UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

CHARLES HARTZ, )

)

Plaintiff )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 2:13-CV-9 RLM

)

DAVID LAIN, et al., )

)

Defendants )

OPINION AND ORDER

Charles Hartz was serving a sentence in the Porter County Jail when he fell

from a bunk in his cell and was injured. He sued Porter County Sheriff David

Lain, Warden John Widup, and Advanced Correctional Health Care (the medical

services provider at the jail) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claiming that

they were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs and/or negligent when they

denied his requests for medication and failed to transfer him to the infirmary or

adequately monitor him when he started exhibiting “strange, erratic and bazaar

behavior.” The defendants moved for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). Although Mr. Hartz was granted an extension of time to respond, he

hasn’t filed a response or requested additional time to do so. For the following

reasons, the court grants the defendants’ motions for summary judgment.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, discovery materials,

disclosures, and affidavits demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact, such
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Protective Life Ins. Co.

v. Hansen, 632 F.3d 388, 391-92 (7th Cir. 2011). The court construes the

evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn from the evidence in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of informing the court

of the basis for its motion, together with evidence demonstrating the absence of

any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, as the defendants have in this

case, the opposing party can’t rest upon the allegations in the pleadings, but

must “point to evidence that can be put in admissible form at trial, and that, if

believed by the fact-finder, could support judgment in his favor.” Marr v. Bank of

America, N,A., 662 F.3d 963, 966 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Hastings Mut. Ins. Co.

v. LaFollette, No. 1:07-cv-1085, 2009 WL 348769, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 6, 2009)

(“It is not the duty of the court to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat

a motion for summary judgment; rather, the nonmoving party bears the

responsibility of identifying the evidence upon which he relies.”); Hammel v. Eau

Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005)(summary judgment is

“not a dress rehearsal or practice run; it is the put up or shut up moment in a

lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier

of fact to accept its version of events”). 

II. DISCUSSION

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The facts giving rise to this action were set forth in great detail in the

defendants’ statements of facts and were supported by the affidavits of Sheriff

Lain, Dr. John Collier, Kim House, RN, Mr. Hartz’s deposition testimony, and

records from the Porter County Jail. [Doc. Nos. 67, 68, 70]. Mr. Hartz didn’t object

to the defendants’ statements as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), so the court

considers those facts undisputed for purposes of the motions for summary

judgment, adopts them by reference, and limits its discussion to whether

judgment is appropriate as a matter of law based on the record before it. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003); Flynn v.

Sandahl, 58 F.3d 283, 288 (7th Cir. 1995); Glass v. Dachel, 2 F.3d 733, 739 (7th

Cir. 1993). 

A. Federal Claims Under § 1983

Mr. Hartz brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Sheriff Lain in his

individual and official capacity, Warden Widup in his official capacity, and

Advanced Correctional Healthcare, Inc., alleging that the defendants were

deliberately indifferent to a “serious medical condition” when they failed to provide

him with all of the medications he was taking before he arrived at the jail on

December 7, 2010 and to ensure access to adequate medical care when he began

exhibiting erratic behavior in January 2011, and that he was injured as a result

of the their “systemic and individual actions and inactions.”

1. Individual Capacity Claim

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To prevail on his claim against Sheriff Lain in his individual capacity, Mr.

Hartz must show that the Sheriff was personally involved in the deprivation of a

constitutional right, Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); Palmer v. Marion

County, 327 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2003), i.e., that he knew about the conduct that

caused the deprivation and “facilitate[d] it, approve[d] it, condone[d] it, or turn[ed]

a blind eye....” Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1988). 

The complaint alleges that “the Defendants” knew about Mr. Hartz’s medical

condition, disregarded his “requests for treatment...and failed to take reasonable

measures to meet [his] serious medical needs”, and did so in furtherance of an

“unreasonable” policy or custom that Sheriff Lain “established and maintained.”

But Mr. Hartz hasn’t pointed to any evidence that could support those allegations,

or identified any facts from which the court could reasonably infer that Sheriff

Lain had knowledge of Mr. Hartz’s condition, or was personally involved in, or

liable for, the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights. 

To the contrary, the affidavits and deposition testimony submitted by the

defendants unequivocally show that Dr. Collier was responsible for Mr. Hartz’s

medical care; that his treatment decisions weren’t based on any policy, custom,

or practice implemented by the jail or Advanced Correctional Healthcare, but on

his medical judgment; and that Sheriff Lain had no knowledge of Mr. Hartz’s

conditions or medical treatment until January 8, 2011, after Mr. Hartz had

returned from the hospital after his fall. Sheriff Lain, accordingly, is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law on the individual capacity claim. See Pepper v. Village

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of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2005) (“to be liable under 1983, an

individual defendant must have ‘caused or participated in a constitutional

deprivation’”); Luck v. Rovenstine, 168 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 1999)(Sheriff not

liable in individual capacity where arrestee had no direct contact with the sheriff

and sheriff lacked actual knowledge of wrongful detention); Jones v. City of

Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1988). 

2. Official Capacity and Claims against ACH

A § 1983 claim against ACH and Sheriff Lain and Warden Widup in their

official capacities is effectively a claim against the municipality. See Gossmeyer v.

McDonald, 128 F.3d 481, 494 (7th Cir. 1997); IND. CODE § 36-8-10-4(a) (members

of a county police force “are employees of the county...”). To prevail on such a

claim, Mr. Hartz must show that he was deprived of a constitutional right by an

official policy or custom. Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of the City of New

York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Johnson v. Dossey, 515 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir.

2008). Mr. Hartz might have met that burden by showing that the alleged

deprivation of his constitutional rights was caused by “(1) an express municipal

policy; (2) a widespread, though unwritten, custom or practice; or (3) a decision

by a municipal agent with final policymaking authority”. Milestone v. City of

Monroe, Wis., 665 F.3d 774, 780 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Monell v. Department

of Social Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. at 694; Lewis v. City of Chicago,

496 F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Misbehaving employees are responsible for

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their own conduct, ‘units of local government are responsible only for their policies

rather than misconduct by their workers.’”). 

Mr. Hartz alleged in his complaint that “the Defendants” were acting in

furtherance of an “unreasonable” policy or custom that Sheriff Lain “established

and maintained,” when they “disregarded his “requests for treatment...and failed

to take reasonable measures to meet [his] serious medical needs.” But he hasn’t

identified the policy or custom to which he was referring, shown that the

defendants were personally involved in any decisions regarding Mr. Hartz’s

medical care, or identified any other incidents from which liability might be

inferred. The record is insufficient to allow a finding that the ACH, Sheriff Lain,

or Warden Widup had a policy, practice, or custom that was the driving force

behind the alleged constitutional violation.

B. State Law Claims

Mr. Hartz also asserts claims of negligence on the part of all defendants. The

court generally would relinquish jurisdiction over supplemental state law claims

rather than resolving them on the merits, when all federal claims have been

dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Al’s Service Center v. BP Products North

America, Inc., 599 F.3d 720, 727 (7th Cir. 2010); Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos.,

Inc., 29 F.3d 1244, 1251 (7th Cir. 1994). “This rule, however, is subject to three

recognized exceptions: when the refilling of the state claims is barred by the

statute of limitations; where substantial judicial resources have already been

expended on the state claims; and when it is clearly apparent how the state claim

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is to be decided.” Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 404 (7th Cir. 2007). Mr.

Hartz’s state claims clearly fall within those exceptions and “is so closely related

to the plaintiff’s federal-law claims as to be in effect part of the same case.”

Williams Electronics Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 479 F.3d 904, 906 (7th Cir. 2007).

“In order to prevail on a claim of negligence, a plaintiff is required to prove:

(1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty by the

defendant; and (3) an injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by the breach.”

Peters v. Forster, 804 N.E.2d 736, 738 (Ind.2004). As already discussed, the

defendants owed a duty to Mr. Hartz to provide adequate medical care, but Mr.

Hartz hasn’t pointed to any evidence that would show that they breached that

duty or that his injuries were caused by their actions or failure to act, and he can’t

rest on the conclusory allegations in paragraphs 78-81 of his complaint.

III. CONCLUSIONS

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS the defendants’ motions for

summary judgment [Doc. Nos. 66 and 69], VACATES the July 25, 2016 final

pretrial conference and August 16, 2016 trial date, and DIRECTS the Clerk to

enter judgment for the defendants. 

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: May 26, 2016 

 /s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr. 

Judge

United States District Court

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