26388 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 95 / Wednesday, May 17, 1995 / Proposed Rules

affect eligibility for or the amount of SSI

payments of individuals. Therefore, a

regulatory flexibility analysis as

provided in Public Law 96–354, the

Regulatory Flexibility Act, is not

required.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance

Program No. 93.807, Supplemental Security

Income)

List of Subjects in 20 CFR Part 416:

Administrative practice and

procedure, Aged, Blind, Disability

benefits, Public assistance programs,

Reporting and recordkeeping

requirements, Supplemental Security

Income.

Dated: May 3, 1995.

Shirley S. Chater,

Commissioner of Social Security.

Part 416 of Chapter III of Title 20 of

the Code of Federal Regulations is

amended as follows:

1. The authority citation for subpart L

of part 416 continues to read as follows:

PART 416—SUPPLEMENTAL

SECURITY INCOME FOR THE AGED,

BLIND, AND DISABLED

Authority: Secs. 1102, 1602, 1611, 1612,

1613, 1614(f), 1621, and 1631 of the of the

Social Security Act; 42 U.S.C. 1302, 1381a,

1382, 1382a, 1382b, 1382c(f), 1382j, and

1383; sec. 211 of Pub. L. 93–66, 87 Stat. 154.

2. Section 416.1232 is amended by

revising paragraph (b), by redesignating

paragraph (c) as paragraph (d) and by

adding a new paragraph (c), to read as

follows:

§ 416.1232 Replacement of lost, damaged,

or stolen excluded resources.

* * * * *

(b) The initial 9-month time period

will be extended for a reasonable period

up to an additional 9 months where we

find the individual had good cause for

not replacing or repairing the resource.

An individual will be found to have

good cause when circumstances beyond

his or her control prevented the repair

or replacement or the contracting for the

repair or replacement of the resource.

The 9-month extension can only be

granted if the individual intends to use

the cash or in-kind replacement items to

repair or replace the lost, stolen, or

damaged excluded resource in addition

to having good cause for not having

done so. If good cause is found for an

individual, any unused cash (and

interest) is counted as a resource

beginning with the month after the good

cause extension period expires.

Exception: For victims of Hurricane

Andrew only, the extension period for

good cause may be extended for up to

an additional 12 months beyond the 9-

month extension when we find that the

individual had good cause for not

replacing or repairing an excluded

resource within the 9-month extension.

(c) The time period described in

paragraph (b) of this section (except the

time period for individuals granted an

additional extension under the

Hurricane Andrew provision) may be

extended for a reasonable period up to

an additional 12 months in the case of

a catastrophe which is declared to be a

major disaster by the President of the

United States if the excluded resource is

geographically located within the

disaster area as defined by the

presidential order; the individual

intends to repair or replace the excluded

resource; and, the individual

demonstrates good cause why he or she

has not been able to repair or replace the

excluded resource within the 18-month

period.

* * * * *

[FR Doc. 95–12099 Filed 5–16–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4190–29–P

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Office of Labor-Management

Standards

29 CFR Part 452

RIN 1294–AA09

Eligibility Requirements for Candidacy

for Union Office

AGENCY: Office of Labor-Management

Standards, Labor.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

SUMMARY: The Office of LaborManagement Standards proposes to

amend its interpretative regulations on

labor organization officer elections. The

proposed amendment will add a

reference to a ruling by the Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit regarding the reasonableness of

meeting attendance requirements set by

labor organizations for eligibility for

union office. This amendment will

inform the public of a court decision

that guides the Office in its enforcement

actions.

DATES: Interested parties may submitted

comments on or before July 17, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Written comments should

be submitted to Edmundo A. Gonzales,

Deputy Assistant Secretary for LaborManagement Standards, Office of the

American Workplace, U.S. Department

of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue,

NW., Room S–2203, Washington, DC

20210.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kay

H. Oshel, Chief, Division of

Interpretations and Standards, Office of

Labor-Management Standards, Office of

the American Workplace, U.S.

Department of Labor, 200 Constitution

Avenue, NW., Room N–5605,

Washington, DC 20210, (202) 219–7373.

This is not a toll-free number.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background and Overview

Title IV of the Labor-Management

Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, as

amended (LMRDA) sets forth standards

and requirements for the election of

labor organization officers. Section

401(e) of title IV, 29 U.S.C. § 481(e),

provides in part that every member in

good standing has the right to be a

candidate subject ‘‘to reasonable

qualifications uniformly imposed.’’

In connection with the Department’s

enforcement responsibilities under

LMRDA title IV, interpretative

regulations have been promulgated, 29

CFR part 452, in order to provide the

public with information as to the

Secretary’s ‘‘construction of the law

which will guide him in performing his

[enforcement] duties.’’ 29 CFR 452.1.

Several provisions in the interpretative

regulations discuss union-imposed

qualifications on candidacy eligibility.

One of these provisions, 29 CFR 452.38,

deals specifically with meeting

attendance requirements and lists

several factors to consider in

determining whether, under ‘‘all the

circumstances,’’ a particular meeting

attendance requirement is reasonable.

On June 15, 1994, OLMS published an

advance notice of proposed rulemaking

(ANPRM) requesting comments from the

public on the possible need to modify

the interpretative regulations on

meeting attendance requirements in

order to incorporate a ruling of the

United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit in Doyle v.

Brock, 821 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In

Doyle, the Secretary’s decision not to

bring enforcement action under LMRDA

title IV was reviewed by the courts

pursuant to Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421

U.S. 560 (1975). (In Bachowski, the

Supreme Court held that judicial review

of the Secretary’s decision not to bring

litigation in LMRDA title IV cases is

available under the Administrative

Procedure Act.) The Secretary had

decided not to bring civil action on a

member’s complaint about his union’s

meeting attendance requirement, even

though the requirement disqualified

97% of the members. The Secretary’s

position, after reviewing the factors set

forth in 29 CFR 452.38, was that since
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 95 / Wednesday, May 17, 1995 / Proposed Rules 26389

the requirement was not on its face

unreasonable (i.e., it did not require a

member to decide to become a

candidate an excessively long period

before the election) and it was not

difficult to meet (i.e., the meetings were

held at convenient times and locations

and the union provided liberal excuse

provisions), the large impact of the

requirement was not by itself sufficient

to render it unreasonable.

The district court held that the

Secretary’s decision not to bring

litigation against the union was arbitrary

and capricious, Doyle v. Brock, 641 F.

Supp. 223 and 632 F. Supp. 256 (D.D.C.

1986). The court of appeals affirmed,

rejecting the Secretary’s position

summarized above. The court

emphasized the importance of the

impact of the meeting attendance

requirement in disqualifying 97% of the

membership as a sufficient factor in

determining the requirement to be

unreasonable:

There is no basis, in [the Supreme Court’s

decision in Steelworkers, Local 3489 v.

Usery, 429 U.S. 305 (1977)] or in any other

case, for the notion that an attendance

requirement that has a large antidemocratic

effect can be reasonable on its face, and that

some additional factor is necessary to find

the requirement violative of the LMRDA.

821 F.2d 778, 785.

The ANPRM suggested three options

for modifying the interpretative

regulations. The first suggested option

was to delete the current language in 29

CFR 452.38(a) and replace it with the

statement that all meeting attendance

requirements are per se unreasonable.

The second suggested option was to

retain the current language in 29 CFR

452.38(a) stating that the reasonableness

of a meeting attendance requirement is

determined by reviewing a number of

factors on a case-by-case basis, but add

language to the effect that there is an

inverse relationship between the impact

of the requirement and the probability

that it will be considered reasonable.

The third suggested option, a

combination of the first two, was to

retain the current case-by-case language

of 29 CFR 452.38, but add a statement

that once the impact reaches a certain

point (such as 50%, 75% or 90%) the

meeting attendance requirement will be

considered to be unreasonable per se.

II. Comments on the ANPRM

OLMS received sixteen (16)

comments pursuant to the ANPRM on

the meeting attendance regulation.

Fourteen (14) comments were received

from the following labor organizations,

which generally opposed restrictions on

meeting attendance requirements:

—International Organization of Masters,

Mates & Pilots

—Association of Western Pulp and

Paperworkers

—United Cereal, Bakery and Food

Workers, No. 374

—International Association of Fire

Fighters

—Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics &

Allied Workers International Union

—American Federation of Grain Millers

—International Guards Union of

America

—Graphic Communications

International Union

—Amalgamated Transit Union

—Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers

International Union

—Amalgamated Clothing and Textile

Workers Union

—International Brotherhood of Painters

& Allied Trades

—The American Federation of Labor

and Congress of Industrial

Organization (joined by the United

Steelworkers of America and the

International Association of

Machinists and Aerospace Workers)

—International Brotherhood of

Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders,

Blacksmiths, Forgers & Helpers

The other two comments, which

opposed meeting attendance

requirements and supported the option

of holding that they are per se

unreasonable, were received from the

following:

—The Association for Union Democracy

—Acuna, Casas & Araiza (a law firm)

The points that were most frequently

made in the comments submitted by

labor organizations are as follows.

—A substantial number of union

constitutions continue to have

meeting attendance requirements,

either because the parent national or

international union requires one or

the parent allows subordinate locals

to choose to impose one.

—Although a large majority of union

members do not attend meetings, it is

not possible to make generalizations

on the portion of membership

disqualified by meeting attendance

requirements. One comment stated

that determining who is ineligible

because of a meeting attendance

requirement in a particular case is

difficult because of the availability of

excuse provisions and the need to

review meeting sign-in sheets and

records of excuse requests.

—The primary purpose of meeting

attendance requirements is to ensure

that candidates are knowledgeable

about the duties of the positions they

seek and that they are committed to

the union and serving its members;

the labor organizations stated that

they and their members feel very

strongly that this is a valid purpose.

Meeting attendance requirements

have served this purpose well (but the

labor organizations presented no facts

to support this belief).

—It is not appropriate to judge the

reasonableness of a candidacy

qualification by the number of

member who choose not to attempt to

meet it. The reasonableness of a rule

should be determined primarily by

how difficult the qualification is to

meet.

—Doyle is not persuasive and should

not be followed in the other circuits.

—No court has held meeting attendance

requirements to be per se

unreasonable, and there is no legal

basis for the Department to make

them per se unreasonable.

—If any change is made to the

regulations, that change should state

that a meeting attendance requirement

is presumptively reasonable as long as

the requirement is flexible (e.g.,

liberal excuse provisions are

available) and/or the union takes

other action to encourage attendance

(e.g., meetings held at different times,

extensive notice of meetings, etc.).

In addition, one of the labor

organization comments cited several

Supreme Court and lower court

decisions to support the proposition

that although ‘‘Congress’ model of

democratic elections was public

elections in this country,’’ Wirtz v.

Hotel, Motel and Club Employees

Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492 (1968), the

Doyle court’s standard for judging union

candidacy qualifications was far more

demanding than the standards which

courts have used for judging state

election rules (and therefore,

presumably, the Doyle standard would

not survive a challenge to the Supreme

Court). The most recent of the Supreme

Court cases, Munro v. Socialist Workers

Party, 479 U.S. 189, 107 S. Ct. 533

(1986), involved a challenge to a

Washington state law which required a

minority party candidate to run in the

state’s open primary and receive at least

1% of all votes cast for that office in

order to be a candidate in the general

election. The Court upheld this

candidacy restriction, even though such

restrictions ‘‘impinge’’ upon the First

and Fourteenth Amendment rights of

candidates and voters, because those

rights ‘‘are not absolute and are

necessarily subject to qualification if

elections are to be run fairly and

effectively.’’Id., at 193.

The state interests generally cited to

justify the impingement on
26390 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 95 / Wednesday, May 17, 1995 / Proposed Rules

constitutional rights are ensuring that

candidates have a ‘‘modicum of

support,’’ Id., at 193, avoiding voter

confusion, and eliminating frivolous

candidates. The Court has held that

states are not required to show that the

restriction is actually needed to serve

valid state interests. In Munro, the Court

accepted the determination of the Court

of Appeals (which has found the

restriction unconstitutional) that, as a

‘‘historical fact,’’ there was no evidence

of voter confusion from ballot

overcrowding, but went on to state that

[W]e have never required a State to make

a particularized showing of the existence of

voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, or the

presence of frivolous candidates prior to the

imposition of reasonable restrictions on

ballot access * * *. Id., at 194–5.

Legislatures, we think, should be permitted

to respond to potential deficiencies in the

electoral process with foresight rather than

reactively * * * Id., at 195.

For the Court, it was sufficient that

the restriction on candidacy in the

general election was based on the state’s

‘‘perception’’ of harmful developments

requiring that restriction. Id., at 196.

The two commenters who opposed

meeting attendance requirements stated

generally that

—they disqualify too many members,

discriminate in favor of incumbents,

are difficult to administer, and serve

no useful purpose,

—their alleged purpose, of ensuring

knowledgeable and committed

candidates, is undermined rather than

supported by the availability of liberal

excuse provisions,

—only a minority of unions have them,

and

—members should make the decision in

the election as to whether a person is

qualified.

One of the comments which

supported a per se ruling against

meeting attendance requirements made

a number of additional points. First, in

support of the position that most

meeting attendance requirements have

been held to violate the LMRDA, this

commenter stated that its review of

court and administrative decisions on

title IV cases disclosed only one court

decision and a handful of administrative

decisions which upheld the application

of a meeting attendance requirement

after Steelworkers Local 3489.

Second, this commenter argued that

the Supreme Court’s approval of the

Department’s case-by-case approach

under 29 CFR 452.38 in Steelworkers

Local 3489 does not prohibit the

Department ‘‘from adopting a less

flexible ban on all meeting attendance

requirements.’’ It stated that in other

areas of law the courts ‘‘have not

hesitated to make the transition from a

test based on all the circumstances to

the adoption of per se rules.’’ In

particular, the commenter cited a

Supreme Court decision involving antitrust laws, Northwest Stationers v.

Pacific Stationery, 472 U.S. 284 (1985),

which rejected the ‘‘rule of reason’’

approach and held that certain business

arrangements were per se illegal because

experience has shown that they ‘‘always

or almost always’’ tend to restrict

competition. This commenter also cited

a handbook of tort law to support its

position that courts have held that

certain actions in violation of statutes or

ordinances are per se unreasonable.

Third, this commenter stated that

several of the Department’s regulations

already contain per se rulings on

eligibility requirements. It cited the

following regulations which set forth

per se prohibitions: prior office holding

(29 CFR 458.40), membership in a

particular branch (29 CFR 458.42),

discrimination on the basis of personal

characteristics such as race, religion,

sex, and national origin which violates

Federal law (29 CFR 458.46), and

declaration of candidacy months prior

to the election (29 CFR 458.51). It also

cited several regulations which hold

that certain candidacy qualifications are

per se reasonable: ineligibility of fulltime non-elective employees (29 CFR

458.48), term limits (29 CFR 458.49),

and two years prior membership (29

CFR 458.37).

Finally, an article cited in these

comments, that was written by the

author of these comments, refers to

several sources which support the

proposition that attendance at union

meetings is and always has been low.

One of these is a statement by Senator

Hubert Humphrey in discussions on

bills which lead to the LMRDA. Senator

Humphrey’s exact statement, made in

the context of emphasizing the

importance of members’ attending

union meetings, was that ‘‘[i]f only 10

percent of union members attend

meetings—and that is a good average—

we can expect abuse of power.’’ 105

Cong. Rec. 17,918.

This commenter concluded by

arguing that it is important to

completely prohibit meeting attendance

requirements because any action short

of this will encourage unions to retain

those requirements and discourage

members who have not met the

requirements from running for office,

even though most such requirements

would not survive challenge. This

commenter also noted that some judges

have upheld an eligibility requirement

because it disqualified only 10% or 25%

of members, even though its

justification was otherwise

questionable; continuing the current

case-by-case approach might encourage

the case law to develop in this direction,

a tendency which should be ‘‘resisted.’’

III. Discussion

After reviewing the comments on the

ANPRM and the pertinent court

decisions in view of these comments,

the Department has decided to propose

a modification of the interpretative

regulations at 29 CFR 452.38 in order to

cite Doyle and refer to its essential

ruling. The Department has concluded

the Doyle is an important decision

‘‘which will guide [the Secretary] in

performing his duties,’’ 29 CFR 452.1,

and it is therefore appropriate to include

it in the interpretative regulations, but

that there is an insufficient basis at this

time to take further action such as

holding that meeting attendance

requirements are per se unreasonable.

The proposal to cite Doyle and refer

to its essential ruling is contrary to the

recommendations of both the labor

organization commenters and those

commenters who supported a per se

ruling against meeting attendance

requirements. Several labor

organizations stated in their comments

that they disagreed with Doyle and

recommended that Doyle not be

followed in other circuits. However, this

recommendation is not feasible. Since

Doyle was decided in the District of

Columbia Circuit, where the Secretary is

located, and since the Supreme Court’s

decision in Dunlop v. Bachowski held

that any member may bring litigation

against the Secretary for judicial review

of his decision not to take enforcement

action, a decision by the Secretary not

to follow Doyle in another circuit would

be susceptible to successful legal

challenge in the D.C. Circuit.

In addition, several labor

organizations recommended that the

Department create a ‘‘safe harbor’’

whereby a meeting attendance

requirement would be presumed to be

reasonable if, for example, meetings are

not difficult to attend, the union makes

significant efforts to encourage

attendance, and there are liberal excuse

provisions. However, many of these

factors were considered and rejected in

Doyle as well as in Steelworkers Local

3489, and the establishment of a

presumptively ‘‘safe harbor’’ is therefore

not possible.

The proposal to cite Doyle is also

contrary to the recommendations made

in the other two comments to prohibit

meeting attendance requirements per se.

The Department has concluded that

such recommended action, at a
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 95 / Wednesday, May 17, 1995 / Proposed Rules 26391

minimum, raises serious legal questions.

As the labor organizations comments

noted, the LMRDA expressly allows

unions to impose ‘‘reasonable

qualifications uniformly imposed’’ on

candidacy eligibility, Congress did not

discuss any abuses stemming from

meeting attendance requirements even

though many unions had such

requirements at the time the LMRDA

was enacted and attendance was

undoubtedly very low at that time as

well, and no court has actually held

meeting attendance requirements to be

per se unreasonable, not even the Doyle

court.

The arguments presented in the

comments in support of the legal

validity of adopting a per se rule do not

overcome these difficulties. In

particular, the Department does not feel

that the Supreme Court decision

involving anti-trust laws, which

reflected the ‘‘rule of reason’’ approach

and held that certain business

arrangements were per se illegal because

the experience shows that they ‘‘always

or almost always’’ tend to restrict

competition, is persuasive here. Unlike

the statutes discussed in that Court

decision (§ 1 of the Sherman Act, 15

U.S.C. § 1, and section 4 of the

Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.

§ 13(b)), LMRDA section 401(e)

expressly allows unions to adopt

reasonable rules limiting candidacy.

Moreover, as stated above, the fact that

attendance at union meetings is low was

acknowledged during Congressional

deliberations, so that the Department’s

‘‘experience’’ in implementing the

LMRDA is not different from the facts

known by Congress when it enacted the

LMRDA.

In addition, the four kinds of

eligibility requirements referred to one

of the commenters which are prohibited

per se in the Department’s regulations

can be readily distinguished from

meeting attendance requirements. ‘‘Prior

office holding’’ by its very terms makes

it impossible for every member to be a

candidate and was expressly found to

be unreasonable by the Supreme Court

in Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel and Club

Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492

(1968). ‘‘Discrimination on the basis of

certain personal characteristics’’ also by

its very terms makes it impossible for

every member to be a candidate and is

illegal under other Federal law.

‘‘Membership in a particular union

branch’’ also by its very terms makes it

impossible for every member to be a

candidate. ‘‘Declaration of candidacy’’

restricts the right of members to

nominate candidates and has been held

by the courts to serve no arguable

purpose.

The Department recognizes that many

of the statements made by the

commenters who supported a per se

prohibition on meeting attendance

requirements may well be valid. For

those cases of which the Department has

knowledge through its investigation of a

complaint, meeting attendance

requirements have most often

disqualified the overwhelming majority

of members and the requirements have

most often been found to be

unreasonable. The justifications for

meeting attendance requirements have

most often been seriously questioned by

the courts. Meeting attendance

requirements are difficult and

burdensome to administer equitably and

uniformly, especially with regard to

excuse provisions, and they lead to

uncertainty and costly litigation for all

concerned. These are all considerations

which labor organizations should be

aware of if they choose to have meeting

attendance requirements, in addition to

the fact that the Department under

Doyle will take enforcement action

whenever a meeting attendance

requirement disqualifies a large portion

of a union’s membership from

candidacy.

Nevertheless, the LMRDA recognizes

that labor organizations have the right to

establish reasonable candidacy

qualifications, and the Department has

concluded that there is not a sufficient

basis at this time for holding this one

type of candidacy qualification to be per

se unreasonable. It is therefore not

appropriate or necessary under the

present case law to replace the case-bycase approach, set forth in 29 CFR

452.38 and cited approvingly by the

Supreme Court in Steelworkers Local

3489, for determining whether a

meeting attendance requirement is

reasonable.

IV. The Proposed Revision

As stated above, the Department

proposes to revise the interpretive

regulations to cite Doyle and refer to its

essential ruling. Under this proposal,

the text of § 452.38 would remain, but

the text of footnote 25 would be

replaced with the following:

25 If a meeting attendance requirement

disqualifies a large portion of members from

candidacy, that large antidemocratic effect

alone may be sufficient to render the

requirement unreasonable. In Doyle v. Brock,

821 F.2d 778 (D.C. Circuit 1987), the court

held that the impact of a meeting attendance

requirement which disqualified 97% of the

union’s membership from candidacy was by

itself sufficient to make the requirement

unreasonable notwithstanding any of the

other factors set forth in 29 CFR 452.38(a).

The current text of footnote 25, which

would be eliminated under this

proposal, refers to the holding of the

Supreme Court in Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel

and Club Employees Union, Local 6, 391

U.S. 492, at 502, as support for the

importance of impact in determining

whether a meeting attendance

requirement is reasonable. However, the

Doyle decision is a more appropriate

citation for this point because in this

case, unlike Local 6, the meeting

attendance requirement was found

unreasonable solely on the basis of its

impact; in contrast, Local 6 involved the

issue for prior office holding, which is

covered in 29 CFR 452.40 and footnote

26, which summarizes Local 6. In

addition, even if the current text of

footnote 25 is replaced, there will

continue to be references to Local 6 in

footnote 26 and the text of 452.36(a).

V. Administrative Notices

A. Executive Order 12866

The Department of Labor has

determined that this proposed rule is

not a significant regulatory action as

defined in section 3(f) of Executive

Order 12866 in that it will not (1) Have

an annual effect on the economy of $100

million or more, or adversely affect in

a material way the economy, a sector of

the economy, productivity, competition,

jobs, the environment, public health or

safety, or State, local, or tribal

governments or communities, (2) create

a serious inconsistency or otherwise

interfere with an action taken or

planned by another agency, (3)

materially alter the budgetary impact of

entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan

programs or the rights and obligations of

recipients thereof, or (4) raise novel

legal or policy issues arising out of legal

mandates, the President’s priorities, or

the principles set forth in Executive

Order 12866.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

The Agency Head has certified that

this proposed rule will not have a

significant impact on a substantial

number of small entities as defined in

the Regulatory Flexibility Act. Any

regulatory revision will only apply to

labor organizations, and the Department

has determined that labor organizations

regulated pursuant to the statutory

authority granted under the LMRDA do

not constitute small entities. Therefore,

a regulatory flexibility analysis is not

required.

C. Paperwork Reduction Act

This proposed rule contains no

information collection requirements for
26392 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 95 / Wednesday, May 17, 1995 / Proposed Rules

purposes of the Paperwork Reduction

Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).

List of Subjects Affected in 29 CFR Part

452

Labor unions.

Text of Proposed Rule

In consideration of the foregoing, the

Department of Labor proposes that part

452 of title 29, Code of Federal

Regulations, be amended as follows:

PART 452—GENERAL STATEMENT

CONCERNING THE ELECTION

PROVISIONS OF THE LABORMANAGEMENT REPORTING AND

DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959

The authority citation for Part 452

continues to read as follows:

Authority: Secs. 401, 402, 73 Stat. 532, 534

(29 U.S.C. 481, 482); Secretary’s Order No. 2–

93 (58 FR 42578).

2. Footnote 25 cited at the end of

section 452.38(a) is revised to read as

follows:

§ 452.38 Meeting attendance requirements.

* * * * * 25 If a meeting attendance requirement

disqualifies a large portion of members from

candidacy, that large antidemocratic effect

alone may be sufficient to render the

requirement unreasonable. In Doyle v. Brock,

821 F.2d 778 (D.C. Circuit 1987), the court

held that the impact of a meeting attendance

requirement which disqualified 97% of the

union’s membership from candidacy was by

itself sufficient to make the requirement

unreasonable notwithstanding any of the

other factors set forth in 29 CFR 452.38(a).

Signed in Washington, DC this 11th day of

May 1995.

Charles L. Smith,

Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary.

[FR Doc. 95–12137 Filed 5–16–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4510–86–M

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

36 CFR Part 701

[Docket No. LOC 95–1]

Reading Rooms and Service to the

Collections

AGENCY: Library of Congress.

ACTION: Proposed rules.

SUMMARY: The Library of Congress is

proposing to amend its regulations on

access to the Library’s collections by

members of the public and policies and

procedures for service to the collections.

This amendment reflects the new

capabilities of the Library’s reader

registration system, specifically

requiring all members of the public

wishing to use the Library’s collections

to obtain a Library-issued User Card.

The User card will contain the name,

current address, and a digitized

photograph of the user. This

amendment also describes new policies

and procedures for providing and

maintaining security for Library

materials from accidental or deliberate

damage or loss caused by users of these

collections and the penalties for misuse.

These measures include establishing

conditions and procedures for the use of

material that requires special handling,

instructing and monitoring readers,

assuring that the conditions and

housing of all materials are adequate to

minimize risk, and establishing control

points at entrances to reading rooms.

These new procedures will enhance the

security of the Library’s collections.

DATES: Comments should be received on

or before June 16, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Ten copies of written

comments should be addressed, if sent

by mail to: Library of Congress, Mail

Code 1050, Washington, DC 20540. If

delivered by hand, copies should be

brought to: Office of the General

Counsel, James Madison Memorial

Building, Room LM–601, First and

Independence Avenue, SE.,

Washington, DC 20540–1050, (202) 707–

6316.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Johnnie M. Barksdale, Regulations

Officer, Office of the General Counsel,

Library of Congress, Washington, DC

20540–1050. Telephone No. (202) 707–

1593.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Under the

authority of 2 U.S.C. 136, the Librarian

of Congress is authorized to make rules

and regulations for the government of

the Library and for the protection of its

property. In March of 1992, James H.

Billington, the Librarian of Congress,

announced that new security measures

had to be taken to protect the Library’s

collections due to an increase in thefts

and mutilation of materials. ‘‘The

Library of Congress has long prided

itself on being open to all readers,’’ Dr.

Billington said. ‘‘However, as the

nation’s Library and the world’s largest

repository of mankind’s intellectual

accomplishments, we have an obligation

to protect our collections for future

generations of Americans. Many of our

books, maps, prints, and manuscripts

are irreplaceable. We cannot risk their

loss or desecration. We are responsible

for the nation’s patrimony.’’ Dr.

Billington’s announcement followed

lengthy planning by the Library to

tighten security. It also followed the

third arrest for theft from the Library

since April 1991. 36 CFR 701.5 is

amended to announce the Library’s new

capability to capture and store the

name, address, and a digitized

photograph of registered users of its

collections in an automated file for

collections security purposes. The

existing text in 36 CFR 701.5 will

become paragraph (b) and a new

paragraph (a) is added. 36 CFR 701.6 is

amended to set forth the general policy

of the Library on the use of materials in

its custody. 18 U.S.C. 64l, 136l, and

2071; and 22 D.C. Code 3106 set forth

criminal provisions for mutilation or

theft of Government property. The

existing text in 36 CFR 701.6, Chapter

VII will become paragraph (a) and new

paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) are added.

The last sentence in paragraph (a)

should be removed.

List of Subjects in 36 CFR Part 701

Libraries, Seals and insignias.

Proposed Regulations.

In consideration of the foregoing the

Library of Congress proposes to amend

36 CFR part 701 as follows:

PART 701—PROCEDURES AND

SERVICES

1. The authority citation for part 701

will continue to read as follows:

Authority: 2 U.S.C. 136.

2. Section 701.5 is amended by

redesignating the existing text as

paragraph (b) and adding a new

paragraph (a) to read as follows:

§ 701.5 The Library’s reading rooms and

public use thereof.

(a) All members of the public wishing

to use materials from the Library’s

collections first must obtain a User

Card. The Library will issue User Cards,

in accordance with established access

regulations, to those persons who

present a valid photo identification card

containing their name and current

address. The Library-issued User Card

will include the name, digitized

photograph, and signature of the user. It

must be presented when requesting

materials housed in the book stacks or

other non-public areas or upon request

of a Library staff member. In accordance

with Library regulations which

prescribe the conditions of reader

registration and use of Library materials,

presentation of a User Card may be

required for entry into certain reading

rooms. The Library will maintain the

information found on the User Cards,

including the digitized photograph and

other pertinent information, in an

automated file for collections security

purposes. Access to the automated file

shall be limited to only those Library