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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

November 14, 2017

v No. 334634

Wayne Circuit Court

ARIUS PINKSTON, LC No. 15-008091-01-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: BECKERING, P.J., and O’BRIEN and CAMERON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals as of right his bench trial convictions for carrying a concealed weapon 

(CCW), MCL 750.227, felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, felon in possession of 

ammunition, MCL 750.224f(6), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony 

(felony-firearm) (third or subsequent offense), MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced 

defendant as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to two years’ probation for the 

CCW, felon in possession of a firearm, and felon in possession of ammunition convictions, and 

10 years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm.

On appeal, defendant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a 

reasonable doubt that he was guilty of all of the charges. We disagree.

Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are reviewed de novo. People v Solloway, 

316 Mich App 174, 180; 891 NW2d 255 (2016). “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

on appeal, a court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and 

determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were 

proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Reese, 491 Mich 127, 139; 815 NW2d 85 (2012) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). “[I]t is for the trier of fact, not the appellate court, to 

determine what inferences may be fairly drawn from the evidence and to determine the weight to 

be accorded those inferences.” People v Flick, 487 Mich 1, 24–25; 790 NW2d 295 (2010) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). “[C]ircumstantial evidence and all reasonable inferences 

drawn therefrom can constitute satisfactory proof of the crime.” Solloway, 316 Mich App at 

180-181.

In relevant part, the CCW statute provides:

A person shall not carry a pistol concealed on or about his or her person . . .

except in his or her dwelling house, place of business, or on other land possessed 
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by the person, without a license to carry the pistol as provided by law and if 

licensed, shall not carry the pistol in a place or manner inconsistent with any 

restrictions upon such license. [MCL 750.227(2).]

CCW is a general intent crime, meaning that the prosecution only needed to prove that defendant 

possessed the intent “to knowingly carry the weapon on [his] person.” People v HernandezGarcia, 266 Mich App 416, 418; 701 NW2d 191 (2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted), 

vacated in part on other grounds by 477 Mich 1039 (2007). “Evidence that a defendant placed a 

revolver in his belt or waistband so that the weapon could not be readily seen has been found 

sufficient to uphold a CCW conviction.” Id.

A rational fact-finder could conclude that defendant carried a concealed weapon. 

Specifically, Detroit Police Officer Kijuan Anderson testified that defendant had a black and 

gray gun in his hand and tucked it into his pocket once he noticed that officers were watching 

him. Detroit Police Officer Christopher Rabior testified that once defendant noticed the officers, 

“he no longer had the object in his hand,” and that defendant moved his hand to his “left jacket 

pocket area.” The officers had the benefit of headlights, flashlights and a spotlight to assist them 

in observing the gun. Officer Anderson also testified that defendant told him that he was 

carrying a gun because “people were getting robbed and killed around here.” Based on this 

evidence, a rational trier of fact could find the elements of CCW proved beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Reese, 491 Mich at 139. Additionally, a rational fact-finder could conclude that 

defendant carried the weapon into the abandoned home, also demonstrating concealment in a 

place other than defendant’s “dwelling house.” See MCL 750.227(2).

Defendant challenges his CCW conviction by arguing that there was a reasonable doubt 

as to whether he actually possessed a gun because he testified at trial that he did not. However, 

defendant ignores the fact that “the prosecution need not negate every reasonable theory 

consistent with the defendant’s innocence, but need merely introduce evidence sufficient to 

convince a reasonable jury in the face of whatever contradictory evidence the defendant may 

provide.” People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 423-424; 646 NW2d 158 (2002) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). Because the prosecution presented sufficient evidence for a rational 

fact-finder to find the elements of CCW proved beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant’s 

argument is without merit.

With regard to defendant’s conviction for felon in possession of a firearm, the 

prosecution must prove that (1) defendant possessed a firearm, (2) defendant was previously 

convicted of a specified felony, and (3) fewer than five years had elapsed since defendant paid 

all fines, served all terms of imprisonment, and completed all terms of probation or parole 

imposed for the offense. MCL 750.224f; see also People v Perkins, 262 Mich App 267, 270-

271; 686 NW2d 237 (2004), abrogated in part on other grounds by People v Smith-Anthony, 494 

Mich 669, 682-683; 837 NW2d 415 (2013). Constructive possession is sufficient if there is 

circumstantial evidence that defendant “knowingly [had] the power and the intention at a given 

time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or 

persons.” Flick, 471 Mich at 14. “[A] defendant has constructive possession of a firearm if the 

location of the weapon is known and is reasonably accessible to the defendant.” People v 

Burgenmeyer, 461 Mich 431, 437; 606 NW2d 645 (2000).
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A rational fact-finder could conclude that defendant was guilty of felon in possession of a 

firearm. Trial counsel stipulated that defendant was not legally permitted to possess a firearm 

because he was previously convicted of a specified felony and his right to possess a firearm was 

not restored. The only remaining element to prove was that defendant possessed the firearm, 

either actually or constructively. See MCL 750.224f; Flick, 471 Mich at 14. The fact-finder 

could reasonably conclude that defendant had both actual and constructive possession of the gun. 

Both testifying police officers saw defendant in the street with the gun in his hand, and one of the 

officers saw defendant conceal the gun into his left pocket. When the officers tried to stop 

defendant, they watched as he went into what appeared to be an abandoned house. The officers 

subsequently searched the house and found a gun in the kitchen that looked similar to the one 

they saw defendant holding. Based on this evidence, a rational trier of fact could conclude 

beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed a gun. Additionally, a rational trier of fact 

could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had constructive possession of the gun 

because he testified that he was aware of the gun’s location in the house and that he had 

reasonable access to it. See Burgenmeyer, 461 Mich 437.

Included in defendant’s statement of questions presented is the assertion that there was 

insufficient evidence to convict him of felon in possession of ammunition, but defendant fails to 

argue or cite authority supporting this contention in the body of his brief. Regardless, his 

argument has no merit. The basis for defendant’s felon in possession of ammunition conviction 

is MCL 750.224f, which states in relevant part:

(4) A person convicted of a specified felony shall not possess, use, transport, sell, 

carry, ship, or distribute ammunition in this state until all of the following 

circumstances exist:

(a) The expiration of 5 years after all of the following circumstances exist:

(i) The person has paid all fines imposed for the violation.

(ii) The person has served all terms of imprisonment imposed for the violation.

(iii) The person has successfully completed all conditions of probation or parole 

imposed for the violation.

(b) The person’s right to possess, use, transport, sell, purchase, carry, ship, 

receive, or distribute ammunition has been restored under section 4 of 1927 PA 

372, MCL 28.424.

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(6) A person who possesses, uses, transports, sells, carries, ships, or distributes 

ammunition in violation of this section is guilty of a felony punishable by 

imprisonment for not more than 5 years or a fine of not more than $5,000.00, or 

both.

Defendant stipulated that he was not eligible to possess “any ammunition.” At trial, defendant 

admitted that the police found “a bullet” in his pocket that matched the caliber of the handgun 
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found in the kitchen. Therefore a rational fact-finder could have concluded that defendant 

possessed ammunition in violation of MCL 750.224f(6).

Lastly, a rational fact-finder could conclude that defendant was guilty of felony-firearm. 

In order to prove a felony-firearm charge, the prosecution must prove that “defendant possessed 

a firearm during the commission of, or in the attempt to commit, a felony.” People v Bosca, 310 

Mich App 1, 22; 871 NW2d 307 (2015) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “A conviction 

for felon-in-possession may constitute the predicate felony for felony-firearm.” People v 

Calloway, 469 Mich 448, 452; 671 NW2d 733 (2003). As stated earlier, there was sufficient 

evidence that defendant possessed the gun. There was also sufficient evidence to support 

defendant’s convictions for felon in possession of a firearm and felon in possession of 

ammunition. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support that defendant was a felon 

and committed a felony while in possession of a gun. See Bosca, 310 Mich App at 22; 

Calloway, 469 Mich at 452.

Defendant relatedly argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating to 

defendant’s prior convictions. This issue is unpreserved because defendant did not move for a 

new trial or for a Ginther1 hearing. “To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

defendant must show: (1) that his attorney’s performance was objectively unreasonable in light 

of prevailing professional norms; and (2) that he was prejudiced by the deficient performance.” 

People v Walker, 497 Mich 894, 895; 855 NW2d 744 (2014). There is a strong presumption that 

defense counsel employed effective trial strategy, People v Payne, 285 Mich App 181, 190; 774 

NW2d 714 (2009), and this Court “will not substitute our judgement for that of counsel on 

matters of trial strategy, nor will we use the benefit of hindsight when assessing counsel’s 

competence,” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 242-243; 749 NW2d 272 (2008).

Defense counsel stipulated that, “at the time of this offense . . . defendant had been 

previously convicted of a specified felony[ a]nd he had not regained the rights to carry, use or 

possess a firearm or any ammunition.” Counsel’s stipulation was reasonable; without a 

stipulation, the prosecution would have presented evidence of defendant’s prior felony 

convictions, which may have included additional prejudicial details of those convictions. 

Considering the presumption in favor of counsel’s actions as effective trial strategy, counsel’s 

actions did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. And even if the stipulation 

was objectively unreasonable, defendant would not have been prejudiced because the 

prosecution would have simply provided the trial court with evidence of defendant’s prior 

convictions and he still would have been convicted of felony-firearm.

Next, defendant contends that the trial court was limited to sentencing him based on the 

felony information and he should have been sentenced to five years for his felony-firearm 

conviction. We disagree.

We review questions of law, such as constitutional issues, de novo. In re Contempt of 

Dudzinski, 257 Mich App 96, 99; 667 NW2d 68 (2003)

 1 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 442-444; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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The felony-firearm statute has a graduated punishment scheme where subsequent 

convictions for felony-firearm require mandatory increases in sentencing. Specifically, relevant 

to the issue on appeal, MCL 750.227b(1) states:

A person who carries or has in his or her possession a firearm when he or she 

commits or attempts to commit a felony, except a violation of [MCL 750.223, 

MCL 750.227, MCL 750.227a, or MCL 750.230], is guilty of a felony, and shall 

be imprisoned for 2 years. Upon a second conviction under this section, the 

person shall be imprisoned for 5 years. Upon a third or subsequent conviction 

under this subsection, the person shall be imprisoned for 10 years.

“Due process protections afforded defendants subject to such sentence enhancement provisions 

are less than those afforded defendants for the substantive offense, because the enhancement is 

not a separate element that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Miles, 454 

Mich 90, 100; 559 NW2d 299 (1997). Regarding an enhancement of a felony-firearm sentence, 

“due process is satisfied as long as the sentence is based on accurate information and the 

defendant has a reasonable opportunity at sentencing to challenge that information.” Id.

In Miles, the PSIR failed to show defendant’s prior felony-firearm convictions and the 

trial court sentenced defendant to the requisite two-year consecutive sentence. Id. at 92. 

However, once the trial court realized its mistake, it sua sponte and without a resentencing 

hearing enhanced defendant’s sentence to reflect the correct five-year sentence. Id. Our 

Supreme Court affirmed the five-year sentence because it was harmless error as the defendant 

admitted the prior felony-firearm convictions. Id. This case is factually similar, and the 

dissimilarities only strengthen the prosecution’s argument. In both cases, the defendant was not 

charged with the statutorily mandated enhancement. But unlike in Miles, defendant’s PSIR in 

this case contained four felony-firearm convictions. Defendant agreed during sentencing that the 

PSIR was accurate, and defendant does not argue any inaccuracies on appeal. Additionally, 

defendant had actual knowledge that the prosecution was seeking the enhancement, as the plea 

offer stated on the record acknowledged that an enhancement would not be sought if he accepted 

the offer. Based on this record, the 10-year sentence for felony-firearm was proper.

Defendant appears to argue that he should only have a five-year sentence as required for 

a second felony-firearm conviction because his prior felony-firearm convictions were based on 

plea agreements that reduced the sentences to two-years (or the equivalent of first offense 

sentences). Defendant’s contention belies the plain reading of MCL 750.227b(1). Defendant has 

four felony-firearm convictions. Therefore, his appropriate sentence is 10 years. See MCL 

750.227b(1).

Affirmed.

/s/ Jane M. Beckering 

/s/ Colleen A. O'Brien 

/s/ Thomas C. Cameron