UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

HILLARD ELAM,

 Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO.: 2:15-CV-287-TLS

THE STATE OF INDIANA, by and through 

the INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS and the WESTVILLE 

CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, CORIZON 

HEALTH, INC., DR. MICHAEL 

MITCHEFF, DR. ANDREW LIAW, D. 

CAMPBELL, RN, DEBBIE REEGER, and 

D. GOFFLIES,

 Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

[ECF No. 97] on certain claims in the Second Amended Complaint [ECF No. 69]. Plaintiff 

Hillard Elam timely responded to the Motion [ECF No. 102], and the Defendants timely replied 

[ECF No. 105]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS summary judgment on the 

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim, relinquishes jurisdiction of the state law claims, and REMANDS this 

case to LaPorte Circuit Court. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Defendants argue in their Reply that the Plaintiff failed to comply with Local Rules, 

and summary judgment should be granted on that basis. See Defs.’ Reply 2–3, ECF No. 105. 

However, the Plaintiff’s Affidavit [ECF No. 104], filed with his Response, serves much the same 

function and mimics what the Defendants themselves did to present their undisputed facts. Cf. 

App., ECF No. 99, with Aff., ECF No. 104. The Plaintiff has sufficiently presented his factual 

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contentions such that they will be considered. See Ind. L.R. 56-1(a) (“The brief supporting a 

summary-judgment motion or the brief’s appendix must include a section labeled “Statement of 

Material Facts” that identifies the facts that the moving party contends are not genuinely 

disputed.”) (emphasis added); id. 56-1(b)(2) (“The response brief or its appendix must include a 

section labeled ‘Statement of Genuine Disputes’ that identifies the material facts that the party 

contends are genuinely disputed so as to make a trial necessary.”) (emphasis added); see also Dr. 

Robert L. Meinders, D.C., Ltd. v. UnitedHealthcare, Inc., 800 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 2015) 

(“District courts are entitled to ‘considerable discretion in interpreting and applying their local 

rules.’” (quoting Cuevas v. United States, 317 F.3d 751, 752 (7th Cir. 2003))). However, the 

Plaintiff has only presented facts related to one medical issue: his rash. The Defendants have 

provided undisputed facts related to the other medical issues presented in the Plaintiff’s Second 

Amended Complaint as a basis for the Eighth Amendment claim, as well as legal argument 

supporting summary judgment in favor of the Defendants as to those medical issues. The 

Plaintiff has not contested these facts or conclusions, and it is not the Court’s job to do so for 

him; the undisputed facts do not present a genuine issue of material fact, and so those factual 

theories do not present a § 1983 claim which survives summary judgment.

1 Ormsby v. Nexus 

RVs, LLC, No. 3:19-CV-626 DRL-MGG, 2020 WL 2041754, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 28, 2020)

(citations omitted); see also Strahan v. Bowen Ctr., 240 F. Supp. 3d 926, 936 (N.D. Ind. 2017). 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Indiana Department of Corrections, Westville 

Community Correction Facility (“Westville”) from February 4, 2013, until August 7, 2013. See 

1 The undisputed facts establish that Defendant D. Gofflies, apparently Nurse Debra Goff-Ellis, only saw 

the Plaintiff in connection with his shoulder injury. See Affidavit of Debra Goff-Ellis, Ex. G, ECF No. 

99-7. As that treatment is no longer at issue in the case, Defendant Goff-Ellis’ conduct is also not at issue, 

and so will not be discussed.

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Pl.’s Aff. ¶ 2, ECF No. 104. While incarcerated at Westville, he experienced what he believed to 

be a bite from an insect or other pest, which led to a painful rash on his finger and wrist. Id. at 

¶ 3. 

On March 11, 2013, he requested medical care for the problem, noting he believed an 

infection was responsible. Id.; see also Pl.’s Ex. A, Request for Healthcare, ECF No. 104-1. The 

Plaintiff was scheduled to be seen on March 14, 2013, but did not appear at the appointment. See 

App. to Defs.’ Br. in Support of Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. H, Medical Records pgs. 201-400, 399-

400, ECF No. 99-9. Upon a second request, see Pl.’s Ex. B, Request for Healthcare, ECF No. 

104-2, the Plaintiff was seen on March 15, 2013 by Katherine Hutchinson, LPN. See Defs.’ Ex.

H, Medical Records pgs. 201-400, 387–90. At that time, the rash was assumed to be from 

Tegretol, one of the plaintiff’s medications (“ever since i started taking the medication ive gotten 

this rash”), id. at 389; the Plaintiff was prescribed acetaminophen, and the doctor substituted 

Naprosyn for Tegretol, id. at 391.

On March 24, 2013, the Plaintiff again submitted a request for medical assistance with 

the rash. See Pl.’s Ex., Request for Healthcare, ECF No. 104-3. The Plaintiff was apparently not 

seen and was instead instructed to continue using the Temovate topical cream he had been 

prescribed in February. Id. The Plaintiff was seen several times over the next week or so for 

unrelated complaints; on April 3, 2013, Nurse Hutchinson noted an alteration in the Plaintiff’s 

skin integrity, specifically a “pruritic, peeling, cracking of the skin; erythemic area with short 

well defined slightly raised border,” but no evidence of infection and a history of psoriasis. See 

Defs.’ Ex. H, Medical Records pgs. 201-400, 372. On April 5, 2013, the Plaintiff was seen by 

Defendant Andrew Liaw, MD, again for various unrelated complaints, see generally Defs.’ Ex.

H, Medical Records pgs. 201-400, 356-64; the Plaintiff noted in his next request regarding his 

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rash, on April 8, 2013, that the doctor “was going to schedule me for a shot for the rash.” See

Pl.’s Ex. D, Request for Healthcare, ECF No. 104-4. However, the medical staff, without seeing 

the Plaintiff, responded that no shot had been ordered. Id.

The Plaintiff’s next request that notes the rash is April 11, 2013, see Pl.’s Ex. E, Request 

for Healthcare, ECF No. 104-5; the Plaintiff had an appointment on April 12, 2013, to substitute 

his wheelchair, but did not appear for the appointment, see Defs.’ Ex. H, Medical Records pgs. 

201-400, 351. The Plaintiff again submitted a request for medical attention on April 15, 2013, 

again mentioning the doctor ordering a shot. See Pl.’s Ex. F, Request for Healthcare, ECF No. 

104-6. The medical staff again responded that no “shot” had been ordered, without seeing the 

Plaintiff, though he was seen on April 19, 2013, and signed the receipt for a new wheelchair. Id.; 

Defs.’ Ex. H, Medical Records pgs. 201-400, 345. On April 20, 2013, the Plaintiff again 

submitted a request, see Pl.’s Ex. G, Request for Healthcare, ECF No. 104-7; on April 23, 2013, 

Diamond Campbell, RN, reviewed the request and noted the Plaintiff had been seen on April 22, 

2013, about psoriasis, see Defs.’ Ex. H, Medical Records pgs. 201-400, 338. On April 26, 2013, 

Dr. Andrew Liaw ordered the Plaintiff sent to urgent care and that, if normotensive and psoriatic 

plaques were present, he could be given a full dose of Solu-Medrol. Id. at 336. 

On April 29, 2013, the Plaintiff again requested assistance with the rash; on May 2, 2013, 

medical staff2responded that the cream he had been using was reordered and to address the issue 

at his chronic care appointment. See Pl.’s Ex. H, Request for Healthcare, ECF No. 104-8. On 

May 3, 2013, the Plaintiff again requested medical attention, but directed it to Defendant Debby 

2 Technically, the Defendants state that Nurse Campbell made these notes. See Def.’s App. 18, ECF No. 

99. However, while Nurse Campbell’s Affidavit ¶ 4 does discuss additional notes, the records only 

support referral to nursing sick call (NSC). See Def.’s Ex. H, Medical Records pgs. 201-400, 229. 

