UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

BILL SNIDER, 

 Petitioner, 

v. CAUSE NO.: 3:16-CV-149-TLS 

SUPERINTENDENT, 

 Respondent. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 This matter is before the Court on Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 60 Motion for Relief from 

Judgment Due to Fraud, Misconduct & Error [ECF No. 29], filed on September 11, 2023. Bill 

Snider, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed the motion pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure Rule 60(a), 60(b)(1), 60(b)(3), and 60(d)(3) asking the Court to set aside the judgment 

entered in this habeas corpus case more than six years ago. Snider was convicted of four counts 

of child molestation and sentenced to sixty years by the St. Joseph Superior Court. Snider v. 

State, 40 N.E.3d 530 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (table). His habeas corpus petition was dismissed 

because his claims were procedurally defaulted. See ECF No. 21. All of Snider’s arguments in 

this motion are based on his assertion that one of his child victims was older than thirteen at the 

time he sexually molested her. 

First, under Rule 60(a) the Court may correct clerical mistakes at any time. “Thus if the 

flaw lies in the translation of the original meaning to the judgment, then Rule 60(a) allows a 

correction; but if the judgment captures the original meaning but is infected by error, then the 

parties must seek another source of authority to correct the mistake.” Shuffle Tech Int’l, LLC v. 

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Wolff Gaming, Inc., 757 F.3d 708, 710 (7th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks, brackets, and citation 

omitted). 

A District Court is not limited under Rule 60(a) to the correction of clerical 

mistakes arising from oversight or omission. Rather, a district court may also 

invoke Rule 60(a) to resolve an ambiguity in its original order to more clearly 

reflect its contemporaneous intent and ensure that the court’s purpose is fully 

implemented. A district court is not permitted, however, to clarify a judgment 

pursuant to Rule 60(a) to reflect a new and subsequent intent because it perceives 

its original judgment to be incorrect. Rather, the interpretation must reflect the 

contemporaneous intent of the district court as evidenced by the record. 

Burton v. Johnson, 975 F.2d 690, 694 (10th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). Here, as Snider’s 

argument makes clear, the age of his child victim was not a clerical mistake made by this Court. 

Nor was it an ambiguity. This Court’s references to the child’s age were accurate references to 

his arguments and the State court record. See ECF No. 21. No relief is possible under Rule 60(a). 

 Second, Rule 60(b)(1) provides that, “the court may relieve a party . . . from a final 

judgment . . . for . . . mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect . . . .” Rule 60(b)(3) 

provides that, “the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment . . . for . . . fraud (whether 

previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party . . 

. .” However, Rule 60(c) requires that both Rule 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(3) motions be filed within 

one year of the entry of the order. Because this motion was not filed until more than six years 

after this case was dismissed, relief cannot be granted under Rule 60(b)(1) or 60(b)(3). Here, 

Snider did not ask to enlarge the one-year deadline, but if he had, the request would have been 

denied because it cannot be extended. See In re Cook Med., 27 F.4th 539, 543 (7th Cir. 2022) 

(explaining that Rule 60(c)’s one-year deadline is not jurisdictional but is a mandatory claimsprocessing rule that must be enforced). 

Also, Snider did not seek relief under Rule 60(b)(6), but it is not applicable either. Rule 

60(b)(6) allows the Court to set aside an order for “any other reason that justifies relief,” but the 

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reason for such relief must be some other reason—different than those outlined in 60(b)(1)–

(5). See id. (citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393 

(1993)). 

Third, Rule 60(d)(3) explains that Rule 60 does not prevent a court from setting aside a 

judgment “for fraud on the court.” The term “fraud on the court” is distinct from the “fraud” 

mentioned in Rule 60(c)(3): 

The term fraud on the court is not defined in Rule 60 or elsewhere in the 

federal rules, and the definition most often offered by the courts (including our 

own)—that it consists of acts that defile the court—though vivid, doesn’t advance 

the ball very far. [The] full definition advances it a little farther: that species of 

fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by 

officers of the court i.e., lawyers so that the judicial machinery can not perform in 

the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases. 

The problem of definition arises from the fact that a motion to set aside a 

judgment on the ground of fraud on the court has no deadline. It must therefore be 

defined narrowly lest it become an open sesame to collateral attacks, unlimited as 

to the time within which they can be made . . .. The question is, how narrowly? To 

answer this question we need to consider what kind of fraud ought to be a ground 

for setting aside a judgment perhaps many years after it was entered. The answer is 

the kind of fraud that ordinarily couldn’t be discovered, despite diligent inquiry, 

within a year, and in some cases within many years—cases in which there are no 

grounds for suspicion and the fraud comes to light serendipitously. 

In re Golf 255, Inc., 652 F.3d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks, brackets, and citations 

omitted). Such is not the case here. 

 Snider has known about his child victim’s age for more than twenty years. He has 

repeatedly challenged whether she was older than thirteen at the time he sexually molested her. 

“In direct appeal, Snider v. State 823 N.E.2d 336 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), Snider contended that: (1) 

there was insufficient evidence to convict him on all charges since the State had failed to present 

evidence that B.A. was under fourteen years of age; and [the court] found that the State had 

established during trial that B.A. was thirteen years old when all the molestations took place.” 

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Snider v. State, 40 N.E.3d 530, *9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (table). Snider argues the prosecutor 

fraudulently misstated the victim’s age, but her age was a fact that could be discovered. It was 

neither a fact Snider had reason to suspect was inaccurate nor one that he recently and 

serendipitously discovered. Her age was an issue during his trial, and he has attempted to relitigate it ever since. The prosecutor’s statement that the child victim was thirteen was not a fraud 

on the court. Rule 60(d)(3) does not provide a basis for reopening this case. 

 For these reasons, the Court hereby DENIES the Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 60 Motion for 

Relief from Judgment Due to Fraud, Misconduct & Error [ECF No. 29]. 

 SO ORDERED on September 15, 2023. 

s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

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