UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

FORT WAYNE DIVISION 

THE MEDICAL PROTECTIVE 

COMPANY OF FORT WAYNE 

INDIANA, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. CAUSE NO.: 1:13-CV-357-HAB 

AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL 

SPECIALTY LINES INSURANCE 

COMPANY, 

 Defendant. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

In this litigation, Plaintiff Medical Protective Company of Fort Wayne, Indiana 

(MedPro or Plaintiff), has sued Defendant American International Specialty Insurance 

Company (AISLIC or Defendant), now known as AIG Specialty Insurance Company, for 

breach of the terms of a 2006 policy AISLIC issued to MedPro (the Policy). MedPro alleges 

that AISLIC breached the Policy when it refused to cover MedPro’s extra-contractual 

liability and eventual settlement of a third party’s claim against MedPro. 

The matter is scheduled for a four-day jury trial. This Opinion and Order 

addresses the parties’ Motions in Limine [ECF No. 130, 131], which were presented in 

briefing to the Court and argued during the Final Pretrial Conference (FPTC) conducted 

on January 16, 2020. To the extent the scope of any requested motion in limine has 

evolved as a result of the FPTC or other rulings of this Court, the Opinion and Order is 

addressed to nature of the request following the Court’s rulings. 
2 

District court judges have broad discretion in ruling on evidentiary questions 

presented before trial on motions in limine. Jenkins v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 316 F.3d 663, 

664 (7th Cir. 2002). The district court’s power to exclude evidence in limine derives from 

its authority to manage trials. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984) A motion in 

limine should only be granted where the evidence is clearly inadmissible for any purpose. 

Jonasson v. Lutheran Child & Family Servs., 115 F.3d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 1997) (describing the 

motion in limine as tool that “permits the trial judge to eliminate from further 

consideration evidentiary submissions that clearly ought not be presented to the jury”). 

“Unless evidence meets this high standard, evidentiary rulings should be deferred until 

trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy and potential prejudice may be resolved 

in proper context.” Hawthorne Partners v. AT & T Tech., Inc., 831 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (N.D. 

Ill. 1993). 

A. American International Specialty Insurance Company’s Motion in Limine 

1. Bar MedPro From Referring to AISLIC as “AIG” or to AISLIC’s Corporate Parent 

 Defendant’s corporate name at the time it issued the Policy to Plaintiff was AISLIC. 

In 2009, Defendant changed its name to Chartis Speciality Insurance Company. Shortly 

thereafter, Defendant’s name became AIG Specialty. The title of Defendant’s request 

suggests that Defendant aims to prevent witnesses from referencing Defendant as AIG, 

or, as anything other than AISLIC. But its argument is that “[a]ny mention of AISLIC’s 

financial status, the fact that the financial holding company American International 

Group, Inc. (“AIG”) is the parent company, or AIG’s involvement in the financial crisis 
3 

of 2008 or the government’s loan, will be highly inflammatory and prejudicial to AISLIC.” 

(Mot. 1, ECF No. 130.) 

 At the FPTC, the Court confirmed that Defendant will be referencing itself as 

“American Speciality” or “AISLIC” throughout the course of the trial. Plaintiff indicated 

that it does not intend to elicit any testimony related to AIG’s involvement in the financial 

crisis of 2008 or the government’s loan. Additionally, MedPro agreed to make good faith 

efforts to refrain from referring to Defendant as AIG, and would instruct its witnesses of 

the same. To the extent Defendant’s request suggests that it would be an error for any 

witness to use a valid corporate name associated with Defendant while testifying about 

matters pertinent to this case, the request is unwieldy and without basis. Therefore, 

Defendant’s Motion in Limine #1 is denied. 

2. Bar Any Argument or Evidence Bearing on AISLIC’s Purported Policy Breach 

This is a breach of contract action. However, Defendant argues that, because the 

only “disputed element” of Plaintiff’s breach of contract action is whether Exclusion (m) 

of the Policy bars coverage, Plaintiff should be prohibited from offering argument or 

presenting evidence bearing on the purported breach. Rather, the case could be much 

simplified by use of a special verdict form for the disputed issue of fact, i.e., did MedPro 

commit an actual Wrongful Act. The Court would then apply the jury’s finding to the 

law. 

Plaintiff, who has requested a jury trial, does not agree with Defendant’s approach. 

In a typical case, the jury, after receiving evidence and determining the facts, will be 

tasked with applying the facts to the law as provided in the Court’s instructions. That the 
4 

factual issues impacting liability have been narrowed in advance of trial, with others 

already having been decided as a matter of law or not seriously disputed, does not 

eliminate the jury’s role in determining the ultimate issue of liability and damages. Nor 

should a jury, even one that is not tasked with determining every element of a claim, be 

kept ignorant of the claim being alleged and the reason for its participation in the judicial 

process. 

The Court does not find that the risk of confusion is so great in this case that it 

should restrict the role of the jury as requested by Defendant. The Court’s instructions 

will direct the jury regarding its role in this case. See Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 

(2000) (“A jury is presumed to follow its instructions.”) (citing Richardson v. Marsh, 481 

U.S. 200, 211 (1987)). Defendant’s Motion in Limine #2 is denied. 

3. Bar Any Mention of AISLIC Policy Terms Other than Endorsement No. 16 and the 

“Wrongful Act” Definition

 Defendant’s third Motion in Limine is premised on the proposition that the only 

factual issues to be resolved by the jury according to the Court’s recent rulings, are: a) 

whether MedPro’s failure to accept the Bramletts’ policy limit demands was a “breach of 

duty, neglect, error, misstatement, misleading statement, omission or other act done or 

wrongfully attempted” and thus a “Wrongful Act,” and b) whether MedPro complied 

with its obligations under the amended Special Reporting Clause set forth in 

Endorsement No. 16 of the AISLIC Policy. Defendant asserts that referencing provisions 

of the Policy other than the “Wrongful Act” definition and Endorsement No. 16 would 
5 

confuse the jury by incorrectly suggesting that the jury, rather than the Court, is 

empowered to interpret the policy or make legal determinations about coverage. 

 Since the filing of this Motion, the Court has ruled as a matter of law with respect 

to the application of Endorsement No. 16. Accordingly, that provision is no longer at 

issue. However, as this is a breach of contract case, the Court finds that the jury should 

be permitted to see the contract at issue. Although it will not be necessary to elicit 

testimony about most of its provisions, Defendant’s request goes too far. Jury instructions 

are the appropriate means of focusing the jury’s attention on the findings that are 

necessary to determine the breach of contract claim. Defendant’s Motion in Limine #3 is 

denied. 

4. Bar Any Testimony or Evidence Bearing on Policy Interpretation, or Other 

Impermissible Legal Opinion Testimony

 Defendant asserts that evidence or opinion testimony, including from Plaintiff’s 

witnesses, Defendant’s underwriters or company representatives, or any expert 

regarding the purpose, meaning, or interpretation of any Policy terms is irrelevant and 

inadmissible. During the FPTC, it became clear that the testimony at issue concerns the 

understanding of Endorsement No. 16. Defendant argued that if there was any dispute 

regarding what Endorsement No. 16 means, that is a question for the Court to resolve. 

Defendant has also objected to the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert on grounds that it is an 

improper legal opinion. 

 The Court generally agrees that contract interpretation is within the province of 

the Court. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 482 N.E.2d 467, 471 (Ind. 1985) (noting that 
6 

“the construction of the ambiguous policy language should be resolved by the court as a 

matter of law”). To that end, as mentioned above, the Court has already ruled on the 

application of Endorsement No. 16 to the undisputed facts of this case [ECF Nos. 146, 

150]. The Court will rule on the admissibility of the expert opinion testimony in a separate 

Opinion. Defendant’s Motion in Limine #4 is denied. 

5. Bar Any Testimony, Evidence or Argument Relating to the Purported “Purpose” 

of the AISLIC Policy or MedPro’s Expectations of Coverage

 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s purpose in purchasing the Policy or its 

expectations under the Policy are irrelevant and immaterial to the jury’s consideration of 

whether Plaintiff committed a Wrongful Act. 

 The Court finds that testimony from Plaintiff’s witnesses concerning the basis for 

its disagreement with Defendant’s position is relevant in this breach of contract action. 

