[Cite as State v. Forrest, 2021-Ohio-122.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 109230 

 v. : 

 

CHRISTOPHER FORREST, : 

 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 21, 2021 

 

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-18-624782-A 

 

Appearances: 

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Debora Brewer, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

Law Office of Timothy Farrell Sweeney and Timothy F. 

Sweeney, for appellant. 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J.: 

Defendant-appellant, Christopher Forrest, appeals his conviction 

following his guilty plea. Finding no merit to the appeal, we affirm. 
In 2018, Forrest was named in a five-count, superseding indictment, 

charging him with rape, attempted rape, importuning, gross sexual imposition, and 

kidnapping with a sexual motivation specification.1 All counts except the 

importuning charge carried a sexually violent predator specification. He pleaded 

not guilty and the case was set for trial multiple times. During voir dire on the day 

of trial, Forrest agreed to accept a plea deal with the state. He pleaded guilty to an 

amended count of attempted rape and the importuning offense as charged; the court 

imposed the five-year, agreed-recommended sentence. 

Forrest now appeals, raising three assignments of error, which we will 

address together because they are interrelated, and he combined them in his brief. 

In his first, second, and third assignments of error, Forrest contends 

that he did not enter a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea because of his trial 

counsel’s deficient performance in failing to pursue a dismissal based on statutory 

and constitutional speedy trial grounds. In these assignments of error, he raises two 

issues: (1) his speedy trial rights were violated, and (2) he was denied effective 

assistance of counsel because counsel failed to seek dismissal on speedy trial 

grounds. 

“When a defendant enters a guilty plea, he generally waives all 

appealable errors that may have occurred unless such errors are shown to have 

 1 Forrest was originally indicted under Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-17-621521 with two 

counts of rape, and one count each of kidnapping and importuning. The state dismissed 

the case on July 24, 2019. 
precluded a defendant from entering a knowing and voluntary plea.” State v. 

Geraci, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 101946 and 101947, 2015-Ohio-2699, ¶ 14, citing 

State v. Kelley, 57 Ohio St.3d 127, 566 N.E.2d 658 (1991), paragraph two of the 

syllabus. 

Moreover, when a defendant enters a guilty plea as part of a plea 

bargain, he waives a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, except to the extent 

that the ineffective assistance of counsel caused the defendant’s plea to be less than 

knowing and voluntary. State v. Milczewski, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97138, 2012-

Ohio-1743, ¶ 5; State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100459, 2014-Ohio-3415, 

¶ 11, citing State v. Spates, 64 Ohio St.3d 269, 272, 595 N.E.2d 351 (1992). 

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant 

must demonstrate: (1) deficient performance by counsel, i.e., that counsel’s 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation, and (2) 

that counsel’s errors prejudiced the defendant, i.e., a reasonable probability that but 

for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 

674 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), paragraphs 

two and three of the syllabus. 

In this case, Forrest contends that counsel’s representation fell below 

an objective standard of reasonable representation when counsel failed to pursue a 

dismissal on speedy trial grounds, thus inducing him into entering an involuntary 

plea. We disagree. 
 We initially note that a guilty plea generally waives a defendant’s right 

to challenge his or her conviction on statutory speedy trial grounds. Kelley, 57 Ohio 

St.3d 127, 566 N.E.2d 658, at paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Yonkings, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98632, 2013-Ohio-1890, ¶ 14-15. Thus, when a defendant 

pleads guilty, he also generally waives the right to claim that his or her counsel was 

ineffective based upon statutory speedy trial issues. See, e.g., State v. Logan, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99471, 2014-Ohio-816, ¶ 20, citing State v. Bohanon, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 98217, 2013-Ohio-261, ¶ 8. 

This court has held, however, that although a defendant generally 

waives his statutory right to a speedy trial by pleading guilty, he does not waive his 

constitutional right to a speedy trial. See State v. Kutkut, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

98479, 2013-Ohio-1442, ¶ 9, citing State v. Carmon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 75377, 

1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 5458, 4 (Nov. 18, 1999), citing State v. Branch, 9 Ohio 

App.3d 160, 162, 458 N.E.2d 1287 (8th Dist.1983).2 

The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 

Constitution and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantee a defendant 

the constitutional right to speedy trial. State v. Taylor, 98 Ohio St.3d 27, 2002-

Ohio-7017, 781 N.E.2d 72, ¶ 32. 

 2 This court recognizes that both the First and Second Appellate Districts have 

reached different conclusions as to whether a guilty plea waives an alleged constitutional 

speedy trial violation. See, e.g., State v. Watson, 2018-Ohio-4971, 126 N.E.3d 289 (1st 

Dist.), and State v. Johnson, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2013-CA-1, 2013-Ohio-4077. 
To determine whether there has been a denial of a defendant’s 

constitutional right to a speedy trial, the court balances the four factors identified in 

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-533, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). State 

v. Long, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5363, ¶ 14. Those factors are: “‘(1) the length 

of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his speedy 

trial right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.’” Id., quoting State v. Hull, 110 Ohio 

St.3d 183, 2006-Ohio-4252, 852 N.E.2d 706, ¶ 22, citing Barker at 530. 

A defendant must meet the “threshold requirement” of a 

“presumptively prejudicial” delay to trigger a Barker analysis. State v. Duncan, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97208, 2012-Ohio-3683, ¶ 8. “‘Until there is some delay which 

is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors 

that go into the balance.’” Long at id., quoting Barker at 530. Courts have generally 

held that a delay approaching one year becomes “presumptively prejudicial.” Long

at id., citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 

520 (1992), fn. 1. 

A. Length of the Delay 

In this case, Forrest was arrested on September 18, 2017, and 

remained in jail until the time he entered his guilty plea on July 23, 2019. The length 

of delay was approximately two years, thus satisfying the threshold requirement of 

a presumptively prejudicial delay, which would weigh in Forrest’s favor. 
B. Reason for the Delay 

The second factor under Barker is the reason for the delay. A review 

of the record reveals that Forrest’s actions contributed to much of the delay. During 

the pendency of the case, discovery was ongoing regarding offenses that carried a 

potential penalty of life in prison. On April 23, 2018, the case was called for trial and 

immediately prior to voir dire, Forrest requested a continuance due to an 

unexpected family tragedy that prevented some of his witnesses from appearing at 

trial. The trial was continued until June. However, in May 2018, Forrest filed a 

motion to disqualify counsel. Following a hearing on the motion, the court 

appointed new counsel, who then sought discovery and a continuance of trial. We 

find that Forrest’s request to change counsel at this stage of the proceedings 

effectively caused his defense to start anew. 

Additionally, during the pendency of the case, Forrest underwent two 

psychological evaluations, one of which occurred after he submitted a series of pro 

se filings three months prior to trial. Additionally, two weeks prior to trial where he 

entered his plea, Forrest filed a “Notice of Issue of Mental Incompetence” suggesting 

that he was incompetent. In fact, from the time new counsel was appointed and 

until Forrest submitted these multiple pro se filings causing further delay, less than 

12 months had passed. 

Finally, we recognize that the trial court entered short and general 

continuances of trial from July 2018 until April 2019. However, the continuances 

were recorded as being “at the defendant’s request,” and there is no evidence in the 
record that the continuances or delay in trial were deliberate attempts by the state 

to prejudice Forrest’s defense or induce a plea. See Long, Slip Opinion No. 2020-

Ohio-5363, at ¶ 56 (DeWine, J., dissenting), citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 

2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (deliberate attempts to hamper the defense weigh against the 

government). 

Based on the record before this court, we find that Forrest caused most 

of the delay in this case; thus the second Barker factor weighs against him. 

C. Assertion of Speedy Trial Right 

The third factor to consider is the defendant’s assertion of his right to 

a speedy trial. Forrest contends on appeal that he “repeatedly demanded his speedy 

trial rights in written pro se motions and other filings.” The record reflects that 

Forrest submitted multiple filings to the court in which he questioned the length of 

delay of his trial. See Correspondence dated April 2, 2019; pro se Motion for 

Discharge for Delay of Trial dated April 2, 2019; and pro se Motion for dismissal 

dated June 4, 2019. Notwithstanding these pro se filings, Forrest was represented 

by counsel at all times, and Ohio does not recognize hybrid representation. State v. 

Thompson, 33 Ohio St.3d 1, 6, 514 N.E.2d 407 (1987) (neither the United States 

Constitution nor the Ohio Constitution require hybrid representation). 

Even considering his pro se filings, Forrest’s initial assertion of his 

right to a speedy trial occurred after he received new counsel and only three months 

prior to him accepting a plea deal. By this time, the days he now complains of on 

appeal — the “rote” continuances of trial from July 2018 to April 2019 — occurred 
prior to his assertion. Accordingly, the timeliness of his assertion is questionable. 

See State v. Doggett, 505 U.S. 647, 651, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992) 

(assertion of speedy trial must be in due course and timely). 

Additionally, his second request for a speedy trial occurred right 

before he presented the court with concerns about his competency to stand trial. 

Thus, although he was demanding a speedy trial, he was also causing additional 

delay by professing incompetence and making pro se requests. Forrest’s differing 

actions did “not convey an earnest desire to have his case move quickly.” See Long, 

Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5363, at ¶ 66 (DeWine, J., dissenting). 

Accordingly, we find that this factor weighs against Forrest. 

D. Prejudice from the Delay 

The fourth Barker factor is prejudice to the defendant. Recently, the 

Ohio Supreme Court reiterated that “[t]he prejudice factor in the analysis ‘should be 

assessed in the light of the interests of defendants[,] which the speedy trial right was 

designed to protect.’” Long at ¶ 22, quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 

33 L.Ed.2d 101. The three interests are: “(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial 

incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit 

the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Id. The third interest — the impact 

of the delay on the ability of the defendant to prepare his defense — is the greatest 

concern because it “‘skews the fairness of the entire system.’” Id.

Forrest summarily contends that he was prejudiced because his 

pretrial incarceration of nearly two years was oppressive and caused him an increase 
in anxiety and concern. In support, he directs this court to the competency 

evaluation performed in June 2019, which was submitted to this court under seal.3 

Our review of the report reveals that Forrest has a history of depression. He received 

mental health treatment in 2016 while he was in prison and continued to receive 

services for depression following his release. The report noted that while he waited 

for trial in the present case, Forrest continued to suffer from mild depression and 

was taking antidepressant and antianxiety medications. Despite his diagnosis, the 

report indicated that he was able to understand the risk of trial, and capable of 

evaluating information to make a rational choice to either take a plea deal or go to 

trial. 

He further argues that the long passage of time presented “grave risks 

that his defense would be impaired” because the allegations were “of a very young 

teen, whose mother was strongly supportive of Forrest and did not want to pursue 

the charges.” It appears that Forrest is suggesting that the support of the victim’s 

mother was crucial to his defense, and the delay jeopardized that support. 

Nevertheless, Forrest does not identify how his pretrial incarceration or delay in trial 

hindered his ability gather evidence, contact witnesses, or prepare for his defense. 

See Barker at 533. Accordingly, we find that Forrest has failed to show any 

reasonable prejudice sufficient to suggest that this Barker factor should weigh in his 

favor. 

 3 This court granted Forrest’s request to supplement the appellate record with the 

competency evaluation dated June 14, 2019. 
Balancing the Barker factors, we find that no violation of Forrest’s 

constitutional speedy trial right. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss based on a claim 

of a speedy-trial violation would have been meritless; therefore, his counsel did not 

provide ineffective assistance by failing to pursue dismissal on this basis. Our review 

of the record demonstrates that Forrest entered a knowing, intelligent, and 

voluntary plea to the offenses of attempted rape and importuning. The assignments 

of error are overruled. 

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s 

convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending is terminated. Case remanded 

to the trial court for execution of sentence. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, PRESIDING JUDGE 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., and 

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCUR