Filed 11/1/18; Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

PAUL ANTHONY CARETTO, 

Petitioner,

 v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS 

ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent;

THE PEOPLE,

Real Party in Interest.

 B265256

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA384603)

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. William N. 

Sterling, Judge. Petition granted.

Ronald L. Brown, Public Defender of Los Angeles County, 

Albert J. Menaster, Olivia Sula-Wang, and Mark Harvis, Deputy 

Public Defenders for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, 

Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Supervising 

Deputy Attorney General, and Mary Sanchez, Deputy Attorney 

General for Real Party in Interest.
2

_____________________________

Petitioner Paul Anthony Caretto challenges by petition for 

writ of mandate the trial court’s denial of his petition for 

resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18, a provision 

added by Proposition 47.

1 We previously denied his petition, 

holding that his felony conviction for receiving stolen property 

under section 496 was not subject to reduction to a misdemeanor 

because the fair market value of the two stolen debit cards in his 

possession was more than $950 as measured by the amounts in 

the victim’s bank accounts linked to the cards, the only evidence 

of value in the record. 

The California Supreme Court granted review and 

transferred the matter to us with directions to vacate our 

decision and reconsider the issue in light of People v. 

Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903 (Romanowski). Romanowski 

confirmed that the “ ‘reasonable and fair market value’ ” test 

from section 484 is the proper measure of the $950 value 

threshold for theft crimes. (Romanowski, at p. 914.) As applied 

to stolen access card information, the court held the fair market 

value is measured by “how much [the] stolen access card 

information would sell for” (id. at p. 915), which can include 

“evidence concerning the potential for illicit sale of the access 

card information” (id. at p. 917). 

After Romanowski, our prior ruling remains correct. 

Romanowski set the proper valuation test as fair market value 

and held that evidence of illicit sales could be considered, but the 

 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless 

otherwise indicated.
3

court did not limit the type of evidence that might be relevant to 

show fair market value. In our view, the balances in linked 

accounts could certainly be relevant evidence of the fair market 

value. But because Romanowski was decided after the trial court 

proceedings in this case, we grant Caretto’s writ petition and 

remand for the trial court to give him the opportunity to present 

evidence of the fair market value of the stolen cards consistent 

with Romanowski.

BACKGROUND

We take the facts from our prior opinion:2 Caretto was 

initially charged with attempted robbery under section 211, 

acquisition of access card account information under section 484e, 

subdivision (d), and receiving stolen property under section 496—

a driver’s license and two debit cards. He was also charged with 

possession of methamphetamine under Health and Safety Code 

section 11377. 

On May 10, 2011, Caretto was detained by the police in 

connection with an attempted robbery investigation. When he 

was searched, the police found methamphetamine. The police 

also found two stolen debit cards and a stolen driver’s license, 

all in the name of the same victim. The police questioned 

Caretto, and he denied ever using the debit cards. At the end of 

the preliminary hearing, the magistrate dismissed the robbery 

and acquisition of access card account information charges based 

upon insufficiency of evidence. 

On August 22, 2011, Caretto pled no contest to the 

remaining charges and admitted three one-year prison prior 

allegations pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b), that were 

 

2

(Caretto v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (May 19, 

2016, B265256) [nonpub. opn.].)
4

added in the amended information. Caretto was sentenced to 

four years in prison and execution of the sentence was suspended. 

He was granted four years of probation but never saw his 

probation officer and was later caught with burglary tools. 

On May 7, 2015, Caretto appeared for a probation violation 

hearing. The trial court appointed a public defender and 

suggested that a motion to reduce the charges under Proposition 

47 might be appropriate. The next day Caretto filed a one-page 

motion asking that the two charges for which he was convicted be 

reduced to misdemeanors under Proposition 47. While he alleged 

the value of the stolen property was less than $950, he did not 

identify the stolen property or attach a declaration or other 

evidence showing the value of the stolen property did not exceed 

$950.

During the May 21, 2015 hearing, the People opposed the 

motion, arguing the value of the stolen debit cards was the 

amount of funds available in the linked bank accounts. Caretto’s 

counsel disagreed and argued the value was the intrinsic value of 

the plastic cards themselves. The court asked for further briefing 

on the issue of how to determine the value of bank debit cards. 

The court suggested the prosecutor attempt to contact the victim 

to ascertain whether the bank debit cards were “valid.” The court 

stated that, although it was the defense’s burden to prove that 

the value of the debit cards was less than $950, it wanted the 

parties to “cooperate.” There was no discussion on resentencing 

of Caretto’s conviction for possession of methamphetamine under 

Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a).

On June 4, 2015, the court indicated it made no sense that 

the value would be limited to the plastic making up the card, and 

that Caretto had the burden to show the value was under $950. 
5

The court stated its belief that the value of each debit card should 

be based on the amount of money in the “appropriate account.” 

The court also indicated that if the parties uncovered facts 

showing the cards were inactive, then the court would reduce the 

charge to a misdemeanor and resentence accordingly. The court 

stated that if the evidence showed there was an ability to use the 

cards to withdraw over $950, then the motion would be denied. 

The court again continued the hearing to allow the parties to 

locate the victim. 

On June 17, 2015, the parties appeared once more.

The People provided the court with an email from the detective 

who had originally investigated the case and now had located the 

victim. The victim told the detective that the amount he had 

available for withdrawal on the two debit cards was between 

$1,500 and $1,800 (from Bank of America and Chase Bank). 

Caretto’s counsel argued that the value of the cards was “not 

necessarily the value of the plastic itself, but actually any loss 

that would determine the value as opposed to a potential and 

hypothetical amount that could have been taken.” The court 

responded, “[T]he court is finding that loss would only be relevant 

as a determining factor as to restitution. But in terms of Prop 47, 

the value of the card to me—I mean if someone has a card worth 

$2,700 and it’s stolen and someone receives it, then the value for 

receiving stolen property is the value of the card at the time . . . .” 

The court once again continued the hearing to determine if the 

parties could obtain any documentation from the victim 

supporting the detective’s email. But the court said, “If [the 

prosecutor] establishes the value is over $950, the amount that 

could be drawn over, you’ll have to have the Court of Appeal tell 

me I’m wrong.” 
6

On June 22, 2015, the trial court denied Caretto’s 

resentencing motion. He admitted violating probation and it was 

revoked. The court then scheduled a sentencing hearing. Once 

again, there was no discussion on Caretto’s request for 

resentencing of the drug possession conviction.

Caretto filed a initial petition for writ of mandate 

challenging the trial court’s valuation for his receiving stolen 

property conviction, as well as the court’s failure to reduce his 

felony conviction for possession of methamphetamine to a 

misdemeanor. On the valuation issue, he argued that the proper 

method of valuing the stolen cards was the “minimal intrinsic 

value” of the cards themselves. 

We issued an alternative writ of mandate as to the trial 

court’s denial of Caretto’s motion for resentencing of his drug 

possession conviction. In response, the trial court vacated its 

ruling as to the drug possession conviction and granted the 

petition. We then dismissed the petition as moot and Caretto 

sought review as to the trial court’s denial of resentencing of his 

section 496 conviction. Our Supreme Court granted review and 

transferred the matter to us with directions to vacate our order 

and issue an order directing respondent court to show cause why 

the relief sought in the petition should not be granted. 

We issued the order to show cause, the People filed a 

return, and petitioner filed a reply. The People argued Caretto 

bore the burden of proving eligibility under Proposition 47 and 

the trial court properly found the fair market value of the stolen 

debit cards exceeded $950 based on the balances in the accounts.

In our prior opinion, we denied Caretto’s writ. We 

characterized the issue as “whether, based on the evidence before 

it, the trial court properly valued the victim’s two debit cards 
7

found in [Caretto’s] possession for the purpose of determining 

whether [Caretto] demonstrated he was qualified for 

resentencing.” (Caretto v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,

supra, B265256, at p. 6.) We agreed with the People that the 

stolen property should be valued based on the fair market value, 

and the only evidence of fair market value in the record was the 

victim’s statement that the combined accounts had over $950 in 

them. We held that Caretto bore the burden to show entitlement 

to resentencing, and he failed to carry that burden on the record 

before us.

Caretto filed a petition for review in the California 

Supreme Court, which the court granted. It transferred the 

matter to us with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider 

the issue in light of Romanowski.

DISCUSSION

I. Proposition 47 and Romanowski

Proposition 47 amended various provisions of the Penal and 

Health and Safety Codes to reduce personal possession drug 

offenses and thefts involving less than $950 from a straight 

felony or a “wobbler,” to a straight misdemeanor. 

Proposition 47 created a new resentencing provision, 

section 1170.18, subdivision (a), which provides: “A person who, 

on November 5, 2014, was serving a sentence for a conviction, 

whether by trial or plea, of a felony or felonies who would have 

been guilty of a misdemeanor under the act that added this 

section (‘the act’) had this act been in effect at the time of the 

offense may petition for a recall of sentence before the trial court 

that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case to 

request resentencing in accordance with Sections 11350, 11357, 

or 11377 of the Health and Safety Code, or Section 459.5a, 473, 
8

476a, 490.2, 496, or 666 of the Penal Code, as those sections have 

been amended or added by this act.” (§ 1170.18, subd. (a).)

Section 496 was amended by Proposition 47, and provides 

in relevant part: “Every person who buys or receives any 

property that has been stolen or that has been obtained in any 

manner constituting theft or extortion, knowing the property to 

be so stolen or obtained, or who conceals, sells, withholds, or aids 

in concealing, selling, or withholding any property from the 

owner, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, shall be 

punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one 

year, or imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 

1170. However, if the value of the property does not exceed nine 

hundred fifty dollars ($950), the offense shall be a misdemeanor, 

punishable only by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding 

one year . . . .” (§ 496, subd. (a).)

In Romanowski, the petitioner had pleaded no contest to 

felony theft of access card information in violation of section 484e, 

subdivision (d) and sought reduction of his sentence pursuant to 

section 1170.18. (Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 906.) The 

trial court denied his petition, holding that Proposition 47 did not 

apply to theft of access card information. A panel of this Division 

reversed, holding that theft in violation of section 484e, 

subdivision (d) was subject to Proposition 47 by way of section 

490.2, which “ ‘reduces a violation of 484e, subdivision (d) to a 

misdemeanor if it involves property valued at less than $950.’ ” 

(Romanowski, supra, at p. 906.) We remanded for the trial court 

to determine whether the property involved in the petitioner’s 

conviction did not exceed $950, but did not set forth how value 

should be determined. (Ibid.)

On review, the Supreme Court affirmed. It first held that 
9

the theft of access card information as defined in section 484e, 

subdivision (d) was subject to resentencing pursuant to 

Proposition 47. The crime fell within section 490.2, which 

“reduce[d] punishment for crimes of ‘obtaining any property by 

theft’ that were previously punished as ‘grand theft’ when the 

stolen property was worth less than $950.” (Romanowski, supra, 

2 Cal.5th at p. 909.)3 

Having held the petitioner’s felony sentence was eligible for 

resentencing, the court addressed the question of how to value 

the access card information. It first noted that section 484g 

separately punishes the fraudulent use of stolen access card 

information, whereas section 484e, subdivision (d) “punishes the 

theft of an access card or access card information itself, not of 

whatever property a defendant may have obtained using a stolen 

access card or stolen information.” (Romanowski, supra, 2 

Cal.5th at p. 914.) As a result, “the $950 threshold for theft of 

access card information must reflect a reasonable approximation 

of the stolen information’s value, rather than the value of what (if 

anything) a defendant obtained using that information.” (Ibid.)

The court concluded that the proper measure is the “fair 

 

3 Section 490.2 states in relevant part, “Notwithstanding 

Section 487 or any other provision of law defining grand theft, 

obtaining any property by theft where the value of the money, 

labor, real or personal property taken does not exceed nine 

hundred fifty dollars ($950) shall be considered petty theft and 

shall be punished as a misdemeanor,” subject to certain 

exceptions. Section 484e, subdivision (d) states, “Every person 

who acquires or retains possession of access card account 

information with respect to an access card validly issued to 

another person, without the cardholder’s or issuer’s consent, with 

the intent to use it fraudulently, is guilty of grand theft.”
10

and reasonable market value” test for theft crimes set forth in 

section 484, subdivision (a). (§ 484, subd. (a) [“In determining the 

value of the property obtained, for the purposes of this section, 

the reasonable and fair market value shall be the test.”]; see 

Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 914.) “Acceptance of this 

approach was part of the backdrop against which Proposition 47 

was enacted, and Proposition 47 does not refer to any other 

approach to valuation. We thus see no basis for an alternative 

approach to valuation either in the original statutory scheme or 

in the provisions enacted by Proposition 47. Courts must use 

section 484’s ‘reasonable and fair market value’ test when 

applying section 490.2’s value threshold for theft crimes.” 

(Romanowski, supra, at p. 914.)

The court refused to adopt either party’s “all-or-nothing 

approach” to valuation, rejecting both the People’s view that the 

difficulty in valuing access card information meant the crime 

should not be reducible at all, as well as the petitioner’s view that 

the value of an access card is de minimis based upon the plastic it 

is printed on. (Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 915.) Instead, 

the court wrote: “We thus hold that the Penal Code’s reference to 

the ‘reasonable and fair market value’ requires courts to identify 

how much stolen access card information would sell for.” (Ibid.) 

As part of this inquiry, the court did not preclude a 

valuation based on illegal sales: “The fact that stolen access card 

information is not sold legally does not relieve the courts of this 

duty. This court has never suggested that the term ‘reasonable 

and fair market value’ must refer to legal market value even in 

cases where there is no legal market for the stolen property. 

When a defendant steals property that is not sold legally, 

evidence related to the possibility of illegal sales can help 
11

establish ‘reasonable and fair market value.’ Only in cases where 

stolen property would command no value on any market (legal or 

illegal) can courts presume that the value of stolen access 

information is de minimis.” (Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 

p. 915.)

Finally, the court addressed the burden of proof, holding 

that the “ultimate burden of proving section 1170.18 eligibility 

lies with the petitioner.” (Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 

p. 916.) The court explained: “In some cases, the uncontested 

information in the petition and record of conviction may be 

enough for the petitioner to establish this eligibility. When 

eligibility is established in this fashion, ‘the petitioner’s felony 

sentence shall be recalled and the petitioner sentenced to a

misdemeanor . . . unless the court, in its discretion, determines 

that resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk 

of danger to public safety.’ (§ 1170.18, subd. (b).) But in other 

cases, eligibility for resentencing may turn on facts that are not 

established by either the uncontested petition or the record of 

conviction. In these cases, an evidentiary hearing may be 

‘required if, after considering the verified petition, the return, 

any denial, any affidavits or declarations under penalty of 

perjury, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken, the 

court finds there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner 

may be entitled to relief and the petitioner’s entitlement to relief 

depends on the resolution of an issue of fact.’ ” (Romanowski, 

supra, at p. 916.)

II. Valuation of the Stolen Debit Cards

Caretto’s offense was receiving stolen property in violation 

of section 496, not theft of access card information in violation of 
12

section 484e, subdivision (c). But the valuation issue is the same 

and the reasoning in Romanowski applies with equal force. 

Caretto contended in the trial court that a debit card has only the 

minimal, intrinsic value of its plastic. As noted above, 

Romanowski rejected that approach in favor of applying the fair 

market value test. (Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 915 

[finding this “approach has no basis in the statutory language 

‘reasonable and fair market value’ ” in § 484, subd. (a)].) Caretto 

now contends the “reasonable and fair market value” cannot be 

based on the amount of money in the linked accounts because, in 

his view, “that is not how much the stolen cards would sell for.” 

Instead, he argues that because Romanowski did not preclude the 

use of black market value, he is entitled to remand for an 

opportunity to present evidence of “black market worth.”

While Romanowski approved the use of illegal sales or an 

illegal market to determine the value of stolen access card 

information, it did not purport to limit evidence to that category. 

