UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

JERRY KEISTER, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 1:16-CV-88-TLS

)

DAVID J. GLADIEUX, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241 [ECF No. 1], filed on March 15, 2016. The Petitioner, Jerry Keister—who was sentenced to

a term of imprisonment of four months on February 16, 2016 (cause number 1:09-cr106)—challenges the Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) calculation of his jail credit time and claims that he

is entitled to immediate release. 

BACKGROUND

On September 17, 2015, the Petitioner was arrested and detained for alleged violations of

his federal conditions of supervised release. On October 29, 2015, the Court, following a Final

Revocation Hearing, entered a Modified Judgment in a Criminal Case [ECF No. 60], ordering the

Petitioner to serve a sentence of time served and a new term of supervised release of six months. On

December 16, 2015, the Petitioner was again arrested and detained for alleged violations of his

federal conditions of supervised release. On February 16, 2016, the Court, following a Final

Revocation Hearing, entered a Modified Judgment in a Criminal Case [ECF No. 85], ordering the 

Petitioner to serve a sentence of four months imprisonment, with no term of supervised release to
follow.

On March 15, 2016, the Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28

U.S.C. § 2241 [ECF No. 1], alleging that the BOP’s calculated release date of April 14, 2016, is

incorrect: 

On February 16, 2016, the District Court held a hearing on a revocation of supervised

release. At the conclusion of that hearing, I was sentenced to four months (120 days)

imprisonment, with no further supervision to follow. It was also determined that I had

107 days jail credit, resulting in a term of imprisonment of 13 days. This would have

made my release date February 29, 2016. Nonetheless, the Bureau of Prisons has

calculated my release date as April 14, 2016. 

(Pet. 7.)1

On March 21, 2016, the Court conducted a telephonic conference to give Petitioner’s

counsel, along with the United States Probation Office (USPO), an opportunity to present any

additional information to assist the parties and the Court in resolving this matter. The Court

ordered USPO to investigate the matter and to issue its findings on the record. That same day,

USPO issued its findings [ECF No. 86, cause number 1:09-cr-106], which state, in relevant

part:

[The BOP] advised that the [D]efendant’s sentence computation was calculated

utilizing December 16, 2015, as his start date; therefore, a sentence of four months

imprisonment gives him a release date of April 14, 2016. [The BOP] advised that the

jail time from September 16, 2015,2 until October 30, 2015, was awarded to his

revocation sentence dated October 29, 2015. [The BOP] related that this was based

on the Modified Judgment in a Criminal Case . . . filed on October 29, 2015, [which]

ordered [the Defendant’s] sentence revoked with time served.

1

The Court has reviewed the transcript of the Final Revocation Hearing on February 16, 2016,

and notes that the Petitioner’s reference to 107 days jail credit derives from an estimate provided by the

United States Probation Officer at the time of the hearing. 

2

USPO’s reference to September 16, 2016, is a typographical error. The correct date is September

17, 2016, the date of the Petitioner’s arrest. 

2
see also ECF No. 5, cause number 1:16-cv-88. 

On March 23, 2016, the Court conducted another telephonic conference to give

Petitioner’s counsel an opportunity to respond to USPO’s findings and/or to present any

additional information to the Court. The Petitioner’s counsel advised that neither an

evidentiary hearing nor additional briefing is necessary for resolution of this matter. 

ANALYSIS 

Under federal law, an individual is entitled to habeas corpus relief if he is being held

“in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.

2241(c)(3). As such, a district court may review an adverse decision regarding an individual’s 

“[r]equests for sentence credit, or for recalculation of time yet to serve.” Romandine v. United

States, 206 F.3d 731, 736 (7th Cir. 2000).3

The award of prior custody credit toward a federal term of imprisonment is governed

by 18 U.S.C. § 3585, which provides, in relevant part: 

A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for

any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence

commences—

(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or 

(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was

arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence

was imposed; 

that has not been credited against another sentence. 

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Generally, a petitioner must exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2241, see Gonzalez v. O’Connell, 355 F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir. 2004); but the exhaustion

requirement is excused when prejudice may result “due to unreasonable delay or an indefinite timeframe

for administrative action.” Iddir v. INS, 301 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). Given the circumstances of the Petitioner’s claim, exhaustion is not required here. 

3
18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (emphasis added). The last clause of the statute has been interpreted as

prohibiting awards of double credit. See United States v. Ross, 219 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir.

2000) (finding that time in custody may only be counted against one sentence). 

Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has determined that the execution of

sentences and the computation of jail time is an administrative function under the exclusive

authority of the Office of the Attorney General, which has delegated this task to the BOP.

United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 335 (1992); see also Ross, 219 F.3d at 594. This

delegation of tasks includes responsibility for computing time credits and determining a

sentence termination date once the defendant actually commences serving his sentence.

Wilson, 503 U.S. at 335. 

Here, the Petitioner contends that, at the time of the Final Revocation Hearing on

February 16, 2016, he had 107 days of jail credit—as originally estimated by the United

States Probation Officer—to count toward his 120-day sentence, resulting in a release date

of February 29, 2016. But as the Court explained at the hearing, the 107 days of jail credit

was merely an estimate, as the BOP is charged with computing time credits under § 3585(b).

See Final Revocation Hr’g Tr. 48, Feb. 16, 2016, ECF No. 87, cause number 1:09-cr-106

(“[J]ail credit is usually formally determined by [the] BOP . . . [and t]he probation [officer]

has given an estimate of the 107 days.”). Thus, even if the Court had granted the Petitioner

107 days of jail credit (which it did not), such an action is impermissible under § 3585(b). See

United States v. Jones, 34 F.3d 495, 499 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[O]nly the Attorney General of the

United States, through the Bureau of Prisons, has authority to determine when to give a

defendant credit against a sentence for time he has served.”); Leahy v. Hollingsworth, Civil

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No. 09-284-GPM, 2010 WL 2836880, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 19, 2010) (“The law thus is clear

that ‘§ 3585(b) does not authorize a district court to compute the credit at sentencing.’”

(quoting Wilson, 503 U.S. at 334.)). 

Nonetheless, the record shows that the BOP’s calculated release date of April 14,

2016, is correct. As noted in USPO’s findings, the Petitioner’s time spent in custody between

September 17, 2015, and October 30, 2015, was previously counted toward his revocation

sentence of time served. See Modified J. in a Criminal Case, Oct. 29, 2015 (ordering the

Defendant to serve a sentence of time served and a new term of supervised release for six

months). Therefore, the Petitioner’s current sentence of four months imprisonment was

properly calculated to begin on December 16, 2015, the date of his arrest. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the BOP properly calculated the prior

jail credit time on the Petitioner’s federal sentence of four months imprisonment. Because the

Petitioner is not being held in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law, the

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [ECF No. 1] is DENIED. 

SO ORDERED on March 30, 2016.

 /s Theresa L. Springmann 

THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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