alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 2:16-CR-100-JVB-JEM

 )

LAWRENCE JOHNSON, )

Defendant. ) 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

UPON A PLEA OF GUILTY BY DEFENDANT LAWRENCE JOHNSON

TO: THE HONORABLE JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Upon Defendant Lawrence Johnson’s request to enter a plea of guilty pursuant to Rule 11

of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, this matter came for hearing before Magistrate Judge

John E. Martin on October 11, 2016, with the consent of Defendant Johnson, counsel for Defendant

Johnson, and counsel for the United States of America.

The hearing on Defendant Johnson’s plea of guilty was in full compliance with Federal Rule

of Criminal Procedure 11 before the Magistrate Judge in open court and on the record.

In consideration of that hearing and the statements made by Defendant Johnson under oath

on the record and in the presence of counsel, the remarks of the Assistant United States Attorney and

of counsel for Defendant Johnson,

I FIND as follows:

(1) that Defendant Johnson understands the nature of the charge against him to which the

plea is offered;

(2) that Defendant Johnson understands his right to trial by jury, to persist in his plea of not

guilty, to the assistance of counsel at trial, to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and his

right against compelled self-incrimination;
(3) that Defendant Johnson understands what the maximum possible sentence is, including

the effect of the supervised release term, and Defendant Johnson understands that the sentencing

guidelines apply and that the Court may depart from those guidelines under some circumstances;

(4) that the plea of guilty by Defendant Johnson has been knowingly and voluntarily made

and is not the result of force or threats or of promises;

(5) that Defendant Johnson is competent to plead guilty;

(6) that Defendant Johnson understands that his answers may later be used against him in

a prosecution for perjury or false statement;

(7) that there is a factual basis for Defendant Johnson’s plea; and further,

I RECOMMEND that the Court accept Lawrence Johnson’s plea of guilty to the offenses

charged in Count 1 of the Indictment and that Defendant Johnson be adjudged guilty of the offenses

charged in Count 1 of the Indictment and have a sentence imposed. A Presentence Report has been

ordered. Should this Report and Recommendation be accepted and Defendant Johnson be adjudged

guilty, sentencing before Judge Joseph S. Van Bokkelen will be set at a later date by separate order. 

Objections to the Findings and Recommendation are waived unless filed and served within fourteen

(14) days. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

So ORDERED this 11th day of October, 2016.

s/ John E. Martin 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN E. MARTIN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

cc: All counsel of record

Honorable Joseph S. Van Bokkelen
VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

HOWARD CARTER, 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

EVEREST RECEIVABLE SERVICES, INC. 

 

 Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

 No. 2:13-cv-237 

VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

 HOWARD CARTER, (Plaintiff), by his attorneys, KROHN & MOSS, LTD., and pursuant to 

FRCP 41(a)(1) (Dismissal of Actions—Voluntary Dismissal By Plaintiff Without Court Order) 

voluntarily dismisses, with prejudice, EVEREST RECEIVABLE SERVICES, INC (Defendant), in 

this case. 

Dated: October 29, 2013 KROHN & MOSS, LTD. 

 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 

 /s/ Ryan Lee

 Ryan Lee 

 Attorney for Plaintiff 

USDC IN/ND case 2:13-cv-00237-JVB-PRC document 7 filed 10/29/13 page 1 of 2
VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on October 29, 2013, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk 

of the Court by using the CM/ECF system. A copy of said Notice was electronically submitted to all 

parties by the Court’s CM/ECF system. 

 

By: /s/ Ryan Lee

 Ryan Lee 

 

USDC IN/ND case 2:13-cv-00237-JVB-PRC document 7 filed 10/29/13 page 2 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

v. ) No. 1:13-cr-00053-TLS-SLC

)

KEITH L. KINNEY )

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

UPON A PLEA OF GUILTY

TO: THE HONORABLE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN, JUDGE, 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Upon Defendant’s request to enter a plea of guilty pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure, this matter came on for hearing before U.S. Magistrate Judge

Susan Collins, on November 17, 2016, with the written consents of Defendant, counsel for

Defendant, and counsel for the United States of America.

The hearing on Defendant’s plea of guilty was in full compliance with Rule 11, Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure, before the Magistrate Judge in open court and on the record.

In consideration of that hearing and the statements made by Defendant under oath on the

record and in the presence of counsel, the remarks of the Assistant United States Attorney and of

counsel for Defendant,

I FIND as follows:

(1) that Defendant understands the nature of the charge against him to which the plea is

offered;

(2) that Defendant understands his right to trial by jury, to persist in his plea of not guilty,

to the assistance of counsel at trial, to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and his

right against compelled self-incrimination;
(3) that Defendant understands what the maximum possible sentence is, including the

effect of the supervised release term, and Defendant understands that the Sentencing Guidelines

apply and that the Court may depart from those guidelines under some circumstances;

(4) that the plea of guilty by Defendant has been knowingly and voluntarily made and is

not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from the plea agreement between the

parties;

(5) that Defendant is competent to plead guilty;

(6) that Defendant understands that his answers may later be used against him in a

prosecution for perjury or false statement;

(7) that there is a factual basis for Defendant’s plea; and further,

I RECOMMEND that the Court accept Defendant’s plea of guilty and that Defendant be

adjudged guilty of the offense charged in the single-count Indictment, and have sentence

imposed. A Presentence Report has been ordered. Should this Findings and Recommendation

be accepted and Defendant adjudged guilty, sentencing will be scheduled before Judge Theresa

L. Springmann by separate order and notice. Objections to the Findings and Recommendation

are waived unless filed and served within fourteen (14) days. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

DATED this 17th day of November 2016.

/s/ Susan Collins 

Susan Collins,

United States Magistrate Judge

2
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-13-00195-CR

Mattie Leora BROWN,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 2, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 361734

Honorable Jason Wolff, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Delivered and Filed: May 15, 2013

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION

The trial court signed the order sought to be appealed on December 12, 2012. Because 

appellant did not file a motion for new trial, the notice of appeal was due to be filed on January 

11, 2013. TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2(a)(1). A motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal 

was due on January 28, 2013. TEX. R. APP. P. 26.3. Appellant did not file her notice of appeal 

until March 19, 2013; appellant did not file a motion for extension of time. This court issued an 

order on April 16, 2013 directing appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be 
04-13-00195-CR

- 2 -

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant filed a written response which did not resolve the 

jurisdictional defect.

When a notice of appeal and motion for extension of time are not filed within the fifteenday grace period allowed by Rule 26.3, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction. TEX. R. APP. P.

26.3; Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Accordingly, the appeal is 

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WAYMO LLC,

Plaintiff,

 v.

UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 17-00939 WHA

COURT-ORDERED

INTERROGATORIES TO

DEFENDANTS TO ASSIST

COURT IN SUPERVISING

CASE MANAGEMENT AND

EXPEDITED DISCOVERY

By APRIL 25 AT NOON, defendants shall please answer the following interrogatories

under oath.

COURT INTERROGATORY NO. 1 TO DEFENDANTS

Identify by name and position each present and former officer, director, or employee of

defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. (including attorneys), who received prior to the acquisition

of Ottomotto LLC and Otto Trucking LLC any electronic or paper material or communication

regarding LiDAR or any aspect thereof from:

(i) Anthony Levandowski or his representatives, or

(ii) Anyone else advising that the material came from Anthony Levandowski or his

representatives.

Any name or communication already disclosed on a privilege log may be omitted.

Case 3:17-cv-00939-WHA Document 225 Filed 04/12/17 Page 1 of 2
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

COURT INTERROGATORY NO. 2 TO DEFENDANTS

For each such person, identify and describe the material or communication received with

sufficient detail to establish any privilege from production, or simply produce the material or

communication received to plaintiff’s counsel by APRIL 25.

Any name or communication already disclosed on a privilege log may be omitted.

COURT INTERROGATORY NO. 3 TO DEFENDANTS

Identify and describe in approximate chronological sequence all LiDAR-related work

Anthony Levandowski has done since leaving Waymo, including whether or not that work led

to or related to any prototype or device, and describe how and where that work is reflected.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 12, 2017. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:17-cv-00939-WHA Document 225 Filed 04/12/17 Page 2 of 2
USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00442-JVB-MGG document 7 filed 01/11/16 page 1 of 17
USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00442-JVB-MGG document 7 filed 01/11/16 page 2 of 17
USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00442-JVB-MGG document 7 filed 01/11/16 page 3 of 17
USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00442-JVB-MGG document 7 filed 01/11/16 page 4 of 17
USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00442-JVB-MGG document 7 filed 01/11/16 page 5 of 17
USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00442-JVB-MGG document 7 filed 01/11/16 page 6 of 17
USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00442-JVB-MGG document 7 filed 01/11/16 page 7 of 17
USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00442-JVB-MGG document 7 filed 01/11/16 page 8 of 17
USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00442-JVB-MGG document 7 filed 01/11/16 page 9 of 17
USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00442-JVB-MGG document 7 filed 01/11/16 page 10 of 17
USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00442-JVB-MGG document 7 filed 01/11/16 page 11 of 17
USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00442-JVB-MGG document 7 filed 01/11/16 page 12 of 17
USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00442-JVB-MGG document 7 filed 01/11/16 page 13 of 17
USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00442-JVB-MGG document 7 filed 01/11/16 page 14 of 17
USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00442-JVB-MGG document 7 filed 01/11/16 page 15 of 17
USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00442-JVB-MGG document 7 filed 01/11/16 page 16 of 17
USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00442-JVB-MGG document 7 filed 01/11/16 page 17 of 17
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

STEVEN LAMONT ROBBINS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Case No. 3:15-cv-51

vs. )

)

WILLIAM WILSON, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Civil Rights Complaint,

filed by Steven Lamont Wilson, a pro se prisoner, on January 30,

2015 (DE #1). For the reasons set forth below, this case is

DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 

BACKGROUND

Robbins alleges that, on November 29, 2012, the Defendant,

Indiana State Prison Warden William Wilson, violated his Fourteenth

Amendment Due Process rights by allowing him to be transported to

Cook County, Illinois, without following the procedures set out in

the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. As a result, Robbins was

accidentally released from custody, which resulted in him being

labeled an “escapee, murderer, woman beater, etc.” (DE #1, p. 7.) 

Robbins seeks money damages against Warden Wilson for this section

1983 claim.
DISCUSSION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review this

prisoner complaint. “Indiana’s two-year statute of limitations .

. . is applicable to all causes of action brought in Indiana under

42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug Enforcement Task

Force, 239 F.3d 892, 894 (7th Cir. 2001). Here, Robbins’ claim

arose on November 29, 2012. Thus, Robbins had until November 29,

2014, to file this claim. However, the complaint was not signed

until January 25, 2015, months after the statute of limitations had

expired. Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative

defense, dismissal is appropriate where it is clear that the claim

is time barred. Cancer Foundation, Inc. v. Cerberus Capital

Management, LP, 559 F.3d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 2009). Because it has

clearly been more than two years since this claim arose, this case

must be dismissed. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, this case is DISMISSED

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 

DATED: February 10, 2015 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

2
EXHIBIT 32

November 16,
2009

Via
EDGAR

Securities
and Exchange Commission
Judiciary Plaza
450 Fifth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20549



Ladies
and Gentlemen:

In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Mesa Offshore Trust (the "Trust") on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2009, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned, not in its individual capacity but solely as the trustee of the Trust, certifies pursuant to
18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to its knowledge:

(1)   The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2)   The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Trust.

The
above certification is furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350) and is not being filed as part of the
Form 10-Q or as a separate disclosure document.

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,
Trustee for Mesa Offshore Trust/s/ MIKE ULRICH Mike Ulrich Vice President and Trust OfficerThe Bank of New York Trust Company, N.A., as attorney-in-fact for the Trustee


---



QuickLinks
[No. 19555-1-II.

Division Two.

August 8, 1997.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Filiberto Rodriguez Gonzalez, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Clallam County, No. 94-1-00144-1, Leonard W. Costello, J., entered May 5, 1995. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Hunt, J., concurred in by Bridgewater, A.C.J., and Armstrong, J.
#### David Eugene WASHINGTON, Petitioner—Appellant, v. Theodis BECK, Secretary, North Carolina Department of Corrections, Respondent—Appellee.

No. 05-7883.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 27, 2006.

Decided: May 4, 2006.

David Eugene Washington, Appellant Pro Se. Clarence Joe DelForge, III, North Carolina Department of Justice, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

David Eugene Washington seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of ap-pealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of his constitutional claims is debatable and that any disposi-tive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. *See Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir.2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Washington has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny Washington’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, deny a certificate of appealability, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

TRAVIS CUNNINGHAM, ) 

 ) 

 Petitioner, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CAUSE NO. 3:16-CV-394 WL 

 ) 

SUPERINTENDENT, ) 

 ) 

 Respondent. ) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 Travis Cunningham, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas corpus petition (DE 1) attempting to 

challenge the prison disciplinary hearing (WCC 16-05-508) where a Westville Correctional 

Facility Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) found him guilty of Possessing an Unknown 

Substance in violation of B-202 on June 2, 2016. As a result, he lost 60 days earned credit time 

and was demoted to Credit Class 2. In his petition, Cunningham states that he did not appeal to the 

Final Reviewing Authority. DE 1 at 1. 

 Before bringing a habeas corpus challenge, a prisoner must exhaust his claims as required 

by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). 

 Indiana does not provide judicial review of decisions by prison 

administrative bodies, so the exhaustion requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) is 

satisfied by pursuing all administrative remedies. These are, we held in Markham 

v. Clark, 978 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1992), the sort of “available State corrective 

process” (§ 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)) that a prisoner must use. Indiana offers two levels of 

administrative review: a prisoner aggrieved by the decision of a disciplinary panel 

may appeal first to the warden and then to a statewide body called the Final 

Reviewing Authority. Moffat sought review by both bodies, but his argument was 

limited to the contention that the evidence did not support the board’s decision. He 

did not complain to either the warden or the Final Reviewing Authority about the 

board’s sketchy explanation for its decision. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 

119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999), holds that to exhaust a claim, and thus 

preserve it for collateral review under § 2254, a prisoner must present that legal 

theory to the state’s supreme court. The Final Reviewing Authority is the 
2 

administrative equivalent to the state’s highest court, so the holding of Boerckel 

implies that when administrative remedies must be exhausted, a legal contention 

must be presented to each administrative level. 

Moffat v. Broyles, 288 F.3d 978, 981-82 (7th Cir. 2002). 

 Because Cunningham has not exhausted his claims by presenting them to the Final 

Reviewing Authority, the habeas corpus petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE because 

it is unexhausted. 

 SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED: July 13, 2016 

 s/William C. Lee 

 William C. Lee, Judge 

 United States District Court
EX-10.2






EXHIBIT 10.2




December 23, 2008




AMENDMENT NO. 1




to the




RESTRICTED STOCK UNIT AWARD AGREEMENT




          AMENDMENT (“Amendment No. 1”) dated as of the 23rd day of December 2008, by and between Polo
Ralph Lauren Corporation, a Delaware corporation (the “Corporation”), and Roger N. Farah (the
“Executive”).




          WHEREAS, the Corporation and the Executive wish to amend the Restricted Stock Unit Award
Agreement between the parties effective as of July 1, 2004 (the “RSU Agreement”) to bring it into
compliance with Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and the regulations
issued or to be issued by the Department of the Treasury thereunder;




          NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereby agree to amend the RSU Agreement, effective as of January
1, 2005, as follows.




     1. Capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise defined shall have the meaning ascribed to
such terms in the RSU Agreement.



     2. The first two sentences of Section 3(a) are hereby replaced with the following:




     “The Participant shall be entitled to receive payment in the form of Shares for each
vested Unit subject to the Performance Award no later than two and one half (21/2) months
following the end of the applicable fiscal year at which vesting of such Units is
determined (or such earlier date of vesting as prescribed by Section 2(c) hereof). The
Participant shall be entitled to receive payment in the form of Shares for each vested Unit
subject to the Time-Based Award no later than ninety days following the termination of the
Participant’s employment (or, if earlier, upon the occurrence of a Change of Control during
the Participant’s employment; provided that such Change of Control is also a change in the
ownership, effective control or a substantial portion of the assets (in each case, within
the meaning of Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and the
regulations issued or to be issued by the Department of the Treasury thereunder (“Section
409A”)) of the Corporation.”



 









 





     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Corporation has caused this Amendment to be duly executed and the
Executive has hereunto set his hand, effective as of the date hereof, subject to the conditions set
forth herein.




	 	 	 	 	 
	 	POLO RALPH LAUREN CORPORATION	 
	 	 	 
	 	By:  	                      /s/ Mitchell Kosh
 	 
	 	 	Name:  	Mitchell Kosh 	 
		 	Title: 

Date:	Senior Vice President 

  January 9, 2009 	 
	 
	 	 	 
	 	                      /s/  Roger N. Farah
 	 
	 	Executive:           Roger N. Farah 

Date:                         January 6, 2009 	 
		 	 
	 




2
I 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1938 

To suspend temporarily the duty on Chloropivaloyl Chloride. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 27, 2005 

Mr. REYNOLDS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To suspend temporarily the duty on Chloropivaloyl Chloride. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. CHLOROPIVALOYL CHLORIDE. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of 

5 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is 

6 amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following 

7 new heading: 

‘‘ 9902.06.05 3-Chloropivaloyl chloride 

(CAS No. 4300–97–4) (provided for in subheading 

2915.90.50) ......................... Free No change No change On or before 

12/31/2008 ’’. 

8 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

9 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 
2 

•HR 1938 IH 

1 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

2 the date of enactment of this Act. 

Æ