UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

STEPHEN HOLBROOK, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff ) 

 vs. ) CAUSE NO. 3:15-CV-552 RLM 

) 

LSC COMMUNICATIONS US, LLC, ) 

) 

 Defendant ) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 Stephen Holbrook was terminated from his position with LSC 

Communications US, LLC in the company’s Warsaw, IN facility in 2014.1 He 

brought suit against his former employer alleging that he was terminated in 

violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621, 

et seq. (Count I) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 

et seq. (Count II). LSC Communications moved for summary judgment and the 

court heard arguments on defendant’s motion on March 6, 2017. Because the 

summary judgment record doesn’t show that comparable employees were treated 

better, the court grants LSC Communications’ motion. 

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

 Summary judgment is appropriate when the record demonstrate that there 

are no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment 

                                                            

1 LSC Communications US, LLC was substituted for RR Donnelley & Sons Company as 

successor in interest in Mr. Holbrook’s former employment. [Doc. No. 38]. 
2 

as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 

322 (1986); Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Hansen, 632 F.3d 388, 391-92 (7th Cir. 

2011). The court construes the evidence and all inferences that reasonably can 

be drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The moving party 

bears the burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying 

the parts of the record that demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of 

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323. It can meet that burden 

by showing that there’s no evidence to support the non-moving party’s case. Id. 

at 325. Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party can’t rest 

upon the allegations in the pleadings, but must “point to evidence that can be 

put in admissible form at trial, and that, if believed by the fact-finder, could 

support judgment in his favor.” Marr v. Bank of America, N,A., 662 F.3d 963, 

966 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Hastings Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaFollette, No. 1:07-cv1085, 2009 WL 348769, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 6, 2009) (“[i]t is not the duty of the 

court to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary 

judgment; rather, the nonmoving party bears the responsibility of identifying the 

evidence upon which he relies”); Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 

852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005) (summary judgment is “not a dress rehearsal or practice 

run; it is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show 

what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of 

events”). 
3 

II. BACKGROUND

LSC Communications hired Mr. Holbrook in 1978. He rose to the level of 

Customer Service Supervisor, and was terminated from the company in October 

2014. He had diabetes and was sixty-two years-old when he was fired. LSC 

Communications is an at-will employer. Its human resources policy outlines a 

“positive counseling” procedure that provides for a progressive discipline 

procedure for employees, while reserving the right to terminate an employee at 

any time. The policy’s recommendation for a first level of discipline is “a formal 

meeting with the employee to raise concerns,” which the company calls a “record 

of conversation.” A “final warning” is issued after a very serious incident or when 

an employee hasn’t corrected problematic behavior. According to the policy, 

“failure to perform in accordance with the [f]inal [w]arning will normally result in 

separation.” 

Mr. Holbrook was issued a final warning in 2012. The final warning stated 

that Mr. Holbrook’s behavior violated LSC Communications’ rules of conduct and 

referenced three events: a March 2010 confrontation with his co-worker, Toby 

Popenfoose; an October 2011 incident in which Mr. Holbrook expressed 

frustration about the company; and a December 2011 outburst in which Mr. 

Holbrook yelled at co-worker Bruce Hazelet. 

Mr. Holbrook recognized that he needed to improve his response to stress 

at work and saw a professional for assistance. His performance reviews suggest 

that his conduct improved. While previous annual reviews raised concerns about 
4 

Mr. Holbrook’s response to stress, his 2012 performance review indicated that 

he “was much improved this year in remaining cool under pressure and 

demonstrated he can be counted on to hold things together under stressful 

situations.” His supervisor, John Pierog, reported on his 2013 performance 

review that Mr. Holbrook “made progress in managing stress in 2013 and 

handled adversity with a more even keeled approach.” 

On October 13, 2014, Mr. Holbrook and his colleague, Tim Scheidt, had a 

confrontation. Mr. Scheidt called Mr. Holbrook a bully and cursed at him, told 

Mr. Holbrook he was worthless, and asked Mr. Holbrook if he wanted to hit him. 

Mr. Holbrook admitted he “lost it” during the confrontation, raised his voice, and 

cursed at Mr. Scheidt. Mr. Scheidt reported to Mr. Pierog that Mr. Holbrook 

threatened to punch him. 

Mr. Pierog called Mr. Holbrook into his office and accused him of 

threatening Mr. Scheidt. Mr. Pierog terminated him for physically threatening a 

coworker, which violated the conditions of his final warning. Mr. Scheidt, who 

was younger than Mr. Holbrook and didn’t identify as disabled, wasn’t 

terminated after his confrontation with Mr. Holbrook, but was issued a “record 

of conversation.” Mr. Holbrook brought suit against his former employer, alleging 

he was terminated in violation of the ADEA and the ADA. LSC Communications 

moved for summary judgment on both claims. 
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III. DISCUSSION

A. ADEA Claim

Mr. Holbrook’s ADEA claim can survive summary judgment if “the 

evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff's 

[age] caused [his] discharge.” Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 

765 (7th Cir. 2016). In a case like this one, in which the employee doesn’t present 

direct evidence of discrimination, the court must analyze the discrimination 

claim under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Peele v. Country 

Mut. Ins. Co., 288 F.3d 319, 326 (7th Cir. 2002). See also Ortiz v. Werner 

Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 766 (7th Cir. 2016) (recognizing that the 

McDonnell Douglas framework remains the appropriate approach for analyzing 

employment discrimination claims). 

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell 

Douglas framework, “the plaintiff has the initial burden of producing evidence 

showing that (1) [he] is a member of a protected class, (2) [he] was meeting the 

defendant's legitimate expectations, (3) [he] suffered an adverse employment 

action, and (4) similarly situated employees who were [younger] were treated 

more favorably.” Simpson v. Franciscan All., Inc., 827 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 

2016). LSC Communications doesn’t dispute that Mr. Holbrook is a member of 

the protected class or that he suffered an adverse employment action, but 

contends that Mr. Holbrook hasn’t met his burden of showing that he was 

meeting LSC Communications’ legitimate expectations and that a younger 

similarly situated employee was treated more favorably. 
6 

To demonstrate that he was meeting LSC Communications’ legitimate 

expectations, Mr. Holbrook argues that while he was issued a final warning in 

2012 for anger issues, his subsequent performance evaluations were positive 

and noted improvement. “[E]arlier evaluations cannot, by themselves, 

demonstrate the adequacy of performance at the crucial time when the 

employment action is taken.” Fortier v. Ameritech Mobile Commc'ns, Inc., 161 

F.3d 1106, 1113 (7th Cir. 1998). Mr. Holbrook, despite demonstrating 

improvement, was still subject to the final warning, which provided him notice 

that another incident could lead to termination. 

The day Mr. Holbrook was fired, Mr. Scheidt reported to Mr. Pierog that 

Mr. Holbrook threatened him during a confrontation. Mr. Pierog called Mr. 

Holbrook into his office and, according to his notes from the conversation, told 

him that “he crossed the line when he physically threatened [Mr. Scheidt]” and 

terminated him because “physical threats would not be tolerated at [LSC 

Communications].” Mr. Holbrook denies ever threatening Mr. Scheidt but 

admitted “losing it,” raising his voice, and cursing during the confrontation. 

While this behavior might have been sufficient to trigger dismissal under the 

terms of the final warning, Mr. Pierog and the company appear to have relied on 

Mr. Scheidt’s accusation that Mr. Holbrook threatened him with physical 

violence as the basis for the termination decision, an accusation Mr. Holbrook 

denies. This is a factual dispute the court can’t resolve on summary judgment. 

LSC Communications argues that even if Mr. Holbrook was meeting the 

company’s legitimate expectations, his ADEA claim fails because he hasn’t 
7 

shown that a similarly situated employee who was younger was treated more 

favorably. “[I]n disciplinary cases—in which a plaintiff claims that [he] was 

disciplined by [his] employer more harshly than a similarly situated employee 

based on some prohibited reason—a plaintiff must show that [he] is similarly 

situated with respect to performance, qualifications, and conduct.” Peele v. 

Country Mut. Ins. Co., 288 F.3d 319, 330 (7th Cir. 2002). The search is for a 

younger employee that is materially similarly, but not a clone. Chaney v. 

Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 916 (7th Cir. 2010). 

Mr. Holbrook claims that he was issued a final warning for his first anger 

management issue, while Mr. Scheidt, who was younger than Mr. Holbrook, 

wasn’t disciplined at all following their confrontation. But Mr. Scheidt was issued 

a “record of conversation” after the confrontation with Mr. Holbrook, the first 

level of discipline pursuant to the company’s human resources policy. Mr. 

Holbrook admits that this incident appears to be Mr. Scheidt’s first anger 

management issue and points to no other evidence of disciplinary reports on Mr. 

Scheidt. Mr. Holbrook, in contrast, was issued a final warning as the result of 

three distinct events: two separate confrontations with coworkers and an 

incident in which Mr. Holbrook expressed frustration about the company. 

Because the record demonstrates divergent disciplinary histories for Mr. Scheidt 

and Mr. Holbrook, no reasonable jury could find that Mr. Scheidt is similarly 

situated for purposes of an ADEA claim. See Simpson v. Franciscan All., Inc., 

827 F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[a]n employee who does not have a similar 
8 

disciplinary history and performance record as the plaintiff is not similarly 

situated”). 

Mr. Holbrook also presents a list of younger employees that he claims are 

similarly situated and were treated more favorably. But Mr. Holbrook hasn’t 

demonstrated that any of these younger employees “dealt with the same 

supervisor, were subject to the same standards, and had engaged in similar 

conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would 

distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them.” See Peele v. 

Country Mut. Ins. Co., 288 F.3d 319, 330 (7th Cir.2002). 

Because Mr. Holbrook hasn’t shown that a similarly situated employee 

who was younger was treated more favorably, he can’t establish a prima facie

case under McDonnell Douglas and this court must grant LSC Communications’ 

motion of summary judgment as to Mr. Holbrook’s ADEA claim. See Atanus v. 

Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 673 (7th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that “[s]ummary judgment 

is appropriate if the employee fails to establish any of the foregoing elements of 

the prima facie case”); Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp., 472 F.3d 930, 939 (7th Cir. 

2007). 

B. ADA Claim

LSC Communications argues that Mr. Holbrook can’t prevail on his ADA 

claim because he can’t establish the elements of a prima facie case. Mr. Holbrook 

doesn’t present direct evidence of discrimination, so the court must also analyze 

this claim under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Taylor-
9 

Novotny v. Health All. Med. Plans, Inc., 772 F.3d 478, 489 (7th Cir. 2014). Title 

I of the ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against any qualified 

individual on the basis of a disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12111. To establish 

a prima facie claim under Title I of the ADA, an employee must demonstrate “(1) 

the plaintiff was a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the 

ADA; (2) [he] was meeting [his] employer's legitimate expectations; (3) [he] 

nevertheless suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated, 

non-disabled employees were treated more favorably.” Taylor-Novotny v. Health 

All. Med. Plans, Inc., 772 F.3d 478, 489 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). LSC Communications challenges whether Mr. 

Holbrook met his burden of showing that a similarly situated employee was 

treated more favorably.2

“To meet his burden of demonstrating that another employee is similarly 

situated, a plaintiff must demonstrate that there is someone who is directly 

comparable to him in all material respects.” Taylor-Novotny v. Health All. Med. 

Plans, Inc., 772 F.3d 478, 492 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Mr. Holbrook argues that Mr. Scheidt is a similarly situated, nondisabled 

employee who received more lenient treatment. 

For the reasons discussed in analyzing his ADEA claim, no reasonable jury 

could find that Mr. Scheidt is similarly situated for purposes of an ADA claim; 

the record demonstrates that he and Mr. Holbrook had divergent disciplinary 

                                                            

2 LSC Communications also disputes whether Mr. Holbrook could demonstrate that he 

was a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the ADA. The court 

assumes without deciding that Mr. Holbrook was a qualified individual with a disability. 
10 

histories. See Id. (holding that a coworker isn’t similarly situated unless “the 

other coworker had a comparable set of failings”). Therefore, he can’t establish a 

prima facie case and summary judgment as to his ADA claim is warranted. See 

Bunn v. Khoury Enterprises, Inc., 753 F.3d 676, 685 (7th Cir. 2014) (recognizing 

that summary judgment is appropriate when a plaintiff cannot establish a prima 

facie of discrimination under the ADA). 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment 

[Doc. No. 44] is GRANTED and the June 21, 2017 final pretrial conference and 

July 10, 2017 trial dates are VACATED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment 

accordingly. 

 SO ORDERED 

 ENTERED: May 15, 2017 

 /s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr. 

 Judge 

United States District Court