UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

 SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

KEVIN CENCELEWSKI, ) 

 ) 

PLAINTIFF ) 

 ) 

VS. ) CAUSE NO. 3:15-CV-580 RLM-MGG 

 ) 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,1 ACTING ) 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, ) 

 ) 

DEFENDANT ) 

 OPINION AND ORDER 

Kevin Cencelewski seeks judicial review of a final decision by the 

Commissioner of Social Security denying his applications for disability insurance 

benefits and Supplemental Security Income under the Social Security Act, 42 

U.S.C. §§ 423 and 1381 et seq. The court has jurisdiction over this action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). For the reasons that follow, the 

court reverses the Commissioner's decision and remands this case for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Cencelewski filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and 

Supplemental Security Income, alleging disability due to posttraumatic stress 

 

1 Nancy A. Berryhill was automatically substituted as the defendant in this case when 

she replaced Carolyn W. Colvin as the Acting Commissioner of Social Security pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). 
2 

disorder, depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, sleep apnea, chronic pain, 

hearing loss, gastrointestinal problems, migraine headaches, and chronic back 

pain. His application was denied initially, on reconsideration, and following an 

administrative hearing at which Mr. Cencelewski and a vocational expert 

testified. Based on the record before her, the ALJ found that Mr. Cencelewski 

had severe impairments, including posttraumatic stress disorder, depressive 

disorder, anxiety disorder, sleep apnea, chronic pain, and tinnitus with hearing 

loss, 2 but concluded that none of Mr. Cencelewski’s impairments met or 

medically equaled any of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, 

App’x 1. 

The ALJ decided that Mr. Cencelewski had the residual functional capacity 

to perform light work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), 

with limitations;3 and that he couldn’t perform his past relevant work, but could 

do other jobs, such as after hours housekeeper/cleaner, office helper, and 

production sorter. The ALJ concluded Mr. Cencelewski wasn’t disabled within 

the meaning of the Social Security Act and wasn’t entitled to benefits. 

 

2 The ALJ also found that Mr. Cencelewski had non-severe impairments: 

gastroesophageal reflux disease, lumbar spine impairment, headaches, diarrhea, 

hypertension, fibromyalgia, and substance abuse disorders in remission. 

3 The ALJ concluded that Mr. Cencelewski was “limited to simple, routine, repetitive 

tasks with only occasional decision making and changes in the work setting, no strict 

production quotas, no interaction with the general public, and only occasional 

interaction with co-workers and supervisors.” The ALJ also limited Mr. Cencelewski to 

environments involving moderate noise. 
3 

When the Appeals Council denied Mr. Cencelewski’s request for review, 

the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. Sims v. Apfel, 

530 U.S. 103, 107 (2000); Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010). 

This appeal followed. 

 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The issue before the court isn’t whether Mr. Cencelewski is disabled, but 

whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision that he wasn’t 

disabled. Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 2011); Nelms v. Astrue, 

553 F.3d 1093, 1097 (7th Cir. 2009). Substantial evidence means “such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Jones v. Astrue, 

623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010). In reviewing the ALJ’s decision, the court 

can’t reweigh the evidence, make independent findings of fact, decide credibility, 

or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner, Simila v. Astrue, 

573 F.3d 503, 513 (7th Cir. 2009); Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 434–435 (7th 

Cir. 2000), but instead must conduct “a critical review of the evidence, 

considering both the evidence that supports, as well as the evidence that detracts 

from, the Commissioner’s decision.” Briscoe v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th 

Cir. 2005). While the ALJ isn’t required “to address every piece of evidence or 

testimony presented, he must provide a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and 

the conclusions so that [the court] can assess the validity of the agency’s ultimate 
4 

findings and afford the claimant meaningful judicial review.” Jones v. Astrue, 

623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010). ALJs must “sufficiently articulate their 

assessment of the evidence to assure [the court] that they considered the 

important evidence and to enable [the court] to trace the path of their reasoning.” 

Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations 

omitted). 

 III. DISCUSSION

Mr. Cencelewski argues that the ALJ made four errors that require 

remand: (1) she didn’t consider all relevant evidence in adjudicating his claim; 

(2) she didn’t consider the aggregate effect of Mr. Cencelewski’s impairments, (3) 

her credibility determination was flawed, and (4) her residual functional capacity 

assessment improperly omitted restrictions related to his interaction with 

coworkers and fatigue. Mr. Cencelewski asks the court to either reverse the 

Commissioner's decision and award benefits or remand the case for further 

proceedings. 

A. Relevant Evidence

Mr. Cencelewski argues that the ALJ erred by not considering all relevant 

evidence when determining the limiting effects of his mental impairments, 

including evidence regarding his depressive symptoms and his Global 
5 

Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scores.4 Mr. Cencelewski contends that the 

ALJ considered only the evidence that suggested he had experienced 

improvement with regard to his mental impairments, but ignored medical reports 

indicating his symptoms of depression were worsening. The Commissioner says 

the ALJ wasn’t required to address every piece of evidence in her decision. Citing 

Sims v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 424, 429 (7th Cir. 2002). 

The ALJ addressed three 2014 psychological treatment reports: a January 

2014 report she noted “indicated that [Mr. Cencelewski] was doing very well”, 

and two February 2014 reports, one describing Mr. Cencelewski’s prognosis as 

“excellent” and the other stating that he was enjoying activities, with good 

motivation and energy levels. She cited 2013 and 2014 medical reports to 

support her opinion that Mr. Cencelewski was “doing well.” But the ALJ didn’t 

address medical reports from that period contradicting her opinion. She didn’t 

address an April 2014 report from Mr. Cencelewski’s treating psychiatrist 

indicating Mr. Cencelewski had worsening depressive symptoms. Nor did she 

address reports from November 2013, January 2014, or April 2014 by his 

treating psychologist noting that his Beck Depression Inventory score indicated 

severe depression. 

 

4 A GAF score represents the clinician’s judgment of the patient’s psychological, social, 

and occupational functioning. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL 

OF MENTAL DISORDERS 32 (4th ed. 2000). Patients are measured on a 100 point scare 

that is divided into ten ranges of functioning. Id. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 

of Mental Disorders no longer includes the GAF metric, but ALJ’s may still consider GAF 

scores as opinion evidence. See Williams v. Colvin, 757 F.3d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 2014). 
6 

An ALJ isn’t “permitted to ‘cherry-pick’ from [mixed treatment records] to 

support a denial of benefits,” Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2011), 

and “may not analyze only the evidence supporting her ultimate conclusion while 

ignoring the evidence that undermines it.” Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1123 

(7th Cir. 2014). See also Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 2008) (“the 

ALJ must rest its denial of benefits on adequate evidence contained in the record 

and must explain why contrary evidence does not persuade”). “An ALJ may not 

selectively consider medical reports . . . but must consider all relevant evidence.” 

Myles v. Astrue, 582 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). 

Mr. Cencelewski also asserts that the ALJ erred by not addressing a GAF 

score that could have supported his disability claim, while relying on other GAF 

scores to support her determination that he wasn’t disabled. 

The ALJ addressed four GAF scores in her opinion, ranging from 55 to70, 

and indicated that the scores of 65, 67 and 70 suggested Mr. Cencelewski’s 

symptoms were mild and that while he might experience “some difficulty in 

occupational and social functioning” he was “generally functioning reasonably 

well.” She noted that the GAF score of 55 indicated “moderate symptoms, or 

moderate difficulty in social and occupational functioning.” But the ALJ didn’t 

consider a GAF score of 50 reported by psychiatrist Hossein Ebadi-Tehrani, 

which indicated serious symptoms or serious impairment in social, occupational, 

or school functioning and can reflect an inability to keep a job. See Campbell v. 
7 

Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 307 (7th Cir. 2010); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC &

STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 32 (4th ed. 2000). 

The Commissioner contends that a GAF score is nothing more than a 

snapshot of a claimant’s functioning at a particular moment, and the ALJ was 

correct to disregard this particular GAF score because it occurred on the day Mr. 

Cencelewski presented himself for addiction treatment. But the ALJ didn’t 

provide any rationale for disregarding this GAF score and “the agency's attorneys 

may not advance an explanation the agency never made itself and may not 

attempt to support the decision with evidence the agency apparently did not 

consider.” Arnett v. Astrue, 676 F.3d 586, 593 (7th Cir. 2012). 

Further, the Commissioner’s argument goes more to the weight the ALJ 

should have given the GAF score, rather than whether she should have 

addressed it. “[T]he problem here is not the failure to individually weigh the low 

GAF score[ ] but a larger general tendency to ignore or discount evidence 

favorable to [Mr. Cencelewski’s] claim, which included [a] GAF score[ ] . . . 

suggesting a far lower level of functioning than that captured by the ALJ's 

hypothetical and mental RFC.” Yurt v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 850, 860 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Because the ALJ didn’t properly address evidence in the record supporting Mr. 

Cencelewski’s disability claims, this case must be remanded.5

 

5 Mr. Cencelewski also argues that the ALJ didn’t properly consider other evidence, 

including evidence regarding his mood. Mr. Cencelewski notes that the ALJ didn’t 

address a February 2013 treatment note indicating that he reported that his mood “was 

a little down” the prior few weeks. But the ALJ did note that a March 2013 medical 
8 

B. Combined Effects of Impairments 

Mr. Cencelewski next contends that the ALJ erred by not explaining how 

she considered the combined effect of his impairments in making her residual 

functional capacity assessment. The Commissioner responds that the ALJ 

properly considered Mr. Cencelewski’s impairments because she discussed each 

impairment individually and concluded that the impairments didn’t prevent him 

from working. 

The ALJ was required to “consider the aggregate effect of th[e claimant’s] 

entire constellation of ailments–including those impairments that in isolation are 

not severe.” Golembiewski v. Barnhart, 322 F.3d 912, 918 (7th Cir. 2003) 

(emphasis in original); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1523, 416.923. See also Williams v. 

Colvin, 757 F.3d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 2014); Browning v. Colvin, 766 F.3d 702, 

706 (7th Cir. 2014). 

If an ALJ considers each impairment individually, finding that none of 

them alone would prevent the claimant from working, but doesn’t demonstrate 

that she considered how the impairments in combination would impact the 

claimant’s ability to work, the case must be remanded. Thomas v. Colvin, 745 

 

report found that Mr. Cencelewski’s “mental disorders manifested with symptoms 

including low energy” and that a November 2013 report found that his depressive 

symptoms were still present. “In rendering a decision, an ALJ must build a logical bridge 

from the evidence to [her] conclusion, but [she] need not provide a complete written 

evaluation of every piece of testimony and evidence.” Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 

362 (7th Cir. 2013). 
9 

F.3d 802, 807 (7th Cir. 2014). But see Browning v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 817, 821 

(8th Cir. 1992) (holding that an ALJ sufficiently articulates her analysis if she 

separately discusses the claimants impairments, subjective complaints, and 

daily activities and then concludes that those impairments don’t prevent the 

claimant from working). 

The ALJ discussed Mr. Cencelewski’s impairments individually in her 

opinion, but her analysis doesn’t support a conclusion that she considered the 

combined effect of Mr. Cencelewski’s impairments, such as how his depressive 

disorder and sleep apnea, in combination, impacted his ability to work. On 

remand, the ALJ should consider the aggregate effect of all of Mr. Cencelewski’s 

impairments. 

C. Credibility Determination 

Mr. Cencelewski contends that the ALJ’s credibility determination was 

flawed because, among other things, she improperly relied on a lack of functional 

restrictions in his treatment notes. The Commissioner contends that the ALJ 

provided a well-reasoned credibility evaluation that addressed the evidence in 

light of the regulatory factors. 

ALJ credibility determinations “are entitled to special deference because 

the ALJ is in a better position than the reviewing court to observe a witness,” but 

those determinations “are not immune from review.” Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. 

Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 354 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 
10 

F.3d 833, 843 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[b]ecause the ALJ is in the best position to observe 

witnesses, [the court] will not disturb [his] credibility determinations as long as 

they find some support in the record”). When evaluating credibility, an ALJ must 

“consider the entire case record and give specific reasons for the weight given to 

the individual’s statements.” Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 517 (7th Cir. 2009) 

(quoting SSR 96–7p6). The reviewing court must determine whether the ALJ’s 

determination “was reasoned and supported,” Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 

(7th Cir. 2008), and shouldn’t “overturn an ALJ’s credibility determination 

unless it is patently wrong.” Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 311 (7th Cir. 2012) 

(quotations omitted). 

 The ALJ found that Mr. Cencelewski’s “allegations with regard to the extent 

and severity of his limitations [were] not fully credible” in part because “no 

treating source ha[d] assessed limitations on [Mr. Cencelewski’s] ability to engage 

in work related activities.” But when a claimant is unemployed, as Mr. 

Cencelewski was during the relevant period, it’s improper for an ALJ to infer that 

“the absence of work restrictions in [a claimant’s] medical record undermined 

[his] claims of disabling impairments” because “[t]he absence of major work 

restrictions in [a claimant’s] medical records does not illuminate the question of 

[his] credibility.” Eskew v. Astrue, 462 F. App'x 613, 616 (7th Cir. 2011). 

 

6 SSR 96-7p was superseded by SSR 16-3p on March 16, 2016. SSR 96-7p was 

binding on the ALJ when her opinion was issued. See Lauer v. Bowen, 818 F.2d 636, 

640 (7th Cir. 1987). 
11 

 This matter is being remanded on other issues, so the court needn't reach 

any conclusions as to whether this problem alone makes the ALJ’s credibility 

determination patently wrong or address the other concerns Mr. Cencelewski 

raised regarding the ALJ’s credibility determination. On remand, the ALJ should 

ensure that her credibility determination is reasoned, supported, and based only 

on the proper factors. See Creek v. Village of Westhaven, 144 F.3d 441, 445 (7th 

Cir. 1998) (quoting Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 168, (1939) 

(recognizing that a lower court is free to consider issues even if they weren’t 

included within the mandate of the reviewing court). 

D. Residual Functional Capacity 

Mr. Cencelewski contends that the ALJ’s findings regarding his residual 

functional capacity improperly omitted restrictions such as limiting his 

interaction with coworkers. Two state agency mental health consultants, Drs. 

Ken Lovko and J. Grange opined that Mr. Cencelewski could “relate on at least 

a superficial basis” with coworkers. The ALJ gave the consultants’ opinions 

significant weight while recognizing that her determination varied some from 

their opinions on Mr. Cencelewski’s limitations. The ALJ found, as part of her 

assessment, that Mr. Cencelewski was limited to only occasional interaction with 

coworkers, but was silent as to the depth of that contact with coworkers. 

Mr. Cencelewski argues that the ALJ’s assessment of his functional 

capacity was improper because she should have limited him to superficial 
12 

contact with coworkers. But Mr. Cencelewski doesn’t point to evidence from any 

source opining that he could only relate to coworkers superficially. The 

consultants’ reports he cites indicates that Mr. Cencelewski could relate to his 

coworkers at least superficially. 

Mr. Cencelewski also asserts that the ALJ erred by not explaining why she 

didn’t include work-related functional limitations related to his fatigue in her 

residual functional capacity assessment. While the ALJ recognized that Mr. 

Cencelewski complained of fatigue and that his fibromyalgia could cause fatigue, 

she didn’t provide any discussion of the limiting effects of fatigue or indicate 

whether she accounted for it in her assessment. See Myles v. Astrue, 582 F.3d 

672, 676–677 (7th Cir. 2009) (recognizing error when an ALJ acknowledges 

complaints of fatigue but doesn’t articulate a rationale for rejecting them). On 

remand, the ALJ should consider the combined effects of Mr. Cencelewski’s 

impairments, including fatigue, on his functional capacity. 

 IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner's decision is VACATED and 

this case is REMANDED for further proceeding consistent with this opinion. 

SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED: March 28, 2017 

 /s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr. 

 Judge, United States District Court