COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Petty, Alston and Senior Judge Willis 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

ANA B. JAMISON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY 

v. Record No. 2785-09-2 JUDGE JERE M.H. WILLIS, JR. 

 JULY 6, 2010 

HOWARD GOLD JAMISON 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 

Michael C. Allen, Judge 

 Henry W. McLaughlin (Central Virginia Legal Aid Society, Inc., on 

brief), for appellant. 

 No brief or argument for appellee. 

 On appeal from the suspension of Howard Gold Jamison’s (husband) obligation to her for 

spousal support, Ana B. Jamison (wife) contends the trial court erred in finding a material change of 

circumstances since entry of the parties’ final decree of divorce on May 30, 2008. She argues that at 

the time of the entry of the final decree, husband was unemployed and receiving no unemployment 

compensation and that he was in the same position at the time of the October 2009 order suspending 

spousal support payments. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

BACKGROUND 

“On review, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing 

in the trial court.” Schoenwetter v. Schoenwetter, 8 Va. App. 601, 605, 383 S.E.2d 28, 30 

(1989). 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 
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On May 30, 2008, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce, awarding wife $350 

per month in spousal support. The decree recited that husband’s income was $3,294 per month, 

that he had no “earnings from the flea market business,” nor did he “have any earnings in 

addition to his salary from Cavalier Telephone.” Pursuant to Code § 20-107.1, the final decree 

provided certain notices, including each party’s employer. The decree originally stated 

husband’s employer as “Cavalier Telephone.” However, this entry was struck through and 

“unemployed” was written in longhand. 

Husband was laid off by Cavalier Telephone on March 21, 2008. He received nine 

weeks of severance pay. Shortly after being laid off, he filed for unemployment compensation; 

but was ineligible due to his severance pay. His application for unemployment compensation 

was re-opened on May 25, 2008. He received compensation from June 7, 2008 until December 

28, 2008 and from January 13, 2009 until March 21, 2009. Since the cessation of unemployment 

compensation, he earned a nominal amount (ranging from approximately $375 to $662 per 

month) from his flea market business. Although he applied for approximately 200 jobs, he was 

unable to find new employment. 

Husband testified that there was a delay between the time of the final hearing, in which 

he testified about his income at Cavalier Telephone, until the entry of the final decree of divorce, 

at which time he had been laid off from Cavalier Telephone.1

On August 5, 2009, husband moved to reduce or terminate his spousal support obligation 

because of his loss of income. On October 26, 2009, the trial court suspended husband’s spousal 

support obligation after the October 2009 payment. Wife timely noted her appeal. 

1

 According to the final decree of divorce, the trial court heard the evidence ore tenus on 

August 17, 2007, and notified counsel of its rulings by conference call on December 7, 2007. 

The trial court entered the final decree on May 30, 2008. There is no evidence in the record as to 

how or when the trial court was notified of the change in husband’s employment situation. 
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ANALYSIS 

Wife argues that the trial court erred in suspending the spousal support payments because 

there was no material change of circumstances since the entry of the final decree. She argues 

that husband’s employment situation and income in October 2009 was the same as on May 30, 

2008, when the trial court entered the final decree. 

“The determination whether a spouse is entitled to [a reduction or increase in spousal] 

support, and if so how much, is a matter within the discretion of the [trial] court and will not be 

disturbed on appeal unless it is clear that some injustice has been done.” Dukelow v. Dukelow, 2 

Va. App. 21, 27, 341 S.E.2d 208, 211 (1986) (citations omitted). 

“Upon [the] petition of either party the court may [modify] . . . spousal support and 

maintenance . . . as the circumstances may make proper.” Code § 20-109. “The moving party in 

a petition for modification of support is required to prove both a material change in 

circumstances and that this change warrants a modification of support.” Schoenwetter, 8 

Va. App. at 605, 383 S.E.2d at 30 (citation omitted). The material change in circumstances 

“must bear upon the financial needs of the dependent spouse or the ability of the supporting 

spouse to pay.” Hollowell v. Hollowell, 6 Va. App. 417, 419, 369 S.E.2d 451, 452 (1988). 

Here, the trial court held that a material change of circumstances had occurred “in light of 

evidence showing the cessation, then resumption, then ultimate termination of Howard Jamison’s 

unemployment benefits, all occurring after entry of the [final] decree, leaving him with no source 

of income.” 

The parties and the trial court knew of husband’s unemployment situation at the time of 

the final decree because the final decree states that husband was “unemployed.” However, at the 

time, husband was receiving severance pay and applying for unemployment compensation. 

Contrary to wife’s argument, husband’s financial situation had changed since the entry of the 
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final decree, because in October 2009, he no longer received severance pay or unemployment 

compensation, but received only a minimal amount of income from his flea market business. 

The record supports the trial court’s finding of a material change of circumstances 

justifying the suspension of husband’s spousal support obligation. Accordingly, we affirm the 

judgment of the trial court. 

Affirmed.