APPEAL,BRIGHT−LN,PROTO,TERMED

U.S. District Court Northern District of Indiana [LIVE]

USDC Northern Indiana (South Bend)

CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:15−cv−00463−JD

Freedom From Religion Foundation et al v. Concord

Community Schools

Assigned to: Judge Jon E DeGuilio

Case in other court: USCA, 17−01591

Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

Date Filed: 10/07/2015

Date Terminated: 03/06/2017

Jury Demand: None

Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other

Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff

Freedom From Religion Foundation represented by Daniel I Mach PHV

American Civil Liberties Union − Was/DC

915 15th St NW 6th Fl

Washington, DC 20005

202−675−2330

Fax: 202−546−0738

Email: dmach@aclu.org

LEAD ATTORNEY

PRO HAC VICE

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gavin M Rose

ACLU of Indiana

1031 E Washington St

Indianapolis, IN 46202

317−635−4059 Ext 106

Fax: 317−635−4105

Email: grose@aclu−in.org

LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather L Weaver PHV

American Civil Liberties Union − Was/DC

915 15th St NW 6th Fl

Washington, DC 20005

202−675−2330

Fax: 202−546−0738

Email: hweaver@aclu.org

LEAD ATTORNEY

PRO HAC VICE

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ryan D Jayne PHV

Freedom From Religion Foundation

10 N Henry St

Madison, WI 53701

608−256−8900

Email: ryan@ffrf.org

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LEAD ATTORNEY

PRO HAC VICE

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Samuel T Grover PHV

Freedom From Religion Foundation

10 N Henry St

Madison, WI 53701

608−256−8900

Email: sgrover@ffrf.org

LEAD ATTORNEY

PRO HAC VICE

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

John Doe represented by Daniel I Mach PHV

(See above for address)

LEAD ATTORNEY

PRO HAC VICE

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gavin M Rose

(See above for address)

LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather L Weaver PHV

(See above for address)

LEAD ATTORNEY

PRO HAC VICE

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Samuel T Grover PHV

(See above for address)

LEAD ATTORNEY

PRO HAC VICE

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Jack Doe represented by Daniel I Mach PHV

(See above for address)

LEAD ATTORNEY

PRO HAC VICE

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gavin M Rose

(See above for address)

LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather L Weaver PHV

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USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00463-JD document 79 filed 04/03/17 page 2 of 35
(See above for address)

LEAD ATTORNEY

PRO HAC VICE

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Samuel T Grover PHV

(See above for address)

LEAD ATTORNEY

PRO HAC VICE

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

John Roe represented by Gavin M Rose

(See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

John Noe represented by Gavin M Rose

(See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.

Defendant

Concord Community Schools represented by Timothy S Shelly

Warrick and Boyn LLP

NBD Bank Building

121 W FranklinSt Ste 400

Elkhart, IN 46516−3284

574−294−7491

Fax: 574−294−7284

Email: tshelly@warrickandboyn.com

LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Anthony W Overholt

Frost Brown Todd LLC − Ind/IN

201 N Illinois St Ste 1900

PO Box 44961

Indianapolis, IN 46204−4236

317−237−3800

Fax: 317−237−3900

Email: aoverholt@fbtlaw.com

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas E Wheeler , II

Frost Brown Todd LLC − Ind/IN

201 N Illinois St Ste 1900

PO Box 44961

Indianapolis, IN 46244−0961

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USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00463-JD document 79 filed 04/03/17 page 3 of 35
317−237−3800

Fax: 317−237−3900

Email: twheeler@fbtlaw.com

TERMINATED: 01/16/2017

Date Filed # Page Docket Text

10/07/2015 1 COMPLAINT for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Nominal Damages

against Concord Community Schools( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number

0755−2766954.), filed by FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION,

JACK DOE, JOHN DOE. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 (FFRF letter), # 2

Exhibit 2 (Superintendent statement), # 3 Civil Cover Sheet, # 4 Proposed

Summons)(Rose, Gavin) (Entered: 10/07/2015)

10/07/2015 2 NOTICE of Appearance by Gavin M Rose on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Rose,

Gavin) (Entered: 10/07/2015)

10/07/2015 3 Corporate Disclosure Statement by FREEDOM FROM RELIGION

FOUNDATION. (Rose, Gavin) (Entered: 10/07/2015)

10/07/2015 4 MOTION Proceed by Anonymous Name and for Protective Order by Plaintiffs

JACK DOE, JOHN DOE, FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION.

(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 (Does Affidavit), # 2 Exhibit 2 (Law Review

Article))(Rose, Gavin) (Entered: 10/07/2015)

10/07/2015 5 MEMORANDUM in Support of 4 MOTION Proceed by Anonymous Name

and for Protective Order filed by JACK DOE, JOHN DOE, FREEDOM FROM

RELIGION FOUNDATION. (Rose, Gavin) (Entered: 10/07/2015)

10/07/2015 Judge Jon E DeGuilio and Magistrate Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein added.

(NEW CASE WITH PENDING MOTION) (mlc) (Entered: 10/07/2015)

10/07/2015 6 Summons Issued as to Concord Community Schools. NOTE:The attached

document is accessible by court personnel only. Summons forms that were

electronically submitted to the court for issuance will be returned to

counsel via e−mail. (mlc) (Entered: 10/07/2015)

10/07/2015 7 Application for Attorney Daniel I Mach to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of

Freedom From Religion Foundation, John Doe, Jack Doe. Pro Hac Vice fee of

$ 93 has been received, receipt number 0755−2767487(Pro Hac Vice

Temporary login, ) (Entered: 10/07/2015)

10/07/2015 8 Application for Attorney Heather L. Weaver to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf

of Freedom From Religion Foundation, John Doe, Jack Doe. Pro Hac Vice fee

of $ 93 has been received, receipt number 0755−2767507(Pro Hac Vice

Temporary login, ) (Entered: 10/07/2015)

10/13/2015 9 ORDER granting 7 Application to Appear Pro Hac Vice of Attorney Daniel I

Mach PHV for JACK DOE, JOHN DOE, and Freedon From Religion

Foundation. Signed by Magistrate Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein on

10/13/2015. (mtr) (Entered: 10/13/2015)

10/13/2015 10 ORDER granting 8 Application to Appear Pro Hac Vice of Attorney Heather L

Weaver PHV for JACK DOE, JOHN DOE, and Freedon From Religion

Foundation. Signed by Magistrate Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein on

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10/13/2015. (mtr) (Entered: 10/13/2015)

10/19/2015 11 NOTICE of Appearance by Thomas E Wheeler, II on behalf of Concord

Community Schools (Wheeler, Thomas) (Entered: 10/19/2015)

10/21/2015 12 Application for Attorney Samuel T Grover to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of

FFRF, Doe family. Pro Hac Vice fee of $ 93 has been received, receipt number

0755−2778933(Pro Hac Vice Temporary login, ) (Entered: 10/21/2015)

10/22/2015 13 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Plaintiffs Jack Doe, John Doe,

Freedom From Religion Foundation. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 (Video of

2014 Christmas Spectacular) (Filed Manually), # 2 Exhibit 2 (Aff. of John

Doe), # 3 Exhibit 3 (Aff. of Jack Doe), # 4 Exhibit 4 (Aff. of Annie Laurie

Gaylor))(Rose, Gavin) (Entered: 10/22/2015)

10/22/2015 14 NOTICE OF MANUAL FILING of CD of 2014 Christmas Spectacular by Jack

Doe, John Doe, Freedom From Religion Foundation (Rose, Gavin) (Entered:

10/22/2015)

10/22/2015 15 ***FILED IN ERROR REFILED AT DE 18 *** MEMORANDUM in Support

of 13 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Jack Doe, John Doe,

Freedom From Religion Foundation. (Rose, Gavin) Modified on 10/22/2015

(rmc). (Entered: 10/22/2015)

10/22/2015 16 ORDER granting 12 Application to Appear Pro Hac Vice of Attorney Samuel T

Grover PHV for Jack Doe, John Doe, and Freedom From Religion Foundation.

