UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

DARNELL KEITH CAIN, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 1:15-CV-097-TLS

)

SHERIFF, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

The Petitioner, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas corpus petition [ECF No. 1] pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging a pending state criminal proceeding in LaGrange Circuit Court.

The Court is obligated to review the Petition and dismiss it if “it plainly appears from the

petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” RULE 4 OF THE

RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES.

Before considering the merits of a habeas petition, the court must ensure that the

petitioner has exhausted all available remedies in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Lewis

v. Sternes, 390 F.3d 1019, 1025 (7th Cir. 2004). As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh

Circuit has explained:

Inherent in the habeas petitioner’s obligation to exhaust his state court remedies

before seeking relief in habeas corpus, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), is the duty to

fairly present his federal claims to the state courts. . . . Fair presentment in turn

requires the petitioner to assert his federal claim through one complete round of

state-court review, either on direct appeal of his conviction or in post-conviction

proceedings. This means that the petitioner must raise the issue at each and every

level in the state court system, including levels at which review is discretionary

rather than mandatory.

Lewis, 390 F.3d at 1025–26 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
Here, it is apparent that the Petitioner has not yet exhausted his state court remedies. In

fact, he has not yet been convicted. “Ordinarily the attempt of a state prisoner to obtain federal

habeas corpus relief in advance of his state criminal trial [is] completely hopeless.” United States

ex rel. Stevens v. Cir. Ct. of Milwaukee Cnty., 675 F.2d 946, 947 (7th Cir. 1982). In Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that equity and federalism concerns require

the federal courts to abstain from enjoining or interfering in state criminal prosecutions. See also

FreeEats.com, Inc. v. Indiana, 502 F.3d 590, 595 (7th Cir. 2007) (Younger abstention “requires

federal courts to abstain from taking jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims that involve

or call into question ongoing state proceedings.”). The Supreme Court has carved out a narrow

exception to this rule in the case of double jeopardy challenges. Justices of Boston Mun. Ct. v.

Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 302–03 (1984). The Court reasoned that double jeopardy rights “cannot be

fully vindicated on appeal following final judgment, since in part the Double Jeopardy Clause

protects against being twice put to trial for the same offense.” Id. at 303 (citation and quotation

marks omitted). Accordingly, a federal habeas court has jurisdiction to entertain a colorable

double jeopardy claim in advance of trial, notwithstanding the holding in Younger. Id.

However, the Petitioner is not alleging a double jeopardy claim. Instead, the Petitioner

alleges that his due process rights were violated because the state trial court “will not hear or file

[the Petitioner’s] pro se motions.” Pet. 7. Such motions appear to relate to claims of illegal

search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment; a denial of the right to counsel under

the Sixth Amendment; and a denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. But as

the Court noted above, such claims do not present a cognizable basis to interfere with an ongoing

state criminal proceeding in light of Younger. See Stevens, 675 F.2d at 947. To the extent that the

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Petitioner believes he has a viable defense to the charges against him or that his case is not being

properly adjudicated, he must first present those claims at trial and on appeal in state court.

Therefore, this petition will be dismissed without prejudice. If the Petitioner is convicted, and he

subsequently exhausts all available remedies in state court, he may properly file another habeas

corpus petition challenging his conviction.

Additionally, pursuant to RULE 11 OF THE RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES, the

Court must either issue or deny a certificate of appealability in all cases where it enters a final

order adverse to the petitioner. To obtain a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c),

the petitioner must show “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree

that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented

were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,

484 (2000) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). As explained above, the Petitioner

has not alleged the type of claim that would fall within the narrow exception to the Younger

doctrine. Nothing before the Court suggests that jurists of reason could debate the correctness of

this ruling or find a reason to encourage the Petitioner to proceed further until the state process

has concluded. Accordingly, the Court declines to issue the Petitioner a certificate of

appealability.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition (ECF No. 1) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

pursuant to RULE 4 OF THE RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES. The Court also DENIES

the Petitioner a certificate of appealability. 

SO ORDERED on May 1, 2015.

 s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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