[Cite as Meinerding v. Coldwater Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2019-Ohio-3611.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

MERCER COUNTY 

 

JILL MEINERDING, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, CASE NO. 10-19-06 

 v. 

COLDWATER EXEMPTED VILLAGE 

SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF 

EDUCATION, ET AL., O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES. 

 

Appeal from Mercer County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. 18-CIV-102 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: September 9, 2019 

 

APPEARANCES: 

 

Edward J. Stechschulte for Appellant 

 Eric A. Baum for Appellee, Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Services 

Jeremy J. Neff for Appellee, Coldwater Exempted Village School 

 District Board of Education 
Case No. 10-19-06 

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SHAW, J. 

{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant, Jill Meinerding (“Meinerding”), appeals the April 

1, 2019 judgment of the Mercer County Court of Common Pleas affirming the 

decision of the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission (“Review 

Commission”) disallowing her claim for unemployment benefits on the basis that 

she quit employment without just cause. On appeal, Meinerding maintains that the 

decision of the Review Commission is unlawful, unreasonable, and against the 

manifest weight of the evidence, and therefore the trial court erred when it affirmed 

the Review Commission’s decision. 

Relevant Facts 

{¶2} Meinerding first became employed with the Coldwater Exempted 

Village School District Board of Education (“the District”) in 1994 as a physical 

education teacher for the middle and high schools. 

{¶3} On February 26, 2018, Meinerding was placed on paid administrative 

leave following an incident in her classroom on February 21, 2018, during which 

she was alleged to have been neglectful in her duties when two male students were 

involved in an altercation while under her supervision. The incident culminated in 

one student striking the other in the hallway. The District further claimed that 

Meinerding was insubordinate when she failed to properly inform the administration 

of the incident. 
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{¶4} On March 2, 2018, after an investigation of the incident, a meeting was 

held in the District Superintendent’s office. Meinerding attended the meeting with 

representatives from the Ohio Education Association (“OEA”) and the Coldwater 

Teachers’ Organization (“CTO”). Meinerding was also made aware that the District 

would consider her discipline history which involved several incidents since 2012, 

including warnings about tardiness and the failure to follow instructions of her 

superiors, and a three-day suspension for carrying an elementary student upside 

down to his classroom. 

{¶5} On March 8, 2018, a second meeting was held by the Superintendent. 

At this meeting, Meinerding was informed of the District’s decision to move 

forward with termination of her contract. The District Treasurer sent a letter to 

Meinerding informing her that the recommendation of termination for good and just 

cause on the basis of “Neglect of Duty and Insubordination” would be submitted to 

the Board of Education at its next meeting. 

{¶6} Thereafter, the record indicates that Meinerding and the District came 

to an agreement, whereby Meinerding agreed to resign. Specifically, in exchange 

for her resignation the District agreed to accept Meinerding’s resignation without 

public comment and agreed to provide Meinerding “with a mutually-agreed 

favorable written employment reference drawn from her evaluations and no 

Administrator, Board member or agent of the Board will give a reference (verbally 
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or in writing) that is inconsistent with or that adds information to said favorable 

written reference.” (Director’s File, Appeal of Notice of Determination of Initial 

Application for Unemployment Compensation Benefits, Ex. 2 “Employment 

Agreement”). 

Procedural History 

{¶7} On April 17, 2018, Meinerding applied for unemployment 

compensation benefits with the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, Office 

of Unemployment Compensation Benefits, (“ODJFS”). 

{¶8} On May 7, 2018, ODJFS disallowed Meinerding’s application in its 

initial determination on the grounds of a disqualifying separation from 

employment—i.e., quitting without just cause, her inability to work for the period 

beginning on April 1, 2018, and her failure to actively seek suitable work.1

 

Meinerding appealed the initial determination to the Director of the Office of 

Unemployment Insurance Operations. 

{¶9} On June 11, 2018, the Director issued a redetermination, affirming the 

disallowance of Meinerding’s application. Meinerding appealed the Director’s 

redetermination and ODJFS transferred the case to the Unemployment 

Compensation Review Commission (“Review Commission”). 

 

1

 The record indicates that Meinerding had surgery on March 30, 2018, and was not released to return to 

work by her physician until May 11, 2018. 
Case No. 10-19-06 

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{¶10} On July 17, 2018 and August 7, 2018, the case was heard by a Hearing 

Officer with the Review Commission. The District Superintendent and Meinerding 

testified at this hearing. 

{¶11} On August 22, 2018, the Hearing Officer issued a decision disallowing 

Meinerding’s application. Specifically, with respect to whether Meinerding had a 

qualifying separation from her employer in order to be eligible for unemployment 

compensation benefits, the Hearing Officer determined the following: 

The facts establish that the employer did make the claimant 

aware of its intent to seek her removal from her teaching position. 

This act was not imminent. In fact, the claimant was adamant 

that if she would have pursued her appeal rights, she would not 

have been terminated from the board. 

After receiving this notification, the claimant had discussion with 

her family and her union and decided it was best to discontinue 

her employment with the school district. This was a voluntary 

act. 

Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the claimant resigned 

without just cause as the discharge was not imminent. The 

claimant had the ability to pursue the matter and eventually 

prevail allowing her to remain employed. She did not take this 

option. 

The Hearing Officer does find that the matters that resulted in the 

recommendation for termination were of a serious nature. 

Claimant did have misconduct in her dealings with students 

during her employment. 

(Dec. Aug. 22, 2018 at 5). 
Case No. 10-19-06 

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{¶12} The Hearing Officer also determined that Meinerding failed to 

demonstrate her eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits because she 

was unable to work and was not actively searching for suitable employment during 

the period for which she sought benefits. Meinerding filed a request for review, 

asking the Review Commission to reconsider the Hearing Officer’s decision. On 

September 26, 2018, the Review Commission disallowed Meinerding’s request for 

review. 

{¶13} Meinerding appealed to the Mercer County Court of Common Pleas 

pursuant to R.C. 4141.282, which provides for an appellate process for review of a 

final decision of the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission. On 

appeal to the trial court, Meinerding challenged the Review Commission’s 

determination that she did not have a qualifying separation from her employment 

with the District; specifically the Review Commission’s conclusion that she quit 

employment without just cause. 

{¶14} On April 1, 2019, the trial court issued a judgment entry finding that 

the record supported the Review Commission’s decision. Specifically, the trial 

court concluded that: 

Appellant makes three claims that address the three bases upon 

which the court could find that the unemployment compensation 

commission’s decision should be reversed, vacated, or remanded 

to the commission for further consideration. Nothing in 

appellant’s arguments or references to the record establish that 

the action of the commission was unlawful. Furthermore, given 
Case No. 10-19-06 

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the facts as presented, and specifically having heard from both the 

Superintendent, Mr. Wood, and the appellant-teacher, Ms. 

Meinerding, the commission’s conclusions drawn from the facts 

presented to it do not appear to be unreasonable. Finally, the 

manifest weight of the evidence establishes that although there 

would have been just cause for the termination of Ms. Meinerding 

had the evidence been presented to the appellee Board of 

Education, because Ms. Meinerding negotiated an agreement for 

her termination prior to that anticipated action, she knowingly, 

voluntarily, and willingly decided to quit her employment as a 

teacher with the Coldwater Board of Education without just cause 

rather than defend herself in response to Mr. Wood’s anticipated 

recommendation to terminate her from her employment for just 

cause. 

(Doc. No. 32 at 4). 

{¶15} It is from this judgment entry of the trial court that Meinerding now 

appeals, asserting the following assignment of error. 

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 

HOLDING THAT THE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 

REVISION COMMISSION’S SEPTEMBER 26, 2018 

DECISION WAS NOT UNLAWFUL, UNREASONABLE OR 

AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 

{¶16} In her sole assignment of error, Meinerding challenges the trial court’s 

decision to affirm the Review Commission’s determination that she is not entitled 

to unemployment compensation benefits because she quit employment without just 

cause. 

Standard of Review 

{¶17} Section 4141.282 of the Revised Code governs appeals from decisions 

of the Review Commission to the court of common pleas. The statute provides: 
Case No. 10-19-06 

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The court shall hear the appeal on the certified record provided 

by the commission. If the court finds that the decision of the 

commission was unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest 

weight of the evidence, it shall reverse, vacate, or modify the 

decision, or remand the matter to the commission. Otherwise, the 

court shall affirm the decision of the commission. 

R.C. 4141.282(H). 

{¶18} The common pleas court and this Court utilize the same, limited 

standard of review in unemployment compensation cases; specifically, reviewing 

courts may reverse just cause determinations only “if they are unlawful, 

unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Tzangas, Plakas & 

Mannos v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Serv., 73 Ohio St.3d 694, 696 (1995). The focus of 

the analysis is on the Review Commission’s decision rather than the decision of the 

common pleas court. Perkins v. Ohio Dep’t of Job & Family Servs., 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 18AP-900, 2019-Ohio-2538, ¶ 11, citing Carter v. Univ. of Toledo, 6th 

Dist. No. L-07-1260, 2008-Ohio-1958, ¶ 12. 

{¶19} Appellate courts are not permitted to make factual findings or to 

determine the credibility of the witnesses; but the reviewing court does have the 

duty to determine whether the Review Commission’s decision is supported by the 

evidence in the record. Tzangas, supra, at 696. This leaves the Review 

Commission’s role as factfinder intact. Id. Where the commission might 

reasonably decide either way, this Court has no authority to upset the Review 

Commission’s decision. Kelly v. Stark Cty. Commissioners, 5th Dist. Stark No. 
Case No. 10-19-06 

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2017CA00148, 2018-Ohio-950, ¶ 17; Williams v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family 

Servs., 129 Ohio St.3d 332, 2011-Ohio-2897. “Every reasonable presumption must 

be in favor of the [decision] and the findings of facts [of the Review Commission].” 

Ro-Mai Industries v. Weinberg, 176 Ohio App.3d 151, 2008-Ohio-301, citing 

Karches v. Cincinnati, 38 Ohio St.3d 12, 19 (1988). The procedure for 

administrative appeals from Review Commission decisions contemplates that 

reviewing courts will “ ‘leave undisturbed the [Review Commission’s] decision on 

close questions.’ ” Irvine v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Review, 19 Ohio St.3d 15, 18 

(1985), quoting Charles Livingstone & Sons, Inc. v. Constance, 115 Ohio App. 437, 

438 (7th Dist.1961). 

Relevant Legal Authority 

{¶20} Under R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a), no individual who has “quit work 

without just cause or has been discharged for just cause in connection with the 

individual’s work” may receive unemployment compensation. The word “quit,” for 

purposes of unemployment compensation, connotes a voluntary act of the employee 

not controlled by the employer. Watts v. Cmty. Health Ctrs. of Greater Dayton, 

12th Dist. Warren No. CA2015-07-068, 2015-Ohio-5314, ¶ 15, citing Caudill v. 

Ashland Oil Co., 9 Ohio Misc.2d 16, 17 (Clermont C.P.1983). “Just cause” is “that 

which, to an ordinarily intelligent person, is a justifiable reason for doing or not 
Case No. 10-19-06 

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doing a particular act.” Shephard v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 166 Ohio 

App.3d 747, 2006-Ohio-2313, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.). 

{¶21} An analysis of just cause must also consider the policy behind the 

Unemployment Compensation Act, which was intended to provide financial 

assistance to individuals who become unemployed through no fault of their own. 

Tzangas, supra, at 697. Accordingly, “fault” on an employee’s part is an essential 

component of a just cause termination. Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. The 

determination of whether an unemployment compensation claimant had just cause 

to quit his or her job depends on the unique factual considerations of a particular 

case and is, therefore, primarily an issue for the trier of fact. Irvine, supra, at 18. 

Testimony before the Review Commission Hearing Officer 

{¶22} Superintendent Jason Wood testified that after Meinerding was placed 

on paid administrative leave, following the February 21, 2018 incident, he 

conducted a meeting in his office on March 2, 2018 with Meinerding and Union 

representatives. At that time, Superintendent Wood presented the surveillance 

footage from Meinerding’s classroom, which depicted her leaving her students 

unattended at least twenty times during the class period. Meinerding was given an 

opportunity to present her side. 

{¶23} Superintendent Wood testified that another meeting was conducted on 

March 8, 2018. During this meeting, Meinerding was informed in writing of the 
Case No. 10-19-06 

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District’s intention to recommend termination of her contract to the Board of 

Education. Superintendent Wood explained that he did not have the authority to 

terminate Meinerding’s contract. Instead, the Board’s approval by vote was 

required. He recalled that the date of the board meeting to consider this 

recommendation had not yet been scheduled, and was in fact never held because 

Meinerding resigned from her position before the board meeting could take place. 

Superintendent Wood explained Meinerding’s resignation halted the termination 

process before it could be considered by the Board. 

{¶24} Meinerding also testified at the hearing. She recalled the meetings in 

Superintendent Wood’s office and expressed her opinion that she believed the 

District’s recommendation to terminate her contract was based upon “false 

evidence.” (Tr. II at 55). Meinerding also discussed the negotiated separation 

agreement which resulted in her decision to resign instead of having a termination 

on her record. She acknowledged that the Board had not yet taken action on moving 

forward with terminating her contact. (Tr. II at 55). She further recognized that she 

was statutorily entitled to due process to challenge the recommendation for 

termination, which included the right to present her case to either the Board or a 

referee. She explained that she believed the statutory procedure would take a “long 

time,” and based on financial considerations and the availability of insurance she 

decided it would be best for her family to resign. Specifically, she stated “I know 
Case No. 10-19-06 

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that fighting this would be long and drawn out and it would mean also that they 

would drop my insurance. It also meant that there was a possibility they would take 

away the pay that was owed to me.” (Tr. II at 75). “I would love to have fought it, 

but couldn’t.” (Tr. II at 56). 

The Decision is not Unlawful nor Unreasonable 

{¶25} On appeal, Meinerding claims that the Review Commission’s decision 

to disallow her application for unemployment compensation benefits is both 

unlawful and unreasonable because it creates an additional requirement, outside of 

the standards set forth in Chapter 4141, that her termination must be “imminent” in 

order for her to quit employment with just cause. Meinerding also argues that the 

decision of the Review Commission improperly found that her termination was not 

“imminent” because she elected not to participate in the statutory due process in 

place for teachers facing termination under R.C. 3319.16. See R.C. 3319.16 (setting 

forth the procedure for termination of contract by a board of education). 

{¶26} A review of the record makes it apparent that Meinerding 

misconstrues the Review Commission’s discussion of the timing of her resignation 

in its decision. The Review Commission’s reference to Meinerding’s resignation 

within the context of R.C. 3319.16 was merely a factual circumstance used in 

determining the voluntary nature of her resignation. In other words, the Review 

Commission determined that Meinerding’s discharge was not as inevitable as she 
Case No. 10-19-06 

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contended based, in part, on evidence in the record regarding the timing of her 

resignation, the negotiation with the District for favorable terms of her resignation, 

and her decision not to challenge the basis for the District’s recommendation to 

terminate her contract. The record is clear that the Review Commission found that 

these factual considerations negated Meinerding’s assertion that her decision to quit 

was involuntary because she faced an alleged ultimatum and had no choice but to 

resign. 

{¶27} Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Meinerding’s assertion that the 

Review Commission imposed an improper legal standard in upholding the 

disallowance of her application for unemployment compensation benefits. As such, 

we conclude that Meinerding has failed to demonstrate that the Review 

Commission’s and the trial court’s decisions were unlawful and unreasonable on 

this basis. 

The Decision is not Against Manifest Weight of the Evidence 

{¶28} Alternatively, Meinerding asserts even if we do not find that the 

Review Commission’s decision is unlawful or unreasonable, she nevertheless 

maintains the Review Commission’s conclusion that she quit without just cause is 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. In considering whether a judgment is 

against the manifest weight of the evidence in civil or criminal cases, a reviewing 

court must “weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the 
Case No. 10-19-06 

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credibility of witnesses, and determine whether in resolving conflicts in the 

evidence, the finder of fact ‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest 

miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’ 

” Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20. 

{¶29} In support of this assertion, Meinerding relies heavily upon the case 

Robb v. Director, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2002-L-060, 2003-Ohio-6972. In Robb, the 

employee was found to have quit with just cause when his employer called him into 

the office and told him that he would be fired if he did not resign. Id. at ¶ 21. The 

court in Robb noted that the employee’s testimony before the Review Commission 

indicated that “he was very nervous about being called in and that he was worried 

that he would be fired. These emotions are not consistent with an employee who is 

planning to voluntarily resign.” Id. Ultimately, the court in Robb concluded that 

the employee’s decision to resign was not voluntary because he was given no option 

but to quit. Id. at ¶ 22. 

{¶30} Here, there is evidence in the record to support the Review 

Commission’s determination that Meinerding’s decision to resign was voluntary. 

Meinerding testified that even though she believed the District’s recommendation 

to terminate her contract was based upon “false evidence,” and that she would be 

successful in defending her employment, she nevertheless felt that the prudent 

course of action was to resign before the Board could vote on the District’s 
Case No. 10-19-06 

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recommendation, which would initiate a “long and drawn out” process. 

Meinerding’s opportunity to weigh the consequences of her resignation and the 

availability of a statutory due process procedure, if she chose to challenge her 

termination had it been pursued by the school board, both suggest that she was not 

under the same coercive pressure to resign as the employee in Robb. 

{¶31} We recognize that there is some evidence in the record to support 

Meinerding’s position that she quit with just cause. Most notably, there is some 

indication in the documentation contained in the Director’s file that lends credibility 

to Meinerding’s claim that her termination was forthcoming and inevitable, despite 

the fact that the Board had not yet taken official action to proceed with the 

termination of her contract. However, the weight of the evidence in favor of 

Meinerding’s claim that she quit with just cause, when compared to the weight of 

the evidence in favor of the Review Commission’s finding that she quit without just 

cause, does not compel us to conclude that the Review Commission, as finder of 

fact in this case, “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of 

justice” that its decision must be reversed and a new proceeding ordered. Eastley, 

supra, 2012-Ohio-2179 at ¶ 20. On this basis, we conclude that the decision of the 

Review Commission is not against the manifest weight of the evidence and that the 

trial court did not err in affirming the decision to disallow Meinerding’s application 

for unemployment compensation benefits. 
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{¶32} For all these reasons, we overrule the assignment of error and affirm 

the judgment of the trial court. 

 Judgment Affirmed 

ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and PRESTON, J., concur. 

/jlr