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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

LAFAYETTE DIVISION 

JANE DOE, as mother and 

natural guardian of JANE 

DOE 2, 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

TIPPECANOE SCHOOL 

CORPORATION, JOHN BEEKER 

and FRED ROOP 

 Defendants. 

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NO. 4:15–CV-00056 

 

OPINION AND ORDER

 This matter is before the Court on: Defendants’ Motion to 

Summary Judgment, filed on October 27, 2016 (DE #44); Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Defendant Tippecanoe 

School Corporation, filed on March 6, 2017 (DE #68); Defendants’ 

Motion to Strike Certain Evidence Designated by Plaintiffs [sic] 

Regarding Summary Judgment, filed on May 4, 2017 (DE #78); 

Defendants’ Motion to Limit or Exclude the Testimony of Plaintiffs’ 

[sic] Expert Witnesses, filed on May 4, 2017 (DE #80); and 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Supplement Qualifications of Dr. 

Kristine Chapleau, filed on June 19, 2017 (DE #92). For the 

reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment 
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(DE #44) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary 

judgment (DE #68) is DENIED AS MOOT. Defendants’ motion to strike 

evidence (DE #78) is DENIED. Defendants’ motion to limit or 

exclude Plaintiff’s expert witnesses (DE #80) is DENIED AS MOOT. 

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to supplement (DE #92) is DENIED AS 

MOOT. Plaintiff’s claims for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), 

are DISMISSED. The Clerk is directed to REMAND this case to 

Tippecanoe Circuit Court for further proceedings. 

BACKGROUND 

 Jane Doe 2 (“Doe”) was a fourteen year old student at 

Defendant Tippecanoe School District Corporation’s (“TSC”) 

McCutcheon High School when she first met teacher Jakob Robinson 

(“Robinson”) during the second semester of her freshman year. Over 

time, Robinson became Doe’s mentor, and Doe worked as Robinson’s 

teacher’s assistant. Doe’s mother Jane Doe (“Plaintiff”), school 

counselors and others raised concerns about Robinson’s close 

relationship with Doe with school administrators. Beginning in 

late 2014, during Doe’s junior year of high school, Robinson and 

Doe engaged in a sexual relationship for approximately three 

months. During that time, Robinson and Doe kept their sexual 

relationship a secret from Plaintiff, teachers and school 
‐3‐ 

administrators. Doe eventually confessed the sexual relationship. 

Robinson pled guilty to child seduction and is in prison. 

 In July 2015, Plaintiff, as natural guardian of Doe, filed a 

lawsuit in Tippecanoe Circuit Court against TSC and high school 

administrators John Beeker and Fred Roop (together, “Defendants”). 

Defendants removed the case to the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Indiana, Lafayette Division. 

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) alleges a state law 

claim of negligence, and violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title 

IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”), 20 U.S.C. 

§1681(a). Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all 

of Plaintiff’s claims (DE #44). Plaintiff filed a motion for 

partial summary judgment on the issue of contributory negligence 

(DE #68). Defendants filed a motion to strike portions of 

Plaintiff’s evidence (DE #78), and a motion to limit or exclude 

Plaintiff’s expert witnesses (DE #80). Plaintiff filed a motion 

for leave to supplement an expert’s qualifications (DE #92). All 

five motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for adjudication. 

DISCUSSION 

Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Evidence 

Defendants move to strike certain portions of Plaintiff’s 

Statement of Material Facts as being impermissible legal 

conclusions, irrelevant, and based on speculation. “Motions to 
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strike are heavily disfavored, and usually only granted in 

circumstances where the contested evidence causes prejudice to the 

moving party.” The Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Lennox Industs., Inc., 

No. 3:14–CV–1731, 2016 WL 495600, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 9, 2016) 

(citing Kuntzman v. Wal–Mart, 673 F. Supp. 2d 690, 695 (N.D. Ind. 

2009), and Gaskin v. Sharp Elec. Corp., No. 2:05–CV–303, 2007 WL 

2228594, at *1 (N.D. Ind. July 30, 2007)). Furthermore, “[i]t is 

the function of the Court, with or without a motion to strike, to 

carefully review the evidence and to eliminate from consideration 

any argument, conclusions, and assertions unsupported by the 

documented evidence of record offered in support of the statement.” 

Davis v. Munster Med. Research Found., Inc., 213 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 

1083 (N.D. Ind. 2016) (citations omitted). The Court has sifted 

through the voluminous evidence and has considered it under the 

applicable federal rules, giving each piece the credit to which it 

is due. Accordingly, the Court denies the motion to strike (DE 

#78) as unnecessary. 

Undisputed Facts 

TSC operates McCutcheon High School (“McCutcheon”). 

Defendant John Beeker (“Beeker”) has been the principal at 

McCutcheon since 2002. Beeker considers himself to be in a 

“[f]raternity” with the teachers at McCutcheon. (DE #70-2 at 3-

4.) During the time period at issue, McCutcheon had four assistant 
‐5‐ 

principals, including Jake Burton (“Burton”), Michael Lowrey 

(“Lowrey”), and Defendant Fred Roop (“Roop”). These 

administrators are in charge of evaluating teachers. TSC has a 

sexual harassment policy, and expects its administrators to look 

into improper teacher-student relationships. 

Doe began attending McCutcheon as a freshman in 2012-13. At 

that time, Robinson was a physical education (“PE”) teacher and 

assistant football coach at McCutcheon. Doe met Robinson during 

the second semester of her freshman year, when he taught her PE 

class. Doe testified that she and Robinson “would talk a lot and 

. . . joke around” while in Robinson’s class. (DE #45-7 at 2.) 

