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NO. CAAP-23-0000388 

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS 

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I 

STATE OF HAWAI‘I, Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JONATHAN P. SPIES, Defendant-Appellant 

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

(CASE NO. 3CPC-21-0001004) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

(By: Leonard, Acting Chief Judge, Hiraoka and Nakasone, JJ.) 

 In this appeal of a first-degree promoting a dangerous 

drug (PDD1) conviction, Defendant-Appellant Jonathan P. Spies 

(Spies) challenges, inter alia, the admission of the drug 

analysis and testing over his foundation objection. Because the 

required foundation was not laid, the evidence was erroneously 

admitted, and we vacate and remand for a new trial. 

 Spies appeals from the June 9, 2023 "Judgment of 

Conviction and Sentence" (Judgment), entered by the Circuit 

Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-23-0000388

03-OCT-2024

08:12 AM

Dkt. 72 MO
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Court of the Third Circuit (Circuit Court),1 following a jury 

verdict finding him guilty as charged of PDD1, in violation of 

Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 712-1241(1)(a).2 The Circuit 

Court sentenced Spies to twenty years of imprisonment, and Spies 

timely appealed.

On appeal, Spies challenges the Circuit Court's 

(1) admission of the criminalist's testimony of the drug 

analysis and testing of the recovered substance for lack of 

foundation showing that, for each of the devices used to weigh 

and identify the substance, the criminalist had been trained in 

accordance with each device manufacturer's requirements; 

(2) denial of Spies's Motion to Dismiss due to defective 

charging; (3) determination that Spies's statement to a police 

officer was voluntarily made and admissible at trial; and 

(4) denial of Spies's multiple motions to suppress the evidence 

of the recovered substance.3 We vacate and remand on the first 

point of error as it is dispositive. To provide guidance on 

remand, we affirm as to the remaining points.

 

1 The Honorable Robert D.S. Kim presided.

2 HRS § 712-1241(1)(a)(i) and (2) (2014 & 2016 Supp.) provide that 

possession of one ounce or more of methamphetamine constitutes the Class A 

felony offense of PDD1. The Indictment charged that on or about February 14-

15, 2021, Spies committed PDD1 by "knowingly possess[ing] . . . substances of 

an aggregate weight of one ounce or more, containing methamphetamine[.]" The 

lab analysis evidence at trial reflected that the substance weighed "33.929 

plus or minus .07" grams and contained methamphetamine.

3 We have consolidated, reordered, and restated Spies's eight 

points of error for clarity.
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I. BACKGROUND

On February 14, 2021, Spies was the target of a 

narcotics investigation by the Hawai‘i County Police Department 

(HIPD), which had obtained search warrants of Spies's residence 

and his person, based on Spies's sale of heroin to an informant 

at his home. HIPD conducted a traffic stop of Spies, who was 

driving a vehicle. After HIPD executed the search warrant for 

Spies's person that turned up nothing, the police asked Spies

for consent to search his vehicle, and Spies responded that what 

the police were seeking was in his vehicle. HIPD seized the 

vehicle and towed it to the police station; conducted a canine 

screen of the vehicle resulting in a positive alert; obtained a

search warrant for the vehicle based, inter alia, on the canine 

screen; executed the search warrant for the vehicle; and 

recovered multiple Ziploc packets of a crystalline substance 

alleged to be methamphetamine from a black zippered pouch with a 

checkbook inside, bearing Spies's name.

Pertinent to the dispositive issue on appeal, Spies 

filed a February 20, 2023 "First Motion in Limine Re: 

Foundational Requirements for Laboratory Test Results" (Motion 

in Limine 1) that objected to the introduction of any laboratory 

test results of the substance, absent a sufficient showing of 

foundation regarding the laboratory technician's training; and

argued that the State must show the operator of the drug testing 

device had "expert training in accordance with manufacturer's 

requirements." The Circuit Court denied Motion in Limine 1

without prejudice, and held that it "must look through and 

determine point by point the qualifications of the expert and 

the results of the expert report." 
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At the March 29-30, 2023 jury trial, the State called 

Criminalist Sophia Schiefelbein (Schiefelbein) to testify to the 

drug analysis and testing she conducted on the substance. 

Schiefelbein testified to her qualifications, and the State 

proffered her as an "expert in the field of controlled substance 

analysis and identification." Spies objected, and conducted 

voir dire of Schiefelbein's qualifications, asking Schiefelbein 

about the "number of jobs" she has held that do not have 

"anything to do with narcotics testing, identification or 

controlled substance analysis"; and her length of training for 

the devices she used for laboratory testing in this case. 

Schiefelbein testified that she was trained at the police 

station; the training course for the balances was less than a 

day; the Fourier Transform Infrared spectrometer (FTIR) training 

was "approximately a month and a half"; and the ultraviolet (UV) 

spectrometer training was "probably like whole weeks [sic]." 

Over Spies's renewed objection, the Circuit Court found 

Schiefelbein to be "an expert in the area of controlled 

substances and analysis based upon her knowledge, skill, 

experience and training and her qualifications in the courts of 

the State of Hawai‘i." 

Schiefelbein then described how she conducted the drug 

analysis, and testified that the results of the drug analysis of 

the "10 packets" was "[t]hat the presence of methamphetamine was 

confirmed" and the total net weight of the substance was "33.929 

plus or minus .07" grams. Spies objected "as to foundation" 

pursuant to "Motion in Limine 1."4 Schiefelbein's March 5, 2021 

4 Spies objected to the substance weight and identification 

evidence as follows:
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"Official Report [HIPD] Crime Lab" summarizing these findings 

and test results was also admitted over Spies's lack of 

foundation objection.5

Regarding the devices used in her analysis and 

testing, Schiefelbein's report indicated that she measured the 

weight with a "Sartorius MSA1203S balance" (Sartorius balance),

and she testified that the substance was identified by using the 

UV spectrometer manufactured by "Agilent" (Agilent UV 

spectrometer), and the FTIR manufactured by "Thermo Scientific" 

(Thermo Scientific FTIR). On cross-examination by Spies's 

counsel regarding her training for the Sartorius balance, 

Agilent UV spectrometer, and the Thermo Scientific FTIR, 

Schiefelbein testified that she was trained by someone at the 

Q. [(BY PROSECUTOR)] And what was your 

interpretation of the analysis?

A. [(BY SCHIEFELBEIN)] That the presence of 

methamphetamine was confirmed. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And I'll object as to 

foundation per Motion in Limine 1.

THE COURT: Overruled.

Q. (By [PROSECUTOR]) And what was the total net 

weight?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, again I object 

as to foundation in accordance to [sic] Motion in Limine 1.

THE COURT: Overruled.

[SCHIEFELBEIN]: Um, 33.929 plus or minus .07.

Q. (By [PROSECUTOR]) Is that in grams?

A. Yes.

5 Only page one of Schiefelbein's two-page report was admitted into 

evidence.
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police station, and had not received training from each device 

manufacturer, or any certification or accreditation that she had 

received training in accordance with each device manufacturer's 

requirements.6 On redirect examination, Schiefelbein explained

6 Schiefelbein testified as follows:

Q. [(BY DEFENSE COUNSEL)] Had you ever received 

any training from someone from Sartorius?

A. [(BY SCHIEFELBEIN)] No.

Q. Any training you received on that Sartorius 

machine came from someone at the police station?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Did you ever receive any, um,

certification or accreditation or any sort of confirmation 

that you have received training in accordance with the 

manufacturer's requirements for that machine?

A. No.

. . . .

Q. Agilent? Have you ever received any training 

from someone at Agilent?

A. For [(gas chromatograph mass spectrometer)] but 

not UV.

Q. Thank you. Thank you for clarifying. With 

respect to this machine have you ever received any, uh, 

training from someone at Agilent?

A. No.

Q. Any training you received was from someone at 

the police station?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you ever receive any certification or

accreditation, uh, indicating that you were trained in

accordance with, uh, Agilent's procedures?

A. No.
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that the "crime lab manager" who trained and supervised her, 

Kathy Pung, "was trained by people from Thermo Scientific," as 

follows: "Kathy Pung was trained by people from Thermo 

Scientific, and we have the manuals from the Thermo Scientific 

themselves [sic] that are then used to write our procedures 

which are accredited." When asked "did you run the FTIR in 

conformance with the manufacturer's recommendation?", 

Schiefelbein responded "Yes."7 No other pertinent testimony 

regarding each device manufacturer's training requirements 

appears in the record. 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Sufficiency of Foundation for the Admission of 

Scientific Evidence

The determination of whether the necessary foundation 

for the introduction of evidence has been established is within 

Q. And the FTIR machine [sic] who's the

manufacturer?

A. Uh, Thermo Scientific.

Q. Did you ever receive any training from someone 

at Thermo Scientific?

A. No.

Q. All the training you received was from someone 

at the police station?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you ever receive any, um, certification 

or accreditation certificate saying that you have been, uh, 

trained in accordance with Thermo Scientific, uh, policies?

A. No.

7 This question specifically asked whether Schiefelbein operated

the FTIR "in conformance with the manufacturer's recommendation," which is 

distinct from whether Schiefelbein herself was trained in accordance with the 

manufacturer's requirements, which is at issue in this case. 
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the discretion of the trial court, and "will not be overturned 

absent a showing of clear abuse." State v. Subia, 139 Hawai‘i 

62, 66, 383 P.3d 1200, 1204 (2016) (citation omitted). 

B. Motion to Dismiss 

 "A trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss an 

indictment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. 

Metcalfe, 129 Hawai‘i 206, 222, 297 P.3d 1062, 1078 (2013) 

(cleaned up). 

C. Motion to Determine Voluntariness 

 We review the ultimate issue of the voluntariness of a 

defendant's statement or confession de novo. State v. Baker, 

147 Hawai‘i 413, 422, 465 P.3d 860, 869 (2020). 

D. Motion to Suppress Evidence 

 "An appellate court reviews a ruling on a motion to 

suppress de novo to determine whether the ruling was right or 

wrong." State v. Hewitt, 153 Hawai‘i 33, 40, 526 P.3d 558, 565 

(2023) (cleaned up). Determinations of probable cause are 

reviewed de novo on appeal. State v. Navas, 81 Hawai‘i 113, 122-

23, 913 P.2d 39, 48-49 (1996). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. The foundation for Schiefelbein's expert 

qualification was deficient8 where the record did 

not reflect that her training to operate the three 

devices used to weigh and identify the substance 

was in accordance with each device manufacturer's 

requirements. 

 Spies argues that the foundation for admission of the 

"scientific readings" on the weight and identity of the 

8 We do not address Spies's argument that "reliability for the 

laboratory and the devices utilized were not shown" because the documents and 

testimony at trial for laboratory accreditation and device calibration were 
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substance was "deficient" because "(1) [t]he State failed to 

show that [] Schiefelbein received training in accordance with 

the manufacturer's requirements for the three devices utilized 

to test the weight and substance identification in this case"; 

and "(2) [t]he State failed to show what the manufacturer's 

required training is for either of the three devices[.]" Spies 

asserts that the required foundation in this case of "training 

in accordance with the manufacturer's requirements" was not met 

for the three devices at issue here, as follows: (1) the 

Sartorius balance used to weigh the substance lacked foundation 

because "[n]o testimony or evidence was provided as to what 

Sartorious's [sic] training requirements are, and whether 

anybody at the police station who was conducting training knew 

of these requirements"; (2) the UV spectrometer manufactured by 

Agilent, used to identify the substance, lacked foundation 

because "[n]o testimony or evidence was provided as to what 

Agilent's training requirements are, and whether anybody at the 

police station who was conducting training knew of these 

dated after the March 2021 drug testing date (testing date argument). The 

point of error maintains that all of Spies's foundation objections were 

preserved in Motion in Limine 1, but the testing date argument does not 

appear there. See State v. Moses, 102 Hawai‘i 449, 456, 77 P.3d 940, 947 

(2003) ("As a general rule, if a party does not raise an argument at trial, 

that argument will be deemed to have been waived on appeal[.]"). The docket 

cites provided in the point reflect Spies's counsel's questioning on device 

calibration dates and laboratory accreditation dates, but no testing date 

argument was made below. The docket cites show Spies objected to device 

calibration and laboratory accreditation exhibits citing "Motion in Limine 

Number 1," which as we have noted, did not contain the testing date argument. 

See id.; State v. Wallace, 80 Hawai‘i 382, 410, 910 P.2d 695, 723 (1996) 

(holding that "issue of the accuracy of the scale" was "waived" in a PDD1 

case, where the defenses's trial objection to "testimony regarding the gross 

weight of the cocaine did not challenge the accuracy of the certified gram 

scale"); Haw. Ventures, LLC v. Otaka, Inc., 114 Hawai‘i 438, 500, 164 P.3d 

696, 758 (2007) ("It is unfair to the circuit court to reverse on a ground 

that no one even suggested might be error." (citation omitted)). 
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requirements"; and (3) the FTIR manufactured by Thermo 

Scientific, also used to identify the substance, lacked 

foundation because "[n]o testimony or evidence was provided as 

to what Thermo Scientific's training requirements are, and 

whether anybody at the police station who was conducting 

training knew of these requirements." 

 Spies relies on the laser gun foundation cases of 

State v. Assaye, 121 Hawai‘i 204, 216 P.3d 1227 (2009), State v. 

Amiral, 132 Hawai‘i 170, 319 P.3d 1178 (2014),9 and the drug 

foundation case of State v. Manewa, 115 Hawai‘i 343, 167 P.3d 336 

(2007),10 to argue that: Manewa held "the foundation of the 

expert's training for a scale to weigh drugs was . . . 

deficient"; and that the foundation to qualify an expert must 

include training in accordance with the device manufacturer's 

requirements, as set forth in Amiral, that "the prosecution is 

9 In Assaye, the supreme court held that the prosecution failed to 

provide "sufficient foundation for the admission of [the officer's] testimony 

regarding the speed reading given by his laser gun" because the prosecution 

did not show whether the officer's training met the laser gun manufacturer's 

requirements, and reversed Assaye's speeding conviction. 121 Hawai‘i at 216, 

216 P.3d at 1239.

 In Amiral, the supreme court held that the officer's testimony 

was insufficient to establish that his laser gun training met the 

manufacturer's requirements; and the prosecution "failed to lay an adequate 

foundation for the introduction of the laser gun reading"; and thus vacated 

the judgment and remanded to district court for further proceedings. 132 

Hawai‘i at 179-80, 319 P.3d at 1187-88. 

10 In Manewa, the supreme court vacated Manewa's convictions for 

first-degree and second-degree promoting a dangerous drug, and held that 

testimony as to the weight of methamphetamine was inadmissible for lack of 

foundation as to the accuracy of the balance because the record "fail[ed] to 

show that there was a manufacturer's accepted procedure for the user of the 

balance to implement to ensure the balance was in working order." 115 Hawai‘i 

at 357-58, 167 P.3d at 350-51. 
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required to produce evidence that the nature and extent of an 

officer's training in the operation of the laser gun meets the 

requirements indicated by the manufacturer." Opening Brief at 

21 (quoting Amiral, 132 Hawai‘i at 178, 319 P.3d at 1186 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Spies's argument has 

merit.11 

 Hawaii Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 702 permits "a 

witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 

training, or education" to testify to "assist the trier of fact 

to determine a fact in issue[.]" "[B]efore the result of a test 

. . . may be introduced into evidence, a foundation must be laid 

showing that the test result can be relied on as a substantive 

fact." Subia, 139 Hawai‘i at 66, 383 P.3d at 1204 (citing 

Wallace, 80 Hawai‘i at 407, 910 P.2d at 720). "A proper 

foundation for introducing a test result would necessarily 

include expert testimony regarding: (1) the qualifications of 

the expert; (2) whether the expert employed valid techniques to 

obtain the test result; and (3) whether the measuring instrument 

is in proper working order." Id. (cleaned up). 

 In Amiral, the supreme court explained that to admit a 

laser gun reading, the prosecution must establish how the laser 

gun operator's training met the requirements of the laser gun 

manufacturer, and that the operator received such training, as 

follows: 

11 The State does not address Spies's argument that training in 

accordance with the device manufacturer's requirements is a necessary part of 

the foundation to qualify Schiefelbein, and only argues that Spies waived 

this argument on appeal by "not rais[ing] the qualifications of Schiefelbein 

as a point of error." This is inaccurate because Spies raises the challenge 

in his first point of error.
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In order to establish a sufficient foundation for the 

admission of a speed reading from a laser gun, the 

prosecution is required to produce evidence that the nature 

and extent of an officer's training in the operation of the 

laser gun meets the requirements indicated by the 

manufacturer. To meet this burden the prosecution must 

establish both (1) the requirements indicated by the 

manufacturer, and (2) the training actually received by the 

operator of the laser gun. 

132 Hawai‘i at 178, 319 P.3d at 1186 (cleaned up). Because there 

was no foundation reflecting the manufacturer's training 

requirements for the laser gun operator in that case, the trial 

court erred in admitting the speed reading from the laser gun 

into evidence. Id. at 179, 319 P.3d at 1187. 

 The Hawaii Rules of Evidence Manual (HRE Manual) 

similarly explains that a proper foundation for admission of a 

test result from a scientific device includes a showing that the 

operator of the device is a "qualified expert," which is met by 

showing that the expert's training is in accordance with the 

device manufacturer's requirements, as follows: 

Assuming judicial approval of the general reliability of a 

scientific machine, admissibility in any particular case 

will depend upon "a foundation . . . showing that the test 

result can be relied on as a substantive fact." State v. 

Subia, 139 Hawaii [sic] 62, 66, 383 P.3d 1200, 1204 (2016) 

(infrared spectrometer used to detect that a substance 

contained methamphetamine). A proper foundation for such a 

test result, according to Subia, would include (1) a 

qualified expert (2) employing "valid techniques" to obtain 

the test result (3) from a machine shown to be in "proper 

working order." Id. That the operator is a "qualified 

expert" means that her training "meets the requirements 

indicated by the manufacturer of the device." State v. 

Assaye, 121 Hawaii [sic] 204, 216 P.3d 1227 (2009) (laser 

speed gun). That the operator used valid techniques means 

she followed procedures recommended by the manufacturer of 

the device. Id.

Addison M. Bowman, Hawaii Rules of Evidence Manual § 702-

2[5][C], at 7-22 (2024-2025 ed.) (emphases added). In 

accordance with the above, the State in this case had to show 
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that Schiefelbein was trained in accordance with the 

manufacturer's requirements for the three devices used to 

analyze and test the substance, to establish foundation that 

Schiefelbein was a "qualified expert" through whom the evidence 

of drug identity and weight could be admitted "as a substantive 

fact." See Subia, 139 Hawai‘i at 66, 383 P.3d at 1204; Amiral, 

132 Hawai‘i at 178, 319 P.3d at 1186; Bowman, Hawaii Rules of 

Evidence Manual, § 702-2[5][C], at 7-22. 

 Here, Schiefelbein testified that she was trained by 

HIPD. She denied being trained by representatives from the 

manufacturers of the three devices she used to analyze the 

identity and weight of the recovered substance. The record does 

not reflect whether HIPD's training was in accordance with each 

device manufacturer's requirements, or what the manufacturer's 

training requirements were for each respective device--the 

Sartorius balance used to calculate the weight of the substance, 

the Agilent UV spectrometer used to identify the substance, and 

the Thermo Scientific FTIR also used to identify the substance. 

See Amiral, 132 Hawai‘i at 178, 319 P.3d at 1186. Thus, the 

State did not lay sufficient foundation to show Schiefelbein's 

qualifications to operate the three devices used to determine 

the identification and weight of the recovered substance. On 

this record, we conclude the Circuit Court acted outside its 

discretion by admitting Schiefelbein's testimony regarding the 

identity of the substance as methamphetamine and the total net 

weight of the substance as 33.929 grams (i.e., over one ounce or 

28.35 grams), as substantive facts. See Subia, 139 Hawai‘i at 

66, 383 P.3d at 1204. 
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 Because such evidence was critical to establishing 

Spies's PDD1 conviction, the erroneous admission of the drug 

analysis and test results from the Sartorius balance, Agilent UV 

spectrometer, and the Thermo Scientific FTIR through 

Schiefelbein's testimony was not harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt. We thus vacate and remand for a new trial. See Subia, 

139 Hawai‘i at 63, 383 P.3d at 1201 (vacating and remanding for a 

new trial in a methamphetamine trafficking case, where the 

admission of the criminalist's testimony regarding the FTIR test 

result that the substance contained methamphetamine lacked 

foundation and was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); 

State v. Long, 98 Hawai‘i 348, 355-56, 48 P.3d 595, 602-03 (2002) 

(vacating and remanding for a new trial in a third-degree 

promoting of a dangerous drug case, where the admission of the 

criminalist's testimony regarding the FTIR test result that the 

substance contained cocaine lacked foundation and was not 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). 

B. The denial of Spies's Motion to Dismiss was not an 

abuse of discretion. 

 Spies argues that the Circuit Court erroneously denied 

his Motion to Dismiss the charge as "fatally defective" for 

failure to include the legal definition of the term "possess," 

which "is more detailed, nuanced, and limited than what a person 

of common understanding would understand the word 'possess' to 

mean." 

 "Whether a charge sets forth all the essential 

elements of a charged offense is a question of law, which we 

review under the de novo, or right/wrong, standard." State v. 

Wheeler, 121 Hawai‘i 383, 390, 219 P.3d 1170, 1177 (2009) 
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(cleaned up). "[W]here the statute sets forth with reasonable 

clarity all essential elements of the crime intended to be 

punished, and fully defines the offense in unmistakable terms 

readily comprehensible to persons of common understanding, a 

charge drawn in the language of the statute is sufficient." 

State v. Basnet, 131 Hawai‘i 286, 298, 318 P.3d 126, 138 (2013) 

(citations omitted). 

 Here, the term "possess" is "readily comprehensible to 

a person of common understanding[.]" See id. at 298-99, 318 

P.3d at 138-39 (holding that the terms "family or household 

member" and "physical abuse" are "readily understandable" and 

need not be defined in the charge). Knowingly possessing a 

substance containing methamphetamine with an aggregate weight of 

one ounce or more is language sufficient to provide notice to 

Spies. The Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying the motion to dismiss. See Metcalfe, 129 Hawai‘i at 222, 

297 P.3d at 1078. 

C. The determination that Spies's statement was 

voluntary and thus admissible at trial was not 

erroneous. 

Spies argues that the Circuit Court erred by admitting 

his statement at trial, "Everything that you guys are looking 

for is in there[,]"12 as voluntary because Spies was subject to 

12 At trial, HIPD Officer Justin Gaspar (Officer Gaspar) testified 

in pertinent part that:

Q. [(BY PROSECUTOR)] And when you came in contact 

with, uh, [Spies] did you request consent to search the 

vehicle, uh, that was near him?

A. [(BY OFFICER GASPAR)] Yes.

Q. Now, upon doing so was there any response that 

was initially uttered by [Spies]? 
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custodial interrogation. [OB at 5-6] Spies claims that: 

"[A]sking to search a vehicle in the context of execution of a 

search warrant for narcotics has a reasonable likelihood of 

eliciting an incriminating response and is interrogation."

 The Circuit Court's unchallenged13 findings of fact 

(FOFs) from the "Order Re: State's Motion to Determine the 

Voluntariness of Defendant's Statements" reflect that: when the 

officers conducted a traffic stop of Spies's vehicle on February 

14, 2021, the police had a search warrant to search Spies's 

person and his home; Spies was seen "walking out of the driver's 

side door" of the vehicle after the stop; Officer Gaspar 

informed Spies of the warrant for the search of Spies's person 

and conducted the search of Spies's person, pockets and 

clothing, but does not locate anything; based on Officer 

Gaspar's training, experience, and investigations, Officer 

Gaspar knew that distributors of controlled substances would 

commonly keep the substance "on or near their person"; Officer 

Gaspar asked Spies for consent to search articles in the vehicle 

that Spies was observed in at the time of the stop; and Spies 

stated "Its [sic] all in there." 

