#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Demond WILSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11-1147.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Submitted Sept. 21, 2011.*

Decided Sept. 21, 2011.

Meredith P. Duchemin, Office of the United States Attorney, Madison, WI, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Kelly A. Welsh, Federal Defender Services, Madison, WI, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before RICHARD D. CUDAHY, Circuit Judge, MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge and ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.

*

 The appellant states that oral argument is unnecessary, and we agree. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(f); Cir. R. 34(f).

ORDER

Demond Wilson, a felon, was carrying several guns in his car, including a shotgun with an obliterated serial number, when police officers conducted a traffic stop. He pleaded guilty to possessing a gun after a felony conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number, *id.*§ 922(k). The district court, over Wilson’s objection, set the base offense level at 20 after concluding that his 2002 conviction in Michigan for using a motor vehicle to elude police, a third-degree felony, *see*Mioh. Comp. Laws § 750.479a(l), (3), counts as a conviction for a “crime of violence,” *see.*U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) & cmt. n. 1, 4B 1.2(a)(2) & cmt. n. 1. The court sentenced Wilson within the resulting guidelines range to a total of 84 months’ imprisonment.

In this appeal from his sentence, Wilson challenges the characterization of the Michigan offense as a crime of violence. The Sixth Circuit has held that an offense under subsections (1) and (3) of § 750.479a is a crime of violence. *United States v. Martin,*378 F.3d 578, 580-84 (6th Cir. 2004); *see United States v. LaCasse,*567 *718F.3d 763, 764 (6th Cir.2009) (holding that violation of subsections (1) and (3) of § 750.479a is a “violent felony” under parallel Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)). We have endorsed the Sixth Circuit’s analysis of § 750.479a, *see United States v. Dismuke,*593 F.3d 582, 593-96 (7th Cir.2010), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 3018, 180 L.Ed.2d 844 (2011), and we also have held that similar statutes in Indiana, Wisconsin, and Illinois define crimes of violence or violent felonies, *United States v. Sykes,*598 F.3d 334 (7th Cir.2010) (analyzing Ind. Code § 35-44-3-3(a), (b)(1)(A)), *aff'd,*— U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2267, 180 L.Ed.2d 60 (2011); *United States v. Spells,*537 F.3d 743, 747-53 (7th Cir.2008) (same); *Dismuke,*593 F.3d at 588-96 (analyzing Wis. Stat. 346.04(03)); *United States v. Womack,*610 F.3d 427, 433 (7th Cir.2010) (analyzing 625 ILCS 5/11-204.1), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 3020, 180 L.Ed.2d 849 (2011); *Welch v. United States,*604 F.3d 408, 415-25 (7th Cir.2010) (same), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 3019, 180 L.Ed.2d 844 (2011).

At sentencing Wilson acknowledged that our precedent compels characterizing § 750.479a as a crime of violence, but cer-tiorari had been granted in *Sykes,*and Wilson sought to preserve the issue pending review by the Supreme Court. In drafting his appellate brief, which was filed before the Supreme Court ruled, Wilson conceded that a decision upholding our opinion in *Sykes*would foreclose his appeal given that the Indiana statute discussed in that case is substantively indistinguishable from its Michigan counterpart. The Supreme Court has since affirmed *Sykes*and confirmed that “[f]elony vehicle flight,” as defined by Indiana, is a violent felony, 131 S.Ct. at 2277. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that a violation of subsections (1) and (3) of § 750.479a is a crime of violence.

AFFIRMED.