IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

THE CINCINNATI )

INSURANCE COMPANY )

a/s/o JASON and )

MICHELLE HOWARD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CAUSE NO. 3:14-CV-1731

vs. )

)

LENNOX INDUSTRIES, )

INC., )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Lennox Industries Inc.’s

Motion to Reconsider Opinion and Order, filed by Defendant, Lennox

Industries, Inc., on February 29, 2016 (DE #46). For the reasons

set forth below, the motion (DE #46) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED

IN PART. The motion is GRANTED as to Count III, and the Clerk is

ORDERED to DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE Count III (for breach of

warranty). The motion is DENIED as to Count II for strict products

liability, which REMAINS PENDING. 

BACKGROUND

On February 9, 2016, this Court entered its opinion and order

on Lennox’s motion for summary judgment, granting in part and

denying in part Lennox’s motion for summary judgment. (DE #45.) 
The Court granted summary judgment in favor of Lennox on the claims

for design defect and failure to warn, but denied summary judgment

on CIC’s claims for breach of warranty (Count III) and

manufacturing defect (Count II).

Lennox filed a motion to reconsider this Court’s February 9,

2016 (DE #45) order, arguing that summary judgment should have been

granted on all of CIC’s claims (including the claims for breach of

warranty and manufacturing defect). (DE #46.) On March 28, 2016,

this Court took the motion under advisement and ordered CIC to file

a response on or before April 11, 2016. (DE #48.) To date, CIC

has not filed a response to the motion to reconsider. 

DISCUSSION

“Motions for reconsideration serve a limited function: to

correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly

discovered evidence.” Keene Corp. v. Int'l Fid. Ins. Co., 561

F.Supp. 656, 665 (N.D. Ill. 1982). A motion for reconsideration

performs a valuable function where:

[T]he Court has patently misunderstood a

party, or has made a decision outside the

adversarial issues presented to the Court by

the parties, or has made an error not of

reasoning but of apprehension. A further basis

for a motion to reconsider would be a

controlling or significant change in the law

or facts since the submission of the issue to

the Court. Such problems rarely arise and the

motion to reconsider should be equally rare.

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Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185,

1191 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan

Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983)).

Motions to reconsider “cannot in any case be employed as a

vehicle to introduce new evidence that could have been adduced

during the pendency of the [motion].” Caisse Nationale De Credit

Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir. 1996).

In other words, the parties cannot introduce evidence previously

available, but not used in the prior proceeding. See Roche

Diagnostics Corp. v. Bayer Corp., 247 F.Supp.2d 1065, 1068 (S.D.

Ind. 2003). Motions for reconsideration are also not vehicles for

“rehashing previously rejected arguments or arguing matters that

could have been heard during the pendency of the previous motion.”

Caisse, 90 F.3d at 1264, 1270 (citations omitted).

I. Breach of Warranty Claim (Count III)

The Court denied summary judgment on the breach of warranty

claim (Count III), finding CIC did not specifically argue the

grounds upon which it was entitled to summary judgment on this

claim (DE #45, p. 21). The Court was well aware that Lennox moved

for summary judgment on all claims. It was, however, concerned

that Lennox did not put CIC on notice for the grounds that Lennox

was seeking summary judgment on Count III, the claims for breach of

warranty. “The party opposing summary judgment has no obligation

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to address grounds not raised in a motion for summary judgment.” 

Pourghoraishi v. Flying J, 449 F.3d 751, 765 (7th Cir. 2006); see

also Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145, 148 (7th Cir. 1990) (“When a

party moves for summary judgment on ground A, the opposing party

need not address grounds B, C, and so on; the number of potential

grounds for (and arguments against) summary judgment may be large,

and litigation is costly enough without requiring parties to

respond to issues that have not been raised on pain of forfeiting

their position.”). 

Upon due consideration, and based upon the argument in

Lennox’s brief in support of its motion to reconsider, it seems

that this Court did misunderstand Lennox’s arguments on this claim. 

Going back to the summary judgment memoranda, Lennox did argue that

all of CIC’s claims against Lennox were subject to the requirements

of the IPLA, and subsumed by the IPLA. CIC did not respond to

these arguments in its memorandum in opposition to the motion for

summary judgment. Moreover, CIC failed to file a memorandum in

opposition to the instant motion for reconsideration, despite being

ordered to do so. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate in

favor of Lennox on Count III.

II. Count II - Manufacturing Defect

This Court analyzed and ruled upon CIC’s claim for strict

liability for a manufacturing defect, finding CIC’s claim survived

summary judgment. In the instant motion, Lennox reargues the merits

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of the case, and sets forth arguments about cases (Whitted v.

General Motors Corp., 58 F.3d 1200 (7th Cir. 1995); and Ford Motor

Co. v. Reed, 689 N.E.2d 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)), that were

already specifically addressed and analyzed by the Court (DE #45,

pp. 17-19). A motion to reconsider is not intended as an

opportunity to reargue the merits of a case. See Neal v. Newspaper

Holdings, Inc. 349 F.3d 363, 368 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming

district court’s decision to deny appellants’ Rule 59(e) motion to

alter or amend judgment where plaintiff simply reargued the merits

of his case); see also Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 247, 249 (7th

Cir. 2004) (“A motion that merely republishes the reasons that had

failed to convince the tribunal in the first place gives the

tribunal no reason to change its mind.”). Moreover, the moving

party must “clearly establish” a manifest error of law or an

intervening change in the controlling law or present newly

discovered evidence to succeed under Rule 59(e). Romo v. Gulf

Stream Coach, Inc., 250 F.3d 1119, 1122 n. 3 (7th Cir. 2001). 

Lennox merely rehashes arguments previously rejected by this

Court, and has not clearly established a manifest error of law or

an intervening change in the controlling law. Consequently, the

Court stands by its previous order (DE #45) regarding Count II, and

that claim remains pending. 

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the motion to reconsider (DE

#46) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED

as to Count III, and the Clerk is ORDERED to DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

Count III (for breach of warranty). The motion is DENIED as to

Count II for strict products liability, which REMAINS PENDING. 

DATED: April 25, 2016 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

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