13-2156 Huang v. Lynch BIA Poczter, IJ A200 236 668 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT** 

## SUMMARY ORDER

**RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF**  **APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN**  **ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.**  **At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals** 1 **for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United** 2 **States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,** 3 **on the 3 rd** **day of March, two thousand sixteen.** 4 5 **PRESENT:** 6 **JON O. NEWMAN,** 7 **PETER W. HALL,** 8 **DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,** 9 Circuit Judges**.** 10

**_____________________________________** 11 12 **BIN HUANG,** 13 Petitioner**,** 14 15 **v. 13-2156** 16 **NAC** 17 **LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES** 18 **ATTORNEY GENERAL,** 19 Respondent**.** 20

**_____________________________________** 21 22 **FOR PETITIONER: Mona Liza F. Lao, New York, New** 23 **York.** 24 25 **FOR RESPONDENT: Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant** 26 **Attorney General; John W. Blakeley,** 27 **Acting Assistant Director; Francis** 28 **W. Fraser, Senior Litigation** 29 **Counsel; Office of Immigration** 30**Litigation, United States Department** 1 **of Justice, Washington, D.C.** 2 3 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 4 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 5 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 6 is DENIED. 7 Petitioner Bin Huang, a native and citizen of the 8 People’s Republic of China, seeks review ofan April 30, 9 2013, decision of the BIA affirming the August 6, 2012, 10 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied his 11 application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 12 under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and his motion 13 for a continuance. In re Bin Huang, No. A200 236 668 14 (B.I.A. Apr. 30, 2013),aff’gNo. A200 236 668 (Immig. Ct. 15 N.Y. City Aug. 6, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity 16 with the underlying facts and procedural history in this 17

case. 18 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed 19 the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. Yan Chen v. 20 Gonzales , 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable 21 standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. 22 § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 23 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). 24

2**I. Adverse Credibility Determination** 1 For asylum applications such as Huang’s, which are 2 governed by the REAL ID Act, the agency may, considering the 3 totality of the circumstances, base a credibility finding on 4 an asylum applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” 5 the plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies in his 6 statements, without regard to whether they go “to the heart 7 of the applicant’s claim.” See8 U.S.C. 8 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 9 167 (2d Cir. 2008). 10 The agency’s adverse credibility finding is supported 11 by substantial evidence. The IJ properly relied on Huang’s 12 inconsistencies and implausible testimony to find a lack of 13 credibility. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii);Xiu Xia 14 Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. 15 Huang testified that Chinese police detained and beat 16 him because he worshiped at a house church, and that the 17 beating was so severe that he was unable to work for the 18 next year. However, he did not mention this inability to 19 work in his asylum application, and it is not mentioned in 20 the letter his mother wrote in support of his application. 21 Huang further testified that police officers visited his 22

3parents’ house every two or three months looking for him, 1 but neither his application nor his mother’s letter 2 indicates that officers visited more than once. 3 To explain these discrepancies, Huang testified that he 4 did not think that his inability to work for a year was 5 important when preparing his application, and that he did 6 not tell his parents that he was unable to work. He also 7 testified that he thought his mother’s letter, which stated 8 that police officers had come looking for him, was 9 sufficiently detailed. None of these explanations compels a 10 reasonable fact-finder to credit it. Majidi v. Gonzales , 11 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2005). 12 The IJ similarly did not err in finding implausible 13 Huang’s testimony that he never sought medical treatment for 14 injuries so severe that he was allegedly unable to work for 15 a year after they were inflicted. This finding is “tethered 16 to record evidence” and based on common sense, and therefore 17 we do not disturb it. Siewe v. Gonzales , 480 F.3d 160, 168- 18 69 (2d Cir. 2007). 19 The IJ found that Huang’s sparse corroborating evidence 20 did not rehabilitate his incredible testimony. Biao Yang v. 21 Gonzales , 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). The IJ also 22

4found that Huang had failed to provide reasonably available 1 evidence regarding his religious activities, both in China 2 and in the United States, most importantly testimony or an 3 affidavit from his wife. These findings were supported by 4 substantial evidence. See8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4); Xiao Ji 5 Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 471 F.3d 315, 341, 342 (2d 6 Cir. 2006); Yan Juan Chen v. Holder, 658 F.3d 246, 253 (2d 7 Cir. 2011). Huang argues that a failure to corroborate, on 8 its own, may not be the basis of an adverse credibility 9 determination, Xiao Ji Chen, 471 F.3d at 341, but here the 10 IJ found Huang incredible not solely on that basis. 11 Because the only evidence of a threat to Huang’s life 12 or freedom depended upon his credibility, the adverse 13 credibility determination in this case necessarily precludes 14 success on his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, 15 and relief under the CAT

. See Paul v. Gonzales , 444 F.3d 16 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). 17 **II. Denial of Continuance** 18 We review the agency’s denial of a continuance for 19 abuse of discretion. Sanusi v. Gonzales , 445 F.3d 193, 199 20 (2d Cir. 2006). An abuse of discretion occurs “if (1) [a] 21 decision rests on an error of law (such as the application 22 of the wrong legal principle) or a clearly erroneous factual 23 5finding[;] or (2) [a] decision–though not necessarily the 1 product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual 2 finding–cannot be located within the range of permissible 3 decisions.” Morgan v. Gonzales , 445 F.3d 548, 551-52 (2d 4 Cir. 2006). The IJ did not abuse her discretion in denying 5 Huang’s motion for a continuance because Huang had 6 sufficient time before his merits hearing to procure 7 witnesses. Cf. Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 198 (2d 8 Cir. 2009) (“[T]he alien bears the ultimate burden of 9 introducing [corroborating] evidence without prompting from 10 the IJ”). 11 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 12 DENIED. Any pending request for oral argument in this 13 petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 14 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 15 34.1(b). 16
FOR THE COURT: 17 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 18 19

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