alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>      9
<MULTIPLIER>   1,000
       
<S>                                          <C>  
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                            DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                               JAN-01-1997 
<PERIOD-END>                                 MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                            17,986          
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                                28
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                   3,425 
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                       0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                       71,533 
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                             4,076
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                               4,058
<LOANS>                                          258,629
<ALLOWANCE>                                        2,459
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   369,234
<DEPOSITS>                                       307,571
<SHORT-TERM>                                      12,404
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                                4,084
<LONG-TERM>                                       13,676
<COMMON>                                           3,293
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                  0
<PREFERRED>                                            0
<OTHER-SE>                                        28,206  
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                   369,234
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                    5,441          
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                  1,131 
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                      35
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                   6,607
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                                 2,806
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 3,132
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                              3,475
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                        150
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                    65
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                    2,825 
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    1,157
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                           287
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                        0
<CHANGES>                                              0 
<NET-INCOME>                                         870
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        .29
<EPS-DILUTED>                                          0
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                         0          
<LOANS-NON>                                           29
<LOANS-PAST>                                       1,349
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     240
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                    2,500
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                   2,403
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                        142
<RECOVERIES>                                          48
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                  2,459
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                               2,459
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                    0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                                0
        

</TABLE>
#### Eastern Exterminating Co., Inc., et al., Petitioners, v Henry G. Williams, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, Respondent.

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination by respondent dated June 21, 1984, made after a hearing, which revoked petitioners’ registration and certification for the commercial application of pesticides.

Determination confirmed and proceeding dismissed on the merits, with costs.

After a hearing, respondent found that petitioners violated State regulations by misapplying the pesticide chlordane in 16 separate instances in which homes in Nassau and Suffolk Counties became contaminated as a result. The respondent Commissioner thereafter revoked the registration and certification of petitioners for commercial pesticide application.

Substantial evidence supports the determination of the Commissioner *(Matter of Pell v Board of Educ.,*34 NY2d 222). The penalty of revocation was not disproportionate in light of the serious risk to public health and safety caused by petitioners’ irresponsible and reckless conduct *(Matter of Pell v Board of*
      *865
      *Educ., supra).*Petitioners’ procedural objections are without merit. Mangano, J. P., Brown, Rubin and Lawrence, JJ., concur.
* Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,

sitting by designation.

** Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

___________________________

No. 01-30609

No. 01-30682

___________________________

GERARD MENDONCA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

TIDEWATER, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

__________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Louisiana, New Orleans

00-CV-2284-C

___________________________________________________

March 7, 2002

Before ALDISERT,* DAVIS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges

PER CURIAM:**

We affirm the judgment of the district court essentially for

the reasons stated by the district court in its Orders and Reasons

of March 21 and April 9, 2001 and by the magistrate judge in his

Minute Entry of April 18, 2001.
Plaintiff-Appellant asserts an additional argument on appeal.

He now seeks to assert state law claims based on diversity

jurisdiction. Even if we were to consider this argument, raised

for the first time on appeal, Plaintiff-Appellant did not allege

facts in the district court sufficient to trigger diversity

jurisdiction.

The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.
[No. 39110-1-I.

Division One.

August 25, 1997.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Timothy John Bart, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Snohomish County, No. 96-1-00171-1, Richard J. Thorpe, J., entered June 26, 1996. *Affirmed*by unpublished per curiam opinion.
#### Rachel Rosenbaum et al., Appellants, v Ross-Rodney Housing Corp. et al., Respondents.

[942 NYS2d 199]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Partnow, J.), dated January 28, 2011, which, upon, in effect, the denial of their motion pursuant to CPLR 4401, made at the close of the evidence, for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability, upon a jury verdict on the issue of liability, and upon the denial of their motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside the verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence, is in favor of the defendants and against them, dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to CPLR 4401, made at the close of the evidence, for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability. Considering the facts in a light most favorable to the defendants, and resolving all questions as to the witnesses’ credibility in the defendants’ favor, there was a rational process that would lead the trier of fact to find in favor of the defendants *(see Szczerbiak v Pilot,*90 NY2d 553, 556 [1997]; *Cohen v Hallmark Cards,*45 NY2d 493, 499 [1978]; *Shallash v New Is. Hosp.,*66 AD3d 988, 991 [2009]; *Healy v Carmel Bowl, Inc.,*65 AD 3d 665, 667 [2009]).

The Supreme Court also properly denied the plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside the verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence. The evidence did not preponderate so heavily in the plaintiffs’ favor that the jury could not have reached a verdict in favor of the defendants by any fair interpretation of the evidence *(see Seong Yim Kim v New York City Tr. Auth.,*87 AD3d 531, 532 [2011]; *Semel v Guzman,*84 AD3d 1054, 1055-1056 [2011]; *Nicastro v Park,*113 AD2d 129, 132-134 [1985]).

