UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

LAFAYETTE DIVISION

KEVIN D. MILLER, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. Case No. 2:15-CV-422 JVB

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, 

Acting Commissioner of 

Social Security Administration, 

 

 Defendant. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 Plaintiff Kevin D. Miller seeks judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner’s 

denial of disability benefits, and asks this Court to remand the case. For the reasons below, the 

Court remands the case. 

A. Overview of the Case 

 Plaintiff alleges he became disabled on November 15, 2011, following a series of health 

issues, an injury at work, and injuries due to overuse in his right knee after undergoing surgery 

on his left knee. (R. at 43-44.) Plaintiff had previously worked as a carpenter. (R. at 515.) The 

Administrative Law Judge found that Plaintiff suffered from bilateral knee disorder, cervical 

degenerative disc disease, carpal tunnel syndrome, schizoaffective disorder, affective disorder, 

and substance abuse disorder. (R. at 502.) Nonetheless, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff can still 

do various kinds of sedentary work, with limitations, so long as he never interacts with the 

public, and only interacts with coworkers and supervisors occasionally. (R. at 506.) T. (R. at 

516.) This denial became final when the Social Security Appeals Council declined to assume 
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jurisdiction. (R.at 586.) 

B. Standard of Review 

This Court has authority to review the Commissioner’s decision under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g). The Court will ensure that the ALJ built an “accurate and logical bridge” from 

evidence to conclusion. Thomas v. Colvin, 745 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court will 

uphold decisions that apply the correct legal standard and are supported by substantial evidence. 

Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005). 

C. Disability Standard 

The Commissioner follows a five-step inquiry in evaluating claims for disability benefits 

under the Social Security Act:

(1) whether the claimant is currently employed; (2) whether the claimant has a 

severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment is one that the 

Commissioner considers conclusively disabling; (4) if the claimant does not have 

a conclusively disabling impairment, whether he can perform his past relevant 

work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the 

national economy.

Kastner v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 642, 646 (7th Cir. 2012).

 The claimant bears the burden of proof at every step except step five. Clifford v. Apfel, 

227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000). 

D. Analysis 

Plaintiff submits that the ALJ: (1) did not adequately support the mental functioning 

capacity determination; (2) erred in considering Plaintiff’s medical compliance; (3) erred in 

evaluating Plaintiff’s symptoms and assigning weight to the opinion evidence; (4) erred when 
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evaluating new medical evidence; (5) and failed to follow SSR 96-8p. Finally, Plaintiff argues 

that in failing to discuss several of Plaintiff’s arguments, the Commissioner agreed with Plaintiff 

that remand was necessary. 

(1) The ALJ’s mental functioning assessment was supported by relevant evidence a 

reasonable mind could understand 

 Plaintiff claims the ALJ’s mental functioning determination was not supported with 

sufficient evidence. The ALJ must support his determination with substantial evidence for it to 

stand. See Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 306 (7th Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence is relevant 

evidence that a reasonable mind could accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See id. at 305–

306. Here, the ALJ considered significant medical evidence related to Plaintiff’s mental 

capabilities, examining claims of schizophrenia and hearing voices, evidence of major 

depression and psychosis, and Plaintiff’s inpatient hospitalizations. (R. at 511−513.) This 

evidence substantially supports the ALJ’s mental functioning determination. 

(2) The ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s medical compliance was not erroneous 

 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ improperly considered Plaintiff’s medical compliance. An 

ALJ may not determine Plaintiff’s ability to work based on whether Plaintiff could hold a job if 

they were in medical compliance, such as taking medication for a mental illness. Kangail v. 

Barnhart,454 F.3d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 2006). Even if a Plaintiff could function at a higher level if 

they were on medication, because mental illness can prevent a Plaintiff from doing things like 

taking their medication regularly, their mental conditional must be considered regardless. Id. at 

630–31. Here, the ALJ mentioned Plaintiff’s ability to function normally even when not taking 

his prescription medication, and not to decide whether Plaintiff would be able to work if he 
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complied with his prescriptions. (R. at 505). In short, when the ALJ’s considered Plaintiff’s 

medical compliance, he was not in error. 

(3) The ALJ weighed and discussed the opinion evidence adequately and provided 

adequate information to support his symptom evaluation 

 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to properly weigh the opinion evidence and 

improperly evaluated Plaintiff’s symptoms. When considering a claimant’s symptoms an ALJ 

evaluates many types of evidence and must make his own determinations about the evidence and 

its credibility. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. As long as the ALJ’s credibility determinations have some 

support in the record, and are not patently wrong, they are upheld. See Diaz, 55 F.3d at 308. 

However, the ALJ must show a logical bridge between his findings and the evidence provided. 

See Thomas v. Colvin, 745 F.3d 820, 806 (7th Cir. 2014). Here, the ALJ sufficiently evaluated 

the medical evidence. The ALJ went into detail and evaluated different pieces of medical 

evidence, such as the Plaintiff’s knee problems, spinal impairments, brachial plexopathy, and 

other conditions and claims. (R. at 506−514.) The ALJ also explained why he weighed opinion 

evidence as he did, evaluating and explaining his evaluation of each source of medical testimony 

separately. (R. at 513−514.) Additionally, the ALJ explained why the information he discussed 

supported his RFC determination. (R. at 510−514.) In short, the ALJ’s determination was not 

unreasonable, patently wrong, or without support, and does not warrant reversal. 

(4) The ALJ’s erred when he did not submit new evidence to medical examination 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s evaluation of new medical evidence was in error. An 

ALJ should submit evidence to medical scrutiny when the evidence is “potentially decisive.” 

Goins v. Colvin, 764 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 2014). And an ALJ should not rely on outdated 
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assessments when making their determinations. See Stage v. Colvin, 812 F.3d 1121, 1125 (7th 

Cir. 2016). Medical evidence from July of 2015 that included electromyogram and nerve 

conduction studies that potentially show cervical radiculopathy, focal left ulnar neuropraxia, and 

left ulna nerve neuropathy were not submitted to other medical professionals for medical 

scrutiny, which stopped the medical professionals providing opinions to update their 

assessments, and did not allow for a qualified examination of the test results. (R. at 1299, 1302.) 

Considering the potentially progressive nature of Plaintiff’s claimed illness and the potentially 

determinative nature of the medical evidence that was not evaluated, Plaintiff’s case requires 

remand for further assessment of Plaintiff’s medical conditions. 

E. Conclusion 

Much of the ALJ’s opinion was accurate and sufficiently supported. However, the ALJ’s 

decision not to have Plaintiff’s new medical evidence reviewed by medical sources requires 

remand. Because this case is being remanded discussion of Plaintiff’s other arguments is 

unnecessary. 

SO ORDERED on March 26, 2018.

 S/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

 JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE