Regulator Use of Market Data to Improve the Identification 

of Bank Financial Distress 

Timothy J. Curry, Peter J. Elmer, and Gary S. Fissel

December 2001

Working Paper 2001-01

Timothy J. Curry

Financial Economist

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

Washington, D.C. 20429

(202) 898-7372

tcurry@fdic.gov

Peter J. Elmer

Gary S. Fissel

Financial Economist

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

Washington, D.C. 20429

(202) 898-3949

gfissel@fdic.gov

The views stated here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal

Deposit Insurance Corporation. The authors would like to thank Audrey Clement and Justin

Combs for extensive research assistance. Sarah Belanger assisted with the tables. Peter J. Elmer

was a senior financial economist at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation at the time that

the authors conducted this research. 
2

Regulator Use of Market Data to Improve the Identification of Bank Financial Distress

Timothy J. Curry, Peter J. Elmer, and Gary S. Fissel

Abstract

This paper assesses the extent to which stock market information may help bank

regulators identify bank financial distress. The research specifies a variety of stock return and

other market-related variables that might contain elements of longer-term trends and be capable

of anticipating changes in regulatory ratings of commercial banks and thrift institutions.

Univariate tests confirm a remarkable tendency for market-related variables to decline, or

otherwise move, far in advance of formal regulatory rating downgrades, a finding suggesting that

these variables may have useful predictive content. Furthermore, multivariate tests support the

notion that market-related variables add predictive value to the value contained in publicly

available Call Report financial data. The evidence supports the use of market-related variables

in off-site monitoring applications. 

JEL Classification: G1, G23
I. Introduction

During the past two decades, research on the relation between market signals and bank

financial health has repeatedly implied that bank supervision might benefit from using information

embedded in stock market prices, returns, or other market-related data. This implication was first

voiced by Pettway (1980) after he found that stock returns of banks destined for failure signaled

problems almost a year (38 weeks) before regulators began the examination process that led to the

banks being classified on the problem-bank list. More recently, Flannery (1998) reiterates the

theme, pointing out that regulators might use market data either to reduce the time required to

recognize problems or to increase the accuracy of forecasts of future changes in bank condition.

In theory, it is not clear whether stock price, return, or other market-related data should

lead, move contemporaneously with, or follow regulatory awareness of problems. The theory of

efficient markets suggests that the market evaluates and prices public information at the fastest

rate possible. Because the primary source of bank financial information, the quarterly Report of

Condition and Income (Call Report), is available to regulators and the market at about the same

time, market efficiency suggests that market awareness of Call Report-related problems could

precede regulator awareness.1 However, managers can often hide “bad” news from public

scrutiny, whereas regulators have authority to access nonpublic information through confidential

on-site examinations.2

 Regulator access to confidential information could easily offset any

processing speed advantage held by the market and enable regulators to recognize problems

either contemporaneously with or ahead of the market.

 

1 Virtually all Call Report data are released to the public, typically about 75 days (10–11 weeks) after the end of

each quarter to which they apply. Approximately the same data as those released to the public are made available

internally to regulators about 2–3 weeks earlier. Although regulators receive the data a little earlier than the public,

it is nevertheless possible that the market can process the information at a faster rate than regulators upon release.

2 It has been shown that there is a correlation between bank examinations and commercial bank write-off of assets

and increased loan provisioning. This suggests that some institutions do hide “bad” news from the public in their

financial statements until forced to make changes by the regulators. See Dahl, O’Keefe, and Hanweck (2000).
2

Empirical evidence does not consistently either support or reject the hypothesis that

information embedded in market prices has useful predictive value to regulators. Pettway (1980)

examines a small sample of large-bank failures and finds market signals that preceded regulatory

awareness by long lead times, but Simons and Cross (1991) analyze a more recent sample to find

that regulators appear to have been aware of problems before the market recognized them. Berger

and Davies (1998) find that the market anticipates upgrades in regulatory ratings but follows

downgrades. Flannery and Houston (1999) find that the market placed a high value on regulatory

certification of bank accounting data in 1988, but a much lower value in 1990. Berger, Davies, and

Flannery (2000) find that regulators acquire information sooner than bond rating agencies do, but

the regulatory assessments are less accurate in predicting future changes in the performance of bank

holding companies than are either stock or bond market indicators.

 This study examines the extent to which market data can be used by regulators in evaluating

bank financial condition. Market-related information offers the potential for assisting regulators

at two points in their assessment, or rating, of bank capital, assets, management, earnings, and

liquidity (“CAMEL” ratings).3 First, during the period preceding a CAMEL rating downgrade,

market-related information might be used to anticipate the need for the downgrade. Second,

during the period after a CAMEL rating downgrade, market information might help distinguish

institutions that will subsequently recover (rating upgrades) from institutions that subsequently

encounter more serious problems (rating downgrades or failure).

Since our interest is to identify variables that are useful for early-warning purposes, we

focus on longer-term trends that are observable in practice and that precede rating changes with

sufficient advance warning to provide regulators with a timely tool for policy change. Although

 

3 In the late 1990s, a sixth component was added to the CAMEL rating system, recognizing bank and thrift

sensitivity to interest rate or market risk. But because the empirical portions of our analysis relate to ratings

performed before the late 1990s, we reference the five-component rating system in effect at that time. 
3

market variables may meet these criteria on a univariate basis, their usefulness is enhanced by an

ability to add marginal predictive value to other information used by regulators to monitor

financial health—information such as Call Report financial data. 

Some previous studies have incorporated market data into traditional default or

bankruptcy models to assess the riskiness of institutions. For example, Altman (1968), KMV

Corporation (1995), and Shumway (2001), have adopted this approach each using a different

statistical methodology to analyze the issue. In contrast to these earlier studies, this paper

utilizes logistic regression analysis and incorporates significantly more and a greater variety of

market variables into the model to identify financially distressed institutions. 

Section II of this paper describes the institutional setting in which regulators assess bank

financial health, and Section III discusses conceptual issues relating to regulatory use of market

data. Section IV describes a sample of publicly traded banks and thrifts that received CAMEL

rating downgrades, and this sample is used in Sections V and VI to examine the performance of

market-related variables around the time of the CAMEL rating changes. Section VII specifies a

logistic regression model to test the marginal predictive content of market-related variables

compared with accounting data from bank financial reports in anticipating changes in CAMEL

ratings. Section VIII concludes. 

II. The Institutional Setting

Modern bank supervision uses information from on- and off-site supervisory tools as the

starting point for its analysis. The largest banks and bank holding companies are monitored by

on- and off-site analysts (examiners) who keep abreast of any information that can be found,

including news reports, Wall Street analysis, and traditional Call Report financial data. Most
4

smaller and mid-sized banks are monitored initially with automated analysis of Call Report

information, and, if risk is identified, they are then reviewed by analysts.4 

Periodic on-site safety-and-soundness examinations begin with off-site pre-exam reviews

of Call Report and other pertinent data. On-site reviews then check the reported information and

explore issues that might not be revealed in the quarterly reports.5 On-site examinations provide

extensive financial information that is not generally available to the public, such as the payment

histories of performing and nonperforming loans, loan classifications and the adequacy of loanloss provisions, and bank capital.6

 

Bank examiners assign overall, or composite, CAMEL ratings of 1 or 2 to institutions in

sound financial condition. Downgrading a bank’s rating to 3 sends an important signal of

financial weakness and is normally accompanied by an agreement between the bank’s primary

regulator and senior bank management specifying the nature of the bank’s weakness and

procedures for changing bank policies to rectify the perceived problems. These agreements are

classified by regulators as “informal” enforcement actions because they are not administratively

or judicially enforceable in a court of law in the event of noncompliance.7 Nevertheless, the

 

4 See Cole and Gunther (1998) for a discussion of off-site monitoring systems.

5 The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) mandated annual

examinations for large banks and all banks with unsatisfactory supervisory ratings. Since then, the examination

schedule for most banking organizations has been stretched out to approximately every 18 months. 

6

 For a detailed discussion of the bank examination process, see Curry et al. (1997), 463–475.

7 Informal enforcement actions are usually issued within three months after completion of the examination that leads

to the downgrade and may require institutions to make changes, such as raising new equity capital, limiting the

origination of certain types of loans, or increasing loan-loss reserves. Although regulators vary in their practices, the

most common type of informal action accompanying a downgrade to 3 is a “memorandum of understanding”

(MOU), which is written by bank supervisors and signed by bank officials and supervisors. MOUs specify activities

that must be undertaken by the bank, time frames for implementing the new procedures, and special requirements

for reporting to the bank’s supervisor. A second type of agreement, known as a “board resolution,” is drafted by the

individual bank and signed by each member of the bank’s board of directors; it commits the institution to a certain

course of action. Since 1983, the FDIC has informed the banks it supervises of their composite CAMEL ratings as

part of the FDIC’s report to bank management on the results of the examination. The Comptroller of the Currency

and the Federal Reserve began revealing their ratings in December 1988. 
5

agreements represent a loud “shot across the bow” signaling significant regulatory concern and

the need for change. Informal enforcement actions are kept confidential by regulators out of

concern that public exposure of a bank’s problems may result in a decline in the deposit base or

otherwise increase the difficulty or cost of recovery. As might be expected, the financial health

of banks receiving a CAMEL rating of 3 varies, although regulators make no effort to distinguish

composite quality ratings beyond the integers 1–5.8 Institutions downgraded to 3 may remain in

that state for periods ranging from several months to several years before passing to a higher or

lower grade.

Downgrading a bank’s CAMEL rating to 4 or lower indicates the existence of serious

problems that could lead to insolvency. In practice, the term “problem” bank is often reserved

for institutions with composite ratings of 4 or lower, and regulatory “problem-bank lists” tend to

specify institutions with these ratings, although practices vary. Banks downgraded to 4 typically

require immediate remedial actions and intensive monitoring by regulatory officials. In some

cases, bank supervisory officials may not assign the more serious “formal” enforcement actions

to 4-rated banks as long as bank management addresses regulatory concerns. If feasible,

regulators prefer to work with informal enforcement actions because they are confidential and

less confrontational than the more serious “formal” enforcement actions. However, most banks

downgraded to ratings 4 and 5 receive formal enforcement actions, and these actions were made

public beginning in 1989.9

 Institutions with CAMEL ratings of 4 can continue in business for as

 

8

 Supervisors do, however, provide individual component ratings on a bank’s performance in the five categories of

capital, assets, management, earnings, and liquidity. The overall, or composite, rating is based primarily on the

ratings for each of the individual categories.

9 Formal enforcement actions are stringent legal decrees that are enforceable in courts and often carry heavy

penalties for noncompliance. They are usually issued within three to nine months of the completion of the bank

examination that resulted in reclassification to a rating of 4 or 5. After FIRREA, formal enforcement actions

become part of the public record when issued. As noted by Curry et al. (1999), during the 1980–1994 period, 89

percent of all formal enforcement actions were imposed on banks with ratings of 4 or 5.
6

long as several years before either returning to a higher grade, moving to a lower grade, or being

declared insolvent by their primary regulator. A rating of 5 indicates an extremely high

probability of failure, usually within the next 12 months.

III. Prudential Bank Supervision and the Interpretation of Market Data

Prudential bank supervision recognizes that bank examinations impose costs on banks

and that higher costs should be justified by higher benefits, such as a comparable reduction in the

expected cost of failure. Regulators have a responsibility to balance the need to limit the

expected cost of failure against the need to minimize oversight costs, especially for well-run

institutions.

With an eye toward balancing the costs against the benefits of bank supervision, we

specify four criteria as a starting point for assessing whether information contained in market

data is useful to regulators. First, the information should be “separable” at the bank level. This

point simply recognizes that a change in a bank’s rating must be justified by the circumstances of

that bank. Informational messages that are applicable to groups of banks, such as a change in the

risk of all banks in a geographic region, are difficult (costly) to review or apply at the bank level

because of their broad application. Second, the message must be “clear” in the sense that there

exists a low likelihood of multiple interpretations. The hope is that the message specifies the

nature of the market’s concern to the point that a meaningful regulatory response can be

formulated. Unclear messages may motivate inappropriate regulatory response, raising the

supervisory cost borne by the regulated institutions. Third, the informational message must

precede problems with sufficient advance warning to provide regulators with a timely tool for

policy change. Finally, the market signals should, on the margin, contain information not

available in other sources of information commonly used by off-site monitoring, such as Call
7

Report financial data. Market information that cannot add incremental benefit to the content of

commonly used financial data may be viewed as redundant and could fail to justify an

expenditure of regulatory resources.

For the purposes of this study, the first two hurdles can be overcome by a focus on

elements of longer-term trend in stock prices, returns, and other market-related variables. Since

stock prices and returns of firms in the same industry are correlated, short-term informational

messages for specific institutions are often reflected in the prices and returns of many other firms

in the same industry.10 This characteristic presents a relatively high cost for distinguishing and

interpreting shorter-term signals of specific firms compared with those of other firms in the

industry. Over longer periods, however, conflicting signals tend to offset, and it becomes easier

to assign informational signals to specific institutions. Focusing on longer-term trends thereby

allows regulators to limit the use of regulatory resources by targeting only the most appropriate

firms for regulatory review. 

The third hurdle requires that market signals have predictive content and sufficient

advance notice. The vast resources of the market, which contains tens of thousands of traders,

analysts, and similar participants, greatly exceed the resources of all banking industry regulators.

Apart from vast resources, the market may also access certain types of nonpublic information

that is not available to regulators, such as large stock sales by insiders and private contacts

between individuals who may be old friends or former business associates. These points

combine to suggest that market awareness of problems might precede regulatory awareness,

possibly by a large margin, despite the ability of regulators to access nonpublic information

through examinations. 

 

10 See Jordan, Peek, and Rosengren (2000).
8

The final hurdle—identifying the incremental value added by market signals—is the most

difficult to deal with because it involves distinguishing the predictive content of market variables

from the content of other common sources of information. But market variables should not be

expected to be independent of other variables or effects. Rather, they need only provide

sufficient additional value so that their contribution can be clearly distinguished from the

contributions of the other variables. For example, if the market has a unique ability to interpret

accounting data contained in quarterly reports, then in regressions that explain changes in

financial position we expect market variables to provide significant additional explanatory power

to financial ratios derived from the quarterly reports.

An intriguing aspect of market data is that various aspects of financial theory effectively

extend the list of market-related variables beyond prices and returns. For example, Merton’s

(1973) option model anticipates a rise in return volatility as an institution approaches

insolvency.11 Wang (1994) ties trading volume to the flow of information about a firm’s

financial health, suggesting that trading volume should rise as information about financial

distress is released.12 Although a comprehensive analysis of market-related variables goes

beyond the scope of this paper, return volatility and trading volume nevertheless are two

variables that are easily observed and, according to financial theory, may contain predictive

content. 

In summary, it appears conceptually feasible for a number of market-related variables to

provide regulators with the ability to speed their identification of risk without imposing

burdensome costs on regulated institutions. Debate about regulatory use of market-related

 

11 French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987) lend empirical support to this view by documenting a positive relation

between the volatility of market returns and market excess returns (market return minus T-bill yield).

12 Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen (1992) find supportive empirical evidence that large daily price movements are

followed by high trading volume.
9

information in prudential bank supervision should therefore focus on empirical questions, not

conceptual ones. In particular, do market-related variables add marginal predictive value to Call

Report or other information easily available to regulators in off-site monitoring systems? In the

absence of marginal predictive value, market signals may be viewed as redundant information

with little supervisory value. 

IV. The Sample

The empirical analysis begins with a sample of publicly traded banks and thrifts whose

ratings were downgraded to problematic levels over the 1988–1996 period. Since a CAMEL

rating of 3 signifies significant regulatory concern, but ratings of 4 and 5 signify more-severe

financial distress that is often followed by failure, we separate institutions downgraded to 3 from

those downgraded to 4 or 5. Recognizing that the financial industry had many problems in the

early and middle 1980s, we limited the sample to institutions that were downgraded to 3

beginning in 1988 or were downgraded to either 4 or 5 beginning in 1989.13 Combining the 4s

and 5s into a single group appeared reasonable, given that institutions may pass to failure from

these two ratings but almost never from a rating of 3. As noted earlier, informal enforcement

actions, which are not made public, are associated with a rating downgrade to 3, whereas formal 

 

13 In the case of thrifts, 1989 was a watershed year because of the passage of FIRREA, which provided the funds

needed to resolve the thrift crisis and contained provisions (such as higher capital requirements) that improved the

safety and soundness of financial institutions. See Gupta and Misra (1999) for an overview of changes made to the

banking system throughout the 1980s and in the early 1990s. Although banks did not experience the same depth of

problems as thrifts, the late 1980s nevertheless marked an important change in bank regulation because of a

significant increase in the regularity of bank examinations as well as other new requirements. For example,

FIRREA required annual examinations for banks with assets over $250 million or banks that had poor ratings; it also

required that regulators take prompt corrective action for undercapitalized institutions. As noted, the examination

requirement has since changed for most institutions: a periodic examination is now required approximately every 18

months.
10

enforcement actions, required by FIRREA to be made public, are associated with the assignment

of 4 and 5 ratings. 

To improve the integrity of the analysis, we also imposed several additional restrictions.

Since our focus is on longer-term stock market behavior around the time of rating downgrades,

the sample was limited to institutions that had a lengthy period of superior ratings before their

downgrade. This condition is implemented by the requirement that institutions have CAMEL

ratings in the 1–2 range at least three years before downgrade to a 3. Similarly, institutions

downgraded to a 4 or 5 were required to have ratings in the 1–3 range for at least three years

preceding downgrade to 4 or 5. The sample is also limited to banks and thrifts that either were

not affiliated with bank holding companies or were members of holding companies that held

only a single banking-related institution. Restricting the sample in this fashion ensures that the

extensive financial data reported on bank Call Reports corresponds closely to the institution that

issues the stock.14 This restriction also reduces contamination from activities of nonbank

subsidiaries of bank holding companies.15 Since the empirical analysis combines Call Report

financial data with stock market information reported by the Center for Research in Securities

 

14 This correspondence is important because the public equity of banks held by holding companies is typically issued

at the holding-company level, whereas detailed Call Report financial data are reported at the bank level. Banks are

also distinguished from their holding companies in bankruptcy, because individual banks are taken over by the

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation whereas their holding companies fall under the purview of standard

bankruptcy law.

15 Analysis of multibank-holding-company stocks carries disadvantages as well as advantages compared with analysis of

single-bank holding companies and nonholding companies. For example, multibank holding companies tend to be large

institutions that are widely traded and rated by nationally recognized rating agencies. Although single-bank holding

companies and banks not affiliated with holding companies tend to have the opposite characteristics, their Call Report

data nevertheless correspond directly to the institution that is publicly traded, and their financial data are far more

extensive than financial data released at the holding company level. Moreover, the many activities of holding-company

subsidiaries cannot be separated from the aggregated data reported at the holding company level, and this lack of

separability obscures the extensive information released by individual banks. Market signals at the holding-company

level may or may not correspond to the performance of the bank subsidiary. The potential disconnect between the

performance of individual banks and the market signals of their holding companies may widen as holding companies

diversify into additional nonbank activities subsequent to the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999.
11

Prices (CRSP), both sources of data were required for a bank to be included in the sample. 

Table 1 provides summary statistics for the two groups of downgraded institutions. The

sample size is relatively large for both groups, with 122 institutions downgraded to 3 and 148

downgraded to 4 or 5. The sample varies slightly from quarter to quarter for several reasons,

including the lack of available data on individual firms and the de-listing rules of the various

exchanges (rules such as minimum capital requirements or minimum trading activity). The

number of institutions in the 4 or 5 group is larger than the number in the 3 group primarily 

because the three-year constraint on previous ratings limits the group of 3s more than the group

of 4s and 5s.

Considerable diversity is apparent in the sample. For example, both groups of

downgraded institutions had a wide range of asset sizes, including institutions with total assets

under $100 million as well as institutions with assets over $5 billion. More than 75 percent of

the institutions had assets under $1 billion, while almost 20 percent had assets in the $1–5 billion

range and about 5 percent had assets in the over $5 billion range. The relatively healthier

condition of institutions downgraded to 3 is reflected in the higher book equity-to-assets and

return-on-assets ratios compared with the ratios reported for institutions downgraded to 4 or 5.

The stronger financial health appears to be recognized by the market, as the market price

summary statistics are also higher for institutions downgraded to 3 compared with those

downgraded to 4 or 5. The diversity in asset size is accompanied by diversity in market

capitalization (average price times number of shares at the end of the quarter), which declines 

with market price. The sample breakout by charter type shows that banks (65 percent) have a

higher representation than thrifts (35 percent). 
12

V. Univariate Trends before Rating Downgrades

The first point at which market information has the potential to help bank regulators is

the period preceding a CAMEL rating downgrade. As explained above, downgrades to ratings of

3 are distinguished from downgrades to ratings of 4 or 5 by the distinct financial and regulatory

problems of banks in the latter category. Our focus on longer-term trends is implemented by an

analysis of quarterly data for several years preceding the downgrade.

Table 2 displays the univariate characteristics of stock prices, returns, and other marketrelated variables for banks and thrifts eight quarters (two years) preceding their downgrades to

CAMEL rating 3, 4, or 5. The zero quarter contains the start date of the examination that results

in the rating downgrade.16 As noted above, the sample of institutions in the 3- and 4- or 5-rated

categories varies slightly from quarter to quarter because of the de-listing rules of the various

exchanges (rules such as minimum capital requirements or minimum trading activity).

The stock price data show prices falling consistently throughout the two years before the

downgrades, with the result that the change in stock price is negative in nearly every quarter

during that period. For the 3-rated group, the average stock price starts at around $15 per share

in the eighth quarter before the downgrade, then falls to $10 per share in the zero quarter,

whereas for the 4- or 5-rated group, the average price declines from about $11 to $6 per share for

the same period. The lower prices for the 4- or 5-rated institutions suggests that the market is

able to distinguish the more serious financial problems of institutions approaching a 4 or 5 rating

compared with those approaching a rating of 3. 

 

16 Examinations that lead to rating downgrades typically take one to two weeks to complete, and they conclude with

a notification to management that the institution’s rating has been downgraded. Thus, the zero quarter can be

regarded as approximately contemporaneous with the rating change.
13

 In an effort to test the consistency of changes in stock prices across the sample, we used

a t-test to test the hypothesis that the mean of each quarterly sample equals zero. For the 3-rated

group, this test shows that the change in stock price becomes statistically significant in the sixth

quarter preceding the downgrade. For the 4- or 5-rated group, the change is significant for all

eight quarters before the downgrade, reflecting the more distressed nature of this group. The

consistency of the t-test results, across many quarters before the rating downgrades, confirms

that market prices have considerable univariate predictive content long before regulators

formally alter an institution’s rating.

Two measures of trading activity are included in Table 2 to allow an examination of the

hypothesis that higher trading activity should accompany market assessment of new information.

But although the data clearly reflect a long-term trend of declining prices before downgrade, neither

of the trading activity variables reflects the corresponding rise in trading activity hypothesized by

financial theory. The most direct measure of trading activity—average daily trading volume—

declines slightly for the 3-rated group and follows no consistent trend for the 4- or 5-rated group

throughout the eight quarters before the downgrades. A second measure of trading activity, known

as “turnover,” divides the shares traded in any quarter by total shares outstanding. Like the trading

volume variable, the turnover variable also shows no discernible trend for either of the groups.

Therefore, the trading activity variables contain no easily observed univariate predictive content

before CAMEL rating downgrades. 

The remainder of Table 2 displays various measures of quarterly returns commonly found

in previous empirical studies. The first return-related variable is the simple cumulative return,

calculated by multiplying unity plus the daily return for each stock i on day t (1+rit) across all

trading days in each quarter, then subtracting unity. Consistent with the long-term decline in

prices, cumulative returns are consistently negative preceding downgrade for both the 3-rated
14

group and the 4- or 5-rated group. However, our t-tests also find that the cumulative returns are

not significantly distinguishable from zero for institutions downgraded to 3, although they are

significant for institutions downgraded to 4 or 5. 

The cumulative return data are followed by a measure of return volatility, the standard

deviation of daily returns. In contrast to the trading activity variables, the trend of volatility

appears consistent with financial theory, which anticipates rising volatility as an institution

encounters distress. For example, the volatility of the variable rises steadily for both groups as

the downgrades approach, especially during the four quarters immediately preceding the

downgrades. The level of volatility is noticeably higher for the most severely distressed

institutions (downgraded to 4 or 5) compared with the moderately distressed institutions

(downgraded to 3). The statistical content of the rising trend is confirmed by significant tstatistics beginning about a year before the rating downgrades.

The remaining columns examine market excess returns by calculating the differences

between the cumulative quarterly return of each stock and the cumulative quarterly returns for

three indexes of market performance. The first two indexes are the equal- and value-weighted

indexes reported on the CRSP tapes. The third index is a value-weighted index constructed from

CRSP data for the bank and thrift industries. 17 Means tests are applied to all quarterly samples

of excess returns to determine whether the mean excess return is statistically distinguishable

from zero. 

The market excess return variables consistently show patterns of negative returns that are

statistically significant in most of the eight quarters before rating downgrades, although the

 

17 The industry value-weighted index was created from approximately 2,200 banking institutions that could be

identified on the CRSP tapes and tied back to their specific charters. Separate value-weighted indexes were created

for banks and for thrifts using the CRSP utility for creating value-weighted indexes (DSXPORT). At the beginning

of each year, the sample of banks or thrifts was established; then the index was calculated for that year. The final

index combined the yearly indexes into a continuous long-term series.
15

significance varies by index. The results for the CRSP equal-weighted return index reflect the

most consistent trend, as they are virtually always negative and significant at the 1 percent level.

Excess returns calculated from the CRSP value-weighted index perform very similar to excess

returns calculated from the CRSP equal-weighted index, with only slightly lower levels of

significance for a few. The excess returns calculated from the industry value-weighted index did

not precede or anticipate rating downgrades as consistently as the other excess return variables

did.

From a broad perspective, the excess return data reported in Table 2 serves to reaffirm

Pettway’s (1980) finding of negative excess returns for lengthy periods preceding financial

distress, although our analysis is based on much more extensive data and statistical tests of the

significance of each quarterly excess return.18 From the narrower interests of this paper, the

excess return variables exhibit consistent negative patterns, effectively anticipating CAMEL

rating downgrades long before they actually occur. 

Table 3 performs a sensitivity analysis of the results in Table 2 by examining monthly trends

of the most consistent quarterly variables. The trends are examined during the 17 months preceding

the rating downgrade, in other words, for a period of almost five quarters. The monthly trends are

not as consistent as the quarterly trends, although some data have reliable predictive content. The

change in the stock price variable is always negative, but the change is not statistically significant

for a number of months for the 3-rated group, although it is almost always significant for the more

distressed firms in the 4- and 5-rated group. The performance of the volatility variable, the change

in the standard deviation of daily returns does not have the anticipated negative sign in all quarters

and is almost never significant at the 1 percent or 5 percent level. The CRSP equal-weighted excess

 

18 The Pettway study examined only six large banking organizations.
16

return performs the best of all variables examined, showing negative returns that are significant at

the 1 percent or 5 percent level in most months for both groups of firms. Consistent with our earlier

findings, the remaining estimates of market excess returns, calculated with either the CRSP 

value-weighted index or the industry value-weighted index, are always negative, but not as

consistently significant as excess returns based on the equal-weighted index. These results suggest

that the equal-weighted market excess return retains, to a large degree, its predictive content over

monthly as well as quarterly periods. 

Table 4 extends the sensitivity analysis by examining the best-performing series from 

Table 3 over weekly periods. We limit the reported data to weeks 36 through 10 (months 9 through

2) preceding CAMEL rating downgrades. The weekly results are noticeably less conclusive than

the monthly data. Somewhat surprisingly, the best-performing variable is the stock price, which is

almost always negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent or 5 percent level in more than

one-half of the reported observations, especially for the most distressed 4- and 5-rated group. The

two measures of market excess returns are not consistently negative, and they are only occasionally

significant at the 1 percent or 5 percent level. Thus, the predictive content of individual market

variables is very limited in weekly applications. This result cautions against the use of short-term

return trends for identifying longer-term market movements preceding rating downgrades. 

VI. Univariate Trends after Rating Downgrades

In addition to anticipating a rating downgrade to the 3 or 4/5 level, regulators also have a

special interest in the period immediately after the downgrade. In this regard, the interests of this

paper prompt us to ask, “Can the market distinguish future ‘winners’ (subsequent upgrades) from

‘losers’ (subsequent downgrades) in the immediate aftermath of the rating downgrades?”

Distressed institutions require close regulatory supervision. Most either recover (are
17

subsequently upgraded) or encounter more serious problems (either are subsequently

downgraded or fail) in reasonable periods of time after the rating changes, although some

institutions languish in these rating categories for several years after their initial rating change. 

If market variables can anticipate the path taken, this information might be used to allocate

supervisory resources, or otherwise improve regulatory oversight of problematic institutions.

Although the ability of the market to anticipate the subsequent performance of a downgraded

institution is interesting by itself, the supervisory value of the anticipation is enhanced if it is

observed relatively soon after the downgrade—such as during the first quarter after the

downgrade.

Tables 5 and 6 present univariate results similar to the results in Table 2. The previous

groups of 3- and 4/5-rated firms are broken into two subsamples, depending on whether the

downgraded institutions subsequently recover (Table 5) or whether they slide into deeper

financial distress (Table 6). Since a subsequent rating change can occur at any time after the

initial downgrade, Tables 5 and 6 show declining samples during the eight quarter period after

the downgrades.19 For example, the sample of 3-rated banks that recover declines from 

54 observations during the zero quarter to 48 in the eighth quarter after the downgrades, while

the 4/5-rated group goes from 94 to 87. A similar pattern is observed for firms that did not

recover after their downgrade (Table 6). 

Table 5 suggests that immediately after the initial rating change, the market does not

anticipate the recovery of institutions that have experienced CAMEL rating downgrades. The

exact nature of the reaction is different, however, depending on the financial condition of the

 

19 As institutions approach failure, they may also drop out of the sample because their stock prices are dropped from

CRSP, given the de-listing rules of the various exchanges. In our sample, the most common reasons for de-listing

were insufficient number of market makers and insufficient capital.
18

group. For example, for the 3-rated group after the downgrade, average stock prices follow a

downward trend for only the first quarter, going from about $11 per share in quarter zero to $10

per share in quarter one before rebounding slightly in quarter two. In other words, for this group,

the market soon determines that recovery is under way. For the 4/5-rated group, stock prices

follow a downward trend for about two quarters on average after the downgrade, with prices

declining from almost $7 per share in the zero quarter to about $6 per share in quarter two.

Thus, the upward trend in prices associated with market anticipation of recovery for the 4/5-rated

group does not occur for about six months. The downward trend in prices after the downgrades

causes all estimates of market excess returns to be negative after the initial downgrade, so these

variables retain no more predictive content than the stock prices. In addition, contrary to the

results in Table 2, the volatility variables fail to develop the downward trend anticipated by

financial theory. Consistent with the results in Table 2, no clear trend appears in the trading

activity variables (trading volume and turnover). Thus, market-related variables provide little

univariate predictive content for institutions that recover from a rating downgrade.

In contrast to the results in Table 5, Table 6 finds the market capable of anticipating the

performance of institutions whose distress deepens after a CAMEL rating downgrade to the 3 or

4/5 level. In Table 6, stock prices for the 3-rated group follow a steady downward trend after the

downgrade. A similar pattern is observed for the 4/5-rated group, with prices declining

continuously for all eight quarters after the downgrade. For both groups, the downward average

price trend during the quarters after downgrade causes negative cumulative and market excess

returns, and the t-statistics associated with the negative returns tend to be statistically significant.

The volatility variables also recover much of their earlier explanatory power, as volatility rises

steadily in the period after downgrade. Consistent with our earlier results, no clear trend appears

in the trading activity variables.
19

Comparative interpretation of results in Tables 5 and 6 is difficult to do. Table 6 in

isolation suggests that market-related variables have univariate predictive content. However,

similarities between the downward trends of prices and returns in Tables 5 and 6 make it more

difficult to distinguish winners from losers after rating downgrades. For example, the market

appears to identify future “losers” in the 4/5-rated institutions in Table 6 with declining average

stock prices and returns in the first quarter after the downgrade. However, the identification of

“winners” in Table 5 takes up to four quarters for the 3-rated group and up to six quarters for the

4/5-rated group. Thus, univariate market signals regarding an institution’s prospects for

recovery, subsequent to a rating downgrade, are difficult to interpret.

VII. The Predictive Power of Stock Returns Compared with Financial Ratios

Testing the marginal importance of stock price and return variables against Call Report

financial data allows us to formally gauge the statistical strength of the two types of explanatory

variables. Our approach proceeds by initially specifying a traditional CAMEL rating prediction

model and then extending the model to include stock prices, returns, and other market related

variables. Although the stock price and return variables need not dominate the traditional 

ratio-based model, a minimum level of competency is required to justify a conclusion that

market-related variables are a meaningful addition to traditional analysis.

In this section, logistic regression equations are estimated to explain changes in financial

institution supervisory (CAMEL) ratings with publicly available financial information.20 Table 7

defines the variables used in the regressions, along with related means and standard definitions.

Two sets of regressions are estimated, one for predicting rating downgrades and the other for

 

20 Logistic regression has been used extensively in this type of analysis, especially by Sinkey (1975), Elmer and

Borowski (1988), Gajewski (1989), and Cole and Gunther (1995 and 1998).
20

predicting either recovery or ultimate failure subsequent to a rating downgrade. A dichotomous

variable is specified for both equations. The dependent binary variable in the first equation

(CAMELCAT) tests our ability to explain CAMEL rating downgrades, whether to ratings of 3,

4, or 5. To this end, each downgraded institution is “matched” with a randomly chosen,

publicly-traded bank or thrift that is healthy and is in the same asset class as the downgraded

institution. If Call Report or CRSP return data are not available for an institution in any quarter,

that institution is dropped from the sample during the quarter. The dependent variable in the first

set of regressions takes a value of 1 if the institution is rated 1 or 2 and is downgraded to 3, and 0

if the institution is rated 1 or 2 and does not experience a downgrade. In the second set of

regressions, the dichotomous dependent variable tests our ability to explain whether an

institution either recovers or suffers further distress after a rating downgrade. In this case, the

dependent variable takes a value of 0 if the institution recovers, and a value of 1 if its distress

deepens after a downgrade.

 The logit model is estimated by the use of data for market variables from quarter four

preceding the downgrade, while Call Report data are taken from quarter five. The reason the

market variables from a given quarter are matched with Call Report financial data from the

preceding quarter is that the Call Reports are routinely released in the quarter following the

quarter to which they apply. 

The first independent variable is a control variable for charter type. This variable is

important because in 1989 FIRREA provided funds to deal with a backlog of troubled thrifts

whose financial condition had slipped below the condition of troubled banks during that era. 

A dummy variable, INSBIF, distinguishes banks and thrifts by assigning a value of unity to

institutions that come under the umbrella of the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF), and a value of zero

to institutions that come under the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF). As shown in
21

Table 7, the mean of the INSBIF variable equals 0.69, signifying that commercial banks

represent 69 percent of the 3-rated group, and therefore thrifts 31 percent of the same group. For

the 4/5-rated group, banks represent 60 percent and thrifts 40 percent. For the overall sample,

banks represent 64 percent and thrifts 36 percent. The coefficient for the “charter” dummy is

expected to be positive in CAMEL rating models using financial ratios because, in the postFIRREA period, banks tended to have a higher likelihood of downgrades than thrifts with similar

asset sizes: many of the most-troubled thrifts had already been sold or liquidated by the Federal

Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation or handed off to the Resolution Trust Corporation for

resolution. 

The traditional CAMEL prediction model is specified with variables from the Call

Reports. The first variable is the equity-to-assets ratio (EQ_AS), which measures the ability of a

firm to absorb loan losses before bankruptcy and is expected to be negatively related to future

distress. The credit quality of the loan portfolio is captured in the NC_RES variable, which

measures the amount of delinquent assets less loan-loss reserves relative to total assets. 

A positive sign is expected for this variable, signifying that higher levels of delinquent loans are

associated with a higher likelihood of rating downgrades and failure. The overall profitability of

the institutions is measured by the return-on-assets variable (ROA), which is expected to be

inversely related to future downgrades. Two measures of liquidity are posited: the securities-toassets ratio (SC_AS) and the volatile liabilities-to-assets ratio (VL_AS). The SC_AS is expected

to be negatively related to future distress, reflecting that higher levels of securities to assets

provide sources of additional liquidity in troubled times. However, the volatile liabilities ratio

VL_AS is expected to have a positive sign, reflecting that higher levels of volatile liabilities are

normally associated with potential for problems of liquidity and funding during times of crisis. 
22

The market variables are segmented into two groups, one specifying “core” financial

variables that reflect market activity, the other accounting for market risk. In the first group, the

first variable is market price, which is measured as the natural logarithm of the average quarterly

price. This variable is expected to be inversely related to rating downgrades. Market excess

returns is captured by EXRET, which measures the CRSP equal-weighted excess quarterly

returns for each observation and is discussed extensively above in the univariate analysis

connected with Table 2. Given the high degree of negative excess return persistence observed in

Table 2, we expect EXRET to possess at least some failure predictive content and to be

negatively related to the future downgrades. Firm dividend policy is captured by the dummy

variable DIV, which is equal to unity if the bank paid a dividend in the last four quarters, or zero

otherwise. The coefficient for DIV is expected to have a negative sign, reflecting financial

weakness if the firm fails to pay a dividend. 

In the second group of variables, those that account for market risk as suggested either by

the market model of Fama and French (1993) or the option model of Merton (1974), the first

variable, SDRET, is the standard deviation of annualized quarterly returns and is expected to be

positively related to future downgrades. As investors become concerned over potential distress

and potential bankruptcy, more variation may appear in return patterns. Another stock market

model variable, TURN, which measures stock turnover in particular quarters, is also expected to

be positive during periods of financial distress. The third market model variable, the book

equity-to-market value ratio (BE/ME), is expected to have a positive coefficient as the ratio

moves directly with changes in stock prices, holding book equity constant. This ratio, therefore,

also serves as proxy for financial distress.

Equation (1) shows the basic logit estimation equation, which sequentially adds stock

market data to Call Report financial data on the right-hand side of the regression: 
23

(1) 

 



 





  

12

10

9

7

6

2

1

(Core Market variables ) (Risk variables )

CAMEL (Charter ) (Call Report variables )

c

c

c

c

c

c

 

 

Pre-Downgrade Results

The results for the pre-downgrade period are presented in Table 8. As noted, the

regressions were run at four quarters before the event date (or, in this case, before the date the

institutions experienced their downgrades to the 3, 4, or 5 levels). Panel A shows the results for

firms that were downgraded to 3, and Panel B shows the results for firms that were downgraded

to 4 or 5. Specification 1 shows the CAMEL prediction model primarily using Call Report data.

The control variable for charter type, INSBIF, has a positive coefficient and is significant only

for those banks that are in the worst financial condition—the 4/5-rated group. This finding

reveals that commercial banks generally tended to be more distressed than thrifts during the early

1990s and therefore exhibit a higher likelihood of being downgraded. 

The first Call Report variable, the equity-to-asset ratio (EQ_AS), has a negative sign as

expected for both groups, thereby confirming the importance of equity levels in models

predicting distressed CAMEL ratings. The portfolio quality variable (NC_RES) has its

anticipated positive coefficient and is significant for only the 3-rated group, confirming the

relationship between downgraded supervisory ratings and credit quality.21 The return-on-asset

variable (ROA) also exhibits a negative sign, as expected, and is highly significant. The two

liquidity measures (SC_AS and VL_AS) also perform as expected: the former is negative and

significant, confirming the fact that there is an inverse relationship between the level of security

 

21 EQ_AS and NC_RES are independent variables that have high correlation values. These high correlations range

between -.82530 and -.85646 in specifications 1 to 3 of Table 8.
24

holdings and financial distress, and the latter shows a positive and significant relationship

between volatile liabilities and future downgrades. For specification 1 for each group, all signs

are correct and most coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. These results suggest that

this equation serves as a good starting point or benchmark for assessing the incremental value of

information embedded in stock returns compared with the information contained in commonly

used financial ratios. 

The analysis proceeds by selectively adding market variables that offer several measures

of returns or stock-return trends to the benchmark regressions containing only financial ratios.

This approach facilitates the ability to examine the predictive content of each of the market

variables, through their individual coefficients and t-statistics. It also tests the predictive content

of market-based models compared with the content of traditional models, through the likelihood

ratio test statistic and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).22 If the likelihood ratio test

statistic is positive and significant, we may conclude that a market-based regression has

significantly higher predictive content than the Call Report model reported in the first

specification of the model. A similar conclusion can be reached if the AIC measure exhibits a

lower value for the market-based specifications relative to the Call Report model.

The logistic regressions incorporating market variables are presented in specifications 

2 and 3. Of the three core market variables added into specification 2—the natural logarithm of

the stock price (LN_PR), the equal-weighted market excess return variable (EXRET), and the

dividend variable (DIV)—all have the expected negative signs for the coefficients. The log of

price variable is significant primarily for the 3-rated group. For the 4/5-rated group, both the

 

22 See Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991), 240, for a discussion of the likelihood ratio test. See Greene (2000), 306, for a

discussion of the AIC.
25

dividend and excess return variables are significant, portraying a mixed picture for the core

market variables.23 

Specification 3 adds two additional market-risk variables: the standard deviation of the

return variable (SDRET), which measures the variance of the returns, and the turnover ratio

(TURN), which measures average trading volume. In this regression, these other market-related

variables failed to show any significant increase in marginal predictive value for either of the

groups. The SDRET variable was significant at the 5 percent level for the 3-rated group, and the

TURN variable was significant at the 10 percent level for the 4/5-rated group. In the last

specification (4), only the publicly available stock-market variables are included. Based upon

the AIC, this equation does not improve upon specification 1, which incorporated only Call

Report variables. 

A likelihood ratio test is performed, measuring the equation specifications that contain

stock-market variables (specifications 2 and 3) compared with the equation specification that

does not contain stock-market information (specification 1). As shown in Table 8, equations 2

and 3 show greater explanatory power compared with specification 1, suggesting value added by

the introduction of the market variables. Specification 4, with only the stock-market data, has

significantly less explanatory power than specifications 1, 2, and 3. These results are shown by

the AIC. The AIC value is lower for both regressions 2 and 3 relative to equation 1, suggesting

that the stock-market variables are adding to the overall predictive content of the model. The

AIC for the last equation is much higher than it is for the previous three regressions, suggesting

 

23 It should be noted that the decline in dividend payments to shareholders of downgraded banks and thrifts as

reflected in all specifications in Table 8 could be the result of a combination of both management decisions to

reduce dividends because of financial problems as well as regulatory orders imposed by bank supervisors.
26

that the model using only market-related variables performs at a lower level than the other three

specifications.24 

Table 9 contains in-sample and out-of-sample tests of the model for both the 3-rated and

4/5-rated groups.25 The critical probability that is used is 50 percent. This critical probability is

used to determine how the model performs in identifying which banks or thrifts in the two

groupings are properly classified as likely to experience future CAMEL rating downgrades.

Within the in-sample classification group for the 3-rated institutions, the correct prediction of

distressed or healthy banks and thrifts generally increases, moving from specifications 1 to 3;

then the correct prediction level declines in specification 4. The group prediction columns

generally reveal a similar pattern for the 4/5-rated group. Thus, for the in-sample forecasts, these

findings show that adding stock variables increases the predictive accuracy of the model in

identifying CAMEL rating downgrades in the first three specifications. This is reflected in the

Type I and Type II errors, which are also displayed in Table 9. 

A similar pattern is observed for the out-of-sample forecasts, although the classifications

are not as accurate as for the in-sample forecasts. For example, for the specifications for the 

3-rated group, the model correctly classified an average of 66 percent of the downgrades for the

out-of-sample, compared with 76 percent for the in-sample. For the 4/5-rated group the

 

24 There is an inverse relationship between the level of the AIC value and the effectiveness of the model. The lower

the value, the more effective the model.

25 The logit models are tested for their accuracy of classifications on both in-sample and out-of-sample data. The insample data refer to the data set for the periods used to construct the model from the - 4 quarter before the

downgrades. The estimated logit model for the in-sample data was run on 94 observations for the pre-3-rated group

and 114 for the pre-4/5-rated group to test the effectiveness of the model in accurately classifying the observations.

The out-of-sample tests were run on the remaining 20 percent of the sample—specifically, 32 observations for the

pre-3-rated group and 41 for the pre-4/5-rated group—to determine the accuracy of the forecasts or classifications.

Each of the observations for the pre-period was matched against a highly rated institution in the regression models.

For the post-period, the in-sample tests amounted to 91 observations for the 3-rated group and 108 for the 4/5-rated

group. The out-of sample tests were conducted on 31 observations for the post-3-rated group and 36 for the post4/5-rated groups.
27

classifications were relatively more accurate, identifying about 72 percent of the downgrades for

the out-of-sample data relative to about 74 percent for the in-sample data. The overall accuracy

of the model appears to improve as the conditions of the institutions deteriorate. 

Post-Downgrade Results

Table 10 shows the logistic regression results for the first quarter after the CAMEL

downgrades for the 3- and 4/5-rated groups. As mentioned previously, the second model is run

to determine if it is sensitive enough to predict which institutions will likely recover or

experience future downgrades or failures. Banking regulators would benefit if the model were

able to distinguish these differences within a relatively short period after the initial downgrades.

The results show that all the coefficients for the Call Report variables have the anticipated signs

and perform as expected, but the significance of the tests varies between the 3- and 4/5-rated

groups. The log of market price and the excess return variables generally add to the CAMEL

predictions in most specifications, although there is some variation in levels of significance,

which range from 1 percent to 10 percent depending on the specification. As before, when the

market-risk variables are combined with the Call Report data and core market variables, they

generally do not add significantly to the equation. Therefore, the logistic regression tests tend to

suggest that relatively simple measures of market price and market excess returns appear to offer

the best hope of improving the predictive content of Call Report data. Although the market

excess return variable is not a dominating variable for the 3-rated group, for the most distressed

organizations—the 4/5-rated group—it adds significantly to standard models based on the

accounting data in quarterly reports. Other market variables, such as return volatility, dividend

payment performance, turnover in shares, and the ratio of book to market value equity, appear to

have little marginal predictive value. 
28

Table 11 contains information on the accuracy of the model in the post-downgrade

period. The critical probabilities for these in-sample and out-of-sample classifications are 0.56

for the 3-rated group and 0.35 for the 4/5-rated group.26 

In general, these findings show that the addition of stock-market information to the Call

Report data not only increases the correct predictions of banks that will either have more

financial distress or recover but also minimize the incorrect predictions—although the results are

not as strong as in the pre-downgrade period. As we move from specification 1 with only Call

Report data to specifications 2 and 3, the model generally improves the correct prediction of

financial distress especially for the most-distressed—banks in the 4/5-rated group. For

specification 4 in relation to specification 1, the stock-market variables have only a mixed

correct prediction rate when compared with Call Report variables alone. 

VII. Conclusions

This paper explores the notion that stock price, return, and other market-related variables

can be used to improve the predictive content of Call Report financial ratios for the purpose of

anticipating CAMEL rating changes. A sample of 122 banks and thrifts that were downgraded to

the CAMEL 3 level and 148 banks and thrifts downgraded to the 4 or 5 level was analyzed over

the period 1988–1996. Extensive univariate analysis confirms that relatively simple measures of

stock prices and returns exhibit downward trends as much as two years before banks and thrifts

experience CAMEL rating downgrades to 3, 4, or 5. The longer-term nature of these trends

suggests that the univariate trends are not commonly found in stock returns of healthy

institutions. Previous research has not confirmed the pre-downgrade returns of patterns found in

 

26 These critical probabilities are derived from the ratio of the regression sample that experienced further financial

distress to the total sample that was used in the regression. 
29

this paper—certainly not for the length of time or for the variety of market variables used in this

research. However, no simple relation appears in univariate comparisons of several other market

variables, including average trading volume and average quarterly turnover of shares. 

The second section of the paper adds stock return variables to regression equations that

include financial ratios commonly used to predict CAMEL rating changes (both upgrades and

downgrades) in off-site monitoring models. The results provide several additional points of

interest. Most important, adding relatively simple measures of excess returns, stock prices, and

an institution’s dividend record improve the CAMEL ratings predictive content of Call Report

data and otherwise appears to have a limited independent role in anticipating financial distress.

The predictive content of the models is most robust for institutions experiencing the greatest

financial distress—those being downgraded to the 4 or 5 level. Other market-related variables,

such as return volatility, trading volume, and the book-to-market equity ratio, appear to have

limited predictive value. 
30

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Table 1

Summary Statistics

A) At Time of Downgrade to 3 B) At Time of Down

Number Minimum Median Maximum Number Minimum Median 

Call Report Financial DataTotal assets ($000s) 122 55,277 466,233 9,416,623 148 61,833 409,2Book equity/Asset ratio (%) 122 2.44 7.07 21.36 148 -2.49 5.Net income/Asset ratio (%) 122 -7.40 0.28 3.14 148 -28.58 -0.CRSP Market DataMarket price ($ per share) 122 1.89 8.29 56.01 148 0.31 5.Market capitalization ($000s) 122 2,796 218,110 656,355 148 970 18,80

 

Book/Market equity ratio 122 0.09 1.54 10.72 148 -3.31 1.

At Rating Later Later At Rating Later Later

Change Upgraded Downgraded Change Upgraded Downgrade

Total Sample 122 54 68 148 94 54 Number with Assets <= $1 Billion 92 43 49 119 76 43 Number with Assets $1-5 Billion 25 10 15 23 15 8 Number with Assets > $5 Billion 5 1 4 6 3 3Number of Banks 85 36 49 89 56 33Number of Thrifts 37 18 19 59 38 21The data are from Call Report financial data reported to regulators or reported on the CRSP tapes during the quarter in which the CAMEL rating of the instdowngraded. Market capitalization equals equity price times number of shares at the end of the quarter of the downgrade. 
 Table 2

Stock Price and Return Characteristics by Quarter Preceding Downgrade in CAMEL Rating

Avg. Change CRSP CRSP Industry

Qtrs. Avg. Change Daily Avg. Qtrly. Cum. St. Dev. St. Dev. Eq. Wt. Va. Wt. Va. Wt.

To Stock Stock Trading Turnover Qtrly. Daily Daily Excess Excess Excess 

Rating Price Price Volume Ratio Return Return Return Return Return Return

Change Sample ($) ($) (shares) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)

A) Trends Preceding Downgrade to 3

-8 116 14.67 0.07 13,050 17.03 3.11 2.43 -0.06 -2.61 -1.07 -0.64

0.38 1.83 * -0.68 -1.77 * -0.74 -0.44

-7 121 14.43 -0.22 10,760 15.36 -1.13 2.46 0.02 -4.93 -4.56 -3.20

-1.03 -0.82 0.24 -4.05 *** -3.71 *** -2.65 *

-6 122 13.80 -0.65 12,538 15.09 -1.82 2.59 0.14 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04

-2.58 *** -1.23 1.41 -5.16 *** -4.32 *** -3.10 ***

-5 126 12.75 -0.94 10,106 13.79 -1.47 2.60 0.04 -5.67 -5.19 -3.15

-2.10 ** -0.92 0.42 -4.48 *** -3.73 *** -2.43 **

-4 126 12.30 -0.45 10,675 14.28 -1.16 2.88 0.28 -5.52 -3.81 -3.63

-2.67 *** -0.70 2.53 ** -3.87 *** -2.58 ** -2.34 **

-3 125 11.95 -0.39 12,023 15.70 -1.63 3.08 0.19 -4.82 -3.88 -2.05

-2.08 ** -0.90 1.85 * -3.12 *** -2.39 ** -1.32

-2 124 11.63 -0.36 11,657 14.68 -2.70 3.38 0.30 -6.95 -4.76 -3.08

-2.46 ** -1.30 2.51 ** -3.93 *** -2.55 ** -1.70 *

-1 123 10.71 -0.94 12,343 16.30 -3.91 3.86 0.46 -8.94 -6.78 -7.25

-4.92 *** -1.96 * 3.28 *** -5.52 *** -3.78 *** -4.50 ***

0 122 10.12 -0.56 12,480 16.49 -3.18 4.05 0.18 -11.07 -6.69 -8.07

-2.69 *** -1.37 1.25 -5.96 *** -3.17 *** -3.99 ***

B) Trends Preceding Downgrade to 4 or 5

-8 148 11.09 -0.33 10,715 14.72 0.20 2.92 0.02 -4.55 -3.37 -2.23

-2.20 ** 0.13 0.18 -3.78 *** -2.61 ** -1.83 *

-7 152 10.72 -0.36 11,335 12.93 -3.09 3.06 0.16 -5.79 -5.31 -3.76

-2.66 *** -2.12 ** 1.46 -4.50 *** -4.05 *** -2.82 ***

-6 151 10.40 -0.33 9,469 13.95 -2.22 3.08 0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04

-2.62 *** -1.43 0.23 -4.82 *** -3.90 *** -3.18 ***

-5 154 9.85 -0.53 9,560 12.72 -4.69 3.45 0.39 -9.57 -8.17 -7.17

-4.73 *** -3.23 *** 2.67 *** -6.67 *** -6.06 *** -5.23 ***

-4 154 9.45 -0.40 9,311 12.82 -6.13 3.53 0.08 -11.77 -10.56 -10.46

-2.90 *** -3.86 *** 0.63 -8.38 *** -7.43 *** -7.52 ***

-3 151 8.66 -0.84 9,956 13.45 -6.37 4.08 0.65 -11.15 -10.00 -8.74

-6.13 *** -3.18 *** 4.39 *** -6.70 *** -5.44 *** -5.05 ***

-2 150 7.79 -0.84 9,932 13.05 -8.46 4.89 0.81 -13.26 -11.53 -10.73

-5.73 *** -4.26 * 2.62 *** -7.65 *** -6.00 *** -5.77 ***

-1 149 6.83 -0.97 10,246 13.51 -6.29 5.79 0.88 -12.69 -9.53 -9.65

-6.89 *** -2.00 ** 2.86 *** -4.61 *** -3.18 *** -3.41 ***

0 148 5.97 -0.90 10,684 13.20 -11.72 5.87 0.82 -17.15 -13.72 -14.01

-6.88 *** -4.04 *** 3.04 *** -6.73 *** -4.95 *** -5.38 ***

The data reported on each of the quarter-to-rating change lines (-8 to 0) are calculated as simple averages for all trading days in each quarter. If data required for any 

quarterly calculation are missing, then they are omitted from the calculation. Excess returns are calculated as the difference between the cumulative quarterly return 

of each stock and the cumulative quarterly return of the various indexes. T-statistics testing the hypothesis that the mean equals zero are shown below many of the 

quarterly average return and change in return statistics. A single, double, or triple "*" indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Table 3

Stock Price and Return Characteristics by Month Preceding Downgrade in CAMEL Rating

Change CRSP CRSP Industry Change CRSP CRSP Industry

Months Change St. Dev. Eq. Wt. Va. Wt. Va. Wt. Months Change St. Dev. Eq. Wt. Va. Wt. Va. Wt.

To Stock Daily Excess Excess Excess To Stock Daily Excess Excess Excess 

Rating Price Return Return Return Return Rating Price Return Return Return Return

Change ($) (%) (%) (%) (%) Change ($) (%) (%) (%) (%)

A) Trends Preceding Downgrade to 3

-17 -0.17 -0.14 -1.90 -1.25 -0.93 -8 -0.20 0.14 -2.05 -1.86 -0.73

-1.11 -1.20 -2.89 *** -1.84 *** -1.32 -2.75 *** 1.19 -2.52 ** -2.26 ** -0.83

-16 -0.33 0.02 -2.70 -2.39 -1.64 -7 -0.23 0.03 -1.46 -0.78 -0.03

-1.85 * 0.18 -3.70 *** -3.17 *** -2.21 ** -2.44 ** 0.26 -1.53 -0.80 -0.03

-15 -0.15 0.08 -0.94 -0.86 -0.15 -6 -0.10 0.35 -3.39 -2.82 -2.09

-1.75 * 0.88 -1.07 -0.94 -0.16 -0.92 2.30 ** -3.10 *** -2.47 ** -1.86 *

-14 -0.14 0.16 -2.35 -2.42 -1.62 -5 -0.30 -0.06 -3.09 -2.08 -1.63

-1.52 1.57 -3.14 *** -3.18 *** -1.96 * -2.67 *** -0.38 -3.31 *** -2.09 ** -1.70 *

-13 -0.20 -0.05 -2.53 -2.31 -1.81 -4 -0.29 0.09 -2.06 -1.44 -1.26

-2.02 ** -0.39 -3.14 *** -2.71 *** -2.29 ** -2.83 *** 0.62 -1.88 * -1.31 -1.14

-12 -0.10 0.14 -0.16 0.52 0.10 -3 -0.27 0.16 -3.81 -3.24 -3.48

-0.86 0.94 -0.18 0.56 0.11 -2.77 *** 0.94 -3.78 *** -3.27 *** -3.48 ***

-11 -0.02 -0.07 -2.55 -2.41 -1.97 -2 -0.24 0.21 -2.73 -2.01 -2.14

-0.30 -0.59 -3.19 *** -3.02 *** -2.35 ** -2.49 ** 1.24 -2.29 ** -1.62 -1.74 *

-10 -0.18 0.33 0.21 0.74 1.32 -1 -0.19 0.13 -3.04 -2.41 -2.93

-1.39 2.44 ** 0.18 0.61 1.11 -1.54 0.76 -2.41 ** -1.77 * -2.12 **

-9 -0.06 -0.12 -3.17 -2.85 -2.45 0 -0.14 0.14 -4.01 -2.54 -2.86

-0.49 -0.87 -3.99 *** -3.40 *** -2.79 *** -1.26 0.63 -3.72 *** -2.26 ** -2.58 **

B) Trends Preceding Downgrade to 4 or 5

-17 -0.19 0.07 -3.74 -3.53 -3.14 -8 -0.35 0.34 -2.16 -1.66 -0.88

-2.65 *** 0.62 -4.91 *** -4.64 *** -3.89 *** -3.86 *** 2.05 ** -1.78 * -1.33 -0.70

-16 -0.19 0.10 -2.63 -2.40 -2.08 -7 -0.16 0.00 -2.36 -1.94 -1.65

-3.15 *** 0.96 -3.18 *** -2.92 *** -2.47 ** -1.89 * -0.01 -2.26 ** -1.76 * -1.52

-15 -0.08 0.16 -1.32 -0.99 -0.53 -6 -0.32 0.11 -4.93 -4.47 -4.24

-0.98 0.97 -1.28 -0.95 -0.50 -4.44 *** 0.68 -5.00 *** -4.34 *** -4.27 ***

-14 -0.13 -0.03 -3.62 -3.21 -2.79 -5 -0.42 0.17 -5.16 -4.09 -3.74

-1.86 * -0.18 -3.75 *** -3.35 *** -2.93 *** -4.76 *** 0.81 -4.56 *** -3.57 *** -3.36 ***

-13 -0.07 0.09 -2.60 -2.28 -2.38 -4 -0.34 0.18 -4.84 -4.16 -4.02

-1.01 0.63 -2.90 *** -2.54 ** -2.60 ** -5.34 *** 0.82 -3.04 *** -2.49 ** -2.46 **

-12 -0.16 -0.04 -4.41 -3.72 -3.89 -3 -0.28 0.41 -3.04 -2.21 -2.39

-1.56 -0.31 -5.15 *** -4.20 *** -4.58 *** -3.98 *** 2.11 ** -2.09 ** -1.42 -1.49

-11 -0.37 0.11 -5.42 -5.34 -5.01 -2 -0.20 0.07 -5.18 -4.11 -3.75

-4.91 *** 0.75 -6.98 *** -6.50 *** -6.11 *** -2.77 *** 0.33 -4.23 *** -3.12 *** -2.90 ***

-10 -0.41 0.66 -4.02 -3.57 -2.85 -1 -0.27 0.45 -3.69 -2.53 -2.76

-4.96 *** 3.28 *** -4.22 *** -3.61 *** -2.95 *** -3.20 *** 1.62 -1.90 * -1.26 -1.43

-9 -0.31 -0.12 -5.54 -5.32 -4.66 0 -0.35 -0.06 -6.49 -5.68 -5.83

-4.32 *** -0.73 -6.08 *** -5.55 *** -4.79 *** -4.94 *** -0.23 -4.89 *** -4.13 *** -4.27 ***

The data reported on each of the month-to-rating change lines (-17 to 0) are calculated as simple averages for all trading days in each month. If data required for 

any monthly calculation are missing, then they are omitted from the calculation. Excess returns are calculated as the difference between the cumulative monthly 

return of each stock and the cumulative monthly return of the various indexes. T-statistics testing the hypothesis that the mean equals zero are shown below many

of the monthly average return and change in return statistics. A single, double, or triple "*" indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Table 4

Stock Price and Return Characteristics by Week Preceding Downgrade in CAMEL Rating

CRSP CRSP CRSP CRSP CRSP CRSP

Weeks Change Eq. Wt. Va. Wt. Weeks Change Eq. Wt. Va. Wt. Weeks Change Eq. Wt. Va. Wt.

To Stock Excess Excess To Stock Excess Excess To Stock Excess Excess 

Rating Price Return Return Rating Price Return Return Rating Price Return Return

Change ($) (%) (%) Change ($) (%) (%) Change ($) (%) (%)

A) Trends Preceding Downgrade to 3

-36 0.00 -0.50 -0.20 -27 0.00 0.44 0.46 -18 -0.10 -0.17 0.10

0.04 -1.05 -0.39 -0.08 0.68 0.71 -2.20 ** -0.30 0.18

-35 -0.04 0.69 0.70 -26 -0.03 -0.28 -0.04 -17 -0.08 -1.13 -1.16

-0.60 1.24 1.26 -0.58 -0.49 -0.06 -1.47 -1.64 -1.64

-34 -0.01 -0.49 -0.46 -25 0.04 -0.34 -0.31 -16 -0.03 -0.05 0.11

-0.28 -1.01 -0.90 0.76 -0.48 -0.43 -0.63 -0.09 0.19

-33 -0.04 -0.13 -0.07 -24 -0.13 -2.00 -1.82 -15 -0.05 -0.87 -0.76

-0.58 -0.26 -0.14 -2.45 ** -3.87 *** -3.33 *** -0.80 -1.31 -1.15

-32 -0.07 -0.63 -0.49 -23 -0.16 -2.07 -1.85 -14 -0.09 0.04 0.09

-1.70 * -1.42 -1.05 -2.60 ** -4.26 *** -3.72 *** -1.48 0.09 0.20

-31 -0.05 0.21 0.39 -22 -0.11 -0.77 -0.70 -13 -0.01 -1.35 -1.14

-0.79 0.35 0.63 -2.01 ** -1.27 -1.12 -0.37 -2.01 ** -1.72 *

-30 -0.01 -0.40 -0.14 -21 -0.04 -0.47 -0.19 -12 -0.05 0.19 0.36

-0.14 -0.72 -0.25 -0.66 -0.98 -0.38 -1.22 0.34 0.64

-29 -0.07 -0.39 -0.43 -20 -0.03 0.82 1.02 -11 -0.02 -0.67 -0.65

-1.69 * -0.71 -0.78 -0.50 1.42 1.74 -0.37 -1.48 -1.36

-28 -0.04 -0.90 -0.65 -19 -0.08 -1.86 -1.67 -10 -0.11 -1.59 -1.49

-0.93 -1.87 * -1.32 -1.43 -3.49 *** -3.04 *** -2.86 *** -3.14 *** -2.87 ***

B) Trends Preceding Downgrade to 4 or 5

-36 -0.12 -0.62 -0.39 -27 -0.24 -0.66 -0.60 -18 -0.13 -1.22 -1.08

-2.96 *** -1.13 -0.70 -1.82 * -1.01 -0.91 -3.96 *** -1.41 -1.23

-35 -0.07 -0.53 -0.51 -26 -0.07 -1.32 -1.24 -17 -0.06 -0.28 -0.06

-1.56 -0.75 -0.70 -2.38 ** -2.40 ** -2.15 ** -1.85 * -0.36 -0.07

-34 0.03 -0.14 0.06 -25 -0.08 -0.38 -0.05 -16 -0.06 -1.12 -0.90

0.60 -0.24 0.11 -2.80 *** -0.62 -0.08 -2.05 ** -1.59 -1.22

-33 -0.06 -0.76 -0.54 -24 -0.04 -0.97 -0.76 -15 -0.08 -1.75 -1.80

-1.30 -1.49 -1.05 -1.19 -1.58 -1.21 -2.78 *** -2.33 ** -2.34 **

-32 -0.14 -0.84 -0.75 -23 -0.09 -1.55 -1.31 -14 -0.10 0.11 0.32

-2.50 ** -1.42 -1.25 -3.49 *** -2.73 *** -2.22 ** -2.23 ** 0.14 0.39

-31 0.01 0.29 0.40 -22 -0.10 -1.41 -1.35 -13 0.00 0.21 0.25

0.33 0.49 0.68 -3.06 *** -2.24 ** -2.14 ** -0.03 0.26 0.29

-30 -0.05 -0.81 -0.77 -21 -0.09 -1.05 -0.84 -12 -0.08 -0.65 -0.33

-1.01 -1.36 -1.25 -2.89 *** -1.62 -1.28 -2.41 ** -0.88 -0.43

-29 -0.08 -0.28 -0.16 -20 -0.04 -0.74 -0.49 -11 -0.05 -1.52 -1.45

-2.53 ** -0.41 -0.24 -1.53 -1.01 -0.67 -1.43 -2.10 ** -1.97 *

-28 -0.07 -1.52 -1.49 -19 -0.12 -1.81 -1.69 -10 -0.08 -0.21 -0.01

-1.43 -2.36 ** -2.29 ** -3.63 *** -2.96 *** -2.72 *** -2.29 ** -0.27 -0.02

The data reported on each of the week-to-rating change lines (-36 to -10) are calculated as simple averages for all trading days in each week. If data required for 

any weekly calculation are missing, then they are omitted from the calculation. Excess returns are calculated as the difference between the cumulative weekly 

return of each stock and the cumulative weekly return of the various indexes. T-statistics testing the hypothesis that the mean equals zero are shown below many 

of the weekly average return and change in return statistics. A single, double, or triple "*" indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Table 5

Stock Price and Return Characteristics by Quarter after Downgrade in CAMEL Rating: Subsequent Recovery

Avg. Change CRSP CRSP Industry

Qtrs. Avg. Change Daily Avg. Qtrly. Cum. St. Dev. St. Dev. Eq. Wt. Va. Wt. Va. Wt.

After Stock Stock Trading Turnover Qtrly. Daily Daily Excess Excess Excess 

Rating Price Price Volume Ratio Return Return Return Return Return Return

Change Sample ($) ($) (shares) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)

A) Trends Following Downgrade to 3: Subsequent Recovery

0 54 10.99 -0.32 10,946 17.49 0.40 4.25 0.11 -8.96 -2.22 -4.24

-1.47 0.10 0.47 -2.86 *** -0.60 -1.21

1 54 10.58 -0.41 7,922 14.46 1.01 4.18 -0.06 -5.42 -1.29 -3.97

-1.66 * 0.39 -0.23 -2.02 ** -0.49 -1.41

2 53 10.60 0.08 7,412 13.37 9.87 4.33 0.07 -3.97 3.62 -2.34

0.30 2.14 ** 0.32 -0.88 0.80 -0.52

3 53 11.56 0.95 7,855 14.74 2.28 4.06 -0.27 -10.08 -2.34 -6.77

3.43 0.86 -1.55 -4.06 *** -0.90 -2.46 **

4 52 11.90 0.37 8,722 14.04 9.89 4.81 0.69 -1.39 6.92 2.67

1.66 * 2.52 ** 1.02 -0.36 1.67 * 0.64

5 52 12.62 0.71 7,539 12.44 19.92 5.04 0.23 11.33 16.28 12.77

2.31 *** 2.02 ** 0.66 1.16 1.67 * 1.31

6 51 14.30 1.44 8,635 15.68 15.92 3.72 -0.15 4.57 13.52 11.22

4.67 *** 4.55 *** -0.87 1.46 3.81 *** 3.20 ***

7 51 15.13 0.83 7,941 13.80 7.22 3.14 -0.58 -2.82 4.85 2.03

2.52 *** 2.63 *** -2.81 *** -1.03 1.77 * 0.75

8 48 14.97 0.89 8,101 13.32 12.58 3.31 0.06 3.29 9.94 6.84

3.68 *** 4.36 *** 0.37 1.17 3.67 *** 2.54 **

B) Trends Following Downgrade to 4 or 5: Subsequent Recovery

0 94 6.66 -0.52 8,681 10.63 -4.07 5.00 0.05 -11.46 -6.36 -8.58

-3.33 *** -1.11 0.20 -3.48 *** -1.82 * -2.55 **

1 94 6.07 -0.60 9,323 11.59 -7.10 6.05 1.05 -14.35 -9.87 -11.90

-3.91 *** -2.12 ** 2.97 *** -4.40 *** -2.94 *** -3.50 ***

2 94 5.81 -0.22 10,674 12.09 5.44 6.65 0.56 -5.75 1.17 -3.32

-1.24 1.34 2.10 ** -1.60 0.29 -0.84

3 94 5.90 0.05 9,950 11.01 6.54 7.06 0.47 -7.13 1.89 -3.48

0.32 1.27 0.73 -1.48 0.36 -0.66

4 92 6.20 0.23 10,691 13.04 14.86 6.62 0.08 3.08 11.46 6.60

1.63 2.70 *** 0.24 0.57 2.08 ** 1.19

5 89 5.89 0.09 12,485 12.67 5.30 6.89 0.10 -5.19 1.72 -2.06

0.64 1.44 0.28 -1.44 0.46 -0.54

6 88 6.35 0.52 15,859 15.00 15.30 6.86 -0.10 2.21 11.43 6.88

3.00 *** 3.79 *** -0.24 0.59 2.77 *** 1.67 *

7 87 7.26 0.94 19,709 18.22 18.95 6.39 -0.53 7.34 16.33 11.30

5.00 *** 4.55 *** -1.54 1.82 3.90 *** 2.71 ***

8 87 7.81 0.56 20,665 14.08 13.04 5.99 -0.40 3.59 11.12 8.03

3.94 *** 2.43 ** -1.15 0.70 2.06 ** 1.50

The data reported on each of the quarter-to-rating change lines (0 to 8) are calculated as simple averages for all trading days in each quarter. If data 

required for any quarterly calculation are missing, then they are omitted from the calculation. Excess returns are calculated as the difference between the 

cumulative quarterly return of each stock and the cumulative quarterly return of the various indexes. T-statistics testing the hypothesis that the mean 

equals zero are shown below many of the quarterly average return and change in return statistics. A single, double, or triple "*" indicates significance at 

the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Table 6

Stock Price and Return Characteristics by Quarter after Downgrade in CAMEL Rating: Subsequent Distress

Avg. Change CRSP CRSP Industry

Qtrs. Avg. Change Daily Avg. Qtrly. Cum. St. Dev. St. Dev. Eq. Wt. Va. Wt. Va. Wt.

After Stock Stock Trading Turnover Qtrly. Daily Daily Excess Excess Excess 

Rating Price Price Volume Ratio Return Return Return Return Return Return

Change Sample ($) ($) (shares) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)

A) Trends Following Downgrade to 3: Subsequent Distress

0 68 9.43 -0.75 13,699 15.70 -6.03 3.90 0.24 -12.75 -10.23 -11.11

-2.28 ** -2.28 ** 1.30 -5.74 *** -4.39 *** -4.85 ***

1 68 8.68 -0.74 15,037 16.74 -10.85 4.36 0.47 -15.95 -14.38 -13.20

-3.32 *** -3.02 *** 2.02 ** -5.68 *** -4.34 *** -4.28 ***

2 67 7.29 -1.32 14,715 16.82 -9.16 5.49 1.08 -14.67 -12.19 -12.27

-3.76 *** -2.51 ** 3.32 * -4.88 *** -3.57 *** -4.04 ***

3 67 6.45 -0.83 14,393 15.64 -8.73 6.66 1.16 -17.24 -13.80 -15.86

-3.62 *** -2.26 ** 1.76 *** -4.96 *** -3.67 *** -4.38 ***

4 66 5.87 -0.50 15,945 15.49 -3.27 7.19 0.47 -11.67 -6.14 -6.94

-2.30 ** -0.60 0.72 -2.42 ** -1.18 -1.37

5 64 5.65 -0.39 19,325 17.27 -7.68 7.05 1.37 -13.30 -9.58 -11.34

-1.58 -1.33 1.88 *** -2.35 ** -1.66 * -1.99 **

6 63 5.34 -0.38 15,724 14.09 -4.92 7.69 0.71 -15.83 -9.46 -13.04

-2.33 ** -0.89 1.38 -3.19 *** -1.72 * -2.44 **

7 61 4.87 -0.16 18,531 14.49 3.14 8.66 0.77 -7.40 -0.11 -4.00

-0.89 0.47 1.27 -1.24 -0.02 -0.61

8 58 4.69 0.00 20,009 15.13 12.86 7.75 -0.33 2.06 9.96 5.53

0.00 1.57 -0.44 0.27 1.22 0.68

B) Trends Following Downgrade to 4 or 5: Subsequent Distress

0 54 4.78 -1.57 14,170 17.68 -25.03 7.41 2.18 -27.06 -26.52 -23.46

-7.53 *** -5.97 *** 3.86 * -7.39 *** -6.63 *** -6.23 ***

1 50 3.22 -1.73 15,113 16.68 -32.47 10.55 3.04 -38.01 -34.95 -34.07

-8.40 *** -8.36 *** 3.28 * -11.76 *** -9.76 *** -10.33 ***

2 49 2.33 -0.91 12,270 16.38 -25.62 12.57 2.07 -32.19 -28.00 -29.66

-5.91 *** -4.50 *** 2.02 ** -6.63 *** -5.32 *** -5.97 ***

3 48 1.79 -0.55 13,135 14.69 -0.36 13.94 1.37 -8.64 -4.22 -6.23

-5.95 *** -0.03 0.98 -0.75 -0.35 -0.53

4 43 1.42 -0.50 11,557 13.10 -19.68 17.00 4.42 -32.61 -24.64 -30.07

-5.47 *** -2.10 ** 2.38 ** -4.00 *** -2.72 *** -3.49 ***

5 33 1.26 -0.35 8,148 9.10 2.80 16.54 1.50 -9.77 -2.24 -7.65

-3.37 *** 0.23 0.82 -0.84 -0.18 -0.62

6 21 1.32 -0.30 8,791 8.57 -8.67 16.86 2.95 -20.08 -11.80 -16.09

-2.47 ** -0.64 1.65 -1.56 -0.89 -1.23

7 17 1.06 -0.42 9,704 10.35 -31.28 15.33 1.84 -39.97 -34.13 -37.35

-3.02 *** -4.10 *** 0.94 -4.63 *** -4.30 *** -4.65 ***

8 15 0.81 -0.35 10,404 12.00 -15.99 18.47 3.32 -27.56 -18.83 -21.71

-2.81 *** -1.23 1.38 -2.23 ** -1.39 -1.59

The data reported on each of the quarter-to-rating change lines (0 to 8) are calculated as simple averages for all trading days in each quarter. If data 

required for any quarterly calculation are missing, then they are omitted from the calculation. Excess returns are calculated as the difference between the 

cumulative quarterly return of each stock and the cumulative quarterly return of the various indexes. T-statistics testing the hypothesis that the mean equals

zero are shown below many of the quarterly average return and change in return statistics. A single, double, or triple "*" indicates significance at the 10%, 

5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 7

Definitions of Variables, Means, and Standard Deviations

Standard Standard

Mean Deviation Mean Deviation

Dependent Variable

CAMELCAT Dummy variable equal to 1 if the institution experienced a 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50

(pre-period) CAMEL rating downgrade to 3, 4 or 5, and 0 otherwise.

CAMELCAT Dummy variable equal to 1 if the institution experienced a 0.56 0.46 0.35 0.48

(post-period) CAMEL rating upgrade, and 0 otherwise.

Charter

INSBIF Dummy variable equal to 1 if the institution is associated with 0.69 0.46 0.60 0.49

the Bank Insurance Fund, and 0 if it is associated with the 

Savings Association Insurance Fund.

Call Report Variables

EQ_AS Equity divided by total assets (%). 8.98 5.00 7.23 3.21

NC_RES Non-Current (delinquent) assets, less loan-loss reserves, divided 1.15 1.36 1.97 2.30

by total assets (%).

ROA Year-to-date annualized earnings, divided by total assets (%). 0.51 1.37 0.14 1.26

SC_AS Securities divided by total assets (%). 18.15 14.20 15.81 12.11

VL_AS Volatile liabilities divided by total assets (%). 23.11 10.77 23.02 10.86

Core Market Variables

LN_PR Natural logarithm of market price. 2.33 0.62 2.05 0.67

EXRET Market excess return, calculated as the difference between -0.06 0.16 -0.12 0.17

the cumulative quarterly return of each stock and the 

cumulative quarterly return of the CRSP equal weighted index.

DIV Dummy variable equal to 1 if a dividend is paid during the 0.37 0.48 0.33 0.47

the previous 4 quarters, and 0 otherwise. 

Risk Variables

SDRET Standard deviation of daily returns during the quarter. 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03

TURN Number of shares traded in a quarter divided by the number 14.28 13.67 12.82 13.15

of shares outstanding at the end of the quarter (%). 

BE_ME Book equity divided by market capitalization. 1.49 0.91 1.85 1.53

CAMEL 3-Rated CAMEL 4/5-Rated
Table 8 

Logit Regression Results: 4 Quarters before Downgrade

Independent Anticipated 4 Quarters Before Downgrade 4 Quarters Before Downgrade 

Variable Sign 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4

Intercept + 1.34 3.01 4.22 2.00 2.85 3.05 2.87 0.52

(2.15) ** (2.84) *** (2.99) *** (1.77) * (3.67) *** (2.75) *** (1.98) ** (0.57)

Charter

INSBIF + 0.50 0.59 0.72 0.29 1.11 1.37 1.45 0.32

(1.17) (1.34) (1.60) (0.81) (2.52) ** (2.82) *** (2.92) *** (0.94)

Call Report Variables

EQ_AS - -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.22 -0.24 -0.25

(2.84) *** (2.83) *** (3.01) *** (3.03) *** (3.11) *** (3.08) ***

NC_RES + 0.26 0.22 0.23 0.02 0.01 0.01

(2.51) ** (2.01) ** (2.13) ** (0.45) (0.09) (0.16)

ROA - -0.98 -0.80 -0.76 -1.86 -1.79 -1.77

(2.97) *** (2.30) ** (2.19) ** (5.09) *** (4.09) *** (3.88) ***

SC_AS - -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12

(4.32) *** (4.16) *** (4.06) *** (5.70) *** (5.52) *** (5.54) ***

VL_AS + 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.07

(4.14) *** (4.07) *** (3.87) *** (4.09) *** (3.85) *** (3.80) ***

Core Market variables

LN_PR - -0.67 -1.08 -0.89 -0.03 -0.02 -0.51

(1.88) * (2.50) ** (2.64) *** (0.07) (0.06) (1.85) *

EXRET - -1.48 -1.88 -1.58 -3.96 -4.06 -3.77

(1.25) (1.42) (1.45) (2.70) *** (2.77) *** (3.31) ***

DIV - -0.50 -0.40 -0.38 -0.77 -0.88 -0.67

(1.34) (1.06) (1.14) (1.87) * (2.06) ** (2.04) **

Risk Variables

BE_ME + 0.28 0.12

(1.33) (0.67)

SDRET + -20.09 -16.39 -1.67 17.06

(1.72) ** (1.58) (0.12) (1.56)

TURN + 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02

(1.43) (1.22) (1.82) * (1.41)

AIC 215.20 211.32 209.88 253.85 197.70 191.89 192.26 285.03

R 2 0.27 0.31 0.33 0.11 0.44 0.47 0.47 0.18

2 (relative to specification 1) NA 9.88 ** 15.31 *** NA NA 11.81 *** 15.44 *** NA

degrees of freedom 35 3 5

Specification

CAMEL 3-Rated Group Camel 4/5-Rated Group

(Panel A) (Panel B)

This table preforms Logit regression analysis on the sample of commercial banks and thrift institutions. All independent variables are defined in Table 

7. T-statistics are shown in parentheses below their corresponding regression coefficients. A single, double, or triple "*" indiciates 

significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 9 

CAMEL Prediction Accuracy and Error Analysis: 4 Quarters before Downgrade

Equation D--Pred (D) D--Pred (ND) ND--Pred (ND) ND--Pred (D)

Specification (Correct D) (Type 1 Error) (Correct ND) (Type 2 Error)

(%) (%) (%) (%)

 In-Sample Classification

1 75.53 24.47 75.53 24.47

2 77.66 22.34 70.21 29.79

3 78.72 21.28 73.40 26.60

4 70.21 29.79 62.77 37.23

 Out-of-Sample Classification

1 65.63 34.38 81.25 18.75

2 65.63 34.38 78.13 21.88

3 68.75 31.25 71.88 28.13

4 62.50 37.50 62.50 37.50

Equation D--Pred (D) D--Pred (ND) ND--Pred (ND) ND--Pred (D)

Specification (Correct D) (Type 1 Error) (Correct ND) (Type 2 Error)

(%) (%) (%) (%)

 In-Sample Classification

1 77.88 22.12 78.76 21.24

2 79.65 20.35 81.42 18.58

3 77.88 22.12 78.76 21.24

4 61.95 38.05 73.45 26.55

 Out-of-Sample Classification

1 73.17 26.83 82.93 17.07

2 78.05 21.95 90.24 9.76

3 78.05 21.95 87.80 12.20

4 58.54 41.46 73.17 26.83

CAMEL 3-Rated Group

CAMEL 4/5-Rated Group
Table 10 

Logit Regression Results: 1 Quarter after Downgrade

Independent Anticipated 1 quarter after Downgrade 1 quarter after Downgrade 

Variable Sign 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4

Intercept + 1.28 1.60 5.28 3.06 -1.58 -0.80 -1.49 -1.21

(1.17) (1.14) (2.31) ** (1.87) * (1.21) (0.51) (0.77) (1.02)

Charter

INSBIF + 0.79 0.80 0.82 -0.12 0.11 0.33 0.43 0.47

(1.27) (1.26) (1.24) (0.23) (0.17) (0.45) (0.58) (0.81)

Call Report Variables

EQ_AS - -0.35 -0.37 -0.44 -0.24 -0.28 -0.26

(3.04) *** (3.16) *** (3.43) *** (1.64) (1.77) * (1.63)

NC_RES + 0.33 0.35 0.46 0.51 0.39 0.39

(2.08) ** (2.18) ** (2.57) ** (3.75) *** (2.68) *** (2.70) ***

ROA - -0.38 -0.25 -0.24 -0.27 -0.04 -0.01

(1.71) * (1.00) (0.90) (2.02) ** (0.20) (0.07)

SC_AS - -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05

(2.21) ** (2.14) ** (1.82) * (1.73) * (1.35) (1.31)

VL_AS + 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05

(2.21) ** (2.03) ** (1.86) * (1.55) (1.46) (1.48)

Core Market Variables

LN_PR - -0.14 -1.08 -1.00 -1.05 -0.90 -1.46

(0.30) (1.66) * (1.86) * (1.98) ** (1.57) (2.71) ***

EXRET - -1.60 -1.73 -2.26 -4.65 -4.31 -4.68

(1.27) (1.30) (1.99) ** (3.03) *** (2.66) *** (3.27) ***

DIV - 0.01 0.24

(0.01) (0.27)

Risk Variables

BE_ME + -0.16 -0.02

(1.17) (0.23)

SDRET + -33.01 -17.11 6.05 7.55

(2.16) ** (1.44) (0.61) (1.02)

TURN + 0.01 0.03

(0.70) (1.62)

AIC 109.72 112.00 108.76 131.11 104.29 93.71 95.33 107.20

R 2 0.27 0.29 0.33 0.10 0.37 0.45 0.45 0.36

2 (relative to specification 1) NA 1.72 6.96 * NA NA 14.58 *** 14.96 *** NA

degrees of freedom 23 2 3

Specification

CAMEL 3-Rated Group Camel 4/5-Rated Group

(Panel A) (Panel B)

This table extends the logit regressions performed in Table 8, using the sample of downgraded banks and thrifts, but performs the analysis 1 

quarter after downgrade. T-statistics are shown in parentheses below their corresponding regression coefficients. A single, double, or triple "*" 

indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 11

CAMEL Prediction Accuracy and Error Analysis: 1 Quarter after Downgrade

CAMEL 3- Rated Group

Equation D--Pred (D) D--Pred (ND) ND--Pred (ND) ND--Pred (D)

Specification (Correct D) (Type 1 Error) (Correct ND) (Type 2 Error)

(%) (%) (%) (%)

 In-Sample Classification

1 74.51 25.49 75.00 25.00

2 74.51 25.49 82.50 17.50

3 72.55 27.45 77.50 22.50

4 70.59 29.41 65.00 35.00

 Out-of-Sample Classification

1 58.82 41.18 50.00 50.00

2 52.94 47.06 71.43 28.57

3 64.71 35.29 64.29 35.71

4 82.35 17.65 35.71 64.29

Equation D--Pred (D) D--Pred (ND) ND--Pred (ND) ND--Pred (D)

Specification (Correct D) (Type 1 Error) (Correct ND) (Type 2 Error)

(%) (%) (%) (%)

 In-Sample Classification

1 68.42 31.58 85.71 14.29

2 81.58 18.42 87.14 12.86

3 81.58 18.42 87.14 12.86

4 81.58 18.42 77.14 22.86

 Out-of-Sample Classification

1 66.67 33.33 70.83 29.17

2 83.33 16.67 75.00 25.00

3 75.00 25.00 70.83 29.17

4 66.67 33.33 62.50 37.50

CAMEL 4/5-Rated Group