The plaintiffs’ remaining contentions are without merit. Mastro, A.EJ., Hall, Lott and Sgroi, JJ., concur.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 8, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-31005

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

$197,557.00 in U.S. CURRENCY,

 

Defendant,

versus

EDWARD LEWIS HANSARD, 

 

Claimant-Appellant. 

 

-------------------------------------------------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 5:88-CV-1318

--------------------------------------------------------------

Before BARKSDALE, STEWART and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*
 

-2-

Edward Lewis Hansard appeals from the denial of his FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) motion seeking

to void the civilforfeiture of $197,577 in United States currency pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6).

Hansard’s Rule 60(b) motion was filed 16 years after the currency was seized pursuant to a default

judgment. We grant Hansard’s motion to expand the record on appeal to include a copy of his Rule

60(b) motion.

Citing Scarabin v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 966 F.2d 989 (5thCir. 1992), Hansard argues

that the district court never had jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceeding because the DEA

possessed only a cashier’s check and never actually possessed the currency. We do not consider this

argument as it is raised for the first time in this court. See Leverette v. Louisville Ladder Co., 183

F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 1999).

Hansard also argues that the Louisiana State Police perpetrated a fraud upon him and the

court, which created exceptional circumstances warranting review. Hansard relies on a letter

purportedly sent to him by the Louisiana State Police informing him that the currency was returned

to another person. Rule 60(b)(6) does not place a time limit on motions based on exceptional

circumstances. Because the exceptional circumstances upon which Hansard relies are based upon his

allegations of fraud, however, it is in the nature of a Rule 60(b)(3) motion, and it is untimely.

See Rule 60(b)(3). Therefo re, Hansard is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See Kerwit

Medical Products v. N. & H. Instruments, 616 F.2d 833, 837 n.8 (5th Cir. 1980). 

Hansard argues that the notice published by the Government in a Louisiana newspaper was

not reasonably designed to give him notice of the forfeiture proceeding. We do not consider this

argument as it is raised for the first time in Hansard’s reply brief. See United States v. Prince, 868

F.2d 1379, 1386 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 

-3-

MOTION TO EXPAND THE RECORD GRANTED; JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
I 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1858 

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on cis-3-Hexen-1-ol. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 26, 2005 

Mr. RANGEL introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on cis-3-Hexen1-ol. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. CIS-3-HEXEN-1-OL. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Heading 9902.02.99 of the Har5 monized Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended 

6 by striking ‘‘12/31/2006’’ and inserting ‘‘12/31/2008’’. 

7 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

8 this section shall apply with respect to goods entered, or 

9 withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 

10 the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ
Exhibit 99.1

                                  Certification
            Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
        (Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18,
                               United States Code)


         Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections
(a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), each
of the undersigned officers of ELXSI Corporation, a Delaware corporation (the
"Company"), does hereby certify, to the best of such officer's knowledge and
belief, that:

         (1)      The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended
September 30, 2002 (the "Form 10-Q") of the Company fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and

         (2)      The information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in
all materials respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

Dated: November 12, 2002               /s/ ALEXANDER M. MILILEY
                                       -----------------------------------------
                                       Alexander M. Milley
                                       Chief Executive Officer


Dated: November 12, 2002               /s/ DAVID M. DOOLITTLE
                                       -----------------------------------------
                                       David M. Doolittle
                                       Chief Financial Officer
#### The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v Ki Rhee, Respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County *656(Hettinger, J.), entered August 11, 1983, dismissing the indictment for the People’s failure to comply with CPL 30.30, unanimously reversed, on the law, and the indictment reinstated.

On November 22, 1982, defendant and his codefendant, Kim Hong, were arrested for a knifepoint assault of three men. Felony complaints against both defendants were filed the next day. The Grand Jury indicted defendant on May 19, 1983, charging him with two counts of assault in the second degree and criminal mischief in the fourth degree. At his arraignment on May 23,1983 — exactly six months from the date of the filing of the felony complaint — the People announced their readiness for trial. In dismissing the indictment the court, without further explanation, found that the People had violated CPL 30.30 by waiting six months and one day before announcing their readiness for trial. As defendant concedes, this was error since CPL 30.30 (1) (a) authorizes the dismissal of an indictment only when the People are not ready for trial within “six months of the commencement of a criminal action”. The time period is computed in terms of calendar months, which is not necessarily 180 days. *(People v Battles,*77 AD2d 405, 407.) Moreover, a criminal proceeding is commenced not with a defendant’s arrest, but with the filing of an accusatory instrument, such as a felony complaint. (CPL 1.20 [1], [17]; *People v Osgood,*52 NY2d 37, 43; *see also,*CPL 100.05.) Thus, the People’s time in which to announce their readiness for trial began to run on November 23,1982 and their announcement on May 23,1983 satisfied the requirements of CPL 30.30. *(People v Giordano,*56 NY2d 524.) We are unable to find any factual support for defendant’s argument that the People’s announcement was not made in good faith or that it did not reflect an actual, present state of readiness. Accordingly, the indictment is reinstated. Concur — Murphy, P. J., Sullivan, Ross, Lynch and Kassal, JJ.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

SCOTT R. GIESLER, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 2:16-CV-364-JVB-PRC

) 

KT-GRANT INC., )

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Consolidate for Factual Discovery

Purposes [DE 35], filed on March 7, 2018. Plaintiff Scott Giesler requests that this matter be

consolidated for purposes of fact discovery with Anthony S. DeVries v. KT-Grant Inc., Cause No.

2:16-CV-365-RL-JEM. On March 9, 2018, Anthony S. DeVries filed a Plaintiff’s Notice of Filing

Motion to Consolidate in Cause Number 2:16-CV-365-RL-JEM. Defendant KT-Grant has not filed

a response to the Motion to Consolidate, and the deadline by which to do so has passed.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) provides that, “[i]f actions before the court involve

a common question of law or fact, the court may . . . consolidate the actions.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

42(a)(2). Consolidation is appropriate for “cases that share the same questions of law or fact and

where consolidation would not result in prejudice to any party.” Back v. Carter, 933 F. Supp. 738,

748 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (citing Fleishman v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 103 F.R.D. 623, 624 (E.D.

Wis. 1984)). Courts “consider such factors as judicial economy, avoiding delay, and avoiding

inconsistent or conflicting results” as well as “as the possibility of . . . administrative difficulties.” 

Habitat Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. Kimbell, 250 F.R.D. 390, 394 (E.D. Wis. 2008). Consolidation “is a

matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 185

(7th Cir. 1994).
Both lawsuits at issue bring claims of personal injury against the same defendant for injuries

incurred while operating an LG machine manufactured by Defendant. The cases were filed within

a month of each other in state court and removed to this Court on the same day. Plaintiffs in both

cases are represented by the same counsel. Having reviewed the Complaint in this case and in Cause

Number 2:16-CV-365-RL-JEM, the Court finds that the two cases have common issues of fact and

common issues of law. Consolidation for the purposes of factual discovery will reduce the burden

placed on witnesses, parties, and judicial resources.

Finding the motion well taken and noting the lack of objection, the Court hereby GRANTS

Plaintiff’s Motion to Consolidate for Factual Discovery Purposes [DE 35] and ORDERS

consolidation of the instant litigation and 2:16-CV-365-RL-JEM for factual discovery purposes

only. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to docket this Opinion and Order in both this case

and in Cause Number 2:16-CV-365-RL-JEM. The Court INSTRUCTS the parties to continue to

file all future motions in both cases under separate cause numbers.

SO ORDERED this 22nd day of March, 2018.

s/ Paul R. Cherry 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE PAUL R. CHERRY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2
EXHIBIT No. 99

CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC FINANCIAL REPORT
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350

Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of
2002, we, the undersigned, certify that, to the best of our knowledge, this periodic
report of CAPITAL REALTY INVESTORS-II LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, filed on Form 10-QSB for the
quaterly period ended June 30, 2003, and containing the financial statements, fully
complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and that the information contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the issuer.

|               |  | CAPITAL REALTY INVESTORS-II
     LIMITED PARTNERSHIP                                                                                                  
|-------------- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|               |  | (Issuer)                                                                                                                                              
|               |  | by:  C.R.I., Inc.                                                                                                                                     
|               |  | Managing General Partner                                                                                                                              
|August 5, 2003 |  | by:  /s/ William B. Dockser                                                                                                                           
|DATE           |  | William B. Dockser,
                  Director, Chairman of the Board,
                  and Treasurer
                  (Principal Executive Officer)
|August 5, 2003 |  | by:  /s/ Michael J. Tuszka                                                                                                                            
|DATE           |  | Michael J. Tuszka,
                  Vice President
                  and Chief Accounting Officer
                  (Principal Financial Officer)    

This
certification accompanies this periodic report and is made solely for purpose of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, subject to the
knowledge standard contained therein, and not for any other purpose, and shall not
be deemed filed by the Issuer for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
##### 



EXHIBIT 31.1 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 I, Anthony W. Thompson, certify that: 1. I
have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K/A of G REIT, Inc.; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included
in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4. The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e), for the registrant and have: a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to
the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within
those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and
presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and
procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial
reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants
fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is
reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial
reporting; and 5. The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit
committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the
registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have
a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting. /s/       Anthony W. ThompsonAnthony W. ThompsonChief Executive Officer Date: April 28, 2005