UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

FORT WAYNE DIVISION 

ANTHONY CYRIL MARTIN, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. CAUSE NO. 1:13-cv-00244-SLC 

MARK WENTZ, et al., 

 Defendants. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 Anthony Cyril Martin, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a motion asking the 

Court to reconsider the screening Order issued June 4, 2014. (DE 186). He states, “after 

reviewing the CD/DVD’s, he has retrieved ‘relevant and material evidence that 

supports [his] claims that were ultimately dismissed by Judge Van Bokkelen, but with 

the ‘now’ present documents and facts, the Court cannot ignore or sit idley [sic], but to 

reconsider plaintiff’s claims [de novo].” (DE 186-1 at 2-3 (imbalanced quotation mark 

and brackets in original except for [sic] to indicate the misspelling of idly)). Specifically, 

Martin asks the Court to reinstate four claims. 

 First, Martin argues he has evidence demonstrating the City of Fort Wayne has 

an unconstitutional policy which violated his rights. He alleges the policy PD97-2301 

instructs officers to stop a person without probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or 

articulatable facts. However, this is not the claim the Court considered when it 

screened his complaint. Here is how the Court explained the dismissal of the claims 

against the City of Fort Wayne: 
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 Martin alleges that the City of Fort Wayne has a policy, procedure, 

or custom which violates his Constitutional rights. “To establish a 

municipal policy or custom, [the plaintiff] must allege a specific pattern or 

series of incidents that support the general allegation of a custom or 

policy.” Hollins v. City of Milwaukee, 574 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. Wis. 2009). 

Here, Martin has neither explained what practice the city has adopted, nor 

described any pattern of events. Though he alleges that the City of Fort 

Wayne failed to train its employees, he has not provided any factual basis 

for this claim. “The inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis 

for § 1983 liability, but only where the failure to train amounts to 

deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come 

into contact.” Id. In sum, these allegations are wholly devoid of any facts 

or context and they do not plausibly state a claim. 

(DE 13 at 6 (brackets in original)). Martin’s attempt to add new facts for his claim 

against the City of Fort Wayne is not properly considered a motion to reconsider 

because reconsidering will not change the facts in the complaint that was screened. To 

add new facts to his complaint would require that he file an amended complaint. 

 However, it is too late to file an amended complaint to add these facts. Pursuant 

to the Court’s scheduling Order, the deadline for amending pleadings expired on 

February 11, 2016. (DE 104). As that Order explains, “pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 16(b), [the scheduling order] shall not be modified except upon a showing of 

good cause . . ..” Id. Martin alleges his new facts are a result of having reviewed the 

CD/DVD’s obtained in discovery for this case and only recently viewed. However, the 

copy of policy PD97-2301 attached to his motion (DE 186-2 at 3-8) shows it was sent to 

him on August 12, 2009, as discovery in Martin v. Fort Wayne Police Department, 1:09-CV074 (N.D. Ind. filed March 23, 2009) (DE 17-4). Martin has not shown good cause for 

waiting nearly five years to amend his complaint to add facts to his claim against the 
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City of Fort Wayne which he had more than five years before he filed the amended 

complaint. (DE 12). 

 Second, Martin asks the Court to reconsider his claim against Officer Mark 

Wentz for filing a false probable cause affidavit. Here is how the Court explained the 

dismissal of this claim: 

 Martin alleges that Fort Wayne Police Officer Mark Wentz filed a 

false probable cause affidavit to obtain a warrant for his arrest for robbery 

and resisting arrest which mentioned a red SUV with Indiana plate 

964LSM even though he knew that there were no reports of a red SUV 

having been seen at the robbery. He has not attached the affidavit or the 

warrant and he makes no mention of how this false statement was 

relevant to the charge of resisting arrest. Because he has not alleged “that 

the false statements were necessary to the judicial officers’ determinations 

that probable case existed,” Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, 320 F.3d 733, 

742 (7th Cir. 2003), to issue a warrant for resisting arrest, he has not 

plausibly alleged that the warrant was invalidly issued or that he was 

falsely arrested pursuant to it. 

(DE 13 at 6-7). 

 Martin now states there was no warrant. He now wants to submit the affidavit. 

He argues he did not resist arrest and that the officer who arrested him lacked authority 

to do so because he was in an unmarked police vehicle. These are not the arguments 

and claims presented in the complaint that was screened. As explained, this is not a 

basis for reconsidering the screening Order. To consider these new facts and arguments 

not previously raised, Martin would have to file an amended complaint. But it is too 

late for that. There is no indication any of these facts, arguments, or documents (DE 

186-2 at 12-16) were obtained from the CD/DVD discovery in this case. All of these 
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documents existed in 2013 when those events occurred.1 Martin has not shown good 

cause for waiting nearly five years to amend his complaint to add facts and change the 

arguments about the false probable cause affidavit which he could have obtained before 

he filed the amended complaint (DE 12). 

 Third, Martin asks the Court to reconsider the claim he was falsely imprisoned. 

Here is how the Court explained the dismissal of this claim: 

 Martin alleges that he was “falsely imprisoned because a 72 hour 

investigation was commenced which plaintiff was never read no warrant 

nor was any formal charges read, or presented to plaintiff before the 

allotted time frame. (7-24-13 [to] 7-29-13).” DE 12 at 7. However, this does 

not state a plausible claim. The dates provided by Martin imply that he 

was held for five days before he was charged, but Indiana Code 35-33-7-

3(b) provides that “If the prosecuting attorney states that more time is 

required to evaluate the case and determine whether a charge should be 

filed, or if it is necessary to transfer the person to another court, then the 

court shall recess or continue the initial hearing for up to seventy-two (72) 

hours, excluding intervening Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.” 

Here, July 27, 2013, was Saturday and July 28, 2013, was Sunday. Martin 

does not say when he was arrested on July 24, 2013. He does not say what 

time his initial hearing was held. He does not say what time the hearing 

was continued to on July 29, 2013. The Supreme Court has held that “an 

individual subjected to a warrantless arrest must receive a probable cause 

determination within forty-eight hours of the arrest. See Cnty. of Riverside 

v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 57 (1991). [But t]he Court did not hold that an 

individual must be charged with a crime within that same forty-eight 

hour period.” Holloway v. Del. County Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063 (7th Cir. 2012) 

(parallel citations omitted). Here, Martin acknowledges that he was 

arrested pursuant to a warrant. For the foregoing reasons, he has not 

alleged facts which permit the court to plausibly infer that any defendant 

falsely imprisoned him in violation of his Constitutional rights. 

(DE 13 at 7-8 (brackets in original)). 

 1 The docket sheet Martin attached was printed on July 13, 2017, but the only entry on the docket 

after 2013 is “1/21/2016 Case File Destroyed.” (DE 186-2 at 16). Therefore all the relevant docket entries 

existed in 2013. 
5 

 Martin now states there was no warrant. He now states his dates were wrong. 

He now wants to include what time events happened. As explained, this is not a basis 

for reconsidering the screening Order. To consider these new facts, Martin would have 

to file an amended complaint. Again, it is too late for that. There is no indication any of 

these facts were obtained from the CD/DVD discovery in this case. All of these facts 

existed in 2013 when those events occurred. Martin has not shown good cause for 

waiting nearly five years to amend his complaint to change the facts related to his false 

imprisonment claim which he could have obtained before he filed the amended 

complaint (DE 12). 

 Fourth, Martin asks the Court to reconsider the claim he was unlawfully 

searched. Here is how the Court explained the dismissal of this claim: 

 Finally, Martin alleges that Fort Wayne Police Officers Robert 

Hollo, Thomas Strausborger, Derrick DeMorest, Gary Hensler, and 

Charles Taylor searched his car. Martin makes the conclusory allegation 

that the search was illegal, but he has not provided any factual basis from 

which it can be plausibly inferred that the search was illegal. “[A]n 

automobile search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest is constitutional 

(1) if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the vehicle during the 

search, or (2) if the police have reason to believe that the vehicle contains 

evidence relevant to the crime of arrest.” Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 

2419 (2011) (quotation marks omitted). Here, Martin does not say what 

was searched for nor what (if anything) was found. He does not say 

whether the search occurred while he was within reaching distance of the 

car. He does not explain why he believes that the search was not related 

to the crime(s) of his arrest. Therefore he has not stated a claim for an 

illegal search of his car incident to his arrest. 

(DE 13 at 8). 

 Martin now wants to add additional facts nearly five years after his complaint 

was screened. As explained several times, this is not a basis for reconsideration. There 
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is no indication the facts he wants to add were obtained from the CD/DVD discovery in 

this case. He has not shown good cause to modify the screening Order to permit him to 

file an amended complaint at this late date. 

 Rather, it is time for Martin to file his response to those portions of the 

Defendants’ summary judgment motion (DE 143) filed July 1, 2016, which addresses his 

two excessive force claims. Though the Defendants included arguments related to other 

claims, those arguments are moot because Martin was not granted leave to proceed on 

them in the screening Order (DE 13). 

 For these reasons, Martin’s motion (DE 186) is DENIED. Anthony Cyril Martin is 

REMINDED the deadline for filing his response to the Defendants’ motion for summary 

is May 1, 2019, at 2:00 p.m. and if he has not done so, “the Court will then reopen the 

case and set a deadline for Plaintiff to file his response brief [and] that once the Court 

sets that deadline, he will not be afforded any further extensions for filing his response 

to the motion for summary judgment.” (DE 185 at 2). 

 SO ORDERED. 

Entered this 29th day of April 2019. 

/s/ Susan Collins 

Susan Collins 

United States Magistrate Judge