MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 2023	ME 41 Docket: Cum

- 22

- 36 Argued : December	6,	2022 Decided: July	27,	2023 Panel: STANFILL ,	C.J.,	and MEAD, JABAR , HORTON , CONNORS ,	and	LAWRENCE , JJ.

STATE	OF MAINE

v. ABDIRAHMON	A.	ABDULLAHI	a.k.a.	ABDIRAHMON	A.	ADBULLAHI

HORTON ,	J. [¶1] Abdirahmon	A.	Abdullahi 1 appeals	from	a	judgment	of	conviction	of unlawful	trafficking	in	scheduled	drugs	(Class	B), 17

- A M.R.S. § 1103(1

- A)(A) (202 3 ) ,	 and	 falsifying	 physical	 evidence	 (Class	 D), 17

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 455(1)(A) (202 3 ) ,	entered	by	the	trial	court	(Cumberland	County, Warre n,	J. )	after	a	jury trial. 2 Abdullahi	 argues	 that	 the	 court	 erred	 in	 (1) denying	 his	 motion	 to suppress	 evidence	 seized as the	 result	 of what	 Abdullahi	 contends	 was an

1 A bd ullahi’s sur name was spelled	“Adbullahi”	on	his	driver’s	license , and	the mis spelling caused confusion	 during the	 trial	 court proceedings

. “Adbullahi”	 appears	in	 our	 caption	 as	 an	 alternate spelling	because	it is how	Abdullahi’s sur name	appe ar s in	 the	 trial court’s docket	record. At	oral argument,	it	was	confirmed	that “Abdullahi” is	the	correct	s pelling.

2 The parties	agreed	that a forfeiture	count	would	be	tried	to	the	court. After	a	hearing,	the court entered	 a	 forfeiture	 order regarding	 cash	 found	 in	 Abdullahi’s	 possession after	 his	 arrest

. See 15 M.R.S.	§	5826	(202 3 )

. Abdullahi’s	appeal focuses	on	the	trafficking	conviction	and does	not separately contest	either	 the	 falsification	 conviction	 or the	 forfeiture	 order,	 although both	would likely	have	to	be	set	aside	if	we	were	to	agree	that	his	motion	to	suppress	should	have	been	granted.2 unlawful	 arrest , (2)	 allowing	 law	 enforcement	 officers	 to	 testify as	 lay witnesses	at	trial on	matters that	required expert	testimony , (3)	including	in	its jury	 instructions	 an	 instruction	 on	 a	 permissible	 inference	 contained	 in	 the applicable drug	trafficking	statute , an d	(4)	denying	his	motions	for	a	judgment of	acquittal	and	a	new	trial. We	affirm	the	judgment.
I. BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ] “ Viewing	the	evidence	admitted	at	trial	in	the	light	most	favorable to	the	State,	the	jury	could	rationally	have	found	the	following	facts	beyond	a reasonable	 doubt.” State	 v.	 Athayde ,	 2022	 ME	 41,	 ¶	 2,	 277	 A.3d	 387 .	 	 On June 24, 2019, a Maine	 State Police corporal stopped	 a	 vehicle	 operated	 by Abdullahi for speeding	on	the	Maine Turnpike

. As	detailed	below,	i n	the	course of	 the	 traffic	 stop ,	 the corporal discovered	 that	 Abdullahi had	 been	 in
possess ion	 of a	 bag containing individual	 packages	 of what	 appeared	 to	 be cocaine	base. After	his	arrest,	Abdullahi	was	found	to	be	in	possession	of	$1,091
in	cash. [¶ 3 ] On	June	26,	2019,	the	State	charged	A bd ullahi	by	criminal	complaint with	 unlawful	 trafficking	 in	 scheduled drugs	 (Class	 B),	 17

- A	 M.R.S. § 1103(1

- A)(A),	falsifying	physical	evidence	(Class	D),	17

- A	M.R.S.	§ 455(1)(A), and	criminal	 forfeiture,	15	M.R.S.	§	5826	(202 3 ). The since

- amended statute3 under	which	Abdullahi	was	charged	with	trafficking provide d that	proo f	that	a person	 intentionally	 or	 knowingly	 possessed	 at	 least	 four	 grams	 of	 cocaine base,	a	Schedule	W	drug,	“gives	rise	to	a	permissible	inference”	that	the	person was	trafficking	in	cocaine	base.		17

- A	M.R.S.	§ 1103 (1

- A) (A),	(3)(B)	(2018). 3 On October	11,	2019,	a	grand	jury	indicted	A bd ullahi for	the	same two offenses	and the forfeiture charged	in	the	complaint

. The	record	does	not	indicate	that	an arraignment	was	held	on	the	indictment

. 4
A. Motion	to	Suppress [¶ 4 ] Abdullahi filed	a	motion	 to	suppress the evidence	 that	he	was	in possession	 of	 cocaine	 base	at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 traffic	 stop ,	and	 the	 trial	 court ( French,	J. )	held	an	evidentiary	hearing	on	 the	motion. Only the Maine	State Police corporal testified	at	the	suppressi on	hearing. The	court	entered	an	order in	which	it	found	the	following	facts, all	of which	are	supported	by	competent

3 Title	 17

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 1103	 has	 since	 been	 amended. See P.L.	 2021,	 ch.	 396,	 § 3	 (effective Oct. 18, 2021) (codified	at	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1103(3)(B)	(202 3 )).

4 Abdullahi	has	not	raised	the	lack	of	arraignment	as	an	issue	either	in	the	trial	court	or	on	appeal, nor,	on	this	record,	would	it	have	availed	him	to	do	so.		As	long	as	an	accused	has	notice	of	the	charge s and	an	opportunity	to	prepare	a	defense,	a	conviction	need	not	be	reversed	for	lack	of	arraignment. See Garland	 v.	 Washington ,	 232	 U.S.	 642,	 646

- 47	 (1914) (overruling	 a	 requirement	 of	 technical enforcement	 of	 formal	 rights	 in	 criminal	 procedure); State v.	 Kovtuschenko ,	 576	 A.2d	 206,	 207 (Me. 1990) (“Any	failure	to	comply	with	the	arraignment	procedure	.	.	.	is	not	jurisdictional	unless the	defendant	has	been	prejudiced,	and	will	not	result	in	reversal	if	the	issue	is	not	raised	prior	to trial.”	(citation and	quotation	marks	omitted)).4 evidence	in	the	record. See Athayde ,	2022	ME	41,	¶	7,	277	A.3d	387; State	v.
Rosario ,	2022	ME	46,	¶	8,	280	A.3d	199

. [¶ 5 ] On June	24,	2019, the corporal stopped	a	vehicle	being	operated	by Abdullahi	for	traveling	on	the	Turnpike	at eighty

- five miles	per	hour

— a rate	of speed	in	excess	of	the	posted	speed	limit

. Because A bd ullahi could not pro duce a	driver’s	license, a	vehicle	registration , or proof	of	insurance (although he	later showed the corporal a	 p hoto of	 his	 license	 on	 his	 cell	 phone) ,	 t he corporal suspected	that	the vehicle m ight not	belong	to	A bdu llahi. After	obtaining	the vehicle registration information through a	 dispatcher , the corporal spoke	 by telephone	with the	owner	of	the vehicle ,	who	told	him	that	she	did	not	know who	A bd ullahi	was and had	not	given	him	permission	to	use	the vehicle

. The corporal testified	that	he decided to	call	a	tow	truck	to	take	the	car.		He placed Abdullahi	in	handcuffs for	safety	reasons because	Abdullahi	was	acting	nervous and	fidgety	and because the	corporal also needed	to pay	attention	to cleaning out	his	cruiser	so	he	could	give	Abdullahi	a ride	off	the	Turnpike

. Toward	the end	of	the	stop,	the	corporal	determined	that	Abdullahi	had	been	in	possession of	what	appeared	to	be	an	illegal	drug	and	placed	him	under	arrest. [¶ 6 ] The	 court	 denied	 A bd ullahi’s	 motion	 to	 suppress.	 	 The	 court determin ed	 that Abdullahi’s detention during	 the	 traffic	 stop was	 lawful5 because ,	 based	 on	 the	 information the corporal obtained from	 the	 vehicle

owner ,	he	had probable	cause	to	arrest	A bd ullahi	when	he	placed	A bd ullahi	in handcuffs.		The	court	also	determined	that	the drug	evidence would	not	have been	subject	to	suppression	even	if	the	arrest	was	unlawful	because	A bd ullahi had	not	demonstrated	a	“nexus	between	the	improper	police	conduct	and	the evidence	seized.”
B. Trial	and	Motion s for	Judgment	of	Acquittal	and	New	Trial [¶ 7 ] The	court	( Warren,	J. )	held	a	three

- day	jury	trial	on	the charges	of drug	trafficking	and	falsifying	evidence	on	July	22,	23,	and	26,	2021. [¶ 8 ] The e vidence that	 was admitted	 included a	 police	 cruiser	 video recording	of the traffic	stop. The	video	showed that,	as Abdullahi was	exiting the	 vehicle	 he	 had	 been	 driving	 and	 before	 he	was	 handcuffed,	 he	 threw an object	under the vehicle .		The	same	video later showed	 that Abdullahi began sliding	toward	the	object	after	he was handcuffed	and seated	on	the	shoulder of	the	roa d .		However,	the video	showed	the tow	truck	driver , who	had	been called	 to	 the	 scene , notic ing the	 object and pick ing it	 up before	 Abdullahi reached it

. [¶ 9 ] The	 court	 heard	 testimony	 from	 three	 law	 enforcement	 officers , including	the corporal , and	a	chemist at	the Maine	Health	and	Environmental6 Testing L aboratory

. T he	 corporal	 testified	 that	 the	 tow	 truck	 driver	 handed him	 the	 object that Abdullahi	 had	 thrown	 under	 the	 car,	 that	 he	 seized	 it because	it	appeared	to be	a	plastic	bag contain ing illegal	drugs,	and	that	he	then placed	Abdullahi	under	arrest. At	the	State Police	barracks , where the corporal transported	 Abdullahi, the corporal requested	 assistance	 in	 identifying and handling the	contents	of	the	bag from two State	Police sergeants who	had	more experience	than the corporal in	drug	investigations

. The three	officers	testified at	trial	regarding	the	appearance	and	weight	of	the	drugs	and	their	experience in	handling	drug	trafficking	investigations. 5 The	three	officers	determined	that the	object	the	corporal	had	seized	was	a	plastic	bag	weighing	twenty

- six	grams and containing	 forty

- five	smaller	baggies,	each	of	which	contained	what	they testified	appeared	to	be	cocaine	base. [¶1 0 ] On	the	second	day	of	trial,	the	State	sought	to	present the chemist to	testify	as	an	expert	witness on	drug	testing, to	support	its	contention	that the forty

- five baggies contained	cocaine base in	an	amount	sufficient	to	generate	a permissible	 inference that	 Abdullahi	 was trafficking in	 cocaine base

. 17

- A M.R.S.	§	1103(3 ). Abdullahi	objected	to	the	chemist’s	testimony,	arguing

5 Abdullahi	made	a	blanket	objection	to	the	testimony	of	one	of	the	sergeants	on	the	ground	that the	State	had	not	designated	the	witness	as	an	expert.		The	court	overruled	the	objection,	noting	that the	sergeant	could	stil l	testify	as	a	lay	witness	based	on	his	experience. See	infra n.1 1 .		Abdullahi	did not	raise	a	similar	objection	to	the	testimony	of	the	other	officers.7 that,	because	the	chemist	had	tested	and	weighed fewer than	four	grams	of	the substance	 contained	 in	 the	 baggies,	 his	 testimony	 could	 not	 be	 admitted	 to support	a	 permissible	inference	 of	 trafficking. See 17

- A	M.R.S.	 §	 1103(3) (B) (2018).	 	 After the	 parties	 conducted a voir	 dire examination of	 the	 chemist

outs ide	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 jury , the	 court	 ruled	 that	 the	 chemist	 would	 be permitted	to	testify about	the	tests	he	performed but	would	not	be	permitted to	testify	that	the forty

- five baggies	contained	a	total	of	four	or	more	grams	of cocaine	base. T he	chemis t	testified before	the	jury that ,	pursuant	to	what	he said	 was	 an	 accepted	 testing	 protocol, he randomly selected	 five	 of the forty

- five baggies	 for	 testing	 and measurement	 and concluded	 that	 all	 five contained	cocaine	base having	a total	weight	of 1.89	grams. [¶1 1 ] After	 the	 State	 and	 defense had rested,	 A bd ullahi	 moved	 for	 a judgment	of	acquittal,	and	the	court	denied	the	motion. See M.R.U.	Crim.	P.	29. The	 court	 provided	 proposed	 jury	 instructions	 to	 the	 State	 and	 Abdullahi, including the	 permi ssible

- inference	 instruction contained	 in	 17

- A	 M.R.S. § 1103(3) .	 	 Abdullahi	 objected	 on	 the	 ground that	 the	 State’s	 evidence	 was insufficient	 to	permit	a	 finding	beyond a	reasonable	doubt that the forty

- five baggies contained at	 least	 four	 grams	 of cocaine	 base ,	 and	 therefore	 the permissible	inference	had	not	been	generated	 for	purposes	of including	it	in8 j ury	 instructions

. The	 court	 overruled	 the	 objection. After	 the	 State	 and Abdullahi	presented	closing	arguments,	the	court	provided	instructions to	the jury,	including	an	instruction	concerning the	permissible	inference. The	jury found	A bd ullahi	guilty	of	both the	trafficking count and the falsifying	evidence

count. [¶1 2 ] After	the	verdict,	A bd ullahi	filed	a	renewed	motion	for	a	judgment of acquittal	 and	 a	 motion	 for	 a	 new	 trial.	 	 The	 court	 held	 a	 hearing	 on	 the
motions.	 	 A bd ullahi	 argued	 that	 the	 court	 erred	 when	 it	 provided	 the permissible

- inference	instruction	to	the	jury	because	the	chemist ’s	testimony was	insufficient	to	generate	the	inf erence .		He	also	argued	that	the	court	erred by	permitting	the	law	enforcement	officers	to	testify as	lay	witnesses about the contents	of the baggies .		The	court	denied	A bd ullahi’s	motions.		The	court	then entered	 a	 judgment	 on	 the	 verdict	 and	 sentenced	 A b d ullahi	 to	 two	 years in prison ,	with	all	but	six	months	suspended,	and	two	years	of	probation. [¶1 3 ] A bd ullahi	 timely	 appeal ed	 from	 the	 judgment	 of	 conviction.
See 15 M.R.S.	§	2115	(202 3 ) ;	M.R.	App.	P.	2B(b)(1).9 II. DISCUSSION
A. The Denial o f Abdullahi’s Motion t o	Suppress [¶1 4 ] Relying mainly on	 the	 Fourth	 Amendment	 to	 the	 United	 States
Constitution , 6 Abdullahi	contends that his	motion	to	suppress	should	have	been granted	because the	bag that	he	threw	under	the	vehicle	he had	been driving would	not	have	been	discovered but	for	what	he	asserts	was	an	illegal de	facto

arrest .		We	review	the	motion	court’s	factual	findings	for	clear	error	and	its	legal conclusions	de	novo. State	v.	Fleming ,	2020	ME	120,	¶	25,	239	A.3d	648 .		We conclu de	that	the	court	did	not	err	by	denying	the	motion	to	suppress. 7 [¶1 5 ] We	have	explained	that	the	police	need	not	have	probable	cause	to detain	a	suspect	while	investigating	a	suspected	violation	of	law. See State	v. Langlois ,	 2005	 ME	 3, ¶ ¶ 6

- 11, 863	 A.2d	 913 (determining that	 an	 officer’s

6 Abdullahi’s	 brief	 also	 alludes	 to	 “section	 5”	 of	 the	 Maine	 Constitution	 in	 support	 of	 his suppressi on	argument,	but it does	not	develop	any	argument	for	construing	the	Maine	Constitution’s protection	against	unreasonable	search	and	seizure	more	broadly	than	the	protection	embodied	in the	Fourth	Amendment	to	the	United	States	Constitution. Accordingly, we	limit	our	analysis	to	the latter. See State v.	Hemminger ,	2022	ME	3 2 ,	¶	8	n.4,	276	A.3d	33

.

7 The	 State has	 not challenge d Abdullahi ’s	 standing to seek suppress ion of	 the bag .	 	 To	 have standing	to	challenge	the	legality	of	a	search	or	arrest,	the	defendant’s own Fourth	Amendment	rights must	have	been	violated. Rakas	v.	Illinois ,	439	U.S.	128,	130

- 31 ,	134	(1978)

. “ [ A ] n	illegal	search	only violates	 the	 rights	 of	 those	 who	 have ‘a	 legitimate	 expectation	 of	 privacy	 in	 the	 invaded	 place.’” United States	 v.	 Salvucci ,	 448	 U.S.	 83, 91

- 92	 (1980) (quoting Rakas ,	 439	 U.S.	 at	 14 3 ).	 	 To make	 a showing	of	a legitimate	expectation	of	privacy,	a	defendant	“must	show	that	he	had	both	a	subjective expectation	 of	 privacy	 and	 that	 society	 accepts	 that	 expectation	 as	 objectively	 reasonable.” United States	v.	Vilches

- Navarrete ,	523	F.3d	1,	13	(1st	Cir.	2008)

. Here , the	bag	was	discovered	on	the pavement	where	it	landed after Abdullahi	threw	it	under	a	vehicle	he	did	not	own

. However,	because there	was	no contention	or finding that	Abdullahi	had	abandoned	the	bag ,	we	do	not	address	whether Abdullahi	had	standing an d	consider	the	merits	of	his	claim.10 ordering of a	 person,	 at	 gunpoint,	 to	lie	 down was	 not	 a	 de	 facto	 arrest	 but rather	an	investigatory	detention). In	the	course	of	an	investigative	stop,	police officers	are	also	authorized	“to	take	such	steps as [are]	reasonably	necessary	to protect	their	personal	safety	and	to	maintain	the	status	quo	during	the	course of	the	stop.” United	States	v.	Hensley ,	469	U.S.	221,	235	(1985); see,	e.g. , State	v. Kirby ,	2005	ME	92,	¶¶	12

- 17,	878	A.2d	499. However,	a traf fic	stop or	other investigatory	 stop must	 not	 last	 longer	 than	 reasonably	 necessary	 to investigate	the suspected violation of	law

. Rodriguez	v.	United	States ,	575	U.S. 348,	3 54

- 55	(2015) ; Florida	v.	Royer ,	460	U.S.	491,	500	(1983) (“The	scope	of the	 detention	 must	 be	 carefully	 tailored	 to	 its	 underlying	 justification.”);
4 Wayne R.	 LaFave, Search & Seizure :	 A	 Treatise on	 the	 Fourth	 Amendment , § 9.2(f)	at	451	(6 th ed.	2020).		“[I]f	a	person	is	stopped	on	suspicion	that	he	has just	e ngaged	in	criminal	activity,	but	the	suspect	identifies	himself	satisfactorily and	 investigation	 establishes	 that	 no	 offense	 occurred,	 there is	 no	 basis	 for further	 detention,	 and	 the	 suspect	 must	 be	 released.” 4	 Wayne R.	 LaFave, Search	&	Seizure:	A	Treat ise	on	the	Fourth	Amendment ,	§	9.2(f)	at	443

- 44

. [¶1 6 ]	 	 When	 an	 investigative	 stop is	 prolonged	 beyond what	 is reasonably necessary	 for	 an	 investigation of	 the	 suspected	 violation ,	 then , regardless	of	the	officer’s	intent	or	purpose, the	stop	may	have	evolved	into a11 de	 facto	arrest	 that	must	be	supported	by	probable	cause. State	v.	Donatelli , 2010	ME	43,	¶ ¶ 11

- 18,	995	A.2d	238 (“ Where	police	actions	taken	during	the detention exceed	what	is	 necessary	 to	 dispel	 the	 suspicion	 that	justi fied	 the stop,	the	detention	may	amount	to	an	arrest	and	is	lawful	only	if	it	is	supported by	 probable	 cause.”	 	 (quotation	marks	 omitted)). An	investigative	 stop	 that amounts	to	a	de	facto	arrest	can	constitute	an	unconstitutional	seizure	if	it	is not	sup ported	by	probable	cause. United	States	v.	Sharpe ,	470	U.S.	675,	685

- 86 (1985) .		The	United	States	Supreme	Court	has	explained	 that	 the	measure	of whether	an	investigative	detention	has	evolved	into	an	arrest	does	not depend

on a	 bright

- line	 test	 but	 is instead based	 on	 common	 sense	 and	 human experience. Id. [¶1 7 ] “ Probable	cause exists	where	facts	and	circumstances	within	the knowledge	 of	 the	 officers	 and	 of	 which	 they	 have	 reasonable	 trustworthy information	 would	 warrant	 a	 prudent	 and	 cautious	 person	 to	 believe	 the arrestee	did	commit	or	is	committing	the	felonious	offense.” Sta te	v.	L a g a sse , 2016	ME	158,	¶	13,	149	A.3d	1153 (quotation mark s	omitted).		Probable	cause has	a	very	low	threshold. Id. ¶	1 4 .		The	determination of probable	cause	is an objective	 one and	 is not	 based	 on	 whether	 the	 officer	 believed there	 was probable	cause. State	v.	Forsyth ,	2002	ME	75,	¶	10,	795	A.2d	66

.12 [¶1 8 ] Abdullahi contends	that	the	bag	containing	cocaine	base	would	not have	 been	 discovered	 but	 for	 the	 fact	 that	 his	 detention	 was	 unla wfully prolonged	 to	 the	 point	 that	 it	 evolved	 into	 an	 illegal	 de	 facto	 arrest.	 	 We conclude	that	Abdullahi ’s detention	was	n either	unreasonably prolonged n or unreasonably restrictive.		Abdullahi’s	inability	to	produce	the	registration	for the	 vehicle	 he	 wa s	 driving	 justified the corporal ’s further investigation	 into whether	 Abdullahi	 had	 permission	 to	 use the	 vehicle .	 	 The corporal ’s conversation	with a	person	he	reasonably	understood	to	be the vehicle’s owner furnished	probable	cause for	him to	believe that	Abdullahi’s use	of	the	vehicle constituted a	 violation	 of	 the	 law	 prohibiting	 unauthorized use	 of	 a	 motor vehicle. See 17

- A M.R.S.	§	360(1)(A) (202 3 )

. In	light	of that	conversation, the corporal ’s decision	to	have	the	vehicle	towed,	which	was a major reason	for	the extended	duration	of	the	stop,	was	appropriate. If	this	was	a	de	facto	arrest,	it was	 supported	 by	 probable	 cause. Moreover, the corporal ’s decision	 to handcuff	 Abdullahi	 while	 he	 attended to	 other	 tasks was independently justified	in	terms	of	officer	safety

. The court	did	not	err	in	denying	Abdullahi’s motion	to	suppress.13 B. The	Admission	of Lay Opinion	Testimony b y	Police	Officers [¶1 9 ] During	 the	 trial, the corporal and	both	sergeants testified about their	 observations	 and	 opinions	 concerning	 the	 contents	 of	 the	 plastic	 bag recovered	at	the	scene	of	the	stop. Although	the	extent	of	their	experience	with drug	investigations	varied,	each officer testified about his	own experience	with drug	 trafficking	 investigations. The sergeants testified that the	 substance inside	the	smaller	bags	within	the	large	bag appeared	to	be “crack	cocaine ”

— a term	sometimes	used	to	describe	cocaine	base. One of	the	sergeants testified that he	 determined ,	 using	 a	 digital	 scale, that	 the	large	 bag and	its	 contents weighed twenty
- six grams. The sergeants also	testified	that in	their	experience the	 manner	 by	 which	 the forty

- five smaller	 bags	 were	 packaged	 inside the larger	bag , the	fact	that	Abdullahi	was	not	using	his	own	vehicle,	and	the	fact that Abdullahi was	 found	 to	 be	 in	 possession	 of	 $1,091	 in	 cash were	 all indicative of drug	trafficking. [¶ 20 ] Abdullahi	 argues	 that	 the three police officers should	 not	 have been	allowed	to give	their testi mon y without being	designated	and q ua lifi ed as expert witnesses

. The	State	did	not	designate	the	officers	as	expert	witnesses, so	 their	 testimony	was	admissible	only	if	it qualified	as lay	opinion evidence

r ather	than	expert opinion evidence

. See M.R.	Evid.	701. “We	review challenges14
to the	admission	of	lay opinion testimony	for	an	abuse	of	discretion. ” State	v.
Patton ,	2012	ME	101,	¶	20,	50	A.3d	544

. 1. Lay	Opinion	and	Expert	Opinion	Evidence [¶ 2 1] Under	 Maine	 Rule	 of	 Evidence	 701,	 lay	 witnesses	 may	 provide testimony	 in	 the	 form	 of	 opinions	 or	 inferences	 as	 long	 as	 the	 testimony	 is “(a) [ r ] ationally	based	on	the witness’s	perception; and	(b) [ h ] elpful	to clearly understanding the witness’s	 testimony or	 t o determin ing a	 fact	in	issue.” A witness’s	 opinion	 must	 be	 “adequately	 grounded	 on	 personal	 knowledge	 or observation	just	as	would	be	the	case	with	simple	statements	of	fact.”		Field	& Murray, Maine	Evidence §	701.1 at	365 ( 6th e d.	2007). Lay	opinion	evidence	is appropriate	 when “ the	 subject	 of	 inquiry	 is	 one	 which	 is	 plainly comprehensible	by	the	jury	and	of	such	a	nature	that	unskilled	persons	would be	capable	of	forming	correct	conclusions	respecting	it.” Ginn v. Penobscot Co

. , 334 A.2d 874, 883 (Me. 1975)

. [¶ 22 ] An	opinion	is not	admissible	as lay	witness	testimony if	it	involves

“ knowledge,	 skill,	 experience,	 training,	 or	 education ”	 that	 is	 beyond	 the comprehension	of	an	ordinary	person. See M.R.	Evid.	702 ; State	v. Woodburn , 559	A.2d	343,	34 6 (Me.	1989)	( “ [B] efore	admittin g	expert	t estimony	the	trial court	must	consider	(1)	whether	the	matter	is	beyond	common	knowledge	so15 that	 the	 untrained	 layman	 will	 not	 be	 able	 to	 determine	 it	 intelligently	 and (2) whether	 the	wit ness	is	qualified	 to	give	 the	opinion	sought.”)

. I f	such	an opinion	is	admissible	at	all,	it	would	be	as expert opinion	evidence pursuant	to Maine	Rule	of	Evidence	702

. [¶ 23 ] Th e distinction between	opinion	testimony	and	fact	testimony is
not always clear,	because whether	something	is	true	as	a	matter	of	fact	often proves	to	be	a	matter	of	opinion. See State	v.	Cunningham ,	1997	ME	60,	¶	4,	691 A.2d 1219	 (1997) ; see Cent

. R. R. Co. of N.J. v.	 Monahan ,	 11	 F.2d	 212,	 214 (2d Cir. 1926) (“The	line	between	opinion	and	fact	is	at	best	only	one	of	degree, and	ought	to	depend	solely	upon	practical	considerations,	as,	for	example,	the saving	of	time	and	the	mentality	of	the	witness.”). L ay	opinion	evidence	can	be admitted	as	a	means	 of	 conveying	a	 “short

- hand	 rendering	 of	 the	 facts”	 that underlie	 the	opinion. Cunningham ,	1997	ME	60,	¶	4,	691	A.2d	1219 ; State v. Bowen , 366 A.2d 174, 177 (Me. 1976) ( explaining	that	lay	opinion	evidence	may include facts	 such	 as	 “[s]peed,	 identity,	 age,	 size,	 quantity,	 etc.”); Stacy	 v. Portland	Pub l’ g	Co. ,	68	Me.	279,	285

- 86	(1878);	M.R.	Evid.	701 A dvisers’ N ote to	former	M.R.	Evid.	701 ( Feb. 2, 1976 )

. [¶ 24 ] Although the	line between	admissible	lay	 opinion	evidence	and expert	opinion	evidence can	be	difficult	to	define , a	lay	opinion must be based16 “wholly	and	solely”	on	the	firsthand	knowledge,	perception,	or	observation	of the	witness, Mitchell	v.	Kieliszek ,	2006	ME	70,	¶	13,	900	A.2d	719 (quotation marks	omitted) , whereas	an	expert	opinion	may	be	based on information	made known	 to	 the	 expert.	 	 La y opinion testimony	is thus inadmissible	if	it	is not based	 on knowledge obtained	 through	 the	 witness’s	 own	 perception	 and personal experience

. See Chrysler	Credit	Corp.	v.	Bert	Cote’s	L/A	Auto	Sales,	Inc. , 1998	 ME	 53,	 ¶ ¶ 2 1

