UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

STEVEN WRIGHTSMAN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CAUSE NO.: 3:15-CV-87-TLS

v. )

)

MARION THATCHER, and RON NEAL, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Steven Wrightsman, a pro se prisoner, filed a Complaint [ECF No. 1] under 42 U.S.C. §

1983, alleging a violation of his federal constitutional right to Equal Protection because he was

denied entry into the Honor Program at the Indiana State Prison due to his age. “A document

filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must

be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Nevertheless, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if

the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. “In order to state a

claim under § 1983 a plaintiff must allege: (1) that defendants deprived him of a federal

constitutional right; and (2) that the defendants acted under color of state law.” Savory v. Lyons,

469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006). Here, the Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the Defendants

are acting under color of state law, but he has not plausibly alleged the deprivation of a federal

constitutional right.

The Plaintiff states that the Honor Program confers special privileges on a select group of

prisoners. Such privileges include, in part, additional hours of non-confinement and visitation
rights, access to certain exercise equipment, and permission to purchase video games. Compl. ¶

5, ECF No. 1. He explains that to get into the program “the offender must be at least 35 years of

age” and “[t]here must be 24 months with no conduct reports, and 48 months with no conduct

reports involving violence.”1 Id. The Plaintiff attaches a form indicating that he was rejected

because of his age. Id., ECF No. 1-1. 

Although it is possible to raise an Equal Protection claim based on age discrimination,

“an age classification is presumptively rational.” Kimel v. Fl. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84

(2000). 

States may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth

Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a

legitimate state interest. The rationality commanded by the Equal Protection

Clause does not require States to match age distinctions and the legitimate

interests they serve with razorlike precision. As we have explained, when

conducting rational basis review we will not overturn such government action

unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the

achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude

that the government’s actions were irrational. 

***

Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a State may rely on age as a proxy for other qualities,

abilities, or characteristics that are relevant to the State’s legitimate interests. The

Constitution does not preclude reliance on such generalizations. That age proves to be an

inaccurate proxy in any individual case is irrelevant. Where rationality is the test, a State

does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by

its laws are imperfect. 

Id. at 83–84 (quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). In particular, “young age is quite

often relevant to valid state concerns, as the Constitution itself attests.” Hedgepeth ex rel.

Hedgepeth v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 386 F.3d 1148, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing

1

The Plaintiff notes, however, that although “the age requirement used to be 35 years to enter the program,”

the age requirement is now 30 years of age. Compl., n. 1. 

2
U.S. Const. art. I, § 2 (minimum age for House of Representatives); id. § 3 (minimum age for

Senate); id. art. II, § 1 (minimum age for President)).

Given that “a State may rely on age as a proxy for other qualities, abilities, or

characteristics,” Kimel, 528 U.S. at 84, age is permissibly used as a proxy for maturity in a

variety of areas, including voting, marriage, driving, alcohol consumption, and employment. As

such, the use of age as a proxy for maturity when determining admission into the Honor Program

would also be constitutionally permissible, particularly in the context of prison. Statistics show

that young inmates are generally less mature and more prone to criminal behavior. See, e.g.,

Howard N. Snyder, Arrest in the United States, 1990-2010, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau

of Justice Statistics, 3–12 (October 2012), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aus9010.pdf (only

18% of those arrested for murder were 40 or older; 23% for rape; 11% for robbery; 25% for

aggravated assault; 24% for simple assault; 14% for burglary; 20% for larceny-theft; 15% for

motor vehicle theft; 16% for weapons violations; and 18% for drug abuse violations.) Of course,

there are young inmates who are more mature and less prone to criminal behavior than older

inmates, but such an age generalization—like the age generalizations employed in the areas

noted above—is nevertheless rational. See Lauth v. McCollum, 424 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2005)

(“Governmental action only fails rational basis scrutiny if no sound reason for the action can be

hypothesized.”) Because the Plaintiff cannot overcome the presumption that the distinction

instituted for participation in the Honors Program is rationally related to a legitimate state

interest, a valid Equal Protection claim has not been alleged. 

In addition to his Complaint, the Plaintiff filed a Motion [ECF No. 4] seeking to certify

this case as a class action on behalf of every inmate at the Indiana State Prison, along with a

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Motion [ECF No. 3] for appointment of counsel. Because the Complaint does not state a valid

claim for relief, the Plaintiff cannot “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class,” Fed.

R. Civ. Proc. 23(a)(4). Furthermore, without a valid claim for relief, there is no basis for

appointment of counsel. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 

Finally, although it is usually necessary to permit a plaintiff the opportunity to file an

amended complaint when a case is dismissed sua sponte, see Luevano v. Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d

1014 (7th Cir. 2013), that is unnecessary where the amendment would be futile, Hukic v. Aurora

Loan Servs., 588 F.3d 420, 432 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[C]ourts have broad discretion to deny leave to

amend where . . . the amendment would be futile.”). Such is the case here. When the Plaintiff

applied for admission to the Honors Program, he was too young per the program’s stated

requirements. Because the age limit is a rational requirement which does not violate Equal

Protection, and there is no amendment that could change either the operative facts or law on

which this decision is based, the Court finds that it would be futile to permit the Plaintiff to file

an amended complaint. 

For the forgoing reasons, the Motions for class certification (ECF No. 4) and

appointment of counsel (ECF No. 3) are DENIED. This case is DISMISSED pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915A. 

SO ORDERED on April 28, 2015.

 s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

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