UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

MATTHEW K. JORDAN, 

 Petitioner, 

 v. Case No. 3:15-CV-487 JVB 

SUPERINTENDENT, 

 Respondent. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 Matthew K. Jordan, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the 

prison disciplinary hearing (WCC 15-06-574) where the Westville Correctional Facility 

Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) found him guilty of having a Sexual Act with a Visitor in 

violation of A-114 on June 27, 2015. As a result, he was sanctioned with the loss of 90 days 

earned credit time and demoted to Credit Class 2. 

Jordan lists four grounds in his petition, but they are merely restatements of two claims. 

He argues that there was insufficient evidence to have found him guilty and that he was denied 

witness statements and video evidence. 

 Jordan asserts that there was insufficient evidence because it was impossible for the 

guard who wrote the conduct report to have seen him with “his hand up the skirt of his visitor . . . 

in the groin area . . . .” (DE 1-1 at 4.) He also argues that when the guards decided to keep an eye 

on him because he and his visitor were too close and were laughing, the guards should have 

moved him to the front of the room rather than allowing him to remain in the back. (DE 1 at 2.) 

In reviewing a decision for some evidence, courts are not required to 

conduct an examination of the entire record, independently assess witness 

credibility, or weigh the evidence, but only determine whether the prison 
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disciplinary board’s decision to revoke good time credits has some factual 

basis. 

McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted). “[T]he 

relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion 

reached by the disciplinary board.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985). 

[T]he findings of a prison disciplinary board [need only] have the support 

of some evidence in the record. This is a lenient standard, requiring no more 

than a modicum of evidence. Even meager proof will suffice, so long as the 

record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board 

were without support or otherwise arbitrary. Although some evidence is not 

much, it still must point to the accused’s guilt. It is not our province to assess 

the comparative weight of the evidence underlying the disciplinary board’s 

decision. 

Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks, citations, parentheses, 

and ellipses omitted). Even a Conduct Report alone can be sufficient evidence to support a 

finding of guilt. McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786. Such is the case here. 

The officer reported seeing Jordan with “his hand up the skirt of his visitor . . . in the 

groin area . . . .” (DE 1-1 at 4.) It is not for the Court to judge the credibility of that officer nor to 

resolve Jordan’s contention that the officer was not in a position to have seen either Jordan’s 

hand or his visitor’s groin. Neither was the guards’ decision to watch Jordan in the back of the 

room rather than move him to the front a basis for finding that there was insufficient evidence 

based on what the reporting officer later saw. Based on the conduct report, there was sufficient 

evidence to have found Jordan guilty. 

 Jordan asserts that it was a due process violation not to have permitted him to submit 

witness statements and video evidence. An inmate has a constitutional right to present relevant, 

exculpatory evidence during a prison disciplinary hearing which extends the duration of his 

confinement. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). 
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However, due process only requires access to witnesses and evidence that are 

exculpatory. Rasheed-Bey v. Duckworth, 969 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992). Exculpatory in this 

context means evidence which “directly undermines the reliability of the evidence in the record 

pointing to [the prisoner’s] guilt.” Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 1996). 

 During his screening, Jordan only requested one witness: Officer Vasquez. Jordan did not 

request any physical evidence. He did not request any video. He signed the screening report. (DE 

1-1 at 8.) Officer Vasquez provided a statement and therefore Jordan was not denied the 

evidence he requested. 

Nevertheless, Jordan now argues that the DHO should have considered other evidence 

even though he did not request it. He argues that the video from the visitation room should have 

been reviewed. However, Jordan watched the video with a sergeant after Jordan was first 

accused and he knows it is not exculpatory. When they watched the video it didn’t show what 

happened and they “couldn’t tell.” (DE 1 at 2.) An inconclusive video is not exculpatory. 

Jordan now argues that the sergeant should have submitted a statement even though he 

did not ask her to do so. However, even if he had requested a statement from her, a statement 

saying that the video was inconclusive would not have been exculpatory. Jordan did get a 

statement from Officer Vasquez who wrote, “When I asked the Sgt. if she could see the video 

she said she could not tell.” (DE 1-1 at 5.) 

Jordan also argues that months after the hearing, he spoke to a guard who agreed to write 

him a statement saying that “the write up and accusations was bogus.” (DE 1 at 2.) However, 

Jordan has not submitted a statement from that guard. Nevertheless, even if it had been 

submitted, it would not demonstrate a due process violation because the DHO did not deny him 

the opportunity to have timely requested and submitted it during the hearing. 
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 For these reasons, the Court DENIES the habeas corpus petition pursuant to Section 

2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 4 and DIRECTS the clerk to close this case. 

SO ORDERED on June 29, 2016. 

s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE