UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

DARIUS WILLIAMS

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Case No. 3:14-CR-91 JD

3:16-CV-372

OPINION AND ORDER

Defendant Darius Williams has filed a motion under Rule 59, asking that the Court 

reconsider its denial of his motion under § 2255. Mr. Williams’ motion to reconsider does not 

present any new claims, nor does it raise any new evidence or arguments that were not already 

before the Court. Instead, it merely rehashes the same arguments that the Court already 

considered and discussed in denying the motion. Mr. Williams therefore presents no valid basis 

for reconsideration, so his motion must be denied.

In addition, the arguments that Mr. Williams raises in his motion to reconsider are all 

meritless. Mr. Williams again argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate 

possible suppression motions. As the Court explained in its previous order, for Mr. Williams to 

receive relief on that basis, he would have to show that if counsel had investigated properly, a 

motion to suppress would have been granted and he would not have pled guilty. Long v. United 

States, 847 F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 2017); Gilbert v. Merchant, 488 F.3d 780, 790–91 (7th Cir. 

2007); United States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 360 (7th Cir. 2005). Even in his motion to 

reconsider, Mr. Williams fails to address those topics. Instead, he argues only that if his attorney 

had investigated properly, he could have requested hearings on these topics. But for the reasons 

explained at length in the Court’s order, any hearings would have been fruitless, as Mr. Williams 

has identified no colorable basis for suppression.
2

Mr. Williams also again argues that his arrest on November 11, 2014, at the time the 

search warrants were executed, was unlawful. As previously discussed, however, Mr. Williams’ 

arrest was lawful despite the absence of an arrest warrant. First, the officers’ months-long 

investigation into Mr. Williams’ and his co-defendant’s drug dealing produced probable cause to 

believe he had committed a number of offenses. In addition, Mr. Williams was lawfully detained 

incident to the execution of the search warrant, as he was caught fleeing as officers began 

entering the home, and the search itself produced contraband and additional evidence tying Mr. 

Williams to unlawful activity. Mr. Williams also notes that the docket reflects that he was 

arrested on November 13, 2014, when in fact he was taken into custody on November 11, 2014. 

However, that docket notation is not meant to indicate the date Mr. Williams was first taken into 

custody; it merely indicates the date that Mr. Williams was arrested pursuant to the indictment 

that was returned the previous day. Mr. Williams further argues that no probable cause affidavit 

was submitted in support of the arrest warrant issued on November 12, 2014. However, that 

arrest warrant was based on an indictment, meaning evidence had been presented to a grand jury, 

which independently found that probable cause existed to charge Mr. Williams with the offenses 

in the indictment. No separate affidavit or judicial finding of probable cause is necessary in those 

circumstances.

Mr. Williams next argues that counsel’s failure to investigate and file suppression 

motions prejudiced him at sentencing. Besides failing on their merits, any such motions would 

have had no effect at sentencing. First, the exclusionary rule does not apply to sentencing 

proceedings. United States v. Sanders, 743 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2014). Thus, even if counsel had 

filed a successful motion to suppress, the Court would have still been required to consider all of 

the evidence at the sentencing stage, whether it had been suppressed from trial or not. Id. And 
3

second, Mr. Williams’ attorney negotiated a plea agreement that included a binding term of 

imprisonment. The Court accepted that agreement and imposed the exact term of imprisonment 

that Mr. Williams asked for, even though it was lower than the guideline range by almost four 

years. Moreover, had Mr. Williams proceeded to trial and been convicted, his guideline range 

would have been about twice as long as the sentence he received. Thus, far from rendering 

ineffective assistance relative to the length of Mr. Williams’ sentence, Mr. Williams’ attorney 

secured an unusually favorable outcome for him.1

Finally, Mr. Williams argues that the Court should have at least held an evidentiary 

hearing prior to denying his motion. However, for the reasons discussed at length, Mr. Williams’ 

claims are meritless, and he has not alleged “facts that, if proven, would entitle him to relief,” so 

no hearing is warranted. Martin v. United States, 789 F.3d 703, 706 (7th Cir. 2015). Therefore, 

the Court denies Mr. Williams’ motion to reconsider. [Case -372, DE 4; Case -91, DE 138].

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: May 22, 2017

 /s/ JON E. DEGUILIO 

Judge

United States District Court

 1 For the same reasons, Mr. Williams’ argument that his attorney told him the guideline range 

would be lower than it ended up being is irrelevant, as Mr. Williams still received the sentence 

he agreed to in his binding plea agreement, which he confirmed under oath that he understood 

and agreed to.