UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

WESLEY ALEXANDER, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 3:13-cv-00356-PPS

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Wesley Alexander was a prisoner at the Westville Correctional Facility when he

was found guilty by the Disciplinary Hearing Body (DHB) of Fleeing or Physically

Resisting in violation of internal prison rules, and Alexander was docked 30 days

earned credit time as a result.1

Here’s what happened according to the Conduct Report: “At Approximately 9:10

AM on the date of 7-30-12, I, Ofc. Halloran, was letting the E1W commissary line back

on the dorm[.] Offender Alexander, Wesley #197997 stormed back off the dorm even

after being told to stay on the dorm[.] [H]e was then told to return to the dorm multiple

times. Sgt. Holmes then escorted Offender Alexander back onto the dorm.” DE 6-1.

Alexander raises four grounds for relief in this habeas corpus petition brought pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He also raises a fifth issue in his traverse.

1 In his petition (DE 1), Alexander also stated that he was found guilty of the charge of

Intimidation. However, the record submitted by the Respondent does not mention that charge nor does

Alexander discuss it in his traverse. Given that the charge was dismissed, the issue of relief from this

Court is moot. Though it is unclear to me why Alexander listed an Intimidation charge in his petition,

because there is no indication that he was found guilty of Intimidation, this opinion only addresses the

Fleeing or Physically Resisting charge. 
Before addressing Alexander’s arguments, there is an initial issue regarding the

scope of the record that needs to be resolved. The record submitted by the Respondent

includes two Conduct Reports (DE 6-2 and 6-3) in addition to the Conduct Report for

the Fleeing charge presently before me. It appears the DHB did not hold a hearing on

either of those conduct reports. Alexander was not found guilty of either of the charges

alleged in those reports. Alexander objects to the inclusion of these two unprocessed

Conduct Reports as being included in the record of this case. The Respondent included

them because they are reports about contemporaneous events related to the Fleeing

charge here and they are part of the Administrative Record for this case which the

Respondent was ordered to produce. Nevertheless, because it is not necessary to

consider them to decide this case, I have not done so. 

Now, it’s on to Alexander’s arguments. First, he argues that the Conduct Report

falsely states that Sgt. Holmes escorted him back to the dorm. Though he disagrees with

that factual statement by Officer Halloran, I cannot re-weigh the evidence considered in

a prison disciplinary hearing. See McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999).

More importantly, whether Sgt. Holmes escorted Alexander back to the dorm is

irrelevant to the question of whether Alexander fled from Officer Halloran. Therefore,

Ground One presents no basis for habeas corpus relief. 

Second, Alexander argues that he “never left the immediate area of the

dormitory” after he returned from the dentist at 9:05 a.m. (DE 1 at 3.) It’s unclear

whether this assertion contradicts the Conduct Report — the report only says that he

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left the dorm, it does not say whether he went very far or left the immediate area.

Nevertheless, even if they are in conflict, it was for the DHB to determine the credibility

of such testimony, not me. See Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455

(1985). Therefore, Ground Two presents no basis for habeas corpus relief.

Third, Alexander argues that he could not be charged with both Fleeing at 9:10

a.m. and then with Intimidation at 9:12 a.m. He does not explain why he believes that

this would be either factually or legally impossible and it is unclear which he intended.

Nevertheless, as noted above, since he was not found guilty of Intimidation, even if it

would have been improper for him to have been charged with both, this argument

presents no basis for habeas relief as to the charge of Fleeing. 

Fourth, Alexander argues that even though Sgt. Holmes was not involved in this

incident, he was required by prison policy to write a witness statement because he was

named in the Conduct Report. However, the violation of a prison policy is irrelevant to

a determination of whether he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because “[i]n

conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction

violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502

U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Therefore, Ground Four presents no basis for habeas corpus relief

either. I also note that the disciplinary hearing screening report (DE 6-4) notified

Alexander of the charge and the hearing, and Alexander could have listed Sgt. Holmes

as a witness if he believed Sgt. Holmes had any pertinent information to add. Instead,

Alexander indicated that he didn’t wish to call any witnesses.

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Finally, Alexander argues in his traverse that the court should not have allowed

the respondent to file its response to his habeas corpus petition six calendar days late

because the assigned Deputy Attorney General did not provide medical records to

demonstrate her assertion that she was out of the office for medical reasons. However,

even if I were to doubt the veracity of her assertion that she had a medical problem

(which I do not), refusing to permit the respondent to file a brief would not preclude the

court from reviewing the administrative record to determine whether Alexander raised

any valid claims for habeas corpus relief. See Lemons v. O’Sullivan, 54 F.3d 357, 364-65

(7th Cir. 1995) (A default judgment is an extreme sanction that is disfavored in habeas

corpus cases); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (Habeas relief can only be granted “on the ground that

[a person] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.”). That is, I don’t need to consider the respondent’s brief in this case to reach the

outcome lain out in this Opinion. Based on the record in this case, Alexander is not

entitled to habeas corpus relief in this case regardless of whether the respondent is

permitted to file a brief. 

For the foregoing reasons, the habeas corpus petition is DENIED. 

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: December 29, 2014.

/s/ Philip P. Simon

Chief Judge

United States District Court

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