Signed by Magistrate Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein on 10/22/2015. (mtr)

(Entered: 10/22/2015)

10/22/2015 17 ORDER regarding 13 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction . The response

brief is due by 11/5/2015 and the reply brief is due by 11/12/2015. This is a

text−only order by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 10/22/2015. (saj) (Entered:

10/22/2015)

10/22/2015 18 AMENDED MEMORANDUM in Support of 13 MOTION for Preliminary

Injunction (Amended) filed by Jack Doe, John Doe, Freedom From Religion

Foundation. (Rose, Gavin) Modified on 10/22/2015 (rmc). (Entered:

10/22/2015)

10/23/2015 19 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Freedom From Religion Foundation, Jack

Doe, John Doe. Concord Community Schools served on 10/13/2015, answer

due 11/3/2015. (Rose, Gavin) (Entered: 10/23/2015)

10/23/2015 20 RECEIPT from Freedom From Religion Foundation of 2 CDs − see 14 Notice

of Manual Filing. (jld) (Entered: 10/23/2015)

10/23/2015 21 Application for Attorney Ryan D. Jayne to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of

Freedom From Religion Foundation. Pro Hac Vice fee of $ 93 has been

received, receipt number 0755−2781289(Pro Hac Vice Temporary login, )

(Entered: 10/23/2015)

10/26/2015 22 ORDER granting 21 Application to Appear Pro Hac Vice of Attorney Ryan D

Jayne PHV for Freedom From Religion Foundation. Signed by Magistrate

Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein on 10/26/2015. (mtr) (Entered: 10/26/2015)

11/03/2015 23 

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ORDER re 4 MOTION Proceed by Anonymous Name and for Protective

Order. Court EXTENDS the deadlines for briefing Plaintiffs pending motion to

proceed anonymously. Defendants response brief is due no later than November

19, 2015. Plaintiffs reply brief is due no later than November 26, 2015. Signed

by Magistrate Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein on 11/3/15. (mc) (Entered:

11/03/2015)

11/04/2015 24 NOTICE of Appearance by Anthony W Overholt on behalf of Concord

Community Schools (Overholt, Anthony) (Entered: 11/04/2015)

11/05/2015 25 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages Defendant's Memorandum in

Opposition to Plaintiffs' Request for a Preliminary Injunction by Defendant

Concord Community Schools. (Wheeler, Thomas) (Entered: 11/05/2015)

11/05/2015 26 RESPONSE to Motion re 13 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by

Concord Community Schools. (Wheeler, Thomas) (Entered: 11/05/2015)

11/05/2015 27 AFFIDAVIT in Opposition re 13 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction

Affidavit of Scott Spradling filed by Concord Community Schools.

(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Policy 2240, # 2 Exhibit B Concord Performing

Arts Department Course Catalog, # 3 Exhibit C1 − Footloose Program, # 4

Exhibit C2 − 2015 Carnival Variety Show Program, # 5 Exhibit C−3 2015 All

School Band Festival Program, # 6 Exhibit C4 − 45th Annual Choral Music

Pops Concert Program, # 7 Exhibit C5 − 2015 Jazz Cafe Program, # 8 Exhibit

C6 2014 Christmas Spectacular Program, # 9 Exhibit D Draft 2015 Christmas

Spectacular Program)(Wheeler, Thomas) (Entered: 11/05/2015)

11/06/2015 28 ANSWER to 1 Complaint, by Concord Community Schools.(Wheeler, Thomas)

(Entered: 11/06/2015)

11/06/2015 29 ORDER − Plaintiffs' counsel having no objection, the 25 Motion for Leave to

File Excess Pages is GRANTED. This is a text−only order by Judge Jon E

DeGuilio on 11/6/2015. (saj) (Entered: 11/06/2015)

11/08/2015 30 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 26

Response to Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Plaintiffs Jack Doe, John

Doe, Freedom From Religion Foundation. (Rose, Gavin) (Entered: 11/08/2015)

11/09/2015 31 ORDER granting 30 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply;

Plaintiffs to file reply in support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction by

11/16/2015. This is a text−only order by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 11/9/2015.

(dk) (Entered: 11/09/2015)

11/10/2015 32 NOTICE of Appearance by Timothy S Shelly on behalf of Concord Community

Schools (Shelly, Timothy) (Entered: 11/10/2015)

11/16/2015 33 Consent MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages and Attached Oversized

Reply Brief in Support of Preliminary Injunction Motion by Plaintiffs Jack Doe,

John Doe, Freedom From Religion Foundation. (Attachments: # 1 Oversized

Reply Brief in Support of Preliminary Injunction, # 2 Exhibit (Dep. of

Spradling), # 3 Exhibit Dep. Exh. 1 (Notice of Dep.), # 4 Exhibit Dep. Exh. 2

(2010 Program), # 5 Exhibit Dep. Exh. 3 (2011 Program), # 6 Exhibit Dep.

Exh. 4 (2012 Program), # 7 Exhibit Dep. Exh. 5 (2013 Program), # 8 Exhibit

Dep. Exh. 6 (2014 Program), # 9 Exhibit Dep. Exh. 7 (2015 Program), # 10

Exhibit Dep. Exh. 8 (Choir Handbook), # 11 Exhibit Dep. Exh. 9 (Calendar), #

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12 Exhibit Dep. Exh. 10 (Commitment Form), # 13 Exhibit Dep. Exh. 11

(Calendar), # 14 Exhibit Dep. Exh. 12 (Calendar))(Rose, Gavin) (Entered:

11/16/2015)

11/17/2015 34 ORDER granting 33 Consent Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages for Reply

Brief. This is a text−only order by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 11/17/2015. (saj)

(Entered: 11/17/2015)

11/18/2015 35 REPLY to Response to Motion re 13 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction

filed by Jack Doe, John Doe, Freedom From Religion Foundation.

(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Spradling Dep., # 2 Exhibit Dep. Exh. 1 − Notice of

Dep., # 3 Exhibit Dep. Exh. 2 − 2010 Program, # 4 Exhibit Dep. Exh. 3 − 2011

Program, # 5 Exhibit Dep. Exh. 4 − 2012 Program, # 6 Exhibit Dep. Exh. 5 −

2013 Program, # 7 Exhibit Dep. Exh. 6 − 2014 Program, # 8 Exhibit Dep. Exh.

7 − 2015 Program, # 9 Exhibit Dep. Exh. 8 − Choir Handbook, # 10 Exhibit

Dep. Exh. 9 − Calendar, # 11 Exhibit Dep. Exh. 10 − Commitment FOrm, # 12

Exhibit Dep. Exh. 11 − Calendar, # 13 Exhibit Dep. Exh. 12 − Calendar)(Rose,

Gavin) (Entered: 11/18/2015)

11/23/2015 36 STIPULATION by Plaintiffs Jack Doe, John Doe, Freedom From Religion

Foundation. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 (2014 Script), # 2 Exhibit 2 (2015

Script), # 3 Exhibit 3 (2005 Program), # 4 Exhibit 4 (2006 Program), # 5

Exhibit 5 (2007 Program), # 6 Exhibit 6 (2008 Program), # 7 Exhibit 7 (2009

Program))(Rose, Gavin) (Entered: 11/23/2015)

11/30/2015 37 ORDER granting 4 Motion to Proceed by Anonymous Name and Motion for

Protective Order. Court ENTERS protective order as proposed by Plaintiffs.

Signed by Magistrate Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein on 11/30/15. (mc)

(Entered: 11/30/2015)

11/30/2015 38 ORDER Joint Proposed Discovery due by 12/15/2015. Rule 16 Preliminary

Pretrial Conference set for 1/7/2016 10:30 AM in US District Court − South

Bend before Magistrate Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein. Signed by

Magistrate Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein on 11/30/15. (slm) (Entered:

11/30/2015)

11/30/2015 39 MAGISTRATE JUDGE CONSENT FORMS sent to all parties (Standard

Track). (slm) (Entered: 11/30/2015)

12/02/2015 40 OPINION AND ORDER: GRANTING 13 MOTION for Preliminary

Injunction filed by John Doe, Jack Doe, Freedom From Religion Foundation.

The Court ORDERS that Concord Community Schools is ENJOINED from

organizing, rehearsing, presenting, or intentionally allowing to be presented,

any portrayal of a nativity scene that is composed of live performers as part of

its 2015 Christmas Spectacular shows. The Plaintiffs shall not be required to

post any bond for this injunction to take effect. Signed by Judge Jon E DeGuilio

on 12/2/2015. (lhc) (Entered: 12/02/2015)

12/08/2015 41 MOTION to Attend Hearing Telephonically by Defendant Concord Community

Schools. (Overholt, Anthony) (Entered: 12/08/2015)

12/09/2015 42 ORDER granting 41 Motion to appear telephonically. PLAINTIFF AND

DEFENDANT may attend the Rule 16 Preliminary Pretrial Conference

telephonically on 01/07/2016.The court will call all counsel listed on the docket

sheet unless it is notified that specified attorneys need not be contacted. If, at

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the time of the scheduled conference, you will not be at the telephone number

identified on the docket please contact chambers. Approved by Magistrate

Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein on 12/9/15. (slm) (Entered: 12/09/2015)

12/15/2015 43 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting. (Rose, Gavin) (Entered: 12/15/2015)

01/07/2016 44 TELEPHONIC RULE 16 PRELIMINARY PRETRIAL CONFERENCE held

on 1/7/2016. before Magistrate Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein. Pla appeared

by atty Rose. Dft appeared by atty Overholt. Any amendments to the pleadings

to be filed by 2/7/2016. Discovery deadline is 7/1/2016. Plaintiff expert witness

disclosures and reports to be delivered to the defendant by 2/26/2016.

Defendant expert witness disclosures and reports to be delivered to the plaintiff

by 3/25/2016. Initial Disclosures to be exchanged by 2/7/2016. Magistrate

Consent forms due by 1/28/2016. (slm) (Entered: 01/07/2016)

02/07/2016 45 AMENDED COMPLAINT for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Nominal

Damages against Concord Community Schools, filed by Freedom From

Religion Foundation, Jack Doe, John Doe, JOHN ROE, JOHN NOE.

(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 (FFRF Letter), # 2 Exhibit 2 (School

Response))(Rose, Gavin) (Entered: 02/07/2016)

02/07/2016 46 NOTICE of Appearance by Gavin M Rose on behalf of JOHN NOE, JOHN

ROE (Rose, Gavin) (Entered: 02/07/2016)

02/07/2016 47 MOTION to Proceed by Anonymous Name and for Protective Order by

Plaintiffs JOHN NOE, JOHN ROE. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 (Aff. of

Gaylor), # 2 Exhibit 2 (Aff. of Roe), # 3 Exhibit 3 (Aff. of Noe))(Rose, Gavin)

(Entered: 02/07/2016)

02/22/2016 48 Defendant's ANSWER to 45 Amended Complaint, by Concord Community

Schools.(Wheeler, Thomas) (Entered: 02/22/2016)

02/29/2016 49 ORDER GRANTING 47 MOTION to Proceed by Anonymous Name and for

Protective Order by Plaintiffs JOHN NOE, JOHN ROE, as outlined in Order.

Signed by Magistrate Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein on 2/29/2016. (lhc)

(Entered: 02/29/2016)

04/13/2016 50 Joint MOTION Set Summary Judgment Briefing Schedule and File Over−Sized

Briefs by Plaintiffs Jack Doe, John Doe, Freedom From Religion Foundation,

John Noe, John Roe. (Rose, Gavin) (Entered: 04/13/2016)

04/14/2016 51 ORDER granting 50 Joint MOTION to Set Summary Judgment Briefing

Schedule and File Over−Sized Briefs . Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion &

supporting memorandum due 4/29/2016 (limited to 35 pages); Defendant's

summary judgment motion, supporting memorandum, and response brief to

Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion due 5/27/2016 (limited to 35 pages);

Plaintiff's reply brief and response brief to Defendant's summary judgment

motion due 6/13/2016 (limited to 35 pages); and Defendant's reply brief due by

7/1/2016 (limited to 20 pages). This is a text−only order by Judge Jon E

DeGuilio on 4/14/2016. (saj) (Entered: 04/14/2016)

04/29/2016 52 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Plaintiffs Jack Doe, John Doe, Freedom

From Religion Foundation, John Noe, John Roe. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1

(Video of 2015 Christmas Spectacular) (manually filed), # 2 Exhibit 2 (Supp.

Aff. of John Doe), # 3 Exhibit 3 (Supp. Aff. of Jack Doe), # 4 Exhibit 4 (Supp.

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Aff. of John Roe), # 5 Exhibit 5 (Supp. Aff. of John Noe), # 6 Exhibit 6 (Supp.

Aff. of Annie Laurie Gaylor), # 7 Exhibit 7 (Dfts.' Answers to Interrogs.), # 8

Exhibit 8 (Dfts.' Responses to RFP))(Rose, Gavin) (Entered: 04/29/2016)

04/29/2016 53 NOTICE OF MANUAL FILING of Video of 2015 Christmas Spectacular by

Jack Doe, John Doe, Freedom From Religion Foundation, John Noe, John Roe

(Rose, Gavin) (Entered: 04/29/2016)

04/29/2016 54 MEMORANDUM in Support of 52 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by

Jack Doe, John Doe, Freedom From Religion Foundation, John Noe, John Roe.

(Rose, Gavin) (Entered: 04/29/2016)

05/02/2016 RECEIPT from Freedom From Religion Foundation (ACLU) of two copies of a

DVD that was filed as a manual filing on 4/29/2016 53 . (kds) (Entered:

05/05/2016)

05/27/2016 55 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment by Defendant Concord Community

Schools. (Overholt, Anthony) (Entered: 05/27/2016)

05/27/2016 56 BRIEF in Support of 55 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment and in

Opposition of Plaintiff's Motion for summary Judgment filed by Concord

Community Schools. (Overholt, Anthony) (Entered: 05/27/2016)

06/10/2016 57 RESPONSE to Motion re 55 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment and

Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Jack Doe,

John Doe, Freedom From Religion Foundation, John Noe, John Roe. (Rose,

Gavin) (Entered: 06/10/2016)

06/28/2016 58 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply in Support of

Summary Judgment by Defendant Concord Community Schools. (Wheeler,

Thomas) (Entered: 06/28/2016)

06/29/2016 59 ORDER granting 58 Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply to 55 Reply to

be filed by 7/5/2016.Approved by Magistrate Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein

on 6/29/16. (slm) (Entered: 06/29/2016)

07/05/2016 60 REPLY to Response to Motion re 55 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment

and in Opposition of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Concord

Community Schools. (Wheeler, Thomas) (Entered: 07/05/2016)

07/07/2016 61 NOTICE: Because the discovery period in this case has now concluded and

there are no pending non−dispositive motions, the referral to Magistrate Judge

Christopher A Nuechterlein is now terminated. All further matters will now be

handled by Judge Jon E DeGuilio unless otherwise directed. This entry

constitutes the court's order on this matter and shall carry the same weight and

authority as a written order signed by the judge. (slm) (Entered: 07/07/2016)

09/14/2016 62 OPINION AND ORDER: The Court takes both parties' motions for summary

judgment under advisement as to the 2014 and proposed−2015 shows. The

School's supplemental brief as to mootness is due by 10/5/2016, with any

response by the Plaintiffs due by 10/26/2016. The Plaintiffs' supplemental brief

as to the appropriate remedy, if any, for those shows is due by 10/5/2016, with

any response from the School due by 10/26/2016. Finally, the Court GRANTS

the School's motion for summary judgment as to the 2015 show, finding that it

did not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court denies the Plaintiffs'

motion for summary judgment to the same extent. Signed by Judge Jon E

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DeGuilio on 9/14/16. (jld) (Entered: 09/14/2016)

10/04/2016 63 BRIEF Defendant's Supplemental Brief on Mootness Issues filed by Concord

Community Schools. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of John Trout)(Wheeler,

Thomas) Modified on 10/4/2016 to correct title (jld). (Entered: 10/04/2016)

10/04/2016 64 SUPPLEMENT to 63 Supplement Defendant's Supplemental Brief on Mootness

Issues filed by Concord Community Schools. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A to

the Affidavit of Superintendent John Trout D#63)(Wheeler, Thomas) (Entered:

10/04/2016)

10/05/2016 65 SUPPLEMENT Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief Concerning Relief filed by Jack

Doe, John Doe, Freedom From Religion Foundation, John Noe, John Roe.

(Rose, Gavin) (Entered: 10/05/2016)

10/26/2016 66 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 55 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment

(Supplemental Response) filed by Jack Doe, John Doe, Freedom From Religion

Foundation, John Noe, John Roe. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit (Dec. 2015 and

Jan. 2016 School Board Meeting Minutes))(Rose, Gavin) (Entered: 10/26/2016)

10/26/2016 67 BRIEF Defendant's Supplemental Brief on Propriety of Permanent Injunctive

Relief and Nominal Damages. (Wheeler, Thomas) (Entered: 10/26/2016)

01/13/2017 68 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Defendant Concord Community

Schools. (Wheeler, Thomas) (Entered: 01/13/2017)

01/16/2017 69 ORDER granting 68 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Thomas E

Wheeler, II terminated. This is a text−only order by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on

1/16/2017. (saj) (Entered: 01/16/2017)

03/06/2017 70 14 OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART 52 MOTION for Summary

Judgment by Plaintiffs Jack Doe, John Doe, Freedom From Religion

Foundation, John Noe, John Roe. The Motion is GRANTED as to the 2014 and

proposed 2015 shows. The 55 MOTION (Cross) for Summary Judgment by

Defendant Concord Community Schools is DENIED to the same extent.

Plaintiffs AWARDED nominal damages in the amounts of $7.00 to Jack Doe;

$1.00 to John Doe; $1.00 to John Roe; and $1.00 to the Freedom From Religion

Foundation. Plaintiffs' request for a declaratory judgment that the 2014 and

proposed 2015 shows violated the Establishment Clause is GRANTED.

Plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction at this time is DENIED. Because

the Court previously granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant as to the

show that was actually performed in 2015, all claims in this action have now

been resolved so the Clerk is DIRECTED to enter final judgment in accordance

with these Orders. Signed by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 3/6/17. (cer) (Entered:

03/06/2017)

03/07/2017 71 34 CLERK'S ENTRY OF JUDGMENT. (cer) (Entered: 03/07/2017)

03/16/2017 72 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Petition for Attorneys' Fees

and Costs by Plaintiffs Jack Doe, John Doe, Freedom From Religion

Foundation, John Noe, John Roe. (Rose, Gavin) (Entered: 03/16/2017)

03/16/2017 73 ORDER granting unopposed 72 Motion for Extension of Time to File. If no

appeal is timely filed in this case, the plaintiffs are afforded a 60−day extension

of time, to and including 5/22/2017 within which to seek an award of their

attorneys' fees and costs. If an appeal is timely filed in this case, the plaintiffs

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are afforded an extension of time until 60 days after the finalization of that

appeal within which to seek an award of their attorneys' fees and costs. This is a

text−only order by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 3/16/2017. (saj) (Entered:

03/16/2017)

03/21/2017 74 NOTICE OF APPEAL, filed by Plaintiffs Jack Doe, John Doe, Freedom From

Religion Foundation, John Noe, John Roe. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number

0755−3199572. (Rose, Gavin) (Entered: 03/21/2017)

03/21/2017 75 Docketing Statement re: 74 Notice of Appeal filed by John Noe, John Doe,

John Roe, Jack Doe, Freedom From Religion Foundation. (Rose, Gavin)

(Entered: 03/21/2017)

03/21/2017 76 Short Record Sent to US Court of Appeals re 74 Notice of Appeal. Appeal

filing fees paid in the amount of $$505.00 − Receipt # 0755−3199572. (mlc)

(Entered: 03/21/2017)

03/21/2017 77 USCA Case Number 17−1591 for 74 Notice of Appeal filed by John Noe, John

Doe, John Roe, Jack Doe, Freedom From Religion Foundation. (jld) (Entered:

03/22/2017)

03/31/2017 78 12 NOTICE OF CROSSAPPEAL as to 70 Opinion and Order,,,,, Order Dismissing

Case,,,,, filed by Defendant Concord Community Schools. Filing fee $ 505,

receipt number 0755−3211073. (Overholt, Anthony) (Entered: 03/31/2017)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

FREEDOM FROM RELIGION 

FOUNDATION, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

CONCORD COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, 

Defendant. 

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Cause No. 3:15-CV-00463-JD-CAN 

NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL 

By this Notice, Defendant Concord Community Schools appeals to the United States 

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit from the Opinion and Order (Document 70) and Final 

Judgment (Document 71), dated March 7, 2017. 

FROST BROWN TODD LLC 

By: /s/Anthony W. Overholt 

Anthony W. Overholt, #16481-49 

Attorneys for Defendant 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 31st day of March, 2017, a copy of the 

foregoing was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent to the following parties by 

operation of the Court’s electronic filing system. Parties may access this filing through the 

Court’s system: 

Daniel I. Mach 

Heather L. Weaver 

American Civil Liberties Union 

915 15th Street, NW, 6th Floor 

Washington, DC 20005 

Gavin M. Rose 

ACLU of Indiana 

1031 E. Washington Street 

Indianapolis, IN 46202 

Ryan D. Jayne 

Samuel T. Grover 

Freedom From Religion Foundation 

10 N. Henry Street 

Madison, WI 53701 

Timothy S. Shelly 

121 W. Franklin Street, Suite 400 

Elkhart, IN 46516 

/s/Anthony W. Overholt 

Anthony W. Overholt 

FROST BROWN TODD LLC 

201 North Illinois Street, Suite 1900 

P.O. Box 44961 

Indianapolis, IN 46244-0961 

317-237-3800 

Fax: 317-237-3900 

aoverholt@fbtlaw.com

LR00264.0631345 4831-5113-9626v1 

Case 3:15-cv-00463-JD Document 78 Filed 03/31/17 Page 2 of 2

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

FREEDOM FROM RELIGION 

FOUNDATION, et al.,

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

CONCORD COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, 

 Defendant. 

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Case No. 3:15-CV-463 JD 

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is again before the Court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary 

judgment. The Plaintiffs contend that a living nativity scene that Concord High School has long 

presented as the finale to its annual Christmas Spectacular violates the Establishment Clause. 

After the Plaintiffs filed this suit, the School proposed some changes for its upcoming shows in 

December 2015, but the Court found that even with those changes, the proposed show was still 

likely to violate the Establishment Clause, so the Court entered a preliminary injunction against 

performing a live nativity scene as part of the 2015 Christmas Spectacular. The School complied 

with that injunction, and the Court previously found that the show the School actually presented 

in 2015 did not violate the Establishment Clause. What remains of this case is the Plaintiffs’ 

challenge to the version of the Christmas Spectacular that the School performed in 2014, and to 

the modified version of the show that the School proposed to present in 2015, prior to the 

issuance of the injunction. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs’ 

challenge to those shows is not moot; finds that those two versions of the Christmas Spectacular 

violated the Establishment Clause; and awards the Plaintiffs nominal damages and a declaratory 

judgment. 

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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

In its previous orders, the Court has described at length each of the versions of the 

Christmas Spectacular at issue in this case. Freedom From Religion Found. v. Concord Cmty. 

Schs., No. 3:15-cv-463, 2016 WL 4798964 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 14, 2016); Freedom From Religion 

Found. v. Concord Cmty. Schs., 148 F. Supp. 3d 727 (N.D. Ind. 2015). [DE 40 p. 2–6; DE 62 p. 

2–8]. Those facts are undisputed, and the Court will not repeat them here. The parties have filed 

cross-motions for summary judgment. In its previous order on those motions, the Court held that 

the version of the Christmas Spectacular that the School actually presented in 2015 did not 

violate the Establishment Clause. The Court did not reach the merits of the Plaintiffs’ challenge 

to the 2014 show or the proposed-2015 show, though, because the School asserted for the first 

time in its surreply that the Plaintiffs’ challenge to those shows was moot. Specifically, the 

School argued that it had decided not to present those versions of the show again, so the 

Plaintiffs’ requests for a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction were mooted by its 

voluntary cessation of the challenged conduct. The School cited no evidence in support of its 

assertion, though, so the Court directed it to file a supplemental brief with any evidence and 

argument in support of its position on this issue. In that same order, the Court also directed the 

Plaintiffs to file a supplemental brief that identified and justified the specific injunction they 

sought. The parties have now submitted and responded to those respective supplements, so the 

motions for summary judgment are again ripe for ruling. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

On summary judgment, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that there “is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A “material” fact is one identified by the substantive law as 

affecting the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A 

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“genuine issue” exists with respect to any material fact when “the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. Where a factual record 

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is 

no genuine issue for trial, and summary judgment should be granted. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. 

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Servs. Co., 391 

U.S. 253, 289 (1968)). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, this Court 

must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all 

reasonable and justifiable inferences in that party’s favor. Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 

(7th Cir. 2008); King v. Preferred Tech. Grp., 166 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 1999). However, the 

non-moving party cannot simply rest on the allegations contained in its pleadings, but must 

present sufficient evidence to show the existence of each element of its case on which it will bear 

the burden at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); Robin v. Espo Eng’g 

Corp., 200 F.3d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 2000). 

III. DISCUSSION 

The Plaintiffs assert that the Christmas Spectacular that the School presented in 2014, and 

the show that it intended to present in 2015 prior to the preliminary injunction, violated the 

Establishment Clause. In its present filings, the School does not defend either of these shows on 

the merits, but instead raises a threshold argument that the Plaintiffs’ challenges to those shows 

are now moot. The Court addresses the mootness argument first. Finding that these claims are 

not moot, the Court then considers these claims on their merits and then decides what remedies 

are appropriate. 

A. Mootness 

The School argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction to resolve the Plaintiffs’ challenges to 

the 2014 and proposed-2015 shows because those claims are now moot. It argues that it has 

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decided not to present those versions of the show in the future, so there is no longer a case or 

controversy that could justify awarding forward-looking relief (a declaratory judgment and a 

permanent injunction). The School does not suggest that it has enacted any formal policy or 

taken any official action that would preclude presenting those shows in the future. However, in 

its supplemental filing, it has submitted an affidavit by its superintendent, John Trout, in which 

he describes a decision the School has made not to present those versions of the show. Mr. Trout 

notes that following the 2015 shows, “the community, the School Board, administrators, 

teachers, parents, and students engaged in a variety of informal discussions regarding the 

program on a going forward basis.” [DE 63-1 ¶ 5]. Mr. Trout describes these conversations as 

taking place “at the local park, over the water cooler, and across the fence,” and he asserts that 

they “resulted in what appeared to be a consensus that the program [as actually presented in 

2015] was a success and that the changes should be made permanent.” Id.

Mr. Trout further states that, in late December 2015, he met with the school board to 

discuss their options relative to the litigation and the future of the Christmas Spectacular. At that 

time, a “consensus was reached that the changes should be made permanent and that the School 

would not return to performing the program as it had been done in 2014 and the years preceding 

that time.” Id. ¶ 6. Mr. Trout states that, as a result of this decision, the School decided to make a 

Rule 68 offer of judgment, part of which included a proposed injunction against presenting a 

living nativity scene or having a faculty member recite the story of Jesus’ birth as it appears in 

the Bible. However, the Plaintiffs did not accept the offer of judgment, so by its own terms, and 

pursuant to Rule 68, the offer was withdrawn. Mr. Trout states, though, that notwithstanding the 

withdrawal of this offer, the School “made the decision to permanently alter the program . . . and 

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to perform the program on an ongoing basis in a fashion largely similar to the program 

performed in 2015 . . . .” Id. ¶ 9.

The School argues that, in light of this decision not to present the 2014 and proposed2015 versions of the show in the future, the Plaintiffs’ challenges to those shows are now moot. 

Article III of the Constitution states that the power of the federal courts extends to “cases” and 

“controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Thus, “[u]nder Article III, ‘cases that do not involve 

actual, ongoing controversies are moot and must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.’” Wisc.

Right to Life, Inc. v. Schober, 366 F.3d 485, 490–91 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed’n of Advert. 

Indus. Representatives, Inc. v. City of Chi., 326 F.3d 924, 929 (7th Cir. 2003)). Mootness has 

been described as “the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest 

that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its 

existence (mootness).” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n.2 (1997). 

That description is imprecise, though, as there are some notable differences between the two. 

Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 189–90 (2000) (noting that this 

description of mootness “is not comprehensive”). Unlike standing, on which a plaintiff bears the 

burden of proof, the burden of proving that a controversy is moot lies with the party asserting 

mootness, which is usually the defendant. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 190; Schober, 366 F.3d at 491. 

The Supreme Court has also acknowledged that “there are circumstances in which the prospect 

that a defendant will engage in (or resume) harmful conduct may be too speculative to support 

standing, but not too speculative to overcome mootness.” Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 190. 

Generally speaking, “‘a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not 

deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice.’” Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 

at 189 (quoting City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1983)); see also 

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Chi. United Indus., Ltd. v. City of Chi., 445 F.3d 940, 947 (7th Cir. 2006) (“It is true that the 

mere cessation of the conduct sought to be enjoined does not moot a suit to enjoin the conduct, 

lest dismissal of the suit leave the defendant free to resume the conduct the next day.”). Only 

when “subsequent events ma[ke] it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could 

not reasonably be expected to recur” will a case become moot by voluntary cessation. Laidlaw,

528 U.S. at 189; accord Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist. (Elmbrook I), 658 F.3d 710, 719 

(7th Cir. 2011), adopted in pertinent part but overruled on other grounds en banc, 687 F.3d 840, 

842–43 (7th Cir. 2012). The Supreme Court has described this burden of proof as “stringent,” 

“heavy,” and “formidable.” Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 189–90. When the defendants are public 

officials, though, courts “place greater stock in their acts of self-correction, so long as they 

appear genuine.” Schober, 366 F.3d at 492. 

To begin with, there is no dispute that the Plaintiffs’ challenges to these shows were live 

and justiciable at the time they were filed. The School had presented roughly the same living 

nativity scene as the conclusion of the Christmas Spectacular for the last forty-five years. Prior to 

filing suit, the Freedom From Religion Foundation also sent a letter to the School, objecting that 

the show violated the Establishment Clause, and the School responded with a defiant statement 

that refused to accede to the Plaintiffs’ demands. Thus, at the time the Plaintiffs filed suit, a 

controversy existed that gave the Plaintiffs standing to assert their challenge to the show that was 

presented in 2014 and likely would have been presented into the future if not for this litigation. 

The challenge to the proposed-2015 show was also live when it was filed. The show that 

the School actually presented in 2015 differed from the version it proposed, but only because the 

Court entered a preliminary injunction that compelled the School to make those changes. The 

School’s music director also said prior to the preliminary injunction that he intended for these 

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changes to be permanent. In light of that, and because the School changed that show only 

because it was ordered by the Court to do so, a live controversy existed as to the legality of the 

proposed-2015 show at the time the Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint shortly thereafter, as 

there was a sufficient likelihood that the School would present that version of the show in the 

future if permitted to do so. 

Thus, the question is whether, in light of subsequent events, those controversies are no 

longer live—whether the School has met its “stringent” and “formidable” burden of showing that 

it is “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to 

recur.” Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 189. Generally, when evaluating whether a defendant’s voluntary 

conduct moots a case, courts look at what actions the defendant took to ensure that the 

challenged practice would not recur, and also consider the reasons the defendant offers for taking 

those actions. First, as to a defendant’s actions, the clearest case for mootness comes when a 

defendant formally rescinds a challenged ordinance or policy or enacts a new ordinance or policy 

that cures the alleged defect. E.g., Wernsing v. Thompson, 423 F.3d 732, 744–45 (7th Cir. 2005); 

Fed’n of Advert. Indus. Representatives, 326 F.3d at 930 (noting the general rule “that repeal, 

expiration, or significant amendment to challenged legislation ends the ongoing controversy and 

renders moot a plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief”); see Elmbrook I, 658 F.3d at 720 (“[W]e 

have accepted the repeal of a challenged ordinance or an express disavowal of official policy as 

sufficient to moot a case . . . .”). Less conclusive measures can suffice, too, though. For 

example, in Schober, the state never repealed the statute at issue, but it took a number of actions 

that, in combination, clearly established that it would not enforce the statute. Prior to the suit, the 

state had openly conceded that the statute was unconstitutional, and in another proceeding, it 

declined to appeal from a district court’s order that held the statute was void in its entirety. After 

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the suit was filed, the state also sent a letter to the plaintiff assuring them that it would not 

enforce the statute, and it posted a public disclaimer on its website indicating that it would not 

enforce the statute. Also, the state had never enforced the statute against anyone. The Seventh 

Circuit thus held that there was “no real prospect that the [state] will ever enforce this statute,” so 

it found the case to be moot. 

Here, the School does not suggest that it has enacted any formal policy or resolution that 

would preclude the versions of the show in question. It has offered only an affidavit from its 

superintendent that a consensus was reached that the changes should be made permanent, and 

that the School has decided to permanently remove the objected-to aspects of the shows. The 

School does not indicate that it has documented this decision in any manner, or that it has taken 

any steps to implement this decision. The minutes of the school board meetings during the period 

this decision occurred do not reflect any discussion or announcement on this topic, either. In fact, 

there is no indication that the School has ever expressed this commitment except in its filings in 

this litigation, through Mr. Trout’s affidavit. Granted, those filings are public records, but Mr. 

Trout’s affidavit was not filed until nearly a year after the decision was made, and the School’s 

failure to take action outside the confines of this litigation undermines its argument that this 

conduct cannot reasonably be expected to recur even if this case was dismissed. The School also 

tries to portray its Rule 68 offer of judgment as communicating its commitment not to present 

these shows in the future, as it offered to agree to an injunction against these versions of the 

shows. However, an offer of judgment is no such commitment; it is a litigation tactic that, by its 

own terms, is withdrawn if not accepted. 

The School has not identified any case where an informal assurance of this sort supported 

a finding of mootness by voluntary cessation. The School cites to Freedom From Religion 

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Found., Inc. v. Franklin Cty., Ind., 133 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1159 (S.D. Ind. 2015), but there the 

county formally enacted an ordinance that cured the plaintiffs’ concerns. The School also cites to 

Schober, where the agency’s actions were less formal than in Franklin County, but those actions 

still went far beyond the circumstances present here. As just discussed, the state in Schober sent

a letter to the plaintiff clearly indicating that it would not enforce the statute, and it posted a 

disclaimer on its website clarifying that it was not attempting to enforce, adopt, or apply the 

statute. Thus, the state had made both “private and public assurances . . . that the statute will not 

be enforced in the future.” 366 F.3d 485. Prior to the suit, it had also admitted that the statute 

was unconstitutional; it declined to appeal a judgment declaring the statute void in its entirety; 

and it had never enforced the statute in the first place. None of those factors are present here. 

Rather, the School’s actions are more similar to Boyd v. Adams, 513 F.2d 83, 89 (7th Cir. 1975), 

where the defendant sent an internal memorandum instructing its employees to discontinue the 

challenged practice, or to Elmbrook I, 658 F.3d at 720, where the defendant discontinued its 

challenged practice and had no intent to resume it, but “presented no evidence of a formal or 

even an informal policy change” that would have prevented it from doing so. In both cases, the 

courts found that the claims were not moot. 

Courts also consider the reasons a defendant provides for voluntarily modifying its 

conduct, as those reasons can provide insight into whether the defendant’s voluntary actions are 

likely to endure. Schober, 366 F.3d at 491 (“We believe that the defendants’ now public policy 

of non-enforcement of the statute and regulations, particularly in view of the reasons 

therefor, . . . moots any challenge to that requirement.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation and 

alteration omitted)). For example, claims are likely to be moot when a governmental entity states 

that it will not enforce a statute or policy because it is admittedly unconstitutional, as government 

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actors are unlikely to engage in conduct that they have already admitted would be unlawful. E.g.,

Schober, 366 F.3d at 492 (“[A] case is moot when a state agency acknowledges that it will not 

enforce a statute because it is plainly unconstitutional, in spite of the failure of the legislature to 

remove the statute from the books.”); Ragsdale, 841 F.2d at 1365–65. 

Other objective rationales can also suffice. In Federation of Advertising Industry 

Representatives, the defendant did not admit that the policy in question was unconstitutional, but 

the court found that the case was moot where the defendant’s voluntary cessation was supported 

by a cost-benefit analysis as to the likelihood of success in litigation, and its “desire to avoid 

substantial litigation costs by removing a potentially unconstitutional law from the books.” 326 

F.3d at 931. And in EEOC v. Flambeau, the Seventh Circuit credited the defendant’s assertion of 

voluntary cessation where the defendant changed its policy after determining, based on two years 

of experience, that the costs of the challenged program outweighed its benefits. 846 F.3d 941, 

949 (7th Cir. 2017). Absent a reason to believe the defendant would re-impose a policy it had 

already determined to be uneconomical, the Seventh Circuit held that the challenge to that policy 

was moot. Id. The court added, though, that a “decision supported by less evidence or less 

thought might more reasonably be expected to recur,” and it emphasized that no evidence 

contradicted the cost-benefit analysis upon which the defendant based its decision. Id.

By contrast, in Concentrated Phosphate, the defendants offered only their “own 

statement that it would be uneconomical for them to engage in any further” challenged conduct. 

393 U.S. at 203. The Supreme Court found that the case was not moot, as “[s]uch a statement, 

standing alone, cannot suffice to satisfy the heavy burden of persuasion which we have held rests 

upon those” who seek to establish mootness by voluntary cessation. Id.; see also Flambeau, 846 

F.3d at 949 (distinguishing Concentrated Phosphate on the additional basis that there was reason 

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to doubt the veracity of those defendants’ economic claims). In addition, in Elmbrook, the court 

noted that the school began holding its ceremonies in a church in the first place because that was 

cheaper than its other options. Because that remained true even after the school ceased holding 

its ceremonies at the church, the court found that “it is not difficult to imagine that such a [cost] 

disparity would lead District schools back to the Church in the future,” so the case was not moot. 

Elmbrook I, 658 F.3d at 720. 

Here, the justification the School offers for its decision undermines rather than reinforces 

its case for mootness. Mr. Trout indicates that the decision was based on “what appeared to be a 

consensus” that was reached after “a variety of informal discussions” were held “at the local 

park, over the water cooler, and across the fence.” [DE 63-1 ¶ 5]. That explanation is problematic 

in many respects. First, public opinion is inherently subject to change, and basing a decision on a 

perceived public consensus offers little assurance that the decision will not change in the future. 

See Flambeau, 846 F.3d at 949 (finding mootness where the “reasons for the [defendant’s] 

change were not speculation or opinion”). Second, Mr. Trout offers no basis for his assertion that 

the informal discussions “resulted in what appeared to be a consensus” that the changes should 

be made permanent. Given his description of these discussions as occurring at the water cooler 

and across the fence, Mr. Trout appears to be speaking purely metaphorically, and the School 

offers no objective support for his broad assertion. 

Third, the record offers reason to doubt the accuracy of this perceived consensus. In the 

individual plaintiffs’ affidavits in support of their motions for leave to proceed anonymously, 

they describe a great deal of public opposition to any changes in the Christmas Spectacular. For 

example, Jack and John Doe explained in their affidavit: 

Elkhart is a very religious area, and countless members of the community have 

rallied around the portion of the Christmas Spectacular to which we have objected. 

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Many of these persons have been extremely vocal in their support: during a meeting 

of the school board at which this issue was discussed, hundreds of persons attended 

in pre-printed t-shirts advocating in favor of the portion of the Christmas 

Spectacular to which we object; yard signs expressing support for the objectionable 

portion of the Christmas Spectacular have also been displayed throughout our 

community; and a petition in support of this portion of the event has been circulated. 

[DE 4-1 ¶ 7]. Jack Doe further stated that he “is aware that the vast majority of the High 

School—including faculty members that oversee his classes and that are responsible for the 

Christmas Spectacular—feel very passionately about the Christmas Spectacular and about 

keeping the live Nativity Scene.” Id. ¶ 16.1

 The affidavits submitted by the new plaintiffs 

following the 2015 show reflect a similar sentiment: 

[C]ountless members of the community have rallied around the portion of the 

Christmas Spectacular to which we have objected. Many of these persons have been 

extremely vocal in their support, and I have witnessed the vitriol that resulted from 

the initial filing of the complaint in this case as well as from subsequent steps in the 

litigation. 

[DE 47-2 ¶ 6; 47-3 ¶ 6]. The Plaintiffs’ supplemental brief also cites to a recent online opinion 

poll in the Goshen News, in which 68% of the voters voted to resume the previous version of the 

nativity scene. Of course, none of that is scientific, but neither is Mr. Trout’s assertion that the 

water cooler conversations held throughout the community resulted in a consensus that the 

changes should be made permanent. This illustrates the subjective and transitory nature of public 

opinion, which undermines the School’s assertion that these versions of the show cannot 

reasonably be expected to recur. Compare Concentrated Phosphate, 393 U.S. at 203 (finding 

that the case was not moot where the defendants offered only their “own statement that it would 

1 See also DE 4-1 ¶ 8, 10 (“Additionally, a Facebook ‘group’ called ‘Save Concord’s Christmas 

Spec’s Nativity Scene has been created. . . . [N]early 6,400 persons have ‘liked’ that group, 

which is about four times as many persons as attend the High School altogether. . . . Hundreds of 

persons have used either the ‘online comments’ section of media reports or the ‘comments’ 

function in the aforementioned Facebook ‘group’ to aggressively express their opposition to our 

position.”).

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be uneconomical for them to engage in any further” challenged conduct), with Flambeau, 846 

F.3d at 949–50 (finding that the case was moot where the defendant offered undisputed proof 

that the costs of the challenged policy exceeded its benefits). 

On the whole, the Court cannot conclude that the School has met its “stringent” burden of 

showing that it is “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be 

expected to recur.” Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 189. As in Elmbrook, the likelihood that the School will 

present the challenged versions of the Christmas Spectacular in the future “certainly has 

decreased” since this litigation began, but not to the extent that the Court now lacks jurisdiction 

to decide these claims. The case for mootness here is marginally stronger than in Elmbrook,

since the School has stated that it will not present the challenged shows in the future, whereas the 

school in Elmbrook said only that it had no intent to resume the challenged conduct. But like in 

Elmbrook, the School “has presented no evidence of a formal or even an informal policy 

change,” and “[n]othing in official policy would prevent or even obstruct [the School] from 

changing its mind” and resuming the challenged versions of the show. Elmbrook I, 658 F.3d at 

720. Nor have the individuals who have decided to make the change indicated how they would 

implement the decision, as they are not the ones who typically set the content of the shows. And 

like the cost incentive that could have caused the school in Elmbrook to resume its challenged 

conduct, public sentiment could do likewise as to the Christmas Spectacular if the School’s 

decision was in fact informed by its perception of the public consensus, as it indicates. 

It is also worth noting that the practice the Plaintiffs challenge is long-standing. The 

School had presented roughly the same version of the living nativity scene for the last forty-five 

years, so it should not be taken lightly that the School will be able to leave behind such a practice 

that has spanned generations and enjoyed a great deal of support within the community. Against 

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that tide of tradition, the School cannot carry its burden of establishing mootness by voluntary 

cessation with only an affidavit attesting to an informal and undocumented decision made by the 

superintendent and school board out of the public eye. Therefore, the Court finds that the 

Plaintiffs’ challenges to these shows are not moot due to the School’s voluntary cessation of the 

challenged conduct, so the Court retains jurisdiction to resolve the Plaintiffs’ claims.2

B. Merits 

Because these claims are not moot, the Court turns to the merits. The Plaintiffs contend 

that the 2014 and proposed-2015 versions of the Christmas Spectacular violated the 

Establishment Clause, which states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 

establishment of religion . . . .” U.S. Const. amend I, cl. 1. The Fourteenth Amendment made this 

provision equally applicable to state and municipal governments, such as the School. Everson v. 

Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist. 

(Elmbrook II), 687 F.3d 840, 849 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). Under Lemon v. Kurtzman, a 

governmental practice violates the Establishment Clause if it (1) lacks a legitimate secular 

purpose; (2) has the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion; or (3) fosters an excessive 

entanglement with religion. 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). The second of those elements has also 

been framed as asking “‘whether, irrespective of government’s actual purpose, the practice under 

review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval’” of religion or of a particular 

religious belief. Books v. Elkhart Cty., Ind., 401 F.3d 857, 867 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Freedom

From Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, Wisc., 203 F.3d 487, 493 (7th Cir. 2000)); see 

2

 Given this finding, the Court need not reach the Plaintiffs’ alternative argument that their 

request for nominal damages would present a justiciable controversy even if all of their other 

requests for relief were moot.

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also Elmbrook II, 687 F.3d at 850 (“[W]e have viewed the endorsement test as a legitimate part 

of Lemon’s second prong . . . .”). 

In granting a preliminary injunction as to the proposed-2015 show, the Court found that 

the Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that that show violated the 

Establishment Clause. Specifically, the Court held that “a reasonable observer would fairly 

believe that the portrayal of the living nativity scene, when viewed in the particular context, 

circumstances, and history of the Christmas Spectacular, conveys a message of endorsement of 

religion, or that a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.” [DE 40 p. 19]. As the Court 

has previously emphasized, the portrayal of a living nativity scene in and of itself did not render 

the performance unconstitutional. But the manner in which the living nativity scene was 

presented and its context within the show combined to create an impermissible message of 

endorsement. Though the standard of review at this stage is different, no new evidence has been 

submitted, and the School’s present filings offer no argument in defense of the constitutionality 

of this version of the show. Accordingly, for the reasons explained in the prior order, [DE 40 p. 

9–19], the Court now finds that the proposed-2015 version of the Christmas Spectacular would 

have violated the Establishment Clause by conveying a message of endorsement. 

The 2014 version of the Christmas Spectacular presents an even clearer case. Not only 

did this version of the show include the same extended living nativity scene as the proposed2015 show, in which the nativity scene was emphasized unlike any other aspect of the show,3

 it 

included a narration consisting of Bible passages read by a faculty member, telling the story of 

3

 As discussed in the Court’s last order, this presentation differed substantially from the show 

that was actually presented in 2015, during which a nativity scene was on stage for less than two 

minutes of the 107-minute show, as the visual complement to a single song performed by a 

single ensemble, and included no student actors. [DE 62 p. 24–26]. 

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Jesus’ birth. It also lacked any context suggesting an educational or cultural purpose for this 

presentation, and instead focused solely on the Christmas holiday, and in particular, the religious 

content of that holiday. The message of endorsement conveyed by this version of the show was 

unmistakable. Indeed, at no point in this litigation has the School presented any argument in 

defense of this version of the show. Accordingly, the Court also finds that the 2014 version of 

the Christmas Spectacular violated the Establishment Clause by conveying a message of 

endorsement. Thus, the Court grants the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to the 

merits of these claims. 

C. Remedies 

Finally, the Court must address what remedies are warranted given those findings. First, 

the Plaintiffs seek nominal damages for their exposure to the 2014 show. The School has not 

responded to this request or otherwise disputed the Plaintiffs’ entitlement to nominal damages if 

this case is not moot.4

 Thus, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs are entitled to nominal damages in 

the amounts they request, which equal one dollar for each exposure to the 2014 show. 

Accordingly, the Court awards nominal damages in the amounts of $7.00 to Jack Doe; $1.00 to 

John Doe; $1.00 to John Roe; and $1.00 to the Freedom From Religion Foundation. Next, the 

Court also grants the Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory judgment, having found that the 2014 and 

proposed-2015 versions of the Christmas Spectacular violated the Establishment Clause. The 

Court will therefore enter declaratory judgment that those versions of the show were unlawful. 

Last, the Plaintiffs request that, in addition to a declaratory judgment, the Court enter a 

permanent injunction against presenting those versions of the show in the future. In contrast to 

4

 The School argues in its supplemental briefs that a claim for nominal damages cannot on its 

own maintain a live controversy if the Plaintiffs’ other requests for relief are all moot, but the 

School does not contest the Plaintiffs’ request for nominal damages in the absence of mootness.

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their extended arguments in support of their request for nominal damages, though, the Plaintiffs 

offer no argument for why a permanent injunction is warranted here. They simply assert that 

because these shows were unlawful, they are “entitled” to a permanent injunction against 

presenting these shows in the future. The Court raised this omission in its previous order, noting 

that a “permanent injunction does not inevitably follow from any finding that a right has been 

violated . . . .” [DE 62 p. 17 (citing Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 782 (7th Cir. 

2010); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006); e360 Insight v. The 

Spamhaus Project, 500 F.3d 594, 604 (7th Cir. 2007))]. That decision is committed to a district 

court’s discretion, which is guided by a number of factors. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (“The decision 

to grant or deny permanent injunctive relief is an act of equitable discretion by the district 

court . . . .”); Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d at 782 (“As for the choice between declaratory 

judgment and an injunction: that’s a matter left to the district court’s discretion . . . . A 

declaratory judgment cannot be enforced by contempt proceedings, but it has the same effect as 

an injunction in fixing the parties’ legal entitlements.”). The Court thus directed the Plaintiffs to 

submit a supplemental brief explaining why a permanent injunction is warranted under the 

present circumstances of this case. 

In their supplemental filing, the Plaintiffs again fail to engage on this issue. They argue 

only that the case is not moot, so they are entitled to a permanent injunction. The Supreme Court 

has rejected that premise on multiple occasions, though, as the Court further noted in its previous 

order. [DE 62 p. 17 (“Even if any changes to the show do not result in these claims being moot, 

those changes may still affect whether a permanent injunction is an appropriate remedy.”)]. In 

Laidlaw, for example, the Supreme Court noted that “although the defendant’s voluntary 

cessation of the challenged practice does not moot the case, ‘such abandonment is an important 

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factor bearing on the question whether a court should exercise its power to enjoin the defendant 

from renewing the practice.’” 528 U.S. at 193 (quoting City of Mesquite, 455 U.S. at 289) 

(internal alteration omitted); see also City of Mesquite, 455 U.S. at 289 n.10 (stating that while 

the case was not moot by voluntary cessation, “‘[o]f course it is still open to appellees to show, 

on remand, that the likelihood of further violations is sufficiently remote to make injunctive 

relief unnecessary’” (quoting Concentrated Phosphate, 393 U.S. at 203–04)). By relying only on 

a categorical argument that they are entitled to a permanent injunction because the case is not 

moot, the Plaintiffs have failed to offer any argument for why, under the circumstances of this 

case as it now stands, the Court should exercise its discretion to enter a permanent injunction. 

The Court finds that a permanent injunction is not warranted here, as a declaratory 

judgment affords the Plaintiffs the relief they seek, without needing to resort to an overbroad and 

likely unnecessary use of coercion through an injunction. Though the School has not met its 

stringent burden of establishing that its voluntary cessation of the challenged conduct deprives 

the Court of jurisdiction to resolve the Plaintiffs’ claims, that factor certainly bears on whether an 

injunction is appropriate. The School’s superintendent has stated under oath that the School will 

not present these versions of the Christmas Spectacular in the future, and the Court has no reason 

to doubt that statement’s sincerity, even if it lacks the sort of certainty and justification that 

would give rise to mootness. It also appears that the School followed through with this 

commitment as to the 2016 shows, as the Plaintiffs did not seek an injunction as to those shows, 

and have not otherwise challenged them. In addition, should the School’s position change in the 

future, a declaratory judgment gives the Plaintiffs the tools they need to address that situation. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2202, “Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or 

decree may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse party whose 

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rights have been determined by such judgment.” Thus, if the School suggests in the future that it 

may present either of these versions of the show, the Plaintiffs can swiftly return to court and 

seek appropriate relief, which could include an injunction. 

The permanent injunction the Plaintiffs seek is also overbroad, which further weighs 

against awarding an injunction under these circumstances. The Plaintiffs seek an injunction that 

bars the School “from organizing, rehearsing, presenting, or intentionally allowing to be 

presented, any portrayal of a nativity scene that is composed of live performers.” [DE 65 p. 2–3]. 

The Court has not held in this case, though, that any portrayal of a living nativity scene violates 

the Establishment Clause. [DE 40 p. 12–14; DE 62 p. 22–23]. The Court has held only that these 

particular performances of the living nativity scenes, in light of all the pertinent context and 

circumstances of these particular shows, conveyed a message of endorsement and violated the 

Establishment Clause. A broader holding is not possible given the fact-intensive inquiry in 

Establishment Clause cases, and the injunction the Plaintiffs seek extends beyond the scope of 

that holding.5

 Conversely, tailoring a permanent injunction to all of the circumstances of these 

shows that made them unlawful, with enough specificity to apprise the School of what conduct is 

prohibited, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1) (“Every order granting an injunction . . . must . . . state its 

terms specifically; and describe in reasonable detail—and not by referring to the complaint or 

other document—the act or acts restrained or required.”), would be unduly complicated. 

If it were more likely that the School would present these versions of the show in the 

future, some sort of injunction might be warranted despite these obstacles. But as it stands, the 

5

 The Plaintiffs take their proposed language from the preliminary injunction the Court issued as 

to the proposed-2015 show. However, that injunction applied only to the 2015 shows, and the 

School had suggested no alternative, so the Court found that any overbreadth was acceptable 

under the circumstances. [DE 40 p. 21–22]. The injunction the Plaintiffs now seek would extend 

into perpetuity, and thus deserves closer scrutiny.

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Court need not choose between a permanent injunction that is simple but overbroad and one that 

is narrow but minutely detailed. The declaratory judgment itself establishes the parties’ rights, 

and if the School acts in the future in ways that would be inconsistent with that judgment, the 

Court can grant further relief to protect and enforce the Plaintiffs’ rights. Badger Catholic, 620 

F.3d at 782 (“The problem with issuing an injunction straight off is that the details required by 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)(C) would be considerably more elaborate than the terms of a declaratory 

judgment. . . . If [the plaintiff’s] fears come to pass, then more relief lies in store. For now, 

however, a declaratory judgment suffices.”). At this time, however, the Plaintiffs have not shown 

that a permanent injunction is warranted, so the Court denies that request. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

The Court GRANTS the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment [DE 52] in part, as to 

the 2014 and proposed-2015 shows, and DENIES the School’s motion for summary judgment 

[DE 55] to the same extent. The Court AWARDS nominal damages to the plaintiffs in the 

amounts of $7.00 to Jack Doe; $1.00 to John Doe; $1.00 to John Roe; and $1.00 to the Freedom 

From Religion Foundation. The Court GRANTS the Plaintiffs’ request for a declaratory 

judgment that the 2014 and proposed-2015 shows violated the Establishment Clause, but 

DENIES the Plaintiffs’ request for a permanent injunction at this time. Because the Court 

previously granted summary judgment in favor of the School as to the show that was actually 

performed in 2015, [DE 62], all claims in this action have now been resolved, so the Clerk is 

DIRECTED to enter a final judgment in accordance with these orders. 

 SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED: March 6, 2017 

 /s/ JON E. DEGUILIO 

 Judge 

 United States District Court 

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AO 450 (Rev. 01/09) Judgment in a Civil Action

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

Northern District of Indiana

FREEDOM FROM RELIGION

FOUNDATION; JOHN DOE;

JACK DOE; JOHN ROE; and

JOHN NOE,

Plaintiffs

v. Civil Action No. 3:15-CV-463 JD

CONCORD COMMUNITY 

SCHOOLS,

 Defendant

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL ACTION

The court has ordered that (check one):

the plaintiff

recover from the defendant the amount of 

 dollars $ , which includes prejudgment interest at the rate of % plus postjudgment interest at the rate of % along with costs.

 the plaintiff recover nothing, the action is dismissed on the merits, and the defendant 

recover costs from the plaintiff .

 X Other: Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant Concord Community Schools and against

Plaintiffs Freedom From Religion Foundation, John Doe, Jack Doe, John Roe and John Noe in that Defendant

did not violate the Establishment Clause as to the 2015 show. Judgment entered in favor of Plaintiffs Freedom

From Religion Foundation, John Doe, Jack Doe, John Roe and John Noe and against Defendant Concord

Community Schools in that Defendant violated the Establishment Clause as to the 2014 and proposed 2015

shows. Nominal damages are AWARDED in the amounts of Seven Dollars ($7.00) to Plaintiff Jack Doe; One

Dollar ($1.00) to Plaintiff John Doe; One Dollar ($1.00) to Plaintiff John Roe; and One Dollar ($1.00) to

Plaintiff Freedom From Religion Foundation. 

This action was (check one):

tried to a jury with Judge presiding, and the jury has rendered

a verdict.

tried by Judge without a jury and the above decision was

reached.

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 X decided by Judge Jon E. DeGuilio on Motions for Summary

Judgment. 

DATE: March 7, 2017 ROBERT N. TRGOVICH, CLERK OF COURT

By s/C. Reed 

Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk

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