IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

BRANDON LEE SCROGGIN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 2:15-CV-432

)

PEGGY DAWSON, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Brandon Lee Scroggin, a pro se prisoner, filed an amended

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (DE #16.) He has also requested

a preliminary injunction and to be appointed counsel. (DE ##4, 20.) 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court:

(1) DENIES the motion for appointment of counsel (DE #4);

(2) DIRECTS the Clerk to send Scroggin ten copies of this

screening order;

(3) DENIES the request for a preliminary injunction;

(4) DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of Scroggin’s amended

complaint (DE #16) along with his letter (DE #20) a copy of this

order to the Superintendent of the Miami Correctional Facility;

(5) GRANTS Brandon Lee Scroggin leave to proceed on his Eighth

Amendment claim against Peggy Dawson and Victoria Burdine in their

individual capacities for money damages for continuing to

administer crushed Wellbutrin that they were told had made his

condition worse;

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(6) GRANTS Brandon Lee Scroggin leave to proceed on his Eighth

Amendment claim against Peggy Dawson and Victoria Burdine for

injunctive relief in connection with properly administering 

Wellbutrin;

(7) GRANTS Brandon Lee Scroggin leave to proceed on his Eighth

Amendment claim against Lee Ann Ivers in her individual capacity

for money damages for denying him adequate medical care by ignoring

his health care requests for his damaged taste buds;

(8) GRANTS Brandon Lee Scroggin leave to proceed on his Eighth

Amendment claim against Lee Ann Ivers for injunctive relief to

schedule medical treatment of his damaged taste buds;

(9) DISMISSES all other claims;

(10) DISMISSES Kathy Griffin, Jennifer Fiscal, Marlene Parker,

Richard Webber, and Corizon Health;

(11) DIRECTS the United States Marshals Service, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to effect service of process on Peggy Dawson,

Victoria Burdine and Lee Ann Ivers; and

(12) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that Peggy

Dawson, Victoria Burdine and Lee Ann Ivers respond, as provided for

in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10.1,

only to the claim for which the pro se plaintiff has been granted

leave to proceed in this screening order. 

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BACKGROUND

Brandon Lee Scroggin, a pro se prisoner, filed his amended

complaint on April 14, 2016. (DE #16.) He alleges that

psychiatrists Peggy Dawson and Victoria Burdine have denied him

adequate medical care by administering crushed time-released

Wellbutrin. He also alleges that Nursing Director Lee Ann Ivers

has ignored his requests to be seen by medical professionals for

his injured taste buds suffered as a result of taking crushed

Wellbutrin. He further alleges the rest of the individual

defendants have failed to help him. And, finally, he brings suit

against Corizon Health as the defendants’ employer.

DISCUSSION

A. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a

prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,

or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. In determining whether the

complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard as

when deciding a motion to dismiss under FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir.

2006). To survive dismissal, a complaint must state a claim for

relief that is plausible on its face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ.

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Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 603. Thus,

the plaintiff “must do better than putting a few words on paper

that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that

something has happened to her that might be redressed by the law.

Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010)

(emphasis in original). The Court must bear in mind, however, that

“[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro

se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 

According to the amended complaint, Scroggin has been

diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder, along with being Bi-Polar

and anti-social. Prior to arriving at the Miami Correctional

Facility (“Miami”), he was prescribed Wellbutrin to deal with his

diagnosed conditions. According to GlaxoSmithKline, Wellbutrin’s

maker, and the Federal Drug Administration, Wellbutrin should not

be crushed. 

Once he arrived at Miami, Scroggin was assigned and treated by

psychiatrist Peggy Dawson. After approximately eight or nine

months, Dawson ordered Scroggin’s Wellbutrin to be crushed and

taken with water. Scroggin alleges that taking Wellbutrin in this

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manner has permanently damaged his taste buds. He claims he cannot

taste anything. He further claims that taking crushed Wellbutrin is

not effective in controlling his diagnosed mental conditions.

