UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

 v. 

COREY BONDS 

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Case No. 3:15-CR-054 JD 

OPINION AND ORDER

Defendant Corey Bonds was convicted on one count of brandishing a firearm in 

furtherance of a crime of violence—Hobbs Act robbery—in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and 

he was sentenced to the mandatory minimum statutory penalty of 7 years of imprisonment. 

Judgment was entered on January 29, 2016, and Mr. Bonds did not appeal. On June 29, 2016, 

Mr. Bonds filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In support, he argued that his conviction was 

unlawful under Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), and that his attorney was 

ineffective for failing to advise him of the Supreme Court’s holding in Carachuri-Rosendo v. 

Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010). The Court dismissed that motion, as Hobbs Act robbery remains a 

crime of violence even after Johnson and Mr. Bonds procedurally defaulted on that claim by not 

raising it on a direct appeal, and Carachuri-Rosendo had no possible application to Mr. Bonds’ 

case. 

Mr. Bonds filed a notice of appeal of that order, and has also moved for leave to proceed 

in forma pauperis on appeal. [DE 57]. Mr. Bonds is financially eligible to proceed in forma 

pauperis, and though the Court did not find that his claim was meritorious, it does not believe 

that his appeal is taken in bad faith. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Mr. Bonds’ motion for leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. 

In addition, after filing his notice of appeal, Mr. Bonds filed a motion under Rule 60(b), 

asking the Court to reconsider its dismissal of his motion under § 2255. Mr. Bonds argues that, 
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even though the only ground of ineffective assistance of counsel that he raised in his initial 

motion was his counsel’s failure to advise him about Carachuri-Rosendo, there are other grounds 

for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that he had not raised, and the Court should have 

independently considered those grounds before dismissing his motion. In particular, he argues 

that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a defective indictment, for permitting him 

to plead guilty when the elements of his offense had not all been established, and for failing to 

advise him of the mandatory minimum penalties. 

First, this Court lacks jurisdiction to grant Mr. Bonds’ Rule 60(b) motion, as Mr. Bonds 

has already filed a notice of appeal, which transfers jurisdiction to the court of appeals. Under 

those circumstances, the Court may either “defer considering the motion,” “deny the motion,” or, 

if applicable, “state either that it would grant the motion if the court of appeals remands for that 

purpose or that the motion raises a substantial issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a). The Court denies 

Mr. Bonds’ motion, as that would be the appropriate outcome even if this Court did have 

jurisdiction over the motion. Mr. Bonds argues that the Court erred by not considering grounds 

for relief that he had not even raised in his motion, as a motion under § 2255 should be dismissed 

where “the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings” demonstrate that 

the movant is not entitled to relief. Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United 

States District Courts, R. 4(b) (emphasis added). Mr. Bonds argues that because the new grounds 

he now raises were present in the record, the Court should have independently considered them 

before dismissing his motion. However, Rule 4(b) does not require the Court to evaluate 

arguments or claims the defendant has not even raised. Though pro se litigants are entitled to 

have their filings be construed liberally, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976), they are not 
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entitled to have courts raise independent grounds for relief on their behalf. Therefore, Mr. 

Bonds’ Rule 60(b) motion [DE 55] is DENIED. 

Finally, the Court does not reach the remaining arguments on the merits that Mr. Bonds 

wishes to add to his initial petition, as those additional arguments attacking the validity of his 

underlying conviction would constitute a second motion under § 2255, which this Court lacks 

jurisdiction to entertain. As discussed above, judgment has already been entered dismissing Mr. 

Bonds’ motion under § 2255. In addition, though motions to amend a § 2255 filing can be filed 

after a judgment but within the time for filing a notice of appeal, the present motion was filed 

over 60 days after entry of judgment, so it cannot fit that exception. Specifically, judgment was 

entered on July 19, 2016, and Mr. Bonds’ motion certifies that it was mailed on September 21, 

2016—64 days later. Accordingly, Mr. Bonds’ present motion must be considered a second 

motion under § 2255. However, a defendant must first receive permission from the court of 

appeals before filing such a motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). Until that happens, this Court lacks 

jurisdiction to consider any additional claims under § 2255. Suggs v. United States, 705 F.3d 

279, 282 (7th Cir. 2013). 

The Seventh Circuit addressed the same situation in Phillips v. United States, 668 F.3d 

433 (7th Cir. 2012). There, a defendant filed a motion under § 2255, the district court dismissed 

the motion, and the defendant filed a notice of appeal. While the appeal was pending, and after 

the time to appeal had expired, the defendant also filed a Rule 60(b) motion in the district court 

in which he supplemented the claim in his initial motion. The Seventh Circuit held that because 

judgment had already been entered on the initial motion under § 2255 and the time to appeal had 

expired, the Rule 60(b) motion constituted an unauthorized second motion under § 2255 and 

should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 668 F.3d at 435–36. That same sequence of 
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events occurred here, so the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider, and thus does not reach, the 

additional arguments Mr. Bonds raises in support of his claim for ineffective assistance of 

counsel. 

 SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED: November 28, 2016 

 

 /s/ JON E. DEGUILIO 

 Judge 

 United States District Court