UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

FORT WAYNE DIVISION 

BARBARA JEAN OVERBAUGH, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Cause No. 1:14-cv-219 

 ) 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ) 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 This matter is before the court on petition for judicial review of the decision of the 

Commissioner filed by the plaintiff, Barbara Jean Overbaugh, on July 22, 2014. For the following 

reasons, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. 

Background 

 The plaintiff, Barbara Jean Overbaugh, filed an application for Disability Insurance 

Benefits on October 4, 2011, alleging a disability onset date of March 31, 2010. (Tr. 16). The 

Disability Determination Bureau denied Overbaugh’s application on December 28, 2011, and 

again upon reconsideration on February 24, 2012. (Tr. 16). Overbaugh subsequently filed a 

timely request for a hearing on March 1, 2012. (Tr. 16). A hearing was held on December 18, 

2012, before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Maryann S. Bright, and the ALJ issued an 

unfavorable decision on February 27, 2013. (Tr. 16–25). Vocational Expert (VE) Sharon D. 

Ringenberg, Mickey Overbaugh, Overbaugh’s husband, and Overbaugh testified at the hearing. 

(Tr. 16). The Appeals Council denied review on March 26, 2014, making the ALJ’s decision the 

final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 3–5). 
2 

 The ALJ found that Overbaugh met the insured status requirements of the Social Security 

Act through December 31, 2015. (Tr. 18). At step one of the five step sequential analysis for 

determining whether an individual is disabled, the ALJ found that Overbaugh had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since March 31, 2010, the alleged onset date. (Tr. 18). At step two, 

the ALJ determined that Overbaugh had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc 

disease and osteoporosis. (Tr. 18). However, the ALJ determined that Overbaugh’s depression 

was non-severe because it did not cause more than a minimal limitation in her ability to perform 

basic mental work activities. (Tr. 18). 

 To determine whether Overbaugh’s depression was severe or non-severe, the ALJ 

considered the Paragraph B criteria. (Tr. 19). First, the ALJ concluded that Overbaugh had a 

mild limitation in daily living activities. (Tr. 19). Overbaugh indicated that she washed dishes, 

did laundry, and cooked quick meals. (Tr. 19). She also stated that she could cook holiday 

dinners with her daughter’s help. (Tr. 19). The ALJ found those daily living activities consistent 

with the record and concluded that Overbaugh had a mild limitation in handling her daily 

activities independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis. (Tr. 19). 

Furthermore, Dr. Joelle Larsen, a State agency psychiatric consultant, also concluded that 

Overbaugh had a mild limitation in this area. (Tr. 19). 

 The ALJ, along with Dr. Larsen, also concluded that Overbaugh had a mild limitation in 

social functioning. (Tr. 19). Overbaugh reported that going to church and spending time with 

her daughters and granddaughter was uplifting. (Tr. 19). The ALJ found that consistent with the 

record and concluded that Overbaugh had mild limitations interacting independently, 

appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis with other people. (Tr. 19). 
3 

 The ALJ, along with Dr. Larsen, found that Overbaugh had mild limitations in 

concentration, persistence, or pace. (Tr. 19). A consultative examination showed that 

Overbaugh had normal fine motor skills, normal concentration, and normal social interaction 

with remote and recent memory intact. (Tr. 19). The ALJ found that consistent with the record 

and with Overbaugh’s daily living activities including watching television, reading, sewing, and 

attending to her dogs. (Tr. 19). The ALJ determined that Overbaugh had mild limitations in 

sustaining focus, attention, and concentration long enough to complete tasks commonly found in 

work settings sufficiently, timely, and appropriately. (Tr. 19). 

 The ALJ determined that Overbaugh had experienced no episodes of decompensation of 

extended duration. (Tr. 19). Additionally, Dr. Larsen indicated that Overbaugh’s physical 

impairments rather than a mental impairment caused her functional limitations. (Tr. 19). 

Furthermore, she concluded that Overbaugh could complete a variety of tasks without 

interference. (Tr. 19). J. Sands, M.D., a State agency medical consultant, affirmed Dr. Larsen’s 

opinion. (Tr. 19). The ALJ gave great weight to this opinion because it was consistent with the 

medical evidence. (Tr. 19). It was also consistent with Overbaugh’s statement that her 

prescription for Celexa helped control her symptoms and that she had no problems getting along 

with people. (Tr. 19). Overbaugh also indicated that Celexa improved her relationship with her 

husband. (Tr. 19). The ALJ concluded that Overbaugh’s medically determinable mental 

impairment was non-severe because it caused no more than a mild limitation in any of the first 

three functional areas and there were no episodes of decompensation. (Tr. 20). 

