UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

EDWARD M. HAMPTON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) 

v. ) No. 1:14 CV 379

)

JUDGE WILLIAM C. FEE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION and ORDER

Edward M. Hampton, a pro se prisoner, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(DE #1.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the complaint and

dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief. The court applies the same standard as when deciding a motion to dismiss under

FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th

Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal, a complaint must state a claim for relief that is

plausible on its face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir.

2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. at 603. The court must bear in mind that “[a] document filed

pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded,

must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Hampton’s lawsuit stems from a Steuben County criminal case in which he pled

guilty to possession of methamphetamine. Hampton complains that, although he made

it known that he wanted to proceed to trial without any continuances, the prosecutor,

the presiding judge and Hampton’s appointed public defender met and agreed to a

five-month continuance of the trial date. As a result of this continuance, Hampton

alleges his constitutional rights have been violated.

He first sues Judge William C. Fee, who presided over the case. Hampton’s

claim cannot proceed, because the judge is entitled to absolute immunity for his actions

taken in connection with Hampton’s criminal case. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359

(1978) (a judge is entitled to absolute immunity for judicial acts regarding matters

within his jurisdiction, even if the judge’s “exercise of authority is flawed by the

commission of grave procedural errors.”). This is true even if Hampton believes the

judge acted improperly; his remedy was through the state appellate process, not a civil

rights suit seeking damages. See id.

Hampton next sues his court-appointed public defender, who allegedly provided

ineffective assistance prior to and during trial, resulting in his conviction and

incarceration. This claim is also foreclosed. The United States Constitution only protects

against acts of defendants acting under color of state law, Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667,

670 (7th Cir. 2006), and the Supreme Court has held that “a public defender does not act

under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to

a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).

2
Furthermore, to the extent Hampton is seeking some type of order or relief declaring

that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated in the criminal case, he can only seek

such relief in a habeas action brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411

U.S. 475, 488 (1973) (habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who

challenges the fact or duration of his confinement). Accordingly, this claim must also be

dismissed.

Hampton also brings suit against the Steuben County prosecutor. Such a claim is

barred because the prosecutor has immunity for his actions taken in Hampton’s

criminal case. “[I]n initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case, the

prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983.” Imbler v. Pachtman,

424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). Accordingly, this claim must be dismissed as well.

As a final note, because Hampton has no plausible claim, his motion for

appointment of counsel [DE #3] is DENIED AS MOOT.

For these reasons, the court DISMISSES this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A. 

SO ORDERED.

Date: December 10, 2014

 s/ James T. Moody 

JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT