IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

CURTIS BURNSIDE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 3:13-CV-661

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on a habeas petition

challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding, filed by Curtis

Burnside, pro se, on July 1, 2013 (DE #1). For the reasons set

forth below, the petition (DE #1) is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

In WCC # 12-09-0259, Burnside was found guilty of assaulting

a staff member. (DE #5-3.) The charge was initiated on September

9, 2012, when Corrections Officer S. Waterman wrote a conduct

report stating as follows: 

On today’s date 9-9-12 at approx 1130 AM, I Officer

Waterman was allowing another offender to exit the

holding cell to use the bathroom. At that time Offender

Burnside Curtis 881663 yell[ed] fuck this shit and tryed

[sic] to exit the holding cell. I Ofc Waterman told

Burnside no you not [sic]. He then lunched [sic] the

gate of [the] holding cell w[h]ich struck me [in the]

back. Then this offender came at me putting both his

hand[s] on my upper chest and threw me Ofc. Waterman into

the wall.
(DE #13-1.)

On March 6, 2013, Burnside was notified of the charge.1

 (DE

#13-2.) He pled not guilty, declined the assistance of a lay

advocate, did not request any physical evidence, and requested a

witness statement from Dr. B. Eichman, the prison psychiatrist,

regarding his “mental capacity” at the time of the incident. (Id.)

Prior to the hearing, a statement was obtained from Dr. Eichman,

who stated as follows: “Since I was not present at the time of this

incident there is no way I can attest to this offender’s mental

status at that time.” (DE #13-3.)

 On March 11, 2013, a hearing was held on the charge. (DE #13-

4.) In his defense, Burnside made the following statement: “I just

ran out of the cage---she got in my way [a]nd in the process was

knocked to the ground. I went back in the cage once I realized

what had happened. I had no control over what happened.” (Id.)

Based on the evidence, the hearing officer found him guilty. (Id.)

Among other sanctions, Burnside lost earned time credits and

received a credit-class demotion. (Id.) His administrative appeals

were denied. (DE #13-5 to #13-7.) 

1

 Burnside was found guilty at two separate hearings held in

October 2012 and December 2012, but in both instances the guilty

findings were vacated on appeal due to procedural errors. (DE #1

at 10-13.) The only facts relevant here pertain to the third

hearing occurring in March 2013. Burnside appears to complain that

he was tried three times on the same charge, but double jeopardy

principles do not apply in the prison disciplinary context. See

Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 1996). 

2
DISCUSSION

 When prisoners lose earned time credits in a disciplinary

proceeding, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause guarantees

them certain procedural protections: (1) advance written notice of

the charge; (2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial

decision-maker; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present

documentary evidence when consistent with institutional safety and

correctional goals; and (4) a written statement by the fact-finder

of evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). To satisfy due process,

there must also be “some evidence” in the record to support the

guilty finding. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S.

445, 455 (1985). 

Burnside raises a number of claims in his petition regarding

the failure of prison staff to follow Indiana Department of

Correction (“IDOC”) policies regarding time deadlines, the

sanctions imposed, and the processing of his appeal. (DE #1 at 5-

7.) However, even if he is correct, a violation of IDOC rules

would not entitle him to federal habeas relief. Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (habeas relief is only available

for a violation of federal law); Hester v. McBride, 966 F. Supp.

765, 775 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (violation of IDOC policy in disciplinary

proceeding could not support grant of habeas relief, since federal

3
habeas court “does not sit to correct any errors of state law”).

Accordingly, these claims are denied.

Burnside next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. (DE

#1 at 6.) In reviewing a disciplinary determination for

sufficiency of the evidence, “courts are not required to conduct an

examination of the entire record, independently assess witness

credibility, or weigh the evidence, but only determine whether the

prison disciplinary board’s decision to revoke good time credits

has some factual basis.” McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786

(7th Cir. 1999). “[T]he relevant question is whether there is any

evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by

the disciplinary board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56 (emphasis

added). The court will overturn a guilty finding only if “no

reasonable adjudicator could have found [the prisoner] guilty of

the offense on the basis of the evidence presented.” Henderson v.

United States Parole Comm’n, 13 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994).

Additionally, circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to

establish guilt. See Hamilton v. O’Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 345 (7th

Cir. 1992).

Upon review, there is sufficient evidence in the record to

support the guilty finding in this case. Officer Waterman reported

that Burnside was in a holding cell,2

 and when she was letting

2

 Burnside explains that he was in the holding cell for

“disciplinary reasons.” (DE #14-1 at 7.)

4
another inmate out to use the restroom, Burnside yelled “fuck this

shit” and tried to push past her. She told him he could not leave,

at which point he pushed the gate into her back, and then shoved

her in the chest into a wall. This is sufficient evidence to

establish that he was guilty of assault. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 457

(evidence is sufficient as long as “the record is not so devoid of

evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without

support or otherwise arbitrary.”); see also Moffat v. Broyles, 288

F.3d 978, 981 (7th Cir. 2002) (witness statements constituted some

evidence); McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786 (conduct report alone

provided some evidence to support disciplinary determination).

In the face of this evidence, Burnside does not offer an

outright denial, but argues instead that he had no control over

what he was doing because he suffers from bi-polar disorder, which

makes him moody and “overly aggressive.” (DE #1 at 5.) He asserts

that he was feeling stressed that day due to the death of his

father approximately six months earlier. (DE #14-1 at 7.) He

appears to argue that the officer caused the incident by not

listening to him when he asked to be let out of the cell. (Id.)

Notably, the evidence Burnside requested (the statement from

Dr. Eichman) did not support his claim that he could not control

his actions on the date in question. Furthermore, even if Burnside

was moody or feeling stressed that day, “inmates cannot be

permitted to decide which orders they will obey, and when they will

5
obey them[.]” Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 476 (7th Cir. 2009).

“When an inmate refuses to obey a proper order, he is attempting to

assert his authority over a portion of the institution and its

officials [which] . . . places the staff and other inmates in

danger.” Id. In other words, Burnside was not entitled to

physically assault the officer or disobey her order to stay in the

cell even if he was feeling stressed or irritable. Moreover, the

hearing officer was aware from other evidence that Burnside had

mental health issues, and she nevertheless concluded that he was

guilty of assault. It is not the province of this court to reweigh

the evidence to make an independent determination of guilt or

innocence. The question is solely whether there is some evidence

to support the hearing officer’s determination, Hill, 472 U.S. at

457, and that standard is satisfied.3

 This claim is denied. 

Burnside also appears to claim that he was denied evidence.

(DE #1 at 5.) A prisoner has a limited right to present witnesses

and evidence in his defense consistent with correctional goals and

safety. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566. A hearing officer has considerable

discretion with respect to witness and evidence requests, and may

3

 Burnside appears to argue that there was insufficient

evidence for the hearing officer to require him to pay restitution.

(DE #1 at 6.) The question for this court is solely whether there

was sufficient evidence to support the determination that Burnside

was guilty of assault, and that standard is satisfied. What

sanction to impose was a matter of IDOC policy; to the extent

Burnside is arguing the policy was not followed, this would not

entitle him to federal habeas relief. Estelle, 502 U.S. 67-68;

Hester, 966 F. Supp. at 775. 

6
deny requests that threaten institutional safety or are irrelevant,

repetitive, or unnecessary. Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666

(7th Cir. 2003). Furthermore, due process only requires access to

witnesses and evidence that are exculpatory. See Rasheed-Bey v.

Duckworth, 969 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992). “Exculpatory” in

this context means evidence that “directly undermines the

reliability of the evidence in the record pointing to [the

prisoner’s] guilt.” Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir.

1996). The denial of the right to present evidence will be

considered harmless, unless the prisoner shows that the evidence

could have aided his defense. See Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841,

847 (7th Cir. 2011). 

Here, Burnside requested one witness at screening, Dr.

Eichman. (DE #13-2.) A statement was obtained from Dr. Eichman

and considered by the hearing officer. (DE #13-3.) There is

nothing to reflect that Burnside requested any other evidence when

he had the opportunity to do so, and he cannot fault the hearing

officer for failing to consider evidence he did not properly

7
request.4 See Piggie v. McBride, 277 F.3d 922, 925 (7th Cir.

2002). He appears to argue that Dr. Eichman should have given a

better statement that included information about his bipolar

disorder. However, this was the witness that he requested. Simply

because his witness did not provide exculpatory evidence as he

hoped does not mean his due process rights were violated.

Accordingly, this claim is denied.

Next, Burnside asserts that he was denied an impartial

decisionmaker. (DE #1 at 6.) In the prison disciplinary context,

adjudicators are “entitled to a presumption of honesty and

integrity,” and “the constitutional standard for improper bias is

high.” Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666. Due process prohibits a prison

official who was substantially involved in the underlying incident

from acting as a decision-maker in the case. Id. However, due

process is not violated simply because the hearing officer knew the

inmate, presided over a prior disciplinary case, or had some

limited involvement in the events underlying the charge. Id. 

4

 The record reflects that during the hearing Burnside

requested a statement from a “Dr. Hanson,” but he did not request

this witness at the time of screening. (DE #13-2; DE #13-4.)

Regardless, the hearing officer noted that Dr. Hanson was a “temp”

and was no longer employed at Westville. (DE #13-4.) Burnside

does not offer anything to contradict the hearing officer’s

determination that Dr. Hanson was unavailable, nor has he explained

how a statement from Dr. Hanson would have exculpated him from the

charge. Assuming he wanted Dr. Hanson to speak about his mental

health issues, as stated above, Burnside was not entitled to

assault the officer even if he suffers from a mood disorder. 

8
Burnside does not argue, nor is there any evidence in the

record to suggest, that the hearing officer was involved in any way

in the events underlying the charge. Instead, he argues that his

rights were violated because the screening officer, hearing

officer, and other staff involved all knew and worked together. 

(DE #1 at 6-7.) However, this was not a criminal proceeding, and

the fact that staff members knew each other, had prior dealings

with Burnside, or even discussed the case would not establish a due

process violation. See White v. Ind. Parole Bd., 266 F.3d 759, 767

(7th Cir. 2001); Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 534 (7th Cir.

1995). To the extent Burnside believes internal prison policies

were violated by staffing serving “dual roles” in the hearing

process, as explained, the court is not permitted to grant federal

habeas relief based on a violation of prison policy. Estelle, 502

U.S. 67-68; Hester, 966 F. Supp. at 775. Burnside also appears to

argue that the hearing officer was biased because she rejected his

proffered defense. (DE #1 at 7.) However, it was the hearing

officer’s job to weigh the relative credibility of the evidence,

and her adverse ruling does not establish impermissible bias. See

Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555–56 (1994). Accordingly,

this claim is denied.

CONCLUSION

9
For the reasons set forth above, the petition (DE #1) is

DENIED.

DATED: April 14, 2014 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

 

10