PSM-175 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 10-4398

___________

MICHAEL CURTIS REYNOLDS,

Appellant

v.

DAVID EBBERT, Warden

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:10-cv-02164)

District Judge: Honorable Richard P. Conaboy

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

July 15, 2011

Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: July 27, 2011 )

___________

OPINION

___________

PER CURIAM

Michael Curtis Reynolds, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the 

District Court’s order denying his habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For 

the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
2

I.

In 2007, Reynolds was convicted of multiple terrorism-related offenses and 

sentenced by the District Court to 360 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised 

release. The court also imposed a special assessment of $500. We affirmed that

judgment on direct appeal. See United States v. Reynolds, 374 F. App’x 356, 358 (3d 

Cir. 2010).

In October 2010, Reynolds filed a pro se habeas petition in the District Court 

pursuant to § 2241. The petition did not challenge the legality of Reynolds’s conviction 

or sentence. Rather, it alleged only that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) had violated his 

rights by issuing a “restitution payment schedule.” (See Habeas Pet. 1.) In support of 

this claim, Reynolds maintained that “only a District Court may set a payment schedule 

for any fine, fee, or restitution.” (Id. at 3.) On October 28, 2010, the District Court, 

acting sua sponte, denied the petition as meritless. In doing so, the court found that 

Reynolds had not been ordered to pay restitution or a fine, and concluded that the BOP 

could indeed establish a payment schedule for collecting the $500 special assessment. 

This appeal followed.

II. 

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1 In reviewing 

the denial of a § 2241 petition, “[w]e exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 

 

1 Because we agree with the District Court that Reynolds’s habeas petition was 

properly brought under § 2241, he does not need to obtain a certificate of 

appealability to proceed with this appeal. See United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 

256, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
3

legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard to its findings of fact.” See

O’Donald v. Johns, 402 F.3d 172, 173 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam). Having 

considered Reynolds’s arguments, and for substantially the reasons set forth in the 

District Court’s opinion, we agree with the Court’s decision to deny his habeas petition

on the merits. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

III.

We write further here to address the numerous filings that Reynolds has submitted 

to this Court since initiating this appeal. In these filings, he claims that prison officials at 

the Federal Correctional Institution at Allenwood in Pennsylvania — his current place of 

confinement — have retaliated against him, interfered with his access to the courts, and 

otherwise mistreated him. He seeks, inter alia, a temporary restraining order prohibiting 

this conduct.

Reynolds’s requests for relief are hereby denied without prejudice, as his claims 

are not properly before this Court. To the extent he wishes to pursue these claims, he 

should file a complaint in the District Court. We note, however, that Reynolds, a 

frequent litigator in the federal courts, has “three strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

Accordingly, to file a complaint in the District Court, he must either pay the filing fee in 

full or demonstrate that he is in “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g). We express no opinion on his ability to meet the imminent danger 

standard or prevail on the merits of his claims.