COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

January 5, 2021

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2020AP1151 Cir. Ct. No. 2018TP149

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT I

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO E.W., A PERSON UNDER THE 

AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

J.T.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: 

GWENDOLYN G. CONNOLLY, Judge. Affirmed. 
No. 2020AP1151

2

¶1 DUGAN, J.1 This is an appeal of the Milwaukee County Circuit 

Court’s2 order denying J.T.’s postdisposition motion requesting to withdraw his no 

contest plea to the grounds contained in the petition to terminate his parental rights 

as the father of E.W. J.T. contends that his no contest plea was not knowingly, 

voluntarily, and intelligently made and that he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel when he entered his no contest plea. He also contends that the circuit 

court violated his right to counsel of his choosing. For the reasons set forth below, 

this court affirms.

BACKGROUND

¶2 J.T.’s daughter, E.W., was born on May 13, 2017, with cocaine and 

alcohol in her system, and she was placed with a foster family on July 5, 2017, 

after E.W.’s mother was unable to care for her. After E.W. spent over a year with 

a foster family, the State filed a termination of parental rights (TPR) petition on 

July 10, 2018.3 As grounds for the petition as it related to J.T., the State alleged 

that J.T. failed to assume parental responsibility under WIS. STAT. § 48.415(6). As 

alleged in the petition, J.T. “failed to establish a substantial parental relationship 

with the child, in that he has failed to come forward to accept and exercise 

 

1

 This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(e) (2017-18). 

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise noted.

2

 The Honorable David Feiss presided over the initial proceedings in this case. The 

Honorable Gwendolyn Connolly presided over the proceedings beginning in January 2019, 

including the proceedings in which J.T. pled no contest, and issued the decision and order 

terminating J.T.’s parental rights. The Honorable Marshall B. Murray presided over the hearing 

on the postdisposition motion and issued the decision and order denying the motion. We refer to 

Judge Murray as the postdisposition court.

3

 The State petitioned to terminate the parental rights of E.W.’s mother in addition to 

J.T.’s parental rights as the father. E.W.’s mother was found in default for a failure to appear 

during these proceedings, and her rights as E.W.’s mother are not at issue in this appeal. 
No. 2020AP1151

3

significant responsibility for the child’s daily supervision, education, protection 

and care.” The petition alleged examples that J.T. failed to provide support for 

E.W. and act as a caregiver and also alleged that J.T. failed to attend E.W.’s 

medical appointments and be involved in making decisions about E.W.’s 

education. The petition further alleged that J.T. had been incarcerated shortly after 

E.W.’s birth and remained incarcerated at the time of the filing of the petition. 

¶3 Attorney Deborah Stringenz was appointed to represent J.T. and 

appeared as his counsel at the hearing on the petition on August 6, 2018. J.T. 

entered a contest plea at that hearing, and a jury trial was scheduled for 

December 10, 2018. As a result of issues with producing J.T. to appear in person,

the trial was rescheduled for April 1, 2019, for a time when J.T. anticipated being 

released from prison. 

¶4 In March 2019, the trial was adjourned a second time after Attorney 

Stringez filed a motion to withdraw based on a significant material breakdown in 

communication, and the circuit court granted her motion. Attorney Cheryl Ward 

was subsequently appointed to handle J.T.’s case, and the trial was rescheduled for 

August 19, 2019. Shortly after her appointment Attorney Ward also moved to 

withdraw because she discovered she had a conflict of interest that J.T. was 

unwilling to waive. 

¶5 Attorney Tawny Brooks was then appointed to handle J.T.’s case, 

and a fourth trial date was set for November 11, 2019. However, days before the 

November 11, 2019 trial date, J.T. requested that Attorney Brooks withdraw

because he disagreed with Attorney Brooks on the direction she wanted to take his 

case and felt that she did not have enough time for him. J.T. told the circuit court 

that he wanted another attorney to represent him. The court asked J.T. if he knew 
No. 2020AP1151

4

who the attorney was, and he responded attorney Mark Tishberg. The court then 

asked J.T. if he had retained Tishberg and he responded, “I talked to him several 

times.” J.T. never said that Tishberg said that he would take the case or that he 

was available. Both the State and the guardian ad litem voiced concern about 

J.T.’s request because the proceedings had already been significantly delayed. 

