#### Robert Warren, Plaintiff, v Arena Associates, Inc., Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant. Commack Arena Marketing Inc., Third-Party Defendant-Respondent. (And a Fourth-Party Title.)

— In an action, *inter alia,*to recover damages for personal injuries under Labor Law § 240, the defendant and third-party plaintiff Arena Associates, Inc. (hereinafter Arena) appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme.Court, Suffolk County (Orgera, J.), dated June 15; 1983, as granted those branches of the motion of third-party defendant Commack Arena Marketing, Inc. (hereinafter Commack) which were to dismiss the third-party complaint for failure to state a cause of action and for summary judgment.

Order reversed, insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and those branches of the motion of the third-party defendant which were to dismiss the third-party complaint for failure to state a cause of action and for summary judgment denied.

On January 4, 1979, plaintiff allegedly sustained personal injuries during the course of his employment when he fell from a ladder. The incident took place on property owned by the defendant and third-party plaintiff Arena and leased to plaintiff’s employer, the third-party defendant Commack. Plaintiff commenced an action against Arena to recover damages for negligence, claiming a violation of Labor Law § 240. Arena then brought a third-party action against the lessee Commack alleging, *inter alia,*that plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the primary negligence of Commack and seeking indemnification pursuant to paragraph 12 of the lease (which the parties have characterized as a “hold-harmless” clause), or, in the alternative, contribution.

Commack contended that it had preindemnified Arena by securing a general liability insurance policy in which Arena is one of the named insureds. Special Term agreed and granted *739that branch of Commack’s motion which sought summary judgment dismissing the complaint, stating that Arena was sufficiently protected by the insurance coverage procured by Com-mack and that no questions of fact existed requiring a trial.

At the outset, we note that based upon the record, the $300,000 limit of the insurance coverage procured by Commack is far less than the potential liability of Arena in view of the $2,000,000 ad damnum clause in plaintiff’s underlying complaint. The issue of whether Commack’s contractual obligation to procure insurance coverage should be construed as supplanting rather than supplementing a separate contractual obligation, if any, to hold Arena harmless from liability for any personal injuries not “caused by or * * * due to the negligence of the Landlord”, is a question of “intent as manifested by the language in the contract” *(Mennis v Westchester County Playland Commn.,*87 AD2d 862, 863, *lv dismissed*57 NY2d 772; *Gorham v Arons,*282 App Div 147, *affd*306 NY 782). We find that Commack did not discharge any obligation it might have had under the lease to hold Arena harmless by securing insurance coverage. The lease manifests a clear intent by the parties to have the insurance coverage available as protection for Arena separate from paragraph 12 thereof.

Moreover, several questions of fact, including whether Com-mack furnished proper, equipment to plaintiff, require a trial (CPLR 3212 [b]; *see, Rotuba Extruders v Ceppos,*46 NY2d 223). Gibbons, J. P., Weinstein, Brown and Eiber, JJ., concur.