UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

JOHN M. RUIZ SR., )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 2:14-CV-69-JEM

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, )

Acting Commissioner of the )

Social Security Administration, )

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on a Complaint [DE 1], filed by John M. Ruiz Sr. on March

3, 2014, and Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for SummaryJudgment [DE 18], filed byPlaintiff

on September 16, 2014. Plaintiff requests that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge be

reversed and remanded for further proceedings. On February 5, 2015, the Commissioner filed a

response, and on February 19, 2015, Plaintiff filed a reply. For the following reasons, the Court

grants Plaintiff’s request for remand. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 15, 2011, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits with

the U.S. Social SecurityAdministration alleging that he became disabled on July24, 2011. Plaintiff’s

application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. On June 21, 2013, Administrative Law

Judge (“ALJ”) Henry Kramzyk held a hearing at which Plaintiff, represented by non-attorney Nora

Cruz, and a Vocational Expert (“VE”) testified. On September 4, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision

finding Plaintiff not disabled. The ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s final decision when

the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on January 3, 2014. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.981. The ALJ made the following findings under the required five-step analysis:
1. The claimant last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act

on December 31, 2011. 

2. The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period from

his alleged onset date of July 24, 2011, through his date last insured of March 31,

2012. 

3. Through the date last insured, the claimant had the following severe impairments:

obesity, diabetes mellitus, meniscal tear and degenerative changes of the right knee

status-post right knee surgery, degenerative changes in the lumbar spine, diverticulitis

of the colon, dysthymia, and obsessive compulsive disorder. 

4. Through the date last insured, the claimant did not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the

listed impairments. 

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the ALJ found that, through the

date last insured, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to lift, carry, push

or pull up to 10 pounds occasionally, lesser weights more frequently, stand and/or

walk about 2 hours in an 8-hour workday, and sit about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday

with normal breaks. The claimant must never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds,

kneel, or crawl, but he can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, or

crouch. He is able to sustain attention and concentration for 2-hour periods at a time

and for 8-hours in the workday on short, simple, repetitive instructions. He can use

judgment in making work decisions related to short, simple, repetitive instructions.

The claimant requires an occupation with only occasional co-worker contact and

supervision, one with a set routine and procedures, few changes during the workday,

and an occupation with only superficial contact with the public on routine matters.

He cannot perform fast-paced production work. However, he can maintain regular

attendance and be punctual within customary tolerances, and perform activities

within a schedule. Finally the claimant must avoid concentrated exposure to wetness

including wet slippery uneven surfaces and avoid concentrated exposures to hazards

such as unprotected heights and dangerous machinery. 

6. Through the last date insured, the claimant was unable to perform any past relevant

work. 

7. The claimant was born on September 9, 1966, and was 45 years old, which is

defined as a younger individual age 18-44, on the date last insured. The claimant

subsequently changed age category to a younger individual 45-49. 

8. The claimant has a limited education and is able to communicate in English. 

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9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability

because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that

the claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills. 

10. Through the date last insured, considering the claimant’s age, education, work

experience, and residual functional capacity, there were jobs that existed in

significant numbers in the national economythat the claimant could have performed. 

11. The claimant was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at

any time from July 24, 2011, the alleged onset date, through March 31, 2012, the date

last insured. 

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff initiated this civil action for judicial review of the

Commissioner’s final decision. The parties filed forms of consent to have this case assigned to a

United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final

judgment in this case. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(c) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

FACTS

Plaintiff was 45 years old the alleged onset date. Plaintiff suffers from severe impairments

of obesity, diabetes mellitus, meniscal tear and degenerative changes of the right knee status-post

right knee surgery, degenerative changes in the lumbar spine, diverticulitis of the colon, dysthymia,

and obsessive compulsive disorder. Plaintiff sought treatment with Dr. Patel since 2010, which

included complaints of abdominal pain, constipation, lower back pain and knee pain. Plaintiff had

knee surgeryin March 2012. State consultant physician Dr. Sands conducted an RFC assessment that

limited Plaintiff to light exertional work with further postural limitations, which was affirmed by

state agency physician Dr. Brill. Plaintiff also suffers from non-severe impairment of hypertension.

State consultant psychologist Dr. Singh diagnosed Plaintiff with OCD and dysthymic disorder. 

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Social Security Act authorizes judicial review of the final decision of the agency and

indicates that the Commissioner’s factual findings must be accepted as conclusive if supported by

substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, a court reviewing the findings of an ALJ will reverse

only if the findings are not supported by substantial evidence or if the ALJ has applied an erroneous

legal standard. See Briscoe v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence

consists of “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Gudgel v. Barnhart,

345 F.3d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 2003)).

A court reviews the entire administrative record but does not reconsider facts, re-weigh the

evidence, resolve conflicts in evidence, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its judgment for

that of the ALJ. See Boiles v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005); Clifford v. Apfel, 227

F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000); Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049, 1055 (7th Cir. 1999). Thus, the

question upon judicial review of an ALJ’s finding that a claimant is not disabled within the meaning

of the Social Security Act is not whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled, but whetherthe ALJ “uses

the correct legal standards and the decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Roddy v. Astrue,

705 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing O’Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir.

2010); Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 734-35 (7th Cir. 2006); Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d

664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004)). “A reversal and remand may be required, however, if the ALJ committed

an error of law or if the ALJ based the decision on serious factual mistakes or omissions.” Beardsley

v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 837 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).

At a minimum, an ALJ must articulate his analysis of the evidence in order to allow the

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reviewing court to trace the path of his reasoning and to be assured that the ALJ considered the

important evidence. See Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002); Diaz v. Chater, 55

F.3d 300, 307 (7th Cir. 1995); Green v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1995). An ALJ must

“‘build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [the] conclusion’ so that, as a reviewing

court, we may assess the validity of the agency’s final decision and afford [a claimant] meaningful

review.” Giles v. Astrue, 483 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Scott, 297 F.3d at 595)); see

also O’Connor-Spinner, 627 F.3d at 618 (“An ALJ need not specifically address every piece of

evidence, but must provide a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and his conclusions.”); Zurawski

v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he ALJ’s analysis must provide some glimpse into

the reasoning behind [the] decision to deny benefits.”).

DISABILITY STANDARD

To be eligible for disability benefits, the claimant must establish that he suffers from a

“disability” as defined by the Social Security Act and regulations. The Act defines “disability” as an

inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable

physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A),

1382c(a)(3)(A). To be found disabled, the claimant’s impairment must not only prevent him from

doing his previous work, but considering his age, education, and work experience, it must also

prevent him from engaging in any other type of substantial gainful activity that exists in significant

numbers in the economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f);

416.920(e)-(f).

When a claimant alleges a disability, Social Security regulations provide a five-step inquiry

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to evaluate whether the claimant is entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). 

The steps are: (1) Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity? If yes, the claimant is not

disabled, and the claim is denied; if no, the inquiry proceeds to step two; (2) Does the claimant have

an impairment or combination of impairments that are severe? If not, the claimant is not disabled, and

the claim is denied; if yes, the inquiry proceeds to step three; (3) Do(es) the impairment(s) meet or

equal a listed impairment in the appendix to the regulations? If yes, the claimant is automatically

considered disabled; if not, then the inquiry proceeds to step four; (4) Can the claimant do the

claimant’s past relevant work? If yes, the claimant is not disabled, and the claim is denied; if no, then

the inquiry proceeds to step five; (5) Can the claimant perform other work given the claimant’s

residual functioning capacity (“RFC”), age, education, and experience? If yes, then the claimant is

not disabled, and the claim is denied; if no, the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); see also Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 699-700 (7th

Cir. 2004).

At steps four and five, the ALJ must consider an assessment of the claimant’s RFC. The RFC

“is an administrative assessment of what work-related activities an individual can perform despite

[claimant’s] limitations.” Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1178 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing SSR

96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (Jul. 2, 1996); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)) (other citations omitted). The RFC

should be based on evidence in the record. Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 676 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing

20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3)). The claimant bears the burden of proving steps one through four,

whereas the burden at step five is on the ALJ. Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 886; see also Knight v. Chater,

55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1995). 

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ANALYSIS

A. Credibility 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s credibility analysis was not proper and used impermissible

boilerplate language. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly assessed Plaintiff’s credibility.

The ALJ must weigh the claimant’s subjective complaints, the relevant objective medical

evidence, and any other evidence of the following factors:

(i) [The claimant’s] daily activities;

(ii) The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of [] pain or other

symptoms;

(iii) Precipitating and aggravating factors;

(iv) The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of anymedication

. . . ;

(v) Treatment . . . for relief of [] pain or other symptoms;

(vi) Any measures . . . used to relieve []pain or other symptoms . . . ;

and

(vii) Other factors concerning [] functional limitations and restrictions

due to pain or other symptoms.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). In making a credibility determination, Social Security Ruling 96–7p

require the ALJ to consider the record as a whole, including objective medical evidence, the

claimant’s statement about symptoms, any statements or other information provided by treating or

examining physicians and other persons about the conditions and how they affect the claimant, and

any other relevant evidence. See SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 (Jul. 2, 1996). An ALJ is not required

to give full credit to every statement of pain made by the claimant or to find a disability each time a

claimant states he or she is unable to work. See Rucker v. Chater, 92 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 1996).

However, Ruling 96-7p provides that a claimant’s statements regarding symptoms or the effect of

symptoms on her ability to work “may not be disregarded solely because they are not substantiated

by objective evidence.” SSR 96-7p at *6. An ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to substantial

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deference by a reviewing court and will not be overturned unless the claimant can show that the

finding is “patently wrong.” Prochaska, 454 F.3d at 738.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ used impermissible boilerplate language in determining his

credibility. The ALJ stated that “the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and

limiting effects of these symptoms are not fully credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the

above residual functional capacityassessment.” AR 32.If the sentence cited byPlaintiff encompassed

the totality of the credibility finding in the ALJ’s decision, it would be improper. See Bjornson v.

Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 645, 647 (7th Cir. 2012); Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 922 (7th Cir.

2010).“However, the simple fact that an ALJ used boilerplate language does not automatically

undermine or discredit the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion if he otherwise points to information that

justifies his credibility determination.” Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367-68 (7th Cir. 2013). In this

case the ALJ did specifically list certain issues he said “call into question the credibility of the

claimant’s subjective allegations of disability.” AR 33. The use of the boilerplate language, standing

alone, is not sufficient to warrant remand where the ALJ has otherwise conducted a credibility

determination, as he did here. See Filus v. Astrue, 694 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2012) (“If the ALJ has

otherwise explained his conclusion adequately, the inclusion of this [boilerplate] language can be

harmless.”); Richison v. Astrue, 462 F. App’x 622, 625 (7th Cir. 2012) (“We have derided this sort

of boilerplate as inadequate, by itself, to support a credibility finding”); Punzio v. Astrue, 630 F.3d

704, 712 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The ALJ declared this testimony ‘not entirely credible,’ but we have said

already that this unexplained finding is unsustainable.”) (emphasis added). 

Although the ALJ did provide a basis for his credibility findings, the Court is concerned by

the credibility analysis. The ALJ, for example, found Plaintiff less than credible because of “a

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significant history of non-compliance with medical treatment.” AR 33. The ALJ did not specify the 

instances of Plaintiff’s non-compliance, but noted that Plaintiff’s doctor instructed him to go to a

hospital because of his knee pain, and that when Plaintiff went to the hospital the next day, “instead

of focusing on his knee pain, the claimant instead reported significant abdominal pain, which was the

primary concern in the ER records.” AR 29. The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff did not return to his

doctor regarding the knee pain “for some two months” and that Plaintiff did not go to the hospital

another time have a recommendation from his doctor. 

The Court is not convinced that these two instances demonstrate a “significant history of noncompliance” where Plaintiff had an intervening ER trip with an overnight stay and continued to

follow-up with his treating physician. To the extent that the ALJ considered this to be noncompliance, he erred in failing to inquire into the reasons Plaintiff failed to seek care. The ALJ “must

not draw any inferences about an individual’s symptoms and their functional effects from a failure

to seek or pursue regular medical treatment without first considering any explanations that the

individual may provide” and “may need to recontact the individual or question the individual at the

administrative proceeding in order to determine whether there are good reasons the individual does

not seek medical treatment or does not pursue treatment in a consistent manner.” SSR 96-7p, at *7;

see also Shauger v. Astrue, 675 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[A]n ALJ must first explore the

claimant’s reasons for the lack of medical care before drawing a negative inference . . . The claimant’s

‘good reason’ may include an inability to afford treatment, ineffectiveness of further treatment, or

intolerable side effects ); Craft, 539 F.3d at 679 (“[T]he ALJ ‘must not draw any inferences’ about

a claimant’s condition from this failure [to follow a treatment plan] unless the ALJ has explored the

claimant’s explanations as to the lack of medical care.”) (quoting SSR 96-7p). 

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The ALJ also noted that “also missing were any references to knee surgery,” but two

paragraphs later stated “[a]s directed, the claimant underwent right knee arthrosporic surgery” and

then faulted Plaintiff for doing it four months after he originally said he was going to have it done.

AR 31. The ALJ also stated “[t]here is no discussion of a use of a cane in the records,” but again, two

paragraphs later, stated “[p]ost-surgical notes discuss the claimant walking with a cane immediately

after surgery.” AR 31. The ALJ also stated that “despite” Plaintiff’s claims “[h]e admitted that he

continues with his daily routine of medication administration and breakfast preparation” as if either

were lofty endeavors. The Court is also concerned by the ALJ’s mention of Plaintiff’s records that

indicate he “admitted to ‘multiple sexual partners, does not use a condom, wants test for HIV and

gonorrhea, chlamydia, syphilis, and herpes,’ this, in spite of his allegations of social phobia and other

mental allegations.” The ALJ appears to question Plaintiff’s mental health diagnosis because of his

on his own assumptions of mental illness, even after giving “great weight” to a state psychological

opinion diagnosed the claimant with OCD and dysthymic disorder. 

Based on the issues in the ALJ’s credibility analysis, the Court remands this case for the ALJ

to conduct a new credibility analysis in compliance with the applicable rules and regulations. 

B. Residual Functional Capacity

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide a proper basis for Plaintiff’s RFC. The

Commissioner argues that the RFC is supported by substantial evidence and the ALJ has adequately

explained his findings. 

“The RFC is an assessment of what work-related activities the claimant can perform despite

[his] limitations.” Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004); see also 20 C.F.R. §

404.1545(a)(1). In evaluating a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ is expected to take into consideration all of

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the relevant evidence, including both medical and non-medical evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1545(a)(3). According to SSA regulations:

The RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion describing

how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical

facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily

activities, observations). In assessing RFC, the adjudicator must

discuss the individual’s ability to perform sustained work activities in

an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis (i.e., 8

hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule), and

describe the maximum amount of each work-related activity the

individual can perform based on the evidence available in the case

record. The adjudicator must also explain how any material

inconsistencies or ambiguities in the evidence in the case record were

considered and resolved.

SSR 96-8p at *7. Although an ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence, he must

consider all of the evidence that is relevant to the disability determination and provide enough

analysis in his decision to permit meaningful judicial review. Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870; Young, 362

F.3d at 1002. In other words, the ALJ must build an “accurate and logical bridge from the evidence

to his conclusion.” Scott, 297 F.3d at 595 (quoting Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir.

2002)). 

The ALJ gave “little weight” to the state agency physician’s opinion that set forth an RFC for

Plaintiff and that was re-affirmed by anotherstate agency physician,. The ALJrejected these opinions

“based on a review of the totality of the evidence, including records received at the hearing level.”

AR 33. The ALJ noted that these opinions limited Plaintiff only to light exertional work but found

that the combination of Plaintiff’s “physically severe impairments limit his exertional ability to that

of sedentary level” and that Plaintiff “would require greater postural limitations in light of his recent

surgical history.” In this case, the ALJ did a commendable job considering additional records and

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recent surgeries to realize that the previously found limits may not be accurate or may have changed.

However, he gave no weight to any other medical report that discussed Plaintiff’s functional

limitations. 

While the ALJ’s limitations were more restrictive than the state agency doctors, the Court is

concerned that the ALJ made medical determination as to what he believes the physical limitations

would be from such medical evidence. See Suide v. Astrue, 371 F. App’x 684, 690 (7th Cir. 2010)

(“[I]t is the evidentiary deficit left by the ALJ’s rejection of his reports—not the decision itself—that

is troubling.”) The ALJ, for instance, noted that the MRIimage of Plaintiff’s right knee and Plaintiff’s

lumbar spine confirmed certain damage and “[b]ased on those conclusive radiographic images, [he]

has incorporated reasonable limitations in the claimant’s physical exertional activities to that of a

sedentary level with no kneeling or crawling.” AR 29. The ALJ did not explain how he determined

that these limitations are reasonable and no medical expert including them in any report. The Seventh

Circuit has repeatedly held that ALJs are not to make their own independent medical findings. See,

e.g., Myles v. Astrue, 582 F.3d 672, 677-78 (7th Cir. 2009); Blakes v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 565, 570

(7th Cir. 2003); Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 1996). ALJs have been warned not to

“succumb to the temptation to play doctor” because “lay intuitions about medical phenomena are

often wrong.” Schmidt v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 117, 118 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing cases). 

When an ALJ denies benefits, he must build an “accurate and logical bridge from the evidence

to [his] conclusion,” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir.2000), and he is not allowed to

“play doctor” by using his own lay opinions to fill evidentiary gaps in the record. See Blakes v.

Barnhart, 331 F.3d 565, 570 (7th Cir.2003). Accordingly, since the Court is remanding this case for

other matters, a new determination of Plaintiff’s RFC should be completed. The Court reminds the

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ALJ of his duty to fully develop the record, including recontacting physicians for clarification, such

as enquiring into the limitations resulting from Plaintiff’s impairments as necessary. Barnett v.

Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 2004); S.S.R. 96-5p; Nelms v. Astrue, 553 F.3d 1093, 1098 (7th

Cir. 2009); Goins v. Colvin, 764 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 2014). 

C. Obesity

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not properly consider obesity in at Step Three or in

combination with Plaintiff’s other impairments. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly

considered obesity in Step Three and in combination. 

The ALJ did not clearly explain his consideration of obesity, if at all, at Step Three. At Step

Three of the disability inquiry, an ALJ must determine whether the claimant’s impairments meet or

equal the criteria of an impairment listed in the appendix to the social security regulations. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). An individual suffering from an impairment that meets or is the

equivalent of the description of a listing is conclusively presumed disabled, and no further analysis

is required. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141 (1987). “To meet or equal a listed impairment, the

claimant must satisfy all of the criteria of the listed impairment,” and he “bears the burden of proving

his condition meets or equals a listed impairment.” Maggard v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 376, 380 (7th Cir.

1999). 

Under the Commissioner’s regulations, an ALJ “will also find that a listing is met if there is

an impairment that, in combination with obesity, meets the requirements of a listing. For example,

obesity may increase the severity of coexisting or related impairments to the extent that the

combination of impairments meets the requirements of a listing.” SSR 02-1p, 2002 WL 34686281,

at *5. In this case, the ALJ referenced listings 1.02 and 1.04, among others. Listing 1.02 addresses

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major dysfunction of a joint and listing 1.04 addresses spine disorders, both which could be impacted

by obesity. See, e.g., SSR 02-1p, 2002 WL 34686281, at *5 (“[Obesity] may substitute for the major

dysfunction of a joint(s) due to any cause (and its associated criteria), with the involvement of one

major peripheral weight-bearing joint in listings 1.02A or 101.02A . . .”). 

The ALJ noted Listings 1.02 and 1.04, and laid out the text of the requirements, but did not

conduct any analysis of Plaintiff’s conditions, much less the impact obesity might have on whether

he met the listings. “In reviewing Step Three determinations, an ALJ should mention by name the

specific listings he is considering; his failure to do so, if combined with a ‘perfunctory analysis’

requires remand.” Mogg v. Barnhart, 199 F. App’x 572, 575 (7th Cir. 2006). The ALJ did not explain

his reasoning as to why Plaintiff did not meet the listing, especially in light of the impact Plaintiff’s

obesity might have on the listings analysis.

ALJs are also required to consider impact of claimant’s impairments in combination.

“Although these impairments may not on their own be disabling, that would only justify discounting

their severity, not ignoring them altogether. Moreover, . . . an ALJ must consider the combined effects

of all of the claimant’s impairments, even those that would not be considered severe in isolation.”

Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Martinez v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 693, 698

(7th Cir. 2011) (“Even if each problem assessed separately were less serious than the evidence

indicates, the combination of them might be disabling.”); Getch v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 473, 483 (7th Cir.

2008) (“[A]n ALJis required to consider the aggregate effects of a claimant’s impairments, including

impairments that, in isolation, are not severe.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523; Golembiewski v.

Barnhart, 322 F.3d 912, 918 (7th Cir. 2003)). In addition, “Social Security Ruling 02-1p requires an

ALJ to consider the exacerbating effects of a claimant’s obesity on his underlying conditions (even

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if the obesity is not itself a severe impairment) when arriving at a claimant’s RFC.” Hernandez v.

Astrue, 277 F. App’x 617, 623-24 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing SSR 02-1p, 2002 WL34686281 (Sept. 12,

2002)) (other citations omitted); see also Gentle v. Barnhart, 430 F.3d 865, 868 (7th Cir. 2005)

(finding that, even if obesity is not a severe impairment itself and “merely aggravates a disability

caused by something else[,] it still must be considered for its incremental effect on the disability”). 

In this case, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s obesity was a severe impairment, making it

especially important that he consider the limitations caused by the combination. While the ALJstated

that he considered “claimant’s obesity . . . in relation to the musculoskeletal, respiratory, and

cardiovascular body systems,” which quotes the language of the regulation, he did not address how

obesity impacts Plaintiff’s severe and non-severe impairments. See SSR 02-1p, 2002 WL 34686281,

at *5 (“For example, obesity may increase the severity of coexisting or related impairments to the

extent that the combination of impairments meets the requirements of a listing. This is especially true

of musculoskeletal, respiratory, and cardiovascularimpairments.”). Norisit apparent to the Court that

the ALJ considered the combination of Plaintiff’s other impairments. The combination of Plaintiff’s

severe and non-severe impairments, even without considering their exacerbation by obesity, could

change the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff can stand and/or walk two hours in an eight hour workday or

even sit about six hours in an eight hour work day. The Court is unable to determine whether the ALJ

considered these impairments in combination and, if he did, how such consideration was reflected

in the ALJ’s RFC. Accordingly, the Court remands for the ALJ to build a logical bridge from the

evidence to his conclusions in the RFC. 

On remand, the ALJ is directed to consider the combination of Plaintiff’s impairments, even

those that are not severe in isolation, and to specifically address the impact his obesity has on his

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ability to perform work and on the listing analysis. 

D. Vocational Expert Testimony 

Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner did not meet her burden to provide sufficient evidence

that a number of jobs exist in the economy that Plaintiff could perform. The Court is remanding the

case for the reasons above and will not reach the arguments on the VE testimony. On remand, the

Court reminds the ALJ to elicit clear testimony from the VE under the applicable regulations. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS the relief requested in the Brief in

Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 18], and REMANDS this matter for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

SO ORDERED this 17th day of September, 2015.

s/ John E. Martin 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN E. MARTIN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

cc: All counsel of record

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