UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

RONNIE Q. HENDERSON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 3:12-CV-43-TLS

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Ronnie Q. Henderson, a prisoner proceeding pro se, is serving a 50-year sentence for

drug offenses committed in Elkhart County. State v. Henderson, 20D03-0604-FA-014. He filed a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his convictions

[ECF No. 1].

BACKGROUND

In deciding the Petition, the Court must presume the facts set forth by the state courts are

correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). It is Henderson’s burden to rebut this presumption with clear

and convincing evidence. Id. On direct appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals summarized the

facts underlying Henderson’s offenses as follows:

On April 22, 2006, Elkhart County Sheriff’s Deputy Michael Wass was stopped at

a traffic light and noticed Henderson, who was driving a nearby vehicle. After the

deputy observed that Henderson’s vehicle had a broken taillight and a cracked

windshield that obstructed the view of the driver, he initiated a traffic stop.

Henderson pulled into the driveway of a residence and jumped out of the vehicle.

The deputy ordered Henderson to get back inside his vehicle and asked for his

driver’s license and registration. Henderson held the registration in his left hand and

appeared to be searching for something with his right hand in between the front seats.

Deputy Wass observed Henderson move his hand as if to throw something. The

deputy became concerned for his safety but elected not to pursue the matter until

backup arrived because he did not want to further upset Henderson.
Henderson eventually produced his State-issued identification card and admitted to

Deputy Wass that his driver’s license was suspended, which the deputy confirmed

to be true. As Henderson handed the deputy his identification card, he was nervous

and his hands were shaking. The deputy arrested Henderson for driving with a

suspended license and searched Henderson, finding “two very large rolls of money.”

Tr. p. 263. Henderson was then placed in the deputy’s vehicle so that the deputy

could begin the process of impounding Henderson’s vehicle.

Pursuant to department policy, Deputy Wass inventoried the van before it was

impounded. The deputy discovered a sweatshirt and sweatpants on the front

passenger seat, and when he moved the clothing he noticed a strong odor of

marijuana. He then saw a brown bag and opened it, finding fifty-five grams of

marijuana. He also found cocaine weighing 21.83 grams in multiple smaller bags.

On April 26, 2006, the State charged Henderson with class A felony dealing in

cocaine and class D felony possession of thirty or more grams of marijuana. On

August 8, 2006, Henderson filed a motion to suppress the drug evidence based on the

allegedly unlawful search of his vehicle. Following a hearing, the trial court denied

Henderson’s motion. A jury trial commenced on April 2, 2007, at which the trial

court overruled Henderson’s renewed objection to the admission of the drug

evidence. On April 4, 2007, the jury found Henderson guilty as charged. On May 24,

2007, the trial court sentenced Henderson to fifty years for dealing in cocaine and

three years for possession of marijuana, to be served concurrently. 

Henderson v. State, No. 20A04-0707-CR-372, slip op. at *2-3 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2008).

On direct appeal, Henderson argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to

suppress because the search of his van violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at *4–5. The Indiana

Court of Appeals determined that the search was valid under the Fourth Amendment and

affirmed Henderson’s convictions. Id. Henderson filed a petition to transfer in the Indiana

Supreme Court, again raising his Fourth Amendment claim. [ECF No. 5-7.] The Indiana

Supreme Court denied the petition. [ECF No. 5-2 at 6.] He did not seek review in the U.S.

Supreme Court. [ECF No. 1 at 1.]

In October 2009, Henderson filed a petition for post-conviction relief with the state trial

court. [ECF No. 1 at 2.] He claimed that the search of his van was invalid under the U.S.

2
Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), which was issued after his

conviction became final. See Henderson v. State, No. 20A03-1102-PC-108, slip op. at *4 (Ind.

Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2011). Following a hearing at which Henderson was represented by appointed

counsel, the trial court determined that Gant was inapplicable to Henderson’s case, and

alternatively, that the search was valid even after Gant. Id. Henderson appealed. Id. The Indiana

Court of Appeals determined that the search was proper and affirmed the denial of postconviction relief. Id. at *5–11. Henderson sought transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court,

reasserting his Fourth Amendment claim. [ECF No. 5-14.] The Indiana Supreme Court denied

the petition. [ECF No. 5-9 at 4–5.] Henderson did not seek review in the U.S. Supreme Court.

[ECF No. 1 at 2.]

In January 2012, Henderson filed a federal habeas petition raising three claims, all of

which are premised on a Fourth Amendment challenge to the search of his van: (1) the trial court

erred by allowing admission of the evidence found in his van because the search was unlawful

under the Fourth Amendment; (2) Officer Wass violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment

in conducting the search; and (3) the Indiana Court of Appeals erred in interpreting federal law

pertaining to searches. [ECF No. 1, 8.]

ANALYSIS

Henderson’s petition is governed by the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). The

AEDPA allows a district court to issue a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to a state court judgment “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

3
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The Court can grant

an application for habeas relief if it meets the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which

provides:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.

Under this deferential standard, a federal habeas court must “attend closely” to the

decisions of state courts and “give them full effect when their findings and judgments are

consistent with federal law.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 383 (2000). A state court

decision is “contrary to” federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by the Supreme Court or reaches an opposite result in a case involving facts materially

indistinguishable from relevant Supreme Court precedent. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694

(2002). A federal court may grant habeas relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if

the state court identifies the correct legal principle from Supreme Court precedent but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the petitioner’s case. Wiggins v. Smith, 539

U.S. 510, 520 (2003). To warrant relief, a state court’s decision must be more than incorrect or

erroneous; it must be “objectively unreasonable.” Id.

Here, all three of Henderson’s claims are based on a Fourth Amendment challenge to the

search of his van. [ECF No. 1, 8.] The Respondent argues that these claims are not cognizable in

this proceeding. [ECF No. 6.] As the Respondent correctly points out, the U.S. Supreme Court

4
has held that “where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth

Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the

ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his

trial.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). This is because the exclusionary rule, which

requires the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, is not a

“personal constitutional right” of the accused; rather, “it is a judicially created means of

effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment.” Brock v. United States, 573 F.3d 497,

499 (7th Cir. 2009). The rule was intended to deter violations of the Fourth Amendment by

“removing the incentive to disregard it,” but it has attendant costs, since it “deflects the

truthfinding process and often frees the guilty.” Stone, 428 U.S. at 484, 490. Thus, the rule “has

been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously

served.” Id. at 486–87. In habeas proceedings the “contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any,

to the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment is minimal, and the substantial societal costs of

application of the rule persist with special force.” Id. at 495. 

Therefore, federal habeas courts are barred from reviewing Fourth Amendment claims

that were fully and fairly litigated in state court. Id. at 494–95; see also Ben-Yisrayl v. Buss, 540

F.3d 542, 552 (7th Cir. 2008) (“As long as a habeas petitioner enjoyed an opportunity for full

and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim in state court, federal habeas review of the claim

is barred.”). A habeas petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate a Fourth Amendment

claim if: (1) he apprised the state court of his Fourth Amendment claim along with the factual

basis for that claim; and (2) the state court thoroughly analyzed the facts and looked to the

5
appropriate body of decisional law to resolve the claim. Miranda v. Leibach, 394 F.3d 984, 997

(7th Cir. 2005); Hampton v. Wyant, 296 F.3d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 2002).

A review of the state proceedings demonstrates that Henderson had a full and fair

opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim. As recounted above, Henderson raised his

Fourth Amendment claim in the trial court both before and during trial, and at two levels of

appellate review. See Henderson, No. 20A04-0707-CR-372, slip op. at *4–7. He was represented

by counsel throughout these proceedings, had an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing in the

trial court, and filed appellate briefs fully outlining his Fourth Amendment claim. [See ECF Nos.

5-3, 5-5, 5-7.] The Indiana Court of Appeals issued an opinion thoroughly analyzing the facts

pertaining to the search and looking to applicable Fourth Amendment law to resolve

Henderson’s claim. See Henderson, No. 20A04-0707-CR-372, slip op. at *1–7. In the postconviction proceedings, where Henderson was represented by counsel, he again asserted a

Fourth Amendment claim challenging the search of his van. Henderson, No. 20A03-1102-PC108, slip op. at *4. He had an opportunity for a hearing in the trial court, and on appellate review

he submitted briefs fully outlining his Fourth Amendment claim. [ECF Nos. 5-10, 5-12, 5-14.]

The Indiana Court of Appeals issued an opinion thoroughly considering the relevant facts and

looking to applicable case law to resolve the claim. See Henderson, No. 20A03-1102-PC-108,

slip op. at *1-11. In sum, it is clear that Henderson had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his

Fourth Amendment claim.

In his traverse, Henderson does not argue that he was denied an opportunity to litigate his

Fourth Amendment claim in state court. [ECF No. 8.] Instead, he argues the merits of his Fourth

Amendment claim. [Id.] Although Henderson clearly disagrees with the result reached by the

6
Indiana courts, the opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim

“guarantees the right to present one’s case, but it does not guarantee a correct result.” Cabrera v.

Hinsley, 324 F.3d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 2003). Unless there has been a “subversion of the hearing

process,” a federal habeas court “will not examine whether the judge got the decision right.” Id.

at 531. Henderson has not demonstrated that there was a subversion of the hearing process in

state court. He “simply asks [this Court] to disagree with the state courts’ decision, a path that

Stone closes.” Hayes v. Battaglia, 403 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the Petition

must be denied.

As a final matter, the Court must consider whether to grant Henderson a certificate of

appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. To

obtain a certificate of appealability, the petitioner must make a substantial showing of the denial

of a constitutional right by establishing “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that

matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues

presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529

U.S. 473, 484 (2000). For the reasons fully articulated above, Henderson has not shown that

reasonable jurists could debate the correctness of this Court’s determination that his Petition is

barred by Stone. Accordingly, the Court declines to issue Henderson a certificate of

appealability.

7
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES the Petition [ECF No. 1] and

DENIES the Petitioner a certificate of appealability. 

SO ORDERED on August 7, 2012.

 s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

8