Staff StudiesFederal Deposit Insurance Corporation

Staff Studies

Report No. 2021-01

Private-Equity-Backed 

Acquisitions of Failed Banks, 

2008–2013

June 2021

www.fdic.gov/cfr • @FDICgov • #FDICCFR • #FDICResearch
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the Federal Deposit 

Insurance Corporation or the United States. FDIC Staff Studies can be cited without additional permission.
1

Private-Equity-Backed Acquisitions of Failed Banks, 2008–2013

George French, Donald Hamm, Scott Leifer, 

Derek Sturtevant, Ann Taylor, and Catherine Topping1

Abstract:

This paper describes the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) experience with private-equity-backed acquisitions 

of failed banks during the 2008–2013 banking crisis. It explains the relevant legal and regulatory framework, the types of 

transaction structures used to effect acquisitions and recapitalizations, and the issues and challenges the FDIC encountered 

and resolved. The paper lists the crisis-era failed banks and their acquirers identified by FDIC staff as being backed by private 

equity investors to an appreciable extent, and provides context on the role of private equity in capital raising and failure 

resolution during the crisis. The conclusion is that, on balance, the careful approach the FDIC took during the crisis when 

entering into failing bank transactions with private equity investors was successful in lowering the agency’s bank failure 

resolution costs in a manner consistent with ensuring the safety and soundness of the resulting banks.

1

 The authors are indebted to Wendy Hoskins, Emily Johnston-Ross, and Lynn Shibut, who provided the data about private equity acquisitions of failed 

institutions discussed in this paper and provided useful comments, and to Kim Lowry and Lisa Garcia for editorial suggestions.
2

The banking crisis of 2008–2013 resulted in the sale by FDIC receiverships of the deposits and assets of hundreds of failed 

banks.2 The large volume of failed bank sales attracted the interest of private investor groups seeking to acquire or make 

investments in banks. During the crisis years, these groups would play a role in the acquisition of both failed and open banks.

This paper is primarily based on the observations of FDIC staff during and shortly after the crisis, including staff’s 

contemporaneous identification of failed bank acquisitions backed by private equity investors (PEIs). There is no universally 

agreed-upon definition of PEIs, but the term often refers to investment funds that offer unique or specialized investment 

strategies to high net-worth investors, that deploy leverage to enhance investment returns, or that are exempt from 

registration under the Investment Company Act. Such entities have generally been viewed as having investment strategies 

that focus on buying undervalued assets and selling them for a profit over a shorter time horizon than would be the case for a 

longer-term strategic investor.3

PEI groups were a source of needed capital to the banking industry during the crisis, and their acquisitions of failed banks 

reduced the financial cost of those failures to the FDIC. In a number of instances, PEI-backed acquisitions of failed banks 

enabled the FDIC to avoid the more disruptive resolution alternative of an insured deposit payout and liquidation of assets. At 

the same time, however, transaction structures that investor groups presented to the FDIC sometimes raised concern about 

the safety and soundness of the banks that would have resulted. How the FDIC addressed such concerns forms part of the 

history of the banking crisis of 2008–2013.

Background

Entry into the U.S. banking industry, whether by PEIs or otherwise, is governed by a statutory framework designed to 

promote a number of public policy goals. In broad terms, these include maintaining a safe-and-sound banking industry that 

operates in compliance with laws and regulations, avoiding monopoly or undue concentrations of economic power, and 

meeting the credit needs of communities. Statutory firewalls—including the restrictions on the transactions between a bank 

and its affiliates imposed by Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, the Bank Holding Company Act Section 106 

restrictions on tying, and Federal Reserve Regulation O (which restricts transactions with insiders)—are intended to protect 

federally insured banks from activities of their nonbank affiliates that may present risk to the bank.4

Under various statutes, entry into the banking industry—whether by merger or acquisition, change of control, or 

establishment of a new bank—requires the approval (or in some cases only the non-objection) of the relevant banking 

agencies. In deciding whether to approve the various types of filings required for entry into the industry, the relevant agencies 

must determine whether certain statutory factors are satisfied.

Among other things, agencies must review the strength of proposed bank management and owners, and ensure that 

resulting banks are in sound financial condition and able to meet various legal requirements. As has been observed with 

respect to the supervision of the savings and loan industry during the 1980s, insufficient attention to these matters can have 

significant adverse effects.5 Thus, in acting on filings dealing with entry into banking, the agencies generally must determine 

2

 Throughout this paper, the term “bank” is an encompassing reference to FDIC-insured depository institutions unless a distinction with thrift institutions is 

evident from the context.

3

 For context on the private equity business model, see Justin L. Browder, “The 2007 Private Equity Bust: Re-Contextualizing Material Adverse Change Clauses 

in a Credit-Stricken Market,” University of Miami Law Review 63 (July 2009); Ravi R. Desai, “Private Equity Investment in Financial Institutions and How to 

Avoid Becoming a Bank Holding Company,” North Carolina Banking Institute 13, no. 1. (2009); Chip MacDonald, “Private Equity Investments in Financial 

Services Firms: Threading the Regulatory Needle,” Bloomberg Law Reports – Banking and Finance 4, no.2 (2011); and Frank Righeimer Martin, “Private Equity 

Investment in Failed Banks: Appropriate Investors Welcome,” North Carolina Banking Institute 14 (March 2010).

4 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1; 12 U.S.C. § 1972; 12 C.F.R. § 215.

5 See generally National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement, Origins and Causes of the S&L Debacle: A Blueprint for 

Reform: a Report to the President and Congress of the United States (Washington, D.C.: The Commission, 1993), 37. 
3

that the filing satisfies the relevant statutory factors.6 These determinations are important to maintaining a safe-and-sound 

banking industry, and they are inherently fact-specific.

Investment by PEIs in banks and their parent companies was not a new or unique aspect of the crisis. For example, 

Federal Reserve guidance states, “For many years, bank holding companies, nonbank financial companies, private equity 

funds, and other firms have made minority investments in banks and bank holding companies.”7 Similarly, the FDIC wrote, 

“Capital investments by individuals and limited liability companies acting through holding companies operating within a 

well-developed prudential framework has long been the dominant form of ownership of insured depository institutions.”8

The prudential framework that governs bank holding company ownership is intended to ensure that companies that acquire 

control of banks have the financial strength and managerial ability to exercise control in a safe-and-sound manner.

The rapid escalation in the number of troubled and failing banks during the crisis, and the need for capital, created 

opportunities for PEIs to acquire or make equity investments in banking organizations. Federal bank regulators, for their part, 

implemented new policies and approaches that allowed PEIs to bid on failing banks. The development of ways for PEIs to bid 

was a new aspect of the 2008–2013 crisis. With these new approaches in place, a number of investor groups offered proposals 

to acquire failed or troubled banks. These proposals sometimes had complex features or raised legal and policy issues, 

and in reviewing these proposals the FDIC dealt with a wide range of issues and challenges. Given the urgency of resolving 

these issues in a timely and transparent manner, the FDIC developed guidance about the types of failed bank acquisition 

transactions it viewed as being consistent with the safety and soundness of resulting institutions.

This paper describes the framework of laws and regulations relevant to PEIs’ investment in banking organizations, the 

types of transaction structures used to effect acquisitions and recapitalizations, and the issues and challenges the FDIC 

encountered and how those issues and challenges were resolved. The paper then summarizes information about PEI‐backed

acquisitions of failed banks during the crisis and discusses the role of PEIs with respect to capital raising and failure 

resolution. The conclusion is that, on balance, the careful approach the FDIC took during the crisis when entering into failing 

bank transactions with PEIs was successful in lowering the agency’s bank failure resolution costs in a manner consistent with 

ensuring the safety and soundness of the resulting banks.

The Failed Bank Resolution Process as It Relates to PEIs

The FDIC’s process for handling failed banks is described in Chapter 6 of Crisis and Response: An FDIC History, 2008–2013, 

and additional information is available in the FDIC’s Resolutions Handbook.9 The FDIC is statutorily required to resolve a failed 

bank in a way that minimizes its expected cost.10 For 463 of the 489 banks that failed from 2008 through 2013, the least-cost 

transaction involved the FDIC arranging for some or all of the banking activities of the failed banks to be taken over by other 

private-sector banks.11 In these situations, the failing bank was placed into FDIC receivership, and its insured deposits and 

some of its other assets and liabilities were transferred to the acquiring bank. Depending on the specific assets and liabilities 

6 See 12 U.S.C. § 1816.

7

 Federal Reserve, Policy Statement on Equity Investments in Banks and Bank Holding Companies, codified at 12 C.F.R. 225.144, September 2008. 

8

 FDIC, Proposed Statement of Policy on Qualifications for Failed Bank Acquisitions, 74 Fed. Reg. 32931–32934 (July 9, 2009). 

9

 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Crisis and Response: An FDIC History, 2008–2013 (2017) (Crisis and Response), available at https://www.fdic.

gov/bank/historical/crisis/; FDIC Resolutions Handbook, available at https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/.

10 See Section 1 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (Pub. L. No. 102--242; 105 Stat. 2236), effective December 19, 1991

(codified to 12 U.S.C. 1811 note). The only exception arises when a “systemic risk” determination is made (see Chapter 3 of Crisis and Response). 

11 Seventeen institutions were handled via a liquidation of assets and payout of insured deposits; seven were handled by the creation of a Deposit Insurance 

National Bank (DINB), a form of payout where the deposit accounts are transferred to a newly chartered temporary bank operated by the FDIC whose 

purpose is to ensure that depositors have continued access to their insured deposits as they transfer their deposit accounts to other financial institutions; 

one was handled by the creation of a National Deposit Institution, a temporary bank that was similar to a DINB except for being chartered by the Office of 

Thrift Supervision; and one was handled by a bridge bank that self-liquidated within a short time.
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transferred, and the nature of any loss-sharing or other indemnification arrangements, transactions could include a cash 

payment from the FDIC to the acquiring bank or vice versa.

In short, the preferred, cost-effective resolution for most banks that failed during the crisis involved a transfer of banking 

activities to another FDIC-insured bank. Moreover, as discussed in more detail in a subsequent section, legal requirements 

and prudential considerations require that the acquiring bank be in sound financial condition and well-managed. To this end, 

the FDIC solicits bids from among an approved list of acquiring banks. Eligible bidders can ask to be contacted when the FDIC 

solicits bids for upcoming bank failures, and they may conduct due-diligence to decide whether, and under what financial 

terms, they would wish to bid.

Since the FDIC’s preferred resolution process involved the transfer of banking activities to an acquiring bank, PEIs 

proposed to invest directly, or more often indirectly through a holding company, in a new or existing bank or thrift. The bank 

or thrift, in turn, would acquire the deposits and selected assets of failing banks or other banks. Further details on how this 

worked will follow.

PEIs and the Statutory Framework Governing Equity Investments in Banks or 

Their Parent Companies

Investments of PEIs in banking organizations took place within a statutory framework that, in very broad terms, is 

intended to promote a safe-and-sound banking system that operates in compliance with laws and regulations. As such, the 

federal bank regulatory agencies carry out several responsibilities. With respect to PEI acquisitions of and investments in 

failing banks, unique responsibilities of each agency include the following: for the FDIC, acting on applications for deposit 

insurance for investor groups seeking to charter a newly insured bank and implementing least-cost resolution of failing 

banks; for the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), acting on proposals to establish new national banks or federal 

thrifts; and for the Federal Reserve, determining whether a proposed transaction would result in a company acquiring control 

of an FDIC-insured institution (thereby becoming a bank or thrift holding company subject to regulation by the Federal 

Reserve) and, if so, whether to approve the formation of the bank or thrift holding company. All three agencies act on merger 

applications or change in control notices for banks under their respective supervision.12 Before the abolishment of the Office 

of Thrift Supervision (OTS) mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), 

the OTS made similar determinations about the formation of savings and loan holding companies, as well as chartering, 

merger, and change of control determinations for thrift institutions it regulated.

New Banks. PEIs sometimes sought to establish a new bank specifically to acquire one or more troubled or failing banks. 

Establishing the new bank required the approval of the relevant chartering authority: the OCC for national banks and, after 

the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, federal thrifts; the OTS for federal thrifts before the Dodd-Frank Act; and state banking 

authorities for state-chartered banks.

A deposit insurance application was also required for investor groups seeking to establish a proposed new insured bank. 

Before the enactment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) in 1991, the FDIC acted on such 

applications for state-chartered banks and the OCC acted for national banks.13 Since 1991, the FDIC has been responsible 

for acting on all applications for FDIC deposit insurance. In determining whether to approve such applications, the FDIC is 

required to consider the statutory factors in section 6 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act) listed in Table 1.

12 Changes of control require notice; the agencies act on these notices by objection or non-objection.

13 See FDICIA §115, amending section 5 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.
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Table 1

Statutory Factors for Deposit Insurance Applications

Deposit Insurance 

Application:

Statutory Factors

• Financial history and condition.

• Adequacy of capital structure.

• Future earnings prospects.

• General character and fitness of management.

• Risk to the Deposit Insurance Fund.

• Convenience and needs of the community to be served.

• Consistency of corporate powers with the purposes of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.

Source: 12 U.S.C. § 1816.

Bank Mergers. In some cases, PEIs proposed to facilitate a merger between a troubled bank and another bank, thereby 

averting a bank failure. Section 18(c) of the FDI Act, commonly called the Bank Merger Act, reflects a number of policy goals 

related to bank mergers, including the maintenance of a sound and competitive banking system. Merger transactions 

exclusively involving banks are subject to the approval of the primary federal regulator of the insured depository institution 

that would result from the merger, or by the FDIC in any case where a merger transaction involves an insured depository 

institution and a noninsured entity. In reviewing the merger application, the responsible agency must consider the statutory 

factors in Table 2.

Table 2

Statutory Factors for Bank Merger Act Applications

Bank Merger Act 

Application:

Statutory Factors

• Whether the transaction will result in a monopoly.

•Whether the effect in any section of the country may be to substantially lessen competition

tend to create a monopoly, or in any other manner be in restraint of trade.

•The financial and managerial resources and prospects of the existing and propose

institutions, and the convenience and needs of the community to be served.

•The effectiveness of any institution involved in the proposed merger in combating mone

laundering activities.

• The risk to the stability of the United States banking or financial system.

Source: 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c).

Bank Control—By a Company. Often, the end result of a transaction proposed by PEIs would be that a company has 

an investment in one or more insured banks, and the PEIs have an investment in the company as well as, in some cases, 

involvement in the management or policies of the insured banks. In all such proposed transactions, the Federal Reserve must 

determine whether the company would control the insured banks for purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA). 

If so, the company would become a bank holding company subject to regulation by the Federal Reserve (or after the DoddFrank Act, potentially a thrift holding company subject to regulation by the Federal Reserve).

Under the BHCA, a company that controls a bank, or another bank holding company, is a bank holding company and 

is subject to certain activities restrictions and the Federal Reserve’s supervision and regulation.14 A company is deemed to 

have “control” of a bank if it owns or can vote 25 percent or more of any class of voting securities of the bank, if it controls 

the election of a majority of the directors or trustees of the bank, or if the Federal Reserve determines the company exerts 

14 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2).
6

a “controlling influence” over the management or policies of the bank.15 The precise threshold for the ownership stake 

triggering the application of the BHCA depends on whether the Federal Reserve finds the existence of “controlling influence” 

on the bank. The BHCA also contains a presumption that a company does not control a bank if it does not own 5 percent or 

more of any class of voting securities of the bank.

The Federal Reserve has indicated that in reaching its determinations regarding whether an investor has control over a 

banking organization, it has been mindful of two key purposes of the BHCA.16 The first purpose cited by the Federal Reserve 

is to ensure that companies that control banking organizations do so in a safe-and-sound manner, and that companies that 

wish to enjoy the benefits of controlling a banking organization must also bear responsibility to address downside risks by 

being prepared to provide financial and managerial resources to support their exercise of control. The second purpose cited 

by the Federal Reserve is to limit the mixing of banking and commerce by effectively preventing companies with commercial 

interests from having a controlling interest in a banking organization.17

Under the BHCA, it is unlawful for any company to become a bank holding company or acquire control of a bank without 

the prior approval of the Federal Reserve. When considering whether to approve such transactions, the Federal Reserve is 

required to consider several factors enumerated in the BHCA, as described in Table 3.18

Table 3

Statutory Factors for Bank Holding Company Acquisitions of Banks

Bank Holding 

Company Act:

Statutory Factors 

for Applications for 

Companies to Acquire 

Control of a Bank

• Whether the proposal would result in a monopoly.

