alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-10395

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MARIO HERNANDEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

(97-CV-955-R)

(92-CR-381-3-R)

--------------------

September 29, 1999

Before POLITZ, WIENER, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Defendant-Appellant federal prisoner Mario Hernandez was

granted a certificate of appealability (COA) solely with respect to

his claim that the delay in the execution of his sentence violated

his due process rights. Because the challenge to the execution of

Hernandez’s sentence — the delay/due process issue — is not

cognizable in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion and is more properly

considered under 28 U.S.C.§ 2241, a COA is not required. See
2

United States v. Gabor, 905 F.2d 76, 77 (5th Cir. 1990); see also

Ojo v. INS, 106 F.3d 680, 681 (5th Cir. 1997). 

The government’s argument that the issue was not properly

raised in the district court is frivolous. Not only did it not

make that argument in the district court, the government ignored

the magistrate judge’s statement in her report filed May 27, 1997,

that the delay-in-surrendering-for-sentence issue “mandates a

response from the government.” 

On the merits, Hernandez has failed to show that the

government’s delay was “so affirmatively wrong or its inaction so

grossly negligent that it would be unequivocally inconsistent with

‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice’ to require a legal

sentence to be served in the aftermath of such action or inaction.”

Piper v. Estelle, 485 F.2d 245, 246 (5th Cir. 1973); Shields v.

Beto, 370 F.2d 1003, 1006 (5th Cir. 1967). The judgment of the

district court, construed as the denial of a petition under 28

U.S.C. § 2241, is 

AFFIRMED.
## COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH

NO. 02

- 14

- 00319

- CV

BRENDA F. PRICE APPELLANT

V.

MICHAEL D. PRICE APPELLEE

------------
FROM THE 233RD DISTR ICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY TRIAL COURT NO. 233

- 524121

- 12

------------


### MEMORAN DUM OPINION 1 

### AND JUDGMENT

------------ On November 4, 2014, we notified appellant that the trial court clerk

responsible for preparing the record in this appeal informed the court that

payment arrangements had not been made to pay for the clerk’s record as
required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 35.3(a)(2). See Tex. R. App. P.

35.3(a)(2). We stated that we would dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.2 unless appellant, within ten days, made arrangements to pay for the clerk’s

record and provide d thi s court with proof of payment.

Because appellant has not made payment arrangements for the clerk’s

record, it is the opinion of the court that the appeal should be dismissed for want

of prosecution. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P.

37.3(b), 42.3(b).

Appellant shall pay all costs of the appeal, for which let execution issue.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and GARDNER, JJ.

DELIVERED: D ecember 4 , 2014
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**CREATIVE COMPUTER APPLICATIONS, INC.**

 

**Certification pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350,As adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

** **

Inconnection with the filing of the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for theperiod ended February 29, 2004 (the “Report”) by Creative ComputerApplications, Inc. (“Registrant”), each of the undersigned hereby certifiesthat to their knowledge:

 

1.                                       The Reportfully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and

 

2.                                       Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of Registrant as of and forthe periods presented in the Report.

 

 

Date: April 14, 2004

 

 
| /S/ Anahita Villafane                                      |   |
|------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Anahita Villafane, Controller and Chief Accounting Officer |

 

 

A signed original of this written statementrequired by Section 906 has been provided to Creative ComputerApplications, Inc. and will be furnished to the Securities and ExchangeCommission or its staff upon request.

 

----
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Mary Josephine DANIEL, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 03-4875.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted May 7, 2004.

Decided May 24, 2004.

*933Thomas G. Dyer, Dyer Law Offices, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. Thomas E. Johnston, United States Attorney, Zelda E. Wesley, Assistant United States Attorney, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, WILLIAMS, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 86(c).

PER CURIAM:

Mary Josephine Daniel appeals her conviction by a jury of one count of possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000). Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Daniel was indicted after her neighbors and erstwhile friends, Julie Herrick and Michael Richmond, reported her possession of a firearm to authorities, and a firearm was found in her residence during an ensuing search. On appeal, Daniel argues that the district court erred in denying her motions in limine and allowing the evidence of her drug use and the motivations of Herrick and Richmond to be admitted at trial. We review a district court’s determination of the admissibility of evidence for abuse *of*discretion. *See United, States v. Brooks,*111 F.8d 365, 371 (4th Cir.1997). Our review convinces us that the district court properly determined that the evidence in question was relevant. *United States v. Masters,*622 F.2d 83, 86 (4th Cir.1980). Moreover, the district court’s evaluation of the evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 403 was not “an arbitrary or irrational exercise of discretion.” *United States v. Heater,*63 F.3d 311, 321 (4th Cir.1995).

We therefore affirm Daniel’s conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Shelter
Properties V Limited Partnership Third Quarter 10-QSB and is qualified in its
entirety by reference to such 10-QSB filing.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000712753
<NAME> SHELTER PROPERTIES V LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    36,784
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                10,255
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<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 9,206
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,042
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,692
<EPS-BASIC>                                    31.88<F2>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>Registrant has an unclassified balance sheet.
<F2>Multiplier is 1.
</FN>


</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 02-4638

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus SEAN SHAKA MYLES, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District ofMaryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, District Judge. (CR01-35) Submitted: May 15, 2003 Decided: May 20, 2003 Before LUTTIG and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Michael E. Marr, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Thomas M. DiBiagio, United States Attorney, Harvey E. Eisenberg, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Sean Shaka Myles appeals his conviction, entered upon a written plea agreement, of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and fifty grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000). As part of his written plea agreement, Myles expressly waived his right to appeal any sentence falling within the statutory range, except for the right to appeal based on an upward or downward departure from the guideline range established at sentencing. Following an extensive Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing, the district court accepted Myles’ plea, and sentenced him to 262 months’ imprisonment, five years of supervised release, and a $100 special assessment. Myles claims on appeal that the district court erred in not granting him a downward departure from the guideline range. As to this claim, we find that Myles knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal. United States v. Marin , 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 1992). We therefore dismiss Myles’ appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
# C_2009036EN.01000301.xml

| 13.2.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 36/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.2.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 36/3

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.5265 — Ergo International/Bank Austria Creditanstalt Versicherung)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2009/C 36/02)

On 18 September 2008, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in German and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32008M5265. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law (http://eur-lex.europa.eu). |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32008M5265. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law (http://eur-lex.europa.eu).

---
#### In the Matter of Dion Ivey, Respondent, v Thomas A. Coughlin, III, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Correctional Services, et al., Appellants.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Klein, J.), entered May 4, 1984, which, *inter alia,*granted the petitioner’s CPLR article 78 petition to the extent of remanding the matter to respondents for the scheduling of arbitration, unanimously modified, on the law, so as to dismiss the petition as against the respondent-appellant union Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

This article 78 proceeding was commenced by Dion Ivey seeking his reinstatement as a correction officer. Petitioner had been terminated from his employment at the Bedford Hills Correctional Facility for his alleged failure to execute an agreement settling certain disciplinary charges prior to those charges being submitted to arbitration.

The undisputed failure of the Department of Correctional Services to send the settlement papers to the petitioner’s correct address, as well as the rest of the circumstances disclosed on this appeal, fully justifies Special Term’s determination that petitioner’s dismissal for failure to proceed with arbitration was arbitrary and capricious. However, we would dismiss the petition as against the respondent-appellant Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. A voluntary, unincorporated association such as Council 82 is not a body or officer against whom an article 78 proceeding can be maintained. *(Matter of Phalen v Theatrical Protective Union No. 1,*27 AD2d 909, *revd on other grounds*22 NY2d 34, *cert denied*393 US 1000.) Accordingly, Council 82’s cross motion to dismiss the petition should have been granted. Concur — Murphy, P. J., Ross, Lynch, Milonas and Ellerin, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1000
       
<S>                                  <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                        3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                    Dec-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                         Mar-31-1999
<CASH>                                          17,415
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                           1,177
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                15,996
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    139,408
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                           1,755
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                             1,790
<LOANS>                                        290,173
<ALLOWANCE>                                      3,629
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<DEPOSITS>                                     376,579
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</TABLE>
**Exhibit 13.01**

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE U.S. SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

In connection with the Annual Report of Genetic Technologies Limited (the “Company”) on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2012, as filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Dr. Paul Donald Richard MacLeman, Chief Executive Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

 

(i)             the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(ii)          the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/   Paul D.R. MacLeman                                                                    |   |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Name:   Dr. Paul D.R. MacLeman                                                         |   |
|            Chief   Executive Officer |   |
|                                                                                        |   |
|                                                                                        |   |
| October 24,   2012                                                                     |   |

 

----
<PAGE>   1
                                                                 Exhibit 3(i)(a)


                            CERTIFICATE OF CORRECTION
                                     OF THE
                      RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION
                                       OF
                           NEVADA ENERGY COMPANY, INC.


         NEVADA ENERGY COMPANY, INC., a Delaware corporation (the "Company"),
certifies pursuant to Section 103(f) of the General Corporation Law of the State
of Delaware that:

         1. The Company filed on November 27, 1996, a Restated Certificate of
Incorporation of Nevada Energy Company, Inc. (SRV number 960348615) (the
"Restated Certificate").

         2. The Restated Certificate was an inaccurate record of the corporate
action because the amendments purportedly effected by such filing were not
approved by the stockholders of the Company, and therefore, should not have been
filed with the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware. As a result of such
inaccuracy, said Restated Certificate is null and void AB INITIO and shall have
no further force or effect.

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Certificate of
Correction to be executed by its duly authorized officer this 25th day of
November, 1998.

                                       NEVADA ENERGY COMPANY, INC.


                                       By:        /s/ Richard A. Cascarilla
                                            --------------------------------
                                            Richard A. Cascarilla, President
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21
- 7670

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. SAMUEL EUGENE HOLLOMAN , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina , at Greensboro

. William L. Osteen, Jr. , District Judge. ( 1:15

- cr - 00246

- WO

- 1; 1:18

- cv 00390

- WO

- LPA )

Submitted : August 18, 2022 Decided: August 22, 2022

Before WYNN , THACKER , and HEYTENS , Circuit Judge s
.
Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

. Samuel Eugene Holloman, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 21-7670 Doc: 10 Filed: 08/22/2022 Pg: 1 of 22 PER CURIAM: Samuel Eugene Holloman seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on Holloman’s 28 U.S.C. § 225 5 motion . The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certifi cate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)( B ). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a p risoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists c ould find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Buck v. Davis , 137 S. Ct. 759, 773

- 74 (2017). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Gonzalez v. Thaler , 5 65 U.S. 134, 140

- 41 (2012) (citing Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000))

. Limiting our review of the record to the issues raised in Holloman’s informal brief ,

we conclude that Holloman has not made the requisite showing. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b); see also Jackson v. Lightsey , 775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014) ( “ The informal brief is an important document; under Fourth Circuit rules, our review is limited to issues preserved in that brief. ” )

. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dism iss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process. DISMISSED USCA4 Appeal: 21-7670 Doc: 10 Filed: 08/22/2022 Pg: 2 of 2