### RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0928- 22
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. A.R., Defendant, and H.L.C., JR ., Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________ IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF H.C., III, and J.C., minors.

__________________________

Submitted November 8, 2023

– Decided December 14, 2023 Before Judges Gooden Brown and Natali.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court. " Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parti es in the case and its use in other cases is limite d. R. 1:36- 3.2 A- 0928

- 22 On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, Docket No. FG- 09

- 0126

- 20. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (James D. O'Kelly, Designated Counsel, on the briefs ). Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Sara M. Gregory, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Renee Greenberg, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minors (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deput y Public Defender, of counsel; David B. Valentin, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant, H.L.C., Jr., appeals from the November 4 , 2022, judgment of guardianship that terminated his parental rights to his two sons, H.C., III, born in 2010, and J.C., born in 2016. Both children hav e been in the care of a resource parent since their removal in February 2019. The r esource parent, a family member, is committed to adoption. A.R., the children's mother, executed an identified surrender of her parental ri ghts to the resource parent, who is A.R.'s3 A- 0928

- 22

aunt. As a result, A.R. is not participating in th is appeal. 1 The Law Guardian joins the Division of Child Protection and Permanen cy (Division) in support of termination. We affirm.
On March 16, 2020, the Division filed a verified compl aint to terminate defendant's parental rights and award the Division guardianship of the children. The complaint detailed defendant's long history of recurring incarcerations, unremitted substance abuse, un addressed mental health issues, and lack of stable housing despite the Division's exhaustive efforts. A guardianship trial was conducted on diverse dates between August 19 and Oc tober 11, 2022. At the trial, the assigned Division adoption worker, defendant's drug counselor, the psychologist who evaluated all the parties, and the resource parent testified for the Division. Numerous documentary exhibits were a lso admitted into evidence. In addition, a psychologist with a specialty in chi ld psychology testified for the Law Guardian. Defendant, who was incarcerated at t he time of trial, produced

no witnesses. Following the trial, the trial judge rendered a com prehensive oral opinion on the record on October 26 and November 4, 2022, r ecounting her factual

1 Defendant and A.R. each have two older children wit h different partners. None of the four children are in either defendant's or A.R.'s custody and are not involved in this appeal

.4 A- 0928

- 22

findings and legal conclusions. Through the adopti on worker's testimony, which the judge found "completely credible," the judge de tailed the Division's extended involvement with the family dating back to 2007, and pointed out that the Division had filed for "custody, care and super vision" of the children in 2019 because their mother "had relapsed, tested positive for cocaine, and . . . failed to participate in substance abuse treatment," while th eir father "was incarcerated." The judge explained that when the guardianship comp laint was filed, "reunification had not occurred due to [A.R.'s] con tinued substance use and . . . mental health concerns" and defendant's habitual in carcerations, addiction problem, mental health issues, and chronic homeless ness. The judge rec ounted that the Division's efforts at reuniting the family included provid ing "substance abuse assessments and treatments, rando m urine screens, psychological evaluations, psychiatric eva luations, individual counseling, parenting skills courses[,] domestic vi olence counseling, anger management counseling, family team meetings, bus ca rds for transportation, . . . security deposits for housing " as well as visitation with the children, "both supervised and therapeutic." Nonetheless, according to the judge, defendant "had not been compliant with getti ng treatment to address his5 A- 0928

- 22

addiction to illicit substances, " which includ ed "PCP, heroin, and cocaine," and "had also been incarcerated repeatedly." The judge stressed that "[d]uring the [ten] years t hat [the Division] ha[d] been involved with the family, [defendant] ha[d] be en in jail the majority of the time." The judge expounded that typically, "when [defendan t] is first released from jail, he is very focused and very compliant. . . . but then unfortunately, he relapses and enters into a downward spiral" during which he "stops attending programs," has "no communication with anyone, inclu ding his children," and "basically goes missing." The judge explained that in the process of identify ing a suitable placement for the children, the Division had evaluated severa l individuals, including various family members, all of whom were ruled out with the exception of the resource mother, the children's maternal grand aunt . The judge credited the testimony of the grand aunt, who confirmed her comm itment to adopting the children and rebuffed Kinship Legal Guardianship (K LG) as a viable alternative. The judge was satisfied that the grand aunt's commi tment to adoption was informed by a full understanding of the differences betwe en KLG and adoption, as it had been explained to her "on many occasions" by "several [Division] workers." The judge further credited the testimony of the Law Guardian's6 A- 0928

- 22

expert, who evaluated the grand aunt, the birth mot her, and the children and opined that "[b]oth children . . . have primary att achment to the [grand aunt] after having lived with her for three[-]and[-]a hal f years." The judge found persuasive the expert's unrebutted opinion that the children's "best interest would be served by termin ation of parental rights followed by the adoption by [the grand aunt ]" and that KLG "would not be in the boys' best interest" because "[ t]hey desperately need[ed] permanency," particularly H.C., III who had "experienced two rem ovals from his home with his mother," had "ADHD," was "deaf in one ear," and was "deal[ing] with posttraumatic stress disorder [PTSD]" from his expo sure to domestic violence between A.R. and defendant. 2 The judge was also persuaded by the credible testim ony of the Division's psych ologist, who was qualified as an expert in both "psychology and substance abuse disorders" and " ha [d] evaluated the . . . family over a seven-year pe riod." According to the expert , defendant's "diagnostic impressions" were "major depressive disorder, PTSD with panic attacks, opioi d use disorder, antisocial and borderline personality traits." The expert opi ned that defendant was "unable

2 H.C., III was also diagnosed with "oppositional def iance disorder" an d was under the care of a psychiatrist. During his prior removal, he had been placed in various treatment homes.7 A- 0928

- 22

to parent today" or "in the foreseeable future" because he "[could not] prioritize the needs of [ the ] children over the need for drugs" and "his inabil ity [would] not be remediated in the foreseeable future." Based on the bonding evaluations , the expert further testified that "the children wer e affectionate with [defendant] but not secure, " while they "share[d] a significant, positive, recip rocal emotional attachment" to their grand aunt and looked to her t o "meet their needs." The judge accepted the expert's unrebutted testimon y that the children "desperately" needed permanency, particularly H.C., III, "because of his special needs," and "delaying permanency [would be] problem atic." Although the expert acknowledged that "there [was] always a risk of harm" associated with "losing a connection with the biological parents pe rmanently," he believed that adoption by the grand aunt "outweigh[ed] the harm o f termination of parental rights" and "would do more good than harm because [ the children were] thriving with the stability and consistency they [were] expe riencing in that home." He stated that "placement with the [grand] aunt has mi tigated any harm caused by separation from the biological parents" and opine d that removal would be "disruptive" and "traumatic" and "very difficult to remediate."8 A- 0928

- 22

Next, the judge applied the statutory "best interes ts of the child" standard, which authoriz es the Division to initiate a petition to terminate p arental rights if: (1) The child's safety, health, or development has been

or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship; (2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and th e delay of permanent placement will add to the harm; (3) The division has made reasonable efforts to prov ide services to help the parent correct the circumstanc es which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to terminatio n of parental rights; and (4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good. [N.J.S.A. 30:4C -15.1(a).] The judge concluded the Division "ha[d] proven by c lear and convincing evidence that it [was] in the child[ren's] best int erest . . . to terminate the parental rights of defendant." As to prong one, the judge found that the children have been harmed because defendant

has for the majority of these boys' lives been unavailable to them and will continue to be unavail able to them; has failed to address mental health issues ; has no housing; has no employment; has been unable to9 A- 0928

- 22 complete long-term residential drug programs or out patient programs while not incarcerated; has been unable to remain uninvolved with the criminal justi ce system; and offers no viable plan to provide for th eir physical, intellectual, and emotional wellbeing. As to prong two, the judge found "defendant has not rectified the circumstances that led to the removal of his childr en," "has never acted as a primary caretaker to his now [eleven] and four-year -old sons," "is unable or unwilling to eliminate the harm [to his children], and delaying permanent placement will add to the harm." As to prong three, the judge determined "[t]he Division provided a comprehensive number of reasonable efforts . . . commencing long before the filing of the guardiansh ip [complaint], " and had "explored" and "ruled out" numerous "relatives and friends." The judge was satisfied that "there [were] no alter natives to termination," explaining that the resource mother was "a relative . . . who ha[d] been involved with both children since their birth," was describe d by the children's mother "as a mother to her," and was aware of the differences between adoption and KLG and "did not want [ KLG ]." Further, the judge stressed that both experts testi fied that "adoption" rather than KLG "was in the best in terest of the children." Finally, relying on the experts' uncontroverted opinions and the overwhelming evidence of defendant's failed efforts to properly parent his children, the judge10 A- 0928