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Reeger3on the basis of their conversation. See Pl.’s Ex. I, Request for Healthcare, ECF No. 104-

9. Defendant Reeger documented their conversation and told the Plaintiff he could write again. 

Id. On May 6, 2013, the Plaintiff saw Barbara Brubaker, APN/NP; the notes document that a 

new medication for the psoriasis was ordered, and that Brubaker would check on the order for 

the last injection. See Defs.’ Ex. H, Medical Records pgs. 201-400, 311. The rash was described 

as “maculopapular,” with pruritic symptoms. Id. at 314. Its status was described as “unchanged.” 

Id. On May 7, 2013, the Plaintiff received a Solu-Medrol injection to treat the rash. Id. at 303. 

However, on May 11, 2013, the Plaintiff filed another request, noting that the rash was 

worse and that the nurse practitioner had told him to report if the shot did not help. See Pl.’s Ex.

J, Request for Healthcare, ECF No. 104-10. Medical staff noted he had a pending appointment 

for his psoriasis with the provider and excused him from nursing sick call. Id. On May 16, 2013, 

the Plaintiff was again seen for the rash; Nurse Hutchinson again concluded the rash was 

psoriasis and noted the upcoming appointment, but the Plaintiff became agitated and was 

removed. See Defs.’ Ex. H, Medical Records pgs. 201-400, 295. On May 17, 2013, the Plaintiff 

again submitted a request, regarding the rash; the medical staff responded that the issue had been 

addressed by the provider. See Pl.’s Ex. K, Request for Healthcare, ECF No. 104-10. The notes 

from the same day document that the Plaintiff should follow up with the provider because he was 

removed from nursing sick call for inappropriate behavior. See Defs.’ Ex. H, Medical Records 

pgs. 201-400, 292. 

On May 20, 2013, the Plaintiff submitted another request regarding his rash, see Pl.’s Ex.

L, Request for Healthcare, ECF No. 104-12, and was seen by Lori Evans, RN. The notes 

document that the Plaintiff reported the rash developed after taking Tegretol, improved after he 

3 The Defendants’ Brief spells Ms. Reeger’s first name “Debby,” see, e.g., Br. at 17; the Second Amended 

Complaint spells her first name “Debbie.” 

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stopped, and returned after he was started on Tegretol again. See Defs.’ Ex. H, Medical Records 

pgs. 201-400, 287. The examination showed pustules, vesicles, or furuncles. Id. Tegretol was 

added to the Plaintiff’s allergy list. Id. at 288. On May 23, 2013, the Plaintiff followed up at 

nursing sick call for his rash, which had improved. Id. at 275. 

On May 30, 2013, the Plaintiff submitted another request, stating the rash had returned. 

See Pl.’s Ex. M, Request for Healthcare, ECF No. 104-13. On June 3, 2013, he was referred to 

nursing sick call and saw Heather McAllister, LPN; he reported that the rash was back after he 

ran out of the prednisone tabs. See Defs.’ Ex. H, Medical Records pgs. 201-400, 263–66. He was 

prescribed Betamethasone for six weeks, a Medrol dose pack, and Benadryl. See Pl.’s Ex. M,

Request for Healthcare, ECF No. 104-13. On June 11, 14, and 17, 2013, the Plaintiff submitted 

additional requests, indicating that his rash was returning after he finished the medications from 

earlier in June. See Pl.’s Exs. N–P, Requests for Healthcare, ECF Nos. 104-14–104-16. On June 

19, 2013, the Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Andrew Liaw, who prescribed an antibiotic and 

prednisone, as well as renewing the Naprosyn. See Defs.’ Ex. H, Medical Records pgs. 401-565, 

545, ECF No. 99-10. On June 28, 2013, the Plaintiff submitted another request, indicating that,

while the rash was gone from his right arm and hand, it remained on his left hand and requesting 

more medication, see Pl.’s Ex. Q, Request for Healthcare, ECF No. 104-17; he submitted another 

request on July 1, 2013, see Pl.’s Ex. R, Request for Healthcare, ECF No. 104-18, and was seen 

that day, see Defs.’ Ex. H, Medical Records pgs. 201-400, 228. Dr. Liaw again prescribed the 

antibiotic and prednisone. Id.

The Plaintiff had an annual health screening on July 29, 2013. See Defs.’ Ex. H, Medical 

Records pgs. 1-200, 173–86, ECF No. 99-8. The Plaintiff submitted a request for healthcare on 

August 1, 2013, again regarding his rash coming back after the medications were finished. See 

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Pl.’s Ex. S, Request for Healthcare, ECF No. 104-19. The Plaintiff was scheduled to see the 

chronic care clinic on August 2, 2013, but the provider called off that day. See Defs.’ Ex. H, 

Medical Records pgs. 1-200, 170. He was rescheduled at the chronic care clinic for August 7, 

2013, and for nursing sick call on August 11, 2013, but the Plaintiff was instead released on 

August 7, 2013, with a supply of the antibiotic and prednisone. See Defs.’ Ex. H, Medical 

Records pgs. 1-200, 159, 162, 165, 168.

On August 7, 2013, the Plaintiff was transferred to Elkhart County Jail, where he was 

diagnosed with scabies. See Pl.’s Ex. T, Elkhart County Jail Screening, ECF No. 104-20. At that 

point, the Plaintiff’s scabies was treated. See Pl.’s Aff. ¶ 7. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). The nonmoving party must marshal and present the Court with evidence on which 

a reasonable jury could rely to find in his favor. Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 

651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). A court must deny a motion for summary judgment when the 

nonmoving party presents admissible evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact. 

Luster v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 652 F.3d 726, 731 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). A court’s role 

in deciding a motion for summary judgment “is not to sift through the evidence, pondering the 

nuances and inconsistencies, and decide whom to believe. [A] court has one task and one task 

only: to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that 

requires a trial.” Waldridge v. Am. Heochst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). Facts that 

are outcome determinative under the applicable law are material for summary judgment 

purposes. Smith ex rel. Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 427 (7th Cir. 1997). Although a bare 

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contention that an issue of material fact exists is insufficient to create a factual dispute, a court 

must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, view all reasonable 

inferences in that party’s favor, Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 491–92 (7th Cir. 2000), 

and avoid “the temptation to decide which party’s version of the facts is more likely true,” Payne 

v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003).

ANALYSIS

A. The Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference Claim

“[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 

‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)) (further 

citation omitted). To prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must prove that he 

(1) suffered from an objectively serious medical condition to which (2) an individual defendant4

was deliberately indifferent. Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc). For 

purposes of summary judgment, the Defendants do not dispute that the Plaintiff had serious 

medical needs. See Defs.’ Br. 5, ECF No. 98. The Court must examine each individual

4

In addition to the individual Defendants, the Plaintiff has sued “the State of Indiana, by and through the 

Department of Corrections,” Westville itself, and Corizon Health, Inc. The Plaintiff’s response on 

Summary Judgment does not articulate how these Defendants could, theoretically, be liable on the federal 

claims. The State of Indiana and Westville cannot be sued under § 1983. See, e.g., Mora v. Westville 

Corr. Facility, Civ. No. 3:07-CV-259, 2008 WL 2906761, at *2 (N.D. Ind. July 24, 2008) (dismissing 

Westville as a Defendant because states and their agencies are not “persons” under § 1983 (citing Will v. 

Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989))). The Plaintiff cites Corizon Health, Inc.’s policies in 

support, rather than contravention of, his claim, and so he does not appear to be arguing Corizon Health, 

Inc. is liable under Monell. See Glisson v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 849 F.3d 372, 378–79 (7th Cir. 2017) (en

banc) (“[A] private corporation that has contracted to provide essential government services is subject to 

at least the same rules that apply to public entities.” (discussing Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. 

Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978))). While the Seventh Circuit has hypothesized that private corporations may 

be liable on a respondeat superior theory, see Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 790–92 (7th Cir. 

2014), the Plaintiff has not actually articulated such a theory against Corizon Health, Inc., and it would 

still require that an individual was deliberately indifferent.

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Defendant’s subjective state of mind to determine if he acted with deliberate indifference. 

Petties, 836 F.3d at 728 (citing Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 992 (7th Cir. 1996)). 

In making this inquiry, the Court must look to the totality of an inmate’s care. Id. at 728–

29 (citing Cavalieri v. Shephard, 321 F.3d 616, 625–26 (7th Cir. 2003)). This is a fact intensive 

analysis. There are instances in which a defendant’s subjective state of mind is easily 

ascertainable, such as when a prison official intentionally interferes with prescribed treatment. 

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–05. Further, “[i]f a risk from a particular course of medical treatment (or 

lack thereof) is obvious enough, a factfinder can infer that a prison official knew about it and 

disregarded it.” Petties, 836 F.3d at 729 (citing Norfleet v. Webster, 439 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 

2006); Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 260 (7th Cir. 1996)). But if a layperson cannot readily 

understand the existence of an unnecessary medical risk, then “a medical professional’s 

treatment decision must be ‘such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, 

practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible did not base the decision on 

such a judgment.’” Id. (quoting Cole, 94 F.3d at 261–62). 

This is because an absence of professional judgment, rather than a disagreement on the 

proper course of action, imposes liability for a deliberate indifference claim. See, e.g., Collignon 

v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982, 989 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A plaintiff can show that the 

professional disregarded the need only if the professional’s subjective response was so 

inadequate that it demonstrated an absence of professional judgment, that is, that no minimally 

competent professional would have so responded under those circumstances.”); Steele v. Choi, 

82 F.3d 175, 179 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that evidence that some other medical professional 

would have chosen a different course of treatment was insufficient to establish a constitutional 

deliberate indifference claim). But “[i]t’s clear that evidence of medical negligence is not enough 

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to prove deliberate indifference[,]” and even “a mistake in professional judgment cannot be 

deliberate indifference.” Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 

2016) (citations omitted). This is because decisions that are actually based on medical judgment 

cannot be made with the requisite subjective intent that forms the basis of liability for deliberate 

indifference claims. Id. “Deliberate indifference is not medical malpractice; the Eighth 

Amendment does not codify common law torts.” Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th 

Cir. 2008) (citing Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 2000)).

The Plaintiff rests his Eighth Amendment case on the premise that, because no provider 

diagnosed and then treated scabies in the 19 times the Plaintiff complained about the rash, 

despite the “directive of the Scabies Protocol,” a reasonable fact finder could “conclude that [the 

Plaintiff’s] providers consciously disregarded his condition.” See Pl.’s Br. 3, 5, ECF No. 103. 

The premise is faulty for several reasons. First, while the Defendants do not contest the 

document put forward by the Plaintiff, the Scabies Protocol in the record is dated October 2014, 

see Pl.’s App. Item 3 (“Scabies Protocol”), ECF No. 103-3; but the Plaintiff was released from 

Westville on August 7, 2013. The document does reference a “previous 2011 version,” 

apparently the basis for the Plaintiff’s statement that the Federal Bureau of Prisons has had such 

a protocol “since at least 2011.” Compare Pl.’s Br. 3, with Scabies Protocol 2. However, the 

immediately preceding sentence supplies that “[t]he protocol for scabies has been substantially 

rewritten.” The Plaintiff has presented no other evidence that the Scabies Protocol applied during 

the relevant period. 

Second, even if it were clear the document applied, it does not establish that any 

individual actor departed from accepted medical practice. See Whiting, 839 F.3d at 663

(affirming a grant of summary judgment because “the decision was not so obviously wrong that 

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a layperson could draw the required inference about the doctor’s state of mind without expert 

testimony,” which the Plaintiff had not presented). The Scabies Protocol describes the 

presentation of scabies as, “typical lesions are symmetrically distributed on the hands . . . wrists, 

elbows, waist, legs, and feet. In men, lesions are frequently around the belt line, thigh, and 

external genitalia.” See Scabies Protocol at 1. The Plaintiff only ever mentions the rash on his 

hands and arms, and it was not symmetrical. See, e.g., Ex. Q, Request for Healthcare, ECF No. 

104-17 (“Red-itch-rash about gone on R-hand/arm L-hand still have”). Thus, the Scabies 

Protocol does not provide enough information for a layperson to determine, without more, that 

the Plaintiff so obviously had scabies that the providers’ failure to treat it can be inferred as 

deliberate indifference. 

Finally, contrary to the Plaintiff’s contention, see Pl.’s Br. 3 (citing Scabies Protocol 

Section 4), the document does not indicate that scabies should be a presumed diagnosis in any 

situation, only that it should be presumptively treated even if it is not a confirmed diagnosis. 

Thus, the Plaintiff has not identified any portion of the Scabies Protocol with which the 

individual Defendants failed to comply. And even if the individual Defendants had somehow 

failed to comply with a protocol, such failures do not automatically give rise to Eighth 

Amendment claims. See, e.g., Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 622–24 (7th Cir. 2010)

(affirming a grant of summary judgment in favor of Nurse Radcliff, despite the nurse’s failure to 

follow a protocol to contact a doctor when an inmate complained of chest pains, because of 

Nurse Radcliff’s specific actions of ensuring the inmate received medications and making a 

notation in the chart that the inmate be seen by a doctor if the medications did not arrive, but 

reversing the grant of summary judgment in favor of Nurse Hibbert partly for her failure to 

follow prison protocol); see also Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003)

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(“However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of 

state laws or, in this case, departmental regulations and police practices.”) (citations omitted).

A reasonable factfinder, looking at the totality of the Plaintiff’s care, could not conclude 

any provider5 was deliberately indifferent to the Plaintiff’s condition. A medical provider 

examined the Plaintiff for his rash no fewer than eleven times between his first complaint on 

March 11, 2013, and his last visit on July 29, 2013. The Plaintiff reported the rash as 

intermittent, and responsive to treatment;

6

treatment was provided in response to the Plaintiff’s 

requests. In addition, the Plaintiff was seen many times for multiple other medical issues during 

this same period. Nothing in the record or presented by the Plaintiff would allow a factfinder to 

conclude that the treatments were not based on medical judgment. Summary judgment is granted 

on the Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against all defendants. 

B. The Plaintiff’s State Law Claims

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 

Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “When all federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial, the 

principle of comity encourages federal courts to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 

§ 1367(c)(3).” Hansen v. Bd. of Trs. of Hamilton Se. Sch. Corp., 551 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 

5 While not relevant to the outcome of the case, the Plaintiff did not distinguish among the different 

Defendants’ supposed deliberate indifference: Nurse Campbell, Dr. Liaw, and Dr. Mitcheff only saw the 

Plaintiff a couple of times each, and Defendant Reeger is the administrator of medical records, not a 

medical provider. Section 1983 “liability depends on each defendant’s knowledge and actions, not on the 

knowledge or actions of persons they supervise.” Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2009). 

“[P]ublic employees are responsible for their own misdeeds but not for anyone else’s.” Id. at 596.

6 The Plaintiff’s brief states that the Plaintiff’s rash was “non responsive [sic] for treatment,” Pl.’s Br. at 

3, that “treatments . . . were clearly not working,” id. at 4, and that “the treatment that had been provided 

was ineffective,” id. at 5. However, as detailed in the Factual Background, the Plaintiff actually reported 

that the rash responded to treatment but returned when the treatment was exhausted. While “[i]t is true 

that continuing the same treatment despite no results can constitute indifferent treatment,” Wilson v. 

Adams, 901 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Kelley v. McGinnis, 899 F.2d 612, 616 (7th Cir. 1990)), 

such is not the Plaintiff’s case.

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2008). Although the decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary, “there is a 

general presumption that the court will relinquish supplemental jurisdiction . . . .” Rivera v. 

Allstate Ins. Co., 913 F.3d 603, 618 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing RWJ Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. BP Prods. N. 

Am., Inc., 672 F.3d 476, 479–80 (7th Cir. 2012)). “The presumption is rebuttable, but it should 

not be lightly abandoned, as it is based on a legitimate and substantial concern with minimizing 

federal intrusion into areas of purely state law.” RWJ Mgmt. Co., Inc., 672 F.3d at 479 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Neither party has put forward an argument for exercising supplemental jurisdiction.

7 As 

the Court has not engaged in any meaningful review of the merits of the state law claims and has 

not otherwise committed substantial judicial resources to them, declining to exercise jurisdiction 

is proper. See Davis v. Cook County, 534 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he district court 

disposed of the federal claims on summary judgment, and so ‘substantial judicial resources’ have 

not yet been committed to the case.”). Further, the Plaintiff has not fully briefed his state law 

claim, and so there will not be a substantial duplication of effort if this matter is refiled in state 

court. Cf. Tyler v. Trs. of Purdue Univ., 834 F. Supp. 2d 830, 846 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (“Here, both 

parties have briefed Tyler’s state law claims, and this Court is intimately familiar with the details 

of the case. Requiring the state court to address these claims would cause a substantial 

duplication of effort.”).

Finally, the Defendants’ argument against the Plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim turns 

on interpretation of Indiana law. The medical provider Defendants argue that, as the Plaintiff has 

not presented expert testimony, his claims of medical malpractice must fail, see Defs.’ Br. 25–

7 While the Defendants have briefed arguments for dismissal of the state law claim for medical 

malpractice, Corizon Health Inc. has not moved or argued for a grant of summary judgment on the

contract claim against it, added as Count V in the Second Amended Complaint. See Op. & Order 4, ECF 

No. 68.

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26; in response, the Plaintiff argues that his case falls into the exception whereby the failure to 

follow the standard of care is so obvious that a layman can make the determination and an expert 

witness is not necessary, see Pl.’s Br. 3–4. Whether expert testimony is required, in a negligence 

action under Indiana medical malpractice, is a state law question distinct from the questions 

considered for the Eighth Amendment claim, which required more than negligence. Compare St. 

Mary’s Ohio Valley Heart Care, LLC v. Smith, 112 N.E.3d 1144, 1150 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) 

(“[T]he doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a limited exception to the general rule that the mere fact 

of injury will not create an inference of negligence.”), with Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 

831–32 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[N]egligence . . . is insufficient . . . to avoid summary judgment on [a] 

deliberate indifference claim.”) (citation omitted). Thus, principles of federalism and judicial 

efficiency indicate that this Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 

remaining claim. See Huffman v. Hains, 865 F.2d 920, 923 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[R]espect for the 

state’s interest in applying its own law, along with the state court’s greater expertise in applying 

state law, [are] paramount concerns.”). The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

over the Plaintiff’s state law claims.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 

94] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor 

of all Defendants on the Plaintiff’s federal claims against them. As to any federal claims, the 

Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of the Defendants and against the 

Plaintiff. The Court DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s state 

law claims against the Defendants, and those claims are REMANDED to LaPorte Circuit Court. 

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SO ORDERED on December 21, 2020.

s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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