UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

FORT WAYNE DIVISION 

CLAIRE MICHAELI, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CAUSE NO. 1:16-cv-00085-SLC 

 ) 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL ) 

SECURITY, sued as Nancy A. Berryhill, ) 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security ) 

Administration,

1

 ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Plaintiff Claire Michaeli appeals to the district court from a final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) denying her application under the Social 

Security Act (the “Act”) for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”).2 For the following reasons, 

the Commissioner’s decision will be AFFIRMED. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 On January 17, 2013, Michaeli filed for DIB, alleging disability beginning on December 

29, 2011. (DE 10 Administrative Record (“AR”) 22, 164-66). Michaeli’s claim was denied 

initially on February 25, 2013, and upon reconsideration on June 5, 2013. (AR 92-103). 

Michaeli filed a request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. (AR 104-05). On 

August 5, 2014, Administrative Law Judge Maryann Bright (the “ALJ”) held a hearing, at which 

Michaeli and Sharon Ringenberg, a vocational expert (the “VE”), testified. (AR 36-73). 

 1

 Nancy A. Berryhill is now the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, see Casey v. Berryhill, 853 F.3d 

322 (7th Cir. 2017), and thus, she is automatically substituted for Carolyn W. Colvin in this case, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 

25(d). 

2

 All parties have consented to the Magistrate Judge. (DE 13); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 
2 

Michaeli was represented by attorney Randal Forbes at the hearing before the ALJ. (AR 36). 

On October 31, 2014, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision, finding that Michaeli was 

not disabled because during the alleged period of disability she could perform a significant 

number of jobs in the national economy. (AR 19-31). Michaeli requested that the Appeals 

Council review the ALJ’s decision (AR 14-16), and the Appeals Council denied her request, 

making the ALJ’s decision the final, appealable decision of the Commissioner (AR 1-3). 

On March 11, 2016, Michaeli filed a complaint with this Court seeking relief from the 

Commissioner’s final decision. (DE 1). In her appeal, Michaeli alleges that the ALJ erred in 

assessing her credibility, resulting in a flawed residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 

determination. In particular, Michaeli claims that the ALJ erred by: (1) overemphasizing her 

ability to perform daily activities; (2) improperly considering her inability to afford treatment; 

and (3) failing to favorably consider her good work history prior to her alleged onset date. (DE 

18 at 7). 

II. THE ALJ’s FINDINGS

Under the Act, a claimant is entitled to DIB if she establishes an “inability to engage in 

any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment which can be expected to . . . last for a continuous period of not less than 12 

months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i)(1), 423(d)(1)(A). A physical or mental impairment is “an 

impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are 

demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(d)(3). 

 In determining whether Michaeli is disabled as defined by the Act, the ALJ conducted the 

familiar five-step analytical process, which required her to consider the following issues in 
3 

sequence: (1) whether the claimant is currently unemployed; (2) whether the claimant has a 

severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of the 

impairments listed by the Commissioner, see 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1; (4) whether the 

claimant is unable to perform her past work; and (5) whether the claimant is incapable of 

performing work in the national economy.3 See Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th 

Cir. 2001); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. An affirmative answer leads either to the next step or, on 

steps three and five, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 

886 (7th Cir. 2001). A negative answer at any point other than step three stops the inquiry and 

leads to a finding that the claimant is not disabled. Id. The burden of proof lies with the 

claimant at every step except the fifth, where it shifts to the Commissioner. Id. at 885-86. 

At step one, the ALJ found that Michaeli had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since her alleged onset date of December 29, 2011. (AR 24). At step two, the ALJ found that 

Michaeli had the following severe impairments: prosthetic right eye, minor cataract in the left 

eye, mild degenerative disc disease, and hearing loss. (AR 24-26). 

At step three, the ALJ concluded that Michaeli did not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments severe enough to meet or equal a listing. (AR 26-67). Before 

proceeding to step four, the ALJ determined that Michaeli’s symptom testimony was “not 

entirely credible” and assigned her the following RFC: 

[T]he claimant has the [RFC] to perform light work . . . except that 

she is only occasionally able to climb ramps and stairs, balance, 

stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She is not able to climb ladders, 

ropes, or scaffolds at all. She can engage in tasks requiring only 

occasional peripheral acuity. She should avoid all exposure to

 3

 Before performing steps four and five, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s RFC, or what tasks the 

claimant can do despite her limitations. 20 C.F.R §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(a). The RFC is then used during steps 

four and five to help determine what, if any, employment the claimant is capable of. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 

404.1545(a)(5). 
4 

excessive noise and hazards, such as slippery/uneven surfaces, 

unprotected heights, and dangerous/unguarded machinery. 

