NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH 

INSTITUTE, INC., A NEVADA 

DOMESTIC NONPROFIT 

CORPORATION, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, AN 

INDIVIDUAL ENGAGING IN DUAL 

EMPLOYMENT WITH THE NEVADA 

STATE SENATE AND CLARK COUNTY 

DISTRICT ATTORNEY; JASON 

FRIERSON, AN INDIVIDUAL 

ENGAGING IN DUAL EMPLOYMENT 

WITH THE NEVADA STATE 

ASSEMBLY AND CLARK COUNTY 

PUBLIC DEFENDER; GLEN LEAVITT, 

AN INDIVIDUAL ENGAGING IN DUAL 

EMPLOYMENT WITH THE NEVADA 

STATE ASSEMBLY AND REGIONAL 

TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION; 

BRITTNEY MILLER, AN INDWIDUAL 

ENGAGING IN DUAL EMPLOYMENT 

WITH THE NEVADA STATE 

ASSEMBLY AND CLARK COUNTY 

SCHOOL DISTRICT; DINA NEAL, AN 

INDIVIDUAL ENGAGING IN DUAL 

EMPLOYMENT WITH THE NEVADA 

STATE SENATE AND NEVADA STATE 

COLLEGE; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, 

AN INDIVIDUAL ENGAGING IN DUAL 

EMPLOYMENT WITH THE NEVADA 

STATE SENATE AND CLARK COUNTY 

PUBLIC DEFENDER; MELANIE 

SCHEIBLE, AN INDIVIDUAL 

ENGAGING IN DUAL EMPLOYMENT 

WITH THE NEVADA STATE SENATE 

AND CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT 

ATTORNEY; JILL TOLLES, AN 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(01 1941A 

No. 82341 

FILED 

APR 2 1 2022 

CLEW 

138 Nev, Advance Opinion 2.b 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 
INDIVIDUAL ENGAGING IN DUAL 

EMPLOYMENT WITH THE NEVADA 

STATE ASSEMBLY AND UNIVERSITY 

OF NEVADA, RENO; SELENA 

TORRES, AN INDIVIDUAL ENGAGING 

IN DUAL EMPLOYMENT WITH THE 

NEVADA STATE ASSEMBLY AND 

CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT; 

AND THE LEGISLATURE OF THE 

STATE OF NEVADA, 

Respondents. 

Appeal from a district court order dismissing a complaint for 

declaratory and injunctive relief. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark 

County; Jim Crockett, Judge. 

Reversed and remanded. 

Fox Rothschild LLP and Colleen E. McCarty and Deanna L. Forbush, Las 

Vegas, 

for Appellant. 

Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division, and Kevin C. Powers, General 

Counsel, Carson City, 

for Respondent Legislature of the State of Nevada. 

Nevada State College and Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel, 

Henderson; University of Nevada, Reno, and Gary A. Cardinal, Assistant 

General Counsel, Reno, 

for Respondents Dina Neal and Jill Tolles. 

Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP, and Bradley S. Schrager 

and Daniel Bravo, Las Vegas, 

for Respondents Brittney Miller and Selena Torres. 

2 
Wiley Petersen and Jonathan D. Blum, Las Vegas, 

for Respondents Nicole J. Cannizzaro, Jason Frierson, and Melanie 

Scheible. 

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC. 

OPINION 

By the Court, HA_RDESTY, J.: 

Appellant Nevada Policy Research Institute, Inc. (NPRI) filed a 

complaint against respondents, alleging that their dual service as members 

of the state Legislature and as employees of the state or local government 

violates the Nevada Constitution's separation-of-powers clause. The 

district court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, finding that 

NPRI did not allege a personal injury for traditional standing and did not 

satisfy the requirements of the public-importance exception to standing. 

The issue in this appeal, thus, is whether this case falls within 

the public-importance exception, such that NPRI had standing without 

needing to show a personal injury. In Schwartz v. Lopez, 132 Nev. 732, 382 

P.3d 886 (2016), we recognized that a public-importance exception applies 

when an appropriate party sues to protect public funds by raising a 

constitutional challenge to a legislative expenditure or appropriation in a 

case involving an issue of significant public importance. But the 

constitutional challenge at issue here does not involve an expenditure or 

appropriation. We thus take this opportunity to limitedly expand the 

public-importance exception in Nevada to cases such as this—specifically, 

we hold that traditional standing requirements may not apply when an 

appropriate party seeks to enforce a public official's compliance with 

3 
Nevada's separation-of-powers clause (even if it does not involve an 

expenditure or appropriation), provided that the issue is likely to recur and 

there is a need for future guidance. The constitutional separation-of-powers 

challenge at issue here meets those requirements. Accordingly, we reverse 

the district court order dismissing the complaint for lack of standing and 

remand for further proceedings. 

FACTS 

NPRI filed a complaint against respondents Nicole J. 

Cannizzaro, Jason Frierson, Glen Leavitt, Brittney Miller, Selena Torres, 

James Ohrenschall, Melanie Scheible, Jill ToIles, and Dina Neal, seeking 

declaratory and injunctive relief. NPRI sought a declaration that 

respondents' dual service as elected members of the Legislature and as paid 

employees of state or local government violates the Nevada Constitution's 

separation-of-powers clause, and NPRI also sought an injunction 

prohibiting respondents from simultaneously holding those positions. 

Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint because NPRI did not satisfy 

the injury requirement for traditional standing and did not meet the publicimportance exception to the traditional standing requirements. 

Specifically, respondents argued that the public-importance exception did 

not apply because NPRI did not assert a constitutional challenge to a 

specific legislative expenditure or appropriation and NPRI was not an 

appropriate party to litigate the matter. 

1As requested by the Legislature, we have modified the caption to 

reflect that Jason Frierson is a member of the Nevada State Assembly, not 

the Nevada State Senate, and we direct the clerk of this court to modify the 

caption on this docket to conform to the caption in this opinion. 

4 
In its opposition to the motions to dismiss, NPRI argued that it 

satisfied the traditional standing requirements because it was forced to 

expend valuable resources bringing this lawsuit. NPRI also argued that it 

satisfied all three requirements for the public-importance standing 

exception because respondents violation of the separation-of-powers clause 

is an issue of public importance; the Legislature appropriated funds that 

paid legislators a daily salary and per diem allowances while the 

Legislature was in session, which violated the separation-of-powers clause 

for the legislators who were also employed by the executive branch of state 

or local government; and NPRI was an appropriate party because it would 

be impossible to find individual plaintiffs both willing and able to seek the 

legislators' executive-branch positions. 

The district court granted the motions to dismiss, concluding 

that NPRI failed to satisfy the traditional standing requirements because it 

did not allege any particularized harm. The district court further concluded 

that the public-importance exception did not apply because NPRI did not 

directly challenge a legislative appropriation or expenditure and because 

NPRI is not the sole and appropriate party to bring this suit. This appeal 

followed. 

DISCUSSION 

NPRI argues on appeal that the district court erred in finding 

that it lacked standing under the public-importance exception announced 

in Schwartz v. Lopez, 132 Nev. 732, 382 P.3d 886 (2016). Alternatively, 

NPRI argues that this court should expand the public-importance exception 

or otherwise waive standing here so that NPRI may litigate the issue of 

significant public importance presented in its complaint. 

We review whether a party has standing de novo. Arguello v. 

Sunset Station, Inc., 127 Nev. 365, 368, 252 P.3d 206, 208 (2011). "The 

5 
question of standing concerns whether the party seeking relief has a 

sufficient interest in the litigation," so as "to ensure the litigant will 

vigorously and effectively present his or her case against an adverse party." 

Schwartz, 132 Nev. at 743, 382 P.3d at 894. Thus, to have standing to 

challenge an unconstitutional act, a plaintiff generally must suffer a 

personal injury traceable to that act "and not merely a general interest that 

is common to all members of the public." Id.; see also Morency v. State, Dep't 

of Educ., 137 Nev., Adv. Op. 63, 496 P.3d 584, 588 (2021). However, in 

Schwartz, we recognized a public-importance exception to the personalinjury requirement. We held that in appropriate cases, "we may grant 

standing to a Nevada citizen to raise constitutional challenges to legislative 

expenditures or appropriations without a showing of a special or personal 

injury." 132 Nev. at 743, 382 P.3d at 894. As set forth in Schwartz, this 

exception applies only when the plaintiff demonstrates that (1) the case 

presents "an issue of significant public importance," (2) the case involves "a 

challenge to a legislative expenditure or appropriation on the basis that it 

violates a specific provision of the Nevada Constitution," and (3) the 

plaintiff is an "appropriate" party to bring the action. Id. at 743, 382 P.3d 

at 894-95. 

NPRI did not meet the second requirement of the publicimportance exception delineated in Schwartz, as it did not bring "a 

challenge to a legislative expenditure or appropriation on the basis that it 

violates a specific provision of the Nevada Constitution." NPRI asks us to 

nevertheless conclude that it has standing based on the public importance 

of the separation-of-powers issue. We are cognizant that Schwartz requires 

all three of the public-importance exception factors to be met for the 

exception to apply. 132 Nev. at 743, 382 P.3d at 984. However, unlike in 

6 
Schwartz, we are now faced with a case that presents a constitutionally 

based challenge, but not to a legislative expenditure or appropriation. 

We recognize, as other jurisdictions have, that in limited 

circumstances this court must use its discretion to exercise jurisdiction in 

cases involving separation-of-powers questions "as a matter of controlling 

necessity[J" "because the conduct at issue affects, in a fundamental way, 

the sovereignty of the state, its franchises or prerogatives, or the liberties 

of its people." State ex rel. Coll v. Johnson, 990 P.2d 1277, 1284 (N.M. 1999) 

(internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Comm. for an Effective Judiciary v. 

State, 679 P.2d 1223, 1226 (Mont. 1984) (noting "that standing questions 

must be viewed in part in light of discretionary doctrines aimed at prudently 

managing judicial review of the legality of public acts" (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). And, where there are "clear threats to the essential nature 

of state government guaranteed to . . . citizens under their [c]onstitution—

[specifically,] a government in which the three distinct 

departments, . . . legislative, executive, and judicial, remain within the 

bounds of their constitutional powers," Johnson, 990 P.2d at 1284 (internal 

quotation marks omitted)—the ability of an appropriate party to obtain 

judicial review of a public official's actions serves an essential role in 

maintaining the constitutional structure of the state government and 

preventing government actors from either overstepping or abdicating their 

public duties. See, e.g., Thompson v. Heineman, 857 N.W.2d 731, 752 (Neb. 

2015) ("[W]ithout an exception for matters of great public concern, electêd 

representatives could flout constitutional violations with impunity. . . . The 

exception for matters of great public concern ensures that no law or public 

official is placed above our constitution."); ACLU of N.M. v. City of 

Albuquerque, 188 P.3d 1222, 1233 (N.M. 2008) (citing Johnson, 990 P.2d at 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

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7 

40) I 947A 4044 
1284, and recognizing the "great public importance of such cases); S.C. 

Pub. Interest Found. v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 804 S.E.2d 854, 858 (S.C. 2017) 

(stating that "public importance standing" is intended "to allow interested 

citizens a right of action in our judicial system when issues are of significant 

public importance to ensure accountability and the concomitant integrity of 

government action" (alterations, omission, and internal quotation marks 

omitted)). Consequently, courts have been willing to confer public 

importance standing in cases concerning "citizens interest in their form of 

government," Thompson, 857 N.W.2d at 751; Johnson, 990 P.2d at 1284, 

that are likely to recur and for which there is a need for future guidance, cf. 

Sears v. Hull, 961 P.2d 1013, 1019 (Ariz. 1998); S.C. Pub. Interest Found., 

804 S.E.2d at 859. So too do these courts recognize that the doctrine must 

be kept in check, lest they paradoxically expand judicial jurisdiction beyond 

the boundaries of their respective states' separation-of-powers clauses in 

the supposed interest of those same clauses and at the expense of the 

political process and franchise. See Horner v. Curry, 125 N.E.3d 584, 595 

(Ind. 2019); see also State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 

715 N.E.2d 1062, 1080 (Ohio 1999) ("The concept of standing embodies 

general concerns about how courts should function in a democratic system 

of government."). 

With these countervailing considerations in mind, we strike a 

balance here, expanding the public-importance exception articulated in 

Schwartz to the instant suit and those of similar caliber, where a plaintiff 

seeks vindication of the Nevada Constitution's separation-of-powers clause, 

but still limiting the exception's reach to extraordinary cases even within 

that category. Sloan v. Sanford, 593 S.E.2d 470, 472 (S.C. 2004) (noting 

that while "Eclitizens must be afforded access to the judicial process to 

8 
address alleged injustices[J" "standing cannot be granted to every 

individual who has a grievance against a public offkiar). Thus, the publicimportance doctrine may apply both where a plaintiff seeks to protect public 

funds or where, as here, the plaintiff seeks to enforce a public official's 

compliance with a public duty pursuant to the separation-of-powers clause, 

but only where an appropriate party seeks enforcement of that right, the 

issue is likely to recur, and it requires judicial resolution for future 

guidance. In such cases, we may confer standing under the publicimportance exception.2 

We conclude that this is one of those rare cases. NPRI alleges 

that respondents dual service as legislators and employees in the state 

executive branch and local government violates the Nevada Constitution's 

separation-of-powers clause, which divides the powers of the state 

government into three separate departments and prohibits "persons 

charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 

departments [from] exercisEing] any functions, appertaining to either of the 

others, except in the cases expressly directed or permitted in this 

constitution." Nev. Const. art. 3, § 1(1). This court has recognized 

separation of powers as "probably the most important single principle of 

government declaring and guaranteeing the liberties of the people." Heller 

v. Legislature, 120 Nev. 456, 466, 93 P.3d 746, 753 (2004) (quoting Galloway 

v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 18, 422 P.2d 237, 241 (1967)). Thus, the question 

2We further hold that a party who brings an action for declaratory 

relief and satisfies these requirements for the public-importance exception 

to standing establishes a legally protectable interest as required to obtain 

declaratory relief. See MB Am., Inc. v. Alaska Pac. Leasing Co., 132 Nev. 

78, 86, 367 P.3d 1286, 1.291 (2016) (establishing requirements for a court to 

grant declaratory relief). 

9 
of whether respondents dual service violates the separation-of-powers 

clause is one that implicates specific conduct of state officials and a matter 

of great and equal concern to all Nevada citizens. Johnson, 990 P.2d at 1284 

(limiting exception to questions with "constitutional moment"); Haik v. 

Jones, 427 P.3d 1155, 1161 (Utah 2018) (noting that exception has been 

limited to questions "where a large number of people would be affected by 

the outcome (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Our refusal to grant standing under these circumstances could 

result in serious public injury—either by the continued allegedly unlawful 

service of the above-named officials, or by the refusal of qualified persons to 

run for office for fear of acting unconstitutionally—because this unsettled 

issue continues to arise. See Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1083 (limiting 

application of the public-importance exception to circumstances where 

serious public injury would result otherwise). Indeed, this court has 

previously been asked to decide a similar question regarding whether state 

and local government employees could simultaneously serve as members in 

the Legislature. See Heller, 120 Nev. at 466, 93 P.3d at 753. In Heller, the 

Nevada Secretary of State asked this court to declare that dual service 

violates the separation-of-powers clause and to order the Legislature to oust 

those legislators who were also employed by the state executive branch and 

local governments. Id. This court declined to reach the issue, finding that 

the Secretary lacked standing and also that the separation-of-powers clause 

barred the relief sought because only the Legislature may judge the 

qualifications of its members.3 Id. at 460-62, 466-72, 93 P.3d at 749-50, 752- 

3In Heller, this court specifically noted that the dual service issue 

would be justiciable if it were instead "raised as a separation-of-powers 

challenge to legislators working in the executive branch, as the 

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(0) IS147A 44131,0. 10 
56. The dual service issue has since been raised in other court cases, but no 

court has addressed it on the merits for a variety of reasons.4 See, e.g., 

Pojunis v. Denis, No. 60554, 2014 WL 7188221 (Nev. Dec. 16, 2014) (Order 

of Affirmance) (affirming dismissal of complaint based on lack of standing 

and mootness); Indep. Am. Party of Nev. v. Titus, Docket No. 43038 (Order 

Denying Petition for Writ of Mandamus, July 14, 2004) (denying petition 

based on lack of standing). 

The greater the need for future guidance, the greater "the 

extent to which public interest would be enhanced by reviewing the case." 

Snohomish County v. Anderson, 881 P.2d 240, 244 (Wash. 1994) (emphasis 

omitted); McConkey v. Van Hollen, 783 N.W.2d 855, 861 (Wis. 2010) 

(applying the doctrine because "as a law development court, we think it 

prudent that the citizens of Wisconsin have this important issue of 

constitutional law resolved"). And here, future guidance is necessary 

because of the lack of judicial interpretation of Nevada's separation-ofpowers clause, this issues recurrence over an extended period, and the 

potential impact that resolution of this issue will have on state government 

and those who seek public office. See S.C. Pub. Interest Found., 804 S.E.2d 

at 859 (concluding that "future guidance is needed since there is no judicial 

qualifications of legislators employed in the executive branch are not 

constitutionally reserved to that branch." Id. at 472, 93 P.3d at 757. 

41n addition, this issue has been the subject of opinions by the Nevada 

Attorney General and the Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau on at least 

six prior occasions. See 2004-03 Op. Att'y Gen. 17 & n.1 (2004) (citing five 

earlier opinions concerning dual service). These opinions are not binding 

on this court, see Clark Cty. Office of Coroner I Med. Exam'r v. Las Vegas 

Review-Journal, 136 Nev. 44, 57, 458 P.3d 1048, 1058 (2020), but serve to 

demonstrate the recurring and unresolved nature of the dual service issue. 

11 
guidance addressing the issue and there is evidence SCDOT will inspect 

this type of property in the future). This need for future guidance in the 

separation-of-powers arena "gives meaning to an issue [that] transcends a 

purely private matter and rises to the level of public importance," ATC S., 

Inc. v. Charleston County, 669 S.E.2d 337, 341 (S.C. 2008), alleviating 

concerns of a potential flood of spurious litigation claims against public 

officials better addressed via the democratic process. See Haik, 427 P.3d at 

1160-61. 

Furthermore, we conclude that NPRI is an appropriate party to 

challenge the constitutionality of respondents dual service. See Schwartz, 

132 Nev. at 743, 382 P.3d at 894-95 (clarifying that an appropriate party 

"mean [s] that there is no one else in a better position who will likely bring 

an action and that the plaintiff is capable of fully advocating his or her 

position in court"). Expanding on the discussion in Schwartz, we agree with 

our sister states that "[a]ppropriateness has three main facets: the plaintiff 

must not be a 'sham plaintiff with no true adversity of interest; he or she 

must be capable of competently advocating his or her position; and he or she 

may still be denied standing if 'there is a plaintiff more directly affected by 

the challenged conduct in question who has or is likely to bring suit,"' which 

ensures that the plaintiff will serve as a true and strong adversary. Baxley 

v. State, 958 P.2d 422, 428 (Alaska 1998) (quoting Trs. for Alaska v. State, 

736 P.2d 324, 329 (Alaska 1987)); see also Hunsucker v. Fallin, 408 P.3d 

599, 602 (Okla. 2017) (limiting doctrine to cases where there is "lively 

conflict between antagonistic demands" (internal quotation marks 

omitted)); McConkey, 783 N.W.2d at 860-61 (applying doctrine where 

plaintiff had "competently framed the issues and zealously argued his case," 

and "a different plaintiff would not enhance [the court's] understandine). 

12 
NPRI is a nonprofit corporation whose primary missions are to 

conduct public policy research and advocate for policies that protect 

individual liberties and promote transparency, accountability, and 

efficiency in government. NPRI thus is not a "sham plaintiff —its 

"sincerity" in challenging the legislators dual employment "is 

unquestioned." See Trs. for Alaska, 736 P.2d at 330 (concluding the 

plaintiffs were appropriate parties because "Whey are not sham plaintiffs; 

their sincerity in opposing the states mineral disposition system is 

unquestionee). NPRI has demonstrated "it has 'the interest necessary to 

effectively assist the court in developing and reviewing all relevant legal 

and factual questions.'" Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality 

Bd., 148 P.3d 960, 972 (Utah 2006) (quoting Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 

1145, 1150 (Utah 1983)). 

Moreover, it is represented by counsel who have competently 

advocated NPRrs position and named as defendants all of the individuals 

who currently serve in dual roles. See Trs. for Alaska, 736 P.2d at 329-30, 

330 n.9 (explaining that "standing may be denied if the plaintiff appears to 

be incapable, for economic or other reasons, of competently advocating the 

position it has asserted"). And as we recognized in Heller, the declaratory 

relief action NPRI filed in district court is an appropriate proceeding in 

which to resolve the dual service issue, as it will allow "a full record [to] be 

developed regarding the nature and scope of [respondente] employment 

duties." 120 Nev. at 467, 93 P.3d at 754 (quoting State v. Evans, 735 P.2d 

29, 33 (Utah 1987)); see also id. at 472-73, 93 P.3d at 757. 

NPRI also has demonstrated that the dual service issue is 

unlikely to be properly raised by any other parties with greater interest. 

The mere possibility that other individuals may have a more direct interest 

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OF 

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(0) 15147A 13 
in bringing a challenge to respondents dual service does not mean that 

NPRI is an inappropriate party to do so, particularly as no such individual 

has filed suit or will likely do so in the future. See Trs. for Alaska, 736 P.2d 

at 330 (holding "the mere possibility that the Attorney General may sue 

does not mean that appellants are inappropriate plaintiffs" and stating "the 

crucial inquiry is whether the more directly concerned potential plaintiff 

has sued or seems likely to sue in the foreseeable future); see also Utah 

Chapter of Sierra Club, 148 P.3d at 972-73 (recognizing that more than one 

party may be appropriate and a party is not required to have the greatest 

interest to have standing). Because we conclude that NPRI has 

demonstrated that it seeks enforcement of the separation-of-powers clause 

as applied to public officials and NPRI has the ability to vigorously litigate 

this important, recurring issue, we elect to confer standing on NPRI to bring 

this challenge. 

CONCLUSION 

Though the public-importance exception to standing that we 

announced in Schwartz requires that the plaintiff challenge a legislative 

expenditure or appropriation as violating a specific provision of the Nevada 

Constitution, we may apply the public-importance exception in cases where 

a party seeks to protect the essential nature of "a government in which the 

three distinct departments, . . . legislative, executive, and judicial, remain 

within the bounds of their constitutional powers," Johnson, 990 P.2d at 

1284 (internal quotation marks omitted), as against a public official, even 

when this requirement is not met. We elect to apply the public-importance 

exception here and confer standing on NPRI because it is an appropriate 

party and the issue in this case implicates separation of powers under our 

state constitution, is likely to recur, and is of such significant public 

importance as to require resolution for future guidance. We therefore 

14 

SUPREME COURT 

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(01 1947A ale00 
reverse the district court order dismissing NPRI's complaint and remand 

for further proceedings on its claims.5 

J. 

Hardesty 

We concur: 

, C.J. 

Parraguirre 

, J. 

Cadish 

Al4C4a) J. 

Stiglich 

‘L

i

zeix.64

) 

Silver 

J. 

Herndon 

5NPRI also argues that the district court erred in granting the 

Legislature's motion to intervene and in denying NPRI's motion to 

disqualify the Nevada System of Higher Education's official attorneys from 

representing respondents. We conclude that NPRI waived its argument to 

the district court's grant of permissive intervention, see Khoury v. 

Seastrand, 132 Nev. 520, 530 n.2, 377 P.3d 81, 88 n.2 (2016) (concluding an 

appellant waives an argument by raising it for the first time in his or her 

reply brief), and fails to demonstrate any abuse of discretion by the district 

court in denying the motion to disqualify counsel, see State ex rel. 

Cannizzaro v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 136 Nev. 315, 317, 466 P.3d 529, 

531 (2020). 

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15