UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

v. ) CASE NO.: 1:15-CR-26-TLS

)

CAMARI STINSON )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Camari Stinson’s Verified Petition to

Withdraw Guilty Pleas [ECF No. 109], filed on April 30, 2018. The Court, having reviewed the

parties’ written submissions and the transcript of the change of plea hearing, and having

conducted an evidentiary hearing on the matter, now denies the Defendant’s request to withdraw

his pleas of guilty to Counts I, II, and III of the Indictment charging him with being a felon in

possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), distributing a controlled substance,

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug

trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

BACKGROUND

On May 27, 2015, the Defendant was charged in a three-count Indictment with being a

felon in possession of a firearm from December 29, 2014, continuing to February 25, 2015 (18

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), distributing a controlled substance on January 29, 2015 (21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1)), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of the January 29 drug trafficking crime

(18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). A jury trial was scheduled to begin on December 5, 2017. On November

30, 2017, the Defendant filed a Motion to Plea[d] Guilty to Counts II and III [ECF No. 93]. The

Defendant stated that he wished to enter pleas of guilty to Counts II and III without the benefit of
a plea agreement, which would leave Count I, the felon in possession charge, for trial. On

December 1, the Court conducted a telephonic status conference and set the change of plea

hearing for December 4.1

On December 4, 2017, the Defendant entered pleas of guilty without the benefit of a plea

agreement to all three counts before the undersigned judge. A sentencing hearing was scheduled

for March 29, 2018. A probation officer prepared a Presentence Investigation Report, to which

the Defendant filed objections. The objections centered around the recitation of the offense

conduct, particularly as it related to relevant conduct for the felon in possession charge,

including whether the Defendant used the firearm in an attempted murder that resulted in serious

bodily injury. With respect to conduct during the January 29, 2015, drug transaction, the

Defendant’s only objection was to the factual assertion that he made comments about his

involvement in the shooting prior to the CI and to the undercover agent completing the

controlled buy.

The Court scheduled an evidentiary hearing to address the objections, but vacated it after

the Defendant expressed a desire to withdraw his guilty plea. In his Verified Petition to

Withdraw, the Defendant asserted that his cousin’s death plunged him into depression at a time

1 If the Defendant admitted the conduct that forms the basis of Counts II and III, distributing

cocaine and carrying a firearm in relation to that distribution on January 29, 2015, he would necessarily

also admit that he possessed a firearm on that date. As January 29 falls within the time frame alleged in

the Count I felon in possession charge—December 29, 2014, continuing to February 25, 2015—the first

element of Count I would have been established by the Defendant’s guilty plea to Count III. See United

States v. Allen, 383 F.3d 644, 646–47 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing the three elements of a felon in possession of

a firearm offense under § 922(g)(1): (1) the defendant possessed a firearm; (2) the firearm had traveled in

or affected interstate commerce; and (3) the defendant had previously been convicted of a felony); Cf.

United States v. Conley, 291 F.3d 464, 470 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that a defendant can only be charged

with separate § 922(g) offenses for the same firearm if possession was interrupted and the defendant

reacquired the firearm). 

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when he was attempting to wean himself from prescribed anti-depressant medication. He further

asserted that this caused “an inability in my mind to be properly prepared for trial in this case”

and feeling “pressured to plead guilty . . . as my only remaining option.” (Verified Pet. 1.) The

Defendant maintains that he “did not commit these offenses, such that all required elements

could be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at 2.)

The Court took the Petition under advisement and set the matter for an evidentiary

hearing to further develop the record, specifically identifying several issues that remained

unclear from the Verified Petition. At the June 15, 2018, hearing the Government presented the

testimony of Agent Wayne Lessner from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and

Explosives to address the Defendant’s claim that he is innocent of the charges to which he pled

guilty. The Defendant did not present testimony. At the conclusion of the hearing, neither party

requested the opportunity to submit additional briefing, but opted to rely on the presentations

made to the Court.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 governs a defendant’s request to withdraw a plea

of guilty. It allows a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty after the court accepts the plea and

before sentence is imposed if “the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the

withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). The Seventh Circuit has “frequently observed that a

defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a plea before sentencing, although the

court may allow him to do so if he has a fair and just reason for doing so.” United States v.

Chavers, 515 F.3d 722, 724 (7th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted);

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United States v. Hodges, 259 F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 2001). “Because the defendant’s statements

at a plea colloquy are presumed to be true, the defendant bears a heavy burden of persuasion in

showing that such a fair and just reason exists.” Chavers, 515 F.3d at 724 (citing United States v.

Logan, 244 F.3d 553, 558 (7th Cir. 2001)). Requiring that the defendant have a “fair and just”

reason to withdraw an accepted plea is consistent with the requirement that, before any plea is

accepted, the defendant has sworn in open court that he actually committed the crimes, he has

stated that he is pleading guilty because he is in fact guilty, he has stated that he is pleading

guilty voluntarily, the court has advised him of his trial rights, the court has advised him of any

maximum possible penalty, the court has explained the terms of any plea agreement provision

waiving the right to appeal, and the court has found a factual basis for the plea. See Fed. R. Crim.

P. 11(b) (setting forth requirements for considering and accepting a guilty plea).

Given the great care with which pleas are taken under . . . Rule 11, there is no reason

to view pleas so taken as merely tentative, subject to withdrawal before sentence

whenever the government cannot establish prejudice. Were withdrawal automatic in

every case where the defendant decided to alter his tactics and present his theory of

the case to the jury, the guilty plea would become a mere gesture, a temporary and

meaningless formality reversible at the defendant’s whim. In fact, however, a guilty

plea is no such trifle, but a grave and solemn act, which is accepted only with care

and discernment. 

United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 676–77 (1997) (quotation marks and brackets omitted)

(citing Advisory Committee explanation for adding “fair and just” language to Rule 32(e) (now

Rule 11(d)).

It is within the court’s discretion whether to hold a hearing on the plea’s validity. United

States v. Collins, 796 F.3d 829, 834 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Jones, 381 F.3d 615,

618 (7th Cir. 2004)). 

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ANALYSIS

In his Verified Petition to Withdraw Guilty Plea, the Defendant does not point to any

deficiency in the Court’s colloquy during the change of plea hearing on December 4, 2017. That

is, he does not allege that the Court failed to follow Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal.

Rather, his claim is that personal circumstances led him to plead guilty as his “only remaining

option” despite the fact that he had intended to defend the charges at trial because he is innocent.

(Verified Pet. ¶¶ 4, 7, 8.) He points specifically to his attempts to “ween [sic] [himself] off of a

prescribed anti-depressant medication (Celexa)” in advance of his trial date. (Id. ¶ 5.) The

Defendant states that, in the meantime, the shooting death of his cousin in Fort Wayne “plunged

[him] into a significant depression” and caused him to “become suicidal.” (Id. ¶ 6.) According to

the Defendant’s Petition, with his “trial date approaching and an inability in [his] mind to be

properly prepared for trial . . . [he] felt pressured to plead guilty,” and thus did so “in the belief

that it was [his] only remaining option.” (Id. ¶ 7.)

A “fair and just reason” for the withdrawal of a guilty plea is that the plea was

involuntary. United States v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1198 (7th Cir. 1994). The Defendant’s Petition

does not convince the Court that the statement he made under oath when he entered his guilty

pleas were false. Nor do they suggest to the Court that he was unable to comprehend what he

was doing when he entered those pleas. First, as the Court noted in the written order setting the

evidentiary hearing, the Defendant’s Petition left unanswered what led him to alter his prescribed

medication regime in advance of trial. Neither did it provide the identity of his cousin, the date

the shooting occurred, or whether the Defendant reported his suicidal thoughts to medical

personnel, or others, at the jail. The Court thought that these question, and others, required an

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evidentiary hearing. The Court also noted that, importantly, the source of the “pressure” to plead

guilty, or what the Defendant meant by “pressure,” had not been adequately developed for the

Court to find that his previous in-court, sworn statements that he actually committed the crimes,

and was pleading guilty voluntarily, should be discounted as falsehoods. 

The Defendant did not attempt to answer any of these lingering questions during the

evidentiary hearing that the Court set into this matter to address the Defendant’s request to

withdraw his guilty pleas. Moreover, having depression, by itself, would not be an indicator to

this Court that the Defendant was unable to voluntarily enter a plea of guilty. See United States

v. Dyer, 2018 WL 2944316, at *3 (7th Cir. June 13, 2018) (noting that “defendants with mental

illnesses can and often do enter knowing and voluntary pleas, so long as the judge can determine

that the defendant is able to understand and participate in the proceedings” (citing as an example

United States v. Woodard, 744 F.3d 488, 496 (7th Cir. 2014)). As in Dyer, the Defendant here

“points to no evidence that his judgment was significantly impaired during . . . the colloquy.

Rather, the transcript shows that the [judge] thoroughly assessed [the Defendant’s] ability to

understand his rights.” Id.

At the time he changed his pleas to guilty, the Defendant advised that he was taking

Celexa for depression and anxiety. (Plea Hr’g Tr. 6.) He stated that he had been taking the

medication since being in custody on the pending criminal charges. (Id. at 7.)2

 The Court

inquired whether the medication affected the Defendant’s “ability to understand the proceedings

in your case today?” (Id.) The Defendant responded that they did not, and affirmed that he was,

in the Court’s words, “of a clear mind.” (Id.) Neither of the party’s counsel had any concerns

2 The Defendant has been in custody since his arrest on March 9, 2017.

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about the Defendant’s ability to proceed in the matter, or his ability to understand what was

happening with the change of plea. (Id. at 7–8 (THE COURT: You believe he’s fully competent

and is able to understand the significance of this proceeding? ATTORNEY JOHN BOHDAN:

Very much so.”).) Additionally, the Defendant confirmed that he had not been threatened or

forced in any way to plead guilty, and that no promises or assurances had been made to persuade

him to plead guilty. (Id. at 18–19.) Rather, he was pleading guilty of his own free will. (Id. at

19.)

B. Actual Innocence Claim

In the Court’s order setting the evidentiary hearing, the Court noted the Defendant’s

assertion that he is “innocent of these charges” and “did not commit these offenses, such that all

required elements could be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Verified Pet. ¶ 8.) The Court

acknowledged that actual and legal innocence have been recognized as legitimate grounds for

the withdrawal of a guilty plea. See United States v. Mays, 593 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2010).

However, “‘bare protestations of innocence’ are insufficient to withdraw a guilty plea,

particularly after a knowing and voluntary plea made in a thorough Rule 11 colloquy.” Chavers,

515 F.3d at 725 (quoting United States v. Carroll, 412 F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 2005)). The

defendant claiming actual innocence “must proffer some credible evidence.” Carroll, 412 F.3d at

792 (citing United States v. Wallace, 276 F.3d 360, 366 (7th Cir. 2002)). 

In Carroll, the defendant’s denial of guilt contradicted his earlier sworn testimony during

the plea colloquy, and ignored the evidence that the government would have offered at trial. Id.

The Seventh Circuit said that the “district court was thus understandably skeptical of the claim of

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innocence, especially since it came only after [the Defendant] saw the presentencing report.” Id.

Likewise, here, the Defendant’s denial of guilt comes after receiving a presentence report to

which he lodged objections regarding relevant conduct that enhanced his offense level. The

denial of guilt also contradicts his earlier sworn testimony, and ignores the evidence that the

Government would offer at trial. The Government described this evidence during the change of

plea hearing as follows:

The Government would present evidence that on January 29th, 2015, ATF arranged

a controlled delivery of cocaine from Camari Stinson to a confidential informant. 

Special Agent Wayne Lessner was acting in an undercover capacity and drove the

CI to an address on Smith Street, where they picked up Camari Stinson. Smith Street

is located in Fort Wayne in the Northern District of Indiana. 

Mr. Stinson got into the undercover vehicle, and the vehicle was equipped with both

video and audio recording capabilities, and the transaction was, in fact, captured on

video and audio, and that would be presented at trial.

Mr. Stinson directed Special Agent Lessner, who was driving the vehicle, to wait

about 15 minutes and then drive them to an address on Lily Street, which is also in

Fort Wayne in the Northern District of Indiana.

Mr. Stinson had a Smith and Wesson .40 caliber firearm on his person in the pocket

of his sweatshirt when he got into the undercover vehicle, and removed the firearm

from his sweatshirt pocket and showed it to the confidential informant.

Upon arrival at Lily Street, Mr. Stinson got out of the undercover vehicle and met

with an individual. Mr. Stinson had that firearm on his person when he left the

vehicle. After a few minutes, Mr. Stinson returned to the vehicle, got inside and then

provided a baggie containing a white powder material to the confidential informant,

who then weighed it. Money was exchanged.

That white -- that baggie with the white powder was later submitted to the Indiana

State police for testing. Tests confirmed the baggie was found to contain cocaine, a

controlled substance. The examination also revealed the presence of a non-controlled

substance mixed with the controlled substance cocaine, and the net weight of the

material was 3.38 grams.

After the deal was complete, Mr. Stinson again removed the firearm at the request

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of the confidential informant, and showed it to him. And then Mr. Stinson at the end

of the transaction left the vehicle with the firearm.

Special Agent Lessner would testify that firearms are tools of the trade for drug

traffickers, that people who distribute drugs often carry firearms to protect

themselves and their product from being robbed, and that carrying a firearm during

a drug trafficking crime facilitates or has the power to facilitate the drug trafficking

crime.

ATF Special Agent Thomas Kaiser is a firearms expert, and Nexus expert. It would

be expected that he would testify that he conducted a test fire of the Smith and

Wesson semi-automatic pistol, model SD40VE, which was a .40 caliber, and that it

functioned as designed, and therefore, meets the definition of a firearm under federal

law.

Special Agent Kaiser would also testify that he conducted a nexus examination of the

firearm, and determined that it was manufactured by Tri-Town Plastics in

Connecticut, and, therefore, having the gun in the presence of the State of Indiana

in January of 2015, it would have traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

Government will also present testimony from a Probation Officer who would testify

that Mr. Camari Stinson, the defendant in this case is the same Camari Stinson, who

was convicted in the Allen Superior Court, Court 4 Fort Wayne, under cause

02D04-0707-FD620 of possession of marijuana, a felony, and that conviction was

on January 15, 2008, and therefore, his possession in January of 2015 at the time he

was prohibited based on that prior felony conviction.

Thank you. I’m sorry, a certified copy would also be admitted, Your Honor, of that

conviction.

(Plea Hr’g Tr. 24–27.) The Court asked the Defendant if he agreed with the Government’s

summary of what he did with regard to each of the charges. He conferred with counsel, and then

stated that he agreed. The Court asked if there was anything with which he disagreed. Counsel

for the Defendant told the Court that the Defendant indicated that he agreed with the summation

of his activities and involvement, but did not know one way or another about Agent Lessner’s

anticipated testimony about firearms being tools of the drug trade. The Court confirmed that

Agent Lessner’s testimony was the Defendant’s only concern.

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During the change of plea hearing, the Defendant admitted all of the essential elements of

each crime. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court asked, “Mr. Stinson, do you have any

questions with regard to any of the statements, any of the questions, any of the matters pertaining

to your presentation of the guilty plea as to these 3 counts.” (Id. at 31.) The Defendant answered,

“No, Your honor.” (Id.) 

Responding to the Defendant’s claim that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty

plea because he is actually innocent, the Government presented at the evidentiary hearing on the

Defendant’s Petition to Withdraw Guilty Pleas the testimony of Agent Lessner, the undercover

agent who was with a confidential informant and the Defendant when the Defendant procured

cocaine for the informant. The Government also entered as exhibits images from the video of the

inside of the undercover vehicle after the Defendant obtained the cocaine from the other vehicle.

They showed the Defendant holding what the agent testified was cocaine, as well as a firearm.

The Government also verified that Agent Lessner had obtained a certified copy of a 2008

judgment against the Defendant for a felony conviction. 

The Defendant has not presented any evidence to refute that he has a prior felony

conviction and was, accordingly, a person prohibited from possessing a firearm. The Defendant’s

cross-examination of Agent Lessner included whether he was able to determine the functionality

of the firearm on that date and, thus, appeared targeted at the definition of a firearm as one of the

required elements that the Defendant may believe cannot be established beyond a reasonable

doubt. The Seventh Circuit has “rejected the contention that the government must prove that the

gun was operable, because it is sufficient to show that the gun was designed to fire.” United

States v. Alanis, 265 F.3d 576, 592 (7th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation

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omitted). The agent testified that he is very familiar with firearms, and that the weapon was a .40

caliber Smith and Wesson. Additionally, as noted above, another agent test fired the firearm and

determined that it functioned as designed.

As a final note, the Court acknowledges the Defendant’s assertions that, before he pled

guilty, it was his intention to defend himself at trial. This does not have any tendency to suggest

actual innocence, or involuntariness. “[D]efendants who once asserted their innocence often

change their plea, and there was no reason for” this Court “to find that phenomenon unusual in

this case.” Dyer, No. 17-1580, 2018 WL 2944316, at *4 (stating that a defendant’s “sudden

change of heart” when he pled guilty despite prior protests of innocence was “no anomaly” that

required a more thorough plea colloquy). Likewise, the claim of unidentified pressure that

accompanied his approaching trial date, and the inability in his mind to be prepared for trial, is a

nonstarter. The Defendant had no issues with seeking, or obtaining, continuances of his previous

trial dates. He sought, and received, eleven such continuances leading up to the December 2017

trial date. (See Mots. to Continue, ECF Nos. 17, 21, 25, 40, 42, 50, 53, 60, 67, 72, and 75.)

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES the Defendant’s Verified Petition to

Withdraw Guilty Pleas [ECF No. 109]. The evidentiary hearing to address the Defendant’s

objections to the Presentence Investigation Report will be set by separate entry.

SO ORDERED on June 21, 2018.

 s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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