UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

JACOB SAHLHOFF, )

)

Plaintiff )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 3:14cv1790RLM-CAN

)

GURLEY-LEEP AUTOMOTIVE )

MANAGEMENT CORP, et al., )

)

Defendants )

OPINION AND ORDER

Jacob Sahlhoff sues two defendants collectively called “Gurley-Leep” in this

opinion. He contends that he worked for Gurley-Leep as an automobile salesman

and that Gurley-Leep retaliated against him in violation of, and interfered with his

rights under, the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. Gurley-Leep

moves to dismiss Mr. Sahlhoff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Because the

amended complaint contains nothing from which it could be inferred that Mr.

Sahlhoff suffered from a serious health condition within the meaning of the FMLA

or that he engaged in activity protected by the FMLA, the court grants GurleyLeep’s motion and dismisses the complaint with leave to amend. 

The defendants move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to

dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim. To state a claim, a

complaint need only contain a short and plain statement showing that the plaintiff

is entitled to relief. See EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776
(7th Cir. 2007). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept as true

all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d

575, 580 (7th Cir. 2009). A complaint survives a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6) if it contains sufficient factual allegations to “state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir.

2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “Specific facts are not

necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . .

. claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

93 (2007) (ellipsis in original).

The court’s understanding of the facts comes from Mr. Sahlhoff’s amended

complaint; no alternative set of facts is in the record. Mr. Sahlhoff was working for

Gurley-Leep when he started having severe headaches centralized around his right

eye in March 2012 (all dates discussed were in 2012). Gurley-Leep discouraged

him from seeing a doctor, and encouraged him to work despite the pain. When Mr.

Sahlhoff sought medical help in May, the eye doctors found nothing wrong but

recommended more testing. Gurley-Leep discouraged him from seeking more

medical treatment and belittled his ability to work through pain, so Mr. Sahlhoff

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worked through the pain, even working overtime, and delayed further testing or

treatment. As the pain worsened, though, he decreased his overtime. 

On July 6, Gurley-Leep fired Mr. Sahlhoff because he wasn’t “committed to

the job.” In August, doctors determined the reason for Mr. Sahlhoff’s pain: he had

cancer in his right eye tear duct, and eventually had his right eye surgically

removed. 

Mr. Sahlhoff’s amended complaint doesn’t state a claim upon which relief

can be granted. It omits allegations from which various elements of his FMLA

claims can be inferred; with respect to some elements, the amended complaint’s

allegations are inconsistent with the elements of an FMLA retaliation or

interference claim. 

An FMLA interference claim requires (a) a plaintiff eligible for FMLA

protection, (b) an employer covered by the FMLA, (c) a plaintiff entitled to FMLA

leave, (d) sufficient notice to the employer to take leave, and (e) a denial by the

employer of FMLA benefits to which the plaintiff was entitled. Scruggs v. Carrier

Corp., 688 F.3d 821, 825 (7th Cir. 2012). To be entitled to FMLA leave, the

employee must have suffered from a serious health condition that left him unable

to perform the functions of his job. Ames v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 629 F.3d

665, 669 (7th Cir. 2011). A “serious health condition: is one that involves inpatient

care in a facility of some sort or continuing treatment by a health care provider.

29 U.S.C. §2611(11); Burnett v. LFW, Inc., 472 F.3d 471, 478 (7th Cir. 2006).

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Without a “serious health condition” within the meaning of the FMLA, an

employee isn’t entitled to FMLA leave, and so can’t succeed on a FMLA

interference claim. Mr. Sahlhoff’s amended complaint alleges in ¶28 that he had

a “serious health condition” within the meaning of the FMLA, but courts don’t take

legal conclusions in a complaint as true. See Redd v. Nolan, 663 F.3d 287, 292

(7th Cir. 2011)

Mr. Sahlhoff says his amended complaint alleges a serious health condition

because serious headaches can constitute a serious health condition. That

proposition no doubt is true, but the cases Mr. Sahlhoff cites demonstrate the

difference between such a case and his own case. In Hendry v. GTE North, Inc.,

896 F. Supp. 816, 827 (N.D. Ind. 1995), the court denied summary judgment for

the employer on an FMLA claim when the record allowed a finding that the

plaintiff had received continuing medical care for her migraines, and a finding that

she was unable to perform her job when the migraines struck. Similarly, in

Kennedy v. United States Postal Svc., Cause No. 2:10cv0279-PPS-PRC, doc. 159

at *14 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 17, 2014), summary judgment was denied because there

was “evidence that Kennedy’s migraines, for which she repeatedly saw a doctor,

rendered her unable to perform her job duties.” 

Mr. Sahlhoff’s amended complaint doesn’t allege anything that would

support, even when viewed in the light most favorable to him, an inference that

he underwent inpatient care in any facility or continuing treatment. The amended

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complaint contains allegations that contravene the existence of a serious health

condition within the meaning of the FMLA: he always returned to work, put in

overtime, and let several weeks pass without seeking medical care or testing. 

The amended complaint doesn’t allege that Mr. Sahlhoff was entitled to

FMLA leave, because entitlement requires a serious health condition. Without

allegations that would allow an inference that Mr. Sahlhoff was entitled to FMLA

leave, the amended complaint states no claim upon which relief can be granted. 

Mr. Sahlhoff’s retaliation claim would also fail on the facts alleged in, or

inferable from, the amended complaint. An FMLA retaliation claim can be proven

either through a direct method of proof or an indirect method of proof; Mr.

Sahlhoff’s response to Gurley-Leep’s motion directs the court to the direct method.

To prevail on an FMLA retaliation claim under that method, an employee must

show that (a) he engaged in a protected activity, (b) the employer took an adverse

employment action — such as denying leave or termination — against him, and

(c) a causal connection exists between (a) and (b). Langenbach v. Wal-Mart Stores,

Inc., 761 F.3d 792, 799 (7th Cir. 2014); Cracco v. Vitran Express, Inc., 559 F.3d

625, 663 (7th Cir. 2010). 

Nothing in the amended complaint would allow an inference that Mr.

Sahlhoff notified Gurley-Leep of any serious medical need. The complaint alleges

Gurley-Leep’s awareness that Mr. Sahlhoff suffered from headaches — according

to the amended complaint, Gurley-Leep personnel mocked Mr. Sahlhoff’s pain and

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his ability to work through it, and discouraged him from seeking medical care. But

the amended complaint makes repeated reference to Mr. Sahlhoff’s cancer

diagnosis: if Gurley-Leep fired Mr. Sahlhoff because his cancer led Gurley-Leep’s

decision-maker to believe Mr. Sahlhoff he wasn’t “committed to the job,” a

retaliation claim likely would have been alleged. The amended complaint

forecloses that scenario when it alleges that Mr. Sahlhoff learned in August — not

until about a month after he was fired — that he had cancer. In July, Gurley-Leep

couldn’t have known more than that Mr. Sahlhoff had worsening headaches;

that’s all Mr. Sahlhoff knew himself. As the court of appeals explained in

Aubuchon v. Knauf Fiberglass GmbH, 359 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2004), “If you

have brain cancer but just tell your employer that you have a headache, you have

not given the notice that the Act requires.” See also Spurling v. C & M Fine Pack,

Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 1063 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Spurling's statement to Bellant on

April 16 (and prior to her medical evaluation), was simply that she needed time

off to figure out why she was falling asleep. Given the circumstances of this case,

this can hardly be deemed as notifying C & M of a ‘serious health condition.’”).

For all these reasons, the complaint must be dismissed for failure to state

a claim on which relief can be granted, so the court GRANTS the defendant’s

motion to dismiss (doc. #25). The court will give Mr. Sahlhoff 21 days from the

date of this order within which to file an amended complaint. Should he choose

not to do so, judgment will be entered for Gurley-Leep.

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ENTERED: September 28, 2015 

/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr. 

Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge

United States District Court 

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