UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

ROBERT DAVID DILLION, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) 

v. ) No. 2:15 CV 405

)

DR. ERSMAN, ) 

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Robert David Dillion, a prisoner at the Lake County Jail, filed a vague amended

complaint alleging that he received inadequate medical treatment for his arm. “A

document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and

citations omitted). Nevertheless, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review

the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious,

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against

a defendant who is immune from such relief. 

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a complaint to contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, it must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A

claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Factual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the

assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotation marks, citations and footnote omitted). “[W]here the

well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quotation marks and brackets omitted). Thus, “a

plaintiff must do better than putting a few words on paper that, in the hands of an

imaginative reader, might suggest that something has happened to her that might be

redressed by the law.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010)

(emphasis in original). 

“In order to state a claim under § 1983 a plaintiff must allege: (1) that defendants

deprived him of a federal constitutional right; and (2) that the defendants acted under

color of state law.” Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006). Dillion explains that

on October 2, 2015, he fell from his bunk and broke his arm. He states that he was

immediately taken to the hospital and treated. The next day, the head doctor at the Lake

County Jail, Dr. Ersman, saw him, prescribed him pain medication, and told him that he

would see him soon. Dr. Ersman is the only defendant named in this complaint. “For a

medical professional to be liable for deliberate indifference to an inmate’s medical

needs, he must make a decision that represents such a substantial departure from

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accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the

person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Jackson v.

Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Dillion only saw Dr. Ersman one time. Dillion says that he has tried to see him

again, but he does not say what he did. Who did he speak to? What request forms did

he fill out? Who did he give them to? What responses did he get back? Dillion

speculates that Dr. Ersman has denied him pain medication. But he has not provided a

factual basis for why he believes that Dr. Ersman knows that he is in pain. Dillion

speculates that Dr. Ersman has allowed him to see an outside specialist only two times

since he went to the hospital. But he has not provided a factual basis for why he

believes that Dr. Ersman has been involved in his treatment since October 3, 2015. Who

is scheduling Dillion’s visits to the outside doctor? Has he seen another doctor at the

jail? Has he seen nurses? What has he told them? What treatment has he received?

Dillion states that his outside specialist wanted to see him more frequently. Did that

specialist communicate his concerns to Dr. Ersman? Did Dr. Ersman respond? Mere

speculation is insufficient to state a claim. Dillion must present facts from which it can

be reasonably inferred that Dr. Ersman violated his rights and is financially liable to

him. 

This complaint does not state a claim. Nevertheless, because so many questions

remain unanswered, it is possible that Dillion has omitted relevant facts. Therefore, he

will be permitted to file an amended complaint if he has additional factual information

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to provide. See Luevano v. Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2013). In his amended

complaint, if he files one, Dillion needs to set forth every claim that he is trying to bring

in this case. He needs to provide all the relevant facts. He needs to address the

questions raised in this order. Alternatively, if he has no additional claims or relevant

facts to submit for consideration, he need not respond, but the complaint will then be

subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.

For these reasons, the court: 

(1) DIRECTS the clerk to place this cause number on a blank Prisoner Complaint

42 U.S.C. § 1983 form and send it to Robert David Dillion; 

(2) GRANTS Robert David Dillion until March 30, 2016, to file an amended

complaint; and

(3) CAUTIONS Robert David Dillion that if he does not respond by that

deadline, this case will be dismissed without further notice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915A because the current complaint does not state a claim.

SO ORDERED.

Date: February 22, 2016

 s/ James T. Moody 

JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT