SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1036- 22 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. KARIF FORD, a/k/a KARIF H. KING, KHYRE KING, and KHY-RE KING, Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________

Submitted on March 6, 2024

– Decided March 26, 202 4 Before Judges Firko and Vanek. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 14- 09

- 2285. Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Brian F. Plunkett, Designated Counsel, o n the brief).
The odore N. Stephens II , Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Frank J. Ducoat, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor , of counsel and on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court. " Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parti es in the case and its use in other cases is limite d. R. 1:36- 3.2 A- 1036

- 22

PER CURIAM Defendant Karif Ford appeals from an August 8, 2022 Law Division order denying his pro se petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) wi thout an evidentiary hearing. Defendant is currently servin g a twenty-year prison sentence after pleading guilty to his role in the carjacking at the parking deck of The Mall at Short Hills in Millburn, which resulted in the death of Dustin Friedland. Defendant contends he is entitled to PC R because evidence was improperly withheld from the grand jury, the re was an in adequate basis for his conviction, and he received ineffective assistance of both plea and appellate counsel. After a careful review of the record and decisional law, we affirm the denial of defendant's PCR petition for substantiall y the same reasons set forth in Judge Michael L. Ravin's 1 thorough, twenty-four-page written decision.
I. A full recitation of the facts underlying defendant 's plea is delineated in our prior opinion on the direct appeal, State v. Fo rd (Ford I), No. A- 5095 -17 (App. Div. Apr. 21, 2020), where we affirmed defend ant's conviction and sentence. In the interest of brevity, we summarize only the facts pertinent to defendant's PCR petition.

1 Judge Ravin handled all of the matters referenced i n this opinion.3 A- 1036

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On December 15, 2013, defendant and three co-defend ants, Kevin Roberts, Hanif Thompson, and Basim Henry, ventured to The Mall at Short Hills with the intention of stealing a car. The group se lected a Range Rover in the parking deck that was occupied by Friedland and his wife. Thompson and Roberts approached Friedland and a struggle ensued. Thompson hit Friedland with a gun and then shot him in the head. Thompson and Roberts forced Friedman's wife out of the Range Rover and drove th e car out of the parking garage. Defendant and Henry fled in the car they a rrived in. Emergency responders took Friedland to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead. That night, defendant recounted the details of the incident to his brother , who reported what he learned to the police. On Decemb er 19, 2013, defendant met with detectives who informed him of his rights before proceeding with a recorded interview. Defendant provided a detailed account of the incident, including the extent of his involvement. On September 19, 2014, a grand jury returned Indict ment No. 14- 09 -2285, charging defendant, Thompson, Roberts, and Henry wi th second-degree conspiracy to commit carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 an d 2C:15-2(a) (count one); first-degree carjacking by purposely or knowingly p utting the occupants in fear of immediate bodily injury, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(2) (count two); first-degree4 A- 1036

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felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) (count three) ; first-degree purposeful and/or knowing murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) (coun t four); second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b ) (count five); and seconddegree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpo se, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count six). Defendant was separately charged in I ndictment No. 14- 09

- 2286 with second-degree certain persons not to possess w eapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b). Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence colle cted during a search of his residence pursuant to a warrant. The judge denied the motion on December 1, 2015. On October 10, 2017, defendant pleaded guilty to co unt two, fi r st -degree carjacking under N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(2). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State dismiss ed the remaining charges against defendant and recomm end ed a custodial sentence not to exceed twenty years. On January 18, 2018, defendant was sentenced to twenty years in prison with eighty -five percent parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 , and the remaining counts were dismissed. The judge entered an amended judgment of conviction with the parties' consent on April 10, 2018 to properly include defendant's jail credit.5 A- 1036

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Defendant appealed, arguing his motion to suppress evidence should have been granted and he received a sentence that was di sproportionate to his culpability as compared to co-defendants. On April 21, 2020, we affirmed defendant's amended judgment of conviction and sentenc e. Ford I, slip op. at 1. We stated:

Defendant's sentence was commensurate with the serious nature of this carjacking, in which Friedla nd was not merely put in fear of immediate bodily inju ry but was murdered. Defendant's contention that he should be sentenced to the lower end of the sentenc ing range for the carjacking offense is patently withou t merit. [Id. at 21.] The Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for c ertification. State v. Ford , 243 N.J. 271 (2020). On October 16, 2020, defendant filed a pro se PCR p etition arguing that the indictment should have been dismissed because t he State's grand jury presentation was based in large part on hearsay, th e State produced an unqualified witness to testify as to Friedland's ca use of death, and the State failed to produce exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. Defendant further

assert ed his conviction should be vacated for prosecutorial misconduct, he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because the factual bas is set forth during his6 A- 1036