(AR 27). Based on this RFC, the ALJ found at step four that Michaeli could not perform her 

past relevant work as a home health aide. (AR 29). The ALJ considered the testimony of the VE 

and other evidence in the record and determined at step five that Michaeli could perform other 

jobs in the national economy that exist in significant numbers, and therefore, her application for 

DIB was denied. (AR 30-31). 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Section 405(g) of the Act grants this Court “the power to enter, upon the pleadings and 

transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court’s task is limited to determining whether the ALJ’s factual findings 

are supported by substantial evidence, which means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744 

(7th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The decision will be reversed only if it is not supported by 

substantial evidence or if the ALJ applied an erroneous legal standard. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 

F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000). 

 To determine if substantial evidence exists, the Court reviews the entire administrative 

record but does not re-weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or 

substitute its judgment for the Commissioner’s. Id. Rather, if the findings of the Commissioner 

are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive. Id. Nonetheless, “substantial 

evidence” review should not be a simple rubber-stamp of the Commissioner’s decision. Id. 
5 

IV. ANALYSIS 

Michaeli makes three arguments on appeal, all of which relate to the ALJ’s credibility 

determination. An ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to special deference because the 

ALJ is in the best position to evaluate the credibility of a witness. See Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 

431, 435 (7th Cir. 2000); Nelson v. Apfel, 131 F.3d 1228, 1237-38 (7th Cir. 1997). If an ALJ’s 

determination is grounded in the record and she articulates her analysis of the evidence “at least 

at a minimum level,” Ray v. Bowen, 843 F.2d 998, 1002 (7th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted), 

creating “an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the result,” Ribaudo v. 

Barnhart, 458 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted), her determination will be upheld 

unless it is “patently wrong,” Powers, 207 F.3d at 435; see Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751, 

754 (7th Cir. 2004) (remanding an ALJ’s credibility determination because the ALJ’s decision 

was based on “serious errors in reasoning rather than merely the demeanor of the witness”); 

Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 335 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[Because] the ALJ is in the best position to 

observe witnesses, [courts] usually do not upset credibility determinations on appeal so long as 

they find some support in the record and are not patently wrong.” (citations omitted)). 

Additionally, “an ALJ’s evaluation of a[n] applicant’s credibility must be specific enough to 

make clear to [the court] how much weight the ALJ gave to the applicant’s testimony and the 

reasons for that decision.” Daniels v. Colvin, No. 12 C 9317, 2014 WL 2158999, at *13 (N.D. 

Ill. May 23, 2014) (alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see 

Hill v. Astrue, 295 F. App’x 77, 81 (7th Cir. 2008). 

As a threshold matter, the Court notes that Michaeli’s arguments are all extremely 

cursory. See generally Rice v. Astrue, No. 1:08-CV-00137, 2009 WL 1605289, at *5 (N.D. Ind. 

June 4, 2009) (“Because she has not developed any arguments with specificity concerning the 
6 

basis for the ALJ’s decision, Rice has waived all challenges to the ALJ’s opinion.” (citations 

omitted)). In Michaeli’s opening brief, each of her three arguments is approximately one page in 

length, and none identify with any specificity evidence of record that the ALJ failed to consider 

in assessing her credibility. In her reply brief, Michaeli merely states: “Plaintiff by counsel 

stands by the arguments in her Opening Brief and maintains that they also constitute sufficient 

reply.” (DE 24 at 2). 

To the extent that Michaeli is simply requesting that the Court reweigh evidence in the 

hope that it will come out in her favor this time, her plea is unavailing as the Court may not 

“reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts in the record, decide questions of credibility, or, in general, 

substitute [its] own judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 

1001 (7th Cir. 2004). Nevertheless, the Court will examine Michaeli’s arguments to determine 

whether the ALJ’s credibility assessment is supported by the record. See id. (“[The Court’s] task 

is limited to determining whether the ALJ’s factual findings are supported by substantial 

evidence.” (citations omitted)). 

A. Daily Activities 

First, Michaeli asserts that the ALJ erred by finding that evidence of her ability to 

perform daily activities undermined her credibility. The ALJ may consider the “consistency of 

the individual’s statements with other information in the case record, including reports and 

observations by other persons concerning the individual’s daily activities, behavior, and efforts 

to work.” SSR96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *6 (July 2, 1996).4 However, the Seventh Circuit 

Court of Appeals has “cautioned the Social Security Administration against placing undue 

 4

 Social Security Ruling 96-7p, was superseded by Social Security Ruling 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 (Mar. 

16, 2016), in March 2016, but Social Security Ruling 96-7p governed at the time the ALJ issued his decision. 

Accordingly, SSR 96-7p applies to this case. 
7 

weight on a claimant’s household activities in assessing the claimant’s ability to hold a job 

outside the home.” Mendez v. Barnhart, 439 F.3d 360, 362 (7th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases). 

Michaeli cites Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2012), where the Seventh 

Circuit stated: 

The critical differences between activities of daily living and

activities in a full-time job are that a person has more flexibility in 

scheduling the former than the latter, can get help from other 

persons (in this case, Bjornson’s husband and other family 

members), and is not held to a minimum standard of performance,

as she would be by an employer. 

The problem in Bjornson was that the ALJ assigned a specific limitation to the claimant based on 

her daily activities. Id. (“The administrative law judge expressed doubt about Bjornson’s 

credibility on the further ground of her ‘activities of daily living,’ notably that she can walk up to 

one block, sit or stand for up to 15 minutes, lift 10 pounds, bathe and dress normally, and even 

drive and shop.”). In stark contrast, the ALJ in this case did not support any specific limitation 

based on Michaeli’s ability to carry out daily activities. Neither did the ALJ improperly equate 

her ability to perform daily activities to an ability to work full time. Gentle v. Barnhart, 430 

F.3d 865, 867 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The administrative law judge’s casual equating of household 

work to work in the labor market cannot stand.”). Rather, the ALJ reasonably found that 

Michaeli’s ability to “engage in a somewhat full range of activities” suggested that she “is not as 

limited as she alleged.” (AR 28). 

Moreover, the ALJ developed a record of Michaeli’s ability to carry out daily activities 

by exploring the issue at the hearing and in her opinion. (See AR 28, 49-50, 54-59); see, e.g.,

Punzio v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 704, 712 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Rather than addressing Punzio’s 

comprehension skills directly, the ALJ instead surmised that her condition has improved over the 
8 

years, that she no longer is suicidal, that her symptoms typically persist for only a few hours, and 

that she is ‘managing activities of daily living without significant difficulty.’”). The ALJ 

considered the degree to which Michaeli struggles to drive (see AR 28 (noting that Michaeli 

drives only “short distances on non-busy roads”)), struggles to wash dishes (see AR 28 (noting 

that Michaeli needs to lean on the counter to support herself)), has difficulty getting comfortable 

(see AR 28 (noting that Michaeli lies down and rests but has difficulty sleeping)), and has 

limited vision (see AR 28 (“[S]he cannot see peripherally on the right and has limited peripheral 

vision on the left.”)). In short, this is not a case where the ALJ neglected to develop or consider 

evidence favorable to a finding of disabled in examining the claimant’s ability to perform daily 

activities. See, e.g., Spiva v. Astrue, 628 F.3d 346, 352 (7th Cir. 2010) (“She didn’t mention the 

evidence that Spiva’s performance of household chores was incompetent; as the aunt with whom 

he had lived for a time stated, he needed help with everything because ‘his mind runs a lot.’”); 

Vandergraff v. Berryhill, No. 4:17-CV-06-JEM, 2018 WL 1282293, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 13, 

2018) (“Rather than considering Plaintiff’s failed attempts to work more hours as indicative of 

her veracity, he disregarded or gave little weight to all of the copious evidence in the record of 

the limitations in Plaintiff’s ability to work more than a few hours per day multiple days in a 

row.”). 

Therefore, the ALJ’s conclusion that Michaeli’s ability to perform daily activities 

undermined her credibility was based on substantial evidence and will not be disturbed. 

B. Lack of Treatment 

Second, Michaeli challenges the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding based on her lack of 

treatment. “Many circuits have upheld the inability to afford medications or regular doctor visits 

as a valid excuse for failing to follow a prescribed course of treatment.” Roper v. Astrue, No. 
9 

2:07-CV-247-PRC, 2008 WL 1925073, at *9 (N.D. Ind. May 1, 2008). SSR 96-7p provides that 

“the adjudicator must not draw inferences about an individual’s symptoms and their functional 

effects from a failure to seek treatment without first considering any explanation that the 

individual may provide.” 1996 WL 374186, at *7; see Thomas v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 953, 960 (7th 

Cir. 2016) (“The ALJ also noted Thomas’s gap in treatment between August 2011 and 

September 2012, but the relevance of this detail to Dr. Rashid’s opinion is unclear, and, in any 

case, the ALJ did not explore the reasons for this gap.” (citations omitted)); Beardsley v. Colvin, 

758 F.3d 834, 840 (7th Cir. 2014) (“But the ALJ may not draw any inferences about a claimant’s 

condition from this failure unless the ALJ has explored the claimant’s explanations as to the lack 

of medical care.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Hoffman v. Astrue, No. 10-C1152, 2011 WL 3236176, at *10 (E.D. Wis. July 27, 2011). 

In this case, the record is devoid of almost any evidence of treatment from December 

2011 to May 2014. Michaeli neglected to seek treatment for any condition after December 28, 

2011, until she was examined by David Ringel, D.O., on February 23, 2013. (AR 223-27). 

Michaeli did not seek treatment again until May 22, 2014. (AR 265). At the administrative 

hearing, Michaeli testified that she did not seek treatment because she did not have insurance and 

because she did not know of any low cost medical clinics. (AR 51-52). The ALJ considered 

Michaeli’s proffered reasons for not seeking medical care but determined that the lack of 

evidence was inconsistent with disabling levels of pain. (AR 28). Thus, the ALJ found that 

Michaeli’s lack of treatment undermined her credibility. (AR 28). 

Michaeli argues that the ALJ erred by assuming that free medical services were available. 

But the ALJ considered that Michaeli’s lack of treatment cut against her symptom testimony 

because apparently her pain was not severe enough to warrant an emergency room visit between 
10 

December 2011 and May 2014, which she was capable of visiting since she did so in May 2014. 

In other words, the ALJ did not wrongly assume that free care was available, she reasonably 

inferred that Michaeli’s pain did not warrant an emergency room visit. See Stevenson v. Chater, 

105 F.3d 1151, 1155 (7th Cir. 1997) (concluding that “[t]he ALJ was entitled to make reasonable 

inferences from the evidence before him”). The ALJ also considered that Michaeli was taking 

only over-the-counter medications for her pain and that she had not undergone, or been 

recommended to undergo, any surgeries, revealing that the treatment she did receive was 

conservative in nature. (AR 28); see Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 519 (7th Cir. 2009) 

(affirming the ALJ’s consideration of claimant’s relatively conservative treatment history when 

discounting the severity of her symptom testimony, acknowledging that “the regulations 

expressly permit the ALJ to consider a claimant’s treatment history” (citation omitted)); Ellis v. 

Astrue, No. 2:09-cv-145, 2010 WL 3782265, at *20 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2010) (affirming the 

ALJ’s discounting of claimant’s complaints given the discrepancies between the severity of her 

self-reported symptoms and the lack of treatment for the purported condition); 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1529(c)(3); SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *3, 8. 

Similarly, Michaeli’s argument that the ALJ did not develop the record regarding her lack 

of treatment is not supported by the record. The ALJ observed SSR 96-7p by inquiring into why 

Michaeli did not seek treatment and considering Michaeli’s explanations in her decision before 

making an adverse credibility finding. See Thomas, 826 F.3d at 960 (citations omitted);

Beardsley, 758 F.3d at 840 (citations omitted). Therefore, the ALJ’s credibility determination as 

to Michaeli’s lack of treatment does not require a remand. 

C. Work History 

Third, Michaeli argues that the ALJ erred by not favorably considering her good work 
11 

record prior to her alleged onset date of December 29, 2011. The Seventh Circuit has explained 

that while “[a]n ALJ is not statutorily required to consider a [claimant’s] work history,” a 

claimant with a good work record prior to the alleged onset date is entitled to substantial 

credibility when claiming an inability to work because of disability. Stark v. Colvin, 813 F.3d 

684, 689 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Hill v. Colvin, 807 F.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2015)); Flores v. 

Massanari, 19 F. App’x 393, 404 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Further, the ALJ failed to even acknowledge 

Flores’s solid work history; Flores had been employed each year for the thirteen years before his 

illness.”). 

Here, Michaeli is correct that the ALJ did not credit her symptom testimony in light of 

her 17-year work history prior to the alleged onset date. However, “when assessing credibility, 

[a claimant’s work record] is but one factor to be considered, and [i]t is well established that the 

ALJ is not required to discuss every factor or conduct a factor-by-factor analysis.” Payne v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 16-CV-13165, 2017 WL 4985646, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 16, 2017), 

report and recommendation adopted, No. 16-13165, 2017 WL 4227567 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 21, 

2017) (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see Denton v. 

Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 2010) (“But an ALJ need not mention every piece of 

evidence, so long [as] he builds a logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.” (citing 

Getch v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 2008))). 

Moreover, the ALJ acknowledged that Michaeli engaged in substantial gainful 

employment from 1994 to 2011 in her decision and at the administrative hearing. (AR 22, 47). 

Therefore, the ALJ was clearly aware of Michaeli’s work activity prior to the alleged onset date. 

“Accordingly, the ALJ’s failure to discuss [Michaeli’s] work history in the context of [her] 
12 

credibility determination does not constitute reversible error.”5

 Payne, 2017 WL 4985646, at *6; 

cf. Hargrove v. Berryhill, No. 116CV01922JMSMJD, 2017 WL 3172917, at *4 (S.D. Ind. June 

30, 2017) (“Combined, the omissions and impermissible inferences in the ALJ’s credibility 

assessment rise to the level of patent error.”). 

At the end of the day, “an ALJ’s credibility assessment will stand ‘as long as [there is] 

some support in the record.’” Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 546 (7th Cir. 2008) (alteration in 

original) (quoting Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 842 (7th Cir. 2007)). Here, when assessing 

the credibility of Michaeli’s symptom testimony, the ALJ built an adequate and logical bridge 

between the evidence—among other factors, the objective medical evidence, or lack thereof; 

Michaeli’s full range of daily activities; and her lack of medical treatment—and the conclusion 

that Michaeli’s symptom testimony was not entirely credible, see Ribaudo, 458 F.3d at 584, and 

the ALJ’s conclusion is not “patently wrong,” Powers, 207 F.3d at 435. Consequently the ALJ’s 

credibility determination, which is entitled to special deference, id, will stand, and the final 

decision of the Commissioner will be affirmed. 

V. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. The Clerk 

 5

 In the credibility determination, the ALJ did adversely consider Michaeli’s representations that she could 

work for the purposes of receiving unemployment, and that she performed some work after the alleged onset date. 

(AR 28). However, Michaeli does not argue that the ALJ erred in evaluating this evidence, much less explain how 

the totality of the circumstances with respect to her representations that she could work and her employment after 

the alleged onset date render Michaeli’s symptom testimony credible. See Pierce v. Colvin, 739 F.3d 1046, 1051 

(7th Cir. 2014) (“But a claimant’s dogged efforts to work beyond her physical capacity would seem to be highly 

relevant in deciding her credibility and determining whether she is trying to obtain government benefits by 

exaggerating her pain symptoms.”); Pursell v. Colvin, No. 12 CV 5455, 2013 WL 3354464, at *11 (N.D. Ill. July 3, 

2013) (“[T]he ALJ should look at the totality of circumstances in deciding the significance of an application for 

unemployment benefits.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, Michaeli has waived her 

opportunity to present arguments on these points. See Webster v. Astrue, 580 F. Supp. 2d 785, 794 (W.D. Wis. 

2008) (explaining in a social security appeal that undeveloped arguments are deemed waived) (citing Kochert v. 

Adagen Med. Int’l, Inc., 491 F.3d 674, 679 (7th Cir. 2007)).
13 

is directed to enter a judgment in favor of the Commissioner and against Michaeli. 

 SO ORDERED. 

 Entered this 11th day of July 2018. 

 /s/ Susan Collins 

 Susan Collins 

 United States Magistrate Judge