IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

ROBERT HOLLAND, )

THE LAW FIRM OF ROBERT HOLLAND, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. ) No. 2:15-CV-207

)

THE CITY OF GARY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on: (1) Motion to Dismiss

Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(B)6), filed by Defendant Judge Deidre

Monroe and/or Gary City Court on July 17, 2015 (DE #26); (2)

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Civil Rule of

Procedure 12(b)(4), (5), (6), filed by The City of Gary, City of

Gary Mayor Rudy Clay, City of Gary Chief of Police Carter, Gary

Detective S. Jones #1408, Sgt. Ben Portis #1142, Gary Officer W.

Oliver #1423, Gary Officer D. Gilliam #1231, Gary Officer Johnny

Gill #1384, Gary Officer T. Williamson #4284, Gary Officer House,

and the City of Gary Police Department (“Gary Defendants”), on July

23, 2015 (DE #30); (3) Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Dominguez,

Tatge, Jansky, May and the Lake County Sheriff’s Department (“Lake

County Defendants”), filed on July 23, 2015 (DE #35); and (4)

Prosecutor Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, filed by Defendants Lake

County Prosecutor Bernard Carter and Deputy Prosecutor Rosie Lynch
(“Prosecutor Defendants”) on July 27, 2015 (DE #41).

For the reasons set forth below, each of the above motions is

GRANTED. This case remains pending as to Med Staff, Inc. All

other Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff, Robert Holland, filed his complaint against

multiple defendants on June 1, 2015 (DE #1). In his difficult-toread, rambling 82-page complaint, he names 20 different defendants. 

He asserts that these defendants have conspired against him in

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, 42 U.S.C. § 1986,

and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a), (b), (c) and (d)(Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) violations). He also alleges

violations of the Hobbs Act (8 U.S.C. 1951) and the Travel Act (18

U.S.C. 1952); and, he alleges violations of Indiana state laws,

including RICO and civil conspiracy. 

The complaint does not lend itself to a brief summary, as the

allegations are extensive. Holland asserts in his complaint that

it is brought “pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

60(B)(1),(2),(3) and (6).” (DE #1 at 4). He “incorporates by

reference” the complaint filed previously in Cause No. 2:10-CV-454

- a case that was decided against Holland on summary judgment,

appealed, and affirmed. Holland v. City of Gary, No. 2:10-CV-454

(N.D. Ind. 2013), aff’d, 533 Fed. Appx. 661 (7th Cir. 2013). 

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Despite his reference to and incorporation of the prior complaint,

Holland claims that this complaint “does not merely rehash legal

theories and arguments already addressed by the Court or add new

theories and arguments that should have been advanced in the

original Motions for Summary Judgment, but demonstrates a

meritorious defense that would have changed the court’s decision.” 

(DE #1 at 4). Holland asserts that he was arrested without

probable cause and subjected to illegal search and seizure, false

imprisonment, fraudulent charges, intimidation, harassment, and

defamation. (DE #1 at 5). He further alleges that he was

involuntarily committed and maliciously prosecuted and that there

was an abuse of process designed to injure his person, business,

property, and profession. (DE #1 at 5). Holland claims that the

Defendants’ criminal conduct has lasted continually for 20 years

and is persisting. (DE #1 at 22). He complains specifically of

actions surrounding his arrest on March 3, 2010 (an arrest stemming

from an alleged altercation with his mother), and his ensuing

incarceration - events that were the subject of the complaint filed

in Cause No. 2:10-CV-454. (DE #1 at 23-50). 

The instant motions to dismiss set forth numerous arguments in

favor of dismissal. Judge Deidre Monroe argues that she is

entitled to judicial immunity, that Holland’s claims are precluded,

and that the claims are frivolous. (DE #26-1). The Gary Defendants

argue that they were not properly served, that the complaint does

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not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), fails to

state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and

is barred by collateral estoppel. (DE #32). The Lake County

Defendants argue that the complaint is unintelligible and violates

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, that the claims are precluded by

res judicata and collateral estoppel, and that the claims are

barred by the statute of limitations. (DE #36). The Prosecutor

Defendants argue that the complaint should be dismissed because it

was brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, does

not satisfy Rule 8 and is barred by res judicata, collateral

estoppel, the applicable statutes of limitations, the Indiana Tort

Claims Act, and prosecutorial immunity. Holland has responded to

each of these motions.1 The Gary Defendants and Lake County

Defendants have replied. The motions to dismiss are fully briefed

and ripe for adjudication.

DISCUSSION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the

dismissal of a complaint, or any portion of a complaint, for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. “To

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

1 In his response briefs, Holland has requested that various portions of

Defendants’ filings be stricken. Northern District of Indiana Local Rule 7-

1(a) requires that motions be filed separately. Because Holland did not file

separate motions to strike, his requests will be disregarded by this Court. 

4
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (internal quotations omitted); see also Ray v. City of

Chicago, 629 F.3d 660, 662-63 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted)

(“While the federal pleading standard is quite forgiving . . . the

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”).

A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a

claim “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove

no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561 (2007)

(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). Plus, Iqbal

requires that a plaintiff plead content which allows this Court to

draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

alleged misconduct. 556 U.S. at 678.

In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must draw all

reasonable inferences that favor the plaintiff, construe the

allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, and accept as true all well-pleaded facts and

allegations in the complaint. Thompson v. Ill. Dep't of Prof'l

Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 2002); Perkins v.

Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 466 (7th Cir. 1991). In order to

withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege the

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“operative facts” upon which each claim is based. Kyle v. Morton

High Sch., 144 F.3d 448, 454-55 (7th Cir. 1998); Lucien v. Preiner,

967 F.2d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 1992). A plaintiff is required to

include allegations in the complaint that “plausibly suggest that

the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above

a ‘speculative level’” and, “if they do not, the plaintiff pleads

itself out of court.” E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc.,

496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting in part Twombly, 550

U.S. at 569 n. 14 (2007)). “Factual allegations must be enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the

assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even

if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotation marks,

ellipsis, citations and footnote omitted). Thus, a “plaintiff must

do better than putting a few words on paper that, in the hands of

an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has happened to

her that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v. Citibank,

N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original).

The Court notes that Holland is appearing pro se in this

matter. Generally, although “pro se litigants are masters of their

own complaints” and “[d]istrict judges have no obligation to act as

counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants,” Myles v. United States,

416 F.3d 551, 552 (7th Cir. 2005), a document filed pro se is to be

liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully

pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

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pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007). However, “on a motion to dismiss, courts are not bound to

accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,

286 (1986) (quotation marks omitted)). In this case, the Court

notes that Holland is a former attorney. According to the Seventh

Circuit, “[a]s a former attorney, [Holland] has only the most

tenuous claim to the more forgiving pleading standards we afford

typical pro se plaintiffs.”). Weston v. Illinois Dep’t Of Human

Services, 433 Fed. Appx. 480, 482 n.1 (7th Cir. 2011). 

Even pro se plaintiffs, however, must “make their pleadings

straightforward so that judges and adverse parties need not try to

fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud.” United States ex rel.

Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003). 

They must “be presented with sufficient clarity to avoid requiring

a district court or opposing party to forever sift through its

pages . . . .” Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1436 (7th Cir.

1990). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that

complaints contain a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Vicom, Inc.

v. Harbridge Merchant Servs., Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 775-76 (7th Cir.

1994) (“A complaint that is prolix and/or confusing makes it

difficult for the defendant to file a responsive pleading and makes

it difficult for the trial court to conduct orderly litigation.”),

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and Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1436 (7th Cir. 1990) (a

complaint “must be presented with clarity sufficient to avoid

requiring a district court or opposing party to forever sift

through its pages in search” of the plaintiff’s claims). In sum,

Rule 8 requires a complaint to be presented with “intelligibility

sufficient for a court or opposing party to understand whether a

valid claim is alleged and [,] if so [,] what it is.” Vicom, 20

F.3d at 775. Wordy, redundant, and seemingly interminable

complaints violate the letter and the spirit of Rule 8 and may be

dismissed with leave to refile. Id. at 776. Here, Holland’s

complaint fails to meet these standards. Usually, such

shortcomings would result in a without-prejudice dismissal, and a

plaintiff would be given an opportunity to amend his complaint to

comply with Rule 8. Here, however, the failure to comply with Rule

8 is only one of several problems with Holland’s complaint. 

The Seventh Circuit recently reviewed an appeal of one of

Holland’s cases in Holland v. Lake County Municipal Government, et

al., No. 2:13-CV-179 (N.D. Ind. 2013), aff’d, 605 Fed. Appx. 579

(7th Cir. 2015). In this case, Judge Theresa Springmann dismissed

claims similar to those raised in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) because Holland failed to state a plausible

claim for relief and the allegations were deemed fantastical and

delusional. Id. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted the

following:

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The suit alleges that since 1998 an array of

public and private actors have conspired “to

put him out of business.” The defendants, he

says, cost him his job with the Lake County,

Indiana, prosecutor’s office, got him banned

from the Lake County government building,

leveled false allegations that prompted the

suspension of his law license, unlawfully

seized two real properties, and caused him to

be falsely arrested and imprisoned. This

suit, though, is actually Holland’s fifth

raising similar allegations. See Holland v.

CEO Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 2:14cv5

(N.D. Ind. 2014), aff’d, No. 14-3447 (7th Cir.

Feb. 9, 2015); Holland v. City of Gary, No.

2:10-CV-454-PRC (N.D. Ind. 2013), aff’d, 533

F. App’x 661 (7th Cir. 2013); Holland v. City

of Gary, No. 2:12-CV-62-TS (N.D. Ind. 2012),

aff’d, 503 F. App’x 476 (7th Cir. 2013);

Holland v. Lake County Mun. Gov’t, No. 2:13-

CV-180 PS (N.D. Ind. 2013). 

Id. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals described the appeal as

frivolous, noted that Holland had been warned previously that

frivolous submissions would be sanctioned, and again warned Holland

about frivolous appeals. 

Here, although the claims are incredibly difficult to

decipher, the complaint is clearly duplicative of other cases

Holland has initiated; most notably, Holland v. City of Gary, No.

2:10-CV-454 (N.D. Ind. 2013), aff’d, 533 Fed. Appx. 661 (7th Cir.

2013). Holland’s incorporation of the complaint in the previous

case, together with his assertion that the judgment in that case is

void and should be vacated pursuant to various sections of Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 60, leave little doubt that this action is

duplicative. Accordingly, this Court must consider whether the

9
claims or issues raised in the instant case are precluded. 

Because Holland’s previous cases were brought in federal

court, this Court looks to the federal common law to determine

whether the current claims are precluded. Taylor v. Sturgell, 128

S. Ct. 2161 (2008). 

A fundamental precept of common-law

adjudication, embodied in the related

doctrines of collateral estoppel and res

judicata, is that a right, question or fact

distinctly put in issue and directly

determined by a court of competent

jurisdiction cannot be disputed in a

subsequent suit between the same parties or

their privies. Under res judicata, a final

judgment on the merits bars further claims by

parties or their privies based on the same

cause of action.

Ross v. Bd. of Educ., 486 F.3d 279, 282 (7th Cir. 2007) (quotation

marks, ellipsis and citations omitted). 

For res judicata to apply, defendants must show identity of

the cause of action, identity of the parties or their privies, and

a final judgment on the merits. Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742

F.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2014). To decide whether there is identity of

the cause of action, the court looks at “whether the claims

comprise the same core of operative facts that give rise to a

remedy.” Id. (quoting Matrix IV v. American National Bank and

Trust Company of Chicago, 649 F.3d 539, 547 (7th Cir. 2011)). In

other words, it must arise out of the same transaction. Ross, 486

F.3d at 283. If it did, then even if the claim were not raised in

the earlier lawsuit, it cannot be asserted. Id. Here, there can

10
be no question that this action arises from the same transaction as

the claims raised in Cause No. 2:10-CV-454; Holland admits as much

in the complaint itself. And, the previous case was disposed of on

the merits at the summary judgment stage. The only remaining issue

is whether there is identity of the parties. While there is

considerable overlap, each complaint named numerous parties, and

the defendants are not identical in the two suits. As to any party

named in Cause No. 2:10-CV-4542

, however, claim preclusion bars all

claims raised in the instant complaint.

With regard to the defendants who were not named in Cause No.

2:10-CV-454, collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) must be

considered. Under this doctrine, “once an issue is actually and

necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that

determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a

different cause of action involving a party to the prior

litigation.” See Carter v. C.I.R., 746 F.3d 318, 321 (7th Cir.

2014)(quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979)). 

Unlike res judicata, collateral estoppel can be used as an

affirmative defense even where the party asserting it was not a

party to the earlier litigation. Id. In order for a federal

judgment to have a preclusive effect, four elements must be

2

 The City of Gary, City of Gary Mayor Rudy Clay, City of Gary Chief of

Police, Lake County Sheriff Dominguez, Warden of the Lake County Jail, Johnny

Gill Officer #1384, Officer Williams #4282, and Officer Tremell Williamson

were among the numerous defendants named in Cause No. 2:10-CV-454.

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satisfied: 

(1) the issue sought to be precluded is the

same as an issue in the prior litigation; (2)

the issue must have been actually litigated in

the prior litigation; (3) the determination of

the issue must have been essential to the

final judgment; and (4) the party against whom

estoppel is invoked must have been fully

represented in the prior action.

Adams, 742 F.3d at 736 (citing Matrix IV, 649 F.3d at 547). 

Holland, who chose to proceed pro se in both this action and

each of the prior actions which could potentially have a preclusive

effect in this action, cannot use his pro se status to avoid

collateral estoppel. DeGuelle v. Camilli, 724 F.3d 933, 938 (7th

Cir. 2013)(“[T]he idea that litigating pro se should insulate a

litigant from application of the collateral estoppel doctrine, or,

more broadly, the doctrine of res judicata, of which collateral

estoppel is an aspect, is absurd.”). That is especially true here,

where Holland was a practicing attorney for many years. 

With regard to the remaining elements, the Court begins by

looking at what issues were addressed in Cause No. 2:10-CV-454. In

that case, Magistrate Judge Cherry issued three summary judgment

rulings covering a variety of issues. Holland, No. 2:10-CV-454, DE

##203, 317, 322. Defendants City of Gary, Mayor Rudy Clay, City of

Gary Chief of Police, Officer Johnny Gill, and Officer Williams

argued that Holland could not demonstrate that his March 3, 2010,

arrest was without probable cause. Magistrate Judge Cherry agreed

and, as a result, dismissed Holland’s claims for wrongful arrest,

12
unreasonable search and seizure, false imprisonment, malicious

prosecution, and failure to investigate. Holland, No. 2:10-CV-454,

DE #203 at 10-11. Magistrate Judge Cherry also determined that

these defendants could not be liable for the actions of the judge,

clerk staff, and prosecuting attorneys because they are not

officers of the city government. Id. at 5-6. Furthermore,

Magistrate Judge Cherry determined that, following Holland’s

arrest, his initial appearance was timely and summary judgment was

warranted on Holland’s claim that he was denied a prompt initial

hearing. Id. at 12. In considering Holland’s failure to train

claim, Magistrate Judge Cherry noted that Holland had not raised

any issue of material fact to support his claim that he suffered a

constitutional violation. Id. Without that, the Court did not need

to consider whether there was a policy or custom such that

liability under section 1983 could attach. Id.

Thereafter, the City of Gary, Mayor Rudy Clay, the City of

Gary Chief of Police, Officer Johnny Gill, and Officer Williams

filed another motion for summary judgment, arguing that Holland’s

remaining claims should be dismissed. Holland, No. 2:10-CV-454, DE

#317. Magistrate Judge Cherry found that summary judgment in favor

of the defendants was appropriate as to Holland’s remaining two

claims: abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional

distress. Id. In addressing this motion, Magistrate Judge Cherry

found both that Holland could not point to any evidence in the

13
record of any nefarious intent and that the Defendants’ acts in the

arrest were procedurally proper under the circumstances. Id. at 6. 

Magistrate Judge Cherry found that Holland had produced no evidence

to support his claim and that, in light of his earlier finding that

probable cause for the arrest existed, the Defendants had done

nothing outrageous. Id. at 7. 

Magistrate Judge Cherry also ruled on motions for summary

judgment filed by Lake County Board of Commissioners, Sheriff

Dominguez, and Warden of the Lake County Jail. Holland, No. 2:10-

CV-454, DE #322. Magistrate Judge Cherry ruled that the Lake

County Board of Commissioners could not be liable to Holland for

the actions of the Sheriff Dominguez or the Lake County Jail even

if they violated his constitutional rights. Id. at 7-8. With

regard to Sheriff Dominquez and the Warden of the Lake County Jail,

Magistrate Judge Cherry granted summary judgment in their favor

because Holland produced no admissible evidence to support his

claim that there was a policy or custom of violating inmates’

constitutional rights. Id. at 8-13. 

Each of these issues were litigated on summary judgment and

essential to the Court’s judgment.3 Holland had the opportunity to

3 Holland claims that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to

litigate these issues in the prior case. More specifically, he complains that

he did not get to conduct more discovery before responding to the summary

judgment motion. He also complains that the judgment was void because not all

Defendants had properly consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge.

These arguments are misplaced. If Holland wanted to challenge Magistrate

Judge Cherry’s rulings regarding discovery, the proper procedure was to raise

the issue with the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in the appeal of that

14
appeal Magistrate Judge Cherry’s rulings. He did so, and the

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered his arguments and

upheld Magistrate Judge Cherry’s judgment in all respects. Holland

v. City of Gary, 533 Fed. Appx. 661 (7th Cir. 2013). 

Holland is precluded from relitigating each of the issues that

Magistrate Judge Cherry decided in Cause No. 2:10-CV-454. This

leaves little left to litigate. With so many issues decided

against him, Holland’s complaint lacks traction. Because part of

the purpose of res judicata and collateral estoppel are to preserve

the limited resources of the judiciary, this Court declines to

conduct a similar analysis of each of the at least five other cases

that also appear related to the instant suit. This decision is

made in part because, even if there remains a claim or issue not

precluded by either res judicata or collateral estoppel, there are

other problems with the complaint, as outlined below.

Holland has not demonstrated that he has properly served the

Gary Defendants. See F.R.Civ. P. 4(j)(2) and Ind. Tr. Pro. Rule

4.6 (both requiring that service be made upon the chief executive

officer of any municipal corporation; in this case, the current

mayor of Gary). 

Additionally, Holland has attempted to sue individuals who are

case. Likewise, if Holland thought that Magistrate Judge Cherry’s orders were

void due to a problem with the consent, he could have raised that argument

when appealing Magistrate Judge Cherry’s judgment. This separate civil action

is not the proper mechanism for these challenges. On the record before this

Court, there is every indication that Holland had a full and fair opportunity

to litigate his claims before Magistrate Judge Cherry.

15
entitled to immunity. Holland’s complaint alleges that Judge

Diedre Monroe engaged in a variety of judicial acts that resulted

in violations of his rights, but she enjoys absolute immunity for

these acts “even if [her] exercise of authority is flawed by the

commission of grave procedural errors.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435

U.S. 349, 359 (1978). Likewise, Holland’s allegations regarding

Lake County Prosecutor Bernard Carter and Deputy Prosecutor Rosie

Lynch stem directly from their handling of his 2010 criminal case. 

They are entitled to prosecutorial immunity for their duties as

advocates for the State, even where they have acted maliciously or

violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Buckley v.

Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409

(1976).4

Lastly, it appears that many, if not all, of Holland’s claims

would be barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Whether

the two-year Indiana statute of limitations related to injuries

applied or the four-year statute of limitations related to federal

civil RICO claims applies, Holland’s claims would fall outside the

statute of limitations. See I.C. § 34-11-2-4(a); Cancer

Foundation, Inc. v. Cerberus Capital Management, 559 F.3d 671 (7th

4 It is possible, as Holland has argued, that some of the actions he

complains of would be entitled only to qualified immunity; but due to the

sheer number of problems with Holland’s complaint, it is not necessary for

this Court to sort out whether any of Holland’s allegations regarding the

Prosecutor Defendants might fall outside the acts for which they enjoy

absolute immunity.

16
Cir. 2009)(“The statute of limitations for a civil RICO cause of

action is a fairly generous four years. It begins to run when the

plaintiffs discover, or should, if diligent, have discovered, that

they had been injured by the defendants.”). Although Holland

claims that the alleged conspiracy has continued for 20 years and

will continue into the future, the crux of his complaint centers

around an arrest occurring on March 3, 2010. This suit was not

filed until June 1, 2015 - over five years later. Holland argues

that the six-year statute of limitations for fraud and breach of

contract applies to his state law claims and that the Indiana civil

Rico statute has a five-year statute of limitations. He further

argues that Defendants should be estopped from raising the statute

of limitations as a defense because their alleged fraud in Cause

No. 2:10-CV-454 prevented him from filing a timely complaint. He

further argues that the statute of limitations should be tolled

because there is a continuing violation. This Court finds each of

these arguments without merit.

Other arguments have been made that this Court declines to

address. Given all the shortcomings outlined above, it is

unnecessary to explore the merits of any remaining arguments. 

Under these circumstances of this case, any attempt to allow

Holland to amend his complaint would be futile.5 Barry Aviation

5 In fact, this Court briefly entertained whether sanctions are

warranted, given the myriad of previous warnings Holland has received that

frivolous filings must be avoided. That, however, will be left to the

discretion of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, should Holland choose to

appeal this order. 

17
Inc. v. Land O'Lakes Municipal Airport Comm'n, 377 F.3d 682, 687

(7th Cir. 2004)(“Unless it is certain from the face of the

complaint that any amendment would be futile or otherwise

unwarranted, the district court should grant leave to amend after

granting a motion to dismiss.”). Accordingly, Holland’s claims

against Judge Diedre Monroe and/or Gary City Court, the Gary

Defendants, the Lake County Defendants, and the Prosecutor

Defendants are dismissed with prejudice. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, each of the instant motions to

dismiss are GRANTED. (DE ##26, 30, 35, 41). Judge Deidre Monroe

and/or Gary City Court, the Gary Defendants, the Lake County

Defendants, and the Prosecutor Defendants are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. The case remains pending as to Med Staff, Inc. only.

DATED: March 18, 2016 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

18