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Filed 4/17/23 P. v. Zalloum CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

KHALED MOHD ZALLOUM,

Defendant and Appellant.

E078029

(Super.Ct.No. INF1702079)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Matthew Perantoni, 

Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part with directions. 

Christopher Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson, Christine Y. 

Friedman and Marvin E. Mizell, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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A jury convicted Khaled Mohd Zalloum of one misdemeanor count of corporal 

injury resulting in a traumatic condition on a former cohabitant or dating partner (Pen. 

Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)) and one misdemeanor count of violating a domestic violence 

protective order (Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (c)(1); undesignated statutory references are to 

this code). Zalloum argues that the trial court prejudicially erred by (1) not instructing 

the jury on the defense of necessity as to the protective order count and (2) excluding 

testimony about a civil lawsuit the victim brought against him. We agree about the 

instructional error and reverse the conviction for violating the protective order. We 

otherwise affirm.

BACKGROUND

A. The Relationship and the Criminal Charges

In 2014, Zalloum met Jane Doe. They had an on-and-off romantic relationship 

from 2014 through 2018. 

In 2020, the People charged Zalloum with several offenses arising from incidents

involving Doe that occurred in June and October 2017. (All date references are to 2017

unless otherwise specified.) The information alleged that Zalloum had committed two

violations of section 273.5, subdivision (a)—one a misdemeanor on June 7 and one a 

felony on October 5—by willfully inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic 

condition on Doe. It was further alleged that on October 5 Zalloum willfully violated a 

protective order in violation of section 166, subdivision (c)(1) (section 166(c)(1)).
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Both Doe and Zalloum testified at trial. They agreed that their relationship had 

been toxic. Doe testified that over the years Zalloum physically abused her about 30 to 

50 times. She described a couple of incidents in which Zalloum used physical force 

against her. Zalloum denied that he had ever twisted Doe’s neck or hit, kicked, beaten, or 

choked her. 

B. June 7 Incident

On June 7, Doe and Zalloum were broken up and not living together. Doe had 

previously lived with Zalloum in his apartment in Palm Desert, California. While she 

lived there, Doe became friends with Sara M., one of Zalloum’s neighbor’s. On the night 

of June 6, Sara, Doe, and another friend of Doe’s went to a nightclub. Around 2:00 a.m.

the next morning, the three women and two men they had met at the club drove to the 

parking lot of Sara’s apartment complex. The group stood around the parking lot talking.

Zalloum came downstairs from his second floor apartment and started fighting 

with one or both of the men. Zalloum got into Doe’s car and, according to Doe, “called 

the cops because he was scared for his car.” A law enforcement officer arrived and told 

everyone who lived at the apartment complex to go back to their apartments and 

everyone else to leave.

Doe walked Zalloum to his apartment. When they arrived at the door to the 

apartment, Zalloum pushed Doe and told her to get inside the apartment. When inside, 

Zalloum pushed Doe onto the couch and would not allow her to leave, though she made 

several attempts. He stood in front of the door. Zalloum ripped off Doe’s dress and 
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necklace. Zalloum grabbed Doe with one hand and choked her against a wall for about 

20 to 30 seconds while Doe stood on her tiptoes. Doe felt numb and had difficulty 

breathing. Doe weighed 130 pounds, and she estimated that Zalloum weighed 190 to 210 

pounds.

Doe ran into Zalloum’s bedroom, banged on a wall shared with Sara’s apartment

next door, and screamed for Sara. Zalloum followed Doe into the bedroom and told her 

to be quiet. Zalloum grabbed Doe, pushed her onto the bed, and started hitting her body 

with one of his shoes. Doe put her hands and forearms up to try to protect herself from 

being hit by the shoe. Doe stopped screaming because she was afraid of Zalloum.

Sara woke up hearing Doe screaming Sara’s name. Sara was concerned and 

believed that Doe might be in danger. Sara went to Zalloum’s front door and knocked, 

but no one answered. Sara texted Zalloum at around 4:30 a.m. and asked if he and Doe 

could “‘please just go to sleep.’” Around the same time, a neighbor who lived below 

Zalloum called 911 and reported that he could hear thumping from the neighbors above 

him, who were also being “verbal.”

Zalloum choked Doe a second time, causing Doe to become “dizzy” and “very 

foggy” and “see[] stars.” Doe feared for her life. Doe said that she then heard the police 

banging on the window and demanding to be let in.

Law enforcement officers arrived at the apartment around 4:30 or 4:40 a.m. From 

the apartment complex’s parking lot across the courtyard, the officers could hear “yelling 

and screaming” from both a female and a male voice from somewhere in the complex. 
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One of the officers described what he heard as an “extremely verbal altercation.” That 

officer also heard “thumping-type noises” and thus believed there “was possibly a 

physical altercation as well.” The officers could not discern what was being said, but it 

sounded “violent” and like someone might be “in danger.” The officers were able to 

determine that the noises were coming from Zalloum’s apartment. 

As the officers got closer to Zalloum’s apartment, one of the officers heard a 

female voice repeatedly yelling, “‘Get off of me,’” and “‘Let me go.’” The officers 

knocked on the door. There was no response. The arguing continued. The officers 

knocked louder and announced their presence, demanding that the door be opened. A 

female voice continued to yell, “‘Get off me,’” and “‘Let me go.’”

Doe opened the door. She ran outside wearing only underwear. She was crying 

and hysterical. A female officer spoke to Doe. Another officer spoke with Zalloum. 

Sara was outside when Doe ran out. Doe told Sara that Zalloum had not allowed her to 

answer the door when Sara knocked.

A recording of the officer’s interview of Doe was played for the jury. While they 

talked, Doe held a bag of ice on her face. According to the officer interviewing Doe, Doe

was crying and distraught and appeared frightened. Doe reported to the officer that

Zalloum had ripped off her clothes, thrown her on the bed, the couch, and the floor,

“choked [her] out,” and hit her in the head. Doe said that Zalloum had been “physical 

with” her that night approximately 10 to 14 times. Doe had “blacked out for a minute.” 

She said that her head and eye were numb and that everything was “all blurry.” 
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Officers found a torn dress and a broken bracelet in the apartment. Zalloum had 

redness on his knuckles. Officers arrested Zalloum.

The interviewing officer took a couple of photographs of Doe. The officer noticed 

redness on the back and front of Doe’s neck along her jawline, which the other officer 

also noticed. The injuries were consistent with Doe’s having been choked. Doe’s eyes

appeared red and swollen, and her forearms were red. That afternoon, Doe went to the 

police station to allow officers to photograph bruises that had developed on her forearms. 

An officer confirmed that “sometimes bruises show up later.” 

Zalloum claimed that Doe had fabricated the entire incident. He admitted that he 

went downstairs into the parking lot when Doe and Sara were down there with others and 

that he pushed one of the men. Zalloum eventually went upstairs with Doe, though he 

did not expect her to stay with him that night. Zalloum did not tell her to go inside his 

apartment. When they were inside his apartment, he sat on the couch. Doe was 

“hysterically crying,” but Zalloum did not know why.

Before law enforcement arrived, Zalloum tried to go to sleep on the couch. He 

had offered Doe the bed, but she did not go to sleep. Doe attempted to have sex with him 

twice. Doe climbed on top of Zalloum while he was on the couch. Zalloum pushed Doe 

off, which she did not like. She cried and sobbed hysterically. Doe’s dress was torn 

because she aggressively took it off herself when she tried to have sex with Zalloum. 

Zalloum denied that he punched or choked Doe or beat her with a shoe. When law 

enforcement knocked on the door, Zalloum asked Doe to put clothes on, and she started 
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saying, “‘Let me go. Let me go.’” Zalloum moved away and opened the door. Zalloum 

did not recall Doe knocking on the wall to Sara’s apartment. He claimed that Sara was 

“probably” lying about hearing Doe scream for her that night because Zalloum did not 

hear that. Zalloum admitted that he did not believe the officers who heard screaming 

from across the courtyard made up what they heard.

