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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

KYLE ANDERSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

C.R. ENGLAND, INC.,

PREMIERE TRUCK DRIVING SCHOOL,

JOHN DOES 1-5, JOHN DOES 6-10,

AND JOHN DOES 11-15,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:15-CV-0083

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

Plaintiff Kyle Anderson (“Plaintiff”) as and for his Complaint against Defendant C.R. 

England, Inc. and Premiere Truck Driving School (collectively the “Defendants”), states as 

follows:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Employment Discrimination

1. This is a proceeding to enforce the rights of Plaintiff and other persons similarly 

situated, to equal employment opportunities, their rights as employees and their civil rights as 

citizens of the United States. Plaintiff seeks money damages, as well as an injunction restraining 

Defendants from maintaining policies, practices, customs and/or usages of:

a. Discrimination against Plaintiff and other persons similarly situated 

because of a disability or a perceived disability, with respect to compensation, terms, 

conditions, and privileges of employment, including without limitation, the hiring, 

transfer, promotion and pay; and 

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b. Limiting, segregating and classifying employees of Defendants in ways 

which deprive Plaintiff and other persons similarly situated of equal employment 

opportunities and/or otherwise adversely affecting their status as employees because of a 

disability or a perceived disability.

2. The Defendants have consistently and/or purposefully and/or negligently deprived 

Plaintiff and, upon information and belief, other persons similarly situated, of the rights 

guaranteed to them under Federal Laws as well as State and Local Laws with the intent and 

design, both directly and indirectly, of fostering a hostile work environment and disability 

discrimination to the detriment of Plaintiff and other persons similarly situated. 

FLSA VIOLATIONS

3. Additionally, Defendants intentionally failed to compensate Plaintiff for wages

earned while in the employ of Defendants. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful actions, Plaintiff

has been harmed.

PARTIES

4. Plaintiff Kyle Anderson (“Plaintiff”) is a citizen of the United States who resides 

at 3650 East Fifth Road, Bremen, Indiana 46506. Plaintiff has been diagnosed with autism. 

Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Claim on 

November 12, 2013 and received a Right to Sue Letter on or about December 13, 2014, a copy 

of which is annexed hereto as Exhibit A. Plaintiff has satisfied all administrative prerequisites.

5. Upon information and belief, at all times herein, Defendant C.R. England, Inc.

(“Defendant C.R. England”) has been and is an entity duly organized and existing under the laws 

of the State of Utah with more than one hundred employees, and corporate headquarters located 

at 4701 West 2100, South Salt Lake City, Utah 84120.

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6. Upon information and belief, Defendant Premier Truck Driving School 

(“Defendant Premiere”) is an alter ego of Defendant C.R. England and is the branch of C.R. 

England, utilized to teach C.R. England employees how to drive trucks. Upon information and 

belief, Defendant created the Premier Trucking School so that it could avoid wage and hour laws 

as it does not provide lawful compensation to its “hires.” Defendants C.R. England and Premiere 

Truck Driving School are collectively referred to as “Defendants.” 

7. Defendant John Does 1-5 are those individual owners and/or managerial 

employees of Defendant C.R. England and Defendant Premiere responsible for the employment 

discrimination at issue in this matter.

8. Defendant John Does 6-10 are those individual owners and/or managerial 

employees of Defendant C.R. England and Defendant Premiere responsible for certain FLSA 

violations at issue in this matter.

9. Defendant John Does 11-15 are those individual owners and/or managerial 

employees of Defendant C.R. England and Defendant Premiere responsible for certain FLSA 

violations at issue in this matter.

10. According to the C.R. England website, “C.R. England has provided truck 

driving jobs to experienced and inexperienced truck drivers alike since 1920. Inexperienced 

truck drivers or those who want to start their truck driving career can attend one of C.R. 

England’s partner truck driving schools. Premier Truck Driving Schools are considered 

among the best in the industry. Admission to Premier Truck Driving School does not require 

a cosigner, money down, or credit requirements. C.R. England's partner truck driving school 

includes Commercial Driver's License (CDL) classroom training and behind the wheel 

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training. Successful graduates of the truck driving training program are guaranteed CDL jobs 

through C.R. England upon meeting our hiring requirements.” 

11. Defendants are employers for the purposes of The Americans with Disabilities 

Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C § 12111 et seq. (the “ADA”), the Fair Labor and Standards Act (“FLSA”) 

and Indiana State Law.

12. Plaintiff was an employee of Defendants for the purposes of the ADA, the 

FLSA, and Indiana State Law. Plaintiff was willing and able to perform his employment duties 

and obligations and was qualified for the employment position(s) he held at Defendants. 

13. At all times relevant, Defendants were subject to the ADA, the FLSA and Indiana 

Wage law.

14. At all relevant times, Defendants affected commerce within the meaning of 

U.S.C. § 203(b).

15. The gross annual volume of sales made or business done by Defendants, for each 

year of the past three years, was not less than $500,000.00.

16. Defendants had the power to hire and fire Plaintiff, control their terms and 

conditions of employment, and determine the rate and method of any compensation in exchange 

for Plaintiff’s services.

JURISDICTION

17. This Court has jurisdiction over these matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 

and 28 U.S.C. § 1441 , 29 U.S.C. § 201, and the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 

1367, in that the state and federal claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts such 

that they are so related that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of 

the United States Constitution.

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18. This Court may properly maintain personal jurisdiction over Defendants because 

Defendants’ contacts with this state and this judicial district are sufficient for the exercise of 

jurisdiction over Defendants to comply with the traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice. 

VENUE

19. The venue of this action is proper because a substantial part of the events and 

omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in the Northern District of Indiana.” (See 28 USC 

1391). 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s Employment Discrimination Claims

Plaintiff Is Hired and Successfully Trained By Defendants

20. After completing his second year of college, Plaintiff decided to take some time 

off from school and enter the work force.

21. On or about June 4, 2013, while searching for a job, Plaintiff came across an 

internet advertisement stating that C.R. England was hiring. Although Plaintiff did not have any 

truck driving experience, the advertisement read “No Experience, No Problem, We Train.”

22. According to their website, in order to qualify for employment at C.R. England, 

candidate must have (a) a horizontal field of vision rating of no less than 80 degrees, (b) pass 

a C.R. England road test, (c) show an original Social Security Card that has not been copied 

or laminated, (d) understand that firearms are strictly forbidden on C.R. England property, 

and (e) meet criminal record policy requirements.

23. Plaintiff, who met said requirements, applied for employment with C.R. 

England. 

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24. On or about June 5, 2013, Defendant’s recruiter Trisha Payne (“Recruiter Payne”) 

contacted Plaintiff and enrolled him in Defendant Premiere, one of C.R. England’s trucking 

schools.

25. On June 6, 2013, Plaintiff received an email from Recruiter Payne stating, “We 

are excited to see you at our Burns Harbor Premier Truck Driving School! You are scheduled to 

start on Monday June 10, 2013. You must arrive one day prior to the start date.” 

26. On June 9, 2013, Plaintiff arrived in Gary, Indiana, where a Defendant employee 

picked up Plaintiff and brought him to Defendant’s training facility in Burns Harbor, Indiana. 

The vehicle that picked up Plaintiff had the name C.R. England on the side of it. 

27. Plaintiff, together with other trainees, was given a series of tests, including a drug 

test, an agility test, and a physical, all of which he easily passed. 

28. The following day, Plaintiff was given a human resources overview about C.R. 

England and was provided with a C.R. England employment manual. The employment manual 

clearly stated that Defendant C.R. England, as required by law, did not discriminate based on 

disability. 

29. Plaintiff was further warned that if he “quit” working at C.R. England within nine 

months, he would have to reimburse C.R. England for the cost of his training. 

30. Plaintiff was further advised that grounds for dismissal included drug use, alcohol 

use, accidents with damages exceeding $2,000, and theft. 

31. Thereafter Plaintiff and his classmates began studying Bureau of Motor Vehicle 

(BMV) training materials to prepare for the written portion of the BMV Commercial Driver’s 

License (CDL) permit examination.

32. Plaintiff easily passed the written CDL permit test and received his CDL permit.

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33. Thereafter, Defendants immediately started training Plaintiff on how to drive a 

C.R. England tractor trailer.

34. On July 6, 2013, Plaintiff passed the CDL driving test in a C.R. England tractor 

trailer. 

35. On July 8, 2013, Defendant C.R. England advised Plaintiff that he was “hired.”

36. On July 10, 2013, C.R. England driver trainer Melvin Woodfork (“Trainer 

Woodfork”) picked Plaintiff up to start “Phase 1 Training,” which included driving Trainer 

Woodfork’s tractor trailer cross-country on multiple trips and accompanying Mr. Woodfork as 

he drove. 

Plaintiff is Involved in a Slight Accident

37. On July 17, 2013, the tractor trailer that Plaintiff was driving came into contact 

with a gate while turning onto a curvy rest stop ramp in California. As a result of the contact, 

two of the tires on the tractor trailer were ruined (the “Tire Incident”). Plaintiff was advised that 

the Tire Incident caused less than $2,000 worth of damage. 

38. Trainer Woodfork acknowledged that the rest stop ramp was difficult to navigate 

and explained to Plaintiff how to correctly make the turn in the future.

39. Trainer Woodfork told Plaintiff that he had to call Defendants’ “Accident 

Coordinator” to inform her about the Tire Incident. The Accident Coordinator reviewed the 

details of the Tire Incident and told Plaintiff that he was “clear to drive.” Thereafter, the 

accident was never mentioned. 

40. Trainer Woodfork remained comfortable with Plaintiff’s driving ability and 

continued to drive with him. After the Tire Incident, Plaintiff put in over 25,000 miles of driving 

over the course of seven cross-country trips. 

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41. At some point after the Tire Incident, Trainer Woodfork told Plaintiff that he was 

one of the best trainees he had ever worked with.

42. During his training, Plaintiff was essentially living in the truck; he was supposed 

to sleep while Trainer Woodfork drove. Plaintiff had difficulty sleeping in the cab of the moving 

truck while Trainer Woodfork drove, because Trained Woodfork spoke on the phone, listened to 

music and communicated with Defendant C.R. England via the truck’s dispatch system when 

stopped. 

43. Towards the end of his month-long road trip with Trainer Woodfork, due to his 

lack of sleep, Plaintiff experienced fatigue on a few occasions while driving. Despite pressure 

from Trainer Woodfork that Plaintiff drove for eleven hours at a time, on a few occasions, 

Plaintiff was forced to stop driving after nine or ten hours due to his fatigue.

44. Plaintiff looked forward to driving on his own, when he would no longer have to 

sleep on a moving truck or be disrupted by other drivers’ conversations or noise. 

45. Still, Plaintiff successfully completed over 25,000 miles of cross-country tractor 

trailer driving with Trainer Woodfork. By mid-August, he had successfully completed 

Defendants’ Phase 1 Training, and was advised that he could begin taking the Phase 1 upgrade 

classes to start Phase 2 Training. 

46. On or about August 16, 2013, Plaintiff returned to Burns Harbor to begin Phase 1 

upgrade training. 

Plaintiff is Instructed to Meet with a Safety Instructor

47. When he arrived for his Phase I Upgrade Training, Plaintiff was told by 

Defendants’ Phase 1 Training Coordinator that he was not allowed to join the Phase I Upgrade 

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class because Defendants had placed a “medical hold” on him and he could not continue training 

until he met with a safety instructor.

48. Plaintiff was instructed to meet with Defendants’ safety director, Dan O’Neil 

(“Safety Director O’Neil”), who was confused about why they were meeting and asked Plaintiff 

if he knew why they were meeting. Plaintiff told Safety Director O’Neil that he did not know 

why either, but possibly because he had experienced fatigue. Safety Director O’Neil told 

Plaintiff that he was required to have a medical evaluation but that he was just going to “clear it,” 

and that Plaintiff just needed to pass a safety evaluation driving test so that he could resume 

training.

Plaintiff Passes the Safety Test and is Released to Finish Phase I Upgrade Training

49. Plaintiff passed the safety evaluation driving test and Safety Director O’Neil told 

him that he should return to the Phase 1 coordinator and tell them that he was ready to complete 

his Phase 1 Upgrade Training. 

Defendants Learn that Plaintiff is Autistic

50. At the conclusion of their meeting, Safety Director O’Neil asked Plaintiff if he 

had any conditions that Defendants should be aware of.

51. Plaintiff responded that he was autistic. In response, Safety Director O’Neil 

asked, “Are you sure?”

52. Plaintiff responded that yes, he was sure that he was autistic, as he had been 

diagnosed in second grade.

Plaintiff Reports to Phase I Upgrade Training 

53. As instructed, Plaintiff went to the Phase I coordinator to tell her that he had 

passed the safety exam and that Safety Director O’Neil had advised him he was to begin Phase I 

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Upgrade training. Plaintiff was told to return the following day to begin training. 

54. The following day, Plaintiff arrived at training and was asked to perform a road 

test, but when Safety Director O’Neil learned that Plaintiff was going to have to take a road test, 

he advised the test administrator that the safety evaluation test Plaintiff passed the day before 

satisfied the road test requirement.

55. Plaintiff was told to sit in the waiting room and “wait on paperwork.” Soon, he 

was instructed to call Defendant employee Shawna Garrett.

Plaintiff is Fired Because He is Autistic

56. Plaintiff called Shawna Garrett, whom he had never spoken to before, and she 

immediately asked him if he “was truly autistic.” When he replied that he was, Garrett told him 

that he was not qualified to haul freight and stated that he should call someone to pick him up 

from Defendants’ facility. She also indicated that C.R. England does not hire people with autism. 

After getting off phone with Garrett, Plaintiff asked Safety Director O’Neil, who was standing 

there, if the phone call meant that he was fired. Safety Director O’Neil responded, “Yes”. 

57. At all times during his employment, including the time of his termination, 

Plaintiff was licensed, ready, willing and able to perform the duties he had been hired to perform.

Plaintiff is Humiliated and Offended By Defendants Actions

58. Defendants failed to provide transportation to Plaintiff to get home and 

immediately cancelled the motel room that they had been providing to him during his training. 

59. Plaintiff was forced to call his relatives looking for a ride home. He was forced to 

sit there and humiliatingly wait while his co-workers wondered what had happened. 

60. Plaintiff had never been previously limited in life by his diagnosis of autism, had 

completed two years of college and had held a series of jobs. He had never previously thought 

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of autism--a communication disorder-as something that would or should hold him back from 

achieving anything that he wanted to achieve. Prior to being fired because of autism, Plaintiff 

had never believed that autism would or could interfere with his career. 

61. Plaintiff was ashamed and humiliated each time he was asked why he lost his job 

and had to explain that he was fired because he was diagnosed with autism. 

62. Plaintiff was especially offended and confused about the reasons he was 

terminated because he had received many extremely positive accolades during his training, and 

knew that he was performing well. Plaintiff’s emotional well-being and self-confidence has been 

and continues to be extremely affected by Defendants’ blatant employment discrimination. 

Defendants Demand to be Reimbursed for Plaintiff’s Training Costs 

63. Shockingly, after not paying Plaintiff properly to work essentially 24 hours, 7 

days a week, and illegally and abruptly firing Plaintiff after learning that he was autistic, 

Defendants have sent Plaintiff bills for the costs of his training.

FLSA VIOLATIONS

64. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in full.

65. During Plaintiff’s employment, Defendant C.R. England failed to pay Plaintiff 

(and all other similarly situated employees) the minimum wage for all hours worked, by (1)

failing to compensate Plaintiff for time spent during the initial orientation; (2) failing to

compensate Plaintiff at least the federal minimum hourly wage for travel time spent traveling 

during normal business hours; (3) failed to compensate Plaintiff at least the federal minimum

wage for all compensable time worked during “Phase 1” of the training program; and (4)

Defendant C.R. England failing to compensate Plaintiff at least the federal minimum wage for

all compensable hours worked when on assignment for more than 24 hours.

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66. Plaintiff was hired by Defendant C.R. England in 2013 and was subjected to

the violations asserted herein within the last two years.

FAILURE TO PAY FOR INITIAL ORIENTATION

67. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in full.

 68. Defendant C.R. England required its newly hired drivers to attend a multi-day 

orientation program.

69. During this initial orientation program, Defendant C.R. England required Plaintiff

to attend classes regarding the rules and procedures of Defendant C.R. England. The classes

lasted approximately 9-10 hours per day.

70. In addition to attending the orientation classes, Defendant C.R. England required

Plaintiff to meet with Defendant C.R. England’s employees and agents about the rules, 

practices, and procedures of Defendant C.R. England and to complete paperwork outside of

class.

71. Defendant C.R. England required Plaintiff to pay for the orientation by

requiring a fee to be paid to “process” them into the program.

72. Defendant C.R. England informed Plaintiff that upon successful completion of the

orientation program, they were guaranteed a job at Defendant C.R. England.

73. Defendant England paid for the travel costs associated with bringing 

Plaintiff to the location of the orientation program.

74. Defendant England paid for the lodging costs associated with housing near

the orientation program, although the lodging provided was subpar.

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75. Upon successful completion of the multi-day orientation program, Defendant 

C.R. England informed its trainee employees that they would be “hired” and would begin

“Phase I” of Defendant C.R. England’s training program.

76. Consistent with Defendant C.R. England’s policies, upon his initial hiring by

Defendant C.R. England, Plaintiff was required to attend a two week orientation program in 

Burns Harbor, Indiana. During this orientation program, Plaintiff attended orientation class for

at least 14 days which lasted more than 10 hours per day. Plaintiff was further required to

engage in other compensable work during this two week period, including meeting with

Defendant C.R. England’s employees and agents about the rules, practices, and procedures of 

Defendant C.R. England outside of class and completing job-related paperwork.

77. Defendant C.R. England failed to compensate Plaintiff for any of the time spent

during the multi-day orientation program, including time spent traveling during normal

business hours to the orientation program, time spent in the orientation classes, and time spent 

with Defendant C.R. England’s agents and employees outside of orientation classes completing 

job-related paperwork and discussing the rules and procedures of Defendant C.R. England.

FAILURE TO PAY MINIMUM WAGE FOR PHASE 1 OF TRAINING

78. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in full.

 79. During Phase 1, Defendant C.R. England required Plaintiff to train with an overthe-road truck driver of Defendant C.R. England. 

80. Defendant C.R. England compensated Plaintiff a daily rate for the time spent

over-the-road during Phase 1.

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81. Defendant C.R. England compensated Plaintiff approximately $61.43 per day for

the time they spent over-the-road during Phase 1. During Phase 1, Plaintiff reported their 

status to Defendant C.R. England via the Qualcomm computer in the truck.

82. Upon information and belief, the Qualcomm messages were received by

Defendant C.R. England in a single centralized location in Utah.

83. During Phase 1, Plaintiff was required to remain on assignment continually for

more than 24 hours. (see 29 C.F.R. § 785.22)

84. Per 29 C.F.R. § 785.22, the maximum amount of time an employer may dock

an employee who is on assignment for more than 24 hours for sleeping and meal periods is 8 

hours per day. The remaining amount of time (16 hours per day) is work time and must be paid.

85. Furthermore, Plaintiff never received five hours of uninterrupted sleep, and hence,

all time logged in the sleeper berth should have been paid.

86. Moreover, during Phase 1, Plaintiff regularly worked more than 16 hours per day

because he was required to (1) drive the truck; (2) remain in the truck while the truck was

actually moving so that they could assist in transporting the cargo; (3) complete modules via

the Qualcomm during times the truck was not moving so that they could complete their

training; (4) wait for cargo while being limited to the truck and not being permitted to leave 

the truck; (5) fuel up the vehicle and perform routine maintenance to same; and (6) remain 

inside the truck when stopped overnight to log time in the sleeper berth and to protect

Defendant C.R. England and its customer’s property.

87. Per the applicable federal minimum wage, Defendant C.R. England was required

to compensate Plaintiff at least $116 per day ($7.25 x 16 hours).

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88. Defendant C.R. England paid Plaintiff a daily rate below $75 per day during

Phase 1.

FAILURE TO PAY FOR COMPENSABLE TRAVEL TIME

89. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in full.

90. Plaintiff was required to engage in significant amounts of travel during regular

business hours that kept him away from home overnight.

91. Plaintiff was required to travel to the initial orientation location where he stayed 

overnight and away from home.

92. Plaintiff completed this travel during regular business hours.

93. Plaintiff was required to travel from the orientation location to the Phase I 

location where he stayed overnight and away from home. This travel was completed during

regular business hours.

94. Defendant C.R. England failed to pay Plaintiff any compensation for such travel

time or in some instances, paid Plaintiff $25.00 per day.

95. The travel required of Plaintiff was well beyond 4 hours per day, and

accordingly, even on the occasions where Defendant C.R. England paid Plaintiff $25.00 per

day, this amount was under the federal minimum wage.

96. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff has been harmed. 

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Americans with Disabilities Act: Discrimination)

97. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in full.

98. The conduct described above constituted unlawful discrimination against Plaintiff 

in violation of his rights under the ADA.

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99. By reason of the foregoing, Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to be 

determined at trial.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(Americans with Disabilities Act: Hostile Work Environment)

100. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in full.

101. The discriminatory conduct described above was sufficiently severe and/or 

pervasive as to alter the conditions of Plaintiff's employment and create an abusive working 

environment in violation of Plaintiff's rights under the ADA by which Plaintiff was repeatedly 

made to feel as if his autism made him unemployable and was led to believe that because of the 

fact that he had been diagnosed as autistic, he was incapable of performing a job he had been 

capably performing. 

102. By reason of the foregoing, plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to be 

determined at trial.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(Americans with Disabilities Act: Retaliation)

103. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in full.

104. In retaliation for Plaintiff’s objections about their unlawful actions, Defendants 

have tarnished Plaintiff’s reputation by accusing him of lying and otherwise adversely attacked 

his character. 

105. In retaliation for Plaintiff’s objections about their unlawful actions, Defendants 

have interfered with Plaintiff’s ability to find employment by falsely representing to possible 

employers that Plaintiff was terminated for causing an accident. 

106. By reason of the foregoing, Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to be 

determined at trial.

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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress)

107. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in full.

108. The conduct described above was extreme and outrageous and severely affected 

Plaintiff’s sense of self and emotional well-being. The Defendants, in conspiracy with each 

other, engaged in the aforesaid conduct with the intent to cause severe emotional distress and/or 

in disregard of a substantial risk of doing so. They knew or should have known that their conduct 

would cause Plaintiff severe emotional distress and it did in fact do so.

109. The Defendants are vicariously liable and responsible for the conduct of the 

individual John Doe Defendants in this regard pursuant to the principle of respondent superior.

110. By reason of the foregoing, Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to be 

determined at trial.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act)

111. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in full.

112. The FLSA requires employers, such as Defendants, to minimally compensate 

employees, such as Plaintiff, at the federal minimum wage rate for each hour worked.

113. As a result of Defendants’ company-wide practices and policies of paying its 

employees below the minimum wage for all hours worked each workweek, Plaintiff has been

harmed. 

114. John Does 1-5 are jointly and individually liable for Defendant C.R. England’s

failure to compensate Plaintiff at least the federal minimum wage for all hours worked because

they directly or indirectly, directed, aided, abetted, and/or assisted with creating and/or

executing the policies and practices which violated the FLSA.

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115. John Does 6-10 are jointly and individually liable for Defendant C.R. England’s

failure to compensate Plaintiff at least the federal minimum wage for all hours worked because

they had control over processing payroll for Plaintiff.

116. Defendants willfully failed to compensate Plaintiff the federal minimum wage. 

117. As a result of Defendants’ failure to compensate Plaintiff at the federal

minimum wage rate, Defendants have violated and continue to violate the FLSA.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Blacklisting Under Indiana Law)

118. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in full.

 119. Pursuant to Indiana Code § 22-5-3-2, et seq., Defendants were precluded 

from blacklisting Plaintiff from obtaining other employment.

120. Upon information and belief, Defendants interfered with Plaintiff’s ability to 

obtain employment by making false accusations concerning the reasons for Plaintiff’s 

termination.

121. Plaintiff is entitled to an award under the Blacklisting statute for his actual

loss, as well as exemplary damages.

Demand for Jury Trial

Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury in this action.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to enter judgment in its favor and 

against the Defendants as follows:

(a) For a declaratory judgment that Defendants' acts, policies and procedures 

violated Plaintiff's rights under Federal and State Law.

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(b) That Defendants, their agents, successors and representatives be permanently 

enjoined from discriminating against Plaintiff with respect to his employment on the basis of his 

disability; from engaging in other employment practices which discriminate on the basis of 

disability; from continuing to deprive Plaintiff of his rights to the equal protection of the laws 

and privileges and immunities under the laws in any of the respects herein above alleged; and 

from conspiring with each other or with any other person to deprive Plaintiff of any of said 

rights;

(c) That Defendants be ordered to compensate, reimburse, and make whole the 

Plaintiff for all the benefits the Plaintiff would have received had it not been for Defendants' 

unlawful conduct including, but not limited to: back pay and benefits. Plaintiff should be 

accorded said benefits unlawfully withheld from the date of Plaintiff's termination, with interest 

on the above withheld amounts to the date of payment;

(d) For actual and consequential damages as may be proven at trial, plus interest;

(e) For compensatory damages for the pain, suffering, humiliation and 

discriminatory treatment that Plaintiff suffered as a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct;

(f) For punitive damages in an amount to properly penalize Defendants for their 

misconduct and to deter such wrongdoing in the future, in an amount to be shown at trial;

(g) For an award to Plaintiff the cost and expenses of this action and reasonable 

attorneys’ fees;

(h) Plaintiff demands the right to have a jury decide all issues raised by his complaint 

that are triable to a jury as a matter of right including issues common to his claim under the 

ADA.

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(i) Plaintiff prays for an award to compensate him for the pain and suffering and for 

the humiliation caused by Defendants’ unlawful treatment of him in an amount no less than

$1,000,000.00.

(j) Providing that Defendant England is to compensate, reimburse, and 

make Plaintiff whole for any and all pay and benefits they would have received had it not

been for Defendants’ illegal actions, including but not limited to past lost earnings.

(k) Awarding Plaintiff liquidated damages pursuant to the laws he is suing under in

an amount equal to the actual damages in this case;

(l) Awarding Plaintiff all other relief as the Court deems appropriate and just. 

Respectfully submitted,

 /s/ Michael J. Hays

Michael J. Hays (23606-71) 

TUESLEY HALL KONOPA LLP

212 E. LaSalle Ave., Suite 100

South Bend, Indiana 46617 

(574) 232-3538 

mhays@thklaw.com

Co-Counsel for Plaintiff

Megan S. Goddard, Esq.

NESENOFF & MILTENBERG, LLP

363 Seventh Avenue, 5th Floor

New York, New York

(212) 736-4500 

mgoddard@nmllplaw.com

USDC IN/ND case 2:15-cv-00083-JVB-PRC document 1 filed 03/09/15 page 20 of 20