UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

AMBER L. DEVRIES, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) 3:15CV188-PPS

)

CAROLYN COLVIN, Acting Commissioner )

of the Social Security Administration, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Amber Devries appeals the final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security denying her application for Child’s Insurance benefits and Supplemental

Security Income benefits. [DE 1.] That decision is embodied in the written opinion of

an Administrative Law Judge issued after an evidentiary hearing. Judicial review of the

Commissioner’s decision is limited. If an ALJ’s findings of fact are supported by

“substantial evidence,” then they must be sustained. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Overman v.

Astrue, 546 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 2008). Substantial evidence consists of “such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

Nelms v. Astrue, 553 F.3d 1093, 1097 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402

U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). In making a substantial evidence determination, I must review the

record as a whole, but I can’t re-weigh the evidence or substitute my judgment for that

of the ALJ. Overman, 546 F.3d at 462.
The ALJ found that Devries had four severe impairments: a depressive disorder,

a generalized anxiety disorder, attention deficit disorder and obesity. [DE 10 at 23.]1

 A

non-severe impairment of hypothyroidism was found to be controlled with medication. 

[Id. at 24.] The ALJ rejected Devries’ claims of several “non-medically determinable”

impairments – osteoarthritis, ankle and knee disorders, mild mental retardation and a

menstrual cycle disorder – finding no supporting diagnoses or treatment in the medical

record, with a careful discussion of the medical evidence not supportive of each claim. 

[Id. at 24-25.] 

At the next step of the familiar sequential evaluation process, the ALJ determined

that Devries’ impairments do not meet or medically equal the severity of one of the

listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. [Id. at 25.] In making

this determination, the ALJ discussed the opinions of various reviewing consultants,

Devries’ daily activities, her school records, and the records of her treating doctors. [Id.

at 25-28.] 

Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that, despite her impairments, Devries retained

the residual functional capacity to lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently,

to stand or walk for up to 2 hours in an 8-hour workday, to sit for up to 6 hours in an 8-

hour workday, to occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch or crawl but never to climb ladders,

1

 The administrative record is found in the court record at docket entry 10, and consists of

435 pages. I will cite to its pages according to the court’s Electronic Case Filing page number,

rather than by the Social Security Administration’s Bates stamp numbers, which don’t begin until

page 5 of 435 as the pages are enumerated in ECF. 

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ropes, or scaffolds. [Id. at 28.] These findings supported the ultimate determination

that Devries is not disabled because she remains capable of performing light work

comprised of simple routine and repetitive tasks, with only occasional interaction with

supervisors, coworkers or the general public, and with some exertional limitations. [Id.

at 28.] Based on the vocational expert’s testimony, the ALJ concluded that Devries is

capable of performing jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy,

such as various assembly positions. [Id. at 34.] 

Devries was 24 years old at the time of her hearing. [DE 10 at 46.] She lived with

her grandparents, and had done so since she was a one year old. [Id.] After four years

of high school, Devries finished only the 10th Grade. [Id.] Devries testified that she

spends most of her day on the computer, reading, or sleeping. [Id. at 49.] She helps

with the laundry but is forgetful about it. [Id. at 48.] She tries to go to the gym with her

grandparents at least three times a week. [Id. at 50.] Devries testified that sitting or

standing too long at one time causes her legs or back to hurt, and that walking for 30

minutes would cause her ankles to swell, although 10 minutes on the treadmill is

helpful for her ankles. [Id. at 51-52.] At that time, Devries had lost more than 20

pounds (down to 282 from 304), thanks to working out at the gym, changing her eating

habits and “trying to leave the house more.” [Id. at 53-54.] She testified to the anxiety

she experiences if she is out of the house around people other than her family members. 

[Id. at 55-56.] Devries testified to the goals she has set for herself, including getting a

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driver’s permit, which she has done. [Id. at 57.] She is setting goals toward

independence from her grandparents, including losing weight, learning to drive, and

getting out of the house to socialize more. [Id. at 57-58.] Her testimony demonstrated

that she imagines being able to hold down a job in the future. [Id. at 60-61.] 

Devries’ first argues that the ALJ is not permitted to deny benefits by relying on

unsigned reports. In particular, Devries points to the ALJ’s reliance on the opinion of a

state agency psychological consultant that Devries’ impairments did not meet or equal 

regulatory listings conclusively demonstrating disability. [DE 13 at 15.] Exhibits 5F and

6F in the administrative record contain the Mental Residual Functional Capacity

Assessment and Psychiatric Review Technique forms attributed to Ann Lovko, Ph.D. 

