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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

 SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

DANIEL E. WILKINS, ) 

) 

Petitioner, ) 

) 

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 3:14-CV-585 

) 

SUPERINTENDENT, ) 

) 

Respondent. ) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 This matter is before the Court on the Amended Petition under 

28 U.S.C. Paragraph 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Daniel 

E. Wilkins, a pro se prisoner, on May 28, 2014. For the reasons 

set forth below, the Court DENIES the amended habeas corpus 

petition, DENIES a certificate of appealability, and DIRECTS the 

clerk to close this case. 

BACKGROUND 

 Daniel E. Wilkins is challenging his convictions for robbery, 

criminal confinement, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a 

serious violent felon. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 30 
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years on March 24, 2008, by the Allen Superior Court under cause 

number 02D04-0707-FB-98. 

 Wilkins filed a direct appeal. The Court of Appeals of Indiana 

affirmed in Wilkins v. State, 901 N.E.2d 535 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), 

DE 17-7. The Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer. DE 17-3 at 2-

3. The Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed the denial of his postconviction relief petition in Wilkins v. State, 2013 WL 5777074, 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2013), DE 17-12. The Indiana Supreme Court denied 

transfer. DE 17-4 at 1. In this habeas corpus petition, Wilkins 

raises eleven grounds for habeas corpus relief. 

DISCUSSION 

 “Federal habeas review . . . exists as a guard against extreme 

malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a 

substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.” Woods v. 

Donald, 575 U.S. __, __; 135 S.Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). 

 An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf 

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

State court shall not be granted with respect to any 

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court 

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim— 

 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or 
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 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

[This] standard is intentionally difficult to meet. We 

have explained that clearly established Federal law for 

purposes of §2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings, as 

opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions. And an 

unreasonable application of those holdings must be 

objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear 

error will not suffice. To satisfy this high bar, a 

habeas petitioner is required to show that the state 

court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal 

court was so lacking in justification that there was an 

error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement. 

Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. __, __; 135 S.Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015). 

(quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Grounds One and Two 

 In Ground One, Wilkins argues that he was denied his Sixth 

Amendment right to a Speedy trial. The respondent argues that 

Ground One was not fairly presented to the State Courts. 

Nevertheless, “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may be 

denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant 

to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 

U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(2). 

 In Ground Two, Wilkins argues that he was denied the effective 

assistance of counsel in connection to his speedy trial claim. 
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However, “[w]ithout a meritorious speedy trial claim, [he] cannot 

possibly demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his . . . counsel’s 

failure to argue such a claim. As the Court noted in Strickland, 

if it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the 

ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often 

be so, that course should be followed.” Ashburn v. Korte, 761 F.3d 

741, 751 (7th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks, brackets, and citations 

omitted). 

 Here, because Wilkins is not entitled to habeas corpus relief 

even under a de novo review, it is unnecessary to address any of 

the procedural issues in connection with Ground One and Ground 

Two. 

The Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 

(1972), set forth the now well-established standard 

governing Sixth Amendment speedy trial challenges. That 

four-part test considers: whether delay before trial was 

uncommonly long, whether the government or the criminal 

defendant is more to blame for that delay, whether, in 

due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy 

trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as the delay’s 

result. 

Ashburn v. Korte, 761 F.3d 741, 751-752 (7th Cir. 2014) (parallel 

citations and quotation marks omitted). However, all four factors 

of the Barker test are not equal. “Until there is some delay which 

is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry 

into the other factors that go into the balance.” Barker v. Wingo, 

407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). Thus, “the length of the delay operates 
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as a trigger — a delay longer than one year triggers the full 

Barker analysis.” O’Quinn v. Spiller, 806 F.3d 974, 977 (7th Cir. 

2015). Conversely, a delay of less than one year ends the analysis. 

 Here, Wilkins was charged on July 6, 2007, and his jury trial 

was held on February 20 and 21, 2008. Wilkins v. State, 901 N.E.2d 

535, 536-37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). DE 17-7 at 2-3. This was less 

than an eight month delay. Because an eight month delay is not 

presumptively prejudicial, a full Barker analysis is not 

necessary, and Wilkins has not established a Sixth Amendment 

violation. Therefore neither Ground One nor Ground Two is a basis 

for habeas corpus relief. 

Ground Three 

 Wilkins argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because 

he prevented Wilkins from waiving a jury and demanding a bench 

trial. However, “there is no federally recognized right to a 

criminal trial before a judge sitting alone.” United States v. 

Clark, 943 F.2d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 1991) (ellipsis omitted) quoting 

Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34 (1965). Because Wilkins 

could not have a meritorious bench trial demand claim, he “cannot 

possibly demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his . . . counsel’s 

failure” to demand a bench trial. Ashburn v. Korte, 761 F.3d 741, 
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751 (7th Cir. 2014). Therefore Ground Three is not a basis for 

habeas corpus relief. 

Ground Four 

 Wilkins argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because 

he incorrectly advised him that the maximum sentence possible was 

50 years. Wilkins argues that if he had known that the maximum 

sentence was only 30 years, he might have taken the State’s 16 

year guilty plea offer. However, as the Court of Appeals of Indiana 

explained, “fifty years was the maximum penalty he faced for the 

charges against him.” Wilkins v. State, 2013 WL 5777074, at *3 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2013), DE 17-12 at 7 (emphasis in original). A 

misstatement by the trial judge at sentencing did not change that 

fact. Moreover, even if the maximum sentence had been shorter than 

he was advised, such an error would not have made it more likely 

that he would have decided to plead guilty. Rather it would have 

made it less likely. Because his trial counsel was not wrong and 

Wilkins would not have been prejudiced even if he had been, Ground 

Four presents no basis for habeas corpus relief. 

Ground Five 

 Wilkins argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because 

he did not object to the testimony of two eye witnesses who 
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identified him at trial. He argues that “[i]n determining whether 

an identification is reliable despite suggestive pre-trial 

identification procedures, courts” must apply a five factor test. 

Cossel v. Miller, 229 F.3d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 2000). He argues 

that because the State could not meet that test, the objection 

would have been sustained and the testimony excluded. However, 

“Cossel is readily distinguishable [because] there is no 

allegation of any prior impermissibly suggestive identification 

procedure here.” United States v. Miller, 795 F.3d 619, 628 (7th 

Cir. 2015). As such, it was not unreasonable for the Court of 

Appeals of Indiana to have found that “Wilkins cannot prove either 

substandard performance or prejudice.” Wilkins v. State, 2013 WL 

5777074, at *5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), DE 17-12 at 9. Therefore 

Ground Five presents no basis for habeas corpus relief. 

Ground Six 

 Wilkins argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because 

he did not object to fingerprint testimony based on the 

Simultaneous Latent Print Impressions method. He argues that 

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 445 Mass. 626 (2005), held that

Simultaneous Latent Print Impressions is a questionable method for 

analyzing fingerprints. The court in Patterson explained that, 
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Such testimony is based on the theory that once a group 

of latent impressions are identified as simultaneous 

impressions, an otherwise unacceptably small number of 

similarities between each of the impressions and its 

allegedly corresponding fully inked fingerprint can form 

the basis for a collective determination as to whether 

the entire group of latent impressions matches a 

corresponding group of full fingerprints. 

Id. at 645, overruled on other grounds by Com. v. Britt, 465 

Mass. 87, 987 N.E.2d 558 (2013). 

 However, no such testimony was admitted during Wilkins’ 

trial. There is no mention of using the Simultaneous Latent Print 

Impressions method. Eric Black testified, “In the comparison of 

latent fingerprint evidence, we use a scientific method called 

ACE-V, and that’s an acronym for A-C-E dash V, and it stands for 

analysis, comparison, evaluation, and then verification.” Trial 

Transcript at 299. 

 David Young did testify that “Three (3) fingers placed on 

there appear to be placed in – in – in an order that appeared to 

me to be a simultaneous impression, in other words close enough 

together that they appeared to be laid down at the same time when 

an item was picked up, the spacing between ‘em and just the 

orientation of the prints appeared to be in that order.” Trial 

Transcript at 331. He also testified that two prints were 

“consistent with the – another finger, a simultaneous impression.” 

Trial Transcript at 337. However, he clearly stated that “There 
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was sufficient information within ‘em to individually identify 

both prints.” Trial Transcript at 339. “These were made independent 

of each other. I didn’t need the other one to substantiate what 

was there, both of ‘em had more than enough information for me to 

identify strictly on its own if the other one wasn’t present.” Id. 

Thus, the identification of Wilkins as the person who had left 

these two prints was not based on “an otherwise unacceptably small 

number of similarities” with multiple prints, but on a complete 

and independent analysis of each print. David Young testified that 

“I was completely confident . . . I was a hundred percent (100%) 

with both.” Trial Transcript at 361. Based on the testimony 

presented at trial, there was no factual basis for an objection to 

the use of the Simultaneous Latent Print Impressions method because 

it was not used to identify any fingerprints presented during 

Wilkins’ trial. Therefore Ground Six is not a basis for habeas 

corpus relief. 

Ground Seven 

 Wilkins argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because 

he did not object to the State’s use of a peremptory strike of 

what he alleges was the only African-American juror. Here is how 

the Court of Appeals of Indiana addressed the claim. 
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 If Juror 62 was the only African–American in the 

venire, the burden would have shifted to the State to 

offer a race-neutral reason as the basis for striking 

him. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the 

prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be 

deemed race neutral. The following exchange occurred 

during voir dire: 

PROSECUTOR: All right. These three (3) 

questions that I asked, if you would agree 

to ask yourself: Do I have a doubt? Does it 

go to the elements? And is my doubt 

reasonable? Would you ask yourself those 

three (3) questions? And if your answer is 

“no”, then—to any of those, I've done my 

job. Right? Is that fair? 

JUROR 63: (Responds by nodding in the 

affirmative.) 

JUROR 62: (Responds by nodding in the 

affirmative.) 

Q: And then, in fact, that your—would you 

return a verdict of guilty in that 

circumstance? 

JUROR 62: I really couldn't say. 

Q: Pardon me? 

JUROR 62: I couldn’t say. I said I—I really 

couldn't say. 

Q: Okay. Well—well, if you don’t have a doubt 

that goes to one of the elements then you 

wouldn't return a verdict of guilty? 

JUROR 62: I don’t know. 

Q: Okay. Well—well, then I guess I just want 

to make sure that I’m under-that I’m able 

to hear you okay. Is it—why would that be, 

sir? 
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JUROR 62: I don't know, ‘cause I've never been 

on a jury trial before. 

Transcript at 111–112. In the discussion that followed, 

the prosecutor noted that Juror 62 had filled out a 

questionnaire asking if there was anyone close to him 

that had been charged or convicted of a crime. He 

answered “yes”. Assuming that question was answered in 

the affirmative, the questionnaire sought additional 

information. The prosecutor noted that Juror 62 had 

failed to provide on the questionnaire any of the details 

pertaining to his affirmative response. The prosecutor 

asked Juror 62 why he did not answer that portion of the 

questionnaire. Juror 62 responded that he did not 

remember the dates and details, but he did share that 

the subject of the previous arrest was his son. Upon 

further questioning, Juror 62 shared that his son had 

been convicted of burglary many years before. 

 When he exercised his peremptory strike of Juror 

62, the prosecutor explained his reasoning as follows: 

Oh. Well then, that being the case, ma‘am, I've provided 

a race-neutral reason. I—he—he was—when I was asking the 

questions, I asked him two (2) or three (3) times and he 

said, “I don’t know, I’ve never been a juror before.” 

