UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

JOHNNY NICHOLS, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff; ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CAUSE NO. 3:13-cv-01205-CAN 

 ) 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ) 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 On November 20, 2013, Plaintiff Johnny Nichols (“Nichols”) filed his complaint in this 

Court seeking reversal of the Commissioner’s final decision denying his application for 

Disability Insurance Benefits. Alternatively, Nichols seeks remand for further consideration of 

his application for Disability Insurance Benefits. On June 4, 2014, Nichols filed Plaintiff’s 

Memorandum in Support of His Motion to Reverse the Decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security. [Doc. No. 19]. On September 9, 2014, Defendant Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) filed a response, asking the Court to affirm the decision denying benefits. 

[Doc. No. 24]. Nichols filed a reply brief on September 24, 2014. [Doc. No. 25]. This Court may 

enter a ruling in this matter based on the parties consent, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). 

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

 In January 2011, Nichols filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits with the 

Social Security Administration (“SSA”) alleging disability beginning January 9, 2011. After the 

SSA denied Nichols’s application initially and upon reconsideration, an administrative law judge 

(“ALJ”) held a hearing regarding Nichols’s application on July 20, 2012. 
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 Mr. Nichols was born on November 1, 1966, making him 44 years old at the alleged 

disability onset date. Nichols has a high school education and lives with wife and son. Prior to 

the alleged onset date Nichols worked at Weil McLain for approximately 25 years performing 

various jobs, some requiring Nichols to regularly lift 300-400 pounds. At his hearing before the 

ALJ, Nichols testified that over the past 10 years he had developed back pain that had finally 

reach the point of debilitation. Nichols provided the ALJ with medical evidence from 2008, three 

years before the alleged onset date, up to the date of the hearing in July 2012 that documented 

his visits to various doctors, including his treating physician Dr. Kora. The medical evidence and 

opinions show repeated visits and treatment for back pain. 

 Before the ALJ, Nichols also testified about his episodes of depression, which began 

about two months before the hearing. Dr. Kora had referred Nichols to a clinical psychologist, 

Dr. Israel, to discuss the depression that Nichols believed was caused by his back pain. In July 

2012, just before the ALJ’s hearing, Nichols underwent a psychiatric evaluation after admitting 

thoughts of suicide to Dr. Israel that were apparently brought on by stress, familial relationship 

troubles, and his back pain. The records of Nichols’s episode of depression were in the record 

presented to the ALJ at the hearing. 

After the hearing, the ALJ issued a written decision reflecting the following findings 

based on the five-step disability evaluation prescribed in the Social Security Administration’s 

(“SSA’s”) regulations. At Step One, the ALJ found that Nichols had not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since January 9, 2011, the alleged onset date. At Step Two, the ALJ found that 

the degenerative changes of Nichols’s lumbar spine and hips, and his depression were severe 

impairments. At Step Three, the ALJ found that Nichols’s impairments did not meet or medically 

equal the severity of a listed impairment. The ALJ also found that Nichols had the residual 
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functional capacity to perform sedentary work except that Nichols could “never climb ladders, 

ropes and scaffolds; occasionally climb ramp and stairs; occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch or 

crawl; would need a hand-held assistive device for uneven terrain and prolonged ambulation; 

would never be able to work around unprotected heights and vibration; and limited to simple, 

routine, repetitive tasks.” Doc. No. 13 at 50. At Step Four, the ALJ found that Nichols was 

unable to perform any past relevant work. At Step Five, the ALJ considered Nichols’s age, 

education, work experience, and residual functional capacity from which he determined that jobs 

existed in the national economy that Nichols could perform, such as a final assembler of optical 

goods, a telemarketer, or a call out operator. 

Based on these findings, the ALJ determined that Nichols had not been disabled from 

January 9, 2011, which was reflected in his written decision issued on August 10, 2012. Nichols 

requested that the Appeals Council review the decision of the ALJ and on September 21, 2013, 

the Appeals Council denied the request. Thus, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of 

the Commissioner for the purposes of judicial review. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review 

The Social Security Act authorizes judicial review of the final decision of the agency and 

indicates that the Commissioner’s factual findings must be accepted as conclusive if supported 

by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, a court reviewing the findings of an ALJ will 

reverse only if the findings are not supported by substantial evidence or if the ALJ has applied an 

erroneous legal standard. See Briscoe v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005). Substantial 

evidence is more than a mere scintilla but may be less than the weight of the evidence. Scheck v. 

Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 699 (7th Cir. 2004). Thus, substantial evidence is simply “such relevant 
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evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. 

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Kepple v. Massanari, 468 F.3d 513, 516 (7th Cir. 2001). 

A court reviews the entire administrative record but does not reconsider facts, re-weigh 

the evidence, resolve conflicts in evidence, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its 

judgment for that of the ALJ. See Boiles v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005). Thus, 

the question upon judicial review of an ALJ’s finding that a claimant is not disabled within the 

meaning of the Social Security Act is not whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled, but whether 

the ALJ “uses the correct legal standards and the decision is supported by substantial evidence.” 

Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2013). “[I]f the Commissioner commits an error of 

law,” the Court may reverse the decision “without regard to the volume of evidence in support of 

the factual findings.” White v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1999). 

Minimally, an ALJ must articulate his analysis of the evidence in order to allow the 

reviewing court to trace the path of his reasoning and to be assured that the ALJ considered the 

important evidence. See Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002). In other words, an 

ALJ must “build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [his] conclusion so that [the 

reviewing court] may assess the validity of the agency’s final decision and afford [a claimant] 

meaningful review.” Giles ex rel. Giles v. Astrue, 483 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 2007). The ALJ 

need not specifically address every piece of evidence in the record, but must present a “logical 

bridge” from the evidence to his conclusions. O'Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 618 

(7th Cir. 2010). The ALJ must provide a glimpse into the reasoning behind the his analysis and 

decision to deny benefits. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001). 

B. Disability Standard 
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To be eligible for disability benefits, a claimant must establish that he suffers from a 

“disability” as defined by the Social Security Act and regulations. The Act defines “disability” as 

an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be 

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(d)(1)(A). To be found disabled, the claimant’s impairment must not only prevent him from 

doing his previous work, but considering his age, education, and work experience, it must also 

prevent him from engaging in any other type of substantial gainful activity that exists in 

significant numbers in the economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e)-(f). 

When a claimant alleges a disability, Social Security regulations provide a five-step 

inquiry to evaluate whether the claimant is entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The 

steps are: (1) Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity? If yes, the claimant is not 

disabled, and the claim is denied; if no, the inquiry proceeds to step two; (2) Does the claimant 

have an impairment or combination of impairments that are severe? If not, the claimant is not 

disabled, and the claim is denied; if yes, the inquiry proceeds to step three; (3) Do(es) the 

impairment(s) meet or equal a listed impairment in the appendix to the regulations? If yes, the 

claimant is automatically considered disabled; if not, then the inquiry proceeds to step four; (4) 

Can the claimant do the claimant’s past relevant work? If yes, the claimant is not disabled, and 

the claim is denied; if no, then the inquiry proceeds to step five; (5) Can the claimant perform 

other work given the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), age, education, and 

experience? If yes, then the claimant is not disabled, and the claim is denied; if no, the claimant 

is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v); see also Scheck, 357 F.3d at 699–700 (7th Cir. 

2004). 
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At steps four and five, the ALJ must consider an assessment of the claimant’s RFC. The 

RFC “is an administrative assessment of what work-related activities an individual can perform 

despite [the individual’s] limitations.” Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1178 (7th Cir. 2001). 

The RFC should be based on evidence in the record. Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 676 (7th Cir. 

2008) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3)). The claimant bears the burden of proving steps one 

through four, whereas the burden at step five is on the ALJ. Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 886; see also 

Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1995).

C. Issues Presented for Review 

Nichols seeks reversal and remand of the ALJ’s decision arguing that (1) the ALJ erred 

by finding that his impairments did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment; (2) the ALJ 

failed to give the treating physician the appropriate weight; (3) the ALJ failed to build a logical 

bridge when evaluating the Nichols’s depression and mental RFC; (4) the ALJ erred by not 

analyzing Nichols’s credibility properly. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds 

remand appropriate in this case. 

 Nichols’s first contention is that the ALJ erred by finding that his impairments, or 

combination of impairments, did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment. Moreover, 

Nichols contends that the ALJ failed to mention whether he specifically considered if Nichols’s 

degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine met the requirements for Listing 1.04. However, 

the Commissioner argues that the ALJ did not need to explicitly mention the listing. The 

Commissioner also argues that the ALJ analyzed the evidence relevant to the Listing analysis 

elsewhere in the opinion and did not need to repeat his consideration of that evidence in the Step 

Three section of the opinion. 
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 Appendix 1 of the disability regulations contains a “Listing of Impairments” that the SSA 

has pre-determined are disabling regardless of a claimant’s age, education, or work experience. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a). The Listings enumerate criteria necessary to establish initially that a 

claimant’s diagnosis is based on acceptable medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(c)(2). The 

remaining criteria establish the severity necessary for an impairment to be considered disabling. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(c)(2). For example, a claimant meets Listing 1.04(A) for spinal disorders 

when he provides evidence of “nerve root compression characterized by neuro-anatomic 

distribution of pain, limitation of motion of the spine, motor loss . . . accompanied by sensory or 

reflex loss and, if there is involvement of the lower back, positive straight-leg raising test.” 20 

C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1, Listing 1.04(A). 

An ALJ’s Listing determination typically “must discuss the listing by name and offer 

more than a perfunctory analysis of the listing.” Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 

2004). However, the Seventh Circuit does not require an ALJ to mention all of the relevant 

listings he considered in his Step Three analysis of Listings if the record has been sufficiently 

developed and articulated somewhere within the ALJ’s decision to show more than a perfunctory 

analysis. Adkins v. Astrue, 226 F. App’x 600, 605–06 (7th Cir. 2007). In Adkins, the plaintiff 

sought review and remand of an ALJ’s decision that he was not disabled because, among other 

things, the ALJ failed to identify a specific listing in his Step Three analysis. Id. at 604–605. 

Despite this shortcoming, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the ALJ’s decision reasoning that, 

although clearly mentioning the listing would have been helpful, the ALJ spent “several pages of 

[the] decision on an exhaustive discussion” of issues relevant to the specific listing that the 

plaintiff argued was not considered. Id. at 605–06. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit in Ribaudo v. 

Barnhart,458 F.3d 580, 583–84 (7th Cir. 2006) remanded an ALJ’s decision for further 
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proceedings because the ALJ had only provided a short, two sentence discussion at Step Three 

related to the plaintiff’s back pain without identifying a specific listing or evaluating any of the 

available evidence that was favorable to the plaintiff’s claim. Id. 

Here, the ALJ, like the ALJs in Adkins and Ribaudo, did not explicitly mention which 

listing he considered when determining at Step Three whether Nichols’s degenerative disc 

disease met or medically equaled a Listing. Nevertheless, the Commissioner contends that the 

ALJ’s consideration of Nichols’s back impairment in the section of his decision related to the 

RFC determination sufficiently addressed evidence that was also relevant to the Listings. As a 

result, the Commissioner contends the ALJ was not required to repeat its discussion of that 

evidence in the section of his decision related to the Listings. The Commissioner points the Court 

to the ALJ’s decision in Adkins and as such, asks the Court to find that the ALJ’s analysis in the 

RFC section to constitute substantial evidence in support of the Listing determination. However, 

the Court is not persuaded. 

The Court agrees with the Commissioner that the ALJ did provide and analyze evidence 

in the RFC section that could relate to a relevant Listing. Yet, the ALJ’s discussion of that 

evidence was limited to ascertaining Nichols’s work-related limitations and remaining 

functionality. It shed little to no light on how or if Nichols’s back impairments met or medically 

equaled a Listing. And even if the medical evidence was related to the relevant Listings, the ALJ 

failed to provide the logical bridge necessary for the undersigned, with no medical expertise, to 

see the connection. As a result, this Court, like the court in Ribaudo, is left unable to trace the 

ALJ’s rationale for finding that Nichols’s back impairment did not meet or equal a Listing and 

cannot adequately review the ALJ’s Step Three Listings analysis. Therefore, the ALJ’s Step 

Three analysis is not supported by substantial evidence and this matter requires remand so the 
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ALJ may explain his Step Three analysis of Nichols’s degenerative changes of the lumbar spine 

and hips. 

 Having determined that remand is warranted based on the ALJ’s Step Three analysis, the 

Court need not reach any conclusions as to Nichols’s RFC-related arguments regarding his 

credibility, the weight given to the opinion of his treating physician, and the ALJ’s explanation 

of his mental RFC finding. Indeed, the Court is not troubled by Nichols’s remaining contentions 

regarding the weight the ALJs gave to Nichols’s treating physician or the ALJ’s explanation of 

the mental RFC finding. However, the Court is concerned about the ALJ’s credibility analysis. 

The crux of Nichols’s credibility contention is that the ALJ performed the pain analysis 

improperly when determining Nichols’s credibility. Nichols specifically contends that the ALJ 

violated SSR 96-7p by failing to consider the side effects of Nichols’s medication when 

analyzing Nichols’s credibility and symptoms. On the other hand, the Commissioner argues that 

the ALJ’s credibility findings were supported by substantial evidence and that consideration of 

any medicinal side effects would not change the outcome and is therefore, harmless. 

An ALJ’s credibility finding is reviewed deferentially and will not be set aside unless it is 

“patently wrong.” Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 678 (7th Cir. 2008). However, Social Security 

Regulation 96-7p explains that an ALJ must consider the “type, dosage, effectiveness, and side 

effects of any medication” taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms as one of the factors when 

assessing the credibility of an individual’s statements. SSR 96-7p. Because this case is already 

being remanded, the Court need not reach any conclusions as to whether this error was harmful. 

If an RFC determination is required on remand, however, the ALJ should take the opportunity to 

review and express an analysis of all the factors that must be considered when determining 
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Nichols’s credibility. See Key v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1056, 1061 (7th Cir. 1991) (“If an issue is left 

open after remand, the lower tribunal is free to decide it.”). 

II. CONCLUSION

 Because the ALJ’s Step Three analysis is not supported by substantial evidence, the 

Court now GRANTS Nichols’s request to reverse and remand this case. [Doc. No. 19]. This case 

is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The 

Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate the case. 

SO ORDERED. 

Dated this 13th day of January, 2015. 

 s/Christopher A. Nuechterlein 

 Christopher A. Nuechterlein 

 United States Magistrate Judge