Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1508-CR-1236 | April 14, 2016 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Ellen M. O’Connor

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Richard C. Webster

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jacqueline Williams,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 14, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A05-1508-CR-1236

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Mark Stoner, 

Judge

The Honorable Jeffrey L. Marchal, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49G06-1408-CM-39471

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1508-CR-1236 | April 14, 2016 Page 2 of 11

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Jaqueline F. Williams (Williams), appeals her

convictions for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated causing death, a 

Level 5 felony, Ind. Code § 9-30-5-5(a)(3) (2014); and driving while suspended, 

a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. § 9-24-19-2.

[2] We affirm.

ISSUE

[3] Williams raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether the 

evidence was sufficient to sustain her convictions.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] On August 13, 2014, a witness was driving southbound on I-65 in Marion 

County, Indiana. The witness observed a small, dark-colored car in front of 

him veer off the road from the center lane to the left, strike the concrete barrier, 

ricochet across the road to the right, strike the metal guardrail, and then come 

to a stop. The witness stopped his vehicle in front of the wrecked car to check if 

anyone was injured. He initially observed no visible injuries to any of the 

occupants. A male passenger in the rear seat was unconscious, but he regained 

consciousness, exited the vehicle on his own, and sat on the guardrail. The 

witness observed the male passenger had a “piece of glass sticking out of his 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1508-CR-1236 | April 14, 2016 Page 3 of 11

face” and a “little bit of blood coming down.” (Transcript pp. 23-24). The 

witness’s wife and several other individuals called 911 to report the accident.

[5] At approximately 8:50 p.m., Officer Marlin Sechrist (Officer Sechrist) of the 

Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) was driving northbound 

on I-65 to work when he noticed the accident on the other side of the highway. 

He turned around at the next exit and drove to the scene. Officer Sechrist 

radioed IMPD’s control station to contact the Indiana State Police (ISP) 

because the accident occurred on the Interstate, which was ISP’s jurisdiction. 

He ensured all of the occupants of the crashed vehicle were present, checked for 

serious injuries, and assessed the accident scene. Williams identified herself as 

the vehicle’s driver. Another female occupant was identified as the front seat 

passenger. William Trotter (Trotter) was identified as the rear seat passenger. 

When Officer Sechrist spoke with Williams, he observed that her eyes were red 

and bloodshot, and her speech was slurred. He smelled the odor of alcoholic 

beverage coming from her breath and person. 

[6] Shortly before 9:00 p.m., ISP Trooper Derek Miller (Trooper Miller) arrived at 

the scene. He observed that the accident was a single vehicle crash and that the 

vehicle struck the Interstate’s concrete median barrier, crossed three lanes of 

traffic, struck the guardrail on the right side of the road, and stopped. Trooper 

Miller spoke with Williams, who stated that she was the driver of the vehicle. 

He smelled the odor of alcoholic beverage emanating from Williams’ breath 

and person; he noticed that she had trouble standing, kept swaying back and 

forth, and had slurred speech. Trooper Miller asked Williams if she needed any 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1508-CR-1236 | April 14, 2016 Page 4 of 11

medical help, and she stated that she was fine. He then asked her if she had 

anything to drink that night, and she stated that she had a couple of drinks. 

Trooper Miller administered a field sobriety test to Williams. She failed the 

test, and Trooper Miller read the implied consent law to her. Williams stated 

that she did not have a driver’s license, but agreed to take the breath test. She 

was transported to the Adult Processing Center and administered a breath test, 

which returned a 0.095 alcohol concentration equivalent. Trooper Miller 

requested Williams’ driving record, which indicated that her driver’s license 

was suspended and that she had two outstanding arrest warrants. 

[7] Trotter died approximately a week after the accident. An autopsy revealed that

Trotter died as a result of a decelerated “blunt force [trauma to] the head” with 

bruising and bleeding to his brain, which he received as a result of the accident. 

(Tr. p. 99). 

[8] After filing an Information on August 14, 2014, and amending it on August 26, 

2014, and June 2, 2015, the State charged Williams with Count I, operating a 

vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, a Class A misdemeanor; Count 

II, operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent of 0.08 or 

more, a Class C misdemeanor; Count III, driving while suspended, a Class A 

misdemeanor; Count IV, operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing death, a 

Level 5 felony; and Count V, operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration 

equivalent of 0.08 or more causing death, a Level 5 felony. On June 3, 2015, 

the trial court conducted a jury trial, and Williams was found guilty as charged. 

