UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

JAMES A. BLAIR, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) 

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 2:16-CV-21-TLS

)

MARY HARPER, and PORTER )

COUNTY CHILD SUPPORT, )

)

Defendants. )

 OPINION AND ORDER

James A. Blair, a Plaintiff proceeding pro se, filed Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983 [ECF No. 1] against the Defendants, Judge Mary Harper, and the Porter County Child

Support Division. He also filed a Petition to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs

[ECF No. 2]. For the reasons set forth below, the Plaintiff’s Petition is DENIED. The Plaintiff’s

Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii),

and he is GRANTED additional time to amend his Complaint, accompanied either by the

statutory filing fee or another Petition to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs. If the

Plaintiff fails to amend his Complaint within the time allowed, the Clerk will be directed to close

this case without further notice to the Plaintiff.

DISCUSSION

Ordinarily, a plaintiff must pay a statutory filing fee to bring an action in federal court. 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, the federal in forma pauperis (IFP) statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915,

provides indigent litigants an opportunity for meaningful access to the federal courts despite

their inability to pay the costs and fees associated with that access. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319 (1989). To authorize a litigant to proceed IFP, a court must make two determinations:

first, whether the litigant is unable to pay the costs of commencing the action, 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a)(1); and second, whether the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

Under the first inquiry, an indigent party may commence an action in federal court,

without prepayment of costs and fees, upon submission of an affidavit asserting an inability “to

pay such costs or give security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Here, the Plaintiff’s Petition

establishes that he is unable to prepay the filing fee.

The inquiry does not end here, however. In assessing whether a petitioner may proceed

IFP, the court must look to the sufficiency of a complaint to determine whether it can be

construed as stating a claim for which relief can be granted or seeks monetary relief against a

defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B). District courts have the

power under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen complaints even before service of the

complaint on the defendants, and must dismiss the complaint if it fails to state a claim. Rowe v.

Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999). Courts apply the same standard under § 1915(e)(2)(B)

as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Luevano

v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1018, 1027 (7th Cir. 2013).

To state a claim under the federal notice pleading standards, all that a complaint must do

is set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Factual allegations are accepted as true and need only give “‘fair

notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” EEOC v. Concentra Health

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Serv., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776–77 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (other citation omitted). However, a plaintiff’s allegations must show that

his entitlement to relief is plausible, rather than merely speculative. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526

F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir. 2008). 

According to the Complaint, the Plaintiff is suing the child support division because it

never advised him of his rights, improperly charged him support for a child that is not his, and

did not comply with federal guidelines. The Defendant names Porter County Judge Mary Harper

as a Defendant because she “did not read the case file” and he was denied his right to appeal his

case. (Pl.’s Compl. 2.) The relief the Plaintiff seeks is “case dismissal[].” (Id. 3.)

It is apparent that the Plaintiff’s claims stem from a lawsuit originating in an Indiana state

court. This Court does not have jurisdiction to review or reverse orders issued in a state court

case. See Gilbert v. Ill. Bd. of Educ., 591 F.3d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 2010); Lewis v. Anderson, 308

F.3d 768, 771–72 (7th Cir. 2002) (observing that under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “lower

federal courts do not have jurisdiction to conduct direct review of state court decisions.”). In

essence, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “prevents a state-court loser from bringing suit in federal

court in order effectively to set aside the state-court judgment.” Gilbert, 591 F.3d at 900. The

doctrine applies “even though the state court judgment might be erroneous or even

unconstitutional.” Id. “[A] plaintiff may not seek a reversal of a state court judgment simply by

casting his complaint in the form of a civil rights action.” Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 754 (7th

Cir. 1993) (quoting Hagerty v. Succession of Clement, 749 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir.1984)). 

A federal court is free to entertain claims that are independent of any state court

proceedings. Gilbert, 591 F.3d at 900. Here, the Court cannot discern any such independent

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claims from the Plaintiff’s Complaint—at least not any that give fair notice of what the claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests. Rather, all of the alleged injuries appear to have resulted

from the state court judgment itself. To the extent the Plaintiff wants an injunction that will alter

the state court’s child support decision, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a jurisdictional bar. This

Court has no authority to review, reverse, or dismiss the orders of the state court as the Plaintiff

requests. 

Moreover, even assuming that the Plaintiff has raised some claim that survives the

Rooker-Feldman bar, he could not sue the state court judge for damages, since she is entitled to

absolute immunity for acts performed in her judicial capacity. See Dawson v. Newman, 419 F.3d

656, 660–61 (7th Cir. 2005). His remedy was “through appellate process,” not a civil rights suit.

Id. at 661.

The Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees will be denied, and the

Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). But the

Court will grant the Plaintiff until February 18, 2016, to file an amended complaint. See

Luevano, 722 F.3d at 1022 (litigant proceeding under IFP statute has the same right to amend a

complaint as fee-paying plaintiffs have). If the Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, he

must also file a new Petition to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs or pay the filing

fee. If the Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint by February 18, 2016, the Court will

direct the Clerk to close this case.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the Plaintiff’s Petition to Proceed Without

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Prepayment of Fees and Costs [ECF No.2], and DISMISSES the Complaint WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. The Plaintiff is GRANTED until February 18, 2016, to file an amended complaint,

accompanied by a new Petition to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs or the filing

fee.

SO ORDERED on January 25, 2016.

 s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

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