MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2023	ME 41

Docket: Cum-22-36

Argued: December	6,	2022

Decided: July	27,	2023

Panel: STANFILL,	C.J.,	and MEAD,	JABAR,	HORTON,	CONNORS,	and	LAWRENCE,	JJ.

STATE	OF	MAINE

v.

ABDIRAHMON	A.	ABDULLAHI	a.k.a.	ABDIRAHMON	A.	ADBULLAHI

HORTON,	J.

[¶1]	 Abdirahmon	A.	Abdullahi1 appeals	from	a	judgment	of	conviction	of	

unlawful	trafficking	in	scheduled	drugs	(Class	B),	17-A M.R.S. § 1103(1-A)(A)	

(2023),	 and	 falsifying	 physical	 evidence	 (Class	 D),	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 455(1)(A)	

(2023),	entered	by	the	trial	court	(Cumberland	County,	Warren,	J.)	after	a	jury	

trial.2	 	 Abdullahi	 argues	 that	 the	 court	 erred	 in	 (1) denying	 his	 motion	 to	

suppress	 evidence	 seized	 as the	 result	 of	 what	 Abdullahi	 contends	 was	 an	

1		Abdullahi’s	surname	was	spelled	“Adbullahi”	on	his	driver’s	license,	and	the	misspelling	caused	

confusion	 during the	 trial	 court proceedings.	 	“Adbullahi”	 appears	in	 our	 caption	 as	 an	 alternate	

spelling	because	it	is how	Abdullahi’s	surname	appears in	 the	 trial	court’s	docket	record.	 At	oral	

argument,	it	was	confirmed	that	“Abdullahi”	is	the	correct	spelling.

2		The	parties	agreed	that	a forfeiture	count	would	be	tried	to	the	court.		After	a	hearing,	the	court	

entered	 a	 forfeiture	 order	 regarding	 cash	 found	 in	 Abdullahi’s	 possession after	 his	 arrest.		

See 15 M.R.S.	§	5826	(2023).		Abdullahi’s	appeal focuses	on	the	trafficking	conviction	and	does	not	

separately contest	either	 the	 falsification	 conviction	 or the	 forfeiture	 order,	 although	both	would	

likely	have	to	be	set	aside	if	we	were	to	agree	that	his	motion	to	suppress	should	have	been	granted.
2

unlawful	 arrest, (2)	 allowing	 law	 enforcement	 officers	 to	 testify	 as	 lay

witnesses	at	trial	on	matters	that	required	expert	testimony, (3)	including	in	its	

jury	 instructions	 an	 instruction	 on	 a	 permissible	 inference	 contained	 in	 the	

applicable	drug	trafficking	statute, and	(4)	denying	his	motions	for	a	judgment	

of	acquittal	and	a	new	trial.		We	affirm	the	judgment.

I.		BACKGROUND

[¶2]		“Viewing	the	evidence	admitted	at	trial	in	the	light	most	favorable	

to	the	State,	the	jury	could	rationally	have	found	the	following	facts	beyond	a	

reasonable	 doubt.”	 	 State	 v.	 Athayde,	 2022	 ME	 41,	 ¶	 2,	 277	 A.3d	 387.	 	 On	

June 24, 2019,	 a	 Maine	 State	 Police	 corporal stopped	 a	 vehicle	 operated	 by	

Abdullahi	for	speeding	on	the	Maine Turnpike.		As	detailed	below,	in	the	course	

of	 the	 traffic	 stop,	 the	 corporal discovered	 that	 Abdullahi	 had	 been	 in	

possession	 of a	 bag	 containing	 individual	 packages	 of	 what	 appeared	 to	 be	

cocaine	base.		After	his	arrest,	Abdullahi	was	found	to	be	in	possession	of	$1,091	

in	cash.

[¶3]		On	June	26,	2019,	the	State	charged	Abdullahi	by	criminal	complaint	

with	 unlawful	 trafficking	 in	 scheduled	 drugs	 (Class	 B),	 17-A	 M.R.S.	

§ 1103(1-A)(A),	falsifying	physical	evidence	(Class	D),	17-A	M.R.S.	§ 455(1)(A),	

and	criminal	 forfeiture,	15	M.R.S.	§	5826	(2023).		The	since-amended	statute	
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under	which	Abdullahi	was	charged	with	trafficking	provided that	proof	that	a	

person	 intentionally	 or	 knowingly	 possessed	 at	 least	 four	 grams	 of	 cocaine	

base,	a	Schedule	W	drug,	“gives	rise	to	a	permissible	inference”	that	the	person	

was	trafficking	in	cocaine	base.		17-A	M.R.S.	§ 1103(1-A)(A),	(3)(B)	(2018).3		On	

October	11,	2019,	a	grand	jury	indicted	Abdullahi for	the	same	two	offenses	and	

the	forfeiture charged	in	the	complaint.		The	record	does	not	indicate	that	an	

arraignment	was	held	on	the	indictment.

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A. Motion	to	Suppress

[¶4]		Abdullahi filed	a	motion	 to	suppress	the	evidence	 that	he	was	in	

possession	 of	 cocaine	 base	at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 traffic	 stop,	and	 the	 trial	 court	

(French,	J.)	held	an	evidentiary	hearing	on	 the	motion.		Only	the Maine	State	

Police	corporal testified	at	the	suppression	hearing.		The	court	entered	an	order	

in	which	it	found	the	following	facts,	all	of	which	are	supported	by	competent	

3	 	 Title	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 1103	 has	 since	 been	 amended.	 	 See P.L.	 2021,	 ch.	 396,	 §	 3	 (effective	

Oct. 18, 2021)	(codified	at	17-A	M.R.S.	§	1103(3)(B)	(2023)).

4		Abdullahi	has	not	raised	the	lack	of	arraignment	as	an	issue	either	in	the	trial	court	or	on	appeal,	

nor,	on	this	record,	would	it	have	availed	him	to	do	so.		As	long	as	an	accused	has	notice	of	the	charges	

and	an	opportunity	to	prepare	a	defense,	a	conviction	need	not	be	reversed	for	lack	of	arraignment.		

See	 Garland	 v.	 Washington,	 232	 U.S.	 642,	 646-47	 (1914) (overruling	 a	 requirement	 of	 technical	

enforcement	 of	 formal	 rights	 in	 criminal	 procedure);	 State	 v.	 Kovtuschenko,	 576	 A.2d	 206,	 207	

(Me. 1990) (“Any	failure	to	comply	with	the	arraignment	procedure	.	.	.	is	not	jurisdictional	unless	

the	defendant	has	been	prejudiced,	and	will	not	result	in	reversal	if	the	issue	is	not	raised	prior	to	

trial.”	(citation and	quotation	marks	omitted)).
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evidence	in	the	record.		See Athayde,	2022	ME	41,	¶	7,	277	A.3d	387;	State	v.	

Rosario,	2022	ME	46,	¶	8,	280	A.3d	199.

[¶5]		On June	24,	2019,	the	corporal stopped	a	vehicle	being	operated	by	

Abdullahi	for	traveling	on	the	Turnpike	at	eighty-five	miles	per	hour—a	rate	of	

speed	in	excess	of	the	posted	speed	limit.		Because	Abdullahi	could	not produce

a	driver’s	license,	a	vehicle	registration, or	proof	of	insurance (although	he	later

showed	the	 corporal a	 photo	 of	 his	 license	 on	 his	 cell	 phone),	 the	 corporal

suspected	that	the vehicle	might not	belong	to	Abdullahi.		After	obtaining	the	

vehicle	 registration information through	a	 dispatcher,	the	 corporal spoke	 by	

telephone	with the	owner	of	the	vehicle,	who	told	him	that	she	did	not	know	

who	Abdullahi	was and	had	not	given	him	permission	to	use	the	vehicle.		The	

corporal testified	that	he decided	to	call	a	tow	truck	to	take	the	car.		He	placed	

Abdullahi	in	handcuffs for	safety	reasons because	Abdullahi	was	acting	nervous	

and	fidgety	and	because	the	corporal	also needed	to pay	attention	to cleaning	

out	his	cruiser	so	he	could	give	Abdullahi	a	ride	off	the	Turnpike. Toward	the	

end	of	the	stop,	the	corporal	determined	that	Abdullahi	had	been	in	possession	

of	what	appeared	to	be	an	illegal	drug	and	placed	him	under	arrest.

[¶6]	 	 The	 court	 denied	 Abdullahi’s	 motion	 to	 suppress.	 	 The	 court	

determined	 that	 Abdullahi’s	 detention	 during	 the	 traffic	 stop	 was	 lawful	
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because,	 based	 on	 the	 information the	 corporal obtained from	 the	 vehicle	

owner,	he	had	probable	cause	to	arrest	Abdullahi	when	he	placed	Abdullahi	in	

handcuffs.		The	court	also	determined	that	the	drug	evidence would	not	have	

been	subject	to	suppression	even	if	the	arrest	was	unlawful	because	Abdullahi	

had	not	demonstrated	a	“nexus	between	the	improper	police	conduct	and	the	

evidence	seized.”

B. Trial	and	Motions for	Judgment	of	Acquittal	and	New	Trial

[¶7]		The	court	(Warren,	J.)	held	a	three-day	jury	trial	on	the	charges	of	

drug	trafficking	and	falsifying	evidence	on	July	22,	23,	and	26,	2021.

[¶8]	 	 The	 evidence that	 was admitted	 included	 a	 police	 cruiser	 video	

recording	of	the traffic	stop.		The	video	showed	that,	as	Abdullahi	was	exiting	

the	 vehicle	 he	 had	 been	 driving	 and	 before	 he	was	 handcuffed,	 he	 threw	 an

object	under	the	vehicle.		The	same	video	later	showed	 that	Abdullahi	began	

sliding	toward	the	object	after	he	was	handcuffed	and	seated	on	the	shoulder	

of	the	road.		However,	the	video	showed	the	tow	truck	driver, who	had	been	

called	 to	 the	 scene, noticing the	 object and picking	 it	 up before	 Abdullahi	

reached it.

[¶9]	 	The	 court	 heard	 testimony	 from	 three	 law	 enforcement	 officers,	

including	the	corporal, and	a	chemist at	the	Maine	Health	and	Environmental	
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Testing	Laboratory. The	 corporal	 testified	 that	 the	 tow	 truck	 driver	 handed	

him	 the	 object	 that	 Abdullahi	 had	 thrown	 under	 the	 car,	 that	 he	 seized	 it	

because	it	appeared	to	be	a	plastic	bag	containing illegal	drugs,	and	that	he	then	

placed	Abdullahi	under	arrest.		At	the	State Police	barracks, where	the	corporal

transported	 Abdullahi, the	 corporal requested	 assistance	 in	 identifying and	

handling the	contents	of	the	bag from	two	State	Police sergeants	who	had	more	

experience	than	the	corporal in	drug	investigations.	 The	three	officers	testified	

at	trial	regarding	the	appearance	and	weight	of	the	drugs	and	their	experience	

in	handling	drug	trafficking	investigations.5		The	three	officers	determined	that	

the	object	the	corporal	had	seized	was	a	plastic	bag	weighing	twenty-six	grams	

and	containing	 forty-five	smaller	baggies,	each	of	which	contained	what	they	

testified	appeared	to	be	cocaine	base.

[¶10]		On	the	second	day	of	trial,	the	State	sought	to	present	the chemist

to	testify	as	an	expert	witness on	drug	testing, to	support	its	contention	that	the	

forty-five	baggies	contained	cocaine	base	in	an	amount	sufficient	to	generate	a

permissible	 inference	 that	 Abdullahi	 was trafficking in	 cocaine base.		

17-A M.R.S.	§	1103(3).		Abdullahi	objected	to	the	chemist’s	testimony,	arguing	

5		Abdullahi	made	a	blanket	objection	to	the	testimony	of	one	of	the	sergeants	on	the	ground	that	

the	State	had	not	designated	the	witness	as	an	expert.		The	court	overruled	the	objection,	noting	that	

the	sergeant	could	still	testify	as	a	lay	witness	based	on	his	experience.		See	infra n.11.		Abdullahi	did	

not	raise	a	similar	objection	to	the	testimony	of	the	other	officers.
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that,	because	the	chemist	had	tested	and	weighed	fewer	than	four	grams	of	the	

substance	 contained	 in	 the	 baggies,	 his	 testimony	 could	 not	 be	 admitted	 to	

support	a	 permissible	inference	 of	 trafficking.	 	See 17-A	M.R.S.	 §	 1103(3)(B)

(2018).	 	 After	the	 parties	 conducted a	 voir	 dire examination	 of	 the	 chemist

outside	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 jury, the	 court	 ruled	 that	 the	 chemist	 would	 be	

permitted	to	testify	about	the	tests	he	performed but	would	not	be	permitted	

to	testify	that	the	forty-five	baggies	contained	a	total	of	four	or	more	grams	of	

cocaine	base.		The	chemist	testified before	the	jury that,	pursuant	to	what	he	

said	 was	 an	 accepted	 testing	 protocol, he	 randomly	 selected	 five	 of	 the	

forty-five	 baggies	 for	 testing	 and	 measurement	 and concluded	 that	 all	 five	

contained	cocaine	base having	a total	weight	of	1.89	grams.

[¶11]	 	 After	 the	 State	 and	 defense	 had	 rested,	 Abdullahi	 moved	 for	 a	

judgment	of	acquittal,	and	the	court	denied	the	motion.		See M.R.U.	Crim.	P.	29.		

The	 court	 provided	 proposed	 jury	 instructions	 to	 the	 State	 and	 Abdullahi,	

including	 the	 permissible-inference	 instruction contained	 in	 17-A	 M.R.S.	

§ 1103(3).	 	 Abdullahi	 objected	 on	 the	 ground that	 the	 State’s	 evidence	 was	

insufficient	 to	permit	a	 finding	beyond a	reasonable	doubt that the forty-five

baggies contained	 at	 least	 four	 grams	 of	 cocaine	 base,	 and	 therefore	 the	

permissible	inference	had	not	been	generated	 for	purposes	of including	it	in	
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jury	 instructions.	 	 The	 court	 overruled	 the	 objection.	 After	 the	 State	 and	

Abdullahi	presented	closing	arguments,	the	court	provided	instructions	to	the	

jury,	including	an	instruction	concerning the	permissible	inference.		The	jury	

found	Abdullahi	guilty	of	both	the	trafficking	count	and	the	falsifying	evidence	

count.

[¶12]		After	the	verdict,	Abdullahi	filed	a	renewed	motion	for	a	judgment	

of	 acquittal	 and	 a	 motion	 for	 a	 new	 trial.	 	 The	 court	 held	 a	 hearing	 on	 the	

motions.	 	 Abdullahi	 argued	 that	 the	 court	 erred	 when	 it	 provided	 the	

permissible-inference	instruction	to	the	jury	because	the	chemist’s	testimony	

was	insufficient	to	generate	the	inference.		He	also	argued	that	the	court	erred	

by	permitting	the	law	enforcement	officers	to	testify as	lay	witnesses about	the	

contents	of the	baggies.		The	court	denied	Abdullahi’s	motions.		The	court	then	

entered	 a	 judgment	 on	 the	 verdict	 and	 sentenced	 Abdullahi	 to	 two	 years	 in	

prison,	with	all	but	six	months	suspended,	and	two	years	of	probation.

[¶13]	 	 Abdullahi	 timely	 appealed	 from	 the	 judgment	 of	 conviction.		

See 15 M.R.S.	§	2115	(2023);	M.R.	App.	P.	2B(b)(1).
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II. DISCUSSION

A. The	Denial	of	Abdullahi’s	Motion	to	Suppress

[¶14]	 	Relying mainly on	 the	 Fourth	 Amendment	 to	 the	 United	 States	

Constitution,

6 Abdullahi	contends that his	motion	to	suppress	should	have	been	

granted	because the	bag	that	he	threw	under	the	vehicle	he	had	been driving

would	not	have	been	discovered but	for	what	he	asserts	was	an	illegal	de	facto	

arrest.		We	review	the	motion	court’s	factual	findings	for	clear	error	and	its	legal	

conclusions	de	novo.		State	v.	Fleming,	2020	ME	120,	¶	25,	239	A.3d	648.		We	

conclude	that	the	court	did	not	err	by	denying	the	motion	to	suppress.7

[¶15]		We	have	explained	that	the	police	need	not	have	probable	cause	to	

detain	a	suspect	while	investigating	a	suspected	violation	of	law.		See	State	v.	

Langlois,	 2005	 ME	 3,	 ¶¶ 6-11,	 863	 A.2d	 913 (determining that	 an	 officer’s	

6	 	 Abdullahi’s	 brief	 also	 alludes	 to	 “section	 5”	 of	 the	 Maine	 Constitution	 in	 support	 of	 his	

suppression	argument,	but	it	does	not	develop	any	argument	for	construing	the	Maine	Constitution’s	

protection	against	unreasonable	search	and	seizure	more	broadly	than	the	protection	embodied	in	

the	Fourth	Amendment	to	the	United	States	Constitution.		Accordingly, we	limit	our	analysis	to	the	

latter.		See State v.	Hemminger,	2022	ME	32,	¶	8	n.4,	276	A.3d	33.

7	 	The	 State	has	 not challenged Abdullahi’s	 standing to seek suppression of	 the	bag.	 	 To	 have	

standing	to	challenge	the	legality	of	a	search	or	arrest,	the	defendant’s	own	Fourth	Amendment	rights	

must	have	been	violated.		Rakas	v.	Illinois,	439	U.S.	128,	130-31,	134	(1978).		“[A]n	illegal	search	only	

violates	 the	 rights	 of	 those	 who	 have ‘a	 legitimate	 expectation	 of	 privacy	 in	 the	 invaded	 place.’”		

United States	 v.	 Salvucci,	 448	 U.S.	 83,	91-92	 (1980) (quoting	Rakas,	 439	 U.S.	 at	 143).	 	 To	make	 a	

showing	of	a legitimate	expectation	of	privacy,	a	defendant	“must	show	that	he	had	both	a	subjective	

expectation	 of	 privacy	 and	 that	 society	 accepts	 that	 expectation	 as	 objectively	 reasonable.”		

United States	v.	Vilches-Navarrete,	523	F.3d	1,	13	(1st	Cir.	2008).		Here,	the	bag	was	discovered	on	the	

pavement	where	it	landed	after Abdullahi	threw	it	under	a	vehicle	he	did	not	own.		However,	because

there	was	no	contention	or	finding	that	Abdullahi	had	abandoned	the	bag,	we	do	not	address	whether	

Abdullahi	had	standing	and	consider	the	merits	of	his	claim.
10

ordering	of	 a	 person,	 at	 gunpoint,	 to	lie	 down was	 not	 a	 de	 facto	 arrest	 but	

rather	an	investigatory	detention).		In	the	course	of	an	investigative	stop,	police	

officers	are	also	authorized	“to	take	such	steps	as [are]	reasonably	necessary	to	

protect	their	personal	safety	and	to	maintain	the	status	quo	during	the	course	

of	the	stop.”		United	States	v.	Hensley,	469	U.S.	221,	235	(1985);	see,	e.g.,	State	v.	

Kirby,	2005	ME	92,	¶¶	12-17,	878	A.2d	499.		However,	a traffic	stop or	other	

investigatory	 stop must	 not	 last	 longer	 than	 reasonably	 necessary	 to	

investigate	the	suspected	violation of	law.		Rodriguez	v.	United	States,	575	U.S.	

348,	354-55	(2015);	Florida	v.	Royer,	460	U.S.	491,	500	(1983) (“The	scope	of	

the	 detention	 must	 be	 carefully	 tailored	 to	 its	 underlying	 justification.”);	

4 Wayne R.	 LaFave,	 Search	 & Seizure:	 A	 Treatise	 on	 the	 Fourth	 Amendment,	

§ 9.2(f)	at	451	(6th ed.	2020).		“[I]f	a	person	is	stopped	on	suspicion	that	he	has	

just	engaged	in	criminal	activity,	but	the	suspect	identifies	himself	satisfactorily	

and	 investigation	 establishes	 that	 no	 offense	 occurred,	 there is	 no	 basis	 for	

further	 detention,	 and	 the	 suspect	 must	 be	 released.”	 	 4	 Wayne R.	 LaFave,	

Search	&	Seizure:	A	Treatise	on	the	Fourth	Amendment,	§	9.2(f)	at	443-44.

[¶16]	 	 When	 an	 investigative	 stop	 is	 prolonged	 beyond what	 is	

reasonably	 necessary	 for	 an	 investigation of	 the	 suspected	 violation,	 then,	

regardless	of	the	officer’s	intent	or	purpose, the	stop	may	have	evolved	into	a	
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de	 facto	arrest	 that	must	be	supported	by	probable	cause.		State	v.	Donatelli,	

2010	ME	43,	¶¶ 11-18,	995	A.2d	238 (“Where	police	actions	taken	during	the	

detention exceed	what	is	 necessary	 to	 dispel	 the	 suspicion	 that	justified	 the	

stop,	the	detention	may	amount	to	an	arrest	and	is	lawful	only	if	it	is	supported	

by	 probable	 cause.”	 	 (quotation	marks	 omitted)).	 	An	investigative	 stop	 that	

amounts	to	a	de	facto	arrest	can	constitute	an	unconstitutional	seizure	if	it	is	

not	supported	by	probable	cause.		United	States	v.	Sharpe,	470	U.S.	675,	685-86	

(1985).		The	United	States	Supreme	Court	has	explained	 that	 the	measure	of	

whether	an	investigative	detention	has	evolved	into	an	arrest	does	not	depend	

on a	 bright-line	 test	 but	 is	 instead	 based	 on	 common	 sense	 and	 human	

experience.		Id.

[¶17]		“Probable	cause	exists	where	facts	and	circumstances	within	the	

knowledge	 of	 the	 officers	 and	 of	 which	 they	 have	 reasonable	 trustworthy	

information	 would	 warrant	 a	 prudent	 and	 cautious	 person	 to	 believe	 the	

arrestee	did	commit	or	is	committing	the	felonious	offense.”		State	v.	Lagasse,	

2016	ME	158,	¶	13,	149	A.3d	1153 (quotation marks	omitted).		Probable	cause	

has	a	very	low	threshold.		Id. ¶	14.		The	determination	of	probable	cause	is	an	

objective	 one	 and	 is	 not	 based	 on	 whether	 the	 officer	 believed	 there	 was

probable	cause.		State	v.	Forsyth,	2002	ME	75,	¶	10,	795	A.2d	66.
12

[¶18]		Abdullahi contends	that	the	bag	containing	cocaine	base	would	not	

have	 been	 discovered	 but	 for	 the	 fact	 that	 his	 detention	 was	 unlawfully	

prolonged	 to	 the	 point	 that	 it	 evolved	 into	 an	 illegal	 de	 facto	 arrest.	 	 We	

conclude	that	Abdullahi’s	detention	was	neither	unreasonably prolonged nor	

unreasonably	restrictive.		Abdullahi’s	inability	to	produce	the	registration	for	

the	 vehicle	 he	 was	 driving	 justified the	 corporal’s	 further	 investigation	 into	

whether	 Abdullahi	 had	 permission	 to	 use	 the	 vehicle.	 	 The corporal’s	

conversation	with	a	person	he	reasonably	understood	to	be	the	vehicle’s	owner	

furnished	probable	cause	for	him	to	believe that	Abdullahi’s use	of	the	vehicle	

constituted a	 violation	 of	 the	 law	 prohibiting	 unauthorized use	 of	 a	 motor	

vehicle.	 See	17-A M.R.S.	§	360(1)(A) (2023).	 In	light	of that	conversation,	the	

corporal’s	decision	to	have	the	vehicle	towed,	which	was	a major reason	for	the	

extended	duration	of	the	stop,	was	appropriate.	 If	this	was	a	de	facto	arrest,	it	

was	 supported	 by	 probable	 cause. Moreover,	 the	 corporal’s	 decision	 to	

handcuff	 Abdullahi	 while	 he	 attended	 to	 other	 tasks	 was	 independently	

justified	in	terms	of	officer	safety.		The court	did	not	err	in	denying	Abdullahi’s	

motion	to	suppress.
13

B. The	Admission	of	Lay	Opinion	Testimony	by	Police	Officers

[¶19]		During	 the	 trial,	the	corporal and	both	sergeants	testified about	

their	 observations	 and	 opinions	 concerning	 the	 contents	 of	 the	 plastic	 bag	

recovered	at	the	scene	of	the	stop.		Although	the	extent	of	their	experience	with	

drug	investigations	varied,	each officer	testified about	his	own	experience	with	

drug	 trafficking	 investigations.	 The	 sergeants testified that the	 substance	

inside	the	smaller	bags	within	the	large	bag	appeared	to	be “crack	cocaine”—a	

term	sometimes	used	to	describe	cocaine	base.		One	of	the	sergeants testified	

that he	 determined,	 using	 a	 digital	 scale, that	 the	large	 bag	 and	its	 contents	

weighed	twenty-six grams.		The	sergeants also	testified	that in	their	experience

the	 manner	 by	 which	 the	 forty-five smaller	 bags	 were	 packaged	 inside	 the	

larger	bag, the	fact	that	Abdullahi	was	not	using	his	own	vehicle,	and	the	fact	

that	 Abdullahi	 was	 found	 to	 be	 in	 possession	 of	 $1,091	 in	 cash were	 all	

indicative	of	drug	trafficking.

[¶20]	 	Abdullahi	 argues	 that	 the	three	 police officers	 should	 not	 have	

been	allowed	to	give	their	testimony without	being	designated	and	qualified as	

expert witnesses.		The	State	did	not	designate	the	officers	as	expert	witnesses,	

so	 their	 testimony	was	admissible	only	if	it	qualified	as lay	opinion	evidence	

rather	than	expert opinion evidence.		See	M.R.	Evid.	701.		“We	review challenges	
14

to	the	admission	of	lay	opinion	testimony	for	an	abuse	of	discretion.”		State	v.	

Patton,	2012	ME	101,	¶	20,	50	A.3d	544.

1. Lay	Opinion	and	Expert	Opinion	Evidence

[¶21]	 	Under	 Maine	 Rule	 of	 Evidence	 701,	 lay	 witnesses	 may	 provide	

testimony	 in	 the	 form	 of	 opinions	 or	 inferences	 as	 long	 as	 the	 testimony	 is	

“(a) [r]ationally	based	on	the	witness’s	perception;	and	(b)	[h]elpful	to	clearly

understanding	the	witness’s	 testimony	or	 to determining a	 fact	in	issue.”	 	A	

witness’s	 opinion	 must	 be	 “adequately	 grounded	 on	 personal	 knowledge	 or	

observation	just	as	would	be	the	case	with	simple	statements	of	fact.”		Field	&	

Murray,	Maine	Evidence §	701.1 at	365 (6th ed.	2007).		Lay	opinion	evidence	is	

appropriate	 when	 “the	 subject	 of	 inquiry	 is	 one	 which	 is	 plainly	

comprehensible	by	the	jury	and	of	such	a	nature	that	unskilled	persons	would	

be	capable	of	forming	correct	conclusions	respecting	it.”		Ginn v. Penobscot Co.,

334 A.2d 874, 883 (Me. 1975).

[¶22]		An	opinion	is	not	admissible	as	lay	witness	testimony	if	it	involves	

“knowledge,	 skill,	 experience,	 training,	 or	 education”	 that	 is	 beyond	 the	

comprehension	of	an	ordinary	person. See M.R.	Evid.	702;	State	v.	Woodburn,	

559	A.2d	343,	346 (Me.	1989)	(“[B]efore	admitting	expert	testimony	the	trial	

court	must	consider	(1)	whether	the	matter	is	beyond	common	knowledge	so	
15

that	 the	 untrained	 layman	 will	 not	 be	 able	 to	 determine	 it	 intelligently	 and	

(2) whether	 the	witness	is	qualified	 to	give	 the	opinion	sought.”). If	such	an	

opinion	is	admissible	at	all,	it	would	be	as	expert	opinion	evidence pursuant	to	

Maine	Rule	of	Evidence	702.

[¶23]		The distinction between	opinion	testimony	and	fact	testimony is	

not	always clear,	because	whether	something	is	true	as	a	matter	of	fact	often	

proves	to	be	a	matter	of	opinion.		See State	v.	Cunningham,	1997	ME	60,	¶	4,	691	

A.2d	 1219	 (1997);	 see Cent. R.R. Co. of	 N.J. v.	 Monahan,	 11	 F.2d	 212,	 214	

(2d Cir. 1926) (“The	line	between	opinion	and	fact	is	at	best	only	one	of	degree,	

and	ought	to	depend	solely	upon	practical	considerations,	as,	for	example,	the	

saving	of	time	and	the	mentality	of	the	witness.”).		Lay	opinion	evidence	can	be	

admitted	as	a	means	 of	 conveying	a	 “short-hand	 rendering	 of	 the	 facts”	 that	

underlie	 the	opinion.		Cunningham,	1997	ME	60,	¶	4,	691	A.2d	1219;	State v.

Bowen, 366 A.2d 174, 177 (Me. 1976)(explaining	that	lay	opinion	evidence	may

include	 facts	 such	 as	 “[s]peed,	 identity,	 age,	 size,	 quantity,	 etc.”);	 Stacy	 v.	

Portland	Publ’g	Co.,	68	Me.	279,	285-86	(1878);	M.R.	Evid.	701	Advisers’	Note

to	former	M.R.	Evid.	701 (Feb. 2, 1976).

[¶24]	 	Although	the	line between	admissible	lay	 opinion	evidence	and	

expert	opinion	evidence	can	be	difficult	to	define, a	lay	opinion	must be based	
16

“wholly	and	solely”	on	the	firsthand	knowledge,	perception,	or	observation	of	

the	witness,		Mitchell	v.	Kieliszek,	2006	ME	70,	¶	13,	900	A.2d	719 (quotation	

marks	omitted), whereas	an	expert	opinion	may	be	based	on	information	made	

known	 to	 the	 expert.	 	 Lay	opinion testimony	is	thus	inadmissible	if	it	is	not	

based	 on	 knowledge obtained	 through	 the	 witness’s	 own	 perception	 and	

personal	experience.		See Chrysler	Credit	Corp.	v.	Bert	Cote’s	L/A	Auto	Sales,	Inc.,	

1998	 ME	 53,	 ¶¶ 21-22,	 707	 A.2d	 1311;	see	 also	 Cunningham,	 1997	 ME	 60,	

¶¶ 5-6,	 691	 A.2d	 1219.	 In	 Chrysler	 Credit,	 we	 determined	 that	 a	 Subaru	

marketing	 manager’s	 testimony	 about	 a	 dealership’s	 lost	 profits	 was	 not	

admissible	as	lay	opinion	evidence	because	his	analysis	was	drawn	largely	from	

information	 he	 had	 analyzed	 about	 current	 and	 future	 sales	 trends	 in	 the	

applicable	motor	vehicle	market,	not	from his	own	experience,	perceptions, and	

observations.	 Chrysler	Credit	Corp.,	1998	ME	53,	¶¶ 22-23,	707	A.2d	1311.

[¶25]	 On	 the	other	hand,	the	 fact	 that	a	witness	may	have	specialized	

training	or	experience	does	not	transform	what	is	otherwise	a	lay	opinion	into	

that	of	an	expert.		See United States v. Mast, 999 F.3d 1107, 1112 (8th Cir. 2021).		

Thus,	whether	opinion	testimony	is	admissible	as	lay	opinion	evidence	or	can	

only	 be	 admitted	 as	 expert	 opinion	 evidence	 is	 primarily	 a	 function	 of	 two	

variables—the	extent	to	which	the	witness’s	foundation	for	giving	the	opinion	
17

consists	 of	 the	 witness’s	 own	 perceptions,	 observations, and	 experiences	 as	

opposed	to	the	knowledge	and	experiences	of	others;	and	whether	the	subject	

of	the	opinion	is	so	“specialized”	as	to	place	it	beyond	the	ability	of	“unskilled	

persons	 [to	 be]	 capable	 of	 forming	 correct	 conclusions	 respecting	 it.”	 	Ginn,	

334 A.2d	at 883.

2. Police	Officer	Opinion	Testimony

[¶26]	 	 As with	 the	 admissibility	 of	 opinion	 testimony	 by	 other	 fact	

witnesses,	the	admissibility	of	opinion	testimony	by	a	police	officer	who has	not	

been	 designated	 as	 an	 expert	 witness	 depends	 on	 the	 extent	 to	 which the	

opinion	to	be	elicited is based	on	the	officer’s	own	perception	and	knowledge

and	is	within	an	ordinary	person’s	capacity	to	understand.

[¶27]	 We recently	 upheld	 the	 admissibility	 of	 a	 police	 officer’s	 lay	

opinion	 testimony	 “that	 in	 his	 experience—gained	 from	 many	 child	 sexual	

assault	investigations	and	interviews—a	victim’s	memory	of	traumatic	events	

was	‘[v]ery	often’	fragmented.”		State	v.	Hunt,	2023	ME	26,	¶	46,	293	A.3d	423.		

Similarly,	 although	 police	 officers	 often	 receive	 training	 in	 identifying	

intoxication	 and	 bloodstains,	 we	 have	 upheld	 the	 admission	 of	 lay	 opinion	

testimony	 by	 police officers	 on	 a	 person’s	 state	 of	 intoxication	 and	 on	 the	

existence	of	bloodstains,	based	on	our	view	 that	 the	knowledge	necessary	 to	
18

form	the	opinions	is	not	a	matter	of	“knowledge,	skill,	experience,	training,	or	

education”	beyond	the	ordinary	person’s	ability	to	understand	without	expert	

guidance.

8	 	 See	 State	 v.	 Libby,	 153	 Me.	 1,	 7-8,	 133	 A.2d	 877	(1957);	 State	 v.	

Wilbur,	 278	 A.2d	 139,	 143	 (Me.	 1971).	 	 We have	 said	 specifically	 that	 the	

statutes	involving	drug	recognition	experts	“do	not	bar	a	nonexpert	officer,	or	

even	 a	 layperson,	 from	 testifying	 to his	 or	 her	 observations	 of	 a	 driver’s	

impairment	 or	 the	 conduct	 and	 results	 of	 a	 field	 sobriety	 test.”	 	 See	 State	 v.	

Atkins, 2015	ME	162,	¶	16,	129	A.3d	952 (emphasis	added);	see	also State	v.	

Barnard,	2001	ME	80,	¶	12	n.9,	772	A.2d	852;	State	v.	Curtis,	2019	ME	100,	¶ 25,	

210	A.3d	834.

[¶28]		More	to	the	point,	we	have	similarly	upheld	the	admission	of	police	

officers’	 opinion	 testimony	 about	 the	 identity	 of	 drugs	 based	 on	 experience	

gained	in	law	enforcement.	 Barnard,	2001	ME	80,	¶	12	n.9,	772	A.2d	852 (“The	

identity	of	a	drug	can	be	proved	by	evidence	in	the	form	of	opinion	testimony	if	

presented	 by	 someone	 who	 identifies	 the	 substance	 and	 who	 is	 sufficiently	

experienced	with	the	drug.”);	accord	Curtis,	2019	ME	100,	¶ 25,	210	A.3d	834

8	 	 Importantly,	 the	 requirement	 that	 lay	 opinion	 evidence	 be	 understandable	 to	 an ordinary	

person,	such	as	a	juror,	without	expert	guidance	does	not	mean	that	an ordinary	person	must	actually	

have	perceived,	observed, or	experienced the	same	matters	covered	in	the	witness’s	opinion.		Thus,	

a	person	need	not	have	experience	with intoxicated	persons or	bloodstains	in	order	to	be	qualified	

to	serve	on	a	jury	in	a	trial	involving	lay	opinion	testimony	on	those	subjects.		In	fact,	the	opposite	is	

true:	lay	opinion	testimony	is	not	admissible	if	the	jury	is	as	capable	as	the	witness	at	forming	the	

opinion.		See	State	v.	Peaslee,	2020	ME	105,	¶	11,	237	A.3d	861.
19

(“In	the	absence	of	a	chemical	analysis,	other	direct	and	circumstantial	evidence	

can	establish	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt	the	identity	of	drugs.		That evidence	

can	include	 testimony	 of	 a	witness	who	 has	 experience	 based	 on	 familiarity	

with	the	drugs	through	law	enforcement,	prior	use, or	trading.”	(alteration	and	

quotation	 marks	 omitted)(emphasis	 added)).

9	 	 Although	 the	 issue	 of	 the	

difference	 between	 lay	 and	 expert	 opinion	 testimony	 was	 not	 addressed	 in	

those	cases,	neither	Barnard nor	Curtis	states	that	either	a	drug	user	or	a	police	

officer	must	be	 designated	 as	 an	 expert	witness	in	 order	to	 testify	 as	 to	 the	

identity	of	a	drug.		In	fact,	in	Curtis, we	quoted	with	approval	a	federal	appeals	

court	 holding that	 evidence	 of	 the	 identity	 of	 a	 drug	 may	 derive	 from	“lay	

9		The	First	Circuit,	in	United	States	v.	Valdivia,	has	explained	that	a	law	enforcement	officer	may	

be	qualified	as	both	a	lay	witness	and	expert	witness	in	the	same	case,	and	there	are	no	bright	line	

rules	 to	 differentiate	 between	 the	 two	 types	 of	 testimony.	 	 680	 F.3d	 33,	 49-51	 (1st	 Cir.	 2012).		

Specifically,	an	officer	need	not	have	scientific	or	technical	expertise	to	testify	as	a	lay	witness	in	drug	

cases, as	long	as	the	testimony	is	based	on	personal	knowledge	acquired	through	the	officer’s	own	

perceptions	 and	 observations through experience	 with	 prior	 drug	 cases.	 	Id.;	see United	 States	 v.	

Ayala-Pizarro,	 407	 F.3d	 25,	 28-29 (1st	 Cir.	 2005) (allowing	 an	 officer	 to	 testify	 as a lay	 witness	

because	the	testimony	was	based	on	knowledge	that	he	obtained	by	virtue	of	his	position	as	a	police	

officer);	United	States	v.	Moon,	802	F.3d	135,	147-48	(1st	Cir.	2015)(upholding	lay	opinion testimony	

in	 a	 drug	 case	 by	 an	 officer	 with significant	 experience	 identifying	 controlled	 substances	 when	

purchasing drugs undercover).		Other	circuits	have	ruled	differently.		See United	States	v.	Watson,	

260 F.3d	301,	307-08	(3d	Cir.	2001)	(“[T]he operations of narcotics dealers have repeatedly been

found to be a suitable topic for expert testimony because they are not within the common knowledge

of the average juror.”) (collecting	cases);	United	States	v.	Johnson,	617	F.3d	286,	293	(4th	Cir.	2010)	

(“At	bottom,	Rule	701	forbids	the	admission	of	expert	testimony	dressed	in	lay	witness	clothing.”)	

(alteration	and	quotation	marks	omitted));	United	States	v.	Oriedo,	498	F.3d	593,	603	(7th	Cir.	2007)	

(explaining	that	one	agent’s	testimony	was	expert	in	nature	because	“he	brought	the	wealth	of	his	

experience	as	a	narcotics	 officer	 to	bear	 on	 [his]	 observations	and	made	connections	 for the	jury	

based	 on	 that	 specialized	 knowledge”);	United	 States	 v.	 Figueroa-Lopez,	 125	 F.3d	 1241,	 1244-46

(9th Cir.	1997)	(concluding	that	the	agents’	testimony	was	expert	in	nature	because	they	used	their	

“training	and	experience” to	testify	about	behaviors	consistent	with	“an	experienced drug	trafficker”

(quotation	marks	omitted)).
20

experience	 based	 on	 familiarity	 through	 prior	 use,	 trading,	 or	 law	

enforcement.”	 	 Curtis,	 2019	 ME	 100,	 ¶ 25,	 210	 A.3d	 834 (quotation	 marks	

omitted).

[¶29]	Abdullahi	 concedes	 that	 drug	 users	who	are	 sufficiently	 familiar	

with	 a	 drug	 may	 give	 lay	 opinion	 testimony	 about	 the	 appearance	 and	

characteristics	 of	 the	 drug	 but contends	 that	 police	 officers	 must	 qualify	 as	

expert	witnesses	in	 order	 to	give	identical	opinion	testimony. If individuals	

who	use	and	traffick	in	drugs may	provide	lay	opinion	testimony	about	drugs	

and	 drug	 trafficking	 based	 on	 their	 personal	 perceptions,	 observations, and	

experiences,	we	see	no	reason	to	prohibit	police	officers	from	giving	lay	opinion	

testimony	 on	 the	 same	 topics	based	 on	 their	 own	personal	 perceptions and

observations	gained	through	different	means.

[¶30]	 Whether opinion	evidence	may	be	given	only	by	a	qualified	expert	

depends	more	on	the	complexity of	the	opinion rather	than	the	identity	of	the	

witness.	 Just	as	whether	a	person	is	intoxicated	is	a	subject	fit	for	lay	opinion	

testimony,	 what	 cocaine	 base	 looks	 like	 is	 not	 a	 matter	 about	 which	 only	

persons	 who	 have	 specialized	 “knowledge,	 skill,	 experience,	 training,	 or	

education”	can	form an	opinion.		M.R.	Evid.	702.		Similarly,	a	witness	need	not	
21

have specialized	 training	 and	 experience	 to	form an	 opinion	 about	 common	

practices	in	drug	trafficking.

[¶31]	 	 We	 emphasize	 that	 although	 the	 precise	 line	 between	 lay	 and	

expert	opinion	evidence	may	not	be	sharp,	we	are	not	suggesting	that	the	line	

cannot be	 drawn.	 	 As	 we	 have	 said,	 “[t]he	 two	 categories	 of	 expert	 and	 lay	

opinion	 testimony	are	 thus	mutually	exclusive.”		Mitchell,	2006	ME	70,	¶	14,	

900 A.2d	 719; cf. Ragland	 v.	 State,	 870	 A.2d	 609,	 620	 (Md.	 2005)(“[B]y	

permitting	testimony	based	on	specialized	knowledge,	education,	or	skill	.	.	.	,	

parties	may	avoid	the	notice	and	discovery	requirements	of	our	rules	and	blur	

the	distinction	between	the	two	rules.		Accordingly,	we	.	.	.	hold	that	Md.	Rules	

5-701	 and	 5-702	 prohibit	 the	 admission	 as	 ‘lay	 opinion’	 of	 testimony	 based	

upon	specialized	knowledge,	skill,	experience,	training	or	education.”).		In	the	

case	of	police	testimony,	it	is	important	that	officers	be	designated	as	experts	

when	 they	 are	 expected	 to	 offer	 opinions	 based	 on	 their	“knowledge,	 skill,	

experience,	 training,	 or	 education”	 that is	 beyond	 the	 comprehension	 of	 an	

ordinary	person.		See M.R.	Evid.	702; M.R.U.	Crim.	P.	16(a)(2)(G); Woodburn,	

559	A.2d	at	346.
22

3. The	Admissibility	of	the	Police	Officers'	Testimony	Here

[¶32]	 	 At	 trial,	 the	 corporal testified	 that	 his	 experience	 included	

“approximately	six	years	of	experience	on	the	road	dealing	with	.	.	.	drug	cases	

on	traffic	stops	and	in	residences.”		He	testified	that he	identified	that the	drugs	

seized	 during	 the	 course	 of	 the	 traffic	 stop	“appeared	 to	 be	 cocaine.”	 	 The	

corporal explained	that	the	package	of	narcotics	seized	at	the	site	of	the	traffic	

stop	 was	 consistent	 with	 what	 he	 had	 seen in	 other	 circumstances for	

packaging	 of	 cocaine	 base	 for	 resale.	 	 On	 cross-examination,	 the	 corporal

testified	that	he	was “not	a	drug	guy,”10 which	is	why	he	sought	assistance	from	

the	two	other	state	officers	who	testified at	trial.

[¶33]		The	sergeants gave	more	extensive	 testimony	about	 the	cocaine	

base	in	the	bag	that	Abdullahi	had tossed	under	the	car,	based	on	their	more	

extensive	 experience	 in	 drug	 trafficking	 investigations.	 They	 testified that,

based	 on	 their	 observations	 and	 experience,	 they	 were	 of	 the	 opinion	 that	

certain	circumstances	surrounding	 the	stop—including	the manner	in	which	

the forty-five smaller baggies	were	packaged, Abdullahi’s	use	of	a	vehicle	he	did	

not	own, and	the	large	amount	of	cash	he	was	carrying—were	indicative	of	drug	

10 The	corporal	testified	that	he	did	not	have	any	“special	expertise	or	training	or	experience	in	

narcotics	 investigations”	 and	 had	 only	 some	 “experience”	 with	 drug	 and	 drug	 trafficking	

investigations.
23

trafficking.		One	sergeant testified	that	he	weighed	the	large	bag	at	twenty-six

grams and	that	the smaller	baggies	inside	it	each	contained	what	appeared	to	

be	a	gram	or	a	half	gram	of	cocaine	base.

[¶34]	 	 It	 is	 noteworthy that	 when	 eliciting	 the	 opinions,	 the	 State’s	

foundational	questions	pointedly	emphasized	the	officers’	training	and	special	

expertise.	 For	 example,	 the	 State	 questioned	 one	 of	 the	 sergeants	 without	

objection	as	follows:

Q: And	in	the	course	of	your	experience	in	law	enforcement,	do	

you	have	particular	experience in	narcotics	investigations?

A: Yes.

Q: Have	you	had	specialized	training	in	that	area?

A: Yes.

Q: About	 how	 many	 investigations	 would	 you	 roughly	 say	

you’ve	been	involved	in	involving	crack	cocaine?

A: Two	 dozen	 or	 so	 at	 least,	 involving	 just	 specifically	 crack	

cocaine.

Q: And	based	 on	 your	 training	and	 your	experience,	what	did	

those	little	ties	appear	to	be	to	you?

Emphasizing a	 police officer’s	 specialized	 expertise,	 particularly	 if	 it	 was

acquired	as	a	result	of	training	or	study rather	than	observation,	as	a	preface	to	

opinion	 questions, may	 be	 inconsistent	 with	 proffering	 the	 officer	 as	 a	 lay	
24

witness.11 Qualifying	any	witness	to	give	lay	opinion	testimony	as	if	the	witness	

were	an	expert risks	impermissibly	bolstering the reliability of	 the	witness’s	

opinion.	 	 See Pelletier	 v.	 Pelletier,	 2012	 ME	 15,	 ¶	 13,	 36	 A.3d	 903	

(“Determinations	 of	 witness	 credibility	 are	 uniquely	 within	 the	 fact–finder’s	

authority,	and	the	fact-finder	is	free	to	discount	or	entirely	ignore	testimony	the	

fact-finder	 finds	 incredible.” (quotation	 marks	 omitted)); State	 v.	 Black,	

537 A.2d	1154,	1156	(Me.	1988)	(improper	bolstering	of	a	witness’s	credibility	

“can	have	a	profound	impact	on	the	outcome	of	the	trial,	particularly,	as	in	the	

present	case,	when	the	prosecution	offers	the	evidence	to	establish	its	case	in	

chief.”); E.I.	 du	 Pont	 de	 Nemours	 &	 Co.	 v.	 Robinson,	 923	 S.W.2d	 549,	 553	

(Tex. 1995)	(“Expert	witnesses	can	have	an	extremely	prejudicial	impact	on	the	

jury,	in	part	because	of	the	way	in	which	the	jury	perceives	a	witness	labeled	as	

an	expert.		To the jury an expert is just an unbridled authority figure, and as

such he or she is more believable.” (alteration and quotation marks omitted));

11		During	a	colloquy	with	counsel	outside	the	hearing	of	the	jury,	the	court	made	the	same	point:

I	think	[the	State	is] limited	to	asking	[the	officer,]	rather	than	as	to	his	training	[and	

his	 opinion	 about]	 consistency	 with	 trafficking, just	 in	 his	 experience	 do—is	 the	

packaging	of	these	items	something	that’s	done	for—for—in	connection	with	sales	of	

illegal	 things.	 And—and	 in	 his—in	 his	 experience	 do	 people	 carrying	 drugs	

sometimes	drive	someone	else’s	car.

.	.	.	.	

.	.	.	If	he	just	sticks	to	his	experience	.	.	.	I	think	he’s	entitled	to	testify	about that.
25

People	v.	Stewart,	55	P.3d	107,	123	(Colo.	2002)	(“Officer	testimony	becomes	

objectionable	 when	 what	 is	 essentially	 expert	 testimony	 is	 improperly	

admitted	under	the	guise	of	lay	opinions.”).

[¶35]	 	Nonetheless,	although the	two	 sergeants	in	 particular	indicated	

that	 they	 had	 specialized	 training and expertise in	 drug	 investigations,	

Abdullahi	did	not	object	to	much	of	the	testimony	he	now	contends	on	appeal	

should	have	been	excluded.	 When	objections	were	made,	the	court	sustained	a	

number	 of	them and	might	 have	 sustained	more.	 	 Further,	 all	 three officers	

indicated	 that	 their	 testimony	 that	the	 drugs	 seized	 during	 the	 traffic	 stops	

“appeared	to	be	cocaine”	and	that	carrying	large	amounts	of	cash	and	driving	

someone	else’s	vehicle	could	be	indicative	of	drug	trafficking was	based	on	their	

experience.

12		See M.R. Evid. 701.		We	conclude	 that	 the	court	did	not	err	 or	

abuse	 its	 discretion	 in	 its	 rulings	 on Abdullahi’s	 objections to	 the	 officers’

testimony.		As	to	the	testimony	admitted	without	objection,	Abdullahi	does	not	

contend	 that	 the	 court	 committed	 obvious	 error	 nor,	 in	 light	 of	 the	 clearly	

admissible	evidence	of	Abdullahi’s	guilt,	do	we	see	any.		State v. White,	2002	

ME 122,	¶	 8,	 804	A.2d	 1146 (“For obvious error to	 require	 the	 reversal	 of	a	

12		The	officers’	testimony	that	the	seized	materials	“appeared”	to	be	cocaine	are	simply	statements	

of	 their	 perceptions	 at	 the	 scene.	 Confirmation	 of	 the	 actual	 chemical	 composition	 of	 particular	

substances	requires	scientific	testing	and	expert	testimony.
26

judgment,	 the error must deprive	 the	 party	 of	a	 fair	 trial	 or	 result	in	 such	a	

serious	injustice	that,	in	good	conscience,	the	judgment	cannot	be	allowed	to	

stand.”).

C. The	Court’s	Permissible-Inference	Instruction

[¶36]	 	 Abdullahi	 argues	 that, because	the	 evidence	 was	insufficient	 to	

allow	the	jury	to	find	that	Abdullahi	possessed	four	grams	or	more	of	cocaine	

base,	the	court	should	not	have	instructed	the	jury	that,	if	it	made	such	a	finding,	

it	could	infer	that	Abdullahi	was	engaged	in	trafficking.

13		The	State	contends	

that	the	instruction	was	proper	because	it	had	presented	evidence	sufficient	to	

support	a	finding beyond	a	reasonable	doubt that	Abdullahi	possessed	at	least	

four	grams	of	narcotics. We	review	preserved	challenges	to	jury	instructions	

for	prejudicial	error.14 State	v.	Hanscom,	2016	ME	184,	¶	10,	152	A.3d	632.

13		Abdullahi	also	argues,	for	the	first	time	on	appeal,	that	the	statutory	permissible	inference	is	

unconstitutional	 as	 applied	 to	 him	 because	 the	 four-gram	 threshold	 at	 which	 the	 inference	 is	

permitted	as	to	cocaine	base has	an	unconstitutional	discriminatory	effect	against	persons	of	color.		

We	review	arguments	not	preserved	in	the	trial	court for	obvious	error.		M.R.U.	Crim.	P.	52(b);	State

v.	 Nisbet,	 2018	 ME	 113,	 ¶	 16,	 191	 A.3d	 359.	 	Because	 the	 argument	 is	 based	 on	 data	 and	 other	

information	outside	this record,	we	do	not	reach	the	merits	of	the	argument.

14		The	State	also	argues	that	Abdullahi	did	not	preserve	this	argument	for	appellate	review.		To	

preserve	 an	 objection	 to	 jury	 instructions,	“a	 party	 must	 object	 before	 jury	 deliberations	 begin.”		

Clewley	v.	Whitney,	2002	ME	61,	¶	9,	794	A.2d	87.		“A	generalized	citation	to	a	group	of	requested	

instructions	is	insufficient	 to	properly	preserve	objections	 to	a	particular	point	in	 the	court’s	jury	

instructions.	 .	 . .	 [A]n	 objecting	 party	 must	 state	 distinctly	 to	 the	 trial	 court	 the	 grounds	 for	 the	

objection	 to	 the	jury	instructions	and	point	 to	 the	specific	claimed	inadequacy	in	 the	instructions	

given	 by	 the	 trial	 court.”	 Id.	 	 Here,	 Abdullahi	 specifically	 objected	 to	 the	 permissible-inference	

instruction prior	to	jury	deliberations.		Therefore,	his	argument	is	preserved.
27

[¶37]	 	 The	 proper	 inquiry	 here	 is	 whether	 the	 State	 provided	 or	

generated	evidence	sufficient	 to	justify the	permissible-inference	instruction.		

See State	v.	Caouette,	462	A.2d	1171,	1175	 (Me.	1983);	State	v.	Tibbetts,	379	

A.2d	735,	737-38 (Me.	1977).		This	is	true	regardless	of	whether	the	State	or	

defendant	proposes	an	instruction.		See	State	v.	Benson,	155	Me.	115,	123,	151	

A.2d	 266	 (1959).	 	 The	 evidence	 in	 the	 record	 necessary	 to	 support an	

instruction	depends	on	the	charge	at	issue.		See	Caouette,	462 at 1175.		Here,	to	

warrant	 the	 permissible-inference	 instruction,	 the	 State	 was	 required	 to	

present	evidence	that	a	reasonable	juror	could	find	sufficient	to	prove	beyond	

a	reasonable	doubt	that	Abdullahi	intentionally	or	knowingly	possessed	four	or	

more	grams	of	cocaine	base.		See 17-A	M.R.S.	§	1103(3)(B) (2018).

15

15		Section	1103	further	provides,	as	is	relevant	here,

Proof	that	the	person	intentionally	or	knowingly	possesses	[four	grams	or	more	of	

cocaine	 base]	 gives	 rise	 to	 a	 permissible	 inference	 under	 the	 Maines	 Rules	 of	

Evidence,	Rule	303	that	the	person	is	unlawfully	trafficking	in	scheduled	drugs[.]

17-A	M.R.S.	§	1103(3),	(3)(b) (2018).		Maine	Rule	of	Evidence	303(b)	explains:

The	 court	may not	 direct	a	 verdict	against	an	accused	 based	 on	a	 presumption	 or	

statutory	provisions	 that	certain	 facts	are	prima	 facie	evidence	of	other	 facts	or	of	

guilt.		The	court	may	permit	a	jury	to	infer	guilt	or	a	fact	relevant	to	guilt	based	on	a	

statutory	or	common	law	presumption	or	prima	facie	evidence,	if	the	evidence	as	a	

whole	supports	guilt	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt.

The	rule	provides	a	safeguard	in	regard	to	permissible	inferences	in	that	it	“require[s] the	court	to	

evaluate	the	inference	as	a	matter	of	 fact	and	mention	it	only	if	in	 fact	the	inference	is	justified	in	

general	terms	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt.”		Field	&	Murray,	Maine	Evidence § 303.4	at	88	(6th	ed.	

2007).
28

[¶38]		The	evidence presented	by	the	State	that	Abdullahi	possessed	four	or	

more	grams	of	cocaine	base	included the	following:

• The	testimony	of	the	law	enforcement	officers	identifying	the	substance	

recovered	as	cocaine	base;

• The	testimony	 of	 law	 enforcement	 officers	 that	 the	 plastic	 bag	 seized	

weighed	twenty-six	 grams and	 contained	 forty-five	 individual	 baggies	

containing	cocaine	base;

• Photographs of	the	forty-five	individual	baggies inside	the	bag	that	was	

seized;	and

• The	testimony	of	a	chemist	that five	baggies	randomly	selected	from	the	

forty-five	all	contained	cocaine	base	weighing	a	total	of	1.89 grams.

[¶39]	 	 We have	 previously	 endorsed	 the	 use	 of	 random	 sampling	 to	

establish	 the	identity	and	quantity	of	illegal	drugs.		See	State	v.	Arbour,	2016	

ME 126,	 ¶	 24,	 146	 A.3d	 1106	 (allowing	 chemical	 testing	 evidence	 that	 five	

randomly	selected	packets	out	of	1,252	packets	seized	contained	heroin	“was	

sufficient	for	the	jury	to	find	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt	that	270	or	more	of	the	

packets .	 .	 . contained	 heroin”).	 	 Here,	 the	 chemist’s	 testimony	 that	 five

randomly	 selected baggies all	 contained	 cocaine	 base weighing	 a	 total	 of	

1.89 grams,	 coupled	 with	 the	 officers’	 testimony	 that	 all	 forty-five	 baggies	

appeared	 to	 contain	 quantities	 of	 cocaine	 base,	was	 sufficient	 to	 support	 an	

inference	that	the	bag	seized	from	Abdullahi	contained	a	total	of	at	least	four	

grams	of	cocaine	base.
29

[¶40]	 	 In	 sum,	 the	 record	 evidence	 was	 sufficient	 to	 justify	 the	

permissible-inference	instruction.

16 17-A	M.R.S.	§	1103(1-A)(A),	(3).

D. The	 Court’s	 Denial	 of	 Abdullahi’s Motion	 for	 New	 Trial	 and	 for	

Judgment	of	Acquittal

[¶41]		Abdullahi’s contention	that	the	court	erred	in	denying	his	motion	

for	 judgment	 of	 acquittal	 and	 motion	 for	 a	 new	 trial rests on	 the	 same	

arguments	he	presents here regarding	his	motion	to	suppress, the	lay	opinion	

testimony	by	police	officer	witnesses, the	chemist’s	testing	testimony,	and	the	

court’s	 decision	 to	 give	 the	 jury an instruction	 regarding	 a	 permissible	

inference	 of	 trafficking.	 	“We	 review	 the	 denial	 of	 a	 motion	 for	 judgment	 of	

acquittal by	 viewing	 the	 evidence	in	 the	light	most	 favorable	 to	 the	 State	 to	

determine	whether	a	jury	could	rationally	have	found	each	element	of	the	crime	

proven	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt.”		State v. Adams, 2015 ME 30, ¶ 19, 113 A.3d

583 (quotation marks omitted).	 “We	 review	 the	 trial	 court’s	 decision	 on	 a	

motion	for	a	new	trial	for	an	abuse	of	discretion	and	any	findings	underlying	its	

decision	 for	clear	error.”		State	v.	Bilodeau,	2020	ME	92,	¶	15,	237	A.3d	156

(quotation	marks	omitted).		As	previously	explained,	the State’s	evidence was	

16		Although	Abdullahi	has	not	directly	contested	the	sufficiency	of	the	evidence	that	he	possessed	

the	 bag	 containing	 cocaine	 base	 intentionally	 or	 knowingly,	 the	 evidence	 that	 he	 had	 physical	

possession	of	the	bag	before	throwing	it	under	the	car	in	an	attempt	to	hide	it	from	the	corporal	was	

sufficient	 to	 support a finding	 that	 he	 intended	 to	 possess the	 bag	 and	 knew	 what	 it	 contained.		

See 17-A	M.R.S.	§	1103(1-A).
30

sufficient	 to	 support	 a	 finding that	 Abdullahi	 intentionally	 or	 knowingly	

possessed	at	least	four	grams	of	cocaine	base.		Likewise,	although	Abdullahi	has	

not	specifically	challenged	them,	we	see	no	error	or	abuse	of	discretion	in	the	

court’s	rulings	regarding	his	falsification	conviction	and	forfeiture	order.

The	entry	is:

Judgment	affirmed.

Kristine	C.	Hanly,	Esq. (orally),	Hanly	Law,	Portland,	for	appellant	Abdirahmon	

A.	Abdullahi

Jonathan	Sahrbeck,	District	Attorney, and	Carlos	Diaz,	Asst.	Dist.	Atty. (orally),	

Cumberland	 County	District	Attorney’s	Office,	Portland,	for	appellee	State	 of	

Maine

Cumberland	County	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket	number	CR-2019-3332

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY