[Cite as State v. Ball , 2020-Ohio-3156.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO Appellee

v. WAYNE E. BALL Appellant C.A. No. 29484

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE No. CR 18 11 3925
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: June 3, 2020

TEODOSIO, Judge. {¶1} Wayne Ball appeals the denial o f his motion to suppress in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. T his Court affirms.
I. {¶2} According to Akron Police Officer Cory Siegferth, he was on pat rol one morning around 1:00 a.m. when he heard three gunshots coming from a nea rby area. He drove in the direction of the shots and began to canvass the area in his cru iser. About a minute after hearing the gunshots, Officer Siegferth no ticed a man walking along the road toward him. While stopped at an intersection, he saw the m an cross from the north side of the road to the south side outside of an approved crosswalk. The officer testified that he made eye contact with the man as they passed each other, and he decided to turn his cruiser around to ask wh ether the man heard the gunshots and because he had seen the man jaywalk.2
{¶3} Officer Siegferth testified that he did a U-turn and pulled alo ngside the man, who had gone onto the sidewalk next to the road. The man turned to ward the cruiser, but kept his body at an angle, obscuring one of his arms and making the officer t hink that he could be hiding something or was preparing to run or fight. Officer Siegferth exited his vehicle and began talking to the man, Mr. Ball, who he now recognized as someone he had m et before during an investigation. Mr. Ball denied hearing any gunshots. Accordin g to Officer Siegferth, from his previous interaction with Mr. Ball, he knew that Mr. Ball was k nown to carry a firearm. He, therefore, asked Mr. Ball to put his arms up so that he could p at him down for weapons before letting him go on his way. As Mr. Ball raised his arms, he tol d Officer Siegferth that he did in fact have a firearm in his possession. {¶4} Following the stop, the Grand Jury indicted Mr. Ball for having weapons while under disability, in violation of R.C. 29293.13, and carrying a concealed weapon, in violation of R.C. 2923.12. Mr. Ball moved to suppress the evidence gathered against him during the stop, arguing that Officer Siegferth did not have reasonable, articul able suspicion or probable cause to stop and frisk him. Following a hearing, the trial court denie d Mr. Ball’s motion. Mr. Ball subsequently pleaded no contest to the offenses, the trial cour t found him guilty, and the court sentenced him to two years imprisonment. Mr. Ball has appealed , assigning as error that the trial court incorrectly denied his motion to suppress.
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE POLICE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO STOP APPELLANT FOR JAYWALKING AND DENYING APPELLANT’S SUPPRESSION MOTION.3
{¶5} Mr. Ball argues that the trial c ourt should have granted his mo tion to suppress because Officer Siegferth did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop him. A motion to suppress presents a mix ed question of law and fact: When considering a motion to suppr ess, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual q uestions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, cr edible evidence. Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then in dependently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial cou rt, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. (Internal citations omitted.) State v. Burnside , 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. {¶6} “[A]lthough a police officer generally may not seize a person w ithin the meaning of the Fourth Amendment unless he has probable cause to arrest him for a crime, ‘not all seizures of the person must be justifie d by probable cause * * *.’” State v. Dunlap , 9th Dist. Summit No. 28762, 2018-Ohio-3658, ¶ 7, quoting Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983). “[N]ecessarily swift action predicated upon on-the-spot observations of the of ficer on the beat” “must be tested by the Fourth Amendment’s genera l proscription against unreason able searches and seizures.” Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). “[T]here is ‘no ready test for determ ining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search (or seize) against t he invasion which the search (or seizure) entails.’” Id . at 21, quoting Camara v. Mun. Court , 387 U.S. 523, 534-535, 536-537 (1967). {¶7} To justify an investigative stop, an officer must point to “spe cific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Maumee v. Weisner , 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 299, (1999), quoting Terry at 21. “[I]t is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standa rd: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant a m an of reasonable caution in the4

belief’ that the action ta ken was appropriate?” Terry at 21-22, quoting Carroll v. United States , 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). “In forming reasonable articulable s uspicion, law enforcement officers may ‘draw on their own experience and specialized training to m ake inferences from and deductions about the cum ulative information available to them t hat might well elude an untrained person.’” State v. Taylor , 9th Dist. Summit No. 26693, 2013-Ohio-3906, ¶ 7, quoting United States v. Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). {¶8} At the suppression hearing, Officer Siegferth initially gave tw o reasons for deciding to approach Mr. Ball. One was that he wanted to ask Mr. Ball a bout the gunshots he had heard. The other was that he had seen Mr. Ball jaywalk across the road . Mr. Ball argues that the officer did not have reasonable articulab le suspicion or probable cause to stop him because his crossing of the road from one to the other outside of a crosswalk did no t constitute jaywalking under the City of Akron’s municipal code. {¶9} Although the jaywalking ordinance was discussed during the supp ression hearing, Officer Siegferth also testified that he saw Mr. Ball walking i n the roadway instead of on the improved sidewalks on either sid e of the road, which was a viol ation of a different city ordinance. In its decision overruling Mr. Ball’s motion to suppress, the t rial court determined that Officer Siegferth had probable cause to stop Mr. Ball because he had se en Mr. Ball violate the ordinance concerning walking in the roadway when there is a sidewalk avai lable. {¶10} In his brief, Mr. Ball has not c hallenged the tri al court’s det ermination that Officer Siegferth had probable cause to stop him because he violated th e city ordinance prohibiting pedestrians from walking in the s treet if a sidewalk is availab le. We, therefore, c onclude that Mr. Ball has failed to establish that the trial court’s denial of h is motion to suppress was incorrect. See In re Estate of Hall , 67 Ohio App.3d 715, 720 (4th Dist.1990) (“It is appellant’s b urden, as a basic5 principle of appellate review, to affirmatively demonstrate in the record the error claimed.”); State v. Fry , 9th Dist. Summit No. 23211, 2007-Ohio-3240, ¶ 55. Mr. Ball’s assignment of error is overruled.
III. {¶11} Mr. Ball’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of t he Summit County Court of Common Pl eas is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, direc ting the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. Immediately upon the filing hereof , this document shall consti tute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file s tamped by the Clerk of the Cour t of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to m ake a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. Costs taxed to Appellant.

THOMAS A. TE ODOSIO FOR THE COURT6

CALLAHAN, P. J. HENSAL, J. CONCUR.
APPEARANCES: JEFFREY N. JAMES, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN DIMARTINO GUEST, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.