O n D ece mb er 29, 2 00 6, O wni t f i l ed a v ol un t ar y pet i t i on un der C hapt er 11 o f t he U ni t ed St at es B ank r upt cy 1 C o d e a n d a ll p ro c e e d ing s a g a ins t i t ar e c u rr e n tly sta ye d
. See 1 1 U
. S.C
. § 3 6 2 (a). C o nsequentl y , our ju d gm ent appl i es ex cl us i vel y t o def endan t Co un t r y wi de. NO T REC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0484n.06 F iled: July 6, 2007 No. 06-1472 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
NIAKEIA SI BB Y, P laintif f-App ellant,
v. OWNI T M OR TGA GE S OL UTI ONS , I NC ., (f or me rl y kno wn as OAKMONT MORTGAG E COMPANY, I NC.); and COUNTRYWI DE HOME L OANS, I NC., De fend ant s- App e lle e s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EAL FROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E E AST ERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN O P I N I O N

BEFORE: NORRIS, GILMAN, and SUTT ON, Circuit Judges. ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Niakeia Sibby appe al s fr o m a gra

nt of summary judgme nt to defenda

nts Ownit Mort gage Soluti ons, I nc. (“ Ownit”), f ormerly known as Oakmont Mortg ag e Company , Inc., and Country wi de Home L oans, Inc. Plaintiff refina nced he r 1 ho me wi th Ownit in 20 01
. In 20 04 , sh e so ug ht to re sc ind the tr ans a c tio n, a lleg in g that Ownit violated the Truth in L ending A ct (“ T I L A”) , 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., and its implementing Re g ulatio n Z , 12 C.F .R. § 226 .2 3, by fa ili ng to pr ov ide he r wit h the re qu ir e d n oti c e of

he r r ig ht t oNo. 06-1472

Sibby v. Ownit Mortgage Solutions, Inc.

- 2 - resc ind. The complaint also included a count broug ht pursuant t o th e M ic higa n Consumer Protection Act, Mich. Comp. L aws § 445.901 e t seq., which wa s dismis sed by ag ree ment below. I. The prope rty

in question is located at 14200 F orre r, De t ro it, Michiga n. On Dec ember

26, 2001, plaintiff re financ ed h er h o m e b y closing on a loan of

$70,200. At her de position, pl aintiff acknow ledg ed that she ha d rec eived a nd signe d a Noti ce o f R i gh t to Cancel, but said that she
rec eived only

one copy . That sig ned notice inc ludes the followinglanguag e above plaintiff’s signatur e : “I /WE ACKNOWL EDGE RECEI PT OF TWO COPI ES OF NO TI CE OF RI GHT TO CANCEL

AND ON E COPY OF TH E FED ERALTRUTH-I N-L E ND I

NG DI SCL OSU RE S TA TE MENT , A L LGIVEN B Y L EN DER I N C OM PL I AN CE WI TH TRUTH-I

N-L ENDI

NG SI MPL I FI CATI ON AND REFORM ACT OF 1980 (PUBL I C L AW 96-211). Under the terms of the notice, plaintiff ha d until mi dni gh t o n De ce m b er 29, 2001, to ex erc ise her rig ht of rec ision. At her deposition, howeve r, pl aintiff stated she had in fa ct re ceive d only one copy of the notice to ca

ncel. When aske d why

she sig ned a r ece ipt stating that she r ece ived two copies of the no tic e to c anc e l if

sh e ha d r e c e ive d o nly

on e , p la int if

f r e pli e d th a t sh e wa s e sse nti a lly tol d to “sig n here ” and that she did not r ead the pag es bef ore sig ning. Plaintiff we nt on to testify that she did not look at the paper

work that she rec eived at her c losing until November of 2004. When she did loo k, the no tic e s o f h e r r ig ht t o c anc e l w e re no t amon g the pa pe rs . De s pite an anti-conve y ance provision c ontained in the mortg ag e, plaintiff executed a quitclaim deed on J anuar

y 14, 2003, which conveyed her entire interest in the proper ty to herself and
an unre lated individual, J ennife r Ridley , as joint tenants in c ommon with full rig hts of survivorship.No. 06-1472

Sibby v. Ownit Mortgage Solutions, Inc.

- 3 - Acc ordingto plaintiff’s deposition testimony , she did this beca use Ms
. Ridley

lived with her a

nd had put some $1,500 into the home for re modeling. L ess than two months later, on Marc h 1, 2003, the pr op e rt y wa s f or fe ite d to the Way

ne Cou nty tr e a sure r f

or no n- pa y me nt o f p ro pe rt

y ta xes. On

Ap ri l 7, 20 04 , Rid le y and pla int if f e xec ute d ano the r qu itc la im de e d that re tur ne d ow ne rs hip of

the pr op e rt

y to plaintiff alone. Plaintiff mailed Oakmont M o rt gage Company a notice of

intent to cance l the loan on Dec ember

21, 2004. One we ek later , plaintiff filed suit. II. TI L A, which is t o be libera lly construed in the c onsumer’s f avor, Inge v . Rock

Fin. Corp. , 28 1 F .3 d 6 13 , 62 1 (6 th Cir
. 20 02 ), wa s e na c te d to “ a ssu re a me anin g fu l di sc los ur e of c re dit te rm s . . . [t o] av o i d t h e u n i n formed use of cr edit.” 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) . The statute de leg ates the
a uth or ity to p ro mul g a te re g ulatio ns to t he F e de ra l Re se rv e B oa

rd . 1 5 U .S. C. § 16 04 (a ). Thos e regulations, like TI L A itself, ar e entitled to def ere nce. Se e Fo rd

Mo tor Cre dit Co. v . M ilh oll in , 444 U. S. 5 55 , 5 60 (1 98 0) (“ [I ]t is a pp ro pr iate to d e fer to the F e de ra l Re se rv e B oa rd and sta ff in deter mining what resolution of [an] issue is impl ied by the truth-in-lendingenac tments.”). At issue in this appeal is the re quirement imposed by both TI L A and R egu l ation Z that an obligor has def ined rig hts of rec ission: [I ]n t he ca se of any consumer cre dit transaction (inc luding ope ning or incre asingthe cre dit lim it for an ope n en d cr ed i t plan) in which a secur ity interest, includingany such intere st arising by

operation of law, is o r wi l l b e retained or a cquire d in any pr op e rt y wh ic h is us e d a s th e pr inc ipa l dw e lli ngof the pers on to who m c re dit is extended, the obligor shall have the rig ht to rescind the tra nsaction until midni g ht of the third business day

following the consummation of the tra nsaction or the de livery of the infor m at ion and re scission forms require d under this sec tion togethe r with aNo. 06-1472

Sibby v. Ownit Mortgage Solutions, Inc.

- 4 - statem ent containing the mate rial disclosures r equire d under this subcha pter, whicheve r is later, by

notifying the cre ditor, in acc ordanc e with re g ulations of the Boa rd, of his intention to do so. The creditor shall cle arly and conspic uously

disclose, in acc ordanc e with regulations of the Boa rd, to a ny obligor

in a transa ction subject to t his se c tio n th e ri ghts of the o bli g or un de r t his se c tio n. Th e c re dit or

sh a ll a lso pr o v id e , in a c c o r d an c e w it h r e g u lati o n s o f th e B o ar d , a p p r o p r iate f

o r ms for the obligor to exercise his rig ht to rescind any transac tion subject to this s ection. 15 U. S.C. § 16 35 (a). In th e e ve nt t hat th e c on sume r h a s n ot b e e n d uly no tif ie d o f h e r r ig ht t o
resc ind, Reg ulation Z extends the right to resc ind to three y ear s unless the proper ty has bee n sold or all of th e consum er’ s interest in the prope rty has bee n transfe rre d. 12 C.F.R. § 226.3(a) (3). The
re g ulatio ns re qu ir e th at “a cre dit or sh a ll d e liv e r t

wo c op ie s o f t

he no tic e of

the ri g ht t o r e sc ind

to
eac h consumer . . . .” 12 C.F.R. § 226.3(b) (1). In this appeal, plaintiff a lleg es that she did not
rec eive the requisite t wo copies of t he noti ce informing plaintiff of her resc ission rights and thus she had thre e y ear s rather

than three day s to inform the holder of the mortg ag e of he r intention to canc el the loan. We r e vie w a

dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra

nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt de novo , e mpl oyingthe same standard a s the district court. Farhat v. Jopk e , 3 70 F.3d 580, 587 ( 6th Cir. 2004). Summ ary judgme nt is appropriate wher e the rec ord shows that “ther e is no g enuine issue as to any materia l fac t and that the moving party is e ntitled to a judgme nt a s a matter of law.” Fe d.R.Civ.P
. 56(c)
. For the following rea sons, we conclude that plaintiff failed to e stablish an issue of mater ial fac t conce rning her r ece ipt of the required noti ces of her right to resc ind her loan. As a re sult, her rig ht to rescind expired three da

y s after her c losing a

nd her attempt to r escind the transac tion nearly three y ear s later

w a s un t i m e l y.No. 06-1472

Sibby v. Ownit Mortgage Solutions, Inc.

- 5 - On September

30, 2005, defe ndants serve d plaintiff with discovery reque sts, including the following reque sts for admission: 1) “Do y ou admit that y ou signe d on Dec ember 26, 2001 a Notice of Rig ht to Ca ncel, in whic h you a c kn ow le dg e d r e c e ipt

of tw o c op ie s o f a

No tic e of

Rig ht t o Cance l? ”; 2) “ Do y ou admit that on or ab o u t Dec ember 26, 2001 y ou rec eived two c opies of the N o t i c e o f R i g h tt o C an c e l w i thr e s p e c t t o th e p r o p e rty l o c a t e d a t 1 4 2 0 0 F o r r e r , D e tr o i t , M I4 8 2 2 7 ?” When plaintiff failed to re spond, defe n d an t s filed a motion to compel that aske d the district court to deem these reque sts to be admitted pursuant to Rule of Fe dera l Procedure 36(a)
. The district cour

t ext ended the discovery

deadline to No v ember

29, 2005 from Nove mber 2 without ex plicitly

rea chin g t he re quests for a dmission i ssue. Plaintiff did not respond to the discovery reque st by

the new de adline and de fenda nts moved for summary judgme nt on Dece mber 1 2
. P l a i n t i f

f f i l e d a m o t i o n t o w i th dr aw an d

/ o r am e n d a dm i s s i o n s o n J anu ar y 5 , 2 0 0 6
. H e r

th e o r y,
re ite rate d to thi s c ourt , is that sh e su bmi tte d to a

de po sit ion on No ve mbe r 23 , 2 00 5, a t w hic h ti me the issues cove red in the r equest for admissions were disc ussed. Consequently , she wa s no longe r ob lig e d to re sp on d to the m. Th e dis tr ic t c ou rt bas ed its d e c isi on g ra nti ngsumma

ry jud g me nt i n p art

up on tho se
a dmi ssi on s: De fe nd ants have pr e se nte d e vid e nc e th at Pla int if f s ig ne d th e No tic e of

Rig ht t o Cance l which stated a

bove the signature line that Plaintiff “ac knowledg e[s] rec eipt of two copie s of Notice of Right t o Cance l,” there by making her r ight to re scission expire on Dec ember 29, 2001. Def endants also prese nted Ali Ghias’s a ffidavit [the ag ent of the title compa

ny who was pre sent at the c losing]. Mr. Ghias states that “[a]t t he closing , Imade c opies of all of the closing documents, including two copies of the No tic e of Rig ht to Canc e l pr ov ide d to Ms. Sib by .” De fe nd ants a lso po int to Pla int if f’ s d e e me d a dmi ssi on s (du e to he r fa ilure to re sp on d to D e fe nd ants ’ R e qu e stsNo. 06-1472

Sibby v. Ownit Mortgage Solutions, Inc.

- 6 - for Admissions), in which she, by defa ult, was held as admitti ng that she did rec eive two copies of the Notice. . . . Contrary to plaintiff’s dee med admission that she rec eived two c opies of the Notice of the Right to C an ce l , P laintiff testified in her deposition that she did not rec eive two c opies. I f this testimony wer e per m i t t ed to contradic t binding admissions, a rea sonable jury could conc lude t hat s he did not rec eive the two copies and should be e ntitled to three y ear s to resc ind the agr eeme nt. The c ourt doubts that a bin din g a dmi ssi on

c an b e so easily

c on tr a dic te d a

nd un do ne . A dmi ssi on s w ou ld lose their for ce and be dra ined of their pur pose if Plaintiff’s testimony wer e allowe d on this point . In addition, the court rec ently considere d and denie d a motion filed by Plaintiff seekingto permit late re sponses to the reque sts to admit . . . . Or de r, Ca se No . 04- CV -7 50 25 -D T, F e b. 28 , 200 6 at 6- 7 (f oo tno te s and c itatio ns omi tte d)
. As thi s pa ssa g e make s c le ar, wh ile the dis tr ic t c ourt did c on sid e r t he dis pute d r e qu e sts to b e a dmi tte d, it d id not base it s gra n t o f summary judgme nt solely

on that fac tor. Fur

thermore , prior to g ranting summary judgme nt, the district court denied plaintiff’s motion to withdraw her admissions on the theory that permitting he r to do so would prejudice defe ndants. Orde r, 04-CV-75025- DT, F eb. 23, 2006 at 5-6. Whil e it is true that the district c ourt “may permit withdrawa l or amendment w h en t he prese ntation of the merits of the a ction will be subserve d thereb y an d t he par ty who obtained the
a dmi ssi on

fa ils to s a tis fy

the c ourt

that w ith dr awa l or

ame ndme nt w ill prej ud ice that pa rt y in maintaining the action or defe nse on the m erits,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(b), we r eview that decision for a n abuse of discretion. Kerry Stee l, Inc. v . Paragon Indus., Inc

. , 106 F.3d 147, 154 (6th Cir. 1997) (a district court has c onsiderable discretion over whether to permit withdrawa l or amendme nt of admissions).No. 06-1472

Sibby v. Ownit Mortgage Solutions, Inc.

T h e d istric t co u rt a lso gr a n te d su m m a ry j u d g m e n t o n the a lter n a tive the o ry tha t she ha d fo rfe ited he r rig h t t o 2 res ci nd when she t rans f erred her ent i re i nt erest i n t he p rop ert y b y execut i ng t he q ui t cl ai m de ed al l ud ed t o earl i er. B eca us e we f

i nd t hat j udgment was proper l y gr ant ed bas ed upon not i ce, we nee d not r eac h t hi s i s s ue. - 7 - We detect no s u ch abuse of discretion by

the district court. On the contra ry , plaintiff’s
c ouns e l ha d ampl e op po rt un ity to r e sp on d to the re qu e sts fo r a dmi ssi on and fa ile d to do so de sp ite beingprovided with additional time. In any event, the a dmissions ar e n o t t h e sol e evide nce that plaintiff rec eived the re quisite ex planation of he r rig ht to rescind. She sig ned an a cknowledg ment tha t s h e r e c e iv e d

tw o c o p ie s o f

th o s e r igh ts a t t

h e c lo s in g . T I L A p r o v id e s th a t “ written acknow ledg ment of re ceipt of a ny disclosures re quired under t his subchapte r by a per son to whom in f o r mati o n , f o r ms , an d a s tate me n t i s r e qu ir e d

to b e g iv e np ur s u an t t o th is s e c ti o n. . . c r e a te [s ] a rebuttable presumption of deliver y there of.” 15 U.S.C. § 1635(c). Plaintiff’s de position t estimony that she only rec eived one copy is insuff icient to r ebut this presumption. See W illiams v. Firs t Gov’t Mortgage and Inv estors Corp. , 225 F.3d 738, 751 ( D.C. Cir. 2000) (testimony byplaintiff of nondelivery insufficient to re but presumption). In short, plaintiff fa iled to cre ate a n issue of mater ial fac t with respe ct t o this iss ue and the district court there fore proper ly conclude d that her r ight to r escind expired three day s afte r she closed on the mortg ag e. 2 III . Th e jud g me nt b e low

is aff irm ed
.