[PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 19

- 1 5039

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 4 :18

- cv - 00955

- JHE

JOHN DIXON WALKER, JR. , Plaintiff

- Appell ant ,
versus SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, COMMISSIONER ,

Defendant

- Appell ee .

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama

_______________________ ( February 11, 2021 ) Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, GRANT and TJOFLAT , Circuit Judges

. WILLIAM PRYOR, C hief Judge : This appeal requires us to decide whether an administrative law judge failed to give proper weight to the opinions of two medical professionals. John Dixon

USCA11 Case: 19-15039 Date Filed: 02/11/2021 Page: 1 of 112 Walker Jr. applied to the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration for disability insuranc e benefits. A physician and a vocational rehabilitation specialist both conclude d that he was disabled. But an administrative law judge assigned little weight to th eir opinions and denied Walker’s application . The district court affirmed , and so do we. T he Commissioner delegates th e determination of disability at the hearing level to an administrative law judge with review by the Appeals Council . And here, substantial evidence support s the administrative law judge’s decision that Walker is not disabled

. I. BACKGROUND In May 2011, wh ile at work unloading a n air

- conditioning unit from a truck , John Walker injured his back

. A few months later, he went to an orthopedic clinic for treatment for ongoing pain in his back and his left leg. Tests revealed a mild defect in one of his lumbar vertebrae and a pinched nerve. A physical therapist performed a functional

- capacity evaluation and determined that Walker had a lumbar spine impair ment of five percent. In the therapist’s opinion , Walker could work an eight

- hour day with medium physical demands, but he would have difficulty in a job that required frequent or constant standing. After discussing the possibility of surgery, the physicia n at the orthopedic clinic told Walker that he could resume light work and that he should return to the

USCA11 Case: 19-15039 Date Filed: 02/11/2021 Page: 2 of 113 clinic as needed. But the physician cautioned Walker that he eventually might have to leave his current job because of his inability to lift or carry he avy objects. In March 2012, Walker visited a primary

- care physician , Pat Herrera, who prescribed medication for his pain. Walker continued to visit Herrera through May
2013 for check

- ups and refills on his pain medications. Herrera’s examinations of Walke r showed no significant abnormalities

. After Walker filed a claim for workmen’s compensation with his employer and an application for disability insurance benefits with the Social Security Administration , Walker’s lawyer asked Herrera in October 2012 to co mplete two forms for these claims. The first form consisted of a series of “Yes” or “No” questions. One of these questions asked , “[H]as John Walker suffered a permanent/partial impairment to his low back

. . . that causes him to have constant severe pain, which is made worse by any activities he tries to engage in?” Herrera answered, “Yes.” The next question asked , “[W]ill John Walker be permanently and totally disabled from any gainful employment

. . . ?” Again, Herrera answered, “Yes.” The second form was titled “Clinical Assessment of Pain,” and it asked a series of multiple

- choice questions about the severity of Walker ’s pain and the prospects for long

- term recovery and treatment. Herrera selected the answers stating that “[p]ain is present to su ch an extent as to be distracting to adequate performance of daily activities or work,” and that physical activity such as

USCA11 Case: 19-15039 Date Filed: 02/11/2021 Page: 3 of 114 walking, standing, bending, or stooping “[g]reatly increased pain

. . . to such a degree as to cause distraction from task or total a bandonment of task.” On the subject of pain medication, Herrera selected the answer stating th at Walker’s medication would cause “[s]ignificant side effects” that “may limit the effectiveness of work duties or the performance of everyday tasks.” He also

an swered that “[p]ain and/or drug side effects can be expected to be severe and to limit effectiveness due to distraction, inattention, drowsiness, etc.” As for Walker’s prospects for long

- term recovery, Herrera selected the answer stating that “[a]lthough p ain may be less intense in the future, it will remain a significant element in this person’s life.” And he answered that treatments such as bio

feedback, nerve stimulation, and injections “have had no appreciable effect or have only briefly altered the lev el of pain this patient experiences.” In March 2013, Walker visited William Crunk, Ph.D., a vocational rehabilitation specialist. He later deposed Crunk for his workmen’s compensation claim

. Crunk s aid that Walker “would not be able to maintain an [eight]

- hour day, he would not be able to be [at work] on a routine and regular basis, [and] persistence and pace would be a problem.” In Crunk’s opinion, Walker was “just not capable of working. So he would have a 100 percent loss of earning capacity.”
A n admini strative law judge denied Walker’s disability claim , and t he Appeals Council denied Walker’s request for review. After Walker filed a

USCA11 Case: 19-15039 Date Filed: 02/11/2021 Page: 4 of 115 complaint in the district court, the Commissioner moved to remand s o that an administrative law judge could “fully conside r and address the medical opinions and evidence” and “reassess [Walker’s] residual functional capacity.” The district court granted the motion and remanded the claim to the Commissioner for further proceedings. Following supplemental hearings, an administr ative law judge again denied Walker’s claim. Consistent with the five

- step evaluation process in the governing regulations, the administrative law judge found , first, that Walker was last insured on December 31, 2016 , and that he had not engaged in substa ntial gainful activity since the alleged onset of his disability on May 1 7, 2011. 20 C.F.R. § 404. 1520(a)(4)(i). Second, he found that Walker had two severe impairments: degenerative disc disease and carpal tunnel syndrome. Id. § 404. 1520(a)(4)(ii) , (c)

. T hird, he found that Walker’s impairments did not meet or equal the severity of one of the impairments necessary to trigger an automatic disability finding. Id. § 404. 1520(a)(4)(iii), (d). Fourth, he determined that Walker had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary, unskilled work with limitations. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1567(a)

. Finally, he found that, based on Walker’s “age, education, work experience, and residual functional c apacity, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that [Walker] could

USCA11 Case: 19-15039 Date Filed: 02/11/2021 Page: 5 of 116 have performed.” See id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v)

. So he concluded that Walker was not disabled. In his explanation about Walker’s residual functional capac ity at step four, the administrative law judge said that he assigned little weight to Crunk’s opinion that Walker would be unable to work an eight

- hour day and would have a 100 percent loss of earning capacity. “[T]he decision regarding disability,” the ad ministrative law judge said, “ is reserved to the Commissioner based on all the evidence.” See id. § 404.1527(d). And Crunk’s opinion was “not consistent with the medical evidence,” including a lack of any significant abnormalities during Walker’s medical e xaminations and the opinion of Walker’s first treating physician that Walker could perform light work. The administrative law judge also assigned little weight to Herrera’s
response s on the medical questionnaire and form that Walker was “permanently and to tally disabled from any gainful employment” and that his pain and medication side effects would significantly limit his ability to work. The administrative law judge re iterated that “[t]he decision regarding disability is reserved to the Commissioner based on all the evidence.” And he explained that Herrera’s responses in the forms were “not consistent with the evidence,” including Herrera’s own medical examinations that showed no significant abnormalities.

USCA11 Case: 19-15039 Date Filed: 02/11/2021 Page: 6 of 117 After t he Appeals Council denied Walker’s request to review the administrative law judge’s decision , Walker filed a complaint against the Commissioner in the district court , which affirmed the Commissioner’s denial. The district court concluded that the administrative law judge had good cause to assign little weight to the opinions of Crunk and Herrera

. It explained that their opinions conflicted with the other evidence, including the opinion of Walker’s first physician that Walker coul d perform light work. And it explained that Crunk’s opinion was not entitled to any particular weight because he was not a treating physician.
II. STANDARD S OF REVIEW When an administrative law judge denies an application for disability insurance benefits and the Appeals Council denies review, we review the administrative law judge’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. Doughty v. Apfel , 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). Our review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to whether sub stantial evidence supports the decision and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. , 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonabl e person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We review de novo both the Commissioner’s legal conclusions , Moore v. Barnhart ,

USCA11 Case: 19-15039 Date Filed: 02/11/2021 Page: 7 of 118 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) , a nd the district court’s decision abou t whe ther the Commissioner ’s decision is support ed by substantial evidence , Wilson v. Barnhart , 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002).
III. DISCUSSION Walker argues that the administrative law judge erred by failing to give proper weight to the opinions of Crunk and Herrera. He takes issue with the administrative law judge’s statements that the d isability decision is “reserved for the Commissioner.” But Walker ’s argument misunderstands the administrative law judge’s decision and the regulations governing disability determinations. The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration has , at the hearing level , delegated to an administrative law judge the responsibility of determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity and whether the claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c) ; see also 42 U.S.C. § 405( l ) (authorizing the Commissioner to delegate his powers to any member, officer, or employee of the Social Security Administration)

. When determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity, an administrative law judge must consider all medical opinions in the record together with other pertinent evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). In deciding h ow much weight to give a medical opinion, the administrative law judge considers, among other things, the examining relationship, the treatment relationship, the extent to which the opinion is supported by medical evidence and

USCA11 Case: 19-15039 Date Filed: 02/11/2021 Page: 8 of 119 explanations, and whether the opinion is consistent with the whole record. Id. § 404.1527(c). Absent “good cause” to the contrary, the administrative law judge must give substantial weight to the opinion, diagnosis, and medical evidence of a treating physician. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. , 363 F.3d 1155, 1159 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotatio n marks omitted) . Good cause may exist when the treating physician’s opinion i s not supported by evidence, evidence support s a contrary finding, or the treating physician’s opinion i s conclusory or inconsistent with the physician ’s own records. Lewis v. Ca llahan , 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997). An administrative law judge is not required to agree with the statement of a medical source that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). Whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability is an administrative finding, not a medical opinion. T hat administrative finding is “reserved to the Commissioner.” Id. § 404.1527(d). And because the Commissioner has delegated his authority to make the finding at the hearing leve l to an administrative law judge , the finding is effectively reserved to the administrative law judge. See id. § 404.1546(c)

. A medical source’s opinion that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work” is not dispositive of a disability claim because th e determination is reserved to administrative law judge acting on behalf of the Commissioner. Id. § 404. 1527(d)(1).

USCA11 Case: 19-15039 Date Filed: 02/11/2021 Page: 9 of 1110 T he administrative law judge applied the correct legal standard when he assigned little weight to Crunk ’s and Herrera ’s opinions

. He accurately quoted the Social Security regulation that the decision regarding Walker’s disability was “reserved to the Commissioner.” Id. § 404.1527(d). To be sure, that language was imprecise insofar as the Commissioner delegated his responsibility at the hearing level to the administrative law judge who act ed on behalf of the Commissioner.
But the administra tive law judge correct ly understood that Crunk’s and Herre ra’s statements that Walker was disabled were not dispositive. H e then evaluated the ir opinions and determined that good cause existed to assign them little weight.
S ubstantial evidence supports the administrative law judge’s decision

. Crunk is a vocationa l rehabilitation specialist, not a treating physician, so his opinion is not entitled to substantial or considerable weight. See Lewis , 125 F.3d at 1440. And even if Crunk were a physician, his opinion that Walker was not capable of working conflicted with other evidence, including several examinations that showed no significant abnormalities and the opinions of other medical experts that Walker could perform light work. As for Herrera, his opinion that Walker would be “permanently and totally disabled” con flicted with his own examinations of Walker, which showed no significant abnormalities. And it conflicted with other medical evidence, including Walker’s functional

- capacity evaluation.

USCA11 Case: 19-15039 Date Filed: 02/11/2021 Page: 10 of 1111 Walker urges us to follow Bjornson v. Astrue , where the Seventh Circui t characterized as “imprecise” a remark by an administrative law judge that a disability determination is reserved to the Commissioner

. 671 F.3d 640, 647

– 48 (7th Cir. 2012). T he Seventh Circuit acknowledged that, under the governing regulations, “a stateme nt by a medical source that [a claimant is] disabled or unable to work does not mean that [the Commissioner] will determine that [the claimant is ] disabled.” Id. at 647 (internal quotation marks omitted). But, it explained, th e regulations do not mean “that such a statement is improper and therefore to be ignored.” Id. A n administrative law judge cannot use a medical

source ’s statement that a claimant is disabled as an excuse to ignore the medical source’s opinion about the cla imant’s alleged disability

. Bjornson does not help Walker’s argument . T he administrative law judge did not ignore Crunk’s and Herrera’s opinions

. He instead considered them and assigned them little weight after concluding that they conflicted with other

e vidence in the record. The concern at issue in Bjornson i s not present here. IV. CONCLUSION We AFFIRM the denial of Walker’s disability claim

. USCA11 Case: 19-15039 Date Filed: 02/11/2021 Page: 11 of 11