Supreme Court

No. 2019-196-C.A.

(P1/16-2067A)

(Concurrence begins on page 15)

State :

v. :

Carlos Rivera. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before 

publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to 

notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 

Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 

(401) 222-3258 or Email: opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any 

typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may 

be made before the opinion is published.

June 29, 2021
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Supreme Court

No. 2019-196-C.A.

(P1/16-2067A)

(Concurrence begins on page 15)

State :

v. :

Carlos Rivera. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

O P I N I O N

Justice Lynch Prata, for the Court. The defendant, Carlos Rivera, appeals 

from an October 15, 2018 judgment of conviction and commitment entered against 

him in the Providence County Superior Court on one count of first-degree child 

molestation sexual assault and two counts of second-degree child molestation

sexual assault. The defendant’ssole contention on appeal is that the trial justice 

erred by unfairly limiting the testimony of a defense witness, thereby violating

defendant’s constitutional right to present a full and fair defense. For the reasons 

set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
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Facts and Travel

This case was initiated by the allegations of the complaining witness, 

Allison,1that defendant, her step-grandfather, had sexually molested her on 

multiple occasions between July 18, 2013, and July 17, 2015. On July 8, 2016, 

defendant was indicted by a grand jury on the following counts, all relating to 

Allison, who was fourteen years of age or younger when the alleged incidents 

occurred: sexual penetration, to wit, penile/vaginal penetration (count one); sexual 

contact, to wit, hand to breast (count two); sexual contact, to wit, hand to buttocks 

(count three); and sexual contact, to wit, hand to vaginal area (count four).

In June 2018, a jury trial was held in the Superior Court. Prior to trial, the 

state moved in limine to preclude any reference at trial to the immigration status of 

any of the witnesses(including defendant) or concerning immigration proceedings 

relative to any of the witnesses.

2 At the hearing, the state argued that such 

references would be irrelevant to the instant case. The state further explained that, 

if such references were permitted, the trial would “turn into a mini immigration 

proceeding regarding the status of [defendant]” and would potentially “play[] upon 

any sympathies of the jury.” The state also contended that, based on the minimal 

1 The complaining witness was a minor when the alleged acts of molestation

occurred; accordingly, we will use the pseudonym “Allison” to refer to her.

2 Although several different pretrial motions were presented to the trial justice, the 

pretrial motion with respect to the immigration status of the witnesses is the only 

issue that has been pressed on appeal.
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documentation asto defendant’simmigration proceedings provided to the state, 

any purported proceedings were “far attenuat[ed] from this case[.]”

Defense counsel responded that the “immigration status and proceedings 

* * * form the genesis of the[] allegations against [defendant].” He asserted that he

should be allowed to question Allison about whether she was aware of the 

immigration proceedings that involved both defendant and her grandmother,

Amanda DeLeone, which proceedings had taken place just three weeks before 

Allison made her accusation of sexual molestation against defendant. Defense 

counsel added that the purpose of such questioning would not be to introduce the 

contents of those proceedings, but rather simply to use the existence of those

proceedings and the events that occurred thereafter to demonstrate Allison’s 

knowledge of “how Ms. DeLeone perceived those events * * * [and] her state of 

mind after those events”—particularly with respect to Ms. DeLeone’s feelings 

toward defendant. Defense counsel added that to deny defendant the opportunity 

to question Allison as to her knowledge about the immigration proceedings “would 

be to deny a fundamental right of cross-examination.”

The trial justice ruled that he would permit defense counsel to cross-examine

Allison on “foundational question[s]”—namely, whether she was aware of the 

immigration proceedingsin which Ms. DeLeone and defendant had participated. 

Defense counsel replied to the trial justice that, if Allison “is not aware of any of 
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these proceedings, and does say no, that would be the end of it.” The trial justice 

added that he would postpone ruling on the motion in limine as it pertained to the 

testimony of a particular defensewitness—Allison’s aunt, Jackelyn Rivera3—until

the conclusion of the state’s case. Allison then began her testimony. 

On direct examination, Allison testified that, at the time of the incidents at 

issue, she was eleven or twelve years old and she lived in Central Falls, Rhode 

Island. She stated that she lived therewith her mother, her younger sister, her 

grandmother(Ms. DeLeone), and defendant,who was at that time married to Ms. 

DeLeone.

4

Allison testified that, on a typical afternoon when she was eleven or twelve

years old, she would return home from school, eat a snack in the kitchen, and then 

would make her way to the bedroom “because there [were] toys there.” Allison 

stated that, on one occasion, defendant, who had also been in the kitchen,followed

her into the bedroom. She testified that, once inside the bedroom, defendant

engaged in sexual intercourse with her. She added: “He told me * * * what he was 

going to do is normal and * * * to not say anything.” She stated that, although she 

told him to stop, she did not yell for anyone because she was scared.

3 For the sake of clarity, we shall hereafter refer to Jackelyn Rivera simply by her 

first name. We intend no disrespect.

4 Allison also testified thatJackelyn sometimes lived at the Central Falls home

with them.
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Allison testified that defendant had sexually assaulted her “[s]ix times, 

seven[,]” and she testified as to what had taken place during some of those 

incidents. She added that, on at least one other occasion, defendant told her not to 

tell anyone. Allison stated that, despite defendant’s admonitions, when she was 

thirteen years old, she told her younger sister and her pediatrician about what 

defendant had done to her.

5

 Allison testified that, after speaking to her 

pediatrician, she spoke to “[a] lot of people[,]” including representatives of the 

Department of Children, Youth, and Families; officers from the police department;

and several medical professionals.

During cross-examination, Allison testified about her relationship with her 

grandmother, Ms. DeLeone. She stated thatshe was “not really close to her” and 

that, even though her grandmother “took care of” her, they “never really talked.” 

Her testimony consisted of the following:

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Do you remember a time that 

your grandmother was mad at Carlos because of some 

issues regarding her ability to live here?

“[THE WITNESS:] No.

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Do you remember she went 

up to * * * Boston at one time and they told her she 

would have to leave the country?

“[THE WITNESS:] No.

5 Allison testified that, although she did not discuss with her mother what 

defendant had done to her, she did tell her mother, one week before she told her 

pediatrician about defendant, about instances of criminal sexual conduct against 

her in which her father had allegedly engaged. Allison added that her mother did 

not believe her. 
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“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] You don’t remember that?

“[THE WITNESS:] No.” 

At the conclusion of the state’s case-in-chief,the trial justice, adhering to his 

previously stated intention,revisited the state’s original motion in limine, which 

had sought to preclude any references to the immigration status of any of the 

witnesses, now focusing on the motion solely as it pertained to the proposed 

testimony of Jackelyn, a defense witness, who wasthe daughter of defendant and 

Ms. DeLeone. 

In arguing against the state’s motion, defense counsel made an offer of proof 

as to the testimony he expected to elicit from Jackelyn. He stated that Jackelyn

would testify that she had lived with Ms. DeLeone, Allison’s mother, and Allison 

for a number of years, during which time Ms. DeLeone freely discussed her 

immigration status. Defense counsel further stated that Jackelyn would testify that,

on January 26, 2016, she and Ms. DeLeone had gone to Boston and, on that date,

Ms. DeLeone received updated information as to the status of certain immigration 

proceedings that involved her.

6

 

During defense counsel’s argument, the trial justice inquired as follows: 

“While I understand you can bring up information of 

bias, prejudice, other types of motive, the only way under 

our rules you can do that is if it’s evidence that is 

6 The defendant also participated in immigration proceedings in Boston on January 

26, 2016, but he did not travel therewith Ms. DeLeone. They had been divorced 

well before that date.
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admissible to go before the jury. * * * What is the 

exception to the hearsay rule that a witness that you 

would call would be able to testify about something she 

heard some other family member say that wasn’t the 

[d]efendant?”

Defense counsel contendedthat Jackelyn would testify as to Ms. DeLeone’s state 

of mind that she “was upset about the outcome of those proceedings” and that,

during the car ride home from Boston,she “blamed [defendant] for the handling of 

those [immigration]proceedings.” Defense counsel indicated that Jackelyn would 

testify that Ms. DeLeone spoke freely in her home about her immigration status.

He argued that, if allowed to hear this testimony, the jury could consider it to be

circumstantial evidence of “a motive for [Allison] to fabricate these 

allegations * * * merely three weeks after” the immigration proceedings had taken

place. Defense counsel added that, because the proposedtestimony “goes to the 

basis of why [Allison] would fabricate the allegations against [defendant,]” said

testimony was “key and central” to the defense’s theory of the case. Defense 

counsel further arguedthat “a motive to fabricate is always relevant as discrediting 

the witness or affecting the weight of his or her testimony.”

