IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

 SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

DERRICK McCAIN, ) 

) 

Petitioner, ) 

) 

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 3:15-CV-294 

) 

SUPERINTENDENT, ) 

) 

Respondent. ) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 This matter is before the Court on the Petition under 28 

U.S.C. Paragraph 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Derick 

McCain, a pro se prisoner, on July 13, 2015. For the reasons set 

forth below, the Court DENIES the petition pursuant to Section 

2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 4; DENIES the summary judgment motion (DE 

3); and DIRECTS the clerk to close this case. 

DISCUSSION 

 McCain filed this habeas corpus petition challenging MCF 15-

02-319, a prison disciplinary proceeding held at the Miami 

Correctional Facility where the Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) 

found him guilty of Battery in violation of B-212. As a result, he 

was sanctioned with the loss of 60 days earned credit time on March 

6, 2015. In his petition, McCain raises three grounds to challenge 

the finding of guilt. 
 First, McCain argues that he was overcharged because there is 

no evidence that he caused injury and therefore he should have 

only been charged with fighting as a class C offense – rather than 

with Battery as a class B offense. 

In reviewing a decision for some evidence, courts are 

not required to conduct an examination of the entire 

record, independently assess witness credibility, or 

weigh the evidence, but only determine whether the 

prison disciplinary board’s decision to revoke good 

time credits has some factual basis. 

McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999) (quotation 

marks omitted). “[T]he relevant question is whether there is any 

evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached 

by the disciplinary board.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 

455-56 (1985). 

 [T]he findings of a prison disciplinary board 

[need only] have the support of some evidence in the 

record. This is a lenient standard, requiring no more 

than a modicum of evidence. Even meager proof will 

suffice, so long as the record is not so devoid of 

evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board 

were without support or otherwise arbitrary. Although 

some evidence is not much, it still must point to the 

accused’s guilt. It is not our province to assess the 

comparative weight of the evidence underlying the 

disciplinary board’s decision. 

Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (quotation 

marks, citations, parenthesis, and ellipsis omitted). Even a 

Conduct Report alone can be sufficient evidence to support a 

finding of guilt. McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th 

Cir. 1999). Such is the case here. The conduct report states that 
McCain was “observed on the DVR system throwing punches and 

striking other offenders.” DE 1 at 10. It states, “[o]ne offender 

received serious bodily injury during the altercation while the 

rest received minor or superficial injuries.” Id. Given that McCain 

was seen hitting other offenders and everyone involved received 

some injuries, it was not arbitrary that the DHO concluded that 

McCain had caused injury to another offender. Cf. Hamilton v. 

O’Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 1992) (Affirming finding of 

guilt where a weapon was discovered in area controlled by four 

inmates because there was a twenty-five percent chance of guilt.) 

 Second, McCain argues that he was denied due process because 

the internal affairs investigator told the DHO that he was guilty. 

However there was nothing improper about such communication 

because “prison disciplinary boards are entitled to receive, and 

act on, information that is withheld from the prisoner and the 

public . . . ." White v. Ind. Parole Bd., 266 F.3d 759, 767 (7th 

Cir. 2001). Indeed, it would be expected that in most (if not all) 

cases that proceed to a hearing, the investigator believes that 

the accused inmate is guilty and has communicated that implicitly 

(if not explicitly) to the DHO. Nevertheless, is remains for the 

DHO to make the ultimate decision. 

 An inmate facing disciplinary charges has the right 

to an impartial decisionmaker. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 571. 

But “the constitutional standard for impermissible bias 

is high,” Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 

2003), and an adjudicator is entitled to a presumption 
of “honesty and integrity” absent clear evidence to the 

contrary, see Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S. 

Ct. 1456, 43 L. Ed. 2d 712 (1975). Due process requires 

disqualification of a decisionmaker who was directly or 

substantially involved in the underlying incident, 

Gaither, 236 F.3d at 820, and we have assumed that a 

decisionmaker might likewise be impermissibly biased if 

his spouse is a crucial witness in the proceeding, see 

Eads v. Hanks, 280 F.3d 728, 729 (7th Cir. 2002). A 

hearing officer is not automatically deemed biased, 

however, simply because he adjudicated or was involved 

in a previous disciplinary charge against the prisoner. 

See Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666-67; Pannell, 306 F.3d at 

502. 

Perotti v. Marberry, 355 Fed. Appx. 39, 43 (7th Cir. 2009). Merely 

hearing that the investigator believed the accused inmate was 

guilty does not demonstrate that the DHO was biased. 

 Third, McClain argues that the administrative appeal process 

is ineffective. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) 

identified rights related to the disciplinary hearing itself, but 

it did not provide for any procedural rights on appeal, nor even 

for a right to appeal at all. The Seventh Circuit has explained 

that Wolff set the limits of due process in prison disciplinary 

cases and they should not be expanded. See White v. Ind. Parole 

Bd., 266 F.3d 759, 768 (7th Cir. 2001). Therefore even if McClain 

is correct that the administrative appeal process is ineffective, 

that did not deny him due process and it is not a basis for habeas 

corpus relief. 

 Finally, McCain filed a motion for summary judgment. He states 

that he sent the respondent a copy of his habeas corpus petition, 
but no response was filed. However that is irrelevant. Section 

2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 5(a) provides that “[t]he respondent is 

not required to answer the petition unless a judge so orders.” The 

respondent was not ordered to answer. Moreover, no answer is needed 

because pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 4, “it plainly 

appears from the petition and [the] attached exhibits that the 

petitioner is not entitled to relief . . . .” Therefore the 

petition must be dismissed. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, the court DENIES the petition 

pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 4; DENIES the summary 

judgment motion (DE 3); and DIRECTS the clerk to close this case. 

DATED: March 16, 2016 

 /s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge 

United State District Court