Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-2849 | May 28, 2019 Page 1 of 7

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jeffrey D. Stanton

Logansport, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Frances Barrow

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Cheryl Alcorn,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

May 28, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-2849

Appeal from the Cass Superior 

Court

The Honorable Richard A. 

Maughmer, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

09D02-1811-MC-807

Najam, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Cheryl Alcorn appeals the trial court’s finding of contempt against her. Alcorn 

raises one issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court abused its 

discretion when it found her in contempt for having failed to pay the court’s 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-2849 | May 28, 2019 Page 2 of 7

payroll voucher. We conclude that Alcorn has not met her burden on appeal to 

demonstrate that she was not in direct contempt and, thus, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In early 2018, the Cass County Council appropriated $25,000 for the Cass 

Superior Court to hire a fourth court employee. The county council did not 

place any restrictions on those funds. The county council had also appropriated 

money for part-time employees, who are to be paid at a rate of not more than 

$12.50 per hour.

1

 On October 15, the Cass Superior Court hired a retired 

school teacher to fill the full-time position of court reporter. However, “due to 

prior teaching commitments,” the court phased in the new court reporter as her 

schedule would allow until she could work full time. Appellant’s App. Vol. II 

at 4. 

[3] On October 29, the trial court submitted a payroll voucher to Alcorn, who is the 

Cass County Auditor. In that voucher, the court approved payment for the new 

court reporter at a rate of $14.01 per hour2 for the hours the court reporter had 

worked, which the trial court “intended to be taken from the $25,000.00 

unrestricted funds.” Id. However, Alcorn refused to pay the voucher as 

submitted. Instead, Alcorn paid the court reporter at the rate of $12.50 per hour 

because the court reporter had only worked part time. 

 

1

 There appears to be some dispute as to whether part-time employees earn $12.50 per hour or $12.15 per 

hour, but that difference is not material to this appeal. 

2

 Twenty-five thousand dollars per year equates to $14.01 per hour for a person who works thirty-five hours 

per week. 
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[4] On November 2, the trial court issued a citation finding Alcorn in contempt for 

failing to pay the payroll voucher as submitted. Specifically, the trial court 

found that Alcorn had “refused to pay said voucher as per the order” of the trial 

court. Id. at 6. The trial court further found that Alcorn’s refusal to pay the 

court reporter at the correct rate “substantially disrupt[ed] the operation of the 

court” and “constitute[d] direct contempt of the court[.]” Id. 

[5] The trial court held a hearing on November 5. At the hearing, Alcorn stated 

that she did not pay the payroll voucher as submitted because part-time 

employees were only able earn $12.50 per hour. Alcorn also asserted that the 

payroll voucher was not an order of the court. At the conclusion of the hearing, 

Alcorn agreed to pay the payroll claim “under protest.” Tr. Vol. II at 15. The 

trial court did not impose any sanctions on Alcorn due to her compliance with 

the payroll voucher. This appeal ensued. 

Discussion and Decision

[6] Alcorn contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it found her in 

contempt. As the Indiana Supreme Court has stated:

“It is soundly within the discretion of the trial court to determine 

whether a party is in contempt, and we review the judgment 

under an abuse of discretion standard of review.” Steele-Giri v. 

Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Witt v. Jay 

Petroleum, Inc., 964 N.E.2d 198, 202 (Ind. 2012)). “We will 

reverse a trial court’s finding of contempt only if there is no 

evidence or inference therefrom to support the finding.” Id. The 

trial court has the inherent power to “maintain [] its dignity, 

secur[e] obedience to its process and rules, rebuk[e] interference 
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with the conduct of business, and punish[] unseemly behavior.” 

Id. 

Reynolds v. Reynolds, 64 N.E.3d 829, 832 (Ind. 2016) (alterations in original). 

[7] “There are two kinds of contempt: direct contempt and indirect contempt.” Id.

A trial court may cite a person for direct contempt when “the court has 

firsthand and immediate knowledge of acts demonstrating a clear disregard for 

its authority which threaten to undermine the integrity of the judicial process 

and impede the performance of court work.” Fearman v. State, 89 N.E.3d 435, 

436 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). And indirect contempt is the “willful disobedience of 

any lawfully entered order of which the offender had notice[.]” Akiwumi v. 

Akiwumi, 23 N.E.3d 734, 737 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). 

[8] Here, the trial court found that Alcorn’s refusal to pay the payroll voucher as 

submitted “substantially disprupt[ed] the operation of the court” and found her

in direct contempt. Appellant’s App. Vol II at 6. However, the trial court also 

found that Alcorn had refused to pay the payroll voucher “as per the order” of 

the court. Id. Thus, the court also found Alcorn in indirect contempt for failing 

to comply with a court order. 

[9] On appeal, Alcorn acknowledges that she did not pay the payroll voucher as 

submitted. However, she contends that the trial court abused its discretion 

when it found her in contempt because the “payroll claim voucher is not an 

Order.” Appellant’s Br. at 8 (emphasis removed). She asserts that, because the 

payroll voucher is not an order, she cannot be held in contempt for failing to 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-2849 | May 28, 2019 Page 5 of 7

comply with it. In essence, Alcorn only asserts that the trial court abused its 

discretion when it found her in indirect contempt for failing to comply with a 

court order. 

[10] We need not determine whether the payroll voucher was, in effect, a court 

order. Again, the trial court found not only that Alcorn was in indirect 

contempt for violating a court order but that she was also in direct contempt 

because her refusal to pay the court reporter at the higher rate substantially 

disrupted the operation of the court. As discussed above, a trial court can find a 

person in direct contempt when “the court has firsthand and immediate 

knowledge of acts demonstrating a clear disregard for its authority which 

threaten to undermine the integrity of the judicial process and impede the 

performance of court work.” Fearman, 89 N.E.3d at 436. In other words, direct 

contempt “involve[s] actions in the presence of the court, such that the court 

her personal knowledge of them.” Jones v. State, 847 N.E.2d 190, 199 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2006). Alcorn makes no argument to explain why her actions did not 

constitute direct contempt.3

 

[11] Here, as the trial court specifically found Alcorn in direct contempt, it appears 

from the record that the trial court had personal knowledge of Alcorn’s refusal 

to pay the voucher. And it appears, as the trial court found, that Alcorn’s 

refusal to pay the court reporter at the higher wage from appropriated funds 

 

3

 For the first time in her reply brief, Alcorn asserts that her “conduct is not that conduct which constitutes 

‘direct criminal contempt.’” Reply Br. at 8. Because she raises this argument for the first time in her reply 

brief, it is waived. See Monroe Guar. Ins. Co. v. Magwerks Corp., 829 N.E.2d 968, 977 (Ind. 2005). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-2849 | May 28, 2019 Page 6 of 7

substantially interfered with the operation of the court. Alcorn has not directed 

us to any evidence in the record, or made any argument, to the contrary from 

which we might conclude that her actions did not constitute direct contempt. 

Accordingly, she has not met her burden on appeal to demonstrate that the trial 

court abused its discretion when it found her in direct contempt. 

[12] Alcorn asserts in the alternative that, even if the payroll voucher were a court 

order, the trial court could not hold her in contempt for failing to comply with it 

because the trial court did not have the authority to set the court reporter’s 

salary as the “county council pays the wage of the court reporter[.]” 

Appellant’s Br. at 10. But as discussed above, we need not decide whether the 

payroll voucher is a court order because Alcorn has not met her burden on 

appeal to demonstrate that her actions did not constitute direct contempt. We 

note, however, that, if the payroll voucher were a court order, Alcorn was 

required to comply with it. It is well settled that “[a] party must follow an 

erroneous order. The only remedy from an erroneous order is appeal[,] and 

disobedience thereto is contempt.” Wilson v. State, 988 N.E.2d 1211, 1216-17 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Accordingly, to avoid a finding of contempt for failing to 

comply with the order, the proper procedure would have been for Alcorn to pay 

the voucher and then appeal. 

[13] In sum, the trial court found Alcorn in both direct and indirect contempt for 

failing to pay the payroll voucher. But Alcorn has not met her burden on 

appeal to demonstrate that her actions did not constitute direct contempt. 

Accordingly, we must affirm. 
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[14] Affirmed. 

Baker, J., and Robb, J., concur.