1

Filed 11/18/21 In re N.W. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re N.W. et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH 

AND HUMAN SERVICES 

AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

N.S.,

Defendant and Appellant;

G.W.,

Defendant and Respondent.

 D079086

 (Super. Ct. Nos. J520236A-B)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Browder A. Willis III, Judge. Affirmed.

William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.
2

Lonnie J. Edridge, County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy 

County Counsel and Emily Harlan, CWLS, Deputy County Counsel for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.

Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Respondent.

INTRODUCTION

N.S. (Mother) appeals from juvenile court orders that terminated 

dependency jurisdiction over her two young children, N.W. and H.W., and 

awarded joint legal custody to Mother and G.W. (Father) and primary 

physical custody to Father. She does not challenge the termination of 

dependency jurisdiction. Her sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile 

court abused its discretion by awarding Father with primary physical custody 

rather than equal physical custody of the children to both parents, as she had 

requested. Finding no abuse, we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. 

Initiation of Dependency Proceedings Through Post-Disposition Review 

Orders

Mother and Father, who are not married, lived with each other from 

approximately December 2014 to December 2019. They have two children, 

N.W. (age 6) and H.W. (age 3). The parents’ relationship involved a 

significant history of domestic violence. As Mother acknowledged in her 

opening brief on appeal, “Father and Mother were physically violent with 

each other, and the children saw some of the violence.” Mother also suffered 

from mental health illness, and was psychiatrically hospitalized twice in 

August 2019 as a result of overdosing on prescription medication and 

expressing suicidal ideations. From 2017 to 2019, leading up to this 
3

dependency case, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency 

(Agency) had attempted to intervene on behalf of the children, but the 

parents “evad[ed] the Agency,” “minimized or denied their history of domestic 

violence,” and declined services, including for domestic violence.

On December 20, 2019, the Agency filed dependency petitions on behalf 

of N.W. and H.W. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300, 

subdivision (b)(1). The petitions alleged the children had been exposed to a 

domestic violence incident on December 10, during which Father hit Mother 

and strangled her until she lost consciousness. As a result, the Agency

alleged the children suffered, or there was a substantial risk that they would 

suffer, serious physical harm or illness as a result of their parents’ failure or 

inability to supervise or protect them adequately. 

From December 9 to December 15, 2019, Mother reported to law 

enforcement “a series of domestic violence incidents” that occurred in the 

home with the children present. In the last reported incident of December 

10, Mother stated Father strangled her until she lost consciousness. On 

December 15, officers arrested Father for violation of a restraining order.2 

They observed bruising around Mother’s neck, right leg, and left arm. Father 

denied strangling or hitting Mother, and reported that Mother had, in the 

past, threatened him with a knife, including while he was holding H.W. 

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless 

indicated otherwise.

2 In March 2019, a criminal protective order was issued against Father, 

prohibiting him from having contact with Mother, except for peaceful 

exchanges of their children. Mother and Father continued to live together in 

violation of the protective order. Mother told the Agency she did not want a 

restraining order or “any type of court order.”
4

Father told the Agency that he had told Mother, “ ‘[w]e need to stop this, we 

are going to kill each other.’ ”

At the detention hearing on December 23, 2019, the juvenile court 

found the Agency had made prima facie showings in support of its petitions 

and detained the children in a foster care home or with a relative or nonrelative extended family member. At the contested jurisdiction and 

disposition hearing in February 2020, the court found true the petitions’ 

allegations, declared the children dependents of the court, placed them in a 

confidential licensed foster home, and ordered reunification services for both 

parents. It also ordered supervised visits with the children for Father and 

unsupervised visits for Mother.

At the six-month review hearing in August 2020, the Agency reported 

that both parents had made “great progress” regarding their insight into the 

protective issues and both had fully engaged in services. The parents had 

obtained separate residences, the children had been placed in Mother’s care 

for a 60-day trial visit in late June 2020, and Father had progressed from 

supervised to unsupervised visits. At the Agency’s recommendation, the 

juvenile court placed the children with Mother, ordered family maintenance 

services, and granted the Agency discretion to allow Father to have overnight 

visits or a 60-day trial visit with the children. The court set an interim 

review hearing for November 2020 with the possibility of closing the case 

before the regularly scheduled 12-month review hearing.

In its report for the November 2020 hearing, the Agency recommended 

the court terminate jurisdiction “as [the case] no longer appear[ed] to be a 

Child Welfare issue but a Family Court and custody issue.” Both parents had 

“shown behavior changes consistent with mitigating the dangers and safety 

issues” to the children and the Agency believed they could coparent safely 
5

using email communication and third-party custody exchanges. The Agency 

recommended the court award joint legal custody with physical custody to 

Mother and unsupervised overnight visits to Father. It also requested that 

the court refer the parents to “Family Court Mediation” for custody issues 

upon Father’s return from deployment in May 2021. Father was an active 

service member of the United States Navy.

However, at the November 2020 hearing, the children’s counsel 

requested a 30-day continuance to investigate “privileged information” she 

had recently received. On December 15, the Agency informed the court that 

it was investigating a new referral for allegations of excessive discipline of 

N.W. by Mother. The court again continued the review hearing to allow the 

Agency to complete its investigation and granted the Agency discretion to 

detain the children with Father if he were able to return from his deployment 

on an emergency basis. In the meantime, with Mother’s agreement, the 

children were being cared for by their daycare provider, Ms. G., pursuant to a 

safety plan.

On December 14, 2020, during an unannounced visit with Ms. G., a

social worker observed N.W. had three teeth missing, her two front teeth and 

one on the bottom right. Ms. G. showed the social worker a cell phone video 

she had taken of N.W. on December 9. In the video, N.W., who was 

excessively drooling, told Ms. G. that “ ‘my mom popped me on the mouth’ ”

that morning. N.W. did not appear upset or scared and stated four of her 

teeth had been loose, pointing to two top and two bottom teeth. N.W. stated 

that she did not know why Mother had smacked her, but it hurt her feelings. 

Her mouth began bleeding and Mother put napkins in her mouth to stop the 

bleeding. They looked around in the dark and found her teeth on the ground. 
6

Ms. G. told the social worker that N.W. would not talk or eat on 

December 9, 2020. Ms. G. texted Mother that morning inquiring about 

N.W.’s missing teeth and Mother texted back, “ ‘Oh you just saw that?’ ” with

three laughing emojis. Mother explained to Ms. G. that she had “ ‘popped 

[N.W.] in the mouth’ ” that morning because N.W. was being loud. Mother 

stated that N.W.’s teeth were already loose and fell out. Ms. G. told the social 

worker she knew before the incident that N.W.’s top left tooth and bottom 

tooth were loose, but not the front right tooth. 

When Mother arrived later on December 14, 2020 to pick up N.W., the 

social worker met Mother at her car and explained what N.W. had disclosed 

regarding Mother smacking her and her teeth falling out. Mother stated that 

N.W. could tell elaborate stories and explained that at 5:00 a.m. that 

morning, N.W. was screaming and yelling in front of their apartment complex 

as they were leaving. Mother stated she “ ‘popped’ ” N.W. on the mouth 

“ ‘very lightly,’ ” demonstrating it by placing her hand over her own mouth, 

and that N.W. put her hands up in the air and must have bitten down. 

Mother stated that N.W.’s teeth “ ‘were hanging on by a thread.’ ” When the 

social worker explained to Mother about the need for the Agency to conduct 

an investigation and the need for a safety plan for the children, at least until 

a medical exam had been completed, Mother became very agitated and 

directed profanities at the social worker. Mother then drove away without 

the children. 

During a subsequent phone interview with another social worker, 

Mother provided a different account of the incident. She explained that she 

was merely trying to “lightly put her hand in front of [N.W.’s] mouth” to quiet 

her when N.W. became defensive and put up her hands. N.W. then “slipped”

and “ ‘fell into’ ” another parked vehicle “on her ‘shoulder’ area.” Mother was 
7

not sure whether the child had also hit her head on the vehicle, but she

denied causing N.W.’s teeth to fall out. Mother claimed she “ ‘didn’t even 

touch her.’ ” According to Mother, N.W.’s teeth had been loose and bleeding 

the days before the incident. She believed the incident “ ‘wasn’t that big of a 

deal’ ” and that she and N.W. talked and laughed about it afterward. On 

another occasion, Mother told the social worker N.W. acted like her Father 

and was a liar.

In N.W.’s forensic interview on December 16, 2020, N.W. denied that 

anyone had done “ ‘any hurting’ ” of her. When asked about her missing 

teeth, N.W. said “ ‘they fell out’ ” when Mother “ ‘smacked me.’ ” She said her 

mouth was bleeding and “it felt ‘weird.’ ” She did not know why Mother 

smacked her and denied that anyone had fallen during the incident. When 

asked how she felt when Mother smacked her, N.W. stated she felt “ ‘sad.’ ” 

When asked whether she felt safe with Mother, N.W. replied, “ ‘no.’ ” When 

asked whether she felt safe with Father, N.W. replied, “ ‘no.’ ” When asked to 

explain her answers, N.W. stated: “ ‘Because I said no.’ ”

During N.W.’s medical examination one week after the incident, the 

physician did not find any evidence of traumatic injury and concluded the 

exam was “ ‘indeterminate’ ” regarding physical abuse. Without knowing the 

prior condition of N.W.’s teeth, the physician was unable to determine how 

much force would have been necessary or used to knock out the child’s teeth.

The Agency closed its investigation as “[i]nconclusive” as to whether 

Mother had committed physical abuse of N.W. Nevertheless, the Agency 

reported that it remained “extremely concerned” for the children in Mother’s 

care. It found that Mother had provided different scenarios for the incident

and had failed to take responsibility. Instead, Mother placed blame on N.W. 

and accused the child of being a liar, which the Agency stated “can be very 
8

detrimental to the mental health of her children.” The Agency also noted 

that Mother’s service providers had implemented a safety plan for her own 

mental health. Finally, the Agency reported “no concerns for the children’s 

safety or care” since they were placed in Father’s care. Father had returned 

from his ship to San Diego a few days after the incident and began caring for 

the children, while Mother had supervised visitation with the children. 

At the January 25, 2021 family maintenance review hearing, the 

Agency recommended the juvenile court terminate jurisdiction and issue

custody orders, this time, for joint legal custody with physical custody to 

Father and supervised visitation for Mother. The Agency had also filed

section 388 petitions requesting the court change its prior placement orders

from placement with Mother to placement with Father. Mother requested a 

contested hearing on the section 388 petitions and a “contested exit order 

trial.” At the request of the Agency and the children’s counsel, the court 

issued an interim order detaining the children with Father and granted 

Mother supervised visitation pending trial.

At the combined hearing on March 18, 2021, the Agency withdrew the

section 388 petitions. It recommended the court terminate its jurisdiction

and issue custody orders. However, it recommended joint legal and joint 

physical custody of the children to both parents. The Agency reported that 

Mother had shown she could safely parent the children in her care, but it still 

had concerns regarding Mother’s “impulsive reactions.” The children 

appeared to be doing very well with Father, who had “shown his ability to 

step up as a full time parent for the children in addition to providing a safe 

home for the children.” The Agency believed “each parent ha[d] the tools” to

safely co-parent with their existing network. However, the children’s 
9

attorney requested a continuance to conduct a further in-person interview 

with N.W. before the court terminated jurisdiction and issued custody orders. 

Accordingly, the juvenile court continued the family maintenance 

review hearing to April 28, 2021, to allow time for the parents to participate 

in Family Court Services (FCS) mediation, and maintained its prior order 

that the children remain in Father’s care pending the hearing. The court 

noted that what was left was “the issue of exit orders and who is going to 

assume primary residence,” and FCS mediation will allow the court to “get a 

baseline on how the [parents] feel about sharing custody, what type of 

visitation can be worked out, what can be worked out if [Father] gets 

deployed.” Mother’s counsel submitted on the continuance and the order for 

the parents to attend FCS mediation. 

On April 28, 2021, Mother requested another referral for FCS 

mediation and a continuance of the review hearing because Father failed to 

appear at the first scheduled FCS mediation. Mother’s counsel argued FCS 

mediation would provide “important information that will be necessary to 

craft the exit orders for th[e] case.” (Italics added.) At the continued hearing 

on May 27, Mother requested another continuance to allow the parties to 

review the FCS mediation report, which they had only received that morning. 

