UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

DANIEL E. WILKINS, 

 Plaintiff, 

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v. Cause No. 3:15-CV-514 JD 

BRUCE LEMON, DAVID LIEBEL, AND 

MARK SEVIER, 

 Defendants. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 Daniel E. Wilkens, a pro se prisoner, alleges that he is being prevented from practicing his 

religion in three distinct ways. He brings this claim against three defendants based on three legal 

theories and seeks both monetary damages and injunctive relief. “A document filed pro se is to be 

liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 

94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Nevertheless, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, 

the court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or 

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against 

a defendant who is immune from such relief. 

 The first way Wilkens alleges that he is being prevented from practicing his religion is by 

being denied “Halal meat that has been slaughtered in the name of Allah [by a] trained Muslim 

man . . . with a very sharp knife across the jugular vein [while] prayers are said throughout the 

proceedings.” DE 2 at 6. The second way is by being denied Halal prayer oils from a reliable 

source which are “essential to the (5) five obligatory daily prayers [and] Jumah Friday prayer in 

congregation.” DE 2 at 7. The third is way is by being denied “festive foods such as dates, sheep, 
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chicken, beef, lamb & goat . . . fruits, milk, [and] special breads [during the] three days [of] EidUl-Fitr and Eid-Ul-Adha Islamic festival according to the Islamic traditions.” DE 2 at 8. 

1. FIRST AMENDMENT 

 Wilkins alleges that the defendants are violating his First Amendment right to practice his 

religion. Prisoners have a right to exercise their religion under the Free Exercise Clause of the First 

Amendment. Vinning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591, 592-93 (7th Cir. 2011). Nevertheless, restrictions 

that limit the exercise of religion are permissible if they are reasonably related to legitimate 

penological objectives, which include safety, security, and economic concerns. Turner v. Safley, 

482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987). At this stage of the litigation, it is unclear why Wilkins is being denied 

the ability to practice his religion. Therefore he will be granted leave to proceed for injunctive 

relief against Commissioner Bruce Lemmon in his official capacity for violating the First 

Amendment. Though he has also sued the two other defendants in their official capacity, it is 

unclear whether either of them have the authority to provide the relief sought. What is clear is that 

the Commissioner does have the required authority and that it is unnecessary to have more than 

one official capacity defendant. 

 Wilkins also asks for monetary damages from David Liebel on his First Amendment 

claims. The complaint alleges that Liebel “is the Director of IDOC Religious Services and a 

member of the Religious Practice Committee responsible for religious policies and procedures.” 

DE 2 at 5. Attached to the complaint is a Grievance Response Report showing that Liebel denied 

his request for meals with Halal meats. DE 2-1 at 22. Attached is a Grievance Response Report 

showing that Liebel denied his order for prayer oil. DE 2-1 at 30. Also attached is a Grievance 

Response Report showing that Liebel denied his request for festive foods. DE 2-1 at 41. Based on 
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these allegations, Wilkins will be granted leave to proceed for monetary damages against Religious 

Services Director David Liebel for violating the First Amendment right to practice his religion. 

2. RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT 

 Wilkins alleges that the defendants are preventing him from practicing his religion in 

violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act or RLUIPA. This statute 

affords even broader protections than the First Amendment by providing that “No government 

shall impose . . . a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined 

to an institution . . . unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that 

person – (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive 

means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). See also

Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. __, __; 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015). However, the statute does not authorize an 

award of money damages against state officials; an inmate may only obtain injunctive relief under 

RLUIPA. Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. __, __; 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1658-59 (2011). Therefore, 

Wilkins will only be granted leave to proceed for injunctive relief against Commissioner Bruce 

Lemmon in his official capacity for violating RLUIPA. 

3. EQUAL PROTECTION 

 Wilkins alleges that the defendants are violating his Equal Protection rights by preventing 

him from practicing his religion while allowing other similarly situated inmates to practice their 

religions. He alleges that other religious groups “purchase ritual items from outside venders . . ..” 

DE 2 at 10. He alleges that Christian Kiros celebrates “their yearly retreat with foods from an 

outside vendor Burger King, McDonalds, and other pre-cooked foods . . ..” DE 2 at 11. 
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 Prisons must permit inmates the reasonable opportunity to exercise 

religious freedom. However, prison restrictions that infringe on an inmate’s 

exercise of his religion are permissible if they are reasonably related to a legitimate 

penological objective, such as security and economic concerns. The court must 

balance [the prisoner]’s right to be afforded a reasonable opportunity to exercise 

the religious freedom guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments against 

the legitimate penological goals of the prison. Within these confines, a prison is 

required to make only reasonable efforts to provide some opportunity for religious 

practice. This test is less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to infringements on 

constitutional rights in consideration of the need to give appropriate deference to 

prison officials, avoiding unnecessary judicial intrusion into security problems and 

other prison concerns. 

 In providing this opportunity, the efforts of prison administrators, when 

assessed in their totality, must be evenhanded. Prisons cannot discriminate against 

a particular religion except to the extent required by the exigencies of prison 

administration. The rights of inmates belonging to minority or non-traditional 

religions must be respected to the same degree as the rights of those belonging to 

larger and more traditional denominations. Of course, economic and, at times, 

security constraints may require that the needs of inmates adhering to one faith be 

accommodated differently from those adhering to another. The treatment of all 

inmates must be qualitatively comparable. 

Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 719–20 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets 

omitted). 

 Again, at this stage of the litigation, it is unclear why Wilkins is being denied the ability to 

practice his religion. Therefore he will be granted leave to proceed on a claim for injunctive relief 

against Commissioner Bruce Lemmon in his official capacity for violating his right to Equal 

Protection. He will also be granted leave to proceed on a claim for monetary damages against 

Religious Services Director David Liebel in his individual capacity for violating his right to Equal 

Protection. 

 For these reasons, the court: 

 (1) GRANTS Daniel E. Wilkens leave to proceed on an official capacity claim for 

injunctive relief against Commissioner Bruce Lemmon for preventing him from practicing his 
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religion by denying him Halal meat, Halal prayer oil, and festive foods during religious holidays 

in violation of his First Amendment, RLUIPA, and Equal Protection rights; 

 (2) GRANTS Daniel E. Wilkens leave to proceed on an individual capacity claim for 

compensatory and punitive damages against Religious Services Director David Liebel for 

preventing him from practicing his religion by denying him Halal meat, Halal prayer oil, and 

festive foods during religious holidays in violation of his First Amendment and Equal Protection 

rights; 

 (3) DISMISSES all other claims; 

 (4) DISMISSES Mark Sevier; 

 (5) DIRECTS the clerk and the United States Marshals Service to issue and serve process 

on Bruce Lemmon and David Liebel with a copy of this order and the complaint (DE 2) as required 

by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and 

 (6) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that Bruce Lemmon and David Liebel 

respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only 

to the claims for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order. 

SO ORDERED. 

ENTERED: October 17, 2016 

 

 /s/ JON E. DEGUILIO 

Judge 

United States District Judge