UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

ADONIS ROBINSON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) No. 3:16 CV 166

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION and ORDER

Adonis Robinson, a pro se prisoner, filed an amended habeas corpus petition (DE 

# 3) challenging the prison disciplinary hearing (MCF 15-07-184) where the Disciplinary 

Hearing Officer (“DHO”) found him guilty of Use and/or Possession of [a] Cellular 

Telephone or Other Wireless or Cellular Communications Device in violation of Indiana 

Department of Correction (“IDOC”) policy A-121. As a result, Robinson was sanctioned 

with the loss of 75 days earned credit time and demoted from Credit Class 1 to Credit 

Class 2.

Along with the response to the petition (DE # 6) on September 8, 2016, the 

Respondent filed a motion (DE # 7) requesting to seal documents containing Robinson’s 

phone records. The court ordered Respondent to identify a specific security concern 

posed by disclosure of the records or move to withdraw the motion to seal. (DE # 9.) In 

response, the Respondent filed a motion to withdraw the motion to seal. (DE # 10.) The 

court agrees that unsealing the phone records (DE # 8) will be neither harmful nor 

compromise the security of the facility. 
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Because the unsealed document is not required to resolve any of the three 

grounds raised in the amended habeas corpus petition, it is unnecessary to order rebriefing in this case. Robinson did not file a traverse. The deadline for doing so passed 

long ago. See N.D. Ind. L. Cr. R. 47-2 (“A party who files a petition under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 . . . must file any reply brief within 28 days after the answer brief is served.”). 

Therefore this case is fully briefed. 

In Ground One, Robinson argues that the DHO did not consider his statements 

that the phone belonged to someone else. (DE # 3 at 2.) The Disciplinary Hearing Report

includes Robinson’s statement that he “never used [the] phone.” (DE # 6-5.) This shows 

the DHO heard and considered Robinson’s statements about the phone belonging to 

someone else. However, the DHO chose not to believe Robinson, and it is not for this 

court to reweigh the evidence. McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999).

In Ground Two, Robinson argues there was insufficient evidence to have found 

him guilty. (DE # 3 at 2.)

[T]he findings of a prison disciplinary board [need only] have the support 

of some evidence in the record. This is a lenient standard, requiring no 

more than a modicum of evidence. Even meager proof will suffice, so long 

as the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the 

disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary. Although 

some evidence is not much, it still must point to the accused’s guilt. It is 

not our province to assess the comparative weight of the evidence 

underlying the disciplinary board’s decision. 

Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks, citations, 

parenthesis, and ellipsis omitted). A Conduct Report alone can be sufficient evidence to 

support a finding of guilt. McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786. Such is the case here.
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The Conduct Report (DE # 6-1) states: “On [7/13/15 at 1400], I Sgt. Nice was 

review evidence. The evidence was a blue and black AT&T flip phone. While looking 

through the phone there was a text message as a draft in the outgoing message box. The 

phone number it was addressed supposed to go to was ran in the offender phone 

system. The number was on offenders Robinson, Adonis 191031 active phone list.”

Based on this evidence, it was not arbitrary for the DHO to have concluded that 

Robinson had possession of the phone when the draft text message was written. 

Though it is possible that someone else was trying to send a text message to a person on 

Robinson’s phone list, the Constitution does not require evidence that logically 

precludes any conclusion but the one reached by the disciplinary board.” Superintendent 

v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985).

In Ground Three, Robinson argues that it was a conflict of interest for the 

Screening Officer to have been the same person who wrote the Conduct Report. (DE # 3 

at 2.) Prisoners have a right to a fair and impartial decision-maker. See generally Wolff v. 

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974).

Due process requires disqualification of a decisionmaker who was directly 

or substantially involved in the underlying incident, Gaither v. Anderson, 236 

F.3d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 2000), and we have assumed that a decisionmaker

might likewise be impermissibly biased if his spouse is a crucial witness in 

the proceeding, see Eads v. Hanks, 280 F.3d 728, 729 (7th Cir. 2002). A hearing 

officer is not automatically deemed biased, however, simply because he 

adjudicated or was involved in a previous disciplinary charge against the 

prisoner. See Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666−67; Pannell, 306 F.3d at 502.

Perotti v. Marberry, 355 F. App’x. 39, 43 (7th Cir. 2009). In the case at hand, the Screening 

Officer was not a decision-maker. That is to say, the Screening Officer was not the same 

person as the DHO. The Screening Officer was merely the person who notified 
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Robinson of the charge against him and asked what witnesses and evidence he wanted 

to present. Then Robinson completed and signed the Screening Report. (DE # 6-2.) This 

dual role was not a conflict of interest and it is not a basis for habeas corpus relief. 

Finally, in Grounds One and Two, Robinson mentions that he was not shown the 

cell phone or the text messages. However, “prison disciplinary boards are entitled to 

receive, and act on, information that is withheld from the prisoner and the public . . . .” 

White v. Ind. Parole Bd., 266 F.3d 759, 767 (7th Cir. 2001). 

If Robinson wants to appeal this order, he does not need a certificate of 

appealability because he is challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding. See Evans v. 

Circuit Court, 569 F.3d 665, 666 (7th Cir. 2009). However, he may not proceed in forma 

pauperis on appeal because pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) an appeal in this case 

could not be taken in good faith.

For these reasons, the court:

(1) GRANTS the motion (DE # 10) to withdraw the motion to seal (DE # 7);

(2) DIRECTS the clerk to edit the docket to show the motion to seal (DE # 7) was 

withdrawn and to unseal the sealed document (DE # 8);

(3) DENIES the habeas corpus petition (DE # 3) 

The clerk is DIRECTED to close this case. Petitioner is DENIED leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis on appeal.

SO ORDERED.

Date: May 30, 2017

s/James T. Moody 

JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT