UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

GENE A. JOINER, )

)

Plaintiff )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO. 2:14-CV-277 RLM

)

U.S. STEEL GARY, )

)

Defendant )

OPINION and ORDER

Gene Joiner filed an employment discrimination complaint, without the

assistance of counsel, alleging that he was permanently disabled as a result of

asbestos exposure while employed at U.S. Steel. U.S. Steel moved to dismiss for

failure to state a claim, contending that: (1) the complaint is time barred on its

face because Mr. Joiner alleges that he received his notice of right to sue letter in

2000, but waited fourteen years to file his complaint; (2) Mr. Joiner hasn’t alleged

any facts that would support a plausible claim for employment discrimination

under any of the statutes cited; and (3) any claim for work-related injuries is

barred by the exclusivity provisions in Indiana’s Worker’s Compensation Act

and/or Indiana’s Occupational Disease Act. IND. CODE §§ 22-2-3-6 and 22-3-7-6. 

Mr. Joiner hasn’t responded. For the following reasons, the court grants U.S.

Steel’s motion [Doc. No. 12].

To survive a motion to dismiss, a “complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Reynolds v. CB Sports Bar Inc., 623 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Mr. Joiner is proceeding pro se, so

the court reads his complaint liberally, Hudson v. McHugh, 148 F.3d 859, 864

(7th Cir. 1998), but can’t act as his attorney, Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d

551, 552-553 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Piler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004)). 

When, as in this case, “it appears ‘beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief,’” the motion to

dismiss must be granted. Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2001).

Mr. Joiner’s complaint seeks relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities

Act, the Rehabilitation Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, but he hasn’t alleged any facts

that would support a claim under any of those statutes. He simply alleges that he

is permanently disabled due to asbestos exposure. Documents attached to his

complaint indicate that he was no longer employed by U.S. Steel when he began

experiencing asbestos-related symptoms in 1977; that he “discover[ed] [he] had

legal rights regarding asbestos exposure” in 1999; and that he filed a Worker’s

Compensation claim in November 2000, but the claim was dismissed because the

statute of limitations had expired. Although Mr. Joiner alleges in the complaint

that he received a right to sue notice from the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission on November 2, 2000, the letter attached to his complaint [Doc. No.

1 at p. 11] is not a notice of right to sue, and there’s no indication he ever filed a

claim of discrimination with the EEOC. To the extent Mr. Joiner is asserting a

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state law claim for work-related personal injuries, his claim is barred by the

exclusivity provisions in Indiana’s Worker’s Compensation Act (IWCA) and/or

Indiana’s Occupational Disease Act (IODA), which provide that “the rights and

remedies granted to an employee [under the IWCA and IODA] . . . shall exclude all

other rights and remedies of such employee[.]” IND. CODE §§ 22-2-3-6 and 22-3-7-

6. See Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 466 (7th Cir. 1990). 

Accordingly, defendant U.S. Steel’s motion to dismiss [Doc. No. 12] is

GRANTED, Any amendment to the complaint would be futile, so the court also

orders the case DISMISSED. 

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: January 13, 2016 

 /s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr. 

Judge, United States District Court

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