UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SASHA M. JONES, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) CAUSE NO. 1:15-CV-293-JVB-SLC 

 v. ) 

 ) 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ) 

Acting Commissioner of the ) 

Social Security Administration ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 Plaintiff Sasha Jones seeks judicial review of the Acting Social Security Commissioner’s 

decision denying her supplementary security income benefits. For the reasons set forth below, 

the Court affirms in part, vacates in part, and remands for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. 

A. Overview of the Case 

 Plaintiff received supplemental security income benefits as a child due to disability. In 

accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(H)(iii), her eligibility for benefits was redetermined 

under adult disability standards upon turning eighteen. This redetermination concluded Plaintiff 

was not disabled and thus ineligible for continued supplemental security income benefits. After a 

hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Plaintiff was again found not disabled. The 

Appeals Council denied her request for review, rendering the denial final agency action for 

purposes of judicial review. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1481. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff 

requests this Court to review the denial. 
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B. Standard of Review 

 This Court has authority to review the Commissioner’s decision under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g). The Court must ensure that the ALJ has built an “accurate and logical bridge” from 

evidence to conclusion. Thomas v. Colvin, 745 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court will 

uphold decisions that apply the correct legal standard and are supported by substantial evidence. 

Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence is 

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008). 

C. Disability Standard 

The Commissioner follows a five-step inquiry in evaluating claims for disability benefits 

under the Social Security Act: 

(1) whether the claimant is currently employed; (2) whether the claimant has a 

severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment is one that the 

Commissioner considers conclusively disabling; (4) if the claimant does not have 

a conclusively disabling impairment, whether he can perform his past relevant 

work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the 

national economy. 

Kastner v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 642, 646 (7th Cir. 2012). 

 The claimant bears the burden of proof at every step except step five. Clifford v. Apfel, 

227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000). 

D. Analysis 

 Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred in (1) considering limitations related to maintaining 

concentration, persistence, and pace; (2) determining that her back impairment was non-severe 
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or, alternatively, that he failed to properly consider her back limitations; and (3) failing to 

address her headaches whatsoever. 

(1) Concentration, Persistence, and Pace

 Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to adequately address her moderate limitations in 

maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace. (Pl.’s Br. at 12.) The ALJ, Plaintiff contends, 

conceded the presence of such limitations in his decision but failed to incorporate this finding 

into the hypotheticals presented to the vocational expert and in Plaintiff’s residual functional 

capacity (RFC) determination. Id. (citing R. at 21.) 

 Generally, a vocational expert testifying at a disability hearing must be oriented to the 

totality of the claimant’s limitations. O’Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 619 (7th Cir. 

2010). Limitations on concentration, persistence, and pace are among those which the vocational 

expert must consider. Id. “Concentration, persistence, and pace” are not “magic words,” 

however; the ALJ is not required to use this specific phraseology in his hypotheticals. See id.

 The ALJ here presented the vocational expert with three hypotheticals, which were 

ultimately consistent with the RFC determination. (R. at 21, 714–16.) The ALJ asked the 

following of the vocational expert: 

[1] I want you to assume, if you will, an individual 22 years of age with an 

11th grade education and the past work history—and no prior work history. I want 

you to assume that that individual is limited to occupations which do not require 

working with the public, do not require more than superficial interrelationships 

with others. And further assume that the individual could not engage in complex 

or detailed tasks, but remain[s] capable of performing simple/routine tasks. 

With those limitations, would there be any jobs that individual could 

perform that exist in significant numbers in the national economy? 

. . . . 

[2] Assume an individual of the same age, education and past work 

experience who has—limited to work at the light exertional level, was limited to 

occupations that do not require more than occasional climbing, crouching, 
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crawling, kneeling and stooping and also had the same non-exertional restrictions 

as indicated in the first hypothetical. 

With those limitations, would there be any jobs such an individual could 

perform? 

. . . . 

[3] Assume an individual of the same age, education, and past work 

experience who had limitations consistent with the testimony presented. With 

those limitations, would that individual be capable of any jobs that exist in 

significant numbers? 

Id. The vocational expert testified that jobs existed in the national economy for the first two 

hypotheticals, but not for the third. Id.

 The ALJ found Plaintiff capable of performing a full range of work at all exertional 

levels, with the following limitations: “no interaction with the public and only superficial 

interaction with coworkers and supervisors. The claimant is limited to simple repetitive tasks.” 

(R. at 21.) In coming to these limitations, he cited medical evidence which noted Plaintiff was 

able to complete simple work-like activities with superficial interaction with coworkers and 

supervisors in a limited public interaction position. (R. at 21–23 (citing R. at 429, 623).) He 

incorporated these medical conclusions nearly-verbatim in the hypotheticals presented to the 

vocational expert. (R. 714–15.) The vocational expert testified jobs exist in the national economy 

which could be performed by an individual with those limitations. Id. This chain of reasoning, 

supported by substantial evidence, draws an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence 

and the ALJ’s conclusion. The Commissioner’s decision regarding Plaintiff’s limitations on 

concentration, persistence, and pace is therefore affirmed. 

(2) Back Impairment
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 Plaintiff asserts the ALJ improperly concluded her back impairment was non-severe. 

(Pl.’s Br. at 14–18.) In the alternative, if her back impairment was properly found non-severe, 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to properly consider the non-severe impairment. Id.

 An ALJ is required to determine whether a claimant has an impairment—or a 

combination of impairments—that is severe, meaning it significantly limits her physical or 

mental ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. In order to be considered a 

severe impairment, an impairment must be expected to last at least twelve months or to result in 

death. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505, 1509. 

 Here, the ALJ properly found Plaintiff’s back impairment was not severe. He cited 

substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that Plaintiff’s back impairment did not 

significantly limit her ability to perform basic work activity and did not meet the twelve-month 

durational requirement. (R. at 19–20.) When the ALJ continued on to consider Plaintiff’s RFC, 

however, he failed to address her back impairment at all. (R. at 21–23.) 

 When assessing a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ must consider all medically-determinable 

impairments of which he is aware, including those which are non-severe. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545 

He must articulate, at some minimum level, his analysis of the evidence to allow a reviewing 

court to trace the path of his reasoning. Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 307 (7th Cir. 1995). There is 

no indication in the decision why Plaintiff’s alleged back impairment, while non-severe, was not 

incorporated into her RFC. This omission fails to draw a logical bridge between evidence and 

conclusion and, accordingly, constitutes error. 

 Standing alone, this error may nonetheless be harmless. Despite not incorporating 

Plaintiff’s back impairment into the RFC, the ALJ presented the vocational expert with a 

hypothetical which incorporated an exertional limitation consistent with a back impairment. (R. 
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at 715) The vocational expert testified an individual with such limitations could perform light, 

unskilled jobs which exist in the national economy. Id. Determining the harmlessness of this 

error is ultimately unnecessary, however, because this case must be remanded on the issue of 

Plaintiff’s headaches regardless. 

 On remand, therefore, the ALJ must incorporate Plaintiff’s back impairment into her RFC 

determination. This Court cannot say whether doing so will actually change her RFC, but the 

ALJ must nevertheless address the impairment. He must draw an accurate and logical bridge 

between the evidence and his conclusion, whatever that may be. 

(3) Headaches

 Plaintiff points out, and the Commissioner concedes, that the ALJ wholly failed to 

mention Plaintiff’s headaches in his opinion. Plaintiff asserts error on these grounds. Rather than 

arguing such omission did not constitute error, the Commissioner maintains the error was 

harmless. 

 An ALJ must consider impairments a claimant says she has, or about which the ALJ 

receives evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512; Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 504 (7th Cir. 

2004). An ALJ may not ignore an entire line of evidence. Diaz, 55 F.3d at 307. Yet, where there 

is no reason to believe correcting an error on remand would lead to a different result, an 

otherwise-reversible opinion may be sustained to prevent the fruitless expenditure of judicial 

resources. See Fisher v. Bowen, 869 F.3d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1989). Just as the harmless error 

doctrine applies to appellate courts reviewing lower court decisions, so too does it apply to 

judicial review of administrative decisions. Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 924 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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 Headaches make an appearance in several documents contained in the record. These 

include complaints to treating doctors (R. at 463.), prescription of medication (R. 461–62.), and 

administration of an occipital nerve block. (R. at 459.) Granted, it appears Plaintiff’s headaches 

have improved somewhat over time. (See, e.g., R. at 442, 450, 455.) This Court, however, cannot 

say that incorporating Plaintiff’s headaches into a disability determination would have no effect 

on its result. Perhaps Plaintiff’s headaches, in conjunction with her other impairments, will be 

sufficiently limiting to find her disabled. Perhaps a vocational expert will testify there are no jobs 

for an individual with Plaintiff’s limitations, including her headaches. Perhaps her headaches 

have completely resolved and will not so much as impact her RFC. That is for the ALJ to 

determine on remand, by drawing an accurate and logical bridge between evidence and 

conclusion. What he may not do, however, is ignore the issue entirely. 

E. Conclusion 

 For the reasons stated above, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision with respect 

to Plaintiff’s limitations on maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace; vacates the 

Commissioner’s decision with respect to Plaintiff’s back issues and headaches; and remands for 

redetermination of Plaintiff’s disability in a manner consistent with this opinion. 

 SO ORDERED on February 16, 2017. 

 s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

 JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE