UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

JOHN H. DAVIS, SHELIA D. DAVIS and )

ERIC S. DAVIS, a minor by parents )

John H. Davis, father, and )

Shelia D. Davis, mother, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) 2:16CV120-PPS

)

ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN )

RESOURCES OF LIMESTONE COUNTY, )

ALABAMA, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

John and Shelia Davis’s first amended complaint seeks relief based on their

claims that the State of Alabama and its Department of Human Resources, through a

child welfare action, have unlawfully taken custody of their disabled son, Eric, and

blocked visitation by John and Shelia.1

 As I’ve previously observed, that simple

sentence offers the gist of the Davises’ lawsuit in a nutshell, but their pleadings are far

from simple. The first amended complaint is 165 pages long, names 16 identified

defendants and 20 John Doe defendants, and sets forth 16 counts. [DE 10.] Nine

defendants have filed motions to dismiss that are fully briefed and ready for decision.2

 1 Intending no disrespect by the informality, I will address the individual plaintiffs by their first

names so as to easily distinguish between them.

 2 A tenth defendant, Dr. Tom B. Vaughan, Jr., M.D., has recently filed a motion to dismiss that is not

yet fully briefed.
The motions of 8 of the defendants raise a common threshold issue that is

potentially dispositive of the entire first amended complaint, namely that the Davises’

pleading fatally fails to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) and 10(b). Rule 8 is entitled

“General Rules of Pleading.” Subsection (a)(b)(2) provides that “[a] pleading that states

a claim for relief must contain...a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Federal Rule 10 governs the “Form of Pleadings.” 

Rule 10(b) requires a party to “state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs,

each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” These are not just

technical requirements. They are necessary for the orderly handling of litigation in

federal court. A reading of the Davises’ pleading readily demonstrates that it falls

woefully short of the requirements of these rules.

Let’s start with the causes of actions as identified by the Davises in the first

amended complaint. It’s a panoply of nearly every cause of action one could

conceivably imagine in this type of circumstance:

I. Defamation

II. Fraud

III. “Relator” (a whistleblower False Claims Act type of claim)

IV. Kidnapping

V. Theft

VI. RICO

VII. Alienation of Affect/Alienation of Familial Relations/Loss of Society &

Companionship

VIII. Abuse of Process/Abuse of Judicial Power

IX. Battery

X. Interference with Parental Custody & Visitation/Violation of 4th & 14th A.

XI. Negligence

XII. Overuse and Misuse of Medications/Violations of HIPAA

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XIII. Violation of 1st Amendment Rights/Interference with Residual Parental

Rights

XIV. False Claims Act/Mail Fraud/Wire Fraud/Forgery

XV. Breach of Fiduciary Duty/Suborning Perjury

XVI. Aggravated Identity Theft/Aiding and Abetting/Misprision. 

(DE 10 at 144 - 158).

The 16 named defendants named are Alabama Circuit Judge Jeanne W.

Anderson, Alabama Circuit Judge James W. Woodroof, Jr., the Athens City Schools and

Athens City Board of Education, Glenwood Incorporated (and its Allan Cott School),

Dr. Clarence Mcdanal MD (a doctor at Glenwood’s Allan Cott School), Dr. Scott Sarrels

MD (a treating physician), Dr. Albert Sprinkle MD (a treating psychiatrist), Connie

Shaw (Shelia’s sister), Howard Shaw (Shelia’s brother-in-law), Lesa Greene (an attorney

appointed as Eric’s guardian ad litem), Claire Tinney Jones (an attorney for DHR),

Louise Collier (Shelia’s mother), Dr. Tom Vaughan, Jr. MD (a doctor associated with

Glenwood/Allan Cott School), the Limestone County DHR, and DHR employee Angela

Hurtubise, along with 20 John/Jane Does. 

I’ll start with the amended complaint’s “Preliminary Statement.” That term

ordinarily connotes a simple straight-forward description of the gist of the lawsuit,

similar to how I started this opinion. But the preliminary statement in the amended

complaint consists of 83 pages, running from pages 6 through 89 of the first amended

complaint. This is where the Davises attempt to relate the story that supports their legal

claims. This rambling discourse consists largely of unnumbered paragraphs, making it

nearly impossible for a defendant to designate particular allegations for the purpose of

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admission or denial as required by Rule 8(b). This is a problem because “[a] complaint

that is prolix and/or confusing makes it difficult for the defendant to file a responsive

pleading and makes it difficult for the trial court to conduct orderly litigation.” Vicom,

Inc. v. Harbridge Merchant Services, Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 775-76 (7th Cir. 1994). 

The Davises’ disjointed presentation contains factual allegations, legal

conclusions, citations to and quotations from legal authorities, and is peppered with

references to the 50 exhibits (totaling 429 pages) filed with the first amended complaint. 

The exhibits include materials that have no conceivable relevance to this case such as

“Copy of Website Document of Limestone County, Alabama, Largest Slave Holders

from 1860 Slave Census Schedules and Surname Matches For African American on 1870

Census marked as Exhibit 19” [DE 10 at 24], “League of Denial – [Wikipedia] RE: NFL

Head Injuries marked as Exhibit 22" [id. at 31], and “Copy of THE ELIAN GONZALEZ

CASE marked as Exhibit 47" [id. at 84].

Next up in the first amended complaint is the so-called “Chronology” which

runs from pages 90 through 130. This section of the first amended complaint alleges

facts in unnumbered paragraphs (the first lines of which are not indented for some

reason) with subheadings for years beginning with 1991 through 2015. “Jurisdiction

and Venue” are addressed in pages 131 through 132. After more than 100 pages of

what appear to be allegations in support of the Davises’ claims for relief, the first

amended pleading proceeds with a separate section entitled “Common Allegations”

from page 133 through page 138. These allegations are stated in numbered paragraphs

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beginning with paragraph 1, but by the second page of the section (page 134), the

format devolves into a single paragraph four pages long. As noted above, in the next

section beginning on page 140, the Davises’ legal claims are set out. Each count is

identified with a Roman numeral and a description of the nature of the claim (as listed

above on pages 2-3). Most counts are pled in a single mammoth paragraph, again

presenting the defendants with an impossible challenge in pleading a meaningful

response admitting or denying particular allegations.

Before moving on, it might be helpful to step back and talk about the history of

this litigation. The Davises’ original complaint was 574 pages in length and requested a

temporary restraining order. A hearing was held on that request for a TRO and after

hearing argument from the plaintiffs, I denied the TRO because they failed to

demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits and failed to show an irreparable

harm. [DE 6] More to the point, I decided to strike the complaint, and in doing so told

Mr. Davis that the complaint had a number of problems, not the least of which was that,

at 574 pages, it violated Rule 8, and without numbered paragraphs it violated Rule 10.

[DE 6.] How was a defendant to respond to such a filing? Although I struck the

complaint I did give the Davises time to file a first amended complaint in which the

allegations and claims were to be set forth in short and plain statements as required by

Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). [Id.]

Although shorter by some 400 pages, the 165-page first amended complaint [DE

10] suffers from the same infirmities as the original. Both the format and the substance

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of the verbose pleading contribute to its unintelligibility. As I explained in my July 18,

2016 order denying the Davises’ second motion for a temporary restraining order:

The amended complaint continues to employ the “kitchen sink” approach

to pleading which I cautioned counsel against at the April hearing. The

rambling and undifferentiated pleading of background facts includes a

“Preliminary Statement” of more than 80 pages, as well as a “Chronology”

of more than 40 pages. There is blatant non-compliance with Fed.R.Civ.P.

10(b)’s requirement of separate numbered paragraphs, each limited to a

single set of circumstances. This sloppy and prolix manner of pleading

has a substantial impact on my ability to understand what is pled, both

factually and legally, as the document is nearly unreadable and

impervious to navigation.

Opinion and Order of July 18, 2016 [DE 16], pp. 3-4.