- 22

concluded that termination of defendant's parental rights "will not do more harm than good." Th e judge entered a memorializing order and this appe al followed. On appeal, defendant raises the following points fo r our consideration:
POINT I THE JUDGMENT OF GUARDIANSHIP MUST BE VACATED AND THE MATTER REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO ENSURE THAT [DEFENDANT] RECEIVED HIS PRESCRIPTION MEDICATION ON EACH TRIAL DATE. WITHOUT MEDICATION, [DEFENDANT] WAS DENIED AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEANINGFULLY PARTICIPATE AT TRIAL.
POINT II [DEFENDANT] RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE AS SISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT THE GUARDIANSHIP TRIAL. (NOT RAISED BELOW)
POINT III [THE DIVISION'S] WILLFUL FAILURE TO ASSESS A FAMILY MEMBER WILLING TO RAISE THE CHILDREN REQUIRES A REVERSAL OF THE COURT'S JUDGMENT OF GUARDIANSHIP. Our scope of review in appeals from orders terminat ing parental rights is limited. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. T.D., 454 N.J. Super. 353, 379 (App. Div. 2018). In such cases, we will gener ally uphold the trial court's findings, so long as they are supported by "adequat e, substantial, and credible11 A- 0928

- 22

evidence." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Serv s. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 552 (2014);

s ee N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448-49 (2012) ("It is not our place to second-guess or substitute our judgment for that of the family court, provided that the record contains substantia l and credible evidence to support the decision to terminate parental rights." ). Such a decision should only be reversed or altered on appeal if the trial court 's findings were "so wholly unsupportable as to result in a denial of justice." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J. 494, 511 (2004) (quoting I n re Guardianship of J.N.H. , 172 N.J. 440, 472 (2002)). "We accord deference to factfindings of the family court because it has the superior ability to gauge the credibility of th e witnesses who testify before it and because it possesses special expertise in ma tters related to the family." F.M., 211 N.J. at 448 (citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 39 4, 413 (1998)). Even where the parent alleges "error in the trial judge' s evaluation of the underlying facts and the implications to be drawn therefrom," deference must be afforded unless the judge "went so wide of the mark that a m istake must have been made." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007) (first quoting In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 18 9 (App. Div. 1993),12 A- 0928

- 22

then quoting C.B. Snyder Realty Inc. v. BMW of N. A m. Inc., 233 N.J. Super. 65, 69 (App. Div. 1989)). Guided by these standards, we conclude that the jud ge's factual findings are amply supported by the credible evidence in the record, and h er legal conclusions expressed in her comprehensive and well-re asoned oral opinion are unassailable. The judge reviewed the evidence pres ented at trial, made detailed findings as to each prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) , and concluded that the Division met by clear and convincing evidence all the legal requirements for a judgment of guardianship. The judge's opinion trac ks the statutory requirements of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), and comports with governing case law. See, e.g. , F.M., 211 N.J. at 447- 54; N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Serv s. v. E.P. , 196 N.J. 88,
103 -07 (2008); In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 347-63 (1999); In re Guardianship of DMH, 161 N.J. 365, 375-93 (1999) ; N.J. Div. of Youth &
Fam. Serv s. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 604-11 (1986). With respect to the "best interests of the child" s tandard, defendant only challenges the judge's conclusion in connection wit h the second part of prong three, arguing the Division's failure to assess his brother, P.C., requires reversal of the judgment. P.C. was ruled out as a suitable placement for the children because his background check revealed prior crimina l convictions, which13 A- 0928

- 22

included weapons and drug related offenses. Admittedly, the Division failed to provide P.C. with an official rule-out letter. Non etheless, the Division met its obli gation to prioritize placement with a family member by pla cing the children with their grand aunt with whom they had a lifelong relationship, in whose home they were thriving, and with whom they were able to maintain family connections

. "The Division must perform a reasonable investigati on of . . . relatives that is fair, but also sensitive to the passage of time and the child's critical need for finality and permanency." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. J.S., 433 N.J. Super. 69, 87 (App. Div. 2013). Here, the Division performed the requisite investigation of P.C. The absence of a formal rule -out letter does not warrant reversing the guardianship judgment where the overw helming evidence establishes that the best interests of the children were served by placement with their grand aunt. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. K.L.W., 419 N.J. Super. 568, 581 (App. Div. 2011) ("Delay of permane ncy or reversal of termination based on the Division's noncompliance w ith its statutory obligations is warranted only when it is in the best interests of the child."). Next, we address defendant's argument that the judg e's "refusal to ensure [ he ] was properly medicated before each trial day bega n . . . was an abuse of14 A- 0928

- 22

discretion that requires a reversal of the judgment " because the "failure deprived [defendant] of the opportunity for meaningful parti cipation at trial." "Procedural due process standards require the oppor tunity for meaningful participation by the person at risk of limitation i n any trial in which important rights or interests are to be adjudicated." Div. o f Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.Y.J.P., 360 N.J. Super. 426, 468 (App. Div. 2003) . Although such rights are implicated in an action for termination of parental righ ts, "[t]he requirements of due process do not confer a constitutional right of confrontation or mandate a parent's presence at the trial." Id. at 467. Still, "[d]ue process evaluations typically call for a balancing of pertinent factors in the situation at hand." Id. at 468. To that end,

[t]he protections needed to ensure due process where governmental action is to be taken depend on a careful balancing of three factors: (1) identifica tion and specification of the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) assessment of the risk that there will be an erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used, and the proba ble value, if any, of additional or substitute procedur a l safeguards; and (3) evaluation of the governmental interest involved, including the added fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitut e procedures would require.15 A- 0928

- 22 [Id. at 465 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 3 19, 335 (1976)).] See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (198 2) (applying Eldridge analysis to termination proceeding). In New Jersey Div ision of Child Protection and Permanency v. K.S., we applied the Eldridge analysis to a termination proc eeding and held that "[a] parent facing the termination of parental rights is entitled to every reasonable opportunity to produce evidence" in order to satisf y procedural due process. 445 N.J. Super. 384, 394 (App. Div. 2016). Thus, we de termined that where a paren t wished to testify even after the close of evidence, "the trial court [was] constitutionally obligated to grant the request as long as it [did] not interfere with the children's 'essential and overriding inter est in stability and permanency.'" Ibid. (quoting In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 26 (1992)). Some states "have held that a parent who is incarcerated or o therwise prevented from attending a termination trial can be afforded due process where the parent receives notice, is represented by counsel, and is given an opportunity to testify by telephone or deposition." M.Y.J.P., 360 N.J. Su per. at 468. The question to be answered in a due process evalua tion "is not whether particular procedures were used, but rather whether those procedures whic h were employed were appropriate and adequate to prot ect the interests at stake."16 A- 0928

- 22

Id. at 467-68. That said, "' the precise method of participation'" afforded a pa rent in a termination proceeding "'should generally be l eft to the discretion of the trial ju dge .'" I d. at 468 (quoting In re Adoption of Edmund, 739 N.E. 2d 274, 277 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000)). Absent an abuse of discreti on, we will not secondguess the judge's decision

. See N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. A.B. , 231 N.J. 354, 366 (2017) ("'Trial judges are given wide discretion in exercising control over their courtrooms' and have 'the ultima te responsibility of conducting adjudicative proceedings in a manner tha t complies with required formality in the taking of evidence and the renderi ng of findings.'" (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. J.Y., 352 N.J. Super . 245, 264 (App. Div. 2002))). An abuse of discretion "arises when a dec ision is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from es tablished policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v. I.N.S., 779 F.2 d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)). Here, on August 19, 2022, the first day of trial, d efendant, who was represented by counsel, appeared virtually from the Hudson County Correctional Facility. During voir dire, defendant confirmed for the judge that he wished to participate in the trial virtually fro m the correctional facility due17 A- 0928

- 22

to medical issues. The judge approved defendant's req uest, advised him that she would allow him to speak privately with his attorne y at any time during the trial, and informed him that if he changed his mind and wi shed to attend the trial in person, she would accommodate his request. Defendant also asked the judge if she could arrange for him to receive his medications early at the jail. The judge responded she could not "control how [his] medication[s were] administered" but she would direc t the medical staff to consult with defendant so that he could discuss his needs with them. The judge cautioned defendant, however, that if he chose "not to join . . . via video link," the trial would proceed in his absence barring some "extenuating circumstances." At the end of the day's proceeding s, defense counsel asked the judge to memorialize in the order her warning to defendant that if he refused to appear, the trial would proceed in his absence and the judge agreed. Defendant appeared for trial via Zoom on the follow ing trial day, August 23, 2022, but refused to appear for trial on August 24, 2022. The judge noted she had not been informed by jail personnel "of any particular issue with [defendant]," other than his "refus[al] to come dow n." Accordingly, the trial proceeded in defendant's absence, concluding the te stimonial portion of the trial

. On October 11, 2022, the judge reopened the record to address defendant's18 A- 0928

- 22

letters to the court expressing concerns about "his medical treatment at the jail" along with other issues. During the proceeding, a Sheriff's officer provided sworn testimony confirming that defendant had been transported to the courthouse that morning , had refused to come to the courtroom, and thereafte r had been returned to the jail. The officer testified that defendant was not ill, a nd the Division's attorney submitted defendant's medic al records from the jail , which showed "no medical issues . . . that would pr event [defendant] from appearing in court." Defense counsel indicated on the record that he was "perplexed" by defendant's nonappearance because he had met with d efendant the day before and was under the impression that defendant intende d to come to court. After confirming with defense counsel that defendant had not expressed any desire to testify, the judge proceeded in defendant's absence. The judge noted they had "done everything . . . to accommodate [defendant]" and to facilitate his participation in the trial, "even recess[ing] on on e occasion to allow . . . [defendant] to meet with [another] attorney on othe r [pending] court matters ." On October 26, 2022, when the judge began placing h er oral decision on the record, defendant appeared via Zoom. As the ju dge delivered her opinion, defendant interrupted the judge, stating he had "ju st got[ten] a tooth pulled" and19 A- 0928

- 22

"need[ed his] medication." Defendant also complain ed that he never received his medication before court despite the judge's pri or assurances. The judge directed her staff to "send an email to the jail le tting them know that [defendant was] complaining that he . . . need[ed] to be medic ated." Thereafter, the judge continued deliver ing her decision without incident. On November 4, 2022, when the judge completed placing her oral decision on th e record, defendant again failed to appear. Defense counsel again expressed surprise at defendant's absence but indicated he was ready to proceed. The judge continued in defendant's absence. Applying the Eldridge analysis, we are satisfied that under the circumstances, defendant was afforded the opportuni ty for meaningful participation at trial and we discern no error in t he procedure employed by the judge

. At all times, defendant received notice of the tria l proceedings, was represented by counsel, and was not deprived of an opportunity to testify or produce evidence. Defendant claims he was deprived of due process bec ause the judge failed to ensure that he was properly med icated by jail personnel at the beginning of each trial day. However, defendant pr ovided no medical records from the jail showing that he was deprived of presc ribed medications, never specified the medications he was prescribed , nor explained how the timing of20 A- 0928

- 22

the administration of the medications would affect his ability to participate in the trial

. What's more, even if we accept as true defendant's claim that he was deprived of needed medications, he showed no signs of impairment or physical manifestations of illness on the days he attended t he trial in a presumably un medicated state. In the same vein, defendant argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney "ignored . . . [def endant's] pleas to be properly medicated" and failed to "ensure [defendant was] me dicated prior to trial." To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, def endant "must meet the

two -prong test established in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court for ineffe ctive-assistance- of -counsel claims asserted in matters involving the terminatio n of parental rights [ in New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. B.R., 192 N.J. 301, 308- 09 (2007)]." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. P.D., 452 N.J. Super. 98, 116 (App. Div. 2017). To meet the test ,

(1) counsel's performance must be objectively deficient

— i.e., it must fall outside the broad range of professionally acceptable performance; and (2) counsel's deficient performance must prejudice the defense

— i.e., there must be "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."21 A- 0928

- 22 [B.R., 192 N.J. at 307 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S . at 694).] Unlike criminal cases, the B.R. Court "direct[ed] t hat claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in termination cases be raise d on direct appeal" given "'the need to stabilize the circumstances of the child.'" Id. at 310-11 (quoting Susan Calkins, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Paren tal-Rights Termination Cases: The Challenge for Appellate Courts, 6 J. Ap p. Prac. & Process 179, 207 (2004)). The Court noted:

In many cases, the issue will be resolvable on the appeal record alone. For example, if the panel acc epts as true appellant's representations regarding the lawyer's shortcomings but determines, on the basis of the full record, that the outcome would not have changed, that will be the end of it. [Id. at 311.] Such is the case here. Even accepting as true defe ndant's claims regarding his attorney's shortcomings, based on the overwhelm ing evidence supporting the judge's decision to terminate defendant's parental righ ts, the outcome would not have been different without the purported deficiencies

. Thus, defendant cannot establish the prejudice prong to justify relief. W e also reject defendant's contention that prejudice should be presumed under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). In Cronic, the United States Supr eme Court identified three22 A- 0928

- 22

rare instances in which counsel's performance is so deficient that prejudice is presumed. 466 U.S. at 659-62. None of the rare ci rcumstances delineated in Cronic are present here. See also State v. Miller, 216 N.J. 40, 61-62 (2013) (determining there was "no authority in this Court for the expansion of the presumption of prejudice beyond the narrow paramete rs set in Cronic"). To the extent we have not specifically addressed a particu lar argument, we deem it without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11

- 3(e)(1)(E). Affirmed.