J-S74010-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

KEVIN SOETH

Appellant No. 3934 EDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order November 3, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-3945-2015

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and Mc LAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J. FILED DECEMBER 06, 2018

Kevin Soeth appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common 

Pleas of Delaware County, denying his petition filed pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Counsel has filed 

a motion to withdraw, as well as an Anders1 brief. Upon careful review, we 

affirm the PCRA court’s order and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

____________________________________________

1 Counsel filed a petition to withdraw and a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1997), apparently in the mistaken belief that an 

Anders brief is proper when counsel seeks to withdraw from representation 

on appeal from the denial of PCRA relief. A Turner/Finley no merit letter is 

the appropriate filing. See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 

1988); Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en 

banc). However, because an Anders brief provides greater protection to the 

defendant, we may accept an Anders brief in lieu of a Turner/Finley “nomerit” letter in a collateral appeal. Commonwealth v. Fusselman, 866 A.2d 

1109, 1111 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2004).
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On January 19, 2016, Soeth entered a negotiated guilty plea to fleeing 

or attempting to elude an officer.2 On February 2, 2016, he was sentenced to 

a term of 9 to 23 months’ incarceration, followed by three years’ probation. 

Soeth did not appeal his judgment of sentence. 

On July 25, 2016, Soeth filed a pro se PCRA petition, alleging that his 

plea was involuntary due to the ineffectiveness of plea counsel. The court 

appointed counsel, who reviewed the record and submitted a Turner/Finley

“no merit” letter to the PCRA court. On September 1, 2017, the PCRA court 

issued notice of its intent to dismiss Soeth’s petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 

907. On November 3, 2017, the court dismissed Soeth’s petition, but for 

reasons not apparent from the record, did not enter an order granting 

counsel’s request to withdraw. 

On December 1, 2017, Soeth filed a notice of appeal. On December 22, 

2017, counsel filed a notice of intent to file an Anders brief pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4). 

Counsel has filed with this Court an application to withdraw and an 

Anders brief. With regard to withdrawal from PCRA representation, our 

Supreme Court has stated that independent review of the record by competent 

counsel is required before withdrawal is permitted. Such independent review 

requires proof of: (1) a “no-merit” letter by PCRA counsel detailing the nature 

and extent of his review; (2) a “no-merit” letter by PCRA counsel listing each 

____________________________________________

2 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a).
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issue the petitioner wished to have reviewed; (3) PCRA counsel’s explanation, 

in the “no-merit” letter, as to why the petitioner’s issues are meritless; (4) 

independent review of the record by the PCRA or appellate court; and (5) 

agreement by the PCRA or appellate court that the petition was meritless. 

Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 876 n.1 (Pa. 2009); 

Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1184 (Pa. Super. 2012).

In Commonwealth v. Friend, 896 A.2d 607 (Pa. Super. 2006),3this 

Court imposed an additional requirement for counsel seeking to withdraw from 

collateral proceedings:

PCRA counsel who seeks to withdraw must 

contemporaneously serve a copy on the petitioner of 

counsel’s application to withdraw as counsel, and must 

supply to the petitioner both a copy of the “no-merit” 

letter and a statement advising the petitioner that, in the 

event that the court grants the application of counsel to 

withdraw, he or she has the right to proceed pro se or 

with the assistance of privately retained counsel.

Id. at 614.

Here, counsel has substantially complied with the Turner/Finley and 

Friend requirements. Counsel has detailed the nature and extent of his 

review, served a copy of his petition to withdraw and brief upon Soeth and 

____________________________________________

3 This Court’s holding in Friend was subsequently overruled on other grounds 

by the Supreme Court in Pitts. However, the additional requirement that 

counsel provide copies of the relevant documentation to the petitioner remains 

intact. Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816, 818 (Pa. Super. 2011). 
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informed him of his right to proceed pro se or with privately retained counsel,4

raised Soeth’s issue in the form of a brief, and explained why his claim is 

meritless. We now turn to an independent review of the record to determine 

whether his claim merits relief. 

This Court’s standard of review regarding an order dismissing a petition 

under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported 

by evidence of record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Burkett, 

5 A.3d 1260, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted). In evaluating a 

PCRA court’s decision, our scope of review is limited to the findings of the 

PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to 

the prevailing party at the trial level. Id. The PCRA court’s credibility 

determinations are binding on this Court where the record supports those 

determinations. Widgins, 29 A.3d at 820. 

In his PCRA petition and on appeal, Soeth asserts that his plea was 

involuntary, as it was based on counsel’s faulty advice that he would be 

paroled at his minimum or good time/earned time date. He claims he did not 

receive the time credit to which he was entitled and would not have entered 

his plea had he known he would not receive the credit. He is entitled to no 

relief.

____________________________________________

4 Soeth has not raised any additional issues, either pro se or through private 

counsel. 
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Soeth’s claim asserts the ineffectiveness of plea counsel. “It is wellestablished that counsel is presumed effective, and to rebut that presumption, 

the PCRA petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 

deficient and that such deficiency prejudiced him.” Commonwealth v. 

Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 132 (Pa. 2012), citing Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 687–91 (1984). To prove that counsel was ineffective, a 

petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) the underlying legal issue has arguable 

merit; (2) counsel’s actions lacked an objective reasonable basis; and (3) he 

was prejudiced by counsel’s act or omission. Koehler, 36 A.3d at 132. Failure 

to prove any prong of this test will defeat an ineffectiveness claim. 

Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 804 (Pa. 2014). In order to 

invalidate a plea on the basis of ineffectiveness of counsel, a petitioner must 

plead and prove that the ineffectiveness caused an involuntary or unknowing 

plea. Commonwealth v. D’Collanfield, 805 A.2d 1244, 1246 (Pa. Super. 

2002). 

Sentencing credit for time served is governed by section 9760 of the 

Sentencing Code and provides, in relevant part, as follows:

(1) Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term 

shall be given to the defendant for all time spent in custody as a 

result of the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is 

imposed or as a result of the conduct on which such a charge is 

based. Credit shall include credit for time spent in custody prior 

to trial, during trial, pending sentence, and pending the resolution 

of an appeal.

. . .
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(4) If the defendant is arrested on one charge and later 

prosecuted on another charge growing out of an act or acts that 

occurred prior to his arrest, credit against the maximum term and 

any minimum term of any sentence resulting from such 

prosecution shall be given for all time spent in custody under the 

former charge that has not been credited against another 

sentence.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9760(1) and (4). A defendant is not entitled to receive credit 

against more than one sentence for the same time served. Commonwealth 

v. Ellsworth, 97 A.3d 1255, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

Here, Soeth was incarcerated between April 28, 2015 and May 28, 2015. 

The 30-day credit attributable to that period of incarceration was applied to a 

Montgomery County case in which he entered a guilty plea on September 2, 

2015. See N.T. Guilty Plea, 1/19/16, at 5. On the record at Soeth’s guilty 

plea hearing, counsel for the Commonwealth stated the following:

MR. DOHERTY: Okay, that being said, the first one 3945 of 2015, 

the Defendant will be entering a Negotiated Plea of Guilty to 

Information Count #1, Fleeing or [Eluding], it’s a Felony of the 

third degree with a recommended sentence of 9 to 23 months, 

followed by three years consecutive probation, there is also a 

mandatory $500 fine. The Defendant’s time served is not to 

include the period of one month that the Defendant pled guilty on 

a Montgomery County case on September 2nd, 2015, that was –

and he was given credit for one month from April the 28th, 2015 

to May 28th, 2015, so just so that is not going to be double counted 

towards his credit on this case or any other case. 

Id.

Later in the hearing, the trial court colloquied Soeth as follows:

THE COURT: Do you have any questions now of your attorney or 

this Court?
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THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, what was the – I didn’t hear what he 

said with the Terroristic Threats one,[5] what was that deal again?

MR. DOHERTY: It’s the same sentence.

THE DEFENDANT: Okay.

THE COURT: Both are the same, both are the same concurrent. 

Both sentences are the same and they run concurrently, so they 

run at the same time.

THE DEFENDANT: It’s just not going to count for that one month?

THE COURT: Just that one month is not going to count because 

you’ve already gotten credit for it from Montgomery County.

THE DEFENDANT: All right.

THE COURT: Right.

THE DEFENDANT: Is there good time on the both of the cases?

THE COURT: That’s up to the prison to determine good time and 

you will, if you deserve good time, they’ll give it to you, but I don’t 

determine good time. 

Id. at 12-13.

Based on the foregoing excerpts from the guilty plea hearing, it is clear 

that Soeth was aware at the time he entered his plea that he would not receive 

the 30-day credit for time served on this case and that the correctional 

institution would determine whether he was entitled to receive good time. 

“[A] defendant is bound by the statements he makes during his plea colloquy, 

and may not assert grounds for withdrawing the plea that contradict 

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5 That same date, Soeth also entered a negotiated guilty plea at a separate 

docket number to one count of terroristic threats, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a), for 

which the Commonwealth agreed to recommend a sentence of 9 to 23 months, 

plus three years’ probation, to run concurrently to his sentence in the instant 

matter. That case is currently on appeal before this Court at docket number 

3937 EDA of 2017. 
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statements made when he pled.” Commonwealth v. Kelly, 5 A.3d 370, 382

n.11 (Pa. Super. 2010). Soeth’s claim that counsel misled him regarding time 

credit is belied by the record in this matter. Rather, the record demonstrates 

that Soeth entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea. 

Accordingly, his ineffectiveness claim must fail. D’Collanfield, supra. 

Order affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/6/18