UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

THOMAS OAKLEY, ) 

 ) 

 Petitioner, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Case No. 3:16-CV-044 JD 

 ) 

SUPERINTENDENT, ) 

 ) 

 Respondent. ) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 Thomas Oakley, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the prison 

disciplinary hearing (BTC 15-02-323) that was held at the Branchville Correctional Facility on 

February 24, 2015. The Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) found him guilty of Fleeing/Resisting 

in violation of B-235 and sanctioned him with the loss of 60 days earned credit time. In the petition, 

Oakley raises four grounds. All four present arguments based on subsequent conduct reports which 

were filed months later. 

 Oakley concedes that he did not present Grounds One and Four to the Final Reviewing 

Authority. He explains that he did not do so because until the subsequent conduct reports were 

filed, he did not know about them. As for Grounds Two and Three, Oakley did not answer the 

question about whether he presented them to the Final Reviewing Authority. Nevertheless, because 

they too are based on the subsequent conduct reports, he could not have done so. In habeas corpus 

proceedings, the exhaustion requirement is contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). 

 Indiana does not provide judicial review of decisions by prison 

administrative bodies, so the exhaustion requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) is 

satisfied by pursuing all administrative remedies. These are, we held in Markham 

v. Clark, 978 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1992), the sort of “available State corrective 

process” (§ 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)) that a prisoner must use. Indiana offers two levels of 

administrative review: a prisoner aggrieved by the decision of a disciplinary panel 
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may appeal first to the warden and then to a statewide body called the Final 

Reviewing Authority. Moffat sought review by both bodies, but his argument was 

limited to the contention that the evidence did not support the board’s decision. He 

did not complain to either the warden or the Final Reviewing Authority about the 

board’s sketchy explanation for its decision. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 

119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999), holds that to exhaust a claim, and thus 

preserve it for collateral review under § 2254, a prisoner must present that legal 

theory to the state’s supreme court. The Final Reviewing Authority is the 

administrative equivalent to the state’s highest court, so the holding of Boerckel

implies that when administrative remedies must be exhausted, a legal contention 

must be presented to each administrative level. 

Moffat v. Broyles, 288 F.3d 978, 981-82 (7th Cir. 2002). 

 Oakley did not present any of these grounds to the Final Reviewing Authority and the time 

for doing so has now passed. Therefore they are procedurally defaulted. Procedural default can be 

excused if the petitioner can show cause and prejudice. However, that is not possible here because 

none of these grounds could be a basis for habeas corpus relief in this case even if they had been 

properly exhausted in the State administrative process. 

 In Ground One, Oakley argues that when he requested video of the incident, the DHO 

falsely claimed that none existed. Oakley argues that when the video was subsequently found and 

reviewed, he was charged with three additional conduct violations. In the prison disciplinary 

context, an inmate has a constitutional right to present relevant, exculpatory evidence. Wolff v. 

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Exculpatory in this context means evidence which “directly 

undermines the reliability of the evidence in the record pointing to [the prisoner’s] guilt.” Meeks 

v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 1996). Here however, the requested video was not 

exculpatory because it corroborated the Conduct Report in this case. Therefore Ground One is not 

a basis for habeas corpus relief. 

 In Ground Two, Oakley argues that it was a violation of prison policies to have filed 

additional Conduct Reports against him months later based on the same incident after he was found 
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guilty in this hearing. Though that may have violated a prison policy, habeas corpus relief is not 

available for the violation of a prison rule. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). (“In 

conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the 

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). Moreover, to the extent that any relief could 

be available for such a violation, it would be to dismiss the later, improperly filed charges – not to 

dismiss this original charge. Therefore Ground Two is not a basis for habeas corpus relief. 

 In Ground Three, Oakley argues that the improperly filed subsequent charges discussed in 

Ground Two list a different date and time for the incident in question. However he does not allege 

that the incident date on the Conduct Report which resulted in this charge was incorrect. Neither 

did he raise this during the hearing on this charge. Erroneously dating subsequent conduct reports 

is not a basis for habeas corpus relief in this case on this charge. Therefore Ground Three is not a 

basis for habeas corpus relief. 

 In Ground Four, Oakley argues that the DHO was not impartial because the requested video 

was not found and watched as requested. 

 An inmate facing disciplinary charges has the right to an impartial 

decisionmaker. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 571. But “the constitutional standard for 

impermissible bias is high,” Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003), 

and an adjudicator is entitled to a presumption of “honesty and integrity” absent 

clear evidence to the contrary, see Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S. Ct. 

1456, 43 L. Ed. 2d 712 (1975). 

Perotti v. Marberry, 355 Fed. Appx. 39, 43 (7th Cir. 2009). Here, Oakley has not alleged that any 

evidence of dishonesty exists. Though it is unclear why the DHO did not find and watch the 

requested video, as previously explained, even if the video had been found, it was not exculpatory 

and so not watching it could not have been prejudicial. Therefore Ground Four is not a basis for 

habeas corpus relief. 
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 For these reasons, the habeas corpus petition is DENIED pursuant to Habeas Corpus Rule 

4. The clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close this case. 

 SO ORDERED. 

 

 ENTERED: August 3, 2016 

 

 /s/ JON E. DEGUILIO 

 Judge 

 United States District Court