The Davises also attempted a second amended complaint, which Judge Cherry

struck because it was filed without consent or the court’s leave. [DE 26.] That third

attempt at pleading was no improvement. The Davises’ proffered second amended

complaint [DE 25] grew to 215 pages and suffers from the same procedural defects as

the first amended complaint. That pleading abandons some of the few paragraph

numbers in its predecessor, apparently in favor of line numbers (as in a deposition

transcript). This is not helpful and does not comply with Rule 10(b) either. Although

the second amended complaint displays an effort to employ numbered paragraphs in

the “Claims” section (though still not limited to a single set of circumstances), the

lengthy “Preliminary Statement” grew from 82 pages to 104 pages in length and

consists entirely of unnumbered paragraphs. The 40-page “Chronology” section

remains, again without numbered paragraphs. Although the second amended

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complaint is not the one that is presently before the court, I point it out so one can see

the continued difficulties that the Davises have had in filing a complaint that meets the

basic requirements of the rules. The time has come to say enough is enough. 

Why is this case subject to dismissal for these pleading deficiencies? “District

judges are busy, and therefore have a right to dismiss a complaint that is so long that it

imposes an undue burden on the judge, to the prejudice of other litigants seeking the

judge’s attention.” Kadamovas v. Stevens, 706 F.3d 843, 844 (7th Cir. 2013). “[L]ength may

make a complaint unintelligible, by scattering and concealing in a morass of

irrelevancies the few allegations that matter.” United States ex rel. Garst v. LockheedMartin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003). “[J]udges and adverse parties need not

try to fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud.” Garst, 328 F.3d at 378. “[D]ismissal is the

appropriate remedy for district courts presented with ‘a bucket of mud.’” Cincinnati

Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 947 (7th Cir. 2013), quoting Garst, 328 F.3d at 378.

Because John Davis is a licensed attorney, representing both himself and his ex-wife

Shelia, their pleading is not entitled to the generous construction that is afforded pro se

litigants who are laymen to the law. Muñiz v. Commissioner of IRS, 661 Fed.Appx. 1027,

n.1 (11th Cir. 2016); LNV Corporation v. Hook, 638 Fed.Appx. 667, 671 (10th Cir. 2015);

Brinn v. Syosset Public Library, 624 Fed.Appx. 47, 48 n.1 (2nd Cir. 2015).

Another difficulty with the first amended complaint (and its predecessor and illfated successor) is the failure to clearly delineate which defendants are named in each

count. “The primary purpose of [FedR.Civ.P. 8 and 10(b)] is to give defendants fair

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notice of the claims against them and the grounds supporting the claims.” Stanard v.

Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 797 (7th Cir. 2011). For example, Count I for defamation appears

to be based on statements made in court filings and which were later “circulated by

staff of the Defendants to local the community” that John and Shelia had abandoned

their son. [DE 10 at 140.] Count I refers only to “the Defendants” in an undifferentiated

plural. To which I must ask: are the four doctors named as defendants, the other judge

and the Athens City Schools to be understood as alleged to be liable on this claim? The

fraud claim in Count II similarly fails to specify which defendants took any particular

actions and are allegedly responsible for “one hundred and sixty-eight (168) separate

acts of civil and criminal fraud.” [Id. at 141.] This lack of specificity persists through the

remainder of the counts as well, suggesting absurd allegations including that the 16

defendants aided and abetted one another in conducting a collective “kidnapping” of

the Davises’ son, as alleged in Count IV. [Id. at 142-43.] “[W]here the lack of

organization and basic coherence renders a complaint too confusing to determine the

facts that constitute the alleged wrongful conduct, dismissal is an appropriate remedy.” 

Stanard, 658 F.3d at 798. 

The Davises’ defense of their pleading is itself confusing. Apparently believing

that its rambling and long-winded discourse is actually necessary to survive a motion to

dismiss, they argue it must be this complex given that it “seeks to set forth

approximately thirty-six (36) different and separate allegations (civil/criminal)

committed by fifteen (15) different defendants over a time period of sixteen (16) years

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and ongoing to the present date against three (3) different plaintiffs which necessarily

requires plausibility for each such defendant for each such count against each separate

plaintiff[.]” [DE 43 at 6 (emphasis in original).] Given that the first amended

complaint enumerates 16 counts, it is unclear what the Davises’ reference to 36

allegations means. A few pages later in their brief, the Davises refer to their case as

involving “thirty counts,” and go on to describe their claims mathematically as

involving 7200 civil or criminal acts committed against each plaintiff for total of “well

over twenty-one thousand and six hundred (21,600) civil/criminal acts.” [Id. at 9.] 

Plaintiffs’ counsel’s misplaced commitment to an exhaustive (and exhausting) standard

of factual and historical description and the inclusion of legal argument and authorities

demonstrate that he clearly does not grasp Rule 8's concept of a “short and plain

statement.”

As to the Defendants’ argument under Rule 10(b), the Davises claim that the

requirement of numbered paragraphs applies to “claims and defenses” and so is not

applicable to the first amended complaint’s “Preliminary” or “Chronology.” [DE 42 at

4.] The Davises contend that it is defendants who fail to understand the governing rules

of procedure, arguing that the defendants confuse “complaint” and “claims.” Here’s

what they say: “Defendants are not required to defend a complaint. Under Rule

10...defendants are required to defend the claims...[D]efendants are held to defend the

facts set forth in the claims. Defendants are not required to decipher a Preliminary

Statement.” [DE 84 at 15.] I’m not sure what this means but to the extent it suggests that

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in responding to the first amended complaint defendants need not plead anything in

response to the lengthy allegations of the Preliminary and Chronology, it is surely

incorrect. Rule 8(b)(1)(B) requires that in responding to a pleading, a party must “admit

or deny the allegations asserted against it by an opposing party.” 

Furthermore, I have previously explicitly indicated (as quoted above on page 6)

that I considered the pleading of the “Chronology” and “Preliminary Statement” to

violate Rule 10(b). I have never known an attorney-drafted civil complaint not to

comply with Rule 10(b) by numbering every paragraph. And I am left to wonder why

the Davises have steadfastly refused to comply with this most basic of requirements. 

Yet they have persisted in their refusal. The Seventh Circuit has previously warned

litigants about the importance of Rule 10(b) while implicitly rejecting the distinction the

Davises now attempt to draw: “Each time, the judge drew the plaintiffs’ attention to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(b), which requires allegations to be separated into numbered

paragraphs, and distinct claims to be separated into counts.” Frederiksen v. City of

Lockport, 384 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). The Davises insist that the

federal rule requiring numbered paragraphs does not “include, anticipate or require

that a preliminary or chronology follow the same format.” [DE 43 at 4.] I suspect that

this is because the federal rules do not anticipate a “Preliminary” statement or a

“Chronology” at all. 

The Davises further contend that the “Claims section of the First Amended

Complaint is clear, concise as well as numbered,” and so satisfies Rule 10(b). [DE 43 at

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4.] Most of the 16 enumerated counts consist of a single numbered paragraph of a page

or more in length, clearly not limited to a single set of circumstances and in no way

accurately described as “concise.” This manner of pleading the causes of action does

not comply with Rule 10(b) and is highly burdensome if not impossible to plead in

response to in any precise and meaningful way.

Among the 16 counts, there is not a single short and plain statement of any claim. 

And this pleading is the Davises’ second try, after my similarly frank discussion with

them at the hearing on April 20, 2016, at which I struck their initial complaint and

allowed them time to correct the “numerous deficiencies” and file an amended

complaint in which “the allegations and claims are set forth in short and plain

statements as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a).” [DE 6.] Like the district judge in

Frederiksen, I am dealing with multiple attempts to plead the complaint without

substantial (or any) improvement in compliance with my directions and the federal

rules: “Concluding that the fourth try was little better than the first – the fourth

complaint put numbers in front of some paragraphs, but most of them are absurdly

long and cover multiple parties and grievances – the district judge finally threw up her

hands and told the plaintiffs that they would have no more opportunities to satisfy Rule

10(b).” Id. 

The Seventh Circuit has observed that a district court “might well have

dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint on the ground that it was an egregious violation of

Rule 8(a)” when it “contained 125 pages (323 paragraphs) including a mass of details

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which might be relevant and appropriate at trial, but which are clearly surplusage in

stating a claim.” Hartz v. Friedman, 919 F.2d 469, 471 (7th Cir. 1990). The Davises have

had more than ample opportunity to file a pleading that meets with the requirements of

the Federal Rules and have utterly failed to do so. This continued failure supports

dismissal of the case with prejudice. 

The dismissal of the entire case on grounds of the Davises’ egregious failure to

comply with Rules 8(a) and 10(b) may be considered sua sponte as to defendants

Glenwood Incorporated and Dr. Vaughan, who did not make that argument in support

of their motions to dismiss, and defendants Mcdanal, Greene, Tinney-Jones, Collier,

Hurtubise and the Limestone County Department of Human Resources, who have not

appeared in the case. “A district court can dismiss defective claims sua sponte, but

ordinarily the judge should give the plaintiff an opportunity to respond to the perceived

defect.” Lee v. Nasatir, No. 16-3237, 2016 WL 7228700 at *1 (7th Cir. Dec. 13, 2016). Both

in a hearing and in an order, I have previously warned the Davises about these precise

failures of their original complaint [DE 6, 16], and the issues were explicitly raised in the

motions to dismiss filed by defendants Sprinkle, Anderson, Woodruff, Connie and

Howard Shaw, Sarrels, and Athens Board of Education. Nonetheless, the Davises have

filed three different complaints in which the failures persist. The Davises have therefore

had both ample opportunity to cure the defects and a chance to defend against the

argument. 

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The “volume and form of the pleading make it difficult to sort out” the Davises’

first amended complaint. Hartz, 919 F.2d at 471. The complaint, even after a second

(and third) try, does not tell an intelligent story that can be followed without herculean

effort, but instead “is prolix, disjointed, confusing, and at times unintelligible.” Jennings

v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1435 (7th Cir. 1990). It is subject to dismissal for failure to comply

with Federal Rules 8(a) and 10(b).3

 In sum, I am more than persuaded that this case

must be dismissed because the Davises have shown that they are incapable of

presenting the case in a manner that permits the court “to conduct orderly litigation.” 

Vicom, 20 F.3d at 776. 

Although I believe the dismissal is legally necessary, it does not reflect a lack of

sympathy for the Davises’ hardship as parents of a severely disabled son from whom

they are separated. Perhaps an experienced family law practitioner in Alabama could

be of assistance to them, but the Davises’ attempt to litigate these matters in this court is

now ended.

ACCORDINGLY:

Defendant Albert Sprinkle, M.D.’s motion to dismiss [DE 19] is GRANTED.

Defendants Judge Jeanne W. Anderson and Judge James W. Woodroof, Jr.’s

motion to dismiss [DE 27] is GRANTED.

Defendants Howard Shaw and Connie Shaw’s motion to dismiss [DE 52] is

GRANTED.

 3 I need not and do not address other arguments for dismissal raised in the pending motions.

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Defendant Dr. Scott M. Sarrels, M.D.’s motion to dismiss [DE 64] is GRANTED.

Defendants Athens City Schools and Athens City Board of Education’s motion to

dismiss [DE 68] is GRANTED.

The Clerk is directed to ENTER JUDGMENT DISMISSING plaintiffs’ first

amended complaint in its entirety for the reasons described herein. The entry of

judgment will close this matter.

Defendant Glenwood Inc.’s motion to dismiss [DE 59] and defendant Dr. Tom B.

Vaughan, Jr.’s motion to dismiss [DE 93] are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS

MOOT.

Plaintiffs John H. Davis, Shelia D. Davis, and Eric S. Davis’s motion for

preliminary injunction [DE 17] is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: March 9, 2017.

/s/ Philip P. Simon 

PHILIP P. SIMON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

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