1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

GARY JET CENTER, INC., ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) Case No. 2:15-cv-368-JVB-JEM 

v. ) 

 ) 

AFCO AvPORTS MANAGEMENT, LLC, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

OPINION AND ORDER

 Plaintiff Gary Jet Center, Inc., sued Defendant AFCO AvPorts Management, LLC, 

Defendant Gary/Chicago International Airport Authority, and five members of its board in a sixcount Complaint. 

Count I purports to assert a claim for “Violation of Contract Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 

1983.” (Compl., Count I, DE 1, ¶¶ 124–132.) The parties agree Count I—the allegation that 

Defendants violated the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution—is the sole basis for 

federal jurisdiction. 

The remaining Counts sound in state law.1

 Count II seeks declaratory relief under the law 

of the State of Indiana. (Id., Count II, ¶¶ 133–137.) Count III claims a breach of contract (Id., 

Count III, ¶¶ 138–144) and Count IV claims an intentional interference with a contractual 

relationship (Id., Count IV, ¶¶ 145–151). Count V seeks injunctive relief (Id., Count V, ¶¶ 152–

154) and Count VI seeks attorney’s fees and costs (Id., Count VI, ¶¶ 155–156). 

                                                            

1

 The only exceptions are that Count V seeks injunctive relief arguably based in part on Count I, 

and Count VI includes a request for attorney’s fees in part pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on the 

basis of Count I. Neither Count V nor Count VI, however, provide a basis for federal jurisdiction 

independent of Count I. In other words, if Count I falls, any federal features of Counts V and VI 

must also fall. 
2 

Defendants Airport Authority and its board members moved to dismiss under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Mot. Dismiss, DE 18.) The Court held a hearing on December 

8, 2015, regarding the Motion to Dismiss. All parties appeared by counsel. 

For the following reasons, the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss as to the impairment of 

contract claim, and will dismiss this claim without prejudice. 

A. Summary of Facts 

The Court accepts the allegations in the Complaint as true, as required at this procedural 

stage. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). 

Plaintiff Gary Jet is a Fixed Base Operator (FBO) at the Gary/Chicago International 

Airport (Gary Airport). (Compl., DE 1, ¶ 18.) Gary Jet provides aeronautical services at the Gary 

Airport. (Id. ¶ 21.) Gary Jet began operating at the Gary Airport after entering into a lease with 

the Airport Authority on December 9, 1991 (“Original Lease”). (Id. ¶ 37.) 

Defendant Airport Authority is a municipal corporation under Indiana law that owns and 

operates the Gary Airport. (Id. ¶ 27.) Defendants Mays, Dillard, Pritchett, Cooper, and Irving are 

members of the Airport Authority’s board. (Id. ¶ 29.) 

Fixed Base Operator Rules and Regulations (“FBO Rules,” also known as “Minimum 

Standards”) govern FBOs at the Gary Airport. (Id. ¶ 48.) When Gary Jet and the Airport 

Authority began negotiating a lease extension in the fall of 2006, the FBO Rules in place 

contained a 1.5% charge on gross revenue. (Id. ¶ 48.) These FBO Rules stated that the Airport 

Authority “intend[ed] to enforce” the 1.5% provision “for all commercial FBO services on the 

airport on or after” January 1, 2001, “pending the expiration of existing leases which do not 

incorporate these terms.” (Id. ¶ 48, quoting FBO Rules, Ex. B to Compl., DE 1-2, ¶ 7(i).) 
3 

Gary Jet’s Original Lease, however, did not contain the provision requiring a 1.5% 

payment on gross revenue set forth in the FBO Rules, and the Airport Authority had never 

attempted to collect such a payment from Gary Jet at any time before the negotiations in the fall 

of 2006 for a lease extension. (Id. ¶ 50.) During these negotiations, Gary Jet objected to the 1.5% 

provision, and the parties eventually agreed that Gary Jet would pay “Supplemental Rent” (10% 

of all fuel flowage, parking, and landing fees that Gary Jet remitted to the Authority each year) 

instead of 1.5% of Gary Jet’s gross revenues. (Id. ¶¶ 51–57.) 

