alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Richard Reeder et al., Individually and as Officers of the Brookview Area Neighborhood Association, Appellants, v Lubomir Szmigel et al., Constituting the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Irondequoit, Respondents. Pinecrest Associates, Intervenor-Respondent.

— Judgment unanimously reversed, on the law, with costs, petition granted and determination annulled. Memorandum: Petitioners seek annulment of a use variance granted to intervenor Pinecrest Associates by respondent Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Irondequoit. Special Term dismissed the petition. The variance permits construction of a branch bank upon a lot situate partly in an R-6 zone and partly in an R-5 zone.

It is first argued that petitioners do not have standing to bring this proceeding. We disagree. The proceeding is brought by petitioners both individually and as officers of the Brookview Area Neighborhood Association. The Association has demonstrated that it is an appropriate organization to act as a representative of its membership *(Matter of Douglaston Civic Assn. v Galvin,*36 NY2d 1, 7). In any event, the record discloses that a number of the individual petitioners are owners of homes in close proximity to the subject property and that the proposed construction would add to already serious traffic problems. We find that the individual petitioners are aggrieved by the action of the Zoning Board of Appeals (Town Law § 267 [7]) and thus have standing to bring this proceeding *(Matter of Friends of Pine Bush v Planning Bd.,*71 AD2d 780, *Iv dismissed*49 NY2d 860).

Turning to the merits, we find that the evidence presented to the Zoning Board of Appeals was insufficient to support the Board’s action. At the public hearing, intervenor’s representative merely stated in conclusory fashion that the property had been for sale for several years and that development of the property for a permissible use would require the expenditure of $30,000 to relocate a stream which traverses the property.

Several nonresidential uses of the property are permitted under present zoning. It was the intervenor’s burden to demonstrate factually, by dollars and cents proof, an inability to realize a reasonable return under existing permissible uses *(Matter of Village Bd. v Jarrold,*53 NY2d 254; *Bellanca v Gates,*97 AD2d 971, *affd*61 NY2d 878). No effort was made, however, to demonstrate those several factors which bear upon the rate of return *(see, Matter of Crossroads Recreation v Broz, 4*NY2d 39, *107944-45), nor was there any proof of diligent and bona fide efforts to sell the property *(see, e.g., Bellanca v Gates, supra; Matter of Shiner v Board of Estimate,*95 AD2d 831).

Thus viewed, there is no need to resolve the issue of whether the intervenor was the proper party to seek the variance. (Appeal from judgment of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Cicoria, J. — art 78.) Present — Dillon, P. J., Callahan, Doerr, Boomer and Schnepp, JJ.
**Exhibit 99.2**

 

**CertificationPursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002(Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United StatesCode)**

 

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections(a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), I,Scott L. Cooper, President of Wheeling Island Gaming, Inc., a Delawarecorporation (the “Company”), do hereby certify, to the best of my knowledge andbelief that:

 

(1) the Annual Report of the Company on Form 10-K for the year endedDecember 31, 2002 (the “Form 10-K”) fully complies with the requirements ofSection 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2) the information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operations of theCompany.

 

 
| Dated:  March  27, 2003 |   | /s/ Scott L. Cooper |   |
|------------------------------|--------|---------------------|--------|
|                         |   | Scott L. Cooper     |   |
|                         |   | President           |   |

 

----
#### Renal NELSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. A.P. KANE, Warden; Board of Prison Terms, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 08-17016.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 24, 2011.*

Filed June 7, 2011.

Renal Nelson, Corcoran, CA, pro se.

Jessica Nicole Blonien, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for Respondents-Appellees.

Before: PREGERSON, THOMAS, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Renal Nelson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We dismiss.

Nelson contends that the Board’s 2003 decision to deny him parole was improper, and therefore violated his violated his due process rights. After briefing was completed in this case, this court held that a certificate of appealability (“COA”) is required to challenge the denial of parole. *See Hayward v. Marshall,*603 F.3d 546, 554-55 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc). Now the Supreme Court has held that the only federal right at issue in the parole context is procedural, and the only proper inquiry is what process the inmate received, not whether the state court decided the case correctly. *See Swarthout v. Cooke,*— U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 859, 863, 178 L.Ed.2d 732 (2011) (per curiam). Because Nelson raises no procedural challenges regarding his parole hearing, a COA cannot issue, and we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

Because we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, we not need reach Appel-lee’s contentions concerning exhaustion and procedural default. *See Day v. McDonough,*547 U.S. 198, 205, 126 S.Ct. 1675, 164 L.Ed.2d 376 (2006); *Vansickel v. White,*166 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir.1999). *786We deny all pending requests.

DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### KITAY, Respondent, v. BROOKLYN, Q. C. & S. R. CO., Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

March 15, 1898.)

Action by Victor Kitay, as administrator, etc., against the Brooklyn, Queens County & Suburban Railroad Company.

No opinion. Application for leave to appeal to the court of appeals denied. See 48 N. Y. Supp. 982.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED APRIL 18, 2013

NO. 03-12-00334-CV

Sylva Engineering Corporation, Appellant

v.

Hasan Giray Kaya, Appellee

APPEAL FROM 419TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES PURYEAR, PEMBERTON AND FIELD

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND DISMISSED IN PART –

OPINION BY JUSTICE FIELD

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the record of the court below, and the same being 

considered, because it is the opinion of this Court that there was no error in the district court’s 

order EXCEPT for the portion of the district court’s order denying appellant’s motion to dismiss 

appellee’s claim that appellant negligently designed portions of State Highway 45 to be almost 

flat. IT IS THEREFORE considered, adjudged and ordered that the portion of the district

court’s order denying appellant’s motion to dismiss as to appellee’s claim that appellant 

negligently designed portions of State Highway 45 to be almost flat is reversed, and judgment is 

rendered dismissing that claim. However, we affirm the district court’s order denying appellee’s 

motion to dismiss in all other respects. It is FURTHER ordered that each party shall pay the 

costs of the appeal incurred by that party, both in this Court and the court below; and that this 

decision be certified below for observance.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

Freedom From Religion Foundation, et al.

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No.: 3:15−cv−00463−JD−CAN

Judge Jon E DeGuilio

Concord Community Schools

Defendant.

NOTICE OF AVAILABILITY OF A UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE TO EXERCISE

JURISDICTION

 In accordance with the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, and Local Rule 72−1, a

United States Magistrate Judge of this district court is available to conduct any or all proceedings in this

case including a jury or nonjury trial, and to order the entry of a final judgment. Exercise of this jurisdiction

by a magistrate judge is, however, permitted only if all parties voluntarily consent.

 Because of the dramatic increase in the number of criminal cases in recent years, the district judges give

priority to the criminal docket as required by law. Under these circumstances, your case can experience

delay, which can result in cost increases, before it can be tried by the district judge. Congress' enactment of

the Civil Justice Reform Act requires the Court to give increased attention to addressing costs and delays in

resolving civil disputes. The Judicial Conference of the United States encourages the designation of

magistrate judges to conduct all proceedings in civil cases, both jury and non−jury. Consent to a Magistrate

Judge will ensure an earlier and a firm trial date. Therefore, the parties are encouraged to consent to

Jurisdiction by United States Magistrate Judge by filling out the form set forth below.

 You may, without adverse substantive consequences, withhold your consent, but this will prevent the

court's jurisdiction from being exercised by a magistrate judge. If any party withholds consent, the identity

of the parties consenting or withholding consent will not be communicated to any magistrate judge or to the

district judge to whom the case has been assigned.

 An appeal from a judgment entered by a magistrate judge shall be taken directly to the United States

Court of Appeals for this judicial circuit in the same manner as an appeal from any other judgment of a

district court.

CONSENT TO THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION BY A UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE

 In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, and Local Rule 72−1, the

parties in this case voluntarily consent to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct all further

proceedings in this case, including trial, entry of a final judgment, and all post−judgment proceedings.

Print and Sign List all Parties Represented Date

NOTE: RETURN THIS FORM VIA EMAIL TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT AT THE

APPROPRIATE EMAIL ADDRESS SHOWN BELOW WITHIN 21 DAYS AFTER THE INITIAL

PRELIMINARY PRETRIAL CONFERENCE.

Fort Wayne: FWClerks@innd.uscourts.gov

Hammond: HMDClerks@innd.uscourts.gov

South Bend: SBClerks@innd.uscourts.gov

Lafayette: LafClerks@innd.uscourts.gov

To return this form via U.S. Mail, please refer to http://www.innd.uscourts.gov for mailing addresses.

USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00463-JD document 39 filed 11/30/15 page 1 of 1
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-2201

WALTER J. BENNETT, Merchant Mariner’s License

No. 776593,

Petitioner,

versus

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the United States Department

of Transportation. (EM-187)

Submitted: January 18, 2001 Decided: January 23, 2001

Before WIDENER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Walter J. Bennett, Petitioner Pro Se. Daniel D. Campbell, NATIONAL

TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Walter J. Bennett filed a petition for review of the National

Transportation Safety Board’s (“Board”) order dismissing his appeal

from the administrative law judge’s decision suspending his merchant mariner’s license for six months based on a charge of misconduct and placing him on a twelve month probationary period.

Parties are accorded sixty days to file a petition for review

in the appropriate court of appeals after the Board issues its

final order. 49 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1994). The Board’s order is

dated July 10, 2000, and was served on July 12, 2000. Bennett did

not file his petition for review until September 14, 2000. We

therefore deny the petition for lack of jurisdiction because

Bennett’s petition was not timely filed. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                          15,757
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     48,242
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                        262,263
<ALLOWANCE>                                      3,299
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 335,043
<DEPOSITS>                                     288,486
<SHORT-TERM>                                     9,363
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<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 335,043
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<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                 6,503
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               2,209
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,516
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            3,987
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                      185
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  3,515
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    867
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<EPS-BASIC>                                        .67
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<LOANS-NON>                                        746
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<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             3,299
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0


</TABLE>
#### AVON SPRINGS SANITARIUM CO. v. KELLOGG.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

October 9, 1907.)

Action by the Avon Springs Sanitarium Company against J. Francis Kellogg.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant’s exceptions ■overruled, and motion for new trial denied, and judgment ordered for plaintiff upon the verdict, with costs.

McLENNAN, P. J., dissents, for the reasons stated in dissenting opinion, reported at 119 App. Div. 560, 104 N. Y. Supp. 58.
* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED

September 22, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-10236

In The Matter of: JERRY W. BIESEL; ELIZABETH S. BIESEL

Debtors

* * * * * * * * * *

JERRY W. BIESEL; ELIZABETH S. BIESEL,

Appellants,

v.

KARL BILLINGS,

Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Texas, Dallas

Before BARKSDALE, DEMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge: *

Jerry W. Biesel and Elizabeth S. Biesel (Biesels) appeal from

the orders of the bankruptcy court which denied their claim that a

contract with Karl Billings (Billings) was terminated. Because of

the finding by the bankruptcy court that the contract was not2

terminated, the bankruptcy court found the contract to be executory

at the time of the filing of the Chapter 11 case and awarded

damages to Billings resulting from the Biesels’ rejection of the

contract. On appeal, the Biesels claim that the bankruptcy court

erred in the following respects:

1) in finding that the Biesels waived the July 29, 1994

deadline for termination of the contract;

2) in finding the Biesels are estopped from asserting that

title-related problems excused performance of the

contract or was grounds for terminating the contract; and

3) in applying a higher standard to Jerry Biesel’s conduct

because he was an attorney.

We have carefully reviewed the briefs and record and

considered the arguments presente d at oral argument and conclude

that no error requiring reversal of the bankruptcy court judgment

has been shown. We affirm essentially for the reasons set forth in

the two orders entered by the district court in the appeals of the

bankruptcy court orders at issue. S ee Orders of Judge Sidney

Fitzwater dated January 28, 2003 and April 24, 2002.

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 31                  Rule 13a-14(d) Certification

                                  CERTIFICATION

     I, Michael L. Parker, a President and Director of Washington Mutual
Mortgage Securities Corp., certify that:

     1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K, and all reports on Form
8-K  containing  distribution  or servicing  reports filed in respect of periods
included  in  the  year  covered  by  this  annual  report,   of  WAMU  MORTGAGE
PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2002-AR1;

     2. Based on my knowledge,  the  information  in these  reports,  taken as a
whole, does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state
a  material  fact  necessary  to make  the  statements  made,  in  light  of the
circumstances  under which such  statements  were made, not misleading as of the
last day of the period covered by this annual report;

     3.  Based  on my  knowledge,  the  distribution  or  servicing  information
required to be provided  to the  trustee by the  servicer  under the pooling and
servicing, or similar,  agreement, for inclusion in these reports is included in
these reports;

     4. I am responsible for reviewing the activities  performed by the servicer
under the  pooling  and  servicing,  or  similar,  agreement  and based  upon my
knowledge and the annual  compliance  review required under that agreement,  and
except as disclosed in the reports,  the servicer has fulfilled its  obligations
under that agreement; and

     5. The  reports  disclose  all  significant  deficiencies  relating  to the
servicer's compliance with the minimum servicing standards based upon the report
provided by an  independent  public  accountant,  after  conducting  a review in
compliance with the Uniform Single  Attestation  Program for Mortgage Bankers or
similar  procedure,  as set forth in the  pooling  and  servicing,  or  similar,
agreement, that is included in these reports.

     In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information
provided to me by the following  unaffiliated  third parties acting as servicers
and sub-servicers:

Washington Mutual


Dated: March 15, 2004
                                     /s/ Michael L. Parker
                                         Michael L. Parker,
                                         President and Director
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2030 Introduced in House (IH)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2030

            To suspend temporarily the duty on Tetramethrin.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 28, 2005

Mrs. Tauscher introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
            To suspend temporarily the duty on Tetramethrin.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. TETRAMETHRIN.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:

``      9902.06.15       (1,3,4,5,6,7-      Free         No change        No change        On or before 12/  ''.
                         Hexahydro-1,3-                                                     31/2008
                         dioxo-2H-isoindol-
                         2-yl)methyl 2,2-
                         dimethyl-3-(2-
                         methylprop-1-
                         enyl)cyclopropane
                         carboxylate (CAS
                         No. 7696-12-0)
                         (provided for in
                         subheading
                         2925.19.90)......

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
# L_2008316EN.01002101.xml

| 26.11.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 316/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.11.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 316/21

---

COUNCIL DECISION 2008/884/CFSP

of 21 November 2008

implementing Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP on the establishment of the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP on the establishment of the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN), and in particular Article 13(2) thereof, in conjunction with the second indent of the first subparagraph of Article 23(2) of the Treaty on European Union,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 30 May 2007, the Council adopted Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP (1) for a period of three years. The operational phase of EUPOL AFGHANISTAN began on 15 June 2007. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 30 May 2007, the Council adopted Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP (1) for a period of three years. The operational phase of EUPOL AFGHANISTAN began on 15 June 2007.

| (2) | It is up to the Council to adopt the financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to EUPOL AFGHANISTAN for the period from 1 December 2008 until 30 November 2009, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

It is up to the Council to adopt the financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to EUPOL AFGHANISTAN for the period from 1 December 2008 until 30 November 2009,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1

The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to EUPOL AFGHANISTAN for the period from 1 December 2008 until 30 November 2009 shall be EUR 64 000 000.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Article 3

This Decision shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels, 21 November 2008.

For the Council

The President

E. WOERTH

---

(1)  
  OJ L 139, 31.5.2007, p. 33.

1

---