UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

 SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

KAREN L MELNICK, ) 

 ) 

PLAINTIFF ) 

 ) 

VS. ) CAUSE NO. 3:16-CV-532 RLM-MGG 

 ) 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,1 ACTING ) 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, ) 

 ) 

DEFENDANT ) 

 OPINION AND ORDER 

Karen Melnick seeks judicial review of a final decision by the 

Commissioner of Social Security denying her application for disability insurance 

benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423. The court has 

jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). For the following 

reasons, the court vacates the Commissioner's decision and remands this case 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

I. BACKGROUND

Ms. Melnick’s application for Disability Insurance Benefits was denied 

initially, on reconsideration, and after an administrative hearing at which she 

and a vocational expert testified. Based on the record before him, the ALJ found 

 

1 Nancy A. Berryhill was automatically substituted as the defendant in this case when 

she replaced Carolyn W. Colvin as the Acting Commissioner of Social Security pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). 
2 

that Ms. Melnick had severe impairments, abdominal pain secondary to a 

gastrointestinal disorder and essential hypertension, but concluded that none of 

her impairments met or medically equaled any of the impairments listed in 20 

C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1. 

The ALJ decided that Ms. Melnick had the residual functional capacity to 

perform light work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), with limitations;2 but 

could perform her past relevant work as a healthcare facility administrator. The 

ALJ concluded that Ms. Melnick wasn’t disabled within the meaning of the Social 

Security Act and wasn’t entitled to benefits. 

When the Appeals Council denied Ms. Melnick’s request for review, the 

ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. Sims v. Apfel, 530 

U.S. 103, 107 (2000); Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010). This 

appeal followed. 

 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The issue before the court isn’t whether Ms. Melnick is disabled, but 

whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision that she wasn’t 

disabled. Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 2011); Nelms v. Astrue, 

 

2 The ALJ concluded that Ms. Melnick couldn’t climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; kneel; 

or crouch. He determined she could frequently crawl but was limited to only occasionally 

climbing ramps or stairs; stooping, balancing or reaching overhead or in any other 

direction with her left hand; and handling, fingering, or feeling bilaterally. 
3 

553 F.3d 1093, 1097 (7th Cir. 2009). Substantial evidence means “such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Jones v. Astrue, 

623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010). In reviewing the ALJ’s decision, the court 

can’t reweigh the evidence, make independent findings of fact, decide credibility, 

or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner, Simila v. Astrue, 

573 F.3d 503, 513 (7th Cir. 2009); Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 434–435 (7th 

Cir. 2000), but instead must conduct “a critical review of the evidence, 

considering both the evidence that supports, as well as the evidence that detracts 

from, the Commissioner’s decision.” Briscoe v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th 

Cir. 2005). While the ALJ isn’t required “to address every piece of evidence or 

testimony presented, he must provide a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and 

the conclusions so that [the court] can assess the validity of the agency’s ultimate 

findings and afford the claimant meaningful judicial review.” Jones v. Astrue, 

623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010). ALJs must “sufficiently articulate their 

assessment of the evidence to assure [the court] that they considered the 

important evidence and to enable [the court] to trace the path of their reasoning.” 

Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations 

omitted). 
4 

 III. DISCUSSION

Ms. Melnick argues that the ALJ made several errors requiring remand: 

(1) the ALJ didn’t properly weigh the opinions of Dr. Vidya Kora, nurse 

practitioner Brittany Hausman, or psychologist Sharon Sacks, Ph.D.; (2) the ALJ 

didn’t properly evaluate Ms. Melnick’s depression, anxiety disorder, bacterial 

infection, or chronic fatigue syndrome; and (3) the ALJ’s finding that Ms. Melnick 

could perform her past relevant work was founded on legal error and wasn’t 

supported by substantial evidence. Ms. Melnick asks the court to either reverse 

the Commissioner's decision and award benefits or remand the case for further 

proceedings. 

A. The ALJ’s Weighing of the Medical Opinions

Ms. Melnick first argues that the ALJ didn’t properly weigh the opinions of 

Dr. Kora, nurse practitioner Hausman, or Dr. Sacks. 

1. Dr. Vidya Kora 

The ALJ recognized that Dr. Kora, an internist, was Ms. Melnick’s treating 

physician but gave his opinion little weight. A treating physician's opinion is to 

get “controlling weight” if it is both “well-supported by medically acceptable 

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the 

other substantial evidence in [the claimant's] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(c)(2). “Even if an ALJ gives good reasons for not giving controlling 
5 

weight to a treating physician's opinion, [he] has to decide what weight to give 

that opinion” and provide “good reasons” for the weight ultimately afforded to it. 

Campbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 308 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Eakin v. Astrue, 

432 Fed. Appx. 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2011). The applicable regulations “guide that 

decision by identifying several factors that an ALJ must consider: ‘the length, 

nature, and extent of the treatment relationship; frequency of examination; the 

physician's specialty; the types of tests performed; and the consistency and 

support for the physician's opinion.’” Campbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d at 308 

(quoting Larson v. Astrue, 615 F.3d 744, 751 (7th Cir.2010)). 

The ALJ, who wrote a very thorough opinion in many respects, discussed 

several of the regulatory factors, including Dr. Kora’s specialty and the types of 

tests performed, but his opinion doesn’t demonstrate that he considered length 

and frequency of the treating relationship. See Campbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 

308 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that the ALJ must “explicitly address the checklist 

of factors as applied to the medical opinion evidence”). But see Henke v. Astrue, 

498 F. App'x 636, 640 n.3 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that the ALJ’s discussion of 

two of the relevant factors was sufficient even though the ALJ didn’t “explicitly 

weigh every factor while discussing her decision to reject [a medical opinion]”). 

The larger problem with the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Kora’s opinion is that 

the ALJ concluded it lacked support in the record, and so discounted it, without 

acknowledging relevant evidence supporting it. Dr. Kora opined in a medical 

source statement that Ms. Melnick couldn’t stand or walk for more than an hour 
6 

during a work day. The ALJ, on the other hand, found that she could perform 

light work, which “requires a good deal of walking or standing.” 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1567(b). The ALJ discredited Dr. Kora’s opinion, opining that his 

“restrictions on standing/walking . . . are not supported by the evidence that 

generally shows a stable gait, normal sensation, intact reflexes and no consistent 

use of an ambulatory device or boot.” While acknowledging that Ms. Melnick 

complained of falling, the ALJ highlighted evidence suggesting that “her strength 

and gait have generally been intact.” 

The record contains some medical records indicating normal gait and 

intact ambulation, but also includes multiple reports of abnormal gait, dizziness, 

and falls. During at least five separate treatment visits over a two-year period, 

Dr. Kora assessed that Ms. Melnick’s gait was ataxic, abnormal, or disturbed. 

On four occasions, his review of her neurological systems indicated dizziness. 

Dr. Kora also diagnosed a rib contusion resulting from a fall. 

Consultative examiner Ralph Inabnit, D.O. and nurse practitioner Jennifer 

Jimenez corroborated Dr. Kora’s findings. Dr. Inabnit concluded that Ms. 

Melnick had ataxic gait and incoordination causing falls, while nurse practitioner 

Jimenez found that Ms. Melnick exhibited “lightheadedness with collapse,” 

dizziness, and vertigo. 

“An ALJ may not selectively consider medical reports, especially those of 

treating physicians, but must consider all relevant evidence.” Myles v. Astrue, 

582 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2009). The court’s review of the record indicates that 
7 

the ALJ impermissibly “identified pieces of evidence in the record that supported 

[his] conclusion . . . [and] ignored related evidence that undermined [his] 

conclusion” that Dr. Kora’s standing and walking restrictions were excessive. 

Scrogham v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 685, 698 (7th Cir. 2014). See also Myles v. Astrue, 

582 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2009); Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 

2009). 

2. Nurse Practitioner Hausmann 

Ms. Melnick similarly contends that the ALJ didn’t properly weigh the 

opinion of nurse practitioner Hausman. Under the regulations in effect at the 

time of the Social Security Administration’s final decision denying Ms. Melnick 

benefits, Ms. Hausmann was neither a treating source nor an “acceptable 

medical source.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502 (“[t]reating source means your own 

physician, psychologist, or other acceptable medical source”); 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1513(d) (nurse practitioner isn’t an “acceptable medical source”). The Social 

Security Administration considered nurse practitioners “medical sources who 

are not ‘acceptable medical sources.’” SSR 06-03p (rescinded effective March 27, 

2017 but in effect at the time of the ALJ’s decision). “In deciding how much 

weight to give to opinions from these ‘other medical sources,’ an ALJ should 

apply the same criteria listed in [the regulations],” including the degree to which 

it is consistent with the record. Phillips v. Astrue, 413 F. App'x 878, 884 (7th Cir. 

2010). 
8 

Ms. Hausmann submitted a medical source statement opining that Ms. 

Melnick couldn’t stand or walk for more than an hour during a work day. Like 

he did with Dr. Kora, the ALJ discounted Ms. Hausmann’s opinion, stating her 

“restrictions on standing/walking . . . are not supported by the evidence that 

generally shows a stable gait, normal sensation, intact reflexes and no consistent 

use of an ambulatory device or boot.” 

