1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

JESSE VARGAS, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

LAKE COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT; 

SHERIFF JOHN BUNCICH, solely in 

his official capacity as Lake 

County Sheriff; HENRY WORONKA, 

individually and in his official 

capacity, 

Defendants. 

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NO. 2:14–CV-288 

OPINION AND ORDER

 This matter is before the Court on the Sheriff Defendants’ 

Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Defendants Lake County Police 

Department and Sheriff John Buncich in his capacity as Lake County 

Sheriff (together, “Sheriff Defendants”), on January 26, 2017 (DE 

#56), and on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by 

Defendant Henry Woronka (“Woronka”), on January 30, 2017 (DE #61). 

For the reasons set forth below, the Sheriff Defendants’ motion 

for summary judgment (DE #56) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN 

PART. The motion is GRANTED as to: (1) all claims against John 

Buncich; (2) the Title VII claims of sex discrimination, disparate 

impact, disparate treatment, training, and promotion in Count I; 

and (3) Counts II-VI against the Lake County Police Department. 
2 

These claims are DISMISSED. The motion is DENIED as to the Title 

VII claims of hostile work environment and retaliation against the 

Lake County Police Department in Count I. Woronka’s motion for 

summary judgment (DE #61) is GRANTED. Counts I-VI against Woronka 

are DISMISSED. 

BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Jesse Vargas (“Vargas”) is a Latino police officer 

employed by the Lake County Sheriff’s Department (“Sheriff’s 

Department”). On August 20, 2012, defendant police officer 

Commander Woronka called Vargas a “fat Tomato Picker” and insulted 

him while in the patrol sergeant’s office. Their conversation 

escalated to a physical altercation that was broken up by other 

officers. Vargas filed an internal complaint against Woronka about 

this altercation, indicating that Woronka had been harassing him 

on a daily basis, calling him “Beaner, Puerto Rican, Bean counter 

or Field worker.” In response to Vargas’ complaint, defendant 

Sheriff John Buncich (“Buncich”) demoted Woronka from his rank of 

Commander and suspended him without pay for fifteen days. Woronka 

resigned from the Sheriff’s Department soon thereafter. Vargas 

filed an EEOC Charge of Discrimination against the Sheriff’s 

Department regarding Woronka’s harassment and the altercation, 

asserting claims of discrimination based on his race, color, 

national origin, and retaliation. After filing the internal 
3 

complaint and EEOC Charge, Vargas repeatedly requested promotion 

to the rank of corporal, but was not promoted. 

Vargas’ Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) alleges violations of 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil 

Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Count I); violations of 

42 U.S.C. § 1981, including retaliation under Section 1981 (Count 

II); failure to train under Section 1981 (Count III); violations 

of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count IV); failure to train resulting in 

violations of Section 1983 (Count V); and violation of Article I, 

Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution (Count VI). (DE #58-1.) 

On January 27, 2017, upon stipulation of the parties, the Court 

dismissed the claims against Woronka in his official capacity. 

(DE #60.) The Sheriff Defendants and Woronka filed motions for 

summary judgment. These motions have been fully briefed and are 

ripe for adjudication. 

DISCUSSION 

Standard 

Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine 

dispute of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 

2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). Not every dispute between the 
4 

parties makes summary judgment inappropriate; “[o]nly disputes 

over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary 

judgment.” Id. In determining whether summary judgment is 

appropriate, the court must construe all facts in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences 

in that party’s favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th 

Cir. 2010). “However, our favor toward the nonmoving party does 

not extend to drawing inferences that are supported by only 

speculation or conjecture.” Fitzgerald v. Santoro, 707 F.3d 725, 

730 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). 

While the movant bears the initial burden of production to 

inform the district court why a trial is not necessary, these 

requirements “are not onerous” where the nonmovant “bears the 

ultimate burden of persuasion on a particular issue.” Modrowski 

v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 2013). A party may move 

for summary judgment based on either “affirmative evidence that 

negates an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim” or by 

“asserting that the nonmoving party’s evidence [is] insufficient 

to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim.” 

Id. at 1169 (citation and internal quotations omitted). A party 

opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion may not rely 

on allegations or denials in his own pleading, but rather, must 

“marshal and present the court with the evidence [he] contends 
5 

will prove [his] case.” Goodman v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 

F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). If the nonmoving party fails to 

establish the existence of an essential element on which he bears 

the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is proper. Massey 

v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2006). 

Material Facts 

 The Parties 

Vargas is a police officer employed by the Sheriff’s 

Department since 1996.1 His race is Mexican and of Hispanic 

origin. During the time period at issue, Vargas was assigned to 

the Patrol Division. Buncich served his first term as Sheriff of 

Lake County from 1995 to 2002. He began his second term as Sheriff 

in 2011, and served in that position during the time period at 

issue. As Sheriff, Buncich had exclusive authority to appoint 

commanders and deputy commanders, and was the final decision-maker 

on promotions, discipline, and transfer of assignments for Vargas. 

 

1 The Court notes that while “Lake County Police Department” is 

named as a defendant and Vargas’ employer in the Complaint (DE 

#58-1 at 2, ¶4), the record indicates that Vargas’ employer is the 

Sheriff’s Department. (See DE #58-5 (EEOC Charge against the 

Sheriff’s Department); DE #68-7 at 2, 6 (Sheriff’s Department 

performance evaluation reports for Vargas); see also DE #58-2 at 

9 (Vargas’ testimony that “the defendants” meant “the Sheriff’s 

Department,” Woronka and Buncich).) Because the parties do not 

address this inconsistency, the Court assumes that the two entities 

are affiliated. (See, e.g., DE #68-6 (Buncich’s response to 

requests for admission regarding “Vargas, of the Lake County 

Police/Sheriff’s Department”).) 
6 

Woronka was a police officer employed by the Sheriff’s 

Department from 1977 to September 2012. Buncich appointed Woronka 

to the position of a Deputy Commander of the Uniformed Patrol 

during his first term as Sheriff. During his second term, Buncich 

appointed Woronka to the position of Commander of the Detective 

Bureau. Woronka had little or no direct supervisory authority 

over Vargas because he was in a different division. Woronka did 

not have authority to hire, fire, or discipline Vargas. He had no 

decision-making authority over Vargas’ requests for promotions or 

assignments, and never made any recommendations concerning Vargas’ 

promotions or assignments. 

