UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

TERRANCE FLYNN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Case No. 3:15-CV-066 JD

v. )

)

MR. MARION THATCHER and RON NEAL, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Terrance Flynn, a pro se prisoner, filed a complaint alleging that he has been denied Equal

Protection because he was prevented from applying to the Honor Program at the Indiana State Prison

because of his age. “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint,

however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Nevertheless, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the merits of a prisoner

complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

“In order to state a claim under § 1983 a plaintiff must allege: (1) that defendants deprived him of

a federal constitutional right; and (2) that the defendants acted under color of state law.” Savory v.

Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006). 

Flynn is suing Unit Team Manager Mr. Marion Thatcher who oversees the Honor Program

and alleges he refused to allow Flynn to apply because he was not 35 years of age. He is also suing

Superintendent Ron Neal because he is in charge of the Indiana State Prison. Flynn alleges that the

Honor Program conveys special privileges on 88 prisoners, all of whom are 35 and older. Though
there are other criteria for entering for program, Flynn states that he meets those requirements and

does not dispute their legitimacy. He argues that:

1. The Defendants have violated Flynn right to Equal Protection pursuant to

the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution by treating Flynn disparately

without any relation to a legitimate penal interest.

2. The Defendants have violated the Flynn Equal Protection rights by

engaging in age discrimination without any rational basis for the discrimination.

3. Flynn is seeking the same benefits and privileges as those individuals who

reside in ICH. Flynn is not looking to reside to ICH.

DE 1 at 3. 

A similar challenge to the age requirements for the Honor Program was recently raised

against the same defendants by another inmate at the Indiana State Prison. See Wrightsman v.

Thatcher, 3:15-CV-087 (N.D. Ind. filed February 25, 2015). That case was dismissed for failure to

state a claim because the age limit for admission to the Honor Program is a rational requirement

which does not violate the Equal Protection clause. Though this case is not barred by res judicata

because Flynn was not a party to that proceeding, the analysis applied by Judge Springmann in that

case is convincing and this case must be dismissed for the same reasons. Here is how the age

discrimination claim was analyzed in Wrightsman:

The Plaintiff states that the Honor Program confers special privileges on a

select group of prisoners. Such privileges include, in part, additional hours of

non-confinement and visitation rights, access to certain exercise equipment, and

permission to purchase video games. Compl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 1. He explains that to get

into the program “the offender must be at least 35 years of age” and “[t]here must be

24 months with no conduct reports, and 48 months with no conduct reports involving

violence.”1 Id. The Plaintiff attaches a form indicating that he was rejected because

of his age. Id., ECF No. 1-1.

Although it is possible to raise an Equal Protection claim based on age

discrimination, “an age classification is presumptively rational.” Kimel v. Fl. Bd. of

Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84 (2000).

States may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the

Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is

rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The rationality

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commanded by the Equal Protection Clause does not require States

to match age distinctions and the legitimate interests they serve with

razorlike precision. As we have explained, when conducting rational

basis review we will not overturn such government action unless the

varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the

achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can

only conclude that the government’s actions were irrational.

* * *

Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a State may rely on age as a proxy

for other qualities, abilities, or characteristics that are relevant to the

State’s legitimate interests. The Constitution does not preclude

reliance on such generalizations. That age proves to be an inaccurate

proxy in any individual case is irrelevant. Where rationality is the

test, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely

because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. 

Id. at 83–84 (quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). In particular, “young

age is quite often relevant to valid state concerns, as the Constitution itself attests.”

Hedgepeth ex rel. Hedgepeth v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 386 F.3d 1148,

1154 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 2 (minimum age for House of

Representatives); id. § 3 (minimum age for Senate); id. art. II, § 1 (minimum age for

President)). Given that “a State may rely on age as a proxy for other qualities,

abilities, or characteristics,” Kimel, 528 U.S. at 84, age is permissibly used as a proxy

for maturity in a variety of areas, including voting, marriage, driving, alcohol

consumption, and employment. As such, the use of age as a proxy for maturity when

determining admission into the Honor Program would also be constitutionally

permissible, particularly in the context of prison. Statistics show that young inmates

are generally less mature and more prone to criminal behavior. See, e.g., Howard N.

Snyder, Arrest in the United States, 1990-2010, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau

of Justice Statistics, 3–12 (October 2012),

http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aus9010.pdf (only 18% of those arrested for

murder were 40 or older; 23% for rape; 11% for robbery; 25% for aggravated

assault; 24% for simple assault; 14% for burglary; 20% for larceny-theft; 15% for

motor vehicle theft; 16% for weapons violations; and 18% for drug abuse violations.)

Of course, there are young inmates who are more mature and less prone to criminal

behavior than older inmates, but such an age generalization – like the age

generalizations employed in the areas noted above – is nevertheless rational. See

Lauth v. McCollum, 424 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Governmental action only

fails rational basis scrutiny if no sound reason for the action can be hypothesized.”)

Because the Plaintiff cannot overcome the presumption that the distinction instituted

for participation in the Honors Program is rationally related to a legitimate state

interest, a valid Equal Protection claim has not been alleged.

Id., DE 7 at 1-3 (footnote omitted). 

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So too in this case. Because the use of age as a criteria for admission in the Honor Program

was not irrational, Flynn’s equal protection rights have not been violated and this complaint does

not state a claim. Although it is usually necessary to permit a plaintiff the opportunity to file an

amended complaint when a case is dismissed sua sponte, see Luevano v. Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d 1014

(7th Cir. 2013), that is unnecessary where the amendment would be futile. Hukic v. Aurora Loan

Servs., 588 F.3d 420, 432 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[C]ourts have broad discretion to deny leave to amend

where . . . the amendment would be futile.”). Such is the case here. The use of age for admission to

the Honor Program did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. No amendment to this complaint

could change either the operative facts or law on which this decision is based, therefore it would be

futile to permit Flynn to file an amended complaint.

For the forgoing reasons, this case is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: June 1, 2015

 /s/ JON E. DEGUILIO 

Judge

United States District Court

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