Gary Jet and the Airport Authority entered a First Amended Lease Agreement on January 

1, 2007 (“2007 Lease”). (Id. ¶¶ 5, 57.) The 2007 Lease states that its term is 39 years, ending on 

December 31, 2045. (2007 Lease, Ex. C to Compl., DE 1-3, Art. IV, § A.) 

The 2007 Lease requires Gary Jet to pay to the Airport Authority “Base Rent” and 

“Supplemental Rent,” which equals “ten [ ] percent of the amount of all Fuel Flowage Fees, 

Landing Fees and Parking Fees it collects as provided for herein.” (Id. Art. V, §§ A, B.) 

The 2007 Lease states that Gary Jet “shall abide by the provisions” of the FBO Rules and 

Regulations, as amended by the Airport Authority from time to time, except when those 

provisions expressly contravene the provisions of the 2007 Lease. (Id. Art. I, § B.) In other 

words, in the event of a conflict between the 2007 Lease and the FBO Rules and Regulations as 

amended, the 2007 Lease controlled. The parties also agreed that the FBO Rules and Regulations 

“shall be a part of and be made applicable to” any subsequent FBO lease agreement entered into 

by the Airport Authority. (Id. Art. I, § B.) 

Gary Jet never paid a 1.5% charge to the Airport Authority, and the Airport Authority 

never attempted to collect such a charge from Gary Jet. (Id. ¶¶ 50, 62.) 
4 

Gary Jet later claimed the Airport Authority illegally favored a different FBO at the Gary 

Airport. Gary Jet sued the Airport Authority (and other defendants) on this basis on December 9, 

2013. Gary Jet Center v. Gary/Chicago International Airport Authority, et al., No. 2:13-CV-453 

(N.D. Ind. Dec. 9, 2013). The parties settled, and entered into a Settlement and Mutual Release 

Agreement (“2014 Settlement Agreement”) effective August 7, 2014. (Compl., DE 1, ¶ 93; 2014 

Settlement Agreement, Ex. D to Compl., DE 1-4.) 

In the 2014 Settlement Agreement, Gary Jet agreed to work in good faith with the Airport 

Authority to develop revised minimum standards (“New Minimum Standards”) for FBOs at the 

Gary Airport. (2014 Settlement Agreement, Ex. D to Compl., DE 1-4, ¶ 3(B).) The parties also 

agreed that in the event of a conflict between Gary Jet’s lease and the New Minimum Standards, 

the New Minimum Standards will control. (Id. ¶ 3(B).) In the instant case, Gary Jet claims the 

2014 Settlement Agreement also includes a term by which the Airport Authority agreed to waive 

the 1.5% provision in the FBO Rules. (Compl., DE 1, ¶ 96.) 

 Around the same time as the 2014 Settlement Agreement, Gary Jet and the Airport 

Authority entered into the First Amendment to First Amended Lease Agreement (“2014 

Amended Lease”) on July 28, 2014. (2014 Amended Lease, Ex. E to Compl., DE 1-5.) The 2014 

Amended Lease only changed the 2007 Lease in one way. The parties replaced Article I, section 

B, of the 2007 Lease with a new provision that included the following terms: 

[Gary Jet] shall abide by the provisions of the Minimum Standards, as 

amended by the [Airport Authority] from time to time. In the event of a 

conflict between the terms of this Lease and the terms of the Minimum 

Standards, the Minimum Standards will control. [The Airport Authority] 

covenants and agrees with [Gary Jet] that [the Airport Authority’s] 

Minimum Standards shall be a part of and be made applicable to any 

subsequent Fixed Base Operator lease agreement entered into by the 

[Airport Authority]. 
5 

(Id. Art. A-1.) In other words, the parties agreed that the Minimum Standards now control over 

the Lease. 

 Gary Jet executed the 2014 Amended Lease and the 2014 Settlement Agreement at the 

same time. (Compl., DE 1, ¶ 97(c).) 

 Consistent with the 2014 Settlement Agreement, the Airport Authority sent Gary Jet a 

draft of the New Minimum Standards on December 5, 2014. (Id. ¶ 100.) This draft did not 

include any provision requiring Gary Jet to pay the Airport Authority a percentage of gross 

revenue. (Id. ¶ 101.) Gary Jet helped the Airport Authority revise the New Minimum Standards, 

and the parties exchanged several more drafts. (Id. ¶¶ 102–103.) 

On May 7, 2015, the Airport Authority informed Gary Jet that the Airport Authority 

intended to include in the New Minimum Standards a requirement that each airport business pay 

the Airport Authority a percentage of their gross revenues. (Id. ¶ 104.) Gary Jet objected. (Id. ¶¶ 

106, 109.) 

 The Airport Authority approved the New Minimum Standards at the September 14, 2015, 

board meeting. (Id. ¶ 121.) Gary Jet claims these New Minimum Standards “flip [the 2007 

Lease] on its head” (Id. ¶ 115) in the following ways: they require Gary Jet to pay the Airport 

Authority 1.5% of Gary Jet’s gross revenues, raise Gary Jet’s rent from $.43 per square foot to 

$.50 per square foot, require Gary Jet to pay to maintain the fuel farm, and require Gary Jet to 

disclose its confidential business information concerning revenues to the Airport Authority. (Id.

¶¶ 116–120.) 

Gary Jet claims the New Minimum Standards violate the Contracts Clause of the United 

States Constitution by impairing the obligations of the 2007 Lease. (Id., Count I, ¶¶ 124–132.) 

Gary Jet also claims the New Minimum Standards exceed the Airport Authority’s power under 
6 

Indiana law (Id., Count II, ¶¶ 133–137) and effectuate a breach of the 2014 Settlement 

Agreement (Id., Count III, ¶¶ 138–144). 

Gary Jet did not bring a claim for breach of the 2007 Lease in this suit, nor did Gary Jet 

bring a claim for unconstitutional impairment of the 2014 Settlement Agreement in this suit. 

B. Discussion 

(1) Standard for Evaluating a Motion to Dismiss

The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim 

is to test the sufficiency of the pleading, not to decide the merits of the case. See Gibson v. City 

of Chi., 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides 

that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 

is entitled to relief.” However, “recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 661, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007))2

. 

As the Supreme Court has stated, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the 

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. Rather, “a 

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A complaint is facially plausible 

if a court can reasonably infer from factual content in the pleading that the defendant is liable for 

                                                            

2

 In Twombly the Supreme Court “retooled federal pleading standards, retiring the oft-quoted

[Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 42, 47 (1957)] formulation that a pleading ‘should not be dismissed 

for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the [pleader] can prove no set of 

facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank 

Nevada, N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2007). 
7 

the alleged wrongdoing. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The Seventh Circuit synthesized 

the standard into three requirements: 

First, a plaintiff must provide notice to defendants of her claims. Second, 

courts must accept a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, but some factual 

allegations will be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide 

sufficient notice to defendants of the plaintiff’s claim. Third, in considering 

the plaintiff’s factual allegations, courts should not accept as adequate 

abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal 

statements. 

Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009).

(2) Count I: Contracts Clause 

The Court considers first the sufficiency of Gary Jet’s claim for unconstitutional 

impairment of contract. Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint purports to assert a claim for 

impairment of the obligations of a contract, in violation of the Contracts Clause of the United 

States Constitution. (Compl., Count I, DE 1, ¶¶ 124–132.) 

(a) Arguments

Defendants Airport Authority and its board members3 moved to dismiss the Complaint 

under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Mot. Dismiss, 

DE 18.) The Airport Authority argues, among other things, that Gary Jet has failed to state a 

claim for violation of the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution. (Id. at 8–10.) 

                                                            

3

 For simplicity’s sake, the Court will refer to Defendant Airport Authority and its board 

members collectively as “Airport Authority.” 
8 

The Airport Authority cites Horwitz-Matthews for the proposition that not every breach 

of contract by a state or municipality is a violation of the Contracts Clause. (Id. at 8, citing 

Horwitz-Matthews, Inc. v. City of Chi., 78 F.3d 1248 (7th Cir. 1996).) 

The Airport Authority argues that Gary Jet’s Complaint “is essentially based on its claim 

of an alleged breach of the 2014 Settlement Agreement.” (Resp. to Mot. Prelim. Inj., DE 23 at 6.) 

The Airport Authority explains: 

Amending the Minimum Standards does not create any impairment to the 

contractual relationship between Gary Jet and the [Airport] Authority. Gary 

Jet has merely alleged a breach of the agreement with the Authority, which 

is not enough to constitute a constitutional impairment of the contractual 

relationship between Gary Jet and the Authority, according to the Court in 

Council 31. Gary Jet has not been deprived of the opportunity to seek 

damages for the alleged breach of contract. 

(Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, DE 19 at 9–10, referencing Council 31 of the Am. Fed’n of State, 

County, and Mun. Employees v. Quinn, 680 F.3d 875 (7th Cir. 2012).) 

 In response, Gary Jet acknowledges it has not asserted a claim that the Airport Authority 

breached the 2007 Lease. (Resp. to Mot. Dismiss, DE 34 at 10.) Rather, Gary Jet has asserted a 

claim that the Airport Authority breached the 2014 Settlement Agreement. (Id. at 10.) Also, Gary 

Jet claims the Airport Authority’s New Minimum Standards unconstitutionally impair the 2007 

Lease, not the 2014 Settlement Agreement. (Id. at 10.) 

 Gary Jet states it did not bring a claim for breach of the 2007 Lease because Gary Jet 

“believed that the [Airport] Authority would rely on its regulatory authority over Gary Jet Center 

to defeat such a claim.” (Id. at 10.) 
9 

(b) Analysis 

 The United States Constitution prohibits States from impairing the obligations of 

contracts: “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .” U.S. 

Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 

 The Contracts Clause applies to states and their subdivisions, including the Airport 

Authority. Horwitz-Matthews, Inc. v. City of Chi., 78 F.3d 1248, 1250 (7th Cir. 1996). 

In Horwitz-Matthews, a developer sued the City of Chicago for impairment of the 

obligation of a contract between the developer and the city. Id. at 1249. Chicago prepared a plan 

for redevelopment of a particular parcel of land and solicited bids to purchase the parcel and 

follow the redevelopment plan. Id. Horwitz-Matthews submitted an offer. Id. The City Council 

enacted an ordinance in 1988 approving the sale and authorizing the mayor to execute a deed 

conveying the parcel. Id. But the parties did not yet execute a sales contract, as certain preconditions remained outstanding. Id. Finally, in 1994, the City Council passed an ordinance 

repealing the 1988 ordinance that had approved the developer’s original offer. Id. at 1250. 

 Horwitz-Matthews sued the City of Chicago, claiming it had impaired the contractual 

obligation in violation of the Constitution, and claiming breach of contract based on state law. Id.

at 1249. 

 The district court observed that not every breach of contract by a governmental entity by 

means of a legislative enactment gives rise to a claim under the Contracts Clause. HorwitzMatthews, Inc. v. City of Chi., 1995 WL 76889, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 1995). Whether an 

action is a breach of a contract or an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of a contract 

“‘depends on the availability of a remedy in damages in response to the state’s (or its 
10 

subdivision’s) action.’” Id. at *3 (quoting E&E Hauling, Inc. v. Forest Pres. Dist., 613 F.2d 675, 

679 (7th Cir. 1980)). 

The district court held that the later Ordinance did not stop Horwitz-Matthews from 

seeking damages as a remedy for Chicago’s alleged breach of the agreement to sell the parcel. Id.

at *4. Accordingly, Chicago did not impair an obligation of the contract and the court dismissed 

that claim. Id. Since that claim was the only basis for federal jurisdiction, the district court 

declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the breach of contract claim, and dismissed the 

case without prejudice. Id.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Horwitz-Matthews, Inc. v. City of Chi., 78 F.3d 1248, 1252 

(7th Cir. 1996). At the outset, the Court of Appeals noted that the district court made the 

dismissal of the constitutional claim without prejudice so that the plaintiff could reinstate the suit 

in federal court if “the disposition of the breach of contract claim by the state court showed that 

the City had impaired the obligation of its contract after all.” Id. at 1249. 

The Court of Appeals observed that a plaintiff has more difficulty stating a prima facie 

case of a Contracts-Clause violation regarding a public contract than he does stating a prima 

facie case of a Contracts-Clause violation regarding the wiping-out of a class of existing 

contracts: 

For when a state repudiates a contract to which it is a party it is doing 

nothing different from what a private party does when the party repudiates 

a contract; it is committing a breach of contract. It would be absurd to turn 

every breach of contract by a state or municipality into a violation of the 

federal Constitution. 

Id. at 1250. 
11 

 Citing Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Court of Appeals noted that if the duty to pay 

damages for breach of contract is unimpaired, then “the obligation of the contract cannot be said 

to have been impaired.” Id. at 1251. 

 The Court of Appeals held that the form of Chicago’s withdrawal—the fact that the 

withdrawal happened through an ordinance—was immaterial: “Unless the form affects the 

promisee’s remedy—unless the city council has been delegated authority by the state to modify 

the law of contracts, which is state rather than municipal law—there is no impairment of the 

obligation of the city’s contracts.” Id. at 1251. The mere fact that a municipality breaches a 

contract by passing an ordinance does not mean that the municipality has impaired the 

obligations of the contract. 

 In Council 31, the Seventh Circuit upheld another dismissal for failure to state a claim 

under the Contracts Clause. Council 31 of the Am. Fed’n of State, County and Mun. Employees v. 

Quinn, 680 F.3d 875 (7th Cir. 2012). There, the State of Illinois repudiated some of its 

agreements by instituting a pay freeze for certain government employees. Id. at 878. Council 31 

sued, alleging that Illinois’ actions violated the Contracts Clause. Id. The district court dismissed 

the Contracts-Clause claim. Id.

 The Court of Appeals set out the standard for Contracts-Clause claims: 

To succeed on a Contracts-Clause claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that 

a change in state law has operated as a substantial impairment of a 

contractual relationship. This inquiry requires the plaintiff to show (1) that 

there is a contractual relationship, (2) that a change in law has impaired that 

relationship, and (3) that the impairment is substantial. 

Id. at 885 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

The Court of Appeals cited its decision in Horwitz-Matthews for the proposition that a 

breach of contract alone is not enough to constitute a constitutional impairment of a contractual 
12 

obligation. Id. at 885 (citing Horwitz-Matthews, 78 F.3d at 1250). A breach of contract triggers a 

duty to pay damages; if the duty to pay damages is unimpaired, then the obligation of the 

contract is unimpaired. Id. (citing Horwitz-Matthews, 78 F.3d at 1251). Accordingly, the Court 

of Appeals focused on whether the defendant governmental entity had set up a defense that 

prevented the plaintiff from obtaining damages, or some equivalent remedy, for the alleged 

breach of contract. Id. (citing Horwitz-Matthews, 78 F.3d at 1251). 

The Court of Appeals observed that Council 31 had already prevailed at arbitration on its 

breach-of-contract claim, and that in the subsequent suit filed by Illinois in state court to vacate 

the arbitration award, Illinois did not raise a defense based on the particular governmental action 

that Council 31 claimed violated the Contracts Clause. Id. at 886. The Court of Appeals 

concluded that Council 31 had failed to state a claim for violation of the Contracts Clause. Id.

