UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

FORT WAYNE DIVISION 

CHRISTOPHER SEAN WALLER, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

STATE OF INDIANA, et al., 

 Defendants. 

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Case No. 1:15-CV-349 JD 

OPINION AND ORDER

In this action, pro se plaintiff Christopher Sean Waller sued a number of individuals and 

the State of Indiana, asserting claims that appear to arise out of various criminal cases in state 

court. On November 20, 2015, Mr. Waller filed a complaint with the heading of “Legal 

Malpractice,” which spans 79 pages and consists of a written narrative interspersed with exhibits 

and quotations of other documents. On February 11, 2016, Mr. Waller filed a “Supplement” to 

his complaint, which begins on a form provided by the Court for complaints under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, but which spans 376 pages, many of which are transcripts from proceedings in state 

court. He has also filed a number of motions and supplements. 

It is difficult to discern what Mr. Waller’s claims actually are, but he appears to assert 

that his due process rights were violated by being sentenced to additional terms of imprisonment 

after having already been sentenced to time served in those proceedings, and by conduct that he 

believes caused his habeas petition contesting those sentences to be wrongfully denied. Mr. 

Waller named as defendants the State of Indiana, two prosecutors involved in the criminal cases 

and his petition for collateral relief, a deputy attorney general who represented the State in the 

habeas petition, and Mr. Waller’s defense attorney, Robert W. Gevers, II. The defendants have 

each moved to dismiss the complaint. 
2 

At the outset, Mr. Waller’s complaint could easily be dismissed for violating Rule 8(a), 

which requires a complaint to contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The 79-page complaint is neither short nor 

plain, and is very difficult to decipher, as are the supplements and other filings Mr. Waller has 

submitted. Having reviewed Mr. Waller’s filings, though, it is apparent that this Court lacks 

jurisdiction over the claims, so dismissing the complaint under Rule 8(a) and permitting an 

amendment would be futile. 

In short, the injuries underlying each of Mr. Waller’s claims were caused by judgments 

entered against him in state court. Mr. Waller asserts that he was improperly sentenced in three 

different criminal matters in 2009 and that he was not given proper credit for time served as of 

the time of those sentences. He then filed a habeas petition that was later construed as a petition 

for collateral review of those judgments, and he argues that the defendants caused that petition to 

be wrongfully denied. However, a federal district court does not have jurisdiction over claims 

that amount to requests for review of state court judgments or that necessarily imply the 

invalidity of convictions or sentences in state court. Hadley v. Quinn, 524 F. App’x 290, 293 (7th 

Cir. 2013) (“Under Heck a plaintiff may not pursue a suit for damages under § 1983 that would 

undermine the validity of a conviction unless he demonstrates that the conviction ‘has been 

reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal 

authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a 

writ of habeas corpus.’” (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994)); Beaven v. Roth, 

74 F. App’x 635, 638 (7th Cir. 2003) (“As a general rule, federal courts (other than the Supreme 

Court) have no subject matter jurisdiction to review state-court judgments, see Rooker v. Fid. 

Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); District of Columbia Ct. of 
3 

App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983), and litigants cannot 

avoid this rule by casting their complaints in the form of a federal civil rights action under 

§ 1983, see Lewis v. Anderson, 308 F.3d 768, 772 (7th Cir.2002); Maple Lanes, Inc. v. Mel 

Messer, 186 F.3d 823, 825 (7th Cir.1999).”). 

Thus, for example, in Beaven, the plaintiff argued that an Indiana trial court improperly 

calculated his credit for time served as of the date of his sentencing. 74 F. App’x at 637. He sued 

a number of defendants in federal court, arguing that they violated his federal rights by depriving 

him of presentence credit to which he was entitled, causing him to be imprisoned for too long. 

The Seventh Circuit held that the claim was barred under Heck, since it was equivalent to a 

collateral attack on the state court’s judgment. Id. at 637–39. Likewise, in Hadley, the plaintiff 

claimed that he had been incarcerated on an invalid conviction and then, after being paroled, 

unlawfully reimprisoned for infractions that occurred only after his parole term had expired. 524 

F. App’x at 291. After pursuing those arguments in habeas petitions, he filed a civil suit in 

federal court against various defendants, arguing that they had caused him to be falsely 

imprisoned. However, the Seventh Circuit held that the claims were barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine and by Heck, since the plaintiff was essentially asking the federal court to 

review the state-court judgments, and his suit for damages under § 1983 would undermine the 

validity of his conviction. Id. at 293. 

The same analysis applies here. Mr. Waller alleges that the defendants caused or allowed 

him to be improperly sentenced in state court and denied credit for time served, and that they 

caused his habeas petition in state court to be wrongfully denied. These claims are essentially an 

attempt to use a civil suit under § 1983 to challenge those judgments. Mr. Waller’s alleged 

injuries stem from the judgments themselves, and his claims, if successful, would imply the 
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invalidity of those judgments, which he does not suggest have been set aside. If Mr. Waller 

believes the judgments in state court were erroneous, he may challenge them within the state 

courts if he has not done so already, and if he is still in custody, he may file a petition for habeas 

corpus in federal court after exhausting his remedies within the state system. However, this Court 

lacks jurisdiction over these claims, so they must be dismissed.1

Finally, Mr. Gevers filed a counterclaim against Mr. Waller asserting that Mr. Waller’s 

claim is barred by res judicata. He also filed a motion for clerk’s entry of default against Mr. 

Waller after Mr. Waller failed to timely file an answer to the counterclaim. However, res judicata 

is an affirmative defense, not a freestanding claim, and thus is not properly asserted as a 

counterclaim. Therefore, the Court dismisses Mr. Gevers’ counterclaim against Mr. Waller and 

denies the motion for clerk’s entry of default as moot. 

In conclusion, the Court GRANTS the motions to dismiss filed by Mr. Gevers [DE 5] and 

by the State Defendants [DE 31]. Mr. Waller’s complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE for lack of jurisdiction. Mr. Waller’s motions for summary judgment [DE 38, 42] 

are therefore DENIED. The Court also DISMISSES Mr. Gevers’ Counterclaim against Mr. 

Waller, and DENIES the motion for clerk’s entry of default [DE 30] as moot. The Clerk is 

DIRECTED to enter judgment and close the case. 

 SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED: July 14, 2016 

 /s/ JON E. DEGUILIO 

 Judge 

 United States District Court 

 

1

 Mr. Waller’s claims would face other impediments on the merits, as described in the 

defendants’ motions, but because the Court lacks jurisdiction, it does not reach those issues.