The state argued that, because none of the information concerning the 

immigration proceedings was relevant to the case at hand, Jackelyn should be 

precluded from making any references to the immigration status of any of the 

witnesses or to the immigration proceedings in general. The state further 
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paraphrased the language of Rule 602 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidencewhen 

he stated: “[A] witness cannot testify to any matter unless evidence is introduced 

sufficient to support a finding that the witness had personal knowledge of the 

matter.” The state argued that, because there was no evidence that Jackelyn had 

any personal knowledge as to whether Allison knew about “any immigration 

proceedings or anything that was going on at that time for her grandmother * * * or 

the [d]efendant,” she should not be permitted to testify about what Allison might 

have known aboutsuch proceedings.

In partially granting the state’s motion in limine with respect to Jackelyn’s

testimony, the trial justice stated:

“This is a very different situation. Now the 

[s]tate’s case is over. This is a witness being called by 

the [d]efendant. That the proffer is that * * * —this 

witness for the [d]efendant is going to raise an issue of 

somehow bias or motivation for the complaining witness

to be untruthful, again understanding that the 

complaining witness has already denied any knowledge 

of it. But, more importantly, what has been proffered at 

this point in order to raise evidence before the jury, there 

needs to be admissible evidence which is an exception to 

the hearsay rule. While I understand counsel makes a 

very artful argument that well, the information should be 

considered by the jury, not for the truth of the matter 

asserted, which basically means they’re not going to 

consider it for what it actually says, but maybe the results 

of what it says.

“The Court finds that does not rise to the level of 

admissible evidence before the jury that can make this 

determination.” (Emphasis added.)
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Having addressed the threshold question of the admissibility of Jackelyn’s 

proposed testimony concerning the immigration proceedings—and concluding it 

was not admissible—the trial justice allowed Jackelyn to begin her testimony. She 

testifiedthat she was the only child born of the marriage of defendant and Ms. 

DeLeone. She stated that, for a number of years before her parents’ divorce, she

had lived at the Central Falls home with her parents and her brother. Jackelyn

testified that her father moved out of the home in February 2015 and that she 

moved out in March 2015; she moved back in 2017 and was living there at the

time of trial.

Jackelyn also testified about the events that occurred on January 26, 2016, in 

Boston and while en route back to Rhode Island. Jackelyn testified that, on that 

day, her mother told her that she was upset with someone; however, the trial justice 

would not permit Jackelyn to name that person.

In the end, the jury found defendant guilty on counts one, two, and three. 7 

The defendant was thereafter sentenced to fifty years’ imprisonment, with thirty 

years to serve and twenty years suspended, with probation, on count one; twenty 

years in prison, with twelve years to serve and eight years suspended, with 

probation, on count two (concurrent with counts one and three); and twenty years 

7At the close of the state’s case, defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal 

on all four counts. That motion was denied with respect to the first three counts; 

however, pursuant to an agreement between the parties, count four was dismissed.
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in prison, with twelve years to serve with eight years suspended, with probation, on 

count three (concurrent with counts one and two). The defendant moved for a new 

trial on the ground that the evidence presented to the jury was insufficient to 

sustain a conviction on all three counts. That motion was denied, and defendant 

thereafter timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court.

Standard of Review

When a defendant claimsthat his constitutional right to present a defense 

was violated, “we engage in a de novo review.” State v. Lopez, 943 A.2d 1035, 

1041 (R.I. 2008); see State v. Albanese, 970 A.2d 1215, 1222 (R.I. 2009). 

Additionally, “[t]his Court reviews evidentiary rulings under an abuse of discretion 

standard.” State v. Jones, 242 A.3d 47, 51 (R.I. 2020) (quoting State v. Whitfield, 

93 A.3d 1011, 1016 (R.I. 2014)). “We will reverse a trial justice’s ruling on the 

admissibility of evidence only where ‘it constitutes a clear abuse of discretion.’” 

State v. Covington, 69 A.3d 855, 862 (R.I. 2013) (quoting State v. Brown, 42 A.3d 

1239, 1242 (R.I. 2012)); see State v. Smith, 39 A.3d 669, 673 (R.I. 2012).

“Furthermore, we are disinclined to perceive an abuse of discretion so long as the 

record contains some grounds for supporting the trial justice’s decision * * *.” Ims 

v. Town of Portsmouth, 32 A.3d 914, 926 (R.I. 2011) (brackets omitted) (quoting 

State v. Pitts, 990 A.2d 185, 189-90 (R.I. 2010)).
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Discussion

On appeal, defendant argues that “the trial justice denied defendant his 

constitutional right to present a full and fair defense by unfairly limiting the 

introduction of testimony of a defense witness.” He specifically avers that, by not 

allowing Jackelyn to testify as to what occurred on the day of the immigration 

proceedings and thereafter, the trial justice thwarted counsel’s efforts to strengthen

the defense’stheory “that [Allison], who had been molested by her father years 

before, later decided to point the finger at the man responsible for her 

grandmother’s deportation troubles.” The defendant further contends that the “trial 

justice mistakenly viewed the proffered evidence as hearsay[,]” when it was 

instead being offered “to demonstrate [Allison’s] grandmother’s state of mind after 

the hearing as well as her perception that her plight was the fault of [defendant].”

This Court has explicitly recognized the principle that “[u]nder the 

Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution, the criminal defendant has the right to present his own witnesses to 

establish a defense.” State v. Bowling, 585 A.2d 1181, 1185 (R.I. 1991) (citing

Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967)). However, we have also clearly 

stated that “it is axiomatic that a defendant has no right to introduce evidence that 

is inadmissible under our well-developed rules of evidence.” State v. Scanlon, 982 

A.2d 1268, 1274 n.10 (R.I. 2009); see United States v. Pires, 642 F.3d 1, 13 (1st 
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Cir. 2011) (“[T]he right to present a defense does not trump valid rules of 

evidence.”).

We first point out that, although the trial justice did not permit any 

references to be made to the immigration status of any of the witnesses or to the 

January 26, 2016 immigration proceedings in general terms, he did permit the 

introduction of some evidence about what happened on that day. More 

specifically, the trial justice stated that the fact that he substantially granted the 

state’s motion in limine did not preclude Jackelyn from “talking about observations 

as far as physical appearance, observation of anger, things along those lines” 

caused by the events ofJanuary 26, 2016. Accordingly, while Jackelyn did not 

testify at great length concerningthe immigration proceedings, she was, contrary to 

defendant’s assertion, permitted to testify more generally about her observations on 

that day.

We turn next to defendant’s contentions with respect to hearsay. We have 

explained that “[h]earsay is ‘a statement, other than one made by the declarant 

while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 

matter asserted.’” State v. Oliveira, 961 A.2d 299, 314 (R.I. 2008) (quoting R.I. R. 

Evid. 801(c)); see State v. Brash, 512 A.2d 1375, 1379 (R.I. 1986). “Hearsay is not 

admissible except as provided by law.” Oliveira, 961 A.2d at 314 (citing R.I. R. 

Evid. 802). Hearsay is generally admissible only if it falls within one of the 
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delineated exceptions to the hearsay rule. See R.I. R. Evid. 803; see also State v. 

Bergevine, 942 A.2d 974, 978 (R.I. 2008) (“The rationale for exceptions to the rule 

against hearsay is that some statements, notwithstanding their nature as hearsay, 

possess ‘sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness so as to justify 

admission of the statement even though the declarant is available and could be 

called to testify.’”) (quoting Rule 803 Advisory Committee’s Note).

The defendant’s offer of proof indicatedthat Jackelyn would testify that, on 

January 26, 2016, she and Ms. DeLeonehad gone to Boston and, on that date, Ms. 

DeLeone received updated information as to the status of her immigration 

proceedings. It was further represented that Jackelyn would testify that Ms. 

DeLeone “was upset about the outcome of those proceedings” and that, during the 

car ride home from Boston, she “blamed [defendant] for the handling of those 

[immigration] proceedings.” Lastly, defendant indicated that, at that time, i.e.,

January 26, 2016, Allison lived with Ms. DeLeone and “they still talked freely 

about [Ms.] DeLeone’s immigration status and proceedings[.]”

8

 The defendant 

maintained that, if the jury were “allowed to hear this evidence, [it] would be able 

8

It is not clear from defendant’s offer of proof that Jackelyn would testify that Ms. 

DeLeone’s anger toward defendant over her immigration status was openly 

discussed in the Central Falls home on or after the hearing in Boston on January 

26, 2016. Jackelyn previously testified that she had moved out of the home in 

March 2015. 
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to maybe use that circumstantial evidence to potentially as a motive for [Allison] to 

fabricate these allegations a mere[] three weeks after this event.”

It is not entirelyclear from the offer of proof what exactly Jackelyn would 

have testified Ms. DeLeone said to her on the day in question. However, it is 

logical to infer that Jackelyn’stestimonywould have been hearsay and therefore 

inadmissible, including, for example, Ms. DeLeone’s conversation with her 

recounting what immigration officials in Boston said about Ms. DeLeone’s and/or 

defendant’simmigration case. It would not have been permissible for Jackelyn to 

relate what Ms. DeLeone said without it being established that the testimony fell

within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. See R.I. R. Evid. 803; Oliveira, 

961 A.2d at 314.

However, defense counsel did not allege that the testimony at issue fell 

within any of the delineated exceptions to the hearsay rule; rather, he contended 

that none of Jackelyn’s testimony would be hearsay because it was not admitted for 

the truth of the matter asserted. In this Court’s opinion, that contention was 

misguided. As we have just stated, it is clear to this Court that at least some 

portion of Jackelyn’s testimony as to what Ms. DeLeone said would have been 

admitted for the truth of the matter asserted. As defendant failed to specify what 

exceptions to the hearsay rule might apply to the proffered testimony, we cannot 

say that the trial justice abused his discretion in excluding the entirety of 
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Jackelyn’s testimony in this regard. Therefore, we are of the decided opinion that, 

as to that portion of Jackelyn’s testimony that would have constituted 

impermissible hearsay, the trial justice acted appropriately in excluding that 

testimony. See Oliveira, 961 A.2d at 314.

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial justice did not err in excluding much 

of Jackelyn’s proposed testimony.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the 

Superior Court. The record may be returned to that tribunal.

Justice Robinson, concurring. While I unhesitatingly concur in the result 

reached at the conclusion of the majority’s opinion, and while I am not without 

respect for the majority’s quest for the best analytical path to take in dealing with 

this vexing case, I find myself unable to join the majority on its chosen path. It is 

my conviction, after long reflection, that this case is best analyzed in terms of Rule 

602 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.

It will be recalled that, in the course of contending that the trial justice 

should not permit Jackelyn Rivera to testify about the immigration proceedings or 

Amanda DeLeone’s reaction to those proceedings, the prosecutor recited virtually 

verbatim the following language from Rule 602: “A witness may not testify to a 
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matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness 

has personal knowledge of the matter.” The prosecutor argued that, because there 

was no evidence that Jackelyn had any personal knowledge as to whether or not 

Allison knew about “any immigration proceedings or anything that was going on at 

that time for her grandmother * * * or the Defendant,” she should not be permitted 

to testify about what Allison might have known about such proceedings. To my 

mind, it is significant that no evidence was presented that Jackelyn ever witnessed 

Ms. DeLeone discussing the immigration issue in Allison’s presence. In fact, 

Jackelyn would have testified that the specific conversation she had with Ms. 

DeLeone, during which Ms. DeLeone indicated that she was upset with someone, 

took place in the car on the return trip from Boston; and she testified that the only 

other person present in the car was Ms. DeLeone’s new husband. Furthermore, 

given Jackelyn’s testimony indicating that she was no longer living at the home in 

Central Falls in which Allison lived as of the time of the immigration proceedings, 

there is no evidence to support an inference that she may have overheard similar 

conversations taking place in the home in Allison’s presence. 

Therefore, it is clear to me that there is insufficient evidence to show that 

Jackelyn had any knowledge about what Allison may or may not have known 

concerning the immigration proceedings. In my judgment, Rule 602 of the Rules 

of Evidence constituted an insuperable obstacle to such testimony by Jackelyn. 
- 17 -

See State v. Ranieri, 586 A.2d 1094, 1098 (R.I. 1991) (“In deciding whether a 

witness is competent for purposes of Rule 602, the trial justice must determine 

whether a witness had a sufficient opportunity to perceive the subject matter about 

which he [or she] is testifying.”) (citing Hallquist v. Local 276, Plumbers and 

Pipefitters Union, AFL-CIO, 843 F.2d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 1988) and 3 J. Weinstein & 

M. Bergen, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 602[02] at 602-12 (M.B. 1988)); see also State 

v. Reyes, 984 A.2d 606, 614 n.8 (R.I. 2009); see generally 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 93 

(June 2021 Update). Accordingly, I conclude that the trial justice did not deny the 

defendant his constitutional right to present a full and fair defense by limiting the 

scope of Jackelyn’s testimony.

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, I respectfully concur in the 

majority’s conclusion, but I am of the view that a different basis for reaching that 

conclusion is more appropriate.
SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2020)

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 

SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE

Licht Judicial Complex

250 Benefit Street

Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case State v. Carlos Rivera.

Case Number No. 2019-196-C.A.

(P1/16-2067A)

Date Opinion Filed June 29, 2021

Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and 

Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Erin Lynch Prata

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Brian P. Stern

Attorney(s) on Appeal

For State:

Owen Murphy

Department of Attorney General

For Defendant:

Megan F. Jackson

Office of the Public Defender