The court granted the continuance to June 14, and indicated its tentative 

ruling was to adopt FCS’s recommendations for joint legal custody and joint 

physical custody, with Father providing the primary residence for the 

children.

II. 

Termination of Dependency Jurisdiction and Exit Custody Orders

On June 14, 2021, the court held the contested family maintenance 

review hearing. Unsatisfied with the FCS report, Mother requested another 
10

continuance and that the juvenile court order FCS to “conduct another 

mediation with a different mediator.” The court denied her request, finding 

the request for a second mediation to be inappropriate. The juvenile court 

judge stated that he has “read hundreds of these family mediation reports,” 

understands “how the information is compiled and presented,” and the 

“content of the report is fairly standard from [his] experience in family court.” 

The judge further stated that, in addition to the FCS report, he was relying 

on “the case file, [his] personal notes” and his “background information on 

th[e] case” and was prepared to proceed with the parties’ arguments to 

“either closing out th[e] case with custody orders or otherwise.”

In the FCS report, the mediator summarized the joint mediation 

session she conducted with Mother and Father, in which both parents 

provided, among other information, a history of their relationship, including 

the past domestic violence, their current residence and work schedule, a 

history of their parenting plan with the children since the dependency 

proceedings began in December 2019, and each of their concerns regarding 

the children and co-parenting. The mediator also listened to each parent’s 

proposed parenting schedule and their supporting reasons. She also 

reviewed portions of the family court files pertaining to matters of paternity, 

support, issuance of a domestic violence temporary restraining order, and 

custody; the CWS history of referrals; a criminal records check for both 

parents; and certain of the Agency’s reports in the dependency proceedings, 

including the report on the Agency’s investigation of Mother’s excessive

discipline of N.W. in December 2020. Although the children were too young 

to be interviewed, the mediator obtained information about them from the 

parents and collateral sources. The mediator noted that Mother did not know 

where N.W. attended school and had no knowledge of her academic progress. 
11

In contrast, Father knew where N.W. was attending school and reported that 

she was performing well academically. Considering the totality of the 

information, the mediator recommended the parents share legal custody, 

Father provide the primary residence, Mother would parent the children on 

alternating weekends and every Wednesday overnights, and the parents 

would alternate the holidays. 

Both Father and the children’s counsel agreed the court should adopt 

the FCS mediator’s recommendations as to custody and terminate 

jurisdiction. Mother agreed to termination of jurisdiction, but disagreed with 

the proposed custody orders. She requested that the parents be awarded 

joint physical custody with both parents equally providing the primary 

residence for the children. Mother’s counsel asserted that Mother disagreed 

with Father’s comments, set forth in the FCS report, that he has been 

cooperative and responsive to Mother’s requests for information since the 

children were placed in his care in December 2020, and requested that 

Mother be allowed to address the court “specifically regarding her concerns 

and ongoing concerns that she has had regarding her inability to get 

information from the father and the difficulties that she has regarding her 

ability to work with the children’s teachers.”

The juvenile court denied Mother’s request to be heard on those specific 

matters, stating that: “This is a court of limited jurisdiction to a certain 

extent. It is limited to the best interest of the children. And that issue, as all 

counsel have agreed, has been addressed fully through the life of the 

dependency case. And the issues that brought the family to the [c]ourt’s 

attention, to the dependency court’s attention, no longer exist, as far as the 

law is concerned, as far as the [c]ourt is concerned. [¶] The issues that 

remain fall squarely within the jurisdiction and the culture of family court. 
12

So Mother’s concerns about communication, or lack thereof, Mother’s 

concerns about the specifics related to education, and/or her access on a daily 

basis or any other form of access, falls squarely within the jurisdiction and 

culture of family court and the nature of the co-parenting issues.” (Italics 

added.)

The juvenile court found the conditions that justified the initial 

assumption of dependency jurisdiction no longer existed, those conditions 

were not likely to recur if supervision is withdrawn, and that placement with 

the parents would not be detrimental to the children. Accordingly, the court 

terminated dependency jurisdiction as to both children. The court issued exit 

orders awarding joint legal custody to the parents and physical custody to 

Mother and Father as set forth in the FCS report, including primary 

residence to Father.3 Mother timely filed a notice of appeal, challenging only 

the court’s custody orders.4

DISCUSSION

Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court abused its 

discretion by awarding Father with primary physical custody of the children, 

instead of equal physical custody to both parents. She contends family court 

mediation is an “[i]nadequate [b]asis” for determining the custodial terms of a 

juvenile court’s exit order and the court erred when it “merely adopt[ed] the 

custodial recommendations of a family law mediator who operates primarily 

from the perspective of the family law court.” Mother also argues substantial 

3 The court adopted the custody orders prepared by Father on Form JV200 and Form JV-205, which had attached the FCS mediator’s proposed 

custody sharing plan.

4 Mother does not challenge the June 14, 2021 orders to the extent the 

juvenile court terminated its dependency jurisdiction over the children.
13

evidence does not support the court’s implied finding that its custody orders 

are in the children’s best interests. We reject Mother’s claims.

I.

No Error in the Juvenile Court’s Use of FCS Mediation

The record is clear: Mother not only failed to object to the juvenile 

court’s use of FCS mediation to determine its exit orders, but she had also 

expressly invited the court to do so. Mother agreed to the court’s order 

referring the parents to FCS mediation for the purpose of assisting the court 

in fashioning the custodial terms of its exit orders. When Father failed to 

appear for the first scheduled mediation, Mother requested the court 

continue the review hearing so that the parties could attend mediation. 

When she was unsatisfied with the FCS report and recommendations, 

Mother requested that the court order the parties to attend a second FCS 

mediation with a different mediator. Multiple continuances of the family 

maintenance review hearing were granted, at her request, specifically to 

allow the court to consider information from the FCS mediation. And, 

contrary to her argument on appeal that FCS mediation was an “[i]nadequate 

[b]asis,” she argued below that it would provide “important information that 

will be necessary to craft the exit orders for th[e] case.” (Italics added.) 

Under these circumstances, we conclude Mother’s claim regarding the 

juvenile court’s use of FCS mediation is precluded by the doctrines of 

forfeiture and invited error. “[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider 

a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in 

the trial court. [Citation.] The purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to 

bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected. 

[Citation.] [¶] Dependency matters are not exempt from this rule.” (In re 

S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. omitted; In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 

Cal.App.4th 212, 222 [“Forfeiture . . . applies in juvenile dependency 
14

litigation and is intended to prevent a party from standing by silently until 

the conclusion of the proceedings.”].) Moreover, “[u]nder the doctrine of 

invited error, when a party by its own conduct induces the commission of 

error, it may not claim on appeal that the judgment should be reversed 

because of that error.” (Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 202, 

212.)

Even if Mother’s claim was not precluded, we see no error in the 

juvenile court’s use of FCS mediation in determining the custodial terms of 

its exit orders. To be clear, it has been long recognized, as Mother notes, that 

family law statutes differ from juvenile dependency statutes and do not bind 

a juvenile court in making dependency determinations. “Dependency 

proceedings in the juvenile court are special proceedings governed by their 

own rules and statutes. [Citations.] Unless otherwise specified, the 

requirements of the Civil Code [or Family Code] and the Code of Civil 

Procedure do not apply.” (In re Jennifer R. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 704, 711

(Jennifer R.).) In particular, “[a]lthough both the family court and the 

juvenile court focus on the best interests of the child[,] significant differences 

exist.” (Id. at p. 712.) The California Supreme Court has noted the 

differences between the family court and juvenile court, stating:

“The two courts have separate purposes. The family court 

is established to provide parents a forum in which to 

resolve, inter alia, private issues relating to the custody of 

and visitation with children. In that setting, parents are 

presumed to be fit and capable of raising their children. 

[Citation.] The juvenile court, by contrast, provides the 

state a forum to ‘restrict parental behavior regarding 

children, . . . and . . . to remove children from the custody of 

their parents or guardians.’ [Citation.] . . . The juvenile 

court has a special responsibility to the child as parens 

patriae and must look to the totality of a child’s 

circumstances when making decisions regarding the child.” 
15

(In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 201 (Chantal S.).)

Notwithstanding “the difference in function between juvenile 

dependency and family law courts in the context of custody and visitation” (In 

re John W. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961, 972 (John W.)), we find no merit in 

Mother’s claim that it was error for the juvenile court to use FCS mediation 

to determine custody in an exit order.

First, mediation in juvenile dependency proceedings is favored by the 

Legislature. (§ 350, subd. (a)(2) [“Each juvenile court is encouraged to 

develop a dependency mediation program to provide a problem-solving forum 

for all interested persons to develop a plan in the best interests of the child, 

emphasizing family preservation and strengthening. The Legislature finds 

that mediation of these matters assists the court in resolving conflict, and 

helps the court to intervene in a constructive manner in those cases where 

court intervention is necessary.”]; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.518 

[standards of practice and administration for dependency mediation 

services].) Toward that objective, the San Diego County Superior Court 

adopted a local rule allowing the juvenile court to refer matters to mediation. 

(Super. Ct. San Diego County, Local Rules, rule 6.1.10 [“At the discretion of 

the [juvenile] court, a case may be referred to mediation.”].) Many juvenile 

courts throughout California have adopted programs to refer parties to 

mediation, in which FCS mediators, who have expertise and training in

family counseling and child custody matters, are routinely used. (See

Edwards, Moving Cases from Juvenile to Family Court: How Mediation Can 

Help (2012) 16 U.C. Davis J. of Juv. L. & Policy 535, 547–549.) 

Second, the record does not support Mother’s contention that the 

juvenile court “merely adopt[ed]” or “arbitrarily adopted” the FCS mediator’s 

recommendations and, by extension, improperly relied on family law rather 

than dependency law. Mother asserts the FCS mediator made her 
16

recommendations “primarily from the perspective of the family law court.” 

While it may be correct that family courts routinely employ FCS mediation 

for custody matters, we perceive nothing in the record, and the report 

specifically, to support Mother’s assertion that the FCS mediator uniquely 

applied family law principles in drafting her report or recommendations. The 

mediator gathered information from a broad source of information, including 

primarily the parents, and none was impermissible for the juvenile court to 

consider under dependency law. (See, e.g., § 304 [“In deciding issues between 

the parents . . . regarding custody of a child who has been adjudicated a 

dependent of the juvenile court, the juvenile court may review any records

that would be available to the domestic relations division of a superior court 

hearing that matter,” which would include the family court files pertaining to 

matters of paternity, support, issuance of a domestic violence temporary 

restraining order, and custody as summarized in the FCS report. (Italics 

added.)].)

Nevertheless, the juvenile court did not merely or arbitrarily adopt the 

FCS recommendations, as Mother argues, without consideration of its 

obligations to determine the children’s best interests under dependency law. 

The court acknowledged, when it initially ordered the parties to attend FCS 

mediation, that an FCS report will simply allow the court to “get a baseline 

on how the [parents] feel about sharing custody, what type of visitation can 

be worked out, what can be worked out if [Father] gets deployed.” When it 

issued the exit orders, the court expressly stated it had not only reviewed the 

FCS mediator’s report, but that it was also relying on the entire dependency
17

case file and the court’s personal notes and familiarity with the background 

information on the case.5 

The court also acknowledged its familiarity with family law 

proceedings and FCS mediation, stating that it had read hundreds of FCS 

mediation reports and understood how their information was compiled and 

presented. The court then recognized its limited authority as a juvenile court 

judge and its obligation to apply juvenile dependency law principles and, in 

particular, to focus on the best interest of the children. Although we are 

required to presume a trial court was aware of and followed the applicable 

law (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 398), here, 

the record unambiguously demonstrates the juvenile court knew and applied 

the appropriate dependency law principles in determining custody orders for 

the children. The court made explicit its considerations were “limited to the 

best interest of the children.” (In re Nicholas H. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 251, 

268 (Nicholas H.) [“When making a custody determination in any dependency 

case, the court’s focus and primary consideration must always be the best 

interests of the child.”].) 

We further disagree with Mother’s contention that the juvenile court 

“ ‘effectively punt[ed] and delegate[d] to family court the issues concerning 

[the children’s] custody’ ” (italics added), when it commented that certain 

“issues that remain fall squarely within the jurisdiction and the culture of 

family court.” Mother has taken the court’s comments out of context. The 

court fulfilled its obligations in issuing custody orders, and then declined to 

5 Since the juvenile court stated it was relying on its knowledge of the 

entire dependency case file, Mother’s complaint that the FCS report “does not 

mention pertinent juvenile-court findings and orders . . . [and] excludes 

pertinent information about the children’s dependency” is of no consequence.
18

hear “Mother’s concerns about communication, or lack thereof, Mother’s 

concerns about the specifics related to education, and/or her access on a daily

basis or any other form of access”⎯ which, as the juvenile court aptly noted, 

do “fall[ ] squarely within the jurisdiction and culture of family court and the 

nature of the co-parenting issues.” And since the exit orders become part of 

the relevant family law file (§ 362.4, subds. (a) & (b)), either parent is free to

seek further orders in family court regarding issues such as communication 

and access to educational information.

II.

No Abuse of Discretion in the Juvenile Court’s Custody Orders

We now proceed to the merits of Mother’s claim that the juvenile court 

abused its discretion in awarding Father with primary physical custody of 

the children, instead of equal physical custody to the parents. Section 362.4 

authorizes the juvenile court to issue a custody and visitation order, or an 

exit order, when it terminates dependency jurisdiction over a child. (§ 362.4, 

subd. (a); see In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 512–513.) “When making 

a custody determination in any dependency case, the court’s focus and 

primary consideration must always be the best interests of the child.” 

(Nicholas H., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 268.) “The juvenile court has a 

special responsibility to the child as parens patriae and must look to the 

totality of the child’s circumstances when making decisions regarding the 

child.” (Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 201.) It has “broad discretion to 

decide what means will best serve the child’s interest” and “[i]ts 

determination will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion.” 

(In re Corey A. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 339, 346.) 

“We normally review the juvenile court’s decision to terminate 

dependency jurisdiction and to issue a custody (or ‘exit’) order pursuant to 

section 362.4 for abuse of discretion [citation] and may not disturb the order 
19

unless the court ‘ “ ‘exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an 

arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination [citations].’ ” ’ ” 

(Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285, 300; accord In re 

M.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 886, 902.) “The trial court’s judgment is presumed 

correct. [Citation.] All conflicts are resolved in favor of the judgment and all 

legitimate inferences are indulged in to uphold the juvenile court’s 

determinations.” (In re K.S. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 327, 337.) We will find 

an abuse of discretion by a trial court only when we conclude that under all 

the circumstances, viewed most favorably in support of the decision, no judge 

reasonably could have made that decision. (Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 

Cal.App.5th 86, 104.) 

As Mother emphasized in her opening brief on appeal, “[a]lthough both 

the family court and the juvenile court focus on the best interests of the 

child[,] significant differences exist.” (Jennifer R., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 712.) Because “[t]he issue of the parents’ ability to protect and care for the 

child is the central issue” in a dependency case, “[t]he presumption of 

parental fitness that underlies custody law in the family court just does not 

apply to dependency cases.” (Ibid., italics added.) “Rather, the juvenile 

court, which has been intimately involved in the protection of the child, is 

best situated to make custody determinations based on the best interests of 

the child without any preferences or presumptions.” (Ibid., italics added.) 

“Thus, for example, a finding that neither parent poses any danger to 

the child does not mean that both are equally entitled to half custody, since 

joint physical custody may not be in the child’s bests interests for a variety of 

reasons. . . . By the same token, a finding that the parent from whom custody 

was removed no longer poses a risk of detriment or that the parent whose 

custody has been subject to supervision no longer requires supervision is 
20

relevant to, but not necessarily determinative of, the best interests of the 

child.” (Nicholas H., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 268; accord John W., supra, 

41 Cal.App.4th at p. 965 [“In making ‘exit’ orders, . . . it is the best interests 

of the child, in the context of the peculiar facts of the case before the 

[juvenile] court, which are paramount. The court is not required to apply a 

[family law] per se rule that the child’s time must be split in half as long as 

neither parent poses an active threat.”].)

On the record before us, we see nothing arbitrary, capricious, or 

patently absurd in the juvenile court’s determination that Father should 

provide the children’s primary residence, Mother should parent them on 

alternating weekends Friday to Monday and every Wednesday overnights, 

and both parents should alternate the holidays equally. 

At the time of the November 2020 interim review hearing, the Agency 

reported that both parents had “shown behavior changes consistent with 

mitigating the dangers and safety issues” to the children and both could coparent safely using email communication and third-party custody exchanges. 

The Agency was recommending the court award joint legal custody with 

physical custody to Mother. However, it was Mother’s conduct in disciplining 

N.W. on December 9, 2020 and her subsequent handling of the incident that 

caused the Agency to later change that recommendation.

Although the Agency ultimately closed its investigation as 

“[i]nconclusive” as to whether Mother had committed physical abuse of N.W., 

the Agency reported that it remained “extremely concerned” for the children 

in Mother’s care. Mother had provided different scenarios for the incident,

failed to take responsibility, and, instead, blamed N.W. and called her a liar. 

N.W. reported that it made her “ ‘sad’ ” when Mother “ ‘smacked’ ” her and 

caused her teeth to fall out. The Agency found Mother’s response to N.W.
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could be “very detrimental to the mental health of her children.” 

Additionally, the Agency noted that Mother’s service providers had 

implemented a safety plan for her own mental health. In contrast, the 

Agency reported it had “no concerns for the children’s safety or care” since 

they were placed in Father’s care in late December 2020. For these reasons, 

in January 2021, the Agency recommended to the court that it award 

physical custody to Father. Even when the Agency withdrew its section 388 

petitions to change placement from Mother to Father and was recommending 

the court award joint physical custody to both parents, in March 2021, it still 

reported concerns regarding Mother’s “impulsive reactions” to the children. 

Moreover, the Agency reported Father had “shown his ability to step up as a 

full time parent for the children in addition to providing a safe home for the 

children” and the children appeared to be doing very well with him.

Contrary to Mother’s suggestion, there was no circumstance, 

presumption, or preference that entitled her to equal physical custody of the 

children. The juvenile court had wide discretion to determine the children’s 

best interests, considering “the parents’ ability to protect and care for the 

child[ren] [as] the central issue.” (Jennifer R., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 712, italics added.) And there is ample support that its custody orders 

were within the bounds of reason. Since the children had been living with 

Father for the preceding six months and were doing “very well” in his care, 

the court’s order that Father provide the primary residence reasonably 

promoted stability and continuity for the children. It also promoted the 

children’s mental and emotional health, in light of concerns that Mother’s 

response to N.W. after the December 2020 incident of excessive discipline 

could be “very detrimental to the mental health of her children.” 
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Other than a claim that the juvenile court “arbitrarily adopted the 

family court mediator’s proposal,” which we have rejected as unsupported by 

the record, Mother fails to demonstrate how exactly the court abused its 

discretion. She contends the children were “formally placed” with her at the 

time of the exit orders in support of her claim that “there were inadequate 

facts supporting the proposed custody change” which would have the children 

live primarily with Father and not Mother. (Italics added.) As the Agency 

correctly noted, that is not accurate. The juvenile court formally detained the 

children with Father on January 25, 2021, due to the safety concerns that 

had arisen after Mother had “ ‘popped’ ” N.W. in the mouth and knocked out 

the child’s teeth. The children were not formally placed solely with Mother 

leading up to the time the court issued the exit orders on June 14, 2021; they 

had been in Father’s home for the preceding six months. 

Mother makes one other contention that “[s]he was more active in 

[N.W.’s] family counseling than Father and was seeking additional services 

for [the] family” and “the mere fact the girls lived with [Father] the preceding 

six-months or so is insufficient evidence that their best interests would be 

promoted primarily in his care.” These arguments, however, overlook the 

applicable standard of review. Even when two or more inferences can 

reasonably be deduced from the evidence, the reviewing court has no 

authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court when reviewing 

for an abuse of discretion. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 319; In re 

Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 641.) 

In sum, Mother has failed to demonstrate that the juvenile court’s exit 

orders are arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd, and so we will affirm the 

orders.
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DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed.

DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O'ROURKE, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.