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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

TASHA A. SMITH, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY, 

Defendant. 

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NO. 3:14–CV-01499 

OPINION AND ORDER

 This matter is before the Court for review of the Commissioner 

of Social Security’s decision denying Disability Insurance 

Benefits and Supplemental Security Income to Plaintiff Tasha A. 

Smith. For the reasons set forth below, the decision of the 

Commissioner is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED to the Social 

Security Administration for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. section 405(g). 

BACKGROUND 

 On December 27, 2010, Tasha A. Smith (“Smith”) filed an 

application for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits 

(“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 

section 401 et seq., and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under 

Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. section 1381, et. 
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seq. Smith alleged that her disability began on April 6, 2010. 

The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied her initial 

applications and also denied her claims upon reconsideration. 

Smith requested a hearing, and on October 19, 2012, Smith 

appeared with her attorney at an administration hearing before 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) David R. Bruce. Testimony was 

provided by Smith and vocational expert (“VE”) Leslie Lloyd. On 

October 25, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision denying Smith’s claim, 

finding her not disabled because she is capable of making a 

successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant 

numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 30.) 

Smith requested that the Appeals Council review the ALJ’s 

decision, but that request was denied. Accordingly, the ALJ’s 

decision became the Commissioner’s final decision. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 422.210(a). Smith has initiated the instant action for judicial 

review of the Commissioner’s final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

section 405(g). 

DISCUSSION 

Facts 

 Smith was born in July 1979, and was 30 years old on the 

alleged disability onset date of April 6, 2010. (Tr. 195-205.) 

She quit school in tenth grade. (Tr. 64.) Her past relevant work 

includes employment as a laundry worker. (Tr. 29.) Miller alleged 
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the following impairments: right knee problems/prosthesis, 

depression, and bipolar disorder. (Tr. 231.) The medical evidence 

is largely undisputed and has been set forth in detail in both the 

ALJ’s decision and Miller’s opening brief. There is no reason to 

repeat it in detail here, although pertinent details are discussed 

below as needed. 

Review of Commissioner’s Decision 

This Court has authority to review the Commissioner’s 

decision to deny social security benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any 

fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 

Id. Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant evidence as 

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 

1420, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971) (citation omitted). In determining 

whether substantial evidence exists, the Court shall examine the 

record in its entirety, but shall not substitute its own opinion 

for the ALJ’s by reconsidering the facts or reweighing the 

evidence. See Jens v. Barnhart, 347 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 2003). 

While a decision denying benefits need not address every piece of 

evidence, the ALJ must provide “a logical bridge” between the 

evidence and his conclusion that the claimant is not disabled. 

Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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As a threshold matter, for a claimant to be eligible for DIB 

or SSI benefits under the Social Security Act, the claimant must 

establish that she is disabled. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) and 

1382(a)(1). To qualify as being disabled, the claimant must be 

unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of 

any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can 

be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be 

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To determine whether a 

claimant has satisfied this statutory definition, the ALJ performs 

a five-step evaluation: 

Step 1: Is the claimant performing substantially 

gainful activity? If yes, the claim is 

disallowed; if no, the inquiry proceeds to 

Step 2. 

Step 2: Is the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments “severe” and expected to last at 

least twelve months? If not, the claim is 

disallowed; if yes, the inquiry proceeds to 

Step 3. 

Step 3: Does the claimant have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets or 

equals the severity of an impairment in the 

SSA’s Listing of Impairments, as described in 

20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1? If yes, 

then claimant is automatically disabled; if 

not, then the inquiry proceeds to Step 4. 

Step 4: Is the claimant able to perform his past 

relevant work? If yes, the claim is denied; 

if no, the inquiry proceeds to Step 5, where 

the burden of proof shifts to the 

Commissioner. 
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Step 5: Is the claimant able to perform any other work 

within his residual functional capacity in the 

national economy? If yes, the claim is 

denied; if no, the claimant is disabled. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v) and 416.920 (a)(4)(i)-(v); 

see also Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 n.8 (7th Cir. 1994). 

In this case, the ALJ found that Smith had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since April 6, 2010, her alleged onset 

date. (Tr. 20.) The ALJ found that Smith suffered from the 

following severe impairments: degenerative joint disease of the 

right knee; status post multiple knee replacements; depression; 

bipolar disorder; and history of marijuana abuse (20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)). (Tr. 21.) The ALJ further found 

that Smith did not have an impairment or combination of impairments 

that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed 

impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 

416.926). (Id.) 

The ALJ made the following Residual Functional Capacity 

(“RFC”) determination: 

[T]he claimant has the [RFC] to perform less than 

sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 

416.967(a). Specifically, the claimant can lift and 

carry ten pounds occasionally and less than ten pounds 

frequently. The claimant can sit for six hours and stand 

and/or walk for two hours for a total of eight hours in 

a standard workday. The claimant can occasionally climb 

stairs and ramps, but cannot climb ladders, ropes, and 

scaffolds. The claimant can occasionally balance, 

stoop, crouch, but cannot kneel on her right knee or 

crawl. The claimant cannot be exposed to unprotected 

heights or uneven or slippery surfaces. The claimant is 
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only capable of performing simple tasks and making simple 

work related decisions, such as found in SVP 1 and 2 

type jobs. The claimant cannot interact with general 

public, but she can frequently interact with coworkers 

and supervisors. 

(Tr. 23-24.) Based upon Smith’s RFC, the ALJ found that Smith is 

unable to perform her past relevant work as a laundry worker. (Tr. 

29.) However, the ALJ found that Smith was capable of performing 

other work that exists in significant numbers in the national 

economy, including office helper, assembler, and surveillance 

system monitor. (Tr. 29-30.) 

Smith believes that the ALJ committed two errors requiring 

reversal. First, Smith argues that the ALJ’s finding that Smith 

can sustain work requiring her to stand and walk for two hours 

without using an assistive device is not supported by substantial 

evidence or relevant legal standards. Second, Smith asserts that 

the mental RFC assessed by the ALJ is not supported by substantial 

evidence or relevant legal standards. 

The RFC Determination 

Smith argues that the ALJ made an erroneous RFC assessment by 

failing to incorporate Smith’s alleged need to use a cane. (DE# 

25 at 22-23.) The Commissioner does not respond to this argument, 

but maintains that the ALJ did not err because the VE identified 

a significant number of jobs that could be performed by an 

individual with Smith’s vocational profile and functional 

limitations. (DE# 31 at 10.) 
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An ALJ’s RFC assessment, as well as the hypotheticals he poses 

to the VE, “must incorporate all of the claimant’s limitations 

supported by the medical record.” Yurt v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 850, 

857 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). “Although the ALJ need 

not discuss every piece of evidence in the record, he must confront 

the evidence that does not support his conclusion and explain why 

it was rejected.” Indoranto v. Barnhart, 374 F.3d 470, 474 (7th 

Cir. 2004). Courts in this Circuit have found that failure to 

address a claimant’s use of a cane requires remand. See Thomas v. 

Colvin, 534 Fed. Appx. 546, 550 (7th Cir. 2013) (remanding where 

ALJ failed to discuss adequately claimant’s alleged need to use a 

cane); Miller v. Colvin, No. 2:13–CV–028, 2015 WL 1884782, at *11 

(N.D. Ind. Apr. 24, 2015) (same); Oplinger v. Colvin, No. 13-cv642, 2015 WL 326809, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2015) (same); Cruz 

v. Astrue, 746 F. Supp. 2d 978, 989 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (same). 

The error . . . is not that the medical evidence required

the ALJ to find that [the claimant] needed a cane to 

stand and walk, but that the ALJ failed to consider the 

issue at all, leaving us without a finding to review. 

We cannot uphold the ALJ’s decision based on a reason 

that the ALJ did not articulate. 

Thomas, 534 Fed. Appx. at 550 (emphasis in original) (citing 

Kastner v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 642, 648 (7th Cir. 2012) and Jelinek 

v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805, 811 (7th Cir. 2011)). 

In the decision, the ALJ refers to Smith’s use of a cane 

repeatedly. He discusses Smith’s hearing testimony “that she needs 
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a cane to walk significant distances and that it is hard to stand 

without a cane. The claimant testified that she could stand one 

hour with a cane, but less than five minutes without one.” (Tr. 

24 (citation omitted).) When addressing the severity of Smith’s 

degenerative joint disease impairment, the ALJ remarks that she 

“more commonly walks with a cane.” (Tr. 21 (citations omitted).) 

He also notes that Smith “was still using a cane” after recovering 

from knee surgery. (Tr. 25.) Despite acknowledging Smith’s use 

of a cane, the ALJ does not include any reasons for excluding cane 

use from the RFC. And while the ALJ concludes that Smith’s 

allegations were “not . . . entirely credible,” (Tr. 27), he does 

not discredit her alleged need for a cane. Generally discrediting 

Smith’s testimony without addressing her cane use is not sufficient 

to build the necessary “logical bridge” between the evidence and 

the ALJ’s conclusions. See Thomas, 534 Fed. Appx. at 550 (citing 

Terry, 580 F.3d at 475). 

Finally, the Court notes that the ALJ limited his questions 

to the VE to a hypothetical individual who had the same past jobs 

as Smith, but did not incorporate the use of a cane into any of 

the hypotheticals. (See Tr. 66.) By the nature of his questions, 

the ALJ prohibited the VE from considering physical limitations 

that the VE might have absorbed either through reviewing the 

evidence on the record or by listening to Smith’s hearing 

testimony. See Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1003 (7th Cir. 
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2004). Because the ALJ failed to consider Smith’s use of a cane, 

REMAND is required.

Smith’s Remaining Arguments 

Having found remand necessary on the basis of the ALJ’s 

failure to address Smith’s use of a cane, this Court finds no 

compelling reason to address Smith’s remaining arguments in 

detail. The Court has considered Smith’s request that it award 

benefits rather than remand the case for additional proceedings 

but finds remand more appropriate here. The Court makes no 

findings regarding the merits of Smith’s claims. On remand, the 

ALJ should consider all of the evidence in the record and, if 

necessary, give the parties the opportunity to expand the record 

so that the ALJ may build a logical bridge between the evidence 

and his conclusions. 

 
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CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, the final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security is REVERSED and this case is 

REMANDED to the Social Security Administration for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion pursuant to sentence four 

of 42 U.S.C. section 405(g). 

DATED: September 22, 2015 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge 

 United States District Court