Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Benzakry v. Patel, 2017 IL App (3d) 160162

Appellate Court 

Caption

EMIL BENZAKRY and EMIL AND SON, LLC, Plaintiffs-Appellees 

and Cross-Appellants, v. PARESH PATEL and KALPITA PATEL,

Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Appellees.

District & No. Third District

Docket No. 3-16-0162

Filed April 5, 2017

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Whiteside County, No. 07-LM-128; 

the Hon. John L. Hauptman, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.

Counsel on

Appeal

Alexander N. Loftus and Daniel J. Voelker, of Voelker Litigation 

Group, of Chicago, for appellants.

Dale G. Haake, of Katz Nowinski PC, of Moline, for appellees.

Panel JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justice Schmidt concurred in the 

judgment and opinion.
- 2 - 

 OPINION 

¶ 1 Plaintiff Emil Benzakry, through his company Emil & Son, LLC, entered into a purchase 

agreement with defendants Paresh and Kalpita Patel, through their company KAP Family 

Investments, LLC, to purchase a gas station in Rock Falls, Illinois. The gas station closed, and 

Benzakry sued for damages. A judgment was entered in favor of Benzakry. Defendants 

appealed, arguing (1) a claim for veil piercing cannot be tried before a jury, (2) the trial court 

abused its discretion by allowing the introduction of bank statements without proper 

foundation, (3) plaintiffs cannot prove fraud because Paresh did not proximately cause 

Benzakry’s damages, (4) plaintiffs cannot prove fraud because Benzakry did not justifiably 

rely on Paresh’s alleged misrepresentations, and (5) the corporate veil judgment against 

Kalpita was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Benzakry cross-appealed, arguing 

(1) the trial court’s grant of defendants’ motion for a directed verdict was error because 

plaintiffs are allowed to sue under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act 

(Consumer Fraud Act or Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2006)) and (2) the trial court’s 

denial of plaintiffs’ motion to amend a complaint to conform the pleadings to the proofs was 

error because there was evidence of a principal-agent relationship. We affirm in part and 

reverse in part, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings. 

¶ 2 FACTS 

¶ 3 The following facts are undisputed. Plaintiff Benzakry owned multiple businesses in 

California throughout his career. In 2005, Benzakry sold his last business and started looking 

on LoopNet1for investments to assist him with his living expenses during his retirement. 

Benzakry came across an advertisement on the LoopNet site that stated the following: 

“*********TRIPLE NNN LEASE[2]**********GAS STATION LOCATED IN 

ROCK FALLS, IL*******Please call for actual location************Located on a 

Major exit on the State Highway. Surrounded by Fast Food restaurants like 

McDonald’s, Arby’s[,] Burger King, Subway. 1 Million Gallon plus annual 

sale!!!!!!!!!! $300,000 inside C-store sales!!!!! EPA CLEAN PHASE I conducted!!!!!! 

13% CAP RATE!!!!!”

¶ 4 “K. Patel” was listed in the advertisement as the contact person for inquires, and after 

several months, Benzakry called the phone number listed. In January 2007, David Levin, a 

realtor, e-mailed Paresh the following information: 

“I just visited with Emil and he has just some basic questions which he is going to 

write up and send to me. I will forward to you for your response. The one that has him 

more worried about any is this: 

 

1Benzakry testified that LoopNet is “an Internet, commercial Internet, it sells, all sorts of 

commercials with caps, which is like you can buy McDonald or you can buy a dollar, Family Dollar, or 

they, they don’t own their buildings, what they, they really do is that they pay you rent. You buy them, 

then you, you pay rent.” 

2Benzakry testified that NNN lease means “you do nothing. You sit at home and collect money. 

That’s called an armchair investment.” 
- 3 - 

 Who is Singh & Singh LLC? We see no evidence of a personal guarantee so if the 

businesses goes bad, what leverage does the owner of the Fee have? They seem to have 

taken your word that everything is good. Some history on the Tenant will be relevant. 

 He would feel more comfortable with a Personal Guarantee and some history of 

who this gentleman or gentlemen are.” 

Paresh responded with Benzakry copied on the e-mail, stating: 

“Singh & Singh LLC is owned by the former manager of my gas station. He has 

over 10 years of experience in managing gas stations. He was operating the Rock Falls, 

IL[,] gas station ever since I bought it in 2005. He also managed my other store in 

Le Claire, IA and in Chicago. I personally know him for the last 8 years. Since I knew 

him personally, I did not ask for a Personal Guarantee on the rental payments in the 

purchase agreement.” 

Benzakry received a copy of the lease agreement between Singh & Singh, LLC, and KAP 3

and of the Singhs’ personal financial statements for his review. On January 12, 2007, 

Benzakry, through his company Emil & Son, entered into a purchase agreement and addendum 

for the Rock Falls gas station for $521,500. Benzakry was to receive $6000 per month in rent. 

¶ 5 On January 24, Benzakry e-mailed Paresh with questions regarding the purchase of the gas 

station, and Paresh responded, providing his answers below Benzakry’s questions: 

“1) who is SING & SING LLC. SINGH & SINGH, LLC is the Tenant of KAP 

Family Investments, LLC (my corporation). KAP Family Investments, LLC owns the 

Land, & Building at Rock Falls, IL and SINGH & SINGH, LLC signed a 15 years 

NNN lease to operate the Gas Station. 

 ***

 3) according to information David and I received is that SING & SING LLC. 

operates another two gas stations, we have no evidence of that. SINGH & SINGH, LLC 

does not operate two gas stations. Mr. Singh was a manager of three gas stations that 

were owned by me. 

 ***

 5) In what capacity was Mr. sing [sic] working for you? Mr. Singh was working as 

a Manager for the three gas stations that I own. 

 ***

 7) In all leases I have ever seen, there always is a clause mentioning, “the leasee 

paid first last and security deposit”, this lease has no mention of that. As I mentioned 

earlier in the email that I know Mr. Signh personally for the last 8 years and have 

worked for me for the last 5 years I did not ask any security deposit from him. 

 * * *

 11) I object to have a tenant with an LLC. Unless he also sign a personal guaranty. 

I can get a personal guarantee signed from the tenant. Attached is the personal 

guarantee agreement. 

 

3

In December 2006, KAP (Kalpita is the registered agent and sole member of KAP) and Singh & 

Singh (owned by Christopher and Anita Singh) entered into a lease agreement with respect to the Rock 

Falls gas station. 
- 4 - 

 12) Because of the above questions, and uncertainties, which were not clear when 

we signed our agreement, and because of the leasee no proof of owning other gas 

stations as presumed earlier, I suggest this course of action, a) a personal guaranty to be 

added, not a problem. 

 b) a security deposit and last moth [sic] rent to be paid, (1 month rent as security 

deposit and last month rent for a total of $12,000 is reasonable).” 

¶ 6 On January 26, a second addendum to the purchase agreement was executed and included 

the enforcement of a personal guarantee agreement and security deposit of $12,000. The 

addendum also contained a clause that stated: 

“Entire Agreement. This Addenda and Agreement contain the entire agreement 

between Seller and Buyer, and there are no other terms, conditions, promises, 

undertakings, statements or representations, either written or oral or expressed or 

implied, concerning the sale contemplated by this agreement.” (Emphasis added.) 

¶ 7 In February 2007, Benzakry and KAP closed on the gas station. At the time, a guaranty of 

lease agreement between KAP and Singh & Singh was signed. The agreement stated the 

following: 

“1. GUARANTOR jointly, severally and unconditionally guarantees to LESSOR, 

its successors and assigns, the prompt payment by TENANT of the rents reserved in 

said LEASE and the performance by TENANT of all provisions and covenants 

contained in said LEASE for and during the original term of said LEASE and any 

renewal or renewals, extensions, modifications or amendments thereof; and if any 

default shall be made by TENANT, GUARANTOR shall pay to LESSOR, its 

successors or assigns, such sum or sums of money as will be sufficient to make up any 

such deficiency, and shall satisfy the provisions and covenants by TENANT to be 

performed.” 

¶ 8 Benzakry received rent for the months of February to April but did not receive rent for the 

month of May. Benzakry called the station to address this issue, but no one answered. He 

called David Levin, who went to the gas station and discovered that it was closed. Levin sent 

pictures of the closed store to Benzakry that depicted an “Out of Gas” sign on the gas tanks and 

a “Sorry ... Closed” sign on the gas station door. 

¶ 9 Singh & Singh entered into an agreement with Emil & Son to relinquish possession of the 

gas station for failure to pay rent. After relinquishment, Benzakry came to Rock Falls, Illinois, 

where he continued to operate the establishment as a gas station for about a year and a half, 

after which time Benzakry turned the establishment into a retail store.4

 Ultimately, Whiteside 

County seized the store due to illegal actions of the store’s manager.5

¶ 10 On August 28, 2007, Emil & Son filed a complaint against Singh & Singh, Christopher 

Singh, Anita Singh, and Jane Singh, claiming rent and damages. On April 6, 2009, Christopher 

and Anita Singh and Benzakry and Emil & Son entered into a consent judgment of 

nondischargability in the amount of $25,000. 

 

4Benzakry testified that he “tried all sorts of other things there to sell. I tried clothing ***. *** They 

go to Walmart to buy whatever I sell so that didn’t work out” and that “I turned it into a check Western 

Union—what do you call it—agency. And I turned it into a smoke shop.” 

5At trial, Benzakry was asked, “Was she dealing drugs out of that store?” and Benzakry answered, 

“She was.” 
- 5 - 

¶ 11 In June 2009, Emil & Son filed an amended complaint adding KAP and Paresh as 

defendants, claiming breach of contract, deceptive practices, and common-law fraud. 

Discovery commenced, and the matter was set for trial on March 15, 2011. 

¶ 12 Emil & Son filed a motion for default judgment against KAP in March 2011, which the 

trial court granted and ordered KAP to pay $577,307.45. 

¶ 13 In February 2013, Emil & Son filed a third amended complaint adding Kalpita as a 

defendant, claiming breach of contract, deceptive practices, and common-law fraud. Another 

amended complaint was filed in July 2013, adding Benzakry as plaintiff. 

¶ 14 At trial, Benzakry testified that the financial strength of the tenant was important in his 

determination to enter into the purchase agreement. Furthermore, he testified that after he 

received the Singh & Singh lease and was assured about the tenant’s ability to pay rent by 

Paresh, Benzakry entered into the purchase agreement with KAP. 

¶ 15 Paresh acknowledged that Benzakry was interested in a triple net lease and the financial 

strength of the tenant when Benzakry inquired about the gas station. He admitted that 

Christopher Singh had not operated the Rock Falls gas station since 2005, Paresh never owned 

a gas station in Chicago, and Paresh had not known Christopher Singh for eight years but 

rather eight months. Also, Paresh admitted that the annual sale of a million gallons of gas and 

$300,000 of convenience store sales were not the actual but projected figures of the gas station. 

Paresh further admitted that the figures were not identified as projected in the advertisement. 

¶ 16 Christopher Singh testified that Singh & Singh signed a lease to the Rock Falls gas station 

with KAP in 2007. At the time, he had never managed a gas station, he had not known Paresh 

for eight years, and he had not worked for Paresh for five years. When he started managing the 

gas station, he was told that the rent would come out of the profits from the gas station. After 

two to three months, Singh realized he was not making enough money from the gas station to 

pay rent and told Paresh about the financial issues. Moreover, Singh testified that Paresh 

provided him the figures listed in the financial statement given to Benzakry. 

¶ 17 Kalpita testified that she and her friend Anjali Agarwel formed KAP. Kalpita could not 

recall how much money she invested in KAP at the time of formation. Eventually, Kalpita 

bought Agarwel’s share in KAP and became sole owner. She was not involved in the 

day-to-day transactions of KAP: “Honestly, this is all day-to-day transactions and my 

manager, that would be my husband, he used to look after all of this. I can request you ask him 

and he can answer you better. I mean I have no clue because I was not involved in day-to-day 

transactions, no.” Kalpita admitted that she transferred funds in the amount of $8500, $31,000, 

and $40,000 to her other business, Mississippi Marketplace, transferred personal funds into an 

Amcore Bank account, and transferred money to Guy Culvert, a horse trainer. When asked 

why payments from the Amcore Bank account were made to the Patels’ horse trainer, Kalpita 

responded, “Okay. So—I don’t know how to answer this but, if you are having multiple 

businesses, as a business woman, I will rotate my money to survive, or—I just said, you know, 

financially you just ask Mr. Paresh Patel[;] he will answer anything.” Also, Kalpita testified 

that she did not have any corporate records because her husband maintained the records. 

¶ 18 Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment as to counts III (breach of contract 

against Paresh), V (common-law fraud against Paresh), IX (breach of contract against Kalpita), 

and XI (common-law fraud against Kalpita), as well as a motion to dismiss counts IV 

(Consumer Fraud Act claim against Paresh) and X (Consumer Fraud Act claim against 
- 6 - 

Kalpita). The trial court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss but granted defendants’ motion 

for summary judgment as to counts III and IX. 

¶ 19 Plaintiffs filed a fourth amended complaint that added an amended count XII, which 

sought a piercing of the corporate veil and holding Kalpita personally liable for the debts of 

KAP. 

¶ 20 Defendants filed a motion for a directed verdict and a combined motion for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict, renewed motion for a directed verdict, and motion for new trial, 

all of which the trial court denied. Plaintiffs filed a motion to conform the pleadings to the 

proofs to add a principal-agent claim against Kalpita, which the trial court denied. 

¶ 21 The jury found in favor of plaintiffs on counts V (common-law fraud) and XII (piercing the 

corporate veil), awarded plaintiffs $700,000 in damages, and found Kalpita personally 

responsible for the debts of KAP. This appeal followed. 

¶ 22 ANALYSIS 

¶ 23 I. Appeal 

¶ 24 A. Corporate Veil Claim 

¶ 25 Defendants first argue that the issue of piercing the corporate veil of KAP is for the court to 

decide, not the jury. Also, because the jury heard the corporate veil claim, the jury was 

presented substantial evidence that was completely irrelevant to the fraud claim. Thus, the 

corporate veil and fraud claims should be reversed and remanded for a retrial. Plaintiffs argue 

that, although Illinois courts have not addressed this issue, there are cases that support the 

proposition that the issue of piercing the corporate veil is a matter for the jury to decide. In the 

alternative, plaintiffs claim case law supports the proposition that courts can treat the jury’s 

decision as advisory and decide whether veil piercing would be appropriate. This appears to be 

an issue of first impression, as there are no Illinois cases that discuss this issue. 

¶ 26 Defendants failed to preserve this issue for review. Dempsey v. Sternik, 147 Ill. App. 3d 

571, 580 (1986) (failure to object at the trial level constitutes a waiver unless the failure 

constitutes fundamental error). The record reveals that defendants did not file a motion to sever 

the corporate veil claim. In fact, the defendants conceded to the corporate veil claim being tried 

before a jury when defendants’ attorney stated, “No, I mean I’m not too concerned about the 

point, I want to make life easier.” Further, at the hearing on defendants’ combined motion, 

defendants’ attorney stated, “let’s get to the veil piercing issue. Uhm, we screwed up on it. 

Uhm, all three of us, I think, screwed up on the veil piercing issue. I didn’t put up much of a 

fight, you got a case, all right, whatever, you got a case.” (Emphasis added.) As a result, we 

find that defendants waived this issue. However, the waiver rule is a limitation on the parties 

and not on the reviewing court. Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, 199 Ill. 2d 483, 504-05 (2002). 

Because this is an issue of first impression, we decline to follow the waiver rule and will 

address the merits. 

¶ 27 The parties have cited various cases to assist in their arguments. Two cases that relate to 

this case are FMC Finance Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1980), and International 

Financial Services Corp. v. Chromas Technologies Canada, Inc., 356 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 

2004), both of which address whether a corporate veil claim in a diversity case is tried before a 

court or jury when applying substantive Illinois law and federal procedural law. 
- 7 - 

¶ 28 In Murphree, the Fifth Circuit determined that the issue of piercing the corporate veil is one 

for the jury. Murphree, 632 F.2d at 421 n.5. However, the Seventh Circuit in Chromas 

Technologies decided not to follow the Fifth Circuit’s decision because it found that the Fifth 

Circuit’s determination lacked authority to support its assertion. Chromas Technologies, 356 

F.3d at 738-39. Instead, the Seventh Circuit found that, under Illinois law, piercing the 

corporate veil is an equitable claim because the theory is only available to remove injustice or 

inequity, the application of the theory is a matter of discretion, and the theory does not always 

result in money damages. Id. at 737. A district court must make an independent judgment as to 

any equitable issue; therefore, the Seventh Circuit found that, under Illinois law, corporate veil 

claims are to be determined by the court. Id. at 735, 737. 

¶ 29 Although these cases provide guidance, they are restricted to the application of federal 

procedural law. Therefore, it is important to look to Illinois substantive law and any applicable 

Illinois procedural law to assist in this analysis. 

¶ 30 Illinois courts have established that corporate veil claims are equitable in nature. Buckley v. 

Abuzir, 2014 IL App (1st) 130469, ¶ 29 (discussing Fontana v. TLD Builders, Inc., 362 Ill. 

App. 3d 491 (2005), and noting that a corporate veil claim is an equitable remedy); Fontana, 

362 Ill. App. 3d at 500 (“ ‘[t]he doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is an equitable remedy’ ” 

(quoting Peetoom v. Swanson, 334 Ill. App. 3d 523, 527 (2002))); In re Rehabilitation of 

Centaur Insurance Co., 238 Ill. App. 3d 292, 300 (1992) (“[t]he doctrine of ‘piercing the 

corporate veil’ is an equitable remedy” (citing Tilley v. Shippee, 12 Ill. 2d 616, 623 (1958))). 

¶ 31 Also, it is well established in Illinois that there is no right to a jury trial in equitable claims. 

Lazarus v. Village of Northbrook, 31 Ill. 2d 146, 148 (1964) (“There was then and there is now 

no constitutional right of trial by jury in equity.”); Martin v. Strubel, 367 Ill. 21, 22-23 (1937) 

(“[i]n this State the guaranty of the right to a jury trial does not extend to cases of equity 

jurisdiction”); Cooper v. Williams, 60 Ill. App. 3d 634, 635 (1978) (“Except in certain 

statutorily enumerated situations, the constitutional guaranty of a jury trial applies only to 

actions known to the common law and is not a matter of right in equity proceedings.”).

¶ 32 However, in Illinois, the trial court does have discretion to direct equitable claims to be 

heard by a jury. Section 2-1111 of the Code of Civil Procedure states, “The court may in its 

discretion direct an issue or issues to be tried by a jury, whenever it is judged necessary in any 

action seeking equitable relief.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1111 (West 2014). Our court has applied this 

Illinois procedure. Kjellesvik v. Shannon, 41 Ill. App. 3d 674, 678 (1976) (“the granting of a 

jury trial in equity cases is discretionary with the trial court”). 

¶ 33 Here, the record shows that the parties presented arguments on the issue of trying the 

corporate veil claim before the jury. The trial court stated that it would consider the parties’ 

arguments and supporting case law and decide whether the claim will be heard before a jury. 

Afterward, the claim was heard before the jury without objection. In light of the circumstances, 

the trial court exercised its discretion to bring the corporate veil claim before the jury. 

Therefore, we find the corporate veil claim was properly tried before a jury pursuant to section 

2-1111. 
- 8 - 

¶ 34 B. Business Records Exception 

¶ 35 Defendants argue the court abused its discretion by admitting computer-generated bank 

records of an account held by KAP without foundation as required by Illinois Rule of Evidence 

803(6) (eff. Apr. 26, 2012) and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 236 (eff. Aug. 1, 1992). 

¶ 36 Rule 803(6) is applicable in both criminal and civil cases. It states: 

“The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is 

available as a witness: 

 * * *

 (6) Records of Regularly Conducted Activity. A memorandum, report, record, or 

data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made 

at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if 

kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular 

practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record or data 

compilation ***.” Ill. R. Evid. 803(6) (eff. Apr. 26, 2012). 

¶ 37 Rule 236 applies exclusively to civil cases. It states: 

“Any writing or record, whether in the form of any entry in a book or otherwise, made 

as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence, or event, shall be 

admissible as evidence of the act, transaction, occurrence, or event, if made in the 

regular course of any business, and if it was the regular course of the business to make 

such a memorandum or record at the time of such an act, transaction, occurrence, or 

event or within a reasonable time thereafter. All other circumstances of the making of 

the writing or record, including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, 

may be shown to affect its weight, but shall not affect its admissibility. The term 

‘business,’ as used in this rule, includes business, profession, occupation, and calling of 

every kind.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 236 (eff. Aug. 1, 1992). 

¶ 38 For computer-generated records, a party must establish “ ‘the equipment which produced 

the record is recognized as standard, the entries were made in the regular course of business at 

or reasonably near the happening of the event recorded and the sources of information, method 

and time of preparation were such as to indicate their trustworthiness and to justify their 

admission.’ ” US Bank, National Ass’n v. Avdic, 2014 IL App (1st) 121759, ¶ 25 (quoting 

Riley v. Jones Brothers Construction Co., 198 Ill. App. 3d 822, 829 (1990)). The standard for 

determining whether records are admissible as business records is abuse of discretion. Id. 

¶ 39 The business record exception requires evidence related to the document’s creation. See 

Apa v. National Bank of Commerce, 374 Ill. App. 3d 1082 (2007). In Apa, the defendant 

argued that the plaintiff did not lay a proper foundation for a bank statement needed to meet the 

business records exception. Id. at 1085-86. Noting that mere retention, without evidence of the 

document’s creation, does not meet the business records exception, the First District 

determined that plaintiff did not lay a proper foundation for the exception. Id. at 1088. 

Specifically, plaintiff only testified to keeping the records in the regular course of business and 

did not testify to the document’s creation. Id. “Without proper authentication and identification 

of the document, the proponent of the evidence has not provided a proper foundation and the 

document cannot be admitted into evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

¶ 40 As in Apa, there is no evidence in the record of the instant case that shows the bank 

statements were made in the regular course of business. Specifically, there is no evidence, 
- 9 - 

through testimony or affidavit, of the bank statement’s creation. Furthermore, there is no 

evidence in the record, through testimony or affidavit, that shows it was regular practice for 

Paresh to keep KAP’s bank statements. Therefore, plaintiffs did not meet the business records 

exception requirements. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 236 (eff. Aug. 1, 1992); Apa, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 1088. 

¶ 41 In their brief, defendants mentioned a possible admission of the bank statements under the 

recorded recollection exception. The requirements for the recorded recollection exception are: 

“(1) the witness had firsthand knowledge of the recorded event; (2) the written 

statement was made at or near the time of the event and while the witness had a clear 

and accurate memory of it; (3) the witness lacks present recollection of the event; and 

(4) the witness can vouch for the accuracy of the written statement.” (Internal quotation 

marks omitted.) Kociscak v. Kelly, 2011 IL App (1st) 102811, ¶ 26. 

See Ill. R. Evid. 803(5) (eff. Apr. 26, 2012). 

¶ 42 However, for the same reasons stated above, defendant does not provide any evidence to 

show that Paresh could attest to the accuracy of the bank statements. Thus, the plaintiffs did not 

meet the requirements of the recorded recollection exception. See Ill. R. Evid. 803(5) (eff. Apr. 

26, 2012). 

¶ 43 The trial court’s error in admitting the bank statements without proper foundation will not 

be overturned if the error was harmless. Lorenz v. Pledge, 2014 IL App (3d) 130137, ¶ 18 

(“Where a trial court abuses its discretion in admitting evidence, a reviewing court should 

grant a new trial only where the error was substantially prejudicial and affected the outcome of 

the case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

¶ 44 Although the bank records were relevant to the corporate veil claim, Paresh’s testimony 

was cumulative. Paresh was cross-examined regarding the issue of commingling funds as 

evidenced in the bank statements. Kalpita also testified to the commingling of funds seen in the 

same bank statements without objection on the foundation. We believe defendants were not 

prejudiced, and therefore, the trial court’s error was harmless. 

¶ 45 C. Proximate Result in Fraud Claim 

¶ 46 Defendants argue that plaintiffs failed to present evidence that proved plaintiffs suffered 

damages as a proximate result of Paresh’s alleged misrepresentations. Plaintiffs argue that 

Paresh’s misrepresentations regarding Singh & Singh’s ability to pay rent were the proximate 

cause of plaintiffs’ lost rental income. 

¶ 47 Defendants request that this court review the trial court’s denial of defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment or their motion for a directed verdict. “[I]f a motion for summary judgment 

is improperly denied the error is not reversible for the result becomes merged in the subsequent 

trial.” Home Indemnity Co. v. Reynolds & Co., 38 Ill. App. 2d 358, 367 (1962). Therefore, only 

the trial court’s denial of defendants’ motion for directed verdict will be reviewed. 

¶ 48 A motion for directed verdict will not be granted unless all of the evidence so 

overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict could stand. Krywin v. Chicago 

Transit Authority, 238 Ill. 2d 215, 225 (2010). All of the evidence must be construed in the 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. The standard of review for a motion for a 

directed verdict is de novo. Id. 

¶ 49 The elements of fraudulent misrepresentation are: “(1) a false statement or omission of 

material fact; (2) knowledge or belief of the falsity by the party making it; (3) intention to 
- 10 - 

induce the other party to act; (4) action by the other party in reliance on the truth of the 

statements; and (5) damage to the other party resulting from such reliance.” Weidner v. Karlin, 

402 Ill. App. 3d 1084, 1087 (2010). “Proximate cause means any cause which, in natural or 

probable sequence, produced the injury complained of. It need not be the sole cause or the last 

or nearest cause.” Capiccioni v. Brennan Naperville, Inc., 339 Ill. App. 3d 927, 937 (2003). 

The trial court’s finding on a count of fraud will not be disturbed unless it was against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. Hassan v. Yusuf, 408 Ill. App. 3d 327, 350-51 (2011). 

¶ 50 Plaintiffs established proximate cause sufficiently to constitute fraud. Benzakry testified 

that his purpose for purchasing the gas station was to pursue a triple net lease, which allows a 

purchaser to collect rent from a tenant. Paresh made representations regarding the tenant’s 

reliability and trustworthiness when he made statements to Benzakry regarding his relationship 

with the tenant in an e-mail. Paresh acknowledged in his testimony that some of the 

representations were false. Shortly after, the tenant was unable to pay the rent due to financial 

problems with the gas station. In fact, Christopher Singh testified that he had actually been 

having trouble paying the rent and had told Paresh about it. Benzakry lost rent profits as a 

direct result of the tenant’s inability to pay the rent. Therefore, we find plaintiffs established 

proximate cause to constitute fraud. 

¶ 51 Also, defendants argue that the jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. A jury’s findings will not be set aside unless it appears that such findings are clearly 

or palpably against and contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Izzo v. Zera, 57 Ill. 

App. 2d 263, 267 (1965). A verdict cannot be said to be against the manifest weight of the 

evidence unless an opposite conclusion is clearly evident. Id. at 267-68. Based on the 

information above, we hold that the jury’s verdict was not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. 

¶ 52 D. Reliance in Fraud Claim 

¶ 53 Defendants argue that plaintiffs failed to present any evidence to prove Paresh’s alleged 

false statements were material or that plaintiffs justifiably relied on the alleged false 

statements. Plaintiffs allege that Benzakry sought a triple net lease for the purpose of collecting 

rental income and the tenant’s ability to pay was important, Paresh made representations about 

Christopher Singh’s ability to pay the rent, and Benzakry relied on Paresh’s representations. 

¶ 54 As stated above, one of the elements of fraudulent misrepresentation requires that the 

allegedly aggrieved party justifiably relied on the statements made by the other party. Weidner, 

402 Ill. App. 3d at 1087. In determining justifiable reliance, courts consider all of the 

circumstances, including “the parties’ relative knowledge of the facts available, opportunity to 

investigate the facts and prior business experience.” Hassan, 408 Ill. App. 3d at 350. A party’s 

reliance is justified when defendant has created a “false sense of security or blocked further 

inquiry, provided that the facts were not such as to put a reasonable person on inquiry.” Id.

Furthermore, “[I]n the absence of circumstances putting a reasonable person on inquiry, that 

person is justified in relying on a representation without engaging in further inquiry, especially 

where the misrepresentation concerns matters which may be assumed to be within the 

knowledge of the party making them.” Id. at 351. The trial court’s finding on a count of fraud 

will not be disturbed unless it was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. at 350-51. 

As stated above, the trial court’s denial of defendants’ motion for a directed verdict will be 

reviewed rather than the motion for summary judgment. 
- 11 - 

¶ 55 Plaintiffs established justifiable reliance sufficiently to constitute fraud. Benzakry testified 

that his purpose for purchasing the gas station was to pursue a triple net lease, which allowed a 

purchaser to collect rent from a tenant. Paresh made representations regarding the tenant’s 

financial reliability and trustworthiness when he made statements regarding his relationship 

with the tenant to Benzakry in an e-mail. Paresh acknowledged in his testimony that some of 

the representations were false. Benzakry relied on the misrepresentations because he testified 

that the reliability of the tenant was important to his decision to purchase a gas station under a 

net lease. Furthermore, Benzakry testified that the sole purpose of a net lease is for the 

purchaser to collect rent on the property. Therefore, we determine Benzakry justifiably relied 

on Paresh’s misrepresentations. 

¶ 56 Also, defendants argue that the jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. A jury’s findings will not be set aside unless it appears that such findings are clearly 

or palpably against and contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Izzo v. Zera, 57 Ill. 

App. 2d 263, 267 (1965). A verdict cannot be said to be against the manifest weight of the 

evidence unless an opposite conclusion is clearly evident. Id. at 267-68. Based on the 

foregoing analysis on this issue, we find the jury’s verdict was not against the manifest weight 

of the evidence. 

¶ 57 Defendants further argue that plaintiffs cannot rely on any representations that are not in 

the purchase agreement because plaintiffs signed a nonreliance agreement. Plaintiffs claim the 

addendum is a standard merger or integration clause, not a nonreliance clause. 

¶ 58 Benson v. Stafford, 407 Ill. App. 3d 902 (2010), provides guidance in determining whether 

the parties’ agreement contained a nonreliance clause. In Benson, defendants argued that a 

nonreliance clause in the parties’ agreement defeated plaintiff’s claim of reliance. Id. at 921. 

The clause stated, in relevant part: 

“ ‘No reliance is placed on any warranty, representation, opinion, advice or assertion 

of fact made either prior to, contemporaneous with, or after entering into this 

Agreement, or any amendment or supplement thereto, by any Party or its directors, 

officers, employees or agents, to any other Party or its directors, officers, employees or 

agents, except to the extent that the same has been reduced to writing and included as a 

term of this Agreement ***.’ ” (Emphases added.) Id. at 909. 

¶ 59 The First District ruled that the language in the agreement constituted a nonreliance clause. 

The court distinguished Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc., 156 Ill. App. 3d 154 

(1986), noting that the clause in Zimmerman did not contain nonreliance language that existed 

in the Benson case. Benson, 407 Ill. App. 3d at 927; Zimmerman, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 159 

(“neither the Seller, broker nor any of their agents have made representations with respect to 

any material fact relating to the real estate, its improvements and included personal property 

unless such representations are in writing”). The court found, inter alia, that language 

describing a party’s agreement not to rely on any representations determined the existence of a 

nonreliance clause. Benson, 407 Ill. App. 3d at 927. In other words, Benson held that a 

nonreliance clause requires inclusion of specific nonreliance language. Id. 

¶ 60 In this case, there was no nonreliance language in the clause contained in the parties’ sales 

agreement. In fact, there is no mention of the word “reliance” or any associated term in the 

clause. Thus, there is no nonreliance clause in the agreement. Accordingly, we hold the parties’ 

agreement does not defeat plaintiffs’ fraud claim.
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¶ 61 E. Corporate Veil Judgment Against Kalpita Patel 

¶ 62 Defendants argue plaintiffs provided no evidence to justify piercing the corporate veil of 

KAP and holding Kalpita personally liable for KAP’s default judgment. 

¶ 63 A jury’s findings will not be set aside unless it appears that such findings are clearly or 

palpably against and contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Izzo v. Zera, 57 Ill. App. 

2d 263, 267 (1965). A verdict cannot be said to be against the manifest weight of the evidence 

unless an opposite conclusion is clearly evident. Id. at 267-68. 

¶ 64 A corporation exists separate and distinct from its shareholders, directors, and officers. 

Jacobson v. Buffalo Rock Shooters Supply, Inc., 278 Ill. App. 3d 1084, 1088 (1996). Generally, 

the shareholders, directors, and officers are not liable for the corporation’s obligations. Id. The 

requirements for piercing the corporate veil and holding a shareholder responsible for the 

corporation’s obligations are “(1) a unity of interest and ownership that causes the separate 

personalities of the corporation and the individual to no longer exist; and (2) the presence of 

circumstances under which adherence to the fiction of a separate corporate existence would 

sanction a fraud, promote injustice or promote inequitable consequences.” Id. 

¶ 65 “Courts are reluctant to pierce the corporate veil.” Id. Accordingly, a party seeking to 

pierce the corporate veil has the burden to make a substantial showing that the shareholder is 

not acting separately and distinctly from the corporation. Id. Courts look at various factors in 

determining whether to pierce the corporate veil, including inadequate capitalization, failure to 

issue stock, failure to observe corporate formalities, nonpayment of dividends, insolvency of 

the debtor corporation, nonfunctioning of the other officers or directors, absence of corporate 

records, commingling of funds, diversion of assets from the corporation by or to a shareholder, 

failure to maintain arm’s length relationships among related entities, and whether the 

corporation is a mere facade for the operation of the dominant shareholders. Id. 

¶ 66 The record discloses that KAP had inadequate capitalization. Singh & Singh signed a lease 

with KAP in December 2006. By March 2007, KAP was having financial issues because it had 

made several insufficient fund transactions and the Patels were transferring money into the 

KAP account, including $17,000 of Paresh’s money to KAP in April 2007. It is inequitable for 

shareholders to establish and maintain a corporation that carries on business without sufficient 

assets available to meet its debt. See Stap v. Chicago Aces Tennis Team, Inc., 63 Ill. App. 3d 

23, 28-29 (1978) (citing Henry Winthrop Ballantine, Ballantine on Corporations 302-03 (rev. 

ed. 1946)). 

¶ 67 Also, the record shows that Kalpita was a nonfunctioning shareholder. Specifically, 

Kalpita was the sole member of KAP, but her testimony indicates that she was not involved 

with the activities of KAP. Kalpita testified that she trusted her husband to handle the finances 

in the business. When asked about the Amcore Bank statements, Kalpita responded, 

“Honestly, this is all day-to-day transaction and my manager, that would be my husband, he 

used to look after all of this. I can request you ask him and he can answer you better. I mean I 

have no clue because I was not involved in day-to-day transaction, so.” 

¶ 68 Lastly, the record shows Kalpita commingled funds. Transactions in the bank statements 

show money being transferred to the Patels’ horse farm. When asked, “Do you know why the 

gas station account was paying the horse trainer?” Kalpita responded, “Okay. So—I don’t 

know how to answer this but, if you are having multiple businesses, as a businesswoman I will 

rotate my money to survive, or—I just said, you know, financially you just ask Mr. Paresh 

Patel[;] he will answer anything.” There were also funds in the amount of $8500, $40,000, and 
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$31,000 transferred between the KAP account and the Patels’ other gas station in Le Claire, 

Iowa, where Kalpita was the sole shareholder. 

¶ 69 Based on this information, we determine the jury’s verdict, piercing KAP’s corporate veil 

and holding Kalpita liable for KAP’s damages, was not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. 

¶ 70 II. Cross-Appeal 

¶ 71 A. Consumer Fraud Act Counts 

¶ 72 Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred when it granted defendants’ motion for a directed 

verdict as to counts IV (Consumer Fraud Act claim against Paresh) and X (Consumer Fraud 

Act claim against Kalpita). Specifically, plaintiffs claim that they do not have to prove a 

misrepresentation involves trade practices addressed to the market generally as once 

implicated in case law because the 1990 amendment to section 10(a) of the Consumer Fraud 

Act (Pub. Act 86-801, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1990) (amending 815 ILCS 505/10a)) states “proof of 

public injury, a pattern, or an effect on consumers generally shall not be required.” (Emphasis 

added.) 

¶ 73 The parties dispute whether a misrepresentation must involve trade practices addressed to 

the market generally pursuant to section 10a of the Consumer Fraud Act. 815 ILCS 505/10a 

(West 2006). This is an issue of statutory interpretation and is reviewed de novo. Landis v. 

Marc Realty, L.L.C., 235 Ill. 2d 1, 6 (2009). 

¶ 74 The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent 

of the legislature. Ryan v. Board of Trustees of the General Assembly Retirement System, 236 

Ill. 2d 315, 319 (2010). The most reliable indicator of that intent is the language of the statute 

itself. Id. In determining the plain meaning of statutory language, a court will consider the 

statute in its entirety, the subject the statute addresses, and the apparent intent of the legislature 

in enacting the statute. Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21, 29 (2009). If the statutory language is 

clear and unambiguous, it must be applied as written, without resorting to further aids of 

statutory interpretation. Hendricks v. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund, 2015 IL 

App (3d) 140858, ¶ 14. 

¶ 75 Section 10a states: 

“Any person who suffers actual damage as a result of a violation of this Act committed 

by any other person may bring an action against such person. The court, in its discretion 

may award actual economic damages or any other relief which the court deems proper; 

provided, however, that no award of punitive damages may be assessed under this 

Section against a party defendant who is a new vehicle dealer or used vehicle dealer 

within the meaning of Chapter 5 of the Illinois Vehicle Code or who is the holder of a 

retail installment contract within the meaning of Section 2.12 of the Motor Vehicle 

Retail Installment Sales Act, unless the conduct engaged in was willful or intentional 

and done with evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of others. Proof of a 

public injury, a pattern, or an effect on consumers and the public interest generally 

shall be required in order to state a cause of action under this Section against a party 

defendant who is a new vehicle dealer or used vehicle dealer within the meaning of 

Chapter 5 of the Illinois Vehicle Code or who is the holder of a retail installment 
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contract within the meaning of Section 2.12 of the Motor Vehicle Retail Installment 

Sales Act.” (Emphasis added.) 815 ILCS 505/10a (West 2006).

¶ 76 The statement “[p]roof of a public injury, a pattern, or an effect on consumers generally 

shall not be required” was added to the statute through Public Act 86-801 (eff. Jan. 1, 1990), 

but the legislature removed the word “not” in Public Act 89-144 (eff. Jan. 1, 1996) and made 

“proof of a public injury, a pattern, or an effect on consumers and the public interest generally” 

required in cases against new or used vehicle dealers. 

¶ 77 It seems that when the language was moved, the legislature did not intend to require that a 

party show proof of public injury generally but added the language further in the paragraph to 

place emphasis on the requirement to show public injury only in cases against a defendant who 

is a new or used vehicle dealer. See Grimaldi v. Webb, 282 Ill. App. 3d 174, 182 (1996) (“This 

amendment is clearly a change in the law, not a mere clarification, as it is specifically carving 

out actions against vehicle dealers from the rule that proof of public injury or a pattern is not 

required.”). To insinuate that the legislature now placed a general requirement to show proof of 

public injury would be departing from the language of the statute, which cannot be done. See 

Ryan v. Board of Trustees of the General Assembly Retirement System, 236 Ill. 2d 315, 319 

(2010) (“[w]here the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we will enforce it as written 

and will not read into it exceptions, conditions, or limitations that the legislature did not 

express”). Therefore, we find the 1996 amendment did not change the meaning of section 10a, 

and thus, no public injury needs to be proven. 

¶ 78 Regardless, we note that there is evidence of public injury because Paresh misrepresented 

the gasoline and convenience store sales in the advertisement. Paresh placed an advertisement 

for the purchase of a triple net lease for the gas station on a website accessed by the general 

public. At trial, Paresh admitted that the annual sale of a million gallons of gas and $300,000 of 

convenience store sales stated in the advertisement were not actual but projected figures and 

that he did not disclose that the figures were projected in the advertisement. 

¶ 79 Also, defendants argue that plaintiffs cannot bring a suit under the Consumer Fraud Act 

because defendants do not meet the statutory definitions of “merchandise” and “consumer” 

under the Consumer Fraud Act.

¶ 80 The Consumer Fraud Act allows purchasers of real estate to bring a claim before the court. 

In Beard v. Gress, 90 Ill. App. 3d 622, 627 (1980), the Fourth District addressed the issue of 

whether a domestic purchaser of real estate had standing to sue under the Consumer Fraud Act. 

The court stated that prior to 1973, section 2 of the Consumer Fraud Act was limited to the sale 

and advertisement of merchandise. Id. However, after 1973, the General Assembly added the 

words “trade” and “commerce” to the Act, which broaden the protection “beyond matters 

connected with the sale or advertisement of merchandise to the conduct of any trade or 

commerce.” Id. Furthermore, the Act added the word “businessman,” which created an 

additional protected group. Because of this, the Fourth District concluded that section 2 also 

protected purchasers of real estate to sue for violations even though they do not meet the 

definition of “consumer” under the Consumer Fraud Act. “Any other interpretation would give 

the obviously unintended result of protecting businessmen who purchase real estate but giving 

no such protection to other citizens who do so.” Thus, we hold plaintiffs can bring a claim 

against defendants under the Consumer Fraud Act without meeting statutory definitions of 

“merchandise” and “consumer.”
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¶ 81 Next, we determine whether plaintiffs are entitled to judgment under the Consumer Fraud 

Act. Section 2 of the Consumer Fraud Act states unfair or deceptive acts or practices, including 

fraud and misrepresentation, are a violation of the Act. 815 ILCS 505/2 (West 2006). To prove 

deceptive acts or practices, a party must show “(1) a deceptive act or practice by the defendant, 

(2) the defendant’s intent that plaintiff rely on the deception, (3) the occurrence of the 

deception during a course of conduct involving trade or commerce, (4) actual damage to the 

plaintiff [and] (5) proximately caused by the deception.” Ramirez v. Smart Corp., 371 Ill. App. 

3d 797, 806 (2007) (citing Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 216 Ill. 2d 

100, 180 (2005)).

¶ 82 We believe defendants engaged in deceptive acts when they knowingly misrepresented 

information in their advertisement and in their e-mails to Benzakry as stated in detail above. 

See Siegel v. Levy Organization Development Co., 153 Ill. 2d 534, 543 (1992) (“it is 

unquestionable that so long as the alleged deception occurred in a course of conduct involving 

trade or commerce, facts satisfying a claim for common law fraud will necessarily satisfy a 

claim under the [Consumer Fraud] Act”). Therefore, we grant judgment on counts IV and X in 

favor of plaintiffs and against defendants. Plaintiffs request that this claim be remanded for the 

sole purpose of assessing attorney fees. Section 10a of the Consumer Fraud Act grants the trial 

court discretion to award damages that the court deems proper. 815 ILCS 505/10a (West 

2006). Because plaintiffs are eligible for attorney fees, the trial court has the discretion to 

award attorney fees on remand.

¶ 83 B. Motion to Conform Pleadings to the Proofs

¶ 84 Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred when it denied their motion to amend the 

complaint to conform the pleadings to the proofs. In their motion, plaintiffs alleged that 

Kalpita was the sole member of KAP and that her husband, Paresh, acted as her agent. 

¶ 85 Section 2-616(c) states: “A pleading may be amended at any time, before or after 

judgment, to conform the pleadings to the proofs, upon terms as to costs and continuance that 

may be just.” 735 ILCS 5/2-616(c) (West 2006). The test is “whether the allowance of the 

amendment furthers the ends of justice.” American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. 

Dozoryst, 256 Ill. App. 3d 674, 678 (1993). This includes whether “the amendments alter[ed] 

the nature of proof required to defend” and whether “the other party would be prejudiced or 

surprised.” Id. at 679. “Any doubt as to whether pleadings should be amended should be 

resolved in favor of an amendment.” Id. The standard of review is abuse of discretion. Cirro 

Wrecking Co. v. Roppolo, 153 Ill. 2d 6, 24 (1992). 

¶ 86 Here, the record shows evidence of a principal-agent relationship. “Under the doctrine of 

respondeat superior, a principal may be held liable for the negligent actions of an agent that 

caused a plaintiff’s injury, even if the principal does not himself engage in any conduct in 

relation to the plaintiff.” Sperl v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 408 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 1057 

(2011). Kalpita became the sole member of KAP after buying all the company shares, and 

Paresh became the sole manager. At various points in her testimony, Kalpita testified that she 

could not answer certain questions because Paresh kept the business records and handled the 

day-to-day transactions of the business. Her testimony indicates that she heavily and almost 

exclusively relied on Paresh to maintain KAP. Based on this information, amending the 

pleadings would not alter the nature of evidence required to defend the principal-agent claim. 
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¶ 87 Furthermore, defendants were not prejudiced or surprised by plaintiffs’ principal-agent 

claim. In fact, plaintiffs included a principal-agent relationship allegation in their fourth 

amended complaint. In the complaint, under amended count XII, it states: 

“23. At all times material hereto Defendant Kalpita was either a co-member or the 

sole member of KAP Family Investments, Inc. 

 24. As such, she delegated the authority to act on KAP’s behalf to Paresh Patel 

who acted on behalf of the LLC.” (Emphasis added.)

Because defendants were aware of this count, they would not be prejudiced or surprised if the 

pleadings were amended. Therefore, we determine the trial court erred when it denied 

plaintiffs’ motion to conform pleadings to the proofs. 

¶ 88 Turning to plaintiffs’ request for judgment, we found the record reveals evidence of a 

principal-agent relationship between Paresh and Kalpita. As stated previously, Kalpita had 

little involvement with her own business because she trusted her husband to handle the 

finances in the business, allowed her husband to do all the day-to-day transactions, and 

allowed him to possess and maintain all the business records. Therefore, we grant judgment in 

favor of plaintiffs and against defendants on the principal-agent claim. 

¶ 89 Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ principal-agent relationship claim is time-barred by the 

statute of limitations for common-law fraud. However, as plaintiffs have argued, Kalpita’s 

bankruptcy case tolled the fraud claim during the five-year limitations period. In fact, 

defendants’ attorney conceded to the tolling, stating: “To save some time, he is right on the 

bankruptcy tolling thing. So the statute of limitations argument he is right on.” Because of 

defendants’ attorney’s comment, the trial court excluded the statute of limitations argument 

from its ruling: “With regard to the Motion to Conform The Pleadings To The Proofs, uhm, 

with the exception of the argument that the statute of limitations has expired, because Mr. 

Loftus conceded that argument, with that exception I find more compelling the written and oral 

arguments made by defense, and accordingly the motion, that post-trial motion is also denied.” 

(Emphasis added.) Thus, defendants’ argument fails on this issue. 

¶ 90 The record is unclear, and the parties have not briefed, regarding the exact calculation of 

damages as it pertains to KAP’s default judgment and its effect on the $700,000 final 

judgment. Therefore, we remand this case for a new calculation of damages and costs, 

including an assessment of attorney fees and any damages related to plaintiffs’ principal-agent 

claim. 

¶ 91 CONCLUSION 

¶ 92 The judgment of the circuit court of Whiteside County is affirmed in part and reversed in 

part, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings. 

¶ 93 Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.