I 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2037 

To halt Saudi support for institutions that fund, train, incite, encourage, 

or in any other way aid and abet terrorism, and to secure full Saudi 

cooperation in the investigation of terrorist incidents, and for other 

purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 28, 2005 

Mr. WEINER (for himself, Mr. FERGUSON, Mr. ANDREWS, Mr. BAKER, Ms. 

BERKLEY, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. CARDOZA, Mr. CROWLEY, Mr. 

GARRETT of New Jersey, Mr. GRIJALVA, Mr. HASTINGS of Florida, Mr. 

ISRAEL, Mrs. JO ANN DAVIS of Virginia, Mrs. LOWEY, Mrs. MALONEY, 

Mrs. MCCARTHY, Ms. MCCOLLUM of Minnesota, Mr. MCNULTY, Mr. 

MEEHAN, Mr. NADLER, Mr. ROTHMAN, and Mrs. TAUSCHER) introduced 

the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on International 

Relations 

A BILL 

To halt Saudi support for institutions that fund, train, incite, 

encourage, or in any other way aid and abet terrorism, 

and to secure full Saudi cooperation in the investigation 

of terrorist incidents, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 

5 ‘‘Saudi Arabia Accountability Act of 2005’’. 
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1 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

2 Congress makes the following findings: 

3 (1) United Nations Security Council Resolution 

4 1373 (2001) mandates that all states ‘‘refrain from 

5 providing any form of support, active or passive, to 

6 entities or persons involved in terrorist acts’’, take 

7 ‘‘the necessary steps to prevent the commission of 

8 terrorist acts’’, and ‘‘deny safe haven to those who 

9 finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts’’. 

10 (2) The Council on Foreign Relations concluded 

11 in an October 2002 report on terrorist financing 

12 that ‘‘[f]or years, individuals and charities based in 

13 Saudi Arabia have been the most important source 

14 of funds for al-Qaeda, and for years, Saudi officials 

15 have turned a blind eye to this problem’’. 

16 (3) In a June 2004 report entitled ‘‘Update on 

17 the Global Campaign Against Terrorist Financing’’, 

18 the Council on Foreign Relations reported that 

19 ‘‘[w]e find it regrettable and unacceptable that since 

20 September 11, 2001, we know of not a single Saudi 

21 donor of funds to terrorist groups who has been 

22 publicly punished’’. 

23 (4) According to the final report of the Na24 tional Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 

25 United States, when asked where terrorist leaders 

26 would likely locate their bases, military officers and 
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1 government officials repeatedly listed Saudi Arabia 

2 as a prime location. 

3 (5) A report released on January 28, 2005 by 

4 Freedom House’s Center for Religious Freedom 

5 found that Saudi Arabia is the state most respon6 sible for the propagation of material promoting ha7 tred, intolerance, and violence within United States 

8 mosques and Islamic centers, and that these publica9 tions are often official publications of a Saudi min10 istry or distributed by the Embassy of Saudi Arabia 

11 in Washington, D.C. 

12 (6) During a July 2003 hearing on terrorism 

13 before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology 

14 and Homeland Security of the Committee on the Ju15 diciary of the Senate, David Aufhauser, General 

16 Counsel of the Treasury Department, stated that 

17 Saudi Arabia is, in many cases, the ‘‘epicenter’’ of 

18 financing for terrorism. 

19 (7) The New York Times, citing United States 

20 and Israeli sources, reported on September 17, 

21 2003, that at least 50 percent of the current oper22 ating budget of Hamas comes from ‘‘people in Saudi 

23 Arabia’’. 

24 (8) The Middle East Media Research Institute 

25 concluded in a July 3, 2003, report on Saudi sup-
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1 port for Palestinian terrorists that ‘‘for decades, the 

2 royal family of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has 

3 been the main financial supporter of Palestinian 

4 groups fighting Israel’’. The report notes specifically 

5 that Saudi-sponsored organizations have funneled 

6 over $4,000,000,000 to finance the Palestinian 

7 intifada that began in September 2000. 

8 (9) A joint committee of the Select Committee 

9 on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Se10 lect Committee on Intelligence of the House of Rep11 resentatives issued a report on July 24, 2003, that 

12 quotes various United States Government personnel 

13 who complained that the Saudis refused to cooperate 

14 in the investigation of Osama bin Laden and his net15 work both before and after the September 11, 2001, 

16 terrorist attacks. 

17 (10) After the 1996 bombing of the Khobar 

18 Towers housing complex at Dahran, Saudi Arabia, 

19 which killed 19 United States Air Force personnel 

20 and wounded approximately 400 people, the Govern21 ment of Saudi Arabia refused to allow United States 

22 officials to question individuals held in detention by 

23 the Saudis in connection with the attack. 

24 (11) As recounted by counterterrorism officials 

25 in a September 2003 issue of Time Magazine, Saudi 
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1 Arabia denied United States officials access to sev2 eral suspects in the custody of the Government of 

3 Saudi Arabia, including a Saudi Arabian citizen in 

4 detention for months who had knowledge of exten5 sive plans to inject poison gas in the New York City 

6 subway system. 

7 (12) The United States Commission on Inter8 national Religious Freedom has reported that Saudi 

9 Arabian Government-funded textbooks used both in 

10 Saudi Arabia and also in North American Islamic 

11 schools and mosques have been found to encourage 

12 incitement to violence against non-Muslims. 

13 (13) There are indications that, since the May 

14 12, 2003, suicide bombings in Riyadh, the Govern15 ment of Saudi Arabia is making a more serious ef16 fort to combat terrorism. 

17 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

18 It is the sense of Congress that— 

19 (1) it is imperative that the Government of 

20 Saudi Arabia immediately and unconditionally— 

21 (A) provide complete, unrestricted, and un22 obstructed cooperation to the United States, in23 cluding the unsolicited sharing of relevant intel24 ligence in a consistent and timely fashion, in 

25 the investigation of groups and individuals that 
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1 are suspected of financing, supporting, plotting, 

2 or committing an act of terror against United 

3 States citizens anywhere in the world, including 

4 within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; 

5 (B) permanently close all charities, schools, 

6 or other organizations or institutions in the 

7 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that fund, train, in8 cite, encourage, or in any other way aid and 

9 abet terrorism anywhere in the world (hereafter 

10 in this Act referred to as ‘‘Saudi-based terror 

11 organizations’’), including by means of pro12 viding support for the families of individuals 

13 who have committed acts of terrorism; 

14 (C) end funding or other support by the 

15 Government of Saudi Arabia for charities, 

16 schools, and any other organizations or institu17 tions outside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that 

18 train, incite, encourage, or in any other way aid 

19 and abet terrorism anywhere in the world (here20 after in this Act referred to as ‘‘offshore terror 

21 organizations’’), including by means of pro22 viding support for the families of individuals 

23 who have committed acts of terrorism; and 

24 (D) block all funding from private Saudi 

25 citizens and entities to any Saudi-based terror 
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1 organization or offshore terrorism organization; 

2 and 

3 (2) the President, in deciding whether to make 

4 the certification under section 4, should judge 

5 whether the Government of Saudi Arabia has contin6 ued and sufficiently expanded the efforts to combat 

7 terrorism that it redoubled after the May 12, 2003, 

8 bombing in Riyadh. 

9 SEC. 4. SANCTIONS. 

10 (a) RESTRICTIONS ON EXPORTS AND DIPLOMATIC

11 TRAVEL.—Unless the President makes the certification 

12 described in subsection (c), the President shall take the 

13 following actions: 

14 (1) Prohibit the export to the Kingdom of 

15 Saudi Arabia, and prohibit the issuance of a license 

16 for the export to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, of— 

17 (A) any defense articles or defense services 

18 on the United States Munitions List under sec19 tion 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 

20 U.S.C. 2778) for which special export controls 

21 are warranted under such Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 

22 et seq.); and 

23 (B) any item identified on the Commerce 

24 Control List maintained under part 774 of title 

25 15, Code of Federal Regulations. 
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1 (2) Restrict travel of Saudi diplomats assigned 

2 to Washington, District of Columbia, New York, 

3 New York, the Saudi Consulate General in Houston, 

4 or the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles to a 25-mile 

5 radius of Washington, District of Columbia, New 

6 York, New York, the Saudi Consulate General in 

7 Houston, or the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, re8 spectively. 

9 (b) WAIVER.—The President may waive the applica10 tion of subsection (a) if the President— 

11 (1) determines that it is in the national security 

12 interest of the United States to do so; and 

13 (2) submits to the appropriate congressional 

14 committees a report that contains the reasons for 

15 such determination. 

16 (c) CERTIFICATION.—The President shall transmit to 

17 the appropriate congressional committees a certification of 

18 any determination made by the President after the date 

19 of the enactment of this Act that the Government of Saudi 

20 Arabia— 

21 (1) is fully cooperating with the United States 

22 in investigating and preventing terrorist attacks; 

23 (2) has permanently closed all Saudi-based ter24 ror organizations; 
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1 (3) has ended any funding or other support by 

2 the Government of Saudi Arabia for any offshore 

3 terror organization; and 

4 (4) has exercised maximum efforts to block all 

5 funding from private Saudi citizens and entities to 

6 offshore terrorist organizations. 

7 SEC. 5. REPORT. 

8 (a) REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT.—Not later than 6 

9 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 

10 every 12 months thereafter until the President makes the 

11 certification described in section 4(c), the Secretary of 

12 State shall submit to the appropriate congressional com13 mittees a report on the progress made by the Government 

14 of Saudi Arabia toward meeting the conditions described 

15 in paragraphs (1) through (4) of section 4(c). 

16 (b) FORM.—The report submitted under subsection 

17 (a) shall be in unclassified form but may include a classi18 fied annex. 

19 SEC. 6. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE20 FINED. 

21 In this Act, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional com22 mittees’’ means the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

23 the Senate and the Committee on International Relations 

24 of the House of Representatives. 

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