United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

March 20, 2006

Before

Hon. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

Hon. DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ] Appeal from the United

 Plaintiff-Appellee, ] States District Court for

 ] the Northern District of

No. 05-1374 v. ] Illinois, Eastern Division.

 ] 

TIMOTHY L. THOMPSON, ] No. 02 CR 196

 Defendant-Appellant. ] 

 ] Ronald A. Guzman,

 ] Judge.

Timothy Thompson was found guilty of bank robbery, and the district court

sentenced him to 100 months’ imprisonment, the bottom of the calculated

sentencing range. On appeal, Thompson filed a motion for a limited remand for

consideration of whether resentencing would be appropriate following United

States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). We granted the motion and ordered a limited

remand under the terms set forth in United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 483-

84 (7th Cir. 2005), for a determination whether the district court would have

imposed the same sentence had it understood that the guidelines were advisory.

The district court has now replied that it would today impose the same

sentence, knowing of the Guidelines’ advisory status. The parties were offered the

opportunity to respond before we finally resolved the appeal, and both parties have

responded. Counsel for Timothy Thompson responds that “it appears there are no

nonfrivolous sentencing issues left to be decided,” but he nonetheless asks that a

briefing schedule be set, indicating that he likely would file an Anders brief and

that Thompson should be afforded the chance to reply. 

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-1374 2

In the first motion for a limited remand counsel filed, it appeared that

counsel might be operating under the mistaken assumption that he could brief

additional issues following resolution of the limited remand. The court therefore

denied counsel’s first remand motion without prejudice to renewal and informed

counsel that if he intended to raise any issue other than a Booker issue, then a

remand would be premature. Counsel renewed the motion, asserting that the only

issue he planned on raising was a Booker issue, and the court granted a limited

remand based on that representation of the appellate issues. Although counsel

subsequently indicated to the court that Thompson might want to raise other

issues, appellate counsel need not raise all possible claims. Smith v. Robbins, 528

U.S. 259, 288 (2000); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983); Page v. United States,

884 F.2d 300, 302 (7th Cir. 1989) (“One of the principal functions of appellate

counsel is winnowing the potential claims so that the court may focus on those with

the best prospects.”). Had counsel filed an opening brief raising only a Booker issue

rather than a remand motion, Thompson would have had no right to respond or

supplement the brief. See Hayes v. Hawes, 921 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Cir. 2000) (There

is no Sixth Amendment right to file a pro se brief when represented by counsel.). 

Similarly, he does not have a right to respond under the Paladino remand

procedure established by the court, and further briefing in the appeal is not

warranted. 

Thompson’s sentence is within the properly calculated guideline range and

therefore presumptively reasonable. See United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606,

608 (7th Cir. 2005). Thompson does not offer any evidence based on the factors

recognized by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) that would tend to rebut that presumption. 

Because the district court would have imposed the same sentence post-Booker, and

because that sentence is reasonable, we conclude that Thompson’s sentence was not

the result of plain error. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district

court.