alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 100 (Wednesday, May 24, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Page 27557]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-12682]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------


DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and 
Production Act of 1993--Engineered Surfaces for Rolling and Sliding 
Contacts Program

    Notice is hereby given that, on March 15, 1995, pursuant to section 
6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993, 
15 U.S.C. 4301, et seq. (``the Act''), the participants in the 
Engineered Surfaces for Rolling and Sliding Contacts Program 
(``ESRSCP'') have filed written notifications simultaneously with the 
Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission disclosing (1) the 
identities of the parties and (2) the nature and objectives of the 
venture. The notifications were filed for the purpose of invoking the 
Act's provisions limiting the recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to 
actual damages under specified circumstances. Pursuant to Section 6(b) 
of the Act, the identities of the parties and the general area of 
planned activity are: Caterpillar Inc., Peoria, IL; The Timken Company, 
Canton, OH; General Motors Corporation, Romulus, MI.
    The nature and objective of the research program performed in 
accordance with ESRSCP is to develop the process and material 
technology base to manufacture engineered surfaces for improved contact 
fatigue, scuffing, and wear of critical, high technology components 
such as gears, bearings, and fuel system components.
    Information about participation in ESRSCP may be obtained by 
contacting Phil J. Shankwitz, Caterpillar Inc., Peoria, IL; Harvey P. 
Nixon, The Timken Company, Canton, OH; or Ron Leachman, General Motors 
Corporation, Romulus, MI.
Constance K. Robinson,
Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.
[FR Doc. 95-12682 Filed 5-23-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-01-M
In re Randy Marvin SWISHER, petitioner.

No. 12-6516.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 29, 2012.

Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Petitioner

v.

DANIEL CASEY,

Respondent :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 130 MAL 2023

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 7th day of August, 2023

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANDREAS JOHN WESLEY

SILITONGA,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 07-74697

Agency No. A096-360-229

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 25, 2010** 

Before: CANBY, THOMAS, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.

Andreas John Wesley Silitonga, a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions

for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from

an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture

FILED

JUN 08 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 07-74697

(“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial

evidence, Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 2009), and we deny

the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that Silitonga does not have a

well-founded fear of future persecution because, even if he is a member of a

disfavored group, he failed to demonstrate the requisite individualized risk of

persecution. Cf. Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922, 927-29 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Accordingly, Silitonga did not establish eligibility for asylum. 

Silitonga has failed to set forth any substantive arguments regarding the

agency’s denial of withholding and CAT relief. See Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94

F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir.1996) (issues not supported by argument are deemed

waived).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
George PAPA, petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, et al.

No. 13-6676.

Supreme Court of the United States

Dec. 2, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied.
Lawrence EVANS, petitioner, v. Thomas BIRKETT, Warden.

No. 12-10067.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 10, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 95 (Wednesday, May 17, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Page 26425]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-12059]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
[Docket No. GT95-34-000]


Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation; Notice of Refund Report

May 11, 1995.
    Take notice that on April 26, 1995, Columbia Gas Transmission 
Corporation (Columbia) tendered for filing with the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (Commission) a Capacity Access Program Refund 
Report. The report indicates that Columbia flowed through to customers 
that had utilized Columbia's Firm Transportation Capacity on Texas 
Eastern Transmission Corporation (Docket Nos. RP90-119 and RP88-67) and 
Texas Gas Transmission Corporation (Docket No. RP90-104) via Columbia's 
Capacity Access Program, the portion of Texas Eastern and Texas Gas's 
refund, which was applicable to the quantities transported on Texas Gas 
and Texas Eastern by each customer under Columbia's Capacity Access 
Program.
    Columbia states that it flowed through these refunds in the form of 
credits to invoices issued on or around April 10, 1995, which were 
payable to Columbia on or before April 20, 1995. Interest was included 
in the amount refunded to each customer, calculated through April 19, 
1995, in accordance with Section 154.67(c)(2) of the Commission's 
Regulations. The total amount credited was $160,179.26.
    Any person desiring to be heard or to protest said filing should 
file a motion to intervene or a protest with the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 825 North Capitol Street, NE., Washington, DC 
20426, in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules 
of Practice and Procedure, 18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214. All such motions 
or protests should be filed on or before May 18, 1995. Protests will be 
considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate action to 
be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the 
proceeding. Any person wishing to become a party must file a motion to 
intervene. Copies of this filing are on file with the Commission and 
are available for public inspection.
Lois D. Cashell,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 95-12059 Filed 5-16-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

Ryan Babjak, et al., 

 Plaintiffs, 

v. Case No. 2:15-CV-40 JVB 

ArcelorMittal USA, LLC, et al., 

 Defendants. 

ORDER 

 The Court referred to Magistrate Judge Paul Cherry for report and recommendation 

Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment (DE 71) and Defendant Arcelormittal USA’s motion for 

leave to file a motion for summary judgment (DE 75). Judge Cherry issued his recommendations 

to which Plaintiff objects. 

 Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment---a drastic one---or the alternative request that 

Defendant be prohibited from filing a motion for summary judgment---less drastic but still 

severe---arise out of Defendant’s failure to comply with the Court’s order to designate witnesses 

and available dates for depositions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6). But as Judge 

Cherry aptly stated “[i]t appears that the issue between the parties could have been resolved 

without the Court’s involvement if Plaintiffs had conferred with Defendants as a first step instead 

of filing the instant motion.” (DE 78, Rep. & Rec. at 4.) And it still can, especially since 

“Defendant’s failure to comply with the Court’s deadline “though ill-advised and improper, does 

not appear to be the result of willfulness or bad faith.” (Id.) 

 Plaintiffs’ objections to Judge Cherry’s recommendations amount to no more than 

repeating the arguments in the original motion, which Judge Cherry thoughtfully considered. In 
2 

fact, the Court has nothing to add or take away and fully adopts Judge Cherry’s 

recommendations as its own. Accordingly, the Court--- 

 Denies Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment (DE 71); 

 declines to award reasonable expenses under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

37(b)(2)(C); 

 Sets the deadline for the Rule 30(b)(6) depositions for 30 days after today’s date; 

 Orders Plaintiffs to file, within 7 days after the Rule 30(b)(6) depositions, either a motion 

to reopen discovery for the limited purpose of conducting discovery on newly learned 

matters that arose in the depositions or a status report indicating that no additional 

discovery is needed; 

 Grants ArcelorMittal’s motion for leave to file Rule 56 summary judgment motions (DE 

75) except that, consistent with this Court’s practice, no such motion may be filed until 

the Court holds a dispositive motions and trial scheduling conference. 

SO ORDERED on August 14, 2017. 

 

s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Exhibit
23





CONSENT
OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM








The Board
of Directors


Sound
Financial, Inc.





We
consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (No.
333-156089) dated December 12, 2008 on Form S-8 pertaining to the Sound
Financial, Inc. 2008 Equity Incentive Plan of our report dated March 31, 2010,
relating to the consolidated balance sheets of Sound Financial, Inc. and
Subsidiary as of December 31, 2009 and 2008 and the related consolidated
statements of operations, stockholders' equity, and cash flows for each of the
two years in the period ended December 31, 2009, which report is included
in the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Sound Financial, Inc. for the year ended
December 31, 2009.





/s/ Moss
Adams LLP





Everett,
Washington


March 31,
2010
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

JOE HAND PROMOTIONS, INC., )

)

Plaintiff )

)

v. ) 2:13 CV 409

)

MIGUEL SERRATO, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

O R D E R

On August 20, 2014, the court referred this case to Magistrate Judge Paul R.

Cherry, for him to conduct an evidentiary hearing and issue proposed findings and a

recommendation for the disposition of plaintiff’s motion (DE #16) for default judgment.

He did so on October 16, 2014 (DE #24), no party has filed an objection, and the time

period for doing so has expired.

The court has reviewed Magistrate Judge Cherry’s findings, report and

recommendation, and they and it are well-supported and reasoned. The court therefore

adopts Magistrate Judge Cherry’s findings, report and recommendation as its own

opinion in this matter. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for default judgment (DE #16)is

GRANTED, and the clerk is directed to ENTER FINAL JUDGMENT in favor of

plaintiff Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. and against defendants Miguel Serrato, individually

and d/b/a Miguel’s Mexican Fusion Grill, and Miguel Mexican Fusion Grill, LLC, an

unknown business entity d/b/a Miguel’s Mexican Fusion Grill, jointly and severally on
Count I of plaintiff’s complaint for $5,500.00 in damages, plus attorney fees and costs of

$3,110.00, for a total judgment sum of $8610.00. Post-judgment interest at the statutory

rate. Counts II and III of plaintiff’s complaint are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

SO ORDERED.

Date: November 21, 2014

 s/ James T. Moody 

JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION

          I, Patrick L. Milton, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of YDI
          Wireless, Inc., certify that:

        1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of YDI Wireless,
Inc.;

        2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

        3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

        4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

           a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

           b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

           c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most
recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an
annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting;
and

        5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based
on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to
the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

           a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design
or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

           b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting.



Date: November 10, 2003                    /s/ Patrick L. Milton
                                           -------------------------------------
                                           Patrick L. Milton
                                           Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer
#### POPHAN v. RUBIN et al.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.

May 9, 1912.)

Set-Off and Counterclaim (§ 44*)—Mutuality of Claims—Partnership. Partners, sued on a debt of the partnership to a bankrupt, cannot set off a debt of the bankrupt to one of the partners individually.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Set-Off and Counterclaim, Cent. Dig §§ 82-96, 98, 99; Dec. Dig. § 44.*]

*1068Appeal from City Court of New York, Trial Term.

Action by William S. Pophan, trustee in bankruptcy of.the Dart Cereal Company, against Samuel C. Rubin and another, copartners, composing the firm' of Rubin & Willner. From a judgment on a verdict directed for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Argued April term, 1912, before SEABURY, GUY, and GERARD, JJ.

Samuel S. Breslin, of New York City, for appellants.

Hirsh & Newman, of New York City (Leon N. Futter, of New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

*

For otter casos see same topic & § number in Dec. *&*Am. Digs: 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

SEABURY, J.

The plaintiff, as trustee in bankruptcy of the Dart Cereal Company, sues the defendants to recover for goods sold and delivered to the latter by the Dart Cereal Company. The Dart Cereal Company was adjudicated a bankrupt oifjune 26, 1911. The defendants are copartners. The defendants admitted the cause of action alleged in the complaint, and by way of set-off alleged that prior to the institution of the bankruptcy proceedings the Dart Cereal Company was indebted to Rubin, one of the defendants, in the sum of $350.

The learned court below directed a verdict for the plaintiff. We think that the direction of the court below was correct. The individual claim of one of the partners could not properly be set off against a claim against both partners upon their joint debt. Hunter v. Booth, 84 App. Div. 585, 82 N. Y. Supp. 1000; Thomas v. Noonan, 133 App. Div. 459, 118 N. Y. Supp. 25; Blumenthal v. Katz, 132 N. Y. Supp. 314.

Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur.
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUREKA DIVISION

JEANETTE BROWN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SONOMA COUNTY LAND COMPANY, 

et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-00913-RMI 

ORDER VACATING JUDGMENT AND 

REOPENING CASE

Re: Dkt. No. 84

On January 24, 2020, Plaintiffs and Defendant Read Realty Management, LLC filed a 

Stipulation for Dismissal and Proposed Order (dkt. 82) requesting “through their respective counsel 

of record, that the above-captioned actions be dismissed with prejudice in their entirety pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).” The court granted the Stipulation (dkt. 83) and 

entered Judgment (dkt. 84). On January 28, 2020, the parties appeared at a previously scheduled 

case management conference and explained that the Stipulation was meant to only apply to 

Plaintiffs and Defendant Read Realty Management, LLC, and that Plaintiffs, Defendants Sonoma 

County Land Company and E. Richard Thomas remain active parties to the case. Thus, the court

vacates the Judgment (dkt. 84) entered on January 27, 2020 and orders the Clerk of Court to 

reopen the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 29, 2020

ROBERT M. ILLMAN

United States Magistrate Judge
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

JOSE SHABARA,

Appellant

v.

PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF 

PROBATION AND PAROLE,

Appellee

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 35 EAP 2018

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 21st day of February, 2019, the Application for Summary Relief is 

GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          FEB-28-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             MAR-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               AUG-31-1997
<CASH>                                         496,992
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               14,172,877
<ALLOWANCES>                                   838,518
<INVENTORY>                                 14,437,228
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            28,788,319
<PP&E>                                       5,877,626
<DEPRECIATION>                               2,221,853
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              36,360,777
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       17,078,262
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       103,800
<OTHER-SE>                                   7,852,695
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                36,360,777
<SALES>                                     48,223,439
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            48,223,439
<CGS>                                       38,772,525
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               38,772,525
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               133,122
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             688,310
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                991,251
<INCOME-TAX>                                    41,810
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   949,441
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .08
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .08
        

</TABLE>
|Insurance Fund Reserve Ratios Percent of Insured Deposits
|---------------------------------------------------------
|
|12/2000                                                  
|12/2001                                                  
|3/02                                                     
|6/02                                                     
|9/02                                                     
|12/02                                                    
|3/03                                                     
|6/03                                                     
|9/03                                                     
|12/03                                                    
|3/04                                                     
|6/04                                                     
|9/04
[No. 29812-1-II.

Division Two.

January 11, 2005.]

#### Pierce County, *Respondent,*v. Richard E. Sorrels, et al., *Appellants.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 97-2-07841-1, Terry D. Sebring, J., entered November 27, *2002.Affirmed in part*and *reversed in part*by unpublished opinion per Houghton, J., concurred in by Bridgewater and Armstrong, JJ.