Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 117 / Tuesday, June 22, 2021 / Rules and Regulations 32637 

1The Court recognized that the parties in Bostock 

each presented a definition of ‘‘sex’’ dating back to 

Title VII’s enactment, with the employers’ 

definition referring to ‘‘reproductive biology’’ and 

the employees’ definition ‘‘capturing more than 

anatomy[.]’’ 140 S. Ct. at 1739. The Court did not 

adopt a definition, instead ‘‘assum[ing]’’ the 

definition of sex provided by the employers that the 

employees had accepted ‘‘for argument’s sake.’’ Id. 

As the Court made clear, it did not need to adopt 

Continued 

requirements, Security measures, 

Waterways. 

For the reasons discussed in the 

preamble, the Coast Guard amends 33 

CFR part 165 as follows: 

PART 165—REGULATED NAVIGATION 

AREAS AND LIMITED ACCESS AREAS 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 165 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 46 U.S.C. 70034, 70051; 33 CFR 

1.05–1, 6.04–1, 6.04–6, and 160.5; 

Department of Homeland Security Delegation 

No. 0170.1. 

■ 2. Add § 165.T11–057 to read as 

follows: 

§ 165.T11–057 Safety Zone; Southwest 

Shelter Island Channel Entrance Closure, 

San Diego, CA. 

(a) Location. The following area is a 

safety zone: The Northeast Shelter 

Island Channel Entrance and all 

navigable waters of San Diego Bay 

encompassed by by a three hundred 

yard circle centered on the coordinate 

32°43′13.7′′ N, longitude 117°13′7.8′′ W. 

(b) Definitions. As used in this 

section, designated representative 

means a Coast Guard Patrol 

Commander, including a Coast Guard 

coxswain, petty officer, or other officer 

operating a Coast Guard vessel and a 

Federal, State, and local officer 

designated by or assisting the Captain of 

the Port Sector San Diego (COTP) in the 

enforcement of the safety zone. 

(c) Regulations. (1) Under the general 

safety zone regulations in subpart C of 

this part, you may not enter the safety 

zone described in paragraph (a) of this 

section unless authorized by the COTP 

or the COTP’s designated representative. 

(2) To seek permission to enter, 

contact the COTP or the COTP’s 

representative by VHF Channel 16. 

Those in the safety zone must comply 

with all lawful orders or directions 

given to them by the COTP or the 

COTP’s designated representative. 

(d) Enforcement period. This section 

will be enforced from 8:30 a.m. until 

10:30 a.m. on June 22, 2021. 

Dated: June 16, 2021. 

T.J. Barelli, 

Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Captain of the 

Port Sector San Diego. 

[FR Doc. 2021–13136 Filed 6–21–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 9110–04–P 

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 

34 CFR Chapter I 

Enforcement of Title IX of the 

Education Amendments of 1972 With 

Respect to Discrimination Based on 

Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 

in Light of Bostock v. Clayton County 

AGENCY: Office for Civil Rights, 

Department of Education. 

ACTION: Interpretation. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of 

Education (Department) issues this 

interpretation to clarify the 

Department’s enforcement authority 

over discrimination based on sexual 

orientation and discrimination based on 

gender identity under Title IX of the 

Education Amendments of 1972 in light 

of the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Bostock v. Clayton County. This 

interpretation will guide the Department 

in processing complaints and 

conducting investigations, but it does 

not itself determine the outcome in any 

particular case or set of facts. 

DATES: This interpretation is effective 

June 22, 2021. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Alejandro Reyes, Director, Program 

Legal Group, Office for Civil Rights. 

Telephone: (202) 245–7272. Email: 

Alejandro.Reyes@ed.gov. 

If you use a telecommunications 

device for the deaf (TDD) or a text 

telephone (TTY), call the Federal Relay 

Service (FRS), toll-free, at 1–800–877– 

8339. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background: Title IX of the Education 

Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681– 

1688, prohibits discrimination on the 

basis of sex in any education program or 

activity offered by a recipient of Federal 

financial assistance. The Department’s 

Office for Civil Rights (OCR) is 

responsible for the Department’s 

enforcement of Title IX. 

OCR has long recognized that Title IX 

protects all students, including students 

who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 

transgender, from harassment and other 

forms of sex discrimination. OCR also 

has long recognized that Title IX 

prohibits harassment and other forms of 

discrimination against all students for 

not conforming to stereotypical notions 

of masculinity and femininity. But OCR 

at times has stated that Title IX’s 

prohibition on sex discrimination does 

not encompass discrimination based on 

sexual orientation and gender identity. 

To ensure clarity, the Department issues 

this Interpretation addressing Title IX’s 

coverage of discrimination based on 

sexual orientation and gender identity 

in light of the Supreme Court decision 

discussed below. 

In 2020, the Supreme Court in 

Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 

1731, 590 U.S. ll (2020), concluded 

that discrimination based on sexual 

orientation and discrimination based on 

gender identity inherently involve 

treating individuals differently because 

of their sex. It reached this conclusion 

in the context of Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 

U.S.C. 2000e et seq., which prohibits 

sex discrimination in employment. As 

noted below, courts rely on 

interpretations of Title VII to inform 

interpretations of Title IX. 

The Department issues this 

Interpretation to make clear that the 

Department interprets Title IX’s 

prohibition on sex discrimination to 

encompass discrimination based on 

sexual orientation and gender identity 

and to provide the reasons for this 

interpretation, as set out below. 

Interpretation: 

Title IX Prohibits Discrimination 

Based on Sexual Orientation and 

Gender Identity. 

Consistent with the Supreme Court’s 

ruling and analysis in Bostock, the 

Department interprets Title IX’s 

prohibition on discrimination ‘‘on the 

basis of sex’’ to encompass 

discrimination on the basis of sexual 

orientation and gender identity. As was 

the case for the Court’s Title VII analysis 

in Bostock, this interpretation flows 

from the statute’s ‘‘plain terms.’’ See 

Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1743, 1748–50. 

Addressing discrimination based on 

sexual orientation and gender identity 

thus fits squarely within OCR’s 

responsibility to enforce Title IX’s 

prohibition on sex discrimination. 

I. The Supreme Court’s Ruling in 

Bostock 

The Supreme Court in Bostock held 

that sex discrimination, as prohibited by 

Title VII, encompasses discrimination 

based on sexual orientation and gender 

identity. The Court explained that to 

discriminate on the basis of sexual 

orientation or gender identity ‘‘requires 

an employer to intentionally treat 

individual employees differently 

because of their sex.’’ 140 S. Ct. at 

1742.1 As the Court also explained, 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with RULES1
32638 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 117 / Tuesday, June 22, 2021 / Rules and Regulations 

either definition to conclude that discrimination 

‘‘because of . . . sex’’ encompasses discrimination 

based on sexual orientation and gender identity. Id. 

(‘‘[N]othing in our approach to these cases turns on 

the outcome of the parties’ debate . . . .’’). Similar 

to the Court’s interpretation of Title VII, the 

Department’s interpretation of the scope of 

discrimination ‘‘on the basis of sex’’ under Title IX 

does not require the Department to take a position 

on the definition of sex, nor do we do so here. 

when an employer discriminates against 

a person for being gay or transgender, 

the employer necessarily discriminates 

against that person for ‘‘traits or actions 

it would not have questioned in 

members of a different sex.’’ Id. at 1737. 

The Court provided numerous 

examples to illustrate why ‘‘it is 

impossible to discriminate against a 

person’’ because of their sexual 

orientation or gender identity ‘‘without 

discriminating against that individual 

based on sex.’’ Id. at 1741. In one 

example, when addressing 

discrimination based on sexual 

orientation, the Court stated: 

Consider, for example, an employer with 

two employees, both of whom are attracted 

to men. The two individuals are, to the 

employer’s mind, materially identical in all 

respects, except that one is a man and the 

other a woman. If the employer fires the male 

employee for no reason other than the fact he 

is attracted to men, the employer 

discriminates against him for traits or actions 

it tolerates in his female colleague. Put 

differently, the employer intentionally 

singles out an employee to fire based in part 

on the employee’s sex, and the affected 

employee’s sex is a but-for cause of his 

discharge. 

Id. 

In another example, the Court showed 

why singling out a transgender 

employee for different treatment from a 

non-transgender (i.e., cisgender) 

employee is discrimination based on 

sex: 

[T]ake an employer who fires a transgender 

person who was identified as a male at birth 

but who now identifies as a female. If the 

employer retains an otherwise identical 

employee who was identified as female at 

birth, the employer intentionally penalizes a 

person identified as male at birth for traits or 

actions that it tolerates in an employee 

identified as female at birth. Again, the 

individual employee’s sex plays an 

unmistakable and impermissible role in the 

discharge decision. 

Id. at 1741–42. 

II. Bostock’s Application to Title IX 

For the reasons set out below, the 

Department has determined that the 

interpretation of sex discrimination set 

out by the Supreme Court in Bostock— 

that discrimination ‘‘because of . . . 

sex’’ encompasses discrimination based 

on sexual orientation and gender 

identity—properly guides the 

Department’s interpretation of 

discrimination ‘‘on the basis of sex’’ 

under Title IX and leads to the 

conclusion that Title IX prohibits 

discrimination based on sexual 

orientation and gender identity. 

a. There is textual similarity between 

Title VII and Title IX. 

Like Title VII, Title IX prohibits 

discrimination based on sex. 

Title IX provides, with certain 

exceptions: ‘‘No person in the United 

States shall, on the basis of sex, be 

excluded from participation in, be 

denied the benefits of, or be subjected 

to discrimination under any education 

program or activity receiving Federal 

financial assistance . . . .’’ 20 U.S.C. 

1681(a). 

Title VII provides, with certain 

exceptions: ‘‘It shall be an unlawful 

employment practice for an employer 

(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to 

discharge any individual, or otherwise 

to discriminate against any individual 

with respect to his compensation, terms, 

conditions, or privileges of employment, 

because of such individual’s . . . sex[ ] 

. . .; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify 

his employees or applicants for 

employment in any way which would 

deprive or tend to deprive any 

individual of employment opportunities 

or otherwise adversely affect his status 

as an employee, because of such 

individual’s . . . sex[ ] . . . .’’ 42 U.S.C. 

2000e–2(a). (Title VII also prohibits 

discrimination based on race, color, 

religion, and national origin.) 

Both statutes prohibit sex 

discrimination, with Title IX using the 

phrase ‘‘on the basis of sex’’ and Title 

VII using the phrase ‘‘because of’’ sex. 

The Supreme Court has used these two 

phrases interchangeably. In Bostock, for 

example, the Court described Title VII 

in this way: ‘‘[I]n Title VII, Congress 

outlawed discrimination in the 

workplace on the basis of race, color, 

religion, sex, or national origin.’’ 140 S. 

Ct. at 1737 (emphasis added); id. at 1742 

(‘‘[I]ntentional discrimination based on 

sex violates Title VII . . . .’’ (emphasis 

added)); see also Jackson v. Birmingham 

Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 174 (2005) 

(‘‘[W]hen a funding recipient retaliates 

against a person because he complains 

of sex discrimination, this constitutes 

intentional ‘discrimination’ ‘on the 

basis of sex,’ in violation of Title IX.’’ 

(second emphasis added)); Meritor Sav. 

Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) 

(‘‘[W]hen a supervisor sexually harasses 

a subordinate because of the 

subordinate’s sex, that supervisor 

‘discriminate[s]’ on the basis of sex.’’ 

(emphasis added)). 

In addition, both statutes specifically 

protect individuals against 

discrimination. In Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 

1740–41, the Court observed that Title 

VII ‘‘tells us three times—including 

immediately after the words 

‘discriminate against’—that our focus 

should be on individuals.’’ The Court 

made a similar observation about Title 

IX, which uses the term person, in 

Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 

U.S. 677, 704 (1979), stating that 

‘‘Congress wanted to avoid the use of 

federal resources to support 

discriminatory practices [and] to 

provide individual citizens effective 

protection against those practices.’’ Id. 

(emphasis added). 

Further, the text of both statutes 

contains no exception for sex 

discrimination that is associated with an 

individual’s sexual orientation or 

gender identity. As the Court stated in 

Bostock, ‘‘when Congress chooses not to 

include any exceptions to a broad rule, 

courts apply the broad rule.’’ 140 S. Ct. 

at 1747. The Court has made a similar 

point regarding Title IX: ‘‘[I]f we are to 

give Title IX the scope that its origins 

dictate, we must accord it a sweep as 

broad as its language.’’ N. Haven Bd. of 

Ed. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) 

(citations and internal alterations 

omitted). It also bears noting that, in 

interpreting the scope of Title IX’s 

prohibition on sex discrimination the 

Supreme Court and lower Federal courts 

have often relied on the Supreme 

Court’s interpretations of Title VII. See, 

e.g., Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. 

Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992); Jennings v. 

Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 695 (4th 

Cir. 2007); Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. 

Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 66 (1st Cir. 2002); 

Gossett v. Oklahoma ex rel. Bd. of 

Regents for Langston Univ., 245 F.3d 

1172, 1176 (10th Cir. 2001). 

Moreover, the Court in Bostock found 

that ‘‘no ambiguity exists about how 

Title VII’s terms apply to the facts before 

[it]’’—i.e., allegations of discrimination 

in employment against several 

individuals based on sexual orientation 

or gender identity. 140 S. Ct. at 1749. 

After reviewing the text of Title IX and 

Federal courts’ interpretation of Title IX, 

the Department has concluded that the 

same clarity exists for Title IX. That is, 

Title IX prohibits recipients of Federal 

financial assistance from discriminating 

based on sexual orientation and gender 

identity in their education programs and 

activities. The Department also has 

concluded for the reasons described in 

this document that, to the extent other 

interpretations may exist, this is the best 

interpretation of the statute. 

In short, the Department finds no 

persuasive or well-founded basis for 

declining to apply Bostock’s 

reasoning—discrimination ‘‘because of 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with RULES1
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 117 / Tuesday, June 22, 2021 / Rules and Regulations 32639 

2Educational institutions that are controlled by a 

religious organization are exempt from Title IX to 

the extent that compliance would not be consistent 

with the organization’s religious tenets. See 20 

U.S.C. 1681(a)(3). 

. . . sex’’ under Title VII encompasses 

discrimination based on sexual 

orientation and gender identity—to Title 

IX’s parallel prohibition on sex 

discrimination in federally funded 

education programs and activities. 

b. Additional case law recognizes that 

the reasoning of Bostock applies to Title 

IX and that differential treatment of 

students based on gender identity or 

sexual orientation may cause harm. 

Numerous Federal courts have relied 

on Bostock to recognize that Title IX’s 

prohibition on sex discrimination 

encompasses discrimination based on 

sexual orientation and gender identity. 

See, e.g., Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. 

Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 616 (4th Cir. 

2020), as amended (Aug. 28, 2020), 

reh’g en banc denied, 976 F.3d 399 (4th 

Cir. 2020), petition for cert filed, No. 20– 

1163 (Feb. 24, 2021); Adams v. Sch. Bd. 

of St. Johns Cnty., 968 F.3d 1286, 1305 

(11th Cir. 2020), petition for reh’g en 

banc pending, No. 18–13592 (Aug. 28, 

2020); Koenke v. Saint Joseph’s Univ., 

No. CV 19–4731, 2021 WL 75778, at *2 

(E.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2021); Doe v. Univ. of 

Scranton, No. 3:19–CV–01486, 2020 WL 

5993766, at *11 n.61 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 

2020). 

The Department also concludes that 

the interpretation set forth in this 

document is most consistent with the 

purpose of Title IX, which is to ensure 

equal opportunity and to protect 

individuals from the harms of sex 

discrimination. As numerous courts 

have recognized, a school’s policy or 

actions that treat gay, lesbian, or 

transgender students differently from 

other students may cause harm. See, 

e.g., Grimm, 972 F.3d at 617–18 

(describing injuries to a transgender 

boy’s physical and emotional health as 

a result of denial of equal treatment); 

Adams, 968 F.3d at 1306–07 (describing 

‘‘emotional damage, stigmatization and 

shame’’ experienced by a transgender 

boy as a result of being subjected to 

differential treatment); Whitaker ex rel. 

Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. 

No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 

1044–46, 1049–50 (7th Cir. 2017) 

(describing physical and emotional 

harm to a transgender boy who was 

denied equal treatment); Dodds v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Educ., 845 F.3d 217, 221–22 

(6th Cir. 2016) (describing ‘‘substantial 

and immediate adverse effects on the 

daily life and well-being of an elevenyear-old’’ transgender girl from denial of 

equal treatment); Doe, 2020 WL 

5993766, at **1–3 (describing 

harassment and physical targeting of a 

gay college student that interfered with 

the student’s educational opportunity); 

Harrington ex rel. Harrington v. City of 

Attleboro, No. 15–CV–12769–DJC, 2018 

WL 475000, at **6–7 (D. Mass. Jan. 17, 

2018) (describing ‘‘ ‘wide-spread peer 

harassment’ and physical assault [of a 

lesbian high school student] because of 

stereotyping animus focused on [the 

student’s] sex, appearance, and 

perceived or actual sexual orientation’’). 

c. The U.S. Department of Justice’s 

Civil Rights Division has concluded that 

Bostock’s analysis applies to Title IX. 

The U.S. Department of Justice’s Civil 

Rights Division issued a Memorandum 

from Principal Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General for Civil Rights 

Pamela S. Karlan to Federal Agency 

Civil Rights Directors and General 

Counsels regarding Application of 

Bostock v. Clayton County to Title IX of 

the Education Amendments of 1972 

(Mar. 26, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/ 

crt/page/file/1383026/download. 

The memorandum stated that, after 

careful consideration, including a 

review of case law, ‘‘the Division has 

determined that the best reading of Title 

IX’s prohibition on discrimination ‘on 

the basis of sex’ is that it includes 

discrimination on the basis of gender 

identity and sexual orientation.’’ 

Indeed, ‘‘the Division ultimately found 

nothing persuasive in the statutory text, 

legislative history, or caselaw to justify 

a departure from Bostock’s textual 

analysis and the Supreme Court’s 

longstanding directive to interpret Title 

IX’s text broadly.’’ 

III. Implementing This Interpretation 

Consistent with the analysis above, 

OCR will fully enforce Title IX to 

prohibit discrimination based on sexual 

orientation and gender identity in 

education programs and activities that 

receive Federal financial assistance from 

the Department. As with all other Title 

IX complaints that OCR receives, any 

complaint alleging discrimination based 

on sexual orientation or gender identity 

also must meet jurisdictional 

requirements as defined in Title IX and 

the Department’s Title IX regulations, 

other applicable legal requirements, as 

well as the standards set forth in OCR’s 

Case Processing Manual, www.ed.gov/ 

ocr/docs/ocrcpm.pdf.2

Where a complaint meets applicable 

requirements and standards as just 

described, OCR will open an 

investigation of allegations that an 

individual has been discriminated 

against because of their sexual 

orientation or gender identity in 

education programs or activities. This 

includes allegations of individuals being 

harassed, disciplined in a 

discriminatory manner, excluded from, 

denied equal access to, or subjected to 

sex stereotyping in academic or 

extracurricular opportunities and other 

education programs or activities, denied 

the benefits of such programs or 

activities, or otherwise treated 

differently because of their sexual 

orientation or gender identity. OCR 

carefully reviews allegations from 

anyone who files a complaint, including 

students who identify as male, female or 

nonbinary; transgender or cisgender; 

intersex; lesbian, gay, bisexual, queer, 

heterosexual, or in other ways. 

While this interpretation will guide 

the Department in processing 

complaints and conducting 

investigations, it does not determine the 

outcome in any particular case or set of 

facts. Where OCR’s investigation reveals 

that one or more individuals has been 

discriminated against because of their 

sexual orientation or gender identity, 

the resolution of such a complaint will 

address the specific compliance 

concerns or violations identified in the 

course of the investigation. 

This interpretation supersedes and 

replaces any prior inconsistent 

statements made by the Department 

regarding the scope of Title IX’s 

jurisdiction over discrimination based 

on sexual orientation and gender 

identity. This interpretation does not 

reinstate any previously rescinded 

guidance documents. 

Accessible Format: On request to the 

contact person listed under FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT, individuals with 

disabilities can obtain this document in 

an accessible format. The Department 

will provide the requestor with an 

accessible format that may include Rich 

Text Format (RTF) or text format (txt), 

a thumb drive, an MP3 file, braille, large 

print, audiotape, or compact disc, or 

other accessible format. 

Electronic Access to This Document: 

The official version of this document is 

the document published in the Federal 

Register. You may access the official 

edition of the Federal Register and the 

Code of Federal Regulations at 

www.govinfo.gov. At this site you can 

view this document, as well as all other 

documents of this Department 

published in the Federal Register, in 

text or Portable Document Format 

(PDF). To use PDF you must have 

Adobe Acrobat Reader, which is 

available free at the site. 

You may also access documents of the 

Department published in the Federal 

Register by using the article search 

feature at www.federalregister.gov. 

Specifically, through the advanced 

search feature at this site, you can limit 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with RULES1
32640 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 117 / Tuesday, June 22, 2021 / Rules and Regulations 

1Public Law 116–260, sec. 212, 134 Stat. 1182, 

2176 (2020). 

2See 17 U.S.C. 701(a). 

your search to documents published by 

the Department. 

Suzanne B. Goldberg, 

Acting Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights. 

[FR Doc. 2021–13058 Filed 6–21–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4000–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Patent and Trademark Office 

37 CFR Part 11 

[Docket No.: PTO–C–2013–0042] 

RIN 0651–AC91 

Changes to Representation of Others 

Before the United States Patent and 

Trademark Office; Correction 

AGENCY: United States Patent and 

Trademark Office, Commerce. 

ACTION: Final rule; correction. 

SUMMARY: The United States Patent and 

Trademark Office (USPTO or Office) is 

correcting an earlier final rule, ‘‘Changes 

to the Representation of Others Before 

the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office,’’ that appeared in the Federal 

Register on May 26, 2021 and which 

takes effect on June 25, 2021. This 

document corrects a minor error. No 

other changes are being made to the 

underlying final rule. 

DATES: This rule is effective June 25, 

2021. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

William R. Covey, Deputy General 

Counsel for Enrollment and Discipline 

and Director of the Office of Enrollment 

and Discipline, at 571–272–4097. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This 

document corrects an error pertaining to 

revisions to definitions made in the 

final rule. Specifically, the Office 

intended to change the listed definition 

of ‘‘Roster’’ to ‘‘Roster or register.’’ The 

Code of Federal Regulations editors 

informed the Office that the original 

Federal Register instruction to ‘‘revise’’ 

the definition was incorrect. Rather, the 

correct instruction should be to ‘‘remove 

and add’’ the intended definition. This 

document corrects that instruction. 

In FR Doc. 2021–10528, appearing on 

page 28442 in the Federal Register of 

Wednesday, May 26, 2021, the 

following correction is made: 

§ 11.1 [Corrected] 

■ On page 28452, in the first column, in 

part 11, correct amendatory instruction 

4 to read as follows: 

■ 4. Amend § 11.1 by: 

■ a. Revising the definitions of 

‘‘Conviction or convicted’’ and 

‘‘Practitioner;’’ 

■ b. Removing the entry for ‘‘Roster’’ 

and adding, in alphabetical order, an 

entry for ‘‘Roster or register;’’ and 

■ c. Revising the definitions for 

‘‘Serious crime’’ and ‘‘State.’’ 

The revisions and addition read as 

follows: 

Andrew Hirshfeld, 

Commissioner for Patents, Performing the 

Functions and Duties of the Under Secretary 

of Commerce for Intellectual Property and 

Director of the United States Patent and 

Trademark Office. 

[FR Doc. 2021–13145 Filed 6–21–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–16–P 

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 

Copyright Office 

37 CFR Parts 201, 202, 203, 210, and 

370 

[Docket No. 2021–3] 

Technical Amendments Regarding the 

Copyright Office’s Organizational 

Structure 

AGENCY: U.S. Copyright Office, Library 

of Congress. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: This final rule makes 

technical changes to the U.S. Copyright 

Office’s regulations pertaining to its 

organizational structure in light of the 

agency’s recent reorganization. It 

reflects recent structural changes, 

updates certain of the Office’s division 

names, and adds a new section for the 

Copyright Claims Board established by 

the Copyright Alternative in SmallClaims Enforcement Act of 2020. 

DATES: Effective July 22, 2021. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Regan A. Smith, General Counsel and 

Associate Register of Copyrights, by 

email at regans@copyright.gov, Kevin R. 

Amer, Deputy General Counsel, by 

email at kamer@copyright.gov, or Joanna 

R. Blatchly, Attorney-Advisor, by email 

at jblatchly@copyright.gov or by 

telephone at (202) 707–8350. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 

Copyright Office is publishing this final 

rule pursuant to its May 2021 

reorganization. This effort is intended to 

accomplish two goals: (1) Rename 

divisions and realign certain reporting 

structures to improve the Office’s 

effectiveness and efficiency; and (2) 

reflect the agency structure for the new 

copyright small-claims tribunal 

established by the Copyright Alternative 

in Small-Claims Enforcement (‘‘CASE’’) 

Act of 2020.1 The Register has 

determined that these changes will 

optimize business processes and aid in 

the administration of her functions and 

duties as Director of the Copyright 

Office.2

Operational reorganization. The 

reorganization reduces the number of 

direct reports to the Register of 

Copyrights and is expected to create 

administrative and cost efficiencies by 

consolidating operational organizations 

currently headed by senior-level 

positions. The reorganization brings the 

Office of the Chief Financial Officer 

(renamed the Financial Management 

Division) and the Copyright 

Modernization Office (renamed the 

Product Management Division) under 

the supervision of the Chief of 

Operations (renamed the Assistant 

Register and Director of Operations 

(‘‘ARDO’’)). Realigning these divisions 

under the ARDO consolidates 

operational support elements under one 

senior manager, in line with operational 

structures across the Library of 

Congress. This consolidation is 

expected to facilitate Office 

coordination with centralized Library 

services, and with similar functional 

elements of other service units. It is also 

expected to allow the Office to increase 

the effectiveness of communications 

across areas of operational 

responsibility, in alignment with 

strategic objectives. 

The reorganization renames certain 

organizational elements and senior 

positions for purposes of greater clarity 

and consistency. The Office of Public 

Records and Repositories is renamed the 

Office of Copyright Records. As noted 

above, the Office of the Chief of 

Operations is renamed the Office of the 

Director of Operations. The following 

subordinate offices are also renamed: 

The Copyright Acquisitions Division 

(‘‘CAD’’) is renamed Acquisitions and 

Deposits (‘‘A&D’’); the Administrative 

Services Office (‘‘ASO’’) is renamed the 

Administrative Services Division 

(‘‘ASD’’); and the Receipt Analysis and 

Control Division (‘‘RAC’’) is renamed 

the Materials Control and Analysis 

Division (‘‘MCA’’). The Copyright 

Modernization Office (‘‘CMO’’) is 

renamed the Product Management 

Division (‘‘PMD’’). 

Further, the Office of the Chief 

Financial Officer (‘‘CFO’’) is renamed 

the Financial Management Division 

(‘‘FMD’’) and work units under this 

division are also renamed, including by 


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