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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

FORT WAYNE DIVISION 

JAMES L. PHILLIPS, 

 Plaintiff, pro se, 

 v. 

RANDY YOUNG, TODD MILLER, 

and DICK COONS, 

 Defendants. 

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Case No. 1:16-CV-176 JD 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 Plaintiff James Phillips filed his pro se complaint on May 23, 2016. [DE 1] It contained a 

single allegation: “They destroyed my property that I own by taking the building I own down to 

the ground.” Id. at 2.1

 The case proceeded to discovery and Defendants moved for summary 

judgment on May 17, 2017. [DE 39] Phillips did not respond until after the Court ordered 

Defendants to remedy their noncompliance with Local Rule 56-1(f), requiring them to give 

proper notice to Phillips in accordance with Faulkner. He eventually responded, albeit 

unconventionally. [DE 54 at 2] 

He also submitted three letters, which the Court construes as motions, requesting default 

judgment [DE 35], subpoenas for people to testify at trial [DE 48], and “a hearing on [the 

Defendants] stealing my land” [DE 46].2

 For the reasons stated herein, the Court will grant 

                                                            

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 His prayer for relief is likewise a single sentence: “I want them stopped and off my property and 

damages.” [DE 1 at 3] 

2 Even after the Court struck several of Phillips’s early filings for failing to seek specific relief [DE 24], 

he has flooded the docket with various other papers. The Court has reviewed all of them, but apart from 

the docket entries mentioned above, these papers are filled with unintelligible ramblings that do not 

appear to seek any kind of relief. [DE 29, 34, 41-45, 47, 50, 51, 53, 57-60] 
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Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and deny Phillips’s motions for default judgment,3

subpoenas, and a hearing as moot.

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

On summary judgment, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that there “is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A “material” fact is one identified by the substantive law as 

affecting the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A 

“genuine issue” exists with respect to any material fact when “the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. Where a factual record 

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is 

no genuine issue for trial, and summary judgment should be granted. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. 

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Servs. Co., 391 

U.S. 253, 289 (1968)). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, this Court 

must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all 

reasonable and justifiable inferences in that party’s favor. Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 

(7th Cir. 2008); King v. Preferred Tech. Grp., 166 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 1999). 

DISCUSSION 

 Defendants are all employees of the Town of Redkey, Indiana. They move for summary 

judgment on two grounds: (1) that Phillips does not own the property at issue, nor did he ever 

own it; and (2) the doctrine of res judicata bars his claim. Defendants identify what they believe 

to be the property at issue and indicate through their exhibits that the property belongs to 

                                                            

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 The Court granted Defendants until July 15, 2016, to file their answer to Phillips’s complaint. [DE 12] 

They did so on July 11, 2016, several days before that deadline. [DE 15] Thus, they did not fail to “plead 

or otherwise defend” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a), and so Phillips’s “motion” for default judgment will be 

denied as moot. 
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Redkey, not Phillips. [DE 40 at 3] In support, they attach corporate quitclaim deeds and a quiet 

title order indicating that Redkey owns the property. [Exh. A to Motion] They further state that 

Phillips never owned the property he complains about in this lawsuit. Lastly, Defendants point to 

a 2009 state court lawsuit filed by Phillips against the Redkey Town Board alleging that the 

Board owed him rent for occupying the same property at issue here. In granting summary 

judgment for the Board in that case, the state court determined that Phillips has no rights to the 

property because it is owned by Redkey itself.4

 [Exh. B to Motion] 

 The bottom line of Defendants’ motion is that Phillips does not own the property that 

makes up the subject matter of his very own lawsuit, and indeed Phillips does not present any 

evidence to dispute this contention, thus failing to create a material issue of fact here. On 

October 30, 2017, Phillips responded to Defendants’ arguments. [DE 54 at 2] On the Faulker 

notice he received in the mail from Defendants, Phillips underlined the following sentence: 

“[The summary judgment motion] says that there should not be a full trial because you cannot 

win some or all of your claims.” Id. He then hand-wrote his only response directly above: “I’ll 

win them all if you give George Washington’s veteran brother a trial by jury like the Constitution 

says.” Id. 

 As the Supreme Court noted in Celotex, “[o]nce the moving party has attacked whatever 

record evidence—if any—the nonmoving party purports to rely upon, the burden of production 

shifts to the nonmoving party ....” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 332 n. 3 (1986). The 

                                                            

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 Defendants contend that this earlier state court case bars Phillips’s current claims via res judicata but 

they provide little analysis to substantiate this argument (although, the Court recognizes that this may be 

due in large part to the difficulty in comparing Phillips’s claims from case to case because they are so 

bare-boned). Regardless, the Court need not address whether res judicata applies because the sum of 

Defendants’ arguments and exhibits demonstrates that Phillips does not own the very property he 

complains was destroyed.
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nonmovant must either: (1) rehabilitate the evidence attacked in the moving party’s papers; (2) 

produce additional evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial; or (3) submit an 

affidavit explaining why further discovery is necessary. Id. (citing 10A Wright, Miller & Kane § 

2727, pp. 138-143). “Summary judgment should be granted if the nonmoving party fails to 

respond in one or more of these ways, or if, after the nonmoving party responds, the court 

determines that the moving party has met its ultimate burden of persuading the court that there is 

no genuine issue of material fact for trial.” Id. (citing First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities 

Service Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968)). 

 Phillips’s response fails in all regards. Even though his complaint does not identify what 

specific property he owns, once the Defendants presented evidence of what they contend to be 

the property at issue, Phillips did not produce any additional information to create a genuine 

issue of material fact for trial (i.e., that the property Defendants identified is not the property at 

issue, that Phillips indeed owns the property Defendants identified, etc.). So, the Court is left 

with the Defendants’ submissions: quitclaim deeds and a quiet title decree affirming that Redkey 

is the owner of the instant property; and a 2009 state court order confirming that Phillips has no 

rights to the real estate at issue here. Phillips has not created a factual dispute as to these matters 

that would preclude summary judgment. Therefore, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment. 

CONCLUSION

 For the reasons stated herein, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment [DE 39] and DENIES Plaintiff’s miscellaneous requests [DE 35; DE 46; DE 

48] as moot. As this Order disposes of all Plaintiff’s claims against all Defendants, the Clerk is 

hereby DIRECTED to enter judgment. 
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SO ORDERED. 

ENTERED: March 13, 2018 

 

 /s/ JON E. DEGUILIO 

 Judge 

 United States District Court