On June 17, 2015, the trial court sentenced Williams to an aggregate term of 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1508-CR-1236 | April 14, 2016 Page 5 of 11

four years at the Department of Correction on Counts III and IV. The trial 

court did not enter sentences on the remaining Counts due to double jeopardy 

concerns. 

[9] Williams now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

[10] Williams argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her convictions. 

When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a 

criminal conviction, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility 

of witnesses. Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012). The evidence—

even if conflicting—and all reasonable inferences drawn from it are viewed in a 

light most favorable to the conviction. Id. We affirm if there is substantial 

evidence of probative value supporting each element of the crime from which a 

reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Id. A conviction can be sustained on only the 

uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, even when that witness is the 

victim. Id. Moreover, a conviction may be sustained on circumstantial 

evidence alone so long as there are reasonable inferences from the evidence that 

enable the fact-finder to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Lawrence v. State, 959 N.E.2d 385, 388 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.

[11] Indiana Code section 9-30-5-5(3) provides that a person who causes the death of 

another person when operating a vehicle while intoxicated commits a Level 5 

felony. Further, Indiana Code section 9-24-19-2 provides that a person who:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1508-CR-1236 | April 14, 2016 Page 6 of 11

(1) knows that the person’s driving privilege, license, or permit is 

suspended or revoked; and

(2) operates a motor vehicle upon a highway less than ten (10) 

years after the date on which judgment was entered against the 

person for a prior unrelated violation of section 1 of this chapter, 

this section, [I.C. §] 9-1-4-52 (repealed July 1, 1991), or [I.C. §] 9-

24-18-5(a) (repealed July 1, 2000);

commits a Class A misdemeanor.

[12] First, Williams claims that the evidence was insufficient to prove that she was 

driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. Identification testimony need 

not necessarily be unequivocal to sustain a conviction. Holloway v. State, 983 

N.E.2d 1175, 1178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Elements of offenses and identity may 

be established entirely by circumstantial evidence and the logical inferences 

drawn therefrom. Id. As with other sufficiency matters, we will not weigh the 

evidence or resolve questions of credibility when determining whether the 

identification evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Id. Rather, we 

examine the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the 

conviction. Id.

[13] Here, our review of the record reveals that Williams admitted that she was the 

driver of the crashed vehicle at least twice. When Officer Sechrist first arrived 

at the accident scene and spoke with Williams, she stated that she was the 

driver of the vehicle. Then, when Trooper Miller arrived at the scene shortly 

after Officer Sechrist, he also spoke with Williams, and she again stated that she 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1508-CR-1236 | April 14, 2016 Page 7 of 11

was the driver of the vehicle. Williams’ admissions continued even further—

she stated to the trooper that she had a “couple of drinks.” (Tr. p. 50). Finally, 

when Trooper Miller read the implied consent law to Williams and asked her if 

she would submit to a breath test, she stated, “I don’t have a license already, 

but I’ll take the test.” (Tr. p. 58). Thus, Williams made several admissions to 

the police officers at the accident scene while Trotter was still alive and sitting 

on the guardrail. However, Trotter died a week later. Once the State amended 

its charges to reflect Trotter’s death, Williams’ position changed. At her trial, 

about a year later, Williams firmly testified that she was not behind the wheel of 

her vehicle at the time of the accident and that she had only stated she was at 

the request of another female occupant of the vehicle. Williams’ request 

essentially amounts to an invitation for us to disregard the jury’s decision and

reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See Bailey, 979 N.E.2d at 143. As 

such, we find that the fact that Williams owned the vehicle, the testimonies of 

the witnesses, her own admissions to the police officers at the accident scene,

and the reasonable inferences therefrom were sufficient to enable the jury to 

find Williams guilty of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. 

[14] Further, as to her conviction for driving while suspended, Williams asserts that 

the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “she was aware her 

[driving] privileges were currently suspended.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 13). A 

defendant’s knowledge of her license suspension can be inferred from the 

computer printout of the driving record showing that a suspension of notice was 

sent to her. Nasser v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1105, 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1508-CR-1236 | April 14, 2016 Page 8 of 11

denied. “An entry in the driving record of a defendant stating that notice of 

suspension or revocation was mailed by the [Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV)] 

to the defendant constitutes prima facie evidence that the notice was mailed to 

the defendant’s address as shown in the records of [BMV].” I.C. § 9-14-3-7(c). 

Our review of the record indicates that a notice of suspension was mailed to 

Williams on May 1, 2000. Williams’ driving privileges were suspended 

indefinitely with the effective date of May 15, 2000. Moreover, when Trooper 

Miller informed Williams of the implied consent law, she stated that she did not 

have a driver’s license. During the trial, Williams admitted that she told 

Trooper Miller that her license was suspended. Thus, at the time of the 

accident, she knew that her license was suspended. At the same time, at her 

trial, Williams also claimed that she “went to [BMV] to clear up her fines. She 

believed the money ‘rolled over’ and validated her license.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 

13). Now, on appeal, after Williams’ admission to Trooper Miller and the 

prima facie proof of mailing of the notice to her, she still maintains that the State 

did not meet its burden of proof. We find Williams’ argument unpersuasive. 

Her argument, again, essentially amounts to a request for us to reweigh the 

evidence and disregard the fact-finder’s decision. We cannot do that. Both 

conflicting positions were presented at the trial where the jury received an 

opportunity to weigh the evidence and assess the witnesses’ credibility. At the 

conclusion of the trial, the jury found Williams guilty of driving while 

suspended. As such, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence 

for the jury to find Williams guilty of driving while suspended beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1508-CR-1236 | April 14, 2016 Page 9 of 11

[15] Finally, Williams asserts that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that her operation of the vehicle while intoxicated was the substantial 

cause of the death of Trotter. To establish causation, the State must show that 

the defendant caused the accident. Smith v. State, 496 N.E2d 778, 781 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1986) (citing Micinski v. State, 487 N.E.2d 150, 154 (Ind. 1986) (holding 

that the State need not prove that the defendant’s intoxication caused the 

accident; the State only need to prove that the defendant caused the accident)),

reh’g denied, trans. denied. 

A conviction for operating while intoxicated causing death 

requires proof that the defendant’s operation of a motor vehicle 

while intoxicated was a “substantial cause,” and not merely a 

“contributing cause” of the resulting death. The well-settled rule 

is that the State must prove the defendant’s conduct was the 

proximate cause of the victim’s injury or death.

Abney v. State, 858 N.E.2d 226, 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (internal citations 

omitted). 

[16] In Abney, a defendant, who was operating his vehicle while intoxicated, struck a 

bicyclist and left the accident scene. Id. at 227. He was apprehended shortly 

thereafter when police noticed him driving a vehicle with extensive front-end 

damage—shattered windshield, caved hood and top of the car, and deployed 

airbag. Id. Among other charges, the defendant was convicted for operating a 

vehicle while intoxicated causing death. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued 

that someone else caused the bicyclist’s death—someone else hit the bicyclist, 

who then, allegedly already deceased, was thrown on top of the defendant’s 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1508-CR-1236 | April 14, 2016 Page 10 of 11

vehicle. Id. at 230. The Abney court found that the defendant’s claim, and even 

the opinion of the defendant’s accident reconstruction expert, relied on 

considerable speculation. Id. The Abney court declined to reweigh the evidence 

and held that the evidence presented to the jury, which primarily consisted of 

evidence that the defendant was the substantial cause of the bicyclist’s death,

was sufficient for the jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

defendant’s operation of a motor vehicle caused the bicyclist’ death. Id. 

[17] Here, Williams claims that her operation of the vehicle while intoxicated was 

not a substantial or proximate cause of Trotter’s death because Trotter had a 

number of other medical conditions that could have caused or contributed to 

his death. We find that this claim is similar to the defendant’s argument in 

Abney; therefore, we find the Abney court’s decision instructive. By arguing that 

Trotter’s death might have been caused by something other than her operation 

of the vehicle and the crash, like the defendant in Abney, Williams invites us to 

speculate and reweigh the evidence. We cannot do that. See id. Our review of 

the record in light most favorable to Williams’ convictions indicates that she

was the driver of the vehicle. She was intoxicated and crashed the vehicle,

hitting the Interstate’s concrete barrier and the metal guardrail. Williams had 

several passengers in the vehicle; one of the passengers, Trotter, died in the 

hospital a week after the accident due to injuries sustained in the crash—i.e., 

blunt force trauma to his head. We find that this evidence and the reasonable 

inferences therefrom were sufficient for the jury to determine beyond a 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1508-CR-1236 | April 14, 2016 Page 11 of 11

reasonable doubt that Williams’ operation of the vehicle while intoxicated 

caused Trotter’s death.

[18] In sum, we decline Williams’ request to reweigh the evidence presented at her 

jury trial. Applying our standards of review, we find that there was substantial 

and sufficient evidence of probative value allowing the jury to determine 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams was the driver; she was intoxicated

while driving; her driver’s license was suspended; and she crashed the vehicle

and caused Trotter’s death. 

CONCLUSION

[19] Based on the foregoing, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support 

Williams’ convictions. 

[20] Affirmed.

[21] Kirsch, J. and Pyle, J. concur