UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

FORT WAYNE DIVISION 

JODY MORGAN, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Case No. 1:15-cv-90 

 ) 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ) 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 This matter is before the court on petition for judicial review of the decision of the 

Commissioner filed by the plaintiff, Jody Morgan, on April 17, 2015. For the following reasons, 

the decision of the Commissioner is REMANDED. 

Background 

 The plaintiff, Jody Morgan, filed an application for Supplemental Security Income on 

May 15, 2012, alleging a disability onset date of January 1, 2009. (Tr. 15). The Disability 

Determination Bureau denied Morgan’s application on August 14, 2012, and again upon 

reconsideration on September 26, 2012. (Tr. 15). Morgan subsequently filed a timely request 

for a hearing on October 16, 2012. (Tr. 15). A hearing was held on May 3, 2013, before 

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Patricia Melvin, and the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on 

August 15, 2013. (Tr. 15–24). Vocational Expert (VE) Charles H. McBee and Morgan testified 

at the hearing. (Tr. 15). The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the 

final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 5–7). 

 At step one of the five step sequential analysis for determining whether an individual is 

disabled, the ALJ found that Morgan had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 
2 

15, 2012, the application date. (Tr. 17). At step two, the ALJ determined that Morgan had the 

following severe impairments: bulging discs with lumbar radiculopathy, osteoarthritis, and 

chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. (Tr. 17). She also found that Morgan’s carpal tunnel 

syndrome was non-severe because it did not have more than a minimal effect on her ability to 

perform work activities. (Tr. 17). The ALJ indicated that Morgan had a mild limitation in daily 

living activities. (Tr. 18). She noted that Morgan could drive, cross-stitch, read, watch 

television, shop, do her own laundry, change her bed, and mow her lawn with a riding mower. 

(Tr. 18). At step three, the ALJ concluded that Morgan did not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed 

impairments. (Tr. 18). 

 The ALJ then assessed Morgan’s residual functional capacity as follows: 

the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light 

work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except she can stand or walk 

2 hours out of an 8 hour workday; she can never climb ladders, ropes 

and scaffolds; she can occasionally climb ramps and stairs; and she 

must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, extreme heat, 

wetness and humidity; pulmonary irritants such as fumes, odors, and 

gases, chemicals, and poorly ventilated areas. 

(Tr. 19). The ALJ explained that in considering Morgan’s symptoms she followed a two-step 

process. (Tr. 19). First, she determined whether there was an underlying medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment that was shown by a medically acceptable clinical or laboratory 

diagnostic technique that reasonably could be expected to produce Morgan’s pain or other 

symptoms. (Tr. 19). Then, she evaluated the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the 

symptoms to determine the extent to which they limited Morgan’s functioning. (Tr. 19). 

 Morgan testified that she had back pain from a herniated and a bulging disc, hip pain 

from arthritis, pain from carpal tunnel syndrome, and headaches. (Tr. 19). She stated that her 
3 

pain was seven or eight out of ten without medication and three out of ten with medication. (Tr. 

19). She indicated that injections relieved some pain, that she used an inhaler daily for COPD, 

and that her inhaler controlled her COPD, despite smoking one pack of cigarettes daily. (Tr. 19). 

Morgan wore splints for her carpal tunnel syndrome, and her medication stabilized her 

hypertension. (Tr. 19). The ALJ found that Morgan’s impairments could cause her alleged 

symptoms but that Morgan was incredible regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting 

effects of her symptoms. (Tr. 19–20). 

 The ALJ then reviewed Morgan’s objective medical evidence. (Tr. 20–22). She noted 

that Morgan had asthma, which caused shortness of breath, and that she used an inhaler three to 

four times a day. (Tr. 20). The ALJ indicated that Morgan had a moderate obstructive defect, 

but that Morgan underwent a cardiac workup and a stress test, which had normal results. (Tr. 

20). Morgan complained of back pain, but the ALJ stated that examination records showed no 

apparent distress or back tenderness and that Morgan had a normal gait and reflexes. (Tr. 20). 

In March 2011, Morgan went to the emergency room for a panic attack, but a physical 

examination was normal and she was discharged in stable condition. (Tr. 20). 

 Morgan received treatment for lower back pain with Physical Medicine Consultants. (Tr. 

20). She complained of pain ranging from zero to ten out of ten. (Tr. 20). Throughout her 

treatment from 2011 to 2012, Morgan’s pain lessened to one or two out of ten. (Tr. 21). 

Additionally, she did not appear in distress, could transition from sitting to standing 

independently, had a normal and nonantalgic gait, and stated that she was doing “quite well.” 

(Tr. 21). However, Morgan did have some pain to palpation along the midline of her lower back. 

(Tr. 21). 
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 Morgan underwent a consultative examination with Dr. Gautham Gadiraju on November 

15, 2010. (Tr. 21). She complained of lower back and hip pain that radiated into her legs with a 

severity of five or six out of ten. (Tr. 21). Morgan said she had difficulty performing tasks, like 

cleaning the dishes, but said she could dress herself, tie her shoes, and handle buttons. (Tr. 21). 

Dr. Gadiraju found that she had normal joint movement, normal heel and toe walking, normal 

tandem walking, a normal squat, and full range of motion in her cervical neck. (Tr. 21). He also 

noted that her gait was stable, she was not in acute distress, that she could carry twenty pounds 

thirty feet, and lift twenty pounds above her head. (Tr. 21). However, he did indicate that she 

had some tenderness to palpation in her upper back and lumbar spine. (Tr. 21). He 

recommended that she complete physical therapy and pain management. (Tr. 21). 

 Morgan also received treatment for lower back and hip pain at Fort Wayne Orthopedics 

throughout 2011. (Tr. 21). The ALJ noted that her physical examination was unremarkable and 

showed 5/5 strength in her legs. (Tr. 21). Internal and external rotation of Morgan’s hip did not 

cause pain or discomfort, but she had some lumbar spine tenderness. (Tr. 21). A lumbar MRI 

was unremarkable, except for some paracentral disc herniation at 5-1, and an EMG showed 

subtle S1 radiculopathy. (Tr. 21). 

 On August 6, 2012, Dr. H. M. Bacchus performed a consultative examination, where 

Morgan complained of carpal tunnel syndrome, migraines, depression, anxiety, hypertension, 

bulging discs, osteoarthritis, and COPD. (Tr. 22). Morgan stated that she was diagnosed with 

osteoarthritis in her hips and back and that she was putting off back surgery. (Tr. 22). Dr. 

Bacchus indicated that Morgan completed her daily living activities independently, that she was 

alert and oriented, that she was not in acute distress, and that she could move on and off the 

examination table. (Tr. 22). However, he noted that she had some hip numbness with a positive 
5 

Tinel’s sign, had minor deficits in her range of motion, and had some right leg numbness. (Tr. 

22). Morgan’s gait and station were normal, she could walk on her heels, tandem walk, hop, and 

squat, and her muscle strength was 5/5. (Tr. 22). Dr. Bacchus concluded that she could work 

full time while sitting six to eight hours a day and standing up to two hours a day in a climatecontrolled environment to prevent COPD symptoms. (Tr. 22). 

 A July 13, 2012 lumbar spine MRI was stable with mild disc and vertebral degenerative 

changes at multiple levels. (Tr. 22). A November 20, 2012 view of Morgan’s left hip was 

normal and showed no arthritic changes. (Tr. 22). December 2012 treatment notes from 

Physical Medicine Consultants indicated that Morgan had a stable, nonantalgic gait and that she 

could transition from sitting to standing without difficulty. (Tr. 22). Additionally, records from 

February 2013 noted that injections improved her pain by 70 to 80% and that she had no 

tenderness in her lower back. (Tr. 22). 

 The state agency opinions found that Morgan could perform medium work, but the ALJ 

limited her to light work considering her subjective complaints. (Tr. 22). The ALJ gave Dr. 

Bacchus’s opinion significant weight because it was consistent with the objective medical 

evidence. (Tr. 22). The ALJ also noted Morgan’s daily living activities and that she could 

concentrate and follow instructions. (Tr. 22). The ALJ concluded that the objective medical 

evidence supported her RFC assessment because the x-rays and MRI’s showed mild 

degenerative changes and the treatment records noted a normal gait, an ability to transition from 

sitting to standing, and no apparent distress. (Tr. 22). Additionally, the ALJ stated that 

Morgan’s inhalers controlled her COPD, which had not caused any serious breathing problems 

previously. (Tr. 22). 
6 

 At step four, the ALJ found that Morgan had no past relevant work. (Tr. 23). 

Considering Morgan’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ concluded that there 

were jobs in the national economy that she could perform, including production assembler (1,000 

jobs locally and 90,000 jobs nationally), small product assembler (1,000 jobs locally and 50,000 

jobs nationally), and hand packages inspector (500 jobs locally and 50,000 jobs nationally). (Tr. 

23–24). 

Discussion 

 The standard for judicial review of an ALJ’s finding that a claimant is not disabled within 

the meaning of the Social Security Act is limited to a determination of whether those findings are 

supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of 

Social Security, as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.”); 

Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1120–21 (7th Cir. 2014); Bates v. Colvin, 736 F.3d 1093, 1097 

(7th Cir. 2013) (“We will uphold the Commissioner’s final decision if the ALJ applied the 

correct legal standards and supported her decision with substantial evidence.”); Pepper v. Colvin, 

712 F.3d 351, 361–62 (7th Cir. 2013); Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2005); 

Lopez ex rel Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003). Substantial evidence has 

been defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support such a 

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L. Ed. 2d 852 

(1972) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 217, 83 L. Ed. 

2d 140 (1938)). An ALJ’s decision must be affirmed if the findings are supported by substantial 

evidence and if there have been no errors of law. Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 

2013). However, “the decision cannot stand if it lacks evidentiary support or an adequate 

discussion of the issues.” Lopez, 336 F.3d at 539. 
7 

 Supplemental insurance benefits are available only to those individuals who can establish 

“disability” under the terms of the Social Security Act. The claimant must show that she is 

unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or 

can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security regulations enumerate the five-step sequential evaluation to 

be followed when determining whether a claimant has met the burden of establishing disability. 

20 C.F.R. § 416.920. The ALJ first considers whether the claimant is presently employed or 

“engaged in substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). If she is, the claimant is not 

disabled and the evaluation process is over. If she is not, the ALJ next addresses whether the 

claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments that “significantly 

limits . . . physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c); see 

Williams v. Colvin, 757 F.3d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 2014) (discussing that the ALJ must consider the 

combined effects of the claimant’s impairments). Third, the ALJ determines whether that severe 

impairment meets any of the impairments listed in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 401, pt. 404, 

subpt. P, app. 1. If it does, then the impairment is acknowledged by the Commissioner to be 

conclusively disabling. However, if the impairment does not so limit the claimant’s remaining 

capabilities, the ALJ reviews the claimant’s “residual functional capacity” and the physical and 

mental demands of her past work. If, at this fourth step, the claimant can perform her past 

relevant work, she will be found not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). However, if the claimant 

shows that her impairment is so severe that she is unable to engage in her past relevant work, 

then the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to establish that the claimant, in light of her 

age, education, job experience, and functional capacity to work, is capable of performing other 
8 

work and that such work exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2); 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.920(f). 

 First, Morgan has argued that the ALJ’s credibility finding was patently wrong. This 

court will sustain the ALJ’s credibility determination unless it is “patently wrong” and not 

supported by the record. Bates v. Colvin, 736 F.3d 1093, 1098 (7th Cir. 2013); Prochaska v. 

Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Only if the trier of fact grounds his credibility 

finding in an observation or argument that is unreasonable or unsupported . . . can the finding be 

reversed.”). The ALJ’s “unique position to observe a witness” entitles her opinion to great 

deference. Nelson v. Apfel, 131 F.3d 1228, 1237 (7th Cir. 1997); Allord v. Barnhart, 455 F.3d 

818, 821 (7th Cir. 2006). However, if the ALJ does not make explicit findings and does not 

explain them “in a way that affords meaningful review,” the ALJ’s credibility determination is 

not entitled to deference. Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 2002). Further, “when 

such determinations rest on objective factors or fundamental implausibilities rather than 

subjective considerations [such as a claimant’s demeanor], appellate courts have greater freedom 

to review the ALJ’s decision.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000). 

 The ALJ must determine a claimant’s credibility only after considering all of the 

claimant’s “symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which [the claimant’s] symptoms can 

reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.” 

20 C.F.R. ' 404.1529(a); Arnold v. Barnhart, 473 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[S]ubjective 

complaints need not be accepted insofar as they clash with other, objective medical evidence in 

the record.”). If the claimant’s impairments reasonably could produce the symptoms of which 

the claimant is complaining, the ALJ must evaluate the intensity and persistence of the 

claimant’s symptoms through consideration of the claimant’s “medical history, the medical signs 
9 

and laboratory findings, and statements from [the claimant, the claimant’s] treating or examining 

physician or psychologist, or other persons about how [the claimant’s] symptoms affect [the 

claimant].” 20 C.F.R. ' 404.1529(c); see Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 746–47 (7th Cir. 

2005) (“These regulations and cases, taken together, require an ALJ to articulate specific reasons 

for discounting a claimant’s testimony as being less than credible, and preclude an ALJ from 

merely ignoring the testimony or relying solely on a conflict between the objective medical 

evidence and the claimant’s testimony as a basis for a negative credibility finding.”). 

 Although a claimant’s complaints of pain cannot be totally unsupported by the medical 

evidence, the ALJ may not make a credibility determination “solely on the basis of objective 

medical evidence.” SSR 96-7p, at *1; see Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1125 (7th Cir. 2014) 

(“‘[T]he ALJ cannot reject a claimant’s testimony about limitations on her daily activities solely 

by stating that such testimony is unsupported by the medical evidence.’”) (quoting Indoranto, 

374 F.3d at 474); Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751, 754 (7th Cir. 2004) (“If pain is 

disabling, the fact that its source is purely psychological does not disentitle the applicant to 

benefits.”). Rather, if the 

[c]laimant indicates that pain is a significant factor of his or her 

alleged inability to work, the ALJ must obtain detailed descriptions 

of the claimant’s daily activities by directing specific inquiries about 

the pain and its effects to the claimant. She must investigate all 

avenues presented that relate to pain, including claimant’s prior 

work record, information and observations by treating physicians, 

examining physicians, and third parties. Factors that must be 

considered include the nature and intensity of the claimant’s pain, 

precipitation and aggravating factors, dosage and effectiveness of 

any pain medications, other treatment for relief of pain, functional 

restrictions, and the claimant’s daily activities. (internal citations 

omitted). 

Luna v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 1994); see Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 

887-88 (7th Cir. 2001). 
10 

 In addition, when the ALJ discounts the claimant’s description of pain because it is 

inconsistent with the objective medical evidence, she must make more than “a single, conclusory 

statement . . . . The determination or decision must contain specific reasons for the finding on 

credibility, supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to 

make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to 

the individual’s statements and the reasons for that weight.” SSR 96-7p, at *2; see Minnick v. 

Colvin, 775 F.3d 929, 937 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[A] failure to adequately explain his or her 

credibility finding by discussing specific reasons supported by the record is grounds for 

reversal.”) (citations omitted); Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 307-08 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that 

the ALJ must articulate, at some minimum level, his analysis of the evidence). She must “build 

an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to her conclusion.” Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 887 

(quoting Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000)). A minor discrepancy, coupled 

with the ALJ’s observations is sufficient to support a finding that the claimant was incredible. 

Bates, 736 F.3d at 1098. However, this must be weighed against the ALJ’s duty to build the 

record and not to ignore a line of evidence that suggests a disability. Bates, 736 F.3d at 1099. 

 Morgan has argued that the ALJ failed to identify any support for her credibility finding. 

She noted that the ALJ indicated that the objective medical evidence supported the RFC, but that 

the ALJ did not explain how it supported her credibility finding. The Commissioner has 

identified instances where the ALJ noted inconsistencies between Morgan’s subjective 

complaints and the objective medical evidence. For example, the ALJ indicated that testing 

showed mild degenerative changes and that Morgan had a normal gait and full muscle strength, 

despite Morgan’s complaints of disabling back pain. The Commissioner also has claimed that 

the ALJ relied on Morgan’s inconsistent statements regarding her daily living activities. She 
11 

indicated that Morgan told Dr. Gadiraju that she had trouble doing dishes and preparing meals 

but that she told the agency that she drove, shopped, cooked, cleaned, mowed the lawn with a 

riding mower, and could concentrate and follow instructions. 

 The ALJ failed to build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to her 

credibility finding. The ALJ did identify inconsistencies between the objective medical evidence 

and Morgan’s subjective complaints, but she could not reject Morgan’s complaints based solely 

on the objective medical evidence. See Moore, 743 F.3d at 1125. Although the Commissioner 

has argued that the ALJ relied on Morgan’s inconsistent statements regarding her daily living 

activities, the ALJ did not indicate that Morgan’s statements were inconsistent or explain how 

they were inconsistent. However, even if the ALJ had relied on those statements, it is unclear 

why Morgan’s 2010 statement that she had difficulty doing dishes and preparing meals was 

inconsistent with her statement, two years later, that she could drive, shop, cook, clean, mow 

with a riding mower, concentrate, and follow instructions. Furthermore, Morgan’s 2012 

statement also indicated that she could not cook big meals and that she needed her children to 

help with cleaning and household chores. (Tr. 242). Therefore, any inconsistency was minor 

and without any explanation by the ALJ, it does not provide a sound basis for the ALJ’s 

credibility finding. See Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 838 (7th Cir. 2014). 

 The Commissioner also has claimed that the ALJ relied on Morgan’s treatment to find 

her incredible. Again, the ALJ did not indicate or explain how Morgan’s treatment rendered her 

incredible. The ALJ did mention that Morgan had put off surgery, but she did not inquire into 

Morgan’s reasoning. See Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 679 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he ALJ ‘must 

not draw any inferences’ about a claimant’s condition from this failure unless the ALJ has 

explored the claimant’s explanations as to the lack of medical care.”) (quoting SSR 96-7p). 
12 

Because the ALJ did not explore Morgan’s reasons for declining surgery, she could not rely on 

that to find Morgan incredible. Here, the ALJ did not provide a valid reason for finding Morgan 

incredible, except for the objective medical evidence. Therefore, the ALJ’s credibility finding 

was patently wrong. She should provide more support for her finding on remand. 

 Second, Morgan has argued that the ALJ’s RFC assessment was incomplete because she 

did not account for her carpal tunnel syndrome. SSR 96-8p explains how an ALJ should assess a 

claimant’s RFC at steps four and five of the sequential evaluation. In a section entitled, 

“Narrative Discussion Requirements,” SSR 96-8p specifically spells out what is needed in the 

ALJ’s RFC analysis. This section of the Ruling provides: 

The RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion describing 

how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical 

facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily 

activities, observations). In assessing RFC, the adjudicator must 

discuss the individual’s ability to perform sustained work activities 

in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis (i.e., 8 

hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule), and 

describe the maximum amount of each work-related activity the 

individual can perform based on the evidence available in the case 

record. The adjudicator must also explain how any material 

inconsistencies or ambiguities in the evidence in the case record 

were considered and resolved. 

SSR 96-8p (footnote omitted). Thus, as explained in this section of the Ruling, there is a 

difference between what the ALJ must contemplate and what she must articulate in her written 

decision. “The ALJ is not required to address every piece of evidence or testimony presented, 

but he must provide a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and his conclusions.” Getch v. 

Astrue, 539 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 

2000)); see Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1123 (7th Cir. 2014). Although the ALJ does not 

need to discuss every piece of evidence, she cannot ignore evidence that undermines her ultimate 

conclusions. Moore, 743 F.3d at 1123 (“The ALJ must confront the evidence that does not 
13 

support her conclusion and explain why that evidence was rejected.”) (citations omitted). “A 

decision that lacks adequate discussion of the issues will be remanded.” Moore, 743 F.3d at 

1121. 

 Morgan has argued that the ALJ’s RFC assessment was incomplete because it did not 

acknowledge or account for any limitations from her carpal tunnel syndrome. She indicated that 

the ALJ found that it was a non-severe medically determinable impairment, but that she did not 

provide any explanation for that finding. Morgan has alleged that her carpal tunnel syndrome 

limited her ability to use her hands for more than one hour and that that limitation would 

preclude the jobs listed by the VE. The Commissioner has argued that the medical evidence did 

not support any work-related limitations due to carpal tunnel syndrome. Therefore, she has 

claimed that the ALJ did not need to discuss Morgan’s carpal tunnel syndrome within her RFC 

assessment. 

 The ALJ found that Morgan’s carpal tunnel syndrome was a non-severe impairment. (Tr. 

17). However, she did not discuss the impairment any further. It is not clear why the ALJ did 

not include any restrictions based on Morgan’s carpal tunnel syndrome or why the syndrome 

would not preclude Morgan from using her hands for a prolonged period. Because this matter is 

being remanded on a separate issue, the ALJ should consider whether Morgan’s carpal tunnel 

syndrome would preclude prolonged use of her hands on remand. 

 Based on the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner is REMANDED for 

further proceedings consistent with this Order. 

 ENTERED this 4th day of April, 2016. 

 /s/ Andrew P. Rodovich 

 United States Magistrate Judge