UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

TRUSTEES OF THE MICHIANA )

AREA ELECTRICAL WORKERS )

PENSION FUND, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 2:14-CV-244-TLS

)

LA PLACE’S ELECTRIC COMPANY, )

INC., et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 44] 

filed by the Plaintiffs, the Trustees of the Michiana Area Electrical Workers Pension Fund, on 

June 11, 2018. The Defendants have not responded or otherwise opposed this Motion as of the 

date of this Opinion and Order.

BACKGROUND

The Plaintiffs previously moved for summary judgment [ECF No. 32] against Defendants 

La Place’s Electric Company, Inc. (LECI); LaPlace Electric, Inc. (LEI); and Harold Oscar 

LaPlace,1and asked the Court to hold that each Defendant owed withdrawal liability jointly and 

severally to the Plaintiffs under 29 U.S.C. § 1381 of the Multiemployer Pension Plan 

Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA). On February 15, 2017, the Court issued an Opinion and 

 

1 Harold Oscar LaPlace passed away on December 28, 2017. On April 11, 2018, the administrator of LaPlace’s 

Estate, Troy D. Warner, was substituted as a party for Defendant LaPlace. (See ECF Nos. 70, 72.)
2

Order [ECF No. 38] granting summary judgment against Defendants LECI and LEI, but 

withheld summary judgment as to Defendant LaPlace.2

LaPlace owned and operated LECI for 43 years as a union shop, but in 2010 LECI ceased 

operations due to financial difficulties. Thereafter in 2011, LaPlace established a new Indiana 

corporation, LEI. Like LECI, LEI was wholly owned and operated by LaPlace. Unlike LECI, 

LEI was a non-union shop. LaPlace used LEI to perform electrical contracting work without 

paying the periodic pension fund contributions to the Plaintiffs’ fund that LECI was required to 

pay under various collective bargaining agreements and a series of participation agreements. On 

these and additional facts non-germane to the present analysis, the Court found that LECI was 

liable to the Plaintiffs for withdrawal liability and that LEI was jointly and severally liable 

because both entities were involved in the same trade or business and were under the same 

common control. However, the Court reasoned that the factual record was not developed 

sufficiently to determine whether LaPlace was personally liable. (Opinion & Order 10.) 

The Plaintiffs now present additional evidence to establish that LaPlace was personally 

liable. This evidence shows that:

 LaPlace was the sole owner of LEI;

 His wife, Branda LaPlace, performed data entry work for LEI and also mailed 

bills on LEI’s behalf;

 Brenda claimed to have no ownership interest in LEI, that she was not employed 

by LEI, and that she did not receive wages or a salary from LEI;

 Despite this, LaPlace would write checks from LEI’s account for Brenda’s 

personal spending;

 

2 The Opinion and Order [ECF No. 38] also describes the relevant background that formed the basis for withdrawal 

liability of LEI and LECI.
3

 LaPlace’s son, Gene “Bud” LaPlace, was paid $30 per hour for 40 hours per 

week, regardless of how many hours he actually worked;

 LEI’s business office was in one of LaPlace’s bedrooms at his Indiana home;

 LEI paid for electric, utilities, and trash collection at the Indiana home, with no 

attempt to limit payment for the one room actually used by LEI;

 Brenda used her own van to drive LaPlace around for business, and never tracked

the mileage, but then received reimbursements from LEI for gas;

 LEI reimbursed gas expenses for both personal and business purposes for both 

Brenda and Bud;

 LEI would pay for the mortgage on the Indiana home and deduct the payment as a 

rent expense on tax returns;

 LEI also deducted thousands of dollars in auto, truck, and electric expenses;

 LEI paid thousands of dollars in rent to B&L Leasing, a company owned by 

Brenda that owns a non-functioning bucket truck, to use a non-functioning bucket 

truck;

 Despite not entertaining clients or providing meals to customers or employees for 

business purposes, LEI deducted expenses for grocery stores and restaurants made 

by Brenda;

 LEI paid for Brenda’s XM radio in her car;

 LEI also provided Brenda with a $2,000 payment in December 2016 for 

Christmas gifts for her grandchildren.

The Plaintiffs assert that under these facts, LaPlace is also jointly and severally liable for 

the withdrawal liability as a matter of law, and moves for summary judgment 
4

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). The nonmoving party must marshal and present the Court with evidence on which 

a reasonable jury could rely to find in his favor. Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 

651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). A court must deny a motion for summary judgment when the 

nonmoving party presents admissible evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact. 

Luster v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrs., 652 F.3d 726, 731 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). A court’s role 

in deciding a motion for summary judgment “is not to sift through the evidence, pondering the 

nuances and inconsistencies, and decide whom to believe. [A] court has one task and one task 

only: to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that 

requires a trial.” Waldridge v. Am. Heochst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). Facts that 

are outcome determinative under the applicable law are material for summary judgment 

purposes. Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 427 (7th Cir. 1997). Although a bare contention that an 

issue of material fact exists is insufficient to create a factual dispute, a court must construe all 

facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, view all reasonable inferences in that 

party’s favor, Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 491–92 (7th Cir. 2000), and avoid “the 

temptation to decide which party’s version of the facts is more likely true,” Payne v. Pauley, 337 

F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003).

DISCUSSION

The Plaintiffs argues that LaPlace may be held personally liable for the withdrawal 

liability under two different theories. First, they argue that he is an individual engaged in an 
5

unincorporated “trade of business” within the meaning of the MPPAA. Second, they assert that 

LaPlace is liable under corporate veil-piercing. The Court finds that the facts of this case are 

more relevant to the corporate veil-piercing theory, and, as such, the Court focuses its analysis 

there.

“Since ERISA has no special rules regarding shareholder liability, the Seventh Circuit 

has determined that state law controls the issue.” Chi. Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund 

v. Sunshine Carpet Servs., Inc., 866 F. Supp. 1113, 1118 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (citations omitted). In 

this case, the Court applies Indiana law. “As a general rule, Indiana courts are reluctant to 

disregard corporate identity and do so only to protect third parties from fraud or injustice when 

transacting business with a corporate entity.” Longhi v. Mazzoni, 914 N.E.2d 834, 838–39 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted). “The party seeking to pierce the corporate veil bears the 

burden of proving that the corporation is merely the instrumentality of another and that misuse of 

the corporate form constitutes a fraud or promotes injustice.” Id. at 839 (citations omitted). This

analysis is a “highly fact-sensitive inquiry.” Id. Indiana courts look for evidence showing the 

following when conducting this analysis:

(1) undercapitalization; (2) absence of corporate records; (3) fraudulent 

representation by corporation shareholders or directors; (4) use of the corporation 

to promote fraud, injustice or illegal activities; (5) payment by the corporation of 

individual obligations; (6) commingling of assets and affairs; (7) failure to observe 

required corporate formalities; or (8) other shareholder acts or conduct ignoring, 

controlling, or manipulating the corporate form.

Aronson v. Price, 644 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Ind. 1994). The list of factor is non-exhaustive, and not 

all factors must be shown to pierce the corporate veil. See D.S.I. v. Natare Corp., 742 N.E.2d 15, 

27 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

In this case, factors (4) through (8) weigh heavily in favor of piercing the corporate veil. 

LEI paid LaPlace’s mortgage payments and then deducted the payments as rental expenses. LEI 
6

paid for all electric and garbage service bills for the Indiana home, despite only using one room 

in the home. LEI paid for several non-business expenses for LaPlace, Brenda, and Bud, including

groceries, gas, satellite radio, restaurant meals, and phone service. LEI leased a bucket truck, 

which was located at the Indiana home, from Brenda’s company, B&L Leasing, for thousands of 

dollars over several years despite little evidence that the bucket truck was ever used. Brenda also 

received $2,000 for Christmas gifts for family members from LEI in December 2016. LaPlace, 

as sole owner of LEI, clearly used corporate funds for his own personal and familial benefits.

The Plaintiffs have demonstrated that, as a matter of law, LaPlace did not respect the corporate 

form and promoted an injustice on the Plaintiffs, and therefore is personally liable for LEI’s 

withdrawal liability.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 79] 

and DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in favor of the Trustees of the Michiana 

Area Electrical Workers Pension Fund and against Troy D. Warner, Administrator for the Estate 

of Oscar Harold LaPlace. Accordingly, the Estate, La Place’s Electric Company, Inc., and 

LaPlace Electric, Inc., owe withdrawal liability jointly and severally to the Plaintiffs in the 

amount of $317,968.61. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.

SO ORDERED on August 10, 2018.

s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FORT WAYNE DIVISION