[DE 10 at 333-350.] The Psychiatric Review concludes that Devries’ mental disorders do

not meet or equal Listings 12.02 (Organic Mental Disorders), 12.04 (Affective Disorders)

or 12.06 (Anxiety-Related Disorders). [Id. at 347-48.] The ALJ reviewed, relied on and

adopted these findings, noting the lack of contrary evidence. [DE 10 at 25-26.] On each

of the two forms, Lovko’s name is typed in the blank for her signature. [Id. at 335, 337.] 

Devries also points to the “great weight” the ALJ afforded the opinion of the State

agency medical consultant concerning Devries’ residual functional capacity. [ DE 10 at

33, 358-365.] This Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment is Exhibit 8F in the

administrative record. In the blank for the medical consultant’s signature, the name “A.

Dobson, M.D.” is typed. [Id. at 365.] 

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Devries cites regulatory language providing signature requirements for medical

consultative examiners. It is true that a consultative examination report must be signed

by the provider under the relevant SSA regulations:

All consultative examination reports will be personally reviewed and

signed by the medical source who actually performed the examination. 

This attests to the fact that the medical source doing the examination or

testing is solely responsible for the report contents and for the conclusions,

explanations or comments provided with respect to the history,

examination and evaluation of laboratory test results. The signature of the

medical source on a report annotated “not proofed” or “dictated but not

read” is not acceptable. A rubber stamp signature of a medical source or

the medical source’s signature entered by any other person is not

acceptable.

20 C.F.R. §404.1519n(e). By its terms, this regulation applies the signature requirement

to reports by consultative examiners – that is, medical professionals who actually examine

the applicant. Dr. Lovko and Dr. Dobson did not perform any examination of Devries,

but were consultants who rendered opinions based solely on their review of the record. 

So the regulatory requirement Devries cites does not apply.

Devries also relies on Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 476 (7th Cir. 2009), in which the

Seventh Circuit cited 20 C.F.R. §404.1519o for the proposition that “an unsigned

examination report may not be used to deny benefits.” Again, that limitation applies to

examination reports, which Dr. Lovko’s and Dr. Dobson’s reports were not. The Court

of Appeals also noted about the unsigned report in Terry that there was “nothing in the

record itself that suggests the report is authored by a physician at all, let alone the

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specific doctor proposed by the government.” Id. By contrast, the challenged exhibits

here clearly identify the doctors to whom they are attributed by name.

The agency also points out that other administrative authority allows for

electronic signatures, citing DI 26510.089 of the agency’s Program Operations Manual

System or POMS. This authority provides that, with an exception not pertinent here,

“[e]ach medical assessment form must have a reviewing MC/PC’s actual physical

signature or an approved electronic signature.” Id. at Section A.4. Relying on the

POMS passage, the agency likens the typewritten names in the signature blanks to

“approved electronic signature(s).” Devries distinguishes the appearance of Dr.

Lovko’s and Dr. Dobson’s typewritten names from the electronic signature of

examining physician Dr. Ralph Inabnit, D.O., on his Disability Determination report,

Exhibit 7F. [DE 10 at 351-357.] That report concludes with a more elaborate electronic

signature:

Electronically signed by Ralph E. Inabnit, DO on Mon Nov 05, 2012 13:16:33

 

Ralph Inabnit, DO

DV_SBTM05/JESSICA

R: 11/03/2012 01:21 PM

T: 11/04/2012 08:19 AM

Job: 1465231

[Id. at 357.] 

Devries fails to cite any authority explaining what does and what does not

constitute an electronic signature. This failure, plus Devries’ reliance on the

inapplicable regulation, mean she has not provided applicable authority about what

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form of signatures is acceptable on reviewing consultant’s reports. So she hasn’t shown

whether or not the simpler typewritten names of Drs. Lovko and Dobson – even if less

detailed than Dr. Inabnit’s electronic signature – constitute “approved electronic

signatures.”

What’s more, Exhibits 5F, 6F and 8F are government OMB forms. My research

has disclosed another provision in POMS that suggests such forms may (or must) be

completed online and “signed” electronically:

eForms, UniForms, and OMB approved forms incorporated in electronic

tools, such as eCAT, are electronically signed using the “SIGN” button

located in the signature field. The “SIGN” button produces an approved

electronic signature, in an italicized font, of the user who is logged on to

the workstation. Electronically signed eForms, UniForms, and forms

incorporated into electronic tools, such as eCAT, do not require a

handwritten signature.

DI 81020.105(C)(1). POMS appears to contemplate a form of approved electronic

signature that may be what was used on the Lovko and Dobson forms.

District courts in this circuit (including this one) have affirmed ALJs’ reliance on

reports signed using electronic signatures. See Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:12-CV228-PPS, 2013 WL 5436929. at *5 (Sept. 26, 2013) (electronically-signed opinions of nonexamining state agency physicians were properly relied upon). See also Borth v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., No. 08-cv-1352, 2010 WL 786007, at *6 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2010) (affirming the

ALJ’s opinion relying upon an electronically signed report in making his decision);

Guthrie v. Astrue, No. 10-cv-03180, 2011 WL 3041365, at *22 (N.D. Ill. July 22, 2011)

(noting that while electronic signatures were unacceptable prior to a POMS

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amendment, electronic signatures were acceptable following June 8, 2009). I am not

persuaded the reports of Drs. Dobson and Lovko must be wholesale discarded based on

their typed signatures and could not properly have been considered by the ALJ. 

Devries’ next challenge is that, in several respects, the ALJ failed to follow

applicable regulations in evaluating medical opinion evidence. [DE 13 at 18.] First,

Devries contends that the ALJ did not give any indication of the weight he assigned to

the opinions of several doctors: consultative examining psychologist Dr. Douglas

Streich (Exhibit 4F), consultative examining physician Dr. Ralph Inabnit (Exhibit 7F),

and a non-examining source, Dr. A. Dobson (Exhibit 8F). I note that Dobson is the

doctor whose opinion Devries earlier complained the ALJ had erroneously given “great

weight” although it was unsigned. So this new and contrary argument is without merit

as to Dobson. But its presentation highlights one difficulty with the ALJ’s opinion,

namely that it often does not identify doctors by name, making it difficult to link the

ALJ’s discussion of a particular doctor’s treatment or opinion with the record of it,

particularly as the ALJ’s decision also at times cites whole exhibits rather than specific

pages of the administrative record. 

Back to Devries’ argument, Doctors Streich and Inabnit examined Devries and

reported objective medical findings rather than “opinions” to which persuasive weight

could be assigned. It is “medical opinions” that the ALJ must evaluate and consider the

appropriate weight to be given. 20 C.F.R. §404.1527. “Medical opinions” are defined in

the regulation as “statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable

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medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your

impairment(s), including [about] your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you

can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.” 

§404.1527(a)(2). 

Some of Doctor Streich’s and Doctor Inabnit’s findings are briefly noted in the

ALJ’s decision, such as concerning Devries’ hygiene and her IQ (Streich, DE 10 at 26,

33) and what Devries reported to the examining physician about her physical

capabilities (Inabnit, DE 10 at 26). This information does not take the form of “medical

opinion,” in that it does not “reflect judgments about the nature and severity” of

Devries’ impairments or her abilities. The ALJ’s opinion appropriately reflects that he

was aware of the medical information and data contained in the reports of Doctors

Streich and Inabnit, but the reports did not contain medical opinions requiring the ALJ’s

determination of the persuasive weight to be given in connection with his ultimate

determination that Devries is not disabled. 

Second, Devries repeats her earlier challenge to the ALJ giving “‘great weight’ to

the unsigned report of a non-examining source.” [DE 13 at 18.] In making this

argument, Devries is citing the exact same portion of the ALJ’s decision as she cited in

her first argument about the opinion of Dr. Dobson [DE 10 at 33], but recasting the

argument with a slightly different approach. Devries challenges the ALJ’s

characterization that the unnamed “State agency medical consultant opined that the

claimant could complete light work,” as the ALJ also ultimately determined. [DE 13 at

9
18, quoting DE 10 at 33.] Devries contends that the administrative record contains no

such opinion by a medical consultant, and that the closest thing – Exhibit 8F, the

Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment of A. Dobson, M.D. – cannot

appropriately be given great weight for several reasons (in addition to the fact that it is

unsigned). 

These reasons are that Dr. Dobson did not consider all of the medical evidence,

that the opinion is inconsistent with the opinion of DeVries’ primary treating physician

and that there was no medical source statement in the file concerning Devries’ physical

capabilities. [DE 13 at 18.] Because Devries fails to identify medical evidence that was

overlooked by Dr. Dobson and fails to identify the “treating primary care physician”

whose opinion Dobson disagreed with, Devries’ weak and conclusory arguments are

unpersuasive. The ALJ did in fact cite medical evidence he found consistent with

Dobson’s assessment, namely Devries’ private treatment records, as well as Devries’

admissions concerning her exertional abilities. [DE 10 at 33.] As to the lack of a medical

source statement in the file, the Commissioner responds that Dobson’s observation was

correct at the time it was made, because Dr. Bartush, whom Devries characterizes as her

treating physician (more on this later), did not render his opinion until a month after

Dobson’s assessment. [DE 20 at 10.]

Next Devries similarly challenges the ALJ’s assignment of “great weight” to the

assessment of a “State agency psychological consultant” that Devries could do

“unskilled work with social limitations.” [DE 13 at 19, quoting DE 10 at 29.] Devries

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identifies the consultant as the “nonexamining psychologist” who gave an unsigned

report, citing “Tr. p. 332.” [DE 13 at 19.] Bates-stamp page 332 of the administrative

record is a continuation sheet of the Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment

attributed to Ann Lovko, Ph.D. On that page, Dr. Lovko’s comments do not expressly

contain an “assessment that the claimant could complete unskilled work with social

limitations,” as the pertinent portion of the ALJ’s decision references. [DE 10 at 33.] 

Rather than quoting Dr. Lovko, the ALJ appears to be applying Dr. Lovko’s

conclusions about Devries’ capabilities: 

To the extent his/her physical condition permits, the evidence suggests

that claimant can understand, remember, and carry-out unskilled tasks in

a setting not requiring significant interpersonal interaction. The claimant

can relate on at least a superficial basis on an ongoing basis with coworkers and supervisors. The claimant can attend to task for sufficient

periods of time to complete tasks. The claimant can manage the stresses

involved with work.

[DE 10 at 336.] Devries’ challenge to the ALJ’s use of Lovko’s report is entirely

conclusory, simply that “the ALJ did not apply the ‘more rigorous tests”’ (applicable to

the opinions of non-treating sources) to Lovko’s assessment. [DE 13 at 19.] This general

statement fails to explain precisely what Devries believes the ALJ impermissibly did, or

failed to do, with respect to Lovko’s opinions, and so is unpersuasive.

In any event, this argument and Devries’ challenges generally to the ALJ’s

handling of Dobson’s, Lovko’s, Streich’s and Inabnit’s opinions are not addressed in

Devries’ reply, and so have been abandoned. Volkman v. Ryker, 736 F.3d 1084, 1088 (7th

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Cir. 2013); Keck Garrett & Associates, Inc. v. Nextel Communications, Inc., 517 F.3d 476, 487

(7th Cir. 2008); Dal Pozzo v. Basic Machinery Co., Inc., 463 F.3d 609, 615 (7th Cir. 2006).

Devries next argues that the ALJ did not properly assess or weigh the opinion of

her treating physician Dr. Joseph Bartush. [DE 13 at 19.] Dr. Bartush executed a

Mental Impairment Questionnaire concerning Devries on December 14, 2012, Exhibit 9F

in the administrative record. [DE 10 at 366-371.] The form has handwritten diagnoses

of dysthymic disorder, depression, mild mental retardation, morbid obesity, hypothyroidism, attention deficit disorder with no hyperactivity, and anxiety. [Id. at 367.] 

Bartush opines that Devries is categorically unable to work. [Id. at 369.] For each

mental ability or aptitude needed to do unskilled work, Bartush checks the box

reflecting his opinion that Devries’ capacity is “Poor or None,” due to her ADD, mild

mental retardation and social anxiety disorder. [Id. at 369-70.] Needless to say, he has

done the same for all the listed abilities and aptitudes needed to do semiskilled or

skilled work. [Id. at 370.] 

The ALJ explains his evaluation of Bartush’s assessment this way:

In this assessment, the physician indicated that the claimant had been

under his care since 2010, yet a review of the Healthlinc records indicated

that the claimant had not personally been examined by this physician

prior to mid-2013 (Exhibits 2F, 11F). Moreover, at that time, Dr. Bartush

saw the claimant for unrelated physical issues, which rendered the

opinion in Exhibit 9F rather unpersuasive as it reflected an individual who

was incapable of functioning at any level and inconsistent with the

educational records. Thus little weight was afforded to the assessment.

12
[DE 10 at 31-32.] As for Devries’ history of treatment with Dr. Bartush, she points out

that the Questionnaire itself lists seven dates of contact in 2011 and 2012 prior to the

completion of the Questionnaire. [DE 10 at 367.] But review of the record confirms the

ALJ’s conclusion -- Devries was seen by other HealthLinc doctors or nurse practitioners

on those seven dates, not by Dr. Bartush. [DE 10 at 281-309; 416-424.] Without his own

treatment of Devries, Dr. Bartush’s assessment is like that of any other non-examiner

who offers an opinion based on review of the patient’s medical records. 

On the date Bartush signed the Questionnaire, the record shows that Devries was

seen by Chantel K. Hendrix, NP, whom Devries had also seen on previous visits. [DE

10 at 416, 281, 286. ] Hendrix’s report on the office visit explains Devries’ “Chief

Complaint” as that she was “here for completion of mental impairment questionnaire.” 

[Id. at 416.] Just below Bartush’s signature on the Questionnaire is a scrawled signature

of “Chantel K. Anderson FNP,” which – in connection with the lack of prior treatment

records with Bartush – raises some question about who actually completed the

Questionnaire. [Id. at 371.]2

The ALJ was also dismissive of Bartush’s opinions about Devries’ mental

impairments because even when he did later see Devries as a patient it was for

unrelated physical issues. Dr. Bartush saw Devries several times for treatment after

2

 Two minutes on Google produces a Facebook page for Chantel Kelly Hendrix Anderson

and other search results for Chantel Anderson and Chantel Hendrix as a Nurse Practitioner in the

Indiana towns of Kentland and Knox, suggesting that Hendrix and Anderson are one and the same

NP.

13
completing the disability-related Questionnaire. On April 26, 2013, Devries saw Dr.

Bartush for prescription refills. [Id. at 409-411.] On June 25, 2013, Devries came to

discuss weight loss options, an ear infection and allergies. [Id. at 392-394.] I agree with

the ALJ that this post-Questionnaire history doesn’t suggest Dr. Bartush had a

treatment relationship with Devries that would particularly inform a well-supported

opinion about her mental capacities. The ALJ has sufficiently and reasonably explained

the little weight he afforded Dr. Bartush’s Questionnaire responses concerning Devries’

mental capacities. 

Devries’ brief concludes with a hodge-podge of arguments, none of which

establishes a basis for overturning the Commissioner’s determination that she is not

disabled. For example, she complains about the ALJ’s references to “objective medical

evidence” without explanation. [DE 13 at 23.] Ironically, Devries provides no citation

to the ALJ’s 15-page opinion to enable an analysis of the language she attacks. Devries

complains that a “non-examining source” failed to consider the clinical findings of Dr.

Bartush. [Id.] Because Devries does not identify the source by name or cite to the

relevant portion of the ALJ’s decision, the argument is a non-starter. I note, however,

that per the discussion above, Dr. Bartush’s opinions as expressed in the Mental

Impairment Questionnaire have been largely found to be unworthy of much weight. 

This determination renders unsuccessful Devries’ various remaining arguments in

reliance on Dr. Bartush, and they don’t warrant further discussion here.

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Finally, to the extent that Devries contends the ALJ did not give adequate

consideration to her obesity as an additional factor aggravating the impact of other

impairments, I reject the argument. [DE 13 at 26.] The ALJ several times expressly

indicated that he had considered such exacerbatory impact pursuant to governing

Social Security authority, namely SSR 02-1p. [Id. at 25, 33.] An explicit example is his

consideration of Devries’ obesity in connection with her allegation of musculoskeletal

impairments of osteoarthritis and disorders of the ankle and knee. [DE 10 at 24.] I am

persuaded that the ALJ properly considered Devries’ obesity in evaluating her claim of

disability. I also note that neither in this court nor before the ALJ did Devries highlight

any specific evidence or argument about how her obesity impacts her work-related

capacities. Furthermore, greatly to Devries’ credit, the hearing transcript reflects that

she was then successfully losing weight – some 20 pounds at that point – by going to the

gym several times a week, working on portion control and reducing binge eating. [DE

10 at 53-54.] 

Conclusion

Devries fails altogether to demonstrate that the ALJ’s findings and conclusions

about the severity of her impairments and her residual functional capacity are not

supported by substantial evidence. Using the applicable deferential standard of review,

I conclude that the ALJ’s determinations were supported by relevant evidence such as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support his conclusions. Moore v. Colvin,

743 F.3d 1118, 1120-21 (7th Cir. 2014).

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ACCORDINGLY:

The final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff

Amber L. Devries’ applications for Child’s Insurance Benefits and Supplemental

Security Income is AFFIRMED.

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: August 18, 2016

 /s/ Philip P. Simon 

PHILIP P. SIMON, CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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