IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

STEVEN SHANE SATTERLY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 3:14-CV-1588

)

ROBERT LAND, and TARI WOLFE, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the court on the amended complaint filed

by Steven Shane Satterly, a pro se prisoner, on July 10, 2014. For

the reasons set forth below, the Court: (1) GRANTS Steven Shane

Satterly leave to proceed on a Fourteenth Amendment claim for a

denial of dental care from May until September 2012, by Nurse Tari

Wolfe in her individual capacity for compensatory damages; (2)

DISMISSES Sheriff Robert Land; (3) DISMISSES all other claims; (4)

DIRECTS the Clerk to transmit the summons and USM-285 for Nurse

Tari Wolfe to the United States Marshals Service along with a copy

of the complaint and this order; (4) DIRECTS the United States

Marshals Service, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to effect

service of process on Nurse Tari Wolfe; and (5) ORDERS, pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that Nurse Tari Wolfe respond, as provided

for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R.

10-1(b), only to the claim for which the Plaintiff has been granted

leave to proceed in this screening order.
BACKGROUND

On May 29, 2012, Steven Shane Satterly was a pre-trial

detainee at the Wabash County Jail when he notified Nurse Tari

Wolfe that he had a painful, broken molar and cavities. DE 7-1 at

1. In response, she told him that the jail did not have a dentist.

Id. Satterly alleges that for months she never provided him with

any medical treatment for his teeth. Satterly sent grievances and

other documents (including a tort claim notice) to Sheriff Robert

Land, but never received a response. Nevertheless, Sheriff Land

sent him to a dentist on August 16, 2012, who prescribed

antibiotics. However, Satterly alleges that Nurse Wolfe prevented

him from obtaining any antibiotics. On September 25, 2012, Sheriff

Land sent him to another dentist who pulled his teeth. 

DISCUSSION

“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a

pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and

citations omitted). Nevertheless, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,

the court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and

dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief. “A claim has

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facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Factual allegations must

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,

on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are

true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

(quotation marks, citations and footnote omitted). “[W]here the

well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the

mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it

has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 679 (quotation marks and brackets omitted). Thus, “a

plaintiff must do better than putting a few words on paper that, in

the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something

has happened to her that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v.

Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in

original). “In order to state a claim under § 1983 a plaintiff must

allege: (1) that defendants deprived him of a federal

constitutional right; and (2) that the defendants acted under color

of state law.” Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006). 

Satterly was a pretrial detainee. “Although the Eighth

Amendment applies only to convicted persons, pretrial detainees .

. . are entitled to the same basic protections under the Fourteenth

Amendment’s due process clause. Accordingly, [courts] apply the

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same legal standards to deliberate indifference claims brought

under either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.” Minix v.

Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 831 (7th Cir. 2010). In medical cases, the

Constitution is violated only when a defendant was deliberately

indifferent to an inmate’s serious medical needs. Gutierrez v.

Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997). A medical need is

serious if it is one that a physician has diagnosed as mandating

treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson would

easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention, and if

untreated could result in further significant injury or unnecessary

pain, and that significantly affects the person’s daily activities

or features chronic and substantial pain. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111

F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997). Here, Satterly has plausibly

alleged that his dental problems were a serious medical need. 

“[C]onduct is deliberately indifferent when the official has

acted in an intentional or criminally reckless manner, i.e., the

defendant must have known that the plaintiff was at serious risk of

being harmed and decided not to do anything to prevent that harm

from occurring even though he could have easily done so.” Board v.

Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks,

brackets, and citation omitted). 

Negligence on the part of an official does not violate

the Constitution, and it is not enough that he or she

should have known of a risk. Instead, deliberate

indifference requires evidence that an official actually

knew of a substantial risk of serious harm and

consciously disregarded it nonetheless.

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Pierson v. Hartley, 391 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 2004) (citations

omitted). It is not enough to show that a defendant merely failed

to act reasonably. Gibbs v. Franklin, 49 F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir.

1995). Moreover, “public employees are responsible for their own

misdeeds but not for anyone else’s." Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d

592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009). There is no general respondeat superior

liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Only persons who cause or

participate in the violations are responsible.” George v. Smith,

507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007). 

Here, Satterly has not plausibly alleged that Sheriff Robert

Land was deliberately indifferent. “If a prisoner is under the care

of medical experts a non-medical prison official will generally be

justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.”

Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir. 2005) (ellipsis

omitted) quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3rd Cir.

2004). Satterly was under the medical care of Nurse Wolfe. Though

Satterly wrote to Sheriff Land to complain about the nurse, that

alone is insufficient to make him financially liable. 

Bureaucracies divide tasks; no prisoner is entitled to

insist that one employee do another’s job. The division

of labor is important not only to bureaucratic

organization but also to efficient performance of tasks;

people who stay within their roles can get more work

done, more effectively, and cannot be hit with damages

under §1983 for not being ombudsmen. Burks’s view that

everyone who knows about a prisoner’s problem must pay

damages implies that he could write letters to the

Governor of Wisconsin and 999 other public officials,

demand that every one of those 1,000 officials drop

everything he or she is doing in order to investigate a

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single prisoner’s claims, and then collect damages from

all 1,000 recipients if the letter-writing campaign does

not lead to better medical care. That can’t be right. The

Governor, and for that matter the Superintendent of

Prisons and the Warden of each prison, is entitled to

relegate to the prison’s medical staff the provision of

good medical care. That is equally true for an inmate

complaint examiner. 

Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation

omitted). “A layperson’s failure to tell the medical staff how to

do its job cannot be called deliberate indifference . . ..” Id. at

596. Moreover, though Sheriff Land did not provide a written

response to Satterly, he did not sit idly by and ignore his

complaints either. Rather, he twice sent him to a dentist.

Therefore Satterly has not stated a claim against Sheriff Land. 

However, Nurse Wolfe is different. Satterly alleges that from

May until September 2012, she never provided him with any medical

treatment and that she prevented him from obtaining antibiotics

that were prescribed by a dentist. Based on these allegations, he

has stated a claim against Nurse Wolfe. “For a medical professional

to be liable for deliberate indifference to an inmate’s medical

needs, he must make a decision that represents such a substantial

departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or

standards, as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually

did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Jackson v. Kotter,

541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks and citations

omitted). 

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Nevertheless, deliberate indifference is a high standard and

though Satterly has plausibly alleged that Nurse Wolfe was

deliberately indifferent, there are many factual details he has not

provided. Even medical malpractice and incompetence do not state a

claim of deliberate indifference. Walker v. Peters, 233 F.3d 494

(7th Cir. 2000). “Under the Eighth Amendment, [a prisoner] is not

entitled to demand specific care. She is not entitled to the best

care possible.” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir.1997).

A “disagreement with medical professionals [does not] state a

cognizable Eighth Amendment Claim under the deliberate indifference

standard of Estelle v. Gamble [429 U.S. 97 (1976)].” Ciarpaglini v.

Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 331 (7th Cir. 2003). Furthermore, the

Constitution does not require free medical care. Poole v. Isaacs,

703 F.3d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 2012). Thus if Satterly refused to be

seen by Nurse Wolfe or if he refused to pay (or incur the

obligation to pay in the future) for the treatment provided, then

he was not being denied medical care. Rather, he was refusing it

and she was not deliberately indifferent. Cf. Freeman v. Berge, 441

F.3d 543 (7th Cir. 2006) (An inmate cannot create a Constitutional

violation by refusing to comply with reasonable conditions for

receiving food.) 

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court: (1) GRANTS Steven

Shane Satterly leave to proceed on a Fourteenth Amendment claim for

a denial of dental care from May until September 2012, by Nurse

Tari Wolfe in her individual capacity for compensatory damages; (2)

DISMISSES Sheriff Robert Land; (3) DISMISSES all other claims; (4)

DIRECTS the Clerk to transmit the summons and USM-285 for Nurse

Tari Wolfe to the United States Marshals Service along with a copy

of the complaint and this order; (4) DIRECTS the United States

Marshals Service, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to effect

service of process on Nurse Tari Wolfe; and (5) ORDERS, pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that Nurse Tari Wolfe respond, as provided

for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R.

10-1(b), only to the claim for which the Plaintiff has been granted

leave to proceed in this screening order.

DATED: July 21, 2014 /s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United State District Court

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