UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

 VS. 

SCHUYLER STANTON 

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CAUSE NO. 3:15-CR-50-RLM

OPINION and ORDER 

Defendant Schuyler Stanton pleaded guilty to possession with intent to 

distribute cocaine, after law enforcement officers made controlled buys of several 

types of drugs from him and then found more drugs in his house. Mr. Stanton’s 

presentence report estimated that he was responsible for an amount of drugs 

equivalent to 757.47 kilograms of marijuana, resulting in a base offense level of 

28. Unbeknownst to the probation department, the government, Mr. Stanton, or 

the court at the time, that total drug amount was wrong; the probation office had 

transposed a number while adding up the numerous small quantities of drugs 

attributed to Mr. Stanton and applying the equivalency formulas, and no one 

caught the error. After various enhancements and reductions, Mr. Stanton’s final 

offense level was 25 and his guideline range was 63 to 78 months imprisonment. 

The court imposed a slightly below-guideline sentence of 60 months. 

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Stanton’s then-girlfriend and co-defendant Calie 

Echevarria was sentenced for the same crime in a separate proceeding. Mr. 

Stanton and Ms. Echevarria were responsible for the same drugs, but Ms. 

Echevarria’s PSR correctly applied the equivalency formulas and held her 
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accountable for 190 kilograms of marijuana – far less than Mr. Stanton’s total of 

757.47 kilograms. At this point, the probation apartment and attorneys realized 

the mistake and the government now asks the court to correct the error and 

reduce Mr. Stanton’s sentence. 

Had the correct drug amount of 190 kilograms been applied, Mr. Stanton’s 

base offense level would be 24 rather than 28 and his final offense level would 

be 21 rather than 25. Combined with Mr. Stanton’s criminal history category of 

II, an offense level of 25 suggests a guideline range of 41-51 months. Because 

the court sentenced Mr. Stanton to 95% of the lower end of the guideline range 

when imposing his original sentence, the government requests the same slight 

departure below the lower end of the corrected range for a total of 39 months. 

The government suggests that the court reduce Mr. Stanton’s sentence 

under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, but Rule 35 isn’t applicable; it only 

permits a court to correct or reduce a clear sentencing error within 14 days after 

sentencing, and Mr. Stanton was sentenced six months ago. The government 

acknowledges Rule 35’s time limits, but says “the parties waive that rule.” The 

government cites no authority suggesting that the time limit can be waived by 

agreement of the parties. Rule 35 is a narrow exception to the general proposition 

in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) that a court “may not modify a term of imprisonment once 

it has been imposed.” Rule 45(b)(2) expressly forbids what the government 

proposes, stating that a court “may not extend the time to take any action under 

Rules 29, 33, 34, and 35, except as stated in those rules.” Nothing in Rule 35 
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permits a court to take action beyond the seven-day period for correcting a 

sentence. See United States v. Baldwin, 414 F.3d 791, 797 (7th Cir. 2005) 

overruled on other grounds by United States v. Parker, 508 F.3d 434 (7th Cir. 

2007) (“There is no provision in Rule 35 for an extension of the seven-day period 

for correcting a sentence.”); see also Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 428 

(1996) (holding that district court erred in taking action after the 7-day filing 

limit applicable to Rule 29 had expired, and noting that district courts have no 

“inherent power” to act in contravention of applicable rules of procedure). 

Neither does Rule 36 provide authority for the court to make the requested 

modification. Under Rule 36, the court may at any time correct a clerical error 

or an error in the record arising from oversight or omission. While Mr. Stanton’s 

sentence was based on an erroneous drug quantity, the court can’t reduce his 

sentence because it was the information in the PSR – not the sentence itself – 

that contained the clerical error. “A district judge may still correct a final 

judgment in a criminal case to reflect the sentence he actually imposed but he 

cannot change the sentence he did impose even if the sentence was erroneous.” 

United States v. Eskridge, 445 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2006). Reliance on Rule 

36 to correct Mr. Stanton’s sentence is unambiguously foreclosed by the court 

of appeals’ decision in United States v. Johnson, 571 F.3d 716 (7th Cir. 2009). 

Johnson was a very similar case, in which a defendant claimed he was sentenced 

based on an incorrectly high drug quantity due to a mathematical error in the 

PSR. The court of appeals held that such an argument must be made via a 
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collateral attack on the sentence rather than through Rule 36, because Rule 36 

“is limited to errors that are clerical in nature, typically where the written 

sentence differs from the oral pronouncement of the sentence, not judicial 

mistakes.” Id. at 718 (7th Cir. 2009). 

The court is in sympathy with Mr. Stanton, who by no fault of his own 

received a longer sentence than he should have. But the court’s authority to 

change a defendant’s sentence once imposed is limited, and no statute or rule of 

procedure permits modification in this case. See United States v. Smith, 438 

F.3d 796, 800 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that “district judges cannot grant 

themselves authority that has been withdrawn by the legislature; the point of § 

3582(c) is to block post-sentencing modifications that district judges want to 

make”) (emphasis in original). 

For these reasons, the court DENIES the government’s unopposed motion 

to amend or correct judgment (Doc. No. 27). 

SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED: May 26, 2016 

 /s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr. 

 Judge 

 United States District Court