UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

LAKESHA L. NORINGTON, )

)

Petitioner, )

) 

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 3:15-CV-412-TLS

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Lakesha L. Norington, a prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a habeas corpus petition

challenging a prison disciplinary hearing conducted at the Westville Control Unit in case number

WCC-15-06-0281, where a disciplinary hearing officer found her guilty of unauthorized

possession of property/theft in violation of B-215 and sanctioned her with 40 days of lost earned

credit time. The conduct report completed by Program Director John Schrader states as follows:

On 6-11-15 1:00PM I - Program Director Jon F. Schrader - reviewed nine bound

documents submitted by Shawntrell Norington - #138726. Each document is 18

pages. They were copied and bound as if they were legal materials in the Law

Library. None qualify as legal mail and none are eligible for copy or binding.

Norington is indigent. He [sic] defrauded the state of the value of 147 pages of

documents (18 pgs x 9 documents @ 10¢/pg. = $14.70)

(ECF No. 11-1.) 

On June 16, 2015, Norington was notified of the charge. (ECF No. 11-4.) The screening

report reflects that she pled not guilty, declined a lay advocate, and requested two witnesses:

Brittany Franks, the library superintendent and John Harvel. (Id.) Norington also requested two

items of physical evidence: the law library copy request and the notice of confiscation. (Id.) On

June 23, 2015, a hearing officer conducted a disciplinary hearing. On the form designated for an

offender’s comment, the hearing officer noted, “offender removed from hearing due to being
disruptive and failing to follow[] the disciplinary process (i.e. arguing and failing to properly . . .

answer question.) (ECF No. 11-8.) The hearing officer found Norington guilty of unauthorized

possession of property. (Id.) In making this determination, the hearing officer relied on staff

reports, evidence from witnesses, and physical evidence, including the notice of confiscation,

remittance slip and photo copies. (See ECF Nos. 11-2, 11-3, 11-5, 11-6, 11-7.) Norington’s

appeals to the facility head and the final reviewing authority were denied. (ECF Nos. 11-9, 11-

10.) 

 Where prisoners lose good time credits in prison disciplinary hearings, the Fourteenth

Amendment Due Process Clause guarantees them certain procedural protections: (1) advance

written notice of the charges; (2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision maker;

(3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in defense when

consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals; and (4) a written statement by a fact

finder of evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418

U.S. 539 (1974). There must also be “some evidence” to support the decision of the prison

disciplinary board. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). 

Norington raises four claims in her Petition. First, she claims the IDOC staff’s action of

referring to Norington as a man violated her equal protection rights. Second, Norington asserts

her due process rights were violated when she was escorted out of the hearing room for being

disruptive. Third, she claims John Schrader wrote the “trumped up charge” in retaliation. And,

fourth, she claims there is insufficient evidence to find her guilty of unauthorized possession of

property.

To start, Norington alleges that she was discriminated against because the IDOC staff

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referred to her as a man even though she is a transgender and identifies as a woman. (ECF No. 1

at 2.) As a threshold matter, this claim only addresses her conditions of confinement, not the fact

or length of her custody. Thus, this claim can not be remedied in a habeas petition pursuant to §

2554. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498–99 (1973). Nevertheless, “simple verbal

harassment does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, deprive a prisoner of a protected

liberty interest or deny a prisoner equal protection of the laws.” DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607,

612 (7th Cir. 2000). In her traverse, Norington points out that the hearing officer’s actions

violated prison policy. However, even if internal rules or policies were violated, this would not

entitle Norington to federal habeas relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (habeas

relief is only available for a violation of the U.S. Constitution or other federal laws); Hester v.

McBride, 966 F. Supp. 765, 775 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (violation of prison policy in disciplinary

proceeding could not support grant of habeas relief, since federal habeas court “does not sit to

correct any errors of state law”). Therefore, IDOC officials referring to Norington as a man does

not violate the constitution and does not provide a basis for habeas relief.

Second, Norington claims her due process rights were violated because she was removed

from the hearing. She claims that her removal prevented her from submitting documentary

evidence and providing a personal statement. However, Norington had the opportunity to request

evidence and witnesses before the hearing, which she did. (ECF No. 11-4.) A prisoner has a

limited right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence consistent with correctional

goals and safety, but she cannot wait until the hearing to request such evidence. Sweeney v.

Parke, 113 F.3d 716, 719–20 (7th Cir. 1997) (where prisoner had opportunity to request

witnesses when he was notified of the disciplinary hearing and chose not to, prisoner’s limited

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right to call witnesses was fulfilled and his due process rights were not violated), overruled on

other grounds by White v. Ind. Parole Bd., 266 F.3d 759, 765–66 (7th Cir. 2001). In fact, all of

the evidence and witnesses she requested were presented to the hearing officer for review at the

hearing. (ECF Nos. 11-3 through 11-8.) Thus, she was not denied the opportunity to present

evidence or witnesses. Piggie v. McBride, 277 F.3d 922, 924-25 (7th Cir. 2002). Moreover,

Norington does not identify what evidence she was prevented from submitting or how she

suffered any prejudice as a result of that unadmitted evidence. Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 847

(7th Cir. 2011) (a prisoner is only entitled to habeas relief if the erroneous denial of evidence

was harmful and caused actual prejudice). In her traverse, Norington argues that her removal was

against prison policy. But, as pointed out above, that would not entitle her to federal habeas

relief. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67–68. 

Norington was given the opportunity to be heard at the hearing. However, she forfeited

her right to provide a personal statement by being disruptive. Criminal defendants who refuse to

behave in an appropriate manner forfeit their right to be present or to present a defense. Illinois

v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 345–46 (1970). An offender in a prison disciplinary proceeding does not

receive the full panoply of rights as in a criminal trial. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556. Thus, Norington’s

argumentative and disruptive behavior amounted to a waiver of her right to be present and

provide a statement. See Griffin v. Spratt, 969 F.2d 16, 20 (3d Cir. 1992) (reasoning that if a

certain act is not a due process violation in a criminal proceeding, it follows that the same act is

not a due process violation in a prison disciplinary proceeding). Thus, Norington was not denied

due process with respect to her opportunity to present evidence, witnesses, or her own statement.

Third, Norington claims that her rights were violated because the charge was initiated by

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staff for retaliatory reasons. “[P]risoners are entitled to be free from arbitrary actions of prison

officials.” McPherson, 188 F.3d at 787. Here, Norington cites to no evidence and provides no

argument from which retaliation may be inferred. Nevertheless, “even assuming fraudulent

conduct on the part of prison officials, the protection from such arbitrary action is found in the

procedures mandated by due process.” Id. In other words, the protections to which Norington

was entitled are the protections afforded by Wolff, and her claim that the charge was false does

not itself entitle her to federal habeas relief. Liberally construed, her claim is more akin to the

evidence was insufficient to find her guilty, which is addressed below.

Finally, Norington claims that her conviction of unauthorized possession of property is

not supported by the evidence. This offense is defined as, “unauthorized possession, destruction,

alteration, damage to, or theft of State property or property belonging to another.”

http://www.in.gov/idoc/files/02-04-101_APPENDIX_I-OFFENSES_6-1-2015(1).pdf (last

visited 10-07-16). In reviewing the hearing officer’s decision, “courts are not required to conduct

an examination of the entire record, independently assess witness credibility, or weigh the

evidence, but only determine whether the prison disciplinary board’s decision to revoke good

time credits has some factual basis.” McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999).

“[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the

conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455–56. In this case, there was

sufficient evidence in the record to support the conclusion reached by the hearing officer. The

conduct report states that Norington copied and bound nine documents, and that none of the

documents qualified for legal mail or were eligible for copying or binding. (ECF No. 11-1.) This

conclusion follows the IDOC’s policy regarding, “Offender Access to the Courts,” which states

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“Offenders shall be permitted to make copies only of court documents that are necessary for

either initial or pending litigation.” (ECF No. 11-12 at 2.) Norington concedes that the 18-page

“Notice of Violation” packet was not intended to be submitted to a court for litigation. (ECF No.

12 at 17.) Instead, she concedes that it was going to be sent to various IDOC officials through

internal mail. (Id.; See ECF No. 11-2.) In her traverse, Norington argues that the “Notice of

Violation” she had copied and bound was an attempt to exhaust her administrative remedies.

(ECF No. 12 at 17.) However, the IDOC’s grievance process does not require offenders to copy

and serve such documents. And, to the extent she claims that she is attempting to exhaust her

administrative remedies for federal court litigation, federal courts would not require the copying

and binding of these documents either. Thus, copying and binding the “Notice of Violation” was

not required for Norington to exhaust her administrative remedies. Ultimately, the “Notice of

Violation” packet is not considered to be a legal document and certainly was not going to be

submitted to a court. (ECF No. 11-2). Thus, Norington was not permitted to make copies of it at

the State’s expense. (Id.)

Norington argues that law library staff gave her permission for the copying and binding

by not denying her request to do so. (See ECF No. 11-7) However, Norington’s own witness,

Britney Franks, the law librarian, stated, “[t]he documents that Norington had bound should not

have been bound together because they are not legal mail to be sent to the courts.” (ECF No. 11-

5.) There is no evidence that the prison library staff member who carried out Norington’s

copying request knew that the documents were non-legal documents not intended for litigation.

Nevertheless, it would be unworkable to hold the IDOC responsible to independently screen and

verify every document to determine if it is intended to be filed in court. There is simply no way

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for IDOC staff to determine if a document is intended to be filed based on the appearance of the

document alone. Thus, this burden must lie with the offender. At the end of the day, Norington

had the State pay for copying and binding non-legal documents that were not intended for

litigation. This is improper. Thus, there is some evidence in the record supporting the hearing

officer’s finding that Norington is guilty of unauthorized possession of property/theft. Hill, 472

U.S. at 454.

 For the foregoing reasons, this Habeas Corpus Petition [ECF No. 1] is DENIED. 

SO ORDERED on October 28, 2016.

 s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

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