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TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
 

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
 

State of California
 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN
 

Attorney General
 

OPINION :
 

: No. 94-1111
 

of :
 

: May 10, 1995
 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN :
 

Attorney General :
 

:
 

GREGORY L. GONOT :
 

Deputy Attorney General :
 

: 

THE HONORABLE SAL CANNELLA, MEMBER OF THE CALIFORNIA 

STATE ASSEMBLY, has requested an opinion on the following question: 

May the governing board of a school district discipline a school principal for 

taking time off to perform emergency duty as a volunteer firefighter? 

CONCLUSION 

The governing board of a school district may not discipline a school principal for 

taking time off to perform emergency duty as a volunteer firefighter, but may require the 

principal to follow reasonable procedures to ensure that the needs of the school are adequately 

met during any absence. 

ANALYSIS 

Section 35020 of the Education Code provides that "[t]he governing board of 

each school district shall fix and prescribe the duties to be performed by all persons in public 

school service in the school district." Such duties, as required of a school principal, may be 

expected to include the principal's presence at the school during regular school hours. 

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However, if also serving as a volunteer firefighter,1 the school principal may be called upon to 

perform emergency duties which could result in occasional, and sometimes lengthy, absences 

from the school. 

We are asked to determine whether a school principal may attend to emergency 

firefighting duties as a volunteer firefighter during regular school hours without being subjected 

to disciplinary action by the school district. We conclude that while disciplinary action may 

not be undertaken, the school district board of trustees may require the principal to follow 

reasonable procedures to ensure that the needs of the school are adequately met during any 

absence. 

Labor Code section 230.32 provides: 

"(a) No employer shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against 

an employee for taking time off to perform emergency duty as a volunteer 

firefighter. 

"(b) Any employee who is discharged, threatened with discharge, 

demoted, suspended, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms 

and conditions of employment by his or her employer because the employee has 

taken time off to perform emergency duty as a volunteer firefighter shall be 

entitled to reinstatement and reimbursement for lost wages and work benefits 

caused by the acts of the employer. Any employer who willfully refuses to 

rehire, promote, or otherwise restore an employee or former employee who has 

been determined to be eligible for rehiring or promotion by a grievance 

procedure, arbitration, or hearing authorized by law, is guilty of a misdemeanor. 

"(c) Subdivisions (a) and (b) of this section shall not apply to any public 

safety agency or provider of emergency medical services when, as determined by 

the employer, the employee's absence would hinder the availability of public 

safety or emergency medical services. 

"Volunteer firefighter" means any person registered as a volunteer member of a 

regularly organized fire department of a city, county, city and county, or district, having official 

recognition of the government of the city, county, city and county, or district in which such 

department is located. (Gov. Code, ' 50952, subds. (h), (m).) 

2

Unless otherwise specified all section references hereinafter are to the Labor Code. 

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"(d) For purposes of this section, "volunteer firefighter" shall have the 

same meaning as the term "volunteer" in subdivision (m) of Section 50952 of the 

Government Code." 

In analyzing the language of section 230.3 so as to resolve the question 

presented, we bear in mind several well established principles of statutory construction. As 

explained by the Supreme Court in Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment and Housing Com. 

(1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386-1387: 

"Pursuant to established principles, our first task in construing a statute is 

to ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the 

law. In determining such intent, a court must look first to the words of the 

statute themselves, giving to the language its usual, ordinary import and 

according significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in 

pursuance of the legislative purpose. A construction making some words 

surplusage is to be avoided. The words of the statute must be construed in 

context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections 

relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each 

other, to the extent possible. [Citations.] Where uncertainty exists 

consideration should be given to the consequences that will flow from a 

particular interpretation. [Citation.] Both the legislative history of the statute 

and the wider historical circumstances of its enactment may be considered in 

ascertaining the legislative intent. [Citation.]" 

The role of the volunteer firefighter and the need for protective legislation was 

expressed in the legislative history of section 230.3 at the time of its enactment. (Stats. 1989, 

ch. 167, ' 1.) The report of the Assembly Committee on Labor and Employment stated with 

respect to the proposed legislation: 

"Volunteer firefighters play an important and often vital role, not only in 

combating fires in their community, but also in assisting the state and other 

governmental bodies in fighting regional fires. Membership in volunteer 

firefighter units should be encouraged. Volunteers should not be subjected to 

the possibility of job loss or other negative employment consequences as a result 

of their services to the community." 

While the legislative history expresses the general legislative intent in enacting 

section 230.3, we recognize that special rules of statutory construction apply when determining 

whether the general terms of a statute are applicable to a public agency and public officials. 

These rules were summarized by the Supreme Court in City of Los Angeles v. City of San 

Fernando (1975) 14 Cal.3d 199, 276-277, as follows: 

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"[I]n the absence of express words to the contrary, neither the state nor its 

subdivisions are included within the general words of a statute. [Citations.] 

But this rule excludes governmental agencies from the operation of general 

statutory provisions only if their inclusion would result in an infringement upon 

sovereign governmental powers. `Where . . . no impairment of sovereign 

powers would result, the reason underlying this rule of construction ceases to 

exist and the Legislature may properly be held to have intended that the statute 

apply to governmental bodies even though it used general statutory language 

only.' [Citations.]" 

We find it significant that although section 230.3 refers generally to an 

"employer," it specifically refers to a "public safety agency." (' 230.3, subd. (c).) Under 

subdivision (c), section 230.3 is inapplicable to public safety agencies when the employee's 

absence would hinder the availability of public safety services. The term "public safety 

agency" is not defined in the Labor Code, but it is used in the Government Code, where it is 

defined as "a functional division of a public agency which provides firefighting, police, 

medical, or other emergency services." (Gov. Code, ' 53102.) We may adopt such definition 

of "public safety agency" for purposes of section 230.3 under the principle of construction that 

"[t]he interpretation of an ambiguous statutory phrase may be aided by reference to other 

statutes which apply to similar or analogous subjects." (People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 

1002, 1008-1009.) 

Accordingly, we find that the Legislature intended for section 230.3 to be 

applicable to public employers as well as private employers. If it had intended to exclude all 

public employers, there would have been no need to create the express exception for public 

safety agencies which appears in subdivision (c).3 The exception would be mere surplusage. 

We construe the exception as indicating that only matters of public safety will justify an 

employer's rejection of a call for the emergency services of a volunteer firefighter. Such 

construction is consistent with the legislative history of section 230.3 which expresses a strong 

public policy favoring the immediate availability of all volunteer firefighters when emergencies 

arise.4 

3

A school district would not be considered an agency which provides police, medical, or 

other emergency services. 

We note that the Education Code contains specific provisions which govern the 

granting of leaves of absence to school employees for the purpose of appearing as a witness in 

court, responding to an official order from another governmental jurisdiction, or serving as a 

juror. (Ed. Code, '' 44036-44037.) We do not find the call for volunteer firefighters to be in 

the nature of an "official order" and therefore regard Education Code section 44036 as 

inapplicable to the matter under consideration here. 

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Our construction of section 230.3 is also consistent with the provisions of section 

220, which provide: 

"Nothing in sections 200 to 211 and 215 to 219, inclusive, shall apply to 

the payment of wages of employees directly employed by the State or any 

county, incorporated city or town or other municipal corporation. All other 

employments are for the purposes of these sections private employments and 

subject to the provisions thereof." 

Section 220 is part of the same legislative scheme ('' 200-243) as section 230.3 and indicates 

that the Legislature could easily have excluded public employees from the requirements of the 

latter statute if it had so intended. (Cf., 73 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 13, 23 (1990).) 

We therefore conclude that the term "employer," as used in section 230.3, 

applies to public as well as private employers. Nevertheless, we do not believe that 

section 230.3 and Education Code section 35020 must be treated as irreconcilable.5 We are 

directed to harmonize statutes relating to the same subject wherever possible. (Dyna-Med, Inc. 

v. Fair Employment and Housing Com., supra, 43 Cal.3d at 1387.) Although advance notice 

of an emergency firefighting situation may not reasonably be expected, it would be incumbent 

upon the principal as the holder of a position of public trust6 to inform the district of his 

firefighter status and to arrange with the district for a contingency plan to be utilized whenever 

he is called away for emergency firefighting duty. Such a plan could ensure that the public 

functions for which the principal is responsible do not unduly suffer as the result of any 

absence. The school district's ability to "fix and prescribe" the duties of its employees thus 

need not be fundamentally compromised in accommodating the public's emergency firefighting 

needs. 

It is concluded that the governing board of a school district may not discipline a 

school principal for taking time off to perform emergency duty as a volunteer firefighter, but 

5 "[W]hen a special and a general statute are in conflict, the former controls." 

(Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 391, 420.) Here, section 

230.3 would necessarily be considered the more specific if the two statutes could not be 

reconciled. 

6

A school principal, as the highest level administrator within a particular school, is in a 

position which directly affects the school district's capacity to perform governmental functions. 

If a principal is able to leave his post on an unscheduled basis for non-school related purposes, 

the district's ability to ensure proper management of the school could be diminished. (See 

Nutter v. City of Santa Monica (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 292, 302.) 

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may require the principal to follow reasonable procedures to ensure that the needs of the school 

are adequately met during any absence. 

* * * * * 

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