As previously discussed, there is a line of evidence in the record that could 

support restrictions on standing and walking that the ALJ didn’t address. The 

ALJ didn’t properly consider the degree to which Ms. Hausmann’s opinion was 

supported by the medical evidence, selectively considered the medical evidence, 

and ignored evidence supporting her opinion. See Scrogham v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 

685, 698 (7th Cir. 2014); Myles v. Astrue, 582 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2009); 

Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 2009). 

3. Sharon Sacks, Ph.D. 

Ms. Melnick contends that the ALJ improperly discounted psychologist 

Sharon Sacks’s opinion, specifically the Global Assessment of Functioning score 

she assessed. The ALJ thoroughly discussed Dr. Sacks’s report, noting that Dr. 

Sacks assessed a GAF score of 60, which suggests moderate symptoms, and 

assigned it only some weight, finding that a single GAF score “is not a good 

indicator of long-term functioning and tends to be a subjective snapshot in time 

of the claimant's functioning level.” 
9 

The ALJ’s decision to assign the GAF score only some weight and his 

rationale were permissible because a “single GAF score at a particular point in 

time, in particular a score that signals psychological symptoms that are 

somewhere between mild and moderate, is not conclusive of a disability . . . and 

does not reflect the clinician's opinion of functional capacity.” Perkins v. Colvin, 

632 F. App'x 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2015); Voigt v. Colvin, 781 F.3d 871, 875 (7th 

Cir. 2015) (recognizing that GAF scores can vary “a great deal” depending on how 

a “patient happens to feel the day he's examined”). The ALJ’s opinion shows that 

he properly considered Dr. Sacks’s opinion, offered good reasons for the weight 

he assigned the GAF score, and didn’t err when he assigned it only some weight. 

Based on the foregoing, the record shows the ALJ didn’t err in considering 

Dr. Sacks’s opinion, but remand is required so that the ALJ can properly weigh 

the opinions of Dr. Kora and Ms. Hausmann based on the record as a whole. 

B. The ALJ’s Severe Impairments Determination 

Ms. Melnick next asserts that the ALJ erred because he found that her 

depression wasn’t severe, allegedly didn’t discuss her anxiety disorder or 

consider whether her bacterial infection and its severe consequences resulted in 

residual functional limitations, and ignored evidence of chronic fatigue 

syndrome. 

“[T]he ALJ is required to determine at step two of the sequential analysis 

whether the claimant in fact has an impairment or combination of impairments 
10 

that is ‘severe.’” Castile v. Astrue, 617 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Ms. Melnick carries the burden of proof that an 

alleged impairment is severe. Id. 

The ALJ’s discussion of Ms. Melnick’s mental impairments spans three 

pages of his decision. The ALJ thoroughly reviewed her depression, anxiety, and 

concentration and memory problems. He noted that her depression began in 

2006 and he recognized that she continued working despite her depression. He 

also highlighted that she was diagnosed with anxiety disorder, caused in part by 

depression. He discussed Dr. Sacks’s consultative examination and a behavioral 

assessment, which found depression and an anxiety disorder. He also noted that 

after a change in medication late in 2013, “she complained of no anxiety, no 

depression, no sleep complaints, no fatigue, no recent weight loss, no memory 

lapses” and more recent evidence showed “some waxing and waning of 

depressive symptoms.” The ALJ recognized that Ms. Melnick reported memory 

and concentration problems, but pointed to medical evidence indicating her 

memory and concentration were intact. 

Ms. Melnick points to some evidence in the record that the ALJ didn’t cite, 

but an “ALJ is not required to address every piece of evidence or testimony 

presented.” Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010). The ALJ’s 

discussion of the severity of her mental impairments was sufficient to provide 

the court “a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and the conclusions” allowing 

the court to “assess the validity of the agency's ultimate findings and afford the 
11 

claimant meaningful judicial review.” Id. 

Ms. Melnick next asserts that the ALJ erred by not considering whether a 

severe bacterial infection that resulted in a coma prior to her alleged onset date 

required any residual functional limitations. The ALJ’s opinion demonstrates 

that he did consider the extent to which her bacterial infection resulted in 

limitations. He recognizing that the infection resulted in a coma over a year 

before her amended disability onset date and that “she has not had a recurrence 

of the bacterial infection nor has she experienced any residual effects noted as 

stemming from her history of a bacterial infection.” Based on his review of the 

record, he concluded that during the relevant period her bacterial infection was 

a non-severe impairment. 

Ms. Melnick doesn’t cite any evidence in the record that would support 

any additional limitations or develop her argument beyond her conclusory 

statement that the ALJ erred, so the court finds no error in the ALJ’s treatment 

of this impairment. See Crespo v. Colvin, 824 F.3d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 2016). 

Ms. Melnick also contends that the ALJ ignored evidence of chronic fatigue 

syndrome and didn’t consider its impact on her ability to engage in full-time 

work. The court agrees. Dr. Kora assessed that Ms. Melnick suffered from 

chronic fatigue syndrome but the ALJ’s opinion never refers to chronic fatigue 

syndrome, citing instead Ms. Melnick’s “complaints of fatigue.” The ALJ 

concluded that fatigue didn’t “cause more than minimal limitations in [her] 

ability to perform basic mental work activities and [was] therefore nonsevere” 
12 

and, in support, highlighted one medical report from 2014 in which Ms. Melnick 

reported that she felt better, had no fatigue, and was sleeping well with 

medications. 

The ALJ didn’t acknowledge that Dr. Kora—Ms. Melnick’s treating 

physician—described chronic fatigue syndrome as an “active problem” in ten of 

his reports between 2012 and 2014. This was an error. See Myles v. Astrue, 582 

F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[a]n ALJ may not selectively consider medical 

reports, especially those of treating physicians, but must consider all relevant 

evidence”). 

While the ALJ’s decision demonstrates he properly found that Ms. 

Melnick’s mental impairments and her bacterial infection were non-severe, the 

court can’t conclude that he properly considered the medical evidence related to 

chronic fatigue syndrome and, on remand, the ALJ should determine the severity 

of her chronic fatigue syndrome and whether it limits her ability to work fulltime. 

C. Past Relevant Work 

Ms. Melnick contends that the ALJ erred at step four of the sequential 

analysis when he determined that she could perform her past work as a 

healthcare facility administrator. She asserts that the ALJ didn’t clearly and 

explicitly compare the demands of her past work with her residual functional 

capacity as required by Social Security Ruling 82-62. See SSR 82-62, 1982 WL 
13 

31386 (1982) (the ALJ must carefully consider “the limiting effects of the person's 

impairment(s) and the physical and mental demands of his or her [past relevant 

work] to determine whether the individual can still do that work”). 

At first glance, the court of appeals decision in Nolen v. Sullivan appears 

to support Ms. Melnick’s argument, seeming to require that an ALJ discuss each 

of the previous job’s physical and mental requirements and note whether the 

claimant’s limitations prohibit her from completing the task. See Nolen v. 

Sullivan, 939 F.2d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that “the ALJ must list the 

specific physical requirements of the previous job and assess, in light of the 

available evidence, the claimant's ability to perform these tasks”). “But th[e] court 

[of appeals] has construed Nolen more narrowly, holding that an ALJ cannot 

describe a previous job in a generic way, e.g., “sedentary,” and on that basis 

conclude that the claimant is fit to perform all sedentary jobs without inquiring 

into any differences in what the job requires while sitting,” and not requiring a 

detailed analysis comparing the past job’s requirements to the claimant’s 

limitations. Cohen v. Astrue, 258 F. App'x 20, 28 (7th Cir. 2007). 

The ALJ didn’t run afoul of the court of appeals’ requirements. At the 

hearing, the vocational expert provided a detailed description of the position of 

healthcare facility administrator, Ms. Melnick’s past work, including the types of 

skills required. The vocational expert testified that a hypothetical individual with 

the limitations included in the ALJ’s residual functional capacity finding would 

be able to perform the work of a healthcare facility administrator as it is generally 
14 

performed in the national economy. Rather than concluding that she could 

perform her past work because it was defined as light, the ALJ “compar[ed] the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity with the physical demands of this work, 

and [took] into consideration the [vocational expert’s] testimony” regarding the 

requirements of the healthcare facility administrator position and concluded that 

Ms. Melnick could perform her past work as a healthcare facility administrator. 

The court of appeals doesn’t require more. See Cohen v. Astrue, 258 F. App'x 20, 

28 (7th Cir. 2007).3

 IV. CONCLUSION

The court VACATES the Commissioner’s decision and REMANDS this case 

for further proceeding consistent with this opinion. 

SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED: October 10, 2017 

 /s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr. 

 Judge, United States District Court 

 

3 Ms. Melnick noted that if she were limited to sedentary work, she would have been 

presumptively disabled according to the grids. But she didn’t develop this argument, 

stating only: “Ms. Melnick’s testimony in conjunction with the record as a whole is far 

more consistent with a sedentary RFC than the light RFC found by the ALJ.” This 

undeveloped argument is deemed waived. See Crespo v. Colvin, 824 F.3d 667, 674 (7th 

Cir. 2016) (“perfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are 

unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived”) (quoting United States v. Berkowitz, 

927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991)).