UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER L. SCRUGGS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) 

v. ) Cause No. 3:14-CV-1992 JD

)

C.O. SUMNER, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Christopher L. Scruggs, a pro se prisoner, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. section 1983

alleging C.O. Sumner used excessive force against him on January 28, 2014, in violation of the

Eighth Amendment. (DE 2.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review a complaint

filed by a prisoner and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b). The court applies the same standard as when deciding a motion

to dismiss under FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d

621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal, a complaint must state a claim for relief that is

plausible on its face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 603. The

court must bear in mind, however, that “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and

a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 

Here, Scruggs complains about events that occurred on January 28, 2014,while he was an
inmate at the Westville Control Unit (“Westville”). (DE 2 at 3.) Scruggs alleges that he was

accompanied by Officers Backus and Sumner walking back to his cell. They were all joking around,

and “talking shit to each other.” (DE 2 at 3.) At one point, Officer Sumner became upset at Scruggs

for making fun of him. When it was time to place leg cuffs on Scruggs, Scruggs asked Sumner to

place the cuff on his sock instead of directly on his skin because of a medical condition that made

his skin extra sensitive. However, because he was mad at Scruggs, Sumner placed the cuff directly

on the skin of Scruggs’ legs and then pulled on the cuff in an effort to hurt Scruggs. Scruggs claims

to have suffered “intense and excruciating” pain from the cuffing incident. In addition, while

Scruggs was explaining his medical condition to Sumner, Sumner pepper sprayed him. Scruggs

called Sumner a “dumb ass” for spraying him, which caused Sumner to again pepper spray him.

The “core requirement” for an excessive force claim is that the defendant “used force not in

a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, but maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”

Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted). Several factors

guide the inquiry of whether an officer’s use of force was legitimate or malicious, including the need

for an application of force, the amount of force used, and the extent of the injury suffered by the

prisoner. Id. Here, the complaint can be read to allege that Sumner cuffed Scruggs in a manner and

used pepper spray on him to maliciously or sadistically cause harm. Giving him the inferences to

which he is entitled at this stage, he has alleged enough to proceed further against Officer Sumner.

Further factual development may show Sumner acted reasonably under the circumstances, but

Scruggs has alleged enough at this stage.

For these reasons, the court:

(1) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed on a claim against O.C. Sumner in his individual

capacity for monetary damages for using excessive force against him on January 28, 2014;
(2) DISMISSES all other claims; 

(3) DIRECTS the clerk to transmit the summons and USM-285 for O.C. Sumner to the

United States Marshals Service along with a copy of the complaint (DE 2) and this order;

(4) DIRECTS the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service of process on O.C. Sumner

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and

(5) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that O.C. Sumner respond, as provided

for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claims for which

the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order. 

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: December 29, 2014

 /s/ JON E. DEGUILIO 

Judge

United States District Court