If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

March 24, 2022

V No. 355965

Leelanau Circuit Court

CHARLES MATTHEW STALLMAN, LC No. 15-001887-FH

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and MARKEY and SERVITTO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this prosecutor’s appeal, plaintiff appeals by right the trial court’s order reducing 

defendant’s restitution obligation from $413,000 to $196,415, while increasing his monthly payments from $50 to $150. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2015, defendant pleaded guilty to a violation of the Construction Lien Act,1see MCL 

570.1110(11)(c)(i), because he, a builder, falsified certain documents involving the payment of 

subcontractors. At issue were construction projects undertaken for Jeffrey Dietel and Rosemary 

McNally (Dietel/McNally), and for Benjamin Amber (Amber). Dietel/McNally and Amber paid 

defendant $484,615 for work done on their projects by subcontractors, but defendant 

misappropriated $366,703 of the money rather than pay the subcontractors. Defendant’s ex-wife, 

Elizabeth Stallman, was involved in the building company as a bookkeeper, but was not charged 

in the matter. Dietel/McNally and Amber encountered problems when the subcontractors sought 

payment from them, including by the placement of liens on their properties.

Defendant’s sentence originally included an obligation to pay $413,000 in restitution, but 

defendant later moved for a hearing to redetermine the amount on the grounds that the trial court 

had not particularized how it arrived at its original calculation, and that Elizabeth Stallman had 

 

1 MCL 570.1101 et seq.
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made payments to Dietel/McNally and Amber in civil proceedings that should count against the 

continuing restitution obligation. The trial court determined that defendant’s restitution should be 

decreased by the amount that Elizabeth Stallman had reimbursed the subcontractors, 

Dietel/McNally, and Amber, but that defendant’s monthly obligation to Dietel/McNally and 

Amber should be increased. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

This Court reviews a trial court’s restitution order for an abuse of discretion. People v 

Gubachy, 272 Mich App 706, 708; 728 NW2d 891 (2006). Likewise, the court’s decision whether 

to hold an evidentiary hearing, People v Danto, 294 Mich App 596, 613; 822 NW2d 600 (2011), 

along with other aspects of the court’s general conduct of proceedings, see People v Ramano, 181 

Mich App 204, 220; 448 NW2d 795 (1989). The trial court does not abuse its discretion when it 

chooses an outcome within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. People v Babcock, 

469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). This Court reviews a trial court’s factual findings for 

clear error. Gubachy, 272 Mich App at 708. However, unpreserved claims are reviewed for plain 

error affecting substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). 

Under this standard, reversal is warranted only if the plain error resulted in the conviction of an 

innocent defendant or if “the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 

judicial proceedings” independent of the defendant’s innocence. Id.

III. RESTITUTION HEARING

Plaintiff first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by holding a restitution hearing 

because defendant did not timely object at sentencing to the restitution award. The trial court 

specifically considered plaintiff’s argument against holding a restitution hearing at a July 2020 

motion hearing, and concluded that the amount of restitution required further investigation because 

“there was no full recitation of the restitution amounts, nor was there a stipulation placed on the 

record as to the restitution amounts.” The court further held that new information before it—“the 

resolution in the bankruptcy court with one of the claimants, Old Mission Windows, . . . that the 

defendant has had a bankruptcy discharge as to remaining assets, and . . . that his ex-wife may 

have also paid on some of these amounts”—allowed it to hold a hearing to amend the restitution 

order. We agree.

We recognize that in People v Grant, 455 Mich 221, 243; 565 NW2d 389 (1997), our 

Supreme Court stated that “[o]nly an actual dispute, properly raised at the sentencing hearing in 

respect to the type or amount of restitution, triggers the need to resolve the dispute by a 

preponderance of the evidence.” In this case, defendant did not dispute the restitution order at his 

October 2015 sentencing, his June 2016 motion for resentencing, or at any time before his 

November 2016 application for leave to appeal to this Court. Defendant first moved for a 

restitution hearing in January 2019, withdrew the motion, then moved again for such a hearing in 

April 2020. Notably, however, defendant was not belatedly raising a challenge that should have 

been resolved at sentencing, but rather was seeking further proceedings in response to new 

information.

MCL 780.766(22) provides, “The court may amend an order of restitution entered under 

this section on a motion by the prosecuting attorney, the victim, or the defendant based upon new 
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information related to the injury, damages, or loss for which the restitution was ordered.” Plaintiff 

asserts that defendant’s ex-wife’s payments to defendant’s victims were known at the time of his 

sentencing, and that there was otherwise no new information for the trial court to consider. 

However, plaintiff itself moved for a modification of the monthly restitution payments on the basis 

of new information about defendant’s finances from his bankruptcy hearing, thereby implicitly 

acknowledging the trial court’s discretion to modify the restitution order. Moreover, plaintiff 

conceded the existence of new information relating to defendant’s finances by relying on such 

information as the basis for plaintiff’s request that defendant be ordered to pay larger amounts of 

monthly restitution. Also, at sentencing plaintiff acknowledged a lack of information for

determining a precise restitution order, explaining as follows:

The calculation has been difficult because monies paid to the Stallmans to some 

extent did purchase some equipment or some materials that were delivered and 

added to the site, so the refined number has been a difficult target for us to 

completely and totally define, Judge. But $413,000 is the figure that we believe 

roughly calculates the total losses.

Defendant’s trial counsel also spoke of the difficulty of establishing a precise restitution amount:

Your Honor, . . . it’s been a real moving number over the last six or eight 

months. We’ve been trying to follow it, we have a bookkeeper who has been 

working on it along with others. But, it certainly is in the area of two to 400 

thousand dollars, depending on where it ends up.

The trial court referenced this lack of detailed information by stating that, “on your best day, you 

stole $200,000, probably more like $400,000,” and referenced ongoing civil proceedings involving

related reimbursements. Defendant’s presentence investigation report also reflected the lack of 

information about restitution at the time of sentencing, by stating that Amber was unsure of the 

amount Amber wanted in restitution, and that Dietel/McNally wanted $401,331 in restitution, that

the local crime victim’s office reported that “there is no set restitution amount at the time,” but that 

it had been “indicated approximately $400,000.00 was owed to” Amber, Dietel/McNally, and 

subcontractors. As noted, the trial court initially ordered defendant to pay $413,000 in restitution.

The record for the evidentiary hearing contained several stipulations offering more precise 

figures on which the trial court could arrive at a comprehensive restitution order. A stipulation 

established, for example, that the subcontractors had released the liens on Amber’s and 

Dietel/McNally’s properties, detailed settlement amounts that Elizabeth Stallman paid to 

subcontractors and victims while indicating that it had yet to be determined how much of these 

payments to subcontractors were applied to the Amber and Dietel/McNally projects, and contained 

information about defendant’s 2020 settlement with a subcontractor through the bankruptcy court. 

The record also contained an October 3, 2018 order of the bankruptcy court approving a $63,750 

settlement between Elizabeth Stallman and Dietel/McNally. And defendant testified that he was 

unaware of Elizabeth’s settlements with creditors until after he was released from prison. Because 

the trial court was considering more precise amounts, along with new information that had not 

been considered during defendant’s sentencing, it did not abuse its discretion by granting 

defendant’s motion for a hearing to revisit and amend the restitution order.
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IV. RESTITUTION ORDER

Plaintiff next argues that there was a procedural error during the restitution hearing because 

the trial court permitted defendant to present his argument first, despite plaintiff’s having the 

burden to prove the victims’ losses. See MCL 780.767(4). Further, “an actual dispute, properly 

raised at the sentencing hearing in respect to the type or amount of restitution, triggers the need to 

resolve the dispute by a preponderance of the evidence.” Grant, 455 Mich at 243.

In this case, the order of presentation was discussed during the motion hearing. The trial 

court stated that plaintiff had the burden, and invited plaintiff to make an opening statement. 

Defendant’s trial counsel interjected that his motion was to amend the restitution order, but that 

plaintiff had also filed a motion to amend restitution, and that counsel would accept the trial court’s

decision regarding which party should speak first. Plaintiff then offered no comments, and the 

trial court stated that defendant should begin because he had the burden to prove its motion. 

Notably, because defendant’s original judgment of sentence included a specific amount of 

restitution, the prosecution had in fact already met its burden to establish an amount of restitution. 

Accordingly, because both parties had moved to amend the restitution provision, both had the 

burden of supporting their respective motions. Plaintiff did not contend below that it should argue 

first, and does not on appeal assert that any error regarding the order of presentation prejudiced its 

position. Thus, plaintiff has not demonstrated that it was plain error for the trial court to allow 

defendant to argue its motion first.

Plaintiff further argues that the trial court legally erred by effectively treating defendant’s 

ex-wife, Elizabeth Stallman, as a codefendant by considering her uncharged conduct and ordering 

joint and several liability in the restitution order. We see no such impropriety.

A trial court’s “restitution award that is based solely on uncharged conduct” should not be 

upheld. People v McKinley, 496 Mich 410, 413; 852 NW2d 770 (2014). Additionally, a trial court 

may make restitution obligations joint and several only as among codefendants. People v Foster, 

319 Mich App 365, 386-387; 901 NW2d 127 (2017). However, in this case the trial court 

referenced neither uncharged conduct nor any supposed codefendant in its restitution order. 

Instead, the trial court based that order on the amounts defendant misappropriated from persons 

who had contracted with him for construction while giving defendant credit for amounts that 

Elizabeth Stallman had paid those victims in settlements in her own separate civil proceedings. 

The trial court noted that defendant’s former spouse was not charged with a crime, and explained 

that it was crediting the amount that she had reimbursed the victims because the victims were 

entitled to be made whole after their losses, not to double recovery. Moreover, MCL 780.766(9) 

provides that a trial court may offset a restitution award by the amount of damages a victim was 

able to recover in civil actions. Accordingly, the trial court did not make defendant’s ex-wife a 

part of defendant’s restitution order, other than by considering payments that the victims had 

received from her in calculating the amount yet needed to make them whole. The trial court thus 

did not actually assign any of defendant’s restitution liability to defendant’s former wife.

Plaintiff additionally argues that the trial court erred by ordering that defendant pay 

$152,201 in restitution to subcontractors, and only $46,296 in restitution to Amber and 

Dietel/McNally, whose money defendant had misappropriated. Plaintiff states that only Amber 

and Dietel/McNally were included in the original restitution order. However, the trial court 
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explained its decision on the basis of the testimony from the hearing. Amber and Dietel/McNally 

had paid defendant for supplies and labor they had received from the subcontractors, who were 

not paid. The trial court stated that the subcontractors had provided $366,703 in goods and services 

to Amber and Dietel/McNally, but had been reimbursed only $142,384 by settlements with 

Elizabeth Stallman, which required further reimbursement from defendant in restitution. Plaintiff 

does not dispute these factual findings as developed with the more complete postsentencing 

information.

In order to determine the amount of restitution to order, “the court shall consider the amount 

of the loss sustained by any victim as a result of the offense.” MCL 780.767(1). The purpose of 

restitution laws is “to enable victims to be compensated fairly for their suffering at the hands of 

convicted offenders.” People v Garrison, 495 Mich 362, 368; 852 NW2d 45 (2014). Thus, the 

restitution awarded to the subcontractors, Dietel/McNally, and Amber based on their losses was 

within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.

Plaintiff also argues that the trial court made several errors in its calculations of the amount 

of restitution owed to each victim. Plaintiff states that the trial court failed to account for the 

portion of Elizabeth Stallman’s settlements with subcontractors that was for work outside the 

pertinent county, that the amount awarded to Dietel/McNally and Amber resulted in a net loss for 

them because it did not fully account for the costs incurred while seeking reparation from 

defendant, that Elizabeth Stallman’s civil settlements should not have substituted for defendant’s 

criminal liability, and that the amount of restitution ordered would not make the victims whole. 

However, the parties stipulated to the amounts of loss suffered by each of the subcontractors before 

the restitution hearing, and the stipulation also recognized total restitution due the victims at 

$413,000. The trial court’s task was to determine the losses of each victim as a result of 

defendant’s conduct in order to ensure that each was compensated. As discussed, Dietel/McNally 

and Amber paid defendant, who withheld most of those funds from the subcontractors who 

performed the pertinent work. When the subcontractors demanded payment, they placed liens on 

the property of Dietel/McNally and of Amber. The parties agreed on the amounts that defendant 

misappropriated. The trial court determined that the property owners were made whole because 

the work was performed and the liens were rescinded, and they were to receive an additional 

$46,296 in restitution from defendant for costs in addition to the settlement money they received 

from Elizabeth Stallman. The restitution award also ensured compensation to the subcontractors 

for the portion of their work that had not been reimbursed after their settlements with Elizabeth 

Stallman. The focus of restitution is “not on what a defendant took, but what a victim lost because 

of the defendant’s criminal activity.” Gubachy, 272 Mich App at 713. In this case, the trial court 

considered the losses of all of the victims and arranged restitution to meet the losses that each had 

sustained after Elizabeth Stallman had independently reimbursed portions of them. The trial court 

did not abuse its discretion when ordering defendant’s restitution amounts.

V. RESTITUTION PAYMENTS

Although the trial court granted plaintiff’s motion to increase defendant’s monthly 

restitution payments, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by doing so by increasing defendant’s 

monthly restitution payments $50 to only $150. Plaintiff had requested an increase to $400 per

month, and on appeal argues for $1,000 per month while pointing out that, at the latter rate, it 

would take over 16 years for defendant to satisfy the debt.
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Plaintiff emphasizes that defendant had asserted at sentencing that he could pay $1,000 a 

month, and defendant confirmed at the motion hearing that his attorney had stated at sentencing 

that defendant could manage monthly restitution payments of $1,000, but defendant also explained 

that that position was based on his financial status before he was incarcerated, which had since

changed. Defendant testified that his income was now $52,000 per year, and that his monthly 

expenses included $200 settlement payments to a subcontractor, $50 restitution, $1,700 in rent. In 

defendant’s brief for his motion hearing, he stated that he also had a $2,400 balloon-payment 

obligation for his settlement payment to the subcontractor, making that payment $400 a month, 

and that he had a monthly $500 obligation for 11 months to pay his attorney fees. The trial court 

concluded as follows:

Currently, the defendant is paying approximately $1,700 a month for rent 

and utilities, $500 a month for legal/attorney fees and $400 a month to Old Mission 

Enterprises, pursuant to a civil judgment. Defendant anticipates his payments for 

attorney fees will cease within the next year and he is pursuing an accelerated 

payment plan with Old Mission Enterprises. Based on these current financial 

obligations, the Court believes that a monthly restitution amount of $150 is 

reasonable. In addition, considering the likely change in defendant’s income over 

the next year, another hearing to address the amount of monthly restitution would 

be prudent.

The trial court thus considered defendant’s income and expenses, and calculated an 

increased monthly payment for restitution. The court’s openness to a future hearing on the matter 

as defendant’s financial situation might change was responsive to the extended period that the 

victims will have to wait for satisfaction. Despite defendant’s optimistic statements about 

managing monthly restitution payments at sentencing—where he was presumably attempting to 

minimize his prospects for incarceration—the trial court properly considered updated information 

in deciding on the new rate of payment. The decision to increase the monthly amount by less than 

what plaintiff wanted was thus within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.

VI. VICTIMS’ RIGHTS2

Plaintiff’s final argument is that Dietel/McNally’s and Amber’s due-process rights were 

violated by the trial court’s amended restitution award. We disagree.

The thrust of plaintiff’s argument is that the reduction of the restitution awarded to 

Dietel/McNally and Amber from $413,000 in the original order, to $46,296 in the amended 

restitution order, was unfair. However, the trial court reasoned that Dietel/McNally and Amber 

received the benefit of the $366,703 that they paid to defendant because the subcontractors, who 

were not paid, provided the equivalent amount of goods and services to Dietel/McNally and 

Amber. The trial court awarded restitution of $44,296 to Dietel/McNally and Amber for expenses 

that they had incurred as a result of defendant’s misappropriating their payments. In addition, 

 

2 Crime victims have a statutory and constitutional right to restitution. See Const 1963, art 1, § 24; 

People v Bell, 276 Mich App 342, 346; 741 NW2d 57 (2007).
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Dietel/McNally and Amber had received a total of $72,117 in settlement payments from Elizabeth 

Stallman, and all liens against their properties by the subcontractors for unpaid but completed work 

were released. “The purpose of restitution is to allow crime victims to recoup losses suffered as a 

result of criminal conduct.” People v Newton, 257 Mich App 61, 68; 665 NW2d 504 (2003). In 

this case, because the losses of Dietel/McNally and Amber were forwarded to the subcontractors 

who completed work and were not paid, their losses were recovered when the liens for unpaid but 

completed work were released from their properties, they collected $72,117 from Elizabeth 

Stallman, and they were awarded $46,296 in restitution from defendant for additional expenses. 

Therefore, even though the amended amount of restitution was much less than the original total, 

Dietel/McNally and Amber nonetheless stand to recoup the losses they suffered from defendant’s 

misconduct.

Affirmed.

/s/ Mark J. Cavanaugh

/s/ Jane E. Markey

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto