UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

ARMECA HAYES-JACKSON, )

Plaintiff, )

)

 v. ) CAUSE NO.: 2:15-CV-315-JEM

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, )

Acting Commissioner of Social Security )

Administration, )

 Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on a Complaint [DE 1], filed by Plaintiff on August 25, 2015,

and on Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Her Motion to Reverse the Decision of the Commissioner of

Social Security [DE 17], filed by Plaintiff on December 11, 2015. The Commissioner filed a

response to Plaintiff’s brief on March 21, 2016, and Plaintiff filed a reply on March 31, 2016.

I. Procedural Background

In February 2014, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits with the United States

Social Security Administration (“SSA”), alleging that she had become disabled as of October 14,

2013. Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially and on reconsideration. On February 11, 2015,

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Jessica Inouye held a hearing at which Plaintiff, represented by

counsel, and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified. On April 24, 2015, the ALJ issued a decision

denying Plaintiff benefits on the ground that Plaintiff was not disabled. 

In the opinion, the ALJ made the following findings under the required five-step analysis:

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act

through December 31, 2018. 

2. The claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 14, 2013,

the alleged onset date. 
3. The claimant had the following severe impairments: right shoulder;

degenerative joint disease, rotator cuff disease, and impingement syndrome;

cervical and lumbar spine degenerative disease; obesity; sarcoidosis and

asthma; obstructive sleep apnea; mild mitral regurgitation and pulmonary

hypertension; major depressive disorder; and generalized anxiety disorder. 

4. The claimant did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that

met or medically equaled any of the listed impairments in 20 CFR 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 1.

5. The claimant had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light

work in that she could sit for a total of six hours and stand or walk in

combination for a total of six hours in an eight-hour work day with normal

breaks. The claimant could lift and carry up to twenty pounds occasionally

and ten pounds frequently. The claimant could never climb ladders, ropes, or

scaffolds, and could occasionally climb ramps and stairs. The claimant could

occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. The claimant needed

to avoid concentrated exposure to hazards of moving dangerous machinery

and unprotected heights. The claimant needed also to avoid concentrated

exposure to pulmonary irritants, extreme temperatures, humidity, and

wetness. The claimant could occasionally push, pull, and reach overhead with

her right upper extremity. The claimant could understand, remember, and

perform simple, repetitive tasks. The claimant could never work with the

general public, but could communicate and relate to coworkers and

supervisors, and make ordinary work decisions with no over-the-shoulder,

intense supervision. 

6. The claimant was unable to perform any past relevant work. 

7. As of the alleged disability onset date, the claimant was fifty-one years old, which

is defined as an individual closely approaching advanced age. 

8. The clamant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in

English.

9. Transferability of job skills was immaterial to the disability determination because

Plaintiff was “not disabled” under the Medical-Vocational rules irrespective of

whether she had transferable job skills. 

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional

capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that

the claimant can perform. 

11. The claimant had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act,

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from October 14, 2013, through the date of the ALJ’s decision.

On July 6, 2015, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, leaving the ALJ’s

decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. On August 25, 2015, Plaintiff filed the

underlying Complaint seeking reversal of the adverse SSA determination. 

The parties consented to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate Judge to

conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case. Therefore, this

Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

II. Facts

In January 2012, Plaintiff’s primary care physician, Dr. Shobha Iyengar, treated Plaintiff for

asthma and sarcoidosis. Later that same year, Dr. Iyengar saw Plaintiff again and noted that her

asthma had worsened. Plaintiff was also diagnosed with obstructive sleep apnea. Doctors told

Plaintiff that she should use a CPAP machine while sleeping, and that she should lose weight to

combat her breathing issues. Plaintiff often did not comply with her CPAP treatment. 

Plaintiff also struggled with pain in her right shoulder. In October 2013, Dr. Iyengar referred

Plaintiff to Dr. Jason Davenport, who diagnosed Plaintiff with right rotator cuff diseases, joint

osteoarthritis, impingement syndrome, and adhesive capsulitis. Plaintiff continued to have shoulder

issues through the date of the hearing. At various times, Plaintiff received injections and took overthe-counter and prescribed medications to help manage her shoulder pain. 

In December 2013, Dr. Iyengar noted that Plaintiff had pain in her upper back and neck.

Plaintiff additionally reported lower back pain in May 2014. MRIs and X-rays revealed that Plaintiff

had both cervical and lumbar spine issues, including disc protrusions, anterolisthesis, and

spondylosis. 

As early as March 2012, Plaintiff reported having palpitations. In November 2012, Plaintiff

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complained of chest pain and palpitations, which revealed mildly increased pulmonary artery

pressure and mild regurgitation. Some of Plaintiff’s doctors opined that Plaintiff’s chest pain and

palpitation might have been related to mental health issues. 

In October 2012, Plaintiff visited Dr. Martin Fields, a psychiatrist. Dr. Fields diagnosed

Plaintiff with major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder. Dr. Fields prescribed an

antidepressant and an anxiety treatment medication. In March 2013, Plaintiff was additionally

diagnosed with a panic disorder. From 2012 and into 2015, Plaintiff visited multiple physicians,

reporting anxiety, stress, inability to concentrate, and depression. Plaintiff sporadically visited Dr.

Melissa Young, a psychologist, for psychotherapy sessions from late 2012 through February 2015.

III. Standard of Review

The Social Security Act authorizes judicial review of the final decision of the SSA and

indicates that the Commissioner’s factual findings must be accepted as conclusive if supported by

substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, a court reviewing the findings of an ALJ will

reverse only if the findings are not supported by substantial evidence or if the ALJ has applied an

erroneous legal standard. See Briscoe v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005). Substantial

evidence consists of “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Gudgel v.

Barnhart, 345 F.3d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 2003)).

A court reviews the entire administrative record but does not reconsider facts, re-weigh the

evidence, resolve conflicts in evidence, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its judgment

for that of the ALJ. See Boiles v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005); Clifford v. Apfel, 227

F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000); Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049, 1055 (7th Cir. 1999). Thus, the

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question upon judicial review of an ALJ’s finding that a claimant is not disabled within the meaning

of the Social Security Act is not whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled, but whether the ALJ 

“uses the correct legal standards and the decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Roddy v.

Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing O’Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 618

(7th Cir. 2010); Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 734-35 (7th Cir. 2006); Barnett v. Barnhart,

381 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004)). “A reversal and remand may be required, however, if the ALJ

committed an error of law or if the ALJ based the decision on serious factual mistakes or omissions.”

 Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 837 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).

At a minimum, an ALJ must articulate his analysis of the evidence in order to allow the

reviewing court to trace the path of her reasoning and to be assured that the ALJ considered the

important evidence. See Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002); Diaz v. Chater, 55

F.3d 300, 307 (7th Cir. 1995); Green v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1995). An ALJ must

“‘build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [the] conclusion’ so that, as a reviewing

court, we may assess the validity of the agency’s final decision and afford [a claimant] meaningful

review.” Giles v. Astrue, 483 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Scott, 297 F.3d at 595)); see

also O’Connor-Spinner, 627 F.3d at 618 (“An ALJ need not specifically address every piece of

evidence, but must provide a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and his conclusions.”); Zurawski

v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he ALJ’s analysis must provide some glimpse into

the reasoning behind [the] decision to deny benefits.”).

To be eligible for disability benefits, a claimant must establish that she suffers from a

“disability” as defined by the Social Security Act and regulations. The Act defines “disability” as

an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable

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physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A),

1382c(a)(3)(A). To be found disabled, the claimant’s impairment must not only prevent her from

doing her previous work, but considering her age, education, and work experience, it must also

prevent her from engaging in any other type of substantial gainful activity that exists in significant

numbers in the economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f),

416.920(e)-(f).

When a claimant alleges a disability, Social Security regulations provide a five-step inquiry

to evaluate whether the claimant is entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).

The steps are: (1) Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity? If yes, the claimant is not

disabled, and the claim is denied; if no, the inquiry proceeds to step two; (2) Does the claimant have

an impairment or combination of impairments that are severe? If not, the claimant is not disabled,

and the claim is denied; if yes, the inquiry proceeds to step three; (3) Does the impairment meet or

equal a listed impairment in the appendix to the regulations? If yes, the claimant is automatically

considered disabled; if not, then the inquiry proceeds to step four; (4) Can the claimant do the

claimant’s past relevant work? If yes, the claimant is not disabled, and the claim is denied; if no,

then the inquiry proceeds to step five; (5) Can the claimant perform other work given the claimant’s

RFC, age, education, and experience? If yes, then the claimant is not disabled, and the claim is

denied; if no, the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); see

also Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 699-700 (7th Cir. 2004).

At steps four and five, the ALJ must consider an assessment of the claimant’s RFC. The

RFC “is an administrative assessment of what work-related activities an individual can perform

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despite [his] limitations.” Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1178 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing SSR 96-

8p, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)) (other citations omitted). The RFC

should be based on evidence in the record. Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 676 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing

20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3)). The claimant bears the burden of proving steps one through four,

whereas the burden at step five is on the ALJ. Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 886; see also Knight v. Chater,

55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1995). 

IV. Analysis

A. Residual Functional Capacity

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to consider certain medical opinions in the

record when assessing Plaintiff’s RFC. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have

incorporated the medical findings of Dr. Victoria Dow, a state agency physician who determined

that Plaintiff had a limited ability to reach in front of her with her arms due to shoulder problems.

The Commissioner contends that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, namely

multiple medical opinions in the record that were not consistent with Dr. Dow’s conclusions. 

The RFC is an assessment of what work-related activities the claimant can perform despite

her limitations. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004); see also 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1545(a)(1); 416.1545(a)(1). In evaluating a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ is expected to take into

consideration all of the relevant evidence, including both medical and non-medical evidence. See

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(3); 416.945(a)(3). Although an ALJ is not required to discuss every piece

of evidence, she must consider all of the evidence that is relevant to the disability determination and

provide enough analysis in her decision to permit meaningful judicial review. Clifford, 227 F.3d

at 870; Young, 362 F.3d at 1002. In other words, the ALJ must build an “accurate and logical bridge

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from the evidence to his conclusion.” Scott, 297 F.3d at 595 (quoting Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d

936, 941 (7th Cir. 2002)).

In October 2013, Plaintiff visited Dr. Davenport, who diagnosed her with right rotator cuff

diseases, joint osteoarthritis, impingement syndrome, and adhesive capsulitis. AR 21-22. Dr. Dow,

a state agency medical reviewer, concluded that Plaintiff was “limited to occasional reaching in all

direction[s].” AR 111. The ALJ noted that she gave Dr. Dow’s opinion “substantial weight” in

assessing Plaintiff’s RFC. AR 28. But the ALJ found that Plaintiff could “use her right upper

extremity only occasionally for pushing, pulling, and reaching overhead,” and that there was “no

reason why she could not perform all other functions with her upper extremities.” AR 26. The ALJ

did not explain why she concluded that Plaintiff was limited in reaching only “overhead” rather than

in all directions as Dr. Dow had concluded. 

The ALJ’s duty is to resolve inconsistencies in the evidence. See SSR 96-8p; 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527. The ALJ must resolve any differences of opinion and explain why she accepted one

opinion over another. See Corder v. Massanari, No. 00 C 2714, 2001 WL 1355986, at *4 (N.D.

Ill. Nov. 1, 2001) (“By failing to resolve conflicts in competing opinions . . . the ALJ left his

conclusions seeking a factual basis.”). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has warned ALJs

against cherry-picking evidence in the record to support their conclusions. “An ALJ cannot rely

only on the evidence that supports her opinion.” Yurt v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 850, 859 (7th Cir. 2014)

(quoting Bates v. Colvin, 736 F.3d 1093, 1099 (7th Cir. 2013)); see also Scrogham v. Colvin, 765

F.3d 685, 698 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he ALJ identified pieces of evidence in the record that supported

her conclusion that [the plaintiff] was not disabled, but she ignored related evidence that undermined

her conclusion. This ‘sound-bite’ approach to record evaluation is an impermissible methodology

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for evaluating the evidence.”); Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 2010) (“An ALJ has

the obligation to consider all relevant medical evidence and cannot simply cherry-pick facts that

support a finding of non-disability while ignoring evidence that points to a disability finding.”). 

Although medical evidence “may be discounted if it is internally inconsistent or inconsistent with

other evidence,” Knight, 55 F.3d at 314 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)) (other citations omitted),

the ALJ “must provide a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and h[er] conclusions.” O’ConnorSpinner, 627 F.3d at 618. 

Here, the ALJ did not mention Dr. Dow’s findings in her opinion, and instead cited generally

to Dr. Dow’s report. AR 28. The ALJ failed to discuss why Dr. Dow’s limitation findings, which

she gave substantial weight, were not incorporated into her RFC conclusions. Dr. Dow concluded

that Plaintiff was limited in reaching in all directions. However, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was

only limited in reaching above her head, and did not explain why she disregarded Dr. Dow’s

conclusions. AR 26. Accordingly, the Court cannot find the “logical bridge” between the ALJ’s cited

evidence and her conclusions concerning Plaintiff’s RFC. See O’Connor-Spinner, 627 F.3d at 618.

This error, alone, warrants remand.

Additionally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider her impairments in the

aggregate, analyzing their compound effect on Plaintiff’s ability to work. Plaintiff also contends that

the ALJ did not rely on any medical opinion that considered Plaintiff’s impairments collectively.

The Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s RFC analysis was sound, and that the ALJ properly

analyzed Plaintiff’s impairments both individually and in combination. 

“Although . . . impairments may not on their own be disabling, that would only justify

discounting their severity, not ignoring them altogether. Moreover, . . . an ALJ must consider the

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combined effects of all of the claimant’s impairments, even those that would not be considered

severe in isolation.” Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Martinez v. Astrue,

630 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Even if each problem assessed separately were less serious than

the evidence indicates, the combination of them might be disabling.”); Getch v. Astrue, 539 F.3d

473, 483 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[A]n ALJ is required to consider the aggregate effects of a claimant’s

impairments, including impairments that, in isolation, are not severe.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. §

404.1523; Golembiewski v. Barnhart, 322 F.3d 912, 918 (7th Cir. 2003)). 

The ALJ in this case conducted an extensive review of the medical record in this case. She

thoroughly discussed each of Plaintiff’s impairments, providing detailed references to medical

expert opinions and record evidence. However, the ALJ did not conduct the required analysis of

Plaintiff’s impairments in the aggregate. See Terry, 580 F.3d at 477.

While the Commissioner argues that the ALJ “indirectly considered Plaintiff’s symptoms

by considering the opinions of physicians” aware of Plaintiff’s other symptoms, this is simply not

enough. To be sure, the Seventh Circuit has acknowledged that an ALJ adequately incorporates a

single impairment into her RFC finding where she relies on a medical opinion that incorporates the

impairment. See Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 504 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Thus, although the ALJ

did not explicitly consider Skarbek’s obesity, it was factored indirectly into the ALJ’s decision as

part of the doctors’ opinions.”). However, this precedent does not support the Commissioner’s

arguments. The Commissioner does not argue, and the record does not suggest, that the medical

opinions upon which the ALJ relied in her RFC analysis addressed the combined effects of the full

sum of Plaintiff’s impairments. The ALJ did not conduct this analysis herself, instead opting to

consider each impairment in isolation. This defect, too, warrants remand. Getch, 539 F.3d at 483. 

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Accordingly, the Court is remanding for additional proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

The ALJ is instructed to assess how each of Plaintiff’s severe impairments, alone and in

combination, affects her RFC.

B. Plaintiff’s Testimony

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ did not adequately assess her subjective statements

concerning her symptoms. Plaintiff specifically argues that the ALJ impermissibly relied on

evidence that Plaintiff did not comply with certain prescribed treatments. The Commissioner

contends that the ALJ’s analysis was proper.

The ALJ must weigh the claimant’s subjective complaints, the relevant objective medical

evidence, and any other evidence of the following factors:

(i) [The claimant’s] daily activities;

(ii) The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of [] pain or other

symptoms;

(iii) Precipitating and aggravating factors;

(iv)The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any

medication . . . ;

(v) Treatment . . . for relief of [] pain or other symptoms;

(vi) Any measures . . . used to relieve your pain or other symptoms

. . . ; and

(vii) Other factors concerning [] functional limitations and

restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). An ALJ is not required to give full credit to every statement of pain

made by the claimant or to find a disability each time a claimant states he or she is unable to work,

but “must ‘consider the entire case record and give specific reasons for the weight given to the

individual’s statements.’” Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 311 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Simila v.

Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 517 (7th Cir.2009)). 

Here, the ALJ relied on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with various treatments as grounds to

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discredit Plaintiff’s testimony. AR 25. When considering non-compliance with treatment as a factor

in determining whether a claimant is impaired, an ALJ is required to make a determination about

whether non-compliance with treatment is justified and develop the record accordingly. See Thomas

v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 953, 961 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he ALJ concluded from [the plaintiff]’s gap in

treatment . . . that her symptoms were not as severe as she alleged, but, as noted, he did not explore

her reasons for not seeking treatment, another error.”); Craft, 539 F.3d at 679 (“[T]he ALJ ‘must not

draw any inferences’ about a claimant’s condition from this failure unless the ALJ has explored the

claimant’s explanations as to the lack of medical care.”) (quotation omitted).

An ALJ “will not find an individual’s symptoms inconsistent with the evidence in the record

. . . without considering possible reasons he or she may not comply with treatment or seek treatment

consistent with the degree of his or her complaints,” and the ALJ must “explain how [she]

considered the individual’s reasons in [her] evaluation of the individual’s symptoms.” SSR 16-3p,

2016 WL 119029, at *8 (Mar. 16, 2016).1

 In considering a claimant’s treatment history, the ALJ

“may need to contact [the claimant] regarding the lack of treatment or, at an administrative

proceeding, ask why he or she has not complied with or sought treatment in a manner consistent

with his or her complaints.” Id.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s non-compliance with her CPAP treatment discounted her

1

 SR 16-3p, which superseded SSR 96-7p, became effective on March 28, 2016, well after the ALJ issued her

opinion. However, SSR 16-3p, by its own terms, was a clarification of existing law rather than a substantive change. See

SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1237954, at *1 (Mar. 24, 2016) (setting SSR 16-3p’s effective date); SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL

119029, at *1 (Mar. 16, 2016) (noting that the purpose of 16-3p was to “clarify that subjective symptom evaluation is

not an examination of an individual’s character” by “eliminating the use of the term ‘credibility’ from [the SSA’s] subregulatory policy”); see also Qualls v. Colvin, 14-CV-2526, 2016 WL 1392320, at *6 (Apr. 8, 2016). A court reviewing

an ALJ’s decision may apply a new SSR where the new regulation is a clarification of rather than a substantive change

to existing law. Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 482-483 (7th Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds by Johns v. Apfel,

189 F.3d 561 (7th Cir. 1999). Therefore, the Court has applied SSR 16-3p and concludes that the ALJ’s assessment of

Plaintiff’s non-compliance with her treatment was deficient under both SSR 16-3p and SSR 96-7p.

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testimony. AR 25. However, the ALJ did not conduct an analysis of Plaintiff’s reasons for noncompliance. The ALJ elicited testimony from Plaintiff that revealed Plaintiff’s non-compliance

might have been related to one of her severe impairments, her sarcoidosis. AR 75-76. While the ALJ

referenced Plaintiff’s sarcoidosis at multiple points in her opinion, she did not provide any

discussion of why Plaintiff’s reasons for failing to comply with her treatment were unconvincing

or were not supported by objective evidence. Without this analysis, the Court is unable to inspect

the ALJ’s reasoning, and remand is appropriate. See O’Connor-Spinner, 627 F.3d at 618.

Although the ALJ pointed to other factors in discounting Plaintiff’s testimony, the above

mentioned errors are not harmless. On remand, the ALJ might still discount some of Plaintiff’s

statements, but might afford others greater weight than in the first instance due to the change in

analysis consistent with this Opinion. Accordingly, the Court is remanding for the ALJ to properly

assess Plaintiff’s testimony concerning her symptoms and limitations.

D. Remedy

Plaintiff requests that the Court reverse the Commissioner’s decision and remand for an

award of benefits. An award of benefits is appropriate “only if all factual issues have been resolved

and the record supports a finding of disability.” Briscoe, 425 F.3d at 356. Here, all factual issues

have not been resolved and, as a result, remand is the appropriate remedy. Depending on the

outcome of the ALJ’s analysis on remand, she might need to elicit additional testimony to determine

whether Plaintiff is disabled. Furthermore, Plaintiff did not provide any argument on why an instant

award of benefits would be appropriate. Accordingly, the Court is remanding this matter for further

proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

V. Conclusion 

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS the request contained in Plaintiff’s

Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Her Motion to Reverse the Decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security [DE 17], REVERSES the Administrative Law Judge’s decision, and REMANDS this

matter to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 

So ORDERED this 29th day of September, 2016.

s/ John E. Martin 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN E. MARTIN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

cc: All counsel of record

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