IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

MICHAEL GENE FREED, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) NO. 3:13-CV-592

)

CHRISTOPHER DUFFY, et al.,)

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is a complaint filed by Michael Gene Freed,

a pro se prisoner, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (DE # 1.) For the

reasons set forth below, the Court: (1) GRANTS the plaintiff leave

to proceed against Christopher Duffy and Dr. Mazick in their

official capacity for injunctive relief related to the current care

he is receiving for mental health problems; (2) DISMISSES Dr.

Elhert, Ms. Richardson, and Mr. Wardell; (3) DISMISSES any and all

other claims contained in the complaint; (4) DIRECTS the United

States Marshals Service to effect service on Christopher Duffy and

Dr. Mazick; and (5) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2),

Christopher Duffy and Dr. Mazick to respond, as provided for in the

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE and N.D. IND. L.R. 10.1, only to the

claim for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in

this screening order.
BACKGROUND

Michael Gene Freed, a pro se prisoner, filed this action on

June 13, 2013. (DE # 1.) He alleges that he has been denied proper

care for mental health problems while incarcerated within the

Indiana Department of Correction (“IDOC”).

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a

prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,

or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. In determining whether the

complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard as

when deciding a motion to dismiss under FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir.

2006). To survive dismissal, a complaint must state a claim for

relief that is plausible on its face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ.

Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 603. Thus,

the plaintiff “must do better than putting a few words on paper

that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that

something has happened to her that might be redressed by the law.

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Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010)

(emphasis in original). The Court must bear in mind, however, that

“[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro

se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 

According to the complaint and attachments, Freed has a

history of mental health and substance abuse problems, dating back

to when he was approximately seven or eight years old. He was

evaluated by a forensic psychologist in September 2010 in

connection with his present offense, and was found to suffer from

schizoaffective disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder

(“ADHD”), antisocial personality disorder, and substance addiction.

The psychologist recommended that he receive psychotropic

medication while in prison “in order to achieve some degree of

stability of mood and thought.” (DE # 1-1 at 16.) Other records he

attaches show that a psychiatrist diagnosed him with bipolar and

antisocial personality disorder in 2007 in connection with a prior

criminal offense, and that at some point prior to his incarceration

he took psychiatric medications prescribed by a psychiatrist. (Id.

at 19-33.)

In the present suit, Freed claims that he has been denied

proper care for his mental health problems while at Miami

Correctional Facility (“MCF”) in 2011 and 2012, and at his current

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facility, Westville Correctional Facility Control Unit

(“Westville”). He claims that he has been hearing voices “that tell

me to hurt and kill others,” and has been acting out by hurting

himself. He states that despite these problems, mental health staff

at MCF and Westville have refused to prescribe him with any

psychiatric medication. He seeks injunctive relief pertaining to

his current care, asking the Court to order that he be provided

with treatment for his mental disorders. (DE # 1 at 5.) He sues an

official from Corizon Healthcare, which employs the medical staff

at the prisons, as well as mental health staff from both MCF and

Westville.

Under the Eighth Amendment, inmates are entitled to adequate

medical care for serious medical needs, including psychiatric

disorders. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Rice v.

Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 671 (7th Cir. 2012). For a medical

professional to be held liable for deliberate indifference to a

serious medical need, he or she must make a decision that

represents “such a substantial departure from accepted professional

judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person

responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.”

Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008). A mere

disagreement with medical professionals about the appropriate

course of treatment does not establish deliberate indifference, nor

does negligence or even medical practice, since “the Eighth

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Amendment does not codify common law torts.” Arnett v. Webster, 658

F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011). An inmate who has received some form

of treatment for a medical condition must show that the treatment

was “so blatantly inappropriate as to evidence intentional

mistreatment likely to seriously aggravate his condition.” Id.

Here, the records Freed attaches present a conflicting

picture. Although they do indicate he has a history of mental

health problems, at least one mental health professional evaluating

him in the past questioned whether he has a mental illness

requiring medication. (DE # 1-1 at 24) (“He states he has a

diagnosis of bipolar disorder and has been on medications for that,

however his description of that illness is not that convincing to

me . . .”). It appears from an attachment that mental health staff

within IDOC evaluated Freed and concluded that he suffers from

antisocial personality disorder, not a psychiatric problem that

requires medication. (DE # 1-1 at 57.) Records also show that he

has not been fully cooperative with staff, in two instances

refusing to speak with a therapist who came to his cell because, in

his own words, he is “extremely cranky” in the mornings. (DE # 1-1

at 41.) Another document reflects that he was previously prescribed

some type of psychiatric medication while in prison, but it was

discontinued because he would not go to the medication window to

pick it up. (Id. at 51.)

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However, at this stage, the Court must accept Freed’s

allegations as true and draw all inferences in his favor. As

recounted above, he alleges that he has suffered from mental health

problems for many years, has been hearing voices, and feels that he

might hurt himself or others if he does not receive medication. He

also alleges that at present he is not receiving any form of mental

health treatment. Although further factual development may show

that medical staff properly evaluated his need for treatment,

giving him the inferences to which he is entitled at this stage, he

has alleged enough to proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim. 

As a procedural matter, Freed is only seeking relief

pertaining to his current need for treatment, and he has no claim

for injunctive relief against the defendants from MCF. Higgason v.

Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir. 1995) (“If a prisoner is

transferred to another prison, his request for injunctive relief

against officials of the first prison is moot unless he can

demonstrate that he is likely to be retransferred.”). Freed does

not claim, nor is there anything before the Court to suggest, that

he is likely to be transferred back to MCF anytime in the near

future. Accordingly, the MCF defendants will be dismissed.

In connection with his current care, he sues Dr. Mazick (first

name unknown), the lead psychologist at Westville, as well as

Christopher Duffy, vice president of operations for Corizon, who

reviewed complaints he made about his medical care. (See DE # 1-1

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at 51.) Both of these individuals are proper defendants for

purposes of a claim for injunctive relief, since they could ensure

that an order pertaining to Freed’s medical care is carried out.

See Feit v. Ward, 886 F.2d 848, 858 (7th Cir. 1989). Accordingly,

Freed will be permitted to proceed against these two defendants in

their official capacity for injunctive relief.

 Freed also sues Mr. Wardell (first name unknown), a therapist

at Westville, but there is no indication he is a final decisionmaker or otherwise a proper party for purposes of ordering

injunctive relief. Nor is there anything to indicate Mr. Wardell

was deliberately indifferent to Freed’s mental health needs. As

stated above, Freed twice refused to speak with him when he

attempted to evaluate his need for mental health treatment. In

response to Freed’s complaint that he was coming by too early,

Wardell went to speak him at a different time of day. After their

meeting, Freed informed him that he was having a problem with

“crying a lot,” which he had failed to mention because, in his

words, “as soon as it passes I get extremely angry.” (DE # 1-1 at

43.) Wardell responded that he would come to speak with him again

so they could discuss the problem further. (Id.) That is the extent

of Wardell’s involvement in these events, as reflected in the

complaint and attachments. Even giving these filings liberal

construction, Freed has not alleged a plausible deliberate

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indifference claim against the therapist. Accordingly, this

defendant will be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court: 

(1) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed against Christopher

Duffy and Dr. Mazick in their official capacity for injunctive

relief related to the current care he is receiving for mental

health problems;

(2) DISMISSES Dr. Elhert, Ms. Richardson, and Mr. Wardell;

(3) DISMISSES any and all other claims contained in the

complaint;

(4) DIRECTS the United States Marshals Service to effect

service on Christopher Duffy and Dr. Mazick; and

(5) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), Christopher

Duffy and Dr. Mazick to respond, as provided for in the FEDERAL RULES

OF CIVIL PROCEDURE and N.D. IND. L.R. 10.1, only to the claim for which

the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening

order.

DATED: June 20, 2013 /s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

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