- 22 ,	 707	 A.2d	 1311 ; see also	 Cunningham ,	 1997	 ME	 60, ¶¶ 5

- 6,	 691	 A.2d	 1219

. In Chrysler	 Credit ,	 we	 determined	 that	 a	 Subaru marketing	 manager’s	 testimony	 about	 a	 dealership’s	 lost	 profits	 was	 not admissible	as	lay	opinion	evidence	because	his	analysis was	drawn	largely	from information	 he	 had analyzed about	 current	 and	 future	 sales	 trends	 in	 the applicable motor vehicle	market,	not from his	own experience, perceptions , and observations. Chrysler	Credit	Corp. ,	1998	ME	53,	¶ ¶ 22

- 23 ,	707	A.2d	1311. [¶ 25 ] On	 the	other	hand, the	 fact	 that	a	witness	may	have	specialized training	or	experience	does	not	transform	what	is	otherwise	a	lay	opinion	into that	of	an	expert. See United States v. Mast , 999 F.3d 1107, 1112 (8 th Cir. 2021)

. Thus, whether opinion	testimony	is	admissible	as	lay	opinion	evidence	or	can only	 be	 admitted	 as	 expert	 opinion	 evidence	 is	 primarily	 a	 function	 of	 two variables

— the	extent	to	which	the	witness’s	foundation	for	giving	the	opinion17 consists	 of	 the	 witness’s	 own	 perception s , observations , and	 experiences as opposed	to	the	knowledge	and	experiences	of	others ; and	whether	the	subject of	the	opinion	is	so	“specialized”	as	to	place	it	beyond	the ability of “unskilled persons	 [to	 be]	 capable	 of	 forming	 correct	 conclusions	 respectin g	 it

. ” Ginn , 334 A.2d at 883

. 2. Police Officer	Opinion	Testimony [¶ 26 ] As with the	 admissibility	 of	 opinion	 testimony	 by other fact witnesses, th e admissibility of opinion	testimony	by	a	police	officer	who has	not been	 designated	 as	 an	 expert	 witness	 depends	 on the	 extent	 to	 which the opinion	to	be	elicited is based	on the	offi cer’s	own perception	and knowledge and	is	within an ordinary	person’s	capacity	to	understand

. [¶ 27 ] We recently	 upheld	 the	 admissibility	 of	 a	 police	 officer’s lay opinion testimony	 “ that	 in	 his	 experience

— gained	 from	 many	 child	 sexual assault investigations	and	interviews

— a	victim ’ s	memory	of	traumatic	events was	‘[v]ery	often’	fragmented. ” State	v.	Hunt ,	2023	ME	26,	¶	46, 293	A.3d	423. Similarly,	 although	 police	 officers often	 receive	 training	 in	 identifying intoxication	 and bloodstains,	 w e	 have	 upheld	 the	 admission	 of	 lay	 opinion testimony	 by	 police officers	 on	 a	 person’s	 state	 of	 intoxication	 and	 on	 the existence	of	bloodstains,	based	on	our	view	 that	 the	knowledge	necessary	 to18 form	the	opinions is	not	a	matter	of “knowledge ,	skill,	experience,	training,	or education” beyond	the	ordinary	person’s	ability	to	understand	without	expert guidance

. 8 S ee	 S tate	 v.	 Libby , 153	 Me.	 1,	 7

- 8, 133	 A.2d	 877 ( 1957) ; State	 v. Wilbur ,	 278	 A.2d	 139,	 143	 (Me.	 1971)

. We have	 said	 specifically	 that the statutes	involving	drug	recognition	experts	“do	not	bar a	nonexpert	officer, or even	 a	 layperson , from	 testifying	 to his	 or	 her	 observations	 of	 a	 driver ’ s impairment	 or	 the	 conduct	 and	 results	 of	 a	 field	 sobriety	 test.” S ee	 State	 v. Atkins , 2015	ME	162,	¶	16,	129	A.3d	952 (emphasis	added); s ee	also State	v.
B arnard ,	2001	ME	80,	¶	12	n.9,	772	A.2d	852; State	v.	Curtis ,	2019	ME	100,	¶ 25, 210	A.3d	834

. [¶ 28 ] More	to	the	point,	w e	have	similarly	upheld the	admission	of police officers’ opinion	 testimony about	 the	 identity	 of	 drugs	 based	 on	 experience gained	in law	enforceme nt. Barnard ,	2001	ME	80,	¶	12	n.9,	772	A.2d	852 (“The identity	of	a	drug	can	be	proved	by	evidence	in	the	fo rm	of	opinion	testimony	if presented	 by	 someone	 who	 identifies	 the	 substance	 and	 who	 is	 sufficiently experienced	with	the	drug.”) ; a ccord Curtis ,	2019	ME	100,	¶ 25,	210	A.3d	834

8 Importantly,	 the	 requirement	 that	 lay	 opinion	 evidence	 be	 understandable	 to an ordinary person,	such	as	a	juror,	without	expert	guidance	does	not	mean	that an ordinary	person	must actually have	perceived , observed , or	experienced the	same	matters	covered	in	the	witness’s	opinion.		Thus, a	person	need	not	have experience	with intoxicated	person s or	bloodstains	in	order	to be	qualified to	serve	on	a	jury	in	a	trial	involving lay	opinion	testimony	on	those	sub jects.		In	fact, the	opposite	is true: lay	opinion	testimony	is	not	admissible	if	the	jury	is	as	capable	as	the	witness	at	forming	the opinion. See State	v.	Peaslee ,	2020	ME	105,	¶	11,	237	A. 3 d	861

.19 (“ In	the	absence	of	a	chemical	analysis,	other	direct	and	circumstantial	evidence can	establish	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt	the	identity	of	drugs. Th at evidence can	include	 testimony	 of	 a	witness	who	 has	 experience	 based	 on	 familiarity with	the	drugs	through law	enforcement , prior	use , or	trading .”	( alteration	and quotation	 marks	 omitted)( emphasis	 added) )

. 9 Although	 the	 issue	 of	 the difference	 between	 lay	 and	 expert	 opinion	 testimony	 was	 not	 addressed	 in those	cases,	n either Barnard nor Curtis states that either	a	drug	user	or a	police officer must be	 designated	 as	 an	 expert witness in	 order to	 testify	 as	 to	 the identity	of	a	drug .		In	fact, in Curtis , we	quoted	with	approval	a	federal appeals

court holding that evidence of the	 identity	 of	 a	 drug may d erive	 from “ lay

9 The	First	Circuit,	in United	States	v.	Valdivia ,	has explained	that	a	law	enforcement	officer	may be	qualified	as	both	a	lay	witness	and	expert	witness	in	the	same	case,	and	there	are	no	bright	line rules	 to	 differentiate	 between	 the	 two	 types	 of	 testimony. 680	 F. 3 d	 33, 49

- 51	 (1st	 Cir.	 2012)

. Specifically,	an	officer	need	not	have	scientific	or	technical	expertise	to	testify	as	a	lay	witness	in	drug cases, as	long	as	the	testimony	is	based	on	personal	knowledge acquired	through	the	officer’s	own perceptions	 and	 observation s through experience	 w ith	 prior	 drug	 cases. Id. ; see United	 States	 v. Ayala

- Pizarro ,	 407	 F.3d	 25,	 28

- 29 (1st	 Cir.	 2005) (allowing	 an	 officer	 to	 testify	 as a lay	 witness because	the	testimony	was	based	on	knowledge	that	he	obtained	by	virtue	of	his	position	as	a	police officer) ; United	States	v.	Moon ,	802	F.3d	135,	147

- 48	(1st	Cir.	2015) (upholding lay	opinion testimony in	 a	 drug	 case by	 an	 officer	 with significant	 experience	 identifying	 controlled	 substances when purchas ing drugs undercover ). Other	circuits	have	ruled	differently. See United	States	v.	Watson , 260 F.3d	301,	307

- 08	(3d	Cir.	2001)	(“[T] he operations of narcotics dealers have repeatedly been found to be a suitable topic for expert testimony because they are not within the common knowledge of the average juror.”) (collecting	cases); United	States	v.	Johnson ,	617	F.3d	286,	293	(4th	Cir.	2010) (“At	bottom , Rule	701	forbids	the	admission	of	expert	testimony	dressed	in	lay	witness	clothing.”) ( alteration	and quotation	marks omitted) ) ; United	States	v.	Oriedo ,	498	F.3d	593,	603	(7th	Cir.	2007) (explaining	that	one	agent’s	testimony	was	expert	in	nature	because	“he	brought	the	wealth	of	his experience	as	a	narcotics	 officer	 to	bear	 on	 [his]	 observations	and	made	connections	 for the	jury based	 on	 that	 specialized	 knowledge”); United	 States	 v.	 Figueroa

- Lopez ,	 125	 F.3d	 1241,	 124 4

- 46 (9 th Cir.	1997)	(concluding	that	the	agents’	testimony	was	expert	in	nature	because	they	used	their “training	and experience ” to	testify	about	behavior s	consistent	with	“an experienced drug	trafficker” (quotation	marks	omitted))

.20 experience	 based	 on	 familiarity	 through	 prior	 use,	 trading,	 or	 law enforcement

. ” Curtis ,	 2019	 ME	 100,	 ¶ 25,	 210	 A.3d	 834 ( quotation	 marks omitted). [¶ 29 ] Abdullahi concedes	 that	 drug	 users	who	are	 sufficiently	 familiar with	 a	 drug	 may	 give	 lay	 opinion	 testimony	 about	 the	 appearance	 and characteristics	 of	 the drug	 but contends	 that	 police	 officers must	 qualify	 as expert	witnesses	in	 order	 to	give identical opinion testimony

. If individuals who	use	and	traffick in drugs may	provide	lay	opinion	testimony	about	drugs and	 drug	 trafficking	 based	 on	 their	 personal	 perceptions , observations , and experiences ,	we	see	no	reason	to	prohibit	police	officers	from	giving	lay	opi nion testimony	 on	 the	 same	 topics based	 on	 their own personal	 perceptions and observations	gained	through	different	means

. [¶ 30 ] Whether opinion	evidence	may	be	given	only	by	a	qualified	expert depends more on	the complexity of	the	opinion rather	than	the	identity	of	the
witness. Just as whether	a	person	is	intoxicated	is	a	subject	fit	for	lay	opinion testimony ,	 what	 cocaine	 base	 looks	 li ke	 is	 not	 a	 matter about	 which only persons	 who	 have speci alized “ knowledge,	 skill,	 experience,	 training,	 or education ”	can form an	opinion. M.R.	Evid.	702. Similarly, a	witness need	not21 have specialized	 training	 and	 experience	 to form an	 opinion about	 common practices in	drug	trafficking

. [¶ 31 ]	 	 We	 emphasize	 that	 although	 the	 precise	 line	 between	 lay	 and expert	opinion	evidence	may	not	be	sharp,	we	are	not	suggesting	that	the	line

can n ot be drawn .	 	 As	 we	 have	 said,	 “[t]he	 two	 categorie s	 of	 expert	 and	 lay opinion	 testimony	are	 thus	mutually	exclusive .” Mitchell ,	2006	ME	70,	¶	14,
900 A.2d	 719 ; c f. Ragland	 v.	 State ,	 870	 A.2d	 609,	 620	 (Md.	 2005) (“[B]y permitting	testimony	based	on	specialized	knowledge,	education,	or	skill	.	.	.	, parties	may	avoid	the	notice	and	discovery	requirements	of	our	rules	and	blur the	distinction	between	the	two	rules.		Accordingly,	we	.	.	.	hold	that	Md.	Rules 5

- 701	 and	 5

- 702	 prohibit	 the	 admission	 as	 ‘lay	 opinion’	 of	 testimony	 based upon	specialized	know ledge,	skill,	experience,	training	or	education.”). I n	the case	of	police	testimony ,	it	is	important that	officers	be	designated	as	experts when	 they	 are	 expected	 to	 offer	 opinions	 based	 on	 their “knowledge,	 skill, experience,	 training,	 or	 education”	 that is	 beyond	 the	 comprehension	 of	 an ordinary	person. See M.R.	Evid.	702; M.R.U.	Crim.	P.	16(a)(2)(G); Woodbur n , 559	A.2d	at	346.22 3. The	Admissibility	of	the	Police	Officers'	Testimony	Here [¶ 32 ] At	 trial, the corporal testified	 that	 his experience	 included “approximately	six	years	of	experience	on	the	road	dealing	with	.	.	.	drug	cases on	traffic	stops	and	in	residences.”		He	testified	that he	identified	that the	drugs seized	 during	 the	 course	 of	 the	 traffic	 stop “appeared	 to	 be	 cocaine.” The corporal explained	that	the	package	of	narcotics	seized	at	the	site	of	the	traffic stop	 was	 consistent	 with	 what	 he	 had	 seen in	 other	 circumstances for packaging	 of	 cocaine	 base	 for	 resale.	 	 On	 cross

- examination, the corporal testified	that	he was “n ot	a	drug	guy ,” 10 which	is	why	he	sought	assistance	from the	two	other	state officers who	testified at	trial

. [¶ 33 ] The sergeants gave	more	extensive	 testimony	about	 the cocaine base	in	the	bag that Abdullahi	had tossed	under	the	car ,	based	on	their	more extensive	 experience	 in	 drug	 trafficking	 investigations. They	 testified that , based	 on	 their	 observations	 and	 experience , they	 were	 of	 the	 opinion	 that certain	circumstances	surrounding	 the	stop

— including the manner	in	which the fort y - five smaller baggies	were	packaged , Abdullahi’s	use	of	a	vehicle	he	did
not	own , and	the	large	amount	of	cash	he	was	carrying

— were	indicative	of	drug

10 The	corporal	testified	that	he	did	not	have	any	“special	expertise	or	training	or	experience	in narcotics	 investigations”	 and	 had	 only	 some	 “experience”	 with	 drug	 and	 drug	 tra fficking investigations.23 trafficking. One	sergeant testified	that	he	weighed	the	large	bag	at twenty
- six
grams and	that	the smaller baggies	inside	it	each	contained what	appeared	to be a	gram	or	a	half	gram	of	cocaine	base

. [¶ 34 ]	 	 It	 is noteworthy that	 when	 eliciting	 the	 opinions,	 the State’s foundational questions pointedly	emphasized	the	officers’	training	and special expertise. For	 example,	 the	 State	 questioned	 one	 of	 the	 sergeants	 without objection	as	follows: Q : And	in	the	course	of	your	experience	in	law	enforcement,	do you	have	particular	experience in	narcotics	investigations?
A : Yes. Q : Have	you	had	specialized	training	in	that	area?
A : Yes. Q : About	 how	 many	 investigations	 would	 you	 roughly	 say you’ve	been	involved	in	involving	crack	cocaine?
A : Two	 dozen	 or	 so	 at	 least,	 involving	 just specifically	 crack cocaine. Q : And	based	 on	 your	 training	and	 your	experience,	what	did those	little	ties	appear	to	be	to	you? Emphasizing a	 police officer ’s specialized expertise ,	 particularly	 if	 it	 was acquired	as	a	result	of	training	or	study rather	t han	observation , as	a	preface	to opinion	 questions , may	 be	 inconsistent	 with	 proffering	 the	 officer	 as	 a	 lay24 witness. 11 Qualifying	any	witness	to	give	lay	opinion	testimony	as	if	the	witness were	an	expert risks impermissibly bolstering the reliability of	 the	witness ’s opinion

. See Pelletier	 v.	 Pelletier ,	 2012	 ME	 15,	 ¶	 13,	 36	 A.3d	 903 (“Determinations	 of	 witness	 credibility	 are	 uniquely	 within	 the	 fact

– finder ’ s authority,	and	the	fact

- finder	is	free	to	discount	or	entirely	ignore	testimony	the fact

- fin der	 finds	 incredible.” (quotation	 marks	 omitted) ); State	 v.	 Black , 537 A.2d	1154,	1156	(Me.	1988)	( i mproper	bolstering	of	a	witness’s	credibility “can	have	a	profound	impact	on	the	outcome	of	the	trial,	particularly,	as	in	the present	case,	when	the prosecution	offers	the	evidence	to	establish	its	case	in chief.”); E.I.	 du	 Pont	 de	 Nemours	 &	 Co.	 v.	 Robinson ,	 923	 S.W.2d	 549,	 553 (Tex. 1995)	(“ Expert	witnesses	can	have	an	extremely	prejudicial	impact	on	the jury,	in	part	because	of	the	way	in	which	the	j ury	perceives	a	witness	labeled	as an	expert. To the jury an expert is just an unbridled authority figure, and as such he or she is more believable.” ( alteration and quotation marks omitted) ) ;

11 During	a	colloquy	with	counsel	outside	the	hearing	of	the	jury,	the	court	made	the	same	point: I	think	[the	State	is ] limited	to	asking	[the	officer,]	rather	than	as	to	his	training [and his	 opinion	 about]	 consistency	 with	 trafficking, just	 in	 his	 experience	 do

— is	 the packaging	of	these	items	something	that ’ s	done	for

— for

— in	connection	with	sales	of illegal	 things. And

— and	 in	 his

— in	 his	 experience	 do	 people	 carrying	 drugs sometimes	drive	someone	else ’ s	car.

.	.	.	.

.	.	. If	he	just	sticks	to	his	experience

.	.	. I	think	he ’ s	entitled	to	testify	about that.25 People	v.	Stewart ,	55	P.3d	107,	123	(Colo.	2002) (“Officer	testimony	becomes objectionable	 when	 what	 is	 essentially	 expert	 testimony	 is	 improperly admitted	under	the	guise	of	lay	opinions.”)

. [¶ 35 ] Nonetheless,	a lthough the two	 sergeants	in	 particular	indicated that	 they	 had specialized	 training and exp ertise in	 drug	 investigations , Abdullahi	did	not	object	to	much	of	the	testimony	he now contends	on	appeal should	have	been	excluded. When	objections	were	made,	the	court	sustained	a number	 of the m and	might	 have	 sustained	more. Further , all	 three officers indicated	 that	 their	 testimony	 that the	 drugs	 seized	 during	 the	 traffic	 stops “appeared	to	be	cocaine”	and	that	carrying	large	amounts	of	cash	and	driving someone	else’s	vehicle	could	be	indicative	of	drug	trafficking was	based	on	their experienc e . 12 See M.R. Evid. 701. We	conclude	 that	 the	court	did	not	err	 or abuse	 its	 discretion	 in its	 rulings	 on Abdullahi’s	 objections to	 the	 officers ’ testimony

. As	to	the	testimony	admitted	without	objection, Abdullahi	does	not contend	 that	 the	 court	 commit ted	 obvious	 error nor,	 in	 light	 of	 the	 clearly admissible	evidence	of	Abdullahi’s	guilt,	do	we	see	any

. State v. White ,	2002
ME 122,	¶	 8,	 804	A.2d	 1146 (“For obvious error to	 require	 the	 reversal	 of	a

12 The	officers’	testimony	that	the	seized	materials	“appeared”	to	be	cocaine	are	simply	statements of	 their	 perceptions	 at	 the	 scene. Confirmation	 of	 the	 actual	 chemical	 composition	 of particular substances requires	scientific	testing	and	expert	testimony

.26 judgment,	 the error must deprive	 the	 party	 of	a	 fair	 trial	 or	 result	in	 such	a serious	injustice	that,	in	good	conscience,	the	judgment	cannot	be	allowed	to stand.”)

. C. The	Court’s Permissible
- Inference I nstruction [¶ 36 ]	 	 Abdullahi	 argues	 that , because the	 evidence	 was insufficient	 to allow	the	jury	to	find	that	Abdullahi	possessed	four	grams	or	more	of	cocaine base ,	the	court	should not	have	instructed	the	jury	that,	if	it	made	such	a	finding, it	could	infer	that	Abdullahi	was	engaged	in	trafficking

. 13 The	State	conten ds that	the	instruction	was	proper	because	it	had	presented	evidence	sufficient	to support	a	finding beyond	a	reasonable	doubt that	A bd ullahi	possessed	at	least four	grams	of	narcotics. We	review	preserved	challenges	to	jury	instructions for	prejudicial	e rror. 14 State	v.	Hanscom ,	2016	ME	184,	¶	10,	152	A.3d	632

.

13 Abdullahi	also	argues,	for	the	first	time	on	appeal,	that	the	statutory	permissible	inference	is unconstitutional	 as	 applied	 to	 him	 because	 the four

- gram	 threshold	 at	 which	 the	 inference	 is permitted	as	to	cocaine	base has	an	unconstitutional	discrimi natory	effect	against	persons	of	color. We	review	argument s	not	preserved	in	the	trial	court for	obvious	error.		M.R.U.	Crim.	P.	52(b); State v.	 Nisbet ,	 2018	 ME	 113,	 ¶	 16,	 191	 A.3d	 359

. Because	 the	 argument is	 based on	 data	 and	 other information outside	this record,	we	do	not	reach	the	merits	of	the	argument.

14 The	State	also	argues	that	Abdullahi	did	not	preserve	this	argument	for	appellate	review.		To preserve	 an	 objection	 to	 jury	 instructions, “ a	 party	 must	 objec t	 before	 jury	 deliberations	 begin. ” C

l ewley	v.	Whitney ,	2002	ME	61,	¶	9,	794	A.2d	87 .		“A	generalized	citation	to	a	group	of	requested instructions	is	insufficient	 to	properly	preserve	objections	 to	a	particular	point	in	 the	court’s	jury instructions.	 .	 . .	 [A] n	 objecting	 party	 must	 state	 distinctly	 to	 the	 trial	 court	 the	 grounds	 for	 the objection	 to	 the	jury	instructions	and	point	 to	 the	specific	claimed	inadequacy	in	 the	instructions given	 by	 the	 trial	 court.” Id. Here,	 Abdullahi	 specifically	 objected	 t o	 the permissible

- inference instruction prior	to	jury	deliberations.		Therefore,	his	argument	is	preserved.27 [¶ 37 ] The	 proper	 inquiry	 here	 is	 whether	 the	 State	 provided	 or generated	evidence sufficient	 to	justify the permissible

- inference	instruction

. See State	v.	Caouette ,	462	A.2d	1171,	1175	 (Me. 1983) ; State	v.	Tibbetts ,	379 A.2d	735,	737

- 38 (Me.	1977)

. This	is	true	regardless	of	whether	the	State	or d efendant proposes an	instruction. S ee	S tate	v.	Benson ,	155	Me.	115,	123,	151 A.2d	 266	 (1959)

. The	 evidence	 in	 the	 record necessary to support an instruction	depends	on	the	charge	at	issue. See	C aouette ,	4 62 at 1175. Here, to warrant	 the permissible

- inference	 instruction ,	 the	 State	 was	 required	 to present evidence	that a	reasonable	juror	could find sufficient	to	prove beyond a	reasonable	doubt that Abdullahi	intentionally	or	knowingly	possessed	four	or more	grams	of	cocaine	base. See 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1103(3) (B) (2018)

. 15

15 Section	1103	further	provides,	as	is	relevant	here, Proof	that	the	person	intentionally	or	knowingly	possesses	[four grams or	more	of cocaine	 base]	 gives	 rise	 to	 a	 permissible	 inference	 under	 the	 Maines	 Rules	 of Evidence,	Rule	303	that	the	person	is	unlawfully	trafficking	in	scheduled	drugs[.]
17

- A	M.R.S. §	1103(3) ,	(3)(b) (2018) .		Maine	Rule	of	Evidence	303(b)	explains: The	 court may not	 direct a	 verdict	against	an	accused	 based	 on	a	 presumption	 or statutory	provisions	 that	certain	 facts	are	prima	 facie	evidence	of	other	 facts	or	of guilt

. The	court	may permit	a	jury	to	infer	guilt	or	a	fact	relevant	to	guilt	based	on	a statutory	or	common	law	presumption	or	prima	facie	evidence,	if	the	evidence	as	a whole	supports	guilt	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt

. The	rule	provides	a	safeguard	in	regard	to	permissible	in ferences	in	that	it	“require [ s ] the	court	to evaluate	the	inference	as	a	matter	of	 fact	and	mention	it	only	if	in	 fact	the	inference	is	justified	in general	terms	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt.”		Field	&	Murray, Maine	Evidence § 303.4	at	88	(6th	ed. 2007)

.28 [¶ 38 ] The	evidence presented	by	the	State	that	A bd ullahi	possessed	four	or more	grams	of	cocaine	base	included the	following :

• The	t estimony	of the law	enforcement	officers	identifying	the	substance recovered	as cocaine	base ;

• The testimony	 of	 law	 enforcement	 officers	 that	 the plastic	 bag seized weighed twenty
- six grams and	 contained forty

- five individual	 baggies containing	cocaine	base ;

• P hoto graphs of	the	forty

- five	individual	bag gie s inside	the	bag	that	was seized ;	and

• The testimony	of	a	chemist	that five baggies randomly	selected from	the forty

- five all	contained	cocaine	base	weighing	a	total of	1.8 9 grams. [¶ 39 ] We have	 previously	 endorsed	 the	 use	 of	 random	 sampling	 to establish	 the	identity	and	quantity	of	illegal	drugs. See	State	v.	Arbour ,	2016
ME 126,	 ¶	 24,	 146	 A.3d	 1106	 ( allowing chemical	 testing evidence	 that	 five randomly	selected	packets out of	1,252	packet s	seized	contained	heroin	“ was sufficient	for	the	jury	to	find	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt	that	270	or	more	of	the packets

.	 .	 . cont a ined	 heroin”). Here, the	 chemist’s	 testimony	 that	 five randomly	 selected baggies all	 contained	 cocaine	 base weighing	 a	 tota l	 of
1.89 grams ,	 coupled	 with	 the	 officers’	 testimony	 that	 all forty

- five baggies appeared	 to	 contain	 quantities	 of cocaine	 base , was	 sufficient	 to	 support	 an inference	that	the	bag	seized	from	Abdullahi	contained a	total	of at	least	four grams	of	cocaine	base.29 [¶ 40 ] In	 sum, t he record	 evidence	 was	 sufficient	 to	 justify	 the permissible

- inference	instruction

. 16 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1103( 1

- A) (A) ,	(3).
D. The	 Court’s	 Denial o f	 Abdullahi’s Motion f or	 New	 Trial a nd f or Judgment o f	Acquittal [¶ 4 1]		Abdullahi ’s contention	that	the	court	erred	in	denying	his	motion for	 judgment	 of	 acquittal	 and	 motion	 for a new	 trial rest s on	 the	 same
argu ments	he	presents here regarding	his	motion	to	suppress , the	lay	opinion testimony	by	police	officer	witnesses , the	chemist’s	testing	testimony,	and	the court’s	 decision	 to	 give	 the	 jury an instruction	 regarding	 a	 permissible inference	 of	 trafficking. “ We	 review	 the	 denial	 of	 a	 motion	 for	 judgment	 of acquittal by	 viewing	 the	 evidence	in	 the	light	most	 favorable	 to	 the	 State	 to determine	whether	a	jury	could	rationally	have	found	each	element	of	the	crime proven	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt. ” State v. Adams , 2015 ME 30, ¶ 19, 113 A.3d 583 (quotation marks omitted)

. “ We	 review	 the	 trial	 court’s	 decision	 on	 a motion	for	a	new	trial	for	an	abuse	of	discretion	and	any	findings	underlying	its decision	 for	clear	error.” State	v.	Bilodeau ,	2020	ME	92,	¶	15,	237	A.3d	156 (quotation	marks	omitted)

. As previously	explained, t he State’s evidence was

16 Although	Abdullahi	has	not	directly	contested	the	sufficiency	of the evidence	that	he	possessed the	 bag	 containing	 cocaine	 base	 intentionally	 or	 knowingly,	 the	 evidence	 that	 he	 had	 physical possession	of	the	bag	before	throwing	it	under	the	car	in	an	attem pt	to	hide	it	from	the	corporal	was sufficient	 to	 support a finding	 that	 he intended	 to	 possess the	 bag	 and	 knew	 what	 it	 contained. See 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1103(1

- A).30 sufficient	 to	 support	 a	 finding that	 A bd ullahi	 intentionally	 or	 knowingly possessed	at	least	four	grams	of	cocaine	base .		Likewise,	although	Abdullahi	has not	specifically	challenged	them,	we	see	no	error	or	abuse	of	discretion	in	t he court’s	rulings	regarding	his	falsification	conviction	and	forfeiture	order. The	entry	is: Judgment	affirmed.

Kristine	C.	Hanly,	Esq. (orally) ,	Hanly	Law,	Portland,	for	appellant	Abdirahmon A.	Abdullahi Jonathan	Sahrbeck,	District Attorney , and	Carlos	Diaz,	Asst.	Dist.	Atty. (orally) , Cumberland	 County	District	Attorney’s	Office, Portland, for	appellee	State	 of Maine

Cumberland	County	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket	number	CR

- 2019

- 3332 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY