UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

SAM RALEV, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO. 2:16-CV-350-JPK

)

PATRICK ROBINSON, JR., )

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Patrick Robinson, Jr’s Motion to 

Enforce a Settlement. (DE 217). Plaintiff Sam Ralev filed a Response to Defendant’s 

Motion to Enforce a Settlement (DE 221) and Defendant filed a Reply in Support of 

Motion to Enforce a Settlement (DE 223).1

I. Background

The Court assumes familiarity with the myriad continuances and other procedural 

issues in this case. However, before moving on to the substance of the settlement 

negotiations, it is worth noting that the Court has time and again attempted to make 

accommodations for Plaintiff’s circumstances and pro se status.2 Nevertheless, all parties, 

1 Subsequent to the instant motion, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Reinstate Pretrial and Trial 

Conferences (DE 219) and a Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 227). Since the Court is 

granting Defendant’s Motion to Enforce Settlement, these motions will be denied without 

prejudice to Plaintiff re-filing them in the event Defendant fails to fulfill the terms of the 

settlement. 

2 Defense counsel, while continuing to zealously represent their client, also attempted to 

work with Plaintiff towards a resolution of this matter in a courteous and professional 

manner. 

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including those proceeding pro se, are required to follow applicable rules. Those rules are 

meant “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 

proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.

To allow this case to persist any longer would run contrary to a negotiated 

settlement and unduly prejudice Defendant. At an earlier point in this litigation, although 

admittedly at a time when this case had perhaps already run past a “just, speedy, and 

inexpensive determination,” the Court allowed Plaintiff’s counsel to withdraw. (DE 70). 

Before doing so, the Court cautioned Plaintiff that he had a right to object to his attorney’s 

motion to withdraw, and that if the motion was granted he would be proceeding pro se, 

as there is no right to counsel in civil cases. (Transcript, 7/11/2019 at 4, DE 122). The 

Court also explained that Plaintiff would be bound by court rules, including the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure, even if he proceeded pro se. (Id. at 7). Despite all of this, Plaintiff 

agreed to his attorney’s withdrawal. (Id. at 8). And, of course, this required resetting trial 

dates while Plaintiff attempted to obtain counsel. Numerous deadlines were missed, and 

perhaps most importantly Plaintiff failed to appear at the Final Pretrial Conference (DE 

94), despite an explicit warning that such actions could result in sanctions, including 

dismissal of his claims (DE 75). While Plaintiff and his claims may not have warranted 

such actions, the Court attempted to recruit counsel out of perhaps an overabundance of 

caution, yet was unsuccessful in doing so. (DE 149). When Plaintiff did hire another 

attorney, that attorney also withdrew, after the Plaintiff filed a “Notice of Termination of 

Client/Attorney Relations.” (DE 146, 149). Again, the deadlines for pretrial filings were 

moved. (DE 149). The day prior to the Final Pretrial Conference, the Court was notified 

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that the parties settled. (DE 216). While not dispositive of the Motion to Enforce a

Settlement, there is little to suggest Plaintiff would provide the required cooperation to 

allow this matter to proceed to trial, even in the event the Court set it once again on the 

trial calendar. 

The Defendant has presented the following facts in support of his Motion to 

Enforce a Settlement. (DE 217). The Court held a hearing (DE 226), and now finds not 

only that Defendant’s asserted facts are true and accurate but also that Plaintiff himself 

indicated a desire to resolve this dispute with Defendant, see (Transcript, 10/18/2021 at 

12:9-24, DE 229). 

On Tuesday, July 6, 2021, Plaintiff made an offer to settle the matter for $25,000. 

(DE 217 at 12, Motion to Enforce a Settlement at Ex. A). The only qualification of the offer 

was that it expired at 5:00 PM that day. (Id.). At 1:07 p.m. that day, well before the 

deadline Plaintiff set forth, Defendant accepted Plaintiff’s offer of settlement. (Id. at 10-

11). Plaintiff confirmed receipt of the email sent by Defendant’s counsel accepting the 

settlement. (Id. at 10). Subsequently, both Plaintiff and Defendant exchanged additional 

terms, none of which were accepted by the other side. Plaintiff wanted to add a future 

fund for lost wages, and a published settlement. (DE 217 at 15-16 (Motion to Enforce a 

Settlement at Exs. C-D). Defendant sought a release involving parties in addition to the 

named Defendant, among other things. (DE 217 at 13-14, Motion to Enforce a Settlement

at Exs. B-C).

The hearing on this matter cleared up a few issues. First, Defendant, who was 

seeking a release, did not view the terms of that release as material to settlement. See 

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(Transcript, 10/18/2021, at 10:12-14, DE 229 (“[W]e are not saying that [ ] anything that 

is in the release, other than [ ] what was in the email is part of the essential terms of the 

contract.”)). Second, Plaintiff agreed he did not “wish to use any language that would 

insinuate that [Defendant] -- or make him liable in any way that would affect his life or 

any type of language of that sort.” (Id. at 12:15-18). Plaintiff also indicated that he 

understood that when Defendant accepted his offer, that would terminate this litigation. 

(Id. at 18:11-13). 

II. Analysis

State law governs “[i]ssues regarding the formation, construction, and 

enforceability” of contracts, including agreements to settle federal lawsuits. Pohl v. United 

Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 336, 338 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Lewis v. Sch. Dist. #70, 648 F.3d 484, 

486 n.1 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Whether a settlement agreement is binding is an issue governed 

by the law of the state in which the parties executed the agreement.”). Under Indiana law, 

“[a] meeting of the minds of the contracting parties, having the same intent, is essential 

to the formation of a contract.” Janky v. Batistatos, 559 F. Supp. 2d 923, 929 (N.D. Ind. 2008) 

(quoting Zimmerman v. McColley, 826 N.E. 2d 71, 77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)). In cases where 

a purported acceptance “varies the terms of the offer,” it “operates as a counteroffer.” 

Martinez v. Belmonte, 765 N.E. 2d 180, 183 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting I.C.C. Protective 

Coatings, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 695 N.E.2d 1030, 1034–35 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)); see 

also Janky, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 929. Of course, once an offer is accepted, a binding contract 

exists that either party may enforce, absent defenses not at issue here. See, e.g.,

Zimmerman, 826 N.E.2d at 76 (“It is established law that if a party agrees to settle a 

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pending action, but then refuses to consummate his settlement agreement, the opposing 

party may obtain a judgment enforcing the agreement.”); Bain v. Bd. of Trs. of Starke 

Memorial Hosp., 550 N.E.2d 106, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that settlement 

agreement is culminated once an offer has been accepted); see also Pohl v. United Airlines, 

Inc., 110 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (“If one party ‘transmit[s] a clear and 

unambiguous settlement offer which [is] accepted by the [other party] ... the parties 

[have] reached a binding settlement agreement.’” (quoting Klebes v. Forest Lake Corp., 607 

N.E.2d 978, 982-83 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)), aff’d, 213 F.3d 336 (7th Cir. 2000).

Plaintiff’s subsequent “negotiations” clearly changed the terms of the deal, 

attempting to increase the amount of money he would receive. The potentially broad 

nature of Defendant’s proposed release is another matter. The release sought to keep the 

deal but proposed additional language. This would only doom Defendant’s efforts to 

enforce the settlement if such language concerned a material term. See Janky, 559 F. Supp.

2d at 930 (where an offer to settle was followed by a written mutual global release draft 

that added additional and material terms); MH Equity Managing Member, LLC v. Sands, 

938 N.E.2d 750, 757 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (distinguishing Janky); Steadfast Ins. Co. v. 

Auto Mktg. Network, Inc., No. 97 C 5696, 2004 WL 906118, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2004) (“If 

Steadfast wanted a confidentiality clause, it should have made it known during the 

negotiations.”). An unresolved immaterial term, however, does not prevent the formation 

of a binding contract. See Beverly v. Abbott Labs., 817 F.3d 328, 335-36 (7th Cir. 2016) 

(finding indemnification, cooperation, and future employment issues not material and 

enforcing handwritten settlement agreement between employer and employee)

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(applying Illinois law); Dillard v. Starcon Int’l, Inc., 483 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2007) 

(“Terms addressing purely contingent matters are not necessarily material.”) (applying 

Illinois law); Higbee v. Sentry Ins. Co., 253 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2001) (“lack of agreement 

on minor, immaterial terms . . . do not preclude a finding that a contract has been 

formed”) (applying Illinois law). The mere fact that parties disagree on whether to 

include a certain provision in their written agreement does not make the issue material. 

See Dillard, 483 F.3d at 508 (“The materiality of additional written terms introduced after 

an . . . agreement is reached is not established simply by one party’s intransigence or 

‘refusal to budge’ on the new terms.”). 

Plaintiff attempts to make additional arguments concerning his capacity to enter a 

settlement contract and duress. However, Plaintiff has appeared before the Court on 

multiple occasions and cogently presented his arguments. At the hearing on Defendant’s 

Motion to Enforce a Settlement, Plaintiff indicated he understood that an acceptance of 

this offer would terminate the litigation. See (Transcript, 10/18/2021, at 18:11-13, DE 229).

Plaintiff was likely concerned about his ability to proceed to trial pro se after terminating 

his relationship with counsel. Nevertheless, many cases are settled on the courthouse 

steps at the eve of trial. Even seasoned attorneys get nervous, or perhaps see the weakness 

in their cases more clearly. To allow any of this to stand in the way of an agreed upon

settlement would mean parties were constantly able to change the terms of a settlement.

Settlements, and litigation, would never end. 

There was an offer of settlement by Plaintiff and an unambiguous and unqualified 

acceptance of that offer by Defendant. The parties agreed on all material terms: the 

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termination of this litigation in exchange for $25,000. That settlement will be enforced, 

without any additional terms. Upon proof of payment of the settlement, this case is to be 

dismissed with prejudice. Defendant’s Motion to Enforce a Settlement (DE 217) is 

GRANTED, and Ralev’s pending motions (DE 219, 227) are DENIED as moot. 

Defendant is to serve notice of payment of settlement funds by April 29, 2022. This case 

will thereafter be dismissed with prejudice. 

So ORDERED this 29th day of March, 2022.

s/ Joshua P. Kolar

MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOSHUA P. KOLAR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

cc: Pro se Plaintiff by first class and certified mail, return receipt requested

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