IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

VALLEY FORGE INSURANCE COMPANY, )

Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant, )

v. ) Hon. William C. Lee, Judge

HARTFORD IRON & METAL, INC., et al., ) Cause No. 1:14-cv-6-WCL-SLC

Defendants and Counter-Plaintiffs. )

VALLEY FORGE INSURANCE COMPANY’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF

ITS MOTION TO EXCLUDE CERTAIN TESTIMONY OF PAUL F. AMORUSO

Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant Valley Forge Insurance Company (“Valley Forge”), by and 

through its counsel, files this brief in support of its Motion to Exclude Certain Testimony of Paul F. 

Amoruso pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Counsel for Defendant and Counter-Plaintiff 

Hartford Iron & Metal, Inc. (“Hartford Inc.”) retained Amoruso, who is a former insurance claims 

handler, to offer opinions related to claims practices and procedures in this case. If that were the 

extent of Amoruso’s opinions, then Valley Forge would not question his qualifications under Rule 

702, even though it disputes the correctness of his claims-handling opinions and conclusions.

Although issues concerning claims practices will be before the trier of fact in this case, so will 

other significant issues, including environmental engineering issues related to the remediation of the 

Hartford Iron site and the implementation of a stormwater management system; and coverage issues 

concerning which party is financially responsible for the remediation of the Hartford Iron site, and to 

what extent. Valley Forge retained experts with backgrounds in, and a thorough comprehension of, 

the applicable fields, including hydrogeology. Instead of also retaining experts in these areas, Hartford 

Inc.’s counsel has sought to have the former claims handler Amoruso offer opinions on these other 

topics that are clearly beyond his knowledge, training, and experience. In fact, Amoruso goes so far 

as to opine on the reliability and effectiveness of environmental engineering proposals for a 

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stormwater management system, despite having no knowledge, training, education, or experience in 

this area, and based in part on his supposition of what Valley Forge’s retained hydrogeologist with 40 

years of experience must have been “misunderstanding” and “not realiz[ing].” Similarly, Amoruso 

provides a legal interpretation of contractual terms that not only infringes on the province of the Court 

and renders some terms meaningless while ignoring the plain meaning of others, but does so, in part, 

on his ostensible divining of the underwriter’s intent more than 40 years ago.

Quite tellingly, Amoruso’s two expert reports bear a striking resemblance to the arguments 

Hartford Inc.’s counsel has repeatedly made during this case, which may explain why Hartford Inc.’s 

counsel refused to let Amoruso testify about whether he actually authored the opinions he claims as 

his own:

Q: Okay did you draft both of these, [reports] 1, and 2?

Mr. Shere: Objection. Calls for work product. Drafts are not 

discoverable. I instruct the witness not to answer.

Mr. Hodyl: I wasn’t asking about drafts.

Mr. Hodyl: Did you – did you draft – Did you author these two, 1 

and 2? That’s my question.

A: The opinions in 1 and 2 are my opinions.

Q: Right. But as far as actually typing out these 

documents, are these documents that you yourself 

wrote?

Mr. Shere: Objection, asked and answered. Objection, calls for 

work product information about the drafting process 

of preparing these reports. I instruct the witness not 

to answer.

(Dec. 6 Depo. Trans., attached as Exhibit 1, at 15:2-18). It may further explain why Amoruso has 

identified his compensation for “file review,” for “trial and deposition testimony,” and “for travel,” 

but not for writing the reports. (See Oct. 2, 2017 Report, attached as Exhibit 2 at 39; Nov. 6, 2017 

Report, attached as Exhibit 3). It may also explain why Amoruso’s reports read like a legal brief.

The opinions of Amoruso that stray far beyond his area of experience and knowledge are not 

the product of sound, careful, and independent research and analysis, but are instead based on 

conjecture, one-sided (and incomplete) data, and subjective beliefs, which may or may not have 

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originated as his own. Further compounding the problem is the fact that Amoruso neither possessed 

nor made any effort to obtain any specialized knowledge that could potentially qualify him as an expert 

and make his opinions of some value to the trier of fact in comprehending evidence or determining a 

fact in issue. Accordingly, the Court should preclude Amoruso’s opinions that are the subject of 

Valley Forge’s motion because he is not qualified to make them, he did not employ a trustworthy 

methodology to reach them, and they are of no assistance to the Court, thus rendering the testimony 

unreliable and inadmissible under Rule 702.

I. AMORUSO’S BACKGROUND AND THE OPINIONS AT ISSUE

Amoruso’s experience in the field of insurance is handling and managing claims, and the focus 

of Valley Forge’s motion is not his purported “claims handling” opinions.1 Valley Forge’s motion is 

directed solely at those opinions Amoruso has been retained to provide on matters far afield from 

insurance claims practices, including environmental engineering and contract interpretation.

A. Amoruso’s Environmental Opinions

Amoruso has no educational or work background in hydrogeology or any other environmental 

science. (See CV attached to Ex. 2; Ex. 1 at 84:18-22). He has no education or training as an engineer. 

(See CV attached to Ex. 1). He has never designed or constructed a stormwater management system, 

nor does he have any experience with a claim involving the type of system present at the Hartford 

Iron site. (See Ex. 1 at 287:17-23 (Q. “How many of those claims involved a proposal to direct 

contaminated storm water off the site to another location?” A. “Offhand right now, I can’t think of 

any.”)). Despite the foregoing, Amoruso offers environmental argument, conclusions, and opinions 

 1 Although Valley Forge does not contest Amoruso’s qualifications to opine about general claims-handling matters, it 

believes his opinions and conclusions in this area are incorrect. Valley Forge recognizes, however, that “the ultimate 

correctness of the expert’s conclusions” is not an issue before the Court in a Rule 702/Daubert analysis. See Schultz v. Akzo 

Nobel Paints, LLC, 721 F.3d 426, 431 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). 

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peppered throughout his reports, including the following opinions, which all together are referred to 

in this brief as his “Environmental Opinions”:

• On February 26, 2014, IDEM changed its April 17, 2012 instruction 

that remediation of PCBs should be carried out to the agency’s 

industrial screening level of 7.4 ppm. Instead, the agency set a cleanup 

level of 1 ppm PCBs ‘due to the recent PCB impacted storm water 

events.’ (Ex. 2 at 3).

• [Valley Forge hydrogeology expert Robert] Karls makes a single 

argument about delay of effective stormwater work. The argument 

provides no valid basis to attribute this delay to Hartford Iron. This 

issue illustrates broader failures of methodology in the Karls and 

[Bernd] Heinze reports. (Ex. 3 at 13, Opinion VIII).

o Karls says nothing about the supposed fault of Hartford Iron 

regarding this task, including the failure of Insurer’s coverage 

counsel to negotiate terms with Keramida in 2015. (Id. at 14, 

Opinion VIII.1).

o Effectively and completely capturing stormwater migrating 

from the Hartford Iron site is fairly easy and simple. (Ex. 1 at 

256:10-14, 21; 323:24-324:1).

o Claims director J. Alpine ended Insurer’s freeze on most 

contractor payments on or about August 1, 2016, allowing 

TEI’s construction of the effective stormwater controls as well 

as other work required by IDEM. (Id. at 15, Opinion VIII.2).

o Even after J. Alpine ended the payment freeze to contractors, 

Insurer failed to provide Hartford Iron the required legal 

defense to implement the work. (Id. at 16, Opinion VIII.3).

o Karls does not recognize that Keramida substantially revised 

its technical specifications as of December 7, 2015 to meet 

IDEM requirements. His lack of knowledge about the facts 

illustrates the broader failure in his report and the Heinze 

report to use reliable references and valid methodology to 

express opinions about claims management. (Id. at 16, 

Opinion VIII.4).

o Insurer’s proposal for a special master was not needed to build 

effective stormwater controls and would have caused further 

delay. (Id. at 17, Opinion VIII.5).

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o Under Insurer’s insurance policies and the arguments of 

coverage counsel, Hartford Iron could not reasonably advance 

substantial funds for effective contractor work in response to 

Insurer’s failure to meet its obligations. (Id. at 19, Opinion 

VIII.6).

Clearly, Amoruso is not qualified to opine on environmental matters, and his mere repetition of 

counsel’s arguments would be of no value to the trier of fact.

B. Amoruso’s Contract-Interpretation Opinions

Amoruso has never worked as an underwriter or studied, formally or informally, to be an 

underwriter. (See Ex. 1 at 83:24-84:3; 85:16-18; 235:24-236:2). In fact, he admits to having never 

personally underwritten a single insurance policy. (See id.) He holds himself out as an insurance claimshandling consultant who specializes in “[g]iving opinions and testifying in State and Federal court as 

to acceptable insurance practices involving claims, insurance agency’s [sic], bad faith, workers 

compensation, insurance principles and practices, [and] proper claims handling.” (Amoruso website, 

attached as Exhibit 4). Despite having no underwriting experience or training, Amoruso nonetheless 

opines that the Court should ignore plain and unambiguous cap language in the Settlement Agreement 

limiting Valley Forge’s financial obligations at the Hartford Iron site, and should instead adopt his legal 

opinion that Hartford Inc. is entitled to nearly $300,000,000 rather than the $15,300,000 in aggregate 

limits expressly stated in the policies at issue. Amoruso’s opinion revealingly parrots the argument 

Hartford Inc.’s counsel has repeatedly asserted for more than a year, long before Amoruso issued his 

first report. (E.g., Doc. No. 702 (counsel arguing Valley Forge’s “misrepresentation of aggregate 

limits” concerning policies that “provide additional tens or hundreds of millions of dollars of coverage 

for the environmental damage in this case”); Doc. No. 741-3 at 17-20 (counsel arguing he discovered 

“a bomb shell” because “[t]here’s no aggregate limit. There’s only occurrences”)).

Amoruso offers the following opinions, which are referred to in this brief as his “Contract 

Interpretation Opinions”:

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• Insurer and its related CNA companies issued liability policies for the 

Hartford Iron business that provide unlimited aggregate coverage, 

without reservation of rights, prior to October 24, 1979, resulting in 

occurrence-based coverage of approximately $298 million using 

conservative assumptions about the deposit and spread of 

contamination. (Ex. 2 at 11, Opinion C).

• Insurer made material omissions and misstatements in its late 

identification of policy years and coverage. (Id. at 15, Opinion D).

• The aggregate and occurrence policy limits apply only to certain claims 

payments. (Id. at 17, Opinion E).

• Insurer continues to withhold information about the Coyle 

Reinsurance Letter, but that letter accurately reflects the lack of 

aggregate limits for the pre-1979 policies. (Ex. 3 at 10, Opinion VII).

o Manual adjustments were customary. (Id. at 10, Opinion 

VII.1).

o Insurer made manual adjustments for Hartford Iron, which it 

tried to conceal. (Id. at 10, Opinion VII.2).

o Insurer did not use the payroll information submitted by 

Hartford Iron to calculate rates for its September 1, 1976 

policy renewal. (Id. at 10, Opinion VII.3).

o The underwriters of the mid-1970s policies did not intend to 

have an aggregate. (Ex. 1 at 344:23-345:5).

Amoruso’s opinions improperly seek to interpret the contracts at issue, which is the sole province of 

this Court.

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a dispute concerning two contracts – settlement agreements – between 

Valley Forge, on one hand, and Hartford Inc. and Alan Goldberg, on the other, which were entered 

April 17, 2009 (“Settlement Agreement”) and December 4, 2012 (“Supplemental Settlement 

Agreement”), respectively. (See Settlement Agreement at Doc. No. 45-4 and Supplemental Settlement 

Agreement at Doc. No. 6-1). After decades of the scrap-yard business allowing (and ignoring) the 

migration of polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”) and other contaminants into the bare ground, the 

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Indiana Department of Environmental Management (“IDEM”) and United States Environmental 

Protection Agency (“EPA”) required Hartford Inc. to remediate the soil on the site and to prevent 

the spread of contaminants offsite via migration in stormwater.2 The Settlement Agreements were 

generally intended to resolve insurance-coverage disputes between the parties about their respective

legal rights and obligations related to that remediation. 

Disputes between the parties arose again shortly after the execution of the Supplemental 

Settlement Agreement. Valley Forge grew frustrated with Hartford Inc.’s usurpation of control of the 

defense, including the almost immediate rejection of the appointed defense attorney, the third such 

experienced attorney rejected in almost as many years.3 Valley Forge was also frustrated that Hartford 

Inc. was obstructing August Mack’s ability to effectively and efficiently handle the remediation of the 

Hartford Iron site, including the stormwater management issue. After failed attempts to resolve these 

disputes and secure the rights it had bargained for through the Settlement Agreements, Valley Forge 

initiated this declaratory-judgment and breach-of-contract lawsuit.

One of the main issues for the trier of fact in this case will be who bears responsibility for the 

delays regarding the remediation of the Hartford Iron site, including the implementation of a 

stormwater management system, which primarily falls within the damages and remedies phase (Phase 

2) of the Court’s bifurcated case schedule. Hartford Inc. has also concocted a new issue in the case, 

that despite the parties’ agreement that Valley Forge’s entire indemnity obligation would be capped 

based on a reference to “the total of the aggregate liability limits of the Policies,” which amounts to 

approximately $15,300,000, the Court should effectively rewrite the Settlement Agreements and 

 2 Hartford Inc. has operated a scrap yard business on the site since 2005, and before that, Defendant Alan Goldberg and 

his father Louis Goldberg each operated scrap yard businesses as sole proprietors dating back to the middle of last century.

3 Not surprisingly, counsel of record for Hartford Inc. in this case later declared himself Hartford Inc.’s “chosen defense 

counsel.” (E.g., Doc. No. 455-20 at 35 filing by Mark Shere referencing “Hartford Iron’s chosen defense counsel (the 

undersigned)”).

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artificially expand the limit twentyfold to almost $300,000,000. (See Doc. No. 45-4 at 6). To reach 

this fantastical conclusion, Hartford Inc. insists that the Court must ignore the indemnity language in 

the Settlement Agreement and ignore that all the policies, none of which were issued to Hartford Inc., 

plainly and undisputedly list aggregate limits. With respect to both issues, Hartford Inc. has not 

retained an environmental expert or an underwriting expert, as Valley Forge has done, but has instead 

had Amoruso strain well beyond his claims-handling background to opine on matters about which his 

testimony is entirely unreliable.

III. LEGAL AUTHORITIES

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires a district court to ensure that proffered expert 

testimony is both reliable and relevant, and sets forth who may provide expert-opinion testimony. See 

FED. R. EVID. 702; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-95 (1993) 

(explaining the framework for assessing expert testimony). Reliability has consistently been the 

hallmark of the Supreme Court’s decisions when evaluating expert testimony under Rule 702. Hartman 

v. EMSCO Indus., Inc., 758 F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 2014). 

All expert testimony under Rule 702 is subject to the Daubert analysis. S.V. Gopalratnam v. 

Hewlett-Packard Co., 877 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir. 2017); Lyons v. Leatt Corp., 322 F.R.D. 327, 338 (N.D. 

Ind. 2017). District courts play a gatekeeper role under Rule 702 in which they “must evaluate: (1) the 

proffered expert’s qualifications; (2) the reliability of the expert’s methodology; and (3) the relevance of the 

expert’s testimony.” Gopalratnam, 877 F.3d at 779 (emphasis in original). A court will not permit a 

party to introduce expert testimony unless it can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

testimony satisfies the Daubert standard. Kirk v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 870 F.3d 669, 673 (7th Cir. 2017); 

see also Bickel v. Pfizer, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 918, 920 (N.D. Ind. 2006).

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IV. ARGUMENT - AMORUSO’S OPINIONS DO NOT SATISFY THE 

REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 702 AND DAUBERT AND MUST BE 

EXCLUDED

Amoruso signed two reports that address an array of issues, including environmental and legal 

contract-interpretation issues, about which he is utterly unqualified to opine and for which he did not 

bother to conduct even the most basic research. His methodology, which appears to have started 

with a predetermined conclusion that he attempted to backfill with subjective beliefs, conjecture, and 

intentionally selective facts, blatantly runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s hallmark for expert-testimony 

cases – reliability. See Hartman v. EMSCO Indus., Inc., 758 F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 2014). For example, 

although Amoruso has no education, training, or experience about the design and engineering of 

stormwater management systems, and he did not read any treatises or consult any professionals in the 

field, he nonetheless gives an opinion regarding which stormwater management proposal “provide[d] 

a sound engineering for control of stormwater” (Ex. 3 at 13). Moreover, he based his conclusion, at 

least in part, on what he divined to be a “misunderstanding of the [stormwater] work” by a 

hydrogeologist retained as an expert for Valley Forge, who, unlike Amoruso, has a formal education 

and almost four decades of hands-on experience in the relevant field. (See id. at 16-17).

Similarly, despite the fact (or perhaps because of it) he has zero underwriting experience and 

training, Amoruso deduced that when the underwriter(s) identified an aggregate limit of $50,000, what 

the underwriter(s) actually meant was that there should be no aggregate limit at all: “I don’t think that 

was [the underwriters’] intent at all to have an aggregate. ... I think they intentionally did not want an 

aggregate.” (Ex. 1 at 344:23-345:5). Such unqualified and speculative conclusions fail to satisfy each 

of the three Rule 702 steps articulated by the Seventh Circuit and are precisely what Rule 702 and 

Daubert are designed to preclude. See Gopalratnam v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 877 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir. 

2017); Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).

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A. Amoruso’s Environmental Opinions Should Be Barred

Amoruso’s Environmental Opinions are little more than a poorly camouflaged repetition of 

legal arguments put forward by Hartford Inc.’s counsel in this case. These arguments concern who 

bears responsibility for the delayed implementation of an effective stormwater management system. 

For example, he argues that 40-year hydrogeologist Karls’s opinion “is defective in several ways”; that 

Karls fails “to attribute this delay [of the installation of a stormwater management system] to Hartford 

Iron”; that Valley Forge’s payments to contractors in August 2016 allowed for the “construction of 

the effective stormwater controls”; and that Karls has a “lack of knowledge” of certain facts, and has

a “misunderstanding of the [stormwater] work.” (See Ex. 3 at 13-14, 16). These are arguments, not 

proper expert opinions. See Roundy’s Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 674 F.3d 638, 648 (7th Cir. 2012) 

(holding that the proffered expert testimony amounted “to legal arguments that should be presented 

to the court in counsel’s analysis, not expert opinion testimony”). Thus, whether Amoruso’s 

statements related to this issue are treated as opinions or arguments leads to the same conclusion – he 

lacks any legal basis under Rule 702 or otherwise to proffer them. 

1. Amoruso Is Not Qualified

The central premise of Amoruso’s Environmental Opinions is the purported “sound 

engineering” and “effective[ness]” of the stormwater management system at the Hartford Iron site. 

When considering Amoruso’s lack of any practical experience or academic or technical training in the 

environmental sciences, including hydrogeology and environmental engineering, it is glaringly obvious 

that he is not qualified to opine about the engineering or effectiveness of stormwater management 

systems or other environmental activities. To be clear, Amoruso has no academic or technical training 

or practical experience in any environmental science. (See CV attached to Ex. 2; Ex. 1 at 84:18-22). 

He has no education or training as an engineer. (See CV attached to Ex. 2). Moreover, he admittedly 

has absolutely no experience with any claims involving the type of stormwater management system 

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installed at the Hartford Iron site, in which stormwater is captured and routed from an industrial site 

to an offsite location. (Ex. 1 at 287:17-23).

Moreover, as previously mentioned, Amoruso seeks to buttress his unqualified environmental 

assessments through some unexplained psychic analysis of Karls’s mindset: “his lack of knowledge 

about the facts”; “his misunderstanding of the [stormwater] work”; his failure to “realize” facts about 

the stormwater work and that the design of the stormwater system changed; and his “reli[ance]” on 

the incorrect evidence. (See Ex. 3 at 16, 17). In addition to being mere conjecture, there is absolutely 

nothing in Amoruso’s education, training, or background that qualifies him to offer opinions about 

the mindset, knowledge, or understanding of another expert, particularly a person he has never met 

and with whom he has never communicated. Thus, Hartford Inc. cannot meet its burden of 

establishing that Amoruso is qualified to provide his Environmental Opinions.

2. Amoruso’s Methodology Is Not Reliable

Amoruso’s Environmental Opinions include: (1) the “stormwater basin and capture system” 

“consisted of the only controls ever proposed or implemented at the Hartford Iron site to provide a 

sound engineering for control of stormwater” (Ex. 3 at 13); (2) the system “provided the only set of 

stormwater controls for the Site approved by IDEM” (id.); (3) the system constituted “effective 

stormwater controls” (id. at 14, 15, 16, 17); and (4) that “[o]n February 26, 2014, IDEM changed its 

April 17, 2012 instruction that remediation of PCBs should be carried out to the agency’s industrial 

screening level of 7.4 ppm” (Ex. 2 at 3). These conclusions were not reached through “the same level 

of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert” in the field of hydrogeology or 

environmental engineering. See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152. In fact, they are merely conclusory 

statements lacking any analysis or discussion linking the opinions and the facts. See C.W. ex rel. Wood 

v. Textron, Inc., 807 F.3d 827, 837 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Salgado v. General Motors Corp., 150 F.3d 735, 

741 n.6 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Expert reports must include ‘how’ and ‘why’ the expert reached a particular 

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result, not merely the expert’s conclusory opinions”); Bickel v. Pfizer, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 918, 920-21 

(N.D. Ind. 2006) (internal quotes omitted) (“A witness’s own training and experience may be the 

foundation for an expert opinion, but the witness must explain how that experience leads to the 

conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience 

is reliably applied to the facts”).

For example, during his deposition, Amoruso was questioned about the basis for his 

conclusion that IDEM had previously set an “industrial screening level of 7.4 ppm” on “April 17, 

2012.” Even when he was provided with the two-page April 17, 2012 letter that he identified in his 

report as the purported basis for his conclusion that 7.4 ppm was the “industrial screening level,” he 

could not identify the basis for his conclusion:

Q: Can you tell me where, on [the April 17, 2012 letter], does 

IDEM have an instruction that remediation of PCBs should be 

carried out to the agency’s industrial screening level of 7.4 part 

per million? Where in this letter?

* * *

A: I don’t see that here. But 7 was the accepted level at that 

time.

Q: 7.4 was the accepted level?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Based on what?

A: I couldn’t tell you right now. I honestly can’t. I – I’m 

confident that it was. ... I was comfortable with it when I 

wrote that. I don’t remember why or where.

* * *

A: I don’t know, honestly, where I got it from, to be honest 

with you. ...

(See Ex. 1 at 290:7-292:4 (emphasis added)). He also could not state whether his opined soil 

remediation standard was, in fact, a standard or just a possible consideration by IDEM. (See Ex. 1 at 

292:17-22). Even more egregious was Amoruso’s testimony that he did not even bother to read the 

deposition transcript from this case of three IDEM employees testifying as IDEM’s official designees, 

who were all personally involved with the Hartford Iron site, and who were deposed a month before 

he issued his second report. (See Ex. 1 293:8-16).

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In addition to the foregoing, many of the bases for Amoruso’s Environmental Opinions were 

nothing more than conjecture. For instance, Amoruso could not cite any support for his supposition 

that all environmental work performed at the Hartford Iron site required IDEM’s approval, including 

August Mack’s proposed underground sump. (See Ex. 1 326:4-17 (citing his “belief” based on 

“everything I’ve seen”); 327:20-328:19 (“I think” August Mack needed approval)). He concluded that 

August Mack’s stormwater management proposal, which he initially appeared not to know about (see 

id. at 285:21-286:5), could not work because, as he conceded, it did “not make any sense to me” (see 

id. at 392:8-13; see also id. at 256:10-14 (Amoruso describing the process of capturing and containing 

contaminated stormwater from the Hartford Iron site as “a fairly easy pollution problem” that is 

“really simple”)). Such conjecture also involved Amoruso’s unqualified opinion concerning the mental 

processes of hydrogeologist Karls, discussed earlier. (Ex. 3 at 16-17).

Hartford Inc. cannot establish that Amoruso’s methodology with respect to his 

Environmental Opinions is reliable because he clearly did not employ the “the same level of 

intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” See Kumho Tire, 526 

U.S. at 152. An expert in an environmental science field would, as a practical matter, begin with a 

foundation of knowledge that Amoruso wholly lacks, merely by the nature of that person’s expertise. 

That expert would nonetheless still study the relevant environmental regulations, review the directly 

applicable testimony of the governing body (i.e., IDEM), and conduct (or have conducted by a 

qualified person) the necessary engineering analyses. Amoruso did none of these things, and instead 

based his opinions on his thoughts, beliefs, and a partial set of facts. Thus, Amoruso’s Environmental 

Opinions should be precluded because Hartford Inc. cannot establish that Amoruso employed a 

reliable methodology in reaching his conclusions.

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3. Amoruso’s Testimony Will Not Assist the Trier of Fact

Under Rule 702, if the “expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” does not 

“help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue,” then the proffered 

opinion testimony is precluded. FED. R. EVID. 702; Hartman, 758 F.3d at 819. It is hard to imagine 

how Amoruso’s unqualified Environmental Opinions premised on conjecture could be of any 

assistance whatsoever to the trier of fact. As already established, Amoruso wholly lacks “scientific, 

technical, or other specialized knowledge” regarding stormwater management issues, hydrogeology, 

environmental science and engineering, etc. to offer any environmental opinions. His arguments, 

conjecture, and unqualified environmental opinions cannot help the trier of fact in any regard. Thus, 

under the third step of the Court’s gatekeeping analysis, Amoruso’s Environmental Opinions should 

be excluded because they neither concern a fact about which Amoruso possesses scientific, technical, 

or other specialized knowledge, nor a fact that the Court requires Amoruso’s assistance to understand.

B. Contract-Interpretation Opinions

Hartford Inc.’s counsel has repeatedly asserted a truly specious argument based on a false 

premise to render the indemnity payment cap that the parties agreed to through the Settlement 

Agreements meaningless. Amoruso did nothing more than parrot counsel’s specious argument in the 

disguise of an opinion that both infringes on the province of the Court and, as with the Environmental 

Opinions, was made without the necessary experience, training, education, or knowledge to satisfy 

Rule 702.

1. Amoruso Is Not Qualified

The crux of Amoruso’s Contract-Interpretation Opinion is his conclusion that a $50,000 

property damage aggregate limit in a 1975-1978 insurance policy should be ignored by the Court and 

that Valley Forge should be exposed to up to approximately $300,000,000 in potential liability to 

Hartford Inc., under that policy alone, for its defense and the remediation of the site. This conclusion 

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is grossly incorrect, and based on shoddy facts and a wholly unreliable methodology, which are 

discussed in the next section. For purposes of step one of the Court’s gatekeeping analysis, however, 

it is enough to note that: (1) interpretation of a contract, including an insurance policy, is a legal matter 

for the Court to decide; and (2) Amoruso’s claims background does not provide him with the 

knowledge, experience, training, or education necessary to opine about underwriting matters.

Here, there is no policy-interpretation issue regarding the extent of Valley Forge’s indemnity 

obligation because the Settlement Agreement defined Valley Forge’s “Indemnity Payment Cap” as an 

amount that “shall not exceed the total of the aggregate liability limits of the Policies.” (Doc. No. 45-

4 at 6). In other words, for all policies issued to Alan Goldberg (no policy was issued to Hartford 

Inc.) that had stated aggregate limits, those limits should be added together to comprise the “indemnity 

payment cap.” This straightforward calculation requires no “expert” assistance to the trier of fact.

Even if there were a policy-interpretation issue, it would be “‘primarily a question of law for 

the court.’” Westfield Ins. Co. v. Orthopedic & Sports Med. Ctr. of N. Indiana, Inc., 247 F. Supp. 3d 958, 967 

(N.D. Ind. 2017) (quoting Wagner v. Yates, 912 N.E.2d 805, 808 (Ind. 2009)). Where the provision of 

an insurance contract is clear and unambiguous, it should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. See 

Allgood v. Meridian Sec. Ins. Co., 836 N.E.2d 243, 247 (Ind. 2005). See also Haag v. Castro, 959 N.E.2d 

819, 821-22 (Ind. 2012) (holding that “an ambiguity is not affirmatively established simply because 

controversy exists and one party asserts an interpretation contrary to that asserted by the opposing 

party”) (internal quotes omitted). Here, the 1975-1978 policy information available plainly identified 

$50,000 as the property damage liability aggregate. (See, e.g., Limits Changed Endorsement and

Certificate of Insurance, attached as Exhibit 5). Accordingly, Amoruso’s opinion improperly infringes 

on the province of the Court and is premised on a false double-assumption of ambiguity – first, that

the Settlement Agreement, which plainly stated the extent of Valley Forge’s indemnity obligation, is 

ambiguous; and second, that the 1975-1978 policy, which plainly identified the property damage 

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liability aggregate, is ambiguous. The assumption of ambiguity itself is unreliable because Amoruso 

admitted that he did not evaluate the Settlement Agreement, but rather focused almost exclusively on 

the Supplemental Settlement Agreement even though the latter expressly incorporated the former: 

A: ... the second [agreement] is where I spent a lot of my time. 

And as I say, I didn’t really get into one, just to read it and 

understand what it was.

(Ex. 1 at 308:14-19 (emphasis added)).

Q: If the second settlement agreement doesn’t address an issue 

that’s in the first settlement agreement, what’s your 

understanding of – of that – the term in the first agreement?

[Objection omitted.]

A: I don’t know.

Q: Okay.

A: Never gave it any thought. It would be a legal conclusion. 

I’d have to give it some thought, but I never did.

Q: All right. But you did that – You did do an analysis of the 

second settlement agreement for purposes of your opinions 

that are on 21 and 22; is that correct?

A: Yes.

(Id. at 311:20-312:14 (emphasis added)) (See also Doc. No. 6-1 at 4 (“The intent of the parties is for 

this Second Agreement to supplement, rather than replace, the First Confidential Settlement 

Agreement and Limited Release (April 17, 2009)”).

Moreover, even if expert testimony on the issue were appropriate (which it is not), Amoruso 

clearly lacks the requisite qualifications to comment on the “customary” practices. (See Ex. 3 at 10). 

He has never worked as an underwriter or studied, formally or informally, to be an underwriter. (See

Ex. 1 at 83:24-84:3; 85:16-18; 235:24-236:2).4

 In fact, he holds himself out as a person who specializes 

in claims-handling practices. (See Ex. 4). Even though he lacks underwriting experience and training, 

he testified that he did not bother to read or consult treatises on underwriting, and did not examine 

opinions or analyses by experienced underwriters. (See Ex. 1 at 235:3-17).

 4 By comparison, Valley Forge expert James Robertson has a background in underwriting that includes working as an 

underwriter, teaching underwriting, and authoring publications on underwriting. (See CV attached to Ex. 6).

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When analyzing whether an expert is qualified to provide an opinion, the Court must focus 

on whether the expert’s “qualifications provide a foundation for [the expert] to answer a specific 

question,” and “not whether an expert witness is qualified in general.” Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 

617 (7th Cir. 2010). See also U.S. v. Allen, 207 F. Supp. 2d 856, 863 (N.D. Ind. 2002) (quoting Smith v. 

Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 718 (7th Cir. 2000)) (advising that “the court should consider a proposed 

expert’s ‘full range of practical experience as well as academic or technical training’”). Amoruso’s 

Contract-Interpretation Opinions involve an analysis of terms, operations, and calculations, some of 

which are archaic/historical (e.g., whether the policy was rated on a remuneration basis), and that are 

unique to insurance underwriting. (See Ex. 3 at 10-12). Analyzing questions of customary underwriting 

practices, whether a policy was rated on a remuneration basis, whether the premium was calculated 

based on payroll information, etc. requires something greater than a rudimentary knowledge of the 

general topic of underwriting, which, at most, is what Amoruso possesses. In other words, the 

“specific question,” as presented by Hartford Inc., concerns particular underwriting matters – namely, 

whether the 1975-1978 policy was rated on a remuneration basis – about which Amoruso is not 

qualified to testify even if he is qualified to testify about general insurance issues. See Gayton, 593 F.3d 

at 617.

District courts, including this Court, have routinely distinguished between whether a witness 

is generally qualified to offer expert testimony concerning an area or field that may be relevant to the 

case versus whether the witness is qualified to offer the specific testimony proffered. For example, in 

Allen, the Court was trying to determine whether a witness was qualified to offer testimony comparing 

the impression of a shoe print left inside a burglarized bank with footwear recovered from the 

defendant at the time of his arrest. 207 F. Supp. 2d at 856. The expert witness was the Police Forensic 

Examiner who had “five years experience as a forensic examiner,” and had “undergone substantial 

training in the areas of fingerprint, palm print, footwear, tire track and other physical comparisons.” 

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Id. at 858, 864. The witness also was “a certified law enforcement instructor” who had “instructed 

numerous groups in latent fingerprint processing,” which the Court noted was “a process similar to 

the science of footwear impression.” Id. at 864.

Considering the foregoing, nobody could reasonably dispute that the Forensic Examiner was 

qualified in the field of forensic science. The Court noted, however, that the issue before it under its 

Daubert and Rule 702 analysis was not whether the witness was generally qualified in the field of 

forensic science, but whether he was specifically qualified to offer the expert testimony being proffered 

about impressions evidence. See id. The Court noted that it did not know whether the witness was 

“proficien[t] in obtaining impression evidence, how frequently he utilizes his training in the area of 

impressions evidence, how often he is proficiency tested, etc.” Id. “Without such evidence before it, 

the court cannot conclude with any certainty that [the witness] is qualified to offer an opinion on 

footwear impression evidence.” Id.

Applying the Court’s analysis in Allen to examine whether Amoruso is qualified to offer 

opinion testimony on whether the 1975-1978 policy was rated on a remuneration basis, it is clear that 

Amoruso wholly lacks the knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to offer such testimony. 

In Allen, the Court could not conclude under Rule 702 that the Forensic Examiner was qualified to 

opine on footwear impression evidence even though the Examiner had specific experience and 

substantial training in the field and was a certified instructor of a process that the Court acknowledged 

was “similar to the science of footwear impressions.” Id. Amoruso, on the other hand, has no 

experience, education, or “substantial training” as an underwriter. (See Ex. 1 at 83:24-84:3; 85:16-18; 

235:24-236:2). He did not read or consult treatises on underwriting, did not examine opinions or 

analyses by experienced underwriters, and is not otherwise a student of underwriting. (See Ex. 1 at 

235:3-17). As Allen illustrates, whether Amoruso is generally qualified in the field of insurance has no 

bearing on whether he is specifically qualified to opine on questions of underwriting matters. He 

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clearly is not. See also Dartey v. Ford Motor Co., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D. Ind. 2000) (this Court 

holding that a metallurgical engineer with decades of experience was qualified to testify about how 

metal cables failed in a tailgate, but not about alternate designs or whether the cables had a design 

defect, because that was too far beyond the engineer’s scope of expertise).

As the decisions of this Court establish, while Amoruso may generally be qualified to opine 

about matters concerning claims handling, Hartford Inc. cannot meet its burden of establishing that 

he is qualified to opine about underwriting matters merely because both claims and underwriting fall 

within the broad general subject matter of insurance. Consequently, Amoruso’s ContractInterpretation Opinions should be barred.

2. Amoruso’s Methodology Is Not Reliable

Amoruso’s opinion that a three-year policy spanning from October 24, 1975 to October 24, 

1978 “provide[s] unlimited aggregate coverage ... resulting in occurrence-based coverage of 

approximately $298 million using conservative assumptions” provides an extreme example of a 

supposedly independent witness disregarding the intellectual rigor required under Rule 702 and 

crossing the line from expert witness to party advocate. The methodology Amoruso employed to 

reach the opinion exemplifies that of a person who first settles on (or is provided with) a 

predetermined conclusion and then, after-the-fact, searches desperately for facts and data to prop up 

that conclusion. Hartford Inc. cannot establish the reliability of Amoruso’s methodology by a 

preponderance of the evidence, and thus cannot satisfy Rule 702. See Gopalratnam, 877 F.3d at 779.

The Contract-Interpretation Opinions fail to satisfy Rule 702 for several reasons. First, the 

opinions are based on an incorrect assumption repeatedly asserted by Hartford Inc.’s counsel and now 

blindly adopted by Amoruso – namely, that there is a policy-interpretation issue before the Court 

regarding whether and how the aggregate limits of the 1975-1978 policy applies. Beyond the 

inaccuracy and inappropriateness of the position, if Amoruso is operating from the assumption that 

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whether and to what extent the aggregate limits of the 1975-1978 policy are in issue, then reliable 

methodology dictates that he at the very least identify this assumption and the basis for it. See Salgado, 

150 F.3d at 741 n.6 (“Expert reports must include ‘how’ and ‘why’ the expert reached a particular 

result, not merely the expert’s conclusory opinions”). The law is clear that an expert cannot merely 

rely on information provided by a party or counsel, but must independently verify that information 

prior to using it in any analysis or calculation. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., 

980 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1048 (N.D. Ind. 2013). Amoruso’s failure to even identify, let alone explain or 

verify, his assumption illustrates that his methodology was unreliable from the start and contrary to 

Daubert and Rule 702.

Second, building on the unidentified and unexplained assumption that the 1975-1978 policy 

and its aggregate limits are at issue, Amoruso concludes that the policy documents, which expressly 

states there is a $50,000 aggregate limit, in fact means there is almost $300 million in coverage. (Id. at 

11-13). An expert must use “the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an 

expert in the relevant field.” Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152. In his first report, Amoruso references a 

handful of policy documents in relation to his Contract-Interpretation Opinions, but he does not 

analyze any of them. (See Ex. 2 at 11-14). Amoruso instead relies solely on one internal letter written 

by claims analyst Kathy Coyle in 2013 in which Coyle, in a footnote, (incorrectly) stated that the 

referenced policies have applicable property damage aggregate limits only if they “were rated on a 

‘remuneration basis’” and that they “were not rated on a remuneration basis, so there is no applicable 

[property damage] aggregate limit.” (Doc. No. 734-6 at 2).

Amoruso’s reliance exclusively on Coyle’s letter falls fatally short of the “intellectual rigor” 

required per Rule 702. As an initial matter, Coyle, like Amoruso, is a claims professional, not an 

underwriter. (Doc. No. 737-18 at 10:18-12:17). To exercise “the same level of intellectual rigor that 

characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field” – here, underwriting – Amoruso should 

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have at a bare minimum analyzed the relevant policy documents. He did not. Amoruso instead relied 

on a non-underwriter’s comment that supported his predetermined conclusion and ignored the policy 

documents, which identify an aggregate limit for property damage liability. (See Ex. 2 at 11-16; Ex. 5).

Amoruso also fails to explain why he seemingly takes Coyle’s underwriting conclusion (which 

is absent any supporting analysis) as infallible when the crux of his expert reports is aimed at criticizing 

Coyle’s allegedly serious mistakes as a claims handler of the Hartford Iron matter. Amoruso also fails 

to even consider, let alone analyze, the impact of Coyle’s testimony that, “I really don’t have a good 

understanding of remuneration,” thereby conceding that she did not comprehend what she was 

writing about. (Doc. No. 737-19 at 221:2-12). Amoruso selectively cites Coyle’s deposition, but 

tellingly omits any acknowledgment or analysis of Coyle’s clear lack of understanding of a material 

element necessary to reach her (incorrect) conclusion and support his opinions. Thus, his blind 

reliance on, and nonobjective framing of, the letter is contrary to good methodological practice and 

seeks to invade the province of the trier of fact by trying to displace the Court’s assessment of the 

credibility of Coyle’s statement with his own partisan conclusions.

The Seventh Circuit has often cited the factors set forth in the Advisory Committee’s notes 

to Rule 702 as helpful tools in evaluating an expert’s reliability. See, e.g., Gopalratnam, 877 F.3d at 779-

80. One such factor is “whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious alternative 

explanations.” Here, Amoruso failed to acknowledge or account for an obvious alternative 

explanation; namely, that Coyle – who is not an underwriter and who admitted she did not understand 

what “remuneration” means, and whose abilities Amoruso otherwise questions – was wrong, and the 

plain language of the policy documents identifying an aggregate limit for property damage liability was 

right. See Lennon v. Norfolk and Western Railway Co., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1152 (N.D. Ind. 2000) 

(rejecting expert’s methodology that relied on select literature, including a study found to lack 

sufficient statistical proof).

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Other than Coyle’s letter, Amoruso’s first report entirely omits citations and analysis that 

support his Contract-Interpretation Opinions. For example, Opinion E in Report 1 (“The aggregate 

and occurrence policy limits apply only to certain claims payments”) is comprised primarily of 10 

numbered paragraphs over two pages purporting to summarize the “difference between qualifying 

indemnity payments and other types of payments.” (Ex. 2 at 17-18). Yet the section includes no 

discussion or analysis, and consists of only a series of general conclusions without any application to 

the facts. (Id.) Experts must “connect the dots” between the facts and their opinions, and Amoruso 

failed to do so here. See C.W. ex rel. Wood, 807 F.3d at 837. He offered no explanation of the “how” 

and “why” he reached his conclusions, just conclusory opinions. See Salgado, 150 F.3d at 741 n.6.

As discussed earlier, Amoruso has never been an underwriter. (See Ex. 1 at 83:24-84:3; 85:16-

18; 235:24-236:2). One could reasonably assume that a person analyzing a topic outside of his area of 

expertise would consult treatises on the topic or study the opinions of professionals and experts who 

have worked in the relevant area. Amoruso did neither. (Id. at 235:9-17). Moreover, unlike the claimshandling portions of his first report, which reference Amoruso’s years of experience as a claims 

manager (e.g., Ex. 2 at 20), his examination of “extensive information” in connection with his claims 

analysis (id. at 19), and the purported claims standards and procedures “that are thoroughly familiar” 

to him (id. at 19-21), the underwriting portions of his report contain no such references. There is no 

discussion of Amoruso’s experience with underwriting because he does not have any. (See Ex. 1 at 

83:24-84:3; 85:16-18; 235:24-236:2). There is no reference to his analysis of the available information 

because he merely relied on Coyle’s letter. (See Ex. 2 at 11-18). And there is no discussion or analysis 

of underwriting standards or procedures because he has no experience with them, does not know 

them, and failed to research them. (See Ex. 1 at 235:9-17). Amoruso has in no way satisfied the 

“intellectual rigor” standard for Rule 702.

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Perhaps because of the glaring deficiencies in the methodology of his first report, Amoruso 

purports to “expand” on his Contract-Interpretation Opinions in his second report. (Ex. 3 at 10). 

Amoruso’s expanded opinions further unveil his forced attempt to backfill his pre-determined 

conclusions with enough “facts” to escape the scrutiny of the Court. His conclusion-first-facts-second

approach stands in direct contrast to the thorough analysis required per Rule 702. See Hartman, 758 

F.3d at 818-19.

Amoruso’s second report fails for all the same reasons as the first report, further evidencing a 

wholesale lack of careful thought and analysis. See Wood, 807 F.3d at 834. In the month between the 

issuance of his two reports, Amoruso did not receive any training or education on underwriting; did 

not read any treatises or consult any authorities on underwriting (Ex. 1 at 235:9-17); and did not change 

his reliance on Coyle’s flawed and repudiated conclusion (id. at 229:5-8 (“that’s a document that’s got 

a lot of weight with me”)). Having made no effort to educate himself on the specific underwriting 

issue he was analyzing, he could not possibly be employing “the same level of intellectual rigor that 

characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field,” as required by Daubert and Rule 702. See 

Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152.

Moreover, the rebuttal reports of Valley Forge’s underwriting expert James Robertson explain 

and analyze how Amoruso’s Contract-Interpretation Opinions in his reports are replete with 

unsubstantiated and fatally flawed conclusions about underwriting practices. (See Robertson Reports, 

attached as Exhibits 6 and 7, respectively). Although the Court’s gatekeeper function under Rule 702 

and Daubert does not involve the determination of “the ultimate correctness of the expert’s 

conclusions,” it does involve “the soundness and care with which the expert arrived at her opinion.” 

Wood, 807 F.3d at 834 (internal quotes omitted). The haphazard nature of Amoruso’s underwriting 

opinions belies any argument that he exercised careful consideration in reaching his opinions.

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In addition to the foregoing, the second report, like the first, is striking for its lack of citations, 

explanations, and analysis. For example, Amoruso referenced his “independent evaluation, based on 

customary accepted insurance practices,” but at no point in the report does he identify any customary 

underwriting practices. (Ex. 3 at 10-12). Amoruso’s testimony further establishes the improperly 

speculative and subjective bases for his opinions. For example, he testified that he “thinks” the 

underwriter(s) who wrote the mid-1970s policies did not intend to have an aggregate for property 

damage liability: “I don’t think that was their intent at all to have an aggregate. ... I think they 

intentionally did not want an aggregate.” (Ex. 1 at 344:23-345:5). This Court has long held that an 

expert’s subjective beliefs and unsubstantiated speculation must be excluded. E.g., Smith v. Ford Motor 

Co., 882 F. Supp. 770, 774 (N.D. Ind. 1995).

In Lennon v. Norfolk and Western Railway Co., the plaintiff retained a neurologist to testify that 

the plaintiff’s multiple sclerosis may have been precipitated by a fall. Id. at 1151. This Court noted 

that the neurologist had “conducted no research or studies on MS and more specifically, has not done 

any research or study on the alleged association between trauma and MS.” Id. The Court further 

advised that the neurologist’s review of medical literature was “very select,” did not include several 

studies that discounted any association between trauma and MS, but did include a study that was 

“undermined by its own author because of a lack of sufficient statistical proof.” Id. at 1151-52. This 

Court barred the doctor’s testimony and criticized his “review of what may be labeled a lopsided 

perspective of the literature.” Id. at 1152.

As “lopsided” as it may have been, at least the neurologist in Lennon had reviewed some medical 

literature (and, as a neurologist, arguably had the knowledge to understand it). Here, Amoruso has 

not reviewed any literature concerning underwriting. And where the Court criticized the doctor for 

relying on a study later undermined by its own author, such criticism is applicable here where the 

foundation for Amoruso’s opinion is Coyle’s letter concerning an issue that she conceded she does 

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not understand. For all these reasons, Hartford Inc. cannot establish that the Supreme Court’s 

hallmark of reliability has been met with respect to Amoruso’s Contract-Interpretation Opinions.

3. Amoruso’s Testimony Will Not Assist the Trier of Fact

Given his lack of qualifications and unreliable methodology, no factual issue could be 

enhanced or clarified for the trier of fact by Amoruso’s conjecture in the form of his ContractInterpretation Opinions. Even if Amoruso possessed the qualifications and employed a methodology 

that would potentially render his Contract-Interpretation Opinions reliable, the opinions can be 

potentially useful to the Court only if the Court finds there is a question of fact regarding Valley 

Forge’s indemnity obligations under the Settlement Agreements. Whether and how the Settlement 

Agreements treat Valley Forge’s indemnity obligations is a question of law reserved for the Court.

Westfield Ins. Co., 247 F. Supp. 3d at 967. Under the third step of the Court’s gatekeeper function, the 

Contract-Interpretation Opinions are, at best, premature unless and until the Court finds that the 

Settlement Agreements are ambiguous on the issue of Valley Forge’s indemnity payment cap and that 

the aggregate limits of the 1975-1978 policy are ambiguous.

* * *

WHEREFORE, for the reasons presented in this brief, Hartford Inc. cannot meet its burden 

to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Amoruso’s testimony at issue satisfies Rule 702 

and the Daubert standard, and Valley Forge therefore respectfully requests that this Honorable Court 

grant Valley Forge’s motion and preclude Defendants and Counter-Plaintiffs Hartford Iron & Metal, 

Inc. and Alan Goldberg from proffering at trial, any hearing, or via motion practice, the opinion 

testimony of Paul Amoruso as it concerns environmental matters, contract-interpretation, or 

insurance underwriting, including said opinions presented within sections I (pp. 1-3), III.C (pp. 11-

14), III.D (pp. 15-16), and III.E (pp. 17-18) of Amoruso’s report dated October 2, 2017, and said 

opinions presented within sections VII (p. 10), VII.1 (p. 10), VII.2 (p. 10), VII.3 (pp. 10-12), VIII (p. 

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