J-A07034-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

LAVELLE MILLS 

 Appellant No. 1675 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 11, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0009837-2011 

BEFORE: BOWES, J., MUNDY, J., and JENKINS, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED APRIL 19, 2016

Appellant appeals from his judgment of sentence following his bench 

trial convictions for possession of firearm with altered manufacturer’s 

number, persons not to possess firearms, firearms not to be carried without 

a license, registration card to be signed and exhibited on demand, 

unauthorized transfer or use of registration, driving while operating privilege 

is suspended or revoked, required financial responsibility, and duties at stop 

signs and/or yield signs.1 Appellant claims the trial court erred in denying

his motion to suppress evidence found during a search of the vehicle he was 

driving and claims the Commonwealth did not present sufficient evidence 

that he possessed the firearm. We affirm. 

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1

 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6110.2(a), 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1); 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1131(b), 

1311(b), 1543(a), 1786(f), and 3323, respectfully. 
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The trial court summarized the factual background as follows: 

This [m]atter arises out [of Appellant’s] arrest on May 18, 

2011[,] following a traffic stop on the North Side of 

Pittsburgh during which a firearm was found in the vehicle 

[Appellant] was operating. [Appellant] filed a [m]otion to 

[s]uppress the firearm on the basis that the police lacked 

probable cause to search the vehicle; there was no consent 

to search the vehicle; and[] the search was not conducted 

pursuant to [a] valid inventory search. 

At the suppression hearing held on July 10, 2013[,] the 

Commonwealth presented the testimony of Allegheny 

County Deputy Sheriff Sean Green[,] who testified that he 

initiated a traffic stop of [Appellant’s] vehicle after it failed 

to stop at a stop sign. ([N.T., 7/10/2013, at] 4 (hereinafter 

“S.H. Transcript”)). After stopping the vehicle, [Appellant] 

jumped out of his vehicle and started moving toward a 

group of people standing on a nearby corner. ([Id. at] 5). 

Sheriff Green ordered [Appellant] back into the vehicle and 

requested his driver’s license and vehicle information. 

Sheriff Green called for backup and City of Pittsburgh 

officers and detectives responded and assisted him. 

[Appellant] produced a non-driver’s identification card and 

it was determined that [Appellant’s] driver’s license was 

suspended and he had several non-traffic and traffic 

magistrate warrants. ([Id. at] 5-7). Although [Appellant] 

was driving a 2004 GMC Yukon, [Appellant] produced an 

insurance card for a 2001 Jeep and it was determined that 

the vehicle was, in fact, registered to an individual from 

Beaver County. ([Id. at] 6). The license plate on the 

vehicle did not match the registration. After it was 

determined that [Appellant] did not have a driver’s license 

and the plate displayed on the vehicle was for the wrong 

vehicle, the decision was made to have the vehicle towed 

because it could not be legally operated or moved. ([Id.

at] 7) Deputy Green also described the area where the 

stop occurred as a high crime area. ([Id. at] 8). Deputy 

Green testified that once it was determined that the 

vehicle had to be towed, an inventory search would be 

done that involved searching for any loose items or

moveable items in the vehicle. ([Id. at] 8). Deputy Green 

testified: 
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Q. What are the procedures in regard to inventories? 

A. Well we are supposed to search [the] vehicle for

any weapons, contraband before it is taken to 

Manchester. 

Q. What is included within that search? 

A. The entire vehicle. We have to -- anything, any 

loose articles, any bags, anything in the vehicle that 

[is] moveable or appears to be moveable is 

searched. 

Q. How about any consoles, any storage places? 

A. Yes, the glove compartment, console area, 

definitely the console area, that would be loose or

not properly affixed. 

([Id. at] 7-8). Deputy Green testified on cross[-

]examination that he prepared a “sheriff’s office tow form,” 

although he did not have a copy of the form. ([Id. at] 

17). He also acknowledged that he did not conduct the 

search of the vehicle but it was done by the City of 

Pittsburgh officers. 

Detective John Henderson from the City of Pittsburgh 

Police testified that he arrived as backup on the stop and 

that Officer Holt obtained consent to search the vehicle. 

([S.H. Transcript at] 21 -22). Upon opening the passenger 

side door he saw a live .45 caliber round on the floor of the 

front seat. ([Id. at] 22). A loaded .45 caliber semiautomatic firearm was found in a void in a molded piece in 

the center console. ([Id. at] 22). 

