UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

ANTHONY WAYNE CILEK, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CAUSE NO. 2:15-CV-151 RL 

vs. )

)

HOBART POLICE )

DEPARTMENT, et al. )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on an amended “Prisoner

Complaint 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” filed by Anthony Wayne Cilek, a pro se

prisoner, on September 28, 2015. (DE #20.) For the reasons set

forth below, the Court:

(1) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed on a claim against

Zachary Crawford, Adrian Bustos and Ryan Snedecor in their

individual capacities for monetary damages for violating the Fourth

Amendment by using excessive force against him on June 5, 2014;

(2) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed on a claim against

Zachary Crawford, Adrian Bustos, Ryan Snedecor and Corey Hanrahan

in their individual capacities for money damages for violating the

Fourth Amendment by conducting a warrantless search of Cilek’s

residence on June 5, 2014;

(3) DISMISSES all other claims; 

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(4) DISMISSES the Hobart Police Department, Scott Shaginaw and

K-9 Spike;

(5) DIRECTS the clerk to transmit the summons and USM-285 for

Zachary Crawford, Adrian Bustos, Ryan Snedecor and Corey Hanrahan

to the United States Marshals Service along with a copy of the

amended complaint (DE #20) and this order;

(6) DIRECTS the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service of

process on Zachary Crawford, Adrian Bustos, Ryan Snedecor and Corey

Hanrahan pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and

(7) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that Zachary

Crawford, Adrian Bustos, Ryan Snedecor and Corey Hanrahan respond,

as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D.

Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claims for which the plaintiff has

been granted leave to proceed in this screening order. 

BACKGROUND

Anthony Cilek raises claims of unlawful search and seizure and

excessive force. He alleges that Hobart Police Officers came to his

home without a warrant in June 2014. They proceeded to kick in the

door of his home, attack him and then took his dog. He brings suit

against the Hobart Police Department, Hobart Police Officers

Zachary Crawford, Adrian Bustos, Corey Hanrahan, Scott Shaginaw and

Ryan Snedecor, and Hobart K-9 police dog, Spike.

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DISCUSSION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review a

prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,

or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief. Courts apply the same standard under § 1915A as when

addressing a motion to dismiss under FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir.

2006). Under federal pleading standards,

a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009) (quotation marks and

internal citations omitted). Furthermore, “[t]hreadbare recitals of

the elements of the cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. To survive dismissal, the

plaintiff “must do better than putting a few words on paper that,

in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something

has happened to her that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v.

Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in

original).

To start, Cilek sues Hobart Police Officers Zachary Crawford,

Adrian Bustos, Ryan Snedecor and Corey Hanrahan in connection with

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an alleged unreasonable search that occurred at his home on June 5,

2014. The complaint alleges that on that date, those officers were

investigating a battery claim and had a search warrant for a yellow

and white trailer located at 615 W. 37th Ave., Lot 38, but for some

undisclosed reason they came to his red and white trailer located

at 615 W. 37th Ave., Lot 50. When they arrived at his trailer, they

spoke with Cilek and asked to search the residence. Cilek refused.

Despite this, those four officers went into the home and conducted

a warrantless search. Cilek brings a claim against these officers

for entering and searching his home without a warrant in violation

of the Fourth Amendment.

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and

seizures shall not be violated . . . .” U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV. The

Fourth Amendment generally protects an individual’s right to be

free from warrantless intrusions into the home. United States v.

Foxworth, 8 F.3d 540, 544 (7th Cir. 1993). However, there are

exceptions to the warrant requirement. One such exception is when

exigent circumstances are present. Id. “Exigent circumstances are

defined as a compelling need for official action and no time to

secure a warrant.” Id. (citations omitted).

Here, the complaint can be read to allege that the four Hobart

officers busted down his front door, entered and searched Cilek’s

home without consent, without a warrant, and without the presence

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of any exigent circumstances. Notably, the allegations and

attachments to the complaint reveal that the search of Cilek’s

residence was likely an issue in the underlying criminal case.

However, it is unclear whether that issue was previously litigated

to invoke res judicata. Giving Cilek the inferences to which he is

entitled at this stage, he has alleged enough to proceed further

against these officers.

Next, Cilek claims that Officers Crawford, Bustos and Snedecor

assaulted him after they entered his residence. He alleges Officer

Snedecor sent K-9 Spike into the residence to attack him. Then,

once the K-9 had subdued Cilek, Bustos and Crawford starting

kicking him. Cilek suffered injuries that required him to seek

medical attention. While at the hospital, Officers Crawford and

Bustos poked and pushed on Cilek’s open wounds in an effort to hurt

him. 

The “core requirement” for an excessive force claim is that

the defendant “used force not in a good-faith effort to maintain or

restore discipline, but maliciously and sadistically to cause

harm.” Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 2009)

(internal citation omitted). Several factors guide the inquiry of

whether an officer’s use of force was legitimate or malicious,

including the need for an application of force, the amount of force

used, and the extent of the injury suffered by the prisoner. Id. 

 Here, the complaint can be read to allege that Officers

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Crawford, Bustos and Snedecor used force against him to maliciously

or sadistically cause harm. Giving him the inferences to which he

is entitled at this stage, he has alleged enough to proceed further

against Officers Crawford, Bustos and Snedecor. Further factual

development may show the officers acted reasonably under the

circumstances, but Cilek has alleged enough at this stage.

Next, Cilek claims that Corey Hanrahan seized Cilek’s dog

while he was searching his residence. The Fourteenth Amendment

provides that state officials shall not “deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”, but a

state tort claims act that provides a method by which a person can

seek reimbursement for the negligent loss or intentional

depravation of property meets the requirements of the due process

clause by providing due process of law. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.

517, 533 (1984) (“For intentional, as for negligent deprivations of

property by state employees, the state's action is not complete

until and unless it provides or refuses to provide a suitable post

deprivation remedy.”) Indiana’s tort claims act (INDIANA CODE § 34-

13-3-1 et seq.) provides for state judicial review of property

losses caused by government employees, and provides an adequate

post-deprivation remedy to redress state officials’ accidental or

intentional deprivation of a person’s property. Wynn v. Southward,

251 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Wynn has an adequate postdeprivation remedy in the Indiana Tort Claims Act, and no more

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process was due.”) “The courts in this and in other states in

numerous decisions have held that dogs are property.” Vantreese v.

McGee, 26 Ind. App. 525, 527 (1901). Therefore, even though Cilek

may have a state tort claim, he does not have a federal

constitutional claim based on the taking of his property. 

Next, Cilek alleges that Officer Scott Shaginaw made false

statements that were recklessly made in the affidavit used to

obtain the search warrant. 

Under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), if a

defendant can demonstrate by a preponderance of the

evidence that the signatory of the warrant

affidavit made a false statement (or omitted a

material fact) either intentionally or with

reckless disregard for the truth, then a court will

consider whether the content of the affidavit,

setting aside the false material (or including the

omitted material), is sufficient to establish

probable cause. If it is not, the search warrant

must be voided and the fruits of the search

excluded.

United States v. Merritt, 361 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2004)

(parallel citations omitted). If the alleged false statements were

not sufficient to result in voiding the warrant and excluding the

evidence obtained with it, then Cilek suffered no injury as a

result of the false statements and he does not have a claim. If the

alleged false statements were sufficient to result in voiding the

warrant and excluding the evidence obtained with it, then that

claim is not ripe until the conviction which resulted from the

evidence obtained with that warrant is overturned or set aside. 

Where the successful prosecution of a civil rights case would

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undermine or imply the invalidity of a criminal prosecution, the

civil rights case cannot proceed without proof “that the conviction

was reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,

declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such

determination, or called into question by a federal court’s

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.

477, 486-7 (1994). Here, a monetary award based on a finding that

the warrant affidavit contained relevant, intentionally false

statements would imply the invalidity of Cilek’s charges or

conviction, therefore this allegation does not state a claim on

which relief can be granted at this time and the claim must be

dismissed without prejudice. If, in the future, Cilek can

demonstrate that his charges were dropped or any resulting

conviction has been overturned, then he may re-file this claim. 

As a final matter, Cilek has brought suit against the Hobart

Police Department and K-9 Spike. Neither of these are proper

defendants. It appears he is trying to hold the Hobart Police

Department liable as the police officers’ employer. However, “the

Indiana statutory scheme does not grant municipal police

departments the capacity to sue or be sued.” Sow v. Fortville

Police Dep’t, 636 F.3d 293, 300 (7th Cir. 2011). Moreover, a

section 1983 suit cannot be maintained against a dog; thus his

claim against K-9 Spike cannot be maintained either. Dye v. Wargo,

253 F.3d 296 (7th Cir. 2001). Therefore, both of these defendants

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must be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court:

(1) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed on a claim against

Zachary Crawford, Adrian Bustos and Ryan Snedecor in their

individual capacities for monetary damages for violating the Fourth

Amendment by using excessive force against him on June 5, 2014;

(2) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed on a claim against

Zachary Crawford, Adrian Bustos, Ryan Snedecor and Corey Hanrahan

in their individual capacities for money damages for violating the

Fourth Amendment by conducting a warrantless search of Cilek’s

residence on June 5, 2014;

(3) DISMISSES all other claims; 

(4) DISMISSES the Hobart Police Department, Scott Shaginaw and

K-9 Spike;

(5) DIRECTS the clerk to transmit the summons and USM-285 for

Zachary Crawford, Adrian Bustos, Ryan Snedecor and Corey Hanrahan

to the United States Marshals Service along with a copy of the

amended complaint (DE #20) and this order;

(6) DIRECTS the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service of

process on Zachary Crawford, Adrian Bustos, Ryan Snedecor and Corey

Hanrahan pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and

(7) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that Zachary

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Crawford, Adrian Bustos, Ryan Snedecor and Corey Hanrahan respond,

as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D.

Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claims for which the plaintiff has

been granted leave to proceed in this screening order. 

DATED: November 18, 2015 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

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