UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

BRANDON T. SHEETS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:14-CV-260 JM 

)

CHANTEL SPOHR, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION and ORDER

Brandon T. Sheets, a pro se prisoner, filed an amended complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. (DE # 21.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a

complaint filed by a prisoner and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails

to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune

from such relief. Courts apply the same standard under Section 1915A as when

deciding a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v.

Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006).

To survive dismissal, the complaint must state a claim for relief that is plausible

on its face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). “A

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. at 603. In other words, “a plaintiff must do better than putting a few words

on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has

happened to her that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d
400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, a pro se complaint “must be

held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

Here, Sheets alleges Nurse Chantel Spohr and Dr. Paul Blusys denied him proper

medical care by refusing to give him his prescribed pain medication, Ultram, while he

was an inmate at the Noble County Jail. On July 26, 2014, Nurse Spohr told Sheets that

the FDA was soon making his prescribed medication, Ultram, a controlled substance 1

and it would no longer be available to him. She told Sheets that he could take Tylenol

or ibuprofen instead, which Sheets refused. Sheets asked to speak with Dr. Paul Blusys.

Nurse Spohr told him that she would put him on a list to be seen; however, Sheets was

never seen by Dr. Blusys. Sheets alleges that Nurse Spohr had lied to him about Ultram

becoming unavailable to inmates. Instead, Nurse Spohr simply refused to give him his

prescribed medication. Further, Nurse Spohr notified other prisons that Sheets should

not be given Ultram because he abuses the medication. Sheets asserts that Nurse Spohr

is lying and that he has never abused any prescription medication.

Inmates are entitled to adequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment.2

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To establish liability the prisoner must show: (1)

he or she had an objectively serious medical need; and (2) the defendant acted with

Presumably, Sheets is referring to the Food andl Drug Administration.

1

 Because Sheets was a pretrial detainee at the time of these events, the Fourteenth rather than the 2

Eighth Amendment applies. Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 473 (7th Cir. 2009). The governing standards

are functionally equivalent, however, and “anything that would violate the Eighth Amendment would

also violate the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. 

2
deliberate indifference to that need. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). A

medical need is “serious” if it is one that “a physician has diagnosed as mandating

treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would perceive the need for a

doctor’s attention.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). Deliberate

indifference is “something approaching a total unconcern for a prisoner’s welfare in the

face of serious risks,” or a “conscious, culpable refusal” to prevent harm. Duane v. Lane,

959 F.2d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 1992). As the Seventh Circuit has explained: “[T]he defendant

must have known that the plaintiff was at serious risk of being harmed and decided not

to do anything to prevent that harm from occurring even though he could have easily

done so.” Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted).

For a medical professional to be held liable for deliberate indifference, he or she

must make a decision that represents “such a substantial departure from accepted

professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person

responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541

F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008). Furthermore, a delay in providing treatment can constitute

deliberate indifference when it causes unnecessary pain or suffering. Arnett v. Webster,

658 F.3d 742, 752-53 (7th Cir. 2011); Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 779 (7th Cir.

2008).

Giving Sheets the inferences to which he is entitled at this stage, he has alleged

that he had a serious medical need that required him to take Ultram while he was

housed at the jail. He also alleges facts indicating that Nurse Spohr was personally

3
aware of his medical condition, but discontinued his pain medication without any

justification, causing him pain and suffering. Sheets has alleged enough to proceed past

the pleading stage against this defendant. Further factual development may show that

the denial of Ultram was reasonable, but accepting his allegations as true, he has alleged

enough to proceed on a claim against Nurse Spohr.

Sheets’ claim against Dr. Blusys is another matter. While he names Dr. Blusys as

a defendant, he does not provide any basis for inferring that Dr. Blusys was personally

aware of the denial of Sheets’ prescription medication or otherwise personally involved

in the violation of his rights. Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009) (under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 government actors can be held liable only for their “own misdeeds . . .

not for anyone else’s.”). In fact, Sheets admits he never spoke with or met with Dr.

Blusys regarding the denial of his prescription medication. As such, Sheets has not

stated a claim against Dr. Blusys.

For these reasons, the court:

(1) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed against Nurse Spohr in her individual

capacity for monetary damages for denying him adequate medical care in violation of

the Eighth Amendment;

(2) DISMISSES Dr. Paul Blusys;

(3) DISMISSES any and all other claims contained in the amended complaint;

4
(4) DIRECTS the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service of process on Nurse

Spohr pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d);

(5) ORDERS Nurse Spohr to respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1, only to the claim for which the pro se plaintiff

has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order.

SO ORDERED.

Date: July 1, 2015

s/ James T. Moody

JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5