 In its Conclusion of Law (COL) 21, the Circuit Court 

correctly concluded, inter alia, citing State v. Rippe, 119 

A. Yes.

 

Q. And what was that?

A. Uh, "Everything that you guys are looking for 

is in there."

13 "It is well-established that . . . unchallenged findings of fact 

are binding upon appellate courts." State v. Rodrigues, 145 Hawai‘i 487, 497, 

454 P.3d 428, 438 (2019) (citation omitted). 
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Hawai‘i 15, 22-24, 193 P.3d 1215, 1222-24 (App. 2008), that "[a] 

request for consent to search the vehicle, without more, is not 

interrogation." In Rippe, this court held that a "request for 

consent to search [a] nylon bag did not constitute 

interrogation" if "there was no prior custodial interrogation," 

as it only "required a simple 'yes-or-no' answer" and "was not 

the type of question reasonably likely to elicit an 

incriminating response." Id. Spies does not claim, and the 

record does not reflect, that any interrogation occurred before 

Officer Gaspar asked for consent to search Spies's vehicle. 

Additionally, similar to Rippe, Officer Gaspar's request 

"required a simple 'yes-or-no' answer[.]" Id. at 24, 193 P.3d 

at 1224. Thus, Officer Gaspar's request "was not the type of 

question reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response" 

and did not constitute "interrogation." Id. The Circuit Court 

did not err in admitting Spies's statement at trial. See Baker, 

147 Hawaiʻi at 422, 465 P.3d at 869. 

D. The denial of Spies's multiple Motions to Suppress 

the substance recovered from the vehicle was not 

an abuse of discretion. 

 Search warrant for Spies's person. While Spies 

acknowledges that the probable cause affidavit referenced "a 

controlled narcotics transaction was conducted in the residence 

of [Spies]" that supported probable cause for a search warrant 

for Spies's residence, Spies claims there was "no basis" for "a 

second separate warrant" "to search [Spies]'s person even when 

not at his residence." Spies argues that the Circuit Court thus 

erred by denying his "3rd" Motion to Suppress. 

 Here, the Circuit Court's order denying this motion 

contained unchallenged findings and conclusions that: "the 
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informant related that he/she has known [Spies] to be in 

possession of heroin in the last 72 hours, not that he/she only 

knows [Spies] to possess narcotics in the home"; "[t]he 

controlled purchased [sic] proved the reliability of the 

statement offered by [Spies]"; "the officer describes in his 

training he has been taught that distributors will use vehicles 

to facilitate the transaction and . . . that currency and 

narcotics will be near or around the distributor"; and "[t]he 

common-sense review of the affidavit to include how distributors 

work and what the informant relayed to officers establishes 

sufficient basis for the warrant for the person of Spies." The 

Circuit Court's denial of this Motion to Suppress and its 

determination that probable cause existed for a warrant to 

search Spies's person were correct. See Hewitt, 153 Hawai‘i at 

40, 526 P.3d at 565; Navas, 81 Hawai‘i at 122-23, 913 P.2d at 

48-49. 

 Spies's detention and warrantless seizure of his 

vehicle. Spies argues the Circuit Court erred by denying his 

"4th" Motion to Suppress because the "prolonged detention" after 

the search of Spies's person turned up nothing was unjustified; 

and the "continued detention of asking to search the vehicle 

[wa]s a violation of [Spies]'s rights." 

 Here, the Circuit Court's order denying this motion 

contained unchallenged findings and conclusions that prolonging 

Spies's detention after the execution of the search warrant of 

Spies's person was justified because Officer Gaspar knew the 

search warrant of Spies's person was based on Spies's alleged 

heroin distribution; the search warrant of Spies's person turned 

up no controlled substances; Spies had come out of the driver's 
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19 

seat of the vehicle; Spies said "Its [sic] all in there" when 

Officer Gaspar asked to search the vehicle; and thus, "Officer 

Gaspar had probable cause to be believe [sic] that the 

contraband and evidence would be located within the vehicle 

which [Spies] was found in just prior to the execution of the 

warrant on [sic] his person." The Circuit Court also made 

unchallenged factual-legal determinations that the seizure of 

the vehicle was justified under the exigent circumstances and 

automobile exceptions to the warrant requirement where "[t]he 

car was exposed to public view[,]" posing "a foreseeable risk 

that the evidence it sheltered might be removed before a warrant 

could be sought some hours later"; automobiles, because of their 

mobility, "'may be treated less stringently than a private 

residence for the Fourth Amendment purposes'" under State v. 

Elliott, 61 Haw. 492, 496, 605 P.2d 930, 933 (1980); and the 

"officers had no assurance that if the vehicle was left 

unattended, persons not in custody would not be able to gain 

access to it or to the contraband which it contained." Given 

this record, the Circuit Court did not err in denying the Motion 

to Suppress on this basis. See Hewitt, 153 Hawai‘i at 40, 526 

P.3d at 565. 

 Canine screen and warrant to search the vehicle. 

Spies argues the Circuit Court erred by denying his "5th and 

6th" Motions to Suppress the alleged drugs where (1) the canine 

screen was an unconstitutional intrusion of his vehicle with a 

"search enhancement device"; and (2) the probable cause 

affidavit omitted the fact that canine Rory did not train with 

"negative control samples" and did not provide "sufficient 

detail of [canine] Rory's alert." 
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20 

 Here, the Circuit Court's orders denying these motions 

contained unchallenged factual-legal determinations that the 

canine screen was permissible and the probable cause affidavit 

was sufficient, as follows: Spies told the officers "Its [sic] 

all in there"; Spies said "It's in the black wallet" and 

referred to the center console of the vehicle from which he had 

exited; "[t]he request for consent to search the truck and the 

dog sniff conducted on the truck were reasonably related in 

scope" to the officers' initial stop of Spies; "[t]he use of the 

canine screen was related to this drug investigation and came 

after [Spies] stated vaguely it is all in there"; "the officers 

had conducted an arrest of [Spies] and a seizure of his vehicle 

prior to the canine screen in this case"; "[t]he canine screen 

took place at the police station while the vehicle was in police 

custody"; there was "no search" resulting from the canine screen 

under State v. Groves, 65 Haw. 104, 112, 649 P.2d 366, 372 

(1982)14 because "[s]imilar to luggage, people normally possess 

an expectation of privacy in a car but not in the airspace 

surrounding it"; the HIPD canine screening officer and canine 

Rory "were fully qualified at the time of the screen" consistent 

with Groves;15 and their "qualifications were attached to the 

affidavit in support of the search warrant." On this record, 

14 The Groves court held that "there can be no reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the airspace surrounding a person's luggage." 

65 Haw. at 112, 649 P.2d at 372 (citations committed). 

15 In Groves, the supreme court required a narcotics-sniffing dog 

and handler to "be fully qualified[,]" 65 Haw. at 114, 649 P.2d at 373, 

meaning "officers and dogs who have participated in established drug 

enforcement programs." Id. at 114 n.6, 649 P.2d at 373 n.6. The Groves

court held that "[w]hen these requirements are met, the results of a 'dogsniff' can be brought . . . in an application for a search warrant." Id. at 

114, 649 P.2d at 373.
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21 

the Circuit Court did not err in denying these Motions to 

Suppress. See Hewitt, 153 Hawai‘i at 40, 526 P.3d at 565. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the June 9, 2023 

"Judgment of Conviction and Sentence," entered by the Circuit 

Court of the Third Circuit, and remand for a new trial based on 

the first dispositive point of error. We affirm as to all other 

grounds raised. 

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai‘i, October 3, 2024. 

On the briefs:

Andrew M. Kennedy, 

for Defendant-Appellant. 

Stephen L. Frye, 

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, 

for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

/s/ Katherine G. Leonard 

Acting Chief Judge 

/s/ Keith K. Hiraoka 

Associate Judge 

/s/ Karen T. Nakasone 

Associate Judge