UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

DANIEL SHOFFNER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CAUSE NO. 3:12-CV-030 PS 

vs. )

)

MICHAEL MOLLENHAUER, SCOTT BELL, )

STEPHEN VANCE, and SANDRA HARRIS, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Daniel Shoffner, a pro se prisoner, filed an amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

alleging that he was mistreated while at the LaPorte County Jail. Shoffner names four defendants

and he raises two distinct claims. First, he argues that the medical ward at the jail should not be

on lock-down. Second, he argues that he was denied medical treatment. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the complaint and dismiss it if the

action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant

who is immune from such relief. Courts apply the same standard under Section 1915A as when

deciding a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463

F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint

must state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs.,

581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 602. Thus, a “plaintiff must do better than putting a few words

on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has happened
to her that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th

Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original). The court must bear in mind, however, that “[a] document filed

pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be

held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 

Shoffner states that these events occurred while he was a pre-trial detainee. Pre-trial

detainees may not be punished without due process of law. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).

They are entitled to the procedural protections of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974),

before imposition of punishment. Nevertheless, not every act against an inmate constitutes

punishment, and a hearing is not necessary when a lock-down is implemented for legitimate

security reasons. See Zarnes v. Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285, 291 n.5 (7th Cir. 1995). Here, Shoffner

alleges the entire cell block was locked down when another inmate smuggled drugs into the jail. 

Prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption

and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve

internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security. That deference

extends to a prison security measure taken in response to an actual confrontation

with riotous inmates, just as it does to prophylactic or preventive measures intended

to reduce the incidence of these or any other breaches of prison discipline. 

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1986) (citations, ellipsis, and quotation marks omitted).

Here, it is clear that the lock-down was not intended to punish Shoffner. Therefore he was not

entitled to due process and he does not state a claim based on the lock-down of the cell block. 

Shoffner also alleges that he was denied medical treatment at the jail. The complaint

names four defendants: three non-medical staff and a nurse. “If a prisoner is under the care of

medical experts a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the

prisoner is in capable hands.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir. 2005) (ellipsis

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omitted) quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3rd Cir. 2004). Here, Shoffner has not

plausibly alleged that the non-medical staff had any reason to second guess his medical care.

Therefore the three non-medical jail staff will be dismissed. 

Shoffner alleges that Sandra Harris charged him1

 for medications that he did not receive,

denied him a mattress, denied him adequate exercise for his medical condition, and denied him

medications that he had been prescribed. “For a medical professional to be liable for deliberate

indifference to an inmate’s medical needs, [s]he must make a decision that represents such a

substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to

demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.”

Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Medical malpractice and incompetence do not state a claim of deliberate indifference. Walker v.

Peters, 233 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2000). Neither does a mere “disagreement with medical

professionals . . . state a cognizable Eighth Amendment Claim under the deliberate indifference

standard of Estelle v. Gamble [429 U.S. 97 (1976)].” Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 331 (7th

Cir. 2003). Here, giving Shoffner the benefit of the inferences to which he is entitled at the

pleading stage of this proceeding, he has stated a claim against Sandra Harris for denying him a

1

 Though the Fourteenth Amendment provides that state officials shall not “deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law,” a state tort claims act that provides a method by which a person can

seek reimbursement for the negligent loss or intentional deprivation of property meets the requirements of the due

process clause by providing due process of law. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (“For intentional, as

for negligent deprivations of property by state employees, the state’s action is not complete until and unless it

provides or refuses to provide a suitable post deprivation remedy.”). Indiana’s tort claims act (INDIANA CODE § 34-

13-3-1 et seq.) and other laws provide for state judicial review of property losses caused by government employees,

and provide an adequate post-deprivation remedy to redress state officials’ accidental or intentional deprivation of a

person’s property. See Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Wynn has an adequate postdeprivation remedy in the Indiana Tort Claims Act, and no more process was due.”). Therefore, Shoffner does not

state a claim for the money taken from his account to pay for medication he did not receive. Nevertheless, he does

state a claim for having been denied medications that he was prescribed. 

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mattress, denying him adequate exercise for his medical condition, and denying him medications

that he had been prescribed. 

For the foregoing reasons, the court:

(1) GRANTS Daniel Shoffner leave to proceed against Sandra Harris in her individual

capacity for monetary and punitive damages for denying him a mattress, denying him adequate

exercise for his medical condition, and denying him medications that he had been prescribed in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment;

(2) DISMISSES all other claims; 

(3) DISMISSES Michael Mollenhauer, Scott Bell, and Stephen Vance;

(4) DIRECTS the clerk to transmit the summons and USM-285’s for Sandra Harris to

the United States Marshals Service along with a copy of this order and a copy of the amended

complaint (ECF 5); 

(5) DIRECTS the United States Marshals Service, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to

effect service of process on Sandra Harris; and

(6) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that Sandra Harris respond, as

provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. IND. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the

claim for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order.2

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: March 15, 2012

s/ Philip P. Simon 

PHILIP P. SIMON, CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2

 N.D. IND. L.R. 10-1(b) exempts answers to pro se complaints from the obligation to include a verbatim,

paragraph by paragraph recitation of the complaint. 

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