alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 11**

 

**CREATIVECOMPUTER APPLICATIONS, INC.**

** **

**COMPUTATION OFEARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE**

 

 
|                                                         |   | **Three Months Ended   November 30,** |     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------------|----------|
|                                                         |   | **2003**                                   |     | **2002** |   |
|                                                         |   |                                       |     |   |   |
| AVERAGE  MARKET PRICE PER SHARE                              |   | $                                          | 1.93     |   | $ | 1.12 |   |
|                                                         |   |                                       |     |   |   |
| NET  INCOME (LOSS)                                           |   | $                                          | (253,658 | ) | $ | 47,983 |   |
|                                                         |   |                                       |     |   |   |
| Basic  weighted average number of commonshares outstanding   |   | 3,318,900                                  |     | 3,266,400 |   |
|                                                         |   |                                       |     |   |   |
| Dilutive  effect of stock options                            |   | —                                     |     | 116,086 |   |
|                                                         |   |                                       |     |   |   |
| Diluted  weighted average number of commonshares outstanding |   | 3,318,900                                  |     | 3,382,486 |   |
|                                                         |   |                                       |     |   |   |
| Basic earnings  (loss) per share                             |   | $                                          | (.08     | ) | $ | .02 |   |
|                                                         |   |                                       |     |   |   |
| Diluted  earnings (loss) per share                           |   | $                                          | (.08     | ) | $ | .01 |   |

 

----
#### PEOPLE ex rel. JOYCE, Appellant, v. VAN WART, Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

February 7, 1899.)

Proceeding by the people of the state of New York, on the relation of John J. Joyce, against Gerard B. Van Wart.

No opinion. Motion to resettle order granted. See 55 N. Y. Supp. 522.
<partyblock><br><br><div align="center"><b><font size="+1">Virginia Feria, Appellant,<br><br>against<br><br>Candace Johnson, Respondent.</font></b></div><br><br><p>Appeal from a final judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Jean T. Schneider, J.), entered November 16, 2015. The final judgment, after a nonjury trial, dismissed the petition in a holdover summary proceeding.</p><p>ORDERED that the final judgment is affirmed, without costs.</p><p>Landlord commenced this owner's use holdover proceeding against tenant, alleging that she wanted to recover possession of the subject rent-stabilized apartment for her son's use as a primary residence. Following a nonjury trial, the Civil Court found that landlord wanted to recover the subject apartment for use as an office for landlord's construction business, and dismissed the petition.</p><p>In reviewing a determination made after a nonjury trial, the power of this court is as broad as that of the trial court, and this court may render the judgment it finds warranted by the facts, bearing in mind that the determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (<i>see Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford</i>, 60 NY2d 492, 499 [1983]; <a href="../2011/2011_05667.htm" target="_blank"><i>Hamilton v Blackwood</i>, 85 AD3d 1116</a> [2011]; <a href="../2008/2008_05925.htm" target="_blank"><i>Zeltser v Sacerdote</i>, 52 AD3d 824</a>, 826 [2008]).</p><p>Pursuant to Rent Stabilization Code (9 NYCRR) ยง 2524.4 (a) (1), an owner "shall not be required to offer a renewal lease to a tenant" if the unit is to be occupied by the owner or a member of the owner's immediate family as his or her primary residence (<i>see also</i> Rent Stabilization Law of 1969 [Administrative Code of City of NY ยง 26-511 (c) (9) (b)]). It is an owner's burden to establish a good faith intention for a family member or the owner to so occupy the unit in order to regain possession on these grounds (<a href="../2008/2008_04900.htm" target="_blank"><i>see Pultz v Economakis</i>, 10 NY3d 542</a>, 548 [2008]; <i>see also Chan v Adossa</i>, 195 Misc 2d 590 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d &amp; 11th Jud Dists 2003]). Upon a review of the record, we find that there is ample support for the Civil Court's determination that landlord failed to establish a good faith intention to recover the subject apartment to have her son reside in the subject apartment as a primary residence, rather than to put it to use as a business office.</p><p>Accordingly, the final judgment is affirmed. </p><p>Pesce, P.J., Solomon and Elliott, JJ., concur.</p><br>Decision Date: January 05, 2017<br><br><div align="center"><form method="LINK" action="../../slipidx/at_2_idxtable.shtml"><input type="submit" value="Return to Decision List"></form></div></partyblock>
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 23, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-41007

Conference Calendar

 

TOMMY ALEXANDER, SR.,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

R.D. MILES, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:04-CV-296-MAC-ESH

--------------------

Before BARKSDALE, GARZA, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Tommy Alexander, Sr., federal prisoner # 07193-035, appeals

the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition

challenging his 1990 convictions on multiple drug and firearm

counts that resulted in a sentence that includes concurrent terms

of life imprisonment. He argues that he is entitled to proceed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 because the 28 U.S.C. § 2255 remedy

is inadequate or ineffective. He also argues the merits of

several claims for relief.
No. 04-41007

-2-

Alexander has not met his burden of showing that he meets

the requirements for filing a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition under 

the savings clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He has neither pointed

to a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision which

establishes that he may have been imprisoned for conduct that was

not prohibited by law nor shown that his claims were foreclosed

by circuit law at the time of his conviction, appeal, or first

28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. See Reyes-Requena v. United States,

243 F.3d 893, 903-04 (5th Cir. 2001). 

 AFFIRMED.
#### William Lane et al., Appellants, v Bankers Life and Casualty Company of New York, Respondent.

In an action to recover damages for breach of an insurance policy, plaintiffs *372appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Marbach, J.), entered January 6, 1984, which, *inter alia,*granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Order affirmed, with costs.

The issue raised on this appeal involves the interpretation of the language of an insurance policy covering major medical expenses. Although plaintiffs concede that the language is clear and unambiguous, they contend that defendant’s interpretation and application of the terms “Deductible Amount” and “Reduced Deductible Amount” are erroneous.

We have previously stated that “ambiguity in policy provisions should not be found where none in fact exists” *(Acorn Ponds v Hartford Ins. Co.,*105 AD2d 723, 724; *see, Loblaw, Inc. v Employers’ Liab. Assur. Corp.,*57 NY2d 872, 877). To adopt the construction urged by plaintiffs would be to effectively disregard the express language of the policy which draws a distinction between the terms “Deductible Amount” and “Reduced Deductible Amount”, and explains under what circumstances each term is applicable.

We also note that the defendant’s interpretation of the language of the policy, which Special Term upheld, is also consistent with that of the New York State Insurance Department which, following a complaint by plaintiffs, reviewed the subject policy. Mangano, J. P., Gibbons, Bracken and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.
| (1) | the Company's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the period ended March 31, 2011, as filed with the Securities Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report") fully complies, in all material respects, with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and |
|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company for the periods presented therein. |
|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                           |   |                                                                  |
|--------------------------------|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                           |   |                                                                  |   |
| Date:  June 29, 2011 | By:    |  /s/ Georges Benarroch                                           |   |
|                           |   | Georges Benarroch                                                     |   |
|                           |   | President, Chief Executive Officer and Acting Chief Financial Officer |   |
|                           |   |                                                                  |   |
USDC IN/ND case 2:13-cv-00237-JVB-PRC   document 1   filed 07/16/13   page 1 of 5

USDC IN/ND case 2:13-cv-00237-JVB-PRC   document 1   filed 07/16/13   page 2 of 5

USDC IN/ND case 2:13-cv-00237-JVB-PRC   document 1   filed 07/16/13   page 3 of 5

USDC IN/ND case 2:13-cv-00237-JVB-PRC   document 1   filed 07/16/13   page 4 of 5

USDC IN/ND case 2:13-cv-00237-JVB-PRC   document 1   filed 07/16/13   page 5 of 5
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 00-7529

GREGORY FLINT TAYLOR, Petitioner - Appellant, versusJOE HAMILTON, Secretary, North Carolina Department of Correction; LYNN PHILLIPS, Director of Prisons; MICHAEL BUMGARNER, Superintendent, Nash Correctional Center; MICHAEL EASLEY, Attorney General of North Carolina; STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Respondents - Appellees.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, District Judge. (CA-99-149-5-H) Submitted: March 22, 2001 Decided: March 28, 2001 Before WILKINS, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.Thomas Franklin Loflin, III, LOFLIN & LOFLIN, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Diane Appleton Reeves, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM:Gregory Flint Taylor appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we denya certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. Taylor v. Hamilton , No. CA-99-149-5- H (E.D.N.C. Sept. 12, 2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Exhibit
10.i


 


AMENDMENT
TO THE


CHANGE
IN CONTROL,


SEVERANCE
AND EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT


FOR
KENNETH T. NEILSON


 


 


This Amendment to
the Change in Control, Severance and Employment Agreement for Kenneth T.
Neilson (the “Amendment”), is made this 17th day of September, 2003, between
Hudson United Bancorp and Hudson United Bank (collectively, the “Company”), a
New Jersey corporation which maintains its principal office at 1000 MacArthur
Boulevard, Mahwah, New Jersey, and Kenneth T. Neilson (the “Executive”), and amends
the Change in Control, Severance and Employment Agreement for Kenneth T.
Neilson, which was made effective as of January 1, 1997 (the “Agreement”).


 


WHEREAS, the
Executive is presently an executive officer of the Company;  and


 


WHEREAS, the
Executive and the Company wish to amend the Agreement as provided herein;


 


NOW, THEREFORE,
for the good and valuable consideration set forth herein, and the Executive’s
continued employment with the Company, the Company and the Executive, each
intending to be legally bound hereby, agree as follows:


 


1.             Paragraph 9(d) of the Agreement,
relating to “Payments and Benefits,” is amended by adding the following
language after the end of the first sentence thereof:


 


“For purposes of
the calculation of the bonus amount component of the Lump Sum only, Paragraph
1(b)(ii)(B), regarding the Time of the Change of Control, will be disregarded.”


 


2.             The Company and the Executive agree
that for purposes of Clause (ii) of Paragraph 9(d) of the Agreement, the annual
incentive bonus paid to the Executive for the 2002 fiscal year was
$1,103,843.00, which is the amount shown in the Company’s proxy statement for
such year, and that the $512,502.00 incentive bonus paid to the Executive in
January 2003 shall only be considered as having been paid in fiscal year 2002.


 

















 


IN WITNESS
WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Amendment to be signed by its duly
authorized representatives pursuant to the authority of its Board of Directors’
Compensation Committee, and the Executive has personally executed this
Agreement, all as of the day and year first above written.


 


 


	
  ATTEST:

  	
  HUDSON UNITED BANCORP
  AND

  
	
   

  	
  HUDSON UNITED BANK

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  /s/ D.Lynn Van
  Borkulo-Nuzzo

  	
   

  	
  By:

  	
  /s/ Charles F.X. Poggi

  	
   

  
	
  .D. Lynn Van
  Burkulo-Nuzzo

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  Charles F. X. Poggi

  	
   

  
	
  Corporate Secretary

  	
  Chairman, Compensation
  Committtee

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
  WITNESS:

  	
  EXECUTIVE

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
  /s/ Victoria S. Freund

  	
   

  	
  /s/ Kenneth T. Neilson

  	
   

  
	
  Victoria S. Freund

  	
  Kenneth T. Neilson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

DAMARIS JUNE RHODES, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 1:15-CV-133

)

Linda, Clerk of Court, John Doe, Jane Doe, )

and Joseph Van Bokkelen )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

On May 28, 2015, Damaris June Rhodes filed a complaint against various defendants in

this Court but failed to pay the filing fee as the same constitutes “extortion” or seek leave to proceed

without prepayment of the filing fees as that would require her to proceed as a “non-natural People.” 

Instead, she asked that the Court rescind its procedures for filing a civil case. In response, the Court

issued an Order instructing Rhodes that she must either pay the filing fee or seek to proceed in forma

pauperis. The Order further gave her until July 19, 2015 to act or dismissal of her case would

follow. To date, Ms. Rhodes has done nothing to proceed with her case as instructed. As a result,

the Court DISMISSES the action. 

SO ORDERED. This 27th day of July, 2015

s/ William C. Lee

United States District Court
USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00463-JD   document 19   filed 10/23/15   page 1 of 2

USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00463-JD   document 19   filed 10/23/15   page 2 of 2
I 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1784 

To suspend temporarily the duty on Tetrakis. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 21, 2005 

Mr. JENKINS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To suspend temporarily the duty on Tetrakis. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. TETRAKIS. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of 

5 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is 

6 amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following 

7 new heading: 

‘‘ 9902.04.54 Tetrakis(2,4-di-tertbutylphenyl) 4,4’- 

biphenyldiphosphinate (CAS 

No. 38613–77–3) (provided 

for in subheading 

2931.00.90) ......................... Free No change No change On or before 

12/31/2008 ’’. 
2 

•HR 1784 IH 

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

2 subsection (a) apply to articles entered, or withdrawn from 

3 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

4 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ
I 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1757 

To provide that a person who brings a product liability action in a Federal 

or State court for injuries sustained from a product that is not in 

compliance with a voluntary or mandatory standard issued by the Consumer Product Safety Commission may recover treble damages, and 

for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 21, 2005 

Mr. ANDREWS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Energy and 

Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, 

in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To provide that a person who brings a product liability 

action in a Federal or State court for injuries sustained 

from a product that is not in compliance with a voluntary 

or mandatory standard issued by the Consumer Product 

Safety Commission may recover treble damages, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 1757 IH 

1 SECTION 1. DAMAGE RECOVERIES. 

2 (a) TREBLE DAMAGES.—Any person who brings a 

3 product liability action in a Federal or State court for in4 juries sustained from the use of a product that is not in 

5 compliance with a voluntary or mandatory standard issued 

6 by the Consumer Product Safety Commission shall recover 

7 treble damages. 

8 (b) NOTICE.—Within 90 days of the date of enact9 ment of this Act, the Consumer Product Safety Commis10 sion shall reissue each voluntary and mandatory standard 

11 the Commission has for a product with a notice notifying 

12 manufacturers of such products of the treble damage pro13 vision of subsection (a). 

Æ
Exhibit 99.2

                                  Certification
            Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
    (Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United
                                  States Code)

      Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a)
and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), the
undersigned officer of ELXSI Corporation, a Delaware corporation (the
"Company"), does hereby certify, to the best of such officer's knowledge and
belief, that:

      (1)  the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2003
(the "Report") of the Company fully complies with the requirements of section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)  the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
materials respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.


Dated: May 15, 2003                              /s/ David M. Doolittle
                                                ------------------------------
                                                David M. Doolittle
                                                Chief Financial Officer

      A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to ELXSI Corporation and will be retained by ELXSI Corporation and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 97-7745

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus KEVIN TYRONE BALDWIN, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior District Judge. (CR-90-238-A, CA-96-1642-A) Submitted: September 30, 1998 Decided: October 13, 1998 Before ERVIN, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Kevin Tryone Baldwin, Appellant Pro Se. William Neil Hammerstrom, Jr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Kevin Tyrone Baldwin seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A.§ 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998). We have reviewed the record and the district court’sopinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. United States v. Baldwin , Nos. CR-90-238-A; CA-96-1642-A (E.D. Va. Oct. 14, 1997). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1917 Introduced in House (IH)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1917

   To suspend temporarily the duty on 2,3-Pyridinedicarboxylic acid.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 27, 2005

 Mr. Hulshof introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To suspend temporarily the duty on 2,3-Pyridinedicarboxylic acid.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. 2,3-PYRIDINEDICARBOXYLIC ACID.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:

``      9902.05.62      2,3-                Free         No change        No change        On or before 12/  ''.
                         Pyridinedicarboxy                                                  31/2008
                         lic acid (CAS No.
                         89-00-9)
                         (provided for in
                         subheading
                         2933.39.61)......

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```