UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

RONRICO J. HATCH, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CAUSE NO. 3:15-CV-279 PS 

vs. )

)

INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF )

CORRECTIONS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Ronrico J. Hatch, a pro se prisoner, filed an amended complaint (DE 1-2 at 70-82)

on June 5, 2015, in the LaPorte Superior Court which was removed here by the United

States Department of Labor on July 6, 2015 (DE 1). I screened (DE 4) the amended

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Department of Labor and the claims

against it were dismissed but, in the spirit of Luevano v. Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir.

2013), Hatch was given an opportunity to file a second amended complaint if he

believed that by doing so he could plausibly state a claim against the Department of

Labor. He has now filed a second amended complaint. (DE 11.)

Hatch is an inmate at the Indiana State Prison. In his second amended complaint,

Hatch alleges that from July 6, 2007, to October 28, 2013, he was enrolled in the

Paralegal Apprenticeship Program at the prison. He alleges that program was operated

by the Indiana Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) and registered with the United
States Department of Labor. His participation in the program ended when IDOC

Apprenticeship Coordinator Kristal Kajer discontinued the program in December 2013.

“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint,

however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation

marks and citations omitted). Nevertheless, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, I must

review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 

Originally, Hatch did not attach a copy of the contract which he alleged was

breached and therefore it was unclear why he believed that the Department of Labor

had a contract with him. He has now provided that contract. (DE 8-1 at 3.) However, it

is not a contract with the Department of Labor. Rather it is “a written agreement,

complying with §29.7 between an apprentice [Hatch] and . . . the apprentice’s program

sponsor [IDOC] . . ., which contains the terms and conditions of the employment and

training of the apprentice.” 29 C.F.R. § 29.2. Thus, there is no express contract between

Hatch and the Department of Labor.

Hatch further alleges that the actions of Kristal Kajer, as an agent for the

Apprenticeship Sponsor (IDOC) and Registration Agency (the Department of Labor),

cause the Department of Labor to become liable. Notably, in Lopinson v. United States, 15

Cl. Ct. 712 (1988), the Court of Claims addressed similar claims raised by State prisoners

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seeking to hold the United States liable in connection to apprenticeships programs in

which they participated. There, the court found that the Department of Labor “played a

considerable role in the functioning of the apprenticeship program [and that the]

plaintiff’s decisions to contract were no doubt influenced by [the Department of Labor

employee’s] representations . . ..” Id. at 715. Nevertheless, it found that “such activity

does not bind the Federal Government contractually to the plaintiffs [and] substantial

involvement by a Government agency in contract negotiations simply does not itself

create an implied-in-fact contract.” Id.

Here, Hatch’s allegations demonstrate far less involvement by the Department of

Labor than existed in Lopinson. Kristal Kajer is an employee of the Indiana Department

of Correction, not the Department of Labor. (DE 11 at 4.) Nevertheless, even if she had

been an employee, the United States is not liable for promises made by employees

unless the employee who made the promise had the authority to do so. “Nowhere in

those regulations [cited to by Hatch] is [the Department of Labor] granted authority to

contract with private individuals concerning apprenticeship training . . ..” Lopinson, 15

Ct. Cl. at 715. Moreover, Kajer is not alleged to have promised Hatch something, but

rather to have violated Department of Labor apprenticeship program rules. 

Though Hatch argues that the Department owes him a fiduciary duty because it

created and failed to enforce rules which should have benefitted him, “[a]n attempt to

implement standards which promote the common good and general welfare clearly

constitutes a sovereign act.” Id. at 716. As such, the department has sovereign immunity

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and cannot be sued. See F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). For all of these

reasons, Hatch does not state a claim against the Department of Labor and the claims

against it must be dismissed. 

This case was removed here solely because the Department of Labor is an agency

of the United States. Without the Department of Labor, it would not be appropriate for

me to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining defendants and claims. See

Al’s Serv. Ctr. v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 599 F.3d 720, 727 (7th Cir.2010) (“When all

federal claims in a suit in federal court are dismissed before trial, the presumption is

that the court will relinquish federal jurisdiction over any supplemental state-law

claims.”) and Doe-2 v. McLean County Unit Dist. No. 5 Bd. of Dirs., 593 F.3d 507, 513 (7th

Cir. 2010) (“Ordinarily, when a district court dismisses the federal claims conferring

original jurisdiction before trial, it relinquishes supplemental jurisdiction over any

state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).”). The parties have been afforded the

opportunity to explain why the court should retain supplemental jurisdiction, but no

attempt was made to do so. Therefore this case will be remanded to the LaPorte

Superior Court.

For these reasons, the court:

(1) DISMISSES the claims against the United States Department of Labor; 

(2) DISMISSES the United States Department of Labor;

(3) DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining State

law claims; and

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(4) REMANDS the remaining State law claims to the LaPorte Superior Court.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: January 26, 2016. s/Philip P. Simon 

Chief Judge

United States District Court

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