UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

WILLIAM HOLLY, )

Petitioner, )

v. ) CAUSE NO. 3:13-cv-00546-PPS

SUPERINTENDENT, )

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

The procedural history of this case is long and complicated. The respondent

argues that this habeas corpus petition is untimely and that the claims were not

exhausted. However, a “procedural-bar issue [need not] invariably be resolved

first,”Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997), and “the AEDPA statute of

limitations defense is not jurisdictional.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010)

(quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). This means that “[a]n application for a writ of

habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant

to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(2).

Because none of the three claims raised by William Holly, a pro se prisoner, have any

merit, “[j]udicial economy . . . counsel[s] giving the[m] priority, [because they are] easily

resolvable against the habeas petitioner . . . .” Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525

(1997). 

The three claims presented in this case are the same three claims that Holly

presented to the Court of Appeals of Indiana which affirmed the denial of his State

habeas corpus petition. Because the State court adjudicated these claims on the merits, I

can only grant habeas corpus if that ruling was an unreasonable determination of either
the facts or the law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Here is how the State court explained the basic

facts of this case:

In the early 1990’s [sic], Holly was serving a federal sentence in

Pennsylvania when he was brought to Indiana to face charges of

attempted murder, rape, and robbery. In 1994, Holly was convicted and

sentenced to fifty years for attempted murder, twenty years for rape, and

eight years for robbery—to run consecutively, for a total term of

seventy-eight years.

Holly was required to complete his federal sentence in

Pennsylvania before serving his state sentence in Indiana. Holly was

returned to Pennsylvania by a private prisoner-transportation company,

TransCor America. On the way back to Pennsylvania, Holly was briefly

housed in correctional facilities in Michigan and Ohio. Although Holly

was returned to Pennsylvania to serve the remainder of his federal

sentence, his state sentence began running while he did so. After his

federal sentence was complete, in June or July 1995, Holly was returned to

Indiana and incarcerated in the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility with

an earliest possible release date of 2036.

Holly v. Indiana, No. 52A04-1109-MI-492, 980 N.E.2d 448 (table), at *1, 2012 Ind. App.

Unpub. LEXIS 1634, at *1-2 (Ind. Ct. App., Dec. 28, 2012); DE 42-14 at 15. 

Holly’s first claim is that the State was in default because its response to his State

habeas corpus petition in the Miami Circuit Court was late. The Court of Appeals of

Indiana explained that because the deadline fell on Saturday, Indiana Trial Rule 6(A)

automatically extended the deadline to the following Monday – which is when the

response was filed. DE 42-14 at 18-19. That was not an unreasonable determination. The

State’s brief was not late. But even if it had been two days late as Holly argues, releasing

him from his 78-year sentence for robbery, rape, and attempted murder would not have

been an appropriate remedy because “habeas corpus relief is not to be used as a remedy

2
for harmless technical violations.” Lemons v. O’Sullivan, 54 F.3d 357, 365 (7th Cir. 1995)

citing Waletzki v. Keohane, 13 F.3d 1079 (7th Cir.1994). 

What’s more, this kind of procedural issue during a State collateral proceeding is

not an independent basis for federal habeas corpus relief. That is because habeas corpus

review is “limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or

treaties of the United States.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991) (emphasis added).

“Unless state collateral review violates some independent constitutional right, such as

the Equal Protection Clause, see, for example, Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1963);

Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961), errors in state collateral review cannot form the

basis for federal habeas corpus relief.” Montgomery v. Meloy, 90 F.3d 1200, 1206 (7th Cir.

1996) (parallel citations omitted). In Lane and Smith, indigent inmates were unable to

attack their convictions because they could not afford to pay the required filing fees

while non-indigent inmates could do so. Here, even if the State’s brief had been filed

two days late, it would not have undermined the validity of his conviction or sentence,

nor would it have been an independent constitutional violation. Therefore this claim

cannot be a basis for habeas corpus relief. 

Second, Holly argues that his Indiana sentence should not have run concurrent to

his federal sentence. This argument is more than a bit perplexing. Concurrent sentences

run at the same time and allow an inmate to get prison credit for the same day on

separate sentences. The alternative is a consecutive sentence where the inmate must

complete the first sentence before he starts the second one. A concurrent sentence

3
allows an inmate to get out of prison sooner than he would if he served consecutive

sentences. Nevertheless, Holly makes this argument because he believes that Indiana

law did not permit a concurrent sentence in his case and therefore the sentence is void.

The Court of Appeals of Indiana found “no authority for the proposition that the

concurrent running of his federal and state sentences was improper.” DE 42-14 at 19. It

also found that even if Indiana law had required consecutive sentences, the proper

remedy would have been re-sentencing, not release. If that had happened, Holly would

spend more time in prison – clearly not the result he is looking for and clearly not a

basis for habeas corpus relief. Moreover, even if the Indiana courts have misinterpreted

Indiana law and sentenced Holly to less time than required by State statute, “federal

habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5

(2010) (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S.

764, 780 (1990))). Being given a lesser sentence than permitted by State law does not

violate the constitution and “Federal courts may not issue writs of habeas corpus to

state prisoners whose confinement does not violate federal law.” Wilson v. Corcoran, 562

U.S. 1, 1 (2010). Therefore this claim cannot be a basis for habeas corpus relief.

Third, Holly argues that Indiana lost jurisdiction over him (and lost the authority

to enforce the criminal sentence against him) because the State delayed in returning him

to federal prison after he was convicted and sentenced in Indiana. This is how the Court

of Appeals of Indiana explained and resolved this claim: 

Specifically, Holly claims that after being convicted in Allen County in

1994, he was to be immediately returned to the federal penitentiary in

4
Pennsylvania, but instead made multiple stops and was housed in

correctional facilities in Michigan and Ohio along the way.

The [Interstate Agreement on Detainers] IAD is codified at Indiana

Code section 35-33-10-4. Article 5(e) of the IAD provides that, “at the

earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this agreement,

the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state.” Ind. Code § 35-33-10-4

(emphasis added). The IAD does not require an immediate return to the

sending state, as Holly claims. Nor has Holly shown that his return to

Pennsylvania was not practicable or otherwise contrary to the purpose of

the IAD. The trial court did not err in denying Holly relief on this basis.

DE 42-14 at 19-20. Before I could grant habeas corpus relief on this claim, I would have

to find that Holly had demonstrated that the State court’s interpretation of the Interstate

Agreement on Detainers, 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, unreasonably applied “clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States . . . . “ 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1). “[I]f the circumstances of a case are only ‘similar to’ [Supreme Court]

precedents, then the state court’s decision is not ‘contrary to’ the holdings in those

cases.” Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. __, __; 135 S.Ct. 1372, 1377 (2015). Moreover, when

United States Supreme Court cases fail to give a “clear answer to the question

presented, let alone one in [the petitioner’s] favor, it cannot be said that the state court

unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law.” Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S.

120, 125 (2008) (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). Such is the case here.

The United States Supreme Court has only mentioned this provision of the IAD one

time. Here is what said:

In concluding that objection to a specified delay may be waived, we

are mindful that the sending State may have interests distinct from those

of the prisoner and the receiving State. This case does not involve any

objection from the sending State, and we do not address what recourse the

sending State might have under the IAD when the receiving State and

5
prisoner agree to, and the court allows, an inordinate delay. Cf. Article

V(e)(“At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this

agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending State”).

New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 118 n.3 (2000). That brief mention in a footnote gave no

guidance as to how to how promptly or directly a State must return a prisoner after the

end of trial. Neither does it even hint that doing otherwise gives rise to a basis for

habeas corpus relief or renders unenforceable the sentence imposed by the “dilatory”

State. As such, this claim is not a basis for habeas corpus relief. 

Finally, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, I must

decide whether to grant a certificate of appealability. To obtain a certificate of

appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), the petitioner must make a substantial showing

of the denial of a constitutional right by establishing “that reasonable jurists could

debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved

in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Here, for

the reasons explained in this opinion, Holly has not made such a showing and will be

denied a certificate of appealability. 

For the foregoing reasons, the habeas corpus petition is DENIED. This case is

DISMISSED. William Holly is DENIED a certificate of appealability.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: August 10, 2015

/s/ Philip P. Simon

Chief Judge

United States District Court

6