UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

ROXANN WYATT, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CAUSE NO. 3:15-346-JD-MGG 

 ) 

SALVATION ARMY, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

ORDER 

 Pending and ripe before the Court is Plaintiff Roxann Wyatt’s (“Wyatt”) motion to reopen 

discovery filed on March 6, 2017. Defendant Salvation Army (“Salvation”) timely filed its 

response on March 16, 2017. This motion became ripe on March 24, 2017, without any reply brief 

being filed. 

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

 This discovery motion stems from a dispute that began in June 2016, regarding the 

discovery deadline. Discussion regarding an agreement to extend the discovery deadline began on 

April 1, 2016, when Wyatt contacted Salvation and requested an extension due to her counsel’s 

case load, potential service as an administrative law judge, and a lengthy illness. Wyatt and 

Salvation came to an informal agreement to extend the discovery deadline and on May 2, 2016, 

filed a motion to extend the deadline from June 7, 2016, to July 29, 2016. 

 The Court denied that joint motion on May 12, 2016, without prejudice because Wyatt and 

Salvation failed to show good cause to extend the deadline, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)

and 16(b)(4). However, Wyatt continued the discovery process with the belief that the agreement 

to extend the deadline to July 29, 2016, remained in effect despite the Court’s order denying the 

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extension. Wyatt propounded written discovery upon Salvation on May 16, 2016, believing that 

it complied with the Court’s order requiring any discovery be initiated at least forty-five days 

before the discovery deadline. However, on June 6, 2016, Salvation corresponded with Wyatt and 

stated that the May 16, 2016, discovery request was untimely as the discovery extension had been 

denied by the Court and the request had been initiated within forty-five days of the discovery 

deadline. Accordingly, Salvation filed a motion for protective order on June 7, 2016, which was 

granted by the Court on June 20, 2016. 

 On June 7, 2016, Wyatt also filed a motion to extend the discovery deadline. To show 

good cause, Wyatt listed her counsel’s various outside obligations and his extensive case load to 

demonstrate his lack of availability. The Court denied this motion to extend the discovery 

deadline. [DE 38]. In its Order, the Court found the overloaded schedule of Wyatt’s counsel 

insufficient to show good cause to extend the discovery deadline. Wyatt appealed to the District 

Judge, the Honorable Judge DeGuilio, for review of the Magistrate Judge’s Order on June 29, 

2016. On February 24, 2017, the District Judge upheld the Order denying the extension, finding 

no clear error in the Magistrate Judge’s decision. 

 However, the District Judge allowed Wyatt to file a motion to reopen discovery by March 

15, 2017. Wyatt timely filed this motion and now seeks to reopen discovery after the discovery 

deadline ended on June 7, 2016. 

II. ANALYSIS

The sole issue before this Court is whether discovery should be reopened over one year 

after the close of discovery. For the following reasons, the Court declines to reopen discovery. 

 Modification of the discovery schedule should only occur for “good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 16(b)(4). Similarly, Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(A) states that a court may only allow extensions for 

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good cause. Good cause is demonstrated when a party shows that despite her diligence “the time 

table could not reasonably have been met.” Tschantz v. McCann, 160 F.R.D. 568, 571 (N.D. Ind. 

1995). This Court has broad discretion in deciding whether to reopen discovery. Lapsley v. Fries, 

1:11-cv-99, 2012 WL 2721909, at *2 (N.D. Ind. July 9, 2012). Additionally, the District Judge’s 

Order that permits Wyatt to file a motion to reopen discovery stipulates that Wyatt’s motion must 

include: “(1) an adequate showing of good cause, (2) a concise and complete description of the 

remaining discovery the Plaintiff seeks, (3) the period of time she believes necessary to obtain it 

and (4) a description of any prejudice reopening discovery would cause to the defense.” [DE 46 

at 5]. 

 Review of Wyatt’s motion to reopen discovery and Salvation’s response brief shows that 

the second and third requirements established by the District Judge are met and are not in 

contention. However, the parties dispute whether has met her burden to show good cause to reopen 

discovery and to describe the weight of any prejudice that Salvation would suffer if discovery were 

reopened. Accordingly, this analysis will only address good cause and any prejudice towards 

Salvation. 

Once again, Wyatt argues that her counsel’s busy schedule constitutes good cause to reopen 

discovery. Additionally, Wyatt asserts that her reliance on the belief that the informal extension 

of the discovery deadline was still in place, despite the Court’s denial of the joint motion, also 

demonstrates good cause. Wyatt further argues that Salvation’s lack of objection between May 

16, 2016, and June 6, 2016, regarding the propounded written discovery furthered her reliance on 

the denied agreement to extend the discovery deadline. Furthermore, Wyatt argues that because 

Salvation has possessed the requested written discovery for over one year and the reopening would 

only last seven weeks, Salvation would not be prejudiced by reopening discovery. 

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Salvation argues that Wyatt fails to show good cause by pointing out that Wyatt is restating 

the arguments she raised in the June 7, 2017, motion to extend discovery, which was denied for 

lack of good cause and affirmed by the District Judge. Salvation furthers this argument by 

asserting that Wyatt’s counsel’s busy schedule is still not enough to show good cause. Salvation 

further argues that Wyatt unreasonably relied on the informal agreement to extend the discovery 

deadline is not good cause because the Magistrate Judge had denied this agreement. Salvation 

also asserts that it would be prejudiced by reopening discovery, as it would extend a two-year old 

case by at least another two months. It further alleges that this would cause Salvation to incur 

more discovery-related costs long after discovery had originally closed. Salvation further states 

that reopening discovery would delay the filing of its motion for summary judgment. 

The Court is not persuaded by Wyatt’s arguments. Wyatt makes the same arguments to 

reopen discovery as she did to extend the discovery deadline in June 2016. Namely, that Wyatt’s 

counsel has an overloaded schedule and that Wyatt relied on the agreement to extend the deadline 

despite the Court’s Order denying the extension. However, an attorney’s busy schedule is not 

enough to establish good cause. Barnell v. LaGrange Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., No. 1:12-cv-99, 2013 

WL 140528, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 11, 2013). Furthermore, this Court has already held that this 

argument is not sufficient to establish good cause, and this holding was upheld by the District 

Judge. [DE 38 at 5-6]. Therefore, the busy schedule of Wyatt’ counsel is not enough to show 

good cause. 

Additionally, the Court is not persuaded that reliance on an informal agreement to extend 

the discovery deadline despite the Court’s denial of that extension is sufficient to show good cause. 

Wyatt was put on notice that the informal agreement was no longer valid after the Court issued its 

Order on May 12, 2016. [DE 38]. Wyatt cannot claim to rely on an informal agreement that the 

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Court expressly invalidated, despite Salvation doing nothing to dispel that belief. To show good 

cause, Wyatt must demonstrate that the time table set could not reasonably have been met despite 

her diligence. Tschantz, 160 F.R.D. 571. If Wyatt were diligent, she would not have relied on an 

informal agreement that was rejected by the Court. Therefore, Wyatt’s reliance on that agreement 

is not enough to establish good cause. 

As to the prejudice that would result if discovery is reopened, the Court does not agree with 

Wyatt’s assertion that Salvation will not be prejudiced by reopening discovery. Discovery closed 

over one year ago, and reopening discovery now would cause Salvation to incur costs for at least 

two additional months. Furthermore, reopening discovery will delay the filing of summary 

judgment motions. Salvation states that it currently has a motion ready to be filed when the 

window for doing so is open. A two-month delay of the filing of summary judgment motions that 

may bring resolution to this case for another two would also prejudice Salvation. Therefore, Wyatt 

fails to meet the requirement that any prejudice towards Salvation be listed in her motion to reopen 

discovery. 

II. CONCLUSION

 While Wyatt timely filed her motion to reopen discovery and satisfied two of the four 

requirements prescribed by the District Judge, she has failed to show good cause for reopening 

discovery and to demonstrate that Salvation will not suffer undue prejudice. Therefore, the Court 

DENIES Plaintiff Wyatt’s motion to reopen discovery. [DE 47]. 

SO ORDERED. 

Dated this 6th day of July 2017. 

 s/Michael G. Gotsch, Sr. 

 Michael G. Gotsch, Sr. 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

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