 At step three, the ALJ concluded that Overbaugh did not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed 

impairments. (Tr. 20). In determining whether Overbaugh had an impairment or combination of 
4 

impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments, the ALJ 

considered the criteria under Listing 1.04. (Tr. 20). 

 The ALJ then assessed Overbaugh’s residual functional capacity as follows: 

the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light 

work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b). The claimant is capable of 

lifting or carrying up to twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds 

frequently. The claimant can stand and/or walk for approximately 

six hours per eight-hour workday and sit for approximately six hours 

per eight-hour workday, with normal breaks and allowing her to sit 

or stand alternatively at will provided she is not off task more than 

ten percent of the work period. The claimant is capable of 

occasional climbing, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and 

crawling. Due to pain, work should be limited to simple, routine, 

and repetitive tasks involving only simple work-related decisions. 

(Tr. 20). In making this finding, the ALJ considered all symptoms and the extent to which those 

symptoms reasonably could be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and 

other evidence. (Tr. 20). The ALJ followed a two-step process when considering Overbaugh’s 

symptoms. (Tr. 21). First, she determined whether there was an underlying medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment that was shown by a medically acceptable clinical 

or laboratory diagnostic technique that reasonably could be expected to produce Overbaugh’s 

pain or other symptoms. (Tr. 21). Next, the ALJ evaluated the intensity, persistence, and 

limiting effects of Overbaugh’s symptoms to determine the extent to which they limited her 

functioning. (Tr. 21). 

 Overbaugh has alleged disability due to back pain, back spurs, osteoporosis, degenerative 

disc disease, scoliosis, spinal arthritis and spondylosis, diffuse osteopenia, and small Schmorl’s 

nodes on the spine. (Tr. 21). Overbaugh indicated that she did not need surgery but that she has 

undergone injections and acupuncture, neither of which relieved her symptoms. (Tr. 21). 

Overbaugh also stated that she did not use a brace or cane. (Tr. 21). However, she noted that 
5 

she has used a hot rub or heating pad to relieve pain. (Tr. 21). Overbaugh claimed that she 

experienced pain in her hips and burning in her bones, but an x-ray did not reveal any 

impairment in her hips. (Tr. 21). Overbaugh also claimed that she could sit only for fifteen 

minutes at a time before a popping feeling in her back occurred and could stand only for five to 

ten minutes at a time in one spot. (Tr. 21). She also indicated that her hands became numb, but 

she could crochet still. (Tr. 21). Overbaugh reported that her prescription for Vicodin helped 

her symptoms, but it made her forget things. (Tr. 21). 

 The ALJ found that the objective medical evidence failed to provide strong support for 

Overbaugh’s allegations of disabling symptoms and limitations. (Tr. 21). Overbaugh underwent 

a dual energy x-ray absorptionmetry scan that revealed her bone mineral density of the lumbar 

spine was consistent with osteoporosis. (Tr. 21). The scan also revealed that her lumbar spine 

was seven times more at risk for fracture than that of a young adult. (Tr. 21). However, given 

these medical findings, doctors prescribed only conservative treatments of pharmacotherapy, 

exercise, and calcium. (Tr. 21). Overbaugh also was not asked to come back for a follow-up 

examination for two years. (Tr. 21). Therefore, the ALJ determined that Overbaugh’s symptoms 

were not severe because she did not need weekly or monthly examinations to treat her condition. 

(Tr. 21). 

 After the conservative treatment was unsuccessful, Overbaugh underwent many thoracic 

epidural steroid injections. (Tr. 21). Her physical examination revealed that she did not have 

cyanosis, clubbing, or edema in her extremities. (Tr. 21). Her musculoskeletal system 

examination revealed that she had back pain but did not have pain in the cervical spine, lumbar 

flexors, or upon axial rotation. (Tr. 21–22). The examination also revealed that Overbaugh had 

good range of motion in the neck region. (Tr. 22). An x-ray of Overbaugh’s thoracic spine 
6 

revealed that she had diffuse osteopenia and a smooth minor convex left curvature of the thoracic 

spine, consistent with scoliosis or paraspinal muscle spasms. (Tr. 22). However, the test showed 

that Overbaugh had a normal vertebral structure. (Tr. 22). She was prescribed Flexeril for her 

back pain. (Tr. 22). 

 Overbaugh underwent a spine MRI, which showed that she had mild degenerative disc 

disease through her thoracic spine and a small left spur at C6-7. (Tr. 22). When her MRI results 

came back, Overbaugh told Robert Shugart, M.D., her examining physician, that she wanted to 

apply for disability. (Tr. 22). She asked Dr. Shugart about any restrictions, but he was unable to 

answer because she was not under physical therapy at the time. (Tr. 22). Dr. Shugart ordered 

home therapy for Overbaugh and restricted her from work for seven weeks to determine the 

injections’ effectiveness. (Tr. 22). Dr. Shugart also told Overbaugh that she could return to 

work earlier if she felt better. (Tr. 22). After seven weeks, Dr. Shugart released Overbaugh 

without any restrictions because she was doing well and her injections were effective. (Tr. 22). 

 Overbaugh’s treating physician, T.L. Shipe, M.D., indicated that she declined medical 

testing and treatment due to the cost and her lack of health insurance coverage. (Tr. 22). During 

Dr. Shipe’s physical examinations, Overbaugh appeared to move slowly from sitting to standing, 

but her straight leg raises showed negative results. (Tr. 22). Dr. Shipe continued to prescribe 

Vicodin and made few changes to her usual prescriptions. (Tr. 22). The ALJ concluded that 

Overbaugh’s prescribed mode of care effectively treated her symptoms. (Tr. 22). 

 A consultative examiner, Vijay Kamineni, M.D., noted that Overbaugh had decreased 

range of motion in her back, joint pain, and trouble walking. (Tr. 22). Her joint movement and 

lower extremities were normal, and she did not have any muscle weakness or pain. (Tr. 22). 

Overbaugh’s straight leg test was positive but with pain at eighty degrees. (Tr. 22). She did not 
7 

perform the lumbar range of motion test because she said it would cause her pain. (Tr. 22). Dr. 

Kamineni also indicated that Overbaugh was able to perform her daily living activities but could 

not stand for any length of time. (Tr. 22). He also stated that Overbaugh could drive a car, but 

she did not drive while on pain medication. (Tr. 22). Dr. Kamineni indicated that Overbaugh’s 

back prevented her from performing her duties at her last job, which required lifting forty pounds 

frequently, and that she could carry and lift ten pounds only for a short time and distance. (Tr. 

22). He also stated that she could not sit for thirty minutes but needed to move and stand for ten 

minutes at a time. (Tr. 22). The ALJ gave Dr. Kamineni’s opinion little weight because it relied 

on Overbaugh’s subjective complaints rather than objective medical evidence. (Tr. 22). 

 State agency medical consultant Dr. Neal opined that Overbaugh could perform light 

exertional activities and all postural functions frequently. (Tr. 23). Dr. Neal gave Overbaugh’s 

back pain a rating of three on a ten-point scale and referenced reports that she could perform her 

daily living activities. (Tr. 23). The ALJ gave Dr. Neal’s opinion great weight because 

Overbaugh’s degenerative disc disease and osteoporosis constituted an exertional level of less 

than light work. (Tr. 23). 

 The ALJ also considered testimony from Overbaugh’s husband, Mickey Overbaugh. (Tr. 

23). The ALJ gave Mr. Overbaugh’s statements some weight because he was able to confirm 

Overbaugh’s activities of daily living. (Tr. 23). Based on the evidence, the ALJ found that 

Overbaugh’s impairments could cause the alleged symptoms but found her incredible regarding 

the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms. (Tr. 23). 

 Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that the objective medical evidence in the record 

supported her RFC assessment. (Tr. 23). The ALJ found that the objective medical evidence 

failed to corroborate Overbaugh’s allegations regarding the severity of her impairment. (Tr. 23). 
8 

The ALJ also found that the medical evidence of record did not show any worsening of 

Overbaugh’s impairments. (Tr. 23). She noted that Overbaugh worked at a medium exertional 

level previously and chose not to transfer to another plant after her job ended despite having that 

opportunity. (Tr. 23). The ALJ reiterated that she was prescribed conservative treatment and 

was directed to receive a follow-up evaluation after two years. (Tr. 23). Based on the two year 

follow up, the ALJ concluded that Overbaugh was receiving effective treatment. (Tr. 23). 

 The ALJ commented that Overbaugh received thoracic injections while she was working 

but not after she left her job. (Tr. 23). Therefore, she concluded that Overbaugh could perform 

her work duties with proper medication. (Tr. 23). The ALJ also indicated that Overbaugh 

watched television all day, played with her dogs, read the bible, texted her children, shopped, 

attended church, and taught Sunday school. (Tr. 23). Although Overbaugh alleged degenerative 

disc disease, osteoporosis, and diffuse osteopenia, the ALJ found that her daily living activities 

did not demonstrate a severe disability that would prevent her from performing basic work 

functions. (Tr. 23). 

 At step four, the ALJ found that Overbaugh could not perform her past relevant work. 

(Tr. 24). Considering Overbaugh’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ 

concluded that there were jobs in the national economy that Overbaugh could perform, including 

cashier (500 jobs regionally, 10,000 jobs in Indiana, and 400,000 jobs nationally), furniture 

rental consultant (300 jobs regionally, 3,000 jobs in Indiana, and 150,000 jobs nationally), and 

hand packager (50 jobs regionally, 1,000 jobs in Indiana, and 20,000 jobs nationally). (Tr. 24–

25). 
9 

Discussion 

 The standard for judicial review of an ALJ’s finding that a claimant is not disabled within 

the meaning of the Social Security Act is limited to a determination of whether those findings are 

supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of 

Social Security, as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.”); 

Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1120–21 (7th Cir. 2014); Bates v. Colvin, 736 F.3d 1093, 1097 

(7th Cir. 2013) (“We will uphold the Commissioner’s final decision if the ALJ applied the 

correct legal standards and supported her decision with substantial evidence.”); Pepper v. Colvin, 

712 F.3d 351, 361–62 (7th Cir. 2013); Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2005); 

Lopez ex rel Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003). Substantial evidence has 

been defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support such a 

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L. Ed. 2d 852 

(1972) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 217, 83 L. Ed. 

2d 140 (1938)); see Bates, 736 F.3d at 1098; Pepper, 712 F.3d at 361–62; Jens v. Barnhart, 347 

F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 2003); Sims v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 424, 428 (7th Cir. 2002). An ALJ’s 

decision must be affirmed if the findings are supported by substantial evidence and if there have 

been no errors of law. Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2013); Rice v. Barnhart, 

384 F.3d 363, 368–69 (7th Cir. 2004); Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 2002). 

However, “the decision cannot stand if it lacks evidentiary support or an adequate discussion of 

the issues.” Lopez, 336 F.3d at 539. 

 Disability insurance benefits are available only to those individuals who can establish 

“disability” under the terms of the Social Security Act. The claimant must show that she is 

unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 
10 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or 

can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security regulations enumerate the five-step sequential evaluation to 

be followed when determining whether a claimant has met the burden of establishing disability. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520. The ALJ first considers whether the claimant is presently employed or 

“engaged in substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b). If she is, the claimant is 

not disabled and the evaluation process is over. If she is not, the ALJ next addresses whether the 

claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments that “significantly 

limits . . . physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c); see 

Williams v. Colvin, 757 F.3d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 2014) (discussing that the ALJ must consider the 

combined effects of the claimant’s impairments). Third, the ALJ determines whether that severe 

impairment meets any of the impairments listed in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 401, pt. 404, 

subpt. P, app. 1. If it does, then the impairment is acknowledged by the Commissioner to be 

conclusively disabling. However, if the impairment does not so limit the claimant’s remaining 

capabilities, the ALJ reviews the claimant’s “residual functional capacity” and the physical and 

mental demands of her past work. If, at this fourth step, the claimant can perform her past 

relevant work, she will be found not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e). However, if the 

claimant shows that her impairment is so severe that she is unable to engage in her past relevant 

work, then the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to establish that the claimant, in light 

of her age, education, job experience, and functional capacity to work, is capable of performing 

other work and that such work exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2); 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(f). 
11 

 First, Overbaugh has argued that the ALJ’s adverse credibility assessment cannot 

withstand scrutiny because it was based on legally insufficient analysis. This court will sustain 

the ALJ’s credibility determination unless it is “patently wrong” and not supported by the record. 

Bates v. Colvin, 736 F.3d 1093, 1098 (7th Cir. 2013); Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 843 (7th 

Cir. 2007); Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Only if the trier of fact 

grounds his credibility finding in an observation or argument that is unreasonable or 

unsupported . . . can the finding be reversed.”). The ALJ’s “unique position to observe a 

witness” entitles her opinion to great deference. Nelson v. Apfel, 131 F.3d 1228, 1237 (7th Cir. 

1997); Allord v. Barnhart, 455 F.3d 818, 821 (7th Cir. 2006). However, if the ALJ does not 

make explicit findings and does not explain them “in a way that affords meaningful review,” the 

ALJ’s credibility determination is not entitled to deference. Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 

942 (7th Cir. 2002). Further, “when such determinations rest on objective factors or fundamental 

implausibilities rather than subjective considerations [such as a claimant’s demeanor], appellate 

courts have greater freedom to review the ALJ’s decision.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 

(7th Cir. 2000); see Bates, 736 F.3d at 1098. 

 The ALJ must determine a claimant’s credibility only after considering all of the 

claimant’s “symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which [the claimant’s] symptoms can 

reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.” 

20 C.F.R. ' 404.1529(a); Arnold v. Barnhart, 473 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[S]ubjective 

complaints need not be accepted insofar as they clash with other, objective medical evidence in 

the record.”); Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 703 (7th Cir. 2004). If the claimant’s 

impairments reasonably could produce the symptoms of which the claimant is complaining, the 

ALJ must evaluate the intensity and persistence of the claimant’s symptoms through 
12 

consideration of the claimant’s “medical history, the medical signs and laboratory findings, and 

statements from [the claimant, the claimant’s] treating or examining physician or psychologist, 

or other persons about how [the claimant’s] symptoms affect [the claimant].” 20 C.F.R. 

' 404.1529(c); see Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 746–47 (7th Cir. 2005) (“These 

regulations and cases, taken together, require an ALJ to articulate specific reasons for 

discounting a claimant’s testimony as being less than credible, and preclude an ALJ from merely 

ignoring the testimony or relying solely on a conflict between the objective medical evidence and 

the claimant’s testimony as a basis for a negative credibility finding.”). 

 Although a claimant’s complaints of pain cannot be totally unsupported by the medical 

evidence, the ALJ may not make a credibility determination “solely on the basis of objective 

medical evidence.” SSR 96-7p, at *1; see Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1125 (7th Cir. 2014) 

(“‘[T]he ALJ cannot reject a claimant’s testimony about limitations on her daily activities solely 

by stating that such testimony is unsupported by the medical evidence.’”) (quoting Indoranto, 

374 F.3d at 474); Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751, 754 (7th Cir. 2004) (“If pain is 

disabling, the fact that its source is purely psychological does not disentitle the applicant to 

benefits.”). Rather, if the 

[c]laimant indicates that pain is a significant factor of his or her 

alleged inability to work, the ALJ must obtain detailed descriptions 

of the claimant’s daily activities by directing specific inquiries about 

the pain and its effects to the claimant. She must investigate all 

avenues presented that relate to pain, including claimant’s prior 

work record, information and observations by treating physicians, 

examining physicians, and third parties. Factors that must be 

considered include the nature and intensity of the claimant’s pain, 

precipitation and aggravating factors, dosage and effectiveness of 

any pain medications, other treatment for relief of pain, functional 

restrictions, and the claimant’s daily activities. (internal citations 

omitted). 
13 

Luna v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 1994); see Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 

887-88 (7th Cir. 2001). 

 In addition, when the ALJ discounts the claimant’s description of pain because it is 

inconsistent with the objective medical evidence, she must make more than “a single, conclusory 

statement . . . . The determination or decision must contain specific reasons for the finding on 

credibility, supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to 

make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to 

the individual’s statements and the reasons for that weight.” SSR 96-7p, at *2; see Minnick v. 

Colvin, 775 F.3d 929, 937 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[A] failure to adequately explain his or her 

credibility finding by discussing specific reasons supported by the record is grounds for 

reversal.”) (citations omitted); Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 887; Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 307-08 

(7th Cir. 1995) (finding that the ALJ must articulate, at some minimum level, his analysis of the 

evidence). She must “build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [her] 

conclusion.” Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 887 (quoting Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 

2000)). A minor discrepancy, coupled with the ALJ’s observations is sufficient to support a 

finding that the claimant was incredible. Bates, 736 F.3d at 1099. However, this must be 

weighed against the ALJ’s duty to build the record and not to ignore a line of evidence that 

suggests a disability. Bates, 736 F.3d at 1099. 

 Overbaugh has argued that the ALJ mischaracterized her daily activities and implied that 

she led an active lifestyle. She acknowledged that she shopped, socialized, played with her dogs, 

and taught Sunday school, but she has argued that the ALJ failed to consider that each of her 

daily living activities was limited by pain. Additionally, she has claimed that the ALJ failed to 

explain how her limited activities supported an adverse credibility finding. Overbaugh has 
14 

indicated that the ALJ failed to consider factors that supported her credibility including her work 

history, her husband’s testimony, third party reports, and the consistency of her allegations. 

Moreover, because she has argued that the ALJ improperly relied on her daily living activities, 

she has claimed that the ALJ’s credibility finding cannot stand because it would rely on the 

objective medical evidence only. 

 The Commissioner has indicated that the ALJ relied on several reasons to support her 

credibility finding including the objective medical evidence, that Overbaugh’s impairments had 

not worsened, that conservative treatment was effective, and her daily living activities. The 

Commissioner has argued that the ALJ reasonably inferred that Overbaugh was not as limited as 

she claimed because her daily living activities were inconsistent with her claimed limitations. 

Additionally, she noted that the ALJ emphasized the medical evidence, Overbaugh’s treatment, 

and that Overbaugh could perform a medium or heavy job with conservative treatment 

previously. 

 The ALJ’s credibility finding was not patently wrong. First, the ALJ reviewed the 

objective medical evidence and noted inconsistencies between Overbaugh’s allegations of 

disability and the evidence. Specifically, she noted that doctors prescribed conservative 

treatment for Overbaugh’s osteoporosis and that they did not ask her to conduct a follow-up 

examination for two years. Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Overbaugh’s symptoms did not 

require weekly or monthly examinations. The ALJ then summarized Overbaugh’s medical 

treatment for her back pain. She indicated that Overbaugh underwent thoracic epidural steroid 

injections and that Dr. Shugart ordered home therapy and restricted her from work for seven 

weeks to determine whether the injections resolved her symptoms. The ALJ noted that Dr. 
15 

Shugart released her without any restrictions after the seven weeks because the injections were 

working. 

 The ALJ mentioned that Overbaugh declined medical testing and treatment because of 

the cost and her lack of health insurance coverage. Furthermore, she noted that Dr. Shipe, 

Overbaugh’s treating physician, continued to prescribe Vicodin and made few changes to her 

usual prescriptions. Based on Dr. Shugart’s and Dr. Shipe’s medical records, the ALJ concluded 

that Overbaugh’s prescribed care effectively treated her symptoms, an inconsistency with her 

allegations of disability. The ALJ also reviewed Overbaugh’s activities of daily living, including 

the testimony from her husband. She noted that Overbaugh could wash dishes, went outside 

every day, shopped, paid bills, watched television or read all day, and played with her dogs. 

 Although the ALJ discounted Overbaugh’s allegations of pain because they were 

inconsistent with the objective medical evidence, she made more than a single conclusory 

statement to explain her findings. The ALJ’s decision contained specific reasons to discount 

Overbaugh’s credibility that were supported by evidence in the record and statements from 

treating and examining physicians. The ALJ also obtained detailed descriptions of Overbaugh’s 

daily activities from the testimony of her and her husband. The ALJ considered Dr. Shipe’s and 

Dr. Shugart’s conclusions on Overbaugh’s pain limitations. Additionally, she noted the dosage 

and effectiveness of pain medication, treatment for pain relief, functional restrictions, daily 

activities, and the nature and intensity of the pain. Therefore, the ALJ minimally articulated her 

findings on Overbaugh’s credibility and built a logical bridge from the objective evidence to her 

findings. 

 Next, Overbaugh has argued that the ALJ’s RFC assessment was not supported by 

substantial evidence because it was incomplete and defied meaningful review. SSR 96-8p 
16 

explains how an ALJ should assess a claimant’s RFC at steps four and five of the sequential 

evaluation. In a section entitled, “Narrative Discussion Requirements,” SSR 96-8p specifically 

spells out what is needed in the ALJ’s RFC analysis. This section of the Ruling provides: 

The RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion describing 

how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical 

facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily 

activities, observations). In assessing RFC, the adjudicator must 

discuss the individual’s ability to perform sustained work activities 

in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis (i.e., 8 

hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule), and 

describe the maximum amount of each work-related activity the 

individual can perform based on the evidence available in the case 

record. The adjudicator must also explain how any material 

inconsistencies or ambiguities in the evidence in the case record 

were considered and resolved. 

SSR 96-8p (footnote omitted). Thus, as explained in this section of the Ruling, there is a 

difference between what the ALJ must contemplate and what she must articulate in her written 

decision. “The ALJ is not required to address every piece of evidence or testimony presented, 

but he must provide a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and his conclusions.” Getch v. 

Astrue, 539 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 

2000)); see Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1123 (7th Cir. 2014). Although the ALJ does not 

need to discuss every piece of evidence, she cannot ignore evidence that undermines her ultimate 

conclusions. Moore, 743 F.3d at 1123 (“The ALJ must confront the evidence that does not 

support her conclusion and explain why that evidence was rejected.”) (citing Terry v. Astrue, 

580 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 2009); Myles v. Astrue, 582 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2009); Arnett v. 

Astrue, 676 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2012)). “A decision that lacks adequate discussion of the 

issues will be remanded.” Moore, 743 F.3d at 1121.

 Overbaugh has claimed that the ALJ failed to consider the side effects from her 

medication and how they affected her concentration and ability to work. She noted that Vicodin 
17 

and Flexeril affected her concentration and that Vicodin made her feel “useless” or “cloudy.” 

Additionally, Overbaugh believed that she could not take Vicodin while she was working 

because it “would affect her job.” Furthermore, she has argued that the ALJ did not 

acknowledge, account for, or consider the limitations caused by her medication’s side effects. 

 The ALJ was not required to make specific findings concerning the side effects of 

prescription drugs on Overbaugh’s ability to work. Herron, 19 F.3d at 335. However, the ALJ 

must include sufficient information for the reviewing court to determine whether the decision 

was supported by substantial evidence. Lewis v. Barnhart, 201 F. Supp. 2d 918, 937 (N.D. Ind. 

2002). In this case, the ALJ noted that Vicodin made Overbaugh forget things and that it helped 

her symptoms. However, she did not discuss explicitly Overbaugh’s testimony that Vicodin 

made her feel “useless” or “cloudy” or that it negatively affected her attention, memory, and 

ability to work. Additionally, the ALJ did not review Mr. Overbaugh’s testimony corroborating 

her allegations. 

 However, the ALJ did indicate that a consultative examination revealed that Overbaugh 

had normal concentration and intact memory, which the Commissioner has argued was 

substantial evidence to support the RFC determination. Moreover, the ALJ reviewed Dr. 

Larsen’s opinion, which concluded that Overbaugh could attend to a variety of tasks without 

interference. Furthermore, the ALJ found Overbaugh’s subjective complaints incredible, which 

this court determined was not patently wrong. A challenge to the ALJ’s RFC finding that was 

“inherently intertwined with matters of credibility” will fail when the credibility finding was not 

patently wrong. Outlaw v. Astrue, 412 F. App’x 894, 897 (7th Cir. 2011). 

 Although the ALJ did not confront all of Overbaugh’s claims about her Vicodin side 

effects directly, she was not required to make a specific finding concerning the side effects. 
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Rather, the ALJ’s decision only needs to be supported by substantial evidence. In this case, the 

ALJ found Overbaugh’s subjective allegations incredible, she reviewed the objective medical 

evidence regarding Overbaugh’s concentration and memory, noted that Vicodin made 

Overbaugh forget things, and found that Overbaugh could perform basic work functions based 

on her daily activities. Therefore, the ALJ built a logical bridge when discounting Overbaugh’s 

complaints of Vicodin side effects. 

 Overbaugh also has claimed that the ALJ’s sit-stand option defied meaningful review. 

The ALJ limited Overbaugh to jobs that allowed her to sit or stand at will as long as she was not 

off task more than ten percent of the work period. Overbaugh has argued that her sit-stand 

behavior would put her off task for more than ten percent of the workday because she needed to 

alternate between sitting, standing, and walking around. She has claimed that she needed to 

move around every fifteen minutes, which would take her off task more than ten percent of the 

time. Furthermore, Overbaugh has argued that the ALJ needed to explain why her testimony 

was rejected. 

 Here, the ALJ properly evaluated and rejected Overbaugh’s claims about needing to walk 

around. The ALJ noted Overbaugh’s allegations that she could sit only for fifteen minutes at a 

time and could stand only for five to ten minutes before needing to move around. Overbaugh’s 

arguments regarding her need to walk around were subjective complaints that related to matters 

of credibility. As discussed above, the ALJ found Overbaugh’s allegations incredible, and this 

court did not find that determination patently wrong. A challenge to the ALJ’s RFC finding that 

was “inherently intertwined with matters of credibility” will fail when the credibility finding was 

not patently wrong. Outlaw, 412 F. App’x at 897. Moreover, the ALJ does not need to specify 
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which statements from Overbaugh were incredible or identify specific evidence that refutes the 

allegations. Jens v. Barnhart, 347 F.3d 209, 213 (7th Cir. 2003). 

 Overbaugh has argued that her sit/stand allegation was consistent with the medical 

evidence because it was supported by Dr. Kamineni’s opinion. However, the ALJ rejected Dr. 

Kamineni’s opinion because it relied on Overbaugh’s subjective complaints. Furthermore, this 

court has concluded that the ALJ properly weighed Dr. Kamineni’s opinion, which is discussed 

more thoroughly below. Although the ALJ did not explain the sit/stand option explicitly, the 

RFC was supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ acknowledged Overbaugh’s sit/stand 

allegation and found Overbaugh incredible. Furthermore, the ALJ indicated that the objective 

medical evidence did not support the severity of Overbaugh’s alleged symptoms and limitations 

and rejected the opinion that supported her sit/stand allegation. 

 Finally, Overbaugh has claimed that the ALJ did not have good cause to reject Dr. 

Kamineni’s opinion. Generally, an ALJ affords more weight to the opinion of an examining 

source than the opinion of a non-examining source but the ultimate weight given depends on the 

opinion’s consistency with the objective medical evidence, the quality of the explanation, and the 

source’s specialty. Givens v. Colvin, 551 F. App’x 855, 860 (7th Cir. 2013); 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(c). “An ALJ can reject an examining physician’s opinion only for reasons supported 

by substantial evidence in the record; a contradictory opinion of a non-examining physician does 

not, by itself, suffice.” Gudgel v. Barnhart, 345 F.3d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 2003). An ALJ may 

give less weight to an examining source’s opinion when it appears to rely heavily on the 

claimant’s subjective complaints. Givens, 551 F. App’x at 861; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3)

(“The more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support an opinion, particularly 

medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight we will give the opinion. The better 
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explanation a source provides for an opinion the more weight we will give that opinion.”); Filus 

v. Astrue, 694 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2012). 

Overbaugh has claimed that the ALJ did not provide “good cause” for rejecting Dr. 

Kamineni’s opinion because the ALJ did not cite any evidence to support her reasoning. The 

ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Kamineni’s opinion because she found that it relied on 

Overbaugh’s subjective complaints rather than the objective medical evidence. However, 

Overbaugh has argued that the report showed that she did not make any allegations to Dr. 

Kamineni. The Commissioner has claimed that Dr. Kamineni’s opinion was not entitled to any 

special significance because he was an examining source. She also has argued that Dr. 

Kamineni’s opinion evidence was not well-supported because he did not rely on any clinical 

evidence. Moreover, she indicated that the ALJ gave Dr. Neal’s opinion great weight and that it 

was inconsistent with Dr. Kamineni’s opinion. 

 The ALJ properly weighed Dr. Kamineni’s opinion. The ALJ can give less weight to an 

examining source’s opinion when that source relied heavily on the claimant’s subjective 

complaints. Givens, 551 F. App’x at 861 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3)). The ALJ found 

that Dr. Kamineni’s opinion relied heavily on Overbaugh’s subjective complaints regarding 

sitting, lifting, and walking rather than on objective medical evidence. The ALJ should rely on 

opinions based on the objective evidence rather than subjective complaints from the claimant. 

Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 371 (7th Cir. 2004). The ALJ also rejected Dr. Kamineni’s 

opinion because it was not well-supported by other evidence and it was inconsistent with other 

substantial evidence within the record, including that of Dr. Neal. Furthermore, Dr. Kamineni 

offered no explanation for his restrictions. The ALJ needed to minimally articulate her reason 

for rejecting Dr. Kamineni’s opinion, and substantial evidence supported her conclusion that the 
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opinion was not entitled to greater weight. 

 Next, Overbaugh has claimed that the ALJ should have recontacted Dr. Kamineni if she 

found his opinion questionable or doubtful. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1519p(b). The ALJ must 

recontact a treating source when the record is insufficient to make a decision. Simila v. Astrue, 

573 F.3d 503, 516–17 (7th Cir. 2009); Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 504 (7th Cir. 2004). 

“An ALJ need recontact medical sources only when the evidence received is inadequate to 

determine whether the claimant is disabled.” Skarbek, 390 F.3d at 504 (citing 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1512(e)). Here, the record was not insufficient to make a decision. Rather, the ALJ found 

that Dr. Kamineni’s opinion was not supported by anything in the record except for Overbaugh’s 

subjective complaints. Nothing shows that the ALJ had any questions or doubts about Dr. 

Kamineni’s opinion. Therefore, the ALJ did not have a duty to recontact Dr. Kamineni for 

clarification. 

 Based on the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. 

 ENTERED this 13th day of July, 2015. 

 /s/ Andrew P. Rodovich 

 United States Magistrate Judge