UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

NELSON H. HARRIS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 3:13-CV-588 PS

 )

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Nelson H. Harris is a prisoner at the Indiana State Prison. On February 12, 2013,

he was ordered to provide a urine sample for a drug test. The lab reported that he tested

positive for Marijuana. A Disciplinary Hearing Body (DHB) later found him guilty of

possessing a controlled substance and docked him 30 days of earned credit time. In this

habeas corpus proceeding, Harris argues that he was denied the opportunity to review

the video showing how his urine sample was handled. Harris argues that the video

would show that the chain of custody was broken in violation of prison policy. 

Though Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) affords prisoners the right to

request that the DHB consider relevant evidence, “prison disciplinary boards are

entitled to receive, and act on, information that is withheld from the prisoner and the

public . . . .” White v. Ind. Parole Bd., 266 F.3d 759, 767 (7th Cir. 2001). Therefore, Harris

was not denied due process merely because he did not see the video. Here, the DHB

reviewed the video, but the hearing officer reported that, “[d]ue to the distance of the

camera, I am unable to see the incident clearly.” DE 1-1 at 5 and DE 6-3 at 3. 
In order to confirm this, I ordered the respondent to produce the video under

seal so that I could review it. However, the video had been destroyed because, “[i]n

cases where the video does not contain usable footage, the video is not stored

permanently by the facility.” DE 10-6 at 1. This is disturbing because it denies me the

ability to review the evidence requested by Harris and seen by the hearing officer.

However, an incomplete record does not guarantee Harris victory. Even where

evidence used at a criminal trial is destroyed, the “failure to preserve evidence is not a

violation of due process rights unless the defendant can demonstrate: (1) bad faith on

the part of the government; (2) that the exculpatory value of the evidence was apparent

before it was destroyed; and (3) that the evidence was of such a nature that the

petitioner would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably

available means.” Hubanks v. Frank, 392 F.3d 926, 931 (7th Cir. 2004). 

“Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the

full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff, 418

U.S. at 556. However, even if I were to apply the test applicable for the destruction of

evidence during a criminal trial, Harris has not demonstrated that the destruction of

this video was a due process violation. It was not destroyed in bad faith. Its destruction

was a routine practice, undoubtedly necessitated by the sheer volume of video

surveillance conducted at the prison. It was not known to be exculpatory. Rather, it had

been determined to be inconclusive. Finally, the video is not the only evidence showing

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how the test sample was handled. Both Harris and the reporting officer provided

statements. 

Harris states that he did not see the test sample placed into – and then sealed in –

the transport bag. Officer Parnell, on the other hand, stated that “[t]his specimen was

sealed in front of offender Harris by W. Parnell, the administrator of the test.” DE 6-1 at

1. Parnell also noted that the laboratory “found the seal sealed on the specimen bottle.”

Id. Harris does not deny seeing the bottle sealed, but argues that not permitting him to

see the placement of the bottle into the bag violated the chain of custody rules required

by prison policy. But there is a fundamental problem with Harris’s reliance on a prison

rule in this context: habeas corpus relief is not available for the violation of a prison

rule. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). (“In conducting habeas review, a federal

court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or

treaties of the United States”). 

Moreover, due process does not require a complete chain of custody in prison

disciplinary cases; it merely requires some evidence of guilt. Superintendent v. Hill, 472

U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985) (“[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the

record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.”). Harris

speculates that Officer Parnell contaminated his test sample, but I cannot re-weigh

evidence presented during prison disciplinary hearings. See McPherson v. McBride, 188

F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999). “The Federal Constitution does not require evidence that

logically precludes any conclusion but the one reached by the disciplinary board.” Hill,

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472 U.S. at 457. Though Harris argues that Officer Parnell contaminated his sample out

of retaliation for his being a Muslim and having filed a grievance, “even assuming

fraudulent conduct on the part of prison officials, the protection from such arbitrary

action is found in the procedures mandated by due process.” McPherson, 188 F.3d at

787. Thus, because there is some evidence demonstrating that Harris was guilty and he

has not shown that there were any due process violations, there is no basis for me to

grant him habeas corpus relief. 

For the foregoing reasons, the habeas corpus petition is DENIED. 

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: July 31, 2014 s/Philip P. Simon 

Chief Judge

United States District Court

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