In the instant case, Gary Jet’s claim for violation of the Contracts Clause has not yet 

crossed the line from speculative to plausible, as required to survive a motion to dismiss under 

Rule 12(b)(6). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 

A municipal entity does not violate the Contracts Clause every time it breaches one of its 

own contracts. Horwitz-Matthews, 78 F.3d at 1250. If the municipal entity has not impaired its 

obligation to answer to the plaintiff for breach of contract, then the municipal entity has not 

unconstitutionally impaired the obligation of the contract. Council 31, 680 F.3d at 885 (citing 

Horwitz-Matthews, 78 F.3d at 1251). For Gary Jet to have a claim against the Airport Authority 

for violation of the Contracts Clause with respect to the 2007 Lease, the Airport Authority must 

have taken an unconstitutional action to wipe out Gary Jet’s remedy for breach of contract. 

Gary Jet claims the Airport Authority unconstitutionally impaired the obligations of only 

one contract: the 2007 Lease. Yet Gary Jet has not brought a claim in this suit for breach of the 
13 

2007 Lease. And the Airport Authority has not had occasion to answer or raise any defenses to 

such a claim. 

At this point, the parties and the Court can only speculate as to the potential merits of a 

claim for breach of the 2007 Lease, the nature of the defenses the Airport Authority would raise 

to such a claim, and whether the Airport Authority would raise a defense that worked an 

unconstitutional impairment of the obligations of the 2007 Lease by eliminating a remedy for 

breach of contract. 

Gary Jet argues that it did not bring a claim for breach of the 2007 Lease because it 

anticipated the Airport Authority would rely on its regulatory authority over Gary Jet to defeat 

such a claim. (Resp. to Mot. Dismiss, DE 34 at 10.) Gary Jet argues it anticipated the Airport 

Authority would argue that the Authority’s New Minimum Standards mandating fuel farm 

maintenance, a higher rental rate, and the 1.5% charge did not breach the 2007 Lease because 

Gary Jet agreed in the 2014 Lease Amendment to be subject to any amendments to the Minimum 

Standards regardless of whether those amendments contradict terms in the 2007 Lease. (Id. at 

10–11.) These two arguments do not necessarily amount to the same thing: the former might 

raise a constitutional problem, the latter does not. If the Airport Authority’s defense to a claim 

for breach of the 2007 Lease would be that Gary Jet agreed in the 2014 Settlement Agreement 

that the Airport Authority could make changes to the Minimum Standards and that these would 

control over the 2007 Lease, then that case would be essentially a simple breach-of-contract case, 

and would not implicate the Constitution’s Contracts Clause. 

In any event, counsel for the Airport Authority made several concessions at the hearing 

regarding the Motion to Dismiss which should, arguably, assuage Gary Jet’s concerns regarding 
14 

the Contracts Clause, and which, at least, demonstrate the speculative nature of the ContractsClause claim at this point. 

Gary Jet purports to bring a claim for impairment of the 2007 Lease in violation of the 

Contracts Clause. To survive a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Gary Jet must essentially 

claim that governmental action has unconstitutionally prevented Gary Jet from having a remedy 

for breach of contract, and this claim must be plausible. But Gary Jet has not raised this claim to 

the level of plausibility. Gary Jet has not tested whether a claim for breach of the 2007 Lease 

would provide an adequate remedy, or what defenses the Airport Authority might raise. The 

claim is not yet plausible. If it turns out in further state-court proceedings that the Airport 

Authority has unconstitutionally impaired the 2007 Lease, then Gary Jet might have a plausible 

Contracts-Clause claim. However, as Judge Posner noted in Horwitz-Matthews, “If not, not.” 

Horwitz-Matthews, 78 F.3d at 1252. 

C. Conclusion 

As Gary Jet’s Contracts-Clause claim does not rise above the line between speculative 

and plausible, the Court dismisses Count I for failure to state a claim, without prejudice. Since 

Count I was the only independent basis for federal jurisdiction, the Court is inclined to decline 

the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction regarding the remaining counts. 

However, the Court will withhold ruling on this issue as requested by Gary Jet. Rather, 

the Court will give the parties an opportunity to brief the issue of supplemental federal 

jurisdiction. Gary Jet may file such a brief by December 28, 2015. Defendants may then respond 

by January 7, 2016. 
15 

SO ORDERED on December 18, 2015. 

 s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

 JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE