UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

CHASE RICHARD CALDWELL )

)

 Plaintiff, )

)

 v. ) CIVIL NO. 2:16cv189

)

MICHELLE KODICEK and )

RONALD CHAPMAN, )

)

 Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the court on a motion to dismiss, filed by the defendants Michelle

Kodicek (“Kodicek”) and Ronald Chapman (“Chapman”), on July 1, 2016. The plaintiff, Chase

Richard Caldwell (“Caldwell”), proceeding pro se, has not filed a response. On August 29,

2016, this court entered an order advising Caldwell, pursuant to Lewis v. Faulkner, of his

obligation to respond to the motion to dismiss and informing him that a response should be filed

by September 12, 2016. Caldwell has still not filed a response.

For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss will be granted.

Discussion

In support of their motion, the defendants recite that the relevant facts alleged in the

Amended Complaint are that on August 23, 2011, Valparaiso Police Officer Michelle Kodicek

followed a vehicle in which Caldwell was a passenger, signaled it to stop, approached the vehicle

and asked him to exit, whereupon he was arrested on a warrant for conspiracy to deal a narcotic

drug, cocaine. Caldwell was handcuffed by an unknown police officer who escorted him into the

squad car of Valparaiso Police Officer Ronald Chapman, who then drove him to the Porter

County Jail where he was held for 46 days. The record shows that Caldwell pleaded guilty to and
was sentenced on the charge of possession of a narcotic drug, a D felony, as a result of his arrest. 

The original charge of conspiracy to commit dealing in a narcotic drug, a Class B felony, and

forgery, a Class C felony, were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. 

On May 24, 2016, Caldwell filed his pro se Complaint on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Complaint

form, alleging that on August 23, 2011, Kodicek violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights

when she unlawfully stopped the car in which he was riding, arrested and handcuffed him, and

transported him to the Porter County Jail. 

On May 27, 2016, Caldwell moved for leave to amend his complaint which the Court

granted on June 1, 2016. On June 3, 2016, Caldwell filed his Amended Complaint adding

Officer Chapman as a defendant and alleging that both Kodicek and Chapman violated his

Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights when they stopped and arrested him on

August 23, 2011. The Plaintiff brought his claim under 42 U.S.C. §14141 in addition to §1983. 

In considering a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court must accept

as true all of the well-pleaded facts alleged by the plaintiff and all reasonable inferences that can

be drawn therefrom. Barnes v. Briley, 420 F. 3d 673,677 (7th Cir. 2005). However, if the

plaintiff provides additional facts in his Complaint beyond a short and plain statement of his

claims, the plaintiff cannot prevent the defendant from suggesting that those same facts

demonstrate the plaintiff is not entitled to relief. Thompson v. Ill Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation, 300

F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 2002). Thus, “if a plaintiff pleads facts which show he has no claim, then

he has plead himself out of court.” McCready v. eBay, Inc., 453 F.3d 882, 888 (7th Cir. 2006).

When the basis for dismissing a case pursuant to an affirmative defense is apparent from the

Complaint, dismissal can be proper. Muhammad v. Oliver, 547 F.3d 874, 878 (7th Cir. 2008).

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The defendants argue that Caldwell’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. 

Defendants point out that Caldwell’s Amended Complaint states that the alleged misconduct by

the two officers occurred on August 23, 2011, when he was arrested and transported to the Porter

County Jail. Caldwell filed his Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on May 24, 2016, more

than two years after the incident.

Federal courts must apply the statute of limitations for personal injuries in the state where

the incident occurred when attempting to determine the timeliness of a civil rights claim. Wilson

v. Garcia, 105 S.Ct. 1938 (1985) (Section 1983 lawsuits are most properly characterized as torts,

and the state’s statute of limitations is applicable in cases brought in federal courts); Dinger v.

City of New Albany, 668 F. Supp 1216 (S.D. Ind. 1987). Indiana has a two-year statute of

limitations for personal injury actions. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. Because Caldwell’s claims were

filed more than two years after the events alleged in the Amended Complaint, his claims under §

1983 are barred by the statute of limitations. Hill v. Trustees of Indiana University, 537 F.2d 248

(7th Cir. 1976).

Defendants also point out that Caldwell’s claims are barred even if the additional 46 days

that he spent in jail is added to his August 23, 2011, arrest date under a theory of the "continuing

violation" doctrine. The continuing violation doctrine has been applied to §1983 suits, Heard v.

Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 2001), and "allows a complainant to obtain relief for a

time-barred act . . . by linking it with acts that fall within the statutory limitations period,"

Filipovic v. K & R Express Sys., Inc., 176 F.3d 390, 396 (7th Cir. 1999). In the present case,

Caldwell’s claims for Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations all arose from his arrest and

detention on August 23, 2011. However, even by extending the date of the violations by the 46

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days that he spent in jail, the Complaint was still filed more four years after that extended date.

Caldwell also alleges that an Eighth Amendment violation for cruel and unusual

punishment occurred because he was in jail for 46 days. However, because he was a pre-trial

detainee, this claim arises under the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth. Again, even if the

46 days are added to extend the date of filing, the Complaint was still not filed within two years

of that extended date. It must also be noted that this not a case, as in Heard, where the detainee is

alleging an Eighth Amendment violation for the deliberate indifference to the serious medical

needs by denial of medical treatment. In such cases, the courts allow for an extension of the

limitations period for "[e]very day that [a defendant] prolonged [a prisoner's] agony by not

treating his painful condition marked a fresh infliction of punishment that caused the statute of

limitations to start running anew." Heard, 253 F.3d at 318-20. Caldwell makes no such claims

here, and the limitations period cannot be extended under that theory. Even if his claims were

interpreted to be some sort of denial of medical care claim, Caldwell did not file his claim within

two years of the end of his incarceration, and thus suffers dismissal on that basis.

Clearly, Caldwell’s claims arising from his arrest and incarceration are barred by the

statute of limitations and, accordingly, they will be dismissed.

Next, the defendants argue that Caldwell has failed to state a claim of a pattern or practice

of depravation of rights. As noted, Caldwell also claims a violation under 42. U.S.C.§14141(a)

and (b). This statute provides for claims based upon a pattern or practice of the defendants in

depriving persons of rights, privileges or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or

laws of the United States. However, Caldwell only alleges an arrest by Officers Kodicek and

Chapman and makes no claims of a policy or practice of engaging in false arrests. Even the most

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liberal reading of Caldwell’s Amended Complaint reveals that it does not contain any facts or

inferences that support a claim that the defendants herein were acting pursuant to an

unconstitutional policy. Accordingly, the court holds that Caldwell has failed to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C. §14141. 

Conclusion

On the basis of the foregoing, defendants’ motion to dismiss [DE 25] is hereby

GRANTED.

 Entered: October 18, 2016.

 s/ William C. Lee 

 William C. Lee, Judge

 United States District Court

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