UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

TAMARA S. WITT, )

Plaintiff, )

)

 v. ) CAUSE NO.:2:14-CV-443-JEM

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, )

Acting Commissioner of Social Security )

Administration, )

 Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Commissioner’s Motion for Remand for Further

Proceedings Pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) [DE 18], filed by the Commissioner

on June 29, 2015. Plaintiff filed a response on July 7, 2015, and on July 14, 2015, the Commissioner

filed a reply. On July 17, 2015, Plaintiff moved for leave to file a sur-reply to the instant Motion.

On August 5, 2015, this Court granted that request, and on August 7, 2015, Plaintiff filed her surreply. 

A. Procedural Background

On February 7, 2012, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits with the

U.S. Social Security Administration (“SSA”). Plaintiff claims that she is disabled and unable to work

due to a combination of Graves’ disease, depression, anxiety, light sensitivity, severe headaches,

pain behind her eyes, double vision, upper back pain, left shoulder pain, and left arm pain. Plaintiff’s

initial application was denied. On April 30, 2013, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Henry

Kramzyk held a hearing, and on August 6, 2013, he issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not

disabled. On October 2, 2014, The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, leaving

the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. 
On December 3, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking reversal of the adverse SSA

determination. On April 1, 2015, the parties filed consent forms assigning the case to the

undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order entry

of a final judgement. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(c) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

On April 17, 2015, Plaintiff filed a brief requesting that the matter be reversed and remanded

with full benefits paid, or alternatively, reversed and remanded to the SSA for further proceedings.

The Commissioner did not directly respond to Plaintiff, but instead, filed the instant Motion moving

for remand to the SSA for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of Section 405(g) of the

Social Security Act. 

B. Standard of Review

The Social Security Act authorizes judicial review of a final decision of the SSA. 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). Under sentence four of Section 405(g), federal courts have “the power to enter, upon the

pleadings and transcript of record, a judgement affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of

the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a hearing.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). At minimum, proper resolution of the Commissioner’s decision requires that the ALJ

explain his specific reasons for accepting or rejecting the proffered medical evidence and articulate

his analysis of that evidence in order to allow the reviewing court to trace the path of his reasoning

and to be assured that the ALJ considered the relevant evidence. See Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d

589, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2002); Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 307 (7th Cir. 1995); Green v. Shalala, 51

F.3d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1995). An ALJ must “‘build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence

to [the] conclusion’ so that, as a reviewing court, we may assess the validity of the agency’s final

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decision and afford [a claimant] meaningful review.” Giles v. Astrue, 483 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir.

2007) (quoting Scott, 297 F.3d at 595)); see also O’Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 618

(7th Cir. 2010) ( “An ALJ need not specifically address every piece of evidence, but must provide

a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and his conclusions.”). A court reviews the entire

administrative record but does not reconsider facts, re-weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in

evidence, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. See Clifford

v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000); Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049, 1055 (7th Cir. 1999). 

C. Analysis

In this case, the parties agree that there were multiple errors in the ALJ’s decision denying

Plaintiff’s claim for benefits and that a reversal and remand of the Commissioner’s decision is

warranted. The dispute is over the grounds for reversal and remand and what concomitant

instructions the ALJ should be provided. The Commissioner requests reversal and remand pursuant

to sentence four of Section 405(g) and a de novo hearing with an entry of a new decision by the ALJ.

The Commissioner proposes that on remand the Court order the ALJ to “further consider the

opinions of Drs. Lewyckyj and Muhrez, further evaluate the claimant’s credibility, further evaluate

the claimant’s residual functional capacity, and if warranted, obtain supplemental vocational expert

evidence.” Plaintiff contends that this proposed language is insufficient. Plaintiff requests that the

Court reverse and remand with full benefits paid, or alternatively, reverse and remand with an order

directing the ALJ to address the issues raised in her brief: (1) to further consider the opinions of Drs.

Lewyckyj and Dr. Muhrez; (2) to further evaluate Plaintiff’s credibility; (3) to further evaluate the

claimant’s residual functional capacity, and if warranted, obtain supplemental vocational expert

evidence; (4) to resolve any conflicts between the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and the

vocational expert’s responses to interrogatories; (5) to reexamine whether Plaintiff suffered from

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a medically determinable mental impairment; (6) to account for Plaintiff’s need for up-lighting; (7)

to reevaluate whether there are limitations attendant to Plaintiff’s left shoulder and left arm pain; (8)

and, if necessary, to obtain supplemental vocational expert testimony to assist in determining what

jobs exist in significant numbers for Plaintiff in the national economy.

Although Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner’s proposed remand language does not

address the arguments she raises in her brief, the requirement that the ALJ reevaluate the opinions

of Dr. Lewyckyj and Dr. Muhrez, further evaluate the claimant’s credibility, further evaluate the

claimant’s residual functional capacity, and if warranted, obtain supplemental vocational expert

evidence necessarily encompasses those arguments and adequately reflects the agreed upon errors

in the ALJ’s initial decision. Degrazio v. Colvin, 558 Fed. Appx. 649, 650–51 (7th Cir. 2014)

(holding that a sentence four remand “depends on a finding of error in the Commissioner’s

decision.”). Indeed, the requirement that the ALJ further evaluate Plaintiff’s RFC ensures that her

multiple claims of pain and light sensitivity are properly incorporated into the RFC, especially in

light of the requirement that he reevaluate Dr. Lewyckyj’s and Dr. Muhrez’s opinions.

Plaintiff also requests that the Court reverse the Commissioner’s decision and remand for

an award of benefits. However, an award of benefits is not proper when there remain outstanding

factual issues, Briscoe v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 356 (7th Cir. 2005), and the record does not yet

support a finding of disability. Allord v. Asture, 631 F.3d 411, 417 (7th Cir. 2011). In this case, the

parties agree that the ALJ failed to properly weigh the entirety of the record. That the ALJ failed to

properly weigh the evidence of Dr. Lewyckyj and Dr. Muhrez does not support a finding by this

Court that the evidence demonstrates Plaintiff’s disability under the Social Security Act. See

Clifford, 227 F.3d at 869 (reasoning that a court in its review of the entire administrative record does

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not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its judgment

for that of SSA). On remand, the ALJ must review the record and fully explain how all of Plaintiff’s

limitations are accounted for, supported by evidence, and incorporated by into her RFC. In this case,

because the ALJ has not properly weighed all the relevant evidence, this can only be resolved

through a remand for further proceedings.

D. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS the Commissioner’s Motion for

Remand for Further Proceedings Pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) [DE 18],

REVERSES the Administrative Law Judge’s decision, and REMANDS this matter to the

Commissioner for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) consistent

with this opinion.

The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to ENTER JUDGMENT in favor of Plaintiff and

against the Commissioner.

So ORDERED this 5th day of February, 2016.

s/ John E. Martin 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN E. MARTIN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

cc: All counsel of record

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