And—and while he may have corrected it, which would 

support not taking him for cause, I think it’s a—it’s a 

sufficient race neutral reason for—to take it as a 

peremptory. Id. at 119. Essentially, the State sought to 

exclude Juror 62 because he indicated that he may not 

vote to convict even if he was convinced the State had 

established all elements necessary to achieve a 

conviction. The State’s subsequent questioning 

established a possible basis for Juror 62’s reluctance, 

i.e., Juror 62’s son had been convicted of a crime. This 

was a sufficiently race-neutral reason to withstand a 

Batson challenge. Thus, even if an objection had been 

made, the trial court would not have sustained it. 

Therefore, Wilkins has failed to demonstrate that he was 

prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to raise a Batson

challenge with respect to the exclusion of Juror 62. 

Wilkins v. State, 2013 WL 5777074, at *5-6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted), DE 17-12 at 11-13. 
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 “When the claim at issue is one for ineffective assistance of 

counsel . . . federal courts are to afford both the state court 

and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.” Woods v. 

Etherton, 578 U.S. __, __; 2016 WL 1278478 at *2 (2016) (quotation 

marks omitted). Because the Court of Appeals of Indiana accurately 

stated the Batson standard and did not unreasonably apply it to 

the facts of this case, Ground Seven is not a basis for habeas 

corpus relief. 

Ground Eight 

 Wilkins argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because 

during the second phase of his bifurcated trial, he did not make 

an opening statement, cross-examine witnesses, object to the 

State’s evidence, nor make a closing argument. “After Wilkins was 

convicted of Counts 1 & 2 the proceedings continued and the jury 

was instructed on count (3) which alleges that the defendant 

omitted the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by an 

individual with a prior conviction enumerated under I.C. 35-47-4-

5.” DE 9-1 at 45 and DE 22 at 31. The Court of Appeals of Indiana 

explained that “Wilkins has failed to articulate what trial counsel 

would or could have said during opening and closing statements 

that would have had any meaningful impact on the outcome of this 

case. Having failed to establish prejudice, his argument with 
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respect to those claims is without merit.” Wilkins v. State, 2013 

WL 5777074, at *7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), DE 17-12 at 13. This was 

not an unreasonable determination. Even now in his habeas corpus 

filings, Wilkins has provided no explanation as to what his trial 

counsel could have said or done which would have resulted the 

exclusion of any admitted evidence or the inclusion of any 

additional evidence. Neither has he provided any suggestion as to 

what could have been said in opening or closing which would have 

given the jury an alternative perspective on the State’s evidence. 

Because the State’s adjudication of this claim was not 

unreasonable, Ground Eight is not a basis for habeas corpus relief. 

Ground Nine 

 Wilkins argues that he was denied the effective assistance of 

both trial and appellate counsel because they did not preserve or 

raise on appeal a claim that the Information charging him with 

Confinement was inadequate. “An [Information] is constitutionally 

sufficient if it (1) contains the elements of the offense intended 

to be charged, (2) sufficiently apprises the accused of what he 

must be prepared to meet, and (3) enables the accused to plead a 

judgment under the indictment as a bar to any subsequent 

prosecution for the same offense.” U.S. ex rel. Ballard v. 
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Bengston, 702 F.2d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 1983) citing Russell v. 

United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1962). 

 Wilkins argues that the Information should have specifically 

stated where the victims were confined pursuant to Indiana Code 

35-34-1-2(a)(8) which requires “stating the place of the offense 

as definitely as can be done if the place is of the essence of the 

offense . . ..” However, specific location is not a part of the 

essence of Confinement which only requires “knowingly or 

intentionally confin[ing] another person without the other 

person’s consent . . . .” Indiana Code 35-42-3-3. Moreover, even 

“[w]here a charging instrument may lack appropriate factual 

detail, additional materials such as the probable cause affidavit 

supporting the charging instrument may be taken into account in 

assessing whether a defendant has been apprised of the charges 

against him.” Gilliland v. State, 979 N.E.2d 1049, 1061 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2012) (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted). 

Here the Probable Cause Affidavit states that Wilkins “made all 

the victims go into the office bathroom and used a new pool stick 

to jam in the door handle to lock them in” at the Stadium Bar and 

Grill. Trial Record at 22. Thus, the Information was not 

insufficiently specific and Ground Nine is not a basis for habeas 

corpus relief. 
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Ground Ten 

 Wilkins argues that he was denied the effective assistance of 

both trial and appellate counsel because they did not preserve or 

raise on appeal a Double Jeopardy claim asserting that the elements 

of his Confinement conviction were not distinct from his Robbery 

conviction. The Court of Appeals of Indiana explained that 

 Robbery consists of taking property “by using or 

threatening the use of force” or “by putting any person 

in fear.” See Ind. Code Ann. § 35–42–5–1 (West, Westlaw 

current with all 2013 legislation). Criminal confinement 

consists of confining a person or removing them by fraud, 

enticement, force, or threat of force from one place to 

another. See I.C. § 35–42–3–3 (West, Westlaw current 

with all 2013 legislation). Our Supreme Court has 

indicated that confinement is not a lesser-included 

offense of robbery. See Hopkins v. State, 759 N.E.2d 633 

(Ind. 2001). Moreover, confinement is a separate 

criminal act where the confinement is greater than that 

which is inherently necessary to rob the victim, even 

where the confinement is a part of the robbery. See id. 

Wilkins confined the three victims well beyond that 

which was necessary to carry out the robbery. He forced 

his victims to the restaurant’s bathroom. It was not 

necessary to do this in order to take the restaurant’s 

money. A double jeopardy challenge would not have 

succeeded, and therefore cannot be the basis of a finding 

of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Wrinkles v. 

State, 749 N.E.2d 1179. 

Wilkins v. State, 2013 WL 5777074, at *7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), DE 

17-12 at 14-15. Wilkins has not provided any explanation for why 

this was an unreasonable adjudication of this claim. The facts of 

this case show that after committing Robbery, he went on to 

separately commit Confinement by locking his victims in the 
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bathroom. Therefore Ground Ten is not a basis for habeas corpus 

relief. 

Ground Eleven 

 Wilkins argues that he was denied the effective assistance of 

both trial and appellate counsel because they did not preserve or 

raise on appeal a claim that the charging Informations were not 

properly sworn. The Court of Appeals of Indiana explained: 

 Finally, under the broad claim that his convictions 

violated the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 

Wilkins claims, “The Charging Information for Counts 1, 

2 & 3 failed to meet the requirements of Ind. Code 35–

34–1–2.4(A).” Brief of Appellant at 50. He explains that 

the charging information was defective in that it failed 

to comply with Ind. Code Ann. § 35–34–1–2.4 (West, 

Westlaw current with all 2013 legislation), which 

provides that a charging information must be “verified 

or sworn under oath”. Further, the statute provides a 

model affirmation clause meeting that requirement, i.e.: 

“I swear (affirm), under penalty of perjury as specified 

by IC 35–44.1–2–1, that the foregoing (the following) 

representations are true.” We note, however, that the 

statute explicitly does not narrow the list of 

acceptable forms to only the model affirmation set out 

therein. Rather, it provides that “a substantially 

similar form” would be acceptable as well. Id. 

 In the present case, the charging informations, in 

pertinent part, read as follows: “Undersigned, upon 

information and belief, being duly sworn upon oath, says 

that: On or about the thirty-first day of May, 2007, in 

the County of Allen and in the State of Indiana, said 

defendant, Daniel E. Wilkins ...”—at this point, the 

charging informations set out the allegations specific 

to the respective offenses with which he was charged. By 

including in the statute a provision indicating that 

language substantially similar to the model form would 

suffice, the Legislature signaled its intention not to 
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create “magic words.” Although it would perhaps be 

preferable to use the model language, the failure to do 

so is not fatal error. The charging informations in the 

present case indicate that the person signing the 

informations did so while “duly sworn upon oath” and 

that it was “[s]ubscribed and sworn to before me”. 

Appellant's Appendix at 363 and 364, respectively. “The 

essential purpose of a verification is that the 

statements be made under penalty of perjury.” Austin v. 

Sanders, 492 N.E.2d 8, 9 (Ind. 1986). I.C. § 35–34–1–

2.4 prescribes a method of verification without the 

presence of a notary or other officer authorized to 

administer an oath. The rule allows verification by 

reciting the statutory language, or substantially 

similar language. 

 To “swear” is “to take an oath.” Black's Law 

Dictionary 1461 (7th ed. 1999). “The legal effect of an 

oath is to subject the person to penalties for perjury 

if the testimony is false.” Id. at 1099. In Indiana, a 

person commits the crime of perjury when he or she “makes 

a false, material statement under oath or affirmation, 

knowing the statement to be false or not believing it to 

be true[.]” Ind. Code Ann. § 35–44. 1–2–1(a)(1) (West, 

Westlaw current with all 2013 legislation). In the 

present case, the deputy prosecutor affirmed the 

representations contained in the charging informations 

were true, and did so swearing an oath to that effect. 

As such, the deputy prosecutor who signed the charging 

informations subjected himself or herself to the 

penalties of perjury if the sworn statement was false. 

Thus, although not in the form set out in I.C. § 35–34–

1–2.4, the affirmation language incorporated in these 

charging informations was sufficient to satisfy the 

purpose of the requirement set out in the statute. In 

light of this, a legal challenge by trial or appellate 

counsel on the grounds that Wilkins identifies here 

would not have succeeded. We reiterate that counsel 

cannot be deemed to have rendered ineffective assistance 

of counsel for failure to present a meritless claim. 

Wilkins v. State, 2013 WL 5777074, at *8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), DE 

17-12 at 15-17. Wilkins has not provided any explanation for why 

this was an unreasonable adjudication of this claim. The charging 
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Informations were properly sworn under oath and he had no valid 

basis for objecting. Therefore Ground Eleven is not a basis for 

habeas corpus relief. 

Cumulative Prejudice 

 Wilkins argues that even if no individual error was 

sufficiently prejudicial to merit habeas corpus relief, the Court 

should grant him relief based on the cumulative prejudice of all 

of the errors combined. “[P]rejudice may be based on the cumulative 

effect of multiple errors. Although a specific error, standing 

alone, may be insufficient to undermine the court’s confidence in 

the outcome, multiple errors together may be sufficient.” Malone 

v. Walls, 538 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2008) quoting Hough v. Anderson, 

272 F.3d 878 (7th Cir. 2001). However, cumulative prejudice is 

only possible where there was more than one error. Here, Wilkins 

has not demonstrated that any errors occurred. Therefore there are 

no errors to combine. 

Evidentiary Hearing 

 Wilkins argues that this court should hold an evidentiary 

hearing before ruling on Grounds One through Eight. Nevertheless, 

he provides no explanation as to why a hearing is needed, nor what 

new evidence might be obtained during a hearing. Neither does he 
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provide any explanation for how he meets the requirements of 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) as required by Boyko v. Parke, 259 F.3d 781, 

790 (7th Cir. 2001). Therefore there is no basis for holding an 

evidentiary hearing in this case. 

Certificate of Appealability 

 Finally, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases, the Court must consider whether to grant a certificate 

of appealability. To obtain a certificate of appealability under 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), the petitioner must make a substantial showing 

of the denial of a constitutional right by establishing “that 

reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree 

that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner 

or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement 

to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

As previously explained, all of the grounds raised by Wilkins are 

meritless and none of them deserve encouragement to proceed 

further. Therefore Wilkins will not be granted a certificate of 

appealability. 
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CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, the court DENIES the amended 

habeas corpus petition, DENIES a certificate of appealability, and 

DIRECTS the clerk to close this case. 

DATED: April 11, 2016 

 /s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge 

United State District Court