IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

RICHARD JENDRZEJCZYK, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CAUSE NO. 2:15-CV-300

vs. )

)

LAPORTE COUNTY, INDIANA, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint, filed by Porter

County, Indiana, and Terri Wood on December 14, 2016 (DE #57). For

the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED. The claims

against Porter County, Indiana, and Terri Wood are dismissed WITH

PREJUDICE. This case will proceed as to Defendants LaPorte County,

Indiana and Westville, Indiana.

BACKGROUND 

Richard Jendrzejczyk (“Jendrzejczyk”) initiated this action in

the Porter County Superior Court on October 31, 2014. The

complaint was later amended to add claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983. In response to the addition of federal claims, the action

was removed to this Court. Following removal, Jendrzejczyk sought

leave to amend his complaint again, indicating that the proposed
amended complaint provided “a substantially clearer statement of

his causes of action against the Defendants.” (DE #19 at 1). 

Leave to amend was granted, and the Amended Complaint (in reality

a second amended complaint) was filed on October 28, 2015. (DE

#21). The Defendants Porter County, Indiana (“Porter County”) and

Terri Wood (“Wood”) filed a motion to dismiss. The Amended

Complaint was dismissed without prejudice, and Jendrzejczyk was

granted until October 31, 2016, to file a Third Amended Complaint. 

The Third Amended Complaint was filed and Defendants Porter County

and Wood have now moved to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint. 

The Third Amended Complaint, although considerably longer than

previous complaints, asserts essentially the same legal claims. 

Jendrzejczyk alleges that Porter County, Indiana; LaPorte County,

Indiana; Westville, Indiana; and Wood are liable for “unreasonable

searches, unreasonable seizures, unreasonable uses of force,

assault, defamation, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment,

false arrest, negligence, illegal conspiracy, and illegal

conspiracy to violate the civil rights of Plaintiff, Richard

Jendrzejczyk.” (DE #47 at ¶ 1).

His claims stem from his arrest on November 8, 2012. 

According to the Third Amended Complaint, on that day:

[W]hile Plaintiff was making his normal

delivery for Dustcatchers, Inc., his employer,

to Ramsay’s West Point Lounge, a tavern in

Westville[,] Indiana, Defendant Wood, who was

heavily intoxicated, confronted him in a

violent and threatening manner within the

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sight and hearing of patrons of the tavern, of

the bartender, and of friends and associates

of the Plaintiff and accused Plaintiff of

being a criminal, of having an outstanding

warrant for his arrest, and cursed Plaintiff

with abusive names and with foul language.

(DE #47 at ¶ 12). Wood indicated she would “call her friends” on

the police department to arrest him. (DE #47 at ¶ 13). Shortly

thereafter, Westville Police Officer Steve Aimes arrested

Plaintiff, allegedly based on an outstanding warrant for failure to

appear. (DE #47 at ¶ 14). Jendrzejczyk was initially held at the

LaPorte County Jail but he was then transferred to the Porter

County Jail. (DE #47 at ¶ 15). He was held for six days without

a hearing and then released without explanation. (DE #47 at ¶ 16). 

Jendrzejczyk claims that he was denied medical care during his

six-day incarceration. (DE #47 at ¶ 17). More specifically, he

alleges that Defendants (as with the previous complaint, he does

not specify which defendants) refused to give him a necessary and

expensive medication ($2,000 per treatment) prescribed by his

doctor for arthritis and psoriasis. (DE #47 at ¶ 17). He claims

he missed his uncle’s funeral due to his unlawful incarceration. 

(DE #47 at ¶ 18). He also alleges that he was demoted and later

fired from his job with Dustcatchers, Inc., due to this incident.

(DE #47 at ¶ 19). 

Jendrzejczyk alleges that the Porter County Sheriff’s

Department, either intentionally or through gross negligence,

issued an invalid warrant for his arrest. (DE #27 at 20). He

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further alleges that the Prosecutor’s office and the courts knew he

was being held unlawfully and delayed notifying the jail that he

should be released. (DE #47 at ¶¶ 21-23). Jendrzejczyk alleges

that the Defendants (he does not specify which ones) knew or should

have known that their fellow officers had no probable cause to

stop, search, or arrest him or use any force, and failed to

intervene on his behalf. (DE #25 at ¶ 25). Additionally, he

alleges that the Defendants (again, he does not specify which ones)

had an opportunity to prevent harm but did not, and that they

attempted to cover up their illegal acts. (DE #47 at ¶¶ 26-27). He

claims that Porter County failed to supervise Defendant Wood and

all other Porter County employees, and that Defendant Wood “acted

willfully, wantonly, oppressively, and with reckless disregard for

Plaintiff’s federally protected rights or for the truth of the

matter.” (DE #47 at ¶¶ 28-29).

Defendants Porter County and Wood argue that Jendrzejczyk’s

Third Amended Complaint fails for a variety of reasons and must be

dismissed. The motion is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.

DISCUSSION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a complaint to

be dismissed if it fails to “state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Allegations other than fraud

and mistake are governed by the pleading standard outlined in

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires a “short and

plain statement” that the pleader is entitled to relief. Maddox v.

Love, 655 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2011). 

In order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint

“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). All well-pleaded facts must

be accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences from those facts

must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. Pugh v. Tribune Co.,

521 F.3d 686, 692 (7th Cir. 2008). However, pleadings consisting

of no more than mere conclusions are not entitled to the assumption

of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. This includes legal

conclusions couched as factual allegations, as well as

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. at 678 (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

The Seventh Circuit has instructed that plaintiffs may not

“merely parrot the statutory language of the claims that they are

pleading (something that anyone could do, regardless of what may be

prompting the lawsuit)” but must provide “some specific facts to

ground those legal claims.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th

Cir. 2009). The court clarified the standard for dismissal under

Rule 12(b)(6) as follows:

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First, a plaintiff must provide notice to

defendants of her claims. Second, courts must

accept a plaintiff’s factual allegations as

true, but some factual allegations will be so

sketchy or implausible that they fail to

provide sufficient notice to defendants of the

plaintiff’s claim. Third, in considering the

plaintiff’s factual allegations, courts should

not accept as adequate abstract recitations of

the elements of a cause of action or

conclusory legal statements.

Id. 

In this Court’s order dismissing Jendrzejczyk’s previous

complaint, the Court noted “that a scatter-shot approach to

pleading is often ill-advised.” (DE #46 at 12). Nonetheless, he

has again taken the scatter-shot approach, including claims in the

Third Amended Complaint that clearly fail as a matter of law and 

giving little consideration to the arguments raised in previous

motions to dismiss. Each of Jendrzejczyk’s eleven claims will be

dismissed with prejudice as to Defendants Porter County and Wood

for the reasons explained below. 

Count I: 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Count I of the Amended Complaint alleges that the Defendants

(all of them, although they are named in this version of the

complaint, as opposed to being referred to collectively), acting

under color of law:

unreasonably searched, seized, and used force

against Plaintiff without probable cause that

Plaintiff had committed any infraction,

misdemeanor, or felony; further only relying

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on an invalid arrest warrant containing no

details or terms. That doing so deprived the

Plaintiff of his rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution or law

of the United States. Defendant Wood in

initiating law enforcement contact,

Westville/Officer Aimes in arresting

Plaintiff, LaPorte and Porter County by

detaining the Plaintiff unlawfully while

knowing that the said warrant was not valid

and Plaintiff had not violated any laws to

warrant their arrest and unlawful detainment;

further in Porter County’s refusal to provide

medical treatment to the Plaintiff.

(DE #47 at ¶ 32). Count I further alleges that the “Defendants had

a duty not to violate the civil rights of a person and breached

that duty when they unlawfully searched/seized, arrested, and

detained the Plaintiff” and that Plaintiff was harmed by this

breach. (DE #47 at ¶¶ 33-34). 

Defendants argue that this claim fails because Porter County

was not the agency that placed Jendrzejczyk under arrest. In

response, Jendrzejczyk notes that the warrant was issued from

Porter County officials and that Porter County authorities were

involved in his detainment and transfer from LaPorte County to

Porter County. 

There is a fundamental problem with Jendrzejczyk’s argument.

The complaint names Porter County, Indiana as a defendant, but

makes references to entities such as the Porter County Sheriff’s

Department, Porter County Prosecutor’s Office and the courts within

Porter County. None of these entities are defendants in this

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action1, and claims against them cannot be imputed to Porter

County, Indiana. 

Porter County is a separate entity from the Porter County

Sheriff’s Department (“Sheriff’s Department”), and is not

responsible for the Sheriff’s actions. See Radcliff v. Cnty. of

Harrison, 627 N.E.2d 1305, 1306 (Ind. 1994) (finding “neither

county had control over the actions of the sheriff” and could not

be held liable for claims against the sheriff). The Sheriff’s

Department is a separate entity that is responsible for the

constitutional violations of its officers. Burton v. Lacy, No.

1:07-cv-0918, 2008 WL 187552, *4-*5 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 18, 2008). 

Porter County cannot be held liable under a respondeat superior

theory for the acts of the Sheriff’s employees because it has no

agency relationship with the Sheriff or his department. See Delk

v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Delaware Cnty., 503 N.E.2d 436, 440 (Ind. Ct.

App. 1987); Estate of Drayton v. Nelson, 53 F.3d 165, 167-68 (7th

Cir. 1994) (concluding that since an Indiana county had no

authority over the sheriff, it “cannot be blamed for any deficiency

1 Inexplicably, after naming only Porter County, Indiana, LaPorte

County, Indiana, Westville, Indiana, and Terri Wood as defendants, Plaintiffs

response to the instant motion lists additional defendants in the caption,

including the Porter County Sheriff. (DE #62). The inclusion of different

entities in the caption of a response brief has no legal effect - the Porter

County Sheriff is not a defendant in this action. If Plaintiff wanted to add

the Porter County Sheriff as a defendant, he has had ample opportunity to do

so: the distinction between Porter County and various other entities was

raised by Porter County in its memorandum filed on December 14, 2015. (DE #31

at 4-5). 

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in the training or supervision of the defendant deputy sheriffs”).2

The action of the Prosecutor’s Office and courts likewise

cannot be imputed to Porter County. The Prosecutor’s Office and

courts of Porter County are arms of the state government, not

county government. Talevski v. Carter, 2006 WL 276927, *7 (N.D.

Ind. Feb. 1, 2006).

Omitting any allegations against entities not named as

defendants, all that remains are the actions of Wood. According to

the complaint, Wood initiated law enforcement contact. It is not

alleged that Wood searched, seized, or used force against the

Plaintiff. It is also not alleged that Wood denied Plaintiff

necessary medical care. There are no facts alleged that support a

claim against Porter County or Wood for unreasonable search,

seizure or use of force or for denial of necessary medical care.

Accordingly, this claim must be dismissed. 

Count II: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Conspiracy

Similarly, Count II alleges that the Defendants conspired

together to cover up their unreasonable searches, seizures, and

uses of force against Jendrzejczyk and to punish him when he

complained about their unlawful acts, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §

1983. He further alleges that each defendant committed at least

2 Furthermore, Jendrzejczyk was not arrested by an officer of the Porter

County Sheriff’s Office, even if the action of the Porter County Sheriff’s

office could be imputed to Porter County, Indiana. 

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one overt act to further the conspiracy. Jendrzejczyk does set

forth some additional detail here, but none of the alleged overt

acts implicate Porter County or Wood. The additional detail

provided pertains to entities that are not defendants: the Porter

County Sheriff/Jail and Prosecutor’s Office. When those

allegations are removed, the remaining allegations are vague and

conclusory, and therefore insufficient to state a claim for

conspiracy. Amundsen v. Chicago Park District, 218 F.3d 712, 718

(7th Cir. 2000). 

Count III: Municipal Liability

In Count III, which Jendrzejczyk titled “Municipal Liability,”

Jendrzejczyk names the City of Westville, County of Laporte, and

County of Porter, and sets forth several different theories of

municipal liability. He alleges that the policy-makers of these

entities were deliberately indifferent to his rights in that they:

knew or should have known that there was no valid warrant for his

arrest, knew or should have known that he did not commit an

infraction, misdemeanor, or felony, and deliberately ignored or

knowingly and intentionally failed to correct problems with their

own warrant tracking and record keeping process and/or failed to

properly screen, hire, train, and supervise their police officers,

including Defendant Wood. (DE #21 at 29). Further, Jendrzejczyk

alleges that the officers of the municipal defendants “unreasonably

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searched, seized, and used force against Plaintiff pursuant to

their policy, custom or practice.” 

The changes Jendrzejczyk made to this count of his complaint

after being admonished that he had not “meaningfully associated the

facts with the various claims” are minuscule. (DE # 46 at 11). No

policy makers are identified and no policies are identified. It is

not clear which, if any, of the allegations in this count pertain

to Porter County, but (as with Counts I and II) the actions of the

Porter County Sheriff, Porter County Prosecutor, and Porter County

Courts cannot be imputed to Porter County. Porter County did not

search, seize or use force against plaintiff, and allegations

related to these claims must be dismissed. 

To the extent it is alleged that Porter County failed to

screen, train, or supervise Wood, those claims must also be

dismissed for failure to state a claim under Monell v. Department

of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).

To state a claim for municipal liability under section 1983, a

plaintiff must establish that the alleged constitutional

deprivation was pursuant to an official policy, practice, or custom

of the municipality. Monell, 436 U.S. at 689. To prevail on a

claim, Plaintiff must ultimately demonstrate that his

constitutional rights were violated and that the defendant’s policy

or custom of failing to train its employees caused the

constitutional violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights,

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Texas, 503 U.S. 115, 123 (1992). The Seventh Circuit is clear that

a plaintiff must “plead factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the [municipality] maintained a

policy, custom, or practice” that caused the violation of the

plaintiff’s Constitutional rights. McCauley v. City of Chicago,

671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011). Moreover, it is insufficient to

rely on mere legal conclusions or boilerplate allegations. Strauss

v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 1985). 

Jendrzejczyk has not provided any factual basis for his claims that

Porter County failed to screen, train, or supervise Wood. 

Even when construing all well-pled factual allegations

contained in the second amended complaint as true, and drawing all

inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court

finds that Plaintiff has not supplied enough factual content in his

allegations to provide a plausible claim for relief. 

Count IV - Assault

In the previous complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Wood

assaulted him. That count of the complaint read only that:

Defendant Wood threatened the integrity of

Plaintiff with unnecessary and unwarranted

violation and interference, including her

intentional attempt and threat to inflict

injury on Plaintiff while she actually had the

present ability to hurt Plaintiff.

(DE #21 at 7). In his Third Amended Complaint, this paragraph is

reiterated verbatim. (DE #47 at 38). The count now includes one

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additional paragraph:

That Defendant Wood had a duty to avoid

assault against another person and breached

that duty when she intentionally threatened

the Plaintiffs [sic] integrity and to inflict

injury upon the plaintiff; she is the actual

and proximate cause of this breach of duty and

the Plaintiff suffered damages as a result of

said breach.

(DE #47 at 39). This adds little, if anything, of substance to the

previous version of the claim - just additional legalese and

boilerplate language. Plaintiff had been admonished of the need to

put the defendants on notice of “precisely what legal theories he

is asserting against which Defendants and the factual basis for

each claim.” (DE #46 at 11-12). In response to the motion to

dismiss, Plaintiff indicates that the complaint alleges that Wood

confronted (Plaintiff) in a violent and threatening manner” and

threatened to inflict injury upon plaintiff. (DE #62-1 at 5). 

This language appears in the section of the complaint labeled

“operative facts,” not Count IV, despite being admonished to

associated the relevant facts with the legal theory. 

Nonetheless, under Indiana law, “[a]n assult creates an

apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact.” Knight v.

Indiana Ins. Co., 871 N.E.2d 357, 362 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The

complaint does not allege any apprehension of imminent harmful or

offensive contact. Wood is described as threatening “the integrity

of Plaintiff.” (DE #47 ¶ 38). While he alleges a “threat to

inflict injury” and the “present ability to hurt Plaintiff,” the

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complaint does not suggest that the injuries being referenced are

physical ones. More is required. 

Count V - Defamation

As with the assault claim, the language in the Fourth Amended

Complaint is identical to that of the previous complaint, except

that an additional paragraph regarding duty, causation, and damages

has been added. The count alleges in its entirety that:

Defendant Wood defamed Plaintiff when she

injured his reputation and diminished his

esteem, respect, good will, and confidence in

Plaintiff in the community, including his

employer, Dustcatchers, Inc., and in

particular in the presence of his business

client.

That Defendant Wood had a duty not to defame

another person and breached that duty when she

inured his reputation by her aforesaid verbal

and physical actions while at the business

location of a client of the Plaintiff[‘]s

employer; she was the proximate and actual

cause of said breach and the Plaintiff

suffered damages as a result of said breach.

(DE #47 at 40-41). The Third Amended Complaint does not actually

identify what Wood said that was defamatory - an oversight that

should have been cured by the fourth drafting of the complaint. 

Presumably, the allegedly defamatory statement is that there was a

warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest. But the Third Amended Complaint

itself alleges that Officer Ames found a warrant for Plaintiff’s

arrest. (DE #47 at ¶ 14). Wood’s statement that there was a

warrant was true, and truth is a defense against a claim of

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defamation. See Northern Indiana Public Service Company v.

Dabagia, 721 N.E.2d 294, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

Count IV: Malicious Prosecution

As with the defamation count, the language in the malicious

prosecution count is identical to the previous complaint, except

for an additional paragraph regarding duty, causation, and damages. 

The malicious prosecution Count alleges, in its entirety that:

Defendant Wood maliciously commenced

criminal/civil proceedings and Defendant

Westville, Defendant LaPorte County, and

Defendant Porter County continued those

proceedings against Plaintiff of which

Plaintiff was found to be not guilty and for

which existed no probable cause.

That Defendant Wood had a duty to avoid

malicious prosecution and breached said duty

when she initiated criminal/civil proceedings

against Plaintiff, knowing that no probable

cause or reason existed to do so; she was the

actual and proximate cause of said breach and

Plaintiff suffered damages as a result of said

breach.

(DE #47 at 42-43). This claim is barred by the Indiana Tort Claims

Act. “A governmental entity or employee acting within the scope of

the employee’s employment is not liable if a loss results from

....(6) the initiation of a judicial or an administrative

proceeding.” I.C. § 34-13-3-3(6). As a matter of law, this claim

fails. 

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Count VII: False Imprisonment

Plaintiff’s false imprisonment count alleges in its entirety

that: 

Defendant Westville, Defendant LaPorte County,

and Defendant Porter County intentionally and

unlawfully exercised the express or implied

threat of force to restrain, detain, or

otherwise confine Plaintiff without his

consent.

That the Defendants had a duty not to

unlawfully detain or imprison another person

and breached said duty when they in-fact

arrested and imprisoned the Plaintiff

unlawfully; the Defendants are the actual and

proximate cause of said breach and the

Plaintiff suffered damages as a result.

(DE #47 at 44-45). Porter County did not arrest or imprison

Jendrzejczyk. Once again, Porter County is not synonymous with the

Porter County Sheriff’s Office. 

Count VIII: False Arrest

Plaintiff’s false arrest count alleges in its entirety that:

Defendant Wood, Defendant Westville, Defendant

LaPorte County, and Defendant Porter County

authorized, encouraged, directed, or assisted

in the arrest of Plaintiff and caused an

unreasonably delay to occur: a) in taking the

Plaintiff before a judge; and, b) before

Plaintiff was released from custody.

That Indiana code 35-33-7-4 & 35-33-7-1

requires a person arrested in accordance with

the provisions of a warrant (or without a

warrant) shall be taken promptly for an

initial hearing before the court issuing the

warrant or before a judicial officer having

jurisdiction over the defendant. This first

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appearance is known as an arraignment or

“initial hearing” and where Indiana Code does

not define “promptly” most Courts agree that

48 hours is the standard in which to bring an

arrested person before a Court but the

Defendants failed to do so intentionally or

through gross negligence.

That the Defendants had a duty to promptly

bring the Defendant before a Judge or

Magistrate and breached that duty when they

failed to ever bring the Plaintiff before a

Judge or Magistrate. That the Porter County

Defendants are the actual and proximate cause

of said breach and the Plaintiff suffered

damages [as] a result of the breach.

(DE #47 at 46-48).

Wood did not arrest Plaintiff. Westville Police Officer Ames 

arrested Plaintiff. Furthermore, there are no facts here linking

Wood to any delay in releasing Plaintiff from custody. Because the

complaint does not allege that Wood either arrested Plaintiff or

caused the delay in his release, Porter County cannot be liable for

false arrest based on the actions of Wood. As with other counts,

this claim must fail because Porter County is not synonymous with

the Porter County Sheriff’s Department, Prosecutor’s Office, or

courts.

Count IX: Negligence

Plaintiff’s negligence count alleges in its entirety that:

Defendant Westville, Defendant LaPorte County,

and Defendant Porter County’s, negligent

hiring, training, and supervision of their law

enforcement officers and computer systems

personnel.

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That the Defendants had a Duty to properly

hire, train, and supervise its employees and

breached said duty to properly train, hire,

and supervised them. That Defendants are the

actual and proximate result of said breach and

Plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the

breach. 

This count of the Third Amended Complaint is both riddled with

grammatical errors and utterly lacking in facts. There are not

facts presented for this Court’s consideration that could support

a finding that Porter County was negligent in hiring Wood. 

Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are not sufficient to allow this

claim to proceed. 

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, the instant motion to dismiss

(DE #57) is GRANTED. When dismissing Jendrzejczyk’s previous

version of the complaint, the Court noted that, while he would be

granted another opportunity to amend his complaint, a plaintiff is

not entitled to endless attempts to state his claims. Having now

filed four separate complaints, failing to make meaningful changes

to the complaint at each juncture, dismissal with prejudice is

warranted. Porter County, Indiana, and Terri Wood are dismissed

WITH PREJUDICE. This case will proceed as to Defendants LaPorte

County, Indiana and Westville, Indiana.

DATED: August 4, 2017 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

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