UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

BRET S. BEILER, )

Plaintiff, )

) 

v. ) No. 1:12 CV 3

)

JAY COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, et al., )

Defendants. )

OPINION and ORDER

Bret S. Beiler, a pro se prisoner, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (DE # 1.)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the complaint and dismiss it if the

action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. The court

applies the same standard as when deciding a motion to dismiss under FEDERAL RULE OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006). 

To survive dismissal, a complaint must state a claim for relief that is plausible on its

face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 603.

The court must bear in mind that “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed,

and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Beiler’s lawsuit stems from a Jay County criminal case in which he was convicted 

of public intoxication and resisting law enforcement. He first sues Judge Max C. Ludy, Jr.,

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who presided over the case. Beiler alleges that Judge Ludy denied him his right to counsel

at a suppression hearing and subsequently appointed a public defender to represent him

who provided ineffective assistance. He seeks an award of compensatory and punitive

damages against the judge. Beiler’s claim cannot proceed, because the judge is entitled to

absolute immunity for his actions taken in connection with Beiler’s criminal case. Stump v.

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978) (a judge is entitled to absolute immunity for judicial acts

regarding matters within his jurisdiction, even if the judge’s “exercise of authority is

flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.”). This is true even if Beiler believes

the judge acted improperly; his remedy was through the state appellate process, not a civil

rights suit seeking damages. See id.

Beiler next sues his public defender, who allegedly provided ineffective assistance

prior to and during trial, resulting in his conviction and incarceration. This claim is also

foreclosed. The constitution protects against actions taken under color of state law, Savory

v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006), and the Supreme Court has held that “a public

defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional

functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454

U.S. 312, 325 (1981). Furthermore, to the extent Beiler is seeking some type of order

declaring that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated in the criminal case, he can only

seek such relief via habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488 (1973) (habeas

corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of

his confinement). Accordingly, this claim must be dismissed.

2

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Beiler also lists the Indiana Attorney General as a defendant, without providing any

information in the narrative section of his complaint to explain his grounds for relief. If he

is attempting to raise a claim against the prosecutor who handled his case, it is not clear

that the Indiana Attorney General would be the proper defendant; regardless, such a claim

is barred because the prosecutor has immunity for his actions taken in Beiler’s criminal

case. “[I]n initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case, the prosecutor is

immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431

(1976). Accordingly, this claim must be dismissed.

Finally, Beiler sues the Jay County Superior Court. The basis of his claim is not

entirely clear, but he appears to be trying to sue the court as the judge’s employer; such a

claim is foreclosed because there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, local

government liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is dependent on an analysis of state law, and

under Indiana law a superior court is not an entity that has the capacity to sue or be sued.

See IND. CODE § 36-1-2-10; Sow v. Fortville Police Dep’t, 636 F.3d 293, 300 (7th Cir. 2011).

Thus, this claim must also be dismissed.

For these reasons, the court DISMISSES this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

SO ORDERED.

Date: January 31, 2012

s/James T. Moody 

JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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