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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

MELLISA HUSK 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. Case No. 4:16-cv-70-JVB-JEM 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, 

Acting Commissioner of 

Social Security Administration, 

 

 Defendant. 

OPINION AND ORDER

 Plaintiff Melissa Husk seeks judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner’s 

decision denying her disability benefits, and asks this Court to remand the case. For the reasons 

below, this Court affirms the ALJ’s decision.

A. Overview of the Case

 Plaintiff alleges that he became disabled on January 18, 2013. (R. at 163.) Her date last 

insured (“DLI”) is December 31, 2017. (R. at 167.) Plaintiff most recently worked as a retail 

manager, but has not worked since her alleged onset date. (R. at 56–57.) The Administrative Law 

Judge (“ALJ”) found that Plaintiff suffered from severe physical and mental impairments. (R. at 

20.) However, the ALJ concluded that she could perform other jobs that existed in significant 

numbers. (R. at 38.) Therefore, the ALJ denied her benefits. (R. at 39.) This decision became 

final when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (R. at 1.)

 
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B. Standard of Review

This Court has authority to review the Commissioner’s decision under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g). The Court will ensure that the ALJ built an “accurate and logical bridge” from 

evidence to conclusion. Thomas v. Colvin, 745 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2014). This requires the 

ALJ to “confront the [plaintiff’s] evidence” and “explain why it was rejected.” Thomas v. Colvin, 

826 F.3d 953, 961 (7th Cir. 2016). The Court will uphold decisions that apply the correct legal 

standard and are supported by substantial evidence. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 

345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005). Evidence is substantial if “a reasonable mind might accept [it] as 

adequate to support [the ALJ’s] conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).

C. Disability Standard

The Commissioner follows a five-step inquiry in evaluating claims for disability benefits 

under the Social Security Act:

(1) whether the claimant is currently employed; (2) whether the claimant has a 

severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment is one that the 

Commissioner considers conclusively disabling; (4) if the claimant does not have 

a conclusively disabling impairment, whether he can perform his past relevant 

work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the 

national economy.

Kastner v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 642, 646 (7th Cir. 2012).

 The claimant bears the burden of proof at every step except step five. Clifford v. Apfel, 

227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000).

D. Analysis

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding that she was not disabled. Specifically, 

Plaintiff challenges the weight that the ALJ gave to several medical opinions, which Plaintiff 
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claims corrupted the ALJ's residual functional capacity (“RFC”) analysis.

(1) The ALJ Properly Weighed the Agency Consultants’ Opinions 

 Plaintiff first complains that the ALJ put too much faith in the Agency consultants, who 

did not examine Plaintiff. Granted, an ALJ cannot simply accept a non-examiner’s opinion at 

face value. Goins v. Colvin, 764 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 2014). In Goins, the plaintiff submitted 

an MRI result that seriously contradicted a consulting physician’s opinion, but the ALJ blindly 

followed the consultant’s opinion anyway and, more importantly, attempted to interpret the MRI 

result herself. Id. Here, Plaintiff provides similar smoking-gun evidence: the Agency consultants 

rendered their opinions prior to the opinions of Drs. Aloman and Rifai. (Pl.s’ Br. At 11.) But the 

ALJ knew that the consultants examined an incomplete record and added additional restrictions 

to compensate for this. (R. at 35.) There is thus no “uncritical acceptance” here.

 The ALJ also noted that the consultants were “well-versed in the . . . disability provisions 

of the Social Security Act.” (R. at 35.) This tilts the scales in favor of accepting the consultants’ 

opinions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(6). Yet, Plaintiff contends, the ALJ never elicited any 

testimony to prove this expertise. (Pl.’s Br. at 12.) The ALJ did not need to, though, since S.S.R. 

96-6p provides that Agency consultants “are experts in the Social Security disability programs.” 

1996 SSR LEXIS 3, *5. An ALJ is entitled to assume this expertise. Mullins v. Colvin, 2014 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 73528, *30 (S.D. Ind., May 29, 2014). Plaintiff, however, reminds this Court that 

she saw another Agency consultant whose opinion the ALJ discounted, even though that doctor 

would have had just as much expertise. (Pl.’s Br. at 12.) True, but, at best, this would create a 

tiebreaker situation that the ALJ would have to resolve. When the ALJ supports her choice with 

substantial evidence, this Court must defer to that choice. McKinzey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884, 889 
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(7th Cir. 2011.) Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to follow the two consultants.

 Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the Agency consultants “did not have an explanation for their 

opinions.” (Pl.’s Br. At 12.) Actually, they did. One consultant provided over two paragraphs’ 

worth of citations to the record in a section entitled “Additional Explanation.” (R. at 85.) And the 

other, when instructed to “[c]ite specific facts upon which your conclusions are based,” did just 

that. (R. at 87.) Plaintiff's argument thus falls flat.

(2) The ALJ Properly Weighted Dr. Rini’s Opinion 

 Next, Plaintiff attacks the ALJ’s decision to afford Dr. Rini’s opinion “little weight.” 

Specifically, Plaintiff accuses the ALJ of misunderstanding the opinion. For instance, the ALJ 

found that “the only actual opinion [Dr. Rini] gave was that [Plaintiff] could manage her own 

funds,” while at the same time conceding that the Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) 

test that Dr. Rini administered was “opinion evidence.” (R. at 36.) True, but the ALJ spent an 

entire paragraph thoroughly rejecting the validity of GAF scores. Id. This is fitting, since the 

Seventh Circuit has little faith in GAF scores. Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 

2010) (noting that a GAF score “does not reflect the clinician’s opinion of functional capacity”). 

In fact, the Commissioner herself found that such scores have no “direct correlation to the 

severity requirements in our mental disorders listings.” 65 Fed. Reg. 50,746, 50,765 (Aug. 21, 

2000). Even the American Psychiatric Association stopped using GAF scores. Williams v. 

Colvin, 757 F.3d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 2014). Thus, because the ALJ discounted the GAF score 

anyway, her error in understanding what constituted opinion evidence was harmless.

 Furthermore, the ALJ seemed to accept Dr. Rini’s findings. The doctor found that 

Plaintiff had low-average memory and concentration, along with below-average social 
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functioning. (R. at 473.) The ALJ accounted for these conditions by finding that Plaintiff 

suffered moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence or pace and by limiting Plaintiff to 

“simple, routine, and repetitive tasks in a low stress job, which is defined as having only 

occasional changes in the work setting and occasional decision making required.” (R. at 23–24.) 

Normally, a limitation to “simple, routine, and repetitive tasks” does not accurately encapsulate 

moderate concentration issues, but the Seventh Circuit is more understanding when, as here, the 

ALJ adds a “low-stress” requirement. O’Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 619 (7th Cir. 

2010). Plaintiff, however, cites Walters v. Astrue to complain that “someone with poor social 

skills should not have even superficial contact with workers.” 444 Fed. Appx. 913, 918 (7th Cir. 

2011). Walters is distinguishable. There, the plaintiff had “significant difficulties with paranoid 

thinking and poor social skills even when taking his medication.” Id. Here, Plaintiff is nowhere 

near as limited, only having “below average” social functioning. (R. at 473.) Unsurprisingly, the 

ALJ assigned less-extreme limitations. This Court sees no error here.

(3) The ALJ Properly Weighed Dr. Aloman’s Opinion 

 Plaintiff next sets her sights on Dr. Aloman’s opinion, which the ALJ afforded “little 

weight.” (R. at 34.) The ALJ discounted the opinion, in part, because Dr. Aloman “merely 

checked off boxes on a form,” which Plaintiff argues is a “material misstatement of fact.” (R. at 

34; Pl.’s Br. at 14.) In a hyper-literal sense, Plaintiff is correct: Dr. Aloman examined Plaintiff 

beforehand and thus did more than simply check boxes. But this Court must “give the [ALJ’s] 

opinion a commonsensical reading rather than nitpicking at it.” Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 

564 (7th Cir. 1999). In reality, the ALJ meant that Dr. Aloman checked off boxes without 

providing any explanation to support her findings. The ALJ is correct. Despite having space in 
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six of the ten questions for Dr. Aloman to provide comments to explain her answer, in only one 

of those spaces did she write anything, and she only wrote one word: “anxiety.” (R. at 710–12.) 

Furthermore, she left the final question, “Other Comments,” completely blank, (R. at 712). Cf. 

Goins v. Colvin, 764 F.3d 677, 678 (7th Cir. 2014) (calling a blank comments section “an 

important omission”). The ALJ’s supposed “material misstatement of fact” was actually a fair 

characterization of the opinion.

 Moreover, a series of checkmarks with no supporting narrative tends to be “weak 

evidence” when the findings are inconsistent with the record. Larson v. Astrue, 615 F.3d 744, 

751 (7th Cir. 2010). The ALJ found as much, even going so far as to say that Dr. Aloman “relied 

quite heavily on the subjective report[s]” of Plaintiff. (R. at 34.) Such an opinion is of no value. 

Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 371 (7th Cir. 2004). And an ALJ can point to “scant objective 

evidence” in the record and inconsistencies with the doctor’s treatment notes to show that the 

opinion was “based almost entirely on [the plaintiff’s] subjective complaints.” Ketelboeter v. 

Astrue, 550 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2008.) Here, the ALJ noted that Dr. Aloman found that 

Plaintiff had two ailments that are mentioned nowhere else in the record. (R. at 34.) Indeed, Dr. 

Aloman’s exams were mostly normal. The issues she found were usually related to chest pain, 

joint issues, dizziness, shortness of breath, and abnormal ranges of motion. (R. at 521, 532, 535, 

559, 572.) The ALJ discounted them by pointing out findings of normal gait and muscle strength 

with intact cranial nerves and negative knee x-rays, among other things. (R. at 28–29.)

 Plaintiff also points to several findings and test results, but they indicate mostly mild and 

sometimes moderate symptoms. (Pl.’s Br. at 15–16.) Moreover, the ALJ analyzed this evidence 

elsewhere in his decision. (R. at 27–37); cf. Denton, 596 F.3d at 425 (“The ALJ specifically 

addressed all the evidence that Denton points out, though he did not assign the significance to it 
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that Denton prefers.”). Most importantly, as the ALJ notes, these findings do not support the 

extreme limitation of “[cannot] maintain reliable attendance,” especially since Dr. Aloman 

provided no explanation for this opinion. (R. at 712.) Dr. Aloman also opined that Plaintiff 

would have concentration issues for at least half of the working day. (R. at 711.) This has even 

less support in the record. Plaintiff very rarely displayed any mental issues by the time Dr. 

Aloman rendered her opinion, and even Dr. Rini, an actual psychologist who examined her 

specifically to analyze her mental conditions, found only moderate limitations at most, which the 

ALJ adopted. (R. at 35–36.) The ALJ thus supported his weighing of Dr. Aloman’s opinion with 

substantial evidence.

(4) The ALJ Properly Weighed Dr. Rifai’s Opinion 

 Eventually, Plaintiff’s issues led her to surgery, which Dr. Rifai performed. The doctor 

also rendered an opinion, but it did not impress the ALJ, who assigned it “little” weight. (R. at 

35.) Plaintiff argues that, as a treating physician, Dr. Rifai’s opinion is entitled to more weight. 

(R. at 18.) Usually, but here, as the ALJ noted, the doctor had only seen Plaintiff twice when he 

rendered his opinion. (R. at 35.) The ALJ properly doubted whether the doctor even deserved the 

“treating physician” designation. White v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Dr. 

Zondag, who examined White once, fits the definition of a nontreating source”); see also 

Kornecky v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 167 Fed. Appx. 496, 506 (6th Cir. 2006) (“The question is 

whether [Dr.] Lian had the ongoing relationship . . . at the time he rendered his opinion”).

 The ALJ also showed that the opinion was inconsistent with itself. For instance, 

according to the opinion, Plaintiff’s medication “would cause fatigue or lapses in concentration 

or memory . . . daily for several times a day,” yet Plaintiff had no “problems with stamina and 
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endurance” that would require more than the standard one-hour break. (R. at 719.) Also, Plaintiff 

could “be reasonably expected to be reliable in attending” a full-time work week despite 

“ha[ving] a reasonable medical need to be absent . . . on a chronic basis.” (R. at 719–20.) Further 

supporting the ALJ’s conclusion is Dr. Rifai’s almost exclusively normal findings in his 

treatment notes. (R. at 745–58.) Courts allow ALJs to discount internally inconsistent opinions. 

Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 503 (7th Cir. 2004.) That is what the ALJ did here.

 Dr. Rifai explained the chronic-absences finding by noting that “patient does have the 

option of surgery.” (R. at 721.) This leads to the ALJ’s last major problem with the opinion: it 

predates Plaintiff’s surgery. (R. at 53.) The parties vigorously disputed whether the surgery 

helped Plaintiff or left her worse off. For example, Plaintiff testified that the surgery left her in 

more pain than before the surgery. (R. at 61.) Also, Dr. Rifai assigned some limitations after the 

surgery and never explicitly stated that they were no longer necessary. (Pl.’s Br. at 19.) On the 

other hand, Dr. Rifai’s notes indicate that, post-surgery, Plaintiff enjoyed a 70% reduction in the 

pain. (R. at 750.) Furthermore, the doctor included the restrictions in two post-surgery visits, but 

not the third. (R. at 752, 755, 758.) This implies that the restrictions were no longer necessary. 

Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 1999) (approving the ALJ’s citation to “an absence 

of any relevant exertional limitations” to discount the plaintiff’s claims); Evans v. Colvin, 2015 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74701, *29 (N.D. Ill., June 10, 2015) (holding that the ALJ properly 

considered the plaintiff’s “reduction and ultimate discontinuation of all pain medication”). Both 

arguments are reasonable and “adequately supported,” but when that happens, the tie goes to the 

ALJ. Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008).

(5) The ALJ Properly Assessed Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity 
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 Plaintiff’s remaining arguments—that the ALJ ignored or improperly discounted various 

ailments—require an uncritical acceptance of the opinions of Drs. Rini, Aloman, and Rifai. “But 

the ALJ need not blindly accept a treating physician’s opinion—she may discount it if it is . . . 

contradicted by other substantial medical evidence in the record.” Henke v. Astrue, 498 Fed. 

Appx. 636, 639 (7th Cir. 2012). The ALJ identified enough substantial contradictory evidence to 

validly discount all three opinions. Plaintiff's arguments also assume that Dr. Rifai’s restrictions 

still applied. The ALJ disagreed, and, as noted, supra, this Court must accept the ALJ’s 

conclusion. Lastly, Plaintiff points out that her testimony contradicts the ALJ's findings. It does, 

which is why the ALJ spent two pages thoroughly scrutinizing Plaintiff’s testimony and 

discounting it by identifying contradictions with the record. (R. at 25–27.) True, a plaintiff’s 

testimony is evidence, but it is not a stipulation of her allegations, so an ALJ can reject them if 

she “builds an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the result.” Sarchet v. 

Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 1996). The ALJ did that here. 

E. Conclusion

The ALJ properly weighed all of the medical opinions before her and supported her RFC 

analysis with substantial evidence. Accordingly, this Court affirms the ALJ’s decision.

SO ORDERED on October 13, 2018.

 S/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

 JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE