UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

JUDITH LUNCEFORD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) 3:16CV59-PPS

)

NANCY BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner )

of the Social Security Administration,1 )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Judith Lunceford appeals the Social Security Administration’s final decision

denying her application for a period of disability and for disability insurance benefits

under sections 216(i) and 223 of the Social Security Act. That denial is in a written

decision of an Administrative Law Judge, entered after a hearing at which Lunceford

and her husband appeared and testified.2 [AR 12-27; AR 33-83.] 

Lunceford is a high school graduate who turns 55 on her birthday in June 2017. 

[AR at 38.] She is married with a teenage daughter. [AR at 39.] At the ALJ’s hearing on

July 10, 2014, Lunceford testified that she had not driven a car for two years. [AR at 39.] 

Her alleged onset date of disability was February 1, 2009, although she had worked 10

1

 On January 23, 2017, Nancy Berryhill became the Acting Commissioner of Social

Security. Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d) provides for Berryhill’s automatic substitution in place of her

predecessor, Carolyn Colvin.

2 The administrative record [AR] is found in the court record at docket entry 9, and

consists of 765 pages. I will cite to its pages according to the Social Security Administration’s

Bates stamp numbers rather than the court’s Electronic Case Filing page number. 
hours a week from December 2011 to June 2012 as a recess monitor at an elementary

school. [AR at 42.] Lunceford had previously worked at American Stationery

beginning in 1993 but was laid off in 2009. [AR at 44-45.] For American Stationery,

Lunceford had been a customer service representative and then a customer service

manager. [AR at 45-46.] 

Lunceford agrees with the ALJ’s determinations of her severe impairments –

lumbar spine degenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis of the knee, obstructive sleep

apnea, restless leg syndrome, obesity, depression, anxiety, and psychotic disorder. [DE

18 at 4-5; AR at 14.] The ALJ concluded (and Lunceford does not here dispute) that

Lunceford’s impairments do not conclusively establish disability by meeting or

equaling the severity of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix

1. [AR at 15.] Based on the ALJ’s findings as to Lunceford’s residual functional

capacity as well as her age, education and work experience, the ALJ concluded that jobs

Lunceford can perform exist in significant numbers in the national economy, and that

Lunceford is not disabled. [AR at 26-27.] 

If substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s factual findings, they are

conclusive. 42 U.S.C. §405(g). Substantial evidence consists of “such relevant evidence

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Nelms v.

Astrue, 553 F.3d 1093, 1097 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401

(1971)). Review of the ALJ’s findings is deferential. Overman v. Astrue, 546 F.3d 456, 462

(7th Cir. 2008). In making a substantial evidence determination, I must review the

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record as a whole, but I can’t re-weigh the evidence or substitute my judgment for that

of the ALJ. Id

Lunceford presents a single argument in support of her appeal, namely that the

ALJ improperly ignored the opinion of Lunceford’s treating physician, Dr. William

Hoover. [DE 18 at 8.] In particular, Lunceford refers to Dr. Hoover’s statement dated

June 30, 2014 (10 days prior to the ALJ’s hearing) written on a prescription pad: “Judith

uses a cane due to fibromyalgia pain and history of falls due to problems with balance. 

I am recommending a rolling walker to give even more support. She has used a cane

for 3 years.” [AR at 303.] The significance of this information, Lunceford suggests, is

that if the ALJ had found that she requires a cane or walker then she would have been

found to be disabled. [DE 18 at 8.]

Lunceford’s rationale is that the “vocational expert testified that the use of a cane

would preclude light work” and that the ALJ “admitted at the hearing that Ms.

Lunceford would be found disabled under the medical vocational guidelines if she

were limited to sedentary work.” [DE 18 at 8.] The first half of this statement is clearly

correct. In response to questions by Lunceford’s counsel, the VE testified that the

necessity of a cane for standing and walking would preclude the performance of light

work. [AR at 81.] The second half of Lunceford’s contention -- that the ALJ “admitted”

that Lunceford would be disabled if limited to the sedentary category of work -- is not

supported in the cited page of the hearing transcript.

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Under what is called the “Treating Physician Rule,” a treating doctor’s “opinion

‘regarding the nature and severity of a medical condition is entitled to controlling

weight if it is well supported by medical findings and not inconsistent with other

substantial evidence in the record.’” Brown v. Colvin, 845 F.3d 247, 252 (7th Cir. 2016),

quoting Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 870 (7th Cir. 2000). More weight is accorded to the

opinions of treating physicians “because they are most familiar with the claimant’s

conditions and circumstances.” Israel v. Colvin, 840 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 2016). An ALJ

must provide sound reasons for discounting the disability opinion of a treating

physician. Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1127 (7th Cir. 2014). Given the deference

afforded to treating physicians, the ALJ “was required to explicitly consider the details

of the treatment relationship and explain the weight he was giving the opinion.” 

Meuser v. Colvin, 838 F.3d 905, 912 (7th Cir. 2016). Failure to do so is cause for remand. 

Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2011). 

Lunceford’s contention that the ALJ “ignored” Dr. Hoover’s opinions is plainly

wrong. Far from overlooking Hoover’s views, the ALJ’s discussion contains an express

acknowledgment of Hoover’s note concerning Lunceford’s use of a cane and his

suggestion of a walker, as well as his stated belief that Lunceford is disabled. [AR at 20,

24.] Further, the ALJ clearly was aware of the standards applicable to her consideration

of Dr. Hoover’s opinions, which she quotes. [AR at 24.] 

Neither is Lunceford persuasive in contending that the ALJ inadequately

supported the weight she gave Hoover’s opinions. Inconsistency with the doctor’s own

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examinations or the broader medical record can be a reasonable explanation for giving

little weight to his opinion that a claimant is disabled. Minnick v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 929,

938 (7th Cir. 2015); Givens v. Colvin, 551 Fed.Appx. 855, 860 (7th Cir. 2013). The ALJ’s

decision provides a detailed analysis of her conclusion that, based on contrary

indications in the medical record, Lunceford’s claims of reliance on a cane or walker

were not reliable. After acknowledging Lunceford’s hearing testimony and her various

health complaints, the ALJ explains her determination that Lunceford’s treatment

record “fails to support many of her symptoms,” including difficulty walking, and that

her allegations are “not completely credible.” [AR at 20.] This explanation is the better

part of six pages of the decision – hardly a failure to explain her reasoning. 

Particular to the issue of needing a cane, the ALJ notes that records of

Lunceford’s visits to Dr. Hoover in 2010, 2011 and 2012 (by which time Lunceford

claimed to be using a cane) “document physical exams that consistently indicate no

motor or sensory deficits or gait abnormalities.” [AR at 21.] The ALJ reviews

Lunceford’s November 2013 visit to an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Praveen C. Perni, for

complaints of leg and back pain, at which Lunceford herself denied any “gait

disturbances.” [Id., citing AR at 537.] The ALJ’s discussion acknowledges that in June

2014 Lunceford saw another orthopedic surgeon concerning bilateral knee pain. [AR at

22.] At that visit Lunceford “denie[d] any frank catching locking or giving way

episodes.” [AR at 751.] The doctor noted that Lunceford walked with a slight limp but

that an x-ray report revealed a normal left knee and only mild degenerative changes in

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the right knee. [AR at 22.] The ALJ observes that although Lunceford used a cane to

come to the administrative hearing and reported using a cane for several years prior,

“she consistently denied any falls between visits, her fall risk was considered ‘low,’ and

examinations showed generally normal gait.” [Id.] 

The ALJ goes on to explain that “[d]espite [Lunceford’s] claims of using a cane

secondary to falling, fainting, or balance issues, a closer review of the medical evidence

of record for the alleged three year period reflects no reports of falls, fainting, or balance

issues,” citing numerous medical records. [AR at 22.] Moreover, citing additional

medical records the ALJ writes that “numerous physical exams indicate that

[Lunceford’s] gait is normal or no ataxia present.” [Id.] Relevant to a need for a cane or

walker, the ALJ also notes that in April and May 2012, medical records reflected that

Lunceford was exercising regularly and “contain[ed] assessments of her muscle

strength, motor, or various other neurological signs that are within normal limits.” [AR

at 23.] 

To the extent that pain might have warranted the use of the cane, the ALJ also

cites discrepancies about Lunceford’s “allegations of severe debilitating pain levels,”

with reference to medical evidence of record that “documents numerous instances

where treating sources describe the claimant as ‘in no acute distress’ or does not appear

to be in any distress.” [Id.] After reviewing these and other medical records pertaining

to Lunceford’s various impairments, the ALJ states her conclusion that “the medical

evidence of record fails to support the use of a cane for the past three years or the

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current medical necessity for same.” [AR at 24.] This extensive analysis of the medical

record can hardly be fairly characterized as a failure to take into consideration all of the

evidence in the record and discuss significant evidence contrary to her ruling.

Dr. Hoover’s “To Whom it May Concern” letter expressing the view that

Lunceford was disabled requires little additional discussion. The letter is dated June 23,

2014, just several weeks prior to the administrative hearing. To his credit, Dr. Hoover

includes his own disclaimer – “I am not a disability determining physician.” [AR at

746.] In any event, the legal determination whether a claimant’s disability qualifies her

for social security benefits is ultimately reserved for the Commissioner, but that truism

alone is not a basis on which to dismiss a physician’s opinion on the subject. Garcia v.

Colvin, 741 F.3d 758, 760 (7th Cir. 2013). So I will examine the adequacy of the other

reasons the ALJ gives.

After setting forth the standard for giving controlling weight to a treating

source’s medical opinion, the ALJ explains that she “decline[s] to assign persuasive

weight to said opinion for various reasons.” [AR at 24.] As the ALJ’s extensive

discussion explains, those reasons are, in sum, that the ALJ found Dr. Hoover’s own

treatment records to be “inconsistent with a complete inability to sustain work

commensurate with the residual functional capacity adopted herein.” [AR at 25.] More

particularly, as the ALJ had previously explained in greater detail, she found that

numerous cited records of Dr. Hoover’s treatment of Lunceford “consistently detail

very little, if any, neurological abnormalities or gait issues” and also “contradict the

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claimant’s allegations of disabling pain.” [Id.] Inconsistency with substantial medical

evidence of record, particularly the treating physician’s own medical evidence, is a

legitimate basis for discounting Dr. Hoover’s opinion that Lunceford is disabled for

purposes of a Social Security benefits determination.

In the course of her discussion of Dr. Hoover’s views, Lunceford also complains

that the ALJ failed to give good reasons for discrediting the view of consultative

examiner Dr. William Terpstra, who opined that Lunceford could not stand or walk for

two hours of an eight-hour work day and had severe impairment in the areas of

standing, walking, lifting and carrying. [DE 18 at 10, 12; AR at 486.] The ALJ must also

give a sufficient explanation of the weight she gives an examining doctor’s disability

opinion. “Although an ALJ is not required to accept the views of an agency examining

physician if there is a contrary opinion from a later reviewer or other compelling

evidence, the ALJ still must have a good explanation for rejecting or discounting the

examining physician’s opinion.” Czarnecki v. Colvin, 595 Fed.Appx. 635, 642 (7th Cir.

2015). The answer with respect to Dr. Terpstra is essentially the same as the answer for

Dr. Hoover: the ALJ gave a thorough and more than sufficient explanation of her

conclusion contrary to theirs concerning Lunceford’s functionality in the areas of

standing and walking. 

I resist Lunceford’s invitation to re-weigh the evidence, and instead determine

that the ALJ’s decisions on the questions raised by Lunceford’s appeal are supported by

substantial evidence and that the ALJ built an accurate and logical bridge between the

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evidence and her conclusions. Thomas v. Colvin, 745 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2014). The

Commissioner’s final decision must be affirmed.

ACCORDINGLY:

The final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff Judith

Lunceford’s application for a period of disability and for disability insurance benefits is

AFFIRMED.

The Clerk shall enter judgment against plaintiff and in favor of defendant.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: June 14, 2017

/s/ Philip P. Simon 

PHILIP P. SIMON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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