IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

JEFF MONEY, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) 

 ) 1:14-cv-00253 

KENDALLVILLE PLACE ) 

APARTMENTS, PHASE II, LLC, ) 

d/b/a NELSON ESTATES ) 

APARTMENTS, PHASE II, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

This matter is before the Court on “Kendallville Place 

Apartments, Phase II, LLC, d/b/a Nelson Estates Apartments, Phase 

II Motion for Summary Judgment,” filed by the defendant, 

Kendallville Place Apartments, Phase II, LLC, d/b/a Nelson Estates 

Apartments, Phase II, on July 20, 2015. (DE #27.) For the reasons 

set forth below, the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. With 

no federal claims now before it, this Court declines to exercise 

jurisdiction on the plaintiff’s state law claim, and, therefore, 

that state law claim is DISMISSED without prejudice. Because no 

claims remain pending, this case is DISMISSED, and the Clerk is 

DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of the defendant, Kendallville 

Place Apartments, Phase II, LLC, d/b/a Nelson Estates Apartments, 

Phase II, and close this case. 
2 

BACKGROUND 

On July 24, 2014, Jeff Money (“Money”) filed a complaint 

against Kendallville Place Apartments, Phase II, LLC, d/b/a Nelson 

Estates Apartments, Phase II (“Nelson Estates”) in the Noble 

Superior Court, Noble County, Indiana (cause number 57D01-1407-

CT-009) alleging claims under “Title II of the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (“ADA”).” (DE #6.) On August 19, 2014, Nelson 

Estates filed a notice of removal. (DE #1.) On October 6, 2014, 

Money filed an amended complaint, alleging that Nelson Estates 

violated his rights under the Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 

U.S.C. section 3601 et seq. (“FHAA”), and that Nelson Estates was 

negligent as a matter of Indiana law. On November 3, 2014, Nelson 

Estates filed its answer. (DE# 20.) On July 20, 2015, Nelson 

Estates filed the instant motion for summary judgment. (DE #27.) 

In support of its motion, Nelson Estates has offered factually 

relevant portions of Money’s deposition transcript. Money has 

failed to respond. 

DISCUSSION 

Standard 

Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine 
3 

dispute of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 

2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). Not every dispute between the 

parties makes summary judgment inappropriate; “[o]nly disputes 

over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary 

judgment.” Id. To determine whether a genuine dispute of material 

fact exists, the Court must construe all facts in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable 

inferences in that party’s favor. See Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 

F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010). 

A party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion 

may not rely on allegations in his own pleading but rather must 

“marshal and present the court with the evidence [he] contends 

will prove [his] case.” Goodman v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 

F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). “[I]nferences relying on mere 

speculation or conjecture will not suffice.” Stephens v. Erickson, 

569 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). If the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an essential 

element on which he bears the burden of proof at trial, summary 
4 

judgment is proper. See Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th 

Cir. 2006). 

Local Rule 56-1 describes the specific obligations of both 

the moving party and the non-moving party when a motion for summary 

judgment is filed. The moving party must file a “‘Statement of 

Material Facts’ that identifies the facts that the moving party 

contends are not genuinely disputed.” N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(a). 

The party opposing the motion must respond within twenty-eight 

days with a “Statement of Genuine Disputes” that sets forth the 

“material facts that the party contends are genuinely disputed so 

as to make a trial necessary.” N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(b)(2). A 

failure to respond as required by the local rules constitutes an 

admission. See Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003);

Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 689 

(7th Cir. 2000). However, even when an opposing party fails to 

respond to a summary judgment motion altogether, Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 56(e) permits judgment for the moving party only if 

the movant is entitled to it. In other words, summary judgment 

may only be granted “if appropriate—that is, if the motion 

demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and 

that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” LaSalle Bank Lake View v. Seguban, 54 F.3d 387, 392 (7th 

Cir. 1995) (quoting Johnson v. Gudmundsson, 35 F.3d 1104, 1112 

(7th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original). 
5 

Because Money has failed to file a response and has not 

identified any material disputes, the facts as claimed and properly 

supported by Nelson Estates in its Statement of Material Facts are 

deemed admitted to exist without controversy. This Court has 

reviewed the following facts and finds that they are adequately 

supported with appropriate citations to admissible evidence in the 

record. While Nelson Estates’ Statement of Material Facts is 

approximately 2 pages in length, this Court need not restate each 

and every fact that is deemed admitted; only the facts that are 

pivotal in resolving the instant motion are included in this order. 

