IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

JESSICA VAN NESS, for her minor child, C.V.,) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Cause No. 3:14-CV-02076-CAN 

 ) 

CAROLYN COLVIN, ) 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 Plaintiff Jessica Van Ness (“Van Ness”), for her minor child, C.V., filed a complaint in 

this Court seeking reversal or remand of the final decision denying C.V.'s application for child's 

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). As analyzed below, the Defendant’s decision as Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) was not supported by substantial evidence. 

I. PROCEDURE 

 On April 10, 2012, Van Ness filed an application for SSI with the Social Security 

Administration (“SSA”), alleging C.V.'s disability beginning January 1, 2004. The SSA denied 

Van Ness’s claim initially on May 23, 2012, and again upon reconsideration on July 17, 2012. 

On August 2, 2012, Van Ness filed a request for an administrative hearing. The hearing was 

held on September 9, 2013, before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) where both Van Ness 

and C.V. appeared and testified. On November 5, 2013, the ALJ issued his decision finding that 

C.V. was not disabled at Step Three of the disability evaluation process and denied Van Ness's 

application for SSI benefits. On December 10, 2013, Van Ness filed a request for review of the 

ALJ’s decision with the Appeals Council. On October 28, 2014, the Appeals Council denied 

Van Ness’s request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the 
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Commissioner. On December 18, 2014, Van Ness filed a complaint in this Court seeking 

reversal or remand of the Commissioner’s decision. On July 6, 2015, Van Ness filed her 

Opening Brief. Thereafter, on October 7, 2015, the Commissioner filed a responsive 

memorandum asking the Court to affirm the decision denying C.V. benefits. Van Ness filed her 

reply brief on October 21, 2015. This Court may enter a ruling in this matter based on the 

parties’ consent pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND 

C.V. was born on September 7, 2002, and was 9-years old on the date of the SSI 

application. C.V. sought child's SSI based upon legal blindness in the left eye, poor vision in the 

right eye, albinism, behavior problems, ADD, and ADHD. 

 At the hearing, C.V. testified regarding his condition. Van Ness also testified in response 

to questioning by the ALJ and her counsel. After the hearing, the ALJ issued a written decision 

reflecting findings based on the three-step sequential evaluation process prescribed by the SSA’s 

regulations to determine whether an individual under the age of 18 is disabled.1

 At Step One, the 

ALJ found that C.V. had not been engaged in substantial gainful activity since the application 

date of April 10, 2012, which governs the start of any SSI benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.335. At 

Step Two, the ALJ found that C.V. has the following severe impairments: oculocutaneous 

albinism2

, nystagmus3, ADHD, and learning disorder. At Step Three, the ALJ found that C.V. 

did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the 

severity of a listed impairment. The ALJ further found that C.V. did not have an impairment or 

																																																								

1

 ALJs must apply a three-part test in determining whether a child is entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 

416.924(a); Giles ex rel. Giles v. Astrue, 483 F.3d 483, 486-87 (7th Cir. 2007); 20 C.F.R. § 416.902. 2

 Oculocutaneous albinism is a disorder characterized by a lack of pigment in the eye. See Stedmans Medical 

Dictionary 19690 (2014). 

3 Nystagmus is a condition involving involuntary rhythmic oscillation of the eyeballs. Stedmans Medical 

Dictionary 619540 (2014).
3

combination of impairments that functionally equals the severity of the listings. In so doing, the 

ALJ assessed C.V.'s functioning in terms of the six domains identified in 20 C.F.R. § 

416.926a(b)(1). Based on that assessment, the ALJ concluded that C.V. had not been disabled, 

as defined in the Social Security Act, since April 10, 2012. 

III. ANALYSIS 

A. Standard of Review 

On judicial review of the final decision of the SSA, the Commissioner’s factual findings 

must be accepted as conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, 

an ALJ’s findings will be reversed only if they are not supported by substantial evidence or if the 

ALJ has applied an erroneous legal standard. See Scrogham v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 685, 695 (7th 

Cir. 2014). Substantial evidence is simply “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); 

Kepple v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 513, 516 (7th Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence may be less than 

the weight of the evidence, but is more than a mere scintilla. Sheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 

699 (7th Cir. 2004). 

 To determine whether substantial evidence exists, the Court reviews the record as a 

whole, but does not attempt to substitute its judgment for the ALJ’s by reweighing the evidence, 

resolving material conflicts, or reconsidering facts or the credibility of witnesses. Beardsley v. 

Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 836-37 (7th Cir. 2014). “Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable 

minds to differ as to whether a claimant is entitled to benefits,” the Court must defer to the 

Commissioner’s resolution of that conflict. Binion v. Chater, 108 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir. 1997). 

In reaching a decision, the ALJ must build a logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion, 

but he need not provide a complete written evaluation of every piece of testimony or evidence. 
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Murphy v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 2014). Minimally, an ALJ must articulate his 

analysis of the evidence in order to allow the reviewing court to trace the path of his reasoning 

and to be assured that the ALJ considered the important evidence. Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 

589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002). If the ALJ's decision is so poorly articulated as to prevent meaningful 

review, the case must be remanded. Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002). 

B. Issues for Review 

 In this case, the Court must not ascertain whether C.V. is disabled, but rather, whether the 

ALJ’s disability determination for C.V. is supported by substantial evidence. Van Ness 

contends, in part, that the ALJ’s functional equivalency assessment for C.V. is not supported by 

substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to consider all of the relevant evidence and failed to 

consider the effect of C.V.'s impairments across all domains. Van Ness also contends that the 

ALJ erred in his credibility finding. Each of these arguments is addressed in turn. 

 1. The ALJ’s Functional Equivalency Determination 

 To determine whether a child's impairment is the functional equivalent of a listing, an 

ALJ evaluates its severity in six domains: 1) acquiring and using information, 2) attending and 

completing tasks, 3) interacting and relating with others, 4) moving about and manipulating 

objects, 5) caring for self, and 6) health and physical well-being. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a), 

(b)(1). Functional equivalence exists and a child is entitled to benefits if the ALJ finds a marked 

difficulty in two domains of functioning or an extreme limitation in one. 20 C.F.R. § 

416.926a(a). An ALJ is required to consider the interactive and cumulative effects of a 

claimant’s impairment or multiple impairments, including impairments that are not severe, in any 

affected domain. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(c). 

 The ALJ, here, concluded that C.V. only had a marked difficulty in the domain of health 
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and physical well-being and therefore did not qualify for SSI. Van Ness is convinced, however, 

that C.V. also has marked difficulty in moving about and manipulating objects and that the ALJ 

did not support his conclusions with substantial evidence. In addition, Van Ness contends that 

the ALJ failed to adequately consider the effects of C.V.’s impairments across all domains. The 

Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s functional equivalency determination is supported by 

substantial evidence. The Court is not persuaded. For the reasons set forth below, remand is 

necessary. 

 a. The Domain of Moving About and Manipulating Objects 

 Regarding the domain of moving about and manipulating objects, Van Ness argues that the 

ALJ failed to consider evidence of C.V.’s photosensitivity and his inability to engage in physical 

activities. Van Ness alleges that the ALJ improperly relied solely on C.V.’s expressed 

enjoyment of sports as the basis of finding a less than marked limitation. Doc. No. 21 at 7. 

Addressing this domain, the ALJ’s brief analysis and conclusion is as follows: 

The claimant has less than marked limitation in moving about and manipulating objects. 

At the hearing, the claimant testified that he has trouble running at times because of his 

diminished eyesight. The claimant then stated that he enjoys playing sports and 

videogames that shows an ability to move about and manipulate objects. The claimant 

also indicated that he sees larger objects without any difficulty (Hearing Testimony). In 

the Function Report, the claimant’s mother stated that he walks, runs, throws a ball, and 

uses scissors without any trouble. (Exhibit 1E). Accordingly, the undersigned finds that 

the claimant has less than marked limitations in this domain, as it is consistent with the 

record. 

Doc. No. 13 at 23-24. 

 The domain of moving about and manipulating objects considers how well a child is able 

to move his body from one place to another and how a child moves and manipulates objects. 20 

C.F.R. § 416.926a(j); SSR 09-6p, 2009 WL 396028. These activities may require gross motor 

skills, fine motor skills, or a combination of both. Id. Limitations in this domain can be 
6

associated with musculoskeletal and neurological impairments, other physical impairments, 

medications or treatments, or mental impairments. Id. When making assessments, an ALJ may 

not pick and choose the evidence that favors his final decision. See Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 

307 (7th Cir. 1995). 

 Notably in Murphy v. Astrue, a minor SSI claimant sought benefits based on his ADHD. 

496 F.3d 630, 632 (7th Cir. 2007). Based on the record and the testimony of a consultative 

psychologist, the ALJ found that the claimant had a marked limitation in the domain of 

interacting and relating to others. Id. The psychologist stated that while he believed the claimant 

may have a marked limitation in the domain of attending and completing tasks, ultimately, he 

could not come to a conclusion without review of the current behavioral evaluations from the 

claimant’s school, which were not then available. Id. After obtaining those evaluations, the ALJ 

ruled that the claimant did not have a marked impairment in that domain and, thus, was not 

disabled. Id. at 633. 

 On review in Murphy, the court determined that the ALJ ignored substantial evidence in 

support of a finding of disability when considering the domain of attending and completing 

tasks. Id. at 634. The court noted an ALJ’s duty to fully develop the record before drawing any 

conclusions and his duty to adequately articulate his analysis, so that the court can follow his 

reasoning. Id. The ALJ did not explain why he gave no weight to portions of the school records 

addressing the claimant’s attention, concentration, and work difficulties, which supported a 

finding of disability. Id. The court remanded the case to the SSA and, in so doing, provided: 

The ALJ did little to counter this evidence. He noted only that the school documents 

reflected that [the claimant] did not talk excessively, did not interrupt or intrude, did not 

move about unexpectedly, knew the answers to questions when called upon, was 

cooperative, had a good sense of humor, tried to follow rules, and wanted to do well in 

his studies. These traits may well be accolades for [the claimant], but the ALJ did not 

explain how or why they trump the evidence of his inability to attend and complete tasks. 
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. . [T]he ALJ disregarded evidence of [the claimant]’s disability without identifying any 

support for his conclusion. 

Id. at 634-35. 

 Here, like in Murphy, without explanation, the ALJ disregarded evidence contrary to his 

conclusion that C.V. did not have a marked limitation in the domain of moving about and 

manipulating objects. Central to the ALJ’s determination in this domain was his finding that 

C.V.’s enjoyment of playing sports and videogames “shows an ability to move about and 

manipulate objects.” Doc. No. 13 at 23. (emphasis added). The ALJ’s finding demonstrates a 

fundamental misapprehension of the applicable standards in this domain. 20 C.F.R. § 

416.926a(j)(2)(iv) provides that a school-age child’s “increasing strength and coordination 

should expand [his] ability to enjoy a variety of physical activities, such as running and jumping, 

and throwing, kicking, catching and hitting balls in informal play or organized sports.” 

(emphasis added). Conversely, here, the ALJ seems to have equated C.V.’s professed enjoyment 

of playing sports and videogames with evidence of his increased strength and coordination. 

When considering functional equivalence across the domains, ALJs must: 

look at how appropriately, effectively, and independently you perform your activities 

compared to the performance of other children your age who do not have impairments. . . 

These domains are broad areas of functioning intended to capture all of what a child can 

or cannot do. 

20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)-(b)(1). (emphasis added). It is the claimant’s ability to perform skills 

and activities, rather than his enjoyment thereof, which is determinative. The ALJ then notes 

that “[i]n the Function Report, the claimant’s mother stated that he walks, runs, throws a ball, 

and uses scissors without any trouble.” Doc. No. 13 at 23. (emphasis added). There are a 

number of problems with the ALJ’s statement. 

 First, the Function Report referenced is a form consisting of a series of check boxes for the 
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most part. See Doc. No. 13 at 130-39. Forms comprised of check boxes with minimal 

explanation are generally considered weak evidence. See Larson v. Astrue, 615 F.3d 744, 751 

(7th Cir. 2010); Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1065 (3d Cir. 1993). The form asks if “the 

child’s physical abilities” are “limited,” to which Van Ness checked “YES.” Doc. No. 13 at 135. 

It then provides “[i]f “yes” or “not sure” please tell us what the child does or can do by checking 

“yes” or “no” for each of the following.” Id. The form goes on to provide a list of skills, 

including, but not limited to, “Walk,” “Run,” “Throw a ball,” and “Use scissors,” to which Van 

Ness checked “YES” indicating that C.V. could perform those skills. Id. Checking a form box 

does not provide information about a child’s proficiency in performing any of the listed skills 

and Van Ness did not provide any information regarding C.V.’s proficiency therein. Thus, 

contrary to the ALJ’s assertion, the Function Report is not evidence of Van Ness reporting that 

C.V. could perform the listed skills “without any trouble.” 

 Second, other evidence shows that C.V. indeed does have trouble with the listed skills and 

demonstrates that his strength and coordination is not expanding. On April 23, 2012, just twelve 

days after completing the function report, Van Ness completed the Activities of Daily Living 

documents in which she reveals C.V.’s difficulties with such skills. Van Ness reported that C.V. 

has difficulties including tripping a few times a day, bumping into things, sometimes bumping 

into other children when walking or running, and frequently hitting other people on accident 

when playing ball. Doc. No. 13 at 157, 160. At the hearing, Van Ness also testified that while 

C.V. likes physical education, “he’s not very good at it.” Doc. No. 13 at 58. She also stated that 

when he plays sports in physical education at school, he comes home with injuries because his 

vision causes him to trip over his own feet or other people’s feet. Doc. No. 13 at 60. With 

regard to his videogame play, Van Ness noted that C.V. is only able to play if he sits 
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approximately six inches away from a large TV screen. Doc. No. 13 at 55, 70. The ALJ did not 

address any of this evidence. 

 Third, the ALJ did not address evidence of exemplary activities in assessing conflicting 

evidence about C.V.’s ability to move about and manipulate objects. Based on Social Security 

Ruling 09-6p, ALJs are encouraged to examine certain physical activities in analyzing the 

domain of moving about and manipulating objects. SSR 09-6p describes the following 

exemplary activities: 

All of these physical actions require children to exhibit varying degrees of strength, 

coordination, dexterity, and place to accomplish a given task or activity (for example, 

getting dressed). They also require children to have a sense of where their bodies are in 

relation to the environment and an understanding of how their bodies move in space (for 

example, jumping rope). In addition, gross and fine motor skills require the integration 

of sensory input with motor output (for example, seeing a ball and catching it). Those 

skills also require the capacity for motor planning and motor memory, that is, the ability 

to plan, remember, and execute controlled movement (for example, riding a bicycle). 

(emphasis added). In reaching a decision, the ALJ need not provide a complete written 

evaluation of every piece of testimony or evidence, but he must build a logical bridge from the 

evidence to his conclusion. Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2005). Minimally, 

an ALJ must articulate his analysis of the evidence in order to allow the reviewing court to trace 

the path of his reasoning and to be assured that the ALJ considered the important evidence. Scott 

v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002). 

 In his opinion, the ALJ correctly acknowledges that ALJs are not required to develop 

evidence about the exemplary activities set forth in SSR 09-6p, and they do not necessarily 

describe marked or extreme limitation in the domain. Doc. No. 13 at 23; SSR 09-6p (The 

examples are provided to “assist adjudicators,” however, they “are not all-inclusive, and 

adjudicators are not required to develop evidence about each of them.”). Such examples can, 

however, serve as a frame of reference for determining whether children are functioning 
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typically for their age with respect to the development and use of gross and fine motor skills. 

SSR 09-6p. As noted above, the ALJ did not address the contrary evidence regarding the 

example of C.V.’s ability to play with a ball. Moreover, on the same page of the Function 

Report cited by the ALJ, it is also noted that C.V. cannot perform the exemplary activities of 

jumping rope or riding a bike. Doc. No. 13 at 23, 135. The statement two pages later in the 

report that C.V. cannot button clothes by himself touches on the example of his ability to get 

dressed. Doc. No. 13 at 137. Again, while the ALJ was not required to address each of these 

exemplary activities, closer consideration of the kinds of physical actions that underpin those 

activities is necessary in light of the conflicting evidence. The Court is unable to trace the path 

of the ALJ’s reasoning. And, by failing to acknowledge his consideration or weighing of the 

contrary evidence, the ALJ has failed to build a logical bridge to his conclusion that C.V. has less 

than marked limitation in the domain of moving about and manipulating objects. 

 Here, like in Murphy, evidence of C.V.’s enjoyment of activities cannot trump evidence of 

his inability to perform those activities. Abundant conflicting evidence, which was not analyzed, 

demonstrates that C.V. did indeed have trouble moving about and manipulating objects. The 

ALJ has made improper inferences. For those reasons, remand for further consideration is 

required. 

 b. Effect of Impairments Across All Domains 

 Next, Van Ness makes an argument that the ALJ did not consider the effect of all of 

C.V.’s impairments across each of the domains. The Social Security rulings and regulations 

provide that limitations imposed by an impairment must be considered in any affected domain. 

See SSR 09–lp, 2009 WL 396031 (explaining that the “whole child” approach considers “all of 

the child's impairments singly and in combination – the interactive and cumulative effects of the 
11

impairments – because it starts with a consideration of actual functioning in all settings.”); 20 

C.F.R. § 416.926a(c) (providing for evaluation of “interactive and cumulative effects of an 

impairment or multiple impairments”). The regulations recognize that an impairment “may have 

effects in more than one domain” and that the limitations for an impairment must be evaluated 

“in any affected domain(s).” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(c). 

 In his opinion, the ALJ acknowledged the requirement to consider the interactive and 

cumulative effects of impairments across domains. Doc. No. 13 at 14. And, the ALJ generally 

asserts that he did make such considerations. Doc. No. 13 at 17. However, within the discussion 

of each of the six domains, the ALJ’s analysis seems to alternate between brief generalized 

analysis of singular impairments, without any express mention of impairments, their interaction, 

or their cumulative effects. See Doc. No. 13 at 20-25. Alternating between conditions and 

failing to “clearly identify which impairments were considered leaves [the Court] without means 

to review [the ALJ’s] conclusion.” Brindisi ex rel. Brindisi v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d 783, 787 (7th 

Cir. 2003). The ALJ has not adequately articulated his consideration of C.V.’s impairments 

across all domains. Thus, remand is required for this reason as well. 

 2. The ALJ’s Credibility Assessment 

 Van Ness contends that the ALJ’s credibility assessment was erroneous. An ALJ must 

follow a two-step process, determining first whether there are underlying medically determinable 

physical or mental impairments that could be reasonably expected to produce the claimant’s 

symptoms, and second determining whether the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the 

claimant’s symptoms to determine the extent to which they limit the claimant’s functioning. See 

20 C.F.R. § 416.929; SSR 96-4p, 1996 WL 374187; SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186. Here, the 

ALJ found that C.V.’s medically determined impairments could be reasonably expected to cause 
12

his alleged symptoms, but the ALJ did not find “the statements concerning the intensity, 

persistence, and limiting effects of [those] symptoms [to be] entirely credible.” Doc. 13 at 18. 

 An ALJ’s credibility finding is entitled to great deference and should be upheld unless 

patently wrong. See Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413-14 (7th Cir. 2008); Schmidt v. Astrue, 

496 F.3d 833, 843 (7th Cir. 2007). Reviewing courts examine whether a credibility 

determination was reasoned and supported; only when an ALJ’s decision “lacks any explanation 

or support . . . will [the court] declare it to be ‘patently wrong.’” Elder, 529 F.3d at 413-14 

(internal citations omitted). An ALJ must only give reasons for the weight given to a claimant’s 

statements sufficient to provide a fair sense of how he assessed the claimant’s testimony. See

SSR 96-7p. An ALJ complies with SSR 96-7p, and the Court will affirm his finding, so long as 

he “gives specific reasons that are supported by the record.” Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 

505 (7th Cir. 2004). An ALJ’s credibility finding need not be explicit. Arbogast v. Bowen, 860 

F.2d 1400, 1406 (7th Cir. 1988). He considers the record as a whole and is not required to 

conduct a point-by-point credibility analysis. Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 312 (7th Cir. 

2012). 

 Van Ness argues that the ALJ’s credibility determination is “meaningless boilerplate,” 

which is not supported by specific reasons, and is patently wrong. The Commissioner asserts 

that the ALJ did identify specific reasons for his credibility determination, including several 

purported inconsistencies between objective medical evidence and Van Ness's and C.V.'s 

testimony, and contends that the “boilerplate” argument is unavailing. Of particular note, the 

Commissioner argues that "the ALJ pointed out the inconsistencies between testimony from 

[C.V.] and his mother about . . . his ability to move about and manipulate objects." Doc. No. 26 

at 11. As was analyzed above, at least with respect to the domain of moving about and 
13

manipulating objects, the purported inconsistencies in the testimony are not born out by the 

record. Though, considering the entire record, the Court cannot say that the ALJ’s credibility 

determination is patently wrong. Nevertheless, as the ALJ reexamines the domain of moving 

about and manipulating objects and the effect of C.V.'s impairments across all domains on 

remand, the Court encourages the ALJ to also reexamine and expound upon on his credibility 

analysis. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that (1) the ALJ’s finding of less than 

marked limitation in the domain of moving about and manipulating objects is not supported by 

substantial evidence, and (2) the ALJ has failed to adequately articulate his consideration of the 

effect of C.V.’s impairments across all domains. Therefore, the Court now GRANTS Van 

Ness’s request to remand this case. [Doc. No. 21]. This case is REMANDED to the 

Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

SO ORDERED. 

Dated this 23rd day of March, 2016 

 s/Christopher A. Nuechterlein 

 Christopher A. Nuechterlein 

 United States Magistrate Judge