Banking Review 

2006 VOLUME 18, NO. 3 

The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, 1989–1993 

PART II: 1991–1993 

by Lee Davison 

Part I of this study of the post-FIRREA legislative history of the Resolution Trust Corporation 

(RTC) appeared in the previous issue of the Banking Review. It focused on the period 

immediately after the RTC’s creation in August 1989 through 1990, examining congressional 

discussion and debate about the RTC’s management, operations, and working capital funding. 

Part II, which focuses on the period 1991–1993, examines the passage of three statutes that 

affected the RTC’s loss funding, management structure, and operations and completes the 

legislative history of the RTC. 

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Deposit Insurance 

Corporation. Articles may be reprinted or abstracted if the FDIC Banking Review and author(s) are credited. Please provide the 

FDIC’s Division of Insurance and Research with a copy of any publications containing reprinted material. 

Chairman Sheila C. Bair 

Director, Division of Insurance Arthur J. Murton 

and Research 

Deputy Director Donald Inscoe 

Managing Editor Jack Reidhill 

Editorial Committee Christine E. Blair 

Valentine V. Craig 

Rose M. Kushmeider 

Publication Manager Geri Bonebrake 
 

The Resolution Trust Corporation and
 

Congress, 1989–1993
 

PART II: 1991–1993 

by Lee Davison* 

Part I of this article appeared in the previous issue of 

the Banking Review, and explored the period immediately following the opening of the Resolution Trust 

Corporation (RTC) in August 1989 through 1990. 

Part II completes the legislative history of the RTC. 

The Resolution Trust Corporation 

Funding Act of 1991 

Congress’s inability to pass a funding bill in the 

previous session did not mean that the RTC’s 

funding requirements had diminished in any way. 

Without additional loss funds and the attendant 

working capital, the agency would essentially cease 

operations before the end of the first quarter of 

1991. But the political dynamic surrounding the 

RTC remained difficult. The administration’s 

position was straightforward: the losses within 

insolvent institutions had already occurred, and 

delays in funding those losses would only increase 

costs. In the eyes of many in Congress, however, 

including even those of the president’s own party, 

giving the RTC more taxpayer money was 

extremely unpalatable. Although a failure to do so 

would abrogate the promise to insured depositors, 

some members of Congress, particularly some 

House Democrats, adamantly opposed any new 

funding at all. Others wanted to tie further funding to changes in the organization or operations of 

the RTC, or to changes in unrelated government 

policy. Still others sought to weight the burden of 

paying for S&L losses to certain regions or taxpayers. Some of these suggestions had little chance of 

being enacted, but they encumbered an already 

contentious bill, making passage even more uncertain. 

Treasury Secretary Brady said the RTC would 

require $30 billion in loss funds and approximately 

$47 billion in working capital for fiscal 1991, provided that new loss funding was forthcoming by 

March 1. If no new funds were appropriated by 

that date, the RTC would have expended all available loss funds and would be forced to stop closing 

and selling institutions by the end of February.1 

He mentioned, moreover, an RTC estimate that 

* The author is a historian in the FDIC’s Division of Insurance and Research. 

The author would like to thank Tim Critchfield, Timothy Curry, Alice Goodman, 

Matthew Green, Jack Reidhill and Lynn Shibut for their helpful comments and 

suggestions. Any errors are, of course, the responsibility of the author. 

1 U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Hearing on 

the Semiannual Report (January 23, 1991), 19; 41–42. See also BNA’s 

Banking Report 56 (January 28, 1991), 146. 

FDIC BANKING REVIEW 1 2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 
The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

delay for just one more quarter could result in 

$750–$850 million in added costs. He suggested 

that Congress consider an open-ended appropriation that would remove the need for any further 

votes on funding and would remove the possibility 

of delays and the extra costs accompanying them. 

Brady admitted, as well, that the total cost was 

impossible to estimate exactly but said the administration still believed that the required loss funds 

would most likely be toward the higher end of the 

$90–$130 billion range forecast (in 1989 presentvalue terms.)2 In other words, perhaps another 

$50 billion after fiscal 1991 would eventually be 

required. Brady sought to balance this unwelcome 

but not unexpected news with a discussion of the 

RTC’s accomplishments and the new measures the 

agency was undertaking to improve its operations. 

No one in Congress was particularly anxious to 

give the RTC unlimited funds. Both Democrats 

and Republicans in the Senate were critical of the 

RTC’s (slow) speed in disposing of assets and were 

therefore less inclined to support unlimited funding. Yet neither of the two ranking members of 

the Banking Committee wanted to withhold all 

funds. The ranking minority member, Sen. Jake 

Garn, said he believed in short leashes but not in 

“choking the animal to death.” Questioning how 

the RTC did its work was entirely appropriate, he 

said, but not giving it sufficient funding to carry on 

its work was “incomprehensible” because a lack of 

sufficient funding only allowed the problem to 

continue to grow.3 The chairman, Sen. Riegle, 

noting that many legislators had concerns about 

how well the RTC was performing, asserted that 

long-term financing was not viable until Congress 

could consider possible reform of the RTC’s structure and operations. He said he would move forward only on interim funding to meet the RTC’s 

needs.4 At the same time, however, he promised 

that his committee’s first priority would be to 

ensure that the RTC did not run out of money. 

The Senate Banking Committee quickly moved to 

approve a bill authorizing $30 billion in additional 

loss funds, the amount requested by Brady for fiscal 

year 1991. Despite continued criticism of the 

RTC, fears over the additional costs associated 

with further delay won out.5 In addition to the 

new funding, the bill required the RTC to provide 

detailed audited financial statements periodically. 

One other significant provision dealt with protecting RTC employees from liability stemming from 

the corporation’s securitization program.6 From 

the RTC’s point of view, Seidman remarked that 

the Senate had passed the bill “essentially the way 

we asked them to pass it.”7 

As might have been expected, even limited funding did not find such clear sailing in the House. 

Relations between House Banking Committee 

Chairman Gonzalez and Treasury Secretary Brady 

had become increasingly cool, and as House members had demonstrated during the autumn, they 

were much less willing to support RTC funding. 

Gonzalez sent a letter to Brady protesting both the 

size and the indefinite nature of the funding 

request and said he expected the Oversight Board 

to submit an analysis explaining the need for $77 

billion in loss funds and working capital for fiscal 

1991.8 When Brady came before the committee, 

he faced a much less cooperative group than the 

one he had faced in the Senate. Few of the House 

committee’s members seemed moved by the argument that the losses had already been incurred and 

that delays would only increase costs. Influential 

Democrats gave notice that they would have to be 

convinced of the need for more funding; others 

suggested they would attach amendments that 

2 U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Hearing on
 

the Semiannual Report (January 23, 1991), 18–19.
 

3 Ibid., 2–3.
 

4 Robert M. Garsson, “Riegle Backs Stopgap RTC Funding; Rejects Brady’s
 

Request for Permanent Legislation,” American Banker (January 24, 1991).
 

5 “Panel Approves Funds for Bailout,” New York Times (February 5, 1991).
 

6 See S. 419 (February 14, 1991); and BNA’s Banking Report 56 (February 11,
 

1991), 243. Under the Securities Act of 1933, RTC and Oversight Board
 

employees could be held personally liable for actions under the program
 

(which was designed to increase asset sales). The RTC was very concerned
 

about this issue and came to the conclusion that the only solution was
 

through legislation. The agency drafted a narrow provision, explaining that
 

the intent of the provision was merely to clarify existing law and not create
 

new law, and met with members of both Banking Committees to discuss it.
 

After the Senate bill passed in committee, the RTC staff was essentially
 

satisfied with the immunity provision the bill contained (RTC Board of
 

Directors Meeting, January 2 and February 5, 1991).
 

7 Ibid., February 19, 1991.
 

8 BNA’s Banking Report 56 (January 28, 1991), 146.
 

2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 2 FDIC BANKING REVIEW 
 

The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

would clearly be unacceptable to the administration; and yet others sought action on other fronts 

before they would contemplate voting for new 

funding.9 

Gonzalez refused to move forward without an opinion from the GAO about the RTC’s performance. 

Comptroller General Charles A. Bowsher had 

many criticisms of the RTC’s operations, especially 

its asset sales, but also stated that it was too soon 

to judge how well the agency was performing. He 

believed that other areas needed improvement, 

including information systems and contracting 

oversight, but on funding the GAO adopted a 

middle road: it recommended that the RTC be 

funded annually because unlimited funding would 

“effectively eliminate controls,” but shorter-term 

financing was inefficient and likely to increase 

costs. When asked what grade he would give the 

RTC for its performance, he replied, “Incomplete,” 

and said that to be fair, the RTC had inherited an 

enormous mess and was a huge organization created from scratch. Many problems existed, he said, 

but the RTC was attempting to address them. In 

any case, the $30 billion request for the RTC 

should be approved.10 

The process in the House Banking Committee, 

however, was fractious, with Democrats seeking to 

attach various contentious amendments to the bill 

(H.R. 1103).11 Reps. Joseph Kennedy and James 

Slattery proposed a $20 billion appropriation, 

adding that anything above that amount would 

have to be paid for through tax increases. The 

amendment was adopted (28-21), with the support 

of Gonzalez. Among other amendments, the committee also adopted (27-16) a much more controversial plan that would have required states where 

the failure of state-chartered thrifts generated high 

RTC costs to pay 25 percent of the costs associated 

with failed thrifts in that state; otherwise, the 

state’s state-chartered thrifts would not be allowed 

to retain federal deposit insurance.12 

The bill as amended, however, failed to make it 

out of the committee, by a vote of 19-31, with all 

committee Republicans voting against it. A 

Republican attempt to substitute a clean funding 

bill also failed, 22-27, with most Democrats opposing it. Afterward Gonzalez blamed the administration for refusing to compromise on a shorter-term 

funding plan, and stated that the RTC bill was 

“mugged by administration lobbyists determined to 

block any effort to reform the RTC.”13 Republican Rep. Frank Riggs described the Democratic 

bill as a “legislative Christmas tree” but “all the 

ornaments brought the tree crashing down. . . . the 

Democrats decided to have a legislative party, and 

yet they wanted the Republicans, the Treasury 

Secretary, and the RTC to clean up their mess. 

Well we all refuse.”14 

Meanwhile, the Senate process moved forward, 

with Riegle supporting that chamber’s bill, which 

simply provided for $30 billion in additional loss 

funding and required that the RTC provide 

detailed financial operating plans, schedules of projected insolvencies, and audit and financial statements within six months of the end of the fiscal 

year. Riegle sought to mollify those pushing for 

RTC reform and restructuring by announcing that 

he would hold hearings on those issues in April.15 

Several Democrats nevertheless sought to intro9 Gonzalez suggested that “much of this so-called working capital will 

ultimately become losses as assets deteriorate.” He also noted that many 

people complained about dealing with the RTC and that its asset sales were 

“painfully slow” (U.S. House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban 

Affairs, Semi-Annual Appearance [January 31, 1991], 78–79). Gonzalez’s 

predictions were not realized; working capital advances to the RTC were fully 

repaid in 1998. “FDIC, RTC Repaid Money Borrowed to Rescue Thrifts,” Wall 

Street Journal (December 18, 1998). 

10 U.S. House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, General 

Accounting Office Report Card (February 20, 1991). See also BNA’s Banking 

Report 56 (February 25, 1991), 353–54. Bowsher suggested that the time 

was ripe for a separation of the RTC from the FDIC (meaning that the system 

of dual boards of directors should be abolished, with the Oversight Board 

retained). However, he said separation should be done carefully, since so 

many FDIC personnel were working for the RTC. Many House members, 

including Gonzalez and Schumer, were in favor of separation. David Cooke 

supported the move as long as the RTC became responsible for liquidating all 

assets controlled by the government (Barbara A. Rehm, “RTC Spinoff from 

FDIC Is Proposed,” American Banker [February 21, 1991]). 

11 For the amendments, see BNA’s Banking Report 56 (March 4, 1991), 

414–15.
 

12 Other Democratic amendments failed; one offered by Rep. Annunzio would
 

have created performance-based funding, where the Treasury appropriations
 

could have only matched asset recoveries. This was soundly defeated 5-43. A
 

similar amendment, introduced by Rep. James Bachus, would have provided
 

$15 billion in funding, with the other $15 billion based on asset sales; it
 

failed on a 9-39 vote.
 

13 Robert M. Garsson, “Panel’s Vote Threatens S&L Bailout, Reform Bill,”
 

American Banker (February 28, 1991).
 

14 Congressional Record H. 1171 (February 27, 1991).
 

15 Congressional Record S. 2296ff. (February 26, 1991).
 

FDIC BANKING REVIEW 3 2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 
 

The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

duce amendments dealing with management 

restructuring and lower funding amounts,16 but 

Riegle succeeded in having these tabled.17 Republicans, with little dissent, supported the Senate’s 

relatively clean funding bill, as the administration 

wished. The Senate bill passed comfortably, 69-30, 

with the support of more than 80 percent of 

Republicans and almost 60 percent of Democrats.18 

The House Banking Committee found it impossible to reach a consensus and chose to allow the 

matter to be decided on the House floor, though 

under a rule that limited both debate and amendments.19 The rule did provide for votes on three 

competing versions of RTC funding, in addition to 

a straightforward $30 billion funding bill.20 One 

of the alternatives was a proposal by Chalmers 

Wylie—essentially the clean bill backed by the 

Bush administration, but including a set of limited 

management reforms and reports as an enticement 

to doubting Democrats.21 One was the KennedySlattery proposal, which was a “pay-as-you-go” bill, 

authorizing RTC spending but demanding that 

after the first $20 billion, all future RTC funding 

be “deficit-neutral.” The third alternative was a 

Gonzalez proposal, which appropriated the $30 billion but attached more substantive reforms.22 

The points of view embodied in these three proposals had already been debated in committee, and 

the arguments attached to them were well-known. 

All three substitute bills failed to pass, and the 

votes illustrate how deeply held the partisan posi16 Robert Kerrey, who had been critical of the RTC’s structure since before its 

inception and had introduced a bill to restructure the RTC in February, 

announced he would offer an amendment on the Oversight Board’s structure 

despite Riegle’s promise. Kerrey’s bill (S. 389, introduced on February 7, 

1991) would have abolished the Oversight Board and replaced it with a new 

board of governors for the RTC with nine members (five presidentially 

appointed citizens plus the Secretary of Treasury, Chairman of the Federal 

Reserve Board, Secretary of HUD, and Chairman of the FDIC); the current RTC 

board would be abolished. The new board was to be an agency of the U.S. 

government—thus, a separate entity from the RTC. Another bill, S. 572, 

introduced by Sen. Tim Wirth, also abolished the Oversight Board but would 

have created an expanded RTC board of directors (four presidential appointees 

plus a restructured FDIC board [with the OTS director removed, and the 

Comptroller of the Currency a nonvoting member]). 

17 See Congressional Record S. 2610 (March 5, 1991). Both Kerrey’s 

amendment and an amendment by Tom Harkin that would have reduced 

funding to only $15 billion were tabled, and in the wake of these votes, 

several other amendments were withdrawn. Democrats opposed tabling 

amendments more than did Republicans (more than 60 percent of Senate 

Democrats voted against tabling Kerrey’s reform amendment). Broken down 

along party lines, the votes went as follows: on the Riegle motion to table 

the Harkin amendment, 40-4 Republican, 31-24 Democrat; on the Riegle 

motion to table the Kerrey amendment, 42-2 Republican, 21-35 Democrat. See 

http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/vote_menu_102_1.htm, 

votes 00021–22. 

18 Ibid., vote 00025. 

19 See U.S. House, H. Res. 105 (March 7, 1991). Some members thought the 

rule was too restrictive, and some Democrats believed the administration was 

trying to push the appropriation through Congress without any RTC reform, 

charging (accurately) that the rule removed provisions previously adopted in 

committee. The leadership, trying to get beyond the stalemate, supported the 

rule and it passed easily, 272-146. The proportion of Democrats in favor was 

only slightly lower than the proportion of Republicans (Congressional Record 

H. 1592 [March 12, 1991]). See also 

http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1991/roll038.xml. 

20 For discussion of actions in the House, see Congressional Record 

(March 12, 1991); James M. Pethokoukis, “House Panel Passes Two RTC Bills; 

Quick Action Seen on Bailout Funds,” American Banker (March 8, 1991); 

Stephen Labaton, “House Vote Bars More S&L Aid,” New York Times (March 

13, 1991); and Susan Schmidt, “Divided House Refuses $30 Billion for Thrift 

Cleanup,” Washington Post (March 13, 1991). For the text of three substitute 

bills, see U.S. House, Providing for the Consideration of H.R. 1315 (March 7, 

1991). 

21 This proposal required the RTC to take action to achieve eight specified 

management reform goals: standardize the agency’s procedures for auditing 

conservatorships; reduce the length of time institutions were in 

conservatorship, with a goal of no more than nine months; make specified 

improvements to the RTC’s information resources management program; 

develop a centralized system for managing the portfolio of securities under its 

control; develop an effective system to track and inventory real estate assets; 

develop a process to update, on a quarterly basis, the value of assets under 

receivership; develop a program for examining one- to four-family mortgages 

and for marketing such loans on a pooled basis; and regularly review its 

organizational contracting structure and standardize its contracting procedures. 

The RTC would be required, by the end of FY 1991, to report to Congress on 

its progress toward achieving these goals and to establish a timetable for 

achieving goals not yet completed. 

22 Gonzalez’s bill required the RTC to report exactly how it used allocated 

funds and to use a least-cost resolution approach. It also provided that the 

RTC could sell affordable housing from conservatorships to qualified 

applicants, and required the RTC to create a separate list of the properties 

that had natural, cultural, scientific, or recreational value. A government 

agency or a qualified nonprofit organization would be given a 90-day right of 

first refusal to purchase the property in order to maintain its specific qualities. 

Finally, the bill established minority contracting goals for the RTC, with 

contracting activity to be designated as follows: 15 percent to minority-owned 

businesses and 10 percent to businesses owned by women. Compliance with 

this goal would be encouraged but not required. 

2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 4 FDIC BANKING REVIEW 
The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

tions still were.23 The defeat of the three alternatives left the House with the original clean bill, 

simply providing the RTC with $30 billion in 

additional funding. House Republicans voted for 

it by a three-to-one margin (120-42), but the 

Democratic leadership was unable to persuade its 

members to support more funding and Democrats 

voted against the bill by a two-to-one margin (81­

177), killing it.24 

It seemed that the process in the House might 

once again end in deadlock, but this time there 

was no $18.8 billion loophole to fall back on;25 the 

RTC’s operations had already been affected by the 

uncertainty, and new resolutions were impossible 

without funding. Having voted down four versions 

of the bill, the House voted overwhelmingly the 

next day to consider the Senate’s bill and amend it 

as a way to move forward, through a compromise 

offered by Gonzalez and agreed to by the administration. The compromise combined some of the 

provisions in the Wylie and Gonzalez bills voted 

down the day before: it required reports on spending and minority contracting, mandated some 

management reforms, and included affordable 

housing provisions. The House voted 213-197 to 

amend the Senate bill according to the compromise language, still with limited Democratic support.26 

When the House considered passage of the bill 

itself, Gonzalez told members that “to fail to 

approve funds now is to invite disaster.” Failure to 

act could have meant a real loss of public confidence in the deposit insurance system. The bill 

passed even more narrowly, 192-181. Speaker of 

the House Thomas Foley took the unusual step of 

casting a vote for the bill (the Speaker seldom 

votes) to indicate to Democrats that the House 

leadership stood behind the compromise and the 

funding.27 Since the House had made changes to 

the Senate bill, a conference was required. Given 

the difficulties involved in getting the bill through 

the House, and since the administration had 

endorsed the compromise, the Senate agreed to 

the House additions on issues such as minority 

contracting and affordable housing. 

The law as enacted in March provided for $30 billion in funding for the RTC and included a provision addressing the RTC’s fear that its officials 

might be held personally liable in connection with 

its securitization program. The law also sought to 

get more information to Congress in a timely fashion, and was a combination of House and Senate 

ideas: the RTC’s audited financial reports had to be 

transmitted to Congress within six months of the 

end of a fiscal year, and quarterly financial operating plans were required. Any delay in submitting 

either kind of information would result in both the 

Oversight Board and the RTC being called before 

Congress to account for the delay. Management 

reform was also required, but vaguely. The RTC 

was to take steps to manage conservatorships more 

effectively and was to set a goal that no institution 

remain in conservatorship for more than nine 

months. The law also called for better information 

systems in general, and for better information systems for securities portfolios and real estate owned 

in particular. The RTC was to develop better asset 

valuation processes and was to standardize due diligence programs on certain mortgages. The contracting process was to be improved through the 

creation of a comprehensive contracting manual, 

clearer directives, and standardization of contract23 The administration would have likely opposed the Kennedy-Slattery proposal 

because it would have resulted in either tax increases or budget cuts. Almost 

all House Republicans voted against it, while about two-thirds of Democrats 

voted in favor; still, the 82 Democrats voting against it were more than 

enough to send it to defeat, 186-237. 

http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1991/roll039.xml. The Wylie substitute was an 

attempt to assuage Democrats who wanted to reform the RTC, but Democrats 

believed it to be superficial. It too was defeated, with almost all Republicans 

voting in favor and about 85 percent of Democrats against. 

http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1991/roll040.xml. Finally, the House turned to the 

Gonzalez substitute, with its greater emphasis on social issues. Republicans 

voted wholeheartedly against it, but about 45 percent of Democrats did as 

well, and it was defeated 121-303, its demise doubtless aided by the threat 

of a presidential veto. http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1991/roll041.xml. See also 

Stephen Labaton, “$30 Billion Bailout Bill Is Passed,” New York Times 

(March 14, 1991). 

24 http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1991/roll042.xml. 25 See Part I of this article (51–53) for a discussion of the $18.8 billion
 

loophole.
 

26 http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1991/roll050.xml. The Democratic vote was 95­

157 against.
 

27 http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1991/roll051.xml. See also Robert M. Garsson
 

and Barbara A. Rehm, “Denied Funds, RTC Will Be Closing Shop,” American
 

Banker (March 14, 1991).
 

FDIC BANKING REVIEW 5 2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 
The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

ing documents and training procedures. A report 

on how the RTC had responded to these goals for 

management reform was required by September 30, 

1991. 

On affordable housing, the RTC was now allowed 

to sell eligible single-family properties to qualified 

entities without regard to minimum purchase 

price, a provision that Gonzalez had supported. 

The law also required that the RTC, in its semiannual report, provide information on all its actions 

to implement the minority outreach program mandated by FIRREA. This was certainly much less 

specific than the percentage goals Gonzalez had 

pushed in the House, although the conference 

committee did urge the RTC to make every effort 

to make contracting available to minorities and 

women.28 On social issues overall, however, the 

final version of the bill resembled the Wylie 

approach far more than the Gonzalez approach. 

Since the fall of 1990, essentially two battles had 

been waged: whether to provide the RTC with 

more funds (something that Congress had no real 

choice but to do), and under what conditions to 

provide it. Since taxpayer funding was required, 

Congress had a very real obligation to ensure that 

the RTC used those funds well. But “reform” of 

the RTC was often enmeshed in political and ideological quarrels that were not always directly related to the RTC’s central purpose. By March 1991, 

with the repercussions of shutting down the RTC 

imminent, Congress managed to find a solution 

that funded the RTC through September 1991 but 

that clearly dissatisfied those who wanted changes 

in how the RTC was managed and operated. After 

the vote, Gonzalez stated that many, himself 

included, wanted more reform, and he promised 

that “we will be back again on the next round of 

funding to ensure that RTC does get its act together.”29 Given that estimates suggested that the 

RTC’s funding would last only through September, 

the next round was obviously close at hand. 

The Resolution Trust Company Refinancing, 

Restructuring and Improvement Act of 

1991(RTCRRIA) 

Indeed, Congress had little choice but to return to 

the RTC almost immediately. During the second 

half of 1991 two issues needed to be resolved— 

continued funding and structural and operational 

reform. The administration wanted sufficient loss 

funds to end any need to return to Congress for 

further appropriations and thought nothing significant was to be gained from a major restructuring of 

the agency. Many congressional Democrats (and 

some Republicans) were displeased enough with 

the RTC’s performance that they were determined 

to withhold funding unless the agency was substantially restructured and many of its operations were 

reformed. They charged that the RTC as constituted simply was not working and that change was 

necessary. 

Political strategies played a role in the reform discussion, and the funding debate (which became a 

reenactment of past partisan action) would end in 

yet another unsatisfactory last-minute compromise. 

Deciding on a restructuring plan was difficult, and 

with a proliferating number of proposals and a 

multiplicity of actors with differing points of view, 

the path it took was convoluted. Despite the 

administration’s opposition to any restructuring, by 

June RTC Chairman Seidman clearly began to 

embrace restructuring in some form. In September, as the certainty grew that no funding would be 

approved without it, the administration 

announced its own legislation for restructuring. 

Several in Congress also offered bills to reform the 

RTC. 

Although the legislative agenda was complicated 

by the need for Congress to pass a major banking 

law (the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 

Improvement Act) during the same session, just 

before Congress recessed in November it passed a 

set of reform and restructuring proposals, along 

with limited funding provisions. As described 

28 U.S. House, Resolution Trust Corporation Funding Act of 1991, Conference
 

Report (March 19, 1991), 11.
 

29 BNA’s Banking Report 56 (March 18, 1991), 54.
 

2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 6 FDIC BANKING REVIEW 
 

The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

above, the bifurcated structure set up under FIRREA was far from ideal, and the RTC Refinancing, 

Restructuring and Improvement Act of 1991 significantly shifted responsibility for RTC operations. It is debatable, however, whether these 

shifts made much real difference in the speed and 

effectiveness with which the RTC carried out its 

mission. Ironically, as criticism of the agency was 

persisting into late 1991 and forming part of the 

debate about the law that eventually passed, 

observers could see that the RTC, despite its faults 

and problems, was actually making significant 

progress toward achieving its goals. 

During the spring and summer of 1991, there was 

no shortage of ammunition for the RTC’s detractors. In April, the GAO announced that uncertainties in the RTC’s cost estimates could mean 

both higher costs and lower asset recoveries. The 

GAO report also labeled the agency’s internal controls deficient. In June, the GAO stated that it 

could not complete its 1990 audit of the agency 

because financial statements had been unavailable 

until April.30 

As the legislative process geared up for a new funding bill, congressional Democrats lost no time setting out their positions. Frank Annunzio 

recommended eliminating the RTC altogether in 

favor of a private sector program.31 Bruce Vento, 

in a report of the RTC task force, recommended 

recreating the RTC as an independent agency with 

its own board, and claimed this was meant to 

streamline the process, not just lead to a “reshuffling of the organizational deck.”32 The momentum clearly lay with linking management change 

to any new loss funding. 

The administration was not a willing partner in 

these plans, but Seidman, who had openly 

expressed his reservations about the structure since 

the debate over FIRREA, indicated he was considering management change. He did not at this 

point publicly endorse such change, for he said it 

could be disruptive, but he did reiterate his belief 

that the current structure was “awkward” and “not 

ideal.” He said the RTC itself should confront the 

issues because any change generated by Congress 

would be highly politicized and could lead to “a 

train wreck.” It was reported that the RTC was 

leaning toward supporting a structure with a single 

leader and board of directors.33 

Still, in public during May Seidman maintained 

that it would be a mistake to undertake restructuring, especially since communication between the 

RTC and Oversight Board had significantly 

improved.34 The administration, trying to stave 

off large-scale structural changes, announced the 

creation of a working group headed by Robson and 

Alfred DelliBovi (from the Department of Housing 

and Urban Development [HUD]) to identify and 

correct management problems at the RTC.35 Criticism, however, continued. In mid-June, William 

Rivoir, the Arizona superintendent of banks, told 

an RTC regional advisory board that the RTC was 

harming local real estate markets and that its operations were “illegal, immoral, wasteful, and downright stupid.” He argued that the only a complete 

overhaul could fix the RTC’s problems. 36 The 

fact that the regional chief in the RTC’s Kansas 

City office spent $26,000 on art for the office did 

nothing to foster positive perceptions of the 

agency.37 

The first legislation on restructuring since Sen. 

Kerrey’s bill in February was introduced by Rep. 

Vento in June. Arguing that the RTC lacked leadership, he presented a bill (H.R. 2682) that abolished the Oversight Board, separated the RTC 

30 Ibid. (April 22, 1991), 748; ibid. (June 17, 1991), 114.
 

31 Ibid. (April 22, 1991), 748.
 

32 Ibid.
 

33 It was reported that a draft plan would be sent to the Oversight Board and
 

Treasury but that statutory change would be necessary to effect this change
 

(Greg Hitt, “Resolution Trust Corp. Initiates Review That Could Lead to
 

Changes in Agency,” Wall Street Journal [April 22, 1991]).
 

34 BNA’s Banking Report 56 (May 27, 1991), 1014ff. Indeed, in April the RTC
 

had decided to revamp the structure of the communications between the two
 

entities by setting up a liaison group to organize the flow of information as
 

well as freeing RTC operations personnel to concentrate on their duties. (RTC
 

Board of Directors Meeting, April 16, 1991).
 

35 Bill Atkinson, “2 Named as Panel for Correcting RTC Problems,” American
 

Banker (June 11, 1991). The RTC Advisory Board (which had regular public
 

meetings) had been created under FIRREA to provide private sector expertise,
 

particularly on matters having to do with the disposition of real estate.
 

FIRREA also created regional advisory boards.
 

36 Stephen Labaton, “Seidman Will Seek $80 Billion,” New York Times (June 

19, 1991); BNA’s Banking Report 56 (June 24, 1991), 1198ff.
 

37 Susan Schmidt, “RTC Office Art Stirs a Storm in Kansas,” Washington Post
 

(June 12, 1991).
 

FDIC BANKING REVIEW 7 2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 
The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

from the FDIC, converted the RTC into an independent agency, and established the position of 

RTC CEO.38 The next day Philip Searle, chairman of the RTC Advisory Board, testified before 

Congress and called for experienced real estate 

professionals to head the RTC, noting that using 

“career bureaucrats,” particularly for asset disposition, was inappropriate. The Home Builders Association also argued for a private sector real estate 

professional to head the agency.39 

By this time, despite the administration’s desire to 

maintain the current structure, the congressional 

debate had shifted: the question was not whether 

but how to change the structure.40 When Seidman testified before the Senate in June asking for 

$80 billion in additional loss funding for the RTC, 

he also decided to put forward two possible management reforms. Both proposed reforms would 

dramatically lessen the FDIC’s part in the S&L 

cleanup: the FDIC would no longer serve as manager of the RTC. One reform would have maintained the current dual board structure, but with 

an expanded Oversight Board in charge only of 

basic policy, such as funding; operations would be 

the responsibility of a new RTC CEO, acting in 

concert with a small RTC board. Seidman’s other 

reform was a more radical departure from the existing structure, calling for a corporate board, a CEO, 

and an executive committee; the corporate board 

would be an expanded version of the Oversight 

Board, with all the responsibilities of both the current Oversight Board and the RTC board; the 

CEO (who would sit on the board) would control 

all agency staff; and the executive committee 

would act on the board’s behalf.41 

RTC and FDIC Chairman Seidman argued that 

his proposals were designed simply to streamline 

management; he also said that since the RTC had 

grown up, it was time “to kick it out of the nest.” 

Some observers thought the FDIC was trying to rid 

itself of the intense criticism as well as the onerous 

job of running the RTC. Economist Robert Litan 

said it seemed as though the FDIC were “parachuting out and watching the RTC drift out to sea,” a 

move he called “a very rational strategy.” The 

FDIC denied that this was Seidman’s motivation.42 

When Treasury Secretary Brady testified before the 

Senate several days later, he asked for both $80 billion in loss funding and an increase in working 

capital. The request for increased funding caused 

attention to focus on management reform. Even 

though the Senate had always been (and was still) 

more likely to approve funding increases than the 

House, it was becoming clear that reform had to 

accompany funding. Brady argued against the kind 

of overhaul proposed by Seidman and the kinds 

espoused by congressional critics of the RTC. The 

administration’s solution was to adopt one feature 

of reform—the creation of a CEO—saying this 

would provide the RTC with needed direction, not 

require legislation, and avoid disrupting the 

agency.43 The division between Seidman and 

Brady was clear. The latter argued for minimal 

change; Seidman said that either of his alternatives 

was preferable to the present situation and that in 

any case the FDIC’s position as manager of the 

RTC should end.44 

38 BNA’s Banking Report 56 (June 24, 1991), 1195. For Vento’s views, see 

also U.S. House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 

Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, 

Resolution Trust Corporation Task Force, Consideration of the Implications 

(June 17, 1991). 

39 U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 

Subcommittee on Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, Real Estate Disposition 

Activities (June 19, 1991), 3ff., 150ff.; Leslie Wayne, “S&L Advisory Panel Asks 

a New Manager for Bailout,” New York Times (June 20, 1991); and BNA’s 

Banking Report 56 (June 24, 1991), 1197. 

40 Kevin G. Salwen, “RTC to Seek $75 Billion More in Thrift Bailout,” Wall 

Street Journal (June 20, 1991).
 

41 U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
 

Restructuring the Resolution Trust Corporation (June 11, 21, and 26, 1991),
 

273ff.
 

42 Leslie Wayne, “S&L Advisory Panel Asks a New Manager for Bailout,” New
 

York Times (June 19, 1991); Bill Atkinson, “Seidman to Suggest Limiting FDIC’s
 

Role in S&L Bailout,” American Banker (June 20, 1991); and BNA’s Banking
 

Report 56 (June 24, 1991), 1194. At the same time, it was rumored that
 

Treasury, not happy about its relations with the RTC, wanted David Cooke
 

removed from his job in order to realign management. This rumor engendered
 

a brief flurry of accusations that Cooke was being made a scapegoat, along
 

with public statements that he was not. (Leslie Wayne, “Seidman Asks for
 

Hiring of a ‘Strong’ Bailout Chief,” New York Times [June 22, 1991]; and
 

Susan Schmidt, “Treasury, RTC Ties Strained Over Report of Cooke Ouster,”
 

Washington Post [June 22, 1991]).
 

43 U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
 

Restructuring the Resolution Trust Corporation (June 11, 21, and 26, 1991),
 

414–15.
 

44 Ibid., 269ff. 

2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 8 FDIC BANKING REVIEW 
The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

The House had always been more vociferous in its 

criticism of the RTC, and this debate proved no 

exception. The need for $80 billion in additional 

loss funds, a need acknowledged by the Senate 

Banking Committee, gave rise to criticism in the 

House, with RTC critics like Annunzio calling the 

RTC “a black hole” for taxpayer funds and suggesting that the agency be disbanded in favor of a private sector solution to the problem of asset 

disposition.45 Gonzalez stated that approval for 

more funds would probably not be forthcoming 

without significant reform. 

Beyond funding and management, House Democrats had another concern—that the RTC was not 

executing the social policy elements of FIRREA 

(the provisions concerning minority contracting 

and affordable housing). There had been reports 

that few minority asset-management companies 

were receiving contracts from the RTC. The 

agency argued that few minority firms were large 

enough to handle many of the contracts, but 

unsuccessful minority bidders disputed this contention. Jesse Jackson, head of the Rainbow 

Coalition, said the RTC could break up contracts 

into smaller parcels, and in June Seidman promised to do so.46 RTC critics also argued that the 

agency was not implementing the affordable housing provisions of FIRREA. Groups such as Citizens United for Economic Development 

complained that it was difficult to get financing for 

RTC properties. During the spring of 1991, lawsuits in Texas and Arizona charged that the RTC 

ignored FIRREA’s affordable housing requirements. 

The RTC replied that the requirements were hard 

to meet, but Democrats in Congress charged that 

the Bush administration had chosen to disregard 

those portions of the law. 

The summer passed with further hearings and continued public debate. The Oversight Board drafted 

a bill that, not surprisingly, retained much of the 

current management structure. The Oversight 

Board would remain and would have the power to 

decide on the appointment of a CEO, who would 

be added to the Oversight Board. The FDIC board 

would continue to act as the RTC board, with the 

CEO added to that board as well. The FDIC 

would continue to be the exclusive manager of the 

RTC, but the CEO would have considerable 

authority to run the agency. On funding, the 

Oversight Board’s bill called for $80 billion in loss 

funds and a $160 billion limit on working capital. 

It also extended for an additional year the RTC’s 

authority to resolve institutions, and in an effort to 

placate critics, it provided for the appointment of 

an executive-level officer to direct outreach programs to minorities and women. Apparently Sen. 

Riegle also submitted a draft bill, one that seemingly adopted much of Seidman’s corporate board 

model as its basis: it abolished the Oversight 

Board, created an expanded RTC board with a 

CEO who was responsible for policy and operations, but placed funding responsibility with the 

Treasury.47 Other possible outcomes were the two 

Seidman plans, the Vento bill, and the plans introduced in the previous session by Senators Kerrey 

and Wirth (see note 16). 

The divergence of opinion between Seidman (representing the FDIC/RTC) and Treasury persisted.48 

The Treasury’s minimalist plan was not likely to 

placate the RTC’s critics, partly because Congress 

wanted far more change than Treasury did and 

partly because Congress saw Seidman as the more 

trustworthy guide. During August and early September, the RTC and FDIC were drafting revised 

versions of the Oversight Board’s bill as part of 

their discussions with the administration about 

putting forward a bill with more substantive 

changes. By early September, the administration 

had agreed, albeit reluctantly, to a bill that 

removed the FDIC as exclusive manager, reduced 

45 U.S. House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, RTC
 

Semiannual Report (July 11, 1991), 5.
 

46 New York Times (June 4 and 7, 1991).
 

47 RTC MSS LEGH-68 Restructuring Bills. Memo from Kymberly Copa to
 

Randall McFarlane, “Oversight Board’s Draft Bill to Reorganize and Restructure
 

the RTC” (July 29, 1991).
 

48 In suggested amendments to the Oversight Board plan, the FDIC/RTC
 

proposed that the FDIC be removed as exclusive manager, that increased
 

authority be delegated to the CEO, and that the Oversight Board have less
 

accountability for the RTC’s performance (RTC MSS LEGH-68 Orig. Oversight
 

Bd. Restruct. Memo from Kymberly Copa to Randall McFarlane, “Outline of
 

Suggested Changes to the Oversight Board’s Bill to Restructure the RTC”
 

[August 19, 1991]).
 

FDIC BANKING REVIEW 9 2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 
The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

the Oversight Board’s responsibility, established 

the CEO position by statute, added the RTC CEO 

to the RTC board, and added both the FDIC 

Chairman and the RTC CEO to the Oversight 

Board—all of which brought the bill much closer 

to what Seidman had envisioned. Robson and 

Seidman reached an agreement that at the hearing 

scheduled for September 12, Robson would maintain the position that the Oversight Board did not 

believe such changes were “necessary or desirable” 

but that if a majority in Congress insisted, the 

administration would agree to the RTC/Treasury 

compromise restructuring plan. Seidman, for his 

part, would state that he favored the restructuring 

plan (acknowledging the difference of opinion 

with the Oversight Board) but that both had 

agreed to the compromise proposal.49 

Seidman and Robson testified about the compromise they had reached. Robson’s reluctance was 

clear: the administration preferred to maintain the 

present structure but with the addition of a CEO. 

“I really think that Congress is going to make one 

big mistake if it folds the tent and recreates this 

thing in its own way because you are going to have 

nothing but one hell of a lot of confusion and a lot 

of disruption and you are not going to buy yourself 

anything from it.” Democratic Rep. Douglas 

Barnard counseled Robson that Treasury ought to 

support the compromise, telling him, “I’d rather 

offer something than take what Congress was 

going to give you.”50 Robson’s later comments 

showed that the administration had taken this to 

heart: “If we’re going to get hit by a truck, what 

type . . . would we like to get hit with?”51 The 

compromise proposal was introduced by Rep. 

Marge Roukema.52 

Although the precise character of the restructuring 

remained uncertain and competing versions still 

needed to be reconciled, the agreement reached by 

the FDIC/RTC and the administration made that 

issue less contentious; the agreement also made it 

far less likely that more sweeping plans such as 

Vento’s would gain widespread support. Indeed, 

the administration now lobbied Congress in favor 

of the compromise restructuring, hoping to persuade members that this was all the change needed. Robson and Seidman met with numerous 

members of Congress, both supportive and not, 

during late September and early October. House 

Banking Committee Democrats perhaps needed 

the most attention, but conservative Republicans 

were also unhappy, some of them believing that 

the RTC essentially amounted to a socialization of 

the American economy. Rep. Newt Gingrich 

introduced a bill in October that terminated the 

agency fully two years before the FIRREA termination date, at year-end 1994.53 (Republican disaffection with the RTC would become much more 

obvious in 1992.) 

The administration moved forward on finding a 

CEO for the RTC, announcing that Albert Casey, 

former head of American Airlines and former Postmaster General, had been selected for the job. 

Since the administration believed that no statutory 

authority was necessary to install him, Casey was 

expected to be in the position in October.54 

Smooth passage of the legislation did not, however, ensue. 

Congressional Democrats, while hoping to push for 

the more significant structural changes as well, 

quickly signaled a return to the funding issue. 

Reps. Annunzio, James Bacchus, and John W. Cox 

introduced a bill tying RTC funding to assets sales 

(they also supported the Vento restructuring 

plan).55 When this element of their bill was 

49 RTC MSS LEGH 68. Treasury’s Restructuring Bill. Letter from John E. 

Robson, deputy Treasury secretary, to L. William Seidman, chairman, FDIC, 

September 9, 1991. The day before the hearing, Democratic Rep. Peter 

Hoagland introduced yet another bill along the lines of Seidman’s corporate 

board model. See H.R. 3303, introduced September 11, 1991. 

50 U.S. House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 

Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, 

Resolution Trust Corporation Refinancing (Sept. 12 and 17, 1991), 45. 

51 BNA’s Banking Report 57 (September 16, 1991), 413; and Leslie Wayne, 

“Congress is Given Plan to Alter S&L Rescue,” New York Times (September 13, 

1991). 

52 H.R. 3356. The bill also contained the $80 billion loss funding, a new 

working capital limit of $160 billion, and the provision to extend by one year 

the deadline by which the RTC could accept institutions for resolution. 

53 H.R. 3449. The bill was not acted on. 

54 Susan Schmidt, “Albert Casey Tapped to Head RTC,” Washington Post 

(September 24, 1991). 

55 Bacchus introduced H.R. 3422 on September 26, 1991; among its 

provisions were those tying RTC funding to asset disposition, making the RTC 

an executive agency when procurement issues were concerned, limiting 

amounts paid for legal services, and barring certain former S&L employees 

from RTC work. 

2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 10 FDIC BANKING REVIEW 
 

The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

offered as an amendment in subcommittee, it was 

defeated.56 Rep. Joseph Kennedy attempted 

another previously unsuccessful tactic, proposing 

an amendment that would give the RTC only $20 

billion and, more importantly, would make any further funding contingent on the president’s submitting a plan to pay for it. Kennedy’s amendment 

was narrowly approved in subcommittee (18-17). 

Republicans stated that since Kennedy’s amendment did not specify how that funding would be 

paid for, it violated the 1990 budget agreement 

and was therefore “doomed.” One committee staff 

member noted that it was ironic that Democratic 

“free spenders” had become fiscal conservatives 

when it came to funding the RTC.57 

The subcommittee considered a host of other 

amendments, mostly from Democrats. The subcommittee approved an amendment introduced by 

Annunzio designed to reimpose a meaningful 

working capital constraint as well as amendments 

that required additional audit requirements, limitations on the acceptance of brokered deposits, and 

changes to contracting processes. The one significant restructuring change agreed to was the presidential appointment and Senate confirmation of 

the new RTC CEO, as well as a further reduction 

in the role of the Oversight Board.58 The more 

radical structural proposals, such as making the 

RTC an executive agency and a wholly owned 

government corporation, were rejected. A series of 

amendments designed to address concerns about 

minority- and women-owned businesses’ participation in both the contracting and the acquiring of 

failed institutions were also added to the bill, 

although Republicans successfully weakened the 

proposed provisions, arguing that they were excessive and added more costs and burdens to the 

RTC.59 

On October 8, the subcommittee voted 20-16 

(mostly on party lines) to report H.R. 3435; 

Kennedy’s pay-as-you-go provision, despite 

attempts by Republican members to remove it, 

remained in the bill. Robson called the bill both 

flawed and inadequate, saying it failed to provide 

sufficient funding, created new bureaucratic obstacles, and violated the 1990 budget agreement. He 

exhorted the full committee to address these problems and said that if the funding provision 

remained, he would advise Bush to veto the bill. 