¶6 The circuit court denied J.T.’s request to have Attorney Brooks 

withdraw and explained:

So this case has been pending since July of 2018. There 

have been a variety of counsel who have been appointed to 

assist you ... through the pendency of this case. 

You are certainly free to retain new counsel if that 

is what you wish to do for the trial which will be next 

Monday, but the new counsel you retain, whether it’s 

Mr. Tishberg or someone else, will need to be prepared to 

proceed with trial on Monday. 

I am not going to relieve Ms. Brooks because based 

on what you told me thus far, there isn’t a basis for me to 

conclude that indeed there has been a breakdown in 

counsel, that she has not -- that is Ms. Brooks essentially 

represented your interests here in court such that I would be 

able to grant her leave to not proceed with trial.

J.T. decided to discuss the matter further with Attorney Brooks, the issue was 

never raised again, and Attorney Brooks ultimately continued as J.T.’s counsel.

¶7 The morning that J.T.’s trial was scheduled to begin, the circuit court 

addressed several matters, including motions in limine addressing J.T.’s criminal 

history, and made a series of rulings allowing the State to question J.T. about the 

number of crimes for which he had been convicted and the nature of some of those 

convictions. Another ruling the circuit court made concerned the ability to 
No. 2020AP1151

5

introduce evidence of J.T.’s noncompliance with the CHIPS

4 order as part of the 

State’s case based on the allegation of failure to assume parental responsibility. In 

addressing whether evidence could be introduced, the circuit court cited the jury 

instruction for a failure to assume parental responsibility:

[A]s I review the jury instruction, it says whether insofar as 

considering whether there is a substantial parental 

relationship, the meaning of that is the acceptance and 

exercise of the significant responsibility for the daily 

supervision, education and protection as well as care of the 

child. And part of demonstrating that or failing to 

demonstrate that is whether the parent has complied with 

essentially the dispositional order in order to essentially 

assume that responsibility.

Moreover, the jury instruction itself also outlines 

that the jury can consider all other evidence which bears on 

that issue which assists it in making its determination as to 

whether there has been a failure to assume.

¶8 Following the discussion on motions in limine, Attorney Brooks 

requested that the circuit court give the jury “the additional incarcerated parent 

instructions regarding how it relates to failure to assume” because she found that 

to be the “main issue” in the case. Attorney Brooks specifically requested that the 

circuit court instruct the jury with WIS JI—CHILDREN 346B, which is the jury 

instruction addressing how to handle a parent’s incarceration in a TPR proceeding 

alleging a failure to assume parental responsibility. She described the instruction 

as describing “how an incarcerated parent does not in and of itself establish failure 

to assume parental responsibility.” 

 

4

 E.W. was found to be a child in need of protection or services (CHIPS) on August 21, 

2017. The CHIPS order contained the conditions that E.W.’s parents were required to meet in 

order to have E.W. returned to their care.
No. 2020AP1151

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¶9 When the proceedings resumed following a break, J.T. indicated that 

he wished to enter a no contest plea. The circuit court conducted a plea colloquy 

with J.T. and accepted his plea. After the disposition hearing, the circuit court 

ordered that J.T.’s parental rights be terminated. 

¶10 J.T. filed a postdisposition motion and argued that he should be 

allowed to withdraw his plea. The postdisposition court held a hearing on the 

motion and took testimony from Attorney Brooks and J.T. The postdisposition 

court denied J.T.’s motion following the hearing. 

DISCUSSION

I. Withdrawal of J.T.’s No Contest Plea

¶11 J.T. argues that he is entitled to withdraw his no contest plea because 

his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary based on the circuit court’s 

failure to fully explain the elements of failure to assume parental responsibility. In 

particular, J.T. contends that the circuit court failed to explain the element of a 

“substantial parental relationship” to him during the plea colloquy when the circuit 

court failed to read the corresponding jury instruction defining that element, and as 

a result, he failed to understand the factors that could be considered in determining 

whether he had a substantial parental relationship with E.W. and that the totality of 

E.W.’s life would be considered.

5

 This court disagrees and concludes that J.T. has 

 

5

 Specifically, J.T. argues that the circuit court should have read WIS JI-CHILDREN 346

to him at his plea colloquy, which provides in relevant part:

(continued)
No. 2020AP1151

7

failed to make a prima facie showing that his no contest plea was not knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily entered.

¶12 “In termination of parental rights proceedings, Wisconsin law 

requires the circuit court to undertake a personal colloquy with the defendant in

accordance with WIS. STAT. § 48.422(7).” Kenosha Cnty. DHS v. Jodie W., 2006 

WI 93, ¶25, 293 Wis. 2d 530, 716 N.W.2d 845. Prior to accepting a no contest 

plea to the grounds alleged in a petition to terminate parental rights, the circuit 

court is required to, as is relevant here, “determine that the admission is made 

voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the acts alleged in the petition.” 

WIS. STAT. § 48.422(7)(a). However, there is no “specific checklist” for a circuit 

court in conducting a colloquy, and “[t]he questions to be asked depend upon the 

circumstances of the case.” Brown Cnty. DHS v. Brenda B., 2011 WI 6, ¶57, 331 

Wis. 2d 310, 795 N.W.2d 730. 

 

The term “substantial parental relationship” means the 

acceptance and exercise of significant responsibility for the daily 

supervision, education, protection, and care of (child). 

Substantial parental relationship is assessed based on the totality 

of the circumstances throughout the child’s entire life. In 

evaluating whether (parent) has had a substantial parental 

relationship with (child), you may consider factors, including, 

but not limited to, whether (parent) has expressed concern for or 

interest in the support, care, or well-being of (child), whether 

(parent) has neglected or refused to provide care or support for 

the child, whether (parent) exposed the child to a hazardous

living environment, whether, with respect to a person who is or 

may be the father of the child, the person has expressed concern 

for or interest in the support, care, or well-being of the mother 

during her pregnancy, and all other evidence bearing on that

issue which assists you in making this determination. You may 

consider the reasons for the parent’s lack of involvement when 

you assess all of the circumstances throughout the child’s entire 

life.
No. 2020AP1151

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¶13 The burden-shifting analysis that our supreme court laid out in 

State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), applies when a 

defendant in a TPR proceeding alleges that a no contest plea was not knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily entered. Oneida Cnty. DSS v. Therese S., 2008 WI 

App 159, ¶6, 314 Wis. 2d 493, 762 N.W.2d 122. “Under that analysis, the 

[defendant] must make a prima facie showing that the circuit court violated its 

mandatory duties and must allege the [defendant] did not know or understand the 

information that should have been provided at the hearing.” Id. If a defendant 

makes a prima facie showing, “the burden then shifts to the [petitioner] to 

demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the [defendant] knowingly and 

intelligently waived the right to contest the allegations in the petition.” Id. This 

court “may examine the entire record, not merely one proceeding, and look at the 

totality of the circumstances to determine whether the circuit court’s procedures 

and determinations are sufficient.” Waukesha Cnty. v. Steven H., 2000 WI 28, 

¶42, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 607. Whether the defendant made a prima 

facie case is a question of law that this court reviews independently. Brenda B., 

331 Wis. 2d 310, ¶27. 

¶14 A review of the record indicates that the proceedings were sufficient 

to establish that J.T. understood the nature of the “substantial parental 

relationship” element, even if the circuit court did not specifically read the jury 

instruction to J.T. The circuit court conducted a plea colloquy that spanned close 

to twenty pages of the hearing transcript and established that J.T. was aware of the 

nature of the grounds alleged in the petition to terminate his parental rights to 

E.W. 

¶15 During the plea colloquy, the circuit court established that J.T. was 

educated—J.T. had a high school degree, had completed some college, and had no 
No. 2020AP1151

9

difficulty reading or writing English. J.T. also answered, “Yes,” when the circuit 

court asked if J.T. had a chance to review the petition and if he understood its 

contents. He likewise answered, “Yes,” when the circuit court asked if he had a 

chance to discuss his no contest plea with Attorney Brooks and if he felt he had 

enough time to discuss his plea with her. After questioning J.T. about the rights he 

was giving up and his understanding of the TPR procedure and potential 

dispositions, the circuit court specifically pointed to pages nine and ten of the 

petition and reviewed the allegations of the petition with him. The circuit court

explained that the State alleged that J.T. “failed to come forward and exercise[] 

and accept[] sufficient responsibility for the daily supervision, education, 

protection and care” of E.W. It also referenced the examples of J.T.’s failure to 

assume parental responsibility provided by the State in the petition. The circuit 

court revisited that J.T. understood the grounds alleged in the petition, and J.T. 

again replied, “Yes.” 

¶16 The circuit court additionally explained to J.T. what would have 

happened at the grounds phase of the proceedings if J.T. had proceeded with a trial 

and asked whether he understood that he “would have an opportunity to present 

evidence in [his] defense either as mitigating facts or mitigating circumstances 

and/or defense [he] may have to the allegation that [the] State has outlined in this 

petition.” To this, J.T. replied, “No,” indicating that he had not had a chance to 

discuss his possible defenses or mitigating circumstances with Attorney Brooks. 

However, Attorney Brooks clarified that she “spoke to [J.T.] about the things 

[they] would have argued at trial, ways [they] would disagree with arguments 

made by other witnesses, and [they] did speak about testimony that he would 

provide to support his position.” J.T. then agreed that he did have a chance to 

discuss the facts in support of his contest posture with Attorney Brooks and did 
No. 2020AP1151

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discuss any disagreements that he had with the allegations made by the State in the 

petition. He further replied that he was satisfied with those discussions. Attorney 

Brooks then confirmed J.T.’s understanding of the allegations and facts in support 

of a contest posture, and the circuit court accepted J.T.’s no contest plea.

¶17 This court is satisfied that J.T. understood the grounds alleged in the 

petition. J.T. indicated that he had completed some college and could read and 

write English. The circuit court also questioned J.T. regarding his satisfaction 

with the discussions with Attorney Brooks about the facts in support of a contest 

position and confirmed that J.T. had reviewed the petition with Attorney Brooks 

prior to entering his no contest plea. 

¶18 The circuit court also read the petition’s description of a failure to

assume parental responsibility and cited the examples provided as supported for 

J.T.’s failure to assume parental responsibility. There is no checklist that the 

circuit court must follow in conducting the plea colloquy and, therefore, no 

requirement that the circuit court had to read a particular jury instruction to J.T. to 

establish that he entered his no contest plea knowingly, voluntarily, and 

intelligently provided that the circuit court established J.T.’s understanding 

through another means. See Brenda B., 331 Wis. 2d 310, ¶57. The circuit court 

was able to establish J.T.’s understanding of the nature of the grounds alleged in 

the petition by referencing and reading a document in the record and then asking if 

J.T. understood the nature of the grounds based on that reading. This is an 

acceptable means of establishing J.T.’s understanding. See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 

at 268-69 (providing a non-exhaustive list of ways for a circuit court to determine 

a criminal defendant’s understanding of the nature of the charges against him 

before accepting a plea, including reading the criminal complaint). 
No. 2020AP1151

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¶19 The circuit court is only required to establish that J.T. understand the

nature of the grounds alleged in the petition. The instruction defines the nature of 

a substantial parental relationship as “acceptance and exercise of significant 

responsibility for the daily supervision, education, protection, and care of” of the 

child. The circuit court read from the petition during the plea colloquy and 

summarized the nature of the grounds alleged in the petition as J.T. failed to

“exercise[] and accept[] sufficient responsibility for the daily supervision, 

education, protection and care” of E.W. This was all the circuit court was required 

to do.6 J.T. does not dispute that the circuit court advised him that substantial 

parental relationship as acceptance and exercise of significant responsibility for 

the daily supervision, education, protection, and care of E.W. Rather, he argues 

that the circuit court was required to read the non-exhaustive list of factors listed 

in the jury instruction. However, he does not cite any authority for that argument. 

“Arguments unsupported by references to legal authority will not be considered.” 

State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992).

¶20 J.T., therefore, has failed to establish a prima facie case that his plea 

was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered.

II. J.T. did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel

¶21 J.T. additionally argues that he is entitled to withdraw his no contest 

plea because he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on Attorney 

 

6

 This is not to say that a circuit court should not read a jury instruction at a plea 

colloquy. “The questions to be asked depend upon the circumstances of the case.” Brown Cnty.

DHS v. Brenda B., 2011 WI 6, ¶57, 331 Wis. 2d 310, 795 N.W.2d 730. Under the facts of this 

case, this court finds the plea colloquy sufficient, despite any alleged failure of the circuit court to 

read the requested jury instruction.
No. 2020AP1151

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Brooks’ failure to discuss the “substantial parental relationship” element with him 

and how a jury would consider his incarceration in deciding that element. 

However, this court concludes that Attorney Brooks was not ineffective because 

the record shows that she did, contrary to J.T.’s assertion, discuss this element 

with J.T.

¶22 A defendant is entitled to withdraw a no contest plea “only upon a 

showing of a ‘manifest injustice’ by clear and convincing evidence.” See State v. 

Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 311, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996). “[T]he ‘manifest injustice’ 

test is met if the defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel.” Id.

¶23 To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show 

two elements: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient 

performance resulted in prejudice to the defense. A.S. v. State, 168 Wis. 2d 995, 

1005, 485 N.W.2d 52 (1992) (citations omitted) (adopting the analysis from 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), for TPR proceedings). “An 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim presents a mixed question of fact and law.” 

State v. Pico, 2018 WI 66, ¶13, 382 Wis. 2d 273, 914 N.W.2d 95. This court “will 

not reverse the circuit court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.” 

Id. “Moreover, this court will not exclude the circuit court’s articulated 

assessments of credibility and demeanor, unless they are clearly erroneous.” 

State v. Carter, 2010 WI 41, ¶22, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 782 N.W.2d 695. However, 

this court “independently review[s], as a matter of law, whether those facts 

demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.” Pico, 382 Wis. 2d 273, ¶13.

¶24 In this case, J.T. fails the first prong of the analysis and is unable to 

show that Attorney Brooks performed deficiently. “To demonstrate deficient 

performance, the defendant must show that his counsel’s representation ‘fell 
No. 2020AP1151

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below an objective standard of reasonableness’ considering all the circumstances.” 

Carter, 324 Wis. 2d 640, ¶22 (citation omitted). However, at the evidentiary 

hearing held on J.T.’s postdisposition motion, the postdisposition court found that 

Attorney Brooks discussed the substantial parental relationship element with J.T. 

and explained how J.T.’s incarceration would bear on a failure to assume parental 

responsibility. This court accepts that finding as it is not clearly erroneous.

¶25 Attorney Brooks testified that, while she could not remember 

specifics of any conversation she had with J.T., it is her practice to discuss with 

her clients the jury instructions explaining the elements of any grounds alleged in 

a TPR petition. She further testified that it would also have been her practice to 

discuss with J.T. how a jury would consider his incarceration because it would 

have been an important issue in determining whether J.T. failed to assume parental 

responsibility. The postdisposition court found Attorney Brooks’ testimony in this 

regard to be credible and any testimony from J.T. contradicting Attorney Brooks 

to lack credibility. This court is bound by that credibility determination from the 

hearing.

¶26 Moreover, the record of the hearing immediately prior to J.T.’s no 

contest plea supports Attorney Brooks’ testimony that she understood the role of 

J.T.’s incarceration in his case and would have discussed this fact with him. 

During the discussions leading up to J.T.’s no contest plea, Attorney Brooks 

requested that the circuit court read to the jury the instruction addressing 

incarcerated parents and how it relates to failure to assume parental responsibility. 