Officer Nicholas Holt testified that he arrived as backup 

and obtained consent to search the vehicle and during the 

search found the firearm as described. ([S.H. Transcript 

at] 27). He testified that [Appellant] never retracted his 

consent to search the vehicle and that the search he 

conducted was pursuant to the consent that was given. 

([Id. at] 29). 

[Appellant] presented the testimony of his sister, Kim 

Washington, who testified that she lived in the 

neighborhood where the stop occurred and after she 

learned that there were police stopping a vehicle nearby, 
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she went to the scene. ([S.H. Hearing at] 34). When she 

arrived [Appellant] was in the vehicle and then he was told 

to get out of the vehicle. When he was asked if they could 

search the vehicle, he repeatedly told them no, however 

they proceeded with the search. (Id.) 

[Appellant] argued that the officers did not have consent 

to search the vehicle and that there was no basis for an 

inventory search. After consideration of all of the 

evidence[,] an order was entered denying the motion to 

suppress on the basis that a valid inventory search was 

warranted. 

At the non-jury trial the testimony from the suppression 

hearing was incorporated into the record and Detective 

John Henson also testified that the firearm’s serial 

numbers were scratched out. ([N.T., 6/24/2014, at] 13 

(hereinafter “Tr. Transcript”)). The Commonwealth also 

offered the certification that [Appellant] did not have a 

license to possess the firearm and the lab report regarding 

the firearm. ([Id. at] 21). 

[Appellant] testified that he worked with his brother doing 

repair work on vehicles and that he was driving the vehicle 

at the time of the traffic stop because he was changing the 

oil and had only taken the vehicle from the shop to get 

something to eat for him and his brother. ([Tr.Transript at] 

25). He testified that the vehicle was owned by “a guy, 

Brian -- it was his girlfriend’s car or something like that.” 

([Id. at] 26). He testified that he tried to buy the vehicle 

but it didn’t work out and that he had possession of the 

vehicle for “[a]bout a week and a half, 2 weeks.” ([Id. at] 

27). He testified that he had never worked on the interior 

of the vehicle and did not know the firearm was in the 

vehicle. ([Id. at] 30). On cross-examination [Appellant] 

testified that he had tried to purchase the vehicle but did 

not have enough money. Furthermore, when he went to 

use the vehicle that day, someone else had placed the 

license plate from the other vehicle that he had owned, 

which was just lying around, on the vehicle when he went 

for the food. ([Id. at] 37-38). [Appellant] also 

acknowledged that he did not have a driver’s license and 

there was no insurance on the vehicle. ([Id. at] 49-50). 

Finally, he testified that the owner of the vehicle had taken 

the license plate off the vehicle, presumably so no one 
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could take it off the lot while it was being repaired. ([Id.

at] 44). After consideration of the evidence[, Appellant] 

was found guilty of all charges. 

Opinion, 7/14/2015, at 2-5. 

On September 11, 2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 35 to 

70 months’ imprisonment for the possession of firearm with altered 

manufacturer’s number conviction, 5 years’ probation for the persons not to 

possess firearms conviction, and 5 years’ probation for the firearms not to 

be carried without a license conviction. The terms of probation were 

concurrent to each other, but consecutive to the term of imprisonment. The 

trial court imposed no further penalty for the remaining convictions. 

On October 10, 2014, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Both 

Appellant and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 1925.2

Appellant raises the following issues on appeal: 

I. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant’s]

suppression motion because the police did not have lawful 

custody of the SUV, and, therefore, the inventory search 

was invalid? 

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2

 On October 15, 2014, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a statement 

of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b) within 21 days 

of the entry of the order. On November 5, 2014, Appellant requested an 

extension, and, on November 6, 2014, the trial court granted Appellant a 

sixty-day extension of time to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. On January 5, 

2015, Appellant filed a petition for an extension of time to file his Rule 

1925(b) statement and, on January 6, 2015, the trial court granted 

Appellant a 30-day extension of time. Appellant filed his concise statement 

of errors complained of on appeal on February 5, 2015. The trial court 

issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion on July 14, 2015. 
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II. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] 

suppression motion because police conducted the search 

for criminal investigatory purposes rather than noncriminal inventory purposes? 

III. Was the evidence insufficient to establish that 

[Appellant] constructively possessed the gun found in a 

closed console of a vehicle that was not his? 

Appellant’s Brief at 5. 

