UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

KIMBERLY SUE KRAEMER, )

)

Plaintiff )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 1:14-CV-170 

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UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, et al., )

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Defendants )

)

OPINION AND ORDER

Kimberly Kraemer filed a pro se complaint in state court asserting a variety

of claims against multiple defendants. United Parcel Service and the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission removed the case to federal court under 28

U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1442, contending that consent of the eight remaining

defendants wasn’t necessary because the claims against them didn’t arise under

federal law or invoke supplemental jurisdiction. Magistrate Judge Cosbey agreed

and directed the parties to show cause why the claims against the “non-joining

defendants” – William Richards PC, the Law Offices of McNeeley Stephensen,

Thopy, and Harrold, Haulers Insurance Company, Indiana Farm Bureau, the

American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the Humane Society of

the United States, the American Kennel Club, Inc., and the Grant County Sheriff’s

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Department – shouldn’t be severed and remanded to the Grant County Circuit

Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)(2). 

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Ms. Kraemer’s response to that order generated a flood of filings, including

the ten motions to dismiss and eleven miscellaneous motions now before the

court. For the reasons that follow, the court grants the motions to dismiss by

defendants UPS and the EEOC, severs the claims against the non-joining

defendants, and denies the remaining motions as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

Ms. Kraemer’s complaint contains multiple “allegations” of alleged

wrongdoing by the defendants, a lengthy and disjointed “explanation” of those

allegations, and 150 pages of random documents, but provides little or no insight

into the legal basis of the claims she asserts. Briefly summarized, Ms. Kraemer

alleges that:

1. McNeeley, Stephenson, Thopy & Harrold, Brett Haacker, and Scott

Richards (attorneys for Indiana Farm Bureau and Haulers Insurance

Company) brought a “fraudulent insurance case” against her after an

automobile accident in March 2012, “conspired ... to prevent the drivers

involved in the accident from testifying ...”, and engaged in conduct that

Ms. Kraemer and five of the non-joining defendants (the AKC, ASPCA,

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Humane Society, Haulers Insurance Company, and the Grant County Sheriff’s

Department) responded to the show cause order. 

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violated the professional standards of ethical conduct and the “law” during

the course of that litigation. (Allegations 1 and 9; Explanation of

Allegations).

2. UPS “improperly and unlawfully” retaliated against her and

terminated her employment in February 2011, after she complained about

being sexually harassed, stalked, and discriminated against by a male

supervisor, and “perpetrated a fraud ... by placing her in an ‘Employee

Dispute Resolution Program’ ... in an attempt to dissuade Ms. Kraemer from

filing charges against UPS.” (Allegations 2-5, 8, 12, 14-18; Explanation of

Allegations).

3. “One or more attorneys provided improper and unethical legal

advice to [UPS], which advice resulted in retaliatory action being initiated

against [Ms. Kraemer],” and violated her “Equal Employment Opportunity

Rights”. (Allegation 7)

4. The EEOC failed to investigate her complaint against UPS.

(Allegation 10).

5. The Grant County Sheriff’s Department refused to investigate her

complaints of “harassment, stalking, and death treats”. (Allegations 6 and

19).

6. “Through the use of legal means, United Parcel Service, Mr. Brett

Haacker and his law firm [McNeeley, Stephenson, Thopy, and Harrold], ...

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Indiana Farm Bureau Insurance, [and] the American Society for the

Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) ... perpetrated ‘legal harassment’

and ‘legal stalking’ of [Ms.] Kraemer.” (Allegation 11). 

7. UPS conspired with the ASPCA, Humane Society of the United

States, and “insurance companies” to pass laws that “prevent citizens from

owning property including animals”, to “defeat animal laws that benefit

United Parcel Service”, and to “harass” and “target” Ms. Kraemer and other

animal rights advocates and breeders because they “attack[] [their]

propaganda.” (Allegation 13; Explanation of Allegations).

8. The AKC and “some of its members” harassed Ms. Kraemer,

“attack[ed] [her] mother by trying to revoke her dog’s registration status”,

and, in 2008, aided a third party “in stealing intellectual property” –

information contained in an article published by an unidentified English

scientist. (Allegation 20; Explanation of Allegations).

The employment-related claims against UPS and the EEOC were properly

removed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(c)(1)(A) and 1442(a)(1). As Magistrate Judge

Cosbey noted, the remaining claims don’t appear to be federal claims or to form

part of the same case or controversy as the claims against UPS and the EEOC.

Judge Cosbey ordered the parties to show cause why the claims against the nonjoining defendants shouldn’t be severed and remanded to the Grant County

Circuit Court [Doc. No. 11].

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In her response, Ms. Kraemer argued that the defendants were involved in

a “conspiracy to harass” and that their actions alone and together violated the

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., the

Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1601, the Animal Enterprise

Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 43, the First Amendment, and various other federal

laws and regulations. She concludes that the claims are related and that the court

should retain jurisdiction over the entire matter. 

The AKC, ASPCA, and Humane Society agree that the court has jurisdiction,

but for different reasons. The AKC surmises that the complaint could be read to

allege a claim for copyright infringement because Indiana law doesn’t recognize

a claim for “theft of intellectual property” (the language in the complaint), and that

the court would have original and exclusive jurisdiction over that claim under 28

U.S.C. § 1338(a). It also contends that the court would have supplemental

jurisdiction because the complaint alleges that the defendants engaged in a

“conspiracy to harass” the plaintiff. The ASPCA and Humane Society take it a step

further, arguing that the court has original and supplemental jurisdiction over the

claims asserted against them because the complaint and subsequent filings (Ms.

Kraemer’s response to the show cause order) allege violations of numerous federal

statutes, the First Amendment, and federal regulations, as well as a “conspiracy

to harass.” All three defendants filed motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) [Doc. Nos. 19, 63, and 86]. 

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Haulers Insurance Company and the Grant County Sheriff’s Department

conceded in their responses to the show cause order that the claims against them

weren’t related to the federal claims against UPS and the EEOC and should be

severed and remanded, but they filed motions to dismiss [Doc. Nos. 68 and 80]

after Ms. Kraemer asserted that federal laws had been violated. 

Indiana Farm Bureau, the Law Offices of McNeely, Stephenson, Thopy &

Harrold, and William R. Richards, P.C. followed with their own motions to dismiss

[Doc. Nos. 77, 78, and 82].

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Motions to Dismiss UPS and the EEOC 

The exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is a matter of discretion, not a

matter of right, and can be declined for a variety of reasons, including dismissal

of all claims over which the court has original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)

and (c); City of Chicago v. Int’l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172-73 (1997).

It’s generally undisputed that the court has original jurisdiction over the claims

asserted against UPS and the EEOC, so discussion should begin with the motions

to dismiss those claims.

When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must

construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all

well-pleaded facts as true, and draw all inferences in her favor. Reynolds v. CB

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Sports Bar, Inc., 623 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 2010). But Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)

"demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Morrison v. YTB

Int'l, Inc., 649 F.3d 533, 538 (7th Cir. 2011); Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581

(7th Cir. 2009). A claim is plausible if "the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (the allegations “must be enough to raise a right to

relief above the speculative level” and give the defendant fair notice of the claims

being asserted and the grounds upon which they rest). See also Swanson v.

Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010)("the plaintiff must give enough

details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds

together.").

Mindful of her pro se status, the court reads Ms. Kraemer’s pleadings and

filings liberally, see Donald v. Cook County Sheriff's Dept., 95 F.3d 548, 555 (7th

Cir. 1996); Hudson v. McHugh, 148 F.3d 859, 864 (7th Cir. 1998) ("The essence

of liberal construction is to give a pro se plaintiff a break when, although [s]he

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stumbles on a technicality, [her] pleading is otherwise understandable."), but finds 

them factually and legally deficient.

“A civil action alleging a Title VII violation must be filed within 90 days of

receiving a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).”

Threadgill v. Moore U.S.A., Inc., 269 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2001). The right-to-sue

notice attached to Ms. Kraemer’s complaint was dated April 29, 2011, and shows

that her charge against UPS was dismissed. Ms. Kraemer waited more than three

years to file the present action against UPS, and hasn’t provided a viable basis for

tolling the 90 day period. Her employment-related claims against UPS are time

barred.

Ms. Kraemer’s related claim against the EEOC for its alleged failure to

investigate her charges against UPS fails as a matter of law, and must be

dismissed. "It is well established that a private-sector employee has no cause of

action against the EEOC for its failure to process a charge of discrimination."

Jordan v. Summers, 205 F.3d 337, 342 (7th Cir. 2000); see also McCottrell v.

EEOC, 726 F.2d 350, 351 (7th Cir. 1984). 

B. Severance of the Remaining Claims

As a general rule, jurisdiction is determined at the time of removal and

nothing filed after a notice of removal affects the court’s jurisdiction. St. Paul

Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 293 (1938); In re Burlington

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N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 606 F.3d 379, 380-81 (7th Cir. 2010); In re Shell Oil, 970

F.2d 355, 356 (7th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). “[T]hough it is sometimes possible for

a plaintiff who sues in federal court to amend away jurisdiction, removal cases

present concerns about forum manipulation that counsel against allowing a

plaintiff’s post-removal amendments to affect jurisdiction.” In re Burlington N.

Santa Fe Ry. Co., 606 F.3d at 381. See also Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States,

549 U.S. 457, 473-474 and n. 6 (2007)). 

Ms. Kraemer’s response to the show cause order and subsequent filings

show a clear desire to remain in federal court, but she can’t amend her complaint

by asserting new factual allegations and legal theories in response to the motions

to dismiss. Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assn., 683 F.3d 328, 348 (7th Cir.

2012); Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984).

Even if she could, Ms. Kraemer hasn’t alleged any facts that would support her

federal claims and “would allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant[s] [are] liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (the

allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level”

and give the defendant fair notice of the claims being asserted and the grounds

upon which they rest). See also Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th

Cir. 2010) ("the plaintiff must give enough details about the subject-matter of the

case to present a story that holds together.") 

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 Ms. Kraemer’s claims involve three separate and distinct events: the

termination of her employment in February 2011, an automobile accident in

March 2012, and purported harassment and “stalking” related to Ms. Kraemer’s

involvement in animal rights issues. The claims against McNeeley, Stephenson,

Thopy and Harrold, William Richards PC, Indiana Farm Bureau, and Haulers

Insurance arise out of litigation related to an automobile accident that occurred

more than a year after the termination of Ms. Kraemer’s employment and have no

relationship to her past employment or to the EEOC’s alleged failure to investigate

Ms. Kraemer’s claims of sexual harassment and discrimination. The claims

against the AKC, ASPCA, and Humane Society appear to involve alleged acts of

harassment relating to Ms. Kraemer’s advocacy for animal rights, while the claims

against the Grant County Sheriff’s Department involve the Department’s alleged

failure to investigate Ms. Kraemer’s claims of harassment and threats dating back

to 2008. 

The only common thread between those claims and the federal claims

asserted against UPS and the EEOC appears to be Ms. Kraemer’s conclusory

assertion that McNeeley, Stephenson, Thopy & Harrold, Indiana Farm Bureau,

and the ASPCA “conspired” with UPS to “perpetrate[] ‘legal harassment’ and ‘legal

stalking’.” The complaint has no factual allegations that would support such a

claim or show that the remaining claims asserted against the non-joining

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defendants “form part of the same case or controversy” as the federal claims

against UPS and the EEOC. 

To the extent the complaint could be read to allege that the AKC engaged

in conduct that violated federal copyright laws it is factually and legally

insufficient. The plaintiff must be the legal or beneficial owner of a copyright to

state a claim for which relief can be granted under the Copyright Act. See 17

U.S.C. § 501(b); Hyperquest, Inc. v. N’Site Solutions, Inc., 632 F.3d 377, 381 (7th

Cir. 2011). Ms. Kraemer hasn’t alleged any facts from which the court could find

or infer that she is the legal or beneficial owner of the copyright that was allegedly

appropriated.

The non-employment claims against the non-joining defendants aren’t

within the court’s original or supplemental jurisdiction and so must be severed

and remand to the state court from which the action was removed. 28 U.S.C. §

1441(c)(2).

C. Miscellaneous Motions

Ms. Kraemer filed eleven motions seeking, among other things, to add the

President of the United States as a party, to remove yet another unrelated state

court case to federal court, to enjoin the Humane Society, ASPCA, and United

States Department of Agriculture from violating the copyright laws, to enter

judgment against Scott Richards and William R. Richards, P.C., and to sanction

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various defendants under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). In light of the foregoing, those

motions [Doc. Nos. 61, 70, 72, 106, 108, 109, 112, 120, 140, 141, and 143] and

the non-joining defendants’ motions to dismiss [Doc. Nos. 19, 63, 68, 77, 78, 80,

82, and 86] are denied as moot.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court:

(1) GRANTS the motions to dismiss by UPS and the EEOC [Doc. Nos.

[57 and 84];

(2) SEVERS AND REMANDS the remaining claims against defendants

William Richards PC, the Law Offices of McNeeley Stephensen, Thopy, and

Harrold, Haulers Insurance Company, Indiana Farm Bureau, the American

Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the Humane Society of the

United States, the American Kennel Club, Inc., and the Grant County

Sheriff’s Department to the Grant County Circuit Court; and

(3) DENIES all remaining motions [Doc. Nos. 19, 61, 63, 68, 70, 72,

77, 78, 80, 82, 86, 106, 108, 109, 112, 120, 140, 141, and 143] as moot. 

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: March 26, 2015 

 /s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr. 

Judge

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United States District Court

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