COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Willis and Bumgardner 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

FELICIA GREGG O'BRIEN, A/K/A 

 FELICIA K. GREGG 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2400-97-2 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III 

 OCTOBER 6, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Thomas N. Nance, Judge 

 Elwood Earl Sanders, Jr., Director 

Capital/Appellate Services (Public Defender 

Commission, on briefs), for appellant. 

 Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Felicia Gregg O'Brien appeals her convictions of involuntary 

manslaughter and unlawful wounding. She argues that the trial 

court erred in denying her motion to strike and not ruling that 

she acted in self-defense. Finding no error, we affirm the 

convictions. 

 We construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth with all reasonable inferences fairly deducible 

therefrom. See Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 

218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). Evidence that conflicts with the 

Commonwealth's case must be discarded. See Cirios v. 

Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 292, 295, 373 S.E.2d 164, 165 (1988). 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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The trial court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless 

plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. See Smith v. 

Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 68, 71, 435 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1993). 

 The victim and the defendant were part of two separate 

groups that had been squabbling with each other. The victim was 

riding with Tomekia Newell when they spotted the defendant and 

two friends at a gas station. Newell pulled into the station and 

stopped her car near the defendant. Newell planned to ask the 

defendant what the problem was between the two groups. As the 

defendant approached, Newell and the victim got out of the car 

and stood beside each other. The defendant had keys in her right 

hand which she made into a fist with the keys protruding between 

her fingers. She swung, Newell threw up her arm to block the 

blow, and the keys punctured Newell's hand. 

 Newell got a tire iron from her car and hit the defendant in 

the head with it. One of the defendant's friends grabbed Newell 

and fought with her while the defendant fought with the victim. 

When the fighting stopped, the victim walked back and got into 

Newell's car, and the two left. The victim was bleeding from 

wounds received in the fight. She passed out on the way to the 

hospital and died in surgery. 

 The victim died of a stab wound to her neck that severed 

the subclavian artery. The autopsy showed that she was stabbed 

five times: on the left side of her neck, the base of her neck, 

her chest, her left arm, and her chin. The edges of the wounds 
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were sharp, not very wide, but deep. An instrument between one 

and two centimeters wide caused them. 

 After the fight the defendant went to a hospital complaining 

of an assault. She required ten stitches to close her head 

wound. She explained her injury to the officer who came to the 

hospital to investigate her assault. The defendant said that 

while she was in a phone booth a female came up and hit her with 

a bottle. The next morning after being charged with the murder, 

she told a different story. She claimed that the victim had hit 

her in the head, and in defense of herself, she picked up 

something off the ground and started swinging. The defendant 

admitted that she told a false story the night before. 

 O'Brien asserts the evidence is insufficient to convict 

because the Commonwealth introduced her statement that supports a 

self-defense theory. She argues that when it introduced her 

statement the Commonwealth introduced evidence that conflicted 

with its theory that the defendant was the aggressor. She 

concludes that two theories arise from the Commonwealth's 

evidence, and the conviction cannot stand because one theory is a 

hypothesis of innocence. We find this argument unconvincing. 

 That part of a confession that offers a theory favorable to 

the defendant does not bind the Commonwealth. "Confessions are 

to be weighed like all other evidence and a jury may believe them 

in whole or in part, as reason may decide. If from the 

confession itself, or other evidence, it appears to a rational 
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mind that a part is not true, a jury does not have to accept it." 

Durham v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 166, 169, 198 S.E.2d 603, 606 

(1973). The fact finder may infer that defendant intended to 

conceal her guilt with self-serving testimony. See Price v. 

Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 760, 768, 446 S.E.2d 642, 647 (1994). 

 This case rests on the credibility of the witnesses. 

Newell's testimony contradicts that of the defense and is not 

inherently incredible. See Robertson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. 

App. 854, 858, 406 S.E.2d 417, 419 (1991). It is the exclusive 

province of the fact finder to assess the credibility of the 

witnesses and to weigh their testimony. See Schneider v. 

Commonwealth, 230 Va. 379, 382, 337 S.E.2d 735, 736-37 (1985). 

The trier of fact was free to disregard the defendant's evidence 

of self-defense, and the evidence is sufficient to support the 

convictions. See Bell v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 48, 56, 341 

S.E.2d 654, 658 (1986). 

 Concluding that the trial court properly denied the motion 

to strike, we affirm the judgment. 

 Affirmed.