UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

LaSANDRA NORMAN, )

 a/k/a Beyonc’e, )

)

Plaintiff )

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 2:16-CV-113 RLM 

)

B.E.T. TELEVISION, )

)

Defendant )

MEMORANDUM and ORDER

This cause is before the court on the motion of B.E.T. Entertainment

Television to clarify the July 18, 2016 Memorandum and Order dismissing

LaSaldra Norman’s claims against defendants Stephen Hill, Debra Lee, and Wendy

(Hunter) Williams under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of

personal jurisdiction over those defendants. B.E.T. says that because that

Memorandum and Order failed to address its request for dismissal of Ms.

Norman’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) and

12(b)(6), the court should clarify whether B.E.T.’s motion remains under

advisement.

The defendants’ motion to dismiss and memorandum in support indicate

in their introductory paragraphs that the motion and memorandum were

submitted on behalf of B.E.T. Television, LLC and the “individual defendants,” but

defendant B.E.T. is referenced nowhere else in the motion or memorandum.

Specific arguments are made on behalf of the “individual defendants,” and Section
IV of the memorandum sets forth arguments for dismissal of certain portions of

the complaint (ironically complaining about the lack of specificity as to the

defendants), but none of the memorandum’s arguments state their relationship

to B.E.T. The court wasn’t inclined to engage in guesswork as to the applicability

of the arguments to B.E.T. United States v. Zambrano, No. 08 CR 746, 2011 WL

4565796, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2011) (“A district judge is not compelled to

respond to undeveloped arguments.”).

In the current motion asking the court to clarify the July 18 Memorandum

and Order, B.E.T. clarifies that in the defendants’ motion to dismiss, B.E.T.

sought dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint “on grounds of improper venue (Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(3)) and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)).” Mot. to Clarify, ¶ 1. With that clarification, the court will

address the Rule 12(b)(3) and Rule 12(b)(6) arguments of the motion to dismiss as

having been made on behalf of B.E.T.

FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B)(3)

Rule 12(b)(3) permits dismissal of an action for improper venue. FED. R. CIV.

P. 12(b(3). “Analysis of the Rule 12(b)(3) dismissal motion begins with the question

of whether venue is, in fact, improper in this district.” Brantley v. Luxottica Retail

North America, Inc., No. 14-cv-561, 2014 WL 4370848, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 3,

2014) (emphasis in original). In a civil action, venue is proper in, among other

places, “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions

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giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of the property that is the

subject of the action is situated.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

Section III of the motion to dismiss claims that venue is improper with

respect to the “individual defendants” because they don’t reside in Indiana and

they have no contacts in Indiana. Defts. Memo., at 8. B.E.T. isn’t mentioned in

Section III, so the remaining statement in that paragraph – “plaintiff does not

allege that any relevant act occurred in Indiana” – will be viewed as the basis for

B.E.T.’s improper venue argument. Defts. Memo., at 8. Because B.E.T. offers

nothing more, and, as discussed in more detail below, the allegations of Ms.

Norman’s complaint are unclear and non-specific as to B.E.T., the court cannot

find that B.E.T. has established that venue is improper in this district with respect

to B.E.T. See Interlease Aviation Investors II (Aloha) L.L.C. v. Vanguard Airlines,

Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 898, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (“The requirements of § 1391(a)(2)

‘may be satisfied by a communication transmitted to or from the district in which

the cause of action was filed, given a sufficient relationship between the

communication and the cause of action.’”) (quoting Fogelson v. Iatrides, No. 99 C

6892, 2000 WL 631293, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 12, 2000)).

B.E.T.’s motion to dismiss based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3)

must be denied.

FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B)(6)

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint

that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must meet the “notice pleading” requirement of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) that the complaint set forth “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” so the

defendant has “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which

it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley

v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). “Although the bar to survive a motion to

dismiss is not high, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bonte v. U.S. Bank,

N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 463 (7th Cir. 2010). A plaintiff “must do better than putting

a few words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest

that something has happened to her that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson

v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original); see

also 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 1216, at 235-236 (3d ed. 2004) (“[T]he pleading must contain something more

. . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally

cognizable right of action.”). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, a court

must accept as true the factual allegations of the complaint and draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff without engaging in fact-finding.

Reynolds v. CB Sports Bar, Inc., 623 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 2010). 

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Liberally construing the allegations of Ms. Norman’s complaint, Perez v.

Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Because Perez’s complaint is pro se,

we construe it liberally, holding it to a less stringent standard than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.”), Ms. Norman appears to be complaining about

“criminal behaviors,” sexual harassment, race and gender discrimination, and

copyright violations. The complaint, though, doesn’t contain “a short and plain

statement” of the specific claims being asserted against defendant B.E.T.,see Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”);

doesn’t allege any of the elements necessary to suggest violations by B.E.T. of 42

U.S.C. § 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.,

or the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.; doesn’t identify specific actions or

inactions by B.E.T. that would give B.E.T. “fair notice of what the claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; and

doesn’t set forth sufficient factual allegations as to B.E.T. that “state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 

The court GRANTS the motion of B.E.T. Television to clarify [docket # 32]

and DISMISSES Ms. Norman’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim against B.E.T. Television upon which

relief can be granted. Ms. Norman is AFFORDED twenty days from this date to file

an amended complaint.

SO ORDERED

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ENTERED: July 25, 2016 

 /s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr. 

Judge, United States District Court

cc: L. Norman

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