AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed August 4, 2022 

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In the 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-20-01088-CV VIVIAN O. TAYLOR, Appellant V. CHARLES E. TAYLOR, Appellee On Appeal from the 330th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DF-19-21619 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Myers, Carlyle, and Goldstein Opinion by Justice Carlyle Appellant Vivian Taylor challenges the trial court’s judgment granting a divorce to appellee and petitioner below Char les Taylor. Both parties appeared pro se below and before this c ourt, and only appellant has f iled a brief in this court. 1 We affirm. T EX
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. P. 47.4. Appellant first filed a brief on Septem ber 20, 2021, pursuant to this court’s order, granting a third extension for doing so. On September 24, 2021, the Clerk of

1 When an appellee fails to file an appellate brief, we review the merits of appellant’s issues to determine whether reversal is appropriate. An appellee’s failure to file a brief does not entitle appellant to automatic reversal. See Yeater v. H-Town Towing LLC , 605 S.W.3d 729, 731 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.).–2– the Court sent appellant a letter, informing appellant that the brief failed to comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedur e in several specific respects, including failing to appropriately cite either the record or authorities. See T EX
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. P. 38.1(i). Appellant filed a corrected brief, bu t added little in the wa y of record citation or reference to applicable legal author ities. We then ordered the case submitted without oral argument. Texas law recognizes the right for civil litigants to proceed on their own behalf in court, pro se. Bolling v. Farmers Branch ISD , 315 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2010, no pet.). Th at said, we hold pro se litigants to the same standards for pleading, briefing, and pro cedure as we do lawyers. See Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn , 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978); Washington v. Bank of N.Y. , 362 S.W.3d 853, 854 (Tex. App.—D allas 2012, no pet.). This includes following the appellate rules for briefing appeals to this court, and though we do not require rigid adherence regarding th e form of a brief, we examin e briefs closely for compliance with rules governing briefs’ contents. Hammonds v. Dallas Cty. , No. 05-18-01433- CV, 2020 WL 948383, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dalla s Feb. 27, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). To do otherwise would give pro se litig ants an unfair advantage over litigants represented by counsel. We liberally c onstrue pro se pleadings and briefs. Washington , 362 S.W.3d at 854. Appellant first claims she did not recei ve “proper notice regarding hearings” or access to “virtual hearings and documen ts timely.” The appellate record consists–3– of one Reporter’s Record volume of the final trial hearing, at wh ich both parties were present; a Clerk’s Record; and a Supplemen tal Clerk’s Record. This court informed appellant, in its September 14, 2021 order granting her thir d motion for extension of time to file the brief, that she could move to supplement the reporter’s record with transcripts for additional hearings—somethi ng she claimed to have been trying to do in each of her motions for extension of tim e to file the opening brief. Appellant did not move to supplement the record with transcripts, nor has she provided any indication that a court reporter was present to transcribe a hearing other than the final trial. See generally T EX
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. P. 34.6. The record includes the court’s May 3, 2021 order directing the 330th Judicial District Court’s Official Court Reporter “to file the reporter’s record.” The reporter subseque ntly filed the single volume reporter’s record with a standard certification. 2 Further, appellant’s factual statement and argument as to this issue rely almost entirely on documents she has attached to her brief that are not otherwise in the appellate record, and we may not consider them. Burke v. Insurance Auto Auctions Corp. , 169 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. de nied). Also, Appellant

2 When filing the record, the court reporter certified as follows: I, Francheska Duffey, Official Court Reporter in and for the 330th District Court of Dallas County, State of Texas, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing contains a true and corre ct transcription of all portions of evidence and other proceedings request ed in writing by counsel for the parties to be included in this volum e of the Reporter’s Record, in the above-styled and -numbered cause, all of which occurred in open court or in chambers and were reported by me. I further certify that this Reporter’s Record of the proceedings truly and co rrectly reflects the exhibits, if any, admitted by the respective parties.–4– has provided no record support for the a llegations regarding electronic access. And as noted, appellant’s corrected brief incl udes reference to sc ant relevant legal authorities. See T EX
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. P. 38.1(i) (appellant’s brie f “must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, w ith appropriate citations to authorities and to the record”). The brie f still fails to meet even th e basic requirements for citing relevant legal authority. For these reasons, we conclude appellan t presents nothing for our review by the first issue. See Burke , 169 S.W.3d at 775; Hammonds , 2020 WL 948383, at *2. We consider appellant’s issue in the inte rests of justice. The appellate record does not support appellant’s a llegations that she was not pr esent for two of the eight hearings in this case, nor does it support her allegation that she was not given reasonable notice to hearings or access to virtual proceedings. 3 Appellant fails to explain why, assuming she was only present or got notice for two of eight pretrial hearings, this prejudiced her or how it affect ed the trial court’s decision to grant the divorce and split the community property the way it did. See T EX
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. P. 44.1 (“No judgment may be revers ed on appeal on the ground that the trial court made an error of law unless the court of appeals c oncludes that the error complained of: (1) probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment; or (2) probably prevented the appellant from properly presenting th e case to the court of appeals.”).

