UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

FORT WAYNE DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) 

 ) 

v. ) Cause No. 1:16-CR-33-HAB 

 ) 

ALA EL BASHATLY ) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 Defendant is an international child predator who agreed to a 100-month sentence for his 

crime. Despite that agreement, and the fact that his sentence was exceedingly lenient considering 

the offense conduct, Defendant now seeks early release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (ECF 

No. 192). He claims that he is at increased risk of significant illness from COVID-19 due to his 

medical conditions and confinement. Because Defendant has not identified extraordinary and 

compelling reasons for release, and because the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors do not support 

Defendant’s release, his motion for compassionate release is denied. 

I. Offense Conduct 

In March 2016, Defendant began communicating online with a person, E.P., who identified 

herself as an 18-year-old girl. Defendant traveled from his home in Canada to Fort Wayne to have 

sex with E.P. Mid-coitus, E.P. told Defendant that she was only 14 years’ old and asked Defendant 

if that was “cool.” It was apparently very cool, as Defendant told E.P. he didn’t care and continued 

having sex with her. No birth control was used during the rendezvous as E.P. told Defendant she 

wanted to get pregnant. 

 The two continued to communicate online and planned to meet that April. Defendant again 

drove to Fort Wayne and again had sex with E.P. Defendant also provided E.P. with marijuana. 

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 Following the second encounter, law enforcement became involved via a report from the 

Indiana Department of Child Services. An Indiana State Trooper took over E.P.’s online account 

and pretended to be E.P. while communicating with Defendant. Defendant and the trooper 

arranged for Defendant to again drive to Fort Wayne in June 2016 to have sex with E.P. Defendant 

was arrested at the arranged meeting spot. Defendant admitted during questioning that he was 

aware E.P. was only fourteen. He also admitted that he knew E.P. was trying to get pregnant. 

 Defendant was indicted on three counts of Coercion or Enticement of a Minor, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), and one count of Use of Interstate and Foreign Commerce to Engage in 

Sexual Activity with a Minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). After a significant delay 

resulting from Defendant’s mental illnesses and resulting inability to stand trial, Defendant pled 

guilty to a single count of Coercion or Enticement of a Minor. As part of that plea, he agreed to a 

100-month sentence. This sentence was above his guideline range, but less than the mandatoryminimum 120-month sentence required if he had pled to the violation of § 2422(b). Despite 

reservations, the Court accepted the binding plea and sentenced Defendant to 100-months’ 

incarceration and five years of supervised release. Defendant is incarcerated at Oakdale II, FCI in 

Oakdale, Louisiana, with an anticipated release date of July 22, 2023. 

II. Legal Analysis 

Defendant’s motion requests compassionate release. Generally, a court is statutorily 

prohibited from modifying a term of imprisonment once imposed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). A 

handful of statutory exceptions exist, however, one of which allows a court to grant an inmate 

compassionate release if the inmate meets certain requirements. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 

Under this provision, a court may not modify a term of imprisonment except that – 

 (1) in any case -- 

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(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion 

of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to 

appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf 

or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the 

defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier . . . after considering the factors set forth 

in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, . . . finds that— 

(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction ... 

... and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued 

by the Sentencing Commission[.]

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 

Because Defendant, not the Director of the BOP, filed the motion, Defendant must first 

show that he has satisfied the statutory exhaustion requirement. The Government concedes that 

Defendant has properly exhausted his remedies. (ECF No. 196 at 1). 

Exhaustion aside, Defendant cannot establish the necessary “extraordinary and compelling 

reasons” for release. Congress did not define “extraordinary and compelling reasons” in the statute, 

instead delegating the matter to the Sentencing Commission to promulgate a policy statement that 

“describe[s] what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence 

reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). 

The policy statement, in United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 1B1.13 and the 

accompanying Application Notes, have not been amended to reflect the First Step Act’s change to 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) allowing prisoners to bring compassionate release claims directly. United States 

v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1180 (7th Cir. 2020)1. As a result, “§ 1B1.13 and its application notes 

provide useful – but not binding – guidance to courts in determining whether a defendant has 

identified an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release.” United States v. 

1

 Yet as Gunn made clear, the policy statement’s requirement that the court consider whether the reduction is otherwise 

“consistent with this policy statement” does not limit a district judge’s discretion. This is because the statute by which 

the district court is bound requires a reduction to track “applicable policy statements.” And the Sentencing 

Commission has not yet issued a policy statement “applicable” to Defendant’s request. Thus, Gunn held, “[a]ny 

decision is ‘consistent with’ a nonexistent policy statement.” Gunn, 980 F.3d at 1180 

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Hoskins, No. 2:99 CR 117, 2020 WL 7640408, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 23, 2020) (citing Gunn, 938 

F.3d at 1180). Indeed, “[d]istrict judges must operate under the statutory criteria–‘extraordinary 

and compelling reasons’–subject to deferential appellate review.” Gunn, 980 F.3d at 1181. 

Using the guidance of §1B1.13 to inform the statutory criteria, the court considers the 

medical condition of the defendant, his age, his family circumstances, and whether there is in the 

defendant’s case an extraordinary or compelling reason “other than or in combination with” the 

other reasons described in the Application Notes. Second, the Court determines whether the 

Defendant is “a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 

U.S.C. § 3142(g).” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2). Finally, the Court considers the § 3553(a) factors, “to 

the extent they are applicable.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. 

Courts in this Circuit were once forced to go through an extended analysis when COVID19 was raised as the extraordinary and compelling reason. That analysis is no longer necessary. In 

July, the Seventh Circuit all but eliminated COVID-19 as a basis for compassionate release under 

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). In United States v. Broadfield, 5 F.4th 801 (7th Cir. 2021), the court 

stated: 

Section 3582(c)(1)(A) was enacted and amended before the SARS-CoV-2 

pandemic, and it will continue to serve a beneficent function long after the 

pandemic ends. But for the many prisoners who seek release based on the special 

risks created by COVID-19 for people living in close quarters, vaccines offer relief 

far more effective than a judicial order. A prisoner who can show that he is unable 

to receive or benefit from a vaccine still may turn to this statute, but, for the vast 

majority of prisoners, the availability of a vaccine makes it impossible to conclude 

that the risk of COVID-19 is an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for 

immediate release. 

Id. 

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 Defendant is vaccinated. (ECF No. 196 at 9). In keeping with Broadfield, the Court finds 

it impossible to conclude that Defendant’s concerns regarding COVID-19 present extraordinary 

or compelling reasons for immediate release. 

 Even if the Court could find extraordinary and compelling reasons for release, it would still 

deny Defendant’s request for release. Simply put, no formulation of the § 3553(a) factors support 

release. Even conceding that Defendant was unaware of E.P.’s age the first time he travelled to 

meet her, Defendant crossed an international border on two occasions to have sex with and 

impregnate a 14-year-old girl. In doing so, Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) and should 

have received no less than a 120-month sentence. Yet, because of the very same mental health 

conditions he now cites in support of his request for relief, this most serious charge was dismissed, 

and Defendant agreed to a more lenient sentence. To release Defendant now would serve only to 

further trivialize the severity of his conduct. 

 The Court is also troubled by Defendant’s refusal to accept responsibility for his actions. 

In his motion, Defendant states that E.P. “deceiv[ed] him.” (ECF No. 192 at 26). He also, 

erroneously, claims that E.P. “gave testimony in his favor.” (Id.). To repeat, Defendant crossed 

an international border twice to have sex with someone he knew to be fourteen. He was not 

deceived, confused, or otherwise unsure about the age of his victim or what he intended to do to 

her. For Defendant to now blame his victim, a child, is unconscionable. 

 Weighing the § 3553(a) factors and considering Defendant’s current circumstances, the 

Court concludes that Defendant’s sentence was insufficient to meet the purposes of sentencing. 

Defendant’s continued attempts to minimize his conduct and place blame on his victim cause this 

Court to question whether the sentence imposed will deter Defendant from further criminal 

conduct or protect future children from Defendant’s lecherous advances. That said, the Court 

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cannot increase Defendant’s sentence. It can only assure that Defendant serves the entirety of the 

sentence to which he agreed. 

III. Conclusion 

 For these reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Compassionate Release/Reduction in Sentence 

(ECF No. 192) is DENIED. 

SO ORDERED on January 25, 2022. 

 s/ Holly A. Brady 

JUDGE HOLLY A. BRADY 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

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