alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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[No. 21724-4-II.

Division Two.

September 12, 1997.]

#### Shanni York, *Respondent,*v. Diane Skogen, et al., *Appellants.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Thurston County, No. 94-2-04210-3, Gary Tabor, J. Pro Tern., entered March 10, 1997. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Armstrong, J., concurred in by Seinfeld and Hunt, JJ.
AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

__________ District of __________ 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Plaintiff(s)

v. Civil Action No.

Defendant(s)

SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION

To: (Defendant’s name and address)

A lawsuit has been filed against you.

Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you

are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney,

whose name and address are:

If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. 

You also must file your answer or motion with the court.

CLERK OF COURT

Date:

Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk

Northern District of Indiana

NIBCO INC.,

an Indiana corporation

LEGEND VALVE & FITTING, INC.,

a Michigan corporation

LEGEND VALVE & FITTING, INC.

300 N. Opdyke Road

Aurburn Hills, Michigan 48326
AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action (Page 2)

Civil Action No.

PROOF OF SERVICE

(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))

This summons for (name of individual and title, if any)

was received by me on (date) .

u I personally served the summons on the individual at (place)

on (date) ; or

u I left the summons at the individual’s residence or usual place of abode with (name)

, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there,

on (date) , and mailed a copy to the individual’s last known address; or

u I served the summons on (name of individual) , who is

 designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization)

on (date) ; or

u I returned the summons unexecuted because ; or

u Other (specify):

.

My fees are $ for travel and $ for services, for a total of $ .

I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.

Date:

Server’s signature

Printed name and title

Server’s address

Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:

0.00
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

EDWARD GAETA, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 

v. 

MERCER BELANGER, P.C., 

 Defendant. 

 

 Case No. 4:16-CV-58 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 Plaintiff Edward Gaeta filed a complaint in state court alleging violations of the federal 

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Defendant Mercer Belanger, P.C. (“Mercer”) removed the 

case. 

 Mercer filed a motion captioned “Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint and for 

Summary Judgment Pursuant to Fed. Civil Rule 12(d).” (DE 11.) In support of this motion, 

Mercer submitted voluminous documents outside the pleadings. The body of the motion (and the 

supporting brief) asked the Court to treat it as a motion for summary judgment. 

 Mr. Gaeta moved to strike the motion on various grounds. Mercer responded (in part) by 

again asking the Court to treat its motion as a motion for summary judgment, and to consider the 

documents beyond the pleadings. (DE 16 at 1; DE 21 at 1.) 

 Pursuant to Rule 12(d), the Court may treat the motion as a motion for summary 

judgment, and not exclude matters beyond the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); Edgenet, Inc. v. 

Home Depot USA, 658 F.3d 662, 664–65 (7th Cir. 2011). The Court accepts Mercer’s request 

that it do that. 
2 

 But Mr. Gaeta must have an opportunity to conduct discovery before responding to a 

motion for summary judgment. Indeed, the motion for summary judgment is premature. The 

Court requires the parties to wait until after discovery closes, and a settlement conference occurs, 

before moving for summary judgment. 

 Accordingly, the Court strikes without prejudice the dispositive motion (DE 11) as 

premature. Mercer may move for summary judgment later. 

 Mercer may answer or otherwise respond to the complaint within 21 days of the entry of 

this order. 

 Magistrate Judge Martin will conduct a Rule 16(a) pretrial conference and issue a Rule 

16(b) scheduling order. Once discovery closes, the Court will hold a scheduling conference, at 

which time it will set the deadline for filing motions for summary judgment. 

SO ORDERED on August 2, 2017. 

 s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

 JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
|   | 1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant. |
|--------|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                            |   |                   |   |
|---------------------------------|--------|------------------------|--------|
| Date:  August 6, 2009 |   | /s/ G. Anthony Busseni |   |
|                            |   | G. Anthony Busseni     |   |
|                            |   | President and CEO      |   |
|                    |   |                                      |   |
|-------------------------|--------|-------------------------------------------|--------|
| Date:  8-7-09 |   | /s/ Doug Carpenter                        |   |
|                    |   | C. Douglas Carpenter                      |   |
|                    |   | Senior Vice President, Secretary, and CFO |   |

----
#### CRANE et al. v. MILLER.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

March 8, 1898.)

1. Appeal—Judgments—Amendments.

On the amendment of a judgment by the trial judge, to conform to the decision made, such judgment will be assumed to have been ¡rendered as so corrected.

2. Same—Several Issues—Partial Recovery—Costs.

Under Code Civ. Proc. § 3234, providing that, if plaintiff recovers on one or more of the issues, where two or more issues of fact are joined, and defendant on the other or others, each party is entitled to costs against the adverse party, defendant was entitled to costs, on recovery of judgment in his favor on several of the causes of action set forth in the complaint.

Appeal from special term, Montgomery county.

Action by T. H. Benton Crane and another, as assignees, against John. C. Miller. From an order of special term, directing the clerk to tax costs to defendant under the provisions of section 3234 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and also amending the judgment as entered so as to make it conform to the proceedings had at the trial, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

Argued before PABICEB, P. J., and LANDON, HEBBICK, PUTNAM, and MEBWIN, JJ.

Nisbet & Hanson, for appellants.

George B. White (H. V. Borst, of counsel), for respondent.

PEE CUBIAM.

The judgment we must assume to be as corrected by the trial judge. He could better determine what took place on the trial than we can upon the conflicting affidavits before us, and he had the right to amend the judgment so that it would conform to the decision that he then made. Assuming it to be as amended, a judgment was recovered by defendant. It is something more than a mere nonsuit. It secures to defendant protection from ever again being prosecuted for the 11 causes of action first set forth in the complaint. The Burns Case, 135 N. Y. 268, 31 N. E. 1080, holds that a nonsuit does not give to defendant such a recovery as entitles him to costs *676under the provisions of section 3234 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It does not decide anything more, and is not applicable to a case like this. The Moosbrugger Case, 7 App. Div. 380, 40 N. Y. Supp. 213, goes to the extent which plaintiff here claims; but it was decided by a divided court, and has been expressly dissented from in Welling v. Manufacturing Co., 15 App. Div. 116, 120, 44 N. Y. Supp., 374. See, also, Browning v. Railroad Co., 64 Hun, 513,19 N. Y. Supp. 453. We are of the opinion that the judgment rendered for defendant entitled him to costs under the section above quoted, and that the order appealed from should be affirmed.

Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements.
Exhibit 15.2





CONSENT










To:           Olympus Pacific Minerals Inc.




And to:   U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission


(the “Securities Regulator”)








Gentlemen:





RE: Technical Reports – Bong Mieu, Phuoc Son and Bau Gold Projects





Reference is made to the technical reports (the “Technical Reports”) entitled “A Technical Review of the Bong Mieu Gold Project in Quang Nam Province, Vietnam” dated August 31, 2007, and “Preliminary Assessment of the Phuoc Son Project in Quang Nam Province, Vietnam’ dated December 2007, and “Technical Report on Feasibility Studies for the Phuoc Son Gold Project in Quang Nam Province, Vietnam” dated March 26, 2008 and “Technical Report on the Bau Project, Bau, Sarawak, East Malaysia” dated August 6, 2010, by Terra Mining Consultants and Stevens & Associates which we prepared for Olympus Pacific Minerals Inc. (the “Company” or “Olympus”).





We hereby consent to the filing of the Technical Reports with the Securities Regulator, and to the written disclosure of the Technical Reports and the inclusion of extracts therefrom or a summary thereof in the annual Form 20-F.  We further agree to being named as an expert in the annual statement (20-F).





Dated this 30th day of April, 2011.




Sincerely,Stevens & Associatesgraphic
  Sincerely,Stevens & Associatesgraphic
#### -PALMA, Appellant, v. UNION FORK & HOE CO., Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

March 28, 1912.)

Action by Michael Palma against the Union Fork & Hoe Company. No opinion. Motion for leave to appeal to Court of Appeals (from 133 N. Y. Supp. 1136) denied, with $10 costs.
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<PERIOD-START>                     AUG-29-1998
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<CASH>                               7,442,596
<SECURITIES>                                 0
<RECEIVABLES>                        5,140,156
<ALLOWANCES>                          (300,752)
<INVENTORY>                          6,760,547
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                    20,277,707
<PP&E>                              12,609,709
<DEPRECIATION>                      (8,194,271)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                      25,866,956
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                4,888,528
<BONDS>                                897,167
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                        0
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<SALES>                             13,492,206
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                    13,492,206
<CGS>                                8,844,260
<TOTAL-COSTS>                       12,545,129
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                      (175,917)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                        50,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                      78,383
<INCOME-PRETAX>                        994,611
<INCOME-TAX>                           368,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                    626,611
<DISCONTINUED>                               0
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<CHANGES>                                    0
<NET-INCOME>                           626,611
<EPS-PRIMARY>                             0.05
<EPS-DILUTED>                             0.05
        

</TABLE>
[No. 21259-5-II.

Division Two.

September 26, 1997.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Joel Waco Manjares, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Clark County, No. 96-1-01033-2, Thomas L. Lodge, J., entered September 23, 1996. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Morgan, J., concurred in by Houghton, C.J., and Bridge-water, J.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Juan Ramos, Appellant.

Mahoney, P. J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Chemung County (Monroe, J.), rendered October 29,1982, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of attempted assault in the second degree.

Defendant was indicted and charged with two counts of second degree assault based on an incident of June 17, 1982 in which, while an inmate at Elmira Correctional Facility, he threw a chair at a correction officer. Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted assault in the second degree in full satisfaction of the indictment and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of IV2 to 3 years, to run consecutive to the sentence he was then serving. Defendant has appealed, claiming that the statute pursuant to which he was sentenced is unconstitutional.

*425Defendant was indicted pursuant to Penal Law § 120.05 (7) which, in effect, raises conduct which would constitute third degree assault to second degree assault where the actor commits the act while imprisoned pursuant to a criminal charge or judgment of conviction. A conviction pursuant to this provision carries a sentence consecutive to the term the defendant was serving unless the trial court provides otherwise in the interest of justice (Penal Law § 70.25 [5]). Defendant contends that these statutory provisions are unconstitutional. Since defendant did not raise this challenge before the trial court, but raises it for the first time on appeal, the issue has been waived *(see, People v Drummond,*40 NY2d 990, 993, *cert denied sub nom. New York v Luis J.,*431 US 908; *People v Balls,*105 AD2d 981).

Judgment affirmed. Mahoney, P. J., Casey, Mikoll, Levine and Harvey, JJ., concur.
#### Patricia A. Lucas, Respondent, v Peter T. Lucas, Appellant.

— In a matrimonial action, in which the plaintiff wife was granted a judgment of divorce on sthe ground of cruel and inhuman treatment upon the default of the defendant husband, he appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (De Luca, J.), dated January 17, 1984, which denied his motion to vacate the judgment of divorce, without a hearing.

Order modified by striking everything following the word “denied” and by substituting therefor the following, “except that the motion is granted to the extent of according defendant a hearing at which he may appear and offer evidence on the limited question of the propriety of the economic provisions of the judgment, i.e., those provisions dealing with maintenance, child support, health and life insurance, title and possession of the marital residence, and equitable distribution of defendant’s pension and/or individual retirement account; in the interim all the provisions of the judgment shall remain in full force and effect unless and until vacated after the hearing and defendant shall forthwith comply with the maintenance, child support and insurance provisions of the judgment. The limited grant of defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment of divorce is conditioned upon payment by defendant of $250 to plaintiff.” As so modified, order affirmed, without costs or disbursements. Defendant’s time to comply with the condition, i.e., the payment of $250, is extended until 20 days after service upon him of a copy of the order to be made hereon, with notice of entry. Upon compliance with the condition, the matter is remitted to Special Term for an immediate hearing and, if necessary, the entry of an appropriate amended judgment. If this condition is not complied with, then order affirmed, with costs.

Under the liberal policy of vacating defaults in matrimonial actions *(Vanderhorst v Vanderhorst,*282 App Div 312; *see also, Harris v Harris,*35 AD2d 894; *Krupinski v Krupinski,*20 AD2d *782719), the circumstances at bar warrant the reopening of the matter to the extent and under the conditions here indicated *(Cocchia v Cocchia,*74 AD2d 592; *Rutledge v Rutledge,*60 AD2d 646; *Rizzo v Rizzo,*50 AD2d 915). While current amendments to the CPLR restored the court’s power to exercise its discretion to excuse the type of default which occurred at bar *(see,*CPLR 2005, 3012 [d], L 1983, ch 318), we do not view those amendments as suggesting that there is no need to comply with the time requirements of the CPLR. Accordingly, we have imposed an appropriate sanction as a condition of the relief accorded to defendant *(Tehan v Tehan,*97 AD2d 840). Finally, we note that the vacatur, if any, of the economic provisions of the judgment would not affect the provisions of the judgment which (1) granted plaintiff a divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment and (2) granted, plaintiff custody of the infant issue of the marriage. Lazer, J. P., Mangano, Bracken and Niehoff, JJ., concur.
Exhibit
32.1





SIGNATURE
EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION CORP.


CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. 1350





The undersigned, Scott Allen, in his
capacities as Chief Executive Officer, President and Secretary, of Signature
Exploration and Production Corp. do each hereby certify that the Form 10-K of
Signature Exploration and Production Corp. for the year ended March 31, 2009
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) and that the information
contained in such Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of Signature Exploration and
Production Corp.





This certification is given by the
undersigned solely for the purpose of 18 U.S.C. 1350 and is subject to the
knowledge standard contained therein.





Executed this 14th day of July,
2009.





/s/
      Scott AllenScott
      AllenChief
      Executive Officer, President and
Director
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

KENNETH WETTERMAN, )

)

Petitioner, )

) 

v. ) CAUSE NO: 3:16-CV-179-TLS

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

The Petitioner, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas corpus petition [ECF No. 1] challenging his

termination from his job assignment with the Prison Enterprises Network (PEN) and his removal

from the United States Department of Labor (“USDOL”) Time Cut Program. 

A prison disciplinary action can only be challenged in a habeas corpus proceeding where it

results in the lengthening of the duration of confinement. Hadley v. Holmes, 341 F.3d 661, 664 (7th

Cir. 2003). The Petitioner argues that because he was expelled from the Time Cut Program, he lost

the opportunity to earn six months credit time that he could have received upon completion of the

program; and thus, the Respondent’s challenged actions lengthened the duration of his confinement.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has determined, however, that collateral consequences—like

being expelled from the USDOL Time Cut Program—cannot be remedied in a habeas corpus

proceeding upon a showing that potential credit time has been lost. See id. (finding that a habeas

corpus petition is an appropriate remedy when “a benefit already conferred has been taken away,”

(i.e., the revocation of good-time credits earned, or the lowering of a previously established

credit-earning classification)); see also Cochran v. Buss, 381 F.3d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding

that the loss of an inmate’s job, housing assignment, reputation, and access to prison programs were

insufficient collateral consequences to permit jurisdiction over a prison disciplinary habeas corpus
petition which did not result in the loss of earned credit time.) As a result, the Petitioner’s claims

should have been raised—if at all—under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226

F.3d 568, 571–72 (7th Cir. 2000) (addressing, under § 1983, a prisoner’s constitutional claim that

his transfer from a prison that had vocational training and substance-abuse programs prevented him

from earning credit time).

Because the Respondent’s challenged actions did not result in the lengthening of the duration

of the Petitioner’s confinement, the Court DENIES the Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition [ECF No.

1] pursuant to SECTION 2254 HABEAS CORPUS RULE 4 and DISMISSES this case. 

SO ORDERED on March 30, 2016.

 s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

2