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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

RGI EVENTS & PUBLIC RELATIONS, 

LLC,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

AL QURM MANAGEMENT 

CONSULTANCY, et al.,

Defendants. 

Civil Action No. 18-1828 (BAH) 

Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

 This removed action raises D.C. contract and tort law claims related to event planning 

services that the plaintiff, RGI Events & Public Relations, LLC (“RGI”), provided to defendant 

Al Qurm Management Consultancy (“AQC”), a corporation, and two of AQC’s employees, 

Bassma El-Afghani and Maria Chin (the “Individual Defendants”). See Compl., ECF No. 1-1; 

Defs.’ Resp. to Order to Show Cause (“Defs.’ Resp. to Order”) ¶ 2, ECF No. 27. As discussed 

below, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the merits of those claims. Accordingly, this action 

shall be remanded to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (“D.C. Superior Court”). 

I. BACKGROUND 

RGI initially filed this action in D.C. Superior Court against three defendants—AQC, a 

corporation, and two AQC employees, Bassma El-Afghani and Maria Chin—asserting D.C. law 

claims for breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, and tortious interference with 

business relations. See Compl.; Defs.’ Resp. to Order ¶ 2. The defendants removed the case to 

this Court, see Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1, which removal RGI did not contest. 

Subsequently, defendant AQC filed counterclaims against RGI, as well as a third-party 

complaint against Rachael Glaws, the sole member of RGI, and two others. See AQC’s Answer, 
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Third-Party Compl., and Countercls., ECF No. 6; AQC’s Suppl. Countercls. with Exs., ECF No. 

9. The Individual Defendants also filed a third-party complaint against Ms. Glaws. See 

Individual Defs.’ Third-Party Compl., ECF No. 7. The parties then filed several dispositive 

motions against each other. Specifically, pending before the Court are (1) the Individual 

Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss RGI’s Complaint, ECF No. 8; (2) RGI’s Motion for 

Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. 12; and (3) RGI and Rachael Glaws’s Joint Motion to 

Dismiss Defendants’ Counterclaims and Third Party Complaints, or a Motion for Summary 

Judgment in the Alternative, ECF No. 14. 

The Court, in reviewing the parties’ filings, questioned its subject matter jurisdiction sua 

sponte and ordered the defendants, which bear the burden of pleading jurisdiction in this 

removed action, to show cause why the Court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

See Min. Order (Feb. 9, 2019). The defendants submitted a sparse response totaling three 

paragraphs. See Defs.’ Resp. to Order. RGI did not file any opposition. For the reasons 

explained below, upon consideration of the defendants’ response and the entire record, the Court 

concludes jurisdiction is lacking. Thus, this action is remanded to D.C. Superior Court, and the 

pending motions are denied as moot. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United 

States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by . . . the defendants, to the district court of 

the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “When it appears that a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over 

a case that has been removed from a state court, the district court must remand the case . . . , and 

the court’s order remanding the case to the state court whence it came ‘is not reviewable on 
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appeal or otherwise.’” Republic of Venezuela v. Philip Morris Inc., 287 F.3d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 

2002) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and quoting id. § 1447(d)). Due to the statutory prohibition of 

appellate review of remanded cases, the legal standard for removal has largely been developed 

by the district courts. 

 The defendants, as the parties seeking the exercise of federal court jurisdiction over this 

removed case, “bear[] the burden of pleading” the basis for jurisdiction. Novak v. Capital Mgmt. 

& Dev. Corp., 452 F.3d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted); Apton v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., 233 F. Supp. 3d 4, 11 (D.D.C. 2017). If the 

defendants are unable to make this showing, a “court must remand the case.” Johnson–Brown v. 

2200 M Street LLC, 257 F. Supp. 2d 175, 177 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). 

“In light of the significant federalism concerns involved, this court ‘strictly construes the 

scope of its removal jurisdiction.’” Moses v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., No. 11-cv-00822 (BJR), 

2012 WL 113375, at *2 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Breakman v. AOL LLC, 545 F. Supp. 2d 96, 100 

(D.D.C. 2008)); accord Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Wilson, No. 18-cv-2381 (RC), 2019 WL 

340717, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 28, 2019). Even “[w]here the need to remand is not self-evident, the 

court must resolve any ambiguities concerning the propriety of removal in favor of remand.” 

Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Hormel Foods Corp., 249 F. Supp. 3d 53, 56 (D.D.C. 2017) (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Johnson–Brown, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 177). 

III. DISCUSSION 

The defendants contend that this action is properly removed, based on diversity 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Notice of Removal ¶ 3.1 Section 1332 provides that federal 

 

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 The defendants also initially invoked federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, claiming that RGI’s 

D.C. law claims “arise under” the “United Nations Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the 

International Sale of Goods” (“U.N. Convention”), a “treaty of the United States.” Notice of Removal ¶ 3. The 

defendants later abandoned this theory, specifying only diversity as the “basis for this Court’s jurisdiction.” Joint 
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courts have “original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the 

sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and is between . . . citizens of a State 

and citizens or subjects of a foreign state.” Id. § 1332(a)(2). Thus, subject matter jurisdiction 

over any action raised in diversity must satisfy a two-prong inquiry: the amount in controversy 

must exceed $75,000, and the litigants must be diverse from one another. See id. The 

defendants have not sufficiently pleaded either requirement, neither of which is apparent on the 

face of the Complaint. 

A. Amount in Controversy 

Diversity jurisdiction requires that the “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or 

value of $75,000.” Id. § 1332(a). RGI’s Complaint includes three counts for damages. Compl. 

¶¶ 28–52. Count I seeks $38,655.33 for a breach of contract claim against AQC only. Id. ¶¶ 28–

32. Counts II and III—for misappropriation of trade secrets and tortious interference with 

business relations, respectively—include claims against all three defendants. Id. ¶¶ 33–52. For 

each of these latter two counts, damages are “in excess of $50,000.” Id. ¶¶ 43, 52. Thus, none of 

RGI’s claims exceed $75,000. 

Undaunted, the defendants argue for two amount-in-controversy calculations, based on 

aggregation of RGI’s claims, to satisfy the $75,000 threshold. In the defendants’ view, 

aggregated damages for (1) RGI’s claims against AQC, in Counts I through III, equal “at least 

$138,655.33,” Notice of Removal ¶ 3; and (2) the claims against all three defendants, in Counts 

II and III, exceed $100,000, Defs.’ Resp. to Order ¶ 3. Each calculation is reviewed in turn. 

 

Report of Rule LCvR 16.3(c) Planning Meeting at 4, ECF No. 21. RGI’s D.C. law claims for breach of contract, 

misappropriation of trade secrets, and tortious interference do not remotely raise a federal question. See Merrell 

Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) (“Since a defendant may remove a case only if the claim 

could have been brought in federal court . . . the question for removal jurisdiction must also be determined by 

reference to the ‘well-pleaded complaint.’”). 
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First, the defendants initially argued, in a single sentence and without legal authority, that 

the amount-in-controversy requirement is met because “the Plaintiff has alleged damages in the 

amount of at least $138,655.33.” Notice of Removal ¶ 3. Although the defendants’ cursory 

explanation fails to indicate which aggregation rule justifies using this amount, the defendants 

appear to have aggregated all of RGI’s claims against AQC in Counts I through III. 

A plaintiff’s claims “against a single defendant” may be aggregated to satisfy the $75,000 

jurisdictional threshold. Gordon v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 467 F.2d 717, 725 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1971) 

(emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 

(1969)); accord Organic Consumers Ass’n v. R.C. Bigelow, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d 344, 350 

(D.D.C. 2018). Aggregating RGI’s claims against AQC, however, does not result in an amount 

in controversy above $75,000. Count I seeks $38,655.33 from AQC, Compl. ¶ 32, and the 

remaining two Counts, which include claims against all three defendants, do not specify a 

separate amount in controversy for the claims against AQC, see id. ¶¶ 33–52. Therefore, the 

aggregated amount in controversy for RGI’s claims against AQC is unknown. See McIntosh v. 

Gilley, 753 F. Supp. 2d 46, 62 (D.D.C. 2010) (“[J]urisdiction under section 1332(a) can only be 

sustained against those defendants whose respective controversies individually involve matters 

exceeding the jurisdictional amount.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also

Middle Tenn. News Co. v. Charnel of Cincinnati, Inc., 250 F.3d 1077, 1081 (7th Cir. 2001) 

(denying aggregation for a plaintiff’s multiple claims against a defendant because the plaintiff 

had not “alleged a separate amount in controversy against” the defendant). 

Second, after the Court questioned the defendants’ initial aggregation theory and ordered 

the defendants to clarify why aggregation is permissible, see Min. Order (Feb. 9, 2019) ¶ 3, the 

defendants submitted a bare, one-paragraph explanation, Defs.’ Resp. to Order ¶ 3. This time, 
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the defendants claimed that the amount-in-controversy requirement may be satisfied by 

aggregating Counts II and III, for more than $50,000 each, because these counts include 

misappropriation and tortious interference claims against all three defendants. Id.

This aggregation theory suffers a fatal flaw, however. “Claims against multiple 

defendants can be aggregated only when the defendants are jointly liable to the plaintiff.” 

GenopsGroup LLC v. Pub. House Invs. LLC, 67 F. Supp. 3d 338, 342 (D.D.C. 2014) (collecting 

cases); accord Theus v. Ally Fin., Inc., 98 F. Supp. 3d 41, 46 (D.D.C. 2015); McIntosh, 753 F. 

Supp. 2d at 62; Rogers v. Nathan, 721 F. Supp. 1393, 1394 (D.D.C. 1989). Removing 

defendants may demonstrate joint liability by, for example, pointing out that the plaintiff 

“seek[s] to hold defendants jointly liable,” or providing “indicia of corporate relationship” 

between the defendants to show joint liability will attach. GenopsGroup LLC, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 

342. 

Here, the defendants have not shown that aggregation of the claims in Counts II and III, 

for the defendants to meet the $75,000 threshold, is appropriate under a joint liability rationale. 

Indeed, the defendants concede that RGI’s “Complaint makes no explicit reference to ‘joint and 

several liability,’” Defs.’ Resp. to Order ¶ 3, and RGI has been silent about whether it seeks to 

hold the defendants jointly liable. Moreover, aside from stating that the Individual Defendants 

are “employees of AQC,” id. ¶ 2, the defendants fail to provide any information about the 

Individual Defendants’ roles within AQC’s corporate structure to demonstrate that the Individual 

Defendants may be held liable for acts by AQC, or for each other’s acts. See Middle Tenn. News 

Co., 250 F.3d at 1081 (finding aggregation inappropriate when there was “no evidence that 

justifies piercing the corporate veil and holding [an individual defendant] liable for corporate 

debts”); N. Am. Fin. Grp., LLC v. Suburban Air Sys., Inc., No. 96 CIV. 2330 (JSM), 1996 WL 
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345790, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 1996) (refusing to aggregate claims on the basis that the 

individual defendants were “owners and employees of” a defendant corporation). Similarly, the 

defendants leave unanswered whether AQC may be held liable for the Individual Defendants’ 

acts. See N. Am. Fin. Grp., LLC, 1996 WL 345790, at *1 (concluding aggregation was 

impermissible when “no basis” was provided for holding a defendant corporation “vicariously 

liable for” individual defendants’ actions). Thus, the “defendants have not suggested—let alone 

demonstrated—that they are jointly liable for” the claims in Counts II and III. GenopsGroup 

LLC, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 342.

In a last gasp argument, the defendants contend that Counts II and III “refer to the 

damages caused by and claimed collectively against ‘the Defendants,’” implicitly indicating that 

RGI seeks to hold all three defendants jointly liable. Defs.’ Resp. to Order ¶ 3. The defendants 

offer no legal support for this position. See id. Indeed, contrary to the defendants’ position, 

aggregation has been found to be inappropriate when the sole basis for purported joint liability is 

the fact that a single count includes claims against multiple defendants. See Shirk v. Gonzales, 

No. 17-CV-1129 MCA/KK, 2018 WL 2411601, at *3 (D.N.M. May 29, 2018) (explaining that 

even though “Count II is brought against both Defendants,” aggregation would be inappropriate 

because “neither party addresse[d] whether Defendants would be jointly liable under Count II”). 

Furthermore, contrary to the defendants’ suggestion that the allegations in Counts II and 

III are “collectively” against the defendants, Defs.’ Resp. to Order ¶ 3, the Complaint identifies 

“separate and distinct” torts by each of the Individual Defendants, suggesting joint liability may 

not be contemplated, GenopsGroup LLC, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 342. For example, RGI’s 

misappropriation and tortious interference claims are rooted in allegations that Individual 

Defendant El-Afghani wrongfully called RGI’s “print media vendor” and “transportation 
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vendor” to obtain “sensitive and confidential information,” Compl. ¶¶ 21–24, while Individual 

Defendant Chin separately emailed RGI’s “hotel management” contact to obtain other “sensitive, 

confidential financial information,” id. ¶ 26. The Complaint does not allege that these two 

defendants acted together or were directed by AQC to engage in those allegedly wrongful acts. 

Additionally, the misappropriation and tortious interference claims stem from confidentiality 

obligations in RGI’s event-planning services contract with AQC, see id. ¶¶ 7, 34, 47, and the 

defendants admit that RGI has not alleged the Individual Defendants are “parties to any contract” 

with RGI, Defs.’ Resp. to Order at 3 n.1; see also GenopsGroup LLC, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 342 

(concluding a plaintiff did not “seek to hold defendants jointly liable” because the “plaintiff’s 

claims arise out of separate contracts”). 

Although the Complaint includes allegations that the “Defendants” wrongfully contacted 

RGI’s vendors to obtain confidential information, see, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 18, 27, suggesting 

collective action, other allegations appear to separate liability among the defendants, see, e.g.,

Compl. at 3–4 (claiming liability due to the “individual co-defendants’ intentional interference”); 

id. ¶ 23 (alleging a tort committed by Individual Defendant El-Afghani alone); id. ¶ 26 (pleading 

tort committed by AQC, “by and through” Individual Defendant Chin, without reference to 

Individual Defendant El-Afghani). Aggregation in the face of such ambiguity is inappropriate. 