C. October 5 Incident

After the June 7 incident, a court issued a three-year restraining order against 

Zalloum, prohibiting him from having any contact with Doe, communicating with her, or 

being within 100 yards of her. The order was filed on July 20 and expired on July 20, 

2020. Zalloum was served with the protective order. Despite the protective order, 

Zalloum and Doe remained in contact and continued to have a sexual relationship.

On October 5, law enforcement responded to a call concerning a possible violation 

of the order. Doe testified that Zalloum invited her to his house on October 4, so she 

went there and stayed the night. At some point on October 5, Zalloum locked her out of 

the house after pushing her through a sliding glass door onto the balcony. Doe did not 

have her cell phone or the keys to her car or house. Doe banged on the sliding glass door

and yelled for Zalloum to let her back inside. Doe said she was “hysterical.”

Zalloum eventually let Doe back inside. Zalloum punched Doe in the ear and put 

her into “a head hold,” which hurt her neck.

Zalloum’s testimony about what happened on October 5 differed from Doe’s. He 

testified that midmorning on October 5 he was awakened by Doe knocking or banging on 
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his bedroom window and calling his name. Doe also was banging on the sliding glass 

door of the living room. She was yelling and crying. Zalloum described Doe as “being 

hysterical.” Zalloum repeatedly told Doe that he could not be around her because of the 

protective order. Zalloum did not call the police. He instead opened the door because he 

“was scared [Doe] actually—to go through the glass door.” He reiterated that he let her 

inside because he “didn’t want her to go through . . . the slider.” He was concerned about 

Doe. He explained: “The way she was banging, I would rather violate the restraining 

order than see her come through the glass and hurt herself.” 

Zalloum asked Doe to calm down, but she would not. Doe jumped on Zalloum’s 

back and bit him on the back and the neck. After Zalloum got Doe off of his back, he

went into the bathroom and immediately started recording on his phone. The recording 

was played for the jury. Screenshots from the recording show the bite marks on 

Zalloum’s neck. In closing argument, the People conceded that there was “definitely a 

bite mark on [Zalloum’s] head.” Doe claimed that the bite mark on Zalloum’s head or 

neck was the result of a sexual encounter the previous night. Zalloum denied punching 

Doe in the ear or hitting her in the ear “on purpose.” 

D. Defense Closing Argument and Verdict

In closing argument, defense counsel acknowledged that the relationship between 

Zalloum and Doe was “very toxic” and that Doe appeared to be troubled, in pain, and 

suffering. Defense counsel argued, however, that “her allegations of physical violence 

[were] completely unreliable.” Defense counsel pointed out that Doe had made a 
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“barrage” of inconsistent statements and that her hostile demeanor when confronted 

about the inconsistencies demonstrated that she was “unreliable” and “not telling the 

truth.” Counsel pointed out the many inconsistencies in Doe’s testimony and encouraged 

the jury “to disregard all of [Doe’s] testimony, because it could not be believed.” The 

prosecutor argued that Zalloum had lied. 

The jury found Zalloum guilty of the misdemeanor infliction of corporal injury 

count arising from the June 7 incident and of violating a domestic violence protective 

order on October 5. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the felony infliction of 

corporal injury count arising from the October 5 incident, so the court declared a mistrial 

on that count.

DISCUSSION

A. Instructional Error—Defense of Necessity

Zalloum requested that the trial court instruct the jury on the defense of necessity 

in CALCRIM No. 3403. He contends that the trial court prejudicially erred by denying 

the request. We agree.

A trial court must instruct the jury “on any affirmative defense for which the 

record contains substantial evidence [citation]—evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury 

to find in favor of the defendant [citation]—unless the defense is inconsistent with the 

defendant’s theory of the case [citation]. In determining whether the evidence is 

sufficient to warrant a jury instruction, the trial court does not determine the credibility of 

the defense evidence, but only whether ‘there was evidence which, if believed by the 
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jury, was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt.’” (People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 

982 (Salas).) In other words, substantial evidence in this context means “‘evidence 

which is “sufficient to ‘deserve consideration by the jury, i.e., “evidence from which a 

jury composed of reasonable [people] could have concluded”’ that the particular facts 

underlying the instruction did exist.”’” (People v. Lemus (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 470, 

477 (Lemus).) Any doubts about the evidence’s sufficiency must be resolved in favor of 

the defendant. (People v. Cole (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 452, 484.) We independently

review the trial court’s decision. (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1206.)

Section 166(c)(1) makes punishable “a willful and knowing violation of a 

protective order.” The jury was instructed that to find Zalloum guilty of violating this 

provision it had to find that (1) there was a protective order restraining him from having 

any contact with Doe, (2) the order was issued “in a pending criminal proceeding 

involving domestic violence,” (3) Zalloum “knew of the court order,” (4) he “had the 

ability to follow the court order,” and (5) he “willfully or intentionally violated the court 

order.” (CALCRIM No. 2701.) The instruction further provided: “Someone commits an 

act willfully when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.” (CALCRIM No. 2701; § 7, 

subd. (1) [defining “‘willfully’”].)

“Except as to crimes that include lack of necessity (or good cause) as an element, 

necessity is an affirmative defense recognized based on public policy considerations.” 

(People v. Kearns (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1134-1135 (Kearns).) “Necessity does 

not negate any element of the crime, but represents a public policy decision not to punish 
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such an individual despite proof of the crime.” (People v. Heath (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 

892, 901.)

In order for an instruction on the necessity defense to be warranted, there must be 

sufficient evidence that the defendant violated the law (1) in an emergency situation to 

prevent a significant bodily harm or evil to themselves or to someone else, (2) when there 

was “no reasonable legal alternative, (3) without creating a greater danger than the one 

avoided, (4) with a good faith belief that the criminal act was necessary to prevent the 

greater harm, (5) with such belief being objectively reasonable, and (6) under 

circumstances in which [the defendant] did not substantially contribute to the 

emergency.” (Kearns, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 1135; CALCRIM No. 3403.) The

“defendant has the burden of establishing the affirmative defense of necessity by a 

preponderance of the evidence.” (People v. Dewberry (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1020; 

People v. Condley (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1012-1013.) 

Defense counsel requested that the jury be instructed on the defense of necessity

with CALCRIM No. 3403 for the count alleging that Zalloum violated the protective 

order on October 5. The trial court denied the request, explaining: “The Court does not 

believe that there’s substantial evidence of necessity, given the way that the evidence has 

come out on this case and the facts regarding the continuous contact between the 

defendant and” Doe. The court otherwise stated: “The evidence is that, I think, on 

10/5/17—first of all, it says ‘on or about that day.’ Additionally, wasn’t the order—isn’t 

there evidence that the order was violated all over the place that day, not just . . . .” 
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The parties agree that the trial court erred by rejecting the instruction on the 

ground that there was evidence that Zalloum had violated the order on some day before 

October 5. Zalloum was charged with violating the protective order only on October 5.

Both the prosecutor and defense counsel argued that the jury could find Zalloum guilty of 

violating the protective order only on the basis of the October 5 incident.

Notwithstanding the court’s erroneous reasoning, we must affirm if the ruling was 

correct on any ground. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 351, fn. 11.) But 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Zalloum, as we must, we conclude 

that there was sufficient evidence to support the necessity defense and therefore to 

require that the jury be instructed on it. Zalloum testified that he opened the sliding glass 

door to let Doe into his house on October 5 because he was worried that she would break 

the sliding glass door and injure herself. Though the accounts of why Doe was banging 

on the glass door differed, Zalloum and Doe both described her as being “hysterical” 

when she was banging. Given that evidence, along with Zalloum’s testimony that Doe 

arrived at his house uninvited, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to 

conclude that the elements of the necessity defense were proven. (Lemus, supra, 203 

Cal.App.3d at p. 477.)

A reasonable jury believing Zalloum’s account of how Doe came to be at his 

house on October 5 could conclude that Zalloum opened the door because the possibility 

of the glass door breaking presented an imminent threat to Doe’s safety. A reasonable 

jury could also conclude that Zalloum believed in good faith that violating the protective 
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order was necessary to prevent the greater harm of Doe being physically injured, which 

also would be objectively reasonable. Finally, a reasonable jury could have concluded 

that calling the police was not an adequate legal alternative (and that no other reasonable 

legal alternative existed) because the threatened harm was possibly imminent—that is, 

Doe’s banging on the glass while admittedly hysterical could cause the glass to break at 

any moment, not leaving time for Zalloum to wait for law enforcement to respond. 

Finally, although there was evidence that Zalloum substantially contributed to creating 

the emergency by locking Doe out of the house without her keys or phone, a reasonable

jury could have rejected that account and believed Zalloum, concluding that he did 

nothing to create the emergency. We thus conclude that the record contains substantial

evidence to support the defense of necessity and that the jury therefore should have been 

instructed on that defense.

The People’s arguments to the contrary lack merit. The People argue that Zalloum 

had an adequate legal alternative of calling the police and then letting Doe in “if they did 

not show up in a timely manner.” The People also argue that there was no evidence that 

the glass was particularly susceptible to breaking or that Doe could have broken the glass 

without a hard object, given her weight. Those arguments go to the weight of the 

evidence and not to its sufficiency. In determining whether an affirmative defense 

instruction should have been given, we do not weigh the evidence or evaluate its 

credibility. (Salas, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 982.) The prosecutor could have argued those 
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points to the jury, but they are not relevant to the analysis of whether the evidence was 

sufficient to instruct the jury on the defense.

The People also argue that a reasonable person would not have believed that 

opening the door was necessary, given the “volatile” nature of the relationship, the fact 

that Zalloum was arrested after the June incident, and the existence of the restraining 

order protecting Doe from him. The argument fails because those facts are irrelevant to 

the question of whether an objectively reasonable person would have believed that 

opening the glass door was necessary to prevent Doe from injuring herself.

We next analyze whether instructional error was prejudicial. The California 

Supreme Court has “yet to determine whether a trial court’s failure to instruct on a 

requested affirmative defense instruction supported by substantial evidence is federal 

constitutional error or state law error.” (People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 199; 

People v. Watt (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1219.) We need not resolve the question in

this case, because the error was prejudicial even under the state law standard. Under that 

standard, reversal is warranted if it is “‘reasonably probable that a result more favorable 

to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.’” (People v. 

Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837 (Watson).) In this context, a probability “‘“does 

not mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract 

possibility.”’” (Richardson v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1050.)

The jury was not told that it could acquit Zalloum if it believed his version of 

events but nevertheless found the elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable 
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doubt. The jury could have found the elements of violating the protective order satisfied 

by Zalloum’s act of opening the door (under his version of the day’s events) because he 

thereby “willfully or intentionally violated the court order,” and he “had the ability to 

follow the court order” by not opening the door. As far as the jury knew, there was no 

way to acquit Zalloum under those circumstances. But the necessity defense would have 

allowed the jury to find that Zalloum violated the order while also finding him not guilty. 

Given that the jury deadlocked on the felony corporal injury count arising from the same 

events, at least one juror did not believe Doe’s version of events in its entirety. Under 

these circumstances, there is a reasonable chance that the same jury would have returned 

a verdict more favorable to Zalloum concerning violation of the protective order had it 

been instructed on the necessity defense.

For all of these reasons, we conclude that it was prejudicial error not to instruct the 

jury on the defense of necessity. We accordingly reverse the conviction under section 

166(c)(1) and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

B. Evidence of the Civil Action 

Zalloum contends that the trial court prejudicially erred under Evidence Code 

section 352 by excluding evidence of a civil action Doe had brought against him and in 

which she received less damages than she sought. He argues that the evidence was 

probative on Doe’s credibility because it demonstrated that she had a motive to lie. We 

conclude that any error was harmless.
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1. Relevant Proceeding

Before trial, the prosecutor moved to exclude “[a]ny mention of a pending civil 

action between the victim and defendant as it is irrelevant, it will confuse the issues, and 

constitute a waste of time.” At a pretrial hearing, defense counsel explained to the court 

that the prosecution was referring to a small claims action Doe had filed against Zalloum 

“with overlapping allegations” in the criminal action. Doe sought $12,000 in damages, 

but the court awarded her $5,000. According to defense counsel, Doe was unhappy with 

the reduced award. Zalloum was unable to defend himself in the civil action “because he 

couldn’t testify.” Defense counsel then explained: “Then in the spring, we were 

discussing what restitution is, and she told the district attorney she was entitled to 

$40,000. Now, I think that’s relevant impeachment. I think that it’s motive to lie. I . . . 

think that she’s motivated by a desire to be paid, and she’s unhappy about the result of 

the small claims matter. And that’s why I think it’s relevant.” 

The prosecutor argued that the evidence was irrelevant because it did not tend to 

prove that Zalloum did not commit any of the charged offenses, and it would confuse the 

jury in any event. The prosecutor also argued that evidence of settlement negotiations 

and offers to compromise is expressly barred by Evidence Code section 1152. Defense 

counsel countered that statements Doe made to the prosecutor about what she believed 

she was owed in restitution did not amount to privileged settlement communications. 

Defense counsel argued that the evidence was relevant because it demonstrated that Doe 

was “going to try to get money out of this case.”
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The court granted the prosecutor’s motion and excluded any mention of the civil 

action. The court did not find the information to be “highly relevant” and also found that 

it would “confuse the issues and be a waste of time.”

2. Analysis

Section 273.5 makes punishable willfully inflicting corporal injury resulting in a 

traumatic condition upon a cohabitant or a former cohabitant. (Id., subds. (a), (b)(2).)

Evidence Code section 352 provides that a trial court “in its discretion may 

exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that 

its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial 

danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” We 

review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision to exclude evidence pursuant to 

Evidence Code section 352. (People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 480.)

Assuming for the sake of argument that the trial court abused its discretion by 

excluding evidence of the civil proceeding, we conclude that any such error was 

harmless. We apply the state law standard of Watson to determining whether the 

erroneous exclusion of evidence under Evidence Code section 352 was prejudicial.

(People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 878; Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) 

For the corporal injury count based on the events of June 7, Zalloum and Doe 

provided vastly different accounts of what happened. Although there were various 

inconsistencies in Doe’s testimony, which tended to undermine her credibility (and which 

defense counsel highlighted in closing argument), there was strong evidence 
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corroborating Doe’s version of what happened that night and thus strong evidence of 

Zalloum’s guilt. Sara woke up to Doe screaming her name. Another neighbor of 

Zalloum’s called 911 because he heard thumping and his neighbors being “verbal.” 

When officers arrived, they heard yelling, screaming, and “thumping-type” noises from 

the parking lot across the apartment complex. Before the officers knocked on Zalloum’s 

apartment door, they could hear a female voice yelling, “‘Let me go,’” and “‘Get off of 

me.’” Officers observed redness on Doe’s neck and that her eyes were red and swollen, 

all of which was consistent with her claim that Zalloum was choking and hitting her. The 

officers also noticed that her forearms were red. Bruises developed on her forearms later 

that day.

By contrast, Zalloum’s version of what happened did not account for any of the 

injuries Doe sustained, any of the yelling and thumping noises heard by his neighbors and 

the officers from across the apartment complex, or the officers’ hearing Doe yelling for 

Zalloum to get off of her and to let her go before the officers knocked on the door.

In sum, there was ample evidence corroborating Doe’s version of what happened 

on June 7, and there was no evidence corroborating Zalloum’s version. Moreover, the 

jury convicted Zalloum on the corporal injury count despite the issues with Doe’s 

credibility. For all of these reasons, we conclude that it is not reasonably probable that 

the jury would have reached a result more favorable to Zalloum on that count had 

evidence of the civil proceeding been admitted.
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DISPOSITION

We reverse the conviction under section 166(c)(1) and remand for further 

proceedings. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MENETREZ

J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ

P. J.

McKINSTER

J.