Facts 

In 2000, Money moved into a Nelson Estates apartment to care 

for his ill mother who also resided there. (Money Dep., DE# 29-

1, pp. 2-3.) At that time, Money’s mother owned a vehicle, but 

Money himself did not own a vehicle. (Id. at 4.) According to 

Money, Nelson Estates provided its tenants with two handicapped 

parking spaces at the end of Money’s building. (Id. at 13.) Both 

of these handicapped parking spaces were equipped with access 

aisles that were demarcated with blue lines painted on the 

pavement. (Id. at 15.) In addition to these two general 

handicapped parking spots, Nelson Estates reserved a parking spot 

for Money directly in front of the door to his apartment. (Id. at 
6 

4.) That spot was marked by a four-by-four post that displayed a 

handicap placard. (Id. at 7.) 

Money testified that he made repeated requests to Nelson 

Estates that it paint blue striped access aisles next to his 

reserved spot in order to provide him with greater access to 

vehicles. (Id. at 14-15.) However, he is unclear exactly when he 

made these requests. (Id.) According to Money, Nelson Estates 

repeatedly denied his requests for the blue striped access aisles 

because the facility did not have enough parking spaces for the 

other tenants as it was. (Id. at 16.) In addition, Nelson Estates 

informed Money that his request would impose an inconvenience to 

the other tenants. (Id. at 14, 16.) Nelson Estates has both 

handicapped and non-handicapped tenants alike who compete for the 

limited available spots at the facility. (Id. at 13, 17, 18.) 

In 2008, when Money’s mother passed away, he took possession 

of his mother’s vehicle. (Id. at 3, 5.) From then on, until the 

vehicle was donated by Money in 2012, the vehicle never moved. 

(Id. at 5.) Nelson Estates had allowed Money to continue to park 

the vehicle in his reserved spot, despite the fact that Money was 

without a driver’s license and had been since 2006. (Id. at 2, 

5.) Money testified that, during this time, either his friend or 

sister would pick him up to take him places. (Id. at 5.) 

After Money donated the vehicle, he testified that his 

reserved parking spot would repeatedly be occupied by other 
7 

vehicles in the complex. (Id. at 17.) However, in response, 

Nelson Estates began the practice of placing an orange cone out in 

the parking lot to keep vehicles from parking in front of Money’s 

apartment and so that he could “have the other parking spot for 

medical transportation or [when] people were coming to pick [him] 

up to take [him] to the hospital.” (Id.) 

On August 3, 2012, Money’s sister arrived at Money’s apartment 

at Nelson Estates to take him to breakfast. (Id. at 5-6.) She 

parked in front of Money’s apartment. (Id. at 6-7.) Money exited 

his apartment in his wheelchair. (Id. at 8.) He had been using 

the wheelchair since January 2012 while he was healing from a 

meniscus injury. (Id. at 11-12.) Money could not get his 

wheelchair between the vehicles, so he got out of the wheelchair 

and walked to the passenger door of the vehicle. (Id. at 9-11.) 

He did not ask his sister to assist him. (Id. at 10.) Money’s 

leg gave out, he fell, and he suffered an injury. (Id. at 11.) 

Money remained a tenant at Nelson Estates until his lease was 

terminated on February 15, 2014. (Id. at 3.) 

Analysis 

Fair Housing Amendments Act 

Under the FHAA, it is prohibited to prevent a disabled 

individual from buying or renting private housing because of his 

or her disability. Wis. Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 
8 

465 F.3d 737, 748 (7th Cir. 2006); see generally 42 U.S.C. § 3604. 

Such an individual must also be provided reasonable “accommodation 

in rules, policies, practices, or services when such accommodation 

may be necessary to afford [them] equal opportunity to use and 

enjoy a dwelling.” Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); see also

Dadian v. Vill. of Wilmette, 269 F.3d 831, 838 (7th Cir. 2001). 

To prevail on an FHAA accommodation claim, a disabled plaintiff 

must establish that a requested accommodation, that was both 

reasonable and necessary to afford him an equal opportunity to use 

and enjoy his dwelling, was denied. See Wis. Cmty. Servs., Inc.,

465 F.3d at 749; U.S. v. WHPC—DWR, LLC, 491 Fed. Appx. 733, 736 

(7th Cir. 2012). 

In this case, Money claims that Nelson Estates violated his 

rights under the FHAA because it failed to make reasonable 

accommodations with respect to the rules, policies, practices, and 

services regarding wheelchair accessibility to its disabled 

tenants. Nelson Estates, however, argues that summary judgment is 

appropriate because, even assuming arguendo that Money was 

disabled, requested an accommodation, and was denied such 

accommodation, his request that blue lines be painted around his 

assigned parking space was neither reasonable nor necessary to 

allow Money an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the premises. 

 
9 

1. Reasonable Accommodation 

The determination of whether a requested accommodation is 

reasonable is highly fact-specific and must be decided on a caseby-case basis. Oconomowoc Residential Programs v. City of 

Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 2002). “The requirement of 

reasonable accommodation does not entail an obligation to do 

everything humanly possible to accommodate a disabled person; cost 

(to the defendant) and benefit (to the plaintiff) merit 

consideration as well.” Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425, 429 (7th 

Cir. 1995) (citing U.S. v. Vill. of Palatine, 37 F.3d 1230, 1234 

(7th Cir. 1994)). “An accommodation is reasonable if it is both 

efficacious and proportional to the costs to implement it.” Wis. 

Cmty. Servs., Inc., 465 F.3d at 749. “Implicit nonetheless in the 

text of the FHAA is the understanding that while reasonable 

accommodations to achieve necessary ends are required, some 

accommodations may not be reasonable under the circumstances and 

some may not be necessary to the laudable goal of inclusion.” 

Bronk, 54 F.3d at 428-29. “An accommodation is unreasonable if it 

either imposes undue financial and administrative burdens or 

requires a fundamental alteration in the nature of a program.” 

Erdman v. City of Ft. Atkinson, 84 F.3d 960, 962 (7th Cir. 1996) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Here, because Nelson Estates refused Money’s request that it 

create access aisles around his reserved space by painting the 
10 

area with blue stripes to provide him with better access transport 

vehicles, this Court must balance the burden on Nelson Estates to 

accommodate that request against the benefit provided to Money 

under the applicable circumstances in order to determine whether 

Money’s request was reasonable. 

First, the Court notes that it is undisputed that Money was 

provided with a reserved parking spot directly in front of his 

building, despite the fact that he had neither a vehicle since 

2012, nor a driver’s license since 2006. It is also undisputed 

that there were two additional handicapped parking spots at the 

end of the building, complete with blue striped access aisles. 

The record shows that parking space in general was limited at the 

apartment complex and that Nelson Estates communicated to Money 

that it did not have enough parking at the facility as it was. In 

addition, Nelson Estates informed Money that his request would 

impose an inconvenience to the other tenants at the facility. 

During his deposition, Money himself acknowledged both the limited 

parking at Nelson Estates and the competition that exists between 

the handicapped and non-handicapped tenants alike for all 

available spots at the facility. Under these circumstances, 

delineating blue striped access aisles around Money’s reserved 

space and further limiting parking to other residents would 

undoubtedly be burdensome to Nelson Estates. 
11 

Second, with regard to the benefit to Money, the record shows 

that Money requested that Nelson Estates provide him with blue 

painted stripes next to his reserved space for the purpose of 

providing him with sufficient space to access transportation 

vehicles. The benefit to Money can be best understood by parsing 

the form from the substance. As a matter of form, Money’s request 

was for Nelson Estates to paint the area around his reserved 

parking spot with blue stripes. However, as a matter of substance, 

the purpose of the request was for a sufficient area to access his 

transportation vehicles. Nothing in the FHAA or relevant 

regulations creates an absolute right to blue lines to be painted 

next to a disabled tenant’s reserved space, so the FHAA does not 

require Nelson Estates to give strict adherence to the particular 

form of Money’s request. Rather, under the FHAA, the accommodation 

need only be reasonable under the circumstances. Here, the record 

shows that in addition to assigning Money a parking spot in front 

of his apartment, Nelson Estates began the practice of placing an 

orange cone out in the parking lot in front of Money’s apartment 

for the purpose of ensuring that Money had sufficient space to 

access transportation vehicles when needed. The orange cone 

procedure provided sufficient space to access vehicles because the 

record shows Money successfully utilized this procedure at various 

times either for medical transport or when others would come to 

pick him up. Accordingly, if the purpose of Money’s request for 
12 

blue stripes was to obtain sufficient space to access 

transportation vehicles, then the orange cone arrangement 

accommodated the substance of that request. Placing upon Nelson 

Estates the additional duty to permanently paint the same area 

with blue stripes would have provided Money with little benefit 

beyond that already provided by the reserved spot and the orange 

cone accommodation. 

As reconfiguring its already limited parking area to provide 

Money with an additional area painted with blue stripes would be 

particularly burdensome on Nelson Estates, and because the benefit 

to Money beyond that already provided by Nelson Estates would be 

minimal, the burden on Nelson Estates to do so outweighed the 

benefit to Money. Thus, Money’s requested accommodation was not 

reasonable under the circumstances. See U.S. v. Port Liberte Condo 

1 Ass'n, Inc., No. 04-2783, 2006 WL 2792780, * 7 (D.N.J. Sept. 27, 

2006) (reallocation of parking spaces is not a reasonable 

accommodation in light of legal rights of other condominium owners 

and in light of engineering realities); Reyes v. Fairfield 

Properties, 661 F.Supp.2d 249, 259 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (“wholly new 

construction or modifications of existing premises is not mandated 

by the reasonable accommodations provision of the FHAA”); 

Rodriguez v. 551 West 157th St. Owners Corp., 992 F.Supp. 385, 387 

(S.D.N.Y 1998) (“reasonable accommodation” includes only an 

accommodation in the “rules, policies, practices, or services,” 
13 

not in “facilities,” but even if FHAA did require it, the 

accommodation must still be reasonable and not impose an undue 

hardship or substantial burden on the landlord). Because Money 

has not shown that the accommodation he sought was reasonable, his 

claim of discrimination must fail. Oconomowoc Residential 

Programs, 300 F.3d at 783. 

 2. Necessary for equal opportunity

 Whether the requested accommodation is necessary requires a 

“showing that the desired accommodation will affirmatively enhance 

a disabled plaintiff’s quality of life by ameliorating the effects 

of the disability.” Bronk, 54 F.3d at 429. The 

requested accommodation must be “‘necessary,’ meaning that, 

without the accommodation, the plaintiff will be denied an equal 

opportunity to obtain the housing of her choice.” Wis. Cmty. 

Servs., Inc., 465 F.3d at 749. The inquiry by the court must delve 

into causation. Id. Furthermore: 

the FHAA links the term ‘necessary’ to the 

goal of ‘equal opportunity.’ 42 U.S.C. § 

3604(f)(3)(B). The ‘equal opportunity’ 

element limits the accommodation duty so that 

not every rule that creates a general 

inconvenience or expense to the disabled needs 

to be modified. Instead, the statute requires 

only accommodations necessary to ameliorate 

the effect of the plaintiff's disability so 

that she may compete equally with the nondisabled in the housing market. 

Id. 
14 

The federal regulations promulgated by the United States 

Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”)1 contain an 

example of a reasonable and necessary accommodation that is 

relevant to this case:

Progress Gardens is a 300 unit apartment 

complex with 450 parking spaces which are 

available to tenants and guests of Progress 

Gardens on a first come first served basis. 

John applies for housing in Progress Gardens. 

John is mobility impaired and is unable to 

walk more than a short distance and therefore 

requests that a parking space near his unit be 

reserved for him so he will not have to walk 

very far to get to his apartment. It is a 

violation . . . for the owner or manager to 

refuse to make this accommodation. Without a 

reserved space, John might be unable to live 

in Progress Gardens at all or, when he has to 

park in a space far from his unit, might have 

difficulty getting from his car to his 

apartment unit. The accommodation therefore 

is necessary to afford John an equal 

opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. The 

accommodation is reasonable because it is 

feasible and practical under the 

circumstances. 

24 C.F.R. § 100.204(b); see also U.S. v. WHPC-DWR, LLC., 491 Fed. 

Appx. 733, 737-38 (7th Cir. 2012), Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 

844 F.Supp. 116, 125 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d, 51 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 

1995). 

In the HUD regulation above, John was mobility impaired and 

could only walk a short distance. Under the Seventh Circuit 

                                                            

1 HUD regulations are applicable because the Secretary of HUD was given the 

power to make rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of the FHAA. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 3614a. 
15 

causation standard, without the requested accommodation for a 

reserved space, John might be unable to live in Progress Gardens 

at all. As a result, the accommodation was necessary for equal 

opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling. In the case at hand, 

however, while Money is similar to John in that he is mobility 

impaired, Nelson Estates did in fact provide Money with a reserved 

spot directly in front of his apartment door. Furthermore, the 

record shows that upon receiving that reserved parking spot, Money 

came and went from his apartment for many years. In fact, even 

when his reserved space was occupied with his own vehicle (which 

he had not driven since at least 2006), Money testified that he 

came and went from his apartment despite the fact that the other 

handicapped spots were always occupied. In addition, in 2012 when 

Money was in a wheel chair due to a meniscus tear which made 

mobility to and from vehicles more difficult, the record shows 

that Nelson Estates would place an orange cone out when requested 

to do so to ensure Money had an available parking area in front of 

his apartment for medical transport or some other transportation 

need. Money utilized this orange cone procedure in the past and 

certainly could have done so on August 3, 2012, the day of his 

fall; however, he has presented no evidence that he made such a 

request on that date. 

Finally, the Court notes that the record shows there are other 

handicapped tenants at Nelson Estates who own vehicles yet, unlike 
16 

Money, must compete with both handicapped and non-handicapped 

tenants for the limited parking spots available. Money has 

testified that he has no vehicle, has no driver’s license, had 

been provided with a reserved spot, and received the orange cone 

accommodation to ensure the parking space needed for 

transportation. To force Nelson Estates to provide Money with 

blue striped access aisles adjacent to his reserved spot would be 

an accommodation, relative to the other tenants, that goes beyond

affording him an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling. 

Thus, the accommodation request that Nelson Estates equip Money’s 

reserved space with blue stripes was not necessary to allow Money 

equal opportunity to use and enjoy the premises because it would 

not have affirmatively enhanced his quality of life by ameliorating 

the effects of his disability. 

 In sum, because Money’s request that Nelson Estates provide 

him with blue stripes around his parking spot, in addition to 

reserving him a spot directly in front of his apartment and 

providing the orange cone accommodation, was neither reasonable 

nor necessary under the circumstances, Nelson Estates did not 

violate Money’s rights under the FHAA by failing to accommodate 

that request, and Money’s claim fails as a matter of law. 

Accordingly, summary judgment must be granted. 
17 

Negligence 

Money has also asserted a state law claim of negligence. As 

all of his federal claims have been dismissed, this Court declines 

supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim, and 

it is dismissed without prejudice. See e.g. Groce v. Eli Lilly & 

Co., 193 F.3d 496, 500-01 (7th Cir. 1999). 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, the Motion for Summary 

Judgment (DE #27) is GRANTED. With no federal claims now before 

it, this Court declines to exercise jurisdiction on the plaintiff’s 

state law claim, and, therefore, that state law claim is DISMISSED

without prejudice. Because no claims remain pending, this case is 

DISMISSED, and the Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of 

the defendant, Kendallville Place Apartments, Phase II, LLC, d/b/a 

Nelson Estates Apartments, Phase II, and close this case. 

DATED: March 7, 2016 /s/Rudy Lozano 

United States District Court