UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER L. SCRUGGS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) 

v. ) Cause No. 3:14-CV-1993 JD

)

C.O. SUMNER, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Christopher L. Scruggs, a pro se prisoner, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. section 1983

alleging C.O. Sumner used excessive force against him on February 1, 2014, in violation of the

Eighth Amendment. (DE 2.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review a complaint

filed by a prisoner and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b). The court applies the same standard as when deciding a motion

to dismiss under FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d

621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal, a complaint must state a claim for relief that is

plausible on its face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 603. The

court must bear in mind, however, that “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and

a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 

Here, Scruggs complains about events that occurred during lunch tray pass out on February
1, 2014,while he was an inmate at the Westville Control Unit (“Westville”). (DE 2 at 3.) At lunch

time, correctional officers were passing out food trays to inmates in their cells. As officers

approached Scruggs’ cell, Scruggs was making fun of Officer Sumner for using pepper spray on him

a few days earlier. Because of that, Officer Sumner mixed together all of the food on Scruggs’ lunch

tray. After handing the food to Scruggs, Officer Sumner walked away from Scruggs’ cell door. 

Scruggs knocked hard on the cell door twice and said something to the effect of, “bitch go get me

Lt. Washington because you fucked up my tray on purpose.” (DE 2, p. 3.) Officer Sumner quickly

approached Scruggs’ cell and sprayed him in the faced with pepper spray through an opening in the

cell door.

The “core requirement” for an excessive force claim is that the defendant “used force not in

a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, but maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”

Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted). Several factors

guide the inquiry of whether an officer’s use of force was legitimate or malicious, including the need

for an application of force, the amount of force used, and the extent of the injury suffered by the

prisoner. Id. Here, the complaint can be read to allege that Officer Sumner used pepper spray on

Scruggs to maliciously or sadistically cause harm. Giving him the inferences to which he is entitled

at this stage, he has alleged enough to proceed further against Officer Sumner. Further factual

development may show Sumner acted reasonably under the circumstances, but Scruggs has alleged

enough at this stage.

For these reasons, the court:

(1) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed on a claim against O.C. Sumner in his individual

capacity for monetary damages for using excessive force against him on February 1, 2014;

(2) DISMISSES all other claims; 
(3) DIRECTS the clerk to transmit the summons and USM-285 for O.C. Sumner to the

United States Marshals Service along with a copy of the complaint (DE 2) and this order;

(4) DIRECTS the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service of process on O.C. Sumner

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and

(5) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that O.C. Sumner respond, as provided

for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claims for which

the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order. 

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: December 31, 2014

 /s/ JON E. DEGUILIO 

Judge

United States District Court