Doe confided to Robinson about family problems at home, after which 

he gave her a hug and told her that “he was always going to be 

there” for her. (Id.) According to Doe, she knew at that point 

that “he cared for me.” (Id.) At that time, Doe thought of 

Robinson only as a “mentor” and “father figure.” (Id. at 3.) He 

encouraged Doe in sports and wanted her to do her best in school. 

During her freshman year, Doe once went to Robinson’s house to 

watch a football game on television, and Plaintiff knew that she 

Doe was going to do so. At that time, Plaintiff knew that Doe 

considered Robinson to be a “mentor/father figure,” and “probably 

had a crush” on Robinson. (DE #45-6 at 2, 9.) Plaintiff saw Doe 

and Robinson interact, but never noticed Robinson ever act in a 
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way that seemed affectionate in any way, or put her on guard, 

during Doe’s freshman or sophomore years. (DE #45-6 at 9.) 

During the first semester of Doe’s sophomore year, Doe worked 

as a teacher’s assistant (“TA”) for Robinson. Robinson and she 

began hugging almost daily, but always when the two were alone, 

because they “didn’t want anybody to see it.” (DE #45-7 at 5.) 

Doe began eating lunch in the office of McCutcheon’s head football 

coach, Ken Frauhiger (“Frauhiger”), where Frauhiger or Robinson 

would help her with homework. (Id.) Beeker was aware that 

Robinson and Doe had eaten lunch together, but did not know they 

did so with regularity. During passing periods, Doe would visit 

Robinson in the hallway where he stood with Frauhiger and Scott 

Muncy (“Muncy”), who was an assistant football coach and PE 

teacher. According to Muncy, Doe interacted with Robinson, 

Frauhinger and Muncy. (DE #45-9 at 2.) Robinson and Doe would 

engage in “silly play,” in that Robinson would occasionally mess 

Doe’s hair, punch her in the arm, or give her a “wet willy.” (DE 

#45-7 at 8; see DE #70-12 at 6). Robinson would also act this way 

with other students. (DE #70-12 at 6.) Frauhiger “never saw 

anything,” though he noted that Doe came to talk with Robinson, 

Muncy and Frauhiger between every passing period. (Id. at 4.) 

Frauhiger spoke to Robinson about the time he spent with Doe 

because another teacher thought Doe was spending an excessive 

amount of time at PE. Frauhiger asked Robinson if he was “doing 
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everything right and . . . being the person you're supposed to 

be,” to which Robinson responded, “Absolutely, she's my daughter 

and you know that.” (DE #45-5 at 6.) When Doe’s friends would 

ask Doe “what are you and Robinson,” she would say, “he’s like a 

dad to me.” (DE #45-7 at 5.) 

Burton saw Doe talking to all three PE teachers, but “didn't 

see anything that [he] thought was out of ordinary.” (DE #45-3 at 

3.) Burton noted that “kids would go to different staff member's 

offices and eat lunch with them all the time so that wasn’t 

anything unusual in my mind.” (Id. at 7.) Burton testified that 

during Doe’s sophomore year, he heard that Robinson and Doe “were 

seeing each other more than a student/teacher relationship,” that 

“they are together all the time,” and that their relationship was 

“[t]oo close,” “unusual” or “odd.” (Id. at 2-3.) Burton believes 

that he discussed the matter with Beeker two or three times during 

Doe’s sophomore year. (Id. at 3.) Beeker told Burton that he had 

talked to Doe’s mother, and that she said there was nothing to it. 

(Id.) 

Robinson and Doe spoke over the phone and texted each other 

during her sophomore year. During one phone call, Robinson told 

Doe that he loved her, but she understood this to be fatherly love, 

and she told him that she loved him like a father. (DE #45-7 at 

7-8.) Doe described his texts as “flirtatious” (such as using a 

winky face) but not sexual. (Id. at 13.) At the end of her 
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sophomore year and into her junior year, Robinson began to tell 

Doe about problems in his marriage. (Id. at 15.) 

Plaintiff testified that during Doe’s sophomore year, she 

told Beeker that Doe “talks about [Robinson] a lot, more than an 

average student, I think, should talk about a teacher. But on one 

hand, I knew that – she liked him. You could tell that she liked 

him” and that he was her mentor. (DE #45-6 at 7.) She also told 

Beeker that Doe and Robinson were talking about Robinson’s divorce. 

(Id. at 8.) At this point, Plaintiff did not have a concern that 

“there was anything going on.” (Id.) Beeker testified that 

Plaintiff called him to ask about Doe’s role as a TA. (DE #70-2 

at 2.) In response to Plaintiff’s call, Beeker asked Frauhiger if 

he had seen Doe being late for class or “hanging around down 

there.” (Id.) Beeker wanted to make sure Doe was not abusing her 

TA position. (Id.) 

During the second semester of Doe’s sophomore year, Doe met 

with school counselor Stephanie Rodgers (“Rodgers”). (DE #70-16 

at 2.) Doe told Rodgers that she and her mother had been arguing 

a great deal regarding her contact with Robinson, and that she and 

Robinson texted each other outside of school. (Id.) Rodgers asked 

Doe if her conversations with Robinson ever became inappropriate, 

“[d]id you have a sexual conversation, or were you intimate with 

him in any way,” and Doe responded no. (Id.) Thereafter, Rodgers 

spoke to another school counselor and Burton about her conversation 
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with Doe. Burton asked her if she thought if there was any sexual 

contact between Robinson and Doe, and she responded that she did 

not believe that was happening. (Id. at 3.) Burton told Rodgers 

that he would speak with Robinson, and that Rodgers “could 

basically step back.” (Id.) 

In the fall of 2014 (Doe’s junior year), Jennifer Smith 

(“Smith”) became Doe’s school counselor. Smith testified that 

another school counselor told her that there was “talk of [Doe’s] 

relationship with Jake [Robinson]” but she did not provide Smith 

with any specifics. (DE #45-11 at 4.) Doe told Smith that her 

mother was concerned about her relationship with Robinson, and 

explained that that Robinson was like a father figure to her. 

(Id.) Smith did not ask Doe for any specifics about her 

relationship with Robinson. (DE #70-18 at 5.) Smith told Burton 

that she had some sense of “crossing the line” in the relationship 

between Robinson and Doe, but did not discuss the details with 

him. (DE #45-3 at 6.) Burton told her that it was “I don’t know 

how many times, let’s say twentieth time I’ve heard this stuff. 

Take it to Beeker because he’s involved in it and he knows. He’s 

talked to the mom. The mom says it’s ok.” (Id.) Smith passed 

this information along to Beeker. Beeker asked Smith if she 

thought “anything is going on, and at that point [she] said no.” 

(DE #45-11 at 4.) 
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Plaintiff contacted Beeker twice during Doe’s junior year 

regarding Doe’s relationship with Robinson. She told Beeker that 

Robinson had discussed his marital problems with Doe, and had asked 

her to go to King’s Island with Robinson “to help with one of his 

daughters;” Plaintiff had denied this request. (DE #45-6 at 11.) 

Beeker responded that he did not know why Robinson had asked Doe 

to go to King’s Island, but noted that Robinson was Doe’s mentor. 

(Id. at 12.) In a separate conversation, Plaintiff told Beeker 

that Robinson and Doe were having lunch together in the football 

office, and she wanted it to stop. (Id.) Beeker told her that 

“he would keep an eye on it.” (Id. at 13.) At some point months 

before January 2015, Beeker told Frauhiger that Plaintiff was 

concerned about Robinson and Doe “spending an inordinate amount of 

time together.” (DE #45-5 at 2.) Frauhiger testified that Beeker 

“asked me if there was anything inappropriate going on and I said 

absolutely not.” (Id. at 3.) Frauhiger told Robinson, “[d]on’t 

do anything to get yourself in trouble,” because Beeker had called 

him. (DE #70-12 at 6.) 

At the beginning of Doe’s junior year, Robinson was one of 

Doe’s teachers and she was his TA. (DE #45-7 at 15.) She would 

see him after every class period. (Id.) According to Doe, their 

hugs became more like “a boyfriend/girlfriend hug,” but were 

hidden, “[u]sually in the weight room.” (Id.) In early October 

2014, Robinson was absent from school for a week. After learning 
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that Robinson was getting a divorce, Doe texted him. Robinson 

told her that he loved her and she was the only person he wanted 

to talk to. (Id. at 17.) On October 5, 2014, Doe had a friend 

drive her to Robinson’s house. When she arrived, Robinson hugged 

her and cried about the breakdown of his marriage. Doe had not 

told Plaintiff where she was going, and left because Plaintiff 

kept calling her. She later returned to Robinson’s house after he 

texted that he “needed” her, where they kissed. (Id. at 20). 

Robinson and Doe first had sexual intercourse in mid-October at 

Robinson’s residence. (Id. at 21.) Doe was sixteen years old at 

that time. They had sexual encounters at school while behind 

closed doors, including in the training room, the locker room, 

weight room, the head coach’s office, the girls basketball coach’s 

office, and the outside football office. (Id. at 21, 23, 24.) 

All instances of sexual intercourse occurred off of school grounds, 

mostly at Robinson’s parents’ home. (Id. at 22-24.) 

In December 2014, the mother of one of Doe's friends, Brandy 

Burger (“Burger”), spoke to Roop about the relationship between 

Robinson and Doe. Burger told Roop that Robinson and Doe “had 

gone to lunch together, that he showed favoritism to her in class, 

and . . . she was allowed to use her phone.” (DE #45-2 at 4.) 

She testified that she told Roop her concerns that Robinson and 

Doe “were inappropriate and that I needed that to be checked to 

make sure nothing more was going on.” (Id. at 2.) Burger suspected 
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that the relationship was sexual, but “never said anything about 

[her] suspicion” to Roop. (Id.) Roop told Burger that he would 

let Beeker know, and later called to tell her that Beeker was aware 

of the situation and that it had been looked into. (Id. at 3.) 

Roop testified that the week before finals, a parent called 

to say that she had heard that Robinson and Doe had dinner 

somewhere together, and wanted to know if the school was aware of 

this. (DE #45-10 at 4.) He could not recall who the parent was 

with certainty.1 Roop told the parent that he would find out what 

the school knew. According to Roop, Beeker told Roop that he had 

spoken to Plaintiff and that Robinson was “more of a family 

friend.” (Id. at 5.) Roop returned the parent’s call to tell her 

what Beeker had told him. 

On December 18, 2014, Robinson and Doe decided to leave 

McCutcheon during the school day to have sexual intercourse at 

Robinson’s parents’ home. (De #45-7 at 25.) That morning, Doe 

suggested that Robinson purchase drinks at McDonald’s, so that 

they could claim that they had gone to lunch there. (Id.) Roop 

saw Robinson and Doe leaving the school building, and radioed 

Beeker to let him know. (DE #45-1 at 9.) Roop and Lowrey followed 

                                                            

1 Defendants contend that Roop’s telephone conversation with the parent was his 

call with Burger, rather than a separate call with the parent identified by 

Roop, because the identified parent categorically denies having a conversation 

with Roop about having seen Robinson and Doe eating dinner together in December 

2014. (DE #45-13 (Affidavit of Debra Weideman); see DE #45-1 at 7 (Beeker’s 

testimony that “it was Mrs. Burger not Weideman”).) This is an issue of fact 

that the Court must consider in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and thus, 

will not infer that Roop only spoke with Burger. 
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them because they wondered where they were going. (DE #45-10 at 

6.) Beeker had not directed Roop to follow them, and did not think 

of contacting Robinson by cell phone. (DE #45-7 at 10, 11.) While 

Robinson and Doe were still away from school, Beeker called 

Plaintiff to let her know that Robinson had taken Doe off of school 

property, and asked if she knew why they left. (DE #70-2 at 5; DE 

#45-6 at 13.) Plaintiff told Beeker that she did not know, and 

suggested that they were leaving to go have sex. (DE #70-2 at 5.) 

Beeker told her that there “was no evidence or premise that that’s 

happening.” (Id.) Beeker told Plaintiff that they had somebody 

following them, and asked her not to call or text Doe because he 

wanted to see where they went, and that he would call her when 

they returned to school. (DE #45-6 at 13-14.) Beeker had an 

opportunity to tell Roop and Lowrey to stop Robinson and Doe and 

tell them to return to school, but chose not to do so. (DE #70-2 

at 5.) 

Roop and Lowrey followed Robinson and Doe, and watched them 

pull into a driveway and go into a house. (#45-10 at 7.) Roop 

and Lowrey then returned to McCutcheon and told Beeker what they 

observed. (Id. at 8.) Roop and Lowrey determined that the house 

was owned by someone named “Robinson.” (Id. at 9.) Roop and 

Lowrey accessed Doe's school email account, and while they did not 

see any inappropriate messages, they noticed that Robinson and Doe 

had emailed each other late at night. (Id.) One of Doe’s emails 
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to Robinson stated, ”My Kind of Love, by Emeli Sande, it’s exactly 

how I feel lately, I just haven’t had any way to talk to you about 

things.” (DE #70-17 at 9.) Roop did not recall seeing this email; 

Lowrey was also unfamiliar with this email. (DE #70-17 at 8; DE 

#70-13 at 4.) They were not familiar with, and did not look up, 

the lyrics to the song referenced in the email. (DE #70-17 at 8-

9; DE #70-13 at 4.) 

Robinson and Doe had violated school rules by leaving the 

school without the requisite permission. (DE #70-13 at 8.) Upon 

their return to school, Beeker called Doe to his office. She 

carried a McDonald’s cup into Beeker’s office for the purpose of 

lying to Beeker about her whereabouts. (DE #45-7 at 25.) Beeker 

did not ask Doe if she was having a sexual relationship with 

Robinson, but Doe asked Beeker if he was thinking that was going 

on. (DE #70-2 at 7.) Doe told Beeker that she and Robinson went 

to the house to get money and change laundry over, and then went 

to McDonald’s. (DE #45-7 at 25.) Beeker believed her lies, and 

Doe believed that Beeker believed her. (Id.) Beeker testified 

that Robinson and Doe’s going to the house did not cause him to 

suspect inappropriate conduct. (DE #45-1 at 11.) Beeker told 

Roop that the two had gone to lunch. (DE #45-10 at 10.) 

Beeker called Plaintiff and told her that he had talked to 

Doe, that she had a McDonald’s cup, that she said they had gone to 

the house to pick something up, and then went to McDonald’s. (DE 
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#45-6 at 14.) According to Plaintiff, the time period between 

Beeker and Plaintiff’s first and second calls was 20-30 minutes. 

(Id.) Plaintiff testified that Beeker said that the school 

“overreacted.” (DE #45-6 at 14.) Doe told Plaintiff the same 

lies she told Beeker, and Plaintiff believed her. (Id.) Plaintiff 

thought Beeker was justified in trusting Doe at that time, and did 

not feel at all that Robinson and Doe were having a sexual 

relationship. (Id.) 

Beeker also met with Robinson. According to Beeker, Robinson 

told him a very similar story as Doe, but longer. (DE #70-2 at 

7.) According to Robinson, Beeker met with Robinson the next day 

and told him that Doe’s mother had called and that Beeker had told 

her there was nothing to worry about. (DE #70-15 at 6.) Beeker 

noted that Doe “had the cup; verified where [they] were.” (Id. at 

4.) Beeker also told Robinson that he thought that Plaintiff was 

jealous of Robinson’s relationship with Doe. (Id.) Beeker did 

not ask Robinson if he was sexually involved with Doe. (Id. at 

6.) Robinson testified that this was Beeker’s only conversation 

with him about his relationship with Doe. (Id.) Burton, Roop and 

Lowrey never questioned Robinson about his relationship with Doe. 

(Id. at 5-6.) 

Robinson and Doe did their best to hide their relationship 

from everybody. (DE #45-7 at 21.) When Doe was with Robinson, 

Doe would text Plaintiff pictures of the mall to show that she was 
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there, but the photos had been taken on earlier trips to the mall. 

(Id. at 4.) She and Robinson developed a code where she would 

start texts to him with “105” so that Robinson would know it was 

Doe texting (and not Plaintiff). (Id. at 34.) Doe testified that 

no one ever saw them doing anything sexual on school grounds. (Id. 

at 24.) She testified that they became more publicly “touchy” 

with each other during her junior year, but says this consisted of 

each resting his or her hand on the other’s shoulder. (Id.) Doe 

believed that they were successful in keeping their sexual 

activities a secret from everyone. (Id. at 21.) Doe testified 

that Robinson “was freaking out” about them getting caught, but 

Doe would tell him to “calm down,” “relax,” “it’ll be fine.” (Id. 

at 32.) 

During winter break, Plaintiff allowed Doe to go with Robinson 

to restaurants in order to observe the two of them together, but 

she did not see anything that concerned her. (DE #45-6 at 6.) 

She had no problem with Robinson and Doe spending time together 

when working on classwork. (Id.) Plaintiff maintains that the 

school had assured her “it was more or less just a mentor 

relationship. Nothing I should be concerned about.” (Id.) She 

never checked Doe’s phone to see how often she was communicating 

with Robinson because she never thought there was a sexual 

relationship. (Id. at 15.) Plaintiff is aware of no adult who 
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had any information about the fact that Robinson and Doe were 

having a sexual relationship. (Id. at 10.) 

Robinson was arrested at McCutcheon on January 9, 2015, the 

first day of school after winter break. Doe initially lied to the 

police about her relationship with Robinson, but admitted it after 

learning the police had evidence of the communications between the 

two of them. (DE #45-7 at 27.) Robinson pled guilty to child 

seduction and is in prison. (DE #4 at 9.) Doe attended McCutcheon 

through the end of the 2014-15 school year, and enrolled in a 

different school for her senior year. 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims against 

them. Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine 

dispute of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 

2505, 91 L.Ed. 2d 202 (1986). Not every dispute between the 

parties makes summary judgment inappropriate; “[o]nly disputes 

over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary 

judgment.” Id. To determine whether a genuine dispute of material 
‐18‐ 

fact exists, the Court must construe all facts in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences 

in that party’s favor. See Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 

(7th Cir. 2010). 

A party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion 

may not rely on allegations in his own pleading but rather must 

“marshal and present the court with the evidence she contends will 

prove her case.” Goodman v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 

651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). “[I]nferences relying on mere 

speculation or conjecture will not suffice.” Stephens v. Erickson, 

569 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). If the 

nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an essential 

element on which he bears the burden of proof at trial, summary 

judgment is proper. See Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th 

Cir. 2006). 

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims 

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment 

on Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against all Defendants, 

including any retaliation claims. Plaintiff does not respond to 

these arguments, and therefore waives any argument that these 

claims are valid. See Johnson v. Gen. Bd. of Pension & Health 

Benefits of United Methodist Church, 733 F.3d 722, 729 (7th Cir. 

2013) (holding that arguments not raised in opposition to a motion 

for summary judgment are waived); Palmer v. Marion County, 327 
‐19‐ 

F.3d 588, 597–98 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that a party abandoned 

his claim where he failed to delineate the claim in opposition to 

a motion for summary judgment); Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am. v. 

Caruso, 197 F.3d 1195, 1197 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that arguments 

not presented in response to a summary judgment motion are waived). 

Therefore, the Section 1983 claims are dismissed. 

B. Title IX Claim 

“Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in 

educational programs or activities that are supported by federal 

financial assistance.” Hansen v. Bd. of Trustees of Hamilton Se. 

Sch. Corp., 551 F.3d 599, 604 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 

1681(a)). “[A] teacher's sexual harassment of a student may render 

a school district liable for sex discrimination under Title IX.” 

Id. at 605 (citation omitted). A school district's liability 

cannot, however, be premised on the ground of respondeat superior. 

Doe v. St. Francis Sch. Dist., 694 F.3d 869, 871 (7th Cir. 2012) 

(citation omitted). To survive summary judgment, Plaintiff must 

establish a genuine issue of fact as to whether an appropriate 

official at TSC “had (1) actual knowledge of misconduct by 

[Robinson] that created a serious risk to its students, and (2) 

responded with deliberate indifference to the misconduct.” 

Hansen, 551 F.3d at 606; see Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. 

Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290, 118 S. Ct. 1989, 141 L.Ed. 2d 277 (1998). 
‐20‐ 

1. Actual Knowledge 

“[A] school district is subject to a private damages action 

only where it is deliberately indifferent to known acts of 

discrimination or harassment.” Hansen, 551 F.3d at 605 (emphasis 

in original; citations omitted). “[U]nder Gebser, a plaintiff in 

a Title IX damages suit based on a teacher’s behavior must prove 

both actual knowledge of misconduct, not just actual knowledge of 

the risk of misconduct, and . . . that the officials having that 

knowledge decided not to act on it.” Id. (citation omitted); see

St. Francis, 694 F.3d at 871 (citing Hansen, 551 F.3d at 605); 

Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290 (“[A] damages remedy will not lie under 

Title IX unless an official who at a minimum has authority to 

address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective 

measures on the recipient's behalf has actual knowledge of 

discrimination in the recipient's programs and fails adequately to 

respond.”).2

                                                            

2 Plaintiff argues that the standard is notice of Robinson’s “misconduct,” not 

notice that Robinson was having sexual intercourse with Doe. She cites TSC’s 

sexual harassment policy for the proposition that sexual harassment does not 

require sexual intercourse. (DE #69 at 9.) But Plaintiff's claim arises under 

Title IX, not school policy. “[I]n determining whether conduct is sexual 

harassment under Title IX, the question is whether the conduct altered the 

conditions of the student’s education, regardless how a particular school 

defines sexual harassment.” Doe v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 218 F. Supp. 3d 

826, 834 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (W.D. Wis. Feb. 9, 2017) (rejecting argument that 

teacher’s conduct was sexual harassment because it violated school policies). 

TSC does not dispute that sexual conduct rises to the level of severe and 

pervasive contact under Title IX, but disputes that anything short of that 

conduct was severe and pervasive. (DE #75 at 7.) The Court agrees. Plaintiff 

does not proffer evidence of misconduct by Robinson that occurred prior to his 

sexual encounters with Doe that rises to the level of sexual harassment under 

Title IX.
‐21‐ 

Plaintiff cites Delgado v. Stegall, 367 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 

2004), for the proposition that “it ought to be enough for 

liability under Title IX that when there are ‘known’ or ‘obvious’ 

risks that makes a failure to take steps against it reckless.” 

(DE #69 at 10-11 (citing Delgado, 367 F.3d at 672).) The Seventh 

Circuit has rejected a plaintiff’s reliance on Delgado to argue 

that something less than actual knowledge of a teacher’s misconduct 

will suffice as a predicate to Title IX liability. See Hansen, 

551 F.3d at 605. Hansen reiterated the requirement of “actual 

knowledge of misconduct, not just actual knowledge of the risk of 

misconduct,” and emphasized that Delgado “noted that a school 

district need not possess actual knowledge of a teacher’s acts 

directed at a particular plaintiff, but it must still have actual 

knowledge of misconduct that it would create risks ‘so great that 

they are almost certain to materialize if nothing is done.’” Id. 

at 605-06 (quoting Delgado, 367 F.3d at 672) (emphasis in 

original). Here, Plaintiff presents no evidence that Defendants 

had actual knowledge of Robinson’s misconduct directed at other 

students. Cf. id. at 606 (noting that “if a teacher had been known 

to be a ‘serial harasser,’ a school district might be found to 

have actual knowledge of that teacher’s misconduct.”). 

In Smith v. Metropolitan School District Perry Township, 128 

F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1997), the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue 

of actual knowledge, coming down on the same side of the issue as 
‐22‐ 

the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Gebser. There, a 

teacher began a sexual relationship with a student during her 

senior year of high school. The student, Smith, later filed action 

against the teacher, school district, school board, and school 

officials, alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title IX, 

among other claims. “Smith told no one about the sexual 

relationship with [the teacher] Rager until it was over and no one 

ever saw them having sex together. During the school year, Rager 

and Smith concealed the relationship by engaging in sex quietly in 

locations where they would not be observed.” Id. at 1017. The 

dissenting opinion of Judge Rovner elaborated on the facts of the 

case: 

No one at Southport High School ever saw Rager and 

Heather having sex, but the two were frequently seen 

together on school grounds. For example, they frequently 

left the school together during the lunch hour, and they 

once had lunch off school grounds with another teacher. 

On that occasion, Rager placed his arm around Heather 

and hugged her in a joking manner. In addition, Rager 

frequently walked Heather toward her next class after 

their time together, and he once personally explained to 

the teacher of that class that he had held Heather over 

fifteen minutes. On other occasions, Rager simply gave 

Heather a note for the teacher when he caused her to be 

late. Rager once also indicated in the presence of an 

assistant school principal that he wanted to be twenty 

years younger so that he could marry Heather. That same 

assistant principal later excused Heather early from the 

lunchroom so that she could meet Rager at his office, 

but not without first asking her in a joking manner what 

was going on down there. 

Finally, Rager was a constant presence at school swim 

meets in which Heather participated. In the presence of 

Heather's coaches and teammates, Rager would rub down 
‐23‐ 

Heather's shoulders. He also would work individually 

with Heather after practice on her swimming strokes. 

Some members of the swim team wondered, and discussed 

amongst themselves, why Rager and Smith spent so much 

time together. 

Id. at 1043-44. The Seventh Circuit held that Smith did “not 

contend that defendants actually knew of the relationship and 

failed to respond. . . . Nor do the facts support any such 

inference.” Id. at 1034. “[T]here is no evidence that anyone had 

actual knowledge of the alleged relationship between Smith and 

Rager. On the contrary, it appears that Rager and Smith 

successfully hid their conduct.” Id. The Seventh Circuit held 

that the school district was entitled to summary judgment in its 

favor. Id. 

In Doe v. St. Francis School District, the defendant school 

district knew about concerns from other teachers that a teacher 

named Kelly Sweet (“Sweet”) and one of her eighth grade students 

“had something like an eighth grade girlfriend/boyfriend 

relationship, like a crush.” 694 F.3d at 872 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). The teachers acknowledged that they had no 

evidence to confirm their suspicions. Id. The district 

superintendent interviewed Sweet and concluded that her denials of 

any impropriety were sincere. Id. The student’s mother 

subsequently discovered the sexual relationship between Sweet and 

the student and reported it to the school, whereupon Sweet’s 

employment was terminated. Id. The student and his parents filed 
‐24‐ 

a lawsuit against the school district alleging violations of Title 

IX and a state law claim. Id. at 870. The district court granted 

summary judgment in favor of the school district. Id. In 

addressing the actual knowledge requirement of a Title IX claim, 

the Seventh Circuit reiterated that “the plaintiff must prove 

‘actual knowledge of misconduct, not just actual knowledge of the 

risk of misconduct.’” Id. at 871 (quoting Hansen, 551 F.3d at 

605). The court noted that the superintendent “must have 

considered the possibility that Sweet and the [student] were 

romantically involved when she asked [another teacher] whether she 

suspected that Sweet was doing anything ‘illegal,’” but the teacher 

said that she didn’t suspect that, and Sweet denied any 

improprieties. Id. at 872. The court found that neither the 

superintendent nor the principal knew about the relationship until 

after the student’s mother discovered it. Id. “What the principal 

and the superintendent knew was that Sweet's colleagues . . . 

suspected an improper relationship between Sweet and the 

[student]. But to know that someone suspects something is not to 

know the something and does not mean the something is obvious.” 

Id. (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary 

judgment in favor of the school district. Id. at 873. 

As in St. Francis, here Plaintiff and others suspected an 

improper relationship between Robinson and Doe. While Doe’s 

counselors and other parents raised concerns about the close 
‐25‐ 

relationship between Robinson and Doe, none of them indicated to 

Defendants that the relationship was sexual. Defendants knew that 

Robinson and Doe ate lunch together, and spent time together 

between class periods and outside of school. But they also knew 

that Robinson was Doe’s teacher and mentor, and Doe was Robinson’s 

TA for a time. Doe told Plaintiff and Smith that her relationship 

with Robinson was a father-daughter relationship. Moreover, 

Robinson and Doe hid the sexual nature of their relationship. See

Hansen, 551 F.3d at 606 (plaintiffs presented no evidence from 

which a reasonable juror could infer that any school district 

official had actual knowledge of the teacher’s misconduct where 

the student hid the relationship from school officials, her parents 

and boyfriend). Plaintiff disputes what was known and observed by 

students and teachers in the school hallways, specifically, 

“flirtatious behavior, them placing hands on each other and being 

‘touchy.’” (DE #69 at 9.) Doe explained that being “touchy” meant 

resting his or her hand on the other’s shoulder. (DE #45-7 at 

24.) Robinson also interacted with other students, by, for 

example, messing up their hair. (DE #70-12 at 6.) “[N]ot all 

inappropriate conduct toward a student qualifies as sexual 

harassment under Title IX.” Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 218 F. 

Supp. 3d at 833 (citations omitted) (finding that a teacher giving 

a student shoulder rubs was not sexual harassment where plaintiff 

did not allege anything sexual or erotic about the conduct, the 
‐26‐ 

teacher did not single out the student, and the conduct took place 

in public with no attempt to hide it). Robinson and Doe only 

hugged, kissed or engaged in sexual activity in private. They 

were never seen by anyone engaging in such conduct. Plaintiff is 

aware of no adult who had any information about the fact that 

Robinson and Doe were having a sexual relationship. 

Plaintiff also cites Doe v. Galster, 768 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 

2014), in which the Seventh Circuit noted that “[s]chool 

administrators certainly cannot escape liability by putting their 

heads in the sand.” Id. at 617. But the court also emphasized 

that “[t]he standard is ‘actual knowledge,’” and thus, “is not 

satisfied by knowledge that something might be happening and could 

be uncovered by further investigation.” Id. at 617-18. There, 

the court found that there was no evidence that any school official 

willfully avoided learning of serious threats to Doe’s safety or 

ability to obtain an education. Id. at 617. 

Here, the evidence does not suggest that Defendants willfully 

avoided learning of serious threats to Doe’s safety. When school 

counselor Smith raised concerns with Beeker, he asked Smith if she 

thought anything was going on between Robinson and Doe. Similarly, 

when Plaintiff raised concerns with Beeker, he asked Coach 

Frauhiger if anything was going on between Robinson and Doe. 

Similar to St. Francis, neither Smith nor Frauhiger believed that 

anything was going on between Robinson and Doe. While Plaintiff 
‐27‐ 

believes that Defendants should have done more, the “actual 

knowledge” standard “is not satisfied by knowledge that something 

might be happening and could be uncovered by further 

investigation.” Galster, 768 F.3d at 617-18. 

Plaintiff argues that the December 18, 2014, incident 

evidences Defendants’ willful avoidance of a serious threat to 

Doe’s safety. The Court disagrees. When Defendants learned that 

Doe had left the school with Robinson, they acted. Beeker called 

Doe to tell her about it, and ask her if she knew where they were 

going. When Plaintiff voiced her concern that Robinson and Doe 

going somewhere to have sex, Beeker responded that they had no 

evidence of this, but he did not end Defendants’ investigation. 

Roop and Lowrey followed Doe and Robinson to Robinson’s parents’ 

home, and when Roop and Lowrey returned to school, they searched 

Doe’s school email account. They did not find any inappropriate 

messages, though they noted that Robinson and Doe had emailed each 

other late at night.3 After Doe and Robinson returned to school, 

Beeker questioned them separately. It is undisputed that Beeker 

believed Doe and Robinson when they lied about only stopping by 

Robinson’s parents’ house before going to McDonald’s for lunch. 

Beeker believed them in part because Doe carried a McDonald’s cup, 

                                                            

3 Plaintiff maintains that Doe’s email to Robinson referencing the song, “My 

Kind of Love,” expressed her romantic love for Robinson, but there is no evidence 

that Roop or Lowrey saw this email. 
‐28‐ 

something she and Robinson had planned in order to give credence 

to their lies. Plaintiff believed Doe’s lies as well. 

Plaintiff relies upon Mary M. v. North Lawrence Community 

School Corp., 131 F.3d 1220 (7th Cir. 1997), in which a cafeteria 

worker had a sexual relationship with a thirteen-year old student. 

There, the Seventh Circuit held that the principal had actual 

knowledge of sexual harassment and failed to respond where the 

principal knew that the worker and student were planning to skip 

school/work the day before they actually did, and failed to act on 

that information. Id. at 1225. The Court finds Mary M. to be 

distinguishable on the facts. Here, Beeker was not aware that 

Robinson and Doe were planning to leave school grounds on December 

18, 2014. Moreover, unlike the situation in Mary M., where the 

expected interaction between a student and cafeteria worker would 

have been limited to lunch in the cafeteria, here Robinson was 

Doe’s teacher and known mentor, and she worked as his TA. In Mary 

M., the cafeteria worker and the student were seen dancing 

together. Here, the observed interactions between Robinson and 

Doe were consistent with a mentor relationship. 

For these reasons, the Court finds that Defendants did not 

have actual knowledge of misconduct by Robinson that created a 

serious risk to Doe, and did not willfully avoid learning of a 

serious threat to Doe’s safety. 
‐29‐ 

2. Deliberate Indifference 

Even if Plaintiff had raised a genuine issue of material fact 

regarding whether Defendants had actual knowledge of Robinson’s 

misconduct, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that Defendants 

were not deliberately indifferent to Robinson’s misconduct. “The 

standard of deliberate indifference sets a high bar for plaintiffs 

under . . . Title IX.” Galster, 768 F.3d at 619. Deliberate 

indifference occurs when the “response to the harassment or lack 

thereof is clearly unreasonable in light of the known 

circumstances.” Davis Next Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. 

of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648, 119 S. Ct. 1661, 143 L.Ed. 2d 839 

(1999) (addressing student-on-student harassment under Title IX). 

“This is not a mere ‘reasonableness’ standard.” Id. at 649. 

Deliberate indifference can be shown where school officials “made 

no effort whatsoever either to investigate or to put an end to the 

harassment.” Id. at 654; see Delgado, 367 F.3d at 671 (“Deliberate 

indifference means shutting one’s eyes to a risk one knows about 

but would prefer to ignore.”). “[A]s long as the school’s response 

is not ‘clearly unreasonable,’ it cannot have acted with the 

requisite deliberate indifference to incur Title IX liability.” 

Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chicago Heights, Ill. Sch. Dist. 163, 

315 F.3d 817, 824 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). 

Plaintiff argues that Defendants did nothing to investigate 

or put an end to Robinson’s harassment of Doe. The evidence 
‐30‐ 

demonstrates otherwise. When counselor Smith raised her concerns 

about Robinson and Doe’s relationship, Beeker asked Smith if she 

thought the relationship was sexual, she said no. Beeker also 

asked Frauhiger, who saw Robinson and Doe interact regularly, if 

there was anything inappropriate going on, and Frauhiger said 

absolutely not. On December 18, 2014, when Beeker learned that 

Doe had left the school with Robinson, he called Doe to tell her 

about it. “Courts applying the deliberate indifference standard 

from Davis have regarded the involvement of parents as evidence 

that a school district is responding to harassment in a reasonable 

manner.” Galster, 768 F.3d at 620 (finding defendant’s responses 

to known acts of student-on-student harassment were not 

deliberately indifferent where defendant engaged in a pattern of 

active responses include communicating with parents) (citation 

omitted). Roop and Lowrey followed Doe and Robinson to Robinson’s 

parents’ home, and when they returned to school, they searched 

Doe’s school email account. After Doe and Robinson returned to 

school, Beeker questioned them separately about where they were 

and what they were doing. Beeker believed them when they lied to 

him, in part because Doe was carrying a McDonald’s cup in order to 

support their lies. 

Plaintiff maintains that Defendants did nothing because they 

failed to question, admonish or counsel Robinson or Doe about the 

rumors and concerns regarding their relationship, and failed to 
‐31‐ 

stop Robinson and Doe from leaving school or entering the house on 

December 18, 2014. The Court does not suggest that reasonable 

persons could not differ as to how this matter should have been 

handled or that Defendants’ response was ideal. But “this was not 

a case, as it was in Davis, of a school making ‘no effort whatsoever 

either to investigate or to put an end to harassment.’” Chivers 

v. Cent. Noble Cmty. Sch., 423 F. Supp. 2d 835, 850 (N.D. Ind. 

2006) (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 654). Although Defendants “could 

have arguably done more, the Defendants’ actions were not clearly 

unreasonable in light of the known facts.” Id. (citation omitted). 

The Court’s “role is to determine whether, based upon all of 

the facts presented in this case, there is a genuine issue of 

material fact regarding whether the [Defendants’] response was 

clearly unreasonable.” Id. (citing Davis, 526 U.S. at 648). The 

Seventh Circuit has admonished judges to “be sensitive to the 

effects on education of heavy-handed judicial intrusion into 

school disciplinary issues, or heavy-handed administrative 

intrusion required by judges interpreting Title IX and other 

statutes that, along with free-wheeling interpretations of the 

speech and religion clauses of the First Amendment, have made 

education one of the most heavily regulated American industries. 

Let us not forget that one component of academic freedom is the 

right of schools to a degree of autonomy in the management of their 

internal affairs.” St. Francis, 694 F.3d at 873 (citations 
‐32‐ 

omitted); see Davis, 526 U.S. at 648 (admonishing that “courts 

should refrain from second-guessing the disciplinary decisions 

made by school administrators”). Because Defendants’ response was 

not clearly unreasonable, it did not amount to deliberate 

indifference. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to summary 

judgment on Plaintiff’s Title IX claim. 

C. Negligence Claim 

Having dismissed the Section 1983 and Title IX claims, the 

Court does not have original jurisdiction over the remaining 

negligence claim in the Complaint. Where a district court has 

“dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” 

the court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 

remaining claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The Court finds that 

it would not be appropriate to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

over Plaintiff’s remaining claim. Therefore, it remands this case 

to the Tippecanoe Circuit Court. See Whitely v. Moravec, 635 F.3d 

308, 311 (7th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that “a district judge has 

discretion to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction and remand once 

the federal claim has dropped out” of a lawsuit). 

Other Motions 

The Court need not rule on the parties’ other motions because 

they raise issues that are not material to the Court’s decision to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 1983 and Title IX claims. Moreover, 
‐33‐ 

Indiana state courts are better suited to decide the state law 

issues raised in these motions. Plaintiff’s motion for partial 

summary judgment, Defendants’ motion to limit or exclude 

Plaintiff’s expert witnesses, and Plaintiff’s motion for leave to 

supplement are denied as moot. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment (DE #44) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motion for 

partial summary judgment (DE #68) is DENIED AS MOOT. Defendants’ 

motion to strike evidence (DE #78) is DENIED. Defendants’ motion 

to limit or exclude Plaintiff’s expert witnesses (DE #80) is DENIED 

AS MOOT. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to supplement (DE #92) is 

DENIED AS MOOT. Plaintiff’s claims for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1681(a), are DISMISSED. The Clerk is directed to REMAND this 

case to Tippecanoe Circuit Court for further proceedings. 

DATED: December 14, 2017 /s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge 

 United States District Court