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plea allocution was insufficient, and there is evid ence of his innocence. Defendant also argued tha t he only pleaded guilty because of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel who told him to ple ad guilty without first obtaining a report prepared by law enforcement and failed to move to dismiss the indictment based upon the deficiencies in the State 's presentation. Finally, defendant argued his appellate counsel was ineffect ive for failing to properly assert errors that should have been raised by couns el on direct appeal. On August 8, 2022, Judge Ravin denied defendant's P CR petition in a comprehen sive written decision, finding in part as follows:

Here, the record reflects, and the parties do not d ispute that the victim was shot in the head and subsequent ly died. Whether or not the State presented an expert to the grand jury about how the victim died would not have changed the outcome of the grand jury at all. It would not have caused an indictment to not be retur ned. Thus, [defendant] has not shown that barring this i ssue would cause fundamental injustice to him. Regarding [defendant's] argument that the State fai led to present co[-]defendant Roberts'[s] statement whe rein Roberts states that [defendant] refused to particip ate in the carjacking, the [c]ourt finds that such informa tion is not exculpatory. . . .

. . . . [T]rial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss the indictment as such a motion would have been futile, for all the reasons the [c] ourt7 A- 1036

- 22 explained in the previous section of its opinion. It is not ineffective assistance of counsel for trial cou nsel not to file a meritless motion. State v. O'Neal, 1 90 N.J. 601, 619 (2007).

. . . . [Defendant's] prosecutorial misconduct claim could have been raised on direct appeal or at an earlier proceeding and thus it is procedurally barred pursu ant to Rule 3:22

- 4.

. . .

. . . . [Defendant] argues that while the individual errors of trial counsel may not rise to the level required to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, the cumulative effect of all his errors led to the deprivation of a fair trial for [defendant]

. In analyzing each of [defendant's] individual arguments, this [c] ourt explained its reasons for finding that trial counse l did not err. As the [c]ourt finds that trial counsel d id not err, there is no cumulative effect of such errors s o as to deprive [defendant] of a fair trial.

. . . . The [c]ourt previously discussed why the deficiency at the grand jury and prosecutorial misconduct claims were meritless. Thus, the [c]ourt finds that appel late counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise th ese meritless claims on appeal.

. . . . Here, there was such overwhelming evidence against [defendant] implicating him in the offenses for whi ch he was charged via accomplice and co-conspirator8 A- 1036

- 22 liability, even though he was not the shooter and d id not get out of the car. . . . Therefore, [defendant] fa ils to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that his claim will ultimately succeed on the merits, and this [c]ourt need not hold an evidentiary hearing to decide this PCR. This appeal follows. Defendant raises the followin g conte ntion s for our consideration:

POINT I DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO [PCR] BECAUSE THE INDICTMENT AGAINST HIM WAS IMPROPERLY OBTAINED WHEN THE STATE WITHHELD CRITICAL INFORMATION FROM THE GRAND JURY.
POINT II
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF GUILTY AS A MATTER OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW BECAUSE AN INADEQUATE FACTUAL BASIS WAS PROVED FOR THE CRIME OF CARJACKING.
POINT III THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DENYING [PCR] OR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING BECAUSE BOTH PLEA AND APPELLATE COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE WHEN TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO SEEK DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT, FAILED TO CONDUCT NEEDED INVESTIGATION, FAILED TO DISCUSS TRIAL STRATEGY, AND PRESSURED DEFENDANT TO PLEAD GUILTY; AND WHEN APPELLATE COUNSEL FAILED TO RAISE ISSUES RELATED9 A- 1036

