UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

JOSIAH PLETCHER, 

Petitioner, 

v. Case No. 3:15-CV-537 JVB 

SUPERINTENDENT, 

 Respondent. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 Josiah Pletcher, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the prison 

disciplinary hearing (WCC 15-09-43) where a disciplinary hearing officer (DHO) at the 

Westville Correctional Facility found him guilty of Trafficking in violation of A-113/111 on 

September 9, 2015. As a result, he was sanctioned with the loss of 90 days earned credit time and 

demoted to Credit Class 2. Pletcher raises three grounds in his petition. 

 In Ground One, Pletcher argues that he was found guilty of the wrong charge. He argues 

that he should have been found guilty of Attempted Trafficking, rather than Trafficking. This is a 

technical argument which is based solely on the omission of the word “Attempted” from the 

Disciplinary Hearing Report. The Conduct Report charged him with “Attempting to engage in 

trafficking” in violation of 111/113. DE 1-1 at 1. The Conduct Report stated that Pletcher sent an 

email to a person outside of the prison stating that she should have received the money by now to 

purchase illegal drugs. It stated that he twice called the same person asking for additional drugs. 

The code number for attempting a Class A violation is 111.1

 The code number for trafficking is 

 

1

 https://secure.in.gov/idoc/files/02-04-101_APPENDIX_I-OFFENSES_6-1-2015(1).pdf 
2 

113.2

 Both the Conduct Report and the Disciplinary Hearing Report contain those numbers. By 

number, he was charged with attempted trafficking. By number he was found guilty of attempted 

trafficking. There is no indication that the omission of the word “Attempted” from the text of the 

Disciplinary Hearing Report changed the factual basis of the charge against him. “Prison 

disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due 

a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). 

“In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction 

violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 

68 (1991). Here, there is no indication that the omission of the word “Attempted” from the 

Disciplinary Hearing Report violated those rights. Therefore Ground One is not a basis for 

habeas corpus relief. 

 In Ground Two, Pletcher argues that his hearing officer was not impartial because she had 

written an unrelated conduct report on him five months before. In Ground Three he argues that the 

sanctions were too harsh. He acknowledges that he did not present either of these two grounds 

during his administrative appeals. 

Indiana does not provide judicial review of decisions by prison 

administrative bodies, so the exhaustion requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) 

is satisfied by pursuing all administrative remedies. These are, we held in 

Markham v. Clark, 978 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1992), the sort of “available State 

corrective process” (§ 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)) that a prisoner must use. Indiana 

offers two levels of administrative review: a prisoner aggrieved by the 

decision of a disciplinary panel may appeal first to the warden and then to 

a statewide body called the Final Reviewing Authority. Moffat sought 

review by both bodies, but his argument was limited to the contention that 

the evidence did not support the board’s decision. He did not complain to 

either the warden or the Final Reviewing Authority about the board’s 

sketchy explanation for its decision. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 

119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999), holds that to exhaust a claim, and 

thus preserve it for collateral review under § 2254, a prisoner must present 

 

2 Id. 
3 

that legal theory to the state’s supreme court. The Final Reviewing 

Authority is the administrative equivalent to the state’s highest court, so the 

holding of Boerckel implies that when administrative remedies must be 

exhausted, a legal contention must be presented to each administrative level. 

Moffat v. Broyles, 288 F.3d 978, 981-82 (7th Cir. 2002). Because Pletcher did not present these 

two grounds to the Final Reviewing Authority, they are unexhausted. 

 Additionally, even if Grounds Two and Three had been exhausted, they would not be a 

basis for habeas corpus relief. “A hearing officer is not automatically deemed biased . . . simply 

because he adjudicated or was involved in a previous disciplinary charge against the prisoner.

See Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666-67; Pannell, 306 F.3d at 502.” Perotti v. Marberry, 355 Fed. Appx. 

39, 43 (7th Cir. 2009). And the harshness of sanctions is not a valid basis for challenging a 

punishment that is within the range of the offense for which the inmate was found guilty. Cf. 

United States ex rel. Long v. Pate, 418 F.2d 1028, 1031 (7th Cir. 1970) (Where a sentence is 

“within the range established by the legislature . . . this court will not [on habeas corpus review] 

question the trial judge’s discretion in imposing sentence, nor will it question the refusal of the 

Illinois Supreme Court to reconsider appellant’s petition for reduction of sentence.”). Pletcher’s 

sentence was within the limits permitted by Indiana’s Disciplinary Code for Adult Offenders for 

a Class A offense. 

 For these reasons, the Court DENIES the habeas corpus petition pursuant to Section 

2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 4 and DIRECTS the Clerk to close this case. 

SO ORDERED on October 27, 2016. 

 s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

 JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE