UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

MAURICE KNIGHT, SR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. 1:15 CV 289 

v. )

)

BILL HECK, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Maurice Knight, Sr., a pro se prisoner, initially filed a vague complaint pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Grant County Prosecutor Bill Heck and Investigator Julie

Autry. (DE # 2.) The court found that he failed to state a claim against either of the

named individual defendants. (DE # 12.) Nevertheless, in the spirit of Luevano v.

Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2013), he was granted leave to file an amended

complaint. (Id.) Knight has now filed an amended complaint, alleging that Prosecutor

Bill Heck’s investigator, Julie Autry, violated his constitutional rights by making false

statements to his common law wife. Knight sues both Heck and Autry.

The court must review the complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. To survive dismissal, the complaint

must state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of

Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 603. Thus, the plaintiff
“must do better than putting a few words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative

reader, might suggest that something has happened to her that might be redressed by

the law.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010). Nevertheless, the

court must bear in mind that “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be

held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). To state a claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that: (1) the defendants deprived him of

a federal constitutional right; and (2) the defendants acted under color of state law.

Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006). 

Knight is currently incarcerated at the Pendleton Correctional Facility. He alleges

that, in September 2014, Julie Autry called and arranged a meeting with his common

law wife, Deanna. At the meeting, Autry showed Deanna some photographs taken from

a marquee sign in front of a bookstore, which read, “Goodbye, good riddance, Deanna.”

Julie Autry expressed concern that the message on that sign was a threat to Deanna

from Knight. Knight claims that Autry’s statements were false, and damaged his

relationship with Deanna. Knight alleges that the sign was a joke created by the

bookstore owner in reference to a 75 year-old employee that was leaving her

employment with the book store. (DE # 15 at 13.) Knight seeks money damages from

Bill Heck and Julie Autry for a violation of his rights under the Due Process Clause.

 While Julie Autry may have been incorrect in saying that the sign was a threat

Knight was making towards Deanna from Knight, those statements did not violate the

plaintiff’s constitutional rights. This is true even if Autry knew that her statements were

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false. As Knight was told in the court’s prior order, even if Investigator Julie Autry’s

statements were false and defamatory, claims for slander or defamation are not

actionable as federal constitutional torts. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976).

Defamation is not a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of the due process clause.

Patton v. Przybylski, 822 F.2d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 1987). Therefore, these claims must be

dismissed.

As a final matter, Knight has requested to be appointed counsel. (DE # 16.) He

does not include any argument as to why counsel is needed, and instead lists attorneys

he contacted about taking his case, apparently without success. Unlike criminal

defendants, indigent civil litigants have no constitutional or statutory right to be

represented by counsel in federal court. Jackson v. County of McLean, 953 F.2d 1070, 1071

(7th Cir. 1992). Nevertheless, the court may in its discretion recruit pro bono counsel

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 when the circumstances warrant it. In assessing a request for pro

bono counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the court must make the following two inquiries:

“(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been

effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does

the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654

(7th Cir. 2007) (en banc).

Assuming Knight could satisfy the first prong, the court would find the

recruitment of pro bono counsel unnecessary. Knight’s filings reflect that he is fully

literate and capable of articulating himself to the court. There is no indication he

required the assistance of an attorney to complete the complaint form that was sent to

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him. Although he might have preferred to proceed with counsel, the court cannot

appoint counsel for this reason alone. See Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655; see also Olson v. Morgan,

750 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Whether to recruit an attorney is a difficult decision:

Almost everyone would benefit from having a lawyer, but there are too many indigent

litigants and too few lawyers willing and able to volunteer for these cases. District

courts are thus placed in the unenviable position of identifying, among a sea of people

lacking counsel, those who need counsel the most.”). 

Nor is there any indication that an attorney would have made a difference in the

outcome of this case. See Navejar v. Iyiola, 718 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013) (denial of

request for pro bono counsel will be improper only if there is “a reasonable likelihood

that the presence of counsel would have made a difference in the outcome of the

litigation.”). Knight’s allegations were clearly pled; they simply failed to give rise to an

actionable constitutional claim. Accordingly, his request for counsel will be denied. 

For these reasons, this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The

plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel (DE # 16) is DENIED. 

SO ORDERED.

Date: March 29, 2016

s/ James T. Moody 

JAMES T. MOODY, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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