UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

Joel D. King, ) CASE NO. 1:16 CV 590

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN

)

Vs. )

)

Forest River, Inc., et al., ) Memorandum of Opinion and Order

)

Defendants. )

INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court upon Defendants’ Motion to Transfer Venue to the

Northern District of Indiana, or Alternatively, to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for Improper

Venue (Doc. 8). Also pending is Jeff Rowe’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal

Jurisdiction (Doc. 6). This is an employment discrimination case. For the following reasons, the

motion to transfer is GRANTED and the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is

MOOT. 

FACTS

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Plaintiff Joel King brings this lawsuit against defendants, Forest River, Inc. (“Forest

River”), Michael Peterson, and Jeff Rowe, alleging wrongdoing in connection with plaintiff’s

termination from employment.

The complaint alleges that plaintiff is a resident in this district. According to the

complaint, Forest River is an Indiana corporation with its principal place of business in Indiana. 

The complaint further alleges that the individual defendants are residents of Indiana. 

Defendants hired plaintiff on or about August 1, 2013 to work as a regional sales

manager. Forest River is in the business of manufacturing recreational vehicles and operates

several manufacturing facilities throughout the United States. On or about June 8, 2014, plaintiff

suffered from a serious health condition that required medical treatment. Shortly thereafter,

plaintiff was hospitalized for this condition. The hospitalization lasted until July 15, 2014. 

According to the complaint, plaintiff provided defendants with documentation from his

physician supporting the fact that he suffered from a serious health condition and would require

a leave of absence until August 4, 2014. Plaintiff claims that he completed the necessary forms

to qualify for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). 

According to the complaint, defendants terminated plaintiff and refused to provide him

with an accommodation for this disability. At the time of his termination, plaintiff was aged 47. 

Plaintiff believes he was replaced by a substantially younger individual. Thereafter, plaintiff

filed this lawsuit asserting seven claims for relief. Counts one and two assert claims under the

FMLA. Count three is a claim asserted under the Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”) and

count four asserts disability discrimination under O.R.C. § 4112.02. Count five is a claim under

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and count six asserts age discrimination

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under O.R.C. § 4112.02. Count seven is a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

Defendants move to transfer this action to the Northern District of Indiana or,

alternatively, to dismiss this matter for improper venue. Defendant Rowe further moves to

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff opposes both motions.

ANALYSIS

Defendants move to transfer this action based on improper venue. Because the Court

finds that the motion is well-taken, the Court will address it first. 

Defendants argue that venue is improper in this District. According to defendants, the

general venue statute set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1391 applies to all of plaintiff’s claims with the

exception of his ADA claim. The general venue statute provides that venue is proper in: 

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the

State in which the district is located;

(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to

the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is

situated; or 

(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this

section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal

jurisdiction with respect to such action.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Defendants further argue that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12117, the venue provision

applicable to Title VII actions, governs plaintiff’s ADA claim. That provision provides that

venue is proper in:

(1) [A]ny judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is

alleged to have been committed; 

(2) [T]he judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are

maintained and administered; or 

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(3) [T]he judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the

alleged unlawful employment practice.

42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f)(3)

Plaintiff does not dispute that these venue provisions apply in analyzing whether venue is

proper. In the event the Court finds that venue is not proper in this jurisdiction, the Court “shall

dismiss, or in the interest of justice, transfer the case to any district or division in which it could

have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). The decision of whether to dismiss or transfer is

within the district court's sound discretion. First of Michigan Corp. v. Bramlet, 141 F.3d 260,

262 (6th Cir.1998). “Unlike section 1404(a) [which permits a transfer of venue for convenience]

... section 1406(a) does not require that the district court have personal jurisdiction over the

defendants before transferring the case.” Pittock v. Otis Elevator Co., 8 F.3d 325, 329 (6th

Cir.1993)(citations and quotations omitted)(utilizing section 1406(a) to transfer a case where

there was both improper venue and lack of personal jurisdiction in the transferor forum). 

Defendants argue that venue is not proper in this district. According to defendants, no

defendant resides in this district. Thus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue is proper here for

plaintiff’s non-ADA claims only if “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to

the claim occurred” in this district. Defendants point out that there is no indication that any part

of the events giving rise to this lawsuit occurred here. Throughout his employment with

defendants, plaintiff worked out of a home office located in the Southern District of Ohio. There

is no suggestion or indication that defendants ever contacted plaintiff in this district regarding his

employment. Nor is there any allegation that any employment-related decision-making occurred

here. Defendant notes that it has a “registered dealer” in this district, as well as one located in

the Southern District. Defendant points out, however, that of the 42 expense reports submitted

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by plaintiff, only five relate to work performed in Ohio. Plaintiff does not dispute these points. 

Rather, plaintiff lumps together the Northern District of Ohio and the Southern District of Ohio

and simply argues that the events giving rise to plaintiffs claims occurred in “Ohio.” Although

plaintiff notes in his affidavit that he interviewed with defendant at an RV show in Cleveland,

standing alone, this is not a sufficient basis on which to base venue in this district. Nor is the

fact that plaintiff currently resides in this district sufficient. Based on a thorough review of the

parties’ arguments and affidavits, the Court finds that “a substantial part of the events or

omissions giving rise to the claim” did not occur in this district. 

The same holds true with respect to plaintiff’s ADA claim. Again, plaintiff does not

point to any activity that occurred specifically in this district. Simply noting that many events

occurred in “Ohio” is not enough. The Court notes that venue is proper with respect to

plaintiff’s ADA claim in the “judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked

but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.” Again, although defendant notes that it has

an RV dealership in Akron and plaintiff responds by indicating that he worked at all “active”

dealerships, the Court cannot say that plaintiff would have worked in this district “but for” the

alleged unlawful employment practice. Defendant notes that plaintiff submitted only five

expense reports for business conducted in Ohio. Given that defendant had a dealership located

near plaintiff’s home office, it is not clear that plaintiff would have worked in this district. 

Plaintiff does not specifically address this prong of the venue analysis, nor does plaintiff make

any effort to explain any work activity that would have occurred here. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that venue is not proper in this district. As

such, the Court may either dismiss this action or transfer it to another district or division in

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which it could have been brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Upon review, the Court finds that the

interests of justice favor transferring this matter. 

With regard to a transfer, the parties dispute whether this action should be transferred to

the Southern District of Ohio or the Northern District of Indiana. The Court finds that venue is

best situated in the Northern District of Indiana. With regard to plaintiff’s non-ADA claims, the

Court finds that the Northern District of Indiana is a “a judicial district in which a substantial

part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” Defendant is located in that

district and the decisions regarding plaintiff’s termination occurred there. Plaintiff’s personnel

file is located in the Northern District of Indiana. Plaintiff communicated with defendants at that

location and traveled to that district approximately seven times. In addition, all defendants

consent to personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of Indiana and the majority of witnesses

are located there. 

Plaintiff points out that he worked out of his home office in the Southern District of Ohio

and that Ohio was one of his assigned sales territories. Defendant did not assign the Indiana

territory to plaintiff and he rarely attended meetings there. Plaintiff regularly communicated

with defendant from Ohio1

 and received nearly all communications from defendant while he was

located in Ohio. He further claims that on at least one occasion defendant Peterson came to Ohio

to meet with plaintiff. Plaintiff also notes that his disability arose in the Southern District of

1 Again, plaintiff fails to distinguish where in “Ohio” these

communications occurred. Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that

his home office was located in the Southern District of Ohio and

therefore rather than outright reject plaintiff’s arguments, the Court

will presume that the communications occurred to and from

plaintiff’s home office. 

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Ohio. In addition, plaintiff lives in Ohio now. 

The Court finds assuming arguendo that the Southern District of Ohio would constitute a

proper venue, plaintiff’s arguments are not sufficient to warrant transferring this case to that

location. As an initial matter, no party is located there. Plaintiff admits that he now resides in

this district. Moreover, it does not appear that any documentary evidence is located in the

Southern District of Ohio. And, although some former doctors of plaintiff’s may be located in

that district, the clear majority of relevant witnesses do not reside there. Moreover, plaintiff

chose not to file his case in that district. In addition, defendants concede personal jurisdiction

over all defendants in the Northern District of Indiana. Although some of the events giving rise

to the claim may have occurred in the Southern District of Ohio, the Court finds that the facts as

a whole warrant a transfer of this matter to the Northern District of Indiana. Thus, even

assuming proper venue would lie in the Southern District of Ohio with respect to plaintiff’s nonADA claims, the Court declines to transfer this matter there. 

The same analysis applies to plaintiff’s ADA claim. Venue is undoubtedly proper in the

Northern District of Indiana because that location is the “district in which the employment

records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered.” Because the factors set forth

above apply equally in assessing which location is preferable with respect to this claim, the

Court will transfer this action to the Northern District of Indiana. 

Having concluded that venue is not proper in this jurisdiction, and because the Court will

transfer this matter to the Northern District of Indiana, the Court finds that defendant Jeff

Rowe’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is MOOT. 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Transfer Venue to the Northern

District of Indiana, or Alternatively, to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for Improper Venue (Doc.

8) is GRANTED. Jeff Rowe’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Doc. 6) is

MOOT.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 /s/ Patricia A. Gaughan 

PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN

United States District Judge

Dated: 6/29/16

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