IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

STEVEN SCHROERS, on behalf of himself 

and all other similarly-situated employees, 

known and unknown, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

PROMPT MEDICAL TRANSPORTATION, 

INC. d/b/a Prompt Ambulance Service and 

Indiana EMS, an Indiana corporation, GARY 

MILLER, individually, SHAR MILLER, 

individually, and JOSEPH MERRY, 

individually, 

 

 Defendants. 

Civil Action 

No. 

JURY DEMAND 

COMPLAINT

 By and through his attorneys of record and on behalf of himself and all other similarlysituated employees, known and unknown, the plaintiff, STEVEN SCHORERS,(the 

“Plaintiff”)complains of the defendants, PROMPT MEDICAL TRANSPORTATION, INC. d/b/a 

“Prompt Ambulance Service” and “Indiana EMS” (“PROMPT”), an Indiana corporation, GARY 

MILLER, individually, SHAR MILLER, individually, and JOSEPH MERRY, individually, (the 

“Defendants”). Pleading hypothetically and in the alternative, the Plaintiffs allege as follows: 

I. PARTIES

1. The Plaintiff brings this action for declaratory judgment, back pay, and other 

relief pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to remedy the Defendants’ willful 

and unlawful violations of federal law complained of herein. 

2. PROMPT is an Indiana corporation having its registered office and principal 

place of business within the Northern District of Indiana, at or near 9835 Express Drive, 

Highland, Indiana 46322. 

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3. PROMPT operates a private, for-profit ambulance service that contracts with 

municipalities in Northwest Indiana including East Chicago and Gary; and, pursuant to those 

contracts and other agreements, PROMPT offers its services to the general public in East 

Chicago, Gary and other municipalities. 

4. At all times relevant to this action, the Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants 

in various work assignments as an Emergency Medical Technician and/or Paramedic (“EMT”). 

5. At all times relevant to this action, the Defendants paid the Plaintiff on an hourly 

basis for the work assignments he performed as an EMT, except upon his transfer into 

PROMPT's Information Technology (IT) department where the Plaintiff was a salaried 

employee. 

6. While working for the Defendants in the position of EMT as well as working in 

the IT department, the Plaintiff was an “employee” of the Defendants within the meaning of 

Section 3(e)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. 

7. GARY MILLER and SHAR MILLER are principal officers of PROMPT. 

8. JOSEPH MERRY is one of PROMPT’s senior managers in charge of operations. 

9. At all times relevant to this action, each of the Defendants was the Plaintiffs’ 

“employer” within the meaning of Section 3(a) and (d) of the FLSA in that the Defendants acted 

directly or indirectly in the interest of the “employer” in relation to the employee plaintiffs 

represented herein, and are therefore jointly and severally liable for the unpaid wages and other 

relief sought herein. 

10. PROMPT had gross receipts in excess of $500,000.00 in: a) 2009; b) 2010; 

c) 2011; d) 2012; e) 2013; and 2014. 

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11. At all times relevant to this action, the Defendants, and each of them, operated, 

controlled and/or constituted an “enterprise” within the meaning of Section 3(r) of the FLSA. 

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

12. Federal question jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Section 16(b) of the 

FLSA and 28 U.S.C. §1331. 

13. Venue is proper as the acts or omissions that gave rise to the claims alleged herein 

occurred within the Northern District of Indiana; and the Defendants maintain their principal 

place of business within the Northern District of Indiana. 

III. THE “OPT-IN” CLASS

14. The Plaintiff brings this case as an “opt-in” collective action under the FLSA on 

behalf of himself and all other similarly situated past and present employees of the Defendants, 

known and unknown (the “Putative Class”); and in accordance with Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 

the Plaintiff has given written consent to bring such an action – the Plaintiff’s written consent 

form is attached as Exhibit A and incorporated by reference. 

15. The Putative Class is comprised of: all past and present employees of the 

Defendants who are and/or were paid hourly for their labor. 

16. At all times relevant to this action, each of the Defendants was and/or is the 

Putative Class members’ “employer” within the meaning of Section 3(a) and (d) of the FLSA in 

that the Defendants acted directly or indirectly in the interest of the “employer” in relation to the 

employee plaintiffs represented herein, and are therefore jointly and severally liable for the 

unpaid wages and other relief sought herein. 

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IV. CLAIMS

Count I 

(Violation of the FLSA) 

17. The Defendants typically assigned the Plaintiff to work what were ostensibly 40-

hour weeks; but the Defendants actually required the Plaintiff to work more than 40 hours in 

most weeks. 

18. In most cases, the overtime (in excess of 40 hours in any given work week) hours 

that the Plaintiff was required to work were completely uncompensated as the result of the 

Defendants’ unlawful practice and policy of: 

a. Requiring the Plaintiff to work as much as10 hours per week “off the clock” 

for the last three (3) years, while inspecting, stocking and otherwise readying 

ambulances to leave the garage and respond to calls (“Rig Check Work”); 

b. Using a time clock system with a “snap” function that automatically rounded 

the Plaintiff’s recorded work time up, and down, to the beginning and end of 

his scheduled shifts – even when the Plaintiff actually worked longer than his 

scheduled shifts in most work weeks; 

c. Maintaining a policy under which overtime was not paid to the Plaintiff unless 

it was “approved,” while at the same time requiring the Plaintiff to perform 

Rig Check Work that the Plaintiff could not have performed during his 

regularly scheduled shifts – because the Defendants required ambulances to be 

out on the street and ready to respond to calls at the beginning of the 

Plaintiff’s scheduled shifts; 

d. Failing to approve and pay compensation for overtime hours when the 

Plaintiff would call JOSEPH MERRY and/or the Defendants’ human 

resources office to report that he had worked overtime; and 

19. In some cases, the overtime (in excess of 40 hours in any given work week) hours 

that the Plaintiff was required to work were completely uncompensated as the result of the 

Defendants’ unlawful practice and policy of: 

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a. Allowing and encouraging the Plaintiff to perform audits of his peers’ 

performance on his own time, while off the clock, which audits the 

Defendants would later use to train and discipline other EMTs; 

b. Allowing and encouraging the Plaintiff to attend company meetings on his 

own time, while off the clock, at which company business and operations 

were discussed, which meetings occurred approximately monthly and lasted 1 

to 2 hours each; 

c. Allowing and encouraging the Plaintiff to perform unpaid “volunteer” work as 

an EMT at community events on his own time, while off the clock, at which 

events the Plaintiff was required to wear his PROMPT uniform and to be 

ready to respond to calls for emergency medical assistance and transportation. 

d. Allowing, encouraging, and requiring the Plaintiff to perform IT work outside 

of work hours, including taking phone calls, answering emails, and making 

service calls. 

20. The Defendants subjected the Plaintiff to the unlawful practices described in the 

two preceding paragraphs as a matter of practice and policy and on an ongoing basis, willfully 

circumventing the FLSA’s requirements, in order to improperly convert funds into profit that 

should have been paid to the Plaintiff as and for wages. 

21. The Defendants subjected the Putative Class members to the same, or to similar, 

unlawful practices as those described above relative to the Plaintiff as a matter of practice and 

policy and on an ongoing basis, willfully circumventing the FLSA’s requirements, in order to 

improperly convert funds into profit that should have been paid to the Putative Class members as 

and for wages. 

22. The Putative Class is comprised of in excess of one hundred EMTs that the 

Defendants employ and/or employed within the last three years and, when viewed relative to the 

Putative Class as a whole, the Defendants improperly converted wages consisting of potentially 

millions of dollars. 

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23. Using the unlawful practices described above and others, the Defendants violated 

the FLSA by, among other ways: 

a. Failing to pay the Plaintiff for numerous hours he worked altogether – 

requiring him to work “off the clock;” and 

b. Failing to accurately record the number of hours that the Plaintiff actually 

worked each week. 

c. Failing to keep records of the Plaintiff’s “off the clock” work. 

24. Using the unlawful practices described above and others, the Defendants violated, 

and continue to violate, the FLSA by, among other ways: 

a. Failing to pay the Putative Class members at a rate not less than one and onehalf times their regular hourly rates for the overtime (in excess of 40 in any 

given week) hours they worked/work in most, if not all, of the weeks that they 

were/are allowed to perform work for the Defendants; 

b. Failing to pay the Putative Class members for numerous hours they 

worked/work altogether – requiring them to work “off the clock;” and 

c. Failing to accurately record the number of hours that the Putative Class 

members actually worked/work each week. 

25. The Defendants’ violation of the FLSA is ongoing and pervasive, in that the 

Defendants continue to subject the Putative Class members to the same unlawful practices 

described above. 

26. During the course of their employment by the Defendants, the Plaintiffs and the 

Putative Class members handled/handle goods that moved in interstate commerce including but 

not limited to pharmaceutical grade saline solution, syringes, plastic tubing and oxygen. 

27. During the course of their employment by the Defendants, the Plaintiffs and the 

Putative Class members were/are not exempt from the FLSA’s minimum wage and maximum 

hour (overtime) provisions. 

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28. STEVEN SCHROERS was employed by the Defendants from about the summer 

of 2006 through about May 23, 2014. 

29. The Plaintiff does not yet have access to the universe of extant employment 

records; and many of the employment records that do exist are grossly inaccurate as a result of 

the Defendants’ unlawful practices described above, including but not limited to the automatic 

“snap” rounding by the Defendants’ time clocks and the Defendants refusal to record or pay 

reported overtime hours. 

30. The Defendants’ violation of the FLSA was willful in that the Defendants were 

aware or should have been aware of their obligations under the FLSA, but nevertheless 

attempted to circumvent its provisions. 

31. The Defendants failed to take affirmative steps to ascertain their obligations under 

the FLSA. 

32. As a result of the Defendants’ willful and purposeful violations of the FLSA, 

there has become due and owing to the Plaintiff and the Putative Class members an amount that 

has not yet been precisely determined and the complete (though inaccurate, as described above) 

employment and work records for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class members are in the 

exclusive possession, custody and control of the Defendants. The Plaintiff is therefore unable to 

state at this time the exact amount due and owing to them. 

33. The Defendants are under a duty imposed by the Section 11(c) of the FLSA, and 

various other statutory and regulatory provisions, to maintain and preserve payroll and other 

employment records with respect to the Plaintiff and the Putative Class members from which the 

amount of the Defendants’ liability can be ascertained. 

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Count II 

(Violation of the Indiana Minimum Wage Law)

34. The Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 33 of this 

Complaint into this count. 

35. To the extent Defendant is not subject to the minimum wage provisions of the 

federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, Defendant is an "employer" for purposes 

of the Indiana Minimum Wage Law of 1965, I.C. §22-2-2, et seq. ("IMWL"); to wit, Defendant 

is an individual, partnership, association, limited liability company, corporation, business trust, 

the state, or other governmental agency or political subdivision that employs two (2) or more 

employees during a given workweek. 

36. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and others minimum wage, or an amount equal 

to minimum wage, or overtime, as required by the IMWL. 

37. Defendants' failure to comply with the IMWL caused Plaintiff and others to suffer 

loss of wages thereon. 

38. Pursuant to IC 22-2-2-9, Plaintiff brings this action for and on behalf of himself 

and all other employees of the same employer who are similarly situated. 

39. Pursuant to IC 22-2-2-9, Plaintiff and the other putative collective action plaintiffs 

are entitled to three (3) years of wages owed, an equal amount in liquidated damages, as well as 

costs and attorneys' fees. 

WHEREFORE, on behalf of himself and the Putative Class, the Plaintiff prays for 

judgment in his favor and against the Defendants, and each of them, and for the following relief: 

A. A decree that the Defendants have willfully and wrongfully violated their obligations 

under the FLSA (or, alternatively the IMWL), and thereby deprived the Plaintiff and 

the Putative Class members of their rights; 

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B. Conditional certification of the Putative Class as defined herein; 

C. Authorization to send notice of this action to the Putative Class members and 

allowing them to “opt-in” and join this action by filing consent forms with the Court; 

D. A complete and accurate accounting of all the compensation to which the Plaintiff 

and the Putative Class members are entitled; 

E. An award of damages equal to the unpaid compensation due and owing to the 

Plaintiff and the Putative Class members under the FLSA (or, alternatively the 

IMWL),; 

F. Liquidated damages under the FLSA (or, alternatively the IMWL); 

G. Pre and Post judgment interest; 

H. Reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs; 

I. Such further relief as may be just and proper. 

JURY DEMAND

The Plaintiff demands a trial by jury of all issues set forth herein that are capable of being 

tried by a jury. 

Respectfully submitted, 

/s/Paul Luka 

One of the Plaintiff’s Attorneys 

Paul Luka 

Law Office of Paul Luka, P.C.

120S.StateStreet,Suite400 

Chicago,IL60603

312.236.9825 

paul@lukapc.com

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 The undersigned attorney certifies that he served the attached pleading and civil cover 

sheet on all parties of record via the Court’s CM/ECF system and filed summonses accordingly. 

 /s/Paul Luka 

 One of the Plaintiff’s Attorneys 

Paul Luka 

Law Office of Paul Luka, P.C.

120S.StateStreet,Suite400 

Chicago,IL60603

312.236.9825 

paul@lukapc.com

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EXHIBIT 

A 

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