UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

RONALD SCHMUCKER, et al., 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC. et al., 

 Defendants. 

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Case No. 3:14-CV-1593 JD 

OPINION AND ORDER

This case is set for a bench trial. In this order, the Court addresses a number of 

evidentiary disputes, including motions in limine, objections to expert testimony, and objections 

to exhibits. 

I. MOTIONS IN LIMINE 

Johnson Controls filed a number of motions in limine, each of which the Court considers 

in turn. 

A. Chemicals other than TCE posing an endangerment 

Johnson Controls first moves to exclude any evidence that chemicals other than TCE may 

pose an endangerment. To begin with, the Court already made such a ruling at summary 

judgment, holding that the Plaintiffs could not present evidence “that compounds other than TCE 

present a danger in their own right,” as the Plaintiffs did not develop that evidence during 

discovery. [DE 351 p. 20]. To the extent the Plaintiffs offer evidence of other chemicals posing 

an endangerment, the Court will disregard that evidence accordingly, but the Plaintiffs represent 

that they have no intent to do so. 

The two specific objections that Johnson Controls raises on this topic are misplaced, 

though. Johnson Controls first objects that Dr. Keramida is opining that the presence of other 
2 

chemicals makes TCE more dangerous, which it characterizes as a back-door way of arguing the 

health effects of those other chemicals. However, Johnson Controls’ argument rests on 

mischaracterizations of her testimony. Dr. Keramida relies on the other chemicals solely to 

determine the applicable screening levels to use for TCE. She explains in her most recent 

supplemental report that, due to the presence of other chemicals, a Hazard Quotient of 0.1 rather 

than 1 is appropriate. [DE 382-1 p. 6 (opining that, because of the presence of other chemicals, 

“the USEPA advises the use of a Hazard Quotient of 0.1, rather than 1, which is applicable when 

only one chemical is present”)]. That is exactly the same thing she said in her initial report, as the 

Court even noted when it excluded her opinion on the effects of other chemicals. [DE 351 p. 18 

(noting that Dr. Keramida referenced other chemicals “to explain the effect they have on the 

applicable screening levels for TCE”)]; 275-3 p. 31 (identifying the applicable screening level as 

0.21 μg/m3

, based on a Hazard Quotient of 0.1, and explaining that that “is the recommended 

[Hazard Quotient] when an individual may be exposed to more than one chemical”)]. 

The Plaintiffs confirmed at the final pretrial conference that Dr. Keramida’s opinion in 

this regard is limited to identifying the applicable screening levels for TCE. Johnson Controls 

also explained how its own expert has responded directly to that opinion and has discussed why 

Dr. Keramida’s reliance on that Hazard Quotient is unfounded. Because Dr. Keramida’s opinion 

in this regard is not new, and because Johnson Controls has already addressed it through its own 

experts, there is no reason to exclude this opinion. Should Dr. Keramida (or any other expert) 

offer additional opinions or explanations at trial not contained in her reports, the Court will not 

consider those new materials, but the Court construes her supplement as referencing the effects 

of other chemicals solely for the purpose of identifying the applicable screening level for TCE. 
3 

Her opinion in that regard complies with the Court’s prior order, so the Court declines to strike 

that opinion. 

Johnson Controls next objects to Dr. Keramida’s consideration of other chemicals for the 

purpose of establishing the course of the migration from the Johnson Controls site. It suffices to 

say on this point, though, that Johnson Controls’ objection has nothing to do with whether those 

other chemicals pose an endangerment in their own right, which is the reason Johnson Controls 

moves to exclude this evidence. The relevance of this line of evidence is to show that a pathway 

exists for exposure to TCE. Again, if the Plaintiffs were to argue that exposure to the other 

chemicals may pose an endangerment, the Court would not consider the evidence for that 

purpose, but the Plaintiffs have confirmed they have no intent to do so. Because Dr. Keramida’s 

supplemental report addresses the most recent testing data and does not transgress the Court’s 

prior order, the Court declines to strike her opinions on this basis. 

B. Dr. Keramida’s November 2018 home inspections 

Johnson Controls next moves to strike evidence of home inspections that Dr. Keramida 

conducted in November 2018, after discovery had already closed and the motions for summary 

judgment were already ripe. Dr. Keramida visited certain homes in the neighborhood to assess 

the presence of vapor intrusion through utilities. Most notably, she used a photoionization 

detector to identify potential vapor entry points into a home. Johnson Controls argues that this 

was an untimely investigation and should be excluded. 

The Court agrees. There is no reason this investigation could not or should not have been 

done during discovery. Vapor intrusion through preferential pathways has always been at issue in 

this case, and Dr. Keramida addressed it in her initial report. Whatever insight these home 

inspections and photoionization detector readings may have to offer into the threat of vapor 

intrusion through utilities, the Plaintiffs had every reason to develop that evidence during 
4 

discovery. The Plaintiffs argue that these inspections permissibly respond to maintenance 

performed on the vapor mitigations systems in 2018, but that maintenance is a red herring. As 

Dr. Keramida herself has repeatedly opined, including in her recent supplement, vapor mitigation 

systems do not address vapor intrusion through utilities. [DE 382-1 p. 6 (“Vapor entry points 

directly into homes from sewer lines bypass the sub-slab of a home and, therefore, are not 

addressed by a vapor mitigation system applied to the sub-slab.”)]. The maintenance on those 

vapor mitigation systems thus cannot justify this untimely investigation into vapor intrusion 

through utility lines. 

At the final pretrial conference, the Plaintiffs argued that these inspections were also 

justified by the severance of a utility line running through the former site, and that the 

inspections were meant to assess the effect, if any, of that new development. Again, the Court is 

unconvinced, and finds that to be another attempt to bootstrap this untimely investigation. The 

Plaintiffs did not conduct a similar investigation prior to that work, so they have no baseline to 

compare the recent inspections against to determine the effect of that work. The Plaintiffs also 

acknowledge that the photoionization detector cannot identify what compounds are present or 

where they came from. Having failed to show how these readings could determine the effect of 

the sewer work, they cannot argue that these inspections were justified by that development. 

Moreover, the Plaintiffs acknowledge that the purpose of the photoionization detector readings 

was to show that a pathway exists for the subsurface migration for volatile compounds. [DE 417 

p. 17]. That was equally relevant during discovery and has little connection to the severance of 

the sewer lines at the site. 

The Court therefore grants the motion to exclude evidence of Dr. Keramida’s November 

2018 home inspections, subject to one exception. During her inspections, Dr. Keramida also 
5 

observed the vapor mitigation systems that had recently been serviced, and some of her opinions 

address the effect of that maintenance. Her opinions in that regard largely reiterate her previous 

criticisms of the vapor mitigation systems, and it would be unfair to allow Johnson Controls to 

invoke the maintenance performed on the systems without allowing the Plaintiffs to address the 

effect of that work. Thus, the Court will permit Dr. Keramida to testify about her observations of 

the vapor mitigations systems from these inspections, to address the effect of the recent 

maintenance on her opinions about the effectiveness of those systems. 

C. Goshen utilities info 

Johnson Controls next raises a similar objection to utilities information that Dr. Keramida 

recently obtained from the City of Goshen. First, it objects to “water and sewer cards” that Dr. 

Keramida obtained. Those materials date back to the 1980s, and the Plaintiffs offer no reason 

why they could not have obtained them during discovery. In fact, the Plaintiffs do not 

acknowledge these materials in response to the motion or attempt to defend their late disclosure. 

The Court thus grants the motion to exclude the newly obtained water and sewer cards. 

Johnson Controls also objects to recent information Dr. Keramida gathered relating to the 

status of a water line that runs through the site. In her most recent supplement, Dr. Keramida 

noted that it has come to her attention that a waterline adjacent to the site may still be active. The 

Plaintiffs represent that they, Johnson Controls, and the City of Goshen had all previously 

believed the line had been taken out of service. At her deposition, Dr. Keramida testified about 

additional information she obtained subsequent to her report. She noted that she spoke to a 

Goshen employee, who revealed that a recent test showed that some water was still reaching a 

fire hydrant on the line, suggesting that the line was not completely sealed and raising the 

possibility that the line was still carrying water into homes in the neighborhood. Johnson 

Controls objects to this information as untimely. The Court agrees. 
6 

The Plaintiffs respond that the possibility that the water line is active is a new fact that 

did not come to light until recently. This may well be a “new fact.” The problem is that it 

shouldn’t be. The Plaintiffs had an extensive discovery period in which to conduct an 

investigation into any conditions that could pose an endangerment—an issue on which they bear 

the burden. They could have determined during that time the status of any water lines that could 

contribute to an endangerment. They haven’t offered an adequate explanation for why they did 

not do so. They cite new documents that came to light that triggered this inquiry, but haven’t 

shown either that the documents are so different from documents they had during discovery that 

they justify this untimely inquiry, or that the timing of the production of those documents was 

improper. 

Moreover, this new, untimely information is plainly prejudicial. Even by the Plaintiffs’ 

own description of this new evidence, it is tentative and would require further investigation to 

assess what amount of water is actually traveling through the line and whether and in what 

amount it may carry TCE to the Plaintiffs’ homes. Johnson Controls has no ability to conduct 

follow-up discovery into what exactly the City of Goshen determined about the water line, either. 

The Court therefore grants this motion and excludes the information obtained by Dr. Keramida 

about the water line after August 26, 2019 and any opinion based on that information. 

D. Dr. Keramida’s testimony about what RCRA requires 

Next, Johnson Controls moves to exclude any testimony by Dr. Keramida about what 

RCRA “requires.” The Court agrees that such testimony would be irrelevant; the question at trial 

is not whether Johnson Controls is in violation of any RCRA requirements, nor is the content of 

legal requirements subject to expert testimony. The Court thus grants the motion to that extent. 

The Plaintiffs clarified, however, that Dr. Keramida’s testimony in this regard will be limited to 
7 

identifying applicable screening or cleanup levels. If limited in that manner, this testimony 

would be acceptable. 

E. Dr. Orris’ supplemental opinion about sewer lines 

Johnson Controls also moves to exclude a supplemental opinion by Dr. Orris, a medical 

doctor who opines about the health effects of TCE. In his initial report, Dr. Orris opined that 

TCE may pose an endangerment to human health in the Plaintiffs’ neighborhood by inhalation of 

TCE vapors. After summary judgment, the Court reopened discovery for the narrow purpose of 

considering the most recent testing data and developments in the area. That testing data included 

sewer vapor sampling. Dr. Orris reviewed that data and addressed it in his supplemental report: 

“My concern over the threat of TCE exposure is also confirmed by sewer vapor sampling . . . 

within the sewer line along Monroe Street. Dr. Keramida’s testing showed levels of TCE as high 

as 270 μg/m3 within this sewer line . . . . These TCE vapors within the public sewer, which are 

connected to 1008 E. Monroe and other homes in the Neighborhood, present an imminent and 

substantial endangerment.” [DE 382-2]. Johnson Controls objects, arguing that this opinion 

about vapors in the sewers posing an endangerment is a new opinion that should have been 

included in the initial report. 

The Court agrees. Not only is this an untimely opinion, but it is difficult to see how the 

analysis in the supplemental report supports it. Dr. Orris is not opining that an endangerment 

would come from possible exposure within the sewer lines themselves; the concern is that the 

vapors in the sewers would migrate into homes in dangerous amounts. To the extent Dr. Orris is 

opining that the contamination in the sewers will reach the indoor air, though, that is an issue of 

vapor migration outside his expertise as a medical doctor. The Plaintiffs respond that he does not 

offer such an opinion, and that they will instead rely on Dr. Keramida to establish that the 

contamination in the sewers can reach the indoor air. The problem, however, is that Dr. Orris 
8 

does not couch his opinion in that manner, nor does he identify any assumption on which he is 

relying about how much contamination may reach the indoor air. He offers only a conclusory 

assertion that the “TCE vapors within the public sewer . . . present an imminent and substantial 

endangerment.” [DE 382-2]. Moreover, Dr. Orris already opined in his initial report that 

concentrations of TCE to which homes in the neighborhood have been exposed pose an 

endangerment to health. The Plaintiffs can rely on that initial opinion (subject to Johnson 

Controls’ Rule 702 objection), and can seek to establish through Dr. Keramida’s testimony that 

those concentrations are still at risk of occurring, whether through the sewers or otherwise. But 

Dr. Orris’ recent addition that the contamination in the sewers itself presents an endangerment 

extends beyond his initial report and lacks a sufficient explanation in his supplemental report. 

The Court thus grants this motion and excludes that opinion in Dr. Orris’ most recent 

supplemental report. 

F. Testimony by the plaintiffs themselves 

Johnson Controls next moves to exclude testimony by the plaintiffs themselves. It argues 

that the issues in this case—whether an endangerment exists and what remediation should 

occur—are highly technical and outside the knowledge of the individual plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs 

largely acknowledge that point. They have agreed to look again at whether to call the individual 

plaintiffs, and they intend to limit the scope of that testimony to relevant factual matters within 

their knowledge as lay witnesses. Based on those representations, the Court declines to exclude 

or further limit this testimony at this time, though it again encourages the Plaintiffs to consider 

whether this testimony is necessary to present at trial. Johnson Controls also objects that the 

Plaintiffs did not disclose themselves as witnesses in their disclosures. In response, the Plaintiffs 

agreed to limit the scope of their testimony to the matters they testified to at their depositions. 

Again, given that understanding, the Court declines to further limit this testimony at this time. 
9 

G. Laszlo Pinnyei 

Finally, Johnson Controls moves to exclude evidence relating to an individual named 

Laszlo Pinnyei, who used to live in the neighborhood. This motion is granted as unopposed. 

II. DAUBERT MOTIONS 

At summary judgment, the Court resolved each of the Daubert objections to Johnson 

Controls’ experts, as well as some of the Daubert objections to Dr. Keramida’s testimony 

relating to vapor intrusion in the Plaintiffs’ homes. The Court took under advisement the 

remaining objections, which addressed Dr. Orris’ opinions and the remainder of Dr. Keramida’s 

opinions. As the Court explained, those objections do not need to be resolved prior to trial in a 

bench trial. Because trial is necessary anyway, and because those opinions and the objections to 

them are complex, the Court believed it would be better positioned to resolve those objections 

after trial, once it has heard the testimony and considered all of the evidence. 

At a scheduling conference, Johnson Controls requested permission to file “very 

targeted” motions before trial on “very narrow” issues. [DE 361 p. 11]. The Court granted that 

permission. The motions Johnson Controls actually filed, though, are expansive and seek to 

exclude Dr. Keramida’s and Dr. Orris’ opinions almost in their entirety.1

 The Court understands 

that Johnson Controls’ first preference is to exclude those opinions at the outset. But the Court 

already decided at summary judgment not to do so. Johnson Controls’ present motion raises little 

beyond a disagreement with that decision, and the reasons the Court had for taking those 

objections under advisement pending trial apply equally now. Thus, the Court declines to 

entertain these motions in large part. 

 

1

 Johnson Controls nonetheless represents that it would raise still further objections at trial. [DE 

389 p. 4 n.3; 388 p. 2 n.1]. There is no reason to indulge that piecemeal motion practice.
10 

Only one issue raised in the motions is actually a narrow, discrete issue that can readily 

be resolved at this stage. In his August 2019 supplemental report, Dr. Orris opines that the level 

of TCE vapors detected in one home present an imminent and substantial endangerment to 

human health, “especially when the mitigation systems throughout this Neighborhood do not 

actually remove TCE from the environment, but instead pump it above ground and discharge the 

TCE back into the Neighborhood air.” [DE 382-2 ¶ 3]. Dr. Orris expanded on that opinion during 

his depositions, explaining that an endangerment exists in the neighborhood in part because the 

mitigation systems vent the TCE vapors into the outside air, where people in the community 

continue to be exposed to those vapors. [E.g., DE 389-1 p. 34 (“And there’s also, in this 

situation, a rather clear community exposure since [the mitigation systems] are pumping stuff out 

from -- from large amounts below the slabs and releasing it in the air just on the -- you know, 

one -- one story above. So clearly the exposures here were community wide . . . .”); 389-2 p. 49–

50, 52–53, 99–101]. 

This opinion fails Rule 702’s reliability prongs, as Dr. Orris failed to consider what 

amount of contamination would be produced in the outside air from vapors vented by the 

mitigation systems. As the Plaintiffs acknowledge, Dr. Orris did not “develop an opinion about 

the output at the end of the pipe.” [DE 417 p. 36]. In other words, he did not consider the level of 

TCE vapors that would result once the vapors left the mitigation systems and mixed with the 

outdoor air. Without considering what the concentrations would be once anyone encounters and 

inhales the vapors in the outside air, Dr. Orris has no basis upon which to opine that those 

exposures would create (or contribute to) an endangerment to human health. Nor does Dr. Orris 

identify any methodology that would allow him to draw such a conclusion. See Varlen Corp. v. 

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 924 F.3d 456, 459–60 (7th Cir. 2019); Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Allen, 600 
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F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir. 2010). Therefore, the Court excludes any opinion by Dr. Orris that the 

vapor mitigation systems are ineffective because they vent rather than treat the TCE vapors, or 

that they create an endangerment by venting the vapors into outdoor air. His opinions will be 

limited (subject to Johnson Controls’ outstanding objection) to any endangerment posed by the 

inhalation of TCE vapors in indoor air. 

III. EXHIBIT OBJECTIONS 

The parties filed numerous objections to exhibits. The Court addresses some of them 

below. The remaining objections (mostly going to relevance or foundation) are better resolved at 

trial should the need arise; the parties should raise those objections as appropriate at that time. 

Expert reports 

First, the Plaintiffs initially objected to the admission of expert reports, noting that those 

reports would typically constitute hearsay and would not be admitted into evidence at trial. They 

have now withdrawn that objection, and the parties each agree that both sides’ expert reports can 

be admitted into evidence (subject to any outstanding Daubert objections). Because this is a 

bench trial, the Court concurs that this is an effective way of streamlining trial and facilitating 

the presentation and understanding of the experts’ extensive and complex opinions, as suggested 

by the Manual for Complex Litigation. 

At the final pretrial conference, the parties also discussed the manner of presenting the 

experts’ testimony and whether any limits should be placed on their direct examinations. The 

Court declines to set time limits on direct examinations, as suggested, but wishes to offer two 

alternatives in that regard. First, the parties need not offer direct examinations at all. The experts’ 

opinions are already contained in their expert reports, which will be admitted into evidence, so 

the experts may adopt those reports without needing to recite their contents in court. See Manual 

for Complex Litigation § 12.51 (“[A] court may consider ordering witnesses under the parties’ 
12 

control to present their direct testimony in substantial part through written statements prepared 

and submitted in advance of trial. At trial, the witness is sworn, adopts the statement, may 

supplement the written statement orally, and is then cross-examined by the opposing counsel and 

perhaps questioned by the judge.”). If the parties wish to highlight certain aspects of the experts’ 

opinions during direct examinations, they may do so, but admitting the expert reports means the 

parties should need to spend little, if any, time on direct examinations. 

Second, along the same lines, the Court will permit the parties to offer the experts’ direct 

testimony through narrative statements submitted prior to trial, as outlined in the Manual for 

Complex Litigation. This approach is also suggested by the Civil Litigation Management 

Manual, p. 113 (2d ed. 2010) (suggesting that courts “have direct testimony of witnesses under 

the parties’ control submitted and exchanged in advance in narrative statement form”). This 

would allow the parties to prepare the direct testimony in advance, and would also promote 

clarity of the record and the efficient use of trial time. The Court will not require the parties to 

present the testimony in this manner, but the Court strongly encourages the parties to consider 

presenting direct testimony through the expert reports or written statements. Should the parties 

wish to offer written statements, they should file those statements two weeks prior to trial. In 

addition, all experts’ testimony should be limited to the opinions duly disclosed in their expert 

reports; whether the experts testify orally or in writing, the parties should be prepared offer 

specific citations to the experts’ reports in support of any opinions offered at trial. 

Supplemental figures prepared by Dr. Zeeb 

The Plaintiffs also object to supplemental figures prepared by Dr. Zeeb, which were 

disclosed for the first time the morning of his deposition—after the deadline for the disclosure of 

supplemental expert reports. Johnson Controls withdrew some of those exhibits, but stands on 
13 

others. Those include six exhibits that Dr. Zeeb updated from previous figures to reflect the most 

recent data,2 plus a spreadsheet to which Dr. Zeeb added calculations. Johnson Controls offers no 

excuse for its failure to disclose these exhibits by the deadline for producing supplemental 

reports. Instead, it argues primarily that the late disclosure was harmless because it produced the 

exhibits on the morning of Dr. Zeeb’s deposition, so the Plaintiffs could have asked him about 

the exhibits at that deposition. The Plaintiffs were still prejudiced by not being able to review 

those revised figures before the deposition, though. The Court set a deadline for the production 

of supplemental reports—at Johnson Controls’ urging, and over the Plaintiffs’ objection—so that 

the parties would have time to review the reports and prepare for the depositions. Johnson 

Controls also argues that these are figures Dr. Zeeb previously prepared, just updated with new 

data. But by failing to timely produce these updated figures, Johnson Controls deprived the 

Plaintiffs of the ability to meaningfully review the new figures so they could be prepared to 

question Dr. Zeeb in detail about any differences. Johnson Controls also argues that Dr. Zeeb 

merely added “some basic arithmetic” to the spreadsheet showing the pumping data from the 

wellfield. But basic or not, that calculation should have been in Dr. Zeeb’s report if Johnson 

Controls wished to rely on it. Neither side’s experts should be offering opinions not properly and 

timely disclosed in their reports. 

For those reasons, the Court sustains the Plaintiffs’ objection to these exhibits. However, 

Johnson Controls may use prior versions of these exhibits that were timely disclosed during 

discovery. 

 

2

 For example, two of the exhibits are maps of the area that depict the scope of the wellfield, with 

arrows showing the direction of groundwater travel. The arrows in the more recent versions of 

the figures point in slightly different directions than the originals, apparently reflecting the more 

recent data.
14 

Dockets of litigation involving the Plaintiffs 

The Plaintiffs object to printouts of court dockets of unrelated litigation involving some 

of the plaintiffs. Johnson Controls agreed to withdraw these exhibits. [DE 399 p. 7]. 

Demonstrative PowerPoint presentation 

Johnson Controls first objects to a PowerPoint presentation that the Plaintiffs intend to 

offer as a demonstrative exhibit, presumably in connection with an opening statement. Johnson 

Controls’ objections generally argue that the slides lack foundation or are unsupported by 

admissible evidence, or that the inferences they anticipate the Plaintiffs will attempt to argue 

based on those materials are unfounded. Parties, however, generally receive a fair degree of 

leeway in presenting demonstrative materials. Courts understand that demonstrative exhibits are 

“argumentative and persuasive in nature.” Baugh ex rel. Baugh v. Cuprum S.A. de C.V., 730 F.3d 

701, 708 (7th Cir. 2013). Demonstrative exhibits are not themselves evidence, and to the extent 

the Court finds that the exhibit at issue is not supported by evidence that has been admitted at 

trial, the Court will not consider it. As to Johnson Controls’ arguments that the materials 

underlying this demonstrative exhibit are inadmissible, the admissibility of those materials is 

better addressed in connection with those underlying exhibits, not indirectly through rulings as to 

a demonstrative exhibit. The Court thus overrules this objection and will allow the Plaintiffs to 

use this exhibit as a demonstrative aid, though the exhibit will not be introduced into evidence. 

Agency levels outside Indiana 

Johnson Controls next objects to exhibits reflecting the screening levels or similar 

guidance from agencies outside of Indiana. It argues that the site at issue is under the oversight of 

the Indiana Department of Environmental Management, so the levels adopted by other agencies 

are irrelevant. This objection is misplaced. As Johnson Controls is quick to point out in other 
15 

contexts, the issue at trial is not whether Johnson Controls is in compliance with its regulatory 

obligations—the Court granted summary judgment in Johnson Controls’ favor on the Plaintiffs’ 

“violation” claim. Instead, the question is whether the contamination may present an 

endangerment. And as discussed at summary judgment, courts have held that agency screening 

levels are an appropriate factor to consider in deciding that question. [DE 315 p. 12–13, 52–53]. 

Johnson Controls has offered no principled basis for holding that only the overseeing agency’s 

screening level is relevant in that regard—an endangerment claim is not governed by regulatory 

screening levels, and there is no reason that the same endangerment in one state should not be 

considered an endangerment in another just because the other state adopted more lenient 

standards. Indeed, RCRA’s citizen-suit provisions exist because an overseeing agency may fail 

or be unable to address an endangerment on its own. See Adkins v. VIM Recycling, Inc., 644 F.3d 

483, 499 (7th Cir. 2011). Johnson Controls is free to argue that Indiana’s levels are appropriate 

and that the other agencies’ levels are unsound or not indicative of an endangerment, but that is a 

question of weight, not admissibility. The Court thus overrules this objection. 

However, as noted at the final pretrial conference, the Court does not intend to allow any 

such materials that were not promulgated prior to the close of discovery in this case. New 

materials produced after that point create prejudice to the opposing side, and though some 

developments may have occurred (and may continue to occur), the Court must set limitations to 

allow trial to proceed and to ensure both sides have had the ability to confront any evidence. 

Judicial notice of agency materials

The Plaintiffs relatedly filed a motion for judicial notice of agency materials reflecting 

the screening levels adopted by various states or agencies. Under Rule 201, a court “may 

judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it . . . can be accurately 
16 

and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. 

Evid. 201(b)(2); Gen’l Elec. Cap. Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th 

Cir. 1997). The Plaintiffs’ motion identified a number of materials that have been published by 

various agencies through their respective websites, and they ask for judicial notice that the 

agencies adopted the action levels for TCE reflected in those materials. 

Johnson Controls opposes the motion, but its arguments are largely non-responsive to the 

Plaintiffs’ request, which is much narrower than Johnson Controls portrays it. Johnson Controls 

argues, for example, that judicial notice of agency action levels is inappropriate because the 

validity of those levels is hotly disputed in this case and even among the agencies. However, the 

Plaintiffs have clarified that they are not asking the Court to take judicial notice that any 

agency’s level is the correct one, only that an agency in fact adopted a particular level. The fact 

that an agency in fact adopted such a level cannot be reasonably disputed, as it is shown by the 

agency’s own publications.3

 That fact is also relevant. For example, one of the reasons Johnson 

Controls offers for discounting an action level on which the Plaintiffs rely is that it is an outlier 

that has been rejected by other agencies. The mere fact that other agencies have adopted similar 

levels is responsive to that weight-of-authority argument. 

Therefore, the Court grants the Plaintiffs’ request, only to the extent that the Court takes 

notice that the agencies made the statements or took the positions reflected in these materials. 

 

3

 In that respect, Johnson Controls is largely correct that the Plaintiffs’ request is akin to 

authenticating the materials in question—they are asking for judicial notice that the agencies said 

the things reflected in those materials, not that those statements are correct. Perhaps 

authentication would be the better way to frame the request, but the Court need not belabor that 

semantic distinction. To be clear, the Court grants the request for judicial notice solely to the 

extent the Plaintiffs articulated that request at the final pretrial conference: “We’re not asking the 

Court to do any more than judicially notice that these are publicly available websites. The 

agencies have taken the action they’ve taken. We’re not asking the Court to say these are the 

appropriate actions. And that’s the extent of it.” [DE 417 p. 64–65].
17 

Health effects of chemicals other than TCE 

In response to Johnson Controls’ objection, the Plaintiffs agreed to withdraw the exhibits 

pertaining to the health effects of chemicals other than TCE. [DE 409 p. 9]. 

Relevance objections 

Johnson Controls objects to multiple categories of exhibits on relevance grounds. This 

includes evidence of historical spills, exhibits pertaining to facts that have already been admitted 

or stipulated, testing data going back decades, discovery responses from Hostetler, testimony 

about the disposal of well “purge water” in sewers, IDEM’s 2003 request to investigate vapor 

intrusion, and other evidence. Though these categories encompassed scores and scores of 

exhibits in their exhibit list, the Plaintiffs now represent that they have winnowed the total 

number of exhibits they will likely use at trial to about fifty or sixty. They also represent that 

they anticipate being able to present their entire case in chief in about two days. 

Because this is a bench trial, the Court need not police relevance quite as strictly, and it 

need not be concerned about misleading or confusing the jury. If the evidence is not relevant, it 

will not affect the outcome, but that need not be decided as a matter of admissibility. Though in 

most instances the Court agrees with Johnson Controls that the evidence subject to these 

objections is of limited value, the Court declines to exclude this evidence at this time. However, 

should the parties detour into these issues at unnecessary length during trial, the Court will limit 

the evidence at that time. 

Asbestos 

The Plaintiffs agreed to withdraw the objected-to exhibits relating to asbestos. [DE 409 p. 

14]. 
18 

Tocon’s disposal of drums 

Johnson Controls objects to evidence of Tocon’s disposal of hazardous wastes at the site. 

In response, the Plaintiffs note that this evidence may be unnecessary if the Court grants entry of 

default against Tocon. The Court has now done so, which presumably moots this objection. 

Should any issue relative to these exhibits remain outstanding, the parties should raise it at trial. 

Hearsay 

Johnson Controls objected to almost fifty exhibits on the basis that they contain hearsay. 

It offers little explanation for its objections, though. The Plaintiffs also represent that many of 

these exhibits would be used only for rebuttal or impeachment (though they also agreed to 

withdraw some of these exhibits). Rather than walk through all of these objections for which 

neither party has developed an argument, the Court declines to resolve these objections at this 

time; Johnson Controls should object at trial if it believes an exhibit is inadmissible as hearsay. 

Scientific studies 

The Plaintiffs identified as exhibits a large number of scientific studies. Johnson Controls 

objected primarily on hearsay grounds. The Plaintiffs note in response that these are the studies 

their experts relied on, and that the studies themselves may qualify as learned treatises that can 

be read into evidence under Rule 803(18). In reply, Johnson Controls states that it will reserve its 

objection to these studies until trial. The Court agrees with that approach, and will address the 

use of these exhibits if necessary at trial. 

Johnson Controls’ Rule 30(b)(6) deposition 

Johnson Controls objects to the use of a transcript from the deposition of its own Rule 

30(b)(6) representative. The federal rules expressly allow the use of such a deposition, though. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3). Johnson Controls also objects that some parts of the deposition aren’t 
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relevant, but again, the Court declines to exclude the evidence on that ground at this time. 

Johnson Controls finally argues that the transcript should not be admitted, as the deposition 

should only be considered as oral testimony. This is a bench trial, though; the parties need not 

(and the Court will not permit them to) read the deposition into the record during trial when the 

Court can simply rely on the transcript for what was said. 

Demonstrative radon mitigation fan 

The plaintiffs listed as an exhibit an actual radon mitigation fan, which they say is similar 

to the type of system installed in their homes. They intend to use it for demonstrative purposes. 

Johnson Controls objects because it hasn’t seen or been able to inspect the item. The Plaintiffs 

should make the exhibit available to Johnson Controls prior to trial, but so long as Johnson 

Controls has had the ability to inspect the exhibit, the Court intends to permit its use as a 

demonstrative exhibit at trial. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

The Court grants in part and denies in part Johnson Controls’ motions in limine. [DE 

387]. The Court dismisses the motions to strike Dr. Keramida’s and Dr. Orris’ opinions [DE 388, 

389], except that it grants the motion to exclude Dr. Orris’ opinions that the vapor mitigation 

systems create an endangerment. The Court grants the Plaintiffs’ motion for judicial notice, to 

the extent explained above. [DE 410]. 

 SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED: October 28, 2019 

 /s/ JON E. DEGUILIO 

 Judge 

 United States District Court