The Honor able Joseph H. McKinley , J r., United States District Judge f or the Western * District of Ke ntucky , sitti ng by desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0428n.06 F iled: Jun e 20, 2007 No. 06-3843 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v. AN DR E A . PO ND ER De fe nd a nt- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DI STRI CT OF OH I O, EASTERN DI VI SI ON

Before: M oore and Gr if fi n, Circuit Judges; McK inley, District Judge. * McK inley, District Judge. Def endant- Appellant Andre Ponder wa s indicted by a fede ral g ra nd jur y fo r b e inga

fe lon in p os se ssi on

of a fi re a rm . Fol lo wi ng his in dic tme nt, the De fe nd a ntAppellant filed a

motion to s uppress the e vidence obtained as a result of the w arr antless sea rch of his brother’s h o m e. T h e district court denie d Ponder’s motion to suppress and Ponder e ntere d a conditional g uilty plea. On appea l, Ponder argues that the district c ourt err ed in deny ing his motion to suppress bec ause the war rantless sea

rch o f his brother’ s home was not justified by exigent circ umstances. The Gover nm en t argues that the district cour t erre d in finding tha t Ponder hadNo. 06-3843

United States v. Ponde r Pag e 2 sta nd ingto c ha lle ng e the wa rr a ntl e ss se a rc h of his br oth e r’ s h ome sin c e he wa s an o ve rn ig ht gue st there . For

the re asons set for

th below, we AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

. I. BACKG ROUND On September

24, 2004, a ca ller ale rted police that s h o t s h ad b een fired. When police of fi c e rs a rr ive d o n th e sc e ne , th e y ob se rv e d a blo od ie d, va nd a lize d v e hic le wi th s ma sh e d w ind ow s. Th e ow ne r o f t

he c a r, Willi e Hi ne s, tol d th e of fi c e rs that two br oth e rs ha d v a nd a lize d h is v e hic le and threatene d him with a gun. Hines told the offic ers that he could identify the two brother s and of fe re d to ta ke the m to the pla c e wh e re Hi ne s b e lie ve d th e y wo uld be . T he of

fi c e rs pla c e d H ine s in the back of their patrol vehicle and followed his directions. The police eventua lly arr ived at what they would lear

n was one of t he brothe rs’ homes a nd saw two blac k males on the porc h whom Hines identified as his assailants. When one of the suspects on the por ch sawthe police c ar, he ran inside. Th e po lic e a

pp ro a c he d th e other suspe c t, w ho re ma ine d o n th e po rc h, a nd wh o w a s e ve ntu a lly identified as Andr e Ponder, t h e Def endant- Appellant (“ Andre ”), a nd observe d that his hand was

wra pped in cloth and b l ee d ing. T he off icer s proce eded to plac e Andr e under arr est for f

elonious assault and va

ndalism to a vehic le. Simult aneously , the offic ers r equeste d permission to searc h the home into which the other brother, K eny a, had f

led. Keny a’s g irlfrien d , a re s ident of the home,

re fu se d to a llo w the po lic e to e nte r wi tho ut a wa rr a nt. She a sk e d, ho we ve r, that sh e be a llo we d to

r e m o v e h e r c h i l d r e n , w h o w e r e a s l e e p i n t h e h o m e , i f p o l i c e w e r e g o i n g t o e n t e r t h e h o u s e a n yw a y. The police then proc eede d to enter a nd sear ch the p re m i s es for Keny a. Dur ing the ir sear ch, they found two g uns in the clothes dry er . Eventually , the police f ound Keny a hiding in a neig hbor’s house.No. 06-3843

United States v. Ponde r Pag e 3 On November 9, 2004, a fede ral g rand jury indicted Andre for being a felon in possession of a fire arm. F ollowing his indictment, the De fenda nt-Ap p el l ant filed a

motion to s uppress the

e vid e nc e ob ta ine d a s a

re su lt o f t

he wa rr a ntl e ss s e a rc h o f h is b ro the r’ s h ome , whe re he c la ime d to b e an o v er n i gh t gu es t