- 22 TO THE STATE'S PRESENTATION TO THE GRAND JURY.
II. PCR is New Jersey's response to the federal writ of habeas corpus. State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992). To succeed in obtaining PCR, a defendant must "establish, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that he [or she] is entitled to the requested relief." State v. Mitche ll, 126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992) (quoting State v. Marshall, 244 N.J. Super. 60, 69 (Law Div. 1990)). Whe re , as in this matter, a PCR court does not conduct a n evidentiary hearing, we review the PCR court's factual findings and legal conclusions de novo. See State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 421 (2004 ). Determining whether counsel's performance was ineffective for purposes of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires analysis un der the standards formulated
in Strickland v. Was hington , 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) , and adopted by the Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1 987). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant mus t meet the two-prong test of establishing that: (l) counsel's performance was d eficient and counsel made errors that were so egregious that counsel was not functioning effectively as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; and (2) the defect in performance prejudiced defendant's right to a fair trial such that there10 A- 1036

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exists a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's u nprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. " Id. at 694. "Ineffective-assistance- of -counsel claims are particularly suited for postconviction review because they often cannot reasona bly be raised in a prior proceeding." State v. Hess, 207 N.J. 123, 145 (201 1) (quoting Preciose, 129 N.J. at 460). To establish a prima facie case of i neffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must present legally competent evidence rather than "bald assertions." State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 15 4, 170 (App. Div. 1999). For the reasons that follow, we affirm Judge Ravin' s conclusion that defendant has not met this standard.
III. We proceed to consider defendant's argument that a n evidentiary hearing should have been held on his PCR petition as to his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel at both his plea hearing and on direct appeal. Pursuant to Rule 3:22

- 4( a) , we consider defendant's contentions regarding plea counsel's deficiency only if we find his appellate counsel was ineffective si nce, otherwise, th e issues should have been raised on direct appeal a nd would be procedurally barred at this juncture

.11 A- 1036

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We agree with Judge Ravin's well-supported conclusi on that defendant's appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing t o pursue defendant's contention that the indictment against him should have been di smissed. Specifically, defendant alleges that the State withheld exculpato ry evidence from the grand jury which resulted an overreaching indictment that was non-reflective of the evidence in totality. "Judicial involvement with and review of the grand jury is generally limited." State v. Shaw, 241 N.J. 223, 239 (2020). "At the grand jury stage, the State is not required to present enough evidence to sustain a conviction." State v. Feliciano, 224 N.J. 351, 380 (2016). "As long a s the State presents 'some evidence establishing each element of the crime to mak e out a prima facie case,' a trial court should not dismiss an indictment. " Ibid. (quoting State v. Saavedra , 222 N.J. 39, 57 (2015)). "An indictment should be disturbed only on the 'cle arest and plainest ground[s],' and 'only when the indictment is m anifestly deficient or palpably defective.'" Shaw, 241 N.J. at 239 (alteration in original) (first quoting State v. Perry, 124 N.J. 128, 168 (1991); then quot ing State v. Hogan, 144 N.J. 216, 229 (1996)). Defendant's claim that he is entitled to PCR becaus e the indictment against him was improperly obtained is both procedurally ba rred and substantively12 A- 1036

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without merit. Under Rule 3:10 -2(c), a defense based on a deficient indictment must be raised before trial. No such relief was re quested here. However, defendant asserts it proper for us to consider his argument regarding the grand jury because the ineffective assistance of both his trial and appellate counsel would render a fundamental injustice under Rule 3:22 -4(a)(2) if we did not. We are unpersuaded and find no merit to defendant's argument that his plea or appellate counsel was ineffective by failin g to raise the issue of exculpatory evidence not being presented to the gra nd jury. Defendant predicates his claims of exculpatory evidence on a December 20, 2013 interview between detectives and co-defendant Roberts, which set forth:

ROBERTS: [Co -defendant Henry] parked so we could just look right at the truck. [DETECTIVE]: Okay. . . . Do you see [Friedland] approaching the car? ROBERTS: No, I ain't see nobody approaching the ca r. The lights blinked [indicat ing the car had been unlocked]

. [DETECTIVE]: Okay.

. . . . ROBERTS: So then I went to go [steal the car], and [Thompson's] 1ike, come on, let's go get it. And t his guy right here is like, [n]ah, I ain't doing that s h[*]t. He13 A- 1036

- 22 said, [n]ah, f[*]ck that. He's like, [y]ou always scared of some sh[*]t, like. [DETECTIVE]: So . . . [t]his guy, Karif Ford . . .
ROBERTS: He

– [DETECTIVE]:

– said he's not doing it. ROBERTS: He said, I ain't doing that sh[*]t. And he said, f[*]ck that. So then bra is 1ike, [y]o. He' s like, [y]o, bra, you going to come with me? I'm like, y' all just got me all up here. Like, f[*]ck. I said, [w ]ell, come on, man. I thought we going to take the truck

. Get the truck. Let's get the f[*]ck out of here. 'Cause y'all got me hold

– y'all holding me up, like.

. . . . [DETECTIVE]: So Mr. Ford said he wasn't doing it[? ] ROBERTS: He ain't with that sh[*] t. [Emphasis added.] We agree with Judge Ravin's determination that this exchange does not constitute exculpatory evidence pursuant to the dec isional factors set forth in Hogan, 144 N.J. at 237- 38. A "prosecutor's duty arises only if the evidence satisfies two requirements: it must directly negate guilt and must also be clearly exculpatory." Id. at 237

. "[U]nless the exculpatory evidence at issue squarel y refutes an element of the crime in question, that e vidence is not within the prosecutorial duty we have set forth." Ibid. (emph asis omitted).14 A- 1036

- 22 The second requirement, that the evidence in questi on be "clearly exculpatory," requires an evaluation of the quality and reliability of the evidence. The excul patory value of the evidence should be analyzed in the context of the nature and source of the evidence, and the strength of the State's cas e. For example, if the exculpatory evidence in question is eyewitness testimony, potential bias on the part of the eyewit ness may affect the prosecutor's obligation to present t he witness's testimony to the grand jury. Similarly, the exculpatory testimony of one eyewitness is not "clea rly exculpatory" if contradicted by the incriminating testimony of a number of other witnesses. Moreover , an accused's self-serving statement denying involvement in a crime, although such a statement directly negates guilt, ordinarily would not be sufficiently credible to be "clearly exculpatory," and need not be revealed to the grand jury. [Id. at 237-38.] Evidence which "requir[es] the grand jury to make a credibility judgment " is not clearly exculpatory. State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J. Super. 363, 427 (App. Div. 1997). We agree with Judge Ravin's conclusion that the "[s ]tatements of witnesses or co[-]defendants frequently change, are frequently recanted, and may be unreliable; therefore, they are not clearly exculpatory." We add only that given (1) defendant's admission in his first i nterview with detectives he learned of his co-defendants' plan to steal a vehic le when they entered the parking garage for the second time and (2) the over whelming evidence connecting defendant to the location of the shootin g and to his co-defendants,15 A- 1036

- 22

we see sufficient indication of contradictory infor mation. As a result, the singular interview from co-defendant Roberts does n ot amount to clearly exculpatory evidence under our decisional law. We decline to disturb Judge Ravin's finding that de fendant has not established a prima facie case under Strickland, 46 6 U.S. at 694, since even if appellate counsel had raised all of the arguments d efendant now deems worthy, there is no showing the result would have been diff erent in order to warrant an evidentiary hearing. An evidentiary hearing is onl y required where the PCR petition has a reasonable probability of being meri torious. State v. Jones, 219 N.J. 298, 311 (2014) (explaining that when "view[in g] the facts in the light most favorable to the defendant," the court should hold an evidentiary hearing if "the PCR claim has a reasonable probability of being mer itorious"). Judge Ravin properly concluded that defendant's PCR petition di d not have "a reasonable probability of being meritorious" and, therefore, n o evidentiary hearing was necessary. Ibid. The "mandate" that PCR counsel advance all argument s proffered by a defendant regardless of their likelihood of success "does not apply to appellate counsel." State v. Gaither, 396 N.J. Super. 508, 5 15 (App. Div. 2007). "[A] defendant does not have a constitutional right to h ave appellate counsel raise16 A- 1036

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every non-frivolous issue that defendant requests o n appeal." Ibid. Therefore, we affirm Judge Ravin's reasoned conclusion that de fendant's argument is both procedurally barred and substantively without merit , so appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise it. As this i s the only substantive argument defendant presents in his merits brief as to the in effectiveness of his appellate counsel, we concur with Judge Ravin that defendant has shown no ineffectiveness on the part of his appellate counse l. In light of this analysis, we similarly find no mer it to defendant's assertion that plea counsel should have moved to dismiss the indictment against him based on the same argument that the grand jury improperly returned the indictment charging him with carjacking because the State with held exculpatory evidence. Just as appellate counsel was not ineffective for d eclining to bring this argument, we see no deficiency in plea counsel declining to a ssert a losing argument because there was no clearly exculpatory evidence w ithheld from the grand jury. "[C]ounsel is not obligated to raise issues or adva nce arguments which are obviously frivolous or specious. " State v. Hughes, 128 N.J. Super. 363, 369 (App. Div. 1974). Based on the above analysis, we further conclude th at there has been no fundamental injustice inflicted on defendant pursua nt to Rule 3:22 -4(a)(2) such17 A- 1036

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that this court should grant PCR. Accordingly, we affirm Judge Ravin's decision not to grant defendant relief based on his assertio n that the State withheld evidence from the grand jury or that either his ple a or appellate counsel was deficient for not previously raising this argument.
IV. Since we have affirmed Judge Ravin's conclusion tha t defendant's appellate counsel was not ineffective, defendant's remaining arguments as to the ineffectiveness of his plea counsel are procedurally barre d under Rule 3:22 -4 as issues that could have been raised on direct appeal . Defendant asserts that preclusion of our consideration of these claims, ho wever, amounts to a fundamental injustice under Rule 3:22 -4(a)(2). We disagree. Nevertheless, we will briefly address each of defendant's arguments regarding plea counsel's effectiveness in turn. Aside from the claims related to proofs presented to the grand ju ry, defendant sets forth three allegations of ineffecti veness of his plea counsel: (1 ) counsel failed to conduct required evidentiary inve stigations before defendant accepted the State's plea offer; (2) counsel did no t discuss trial strategy with defendant; and (3) counsel pressured defendant into accepting the State's plea offer.18 A- 1036

- 22

As to defendant's assertion that plea counsel condu cted insufficient investigation by failing to seek a report from law enforcement, we substantially agree with the analysis set forth by Judge Ravin. There is ample evidence in the record that plea counsel did seek out the report, i ncluding through motion practice. Furthermore, defendant's own certificati on in support of his PCR petition sets forth that his plea counsel made "rep eated request[s] for this report." We fail to see how this admission lends i tself to defendant's claim for ineffectiveness and see no further merit in this as sertion. The analysis set forth in defendant's merits brief intertwines his remaining arguments by asserting that failing to discuss trial str ategy was part of how plea counsel pressured him into pleading guilty. Specif ically, defendant asserts that but for counsel's undue pressure, he would not have pleaded guilty. Our "scrutiny of counsel's performance must be high ly deferential." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669. "An attorney is entit led to 'a strong presumption' that he or she provided reasonably effective assist ance, and a 'defendant must overcome the presumption that' the attorney's decis ions followed a sound strategic approach to the case." State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 578- 79 (2015) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).19 A- 1036

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Aside from the assertions that we have already disc ussed and found unconvincing, defendant's merits brief lacks any sp ecific reference to how he was pressured by counsel to plead guilty. Wit hout facts to support the argument , we conclude there was insufficient evidence to over come the presumption of effectiveness afforded to counsel. In this regard, defendant has not met his burden, and we are unable to consider this argument furthe r. We see no error in Judge Ravin's determination that defendant has not established a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance as to his plea counsel.
V.
We next consider defendant's assertion that he is ent itled to withdraw his guilty plea because there was an inadequate factual basis to establish he was guilty of carjacking. First, defendant is procedur ally barred from raising this argument on this PCR appeal. Defendant does not ar gue in his brief that appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to rai se this issue on direct appeal. Thus, d efendant’s argument of inadequate factual basis for the crime of carjacking is barred under Rule 3:22

- 4( a )( 1) as an issue that could have been brought up on direct appeal and was not. Even if we were to consider defendant's belated arg ument, we are unconvinced that withdrawal of the guilty plea is s upported by the record and20 A- 1036

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prevailing law. "A trial judge's finding that a pl ea was voluntarily and knowingly entered is entitled to appellate deference so long as that determination is supported by sufficient credible e vidence in the record." State v. Lipa, 219 N.J. 323, 332 (2014). A presumption of reasonableness attaches to the sentence where, as in this matter, a defendant receives the exact sentence agreed upon

. State v. S.C., 289 N.J. Super. 61, 71 (App. Div. 1 996). "An appellate court is in the same position as the trial court in assessing whether the factual admissions during a plea colloq uy satisfy the essential elements of an offense." State v. Tate, 220 N.J. 3 93, 404 (2015). 2 We unequivocally disagree with defendant's assertion t hat his plea colloquy lacked

2 W he re , as is the case in defendant's PCR appeal, "the is sue is solely whether an adequate factual basis supports a guilty plea, a Slater analysis is unnecessary." Tate, 220 N.J. at 404 (citing State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 157- 58 (2009))

. [T]rial judges are to consider and balance four fac tors

in evaluating motions to withdraw a guilty plea: ( 1) whether the defendant has asserted a colorable claim of innocence; (2) the nature and strength of defendant 's reasons for withdrawal; (3) the existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal would result in unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage t o the accused. [Slater, 198 N.J. at 157-58 (2009).]21 A- 1036

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the factual basis to support his conviction. Defen dant pleaded guilty to carjacking under N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(2), which sets forth:

A person is guilty of carjacking if in the course o f committing an unlawful taking of a motor vehicle .

. . or in an attempt to commit an unlawful taking of a motor vehicle he [or she]:

. . . . (2) threatens an occupant or person in control with , or purposely or knowingly puts an occupant or person i n control of the motor vehicle in fear of, immediate bodily injury . . . . [N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(2).] Further, our statutory framework for co-conspirator liability sets forth that defendant is unable to deflect culpability simp ly because he was not the one to pull the trigger or drive the Range Rover away from the scene.

a. A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both. b. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when:

. . . . (3) He is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of an offense; or (4) He is engaged in a conspiracy with such other person.22 A- 1036

- 22 [N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6.] On October 10, 2017, defendant testified in part as follows at his plea allocution: [DEFENDANT]: On December 15th, 2013, I went to

Short Hills Mall in Millburn to steal a car and it turned into a carjacking.

. . . . [DEFENDANT] : I was part of the agreement to the carjacking, where they threatened the occupants of the car with force.

. . . . [DEFENDANT]: When we went to steal the car, then there was

– it turned into a carjacking.

. . . . [DEFENDANT]: My understanding we was going to steal a car, not to use force to take the car but t hat's what happened in the process.

. . . . [DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL]: Did certain of the occupants of . . . the car that you went [to th e mall] in, leave the car? [DEFENDANT]: What do mean, leave the

– [D EFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL]: Leave the car that you four went to the mall in?23 A- 1036

- 22 [DEFENDANT]: Yes. [DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL]: And . . . are they the ones that approached the [Range Rover and Friedland] ? [DEFENDANT]: Yes. [DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL]: And was that done as part of your plan to steal that car? [DEFENDANT]: Yes. [DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL]: And did these people get into a confrontation or a conflict or a fight with the person that they approached who was the occupant of th e [Range Rover]? [DEFENDANT]: Yes. For sure. [DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL] : And was that part of your plan to steal this car? [DEFENDANT]: Yes. [DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL]: And during the course of that was Mr. Friedland shot? [DEFENDANT]: I believe yes.

. . . . THE COURT: Has anyone threatened you or pressured or coerced you to get you to plead guilty? [DEFENDANT]: No.

. . . .24 A- 1036

- 22 THE COURT: Well, is your plea of guilty entirely voluntary and of your own free will? [DEFENDANT] : Yes.

. . . . THE COURT: Are you yourself guilty of the crime to which you're pleading guilty to? You yourself. Ar e you guilty of the crime to which you are pleading guilty? [DEFENDANT]: Yes. THE COURT: Has [defendant's trial counsel] represented you during these proceedings, met with you, explained everything to you, and answered ever y single one of your questions? [DEFENDANT]: Yes. THE COURT: Are you absolutely satisfied with his services? [DEFENDANT]: Yes. We reject defendant's argument that there was an in sufficient factual basis to support his guilty plea to carjacking. The plea allocution which set forth a factual basis for defendant's participation in the plan to carjack by force complies with prevailing law. N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)( 2); Rule 3:9

- 2; see also State v. Gregory, 220 N.J. 413, 419 (2015) ("The factual b asis for a guilty plea can be established by a defendant's explicit admission of guilt or by a defendant's25 A- 1036

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acknowledgment of the underlying facts constituting essential elements of the crime."). Defendant testified he had a plan with co-defendant s to steal a vehicle. Although defendant asserted he did not think force was part of the plan originally, it was his intention that the group ste al a car and the resulting altercation with Friedland was part of that plan. Ultimately, the plan to obtain the vehicle by force through the confrontation was successful and led to the death of Dustin Friedland. To the extent we have not addressed defendant's rem aining arguments, we are satisfied they lack sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in this written opinion, Rule 2:11 -3(e)(2)

. Affirmed.