Filed 4/2/13 P. v. Wolf CA2/2 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION TWO 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

DAVID WAYNE WOLF, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 B233289 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. SA063264) 

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Cynthia 

Rayvis, Judge. Affirmed. 

 Joy A. Maulitz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Lawrence M. Daniels and 

Allison H. Chung, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

________________________ 
2

 Appellant David Wayne Wolf appeals from the judgment of conviction following 

a jury trial in which he was convicted of one felony count of grand theft auto (Pen. Code, 

§ 487, subd. (d)(1))1

 (count 1) and two felony counts of attempted carjacking 

(§§ 664/215, subd. (a)) (counts 2 and 3). He was sentenced to the middle term of two 

years six months on count 2, with the same sentence on count 3 and the middle term of 

two years on count 1, both to run concurrently. On the date of his sentencing on 

November 19, 2008, he received 713 days of custody and work credit.2

 

Appellant contends the trial court violated his due process rights by not 

conducting a competency hearing postverdict and prior to sentencing. We disagree and 

affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

On July 24, 2007, prior to trial, defense counsel declared a doubt as to appellant’s 

competency to assist her, and stated that she had received an inconclusive psychologist’s 

report. The trial court suspended criminal proceedings and ordered another psychologist 

to examine appellant pursuant to Evidence Code section 730. 

On August 14, 2007, the trial court found appellant incompetent to stand trial 

based upon the two reports. The court ordered the criminal proceedings to remain 

suspended and that appellant be committed to Patton State Hospital until his competence 

was restored. The court also ordered that the hospital was authorized to involuntarily 

administer antipsychotic medication to appellant when and as prescribed by his treating 

psychiatrist. 

 Patton State Hospital eventually declared appellant to be competent. On 

January 25, 2008, the trial court approved the certificate of mental competence and 

reinstated criminal proceedings. 

 1

 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 

2

 We granted appellant’s request for relief from default for failure to file a timely 

notice of appeal. It would appear that appellant has finished serving his sentence by now. 

However, because he raises constitutional challenges, we reach the merits of his appeal.
3

 After the jury was selected, on March 27, 2008, defense counsel submitted an 

emergency request for a conference with a psychologist regarding appellant’s 

competence, but stated that she had witnesses present and was willing to proceed. The 

court ordered the trial to proceed. Later that day, defense counsel informed the court that 

the psychologist had evaluated appellant and found him to be competent. 

 Appellant testified at trial, stating that on the date of the crimes he was hearing 

voices, he believed that people could read his mind and he thought he was in a “movie.” 

On April 4, 2008, the jury found appellant guilty on all three counts.3

 On the original date set for sentencing, April 21, 2008, defense counsel stated that 

she did not believe appellant was able to assist in his defense, and asked to continue 

sentencing. Appellant, however, asked to be sentenced that day and to represent himself. 

After the trial court granted appellant’s request to represent himself and appellant 

addressed the court, the court declared a doubt as to appellant’s competence, suspended 

proceedings, reappointed defense counsel to represent appellant, and appointed two 

psychologists to evaluate appellant. In the meantime, the court denied two more requests 

by appellant for self representation. 

 On September 17, 2008, the trial court noted that both appointed psychologists had 

found appellant competent. The court reinstated proceedings and granted appellant’s 

request to represent himself. 

 On October 28, 2008, appellant appeared for sentencing. He stated that he had 

been refusing medication, but that he was ready to be sentenced. Both the prosecutor and 

the trial court noted that appellant did not appear to be lucid or awake. The court noted 

that while two psychologists had found appellant to be competent for sentencing, the 

court found that appellant was not competent to represent himself at sentencing. The 

court revoked appellant’s pro per status, reappointed defense counsel, and continued the 

sentencing hearing. 

 3

 Because the issue on appeal involves appellant’s posttrial competence, we do not 

set forth the evidence presented at trial.
4

 At the continued sentencing hearing on November 19, 2008, defense counsel 

stated that she had discussed sentencing options with appellant, who was adamant that he 

wanted to be sentenced to prison and not to a treatment program. Defense counsel stated 

that she did not join in appellant’s request and that appellant “is, in fact, competent, 

though he might be mentally ill.” The court then proceeded to sentencing. 

DISCUSSION 

 Appellant contends the trial court violated his state and federal due process rights 

by failing to conduct a competency hearing prior to his sentencing. We disagree. 

I. Applicable Law. 

 “Trial of an incompetent defendant violates the due process clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution [citation] and article I, section 

15 of the California Constitution. Those protections are implemented by statute in 

California.” (People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1281.) “Our state statute provides 

that a person is mentally incompetent to stand trial if, as a result of mental disorder or 

developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal 

proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner. 

(§ 1367.)” (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 737; § 1367, subd. (a).) The right to 

be both physically and mentally present extends through sentencing. (§ 977, subd. (b); 

People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 157; People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 847 

[“The court’s duty to conduct a competency hearing may arise at any time prior to 

judgment”].) 

 “‘When the accused presents substantial evidence of incompetence, due process 

requires that the trial court conduct a full competency hearing.’” (People v. Koontz

(2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1063.) Substantial evidence is “evidence that raises a reasonable 

or bona fide doubt concerning the defendant’s competence to stand trial.” (People v. 

Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 847; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 952.) 

“Evidence of incompetence may emanate from several sources, including the defendant’s 

demeanor, irrational behavior, and prior mental evaluations. [Citations.] But to be 

entitled to a competency hearing, ‘a defendant must exhibit more than . . . a preexisting 
5

psychiatric condition that has little bearing on the question . . . whether the defendant can 

assist his defense counsel.’” (People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 847.) If the 

evidence is not substantial, “[i]t is within the discretion of the trial judge whether to order 

a competence hearing.” (People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 742.) “A trial court’s 

decision whether or not to hold a competence hearing is entitled to deference, because the 

court has the opportunity to observe the defendant during trial.” (People v. Rogers, 

supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 847.) 

“‘“When a competency hearing has already been held and defendant has been 

found competent to stand trial, however, a trial court need not suspend proceedings to 

conduct a second competency hearing unless it ‘is presented with a substantial change of 

circumstances or with new evidence’ casting a serious doubt on the validity of that 

finding. [Citations.]”’” (People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, 864, quoting People v. 

Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 542–543.) 

II. The Evidence Did Not Require Another Competency Hearing. 

Appellant argues that the following factors constitute substantial evidence that a 

competency hearing should have been conducted prior to his sentencing: (1) Both the 

trial court and the prosecutor noted that appellant did not appear to be lucid or awake at 

the presentencing hearing on October 28, 2008; (2) appellant stated at the October 28, 

2008 hearing, against his own interest, that he was willing to submit to the maximum 

sentence, and made misstatements at the hearing; (3) the trial court had been informed at 

least three times after the verdict that appellant was on suicide watch at the jail; (4) the 

trial court knew that appellant was suffering from “a major mental illness” and that he 

was currently refusing his medications; and (5) a psychologist had testified at trial that 

appellant was a paranoid schizophrenic with bipolar disorder and did not appear to be 

malingering. We find appellant’s arguments unpersuasive. 

A. October 28, 2008 Hearing 

The prosecutor’s statement at the October 28, 2008, presentence hearing that “I’m 

not quite sure the defendant is awake or is lucid at the time. It looks like he’s go [sic] 

ready to go to sleep,” was not a change in circumstance casting doubt on the previous 
6

finding of competency. The prosecutor’s statement merely indicated that appellant 

appeared drowsy. Although appellant had stated that he was refusing his medication, the 

trial court observed that appellant appeared to be medicated based on his drowsiness in 

court: “I asked Mr. Wolf if he was medicated because he appears to be medicated.” 

“[T]the mere fact that the petitioner was taking medications during his trial does not raise 

a ‘bona fide doubt’ as to his competence to stand trial.” (See Contreras v. Rice (C.D. 

Cal. 1998) 5 F.Supp.2d 854, 864 [citing Sturgis v. Goldsmith (9th Cir. 1986) 796 F.2d 

1103, 1109–1110 [failure to present evidence of medication petitioner was taking or 

“how [the medication] might have affected his competence at trial” did not raise a bona 

fide doubt as to the petitioner’s competency to stand trial]; U.S. v. Fernandez (9th Cir. 

2004) 388 F.3d 1199, 1251–1252 [finding no substantial evidence of incompetence 

where trial court commented on defendant’s sleepiness apparently caused by 

medication].) In any event, appellant thereafter participated in the proceedings and 

answered the court’s questions. 

Appellant next asserts that he miscalculated the maximum term of imprisonment 

at the October 28, 2008 hearing. But he made clear that his calculation was based on 

“what [he] read in the Penal Code book.” As the People note, this shows that appellant 

had the presence of mind to read the Penal Code in preparation for his sentencing 

hearing. Appellant also points to his statement, in response to the trial court’s revocation 

of his right to self-representation, “I object to this on the grounds that of [sic] violation of 

time restraints before trial, I wasn’t able to file the paperwork.” The court then pointed 

out that trial had already taken place. A defendant’s lack of technical legal knowledge is 

irrelevant to any competency inquiry. (See People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 718.) 

And appellant had coherently responded to the trial court’s question of whether he 

wanted a lawyer: “THE COURT: Mr. Wolf, are you sure you don’t want to have a 

lawyer? [¶] THE DEFENDANT: Positive.” 

Appellant also argues that his “self-defeating behavior” of stating that he was 

willing to accept the maximum term of imprisonment was new evidence casting doubt on 

the trial court’s prior finding of competency. We reject this argument. “[A] possibly 
7

self-destructive emotional approach to self-representation does not equate to substantial 

evidence of incompetence to stand trial.” (People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 

406; see also People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 526 [“a defendant’s preference for 

the death penalty does not invariably demonstrate incompetence”]; People v. Blair, 

supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 718 [“we have rejected the notion that a defendant’s choice not to 

present a defense, even at the penalty phase, amounts to substantial evidence of 

incompetence”].) If anything, appellant’s willingness to receive the maximum term of 

imprisonment indicated his awareness of wrongdoing: “I’m ready to accept everything 

that’s coming to me.” 

B. Suicide Watch 

Appellant also asserts that being on suicide watch at the jail was a new 

circumstance alerting the trial court that he was no longer competent. But on September 

17, 2008, appellant expressly told the trial court that he was not suicidal: “Now, the 

situation is I am in county jail, they have me on suicidal watch, but I am not suicidal. I 

told them I would sue them, because they had to protect me.” Additionally, our Supreme 

Court has found that evidence of a defendant’s “death wish” and planned suicide attempt 

do not amount to substantial evidence of incompetence requiring a competency hearing. 

(See People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 508–511.) 

C. Mental Illness 

Appellant also points out that he was suffering from a major mental illness and 

that a psychologist had testified at trial that he was a paranoid schizophrenic with bipolar 

disorder and did not appear to be malingering. But “even a history of serious mental 

illness does not necessarily constitute substantial evidence of incompetence that would 

require a court to declare a doubt concerning a defendant’s competence and to conduct a 

hearing on that issue.” (People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 714; People v. Ramos, 

supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 508–511 [defendant’s death wish, history of psychiatric 

treatment, planned suicide attempt, propensity for violence, and psychiatric testimony 

that defendant was physically abused as a child and suffered from a paranoid personality 
8

disorder did not constitute substantial evidence of incompetence requiring court to 

conduct a competency hearing].) 

 Appellant asserts that certain of his own testimony at trial was “nonsensical and 

disturbing.” Even assuming appellant is correct that his testimony indicated some form 

of mental illness, our Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that “more is required to 

raise a doubt than mere bizarre actions [citation] or bizarre statements [citation]. . . .’” 

(People v. Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 403, quoting People v. Laudermilk (1967) 

67 Cal.2d 272, 285.) 

Despite his own testimony and the other factors discussed above, the record does 

not show that appellant lacked an understanding of the nature of the proceedings or the 

ability to assist in his defense. (People v. Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1064.) 

Accordingly, we are satisfied the evidence was insufficient to require a reexamination of 

appellant’s competency before proceeding with sentencing. 

DISPOSITION 

The judgment is affirmed. 

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS. 

 ______________________________, J. 

 ASHMANN-GERST 

We concur: 

_______________________________, P. J. 

 BOREN 

_______________________________, J. 

 CHAVEZ