Scroggin informed Dawson of these effects, but Dawson told him that

the medication would continue to be crushed and put into water

pursuant to Victoria Burdine’s orders.

Scroggin filled out healthcare request forms asking to be seen

by a doctor for his damaged taste buds. However, even though

Nursing Director Lee Ann Ivers was aware of his condition, she

ignored his healthcare requests. This has resulted in Scroggin not

receiving medical treatment.

On August 31, 2015, Scroggin filed an informal grievance

complaining about the crushed Wellbutrin and sent copies to Peggy

Dawson, Superintendent Kathy Griffin, Assistant Superintendent

Jennifer Fiscal, Director of Mental Health, and Marlene Parker.

None of these individuals intervened.

Based on these allegations, Scroggin has brought Eighth

Amendment claims against Peggy Dawson, Lee Ann Ivers, Marlene

Parker, Richard Webber, Kathy Griffin, Jennifer Fiscal, Victoria

Burdine, and Corizon Health. Scroggin seeks money damages and

injunctive relief - to be medically treated for his damaged taste

buds and have his Wellbutrin administered properly.

Under the Eighth Amendment, inmates are entitled to adequate

medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To

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establish liability, a prisoner must satisfy both an objective and

subjective component by showing: (1) his medical need was

objectively serious; and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate

indifference to that medical need. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. A

medical need is “serious” if it is one that a physician has

diagnosed as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that

even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a

doctor’s attention. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir.

2005). Deliberate indifference means that the defendant “acted in

an intentional or criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant

must have known that the plaintiff was at serious risk of being

harmed and decided not to do anything to prevent that harm from

occurring even though he could have easily done so.” Board v.

Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal citation

omitted). 

For a medical professional to be held liable for deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need, he or she must make a

decision that represents “such a substantial departure from

accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to

demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the

decision on such a judgment.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697

(7th Cir. 2008). A mere disagreement with medical professionals

about the appropriate course of treatment does not establish

deliberate indifference, nor does negligence or even medical

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practice. Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011). An

inmate who has received some form of treatment for a medical

condition must show that the treatment was “so blatantly

inappropriate as to evidence intentional mistreatment likely to

seriously aggravate his condition.” Id.

Here, Scroggin alleges that psychologists Peggy Dawson and

Victoria Burdine knew of the warnings against crushing Wellbutrin

and also knew of the damages it was causing Scroggin, but

nevertheless continued to administer crushed Wellbutrin. This

states a claim for deliberate indifference. Perez v. Fenoglio, 792

F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2015). Although further factual development may

show that Burdine and Dawson were justified in administering

crushed Wellbutrin to Scroggin, giving him the inferences to which

he is entitled at this stage, he has alleged enough to proceed on

an Eighth Amendment claim against them.

Next, Scroggin brings suit against Lee Ann Ivers, the nursing

director, for failing to schedule him to see a medical provider for

his injured taste buds. He alleges that Ivers violated the Eighth

Amendment by ignoring his health care request forms for treatment.

Scroggin states that this resulted in him not receiving treatment,

which has caused him to suffer for a prolonged period of time. A

delay in providing treatment can constitute deliberate indifference

when it causes unnecessary pain or suffering. Arnett v. Webster,

658 F.3d 742, 752-53 (7th Cir. 2011); Grieveson v. Anderson, 538

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F.3d 763, 779 (7th Cir. 2008). Thus, Scroggin has alleged an

Eighth Amendment claim against Ivers and he will be permitted to

proceed on a claim against her.

Next, Scroggin brings suit against Kathy Griffin, Jennifer

Fiscal, Marlene Parker, and Richard Webber for failing to intervene

in Burdine and Dawson’s decision to administer crushed Wellbutrin.

