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Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 48909 

C hief Justice Justices 

Maura D. Corrigan	 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Clifford W. Taylor Opinion Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED JULY 17, 2001
 

MICHAEL LEE, BRYAN DUNCIL, MARY


DUNCIL on behalf of herself and
 

JOSEPH DUNCIL, BRYAN DUNCIL, KENNETH


DUNCIL, and JON DUNCIL, as their


Next Friend, and the class of all


others similarly situated,
 

Plaintiff-Appellees,
 

v	 No. 114700
 

THE MACOMB COUNTY BOARD OF
 

COMMISSIONERS, and the COUNTY OF


MACOMB,
 

Defendant-Appellants.
 

DENNIS D. WALKER, on behalf of


himself and DAWNELL J. WALKER and
 

MELANIE WALKER, their Next Friend,


and DWAYNE STEAGALL, ERNEST GROCE,


JERRY GRAY, PAUL ECKLEY, DUANE GORE,


KENNETH JONES, MORRIS BARTOLOTTA, and


the class of all others similarly


situated,
 

Plaintiffs-Appellees,
 

v
 No. 115259
 
_____________________________ 

THE WAYNE COUNTY BOARD OF
 

COMMISSIONERS and THE COUNTY
 

OF WAYNE,
 

Defendants-Appellants.
 

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 


TAYLOR, J.
 

At issue in these two cases coming to us from Macomb and
 

Wayne counties is whether these plaintiffs have standing to
 

pursue actions to compel their respective county board of
 

commissioners to levy a tax to establish a veterans’ relief
 

fund in accordance with the soldiers’ relief fund act, MCL
 

35.21 et seq. It is uncontested that none of the plaintiffs
 

actually had sought relief under the act. Because of this,
 

the counties asserted that these litigants had suffered no
 

injury and, accordingly, that plaintiffs (1) were without
 

standing to sue and (2) had failed to exhaust statutory
 

remedies. In Lee, the Macomb County case, the trial court
 

granted summary disposition for the county on those grounds.
 

In Walker, the Wayne County case, the trial court denied the
 

county’s motion for summary disposition, concluding that
 

plaintiffs had standing and were not required to exhaust
 

statutory remedies because they alleged a complete failure to
 

comply with the act. The Court of Appeals consolidated the
 

appeals and largely reversed in Lee and affirmed in Walker.
 

235 Mich App 323; 597 NW2d 545 (1999). It concluded that
 

2
 
plaintiffs had standing to sue to compel implementation of the
 

act and that mandamus was a proper remedy. We reverse.
 

Statutory Analysis
 

In these actions, plaintiffs seek to compel the
 

legislative branch of the county government, the board of
 

commissioners, to levy a tax to establish a veterans’ relief
 

fund pursuant to the soldiers’ relief fund act. MCL 35.21
 

provides in pertinent part:1
 

The county board of commissioners of each


county shall annually levy, a tax not exceeding


1/10 of a mill on each dollar, to be levied and


collected as provided by law, upon the taxable


property of each township and city, for their


respective counties, for the purpose of creating a


fund for the relief of honorably discharged
 

indigent members of the army, navy, air force,


marine corps, coast guard, and women's auxiliaries


of all wars or military expeditions in which the


United States of America has been, is, or may


hereafter be, a participant . . . and the indigent


spouses, minor children, and parents of each such


indigent or deceased member. . . . If any money in


the fund is not necessary for the purpose for which


it was raised, the money shall remain in the


treasury of the county as a soldiers' relief fund,


and shall be considered in raising future sums


therefor. 


As can be seen, this section requires that the board of
 

commissioners create a soldiers’ relief fund by a tax levy.
 

It also, however, requires the commissioners to consider the
 

amount existing in the fund when determining the amount, if
 

1This act was initially enacted in 1899 and amended in


1984 to update antiquated language.
 

3
 
any, of the annual levy for the fund.2
 

Having thus established the funding mechanism, the act
 

then continues by providing a procedure in MCL 35.23 for
 

initiating and determining the amount of relief to be granted.
 

This section states:
 

The supervisor of each township and ward in


each of the counties of this state, and where there


is no ward supervisor the aldermen of the several


wards of every incorporated city in this state,


shall, on or before the last Monday in September in


each year, make and place in the hands of the


soldiers' relief commission of the county, a list


of all the persons entitled to relief under the


provisions of this act, and the soldiers' relief


commission, on the first Monday in October in each


year, shall proceed to determine the amount
 

necessary for aid and relief to be granted such


persons under this act, which shall be then and


there recorded in the books to be kept by the


secretary of said soldiers' relief commission. The
 

commission may determine not only the sum to be


paid, but the manner of paying the same, and may


discontinue the payment of such relief in their


discretion. Appeal may be taken therefrom to the


circuit court of such county, by certiorari by


filing application therefor with the clerk within


fifteen days following the making of such decision.


The court shall hear the case de novo and its
 

decision shall be final.
 

What is established, then, is a scheme whereby it is
 

2In response to the dissent, we note that, once the fund


is created, the act provides the commissioners with discretion


regarding the amount of the annual tax levy in light of any


amount existing in the fund. Moreover, at oral argument,


plaintiffs’ counsel conceded that the record did not establish


whether Macomb County had, at some time in the past, created


a fund by levying a tax in compliance with the act.


Presumably, the record is similarly unclear regarding whether


Wayne County, at some time in the past, created a fund by


levying a tax in compliance with the act.
 

4
 
 

anticipated that the township supervisor or ward aldermen will
 

annually prepare a list of persons eligible for relief and
 

provide this list to the soldiers’ relief commission.3 That
 

commission then, in its discretion, determines the amount of
 

relief, if any, to grant to the indigent, honorably discharged
 

veteran or dependent applicant. Moreover, the statute
 

provides that aggrieved applicants can appeal the commission’s
 

decision to the circuit court.
 

Facts and Proceedings
 

Here, without ever having sought relief under the act,
 

plaintiffs filed suit to compel Macomb and Wayne Counties to
 

levy the annual tax in order to create the fund of which the
 

act speaks. Further, they, and presumably others, will soon
 

seek damages for those years in which the counties allegedly
 

3The statute requires the supervisor or alderman to


create such a list, but it does not specify the means for


identifying eligible persons. Clearly, the supervisor or


alderman can only place persons on this list if aware or made


aware that an eligible person is in need. The supervisor or


alderman can obviously act sua sponte and include on the list


any known eligible persons. However in order to fulfill the
 

duty to “make . . . a list of all the persons entitled to


relief under the provisions of this act,” he is also obligated


to add to the list any eligible person who asks to be included


on it. (Emphasis added.) This reading of the statute, rather


than one reposing veto power with the supervisor or alderman


regarding who will be included on the list, expands the


opportunities for eligible veterans who, for whatever reason,


have not been included on the list. We opt for this expansive


reading because this is a remedial statute and we are
 

obligated to read it liberally in favor of the indigent


veterans it is intended to benefit. See Chandler v Dowell
 

Schlumberger Inc, 456 Mich 395, 398; 572 NW2d 210 (1998).
 

5 
failed to comply with the act.
 

Macomb County, in the Lee case, moved for summary
 

disposition, claiming, inter alia, lack of standing and
 

failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In support, it
 

provided the 1994 affidavit of its Department of Veterans
 

Affairs Director, which indicated that the department had,
 

through county budget appropriations, maintained a fund of
 

$1000 for veterans relief for several years and that no claims
 

for such relief had been filed for the past ten years. The
 

trial court granted Macomb County’s motion for summary
 

disposition, concluding that plaintiffs lacked standing and
 

failed to exhaust administrative remedies because they had not
 

requested relief from the local government.
 

Wayne County, in the Walker case, sought summary
 

disposition on similar grounds. It provided documentary
 

evidence indicating that, in 1994, the Wayne County Commission
 

approved an appropriation of $1,146,042 for Veterans’ Affairs
 

expenditures and that the Wayne County Soldiers Relief Program
 

had been operational since February 1995. In this case,
 

however, the trial court denied Wayne County’s motion for
 

summary disposition, concluding that plaintiffs had standing
 

because they were in the class intended to be benefitted by
 

the act and had been harmed by noncompliance with it and that
 

they were not required to exhaust administrative remedies to
 

challenge a wholesale failure to comply with the act.
 

6
 
These two cases were consolidated in the Court of
 

Appeals, which largely reversed in Lee and affirmed in
 

Walker.4 The Court of Appeals majority concluded that
 

plaintiffs had standing because they are “members of the class
 

for whose benefit the Act was enacted” and because they are
 

“detrimentally affected in a manner different from the public
 

generally.” 235 Mich App 332. The panel held that mandamus
 

was an appropriate remedy here because plaintiffs were seeking
 

compliance with the act, not the levy of a particular amount
 

or the grant of particular benefits. Id. at 333-334.
 

Finally, it concluded that plaintiffs’ actions could not be
 

dismissed on the basis of failure to exhaust statutory
 

remedies because they were alleging a wholesale failure to
 

implement and comply with the act. Id. at 335.
 

In dissent, former Justice John Fitzgerald, sitting by
 

assignment, disagreed with the majority regarding standing:
 

[P]laintiffs have not alleged any specific


injury as a result of defendants' failure to
 

establish a mechanism for evaluation of a claim for
 

benefits or of defendants' underfunding of their


respective veterans' relief funds. [Id. at 337.]
 

Explaining further he said:
 

[P]laintiffs have not alleged a distinct and


palpable injury resulting from defendants' failure


to fully comply with the statute, and consequently


their claims cannot be differentiated from those of
 

4The Court of Appeals ruled that government immunity


precluded plaintiffs’ negligence and gross negligence claims


in both cases.
 

7
 
any other citizen. As a prudential matter, courts


must exercise their jurisdiction to address
 

tangible, personal, threatened interests, not
 

generalized grievances. I am not persuaded that


plaintiffs, as private citizens whose individual


rights under the statute have not been abridged,


have standing . . . . [Id. (citations omitted).]
 

Regarding mandamus, he stated that it was inappropriate,
 

assuming standing existed, because plaintiffs were “seeking to
 

compel defendants’ exercise of discretion in a particular
 

manner” that is beyond the scope of mandamus Id. at 338-339.
 

This Court granted leave to appeal. 462 Mich 912 (2000).
 

Standard of Review
 

Whether a party has standing is a question of law. This
 

Court reviews questions of law de novo. Stitt v Holland
 

Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591, 595; 614 NW2d 88
 

(2000). 


Standing
 

It is important, initially, to recognize that in
 

Michigan, as in the federal system, standing is of great
 

consequence so that neglect of it would imperil the
 

constitutional architecture whereby governmental powers are
 

divided between the three branches of government.
 

Standing, as a requirement to enter the courts, is a
 

venerable doctrine in the federal system that derives from US
 

Const, art III, § 1, which confers only “judicial power” on
 

the courts and from US Const, art III, § 2's limitation of the
 

8
 
judicial power to “Cases” and “Controversies.”5 In several
 

recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has discussed
 

the close relationship between standing and separation of
 

powers. In Lewis v Casey, 518 US 343, 349; 116 S Ct 2174; 135
 

L Ed 2d 606 (1996), Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
 

said:
 

[T]he doctrine of standing [is] a
 

constitutional principle that prevents courts of


law from undertaking tasks assigned to the
 

political branches. It is the role of courts to
 

provide relief to claimants, in individual or class


actions, who have suffered, or will imminently


suffer, actual harm; it is not the role of courts,


but that of the political branches, to shape the


institutions of government in such fashion as to


comply with the laws and the Constitution.
 

[Citations omitted.]
 

Lewis was foreshadowed in Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife,
 

504 US 555, 559-560; 112 S Ct 2130; 119 L Ed 2d 351 (1992),
 

5The first clause of US Const, art III, § 2 states:
 

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases,


in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,


the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,


or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to


all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public


Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty


and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to
 

which the United States shall be a Party;—to


Controversies between two or more States;—between a


State and Citizens of another State;—between


Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of


the same State claiming Lands under Grants of


different States, and between a State, or the


Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or


Subjects.
 

9
 
where Justice Scalia, again speaking for the Court, explained:
 

[T]he Constitution's central mechanism of
 

separation of powers depends largely upon common


understanding of what activities are appropriate to


legislatures, to executives, and to courts. . . .


One of those landmarks, setting apart the "Cases"


and "Controversies" that are of the justiciable


sort referred to in Article III—"serv[ing] to


identify those disputes which are appropriately


resolved through the judicial process,"—is the


doctrine of standing. Though some of its elements


express merely prudential considerations that are


part of judicial self-government, the core
 

component of standing is an essential and
 

unchanging part of the case-or-controversy


requirement of Article III. [Citations omitted.]
 

In Plaut v Spendthrift Farm, Inc, 514 US 211, 219-225;
 

115 S Ct 1447; 131 L Ed 2d 328 (1995), Justice Scalia, in
 

another majority opinion, provided a detailed analysis of the
 

concern with preserving the separation of powers between the
 

legislative and judicial branches, that traced its history
 

back to the framers of the U.S. Constitution.
 

Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist even more dramatically
 

stated the case in his majority opinion in Raines v Byrd, 521
 

US 811, 818, 820; 117 S Ct 2312; 138 L Ed 2d 849 (1997):
 

“No principle is more fundamental to the


judiciary's proper role in our system of government


than the constitutional limitation of federal-court
 

jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.”
 

* * *
 

“[T]he law of Art III standing is built on a


single basic idea—the idea of separation of
 

powers.”
 

In Michigan, standing has developed on a track parallel
 

10
 
to the federal doctrine, albeit by way of an additional
 

constitutional underpinning. In addition to Const 1963, art
 

6, § 1, which vests the state “judicial power” in the courts,
 

Const 1963, art 3, § 2 expressly directs that the powers of
 

the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary be
 

separate.6 Concern with maintaining the separation of powers,
 

as in the federal courts, has caused this Court over the years
 

to be vigilant in preventing the judiciary from usurping the
 

powers of the political branches. Early on, the great
 

constitutional scholar Justice Thomas M. Cooley discussed the
 

concept of separation of powers in the context of declining to
 

issue a mandamus against the Governor in Sutherland v
 

Governor, 29 Mich 320, 324 (1874):
 

Our government is one whose powers have been


carefully apportioned between three distinct
 

departments, which emanate alike from the people,


have their powers alike limited and defined by the


constitution, are of equal dignity, and within


their respective spheres of action equally


independent. One makes the laws, another applies


the laws in contested cases, while the third must


see that the laws are executed. This division is
 

accepted as a necessity in all free governments,


and the very apportionment of power to one
 

department is understood to be a prohibition of its
 

The powers of government are divided into


three branches: legislative, executive and
 

judicial. No person exercising the powers of one


branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to


another branch except as expressly provided in this


constitution.
 

11
 

6 
exercise by either of the others. The executive is
 

forbidden to exercise judicial power by the same


implication which forbids the courts to take upon


themselves his duties.
 

This position followed from the even earlier iteration of the
 

standing doctrine by Justice Campbell in 1859 when, speaking
 

for this Court, he said:
 

By the judicial power of courts is generally


understood the power to hear and determine
 

controversies between adverse parties, and
 

questions in litigation. [Daniels v People, 6 Mich
 

381, 388 (1859)(emphasis added).]
 

Later, in Risser v Hoyt, 53 Mich 185, 193; 18 NW 611 (1884),
 

this Court explained:
 

The judicial power referred to is the
 

authority to hear and decide controversies, and to


make binding orders and judgments respecting them.


[Emphasis added.]
 

More recently, Johnson v Kramer Bros Freight Lines, Inc, 357
 

Mich 254, 258; 98 NW2d 586 (1959), reaffirmed this concept by
 

quoting this portion of Risser.
 

In fleshing out the tests that a litigant must meet to
 

establish standing, the most recent majority iteration from
 

this Court7 is found in House Speaker v Governor, 441 Mich
 

547, 554; 495 NW2d 539 (1993):
 

Standing is a legal term used to denote the


existence of a party's interest in the outcome of


litigation that will ensure sincere and vigorous


advocacy. However, evidence that a party will
 

7This Court addressed standing in Detroit Fire Fighters
 

Ass’n v Detroit, 449 Mich 629; 537 NW2d 436 (1995), but a


majority did not agree on a standing test.
 

12
 
 

engage in full and vigorous advocacy, by itself, is


insufficient to establish standing. Standing


requires a demonstration that the plaintiff's


substantial interest will be detrimentally affected


in a manner different from the citizenry at large.
 

House Speaker provided a general description of standing and
 

articulated the requirement of an interest distinct from that
 

of the public. However, further explication of the essential
 

elements of standing has proven difficult as demonstrated by
 

this Court’s experience in attempting to fashion a clear
 

majority in Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n v Detroit, 449 Mich
 

629; 537 NW2d 436 (1995). In that case, the separate opinions
 

suggested different inquiries as being central to determining
 

standing. Some focused on whether the plaintiff could
 

establish an injury distinct from that of the public, others
 

on whether the plaintiffs were in the zone of interest the
 

statutory or constitutional provision at issue is designed to
 

regulate. Perhaps the clearest template was set forward by
 

Justice Cavanagh who, along with Justice Boyle, advocated
 

adopting the United States Supreme Court’s Lujan test. Lujan
 

held:
 

Over the years, our cases have established
 

that the irreducible constitutional minimum of
 

standing contains three elements. First, the


plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"—an


invasion of a legally protected interest which is


(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) "actual or


imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.' "


Second, there must be a causal connection between


the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury


has to be "fairly . . . trace[able] to the
 

challenged action of the defendant, and not . . .
 

13
 
th[e] result [of] the independent action of some


third party not before the court." Third, it must


be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative,"


that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable


decision." 


The party invoking . . . jurisdiction bears


the burden of establishing these elements. [504 US


560-561 (citations omitted).]
 

In our view, the Lujan test has the virtues of articulating
 

clear criteria and of establishing the burden of demonstrating
 

these elements. Moreover, its three elements appear to us to
 

be fundamental to standing; the United States Supreme Court
 

described them as establishing the “irreducible constitutional
 

minimum” of standing. We agree. Accordingly, we now join
 

Justice Cavanagh’s view and adopt the Lujan test, which should
 

be seen as supplementing the holding in House Speaker, as well
 

as this Court’s earlier standing jurisprudence, e.g., Daniels
 

and Risser, supra.
 

Applying this test in the present case, it is clear that
 

plaintiffs lack standing. In Lujan terms, they have not yet
 

suffered any “injury in fact.” See 504 US 560. Specifically,
 

they have shown no “invasion of a legally protected interest
 

which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or
 

imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Id. at 560.
 

Both groups of plaintiffs have alleged and argued only that
 

they “should receive” and “should have received, the benefit
 

of the property tax levy required by MCL 35.21,” and that the
 

failure to levy and collect the tax set forth in the soldiers’
 

14
 
relief fund act “has caused, and continues to cause,
 

plaintiffs great harm and damage.” Even if accepted as true,
 

these allegations cannot satisfy the Lujan injury in fact
 

requirement because it is not readily apparent how the
 

collection of a tax pursuant to the act would have benefitted
 

plaintiffs in a concrete and particularized manner. MCL 35.23
 

provides that the soldiers’ relief commission is to determine
 

the amount and manner of any relief thereunder and that it may
 

discontinue such relief in its discretion. Thus, the amount
 

of relief, if any, that plaintiffs might have received under
 

this act is solely within the discretion of the commission.8
 

“[G]reat harm and damage” is not concrete or particularized.
 

Plaintiffs also fail to explain, with particularity, what is
 

meant by “the benefit of the property tax levy required by MCL
 

8The dissent argues that it is “inescapable” that relief


under that act would have benefitted the indigent plaintiffs


in a concrete and particularized manner. Slip op, p 8. We
 

surmise that the idea is that any claimant would be better off


with more money. Yet this verity misses the point. The issue
 

is whether plaintiffs can demonstrate a concrete and
 

particularized injury arising out of the alleged failure of


the counties to levy a tax in accordance with the act.


Moreover, even if we jump ahead, as the dissent would, to the


point where fund distribution to plaintiffs was at issue, it


is not “inescapable” that plaintiffs would receive funds
 

because the commission would likely exercise its discretion to


avoid duplicating other government and private social welfare


programs. Thus, the commission could, even if plaintiffs were


indigent, decide not to award funds to them.
 

Thus, for all these reasons, what might be received, if


anything, far from being concrete and particularized, is


simply uncertain.
 

15
 
35.21.” At most, we can only speculate how the existence of
 

a fund would have helped plaintiffs. Accordingly, plaintiffs
 

lack standing to pursue the present actions.
 

In the absence of standing, we will not address
 

plaintiffs’ substantive claims.
 

Conclusion
 

Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring the present
 

actions. We accordingly reverse the Court of Appeals
 

determination that they have standing and remand these actions
 

to the respective circuit courts for entry of orders
 

dismissing plaintiffs’ actions on the basis of lack of
 

standing.
 

CORRIGAN, C.J., and YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with
 

TAYLOR, J.
 

16
 
 

____________________________________ 

____________________________________ 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
 

SUPREME COURT
 

MICHAEL LEE, BRYAN DUNCIL, MARY


DUNCIL on behalf of herself and
 

JOSEPH DUNCIL, BRYAN DUNCIL, KENNETH


DUNCIL, and JON DUNCIL, as their


Next Friend, and the class of all


others similarly situated,
 

Plaintiff-Appellees,
 

v No. 114700
 

THE MACOMB COUNTY BOARD OF
 

COMMISSIONERS, and the COUNTY OF


MACOMB,
 

Defendant-Appellants.
 

DENNIS D. WALKER, on behalf of


himself and DAWNELL J. WALKER and
 

MELANIE WALKER, their Next Friend,


and DWAYNE STEAGALL, ERNEST GROCE,


JERRY GRAY, PAUL ECKLEY, DUANE GORE,


KENNETH JONES, MORRIS BARTOLOTTA, and


the class of all others similarly


situated,
 

Plaintiffs-Appellees,
 

v No. 115259
 

THE WAYNE COUNTY BOARD OF
 

COMMISSIONERS and THE COUNTY
 

OF WAYNE,
 

Defendants-Appellants.
 

WEAVER, J. (concurring).
 
I concur in the majority’s decision to reverse the
 

judgment of the Court of Appeals. I write separately because
 

I disagree with the majority’s decision to adopt the Lujan1
 

standing requirements. I would find that the plaintiffs have
 

standing. However, I agree with the decision to reverse;
 

because the relief requested is a discretionary act, I would
 

find that mandamus is not an appropriate remedy in this case.
 

Although I would hold that no relief can be granted in
 

this case, I am still cognizant of the great debt that our
 

society owes to its veterans. The soldiers’ relief act was
 

first enacted in 1899, “to provide relief outside of the
 

soldiers’ home for honorably discharged indigent soldiers,
 

sailors and marines, and the indigent wives, widows and minor
 

children of such indigent or deceased soldiers, sailors and
 

marines . . . .” 1899 PA 214. I think it is appropriate to
 

consider the last paragraph of the report on the Spanish-


American War included in the Michigan Legislative Manual and
 

Official Directory for the years 1899-1900, p 693:
 

The forces that went into the war with Spain,


from Michigan, were actuated by the highest


motives. They came from every employment and walk


of life, yet none entered that service without a


sacrifice. All left peaceful homes with
 

comfortable surroundings and sure sources of income


to risk their lives in battle or in camp in
 

1Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555; 112 S Ct


2130; 119 L Ed 2d 351 (1992).
 

2
 
 

response to the call of duty and patriotism. Some
 

were killed in battle, others died of diseases


incident to life in camp under new and untried


conditions. Some came home comparatively unharmed,


while others, and very many others, came bringing


with them the seeds of disease and infirmities from
 

which they will always suffer. There is but one
 

proposition to make. The people of Michigan in


common with the people of this great nation owe a


debt of gratitude and love to those who in any way
 

represented them in the glorious contest for
 

humanity so happily and successfully ended by our


treaty of peace with Spain, and we should not


forget now or hereafter any of the obligations


imposed on us by this debt. 


I
 

Unlike constitutional cases in federal courts, the
 

Michigan standing requirements have been based on prudential,
 

rather than constitutional, concerns. See, generally, House
 

Speaker v State Administrative Bd, 441 Mich 547, 559, n 20;
 

495 NW2d 539 (1993), and Justice RILEY’s dissent in Detroit
 

Fire Fighters Ass’n v Detroit 449 Mich 629; 537 NW2d 436
 

(1995). Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court
 

have recognized that we are not required to comply with the
 

federal rules regarding standing.2 I believe that adopting
 

2In House Speaker we stated that “this Court is not bound
 

to follow federal cases regarding standing,” pointing out that


“[o]ne notable distinction between federal and state standing


analysis is the power of this Court to issue advisory


opinions. Const 1963, art 3, §8. Under Article III of the
 

federal constitution, federal courts may issue opinions only


where there is an actual case or controversy.” Id., p 559,


including n 20. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in


ASARCO Inc v Kadish, 490 US 605, 617; 109 S Ct 2037; 104 L Ed


(continued...)
 

3
 
the federal standing test as set forth in Lujan v Defenders of
 

Wildlife, 504 US 555; 112 S Ct 2130; 119 L Ed 2d 351 (1992),
 

is unnecessary; therefore I decline to supplement the current
 

standing doctrine of this Court.
 

Applying Michigan’s traditional rules of standing, I
 

would find that the plaintiffs have standing to bring the
 

present action. In Michigan, it is well settled that all
 

disgruntled citizens do not automatically have standing to sue
 

a public body. In House Speaker, supra at 554, we said:
 

Standing is a legal term used to denote the


existence of a party’s interest in the outcome of


litigation that will ensure sincere and vigorous


advocacy. However, evidence that a party will


engage in full and vigorous advocacy, by itself,


is insufficient to establish standing. Standing


requires a demonstration that the plaintiff’s


substantial interest will be detrimentally affected


in a manner different from the citizenry at large.
 

The usual rule has been that a private citizen has no standing
 

to vindicate a public wrong or enforce a public right where
 

that citizen has not been hurt in any manner different than
 

the citizenry at large. Waterford Sch Dist v State Bd of Ed,
 

98 Mich App 658, 662; 296 NW2d 328 (1980). 


2(...continued)


2d 696 (1989), acknowledged:
 

We have recognized often that the constraints


of Article III do not apply to state courts, and


accordingly the state courts are not bound by the


limitations of a case or controversy or other


federal rules of justiciability . . . .
 

4
 
However, while a private suit is generally precluded when
 

a violation of a public duty is claimed, a private action can
 

be maintained if the public duty also was intended to benefit
 

private individuals. Taylor v Lake Shore & M S R Co, 45 Mich
 

74, 77; 7 NW 728 (1881). Justice COOLEY, speaking for the
 

Court, explained that “[t]he nature of the duty and the
 

benefits to be accomplished through its performance must
 

generally determine whether it is a duty to the public in part
 

or exclusively, or whether individuals may claim that it is a
 

duty imposed wholly or in part for their especial benefit.”
 

Id. See also Gardner v Wood, 429 Mich 290; 414 NW2d 706
 

(1987). 


The plain language of the soldiers’ relief fund act3
 

unequivocally supports the notion that the statute was enacted
 

solely to benefit citizens in the same class as the
 

plaintiffs, i.e., honorably discharged, indigent veterans.
 

Clearly, the plaintiffs possess an interest in the soldiers’
 

relief fund that is “different from the public at large.”
 

Moreover, the relief sought does indeed more directly and
 

3
 

The county board of commissioners of each


county shall annually levy, a tax not exceeding


1/10 of a mill on each dollar . . . for the purpose


of creating a fund for the relief of honorably


discharged indigent members of the army, navy, air


force, marine corps, coast guard, and women’s


auxiliaries of all wars or military


expeditions . . . . See MCL 35.21.
 

5
 
tangibly benefit the plaintiffs than it does the public at
 

large. In this case, the plaintiffs made a proper showing
 

that they were injured in a manner distinct from the citizenry
 

at large. Therefore, I would find that the plaintiffs have
 

standing to pursue the instant action.
 

II
 

Plaintiffs ask that the defendant counties be ordered to
 

begin assessing taxes to maintain their soldiers’ relief
 

funds. However, this particular duty, which is covered by MCL
 

35.21, is discretionary, and therefore is not a proper subject
 

for mandamus. Because I would find that mandamus is not an
 

appropriate remedy in this case, I agree with the majority’s
 

result. 


It is well settled that an order of mandamus will be
 

issued only if the plaintiffs have a clear legal right to the
 

performance of the specific duty sought to be compelled and
 

the defendant has a clear legal duty to perform the same.
 

State Bd of Ed v Houghton Schs, 430 Mich 658, 666; 425 NW2d 80
 

(1988). The act sought to be compelled must not be
 

discretionary. It must be of a ministerial nature, and it
 

must be prescribed by law with such precision and certainty as
 

to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment.
 

If any reasonable doubts exist regarding the question of
 

6
 
discretion or want of discretion, the courts will hesitate to
 

interfere. See In re MCI Telecommunications, 460 Mich 396;
 

596 NW2d 164 (1999), Oakland Schs Bd of Ed v Sup’t of Pub
 

Instruction, 401 Mich 37; 257 NW2d 73 (1977) and Taylor v
 

Ottawa Circuit Judge, 343 Mich 440; 72 NW2d 146 (1955). 


Here, the county board of commissioners is given the
 

authority and the discretion to determine the amount of the
 

tax to be levied; the only limit it is given is that it not
 

exceed 1/10 of a mill. The first sentence of MCL 35.21
 

provides:
 

The county board of commissioner of each


county shall annually levy, a tax not exceeding


1/10 of a mill on each dollar, to be levied and


collected as provided by law, upon the taxable


property of each township and city, for their


respective counties, for the purpose of creating a


fund for the relief of honorably discharged
 

indigent . . . .
 

Further, the last sentence of MCL 35.21 states 


If any money in the fund is not necessary for


the purpose for which it was raised, the money


shall remain in the treasury of the county as a


soldiers' relief fund, and shall be considered in


raising future sums therefor.
 

Additionally, the soldiers’ relief commission is required to
 

make an annual report of the money on hand, the money it is
 

expending, and how much it believes will be needed for the
 

next year. Therefore the relief requested by the plaintiffs,
 

7
 
that the defendant counties be ordered to begin assessing
 

taxes under the statute, is a discretionary act, and mandamus
 

is not an appropriate remedy. 


There is no specific relief the Court could provide, as
 

we cannot require the county to assess a specific amount.
 

Accordingly, I concur with the majority opinion’s result
 

reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
 

8
 
___________________________________ 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
 

SUPREME COURT
 

MICHAEL LEE, BRYAN DUNCIL, MARY


DUNCIL on behalf of herself and
 

JOSEPH DUNCIL, BRYAN DUNCIL,


KENNETH DUNCIL, and JON DUNCIL,


as their Next Friend, and the class


of all others similarly situated,
 

Plaintiffs-Appellees,
 

v No. 114700
 

THE MACOMB COUNTY BOARD OF
 

COMMISSIONERS, and the COUNTY OF


MACOMB,
 

Defendants-Appellants.
 

DENNIS D. WALKER, on behalf of


himself and DAWNELL J. WALKER and
 

MELANIE WALKER, their Next Friend,


and DWAYNE STEAGALL, ERNEST GROCE,


JERRY GRAY, PAUL ECKLEY, DUANE GORE,


KENNETH JONES, MORRIS BARTOLOTTA,


and the class of all others similarly


situated.
 

Plaintiffs-Appellees,
 

v No. 115259
 
___________________________________ 

THE WAYNE COUNTY BOARD OF 


COMMISSIONERS and the COUNTY OF
 

WAYNE,
 

Defendants-Appellants.
 

KELLY, J. (dissenting).
 

I disagree with the majority's reversal of the Court of
 

Appeals decision. I believe plaintiffs have standing to bring
 

the current actions and mandamus has been appropriately
 

sought. I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision that
 

reversed summary disposition in favor of Macomb County and
 

affirmed denial of Wayne County's motion for summary
 

disposition.
 

I. THE STATUTES
 

Plaintiffs alleged in their complaints that defendants
 

violated the soldiers' relief fund act1 by failing to comply
 

with their duty to levy and collect a tax and perform other
 

obligations. Section 1 of the act creates a relief fund by
 

mandating an annual tax levy and payment of the moneys
 

collected to the county treasurer. MCL 35.21. 


The method for disbursing moneys from the fund appears at
 

§ 3 of the act. This section mandates the compilation of a
 

list of persons entitled to relief under the act and a
 

1MCL 35.21 et seq.
 

2
 
 

determination of the amount of relief to be granted to such
 

persons. MCL 35.23.2
 

In summary, a relief fund was to be established and an
 

annual compilation of the names of persons entitled to monies
 

from the fund was to be made. Many of the actions of the
 

county board of commissioners, the township supervisors and
 

the soldiers' relief commission that are described in the
 

statute are mandatory, as evidenced by use of the word
 

"shall."
 

Under the act, the county board of commissioners has a
 

duty to levy a tax annually. The supervisor of each township
 

and ward is obligated to make a list of persons eligible for
 

relief and give that list to the soldiers' relief commission.
 

The soldiers' relief commission must determine the amount of
 

money to be distributed to the persons on the list. The
 

county board of commissioners is obligated to pay the money
 

from the taxes to the county treasurer, who disburses the
 

money at the order of the soldiers' relief commission.
 

The majority focuses on the discretion that the act gives
 

the soldiers' relief commission to set the amount to be
 

distributed. However, plaintiffs do not allege that the
 

2Pursuant to MCL 35.622, the soldiers' relief commission


was declared inoperative and its duties and powers transferred


to the county department of veterans' affairs. This opinion


will continue to refer to the soldiers' relief commission for
 

the sake of consistency.
 

3
 
soldiers' relief commission failed to comply with the act, nor
 

do they request money from it. Rather, plaintiffs seek to
 

compel the creation of a relief fund through the levy and
 

collection of an annual tax. The majority's reliance on the
 

discretion of the soldiers' relief commission ignores the fact
 

that the act gives no discretion whatsoever regarding whether
 

taxes are levied and a fund created. It mandates these acts
 

and directs the board of commissioners to accomplish them.
 

In the cases before us, plaintiffs claim that the county
 

boards of commissioners failed to comply with the act and
 

perform their nondiscretionary duties. Plaintiffs alleged in
 

their complaints that the county boards of commissioners had
 

not at any time levied a tax for the soldiers' relief fund.3
 

This failure to comply with the nondiscretionary obligations
 

3It appears that the allegation regarding the Macomb


County Board of Commissioners may have been overstated.


Plaintiffs' counsel conceded during oral argument that the


record does not establish whether a fund was created in Macomb
 

County at sometime in the past and later eliminated.
 

Nevertheless, it must be remembered that these cases challenge


rulings made on motions for summary disposition brought under


MCR 2.116(C)(8). In ruling on these motions, only the


pleadings are considered. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109,


119-120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). Therefore, the concession is


not relevant to the resolution of this appeal.
 

Moreover, plaintiffs' complaints alleged ongoing


violations of the act. Whether a fund went into and out of
 

existence during the last century has no bearing on the


allegation that the Macomb County Board of Commissioners


failed to comply with the act at the time plaintiffs filed


their complaint.
 

4
 
of the act is the basis of plaintiffs' claims. Hence, the
 

majority's focus on the discretionary nature of the soldiers'
 

relief commission's duties camouflages the relevant fact: no
 

discretion exists that permits the county boards of
 

commissioners not to levy taxes for a soldiers' relief fund.4
 

II. STANDING
 

The trial court decisions in these matters were made on
 

motions for summary disposition and are reviewed de novo.
 

Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). In
 

both cases, defendants challenged plaintiffs' standing under
 

MCR 2.116(C)(8). Such motions test the legal sufficiency of
 

the complaint, and, when ruling on them, the court may
 

consider only the pleadings. A trial judge may grant summary
 

disposition where the claims alleged are "so clearly
 

unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development
 

could possibly justify recovery." Id. at 119. 


The majority has concluded that summary disposition was
 

properly granted to Macomb County and improperly denied to
 

Wayne County. It adopts the test for standing articulated in
 

Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555; 112 S Ct 2130; 119
 

4As noted by the majority and the concurrence, the act


gives the county boards of commissioners discretion in


determining the amount of the annual tax levy. However, this


fact does not in any way undermine plaintiffs' claims. As
 

evidenced by the word "shall," there is no discretion


regarding whether to levy an annual tax. 


5
 
L Ed 2d 351 (1992). It then finds that plaintiffs failed to
 

establish standing under the test. 


While I agree with the majority's adoption of the Lujan
 

test, I cannot agree that plaintiffs lack standing. That
 

conclusion ignores the nature of plaintiffs' claims.
 

Plaintiffs did not appeal from the denial of benefits under
 

the act. Instead, they sought to compel defendants to comply
 

with the act. That the amount of relief "is solely within the
 

discretion of the commission" is irrelevant to a determination
 

of the injury plaintiffs sustained from defendants' failure to
 

establish a relief fund in compliance with the act.
 

To withstand summary disposition on the basis of
 

standing, plaintiffs must plead that they suffered an injury
 

in fact through defendants' failure to comply with the
 

mandates of the soldiers' relief fund act. They have done so.
 

They have alleged that they are members of the class of
 

persons for whose benefit the fund was intended. They have
 

alleged that defendants failed to (1) levy a tax to establish
 

the relief fund, and (2) pay the collected moneys to the
 

county treasurer, both of which were for the benefit and
 

relief of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have asserted that, because
 

defendants failed to comply with the act and establish the
 

fund, plaintiffs could not apply for or receive benefits to
 

which the act entitled them. 


6
 
 

Because plaintiffs have alleged failure to establish a
 

relief fund and denial of the opportunity to apply for or
 

receive its benefits, they have sufficiently asserted an
 

injury in fact. There is no need for them to allege precisely
 

how the fund would have helped them. Had it been established,
 

plaintiffs have alleged that they would have applied for
 

financial assistance. 


It is inescapable that the creation of a fund and the
 

opportunity for indigents to receive its financial assistance
 

would have benefitted plaintiffs in a concrete and
 

particularized manner. By definition, to be indigent is to be
 

"needy and poor, or one who has not sufficient property to
 

furnish him a living nor anyone able to support him to whom he
 

is entitled to look for support." Black's Law Dictionary (6th
 

ed). Through their assertions, plaintiffs have sufficiently
 

alleged "specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the
 

challenged practices harmed [them], and that [they] personally
 

would benefit in a tangible way from the court's
 

intervention." Warth v Seldin, 422 US 490, 508; 95 S Ct 2197;
 

45 L Ed 2d 343 (1975).
 

The majority determines that plaintiffs' claims are
 

"uncertain" because plaintiffs do not allege a likelihood that
 

the soldiers' relief commission would have granted funds to
 

them. Under this test, no plaintiffs could ever have standing
 

7
 
to contest defendants' failure to establish a relief fund. No
 

plaintiff could know how a soldiers' relief commission would
 

have exercised its discretion. If plaintiffs' had sought
 

relief within the discretion of the soldiers' relief
 

commission, what could they be required to allege to defeat a
 

motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8)? I
 

submit that it is only that, under a reasonable exercise of
 

discretion, the soldiers' relief commission would have granted
 

them relief. Plaintiffs in these cases made that showing by
 

alleging their eligibility, as veterans and as indigents. 


However, that the amount of relief distributed was solely
 

within the discretion of the soldiers' relief commissions is
 

in no way related to whether plaintiffs suffered an injury in
 

fact. Since plaintiffs alleged injury from defendants'
 

failure to establish funds in accordance with the act, the
 

issue of discretion in administering the funds is irrelevant.
 

Plaintiffs also adequately pleaded facts that established
 

the second element of the Lujan test. The causal connection
 

between their alleged injuries and defendants' alleged conduct
 

or failure to act is illustrated in the reasoning above. If
 

defendants had complied with the requirements of the act,
 

plaintiffs have asserted that they would have applied for
 

benefits. There is no indication that the failure to comply
 

8
 
with the provisions of the act was the result of the
 

independent action of a third party.
 

Finally, plaintiffs have pleaded facts sufficient to
 

fulfill the third element of the Lujan test. They seek to
 

compel defendants' full compliance with the soldiers' relief
 

fund act. On the basis of the pleadings, plaintiffs have
 

alleged sufficient facts to establish that their injuries
 

would be redressed if these cases were returned for further
 

proceedings. 


For these reasons, I would conclude that plaintiffs have
 

standing under the test in Lujan.
 

III. MANDAMUS
 

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that cannot be
 

invoked to compel discretionary actions. Teasel v Dep't of
 

Mental Health, 419 Mich 390, 409-410; 355 NW2d 75 (1984).
 

However, an order of mandamus can be issued where "a body or
 

an officer [is] charged with a duty to take action in the
 

matter, notwithstanding the fact that the execution of that
 

duty may involve some measure of discretion." Id. at 410. 


Therefore, mandamus can compel a body or officer to
 

exercise discretion, but cannot compel the manner in which the
 

discretion is exercised. Id. To issue an order of mandamus,
 

9
 
a defendant must have a clear legal duty and a plaintiff must
 

have a clear legal right to have the duty performed. Toan v
 

McGinn, 271 Mich 28, 33; 260 NW 108 (1935).
 

The relevant parts of the soldiers' relief fund act are
 

phrased in terms of clear legal duties that are applicable to
 

defendants. Under the act, the county board of commissioners
 

is charged with the duty of levying taxes on an annual basis.
 

It is the exercise of duty that plaintiffs seek to compel, a
 

proper purpose for the issuance of an order of mandamus.
 

The act also imposes a legal duty on defendants to create
 

a fund for the relief of honorably discharged indigent
 

veterans and their indigent spouses, minor children, and
 

parents. It establishes a clear legal right to relief for
 

certain persons, including the class that plaintiffs seek to
 

represent. Whether persons eligible under the act receive
 

relief is dependent on compliance by defendants in
 

establishing a relief fund. Defendants have clear legal
 

duties and plaintiffs have a clear legal right to have
 

defendants perform their duties. Mandamus is appropriately
 

sought.
 

IV. CONCLUSION
 

The soldiers' relief fund act, however arcane, is valid
 

and binding law. The Legislature could have chosen to repeal
 

it at any time during the last century, but did not do so.
 

10
 
Moreover, it is apparent from the fact that the Legislature
 

amended the act in 1984 that it made a conscious decision not
 

to repeal it.
 

The majority's reliance on that portion of the act giving
 

the soldiers' relief commission discretion in granting relief
 

ignores the nature of plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs did not
 

contend that the soldiers' relief commission failed to comply
 

with the act. Nor did plaintiffs seek relief within the
 

discretion of that commission. Therefore, the fact that the
 

amount of relief "is solely within the discretion" of the
 

soldiers' relief commission, as the majority points out, is
 

irrelevant to the claims presented here. What plaintiffs seek
 

is to compel the county boards of commissioners to comply with
 

their mandatory obligation to annually levy taxes and to
 

create relief funds. 


As noted by the majority, the soldiers' relief fund act
 

is remedial and should be read liberally in favor of
 

plaintiffs, its intended beneficiaries. See Chandler v Dowell
 

Schlumberger Inc, 456 Mich 395, 398; 572 NW2d 210 (1998).
 

Plaintiffs alleged that they suffered an injury in fact
 

through defendants' failure to establish relief funds and
 

denial of the opportunity to apply for or receive benefits
 

under the act. These claims are not so unenforceable as a
 

matter of law that no factual basis could possibly justify
 

11
 
recovery. 


Plaintiffs have satisfied the criteria under the Lujan
 

test, establishing standing. The soldiers' relief fund act
 

charges defendants with the duty to take action in plaintiffs'
 

interest. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly determined
 

that plaintiffs had standing to bring suit and that mandamus
 

was a proper remedy. Accordingly, I would affirm the decision
 

of the Court of Appeals.
 

CAVANAGH, J., concurred with KELLY, J.
 

12