UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

BOBBIE J. DIXON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 3:13-cv-01195-PPS

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, )

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Bobbie Dixon appeals the decision by an administrative law judge to

deny her application for Social Security disability benefits. Dixon says that the ALJ’s

decision disregarded the opinion of her treating psychologist and was not otherwise

based on substantial evidence. For the reasons outlined below, I will affirm the decision

of the ALJ.

BACKGROUND

Dixon applied for Social Security Income (SSI) on February 28, 2011, alleging a

disability onset date of August 15, 2010. (DE 17 at 3; R. at 15.) Dixon’s claim worked its

way to the ALJ, who held a hearing on July 16, 2012. (R. 15, 36.) The ALJ issued an

unfavorable decision on August 17, 2012 (R. 30), and that decision was affirmed by the

Appeals Council. (DE 17 at 3-4.) 

The Medical Evidence

Dixon’s medical history includes both mental and physical impairment. As the

ALJ put it at the start of the hearing, “[d]epression, anxiety, and schizoaffective disorder
are the main psychological impairments. She also has a cervical spine impairment that

limits her in some fashion. I would emphasize I think that the majority of her problems

that we’re here for today are psychological in nature.” (R. 40; see also, R. 20-21.)

Nonetheless, the ALJ “specifically considered whether [Dixon’s physical] impairment

causes more than a minimal effect on [her] ability to perform basic physical work

activities.” (R.17.) Dixon’s opening brief does not raise physical limitations in support of

her claim. Dixon’s attorney asked about physical limitations very briefly during the

hearing. (R. 54.) Two state agency physicians reviewed the medical evidence through

March 2011 and opined that Dixon “did not suffer from any severe physical

impairments.” The ALJ gave these opinions great weight because they were consistent

with the record. (R. 28.) 

To set the stage, I note that the deficiency in Dixon’s claim is less the symptoms

and more a lack of the necessary medical evidence. This isn’t to say whether the

symptoms would qualify for benefits if the evidence were available, but rather that it is

impossible to evaluate that counterfactual scenario. Dixon applied for SSI in February

2011, alleging an onset date in August 2010. But Dixon’s description in her brief of her

medical treatment doesn’t start until nine months after she first filed for disability

benefits. In other words, Dixon filed for disability benefits as of August 2010 claiming a

psychiatric disorder, but didn’t seek treatment for that disorder until May 2011, when

she saw Dr. Loren Burton at Oaklawn Psychiatric Center for therapy. What’s more, Dr.

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Burton didn’t see Dixon regularly until after April 2012, which the ALJ considered

significant. (R. 26.) 

Dr. Burton’s records from May 2011 note that Dixon was “being treated for panic

attacks, schizoaffective disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder.” (R. 362.) Dr. Burton

noted that case management services might be in order, and that therapy was

necessary, writing that Dixon was scheduled to return in two weeks for therapy. The

session notes don’t include Dr. Burton’s assessment of how long Dixon might have been

impaired or suffering from her conditions, or how long they were expected to continue.

(Id.) Dixon’s regular visits to Dr. Burton began almost a year later, only three months

before the ALJ held the hearing in this case.

On March 16, 2011, Dixon completed a “Function Report” for herself. (R. 160-67.)

She completed another one on April 3. (R. 179-86.) On March 17 Dixon’s daughter

Kelsey Dixon completed a Third Party Function report at the Disability Determination

Bureau’s Request. (DE 17 at 4; R. 170-77.) This report noted Dixon’s difficulty

completing household and personal care tasks independently, her issues paying

attention, and her anxiety. Kelsey completed another one on May 3. (R. 196-203.)

Before 2011, records detailing Dixon’s mental and emotional issues are sparse, as

the ALJ noted. (R. 22-23.) An August 2010 record doesn’t reference any mental issues,

and is limited to things like family history of hypertension. It is true that Dixon was

prescribed Xanax and Pristiq in April 2009, but there was no explanation in the record

as to why. There had been a gap in medication from 2007 to 2009. (R. 22.) Office notes

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began in February 2010, and they note that Dixon had applied for SSI benefits and had

been denied. Dixon had a GAF score of 65. There was more activity in Dixon’s

medication regimen starting in March 2010 with a visit to Dr. Curry. (R. 23.) In March

2011 Dixon saw psychologist Carol Singler, Ph.D., and discussed her work and medical

history, and her social interaction. Dixon said “[s]he dresses, grooms and bathes

without assistance and reminder.” “She denied a psychiatric history,” but said she’d

been diagnosed with bipolar disorder because of “massive mood swings.” Dixon

denied being a victim of emotional, physical, or sexual abuse. Dixon reported having a

few friends, and that she “had a boyfriend and he was paying the bills for me but he

went back to Michigan City about six months ago but he still helps me out.” Dr. Singler

assessed a GAF score of 64. (R. 23-24, 285-88.)

Dixon saw Dr. Vivek Prasad at Oaklawn on June 30, 2011, for medication review

and followup. (DE 17 at 5; R. 316.) Dr. Prasad noted that Dixon was taking Prozac,

Ambien, and Xanax, which her primary care provider Dr. Curry had started her on

“four or five months ago.” (R. 316.) Dixon reported various symptoms, including

decreased sleep, mood swings, irritability, and panic attacks. Dr. Prasad diagnosed

schizoaffective disorder, assessed a GAF of 55, and changed Dixon’s medication

regimen. (R. 316-17.) Dr. Prasad described Dixon as having “a disheveled appearance,”

but “good eye contact and a pleasant and cooperative attitude,” with a logical, concrete,

and goal-directed thought process. (R. 317.) Dr. Prasad also noted a “chronic history of

panic attacks and mood swings.” (R. 316.) 

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Dixon returned to Dr. Prasad on August 11, 2011, for medication and followup.

She complained of irritability, but had good eye contact and a thought process that

“was logical, concrete, and goal directed.” She had no hallucinations. (R. 313-14.) Dr.

Prasad wrote that Dixon was going to follow up with Ann Hofsommer before seeing

Dr. Prasad again in three months. (R. 314.) The ALJ noted that the record contains notes

from a visit to Dr. Curry on August 23, 2011, about an ankle injury sustained “3 week(s)

ago at work.” (R. 24.)

On November 3, 2011, Dixon saw social worker Ann Hofsommer. (R. 340-41.)

Dixon complained of “[c]hronic panic attacks, [a]goraphobia, auditory and visual

hallucinations, significant mood swings with depression lasting 3-4 days.” (R. 340.)

Hofsommer noted that Dixon had been referred to individual therapy “which she

attended once and then dropped out.” (R. 340.) A few days later, on November 8, Dixon

saw Dr. Prasad. She reported that she hadn’t been sleeping for the last three months.

She said she had gone to the emergency room for fainting about 6 to 8 weeks before.

Dixon was found to be potassium-deficient, and had begun taking supplements. (The

record doesn’t state whether the fainting was attributed to the potassium deficiency.)

“She denied any outright auditory or visual hallucinations or manic behaviors.” (R.

338.) Dixon’s medication regime was altered again. (Id.) 

On April 4, 2012, Dixon returned to Dr. Prasad. Prasad described Dixon as

disheveled, malodorous, reeking of cigarette smoke, and with an irritable affect, but

making “good eye contact.” Dixon reported not sleeping well. Dr. Prasad described her

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thought process as “illogical[,] denying any benefit from any of the medications she has

tried,” with “limited to poor insight and judgment into her condition and need for

medications and followup.” (R. 335.) Dr. Prasad assessed a GAF score of 55. (R. 336.)

Dixon said her medications were not working well. She reported walking a mile per

day, but she had gained weight and was smoking two packs a day. Dr. Prasad noted

that Dixon had met with Loren Burton before and was willing to follow up with her. (R.

334-35.)

Dixon saw Dr. Burton again on April 17, 2012, after a long hiatus, for an

individual therapy session. She would see Dr. Burton approximately 8 times between

April 17 and June 29, 2012. Dr. Burton noted not having seen Dixon in several months.

Dixon was concerned about losing financial support in the form of child support once

her son turned 21. Dixon reported being depressed, not sleeping well, waking up in the

middle of the night and being unable to fall asleep again, and having nightmares. She

also reported that she sometimes slept all day. Dixon said she talked to people,

“believing that they are there and then suddenly ‘they’re gone.’” Dixon described

having difficulty distinguishing reality from dreams, and also “still” hearing voices. She

reported “doing things that she can’t remember doing.” In terms of personal care Dixon

reported not showering as often as she knew she should, and she “continues to pick at

her hands and it is noted that she has no finger nails.” Dixon said she usually didn’t

drive due to concern about her level of functioning. Dr. Burton observed that Dixon

looked away from Dr. Burton “at times that she is talking.” Dr. Burton’s assessment was

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that Dixon had “significant difficulty functioning,” and may have had “specific

problems with sleep that involve not being able to distinguish sleep from her waking

state. [I]t is not clear whether her lack of memory for things involves dissociative

experiences or a sleep disorder.” (R. 372.) 

Dixon saw Dr. Burton again on May 1, 2012. She reported continued trouble

sleeping, but had a little more energy. Dixon said her daughter could get her to leave

the house, and they had done a walk-a-thon, which Dixon found difficult at first but

was able to do it once the crowd thinned. Dixon said she had panic symptoms in stores

and wouldn’t go out unless pushed by her family. She was concerned about her

finances because she said she couldn’t continue to work because she couldn’t be around

people. Dixon said she continued to pick at her nails with tweezers to manage anxiety.

Dr. Burton assessed Dixon as having psychotic symptoms, a mood disorder, and

obsessive compulsive symptoms that impaired her functioning. Dr. Burton wrote that

therapy was necessary to teach Dixon how to cope with her symptoms and manage her

mood because Dixon was “showing significant problems with functioning.” At the end

of the session Dr. Burton taught Dixon a technique for managing anxiety. (R. 370.) 

On May 15 Dixon again met Dr. Burton for therapy. She reported depression and

anxiety, panic attacks, difficulty leaving home, and “problems with checking things,”

meaning “she can be driving down the road and have to go home as she is uncertain

about whether she really checked the door.” Dixon said “that being outside of the house

with the dogs is okay.” Dixon reported difficulty in her relationship with her daughter

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and her daughter moving things and leaving a mess. Dixon said her symptoms

worsened after her father died in 2006 and her mother died in 2007. (R. 368-69.) After

the May 24 session Dr. Burton described Dixon as tearful and agitated. Dixon reported

having one or multiple panic attacks per day, and only going places if she had to. (R.

362.)

On June 1 Dixon told Dr. Burton that she had “anxiety over the roof” and was

tearful during the session. Dixon said she was anxious about her financial situation, she

couldn’t handle her stress, she didn’t care about anything, and she hadn’t wanted to get

dressed that day. She said she’d thrown up three times before that day’s therapy

session. Dr. Burton and Dixon agreed that Dixon would benefit from case management

services. (R. 366.) On June 6 Dixon again reported to Dr. Burton that she had “anxiety

over the roof.” Dixon also said she wasn’t eating due to stress, and that she had thrown

up three times before the session. She had “feelings of worthlessness, wanting to run

away from where she is at (denies suicidal thoughts), she lacks energy and doesn’t take

care of things or paces around the house.” Dixon was anxious about life stresses,

especially money and her daughter moving out of her house. (R. 364-65.) 

Also on June 6 Dr. Burton completed an Adult Needs and Strengths Assessment

(“ANSA form”) for Dixon using the Data Assessment Registry Mental Health &

Addiction (“DARMHA”) form. (R. 355-61.) The form required Dr. Burton to select

generic pre-written descriptions of Dixon’s functioning in an assortment of areas. The

form indicates significant family problems, severe work problems, moderate problems

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with social functioning, and no access to or interest in recreational activities. (R. 355.)

The form goes on to indicate other issues: sleep deprivation, moderate self-care

impairment, significant problems with decision-making, minimal interpersonal

strengths, difficulty being optimistic, no talents or interests, no positive work history,

moderate disturbance in thought process, moderate impulse control problems, severe

depression, severe anxiety, post traumatic stress issues, moderate anger control

problems, no career plans or aspirations, a history of repeated physical and emotional

abuse, moderate attachment problems, and maybe some symptoms of dissociation.

At a June 19 session Dixon reported to Dr. Burton trying to go to the store, then

having a panic attack involving breathlessness and spinning and throwing up. Dixon

said she had sleep problems such that if she slept past 4:30 a.m. she was confused about

what day of the week it was. She also said she was easily confused. When she drove she

could get disoriented and lost. Dixon was concerned about managing on her own once

her daughter moved out. (R. 353-54.) The record includes a “Medical Assessment of

Ability to Do Work-Related Activities (Mental)” (“Work Abilities form”) dated June 20

(on the first page – the last page is dated June 26) that was completed by Dr. Burton. Dr.

Burton circled “fair” or “poor/none” for all of the items related to Dixon’s ability to

adjust to a job and wrote that Dixon was “extremely anxious and self conscious around

people and avoids leaving the house,” reporting “periods where she has been talking to

someone and then realizes that there is no one there.” (R. 345.) Dr. Burton also circled

“fair” or “poor/none” for each of the performance adjustment skills due to Dixon’s

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concentration issues, noting mistakes as Dixon counted down from 100 by sevens. (R.

345-46.) Dr. Burton once again circled “fair” or “poor/none” for each of the personalsocial adjustment skills. (R. 346.) Dr. Burton assessed “extreme loss” of abilities to

sustain basic work-related activities. Dr. Burton wrote on the form that Dixon’s

condition had been substantially the same as described since May 16, 2011. On June 29

Dixon told Dr. Burton she was sleeping a little more and having more energy, but she

said she saw shadows and heard voices that were “worse or louder across the last 2

months.” (R. 351.) 

At the July 2012 hearing before the ALJ Dixon testified about her anxiety,

depression, difficulty concentrating, and difficulty leaving her house. (R. 43.) She said

for treatment she saw Dr. Moore, a psychotherapist, Br. Burton, a therapist, and Dr.

Curry, her family doctor. (R. 43.) Dixon explained that Dr. Moore had replaced Dr.

Prasad within a few months before the hearing. (R. 51.) She testified that she leaves her

house four or five times per month. (R. 45.) Dixon said her condition had remained

about the same “for a period of time, but the voices – when they change my

medications, the voices get worse.” (R. 48-49.) Dixon described the voices as muffled,

and said she hears them daily and had been hearing them for about a year. (R. 49.) She

said she sees things that aren’t there, describing them as shadows, and said they made

her anxious. (R. 50.) Dixon told the ALJ that she had stopped working because she

didn’t want to be around people. (R. 58.)

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During the hearing the ALJ noted that he had seen GAF scores of 55-65, which

indicates some limitation, but not to the extent suggested by Dr. Burton’s ANSA form

and Work Abilities form. (R. 52.) The starkly contrasting views in the record led the ALJ

to say, leading up to the examination of the Vocational Expert, “I’m somewhat at a loss,

counsel, because I’ve got the state agency’s position saying no severe impairment both

physically and mentally, and then I’ve got Dr. Burton saying essentially incapable of

even the most undemanding mental and emotional requirements of any work. And

there’s not a heck of a lot of medical opinion indicating any middle ground. So that’s

giving me some hesitation in coming up with what I think would be reasonable

limitations based on the entirety of the evidence as a whole.” (R. 59.) 

The ALJ went on to examine the vocational expert (“VE”) Dr. Leonard Fisher. He

described to Dr. Fisher someone limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks; simple

decision-making tasks; little change in daily work routine; and with limitations

commensurate with moderate social functioning deficits. (R. 60-61.) Dr. Fisher said

Dixon couldn’t do her past jobs. (R. 61.) However, there were light-exertion jobs that he

said she could do. (R. 62.) Dixon’s attorney followed up, and Dr. Fisher said that if a

person were off-task for an hour each day, or missed four days of work per month, that

person would not be able to sustain a job. (R. 63-64.) 

The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on August 17, 2012. (R. 15-30.) At Step 1

the ALJ found Dixon had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity since applying for

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benefits on February 28, 2011. (R. 17.) In Step 2 the ALJ found that Dixon has the severe

impairments of depression, anxiety, and schizoaffective disorder. (R. 17.) At Step 3 the

ALJ wrote that Dixon does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that

meet or medically equal the severity of a listed impairment. (R. 18.) Dixon’s

representative had affirmed this at the hearing. (R. 19, 40.)

In considering Dixon’s Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) in the second part

of Step 3, the ALJ found that she has the RFC to work at all exertional levels, but is

moderately limited with respect to her concentration, persistence, or pace, so is limited

to simple tasks, simple decision-making, and work with only minimal variation, as well

as work commensurate with Dixon’s moderate social functioning deficits. (R. 19-20.) In

this step the ALJ extensively described Dixon’s medical history as reflected in the

record. (R. 20-28.) The ALJ noted contradictory evidence in the record – some doctors’

records didn’t contain any information about mental or emotional issues, while Dr.

Burton’s records indicated severe issues. The ALJ acknowledged the apparent

worsening of Dixon’s conditioning in April 2012, but determined that “the record as a

whole does not establish that this recent exacerbation was disabling, or that it had lasted

or was expected to last a continuous twelve months. No doctor changed the claimant’s

overall GAF score from the previous 55, which indicates moderate symptoms or

limitations, and which is consistent with the capacity I attribute to the claimant.” (R. 26.) 

The ALJ considered it significant that Dixon’s claim relies heavily on Dr. Burton’s

assessment, and Dr. Burton described treatment beginning in May 2011, but in reality

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there was only a regular treatment relationship beginning in April 2012. (R. 26.) Further,

the ALJ largely discounted Dr. Burton’s assessment of Dixon as essentially

nonfunctional because that assessment had no support in the record other than Dr.

Burton’s opinions. Other doctors had not found that Dixon suffered from anywhere

near that level of impairment. (R. 26.) 

The ALJ also found that, even if Dr. Burton’s assessments were correct, they were

only true as of April 2012, and there was no indication that Dixon’s status had existed

for 12 months before the hearing, or would remain the same for 12 months. (R. 26-27.)

The ALJ stated that he defined Dixon’s RFC giving her the “significant benefit of the

doubt,” applying certain restrictions not specifically supported by the record outside of

Dr. Burton’s assessment, although at a level less severe than Dr. Burton assessed. (R.

27.) Ultimately, in this step, the ALJ found “that there is simply insufficient evidence to

substantiate the claimant’s claims.” (R. 28.)

In Step 4 the ALJ found that Dixon had no past relevant work against which to

measure her RFC. (R. 28.) 

Finally, in Step 5 the ALJ considered Dixon’s age, education, work experience,

and RFC, and found that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers that she can do.

Therefore the ALJ found Dixon not disabled for the purpose of awarding SSI benefits.

(R. 29-30.)

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DISCUSSION

My review of an ALJ’s decision to deny social security benefits is limited to

determining whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Young v.

Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004). “Evidence is substantial if a reasonable

person would accept it as adequate to support the conclusion.” Id. The question before

me is not whether or not Dixon is disabled, but whether there is substantial evidence in

the record supporting the ALJ’s decision that she’s not. Books v. Chater, 91 F.3d 972, 977

(7th Cir. 1996). In other words, the ALJ’s decision, if supported by substantial evidence

and reached under the correct legal standard, will be upheld even if reasonable minds

could differ as to the appropriate conclusion. See Schmidt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 970, 972 (7th

Cir. 2000). It is not my job to re-weigh evidence, choose among conflicting versions of

events, decide questions of credibility, or substitute my own judgment for the ALJ’s. 

Young, 362 F.3d at 1001.

Dixon contends that the ALJ erred by assessing a mental RFC unsupported by

substantial evidence or the relevant legal standards. Dixon argues he made this error by

improperly discounting Dr. Burton’s opinion and Dixon’s and her daughter’s claims,

and also by failing to take into account Dixon’s psychological decompensation. Dixon

argues that the ALJ then used this erroneous RFC for the rest of the analysis, rendering

incomplete hypothetical questions for the VE. She alleges those hypothetical questions

led to uninformed and incorrect testimony by the VE that in turn led to a mistaken Step

5 assessment of jobs Dixon can perform. Boiled to their essence, the alleged errors all

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stem from the ALJ’s assessment of Dixon’s RFC based on the record. That’s where I’ll

focus.

The ALJ rejected Dr. Burton’s opinion, and also Dixon’s self-reporting and her

daughter’s reporting to the extent they portray Dixon’s condition as more severe than

the rest of the record indicates. (R. 26-28.) He rejected Dr. Burton’s assessment because

it is inconsistent with the record as a whole. The record does not indicate that Dixon’s

condition is anywhere near as serious as the ANSA form suggests — the form describes

someone who is nearly non-functional in every way, with poor-to-no functional ability

across the board. (R. 26.) But the history of GAF scores and the notes from other treating

doctors within a year before the ALJ’s hearing don’t suggest nearly such severe

limitations. Even Dr. Burton’s own notes from therapy sessions don’t indicate a nonfunctional person, but rather a significantly impaired one. For instance, Dixon drove

herself to appointments and generally behaved appropriately.

The ALJ acted within the bounds of the law: a treating physician’s opinion

receives controlling weight only “if it is well supported by medical findings and not

inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d.

863, 870 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)). Moreover, “[a]n ALJ is not

required to accept a doctor’s opinion if it is brief, conclusory, and inadequately

supported by clinical findings.” Gildon v. Astrue, 260 Fed. App’x 927, 929 (7th Cir. 2008)

(citations and quotations omitted). Additionally, a claimant is not entitled to benefits

just because a physician finds her “disabled” or “unable to work.” In fact, opinions by a

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physician, treating or otherwise, that a claimant is “unable to work” are not considered

medical opinions at all, and “are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the

Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case.”

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1-2); see also, Clifford, 227 F.3d. at 870. 

Where an ALJ discounts a treating physician’s opinion after considering the

extent to which the opinion is supported by medical findings and is consistent with

substantial evidence in the record, the ALJ need only “minimally articulate[]” his

reasons for doing so. Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 415 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).

In this case, the ALJ carefully considered Dr. Burton’s treating relationship with Dixon,

wrote up a detailed description of Dr. Burton’s treatment records, and found that Dr.

Burton’s conclusions about Dixon’s level of impairment were inconsistent with

substantial evidence in the record. The ALJ found unsupported Dr. Burton’s conclusory

opinion that Dixon is virtually unable to function, expressed mostly through picking

generic descriptions on the ANSA form and circling one-word descriptors on the Work

Abilities form, which both purported to determine Dixon’s level of impairment. Given

that logical determination, and the ALJ’s review of the medical evidence, the ALJ has

clearly met the standard of minimal articulation, and remand is unwarranted.

As for Dixon’s argument about a possible period of decompensation, the ALJ

does acknowledge that Dixon’s condition may have worsened beginning around the

time she started therapy with Dr. Burton in April 2012, but the ALJ is correct that there

is “no clear indication that such worsened condition is disabling or expected to last for

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twelve months.” (R. 26.) That is, even if the condition were disabling as of April 2012,

the ALJ is correct that there is no evidence that it would last the period of time required

for it to qualify as disabling under the law, and it had not lasted the requisite period by

the time the ALJ held his hearing. There is certainly not substantial medical evidence in

the record that Dixon’s condition was disabling before April 2012.

In summary, the ALJ’s opinion outlined sufficient evidence to support rejecting

Dr. Burton’s opinion and the assessments of Dixon and her daughter. But even if Dr.

Burton’s opinion weren’t discounted, there is nothing in it to suggest a disabling

condition of the duration required for an award of benefits. For these reasons I find no

error.

The ALJ used his assessment of the entire record in forming his description of

Dixon’s RFC. As I’ve said, discounting Dr. Burton’s assessment in evaluating the record

was not erroneous, nor was taking with a grain of salt Dixon’s own self-assessment or

her daughter’s non-medical third-party assessment. The ALJ factored into the RFC the

fact that he found Dixon to be severely impaired, and the RFC therefore included

substantial, and reasonable, limitations. The RFC described someone who could work at

all exertional levels, but is moderately limited with respect to her concentration,

persistence, or pace, so is limited to simple tasks, simple decision-making, and work

with only minimal variation, as well as work commensurate with Dixon’s moderate

social functioning deficits. There is no evidence that these restrictions fail to reasonably

accommodate Dixon’s mental limitations. See Outlaw v. Astrue, 412 Fed. App’x. 894, 897

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(7th Cir. 2011) (finding that limiting the claimant’s RFC to include only unskilled work,

with no public contact, did provide reasonable accommodations for the claimant’s

mental limitations). These restrictions are supported by Dixon’s medical records and

treatment history.

In forming the RFC the ALJ acknowledged that his assessment and specific set of

limitations were not directly drawn from the record. However, he was not “playing

doctor” as Dixon alleges. He was looking at the record, giving little weight to Dr.

Burton’s assessment, and then giving Dixon the benefit of every doubt with respect to

the rest of the record. And although the ALJ correctly pointed out that Dixon had not

been limited to light exertion by any doctor’s orders, even assuming she were so limited

the VE confirmed that there are jobs she could do. Accordingly, the ALJ’s determination

as to Dixon’s mental impairments is appropriate, and his decision is affirmed.

CONCLUSION

The ALJ provided legitimate reasons for his opinion. While reasonable minds

could differ, the only issue is whether the conclusion reached by the ALJ was supported

by substantial evidence, and it was. Accordingly, the decision of the ALJ is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: February 11, 2015

/s/ Philip P. Simon

PHILIP P. SIMON, CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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