UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

MATTRESS WAREHOUSE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Cause No. 1:15-CV-91

 )

JOE BARR, AMERICAN MATTRESS, )

and GOOGLE, INC., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Mattress Warehouse originally brought this action in Indiana state court against

American Mattress, Google, Inc., and an unidentified person, sued at that point as “John

Doe.” (DE 6.) The gist of Mattress Warehouse’s allegations is that the company was

defamed when an employee of a competitor made disparaging comments online, using

the phony name “Celeste Swift.” (Id. at 2–3.) Google removed the case to federal court

on the basis that the known parties were completely diverse and that the amount in

controversy exceeded $75,000. (DE 1.) Mattress Warehouse subsequently conducted

discovery and learned the identity of the John Doe defendant. Mattress Warehouse

then amended the complaint to name Joe Barr, a resident of Indiana, in place of “John

Doe.”(DE 31.) The problem, of course, is that both Mattress Warehouse and Barr are

citizens of Indiana, and so Barr’s inclusion in the case appears to have destroyed subject

matter jurisdiction. Thus, Mattress Warehouse has moved to remand the case to state

court. (DE 45.) None of the defendants has responded to the motion. 

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Federal district courts have original subject matter jurisdiction over civil cases

between citizens of different states, so long as the amount in controversy exceeds

$75,000. 28 U.S.C. §1332. Defendants may remove state court actions to federal court if

the action could have been brought originally in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a);

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). When a party seeks joinder of a

nondiverse party after a case has been removed, 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (e) requires that the

court either deny the joinder or permit the joinder but remand the action to state court.

Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752, 758 (7th Cir. 2009). “These are the only

options; the district court may not permit joinder of a nondiverse defendant and retain

jurisdiction.” Id. (emphasis in original). 

The Seventh Circuit has found the following factors relevant to determining

whether post-removal joinder of a nondiverse party is appropriate: “(1) the plaintiff’s

motive for seeking joinder, particularly whether the purpose is to defeat federal

jurisdiction; (2) the timeliness of the request to amend; (3) whether the plaintiff will be

significantly injured if joinder is not allowed; and (4) any other relevant equitable

considerations.” Id. at 758 (citations omitted). Although Magistrate Judge Susan Collins

already has permitted joinder of Barr by granting Mattress Warehouse leave to amend

the complaint, it is unclear whether she knew that Barr was nondiverse and, if she did,

whether she assessed the appropriateness of joinder. (See generally DE 21.) It is also

unclear if any party objected to the joinder. Regardless, nothing precludes me from

reconsidering whether joining Barr was appropriate. Schur, 577 F.3d at 760–62 (“If a

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district judge may reconsider his own order permitting joinder because he did not

recognize the jurisdictional implications of his action, then he may certainly reconsider

a similar order by a magistrate judge.”) (emphasis in original).

Considering the factors identified by the Seventh Circuit for assessing joinder of

a nondiverse party, I believe Barr was properly joined. Mattress Warehouse declared its

intention to sue Barr when it named “John Doe” a defendant in the original complaint

filed in state court. (DE 6 at ¶ 2 (stating that the true identity of the unnamed defendant

would be ascertained through discovery).) As a result, there is no reason to suspect that

Mattress Warehouse’s purpose in joining Barr was to destroy federal jurisdiction. To

the contrary, if the allegations of the second amended complaint are to be believed, Barr

is important because his actions precipitated the case. There is also no question that

Mattress Warehouse acted expeditiously in joining Barr. It moved to amend the

complaint on May 21, 2015, a little over a month after the case was removed, and filed

the second amended complaint in early September 2015. (DE 21; DE 31.) That timeframe

is reasonable given that Mattress Warehouse needed discovery to learn that the

username “Celeste Swift” belonged to Barr. As a result, Barr’s joinder was appropriate,

and complete diversity has been destroyed. I no longer have jurisdiction over this

matter, and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (e), the case must be remanded to state court.

Accordingly, this case is REMANDED to the Allen Superior Court.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: December 16, 2015.

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s/ Philip P. Simon 

CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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