She considered it “very relevant” and “quite frankly, borders ineffective” if she 

failed to request the instruction because “an incarcerated parent does not in and of 

itself establish failure to assume parental responsibility.” This court, therefore,

concludes that counsel’s performance was not deficient and J.T.’s argument fails.
No. 2020AP1151

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III. J.T.’s right to hire counsel of his choosing was not 

violated

¶27 J.T. last argues that he was denied his right to hire counsel of his 

own choosing when the circuit court refused to adjourn the trial in order that 

Attorney Brooks could withdraw and he could hire Attorney Tishberg. 

¶28 “One of the procedural safeguards the legislature has afforded to 

parents in termination of parental rights proceedings is the right to counsel.” 

State v. Shirley E., 2006 WI 129, ¶30, 298 Wis. 2d 1, 724 N.W.2d 623. Thus, 

“[i]n a proceeding involving ... an involuntary termination of parental rights, any

parent who appears before the court shall be represented by counsel[.]” WIS.

STAT. § 48.23(2)(b) (emphasis added). The court may discharge counsel only 

after a knowing and voluntary waiver. Sec. 48.23(4m). A defendant in a TPR 

proceeding is “entitled to retain counsel of his or her own choosing at his or her 

expense.” Sec. 48.23(5). Whether a parent was denied his or her statutory right to 

counsel during a TPR proceedings is a question of law that this court reviews 

independently. See Shirley E., 298 Wis. 2d 1, ¶21.

¶29 In this case, J.T. argues that the circuit court erred when it refused to 

adjourn his trial for the fourth time, discharge his third appointed attorney, and 

allow him to hire Attorney Tishberg, the counsel of his choosing. He relies on 

Phifer v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 24, 218 N.W.2d 354 (1974), as support for his 

argument that the circuit court violated his right to counsel of his choosing. 

¶30 Phifer addressed an alleged violation of a criminal defendant’s 

constitutional right to counsel found in the Sixth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution. Id. at 30. In Phifer, the defendant’s second appointed attorney 

moved to withdraw and requested that the trial be adjourned in order that the 
No. 2020AP1151

15

defendant could hire a new attorney of his choosing. Id. at 28-29. The 

defendant’s attorney indicated that the relationship between him and the defendant 

“had not been great and that the defendant lacked confidence in him.” Id. at 29. 

He also indicated that the defendant, prior to the hearing, had contacted an 

attorney who was willing to take the case. Id. at 28. The defendant’s chosen 

attorney was present in court at the time of the request for withdrawal and 

confirmed that he was willing to accept the defendant’s case and would be ready 

for trial with a two-day adjournment. Id. at 29. The circuit court denied the 

motion to withdraw, id., and the circuit court’s denial was affirmed by our 

supreme court, id. at 32. 

¶31 This court fails to see any error in the circuit court’s decision here. 

Attorney Brooks was the third attorney appointed to handle J.T.’s case, and the 

trial had already been adjourned on four prior occasions. Additionally, J.T. failed 

to provide any proof that Tishberg was willing to accept his case should Attorney 

Brooks be allowed to withdraw. As noted above, when the circuit court asked J.T. 

if he retained Tishberg, he merely told the circuit court that he had talked to 

Tishberg several times. Moreover, the circuit court specifically told J.T. that he 

was free to hire Tishberg, or any other attorney that he wanted, provided that 

attorney would be prepared to proceed with the trial on its scheduled date. J.T. 

responded that he wanted to talk further with Attorney Brooks. J.T. never raised 

the issue again, and Attorney Brooks continued to represent him. 

¶32 Indeed, in looking to Phifer, the court recognized that the 

defendant’s “right to select his own counsel cannot be manipulated so as to 

obstruct the orderly procedure for trials or to interfere with the administration of 

justice.” Id. at 30. This court, therefore, fails to see how Phifer requires the 
No. 2020AP1151

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conclusion that J.T. was denied his statutory right to counsel of his choosing in his

TPR proceeding. 

CONCLUSION

¶33 In sum, this court concludes that J.T. has failed to demonstrate that 

he is entitled to withdraw his no contest plea on the basis that it was not 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered or on the basis that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel when he decided to enter his no contest plea. 

This court further concludes that the circuit court did not violate J.T.’s right to 

counsel of his own choosing. The order of the postdisposition court denying J.T.’s 

motion is accordingly affirmed. 

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This order will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.