PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 16-4175

_____________

JASON PIASECKI,

Appellant

v.

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, BUCKS COUNTY, PA;

DISTRICT ATTORNEY BUCKS COUNTY;

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(No. 2-14-cv-07004)

District Judge: Honorable Legrome D. Davis

_____________

Argued March 6, 2018

____________

Before: McKEE, AMBRO and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges.

(Opinion Filed: February 27, 2019)

______________

Peter Goldberger, Esq.

50 Rittenhouse Place

Ardmore, PA 19003

Matthew Stiegler, Esq. [Argued]

7145 Germantown Avenue

Suite 2

Philadelphia, PA 19119

Attorneys for Appellant
2

Karen A. Diaz, Esq.

Stephen B. Harris, Esq. [Argued]

Bucks County Office of District Attorney

Bucks County Justice Center

100 North Main Street

Doylestown, PA 18901

Attorneys for Appellee

Aaron J. Marcus, Esq.

Defender Association of Philadelphia

1441 Sansom Street

Philadelphia, PA 19102

Attorneys for Amicus Defender Association of 

Philadelphia

Mark B. Sheppard, Esq.

Montgomery McCracken Walker & Rhoads

1735 Market Street, 21st Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Attorneys for Amicus Pennsylvania Association of 

Criminal Defense Attorneys

______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

______________

McKEE, Circuit Judge.

We are asked to decide whether a habeas corpus 

petitioner who was subject only to registration requirements 

under Pennsylvania’s Sex Offender Registration and 

Notification Act (“SORNA”) when he filed his petition was “in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State Court,” as required 

for jurisdiction. We hold that the registration requirements 

were sufficiently restrictive to constitute custody and that they 

were imposed pursuant to the state court judgment of sentence. 
3

Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court and remand for 

further proceedings. 

I.

Following a bench trial in the Court of Common Pleas 

of Bucks County, Jason Piasecki was convicted of fifteen

counts of possession of child pornography. On April 26, 2010, 

the court sentenced him to a term of three years’ probation. At 

sentencing, the court informed Piasecki:

So as to counts 16 through 30, as 

to each count the defendant is 

sentenced to 36 months’ county 

probation. The conditions of his 

sentence are that he undergo sex 

offender supervision, that he be 

subject to ten-year registration, 

that he have no unsupervised 

contact with minor children under 

the age of 18, excluding your son 

and your girlfriend’s son, without 

written permission of Bucks 

County Adult Probation and 

Parole.

You’re to have no computer 

Internet use. You’re to continue in 

treatment with Dean Dixon and 

Dr. Nover. You’re not to drink, 

and you’re to take medications as 

directed. You’re ordered to pay 

court costs.

I’m going to have you sign the 

mandatory sex offender 

conditions.1

At the time of sentencing, Pennsylvania sex offenders 

were subject to registration requirements under a statutory 

scheme referred to as Megan’s Law III.

2 But in December of 

 1 App. 150–52. 2 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915(a)(1) et seq. (expired Dec. 20, 2012).
4

2012, as Piasecki pursued appellate and collateral relief in state 

court, the Pennsylvania legislature permitted its Megan’s Law 

statute to expire and replaced it with SORNA. It was enacted 

to “bring the Commonwealth into substantial compliance with 

the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006.”3

Any state that did not implement restrictions similar to those 

set forth in the Adam Walsh Act stood to lose ten percent “of 

the funds that would otherwise be allocated for that fiscal year 

[under] . . . the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 

of 1968.”4 When Piasecki filed his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 

2254, SORNA applied retroactively to any Megan’s Law 

registrant who lived in the Commonwealth.5 An offender who 

had been required to comply with Megan’s Law III was 

therefore automatically subject to SORNA’s increased 

registration and reporting requirements.

Piasecki was a Tier III offender under the provisions of 

SORNA. Accordingly, he was required to register in-person 

with the State Police every three months for the rest of his life.6

The statute also required him to appear, in-person, at a 

registration site if he were to:

• Change his name;

• Change his residence or become transient;

• Begin a new job or lose previous 

employment;

• Matriculate or end enrollment as a student;

• Add or change a phone number;

• Add, change, or terminate ownership or 

operatorship of a car or other motor vehicle, 

and, as part of that visit, provide his license 

 3 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.10 (citing P.L. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587).

4 P.L. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 34, § 125 (implemented as 34 

U.S.C. § 20927). 

5 42 Pa.C.S §§ 9799.12–9799.14.

6 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.15(a)(3), 9799.15(e)(3). A Tier III 

SORNA registrant could petition a court to exempt him or her 

from the registration requirements after twenty-five years 

provided that the registrant satisfied certain criteria and 

satisfy a threat assessment board. Id. § 9799.15(a.2)(1)-(9). 
5

plate number, VIN number, and location 

where the vehicle will be stored;

• Commence or change “temporary lodging;”7

• Add, change, or terminate any email address 

or other online designation; or

• Add, change, or terminate any information 

related to an occupational or professional 

license.8

If Piasecki were to become homeless, he was required to 

“appear in person monthly and to be photographed.”9 Prior to 

any international travel, Piasecki had to “appear in person at an 

approved registration site no less than 21 days” before his 

anticipated departure.10 Failure to abide by any of these 

reporting requirements exposed Piasecki to criminal 

prosecution.11

The parties do not dispute that Piasecki was subject to 

these restrictions—and only these restrictions—when he filed 

his § 2254 petition on December 4, 2014.12 His probation and 

its attendant conditions of supervision had expired on April 26, 

2013. Piasecki’s habeas petition attacked his underlying 

conviction on four grounds, none of which are relevant to the 

issues before us.13

 7 Temporary lodging is defined as “[t]he specific location, 

including street address, where a sexual offender is staying 

when away from the sexual offender’s residence for seven or 

more days.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.12.

8 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(g)(1)-(9). 

9 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(h)(1).

10 Id. § 9799.15(i). 

11 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.21(a); see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1 

(relating to failure to comply with registration requirements). 

12 Br. for Appellant 12; Br. for Appellee 13–15. 

13 Specifically, Piasecki alleged that the incriminating 

statements that were admitted at trial were given in violation 

of Miranda; the evidence was insufficient to support the 

verdict; the Commonwealth failed to preserve electronic 
6

The District Court referred the matter to a Magistrate 

Judge, who recommended that the petition be dismissed for 

lack of jurisdiction. The Magistrate Judge acknowledged that 

Pennsylvania’s SORNA statute made “sex offenders’ 

registration obligations considerably more burdensome,” but 

ultimately concluded that Piasecki was “free to live, work, 

travel, or engage in any legal activity without the approval of a 

government official.”14 The Magistrate Judge also concluded

that Pennsylvania’s sex offender registration requirements 

were “collateral consequences and not direct consequences of 

the petitioner’s conviction.”15 Accordingly, the court reasoned 

that they were not part of the judgment of the state court and 

could not support habeas corpus jurisdiction. 

In overruling objections that Piasecki filed to the Report 

and Recommendation, the District Court emphasized that 

Piasecki’s sentence had expired, and that the registration 

requirements were “merely collateral consequences of a 

conviction.”16 It also noted that Piasecki’s reporting 

requirements were not explicitly included in the state court’s 

judgment and that the requirements were “remedial rather than 

punitive.”17 Consequently, the court held that they could not 

support habeas jurisdiction because they did not constitute 

custody. 

We granted a certificate of appealability, and this timely 

appeal followed.

II.

18

 

evidence that was favorable to his defense; and that his 

attorney was ineffective for failing to raise these issues. 

14 App. 13a–14a.

15 App. 15a.

16 App. 3a.

17 App. 4a.

18 This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291 (granting jurisdiction over appeals from all final 

decisions of the District Court) and § 2253 (subjecting the 

final order in a habeas corpus proceeding to review). We 

granted a certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
7

A federal court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition for 

a writ of habeas corpus under § 2254 only if the petitioner was 

“in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court” when 

the petition was filed.

19 “Thus, custody is the passport to 

federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.”20 The jurisdictional

requirement has two components—“custody” that arises

“pursuant to the judgment of a state court” that is under 

attack.21 Put differently, the habeas jurisdictional provision 

requires that the petitioner be subject to a “non-negligible 

restraint on physical liberty” that is a “direct consequence of 

[the] conviction” being challenged.

22 Therefore, we must 

examine these elements separately to determine if

Pennsylvania’s SORNA requirements were sufficiently 

restrictive to constitute custody. If they were, we must 

determine if they were directly imposed pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court.

A. “In Custody”

Over the past half-century, courts have addressed the 

issue of habeas custody in an effort to determine when various

state-imposed restrictions were sufficiently onerous to 

constitute “custody” for purposes of habeas jurisdiction. It is 

now beyond dispute that custody is not limited to “actual 

physical custody.”23 Rather, for the purposes of habeas 

jurisdiction, a petitioner is “in custody” if he or she files while 

subject to significant restraints on liberty that are not otherwise 

experienced by the general public.24

 

2253(c)(2) & (3). We review the District Court’s dismissal of 

a habeas petition on jurisdictional grounds de novo. We 

review the denial of an evidentiary hearing for abuse of 

discretion.

19 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

20 United States ex rel. Dessus v. Pennsylvania, 452 F.2d 557, 

560 (3d Cir. 1971).

21 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

22 Stanbridge v. Scott, 791 F.3d 715, 719 (7th Cir. 2015). 

23 Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 239 (1963).

24 Id.; see also Lehman v. Lycoming Cty. Children Servs. 

Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 510 (1982) (“[P]ast decisions have 

limited the writ’s availability to challenges to state-court 
8

In Jones v. Cunningham, the Supreme Court considered 

whether a parolee was “in custody” for the purposes of habeas 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.25 The conditions of 

Jones’s parole required him to live with his family in Georgia; 

obtain permission to leave the community, change residence, 

and own or operate a car; and make monthly visits to his parole 

officer.26 Additionally, he was required to permit parole 

officers to come into his home or place of employment, “follow 

the officer’s instructions and advice,” and be subject to 

“revocation and modification at any time.”27

Jones held that these parole restrictions were 

sufficiently restrictive to render the petitioner “in custody.” It

rooted its analysis in the historical development of the custody 

requirement. The Court acknowledged that “the chief use of 

habeas corpus statutes has been to seek release of persons held 

in actual, physical custody in prison or jail.”28 However, the 

Court also noted that courts had “long recognized the writ as a 

proper remedy even [when] the restraint [was] something less 

than close physical confinement.”29 For example, English 

courts permitted the use of habeas corpus where “a woman 

alleged to be the applicant’s wife was being constrained by her 

guardians to stay away from her husband against her will.”30

The test employed in England was “simply whether she was ‘at 

 

judgments in situations where–as a result of a state-court 

criminal conviction–a petitioner has suffered substantial 

restraints not shared by the public generally.”); Hensley v. 

Mun. Court, San Jose v. Mipitas Judicial Dist., Santa Clara 

Cty., Cal., 411 U.S. 345 (1973) (“The custody requirement of 

the habeas corpus statute is designed to preserve the writ of 

habeas corpus as a remedy for severe restraints on individual 

liberty.”).

