FOR PUBLICATION

APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

PAUL R. SEMENICK GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

JOSEPH Y. HO

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

PAUL R. SEMENICK, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A02-1111-CR-1035

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable William J. Nelson, Judge

Cause No. 49F07-1009-CM-69436

 

October 9, 2012

OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION

BAILEY, Judge
2

Case Summary

Paul R. Semenick (“Semenick”), a long-term member of Lakeview Christian Church 

(“Lakeview”), appeals his conviction for Criminal Trespass, as a Class A misdemeanor,1

arising out of his attendance at Sunday morning services. Semenick challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction.2 We reverse.

Facts and Procedural History

On September 5, 2010, certain worshippers at Lakeview sought to impose their will 

over anothersimilarly situated worshipper during Sunday morning services. One parishioner

sought to engage the authority of the State to intervene in a private disagreement over the 

degree of reverence for the church sanctuary, and this ultimately led to a criminal conviction 

and order to stay off Lakeview property. We do not “take it on faith” that the off-duty police 

officer, acting as a security guard, had unfettered discretion to take sides and remove one 

worshipper at the behest of another.

On September 5, 2010, Semenick attended a Sunday morning worship service at 

Lakeview. During the musical portion of the service, Semenick approached Manuel Halbert 

(“Halbert”), a volunteer greeter, to complain that Halbert was speaking too loudly with 

Sheriff’s Deputy Jennifer Crittendon (“Deputy Crittendon”). Deputy Crittendon then moved 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2.

2

In light of our disposition for insufficiency of the evidence, we need not address Semenick’s contention that 

he could not be prosecuted under the Criminal Trespass statute because he was exercising his First Amendment 

right to worship. Semenick neither moved to dismiss the charge on this basis nor raised any constitutional 

issue in the trial court. Nonetheless, it is readily apparent that fundamental rights are implicated, including 

freedom of worship and freedom of assembly. 
3

out of the sanctuary, and Halbert began to speak with James Martin (“Martin”).

Semenick left the sanctuary to seek the assistance of Donald Henry (“Henry”), the 

head volunteer greeter. Semenick requested that Henry direct Halbert and Martin to be quiet 

or continue their conversation outside the sanctuary. Henry responded that Halbert needed to 

welcome people, as “that’s his job.” (Tr. 72.) Martin nonetheless decided to apologize to 

Semenick. He approached Semenick by placing a hand on his shoulder. Semenick ordered 

Martin “get your hand off me” and Henry asked both men to sit down.3(Tr. 72.) They 

complied.

Yet, Halbert left the sanctuary to seek assistance from security officers who were at 

the main entrance of the Lakeview parking lot. He located Sergeant John Dierdorf 

(“Sergeant Dierdorf”), an off-duty Town of Cleremont police officer who provided services 

to Lakeview on a call-in basis and would “usually roam the parking lot in [his] car.”4 (Tr. 

100.) And although Semenick was seated and participating in the service, Sergeant Dierdorf 

entered the sanctuary and asked Semenick to leave. Semenick initially refused to leave but, 

upon threat of forcible removal, moved into the main hallway. Sergeant Dierdorf directed 

Semenick to exit the door to his right.

 

3 The dissent characterizes Semenick’s tone as yelling, but we do not feel it appropriate to over-dramatize the 

verbal discord, given that there was conflicting evidence as to any level of disruption. For example, Henry 

testified that Semenick had only been “a little loud” when asking Martin to remove his hand from Semenick’s 

shoulder and, as far as Henry was concerned, “the worship service was not interrupted, disrupted, stopped, [or] 

altered.” (Tr. 76-77.) Indeed, the jury acquitted Semenick of Disorderly Conduct and the evidence most 

favorable to this verdict of acquittal suggests only that a minor incident had ensued.

4

It is unclear from the record whether Sergeant Dierdorf also attended services at Lakeview, as he testified that 

he prefers to attend church rather than police the parking lot. In addition, he was dating, and later married, 

Deputy Crittendon.
4

In the hallway, Semenick approached Henry although Sergeant Dierdorf twice more 

insisted that Semenick leave. Semenick told Henry “you need to tell your rent-a-cops they 

can’t do nothing to me.” (Tr. 104-5.) Henry responded, “these officers are here by church’s 

orders ... they do traffic and everything else.” (Tr. 73.) According to Henry, “[Semenick] 

kept on ranting” and Sergeant Dierdorf responded, “I’ll show you what a rent-a-cop can do.” 

