UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

LIPPERT COMPONENTS 

MANUFACTURING, INC., 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

MOR/RYDE INTERNATIONAL INC., 

and MOR/RYDE INC., 

 Defendants. 

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Case No. 3:14-CV-1999 JD 

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Lippert Components Manufacturing, Inc. (“Lippert”) alleges that Defendants 

Mor/Ryde International, Inc. and Mor/Ryde, Inc. (“Mor/Ryde”) have infringed and contributed 

to the infringement of Lippert’s patents (U.S. Patent Nos. 7,918,478 (issued on April 5, 2011) 

and 7,296,821 (issued on November 20, 2007), hereinafter referred to as the ‘478 patent and ‘821 

patent, respectively), which concern the same suspension system equalizer technology.1 The 

accused instrumentality concerns Mor/Ryde’s products known as the CRE/3000 suspension 

system [DE 61-2] and the SRE/4000 suspension system [DE 61-3]. The parties initially 

identified four terms appearing in the patents that require construction: “suspension system”; 

“pivotally mounted”; “generally encapsulated between”; and, “at least partially encapsulated 

between”. However, once the claim construction briefs were filed [DE’s 110, 121, 122, 132, 133] 

 

1

 The patents-in-suit are entitled “Equalizer For Suspension System” and relate to an equalizer for a suspension 

system for a trailer. The Abstracts and the Summary of the Invention of the patents-in-suit provide that an equalizer 

is configured to absorb or dampen harsh shocks or vibrations coming off of leaf springs to allow for a softer ride in 

vehicles or trailers having tandem axles generally between 2,000 to 7,000 pounds with double eye springs. The 

invention achieves this softer ride by using one or two independent equalizer arms that are rotatably secured within 

the equalizer. Each equalizer arm is associated with one of the leaf springs such that upon upward movement of the 

leaf spring, the equalizer arm assembly is forced to rotate within the equalizer and to deform a shock absorber 

provided within the equalizer. The shock absorber then, upon deformation, absorbs the shocks and vibrations. 
2 

and the claims construction hearing held [DE 168], the parties agreed that the only contested 

term requiring the Court’s consideration was the term “pivotally mounted”.2 

I. Legal Standard 

As a matter of law, the Court must construe the claims of the patent for the jury. 

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 977 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Claim construction is 

crucial because it “defines the scope of the protected invention.” Bell Commc'ns Research, Inc. v. 

Vitalink Commc'ns Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 619 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 

In interpreting a disputed claim, the court must first look at the intrinsic evidence of 

record—the patent itself, including the claims, the specification, and (if in evidence) the 

prosecution history. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 

The process begins with the words of the claims. Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa North American Corp., 

299 F.3d 1313, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2002). “It is a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims of a 

patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” Phillips v. 

AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted); 

Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1324 (“The claim language defines the bounds of claim scope.”). Absent an 

express intent otherwise, claim terms should be given “the ordinary and customary meaning . . . 

that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the 

invention.”3 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. “[T]he context of the surrounding words of the claim 

 

2

 The parties agree that “suspension system” is properly construed as “component(s) connecting the axle of a vehicle 

to the frame of the vehicle” [DE 110 at 2]; and, they withdrew construction of the terms “generally encapsulated 

between” and “at least partially encapsulated between”. 

3

 Mor/Ryde does not dispute Lippert’s assertion that the person of ordinary skill in the art is someone who has either 

(i) a high-school degree and approximately five years of mechanical experience in suspension systems for trailers or 

recreational vehicles or (ii) a mechanical technology degree with approximately a year of experience in suspension 

systems for trailers or recreational vehicles. 
3 

also must be considered in determining the ordinary and customary meaning of those terms.” 

ACTV, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 346 F.3d 1082, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

However, the claims do not stand alone and they “must be read in view of the 

specification, of which they are a part.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 

979). The specification includes the drawings and the written description of the invention. 

Playtex Products, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble, Co., 400 F.3d 901, 909 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The 

specification “is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is 

dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 

1315 (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582). It can resolve ambiguities between the ordinary and 

customary meaning of words if the words used in the claim are not sufficiently clear to allow the 

scope of the claim to be determined from words alone. Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1325. Yet, there’s a 

difference “between using the specification to interpret the meaning of a claim,” which is 

permissible, and “importing limitations from the specification into the claim,” which is not. 

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. “[T]he general principle is that limitations from the specification are 

not to be read into the claims.” Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 

(citation omitted). 

Finally, the court must look to the patent’s prosecution history, which “consists of the 

complete record of the proceedings before the [USPTO] and includes the prior art cited during 

the examination of the patent.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. “The prosecution history can often 

inform the meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the 

invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution, making the 

claim scope narrower than it would otherwise be.” Id. A patentee may modify the “meaning of a 
4 

claim term by making a clear and unmistakable disavowal of scope during prosecution.” Purdue 

Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms., Inc., 438 F.3d 1123, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 

Nonetheless, if intrinsic evidence does not resolve the ambiguity in a disputed claim 

term, the court may then look to extrinsic evidence, such as expert testimony, inventor testimony, 

dictionaries, and treatises. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584. Extrinsic evidence may help the court 

better understand “the way in which one of skill in the art might use the claim terms.” AquaTex 

Indus., Inc. v. Techniche Solutions, 419 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). But

extrinsic evidence may not be used to “contradict any definition found in or ascertained by a 

reading of the patent documents.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1322–23 (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 

1584, n.6). As the Federal Circuit explained in Phillips: “Ultimately, the interpretation to be 

given a term can only be determined and confirmed with a full understanding of what the 

inventors actually invented and intended to envelop with the claim. The construction that stays 

true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention 

will be, in the end, the correct construction.” Id. at 1316 (citation omitted). 

II. Construction of “Pivotally Mounted” 

The term “pivotally mounted” appears in the ‘821 patent: Claims 1, 8-10, 12-14, 23-25, 

and 27-28 (with Claims 1 and 14 asserted in the independent format); and, in the ‘478 patent: 

Claims 1, 4, 15, and 17 (with Claims 1 and 15 asserted in the independent format). 

In its opening claim construction brief, Lippert proposes that “pivotally mounted” should 

be construed as “mounted for rotation about an axis.” [DE 121 at 13]. Lippert notes that the 

specifications of the patents use the description “rotatably secured or pivotally mounted,” and the 

figures illustrate that the rotation occurring between the identified components occurs “about an 
5 

axis.” Extrinsically, Lippert argues that its proposed definition is also consistent with the 

dictionary definitions that it has provided. 

In response, Mor/Ryde argues that Lippert’s claim construction position relative to the 

term “pivotally mounted”: (1) is inconsistent with the plain and ordinary meaning given to it by 

the specification “because it would include embodiments where the axis point could move nonrotationally” [DE 133 at 7–9]; (2) broadens the claims beyond the inventor’s intention as 

evidenced by the inventor’s descriptions of the invention in the patents’ Summary of the 

Invention, the Abstract, and the embodiments [Id. at 9–11]; (3) is not consistent with the 

remaining dictionary definitions of the word “pivot” [Id. at 11–12]; and (4) will render the 

patents-in-suit invalid for failure to comply with the enablement requirement [Id. at 13–14]. 

Ultimately, Mor/Ryde argues that no construction of the term “pivotally mounted” is necessary 

because the ordinary and customary meaning is so apparent—that is, the term necessarily 

describes rotational (not linear) movement, around a “fixed” axis. In sum, the parties’ dispute 

concerns whether “pivotally mounted” allows rotational movement only from a fixed point. 

The Court finds that the intrinsic evidence does not support Mor/Ryde’s overly narrow 

reading of the claim term “pivotally mounted”. Claims 1 and 14 of the ‘821 patent recite that a 

“first plate [is] pivotally mounted to the frame of the vehicle” and that “at least one equalizer arm 

[is] pivotally mounted to said first plate”; and, Claim 14 further recites that the “equalizer [is] 

pivotally mounted to the frame of the vehicle.” [DE 121-1 at 27-28]. Similarly, Claims 1 and 15 

of the ‘478 patent recite that a “first plate [is] pivotally mounted to the frame of the vehicle” and 

that “at least one equalizer arm [is] pivotally mounted to said first plate”; and, Claim 15 further 

recites that the “equalizer [is] pivotally mounted to the frame of the vehicle.” [DE 121-2 at 68-

69]. 
6 

The specifications of the ‘821 and ‘478 patents describe that the first plate is “rotatably 

secured or pivotally mounted” [DE 121-1 at p. 26, 17:62-18:28; DE 121-2 at p. 54, 20:21-49]; 

that the equalizer arm is “rotatably secured or pivotally mounted between the first and second 

base plates” [DE 121-1, at 26, 17:39-45; DE 121-2 at 54, 19:66-20:6]; and, that the equalizer is 

“rotatably secured or pivotally mounted” between extending portions of the center frame hangar 

[DE 121-1 at p. 26-27, 17:62-18:28, 18:45-19:6; DE 121-2 at p. 54-55, 20:21-49, 21:3-31]. 

With respect to the drawings, figures 2 and 35-36 of the ‘821 patent illustrate that the first 

plate (104b) of the equalizer (100) is mounted for rotation about an axis (illustrated at point J in 

figure 2, see also fastening member (390)) to a center frame hanger (372) of the frame (374) of 

the vehicle. DE 121-1 at Figs. 2 and 35-36; see also DE 121-1 at p. 26-27, 18:49-55 (discussing 

that the equalizer is “rotatably secured” to the center frame at point J). The figures also illustrate 

that the equalizer arm (108b) is mounted for rotation about an axis (illustrated at points R or S in 

figure 2, see also fastening members (122b and 122c) and securing members (124b and 124c)) to 

the first plate (104b), wherein the rotation can actually be seen in comparing the change in the 

side spacing between the first plate (104b) and the equalizer arm (108a/b) across figures 36-38. 

Id.; see also DE 121-1 at p. 26-27, 17:39-45; 19:56-60 (discussing that the equalizer arm “rotates 

or pivots” about point R); 20:17-21 (discussing that the equalizer arm “rotates or pivots” about 

point S).4

 Similarly, figures 39-44 of the ‘478 patent illustrate that the first plate (520a) of the 

equalizer (500) is mounted for rotation about an axis (illustrated at point J in figure 39, see also

upper pivot tube (532) and bushing (534a)) to a center frame hanger (516) of the frame (760) of 

the vehicle. DE 121-2, at Figs. 39-44; see also DE 121-2 at p. 61, 33:9-13 (noting that the 

 

4

 In the specification of the ‘821 and ‘478 patents, the rotation that occurs between the identified components occurs 

“about an axis.” DE 121-1, 3:12-34 (describing the views of Figures 33 through 38); 19:55-60; 20:17-22 (noting 

rotation occurs about identified points R and/or S, with said points corresponding with an axes); id. at 18:49-55 

(noting rotation occurs about identified point J, with said point corresponding with an axis). 
7 

equalizer “rotates” upwardly and to the left relative to the center hanger (516) about point J); 

33:31-35 (noting that the equalizer “rotates” upwardly and to the left relative to the center hanger 

(516) about point J). The figures also illustrate that the equalizer arm (524a) is mounted for 

rotation about an axis (illustrated at points R or S in figure 39; see also fastening members (750b 

and 750c) and securing members (756b and 756b)); see also pivot tubes (590a and 590b) of the 

equalizer arms to the first plate (520a). Id.; see also DE 121-2 at p. 61, 33:13-17 (noting that the 

equalizer arm “rotates” or pivots upwardly between the first and second plates about point R); 

33:35-39 (noting that the equalizer arm “rotates” or pivots upwardly between the first and second 

plates about point S). 

Thus, the specifications indicate that rotation of parts “pivotally mounted” occur about a 

point or axis, but does not necessarily limit the movement to a “fixed” axis point. Mor/Ryde’s 

attempt to import such a limitation, without a clear indication in the intrinsic record that the 

patentee intended the claims to be so limited, is improper. See Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, 

Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 

Moreover, the fact that the patentee disclosed particular embodiments, does not 

necessarily import such a limitation. GE Lighting Sol’ns, LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 

1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (reasoning that the specification and prosecution history only compel 

departure from the plain meaning in two instances: lexicography and disavowal; and, to act as its 

own lexicographer, a patentee must “clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term,” 

and “clearly express an intent to define the term[]”; while, disavowal requires that “the 

specification [or prosecution history] make[ ] clear that the invention does not include a 

particular feature.”). “[I]t is improper to read limitations from a preferred embodiment described 

in the specification—even if it is the only embodiment—into the claims absent a clear indication 
8 

in the intrinsic record that the patentee intended the claims to be so limited.” Liebel–Flarsheim 

Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 

Here, the specifications explicitly clarified that “this invention may be susceptible to 

embodiment in different forms” and that the embodiments disclosed are “to be considered an 

exemplification of the principles of the invention, and . . . not intended to limit the invention to 

that as illustrated.” [DE 121-1 at 19; DE 121-2 at 47]. The specifications further provided that 

although preferred embodiments “of the invention [are] shown and described, it is envisioned 

that those skilled in the art may devise various modifications without departing from the spirit 

and scope of the foregoing description and the appended claims.” [DE 121-1 at 27; DE 121-2 at 

68]. Thus, the specifications and the prosecution history do not define “pivotally mounted” 

(except to alternatively refer to the term as “rotatably secured”) or include any indication that the 

inventor intended to act as its own lexicographer. In fact, the inventor expressly identified other 

mountings as “fixed,” as distinguished from pivotal mounting. DE 121-2 at p. 69, 49: 1-2 (“a 

second plate, spaced from said first plate, which is fixedly mounted to the first plate for pivoting 

therewith”) (italics added). Likewise, the specifications do not disavow or disclaim the plain 

meaning of “pivotally mounted” or otherwise limit the term to a particular disclosed 

embodiment, let alone one that requires rotation from a fixed point. 

The Court also concludes that the dictionary definitions provided by the parties need not 

be referred to by the Court because the intrinsic evidence makes the meaning of the term 

“pivotally mounted” clear. Although it is true that some of the dictionary definitions identified 

by Mor/Ryde [DE 133 at 11-12] would indicate that the term “pivot” could require rotation on a 

fixed axis (i.e., a basketball player who while stationary pivots on one foot), this extrinsic 

evidence may not be used to contradict any definition ascertained by a reading of the patent 
9 

documents. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1322–23. Moreover, other dictionary definitions identified by 

Lippert [DE 121 at 15], indicate that the term “pivot” can also relate to rotation about an axis 

(i.e., a short rod or shaft on which a related part rotates or swings). Thus, even if the dictionary 

definitions were considered, the Court’s claim construction would remain unchanged. Therefore, 

the Court concludes that the term “pivotally mounted” means “mounted for rotation about an 

axis”.5

III. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the disputed claim term “pivotally mounted” is construed in 

the manner set forth in this Opinion and Order. The Court will contact counsel in the near future 

to schedule a telephonic status conference so that this case may move forward. 

 SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED: June 18, 2018 

 /s/ JON E. DEGUILIO 

 Judge 

 United States District Court 

 

5

 At this time, the Court need not (and cannot) address the defense’s vague assertion and insufficiently developed 

argument that such a construction “would likely” render the patents invalid because one of ordinary skill in the art 

would be “unlikely to practice the claimed invention”. [DE 133 at 13]. This enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 

112(a) indicates that one skilled in the art must be enabled to make and use the invention. But the Court has 

insufficient facts before it to decide this issue, which is typically resolved on summary judgment. See, e.g., Minerals 

Separation Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270 (1916) (asking whether the experimentation needed to practice the 

invention is undue or unreasonable); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988); United States v. Telectronics, 

Inc., 857 F.2d 778, 785 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Invalidity must be proven by facts supported by clear and convincing 

evidence.”).