UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

RONALD E. ROGERS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CAUSE NO. 3:14-CV-2071-JD-CAN

v. )

)

ST. JOSEPH COUNTY JAIL, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Ronald E. Rogers, a pro se prisoner, filed an amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(DE 23.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review a prisoner complaint and dismiss

it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a),

(b).Courts apply the same standard under Section 1915A as when deciding a motion under FEDERAL

RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006).

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint muststate a claim for relief

that is plausible on its face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir.

2009). “A claim hasfacial plausibility when the plaintiff pleadsfactual content that allowsthe court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 603.

In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court must bear in mind that “[a] document

filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must

be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). To state claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) that
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defendants deprived him of a federal constitutional right; and (2) that the defendants acted under

color of state law.” Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006).

Here, Rogers claimsthat he was denied adequate medical care while housed at the St.Joseph

County Jail as a pretrial detainee. Specifically, he alleges that on November 21, 2014, his left arm

was bleeding excessively through an abscess. He contacted a pod officer in charge, whose identity 

is unknown to Rogers, and asked that officer to contact medical staff or come into the cell to

personally assess the situation. However, the pod officer refused to respond to Rogers’s request for 

assistance. After some time, Rogers was ultimately seen and transported to the County Jail Medical

Unit, where it was determined that a main artery in his arm was bleeding and that the condition was

worsened due to the delay in receiving medical treatment. Rogers has brought suit against the

unknown officer and Warden Julie Lawson, seeking both money damages and injunctive relief.

Because Rogers is a pretrial detainee, the Fourteenth rather than the Eighth Amendment

applies. Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 473-74 (7th Cir. 2009). However, the standards that apply

are functionally equivalent, and “anything that would violate the Eighth Amendment would also

violate the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 475. Under either Amendment, inmates are entitled to

adequate medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To establish liability, a prisoner

must satisfy both an objective and subjective component by showing: (1) his medical need was

objectively serious; and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that medical need.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). A medical need is “serious” if it is one that a

physician has diagnosed as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person

would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653

(7th Cir. 2005).
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On the subjective prong, the prisoner must show the defendant acted with deliberate

indifference to the inmate’s health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. As the Seventh Circuit has

explained:

[C]onduct is deliberately indifferent when the official has acted in an intentional or

criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant must have known that the plaintiff

was at serious risk of being harmed and decided not to do anything to prevent that

harm from occurring even though he could have easily done so.

Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted).

Here, Rogers alleges that he was suffering from a serious medical condition, but yet the

unknown officer prevented him from being evaluated or given the medical care that he needed,

despite his repeated protests that he needed medical attention. As a result, his condition worsened.

Giving Rogersthe inferencesto which he is entitled at thisstage, he hasstated a plausible deliberate

indifference claim against the unknown officer. See Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 

1999) (where inmate complained about severe deprivations but was ignored, he established a

“prototypical case of deliberate indifference”).

Asto Warden Julie Lawson, he asserts generally thatshe conspired with the unknown officer

and others to deprive Rogers of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment. (DE 23 at 3-4.) He does not offer any specifics about this alleged conspiracy. Instead,

he merely states that she was involved in the conspiracy. Rogers’s bare allegations of a conspiracy

do not suffice. See Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 2006) (“bare” allegation of

conspiracy is insufficient to state a claim). Accordingly, Rogers’s amended complaint does not

contain a plausible conspiracy claim against Warden Lawson.
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As a practical matter, this case cannot proceed against the unnamed officer. See Wudtke v.

Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[I]t is pointless to include lists of anonymous

defendants in federal court; this type of placeholder does not open the door to relation back under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, nor can it otherwise help the plaintiff.”). Thus, the Court will order that service

be made on the Warden for the sole purpose of identifying the defendant officer through discovery.

See Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1428 (7th Cir. 1996). The Court will set deadlines for

Rogers to conduct discovery and to file an amended complaint containing the name of the officer,

which he must do in order for this case to proceed. If Rogers can obtain the name of the officer on

his own without having to conduct discovery, he may of course do so. In either case, however, if he

failsto submit an amended complaint containing the officer’s name by the deadline1

, this action will

be dismissed for failure to state a claim against a viable defendant.

For these reasons, the Court:

(1) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed against Julie Lawson for the sole purpose of

conducting discovery to identify the unknown defendant who delayed him receiving medical

treatment on November 21, 2014;

(2) DISMISSES all other claims;

(3) DIRECTS the United States Marshals Service to effect service of process on Julie

Lawson;

(4) ORDERS Julie Lawson to appear and respond to discovery for the sole purpose of

identifying the unknown officer defendant;

(5) WAIVES Julie Lawson’s obligation to file an answer to the complaint;

1

Of course, Rogers can ask for additional time, if necessary.
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(6) DIRECTS the clerk to place this cause number on a blank 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Prisoner

Complaint form and mail it to the plaintiff along with a copy of this order;

(7) ORDERS that any discovery by the plaintiff regarding the identity of the unnamed

officer defendant be initiated by December 14, 2015;

(8) ORDERS the plaintiff to file an amended complaint on or before February 22, 2016,

which names the officer defendant who delayed him receiving medical treatment on November 21,

2014 and all claims that he is asserting against him; and

(9) CAUTIONS him that if he does not file an amended complaint by the deadline, this case

will be dismissed without further notice.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: October 19, 2015

/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO

Judge

United States District Court