UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4380

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

TAMMY HENDERSON, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Spartanburg. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., District 

Judge. (7:07-cr-01206-GRA-1) 

Submitted: October 22, 2008 Decided: November 24, 2008 

Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

David W. Plowden, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville, 

South Carolina, for Appellant. David Calhoun Stephens, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Tammy Henderson appeals the district court’s judgment 

entered pursuant to her guilty plea to conspiracy to make and 

possess counterfeit securities, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 513 

(2000). Counsel for Henderson filed a brief pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which he asserts 

there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but asks this court 

to review whether the district court committed plain error in 

determining Henderson’s sentence. Henderson filed a pro se 

supplemental brief in which she asserts a number of errors in 

her presentence report (“PSR”) and the resulting Sentencing 

Guidelines range. Finding no error, we affirm. 

 Following United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 

(2005), a district court must engage in a multi-step process at 

sentencing. First, it must calculate the appropriate advisory 

Guidelines range. It must then consider the resulting range in 

conjunction with the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) 

(West 2000 & Supp. 2008) and determine an appropriate sentence. 

Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596 (2007). We review 

the district court’s imposition of a sentence for abuse of 

discretion. Id. at 597; see also United States v. Pauley, 511 

F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007). This court “must first ensure 

that the district court committed no significant procedural 

error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) 

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the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, 

failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence 

based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately 

explain the chosen sentence--including an explanation for any 

deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. 

 If there are no procedural errors, we then consider 

the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id. 

“Substantive reasonableness review entails taking into account 

the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any 

variance from the Guidelines range.” Pauley, 511 F.3d at 473 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, this 

court may presume a sentence within the Guidelines range to be 

reasonable. Id. Mere disagreement with the district court’s 

exercise of sentencing discretion does not permit us to 

substitute our judgment for that of the lower court. Id. at 

473-74. “Even if we would have reached a different sentencing 

result on our own, this fact alone is ‘insufficient to justify 

reversal of the district court.’” Id. at 474 (quoting Gall, 128 

S. Ct. at 597). 

 Following the probation officer’s preparation of the 

PSR, Henderson objected to the calculation of the intended loss 

amount, as well as to the inclusion of a two-level offense level 

enhancement for possession or use of device-making equipment, 

pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) 

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§ 2B1.1(10)(A)(i) (2007), and a two–level enhancement for 

Henderson’s role as a leader, manager, or supervisor, pursuant 

to USSG § 3B1.1(c). At the sentencing hearing, Henderson 

indicated that all of the objections had been resolved with the 

Government, as the parties agreed that the two-level enhancement 

for possession or use of device-making equipment should be 

removed, resulting in a total offense level of ten and a 

Sentencing Guidelines range of 24 to 30 months. Henderson 

received a 30-month sentence. 

In her pro se brief, Henderson asserts that the PSR 

used by the district court at sentencing did not reflect the 

removal of the enhancement for possession or use of devicemaking equipment and that, as a result, she received a harsher 

sentence based on this allegation of “white-collar thievery.” 

However, there is no indication in the record that Henderson 

received a longer sentence due to an enhancement that was 

brought to the court’s attention and was withdrawn prior to 

sentencing. Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(1)(C), the 

district court properly permitted the parties to comment on the 

findings in the PSR and to notify the court that the enhancement 

for device-making equipment was erroneously included in the 

Guidelines calculation and should be removed. Accordingly, 

Henderson’s claim is without merit. 

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Henderson also contends the district court improperly 

calculated the intended loss amount and erroneously included a 

two–level enhancement for her role as a leader, manager, or 

supervisor. While she originally objected to the PSR’s findings 

in regards to these two issues, Henderson stated at sentencing 

that those objections had been resolved with the Government. 

Accordingly, with no disputed issues presented at the sentencing 

hearing, the district court properly accepted the undisputed 

portions of the PSR as findings of fact. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 

32(i)(3)(A). Because Henderson failed to raise any objections 

to the PSR, the district court did not err in determining the 

intended loss amount or imposing the leadership enhancement 

without requiring the Government to prove the underlying facts. 

Finally, in her Anders brief, Henderson contends that 

she received an unreasonable sentence. At the sentencing 

hearing, the district court appropriately treated the Guidelines 

as advisory, considered the relevant factors under § 3553(a), 

and sentenced Henderson within the properly calculated 

Guidelines range. Because Henderson has failed to demonstrate 

her sentence is either procedurally or substantively 

unreasonable, we find that the sentence imposed by the district 

court was reasonable and should be affirmed. 

 In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

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We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of her 

right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If the client requests that a petition be 

filed, but counsel believes such a petition would be frivolous, 

then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED