J-S10032-19

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

CHRISTOPHER COTTLE

Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1425 EDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order April 26, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0000962-2008

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and COLINS*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 22, 2019

Appellant, Christopher Cottle, appeals from the order entered in the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his first petition 

brought pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), at 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 9541-9546. We affirm. 

In its opinion, the PCRA court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant 

facts and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no need to 

restate them. Procedurally, we add initial PCRA counsel filed a motion to 

withdraw as counsel on April 26, 2018, when the court stated on record it 

denied Appellant PCRA relief. That same day, the PCRA court permitted 

counsel to withdraw and appointed new PCRA counsel. Appellant filed a 

timely notice of appeal on May 16, 2018. The PCRA court ordered Appellant 

on May 21, 2018, to file a concise statement of errors complained of on 
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appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); Appellant complied on July 5, 2018, following 

an extension. 

Appellant raises two issues for our review:

WHETHER THE [PCRA] COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING 

APPELLANT’S PETITION UNDER THE [PCRA] WITHOUT AN 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING[?]

WHETHER THE [PCRA] COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING 

APPELLANT’S AMENDED PETITION UNDER THE [PCRA][?]

(Appellant’s Brief at 4).

Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to 

examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s 

determination and whether its decision is free of legal error. 

Commonwealth v. Conway, 14 A.3d 101, 109 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal 

denied, 612 Pa. 687, 29 A.3d 795 (2011). This Court grants great deference 

to the findings of the PCRA court if the record contains any support for those 

findings. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513, 515 (Pa.Super. 2007), 

appeal denied, 593 Pa. 754, 932 A.2d 74 (2007). We give no such 

deference, however, to the court’s legal conclusions. Commonwealth v. 

Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa.Super. 2012). Further, a petitioner is not 

entitled to a PCRA hearing as a matter of right; the PCRA court can decline 

to hold a hearing if there is no genuine issue concerning any material fact, 

the petitioner is not entitled to PCRA relief, and no purpose would be served 

by any further proceedings. Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335, 338 

(Pa.Super. 2012); Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. 
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The law presumes counsel has rendered effective assistance. 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 597 Pa. 109, 950 A.2d 294 (2008). Under 

the traditional analysis, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, a petitioner bears the burden to prove his claims by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 

876 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 596 Pa. 707, 940 A.2d 365 (2007). 

The petitioner must demonstrate: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable 

merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for the asserted action 

or inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is a 

reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been 

different. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 724 

A.2d 326 (1999). “A reasonable probability is a probability that is sufficient 

to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.” 

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 624 Pa. 4, 34, 84 A.3d 294, 312 (2014) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Ali, 608 Pa. 71, 86-87, 10 A.3d 282, 291 

(2010)). “Where it is clear that a petitioner has failed to meet any of the 

three, distinct prongs of the...test, the claim may be disposed of on that 

basis alone, without a determination of whether the other two prongs have 

been met.” Commonwealth v. Steele, 599 Pa. 341, 360, 961 A.2d 786, 

797 (2008). 

“The threshold inquiry in ineffectiveness claims is whether the 

issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis 
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for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit....” Commonwealth 

v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 524, 645 A.2d 189, 194 (1994). “Counsel cannot 

be found ineffective for failing to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.” 

Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 852 A.2d 323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004). 

Once this threshold is met we apply the ‘reasonable basis’ 

test to determine whether counsel’s chosen course was 

designed to effectuate his client’s interests. If we conclude 

that the particular course chosen by counsel had some 

reasonable basis, our inquiry ceases and counsel’s 

assistance is deemed effective.

Pierce, supra at 524, 645 A.2d at 194-95 (internal citations omitted).

Prejudice is established when [a defendant] demonstrates

that counsel’s chosen course of action had an adverse

effect on the outcome of the proceedings. The defendant

must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome. In [Kimball, supra], we held 

that a “criminal defendant alleging prejudice must show 

that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the 

defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”

Commonwealth v. Chambers, 570 Pa. 3, 21-22, 807 A.2d 872, 883 

(2002) (some internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Glenn B. 

Bronson, we conclude Appellant’s issues merit no relief. The PCRA court 

opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions 

presented. (See PCRA Court Opinion, filed August 6, 2018, at 6-9) (finding:

trial counsel objected when Commonwealth attempted to introduce 
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Brandon’s police statement before Commonwealth asked Brandon about 

incident, and court sustained objection; later, when Brandon testified he 

knew nothing about incident and did not recall making statement to police, 

Commonwealth introduced Brandon’s statement to police as prior 

inconsistent statement; Commonwealth offered testimony from police 

officers to prove Brandon had made statement, reviewed statement, made 

no corrections to statement, and acknowledged statement accurately 

memorialized what he had told police; Rules of Evidence did not require 

Commonwealth to refresh Brandon’s recollection with prior statement before 

introducing statement; further, Commonwealth’s offer of statement during 

direct examination of Brandon, before evidence from detectives to prove 

Brandon had made statement, gave Brandon opportunity to explain or deny 

making statement; trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise second 

objection to admission of Brandon’s prior statement to police; based on 

foregoing, PCRA evidentiary hearing would have served no purpose). The 

record supports the PCRA court’s rationale. Accordingly, we affirm on the 

basis of the PCRA court opinion. 

Order affirmed. 
J-S10032-19

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/22/19
Circulated 03/04/2019 04:02 PM

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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION 

CP-51-CR-0000962-2008 

/-- 

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CP-51-<;R.0000002·2008 Comm. v. Collie. Ctvislcphef 

Opinion 

CHRISTOPHER COTTLE 

BRONSON, J. 

OPINION l II IIIIIJll!WJIIIIII 

August 6, 2018 

On March 8, 2012, following a jury trial before this Court, defendant Christopher Cottle 

was convicted of one count of murder of the first degree (18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a)), one count of 

conspiracy to _commit arson (18 Pa.C.S. §§ 903, 3301 (a)(l)(i)), one count of conspiracy to 

commit assault (18 Pa.C.S. §§ 903, 2702(a)(l)), and one count ofrecklessly endangering another 

person (18 Pa.C.S. § 2705).

1 The Court immediately imposed the mandatory sentence of life in 

prison for the murder charge (18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(a)(l )). No further penalty was imposed on the 

remaining charges. Defendant was represented at trial, sentencing, and on direct appeal by Gary 

S. Server, Esquire. 

On July 3, 2013, the Superior Court affirmed defendant's judgment of sentence. The 

Supreme Court denied allocatur on November 6, 2013. Defendant then filed a prose petition 

under the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") on May 14, 2014. Jennifer Bretschneider, 

Esquire was appointed to represent defendant on January 19, 2016. On April 28, 2017, Ms. 

Bretschneider filed an Amended PCRA Petition ("Amended Petition"). On November 22, 2017, 

after reviewing the Amended Petition, the Commonwealth's Motion to Dismiss, defendant's 

1 Defendant was acquitted of arson (18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a)(l)(i), conspiracy to commit murder (18 Pa.C.S. §§ 903, 

2502(a)), and conspiracy to commit robbery ( 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 903, 370 l(a)(l)(iii)). 
Response to the Commonwealth's Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Amended PCRA Petition, and 

. . 

the Commonwealth's Sur-reply to Defendant's Response to the Motion to Dismiss, this Court 

ruled that the claims set forth in defendant's Amended Petition were without merit. That day, 

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, the Court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without 

a hearing ("907 Notice'} Defendant filed a prose response to the 907 Notice on December 15, 

2017. On April 26, 2018, the Court entered an order dismissing defendant's PCRA Petition. In 

addition, the Court granted Ms. Bretschneider's motion to withdraw, and appointed Benjamin 

Cooper, Esquire to represent defendant on appeal. 

Defendant has now appealed the Court's dismissal of his PCRA Petition, alleging that 

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admissibility of a pretrial statement to 

police given by Commonwealth witness Brandon Cottle. Defendant also claims that the PCRA 

court erred by dismissing his claim without an evidentiary hearing. Appellant's Concise 

Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal in Accordance with Pa.R.A.P. § l 925(b) 

CStatement of Errors") at ,i11�2.

2 For the reasons set forth below, defendant's claim is without 

merit and the PCRA Court's order dismissing his PCRA Petition should be affirmed. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

The factual background of this matter is set forth in the Court's Rule 1925(a) opinion 

filed in defendant's direct appeal as follows: 

At trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Lasheena Cottle, Karen 

Childrey, Roslyn Spearman, Brandon Cottle, Ryan Gallagher, Dr. Sam Gulino, 

Philadelphia Police Officers Terrence Lewis and Andre Daniels, Philadelphia 

Police Detectives Crystal Williams, John McDermott, Thorsten Lucke, Joseph 

Bannberski, and Howard Peterman, Philadelphia Police Sergeant Stephen Crosby, 

and Philadelphia Fire Department Lieutenant Bordes Ramseur. Defendant 

presented the testimony of Cheryl Moses. Viewed in the light most favorable to 

2 The additional paragraphs in defendant's Statement of Errors contain argument in support of defendant's claims. 

Defendant's claims have been reordered for ease of disposition. 

2 
the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, their testimony established the 

following. 

On or about January l l , 2007, Brandon Cottle, the brother of the defendant, heard 

the defendant talking to Rick Hughes about killing a neighbor, Joseph Briggman. 

N.T. 3/6/2012 at 172-173.

3 Two days after this conversation, on January 13, 

2007, defendant told Brandon Cottle to "{ c Jome on over with us and be the 

lookout." N.T. 3/6/2012 at 172; 3/7/2012 at 39. Brandon Cottle, defendant, and 

Rick Hughes entered the home of Mr. Briggman, located at 2421 North Patton 

Street. N.T. 3/6/2012 at 169-172. After the three men entered the home, 

defendant told Brandon Cottle to check upstairs to see if anyone other than Mr. 

Briggman was in the home. N.T. 3/6/2012 at 172. Brandon Cottle went upstairs, 

and when he came back down, defendant had Mr. Briggman in a chokehold. N.T. 

3/6/2012 at 172. Brandon Cottle went down to check the basement, and when he 

returned to the main floor of the house, defendant was still holding Mr. Briggman 

as Rick Hughes stabbed him repeatedly. N.T. 3/6/2012 at 172. At one point, Mr. 

Briggman broke free from defendant's grasp and stabbed him in the leg. N.T. 

3/6/2012 at 172-173; 3/7/2012 at 41-42. 

At the same time, Lasheena Cottle was getting ready for work in the home that 

she shared with her two brothers, defendant and Brandon Cottle, at 2428 North 

Patton Street. N.T. 3/5/2012 at 229-231. Rick Hughes, the father of her child, 

had spent the night at the home. N.T. 3/5/2012 at 230. As she prepared for work 

in her upstairs bathroom, she heard an explosion. N. T. 3/5/2012 at 231. She 

looked across the street and saw that the home belonging to her neighbor, Mr. 

Briggman, was on fire. N.T. 3/5/2012 at 231. Although Rick Hughes had spent 

the night in her home, and she had heard one of her brothers in the house that 

morning, Lasheena Cottle was alone in the house at the time that the fire broke 

out across the street. N.T. 3/5/2012 at 232-233. 

At the time of the explosion, Roslyn Spearman was buying drugs on the corner of 

Patton Street and York Street, approximately six to eight houses from Mr. 

Briggman I

s residence, when she heard an explosion and saw defendant and 

Brandon Cottle running out of Mr. Briggman's residence. N.T. 3/6/2012 at 81- 

86. One block away from Ms. Spearman, another woman, Karen Childrey, was 

using drugs with her cousin on some outdoor steps on the 2500 block of Patton 

Street. N.T. 3/6/2012 at 59-60. Ms. Childrey heard a loud "boom," but did not 

know the source of the explosion. N.T. 3/6/2012 at 61-62. 

When the Philadelphia Fire Department arrived at the scene to investigate the 

explosion that had destroyed Mr. Briggman's house, they determined the cause of 

the fire and resulting explosion to be a person or persons lighting gasoline on fire 

within the house. N.T. 3/6/2012 at 39-42. While investigating the source of the 

fire, members of the Fire Department discovered the body of Mr. Briggman inside 

3 Rick Hughes's case was severed from defendant's due to the unavailability of his counsel. Brandon Cottle agreed 

to cooperate and pied guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit murder (J 8 Pa.C.S. §§ 903, 2502). 

3 
the house. N.T. 3/6/2012 at 18-19. Mr. Briggman was pronounced dead at the 

scene. N.T. 3/6/2012 at 113. Although the cause of his death was later 

determined to be multiple stab wounds, he was burned over 70 percent of his 

body from the fire. N. T. 3/6/2012 at 115, 122. Mr. Briggman had been stabbed 

five times in the head and neck, five times in the chest, once in the shoulder, and 

once in the back. N.T. 3/6/2012 at 115. 

Police arrived shortly after the explosion and approached Ms. Childrey and her 

cousin, who told police they did not know where the explosion came from, and 

that all they heard was a loud noise. N.T. 3/6/2012 at 62-63. After the police left, 

defendant approached Ms. Childrey and told her "don't talk to the cop." N.T. 

3/6/2012 at 64-65. Later in the day, defendant returned and told Ms. Childrey 

again not to talk to the police, this time threatening her with a gun. N.T. 3/6/2012 

at 64-65. 

On the night of January 13, 2007, Lasheena Cottle saw Rick Hughes for the first 

time since the fire that morning. N.T. 3/5/2012 at 233-234. He had bums and 

bruises on both his face and his hands. N.T. 3/5/2012 at 234. The next day, 

Lasheena Cottle noticed defendant limping and he told her he had been stabbed. 

N.T. 3/5/2012 at 235-236, 239. 

On June 7, 2007, the Fugitive Unit of the Philadelphia Police Department arrested 

defendant and Brandon Cottle for the murder of Mr. Briggman. N.T. 3/6/2012 at 

161; 3/7/2012 at 28. Brandon Cottle confessed to being the "lookout" for his 

brother and Rick Hughes as they killed defendant, and told the police other details 

of the crime. N.T. 3/6/2012 at 169-170; 3/7/2012 at 41-44. Defendant also gave 

a statement to police, in which he admitting selling crack cocaine to Mr. 

Briggman for years and that Mr. Briggman, in the past, had owed him money. 

N.T. 3/7/2012 at 9L He claimed that, on the day of the incident, he had gone over 

to Mr. Briggman's house to sell him drugs, and was there attacked by Mr. 

Briggman and some unknown man and was stabbed by Mr. Briggman in the leg. 

He claimed to have fled from the house after pushing Mr. Briggman onto a glass 

coffee table, but denied being present when anyone stabbed Mr. Briggman. N.T. 

3/7i2012 at 85-92. Police searched defendant and found a healed stab wound on 

his leg. N.T. 3/7/2012 at 45-48. 

I 

Trial Court Opinion, filed October 4, 2012, at pp. 2-5. 

II. DISCUSSION 

An appellate court's review of a PCRA court's grant or denial of relief "is limited to 

determining whether the court's findings are supported by the record and the court's order is 

otherwise free oflegal error." Commonwealth v. Yager, 685 A.2d 1000, 1003 (Pa. Super. 1996) 

4 
(citing Commonwealth v. Legg, 669 A.2d 389, 391 (Pa. Super. 1995)). The reviewing court "will 

not disturb findings that are supported by the record." Id. 

Here, defendant's only substantive claim pertains to the alleged ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel. Under Pennsylvania law, counsel is presumed effective and the burden to prove 

otherwise lies with the petitioner. Commonwealth v. Basemore, 144 A.2d 717, 728 (Pa. 2000), 

n.10 ( citing Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 719 A.2d 242, 250 (Pa. 1998)). To obtain collateral 

relief based on the ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that counsel's 

representation fell below accepted standards of advocacy and that as a result thereof, the 

petitioner was prejudiced. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). In 

Pennsylvania, the Strickland standard is interpreted as requiring proof that: (1) the claim 

underlying the ineffectiveness claim had arguable merit; (2) counsel's actions lacked any 

reasonable basis; and (3) the ineffectiveness of counsel caused the petitioner prejudice. 

Commonwealth v. Miller, 987 A.2d 638, 648 (Pa. 2009); Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 

973, 974� 75 (Pa. 1987). To satisfy the third prong of the test, the petitioner must prove that, but 

for counsel's error, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would 

have been different. Commonwealth v. Sneed, 899 A.2d 1067, 1084 (Pa. 2006) (citing 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). If the PCRA court determines that any one of the three prongs 

cannot be met, then the court need not hold an evidentiary hearing as such a hearing would serve 

no purpose. Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa. Super. 2008), app. denied, 956 

A.2d 433 (Pa. 2008). 

5 
A. Failure to Object to the Introduction, Admission, and Reading of Brandon Cottle 's 

Pre-trial Statement to Police 

Defendant first claims that trial counsel failed to "object to the introduction, admission 

and reading of Commonwealth witness Brandon Cottle's pretrial statement to police ... " 

Statement of Errors at ,r 2. This claim is without merit. 

At trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony o_f Brandon Cottle, defendant's 

younger brother.4 Prior to defendant's trial, Brandon was interviewed by detectives and 

confessed to acting as a lookout while defendant and his coconspirator, Rick Hughes, stabbed the 

victim, Joseph Briggman, to death. N.T. 3/6/12 at 169-70. In his statement to the detectives, 

Brandon gave detailed information regarding the murder. In particular, he told the detectives that 

a few days prior to the murder, he had heard defendant and Hughes talking about killing 

Briggman. He also stated that on the day of the murder, defendant instructed him to enter 

Briggman's home with defendant and Hughes, and to check the home to see if anyone else was 

there. N.T. 3/6/12 at 172. According to the statement, once Brandon checked the basement of 

the home, he came upstairs to find defendant holding Briggman down, while Hughes was 

repeatedly stabbing him. Id. However, at trial, Brandon denied knowing anything about the 

incident and claimed not to remember giving the portions of his statement to detectives in which 

he inculpated defendant and Hughes. N.T. 3/6/12 at 162-81. As a result, the Commonwealth 

presented the signed police statement of Brandon Cottle, here at issue. 

Rule 803.1 ( 1) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence sets forth an exception to the 

hearsay rule for certain prior inconsistent statements of witnesses who testify at trial and are 

subject to cross-examination. Included under this exception to the hearsay rule are statements 

that have been reduced to a writing that was signed and adopted by the witness. Pa.RE. 

4 Because Brandon Cottle and his brother, defendant Christopher Cottle, both have the same surname, Brandon 

Cottle is referred to hereafter as "Brandon." 

6 
803.1(1)(8). Such statements are admissible as substantive evidence even when the witness 

repudiates the prior statement during his testimony at trial. As long as the Commonwealth 

proves that the statement was signed by the witness and adopted at some time prior to the trial, it 

is covered by this hearsay exception. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 1139, 1169-71 (Pa. 

2012). Such prior inconsistent statements alone may be sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. Id. 

Here, Brandon, at trial, claimed to know nothing about the incident, and to not recall 

giving his statement to detectives. Therefore, his statement to police containing detailed 

information about the killing was plainly inconsistent with his trial testimony. Moreover, the 

Commonwealth offered the testimony of Detective John McDermott, who took the statement 

along with Detective David Baker, to prove that Brandon made the statement. N.T. 3/7/12 at 27- 

44. In addition, Detective Chrystal Williams testified that she read back the entire statement to 

Brandon, and that he made no corrections, signed each page of the statement, and acknowledged 

that the statement accurately memorialized what he had told the detectives. N.T. 3/7/12 at 19-22, 

25. Therefore, the statement was properly admitted as substantive evidence under Rule 

803.l(l)(B). 

Defendant argues that defense counsel failed to object to the prosecutor reading 

Brandon's statement to the jury without a proper foundation. In particular, he contends that the 

statement was read, without counsel objecting, before Brandon gave any testimony inconsistent 

with the statement, and before any writing was used to attempt to refresh his recollection. This 

argument is meritless. 

It is true that the prosecutor attempted to introduce the statement before asking Brandon 

anything about the events at issue in the case. Because Brandon had yet to give testimony 

inconsistent with the statement, its introduction at that time would have been improper. 

7 
However, trial counsel did object to the introduction of the statement at that time, and the Court 

sustained the objection. N.T. 3/6/12 at 161-65. Thereafter, Brandon denied knowing what 

happened to the decedent, Joseph Briggman, during the month of the murder, even though 

Brandon had pleaded guilty to conspiring to kill Briggman. N.T. 3/6/12 at 165-67. He claimed 

that he was high when he pied guilty and when he gave the statement to detectives. Id at 166- 

67. Once Brandon denied any knowledge of the killing, his detailed accounting of the events in 

his statement was inconsistent with his trial testimony and was properly admitted. See 

Commonwealth v. Carmody, 799 A.2d 143, 148-49 (Pa. Super. 2002) (where witness claimed 

she had blacked out from alcohol and could not recall anything that had happened, her prior 

statement to police was admissible). 

It is also true that the prosecutor made no attempt to refresh Brandon's recollection with 

his prior statement. However, there is no requirement, in the Rules of Evidence or elsewhere, 

that such an attempt be made before offering a prior inconsistent statement. 

Finally, it is true that the prosecutor read the statement during the direct examination of 

Brandon, prior to offering the evidence from the detectives to prove that the statement had been 

made and adopted by Brandon.· However, extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement is 

generally not admissible, even just for impeachment purposes, unless the statement is first 

disclosed to the witness, and the witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny the making of 

the statement. Pa.R.E. 613(b). 

Accordingly, Brandon's statement to police was properly admitted as substantive 

evidence under Rule 803. l(l)(B). Although the Commonwealth attempted to question Brandon 

about the statement before a proper foundation had been laid, defense counsel objected and a 

proper foundation was presented. Thereafter, any objection by counsel to the statement would 

8 
• ' • t 

Commonwealth v. Christopher Cottle 

Type of Order: 1925(a) Opinion 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

CP-5 l-CR-0000962-2008 

I hereby certify that I am this day serving the foregoing Court Order upon the person(s), and in 

the manner indicated below, which service satisfies the requirements of Pa.R.Crim.P.114: 

Defense Counsel/Party: 

Benjamin Cooper, Esquire 

1500 Walnut St 

22nd Floor 

Philadelphia, PA 19102 

Type of Service: 

District Attorney: 

Type of Service 

( ) Personal (X) First Class Mail O Other, please specify: 

Lawrence Goode, Esquire 

Interim Supervisor, Appeals Unit 

Office of the District Attorney 

Three South Penn Square 

Philadelphia, PA 19107-3499 

( ) Personal () First Class Mail (X) Other, please specify: Interoffice Mail 

Additional Counsel/Party: 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esquire 

Prothonotary 

Office of the Prothonotary - Superior Court 

530 Walnut Street, Suite 315 

Philadelphia, PA 19106 

Type of Service: ( ) Personal (X) First Class Mail ( ) Other, please specify: 

Dated: August 6, 2018