. T h e d i s t ri ct co u rt h el d t h at t h e D ef

en d an t -A p p el l an th ad s t an d i n g t o ch al l en ge the war rantless sea

rch of his bro t h er ’s re sidence beca use he w as an ove rnig ht gue st there. The district court, howe ver, de nied the motion to suppress, holding that the w arr ant l es s s ea rch w as justified by

the exist ence of “e x ige nt circumstanc es.” II. AN AL YSI S A. The Defendan t-Appellant has S tandin g I nit ia lly , th e Go ve rn me nt a rgue s th a t th e De fenda

nt- Ap pe lla

nt d oe s n ot h a ve sta

nd ingto object to the sea

rch of Keny a’s residenc e since Andre was only a visitor there and, ther efor e, had

no rea sonable e x pectat ion of privac y . The De fenda nt-Appellant a

rg ues that this issue cannot be considere d on appea l be cause the Gover nment did not appea l the district court’s orde r holding that the Def endant- Appellant h ad standing . The De fenda nt-Appellant’s a

rg ument fails in this reg ard beca use a pr evailing party

need not c ross-appe al to be entitl ed to support the judg ment in its favor

on g rounds expressly

reje cted by

the district court. See , e.g ., J ac ob s v . E .I

. d u P on t deNe mo ur

s & Co. , 6 7 F .3 d 1 21 9, 12 46 n. 43 (6 Cir . 1 99 5) (“

.. .a n ap pelle e c a n p ro po se a lte rn a tiv e g ro un ds in th

su pp or t of tr ia l c ourt

jud g me nt s o lo ng a s th os e a rgume nts we re pr e se nte d b e low ” ); Ba ll v . A bb ott Adve rtising, Inc. , 8 6 4 F. 2 d 419, 421 (6 Cir. 1988) (“Adefe ndant may raise a n alternative theory th wi t h o u t cross-a

ppealing .”) A ccor dingly , we c an conside r whe ther the D efe ndant-Appe llant has standing to c halleng e the war rantless sear ch since the Gover nment raised the issue befor e the districtNo. 06-3843

United States v. Ponde r Pag e 4 court. To have standing , a per son m u s t h av e a subjective expectation of pr ivacy in the premises

sear ched. Minnesota v. Olson , 495 U.S. 91, 95-97 (1990). The Defenda nt has the burde n of proof to establish the standing nece ssary to assert a Four

th A mendment violation. Un ite d S tat es v . S mi th , 26 3 F .3 d 5 71 , 5 82 (6 Cir

. 20 01 ). I mpo rt a ntl y , the Sup re me Court ha s he ld that a n ov e rn ig ht gue st, th unlike a g uest prese nt a

t a home without the homeowner ’s consent, has a rea sonable e x pectation of p r iv a c y th a t w il l s u

p p o rt s ta nding. Olson , 4 95 U. S. at 97 ; Minnesota v. Carter , 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998). I n the pr oc e e din g s bel ow , the dis tr ic t court he ld that the De fe nd a nt- Ap pe lla nt h a d me t hi s burden of establishing sta

nding by prese nting the “ consistent and unequivoca l” testimony of three witnesses - his mother, his brother , and his brother ’s g irlfriend. The district court found that the testimony of these w itnesses outweig hed the c ircumstantial evidenc e introduce d by the Gover nment, that Andre broug ht no pe rsonal overnig ht items to his brother’s re sidence and that he

never told the pol ice that he was an overnig ht g uest there

. On appe al, the Gove rnment ar g ues that Def endant- Appellant’s witnesse s were not c redible beca use their testimony was contra dictory and beca use they soug ht to protect the De fenda nt-Appellant. Howeve r, i n revie wing a mot ion to suppress, the district court’s factua l finding s are acc epted unless clea

rly err oneous. United States v. Huffman , 4 61 F .3 d 7 77 , 7 82 (6 Cir . 2 00 6) ; United States th v. Ogbuh , 982 F.2d 1000, 1003 ( 6 Cir. 1993). To put it another wa y , a district co u rt ’s fac tual th finding s are overturne d only if the appellate court has “a definite a nd firm conviction that a mistake has bee n committed.” Huffman , 9 8 2 F. 2 d at 7 8 2 (q u o t i n g United States v. W orley , 193 F.3d 380, 384No. 06-3843

United States v. Ponde r Pag e 5 (6 Cir. 1999)). Ac cording ly , a “district court’s findings ba sed on the c redibility of witnesses be fore th it are entitled to g reat defe renc e on appe al.” Is ab e l v . Ci ty of M e mp his , 404 F.3d 404, 411 ( 6 Cir. th 2005). Her e, base d on the evidenc e, we find rea sonable the district c ourt’s conclusion that the De fe nd a nt- Ap pe lla

nt w a s an ove rn ig ht gue st at hi s b ro the r’ s r e sid e nc e . T hu s, the De fe nd a ntAppellant has standing to challeng e the war rantless sea

rch tha t occur

red on the night in question. B. Th e Warr antless Search was Ju stifi ed On appea l, the Def

endant- Appellant argues that the war rantless sear ch of the home was not justified beca

use not one of the exigent eme rg enc y ex ceptions is applicable to the situation that exis ted when the police ente red K eny a’s home w ithout a warr ant. We disag ree . I t is a “ ‘b a sic pr inc ipl e of

F ourt h A me ndme nt’ law tha t se a rc he s and se izur e s in sid e a

ho me without a warra

nt are presumptively

unrea sonable.” O’Brien v . City of Grand Rapids , 23 F.3d 990, 9 9 6 (6 C i r. 1 9 9 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Pa y ton v . Ne w York , 4 45 U. S. 5 73 , 5 86 (1 98 0) ). Thus , th e F ou rt h th Am e ndme nt p ro hib its the wa rr a ntl ess en tr

y a nd se a rc h o f a

ho me a bs e nt e xig e nt c ir c ums tanc e s. Payton , 445 U.S. at 589-590. Exigent cir cumstance s are situations where “r ea l , i mmediate, and

se ri ou s c on se qu e nc e s” wi ll “ c e rt a inl y oc c ur ” if a po lic e of fi c e r pos tpo ne s ac tio n to ob ta in a wa rr a nt. United States v. W

illiams , 3 5 4 F. 3 d

4 9 7 , 5 0 3 (6 C i r. 2 0 0 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Ewolski v. City of Brunswi ck,

th 2 8 7 F. 3 d 4 9 2 , 5 0 1 (6 C i r. 2 0 0 2 )( qu o t i n g W e lsh v . W isc on sin , 4 66 U. S. 7 40 , 7 51 (1 98 4) ); se e a lso th Thacker v . City of Col umbus , 328 F.3d 244, 253 ( 6 Cir. 2003). The r eleva nt inquiry is whether the th fa c ts a re su c h th a t an o bje c tiv e ly re a so na ble of fi c e r c on fr on te d wi th t

he same c ir c ums tanc e s c ou ld

rea sonably believe that exi g ent circ umstances e x isted. Ewolski , 2 8 7 F. 3 d at 5 0 1 (c i t i n g Dicke rsonNo. 06-3843

United States v. Ponde r Pag e 6 v. Mc Clellan , 101 F.3d 1 1 5 1 , 1158 (6 Cir. 1996)). F inally , it is t he Gove rnment who be ars the th burden of proving the exist ence of a le g itimate exi g ency . Un ite d S tat es v . Le wis , 231 F.3d 238, 241 (6 Cir. 2000). th We ha

ve identified the following situations that may g ive rise to exige nt circumstanc es: 1) the ho t pur su it of a fl e e ing fe lon ; 2) the imm ine nt de str uc tio n o f e vid e nc e ; 3) the ne e d to pr e ve nt a suspect’s e scape ; and 4) the r isk of dang er to police or others. W illiams , 3 5 4 F

. 3 d a t50 3; Un ited States v. Johnson , 2 2 F .3 d 6 74 , 6 80 (6 Ci r. 19 94). Whe the r e xig e nt c ir c ums tanc e s e xist is th deter mined at “the moment of

the war rantless e ntry

by the offic ers.” United States v. Killebrew , 560 F.2d 729, 733 ( 6 Cir. 1977). Her e, the district cour t held that the war ra n t l es s entry of Ke ny a’s th home was justified ba sed on the fou rth exception - bec ause the situation created “a n immediate threat to the safe ty

of the off icer s.” I n order to show that the war

rantless e ntry

and sea rch of a re sidence was justified base d upon a “r isk of dang er,” the Government must show that “ther e wa s a risk of se rious injury posed to the office rs or other s that require d swift action.” Huffman , 4 6 1 F. 3 d a t 7 8 3 ( c i t i n g United States v. W hren , 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996))

. More spe cifica lly , a “r isk of dang er” exis ts where 1) the off icer s have a re a so na ble be lie f t

ha t a su sp e c t in

the ho me ha s a we a

po n; an d 2) t

he of fi c e rs c a n d e mon str a te that the suspect ha d a willingne ss to use the wea pon. Cau se

y v . City of Ba

yCity , 442 F.3d 524, 529 (6 C i r. 2006). Ac cording ly , in Causey , our cour t held that it was rea sonable for office rs to enter th

a re sidence on New Y ear ’s Eve w ithout a warr ant bec ause, a fter le arning that a g un had bee n fired on the prope rty

six times, it was nece ssary for the office rs to “asc erta in whether someone inside the ho us e wa s in pe ri l,” de sp ite the fa c t th a t 1) a ne ig hb or ha d in fo rm e d th e of

fi c e rs that sh ots ha d a lsoNo. 06-3843

United States v. Ponde r Pag e 7 b ee n fi re d fr o m t h e h o m e on p re v i o u s h o l i d ay s ; 2 ) t h e o ff i ce rs h ad s p o k en t o t h e o cc u p an t s t h ro u gh a window a

nd the occ upants had told the off icer s that no one wa s injured; and 3) the office rs made

no observations that c ontradicte d the occ upants’ assur ance s. Id . Our c ourt up he ld t he se a rc h b e c a

us e t h e fa ct s i n d i cate d that there was someone within the residenc e who ha d both a wea pon and a willingness to use it and, thus, the officer s had a justified, re asonable belief tha t either they or others

we re in i mmi ne nt p e ri l of bo dil y ha rm . Simi larly , we ha

ve upheld wa

rra ntless searc hes due t o a “r isk of dang er” in Dicke rson v. McClellan , 101 F.3d 1151 ( 6 Cir. 1996), and Hancoc k v. D odson , 958 F.2d 1367 ( 6 Cir. 1992). th th I n Dicke rson , o u r c o u rt h e ld th a t a w a r r a n tl e s s e n tr

y in to a h o me w a s ju s ti f

ie d w h e r e a ne ighbor called 911 to repor

t that nine g unshots ha d been fired; the occupa nt of the house wa s drunk; and the office r hea

rd the oc cupant y elling in a threa tening tone. 101 F.3d 1151. I n Hancoc k , our c ourt

he ld that exigent cir cumstance s exi sted wher e, in addition to a shots-fire d repor t, the police also kne w from the suspec t’s psy cholog ist that the suspect wa s “suicidal and possibly homicidal” and that he had threatene d to kill any responding office r. Hancoc k , 958 F.2d at 1375-76. These c ases a re unlike United St a t es v. Bates , i n wh i ch o u r c o u rt h el d t h at n o ex i gen tci rc u m s t an ce ex i s t ed , ev en t h o u gh the offic ers be lieved that the suspec t had a ha ndg un in his re sidence , since the of fice rs possessed no specific information s ug g esting that the suspect wa s likely to use the we apon or be come violent. 84 F.3d.790, 795- 796 (6 Cir. 1996). th Th e po lic e in th is case , bas ed on the fa c ts k no wn to t he m a t th e tim e of

the ir wa rr a ntl e ss entry i n to Keny a’s r esidenc e, could r easona bly have c oncluded that the c ircumstance s posed an immediate risk of harm, either to themselves or others. I t was re asonable for the of fice rs to fea

r thatNo. 06-3843

United States v. Ponde r Pag e 8 Keny a had both a wea

pon and a willingness to use it since Wil lie Hines had indicated that Andre and Keny a we re the individuals who had illeg ally fi re d s h o t s near his home less than an hour e arlier

. Acc ording ly , the offic ers we re justified in m ak i n g a wa rra ntless entry

into the house to sear ch for Keny a. Th e De fe nd a nt- Ap pe lla nt f ur the r a rgue s, ho wev er, that

e ve n if the po lic e ha d a

re a so na ble belief that a “risk of harm” exis ted, this ex ige nt situation was cre ated by the offic ers themse lves, and there fore , the war

rantless sea

rch w as not justified. I t is well-e stablished that police officer s are not fre e to cre ate e x ige nt circumstanc es to justify their wa rra ntless searc hes. Un ite d S tat es v . Ca mp be ll , 261 F.3d 628, 633 ( 6 Cir. 2001)(citing th United States v. Morgan , 743 F .2 d 115 8, 11 63 (6 Cir . 198 4) ). I nd e e d, in o rd e r “ fo r a wa rr a ntl e ss th

sear ch to stand, law e nforc ement off icer s must be responding to an unanticipat ed exigenc y rathe r than simply cre ating the exigenc y for themse lves.” Un ite d S tat es v . Ch am be rs , 395 F.3d 563, 566 (6 Cir. 2005). I mportantly , howeve r, establishing that police have creat ed an exi g ent situation th usually require s a showi n g o f “de liberate conduct on the pa rt of the police evincing an ef fort intentionally

to evade the war

rant re quirement.” Ewolski v. City of Brunswi ck, 287 F.3d 492, 504 ( 6 th Cir. 2002). There is no evidenc e her e to sug g est that the police ma de a de liberate eff ort to evade the

war rant re quirement. Rather , it appear s that they wer e proper ly conducting an ong oing inve stiga tion that ha d b e g un

jus t a fe w h ours e a rl ie r. Ac c or din g ly , w e ho ld t ha t th e of fi c e rs did no t in te nti on a lly

c r e a t e a n e x i g e n ts i tu a t i o n , b u t r a t h e r t h e e x i g e n t s i tu a t i o n n a tu r a l l y a r o s e w h e n t h e y o b s e r v e d K e n ya flee into the house. III . C ON CL USI ONNo. 06-3843

United States v. Ponde r Pag e 9 For

all of the re asons set for

th above, we AF F IRM the judg ment of the district cour t.