•Whether the effect of the proposal in any section of the country may be to substantiall

lessen competition, tend to create a monopoly, or in any other manner be in restraint of 

trade.

•The financial and managerial resources and future prospects of the company or companie

and the banks concerned.

• The convenience and needs of the community to be served.

• The treatment of certain bank stock loans.

•The ability of the Federal Reserve to obtain adequate information about the company

whether a foreign bank would be subject to comprehensive, consolidated supervision in its 

home country.

•The competence, experience, or integrity of the officers, directors, and principa

shareholders.

• The effectiveness of the company in combating money laundering.

• Risks to the financial stability of the United States.

Source: 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(1-7).

Bank Control—By a Person, or Persons Acting in Concert. Under the Change in Bank Control Act of 1978 (CIBC),19 a 

person, or persons acting in concert, must submit prior written notice to the appropriate federal banking agency before 

acquiring control of a bank or bank holding company.20 A person for this purpose includes an individual, corporation, 

15 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(2); 12 CFR § 225.2(e).

16 See Federal Reserve, Policy Statement on Equity Investments in Banks and Bank Holding Companies, September 22, 2008.

17 Statutory exceptions exist that allow for ownership of FDIC-insured institutions by commercial firms in limited circumstances. 12 U.S.C. §1841(c)(2)(H).

18 Before it was abolished by the Dodd-Frank Act, the OTS was the federal regulator of savings and loan (S&L) holding companies. The regulation of these 

holding companies was different from that of bank holding companies, but it did involve the OTS determining whether a company controlled a thrift 

institution, and thus whether that company was an S&L holding company subject to OTS regulation. Such determinations were governed by the Home 

Owners Loan Act, and the details will not be discussed in this article.

19 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j).

20 Steve Mumm, “Change in Bank Control Act: What You Need to Know,” Bank Owner, Spring 2013, https://thebhca.org/change-in-bank-control-act-whatyou-need-to-know/. 
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limited-liability company, partnership, trust, or any other form of entity. A number of specific exceptions exist to the 

requirement to file a change of control notice, including if the transaction is already subject to review under the BHCA or the 

Bank Merger Act. The appropriate federal banking agency has the authority to disapprove the transaction.

Commentary from shortly after the CIBC’s passage indicates that it was passed “primarily to prevent speculative 

purchases of small banks by irresponsible individuals with questionable integrity.”21 Shortly before the CIBC’s passage, a 

congressional report noted that with respect to the 101 banks that failed between 1960 and 1977, the vast majority failed 

because of fraud and insider abuse, and there was concern that some individuals were acquiring banks with the intent of 

using bank resources for personal gain.22 In this sense, the CIBC has goals similar to the BHCA but applies to transactions 

involving a broader class of entities than “companies.”23

A federal banking agency generally has 60 days to decide whether to object to a change in control notice. In deciding 

whether to object, the agency must consider the statutory factors in Table 4. These statutory factors are similar to those that 

must be considered by the federal banking agencies in other contexts regarding proposed entry into banking. 

Table 4

Statutory Factors for Review of Change in Control Notices

Notice of Change 

in Control:

Statutory Factors

•Whether the proposal would result in a monopol

•Whether the effect of the proposal in any section of the country may be to substantiall

lessen competition, tend to create a monopoly, or in any other manner be in restraint of 

trade.

•The financial condition of the acquiring party or the future prospects of the institution an

their potential impact on the bank or depositors.

•The competence, experience, or integrity of any acquiring person or propose

management.

•Whether any acquiring party neglects, fails, or refuses to furnish information required by th

FDIC.

•The effect on the Deposit Insurance Fun

Source: 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(7).

Under the CIBC, a person has control of an insured depository institution if it has the “power, directly or indirectly, to 

direct the management or policies of an insured depository institution,” or the power to vote 25 percent or more of any class 

of an insured institution’s voting securities.24 In addition, each federal banking agency has adopted a regulatory presumption 

of control under the CIBC. It is triggered if a person owns 10 percent or more of the institution’s outstanding voting common 

stock and either the stock is publicly traded or no other person holds a greater amount.25 If the CIBC is implicated, the investor 

must submit a written notice to the appropriate federal banking agency of the institution that includes extensive information 

about the investor and entities that control the investor. Some PEIs were unwilling to file a CIBC notice and, thus, sought to 

structure their investments to avoid a required filing.

21 Roger D. Rutz, “Chain Banking, Competition, and the Change in Bank Control Act of 1978,” Nebraska Law Review 59 (1980): 237.

22 Rutz (1980), p. 237.

23 Rutz (1980), p. 238.

24 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(8)(B).

25 12 C.F.R. § 303.82(b)(2) (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. § 5.50(f)(2) (OCC); 12 C.F.R. § 225.41(c)(2) (FRB).
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Crisis-Era Policy Developments Relevant to PEI Investments in 

Banking Organizations

Beginning in the fall of 2008, the federal banking regulators took steps to clarify, and in a number of respects ease, 

requirements related to private equity investments in banking organizations.

Federal Reserve. In September 2008, the Federal Reserve issued its Policy Statement on Equity Investments in Banks 

and Bank Holding Companies (Policy Statement) that provided additional guidance on the Federal Reserve’s position on 

minority equity investments in banks and bank holding companies that generally do not constitute “control” for purposes of 

the BHCA.26 The guidance described how large minority investors (companies that acquire between 10 and 24.9 percent of 

the voting stock of a banking organization) typically have avoided acquiring a controlling interest in a banking organization 

by providing the Federal Reserve with passivity commitments and avoiding certain control enhancing mechanisms. For 

example, as stated in the guidance, minority investors have avoided exerting a controlling influence by limiting their total and 

voting equity investments in the banking organization, avoiding the use of covenants that restrict the banking organization’s 

management and other attempts to influence the organization’s decision making processes, and limiting director interlocks 

and business relationships between the investor and the banking organization.27

The Policy Statement indicated that the Federal Reserve was changing its approach to evaluating control determinations 

in a number of respects, three of which will be mentioned here. First, while past Federal Reserve practice had been 

generally not to permit minority investors to have representation on the board of directors of the banking organization, the 

Policy Statement indicated the Federal Reserve’s belief that a minority investor generally should be able to have a single 

representative on the organization’s board of directors (or two representatives in certain circumstances) without acquiring a 

controlling influence. Second, the Policy Statement expanded the types of communication that minority investors could have 

with banking organization management without the Federal Reserve determining that the minority investors were exercising 

control. Third, while past Federal Reserve practice had been to view ownership of nonvoting equity of more than 25 percent of 

total equity as raising control issues, the Policy Statement revised that presumption. Specifically, the Federal Reserve indicated 

that it would not expect a minority investor to exert control if the investor owns less than one-third of the total equity of the 

organization, provided the investor does not own 15 percent or more of any class of voting securities of the organization.28

The BHCA’s definition of control over a banking organization, and the standards the Federal Reserve uses in making 

control determinations, are of considerable significance to PEIs. One reason is that bank holding companies typically are 

permitted to engage in only those activities that are closely related to banking.29 Private equity firms have traditionally 

invested in a host of nonbanking and nonfinancial activities and, thus, may find it difficult to become a bank holding company 

and maintain their other investments. Another reason is that bank holding companies must act as a “source of strength” for 

the insured depository institutions they control, which may require the bank holding company to make capital injections.30

Private equity firms typically were not structured nor willing to provide such financial support. Most PEIs took care to structure 

proposed banking investments in a way that would not cause them to be found to exert control and thereby become bank 

holding companies. As a result, the vast majority of the private equity that has been invested in banking organizations 

represents ownership stakes of 24.9 percent or less.31

26 Federal Reserve, “Board Announces the Approval of a Policy Statement on Equity Investments in Banks and Bank Holding Companies,” press release, 

September 22, 2008. 

27 Federal Reserve, Policy Statement on Equity Investments in Banks and Bank Holding Companies, September 22, 2008.

28 In January 2020, the Federal Reserve issued a final rule revising its framework for determining whether a company has control over another company 

under the BHCA. The 2008 Federal Reserve Policy Statement remains in effect to the extent not superseded by the final rule. See Control and Divestiture 

Proceedings, 85 Fed. Reg. 12398 (March 2, 2020).

29 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843(j); 1843(k)(1).

30 12 U.S.C. § 1831o; 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(1).

31 Matthew Monks, “The Private Equity Effect,” American Banker, November 1, 2012, https://www.americanbanker.com/news/the-private-equity-effect. 
9

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. During the crisis, the OCC implemented a “shelf charter” program, which 

provided PEIs a vehicle to bid for failed banks.32 The charter remains inactive, or “on the shelf,” until the investor group is 

named the winning bidder for a failing or failed bank. Assuming their bids presented the least cost to the Deposit Insurance 

Fund (DIF),33 the shelf charter allowed entities other than banks the ability to immediately acquire deposits and assets of 

failed banks. Companies or investor groups acquiring an interest in the resulting national bank through a holding company 

structure were subject to holding company control determinations and approvals by the Federal Reserve.34 The OTS35 also 

developed a similar pre-clearance process that enabled PEIs that did not currently own an insured institution to bid for 

failed institutions.36 Private equity groups acquired two of the larger, early failed institutions, IndyMac Bank, FSB, Pasadena, 

California, and BankUnited, FSB, Coral Gables, Florida, from the FDIC (as receiver) in this manner.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. In November 2008, the FDIC, recognizing the importance of additional sources 

of capital to resolve the growing number of failed banks, established a modified bidder qualification process to expand the 

pool of qualified bidders for the deposits and assets of failing banks.37 The modified process allowed interested parties that 

did not have a bank charter to participate in the bidding process for failing banks. In the modified process, the FDIC evaluated 

applications for deposit insurance based on streamlined information submissions and applications. For example, the 

streamlined process provided the FDIC with critical information for making a supervisory determination but did not include 

field investigations. The process allowed proponents, as a condition of approval, to submit comprehensive business plans 

and other supporting documentation (that normally would have been required before an application could be approved) to 

the FDIC within 60 days of the date that the FDIC approved an application. The application reviews were closely coordinated 

among the agencies, and final deposit insurance and charter approvals were granted concurrently to address each of the 

agencies’ timing requirements. In particular, companies or investor groups with a stake in any resulting banks were subject 

to holding company control determinations and approvals by the Federal Reserve (or the OTS as applicable) and, as noted 

earlier, these entities often attempted to structure their involvement to avoid a determination of control and consequent 

regulation as a bank holding company.

The FDIC’s modified bidder program generated considerable interest. Potentially interested parties included individuals, 

private equity firms, banks and bank holding companies, consulting or professional service firms, and nonbank financial 

companies. However, interested parties frequently presented a number of concerns with respect to management depth and 

qualifications, the proposed business strategy (or lack thereof), or the source, structure, or level of capital.

As expressions of interest in the modified bidder program were being evaluated, the FDIC completed two significant 

resolution transactions involving PEIs. These transactions occurred early in the evolving crisis and helped inform the FDIC’s 

thinking about the parameters for PEI investments in banking organizations. The resolutions involved newly chartered federal 

thrift institutions that acquired IndyMac Federal Bank, FSB, in March 2009, and BankUnited, FSB, in May 2009. The IndyMac 

transaction was the largest PEI acquisition of a failed institution.

32 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, “OCC Conditionally Approves First National Bank Shelf Charter to Expand Pool of Qualified Bidders for Troubled 

Institutions,” news release 2008-137, November 21, 2008, http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2008/nr-occ-2008-137.html. See also

Righeimer Martin (March 2010): 410.

33 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4).

34 See, e.g., OCC, RE: Application to establish a new national bank, with the title of Ford Group Bank, National Association, Application Control Number: 

2008-SO-01-0015, Charter No. 24911, November 17, 2008, available at https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2008/memo-ford-group-bankapproval-2008.pdf.

35 The FDIC processed bidder clearance requests and related filings concurrently with the OTS before its dissolution in July 2011. 

36 See the description in Office of Thrift Supervision, “OTS Gives Preliminary Clearance to Successful Bidders for IndyMac,” news release OTS-09-001, 

January 2, 2009.

37 FDIC, “FDIC Expands Bidder List for Troubled Institutions,” press release PR-127-2008, November 26, 2008.
10

IndyMac Failure

IndyMac Bank, FSB (IndyMac) was closed by the OTS on July 11, 2008, and the FDIC was appointed receiver. IndyMac 

Federal Bank, FSB (New IndyMac) was chartered on the same day, and the OTS appointed the FDIC as conservator of the 

new institution. Before its failure, IndyMac reported approximately $31 billion in assets and $19 billion in deposits. Its failure 

was due to poor asset quality in its portfolios of nontraditional mortgages, construction loans, and private mortgage-backed 

securities. Substantially all of IndyMac’s assets and nonbrokered insured deposits were passed from the receiver to the 

conservator with the intent of marketing the institution in conservatorship.

The FDIC, having no intention of operating New IndyMac as conservator on a long-term basis, entered into discussions 

with an investor group of PEIs about the group’s interest in acquiring the business and operations of New IndyMac. The 

investor group generally consisted of private equity firms and personal investment vehicles with sizeable asset holdings and 

financial resources. The FDIC and the OTS ultimately determined that the proposed acquisition would be most appropriately 

achieved through a newly established OTS thrift charter, approval of deposit insurance, and a purchase and assumption 

transaction between the FDIC, as receiver of New IndyMac, and the new thrift (ultimately named OneWest Bank, FSB).

The structure of the proposed transaction illustrates the statutory and regulatory considerations outlined in the 

preceding sections of this paper. Several applications were submitted in connection with the proposed acquisition. For 

example, the FDIC considered an application for deposit insurance for the new thrift; the OTS reviewed the new thrift’s charter 

application and an application for OneWest Bank, FSB to merge with New IndyMac; and the OTS also reviewed applications to 

allow the applicable parties to acquire control of OneWest Bank, FSB and become savings and loan holding companies under 

the Home Owners’ Loan Act.38

Central to the transaction for the PEIs was that they would have equity investments in OneWest Bank’s thrift holding 

company, without these investments causing them to become a regulated thrift holding company or BHC. In other words, 

while OneWest Bank was controlled by a regulated holding company, the PEI investors in that holding company did not 

wish to become regulated holding companies themselves. Thus, rebuttals of control were submitted on behalf of the parent 

thrift holding company’s two largest shareholders and their related entities—Paulson & Co., Inc. and J.C. Flowers & Co. 

LLC—each of which acquired 24.99 percent ownership interests in the thrift holding company. These companies also sought 

and received a determination from the FDIC that their proposed equity investments in the parent thrift would not result in 

either group being deemed to be (i) in control of OneWest Bank, FSB or its holding company within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. 

§ 1813(w)(5) or § 1831o or (ii) a “controlling shareholder” within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u). These determinations 

ensured that their equity investments in the new thrift holding company and in other institutions would not cause them to 

become subject to the FDIC’s statutory cross-guarantee authority.39

As the PEIs with equity investments in the parent thrift holding company were not viewed as control investors, and 

therefore were not subject to holding company regulation, it was important to ensure that they did not exert management 

control over the new institution. The FDIC’s approval of deposit insurance was conditioned on receiving the rebuttals of 

control mentioned above, which would limit the investors’ influence on the management and policies of the new thrift and 

restrict transactions between the investors, the investment funds they managed, and the new thrift. The FDIC’s approval of the 

application for deposit insurance also required prior notice of any material business plan changes, quarterly business plan 

variance reporting, and monthly reporting under the bank’s loss-share agreements with the FDIC. The proposed transaction 

38 Investors in OneWest Bank, FSB included four savings and loan holding companies in a tiered structure. For details, search under RSSD ID = 3943386 

(IMB Management Holdings Group, LLC) using the FFIEC National Information Center search tool at https://www.ffiec.gov/NPW, with an as-of date of 

June 30, 2009.

