[Cite as Knight & Day Childcare Too v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2024-Ohio-3199.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Knight and Day Childcare Too, :

Plaintiff-Appellant, :

v. No. 23AP-577

: (C.P.C. No. 23CV-2844)

Ohio Department of Job and Family

Services, : (REGULAR CALENDAR)

Defendant-Appellee. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on August 22, 2024

On brief: David L. Engler, for appellant.

On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Samantha V. 

Rupp, for appellee.

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

PER CURIAM.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Knight and Day Childcare Too (“Knight and Day”), 

appeals the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, granting defendantappellee, Ohio Department of Job and Family Services’ (“ODJFS”), motion to dismiss. For 

the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS

{¶ 2} Knight and Day is a Type A Home Provider childcare program in Jefferson, 

Ohio, Ashtabula County, that is owned and operated by Tracey Knight. 

{¶ 3} On September 22, 2022,1 ODJFS sent a notice informing Knight and Day that 

the agency was proposing to enter an adjudication order to revoke its Type A Home 

Provider license. The notice listed a number of violations, including: employees that were 

near children without the requisite preliminary approval from ODJFS, background checks 

1 The letter was dated September 21, 2022.
No. 23AP-577 2

were not requested for several childcare staff members, Knight and Day exceeded its license 

capacity and ratio of staff to children, and a child was left unattended and unsupervised 

outside the home. The notice also stated that Knight and Day had an opportunity to request 

a hearing on the proposed license revocation within 30 days of the date of the mailing of 

the notice. 

{¶ 4} Following receipt of the notice, Knight spoke with an ODJFS employee who 

mistakenly informed her that she had until October 29, 2022 to file her request for a hearing 

on the license revocation. On October 27, 2022, Knight and Day requested, via email, an 

administrative hearing regarding its license. 

{¶ 5} On November 2, 2022, ODJFS denied Knight and Day’s request for a hearing 

because the request was made after the 30-day deadline. 

{¶ 6} On January 19, 2023, Knight and Day sent a letter to ODJFS requesting that 

the agency reconsider its November 2, 2022 decision. Knight and Day argued that the 

agency should reconsider its decision under the principle of equitable estoppel, because an 

ODJFS employee had mistakenly informed Knight that her request for a hearing was not 

due until October 29, 2022, and Knight had relied on that information. Knight and Day 

also argued the agency should reconsider its denial due to excusable neglect. Knight and 

Day argued that its request for a hearing was late due to an employee of Knight and Day’s 

counsel failing to inform counsel of the facts of Knight and Day’s case but was not a 

complete disregard for the judicial system. 

{¶ 7} On April 7, 2023, ODJFS mailed a letter to Knight and Day stating that the 

agency did not have the statutory authority to reinstate a revoked license. ODJFS stated

that requests for a hearing must be filed within 30 days and that a timely request was not 

received. 

{¶ 8} On April 21, 2023, Knight and Day filed an appeal with the Franklin County 

Court of Common Pleas under R.C. 119.12. In its notice of appeal, Knight and Day stated 

that it was appealing the final agency decision by ODJFS that was mailed on April 7, 2023.

{¶ 9} On August 28, 2023, the trial court concluded that it did not have subjectmatter jurisdiction to hear the appeal because Knight and Day did not file its appeal in the 

common pleas court for the county where its business is located, as required under R.C. 
No. 23AP-577 3

119.12(A)(1). (Decision & Entry Granting Mot. of ODFJS to Dismiss at 4.) The trial court

also found that Knight and Day’s appeal was untimely. Id. at 5. 

{¶ 10} On September 26, 2023, Knight and Day filed this appeal. 

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶ 11} Knight and Day argues the following assignments of error:

(1) The trial court erred in concluding that it did not have 

subject matter jurisdiction over this administrative appeal, 

and, therefore, granted the Ohio Department of Job and 

Family Services’ Motion to Dismiss.

(2) The trial court erred concluding that Knight and Day 

Childcare Too did not timely file its administrative appeal, 

and, therefore, granted the Ohio Department of Job and 

Family Services’ Motion to Dismiss.

(3) The trial court erred in deciding that Knight and Day 

Childcare Too was not entitled to have the Agency 

reconsider its denial of the request for a hearing.

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

{¶ 12} In its first assignment of error, Knight and Day argues that the trial court 

erred in determining it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Knight and Day’s 

appeal under R.C. 119.12. A trial court’s decision to dismiss an administrative appeal 

brought pursuant to R.C. 119.12 for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law 

that we review de novo. Nkanginieme v. Ohio Dept. of Medicaid, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-596, 

2015-Ohio-656, ¶ 12, citing Daniel v. Williams, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-797, 2011-Ohio-1941, 

¶ 9, citing Ford v. Tandy Transp., Inc., 86 Ohio App.3d 364, 375 (4th Dist.1993).

{¶ 13} “Subject-matter jurisdiction involves ‘ “a court’s power to hear and decide a 

case on the merits and does not relate to the rights of the parties.” ’ ” Moore v. Ohio Dept. 

of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-599, 2019-Ohio-767, ¶ 4, quoting Robinson v. Ohio 

Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-550, 2011-Ohio-713, ¶ 5, quoting Vedder v. 

Warrensville Hts., 8th Dist. No. 81005, 2002-Ohio-5567, ¶ 14. It is axiomatic that a 

tribunal must have subject-matter jurisdiction before it can consider the merits of a 

controversy. Turner v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 08AP-568, 2008-Ohio6608, ¶ 9.
No. 23AP-577 4

{¶ 14} “[W]hen the right to appeal is conferred by statute, an appeal can be perfected 

only in the manner prescribed by the applicable statute.” Welsh Dev. Co. v. Warren Cty. 

Regional Planning Comm., 128 Ohio St.3d 471, 2011-Ohio-1604, ¶ 14. Thus, “a statutory 

requirement for appealing an administrative order to a specific court is a matter of subjectmatter jurisdiction and not venue.” Greater Dayton Regional Transit Auth. v. State Emp. 

Relations Bd., 10th Dist. No. 14AP-876, 2015-Ohio-2049, ¶ 40 (finding the R.C. 4117.13(D) 

requirement that a party file an appeal from an order of the State Employment Relations 

Board “to the court of common pleas of any county where the person transacts business 

relate[d] to subject-matter jurisdiction and not venue”). See also Calo v. Ohio Real Estate 

Comm., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-595, 2011-Ohio-2413, ¶ 38 (stating that, as the appellant 

sought to appeal an agency’s order “under the provisions of R.C. 119.12,” his rights were “as 

set forth in the statute, and he must comply with the terms of the statute to perfect his 

appeal, including the county where the appeal is filed”). 

{¶ 15} Here, the trial court looked to R.C. 119.12(A)(1)2 to determine whether it had 

subject-matter jurisdiction over Knight and Day’s appeal. R.C. 119.12(A)(1) states:

[A]ny party adversely affected by any order of an agency issued 

pursuant to an adjudication denying an applicant admission to 

an examination, or denying the issuance or renewal of a 

license or registration of a licensee, or revoking or suspending 

a license, or allowing the payment of a forfeiture under section 

4301.252 of the Revised Code may appeal from the order of the 

agency to the court of common pleas of the county in which the 

place of business of the licensee is located or the county in 

which the licensee is a resident.

(Emphasis added.)

{¶ 16} Knight and Day argues that R.C. 119.12(A) is not the appropriate 

jurisdictional statute. Since it is challenging a procedural issue, namely ODJFS’s denial of 

a hearing, Knight and Day contends that the trial court erred by not applying R.C. 119.12(B), 

which states that “[a]ny party adversely affected by any order of an agency issued pursuant 

to any other adjudication may appeal to the court of common pleas of Franklin [C]ounty.” 

R.C. 119.12(B). 

2 R.C. 119.12 was amended in 2023 by S.B. 21 and H.B. 33. The text of the statute cited herein, and as analyzed 

by the trial court, is the statutory language that was in effect at the time of the trial court’s decision.
No. 23AP-577 5

{¶ 17} Knight and Day argues it was denied a hearing regarding the revocation of its 

license. In other words, the denial of the hearing related to the adjudication regarding 

Knight and Day’s license. Therefore, R.C. 119.12(A) applies, and we agree with the trial 

court that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Knight and Day’s appeal. The parties 

do not dispute that Knight and Day is located in Ashtabula County, not in Franklin County. 

Therefore, under R.C. 119.12(A), Knight and Day was required to file its administrative 

appeal in the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas. Having instead filed in Franklin 

County, Knight and Day did not perfect its appeal in accordance with R.C. 119.12. 

{¶ 18} Because we have concluded that the trial court did not possess subject-matter 

jurisdiction to hear Knight and Day’s appeal, we decline to address Knight and Day’s second 

and third assignments of error. 

IV. CONCLUSION

{¶ 19} For these reasons, we overrule Knight and Day’s first assignment of error, 

decline to address its second and third assignments of error, and affirm the judgment of the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. 

Judgment affirmed.

DORRIAN, JAMISON, and BOGGS, JJ., concur.