The basic question is simply fair market value, which has been 

defined as the highest price obtainable in the marketplace. (See 

Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 915, citing People v. Tijerina

(1969) 1 Cal.3d 41, 45 [“In the absence of proof . . . that the price 

charged by a retail store from which merchandise is stolen does 

not accurately reflect the value of the merchandise in the retail 

market, that price is sufficient to establish the value of the 

merchandise”], People v. Pena (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 100, 104

[“When you have a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither of 

whom is forced to act, the price they agree upon is the highest 

price obtainable for the article in the open market. Put another 

way, ‘fair market value’ means the highest price obtainable in the

market place”], and CALCRIM No. 1801 [“Fair market value is 
13

the price a reasonable buyer and seller would agree on if the 

buyer wanted to buy the property and the seller wanted to sell it, 

but neither was under an urgent need to buy or sell.”].)

Here, we have no doubt evidence of the balances in linked 

accounts could be relevant to fixing the highest price in the 

marketplace for stolen access cards. Indeed, the value of stolen 

access cards may very well turn on the amount of money 

accessible with the card—it stands to reason that the higher the 

balance in the account, the more valuable the card giving access 

to that balance. So a court (or perhaps an expert witness) would 

likely need to know the amount of money available to an illicit 

buyer in order to place the highest value on access cards in an 

illegal market.

We take a moment here to clarify our language in People v. 

Liu (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 143 (Liu), review granted June 13, 

2018, S248130, an opinion we recently issued dealing with 

similar valuation issues under Proposition 47 and Romanowski. 

In Liu, the petitioner sought resentencing on five counts 

involving the theft of access card information in violation of 

section 484e, subdivision (d). For each count, there was evidence 

of either the amount of fraudulent charges on the stolen cards or 

how much restitution was ordered, or both. For three counts, 

both the fraudulent charges and the restitution exceeded $950; 

and for two counts, the purchases and restitution fell below $950. 

(Liu, supra, at p. 147.)

We concluded the petitioner was ineligible for resentencing 

on three counts but eligible for resentencing on two counts, based 

on the amounts fraudulently charged on the stolen cards. (Liu, 
14

supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at pp. 149–150.) In reaching our decision, 

we explained that Romanowski held that section 484e, 

subdivision (d) was subject to Proposition 47 resentencing, the 

petitioner bore the burden to show eligibility, and “courts may 

use the ‘ “reasonable and fair market value” ’ test, and may look 

to evidence of illegal sales to determine how much stolen access 

card information is worth.” (Liu, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at pp. 

148–149.) 

After noting that the defendant “contends the only method 

of valuation of stolen access card information is the fair market 

value on the black market, and that remand is necessary because 

the record here contains no evidence of fair market value,” we 

said that “Romanowski does not establish that the only method 

for valuing access card information is the fair market value test.” 

(Liu, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 149.) In our view, “[w]here, as 

here, the access card information was actually used to procure 

goods or services, common sense tells us that the unauthorized 

charges are proof of at least the minimum value of the access 

card information.” (Ibid.)

We continued: “Defendant relies heavily on the statement 

in Romanowski that: ‘[A] defendant can be convicted of violating 

section 484e, subdivision (d) even if he or she never uses the 

stolen account information to obtain any money or other 

property. So the $950 threshold for theft of access card 

information must reflect a reasonable approximation of the stolen 

information’s value, rather than the value of what (if anything) a 

defendant obtained using that information.’ (Romanowski, 

supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 914.) She also relies on the court’s 

reasoning that the reference to ‘reasonable and fair market value’ 

in section 484 (defining theft and providing guidance on the 
15

determination of the value of stolen property) ‘requires courts to 

identify how much stolen access card information would sell for.’ 

(Romanowski, at p. 915, see § 484, subd. (a).) Defendant argues 

this means that, in the case of a defendant who did use the stolen 

account information, the value of property the defendant 

obtained is irrelevant. Defendant’s argument makes no sense. 

Surely, stolen access card information would sell for at least the 

value of the property obtained by a defendant who used the 

information, and in many cases, it would sell for much more.” 

(Liu, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 149.)

Under our decision today, the outcome in Liu was correct, 

as was our reasoning. Fraudulent charges could be highly 

probative of the value of the stolen cards themselves. Where we 

spoke imprecisely was suggesting or implying that a valuation 

based on fraudulent charges is an alternative to the fair market 

value test set out in Romanowski or that the fair market value 

test is optional. It is not. The fair market value test from 

Romanowski is the controlling test for valuing stolen access card 

information for Proposition 47 purposes. (Romanowski, supra, 2 

Cal.5th at p. 914 [“Courts must use section 484’s ‘reasonable and 

fair market value’ test when applying section 490.2’s value 

threshold for theft crimes.” (Italics added.)]; id. at p. 915 [“We 

thus hold that the Penal Code’s reference to the ‘reasonable and 

fair market value’ requires courts to identify how much stolen 

access card information would sell for.” (Italics added.)].) 

Although Romanowski did say that “the $950 threshold for 

theft of access card information must reflect a reasonable 

approximation of the stolen information’s value, rather than the 
16

value of what (if anything) a defendant obtained using that 

information,” it did so because fraudulent use of access card 

information is a separate crime from acquisition and possession 

of access card information. (Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 

p. 914, italics added.) We do not interpret this statement to 

preclude the use of evidence of fraudulent charges to fix the value 

of the stolen card itself, so long as that evidence is introduced 

with the goal of determining the card’s fair market value.

In short, consistent with Romanowski and Liu, a host of 

evidence could be relevant to the fair market value of stolen 

access cards, from actual fraudulent charges and the balances in 

linked accounts to expert testimony on the illegal market for 

stolen cards. We merely reiterate that the proper analysis under 

Romanowski is the fair market value test, whatever evidentiary 

components might go into that determination in any given case.

This evidence-based approach is consistent with the 

approach of at least one other court in valuing property for 

Proposition 47 purposes. (See People v. Lowery (2017) 8 

Cal.App.5th 533 (Lowery), review granted April 19, 2017, 

S240615.) Decided just before Romanowski, Lowery involved the 

cashing of a forged check written for over $1,000, above the $950 

value limit for misdemeanor forgery in section 473, subdivision 

(b), which was set by Proposition 47. (Lowery, at p. 535.) Similar 

to Romanowski, the court rejected the parties’ all-or-nothing 

approach to value: it rejected the People’s view that the check 

was valued in the amount written on it; and it rejected the 

petitioner’s view that the check was valued at the intrinsic value 

of the paper. (Lowery, at p. 539.) Instead, the court held that the 

value of a forged check is its “actual monetary worth,” typically 

“measured by its fair market value.” (Ibid.) The court explained
17

that a check’s face value could be evidence of its value, especially 

if it was cashed. But other evidence might show a value less than 

the face value, such as if the check was poorly forged and unlikely 

to be cashed, or evidence from an expert witness of “a discounted 

price paid on the street.” (Id. at p. 541.)

In Caretto’s case, the only evidence of value presented to 

the trial court was the victim’s statement that he had a combined 

total of $1,500 to $1,800 in the two bank accounts linked to the 

stolen debit cards. The trial court was entitled to credit the 

victim’s statement to infer that the stolen debit cards would have 

been valued in the marketplace at or near the balances in the 

linked accounts, that is, the highest price someone would have 

been willing to pay for cards to access those funds. (See Evid. 

Code, § 813, subd. (a)(2) [owner of personal property is qualified 

to opine about its value]; People v. Henderson (1965) 238 

Cal.App.2d 566, 566–567 [owner of stolen watch could testify as 

to the worth of stolen watch for purposes of determining whether 

defendant was guilty of grand theft]; People v. Haney (1932) 126 

Cal.App. 473, 475–476.) But because Romanowski was decided 

after the trial court proceedings and provided critical guidance on 

how to value the stolen debit cards at issue here, we think 

Caretto should be given an opportunity to present evidence 

consistent with Romanowski in order to rebut the People’s 

showing. Thus, we will remand for further proceedings. 

DISPOSITION

The petition is granted and the matter remanded for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Having served 

its purpose, our order to show cause is discharged.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
18

BIGELOW, P. J.

We concur:

RUBIN, J.

 GRIMES, J.