COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Willis and Elder 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

EVELYN CHRISTIAN BRYDON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0808-97-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 NOVEMBER 4, 1997 

ROBERT CARTER BRYDON 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

James B. Wilkinson, Judge 

 Maurice H. Bell, Jr., for appellant. 

 Robert G. Cabell, Jr., for appellee. 

 Evelyn Christian Brydon (wife) appeals an order of the 

trial court terminating the monthly spousal support paid to her 

by Robert Carter Brydon (husband) since their divorce. She 

contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support the 

trial court's conclusion that she engaged in an incestuous 

relationship with the parties' son during his teenage years, and 

(2) that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it 

terminated her spousal support. For the reasons that follow, we 

reverse. 

 The evidence established that the parties were married in 

1961 and divorced in 1969. The parties had one child, a son, who 

was six at the time of the divorce and thirty-four at the time of 

the hearing on husband's petition to terminate spousal support. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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At the hearing, the parties' son testified that, beginning when 

he was thirteen or fourteen, he began an incestuous relationship 

with his mother. Wife contends that Code § 20-109 precluded the 

trial court from terminating spousal support because the parties 

contractually agreed upon the amount of spousal support in a 

settlement agreement that was approved and incorporated into 

their final divorce decree. We agree. 

 The record indicates that, prior to their divorce, the 

parties entered into an agreement that states that "[h]usband 

agrees to pay to the wife the sum of Two Hundred Dollars 

($200.00) per month alimony for the wife . . . ." In their final 

divorce decree, the trial court incorporated the parties' 

agreement and ordered: 

 in conformity with said agreement and with 

the consent of the parties, . . . that 

[husband] pay to [wife] the sum of $200.00 

alimony each month until such time as [wife] 

remarries, or the death of one or the other 

parties, or until the further order of this 

Court; . . . . 

 We hold that the trial court erred when it terminated wife's 

spousal support because it lacked the authority to do so. Under 

Code § 20-109, the trial court may modify or terminate a prior 

award of spousal support upon the petition of either party, if 

the court determines that there has been a material change in 

circumstances that justifies the remedy sought. See Hollowell v. 

Hollowell, 6 Va. App. 417, 419, 369 S.E.2d 451, 452 (1988). 

 However, where the parties contract or 

stipulate to the amount of spousal support 

and that agreement is filed without objection 
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prior to the entry of the final divorce 

decree, "no decree or order directing the 

payment of support and maintenance for the 

spouse . . . shall be entered except in 

accordance with that stipulation or 

contract." 

Pendleton v. Pendleton, 22 Va. App. 503, 506, 471 S.E.2d 783, 784 

(1996) (quoting Code § 20-109) (emphasis in original). In this 

case, the parties agreed to an amount of spousal support that was 

incorporated into their final divorce decree. Thus, the trial 

court was without authority to terminate spousal support except 

as provided in their agreement. See id., 22 Va. App. at 507, 471 

S.E.2d at 784 (citing Parrillo v. Parrillo, 1 Va. App. 226, 228, 

336 S.E.2d 23, 24 (1985)). Because husband failed to establish 

that wife had either re-married or died, the trial court was 

powerless to terminate his support obligation. 

 Assuming arguendo that the language in the final divorce 

decree of "or until final order of this Court" gave the trial 

court the authority to terminate wife's spousal support based on 

a change in circumstances, its decision was still erroneous. 

First, its conclusion that husband's "economic circumstances" had 

changed was not supported by the evidence. Although husband 

testified that he had retired from one accounting firm and joined 

another, he testified that his salary was "about the same" and 

that he had additional retirement income of $1,500 per month. In 

addition, the discovery of an incestuous relationship between a 

custodial parent and a child nearly twenty years after the fact 

does not, under current law, provide a ground to terminate the 
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non-custodial parent's obligation to pay spousal support. While 

we agree with the trial court that sexual relations between 

parent and child are "egregious" and "reprehensible," it is not a 

"'circumstance[]' which make[s] 'proper' . . . [the] cessation of 

spousal support under Code § 20-109" because it does not "bear 

upon the financial needs of the dependant spouse or the ability 

of the supporting spouse to pay." See Hollowell, 6 Va. App. at 

419, 369 S.E.2d at 452 (stating that the General Assembly did not 

intend for post-marital "misconduct or illicit cohabitation to 

terminate spousal support"). 

 Because we hold that the trial court erred when it 

terminated wife's alimony on the grounds asserted by husband, we 

need not address the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the 

alleged incestuous relationship. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's 

order terminating husband's obligation to pay spousal support. 

 Reversed.