IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

RICKY LYNN JACKSON, SR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 1:14-CV-368

)

DARRELL HIMELICK, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the court on the complaint filed

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Ricky Lynn Jackson, Sr., a pro se

prisoner, on November 24, 2014. For the reasons set forth below,

the court: (1) DIRECTS the clerk to place this cause number on a

blank 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Prisoner Complaint form and send it to Ricky

Lynn Jackson, Sr.; (2) GRANTS Ricky Lynn Jackson, Sr., until April

16, 2015, to file an amended complaint; and (3) CAUTIONS Ricky Lynn

Jackson, Sr., that if he does not respond by that deadline, this

case will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A because the

current complaint does not state a claim. 

BACKGROUND

Jackson alleges that on September 25, 2014, a fellow inmate

punched him in the face with a closed fist causing an abrasion to

the inside of his bottom lip and injuring his back. He alleges that

Lt. Jail Commander Cathy Lee failed to give the inmate his

psychiatric medication that day. He alleges that Lt. Jail Commander
Cathy Lee placed him in a one man holding cell for fighting even

though he was acting in self defense. He alleges that Sheriff

Darrell Himelick, Lt. Jail Commander Cathy Lee, and Captain Randy

Albertson refused him medical treatment for his back and refused to

file charges against his attacker. 

DISCUSSION

“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a

pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and

citations omitted). However, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the

court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it

if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against

a defendant who is immune from such relief. “In order to state a

claim under § 1983 a plaintiff must allege: (1) that defendants

deprived him of a federal constitutional right; and (2) that the

defendants acted under color of state law.” Savory v. Lyons, 469

F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006).

At the time of these events, it is unclear whether Jackson was

a convicted prisoner or a pre-trail detainee at the jail. “Although

the Eighth Amendment applies only to convicted persons, pretrial

detainees . . . are entitled to the same basic protections under

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the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. Accordingly,

[courts] apply the same legal standards to deliberate indifference

claims brought under either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.”

Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 831 (7th Cir. 2010). 

When an inmate is attacked by another inmate, the Constitution

is violated only if “deliberate indifference by prison officials

effectively condones the attack by allowing it to happen.” Haley v.

Gross, 86 F.3d 630, 640 (7th Cir. 1996). The defendant “must both

be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the

inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). General

requests for help and expressions of fear are insufficient to alert

guards to the need for action. Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d

633, 639–40 (7th Cir. 2008). Here, Jackson does not allege that he

expressed any concerns about the other inmate prior to the attack.

Neither does he explain how Jail Commander Lee knew that the inmate

would become violent toward Jackson if he missed his medication.

Based on these allegations, he has not stated a claim for failing

to protect him. 

Jackson is also suing Jail Commander Lee for placing him in a

one man holding cell for fighting even though he was acting in self

defense. However, “inmates do not have a constitutional right to

raise self-defense as a defense in the context of prison

disciplinary proceedings.” Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 848 (7th

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Cir. 2011). After the fight, it was necessary for the jail to reestablish order and “[c]oncerns of security are to be given

‘particular sensitivity.’” Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 800 (7th

Cir. 2008). “[A] prison’s internal security is peculiarly a matter

normally left to the discretion of prison administrators [because

p]rison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in

the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their

judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and

to maintain institutional security.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.

312, 321–22 (1986) (quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). Thus,

Jackson has not stated a claim for being placed in a holding cell

after the fight. 

Jackson alleges that the defendants refused to file charges

against his attacker. However, “a private citizen lacks a

judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution

of another.” Del Marcelle v. Brown Cnty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 901

(7th Cir. 2012) quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619

(1973). Therefore this does not state a claim. 

Finally, Jackson alleges that the defendants denied him

medical treatment. In medical cases, the Constitution is violated

only when a defendant was deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s

serious medical needs. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369

(7th Cir. 1997). “[C]onduct is deliberately indifferent when the

official has acted in an intentional or criminally reckless manner,

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i.e., the defendant must have known that the plaintiff was at

serious risk of being harmed and decided not to do anything to

prevent that harm from occurring even though he could have easily

done so.” Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005)

(quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). “Negligence on

the part of an official does not violate the Constitution, and it

is not enough that he or she should have known of a risk. Instead,

deliberate indifference requires evidence that an official actually

knew of a substantial risk of serious harm and consciously

disregarded it nonetheless.” Pierson v. Hartley, 391 F.3d 898, 902

(7th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). It is not enough to show that

a defendant merely failed to act reasonably. Gibbs v. Franklin, 49

F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1995). Even incompetence does not state

a claim of deliberate indifference. Walker v. Peters, 233 F.3d 494

(7th Cir. 2000). 

Here, Jackson has not explained how serious an injury he

suffered to his back. The injury to his lip was minor and it cannot

be inferred that seeing it would have put anyone on notice that he

had a back injury. Jackson does not explain what each individual

defendant knew about his injury and how each one learned about it.

Though it is clear that he did not receive immediate medical

attention for his back, Jackson has not explained why he needed

immediate treatment. Neither does he say if or when he did receive

treatment for his back. Has he seen a doctor or nurse at the jail

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since the attack? When? What diagnosis was made and treatment

prescribed? 

A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state

a claim that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility

when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Factual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on

the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true

(even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotation

marks, citations and footnote omitted). “[W]here the well-pleaded

facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not

shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

679 (quotation marks and brackets omitted). Thus, “a plaintiff must

do better than putting a few words on paper that, in the hands of

an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has happened to

her that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A.,

614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original). Here,

Jackson has not plausibly alleged that any of these defendants were

deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. Therefore this

complaint does not state a claim. 

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Nevertheless, because Jackson might be able to provide

additional facts which could state a claim for the denial of

medical treatment against one or more of the defendants, he will be

granted leave to file an amended complaint. See Luevano v.

Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2013). In the amended complaint

he needs to clearly explain his back injury and what treatment he

has received for it. He needs to describe what each defendant

personally knew about his back injury and how each defendant

learned about it as well as how each defendant responded. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the court: (1) DIRECTS the

clerk to place this cause number on a blank 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Prisoner Complaint form and send it to Ricky Lynn Jackson, Sr.; (2)

GRANTS Ricky Lynn Jackson, Sr., until April 16, 2015, to file an

amended complaint; and (3) CAUTIONS Ricky Lynn Jackson, Sr., that

if he does not respond by that deadline, this case will be

dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A because the current

complaint does not state a claim. 

DATED: March 6, 2015 /s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United State District Court

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