UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

MUNSTER STEEL CO., INC., )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

CRANE 1 SERVICES, INC., et al., )

Defendants. )

____________________________________) CAUSE NO. 2:16-CV-345

)

CRANE 1 SERVICES, INC., )

Third-Party Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

CINCINNATI CRANE & HOIST, LLC, )

Third-Party Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Crane I Services, Inc.’s Motion to Strike Cincinnati Crane

& Hoist, LLC’s Affirmative Defenses [DE 124], filed December 12, 2018. Third-Party Plainitff

Crane 1 Services seeks to strike all of Third-Party Defendant Cincinnati Crane & Hoist’s affirmative

defenses pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). Cincinnati filed a response on January

9, 2019, and Crane 1 replied on January 24, 2019.

I. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that a “court may strike from a pleading an

insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(f). Motions to strike are generally disfavored, but when striking portions of a pleading

“remove[s] unnecessary clutter from the case,” the motion may “serve to expedite, not delay.” Heller

Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., Inc., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989). Ultimately, whether
to strike material under Rule 12(f) is within the sound discretion of the court. Talbot v. Robert

Matthews Distrib. Co., 961 F.2d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 1992). Because affirmative defenses are

pleadings, they must meet all pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

including “set[ting] forth a ‘short and plain statement’ of the defense.” Heller, 883 F.2d at 1294

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). “[B]are bones conclusory allegations” which “omit[] any short and

plain statement of facts and fail[] totally to allege the necessary elements of the alleged claims” will

not meet this standard and may be stricken. Id. at 1295.

II. Analysis

Crane 1 seeks to strike each of Cincinnati’s affirmative defenses. Cincinnati argues that its

defenses meet the requisite pleading standard. The Court addresses each in turn.

A. First Affirmative Defense

Cincinnati’s first affirmative defense states that Crane 1 fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. Crane 1 argues that it should be stricken as lacking in factual support.

However, the former Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 84, now abrogated, and the accompanying

Form 30 in the Appendix to the Rules explicitly provided for an affirmative defense of failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Kimbrew v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp.,

No. 10 C 4531, 2010 WL 5135908, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 2010) (declining to strike on the grounds

that “[the] first defense, however, follows the form set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 30); Leon v. Jacobson Transp. Co., No. 10 C 4939, 2010

WL 4810600, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2010) (“[T]his language is specifically listed in Form 30, and

Rule 84 explicitly states that the Forms ‘suffice’ under the rules.”). Therefore, the Court finds that

it suffices under the Rules and will not be stricken.

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B. Second, Tenth, and Twelfth Affirmative Defenses

Cincinnati’s second affirmative defense states that the alleged injuries and damages were

caused by “the superseding or intervening conduct of other parties”; its tenth states that Cincinnati

is “not a proximate or legal cause of any injury or loss”; and its twelfth states that Crane 1 “does not

have standing to assert claims raised in the Complaint.” Crane 1 argues that the second defense is

duplicative of the tenth, that lack of standing is not an affirmative defense, and that all three lack

factual basis and are redundant given the denials to the allegations in the Complaint. Cincinnati

provides no argument as to these affirmative defenses. The Court finds that they do not provide

sufficient factual detail.

C. Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Thirteenth Affirmative Defenses

Cincinnati’s third affirmative defense alleges that Crane 1’s claims are limited by its failure

to mitigate damages. Its fourth affirmative defense alleges that it is entitled to “apportionment [from

other tortfeasors] for that person or entity’s percentage of the tortuous conduct.” Its fifth and sixth

affirmative defenses state that the claims are barred by “the doctrine of waiver, release, laches, or

estoppel” and “Plaintiff’s own negligence, fault, laches, or estoppel,” respectively. Its thirteenth

defense states that it has “a right to set off damages.” These amount to a laundry list of would-be

defenses, consisting of “nothing but bare bones conclusory allegations” without “any short and plain

statement of facts.” Heller, 883 F.2d at 1295. Accordingly, they must be stricken.

D. Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Affirmative Defenses

Cincinnati’s seventh affirmative defense alleges lack of subject matter and/or personal

jurisdiction, and its eighth states that the claims “may be barred because venue is not appropriate

in this forum.” Its ninth defense states that the claims “may be barred . . . because Plaintiff has failed

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to join a necessary party.” These, like Cincinnati’s prior defenses, are devoid of factual allegations.

Cincinnati argues that jurisdiction, venue, and failure to join are contemplated as affirmative

defenses under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12. They are, but that does not excuse Cincinnati’s

obligations to provide a sufficient factual basis for its pleadings.

E. Eleventh Affirmative Defense

Cincinnati’s eleventh defense states that “Plaintiff’s claim is barred . . . because Plaintiff is

not a party in interest to the relevant agreements.” The Complaint against Cincinnati alleges that

Cincinnati entered into certain contracts with Crane 1, attached as exhibits to the Complaint, which

apparently form the basis of the claims against Cincinnati. The Court finds that given that the

contracts were discussed in and attached to the Complaint, Cincinnati’s allegation that it was not a

party to those contracts contains sufficient factual detail, and the defense need not be stricken. 

F. Reservation of Rights and Defenses

Crane 1 also seeks to strike Cincinnati’s statement that it “reserves the right to amend and/or

supplement these affirmative defenses as appropriate.” It is true that affirmative defenses cannot be

added without Crane 1’s written consent or the Court’s leave, but nothing in the sentence at issue

contradicts that, and Defendant has not attempted to add any defense without seeking leave.

According, the Court declines to strike the statement.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Crane

I Services, Inc.’s Motion to Strike Cincinnati Crane & Hoist, LLC’s Affirmative Defenses, filed

December 12, 2018 [DE 124]. The Court STRIKES the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,

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Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Affirmative Defenses in Cincinnati Crane

& Hoist LLC’s Answer [DE 115].

So ORDERED this 4th day of February, 2019.

s/ John E. Martin 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN E. MARTIN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

cc: All counsel of record 

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