UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Case No. 3:12-CR-124 JD 

 ) Related Case Nos. 3:14-CV-1683 JD 

MARQUIS KASIMIR BROADWAY ) 3:16-CV-0411 JD 

 

OPINION AND ORDER

 After pleading guilty, Marquis Kasimir Broadway was convicted of carjacking, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1) (Count 1), and carrying and brandishing a firearm during a 

crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count 2). On July 29, 2013, Mr. 

Broadway was sentenced to 162 months of imprisonment, comprised of 78 months on the 

carjacking charge (at the low end of the advisory guidelines range applicable to that count), 

followed by the consecutive 84 months on the § 924(c) charge (the statutory mandatory 

minimum term of imprisonment because the gun was admittedly brandished) [DE 60]. Mr. 

Broadway did not file a direct appeal, but filed a timely petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

[DE 63], which the Court denied in an extensive decision on the merits [DE 93] after holding an 

evidentiary hearing [DE 91]. Thereafter, Mr. Broadway, represented by the Federal Community 

Defenders’ office, filed a second motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [DE 97], along 

with an application seeking authorization from the Seventh Circuit to file the successive § 2255 

motion, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). The Seventh Circuit denied Mr. Broadway’s request 

and determined that the classification of federal carjacking as a crime of violence is unaffected 

by Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2010). Broadway v. United States, No. 16-2646, 

doc. 5 (7th Cir. July 21, 2016). 
2 

 Section 2255 gives a federal prisoner one opportunity to challenge a conviction and 

sentence following a direct appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a), (h). If a prisoner seeks to challenge 

his conviction or sentence a second time, he must persuade a court of appeals to certify the 

motion and authorize the district court to hear it. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(a)–(b), 2255(h). 

Without authorization from the court of appeals, the district court has no jurisdiction to hear the 

petition. Suggs v. United States, 705 F.3d 279 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 

147, 152–53 (2007)); Nunez v. United States, 96 F.3d 990, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (“From the 

district court’s perspective, it is an allocation of subject-matter jurisdiction to the court of 

appeals. A district court must dismiss a second or successive petition, without awaiting any 

response from the government, unless the court of appeals has given approval for its filing. Even 

an explicit consent by the government to beginning the case in the district court would be 

ineffectual; the power to authorize its commencement does not reside in either the district court 

or the executive branch of government. A second or successive collateral attack may no more 

begin in the district court than a criminal prosecution may commence in the court of appeals.”). 

 Here, Mr. Broadway is challenging the same conviction and resulting sentence a second 

time via § 2255 without authorization from the Seventh Circuit. Because the Court has no 

authority to consider the unauthorized successive petition, it is DISMISSED for want of 

jurisdiction [DE 97], and a certificate of appealability will not be issued. 

 SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED: July 26, 2016 

 

 /s/ JON E. DEGUILIO 

 Judge 

 United States District Court