NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STEPHEN FRANK KARBAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. VIVIAN BALTIERRA, Deputy Warden at Eyman Complex, Cook Unit Prison; STEVEN BRENNAN, Corrections Office (Captain) #2304 at Eyman Complex; CHARLES L. RYAN, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections; RON LEE, Security Operations Manager at Arizona Department of Corrections,

Defendants

- Ap pellees. No. 21

- 15548
D.C. No. 2:19

- cv - 04377

- DWL

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Dominic Lanza, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 17, 2022 * *
Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges. Arizona state prisoner Stephen Frank Karban appeals pro se from the district

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

MAY 24 2022 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 21

- 15548

court’s judgment in his 4 2 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims . We review de novo. Hamby v. Hammond , 821 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 2016 ) (summary judgment) ; Resnick v. Hayes , 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Karban’s due process claim against defe ndant Brennan because Karban failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the temporary loss of privileges resulting
from a disciplinary violation that was dismissed through the prison’s administrative appeal process imposed an atypical and significant hardship. See Ramirez v. Galaza , 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (under the Due Process Clause, a prisoner may challenge a state disciplinary action only if it “deprives or
restrains a state

- created liberty interest in some ‘unexpected manner’” or “imposes some ‘atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life’” (quoting Sandin v. Conner , 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)))

. However, summary judgment was improper on Karban’s retaliation claim

a gainst defendant Baltierra. The record reflects that, approximately two weeks after Karban filed a grievance, Baltierra requested Karban be transferred. In the transfer request, Baltierra stated Karban was “not a yard problem, [and] likes paperwork.” Additionally, Karban submitted a declaration stating that he had not3 21

- 15548

had issues with other inmates or staff prior to his transfer. Taking this evidence in the light most favorable to Karban, a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to
whether Baltierr a retaliated against Karban. See Brodheim v. Cry , 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009) ( setting forth elements of a retaliation claim in the prison context) ; Bruce v. Ylst , 351 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 2003) ( explaining that prison officials may not rely on an otherwise legitimate penological interest “as a cover or ruse to silence and punish [an inmate] because he filed grievances” ). We reverse and remand for further proceedings on this claim. The district court properly dismissed Karban ’ s access - to

- cou rts claim against defendants Ryan and Lee because Karban failed to allege facts sufficient to
establish these defendants caused an actual injury to a nonfrivolous claim. See Lewis v. Casey , 518 U.S. 343, 349

- 5 4 (1996) (setting forth elements of an access

to

- courts claim and explaining that that right of access to the courts is the “right to bring to court a grievance that the inmate wishe[s] to present , ” not a right “to litigate effectively once in court” (emphas i s omitted) )

. Karban’s motion for appointment of counsel (Docket Entry No. 20) is
denied. The parties will bear their own costs on appeal. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.