UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

JEROME WILLIAMS, 

 Plaintiff, 

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vs. CAUSE NO. 3:15-CV-428 WL 

RON NEAL, and HOWARD MORTON, 

 Defendants. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 Jerome Williams, a pro se prisoner, filed an amended complaint (DE 35). In a previous 

order (DE 36), the court limited the claims in this case to those in Sections 1 and 2 of that complaint 

where Mr. Williams alleges that Superintendent Ron Neal and Executive Assistant Howard 

Morton retaliated against him by denying the restoration of good time credits because he filed a 

lawsuit. “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however 

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 

lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Nevertheless, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the merits of a prisoner 

complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such 

relief. 

 “To prevail on his First Amendment retaliation claim, [Mr. Williams] must show that (1) 

he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would 

likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was at 

least a motivating factor in the Defendants’ decision to take the retaliatory action.” Gomez v. 
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Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, Mr. 

Williams has pleaded sufficient facts to meet the first prong because he alleges that he engaged in 

a First Amendment activity by filing a lawsuit against the former Superintendent. He has pleaded 

sufficient facts to meet the second prong because being denied the restoration of earned credit time 

extends the duration of his confinement. However he has not pleaded sufficient facts to meet the 

third prong showing that either Ron Neal or Howard Morton were in any way motivated to act 

because he had sued the former superintendent. 

 A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim that is plausible on its 

face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility 

when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Legal conclusions can provide a complaint’s framework, but unless 

well-pleaded factual allegations move the claims from conceivable to plausible, they are 

insufficient to state a claim. Id. at 680. “[C]ourts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion 

couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 

265, 286 (1986) (quotation marks omitted). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of 

his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of 

the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are 

true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (quotation marks, citations and footnote omitted). “[I]n 

considering the plaintiff’s factual allegations, courts should not accept as adequate abstract 

recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements.” Brooks v. Ross, 

578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer 
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more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—

that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal at 679 (quotation marks and brackets omitted). Thus, 

“a plaintiff must do better than putting a few words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative 

reader, might suggest that something has happened to her that might be redressed by the law.” 

Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original). 

 Such is the case here. Mr. Williams has not alleged facts from which it can be plausibly 

inferred that either Ron Neal or Howard Morton personally knew about the previous lawsuit. If 

they did not know about that case, they could not have been motivated to retaliate against Mr. 

Williams because of it. Also, he has not alleged facts from which it can be reasonably inferred that 

either defendant applied the earned credit time restoration policy differently in his case than for 

other inmates. If they applied the rules to Mr. Williams in the same way they did for all other 

inmates, it would not be reasonable to infer that they were acting out of retaliatory animus. Without 

facts showing that these defendants were motivated to retaliate against him because of the former 

lawsuit, this complaint does not state a claim. 

 Nevertheless it is possible that Mr. Williams has additional facts which he did not include 

in this amended complaint. Therefore he will be given the opportunity to file one more amended 

complaint. See Luevano v. Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2013). This amended complaint 

must be limited to his claims that Superintendent Ron Neal and Executive Assistant Howard 

Morton retaliated against him by denying the restoration of good time credits because he filed a 

lawsuit. If he files another amended complaint, he needs to provide facts (not guesses, speculation, 

or legal conclusions) showing that Ron Neal and Howard Morton were motivated to deny the 

restoration of his good time credits because he sued the former superintendent. It is not sufficient 

to merely re-allege that they denied the restoration of his good time credits after he sued the former 
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superintendent. If Mr. Williams has no additional facts to add, he should not file an amended 

complaint. If he does have additional facts, he can obtain a copy of this court’s approved form – 

Prisoner Complaint (INND Rev. 8/16) – from the prison law library. 

 For these reasons, Jerome Williams is GRANTED until April 20, 2017, to file an amended 

complaint and CAUTIONED that if he does not respond by that deadline, this case will be 

dismissed without further notice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a claim. 

 SO ORDERED. 

ENTERED: March 28, 2017 

 

 s/William C. Lee 

William C. Lee, Judge 

United States District Court