UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

FREDDIE L. MCKNIGHT III,

Petitioner,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:14-CV-625-JD-MGG

WARDEN,

Respondent.

OPINION AND ORDER

Freddie L. McKnight, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed an amended habeas 

corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to challenge his conviction for cocaine dealing

under Case No. 20C01-606-FA-49. ECF 1. Following a jury trial, on December 7, 2006, 

the Elkhart Circuit Court sentenced him to forty-eight years of incarceration.

BACKGROUND

In deciding this habeas petition, the court must presume the facts set forth by the 

state courts are correct unless they are rebutted with clear and convincing evidence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The Court of Appeals of Indiana summarized the evidence 

presented at trial:

The relevant facts indicate that on May 31, 2006, “a cooperating source 

working with Officer Shawn Turner of the Elkhart County Interdiction 

and Covert Enforcement Unit purchased 8.709 grams of cocaine freebase 

or crack from McKnight.” Specifically, under the direction of Officer 

Turner, cooperating source Mickie Rhymer called McKnight and arranged 

to buy a quarter ounce or “quad” of cocaine from McKnight. Officers 

searched Rhymer, gave her $500 of photocopied cash to cover the drug 

purchase and a debt owed by Rhymer to McKnight, and wired her with a 

recording device. Rhymer and an undercover officer traveled to a 

USDC IN/ND case 3:14-cv-00625-JD-MGG document 76 filed 09/23/21 page 1 of 22
2

residence in Rhymer’s vehicle. Rhymer entered the kitchen of the 

residence, where she saw McKnight and scales with a bag of cocaine on it. 

Rhymer spoke with McKnight, and he indicated that he was giving her a 

little “extra” cocaine. Rhymer gave McKnight $500 in cash, and he gave 

her the bag later found to contain over eight grams of cocaine. Rhymer left 

the residence, was again searched by officers, and was found to only have 

the cocaine that she purchased from McKnight. As a result, the State 

charged McKnight with class A felony dealing in cocaine weighing three 

grams or more. Following a trial held on November 13 and 14, 2006, a jury 

found McKnight guilty as charged. The trial court imposed a sentence of 

forty-eight years.

ECF 36-16 at 2-3; McKnight v. State, 1 N.E.3d 193, 197–98 (Ind. App. 2013).

On February 14, 2008, the Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed the sentence on 

direct appeal. ECF 36-8. On March 24, 2008, the Indiana Supreme Court denied the 

petition for transfer. ECF 36-3 at 2. On March 26, 2009, McKnight initiated postconviction proceedings in the Elkhart Superior Court, and that court denied his petition 

for post-conviction relief. ECF 36-2. On December 31, 2013, the Court of Appeals of 

Indiana affirmed the decision of the lower court. ECF 36-16. On July 30, 2014, the 

Indiana Supreme Court denied McKnight’s motion to file a belated petition for transfer.

ECF 36-20.

On March 31, 2014, McKnight filed the petition initiating this habeas case, and he 

later amended it. ECF 1, ECF 6. In the amended petition, McKnight argues that the trial 

court erred by failing to dismiss a biased juror and that the prosecution failed to 

disclose material impeachment evidence related to Mickie Rhymer. He further argues 

that trial counsel erred by failing to investigate and cross-examine Rhymer, by failing to 

object to the admission of an audio recording, by failing to move for a directed verdict 

based on insufficient evidence in relation to the weight of the cocaine, and by coercing 

USDC IN/ND case 3:14-cv-00625-JD-MGG document 76 filed 09/23/21 page 2 of 22
3

him into informally accepting a plea deal.1 Additionally, he argues that appellate 

counsel erred by failing to raise on direct appeal the admissibility of the audio 

recording and insufficiency of the evidence in relation to the weight of the cocaine.

PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Before considering the merits of a habeas petition, the court must ensure that the 

petitioner has exhausted all available remedies in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); 

Lewis v. Sternes, 390 F.3d 1019, 1025 (7th Cir. 2004). To avoid procedural default, a 

habeas petitioner must fully and fairly present his federal claims to the state courts. 

Boyko v. Parke, 259 F.3d 781, 788 (7th Cir. 2001). Fair presentment “does not require a 

hypertechnical congruence between the claims made in the federal and state courts; it 

merely requires that the factual and legal substance remain the same.” Anderson v. 

Brevik, 471 F.3d 811, 814–15 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Boyko, 259 F.3d at 788). It does, 

however, require “the petitioner to assert his federal claim through one complete round 

of state-court review, either on direct appeal of his conviction or in post-conviction 

proceedings.” Lewis, 390 F.3d at 1025 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “This 

means that the petitioner must raise the issue at each and every level in the state court 

system, including levels at which review is discretionary rather than mandatory.” Id. “A 

habeas petitioner who has exhausted his state court remedies without properly 

asserting his federal claim at each level of state court review has procedurally defaulted 

that claim.” Id.

1 As detailed below, McKnight later declined to formally accept the plea agreement before the 

trial court and proceeded to trial. 

USDC IN/ND case 3:14-cv-00625-JD-MGG document 76 filed 09/23/21 page 3 of 22
4

McKnight presented his claim that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss a 

biased juror to the Court of Appeals of Indiana and the Indiana Supreme Court on 

direct appeal. ECF 36-6; ECF 36-9. At the post-conviction review stage, McKnight did 

not present his claim that trial counsel coerced him into accepting a plea deal to the 

Elkhart Circuit Court.2 PCR App. 106-23. Further, the Indiana Supreme Court rejected 

the petition for transfer referencing his claims of prosecutorial misconduct and 

ineffective assistance of counsel, as detailed above, as untimely pursuant to Ind. R. App. 

57(C). ECF 36-19. Therefore, the claims of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective 

assistance of counsel are procedurally defaulted. 

McKnight asserts that the court should excuse procedural default because he 

proceeded pro se during post-conviction review. A habeas petitioner can overcome a 

procedural default by showing both cause for failing to abide by state procedural rules 

and a resulting prejudice from that failure. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977); 

Wrinkles v. Buss, 537 F.3d 804, 812 (7th Cir. 2008). “Cause for a procedural default exists 

where something external to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed to 

him impeded his efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Maples v. Thomas, 

565 U.S. 266, 280 (2012). As a general rule, “[n]egligence on the part of a prisoner’s 

postconviction attorney does not qualify as cause.” The exception is that “[i]nadequate

assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a 

2 While this claim may have been raised before the Elkhart Circuit Court by presenting it in 

various filings or at a hearing, McKnight did not raise it properly by including it in the operative petition, 

and, as a result, the Court of Appeals of Indiana considered the claim waived. ECF 36-16 at 11 n.5.

USDC IN/ND case 3:14-cv-00625-JD-MGG document 76 filed 09/23/21 page 4 of 22
5

prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” Martinez v. 

Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9 (2012); Brown v. Brown, 847 F.3d 502 (7th Cir. 2017).

[W]hen a State requires a prisoner to raise an ineffective-assistance-oftrial-counsel claim in a collateral proceeding, a prisoner may establish 

cause for a default of an ineffective-assistance claim in two circumstances. 

The first is where the state courts did not appoint counsel in the initialreview collateral proceeding for a claim of ineffective assistance at trial. 

The second is where appointed counsel in the initial-review collateral 

proceeding, where the claim should have been raised, was ineffective 

under the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To 

overcome the default, a prisoner must also demonstrate that the 

underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial 

one, which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has 

some merit.

Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14. 

McKnight raised each of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims before 

the Elkhart Circuit Court except for the claim that trial counsel coerced him into 

accepting a plea deal, so that claim is the only one of McKnight’s claims that qualifies 

under these parameters. PCR App. 106-23. “[A] prisoner must also demonstrate that the 

underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to 

say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit.” Id. at 14. As 

detailed below, the court finds that the claim that trial counsel coerced him into 

accepting a plea deal is not substantial and declines to excuse procedural default. 

McKnight asserts that the court should excuse procedural default for the 

remaining claims because correctional staff did not promptly mail his motion for a 

rehearing, which, in turn, caused him to file an untimely petition to transfer. The 

Warden responds that McKnight’s failure to follow institutional procedures for legal 

USDC IN/ND case 3:14-cv-00625-JD-MGG document 76 filed 09/23/21 page 5 of 22
6

mail caused the untimely nature of the motion for rehearing. The Warden contends that 

McKnight instructed the mail room staff to send the filings to the law library for 

copying, binding, and mailing and that, absent these instructions, the mail room staff 

would have promptly mailed the filings, resulting in a timely filing. McKnight replies 

that he needed to send the motion for rehearing to the law library for copies in order to 

satisfy his service obligations to opposing counsel. After consideration of these 

arguments, the court finds that these circumstances present a difficult question on 

whether the petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated cause-and-prejudice to excuse 

procedural default. However, as discussed below, this case does not turn on this 

question, so the court will assume without deciding that McKnight has demonstrated 

cause and prejudice and consider the merits of his claims.3

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Federal habeas review . . . exists as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the 

state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through 

appeal.” Woods v. Donald, 135 S.Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015). 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted 

with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court 

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding.

3 Notably, federal courts have the discretion to consider claims for habeas relief under certain 

circumstances even if such claims are procedurally barred. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

USDC IN/ND case 3:14-cv-00625-JD-MGG document 76 filed 09/23/21 page 6 of 22
7

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

[This] standard is intentionally difficult to meet. We have explained that 

clearly established Federal law for purposes of §2254(d)(1) includes only 

the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions. And an 

unreasonable application of those holdings must be objectively 

unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice. To 

satisfy this high bar, a habeas petitioner is required to show that the state 

court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking 

in justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 

disagreement.

Woods, 135 S. Ct. at 1376. Criminal defendants are entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect 

one. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986). To warrant relief, a state court’s decision 

must be more than incorrect or erroneous; it must be objectively unreasonable. Wiggins 

v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit 

precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the 

correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011).

ANALYSIS

Juror Bias

McKnight argues that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss a juror due to her 

connection with the prosecution’s witness. For this proposition, McKnight relies on 

McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984), which holds that “to 

obtain a new trial in such a situation, a party must first demonstrate that a juror failed 

to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct 

response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.” “The 

requirement of an impartial jury is met when the prospective juror has given final, 

USDC IN/ND case 3:14-cv-00625-JD-MGG document 76 filed 09/23/21 page 7 of 22
8

unequivocal assurances, deemed credible by the judge, that for purposes of deciding 

the case, she can set aside any opinion she might hold, relinquish her prior beliefs, or 

lay aside her biases or her prejudicial personal experiences.” U.S. v. Taylor, 777 F.3d 434, 

441 (7th Cir. 2015). 

“Many of the rules that require excusing a juror for cause are based on implied 

bias, rather than actual bias. For example, a court must excuse a juror for cause if the 

juror is related to one of the parties in the case, or if the juror has even a tiny financial 

interest in the case. Such a juror may well be objective in fact, but the relationship is so 

close that the law errs on the side of caution.” U.S. v. Polichemi, 219 F.3d 698, 704 (7th 

Cir. 2000). “On the other hand, courts have declined to find implied bias when a juror 

was personally acquainted with a witness provided no actual bias existed.“ Tinsley v. 

Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 528–29 (9th Cir. 1990) (collecting cases).

After the jury was paneled but before opening arguments, the trial court received 

a note from one of the jurors, Carrie Bechtel, which was discussed as follows:

The Court: Ms. Bechtel, you gave me a note this morning. I furnished a 

copy of the note to each of the lawyers. You’ve indicated you’re 

acquainted with Heather Turner, who you believe is the spouse of Shawn 

Turner. I think you’re correct. Now the fact that you know Heather 

Turner, will that in any way affect your ability to be fair to Mr. McKnight 

and to the State of Indiana in this matter?

Juror: I don’t believe so. I don’t know her spouse very well. I only met him 

on one occasion, so I don’t -- I feel like Heather is trustworthy. I assume 

she has a trustworthy spouse, but I still feel like I can be impartial.

The Court: You still feel you can be impartial.

Juror: Sure.

USDC IN/ND case 3:14-cv-00625-JD-MGG document 76 filed 09/23/21 page 8 of 22
9

The Court: All right. The fact that you have met Shawn Turner, who may 

or may not be a witness in this matter, will that in any way affect your 

ability to be fair to both sides? 

Juror: No.

The Court: [Prosecution], do you have any questions?

Prosecution: No, your Honor.

The Court: [Trial counsel], do you have any questions?

Trial Counsel: Ms. Bechdel, my question would be having met Mr. Shawn 

Turner and knowing his wife and knowing her through a relationship that 

you had being at a church organization, do you think you’d give his 

testimony any more credibility than anybody else who would take the 

stand?

Juror: I mean, I don’t think so, no.

* * *

Trial Counsel: Your Honor, if I’d known this prior to today, I think I 

would have used my peremptory. I don’t have any peremptories left. I 

wouldn’t have had any near the end, but she was not near the end. She 

was closer toward the middle. Being that the relationship was through a 

church relationship with the wife and it had been in the discussion group 

some time, I know I would have struck her earlier on.

Prosecution: Oh, your Honor, that doesn’t say a discussion group for 

some time. It says that they have been in a discussion group at a local 

church organization. And to Monday morning quarterback a peremptory 

strike seems a little bit unfair considering I think other jurors said they 

knew people even sitting at my table and that wasn’t used. So she said she 

could be fair.

The Court: Your objection would be if you would have known that she 

knew the wife of Shawn Turner and she was in a discussion group with 

her, you would have struck her in jury selection. Why didn’t you ask?

Trial Counsel: We asked if they knew any of the names, and, at the time, 

she said she was unaware. She didn’t realize it until afterwards. She was 

asked if she knew Shawn Turner. She was asked if she knew any of the 

USDC IN/ND case 3:14-cv-00625-JD-MGG document 76 filed 09/23/21 page 9 of 22
10

names of people that might have been called. She wasn’t aware. She didn’t 

even know when she was asked if she knew police officers. 

The Court: She didn’t say she was well acquainted with Shawn Turner. 

She said she met him once at a wedding reception in the note. Isn’t that 

correct?

Trial Counsel: Yes, your Honor. But she knew the wife and she had some 

sort of relationship with the wife and then had met him thereafter. I just 

reiterate my objection as the direction I would have gone if I had known 

that at the time. And she didn’t say I know I could be impartial. She said I 

think I could be impartial.

Prosecution: She said she could be fair.

The Court: Over the objection of the defendant, Ms. Bechtel will continue 

as a juror. She said in no uncertain terms that she could be fair, and I think 

we all need to keep in mind that the Supreme Court has indicated in some 

of their decision that these jurors have a right to serve also, which she’s 

willing to serve. She’s been here all day yesterday. She’s here today, and 

she’s ready to go. If she said she couldn’t be fair because of her 

acquaintance with the wife of a witness, I would be with you on that, [trial 

counsel], but that’s not what she said. She said she believed she could be 

fair. 

Trial Tr. 28-33.

On direct appeal, McKnight argued that the trial court should have removed the 

juror on the basis of implied bias due to the relationship between the juror and the 

witness. ECF 36-6 at 11-15. The Court of Appeals of Indiana rejected this claim, 

reasoning that the relationship between the juror and the witness was casual and that 

she disclosed the relationship to the trial court as soon as she recognized it. ECF 36-8 at 

5-6. The appellate court further observed that the juror had represented that she could 

be impartial and fair and that nothing in the record suggested that the trial court’s 

decision to credit these representations was an abuse of discretion. Id.

USDC IN/ND case 3:14-cv-00625-JD-MGG document 76 filed 09/23/21 page 10 of 22
11

After reviewing the record, the court cannot find that the State courts made an 

unreasonable determination with respect to the decision to not remove the juror. The 

juror’s testimony contains ample support for the determination that the juror was not 

actually biased. Further, other courts have found similarly casual relationships 

insufficient to establish implied bias. See e.g., Manuel v. MDOW Ins. Co., 791 F.3d 838, 

842 (8th Cir. 2015) (juror knew two witnesses as a former teacher); U.S. v. Mitchell, 690 

F.3d 137, 150 (3d Cir. 2012) (coworker of two police officers who served as key 

witnesses); U.S. v. Bradshaw, 787 F.2d 1385, 1387 (10th Cir. 1986) (juror conducted 

business with witness). Therefore, the claim of implied bias is not a basis for habeas 

relief. 

Controlled Buy Witness

McKnight argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because trial counsel did not 

adequately investigate or cross-examine the prosecution’s key witness, Mickie Rhymer, 

with respect to her pending criminal charges, criminal history, mental health, and drug 

use. Second, McKnight argues that the prosecution failed to disclose Rhymer’s criminal 

history. Third, McKnight argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because trial counsel 

coerced him to sign a plea agreement based on the false information that he could be 

subject to consecutive sentences on five counts of cocaine dealing. He maintains that 

trial counsel’s coercion resulted in his signing of a plea agreement, which caused the 

prosecution and trial counsel to neglect their pretrial obligations with respect to 

Rhymer, which, in turn, prejudiced him at trial after he withdrew from the plea 

agreement. As mentioned above, McKnight did not raise the claim that trial counsel 

USDC IN/ND case 3:14-cv-00625-JD-MGG document 76 filed 09/23/21 page 11 of 22
12

coerced him into pleading guilty in his post-conviction petition but asserts that the 

court should excuse the procedural default under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). In 

determining whether Martinez applies, the pertinent question is whether the claim is a 

substantial one. Id. at 9. 

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must show 

that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced 

him. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To demonstrate deficient 

performance, “the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. “[S]trategic choices made after 

thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually 

unchallengeable.” Id. at 690. The test for prejudice is whether there was a reasonable 

probability that “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability 

“sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 693. In assessing prejudice 

under Strickland, “[t]he likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just 

conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011).

“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon 

request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 

punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). “Impeachment evidence . . . as well as exculpatory 

evidence, falls within the Brady rule.” U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). 

“[F]avorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression 

USDC IN/ND case 3:14-cv-00625-JD-MGG document 76 filed 09/23/21 page 12 of 22
13

by the government, if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 

disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Kyles 

v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995).

At trial, the prosecution presented Shawn Turner, a police officer, who testified 

that, on March 31, 2006, he worked with Mickie Rhymer to set up a controlled buy of a 

quarter-ounce of cocaine from McKnight. Trial Tr. 48-67. Prior to her arrival at 

McKnight’s residence, Officer Turner searched Rhymer’s person and vehicle for 

contraband but found none. Id. He provided her with a recording device and five 

hundred dollars to complete the purchase and to satisfy a pre-existing debt. Id. She 

went to McKnight’s residence in her vehicle with another officer as a passenger. Id.

After Rhymer completed the transaction, she returned to her vehicle, where police 

officers searched her again and retrieved the recording device and confiscated what she 

had purchased from McKnight. Id. 

Rhymer testified, consistent with Turner’s testimony, that, on March 31, 2006, she 

participated in a controlled buy. Trial Tr. 87-104. She testified that the transaction lasted 

for about five minutes, and she received more than a quarter ounce of crack cocaine 

from McKnight. Id. She confirmed that the contents of the audio recording accurately 

reflected her interactions with McKnight. Id. On cross-examination, Rhymer testified 

that she agreed to participate in the controlled buy to avoid criminal charges. Id. at 104-

09. Two police officers, who the transcript does not identify by name due to their 

undercover work, testified about the controlled buy consistent with Turner and 

Rhymer’s testimony. Id. at 112-32. 

USDC IN/ND case 3:14-cv-00625-JD-MGG document 76 filed 09/23/21 page 13 of 22
14

Dewey Murdick, a forensic analyst, scientifically verified that the confiscated 

substance obtained from McKnight during the controlled buy was crack cocaine. Id. at 

147-55. Wanda Sheppler, a forensic analyst, measured the crack cocaine at a weight of 

8.709 grams. Id. at 138-45. On cross-examination, Sheppler testified that she did not 

know when the scales had been calibrated in relation to when she measured the crack 

cocaine. Id. at 145-47. According to Sheppler, the scales are tested at random intervals 

and had never been found to vary more than one or two millionths of a gram. Id. 

At closing, trial counsel argued that Rhymer could have had the crack cocaine in 

her undergarments when she went to McKnight’s residence and that there was no 

discussion about monetary payment on the audio recording. Id. at 205-09. He argued 

that the desire to escape criminal liability likely motivated Rhymer’s testimony against 

McKnight. Id. He also questioned the absence of information regarding the accuracy of 

the scales used to weigh the crack cocaine. Id.

At the post-conviction stage, McKnight established that Rhymer had a conviction 

for theft that was eight years old at the time of trial. PCR Ex. 2. Trial counsel testified at 

an evidentiary hearing about why he did not investigate Rhymer more thoroughly. PCR 

Tr. 114-15, 128, 139-40, 202-05, 214-15. According to this testimony, the parties had 

scheduled a deposition of Mickie Rhymer on the Friday before the Monday trial setting. 

Id. The parties were prepared to conduct the deposition during which the prosecution 

would have disclosed her relevant criminal history and trial counsel would have 

explored grounds for impeachment. Id. After the parties and Rhymer were present for a 

deposition, McKnight agreed to plead guilty and signed a written agreement, and the 

USDC IN/ND case 3:14-cv-00625-JD-MGG document 76 filed 09/23/21 page 14 of 22
15

parties canceled the deposition. Id. Trial counsel had advised McKnight to plead guilty 

because the prosecution had offered to dismiss three of the five counts and because trial 

counsel believed that the evidence supporting each count was strong. Id. By Monday, 

McKnight had decided to withdraw from the plea agreement, and the trial court denied 

the motion for continuance. Id.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Indiana found that trial counsel did not 

perform deficiently by not adequately investigating Rhymer. ECF 36-16 at 8-12. The 

appellate court reasoned that trial counsel had prepared to investigate her by 

deposition but cancelled due to McKnight signing a plea agreement and that he did not 

have any opportunity to conduct further investigation when he discovered that 

McKnight had changed his mind on the morning of trial and the trial court refused to 

grant a continuance. Id. The appellate court further noted that the cancelled deposition 

limited the extent of trial counsel’s efforts to cross-examine Rhymer. Id. The appellate 

court also found that McKnight had not demonstrated prejudice as trial counsel 

established that Rhymer had a motive for testifying against McKnight and that 

McKnight’s allegations regarding Rhymer’s mental health and drug use were 

speculative and unsupported by evidence. The Court of Appeals of Indiana also 

rejected the claim that the prosecution failed to disclose Rhymer’s criminal history, 

reasoning that the eight-year-old conviction was negligible in light of the credibility 

issues established by trial counsel and the overwhelming evidence against him. Id. at 

19-21. 

USDC IN/ND case 3:14-cv-00625-JD-MGG document 76 filed 09/23/21 page 15 of 22
16

After reviewing the record, the State courts did not act unreasonably in 

determining that trial counsel did not perform deficiently by not adequately 

investigating and cross-examining Rhymer or that the prosecution did not fail to 

disclose material evidence of impeachment. When trial counsel cancelled the Rhymer 

deposition, McKnight had agreed to plead guilty, which would have necessarily 

required McKnight to admit that he had committed the crime. See Patton v. State, 517 

N.E.2d 374, 375 (Ind. 1987) (“A guilty plea is an admission of guilt; it admits the 

incriminating facts alleged.”). Considering this context, it is unclear what purpose 

continuing to investigate Rhymer for impeachment material would have served, and 

trial counsel had no opportunity to reopen the investigation at the time he learned that 

McKnight had decided against pleading guilty. See e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (“[W]hen a defendant has given counsel reason to believe that 

pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel’s failure to 

pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable.”); Earl v. 

Israel, 765 F.2d 91, 93 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[O]f course if it is reasonable in the circumstances 

not to conduct a particular investigation, the lawyer’s failure to do so will not establish 

ineffective representation.”).

The court further agrees with the State court’s assessment on prejudice and 

materiality given trial counsel’s other efforts to impeach Rhymer, including her motive 

for cooperating with the prosecution, and the weight of the evidence against him, which 

included numerous witnesses involved in a controlled buy, an audio recording, and the 

scientific verification of the weight and contents of what McKnight had sold Rhymer 

USDC IN/ND case 3:14-cv-00625-JD-MGG document 76 filed 09/23/21 page 16 of 22
17

during the controlled buy. Therefore, these claims are not a basis for habeas relief. See 

e.g., Hockett v. Duckworth, 999 F.2d 1160, 1170 (7th Cir. 1993) (no prejudice for failure to 

investigate when evidence against criminal defendant was overwhelming); Carpenter v. 

U.S., 492 F. Supp. 2d 912, 919 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (same).

Additionally, the court finds that McKnight has not demonstrated that his claim 

regarding trial counsel’s advice to plead guilty is substantial. Broadly speaking, when a 

defendant has five pending criminal cases, recommending a guilty plea based on the 

prosecution’s offers to dismiss three of the five charges after concluding that the 

evidence supporting each charge is strong seems a reasonable strategic decision. See e.g.,

Miller v. U.S., 940 F.3d 371, 375 (7th Cir. 2019) (suggesting that trial counsel should 

consider strength of the prosecution’s case for guilty plea advice); Fed. R. Crim. P. 

11(c)(1) (suggesting that the prosecution’s offer to dismiss other charges is a reasonable 

factor for trial counsel’s consideration for guilty plea advice). 

Though McKnight testified that trial counsel falsely informed him that he could 

receive consecutive sentences for these charges, the Elkhart Circuit Court found that 

this testimony was not credible. ECF 36-16 at 11. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), this 

credibility finding is entitled to a presumption of correction unless rebutted by clear 

and convincing evidence, and McKnight cites no such evidence. Further, McKnight

does not describe the specific details or context surrounding how trial counsel provided 

this information. Nor does he explain why he believes this information is false either by

detailing how the State courts decide whether to impose consecutive or concurrent 

sentences or by providing information about his other charges or any other factors that 

USDC IN/ND case 3:14-cv-00625-JD-MGG document 76 filed 09/23/21 page 17 of 22
18

would be relevant to that decision-making process. Moreover, as previously discussed, 

the State court reasonably determined that obtaining information about Rhymer’s prior 

conviction would not have been likely to change the outcome of the trial, so it is unclear 

how the advice to plead guilty prejudiced McKnight. Because the claim regarding trial 

counsel’s advice to plead guilty is insubstantial, it remains procedurally defaulted. See 

e.g., Hockett, 999 F.2d at 1170; Carpenter, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 919.

Failure to Object

McKnight argues that trial counsel erred by failing to object to the admission of 

an audio recording of the controlled buy on the basis that it was unintelligible and that 

appellate counsel erred by failing to raise the admissibility of the audio recording on 

direct appeal. He maintains that this audio recording caused him prejudice because it 

contained unintelligible portions that would lead the jury to engage in speculation and 

because it included McKnight’s statements about other drug transactions that were not 

related to the criminal charge that was the subject of the trial. 

At the post-conviction stage, trial counsel testified that he did not believe that the 

court would have sustained an objection to the audio recording given his experience 

with other audio recordings at other trials. PCR Tr. 183-90. He further testified that he 

declined to object because it may have raised the jury’s suspicions and because he

believed that the better strategy was to allow the jury to hear it and to rely on the poor 

quality of the recording to argue that the prosecution had not satisfied its burden of 

proof. Id.

USDC IN/ND case 3:14-cv-00625-JD-MGG document 76 filed 09/23/21 page 18 of 22
19

The Court of Appeals of Indiana rejected this ineffective assistance claim, 

reasoning that trial counsel’s decision to refrain from objecting was a reasonable 

strategic decision. ECF 36-16 at 12-13. The appellate court further found a lack of 

prejudice because the objection would not have been sustained because it was 

sufficiently intelligible for admission and noted that it was cumulative of the other 

evidence at trial. Id. Based on the same reasoning, the appellate court also rejected the 

claim that appellate counsel should have challenged the admissibility of the audio 

recording on direct appeal. Id. at 15-16.

Under Indiana law, “[t]o be admissible at trial, a recording must be of such 

clarity as to be intelligible and enlightening to the jury.” Dearman v. State, 743 N.E.2d 

757, 762 (Ind. 2001). “However, every word of a recording need not be intelligible.” Id.

“Rather, the tape recording, taken as a whole, must be of such clarity and completeness 

to preempt speculation in the minds of the jurors as to its content.” Id. The court has 

reviewed the audio recording. PCR Ex. 3. While it contains unintelligible portions, the 

contents are sufficiently intelligible for the purpose of identifying Rhymer and 

McKnight’s voices and the subject matter of their conversation -- a monetary 

transaction. Given the futility of the objection and the potential negative reaction from 

the jury, the court cannot find that the State courts’ determinations on these claims were

unreasonable. See Carter v. Douma, 796 F.3d 726, 735 (7th Cir. 2015) (“performance was 

not deficient by failing to make a futile objection”); Hardamon v. United States, 319 F.3d 

943, 949 (7th Cir. 2003) (whether to lodge an objection is generally a matter of trial 

strategy).

USDC IN/ND case 3:14-cv-00625-JD-MGG document 76 filed 09/23/21 page 19 of 22
20

McKnight also argues that trial counsel erred by failing to move for a directed 

verdict based on insufficient evidence on the weight of the cocaine and that appellate 

counsel erred by failing to raise this issue on direct appeal. He argues that the 

prosecution did not establish that the scales used by the forensic analyst to measure the 

weight of the crack cocaine had been properly calibrated. 

At the post-conviction stage, the Court of Appeals of Indiana rejected this claim, 

reasoning that the prosecution was not required to prove the exact dates of the 

calibration or that the scales were calibrated immediately before or after they were used 

to measure contraband. ECF 36-16 at 13-15. The appellate court found that the forensic 

analyst’s testimony regarding periodic calibration and the history of only minor 

variations were sufficient to serve as a foundation for testimony about the weight of the 

crack cocaine and that trial counsel addressed the absence of more specific information 

regarding calibration on cross-examination and during closing arguments. Id. The 

appellate court further observed that McKnight’s charged crime required only that the 

prosecution prove that he had three or more grams of crack cocaine and that McKnight 

had offered nothing to suggest that the measurement of 8.709 grams was inaccurate to 

the point that it would have likely affected the outcome of his trial. Id.

McKnight was charged with dealing three or more grams of cocaine. Direct 

Appeal App. 5. Under Indiana law, the test for sufficiency of the evidence claims is as 

follows:

When sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction is 

challenged on appeal, we apply a narrow standard of review. We neither 

reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Rather, we 

USDC IN/ND case 3:14-cv-00625-JD-MGG document 76 filed 09/23/21 page 20 of 22
21

look at the evidence most favorable to the State together with all 

reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. If there is substantial 

evidence of probative value from which the jury could have reasonably 

inferred guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the conviction will be affirmed.

Maynard v. State, 513 N.E.2d 641, 643 (Ind. 1987). Given this narrow standard of review, 

Sheppler’s testimony that, according to the scale, the crack cocaine weighed 8.709 grams 

and that the scales had never been found to vary more than one or two millionths of a 

gram was sufficient to establish that crack cocaine retrieved from Rhymer after the 

controlled buy was three or more grams. Consequently, the court cannot find that the 

State courts determination on the claim that trial counsel and appellate counsel did not 

raise a sufficiency of the evidence argument based on the calibration of the scales was 

unreasonable. Therefore, these claims are not a basis for habeas relief.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 11, the court must grant or deny a 

certificate of appealability. To obtain a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c), the petitioner must make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right by establishing “that a reasonable jurist could debate whether (or, for that matter, 

agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the 

issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). For the reasons explained in this order, there is no 

basis for encouraging McKnight to proceed further. 

For these reasons, the court DENIES the amended habeas corpus petition (ECF 

6); DENIES a certificate of appealability pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 

USDC IN/ND case 3:14-cv-00625-JD-MGG document 76 filed 09/23/21 page 21 of 22
22

11; and DIRECTS the clerk to enter judgment in favor of the Respondent and against the 

Petitioner.

SO ORDERED on September 23, 2021

/s/JON E. DEGUILIO

CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

USDC IN/ND case 3:14-cv-00625-JD-MGG document 76 filed 09/23/21 page 22 of 22