UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

YOLANDA D. YOUNG-SMITH, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO. 3:15-cv-156-PPS-APR

)

STEPHEN ANTHONY )

YOKICH ET AL, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This is Plaintiff Yolanda Young-Smith’s third case in which she has alleged that

she is the victim of a conspiracy between Ivan Bodensteiner (her former attorney) and

Stephen Yokich (an attorney who represented her opponent in one of her earlier cases).

Three different judges of this court and two panels of judges in the Seventh Circuit have

reviewed these allegations and have found them to be deficient. Despite the previous

dismissals of her cases with prejudice, Young-Smith has nonetheless filed this case – her

third attempt to raise the same issues against the attorney defendants. It’s time to put an

end to this.

FACTUALBACKGROUND

Although it is a bit tedious, to fully understand the matter that is presently before

the Court, one needs to understand the chronology of Young-Smith’s prior cases. This 

is how we got here: After Young-Smith was fired from her job with Bayer Healthcare,

she sued Bayer and her Union. [Cause No. 3:07-cv-629, DE 1.] For ease of
2

reference I will call this the “employment case.” Young-Smith settled her claims against

Bayer in late 2009, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the

Union on one of Young-Smith’s two remaining claims, sending Young-Smith’s

remaining claim to trial. [Id., DE 94.] Prior to trial, Young-Smith fired her attorney and

asked the court to reconsider earlier rulings, alleging that there was a conspiracy afoot

to perpetrate fraud upon the court. Judge Lee asked Young-Smith to prepare a list of

evidence to support her contentions. Upon reviewing the evidence presented by

Young-Smith, Judge Lee found that most of Young-Smith’s contentions related entirely

to the decision of her counsel strategically to place certain evidence into the record

before the court during the summary judgment process, as opposed to every piece of

evidence, and this did not amount to “fraud on the court.” [Id., DE 153 at 6-8.]

Young-Smith’s remaining claim in the employment case went to trial before

Judge Van Bokkelen, the case having been transferred to him from Judge Lee. The trial

ended in a verdict in favor of the Union. [Id., DE 280.] In her post-trial motions before

Judge Van Bokkelen, Young-Smith rehashed her claims previously decided by Judge 

Lee about the alleged fraud on the court, perjury, and attorney misconduct as a basis for

a new trial. [Id., DE 297.] Just as Judge Lee had done once before, Judge Van Bokkelen

denied the motion. [Id., DE 297].

While Young-Smith’s employment case was pending, Young-Smith filed another

action in federal court regarding the same alleged conspiracy and attorney misconduct

that she raised in her employment case. [Cause No. 3:12-cv-275, DE 1.] Her claims,
3

however, failed to state a federal cause of action or raise a substantial question of

federal law, thereby failing to secure the jurisdiction of this Court. As a result, I

dismissed her claims, albeit without prejudice. [Id., DE 84.] None of the parties were

particularly pleased with that decision, filing several motions after the opinion was

entered. [Id., DE 86, 91, 94.] Specifically, Young-Smith believed that I had failed to

consider all of her claims based on federal violations. I denied that motion as simply an

effort to relitigate arguments that I previously had rejected. [Id., DE 105.] Defendants

Bodensteiner and Yokich asked that I dismiss all of Young-Smith’s claims regarding

fraud on the court with prejudice in light of Judge Lee’s opinion in Young-Smith’s

employment case, which precluded Young-Smith from raising the same issues again.

Because I had concluded that this Court did not have jurisdiction over those claims, I

decided that I could not properly make such a ruling and denied their motions. [Id.]

Young-Smith and Yokich both appealed (consolidated under Seventh Circuit

Cause No. 13-2427) and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, finding that YoungSmith failed to raise a substantial federal question, but also held that her claim of

conspiracy to defraud the court against Bodensteiner and Yokich should have been

dismissed with prejudice because “her exclusive remedy for that claim is in the

employment case.” [Cause No. 13-2427, DE 40 at 4.]

Undeterred, Young-Smith filed this – her third case – in state court regarding the

same alleged conspiracy and attorney misconduct that she raised in her employment

case and in her second federal action, naming three of the same defendants as in the
4

second action (Yokich, Bodensteiner, and Holt) [DE 4]. The three Defendants removed

the case to this Court asserting that Young-Smith’s complaint purported to state federal

claims including a conspiracy to violate Young-Smith’s rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985

[DE 1]. Defendants Yokich and Bodensteiner promptly filed Motions to Dismiss [DE

10] and Judgment on the Pleadings [DE 12], respectively.

After the present case was filed, the Seventh Circuit ruled on the appeal brought

by Young-Smith in her original employment case, in which she contended that the

district court committed errors assessing the evidence in that case. [Cause No. 14-3617,

DE 39.] In its June 2015 Order, the Seventh Circuit noted that Young-Smith raised

“what appear to be substantially similar allegations against her and the Union’s

attorneys” in her second suit and that “[a]side from the possible preclusive effect of [the

Seventh Circuit’s] affirmance [of that case] on these allegations, our review of the record

uncovers no evidence to substantiate them.” [Id., DE 39 at 5.] As such, the Seventh

Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Young-Smith’s

motions based on her allegations that Bodensteiner and Yokich conspired to defraud the

court.

DISCUSSION

With the factual background in mind, I will now take up the pending motions

brought by Yokich and Bodensteiner to dismiss the pending case. As I mentioned,

Defendants Yokich and Bodensteiner filed Motions to Dismiss and Judgment on the

Pleadings, respectively, but these motions may be adjudicated together. “A motion for
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judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is

governed by the same standards as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Rule 12(b)(6).” Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 727-28 (7th Cir. 2014). A

motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) “challenges the sufficiency of the complaint

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of

Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’ A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(internal citations omitted).

Young-Smith’s claims that Yokich and Bodensteiner conspired against her and

committed fraud on the court in her employment case have been raised and rejected at

least five times. They were rejected by both Judge Lee and Judge Van Bokkelen in

Young-Smith’s employment case. That decision was later affirmed by the Seventh

Circuit, which noted not only the possible preclusive effect the judgment renders in

Young-Smith’s subsequent federal action, but the fact that there was no evidence to

substantiate Young-Smith’s claims.

Young-Smith’s allegations were again rejected – this time by me – in her second

suit brought in federal court. I found that the references to federal law contained in her

complaint were insufficient to confer jurisdiction of this Court and dismissed Young-
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Smith’s claims without prejudice. I also noted that even if I had jurisdiction over

Young-Smith’s claims, they were potentially barred by Judge Lee’s prior opinion in

Young-Smith’s employment case. Reviewing my dismissal of the action, the Seventh

Circuit agreed with the majority of my disposition of the second case but disagreed

with me in one important way; the Seventh Circuit said that Young-Smith’s claims of

conspiracy to defraud the court should have been dismissed with prejudice.

So here we find ourselves again discussing Young-Smith’s claims of conspiracy

to bring fraud upon the court for a sixth time. But these claims have previously been

adjudicated and dismissed with prejudice. I italicize “with prejudice” to emphasize the

importance of that proviso. A dismissal of a claim with prejudice works as an

adjudication on the merits. See, e.g., Georgakis v. Illinois State University, 722 F.3d 1075,

1077-78 (7th Cir. 2013). Here is why that is important: when a matter has been decided

on the merits, it means that the issue cannot be raised again. This is because collateral

estoppel or issue preclusion applies to prevent relitigation of issues resolved in an

earlier suit.1 Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008).

1

While my analysis relies on issue preclusion to preclude relitigation of these

issues, claim preclusion may also apply to prevent Young-Smith from raising these

issues. Res judicata or claim preclusion applies when “there was a final judgment on

the merits in an earlier case and both the parties and the claims in the two lawsuits are

the same.” Bernstein v. Bankert, 733 F.3d 190, 224 (7thCir. 2012). Because the Seventh

Circuit in Young-Smith’s second case ordered the dismissal with prejudice of these

same claims against the same parties to this lawsuit – Bodensteiner and Yokich – res

judicata also applies to preclude the claims in this case.
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Issue preclusion has the following elements: (1) the issue sought to be precluded

is the same as an issue in the prior litigation; (2) the issue must have been actually

litigated in the prior litigation; (3) the determination of the issue must have been

essential to the final judgment; and (4) the party against whom estoppel is invoked

must have been fully represented in the prior action. Matrix IV, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank &

Trust Co. of Chicago, 649 F.3d 539, 548 (7th Cir. 2011). As already discussed at length,

Young-Smith has had an opportunity to litigate the same issue several times, in 

multiple actions (the most recent of which involved the same parties to this action)

including two appeals to the Seventh Circuit. Young-Smith, therefore, is precluded

from yet again raising the issue in this action.

Furthermore, Young-Smith’s additional claims against Bodensteiner and Yokich

– defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, and perjury

– also are precluded because these issues also were raised in the previous actions. It is

this alleged conduct, Young-Smith asserts, that is the vehicle by which Bodensteiner and

Yokich brought fraud upon the district court in Young-Smith’s employment case.

Specifically, Young-Smith alleges that certain evidence was or was not introduced and

challenges the veracity of that evidence. Both Judge Lee, Judge Van Bokkelen, and the

Seventh Circuit had the opportunity to review Young-Smith’s list of purported evidence

of Bodensteiner and Yokich’s alleged fraudulent activity, including defamation and

perjury, and found that Young-Smith’s claims were unsubstantiated.
8

But let’s suppose that Young-Smith did not bring in the earlier cases the specific

claims that she now raises, such as defamation and intentional infliction of emotional

distress. She would nonetheless be barred from bringing those claims in this case

because to do so would amount to claim splitting, which is prohibited. Carr v. Tillery,

591 F.3d 909, 913 (7th Cir. 2010). As the Court stated in Carr, claim splitting is

prohibited because “[y]ou cannot maintain a suit arising from the same transaction or

events underlying a previous suit simply by a change in legal theory.” Id.

Young-Smith is, therefore, precluded from once again raising the same issues in

this case that she has raised (or could have raised) in her two prior cases. Counts IV, VIX2 as against Bodensteiner and Yokich will therefore be dismissed with prejudice.

Young-Smith also brings two state law claims against Rebecca Holt, a former coworker at Bayer, for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 48-60.) Unlike Bodensteiner and Yokich, Holt has not moved to dismiss; she

has answered the Complaint. In the absence of any argument from Holt as to why this

case should be dismissed against her, it must go forward. But where? As I mentioned,

the claims against Holt are based on state law and I therefore do not have 

original jurisdiction over them. They are supplemental state law claims. Pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the proper course is to relinquish jurisdiction over the remaining

state law claims and remand them back to state court. See, e.g., Williams Electr. Games v.

2

Young-Smith uses consecutive heading numbers in her Complaint and does not

restart the numbers for her Counts, so the first Count is numbered IV.
9

Garrity, 479 F.3d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he sensible presumption is that if federal

claims drop out before trial, the district court should relinquish jurisdiction over the

state law claims.”). Counts V and VI against Holt will therefore be remanded to state

court.

TO SUM UP:

(1) Bodensteiner’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [DE 12] and Yokich’s

Motion to Dismiss [DE 10] are GRANTED. The claims against them are dismissed, and

I direct the Clerk of Court to denote the matter as terminated against those defendants;

(2) Young-Smith’s state-law claims of defamation and intentional infliction of

emotional distress against Holt ARE REMANDED TO STATE COURT;

(3) All other pending motions [DE 14, 16 and 18] are DENIED AS MOOT.

ENTERED: October 29, 2015

s/ Philip P. Simon

PHILIP P. SIMON, CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT