IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

JULIE MARSH, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CAUSE NO. 1:15-CV-00301

vs. )

)

HUNTINGTON COUNTY )

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the “Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, In Part, by Defendant

Huntington County Sheriff’s Department,” filed by Defendant, the

Huntington County Sheriff’s Department, on April 14, 2016 (DE #68). 

For the reasons set forth below, the motion (DE #68) is DENIED. 

BACKGROUND 

This case stems from the incarceration and ultimate suicide of

Joshua Eckert, an inmate at the Huntington County Jail. Plaintiff,

Julie Marsh, brings this action individually and as the special

administrator for the Estate of Joshua Eckert against a number of

Defendants, including the Huntington County Sheriff’s Department

(hereinafter the “Department”). 

In her second amended complaint, Plaintiff includes claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the Department failed to adequately

train its correctional officers and other staff. (DE #63 ¶ 42.) 

The Department argues that Marsh’s factual allegations are

insufficient (specifically, it argues she fails to set forth any

facts to demonstrate that deficient training programs actually

exist, how they amount to deliberate indifference, or how the

Department’s alleged practice or policy could have caused the

constitutional violation). As such, the Department requests

dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for failure to train. 

DISCUSSION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a complaint to

be dismissed if it fails to “state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Allegations other than fraud

and mistake are governed by the pleading standard outlined in

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires a “short and

plain statement” that the pleader is entitled to relief. Maddox v.

Love, 655 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2011). 

In order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint

“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face’.” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). All well-pleaded facts must

be accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences from those facts

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must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. Pugh v. Tribune Co.,

521 F.3d 686, 692 (7th Cir. 2008). However, pleadings consisting

of no more than mere conclusions are not entitled to the assumption

of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. This includes legal

conclusions couched as factual allegations, as well as

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. at 678 (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

Facts

Plaintiff points to the following allegations in the second

amended complaint in support of her claim that she sufficiently

alleged proper failure to train claims:

A. The Huntington County Jail had a policy that

required the Defendant confinement officers to

provide “continuous uninterrupted observation”

of suicidal inmates. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 30.) 

B. Eckert hung himself from the surveillance

camera in his cell while on suicide watch,

while he was the only inmate on observation

status, while he was “acting strange all day,”

and while he was clearly observable via the

surveillance camera, which showed him pulling

on, stripping and tearing the threads of a

suicide blanket, throwing blanket threads into

the toilet, and tying some of the blanket

fabric together. (Id. ¶¶ 20-26.)

C. The Huntington County Jail had policies and

procedures that restricted Eckert’s ability to

obtain his needed mental health medications

because those medications could not be filled

until a “Non-Preferred Medication Request

Form” was completed by an off-site corporate

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representative of the Defendant Medical

Providers. (Id. ¶ 19.)

D. The Huntington County Jail had no medical

personnel at the Jail on weekends. (Id. ¶

27.)

E. After Eckert was finally found in his cell

hanging from the surveillance camera, the

Defendant confinement officers dragged him out

into the hall, cuffed him, and waited for a

cook at the Jail with some “nursing

experience” to check for a pulse before

initiating CPR just prior to the EMS arrival. 

(Id. ¶ 27.) 

F. The Huntington County Sheriff’s Department,

through its agents and/or employees, had a

duty to provide a safe environment to inmates,

including having medical personnel at the jail

on the weekends, and otherwise training and

supervising its officers, physicians, nurses

and staff regarding how to appropriately

monitor and provide a safe environment for

potentially suicidal inmates such as Eckert.

(Id. ¶ 40.)

G. The Huntington County Sheriff’s Department was

deliberately indifferent to the obvious need

for (1) having medical personnel at the jail

on the weekends, (2) providing supervision and

training of their officers, physicians, nurses

and staff regarding proper detainment and

monitoring procedures for potentially suicidal

inmates such as Eckert, and (3) timely

providing necessary mental health medications

to inmates such as Eckert, among other things.

(Id. ¶ 41.)

H. The deficiencies in the Huntington County

Sheriff’s Department’s medical staffing and

suicide training program, as well as its

failure to provide necessary mental health

medications to inmates such as Eckert,

constitute deliberate indifference to the

rights of those persons, such as Eckert, with

whom the officers, physicians, nurses and

staff come into contact, and such failure is

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an unconstitutional policy or custom that is

actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See City

of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).

(Id. ¶ 42.)

 

I. The deficiencies in the Huntington County

Sheriff’s Department’s medical staffing and

suicide training program, as well as its

failure to provide necessary mental health

medications to inmates such as Eckert, is

closely related to, and a direct and proximate

cause of, Eckert’s death. (Id. ¶ 43.)

Motion to Dismiss

In this case, the Department argues that the claims for

failure to adequately train its correctional officers and staff

should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Monell v.

Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658,

690 (1978), because Plaintiff has not provided any factual basis

for those claims. In her response, Plaintiff contends she has

alleged sufficient factual allegations to support her failure to

train claim, which rises above the level of speculation and

constitutes a valid claim for relief. 

To state a claim for municipal liability under section 1983,

a plaintiff must establish that the alleged constitutional

deprivation was pursuant to an official policy, practice, or custom

of the municipality. Monell, 436 U.S. at 689. The Supreme Court

of the United States held “that the inadequacy of police training

may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure

to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of

persons with whom the police come into contact.” City of Canton,

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Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). This can be met if “in

light of the duties assigned to specific officers of employees the

need for more or different training is so obvious, and the

inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional

rights, that the policymakers . . . can reasonably be said to have

been deliberately indifferent to the need.” Id. at 390. To

prevail on a claim against the Department, Plaintiff must

ultimately demonstrate that Eckert’s constitutional rights were

violated and that the Department’s policy or custom of failing to

train its employees caused the constitutional violation. Collins

v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S. 115, 123 (1992). 

The Seventh Circuit is clear that a plaintiff must “plead

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the City maintained a policy, custom, or practice”

that caused the violation of the plaintiff’s Constitutional rights. 

McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011). 

Moreover, it is insufficient to rely on mere legal conclusions or

boilerplate allegations. Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765,

767 (7th Cir. 1985). 

The Department cites to a number of cases in its memoranda in

which a failure to train claim was dismissed for failure to allege

sufficient facts or inferring a lack of training based upon the

occurrence of a single incident. See, e.g., Srauss, 760 F.2d at

767; Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 596 F.Supp. 13, 20

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(N.D. Ill. 1984); Sheehan v. Noble Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 1:14-

cv-324, 2015 WL 3670092, at *4 (N.D. Ind. June 12, 2015); Hodge v.

County of Delaware, No. 1:09-cv-519-WTL-DML, 2009 WL 3415131, at *4

(S.D. Ind. Oct. 16, 2009); Sanders v. City of Indianapolis, No.

1:09-cv-622-SEB-JMS, 2010 WL 2484772, at *4 (S.D. Ind. June 11,

2010); Suber v. City of Chicago, No. 10 C 2876, 2011 WL 1706156, at

*4 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2011). However, this case is more like Doffin

v. Ballas, No. 2:12-CV-411 JD-PRC, 2013 WL 3777231 (N.D. Ind. July

18, 2013) (cited by the Department), where the Court found that:

Assuming the allegations contained in the Complaint

are true, Doffin has supplied enough facts to

establish a plausibility of success on his Monell

claim, such that only further discovery will

determine whether the claim will in fact ultimately

succeed.

Id. at *8. 

While this is a close case, the Court believes that, like in

Doffin, the pleadings here are sufficient. Plaintiff did allege

that the Department’s medical staffing (having no medical personnel

at the jail on weekends) and suicide training program “constitute

deliberate indifference to the rights of those persons, such as

[Eckert], with whom the officers, physicians, nurses and staff come

into contact.” (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 42.) Moreover, she alleges

that the Department was deliberately indifferent to “timely

providing necessary mental health medications to inmates such as

[Eckert]” and had a duty to train and supervise its staff regarding

how to appropriately monitor and provide a safe environment “for

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potentially suicidal inmates like [Eckert].” (Id. ¶¶ 40, 41.) As

such, Plaintiff has alleged some specific facts, she does allege

that the policy affects other inmates (and is not just based upon

this one incident), and Plaintiff does allege deliberate

indifference. She also alleges that the Department is the moving

force in causing the injury. (Id. ¶¶ 38.) 

Construing all well-pled factual allegations contained in the

second amended complaint as true, and drawing all inferences in the

light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff

has supplied enough factual content in her allegations which, if

true, provide a plausible claim for relief. The Department’s

reliance upon City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 821-24

(1985), is misplaced, because in that case the Supreme Court

reviewed jury instructions after a trial, finding evidence of more

than a single incident is required before municipal liability may

be found under section 1983. This case is only at the motion to

dismiss stage, and this Court is merely ruling that Plaintiff has

alleged sufficient facts that, if accepted as true, could plausibly

suggest a policy or practice. At the summary judgment stage,

Plaintiff will have to support these allegations with sufficient

evidence. 

Finally, in making this finding, this Court has also

recognized Judge Marshall’s concerns:

We are at loss as to how any plaintiff, including a

civil rights plaintiff, is supposed to allege with

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specificity prior to discovery acts to which he or

she personally was not exposed, but which provide

evidence necessary to sustain the plaintiff’s

claim, i.e., that there was an official policy or a

de facto custom which violated the Constitution.

Means v. City of Chicago, 535 F.Supp. 455, 460 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, the “Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, In Part, by Defendant

Huntington County Sheriff’s Department,” filed by Defendant, the

Huntington County Sheriff’s Department, on April 14, 2016 (DE #68),

is DENIED. 

DATED: August 17, 2016 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

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