### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d onBr ie fs January 14, 200 4

DA MIEN LA MA R O WES v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE
Appeal f rom the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 99-C- 1934 Steve D ozier , Judge

No. M2002- 03020-CCA -R3-P C - F iled May 3, 2004

The pe titioner, Damien L amar Owes, w as found guilty by a Davidson C o u n t y jury and stands
c on vic te d o f e sp e c ia lly

a g g ra vate d r ob be ry , a g g ra

vate d b ur g lary , a

nd fi ve cou nts of

e sp e c ia lly ag g ravated kidnapping . He is ser ving a 30-y ear sentenc e. Ag g rieve d by his convictions, the petitioner pursue d a pr o s e action for post-conv i ction relief

predic ated on the a lleg ed inef fec tive assistance of trial and a

ppellate c ounsel. Following the appointment of counse l and a he aring , the petition was denied. The petitioner appe als and urg es that he is entitled to re lief. We disag ree and aff irm the dismissal of the petition.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e ntof t he Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d.

J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J J ., joined.

J ame s P . McNamara , Nashville, Tenne ssee ( on appea l); and Monte D. Watkins, Nashville, Te nn e sse e (o n a

pp e a l) , f or the Ap pe lla

nt, Da mie n L amar O we s. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral & Reporter ; K im R. Helper , Assistant Attorney Gene ral; Victor S. J ohnson, I I I , Dist ri ct At t o rney Gene ral; and D err ick L . Scretc hen, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

The fa cts underly

ing the petitioner’s c onvictions are g leane d fro m t h e cour t’s opinion
on dir e c t a pp e a l.

I n the ea

rly morning hours of Nove mber 1 2 , 1998, four masked men br oke i nto the north Nashville two-be droom home of Be tty J ean Mit ch ell. Ms. Mitchell and her boy friend, Mic hael Pr itc ha rd , w e re a sle e p in on e be dr oo m, and Ms. Mit c he ll’ s tw o s on s, eig hteen- y ear -old Mario Mitchell and thirte en-year -old Geno Smith,-2- wer e asle ep in the sec ond bedroom, whe n men shouting “ Police! Police!” kic ked in the fr ont door of their home on Vanc e Ave nue.
The a rmed, maske d men who ente red the house were not the police. The y

bound Ms. Mitchell, Michael Pritchar d , and Geno S m i t hwi t hd

u ct t ap e, an d

s h o tM ar i o M i t ch el l twi ce i nth e l eg, demandingthat he tell them wher e the money and guns were hidden. Ransackingthe house, the men found and took approximately $800 in cash a nd a nine- mill i m eter

g un belong ing to Ma

rio. When they threatened to kill him if he did n ot tell them where the re st of the money was hidden, Ma

rio lied, telling them that his cousin was staying at Mario’s former residenc e, a house on 12th Avenue, a nd that they would find his money there

. Instead of leaving him behind, the men dra g g ed Mario into the hallway , wher e they shot him aga in in the le g . The y the n carr ie d him out sid e to his sp or t utili ty ve hic le , p ut h im inside, and drove him to his former residenc e.
At the house on 12th Ave nue, the men took Ma rio to the bac k porch a nd order ed him to y ell for his cousin. When t h e man and woman who we re in the a partment c ame out, t h e m en forced e ither
on e or bo th o f t he m ba c k in sid e a t gu

np oint, r ans a c ke d th e a

pa rtme nt, and dema nded money . Be fore takin g fl i gh t, one of the me n shot Mario o n ce m o re, gr azing his che st with a bullet. W hile still in the
emer g ency

room, Mario told police that he had re cog nized three of the men as a cquaintanc es fr om his neighbo r h o o d

. A pproxi mately

one wee k later, he identified [three of t h e assailants, i ncluding the pe tit ion e r] f

ro m a se ri e s o f p ho togra

ph ic lin e up s.
State v. Damian Lamar Owes , No. M2000-00477-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 2-6 (Te nn. Crim. App., Nashville, June 1, 2001) (footnote omitted).