Municipal Policies and Discrimination Training 

During the time period at issue, the Lake County Employee 

Handbook contained a policy prohibiting violence in the workplace, 

including any verbal or physical action that is communicated or 

perceived as harassment. (DE #58-6.) Under this policy, employees 

were to report threats to their supervisor or department head, and 

employees who violate this policy were subject to discipline. Lake 

County also had an Equal Employment Opportunity policy to recruit, 

hire, and promote for all job classifications without regard to 

race, color, and national origin. (DE #58-7.) This policy 

provided that discrimination by co-workers and supervisors would 

not be tolerated. 
7 

The Sheriff’s Department General Order 2000-06 was a policy 

against harassment in any form, including racial and ethnic 

harassment. (DE #58-8.) The General Order provides that incidents 

of harassment are to be “reported immediately to the employee’s 

supervisor and/or the Sheriff or Chief.” (Id.) Any person who 

violated this anti-harassment policy would be subject to 

discipline. The Sheriff’s Department Rules and Regulations 

8.01.01 provided that no officer shall harass or verbally abuse 

anyone who files a complaint against an officer. (DE #58-9.) 

Police officers participated in anti-discrimination training, 

though the record is unclear as to the substance and frequency of 

such training. Woronka testified that he participated in such 

training twice, and learned that “[t]imes have changed.” (DE #68-

1 at 30.) 

Woronka’s Alleged Misconduct 

Sometime during Buncich’s first term as Sheriff (between 1995 

and 2002), Woronka called officers of Latino descent “spik, 

wetback, [and] beaner.” (DE #68-1 at 40.) At that time, Chief 

Tom Downs told Woronka that he “need[ed] to watch his language.” 

(Id.) 

Between 2000 and 2002, the FOP Chris Anton Lodge (“Lodge”) 

disciplined Woronka for referring to Officer Jesse Solomon as 

“Gomez.” (Id. at 24-25.) Woronka maintains that the Lodge 

directed him to write a letter of apology to Officer Solomon, and 
8 

he did so. Officer Troy Johnson (“Johnson”) attests that Woronka 

was suspended from the Lodge as a result of this incident; Woronka 

denies that he was suspended. Woronka believed that Buncich and 

the Sheriff’s Department were aware of the incident, but Buncich 

denied knowledge of it. The Sheriff’s Department is not affiliated 

with the Lodge and did not take any action against Woronka for the 

incident. 

Ten years later, sometime shortly before August 20, 2012, 

Johnson reported incidents of Woronka calling Johnson “ghetto 

Tyrone,” an African American officer “Black Russian,” and a 

Hispanic officer “wetback” to his Direct Commander Matthew Eaton 

and Deputy Chief Daniel Murchek (“Murchek”). (DE #68-2 at 1-2; DE 

#68-1 at 115.) Murchek allegedly responded to Johnson’s complaint 

by “stat[ing] that they were familiar with Hank Woronka’s conduct, 

and that Hank Woronka is ‘from the old school.’” (DE #68-2 at 2, 

¶17.) No official action was taken against Woronka in response to 

Johnson’s complaints. 

On August 20, 2012, Vargas was in the Patrol Supervisors 

office with other officers. Woronka entered the office, told 

Vargas he looked like “a fat Tomato Picker” and asked him “why 

don’t you show these guys how you use [sic] to suck Dale Bock’s 

dick.” (DE #68-3.) Vargas called Woronka an “asshole.” (Id.) 

Woronka attempted to kick Vargas and smacked him in the face. 

Vargas grabbed Woronka from behind and put his arm around Woronka’s 
9 

neck. Lieutenant Brian Marsh (“Marsh”) broke up this altercation 

(“August 20 altercation”). Woronka then came towards Vargas and 

shoved him, and the two began yelling at each other. Officer Scott 

Bock observed the altercation and initially thought that Woronka 

and Vargas were “play fighting,” but saw that Woronka became 

serious once they were separated. (DE #58-4.) One of the officers 

advised Vargas to leave the office, and he did. 

Later that day, Vargas submitted an internal complaint to 

Commander William Paterson describing the August 20 altercation 

and explaining that “Woronka harasses myself on a daily basis,” 

called Vargas “Beaner, Puerto Rican, Bean counter or Field worker” 

on several occasions, and would smack the back of Vargas’ head or 

flick his ears. (DE #68-3 at 1.) Vargas maintained that he had 

not complained about Woronka’s behavior before the August 20 

altercation “because of fear of retaliation.” (Id. at 2.) Marsh 

and Bock also submitted written accounts of the August 20 

altercation. The day after the August 20 altercation, Woronka 

approached Vargas and told him that “payback’s a bitch.” (DE# 68-

1 at 47.) Vargas informed Paterson of Woronka’s “paybacks a bitch” 

statement. (DE #68-4.) 

Woronka admits to calling Vargas “a wetback and a beaner and 

everything else,” and to calling Officer Oreuta “f--king wetback,” 

and Officer Oscar Martinez “spik.” (DE #68-1 at 32-34, 83.) 

Woronka testified that his language was “mill talk,” “jiving,” or 
10 

“just screwing with” Vargas. (Id. at 23-24.) He thought Vargas 

was a friend, and never meant to hurt his feelings. (Id. at 22.) 

Woronka testified that if he learned that his language was 

offensive to another person, he would stop using it with that 

person. (Id. at 56-57; see, e.g., id. at 34, 36-37 (testifying 

that he had apologized to Officers Martinez and Johnson for 

offending them). 

On September 5, 2012, Buncich found Woronka in violation of 

Sheriff’s Department Rules and Regulations 7.07.05, which 

prohibited officers from verbally harassing fellow employees, and 

General Order 2000-006. Buncich suspended Woronka without pay for 

fifteen days, removed Woronka from the position of commander, and 

demoted him to the permanent rank of captain. Buncich testified 

that prior to the August 20 altercation, he was never notified 

that Vargas was subjected to racial harassment by anyone within 

the Sheriff’s Department. 

On September 11, 2012, Woronka resigned from the Sheriff’s 

Department. On September 14, 2012, Vargas filed an EEOC Charge of 

Discrimination (“EEOC Charge”) against the Sheriff’s Department. 

The EEOC Charge indicates that Vargas’ allegations of 

discrimination are based on race, color, national origin, and 

retaliation, and that it is a continuing action. The charge 

alleges: 
11 

Woronka, Commander of the Detective Bureau, harasses me 

because of my national origin. He calls me “tomato 

picker”, “f--king wetback”, “Beaner”, “field worker”, 

and other similar comments. On August 20, 2012, he 

physically assaulted me. I reported the harassment and 

attack to Commander W. Paterson and Deputy Commander B. 

Czerwinski. After I reported Woronka, he threatened me 

by saying, “Payback’s a bitch, asshole.” I am not the 

first person to report Woronka for harassment. Lake 

County Sheriff’s Department has allowed Woronka to 

create a hostile work environment for me and other 

minority police officers. 

I believe I have been harassed based on my national 

origin, Mexican, and retaliated against because I 

engaged in a protected activity in violation of my rights 

under Title VII. . . . 

(DE #58-5.) After Vargas filed the EEOC Charge, the Sheriff’s 

Department did not reduce Vargas’ compensation or employment 

benefits, or change his employment status. Vargas testified that 

he has always performed his duties as a patrolman satisfactorily, 

despite any harassment by Woronka. 

Vargas’ Requests for Promotion 

After filing the EEOC Charge, Vargas repeatedly requested 

promotion to the rank of corporal, but was not promoted. As 

Sheriff, Buncich had the sole authority to appoint officers to the 

rank of corporal. His criteria for promotion to corporal were: 

seniority (including a minimum of five years of service), work 

performance, and the need within a division. In response to 

requests for admissions, Buncich denied that Vargas met all 

prerequisites to be promoted to corporal. Vargas testified that 

six corporal positions existed, and that of seven identified 
12 

corporals (including a recent retiree), three were “Hispanic, 

Mexican or half Mexican,” two were African American, and two were 

Caucasian. (DE #58-2 at 14.) 

Claims against Sheriff Buncich in His Official Capacity 

The Sheriff Defendants argue that Buncich is entitled to 

summary judgment on all official capacity claims because these 

claims are construed as claims against the Lake County Police 

Department. Vargas fails to respond to this argument, and thus 

waives any argument that these claims are valid. See Johnson v. 

Gen. Bd. of Pension & Health Benefits of United Methodist Church, 

733 F.3d 722, 729 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that arguments not 

raised in opposition to a motion for summary judgment are waived);

Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 597–98 (7th Cir. 2003) 

(holding that a party abandoned his claim where he failed to 

delineate the claim in opposition to a motion for summary 

judgment); Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am. v. Caruso, 197 F.3d 

1195, 1197 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that arguments not presented 

in response to a summary judgment motion are waived). A claim 

against a person’s office is no different than a claim against the 

entity and is properly dismissed as duplicative. See Thanongsinh 

v. Bd. of Educ., 462 F.3d 762, 771 n.7 (7th Cir. 2006). Therefore, 

the claims against Buncich in his official capacity are dismissed. 
13 

Count I - Title VII Claims against Woronka in His Individual 

Capacity 

Woronka argues that the Title VII claims against him 

individually in Count I must be dismissed. Vargas does not respond 

to this argument, presumably because Woronka is correct. “Title 

VII authorizes suit only against the employer. Individual people 

who are agents of the employer cannot be sued as employers under 

Title VII.” Passananti v. Cook County, 689 F.3d 655, 662 n.4 (7th 

Cir. 2012). Because Woronka, in his individual capacity, does not 

fall within Title VII’s definition of employer, the Title VII 

claims against Woronka in Count I are dismissed. 

Count I – Title VII Claims of Sex Discrimination, Disparate Impact, 

Disparate Treatment, Training, and Promotion 

The Sheriff Defendants move for summary judgment on certain 

Title VII claims in Count I because they are outside the scope 

Vargas’ EEOC Charge. “As a general rule, a Title VII plaintiff 

cannot bring claims in a lawsuit that are not included in [his] 

EEOC charge.” Vela v. Vill. of Sauk Vill., 218 F.3d 661, 664 (7th 

Cir. 2000). A plaintiff may pursue a claim not explicitly included 

in his EEOC charge “only if [his] allegations fall within the scope 

of the earlier charges contained in the EEOC complaint.” Ezell v. 

Potter, 400 F.3d 1041, 1046 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). 

To determine if a claim meets this standard, the court considers 

“whether the allegations are like or reasonably related to those 

contained in the EEOC complaint. If they are, then we ask whether 
14 

the current claim reasonably could have developed from the EEOC’s 

investigation of the charges before it.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Claims are “reasonably related” when “there is a factual 

relationship between them.” Id. (citation omitted). The EEOC 

charge and the complaint “must describe the same conduct and 

implicate the same individuals.” Id. (citation omitted). 

The Sheriff Defendants maintain that the Court should dismiss 

the following claims in Count I because they are outside the scope 

of Vargas’ EEOC Charge: discrimination based on sex, disparate 

impact, disparate treatment, training, and promotion. In his 

response brief, Vargas does not address claims of sex 

discrimination, disparate impact, disparate treatment, or 

training.2 By failing to address these claims, Vargas has waived 

any argument in support of them. See Johnson, 733 F.3d at 729; 

Palmer, 327 F.3d at 597–98. Therefore, Vargas’ Title VII claims 

of discrimination based on sex, disparate impact, disparate 

treatment, and training are dismissed. 

Vargas’ promotion claim is more complicated. While Count I 

does not specifically allege a claim relating to promotion, it 

incorporates allegations that Vargas requested and was denied 

promotions to the rank of corporal after filing his internal and 

 

2 The training claim in Count I alleges that “Woronka’s conduct . 

. . constitutes a training program that promotes discrimination 

because of race, color, or national origin.” (DE #58-1 at 8, ¶62.)
15 

EEOC complaints. (See DE #58-1 at 7, ¶¶50-51.) In his response 

brief, Vargas argues that Buncich denied that he was qualified for 

promotion to corporal because he is Mexican. But Vargas failed to 

respond to the Sheriff Defendants’ outside-the-scope argument, and 

therefore waived this claim. See Saket v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 

02 CV 3453, 2004 WL 1064733, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 2004) 

(granting summary judgment where plaintiff failed to address 

beyond-the-scope argument). Moreover, the EEOC Charge focuses on 

Woronka’s harassment; it does not allege that Buncich failed to 

promote Vargas because of his race, ethnicity or national origin. 

“A failure to promote is a distinct act of discrimination.” Hale 

v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ. Sch. of Med., 219 F. Supp. 3d 860, 

867 (C.D. Ill. 2016) (citation omitted). Because Vargas’ promotion 

claim does not involve the same individuals or same conduct alleged 

in the EEOC Charge, it is outside the scope of the EEOC Charge. 

Vargas also argues that the failure to promote him constituted 

retaliation for reporting Woronka and filing the EEOC Charge. The 

EEOC Charge indicates that Vargas’ claim was based in part on 

retaliation, and describes Woronka’s alleged threat that 

“[p]ayback’s a bitch,” after Vargas reported the August 20 

altercation. (DE #58-5.) Vargas contends that the “Sheriff’s 

department continued to make god [sic] on Woronka’s [threat] by 

failing to promote Vargas to the rank of corporal” after he filed 

the EEOC Charge. (DE #69 at 15.) The Sheriff Defendants do not 
16 

assert that this retaliation claim is outside the scope of the 

EEOC Charge. Nor can they. “[R]etaliation for complaining to the 

EEOC need not be charged separately from the discrimination that 

gave rise to the complaint.” Horton v. Jackson County Bd. of 

County Comm'rs, 343 F.3d 897, 898 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations 

omitted). To the extent Vargas alleges a retaliation claim based 

on the failure to promote him to corporal, such claim is not 

outside the scope of the EEOC Charge. 

Count I – Title VII Hostile Work Environment Claim 

Count I alleges that the Sheriff Defendants subjected Vargas 

to a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. To 

survive summary judgment on a hostile work environment claim, a 

plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to raise a material 

issue of fact on four elements: (1) his work environment must have 

been subjectively and objectively offensive; (2) his race and/or 

national origin must have been the cause of the harassment; (3) 

the conduct must have been severe or pervasive; and (4) there must 

be a basis for employer liability, meaning either that a supervisor 

participated in the harassment or that the municipality was 

negligent in discovering or remedying co-worker harassment. See 

Liu v. Cook County, 817 F.3d 307, 318 (7th Cir. 2016). The Sheriff 

Defendants do not dispute that Woronka called Vargas racial slurs, 

or that the harassment was based on race and national origin. They 

argue that Vargas cannot demonstrate a basis for employer 
17 

liability, or that the alleged harassment was sufficiently 

pervasive. 

The basis for employer liability depends on whether the 

alleged harassment was perpetrated by a supervisor or a coworker. 

“An employer may be strictly liable for harassment by supervisors, 

but a negligence standard applies for harassment by coworkers.” 

Jajeh v. County of Cook, 678 F.3d 560, 568 (7th Cir. 2012) 

(citation omitted). For purposes of Title VII, a “supervisor” 

must have “the power to directly affect the terms and conditions 

of the plaintiff’s employment.” Id. (citation omitted). The 

Sheriff Defendants maintain that Woronka was not Vargas’ 

supervisor because he did not have the authority to hire, fire or 

discipline Vargas, or transfer his duty assignment. Vargas does 

not argue that Woronka was his supervisor, and thus, the Court 

will consider Woronka to be Vargas’ co-worker for the purpose of 

this analysis. 

An employer may be liable for failing to remedy a hostile 

work environment created by a co-worker if it “was negligent in 

either discovering or remedying the harassment.” Id. at 569 

(citation omitted). Vargas must “demonstrate that he notified the 

employer about the harassment or that the harassment was so 

pervasive that a jury could infer his employer knew about it.” 

Andonissamy v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 547 F.3d 841, 849 (7th Cir. 

2008) (citation omitted). Courts generally do not consider an 
18 

employer to be aware of workplace harassment “unless the employee 

makes a concerted effort to inform the employer that a problem 

exists.” Jajeh, 678 F.3d at 569 (citation omitted). Vargas admits 

that he did not complain about Woronka’s harassment prior to the 

August 20 altercation, claiming that he feared retaliation. But 

“an employee’s subjective fears of confrontation, unpleasantness 

or retaliation do not alleviate the employee’s duty . . . to alert 

the employer to the allegedly hostile environment.” Porter v. 

Erie Foods Int'l, Inc., 576 F.3d 629, 638 (7th Cir. 2009) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). When Vargas 

complained after the August 20 altercation, Buncich demoted 

Woronka, removed him from his position as commander, and suspended 

him for fifteen days without pay. See Jajeh, 678 F.3d at 569 

(“Once an employer is aware of workplace harassment, it can avoid 

liability by taking prompt and appropriate corrective action 

reasonably likely to prevent the harassment from recurring.”). 

Vargas does not dispute that Woronka was disciplined promptly after 

he complained about the August 20 altercation. Rather, he focuses 

on Woronka’s harassment leading up to the August 20 altercation. 

Vargas cites evidence that the Lodge disciplined Woronka 

between 2000 and 2002 for referring to Officer Jesse Solomon as 

“Gomez.” (DE #68-1 at 24-25). It is undisputed that the Lodge is 

not affiliated with the Sheriff’s Department, and that the 

Sheriff’s Department did not take any action against Woronka for 
19 

this incident. Vargas also proffers evidence that sometime during 

Buncich’s first term as Sheriff (between 1995 and 2002), Chief 

Downs told Woronka to “watch his language” in response to his 

calling officers of Latino descent “spik, wetback, [and] beaner.” 

(DE #68-1 at 40.) Both of these incidents occurred at least ten 

years before Woronka’s harassment of Vargas, and are too remote to 

support a finding that the Sheriff Defendants had constructive 

knowledge of Woronka’s harassment of Vargas. 

Vargas maintains that between January 2011 and August 20, 

2012, Woronka harassed him on a daily basis, using racial comments 

such as beaner, Puerto Rican, bean counter or field worker, and 

smacking the back of his head or flicking his ears. Woronka admits 

he called Vargas “wetback” and “beaner,” and that he called Officer 

Oreuta “wetback,” and Officer Martinez “spik.” (DE #68-1 at 24, 

32-34, 83.) Vargas also presents evidence that before the August 

20 altercation, Johnson reported incidents of Woronka calling 

Johnson and two other officers “ghetto Tyrone,” “Black Russian,” 

and “wetback.” (DE #68-2 at 1-2; DE #68-1 at 115.) Deputy Chief 

Murchek allegedly responded to Johnson’s complaint by saying that 

“they were familiar with Hank Woronka’s conduct, and that Hank 

Woronka is ‘from the old school.’” (DE #68-2 at 2, ¶17.) No 

corrective action was taken as a result of Johnson’s complaint. 

If a factfinder believes that supervisors knew about the 

hostile work environment, the argument that the Sheriff Defendants 
20 

did not know, and could not have known, about Woronka’s harassment 

may be weakened. See Hawkins v. Groot Indus., Inc., No. 01 C 1731, 

2003 WL 1720069, *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2003) (finding that a jury 

must weigh evidence of supervisors’ awareness of harassment and 

make credibility determinations regarding the employer’s knowledge 

of it). Considered in the light most favorable to Vargas, the 

evidence suggests that the Sheriff’s Department was aware that 

Woronka was calling fellow officers racial slurs. Therefore, the 

Court finds a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether 

the Sheriff Defendants had constructive knowledge of Woronka’s 

harassment of Vargas. 

The Sheriff Defendants also argue that Woronka’s harassment 

of Vargas was not so pervasive as to rise to the level of a Title 

VII violation. In assessing the pervasiveness and severity of the 

offensive conduct, both Vargas and the Sheriff Defendants rely on 

Minority Police Officers Association v. City of South Bend, 

Indiana, 617 F. Supp. 1330, 1352 (N.D. Ind. 1985). Minority Police 

holds that offensive racial epithets do not rise to the level of 

a Title VII violation unless the working environment is “dominated 

by racial slurs.” Id. at 1353. More recently, the Seventh Circuit 

explained that “although a workplace need not be ‘hellish’ to 

constitute a hostile work environment, . . . [the] environment 

must be so pervaded by discrimination that the terms and conditions 

of employment are altered.” Alamo v. Bliss, 864 F.3d 541, 550 
21 

(7th Cir. 2017) (internal citations, quotation marks and brackets 

omitted). 

There is no “magic number” of instances or type of slur 

that indicates a hostile work environment. Instead, we 

look to the “pervasiveness and severity” of language 

used, which we have described as being “inversely 

related.” A “severe episode” that occurs “as rarely as 

once” and a “relent-less pattern of lesser harassment” 

both may violate Title VII. 

Id. (internal citations omitted); see Cerros v. Steel Techs., 288 

F.3d 1040, 1047 (7th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that an “unambiguously 

racial epithet falls on the ‘more severe’ end of the spectrum”). 

“Offhand comments, isolated incidents, and simple teasing do not 

rise to the level of conduct that alters the terms and conditions 

of employment.” Scruggs v. Garst Seed Co., 587 F.3d 832, 840–41 

(7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Courts consider the totality 

of the circumstances in determining whether conduct is 

sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable, including: “(1) 

the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; (2) how offensive a 

reasonable person would deem it to be; (3) whether it is physically 

threatening or humiliating conduct as opposed to verbal abuse; (4) 

whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work 

performance; and (5) whether it was directed at the victim.” 

Nichols v. Mich. City Plant Plan. Dep't, 755 F.3d 594, 601 (7th 

Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 

The Sheriff Defendants contend that Vargas fails to provide 

specific examples of Woronka’s allegedly daily harassment to 
22 

demonstrate that his comments pervaded Vargas’ work environment. 

They cite Williams v. Arrow Chevrolet, Inc., 121 F. App'x 148 (7th 

Cir. 2005), in which the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment 

on a hostile work environment claim where the plaintiff claimed 

that he was subjected to racial slurs daily and referred generally 

to “O.J. jokes, Martin Luther King jokes, Farrakhan jokes,” but 

only described a single utterance of an offensive epithet directed 

at a customer. Id. at 149-50. In contrast, here Woronka admits 

to calling Vargas and other officers a variety of racial slurs, 

including “wetback,” “Puerto Rican,” and “spik.” See Rodgers v. 

W.-S. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 671–73 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding 

an actionable hostile work environment when supervisors and 

employees referred to an employee by a racial slur between five 

and ten times); Alamo, 864 F.3d at 550 (noting that the racial 

slurs “spic” and “f--king Puerto Rican” are “severe”). “Where a 

hostile work environment claim involves ongoing conduct, a 

plaintiff need not date stamp every incident.” Hawkins, 2003 WL 

1720069, at *2 (finding that plaintiff’s testimony that he was 

subjected to racial epithets on a daily basis raised an issue of 

fact regarding the level of racial hostility in the employer’s 

work environment) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

The Sheriff Defendants also argue that Woronka’s racial comments 

to other officers do not prove that Vargas was subject to a hostile 

work environment. While Woronka’s calling other officers racial 
23 

slurs would not have the same impact on Vargas as Woronka’s 

comments to him, they are not irrelevant to the hostile work 

environment claim. See Smith v. Ne. Ill. Univ., 388 F.3d 559, 567 

(7th Cir. 2004) (“While certainly relevant to the determination of 

a hostile work environment claim, when harassment is directed at 

someone other than the plaintiff, the impact of [such] ‘secondhand harassment’ is obviously not as great as the impact of 

harassment directed at the plaintiff.”) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

It is a close call as to whether Vargas has met his burden to 

show pervasiveness. On the one hand, there is no dispute that 

Woronka’s conduct was offensive and was directed at Vargas. 

Woronka admits that he called Vargas and other officers a variety 

of racial slurs. His testimony, along with evidence of Murchek’s 

alleged response to Johnson’s complaints that they were familiar 

with Woronka’s conduct, indicates that Woronka’s use of racial 

slurs was not an isolated incident. On the other hand, Vargas 

testified that he was able to perform his duties as a patrolman 

throughout his employment satisfactorily, despite Woronka’s 

harassment. And while Woronka’s offensive comments culminated in 

the August 20 altercation, Vargas does not claim that Woronka’s 

harassment was physically threatening. Considering the evidence 

in the light most favorable to Vargas, the Court finds that he has 

offered sufficient evidence such that a factfinder could determine 
24 

that Woronka’s harassment was pervasive. The Sheriff Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment on the Title VII hostile work 

environment claim is denied. 

Count I – Title VII Retaliation Claim 

 Vargas argues that he has established a prima facie case of 

retaliation under Title VII. “A retaliation claim arises when an 

employee engages in activity protected by Title VII and suffers an 

adverse employment action as a result.” Ferrill v. Oak CreekFranklin Joint Sch. Dist., 860 F.3d 494, 501 (7th Cir. 2017). The 

parties do not dispute that Vargas engaged in protected activity 

by reporting Woronka and filing the EEOC Charge. The issue is 

whether Vargas’ protected activity is causally linked to an adverse 

employment action. 

The Sheriff Defendants initially argue that Vargas cannot 

prevail on a Title VII retaliation claim because he has no hostile 

work environment claim, and thus, no materially adverse employment 

action. See Yuhe Diamba Wembi v. Metro Air Serv., 195 F. Supp. 3d 

957, 968 (N.D. Ill. 2016). Vargas does not respond to this 

argument. Rather, he maintains that the adverse employment action 

was the failure to promote him to the rank of corporal.3 “The 

denial of a promotion can be an adverse action for purposes of a 

 

3 Vargas also mentions that the Sheriff Defendants retaliated 

against him by failing to transfer him to other units, but fails 

to cite evidence supporting this claim.
25 

retaliation claim.” Poullard v. McDonald, 829 F.3d 844, 858 (7th 

Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Vargas proffers evidence that (1) 

the Sheriff has the exclusive right to appoint an officer to the 

rank of corporal, (2) an officer must have five years of service 

before being considered for the rank of corporal, and (3) the 

criteria for the position are work performance, seniority, and the 

need within a division. It is undisputed that Vargas had more 

than five years of service with good work performance and 

repeatedly sought a promotion to corporal, but other officers were 

promoted to corporal in his division. In response to requests for 

admissions, Buncich denied that Vargas met all prerequisites to be 

promoted to corporal. Vargas maintains that Buncich denied that 

Vargas was qualified for this promotion because Vargas had 

complained about Woronka and filed the EEOC Charge. 

 The Sheriff Defendants do not respond to the merits of Vargas’ 

argument that the failure to promote him was retaliation. Instead, 

they contend that the Title VII retaliation claim was first raised 

in Vargas’ response brief, and thus is waived. This argument is 

unavailing. Vargas’ EEOC Charge indicates that one of its bases 

is retaliation. Count I of the Complaint incorporates allegations 

that Vargas’ requests for promotion to corporal were denied after 

he complained about Woronka and filed the EEOC Charge. (See DE# 

58-1 at 7, ¶¶50-51, 59; see also id. at 13, ¶ 94 (alleging in Count 

II that “Defendants denied Plaintiff’s promotion to Corporal so as 
26 

to retaliate against Plaintiff for filing said complaints.”).) 

While Count I does not specifically mention retaliation, “it is 

factual allegations, not legal theories, that must be pleaded in 

a complaint.” Whitaker v. Milwaukee County, Wis., 772 F.3d 802, 

808 (7th Cir. 2014). Moreover, as noted above, the Sheriff 

Defendants acknowledged the existence of the retaliation claim in 

their opening brief, arguing that Vargas had “no viable Title VII 

retaliation claim” based on the merits of the claim. (DE #57 at 

12.) Because the Sheriff Defendants had fair warning of this 

theory of liability, Vargas did not waive it. 

Vargas raises genuine issues of material fact as to the reason 

he was not promoted to the rank of corporal. Therefore, the 

Sheriff Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied as to 

the Title VII retaliation claim. 

Counts II and III – 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Claims 

Counts II and III assert claims against all defendants based 

on 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Section 1981 guarantees that “[a]ll persons 

within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same 

right . . . to make and enforce contracts,” regardless of race. 

42 U.S.C. § 1981. Defendants contend that Counts II and III must 

be dismissed because “[Section] 1981 does not create a private 

right of action against state actors.” Campbell v. Forest Pres. 

Dist. of Cook County, Ill., 752 F.3d 665, 671 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Rather, Section 1983 “remains the exclusive remedy for violations 
27 

of § 1981 committed by state actors.” Id.; see Wilson v. City of 

Galesburg, No. 416CV04025SLDJEH, 2016 WL 7408818, at *4 (C.D. Ill. 

Dec. 22, 2016) (“§ 1983 is the exclusive mechanism to vindicate 

violations of § 1981 by an individual state actor acting in his 

individual capacity”). Vargas does not respond to defendants’ 

argument, and thereby waives any argument that he may assert claims 

based on Section 1981. See Johnson, 733 F.3d at 729; Caruso, 197 

F.3d at 1197. Furthermore, because the Sheriff Defendants and 

Woronka were state actors, Vargas cannot assert claims based on 

Section 1981. Counts II and III are dismissed. 

Count IV and V – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims against Woronka 

 Counts IV and V assert claims against all defendants based on 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, and, by incorporation of the allegations in Counts II 

and III, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.4 Woronka moves for summary judgment on 

these claims against him. To prevail on a Section 1983 claim, a 

plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a right secured by the 

Constitution or laws of the United States and that the deprivation 

 

4 Count V alleges a Section 1983 claim based on a failure to train 

Woronka. While not addressed by the parties, the Court notes that 

Vargas does not explain how Woronka could be held liable for 

failing to train himself. See generally Sanville v. McCaughtry, 

266 F.3d 724, 739 (7th Cir. 2001) (“failure to train claims are 

usually maintained against municipalities, not against 

individuals”). 
28 

was caused by a person “acting under color of state law.” Reynolds 

v. Jamison, 488 F.3d 756, 764 (7th Cir. 2007). 

Vargas argues that Woronka’s assault and battery during the 

August 20 altercation form the basis of his Section 1983 claims 

against Woronka. He relies upon Treiber v. Rompala, No. 01 C 5049, 

2002 WL 1467673 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2002), in which a junior police 

officer sued another police officer alleging battery, illegal 

seizure and excessive force under Section 1983 and the Fourth 

Amendment. The complaint alleged that the defendant police officer 

intentionally terminated the plaintiff’s movement when he grabbed 

and twisted her arm. Id. at *3. The defendant moved to dismiss 

the complaint. The court concluded that the complaint “alleged 

conduct during the parties’ on-the-job interactions which could 

have been related to (although perhaps an abuse of) [the 

defendant’s] duties as a higher-ranking police officer.” Id. at 

*4. The court found the plaintiff had alleged an inappropriate 

seizure with excessive force by a state official acting under state 

law, but noted that “it was only with a broad reading and 

significant deference to Plaintiff that this court was able to 

characterize the incident as a potential constitutional 

violation.” Id. at *5. The court granted qualified immunity to 

the defendant, explaining that “a reasonable officer in [the 

defendant’s] position would not have considered that Plaintiff’s 
29 

constitutional rights were in jeopardy when he allegedly grabbed 

and twisted her arm.” Id. at *5.5

Like the defendant in Treiber, Woronka was an on-duty officer 

with a higher rank than Vargas at the time of the August 20 

altercation. Despite this factual similarity, the Court finds 

Treiber to be distinguishable. Treiber addressed a motion to 

dismiss, rather than a motion for summary judgment. The standard 

for summary judgment is, of course, different from the standard 

for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See 

Commissioning Agents, Inc. v. Long, 143 F. Supp. 3d 775, 785 (S.D. 

Ind. 2015) (“[T]he 12(b)(6) standard is ‘plaintiff friendly,’ thus 

many claims survive a motion to dismiss only to be disposed of on 

summary judgment.”). Unlike Treiber, Vargas does not claim that 

Woronka seized him in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Vargas 

asserts that Woronka should be held individually liable for the 

Section 1983 equal protection claims because he was on duty during 

the August 20 altercation, and Vargas was subordinate to him. He 

 

5 In response to Treiber, Woronka quotes extensively from the 

Treiber court’s analysis of qualified immunity. He contends that 

his intent is critical to the “acting under color of state law” 

analysis, and maintains that he did not contemplate depriving 

Vargas of his constitutional rights during their altercation. To 

the extent Woronka attempts to argue a qualified immunity defense, 

this argument is waived because he did not assert this defense in 

his motion for summary judgment. See Narducci v. Moore, 572 F.3d 

313, 324 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting defendants “waived the qualified 

immunity defense in the summary judgment proceedings because they 

failed to raise the issue before their reply brief”).
30 

relies on David v. City and County of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344 (10th 

Cir. 1996), in which the Tenth Circuit held that a plaintiff may 

be able to recover on her Section 1983 Fourteenth Amendment sexual 

harassment claim if she could establish that defendant officers 

“had supervisory authority over her or in some other way exercised 

state authority over her.” Id. at 1354. Here, Vargas cites no 

evidence that Woronka had supervisory authority or exercised state 

authority over him. 

Moreover, while Vargas maintains that Sections 1981 and 1983 

protect against the misuse of power by an individual acting under 

color of state law, “every official abuse of power, even if 

unreasonable, unjustified, or outrageous, does not rise to the 

level of a federal constitutional deprivation. Some such conduct 

may simply violate state tort law or indeed may be perfectly legal, 

though unseemly and reprehensible.” McCoy v. Harrison, 341 F.3d 

600, 605 (7th Cir. 2003). Vargas maintains that his Section 1983 

claims against Woronka are supported by evidence demonstrating 

“common law torts of assault and battery.”6 (DE #71 at 13.) He 

 

6 Vargas also argues in passing that the Complaint includes facts 

that support assault and battery claims, but the Court finds that 

the Complaint cannot fairly be read to include such claims. 

Generally, “[a] plaintiff may not amend his complaint through 

arguments in his brief in opposition to a motion for summary 

judgment.” Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 606 (7th 

Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). If Vargas wanted to amend the 

Complaint to include these claims, he could have sought leave to 

do so. He did not, so these claims will not be addressed.
31 

fails to proffer evidence that Woronka’s interaction during the 

August 20 altercation rose to the level of a deprivation of Vargas’ 

constitutional rights. As such, this evidence fails to support 

the Section 1983 claims against Woronka. 

Citing Fane v. Locke Reynolds, LLP, 480 F.3d 534 (7th Cir. 

2007), Vargas argues that he satisfies the elements of a prima 

facie case of racial discrimination against Woronka because: 1) he 

is a member of a protected class; 2) he was meeting his employer’s 

legitimate performance expectations; 3) he suffered an adverse 

employment action; and 4) other similarly situated employees who 

were not members of the protected class were treated more 

favorably. See id. at 538.7 For an individual defendant to be 

liable under Section 1983, he must have participated directly in 

the constitutional violation. Hildebrandt v. Ill. Dep't of Nat. 

Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1039 (7th Cir. 2003) (“some causal connection 

or affirmative link between the action complained about and the 

official sued is necessary for § 1983 recovery”). Vargas does not 

proffer evidence of any adverse employment action for which Woronka 

was personally responsible. Woronka maintains that he had no 

 

7 The Court notes that Fane does not address Section 1983 claims, 

but rather, Title VII and Section 1981 claims. See 480 F.3d at 

536. However, “[w]hen the plaintiff alleges intentional 

discrimination . . . the same standards in general govern liability 

under sections 1981, 1983, and Title VII.” Wuerffel v. Cook County 

Sheriff's Office, No. 14 C 3990, 2016 WL 1660497, at *9 (N.D. Ill. 

Apr. 27, 2016) (citations omitted).
32 

personal involvement with the alleged adverse employment actions 

of failing to promote or reassign Vargas, had no decision-making 

authority over Vargas’ requests for promotions and assignments, 

and never made any recommendations regarding these requests. 

Vargas did not respond to this argument, and therefore waived it. 

See Palmer, 327 F.3d at 597–98; Caruso, 197 F.3d at 1197. Because 

Vargas fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding 

Section 1983 claims against Woronka, Woronka’s motion for summary 

judgment on Counts IV and V is granted. 

Count IV – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Discrimination Claim against the 

Sheriff Defendants 

The Sheriff Defendants move for summary judgment on Count IV, 

which asserts that they discriminated against Vargas in violation 

of Section 1983. “Plaintiffs who seek to impose liability on local 

governments under § 1983 must prove that ‘action pursuant to 

official municipal policy’ caused their injury.” Connick v. 

Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60–61, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359, 179 L. Ed. 2d 

417 (2011) (quoting Monell v. New York Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 

U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). For a 

Section 1983 Monell claim, a plaintiff must “establish an official 

policy through (1) an express policy that causes a constitutional 

deprivation when enforced; (2) a widespread practice that is so 

permanent and well-settled that it constitutes a custom or 

practice; or (3) an allegation that the constitutional injury was 
33 

caused by a person with final policymaking authority.” Teesdale 

v. City of Chicago, 690 F.3d 829, 834 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). While Vargas does not 

specifically address these requirements, he provides evidence that 

Buncich, as Sheriff, had final policymaking authority regarding 

officer promotions, and failed to promote Vargas. 

Vargas maintains that he has established a prima facie case 

of racial discrimination claim against the Sheriff Defendants 

because: 1) he is a member of a protected class; 2) he was meeting 

his employer’s legitimate performance expectations; 3) he suffered 

an adverse employment action; and 4) other similarly situated 

employees who were not members of the protected class were treated 

more favorably. See Fane, 480 F.3d at 538 (addressing Title VII 

and Section 1981 claims). Vargas relies upon evidence that Buncich 

denied that he was qualified to be promoted, despite the fact that 

he met Buncich’s criteria for promotion to corporal. According to 

Vargas, a factfinder could reasonably infer that Buncich denied 

that Vargas was qualified for the promotion because he is Mexican.8 

However, Vargas fails to cite evidence demonstrating that 

similarly situated employees not in the protected class were 

 

8 Vargas also asserts that “evidence as to how Vargas was treated 

by the Command staff in general from 2011-August 20, 2012” supports 

his discrimination claim. (DE #69 at 18.) Because Vargas provides 

no support for this assertion, this perfunctory and undeveloped 

argument is waived. See United States v. Hassebrock, 663 F.3d 

906, 914 (7th Cir. 2011). 
34 

treated more favorably. Rather, the evidence indicates that 

Buncich promoted other officers of Mexican or Hispanic heritage to 

the rank of corporal. Because Vargas fails to raise a genuine 

issue of material fact as to his discrimination claim, Count IV is 

dismissed. 

Count V – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure to Train Claim against the 

Sheriff Defendants 

Count V asserts that the Sheriff Defendants failed to 

adequately train Woronka with respect to racial discrimination in 

violation of Section 1983. In certain circumstances, a 

municipality’s decision not to train employees about their legal 

duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights may rise to the level of 

a municipal policy for purposes of Section 1983. See Connick, 563 

U.S. at 61 (“A municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of 

rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to 

train.”). To satisfy Section 1983, a municipality’s failure to 

train its employees “must amount to deliberate indifference to the 

rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into 

contact.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

“[D]eliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault, 

requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or 

obvious consequence of his action.” Id. (citation omitted). 

The record demonstrates that the Sheriff Defendants had 

several policies prohibiting racial discrimination. Lake County 
35 

had a policy prohibiting any verbal or physical action in the 

workplace that is communicated or perceived as harassment. General 

Order 2000-06 prohibited harassment in any form, including racial 

and ethnic harassment. Both policies state that violators would 

be disciplined. Lake County’s Equal Employment Opportunity Policy 

provided that discrimination by co-workers and supervisors would 

not be tolerated.9 Vargas disputes the effectiveness of these 

policies, and argues that they are broad and general provisions 

rather than policies. The Court disagrees. While Vargas complains 

that the policies do not explain racial harassment or offer 

employees guidance regarding what to do if they believe they have 

been subjected to racial harassment, a review of the policies 

provides this information. For example, General Order 2000-006 

explains that “[e]mployees expect to work in an environment free 

of intimidation, humiliation, insult, and offensive and verbal 

abuse,” and encourages employees to report harassment immediately 

to “their supervisor and/or Sheriff or Chief.” (DE #58-8; see 

also DE #58-6 (anti-violence in the workplace policy provides that 

employees should report threats to their supervisor or department 

 

9 The Equal Employment Opportunity policy also provided that 

meetings would be held at least annually to explain the intent of 

the policy and individual responsibility for effective 

implementation. Vargas proffers evidence that these meetings were 

not held, and that the Lake County Grievance Committee was 

dissolved, but fails to explain how this evidence supports his 

failure to train claim.
36 

head).) Vargas also contends that officers did not follow General 

Order 2000-006, which allegedly required them to inform the Sheriff 

of racial slurs and/or discriminatory policies. While Buncich was 

not informed of Woronka’s misconduct until after the August 20 

altercation, Johnson and Vargas followed General Order 2000-006 by 

submitting their complaints to supervisors. 

Vargas concedes that officers are required to go through 

training with respect to racial discrimination. Because the 

officers receive some training, Vargas must show that the training 

program is so inadequate that the need for more training is 

obvious. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390, 109 S. 

Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). Vargas provides no details 

regarding the officers’ training, and points to no obvious 

inadequacy in the anti-discrimination training program. Rather, 

he proffers evidence that Woronka only attended the training twice, 

could not remember when he last attended the training, and only 

learned from it that “[t]imes have changed.” (DE #68-1 at 30.) 

The fact “[t]hat a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily 

trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability on the 

[municipality].” Canton, 489 U.S. at 390; see Palmquist v. Selvik, 

111 F.3d 1332, 1345 (7th Cir. 1997) (“In determining the adequacy 

of training, the focus must be on the program, not whether 

particular officers were adequately trained.”). “[I]t may be, for 

example, that an otherwise sound program has occasionally been 
37 

negligently administered,” or that Woronka was an exceptionally 

poor student. Ellis v. Country Club Hills, No. 06-CV-1895, 2011 

WL 1113032, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2011) (quoting Canton, 489 

U.S. at 391).10

It is undisputed that the Lake County officers received antidiscrimination training. Vargas presents no evidence that any 

aspect of that training was inadequate. Therefore, there is no 

evidence that the Sheriff Defendants “had notice that further 

training was obviously necessary to correct an inadequacy in the 

officers’ previous training.” Bell v. Vill. of Streamwood, No. 

CIV.A. 10 C 3263, 2011 WL 4435664, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 

2011). The Sheriff Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on 

Count V is granted. 

Count VI – Indiana Constitutional Claim 

All defendants assert that Vargas’ claim under Article I, 

Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution must be dismissed because 

the Complaint seeks only monetary damages. “[N]o Indiana court 

has explicitly recognized a private right of action for monetary 

damages under the Indiana Constitution.” Smith v. Ind. Dep't of 

 

10 Vargas also relies upon the Sheriff Defendants’ failure to retrain Woronka after the August 20 altercation, and failure to place 

anything in Woronka’s personnel file regarding the August 20 

altercation. The Court notes that Woronka resigned shortly after 

the August 20 altercation, and finds that the lack of such evidence 

does not raise an issue of material fact as to the failure to train 

claim.
38 

Corr., 871 N.E.2d 975, 985 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); see McIntire vs. 

Franklin Twp. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 15 N.E.3d 131, 137 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2014) (noting that “there can be no claim for monetary damages 

arising out of the Indiana Constitution”). Vargas does not oppose 

the defendants’ motions as to this claim. Accordingly, Count IV 

is dismissed. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, the Sheriff Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment (DE #56) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED 

IN PART. The motion is GRANTED as to: (1) all claims against John 

Buncich; (2) the Title VII claims of sex discrimination, disparate 

impact, disparate treatment, training, and promotion in Count I; 

and (3) Counts II-VI against the Lake County Police Department. 

These claims are DISMISSED. The motion is DENIED as to the Title 

VII claims of hostile work environment and retaliation against the 

Lake County Police Department in Count I. Woronka’s motion for 

summary judgment (DE #61) is GRANTED. Counts I-VI against Woronka 

are DISMISSED. 

DATED: September 27, 2017 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge 

 United States District Court