Appellant’s first two issues challenge the denial of his suppression 

motion. When reviewing a denial of a suppression motion, we limit our 

review to determining whether the record supports the factual findings and 

whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1104 (Pa.Super.2013). We may 

only consider evidence presented at the suppression hearing. In re L.J., 79 

A.3d 1073, 1085-87 (Pa.2013). In addition, because the Commonwealth 

prevailed in the suppression court, we consider only the Commonwealth’s 

evidence and so much of the defense evidence “as remains uncontradicted 

when read in the context of the record as a whole.” Brown, 64 A.3d at 

1104 (quoting Commonwealth v. Cauley, 10 A.3d 321, 325 

(Pa.Super.2010)). We may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn from 

the facts are in error. Id. 

The Commonwealth contends Appellant cannot prevail on the 

suppression motion because he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in 

the vehicle. Appellee Brief at 26-28.

“[G]enerally under Pennsylvania law, a defendant charged with a 

possessory offense has automatic standing to challenge a search.” 
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Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 14 A.3d 907, 910 (Pa.Super.2011) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 428, 435 (Pa.Super.2009) 

(en banc)). To prevail on a motion to suppress evidence, however, the 

appellant must establish he has a privacy interest in the area searched.3 

Id.; Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 113 (Pa.Super.2005) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Perea, 791 A.2d 427, 429 (Pa.Super.2002)). This 

Court has stated: 

An expectation of privacy is present when the individual, 

by his conduct, exhibits an actual (subjective) expectation 

of privacy and that the subjective expectation is one that 

society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The 

constitutional legitimacy of an expectation of privacy is not 

dependent on the subjective intent of the individual 

asserting the right but on whether the expectation is 

reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances. 

Jones, 874 A.2d at 113 (quoting Commonwealth v. Brundidge, 620 A.2d 

1115, 1118 (Pa.1993)). 

 On the issue of whether the defendant has a reasonable expectation of 

privacy in the area searched, the Commonwealth bears the initial burden of 

production. Enimpah, 106 A.3d at 701. If the Commonwealth meets its 

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3

 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has explained: “[Although] a 

defendant’s standing dictates when a claim under Article I, § 8 may be 

brought, his privacy interest controls whether the claim will succeed—once a 

defendant has shown standing, ‘[h]e must, in short, having brought his 

claim, demonstrate its merits by a showing of his reasonable and legitimate 

expectation of privacy in the premises.’” Commonwealth v. Enimpah, 106 

A.3d 695, 699 (Pa.2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Peterson, 636 A.2d 

615, 618 (Pa.1993)). 
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burden by showing the defendant lacked a privacy interest, then the 

defendant has the burden of persuasion to establish he had a privacy 

interest in the area searched. Id. 

In Jones, this Court found the appellant did not have a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in a rental vehicle where the return date had expired, 

the appellant was not the named lessee, the named lessee was not in the 

vehicle, the appellant was not authorized to drive the vehicle, and the 

appellant and his passengers did not attempt to explain their connection to 

the authorized lessee. 874 A.2d at 120. This Court held that, because the 

appellant did not have an expectation of privacy in the vehicle searched, the 

trial court properly denied the motion to suppress.

 In Commonwealth v. Brown, this Court found an appellant did not 

have an expectation of privacy in the vehicle searched and, therefore, could 

not prevail on his suppression motion, where he did not own the vehicle, and 

did not introduce evidence he had authority to use the vehicle. 64 A.3d 

1101, 1107 (Pa.Super.2013). Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Cruz, the 

Court found the appellant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in a 

vehicle where he presented no evidence that he owned the vehicle, that it 

was registered in his name, or that the registered owner gave him 

permission to drive the vehicle. 21 A.3d 1247, 1251 (Pa.Super.2011). 

Appellant did not own the car he was driving, which was registered to 

someone who resided in a different county. He provided an insurance card 

to the officer, but the card was for another vehicle. Further, at the 
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suppression hearing, Officer Green testified Appellant told him that he was 

working on the car. S.H. Transcript at 14.4 Placing a car with a repair shop 

does not authorize a repair shop owner or employee to use the car, and the 

owner or employee of the shop does not have an expectation of privacy in 

the car. The Commonwealth’s evidence showed Appellant lacked a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle, and Appellant presented no 

evidence at the suppression hearing to establish he had such an expectation. 

Accordingly, because Appellant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in 

the car, he cannot establish the search of the car violated his constitutional 

rights.5 The trial court did not err in denying the suppression motion.6

Appellant’s last issue claims the Commonwealth presented insufficient 

evidence that he possessed the firearm found in the vehicle. Appellant’s 

Brief at 36-44. 

We apply the following standard when reviewing a sufficiency of the 

evidence claim: “[W]hether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the 

light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to 

____________________________________________ 

4

 At trial, Appellant explained that he worked with his brother repairing cars. 

Tr. Transcript at 25. 

5

 Because we find Appellant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in 

the vehicle searched, and, therefore, cannot prevail on his suppression 

motion, we need not address his claims challenging the search. 

6

 This Court can affirm the trial court decision on any basis. In re Jacobs, 

15 A.3d 509, 509 n.1 (Pa.Super.2011) (“We are not bound by the rationale 

of the trial court, and may affirm on any basis.”).
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enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Lehman, 820 A.2d 766, 772 

(Pa.Super.2003), affirmed, 870 A.2d 818 (Pa.2005) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 782 A.2d 574 (Pa.Super.2001)). When we 

apply this standard, “we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our 

judgment for the fact-finder.” Id. 

“[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth 

need not preclude every possibility of innocence.” Lehman, 820 A.2d at 

772. Moreover, “[a]ny doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved 

by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a 

matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances.” Id. “The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving 

every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly 

circumstantial evidence.” Id. 

In applying the above test, we must evaluate the entire record and we 

must consider all evidence actually received. DiStefano, 782 A.2d at 582. 

Further, “the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of 

the evidence.” Id. 

Appellant maintains the Commonwealth failed to establish he 

possessed the firearm. Appellant’s Brief at 36-44. Because the firearm was 

not found on Appellant’s person, the Commonwealth had to establish that 

Appellant constructively possessed the firearm. Commonwealth v. Brown, 
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48 A.3d 426, 430 (Pa.Super.2012). This Court has described constructive 

possession as follows: 

Constructive possession is a legal fiction, a pragmatic 

construct to deal with the realities of criminal law 

enforcement. Constructive possession is an inference 

arising from a set of facts that possession of the 

contraband was more likely than not. We have defined 

constructive possession as “conscious dominion.” We

subsequently defined “conscious dominion” as “the power 

to control the contraband and the intent to exercise that 

control.” To aid application, we have held that 

constructive possession may be established by the totality 

of the circumstances. 

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Parker, 847 A.2d 745, 750 

(Pa.Super.2004)). 

 The Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to allow the factfinder to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant constructively 

possessed the gun, i.e., that he had the power to control the firearm and the 

intent to exercise that control. Appellant was driving the vehicle in which 

the firearm was found and attempted to distance himself from the vehicle 

when pulled over, Appellant had attempted to purchase the vehicle, the 

license plate on the car belonged to a car previously owned by Appellant, 

and the police found a bullet on the passenger-side floor, which the driver of 

the vehicle would have seen.7 See Cruz, 21 A.3d at 1253 (sufficient 

____________________________________________ 

7

 Appellant argues Officer Henson testified that the bullet was “where the 

two bolts go down to secure the [passenger] seat to the floor.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 38 (citing S.H. Transcript at 25) (alteration in original). The officer, 

however, also testified, both at the suppression hearing and at trial, that he 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
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evidence to find appellant constructively possessed the firearm where 

appellant was only person in the vehicle, he was seen moving toward where 

gun was found as soon as he was aware that he was being stopped, and he 

exhibited a marked consciousness of guilt); Jones, 874 A.2d at 122 (finding 

of constructive possession upheld where police found cocaine in the cabin of 

car, in plain view, while outside of the rental car, Appellant was “constantly 

staring” in the direction of the passenger seat from which the cocaine was 

discovered, and Appellant had $481.00 in small denominations, which is 

common for someone involved in a drug distribution scheme); 

Commonwealth v. Cruz Ortega, 539 A.2d 849, 851, 851 n.1 

(Pa.Super.1988) (appellant, a passenger in a rented vehicle, constructively 

possessed cocaine where cocaine was found under the seat in which 

appellant was sitting, before police stopped the vehicle appellant was 

observed leaning over in his seat, and there was a money order appellant 

purchased in glove compartment). 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

saw the bullet as soon as he opened the door. S.H. Transcript at 25; Tr. 

Transcript at 20. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 4/19/2016