alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 07-3342

___________ G. Yvonne Stephens, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of Minnesota. John A. Hedback, Trustee of Chapter * 7 Bankruptcy Estate of G. Yvonne * [UNPUBLISHED] Stephens; Mary Jo A. Jensen-Carter, * Trustee of the Bankruptcy Estate of * Larry Kenneth Alexander, Bankruptcy * 98-33694, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: April 17, 2009 Filed: April 21, 2009

___________ Before WOLLMAN, MURPHY, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.1 The Honorable Patrick J. Schiltz, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.
2 The Honorable Dennis D. O’Brien, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the District of Minnesota. -2- Georgina Stephens appeals an order of the district court 1 which (1) affirmed a partial-summary-judgment order of the bankruptcy court, 2holding that Stephens does not have an ownership interest in a resi dence at 875 Laurel Avenue in St. Paul, Minnesota, and (2) denied Stephens’s “Mo tion for the Withdrawal of the Bankruptcy Court’s Reference.” In addition, the district court imposed restrictions on future filings by Stephens related to the property. Having carefully reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments, we find no basis for reversal. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions, judgmen ts, orders, and decrees entered by district courts sitting as appellate court in bankruptcy matter); In re Farmland Indus., Inc. , 397 F.3d 647, 650 (8th Cir. 2005) (order entere d before conclusion of complex bankruptcy case is not appealable under § 158(d) unless it finally resolves discrete segment of proceeding); see also In re M & S Grading, Inc. , 526 F.3d 363, 367 (8th Cir. 2008) (appellate court reviews bankruptcy court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo); Le monds v. St. Louis County , 222 F.3d 488, 492 (8th Cir. 2000) (de novo review of jurisdicti onal challenges); In re Tyler , 839 F.2d 1290, 1290- 95 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (courts have discretion to place reasonable restrictions on litigant who generally abuses judicial pr ocess; affirming district court’s order limiting inmate to single monthly filing in di strict court because of inmate’s flagrant and repeated abuse of judicial process). Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________
EXHIBIT 32.1





CERTIFICATION


Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. 1350


(Section
302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)





In
connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Covenant Group of China
Inc. (the “Company”) for the year ended December 31, 2009, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), Kenneth
Wong, President of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.






Date :
      March 31, 2010
                By:
                /s/ Kenneth WongName:
      Kenneth WongTitle:
      President
 This
certification accompanies each Report pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of §18 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

TYQUAN STEWART,

Plaintiff,

v.

PARKVIEW HOSPITAL, INC. d/b/a PARKVIEW 

BEHAVIORAL HEALTH HOSPITAL, and

LAKISHA HOUSTON,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. 1:16-CV-00138 – JTM-SLC

MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME

COME NOW the Defendants, Parkview Hospital, Inc. d/b/a Parkview Behavioral Health 

Hospital, and Lakisha Houston, by counsel, and move for an extension of time in which to respond 

to Plaintiff’s Complaint. In support of said Motion, Defendants state as follows:

1. The original deadline for responding to Plaintiff’s Complaint is October 12, 2016.

2. Defendants request an extension of time to and including October 26, 2016.

3. The undersigned counsel for Defendants has contacted the pro se Plaintiff, Tyquan 

Stewart, by telephone, and he has verbally agreed to the extension of time.

WHEREFORE, Defendants, Parkview Hospital, Inc. d/b/a Parkview Behavioral Health 

Hospital, and Lakisha Houston, pray for an extension of time to and including October 26, 2016, in 

which to respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint.

Dated: September 26, 2016 s/Mark W. Baeverstad

Mark W. Baeverstad #3896-02

Rothberg Logan & Warsco LLP

505 E. Washington Blvd.

Fort Wayne, IN 46802

(260) 422-9454 - Telephone

(260) 422-1622 - Facsimile

mbaeverstad@rlwlawfirm.com
2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 26th day of September, 2016, the following non-CM/ECF 

participant was served by first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid to:

Tyquan Stewart

4510 Austin Dr.

Fort Wayne, IN 46806

s/Mark W. Baeverstad

Mark W. Baeverstad
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion *

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-11007

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

CECIL CLINTON, III, also known as Clifton Dwight Washington,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 6:08-CR-15-1

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appealing the judgment in a criminal case, Cecil Clinton, III, presents

arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Brown, 920 F.2d

1212, 1216-17 (5th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by United States v.

Candia, 454 F.3d 468, 472-73 (5th Cir. 2006), which held that a district court

may order a term of imprisonment to run consecutively with an unimposed state

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

August 18, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-11007

2

sentence. The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and

the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Jerome HALE, petitioner, v. Bonita HOFFNER, Warden.

No. 13-5154.

Supreme Court of the United States

Dec. 2, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.
Sherry-Jolene GABBARD, petitioner, v. TENNESSEE ELECTIONS COMMISSION, et al.

No. 12-8850.

Supreme Court of the United States

Aug. 30, 2013.

Petition for rehearing denied.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

MICHAEL EDWARD YARBROUGH, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) NO. 1:13-CV-160

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on a Petition under 28 U.S.C.

Paragraph 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a person in State

Custody filed by Michael Edward Yarbrough, a pro se prisoner, on

May 16, 2013. (DE # 1.) The Court is obligated to review the

petition and dismiss it if “it plainly appears from the petition

and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to

relief[.]” RULE 4 OF THE RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES. For the

reasons set forth below, the petition (DE # 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

BACKGROUND

According to the petition, Yarbrough is presently detained at

the Steuben County Jail awaiting trial on a charge that he

committed fraud on a financial institution. (DE # 1 at 1.) Giving

the petition liberal construction, he claims that the prosecutor
improperly reneged on a promise to dismiss the pending charge if he

provided certain information about a murder case. (Id. at 3-4.) He

seeks dismissal of the fraud charge and immediate release from

custody. (Id. at 6.)

DISCUSSION

“Ordinarily the attempt of a state prisoner to obtain federal

habeas corpus relief in advance of his state criminal trial [is]

completely hopeless.” United States ex rel. Stevens v. Circuit

Court of Milwaukee County, 675 F.2d 946, 947 (7th Cir. 1982); see

also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Although there is a

narrow exception involving double jeopardy claims, see Justices of

Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 302–03 (1984), this

case does not present a double jeopardy claim. If Yarbrough

believes that he has a viable defense to the pending criminal

charge or that his case is not being properly adjudicated, he can

present those claims to the state courts. The petition will be

dismissed, but the dismissal will not preclude him from seeking

federal habeas relief at a later date, if he is convicted and

properly exhausts his claims in one complete round of state review.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).

2
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the petition (DE # 1) is

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

DATED: May 31, 2013 /s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

3
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

JAMES A. MUDD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:15-cv-00177-WCL-SLC

)

DEAN ESSERMAN, Chief of )

Police, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to strike the third amended complaint filed by

Plaintiff on November 3, 2015. (DE 24). Defendants’ motion to strike is not well taken and will

be DENIED. 

“Generally speaking, motions to strike portions of pleadings are disfavored as they

consume scarce judicial resources and may be used for dilatory purposes.” Silicon Graphics,

Inc. v. ATI Techs. ULC, No. 06-C-611-C, 2007 WL 5312633, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 12, 2007)

(citing Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest River, Inc., 464 F.3d 725, 727 (7th Cir. 2006); Heller

Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989)). Motions to strike

pleadings “will generally be denied unless the portion of the pleading at issue is prejudicial.” 

U.S. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Bryant, No. 3:10-cv-129, 2011 WL 221662, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 2011)

(citing Heller, 883 F.2d at 1294; Tektel, Inc. v. Maier, 813 F. Supp. 1331, 1334 (N.D. Ill. 1992)).

 Here, on September 23, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint for the

third time in order to substitute the City of New Haven, Indiana, for the Chief of Police and to

add a claim of false arrest; Plaintiff attached his proposed third amended complaint to the
motion. (DE 20). On October 15, 2015, the Court—after noting that the motion was timely filed

and that Defendants had not filed a response to the motion—granted Plaintiff leave to amend his

complaint. (DE 22). In doing so, the Court observed that paragraph 4 of Plaintiff’s proposed

amended complaint referred to the New Haven Police Department as a defendant, rather than the

City of New Haven. Rather than deem that incorrect proposed complaint filed, the Court

afforded Plaintiff to October 22, 2015, to file an amended complaint that complied with its

motion to amend. (DE 22). 

Now Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s third amended complaint should be stricken

because it was filed 12 days after the Court’s October 22nd deadline. Defendants also argue that

the third amended complaint is “prejudicial” because it was amended twice previously and

because it contains “frivolous allegations.” (DE 24 ¶¶ 3, 4). Contrary to Defendants’ bald

assertions, there is no evidence of prejudice to Defendants by Plaintiff’s belated filing. 

Defendants did not respond to the motion to amend when they had the opportunity to do so, and

thus, Defendants cannot now raise arguments that the third amended complaint is prejudicial or

frivolous. Defendants’ motion to strike is needlessly consuming scarce resources and causing

additional expenditures of time. Silicon Graphics, Inc. 2007 WL 5312633, at *1. Accordingly,

the motion to strike (DE 24) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED. 

Entered this 3rd day of November 2015.

/s/ Susan Collins 

Susan Collins,

United States Magistrate Judge
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Flow International Corporation, a Washington
corporation (the Company), on Form 10-Q for the quarter ending July 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I, Stephen R. Light, Principal Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1350), that to my knowledge:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



|                           
|---------------------------
|/s/    STEPHEN R. LIGHT    
|Stephen R. Light           
|Principal Executive Officer
|December 29, 2004          



CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Flow International Corporation, a Washington corporation (the Company), on Form 10-Q for the quarter ending July 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
Report), I, Stephen D. Reichenbach, Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1350), that to my knowledge:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



|                             
|-----------------------------
|/s/    STEPHEN D. REICHENBACH
|Stephen D. Reichenbach       
|Principal Financial Officer  
|December 29, 2004
109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1972

AN ACT

To direct the Secretary of the Interior to conduct a special 

resource study to determine the suitability and feasibility 

of including in the National Park System certain sites 

in Williamson County, Tennessee, relating to the Battle 

of Franklin.
2

•HR 1972 EH 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Franklin National Bat5 tlefield Study Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

7 In this Act: 

8 (1) SECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means 

9 the Secretary of the Interior. 

10 (2) STUDY AREA.—The term ‘‘study area’’ 

11 means the cities of Brentwood, Franklin, Triune, 

12 Thompson’s Station, and Spring Hill, Tennessee. 

13 SEC. 3. SPECIAL RESOURCE STUDY. 

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall conduct a 

15 special resource study of sites in the study area relating 

16 to the Battle of Franklin to determine—

17 (1) the national significance of the sites; and 

18 (2) the suitability and feasibility of including 

19 the sites in the National Park System. 

20 (b) REQUIREMENTS.—The study conducted under 

21 subsection (a) shall include the analysis and recommenda22 tions of the Secretary on—

23 (1) the effect on the study area of including the 

24 sites in the National Park System; and 
3

•HR 1972 EH 

1 (2) whether the sites could be included in an 

2 existing unit of the National Park System or other 

3 federally designated unit in the State of Tennessee. 

4 (c) CONSULTATION.—In conducting the study under 

5 subsection (a), the Secretary shall consult with—

6 (1) appropriate Federal agencies and State and 

7 local government entities; and 

8 (2) interested groups and organizations. 

9 (d) APPLICABLE LAW.—The study required under 

10 subsection (a) shall be conducted in accordance with Pub11 lic Law 91–383 (16 U.S.C. 1a–1 et seq.). 

12 SEC. 4. REPORT. 

13 Not later than 3 years after the date funds are made 

14 available for the study, the Secretary shall submit to the 

15 Committee on Resources of the House of Representatives 

16 and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of 

17 the Senate a report that describes—

18 (1) the findings of the study; and 

19 (2) any conclusions and recommendations of the 

20 Secretary. 
4

•HR 1972 EH 

1 SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 

2 There are authorized to be appropriated such sums 

3 as are necessary to carry out this Act.

Passed the House of Representatives November 15, 

2005. 

Attest:

Clerk. 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1972

AN ACT

To direct the Secretary of the Interior to conduct 

Tennessee, relating to the Battle of Franklin.Park System certain sites in Williamson County, ability and feasibility of including in the National a special resource study to determine the suit-
#### Yervand HARUTYUNYAN, Petitioner, v. John ASHCROFT, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 03-1998.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted April 23, 2004.

Decided May 25, 2004.

Robert L. Oswald, Noto & Oswald, P.C., Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Norah Ascoli Schwarz, Senior Litigation Counsel, Frances M. McLaughlin, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Before NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM.

Yervand Harutyunyan, a native and citizen of Armenia, petitions for review from an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) affirming, without opinion, the Immigration Judge’s denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.

On appeal, Harutyunyan raises challenges to the immigration judge’s determination that he failed to establish his eligibility for asylum. To obtain reversal of a determination denying eligibility for relief, an alien “must show that the evidence he presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” *INS v. Elias-Zacarias,*502 U.S. 478, 483-84, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). We have reviewed the evidence of record and conclude that Harutyunyan fails to show that the evidence compels a contrary result. Accordingly, we cannot grant the relief Harutyunyan seeks.

Additionally, we uphold the immigration judge’s denial of Harutyunyan’s applications for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture. To qualify for withholding of removal, an applicant must demonstrate “a clear probability of persecution.” *INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,*480 U.S. 421, 430-31, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987). To obtain relief under the Convention Against Torture, an applicant must establish that “it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (2003). Based on our review of the record, we find that Harutyunyan has failed to meet either one of these standards.

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED*
#### In the Matter of the Estate of Mollie M. Levy, Deceased. Allen H. Weiss et al., Respondents; Herbert Levy, Appellant.

— In a proceeding to fix attorney’s fees pursuant to SCPA 2110, Herbert Levy appeals from a decree of the Surrogate’s Court, Kings County (Pizzuto, J., on the decree; Bloom, S., on the decision), dated April 24,1984, which fixed the reasonable value of all legal services rendered to coexecutors Ralph Levy and Herbert Levy at $7,000, and allocated that sum as follows: (1) $3,500 to the law firm of petitioner Allen Weiss, (2) $2,500 to Katz, Robinson, Brog & Seymour, P. C., and (3) $1,000 to Herbert Levy.

Decree affirmed, with costs payable personally by the appellant.

*850Appellant Herbert Levy contends that the Surrogate failed to apply the correct rule in making his determination. While there are some well-recognized guidelines in this area *(see, Matter of Potts,*213 App Div 59, 62, *affd*241 NY 593), “[t]here is no hard and fast rule by which it can be determined what is reasonable compensation for an attorney in any given case” *(Matter of Brehm,*37 AD2d 95, 97; *see also, Matter of Wilhelm,*88 AD2d 6, 12). The Surrogate’s power to fix such compensation “must be exercised with reason, proper discretion and not arbitrarily” *(Matter of Brehm, supra,*at p 97). We find no basis in the record for disturbing the exercise of the Surrogate’s discretion.

We have reviewed appellant’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Thompson, J. P., Weinstein, Niehoff and Lawrence, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jesus ORTEGA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-10498

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Aug. 11, 2011.

Joshua Thomas Burgess, I, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

John Steven Bush, Fort Worth, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before SMITH, GARZA, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Jesus Ortega pleaded guilty to conspiracy to smuggle goods from the United States. He was sentenced to 48 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. He now appeals, arguing that he was entitled to a minor participant adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b).

Whether a defendant is a minor participant is a “sophisticated factual determination” reviewed for clear error. *United States v. Garcia,*242 F.3d 593, 597-98 (5th Cir.2001) (citation omitted). “[I]n order to qualify as a minor participant, a defendant must have been peripheral to the advancement of the illicit activity.” *United States v. Miranda,*248 F.3d 434, 446-47 (5th Cir.2001) (citation omitted). Ortega wrapped and concealed 33 firearms and thousands of rounds of ammunition in a vehicle and participated in the attempted exportation of the firearms from the United States to Mexico. He was aware the guns were being smuggled to Mexico illegally and for money. The conclusion that his contribution to the illegal activity was more than peripheral is plausible in light of the record as a whole; thus, it is not clearly erroneous. *See United States v. Villanueva,*408 F.3d 193, 203-04 (5th Cir. 2005); *United States v. Brown,*54 F.3d 234, 240-41 (5th Cir.1995).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### GREEN, Respondent, v. GREEN, Appellant..

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

March 29, 1912.)

Action by Daisy Green against Albert L. Green. No-opinion. Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements.