UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

Jeffery Jackson, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

v. Civil Action No. 2:13-CV-198 JVB 

 

 

David E. Lain, Individually and in his 

Official Capacity as Sheriff of the Porter County 

Sheriff’s Department; and Captain Thomas 

Henderson, 

 

 Defendants. 

 

 OPINION & ORDER 

Plaintiff, Jeffery Jackson, filed this § 1983 lawsuit in Indiana state court after he was 

fired from his position as an Animal Control Officer with the Porter County Sheriff’s 

Department. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, Sheriff David Lain and Captain Thomas 

Henderson, violated his First Amendment right to free speech by retaliating against him after he 

reported illegal activities that he witnessed while an employee of the Porter County Animal 

Shelter. Plaintiff maintains that he was treated poorly, denied overtime, and eventually 

discharged because he was a whistleblower. Plaintiff also raises an equal protection claim 

stemming from Defendants’ treatment of him during his employment. Plaintiff initially alleged 

state law claims, but has since abandoned them. Defendants removed this case to federal court 

and have moved for summary judgment on all claims. Defendants contend that Plaintiff has 

provided insufficient evidence to outline a prima facie case of retaliation or a violation of his 

right to equal protection. 
2 

A. Background 

The Porter County Commissioners hired Plaintiff as an Animal Control Officer in 

November 2009. (DE 34-2, Pl.’s Dep. 10:13–16, 17:3–5.) In early 2011, Plaintiff encountered 

“illegal activities” at work and documented these activities. (Id. at 22:2–20.) Plaintiff observed 

that Porter County Jail inmates, brought in to assist the Animal Control staff, were not well 

supervised. Plaintiff noticed that unsupervised inmates received visitors while working at Animal 

Control, which gave them access to drugs that were later smuggled into the jail. (Id. at 14:1–20.) 

Additionally, after returning from a 9-1-1 call late one evening, Plaintiff observed three 

employees stealing money that was donated by local citizens to aid Porter County Animal 

Control operations. (Id. at 21:21–25.) 

After witnessing these activities for a few months, Plaintiff spoke to Sheriff Lain, the 

Porter County Sheriff, to relay his concerns. (Id. at 17:11–16.) Sheriff Lain assured Plaintiff that 

he would improve the supervision of the inmates and directed Plaintiff to alert his employer, the 

Porter County Commissioners, of these issues. (Id. at 17:11–22.) Plaintiff followed Sheriff 

Lain’s advice and relayed his concerns to the Porter County Commissioners. (Id. at 18:1–9.) In 

response, the Porter County Commissioners called a meeting of the entire animal control staff 

and investigated Plaintiff’s claims. (Id.) 

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Porter County Commissioners relinquished 

oversight of animal control to the Porter County Sheriff’s Department. (DE 34, Pl.’s Resp. at 2.) 

As a result of this transfer of authority, every animal control staff member was released from 

their employment on April 11, 2011, and required to reapply for their positions through the 

Porter County Sheriff’s Department. (DE 34-2, Pl.’s Dep. 28:17–24.) Only Plaintiff and two 
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other individuals retained their job with animal control after this transfer took place. (Id. at 

28:11–16.) After being hired by the Porter County Sheriff’s Department, Plaintiff no longer 

observed any illegal activity at his workplace. (Id. at 28:1–10.) Moreover, due to his experience, 

Plaintiff assisted in the training of new animal control officers hired by the Porter County 

Sheriff’s Department. (Id. at 31:4–9.) 

However, Plaintiff and his new supervisor, Captain Thomas Henderson, did clash on a 

few occasions. Plaintiff alleges that when he began working at the Porter County Sheriff’s 

Department, Captain Henderson warned him not to “go[] over his head” to Sheriff Lain and that 

he would be fired if he did. (Id. at 32:6–20, 36:3–9.) Plaintiff also claims that Captain Henderson 

improperly denied his overtime pay requests, but still approved overtime compensation for other 

animal control workers. (Id. at 37:14–25, 38:1–17.) The most significant dispute occurred after 

Plaintiff failed to attend a pepper spray certification class that Captain Henderson had ordered 

him to attend. (Id. at 44:2–25.) Plaintiff was present when Captain Henderson gave a verbal 

order to attend the class, but believed it was only directed at his two co-workers. (Id. at 42:1–11.) 

Plaintiff did not believe that Captain Henderson’s order applied to him because he had 

previously attended the same class. (Id. at 41:17–23.) As a result of his absence, Sheriff Lain 

issued a written reprimand to Plaintiff for failing to follow a direct order of a supervisor. (DE 33-

11, Ltr. at 1.)

Following his disputes with Henderson, Plaintiff experienced two further setbacks at 

work. First, Plaintiff was injured while attempting to capture two large dogs and load them into 

his Animal Control vehicle. (DE 34-2, Pl.’s Dep. 46:15–25, 47:1–24.) After this injury, Plaintiff 

never returned to work at the Porter County Sheriff’s Department because his doctor would not 

clear him to perform the physical duties of an animal control officer. (Id. at 54:5–9.) Second, 
4 

three months after Plaintiff’s injury, Captain Henderson prepared an evaluation memorandum for 

Sheriff Lain assessing Plaintiff’s job performance. (DE 33-12, Mem. at 1–2.) Henderson 

described Plaintiff’s job performance as average, but noted that his report-writing was substandard, he managed his time inefficiently, improperly submitted overtime compensation 

requests, and “struggled to perform his assigned duties.” (Id.) 

On October 24, 2012, almost a year after Plaintiff’s injury, Sheriff Lain informed him 

that he was “terminated from the Porter County Sheriff’s Animal Control.” (DE 33-13, Ltr. at 1.) 

Sheriff Lain outlined three reasons for Plaintiff’s termination. First, Plaintiff’s doctor-imposed 

work limitations prevented him from performing the duties of an animal control officer and no 

light-duty positions were available. (Id.) Second, in keeping with the Porter County Policy 

Manual, the Porter County Sheriff’s Department filled Plaintiff’s vacant position because he had 

not returned to work within six months. (Id.) Third, Plaintiff’s “job performance was substandard 

and unacceptable and serves as an additional basis [to] warrant termination.” (Id.) The 

performance issues listed were: (1) failure to attend training as directed by a supervisor; (2) 

numerous instances of “below standard performance;” (3) inefficient time management; (4) need 

for additional supervision; and (5) failure to adhere to Porter County Sheriff’s Department’s 

overtime request procedures. (Id. at 1–2.) 

Plaintiff contends that he was fired for his whistleblowing activity, even though it 

occurred while he was employed and supervised by the Porter County Commissioners. (DE 34-2, 

Pl.’s Dep. 61:13–25, 62:1–25.) In support of this claim, Plaintiff points to Henderson’s warning 

about whistleblowing and also alleges coworkers and supervisors asked him on multiple 

occasions if he was taping their conversations. (Id.) 
5 

B. Summary Judgment Standard 

A motion for summary judgment must be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers 

to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Rule 56(c) further requires the entry of summary judgment, 

after adequate time for discovery, against a party “who fails to make a showing sufficient to 

establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will 

bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing a court of 

the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes 

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the 

moving party supports its motion for summary judgment with affidavits or other materials, it

thereby shifts to the non-moving party the burden of showing that an issue of material fact exists. 

Keri v. Bd. of Trust. of Purdue Univ., 458 F.3d 620, 628 (7th Cir. 2006).

Rule 56(e) specifies that once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is 

made, “the adverse party’s response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 

forth specific facts to establish that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

In viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe 

all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all legitimate inferences and 

resolve all doubts in favor of that party. Keri, 458 F.3d at 628. A court’s role is not to evaluate 

the weight of the evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, or to determine the truth of the 
6 

matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986).

C. Analysis 

Defendants have moved for summary judgment on both of Plaintiff’s claims. They assert 

that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation because his speech regarding 

illegal activities at the Porter County Animal Control was not a motivating factor in his dismissal 

from employment. Defendants also contend that Plaintiff cannot maintain an equal protection 

claim, under either the traditional or class-of-one theory, because he has provided insufficient 

evidence of a prima facie case. For the reasons outlined below, Defendants are correct on both 

counts. 

1. First Amendment Retaliation Claim

To succeed in a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) 

his speech was constitutionally protected; (2) he has suffered a deprivation likely to deter free 

speech; and (3) his speech was at least a motivating factor in the employer’s actions.” Kidwell v. 

Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 964 (7th Cir. 2012). At summary judgment, the burden of proof for 

these elements is split between the parties. Id. at 965. For the third element, the plaintiff must 

provide evidence that his speech was a motivating factor, or a “sufficient condition,” for the 

employer’s retaliatory conduct. Greene v. Doruff, 660 F.3d 975, 979–980 (7th Cir. 2011). If the 

defendant is unable to adequately rebut the causal relationship presented by plaintiff, this 

condition is satisfied. Kidwell, 679 F.3d at 965. 
7 

A litigant demonstrates that speech was a motivating factor for the alleged retaliation 

through either direct or circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence proves a particular fact in 

question without reliance upon inference or presumption. Rudin v. Lincoln Land Cmty. Coll., 420 

F.3d 712, 720 (7th Cir. 2005). In retaliation cases, it is often difficult for a litigant to present 

direct evidence, because “[d]irect evidence typically consists of an admission by the 

decisionmaker that he acted with retaliatory intent.” Long v. Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of Ill., 585 F.3d 

344, 350 (7th Cir. 2009). 

Circumstantial evidence, which is often much easier to obtain, enables a trier of fact to 

infer that retaliation occurred. Rudin, 420 F.3d at 720–21. “Circumstantial evidence may include 

suspicious timing, ambiguous oral or written statements, or behavior towards or comments 

directed at other employees in the protected group.” Long, 585 F.3d at 350. Regardless of the 

type of evidence proffered, a plaintiff must demonstrate “that the protected activity and the 

adverse action are not wholly unrelated.” Sauzek v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 202 F.3d 913, 918 

(7th Cir. 2000). To demonstrate that the protected activity and adverse action are not wholly 

unrelated, plaintiffs must produce facts which somehow tie the adverse decision to the plaintiff’s 

protected actions. Stagman v. Ryan, 176 F.3d 986, 1001 (7th Cir. 1999); Bermudez v. TRC 

Holdings, Inc., 138 F.3d 1176, 1179 (7th Cir. 1998). One event preceding another does not show 

that the first event caused the second. Bermudez, 138 F.3d at 1179. Instead, “other circumstances 

must also be present which reasonably suggest that the two events are somehow related to one 

another.” Sauzek, 202 F.3d at 918. 

Without examining whether Plaintiff’s speech was protected, it is apparent that Plaintiff 

cannot associate his dismissal with his whistleblowing on the basis of suspicious timing. Plaintiff 

reported illegal activity to Sheriff Lain and then the Porter County Commissioners. His actions 
8 

assisted the Porter County Commissioners’ investigation of misconduct by animal control 

officers, which eventually led to corrective action being taken against other animal control 

employees. Following the investigation and subsequent transfer of animal control to the Porter 

County Sheriff’s Department, Plaintiff and every other animal control employee were forced to 

reapply for their positions. Plaintiff was one of three employees the Porter County Sheriff’s 

Department hired after the reorganization. Plaintiff concedes that the Porter County Sheriff’s 

Department was not obligated to rehire him as an animal control officer, but chose to despite 

knowing that he had previously reported misconduct in the workplace. 

Unable to make a temporal connection between his speech and termination, Plaintiff also 

fails to allege any other circumstances that could connect his whistleblowing to his dismissal. 

Plaintiff admits that his physical limitations brought about by his injury prevented him from 

performing the duties of an animal control officer. Plaintiff also concedes that he was not a good 

report writer, but argues that all officers struggled with writing reports. Lastly, Plaintiff admits 

that he failed to attend training, but dismisses this incident as a miscommunication between 

himself and Captain Henderson. All of these events, coupled with his subpar performance 

evaluation, provide a legitimate rationale for Defendants’ actions.

Plaintiff argues that Captain Henderson’s repeated questions regarding whether Plaintiff 

was recording their conversations is evidence of retaliation. This argument is unconvincing. 

Plaintiff asserts that Captain Henderson told him not to go over his head and would often ask 

him whether he was recording their conversation. What Plaintiff fails to do, which is fatal to his 

retaliation claim, is provide any connection between these comments and his discharge. While 

these comments are not indicative of a healthy supervisor-employee relationship, they do not 
9 

demonstrate that Plaintiff was fired in retaliation for speech he engaged in before he was hired by 

the Porter County Sheriff’s Department. 

While Plaintiff questions the reasons for discharge, “his questions are irrelevant without a 

prima facie case.” Foster v. Adams, 489 Fed. Appx. 959, 962 (7th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for retaliation fails. 

2. Equal Protection Claim

Plaintiff contends that he has both a traditional equal protection claim and a class-of-one 

equal protection claim. Plaintiff is incorrect. Plaintiff cannot proceed under a class-of-one theory 

because he has failed to distinguish his class-of-one claim from the one presented in Engquist v. 

Oregon Department of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591 (2008). In Enquist, the Supreme Court found 

that class-of-one claims are inappropriate for public employees. Id. The Court reasoned that the 

class-of-one claims are “‘simply a poor fit’ in the employment context, which necessarily 

‘involve[s] discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective, individualized 

assessments.’” Wade v. Collier, 783 F.3d 1081, 1089 n.5 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Engquist, 553 

U.S. at 603, 605 (2008). Plaintiff has not presented any evidence or argument that Defendants’ 

employment decision exceeds the reach of Enquist. See, e.g., Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491, 495 

(7th Cir. 2009) (discussing the limitations of Enquist within the Seventh Circuit.). Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s class-of-one claim fails, which leaves only a traditional equal protection claim for the 

Court to address.

Equal protection challenges arise most commonly in one of two instances. First, a claim 

often emerges if a distinction is drawn based on an individual’s membership in a suspect class. 

Srail v. Vill. of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Martin v. Shwano-Gresham Sch. 
10 

Dist., 295 F.3d 701, 712 (7th Cir. 2002)). Suspect classes include race, alienage, and national 

origin. Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 1000 (7th Cir. 2006). The second 

common equal protection claim arises when an individual is denied a fundamental right, such as 

the freedom to practice religion or the freedom of speech. Id. 

If no fundamental right or suspect classification is involved, equal protection claims are 

evaluated under the rational-basis standard of review. Discovery House, Inc. v. Consol. City of 

Indianapolis, 319 F.3d 277, 282 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Smith v. City of Chi., 457 F.3d 643, 

650–651 (7th Cir. 2006). To prevail under this standard of review, a plaintiff must prove the 

defendant: “(1) intentionally treated him differently from others similarly situated; (2) 

intentionally treated him differently because of his membership in the class to which he 

belonged; and (3) the difference in treatment was not rationally related to a legitimate state 

interest.” Smith, 457 F.3d at 650–651 (citing Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 

950–51 (7th Cir. 2002)). 

Here, Plaintiff asserts that he is a member of a suspect class because he is a 

whistleblower, thus heightening the Court’s standard of review. However, Plaintiff provides no 

support for the principle that whistleblowers enjoy the same protection as members of a suspect 

class that is based on race, gender, alienage, or national origin.1

 Likewise, Plaintiff does not 

assert that he has been denied a fundamental right. Consequently, the Court must evaluate 

Plaintiff’s claim using a rational basis standard of review. 

 

1

 Plaintiff points to O’Connor v. Chicago Transit Authority., 778 F. Supp. 967, 975 (N.D. Ill. 1991) in support of the 

principle that whistleblowers are a suspect class. This case does not stand for this principle. Instead, this case turns 

on whether the Plaintiff, who was a whistleblower, was treated differently than other similarly situated nonwhistleblowers. As the Seventh Circuit has found, “[w]histleblowers cannot, by imaginative pleadings, qualify as a 

class afforded [civil rights protections], for they do not possess any of the characteristics--i.e. race, national origin or 

gender--which are traditionally part and parcel of discrete and insular minorities.” Hicks v. Resolution Trust Corp., 

970 F.2d 378, 382 (7th Cir. 1992). 
11 

Under this standard, Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove any of the 

three required elements. First, Plaintiff only makes bare, unsupported assertions that other 

employees had their overtime requests approved, when his were denied. There is no evidence 

delineating what happened to other animal control officers’ overtime requests. Additionally, 

Plaintiff provides no benchmarks to describe how he is similarly situated to other employees, 

other than that they shared the same place of employment. Second, there is no evidence that 

Plaintiff was treated differently on the basis of his whistleblowing activities. Plaintiff was 

actually hired by the Porter County Sheriff’s Department after his whistleblowing activity, which 

undermines his claim. In fact, Plaintiff, due to his past experience, trained newly hired animal 

control employees. 

Moving to the third prong, Plaintiff has presented no evidence to overcome the rational 

basis the Porter County Sheriff’s Department had for denying his overtime compensation 

requests and firing him. Henderson testified that when he reviewed overtime compensation 

requests he would contrast the work performed and the time requested with the normal 

productivity of an animal control officer. After this analysis, Henderson would either approve, 

modify, or deny the request. Henderson maintained that if he determined the overtime hours 

worked exceeded the time actually necessary to accomplish a task he would modify the amount 

of overtime on the request and grant it. This sort of cost-conscious use of public funds is 

rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Likewise, the Porter County Sheriff’s Department 

had a rational basis for terminating Plaintiff from his position since, after a year of convalescing, 

he was still unable to work. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1983 equal protection claim fails. 
12 

D. Conclusion 

For the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 32) is 

GRANTED. Additionally, Defendants’ Rule 56 Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Supporting 

Affidavits (DE 36) is denied as moot. 

 SO ORDERED on July 20, 2015. 

 s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

 JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE