Filed 4/14/22 Kleidman v. RFF Family Partnership CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

PETER KLEIDMAN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

RFF FAMILY PARTNERSHIP, LP,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B302449

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. SC121303)

APPEAL from postjudgment orders of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Elaine W. Mandel, Judge. Affirmed.

Peter Kleidman, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant

Parcells Law Firm and Dayton B. Parcells III for Defendant and 

Respondent.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Peter Kleidman, in propria persona, appeals from the 

trial court’s order awarding defendant RFF Family Partnership, LP
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attorney fees incurred postjudgment and on appeal pursuant to Civil 

Code section 1717. Plaintiff also challenges the court’s issuance of a 

protective order that defendant need not respond to plaintiff’s discovery 

request. We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This court previously addressed the merits of this case in 

Kleidman v. RFF Family Partnership, LP (July 10, 2018, B268541). As 

explained in our prior opinion, plaintiff sued defendant (and others) for, 

among other claims, breach of contract, alleging that he had been 

overcharged interest, fees, and other expenses in connection with 

numerous loans. The loan agreement between defendant and plaintiff 

had a clause awarding attorney fees to the prevailing party. He failed 

to appear at trial and judgment was entered against him. In the prior 

appeal, we affirmed the judgment, affirmed the postjudgment order 

denying plaintiff’s motions to set aside the judgment and for a new trial, 

and affirmed the postjudgment order awarding attorney fees to 

defendant. After remittitur issued, defendant filed a motion in the trial 

court for additional attorney fees incurred postjudgment and on appeal. 

Defendant also filed a motion for protective order related to discovery 

propounded by plaintiff. The trial court granted defendant’s motions. 

The court awarded defendant $38,572.50 in attorney fees and issued an 

order that defendant need not respond to plaintiff’s belated discovery 

request. This appeal followed. 
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DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Attorney Fees

Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees 

to defendant and that the amount awarded was unreasonable. We 

disagree. 

As noted, this Court previously affirmed the underlying judgment 

and postjudgment orders in favor of defendant. (Kleidman v. RFF 

Family Partnership, LP (July 10, 2018, B268541).) In pertinent part, 

we concluded that defendant was the prevailing party, as it obtained a 

judgment relieving it of liability on plaintiff’s contract claims. Thus, 

defendant was the prevailing party in the trial court and on appeal. 

(Mustachio v. Great Western Bank (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1150; 

see Code Civ. Proc., § 1032.) A prevailing party is entitled to recover 

costs in any action or proceeding, “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly 

provided by statute.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (b).) “These costs, 

however, do not include the attorney fees the prevailing party has 

incurred in the litigation unless (1) an agreement between the parties 

provides for the recovery of those fees, or (2) a statute creates a right of 

recovery.” (Butler-Rupp v. Lourdeaux (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 918, 923; 

see Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1021, 1033.5, subd. (a).)

Here, defendant sought attorney fees pursuant to Civil Code 

section 1717, which provides generally that, “[i]n any action on a 

contract” with an attorney fees provision, the party “prevailing on the 

contract” shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees in addition to 

other costs. (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (a).) In our prior opinion, we 
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determined that the fee provision in the parties’ loan agreement 

provided for recovery of attorney fees to the prevailing party pursuant 

to Civil Code section 1717. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in finding defendant was the prevailing party

and awarding defendant attorney fees incurred postjudgment and on 

appeal.

1 (See Roden v. AmerisourceBergen Corp. (2007) 155 

Cal.App.4th 1548, 1578.) 

Defendant submitted to the trial court the declaration of its lead 

attorney (Dayton B. Parcells III) and a summary of the invoices sent to, 

and paid by, defendant to support its request for attorney fees. In the 

declaration, Parcells averred that his and his associates’ rates were the 

prevailing rates for similar work by attorneys with comparable 

experience in Los Angeles County. He further stated that the total 

number of hours spent postjudgment (specifically, responding to 

plaintiff’s motions for new trial) and on appeal was 77.85, at the hourly 

billing rates of $600 (for Parcells) and $350 (for his associates). This

1 During the pendency of the prior appeal, plaintiff filed a motion for the 

correction of a clerical error in the judgment. The trial court had granted 

defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, in part, as to plaintiff’s conversion 

cause of action only. This cause of action was “ordered stayed pending 

further order of the Court after resolution of Plaintiff’s five other claims 

against Defendant.” Because the judgment inadvertently disposed of the 

entire action against defendant, the court granted plaintiff’s motion, and 

corrected the judgment by interlineation to reflect that the conversion cause 

of action was still pending arbitration. However, plaintiff subsequently 

dismissed the conversion cause of action with prejudice in exchange for 

defendant waiving all requests for costs and fees in connection with this 

claim. Therefore, to the extent plaintiff challenges this court’s determination 

that defendant was the prevailing party, it is moot given plaintiff’s dismissal 

of this remaining claim with prejudice. 
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declaration alone was sufficient to support the fee award. (Syers 

Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 698 [“[i]t is 

well established that ‘California courts do not require detailed time 

records, and trial courts have discretion to award fees based on 

declarations of counsel describing the work they have done and the 

court’s own view of the number of hours reasonably spent’”]; Raining 

Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375; Sutter 

Health Uninsured Pricing Cases (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512 

[attorney declarations attesting to hours worked and hourly rates 

sufficient to support fee award]; Weber v. Langholz (1995) 39 

Cal.App.4th 1578, 1586–1587.) By granting the fees largely as 

requested,

2 the trial court impliedly found the request credible and 

reasonable. Plaintiff’s various contentions challenging the 

reasonableness of the attorney fees award would require us reweigh the 

evidence, something we decline to do. (G.R. v. Intelligator (2010) 185 

Cal.App.4th 606, 620 [“‘We may not reweigh on appeal a trial court’s 

assessment of an attorney’s declaration’”].) Given the broad discretion 

vested in the trial court when determining an attorney fee award, we 

find no abuse of that discretion. (See PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler 

(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1096.)

2 The trial court agreed with plaintiff’s challenge that 2.5 hours 

requested by defendant for correcting pagination of a brief was excessive and 

therefore subtracted the value of 2.5 hours ($1,500) from defendant’s total 

award. 
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B. Motion for Protective Order 

On appeal, plaintiff also challenges the trial court’s granting of 

defendant’s motion for protective order. The challenge is meritless.

More than three years after the discovery cut-off (March 21, 2015) 

and after remittitur was issued in the subsequent appeal, plaintiff 

propounded a request for production of documents on November 26, 

2018. After failed meet and confer efforts with plaintiff, defendant filed 

a motion for a protective order prohibiting discovery based, in part, on 

the lateness of the request. We conclude the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in granting the motion. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2024.020, 

subd. (a) [generally, a party is “entitled as a matter of right to complete 

discovery proceedings on or before the 30th day . . . before the date 

initially set for the trial of the action”].) Plaintiff has failed to put forth 

any persuasive authority to permit discovery beyond the discovery cutoff in this case. 

DISPOSITION

The postjudgment orders are affirmed. Defendant shall recover 

its costs on appeal. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

WILLHITE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

COLLINS, J. CURREY, J.