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Filed 6/24/14 In re D.J. CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re D.J. et al., Persons Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

CONTRA COSTA COUNTY CHILDREN 

& FAMILY SERVICES BUREAU,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

T.A.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A139280

 A139982

 A140147

 (Contra Costa County

 Super. Ct. Nos. J1300653, J1300654, 

 J1300655)

Appellant T.A. (Mother) argues on appeal no substantial evidence supports the 

juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders with respect to her daughter, A.J.

We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In May 2013, the Contra Costa County Children & Family Services Bureau 

(Bureau) filed the present Welfare and Institutions Code section 3001petition on behalf 

of A.J, then nine years old. Related petitions were filed on behalf of Mother’s other 

 

1 All undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
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daughter, D.J. (then 15 years old), and Mother’s niece, K.J. (then 11 years old). At the 

time, Mother was K.J.’s legal guardian.2 

The petitions alleged Mother struck D.J. on the face and head, leaving swollen 

areas and a ringing in her ears. The petitions further alleged Mother previously punched 

D.J. in the face, causing her nose to bleed. The petitions alleged Mother’s ability to care 

for and supervise the minors was impaired. (§ 300, subdivision (b).) The petition on 

behalf of D.J. also alleged she had suffered serious physical harm (§ 300, subd. (a)), and 

the petition on behalf of A.J. alleged sibling abuse (§ 300, subd. (j)). 

The contested jurisdictional hearing on all three petitions was held in July 2013.3

D.J. testified Mother hit her in the face three times with her fist, leaving a “lump,” and hit 

her in the ear, leaving a ringing in her ears. D.J. testified Mother was angry because D.J.

said she did not believe in mind reading. On another occasion, Mother punched D.J. in 

the face, causing a nosebleed. Mother had unprovoked angry outbursts at D.J. and other 

people, behavior that had been going on for four years and was getting worse over time. 

Mother also said things D.J. did not understand, for example, Mother talked about the 

government tracking people down. In an interview with a Bureau social worker, as 

 

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In these consolidated appeals, Mother appealed from the jurisdictional findings as 

to all three minors (case No. A139280), the jurisdictional findings and order terminating 

Mother’s guardianship of K.J. (case No. A139982), and the jurisdictional findings and 

dispositional orders regarding D.J. and A.J. (case No. A140147). The jurisdictional 

findings appealed from in case No. A139280 are not appealable, but are reviewable in the 

appeals from the dispositional orders in cases No. A139982 and No. A140147. (In re 

Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1393, fn. 8.) Although courts have deemed 

notices purporting to appeal from jurisdictional findings as appealing instead from a 

subsequent dispositional order (see ibid.), we need not do so here because Mother also 

appealed from the dispositional orders. Accordingly, we dismiss case No. A139280. In 

addition, in her briefs on appeal, Mother contests only the jurisdictional and dispositional 

orders with respect to A.J. She has therefore waived any arguments in case No. A140147 

with respect to D.J. and in case No. A139982 with respect to K.J. We discuss the 

background facts regarding D.J. and K.J. only as relevant to Mother’s arguments 

regarding A.J. 

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Prior to this hearing, all three minors were removed from Mother’s custody and 

released to D.J. and A.J.’s father (Father). 
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documented in a written Bureau report received into evidence, D.J. reported Mother 

saying “ ‘the people in the telephone are watching her.’ ” D.J. stated Mother did not 

hit A.J. 

K.J. also testified at the jurisdictional hearing. She witnessed Mother hitting D.J. 

repeatedly on the head. A.J. was also present. Mother had hit K.J. on the face on more 

than one occasion. K.J. had not seen Mother hit A.J. K.J. also testified to 

“embarrassing” things Mother said. For example, when K.J. wore a pedometer for a 

health project at school, Mother told her “the government is actually tracking you 

with pedometers.” 

Tracy Kenney, the social worker who prepared the Bureau’s report, testified. Her 

report described interviewing D.J. the day after, according to D.J., Mother hit her 

repeatedly in the face. In this interview, Kenney witnessed swelling on D.J.’s forehead 

and the left side of her face. Her report also recorded Mother’s statement that she had 

spanked D.J. because she was being disrespectful. Mother subsequently stated she hit 

D.J. with her fist on the shoulder, and D.J had hit her. 

Kenney also testified to, and her report described, statements Mother made that 

caused Kenney concern. Mother told Kenney, “ ‘A few churches are trying to take my 

children. They are trying to make me a prostitute. I got evidence of all this. Using biometrics and trying to make people slaves and all this.’ ” Mother later stated, “My 

concern is why are these churches trying to take my children from me. Not only that did 

you know that they were running around trying to say that I was a man, I was an it, I 

didn’t give birth to my children.” 

Father informed Kenney of his concerns about Mother’s “mental state.” He 

reported Mother had exhibited angry and volatile behavior for the past three years.4

 

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The Bureau’s report also described an interview with K.J.’s attorney regarding 

Mother. Mother objected to this hearsay evidence. The juvenile court admitted the 

evidence, but gave “very little weight to it if any.” Because, as we find below, other 

substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings, we need not and do not rely 

on this evidence.
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The juvenile court sustained the allegations that Mother “has displayed behaviors 

that impairs [sic] her ability to care for and supervise the [minors]. [Mother] has been 

volatile and violent towards and/or in front of the [minors].” The court also sustained the 

section 300, subdivision (j) allegation with respect to A.J., and the section 300, 

subdivision (a) allegation with respect to D.J. The court expressly found D.J. and K.J. 

“very credible” witnesses and noted “[t]he descriptions that they provided for [Mother’s] 

behaviors and anger are not inconsistent with behaviors that have been on display in 

this courtroom.”

The dispositional hearing for D.J. and A.J. was held in September 2013. Two 

Bureau reports were received into evidence. The reports described the minors as 

“thriving” with Father, although the second report stated A.J. wished to return to live 

with Mother. The reports described several instances in which Mother exhibited angry, 

volatile, and/or threatening behavior with Bureau staff. The reports also noted Mother 

continued to admit only to “spanking” D.J., rather than hitting her in the face. 

Against the advice of counsel and her guardian ad litem5, Mother testified at the 

dispositional hearing. Mother disagreed with the case plan’s recommendation she have a 

mental health assessment because “I have no mental health issues within my family.” 

Mother disagreed with the case plan’s requirement of domestic violence counseling 

because “my child struck me and when she struck me I defended myself.” She testified 

she did not need anger management services because “I’m not angry.” 

The juvenile court adjudged D.J. and A.J. dependents of the juvenile court and 

found by clear and convincing evidence there is or would be substantial danger to them if 

they were returned to Mother’s custody. 

 

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Prior to the jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court appointed a guardian ad litem 

for Mother because the court concluded Mother was “unable to understand the 

proceedings,” in part because she was “unable to follow [the court’s] basic instructions 

. . . not to interrupt [the court].” 
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DISCUSSION

“ ‘When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order is challenged 

on appeal, the reviewing court must determine if there is any substantial evidence, that is, 

evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value to support the conclusion of the 

trier of fact. [Citation.] In making this determination, all conflicts [in the evidence and 

in reasonable inferences from the evidence] are to be resolved in favor of the prevailing 

party, and issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact. [Citation.] In 

dependency proceedings, a trial court’s determination will not be disturbed unless it 

exceeds the bounds of reason. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Savannah M., supra, 131 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1393.)

I. Jurisdictional Findings

Section 300, subdivision (b) provides a basis for juvenile court jurisdiction if 

“[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious 

physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or 

guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child . . . .” Section 300, subdivision (j) 

provides a basis for juvenile court jurisdiction if “[t]he child’s sibling has been abused or 

neglected, . . . and there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected

. . . .”

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 The Bureau had the burden of proving the basis for jurisdiction by a 

preponderance of the evidence. (§ 355, subd. (a).)

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings. There 

was evidence Mother was physically violent with D.J. and had also hit K.J.; was volatile 

and angry; and held unreasonable beliefs, yet became violent when D.J. disagreed with 

these beliefs. This created a substantial risk Mother would be physically violent with 

A.J. in the future.

Mother argues there was no evidence her unreasonable beliefs — for example, in 

mind reading and that churches were trying to take away her children — created a risk of 

physical harm for A.J. We disagree. There was evidence Mother physically abused D.J. 

 

6 Mother does not dispute the allegation that A.J.’s sibling, D.J., had been abused. 
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because D.J. reasonably disagreed with Mother’s belief in mind reading. Substantial 

evidence supports the finding that Mother’s physical violence in the face of disagreement 

with her unreasonable beliefs placed A.J. at risk. 

Mother also suggests there was no evidence her angry outbursts placed A.J. at risk. 

We again disagree, as there was evidence Mother’s explosive temper at times led to 

physical violence. 

Mother argues her physical abuse of D.J. does not place A.J. at risk because it was 

the result of a conflict specific to Mother and D.J. However, the “conflict” was the result 

of D.J.’s refusal to agree with Mother’s unfounded beliefs, something that could easily 

occur with A.J. as well. Moreover, there was evidence Mother had hit K.J. on more than 

one occasion in the past, demonstrating Mother’s physical violence was not limited to 

D.J. Evidence that A.J. was not afraid of Mother at the time of the jurisdictional hearing 

does not preclude a finding she was nonetheless at substantial risk of physical harm.

II. Dispositional Findings

The juvenile court found “[t]here is substantial danger to [A.J.’s] physical health, 

or would be if [A.J.] were returned home, and there are no reasonable means to protect 

[A.J. without] removal of physical custody.” (See § 361, subd. (c)(1).)7

We conclude substantial evidence supports the court’s finding, for largely the 

same reasons the jurisdictional findings are so supported. Although the dispositional 

hearing took place seven weeks after the jurisdictional hearing, Mother continued to 

display angry and threatening behavior. Moreover, in Mother’s testimony at the 

 

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The juvenile court made this finding by clear and convincing evidence. (§ 361, 

subd. (c).) There is a split of authority over how a reviewing court should apply 

substantial evidence review to such a finding. (Compare In re Angelique C. (2003) 113 

Cal.App.4th 509, 519 [“on appeal from a judgment required to be based upon clear and 

convincing evidence, ‘the clear and convincing test disappears . . . [and] the usual rule of 

conflicting evidence is applied’ ”]; with In re Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 694 

[review determines “whether there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier 

of fact could make the necessary findings based on the clear and convincing evidence 

standard”].) We need not decide the proper approach in this case because we affirm the 

court’s finding in either event.
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dispositional hearing, she refused to acknowledge the physical harm she caused D.J. or 

her need for services.

Mother argues the trial court failed to consider the alternative of family 

maintenance services. However, as noted above, at the dispositional hearing Mother 

denied needing the recommended services. Mother’s citations to In re Jeannette S.

(1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 52 and In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522 are unavailing. 

In each case, the court of appeal reversed a removal order on the ground the child could 

safely be kept in the custodial parent’s home with the provision of services. (In re 

Jeannette S., at pp. 59-60; In re Henry V., at p. 529.) However, in each case the custodial 

parent amply demonstrated willingness to take advantage of supportive services. (In re 

Jeannette S., at p. 56; In re Henry V., at p. 529.) Here, in contrast, the juvenile court 

reasonably could have found that family maintenance services would have been 

ineffective because Mother denied needing such services. 

DISPOSITION

The appeal in case No. A139280 is dismissed. The orders appealed from in cases 

No. A139982 and No. A140147 are affirmed.

SIMONS, Acting P.J.

We concur.

NEEDHAM, J.

BRUINIERS, J.