UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

GEORGE NOVAK, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:15 CV 48

)

VICKY THRASHER, et al., )

)

Defendants. ) 

OPINION and ORDER

This matter is before the court on a motion to dismiss filed by defendants, Vicky

Thrasher and her employer, the City of Valparaiso, Indiana. (DE # 24.) Plaintiff filed a

response to the motion (DE # 29), defendants have filed a reply (DE # 30), and the

motion is now ripe for ruling. For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss is

denied and the court, sua sponte, moves to dismiss the amended complaint. 

 I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff has filed an amended complaint alleging violations of his due process

rights arising out of municipal ordinance violation proceedings (“the State Court

Lawsuit”) in the Porter County Superior Court. (DE # 21.) Defendant Vicky Thrasher is

a building commissioner employed by her co-defendant, the City of Valparaiso,

Indiana. (DE # 21-3 at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that defendants wrongfully initiated

ordinance enforcement proceedings against him and obtained a money judgment in the

amount of $26,500. (DE # 21 at 7-8.) This judgment was allegedly unlawful in that it

greatly exceeds the statutory caps for ordinance violations under Indiana Law. (Id. at 4.)

Plaintiff alleges that defendants evaded the statutory limits by intentionally mis-coding
the state court action as an “MI” (miscellaneous) case rather than an “OV” (ordinance

violation) case. (Id.)

Moreover, plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his due process rights by

failing to comply with the procedural notice requirements before filing the State Court

Lawsuit and obtaining a default judgment against the plaintiff. (Id. at 6.) Lastly, he

alleges a violation in that defendants sought a “Sheriff’s sale” of his property in order

“to liquidate the unlawful money judgment in the State Court Lawsuit.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff’s complaint seeks compensatory and punitive damages against

defendants as well as injunctive relief preventing any further efforts to seize plaintiff’s

property and enforce plaintiff’s contempt fines. (Id. at 13-14.)

II. DISCUSSION

Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on the basis

that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (DE # 24.) However, before

addressing the merits of the motion to dismiss, the court must resolve a more

fundamental matter of subject-matter jurisdiction.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “precludes lower federal court jurisdiction over

claims seeking review of state court judgments . . . [because] no matter how erroneous

or unconstitutional the state court judgment may be, the Supreme Court of the United

States is the only federal court that could have jurisdiction to review a state court

judgment.” Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 990, 996 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)). “In its most straight-forward presentment, the Rooker2
Feldman doctrine bars federal jurisdiction when the federal plaintiff alleges that her

injury was caused by a state court judgment.” Id. Thus, the doctrine is triggered when,

“after state proceedings have ended, a losing party in state court files suit in federal

court complaining of a state court judgment and seeking review and rejection of that

judgment.” Holt v. Lake Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs., 408 F.3d 335, 336 (7th Cir. 2005). 

A separate jurisdictional doctrine applies to federal suits involving pending state

court actions. The Younger doctrine of abstention “generally requires federal courts to

abstain from taking jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims that involve or call

into question ongoing state proceedings.” FreeEats.com, Inc. v. Indiana, 502 F.3d 590, 595

(7th Cir. 2007). This doctrine was originally limited to criminal prosecutions but has

since been expanded to cover “various civil proceedings in state court implicating

important state interests.” Id. at 595 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under Younger, “federal district courts must abstain from enjoining or otherwise

interfering in ongoing state court proceedings that are (1) judicial in nature, (2) involve

important state interests, and (3) provide an adequate opportunity to raise federal

claims, as long as (4) no exceptional circumstances exist that would make abstention

inappropriate.” Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Martinez, 505 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2007). 

As plaintiff states in his response to the motion to dismiss, this lawsuit “seeks to

redress the defendants’ unlawful use of state court jurisdiction to obtain ‘contempt

fines’ against Novak contrary to the standards of due process as set by state law.” (DE

# 29 at 1.) Thus, the “injury” in this case stems from the default order and contempt

fines in the State Court Lawsuit and his claims directly implicate those judgments.

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Furthermore, the amended complaint seeks injunctive relief “including the entry of a

preliminary injunction against any and all efforts to enforce the unlawful contempt

fines entered in the State Court Lawsuit.” (DE # 21 at 14.) Thus, to the extent that the

State Court Lawsuit is still pending, plaintiff’s claims seek federal court interference

with those proceedings. 

Neither party addressed the issue of jurisdiction in the briefing related to the

motion to dismiss. Based upon the amended complaint and the response to the motion

to dismiss, it is unclear to what extent the State Court Lawsuit is still pending in the

Porter Superior Court. For their part, defendants indicate that the underlying State

Court Lawsuit is still pending. (DE # 25 at 1.) In either scenario, one of the

aforementioned doctrines would appear to deprive the court of jurisdiction over

plaintiff’s claims. See, Yoder v. City of Logansport, Indiana, 286 F. App’x 322, 324 (7th Cir.

2008) (upholding dismissal under Rooker-Feldman where plaintiff’s claims attacked state

court order in zoning ordinance violation case); Am. Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Parkman, 702

F. Supp. 168, 171 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (finding lack of jurisdiction under Younger abstention

doctrine where plaintiff’s federal claims sought to enjoin enforcement of municipal

zoning ordinance). 

The court can move to dismiss a compliant sua sponte “if [it has] given the

affected parties advance notice of their intent to do so and a fair opportunity to respond

with argument and evidence.” Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 903 (7th Cir. 2012). The court

now moves to dismiss the amended complaint and the parties will be afforded an

opportunity to respond. 

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss (DE # 24) is DENIED.

The court, sua sponte, MOVES TO DISMISS the amended complaint for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction. The parties are hereby GRANTED thirty days from the date of this

order to file any argument or evidence that they believe to be relevant to the court’s

analysis of subject-matter jurisdiction. 

SO ORDERED.

Date: September 18, 2017

 s/ James T. Moody 

JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

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