UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

THERESA J. SUESS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) 

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 4:14-CV-01-WCL

)

BARACK OBAMA, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

 OPINION AND ORDER

Theresa J. Suess, a pro se Plaintiff, filed her second Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

[DE 1]. She also filed an Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Affidavit (in

forma pauperis) [DE 2]. For the reasons set forth below, the Plaintiff’s Application is DENIED,

and the Complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

DISCUSSION

This is Plaintiff’s second attempt to file her case in this Court and receive relief from the

statutorily required filing fee. Ordinarily, a plaintiff must pay a statutory filing fee of $400 to bring

an action in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, the federal in forma pauperis statute, 28

U.S.C. § 1915, provides indigent litigants an opportunity for meaningful access to the federal courts

despite their inability to pay the costs and fees associated with that access. See Neitzke v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319 (1989). To authorize a litigant to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court must make two

determinations: first, whether the litigant is unable to pay the costs of commencing the action, 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); and second, whether the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 
Under the first inquiry, an indigent party may commence an action in federal court, without

prepayment of costs and fees, upon submission of an affidavit asserting an inability “to pay such

costs or give security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Here, the Plaintiff contends that she receives

approximately $660 per month in disability payments. Based on this income information, it appears

that she is financially eligible for in forma pauperis status.

The inquiry does not end there, however. District courts have an obligation under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen complaints before service on the defendants, and must dismiss the

complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief. In determining whether the complaint states

a claim, the Court applies the same standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006).

To survive dismissal under federal pleading standards,

[the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 673 (2009). Thus, a “plaintiff must do better than putting a few

words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has

happened to her that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403

(7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original).

In evaluating whether a complaint is frivolous for purposes of the in forma pauperis statute,

the Court need not “accept without question the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations.” Denton v.

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992). Instead, the statute “accords judges not only the authority to

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dismiss a claim based on an undisputablymeritless legal theory, but also the unusual powerto pierce

the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions

are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. This includes allegations that are “fantastic” or

“delusional.” Id. at 328.

Plaintiff’s first attempt to file her cause was dismissed WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous by

United States District Judge Theresa Springmann, see Case No. 4:13-CV-51 [DE 3]. In her Order

of dismissal, District Judge Springmann explained the Plaintiff’s allegations as follows:

Here, the Plaintiff alleges that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), along with

other governmental agencies and actors, including the President, have joined a

conspiracy to torment her, which began when she was a graduate student in

Indianapolis in the late 1980s. The conspiracy has allegedly continued to and

including the present date, and includes among other things, the CIA putting

electrodes on her body, threatening to murder her, putting radio devices in her pets,

and hiring “20-something-year olds, mostly female,” who “interrupt my thinking,

[and] try to influence and disrupt my positive thoughts and behavior.” She indicates

that mental health professionals have diagnosed her with schizoaffective disorder,

although she disagrees with this diagnosis. Among other relief, she seeks $97 million

in damages, and also requests that the Court “reopen” a California family court case

in which she lost custody of her daughter.

[DE 3, at p. 3]

Upon review of the Plaintiff’s newest submissions, she alleges virtually identical allegations

to the ones in her prior case. In light of these repetitive allegations, the Court concludes, as did

District Judge Springmann, that the Plaintiff’s allegations are implausible and fantastical.

Accordingly, the Complaint will be dismissed as frivolous. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325; Gladney

v. Pendleton Corr. Facility, 302 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal of complaint as

frivolous where the plaintiff alleged that over a span of three years, multiple guards at three different

prisons left his cell door unlocked at night while he was sleeping so that other inmates could come

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in his cell and assault him); see also Schottler v. Wisconsin, 388 F. App’x 547 (7th Cir. Jul. 28,

2010) (affirming dismissal of complaint as frivolous, where plaintiff alleged that someone had

inserted a metal pin in his head and various state officials and police officers had purposely ignored

his pleas for help); Lawrence v. Interstate Brands, 278 F. App’x 681, 684 (7th Cir. May 22, 2008)

(“Lawrence’s allegations—that the Illinois legal system is controlled by the Ku Klux Klan and that

a vast network composed of lawyers, judges, and his former employers have conspired over the past

20 years to deny him equal protection of the laws, harass him on the basis of his race, and defraud

him—are frivolous under this standard.”).

The Court is mindful of the Seventh Circuit’s concern that when a complaint is dismissed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), if there is no opportunity to amend “an IFP applicant’s case

could be tossed out of court without giving the applicant any timely notice or opportunity to be heard

to clarify, contest, or simply request leave to amend,” which negatively impacts “fair access to the

courts.” Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 11-1917, 2013 WL 3599156, at *6 (7th Cir. July 16,

2013). Here, however, there is no reason to believe that the frivolous factual allegations could be

remedied through more specific pleading; they are inherently frivolous. Accordingly, the Complaint

is dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend. See, e.g. Denton, 504 U.S. at 34

(recognizing that where it appears that frivolous factual allegations could be remedied through more

specific pleadings, a court of appeals should consider whether the district court abused its discretion

by dismissing the complaint with prejudice or without leave to amend); Mathis v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co.,

133 F.3d 546, 548 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that Denton recognized that dismissals under materially

identical predecessor to § 1915(e)(2)(B) on grounds of frivolousness could be with prejudice);

Holland v. City of Gary, 503 F. App’x 476, 477–78 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding that the district court

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did not abuse its discretion in concluding through a screening of the plaintiff’s complaint under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) that the plaintiff’s fantastic and delusional allegations lacked any arguable

basis in fact and that an amendment would be futile). 

CONCLUSION

Forthe foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed Without

Prepayment of Fees [DE 2], and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE the Complaint [DE 1] as

factually frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Clerk will enter judgment

accordingly.

SO ORDERED on January 27, 2014.

 s/ William C. Lee

WILLIAM C. LEE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

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