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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

DIONTA McBRIDE, 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

OFFICER CHAD ODLE, OFFICER 

BRANDON ROUNDTREE, OFFICER 

ANDREW WHITMEYER, and SGT. 

BRIAN SCHROTH, 

 Defendants. 

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NO. 3:15–CV-00559 

 

OPINION AND ORDER

 This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to 

Summary Judgment, filed on April 3, 2017 (DE #15). For the reasons 

set forth below, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (DE #15) 

is GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case. 

BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff Dionta McBride (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint in 

alleging that Elkhart Police Department officers Chad Odle, 

Brandon Roundtree, and Andrew Whitmeyer, and Sergeant Brian 

Schroth (together, “Defendants”) subjected him to false arrest, 

false imprisonment, and unreasonable search in violation of Fourth 

Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in connection with a traffic stop 
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on May 5, 2014. Defendants filed motion for summary judgment based 

on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). The motion is fully 

briefed and are ripe for adjudication. 

DISCUSSION 

Summary Judgment Standard 

Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine 

dispute of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 

2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Not every dispute between the parties 

makes summary judgment inappropriate; “[o]nly disputes over facts 

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law 

will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. To 

determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the 

Court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s 

favor. See Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010). 

A party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion 

may not rely on allegations in her own pleading but rather must 

“marshal and present the court with the evidence she contends will 

prove her case.” Goodman v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 

651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). “[I]nferences relying on mere 
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speculation or conjecture will not suffice.” Stephens v. Erickson, 

569 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). If the 

nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an essential 

element on which he bears the burden of proof at trial, summary 

judgment is proper. See Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th 

Cir. 2006). 

Undisputed Facts 

In May 2014, Plaintiff, a resident of Texas, was in Elkhart 

for the purpose of recording a comedy CD and performing comedy 

live at various locations in Elkhart. (Defs. Ex. A, at 14, 46-

48.) While in Elkhart, Plaintiff drove his sister’s vehicle, a 

dark blue Dodge Intrepid (“Intrepid”). (Id. at 57.) On May 5, 

2014, Plaintiff was at the house located at 2301 South 6th Street 

in Elkhart, Indiana (“Residence”). (Id. at 46.) He was there to 

use a recording studio located in the basement of the Residence. 

(Id. at 46-47.) Plaintiff had visited the Residence approximately 

three times for the purpose of utilizing the recording studio. 

(Id. at 50.) He did not know who owned or lived in the Residence, 

and was only familiar with the producer with whom he was working 

during the studio sessions. (Id. at 50-51.) 

On May 5, 2014, defendant Sergeant Brian Schroth (“Schroth”) 

was a member of the Elkhart Police Department Drug Unit, which was 

conducting a short term drug investigation into the Residence. 

(Defs. Ex. B, ¶¶ 1-3.) That day, a confidential informant had 
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purchased marijuana at the Residence. (Id., ¶4.) At 9:00 a.m., 

Schroth drove past the Residence and observed a dark blue Dodge 

Intrepid bearing Indiana license plate RLO899 parked in the 

driveway of the Residence. (Id., ¶5.) Schroth ran the license 

plate and it was registered to Donisha McBride, Plaintiff’s sister. 

(Id.) Several times throughout the day, Schroth drove past the 

Residence and observed the Intrepid parked in the driveway. (Id., 

¶6.) 

On May 5, 2014, Plaintiff arrived at the Residence at 

approximately 5:30 p.m. and was there for approximately one hour 

and twenty minutes. (Defs. Ex. A, at 59-60.) He had driven the 

Intrepid there and parked it in the driveway. (Id. at 65.) 

Plaintiff saw Steven Randall (“Randall”) inside the Residence. 

(Id. at 61.) Plaintiff had no knowledge of any illegal activity 

occurring in the Residence and had never personally seen drugs, 

drug use, or drug sales occurring at the Residence. (Id. at 56-

57.) 

At approximately 6:30 p.m., Schroth and defendant Officer 

Andrew Whitmeyer (“Whitmeyer”) were conducting surveillance on the 

Residence and observed the Intrepid backed into the driveway. 

(Defs. Ex. B, ¶7.) Schroth then observed a black male, later 

identified as Randall, exit the Residence and leave in the 

Intrepid. (Id., ¶8.) Schroth and Whitmeyer followed Randall to 

a store, then to a gas station and back to the Residence. (Id.) 
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At approximately 7:28 p.m., Schroth and Whitmeyer observed a 

black male exit the Residence and leave in the Intrepid. (Id., 

¶9.) Schroth and Whitmeyer followed the Intrepid to West Lusher 

Avenue, where they directed defendants Corporal Brandon Roundtree 

(“Roundtree”) and Corporal Chad Odle (“Odle”) of the Elkhart Police 

Department to execute a traffic stop of the Intrepid “for visiting 

a common nuisance” at the Residence. (Id., ¶10.) Schroth and 

Whitmeyer requested that Roundtree and Odle execute the traffic 

stop because they were in uniform and a marked squad car, as 

required by Elkhart Police Department general orders. (Id., ¶11.) 

The driver of the Intrepid was identified as Plaintiff. (Id., 

¶12.) 

Roundtree and Odle conducted a traffic stop of the Intrepid 

as directed. (Defs. Ex. C, ¶¶2-3.) When Plaintiff saw the police 

put their lights on and pull up behind him, he immediately pulled 

over near a stoplight on Oakland. (Defs. Ex. A, at 67.) Another 

marked car and an unmarked minivan pulled up behind the first 

officer. After Roundtree and Odle executed the traffic stop, 

Schroth and Whitmeyer took over the stop. (Defs. Ex. C, ¶4.) 

Plaintiff was not asked to produce identification. (Defs. Ex. A

at 70.) Plaintiff was ordered out of the car, handcuffed, 

searched, and placed in the back seat of Roundtree’s police car. 

(Id. at 72.) While performing the outer clothing pat-down on 

Plaintiff for possible weapons, Schroth located $2,100 in cash on 
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Plaintiff. (Def. Ex. B, ¶13.) Plaintiff was stopped and arrested 

for visiting a common nuisance because he was seen exiting the 

Residence where a confidential informant had purchased drugs. 

(Id., ¶14.) Plaintiff asked Roundtree if he could retrieve 

Plaintiff’s prescription anxiety medication from the Intrepid, but 

Roundtree did not do so. (Defs. Ex. A, at 80-81.) 

Roundtree placed Plaintiff in his police car and drove 

Plaintiff back to the Residence without explaining why he was being 

detained. (Id. at 79-81.) Upon returning to the Residence, a 

search was conducted of the Residence with a search warrant that 

had been previously obtained. (Defs. Ex. B, ¶15.) The Drug Unit 

found marijuana, a white powdery substance, drug paraphernalia, 

baggies and a scale, all of which were in plain sight throughout 

the Residence. (Id.) Plaintiff sat in the back of the police car 

at the Residence for two and one-half hours. (Defs. Ex. A at 82.) 

At the end, the police put Randall into the back of the car with 

Plaintiff. (Id. at 84.) While sitting in the police car with the 

windows rolled up and no air conditioning on, Plaintiff began to 

suffer an anxiety attack. (Id. at 81-84.) 

Roundtree drove Plaintiff and Randall to the Elkhart police 

station. (Id. at 87.) Once inside the station, Plaintiff went 

through processing, including a search of his person by Roundtree. 

(Id. at 88-89.) As Roundtree was booking Plaintiff, he discovered 

a plastic bag containing a green, leafy substance that he believed 
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to be marijuana in the front pocket of his sweatshirt. (Defs. Ex. 

C, ¶6.) Roundtree turned the substance over to Whitmeyer for 

further testing. (Id.) 

Plaintiff was charged with felony possession of marijuana and 

visiting a common nuisance. (Defs. Ex. B, ¶17.) He was held for 

two days in jail and did not learn of the charges until he was 

bonded out of jail. (Defs. Ex. A. at 98-99.) On January 30, 2015, 

the Elkhart Superior Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to suppress 

evidence found on Plaintiff or in his vehicle. (Pl. Ex. B.) The 

State then moved to dismiss all charges against Plaintiff. (Pl. 

Ex. C.) 

ANALYSIS 

Plaintiff claims that Defendants falsely arrested, falsely 

imprisoned, and unreasonably searched him in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment and Section 1983. A plaintiff may bring a cause 

of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against “[e]very person who, under 

color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 

any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen 

of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 

secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order 

to prevail on a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that he 

“was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or federal 

law” “by a person acting under color of law.” Thurman v. Vill. of 
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Homewood, 446 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2006). The Fourth Amendment 

to the United States Constitution provides protection against 

unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. 

Personal Involvement 

As an initial matter, “[Section] 1983 lawsuits against 

individuals require personal involvement in the alleged 

constitutional deprivation to support a viable claim.” Palmer v. 

Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations 

omitted). It is undisputed that neither Odle nor Whitmeyer 

searched Plaintiff. Therefore, Odle and Whitmeyer do not have the 

requisite personal involvement required to be liable for 

Plaintiff’s unreasonable search claim.1

In his response brief, Plaintiff mentions in passing that 

searches of the car he was driving were unreasonable. (See, e.g.,

DE #17 at 5.) Even if his complaint included a claim for an 

unreasonable search of a vehicle (which it does not), Plaintiff 

proffers no evidence whatsoever to support this claim. Because 

there is no evidence in the record that any of the Defendants were 

personally involved in allegedly unreasonable searches of 

Plaintiff’s vehicle, Plaintiff cannot show individual liability 

under Section 1983 for such claim. 

                                                            

1 The Court need not address Defendants’ argument that Roundtree and Odle lacked 

personal involvement as to Plaintiff’s false arrest and imprisonment claims 

because, for the reasons below, it finds that they are entitled to qualified 

immunity.
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Probable Cause and Qualified Immunity 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims fail 

because they had probable cause to arrest him for visiting a common 

nuisance, and even if they did not, they are entitled to qualified 

immunity. “Probable cause to arrest is an absolute defense to any 

claim under Section 1983 against police officers for wrongful 

arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution.” Mustafa v. 

City of Chicago, 442 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation 

omitted). “Police ordinarily have probable cause if, at the time 

of the arrest, the facts and circumstances within the officer's 

knowledge . . . are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one 

of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, 

that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to 

commit an offense.” Smith v. Gomez, 550 F.3d 613, 618 (7th Cir. 

2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

“[P]robable cause—the area between bare suspicion and virtual 

certainty—describes not a point but a zone within which reasonable 

mistakes will be excused.” Sheik-Abdi v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 1240, 

1246 (7th Cir. 1994) (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted). “[C]ourts evaluate probable cause not on the facts as 

an omniscient observer would perceive them but on the facts as 

they would have appeared to a reasonable person in the position of 

the arresting officer —seeing what he saw, hearing what he heard.” 

Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). “The probable cause 
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determination must be made by a jury if there is room for a 

difference of opinion concerning the facts or the reasonable 

inferences to be drawn from them.” Chelios v. Heavener, 520 F.3d 

678, 686 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Here, Plaintiff “carries the burden of establishing the 

absence of probable cause.” McBride v. Grice, 576 F.3d 703, 706 

(7th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). 

“Qualified immunity protects public servants from liability 

for reasonable mistakes made while performing their public 

duties.” Findlay v. Lendermon, 722 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2013) 

(citation omitted); see Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308, 193 

L.Ed.2d 255 (2015) (Qualified immunity protects “all but the 

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”). 

“To overcome the defendant’s invocation of qualified immunity, the 

plaintiffs must show both (1) that the facts make out a 

constitutional violation, and (2) that the constitutional right 

was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the official's alleged 

misconduct.” Abbott v. Sangamon Cty., Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 713 

(7th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). “[C]ourts now have discretion 

to grant immunity on the basis that the right was not clearly 

established without determining whether there was a violation in 

the first place.” Id. (citations omitted). 

“The probable-cause standard inherently allows room for 

reasonable mistakes,” “but qualified immunity affords an added 
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layer of protection by shielding officers from suit for damages if 

a reasonable officer could have believed [the arrest] to be lawful, 

in light of clearly established law and the information the 

[arresting] officers possessed.” Id. at 714 (citations and 

quotation marks omitted). “Often termed ‘arguable probable 

cause,’” “qualified immunity in this context protects officers who 

reasonably but mistakenly believe that probable cause exists.” 

Id. at 714-15 (citations omitted). “The existence of probable 

cause or arguable probable cause depends, in the first instance, 

on the elements of the predicate criminal offense(s) as defined by 

state law.” Id. at 715 (citations omitted). 

Defendants maintain that they had probable cause to arrest 

Plaintiff for the offense visiting a common nuisance. At the time 

of Plaintiff’s arrest, visiting a common nuisance was a Class B 

misdemeanor under Indiana Code § 35-48-4-13.2 See Ind. Code § 35-

48-4-13(a) (2013) (“A person who knowingly or intentionally visits 

a building, structure, vehicle, or other place that is used by any 

person to unlawfully use a controlled substance commits visiting 

a common nuisance, a Class B misdemeanor.”). “The question is 

whether there was probable cause that the location was a common 

nuisance and that [Plaintiff] was visiting it.” United States v. 

Sims, No. 2:06-CR-85 PS, 2006 WL 3386718, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 

                                                            

2 Section 35–48–4–13 was repealed by P.L. 59-2016, SEC. 8, effective July 1, 

2016. 
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20, 2006). Where an officer “has probable cause to believe that 

an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in 

his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, 

arrest the offender.” Ray v. City of Chicago, 629 F.3d 660, 663 

(7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). 

On the day of Plaintiff’s arrest, Schroth was a member of the 

Elkhart Police Department Drug Unit (“Drug Unit”), and was 

investigating the Residence. That day, a confidential informant 

had purchased marijuana from the Residence. Schroth observed 

Plaintiff’s Intrepid in the driveway of the Residence several times 

that day. Schroth and Whitmeyer observed the Intrepid in the 

driveway, and saw Plaintiff leave the Residence in the Intrepid at 

approximately 7:28 p.m. Schroth and Whitmeyer followed Plaintiff 

in the Intrepid, and directed Roundtree and Odle to stop him for 

visiting a public nuisance. They arrested Plaintiff for visiting 

a public nuisance, placed him in a police car, and returned to the 

Residence. Plaintiff remained in the police car while the Drug 

Unit conducted a search of the Residence pursuant to a search 

warrant. During that search, marijuana and other drug 

paraphernalia were found in plain sight throughout the Residence. 

While Plaintiff asserts that he lacked knowledge of the drug 

activity at the Residence, the Court is to consider the facts known 

to the officers, not Plaintiff, at the time of the arrest in 

determining probable cause. See Tebbens v. Mushol, 692 F.3d 807, 
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816 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Whether [the officer] had probable cause 

depends on the facts known to him at the time of arrest.”). 

Plaintiff relies on two Supreme Court cases to argue that 

Defendants lacked probable cause to stop and detain him: Michigan 

v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981), 

and Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 185 

L.Ed.2d 19 (2013). Summers defined a category of cases in which 

detention is allowed without probable cause to arrest for a crime. 

It held that for Fourth Amendment purposes, “a warrant to search 

for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with 

it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises 

while a proper search is conducted.” Summers, 452 U.S. at 705. 

In Bailey, the Court considered whether Summers justified 

detentions beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises being 

searched. 133 S. Ct. at 1038. In that case, the police had 

obtained a warrant to search a residence for a gun. Id. at 1036. 

The residence was under surveillance when the petitioner and 

another man exited the residence, entered a car parked in the 

driveway, and drove away. Id. The police followed the car for 

about a mile before pulling the car over. The police searched 

both men, handcuffed them, and returned them to the residence. 

Id. The petitioner was told that they were being detained incident 

to the execution of a search warrant of the residence. Id. The 

search of the residence recovered a gun and drugs in plain view, 
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and the petitioner was arrested. The Court found that the 

petitioner was detained “at a point beyond any reasonable 

understanding of the immediate vicinity of the premises in 

question.” Id. at 1042. Bailey held that “[o]nce an individual 

has left the immediate vicinity of a premises to be searched . . 

. detentions must be justified by some other rationale.” Id. at 

1043. 

Plaintiff argues that his case is similar to Bailey, in that 

he was detained nearly one mile from the Residence to be searched, 

had committed no traffic offense, was stopped, handcuffed, 

searched, and returned to the Residence. Defendants distinguish 

Bailey by offering another rationale for stopping and arresting 

Plaintiff: they had probable cause to believe that Plaintiff had 

committed the offense of visiting a common nuisance. Defendants 

proffer undisputed evidence that Schroth and Whitmeyer directed 

Roundtree and Odle to execute a traffic stop of Plaintiff’s 

Intrepid for visiting a common nuisance because they saw Plaintiff 

leave the Residence where a confidential informant had purchased 

drugs. (Defs. Ex. B, ¶10, ¶14, ¶17; Defs. Ex. C, ¶3 (Roundtree 

and Odle executed the stop of Plaintiff as directed by Schroth 

“for visiting a common nuisance”).) Plaintiff contends that 

Defendants did not have sufficient evidence to effectuate the stop 

or arrest because he was not known to officers or suspected of 

illegal activity. (DE #17 at 9 (citing Matz v. Klotka, 769 F.3d 
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517, 523 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[S]uspicion of illegal activity at a 

particular location does not transfer such a suspicion to an 

individual leaving the property.”).) However, the evidence before 

the Court indicates that Schroth and Whitmeyer suspected Plaintiff 

of the offense of visiting a common nuisance because a confidential 

informant had purchased drugs at the Residence that day. 

Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ rationale of arresting him 

for visiting a public nuisance is disingenuous because “[o]ther 

vehicles had come and gone in the days and hours prior to the 

execution of the search warrant, and not one of them was stopped.” 

(DE #17 at 8.) However, he proffers no evidence to support this 

assertion. He argues that he was improperly stopped nearly one 

mile from the Residence, but cites no authority to suggest that 

police were prohibited from making an arrest for visiting a common 

nuisance away from the location of the common nuisance. Plaintiff 

contends that Defendants stopped him not because he had visited a 

common nuisance, but because he left the Residence minutes before 

a search warrant was executed at the Residence. In support, he 

notes that Defendants brought him back to the Residence and held 

him in a police car there during the execution of the search 

warrant. 

Plaintiff asserts that in his criminal case, the state court 

rejected the State’s argument that “the officers had reasonable 

suspicion to stop the vehicle as it was fleeing a known drug house 
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and that they also had probable cause to arrest the defendant 

without a warrant” in its order granting Plaintiff’s motion to 

suppress evidence. (DE #17 at 8 (quoting Pl. Ex. B. at 4).) 

Defendants do not address the state court’s order. Aside from the 

sentence quoted by Plaintiff, the state court’s order does not 

refer to Plaintiff visiting a common nuisance, or explain why the 

court did not find the State’s argument persuasive. The state 

court relied on Bailey to hold that the police were precluded from 

arresting and searching Plaintiff where there was no arrest warrant 

for Plaintiff, he had committed no traffic violation so as to 

justify stopping the vehicle a mile from the Residence, and the 

search warrant was confined to the Residence. (Pl. Ex. B. at 5-

6.) “Under Indiana law, collateral estoppel bars subsequent 

litigation of an issue necessarily adjudicated in a former suit if 

the same issue is presented in the subsequent suit.” Best v. City 

of Portland, 554 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). To the extent that Plaintiff 

intended to argue that Defendants are collaterally estopped to 

asserting probable cause for his arrest, he fails to develop this 

argument in any meaningful way. Therefore, the Court will not 

consider the issue of collateral estoppel. See Mahaffey v. Ramos, 

588 F.3d 1142, 1146 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Perfunctory, undeveloped 
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arguments without discussion or citation to pertinent legal 

authority are waived.”).3

The Court need not determine whether Defendants had probable 

cause to arrest and detain Plaintiff because a reasonable officer 

could have believed that probable cause existed to support the 

arrest. “Once a defendant raises the defense of qualified 

immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of defeating it either by 

identifying a closely analogous case or by persuading the court 

that the conduct is so egregious and unreasonable that, 

notwithstanding the lack of an analogous decision, no reasonable 

officer could have thought he was acting lawfully.” Abbott, 705 

F.3d at 723–24 (citation omitted). Plaintiff contends that Bailey

clearly established that it was unconstitutional to search and 

seize a citizen who was no longer in the immediate vicinity of a 

premises subject to a search warrant. As noted above, in Bailey

the officers had followed the petitioner from a residence and then 

detained him incident to the execution of a search warrant of the 

residence. 133 S. Ct. at 1036. Bailey held that “[o]nce an 

individual has left the immediate vicinity of a premises to be 

searched . . . detentions must be justified by some other 

                                                            

3 The Court also notes that several other courts have held that “a state criminal 

proceeding should not be used as a basis for offensive collateral estoppel when 

the state court had no reason to consider whether the officer would be entitled 

to qualified immunity from a civil suit.” Posey v. Pruger, No. 10 C 3574, 2015 

WL 5610764, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2015) (citing Cannaday v. Sandoval, 458 

Fed. Appx. 563, 566–67 (7th Cir. 2012), and Johnson v. Beckman, 2013 WL 1181584, 

at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. March 21, 2013)).
‐18‐ 

rationale.” Id. at 1043. Here, it is undisputed that Schroth and 

Whitmeyer justified Plaintiff’s arrest and detention by “some 

other rationale” than a detention incident to a search warrant, 

i.e., they believed they had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff 

for visiting a common nuisance because they saw him leave the 

Residence where a confidential informant had purchased drugs. Even 

if Schroth and Whitmeyer were mistaken in their belief that they 

had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for this offense, a 

reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed 

to support the arrest in light of the law established in Bailey. 

Because Schroth and Whitmeyer had arguable probable cause to arrest 

Plaintiff, they are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s 

false arrest and false imprisonment claims. See Thayer v. 

Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 251 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The existence of 

arguable probable cause to arrest [plaintiff] is an absolute bar 

to his § 1983 claim for unlawful arrest and false imprisonment.”). 

Qualified immunity also applies to the false arrest and false 

imprisonment claims against Roundtree and Odle. Plaintiff argues 

that Roundtree and Odle should have intervened to prevent the 

unlawful stop directed by Schroth and Whitmeyer, but instead 

effectuated the stop. “[A]n officer who is present and fails to 

intervene to prevent other law enforcement officers from 

infringing the constitutional rights of citizens is liable under 

§ 1983 if that officer had reason to know . . . that a citizen has 
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been unjustifiably arrested, or . . . that any constitutional 

violation has been committed by a law enforcement official; and 

the officer had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent 

the harm from occurring.” Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 

763, 774 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Defendants maintain 

that Roundtree and Odle had probable cause to stop Plaintiff at 

the direction of Schroth and Whitmeyer. “The collective knowledge 

doctrine permits an officer to stop, search, or arrest a suspect 

at the direction of another officer or police agency, even if the 

officer himself does not have firsthand knowledge of facts that 

amount to the necessary level of suspicion to permit the given 

action.” United States v. Williams, 627 F.3d 247, 252 (7th Cir. 

2010) (citation omitted). “The police who actually make the arrest 

need not personally know all the facts that constitute probable 

cause if they reasonably are acting at the direction of another 

officer or police agency. In that case, the arrest is proper so 

long as the knowledge of the officer directing the arrest, or the 

collective knowledge of the agency he works for, is sufficient to 

constitute probable cause.” United States v. Valencia, 913 F.2d 

378, 383 (7th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). “[T]he collective 

knowledge doctrine means a defendant is entitled to qualified 

immunity if he relied in objective good faith on another officer 

as to the justification for the arrest.” Wilbon v. Plovanich, 67 

F. Supp. 3d 927, 940 (N.D. Ill. 2014). “[I]f there are no 
‐20‐ 

circumstances that would lead a reasonable officer in the 

defendant’s position to believe the officer directing the seizure 

cannot be trusted to assess probable cause, the defendant can rely 

on the lead officer in good faith and be accorded qualified 

immunity for any unlawful arrest.” Id. at 940–41 (citations 

omitted). 

It is undisputed that Roundtree and Odle executed the stop of 

Plaintiff’s Intrepid at the direction of Schroth and Whitmeyer for 

visiting a common nuisance, and that Schroth and Whitmeyer did so 

because they saw Plaintiff leaving the Residence where a 

confidential informant had purchased drugs. This evidence 

suggests Roundtree and Odle relied in objective good faith on 

Schroth and Whitmeyer as to the justification for Plaintiff’s 

arrest. Plaintiff argues that Roundtree and Odle should have known 

that the stop was unlawful because they were “required to transport 

[Plaintiff] back to [the Residence] for the purpose of detaining 

[him] during the execution of the search warrant.” (DE #17 at 

11.) He does not cite evidence in the record to support this 

statement, and the Court has seen no evidence that the officers 

were “required” to transport Plaintiff to the Residence. While it 

is undisputed that Defendants brought Plaintiff to the Residence 

after arresting him, this fact does not raise an issue as to 

whether a reasonable officer would believe that Schroth and 

Whitmeyer could not be trusted to assess probable cause. See
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Abbott, 705 F.3d at 723–24 (plaintiff bears the burden of defeating 

qualified immunity). The undisputed evidence indicates that 

Roundtree and Odle relied in objective good faith on Schroth and 

Whitmeyer as to the justification for Plaintiff’s arrest. 

Therefore, Roundtree and Odle are entitled to qualified immunity 

on Plaintiff’s false arrest and false imprisonment claims. Since 

Roundtree and Odle are entitled to qualified immunity because they 

reasonably relied on Schroth and Whitmeyer, they are also not 

liable for Plaintiff’s failure to intervene claim. See Wilbon, 67 

F. Supp. 3d at 947 (where court found that defendants were entitled 

to qualified immunity because they reasonably relied on the other 

officers, they were not liable for failure to intervene); Crawford 

v. City of Chicago, No. 12 C 5289, 2014 WL 1661720, at *8 (N.D. 

Ill. Apr. 25, 2014) (dismissing plaintiff’s failure to intervene 

claim against defendant officers after finding that they were 

entitled to qualified immunity for false arrest claim). 

Regarding Plaintiff’s unreasonable search claim, the evidence 

demonstrates that Schroth conducted an outer clothing pat-down for 

possible weapons after Plaintiff was arrested, and Roundtree 

searched Plaintiff as he was booking Plaintiff in at the Elkhart 

Police Department. The Fourth Amendment prohibits, with limited 

exceptions, warrantless searches. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 

332, 338, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009). “[O]fficers 

may perform searches incident to constitutionally permissible 
‐22‐ 

arrests in order to ensure their safety and safeguard evidence.” 

Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1607, 170 

L. Ed. 2d 559 (2008). “A custodial arrest of a suspect based on 

probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth 

Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the 

arrest requires no additional justification.” Id. at 177 (citation 

omitted). Because the Court has found that a reasonable officer 

could have determined that probable cause existed to arrest 

Plaintiff for visiting a common nuisance, it follows that a 

reasonable officer also could conclude that he had the authority 

to search Plaintiff incident to the arrest. See Stanberry v. 

Morrison, No. 13-3037, 2013 WL 5509177, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 

2013) (finding qualified immunity applied to unreasonable search 

claim because “after performing the arrest, Defendant had no reason 

to believe a patdown prior to transporting Plaintiff to the Quincy 

Police Department constituted a clear violation of Plaintiff's 

Fourth Amendment rights.”). Scroth had no reason to believe that 

performing an outer clothing pat-down of Plaintiff after arresting 

him would constitute an illegal search. Nor did Roundtree have 

reason to believe that a pat-down of Plaintiff while booking him 

in at the Police Department would constitute an illegal search. 

Therefore, Schroth and Roundtree are entitled to qualified 

immunity on Plaintiff’s unreasonable search claim. 
‐23‐ 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment (DE #15) is GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to 

close this case. 

DATED: March 19, 2018 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge 

 United States District Court