I n connec tion with his pendingbid for post-convic tion r e li e f , th e p e ti ti o n e r

alleg ed that trial and a ppellate c ounsel’s ser

vices wer e constitutionally ineffe ctive. More particula rly , he cla imed that trial counsel failed to pr operly investigate and pr epar e for trial; failed to prope rly

advise a bout the possible punishment, if convicted; failed to proper ly rela y a plea offe r made by

the state; fa iled to i mp e a c hM ar i o M i t c h e l l ; an d f a i l e d t o c a l l Ap r i l F a

u s ta s a w i tn e s s

. H e c l a i m e d

th a ta p p e l la te counsel fa iled to consult with him and failed to proper ly rese arc h and present m eritorious i ssues on appea l. The petitioner a lso claimed e n t i t l em ent t o post-conviction re lief base d on err oneous jury ins tr uc tio ns and

fa ult y ame ndme nt o f t

he ind ic tme nt.

At a he ari ngon his c la ims , the pe tit ion e r te sti fi e d that tria l cou ns e l con su lte d w ithhim on approximately

two occa sions, but they never fully discussed his case . The pe titioner claimed that the da y be fo re tr ia l be g an, c ouns e l di sc us se d a ple a of fe r wi th him

. Ac c or din g to t he pe tit ion e r, his-3-

case was set f

or trial at that tim e wi t h out his knowledg e. Up until the time of trial, the pe titioner thought that c ounsel was “ shooting for ” re lease on probation.

The pe titioner was aske d about the plea offe r, and he related that “the State ha d offe red [hi m] fiftee n y ear s at 100 perc ent.” I n terms of the pe titioner’s rea ction to the offe r, his testimony was disjoint ed; we disc ern that he took the position that he would have acc epted the offe r but that he was unable to do so bec ause his case was a lrea dy set for tria l. “B eca

use I was a lrea dy

set for tria l,” he stated, “A nd, from -- from my -- from my understanding , it is that y ou cannot cop out f or a plea offe r, if y ou alre ady

set for tria l, beca

use the DAwon’t g ive -- the DA won’ t allow it.”

Th e pe tit ion e r f

ur the r t e sti fi e d th a t tr ia l c ouns e l did no t int e rv ie w a ny wi tne sse s o n h is be ha lf and did no t su

bp oe na a ny wi tne ss, a lth ou g h th e pe tit ion e r s a id t hat he ha d p ro vid e d w itn e ss name s to c ouns e l. Mor e ov e r, the pe tit ion e r co mpl a ine d th a t c ouns e l r e fu se d to c ro ss- e xami ne c e rt a in state witnesses. One specific complaint the petitioner made was that counsel failed to “ impeach the perjury of Mar io Mitchell,” ref

err ing ev i d en t l y t o inconsistent statements that Mitchell had made

. The petiti oner said that to his knowledg e trial counsel did not prepa re f or trial. One of the things that the petitioner wanted trial counsel to do was call April Fa ust a s a witness, but counsel did not do so. She had bee n listed as a wi t ness for the state, but the prose cution could not locate he r. The pe titioner believed that his counsel could have located he r. A cc o rdi ng to the petitioner, counse l a lso f

ailed to call Ter esa Cre nshaw a s an alibi witness; the petitioner cla imed that she would have testified that the petitioner w as aslee p at her house all day

on November

12. The pe titioner was aske d about the service s of his a ppellate counsel, and the petitioner te sti fi e d th a t a

pp e llate c ouns e l’ s h e avy

c a se loa d p re ve nte d h im f ro m pr op e rl y pr e pa

ri ng the a pp e a l. The pe titioner met with appellate counsel on one occa sion. The petitioner said that a ppellate c ounsel did no t r a ise a ll o f t

he iss ue s th a t th e pet it io ner wan te d a dd re sse d, but th e pe tit ion e r w a s una ble to
name the omi tte d is su e s.

Tr ia l c o u n s e l t e s ti f

ie d a t t h e p o s t- c o n v ic ti o nh e ar in g , an d h is te s ti mo n y , n ot surpri s in g ly , c o n tr a d ic te d th e p e ti ti o n e r ’ s c la im s

. Co un s e l h a d b e e n a p p o inte d to r e p r e s e n t the petitioner, and a ccor ding to c ounsel’s notes he me t with the peti t i o n er on a pproxi mately

thirteen
occa sions, either in court or wher e the pe titioner was beingheld.
Reg ardingplea of

fer s, counsel testified that the state offe re d fi ftee n y ear s at one hundred pe rce nt. Counsel said that the petitioner “f latly declined t h at o ff

er

. ” The offe r wa s communicated on multiple occ asions; eac h time the petitioner ref used beca use the petitioner did not be li e v e th a t t

h e s ta te ’ s p r im ar

y w it n e s s , M ar io M it c h e ll , c o u ld id e n ti f y h im a s o n e o f th e ma sked
as s ai l an t s

. C o u n s el ad d edt h at M i t ch el l h adb ee nu n ab l e, wh en h e t es t i fi edatth e p re l i m i n ary h ea ri n g, to i de nti fy

the pe tit ion e r. Mit c he ll’ s te sti mony , h ow e ve r, c ha ng e d a t tr ia l.

Counsel affir

med that he rece ived discover y from the state in a timely

fashion and that he supplied the pe titioner with a copy of that discover y . Counsel said that he discussed with the-4-

pe tit ion e r t

he str e ng ths and

we akn ess es of th e state ’s c a se nume ro us tim e s. Re g ard ingde fe ns e witnesses, counse l produce d a letter that the petit ioner had written re questing that counsel subpoena the petitioner’s g irlfriend, L aketa Summers, to be an alibi wit ness. Counsel explained that after he discussed with the petitioner how the g irlfriend c ould be cr o s s -examined about any prior cr iminal
re co rd , t he petitioner de cided that he did not want her to be subpoenae d. Fur thermore , based on
c on su ltatio ns wi th the c o- de fe nd ants and the ir a tto rn e y s, c ou ns e l re late d th a t e ve ryon e a g re e d th a t it
wa s be st no t to c a ll any a lib i wi tne sse s. Couns e l wa s no t fa mil iar wi th a pe rs on named Te re sa Crenshaw

. Couns e l de nie d n ot p ro pe rl y a dv isi ngthe pe tit ion e r a

bo ut t he ple a of fe r. Couns e l sa id that to the best of his rec ollection, the offer was prese nted as an “all-or-nothing packa g e” for all of the def endants, a nd it appear ed to c ounsel that one of the co-de fenda nts w as influencing the petitioner not to acce pt the offe r. I n terms of advising the petitioner about his pote ntial se ntence , if convicte d, counsel identified f

rom his file photocopies of the s tatutory offe nses wit h which the pe titioner was char g ed and note s ref

lectingwhen he cover ed ea ch cha rg e and i t s co rr esponding penalty with the petitioner. Counsel also disputed the petitioner’s c laim t h a t h e d id n o t i mpeac h Mitchell. Counsel maintained he a

nd the other two de fens e at torney s thoroug hly cross-e x amined Mitchell and highlig hted inconsist en ces among the var ious statements and testimony he had g iven. Reg arding April Fa ust, counsel testified that she a nd sever al other w omen we re l i s t ed o n the indictment as witnesses. Counsel was una ble to locate the women, even a fter he reque sted and re ceive d from the state update d addre sses and phone numbers for the women. Counsel said that the petitioner a dvised him that “ the wo rd

on the str e e t” wa s th a t th e wo me n w ou ld n ot a pp e ar a nd te sti fy a g a ins t hi m.
Counsel char acte rized the petitioner’s de cision to g o to trial as “incr edible.” Counsel testified that he “ethica lly thought that [t he petitioner] should take the fiftee n y ea rs at a h u ndred pe rc e nt, and

that w e we re no t g onna

be a ble to c a ll a

ny a lib i w itn e sse s. ” Cou

ns e l sa id t

hat he so advised the pe titioner.

The pe titi o n er ’s ap p o i n t edap p el l at e c o un s el al s o t es t i fi edat th e h ea ri n g. He explained how he pr epar ed the pe titioner’s appe al. He sa id that when he is involved in the a ppeal of a ca se that he did not try , he consults with the client for input and possible issues. Appellate c ounsel’s pra ctice is t o in c lud e any

iss ue s su g g e ste d b y

the c lie nt f

or wh ic h c ouns e l c an f

ind a le g a l ba sis

. Reg ard ing the petitioner’s a ppeal, a ppellate c ounsel rec alled mee ting with the pe titio ner in p e rs on

and havin g te le ph on e dis c us sio ns . Co un se l di d n ot s pe c if ic a lly re c a ll what, i f any , issues that t h e petitioner ma y have r aised with him. Counsel, however , was c erta in if the petitioner had sug g ested a n issue, counsel would have included it in the brief if a leg al basis exist ed to support the issue.

The post-c onviction court took the matter under advisement and later issued a wr itten order denying post-c onviction relief. T he cour t reg arde d the testimony

of trial and a

ppellate c ounsel-5-

as cr edibl e an d fo u nd that the petitioner ha d failed to e stablish both deficient per formanc e and prej u d i ce , wh ich ar e re quired to pre vail on an inef fec tive assistance of counse l claim. The c ourt further found that two o f t h e cl aim s involving the re asonable doubt jury instruction and the
ame ndme nt o f t

he ind ic tme nt h a d b e e n w a ive d f or fa ilure to r a ise the m in

e arl ie r p ro c e e din g s.
On a pp e a l, t he pe titio ner has re str ic te d th e iss ue s to tr ia l c ouns e l’ s e ff e c tiv e ne ss i n terms of investig ating his case pr ior to trial and communicating t h e s t at e’ s plea ba rg ain offe r in a timely fashion.

I n a post-convic tion procee ding, the petitioner bea rs the b u r d e n of provingthe g rounds raised by clea

r and convincingevidenc e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 110(f) (2003). “ Evidence is clear and convinc ing when ther e is no serious or substantial doubt about the cor rec tness of the c onclusions drawn from the e vidence .” Hi c k s v . S tate , 9 83 S.W. 2d 24 0, 24 5 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ). On a pp e a l,
a claim of ineff

ective a ssistance of c ounsel prese nts a mix ed question of law and fa ct subject to de
novo revie w. State v. Burns , 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999). As such, the post-c onviction court’s fi nd ing s o f f

a c t are e nti tle d to a

pr e sumpt ion

of c or re c tne ss u nle ss t he e vid e nc e pr e po nd e ra

te s a g a ins t those finding s. Fi e lds v . S tate , 40 S.W .3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001). The cre dibilit y of the witnesses and the we ight a

nd value to be a ffor ded their te stimony are questions to be res o l v ed b y the post-conviction cour

t and, on appe al, the burde n is on the petitioner to prove that the evidenc e preponde ra t es ag ainst the post-conviction cour t’s finding s. He nle

yv . S tate , 960 S.W .2d 572, 579 (Tenn. 1 9 9 7 ). However, a post-conviction cour

t’s conclusions of law , such as whe ther c ounsel’s p e r f o r m an c e w a s d e f

i c i e n t o r w h e t h e r t h a t d e f

i c i e n c y w a s p r e

j u d i c i a l , ar e s u

b j e c tt o a p ur e l y de novo revie w with no presumption of cor rec tness. Fields , 40 S.W .3d at 458. When a pet i t i o n er seeks post-convic tion relief on the ba sis of ineffe ctive assistanc e of counse l, “the petitioner be ars the bur den of proving both that counsel’s pe rfor mance was de ficient and that the defic iency prejudice d the def ense.” Go ad

v . S tate , 938 S.W .2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) (c i t i n g Strickland v. W

ashington , 4 66 U. S. 6 68 , 6 87 , 1 04 S. Ct . 2 05 2, 20 64 (1 98 4))

. To e sta bli sh defic ient perf

ormanc e, the pe titioner must show that counsel’s perfor mance was below “the ra

ng e of competenc e demande d of attorney s in c riminal case s.” Ba x te r v . R os e , 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 19 75 ). To e sta

bli sh pr e jud ic e , the pe tit ion e r mus t show that “th e re is a re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity that, but for counse l’s unprofe ssional error s, the result of the pr oceed i n g wo u ld have be en diffe rent. A
rea sonable proba

bility is a p robabili ty

sufficie nt to undermine conf idence in the outcome.” Strickland , 4 66 U. S. a t 69 4, 10 4 S. Ct. a t 20 68

. Mo re ov e r, “ a c ourt ne e d n ot a dd re ss t he c omp on e nts in any particula r orde r or even addre ss both if the [petit ioner] makes an insuffic ient showing of one component.” Goad , 9 3 8 S

. W

. 2 d at 3 7 0 (c i t i n g Strickland , 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct . at 2069). The pe titioner first submits t hat trial counse l w as ineffe ctive for not interviewingthe potential alibi witness Tere sa Crensha w. This complaint fa i l s , in the first instance, be cause the petitioner never offere d the t estimony of Ms

. Crenshaw at the post-convic tion hearing

. See B lack v

. Sta te , 794 S.W .2d 752, 757 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (“[W] hen a pe titioner contends that trial c ounsel fa ile d to dis c ov e r, int e rv ie w, or pr e se nt wit ne sse s in su pp or t of his de fe ns e , th e se wi tne sse s sh ou ld-6-

be pr e se nte d b y

the pe tit ion e r a

t th e e vid e nti ary

he ari ng ” ; ot

he rw ise , th e pe tit ion e r is n ot e nti tle d to relief .).

Fur

thermore , in response to que stioning fr om the court, trial c ounsel testified that the petitioner had g iven a state ment to the police cla iming that he ha d been at Crenshaw’ s apar tment on November

12, 1998, from appr ox imately 5:30 p.m. The brea

k-in and robbe ry

occur re d d u ri n g the
e arl y mor nin g ho ur s o f N ov e mbe r 1 2, be tw e e n 2 :00 and 4:0 0 a. m. Th e dif fe ri ngtim e s f

ra me s w ou ld not have supplied the pe titioner with an alibi fo r t h e o ff enses; therefor e, no pre

judice has be en established.

I n his se cond issue, the petitioner insists that trial counsel f ailed to timely

convey the state’s off er to plea d to a fiftee n-y ear sentenc e. The pe titioner acknow ledg es that the post-c onviction
c ourt c re dit e d tri a l c ouns e l’ s te sti mony that he c on ve y e d th e state ’s of fe r t o th e pe tit ion e r o n mu lti ple
oc c a sio ns but th a t th e pe tit ion e r “ fl a tly de c lin e d” the of

fe r. Non e the le ss, the pe tit ion e r a rgue s in
c o n c lu s o r y f a s h io n th a t t h e e v id e n c e p r e p o n d e r a te s a g a in s t t h e c o urt’ s c r e d ib il it

y d e te r mi n a ti o n

. We disag ree . Credibility

issu es fa l l wi thin the sound discretion of the lowe r cour t, and we disc ern no r e a s o n to d is tu

r b th a t d e te r

mi n a ti o n in this case. See H enley , 960 S.W .2d at 579 (c redibility of witnesses and w eig ht and value to be aff orded the ir testimony ar e questions t o be re solved by the post-conviction cour

t).

Ba sed upon the for eg oing, the judgme nt of the post-convic tion court is affir med.

__________________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE