IN THE SUPERIOR COUR T OF THE STATE OF DE LAWARE

L‟TANYA GRAHAM , and MARLAINE S. WILSON, as next friend of GABRIEL NIEEM WILSON, Plaintiffs,

v. DELAWARE GOLF & TRAVEL, LLC , d/b/a a Limited Liability Company and GOLDCLUB PARTNERS, LTD., a Delaware Corporation, MICHAEL ROSE, PML CLUBS, INC. and MICRO MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC,
Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) C.A. No. N1 5 C

- 12

- 245 CLS ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

Date Submitted: August 23 , 2016 Date Decided: January 20, 2017
On Defendant Michael Rose‟s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6)

.

GRANTED

.

ORDER

Beverly L. Bove, Esquire, and Vincent J.C. Hendrick, II, Esquire Wilmington, D elaware, Attorney for Plaintiffs L‟Tanya Graham and Marlaine S. Wilson. Michael Rose, pro se Defendant

.
SCOTT, J.2

D efendant, Michael Rose, move s this Court to dismiss him as a Defendant in the present action pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6 ). For the following reasons, Defendant ‟s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED

. Background
Plaintiff s L „Tanya Graham is the mother of decedent William O. B rown (hereinafter “Mr. Brown”) and Plaintiff Marlaine S. Wilson is the parent of Gabriel
Nieem Wilson, Mr. Brown‟s minor child respectively. On November 16, 2015 , Mr. Brown was an invitee at T he Gold Club located at 1031 South Market Street, Wilmington, Dela ware 19802. Mr. Brown was shot in the bathroom by an unknown patron. Plaintiffs filed a C omplaint with this Court on December 30,
2015. Plaintiff

s plead intentional, willful and wanton, reckless, an d negligent conduct against all Defendants , as well as a wrongful death action against all Defendants, including Defendant, Michael Rose (hereinaf ter “Mr. Rose”)

. Plaintiff s plead that Kent Manor, Inc., a Delaware corporat ion owned the property
where the incident occurred, 1031 South Market Street, Wilmington, Delaw are
19802. 1 Similarly, Defendant PML Clubs, Inc. is the owner of Defendant
Delaware Golf and Travel, LLC, d/b/a The Gold Cl ub. Consequently, Mr. Rose is the owner and operator of Kent Manor, Inc. and Defendant, PML Clubs Inc. In

1 Kent Manor, Inc. was dismissed from the case sub judice without prejudice.3

M arch 2016 this Court entered a Final Abatement Order and The Gold Club was
closed.
Standard of Review
The t est for sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is whether a plaintiff may recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof under the complaint. 2 In making its determination, the Court m ust accept all well

- pleaded allegations in the complaint
as true and draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non

- moving
party. 3 The complaint must be without merit as a matter of fact or law to be
dismissed. 4 Therefore, if the plaintiff ca n recover under any conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof under the complaint, the motion to dismiss will not be granted. 5
Discussion Defendant Michael Rose contends that a Motion to Dismiss is proper because Plaintiffs seek to pierce the corporate veil and hold Mr. Rose individually
liable for the wrongful death of Mr. Brown. Mr. Rose argues that Plaintiffs have

2 Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967, 968 (1978); see Cambium Ltd. v. Trilantic Capital Partners III L.P. , 2012 WL 172844, at *1 (Del. Jan. 20, 2012) (citing Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital Holdings LLC , 27 A.3d 531, 537 (Del. 2011)). 3 Ramunno v. Cawley, 705 A.2d 1029, 1034

- 36 (Del.1998); Nix v. Sawyer, 466 A.2d 407, 410 (Del. Super. Ct.1983). 4 Diamond State Tel. Co. v. University of Delaware, 269 A.2d 52 ( Del.1970). 5 Ramunno , 705 A.2d at 1034; see Cambium , 2012 WL 172844, at *1 (citing Cent. Mortg. , 27 A.3d at 537).4

not plead facts to demonstrate that he was present at the time of the incident or participated in the events which caused Mr. Brown‟s death. Plain t i ffs seem to argue that Mr. Rose is liable for the wrongful death of Mr. Brown under two
theories. First, Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Rose himsel f acted willfully, recklessly , and intentionally because at the time of Mr. Brown‟s death he operated illegal

a ctivities through his business PML Clubs, Inc

. 6 Second, Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Rose is liable under the theory that Mr. Rose willfully, reckl essly, and intentionally failed to train, supervise and monitor The Gold Club staff and premises, fully
aware of the unremitting criminal activity and previous injured patrons prior to Mr.
Brown‟s death. Mr. Rose‟s Motion to Dismiss is proper. Plaintiffs failed to plead facts in either their original Complaint or Amended Complaint demonstrat ing that Mr. Rose participated in, or was involved with , the incidents surrounding Mr. Brown‟s
death . Mr. Brown was shot by an unknown invitee in the bathroom of The G old Club, and even accept ing all well

- pleaded allegations in the C omplaint as true and drawing all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the Plaintiffs, no evidence exists demonstrating that Mr. Rose was a party involved in this shooting . To
address Plaintiffs ‟ second argument, as a matter of law this Court does not have

6 Plaintiffs cite to three online news articles stating that Mr. Rose plead guilty to racketeering, money laundering, and conspiracy to distribute cocaine in an action in the Northern District of California.5

jurisdiction to pierce the corporate veil of Defendant, PML Clubs, Inc. to hold Mr.
Rose personally liable for his alleged tort ious conduct

. Under Delaware Law, “[t]he personal parti cipation doctrine stands for the idea that, in certain situations, an officer in a corporation can be held liable for his own wrongful acts.” 7 Thus, a court may impose liability on “corporate officers for torts which they „commit, participate in, or inspi re, even though the acts are performed in the name of the corporation.‟” 8 Furthermore , “individual liability attaches only where an officer „directed, ordered, ratified, approved, or consented to‟ the tort ious act in question.” 9 However, “ only the Chance ry Court may preside over an action to pierce the corporate veil. ” 10 Thus, this Court may not determine whether Mr. Rose is individually liable for Mr. Brown‟s wrongful death through alleged tortious acts performed in the name of the corporation. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant
Michael Rose‟s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED

. IT IS SO ORDERED

.
/s/ Calvin L. Scott Judge Calvin L. Scott, Jr.

7 Brasby v. Morris , 2007 WL 949485, at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 29, 2007) (citing Brandt v. Rokeby Realty Co., 2004 WL 2050519 , at *26 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 2004)). 8 Brasby , 2007 WL 949485, at *8 (quoting Heroemus v. Ulrick, 1997 WL 524127 (Del. Super. Ct. July 9, 1997)). 9 Brasby , 2007 WL 949485, at *8 (citing Brandt, 2004 WL 2050519 , at *26 ); see also Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC , 62 A.3d 649, 667 (Del. Ch. 2012) (stating that “ Courts also may use piercing to benefit tort claimants, who additionally can recover from the indi viduals who committed the tort.”). 10 Vepco Park, Inc. v. Custom Air Servs., Inc. , 2016 WL 1613654, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2016); see also Sonne v. Sacks , 314 A.2d 194 (Del. 1973) (stating that “ piercing the corporate veil may be done only in the Court of Chancery, when the purpose of the action is to obtain a judgment against individual stockholders or officers”).