[Cite as Bruwier v. Bruwier, 2016-Ohio-7568.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

STARK COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

TODD BRUWIER 

 Plaintiff-Appellant 

-vsJENNIFER BRUWIER 

 Defendant-Appellee 

JUDGES: 

: Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, P.J. 

: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J. 

: Hon. John W. Wise, J. 

: 

: 

: Case No. 2016CA00072 

: 

: 

: O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from the Stark County Court of 

Common Pleas, Domestic Relations 

Division, Case No. 2014DR00756 

JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: October 31, 2016 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee 

JEREMY J. FOLTZ JENNIFER A. BRUWIER PRO SE 

122 Central Plaza North 515 Bebb Ave. S.W. 

Canton, OH 44702 Massillon, OH 44647 
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00072 2 

Gwin, J., 

{¶1} Appellant appeals the March 11, 2016 judgment entry of the Stark County 

Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, adopting appellee’s proposed 

shared parenting plan. 

Facts & Procedural History 

{¶2} Appellant Todd Bruwier and appellee Jennifer Bruwier were married in 

December of 2008. Appellant and appellee had three children: H.B., born December 14, 

2008, B.B., born October 30, 2011, and M.B., born September 22, 2012. Appellant filed 

a complaint for divorce on July 15, 2014. On September 2, 2014, appellee filed an answer 

and counterclaim. Appellee was designated the temporary legal custodian of the three 

children on September 23, 2014. 

{¶3} In January of 2015, the trial court stayed the case due to appellant filing a 

bankruptcy petition. The case was reactivated in June of 2015. A guardian ad litem was 

appointed in August of 2015. Melissa Pitinii (“Pitinii”), the guardian ad litem, filed a report 

in October of 2015. In her report, Pitinii completed an analysis of the factors contained in 

R.C. 3109.04 and recommended appellant be named the residential parent. As of the 

date of Pitinii’s first report, neither party had filed a proposed shared parenting plan. 

{¶4} On November 30, 2015, appellee filed a proposed shared parenting plan. 

Though the trial court stated in its later entry that appellant did not file a shared parenting 

plan, according to the docket, appellant filed a proposed shared parenting plan on 

January 19, 2016. Pitinii filed an updated report in January of 2016. She again went 

through the factors contained in R.C. 3109.04. Due to the requests for shared parenting, 
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00072 3 

Pitinii recommended the parties enter into a shared parenting plan, wherein appellant is 

named the residential parent for school purposes. 

{¶5} The trial court held a hearing on January 26, 2016. Pitinii testified she 

recommended shared parenting with appellant as the residential parent for school 

purposes. Pitinii stated appellant was more stable because he is employed. Further, 

Pitinii testified appellee was not working and did not take the whole custody issue very 

seriously. Pitinii was concerned about appellee’s boyfriend being charged with a 

misdemeanor drug possession, but had no concerns about appellee using drugs. Pitinii 

testified her decision in this case is a close call, as the parties have worked well together 

during the pendency of the case, with appellant receiving more visitation than ordered by 

the trial court. While Pitinii was concerned about appellee’s stability, Pitinii stated she 

had no concerns about appellee parenting the children. Pitinii also testified appellant has 

never had custody of the children and is living with his girlfriend. Pitinii confirmed if 

appellant receives custody of the children, his three children will be living with appellant, 

his girlfriend, and her two children. 

{¶6} Appellant testified he moved out of the martial home in March of 2014. 

Currently, he has the children every Thursday through Sunday. Appellant believes he 

should be the residential parent for school purposes because he has more stability as he 

has a steady job, is in good health, and has no criminal record. Appellant lives with his 

girlfriend and her two children. Appellant’s girlfriend owns the house he lives in and his 

name is not on the deed. Appellant testified appellee has given him much more visitation 

than ordered by the court. 
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00072 4 

{¶7} Appellee testified she lives in a rental home on which she has a lease. 

Appellee stated she is extremely involved in her children’s lives. Appellee has no 

problems with the visitation arrangement and wants it to continue. Appellee intends on 

returning to work and has no health issues. Appellee testified that, throughout the 

separation, she took care of everything for the children, including providing clothes and 

groceries. 

{¶8} The trial court issued a judgment entry on February 2, 2016. The trial court 

found, pursuant to R.C. 3109.04(D)(1)(a), appellee’s proposed shared parenting plan did 

not allocate parenting time with sufficient specificity and thus rejected appellee’s plan. 

However, the trial court found shared parenting was in the best interest of the children. 

The trial court ordered the parties to each, within thirty days, submit a proposed shared 

parenting plan, considering Pitinii’s input and reflecting the trial court’s concerns. 

Appellant filed a proposed shared parenting plan with himself as the residential parent for 

school purposes and appellee filed a proposed shared parenting plan with herself as the 

residential parent for school purposes. 

{¶9} The trial court issued a judgment entry on March 11, 2016. In its entry, the 

trial court stated the guardian ad litem recommended shared parenting and the parties 

submitted proposed shared parenting plans as directed by the court. The trial court 

further stated it reviewed both plans and found appellee’s plan to be in the best interest 

of the children. The trial court adopted appellee’s proposed shared parenting plan with 

appellee named as the residential parent for school purposes. 

{¶10} Appellant appeals the March 11, 2016 judgment entry of the Stark County 

Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, and assigns the following as error: 
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00072 5 

{¶11} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ADOPTING THE 

SHARED PARENTING PLAN SUBMITTED BY THE APPELLEE NAMING APPELLEE 

RESIDENTIAL PARENT, WHEN THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM UNEQUIVOCALLY 

RECOMMENDED THAT APPELLANT BE NAMED RESIDENTIAL PARENT. 

{¶12} II. THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY VIOLATED R.C. 3109.04(D)(1)(A)(ii) 

WHEN IT FAILED TO MAKE SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 

LAW AS TO THE REASONS IT DENIED APPELLANT’S PROPOSED SHARED 

PARENTING PLAN.” 

II. 

{¶13} For ease of discussion, we will first address appellant’s second assignment 

of error. In his second assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court violated R.C. 

3109.04(D)(1)(a)(ii) and (iii) when it failed to make specific findings of fact and conclusions 

of law as to the reasons it denied appellant’s proposed shared parenting plan and adopted 

appellee’s proposed shared parenting plan. 

{¶14} R.C. 3109.04(D)(1)(a) provides, in pertinent part: 

(ii) If each parent * * * files a separate plan, the court shall review each plan 

filed to determine if either is in the best interest of the children. If the court 

determines that one of the filed plans is in the best interest of the children, 

the court may approve the plan * * * if the court approves a plan under this 

division * * * the court shall enter in the record of the case findings of fact 

and conclusions of law as to the reasons for the approval or the rejection or 

denial. * * * 
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00072 6 

(iii) if only one parent * * * files a plan, the court * ** may approve the plan * 

* * the court enter in the record of the case findings of fact and conclusions 

of law as to the reasons for the approval or the rejection or denial. 

Further, in determining the best interest of a child, the court shall consider all relevant 

factors contained in R.C. 3109.04(F). 

{¶15} As this Court stated in Phillips v. Phillips, 5th Dist. Stark Nos. 

2004CA00105, 2004CA00005, 2005-Ohio-231, “when the allocation of parental rights 

and responsibilities is contested, before approving or adopting a shared parenting plan, 

the trial court is required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to R.C. 

3109.04(D)(1)(a)(ii) and (iii)” and “to determine whether the plan is in the best interest of 

the children.” However, a trial court may substantially comply with these statutes if there 

are sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to permit this Court to conduct a 

meaningful review. Haynes v. Haynes, 5th Dist. Coshocton No. 2010-CA-01, 2010-Ohio5801. 

{¶16} We find this case analogous to Phillips. The trial court ordered the parties 

to submit proposed shared parenting plans. However, in its judgment entry, the trial court 

stated only that it “has reviewed the proposed Shared Parenting Plans and finds that the 

attached Plan is in the best interests of the children.” The trial court failed to articulate 

any findings of fact or conclusions of law pursuant to R.C. 3109.04(D)(1)(a)(ii) and (iii) as 

to why it adopted appellee’s proposed shared parenting plan or how it analyzed the 

factors contained in R.C. 3109.04(F). There are not sufficient findings of fact and 

conclusions of law to permit this Court to conduct a meaningful review. 
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00072 7 

{¶17} While appellant suggests the trial court could not disregard Pitinii’s 

recommendation that appellant be named the residential parent, this Court has previously 

held that a trial court has discretion to follow or reject the recommendations of a guardian 

ad litem. Wine v. Wine, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 04 CA F 10 068, 2005-Ohio-975; 

Hammons v. Hammons, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 13 CAF 07 0053, 2014-Ohio-221. 

However, as noted above, there are not sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law 

to permit this Court to conduct a meaningful review as to whether the trial court abused 

its discretion in adopting the proposed shared parenting plan submitted by appellee and 

denying the plan submitted by appellant. 

{¶18} Appellant’s second assignment of error is sustained. Based on our 

disposition of appellant’s second assignment of error, we find appellant’s first assignment 

of error is moot because there are not sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law for 

this Court to review whether the trial court abused its discretion in adopting appellee’s 

proposed shared parenting plan. The judgment of the Stark County Court of Common 

Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, is reversed and remanded for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

By Gwin, J., 

Farmer, P.J., and 

Wise, J., concur 

WSG:clw 1013