UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER L. SCRUGGS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) 

v. ) Cause No. 3:16-CV-039 JD

)

STG. SIN CLAIR, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Christopher L. Scruggs, a pro se prisoner, initially filed a vague complaint under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, wherein he generally complained about not having access to running water in his

cell. Though the complaint did not state a claim, he was granted leave to file an amended

complaint and clarify his allegations in the spirit of Luevano v. Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d 1014 (7th

Cir. 2013). Scruggs has now filed an amended complaint, alleging that he was denied anything to

drink for ten days. (DE 19.) 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review a complaint filed by a prisoner and

dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a), (b). The court applies the same standard as when deciding a motion to dismiss under

FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th

Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal, a complaint must state a claim for relief that is plausible on its

face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

1
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 603. The

court must bear in mind, however, that “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed,

and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 

Here, Scruggs alleges that he was housed under inhumane conditions at the Westville

Control Unit from December 2, 2015 through December 11, 2015. Scruggs complains that

defendants Lt. Creasy and Stg. SinClair ordered the running water in his cell turned off. For the

next ten days, Scruggs alleges he was deprived of anything to drink. He was not able to get any

water from his cell since the water was turned off. He was unable to go to the commissary and

purchase anything to drink because he was in segregation. And, he did not receive any liquids to

drink with his meals. He was given only powdered milk or drink mix. Scruggs spoke with

defendants Stg. Penny, C.O. Herbert, C.O. Kearby, DHB Officer Finn, C.O. Szkop, C.O.

Mahoney, C.O. Murray, C.O. Miller and C.O. Juan about his need for something to drink, but

none of these individuals would provide him with anything. On December 11, 2015, Stg. Sotos

turned back on the running water in Scruggs’s cell, which provided him water to drink. As a

result of having no liquids to drink for those ten days, Scruggs complains that his left side hurts

and it is hard for him to urinate.

In evaluating an Eighth Amendment claim, courts conduct both an objective and a

subjective inquiry. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The objective prong asks

whether the alleged deprivation is “sufficiently serious” so that “a prison official’s act results in

the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. Although “the Constitution

does not mandate comfortable prisons,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981), inmates

2
are entitled to adequate food, clothing, shelter, bedding, hygiene materials, and sanitation. Knight

v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2009); Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir.

2006). Conditions of confinement may establish a constitutional violation in combination when

each condition alone would not satisfy the standard. Gillis, 468 F.3d at 493. On the subjective

prong, the prisoner must show the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to the inmate’s

health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. As the Seventh Circuit has explained:

[C]onduct is deliberately indifferent when the official has acted in an intentional

or criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant must have known that the

plaintiff was at serious risk of being harmed and decided not to do anything to

prevent that harm from occurring even though he could have easily done so.

Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted); see also Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 1999) (where inmate

complained about severe deprivations but was ignored, he established a “prototypical case of

deliberate indifference”). 

As explained before, to determine whether Scruggs has stated a Constitutional claim for a

lack of drinking water, the court must evaluate both the severity and duration of the deprivation.

Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 1997)). The duration was relatively short, a ten

day period. However, the severity of the deprivation was extreme. Scruggs was denied anything

to drink during this time. Scruggs’ allegations that these defendants deprived him of any liquids

to drink for ten days satisfies the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment inquiry. Cf. Tesch v.

Cnty. of Green Lake, 157 F.3d 465, 476 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that an inmate’s allegations that

he was denied assistance in obtaining drinking water for “less than two full days” was de

minimis and did not state a claim for relief). With respect to the subjective prong, Scruggs

alleges that these defendants were personally aware of his lack of anything to drink, but

3
intentionally ignored his situation. If proven, these allegations could establish deliberate

indifference. See Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 1999) (where inmate repeatedly

complained about severe deprivations but was ignored, he established a “prototypical case of

deliberate indifference.”). Giving Scruggs the inferences to which he is entitled at this stage,

Scruggs has alleged an Eighth Amendment claim against the defendants for denying him any

liquids to drink for ten days.

For these reasons, the Court:

(1) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed on a claim against Stg. SinClair, Stg. Miller,

Stg. Penny, Lt. Creasy, C.O. Hebert, C.O. Mahoney, C.O. Murray, C.O. Finn, C.O. Kearby, C.O.

Juan and C.O. Szkop in their individual capacities for compensatory and punitive damages for

depriving him of any liquids to drink from December 2, 2105, through December 11, 2015,

under the Eighth Amendment;

(2) DISMISSES any and all other claims contained in the complaint;

(3) DIRECTS the United States Marshals Service to effect service of process on Stg.

SinClair, Stg. Miller, Stg. Penny, Lt. Creasy, C.O. Hebert, C.O. Mahoney, C.O. Murray, C.O.

Finn, C.O. Kearby, C.O. Juan and C.O. Szkop; and

(4) ORDERS Stg. SinClair, Stg. Miller, Stg. Penny, Lt. Creasy, C.O. Hebert, C.O.

Mahoney, C.O. Murray, C.O. Finn, C.O. Kearby, C.O. Juan and C.O. Szkop to respond, as

provided for in the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE and N.D. IND. L.R. 10.1, only to the

claim for which the pro se plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order.

4
SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: August 10, 2016

 /s/ JON E. DEGUILIO 

Judge

United States District Court

5