Chalmers Wylie predicted that the House Banking 

Committee would not remove the provision and 

that a veto would follow. Kennedy argued he was 

simply attempting to reduce the budget deficit. 

No equivalent of the administration bill had been 

introduced in the Senate, but as noted above, during the previous session long-standing critics of the 

RTC’s organization had introduced bills to restructure it, and in late October, two Senate hearings 

on the issue took place.60 John Robson again 

defended the need for a separate Oversight Board, 

citing the GAO’s advice that the Oversight Board 

should be maintained and that any restructuring 

should minimize disruption. Albert Casey, just 

installed as RTC CEO, made his first appearance 

before Congress and advocated the administration’s position as well. Kerrey and Wirth maintained that more substantial changes should be 

made. During the second hearing, senators heard 

complaints from people in the real estate industry 

about dealing with the RTC, and Riegle drew a 

parallel between perceived problems at the lower 

levels of the agency and the problems he observed 

at the top. He suggested that the structural problems at the RTC led to poor or inconsistent treatment of prospective bidders for RTC property.61 

56 During the previous session Annunzio had tried but failed to enact this sort
 

of constraint on the RTC.
 

57 BNA’s Banking Report 57 (October 7, 1991), 562.
 

58 U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
 

Subcommittee on Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, Oversight Structure
 

(October 23, 1991), 65.
 

59 Even more controversial issues were withdrawn. Vento had introduced an 

amendment along the lines of the single-board model.
 

60 U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
 

Subcommittee on Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, Oversight Structure
 

(October 23, 1991); and U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
 

Urban Affairs, Refunding the RTC (October 24, 1991).
 

61 Ibid., 29. Seidman, who had recently left his posts with the FDIC and RTC
 

and could therefore be thought to have had no political axe to grind, still
 

maintained that the compromise he had worked out with Treasury was the
 

best method to restructure the agency (ibid., 47–48).
 

FDIC BANKING REVIEW 11 2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 
The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

In early November, Riegle introduced a Senate bill 

that called for a much more significant restructuring than the administration wanted, one that was 

similar to Seidman’s corporate board model. The 

bill abolished the Oversight Board, set up a single 

RTC Board of Directors to be chaired by a presidentially appointed (and Senate-confirmed) RTC 

CEO (the other members being the Treasury Secretary, Chairman of the FDIC, and two independent members). This new, smaller board would 

have full responsibility for oversight and management of the RTC but would delegate operating 

authority to the CEO.62 This bill never came up 

for a vote. 

Although Riegle’s bill was not acted on, the House 

Banking Committee did move forward, on 

November 20 approving the bill with the controversial funding provision, 27-25, again essentially 

along party lines. As in subcommittee, Republicans sought to remove the funding provision by 

offering a substitute that included everything but 

the pay-as-you-go provision, therefore containing 

elements that many Republicans and the administration would have rejected but also giving the 

RTC permanent and open-ended funding, something few Democrats would support. The committee did approve a host of amendments, mostly by 

voice vote. At this point, however, the prospects 

for agreement appeared dim. Speaker Foley noted 

that the House would not adjourn without providing some RTC funding, stating, “There is no way it 

can be left totally to sometime next year”—but 

predicting the amount might well be less than the 

administration had requested.63 

RTC and administration officials commented that 

new funding was essential and contended that 

many held an unjustifiably jaundiced view of the 

agency and its accomplishments. Casey argued 

that the RTC was actually ahead of schedule, having resolved large numbers of institutions since its 

inception as well as having sold $200 billion in 

assets, including many hard-to-sell assets. Critics, 

he said, should recognize that improvements had 

taken place, and while he stood ready to work with 

Congress, the legislature had to stand behind the 

government’s pledge to depositors with the 

requested $80 billion. Peter Monroe of the Oversight Board echoed the request for funds.64 

Congress was, however, again finding it difficult to 

provide those funds. In 1990 when legislators 

waited until the last minute but were unable to 

act, they had the $18.8 billion loophole to keep 

the RTC going until more funds were appropriated. This time they had no such way out; on October 10, the RTC had withdrawn 14 larger thrifts 

and numerous small ones from the resolution 

schedule. William Roelle stated that the RTC had 

sufficient money to operate, but not enough to 

consummate any new deals.65 

On November 27, perhaps with members realizing 

that not providing any funding would be problematic, Congress approved a compromise that had 

been put forward after the House rejected the bill 

approved by the Banking Committee. The compromise provided $25 billion in new loss funds but 

mandated that the money could be used only until 

April 1, 1992, forcing Congress to return yet again 

to the RTC in its next session. The bill also 

included changes in the RTC management structure, provisions on aiding minority- and womenowned businesses, and provisions expanding 

affordable housing programs. House members were 

sufficiently anxious to distance themselves from 

the legislation that it was, unusually, passed by a 

voice vote. Senators had intended to do the same, 

but Paul Wellstone forced a recorded vote; the bill 

passed 44-33.66 President Bush, urging lawmakers 

to fully fund the RTC on their return, signed the 

bill on December 12.67 

62 S. 1943, the Resolution Trust Corporation Reform Act of 1991, was
 

introduced on November 7.
 

63 BNA’s Banking Report 57 (November 25, 1991), 850.
 

64 Peter H. Monroe, “Fund the RTC,” New York Times (November 25, 1991).
 

65 Barbara A. Rehm, “Lacking Cash, RTC Delays Big S&L Sales,” American
 

Banker (October 11, 1991).
 

66 See vote 00280,
 

http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/vote_menu_102_1.htm.
 See also Stephen Labaton, “Congress Votes $100 Billion Bank and S&L Aid,”
 

New York Times (November 27, 1991). It was noted that although there was
 

not a recorded vote in the House, 112 were counted in favor, with 63
 

opposed.
 

67 “Bush Signs S&L Bill,” New York Times (December 13, 1991). 

2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 12 FDIC BANKING REVIEW 
The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

As noted, RTCRRIA provided up to $25 billion in 

new loss funds to be available through April 1, 

1992. The changes in the working capital limit 

that the administration had sought were not incorporated into the law.68 As the administration had 

requested, the time limit on the RTC’s power to 

take over insolvent thrifts was extended from 

August 9, 1992, to October 1, 1993. The restructuring provisions, which would take effect February 

1, 1992, were a mix of the various ideas that had 

been discussed during the previous year. The 

Oversight Board was renamed the Thrift Depositor 

Protection Oversight Board; its membership was 

expanded to seven members with the addition of 

the CEO, the FDIC Chairman, and the director of 

the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the removal 

of the secretary of HUD; and its ability to insert 

itself into RTC operations was curtailed. The position of CEO was created by the statute, and the 

person filling the position had to be appointed by 

the president and confirmed by the Senate. The 

FDIC was removed as the exclusive manager of the 

RTC, the RTC’s Board of Directors was abolished, 

and the job of running the RTC was given to the 

CEO. 

Insofar as social policy was concerned, several proposals introduced by Democrats in the House were 

included in the law. For example, the technical 

evaluation procedure for selecting contractors was 

changed in such a way that minority- and womenowned businesses (MWOBs) would receive preferential treatment. The law also sought to 

encourage the operation of branch facilities by 

MWOBs: the RTC could make available branches 

of failed thrifts located in predominantly minority 

neighborhoods to minority- or women-owned 

depository institutions.69 In addition, several 

affordable housing provisions stemming from those 

offered by Reps. Kennedy and Barney Frank were 

included in the law. For example, residential properties held by the RTC as conservator were made 

eligible for the RTC’s affordable housing program. 

Essentially Democrats had gotten management 

reform and provisions on social issues (but not as 

much or as many as they wanted), and the administration had gotten four months of continued 

RTC operations. Republicans apparently also 

received assurances that an economic stimulus 

package with tax cuts included would be considered in the next session.70 The limited funding 

provision, however, meant that Congress would 

again be faced with requests for further funding in 

an election year—and the experience of 1990 did 

not suggest passage of that funding would be easily 

accomplished. 

Legislative Stalemate II: 1992 

Having passed RTC legislation in November, Congress would need to return to the subject almost 

immediately. The April 1 deadline meant that the 

RTC had not really been provided with $25 billion, for the agency was able to resolve only a limited number of institutions per quarter and could 

not use the entire sum by that date. Indeed, Treasury Secretary Brady noted that the RTC would be 

able to spend only about 40 percent of the money 

by the deadline.71 

The debate over the RTC in early 1992 was not 

unlike the debate that had gone on since the 

RTC’s inception: taking their familiar places were 

concerns about asset-disposition methods and their 

effects, the effectiveness of the RTC’s management, and, of course, the growing cost of the 

cleanup. Certain facts on the ground, however, 

68 It is unclear why this did not occur. The increase was unnecessary 

because, given the effect of the $18.8 billion loophole, the RTC was not close 

to the limit set by the note cap formula in FIRREA (this limitation worked out 

to be $125 billion). The administration might have been suggesting the $160 

billion figure because some congressional Democrats were trying to rewrite the 

note cap formula, but with no such language in the last-minute compromise 

bill, probably no one saw any need to retain the working capital increase. 

69 Most of these proposals had been introduced by Kweise Mfume and then 

somewhat diluted by amendments offered by Wylie. Another encouragement 

to make branch operations available to MWOBs was that institutions that 

donated branches, or provided them on favorable terms, to MWOBs would 

receive Community Reinvestment Act credit for this action. 

70 Wall Street Journal (November 29, 1991). Some Republican members had 

introduced a bill appending the RTC funding and structural changes to a 

previous bill that would have cut the capital gains tax rate and made other 

tax changes. This tying together of RTC financing and tax cuts appears to 

have been aimed at least partly at the administration, since Democrats 

supported neither of the tax initiatives. See H.R. 3798. 

71 Barbara A. Rehm, “Brady Faults RTC Deadline,” American Banker 

(January 9, 1992). In fact, the RTC actually used only $6.7 billion by the 

deadline (RTC, Statistical Abstract: August 1989/September 1995 [1995], 4). 

FDIC BANKING REVIEW 13 2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 
 

The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

were changed, some points of contention were 

new, and the political dynamic was somewhat different. Although no one in Congress was happy 

about appropriating funds for the RTC, the new 

political dynamic probably contributed most to the 

legislature’s inability to pass to a bill to provide 

new loss funds in 1992. 

Some of the changed circumstances were, at least 

on the surface, positive. The RTC’s CEO, Albert 

Casey, had confirmation hearings in January, had 

been well received, and was confirmed unanimously in February. The creation of the position itself, 

along with Casey’s promises to streamline the management process by delegating significant authority 

to RTC field managers, at least indicated that perceived problems connected with the RTC’s way of 

doing business were to be addressed.72 As Congress was considering the new RTC funding bill in 

March, Casey announced that the RTC was nearing the completion of its task and would begin to 

close offices and shed employees, with plans to 

halve its field staff by the end of 1993. Although 

some Democrats viewed this as an election-year 

political maneuver, the RTC had actually made 

significant progress.73 By year-end 1991 it had 

taken over 675 institutions and resolved 584 of 

them. Total assets held by the RTC, though still 

high at $130.4 billion, had declined by about $30 

billion during 1991 even while more than 120 

institutions had been taken into conservatorship.74 

(See figure 1.) Moreover, in response to the recesFigure 1 

Assets Under RTC Management, 1989–1995

$ Billions 

200 

150 

100 

50 

0 

Conservatorship 

Assets 

Receivership 

Assets 

sion (which had ended “officially” in March 

1991),75 the Federal Reserve Board had been 

steadily lowering interest rates (between January 

1991 and January 1992 the fed funds rate dropped 

from 6.91 percent to 4.03 percent).76 The drop 

was helpful to troubled thrifts and to the RTC 

because it meant that those thrifts that the RTC 

would be taking over would be in less dire condition, and others that might have had to be taken 

over were likely to survive.77 

Other developments were less auspicious, at least 

with regard to how Congress would view requests 

for further funding. The GAO criticized the 

RTC’s ability to keep track of assets and oversee its 

contractors, and issued a number of reports that, 

while citing improvements in the RTC’s operations, nevertheless suggested that problems 

remained. Indeed, the GAO recommended that 

Congress not grant the administration’s funding 

request in full but keep the RTC on an annual 

funding schedule as a way to ensure 

72 U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Nomination 

of Albert V. Casey (January 22, 1992), 16. 

73 Susan Schmidt, “RTC to Cut Work Force by Half, ‘Phase Down’ Operations,” 

Washington Post (March 24, 1992). The RTC’s workforce did begin to shrink 

in 1992. Peak RTC employment was in April 1992, when the agency had 

7,391 field staff. By year-end 1993, field staff had declined not by half but 

by a third, to 4,942. During the same period, the total number of RTC 

employees fell from 8,624 to 6,499 (RTC, CEO Management Information 

[January 1994]). 

74 RTC Statistical Abstract. Indeed, by the time Congress was voting on RTC
 

funding at the end of the first quarter, the agency had taken over 711
 

institutions and resolved 640 of them.
 

75 http://www.nber.org/March91.html.
 76 By the end of 1992 the fed funds rate would drop to about 3 percent,
 

where it would remain until the beginning of 1994.
 

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data/Monthly/H15_FF_O.txt.
 77 This was already reflected in thrift profitability during 1991: in that year,
 

for the first time since 1985, the industry as a whole was profitable in every
 

quarter (OTS Press Release 92-97 [March 10, 1992]). During 1992,
 

improvement can also be seen in the OTS’s ratings of thrifts: As of January
 

31, 1992, the OTS placed 62 thrifts in Group IV (it was assumed these would
 

be taken over by the RTC), an additional 44 in Group IIIc (“probable” RTC
 

candidates), another 106 in Group IIIb (reasonably possible RTC candidates),
 

and a further 231 in Group IIIa (weak and poorly capitalized, but less likely to
 

require RTC takeover) (RTC, “CEO Management Information” [February 18,
 

1992]). By December1992, Group IV had shrunk from 62 to just 19, Group
 

IIIc from 44 to 42, and Group IIIb from 106 to just 26 institutions (and the
 

number in Group IIIa had risen from 231 to 251 thrifts). The total size of
 

the bottom three categories had dropped from 212 to only 87 (RTC, “CEO
 

Management Information” [December 31, 1992]).
 

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 

Sources: RTC, Statistical Abstract (1995), 29-31 and Thrift Depositor Protection Oversight Board 

and RTC, Annual Report (1996), Part II, 4. 

2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 14 FDIC BANKING REVIEW 
 

The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

accountability.78 And one particular example of 

RTC mismanagement in contractor oversight 

came to the fore just as Congress began to consider 

new funding. In the wake of 1990’s Operation 

Clean Sweep, the RTC’s swift resolution of more 

than a hundred thrifts (many with very poor bookkeeping records), there was a discrepancy of nearly 

$7 billion in assets between the ledger maintained 

at the RTC and the ledgers in 92 different 

receiverships. The RTC’s response to this was 

“Western Storm,” a large contract issued to obtain 

an accurate accounting of assets. The $24 million 

contract, however, had numerous problems. The 

GAO charged that the RTC’s western-region officials improperly issued the contract without competition, then wrote it without proper budget and 

cost limits, and circumvented the agency’s own 

rules on allowable maximum contract amounts 

that could be awarded without approval from 

Washington by breaking the contract up into more 

than 90 task orders.79 Such missteps were hardly 

helpful to an already flawed image. 

In addition, a suggested policy change was particularly important to the debate on funding in early 

1992—a push, spearheaded by Rep. Bill McCollum, to use RTC funds to buy back supervisory 

goodwill from troubled thrifts.80 FIRREA had created stricter capital requirements for thrifts; among 

these stricter requirements, the inclusion of supervisory goodwill was to be phased out by 1995.81 

McCollum believed that many institutions, if only 

they were spared this difficulty, would survive 

rather than require RTC takeover and so would 

save considerable taxpayer funds. Many in Congress—particularly fellow Republican James Leach 

and Democrat Bruce Vento—opposed this as a 

return to forbearance. Interestingly, just as McCollum was pushing for this legislative change, the 

legal ramifications of FIRREA’s goodwill provisions 

were beginning to become apparent. In February, 

a U.S. Claims Court issued a preliminary ruling 

against the government in Winstar v. U.S. This 

litigation eventually reached the Supreme Court, 

and led to a 1996 ruling that the government in 

FIRREA had had no right to repudiate the 

accounting variances that had been included in 

resolution contracts. As a result, a number of 

institutions successfully sued the government for 

damages. As of this writing, the overall cost of the 

goodwill litigation since 1997 has reached approximately $1.4 billion (just under $1 billion has been 

paid in settlements with plaintiffs; the remainder 

has gone toward litigation costs). Whatever the 

merits of using RTC funds to buy back goodwill, 

McCollum’s suggested change provided another 

focus for Republicans who, for a variety of reasons, 

had disliked the RTC. His proposal helped create 

an environment in which significant numbers of 

House Republicans felt willing to reject the position of their own administration. Their stance was 

undoubtedly fueled, as well, by ongoing antipathy 

toward various aspects of the RTC’s activities, a 

general disdain for bureaucracy, and the imminence of an election. 

The legislative process started with identical bills 

in each house, introduced at the administration’s 

request, that simply removed the April 1, 1992, 

deadline on funds provided in RTCRRIA and gave 

the RTC an additional $55 billion in loss funds. 

These were the amounts asked for by both Casey 

and Brady in congressional testimony. Unsurprisingly, many members of both houses had proposals 

for amendments. In the House it quickly became 

78 See U.S. House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 

Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, 

Resolution Trust Corporation Funding Act of 1992 (February 26, 1992), 7–8, 

54ff. See also Stephen Labaton, “Congress Advised to Limit Bailout Funds,” 

New York Times (February 26, 1992). 

79 Stephen Labaton, “Congress Advised to Limit Bailout Funds,” New York 

Times (February 26, 1992); and U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, 

and Urban Affairs, Nomination of Albert V. Casey (January 22, 1992), 3, 17. 

For an extended discussion, see U.S. House Committee on Banking, Finance 

and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on General Oversight and Investigations, The 

RTC’s Operation Western Storm (August 6, 1992). 

80 McCollum was vice chair of the House Republican Conference; thus, he was 

more consequential than just a “backbencher.” 

81 Earlier in the 1980s, faced with growing numbers of insolvent thrifts but 

without any means of paying for their closure, the government encouraged 

mergers as a way to deal with this intractable problem. To make such 

transactions viable for acquiring institutions, the government allowed the 

acquirers (for the purposes of meeting capital requirements) to offset the 

liabilities they were assuming with a counterbalancing paper asset called 

supervisory goodwill. Acquirers were allowed as much as 40 years to write 

off supervisory goodwill. In addition, other variances from generally accepted 

accounting principles (GAAP) were allowed for all thrifts. FIRREA’s provision 

therefore had serious negative implications for many acquirers’ net worth, 

even their solvency, and led to extensive litigation.. See Davison, “Policy and 

Politics (2005), 18, n.2. 

FDIC BANKING REVIEW 15 2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 
The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

clear that the GAO’s recommendation to provide 

only sufficient funds for another year, until April 

1993, had strong support. Casey informed Rep. 

Annunzio that removal of the April 1 deadline on 

use of the previously authorized funding, plus an 

additional $25 billion, would be sufficient.82 This 

level of funding, offered as an amendment by Rep. 

Joseph Kennedy, seems to have been embraced 

without much dissension, and it passed the subcommittee on a voice vote.83 

Of course, there were some in the House who 

thought more needed to be done to reform the 

RTC or to accomplish other goals. Vento, for 

example, wanted increased reporting and analysis 

of assets on hand and sold, as well as a restoration 

of the borrowing limitation originally present 

under FIRREA. Bacchus wanted to condition 

RTC funding on the receipt by Congress of the 

GAO audit for fiscal year 1991; he also wanted to 

institute limits on legal fees. The RTC opposed all 

of these. McCollum offered his supervisory goodwill amendment, as well as an amendment on capital forbearance for thrifts. The RTC took no 

position on the desirability of these two proposals 

but thought that RTC funds should not be used 

for, or tied to, either proposal.84 Democratic Rep. 

William Orton put forward an amendment containing a whole series of RTC reform initiatives. 

In the end, all of these amendments and others 

were withdrawn because any amendment not 

specifically having to do with funding was ruled 

nongermane by Annunzio. This approach had 

been taken “to avoid the usual bottlenecks over 

controversial restructuring amendments that have 

delayed the funding process in the past” and also 

to give Casey at least some time running the 

agency without “constant Congressional micromanagement.” It was noted that many members, 

tired of the RTC issue, had willingly withdrawn 

their amendments.85 

When the full House Banking Committee considered the bill, many of the same amendments reappeared, but Gonzalez took a similarly hard line, 

stating that both committee Democrats and the 

House leadership of both parties wanted to pass a 

clean bill. Gonzalez himself wanted to offer reform 

proposals but said he would refrain from doing so. 

McCollum, who again wanted to put forward his 

goodwill amendment, was displeased at his inability to do so. Nonetheless, the bill passed the committee easily, 30-17.86 

The Senate Banking Committee, however, did not 

follow the clean-bill path. The Senate funding 

provision was identical to that adopted in the 

House, but in addition, the Senate bill (S.2482) 

contained a number of other elements. These 

included repeal of RTCRRIA’s capital forbearance 

for certain types of loans; an extension of the time 

allowed for certain thrifts to divest a particular sort 

of FIRREA-grandfathered real estate investment; 

an extension of the statute of limitations (from 

three to five years) for suits against insiders at 

failed thrifts and banks; the publication of examination reports of failed banks and thrifts if taxpayer funds had been used in the resolution of these 

institutions (a measure opposed by all the regulators); and a provision to provide health care to 

employees of failed institutions for a certain period 

after failure. The only initial provision that related directly to the RTC was one that provided for 

the designation of an acting RTC CEO if the 

office became vacant.87 The committee winnowed 

the 52 amendments scheduled to be offered, debated only some, and adopted even fewer. Garn’s 

attempt to strip the bill down to a clean funding 

bill failed 10-11. Successful amendments included 

one (from Sen. Connie Mack) to add Florida to 

the RTC’s distressed areas and one (from Sen. 

Terry Sanford) to set aside $1.85 billion for open82 Albert Casey to Rep. Frank Annunzio (February 26, 1992) (RTC MSS LEGH 

68, Folder on H.R. 4121 Subcommittee Markup).
 

83 Other approaches were proposed. Reps. Barnard and Hoagland offered an
 

amendment that would have lifted the April 1 deadline and provided whatever
 

funding was deemed necessary through April 1, 1994. Gerald Kleczka offered
 

an amendment that was fairly close to the administration’s position, differing
 

only in that it forced the president to request the sums as needed. The first
 

was defeated, the second withdrawn. See list of amendments, RTC MSS
 

LEGH 68, Folder on H.R. 4121 Subcommittee Markup.
 

84 Casey to Annunzio (February 26, 1992).
 

85 BNA’s Banking Report 58 (March 2, 1992), 355.
 

86 Ibid. (March 16, 1992), 459.
 

87 Ibid. (March 30, 1992), 552.
 

2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 16 FDIC BANKING REVIEW 
 

 

The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

thrift assistance.88 The latter likely would have 

proved contentious, for it potentially could have 

aided thrift shareholders as opposed to depositors 

(this provision was clearly similar in intent to 

McCollum’s).89 In addition, Sanford proposed it 

at about the same time that regulators were considering the use of an early resolution program that 

suggested open-thrift assistance.90 

The floor debate in the Senate took place just a 

week before the April 1 deadline, with some members, such as Kent Conrad and Robert Kerrey, indicating they opposed the bill because of their 

dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of RTC operations and the agency’s (lack of) accountability. 

John Kerry attempted to resurrect an amendment 

that had been defeated in committee that would 

have required RTC funding to be treated as spending for purposes of budget enforcement. This 

measure was an attempt to force the use of either 

budget cuts or new taxes to offset the RTC spending. With strong Democratic support but the 

opposition of the Democratic leadership, the 

amendment failed.91 In the end, perhaps the most 

persuasive argument was the simplest—the government had to fulfill its promise to insured depositors—and the bill passed, though not resoundingly, 

52-42.92 Both Democrats and Republicans had 

similar voting splits: it was not all that surprising 

that 25 out of 54 Democrats went against the bill, 

but the opposition of 17 out of 40 Republicans suggested that Republican antipathy to RTC funding 

was not confined to the House.93 

On the same day, Gonzalez informed Speaker 

Foley that Republican support in the House for 

funding continued to decrease and that without it, 

passage of the bill would be difficult.94 As the 

April 1 deadline approached, what would happen 

remained unclear. Democrats said they would not 

support funding unless a majority of Republicans 

did as well, and many (reportedly about twothirds) of the Republicans, ambivalent about voting for more funds, were lining up with McCollum, 

who was supported by minority whip Gingrich.95 

As a result of this impasse, the bill that had passed 

the House Banking Committee was shelved and a 

very narrow substitute (H.R. 4707) was introduced 

in its place. This bill simply removed the April 1 

deadline, allowing the RTC to use the funds that 

had been appropriated in November. By now, 

however, the legislative process had significantly 

deteriorated. The substitute bill had been introduced under a very narrow rule that permitted no 

alterations, little debate, and only a single motion 

to send the bill back to committee. Republicans, 

complaining about overbearing tactics, tried 

unsuccessfully both to defeat the rule and to 

recommit the bill. When the measure itself came 

up for a vote, it failed 125-298 because when 

Democrats saw that Republicans would not support even this limited bill, they too voted against 

88 A summary of the bill as it came out of committee can be found in 

Congressional Record (March 25, 1992), S4204ff. Sanford originally sought 

$2.7 billion in open-assistance funds, saying that regulators had a “liquidation 

mentality” and that some weak institutions deserved a chance to recover (Bill 

Atkinson, Senate Banking Panel Backs $25 billion in RTC Funding; Committee 

Rejects New-Powers Amendments,” American Banker [March 25, 1992]). 

89 See Kenneth H. Bacon, “Legislators Debate Bill Funding S&Ls That Includes 

Weak, but Solvent Thrifts,” Wall Street Journal (March 30, 1992). 

90 Another amendment offered by Sanford (this one failed) would have 

prohibited the OTS from naming the RTC as conservator or receiver until the 

OTS had determined that such a course was more cost-effective than provision 

of open assistance. The RTC opposed this as potentially inconsistent with the 

current statutory least-cost test (RTC MSS, LEGH 68, Folder on S.2482 Senate 

Markup). On March 25, 1992, the Thrift Depositor Protection Oversight Board 

heard testimony on the use of a program for early resolutions/assisted 

mergers (ER/AM), which was supported by OTS Director Ryan. Although use 

of this program was promoted as a way to reduce taxpayer cost through early 

intervention, those who opposed it felt it harked back to the discredited FSLIC 

policies of the 1980s. By late April the Oversight Board decided to postpone 

any decision to use the program, at least partly because there was still hope 

that Congress would pass a new funding bill and ER/AM might be used as a 

reason by some in Congress to vote against such a bill. 

91 Congressional Record (March 25, 1992), S4341–42. The vote on a point of 

order under the budget act was 45-48 against the amendment. Forty-two of 

53 Democrats voting supported Kerry’s amendment; Republicans were almost 

united in their opposition, voting 3-37 against it. 

See vote 00057, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/ 

vote_menu_102_2.htm. 

92 The parties had similar splits in their voting, with Democrats voting 29-25 

to support the bill, and Republicans voting 23-17 (Congressional Record 

[March 25, 1992], S4353). The bill as passed can be found in the Record 

after the vote. It was identical to the one passed in committee, but with the 

addition of a set of managers’ amendments presented by Riegle and Garn. 

These were uncontroversial; many of them related to financial institutions but 

were not specifically relevant to the RTC. See ibid., S4349ff. 

93 See vote 00057, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/ 

vote_menu_102_2.htm
 

94 Bill Atkinson, “Senate Banking Panel Backs $25 billion in RTC Funding;
 

Committee Rejects New-Powers Amendments,” American Banker (March 25,
 

1992).
 

95 Keith Bradsher, “House S&L Proposal Has No New Financing,” New York
 

Times (April 1, 1992).
 

FDIC BANKING REVIEW 17 2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 
The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

it.96 The RTC was out of money. (Actually, it 

wasn’t quite out of money: the agency had set aside 

over $2 billion from previous appropriations that 

had not expired on April 1, but this would not be 

generally known until later that month.)97 

In the immediate aftermath of the failed legislation, it appeared that another attempt might be 

made to pass a bill. The administration said it was 

open to any reasonable funding plan, and although 

Gonzalez wanted the administration to push harder in support of RTC funding, he indicated that he 

would try to pass a bill as soon as possible after the 

House Easter recess.98 And indeed, Gonzalez 

decided to try to resurrect a modified version of 

the clean bill that had removed the April 1 deadline and provided additional funding (the main 

change being to provide only an additional $25 

billion for use through April 1993) by having a 

hearing on the bill in the Rules Committee. 

Moreover, Gonzalez asked for either an open rule 

or the consideration of amendments at the hearing; either course would allow McCollum to bring 

up his goodwill buyback plan (and would, of 

course, allow others to put forward changes as 

well) and so would permit debate and a vote. It 

was thought possible such a course might assuage 

the rancor that had attended House proceedings 

thus far, and McCollum said he thought many 

Republicans would favor a funding bill with his 

plan attached. Rules Committee staff, however, 

said they could not predict when such a hearing 

would be held or when floor action on the bill 

might occur.99 

There appears, however, to have been little 

appetite for returning to the issue of RTC 

funding.100 In July, President Bush wrote Speaker 

Foley asking the House to pass additional funding. 

Gonzalez noted that the bill was with the Rules 

Committee and that further action on it depended 

on the leadership.101 Casey had announced in 

May that because of the favorable interest-rate 

environment, the total estimated cost of the 

cleanup had dropped by $30 billion and that the 

amount provided in the Senate bill would end the 

RTC’s requests for funding. At the same time, 

OTS Director John Ryan stated that the number 

of thrifts likely to fail had dropped significantly as 

well. These optimistic pronouncements were 

attacked by some as little more than election-year 

propaganda. Robert Reischauer, head of the CBO, 

said his office believed 600–700 additional thrifts 

would fail and that the low interest-rate environment would be short-lived.102 He reiterated this 

in July and suggested that the RTC be kept open 

for three years beyond its planned closure.103 His 

predictions turned out to be far too pessimistic, 

whereas Casey’s and Ryan’s came very much closer 

to being accurate. 

96 Congressional Record (April 1, 1992), H2208–29. For the vote, see 

http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1992/roll069.xml. 97 See, for example, Stephen Labaton, “Bailout Agency Squirrels Away over $2 

Billion,” New York Times (April 26, 1992). Although there was clearly nothing 

improper in what the RTC had done, some members of Congress were 

angered by the disclosure, for RTC officials had maintained that the agency 

would be out of funds without a new appropriation. The RTC said the 

amount was not large; it had been held for a specific expected S&L sale and 

for emergencies in the event of a depositor run at a thrift in conservatorship 

(Susan Schmidt, “RTC Admits to $2 Billion in Its Coffers; Funds Not ‘Secret,’” 

Washington Post [April 28, 1992]). 

98 On April 3, Gonzalez introduced a bill on his own (H.R. 4765) that removed 

the April 1 deadline, provided an additional $25 billion, and included some of 

the Senate provisions as well as provisions for some RTC reforms (concerning 

contracting). It also had a mechanism for a special assessment on SAIF 

institutions to provide RTC funding, a policy that would have generated 

considerable controversy. Such an approach to funding was unlikely to go far, 

and no action was taken on the bill after its introduction. See “Bill Proposes 

to Aid Bailout by Tapping Healthy S&Ls,” New York Times (April 4, 1992). 

99 See BNA’s Banking Report 58: May 4, 1992, p.781, and May 11, 1992, 

pp.829, 834–35. A number of RTC-related bills were introduced following the 

failure to provide funds. In April, Rep. Bill Jontz introduced an RTC reform 

bill (H.R. 4924) that sought to deal with the effect of the RTC on real estate 

markets, encourage the preservation of environmentally sensitive land, provide 

for the publication of examination reports of failed institutions, extend the 

statute of limitation on tort actions, and turn the RTC into a wholly owned 

government corporation. It provided for funding by the creation of citizen 

restitution bonds. In July, three bills were introduced. Leach’s (H.R. 5629) 

extended the statute of limitations on RTC tort actions from three years to 

five. Alex McMillan and Wylie’s (H.R. 5544)—in an attempt to allow the RTC 

to continue its resolutions—prohibited the RTC from refraining to close an 

institution because of lack of funds and authorized the agency to issue notes 

to insured depositors in lieu of cash. McCollum’s (H.R. 5603) removed the 

April 1 deadline, provided $25 billion in funding, and, not surprisingly, 

included its author’s supervisory goodwill buyback plan. None of these bills 

went anywhere. 

100 In June it was reported that despite negotiations between McCollum and 

Democrats, there appeared no room for compromise and if action were not 

taken within six weeks, the issue of RTC funding would likely be postponed 

until after the election (BNA’s Banking Report 58 [June 1, 1992], 955–56). 

101 U.S. House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Semiannual 

Appearance of the Thrift Depositor Protection Board(July 29, 1992), 4–6. 

102 Susan Schmidt, “Rosy Forecasts about Cleanup of S&Ls Come under 

Attack,” Washington Post (May 18, 1992). 

103 Joel Glenn Brenner, “CBO Chief: Thrift Crisis Isn’t Over; Reischauer Says 

700 More S&Ls May Fail,” Washington Post (June 18, 1992). 

2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 18 FDIC BANKING REVIEW 
The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

In the existing climate, however, many in Congress were unwilling to trust claims suggesting that 

the job was nearly complete and that a single 

appropriation would suffice. Although during the 

late summer and early autumn Casey occasionally 

called for Congress to provide funds, nothing further was done. The RTC continued to take over 

thrifts, but by the third quarter of 1992 RTC resolution activity slowed almost to a halt. This situation persisted until the latter part of 1993, when 

the RTC finally received new loss funds. 

The failure to provide funding in 1992 had been 

caused by a confluence of factors. Dissatisfaction 

with the RTC’s operations—whether its methods 

of asset disposition, its contracting oversight, or its 

provision of affordable housing—was certainly 

present and provided reasons for legislators to 

oppose funding, or at least funding without operational changes. But what happened in 1992 

stemmed also from politics—the politics of an 

election year, the politics of congressional Republican disaffection with administration policy, and 

the politics of a Democratic majority unwilling to 

pass unpopular legislation without Republican support. 

The RTC Completion Act of 1993 

As Congress returned in 1993, the need for RTC 

funding remained unchanged, as did congressional 

reluctance to provide that funding. Also 

unchanged were the concerns of many in Congress 

about RTC management and operations. And no 

debate over an RTC bill would have been complete without a scandal or two: this time Western 

Storm was replaced by a contract with Price 

Waterhouse that resulted in spectacular photocopying costs. The circumstances surrounding the 

debate, however, differed in three significant ways: 

the amount of money thought to be needed was 

much smaller, the amount of time remaining to 

the RTC was much shorter, and control of the 

White House had shifted from the Republican 

party to the Democratic party. 

First, the continued improvement in the economy 

and the very favorable interest-rate environment 

meant that the number of likely failures kept 

diminishing and therefore the additional cost of 

the cleanup was expected to be lower than had 

been estimated even six months earlier. Second, 

time was running out on the RTC, which (according to RTCRRIA) would have to stop taking over 

failed thrifts on September 30, although it could 

continue to resolve the institutions it had already 

taken over and could continue to sell assets until 

its scheduled closure at the end of 1996. Accordingly, Congress needed to begin grappling with the 

RTC’s shutdown. The September deadline focused 

attention on the Savings Association Insurance 

Fund (SAIF), which (under the FDIC’s direction) 

would soon be responsible for taking over and then 

resolving failed thrifts—but to be in a position to 

do this it, too, would likely require appropriations. 

In the event, debate over the SAIF had implications for the RTC and proved an obstacle to passage of RTC legislation. 

Finally, with the election of Bill Clinton, the political dynamic had shifted: a Democratic president 

was asking members of his own majority party to 

approve RTC funding. This put many congressional Democrats in a difficult position. Although 

the Democratic leadership had supported funding 

during the previous administration and many of 

the rank and file had voted for it, many had also 

been harsh critics of the RTC for three years and 

now found it hard to make an about-face. In addition, a great many freshman Democrats were 

unhappy about voting money for the RTC after 

having often criticized the agency during the 1992 

election campaign. They viewed the need for 

funding as an unwelcome inheritance. On the 

other side of the aisle, many congressional Republicans were no great champions of the RTC, had 

spurned funding in 1992, and were even less likely 

to support funding now that a Democratic administration was seeking it. 

The year 1993 therefore witnessed yet another 

long legislative struggle, with substantial changes 

made to what started out—in the familiar way—as 

an attempt at a “clean bill.” This time, though, 

legislation was enacted. It was the last major RTC 

statute and would end the RTC’s funding needs, 

make some preparations for the agency’s closure, 

FDIC BANKING REVIEW 19 2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 
The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

and shut down the agency a year early. And true 

to form, in this legislation, too, Congress would 

have a final say about how the RTC did business— 

in the realms of accountability, management methods, and social policy, the same realms on which 

Congress had legislated in FIRREA and Congress 

had discussed in all previous debates surrounding 

the RTC. 

In the early months of 1993, even before a funding 

request reached Congress, a question that needed 

to be answered was what the presence of a new 

administration would mean for the RTC and the 

legislative process. Before the new administration 

took office, Lloyd Bentsen had signaled that, as 

Treasury Secretary, he would try to obtain RTC 

funding quickly.104 Two issues, however, made 

obtaining funding more difficult. The first concerned the RTC’s problems with a 1992 Price 

Waterhouse contract to determine the value of 

assets in preparation for the resolution and sale of 

assets at the failed HomeFed Bank in San Diego, 

California. Under the contract, the RTC was 

charged 67 cents per page to copy 11 million documents. The RTC managers supervising this contract did not question either why so many 

documents were copied or why the cost per page 

was such a seemingly excessive amount. This 

copying helped increase the initial contract costs 

from $5 million to approximately $25 million. 

Casey tried to defend at least some of the costs 

(although he admitted with hindsight that the 

contract ought to have been renegotiated once the 

need for so much copying was discovered), but the 

RTC’s inspector general was highly critical of the 

contract. The episode served to expose some of 

the RTC’s systemic problems in awarding and 

managing contracts, foremost among which were 

insufficient oversight by senior management and 

inadequate internal controls—and it provided new 

ammunition for RTC critics.105 The second issue 

that came to light in February was the disclosure 

that many top RTC officials had received bonuses 

totaling more than $1 million for 1992. Many 

RTC executives’ salaries were already higher than 

government salaries in general, and although 

Casey defended the bonuses, they drew congressional criticism as extravagant.106 

These revelations did not help make a case for 

funding the RTC, and it was soon after they came 

to light that Bentsen appeared before Congress 

asking for $28 billion for the RTC and another 

$17 billion for the SAIF.107 The timing of the 

request was not propitious, and not only because of 

the two particular revelations. Many inside and 

outside Congress remained unhappy with the 

RTC’s performance. Some developers and some in 

Congress thought the RTC’s practice of selling 

assets in bulk meant that small investors were 

being denied the opportunity to bid on assets. 

(Partly in response, the RTC in April would 

announce the use of smaller asset pools.)108 Some 

in Congress were concerned about reports that the 

RTC’s use of MWOBs had been lackluster.109 

104 Robert M. Garsson, “Bentsen to Press for RTC Funding,” American Banker 

(January 13, 1993). 

105 Unbeknownst to RTC management, the documents were being copied in 

response to a Justice Department subpoena for all of HomeFed’s documents. 

In February 1993, the RTC renegotiated the contract with Price Waterhouse 

(PW). Although not legally required to do so, PW voluntarily agreed to a fee 

reduction of about 20 percent for any billings over $5 million—a reduction that 

ultimately resulted in a savings to the RTC of over $4 million. This 

discussion is based on S. Duran Field, The RTC’S Contracting for Asset 

Management and Disposition, unpublished FDIC paper (2003). See also U.S. 

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Regulation and 

Government Information, Contracting Problems (February 19, 1993). 

106 Susan Schmidt, “RTC Paid 136 Top Officials More Than $1 Million in 

Bonuses in ’92,” Washington Post (February 24, 1993). The contracting 

problems and bonuses made Casey’s desire to remain at the RTC difficult to 

achieve, apart from his having been appointed by the previous Republican 

administration. It soon became clear that the new administration wanted him 

to leave, and in February he announced his resignation. He left on March 15. 

Deputy Treasury Secretary Roger Altman was named interim CEO (BNA’s 

Banking Report 60 [March 15]: 347). Later in 1993 the administration 

nominated Stanley Tate to replace Altman, but when the Senate delayed in 

acting on his nomination, Tate angrily withdrew before the end of 1993. See 

Albert R. Karr, “Tate Withdraws as Nominee to Head RTC, Criticizes Sen. 

Riegle for Inaction” (Wall Street Journal [December 1, 1993]). John Ryan 

eventually held the post of acting CEO during 1994 and 1995. 

107 See U.S. House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 

Semiannual Appearance of the Thrift Depositor Protection Oversight Board 

(March 16, 1993), 9ff.; and U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and 

Urban Affairs, Hearing on the Semiannual Report (March 17, 1993), 51–52. 

This total of $45 billion was about $5 billion less than the CBO was then 

estimating for the likely cost. See U.S. House Committee on Banking, Housing 

and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, 

Regulation and Deposit Insurance, Funding Needs (March 17 and 18, 1993). 

108 BNA’s Banking Report 60 (April 12, 1993), 509. The policy changes 

significantly lowered the RTC’s asset sales goals for 1993: instead of $70 

billion in book value sales and principal collections, the RTC (as of June) set 

a goal of $56 billion (RTC Department of Planning and Analysis, Briefing Book 

Overview [July 1993], 24). 

109 See, for example, Richard B. Schmitt, “RTC Lags Behind in Effort to Give 

Out Legal Work to Minorities and Women,” Wall Street Journal (March 23, 

1993). See also U.S. House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban 

Affairs, Subcommittee on General Oversight, Investigations, and the Resolution 

of Failed Financial Institutions, Professional Liability (March 30, 1993). 

2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 20 FDIC BANKING REVIEW 
The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

General worries about contract oversight persisted. 

To deal with these and other concerns, Bentsen 

promised a series of management reforms in the 

hope that Congress would refrain from further 

statutory management requirements.110 

The Senate Banking Committee acted quickly to 

approve the $45 billion funding request, despite 

the misgivings of newly elected members. Their 

hesitancy did engender an amendment designed to 

ensure that the management reforms promised by 

Bentsen would have been successfully implemented. Among other things, this amendment provided that Bentsen certify that the reforms were 

working at the point when the RTC had expended 

more than $10 billion of the appropriated funding, 

and again at the $20 billion point. However, senators of both parties said that the amendment was 

too weak and they would propose tougher safeguards later.111 

Despite hopes for a relatively quick process in the 

House, the legislation languished long enough for 

the administration to be able, in late April, to 

decrease by $3 billion the amount of funds it 

sought.112 In May, when the House banking subcommittee finally approved a bill, with newcomers 

to the House leery of voting for RTC funding, the 

amount for the RTC’s funding was cut to $18.3 billion (the share of the $25 billion in RTCRRIA 

funds that was not used by the April 1992 deadline); SAIF funding was also cut. Members took 

refuge in releasing the unused funds that had been 

appropriated in 1991, thereby making it possible to 

say that they had not voted any new RTC funds at 

all. The decrease in amount, irrespective of the 

motives behind it, made sense: the GAO now estimated that the RTC would likely need between 

$12 and $17 billion and possibly as little as $7 billion. The House bill also ended the RTC’s existence a year early, at year-end 1995, and added a 

number of management reforms, some limitations 

on bonuses and compensation to RTC employees, 

and provisions dealing with MWOBs.113 

The full House Banking Committee quickly passed 

the bill. It removed the April 1, 1992, deadline 

from RTCRRIA, thus providing $18.3 billion to 

the RTC, and adopted the certification requirements contained in the Senate bill. It also authorized $16 billion for the SAIF (but required certifications from the Treasury Secretary for its use) to 

be used as loss funding through 1998 or until the 

SAIF met its designated reserve ratio of 1.25 percent. In addition, the House committee’s bill 

included a host of RTC management reforms, 

including requiring the RTC to maintain a business plan and create the position of chief financial 

officer; created a new audit committee at the 

Thrift Depositor Protection Oversight Board; and 

mandated new contracting oversight procedures. 

The bill had a series of provisions related to helping MWOBs, both as bidders on assets and as contractors, but these provisions were weaker than 

those in the subcommittee version. The bill also 

included a response to complaints about small 

investors not being able to bid on RTC assets, and 

a response to perceived problems in the prosecution of thrift officials who had caused losses at 

institutions. The latter response included an 

extension of the statute of limitations on cases 

against such individuals—a provision that complicated the legislative process because the House 

Judiciary Committee would have to consider it 

before passage. The House bill also placed limits 

on RTC compensation and bonuses. Finally, the 

bill established an FDIC-RTC transition task force 

to plan for the agency’s shutdown and the takeover 

of its functions by the FDIC, and moved up the 

date of that closure by a year, to year-end 1995.114 

Just after the House Banking Committee passed 

the bill, the full Senate comfortably passed its bill, 

61-35.115 The Senate adopted the House’s position on RTC funding, providing $18.3 billion. 

110 U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Hearing 

on the Semiannual Report (March 17, 1993), 50–51.
 

111 Some 19 amendments that had been drafted were not considered in
 

committee but were expected to surface later in the debate. Concerns about
 

the bill were evident from the statements that six Democrats appended to the
 

Senate report. See U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
 

Affairs Thrift Depositor Protection Act of 1993 (April 1, 1993), 17ff.
 

112 The favorable economy (particularly the benign interest-rate environment)
 

was cited as the reason for the decrease.
 

113 BNA’s Banking Report 60 (May 3, 1993), 619.
 

114 See H.R. 1340.
 

115 Although Democratic support was stronger than Republican, a solid
 

majority of Senate Republicans supported the bill, with 24 voting for it and
 

only 16 against. The Democratic vote was 37-19.
 

FDIC BANKING REVIEW 21 2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 
 

The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

The Senate also provided $16 billion for the SAIF 

(although it initially appropriated only $8.5 billion, with the rest authorized if necessary). And 

the Senate added a series of provisions on management reforms, MWOB contracting, and other 

issues, essentially duplicating the provisions in the 

House bill. 

In mid-June, when the House Judiciary Committee 

approved (with some modifications) the extension 

of the statute of limitations, the RTC bill seemed 

ready for passage.116 However, Democratic congressional support for the bill was weak and Republican support almost nonexistent, so the leadership 

chose to delay the vote. Congress continued to 

work through the summer to find a way to pass the 

bill. A major stumbling block was not RTC but 

SAIF funding:117 Republicans wanted to provide 

amounts lower than $16 billion and wanted to be 

certain that the funds would be used only for losses, not to capitalize the SAIF. Republicans also 

opposed some of the provisions related to MWOB 

contracting and wanted to weaken them further. 

Democrats, of course, wanted them retained. A 

stalemate similar to that of 1992 appeared very 

possible. 

In September an agreement on funding appeared 

to have been reached. The RTC funding 

remained unchanged, but the SAIF funding would 

be reduced to $8 billion. To take pressure off the 

SAIF, the RTC would continue resolving failed 

thrifts for an additional 18 months, until March 

31, 1995 (as opposed to September 30, 1993, the 

date set by RTCRRIA). In addition, the MWOB 

provisions were adjusted so they would have no 

effect on the budget, in an effort to mollify Republican opposition. On September 14, the bill was 

narrowly approved, 214-208, with only 24 Republicans voting in favor. The provisions dealing 

specifically with the RTC were relatively little 

changed from those that had passed the committee 

in May. 

As the House and Senate moved toward a conference, negotiations on a final bill continued. The 

most substantive issues, however, were only tangentially related to the RTC. Now that agreement 

had been reached on funding for the RTC, on the 

extension of the period during which the agency 

would resolve failed thrifts, on its early closure, and 

on management reforms, the RTC was a problem 

close to being in the past. Concerns now centered 

on the deposit insurance funds: how much money 

to provide to the SAIF and under what conditions, 

as well as what effect the potential premium differentials between the SAIF and the Bank Insurance 

Fund would have. Reaching agreement on the 

SAIF took another month. One last RTC-related 

hurdle remained. Some Senate Republicans, 

notably Alphonse D’Amato, opposed the MWOB 

provisions in the House bill and therefore held up 

the appointment of Senate conferees. A November compromise on these provisions, one that 

somewhat weakened the House version, finally 

cleared the way for passage. On November 20, the 

Senate voted for the bill 54-45, and two days later 

the House voted for it 235-191.118 

The RTC Completion Act appropriated $18.3 billion for the RTC.119 None of the appropriated 

funds could benefit thrift shareholders. The first 

$10 billion was available to the RTC, and the 

remainder would be available only after certification by the Treasury Secretary that statutory management reforms had been implemented.120 The 

required management reforms included the development of a comprehensive business plan for the 

remainder of the RTC’s existence, the creation of a 

small-investor program, the appointment of a chief 

financial officer, a strengthening of contract oversight, the creation of a new audit committee, and 

116 For the Judiciary Committee’s views, see U.S. House, Resolution Trust 

Corporation Completion Act ( June 15, 1993).
 

117 Although Republicans did want to reduce RTC funding to $12 billion, this
 

desire does not appear to have been a sticking point.
 

118 The Senate vote was reasonably bipartisan, although fewer Republicans
 

supported the bill than had supported it in May. Voting in favor were 19
 

Republicans and 35 Democrats; voting against were 24 Republicans and 21
 

Democrats. See vote 00393, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/
 

roll_call_lists/vote_menu_103_1.htm. Characteristically, the House vote was
 

more politically divided. Only 27 Republicans joined 208 Democrats in favor
 

of the bill, while 144 Republicans and 46 Democrats voted against it. See
 

http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1993/roll613.xml.
 119 See Public Law 103-204, which was signed into law on December 17, 

1993.
 

120 Although $8 billion was authorized for the SAIF, no money was
 

appropriated for the deposit insurance fund.
 

2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 22 FDIC BANKING REVIEW 
 

The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

the maintenance of effective information systems 

and internal controls. The GAO was to evaluate 

how well the RTC complied with the required 

reforms. In an effort to allow the RTC to continue 

to pursue thrift officials who had contributed to 

the S&L debacle, the statute of limitations on 

RTC civil lawsuits was extended from three to five 

years (unless state law permitted a longer period). 

If the period of the extension had passed, actions 

could be revived for serious fraud that had resulted 

in unjust enrichment or substantial loss to an institution. The law also had provisions that limited 

bonuses and compensation to RTC employees and 

that included RTC employees and contractors 

under whistleblower protection laws. Under the 

statute, the RTC would close down a year early, on 

December 31, 1995, but to take pressure off the 

SAIF, the RTC would not cease taking over insolvent institutions until sometime between January 1 

and July 1, 1995.121 

The law also contained a number of “social policy” 

provisions. One set was designed to increase 

opportunities for minorities and women, and it 

required the creation of a division devoted to these 

programs headed by a vice president who would sit 

on the RTC’s executive committee. The law also 

required contractors who received large contracts 

to subcontract with MWOBs unless such subcontractors were unavailable and unless such subcontracting significantly increased costs or impeded 

performance. In addition to these kinds of provisions, affordable housing programs at both the 

RTC and the FDIC were expanded. 

Lastly, to address the transition that would occur at 

the end of 1995, the law extended to the FDIC 

certain regulations and restrictions that had been 

developed at the RTC. These included regulations 

on conflicts of interest and ethics, and restrictions 

on the ability of individuals to buy FDIC-controlled assets if those individuals had contributed, 

through fraud or other means, to the losses of 

failed institutions. In addition, an asset-disposition 

division was to be created at the FDIC. The law 

also created an FDIC-RTC Transition Task Force 

to ensure the orderly transfer of systems and personnel to the FDIC. 

Conclusion 

As was to be expected, congressional oversight of 

the RTC continued until the agency closed in 

1995, but the legislative story ends with passage of 

the 1993 Completion Act—the last significant 

legislative activity involving the RTC. At that 

point the RTC’s work was winding down. 

Although the 1993 law provided $18.3 billion in 

additional funds, the agency requested only $4.6 

billion and did not even use all of that.122 After 

the third quarter of 1993 no new thrifts were taken 

into conservatorship, and, with the new funding 

that allowed the agency to resolve institutions 

already in conservatorship, the number of RTC 

conservatorships dropped from 68 at year-end 1993 

to just 2 a year later. The story of asset disposition 

is comparable: during the period when the RTC 

had no funding it nonetheless reduced its asset 

inventory by more than $50 billion, and at yearend 1994 it held just $25 billion in assets. When 

the agency closed at year-end 1995, only $7.7 billion in assets was left to be transferred to FDIC 

management. Over its entire lifetime, the RTC 

disposed of $458.5 billion.123 Thus, despite all the 

criticism—some warranted, some not—the RTC 

accomplished its goals and disappeared a full year 

earlier than FIRREA had mandated in 1989.124 

The RTC’s relationship with Congress was dominated by two issues: funding and management. 

The experience with funding clearly demonstrates 

121 In December 1994, Bentsen decided that the date would be June 30, 

1995. 

122 When the agency’s acting CEO, John Ryan, predicted in May 1994 that the 

RTC would likely require only $5 billion more, some Republicans sought (but 

failed) to cut the $18.3 billion appropriation to that amount. Robyn Meredith, 

“White House Blocks Moves to Trim RTC Funding,” American Banker (June 13, 

1994). The total amount provided to the RTC was $91.3 billion, but at 

closure it had used only $87.9 billion. Thrift Depositor Protection Oversight 

Board and Resolution Trust Corporation, Annual Report . . . for the Calendar 

Year 1995 (1996), Part I, 44. The final amount “used” by the RTC continued 

to drop after its closure as the FDIC sold off RTC assets and achieved betterthan-expected recovery rates. It turned out that, although it was not apparent 

in 1993, the RTC needed none of the funding provided by the Completion Act. 

123 Thrift Depositor Protection Oversight Board and Resolution Trust 

Corporation, Annual Report . . . for the Calendar Year 1995 (1996), Part I, 44. 

124 This exit, of course, was feasible only because a permanent entity (the 

FDIC) was available to take over the remaining RTC assets and manage its 

receiverships. 

FDIC BANKING REVIEW 23 2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 
The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

that for an agency with the functions of the RTC, 

adequate funding—both for working capital and 

for losses—is extremely important. A mechanism 

for raising working capital should probably have 

been specified in FIRREA, obviating the need for 

a six-month political debate. As for loss funding, 

the viewpoints of both those in the executive 

branch who were seeking funding and those in 

Congress who opposed it were not hard to understand—primarily because at the beginning and 

continuing almost until the end, the size of the 

losses in the thrift industry was a large and moving 

target. The estimates changed substantially, 

depending on the date and the source. Appropriating the full amount in 1989 would have been 

impossible not only politically but also practically. 

And even after 1989, when the need for more 

funds was inescapable although the amount was 

not yet fully known, the disinclination of congressional critics to provide unlimited funds to the 

RTC was not unreasonable (though politics played 

as much of a role as did prudence). However, 

some might describe the House’s inability to pass a 

bill providing funds to the RTC in 1990 and 1992 

as at least a temporary abdication of its responsibility to honor the federal government’s promise to 

insured depositors. To be sure, the money was 

eventually appropriated, but these delays had real 

costs.125 Nor would the GAO’s suggestion that 

Congress fund the RTC annually have been likely 

to help remedy the problem, given the political 

reality. Earlier adoption of the 1993 approach— 

authorizing appropriations but requiring certification as funding needs increased—might have made 

the process easier both for the RTC and for those 

in Congress who had to vote for funding. However, this approach would not have removed the 

attendant problems of appropriating such funding 

at a time of severe deficits or of relieving the RTC 

of the opprobrium in which it was held. No matter what approach had been taken, finding the 

political will to fund the RTC during this period 

would have been difficult. 

Congressional unwillingness to provide funding 

was frequently intertwined with the second element of the legislative environment, the constant 

scrutiny of RTC management and operations. Critics often claimed that problems at the RTC made 

it difficult to support additional RTC appropriations. During the first two years, criticism of the 

RTC’s operations was most often seen through the 

prism of perceived problems in the management 

structure created by FIRREA—a structure viewed 

as cumbersome and as preventing the agency from 

responding to the huge task confronting it. 

Certainly conflict between the RTC and the Oversight Board was present, particularly in 1989–1990. 

Had the structural change enacted at the end of 

1991 been in place from the outset, the result 

might well have been a better functioning agency. 

But delayed until 1991, the changes were of debatable significance. By then the strife between the 

RTC and the Oversight Board had substantially 

lessened; the RTC had resolved more than threequarters of the thrifts it would take over; and 

although large amounts of increasingly hard-to-sell 

assets were still under RTC control, their levels 

were dropping. Moreover, the new management 

structure had no effect on the trends in methods of 

asset disposition; and apart from a new CEO, most 

of the senior personnel running the agency 

remained in place. Still, the initial difficulties and 

the debate over management structure do point to 

an inherent problem that was perhaps given too 

little attention when the RTC was created: tension 

was almost inevitable with the creation of a government corporation designed to have a good deal 

of autonomy while also using taxpayer dollars. 

Aside from the management structure, Congress 

was constantly reviewing RTC operations and 

policies. Although politics often intruded into 

judgments about the agency, congressional oversight was necessary; and although some of the 

statutory requirements imposed on the RTC could 

be viewed as micromanagement, they probably 

125 However, the oft-cited figures of so many millions of dollars per day as 

costs of the delays were probably inaccurate and might have been 

overstatements, particularly during the funding hiatus of 1992–1993, when 

conditions in thrifts were markedly better than they had been previously. 

2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 24 FDIC BANKING REVIEW 
The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

contributed to positive changes in RTC operations. Yes, the agency got better at its job for reasons that had nothing to do with Congress: the 

RTC’s managers and personnel gained knowledge 

about how best to approach the thrift cleanup. 

Nevertheless, the constant congressional examination, despite possible negative effects, forced the 

agency to operate in a manner that would withstand scrutiny. 

In addition, the social initiatives mandated by 

FIRREA and subsequent legislation —specifically, 

contracting out to MWOBs and providing affordable housing—certainly affected the RTC. By the 

end of the agency’s existence, for example, about 

35 percent of its contracts had gone to MWOBs. 

And in response to congressional concerns that 

most such contracting had been with nonminority 

women, in 1994 and 1995 the agency greatly 

increased the proportion of its contracting with 

minority-owned businesses. In total, however, 

minority-owned businesses received only about 12 

percent of the approximately 160,000 contracts 

awarded by the agency.126 Under the RTC’s 

Affordable Housing Disposition Program, the 

agency sold more than 23,000 single-family properties for a total of $632 million and more than 800 

multifamily properties (with more than 80,000 

units) for almost $900 million.127 These totals 

were clearly only a small fraction of the properties 

sold by the RTC. Overall, therefore, congressional 

social policy initiatives were in some measure 

accomplished, required the RTC to create programs that otherwise would not have existed, and 

added some costs to the cleanup. But in the context of the RTC’s work, the effects on the agency 

occurred at the margins. 

The legislative environment surrounding the RTC 

was obviously a difficult one. Although the costs 

generated by insolvent thrifts had already been 

incurred, there was little appetite to pay them, and 

the ever-increasing addition of more costs made 

the legislative process even more problematic. In 

addition, the RTC provided a convenient target— 

and there was often much to criticize, although the 

agency had an immense task and little time to 

either prepare for or accomplish it. Legislators 

often noted that they frequently received complaints about the RTC from constituents, and their 

reluctance to provide additional funding was partly 

a response to that criticism. Nevertheless, in the 

end Congress managed to appropriate the funds 

required and to provide necessary oversight over 

the process. At the same time, the RTC, sometimes chafing under that oversight and the delays 

in funding, did what it was intended to do. When 

the RTC opened for business, some observers predicted that their grandchildren would be buying 

assets from the agency. Perhaps a measure of the 

RTC’s success is that little more than a decade 

after it closed, this agency that provoked so much 

debate is now largely forgotten. 

126 Thrift Depositor Protection Oversight Board and Resolution Trust 

Corporation, Annual Report . . . for the Calendar Year 1995 (1996), Part II, 61. 

Minority-owned businesses did receive almost 17 percent of estimated fees. 

127 Ibid., 47. 

FDIC BANKING REVIEW 25 2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 
The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Note: Although some of the materials in the following bibliography are cited only in Part I of this 

article (see FDIC Banking Review 18, No. 2 [2006]), the full bibliography is provided here for the 

reader. 

RTC Manuscripts 

RTC. Board Meeting Transcripts. 1989–1991.
 

RTC. Legislative History Files. (LEGH 68). 1990–1992.
 

RTC. Transition Briefing Books. 1991–1993. 


RTC. “CEO Management Information.” 1993–1994.
 

Congressional Sources 

Debates 

Congressional Record 1989–1993. 

Bills and Resolutions 

U.S. House. 	 H.R. 3469. Federal Agency Debt Management Act. 101st Cong., 1st sess., October 13, 1989. 

———. H.R. 4127. Resolution Trust Corporation Reform Act of 1990. 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 

February 27, 1990. 

———. H.R. 4386. Resolution Trust Corporation Reorganization Act. 101st Cong., 2d sess., 

March 27, 1990. 

———. H.R. 4851. Financial Institutions Oversight Reform Act of 1990. 101st Cong., 2d sess., 

May 17, 1990. 

———. H.R. 5029. Resolution Trust Corporation Financing Amendments of 1990. 101st Cong., 

2d sess., June 13, 1990. 

———. H.R. 5891. Resolution Trust Corporation Funding Act. 101st Cong., 2d sess., October 

22, 1990. 

———. H. Res. 105. Providing for the Consideration of the Bill (H.R. 1315) to Provide Additional Funding for the Resolution Trust Corporation. 102d Cong., 1st sess., March 7, 1991. 

———. H.R. 3303. Resolution Trust Corporation Reorganization and Accountability Act of 1991. 

102d Cong., 1st sess., September 11, 1991. 

———. H.R. 3356. Resolution Trust Corporation Refinancing Act of 1991. 102d Cong., 1st 

sess., September 17, 1991. 

———. H.R. 3422. Resolution Trust Corporation Reform and Accountability Act of 1991. 102d 

Cong., 1st sess., September 26, 1991. 

———. H.R. 3449. Resolution Trust Corporation Amendments Act of 1991. 102d Cong., 1st 

sess., October 1, 1991. 

———. 	 H.R. 3798. Real Estate Recovery Act of 1991. 102d Cong., 1st sess., November 18, 

1991. 

2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 26	 FDIC BANKING REVIEW 
The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

———. H.R. 4765. Resolution Trust Corporation Funding and Cost Reduction Act of 1992. 

102d Cong., 2d sess., April 3, 1992. 

———. H.R. 4924. Resolution Trust Corporation Reform Act of 1992. 102d Cong., 2d sess., 

April 9, 1992. 

———. H.R. 5544. Resolution Trust Corporation Cost Reduction Act. 102d Cong., 2d sess., 

July 2, 1992. 

———. H.R. 5603. Resolution Trust Corporation Loss Reduction and Funding Act of 1992. 

102d Cong., 2d sess., July 9, 1992. 

———. H.R. 5629. Resolution Trust Corporation Asset Recovery Act of 1992. 102d Cong., 2d 

sess., July 21, 1992. 

U.S. Senate. 	 S. 2155. Resolution Trust Corporation Reorganization Act. 101st Cong., 2d sess., 

February 21, 1990. 

———. S. 3112. Savings and Loan Simplification Act of 1990. 101st Cong., 2d sess., September 26, 1990. 

———. S. 3222. Resolution Trust Corporation Funding Act. 101st Cong., 2d sess., October 28, 

1990. 

———. S. 389. Resolution Trust Corporation Reorganization Act. 102d Cong., 1st sess., February 7, 1991. 

———. S. 1943. Resolution Trust Corporation Reform Act of 1991. 102d Cong., 1st sess., 

November 7, 1991. 

———. S. 419. Resolution Trust Corporation Funding Act of 1991. 102d Cong., 1st sess., February 14, 1991. 

———. 	 S. 572. Savings and Loan Simplification Act of 1991. 102d Cong., 1st sess., March 6, 

1991. 

Hearings and Reports 

U.S. House. 	Providing for the Consideration of H.R. 1315. Report (to accompany H. Res. 105), 

102d Cong., 1st sess., H. Rpt. 102-13, March 7, 1991. 

———. Resolution Trust Corporation Funding Act of 1991, Conference Report. 102d Cong., 1st 

sess., H. Rpt. 102-7, March 19, 1991. 

———. 	Resolution Trust Corporation Completion Act. Report. 103d Cong., 1st sess., H. Rpt. 

103-103, Part 2, June 15, 1993. 

U.S. House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. 	Oversight Hearings on the 

Resolution Trust Corporation. 101st Cong., 2d sess., Ser. No. 101-69, January 23–25, 

1990. 

———. 	Semiannual Report and Appearance by the Oversight Board of the Resolution Trust Corporation. 101st Cong., 2d sess., Ser. No. 101-33, June 14, 1990. 

———. Funding the Resolution Trust Corporation: Hearing. 101st Cong., 2d sess., Ser. No. 

101-160, July 30, 1990. 

———. Resolution Trust Corporation Funding Act of 1990: Report. 101st Cong., 2d sess., H. 

Rpt. 101-974, October 27, 1990. 

FDIC BANKING REVIEW	 27 2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 
The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

———. Semi-Annual Appearance of the Resolution Trust Corporation Oversight Board: Hearing. 

102d Cong., 1st sess., Ser. No. 102-2, January 31, 1991. 

———. General Accounting Office Report Card on RTC Operations: Hearing. 102d Cong, 1st 

sess., Ser. No. 102-5, February 20, 1991. 

———. RTC Semiannual Report for Period Ending April 30, 1991: Hearing. 102d Cong., 1st 

sess., Ser. No. 102-54, July 11, 1991. 

———. Semiannual Appearance of the Thrift Depositor Protection Board: Hearing. 102d Cong., 

2d sess., Ser. 102-140, July 29, 1992. 

———. Semiannual Appearance of the Thrift Depositor Protection Oversight Board: Hearing. 

103d Cong., 1st sess., Ser. No. 103-18, March 16, 1993. 

U.S. House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on Financial 

Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance. Resolution Trust Corporation Refinancing and Restructuring Issues: Hearing. 102d Cong., 1st sess., Ser. No. 102-70, September 12 and 17, 1991. 

———. 	Resolution Trust Corporation Funding Act of 1992: H.R. 4241: Hearing. 102d Cong., 

2d sess., Ser. No.102-102, February 26, 1992. 

U.S. House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on Financial 

Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Deposit Insurance. Funding Needs of the Resolution Trust Corporation and Savings Association Insurance Fund: Hearing. 103d Cong., 

1st sess., Ser. No. 103-19, March 17 and 18, 1993. 

U.S. House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on Financial 

Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, Resolution Trust Corporation 

Task Force. Status and Activities of the RTC and the Oversight Board: Hearings. 101st 

Cong., 1st sess., Ser. No. 101-55, October 4 and 19; November 6 and 13, 1989. 

———. Disposition of Assets by the Resolution Trust Corporation: Hearing. 101st Cong., 2d sess., 

Ser. No. 101-102. (March 27, 1990). 

———. Disposition of Assets by the RTC: Hearing. 101st Cong., 2d sess., Ser. No. 101-122. 

May 4, 1990. 

———. Alternative Financing Options for the Savings and Loan Cleanup Costs: Hearing. 101st 

Cong., 2d sess., Ser. No. 101-174. (September 26, 1990). 

———. Consideration of the Implications of the RTC Control Problems for Proposals to Restructure the Bail-out Machinery. 102d Cong., 1st sess., Ser. No. 102-51, June 17, 1991. 

U.S. House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on General 

Oversight and Investigations. Resolution Trust Corporation’s Asset Disposition Policies: 

Hearing. 102d Cong., 1st sess., Ser. No. 102-68. (September 6, 1991). 

———. 	The RTC’s Operation Western Storm: Hearing. 102d Cong., 2d sess., Ser. No. 102­

144, August 6, 1992. 

U.S. House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on General 

Oversight, Investigations, and the Resolution of Failed Financial Institutions. Professional Liability and RTC Contracting with Lawyers: Hearing. 103d Cong., 1st sess., Ser. 

No. 103-22, March 30, 1993. 

U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means. 	Additional Financing Costs Associated with Resolving Insolvent Savings and Loans Institutions: Hearing. 101st Cong., 2d sess., Ser. No. 

101-125, September 19, 1990. 

2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 28	 FDIC BANKING REVIEW 
The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Oversight. 	Role of Federal 

Borrowing and Loan Guarantees in Resolving Insolvent Thrift Institutions: Hearing on 

H.R. 3469 to Amend Title 31, United States Code, to Prevent Newly Established Federal 

Agencies from Increasing Debt through Unauthorized Borrowing. 101st Cong., 1st sess., 

Ser. No. 101-68, October 31, 1989. 

U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. 	Oversight Hearing on the 

Resolution Trust Corporation. 101st Cong., 1st sess., S. Hrg. 101-504, October 4, 1989. 

———. Second Oversight Hearing on the Resolution Trust Corporation. 101st Cong, 2d sess., S. 

Hrg. 101-738, January 31, 1990. 

———. Hearing on the Semiannual Report of the Resolution Trust Corporation. 101st Cong., 2d 

sess., S. Hrg. 101-974, May 23, 1990. 

———. Resolution Trust Corporation Funding Act of 1990: Report. 101st Cong., 2d sess., S. 

Rpt. 102-13, October 19, 1990. 

———. Hearing on the Semiannual Report of the Resolution Trust Corporation, 1991. 102d 

Cong., 1st sess., S. Hrg. 102-54, January 23, 1991. 

———. Restructuring the Resolution Trust Corporation and the Semiannual Report on FIRREA 

Legislation: Hearing. 102d Cong., 1st sess., S. Hrg. 102-465, June 11, 21, and 26, 1991. 

———. Refunding the RTC: Hearing. 102d Cong., 1st sess., S. Hrg. 102-535, October 24, 

1991. 

———. Nomination of Albert V. Casey: Hearing. S. Hrg 102-668, 102d Cong., 2d sess., January 22, 1992. 

———. Hearing on the Semiannual Report of the Resolution Trust Corporation—1993. 103d 

Cong., 1st sess., S. Hrg. 103-58, March 17, 1993. 

———. 	Thrift Depositor Protection Act of 1993: Report. 103d Cong., 1st sess., S. Rpt. 103-36, 

April 1, 1993. 

U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on Consumer and Regulatory Affairs. Real Estate Disposition Activities of the Resolution Trust 

Corporation: Hearing. 102d Cong., 1st sess., S. Hrg. 102-141, June 19, 1991. 

———. 	Oversight Structure of the RTC: Hearing. 102d Cong., 1st sess., S. Hrg. 102-513, 

October 23, 1991. 

U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Regulation and Government Information. Contracting Problems at the Resolution Trust Corporation: HomeFed, 

Hearing. 103d Cong., 1st sess., S. Hrg. 103-804. February 19, 1993. 

Periodicals 

American Banker. 1989–1993. http://www.lexisnexis.com.
 

BNA’s Banking Report. 1989–1993.
 

National Mortgage News. 1989–1993. http://www.lexisnexis.com.
 

New York Times. 1989–1993. http://www.lexisnexis.com.
 

Wall Street Journal. 1989–1993. http://www.factiva.com.
 

Washington Post. 1989–1993. http://www.lexisnexis.com.
 

FDIC BANKING REVIEW	 29 2006, VOLUME 18, NO. 3 
 

The Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, Part II: 1991–1993
 

Other Sources 

Congressional Quarterly. Almanac: 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 1990. Vol. 46. Congressional 

Quarterly. 1991. 

———. Almanac: 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 1991. Vol. 47. Congressional Quarterly. 1992. 

———. Almanac: 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1992. Vol. 48. Congressional Quarterly. 1993. 

———. Almanac: 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993. Vol. 49. Congressional Quarterly. 1994. 

Davison, Lee. “Politics and Policy: The Creation of the Resolution Trust Corporation.” FDIC 

Banking Review 17, no. 2 (2005): 18–44. 

Field, S. Duran. The RTC’s Contracting for Asset Management and Disposition: Challenges, 

Successes, and Lessons Learned. Unpublished FDIC paper. 2003. 

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Managing the Crisis: The FDIC and RTC Experience 

1980–1994. FDIC. 1998. 

Resolution Trust Corporation. 1989 Annual Report. RTC. 1991. 

———. Annual Report 1990. 1991. 

———. Statistical Abstract: August 1989/September 1995. RTC. 1995. 

Seidman, L. William. Full Faith and Credit: The Great S&L Debacle and Other Washington 

Sagas. Times Books. 1993. 

Thrift Depositor Protection Oversight Board and Resolution Trust Corporation. Annual 

Report of the Thrift Depositor Protection Oversight Board and the Resolution Trust Corporation for the Calendar Year 1995. 1996. 

U.S. General Accounting Office. 	Obligations Limitation: Resolution Trust Corporation’s Compliance as of March 31, 1990. GAO/AFMD-90-11. 1990. 

———. Obligations Limitation: Resolution Trust Corporation’s Compliance as of June 30, 1990. 

GAO/AFMD-91-41. 1990. 

———. Obligations Limitation: Resolution Trust Corporation’s Compliance as of September 30, 

1990. GAO/AFMD-91-63. 1991. 

———. Obligations Limitation: Resolution Trust Corporation’s Compliance as of December 31, 

1990. GAO/AFMD-92-4. 1991. 

———. 	Obligations Limitation: Resolution Trust Corporation’s Compliance as of March 31, 1991. 

GAO/AFMD-92-39. 1992. 

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