NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

PATRICIA ANN AUSTIN,

Claimant-Appellant,

v.

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, Secretary of Veterans Affairs,

Respondent-Appellee.

______________________ 

2013-7149, -7150

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 13-991, Chief Judge Bruce E. 

Kasold, and No. 13-1488, Judge William Greenberg. 

______________________ 

Decided: February 5, 2014

______________________ 

PATRICIA ANN AUSTIN, of San Antonio, Texas, pro se. 

RUSSELL J. UPTON, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. 

With him on the brief were STUART F. DELERY, Assistant 

Attorney General, BRYANT G. SNEE, Acting Director, and 

SCOTT D. AUSTIN, Assistant Director. Of counsel on the 

brief were DAVID J. BARRANS, Deputy Assistant General 
2 AUSTIN v. SHINSEKI

Counsel and MARTIN J. SENDEK, Attorney, United States 

Department of Veterans Affairs, of Washington, DC.

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, MAYER, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Patricia Ann Austin (“Austin”) appeals from the 

decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”) dismissing her notice of 

appeal for lack of jurisdiction and denying her petition for 

extraordinary relief. See Austin v. Shinseki, No. 13-991, 

2013 WL 4400198 (Vet. App. Aug. 13, 2013); Austin v. 

Shinseki, No. 13-1488, 2013 WL 3243518 (Vet. App. June 

27, 2013). Because the Veterans Court did not err in 

dismissing Austin’s claim on the basis that there was no 

underlying decision from which to appeal and in denying 

her petition for extraordinary relief, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

On April 4, 2013, Austin filed a notice of appeal at the 

Veterans Court, indicating that she was appealing a 

January 17, 2013 decision of the Board of Veterans’ 

Appeals (the “Board”). On April 16, 2013, the Secretary 

filed a motion to dismiss that appeal, stating that Austin’s 

claim for Veterans Administration (“VA”) benefits was 

still pending before the VA Regional Office and had not 

been certified to the Board, that there was no Board 

decision issued to Austin on January 17, 2013, and that 

the Veterans Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the 

appeal due to the absence of a final Board decision. 

On April 26, 2013, Austin filed a self-styled “Appellant’s Petition for Extraordinary Relief” at the Veterans 

Court seeking a stay of the dismissal of her appeal “pending receipt of [the] decision and investigation by the 

Secretary at the [Regional Office] level.” Resp’t’s App. at 

A14–17. On June 19, 2013, the Veterans Court issued an 
AUSTIN v. SHINSEKI 3

order construing Austin’s petition as both a response to 

the Secretary’s motion to dismiss and as a petition for 

extraordinary relief. Id. at A20 The court noted that the 

Secretary’s motion to dismiss stated that no Board decision had issued on January 17, 2013 and directed Austin 

to explain why her appeal should not be dismissed. Id. 

On June 27, 2013, the Veterans Court denied Austin’s 

petition, which it treated as a writ of mandamus, noting 

that extraordinary relief was “not necessary when a 

petitioner is merely seeking a stay of a dismissal of an 

appeal in a different matter already before the Court.” 

Austin, 2013 WL 3243518, at *1. The Veterans Court 

found that “nothing further [could] be granted as a result 

of this petition” because it had construed the petition as a 

response to the Secretary’s motion to dismiss, which it 

was still considering. Id. at *1. 

On August 13, 2013, the Veterans Court dismissed 

Austin’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Austin had 

“failed to demonstrate that a final Board decision ha[d] 

been issued in her case.” Austin, 2013 WL 4400198, at *1. 

Austin timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

38 U.S.C. § 7292(a). 

DISCUSSION

Our jurisdiction to review decisions of the Veterans

Court is limited by statute. Under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), a 

party may obtain review “with respect to the validity of a 

decision of the [Veterans] Court on a rule of law or of any 

statute or regulation . . . or any interpretation thereof

(other than a determination as to a factual matter) that

was relied on by the Court in making the decision.” 

Under § 7292(d)(2), however, absent a constitutional

issue, we “may not review (A) a challenge to a factual

determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as

applied to the facts of a particular case.” We review legal 

determinations of the Veterans Court de novo. Bailey v. 

West, 160 F.3d 1360, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
4 AUSTIN v. SHINSEKI

Austin’s informal brief argues that the Veterans 

Court incorrectly dismissed her case and “rendered a 

partial decision.” Pet’r’s Br. 1. However, Austin does not 

identify any error in the Veterans Court’s finding that 

there was no final decision of the Board from which to 

appeal. The Veterans Court has jurisdiction to review a 

final decision of the Board. See 38 U.S.C. § 7252 (granting the Veterans Court jurisdiction to review “decisions” 

of the Board); 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a) (requiring individuals 

seeking review of “a final decision” of the Board to file a 

notice of appeal). In dismissing Austin’s appeal, the 

Veterans Court’s decision rested solely on its determination that Austin identified no final decision of the Board 

from which she was appealing, thereby failing to satisfy

the requirement of § 7266(a). 

Additionally, the Veterans Court did not err in denying Austin’s petition for extraordinary relief, which it 

treated as a writ of mandamus, and construing it as an 

answer to the motion to dismiss. A writ of mandamus is 

an “extraordinary remedy.” Mukand Int’l, Ltd. v. United 

States, 502 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007). “[T]he party 

seeking issuance of the writ must have no other adequate 

means to attain the relief he desires—a condition designed to ensure that the writ will not be used as a substitute for the regular appeals process.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. 

Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380–81 (2004). The Veterans Court 

was correct in determining that Austin’s then-pending 

appeal provided an adequate means to seek the relief 

requested in her petition. See Hargrove v. Shinseki, 629 

F.3d 1377, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (affirming Veterans 

Court decision denying writ of mandamus because petitioner had adequate alternative means to attain the relief 

requested). 

Austin further alleges various constitutional and civil 

rights violations by VA Regional Offices in her informal 

brief. However, the Veterans Court did not address any 

constitutional issues in its decision. Without an explana-
AUSTIN v. SHINSEKI 5

tion providing an adequate basis for Austin’s claims, they 

are constitutional claims in name only and thus outside of 

our jurisdiction. Helfer v. West, 174 F.3d 1332, 1335 (Fed. 

Cir. 1999) (finding invocation of a constitutional label 

does not establish jurisdiction).

We have considered Austin’s remaining arguments 

and conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decisions of the Veterans Court 

dismissing Austin’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and 

denying her petition for extraordinary relief.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.