alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 103 (Tuesday, May 30, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Page 28093]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-13128]



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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Department of the Navy


Naval Research Advisory Committee; Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 
U.S.C. App. 2), notice is hereby given that the Naval Research Advisory 
Committee Panel on Reduced Manning will meet June 6-7, 1995. The 
meeting will be held at the Boeing Company, Seattle, Washington. The 
meeting will commence at 8:45 a.m. and terminate at 4:30 p.m. on June 
6; and commence at 9:30 a.m. and terminate at 2 p.m. on June 7, 1995. 
All sessions will be closed to the public.

    The purpose of this meeting will be to provide the Navy with an 
assessment of the force structure and ship concepts which would require 
a minimum manning level with a goal of 25% reduction of current 
manning. The agenda will include briefings, discussions, 
demonstrations, and technical examination of information on the Boeing 
Company and Department of the Navy initiatives related to simulation 
based design, life cycle cost estimation, engineering for reduced 
operating and maintenance costs, and relevant technology developments 
and issues. Enclosure (1) is a tentative meeting agenda. These 
technical briefings, discussions, and demonstrations will contain 
sensitive company proprietary information and classified information 
and that is specifically authorized under criteria established by 
Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense 
and are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive Order. 
The sensitive compant proprietary information and classified and non-
classified matters to be discussed are so inextricably intertwined as 
to preclude opening any portion of the meeting.

    Accordingly, the Secretary of the Navy has determined in writing 
that the public interest requires that all sessions of the meeting be 
closed to the public because they will be concerned with matters listed 
in section 552b(c) (1) and (4) of title 5, United States Code.

    This Notice is being published late because of administrative 
delays which constitute an exceptional circumstance, not allowing 
Notice to be published in the Federal Register at least 15 days before 
the date of the meeting.

    For further information concerning this meeting, contact: Ms. Diane 
Mason-Muir, Office of Naval Research, Naval Research Advisory 
Committee, 800 North Quincy Street, Arlington, VA 22217-5660, Phone: 
(703) 696-5660.

    Dated: May 23, 1995.
L. R. McNees,
LCDR, JAGC, USN, Federal Register Liaison Officer.
[FR Doc. 95-13128 Filed 5-26-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3810-FF-F
[No. 22669-7-III.

Division Three.

February 1, 2005.]

#### The State of Washington, Appellant, v. Justin James Branson, *Respondent.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Spokane County, No. 02-1-03337-8, Richard J. Schroeder, J., entered December 5, 2003. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Kato, C.J., concurred in by Sweeney and Schultheis, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Samuel Jerome, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Kuffner, J.), rendered April 6, 1983, convicting him of robbery in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Judgment affirmed.

Upon this record, there is no basis to warrant our interference with the factual determinations of the court made at defendant’s *Wade/Huntley*hearing *(see, e.g., People v Prochilo,*41 NY2d 759; *People v Armstead,*98 AD2d 726). Consequently, the record adequately supports that court’s legal determination that the statements made by defendant to the police were a result of a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights after sufficient warning by the arresting officers *(see, e.g., People v Williams,*62 NY2d 285, 287, 289-290).

Nor does the record support defendant’s contention that the pretrial identification procedures were unduly suggestive. Ordinarily, it is incumbent upon the People to preserve a photo array so that a court may determine whether the procedure employed was unduly suggestive *(see, e.g., People v Barber,*96 AD2d 1112; *People v Foti,*83 AD2d 641). Here, however, the complainant came to the police precinct within hours of the crime and was shown approximately 1,000 photographs over a period of two days, resulting in his identification of defendant. The sheer volume and scope of this procedure militates against the presence of suggestiveness and the undue burden of preserving and producing an array of this size justified the People’s failure to produce it at the *Wade*hearing. In addition, both the complainant and the officer who showed him the photographs were subjected to cross-examination as to the nature of the photographs shown to complainant without any resulting indication that the photographs were suggestive in any way. Indeed, this procedure was conducted at a point in the investigation where the police had not yet focused upon any particular suspect. Thus, the likelihood of a suggestive procedure is significantly diminished.

Furthermore, the arresting officer’s intimation to the complainant that the man whose photograph he had selected three days earlier would be in one of the two lineups he later viewed does not itself warrant suppression of the lineup identification *(see, e.g., People v Rodriguez,*64 NY2d 738, 740-741; *People v Logan,*25 NY2d 184, 192, *cert denied*396 US 1020). Although this is a practice to be discouraged, the record discloses the inherent reliability of the various identifications of defendant *875made by the complainant, rendering this error harmless *(see, e.g., People v Crimmins,*36 NY2d 230).

We have examined defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Mollen, P. J., Rubin, Lawrence and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.
Mark Allen BIR, petitioner, v. FLORIDA.

No. 12-10133.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 17, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida denied.
AGRIUM INCORPORATED, et al, v. MINN-CHEM, INCORPORATED, et al.

No. 12650, R46-021.

Supreme Court of the United States

July 22, 2013.

The petition for writ of certiorari was dismissed today pursuant to Rule 46.1 of the Rules of this Court.
1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

RICHARD SPINNENWEBER, ) 

Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CAUSE NO.: 2:14-CV-101-JEM 

) 

ROBERT LADUCER and ) 

RED RIVER SUPPLY INCORPORATED, ) 

Defendants. ) 

ORDER 

This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Costs [DE 210], filed by Defendants on 

April 21, 2020. Plaintiff has not responded and the time to do so has passed. 

At the bench trial on March 9, 2020, Plaintiff did not offer any evidence or testimony as 

part of his case-in-chief, and the Court granted Defendants’ motion for directed verdict. 

Defendants reserved its right to move for costs unless there was an appeal. Plaintiff filed a Notice 

of Appeal on April 1, 2020, and Defendants now seek recovery of their costs. Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 54(d) provides for recovery of costs to the prevailing party unless otherwise prohibited. 

28 U.S.C. § 1920 provides that the costs that may be recovered include fees for transcripts, printing 

and witness fees, and costs of copies. 28 U.S.C. §1920(2), (3), (4). For the Court “to award costs 

to a prevailing party, the court must determine that the expenses are allowable cost items and that 

the amounts are reasonable and necessary.” Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co. v. Procter & 

Gamble Co., 924 F.2d 633, 642 (7th Cir. 1991). Defendants seek $2,032.00 for transcripts and 

$966.05 in travel expenses for a potential witness, for a total of $2,998.05. Plaintiff has not 

objected to these costs, and the Court concludes that these are reasonable amounts for necessary 

and allowable items. 

USDC IN/ND case 2:14-cv-00101-JEM document 211 filed 05/06/20 page 1 of 2
2 

 Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS the Motion for Costs [DE 210] and ORDERS 

Plaintiff to pay $2,998.05 in costs. 

So ORDERED this 6th day of May, 2020. 

s/ John E. Martin 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN E. MARTIN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

cc: All counsel of record 

USDC IN/ND case 2:14-cv-00101-JEM document 211 filed 05/06/20 page 2 of 2
#### McNULTY, Respondent, v. LUDWIG & CO., Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

October 11, 1907.)

Action by Bernard McNulty against Ludwig & Co.

No opinion. Judgment and order affirmed by default, with costs.
EXHIBIT 32.2

                CERTIFICATION OF THE PRINCIPAL ACCOUNTING OFFICER

                                   PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


      I, Zong Yun Zhou, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly
Report of SORL AUTO PARTS, INC. on Form 10-QSB for the fiscal quarter ended June
30, 2005 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Quarterly
Report on Form 10-QSB fairly presents in all material respects the financial
condition and results of operations of SORL AUTO PARTS, INC.

Date:  August 10, 2005

/s/ Zong Yun Zhou
-----------------
Zong Yun Zhou
Chief Financial Officer
#### Martin J. Mayblum et al., Appellants, v Roderick G. W. Chu, as Commissioner of Taxation and Finance and President of the State Tax Commission of the State of New York, et al., Respondents.

— In an action, *inter alia,*for a judgment declaring that the transfer of shares issued pursuant to a cooperative apartment conversion plan did not constitute a taxable event under Tax Law article 31-B, plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Graci, J.), dated June 27, 1984, as upon the parties’ motions for summary judgment, declaring that such transfer was a taxable event.

Order affirmed, insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Special Term properly declared that the transfer of shares from an apartment corporation to individual unit purchasers, pursuant to a cooperative apartment conversion plan, is a taxable event pursuant to Tax Law article 31-B (L 1983, ch 15, § 181; as amended L 1984, ch 900). The making of the contract of sale for the transfer of real property from the sponsor to the apartment house corporation was not the taxable event. O’Con-nor, J. P., Rubin, Lawrence and Fiber, JJ., concur.
Kevin MAYFIELD, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 13-7102.

Supreme Court of the United States

Dec. 2, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.

Justice KAGAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

STATESVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:15-CV-00026-RLV-DSC

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the “Application for Admission to Practice Pro 

Hac Vice [for Paul T. Yarbrough]” (document # 14) filed March 5, 2015. For the reasons set 

forth therein, the Motion will be granted.

The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Order to counsel for the parties, including but 

not limited to moving counsel; and to the Honorable Richard L. Voorhees.

SO ORDERED.

SIMPSON PERFORMANCE 

PRODUCTS, INC. AND

SFI FOUNDATION, INC.,

)

)

)

)

Plaintiffs, )

) ORDER

v. )

)

DEREK RANDALL CATHCART AND

ROBERT WAGONER,

)

)

)

Defendants. )

Signed: March 5, 2015
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER**

**PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

          I, Xiao Ping Zhang, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Amendment to Quarterly Report of SORL AUTO PARTS, INC. on Form 10-Q/A for the fiscal quarter ended September 30, 2005 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of SORL AUTO PARTS, INC.

| Date:  June 15, 2006 |   |
|---------------------------|--------|
|                      |   |
| /s/ Xiao   Ping Zhang     |   |
|                           |   |
| Xiao Ping   Zhang         |   |
| Chief   Executive Officer |   |

----
#### Sheldon R. Raphael et al., Respondents, v Myron Cohen et al., Appellants. (And a Second Action.)

Appeals by defendants in action No. 1 from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Gurahian, J.), dated January 19, 1981, which, *inter alia,*granted plaintiffs’ motions to deem the bill of particulars timely served and to consolidate two actions brought by the plaintiffs and denied defendants’ cross motion, *inter alia,*for summary judgment. By order dated April 5,1982, this court reversed the order appealed from, denied plaintiffs’ motions, granted the cross motion, and awarded judgment to the defendants in action No. 1 *(Raphael v Cohen,*87 AD2d 815). By order dated May 3, 1984, the Court of Appeals reversed the order of this court and remitted the matter for the “exercise of * * * discretion” *(Raphael v Cohen,*62 NY2d 700, 701).

Order dated January 19, 1981, affirmed, without costs or disbursements, on condition that within 30 days after service upon plaintiffs’ counsel of a copy of the order to be made hereon, with notice of entry, they personally pay to defendants the total *156sum of $1,000. In the event plaintiffs’ counsel fail to comply with this condition, order reversed, as a matter of discretion, with costs, motions denied, cross motion granted, and summary judgment awarded to defendants in action No. 1.

This court’s original memorandum concluded that the excuse proffered by plaintiffs for failing to timely serve their bill of particulars in accordance with a conditional order of preclusion amounted to no more than law office failure *(Raphael v Cohen,*87 AD2d 815, *supra).*Thereafter CPLR 2005 was enacted to empower the courts, under appropriate circumstances, to exercise discretion in the interest of justice to excuse delay or default resulting from law office failure (CPLR 2005, added L 1983, ch 318, eff June 21, 1983). Pursuant to that enactment, we determine that plaintiffs’ default should be excused in accord with the long-established public policy that actions should be resolved on their merits *(Mineroff v Macy’s & Co.,*97 AD2d 535, 536). Although plaintiffs failed to serve their bill of particulars in accordance with a conditional order of preclusion because of law office failure, the defendants suffered no prejudice as a result thereof. Mollen, P. J., Titone, Thompson and Bracken, JJ., concur.
## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 98-2316

___________ Larry Wayne Crites, * * Appellant, * * Doris Ann Crites, * * Plaintiff, * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the v. * Eastern District of Missouri. * Division of Family Services; Social * [UNPUBLISHED] Security Administration, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: August 24, 1998 Filed: August 28, 1998

___________ Before WOLLMAN, HANSEN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Larry Wayne Crites and his wife, Doris Ann Crites, filed suit against th e Division of Family Services (DFS) and the Social Security Administration. The y alleged in their complaint that “General Relief denie d my benefits on 07/09/1990,” and that “Social Security has denied my benefits since Dec 5, 1988 until Sept 20, 1994”;The Honorable Catherine D. Perry, United States District Judge for the Eastern 1 District of Missouri. -2- they sought a court hearing “to receive back benefits.” The district court construe d 1 the compla int as contesting under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) the denial of social securit y benefits to Mrs. Crites. The cour t concluded Mr. Crites was not a proper plaintiff and struck him from the case. Noting there was no indication that Mrs. Crites ha d ex hausted her available administrative remedies, the court then dismissed the actio n without prejudice.
Mr. Crites appeals, appearing to challenge only the decision to strike him from the case. It appears from his brief that plaintiffs intended their complaint to encompass DFS & s termination of Mr. Crites & s benefits. See Mo. Rev. St at. § 208.015 (1994) (DFS determines whether claimant is entit led to general relief benefits). Plaintiffs, however, did not allege

a constitutional violation or any other basis for federal jurisdiction over a claim for benefits unde

r Missouri statutes. See Berger Levee Dist. v. United States , 128 F.3d 679, 6 80 (8th Cir. 1997) (under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal courts hav e original jurisdiction over actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties o f UnitedStates); Williams v. Hopkins , 130 F.3d 333, 337 (8th Cir.) (violation of stat e statute does not infringe federal Const itution), cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997). We thus co nclude the district court & s dismissal of the complaint without prejudice wa s proper as to both plaintiffs. Accordingly, we affirm. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 101 (Thursday, May 25, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Page 27723]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-12880]



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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration


Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary Advisory Council Open 
Meeting

AGENCY: Sanctuaries and Reserves Division (SRD), Office of Ocean and 
Coastal Resource Management (OCRM), National Ocean Service (NOS), 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Department of 
Commerce.

SUMMARY: The Advisory Council was established in December 1993 to 
advise NOAA's Sanctuaries and Reserves Division regarding the 
management of the Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary. The Advisory 
Council was convened under the National Marine Sanctuaries Act.

TIME AND PLACE: Friday, June 23, 1995, from 9:00 until 4:30. The 
meeting will be held at the Crossroads Community Room, Carmel, 
California.

AGENDA: General issues related to the Monterey Bay National Marine 
Sanctuary are expected to be discussed, including an update from the 
Sanctuary Manager, reports from the working groups, an update on the 
Water Quality Protection Program, a status report on the California 
Mussel Watch Program, and an update on the Vessel Traffic Report.

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: The meeting will be open to the public. Seats 
will be available on a first-come, first-served basis.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jane Delay at (408) 647-4246 or 
Elizabeth Moore at (301) 713-3141.

Federal Domestic Assistance Catalog Number 11.429 Marine Sanctuary 
Program

    Dated: May 22, 1995.
W. Stanley Wilson,
Assistant Administrator for Ocean Services and Coastal Zone Management.
[FR Doc. 95-12880 Filed 5-24-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-08-M
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

COREY McNAMEE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:14 CV 260

)

FAMILY FOCUS, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

O R D E R

On September 1, 2016, this court referred defendant’s motion to dismiss to

Magistrate Judge Paul R. Cherry. (DE # 52.) On October 6, 2016, Magistrate Judge

Cherry issued an order recommending that this court deny in part and grant in part the

motion to dismiss. (DE # 53.) In his report, Magistrate Judge Cherry informed the

parties that any objections to the report and recommended finding must be made

within 14 days after being served with a copy of the report. (DE # 53 at 6.) That time has

passed, and no objections have been filed. Therefore, the court ACCEPTS and

ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Cherry’s report and recommendation (DE # 53).

Accordingly, the court DENIES in part and GRANTS in part defendant’s motion to

dismiss (DE # 50).

As to the request to dismiss under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the court DENIES the motion. As to the request to dismiss under Rule 37(d),

the court GRANTS relief different than requested in the form of an award of

reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, against plaintiff and in favor of defendant
for the time and expense incurred as a result of plaintiff’s lack of response to the

discovery served on him and failure to appear for his deposition, and the costs incurred

in bringing this motion. The court GRANTS defendant until December 8, 2016 to file a

request for these attorney fees and expenses, itemized by task and time expended

where appropriate. Plaintiff is ORDERED to file his response, if any, on or before

December 22, 2016.

The court GRANTS plaintiff a final extension to file responses to the outstanding

discovery requests and EXTENDS the discovery deadline to allow defendant time to

reschedule plaintiff’s deposition. The length of the extension and the new discovery

deadline will be set by Magistrate Judge Cherry in a separate order. The court also

WARNS plaintiff that this cause of action will likely be dismissed pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 37(d) or 41(b) if he fails to (1) respond to discovery requests, (2)

appear for his deposition, if he receives notice of one, or (3) prosecute this cause of

action.

SO ORDERED.

Date: November 8, 2016

s/ James T. Moody 

JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2