Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

BARBARA J. SIMMONS GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Oldenburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

RUTH JOHNSON CHANDRA K. HEIN

Marion County Public Defender Agency Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

VICTORIA ANDERSON, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A02-1207-CR-603

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Rebekah Pierson-Treacy, Judge

The Honorable Shatrese Flowers, Commissioner

Cause No. 49F19-1203-CM-13956

March 13, 2013

MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BAKER, Judge 
2

Victoria Anderson was convicted of one count of Criminal Mischief,1a class B 

misdemeanor. On appeal, she contends that her conviction should be reversed because 

the alleged victim’s testimony at trial was incredibly dubious. 

We conclude that the doctrine of incredible dubiosity does not apply in this 

instance because the victim’s testimony was neither inherently contradictory nor coerced, 

and a law enforcement officer partially corroborated the victim’s testimony. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS

On the morning of February 21, 2012, Melissa Thomas looked out her apartment 

window and observed Anderson, her former co-worker, puncturing the tires of her 

vehicle. Thomas ran outside to yell at Anderson, but she was not sure if Anderson heard 

her. Thomas then called the police to report the incident. 

During a subsequent investigation, Thomas reported that Anderson had also 

vandalized her vehicle earlier that month. According to Thomas, the earlier incident 

consisted of Anderson pouring paint over the vehicle and puncturing all four of the 

vehicle’s tires. Thomas claimed to have reported this incident to the police; however, she 

said that no officers responded because they were all busy in downtown Indianapolis.

2

 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-43-1-2.

2 This alleged incident occurred during the weekend when Indianapolis hosted the Super Bowl. 
3

The State charged Anderson with two counts of criminal mischief as class B 

misdemeanors, one count for each alleged incident. At a bench trial held on June 28, 

2012, Thomas recounted her version of the incidents. 

Regarding the first incident, Thomas stated that she was inside her apartment on 

February 4, 2012, when she observed Anderson near her vehicle. Thomas stated that she 

then watched as Anderson “poured paint all over [Thomas’s] car . . . [and] flattened all 

the tires.” Tr. p. 17. She recalled calling the police, who “said that they [were] going to 

send somebody but they [were] so busy downtown that it would take a couple of hours.” 

Id. at 19. However, no officers ever responded. Thomas then cleaned the paint from her 

vehicle while it was still wet. Thomas reported that she “took pictures [of the paint on 

her vehicle] but couldn’t no body [sic] see it.” Id. at 27. 

After this incident, Thomas reported that she “had started sleeping with [her] 

window open . . . to see if [she] could hear [Anderson] comin’.” Id. at 20. On the 

morning of the second incident, Thomas saw Anderson puncturing her vehicle’s tires 

through her open window. Thomas ran outside to confront Anderson, who was leaving, 

and Thomas called the police. 

Officer Shannon Harmon of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department 

testified that when he arrived at the scene, Thomas was “emotional . . . and stressed about 

the incident.” Tr. p. 33. He recalled observing three flat tires on Thomas’s vehicle. 

However, Officer Harmon did not recall Thomas reporting an earlier incident or seeing 

paint on Thomas’s vehicle. 
4

Anderson testified that she and Thomas “had a fling” while they were co-workers. 

Id. at 40. Anderson claimed that she had ended the relationship in October 2011 when 

her husband found out about it. Anderson further claimed that she was not involved in 

the second incident because she “probably” would have been getting her children ready 

for school. Id. at 43. 

Because of a discrepancy about the date of the first incident, the trial court 

dismissed Count II. However, Anderson was found guilty as charged on Count I, which 

pertained to the later incident. Anderson now appeals.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Anderson’s sole contention on appeal is that her conviction should be reversed 

under the doctrine of incredible dubiosity. More particularly, Anderson claims that 

Thomas’s rendition of the facts was so “inherently improbable” that this Court should 

find Anderson not guilty as a matter of law. Appellant’s Br. p. 1.

Generally, we do not reweigh the evidence presented or judge witness credibility. 

Reed v. State, 748 N.E.2d 381, 395 (Ind. 2001). Rather, we will affirm a conviction if 

there is probative evidence or reasonable inferences supporting the judgment. Id. 

Notwithstanding these general principles, the incredible dubiosity doctrine 

provides an extremely narrow exception. Tillman v. State, 642 N.E.2d 221, 223 (Ind. 

1994). It applies only “in those rare cases where a sole witness presents inherently 

contradictory testimony that is equivocal or the result of coercion and there is a complete 

lack of circumstantial evidence of the appellant’s guilt.” Reed, 748 N.E.2d at 395-96. 
5

Conversely, the doctrine is inapplicable when testimony is corroborated by additional 

witnesses or circumstantial evidence. Thompson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1273, 1274 (Ind. 

2002).

In the present case, Thomas was unequivocal about her allegations, and there was 

no evidence presented that Thomas’s testimony was coerced. Tr. p. 20-21. Moreover, 

Thomas was not the State’s sole witness. By testifying that he responded to Thomas’s 

complaint and observed three flat tires on her vehicle, Officer Harmon partially 

corroborated Thomas’s allegations. Id. at 32-33. Accordingly, the doctrine of incredible 

dubiosity is inapplicable here. 

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

RILEY, J., and BARNES, J., concur.