39 Under 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e), an FDIC-insured depository institution may have a liability to the FDIC for losses the FDIC incurs in the event of the failure of, or 

FDIC assistance to, a commonly controlled insured institution. The FDIC may waive the liability if doing so is in the best interest of the DIF.
11

was approved based on evaluation of the statutory factors, including the capital resources contributed by the investors to the 

transaction and management’s overall banking experience and expertise.

FDIC Statement of Policy on Qualifications for Failed Bank Acquisitions

As the FDIC reviewed the proposals submitted under the modified bidder qualification program, it determined that 

some of the proposed structures raised potential safety-and-soundness concerns and risks to the DIF. The FDIC determined 

that it should provide clarity to potential acquirers about the types of failed bank transactions the FDIC believed would be 

consistent with the safety and soundness of the resulting banks.

A proposed Statement of Policy was published in July 2009. As the FDIC conveyed in the statement’s introduction, its 

concerns centered on the need for fully adequate capital, a source of financial and managerial strength for the depository 

institution, and the potential adverse effects of extensions of credit to affiliates. The proposed Statement of Policy explained, 

“The FDIC is particularly concerned that owners of banks and thrifts, whether they are individuals, partnerships, limited 

liability companies, or corporations, accept the responsibility to serve as responsible custodians of the public interest that 

is inherent in insured depository institutions and will devote their efforts to assuring that banks or thrifts acquired with 

assistance from the deposit insurance fund do not return to the category of troubled institutions.”40

The FDIC sought and reviewed comments on the proposed Statement of Policy and, in September 2009, published a 

Final Statement of Policy (Statement).41 The Statement contained elements designed to preserve the safety and soundness 

of the insured institutions resulting from failed bank acquisitions. It applied to private investors in companies proposing 

to directly or indirectly assume deposits of a failed bank, and to applicants for deposit insurance for bank or thrift charters 

issued in connection with the resolution of failed banks. The Statement clarified that it was not intended to interfere with 

or supplant holding company regulation, and that any of the Statement’s provisions could be waived by the FDIC Board of 

Directors if doing so was in the best interests of the DIF.

The Statement communicated the FDIC’s expectations in a number of areas including that (1) insured institutions 

resulting from failed bank acquisitions would maintain a ratio of tier 1 common equity capital to total assets of at least 

10 percent for three years following the transaction; (2) if one or more investors own 80 percent or more of two or more banks 

or thrifts, the stock of these banks or thrifts commonly owned by the investors would be pledged to the FDIC against the 

possibility that any of these banks or thrifts would fail; (3) new extensions of credit from resulting insured institutions to the 

investors or certain of their interests would be prohibited; (4) ownership structures involving entities domiciled in secrecy 

law jurisdictions would not be permitted to have direct or indirect ownership of a resulting insured institution unless the 

investors are subject to comprehensive and consolidated supervision and agree to providing certain information to U.S. 

banking regulators;42 (5) investors would be prohibited from selling or transferring their securities within three years following 

the acquisition without FDIC approval; (6) complex and opaque ownership structures, for example “silo structures,” would not 

be viewed as appropriate for approval for ownership of insured banks;43 and (7) investors that directly or indirectly own more 

than 10 percent of a failing institution would not be eligible to bid for that institution in receivership.

40 FDIC, Proposed Statement of Policy on Qualifications for Failed Bank Acquisitions, 74 Fed. Reg. 32931 (July 9, 2009). 

41 FDIC, Final Statement of Policy on Qualifications for Failed Bank Acquisitions, 74 Fed. Reg. 45440–49 (Sept. 2, 2009).

42 The Statement describes secrecy law jurisdictions as countries that apply bank secrecy laws that, among other things, limit U.S. regulators ability to 

ascertain compliance with U.S. law. 

43 “Silo structures” have been described as arrangements where a fund manager may have a fund dedicated to bank investments and other funds dedicated 

to commercial investments, in such a way that the fund manager avoids designation as a bank holding company (even if one or more entities within the 

banking silo are designated as bank holding companies). By avoiding designation as a bank holding company, the fund manager can avoid divesting the 

commercial activities and avoid source-of-strength commitments. See Desai (2009). 
12

The Statement addressed FDIC concerns about a number of proposals put forward by PEIs to acquire failed banks. New 

banks formed from the assets of failed banks posed potentially greater risk than other new banks, and the expectation for 

resulting banks to maintain a 10 percent ratio of tier 1 common equity to assets for three years was intended to mitigate these 

risks.44 The expectation for investor agreement to a form of cross guarantee was to protect the DIF when the FDIC entered into 

transactions with investors who were seeking substantial common ownership of multiple insured institutions. The prohibition 

on new extensions of credit to investors was to address risks with respect to transactions with affiliates by private capital 

investors who are not subject to the activities restrictions of the Bank Holding Company Act.45 Direct or indirect ownership 

of insured banks by entities domiciled in bank secrecy jurisdictions can make it difficult for the FDIC to obtain information 

about a company’s owners and its affiliated entities. Limitations on the sale of an investor’s interest within the first three years 

were intended to encourage long-term investments to promote the stability of an insured bank, including the stability of the 

institution’s management. The expectation that silo structures would not be permitted was to avoid situations where effective 

control of an insured institution was held by an entity that assumed none of the obligations typically associated with such 

control.46 The limitation on participation by persons with substantial ownership of the failed bank was intended to address 

the potential conflicts of interest inherent in such situations.47

Although the Statement provided potential investors with information about the FDIC’s expectations about the 

parameters of failed bank acquisitions, certain aspects required additional clarity. The FDIC subsequently posted two sets 

of questions and answers on its website, in January 2010 and in April 2010.48 The questions and answers addressed several 

issues and clarified the portion of the Statement dealing with “strong majority interest.” The Statement had indicated that 

it did not apply to “investors in partnerships or similar ventures with bank or thrift holding companies or in such holding 

companies (excluding shell holding companies) where the holding company has a strong majority interest in the resulting 

bank or thrift and an established record for successful operation of insured banks or thrifts.” The questions and answers 

outlined, with greater specificity, situations in which the FDIC would not generally expect investors to agree to be subject to 

the terms of the Statement.

In short, while PEIs were seeking to enter into failing bank transactions with the FDIC that they hoped would be 

financially advantageous to them, the Statement described the FDIC’s expectations for failing bank transactions that would be 

consistent with the safety and soundness of resulting insured institutions. Whether to agree to be subject to the terms of the 

Statement was up to each PEI entity.

Agreements were memorialized in writing as part of the conditions for approval of deposit insurance, if applicable, or in 

acknowledgement letters that the FDIC required the PEIs to provide as a condition for entering into a transaction. Generally, 

the FDIC would proceed with a transaction only if investors representing at least a third of the resulting insured bank’s total 

voting equity shares or total equity shares—a so-called anchor group—agreed to be subject to the terms of the Statement.49

44 FDIC, Final Statement of Policy on Qualifications for Failed Bank Acquisitions, 74 Fed. Reg. 45446 (Sept. 2, 2009). By comparison, the FDIC Statement of 

Policy on Applications for Deposit Insurance states that the initial capital raised by a proposed institution should generally be sufficient to provide a leverage 

ratio of at least 8 percent throughout the first three years of operation. See 63 Fed. Reg. 44756 (Aug. 20, 1998). As the FDIC has also stated, “While the 8 percent 

threshold will generally be applied to proposals displaying a traditional risk profile, the FDIC may seek a higher level of capital for those proposals displaying 

heightened risk profiles or complexity, such as with respect to the proposed institution’s anticipated size, complexity, and business strategy.” See FDIC 

Statement of Policy on Applications for Deposit Insurance Q&As, November 2014, available at https://www.fdic.gov/news/financial-institution-letters/2014/

fil14056a.pdf.

45 FDIC, Final Statement of Policy on Qualifications for Failed Bank Acquisitions, 74 Fed. Reg. 45447 (Sept. 2, 2009).

46 See 74 Fed. Reg. 45447.

47 See 74 Fed. Reg. 45447; see also FDIC, Proposed Statement of Policy on Qualifications for Failed Bank Acquisitions, 74 Fed. Reg. 32932 (July 9, 2009).

48 FDIC, Statement of Policy on Qualifications for Failed Bank Acquisitions, Q&As Posted in January and April 2010, https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/

faqfbqual.html.

49 FDIC, Q&As Posted in January and April 2010.
13

Failed Bank Transaction Structures

Because bidders for failed banks must be FDIC-insured if they are to assume failed bank deposits, organizers backed 

by PEIs typically used one of two vehicles to establish a platform to acquire a failed bank: a newly insured bank or thrift, or 

a recapitalized existing bank or thrift. A deposit insurance application was required for investor groups seeking to obtain 

clearance to bid through newly chartered and newly insured banks or thrifts (commonly called “shelf charters”). Alternatively, 

investor groups obtained clearance to bid using an existing insured bank as the acquisition platform (commonly called 

“inflatable charters”).50 For inflatable charters, the underlying application or filing could include a merger application, change 

in control notice, or other filing depending on the circumstances.

Regardless of the strategy selected by the investors or the type of filing, the FDIC, in granting its clearance to bid, required, 

at a minimum, conditional approval from the chartering authority, an acceptable business plan (including detailed integration 

plans and strategies), appropriate and readily available capital, and a satisfactory management team.51 In addition, as noted, 

the FDIC expected an anchor-group of investors to agree to the terms of the Statement.

Table 5 lists the types of filings submitted in conjunction with open bank recapitalizations, as well as shelf and inflatable 

charter proposals.

Table 5

Applications and Filings Submitted in Connection With Bank Acquisitions and Recapitalizations

Structure Filing Type Purpose

Shelf Charters •Charter and Deposit Insuranc

Application 

•Necessary to establish an insured shelf charte

•Holding Company Filing(s) – a

applicable

•Necessary in the event of holding company formation o

to resolve requirements to operate as a passive investor.

Inflatable Charters 

and Open Bank 

Recapitalizations

• Bank Merger Act Application •Necessary to effect acquisition of an insured depositor

institution (IDI) by an existing IDI, depending on the 

transaction structure.

•Notice of Change in Control •Necessary for the primary organizer to acquire control

the “platform” IDI, though investors may be passive.

•Other Filing (e.g., Busines

Plan Change Request, Capital 

Restoration Plan)

•May be necessary depending on the circumstances o

the platform or target institution.

•Holding Company Application(s

– as applicable 

•Necessary in the event of holding company formation o

to resolve requirements to operate as a passive investor.

Source: FDIC.

Ultimately, all applicable statutory factors and other applicable regulatory requirements had to be considered and 

favorably resolved for the FDIC (and the other banking agencies) to approve the respective filings and allow PEI-backed 

acquisitions to occur. Table 6 differentiates common characteristics of successful and unsuccessful PEI-backed proposals.

50 Inflatable charters involve the injection of significant capital into existing institutions for the purpose of acquiring one or more failed IDIs.

51 Certain investors were also required to make passivity commitments to the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, or the chartering agency with respect to their 

planned ownership interests.
14

Table 6

Characteristics of Successful and Unsuccessful Failed Bank Acquisition Proposals

Aspect Successful Unsuccessful

Business Plans •Well-supported business plan wit

reasonable underlying assumptions.

•Appropriate focus on three key phases

resolution of acquired problem assets, 

generation of organic loans/deposits, 

and transition into ongoing operations 

consistent with business model.

•Comprehensive and well-develope

integration and contingency plans.

•Vague, poorly conceived, or aggressive busines

plan that places an undue emphasis on growth 

and/or acquisitions without viable long-term 

strategies.

•Unsupported projections and assumption

•Failure to address integration plan

•Plans that included staggered (“pay-as-you-grow”

or uncertain capital contributions over the first 

three years of operation.

Management •Key management and/or directors wit

requisite experience identified early in the 

filing process.

•Individuals with strong background

in managing problem assets, handling 

acquisitions, and overseeing contemplated 

activities.

•Adequate risk management framewor

(policies, procedures, controls, etc.).

•Appropriate staffing depth an

management succession plans.

•Reasonable compensation plans (e.g.

salaries/bonuses, employment agreements, 

stock incentive plans, severance packages).

•Unacceptable management/directors and/or void

in several key management positions (e.g., Chief 

Lending Officer or Chief Financial Officer).

•Poor due diligence (proposed managemen

candidates with unsuitable backgrounds).

•Inexperience managing problem assets or workin

in a regulated banking environment.

•Inadequate policies, procedures, controls, ris

tolerance levels, staffing resources, and/or 

succession plans.

•Unacceptable compensation plans (e.g., salar

based on third-year assets, excessive stock options, 

stock warrants tied to achieving certain stock 

prices).

Capital •Sufficient capital relative to risk profile an

acquisitions strategy.

•Firm capital commitments (signed investo

agreements and escrowed funds).

•Acceptable equity structures withou

unfavorable embedded control elements. 

•Insufficient capital given risk profile and planne

growth through acquisitions.

•Inability to secure capital commitment

•Undisclosed follow-on or contingent capital plan

•Unacceptable, convoluted, or overly complicate

equity structures.

Other •The FDIC was able to favorably resolv

all statutory factors and other relevant 

regulatory/supervisory considerations.

•No issues with respect to affiliate, insider, o

third-party relationships.

•Satisfactory resolution of consideration

described in the FDIC Statement of 

Policy on Qualifications for Failed Bank 

Acquisitions (FDIC Policy Statement).

•The FDIC was unable to resolve one or mor

statutory factors applicable to the filing (commonly 

capital, management, and/or risk to the Deposit 

Insurance Fund).

•Material affiliate or insider concern

•Unresolved FDIC Policy Statement issues (e.g.

ownership/equity structure, secrecy jurisdiction).

Source: FDIC.
15

PEI Involvement in FDIC Failure Resolutions During the 2008–2013 Banking Crisis

According to data gathered contemporaneously during the crisis by FDIC staff, 17 acquiring banks connected with PEI 

groups purchased 58 failed banks during the crisis years 2008 through 2013, and two other failed banks in 2014, through the 

creation of new bank charters (e.g., shelf charters) specifically to acquire failed banks or through substantial equity injections 

that positioned existing banks (e.g., inflatable charters) to acquire failed banks.52 Table 7 lists the 17 acquiring banks and 

the 60 failed banks they acquired. Table 7 also lists the open banks that some of the 17 banks acquired after their initial 

failed bank acquisitions.53 For some of the acquiring banks in Table 7, the investor groups consisted of multiple PEI entities. 

To avoid attempting to distinguish a lead PEI group for each acquiring bank, Table 7 does not list the PEI groups associated 

with the 17 acquiring banks.

 The 60 failed banks collectively reported about $81 billion in assets on their last Consolidated Reports of Condition and 

Income (Call Report) before failure. Their assets at failure totaled about $75 billion, of which the 17 acquiring banks acquired 

about $63.4 billion. FDIC staff has estimated based on Call Report data that the PEIs contributed approximately $5.4 billion 

in new capital in connection with these failure resolutions.54 The 60 failures cost the DIF approximately $21.3 billion. FDIC 

staff analysis indicated that without PEI participation, the estimated cost to the DIF of the 60 failures would have been $24.6 

billion. The $3.3 billion difference reflects the difference in cost between the winning PEI bids and the next-best bids submitted 

by banks that were not backed by PEIs, or in some cases the difference between the PEI bids and the estimated cost of a 

payout and liquidation. The staff analysis indicated that 24 of the 60 failures would have been handled as payouts, absent 

PEI participation.

As shown in Table 7, a number of these 17 failed bank acquirers became active acquirers of open banks. Through 

December 31, 2020, the 17 acquiring banks in Table 7 collectively acquired 38 other open banks, with last-reported total assets 

(in aggregate) of $22.6 billion, after acquiring their first failed bank. Twelve of these open banks were acquired during the 

2008–2013 crisis years, and 26 were purchased after the crisis.

A notably large proportion of the 17 private-equity backed acquiring banks have since been acquired by other banks, an 

outcome that is generally consistent with the view that most private equity investors in failed banks did not intend to become 

permanent investors in the acquired banks. Of the 17 acquiring banks in Table 7, through December 31, 2020, 13 had merged 

into other banks. Of these 13, 11 were acquired by unaffiliated banks and 2 were consolidated into affiliated banks.55 Three of 

the 17 acquiring banks existed as active FDIC-insured institutions.56 One of the 17 acquiring banks (CertusBank, NA) voluntarily 

relinquished FDIC insurance in 2015 and self-liquidated without FDIC assistance. None of the 17 had failed.

52 Specifically, the 17 acquiring institutions were those for which staff believed the nature of PEI involvement triggered application of the FDIC’s Statement 

of Policy on Qualifications for Failed Bank Acquisitions, or would have triggered its application had the Statement been in effect. Johnston-Ross et al. (2021) 

(available at https://www.fdic.gov/analysis/cfr/working-papers/2021/cfr-wp2021-04.pdf), using slightly broader criteria not based on the applicability of 

the FDIC’s Statement, report that 62 failed banks acquisitions were backed by private equity compared with the 60 reported in this paper. 

53 In Table 7, “Hillcrest Bank, NA/Bank Midwest/NBH” is listed as a single acquiring bank. Hillcrest Bank NA and Bank Midwest (which changed its name to 

NBH Bank) were separate banks under the common control of NBH Holdings.

54 FDIC research staff estimated the capital contributions based on first reported capital for de novo acquirers and change in capital surplus for pre-existing 

acquirers. 

55 Hillcrest Bank, NA was acquired by an affiliate, Bank Midwest, NA (the two were commonly controlled by NBH Holdings); and Superior Bank was acquired 

by an affiliate, Cadence Bank (the two were commonly controlled by Community BC LLC). 

56 The three remaining banks as of December 31, 2020, were Premier Bank, NBH Bank, and BankUnited, NA. OneWest Bank, FSB became a division of CIT 

Bank after CIT Group acquired OneWest Bank in 2015. Thus, although CIT Bank operated under the original OneWest Bank FDIC certificate number as of yearend 2020, OneWest is considered an acquired bank for purposes of this discussion.
16

Table 7

Private-Equity Acquisitions of 2008–2013 Failed Banks and Subsequent Acquisitions1

Acquiring Bank

Bank Acquired

(Failed banks are not shaded; open banks are shaded)

Name Acquisition Date

OneWest Bank, FSBa IndyMac, FSB March 19, 2009

First Federal Bank of California December 18, 2009

La Jolla Bank, FSB February 19, 2010

BankUnited, NAb BankUnited, FSB May 21, 2009

Herald National Bank March 22, 2013

State Bank and Trust Companya Security Bank of North Metro June 24, 2009

Security Bank of Jones County June 24, 2009

Security Bank of Houston County June 24, 2009

Security Bank of Gwinnett County June 24, 2009

Security Bank of Bibb County June 24, 2009

Security Bank of North Fulton June 24, 2009

The Buckhead Community Bank December 4, 2009

First Security National Bank December 4, 2009

Northwest Bank and Trust July 30, 2010

United Americas Bank, NA December 17, 2010

Piedmont Community Bank October 14, 2011

Community Capital Bank October 21, 2011

Bank of Atlanta October 1, 2014

First Bank of Georgia July 24, 2015

S Bank December 31, 2016

National Bank of Georgia December 31, 2016

Alostar Bank of Commerce September 30, 2017

Premier American Bank, NAa Premier American Bank January 22, 2010

Florida Community Bank January 29, 2010

Peninsula Bank June 25, 2010

Sunshine State Community Bank February 11, 2011

Cortez Community Bank April 29, 2011

First National Bank of Central Florida April 29, 2011

Coastal Bank May 6, 2011

First Peoples Bank July 15, 2011

Great Florida Bank February 1, 2014

Floridian Community Bank March 1, 2018

continued on page 17
17

Table 7 continued from page 16

Private-Equity Acquisitions of 2008–2013 Failed Banks and Subsequent Acquisitions1

Acquiring Bank

Bank Acquired

(Failed banks are not shaded; open banks are shaded)

Name Acquisition Date

Community & Southern Banka First National Bank of Georgia January 29, 2010

Appalachian Community Bank March 19, 2010

First Commerce Community Bank September 17, 2010

Bank of Ellijay September 17, 2010

The Peoples Bank September 17, 2010

Georgia Trust Bank July 20, 2012

First Cherokee State Bank July 20, 2012

Verity Bank June 24, 2014

Eastside Commercial Bank July 18, 2014

Alliance National Bank September 19, 2014

Community Business Bank May 8, 2015

First Michigan Banka CF Bancorp (Citizens First Savings Bank) April 30, 2010

First Banking Center November 19, 2010

People's State Bank February 11, 2011

Community Central Bank April 29, 2011

First Place Bank February 10, 2014

Signature Bank February 6, 2015

Talmer West Bank August 21, 2015

Bay Bank, FSBa Bay National Bank July 9, 2010

Carrollton Bank April 19, 2013

Slavie Federal Savings Bank May 30, 2014

Hopkins Federal Savings Bank July 8, 2016

NAFH National Banka Turnberry Bank July 16, 2010

Metro Bank of Dade County July 16, 2010

First National Bank of the South July 16, 2010

TIB Bank April 30, 2011

Capital Bank June 30, 2011

GreenBank September 8, 2011

Southern Community Bank and Trust October 11, 2012

Communityone Bank, NA October 26, 2016

First Southern Banka Haven Trust Bank September 24, 2010

First Commercial Bank of Florida January 7, 2011

continued on page 18
18

Table 7 continued from page 17

Private-Equity Acquisitions of 2008–2013 Failed Banks and Subsequent Acquisitions1

Acquiring Bank

Bank Acquired

(Failed banks are not shaded; open banks are shaded)

Name Acquisition Date

Hillcrest Bank, NA/ Hillcrest Bank October 22, 2010

Bank Midwest, NA/ Bank of Choice July 22, 2011

NBH Bankc Community Banks of Colorado October 21, 2011

Pine River Valley Bank August 1, 2015

Peoples National Bank January 1, 2018

Peoples Bank January 1, 2018

Grandpoint Banka First Vietnamese American Bank November 5, 2010

First Commerce Bank December 28, 2010

Orange Community Bank August 30, 2011

Bank of Tucson June 21, 2013

Regents Bank, NA September 20, 2013

Gilmore Bank September 26, 2013

The Biltmore Bank of Arizona March 21, 2014

CertusBank, NAd CommunitySouth Bank and Trust January 21, 2011

Atlantic Southern Bank May 20, 2011

First Georgia Banking Company May 20, 2011

Hometown Community Bank November 16, 2012

Parkway Bank April 26, 2013

AloStar Bank of Commercea Nexity Bank April 15, 2011

Superior Bank, NAa Superior Bank April 15, 2011

Hamilton State Banka Bartow County Bank April 15, 2011

McIntosh State Bank June 17, 2011

The First State Bank January 20, 2012

Douglas County Bank April 26, 2013

Cherokee Bank, NA February 17, 2014

Highland Commercial Bank August 31, 2015

Premier Bankb Mid City Bank, Inc November 4, 2011

Farmers Bank and Trust Company April 6, 2015

continued on page 19
19

Table 7 continued from page 18

Private-Equity Acquisitions of 2008–2013 Failed Banks and Subsequent Acquisitions1

Acquiring Bank

Bank Acquired

(Failed banks are not shaded; open banks are shaded)

Name Acquisition Date

Harbor Community Banka Putnam State Bank June 15, 2012

Bank of St. Augustine August 29, 2013

Highlands Independent Bank October 25, 2014

First America Bank May 9, 2015

Florida Citizens Bank December 5, 2015

Jefferson Bank of Florida July 28, 2017

Source: FDIC.

1 As of December 31, 2020. Acquiring banks were identified by FDIC staff as being backed by PEIs to an extent that triggered application 

of the FDIC’s Statement of Policy on Qualifications for Failed Bank Acquisitions, or would have had the statement been in effect. Acquiring bank name is as of its first failed bank acquisition during 2008–2013. Names of acquired open banks are shaded, names of acquired 

failed banks are not shaded.

a

 Acquired by another insured institution after acquiring the listed banks.

b

 Active insured institution, same name.

c

 Active insured institution, different name.

d

 Voluntarily relinquished insurance and self-liquidated.

Context on the Role of PEIs During the Crisis

This paper has described the framework and processes by which PEIs made investments in companies that acquired one 

or more failing banks during the 2008–2013 banking crisis. In this section we broaden the focus by placing in context the role 

of private equity investment in all banks (that is, not limited to the failing banks discussed above) relative to overall capital 

raising by U.S. banks, and the role PEIs played in the resolution of crisis-era bank failures.

Private equity investment appears to have constituted a small but by no means immaterial subset of overall capital raising 

by FDIC-insured banks during the 2008–2013 banking crisis. There is no readily available, non-proprietary source of information 

about private equity investments in banks, but a number of accounts provide a rough sense of the scope and extent of PEI 

activity. An American Banker article published in November 2012 stated that $31 billion had “changed hands” in 187 private 

equity transactions involving U.S. banks since the start of 2008.57 Shortly thereafter, SNL Financial reported that it had identified 

only “23 major-exchange-traded U.S. bank and thrift stocks where a PE firm owned at least 10% of the listed common shares 

outstanding,” as of May 2013.58 More recently, DeYoung, Kowalik, and Torna (2018) collected data on private equity investments 

from SNL Financial, S&P Capital IQ, and Bloomberg databases and reviewed press releases and U.S. Securities and Exchange 

Commission filings relevant to banks identified by the data.59 The authors identified private equity capital injections in 

97 banking companies between 2004 and 2016, of which 79 were publicly traded and 18 were privately held. The authors 

stated, “To the best of knowledge, these deals comprise the population of all PE investments in publically traded commercial 

banks during this time period.”60 The authors also stated that “In 2008, PE investment in U.S. banking companies totaled only 

57 Monks, “The Private Equity Effect.”

58 Andy Pierce and Maria Tor, “SNL Report: Private Equity Mostly Ignores Banking Sector,” Banking Exchange, May 17, 2013, https://m.bankingexchange.com/

management-topics/item/1951-snl-report-private-equity-mostly-ignores-banking-sector.

59 Robert DeYoung, Michael Kowalik, and Gokhan Torna, “Private Equity Investment in U.S. Banks,” (Unpublished Working Paper, March 26, 2018), 

https://business.depaul.edu/about/centers-institutes/financial-services/Documents/DeYoung%20Kowalik%20Torna.pdf.

60 DeYoung et al. (March 26, 2018), p. 2.
20

about $400 million; by 2012, PE investment in U.S. banking companies had increased to more than $7 billion.”61 To place these 

dollar amounts in context, total capital injections into FDIC-insured institutions by one measure totaled $392 billion during 

the 2008–2013 crisis.62 Investments by the U.S. Treasury under its Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) bank programs totaled 

about $245 billion.63 Thus, of the $392 billion, at least $147 billion consisted of capital injections from private sector sources.64

In the sphere of failed bank resolution, PEI groups played an important role. During the crisis years 2008–2013, the 

17 PE-backed acquirers in Table 7 acquired 58 failed banks, or 12 percent of crisis-era failures, and the assets they acquired 

in these transactions were about 22 percent of assets passed to all acquirers of crisis-era failed banks (excluding the assets 

of Washington Mutual). PEI involvement materially reduced the FDIC’s resolution costs of those failures and allowed the 

FDIC to resolve banks less disruptively than would otherwise have been the case. The new capital infused into the banking 

industry by these PEI groups likely supported credit availability during the crisis. This is especially the case in those failures 

where resolution by deposit payoff and liquidation of assets was avoided, as that is the type of resolution where the risk of 

disruptions to established credit relationships may be greatest.65

Conclusion

The acquisition of failed banks by PEI-backed acquirers presented opportunities and risks to both the PEIs and the FDIC. 

PEIs sought an opportunity to acquire equity investments in banking franchises at potentially favorable prices or terms. For 

the FDIC’s part, PEI participation in the bidding process for failed banks held out the possibility of avoiding disruptive deposit 

payouts or increasing the prices the FDIC received for failed bank assets, and thereby lowering its resolution costs.

The primary risk to PEIs that acquired a stake in a bank was that the investment would not work out as hoped. A wellknown example of this was the investment in Washington Mutual, led by the private equity firm TPG, in April 2008. The 

September 2008 headline, “WaMu Fall Crushes TPG” illustrates that investments in banks are not risk-free.66 Acquiring failed 

banks, where the FDIC as receiver bears a significant portion of the losses, may have been viewed as presenting more limited 

downside risks for PEIs.

However, unless the FDIC liquidates a failed bank’s assets and pays off its insured deposits, a failed bank transaction 

requires an agreement between the acquirer and the FDIC. Thus, any transaction must both attract bidders and be less costly 

to the FDIC than a payoff or the other bids. Notwithstanding that any transaction requires the FDIC to thread these multiple 

constraints, there is always the possibility that a transaction is viewed in retrospect as being costly to the DIF. Such criticism 

happened, for example, with the BankUnited transaction.67

61 DeYoung et al. (March 26, 2018), p. 2.

62 “Capital injections” for this analysis were measured for each bank at each of the six year-ends 2008–2013, as the sum of “sale, conversion, acquisition, or 

retirement of capital stock, net (excluding Treasury stock transactions),” if positive, and “other transactions with stockholders (including a parent holding 

company),” if positive, from Call Report schedule RI-A. 

63 The U.S. Treasury reports that its total investments under the three TARP bank programs that made investments were as follows: in the Capital Purchase 

Program, $204.9 billion; in the Targeted Investment Program (Citigroup and Bank of America Corporation), $40 billion; and in the Community Development 

Capital Initiative, $570 million (see https://home.treasury.gov/data/troubled-assets-relief-program and follow the link to “bank investment programs”).

64 This analysis does not attempt to determine how much of the $245 billion in TARP investments was down-streamed from bank holding companies into 

FDIC-insured banks, nor what amounts were invested in credit unions or other nonbanks. 

65 For a discussion of adverse local economic spillover effects associated with bank failures, see Adam Ashcraft, “Are Banks Really Special? New Evidence from 

the FDIC-Induced Failure of Healthy Banks,” American Economic Review 95, no. 5 (December 2005).

66 Peter Lattman, “WaMu Fall Crushes TPG,” Wall Street Journal, September 27, 2008.

67 See, e.g., Shira Ovide, “BankUnited IPO: Who Got Rich?” Wall Street Journal, January 28, 2011. 
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The private equity business model may sometimes involve a short-term investment horizon or a willingness to take risk 

that may be associated with a high potential return.68 In entering into failed-bank transactions with PEIs, the FDIC sought to 

manage the risk that the resulting banks would not be appropriately capitalized or that PEI investors would adopt short-term 

strategies that would not be consistent with the long-term safety and soundness of the resulting banks. The FDIC sought to 

limit these risks by ensuring that failed bank transactions with PEI-backed acquirers were on prudent terms.

Given the numerous expressions of interest in acquiring failed banks, the FDIC decided it would be appropriate to 

clarify the parameters for failed bank acquisitions that it viewed as generally consistent with the safety and soundness of the 

resulting banks. The FDIC provided this clarity in its Statement of Policy on Qualifications for Failed Bank Acquisitions and 

subsequently published question and answer documents.

In retrospect, private equity investments in failing banks during the 2008–2013 crisis appear to have had satisfactory 

outcomes. FDIC staff estimated that PEI participation lowered the FDIC’s resolution costs by about $3.3 billion on a subset of 

the crisis-era bank failures and enabled the FDIC to handle 24 failures as purchase and assumptions instead of payouts. None 

of the acquiring insured depository institutions in Table 7 has failed. On balance, experience to date suggests that the careful 

approach the FDIC took during the crisis when entering into failing bank transactions with PEIs was successful in lowering the 

agency’s failure resolution costs in a manner consistent with the safety and soundness of resulting banks.

68 DeYoung et al. report that the 79 public companies that received PE capital injections appear to have operated with a higher-return, higher-risk strategy 

than their peers. An analysis of the performance of private-equity-backed acquiring banks is in Emily Johnston-Ross, Song Ma, and Manju Puri, “Private Equity 

and Financial Stability: Evidence from Failed Bank Resolution in the Crisis,” (Working Paper, no. 2021-04, FDIC Center for Financial Research, April 2021), 

https://www.fdic.gov/analysis/cfr/working-papers/2021/cfr-wp2021-04.pdf.