Scroggin does not allege, nor is it reasonable to infer from the

amended complaint, that any of these officials played a direct role

in the providing of medical care. Nevertheless, Scroggin asserts

that they had personal involvement sufficient to trigger liability

under Section 1983 because he complained to them about his

treatment. “Section 1983 does not establish a system of vicarious

responsibility” and “public employees are responsible for their own

misdeeds but not for anyone else’s.” Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d

592, 593 (7th Cir. 2009). As the Seventh Circuit has explained:

Bureaucracies divide tasks; no prisoner is entitled to

insist that one employee do another’s job. The division

of labor is important not only to bureaucratic

organization but also to efficient performance of tasks;

people who stay within their roles can get more work

done, more effectively, and cannot be hit with damages

under §1983 for not being ombudsmen. [The] view that

everyone who knows about a prisoner’s problem must pay

damages implies that [a prisoner] could write letters to

the Governor of Wisconsin and 999 other public officials,

demand that every one of those 1,000 officials drop

everything he or she is doing in order to investigate a

single prisoner’s claims, and then collect damages from

all 1,000 recipients if the letter-writing campaign does

not lead to better medical care. That can’t be right. The

Governor, and for that matter the Superintendent of

Prisons and the Warden of each prison, is entitled to

relegate to the prison’s medical staff the provision of

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good medical care.

Id. at 595. 

Nothing in the complaint indicates that Griffin, Fiscal,

Parker, Ivers, or Webber did anything to cause or exacerbate

Scroggin’s serious medical problems. At most, he alleges that they

knew about his complaints. Moreover, as noted above, Scroggin was

under the treatment of medical staff during this period, and nonmedical prison officials cannot be held liable for deferring to

their judgment. Id. at 596 (“[A] layperson’s failure to tell the

medical staff how to do its job cannot be called deliberate

indifference . . . .”); Greeno, 414 F.3d at 656 (“If a prisoner is

under the care of medical experts a non-medical prison official

will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in

capable hands.”). For these reasons, Scroggin fails to state a

claim against these defendants and they must be dismissed.

Finally, Scroggin sues Corizon. He is trying to hold the

company liable because it employs the individual medical staff

involved in his care. However, there is no general respondeat

superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Chavez v. Illinois State

Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Johnson v.

Dossey, 515 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[A] private corporation

is not vicariously liable under § 1983 for its employees’

deprivations of others’ civil rights.”). The crux of his amended

complaint is that individual medical staff made poor decisions in

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providing him care. Accordingly, Corizon will be dismissed as a

defendant.

B. Request for Preliminary Injunction

Scroggin seeks a preliminary injunction requiring officials at

Miami to treat his damaged taste buds and to also stop crushing his

Wellbutrin. “[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and

drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant,

by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v.

Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). To obtain preliminary

injunctive relief, the moving party must demonstrate that he or she

has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, lacks an

adequate remedy at law, and will suffer irreparable harm if

immediate relief is not granted. Girl Scouts of Manitou Council,

Inc. v. Girl Scouts of U.S., Inc., 549 F.3d 1079, 1086 (7th Cir.

2008). Even assuming Scroggin met these threshold requirements, a

preliminary injunction would still not be appropriate.

When a prisoner seeks injunctive relief against correctional

officials the last factor, public interest, takes on particular

importance. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, injunctive

relief must be “narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to

remedy the constitutional violation, and must use the least

intrusive means to correct the violation of the federal right.”

Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 681 (7th Cir. 2012). As the U.S.

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Supreme Court has observed, “the problems of prisons in America are

complex and intractable,” and “courts are particularly ill equipped

to deal with these problems[.]” Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229

(2001) (internal quote marks and citation omitted). Accordingly,

courts must afford prison officials “wide-ranging deference” in the

day-to-day operations of a correctional facility. Bell v. Wolfish,

441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979). Moreover, a preliminary injunction

ordering the defendant to take an affirmative act rather than

merely refrain from certain conduct is “cautiously used and

sparingly issued.” Graham v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 130 F.3d 293, 295

(7th Cir. 1993).

The method of how to administer drugs for a prison inmate and

whether to treat certain conditions is an exercise of medical

judgment. To obtain a preliminary injunction in such a situation

requires proof that prison officials have refused to appropriately

administer a drug, appropriately treat a condition, or “to follow

the advice of a specialist.” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 753

(7th Cir. 2011). While Scroggin has alleged enough to get beyond

the pleading stage, he has not presented any evidence from any

medical professional that he should not be given crushed Wellbutrin

or that he needs medical attention for his taste buds. The Eighth

Amendment does not entitle inmates to demand specific care, id., or

authorize courts to decide questions of medical care on the basis

of lay opinion. Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014);

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Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 1996). Moreover,

ordering prison officials to administer medication in a particular

manner is a substantial interference with prison administration.

Prisons, at times, have strong incentives to crush certain

medication to avoid the risk of hoarding. Craig v. Lane, No. 2:13-

CV-92, 2015 WL 5174049, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 2, 2015).

Here, public policy weighs against granting an injunction at

this preliminary stage. Getting involved in this matter is the type

of day-to-day operations the court tries to avoid. Such decisions

are better left to the correctional facility’s deference. For now,

the Superintendent will be provided with a copy of this order so

that he is aware of these issues and this litigation so he can best

decide how to proceed.

C. Request for Counsel

Scroggin also requests the court appoint him counsel. Indigent

civil litigants have no constitutional or statutory right to be

represented by counsel in federal court. Jackson v. County of

McLean, 953 F.2d 1070, 1073 (7th Cir. 1992). However, the court may

in its discretion appoint counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The

Seventh Circuit has directed:

When confronted with a request under § 1915(e)(1) for pro

bono counsel, the district court is to make the following

inquiries: (1) has the indigent plaintiff made a

reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively

precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the

difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear

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competent to litigate it himself? 

Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007). When a litigant

fails to satisfy the first inquiry, the court is justified in

denying the motion. Jackson, 953 F.2d at 1073. Scroggin does not

address this first prong, and there is nothing in the motion to

indicate that he has made any efforts to obtain counsel on his own.

Accordingly, the motion will be denied. However, the Court will

direct the Clerk to send Scroggin ten copies of this screening

order so that he can enclose them in his letters to attorneys

asking them to represent him in this case.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court: 

(1) DENIES the motion for appointment of counsel (DE #4);

(2) DIRECTS the Clerk to send Scroggin ten copies of this

screening order;

(3) DENIES the request for a preliminary injunction;

(4) DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of Scroggin’s amended

complaint (DE #16) along with his letter (DE #20) a copy of this

order to the Superintendent of the Miami Correctional Facility;

(5) GRANTS Brandon Lee Scroggin leave to proceed on his Eighth

Amendment claim against Peggy Dawson and Victoria Burdine in their

individual capacities for money damages for continuing to

administer crushed Wellbutrin that they were told had made his

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condition worse;

(6) GRANTS Brandon Lee Scroggin leave to proceed on his Eighth

Amendment claim against Peggy Dawson and Victoria Burdine for

injunctive relief in connection with properly administering 

Wellbutrin;

(7) GRANTS Brandon Lee Scroggin leave to proceed on his Eighth

Amendment claim against Lee Ann Ivers in her individual capacity

for money damages for denying him adequate medical care by ignoring

his health care requests for his damaged taste buds;

(8) GRANTS Brandon Lee Scroggin leave to proceed on his Eighth

Amendment claim against Lee Ann Ivers for injunctive relief to

schedule medical treatment of his damaged taste buds;

(9) DISMISSES all other claims;

(10) DISMISSES Kathy Griffin, Jennifer Fiscal, Marlene Parker,

Richard Webber, and Corizon Health;

(11) DIRECTS the United States Marshals Service, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to effect service of process on Peggy Dawson,

Victoria Burdine and Lee Ann Ivers; and

(12) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that Peggy

Dawson, Victoria Burdine and Lee Ann Ivers respond, as provided for

in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10.1,

only to the claim for which the pro se plaintiff has been granted

leave to proceed in this screening order. 

DATED: July 5, 2016 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

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