### SUPERIOR COURT OF THE 

### STATE OF DELAWARE
P AUL R. W ALLACE J UDGE L EONARD L. W ILLIAMS J USTICE C ENTER 500 N. K ING S TREET , S UITE 10400 W ILMINGTON , D ELAWARE 19801 (302) 255

- 0660



### Submitted: September 1 4

, 202 3 Decided: Decem

ber 1 3

, 202 3

Mr. Michael D. Chambers SBI# 246261 James T. Vaughn Correctional Center 1181 Paddock Road Smyrna, DE 19977

Abigail E. Rodgers , Esquire Chief Prosecutor

– New Castle County Department of Justice Carvel State Office Building 820 North French Street , 7th Floor Wilmington, Delaware 19801 Todd E. Conner, Esquire Chief Deputy Dawn M. Williams, Esquire Assistant Public Defender Office of De fense Services Carvel State Office Building 820 North French Street, 3rd Floor Wilmington, Delaware 19801

RE: State v. Michael D. Chambers I.D. No. 0311009491A

Dear Mr. Chambers and Counsel :

The Court has re viewed Mr. Chambers ’ latest pro se filing d ocket ed September 14 , 202 3 , through which he asserts he is due a certificate of eligibility to seek review of his sentence under Title 11, Section 4214(f) and that the C ourt should order th e Office of Defense Services (ODS) to further assist him in his efforts to obtain relief under § 4214(f). 1 

### At bottom

, Mr. Chambers suggest s that the Court should grant him a certificate of eligibility because he h as m a ximized his rehabilitative efforts and believe s he now meets the eligibility requirements for such e xtraordinary relief

. 2

1 D.I. 151

.
2 Id. at 2 ( positing that if he “were sentenced today [he] wouldn’t even be declared an Habitual Offender, or if so would not have received a 25 year sentence for 1447A”)

.State v. Michael D. Chambers

I.D. No. 0311009491A December 12

, 202 3 Page 2 of 5



### The legislation enacting Section 4214(f) called for this Court to establish procedural rules to govern the filing of and proceedings on certain sente nce modification petitions. The Court has adopted Special Rule of Procedure 2017

- 1 for that purpose. That rule provides that pro se applications will not be considered unless the Court expressly grants a petitioner permission to proceed
pro se

. The Court has not granted Mr. Chambers such permission, but it appears his latest filing is in stigated by ODS’s notification that it cannot file a request for a certificate of eligibility on his behalf. 3



### F or the sake of completenes s , the Court has reviewed: Mr. Chambers ’ request; the record in his case; and, the applicable law and Court rules. Those materials were examined to see if he might arguably satisfy the exacting threshold requirements for § 4214(f) eligibility 4 

### thus warranting any further ODS involvement. Mr. Chambers does not.

A fter a three

- day jury trial

, Mr. Chambers was convicted of drug and firearms charges he committed in November 2003. 5 

### At the time he committed these crimes, Mr. Chambers had at least three prior felony convictions and was subject to sentencing enhancement as a habitual criminal offender. 6 

### So, prior to his sentencing, the State filed a petition to declare him a habitual criminal offender. 7 

### The Court granted that motion and sentenced Mr. Chambers accordingly. 8



### Resultingly, Mr. Chambers is serving, inter alia , a sentence of 25 years imprisonment imposed under the Habitual Criminal Act. The individual

c omponents of Mr. Chambers ’ current cumulative sentence are:

3 D.I. 15 0

.
4 See State v. Lewis

, 2018 WL 4151282, at *1

- 2 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2018), aff’d , 2019 WL 2157519 (Del. May 16, 2019) (describing the requirements that must be met before the Court will issue a certificate of eligibility to seek relief via 11 Del. C. § 4214(f)).

5 D.I. 29.

6 See D EL

. C ODE A NN

. tit. 11, § 4214(a) (2003) (providing that a person who has been thrice previously convicted of a felony and is thereafter convicted of another felony may be declared a habitual criminal).

7 D.I. 38

.
8 D.I. 47

- 48

.State v. Michael D. Chambers

I.D. No. 0311009491A December 12

, 202 3 Page 3 of 5



### - Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (P F DCF) (I N06

- 0 5

- 0449 )

— 2 5 years at S upervision Level V (to be served under the then

- extant provisions of 11 Del. C. § 4214(a));

- Possession w ith Intent to Deliver Cocaine (I N 06

- 05

- 0 447 )

— Tw o years at S upervision Level V, suspended in whole for
two years at S upervision Level I V, suspended after serving six months at S upervision Level I V for 18 months at Supervision Level III;

- Use of a Dwelling for Keeping Controlled Substances ( IN06

- 0 5

- 0 448 )

— One year at S upervision Level V, suspended in whole for one year at S up ervision Level III ; and

- Illegal Possession of Alazopram (I N06

- 0 5

- 0 453 )

— costs of prosecution

. 9



### The effective date of Mr. Chambers ’ sentence is January 26

, 2007

. 10



### Since then, Mr. Chambers’ convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal 11 

### and he has filed various unsuccessful motions seeking vacatur of his convictions and sentence. This i nclud es n o less than seven motions for postconviction relief

, 12 

### a motion for sentence modification

, 13 

### and three state habe as petitions

. 14



### T he Court now turns to his latest volley and whether Mr. Chambers satisfies the exacting threshold requirements for § 4214(f) eligibility.

9 Sentenc ing Order, State v. Michael D. Chambers , ID No. 0311009491A (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 26 , 200 7 ) (D.I. 49 ).

10 Sentencing Order, at 1.

11 D.I. 60

.
12 D.I. 52, 56 ; D.I. 63

, 69 ; D.I. 7 1 , 74 ; D.I. 7 9, 8 5 ; D .I. 97, 99; D.I. 103, 1 06; D.I. 113, 115; and D.I. 122, 125

.
13 D.I. 111

- 112

.
14 D.I. 129, 1 32 ; D.I. 134, 137 ; and 138, 141

.State v. Michael D. Chambers

I.D. No. 0311009491A December 12

, 202 3 Page 4 of 5



### “[ T ] o be eligible to petition for sentencing relief under § 4214(f), an inmate serving a sentence (or sentences) imposed under the pre

- 2016 Habitual Criminal Act must meet both a type

- of

- sentence and the time

- served requirement. ” 15 

### Mr. Chambers may meet the first in regard to the PFDCF conviction for which he was sentenced as a habitual criminal, but he does n ’ t satisfy the second

.

Mr. Chambers w as sentenced to the minimum required for his PFDCF conviction

— 25 years of imprisonment under the then

- extant four

- strikes provision of the Habitual Criminal Act. 16 

### O ne might become time

- served eligible for § 4214(f) relief only “ after [he] has served a sentence of incarceration equal to any applicable mandatory sentence otherwise required by th[e current provisions of the Habitual Criminal Act] or the st at utes describing said offense or offenses, whichever is greater.” 17

U nde r either of the current provisions of the Habitual Criminal Act applicable
to Mr. Chambers and his PFDCF conviction

— § 4214(c) or (d)

— the habitual criminal portion of his sentence for th at crime would be no less than the minimum mandatory term of 25 years o f unsuspended imprisonment he is currently serving

. 18

15 Yelardy v. State , 2022 WL 9632128, at *2 (Del. Oct. 14, 2022) (emphasis added) (citations and quotation mar ks omitted); State v. Harris , 2022 WL 472518, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 2022)

.
16 See D E L

. C ODE A NN

. tit. 11, § 4214(a) ( 2003 ) (“[A] ny person sentenced pursuant to this subsection shall receive a minimum sentence which shall not be less than the statutory maximum penalty provided elsewhere in this Title for the fourth or subsequent felony whi ch forms the basis of the State’s petition to have the person declared to be an habitual criminal except that this minimum provision shall apply only when the fourth or subsequent felony is a Title 11 violent felony, as defined in § 4201(c) of this title.” )

.
17 Id. at § 4214(f) (202 3 ).

18 See id. at § 4214(c) (providing habitual criminal sentenced for a triggering fourth felony, when that felony is a Title 11 violent felony and at least one of his priors was a Title 11 violent felony, must receive the statutory maximum for that trigge ring Title 11 violent felony); id. at § 4214(d) (providing one sentenced under this provision also must receive a minimum sentence of the statutory maximum penalty provided elsewhere in Title 11 for the triggering felony that form the basis o f the habitual criminal petition ). When Mr. Chambers committed his crimes i n 2003 , PFDCF was a class B violent felony with a statutory maximum of 2 5 years imprisonment. D EL

. C ODE A NN

. tit. 11, §1447 A , 4201(c) and 4205(b)(2) ( 2003 ). A nd M r

. C h a m b e r s no doubt had by then am assed no less tha n three prior conviction s for Title 11 violent felo nies

. See D.I. 38 (State ’ s habitual criminal pe tition eviden cing M r. Cha m bers ’ 1995 conviction for first

- deg r ee assault, 199 9 conviction for second

- degree robbery, and 200 0State v. Michael D. Chambers

I.D. No. 0311009491A December 12

, 202 3 Page 5 of 5



### Simply put, he is nowhere close to time

- served eligibility for release.

Accordingly

, to the extent Mr. Chambers ’ filing that he entitle s a n application for “ A ffirmative Relief ” is de emed a pro se certificate of eligibility under Del. Super. Ct. Spec. R. 2017

- 1(c) it must be DENIED , with prejudice. He is manifestly ineligible for relief under 11 Del. C. § 4214(f) and the Court need not enlist ODS to pursue a n application for relief that is going nowhere

. 19



### IT IS SO ORDERED.

P aul R. Wallace, Judge

cc: Prothonotary

- Criminal Investigative Services Office

conviction for second

- degree ass ault ) ; see a lso Sente ncing Trans c ri pt , at 4

- 6 ( D.I. 126 ) ( the State laying out tho se pr ior convictions d u r ing the habitual criminal hearing and Mr. Chamber ’ s response: “ There ’ s no objection on my part to the State ’ s offer, Your Honor

. ” ).

Mr. Chambers ’ mistaken belief that today his PFDCF would not be considered a triggering T itle 11 violent felony seem s to be a produ ct of his errant re lian ce on current 11 Del. C. § 3901(d). T hat stat ute only governs which violent felonies mandate cons ecutive sentencing. It does nothing to remove PFDCF from 11 Del. C. § 420 1 (c) ’ s list of violent felon ie s . PFDCF is now and al ways has bee n defined as a Title 11 violent felony. D EL

. C ODE A NN

. tit. 11, § 4201(c) ( 1996 ) ; id . (2023) . So

, it would still count as a trigger when figuring Mr. C hamber s ’ habitual criminal eligibility and slotting under the c urrent Habitual Criminal Act. I d. at § 42 1 4 (c) ( 2023); id

. at § 42 1 4 ( d ) ( 2023)

. 19 See, e.g., Clark v. S tate , 2018 WL 1956298 (Del. Apr. 24, 2018) (this Court does not err by denying appointment of counsel when a n inmate clearly does n o t meet § 4214(f)’ s eligibility requirements) ; State v. Rowan , 2022 WL 8962 60, at *3 (De l. S uper. Ct Mar. 28, 2022)

.