alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

FORT WAYNE DIVISION 

GLOBAL ARCHERY PRODUCTS, INC. ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No.: 1:15-cv-297-JVB-SLC 

 ) 

v. ) 

 ) 

JORDAN GWYTHER d/b/a ) 

LARPING.ORG and UPSHOT ARROWS, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

STIPULATED DISMISSAL OF PATENT COUNTS WITH PREJUDICE 

Plaintiff Global Archery Products, Inc. (“Global Archery”), pursuant to Rule 

41(a)(1)(A)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby dismisses with prejudice Counts 1 

and 2 (the patent infringement counts) in the present action as it relates to the iDV arrows being 

sold by Mr. Gwyther. 

Dated: March 31, 2016 s/Dean E. McConnell 

 Dean E. McConnell, Esq. Atty No. 20254-49 

 INDIANO & McCONNELL LLP 

 9795 Crosspoint Blvd., Suite 185 

 Indianapolis, IN 46256 

 Phone: (317) 912-1331 

 Fax: (317) 927-8279 

dean@im-iplaw.com 

 s/Gregg S. Gordon 

 Gregg S. Gordon, Attorney No. 19360-49 

 Of Counsel, Cremer & Cremer 

 8038 N 600 W, Ste 400 

 McCordsville, Indiana 46055 

 Telephone: (317) 335-3360 

 Fax: (317) 335-3361 

 GGordon@Geistlaw.com 

USDC IN/ND case 1:15-cv-00297-JVB-SLC document 40 filed 03/31/16 page 1 of 3
2 

 s/ Mark P. Walters 

 Mark P. Walters 

 LOWE GRAHAM JONES PLLC 

 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4800 

 Seattle, Washington 98104 

 Telephone: 206-381-3300 

 walters@lowegrahamjones.com

 s/ Robert T. Keen, Jr. 

 Robert T. Keen, Jr. 

 215 East Berry Street 

 Fort Wayne, Indiana 46802 

 Telephone: 260-423-9551 

 rtk@barrettlaw.com

USDC IN/ND case 1:15-cv-00297-JVB-SLC document 40 filed 03/31/16 page 2 of 3
3 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

 The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 

electronically filed on this 31st day of March 2016, by way of the Court’s electronic filing 

system, and that a copy of this filing will be sent to all counsel of record via the Court’s 

electronic filing system. 

 /s/ Dean E. McConnell 

USDC IN/ND case 1:15-cv-00297-JVB-SLC document 40 filed 03/31/16 page 3 of 3
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 189 Introduced in House (IH)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 189

      To provide for the retention of the name of Mount McKinley.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 4, 2005

  Mr. Regula introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                         Committee on Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
      To provide for the retention of the name of Mount McKinley.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, That, notwithstanding 
any other authority of law, the mountain located 63 degrees 04 minutes 
12 seconds north, by 151 degrees 00 minutes 18 seconds west shall 
continue to be named and referred to for all purposes as Mount 
McKinley.
                                 <all>
```
#### MEYERS, Appellant, v. EVANS, Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

March 27, 1912.)

Action by Arthur W. Meyers against Burdette J. Evans. No opinion. Motion for leave .to appeal to Court of Appeals (from 133 N. Y. Supp. 1133) denied, with $10 costs.
<PAGE>

                                                                   Exhibit 10.78

              MUTUAL TERMINATION OF DEFERRED COMPENSATION AGREEMENT

         THIS AGREEMENT is made as of this 22nd day of December, 2003, by and
between SELECT MEDICAL CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation ("Employer"), and
ROCCO A. ORTENZIO, an individual ("Executive").

                                   BACKGROUND

         A. Employer and Executive executed and delivered that certain Deferred
Compensation Agreement, dated January 1, 2000 (the "Agreement"), pursuant to
which Employer and Executive agreed that Executive's compensation for the period
beginning on March 1, 1997 and ending on December 31, 2000 (with interest
thereon as therein provided) would be deferred and paid as therein provided.

         B. All capitalized terms not specifically defined herein shall have the
meanings ascribed to them in the Agreement.

         C. The parties hereto now mutually desire to terminate the Agreement.

         NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto, intending to be legally bound
hereby, covenant and agree as follows:

         1.       Mutual Termination of the Agreement. The Agreement is hereby
terminated effective on December 22, 2003. Notwithstanding anything contained to
the contrary in Section 4 of the Agreement, all amounts credited to the Account
will be paid to Executive on or before December 26, 2003. Upon receipt of such
amounts, Executive shall be deemed to have fully released Employer from any
obligation relating to, or arising under, the Agreement.

         2.       Binding Effect. This instrument shall be binding upon, and
inure to the benefit of, the parties hereto and their respective successors and
assigns.

         3.       Entire Agreement. This is the entire agreement between the
parties hereto regarding the matters described herein, and there are no other
terms, conditions, provisions or statements, oral or otherwise, of any kind
whatsoever.

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have duly executed this
instrument, under seal, as of the day and year first above written.

                                    SELECT MEDICAL CORPORATION, a Delaware
                                    corporation

                                    By: /s/ Michael E. Tarvin
                                        ---------------------------------------
                                             Michael E. Tarvin,
                                             Senior Vice President

                                         /s/  Rocco A. Ortenzio
                                         --------------------------------------
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO

RULE 13a-14(a) OR RULE 15d-14(a) UNDER THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, AS AMENDED

I, Tom W. F. De Weerdt, certify that:



|1. | I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Surgical Care Affiliates, Inc.; and
|-- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: March 16, 2017



/s/ Tom W. F. De WeerdtTom W. F. De WeerdtExecutive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
[No. 21860-1-III.

Division Three.

February 3, 2005.]

#### Seneca Foods Corporation, *Appellant,*v. Starbucks Corporation, *Respondent.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Yakima County, No. 00-2-01647-5, Robert N. Hackett, Jr., J., entered February 7, 2003. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Schultheis, J., concurred in by Kato, C.J., and Kurtz, J.
Mumbi MWANGI, petitioner, v. Dale BRAEGELMANN, et al.

No. 13-367.

Supreme Court of the United States

Dec. 2, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO. 1:13-CR-50

)

PHILLIP BIDDLE )

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

UPON A PLEA OF GUILTY

TO: THE HONORABLE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN, JUDGE, 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Upon Defendant’s request to enter a plea of guilty pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules

of Criminal Procedure, this matter came on for hearing before U.S. Magistrate Roger B. Cosbey,

on May 15, 2014, with the written consents of the defendant, counsel for the defendant, and

counsel for the United States of America.

The hearing on defendant’s plea of guilty was in full compliance with Rule 11, Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure, before the Magistrate Judge in open court and on the record.

In consideration of that hearing and the statements made by the defendant under oath on

the record and in the presence of counsel, the remarks of the Assistant United States Attorney and

of counsel for defendant,

I FIND as follows:

(1) that defendant understands the nature of the charge against him to which the plea is

offered;

(2) that the defendant understands his right to trial by jury, to persist in his plea of not

guilty, to the assistance of counsel at trial, to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and
his right against compelled self-incrimination;

(3) that the defendant understands what the maximum possible sentence is, including the

effect of the supervised release term, and defendant understands that the Sentencing Guidelines

apply and that the Court may depart from those guidelines under some circumstances;

(4) that the plea of guilty by the defendant has been knowingly and voluntarily made and

is not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from the plea agreement between the

parties;

(5) that defendant is competent to plead guilty;

(6) that the defendant understands that his answers may later be used against him in a

prosecution for perjury or false statement;

(7) that there is a factual basis for the defendant’s plea; and further,

I RECOMMEND that the Court accept the defendant’s plea of guilty and that the

Defendant be adjudged guilty of the offense charged in the single-count Indictment, and have

sentence imposed. A Presentence Report has been ordered. Should this Report and

Recommendation be accepted and the Defendant adjudged guilty, sentencing will be scheduled

before Judge Theresa L. Springmann by separate order and notice. Objections to the Findings

and Recommendation are waived unless filed and served within fourteen (14) days. 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(B).

DATED this 15th day of May 2014.

/s/ Roger B. Cosbey 

Roger B. Cosbey

United States Magistrate Judge

2
<PAGE>
                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF
                         THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Form 10-KSB of Penthouse International, Inc. (the
"Company") for the fiscal year ended October 31, 2002, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Robert
C. Guccione, President and the principal financial and accounting officer of the
Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

      (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and


      (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

February 13, 2003              /s/ R. Guccione
                               -------------------------------------------------
                               Robert C. Guccione, President
                               (Principal Executive Officer; Principal Financial
                               and Accounting Officer)
[No. 21241-2-II.

Division Two.

August 22, 1997.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Ricky L. Blair, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Lewis County, No. 96-1-00231-8, David R. Draper, J., entered October 10, 1996. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Bridgewater, A.C.J., concurred in by Morgan and Hunt, JJ.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

ERIC ANTHONY HUERTA, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-30069 

D.C. No. 2:11-cr-00014-DWM-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Donald W. Molloy, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 18, 2019**

Before: FARRIS, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges. 

Eric Anthony Huerta appeals from the district court’s judgment and 

challenges the 15-year term of supervised release imposed upon his second 

revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 

and we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

SEP 25 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 19-30069 

Huerta argues that the 15-year term of supervised release exceeds the 

statutory maximum. This argument lacks merit. The term of supervised release 

authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in Huertas’s original term of 

supervised release was life. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k). Thus, upon revocation, the 

district court could have imposed a new term of supervised release as long as life, 

notwithstanding the seven months of imprisonment imposed upon Huerta’s two 

revocations. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h); United States v. Crowder, 738 F.3d 1103, 

1104-05 (9th Cir. 2013) (district court did not err in imposing another lifetime term 

of supervision upon revocation, even though it also sentenced defendant to 14 

months’ imprisonment, because requirement that terms of imprisonment be 

subtracted from maximum authorized supervised release term has no practical 

effect when maximum supervised release term is life). Huerta attempts to 

distinguish Crowder on the ground that the district court here imposed a supervised 

release term of 15 years at both the original sentencing and upon the first 

revocation, rather than a term of life as was ordered in Crowder. However, he 

cites no authority to support this distinction, and neither Crowder nor the 

applicable statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h), supports it.

AFFIRMED.
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D17-2506

_____________________________

MARY CAROLINE HIGGINS,

Former Wife,

Appellant,

v.

THOMAS N. BROWN, Former 

Husband,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County.

John Jay Gontarek, Judge.

March 29, 2018

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

B.L. THOMAS, C.J., and OSTERHAUS and M.K. THOMAS, JJ.,

concur.
2

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________

Shannon L. Novey, Christin F. Gonzalez, and Jerome M. Novey of 

Novey Law, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Kyle S. Bauman and Matthew J. Ausley of Anchors Smith 

Grimsley, Fort Walton Beach, for Appellee.
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h
Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk January 29, 2010

p0125 

# Order

January 29, 2010

139895

LESLIE SHANKSTER, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 139895 COA: 284850 St. Clair CC: 07-001562-NF FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF MICHIGAN, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application fo r leave to appeal the September 22, 2009 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

Y OUNG

, J., would grant leave to appeal to c onsider whether ORV’s are “motor vehicles” under the prior version of the no-fau lt statute in effect at the time plaintiff’s
claim arose.
**EXHIBIT 31.1****CERTIFICATIONS**I, Steven F. Udvar-Hazy, certify that:1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of International Lease FinanceCorporation; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport; 4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have: a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating tothe registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others withinthose entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;  b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions): a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect theregistrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and  b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.Date: November 8, 2005                                           /s/ Steven F. Udvar-Hazy   STEVEN F. UDVAR-HAZY   Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer  
-30-
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 9
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                       1,545,901
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                         400,000
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                             3,801,000
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    300,000
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                         302,000
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                         2,083,852
<LOANS>                                     29,210,338
<ALLOWANCE>                                    515,525
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              43,826,427
<DEPOSITS>                                  39,691,844
<SHORT-TERM>                                   650,000
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                            370,031
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     2,808,201
<OTHER-SE>                                     306,551
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>              43,826,427
<INTEREST-LOAN>                              1,802,284
<INTEREST-INVEST>                               82,591
<INTEREST-OTHER>                               213,845
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                             2,098,720
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                           1,124,418
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              64,726
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                          909,576
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                  145,942
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                            (11,314)
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                              1,488,792
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (534,634)
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                   (534,634)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (539,073)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.19)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.19)
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    8.37
<LOANS-NON>                                    328,000
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                20,698
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                328,000
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                               462,768
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                  114,396
<RECOVERIES>                                    21,133
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                              515,525
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                           515,525
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                        395,755
        

</TABLE>
[No. 37679-9-I.

Division One.

September 2, 1997.]

#### Leanne Christensen, *Appellant,*v. The Department of Labor and Industries, *Respondent.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for What-com County, No. 94-2-02139-3, David A. Nichols, J., entered October 31,1995. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Baker, C.J., concurred in by Kennedy and Cox, JJ.