See Devito v. Wood, No. 2:09-CV-423-FtM-36DNF, 2011 WL 13175834, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 

2, 2011) (denying request for aggregation because “[i]n some paragraphs,” the plaintiff appeared 

to be asserting claims against defendants jointly, and “[i]n other paragraphs,” the plaintiff 

appeared to be suing an individual defendant “as an individual”); see also Johnson–Brown, 257 

F. Supp. 2d at 177 (“Where the need to remand is not self-evident, the court must resolve any 

ambiguities concerning the propriety of removal in favor of remand.”). 
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The defendants fail to show that aggregation of Counts II and III is proper. Thus, the 

amount-in-controversy requirement has not been satisfied, and diversity jurisdiction is lacking. 

B. Diversity of Citizenship 

Second, even if the amount-in-controversy requirement had been satisfied, jurisdiction 

under § 1332 requires diversity of citizenship between the parties, such as when the action is 

between “citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). 

The defendants allege diversity because RGI, a limited liability company, is “domiciled in 

Washington, D.C.,” and the three defendants are all citizens of the United Arab Emirates. See 

Notice of Removal ¶ 3; Defs.’ Resp. to Order ¶¶ 1–2. In relevant part, the defendants posit that 

RGI is “domiciled in” Washington, D.C. since the Complaint lists RGI’s business address in 

Washington, D.C., and RGI filed a “‘domestic entity’ business license filing” with the D.C. 

government. Defs.’ Resp. to Order ¶ 1. 

The defendants’ rationale ignores the Court’s order, which asked the defendants to 

provide RGI’s citizenship under § 1332, and explained that an LLC’s citizenship is determined 

by the citizenship of its members. See Min. Order (Feb. 9, 2019) ¶ 1 (citing Carden v. Arkoma 

Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195–96 (1990), and Hoch v. Eli Lilly & Co., 736 F. Supp. 2d 219, 220–21 

(D.D.C. 2010)). Thus, when an LLC’s sole member is an individual, the LLC’s citizenship is 

determined by that individual’s domicile. See Herbin v. Seau, 317 F. Supp. 3d 568, 572 (D.D.C. 

2018) (“For purposes of assessing diversity jurisdiction, an individual is a citizen of the state in 

which she is domiciled.” (citing Prakash v. Am. Univ., 727 F.2d 1174, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1984))). 

Domicile, in turn, requires “‘physical presence in a state’ as well as the ‘intent to remain there 

for an unspecified or indefinite period of time.’” Id. (quoting Prakash, 727 F.2d at 1180). 

Here, the defendants merely allege that RGI’s sole member, Rachael Glaws, “resides in 

Virginia.” Defs.’ Resp. to Order ¶ 1. This “residency allegation,” however, “raises a threshold 
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problem” because “an allegation of residence alone is insufficient to establish the citizenship

necessary for diversity jurisdiction.” Novak, 452 F.3d at 906 (emphasis in original) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). The defendants neither provide Ms. Glaws’s domicile, 

nor suggest whether she intends to remain in Virginia. See Defs.’ Resp. to Order ¶ 1. 

The Court is unable to determine RGI’s citizenship due to the defendants’ failure to 

provide Ms. Glaws’s domicile, even after the Court specifically asked for “the state in which 

each member” of RGI “is domiciled.” See Min. Order ¶ 1 (Feb. 9, 2019). The defendants’ 

pleading defect is “not a mere technicality” because “[c]itizenship is an essential element of 

federal diversity jurisdiction,” Novak, 452 F.3d at 906, and the “party seeking the exercise of 

diversity jurisdiction bears the burden of pleading the citizenship of each and every party to the 

action,” id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, this action is remanded 

to D.C. Superior Court, and the three pending motions are denied as moot. See Simon v. 

Mitchell, 199 F. Supp. 3d 244, 246 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Because a . . . district court, acting sua 

sponte, may raise the court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a court may also issue a remand 

order on its own initiative.”). 

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

Upon consideration of the memoranda, exhibits, and declarations submitted in support of, 

and opposition to, the pending motions, and the entire record herein, for the reasons set forth in 

in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, it is hereby 

ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall REMAND this action to D.C. Superior Court; and 

it is further 

ORDERED that the Individual Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss RGI’s Complaint, ECF 

No. 8; RGI’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. 12; and RGI and Rachael Glaws’s 
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Joint Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Counterclaims and Third Party Complaints, or a Motion for 

Summary Judgment in the Alternative, ECF No. 14, are DENIED as moot; and it is further 

ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.

SO ORDERED. 

Date: February 26, 2019 

__________________________ 

BERYL A. HOWELL 

Chief Judge