UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

VINCENT PRICE and DENISE PRICE, )

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 2:15-CV-331-PRC

)

JOSEPH KRAUS, individually and in his )

official capacity as Deputy Sheriff; )

CHRISTOPHER KOSTOFF, )

individually and in his official capacity as )

Deputy Sheriff; LAKE COUNTY )

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; and LAKE )

COUNTY, INDIANA, )

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Lake County Sheriff’s Department Motion [sic]

to Bifurcate § 1983 Monell Claims and Stay Discovery and Trial on Those Claims [DE 23], filed

by Defendant Lake County Sheriff’s Department (“Sheriff’s Department”) on December 30, 2015. 

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs filed their response late. Northern District of Indiana Local

Rule 7-1(d)(2)(A) provides that a party must file a response brief within fourteen days, which was

January 13, 2016, in this case. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(d) allows an additional three days

following electronic service, which made the deadline January 16, 2016, a Saturday. Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 6(a)(1) provides that weekends and federal holidays are excluded from the

calculation of the last day of a time period. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a)(6), the day

observing Martin Luther King, Jr.’s birthday is a federal holiday, and Monday, January 18, 2016,

was the observation of his birthday. Therefore, the response brief was due the following day,

January 19, 2016. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs did not file their response brief until January 22, 2016.

Plaintiffs did not file a motion for an extension of time with a showing of good cause before the
deadline expired, nor did Plaintiffs file a motion after the deadline expired showing good cause and

excusable neglect. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). However, because the Court prefers to rule on the merits

and because this is a first offense in this case, the Court will not strike the response brief.

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs are advised that any future failure to comply with the filing deadline

requirements may result in the Court striking the filing.

In their Complaint, Plaintiffs seek to hold the individual officer Defendants liable for

excessive force, denial of medical care, and deprivation of speech and expression in violation of the

First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 as well as state law tort claims of battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress,

negligence, and false imprisonment/false arrest in relation to Plaintiffs’ arrest on July 3, 2014.

Plaintiffs also seek to hold the Sheriff’s Department liable under § 1983 pursuant to Monell v. New

York Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), alleging that customs, policies, and

practices of the Sheriff’s Department caused Plaintiffs’ alleged constitutional violations. In the

Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the Sheriff’s Department had a policy, practice, or custom of

directly encouraging the alleged constitutional violations by consciously disregarding the illegality

and unconstitutionality of illegal detentions and arrests, use of force, and retaliation in order to

punish peaceful expression of speech; a policy and/or custom of inadequately and improperly

investigating citizen complaints of police misconduct; and a policy and/or custom of inadequately

training, supervising, and disciplining its police officers.

In the instant motion, the Sheriff’s Department seeks to bifurcate Plaintiffs’ Monell claims

against it and to stay discovery and trial on the Monell claims pending resolution of Plaintiffs’

federal § 1983 claims and state law claims against the individual officer Defendants. Rule 42(b)

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provides: “For convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order

a separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party

claims. When ordering a separate trial, the court must preserve any federal right to a jury trial.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 42(b). Bifurcation of claims may be appropriate if “the separation would prevent prejudice

to a party or promote judicial economy.” Chlopek v. Fed. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 692, 700 (7th Cir. 2007)

(citation omitted). “If one of these criteria is met, the district court may order bifurcation as long as

doing so will not prejudice the non-moving party or violate the Seventh Amendment.” Id.

Defendants argue that bifurcation will convenience all the parties, avoid prejudice, expedite the

matter, and economize resources for the Court and parties during the discovery process and trial. 

First, the Monell claims brought by Plaintiffs against the Sheriff’s Department are based on

allegations of false arrest, excessive force, and denial of medical care. These claims are well suited

for bifurcation because, unless one of the Plaintiffs proves that an officer violated his or her

constitutional rights, the Monell claims against the municipality will fail as a matter of law and the

litigation will be over without the need for discovery or trial on the Monell claims. See City of Los

Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986); see also Swanigan v. City of Chicago, 775 F.3d 953,

962 (7th Cir. 2015). Additionally, there can be no liability under Monell for failure to train when

there has been no violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Jenkins v. Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482,

492 (7th Cir. 2007).1

 Thus, it is more efficient and convenient to first determine whether the

1

 Although there can be no Monell liability without proof of a violation of constitutional rights, the Seventh

Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that it is possible that “‘a municipality can be held liable under Monell, even when

its officers are not, unless such a finding would create an inconsistent verdict.’” Saunders v. City of Chicago, No. 12-CV9158, 2015 WL 7251938, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2015) (quoting Thomas v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293,

305 (7th Cir. 2010)). In Saunders, the court noted that, “[p]resumably such a situation could arise . . . should Plaintiffs

be unable to recover from the Defendant Officers because of their qualified immunity, but Plaintiffs could still recover

from the municipality, which lacks such a protection.” 2015 WL 7251938, at *9. Like the court in Saunders, the Court

finds that any such concern is premature and can be addressed at the close of the trial on the individual claims, if

necessary.

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individual officer Defendants violated a Plaintiff’s constitutional rights before requiring the Court

(and the parties) to expend resources litigating the Monell claims against the Sheriff’s Department

that may never be reached or otherwise adjudicated. Bifurcating the Monell claims against the

Sheriff’s Department will avoid prejudice to the Sheriff’s Department and avoid spending taxpayer

money to unnecessarily defend against the Monell claims if Plaintiffs are unable to prove that an

underlying constitutional violation occurred.

In addition, the discovery of Monell claims “can add significant time, effort, and

complications to the discovery process.” Medina v. City of Chicago, 100 F. Supp. 2d 893, 895 (N.D.

Ill. 2000); see also Readus v. Dercola, 09 C 4063, 2012 WL 1533167, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2012)

(quoting Moore v. City of Chicago, No. 02 C 5130, 2007 WL 3037121, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Oct.15,

2007)). Defendants argue that litigating Plaintiffs’ Monell claims will be burdensome and time

consuming, involving a significant amount of money that would include locating, compiling, and

producing documents, the time required for several depositions in addition to a Rule 30(b)(6)

witness deposition, other written discovery, and potential expert witnesses. In their response brief,

contesting the burden of Monell discovery, Plaintiffs acknowledge only the possibility of document

production and do not factor in the numerous other forms of discovery that would likely be involved

with their Monell claim. 

Significantly, in this case, the allegations of the Complaint supporting Plaintiffs’ Monell

claims are general in nature and do not allege any specific facts as to the nature of the policy,

procedure, or custom that lead to the alleged constitutional violations. The relevant paragraphs

allege that the Sheriff’s Department has:

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41. . . . policies, practices, and customs that condoned and fostered the

unconstitutional conduct of DEPUTY KRAUS and DEPUTY KOSTOFF . . . .

42. . . . policies, practices, customs, and usages of encouraging and/or tacitly

sanctioning the violation and/or retaliation of individuals’ constitutional rights. [The

Sheriff’s Department] consciously disregarded the illegality and unconstitutionality

of illegal detentions and arrests, use of force, and retaliation in order to punish and

suppress peaceful expression and speech. 

. . . 

44. . . . a policy and/or custom of . . . inadequately and improperly investigat[ing]

citizen complaints of police misconduct, and acts of misconduct were instead

tolerated.

45. . . . a policy and/or custom of . . . inadequately train[ing], supervis[ing], and

disciplin[ing] its police officers, including Defendants DEPUTY KRAUS and

DEPUTY KOSTOFF, thereby failing to adequately discourage further constitutional

violations on the part of its police officers. [The Sheriff’s Department] did not

require appropriate in-service or re-training of officers who were engaged in police

misconduct.

(Compl.).

In contrast, in the case cited by Plaintiffs, Miller v. City of Plymouth, No. 2:09-CV-2050,

2010 WL 1754028 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 29, 2010), in which this Court denied a motion to bifurcate, the

plaintiffs brought specific failure to train allegations, namely “prohibitive use of setting up

drug-interdiction checkpoints, use of canines and conducting canine sniffs, motor vehicle searches,

physical search of persons, conducting traffic stops, detention of motorists, use or display of force,

and duty of law enforcement officers to intervene to prevent violations of individuals’ constitutional

rights, as well as Defendant’s failure to require law enforcement officers to generate reports detailing

incidents of canine sniffs or deployments, vehicle searches, personal searches, or handcuffed

detention of motorists.” Id. at *3. In addition, unlike the Sheriff’s Department in this case, the

defendant police department in Miller did not specifically articulate how it would incur significant

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costs in responding to Monell discovery requests.

Plaintiffs’ federal right to a jury trial on the Monell claims is unaffected by bifurcation and

will be preserved, and there is no identified prejudice to Plaintiffs. Rather, Plaintiffs will be able to

pursue more efficiently and conveniently the relevant discovery pertaining to the objective

reasonableness standard governing the alleged excessive force claims against the individual officer

Defendants. In fact, Plaintiffs do not argue that they will be prejudiced by the requested bifurcation. 

In contrast, Defendants argue, and Plaintiffs do not respond, that presenting evidence to the

jury regarding a countywide policy, practice, or custom involving multiple improper police actions

poses a danger of undue prejudice to the individual officer Defendants by creating the perception

that the police department routinely acts improperly, even if the officers in fact acted properly in this

case. See Readus, 2012 WL 1533167, at *4 (citing Lopez v. City of Chicago, No. 01 C 1823, 2002

WL 335346, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2002) (“Without bifurcation, the jury would likely hear

evidence against the City of various acts of alleged police misconduct committed by numerous nonparty officers to establish a policy or practice. Such evidence can be prejudicial to the individual

defendants.”)).

Finally, Defendants argue, also without response from Plaintiffs, that, even if the Monell

claims survive summary judgment and are proven at a trial, Plaintiffs may not recover duplicate

compensatory damages on the Monell claims and the non-Monell claims. See Cadiz v. Kruger, No.

06 C 5463, 2007 WL 4293976, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2007); Elrod v. City of Chicago, Nos. 06

C 2505, 07 C 203, 2007 WL 3241352, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2007). Moreover, the Sheriff’s

Department is not required to pay punitive damages under any circumstances; therefore, bifurcation

would not prejudice Plaintiff’s ability to recover punitive damages. See City of Newport v. Fact

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Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).

In their belated reply brief, Plaintiffs argue, without citation to law, that Defendant’s motion

is premature at this early stage of the litigation and at the same time that Defendant has waived the

right to seek bifurcation by having participated in the Rule 16(b) discovery conference. Neither

argument is persuasive. This Court has previously found that participation in discovery does not

waive a party’s right to seek bifurcation. Miller, 2010 WL 1754028, at *2. Nor is the motion

premature; the discovery process has only just begun, and the benefit of avoiding the costs of Monell

discovery can only be realized by avoiding the discovery itself. Finally, Plaintiffs argue, again

without citation to law, that “Defendant has failed to provide any specific reasons supporting the

claim that Plaintiffs’ underlying constitutional claims would fail.” (Pl. Resp. 3). No standard requires

a defendant to disprove a plaintiff’s constitutional claim in requesting bifurcation under Rule 42(b).

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the interests of justice, convenience, economy,

expedience, and the avoidance of prejudice support bifurcation and hereby GRANTS Defendant

Lake County Sheriff’s Department [sic] Motion to Bifurcate § 1983 Monell Claims and Stay

Discovery and Trial on Those Claims [DE 23]. The Court ORDERS, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

42(b), that the Monell claims against the Sheriff’s Department are bifurcated from the § 1983 claims

and from the state law claims against the individual officer Defendants for both discovery and trial.

The Court ORDERS that all discovery on the Monell claims against the Sheriff’s

Department is stayed until resolution of the claims against the individual officer Defendants.

The Court ORDERS that there be separate trials, with the § 1983 claims and the state law

claims against the individual officer Defendants taking place first. The trial on the Monell claims

against the Sheriff’s Department is stayed until resolution of the claims against the individual officer

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Defendants. The Court ORDERS that Plaintiff’s right to a jury trial on the Monell claims is

preserved.

SO ORDERED this 1st day of February, 2016.

s/ Paul R. Cherry 

MAGISTRATE PAUL R. CHERRY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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