2023 IL App (4th) 210406-U 

NO. 4-21-0406 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. 

JULIANA VEGA, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

)

) 

) 

) 

)

) 

)

)

)

Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Livingston County 

No. 19CF141 

Honorable 

Jennifer H. Bauknecht, 

Judge Presiding.

 

 JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court.

 Justice Knecht concurred in the judgment. 

 Presiding Justice DeArmond dissented.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court reversed, finding the trial court erred in denying defendant’s 

pro se motion to correct fines and fees without giving due consideration to the fines 

and fees set forth in the circuit clerk’s payment status information sheet. 

¶ 2 Defendant, Juliana Vega, appeals from the trial court’s denial of her pro se motion 

to correct fines and fees filed pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 472 (eff. May 17, 2019). 

Defendant claims the circuit clerk failed to apply the appropriate credit to the imposed assessments

and assessed additional costs contrary to the trial court’s finding of indigency and to its sentencing 

order. We agree and reverse the court’s order denying defendant relief and remand for the filing 

of an amended assessment of amounts due. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

FILED

March 29, 2023

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 
- 2 - 

¶ 4 In January 2020, a jury found defendant guilty of one count of delivery of a 

controlled substance containing fentanyl, a Class 1 felony (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(1), (b-1) (West 

2018)). On February 20, 2020, the trial court sentenced defendant to seven years in prison. After 

imposing the prison term, the court stated:

“In addition, there are financial obligations that are associated with this. 

There’s a minimum fine of $75. The Schedule [3] felony drug offense criminal 

assessment of $2,215 applies. There’s a $100 lab fee, a $250 DNA fee. You have 

pretrial incarceration credits for the 38 days that you’ve been in custody so that’s 

[], $1,140. That will offset your fines so you don’t have to pay the fine. That’s 

offset.

Under the statute, you may be entitled to a waiver of the criminal 

assessment. That’s the $2,215. Based upon the sentence and the information that 

the Court has been given today during the sentencing hearing, I am going to waive 

the requirement that you file a request to waive the criminal assessment; and I will 

waive 100 percent of that assessment so the $2,215 is waived.

But within 12 months of your release from the Department of Corrections, 

you will have to pay the $100 lab fee and the $250 DNA fee. Okay?”

¶ 5 The trial court entered a written “Supplemental Financial Sentencing Order,” which 

listed the following assessments (as indicated with check marks next to the applicable 

assessments): a fine of $75, a felony drug offense assessment of $2215, a crime lab drug analysis 

assessment of $100, and a DNA analysis assessment of $250. The order indicated a credit for 38 

days of pretrial incarceration at $30 per day for a total credit of $1140. It further indicated a 100% 

waiver of the felony drug offense assessment. The order also indicated the circuit clerk was ordered 
- 3 - 

to apply all available bond “prior to pretrial incarceration credits and assessment waivers. All fines, 

assessments and fees ordered herein shall be paid in full *** (within) 12 months of release from 

IDOC.” This written order was consistent with and mirrored the court’s oral pronouncement.

¶ 6 On May 15, 2020, the trial court denied defendant’s timely filed motion to 

reconsider her sentence and, after defendant indicated her desire to appeal, the court appointed the 

Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD). OSAD filed a direct appeal docketed in this court 

as case No. 4-20-0232. 

¶ 7 On January 21, 2021, this court allowed defendant’s motion to dismiss her appeal.

On July 12, 2021, defendant filed in the trial court a Rule 472 pro se motion to correct fines and 

fees. In her motion, defendant alleged OSAD notified her “there were errors that should be 

corrected[.]” She claimed OSAD informed her “the following fines were assessed in the absence 

of a court order: Violent Crime, Trauma Center, Medical Costs, Spinal Cord Trust, CJI Fund, Pill 

disposal, State Police Ops, and Child Advocacy.” She claimed these “improperly assessed fines 

total approximately $351.” She further claimed OSAD informed her she “was entitled to $1,140 

of per diem credit, a portion of which should have been applied to offset the $100 Crime Lab fee 

that was orally imposed by this Court at the sentencing hearing.”

¶ 8 On July 14, 2021, the trial court entered a docket entry denying defendant’s pro se

motion, acknowledging its jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 472, and finding it had “ordered Schedule 

3 criminal assessments – which are then allocated to the various funds per status [sic] (705 ILCS 

135/15-15 [(West 2020)]. In addition, defendant received credit for time served.” 

¶ 9 This appeal followed.

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 Rule 472 provides a means for the trial court to address certain claimed sentencing 
- 4 - 

errors, including “[e]rrors in the imposition or calculation of fines, fees, assessments, or costs.” Ill. 

S. Ct. R. 472(a) (eff. May 17, 2019). The rule provides, in criminal cases, “the circuit court retains 

jurisdiction to correct *** sentencing errors at any time following judgment and after notice to the 

parties, including during the pendency of an appeal, on the court’s own motion, or on motion of 

any party.” Id. The rule requires the claimed error to first be raised in the circuit court, and “any 

claim of error not raised in [a postjudgment] motion shall be deemed forfeited.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 472(c) 

(eff. May 17, 2019).

¶ 12 In this appeal, defendant claims the trial court erred in denying her motion to correct

fines and fees because the circuit clerk did not appropriately apply the credit ordered by the court 

and imposed additional unauthorized assessments. The State contends defendant has forfeited her 

claims because the particular claims raised in this appeal were not included in her motion as 

required by Rule 472(c). In response, defendant argues against forfeiture, acknowledging her

motion “did not accurately set forth the errors made by the clerk,” but suggesting her pro se petition 

be liberally construed. 

¶ 13 Our review of defendant’s pro se petition finds defendant’s allegation “that there 

were errors that should be corrected by [the trial] Court” sufficient to constitute a request for the 

trial court to review the fines and fees imposed, ensure the appropriate assessments were entered, 

and ensure the appropriate credit was applied. We find her claim was not forfeited and was 

sufficient to preserve the issue for purposes of this appeal.

¶ 14 Defendant relies on the columns entitled “credits” and “due” on the circuit clerk’s 

printouts to argue the wrong amounts were assessed and/or credited. She claims the clerk “applied 

the waiver to some, but not all, of the Schedule 3 fees, and charged [defendant] for $853.45 in 

court fees, $9.45 still outstanding. [Citation.] Thus, the clerk collected $494 in excess of what 
- 5 - 

[defendant] was ordered to pay—an amount that must be reimbursed—and assessed an additional 

$9.45, which should be waived in accordance with the trial court’s order.”

¶ 15 Our decision rests on whether the trial court had the authority to impose certain 

fines, fees, and assessments and whether the circuit clerk’s allocation of funds, whether assessed 

or credited, was consistent with the applicable statutes and the court’s order at sentencing. This 

issue involves questions of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. People v. Caballero, 

228 Ill. 2d 79, 82 (2008).

¶ 16 Section 15-15, known as Schedule 3, of the Criminal and Traffic Assessment Act 

(705 ILCS 135/15-15 (West 2020)) provides the circuit clerk shall collect $2215 upon a felony 

drug conviction and allocate those funds as specified in the statute. At sentencing, the trial court 

indicated the assessment of $2215 applied to defendant but 100% of this amount would be waived. 

The court also noted a fine of $75 applied but indicated defendant’s pretrial incarceration credit of 

$1140 would offset that amount, so defendant would owe no fine. However, the court ordered 

defendant “to pay the $100 lab fee and the $250 DNA fee.”

¶ 17 The trial court’s written “Supplemental Financial Sentencing Order” ordered the 

circuit clerk to “apply all available bond prior to pretrial incarceration credits and assessment 

waivers.” Thus, before any funds were allocated or credited, the clerk should have applied $844 

from defendant’s $1000 bond. (The clerk indicated $156 of the bond was “transferred to 19-CL44,” a fact this court will assume was appropriate, as neither party has disputed it.) 

¶ 18 This court’s review of the circuit clerk’s July 14, 2020, printout of defendant’s 

financial obligations indicates the total due should be $2640, not $2749.45. We find no authority 

for the assessment of the $109.45 fee designated as “clerk” and therefore vacate the same. From 

the $2640 owed, the clerk should then have applied “all available bond” in the amount of $844, 
- 6 - 

leaving a total due of $1796. After the bond is applied, the trial court instructed the clerk to then 

apply the pretrial incarceration credits and assessment waivers. The pretrial incarceration credit 

was to be applied only toward the $75 fine. After applying that credit, the total due was $1721, of 

which the $2215 waiver should have been applied, leaving a zero balance due. However, the court 

ordered defendant “to pay the $100 lab fee and the $250 DNA fee.” Thus, the circuit clerk should 

have collected $350 from defendant. Defendant is entitled to a reimbursement of any amount she 

paid over $350.

¶ 19 Given this disposition, based upon our calculation, we conclude the trial court erred 

in denying defendant’s pro se motion to correct fines and fees filed pursuant to Rule 472. We 

reverse the court’s July 14, 2021, order and remand for a recalculation of defendant’s financial 

status consistent with our decision and calculation set forth above. 

¶ 20 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 21 For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with our decision. 

¶ 22 Reversed and remanded. 

¶ 23 PRESIDING JUSTICE DeARMOND, dissenting:

¶ 24 I respectfully dissent and adopt the State’s argument and rationale. Defendant, in her 

pro se petition, does not allege “that there were errors that should be corrected by [the trial] Court,” 

as the majority’s analysis asserts. Instead, she says, “[A]ppellate counsel notified me that there were 

errors that should be corrected by this Court.” Defendant identified the errors appellate counsel 

described to her. More importantly, defendant then specified the errors to which she refers, naming 

the fines or assessments about which she complains. 
- 7 - 

¶ 25 As the State observes, “[T]he claims raised in [defendant’s] appellate brief are entirely 

different from those in her initial motion.” OSAD now raises new claims regarding other fees not 

originally named and contests an assessment to which the trial court’s waiver should be extended. If 

this was an inartful pro se motion, couched in the most general terms, some leeway in applying 

forfeiture might be appropriate. Here, however, defendant was very specific about her claims, which 

she made at her appellate counsel’s direction. OSAD has now expanded on that substantially. 

¶ 26 The new claims, raised for the first time on appeal, are forfeited and not properly 

considered under plain error based on the clear language of Rule 472. As the State noted, then-Chief 

Justice Karmeier’s comments about the policy considerations involved in the enactment of Rule 472 

were referenced in People v. Jones, 2022 IL App (2d) 210079-U, ¶ 32. Those comments included the 

following: “If a party files a post-judgment motion raising a sentencing error pursuant to the new 

rules, the party must include all claims of sentencing error at that time. Any claim of error not so 

raised shall be deemed forfeited.” Karmeier, CJ., Overcoming the Chronic Challenge of Correcting 

Sentencing Errors: Help is on the Way, (Feb. 25, 2019), available at, 

https://www.illinoiscourts.gov/News/509/Overcoming-the-Chronic-Challenge-of-CorrectingSentencing-Errors-Help-is-on-the-Way/news-detail/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2023).

¶ 27 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.