### F I LE D U. S . COURT OF AP PE ALS E LEVE NTH CI RCUI T M ay 13, 2005 T HOM AS K. KAHN C L E RK [ DO NO T P UB L I S H] I N THE UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS F O R T H E E L E V E N T H C IR C U IT

________________________ N o. 04- 12607 N on -A rgum entC al endar

________________________ D. C. Do c k e tNo . 9 8 - 1 4 0 0 3 - CR - KLR U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A , P la in tif f - A p p e lle e , v ersu s C H R I S T O P H E R R . B R O W N , D e f e n d a n t- A p p e lla n t.

________________________ A pp ea l fr om the U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rt f orthe S outhe r n D i s tr i c tof F l or i da

_________________________ ( M ay 13, 2005) B efo re A N D E R S O N , B IR C H an d H U L L , C i rcu i tJu d g es. P E R C U R I A M: A f te rh is s e c o n d s e n te n c in g , C h r is to p h e rB r o w n a p p e a ls th e 2 1 0 - m o n thU. S.S. G. § 4 B 1. 1( a) s tate s th at: 1 A d e fend ant i s a c are e r of fend e r if (1 ) t

hede fend ant w a s at le a st e ighte e n ye ars old at the time the def

endant c ommitt ed the inst ant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offen s eo f

c o nv ic ti o nis a

f e lo ny th at i s e it

h e r a c rim eo f v io len c eo r

a c o ntro lled substance of

fense ; and (3) thedefendant has at least two prior felony convictions of 2 s e nt e nc e i m pos e d f

orhi s c onvi c t i on of

pos s e s s i on w i th i nt e ntt o di s tr i but e c oc a i ne ba s e . A f t e rr e vi e w , w e a f

f i r m B r ow n’ s c onvi c t i on, va c a t e hi s s e nt e nc e , a nd r e m a nd f orr e s e nt e nc i ng. I . B AC KG RO UN D A . B r ow n ’ s I n d i c t m e n t an d T r i al O n J a n u a r y 1 5 , 1 9 9 8 , B r o w n w a s in d ic te d f o ro n e c o u n t o f

p o s s e s s io n w ith i nt e ntt o di s tr i but e c oc a i ne ba s e , i n vi ol a t i on of 21 U . S . C . § 841( a ) ( 1) a nd 18 U .S .C . § 2 . O n M a y 2 6 , 1 9 9 9 , th e ju r y r e tu r n e d a g e n e r a l v e r d ic t a g a in s t B r o w n . T h e r e a f te r , B r o w n f

ile d m o tio n s f

o ra n e w tr ia l a n d f

o ra ju d g m e n t o f

a c q u itta l, w hi c h the di s tr i c tc our tde ni e d. B. Br o w n’ s Fi r s t Se nt e nc i ng B row n’ s P S I s t at ed thatthe ca re eroffe nd erprov i si on i n t he U ni t ed S t at es S ent enci ng G ui del i nes app l i ed t o B row n b ec ause : (1) B row n w as atl ea stei gh t ee n y e a r s ol d a tthe t i m e he c om m i t t e d the i ns t a ntof f e ns e ; ( 2) the of

f e ns e w a s a f

e l ony tha tw a s a c ontr ol l e d- s ubs t a nc e of f e ns e ; a nd ( 3) B r ow n ha d a tl e a s ttw o pr i or f e lo n y c o n v ic tio n s o f

e ith e ra c r im e o f

v io le n c e o ra c o n tr o lle d - s u b s ta n c e o f f e n s e . S ee U . S . S . G . § 4 B 1. 1. T he P S I, w hi ch w as adop t ed by the di stri ctcourt , l i st ed 1either a crime of violence or

a controlled substance of fense . Withre sp e c t to his c onvic tio n, B ro wn argue d: ( 1) that th edis tric t c ourt e rre d in 2 admitting evidence of

Brown’s par

ticipation in an underc over dr ugtransac tion; (2) that the district court er

red in a dmitti ngtestimony of where B rown hid coc aine; and ( 3) that therewas insufficient e videnceto support his conviction. 3 f ourc onvi c t i ons tha tw oul d qua l i f y B r ow n a s a c a r e e rof

f e nde r : ( 1) pos s e s s i on of c o c a in e a n d r e s is tin g a r r e s t w ith v io le n c e o n A p r il 2 5 , 1 9 9 4 ; ( 2 ) p o s s e s s io n w ith i nt e ntt o s e l l orde l i ve rc oc a i ne on M a y 19, 1994; ( 3) a t t e m pt e d s a l e of c oc a i ne on M a r c h 15, 1995; a nd ( 4) a t t e m pt e d m a ns l a ught e ron J ul y 29, 1998. A s a r e s ul tof the appl i ca t i on of § 4 B 1. 1, B row n’ s t ot al offe nse l evel w as 37 , and h i s c ri m i nal hi st ory c at egory w as V I. T he re sul t i ng G ui del i nes r ange w as 36 0 m on ths’ t o l i fe im p r is o n m e n t. A ts e nt e nc i ng, B r ow n obj e c t e d t o the c a r e e r - of f e nde re nha nc e m e nt , a r gui ng tha ttw o of

hi s pr e di c a t e of

f e ns e s ( the A pr i l 25, 1994 of f e ns e a nd the M a y 19, 1994 offe nse) w er e c om m i t t ed w hen h e w as si xt ee n, and t hathe had n othad any chance t o r e ha bi l i t a t e hi m s e l f

. T he di s tr i c tc our tove r rul e d the obj e c t i on. F ur the r , the di stri ctcourtst at ed i t s bel i ef thati tdi d n othave the po w ert o d epar tdo w nw ar d f r o m th e c a r e e r - o f

f e n d e rG u id e lin e s r a n g e o f 3 6 0 m o n th s ’ to lif

e im p r is o n m e n t. T h e d is tr ic t c o u r t th u s s e n te n c e d B r o w n to 3 6 0 m o n th s ’ im p r is o n m e n t. C . B r ow n ’ s F i r s t A p p e al O n a ppe a l , B r ow n r a i s e d s e ve r a l a r gum e nt s w i th r e s pe c tt o hi s c onvi c t i on. 24

A s t o h i s s ent ence , B row n argued t hatthe di stri ctcourterre d i n fai l i ng t o rec og ni ze th a t it h a d d is c r e tio n to d e p a r t d o w n w a r d in s e n te n c in g h im . I n h is f ir s t a p p e a l, B r o w n d id n o t r a is e a n o b je c tio n to h is c a r e e r - o f

f e n d e rs ta tu s a n d th is C o u r t d id no texam i ne w hether B row n h ad the re qu i si t e c on vi ct i on s f or a c ar ee r off

ender unde r§ 4B 1. 1. T hi s C ou rtaf

fi rm ed B row n’ s c on vi ct i on , bu tconcl ud ed thatthe di stri ctcourt

“ w a s m i s t a ke n i n i t s be l i e f tha ti tl a c ke d the a uthor i ty t o de pa r tout s i de of the gui de l i ne r a nge f

orc a r e e rof

f e nde r s . ” U ni t e d S t a t e s v. B r ow n, N o. 99- 12991, a t21 (11t h C i r. June 8, 20 00 ). W e not ed, ho w ever , thatB row n’ s s t at ed re as on s f or a de pa r tur e – drug de pe nde nc e a nd a di s a dva nt a ge d upbr i ngi ng – w e r e notr e l e va nt g r o u n d s f

o rd e p a r tu r e . W e s ta te d th a t th e d is tr ic t c o u r t c o u ld d e p a r t d o w n w a r d if it f ound tha tthe s e nt e nc e ove r - r e pr e s e nt e d B r ow n’ s c r i m i na l hi s t or y . W e thus r e m a nde d the c a s e f

ora ne w s e nt e nc i ng he a r i ng on the “ l i m i t e d i s s ue of w he the ror n o t to g r a n t B r o w n a d o w n w a r d d e p a r tu r e .” I d . D . Br o w n’ s Se c o nd Se nt e nc i ng A th i s seco n d sen t en ci n g o n O ct o b er 2 5 , 2 0 0 0 , B ro w n ag ai n d i d n o tco n t est hi s c ar ee r off

ender s t atus, bu tar gu ed thatthe G ui del i nes s ent ence for a ca re er o f f e n d e rw a s to o s tr in g e n t in th is c a s e . T h e d istrict co u rt, n o ti n g th is C o u rt’s v iew th at an o v er statem en t o f B ro w n ’s5

cr i m i nal hi st ory w ou l d b e a basi s f or departure, se nt ence d B row n “ bel ow the ca re er cr i m i nal . . . . at24 0 m on ths. ” B row n l od ged n o o bj ec t i on s t o t he se nt ence im p o s e d , a n d a n a m e n d e d ju d g m e n t w a s e n te r e d r e f le c tin g th e n e w s e n te n c e . B row n d i d n otappeal thi s 240 -m on th sent ence . E . B row n ’s § 2 25 5 M oti on to V acate S en te n ce O n O c to b e r1 9 , 2 0 0 1 , B r o w n f ile d a m o tio n to v a c a te , s e t a s id e o rc o r r e c t h is s e nt e nc e pur s ua ntt o 28 U . S . C . § 2255. B r ow n’ s m ot i on c ha l l e nge d hi s c onvi c t i on and sent ence on nu m er ou s groun ds. O f r el evance t o t hi s app ea l , B row n argued th at h is co u n se l w as in ef fe ctiv e f o r f aili n g to file a n o ti ce o f a p p ea l after B ro w n ’s O c to b e r3 0 , 2 0 0 0 s e n te n c in g ( th e s e c o n d s e n te n c in g ) . B r o w n a lle g e d th a t h is c ouns e l di d notf

i l e the not i c e e ve n a f

t e rB r ow n a s ke d hi m t o do s o. O n S e p te m b e r2 3 , 2 0 0 3 , th e d is tr ic t c o u r t g r a n te d B r o w n ’s § 2 2 5 5 m o tio n to va c a t e hi s s e nt e nc e s ol e l y w i th r e ga r d t o hi s c l a i m tha thi s c ouns e l w a s i ne f f e c t i ve for f ai l i ng t o fi l e a n app ea l af t erhi s s ec on d sent enci ng . In do i ng so, the di stri ct courtvaca t ed B row n’ s e nt i re se nt ence and o rder ed thatB row n b e r es ent ence d as f o llo w s : T hi s m ot i on t o v ac at e i s gra nted w i th regard t o B row n’ s c l ai m that c ouns e l w a s i ne f

f e c t i ve f or fa i l i ng t o f

i l e a n a ppe a l a f

t e rbe i ng r e q u e s te d to d o s o . T h e ju d g m e n t s h a ll b e v a c a te d , a n d B r o w n s h a ll b e r e s e n te n c e d a n d p e r m itte d to f ile a n a p p e a l. T h e d is tr ic t c o u r t d e n ie d a ll o f th e o th e rc la im s in B r o w n ’s § 2 2 5 5 m o tio n .The g overnme nt argues that the law -of- the-c ase doc trine bar s Brown from raising 3 sentenc ing issues in this appeal beca use in his first appeal this C ourt had issued a limit ed remand mandatingthat the district court c onsider only whether a downwa

rd depa rture w as proper. See United States v. Tamayo, 80 F.3d 1514 ( 11th Cir. 1996). However, the g overnment overlooks the fa ct that af

ter that a ppeal, the district c ourt grante d Brown’s § 2255 motion, vacated B rown’s sentenc e in its entirety , and ordered a new sentencinghearing. Thus, this appeal is from a n entirely new se ntence . Brown’s status as a career-off

ender was ne ver raised a

nd decide d in any prior a pp e a l. 6 B row n fi l ed a m ot i on for a ce rt i fi ca t e of app ea l abi l i ty ( “ C O A ”) i n t he di stri ctcourt a n d in th is C o u r t b a s e d o n th e d is tr ic t c o u r t’s d e n ia l o f th e r e m a in in g c la im s in h is § 2 2 5 5 m o tio n . B o th m o tio n s f o ra C O A w e r e d e n ie d . F. Br o w n’ s Thi r d Se nt e nc i ng F o llo w in g th e d is tr ic t c o u r t’s o r d e rg r a n tin g B r o w n ’s § 2 2 5 5 m o tio n to vaca t e hi s s ent ence , a new se nt enci ng hear i ng w as hel d. T hu s, atthi s j un cture, B ro w n h ad n o t b ee n se n ten ce d an d th e s en ten cin g p ro ce ss b eg an an ew . B ro w n ’s 3 th i rd P S I, p rep ared i n an t i ci p at i o n o f h i s th i rd sen t en ci n g , reco m m en d ed a b ase o ffen se l ev el o f 2 8 . T h e P S I reco m m en d ed a fo u r-l ev el en h an cem en tt o h i s o ffen se l evel base d o n B row n’ s c ar ee r off ender s t atus, pu rs uantt o § 4B 1. 1, w hi ch i ncre as ed hi s off

ense l evel t o 3 2. B row n’ s c ri m i nal hi st ory c at egory w as se tatV I, gi ven h i s c ar ee r off

ender s t atus. W i th an o ff ense l evel at32 and a cri m i nal hi st ory c a te g o r y o f

V I , B r o w n ’s G u id e lin e s r a n g e w a s 2 1 0 - 2 6 2 m o n th s ’ im p r is o n m e n t. P r io rto h is r e s e n te n c in g , B r o w n r a is e d o b je c tio n s to th e u s e o f

c e r ta in c onvi c t i ons s uppor t i ng the r e c om m e nde d c a r e e rof f e nde re nha nc e m e nt . T he7

g o v e r n m e n t c o n c e d e d th a t B r o w n h a d b e e n a ju v e n ile a t th e tim e h e p le d g u ilty to tw o o f the four conv i ct i on s a nd thathi s r i gh t s had no tbeen prot ec t ed i n acc ordance w i th F l ori da l aw w i th res pectt o t hem . H ow ever , the go vernm entcont ended t hat tw o o f the ot her c on vi ct i on s c ou l d ser ve as the basi s f or the ca re eroffe nd er e nha nc e m e nt : ( 1) the M a r c h 15, 1995 c onvi c t i on f ora t t e m pt e d s a l e of

c oc a i ne ; a nd (2) the Jul y 29, 19 98 conv i ct i on for a t t em pt ed m ansl augh t er . T he offens e c on du ct here occurre d o n D ec em ber 16, 19 97 . T hu s the 19 95 conv i ct i on occurre d b ef ore th e o ffen se co n d u cti n th i s case an d th e 1 9 9 8 co n v i ct i o n o ccu rred aft er th e o ffen se c o n d u c t in th is c a s e . N o n eth el ess, B ro w n ’ s co u n sel rep eat ed l y ack n o w l ed g ed th atB ro w n w as a c a r e e rof f e nde rba s e d on the M a r c h 15, 1995 drug of f e ns e a nd the J ul y 29, 1998 m ansl augh t erconv i ct i on and t hatB row n’ s off ense l evel w as 32 and h i s c ri m i nal h i s t o r y c a t e g o r y wa s VI . B r o wn ’ s c o u n s e l m a d e n o o b j e c t i o n t o th e s e two c o n v ic tio n s b e in g u s e d u n d e r§ 4 B 1 .1 to c a u s e B r o w n to b e a c a r e e ro f f e n d e r . N ever thel es s, B row n request ed a dow nw ar d d epar ture f rom the ca re eroffe nd er G u id e lin e s r a n g e . T he di s tr i c tc our tde c l i ne d t o de pa r tdow nw a r d, a nd s e nt e nc e d B r ow n t o 210 m on ths’ i m pri sonm ent , atthe l ow end o f the ca re eroffe nd erG ui del i nes r ange. In doi ng s o, the di s tr i c tc our ts t a t e d:In this appeal, B rown also raises one c halleng e to his conviction, namely that he wa s 4 wrong ly convicted under the aiding a nd abettingtheory . Specifically , Brown contends that the indictment did not li st aiding a nd abetting , the district court improperly g ave thejury

the s t an d ard a i d i n gan d

a b e tt i n gi n s tr

u c t i o n , an d

th ej ur y r e tur n e d o n l y a g e n e r a lv e rd i c to f

gu i l t . In Brown’s first a

ppeal be forethis Court, we aff irmed B rown’s c onviction. Be causeBrown did not raise his aiding a

nd abettingargument in this first appeal bef ore this Court, Brown has waived that issue. See United States v. F iallo-J acome , 874 F.2d 1479, 1481- 83 (11th Cir. 1989) (c on c ludingthat de fend ant’ s f a ilureto ra isean is su ein f ir st a pp e a l pre c lud e d ra isingthat is su ein a su bs e qu e nt a

pp e a l, a nd statin g“ [i]n th ewi thin a pp e a l, t hereis n o re a so n why

F iallo -Ja c ome should ge t ‘two bites at the appe llate apple,’ and wewill not afford him the same ”); United States v. Pultrone, 241 F .3d 306, 307 (3d Cir. 2001) (holdingthat claims of er ror that “ could and should have be en raised” on fir st direct appe al are not subject to re view in a subsequent appeal); United States v. Montoya, 979 F .2d 136, 138 (8th Cir. 1992) (“ Montoya waived any error the district court may

have c ommitt ed in incre asingMontoya’s of fenselevel under

§ 3B1.1(b) by failingto raise the issue in the f irst appeal.”). Fur ther, the district c ourt’s grant of the§ 2255 motion vacated his sentence a nd did not a ff e c t hi s c onvic tio n. Whil eB ro wn may raisenew i ssu e s a s to his new s e ntenc e , h ec ann ot a s to his conviction. 8 I ’ m notgoi ng t o de pa r tdow nw ard , b u tI w i l l s e nt e nc e w i thi n the g u id e lin e r a n g e . T h e C o u r t h a s c o n s id e r e d th e s ta te m e n ts b y a ll pa r t i e s a nd r e vi e w e d the pr e s e nt e nc e i nve s t i ga t i on r e por t . B a s e d upon t he s e v e r i ty a n d s i g n i f

i c a n c e o f th e i n s t a n to f

f e n s e , th a tth e D e f

e nda nt i s a c a r e e rof

f en d er. T h e C our ts ha l l i m pos e a s e nt e nc e a tthe l ow e nd o f th e g u i d el i n e ran g e. T h i s sen t en c e i s su ffi ci en tt o serv e as a d e te r r e n t. ( E m p h a s is a d d e d ) . B r o w n d id n o t o b je c t to h is th ir d s e n te n c e in th e d is tr ic t c o u r t. I I . DI S CUS S I ON O n a p p e a l, B r o w n a r g u e s th a t th e d is tr ic t c o u r t e r r e d w h e n it c la s s if ie d h im a s a c a r e e ro f

f e n d e ru n d e rth e G u id e lin e s § 4 B 1 .1 . B r o w n a ls o r a is e s a r g u m e n ts pu rs uantt o B l akel y v. W as hi ng t on , 54 2 U . S . __ _, 12 4 S . C t . 25 31 (200 4). 4 A . C l assi fi cati on as a C aree r O ff en d er O n a p p e a l, B r o w n a r g u e s th a t th e d is tr ic t c o u r t e r r e d w h e n it c la s s if ie d h imTo establish plain error, the de fenda nt must show “‘(1) error , (2) that is plain, and ( 3) 5 that aff ects substantial rights.” Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1298 ( quoting United States v. Cotton, 53 5 U .S. 62 5, 63 1, 12 2 S. Ct. 17 81 , 1 78 5 ( 20 02 )) . “ ‘I f all thre ec on dition s a reme t, a n a pp e llate c ourt may then e xerc iseits dis c re tio n to no tic ea fo rf e ite d error , b ut o nly

if (4 ) t hee rror se ri ou sly aff ects the f airne ss, integrity , or public reputation of judicial proce eding s.” I d. (quotingCotton, 535 U.S. at 631, 122 S. Ct . at 1785). 9 a s a c a r e e rof

f e nde runde r§ 4B 1. 1. S pe c i f i c a l l y , B r ow n a r gue s tha tbe c a us e the J ul y 1998 m a ns l a ught e rc onvi c t i on oc c ur r e d s ubs e que ntt o the D e c e m be r1997 of f e ns e c onduc ti n thi s c a s e , i tc oul d notbe c ons i de r e d a “ pr i orf e l ony ” f orthe p u rp o ses o f th e career o ffen d er p ro v i si o n . B ecau se B ro w n d i d n o to b j ectt o th e u se o f th is p a r tic u la rc o n v ic tio n in th e d is tr ic t c o u r t, w e r e v ie w o n ly f o rp la in e r r o r . U ni t ed S t at es v. R od ri gu ez , 39 8 F . 3d 12 91 , 12 98 (11t h C i r. 20 05 ). 5 In thi s c as e, B row n h as show n t hatthe di stri ctcourtcom m i t t ed error that w as p l ai n . P u rsu an tt o U . S . S . G . § 4 B 1 . 2 , th e t erm “ tw o p ri o r fel o n y co n v i ct i o n s” for purpo se s of the ca re eroffe nd erprov i si on m ea ns: “ [T ] he defendantcom m i t t ed the i ns t a ntof

f e ns e of c onvi c t i on s ubs e que ntt o s us t a i ni ng a tl e a s ttw o f e l ony c onvi c t i ons . . . . ” U . S . S . G . § 4B 1. 2 ( c ) . F ur the r , “ [ t ] he da t e tha ta de f e nda nt sust ai ned a conv i ct i on shal l be the dat e thatthe gu i l tof the defendanthas bee n es t abl i shed. . . . ” I d. T hu s, “ conv i ct i on s s ust ai ned sub se qu entt o t he cond uct fo rm in g th e b as is fo r th e o ff en se at issu e c an n o t b e u se d to en h an ce a d ef en d an t’ s st atus t o car ee r off

ender. ” U ni t ed S t at es v. W i l l i am s, 29 F . 3d 17 2, 17 4 (4t h C i r. 19 94 ) ( ci t at i on om i t t ed).10

In thi s c as e, i ti s und i sput ed thatB row n sust ai ned t he m ansl augh t er c onvi c t i on on J ul y 29, 1998, a f t e rthe D e c e m be r16, 1997 da t e on w hi c h he c om m i t t e d the of

f e ns e c onduc ti n thi s c a s e . I ti s f ur the rundi s put e d tha ta bs e ntthe 1 9 9 8 m a n s la u g h te rc o n v ic tio n , o n ly th e 1 9 9 5 d ru g o f f e n s e r e m a in s to s u s ta in B r ow n’ s c a r e e rof

f e nde rs t a tus . T ha tone c onvi c t i on i s note nough. T hus , the di s tr i c tc our tpl a i nl y e r r e d i n a ppl y i ng the c a r e e rof f e nde rG ui de l i ne t o B r ow n. B r o w n a ls o h a s s h o w n th a t th is e r r o ra f f e c te d h is s u b s ta n tia l r ig h ts . W i tho utthe ca re eroffe nd erst atus, B row n’ s off ense l evel w as 28 and h i s c ri m i nal h i st o ry cat eg o ry w as IV , resu l t i n g i n a G u i d el i n es ran g e o f 1 1 0 -1 3 7 m o n th s’ i m pri sonm ent . B ec ause B row n w as deem ed a c ar ee r off ender, the di stri ctcourt se nt ence d h i m usi ng an offe nse l evel of 32 and a cri m i nal hi st ory c at egory of V I, re sul t i ng i n a G ui del i nes r ange of 21 0-26 2 m on ths’ i m pri sonm ent . S ee U ni t ed S ta te s v . R o m a n o , 3 1 4 F .3 d 1 2 7 9 , 1 2 8 2 ( 1 1 th C ir . 2 0 0 2 ) ( “W e h a v e n o d if f ic u lty in concl ud i ng thatthe use of the hi gh erse nt enci ng ra ng e [ 84 -105 m on ths as op po se d t o 57- 71 m onths ] a f

f e c t e d a ppe l l a nt ’ s s ubs t a nt i a l r i ght s . ” ) ; U ni t e d S t a t e s v. K haw aj a, 11 8 F . 3d 14 54 , 14 59 (11t h C i r. 19 97 ) ( vaca t i ng defe nd ant s’ se nt ence s a nd c onc l udi ng tha tthe di s tr i c tc our t ’ s f a i l ur e t o a ppl y pr ope rG ui de l i ne pr ovi s i on w as pl ai n err or because i tw ou l d h ave r es ul t ed i n a l ow eroffe nse l evel for e ac h defe nd ant ).Brown also challeng es his sentenc e pursua nt to Blake ly . Be causewe a re vacating 6 Brown’s 210-month sentenc e base d on the Guidelines error and remandingto the district court for resente ncing , we ne ed not dec ide the B lakely issues. We simpl y

note here that upon remand, the district court must sentenc e B rown c onsistent with the Supreme Court’s mandatein United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 738, 746 (2005). 11 W e al so co n cl u d e th atth e p l ai n erro r seri o u sl y affected the fairness, i nt e gr i ty , orpubl i c r e put a t i on of the j udi c i a l pr oc e e di ngs . I tw a s know n t o the di s tr i c tc our t , the pr os e c ut or , a nd ( unf or tuna t e l y ) t o de f

e ns e c ouns e l , tha tthe 1998 m ansl augh t erconv i ct i on w as no ta pri or fe l on y. Y etB row n st i l l w as se nt ence d as a c ar ee r off

ender. W e c on cl ud e thatthi s a ff ec t s the i nt egri ty of the j ud i ci al pr oc e e di ngs , a nd w e the r e f or e va c a t e B r ow n’ s s e nt e nc e a nd r e m a nd f or pr oc e e di ngs c ons i s t e ntw i th thi s opi ni on. 6 I I I . CONCL US I ON F o rth e f o r e g o in g r e a s o n s , w e a f f ir m B r o w n ’s c o n v ic tio n , v a c a te h is s e nt e nc e , a nd r e m a nd f

orr e s e nt e nc i ng. A FFI R M ED I N PA R T; VA C A TED A N D R EM A N D ED I N PA R T.