IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

 SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

ERIC WILBURN, ) 

) 

Petitioner, ) 

) CAUSE NO. 3:16-CV-108 

vs. ) 

) 

SUPERINTENDENT, ) 

) 

Respondent. ) 

 OPINION AND ORDER 

 This matter is before the Court on the Petition under 28 

U.S.C. Paragraph 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Eric 

Wilburn, a pro se prisoner, on February 29, 2016. For the reasons 

set forth below, the court DENIES the petition pursuant to Section 

2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 4 and this case is DISMISSED. 

DISCUSSION 

 Wilburn filed a habeas corpus petition challenging ISO 16-

01-0010, a prison disciplinary proceeding held at the Indiana State 

Prison. On January 27, 2016, the Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) 

found him guilty of Disorderly Conduct in violation of B-236. As 

a result, he was sanctioned with the loss of 30 days earned credit 

time. In his petition, he attempts to raise three ground to 

challenge the finding of guilt. In his petition, Wilburn 

acknowledges that he did not present any of these grounds to the 

Final Reviewing Authority. DE 1 at 2 and 6. 
 In habeas corpus proceedings, the exhaustion requirement is 

contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). 

 Indiana does not provide judicial review of 

decisions by prison administrative bodies, so the 

exhaustion requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) is 

satisfied by pursuing all administrative remedies. These 

are, we held in Markham v. Clark, 978 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 

1992), the sort of “available State corrective process” 

(§ 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)) that a prisoner must use. Indiana 

offers two levels of administrative review: a prisoner 

aggrieved by the decision of a disciplinary panel may 

appeal first to the warden and then to a statewide body 

called the Final Reviewing Authority. Moffat sought 

review by both bodies, but his argument was limited to 

the contention that the evidence did not support the 

board’s decision. He did not complain to either the 

warden or the Final Reviewing Authority about the 

board’s sketchy explanation for its decision. O’Sullivan 

v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 

1 (1999), holds that to exhaust a claim, and thus 

preserve it for collateral review under § 2254, a 

prisoner must present that legal theory to the state’s 

supreme court. The Final Reviewing Authority is the 

administrative equivalent to the state’s highest court, 

so the holding of Boerckel implies that when 

administrative remedies must be exhausted, a legal 

contention must be presented to each administrative 

level. 

Moffat v. Broyles, 288 F.3d 978, 981-82 (7th Cir. 2002). 

 Because Wilburn concedes that he did not present these three 

grounds to the Final Reviewing Authority, they are all procedurally 

defaulted. Nevertheless, procedural default can be excused and the 

court can consider a claim that was not properly raised if a 

petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice. Weddington v. 

Zatecky, 721 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir. 2013). Here, Wilburn explains 

that he was unfamiliar with the appeal process and he had another 
inmate prepare the appeals for him. However, “it is well 

established in this Circuit that circumstances such as youth, lack 

of education, and illiteracy are not external impediments within 

the context of excusing procedural default.” Harris v. McAdory, 

334 F.3d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 2003). Indeed, Harris went on to hold 

that neither mental retardation, mental deficiencies, nor mental 

illness demonstrate cause to excuse procedural default. Therefore, 

Wilburn’s ignorance does not excuse the procedural default. 

 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, the court DENIES the petition 

pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 4 and this case is 

DISMISSED. 

DATED: March 3, 2016 /s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge 

United State District Court