1 Filed 7/31/13 Sierra Club v. County of Solano CA1/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE
SIERRA CLUB, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. COUNTY OF SOLANO et al., Defendants and Appellants; POTRERO HILLS LANDFILL, INC., Real Party in Interest and Appellant; BLT ENTERPRISES OF SACRAMENTO et al., Interveners and Appellants. A130682
(Solano County Super. Court No. FCS034073)

NORTHERN CALIFORNIA RECYCLING ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. COUNTY OF SOLANO, Defendant and Appellant. A130734
(Solano County Super. Court No. FCS033687)

SUSTAINABILITY, PARKS, RECYCLING & WILDLIFE LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. COUNTY OF SOLANO et al., Defendants and Appellants; POTRERO HILLS LANDFILL, INC., et al., Real Parties in Interest and Appellants; TRASHPROS LLC et al., Interveners and Appellants. A130735
(Solano County Super. Court No. FCS033700)

These consolidated appeal s present the question of wh ether County of Solano (county) is required to enforce Measure E, a 1984 initiative measure that severely
restricts the amount of solid waste that can be imported into the county. Effective2 January 1, 2013, state law pr ohibits counties from restric ting or limiting the importation of solid waste into a privately owned facility in the county based on the waste’s place of origin. (Pub. Resources Code, § 40059.3, subd. (a).) In light of this recent change to state law, certain parties to these appeals moved to have them dismissed or summarily reversed as moot. Because we agree th e appeals have been rendered moot, it is unnecessary to reach the merits of the unde rlying dispute. We dismiss some of the appeals and dispose of the rest by summarily reversi ng the judgments.
F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND Measure E was adopted by county voters in 1984. It precludes the importation of more than 95,000 tons of solid waste annually that originated or wa s collected outside the county. 1 The county has not enforced Measur e E since 1992, when county counsel
determined that Measure E is unconstitutional and unenforceab le in light of then-recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court. In one of the decisions relied upon by county counsel, Fort Gratiot Sanitary La ndfill, Inc. v. Michi gan Dept. of Natural
Resources (1992) 504 U.S. 353, the court struck down a Michigan law prohibiting landfill operators from accepting solid waste that originates outside the county in which a
landfill is located. The court held the law di scriminated against interstate commerce. ( Id. at p. 367.) The Legislative Counsel of California issued its own opinion in 1992 concluding Measure E is “protectionist an d impermissibly discriminatory against
interstate commerce.” A party to these consolidated appeals, Po trero Hills Landfill, Inc. (PHLI), operates a landfill in the county. PHLI applied for a permit to expand its landfill from 320 to 580 acres. After the county approv ed the permit, various parties challenged the approvals in

1 The operative language of Measure E is co ntained in section 2 and provides as follows: “The County of Solano shall not create a polic y, adopt a resolution or ordinance, enter into a contract or in any manner allow for th e importation of any solid waste as defined in Section 3 which originated or was collected out side the territorial li mits of Solano County which will bring the cumulative total amount of such imported solid waste in excess of 95,000 tons per year.”3 separate litigation that preceded the actions giving rise to these appeals. (See Protect the Marsh v. County of Solano et al., Solano County Super. Ct ., No. FCS026839.) Among
the issues raised in the Protect the Marsh litigation was whether th e county was required to comply with Measure E in approving the expansion permit. Following years of litigation, the court in Protect the Marsh entered a final judgment upholding the county’s approval of PHLI’s la ndfill expansion project. One of the parties to these appeals, Sustainability, Parks, Recycling & W ildlife Legal Defense Fund (SPRAWLDEF), appealed the decision in Protect the Marsh to Division Five of this court, which dismissed the appeal. ( SPRAWLDEF v. County of Solano et al., Ct. of Appeal, First Appellate Dist., Div. Five, No. A127688.) The three petitioners below—Sierra Club, Northern California Recyling Association, and SPRAWLDEF—f iled the actions giving rise to these appeals. They sought declaratory relief esta blishing that Measure E is la wful and asked the court to issue writs of mandate (1) ordering the county to vacate and set aside its approval of PHLI’s landfill expansion as in consistent with Measure E, and (2) compelling the county
to enforce Measure E. The trial court issued a joint ruling on a ll three petitions. In its joint ruling, the
court concluded that Measur e E would not offend the co mmerce clause if it were rewritten to apply only to intrastate wast e and not to waste generated outside of
California. The court determined it had authority to rewrite the law to make it constitutional and consequently granted the petitions to the extent they sought a declaration and mandate that the county enforce Measure E against waste produced
within California but outside of the county. The court de nied the request to vacate approval of the PHLI permit for its landfill expansion, reasoning in part that the parties challenging approval had failed to exhaust ad ministrative remedies because they did not raise the issue of Measure E compliance duri ng the public review period, although the
court noted the issue had been addressed by the parties in the Protect the Marsh litigation.4 The county and PHLI, along with comp anies engaged in the solid waste and recycling industry that interv ened in the action below, appe aled the portion of the trial court’s ruling directing the county to comp ly with a judicially revised version of
Measure E. Sierra Club and SPRAWLDEF file d cross-appeals challenging the denial of the request to vacate approval of the landfill expansion. Assembly Bill No. 845 ame nded the Public Resources Co de effective January 1, 2013, to provide that “[a]n ordinance adopted by a city or county or an ordinance enacted by initiative by the voters of a city or county shall not restrict or limit the importation of solid waste into a privately ow ned facility in that city or county based on the place of origin.” (Pub. Resources C ode, § 40059.3, subd. (a); A ssem. Bill No. 845 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) §1.) Assembly Bill No. 845 also de clares the state policy that “restrictions on the disposal of solid waste that discriminate on the basis of the place of origin of the waste are an obstacle to, and conflict with, statewide and regional policies to ensure adequate and appropriate capacity for solid waste disposal.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 40002, subd. (b).) After the governor signed Assembly Bill No. 845 into law, PHLI, along with the solid waste and recycling industry interven ors who appealed, filed a motion to dismiss certain appeals and summarily reverse the judgm ents in others on th e ground the recently passed legislation renders the pending appeal s and cross-appeals moot. We proceed to
consider the substance of that motion.
D ISCUSSION 1. The appeals of the order directing the co unty to enforce Measure E as judicially
rewritten are moot. In the judgment on appeal, the trial court directed the county to comply with and enforce Measure E as judicially modified to apply to solid waste generated within the state but outside the county. Measure E is preempted by Assembly Bill No. 845, which expressly prohibits counties from discrimina ting against solid waste importation based on place of origin. (Pub. Resour ces Code, § 40059.3, subd. (a).) Assembly Bill No. 845
therefore renders Measure E void and unenforceable. ( Morehart v. County of Santa5 Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 747 [“local legislation in conf lict with general law is void”].) Repeal or modification of a statute, or the subsequent enactment of legislation, may render issues raised in an appeal moot. ( County of San Di ego v. Brown (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1054, 1087; Callie v. Board of Supervisors (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 13, 18.) Ordinarily, we will dismiss an appeal when it has been rendered moot and the court
cannot afford effective relie f to the parties. (See Finnie v. Town of Tiburon (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1, 10-11.) However, a dismissal has the effect of affirming the judgment below, which creates an undesired outcome wh en the relief afforded by the trial court is rendered improper due to a change in the law. (See County of Fresno v. Shelton (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 996, 1005.) Consequently, when an appeal becomes moot as a result of a change in the law and the cha llenged judgment is contrary to the newly enacted law, the appropriate procedure is to summarily reverse the judgment with inst ructions to the trial court to dismiss the petition as moot. ( Ibid.; Callie v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 1 Cal.App.3d at pp. 18-19.) Here, enactment of Assembly Bill No. 845 has rendered the issues raised on appeal moot. Because the portion of the judg ment directing enforcement of Measure E is contrary to existing law, the appropriate course of action is to reverse that portion of the judgment with instructions to dismiss the petition. Sierra Club disputes this course of action, contending the court can provide effective relief without reaching the validity of Measure E. According to Sierra Club, the court need only reach the core issue of wh ether county official s had the power to unilaterally ignore Measure E based on thei r belief the measure is unconstitutional. Relying on Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1055, Sierra Club argues that local offici als have a duty to enforce duly enacted laws until there has been a judicial determination they are invalid . Because there has been no such judicial determination here, Sierra Cl ub contends the court can and should issue the writ without deciding the underlying validity of Measure E, leaving that issue fo r the county or PHLI to pursue in a separate acti on. We are not persuaded.6 It would be a hollow and pointless exerci se to disregard the plain effect of Assembly Bill No. 845 and direct the county to en force Measure E. That would not be “effective relief” in any sense of the term because any supposed duty the county would have regarding Measure E is mooted by Assemb ly Bill No. 845. Furt her, the relief Sierra Club wants this court to award is contrary to existing law. It would be a tremendous waste of attorney and court resources to requi re the county or PHLI to file a separate lawsuit challenging the validity Measure E, an issue that has been litigated extensively
both in the trial court and in these consolidated appeals. We also reject Sierra Club’s suggestion th at the court could provide effective relief by ordering the county or PHLI to take re medial action, such as disgorging fees and profits resulting from past violations of Meas ure E. Sierra Club has not demonstrated that any petitioner below sought such a remedy, nor has it shown that such relief is available to it under the statutes providing fo r administrative and traditional mandate.
2. The cross-appeals of the order denying the request to vaca te approval of the landfill expansion are moot. The cross-appeals filed by Sierra Cl ub and SPRAWLDEF challenge the order denying their request to invalidate the county ’s approval of PHLI’s landfill expansion.
Sierra Club and SPRAWLDEF contend the a pproval is invalid because the county approved the landfill expa nsion without ensuring that th e project would comply with Measure E. Because Measure E is preempt ed by Assembly Bill No. 845, the crossappeals are moot. Even if we were inclin ed to agree with Sie rra Club and SPRAWLDEF on the merits of the dispute, we are not in a position to direct the county to reconsider whether PHLI’s permit application complies with Measure E. As to the cross-appeals, dismissal is appropriate because that dispos ition will act as an affirmance of the order denying the relief Sierra Club a nd SPRAWLDEF had requested. ( County of Fresno v. Shelton, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 1005.) Sierra Club and SPRAWLDEF argue the co urt can provide effective relief and that Assembly Bill No. 845 is irre levant to the cross-appeals. They contend the county’s approval of the expa nsion permit was void ab initio because it was contrary to the law in7 effect at the time. Thus, they claim the court has no ch oice but to invalidate the expansion permit, even if the law has subs equently changed. Sierra Club relies on Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek (1990) 52 Cal. 3d 531, 544 ( Lesher ), for the proposition that a city or county “approv al” that conflicts with governing local legislation is “invalid at the time it is passe d” and cannot be resurrected by subsequent legislation. Contrary to Sierra Club’s characterization of Lesher, the case did not involve permit “approval” and was not decided under Co de of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Instead, the court held that “[a] zoning ordi nance that conflicts with a general plan is invalid at the time it is passed.” ( Lesher, supra, at p. 544.) The court’s focus was not upon the validity of an administrative action approving a permit but was instead upon the validity of legislation. Thus, th e court concluded that “[a] void statute or ordinance cannot be given effect.” ( Ibid. , italics added.) Lesher did not address whether an administrative approval that disregards some aspect of existing law is void ab initio . “It is axiomatic that an opinion does not stand for a proposition the court did not consider.” ( People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 626.) In reviewing challenges to permitting d ecisions, we “must apply the law in effect
when the case is decided and not when the permit was issued or denied.” ( GeorgiaPacific Corp. v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 678, 696; see also Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura (1973) 10 Cal.3d 110, 1 25 [“It is the prevailing rule that a reviewing court will apply the law in existence at th e time of its decision rather than at the time the permit was denied.”].) Th e only exception to this principle arises when a subsequent legislative enactment arose out of an attempt to frustrate a particular developer’s plans. ( Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventure, supra, at p. 126, fn. 11.) Here, Assembly Bill No. 845 was not the product of an e ffort to frustrate the efforts of a particular developer to secure a perm it. Accordingly, we disagree with the
contention that we must disr egard Assembly Bill No. 845 an d treat the approval of the landfill expansion permit as void ab initio . Under the law as it now exists, the permit cannot be invalidated as a result of the county ’s failure to take into account whether the project complies with Measure E.8 Furthermore, we disagree with SPRAWL DEF’s contention that we are bound to disregard changes in the law because we ar e limited to reviewing the record that was before the administrative agen cy at the time it made the ch allenged decision. Although
our review is limited to the evidentiary record compiled by the administrative agency (see State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners v. Superior Court (2009) 45 Cal.4th 963, 977), “courts have not hesitated to consider postju dgment events when legislative changes have occurred subsequent to a judgment [citations] or when subsequent events have caused issues to become moot.” ( Reserve Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta (1982) 30 Cal.3d 800, 813.) We may properly consider a change in the law th at has rendered the issues on appeal moot. Sierra Club and SPRAWLDEF’s arguments fail for the alternativ e reason that they cannot demonstrate that any abuse of discretion by the county in faili ng to give effect to Measure E was prejudicial. Issuance of a writ of administrative mandate is governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, which provides in relevant part that a court shall inquire whether there was “any prejudicial abuse of discretion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).) An “[a]buse of discreti on is established if the [agency] has not proceeded in the manner required by law . . . .” ( Ibid .) Here, in effect, Sierra Club and SPRAWL DEF argue the county abused its lawful scope of discretion when it a pproved PHLI’s permit without complying with Measure E. Even if we were to agree with that c ontention, Sierra Club and SPRAWLDEF cannot demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the purported abuse of disc retion. Given the preemptive effect of Assembly Bill No. 845, the county can not require compliance with Measure E as a condition of appr oving a use permit. It is th erefore immaterial that the county purportedly abused its discretion in failing to enforce Measure E at the time it approved the permit.
3. The pending challenge to the award of attorney fees does not require an examination of the merits of the appeals. The trial court awarded attorney fees to Sierra Club, Northern California Recycling Association, and SPRAWLDEF as succ essful parties pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The attorney fee award is currently being challenged in a9 separate appeal that has not been conso lidated with the merits appeals. (See Northern California Recycling Associa tion v. County of Solano , Docket No. A132844.) Sierra Club argues these consolidated appeals are not moot because it is necessary to examine the merits of the dispute in order to dete rmine whether the trial court properly awarded attorney fees. We disagree.
It is well settled that when an appellate court reverses an underlying judgment, an award of attorney fees under Code of Civ il Procedure section 1021.5 premised on that judgment must also be reversed. ( Klajic v. Castaic Lake Water Agency (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 5, 16; National Parks & Conservation A ssn. v. County of Riverside (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 234, 238-239; City of Sacramento v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 960, 978-979.) The a ttorney fee award falls along with the underlying judgment because th e party that received the award is no longer a successful party for purposes of Code of Civil Procedur e section 1021.5. ( City of Sacramento v. State Water Resources Control Bd., supra, at p. 979.) For reasons we have discussed above, th e proper resolution of these appeals in light of Assembly Bill No. 845 is to summari ly reverse the order di recting the county to enforce Measure E as judicially rewritten. (See County of Fresno v. Shelton, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 1005 [summary reversal is appropriate procedure when challenged judgment is contrary to newly enacted law re ndering appeal moot].) Because Sierra Club is no longer a successful party following the reversal compelled by Assembly Bill No. 845, the award of attorney fees must necessar ily be reversed. It is unnecessary to reach the merits of the dispute to arrive at this conclusion. In support of its position, Sierra Club relies on Save Our Residential Environment v. City of West Hollywood (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1745 ( SORE ) and Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 185 Cal. App.4th 866 ( CBD ). In both
SORE and CBD, the trial court issued writs of mandate to governmental entities and awarded attorney fees to the prevailing parties. ( SORE, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1748- 1749; CBD, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 880.) Th e governmental entities voluntarily complied with the writs. ( SORE, supra, at pp. 1749-1750; CBD, supra, at pp. 880-881.)10 In SORE, the court observed the rule that an appe al from a judgment directing issuance of a writ is generally rendered moot when a re spondent voluntarily comp lies with the writ. ( SORE, supra, at p. 1750.) However, because “the award of attorney fees depend[ed] on the propriety of the trial court’s ruling on th e merits of the action,” the court concluded the appeal was not moot. ( Id. at p. 1751.)
SORE and CBD are inapposite. Here, unlike in SORE and CBD , the appeals are moot because the law changed and not becaus e the county voluntar ily complied with the trial court’s order. The proper course of acti on in light of the change in the law is to summarily reverse the order dir ecting compliance with Measure E as rewritten. It is the reversal of the underlying order that compel s reversal of the asso ciated attorney fee
award. In SORE and CBD, by contrast, voluntary complia nce with the writs did not require reversing the underlying judgments. Consequently, the courts in those cases still had to decide the propriety of the attorney fee awards. That is not the case here, where the attorney fee award fa lls with the reversal of the underlying judgment. Insofar as Sierra Club may argue that its entitlement to attorney fees is unaffected by a change in the law while the judgment is on appeal, it is mistaken. Procedural success at the trial court level does not justify an attorney fee award if the judgment is subsequently vacated as a result of a change in the law. (See Miller v. California Com. on Status of Women (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 454, 458 ( Miller ).) In Miller, the trial court imposed injunctive relief and awarded attorney fees to the plaintiffs as the prevailing parties, with the amount of the fe e award to be determined later. ( Id. at p. 456.) Following the trial court ruling in the pl aintiffs’ favor, the Legislature “acted constitutionally to reverse the trial court’s” judgment. ( Id. at p. 458.) The plaintiffs sought to recover the attorney fees awarded by the trial court before the law changed. In rejecting the claim, the Court of Appeal desc ribed the plaintiff’s re quest as “an amazing display of chutzpah.” ( Id. at p. 455, fn. omitted.) The c ourt explained: “A necessary prerequisite to recovery under Code of Civ il Procedure section 1021.5 is the status of a prevailing party. [Citation.] While it is not necessary for plaintiff to achieve a favorable final judgment to qualify for a ttorneys’ fees (so long as th e plaintiff’s actions were the11 catalyst for the defendant’ s actions), there must be some relief to which the plaintiff’s actions are causally connected.” ( Id. at pp. 457-458.) Because of the change in the law, plaintiffs did not succeed in achieving any relief and were consequently not entitled to attorney fees. ( Id. at pp. 458-459; cf. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers’ Assn. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1598, 1602, fn. 3 [where judgment changed substantially upon appeal as a result of interv ening legislation, trial court’s attorney fee award must be vacated].)
The situation here is no different from that in Miller. Following the trial court judgment, the Legislature chan ged the applicable law while the judgment was on appeal.
Just as in Miller, the legislation was enacted to revers e the trial court’s judgment. The legislative history of Assembly Bill No. 845 2 could not be more empha tic: “This bill is in response to Measure E” and “will essentially nullify Measure E and the Solano County Superior Court ruling by prohibiting a local government from restricting or limiting the importation of solid waste based on the place of origin.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Asse m. Bill No. 845 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 14, 2012, pp. 2, 4.) Conse quently, Sierra Club did not succeed in achieving any relief causally connected to its actions. Indeed, instead of achieving some measure of relief, Sierra Club’s efforts were th e catalyst for legislat ion denying the relief it sought. Under these circumstances, it is unnecessary to review the appeals on their merits in order to assess the pr opriety of the attorney fee award. 3

2 On the court’s own motion, we take judi cial notice of the legislative history of Assembly Bill No. 845 solely for the purpose of demons trating the law was enacted in response to Measure E and the trial court’s rulin g in this case. We previously provided notification of our intent to take judicial no tice of the legislative history of Assembly Bill No. 845 and afforded the parties an opportunity to respond. During the course of the appeals, we de ferred consideration of numerous requests for judicial notice pending consid eration of the appeals on their merits. Because it is unnecessary to address the me rits of the appeals, we deny the pending requests for judicial notice as moot.

3 Even if we were to examine the merits of the dispute, our conclusion would be no different. On an appeal from an injunction, declaratory relief, or a writ of mandate, we12 4. The appeals do not present a question of ge neral public interest likely to recur. Even when an app eal is technically moot, an appellate court has discretion to decide an issue raised by the appeal if the issu e involves a matter of public interest and is likely to recur while evadi ng appellate review. (See People v. Cheek (2001) 25 Cal.4th 894, 897-898.) Sierra Club and SPRAWL DEF argue that we should exercise our
discretion to resolve certain issues raised by these appeals. We decline to do so. The overwhelming majority of issues rais ed by the appeals will not recur in light of the enactment of Assembly Bill No. 845. There is no reason to consider whether cities and counties are prohibited from limiting the importation of solid waste on the constitutional and other legal grou nds raised in the parties’ briefs on appeal. Assembly Bill No. 845 definitively answers the question. Nevertheless, Sierra Club argues we should address the more general question of whether a city or county may “usurp” the judicial function by refusing to enforce an initiative measure. Sierra Club fails to adequately explain why this issue will escape appellate review in the future. Indeed, Sierra Club even cites recent published cas es where appellate cour ts have addressed a municipality’s supposed refusa l to comply with a local in itiative measure, thus belying any claim the issue will evade review. Furthe r, it is far from clear that the unique factual circumstances giving rise to th e county’s decision not to en force Measure E are likely to
recur in other contexts.
5. SPRAWLDEF’s challenge to the constitutio nality of Assembly Bill No. 845 is
meritless. SPRAWLDEF contends that Assembly Bill No. 845 is unconstitutional. It argues
the bill’s enactment violates constitutional separation of powers principles because it
apply the governing law in effect at the time of our decision. ( Marine Forests Society v. California Coastal Com. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1, 14 [injunction]; City of Watsonville v. State Dept. of Health Services (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 875, 884-885 [declaratory relief]; Callie v. Board of Supe rvisors, supra, 1 Cal.App.3d at p. 18 [mandate].) Under the law as it now exists, Measure E is preempted by P ublic Resources Code section 40059.3, subdivision (a). Because Measure E is unenf orceable, an examination of the merits would lead to the same point we have reache d here—i.e., reversing the trial court’s order directing enforcement of Measure E as judicially rewritten.13 constitutes a legislative attempt to nullify th e trial court’s ruling in this case. The argument is specious. SPRAWLDEF relies on the principle that, “[w]hile the Legislature may amend a statute and apply the changed law to pending and future cases, the amended statute may not readjudicate or otherwise disregard judgments that are already final.” ( Perez v. Roe 1 (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 171, 177. ) In this case, because the review process has not concluded, the judgment is not yet “final ” for separation of powers purposes. (See id. at p. 179.) Consequently, the prohibition agains t applying a statute retroactively to final court judgments is inapplicable. On a more fundamental level, SPRAWL DEF’s argument fails because Assembly Bill No. 845 does not have retroactive effect. ( Quarry v. Doe I (2012) 53 Cal.4th 945, 955 [statutes construed as opera ting prospectively only absent clear intent to contrary].) The legislation does not constitute an attemp t to retroactively ch ange civil liability established by a court of law for actions th at took place in th e past. Rather, the legislation is prospective only and, eff ective January 1, 2013 , precludes cities and counties from restricting the impor tation of solid waste except in specified circumstances. As a consequence of this prohibition, Measur e E is preempted and the trial court’s order directing compliance with Measure E in the future cannot be given effect. This prospective change in the law does not implicate the concerns SPRAWLDEF has identified or intrude upon the powers reserved to the judicial branch. As final matter, we note that the pa rties requested oral argument in the consolidated appeals. Sierra Club request ed that we schedule oral argument on this motion to be heard concurrently w ith the merits of the appeals. It is unnecessary for us to reach the merits of the appeals for the reas ons we have explained in this opinion. A party’s right to oral argument ex ists in any appeal considered on the merits and decided by written opinion. (See Moles v. Regents of Un iversity of California (1982) 32 Cal.3d 867, 871; accord Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232 , 1255.) Because we dismiss or otherwise summarily dispose of th e appeals without reachi ng the merits, there14 is no right to oral argument on the motion be fore us. Furthermore, oral argument is unnecessary to our summary disposition of the appeals on the grounds they are moot.
D ISPOSITION The judgment in each of the consolidated appeals is reversed insofar as it orders the county to comp ly with Measure E as judicially re written. The cross-appeals filed by
Sierra Club and SPRAWLDEF are dismissed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to dismiss the petitions as moot. Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.

_ ____________ ____________ McGuiness, P. J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ Pollak, J.

_____________ ____________ Siggins, J.