UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

MINNESOTA LIFE INSURANCE )

COMPANY, )

)

 Plaintiff, )

)

 v. ) CIVIL NO. 2:13cv212

)

HOWARD C. KINGKADE, JOHN B. )

KINGKADE, WINSTON KINGKADE, )

J.B.K (a minor), and T.R.K. (a minor), )

)

 Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the court on a motion for summary judgment filed by the

Defendant/Cross-Claimant, Howard C. Kingkade (“Howard”), on April 23, 2015. The

Defendants/Cross-Defendants, John B. Kingkade (“John”), Winston Kingkade (“Winston”), and

J.B.K and T.R.K, have not filed a response. None of the Defendants/Cross-Defendants are

represented by counsel. On April 27, 2015, Howard filed a “Notice and Order” directed to John

and Winston, in which these parties were advised of their obligation to respond to the summary

judgment motion.

For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment will be granted.

Discussion

This case has been pending for over a year, with the following procedural history. On

June 14, 2013, Minnesota Life Insurance Company (“Minnesota Life”) filed its Complaint for

Interpleader against Howard and the Defendants/Cross-Defendants. On September 5, 2013,

Howard filed his Unopposed Answer to Minnesota Life’s Complaint for Interpleader. 

Thereafter, on October 21, 2013, Howard filed his Amended Answer to Minnesota Life’s
Complaint for Interpleader and Crossclaim against the Defendants/Cross-Defendants. In

accordance with the Court’s March 3, 2014 Order, the parties participated in a Settlement

Conference but were unable to reach a resolution. Thus, Howard has now filed a motion for

summary judgment.

Summary Judgment

Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine

issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Not every dispute between the parties precludes summary judgment, however, since “[o]nly

disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law” warrant a

trial. Id. To determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must construe all

facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in

that party’s favor. Heft v. Moore, 351 F.3d 278, 282 (7th Cir. 2003). A party opposing a properly

supported summary judgment motion may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own

pleading, but rather must “marshal and present the court with the evidence she contends will

prove her case.” Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7 Cir. 2010). th

Factual Background

Howard has submitted the following statement of uncontested facts. Howard J. Kingkade

(the “Decedent”), was the Father of the Defendant/Cross-Claimant, Howard, and the Grandfather and Great-grandfather of the Defendants/Cross-Defendants. During his life, the Decedent

was employed by Unilever/Lever Brothers Company (“Unilever”) and, as its employee, was

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provided insurance by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”) under a life insurance

policy (“MetLife Policy”) with a value of $8,000.00. He was also provided insurance by the

Plaintiff, Minnesota Life Insurance Company (“Minnesota Life”), under Minnesota Life Group

Term Life Insurance Policy (“Group Policy”) valued at $40,000.00.

On or about August 4, 2008, the Decedent completed and executed a “Life Insurance

Beneficiary Designation Form” (“Designation Form”). The Designation Form, on its face, was a

generic form and not specific to either MetLife or Minnesota Life. As seen on the Designation

Form itself, the Form provides for the designation of primary and secondary beneficiaries and

their respective percentages of death benefits. It also states, “[i]n the event that the above-named

primary beneficiary is not living at the time my death occurs, the following secondary

beneficiary(ies) are to receive any benefits payable upon my death.”

Under the Primary Beneficiary section, the Decedent wrote that the Defendant/CrossClaimant, Howard C. Kingkade, is to receive $4,000.00, while the Defendants/Cross-Defendants,

J.B.K. (a minor) and T.R.K. (a minor) are to receive $1,000.00 each. The Defendants/CrossDefendants, John B. Kingkade and Winston Kingkade, are listed under the Secondary

Beneficiary section, each of whom is to receive $1,000.00 in death benefits only in the event the

primary beneficiaries are not living at the time of death. The total value of the benefit amounts

payable to the designated beneficiaries identified on the Designation Form equals $8,000.00,

which is also the total value of the MetLife Policy. It is not disputed that the Designation Form

was not properly completed by the Decedent, as the Form specified that percentages were to be

entered and the Decedent entered dollar amounts. 

On May 16, 2013, MetLife Insurance distributed the $8,000.00 proceeds of the MetLife

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Policy pursuant to the beneficiary designations outlined in the Designation Form. Howard C.

Kingkade received $4,000.00, while each of the Defendants/Cross-Defendants received

$1,000.00. 

Analysis

The issue before this Court is whether the Beneficiary Designation Form pertains to the

Minnesota Life Group Policy of $40,000.00. Howard argues that there is nothing in the record

that would remotely suggest that the generic Designation Form pertains to the Minnesota Life

Group Policy. Howard points out that a casual reading of this generic Designation Form shows

that, on its face, it applies to the allocation of $8,000.00 in death benefits. The Form requests that

the maker of the Form identify percentages of allocation of insurance benefits that the maker

wants to divide amongst the primary and contingent beneficiaries. The maker/Decedent in this

instance, Howard J. Kingkade, completed the form and used specific dollar amounts in the

spaces where he was directed to use percentages. The dollar amounts he used total $8,000.00.

The Decedent had a life insurance policy through MetLife in that amount and which paid a death

benefit of the amount of $8,000.00. The Form identifies allocation amounts equal to the death

benefits under the MetLife policy which, as noted, has been paid in accordance with the

Designation Form. 

Howard contends that because the amounts in the Form exactly match the benefits

available under the MetLife Policy, it is clear that the Form applied to the MetLife policy, and

not to the Minnesota Life Group Policy which had a death benefit of $40,000.00. Moreover, the

Designation Form provides no reference to the Minnesota Life Group Policy.

Howard further argues that the Dead Man’s Statute precludes any testimony of

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statements made by the Decedent. Ind. Code § 34-45-2-4; In re Estate of Rickert, 934 N.E.2d

726, 731 (Ind. 2010). Thus, concludes Howard, there is nothing that the Defendants/CrossDefendants have presented to date or could present in a trial of this matter which would create an

issue of material fact. Howard points out that the record shows that the Defendants/CrossDefendants did not answer or otherwise respond to the Request for Admissions propounded to

them during the discovery phase. Thus, with the exception of the generic Designation Form,

there is nothing that could or would be submitted to a trier of fact as a material issue for

determination. 

This court agrees with Howard that, in the absence of any evidence or argument from the

Defendants/Cross-Defendants, there are no issues of fact in this case, and summary judgment

should be entered in favor of Howard C. Kingkade.

Conclusion

On the basis of the foregoing, Howard C. Kingkade’s motion for summary judgment is

hereby GRANTED.

 

 Entered: July 20, 2015.

 s/ William C. Lee 

 William C. Lee, Judge

 United States District Court

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