25 Jones, 371 U.S. at 238.

26 Id. at 237.

27 Id. at 238.

28 Id. 29 Id. 30 Id. at 238–39 (citing Rex. v. Clarkson, 1 Str. 444, 93 Eng. 

Rep. 625 (K.B. 1722)).
9

her liberty to go where she pleased.’”31 Jones noted that United

States courts have historically found that “the use of habeas 

corpus has not been restricted to situations in which the 

applicant is in actual, physical custody.”32 Rather, “[h]istory, 

usage, and precedent can leave no doubt that, besides physical 

imprisonment, there are other restraints on [a person’s] liberty, 

restraints not shared by the public generally, which have been 

thought sufficient in the English-speaking world to support the 

issuance of habeas corpus.”33

Turning to the specific conditions of Jones’s parole, the 

Court found that they constituted custody because they 

“significantly restrain[ed] petitioner’s liberty to do those things 

which in this country free men [were] entitled to do.”34 Indeed, 

the parole restrictions were myriad and demanding. The parole 

order confined Jones to “a particular community, house, and 

job at the sufferance of his parole officer.”35 He could not drive 

a car without permission, and he was required to open his home 

and place of employment to his parole officer at any time. 

Additionally, his parole officer required him to “keep good 

company and good hours,” stay away from “undesirable 

 31 Id. (quoting Clarkson, 93 Eng. Rep. at 625); accord Rex v. 

Delaval, 3 Burr. 1434, 97 Eng. Rep. 913 (K.B. 1763) 

(ordering an indentured girl “discharged from all restraint, 

and be at liberty to go where she will” after her “master” 

assigned her to another man for “bad purposes”).

32 Jones, 371 U.S. at 239.

33 Id. at 240.

34 Id. at 243. The Court also observed that the Virginia statute 

that governed Jones’s supervision explicitly provided that a 

“paroled prisoner shall be released ‘into the custody of the 

Parole Board,’ and the parole order itself placed Jones under 

the ‘custody and control of the Virginia Parole Board.’” Id. at 

241–42 (quoting Va. Code Ann. § 53-264). While not 

dispositive, the Court was informed by the plain language of 

the statute and the order to which Jones was subject. As we 

discuss below, Pennsylvania’s sex offender registration 

requirements were included in the state court’s judgment of 

sentence here.

35 Id. at 242.
10

places,” and “to live a clean, honest, and temperate life.”36 Any 

failure to follow these provisions, however slight, could have 

resulted in Jones being returned to prison.

Under these circumstances, the Court concluded that 

even though Jones has been “release[d] from immediate 

physical imprisonment,” his parole conditions “significantly 

confine[d] and restrain[ed] his freedom.”37 That was “enough 

to keep him in the ‘custody’ of the members of the Virginia 

Parole Board within the meaning of the habeas corpus 

statute[.]”38

After Jones, the Supreme Court decided Hensley v. 

Municipal Court.

39 There, it considered whether a similar—

but slightly less—restrictive scheme than the one in Jones 

could support habeas jurisdiction to adjudicate a § 2254

petition of a petitioner who was released on his own 

recognizance pending appeal.

40 The relevant bail statute

required Hensley to appear “at all times and places as ordered 

by the court or magistrate releasing him and as ordered by any 

court in which, or any magistrate before whom, the charge 

[was] pending.”41 Finally, any court could “revoke the order of 

release and either return him to custody or require that he give 

bail or other assurance of his appearance.”42

The Court held that these conditions supported habeas 

jurisdiction even though Hensley was subject to less restrictive 

supervision requirements than Jones.43 Despite the less 

intrusive requirements, Hensley was still subject to “restraints 

 36 Id.

37 Id. at 243.

38 Id.

39 411 U.S. 345 (1973).

40 Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351.

41 Id. at 348. Additionally, if he failed to “appear and [was] 

apprehended outside of the State of California” he waived his 

right to an extradition hearing. Id.

42 Id.

43 Id. at 348 (“It is true, of course, that the parolee is generally 

subject to greater restrictions on his liberty of movement than 

a person released on bail or his own recognizance.”).
11

‘not shared by the public generally,’” as Jones had been.

44

Hensley was obligated to appear wherever and whenever a 

court ordered him.45 He could not “come and go as he 

please[d]” because his “freedom of movement rest[ed] in the 

hands of state judicial officers, who [could have] demand[ed] 

his presence at any time without a moment’s notice.”46 The 

Court also noted that any failure to abide by these conditions 

was, itself, a criminal offense.47 He was, therefore, “in 

custody.”48

We have also held that the jurisdictional “custody”

requirement can be satisfied by restrictions other than physical 

confinement.

49 In Barry v. Bergen County Probation 

Department,

50 we were asked to decide whether a sentence of 

community service was sufficiently onerous to qualify as 

custody under § 2254. Barry’s probationary sentence had

 44 Id. (quoting Jones, 371 U.S. at 240).

45 Id. 46 Id. at 351.

47 Id. Hensley also found it compelling that the petitioner’s 

liberty only resulted from a judicial order staying his 

sentence—which the government had twice tried to lift. In 

other words, incarceration was not a “speculative possibility.” 

Rather, Hensley had been forced to “fend off the state 

authorities,” and this “need to keep the stay in force [was] 

itself an unusual and substantial impairment of his liberty.” 

Finally, the Court also noted that its holding “did not interfere 

with any significant interest of the State” because even if it 

had concluded that Hensley was not in custody, it would only 

delay the filing of the petition until he was incarcerated after 

the stay was lifted.

48 Id. at 351.

49 See, e.g. Barry v. Brower, 864 F.2d 294, 296 (3d Cir. 1988) 

(finding that habeas jurisdiction continued “at least until the 

expiration of Barry’s probationary term”); Pringle v. Court of 

Common Pleas, 744 F.2d 297, 300 (3d Cir. 1984) (“Custody, 

however, has been liberally defined to include persons on 

parole, those released on their own recognizance pending 

appeal, and those who have been released from confinement 

pursuant to [a ‘good behavior’ time credit statute].”).

50 128 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 1997).
12

expired when he filed his petition, but the sentencing court had 

also ordered him to complete 500 hours of community service 

over a period of three years.

51 The community service 

requirement was imposed in lieu of a fine, which the 

sentencing court concluded Barry was unable to pay.52

We held that the community service obligation 

constituted custody even though the “State did not monitor or 

restrict Barry’s every act” because his sentence nevertheless 

required him “to be in a certain place—or in one of several 

places—to attend meetings or to perform services.”53 Thus, he 

was “clearly subject to restraints on his liberty not shared by 

the public generally.”54 As a result, Barry’s community service 

sentence constituted custody that was sufficiently restrictive to 

support habeas jurisdiction.55

In reaching that decision, we relied on Dow v. Circuit 

Court of the First Circuit, a per curiam decision from the Court 

 51 Id. at 159, 161.

52 Id. at 158–59. 

53 Id. at 161.

54 Id. at 161 (citing Dow v. Circuit Court of the First Circuit, 

995 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)). 

55 We rejected the state’s argument that Barry was not in 

custody because he was not “supervised on a continuous 

basis.” Barry, 128 F.3d at 161 (citing Poodry v. Tonawanda 

Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 894 (2d Cir. 1996)). A per 

curiam opinion issued by this Court in 2003, Obado v. New 

Jersey, 328 F.3d 716 (3d Cir. 2003) (per curiam), cited Barry

for the proposition that “some type of continuing 

governmental supervision” was required to support habeas 

jurisdiction. However, Obado cited the portion of Barry that 

discussed the state’s argument concerning habeas jurisdiction. 

Obado, 328 F.3d at 717 (citing Barry, 128 F.3d at 160). The 

very paragraph in Barry that Obado cites ends with the 

conclusion “that the state has read § 2254’s custody 

requirement too narrowly,” Barry, 128 F.3d at 160. In fact, 

Barry conclusively rejects that argument. Id. at 161 (“Equally 

unavailing is the State’s contention that Barry was not ‘in 

custody’ because he was not supervised on a continuous 

basis.”).
13

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which we found to be “quite 

compelling and analogous” to the question before us in 

Barry.56 Dow’s sentence for DUI required him to attend 

fourteen hours of alcohol rehabilitation classes.

57 He had the 

option of scheduling the classes over a three- or five-day 

period.58 Dow filed a § 2254 petition after his probationary 

sentence was completed but before he attended the classes. The 

court concluded that Dow’s in-class obligation supported 

habeas jurisdiction. The sentence required Dow’s “physical 

presence at a particular place” and “significantly restrain[ed] 

[his] liberty to do those things which free persons in the United 

States are entitled to do.”59 His mandated presence at the 

classes meant that he could not “come and go as he 

please[d].”60 Therefore, the Court held that the sentence “must 

be characterized, for jurisdictional purposes, as ‘custody.’”61

More recently, in United States v. Ross,

62 we considered 

whether a $100 “special assessment” that accompanied a 

conviction for possessing a machine gun constituted “custody”

for the purposes of § 2255.

63 Relying on the precedent we have 

described above, Ross set forth a three-part test for answering 

that question.64 We held that a restriction is custodial if it 

 56 Barry, 128 F.3d at 160.

57 Dow, 995 F.2d at 922.

58 Id. at 922–23. 

59 Id. at 923.

60 Id (quoting Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351). 61 Id. 62 801 F.3d 374 (3d Cir. 2015).

63 Ross, 801 F.3d at 379. Ross arose in a slightly different 

context, but it is still helpful. In Ross, the government alleged 

that the petitioner was ineligible for relief under § 2255 

because that statute could only afford relief to a “prisoner in 

custody . . . claiming the right to be released upon the ground 

that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution 

or laws of the United States[.]” Id. at 378 (quoting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255a)). The issue in Ross was, therefore, about “custody,” 

but not jurisdiction. Nevertheless, we addressed the definition 

of “custody” for the purposes of habeas corpus. Accordingly, 

we think that its analysis is helpful to our inquiry here.

64 Id. at 379.
14

provides for restraints that are “(1) severe, (2) immediate (i.e.

not speculative), and (3) not shared by the public generally.”65 

Applying this test to Ross’s special assessment, we 

concluded that a fine is not the type of obligation that can 

support habeas jurisdiction. We noted that the Supreme Court

has “emphasized the physical nature of the restraints” when 

defining custody.66 Ross’s fine imposed no analogous 

restriction on his freedom of movement and thus could not be 

viewed as “severe.”67 Thus, Ross could not challenge a special 

assessment under § 2255. The decision was consistent with our 

own precedent and decisions of our sister circuit courts of 

appeals. Courts consistently conclude that the “monetary 

component of a sentence is not capable of satisfying the ‘in 

custody’ requirement of federal habeas statutes.”68

Given this precedent, the question of whether Piasecki’s 

registration requirements were sufficiently restrictive to 

constitute custody is easily answered. They were. At a 

minimum, Piasecki was required “to be in a certain place” or 

“one of several places”—a State Police barracks—at least four 

times a year for the rest of his life.

69 The state’s ability to 

compel a petitioner’s attendance weighs heavily in favor of

concluding that the petitioner was in custody.70 Further, 

Piasecki was not free to “come and go as he please[d].”71 Any 

change of address, including any temporary stay at a different 

residence, required an accompanying trip to the State Police 

barracks within three business days.

72 He was even required to 

regularly report to police if he had no address and became 

homeless. In addition, Piasecki could have no “computer 

 65 Id. (parenthetical in original).

66 Id. at 379–80 (citing Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351; Peyton v. 

Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 66–67 (1934); Jones, 371 U.S. at 242). 67 Id. at 379. 68 Id. at 380 (citations omitted). 

69 Barry, 128 F.3d at 161; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(a)(3). 

70 Dow, 995 F.2d at 923; Barry, 128 F.3d at 160–61. 71 Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351.

72 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(g)(2), (3), (4), (7).
15

internet use.”73 The SORNA statute also compelled Piasecki to 

personally report to the State Police if he operated a car, began 

 73 Such prohibitions on computer and internet access are 

relatively common. Yet, it is not at all clear that the judges 

imposing such sweeping and unconditional bans appreciate 

the impact they would have if literally interpreted and 

enforced. A literal enforcement of such provisions would 

subject one to violation for using an ATM, using a 

“smartphone,” seeking directions from any device that 

utilizes GPS navigation, or even driving a relatively late 

model car—most, if not all, of which are equipped with 

computers that are an integral part of the car’s functioning. 

See United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 148 n.8 (3d Cir. 

2007) (noting that modern cars “contain at least one 

computer” and “might have as many as 50 microprocessors”) 

(citations omitted). As a result, many courts have struck down 

statutes or vacated sentences that impose broad bans on 

computer and internet usage. See, e.g., Packingham v. North 

Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1738 (2017) (holding that a statute 

that prevented sex offenders from accessing social media 

websites violated the First Amendment); United States v. 

Holena, 906 F.3d 288, 295 (3d Cir. 2018) (vacating a 

sentence that banned a defendant from possessing or using a 

computer or other electronic communication device and 

prohibited him from using the internet without his probation 

officer’s approval); Voelker, 489 F.3d at 144 (vacating a 

sentence that imposed “an absolute lifetime ban on using 

computers and computer equipment as well as accessing the 

internet”); United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 188 (3d Cir. 

2010) (vacating a sentence that prohibited an offender from 

using a computer with internet access “unless he received 

approval from his probation officer to use the internet and 

other computer networks”); United States v. Albertson, 645 

F.3d 191, 194, 200 (3d Cir. 2011) (vacating a sentence that 

barred an offender from using a computer with online access 

without preapproval from a probation officer and holding 

that, “in a time where the daily necessities of life and work 

demand not only internet access but internet fluency, 

sentencing courts need to select the least restrictive 

alternative for achieving their sentencing purpose”); United 

States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 878 (7th Cir. 2003) (“We find 
16

storing his car in a different location, changed his phone 

number, or created a new email address.74 These are 

compulsory, physical “restraints ‘not shared by the public 

generally.’”75 Unlike the special assessment considered in 

Ross, these restraints compelled Piasecki’s physical presence 

at a specific location and severely conditioned his freedom of 

movement. They were more severe than the community service 

requirement in Barry or the mandatory alcohol classes 

considered in Dow.

Moreover, any failure to abide by the restrictions was 

“itself a crime,” just like the situation facing the petitioner in 

Hensley.

76 If Piasecki failed to report to the State Police 

barracks within three days of any triggering event listed in the 

SORNA statute, he could be charged with a felony of the 

second degree.77 In Pennsylvania, such felonies are punishable 

by up to ten years’ imprisonment.78 If Piasecki provided

inaccurate information, he faced prosecution for a felony of the 

first degree and incarceration of up to twenty years.79 Given 

the level of restriction imposed by the registration 

requirements and the harsh consequences that would result 

from failing to adhere to them, we easily conclude that the 

restrictions placed on Piasecki were “severe.”80

The remaining two prongs of the test we announced in 

Ross are also easily satisfied. The restrictions were “immediate 

(i.e. not speculative)”81—neither side disputes that Piasecki 

was subject to all of SORNA’s requirements when he filed the 

petition at issue. Finally, and as explained above, these 

 

that to the extent that the condition is intended to be a total 

ban on Internet use, it sweeps more broadly and imposes a 

greater deprivation on Holm’s liberty than is necessary[.]”). 

74 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(g). 75 Hensley 411 U.S. at 351 (quoting Jones, 371 U.S. at 240).

76 Id. 77 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.21; 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(c)(1).

78 18 Pa.C.S. § 106(b)(3).

79 42 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(c)(3); 18 Pa.C.S. § 106(b)(2).

80 Ross, 801 F.3d at 379. 81 Id. 
17

restrictions were obviously “not shared by the public 

generally.”82

We recognize that several of our sister circuit courts of 

appeals have found that various sex offender registration 

schemes were not sufficiently restrictive to constitute 

“custody.”83 As we explain below, many courts have held that 

registration requirements cannot support habeas jurisdiction 

because they were collateral consequences of a conviction that 

were not imposed pursuant to the judgment of a state court.

84

Others have held that sex-offender registration conditions do 

not impose a severe restriction on an individual’s freedom.85

We do not find those cases compelling for two reasons. 

First, many of our sister circuit courts of appeals that

have found sex offender registration requirements could not 

support habeas jurisdiction reached that conclusion when 

considering restrictions imposed under pre-SORNA statutes.86 

 82 Id.

83 See, e.g., Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 338 (4th Cir. 

2012); Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 719 (7th Cir. 2008); 

Leslie v. Randle, 296 F.3d 518, 521–23 (6th Cir. 2002); 

Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001).

84 See infra Part II.B.

85 E.g., Calhoun v. Attorney Gen. of Colo., 745 F.3d 1070,

1074 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding that “the Colorado sexoffender registration requirements at issue here are collateral 

consequences of conviction that do not impose a severe 

restriction on an individual’s freedom” because the registrant 

was “free to live, work, travel, and engage in all legal 

activities without limitation and without approval by a 

government official”); Virsnieks, 521 F.3d at 719 (“[T]he 

Wisconsin sexual offender registration statute does not 

impose any significant restriction on a registrant’s freedom of 

movement . . . . [It] does not limit where a registrant may 

move or travel within Wisconsin, within the United States or 

internationally”).

86 See Zichko 247 F.3d at 1019; Leslie 296 F.3d at 521–23;

Wilson 689 F.3d at 338.
18

Those registration requirements were not as onerous as those 

imposed under SORNA.87

Second, we have explicitly departed from the courts that

have held that registration requirements are not custodial 

because they do not require pre-approval from the government 

before a registrant travels, thus not limiting his or her ability to 

move freely.

88 In Barry, we held that custodial “restraint does 

not require ‘on-going supervision’ or ‘prior approval.’”89

Rather, we concluded that even though the government did not

“monitor[] Barry’s every move, [it] nevertheless performed an 

oversight function” and that “level of supervision was clearly 

adequate” to qualify as custody.

90 Accordingly, we cannot 

conclude that Piasecki’s supervision did not amount to custody 

based on a “pre-approval” theory.

In sum, we hold that Piasecki was subject to severe

restraints on his liberty not shared by the public generally. 

Tasks as banal as changing an e-mail address or taking a 

week’s vacation required him to physically appear at a State 

Police barracks. Even in the absence of those ostensibly 

elective choices, Piasecki was compelled by the state to report 

to a police station every three months for the rest of his life. 

We hold that those requirements were at least as restrictive as 

those encountered in Barry and Dow and clearly rise to the 

level of “custody” for purposes of our habeas jurisdiction. 

B. “Pursuant to the Judgment of a State Court”

 87 See, e.g., Wilson, 689 F.3d at 338 (allowing registration by 

mail); Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 

1998) (same). We take no position on whether we would find 

such conditions sufficiently restrictive to constitute custody 

for habeas purposes if the issue were presented to us in an 

appropriate case.

88 See, e.g., Virsnieks, 521 F.3d at 719; Williamson, 151 F.3d 

at 1184 (“Williamson cannot say that there is anywhere that 

the sex offender law prevents him from going.”).

89 Barry, 128 F.3d at 161 (citing Poodry v. Tonawanda Band 

of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 894 (2d Cir. 1996)). 90 Id.
19

Even an onerous restriction cannot support habeas 

jurisdiction if it is nothing more than a “collateral

consequence” of a conviction.91 Rather, the custody that is a 

condition precedent to our habeas jurisdiction must be a direct 

result of “the conviction or sentence under attack” when the 

petition is filed.

92 Thus, a court will not have jurisdiction to 

rule on a habeas petition if “the sentence imposed for [the 

challenged] conviction has fully expired at the time [the] 

petition is filed.”93 This requirement is evident from the plain 

text of § 2254, which states that the petitioner must be “in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”94

We must therefore decide whether Piasecki’s custodial 

restrictions were imposed as part of his sentence or if they were 

merely collateral consequences of his underlying child 

pornography convictions.

We begin at perhaps the most obvious starting point—

the actual judgment of sentence entered by the state court. Two 

documents from the state court record inform and guide our 

inquiry—the “Bucks County Criminal Court Sheet” and the 

“Bucks County Mandatory Sex Offender Conditions” Order. 

Both show that the registration requirements were part of the 

judgment of sentence. 

The Court Sheet has a handwritten notation under 

“Sentence,” stating that, in addition to “Sex Offender 

Supervision,” Piasecki was sentenced to “Registration” for “10 

yrs.” More compellingly, the Sex Offender Conditions Order

states that Piasecki’s “SENTENCE IS SUBJECT TO THE 

FOLLOWING CONDITIONS IN ADDITION TO THOSE 

WHICH APPEAR ON THE COURT SHEET.” Under that 

heading, the sentencing court checked a box next to “Sex 

Offender Registration Pursuant to Megan’s Law” and another 

box indicating “10 Year Registration.”

 91 Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 492 (1989) (per curiam). 92 Id. at 490.

93 Id. at 491.

94 28 U.S.C § 2254(a) (emphasis added).
20

These documents weigh strongly in favor of finding that 

the sex-offender registration requirements were part of 

Piasecki’s sentence and therefore imposed “pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court.”95 Both of the documents plainly

reflect that the registration requirements were a part of the

sentence. 

As compelling as this record is, we will not end our 

inquiry there. Federal courts confronted with the question of 

whether sex offender registration requirements are part of the 

state court judgment of sentence also look to state law to see if 

the state construessex offender registration as a punitive aspect 

of a criminal sentence or a remedial measure imposed 

collaterally. Our sister circuit courts of appeals that have held

registration requirements are not imposed pursuant to the 

judgment of sentence have done so, in part, because the 

respective state courts have determined that their state 

registration schemes are remedial, not punitive. 96

Pennsylvania courts have concluded otherwise. Just two 

months before Piasecki filed his habeas petition, the 

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania decided Coppolino v. 

 95 28 U.S.C § 2254(a)

96 See Bonser, 659 Fed. App’x at 127 n.1 (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Whanger, 30 A.3d 1212, 1215 (Pa. Super. 

Ct. 2011) (noting that Pennsylvania deemed a sexually violent 

predator designation as a “collateral consequence of a 

conviction” and hence “not a sentence”)); Calhoun, 745 F.3d 

at 1074 (citing People v. Sheth, 318 P.3d 533, 534 (Colo.

App. 2013) (“Moreover, the Colorado sex-offender 

registration requirements are remedial, not punitive.”)); 

Virsnieks 521 F.3d at 720 (citing State v. Bollig, 605 N.W. 2d 

199, 205 (Wis. 2000) (“[T]he Wisconsin sexual offender 

registration is considered remedial, rather than punitive, in 

nature.”)); Leslie, 296 F.3d at 522–23 (citing State v. Cook, 

700 N.E. 2d 570, 585 (Ohio 1998) (“The Ohio Supreme Court 

has also held that the sexual-predator statute is remedial as 

opposed to punitive in nature . . . . [This] provides additional 

support for our conclusion that the classification, registration, 

and community notification provisions are more analogous to 

collateral consequences . . . .”)).
21

Noonan, which held that SORNA’s “in-person updating

requirements” were punitive.97 There, Coppolino filed a writ 

of mandamus asking the Commonwealth Court to remove him 

from the list of offenders required to comply with SORNA. 

Like Piasecki, he had initially been required to register under 

Megan’s Law, but became subject to SORNA’s registration 

requirements when they took effect in 2012. He alleged that 

several of the new registration requirements were punitive and 

that subjecting him to the increased punishment violated 

principles of double jeopardy. 

Coppolino held that the quarterly registration 

requirements were not punitive, but the in-person updates

were. The court reasoned that the quarterly registration 

requirements were not punitive because they left Coppolino 

free to live as he chooses and did not prevent him from 

engaging in any given activity. 

The in-person updates, however, were punitive because 

they imposed “an affirmative disability or restraint on 

registrants by inhibiting their ability to travel freely.”98 The 

court specifically pointed to the “temporary lodging” and 

“motor vehicle” restrictions that SORNA required registrants 

to follow and held that they were particularly restrictive.99 If, 

the court surmised, a hotel where the registrant was planning 

to stay was full, “he would have three days to return to 

Pennsylvania and report the change in person or risk a five year 

prison sentence.”100 Similarly, it was “unclear how a registrant 

travelling to another city would be able to register, prior to 

renting a car there, a vehicle’s license plate number and 

registration number and other identifier.”101 If the registrant 

were unable to determine such information in advance, he 

would have to return within three business days to report the 

information in person.”102 The court noted that this “might be 

 97 Coppolino v. Noonan, 102 A.3d 1254, 1278 (Pa. Commw. 

Ct. 2014).

98 Id. at 1277.

99 Id.

100 Id. 101 Id. 102 Id.
22

impossible” depending on “where and how the registrant is 

traveling.”103

Coppolino concluded that, by impairing a citizen’s 

“basic right” of “freedom of movement,” the periodic reporting 

requirements imposed an affirmative restraint that was 

disproportionate to any public purpose that it served.104 “On 

balance, this disproportionality, along with the similarity to the 

traditional punishment of parole and the substantial 

infringement of a fundamental right” led the court to conclude 

that the provisions were punitive.105 Therefore, the 

Commonwealth Court held that those restrictions could not be 

applied to Coppolino without violating prohibitions against ex 

post facto laws.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed Coppolino

in a per curiam opinion.

106 But that was not its final say on 

Pennsylvania’s SORNA statute. In Commonwealth v. 

Muniz,

107 it held that all of the SORNA registration provisions 

were punitive and that applying them retroactively violated the 

Pennsylvania Constitution.

108 The OAJC and two concurring 

 103 Id (internal quotation marks omitted). 104 Id. at 1278.

105 Id.

106 Coppolino v. Noonan, 125 A.3d 1196 (Pa. 2015) (per 

curiam). 107 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017).

108 Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1193. Muniz was a divided opinion. 

Three justices joined the Opinion Announcing the Judgment 

of the Court (“OAJC”) concluding that Pennsylvania’s 

SORNA statute violated both the U.S. Constitution and the 

Pennsylvania Constitution, which, in their estimation, 

provided “even greater [ex post facto] protections than its 

federal counterpart.” Id. at 1223. Two justices concurred in 

the entirety of the opinion except for the portions that held the 

Pennsylvania Constitution provided greater protections than 

the U.S. Constitution. In their view, the “state and federal ex 

post facto clauses are coterminous.” Id. at 1232 (Wecht, J., 

concurring). The Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court dissented, finding that “SORNA does not impose 

punishment and, thus, does not violate either the federal or 
23

justices agreed that the Pennsylvania legislature did not intend 

to create a punitive scheme—but nevertheless did so when it 

enacted SORNA.

109 Retroactive application of the scheme 

therefore violated the Pennsylvania Constitution’s ex post facto 

clause.

As a result of Coppolino and Muniz, Pennsylvania 

courts have concluded that SORNA’s registration 

requirements are punitive, not remedial—unlike the courts in 

nearly every other state. This supports Piasecki’s claim that the 

registration requirements imposed upon him are punitive 

sanctions imposed pursuant to the state court’s judgment of 

sentence rather than collateral consequences or remedial 

measures. 

Moreover, Pennsylvania state court decisions have 

historically treated sex offender registration requirements as 

part of the judgment of sentence. The Commonwealth 

concedes that registrants seeking to challenge their registration 

status have traditionally done so by appealing the judgment of 

sentence, and Pennsylvania courts treat a registrant’s “status” 

under a sex offender registration statute as “a component of the 

judgment of sentence.”110 Challenges to a registration 

classification, therefore, must be made in the context of a 

challenge to the judgment of sentence itself.111 Thus, under 

 

state constitutions’ ex post facto clauses.” Id. at 1233 (Saylor, 

C.J., dissenting). The net precedential effect of these opinions 

was “confined to the determination that SORNA’s 

registration requirement is punishment that runs afoul of the 

ex post facto clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution when 

applied retroactively.” Commonwealth v. Hart, 174 A.3d 660, 

667 n.9 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).

109 Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1219, 1223; id. at 1224 (Wecht, J., 

concurring).

110 Br. for Appellee, 20 (quoting Commonwealth v. Harris, 

972 A.2d 1196, 1201–02 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (“We agree 

that the term ‘judgment’ is not limited to the court’s sentence 

of incarceration, but also includes that status determination 

under Megan’s Law.”)).

111 Commonwealth v. Leonard, 172 A.3d 628, 631 (Pa Super. 

Ct. 2017) (“Appellant challenges the requirements imposed 
24

Pennsylvania law, SORNA registration requirements are 

imposed pursuant to the state court judgment of sentence.

Nevertheless, we recognize that one factor does support

the contrary view. As the Commonwealth notes, the 

registration requirements at issue here were created more than 

two years after Piasecki was sentenced. Arguably, then, 

Piasecki’s registration requirements were imposed pursuant to

an act of the legislature, not a state court judgment. This 

argument has some force, but ultimately we disagree with the 

Commonwealth’s position because Piasecki became subject to 

SORNA’s registration requirements as a “direct consequence 

of [the] conviction” being challenged.112

Piasecki became subject to SORNA’s registration 

requirements by virtue of his conviction and subsequent 

judgment of sentence. Under the initial version of SORNA 

passed by the Pennsylvania legislature, any person who was 

“required to register with the Pennsylvania State Police . . . 

prior to the [amendment]” and who had “not fulfilled the period 

of registration as of the effective date of this section” became 

subject to SORNA’s increased registration requirements.113 In 

other words, Piasecki was subject to SORNA’s registration 

requirements because of the sentence imposed pursuant to the

state court judgment.

We therefore conclude that SORNA’s registration 

requirements rendered Piasecki “in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State Court” when he filed his petition. 

 

by the trial court that he register as a sex offender for life 

based upon the court’s interpretation of SORNA’s 

requirements.”) (emphasis in original); Commonwealth v. 

Sauers, 159 A.3d 1, 16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) (noting that a 

challenge to a Tier III SORNA classification is a “nonwaivable legality-of-sentence issue,” vacating “the lifetime 

registration portion of Appellant’s sentence” and 

“remand[ing] for re-sentencing under SORNA”).

112 Stanbridge, 791 F.3d 715, 719 (7th Cir. 2015).

113 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13(3) (2012); 2011 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 

2011-111 (S.B. 1183) (PURDON'S)
25

C. The Limits of Our Ruling

Many of our sister circuits have predicted that a ruling 

such as the one we announce today would render the “in 

custody” requirement of the habeas statute superfluous.114 Our 

decision today raises no such concerns. We do not hold that 

any collateral consequence of conviction can support habeas

jurisdiction. Rather, we hold that the custodial jurisdiction 

requirement is satisfied by severe, immediate, physical, and 

(according to the state’s own definition) punitive restraints on 

liberty that are imposed pursuant to—and included in—the 

judgment of a state court such as the one here. Truly collateral 

consequences—such as the “inability to vote, engage in certain 

businesses, hold public office, or serve as a juror”115—are not 

analogous to the restrictive and invasive regime created under 

SORNA’s registration requirements. The physical compulsion

of SORNA’s registration requirements and their direct relation 

to the judgment of sentence set them apart from consequences 

that are truly collateral and noncustodial.

Additionally, this is not a situation where Piasecki was 

in custody as a result of an intervening judgment such as a 

separate conviction or a civil commitment hearing.116 In those 

cases, a litigant could not challenge a previously expired 

conviction that is no longer the source of any restrictions. As 

we have explained, Piasecki’s registration requirements were 

part of his sentence and continue as such into the future. No 

separate order is involved. 

 114 See, e.g., Calhoun 745 F.3d at 1074 (quoting Maleng, 490 

U.S. at 492)(suggesting that a holding that sex offender 

registration requirements can give rise to habeas jurisdiction 

“would read the ‘in custody’ requirement out of the statute”); 

Wilson, 689 F.3d at 339 (“To rule otherwise [and find that 

sex-offender registration requirements can support habeas 

jurisdiction] would drastically expand the writ of habeas 

corpus beyond its traditional purview and render § 2254’s ‘in 

custody’ requirement meaningless.”). 

115 Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491–92. 

116 Stanbridge, 791 F.3d at 719.
26

Finally, nothing we have said should be interpreted as 

calling into question the wisdom or propriety of 

Pennsylvania’s sex offender registration requirements. That 

determination is the province of the legislature, not the 

courts.117 The legislature determined that long-term, in-person 

registration and supervision was necessary for those who 

commit sexual offenses118—including those who possess truly 

horrific videos such as those possessed by Piasecki. Today, we 

hold only that the restrictions that follow from that level of 

supervision constitute custody for the purposes of habeas

jurisdiction.

III. CONCLUSION

The writ of habeas corpus “is not now and never has 

been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy.”119 The scope of the 

writ has grown in accordance with its purpose—to protect 

individuals against the erosion of their right to be free from 

wrongful restraints upon their liberty.120 SORNA’s registration 

requirements clearly constitute a restraint upon liberty, a 

physical restraint not shared by the public generally. The 

restraint imposed on Piasecki is a direct consequence of a state 

court judgment of sentence, and it therefore can support habeas 

corpus jurisdiction. For all of the reasons set forth above, the 

order of the District Court is vacated and the case is remanded 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 117 To the extent that we have cautioned against imposition of 

overly broad restrictions on internet and computer use, see 

supra note 73, we have done so merely to call attention to the 

ease with which such restrictions can sweep further than 

intended or warranted and to note the unintended 

consequences that may follow if they are not appropriately 

tailored to focus on the conduct that the court was attempting 

to address. 

118 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.11.

119 Jones, 371 U.S. at 243.

120 Id.