3 Again, to the extent any of the documents appellant attach ed to her brief that are not otherwise in the record support these allegations, we may not consider them. See Burke , 169 S.W.3d at 775.–5– The appellate record in this case demons trates that both appellant and appellee appeared pro se virtually before the c ourt for final bench trial pursuant to the COVID-19 orders in effect at the time of tr ial. At trial, the court first questioned appellee, the petitioner in this divorce, goi ng through the basic predicate questions that would support a divorce under Texas law. The court then asked appellant if her answers to these basic questions would be different, and she said they would. The court inquired further, asking appellant ho w and giving appellant ample leeway to answer. The court did not stop appellant from answering the questions, and indeed, the court’s follow-up questions dem onstrate the court engaged appellant appropriately. We overrule appellant’s first issue. We come to a similar conclusion as to appellant’s fourth issue: “Did the Court’s office express continued bias an d assistance for Ap pellee?” Appellant’s statement of facts and argument as to this issue rely on documents attached to her brief that are not in the appellate record, which we may not consider. See Burke , 169 S.W.3d at 775. Nothing in the appellate record supports the assertion that the court’s office expressed bias, and nothing in the record supports reversal. See T EX
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. P. 44.1. We overrule appe llant’s fourth issue. Finally, we consider appellant’s sec ond and third issues, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support th e judgment granting divorce and dividing community property. Appellant has provided no briefing or argument as to why the–6– court should not have granted the divorce, a nd thus this portion of the second issue presents nothing for this court’s review. See Hammonds , 2020 WL 948383, at *2. 4 Regarding the community property divisi on, appellant claims there is no evidence to support the trial court’s decisi on, but gives no further argument, and this issue too presents nothing for our review. See Hammonds , 2020 WL 948383, at *2. In the interests of justice, we review these issues as well. The court awarded appellee a Chevy Silverado an d appellant a Nissan Armada . The court also awarded appellee his pest control business, which he stated without contradiction that he owned “way before” the marri age. The division was otherwise identical, though the court awarded appellant her wedding bands, an HP computer, a Fre nch room divider, a washer and dryer, and embroidery soft ware and designs on appellee’s computer. The court awarded appellee $600 in debt add itional to what it required of appellant. Neither party requested findings of fact or conclusions of law. See T EX
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. C ODE § 6.711. On the record before this court, a nd indulging every reasonable presumption in favor of the trial court’s proper exerci se of discretion in dividing marital property as we must, we can discern no clear abuse of discretion in this division or that any error materially affected the just and right division of the community estate. See Mandell v. Mandell , 310 S.W.3d 531, 538 (Tex. App.—F t. Worth 2010, pet. denied)

4 In any event, the record amply supports gran ting the divorce on the ground of insupportability. See T EX

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. C ODE § 6.001.–7– (reciting the appellate standard fo r community property division); T EX
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. C ODE § 7.001 (“General Rule of Property Division”). To the extent appellant complains th e trial court erred by asking appellant leading questions during the final hearing, the only hearing transcribed in our record, we find no error. As an initial matter, appe llant lodged no objection to the trial court questioning appellee and thus has preserved no error for our review. See T EX
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. P. 33.1. In any event, a trial court has broad disc retion over the conduct of a trial and may properly intervene to maintain control in the courtroom, to expedite the trial, and to prevent what it considers to be a waste of time. Dow Chem. Co. v.
Francis , 46 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. 2001) (per curi am). And in a benc h trial, a judge may question witnesses to clarify facts on i ssues the judge must decide in fulfilling her role as factfinder. See Sklar v. Sklar , 598 S.W.3d 810, 824–25 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.). The court asked leading and non-leading questions of both parties, a nd none of the questioning in this record constituted an abuse of discretion. See id. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 5

201088F.P05

5 To the extent appellant complains in her brief th at appellee failed to follow the trial court’s orders regarding returning her property and allowing her acces s to it, those complaints present nothing for our review because they are properly addressed to the trial court, not this court. /Cory L. Carlyle / CORY L. CARLYLE JUSTICE–8– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT VIVIAN O. TAYLOR, Appellant
No. 05-20-01088-CV V. CHARLES E. TAYLOR, Appellee On Appeal from the 330th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DF-19-21619. Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle. Justices Myers and Goldstein participating. In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered August 4, 2022