UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

TODD A. BEBOUT, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. CAUSE NO.: 3:16-CV-417-PPS-MGG 

DR. LIAW, MD, 

 Defendant. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 Todd A. Bebout, a prisoner without a lawyer, has finally filed a second amended 

complaint (ECF 22-1) after a long delay. His original complaint (ECF 1) filed in June 

2016 and his first amended complaint (ECF 10) filed in September 2016 both alleged Dr. 

Liaw was denying him medical treatment, but lacked sufficient facts to state a claim. As 

a result, he was granted leave to amend pursuant to Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 

F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2013). Bebout asked for extended enlargements of time (ECF 12 and 

18) and this case remained stayed waiting for him to proceed. Finally he was ordered to 

file an amended complaint (ECF 20) because further delay would prejudice the 

defendant. 

 In the second amended complaint, Bebout alleges Dr. Liaw has denied him 

proper medical treatment at the Westville Correctional Facility for his “Spinal Scoliosis 

as well as Degenerative Disk Disease” (ECF 22-1 at 7) (emphasis omitted) since October 

2014. A filing by an unrepresented party “is to be liberally construed, and a pro se 

complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than 
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formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) 

(quotation marks and citations omitted). Nevertheless, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, 

the court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is 

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks 

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 

 For a medical professional to be held liable for deliberate indifference to a serious 

medical need, the decision must be “such a substantial departure from accepted 

professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person 

responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 

F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, Bebout 

alleges Dr. Liaw told him he was prescribing medication, but frequently did not do so. 

He also alleges his prescribed medication was repeatedly allowed to expire without 

being renewed. Though the second amended complaint is thin on details about when, 

how often, or why these events occurred, it nevertheless states a claim against Dr. Liaw. 

 Bebout is seeking both monetary damages and injunctive relief. However, he is 

no longer at the Westville Correctional Facility. On January 3, 2018, he was transferred 

to the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility. ECF 23. Therefore his injunctive relief claim 

is moot. See Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks and 

citation omitted) (“If a prisoner is transferred to another prison, his request for 

injunctive relief against officials of the first prison is moot unless he can demonstrate 

that he is likely to be retransferred.”). Therefore he will be granted leave to proceed 

only for monetary damages. 
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 Bebout also names Corizon Health Medical, Inc., and Wexford of Indiana, LLC. 

“Private corporations acting under color of state law may, like municipalities, be held 

liable for injuries resulting from their policies and practices.” Hahn v. Walsh, 762 F.3d 

617, 640 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 675 

(7th Cir. 2012)). However, “[a] municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 based 

on a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Jenkins v. Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482, 

492 (7th Cir. 2007). Thus, to state a claim against either of these companies, Bebout must 

allege “(1) an express policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; 

(2) a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express 

municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage 

with the final force of law; or (3) an allegation that the constitutional injury was caused 

by a person with final policymaking authority.” Lewis v. City of Chicago, 496 F.3d 645, 

656 (7th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). Here, he has not done so. Rather, he 

merely speculates he was denied treatment to save money for the companies, but he has 

not alleged facts which plausibly support that claim. Legal conclusions can provide a 

complaint’s framework, but unless well-pleaded factual allegations move the claims 

from conceivable to plausible, they are insufficient to state a claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 680 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Therefore the two corporate 

defendants will be dismissed. 

 Finally, Bebout filed a motion (ECF 22) asking to file the second amended 

complaint. However this was unnecessary because he was ordered (ECF 20) to file it. 

 For these reasons, the court: 
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 (1) DENIES the motion to amend (ECF 22) as MOOT; 

 (2) DIRECTS the clerk to separately docket the second amended complaint (ECF 

22-1); 

 (3) GRANTS Todd A. Bebout leave to proceed against Dr. Liaw, MD, in his 

individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for denying him proper 

medical treatment for spinal scoliosis and degenerative disk disease at the Westville 

Correctional Facility from October 2014 to January 3, 2019, by not prescribing 

medication he told Bebout would be prescribed and by repeatedly allowing his 

prescriptions to expire without being renewed in violation of the Eighth Amendment; 

 (4) DISMISSES all other claims; 

 (5) DISMISSES Corizon Health Medical, Inc., and Wexford of Indiana, LLC.; 

 (6) DIRECTS the clerk and the United States Marshals Service, as required by 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(d), to issue and serve process with a copy of this order and the Complaint 

(ECF 22-1) on Dr. Liaw, MD; and 

 (7) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), Dr. Liaw, MD, to respond, as 

provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to 

the claim for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening 

order. 

SO ORDERED. 

ENTERED: January 29, 2019 

/s/ Philip P. Simon 

PHILIP P. SIMON, JUDGE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT