Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

People v. Carter, 2016 IL App (3d) 140196

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

CORNELIUS D. CARTER, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Third District

Docket No. 3-14-0196

Filed

Modified upon

denial of rehearing

July 25, 2016

September 2, 2016

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Rock Island County, No. 10-CF-821; 

the Hon. Walter D. Braud, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with directions.

Counsel on

Appeal

Michael J. Pelletier and Sean Conley, both of State Appellate 

Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.

John L. McGehee, State’s Attorney, of Rock Island (Robert M. 

Hansen, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of 

counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justice McDade specially concurred, with opinion.

Justice Wright dissented, with opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 Defendant, Cornelius D. Carter, argues on appeal that his conviction for aggravated 

battery with a firearm should be reversed because the trial court abused its discretion in 

allowing the State to present an excessive amount of other-crimes evidence related to an 

alleged escape attempt from the county jail. We affirm in part, vacate the DNA analysis fee 

and the fines improperly imposed by the circuit clerk, and remand for the trial court to 

modify its judgment on fine, fees, and costs in accordance with this order. 

¶ 2 FACTS 

¶ 3 Defendant was charged with aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(a)(1) 

(West 2010)). In October 2012, while incarcerated in the Federal Bureau of Prisons, 

defendant requested a disposition of all pending Illinois charges through the interstate 

Agreement on Detainers statute (730 ILCS 5/3-8-9 (West 2012)). The detainer documents 

listed another pending Illinois case in addition to the instant case. 

¶ 4 The State filed a motion in limine requesting that the court deem evidence of defendant’s 

alleged escape attempt from the county jail in July 2013 to be admissible at defendant’s 

aggravated battery trial. Said evidence would include defendant’s audiotaped phone calls 

from jail, physical evidence, testimony, and photographs. Defendant objected. Following a 

hearing on the State’s motion, the trial court ruled that evidence of defendant’s escape 

attempt was admissible. The court advised the State that it wanted “as little [evidence] as 

possible” regarding the escape attempt. The court added, “I want the case to be about the 

shooting, not about the escape.”

¶ 5 A jury trial was held. Kameron Angel testified that he had known defendant since he was 

10 or 11 years old and they had been close friends. On the evening of August 30, 2010, 

Kameron was socializing with his brother, Granvil Angel, defendant, and several other 

people. Defendant was wearing a black hooded sweatshirt, dark colored pants, and hospital 

gloves. Defendant had been wearing the hospital gloves all day, and Kameron did not think it 

was strange. Defendant showed Kameron a handgun that he had in the pocket of his hooded 

sweatshirt. Kameron asked if he could purchase the gun, and defendant said Kameron could 

purchase it after defendant was done with it. A few minutes later, defendant asked Kameron 

to go somewhere with him. 

¶ 6 Kameron walked with defendant to a garage near a store called Jesse Mart. They entered 

the garage, and defendant told Kameron there was a gun under a dresser. The garage was 

dark so Kameron used his cell phone as a light. Kameron bent down to look for the gun, and 

defendant shot him in the back of his neck and his back. Kameron fell to the ground. 

Defendant took Kameron’s cell phone and called or texted someone with it. Defendant then 

shot Kameron three more times in the back and arm. Kameron lay down and did not move. 

¶ 7 Defendant left the garage. After a minute or two, Kameron got up and jogged to Jesse 

Mart. The clerk at Jesse Mart called 911, and several police officers and an ambulance 

arrived. Kameron told the officers that defendant shot him. Kameron was taken to the 

hospital to be treated. While at the hospital, Kameron picked defendant out of a photographic 

lineup as the individual who shot him. Kameron was in the hospital for several days and 

continued to have back problems because a bullet was still in his spine. 
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¶ 8 Kameron did not have his cell phone after the shooting. Kameron did not send a text 

message to Granvil on the night of the shooting saying that he was going to Kia’s house. Kia 

was the mother of Kameron’s son.

¶ 9 Kameron spoke to Tresvour Robertson in jail approximately a year prior to trial, and 

Robertson told Kameron that defendant was paid to kill Kameron. Kameron and Granvil had 

obtained a pound of cannabis from Marcus Hampton and Robertson’s cousin, T.J. Everett, 

prior to the shooting and decided not to pay for the cannabis. 

¶ 10 Kameron acknowledged that he had previously pled guilty to the offense of “going armed 

with intent” for throwing a golf club at someone, for which he was on probation. 

¶ 11 Granvil testified that he was Kameron’s brother. At approximately 9:30 p.m. on the 

evening Kameron was shot, Granvil, Kameron, defendant, and several others were smoking 

cannabis together. Defendant asked Granvil to go somewhere with him. Granvil told 

defendant he did not feel like walking anywhere. Defendant asked Granvil a second time, and 

Granvil again refused. Defendant then asked Kameron, and Kameron agreed. Defendant and 

Kameron began walking toward Jesse Mart. Defendant was wearing black clothing and latex 

gloves. 

¶ 12 At approximately 10:15 p.m., the police came to the house where Granvil and his friends 

were smoking. The police banged on the door and said someone had been shot. Granvil left 

and started walking because he had a “really bad feeling in the gut of [his] stomach.” While 

he was walking, Granvil received a text message from his father stating that Kameron had 

been shot. Around that time, Granvil also received a “weird text message” from Kameron’s 

cell phone which said that Kameron was with Kia. Granvil could not remember if he received 

the text message from Kameron’s phone before or after the text message from his father. 

Granvil later talked to Kia and learned that she had not spoken with or seen Kameron that 

night. Kameron later told Granvil that he did not send that text message. 

¶ 13 After he received the text message from his father, Granvil saw a car driving down an 

alley and motioned for the car to stop. Granvil recognized the driver as Arletha Farmer and 

asked for a ride to the hospital. Granvil then noticed that defendant was in the backseat. 

Farmer agreed to give Granvil a ride, and Granvil got in the backseat with defendant. Granvil 

repeatedly asked defendant what happened to Kameron. Defendant said, “I don’t know, I just 

ran.” Defendant was sweating profusely and smoking cigarettes. Defendant twice asked 

Farmer to pull over so he could get out, but she did not pull over. Defendant was wearing 

different clothes than he had worn earlier in the evening. Specifically, defendant was wearing 

blue jeans and a white muscle shirt. When the car arrived at the hospital and Granvil got out, 

the car sped off. 

¶ 14 Granvil testified that approximately one week before the shooting, Granvil and Kameron 

obtained one pound of cannabis, which was worth approximately $1000, from Everett, 

Robertson, and Hampton. Kameron and Granvil later discovered that the cannabis was bad 

and refused to pay for it. Everett, Hampton, and Robertson called Granvil a few days later 

after he refused to pay for the cannabis and told Granvil that they were going to kill him and 

Kameron. They said that the “hit [was] going to be so close that [he was] not going to see it 

coming.”

¶ 15 Farmer testified that she had known defendant for about five years. On the evening of the 

shooting, Farmer was driving around with a friend. At approximately 10:30 or 11 p.m., 

Farmer saw defendant walking down the street and gave him a ride. A few minutes later, 
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Farmer saw Granvil. Farmer did not know Granvil, but she knew of him. Granvil asked for a 

ride to the hospital, and Farmer drove him to the hospital. Farmer heard defendant and 

Granvil greet each other when Granvil got into the car, but they did not talk much during the 

ride. Farmer dropped Granvil off at the hospital and drove away. Farmer did not recall telling 

a police officer that defendant told her someone had been shot when she picked him up. 

¶ 16 Police Officer Greg Whitcomb testified that when he interviewed Farmer the day after 

the shooting, Farmer said that when she picked defendant up, he told her there had been a 

shooting. 

¶ 17 Police officers who investigated the shooting testified that when they responded to the 

911 call, Kameron told them defendant shot him in an abandoned garage. The officers 

observed bullet wounds on Kameron’s neck and left arm. An officer later located the garage 

and found a pool of blood and what appeared to be bullets. Whitcomb testified that he 

showed Kameron a photographic lineup, and Kameron identified defendant as his shooter. 

¶ 18 Robertson testified that he knew Everett and Hampton. Kameron and Granvil obtained 

approximately one pound of cannabis from Everett, who had received the cannabis from 

Robertson. Kameron and Granvil did not pay for the cannabis. Prior to the shooting, 

Robertson saw Everett speaking with defendant in a car parked in Robertson’s backyard. 

After Everett spoke to defendant, Everett told Robertson that defendant was going to “get 

Kameron.” After the shooting, defendant asked Robertson to tell Everett to pay defendant. 

Robertson stated that he did not hire defendant to kill Kameron. Robertson believed the 

marijuana Kameron and Granvil took was worth approximately $800 and was not worth 

killing someone over. Robertson was currently incarcerated for the offense of intimidation 

with a dangerous weapon, which was unrelated to the instant case. The State agreed not to 

prosecute Robertson for hiring defendant to shoot Kameron if Robertson testified against 

defendant. 

¶ 19 The remaining evidence, which concerned defendant’s attempted escape from the county 

jail, was admitted over defendant’s objection. Edward Schliltz, a correctional officer, 

testified that while working at the county jail on July 23, 2013, he smelled smoke near the 

inmates’ cells. Schliltz and other officers thoroughly searched the inmates, the cells, and the 

day rooms. One officer found a hacksaw handle, cell phone, cell phone charger, and a mop 

handle with several pieces of a torn T-shirt wrapped around it in a garbage can in one of the 

day rooms. Defendant had the same T-shirt material that was found in the garbage can 

wrapped around his hand. The officers also found a hollowed-out Bible containing a socket 

cover in one of the common areas. In defendant’s cell, the officers discovered a four-inch 

square hole in the window, which was covered with a piece of plastic. The window’s steel 

frame and beam had been cut through with a hacksaw. No other inmate shared a cell with 

defendant. Schliltz believed that the officers found a piece of paper in defendant’s cell that 

contained several phone numbers that were found in the cell phone retrieved from the day 

room. A different inmate claimed that the cell phone the officers found belonged to him. 

¶ 20 Jason Patterson, a sheriff’s department employee, testified that he investigated a hole in 

the window of defendant’s cell on July 23, 2013. Defendant had occupied the cell since 

December 28, 2012. No one else occupied the cell at the time the hole was found. Sixteen 

photographs were admitted into evidence. Patterson identified and described the photographs, 

which depicted defendant’s cell, including the hole in the window and the cut marks on the 

window’s metal bar, the day room at the county jail, and items of contraband found by the 
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officers. Patterson found hacksaw blades in defendant’s toilet and strips of fabric in 

defendant’s cell. The contraband items found in the common areas included a cell phone and 

charger, a hollowed-out book containing a socket plate with burnt edges, strips of a T-shirt 

that were tied together, and fabricated paper rods. Some of the pictures showed defendant’s 

cell window from outside the building. Electrical tape and a light socket were found on the 

roof underneath defendant’s cell window.

¶ 21 The parties stipulated that a sheriff’s department employee would testify that he provided 

investigator Mindy Meyers with a compact disc (CD) that included recordings of 14 

telephone and visitation conversations of defendant between June 1 and July 27, 2013. The 

CD was admitted into evidence but not played for the jury. Whitcomb was recalled as a 

witness and testified that he listened to all the recorded conversations contained on the CD. 

Whitcomb was familiar with defendant’s voice and reported that all the recordings contained 

defendant’s voice except two or three conversations.

¶ 22 Mindy Meyers, an investigator employed by the sheriff’s department, testified that she 

was assigned to listen to defendant’s recorded telephone and visitation conversations. Meyers 

briefly described 12 recorded conversations of defendant, which were contained on the CD 

previously offered into evidence but not played for the jury. In one conversation with an 

unknown man, defendant asked the man to give someone named DeShawn “a little bit of 

bread” because DeShawn was “getting things” for defendant. Most of the other conversations 

that Meyers described involved defendant asking various people to obtain a cell phone for 

him, buy minutes for his cell phone, call him, or bring him things. 

¶ 23 The State also introduced a different CD containing a recording of a visitation 

conversation between defendant and Shakera Abbey. Meyers testified that, based on her 

investigation, she believed Abbey was defendant’s girlfriend. The CD was played for the 

jury, and a transcript of the conversation was introduced into evidence. 

¶ 24 During defendant’s conversation with Abbey, defendant told Abbey he would probably 

not be there next month. Abbey responded, “You trying to pull it off this month?” Defendant 

replied, “I just... there’s a chance that I might not be here next month.” Abbey told defendant 

not to do anything he would regret. Defendant replied that he was going to trial. He then 

stated, “See, hopefully I won’t make it to trial *** so I’m hoping, but I’m supposed to go to 

trial, you know, if I loose [sic] my trial...shhhh...man, I’m trying to breaking [sic] me out or 

something. *** I am gonna win in my own way man. Somehow someway [sic] man.” 

Defendant told Abbey that she would see him soon under “certain circumstances.” Abbey 

told defendant to call her. Defendant replied, “I’m for real man.” Abbey responded, “I know, 

you probably tired of being in here.” Defendant then said, “We’re going off in the sunset 

together.”

¶ 25 Defendant asked Abbey to get a pen and directed her to draw a picture. Defendant asked 

Abbey if she remembered what he told someone named “Deshar” to get for him, and Abbey 

replied that she remembered. Defendant told Abbey to call Deshar and ask if he was going to 

get it. Defendant asked Abbey to get it for him herself if she could not reach Deshar. 

Defendant said that he needed it before Wednesday. Defendant said that Abbey would be 

able to get the items at Walmart, Menards, K&K, True Value, or any hardware store. 

Defendant told Abbey that she had to be careful because the items would be sharp. Defendant 

then added: “[Y]ou just got to make sure, hell, that no matter what kind you get that you got 

the kind that go through handcuffs alright?”
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¶ 26 Meyers testified that she also took pictures of the outside of the jail in connection with 

the investigation into the contraband found in defendant’s cell. She took a photograph of 

black electrical tape, which was found on the ground outside the jail. The photograph had 

previously been introduced into evidence during Patterson’s testimony. Finally, Meyers 

testified that when the inmates were in their jail cells, no one was able to come in or out of 

the cell without a correctional officer opening the door. The inmates leave their cells during 

the day and stay in the day room. The cell doors are locked, and no inmates are able to access 

their own cells or other inmates’ cells during that time.

¶ 27 The State rested. Defendant did not present any evidence. During its initial closing 

argument, the State did not mention the escape evidence. Defense counsel argued that 

defendant was only using the hole in his jail cell window to smuggle in cigarettes and a cell 

phone and was not attempting to escape. During its rebuttal argument, the State contended 

that defendant was using the hacksaws to cut through his window in an attempt to escape. 

¶ 28 During deliberations, the jury requested a copy of the transcript of defendant’s 

conversation with Abbey. The jury found defendant guilty. On January 17, 2014, the trial 

court sentenced defendant to 30 years’ imprisonment to be served consecutively with his 

sentence in his federal case. On January 24, 2014, the trial court entered a written judgment 

order, which required defendant to pay “the costs of prosecution.” The written order provided 

that these costs were reduced to judgment against defendant. On January 27, 2014, the circuit 

clerk entered a judgment against defendant in favor of the State in the amount of $597. 

¶ 29 A cost sheet titled “Payment Status Information” and dated April 22, 2014, appears in the 

record. The following assessments along with the following descriptions appear on the cost 

sheet: (1) $100 “Clerk,” (2) $50 “State’s Atty,” (3) $50 “Court,” (4) $15 “Automation,” (5) 

$25 “Violent Crime,” (6) $25 “Judicial Security,” (7) $15 “Document Storage,” (8) $10 

“Medical Costs,” (9) $250 “DNA Identification,” (10) $5 “Youth Diversion,” (11) $0.25 

“Clerk Op Deduction,” (12) $4.75 “Drug Court,” (13) $10 “Clerk Op Add-Ons,” (14) $10 

“State Police Svcs,” (15) $15 “State Police Ops,” (16) $2 “SA Automation Fee,” and (17) 

$10 “Probation Ops Fee.”

¶ 30 ANALYSIS 

¶ 31 I. Other-Crimes Evidence of Attempted Escape 

¶ 32 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing an excessive amount of 

other-crimes evidence regarding defendant’s attempted escape from the county jail such that 

the trial court conducted a trial within a trial on defendant’s escape attempt. 

¶ 33 It is a longstanding proposition of Illinois law that evidence of the crime of attempted 

escape and the related crime of flight is admissible for the purpose of showing a defendant’s 

consciousness of guilt. Jamison v. People, 145 Ill. 357, 376 (1893) (attempted escape); 

People v. Duncan, 261 Ill. 339, 352-53 (1913) (suicide attempt as attempted escape); People 

v. Bundy, 295 Ill. 322, 329-30 (1920) (flight); People v. Limeberry, 298 Ill. 355, 370 (1921) 

(attempted flight); People v. Spaulding, 309 Ill. 292, 306 (1923); People v. Talbe, 321 Ill. 80, 

91 (1926) (attempted escape); People v. Rappaport, 362 Ill. 462, 468 (1936) (flight); People 

v. Gambino, 12 Ill. 2d 29, 32 (1957) (escape and attempted escape); People v. Harper, 36 Ill. 

2d 398, 403-04 (1967) (attempted escape); People v. Yonder, 44 Ill. 2d 376, 392 (1969) (two 

hacksaw blades hidden in the defendant’s shoe were evidence of attempted escape); People v. 

Gaines, 88 Ill. 2d 342, 366 (1981) (escape); People v. Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d 221, 246 (1988) 
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(letter indicating that defendant wanted to escape admissible as evidence of consciousness of 

guilt). 

¶ 34 Other-crimes evidence is admissible only if the probative value of the evidence is not 

outweighed by its prejudicial effect. People v. Adkins, 239 Ill. 2d 1, 23 (2010); Ill. R. Evid. 

403 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value 

is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 

misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 

presentation of cumulative evidence.”). A trial court’s decision to admit other-crimes 

evidence will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion. Adkins, 239 Ill. 2d at 23. 

Even if relevant, other-crimes evidence should not become a focal point of the trial. People v. 

Boyd, 366 Ill. App. 3d 84, 94 (2006). “Courts have warned against the dangers of putting on 

a ‘trial within a trial,’ with detail and repetition greatly exceeding what is necessary to

establish the particular purpose for the evidence.” Id. (quoting People v. Bartall, 98 Ill. 2d 

294, 315 (1983)). 

¶ 35 We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State’s evidence 

regarding defendant’s escape attempt. First, the escape evidence had high probative value in 

that it showed defendant’s consciousness of guilt. We find the evidence offered by the State 

was reasonably necessary to show defendant’s escape attempt. Defendant’s recorded 

conversation with Abbey was needed to show that defendant intended to escape from jail. 

During the conversation, defendant told Abbey, “I’m trying to breaking [sic] me out or 

something.” He also directed Abbey to obtain an item from a hardware store for him that 

could cut through handcuffs. Defendant’s conversation with Abbey showed that the items of 

contraband that were subsequently connected to him were related to an escape attempt rather 

than a smuggling operation, as defense counsel argued at trial. 

¶ 36 Evidence of the discovery of hacksaw blades in defendant’s toilet and other items of 

contraband linked to defendant showed that the escape plan defendant discussed with Abbey 

went beyond mere fantasy and that defendant was actually in the process of executing the 

plan. The additional recordings of defendant’s telephone and visitation conversations in 

which he sought cell phones and other items helped link him to the items of contraband that 

were ultimately found. 

¶ 37 We reject defendant’s contention that the probative value of the attempted escape 

evidence in the instant case was low because it is unlikely that defendant would have been 

able to cut a sufficiently large hole in his window to actually escape. We note Illinois courts 

have admitted evidence of possession for the means of escape or the intent to escape to show 

consciousness of guilt even when no actual escape was attempted. See Yonder, 44 Ill. 2d at 

392 (hacksaw blades hidden in the defendant’s shoe); Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d at 245-46 (letter 

defendant sent from jail stating that he believed he could escape). 

¶ 38 Similarly, we find no merit to defendant’s contention that the probative value of the 

escape evidence was somehow lessened due to the fact that he was serving a federal sentence 

and was facing charges in another Illinois case. Evidence of attempted escape is admissible 

even when a defendant is incarcerated on multiple charges. See In re L.F., 119 Ill. App. 3d 

406, 409 (1983); People v. Day, 76 Ill. App. 3d 571, 585 (1979). As defendant presented no 

evidence either at the hearing on the State’s motion in limine or at trial that his escape 

attempt was related to anything other than the instant case, for which he was awaiting trial at 

the time of the escape attempt, we decline to find that the probative value of the escape 
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attempt was lessened due to defendant’s other charges. See People v. Ligon, 15 Ill. App. 3d 

746, 751 (1973). 

¶ 39 In addition to finding that probative value of the attempted escape evidence was high, we 

find that the prejudicial impact of the escape evidence was low. That is, evidence that 

defendant wished to escape from jail and acquired various items of contraband including 

hacksaw blades to do so was unlikely to inflame the passions of the jury. This is especially 

true when compared with the strong evidence of the relatively more heinous offense of 

attempted murder. Kameron testified that defendant, who had been his friend since 

childhood, shot him multiple times in an abandoned garage. The testimony of police officers 

confirmed that Kameron adamantly claimed that defendant was his shooter immediately after 

the shooting. Kameron’s, Granvil’s, and Robertson’s testimony tended to establish 

defendant’s motive for shooting Kameron—namely, that he had been paid to do it. 

¶ 40 Thus, due to the high probative value and low prejudicial impact of the attempted escape, 

we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the evidence of defendant’s 

escape attempt. The amount of escape evidence presented did not greatly exceed what was 

necessary to establish the escape attempt such that a trial within a trial occurred. See Boyd, 

366 Ill. App. 3d at 94. 

¶ 41 In coming to this conclusion, we reject defendant’s reliance on People v. Nunley, 271 Ill. 

App. 3d 427 (1995), People v. Bedoya, 325 Ill. App. 3d 926 (2001), People v. Richee, 355 Ill. 

App. 3d 43 (2005), and People v. Thigpen, 306 Ill. App. 3d 29 (1999), in support of his 

argument that his conviction should be reversed because the admitted evidence of his escape 

attempt was too extensive. Initially, we note that none of those cases involved other-crimes 

evidence of escape or other-crimes evidence showing consciousness of guilt. Nunley, 271 Ill. 

App. 3d at 432 (other-crimes evidence admitted to show the “continuing narrative” of the 

defendant’s arrest and confession); Bedoya, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 939-40 (intent); Richee, 355 

Ill. App. 3d at 58-59 (modus operandi); Thigpen, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 36 (common plan or 

scheme). Additionally, all four of defendant’s cited cases, unlike the instant case, either 

found the other-crimes evidence to lack probative value or be unduly prejudicial. 

¶ 42 In Bedoya and Richee, the courts first found that the other-crimes evidence at issue was 

irrelevant to the purpose for which it was admitted and should not have been admitted at all. 

Bedoya, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 939-40; Richee, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 58-59. Both cases found in the 

alternative that even assuming the other-crimes evidence was relevant, the probative value of 

the evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial impact due to the excessive amount of 

evidence presented at trial and its inflammatory nature. Bedoya, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 939-40 

(other-crimes evidence that the defendant shot at three buildings, including the residence of a 

cardinal); Richee, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 58-59 (other-crimes evidence of multiple burglaries). 

¶ 43 Similarly, in Thigpen, a murder case, the trial court found that some other-crimes 

evidence that defendant had previously committed a double murder may have been relevant 

to show a common plan or scheme. Thigpen, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 37-38. The court held, 

however, the detailed evidence of the double murder that was admitted at trial—including the 

introduction of a photograph of the victims’ corpses, which was subsequently sent to the jury 

room—was not relevant. Id. It was not only the amount of evidence of the double murder that 

the court found constituted reversible error, but the inflammatory and prejudicial effect of 

detailed evidence of a double murder on the jury. Id. at 38-39. 
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¶ 44 In Nunley, extensive other-crimes evidence that the defendant was under arrest for 

stabbing his mother and killing her dog at the time he confessed to the robbery and murder 

for which he was on trial was admitted to show the “continuing narrative” of the defendant’s 

arrest and confession. Nunley, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 432. On review, the Nunley court held that 

due to the “extremely inflammatory nature of the prior conduct evidence,” it was an abuse of 

discretion to allow other-crimes evidence beyond the fact that defendant was in custody for 

the aggravated battery of his mother at the time of his confession. Id.

¶ 45 In the instant case, unlike in Bedoya, Richee, and Thigpen, all the other-crimes evidence 

was relevant to the purpose for which it was introduced, that is, to show defendant’s 

consciousness of guilt by way of his attempted escape from jail. Unlike in Nunley, Bedoya, 

Richee, and Thigpen, the other-crimes evidence in this case—namely, that defendant planned 

to escape from jail and possessed contraband items in connection with his attempted 

escape—was not particularly inflammatory or unduly prejudicial. Additionally, the evidence 

of the escape attempt in the instant case was largely based on inferences drawn from 

defendant’s statements, actions, and the surrounding circumstances. Consequently, a greater 

amount of evidence was needed to show the escape attempt in this case than in Nunley, 

Bedoya, Richee, and Thigpen, where the other-crimes evidence at issue was either completely 

irrelevant or could serve its relevant purpose in small amounts. 

¶ 46 Lastly, even if we were to accept defendant’s argument that an excessive amount of 

evidence was presented regarding the escape attempt, we find that any error in the admission 

of the escape evidence was harmless. We acknowledge that the jury requested to view the 

transcript of defendant’s conversation with Abbey during deliberations. However, in light of 

the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt, we do not believe that the result of the 

proceedings would have been different even if no evidence of the escape attempt had been 

presented. People v. McKown, 236 Ill. 2d 278, 311 (2010) (“Error will be deemed harmless 

and a new trial unnecessary when ‘the competent evidence in the record establishes the 

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and it can be concluded that retrial without the 

erroneous admission of the challenged evidence would produce no different result.’ ” 

(quoting People v. Arman, 131 Ill. 2d 115, 124 (1989))). Additionally, we are mindful of the 

decisions in People v. McKibbins, 96 Ill. 2d 176, 186-87 (1983), and Bartall, 98 Ill. 2d at 315, 

where the court held that no prejudicial error occurred where an excessive amount of relevant 

other-crimes evidence was admitted at trial. 

¶ 47 II. Fines and Fees 

¶ 48 Defendant argued in his appellate brief that this matter should be remanded to the trial 

court for entry of a proper order of fines and fees because the circuit clerk improperly 

assessed fines against defendant after it was too late to challenge them. The State conceded 

that the matter should be remanded for the trial court to address the issues defendant raised 

regarding the fines and costs assessed against him. However, after the filing of the 

appellant’s brief in this case, our supreme court issued its opinion in People v. Castleberry, 

2015 IL 116916. Defendant now contends that Castleberry abrogated the procedure of 

remanding cases for the proper imposition of fines and fees. For the reasons that follow, we 

agree. 

¶ 49 Prior to Castleberry, the appellate court could correct an illegally low sentence to 

conform with minimum statutory requirements without running afoul of Illinois Supreme 
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Court Rule 615(b)(4), pursuant to the void sentence rule—i.e., the rule that a sentence that 

does not conform to statutory requirements is void. People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 

(1995), abrogated by Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916. In Castleberry, however, the supreme 

court abolished the void sentence rule. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 19. 

¶ 50 Castleberry’s holding applies to the instant case, as it was pending on appeal when 

Castleberry was decided. See People v. Granados, 172 Ill. 2d 358, 365 (1996) (“As a general 

rule *** this court’s decisions apply to all cases that are pending when the decision is 

announced, unless this court directs otherwise.”); see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 

328 (1987) (“We therefore hold that a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to 

be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final 

***.”).

¶ 51 After Castleberry, we may no longer remand a cause to the trial court for the imposition 

of an increased sentence, even if the sentence given by the trial court is illegally low. See 

Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶¶ 20-26 (holding that the appellate court was without 

authority to add a 15-year firearm enhancement to the defendant’s sentence pursuant to 

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) even though the sentence was illegally low without 

the enhancement). Fines are part of a criminal sentence. People v. Graves, 235 Ill. 2d 244, 

250 (2009). Therefore, we will merely vacate improperly imposed fines rather than 

remanding for the reimposition of such fines. We now turn to the question of whether any 

fines were improperly imposed in this case. 

¶ 52 “Because the imposition of a fine is a judicial act, and the circuit clerk has no authority to 

levy fines, any fines imposed by the circuit clerk are void from their inception.” People v. 

Larue, 2014 IL App (4th) 120595, ¶ 56. We find that the following fines were imposed by 

the circuit clerk and are therefore void: (1) the $50 court fund fee (People v. Smith, 2013 IL 

App (2d) 120691, ¶ 21); (2) the $5 youth diversion fee (Graves, 235 Ill. 2d at 255); (3) the 

$4.75 drug court fee and the $0.25 “Clerk Op Deduction” (People v. Johnson, 2015 IL App 

(3d) 140364, ¶ 9); (4) the $15 State Police Operations Assistance Fund fee (People v. 

Millsap, 2012 IL App (4th) 110668, ¶ 31); (5) the $25 Violent Crime Victims Assistance 

Fund fine (People v. Dillard, 2014 IL App (3d) 121020, ¶ 11); and (6) the $10 medical costs 

fine (Johnson, 2015 IL App (3d) 140364, ¶ 9). Accordingly, we vacate the foregoing fines. 

¶ 53 We also find that a $30 juvenile records expungement fine was improperly imposed in 

this case. Section 5-9-1.17 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.17 (West 

2012)) provides: 

“(a) There shall be added to every penalty imposed in sentencing for a criminal 

offense an additional fine of $30 to be imposed upon a plea of guilty or finding of 

guilty resulting in a judgment of conviction. 

 (b) Ten dollars of each such additional fine shall be remitted to the State Treasurer 

for deposit into the State Police Services Fund to be used to implement the 

expungement of juvenile records as provided in Section 5-622 of the Juvenile Court 

Act of 1987, $10 shall be paid to the State’s Attorney’s Office that prosecuted the 

criminal offense, and $10 shall be retained by the Circuit Clerk for administrative 

costs associated with the expungement of juvenile records and shall be deposited into 

the Circuit Court Clerk Operation and Administrative Fund.”

¶ 54 This assessment is a fine, as it is punitive in nature. People v. Wynn, 2013 IL App (2d) 

120575, ¶ 16. Because the fine was imposed without authority by the circuit clerk in this 
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case, it is void. See Larue, 2014 IL App (4th) 120595, ¶ 56. In the instant case, this $30 fine 

appears in three places on the clerk’s cost sheet: (1) the $10 State Police Services Fund 

assessment, (2) the $10 “Clerk Op Add-Ons” assessment, and (3) as a portion of the $50 

State’s Attorney fee. Accordingly, we vacate the $10 State Police Services Fund assessment, 

the $10 “Clerk Op Add-Ons” assessment, and $10 of the $50 State’s Attorney fee, thereby 

reducing the State’s Attorney fee to $40.

¶ 55 Defendant also argues that the probation operations assistance fee is a fine because it 

does not compensate the State or county for the costs of prosecuting a particular defendant 

but rather is a flat amount imposed upon conviction regardless of the amount of probation 

services used by defendant. Defendant further argues that the imposition of the probation 

operations assistance fee violates ex post facto principles because its effective date was 

subsequent to the date of the offense. Section 27.3a(1.1) of the Clerks of Courts Act (705 

ILCS 105/27.3a(1.1) (West 2012)), which establishes the probation operations assistance fee, 

states as follows: 

“Starting on July 6, 2012 (the effective date of Public Act 97-761) and pursuant to an 

administrative order from the chief judge of the circuit or the presiding judge of the 

county authorizing such collection, a clerk of the circuit court in any county that 

imposes a fee pursuant to subsection 1 of this Section shall also charge and collect an 

additional $10 operations fee for probation and court services department operations. 

 This additional fee shall be paid by the defendant in any felony, traffic, 

misdemeanor, local ordinance, or conservation case upon a judgment of guilty or 

grant of supervision, except such $10 operations fee shall not be charged and 

collected in cases governed by Supreme Court Rule 529 in which the bail amount is 

$120 or less.”

¶ 56 We determine that this assessment is overall a fine. “Broadly speaking, a ‘fine’ is a part 

of the punishment for a conviction, whereas a ‘fee’ or ‘cost’ seeks to recoup expenses 

incurred by the state—to ‘compensat[e]’ the state for some expenditure incurred in 

prosecuting the defendant.” People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 582 (2006). “[T]he most 

important factor [in determining whether a charge is a fine or fee] is whether the charge seeks 

to compensate the state for any costs incurred as the result of prosecuting the defendant.” 

Graves, 235 Ill. 2d at 250. “Other factors to consider are whether the charge is only imposed 

after conviction and to whom the payment is made.” Id. at 251. The probation operations 

assistance fee is assessed against all criminal defendants “upon a judgment of guilty or grant 

of supervision” regardless of whether probation services were actually utilized in each 

defendant’s case. 705 ILCS 105/27.3a(1.1) (West 2012). As such, we conclude the probation 

operations assistance assessment qualifies as a fine, created to generate a fund to support 

probation and court services, regardless of a defendant’s actual utilization of those services.

¶ 57 In reaching our conclusion, we recognize that our approach is contrary to the holding of 

People v. Rogers, 2014 IL App (4th) 121088, ¶ 37. In Rogers, the court held that a probation 

operations assistance assessment was compensatory in nature—and, consequently, a fee 

rather than a fine—because the defendant received a sentence of probation and the probation 

office prepared a presentence investigation report. Id. The Rogers court found, however, that 

the probation operations assistance fee would be a fine in cases where the probation office 

was not involved in a defendant’s prosecution. Id. ¶ 38. We decline to follow Rogers. 
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¶ 58 Having found the probation operations assistance fee to be a fine, we find that it is void 

because it was improperly assessed by the circuit clerk. Larue, 2014 IL App (4th) 120595, 

¶ 56. Additionally, the imposition of the fine violates ex post facto principles because the date 

of the offense—August 30, 2010—was prior to the effective date of the legislation that 

created the fine—July 6, 2012. Pub. Act 97-761 (eff. July 6, 2012) (adding 705 ILCS 

105/27.3a(1.1) (West 2012)). See People v. Prince, 371 Ill. App. 3d 878, 880 (2007) (“A fine 

*** is a pecuniary punishment imposed as a part of a criminal sentence and is subject to the 

prohibition against ex post facto laws.”).

¶ 59 Defendant argues that the $250 DNA analysis fee imposed by the circuit clerk was 

improper because he previously provided a DNA sample as a result of a prior conviction. 

“[S]ection 5-4-3 [of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4-3 (West 2008))] 

authorizes a trial court to order the taking, analysis, and indexing of a qualifying offender’s 

DNA, and the payment of the analysis fee only where that defendant is not currently 

registered in the DNA database.” People v. Marshall, 242 Ill. 2d 285, 303 (2011). At 

defendant’s request, we take judicial notice of a document from the Illinois State Police 

Division of Forensic Services showing that he had previously submitted a DNA specimen, 

which defendant included in the appendix to his appellate brief. See People v. Garrett, 62 Ill. 

2d 151, 163 (1975) (holding that the appellate court may take judicial notice of the contents 

of public records). Accordingly, we vacate the $250 DNA fee assessed in this case, as 

defendant has already submitted a DNA specimen. See Marshall, 242 Ill. 2d at 303. 

¶ 60 We find that the remaining assessments, which total $197, were fees properly imposed by 

the circuit clerk: (1) the $100 clerk fee (705 ILCS 105/27.1a(w)(1)(A) (West 2012)); (2) the 

$30 State’s Attorney fee and $10 preliminary hearing fee, for a total of $40 (55 ILCS 

5/4-2002(a) (West 2012)); (3) the $15 automation fee (705 ILCS 105/27.3a(1) (West 2012)); 

(4) the $25 judicial security fee (55 ILCS 5/5-1103 (West 2012)); (5) the $15 document 

storage fee (705 ILCS 105/27.3c(a) (West 2012)); and (6) the $2 State’s Attorney automation 

fee (55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a) (West 2012)). 

¶ 61 CONCLUSION 

¶ 62 We affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County in part, vacate in part 

as to the fines imposed by the circuit clerk and the $250 DNA analysis fee, and remand for 

the trial court to enter a modified judgment on fines, fees, and costs in accordance with this 

order. 

¶ 63 Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with directions. 

¶ 64 JUSTICE McDADE, specially concurring. 

¶ 65 I agree with Justice Carter that existing Illinois law requires a holding that the circuit 

court did not err when it admitted the other-crimes evidence regarding the defendant’s 

activities while in the Rock Island county jail. I also agree with Justice Carter that those 

assessments properly characterized as fines and the $250 DNA fee should be vacated for the 

reasons stated and that the other fees were properly imposed. I write separately to express my 

strong disagreement with the propriety of using the concept of consciousness of guilt in the 

context of incarceration. 
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¶ 66 I recognize that the supreme court has consistently demonstrated its belief in the concept, 

but I believe that evidence related to an escape or an attempted escape from incarceration 

should not be admissible at a defendant’s trial as evidence of consciousness of guilt for 

multiple reasons. As a general premise, I find consciousness of guilt to be a flawed concept 

in any context because it runs afoul of the foundational principle of our jurisprudence that a 

criminal defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty. More specifically, to be used as 

consciousness of guilt of the charged offense, evidence that one has escaped or attempted to 

escape from incarceration invites—indeed, requires—the fact-finder to presume that the 

individual is guilty of that underlying crime. 

¶ 67 The consciousness-of-guilt concept also offends logic in that its operation is circular. In 

the instant case, for example, in order to serve as proof of the defendant’s guilt of the charged 

crime, the concept requires the fact-finder to presume his unproven guilt and find that his 

conduct at the jail—arguably an attempt to escape—was solely motivated by his awareness 

of that guilt. This is a logical fallacy. 

¶ 68 But I am certainly not alone in questioning the validity of the concept and its use in the 

courts. While consciousness of guilt has long been accepted as admissible evidence, the 

problematic nature of the concept has also long been recognized. See, e.g., Robert M. 

Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations of the Law of Evidence—Consciousness of 

Guilt, 77 U. Pa. L. Rev. 725 (1929) (critiquing consciousness of guilt for being scientifically 

unverifiable and citing, inter alia, John Henry Wigmore’s treatise on evidence and his book, 

The Principles of Judicial Proof (1913)). Context is extremely important when 

consciousness-of-guilt evidence is proffered: 

“ ‘The same symptom is often the result of exactly opposite psychological 

conditions. This sort of evidence is admitted because there is a certain degree of 

uniformity in its meaning, but the variations from uniformity are so frequent, and 

depend so much upon personal character and local circumstances that no fixed rules 

should be laid down. Repeated judicial warnings tell us that the evidence is merely to 

be estimated as best we can in the light of our knowledge of human nature in general 

and of the accused in particular. ... The general principle, as applied to the conduct of 

one accused of crime, finds illustration in a great variety of instances. In those which 

have led to judicial rulings, there has seldom resulted an exclusion, because usually 

none but conduct having at least plausibly a guilty significance is commonly 

offered.’ ” Id. at 728-29 (quoting John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the 

Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 273 (2d ed. 1923)). 

Additionally, it was noted as early as 1846 that the flight of an accused: 

“is not necessarily an admission of guilt; it may proceed from an unwillingness to 

stand a public prosecution, or from a fear of the result, from an inability to explain 

certain false appearances, indicating guilt, though the party was innocent. The conduct 

of one accused of crime, is the most fallible of all competent testimony. Those emotions 

or acts which might be produced in one person by a sense of guilt, or by the stings of 

conscience, might be exhibited by another, differently constituted, by an 

overwhelming sense of shame, and the degradation consequent upon a criminal 

accusation. The same cause producing opposite effects in different persons, owing to 

weakness or strength of nerve, and other inexplicable moral phenomena.” (Emphasis 

added.) Smith v. State, 9 Ala. 990, 995 (1846). 
- 14 - 

Even if one (like Wigmore) is not troubled by the inability to scientifically verify 

consciousness of guilt, notable objections to its use in the courts include that “its 

manifestations are equivocal; [citation] it may be caused by guilt of another crime than the 

one charged; [citation] or it may be caused by other emotional disturbances [citation].” 

Hutchins & Slesinger, supra, at 734. 

¶ 69 Particular to the prison context, I find such evidence problematic because there are a 

multitude of reasons why an individual may attempt to escape from incarceration that are 

wholly unrelated to whether he or she committed the charged offense. In this regard, I note 

Justice Seymour Simon’s dissent in People v. Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d 221 (1988). In Gacho, a 

defendant had been arrested and incarcerated based on his suspected involvement in the 

murders of two people. Id. at 231. While incarcerated, he wrote a letter to his girlfriend that 

included the statement, “ ‘I still believe I can escape from here one way or the other.’ ” Id. at 

245. The supreme court held that the statement from the letter was admissible at trial as 

consciousness-of-guilt evidence. Id. at 246. Justice Simon dissented, in part due to the fact 

that the two cases cited by the majority (People v. Gaines, 88 Ill. 2d 342 (1988) and People v. 

Harper, 36 Ill. 2d 398 (1967)) involved actual escapes or attempts to escape, which was not 

the case in Gacho. Id. at 265 (Simon, J., dissenting). Justice Simon then stated: 

“Here, the defendant was simply writing about the possibility of leaving prison 

sometime in the future. He may have meant that he thought he would be found 

innocent and be released or he may have been thinking of escaping because of harsh 

conditions in prison. In any case, his statement is not relevant to the issue of whether 

he is guilty of murder, and permitting the State to cross-examine the defendant about 

the statement was reversible error.” Id. 

¶ 70 I recognize that case law states that whether an escape or an attempted escape was 

motivated by consciousness of guilt or by some other reason is a question for the fact-finder 

to decide. See, e.g., People v. Sheridan, 51 Ill. App. 3d 963, 967 (1977). However, as I stated 

above, considering, even as a broader inquiry, whether evidence of an actual or attempted 

escape shows consciousness of guilt requires the fact-finder to presume that the defendant is 

guilty of the underlying offense. Moreover, it is also dangerous to allow the evidence because 

of the likelihood of it being used as evidence of a defendant’s general bad character, rather 

than evidence of his or her consciousness of guilt for the charged offense. 

¶ 71 The problematic nature of such evidence is exacerbated in a case like the one before us. 

Here, whether the defendant’s actions even constituted an escape attempt were particularly 

suspect. First, at the time the defendant was transferred to the Rock Island County jail to face 

the charges in this case, he had been incarcerated on a federal charge. He was also facing 

other state criminal charges. Any purported plan to escape could have been an attempt to 

evade any or all of those charges and not the instant aggravated battery with a firearm charge. 

Second, it is not at all clear that the defendant was even planning an escape. His 

actions—including his recorded statements—could as easily have been the implementation of 

an operation to smuggle drugs into the jail as an attempt by the defendant to escape from it. 

¶ 72 Unfortunately, despite long-standing doubts of legal scholars and judges about the 

general validity of the concept of consciousness of guilt and, more specifically about the 

reliability of its application in the context of actual or attempted escapes from incarceration, I 

am compelled to concur with the decision to affirm the defendant’s conviction.
- 15 - 

¶ 73 JUSTICE WRIGHT, dissenting. 

¶ 74 I respectfully dissent on the issue of the admissibility of the other-crimes evidence in this 

case. I would find the excessive other-crimes evidence constitutes reversible error arising out 

of a trial within a trial. 

¶ 75 I am not persuaded by the case law relied on by the majority. First, many of the cases 

cited in the majority decision involve prearrest flight to avoid arrest. I distinguish those cases 

on the grounds that this defendant did not attempt to flee in order to avoid arrest. Instead, this 

defendant voluntarily requested to be returned to Rock Island County, from federal prison, to 

answer to two outstanding Rock Island County warrants. 

¶ 76 Next, I also distinguish three of the decisions cited by the majority that are more 

analogous to the facts in this appeal because those cases involve a postarrest escape. In the

oldest postarrest case, People v. Talbe, 321 Ill. 80, 86 (1926), defendant was arrested, placed 

in the local jail, and then forcefully removed the jailer’s keys before leaving his jail cell 

without permission. Similarly, in People v. Gambino, 12 Ill. 2d 29, 32 (1957), defendant was 

first arrested, placed in the local jail, and then left the jail itself without permission. I do not 

find these two cases to be helpful because this defendant did not physically depart from 

either his Rock Island jail cell or the Rock Island County jail, without permission, at any 

time. 

¶ 77 A third case cited by the majority, People v. Yonder, 44 Ill. 2d 376 (1969), appears to be 

on all fours with the facts in the case now before this court. For example, both the facts in the 

case at bar and the facts in Yonder involved an inmate who was discovered to be in 

possession of hacksaw blades while incarcerated in the jail and awaiting trial. 

¶ 78 However, upon closer examination, I submit the holding in Yonder does not provide 

persuasive authority in this appeal. Specifically, in Yonder, the defense challenged the 

correctness of the trial court’s evidentiary ruling extending the reach of consciousness of 

guilt evidence to apply where the correctional officers thwarted the plan to escape before the 

inmate began to execute an escape. Id. at 392. 

¶ 79 In Yonder, unlike the case at bar, the jury received minimal evidence showing Yonder 

possessed hacksaw blades in his shoes while in jail. The evidence linking defendant to the 

hacksaw blades paled in comparison to the extensive evidence the jurors received pertaining 

to the armed robbery. In that case, the State’s accomplice witnesses and the victims described 

for the jury how Yonder woke up the family by attacking the husband as he slept. The armed 

robbers, including Yonder, then dragged the other household occupants out of bed; bound 

them with tape; gouged out the eyes of the husband causing blindness; forced the wife to 

witness her husband’s mutilated face; threatened to cut off the wife’s finger to remove her 

ring; announced an intent to have a “sex orgy” with the couple’s 11-year-old son; and 

encouraged the others to continue to beat, injure, and burn the women present in the home by 

applying cigarettes to their breasts and pubic hairs while “lying naked” on their backs. 

Further, the jury learned that the armed robbery yielded $130 in cash, two pairs of pearls, and 

a ring. 

¶ 80 Not surprisingly, our supreme court engaged in a cursory analysis in Yonder, which 

explained that, in that particular case, the possession of hacksaw blades was admissible 

evidence showing consciousness of guilt. Here, defendant concedes in his brief on this appeal 

that the trial court correctly decided some limited evidence of consciousness of guilt could be 
- 16 - 

introduced by the State in their case-in-chief. However, unlike Yonder, defendant agues the 

details of the escape plan, which this jury received, became quite excessive and prejudicial. 

¶ 81 Here, the State’s theory was that defendant did not simply acquire and possess 

contraband while housed in the Rock Island County jail but, rather, acquired the various 

items of contraband, not limited to the hacksaw blades, as part of a bigger plan to escape 

from the jail. In support of the State’s escape theory, this jury received 16 photographic 

exhibits depicting contraband found in common day areas of the jail and other evidence 

discovered outside the jail below defendant’s window. 

¶ 82 Further, the jury learned about defendant’s 14 recorded telephone calls from the jail 

where defendant made incriminating statements about getting cell phone access and other 

unspecified contraband to defendant. Finally, the jury heard one recording of a visitation 

between defendant and his girlfriend that took place on June 8, 2013. During this 

conversation, defendant dramatically advised his girlfriend that he might not be in jail “next 

month” and promised they would be “going off in the sunset together.” Yet, it is undisputed 

that defendant’s prediction did not come true and he remained in jail the next month. Thus, 

the issue of whether defendant actually intended to escape or was expressing simple bravado 

on June 8, 2013, created a trial within a trial documented by the jurors’ request to review a 

transcript of the conversation on June 8, 2013. 

¶ 83 I also distinguish the facts in Yonder from the instant case because, here, the jury did not 

learn that this defendant may have been planning his escape to avoid returning to federal 

prison to serve the balance of a 10-year sentence. For obvious reasons, defendant could not 

counterbalance the excessive other-crimes evidence—about possessing contraband in a penal 

institution while hoping to escape—by informing the jury of an equally plausible reason for 

his desire not to return to federal prison to complete a 10-year sentence. 

¶ 84 Had the State limited the evidence to the items and physical evidence found in 

defendant’s cell on July 27, 2013, I could adopt the majority’s harmless error analysis. 

However, my views are premised on the excessive amount of evidence the State elected to 

introduce, in spite of the court’s warning to minimize the evidence of escape long before the 

trial began. I dissent. Finally, with respect to fines and costs, I agree in the majority’s 

analysis of the application of Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, to the case at bar. I also agree 

with the majority’s view of the decision in Rogers, 2014 IL App (4th) 121088. 

¶ 85 I strongly agree with the majority that Castleberry bars this court’s prior practice of 

remanding cases to the trial court with instructions to add the statutorily required fines 

originally omitted by the sentencing judge. Yet, I respectfully dissent because I would not 

adjust or reduce the amounts included in the clerk’s tally sheet as a “void” component of 

defendant’s sentence. 

¶ 86 In People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 19, our supreme court wisely abolished the 

void sentence rule. In doing so, our supreme court clarified that a void sentence exists only 

where the trial court lacked jurisdictional authority to enter an erroneously low (or high) 

sentence and judgment against defendant. In this case, the defendant does not assert the trial 

court lacked jurisdictional authority to order the payment of costs only for purposes of this 

appeal. I contend this court should not correct the circuit clerk’s errors when the trial court 

has not been requested to do so. This does not mean defendant is without a remedy in this 

case. 
- 17 - 

¶ 87 I note that either the State or a defendant may file a writ of mandamus directed to the 

circuit clerk. Mandamus is the proper method for any trial court to be instructive to the 

circuit clerk. Alternatively, I respectfully suggest either party could present an agreed bench 

order for the trial court to sign, which clarifies those amounts recognized by existing case law 

as true court “costs.” Either approach would result in a reduction of costs for purposes of the 

clerk’s records.

¶ 88 For these reasons, I would affirm the defendant’s sentence including court “costs” and 

encourage the parties to initiate any request to correct the clerk’s tally sheet in the trial court.