UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

ROGER PRINGLE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 3:15-CV-484 TLS

)

MONIKA P. TALBOT, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Proceed [ECF No. 21] filed by the

Plaintiff, Roger Pringle, a pro se prisoner. The Plaintiff’s motion requests that the Court appoint

him counsel for this case. Specifically, the Plaintiff states, “Mr. Pringle would like a court

appointed counsel by Federal law to protect mental people with disabilit[ies].” [ECF No. 21].

The Plaintiff’s motion asserts that “Mr. Pringle cannot understand the law do [sic] to mental

disease and defects,” but he does not identify any specific medical conditions that he suffers

[ECF No. 21]. The Court notes that the Plaintiff has made one other request for the Court to

appoint counsel. This came in the Plaintiff’s Motion for Speedy Trial [ECF No. 6], where the

Plaintiff did not reference any mental illness. On November 23, 2015, the Court issued an Order

[ECF No. 15] denying his request because the Plaintiff was directed to file an amended

complaint, meaning that it was too earlier to determine whether the Plaintiff would need counsel.

On December 23, 2015, the Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint [ECF No. 22], and the Court

now considers his request for court-appointed counsel.
DISCUSSION

“There is no constitutional or statutory right to court-recruited counsel in federal civil

litigation.” Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 760 (7th Cir. 2010). Regardless, a district court has

discretion to recruit counsel for a civil litigant who is unable to afford counsel. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(1). First, the indigent plaintiff must make a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or

have been effectively precluded from doing so. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007)

(en banc). Second, the district court must ask whether the plaintiff appears competent to litigate

the case himself. Id. “There are no fixed requirements for determining a plaintiff’s competence to

litigate his own case,” but the district court will normally consider “the plaintiff’s literacy,

communication skills, educational level, and litigation experience,” and ask whether the factual

and legal “difficulties of the particular case” “exceed the particular plaintiff’s capacity as a lay

person to coherently present it.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 784 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting

Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Plaintiff’s motions requesting the appointment of counsel do not show that he made a

reasonable effort to obtain counsel or that he was effectively precluded from doing so. A

plaintiff’s status as a prisoner does not automatically satisfy the first requirement. See Olson v.

Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 710–11 (7th Cir. 2014) (observing that the plaintiff inmate submitted

several denial letters from attorneys to prove he attempted to obtain counsel); Allen v. Wine, 297

Fed. App’x 524, 530 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[The plaintiff inmate] has not persuaded us that he

satisfied this threshold requirement of trying to retain counsel himself, which was sufficient

reason for the judge to deny all of [his] requests for counsel.”).

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Even if the Plaintiff had satisfied the threshold requirement, his request for counsel would

still be denied because he is capable of coherently presenting this case. Olson, 750 F.3d at 711

(addressing only the second part of the test, even though the parties disputed whether the plaintiff

satisfied the first part, because the plaintiff’s failure on the second part is dispositive). Although

the Plaintiff’s motions do not elaborate on his alleged mental condition, other parts of the record

include various statements about his health, including some medical records from late 2010 to

early 2011. Navejar v. Iyiola, 718 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013) (“When ruling on a motion to

recruit counsel, the court should take account of all evidence in the record relevant to the

plaintiff’s capacity to litigate.”). The Plaintiff has been prescribed Prozac (ECF No. 1, at 15, 20;

ECF No. 14-1, at 27); he reports suffering from dyslexia (ECF No. 17, at 1), anxiety and paranoia

(ECF No. 1, at 17; ECF No. 14-1, at 23), alcoholism (ECF No. 1, at 18), post-traumatic stress

disorder (ECF No. 1, at 19), anger management problems (ECF No. 1, at 19); and he informed a

medical professional that he was “crazy” (ECF No. 1, at 21) and has a previous suicide attempt

(ECF No. 1, at 17). Many of these conditions are simply asserted without elaboration. The

Plaintiff also contends that Judge Monroe diagnosed him with “paranoia and bipolar [sic].” (ECF

No. 1, at 4). Further, the Plaintiff has a ninth-grade education and extensive experience with the

criminal justice system. (ECF No. 1, at 9, 43–50.) Despite needing to amend his complaint

because he filed multiple complaints on the docket, the Plaintiff’s letters to the Court have been

coherent. Additionally, the Plaintiff was cognizant enough to retain copies of his first complaint

and refile the relevant page in the amended complaint. (Compare Pro Se Compl. 42, ECF No. 1,

with Am. Compl. 4, ECF No. 22.)

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This case is not complex and the Plaintiff has the capacity as a lay person to present his

case coherently. The Plaintiff should know his criminal history and has access to the document

where the Defendant made the alleged defamatory statements. (See ECF No. 1, at 40–41.) The

Plaintiff also presumably has access to the pre-sentence investigation report prepared for

sentencing on his state conviction, which is the document from which the Defendant quoted the

alleged defamatory statements. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, Pringle v. State, No.

03A01-1502-CR-78 (Ind. Ct. App. April 29, 2015), 2015 WL 4399564, at *4–5. Further, this

case does not involve complex medical evidence, which typically causes pro se plaintiffs to

struggle. Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655–56. Since the Plaintiff has not satisfied either part of the test, the

Plaintiff’s request for counsel is denied.

The Court is mindful that it is the appellate court’s function to determine “whether

assistance of counsel could have strengthened the preparation and presentation of the case in a

manner reasonably likely to alter the outcome.” Id. at 660; Navejar v. Iyiola, 718 F.3d 692, 696

(7th Cir. 2013) (“Pruitt nowhere suggests that a district court should consider whether recruiting

counsel would affect the outcome of a case; instead, that inquiry is reserved for the appellate

court’s review of prejudice.”). Alternatively, the Court has also found, and stated by separate

order, that the Plaintiff does not state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Given this outcome, any

request for counsel would be moot.

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CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed [ECF No. 21] is DENIED.

SO ORDERED January 19, 2016

s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

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