(Tr. 73.) Semenick was arrested and charged with Criminal Trespass and Disorderly 

Conduct.

Semenick was tried before a jury on October 25, 2011. Prior to the presentation of 

evidence, the trial court, without opposition from the State,5 quashed subpoenas that had been 

issued to a Lakeview senior pastor and another individual whose position was not specified. 

At the conclusion of the trial, Semenick was acquitted of Disorderly Conduct but convicted 

of Criminal Trespass. The trial court sentenced Semenick to 365 days imprisonment, 

suspended 363 days, and ordered him to stay away from Lakeview (absent an invitation of 

fellowship from the church). This appeal ensued. 

Discussion and Decision

When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is challenged, we neither 

reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses, and we affirm if there is 

substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the crime from which a 

reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Wright v. State, 828 N.E.2d 904, 905-06 (Ind. 2005).

 

5 Upon questioning from the trial court, the prosecutor indicated that one of the individuals subject to the 

subpoenas lacked “personal information regarding the facts of the case.” (Tr. 10.)
5

Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-43-2-2(a)(2), one commits the offense of 

Criminal Trespass when he “not having a contractual interest in the property, knowingly or 

intentionally refuses to leave the real property of another person after having been asked to 

leave by the other person or that person’s agent.” “The criminal trespass statute’s purpose is 

to punish those who willfully or without a bona fide claim of right commit acts of trespass on 

the land of another.” Woods v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1115, 1117 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (citing 

Myers v. State, 190 Ind. 269, 273, 130 N.E. 116, 117 (1921)). The State must prove every 

element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 

(1970). 

“Contractual interest,” as that phrase is used in the criminal trespass statute, refers to 

the right to be present on another’s property, arising out of an agreement between at least two 

parties that creates an obligation to do or not to do a particular thing. Taylor v. State, 836 

N.E.2d 1024, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. “[T]he State need not ‘disprove every 

conceivable contractual interest’ that a defendant might have obtained in the real property at 

issue.” Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Fleck v. State, 508 N.E.2d 

539, 541 (Ind. 1987)). “[T]he State satisfies its burden when it disproves those contractual 

interests that are reasonably apparent from the context and circumstances under which the 

trespass is alleged to have occurred.” Id.

In Lyles, the State disproved the defendant’s contractual interest where there was 

evidence that the “irate and disrespectful” defendant was neither an owner nor an employee 

of the bank, as well as evidence that the bank manager had authority to ask customers to 
6

leave the bank premises. Id. at 142. Here, there is uncontroverted testimony that Semenick 

was a church member, and an absence of evidence that Sergeant Dierdorf had authority to 

demand, without more, that a worshipper leave the sanctuary during Sunday services. 

Effectively, he intervened between parishioners who presumably had equal interests in the 

premises, and chose who would stay and who would go. 

Semenick was not a stranger in the midst of the church, but was rather a longtime 

contributor, participant, and believer. He had attended Lakeview services on a regular basis 

for twenty-two to twenty-three years. He had enrolled his children in Lakeview’s elementary 

school for several years. He had “prayed for people that [he] thought needed it and they’ve 

prayed for [him].” (Tr. 131.) He considered himself to be a member of Lakeview, testifying 

that Lakeview did not have a formal procedure for attaining membership. 

Moreover, Semenick’s membership was not challenged by the State in the trial court.

There was no testimony from a pastor or member of the Lakeview governing board that 

Semenick had failed to comply with a membership requirement or was not a member. Thus, 

the evidence indicates only that Semenick was a church member having a right to be present 

at a church service on church property “arising out of an agreement.”6 Id. 

 

6 The dissent has expressed the view that the majority “wholly credits Mr. Semenick’s self-serving testimony.” 

Slip op. at 8. Indeed, Semenick’s testimony in regard to his Church membership may be self-serving, but it is 

the sole testimony offered regarding Semenick’s interest in being on Church premises. We could speculate 

that – had the trial court not quashed the subpoenas of Church leaders Semenick had sought to offer as 

witnesses – testimony might have been presented by a pastor or Church employee regarding Semenick’s lack 

of contractual interest. However, with full acquiescence of the State, such testimony was not offered. Where 

no evidence is offered by the State on an essential element of a charged crime, we cannot draw inferences 

favorable to the State from non-existent evidence. We will affirm a conviction only if there is substantial 

evidence of probative value supporting each element of the crime from which a reasonable trier of fact could 

have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Wright, 828 N.E.2d at 906 (emphasis added). 
7

Persons having the same interest in being present on the premises disagreed regarding 

the reverence to be afforded the sanctuary of the church. One parishioner insisted upon 

involving the Sunday morning parking lot patrol. Although the record suggests that Sergeant 

Dierdorf performed services for Lakeview as an independent contractor, there was no 

testimony from a pastor, governing board member or employee that Sergeant Dierdorf had 

the authority, without more, to take sides and ask a parishioner to leave, let alone threaten to 

forcibly remove a member from the sanctuary, during Sunday morning services. Lyles is 

distinguishable on this basis. Even more compelling, a bank is a commercial setting and we 

should be ever more diligent to hold the State to its burden of proof where such fundamental 

rights of assembly and worship are implicated.

Clearly, one having a contractual interest in being on property is nevertheless not 

entitled to make unreasonable noise or disrupt services. See Woods, 703 N.E.2d at 1118 

(“Woods’ membership did not entitle her to make unreasonable noise and disrupt Bally’s 

facility in demanding the return of her membership card”). See also A.E.B. v. State, 756 

N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (concluding that a student “violated whatever contract 

existed when she interfered with the educational activities at Coleman Middle School to the 

point where she committed the crime of disorderly conduct.”). Nonetheless, although 

Semenick’s words and conduct were arguably unfriendly, it was his prerogative to verbally 

rebuff an unwanted touching and to seek out a volunteer coordinator to resolve a noise 

complaint. One could argue that Halbert’s boisterousness and gregariousness constituted 

unreasonable noise and it was certainly disruptive to at least one other worshipper. 
8

Regardless, the church service continued uninterrupted. Indeed, the jury acquitted Semenick 

of Disorderly Conduct. In short, there is evidence of unpleasant demeanor by several in 

attendance on that fateful morning but an unpleasant demeanor does not always equate to 

criminality.7

The evidence does not establish that Sergeant Dierdorf was given the authority to 

remove someone from the church sanctuary. In fact, the only authority given to Sergeant 

Dierdorf that is in the record is that he was to direct traffic and see that no one “messed” with 

the cars—none of which is relevant to the issues herein. Accordingly, there is insufficient 

evidence to persuade a reasonable fact-finder that Sergeant Dierdorf acted as Lakeview’s 

agent when he removed Semenick. Indeed, by Sergeant Dierdorf’s own account, he typically 

patrolled the parking lot and had not made a prior arrest in the church sanctuary. 

Distressingly, the instant arrest appears to have neatly coincided with Semenick’s rude and 

repetitious use of the phrase “rent-a-cop.” Without testimony from a church official 

disavowing Semenick’s contractual interest and otherwise clearly delineating the limits of a 

 

7 The State did not confine itself to the presentation of relevant evidence, that is, evidence having a tendency to 

make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 

probable than it would be without the evidence. Ind. Evidence Rule 401. Rather, the prosecutor improperly 

suggested that Semenick was dangerous, in a manner designed to inflame the passions of the jury. The 

prosecutor inquired of Semenick whether he had a lawsuit against the City of Indianapolis. Semenick 

conceded that he had filed a lawsuit, but explained it was “unrelated” to the criminal charges against him. (Tr. 

149.) Undeterred, the prosecutor asked, “So were you concerned when they found all the weapons in your 

car?” (Tr. 151.) Semenick was then obliged to explain that the rifles were part of his gun collection, all were 

unloaded, and they were locked in his trunk so that his son (convicted of credit card fraud at age 18) would not 

have access to any weapon in violation of the law. The prosecutor advised the trial court, upon inquiry, that 

Semenick had not been charged with any weapons violation. Nonetheless, the damage was done. Semenick, 

who had a Second Amendment right to lawfully bear arms, was portrayed – by the misconduct of the 

prosecutor intent upon introducing extraneous and inflammatory material – as a threatening individual in the 

midst of the Church. The dissent exacerbates the harm ensuing from the improper line of questioning by 

suggesting that unlawful conduct was afoot because Semenick’s locked vehicle contained unloaded rifles. 
9

member’s contractual interests and the breadth of an occasional part-time contract 

employee’s authority, the State failed in its burden to prove material elements of Criminal 

Trespass within the meaning of Indiana Code Section 35-43-2-2(a)(2). Accordingly, there is 

insufficient evidence to sustain Semenick’s conviction.

Reversed.

ROBB, C.J., concurs.

MATHIAS, J., dissents with opinion.
10

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

PAUL R. SEMENICK, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

 vs. ) No. 49A02-1111-CR-1035

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

MATHIAS, Judge dissenting 

I respectfully dissent.

I believe that we are constrained to affirm the jury verdict in this case under our 

standard of review and because of the unique location in which Mr. Semenick’s disruptive 

behavior took place. 

Mr. Semenick’s appeal is from a jury verdict. Our standard of review regarding a jury 

verdict requires us to consider only the facts most favorable to that verdict, along with any 

reasonable inference that the jury could have drawn from those facts. McHenry v. State, 820 

N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005). We must respect the jury’s exclusive province to weigh 

conflicting evidence, and we should therefore neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness 
11

credibility. Id. We must also recognize the province of the jury to disregard undisputed 

testimony. Griffin v. State, 493 N.E.2d 439, 443 (Ind. 1986); Morphew v. Morphew, 419 

N.E.2d 770, 777 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). What follows are the facts that I believe support the 

jury’s verdict. 

On the morning in question, Manual Halbert (“Halbert”), who is a retired Special 

Deputy Sheriff for the Indianapolis Department of Public Works and uses a wheelchair as a 

result of his diabetes, was serving as a volunteer greeter at Lakeview Christian Church in 

Indianapolis (“the Church”). When Mr. Semenick entered the Church that morning, Halbert 

greeted him but received no response. As the services began, Halbert moved inside the 

entrance to the sanctuary, which seats approximately 2,000, to greet those who entered the 

sanctuary. Halbert began to speak with Jennifer Crittendon (“Crittendon”), a Deputy Sheriff 

employed by the Church to provide security for the Church during services. Shortly 

thereafter, Mr. Semenick, who was seated nearby in the back of the sanctuary, approached 

Halbert and Crittendon and told them to “shut up.” Tr. p. 26. Crittendon then left the 

sanctuary area, and Halbert began to speak with another churchgoer, James Martin 

(“Martin”). Mr. Semenick turned around in his seat, glared at Halbert and Martin and told 

them that they were “making too much noise.” Tr. pp. 26-27. 

Mr. Semenick then left his seat in the sanctuary to look for Don Henry (“Henry”), who 

was the head usher and supervisor of the door greeters, to complain about people making too 

much noise. Henry assumed Mr. Semenick was complaining about other parishioners, but 

when he went with Mr. Semenick into the sanctuary, Mr. Semenick pointed at Halbert and 
12

Martin and stated, “these guys need to shut up.” Tr. p. 60. Henry informed Mr. Semenick 

that Halbert was one of the greeters and that it was his job to welcome people to the Church. 

He also told Mr. Semenick that he would hear the door greeters if he sat in the back of the 

Church. Martin attempted to apologize for disturbing Mr. Semenick, and extended his hand 

toward Mr. Semenick. This caused Mr. Semenick to yell or shout8at Martin, “don’t touch 

me,” and “get your hand off me.” Tr. pp. 38, 72. Martin had “never seen that much anger in 

one person,” and was of the opinion that Mr. Semenick “created . . . a clear and present 

danger.” Tr. p. 60. Mr. Semenick’s loud voice caused several people in the front of the 

sanctuary to turn around and look back. 

Concerned that Mr. Semenick was causing or about to cause a disturbance in the 

sanctuary, Halbert left the sanctuary and flagged down Sergeant John Dierdorf (“Sgt. 

Dierdorf”) of the Town of Clermont Police Department, who worked as a security guard for 

the Church. Sgt. Dierdorf was in full uniform and was at that time speaking with Officer 

Kevin Brown (“Officer Brown”) of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department. 

Halbert informed Sgt. Dierdorf of Mr. Semenick’s behavior. Sgt. Dierdorf stated that 

Halbert was extremely upset and “almost in tears,” which was uncharacteristic for Halbert. 

Tr. p. 102. 

 

8

 The majority takes issue with the characterization of Mr. Semenick’s behavior as “yelling,” choosing to 

characterize the words he used as an order, rather than characterizing the level or tone of voice that he 

used, as well. Witness Manuel Halbert agreed with the term, “yell,” and witness Donald Henry testified 

that he only heard Mr. Semenick “yell or shout” when he “told James [Martin] to get his hands off of him.” 

See Tr. pp. 42-43, 77. The majority claims that characterizing Mr. Semenick’s behavior as a yell or a 

shout “over-dramatiz[es]” Mr. Semenick’s behavior “given that there was conflicting evidence as to any 

level of disruption.” Slip op., supra, p. 3. I disagree. There is conflicting evidence in every trial, and it 

was the sole province of the jury to weigh any conflicting testimony. McHenry, 820 N.E.2d at 126. On 

appeal, our role is to consider only the evidence that favors the jury’s verdict. Id.
13

Sgt. Dierdorf then followed Halbert back into the sanctuary. As Halbert was 

informing him of what had happened, but before he had pointed to Mr. Semenick as the 

person involved, Sgt. Dierdorf noticed Mr. Semenick “fidgeting in his seat, looking behind 

him . . . in an agitated mode,” as if “he was angry at whatever noise was going on around 

him.” Tr. pp. 103, 110. Sgt. Dierdorf wanted to “deescalate the situation” and approached 

Mr. Semenick in his seat and asked him to gather his belongings and step outside the 

sanctuary with Sgt. Dierdorf. Tr. p. 103. Mr. Semenick asked if he was under arrest, and 

when told that he was not, he refused to leave the sanctuary. Sgt. Dierdorf then informed Mr. 

Semenick that he had to leave the sanctuary on his own or Sgt. Dierdorf would “help him 

stand up and make him leave.” Tr. p. 104. Mr. Semenick then left the sanctuary with Sgt. 

Dierdorf. 

As he escorted Mr. Semenick out of the sanctuary and into the lobby, Sgt. Dierdorf 

told Mr. Semenick he needed to leave the Church. Instead of directly leaving the Church, 

Mr. Semenick approached Henry, who was also in the Church lobby at this time, and told 

him to “explain to these cops . . . what was going on.” Tr. p. 73. Henry again told Mr. 

Semenick that the door greeters had to welcome people and that Mr. Semenick would hear 

them talking from where he was seated. Mr. Semenick asked Henry, “what are these rent-a 

cops doing here?” Tr. p. 73. Henry informed him that the police were there “by church’s 

orders.” Id. Mr. Semenick then stated that the officers, whom he again referred to as “renta-cops,” could not do anything to him. At this point Mr. Semenick was again being loud, 
14

causing people in a nearby café area of the church to stop and look at the disturbance. Sgt. 

Dierdorf then placed Mr. Semenick in handcuffs and took him outside the Church.9

Discussion and Decision

To me, the resolution of this case is dictated by our well-settled standard of review. 

When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, in the case of a jury verdict, we consider 

only the facts most favorable to that verdict, along with any reasonable inference that the jury 

could have drawn from those facts. McHenry, 820 N.E.2d at 126. Respecting the jury’s 

exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge 

witness credibility. Id. We must affirm the jury’s verdict if the probative evidence and 

reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence could have allowed a jury to find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 

In Lyles v. State, our supreme court summarized the elements of criminal trespass as 

follows: 

“[T]he State must prove that the defendant (1) knowingly or intentionally (2) 

refused to leave (3) the real property (4) of another person (5) after having 

been asked to leave (6) by the person or the person’s agent (7) when such 

defendant lacked a contractual interest in the real property.” 

970 N.E.2d 140, 142-43 (Ind. 2012) (citing Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(a)(2)). 

Applying our standard of review, I conclude that the State presented sufficient 

evidence from which the jury could reasonable conclude that Mr. Semenick, not having a 

contractual interest in the property at issue, knowingly or intentionally refused to leave the 

real property of the Church after having been asked to leave by an agent of the Church. 

 

9

 A subsequent inventory search of Mr. Semenick’s car revealed several rifles. 
15

A. Agent of the Church

First, I believe that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Semenick 

was asked to leave by the Church or an agent of the Church. Although “the property owner” 

did not testify, the State did present evidence that Sgt. Dierdorf was hired by the Church and 

was under the orders of the Church to act as a security officer. The majority claims that Sgt. 

Dierdorf was given authority only to patrol the parking lot. It is true that Sgt. Dierdorf 

testified that he was patrolling the parking lot when he was called into the church to deal with 

the escalating situation involving Mr. Semenick. But he also testified that although he was 

typically outside during the first service, he would be inside the Church building during the 

second service. Thus, it is apparent that his authority extended beyond simply patrolling the

parking lot and including acting as a security officer inside the Church building itself. 

I think the jury could reasonably conclude that part of Sgt. Dierdorf’s powers as a 

security officer was to ask anyone causing a disturbance to leave the Church premises. 

Indeed, Sgt. Dierdorf would be a distinctly ineffectual security officer if he were without 

authority to ask those causing a disturbance to leave the Church. In fact, Mr. Semenick’s 

own reference to Sgt. Dierdorf as a “rent-a-cop” strongly suggests that Mr. Semenick himself 

understood that Sgt. Dierdorf was hired by the Church to act as a security officer. 

I find Mr. Semenick’s citation to Glispie v. State, 955 N.E.2d 819 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2011), unavailing. In that case, this court held that the testimony of a police officer that he 

could act as an agent of the property owner was insufficient to establish that the officer was 

in fact such an agent because “[i]t is a well-established rule that agency cannot be proven by 
16

the declaration of the agent alone.” Id. at 822 (citing United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. 

Ind. Dep’t of State Revenue, 459 N.E.2d 754, 758 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)). In Glispie, the State 

offered no other evidence indicating that the police officer had any authority to act on behalf 

of the property owner. 

Here, however, Sgt. Dierdorf’s testimony was not the only evidence of his agency for 

the Church. Indeed, Henry testified that Sgt. Dierdorf and the other security officers were 

there “by church’s orders.” Tr. p. 73. And, as indicated above, Mr. Semenick’s own “rent-acop” statements indicate that he understood that Sgt. Dierdorf was hired by the Church to act 

as a security guard. From this, I believe that the jury could reasonably conclude that Sgt. 

Dierdorf was an agent of the Church who had the authority to ask anyone causing a 

disturbance on Church property, such as Mr. Semenick, to leave the Church. 

B. Lack of a Contractual Interest in the Real Property of the Church

I also disagree with Mr. Semenick’s claim the State failed to prove that he did not 

have a contractual interest in the church property. See I.C. § 35-43-2-2(a)(2). “A 

‘contractual interest in the property’ is a right, title, or legal share of real property arising out 

of a binding agreement between two or more parties.” Lyles, 970 N.E.2d at 143 n.3. In 

proving the lack of a contractual interest, the State need not disprove every conceivable 

contractual interest that a defendant might have in the real property at issue. Id. at 3-4. 

Otherwise, the State would face a potentially impossible burden to identify and refute every 

possible contractual interest a defendant might have in the property, which is more than due 

process requires. Id. at 4. Thus, some contractual interests need not be disproven because 
17

they do not create any reasonable doubt that a defendant lacks a contractual interest in the 

property. Id. “For this reason, the State satisfies its burden when it disproves those 

contractual interests that are reasonably apparent from the context and circumstances under 

which the trespass is alleged to have occurred.” Id.

Here, the only possible contractual interest that is reasonably apparent from the 

context and circumstances under which the trespass was alleged to have occurred is that of a 

parishioner or member of the Church. Mr. Semenick claims that the State failed to prove his 

lack of a contractual interest in the church premises because there was no testimony from the 

property owner directly stating that he had no such interest or documentary proof to the same 

effect. This characterizes the State’s burden too strongly. The State need not present direct

evidence to support each element of a crime, and it has long been held that circumstantial 

evidence will support a conviction. See Maul v. State, 731 N.E.2d 438, 439 (Ind. 2000). 

The majority states that Mr. Semenick was a “longtime contributor, participant, and 

believer.” Slip op., supra, at 6. It is true that Mr. Semenick testified that he had regularly 

attended the Church for over twenty years and that the Church considered him a “regular 

member,” even though he had no formal membership. He also testified that he had sent his 

children to school at the Church. The majority wholly credits Mr. Semenick’s testimony. Our 

constitution and common law make it the province of the jury, and not a court on appeal, to 

determine the credibility of such testimony. Ind. Const. art. 1, sec. 19 (“In all criminal cases 

whatever, the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts.”); McHenry, 820 

N.E.2d at 126. Here, the jury could have simply discredited Mr. Semenick’s claims 
18

regarding his membership at the Church. See Griffin v. State, 493 N.E.2d 439, 443 (Ind. 

1986) (noting that jury apparently disbelieved defendant’s allegedly uncontroverted evidence 

that he was in another state at the time the crime at issue was committed); Morphew v. 

Morphew, 419 N.E.2d 770, 777 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (noting that uncontroverted evidence is 

not necessarily binding on the trier of fact and may be disbelieved and given no weight). 

But even if we accept Mr. Semenick’s testimony at face value, and even if Mr. 

Semenick was a member or regular parishioner of the Church, I cannot agree that his status 

as such created a “right, title, or legal share of real property arising out of a binding 

agreement between” Mr. Semenick and the Church. Lyles, 970 N.E.2d at 143 n.3. (emphasis 

added). Lyles is instructive both on the issue of the nature of underlying agreements and the 

limitations of any interest in real property they might create. 

In Lyles, the defendant, a bank customer, became “irate and disrespectful” after being 

informed by the bank manager that he could not obtain an account statement for free. 970 

N.E.2d at 142. When the defendant refused the manager’s request to leave the bank, the 

manager called the police. The responding officer arrested the defendant after asking him to 

leave multiple times. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the State failed to prove that he 

did not have a contractual interest in the bank given his status as a bank customer. Our 

supreme court disagreed, noting that there was evidence that “the defendant was neither an 

owner nor an employee of the bank as well as evidence that the bank manager had authority 

to ask customers to leave the bank premises.” Id. at 143. This evidence, the court held, 

“refuted each of the most reasonably apparent sources from which a person in the 
19

defendant’s circumstances might have derived a contractual interest in the bank’s real 

property: as an owner, as an employee, and as an account holder.” Id. 

Thus, Lyles stands for the proposition that even a bank account holder, a person who 

actually has a written contract with the bank governing his deposits, has no right to remain on 

bank property after being asked to leave by someone with authority to make such a request or 

demand. Here, there is no suggestion that Mr. Semenick was an owner of the Church 

premises or that he was an employee of the Church. Only his status as a Church member or 

parishioner could have given him any right to be at the Church. Although there was no direct 

evidence that Sgt. Dierdorf was authorized to ask Church members to leave the church, the 

jury could, and apparently did, reasonably infer from all of the evidence that Sgt. Dierdorf, an 

off-duty police officer hired by the Church to act as a security officer for the Church, had 

such authority. 

C. Disruptive Behavior May Terminate Limited Contractual Interest

Moreover, even someone like Mr. Semenick, with a limited right to come upon certain 

real property, may lose this right based on her or his behavior. This court concluded as much 

in Taylor v. State, 836 N.E.2d 1024, 1027 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), where we stated that “if a 

student has a contractual interest in school property, that interest is not unlimited and can be 

violated by the student’s conduct.” In Taylor, the student convicted for criminal trespass was 

roaming around the building over two hours after his classes had ended, even after being told 

to wait in the front entry for a bus. The student then refused a school police officer’s 

directions to leave the school premises. This evidence was sufficient to prove that the 
20

student “did not have a contractual interest in the school property where and when he was 

asked to leave the premises.” Id. 

The same could be said here; even if Mr. Semenick had a limited right to be on the 

Church’s property, he lost this limited right through his disruptive behavior. See id.; see also

A.E.B. v. State, 756 N.E.2d 536, 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that State presented 

sufficient evidence to establish that student abandoned whatever contractual interest she had 

in school property where her disruptive behavior rose to the level of disorderly conduct). 

D. The Location of the Disruptive Behavior: a Sunday Worship Service

Perhaps just as important as our standard of review regarding jury verdicts is the 

location of Mr. Semenick’s disruptive behavior, in the sanctuary of a church during an 

ongoing, Sunday worship service. What is disruptive behavior in one context might not rise 

to the level of disruptive behavior in another context. See Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 

964 (Ind. 1993) (noting that “noise made during normal sleeping hours may be a nuisance, 

while the same or even greater noise during the day would not.”); Johnson v. State, 719 

N.E.2d 445, 448 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that, in context of disorderly conduct, the State 

must prove that the defendant produced noise that was “too loud for the circumstances.”). 

Thus, while Mr. Semenick’s actions might have been within the bounds of acceptable 

behavior at a loud, outdoor event, I cannot ignore, and the jury did not ignore, the fact that 

his actions occurred in the sanctuary of a church. Even though there was some indication 

that the Church had services that were relatively energetic, Mr. Semenick was angry, rude 

and, most importantly in the context of his actions, loud. In fact, Mr. Semenick was loud 
21

enough to cause people at the front of the Church, during a service that included loud music, 

to turn around and look at the confrontation when he told Martin not to touch him. He was 

also loud enough in the lobby of the Church while talking to Henry that people in a nearby 

Church café area stopped to see what was going on. 

I believe that this level of disruption on a church premises during its Sunday worship 

service was sufficient to terminate any limited right Mr. Semenick might have had to be on 

the Church premises as a member or parishioner. That the jury acquitted Mr. Semenick of 

disorderly conduct is of no moment or relevance to the task of determining whether the 

probative evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence adduced at trial and 

most favorable to the verdict could have allowed a jury to find Mr. Semenick guilty of 

criminal trespass beyond a reasonable doubt. See Beattie v. State, 924 N.E.2d 643, 648-49 

(Ind. 2010) (noting that jury verdicts are not subject to appellate review on grounds that they 

are inconsistent and noting that the only task for the court on appeal is to review the 

sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict); McNeill v. State, 936 N.E.2d 358, 

360 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that “the inner workings of juries are unknown, [and] jurors 

could return inconsistent verdicts for a variety of reasons, such as lenity or compromise.”); 

McHenry, 820 N.E.2d at 126 (setting forth standard of review for claims of sufficiency of the 

evidence). Thus, the jury’s acquittal of Mr. Semenick on the charge of disorderly conduct 

should have no impact on our review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support his 

conviction for criminal trespass. See Beattie, 924 N.E.2d at 648-49. 
22

E. Refusal to Leave

The State also presented sufficient evidence to show that Mr. Semenick refused to 

leave after being asked to do so by an agent of the church. Sgt. Dierdorf testified that he 

asked Mr. Semenick to leave the church both before and after Mr. Semenick spoke with 

Henry in the church lobby. Instead of leaving, Mr. Semenick challenged Sgt. Dierdorf’s 

authority. Indeed, Sgt. Dierdorf testified that when he asked Mr. Semenick to leave, Mr. 

Semenick responded, “I’m not leaving.” Tr. p. 106. This clearly shows that Mr. Semenick 

refused to leave after being asked to do so by Sgt. Dierdorf. 

Thus, I believe that the evidence favorable to the verdict, and the reasonable 

inferences to be drawn therefrom, would allow a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Mr. 

Semenick knowingly10 refused to leave the church premises after being asked to leave by an 

agent of the church and that Mr. Semenick lacked a contractual interest in the property. This 

is sufficient to support his conviction for criminal trespass under Indiana Code section 35-43-

2-2(a)(2). 

F. First Amendment 

Lastly, I reject Mr. Semenick’s claim that the evidence is insufficient to support his 

conviction in that the State failed to prove that it had “a compelling interest requiring Mr. 

Semenick to be removed from the worship service at Lakeview against his natural right to 

worship[.]” Appellant’s Br. p. 47. Consideration of Mr. Semenick’s alleged natural right to 

 

10

 Mr. Semenick’s argument that he had a bona fide belief that he was rightfully remaining on church 

premises is little more than a request that this court reweigh the evidence considered by the jury and come 

to a conclusion that he did not act knowingly or intentionally, which is of course contrary to our standard 

of review. 
23

worship is not a statutory element of the crime of criminal trespass. I therefore take Mr. 

Semenick’s argument to be that his arrest violated his First Amendment right to the free 

exercise of religion. 

But even so, Mr. Semenick did not move to dismiss the charges against him based on 

this alleged constitutional violation. See Baumgartner v. State, 891 N.E.2d 1131, 1135-36 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that the failure to file a motion to dismiss raising a 

Constitutional challenged waives the issue on appeal). Nor is there any indication that Mr. 

Semenick ever presented this constitutional argument to the trial court. I therefore consider 

this argument waived for being presented for the first time on appeal. See Whitfield v. State, 

699 N.E.2d 666, 669 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that an argument raised for the first time 

on appeal is waived and will not be considered by appellate court) (citing Goodner v. State, 

685 N.E.2d 1058, 1060 (Ind. 1997)).11 

Conclusion

Under the applicable standard of review for claims challenging the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting a jury verdict, I conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence that 

Sgt. Dierdorf was an agent of the Church and that Mr. Semenick had no contractual interest 

in Church premises. And even if Mr. Semenick had some limited right to be on the Church 

premises, I believe his disruptive behavior terminated that limited right. I am also of the 

opinion that there was sufficient evidence demonstrating that Mr. Semenick refused to leave 

 

11

 Waiver notwithstanding, I would note that Mr. Semenick’s criminal behavior cannot be justified on 

First Amendment grounds, as the criminal trespass statute is a neutral law of general applicability. See

Brazauskas v. Fort Wayne-South Bend Diocese, Inc., 796 N.E.2d 286, 292-93 (Ind. 2003) (noting that the 

Free Exercise Clause does not exempt religiously motivated action from neutral laws of general 

applicability) (citing Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990)). 
24

the Church premises after being asked to do so by Sgt. Dierdorf. In short, I believe that the 

evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s conviction of Mr. Semenick’s 

for criminal trespass. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion reversing 

that conviction.