The jury will know, from the very beginning, that it is being tasked with resolving a 

dispute between the parties arising out of the Policy. Allowing witnesses to give voice to 

the general basis for the disagreement has probative value that will not be outweighed 

by the confusion of issues or unfair prejudice to Defendant. 

The Court’s jury instructions will clearly delineate which facts are for the jury to 

find, and how to apply those facts to the law. Motion in Limine #5 is denied. 

6. Bar Any Mention of the AISLIC Policy Premium Paid by MedPro 

Plaintiff paid almost $400,000 in premiums for the Policy and would like to elicit 

testimony about this fact at trial. Defendant argues that the amount of the premium is not 
7 

relevant to any of the issues before the jury, and that any alleged probative value would 

be outweighed by the confusion of issue and unfair prejudice. 

Although it may not cause confusion to elicit testimony regarding premiums, the 

probative value of the amount of the premium appears to be substantially outweighed 

by the danger of unfair prejudice. Plaintiff can establish that there was consideration for 

formation of the contract with testimony that does not include the amount of the 

premium. In addition, the parties have already stipulated that the Policy is a valid 

contract. (Joint Trial Brief 2, ECF No. 139.) Defendant’s Motion in Limine #6 is granted. 

7. Bar Any Argument That the Texas Stowers Standard Is Solely Determinative of 

Whether MedPro’s Failure to Settle Was a “Wrongful Act”

 According to Defendant, the Texas Stowers standard is not controlling on the 

question of whether Plaintiff’s failure to accept the Bramletts’ policy limit demands was 

a Wrongful Act. Rather, because “Wrongful Act” is defined in the Policy as a “breach of 

duty, neglect, error, misstatement, misleading statement, omission or other act done or 

wrongfully attempted,” Defendant can point to duties other than the Texas Stowers duty 

that Plaintiff owed to its insured, Dr. Phillips. Defendant asserts that an “error” that 

might not comprise a “breach of duty” can still comprise a “Wrongful Act” under the 

Policy. 

 Although the last statement is technically correct, it is not clear how it would be 

applicable to the facts of this case. The only action at issue was Plaintiff’s failure to accept 

settlement demands for the Policy limits. See, e.g., Def.’s Trial Br. 2 (“There is no dispute 

that the settlement of the ‘claim’ for which MedPro seeks coverage arises out of MedPro’s 
8 

failure to accept two demand by the Bramletts—dated December 17, 2003 and March 23, 

2004—to settle for the $200,000 limits of Dr. Phillips’ policy with MedPro.”). MedPro will 

be permitted to argue that a reasonably prudent insurer would have considered the legal 

landscape as it existed in Texas, the state where its insured was being sued for 

malpractice. Neither Dr. Phillips nor the Bramletts would have had any legal grounds to 

recover the amount of the verdict in excess of the statutory cap absent Stowers, which “is 

the only common law tort duty in the context of third party insurers responding to 

settlement demands.” Mid-Continent Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 236 S.W.3d 765, 776 

(Tex. 2007) (responding to insurance company’s argument that it was subrogated to the 

common law right of the insured to enforce its insurer’s duty to act reasonably when 

handling an insured’s defense). 

Although “error” is included in the definition of a Wrongful Act, it cannot be said 

that every error by an insurance company has the potential to lead to a claim. The 

definition of a Wrongful Act also includes “or other act done.” This expansive definition 

only highlights how the Wrongful Act must be something that actually led to a claim 

against MedPro. Citing to this expansive definition matters little outside the context of 

the particular claim at issue. The suit by the Bramletts is the only claim for which Plaintiff 

invoked its professional liability insurance policy with Defendant. 

 A review of the Seventh Circuit’s decision shows that it did not frame up its 

consideration of whether MedPro committed a Wrongful Act by focusing on the 

definition. It focused on the facts that supported MedPro’s argument that it handled the 

Barmletts’ Stowers demands appropriately: 
9 

Outside counsel believed that MedPro had not acted in bad faith by 

declining both Stowers demands in order to investigate the case, and 

MedPro’s own counsel agreed. Moreover, there is some evidence that the 

largest medical malpractice verdict in the area at that time was $2 million—

a similar verdict, or even a larger verdict (up to $2.5 million), would not 

lead to extra-contractual liability for MedPro, because the hospital had 

already agreed to pay $2.3 million. It was not until after MedPro declined 

to settle that several people, including Dr. Phillips’s attorneys and a 

MedPro claims specialist, advised that there would be an adverse verdict 

and it was likely to be $3 million or over. 

Med. Protective Co. of Fort Wayne, Ind. v. Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 911 F.3d 438, 447–

48 (7th Cir. 2018). The Seventh Circuit then cited the following as evidence that pointed 

in the other direction: 

By the time the Bramletts made their second demand, MedPro knew of the 

damaging fact that Dr. Phillips had not immediately attended to Mrs. 

Bramlett because he went to exercise. By that time, the Bramletts had also 

submitted an expert report supporting Dr. Phillips’s liability for their claim. 

In addition, MedPro knew that the hospital had settled for $2.3 million, 

presumably because it believed that the verdict could be adverse and large. 

Id. at 448. 

When the court of appeals then considered the foreseeability prong of Exclusion 

(m), it specifically referred to whether a Stowers claim was foreseeable. Id. (“As long as 

Dr. Phillips’s Stowers claim was foreseeable, it was also foreseeable that he could have 

assigned the claim to the Bramletts. And Dr. Phillips’s Stowers claim was, in fact, 

foreseeable.”). The court noted that MedPro’s belief regarding whether “it would be 

found liable under Stowers,” was not relevant because it was “relevant only that there 

may be a claim at all.” Id. at 449. In the context of Exclusion (m), as interpreted by the 
10 

Seventh Circuit, Wrongful Act requires that MedPro actually committed an act that 

would lead to a finding of liability.1

Plaintiff’s liability for an excess judgment is all that has ever been at issue in this 

case. Plaintiff does not become liable for that excess judgment unless it first wrongfully 

rejected a demand within policy limits, which is necessarily determined by looking to the 

standard under Stowers. Defendant’s Motion in Limine #7 is conditionally denied. It 

should be noted, however, that this Motion in Limine request was directed at what 

MedPro would be permitted to argue. 

The Court’s ruling does not prohibit Defendant from relying on the language of 

the Policy, particularly the definition of Wrongful Act, to argue that the Plaintiff’s failure 

to settle within policy limits when it had the opportunity to do so was a Wrongful Act. 

Where reconciliation of the two arguments requires clarification, it is anticipated that the 

Court’s instructions to the jury will provide that clarification. 

8. Bar Any Discussion or Argument Based on AISLIC’s Conduct or the Testimony of 

Any AISLIC Representatives or Witnesses

 Defendant argues that its conduct is not at issue in this case because the only 

question for the jury’s consideration concerns Plaintiff’s conduct. Accordingly, it 

“requests an order in limine barring [Plaintiff]’s attorneys, witnesses, agents, and anyone 

1 What does it mean to require that MedPro have committed an actual Wrongful Act, and 

not merely an alleged Wrongful Act unless the definition (“any breach of duty, neglect, error, 

misstatement, misleading statement, omission or other act done or wrongfully attempted”) is 

analyzed within the context of another standard, such as Stowers? AISLIC must establish that 

MedPro would have been found liable under some legal standard for its failure to settle within 

policy limits when it had the opportunity to do so. AISLIC has not identified a legal standard 

other than the negligence standard of Stowers that can be applied in this case. 
11 

else from discussing, mentioning, alluding or referring to in any manner during trial or 

in the presence of the jury to any actions taken or not taken by [Defendant] or its affiliates, 

the testimony of any [Defendant] witnesses, former employees, or agents, and any 

litigation positions taken by [Defendant] or its affiliates in other disputes.” 

Defendant’s request is overly broad. Plaintiff is alleging that Defendant breached 

its contract with Plaintiff. Accordingly, the actions of persons acting on behalf of 

Defendant are likely to be relevant, at least to some degree and for some purpose. 

However, Defendant’s position in other litigation would not be probative of the issues in 

this case. Defendant’s Motion in Limine #8 is granted in part and denied in part. 

 To the extent the real dispute underlying this request was whether Plaintiff can 

offer evidence of Defendant’s response to its notice of a potential claim arising out of its 

handling of the Phillips malpractice litigation, that issue has been resolved by the Court’s 

ruling that Plaintiff satisfied Endorsement No. 16, the Special Reporting Clause. 

B. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine 

1. To Preclude Irrelevant and Unduly Prejudicial Evidence Regarding Alleged Prior 

“Claims” Against MedPro 

 The essence of Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine #1 is that Defendant should not be 

permitted to argue, or to introduce evidence, that the claim for which it seeks coverage 

was first filed against Plaintiff before the July 1, 2006, inception date of the Policy. 

Plaintiff’s Motion is appropriate in light of the Court’s rulings in this case [ECF Nos. 150, 

152]. The reference to a claim in this case is understood to mean the Bramletts’ 2009 
12 

lawsuit. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine #1 is granted. The ruling is not a restriction on the 

evidence that can be admitted, but on its characterization. 

2. To Preclude Irrelevant and Unduly Prejudicial Evidence of the Jury Verdict and 

Judgment in the Bramletts’ Malpractice Case Against Dr. Phillips and Other Matters in 

the Course of that Action After April 12, 2004 

 Plaintiff seeks to exclude from evidence the medical malpractice judgment entered 

against Dr. Phillips, defense counsel’s status reports and other correspondence authored 

after April 24, 2004 (the date the last Stowers demand was rejected), and John 

Bedingfield’s February 24, 2005, internal email drafted after he attended mediation. 

Plaintiff asserts that none of this evidence is pertinent to the Stowers standard of care and, 

accordingly, to whether Plaintiff’s failure to settle was a Wrongful Act. 

 A Stowers cause of action arises when an insurer negligently fails to settle a claim 

covered by an applicable policy within policy limits. See G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. Am. 

Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1929). The relevant inquiry is whether 

a demand within policy limits was such that an ordinary, prudent insurer would have 

accepted it, considering the likelihood and degree of the insured’s potential exposure to 

an excess judgment. Am. Physicians Ins. Exch. v. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d 842, 849 (Tex. 1994). 

Under this negligence standard, how an ordinarily prudent insurer would respond to a 

settlement demand within policy limits considering the likelihood and degree of the 

insured’s potential exposure to an excess judgment cannot be based on 20/20 hindsight. 

“In the context of a Stowers lawsuit, evidence concerning claims investigation, trial 

defense, and conduct during settlement negotiations is necessarily subsidiary to the 

ultimate issue of whether the claimant’s demand was reasonable under the 
13 

circumstances, such that an ordinarily prudent insurer would accept it.” Coats v. Ruiz, 198 

S.W.3d 863, 882 (Tex. App. 2006) (citing Am. Physicians Ins. Exch. v. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d 842, 

848–49 (Tex. 1994)). 

a. Jury Verdict 

There can be no dispute that the jury award in the medical malpractice case against 

Dr. Phillips takes into consideration facts that were not known to Plaintiff at the time it 

had the opportunity to settle in response to the Stowers settlement demands. The outcome 

of a jury trial can turn on a wide array of factors that a reasonably prudent insurer would 

have no reason to predict. For purposes of the Wrongful Act, the jury need only know 

that the Texas jury returned a verdict that exposed Dr. Phillips to personal liability in 

excess of his insurance coverage without revealing an amount that poses the risk of being 

unfairly prejudicial and leading to jury confusion. The motion in limine to preclude 

evidence of the dollar amount of the Texas jury’s award to the Bramletts is granted. 

b. Status Reports and Correspondence Authored After April 12, 2004 

 Although Defendant generally agrees that information Plaintiff learned after April 

12, 2004, when the second Stowers demand was rejected, is not relevant, it objects to an 

unnecessarily restrictive view of the timing. For example, Defendant maintains that it 

should be permitted to elicit testimony regarding facts learned after April 12, 2004, if they 

were facts a reasonably prudent insurer would have discovered before rejecting the 

Stowers settlement demand. 

 The Court agrees that communications that occurred after April 12, 2004, may be 

admissible to highlight what was already known before that date. Additionally, 
14 

Defendant should not be prevented from presenting evidence bearing on how a 

reasonably prudent insurer would have responded to an early settlement demand, 

knowing that the opportunity would expire. 

 The Court’s ruling is consistent with the district court’s decision denying summary 

judgment in the Bramlett Direct Action. In determining that MedPro was not entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law, the court concluded that MedPro was aware of “facts that 

would enable a reasonable jury to find that a reasonably prudent insurer would have 

accepted the first Stowers demand.” Bramlett v. Med. Protective Co. of Ft. Wayne, Ind., No. 

3:10-CV-2048-D, 2013 WL 796725, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2013). In doing so, the court 

focused on the evidence that showed what MedPro knew “at the time of the first Stowers

demand.” Id. However, the Bramlett decision also highlighted another reality of Stowers

demands: 

There is no per se requirement that an insurer know all, or even most, of the 

facts of the case in order to have a Stowers duty. Indeed, early settlement is 

encouraged. See [Am. Physicians Ins. Exch. v.] Garcia, 876 S.W.2d [842,] 851 

n.18 [(Tex. 1994)] (“If the claimant makes such a settlement demand early 

in the negotiations, the insurer must either accept the demand or assume 

the risk that it will not be able to do so later. In cases presenting a real 

potential for an excess judgment, insurers have a strong incentive to accept.” 

(emphasis added)). 

Id. at *4. Which facts a reasonably prudent insured would seek out before deciding 

whether a case presents a real potential for an excess judgment is fair argument in this 

case. Rather than bar potentially relevant evidence with a broad motion in limine, the 

Court will conditionally deny the motion, and defer ruling on specific evidentiary 

submissions until they are proposed at trial and proper objections are made. 
15 

c. John Bedingfield’s February 24, 2005, email

The Court finds that John Bedingfield’s February 24, 2005, email is not relevant 

evidence of what Plaintiff knew before April 12, 2004. For example, it specifically 

references depositions that were not taken until after the Stowers demands had expired. 

Bedingfield is deceased, so he cannot be cross-examined regarding the basis for his 

statements and dissecting his email through other testimony would be wasteful and 

confusing. Additionally, the questionable probative value of the email is outweighed by 

the risk of unfair prejudice. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine #2 to bar admission of 

Bedingfield’s email is granted. 

3. To Preclude Evidence of Settlements and Mediation Communications

 Plaintiff seeks to preclude evidence of settlements and mediation communications 

in the course of the underlying medical malpractice case and in the Bramlett Direct 

Action. Plaintiff notes that the communications occurred after the Stowers demands had 

expired. MedPro does not object to evidence that it settled the Bramletts’ Direct Action to 

show that it suffered a loss that it contends is covered under the Policy. 

 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s settlement offers in excess of its policy limits are 

a recognition that it messed up, i.e., committed a Wrongful Act. This appears strikingly 

similar to a request that the settlement be admitted to prove liability of a disputed claim, 

which is not permissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 408. The Advisory Committee 

Notes provide that 

exclusion may be based on two grounds. (1) The evidence is irrelevant, 

since the offer may be motivated by a desire for peace rather than from any 

concession of weakness of position. The validity of this position will vary 
16 

as the amount of the offer varies in relation to the size of the claim and may 

also be influenced by other circumstances. (2) A more consistently 

impressive ground is promotion of the public policy favoring the 

compromise and settlement of disputes. McCormick §§ 76, 251. While the 

rule is ordinarily phrased in terms of offers of compromise, it is apparent 

that a similar attitude must be taken with respect to completed 

compromises when offered against a party thereto. This latter situation will 

not, of course, ordinarily occur except when a party to the present litigation 

has compromised with a third person. 

Fed. R. Evid. 408 (Advisory Committee Notes, 1972 Proposed Rules). The Court finds that 

the settlement offers are not admissible for the purposes Defendant offers. Plaintiff’s 

Motion in Limine # 3 is granted. The Court will entertain individual proffers as they arise 

at trial if Defendant believes that permissible reasons for the admitting the settlement 

offers and discussions develop. 

4. To Preclude AIG From Relying on Any Evidence Not Disclosed In Discovery

As no particular evidence is identified, the Court grants the request conditionally. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion [ECF No. 130] in Limine 

Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 are denied. Motion in Limine Number 6 is granted, and 8 is 

granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff’s Motion [ECF No. 131] in Limine Numbers 

1 and 3 are granted; Number 2 is granted in part and denied in part. 

SO ORDERED on January 23, 2020. 

 

 s/ Holly A. Brady 

JUDGE HOLLY A. BRADY 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT