IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) No. 2:15-CR-79

)

DAVID WATSON, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Suppress

Evidence, filed by Defendant, David Watson, on November 20, 2015. 

(DE #19). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED. 

BACKGROUND

Defendant, David Watson (“Watson”), is charged with being a

felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. section

922(g). Watson has moved to suppress all evidence seized or

derived from his seizure on July 5, 2015, claiming violations of

his Fourth Amendment rights. In his motion, Watson claims that his

seizure was based on an uncorroborated anonymous tip which, under

the circumstances, was insufficient to justify the seizure.

This Court held an evidentiary hearing on the matter on

January 11, 2016, at which Officers Anthony Boleware (“Officer

Boleware”) and Wayne Dodson (“Officer Dodson”), of the Gary Police
Department, testified. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court

took the instant motion under advisement and ordered that the

parties submit additional briefing to the Court.

FINDINGS OF FACT

In making the following findings of fact, the Court has

considered the briefs of the parties, the evidence presented, and

the credibility of the witnesses. Therefore, the Court finds as

follows:

 On July 5, 2015, at 9:34 a.m., the following exchange took

place over the Gary Police Department’s 911 dispatch system: 

911 Operator: Gary 911

Caller: Hello. I’m calling [inaudible] 1832 West 5th

Avenue they’s, uh, boys [inaudible] parking lot

playing with guns and stuff.

911 Operator: 1832 West what?

Caller: 5th Avenue.

911 Operator: And there’s boys in the parking lot playing with

guns?

Caller: Yes and they, uh, but they standing there, it’s a grey

and greenish Charger, they standing there, everybody

just out there playing with they guns [inaudible].

911 Operator: Gray and green charger?

Caller: Yes.

911 Operator: How old are you?

Caller: 14

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911 Operator: Is your parents there?

Caller: Um, No.

911 Operator: Do you live in the building?

Caller: No. I’m, I was at my friend’s house but they wasn’t

here and I left.

911 Operator: You at your friend house, your friend parents there?

Caller: Um, no, I say, I was at their door, there wasn’t

nobody there, so I left, but—

911 Operator: Do you know how many it is?

Caller: Uh, it’s about 4 or 5, I think 5 of em.

911 Operator: You think it’s 5 of em?

Caller: Yes, but I know it’s more than 4, [inaudible] 5.

911 Operator: Are they Black, White, Hispanic?

Caller: They Black.

911 Operator: In the alley?

Caller: Um, in the parking lot across [inaudible].

911 Operator: They where?

Caller: In the parking lot across the street from McDonalds.

911 Operator: In the parking lot across the street from McDonalds?

Caller: Yes. Hello?

911 Operator: I’m here, I’m just typing it in.

Caller: Yes.

911 Operator: And you said the Charger is gray and green?

Caller: Yes, it’s like, yeah, it’s gray and green put

together.

911 Operator: So you saw ‘em playing with a gun?

Caller: Yes.

911 Operator: Did you happen to see how many weapons there was?

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Caller: Um, I know I seen 2, but I don’t know if the other

2 had guns, but I know I seen 2 of em.

911 Operator: Are you still in the building?

Caller: Um, I’m, I’m in McDonalds.

911 Operator: You in McDonalds?

Caller: Yes.

911 Operator: And your number is 433-2077?

Caller: Yes. No, no, no, no, no. This is um, this man’s

phone. Um, I don’t have a phone uh, but, I can try

to stay close to the man’s phone [inaudible].

911 Operator: OK.

Caller: All right.

911 Operator: Bye.

(Gov. Hrg. Ex. 1; Def.’s Ex. A).

As a result of that call, the following call was sent from

dispatch at 9:42 and received by Officer Boleware:

911 Operator: 1292, 1362, Gary

Boleware: [inaudible] Go

911 Operator: Have a man with a gun 1532 West Fifth Avenue. 1-

5-3-2 West Fifth Avenue. Have five male blacks in

the parking lot across from McDonald’s in a

green—check that, a gray and green Charger

displaying weapons. 1-5-3-2 West Fifth Avenue

[inaudible].

Boleware: 13. Copy. 15th and uh [inaudible] ... you said a

gray and green Charger?

911 Operator: Affirmative.

(Gov. Hrg. Ex. 1).

Officer Boleware has been working for the Gary Police

Department for 18 years, and he has been a patrolman for

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about eight years. (Tr. 5-6). As a patrolman, he is in charge

of patrolling the midtown sector of Gary. (Tr. 6). Officer

Boleware was doing that on the morning of July 5, 2015. (Tr.

6). At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer

Boleware testified that he received a call from the Police

Department’s dispatcher indicating — as he remembered it —

that there were “either four or five guys in a Charger, I

think it was a gray or green Charger, at 1532 West 5th Avenue

in the parking lot pointing guns at people.”1

 (Tr. 8). When

Officer Boleware heard the call, what stuck out to him was

the address. (Tr. 9). He knows this address to be in a highcrime area. (Tr. 9). Officer Boleware said it was the type

of call he would take seriously and contained a sense of

urgency because “[i]f it was described like three or four

guys displaying weapons, they might [be] about to shoot

somebody or may be sitting there waiting for somebody to

come out so they could shoot them. It may be a shooting about

to go down.” (Tr. 9-10). 

Officer Boleware drove his car to the location and, at

9:46 a.m., pulled into the parking lot through an alley. (Tr.

1 This recollection is inaccurate. Neither the 911 caller nor the

dispatch call indicated that guns were being pointed at people. Furthermore,

the dispatch employee failed to indicate that the individuals were described

by the caller as being in the parking lot, not the vehicle.

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10). There were seven vehicles in the parking lot, but it

was clear which car dispatch was referring to, and Officer

Boleware saw “about four guys sitting in it.” (Tr. 10-11,

27). He did not see any other Chargers in the area, and

“that was the only car that had four people in the car.”

(Tr. 11).

Officer Boleware parked perpendicular to the Charger,

blocking it in, because he wanted to make sure they did not

drive away. (Tr. 11). Officer Boleware asked the individuals

multiple times if they had any weapons, and all four denied

there were weapons in the car. (Tr. 29). Officer Boleware

asked the driver for identification, and he produced a valid

driver’s license. (Tr. 29). 

At 9:47 a.m., Gary Police Officer Stiles (“Officer Stiles”)

arrived at the scene. After Officer Stiles showed up, the

officers called for further backup because they were outnumbered.

(Tr. 12). Officer Boleware continued to interrogate the

occupants regarding the presence of guns. (Tr. 41, Gov. Ex. 2). 

Around 9:54, Gary Police Officer Mike Clark arrived. (Gov.

Ex. 2). A few seconds later, Officer Dodson arrived. 

Officer Dodson has worked for the Gary Police Department for

17 years, has been a patrolman for the past nine, and was out

patrolling on July 5, 2015. (Tr. 47-48). Like Officer Boleware,

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Officer Dodson testified that the location was “known to be

a hot area.” (Tr. 48). Officer Dodson testified that the

call was one he would take seriously and there was an

urgency to it because “[a]ny time you have males with

weapons, there’s always a sense of urgency ’cause anything

could happen.” (Tr. 49).

Officer Dodson was the last of four officers to respond

and, upon arrival, he saw a car fitting dispatch’s

description. He noted that “it was the only gray Charger in

the parking lot and it was occupied.” (Tr. 50).

An officer was positioned at each of the doors of the

car. Officer Boleware was at the back door on the passenger’s

side, Officer Dodson was at the front door on the passenger’s

side, Officer Clark was at the driver’s side front door, and

Officer Stiles was by the back door on the driver’s side. 

(Tr. 13). The officers planned on pulling the occupants out

of the car one-by-one, but when the officers told the frontseat passenger — Watson — to get out, Watson turned his back

to the door with his face looking toward the officer and threw

a gun over the seat and into the back.2 (Tr. 13-14). It

2

 On cross-examination, Officer Boleware clarified as follows:

Q: Okay. So it’s your testimony that the gun was thrown

before he was taken out of the vehicle?

A: The gun was thrown while he’s trying - - he’s trying

to get out the vehicle. He’s coming out the vehicle,

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landed at the feet of one of the rear passengers. (Tr. 13-

14). Officer Dodson heard Officer Boleware say: “[h]e threw

a gun, get the passenger out of the car, and that’s what

[Officer Dodson] did.” (Tr. 51). Officer Boleware then

recovered the gun, and, in the process, found another gun in

the pouch behind the front-seat passenger’s seat. (Tr. 15-

16).3

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Fourth Amendment protects persons from unreasonable

searches and seizures, and this protection has been extended to the

states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); U.S. Const.

Amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment prohibits a warrantless search,

unless the search falls under one of the recognized exceptions to

the warrant requirement. U.S. v. Denney, 771 F.2d 318, 320 (7th

and right when he’s coming out, he do this (indicating). 

He’s backing out the vehicle, and he throw it over his

back. And it went over the top of the chair and landed

back there in the back of him where the other guy was

sitting at.

(Tr. 40).

3 Watson’s attorney argues that Officer Dodson had not yet reached the

car when Officer Boleware began searching and patting down the passenger

seated on the rear of the passenger’s side of the vehicle. The Court has

reviewed both angles of available video footage, and in each of them, the

Charger is in a shadowy area, making it difficult to determine the precise

moment when Officer Boleware began patting down the rear passenger. There is

no evidence other than the video, which is inconclusive at best, to support

Watson’s version of the events. This factual disagreement, however, is

immaterial to the outcome of the instant motion. 

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Cir. 1985). If a search is conducted without a warrant, the

Government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the

evidence that an exception to the warrant requirement existed at the

time of the search. United States v. Taylor, 776 F.3d 513, 518 (7th

Cir. 2015). Ultimately, the Fourth Amendment’s touchstone is

reasonableness. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 

This Court has considered the evidence, the briefs, and the oral

arguments of counsel and finds no violation of Watson’s Fourth

Amendment rights. 

Probable cause is not necessary for police to conduct an

investigatory stop, limited in scope and executed by reasonable

means. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1968). To make an

investigatory stop, an officer needs only reasonable suspicion

supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot. 

Id.; United States v. Jackson, 300 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2002). 

Reasonable suspicion is “some objective manifestation that the

person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.” 

Jackson, 300 F.3d at 745 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.

411, 417 (1981)).

The reasonableness of a Terry stop is evaluated by looking at

whether the officers’ actions were justified at the inception of the

stop and whether the stop was reasonably related in scope to the

circumstances that justified the stop in the first place. Jackson,

300 F.3d at 745 (citing United States v. Swift, 220 F.3d 502, 506

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(7th Cir. 2000)). The totality of circumstances known to the

officers at the time of the stop must be considered in making this

evaluation. Id. (citing Swift, 220 F.3d at 506). The totality of

the circumstances includes the “experience of the law enforcement

agent and the behavior and characteristics of the suspect.” Id.

(quoting United States v. Odum, 72 F.3d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995)). 

Here, the parties agree upon several things. When Officer

Boleware parked his car perpendicular to the Charger, it constituted

a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, the

parties agree that the anonymous tip provided a sufficient basis for

further police investigation. Watson, however, contends that both

the initial seizure and the subsequent frisk nonetheless violated

the Fourth Amendment. Watson argues that the stop violated the

Fourth Amendment because the officers did not, at the time of the

seizure, have reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity

was afoot. Furthermore, that the frisk violated the Fourth

Amendment because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that

Watson was armed and dangerous.

The Initial Stop

An anonymous tip, standing alone, is seldom sufficient to

justify an investigatory stop. Navarette v. California, 134 S.Ct.

1683, 1688 (2014); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). But,

“under appropriate circumstances, an anonymous tip can demonstrate

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‘sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion

to make [an] investigatory stop.’” Navarette, 134 S.Ct. at 1688

(quoting White, 496 U.S. at 327). The Supreme Court has addressed

when anonymous tips can support reasonable suspicion on numerous

occasions. See White, 496 U.S. at 325-33; Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S.

266 (2000); Navarette, 134 S.Ct. at 1686-97.

In Alabama v. White, police received a detailed anonymous tip

claiming that the defendant would leave a particular address at a

particular time in a particular car with the right taillight lens

broken, that she would go to a particular hotel, and that she would

have a brown attaché case containing cocaine. 496 U.S. 325 (1990).

Based on this tip, officers watched as the defendant proceeded

exactly as the anonymous caller predicted. Just short of the hotel

that the anonymous caller had described, the vehicle was pulled

over. The Court found that the caller’s ability to predict future

behavior showed a special familiarity with the defendant and

increased the likelihood that the caller also had information about

the defendant’s criminal activity. Id. at 332. Although described

as a close case, the Court found that the stop was supported by

reasonable suspicion. Id.

In Florida v. J.L., however, the Court found that an anonymous

tip was insufficient to support reasonable suspicion. 529 U.S. 266

(2000). In J.L., police received an anonymous tip that a “young

black man standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid

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shirt was carrying a gun.” Id. at 268. The tip was not recorded

and nothing was known about the individual supplying the tip. Some

time later, and it is not clear how much later, officers were told

to respond. Upon arrival at the bus stop, there were three black

males, one of which was wearing a plaid shirt. Based on the tip

alone, the individual in the plaid shirt was stopped and frisked. 

In finding that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion, the Court

noted that:

An accurate description of a subject’s readily

observable location and appearance is of course

reliable in the limited sense: It will help the

police correctly identify the person whom the

tipster means to accuse. Such a tip, however,

does not show that the tipster has knowledge of

concealed criminal activity. The reasonable

suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be

reliable in its assertion of illegality, not

just in its tendency to identify a determinate

person. 

Id. at 272. The Court considered whether the fact that firearms

were involved justified the stop, but found that:

[A]n automatic firearm exception to our

established reliability analysis would rove too

far. Such an exception would enable any person

seeking to harass another to set in motion an

intrusive, embarrassing police search of the

targeted person simply by placing an anonymous

call falsely reporting the target’s unlawful

carriage of a gun.

 

Id. 

In Navarette v. California, the Supreme Court’s most recent

case addressing anonymous tips, an individual called 911 and

reported that a Silver Ford 150 pickup with license plate number

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8D94925 and headed southbound on Highway 1 had just ran her off the

road. Several minutes later, an officer spotted the truck several

miles further down the road and pulled the truck over. In

determining whether the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion,

the Court in Navarette looked to prior precedent, including White, 

and J.L., and determined that, although it was a close case, the

stop was supported by reasonable suspicion of drunk driving. 

Navarette, 134 S.Ct. at 1690-92. In making this decision, the Court

considered several factors. Id. First, the Court found that the

caller’s account of what had occurred was sufficiently reliable for

the officer to credit it because she was claiming eyewitness

knowledge of what she reported. Id. at 1689. Furthermore, the

caller’s report was contemporaneous, and police were able to confirm

the truth of some of what she reported - a truck meeting the

description was found approximately 19 minutes after the report and

located approximately 18 miles away from the mile marker indicated

by the caller. Id. The Court also considered that the caller used

the 911 emergency system - a system that makes calls traceable and

would potentially subject the caller to prosecution for making a

false report. Id. at 1689-90. Additionally, the Court determined

that the report provided reasonable suspicion that the driver of the

truck was engaged in ongoing criminal activity; namely, that the

behavior reported by the anonymous caller provided reasonable

suspicion of drunk driving. Id. at 1690.

The dissent in Navarette characterized the majority opinion as

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a deviation from past precedent, but the majority does not claim to

have altered the legal standard for determining when reasonable

suspicion justifying an investigatory stop is present. Id. at 1692

(Scalia, J., dissenting). Accordingly, this Court will draw on

Navarette as well as earlier Supreme Court cases in assessing

whether the totality of the circumstances in this case support a

finding of reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop. 

Here, like in Navarette, the caller claimed eyewitness

knowledge of the reported activity. The operator specifically asked

the caller, “So you saw ‘em playing with a gun?” The caller

responded in the affirmative. Also, the report was, like in

Navarette, made contemporaneously. The caller used the present

tense throughout the call. And, the caller used the 911 emergency

system. Here, however, the caller claimed that he was not calling

from his own phone. He reported that he had borrowed the cell phone

of an unidentified man at the McDonald’s across the street from the

parking lot. And, the caller indicated he could try to stay close

to the man’s phone, suggesting a willingness to remain available if

the police needed to contact him. The caller did not provide his

name or address, but the operator never requested that the caller

provide them. While this call was not directly traceable to a phone

associated with the caller, unlike the call in J.L., this call was

recorded, and there was some possibility that the caller could be

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identified and held accountable for a false report.4

Watson also points out that the dispatcher wrongly stated that

the individuals were in the Charger, while the tipster said they

were outside the Charger. The officers, however, were entitled to

rely on the information provided by dispatch, even if erroneous. 

See United States v. Mounts, 248 F.3d 712, 715 (2001)(“Whether or

not the officers were given faulty (inaccurate) information ... is

immaterial to the case because police officers are entitled to rely

on the reasonable information relayed to them from a police

dispatcher.”)(citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 231

(1985)).

Watson also points out that the caller did not provide any

description of the individuals displaying weapons other than that

they were black males. There were no descriptions of clothing or

stature, for example. It would have been preferable if the caller

had described more thoroughly the identity of the individuals who

were displaying weapons. But, dispatch communicated that four or

five black males were in a green and grey Charger in a parking lot

at 1532 W. 5th Ave., and Officer Boleware arrived at the scene

shortly thereafter to find a green and grey Charger containing four

black individuals. 

The description did not pinpoint which two of the four or five

4 In fact, the Government was able to identify the caller following the

hearing on the instant motion. (DE #39). This fact is irrelevant, however,

as this Court’s inquiry must focus on what was known by the officers at the

time of the encounter. See United States v. Hicks, 531 F.3d 555, 558 (7th

Cir. 2008).

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men allegedly possessed the guns. United States v. Williams, 731

F.3d 678, 681 (2013), is instructive here. In Williams, a caller

reported a group of 25 rowdy people with three or four displaying

guns, but when officers arrived they found a much smaller group of

people behaving appropriately. Id. Yet, the Seventh Circuit found

the initial stop of the group of individuals lawful; although not

the subsequent frisk. Id. at 683-90. Locating a group of four

individuals, two of whom a caller has alleged possess guns, is very

different than an allegation of three or four people in a group of

25, especially after many people left. At that point, the odds of

one of the individuals who remained being the alleged possessor of

the gun is negligible, yet the court in Williams thought it was

enough to warrant an investigatory stop. 

Under the circumstances before this Court, the information

provided by the caller was reliable in the sense that it provided

enough information for the police to identify the group of

individuals whom the caller was accusing of displaying weapons. See

J.L., 529 U.S. at 272. 

Watson also contends that the call did not provide reasonable

suspicion to believe a crime may be afoot. In other words, the

caller’s allegations lacked reliability in the assertion of

illegality, which is essential to justify the initial seizure. Id. 

In fact, Watson contends that an assertion of illegality is missing

entirely. As Watson points out, in Indiana, it is not illegal to

possess or even display a firearm in public. See I.C. § 35-47-2-1. 

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Gun rights have, indeed, been expanded in recent years, as Judge

Hamilton noted in his concurring opinion in Williams, 731 F.3d at

694. And, if the Court considered only the information that

dispatch provided, then there are considerably fewer facts on which

to rest a finding of reasonable suspicion for the initial seizure. 

Dispatch indicated only that there were black males in the parking

lot displaying weapons. These facts raise the same concerns as the

facts in J.L. There is, after all, not an automatic firearms

exception, and these facts may not suggest an ongoing emergency. 

J.L., 529 U.S. at 272. Arguably, the situation is not so different

than that in Williams, where the initial stop was deemed

permissible, but this Court need not decide that issue.5 

The Government, however, urges that the collective knowledge

doctrine allows the knowledge of the 911 operator to be imputed to

the officers. Under the collective knowledge doctrine, an officer

may “stop, search, or arrest a suspect at the direction of another

officer or police agency, even if the officer himself does not have

firsthand knowledge of facts that amount to the necessary level of

suspicion to permit the given action.” United States v. Williams,

627 F.3d 247, 252 (7th Cir. 2010). Most often, the application of

5 There are, of course, differences between the facts here and the facts

in Williams. The call in Williams came in at night and the individuals were

allegedly being loud in a bar parking lot, while the caller in the instant

case called on a Sunday morning and reported nothing unruly about the group of

men other than their display of weapons in a residential parking lot. This

Court does not believe that any of these factual differences would tip the

scales in Watson’s favor on the issue of the initial seizure, although the

issue need not be decided here. 

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the doctrine becomes important when one agency is investigating a

crime and seeks the assistance of another agency in effectuating a

stop or arrest. With regard to 911 operators, the Second Circuit

Court of Appeals found that the doctrine did not apply to 911

operators because they lacked the training necessary to determine

whether reasonable suspicion existed. See United States v. Colon,

250 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2001). The Seventh Circuit Court of

Appeals, however, has been critical of that decision. The court

commented on the Second Circuit’s position in United States v.

Whitaker:

One case in the Second Circuit expresses

reservations concerning whether the collective

knowledge doctrine should be extended to the

911 employee who takes the call and passes on

the emergency nature of the situation to police

officers operating in the field. See United

States v. Colon, 250 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2001). 

The panel’s misgivings in that case were based

on the training given to employees who are not

police officers. Id. at 135-37. Our case law,

and indeed the case law of the other circuits,

has not dwelled on the same reservations. In

Drake, we held that 911 reports by identified

callers can provide the police with reasonable

suspicion and that 911 employees are part of

the police collective. Drake, 456 F.3d at 775. 

Indeed, it appears that the Second Circuit has

modified its position and would follow the path

that we have chosen here in a case such as this

where the callers were describing events of an

emergency nature occurring as the individuals

reported them. See Anthony v. City of New

York, 339 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir. 2003)(“In the

instant case, the call came from the same

location to which the police responded, and

more importantly, the caller described an

immediate and deadly threat of harm to which

she herself was being exposed at that location. 

The concern we expressed in Kerman regarding

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the reliability of anonymous and uncorroborated

calls - that is, calls reporting an emergency

at a different location and involving someone

other than the caller - is not implicated here,

where the caller expressed an immediate risk of

harm to herself, and where the address from

which the call was placed was verified.”). 

546 F.3d 902, 911 n.12 (7th Cir. 2008). Watson has offered no

argument on the subject of the collective knowledge doctrine.6

Accordingly, this Court finds that, in this circuit, the collective

knowledge doctrine can extend to 911 operators. 

For the doctrine to apply, “(1) the officer taking the action

must act in objective reliance on the information received, (2) the

officer providing the information - or the agency for which he works

- must have facts supporting the level of suspicion required, and

(3) the stop must be no more intrusive than would have been

permissible for the officer requesting it.” United States v.

Williams, 627 F.3d at 253 (citing United States v. Nafzger, 974 F.2d

906, 911 (7th Cir. 1992)). 

One district court has interpreted the first requirement of the

collective knowledge doctrine as requiring that the 911 operator

either communicate the information or tell the officers to detain

the suspect. See Fernandez v. Rodriquez, No. 09-CV-4297, 2012 WL

1565449, *3 n.2 (N.D. Ill. May 2, 2012)(“[T]he collective knowledge

doctrine is not in play because the dispatcher neither communicated

6

 In fairness, the Government raised this issue in response to Watson’s

post-hearing brief (DE #37). With seven briefs already on the record, counsel

may have been hesitant to request an opportunity to file a sur-reply. 

Unfortunately, this leaves an important issue less than fully developed. 

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the information nor even simply told the officers to detain

Fernandez.... As far as the officers knew, they were simply to

respond to Fernandez’s complaint and investigate it.”)(citing United

States v. Nafzger, 974 F.2d 906, 911 (7th Cir. 1992)). However,

when the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals indicated a willingness to

extend the doctrine to 911 operators, it is unlikely they envisioned

a scenario where 911 operators would direct officers to stop, frisk,

or arrest a suspect. If information that is not actually

communicated by a 911 officer can only be imputed to an officer when

the dispatcher directs that the officer stop, frisk, or arrest a

suspect, then the extension of the doctrine to 911 operators is

nothing but a theoretical possibility. This Court does not believe

that is what the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Whitaker

imagined, and therefore, the knowledge of the 911 operator will be

imputed to the officers in this case.

Although the caller did not say that the boys were pointing

guns at anyone or otherwise misusing the guns, he did say that they

were “playing” with them. Furthermore, the caller used the term

“boys,” implying that the individuals with the guns might be minors. 

While the 911 operator did not relay all the details to the

responding officers, both the caller and the dispatcher implied a

need for dispatch. “[A] need for dispatch can make reasonable a

stop that would not be reasonable if the police had time to

investigate at leisure.” United States v. Wooden, 551 F.3d 647, 650

(7th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Drake, 456 F.3d 771, 775

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(7th Cir. 2006) and United States v. Hicks, 531 F.3d 555, 558-59

(7th Cir. 2008)). While in this case, the need for dispatch was not

quite as urgent as in other cases, “boys” that are “playing” with

guns suggests a potentially dangerous and volatile situation

sufficient to justify the initial seizure. See Wooden, 551 F.3d at

650 (need for dispatch where caller reported that a man with a gun

was arguing with his girlfriend); United States v. Washington, No.

11-cr-40014-JPG, 2011 WL 5040949 (S.D. Ill. 2011)(noting the lack of

a need for dispatch where the informant did not say that the suspect

was brandishing or threatening to use the firearm).

Additionally, both Officer Boleware and Officer Dodson

testified that the particular address referenced by the caller was

a high-crime area.7 While this alone cannot justify the seizure, it

remains a relevant factor for consideration. See United States v.

Williams, 731 F.3d 678, 687 (2013)(“While we understand that the

fact that a stop occurs in a high-crime area may be a factor under

Terry, we believe that the rest of the case for a frisk, here, was

so weak that this factor cannot save the frisk.”); United States v.

Kenerson, 585 F.3d 389, 392-93 (7th Cir. 2009)(noting that the highcrime area was one “bit” of information that contributed to a

finding of reasonable suspicion).

Watson also points out that the caller in this case was a minor

7 Watson argues that the Government should have put on more evidence to

substantiate its claim that this is a high-crime area. Based on their

experience and training, the officers’ testimony is sufficiently reliable to

support a finding that this is a high-crime area. 

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who represented that he was 14 years of age. Watson asks this Court

to place less weight on his claims because of his age, but this is

not a child of four or ten - this is a teenager. Watson has pointed

to no case law that suggests the age of the boy who placed this 911

call (fourteen) should be viewed as detracting from the reliability

of the allegations. This Court declines to treat the caller’s

allegations as less reliable due to his age. 

Lastly, Watson contends that the officers, instead of

immediately seizing the vehicle’s occupants, should have

investigated further. More specifically, Watson believes they

should have parked the vehicle and observed to confirm the alleged

facts. That may have been a reasonable police response to the

anonymous tip received, perhaps an even better response, but this

Court is tasked with determining whether the actions taken comply

with the Fourth Amendment, not identifying best police practices. 

Here, the Government has demonstrated by a preponderance of the

evidence that the officers had reasonable suspicion to make an

investigatory stop without the additional observation urged by

Watson. 

The Frisk

Watson argues that the frisk also violated his Fourth Amendment

rights. A frisk may not be warranted even where an investigatory

stop is warranted under Terry - it requires “some articulable

suspicion that the subject is ‘armed and dangerous.’” United States

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v. Williams, 731 F.3d 678, 686 (2013)(citations omitted). Watson

notes that, “[e]ven in high crime areas, where the possibility that

any given individual is armed is significant, Terry requires

reasonable, individualized suspicion before a frisk for weapons can

be conducted.” Williams, 731 F.3d at 687 (citing Maryland v. Buie,

494 U.S. 325, 342 n. 2 (1990)). Furthermore, “given the more

burdensome intrusion of a frisk, such action should only be allowed

when the officer can point to articulable facts that would establish

the separate and specific condition that the detainee has a weapon

or poses some danger. Williams, 731 F.3d at 686 (citing Terry v.

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17). 

Earlier, this Court noted that it is unclear whether the

backseat passenger’s pat-down began before Watson tossed the gun. 

Even if, as Watson alleges, the backseat passenger was frisked prior

to the tossing of the gun and this constituted a violation of that

individual’s Fourth Amendment rights, Watson cannot challenge that

violation. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 128 (1978)(“Fourth

Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be

vicariously asserted.”)(quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.

165 (1969)); United States v. Baker, 719 F.3d 313, 320 (4th Cir.

2013)(“This court has repeatedly held that one occupant of a vehicle

lacks standing to challenge the frisk or search of another.”). 

The evidence before the Court shows that Watson was not frisked

until after he threw the gun. Once Watson threw the gun, the

officers had a good deal more than “some reasonable suspicion” that

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Watson was armed and dangerous. Therefore, the Court need not

address whether a frisk prior to the throwing of the gun would have

also been permissible. The Government has sustained its burden as

to the frisk. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, this Court finds that Watson’s

Fourth Amendment rights were not violated,8 and Defendant’s Motion

to Suppress Evidence, filed on November 20, 2015 (DE #19) is DENIED.

DATED: September 2, 2016 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

8

 Because this Court finds no Fourth Amendment violation, the

Government’s argument that the violation does not necessitate exclusion of the

evidence will not be addressed. 

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