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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

August 23, 2016 

v No. 327375 

Bay Circuit Court 

JOEL IRWING WILSON, LC No. 13-010011-FH 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: OWENS, P.J., and SAWYER and SHAPIRO, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 A jury convicted defendant of racketeering, MCL 750.159i(3), larceny by conversion of 

$20,000 or more, MCL 750.362, two counts of securities fraud, MCL 451.2501, and two counts 

of securities act violation, MCL 451.2508. The court sentenced defendant to concurrent prison 

terms of 105 to 240 months for the racketeering conviction and 80 to 120 months for each 

remaining conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm defendant’s convictions, but 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

I. FACTS 

 Defendant’s convictions arise from his involvement in an elaborate real estate scheme 

involving the purchase of distressed property to be renovated and sold at a profit. In 2009 

defendant and his partner, Michael Kazee, started Diversified Group Management Partnership, 

LLC (Diversified) and American Realty Funds Corporation (American). Diversified, in turn, 

created 17 limited partnerships, each with a limited number of investors.1 Kazee left the 

company in May 2012. The prosecution alleged that defendant structured the various entities in 

a manner designed to evade compliance with federal and state securities laws and regulations, 

and to deceive individuals into investing in unprofitable companies, thereby allowing defendant 

to use the investment funds for his family’s personal gain, rather than for the purposes for which 

the funds were invested. Over the course of this enterprise from 2009 to 2012, approximately 

125 investors invested approximately $7 million. The investors lost approximately $6.4 million. 

 

1

 American was a registered, publicly traded company. None of the Diversified partnerships 

were registered. 
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The prosecutor maintained that, during this time period, defendant converted approximately 

$583,000 in Diversified assets. 

II. CHANGE OF VENUE 

 Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a change of 

venue due to extensive adverse pretrial publicity.2

 The record reflects that the trial court denied 

defendant’s pretrial motion for a change of venue, without prejudice to defendant renewing the 

motion at trial. At trial, the court engaged in a lengthy selection process that included the 

sequestration of any jurors who had been exposed to media coverage about the case, and then 

separate questioning of each of these jurors. Defendant not only failed to renew his motion for a 

change of venue, but expressed satisfaction with the jury that was chosen. Under these 

circumstances, defendant waived review of the change of venue issue. People v Clark, 243 Mich 

App 424, 425-426; 622 NW2d 344 (2000). 

III. EXPERT TESTIMONY 

 Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial.3 

Defendant argues that a mistrial should have been granted because (1) the prosecutor’s expert 

witness offered his own opinions of the applicable law, and (2) the expert relied on facts not in 

evidence in support of his opinions. The parties agree that, in Michigan, an expert witness’s 

testimony must be based on facts in evidence. MRE 703; Teal v Prasad, 283 Mich App 384, 

394-395; 772 NW2d 57 (2009). The parties also agree that the expert initially relied, in part, on 

facts not in evidence in support of his opinion concerning defendant’s actions. The question is 

whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining that a curative instruction, rather than 

a mistrial, was a proper remedy. 

 A mistrial is an extraordinary remedy that should be granted only when an error is so 

egregious that its prejudicial effect cannot be remedied in any other way. People v Lumsden, 168 

Mich App 286, 299; 423 NW2d 645 (1988). This is not such a case. After it became apparent 

that the testimony of the expert was based on certain items that lacked evidentiary support, the 

trial court repeatedly asked the expert if his opinion would be the same based on the facts 

actually presented at trial, and the expert agreed that it would be. The trial court also explored 

which matters of evidence the expert would use to support his opinion, and the expert provided 

that information. The trial court then provided cautionary instructions to both the expert and the 

jury concerning the proper basis for the expert’s testimony. Additionally, the court cautioned the 

expert about the difference between the ultimate question of defendant’s guilt or innocence of the 

criminal charges and stating that defendant had misrepresented the securities to investors or had 

breached his standard of care as a fiduciary. The trial court also instructed the jurors that they 

 

2

 We generally review a trial court’s decision concerning a motion for a change venue for an 

abuse of discretion. People v Jendrzejewski, 455 Mich 495, 500; 566 NW2d 530 (1997). 

3

 We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of 

discretion. People v Ortiz-Kehoe, 237 Mich App 508, 512; 603 NW2d 802 (1999). 
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would make the ultimate decision concerning defendant’s guilt or innocence. “Jurors are 

presumed to follow their instructions, and instructions are presumed to cure most errors.” People 

v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 279; 662 NW2d 836 (2003). Under the circumstances, 

defendant has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion for a 

mistrial and instead curing the initial problems with the expert’s testimony through additional 

questioning and appropriate jury instructions. 

IV. VIOLATION OF SEQUESTRATION ORDER 

 Defendant next argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a 

mistrial based on violations of the trial court’s sequestration order.4

 To establish ineffective 

assistance of counsel, “a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness and (2) but for counsel’s deficient performance, there is a 

reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different.” People v Trakhtenberg, 493 

Mich 38, 51; 826 NW2d 136 (2012). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.” People v Chenault, 495 Mich 142, 150; 845 NW2d 731 

(2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

 The trial court ordered the sequestration of witnesses on the first day of trial. Defendant 

asserts that witnesses Pamela Buehl and Vicki Tedrow violated this order by attempting to 

remain in the courtroom at the beginning of the trial. The record does not support this claim. 

Instead, at the start of the proceedings on February 25, 2015, the prosecutor noted that there were 

some witnesses in the courtroom and the trial court asked them to leave. Neither Buehl nor 

Tedrow were mentioned by name. Even if the two were present, nothing suggests that the trial 

court found that they were listening to witness testimony. 

 Later, Buehl admitted that during a break in her testimony, she violated the sequestration 

order, but she denied that she had attempted to listen to the testimony of David Charlesbois, who 

had testified before her. Defense counsel stated that Buehl had left the courtroom during the 

break in her testimony and went into a nearby conference room where she began to speak to 

other witnesses. The prosecutor stated that he had spoken with Buehl, who admitted that she 

may have told another witness, presumably Tedrow, about her “perfect signatures,” referring to 

her signatures on documents that she claimed were forged. The trial court brought Buehl into the 

courtroom and admonished her for speaking with other witnesses. The court also allowed 

defense counsel to cross-examine Buehl about the alleged violations. 

 In People v Meconi, 277 Mich App 651, 654; 746 NW2d 881 (2008), this Court 

observed: 

 The purposes of sequestering a witness are to “prevent him from 

‘coloring’ his testimony to conform with the testimony of another,” People v 

 

4

 Because defendant did not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a motion for a 

new trial or request for an evidentiary hearing, our review of this issue is limited to errors 

apparent from the record. People v Lopez, 305 Mich App 686, 693; 854 NW2d 205 (2014). 
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Stanley, 71 Mich App 56, 61; 246 NW2d 418 (1976), and to aid “in detecting 

testimony that is less than candid.” Geders v United States, 425 US 80, 87; 96 S 

Ct 1330; 47 L Ed 2d 592 (1976). Additionally, the United States Supreme Court 

has recognized three sanctions that are available to a trial court to remedy a 

violation of a sequestration order: “(1) holding the offending witness in contempt; 

(2) permitting cross-examination concerning the violation; and (3) precluding the 

witness from testifying.” United States v Hobbs, 31 F3d 918, 921 (CA 9, 1994), 

citing Holder v United States, 150 US 91, 92; 14 S Ct 10; 37 L Ed 1010 (1893). 

Although usually stated in the context of a defense witness’s exclusion in a 

criminal case, courts have routinely held that exclusion of a witness’s testimony is 

an extreme remedy that should be sparingly used. See, e.g., United States v 

Smith, 441 F3d 254, 263 (CA 4, 2006); Hobbs, supra. 

 In the instant case, the trial court permitted defense counsel to cross-examine Buehl 

regarding her alleged violations of the sequestration order. Such cross-examination is a 

recognized remedy where a sequestration order has been violated. The opportunity for crossexamination allowed the jury to learn of any possible prejudice Buehl’s actions may have had on 

Tedrow’s testimony, and thereby assess whether it affected Tedrow’s credibility. Defendant has 

not shown that defense counsel acted unreasonably by not requesting a mistrial, particularly 

considering that a mistrial is not a recognized remedy for violation of a sequestration order. In 

addition, Buehl’s testimony explaining the limited nature of the violation did not establish any 

substantial basis for believing that the violation was calculated to aid Tedrow’s testimony. 

Accordingly, defendant has failed to establish that counsel was ineffective for failing to move for 

a mistrial with respect to this issue. People v Reed, 453 Mich 685, 695; 556 NW2d 858 (1996). 

V. GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE 

 Defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the jury’s verdicts are against 

the great weight of the evidence.5

 The test to determine whether a verdict is against the great 

weight of the evidence is whether the evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict that 

it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand.” People v Musser, 259 Mich 

App 215, 218-219; 673 NW2d 800 (2003). Mere conflicting testimony and credibility concerns 

do not suffice to grant a new trial; rather, exceptional circumstances must exist, such as where 

directly contradictory testimony was so far impeached that it was deprived of all probative value, 

where witness testimony was so inherently implausible that a reasonable juror could not believe 

it, where testimony contradicted indisputable physical facts or defied physical realities, or where 

the case was marked with unacceptable uncertainties and discrepancies. People v Lemmon, 456 

Mich 625, 643-646; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). “[A]bsent exceptional circumstances, issues of 

 

5

 Defendant acknowledges that he did not raise this issue in a motion for a new trial below, 

leaving the issue unpreserved. MCR 2.611(A)(1)(e); People v Winters, 225 Mich App 718, 729; 

571 NW2d 764 (1997). This Court reviews an unpreserved issue challenging whether 

convictions are against the great weight of the evidence for plain error affecting substantial 

rights. People v Musser, 259 Mich App 215, 218; 673 NW2d 800 (2003). 
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witness credibility are for the jury, and the trial court may not substitute its view of the 

credibility for the constitutionally guaranteed jury determination thereof.” Id. at 642 (quotation 

omitted). 

 Defendant generally maintains that the prosecution’s witnesses were “deprived of all 

probative” value because they were investors who had lost all of their money, and thus had a 

motive to lie. He also argues that the prosecution’s expert witness was biased against him, in 

part because the expert was an attorney involved in a class action suit against defendant. He 

argues that another witness provided testimony against him solely to obtain favorable sentencing 

in her own criminal case. These bases for challenging the credibility of the witnesses do not 

approach the threshold necessary to demonstrate that defendant’s convictions are against the 

great weight of the evidence. They amount to nothing more than arguments that the witnesses 

had various motives to lie. These were credibility matters to be resolved by the jury. Id. They 

do not rise to the level of exceptional circumstances in which a court may second-guess the 

jury’s credibility determination. 

 In discussing the alleged lack of evidence that he committed larceny by conversion, 

defendant essentially argues that because he was a signatory on the Diversified accounts, he 

could not have “converted” the money in the accounts to his personal use in violation of MCL 

750.362. However, defendant fails to discuss all of the evidence presented, in particular the 

documentary evidence that supported a finding that not only did defendant lie to investors about 

the actual risks for their initial investment, he also forged their signatures in order to draw on 

their brokerage accounts without their permission. Defendant also fails to discuss the evidence 

that he used Diversified funds for his personal use, instead of the purposes for which they were 

invested. 

 Similarly, defendant states that no evidence was presented to show that he violated the 

registration requirement concerning public securities or that the Diversified partnerships were 

required to be registered, because no evidence was presented that the partnerships were actually 

advertised. However, he ignores that the jury viewed a video of defendant advertising 

Diversified investments, which contained advertising specifically marketing Diversified to 

investors outside of Michigan. Two of the prosecutor’s expert witnesses testified that this 

advertising was enough to remove the diversified partnerships from any registration exemption. 

 In sum, the evidence does not preponderate so heavily against the jury’s verdicts that it 

would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdicts to stand. 

VI. AMENDED COMPLAINT 

 Defendant was extradited from Germany to stand trial in this case. He argues that under 

the extradition treaty between the United States and Germany, the prosecutor was prohibited 

from changing, adding to, or amending the criminal charges used to justify the extradition, and 

that the prosecutor violated this “principle of specialty” by amending the complaint to allege new 

offenses, thereby depriving the trial court of personal jurisdiction over him with respect to any 

unextradited or amended charges. We disagree. 
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 “The principle of specialty ‘requires that the requesting country not prosecute for crimes . 

. . for which an extradition was not granted.’ ” United States v Garrido-Santana, 360 F3d 565, 

577 (CA 6, 2004), quoting Demjanjuk v Petrovsky, 776 F2d 571, 583 (CA 6, 1985), vacated on 

other grounds, 10 F3d 338 (CA 6, 1993). The Sixth Circuit has recognized that the rule of 

specialty bars the prosecution of an individual for unextradited crimes. Garrido-Santana, 360 

F3d at 578. Incorporating this principle of specialty, article 22(1) of the extradition treaty with 

Germany provides in pertinent part: 

 A person who has been extradited under this Treaty shall not be proceeded 

against, sentenced or detained with a view to carrying out a sentence or detention 

order for any offense committed prior to his surrender other than that for which he 

was extradited, nor shall he be for any other reason restricted in his personal 

freedom, . . . [Treaty Between the United States of America and the Federal 

Republic of Germany Concerning Extradition, signed June 20, 1978, art 22, cl 1 

(emphasis added).] 

The term “offense” is not specifically defined in the treaty. However, plaintiff correctly observes 

that the complaint and amended complaint contain the same offenses, with the same possible 

penalties. There are only two differences between the original and amended complaints. First, 

in count two of the amended complaint, concerning the larceny by conversion charge, the 

language was changed from the conversion of property “which belonged to Robert Wachoski 

and other investors in the Diversified Group” to the conversion of property “which belonged to 

the investors in the Diversified Group[.]” The removal of one specific complainant does not 

change the nature of the offense. Both complaints alleged that defendant converted money from 

investors in the Diversified Group; Wachoski was one member of the group. Neither the 

elements of the offense nor the possible punishment were changed by the amendment. 

 The second change involved one of the securities act violations, specifically that 

defendant illegally offered or sold unregistered securities, contrary to MCL 451.2508. The 

language was changed from “offering or selling a non-registered security to Robert Wachoski” to 

“offering or selling a non-registered security to Pamela Buehl[.]” The proofs for this charge 

remained essentially the same, despite that Wachoski may have purchased an interest in a 

different Diversified partnership, or invested a different amount, than Buehl. The crime charged 

is the offering of the unregistered security. Defendant has not shown that he was charged with a 

different offense so as to trigger the rule of specialty. Moreover, because no formal charging 

document is necessary to support a request for extradition under the treaty, see Kaiser v 

Rutherford, 827 F Supp 832, 834 (DDC, 1993), and the amendment of the complaint only fixed a 

technical defect in the initial complaint, we conclude that the amendment did not amount to a 

change in the charge or offense so as to prevent a trial on the offense. See In re Rowe, 77 F 161, 

167 (CA 8, 1896). 

 
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VII. SENTENCING 

 Defendant argues that he is entitled to resentencing because his sentences were based on 

improper judicial fact-finding in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, and 

because the trial court departed from the sentencing guidelines, resulting in an unreasonable 

sentence.6

 

 In People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 364, 392; 870 NW2d 502 (2015), our Supreme 

Court held that “the rule from Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466; 120 S Ct 2348; 147 L Ed 2d 

435 (2000), as extended by Alleyne v United States, 570 US ____; 133 S Ct 2151; 186 L Ed 2d 

314 (2013), applies to Michigan’s sentencing guidelines and renders them constitutionally 

deficient” to the extent that they “require judicial fact-finding beyond facts admitted by the 

defendant” or found by the jury to score offense variables that mandatorily increase the floor of 

the guidelines minimum sentence range. (Emphasis in original). To remedy that violation, the 

Court severed MCL 769.34(2) “to the extent that it makes the sentencing guidelines range as 

scored on the basis of facts beyond those admitted by the defendant or found by the jury beyond 

a reasonable doubt mandatory.” Lockridge, 498 Mich at 364. In addition, the Court struck the 

requirement in MCL 769.34(3) that a sentencing court state substantial and compelling reasons 

for imposing a sentence that departs from the guidelines range. Id. at 364-365. A sentence that 

departs from the applicable guidelines range is to be reviewed for reasonableness. Id. at 392. 

 The trial court scored the guidelines for defendant’s conviction of racketeering, a class B 

offense, MCL 777.16i, resulting in a guidelines range of 51 to 85 months. The trial court 

departed from that range and sentenced defendant to a prison term of 105 to 240 months for his 

conviction of racketeering. Although defendant argues that the scoring of offense variables 9, 

10, and 14 were each based on judicially-found facts, because defendant received a departure 

sentence, he was not prejudiced by any impermissible judicial fact-finding in the scoring of these 

variables. See Lockridge, 498 Mich at 394, 399 (where a court imposes a departure sentence, 

and thus does not rely on the guidelines minimum sentence range, the defendant cannot show 

prejudice from any error in scoring the guidelines in violation of Alleyne). 

 However, with respect to defendant’s challenge to the substantive length of his sentences, 

remand for further proceedings is necessary. Initially, defendant’s reliance on the factors in 18 

USC 3553(a) for determining the reasonableness of his sentences is misplaced. In People v 

Steanhouse, 313 Mich App 1, 47; ___ NW2d ___ (2015), lv gtd ___ Mich ___ (2016), this Court 

expressly rejected the application of 18 USC 3553(a) for purposes of determining whether a 

departure sentence in Michigan is unreasonable under Lockridge. Instead, the reasonableness of 

a departure sentence is to be determined under the “principle of proportionality” standard set 

forth in People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). Steanhouse, 313 Mich App at 

47-48. This Court further held in Steanhouse that where, as here, a defendant was sentenced 

 

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 A Sixth Amendment challenge presents a question of constitutional law that this Court reviews 

de novo. People v Drohan, 475 Mich 140, 146; 715 NW2d 778 (2006). This Court reviews a

departure sentence for reasonableness. People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 365, 392; 870 NW2d 

502 (2015). 
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before Lockridge overturned the substantial and compelling reason standard for departures, and 

the trial court was unaware of and not expressly bound by the reasonableness standard rooted in 

Milbourn, the case should be remanded for a Crosby7 proceeding, as adopted in Lockridge. 

Steanhouse, 313 Mich App at 48. On remand, the trial court should follow the procedure 

described in Lockridge. Defendant must be given the option of promptly notifying the trial court 

that resentencing will not be sought. If notification is not received in a timely manner, the trial 

court shall continue with the remand procedure as explained in Lockridge. See id. at 48-49. 

 We affirm defendant’s convictions, but remand for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Donald S. Owens 

/s/ David H. Sawyer 

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro 

 

7 United States v Crosby, 397 F3d 103 (CA 2, 2005).