UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

LALETA M. MCCLURE, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff, ) 

 ) CASE NO: 1:15-CV-17 

 v. ) 

 ) 

H-N-R BLOCK, ) 

 ) 

Defendant. ) 

 ) 

OPINION and ORDER 

 This matter is before the Court on the Defendant’s 

Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to Stay and to 

Compel Arbitration (DE #8), filed by the Defendant on 

February 17, 2015. For the reasons set forth below, the 

Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and stay 

proceedings is GRANTED. Pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 4, the 

parties shall proceed with arbitration as provided by their 

agreement. Pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 3, the proceedings are 

STAYED pending further order of the Court. The Clerk is 

ORDERED to close the case, subject to the right of either 

party to seek relief from the stay. 

 The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides that an 

arbitration clause in a “contract evidencing a transaction 

involving commerce . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and 

enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
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equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. 

The FAA generally requires a court to grant a motion to 

compel arbitration where the court finds: (1) “a written 

agreement to arbitrate,” (2) “a dispute within the scope of 

the arbitration agreement,” and (3) “a refusal to 

arbitrate.” Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Watts Indus., Inc., 417 

F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2005). “[T]he FAA compels judicial 

enforcement of a wide range of written arbitration 

agreements,” including arbitration agreements found in 

employment contracts. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 

532 U.S. 105, 111, 119 (2001); International Bros. of 

Teamsters Local Union No. 50 v. Kienstra Precast, LLC., 702 

F.3d 954, 956 (7th Cir. 2012). The FAA also compels 

arbitration of a wide range of statutory violations, 

including federal employment discrimination claims. See 

CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S.Ct. 665, 668 

(2012)(finding that courts must enforce arbitration 

agreements “even when the claims at issue are federal 

statutory claims, unless the FAA’s mandate has been 

‘overridden by a contrary congressional 

command.’”)(internal citation omitted); Gilmer v. 

Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33-34 

(1991)(compelling arbitration of claims under the Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) under a broadly-
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worded arbitration clause); Koveleskie v. SBC Capital 

Markets, Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 365 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding 

that Congress did not intend Title VII to preclude 

enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements). 

 Here, the parties agreed in writing as a part of an 

employment contract to arbitrate the claims Plaintiff 

alleges in her Complaint (D.E. #9-1 at ¶ 17), i.e., that 

Defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964 and certain state law claims concerning wages. 

Moreover, while Plaintiff believes that Defendant’s motion 

to dismiss is further evidence of discrimination, she has 

stated no reason suggesting that arbitration of her claim 

is inappropriate. Accordingly, this Court is satisfied 

that Plaintiff’s claim is referable to arbitration. 

 “[U]pon being satisfied that the issue involved in 

such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under 

such an agreement, [the court] shall on application of one 

of the parties stay the trial of the action until such 

arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of 

the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not 

in default in proceeding with such arbitration.” 9 U.S.C. § 

3 (emphasis added). A stay prevents the parties from 

having to file a new action each time the Court’s 

assistance is required regarding issues involving the 
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arbitrator (9 U.S.C. § 5), witnesses (9 U.S.C. § 7), or the 

award (9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 10, 11). Lloyd v. HOVENSA, LLC, 369 

F.3d 263, 270 (3d. Cir. 2004). 

 Notwithstanding the plain language of § 3, many courts 

hold that dismissal is a permissible remedy when all of the 

issues presented in a lawsuit are arbitrable. See Apache 

Bohai Corp., LDC v. Texaco China. B.V., 330 F.3d 307, 311 

n. 9 (5th Cir. 2003); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 

975 F.2d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir. 1992). Other Courts hold 

that district courts are obligated to grant a stay pursuant 

to § 3. See HOVENSA, 369 F.3d at 269. 

 In this case, the Defendant requests this Court to 

dismiss the action or, in the alternative, to stay the 

action. Given the plain language of § 3 and the benefits 

of granting a stay rather than a dismissal, this Court is 

not persuaded that a dismissal is more appropriate than a 

stay. 

 For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s motion to 

compel arbitration and stay proceedings is GRANTED. 

Pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 4, the parties shall proceed with 

arbitration as provided by their agreement. Pursuant to 9 

U.S.C. § 3, the proceedings are STAYED pending further 

order of the Court. The Clerk is ORDERED to close the 
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case, subject to the right of either party to seek relief 

from the stay. 

DATED: May 11, 2015 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge 

 United States District Court