UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

TERRI G. MARTIN, 

 Plaintiff, 

 

v. 

 

ANTHONY COPELAND, et al., 

 Defendants. 

 Case No.: 2:16-CV-59-JVB-JEM 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 Terri G. Martin sued the City of East Chicago, its mayor, and three other individuals in 

connection with her employment termination in October 2015. East Chicago moved for partial 

dismissal. (DE 9.) The four individual Defendants also moved for dismissal. (DE 11.) 

A. Standard for evaluating a motion to dismiss

 The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim 

is to test the sufficiency of the pleadings, not to decide the merits of the case. See Gibson v. Chi., 

910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). Rule 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint must contain “a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” However, 

“recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 

suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).1

                                                            

1

In Twombly, the Supreme Court “retooled federal pleading standards, retiring the oft-quoted 

[Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 42, 47 (1957)] formulation that a pleading ‘should not be dismissed 

for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the [pleader] can prove no set of 
2 

As the Supreme Court has stated, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the 

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. Rather, “a 

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A complaint is facially 

plausible if a court can reasonably infer from factual content in the pleading that the defendant is 

liable for the alleged wrongdoing. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

The Seventh Circuit has synthesized the standard into three requirements. See Brooks v. 

Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). “First, a plaintiff must provide notice to defendants of 

her claims. Second, courts must accept a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, but some factual 

allegations will be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice to 

defendants of the plaintiff’s claim. Third, in considering the plaintiff’s factual allegations, courts 

should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or 

conclusory legal statements.” Id.

B. Plaintiff’s complaint

 Martin alleges the following: 

She entered into an employment contract on December 17, 2014, with the East Chicago 

Board of Health to act as its Director from January 1, 2015, to December 31, 2017. The contract 

says Martin may be removed from her position only for cause after a hearing by the East 

Chicago Board of Health. 

                                                            

facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank 

Nevada, N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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 Mayor Copeland “looked with disfavor” on Martin’s handling of certain matters—Martin 

doesn’t say why—and as a result the individual Defendants conspired to terminate Martin’s 

employment. 

 On October 13, 2015, Dabertin and Favella delivered a letter to Martin signed by 

Browning, terminating Martin’s employment without a hearing. Dabertin and Favella demanded 

Martin turn over various items, and they confined her in her office and intimidated her. 

 Martin purports to bring § 1983 claims under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments. She claims the contract created a property interest in her employment protected by 

the Fourteenth Amendment. She claims she did not receive a pre-termination hearing or 

opportunity to object. She claims political considerations of the Defendants motivated the 

termination. She claims Defendants retaliated against her for exercising her rights in the 

performance of her duties. 

 Martin also purports to bring state claims for intentional tortious interference with 

contract, confinement, intimidation, and defamation. 

C. Discussion 

(1) Defendant East Chicago’s motion to dismiss 

(a) Defamation 

 Defendant East Chicago seeks dismissal of the defamation claim because the complaint 

does not state the specific defamatory statement, nor does the Complaint allege East Chicago 

published any statement. In her response, Plaintiff Martin failed to address these arguments. 
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 The Supreme Court of Indiana considers it a matter of hornbook law that a plaintiff must 

include the alleged defamatory statement in the complaint. Trail v. Boys & Girls Clubs Nw. Ind., 

845 N.E.2d 130, 136–37 (Ind. 2006). And even under the liberal federal pleading standards, 

Plaintiff failed to state a defamation claim because she failed to put East Chicago on notice 

regarding the claim’s basis. Plaintiff has not alleged who said what, even by way of paraphrase. 

 Moreover, Plaintiff waived her defamation claim by failing to respond to East Chicago’s 

arguments for its dismissal. Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.S., 624 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2010). 

 The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s defamation claim against Defendant East 

Chicago. 

(b) Tortious interference with contract 

 Defendant East Chicago seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s tortious-interference claim on the 

ground that this tort requires the action of an independent third party. East Chicago argues it is 

not an independent third party because one of the parties to the contract—the East Chicago 

Board of Health—is an instrumentality of East Chicago. Therefore, the argument goes, East 

Chicago is not an independent third party whose actions could give rise to a claim for tortious 

interference with contract. 

 Although Plaintiff addressed this claim in her response to East Chicago’s motion to 

dismiss, Plaintiff failed to address the argument that East Chicago cannot be liable for this claim 

because it is not a third party with respect to the contract. Plaintiff presented no argument against 

East Chicago’s assertion that the East Chicago Board of Health, which was a party to the 

contract, is an instrumentality of East Chicago such that East Chicago is not a third party. 
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 The Supreme Court of Indiana recognizes that a party cannot interfere with its own 

contracts, so only third parties can commit tortious interference with contract. Trail, 845 N.E.2d 

at 138. 

 Plaintiff waived any argument against the applicability of Trail. 

 The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant East Chicago for 

tortious interference with contract. 

(c) Confinement 

Defendant East Chicago seeks dismissal of the confinement claim against it on the 

grounds that the complaint lacks supporting facts and presents only labels and conclusions. But 

the complaint does not lack supporting facts. Plaintiff claims that when Defendants Dabertin and 

Favella delivered the termination letter to Plaintiff on October 13, 2015, they “kept the Plaintiff 

confined in her office, until she turned over various items of personal property which they 

demanded . . . .” (Compl., DE 1, ¶ 17.) 

This allegation does not provide every detail of the occurrence, but it provides enough 

details to give East Chicago fair notice of the claim. Plaintiff provides the date and location, the 

names of the alleged confiners, and the context of the occurrence. Plaintiff provides more than 

mere labels and conclusions. East Chicago has not demonstrated that this claim is facially 

implausible. 

The Court denies Defendant East Chicago’s motion to dismiss the confinement claim. 
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(d) Intimidation

 Plaintiff alleges “intentional tortious acts of . . . intimidation . . . .” (Compl., DE 1, ¶ 32.) 

Defendant East Chicago moved to dismiss this claim without addressing the issue of whether 

Indiana recognizes such a claim, let alone what its elements are. Instead, East Chicago focuses 

on whether the facts are sufficient. 

 The movant bears the burden on a motion to dismiss to establish the legal insufficiency of 

the complaint. Yeksigian v. Nappi, 900 F.2d 101, 104 (7th Cir. 1990). 

As East Chicago failed to carry its burden, the Court denies the motion to dismiss the 

intimidation claim against it, without deciding anything further regarding this claim. 

(2) Individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss 

(a) Section 1983 official-capacity claims 

 Plaintiff’s complaint purports to bring § 1983 claims against each individual Defendant in 

his official capacity and individual capacity. 

Defendants Copeland, Dabertin, Favella, and Browning (“individual Defendants”) moved 

to dismiss the § 1983 claims against them in their official capacities on the grounds that officialcapacity claims are actually claims against the governmental entity and are duplicative of the 

claims against the named governmental entity. 

Section 1983 allows a party to sue a “person” in his individual or official capacity, or 

both. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Official-capacity 

suits are “another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Id. 

at 690 n.55. An official-capacity suit is not a suit against the government official individually, 

but against the local government entity. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). An 
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individual-capacity suit, on the other hand, seeks to impose personal liability on an individual 

who, under color of state law, custom, or policy, violates someone’s constitutional rights. Id.

Here, Plaintiff named East Chicago itself as a Defendant. The official-capacity claims 

against the individual Defendants are duplicative of the claim against East Chicago. Accordingly, 

the Court dismisses the official-capacity claims against the individual Defendants. 

(b) Section 1983 individual-capacity claims

 The individual Defendants also seek dismissal of the § 1983 individual-capacity claims 

against them. These Defendants correctly note that an individual is only liable in a § 1983 action 

if he caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation. Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 

869 (7th Cir. 1983). 

 The individual Defendants argue that all the actions the complaint alleges they performed 

were performed in their official capacities. The individual Defendants argue that the complaint 

does not allege they stepped outside their roles with East Chicago and became personally 

involved in the alleged constitutional deprivations. They further argue that the individualcapacity claims are duplicative. 

 But these arguments miss the mark. 

The mere fact that an individual who causes a constitutional deprivation is an official 

employed by a government entity does not insulate that individual from individual-capacity 

liability. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27–28 (1991) (“The requirement of action under color of 

state law means that Hafer may be liable for discharging respondents precisely because of her 
8 

authority as auditor general. We cannot accept the novel proposition that this same official 

authority insulates Hafer from suit.”) 

Nor is an individual-capacity claim duplicative of a claim against the government entity. 

See Hafer, 502 U.S. 21. 

 The relevant question is: did these individual Defendants cause or participate in a 

constitutional deprivation? Wolf-Lillie, 699 F.2d at 869. 

 At this stage, the individual Defendants have not established that Plaintiff failed to allege 

facts supporting plausible individual-capacity claims against them. The Court therefore denies 

the motion to dismiss the individual-capacity claims. 

(c) Defamation 

 Like East Chicago, the individual Defendants seek dismissal of the defamation claim 

because the complaint does not state the specific defamatory statement, nor does it allege 

publication of any statement. In her response to this motion, Plaintiff Martin again failed to 

address these arguments. 

 For the same reasons given above regarding dismissal of the defamation claim against 

East Chicago, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s defamation claim against the individual 

Defendants. 

(d) Tortious interference with contract 

 The individual Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s tortious-interference claim on the 

ground that this tort requires the action of an independent third party. The individual Defendants 
9 

argue they are employees and agents of East Chicago, of which the East Chicago Board of 

Health is an instrumentality, and therefore they are not independent third parties to the East 

Chicago Board of Health’s contract. 

 In her response, Plaintiff failed to address the argument that the individual Defendants 

cannot be liable for this claim because they are not third parties to the contract. 

 As noted above, the Supreme Court of Indiana recognizes that a party cannot interfere 

with its own contracts, so only third parties can commit tortious interference with contract. Trail, 

845 N.E.2d at 138. Moreover, Plaintiff waived any argument against the applicability of Trail. 

 The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the individual Defendants for 

tortious interference with contract. 

(e) Confinement 

The individual Defendants seek dismissal of the confinement claim against them on the 

grounds that the complaint lacks supporting facts and presents only labels and conclusions. But, 

as noted above, the complaint does not completely lack supporting facts. Plaintiff claims that 

when Defendants Dabertin and Favella delivered the termination letter to Plaintiff on October 13, 

2015, they “kept the Plaintiff confined in her office, until she turned over various items of 

personal property which they demanded . . . .” (Compl., DE 1, ¶ 17.) 

This allegation does not provide every detail of the occurrence, but it provides enough 

details to give Defendants Dabertin and Favella fair notice of the claim. Dabertin and Favella 

have not demonstrated that this claim is facially implausible. 
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The complaint does not, however, state facts to support a plausible confinement claim 

against Defendants Copeland and Browning. 

The Court therefore dismisses the confinement claim against Copeland and Browning, 

but denies the motion to dismiss the confinement claim against Dabertin and Favella. 

(f) Intimidation

 Plaintiff alleges “intentional tortious acts of . . . intimidation . . . .” (Compl., DE 1, ¶ 32.) 

Like East Chicago, the individual Defendants moved to dismiss this claim without addressing the 

issue of whether Indiana recognizes such a claim, let alone what its elements are. 

As Dabertin and Favella failed to carry their burden at this stage, the Court denies the 

motion to dismiss the intimidation claim against them, without deciding anything further 

regarding this claim. 

Copeland and Browning, however, have carried their burden at this stage. As the 

complaint lacks facts supporting a plausible claim that they committed intentional tortious acts of 

intimidation against Plaintiff, the Court dismisses the intimidation claim against them. 

D. Conclusion

 The Court GRANTS Defendant East Chicago’s motion for partial dismissal (DE 9) in 

part and DENIES it in part. The Court dismisses: 

a. Plaintiff’s defamation claim against East Chicago; and 

b. Plaintiff’s tortious-interference claims against East Chicago. 

In all other respects the Court denies the motion. 
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 The Court GRANTS the individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss (DE 11) in part and 

DENIES it in part. The Court dismisses: 

a. Plaintiff’s official-capacity federal claims against the individual 

Defendants; 

b. Plaintiff’s defamation claim against the individual Defendants; 

c. Plaintiff’s tortious-interference claim against the individual Defendants; 

d. Plaintiff’s confinement claim against Copeland and Browning; and 

e. Plaintiff’s intimidation claim against Copeland and Browning. 

In all other respects the Court denies the motion. 

SO ORDERED on January 17, 2017. 

 s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

 JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE