UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

 v. 

WANDA C. SHORTER

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Case No. 3:14-CR-032 JD 

 3:18-CV-245 JD 

OPINION AND ORDER

Defendant Wanda C. Shorter was convicted by a jury of committing health care fraud 

(Count 1) and aggravated identity theft (Counts 2-4).1

 She was sentenced to seventy-five months 

of imprisonment (which represented the low end of the applicable guideline range)2 and two 

years of supervised release. Shorter was also ordered to pay restitution to Indiana Medicaid in the 

agreed amount of $1,340,284.32. On appeal, Shorter challenged in relevant part the sufficiency 

of the evidence as to Counts 2-4, but the Seventh Circuit rejected this argument because “the 

government submitted a substantial amount of evidence to support the convictions for Counts 2-

4.” United States v. Shorter, 874 F.3d 969, 977–78 (7th Cir. 2017). 

Shorter now seeks to vacate her convictions and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. She 

argues that her attorney, Mr. Jay Stevens, was ineffective during trial for failing to object to the 

 

1

 Count 1 alleged that between 2011 and early 2014, defendants knowingly engaged in a scheme 

to defraud Indiana Medicaid in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347 by requesting payment for services 

and transportation never actually provided, or if provided, for higher payments than justified by 

actual services and transportation provided. Counts 2 through 4 of the indictment charged the 

defendants with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1028A by knowingly using “without lawful authority a 

means of identification of another person during and in relation to health care fraud . . . and wire 

fraud.” In Count 2, defendants were charged with fraudulently using the identification of C.C. 

(later identified as Cassamdra Cook) in August 2012, while Counts 3 and 4 charged them with 

fraudulently using the identification of a different C.C. (later identified as Chitika Cox) in June 

and August 2013. 

2

 Shorter faced a guideline range of 51-63 months of imprisonment for her conviction under § 

1347, and a minimum statutorily mandated consecutive two-year term of imprisonment for her 

three convictions under § 1028A. 
2 

admission of the government’s summary Exhibits 35 and 40. Shorter also alleges that Mr. 

Stevens was ineffective during sentencing for: (1) failing to object to her receipt of a two-level 

enhancement under guideline § 3B1.3 for abusing a position of trust; and (2) failing to advise her 

of the supervised release conditions proposed by the presentence investigation report [DE 84, 

hereinafter, “PSR”] in paragraphs 89-99. 

For the following reasons, the Court finds that Shorter is not entitled to relief and that no 

hearing is required on these claims, so it denies the petition. Lafuente v. United States, 617 F.3d 

944, 946 (7th Cir. 2010) (“A hearing, though, is not required when ‘the files and records of the 

case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief’”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b)). 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

In early 2011, Shorter, already a licensed nurse, formed Empowerment Non-Emergency 

Medical Transportation, Inc. to provide transportation services to Medicaid clients. In April 

2011, Shorter began submitting invoices for Empowerment’s services. Indiana Medicaid 

provides reimbursements for health-related transportation services to eligible patients. The 

provider of those services agrees to follow Medicaid’s billing policies and to seek reimbursement 

for only medically necessary and truly rendered services. To ensure compliance, transportation 

providers must submit bills by using a unique Medicaid provider identification number and must 

maintain trip tickets that include the recipient’s name and identification number, date of 

transport, type of services rendered, whether it was one-way or round trip, and the mileage 

driven. Each type of service is assigned a Medicaid code used for reimbursement.3

 The service 

 

3

 The relevant codes, per the testimony of James Waddick, Jr., are: 

• T 2003: “ambulatory” patient who does not need to ride in a wheelchair; 

• T 2001: attendant or parent who travels with an ambulatory patient; 

• A0130: “nonambulatory” patient who must be transported in a wheelchair; 

• A0130 TK: attendant or parent who travels with a nonambulatory patient; 
3 

provider submits the applicable codes to Medicaid, which reimburses according to set rates 

specific to the type of service provided. For instance, Medicaid reimburses twice as much if the 

patient is wheelchair-bound, and it provides additional reimbursement without prior 

authorization when an attendant also rides or when rides are more than twenty but fewer than one 

hundred miles round-trip. Empowerment billed and received Medicaid reimbursements using 

these codes until early 2014. 

 To prove that Shorter was guilty of the charges, the government submitted the following 

evidence, as summarized by the Seventh Circuit on Shorter’s direct appeal: 

To prove the allegations in Count 1, the government submitted evidence of: (1) 

Shorter’s personal involvement in Empowerment’s billing practices; (2) the 

results of a September 2013 Indiana Attorney General Investigation into 

Empowerment’s billing practices; (3) [the results of] an October 2013 FBI search 

[and seizure] of Empowerment’s records; and (4) the experiences of 

Empowerment employees and of clients who used its services. As for Shorter’s 

personal involvement, an FBI agent testified that Shorter confirmed during an 

interview her ownership of Empowerment, as well as her training and comfort 

with Medicaid billing. Shorter also told the agent that her aunt, Annette Gates, did 

some of Empowerment’s Medicaid reimbursement requests between April 2012 

and October 2013. Moreover, there was substantial evidence that Shorter 

personally trained Aunt Annette and a cousin, Lakesha Gates, on how to prepare 

Medicaid bills. 

Specifically, both Annette and Lakesha testified that: (1) they submitted bills for 

Medicaid reimbursement in accordance with Shorter’s instructions; (2) they had 

no knowledge about the Indiana Medicaid billing process before beginning work 

for Empowerment; and (3) they received no formal training beyond Shorter’s 

instructions. They both further testified that Shorter taught them to use the same 

four codes for every trip: transport of a nonambulatory patient, when another 

client is already in the vehicle, with an attendant and more than 20 miles roundtrip. 

Multiple agents involved in the Indiana Attorney General’s September 2013 

investigation also testified to arranging for transportation services with 

 

• A0130 TT: nonambulatory patient the provider picks up when a Medicaid client is already in 

the vehicle; and 

• A0425 U5: transport of a nonambulatory patient for more than twenty, but less than one 

hundred, miles round-trip. 
4 

Empowerment using fake names [like David Holtcamp, Jennifer Jones, and 

Shayna Lawson] but real Medicaid identification numbers. Each agent arranged 

for and took one-way trips without use of a wheelchair or presence of an 

attendant. Nevertheless, Empowerment billed each of these transports as roundtrip for a wheelchair-bound client with an attendant. Similarly, there was 

testimony that trips of 3.4 miles and 4.2 miles were billed by Empowerment for 

77 miles and 40 miles, respectively. An agent further testified that despite 

cancelling a trip, Empowerment later billed for the 40-mile transport of a 

wheelchair-bound client with an attendant. Finally, the agents testified that 

Empowerment submitted bills for their transport in June, July, and August 2013, 

well before they began requesting transportation. [Even more so, false billings 

were submitted by Empowerment even after the execution of the warrant in late 

October 2013]. 

As further proof of Count 1, twelve former clients and three former drivers 

testified about their actual experiences with Empowerment. This testimony was 

also inconsistent with Empowerment’s actual billings for those same transports as 

reflected in government summary exhibits. Among other things, these exhibits 

showed that Empowerment coded transports to claim a wheelchair-bound patient, 

round-trips, and attendant trips, while only one client, Chitika Cox, testified that 

she used a wheelchair, and then only for one week at the end of 2013. Clients 

further testified that their trips with Empowerment were often one-way, not 

round-trips as coded, and only two of the twelve clients testified to using an 

attendant.[] This client testimony was confirmed by former Empowerment 

drivers. For example, one former driver testified that in two months driving for 

Empowerment, she had three to five wheelchair patients and one patient who 

needed an attendant. A second driver testified that between five and ten percent of 

her riders needed an attendant, while a third driver testified that attendants were 

not frequently present during trips. Yet for each trip, defendants submitted 

reimbursement requests seeking compensation for these additional services. 

To prove Counts 2-4, the government submitted additional testimony and 

documentary evidence with respect to the “C.C.” references in the indictment, 

including that “C.C.” stood for Cassamdra Cook in Count 2, and for Chitika Cox 

in Counts 3 and 4. Without objection, the government also submitted Exhibits 18 

and 20, which included Empowerment’s trip tickets from Cook and Cox trips, 

respectively, as well as Exhibits 35 and 40, which were summary charts, 

respectively entitled “Empowerment’s Billings for Chitika Cox” and 

“Empowerment’s Billings for Casamdra[sic] Cook.” 

At trial, Chitika Cox acknowledged using Empowerment to transport her to 

dialysis appointments three times a week, but testified that except for one week at 

the end of 2013, she never used a wheelchair, and she never traveled with an 

attendant. For five of her scheduled trips during the period that Empowerment 

billed Indiana Medicaid for this transport, Cox cancelled altogether, and 

Empowerment did not drive her to dialysis. Specifically, Empowerment’s May 6, 
5 

17, 22, and June 10 and 19, 2013, trip tickets showed that Cox cancelled, and her 

medical records confirm that she did not appear for her medical appointment on 

those dates. However, the government submitted evidence that Empowerment 

billed each of those dates as round-trip, wheelchair trips with an attendant. 

Similarly, the trip tickets from May 1, 10, 29 and June 5, 2013, show that Cox 

either did not appear or did not list any mileage, but Empowerment billed those 

trips as round-trip, wheelchair transports as well. 

In addition, Cook testified that she used Empowerment on a regular basis for 

transport to a standing appointment on Tuesdays at 5 p.m., but that she did not use 

a wheelchair [or need an attendant]. Because her mother would always pick her 

up, Cook also testified that these Tuesday trips were always one-way. 

Nevertheless, Empowerment billed two of these appointments as wheelchair trips 

on the wrong dates, with Cook as both a primary and secondary passenger. 

United States v. Shorter, 874 F.3d 969, 972–73 (7th Cir. 2017). For her part, Shorter’s defense 

was emphasized through cross-examination of the witnesses where Mr. Stevens attempted to 

convey that Shorter denied being responsible for Empowerment’s billing errors and for the 

drivers’ failure to submit adequately documented trip tickets. Despite this, the jury convicted 

Shorter on all counts. 

 At sentencing, Shorter admitted under oath that she had received and reviewed a copy of 

the PSR, which included the proposed conditions of supervised release along with their 

justifications. She also acknowledged that she had discussed these matters with Mr. Stevens. Mr. 

Stevens lodged a single objection to the PSR with respect to the loss amount and successfully 

obtained a two-level deduction from the sixteen-level enhancement proposed by the PSR. 

Shorter also received uncontested two-level enhancements for defrauding a government health 

care program of over one million dollars and for abusing a position of public trust. The Court 

then rejected Mr. Stevens’ request pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553 for imposition of a below 

guideline sentence; and instead, the Court imposed a sentence at the low end of the applicable 

guideline range. Shorter unsuccessfully appealed her conviction and then timely filed a motion to 
6 

vacate her convictions and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Her motion has been fully briefed 

and the Court GRANTS her unopposed request to supplement her original motion [DE 134]. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Section 2255(a) of Title 28 provides that a federal prisoner “claiming the right to be 

released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States . . . may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or 

correct the sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). The Seventh Circuit has recognized that § 2255 relief 

is appropriate only for “an error of law that is jurisdictional, constitutional, or constitutes a 

fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Harris v. 

United States, 366 F.3d 593, 594 (7th Cir. 2004). Relief under § 2255 is extraordinary because it 

seeks to reopen the criminal process to a person who has already had an opportunity of full 

process. Almonacid v. United States, 476 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Kafo v. United 

States, 467 F.3d 1063, 1068 (7th Cir. 2006)). 

III. DISCUSSION 

Shorter offers three grounds in support of her motion which rely only on her sworn 

statements. First, she argues that government’s summary Exhibits 35 and 40 are inaccurate 

because the underlying billings or invoices (which Shorter has not provided; indeed, has not even 

identified) would show that Medicaid was never billed by Empowerment for transportation 

services; and therefore, Mr. Stevens ought to have objected to their admission at trial. Second, 

Shorter alleges that she should not have received a two-level enhancement for abusing a position 

of trust; and therefore, Mr. Stevens ought to have objected to application of the enhancement at 

sentencing. Third, Shorter contends that Mr. Stevens failed to warn her that the Court intended to 

impose overly broad and inapplicable supervised release conditions; and therefore, Mr. Stevens 
7 

should not have waived the Court’s reading of those conditions at sentencing. Shorter makes 

each of these arguments through the lens of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. 

The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 

enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. To 

prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show: (1) that her 

counsel’s performance was deficient, meaning that it fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness; and (2) that she was prejudiced by the deficiencies in her counsel’s performance, 

meaning that there is a reasonable probability that the results of the proceeding would have been 

different with effective representation. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 687 (1984). To 

demonstrate prejudice in the trial context, Shorter must show that trial counsel’s conduct so 

undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as 

having produced a just result. Cooper v. United States, 378 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2004). In the 

sentencing context, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that the results 

of the sentencing hearing would have been different but for the ineffective assistance. Fuller v. 

United States, 398 F.3d 644, 650 (7th Cir. 2005). 

A. Summary Exhibits 35 and 40 

Shorter contends she received ineffective assistance because her attorney failed to object 

to the admission of government Exhibits 35 and 40 (and instead, stipulated to their admission), 

despite knowledge that the underlying documents were not going to be identified by a testifying 

witness or admitted into evidence at trial. Exhibits 35 and 40 consist of charts that summarize 

Empowerment’s Medicaid billings for Cassamdra Cook and Chitika Cox. Shorter alleges that 

these summary exhibits are inaccurate because the actual bills or invoices underlying Counts 2-4 

were either (1) never sent to Medicaid; or, (2) if sent to Medicaid, then the bills were for medical 

services provided by physicians and not transportation services rendered by Empowerment 
8 

(despite evidence of payment from Medicaid to Empowerment). Again, Shorter makes these 

contentions without further documentary proof or even specific reference to the documents. 

In response, the government submits the affidavit of Mr. Stevens who attests that the 

decision not to attack the underlying documents was a matter of trial strategy because the 

documentary evidence of erroneous billings was overwhelming [DE 131-1]. They also argue that 

Shorter authorized the stipulation. Thus, the trial strategy adopted was to let Exhibits 35 and 40 

come into evidence without objection, while arguing that Shorter had no intention to defraud the 

government; rather, any errors were the result of confusion or were someone else’s doing. 

Shorter retorts [DE 134] that she never agreed to the admission of these summary 

exhibits without questioning their authenticity and that Mr. Stevens should have conducted 

additional investigation into the underlying documents. She makes this argument even though 

she was present during the final pretrial conference where the stipulation4

 regarding the 

authenticity of the exhibits was discussed and agreed upon. 

As explained below, the Court resolves this issue on the trial record alone without 

reliance on Mr. Stevens’ affidavit which was submitted by the government in response to the § 

2255 petition. First, and generally speaking, summary exhibits need not be supported by the 

separate admission of their underlying documents. Second, even had Mr. Stevens lodged an 

objection to the admission of Exhibits 35 and 40, the government’s other trial evidence amply 

supports Shorter’s convictions (and in fact, further supports the accuracy of Exhibits 35 and 40). 

 

4

Any argument by Shorter that the stipulation regarding the authenticity of the government’s 

exhibits [DE 51] is invalid because it only contains electronic signatures is without merit because 

handwritten signatures are not required. See N.D. of Ind. L.R. 5-1; CM/ECF Civil and Criminal 

User Manual; see also Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 763 (2001) (“We do not doubt that 

the signature requirement can be adjusted to keep pace with technological advances.”). 
9 

The documents underlying government Exhibits 35 and 40 were not admitted into 

evidence, but they did not have to be. Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 allows a court to admit into 

evidence summaries of “voluminous writings . . . that cannot conveniently be examined in 

court,” provided that all parties have had an opportunity to examine the documents summarized. 

Rule 1006 does not require admission of the documents underlying a summary exhibit; indeed, 

the rule’s purpose is to obviate the admission of voluminous documents. Committee Comment to 

Seventh Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction 3.16. Nor does Shorter contend that the defense 

did not have the opportunity to examine the documents underlying Exhibits 35 and 40. Thus, any 

objection to Exhibits 35 and 40 premised on the fact that not all of the underlying documents 

were identified by a witness or offered into evidence would have been meritless (assuming for a 

moment the accuracy of the summary exhibits). As a result, Mr. Stevens’ performance was not 

deficient in this respect, nor could his lack of an objection have influenced the outcome of 

Shorter’s trial. See Hough v. Anderson, 272 F.3d 878, 898 (7th Cir. 2001) (“If evidence admitted 

without objection was admissible, then the complained of action fails both prongs of the 

Strickland test: failing to object to admissible evidence cannot be a professionally ‘unreasonable’ 

action, nor can it prejudice the defendant against whom the evidence was admitted.”). 

Yet, the Court must also address Shorter’s claim that the actual billing documents or 

invoices underlying Exhibits 35 and 40 (which have not been submitted or identified) would 

have proven the inaccuracy of these summary exhibits. More specifically, she claims that the 

billings which were the subject of Counts 2-4 were never summitted to Medicaid by 

Empowerment, and so they should have been presented to the jury for its consideration. 

However, Shorter’s allegations are belied by the trial record beyond Exhibits 35 and 40. 
10 

Investigators with the Office of the Indiana Attorney General’s Medicaid Fraud Control 

Unit, Lisa Sweatland and Sandy Weston, testified during trial. These witnesses acknowledged 

that they personally analyzed the trip tickets seized during the execution of the search warrant on 

Empowerment (government’s Exhibit 20) and compiled various summaries of Empowerment’s 

Medicaid billings. They further provided testimony that was consistent with the billings and 

payments reflected in government’s Exhibit 19.5 

Relevant to Count 2, their testimony established personal familiarity with trip tickets 

dated August 7, 2012 and August 21, 2012 for Cassamdra Cook, which were introduced into 

evidence as government’s Exhibit 18. The investigators’ testimony (and the trip tickets) revealed 

that the August 7th trip was for a one-way transport because Cook was getting a ride home from 

someone else, while the August 21st trip was supported by documented mileage for only oneway. Despite this evidence, government’s Exhibit 19 (which Shorter does not contest the 

accuracy of) revealed that Empowerment billed Medicaid using its Medicaid provider number on 

August 9th for the August 7th trip and on August 24th for the August 21st trip, and that those 

billings were for round-trip transport of a nonambulatory client, Medicaid recipient Cassamdra 

Cook. These round-trip billings were submitted to Medicaid by Empowerment despite Cook’s 

trial testimony that she only took one-way trips with Empowerment and never needed a 

wheelchair. Testimony by Cook’s mother, Clara Jones, corroborated the fact that Cook only took 

one-way trips because she drove Cook home. 

 

5

 Government’s Exhibit 19 consisted of summary charts that identified thousands of claims paid 

by Medicaid to Empowerment, along with detailed information such as client identifying 

information; dates of service, billing, and payment; amounts billed, allowed, and paid; Medicaid 

codes used; and the recorded number on the checks issued. 
11 

Relevant to Counts 3 and 4, the investigators’ testimony established personal familiarity 

with trip tickets dated June 10, 2013 and June 19, 2013 for Chitika Cox, which were introduced 

into evidence as government’s Exhibit 18. The investigators’ testimony revealed that Cox’s June 

10th trip ticket indicated that the trip was canceled. But based on their investigation, it was 

discovered that Empowerment had in fact billed Medicaid (under the name of Chitika Cox using 

Empowerment’s Medicaid identification number) on August 16, 2013, for round-trip 

transportation of a nonambulatory client with an accompanying attendant. In addition, although 

the June 19th trip ticket indicated that Cox did not come outside to catch her ride, on June 21, 

2013, Empowerment billed Medicaid for services rendered. And per government’s Exhibit 19, 

Empowerment billed Medicaid in June 2013 for at least eight round-trips of a nonambulatory 

client using Cox’s Medicaid information. Ultimately, the testimony of Cox established that she 

canceled many trips, did not require an attendant, and only used a wheelchair for a very short 

time at the end of 2013. 

Accordingly, even if the Court had sustained an objection to government Exhibits 35 and 

40, the government’s other trial evidence amply supports Shorter’s convictions. In other words, 

subtracting Exhibits 35 and 40 from the government’s proof would not have altered the 

overwhelming weight of evidence submitted against Shorter at trial. Alternatively, the testimony 

and other exhibits introduced at trial support the accuracy of Exhibits 35 and 40, and any 

objection to their admission would have been frivolous. Thus, Shorter fails to establish that she 

was prejudiced by her attorney’s decision not to object to government Exhibits 35 and 40. Her 

ineffective assistance claim on that ground fails.

B. Sentencing Enhancement for Abuse of Trust 

Shorter next argues, without much explanation, that Mr. Stevens should have objected to 

the Court’s imposition of a sentencing enhancement for abusing a position of trust consistent 
12 

with guideline § 3B1.3. The Court surmises that Shorter’s contention appears based on the 

already rejected argument that had Mr. Stevens objected to the admission of government 

Exhibits 35 and 40, then she would not have been convicted of Counts 2-4. And in turn had she 

not sustained convictions for aggravated identity theft, then she would not have received the 

sentencing enhancement. 

But the Court has already concluded that Shorter’s convictions for aggravated identity 

theft were amply supported by the trial record. Accordingly, for the reasons previously stated, 

the Court concludes that Shorter is unable to succeed on her ineffective assistance claim in this 

respect.

Moreover, the enhancement was properly applied and can’t support a claim of 

ineffectiveness. A two-level enhancement under § 3B1.3 applies if “the defendant abused a 

position of public or private trust” in committing the offenses. The application notes state “an 

adjustment under this guideline shall apply to the following: . . . [a] defendant who exceeds or 

abuses the authority of his or her position in order to obtain, transfer, or issue unlawfully, or use 

without authority, any means of identification.” § 3B1.3 n.2(B). “Means of identification” has 

the meaning given that term in 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7). Id. In turn, § 1028(d)(7) indicates that 

“means of identification” includes “any name or number that may be used, alone or in 

conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual, including any—(A) 

name, . . . [or] official State or government issued driver’s license or identification number.” 

The facts of this case fall plainly within the scope of application note 2(B). Shorter 

abused the authority of her position as owner of Empowerment by using more than five hundred 

Medicaid patients’ identifying information, without authority, to file fraudulent claims for 

payment on behalf of her company. See, e.g., United States v. Abdelshafi, 592 F.3d 602, 611–12 
13 

(4th Cir. 2010) (applying an abuse of trust enhancement based on the commentary in application 

note 2 to a defendant who abused the authority of his position by using Medicaid patients’ 

identifying information, without authority, to file fraudulent claims for payment). Furthermore, 

Shorter’s abuse of trust significantly facilitated her commission of aggravated identity theft, as it 

granted her access to the patient identifying information necessary to file fraudulent billing 

claims. See id. 

Given this, Mr. Stevens had “no duty to make a frivolous argument” by objecting to the 

abuse of trust enhancement, United States v. Rezin, 322 F.3d 443, 446 (7th Cir. 2003), overruled 

on other grounds, and indeed was barred by the rules of professional ethics from doing so, see 

Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 272 (2000). Thus, Shorter has failed to present any nonfrivolous objection that her trial counsel failed to make to the abuse of trust sentencing 

enhancement that would have resulted in a more favorable sentence. See Fuller, 398 F.3d at 651–

52. Because there is no merit to the claim that Mr. Stevens’ performance was deficient and 

because there is a complete failure to demonstrate any possibility that Shorter suffered prejudice 

as a result of her trial counsel’s performance during sentencing, her § 2255 motion cannot 

succeed in this respect. 

C. Supervised Release Conditions 

Finally, Shorter argues that Mr. Stevens rendered ineffective assistance in connection 

with the explanation provided regarding her supervised release conditions. But this argument is 

easily dispensed with as lacking merit. 

First, the dispositive facts underlying this claim have already been addressed at a 

hearing—the sentencing hearing—and Shorter’s sworn statements at that hearing preclude relief 

on this claim. After Shorter took an oath to tell the truth, the following exchange took place 

during her sentencing hearing: 
14 

THE COURT: . . .Mr. Schmid, did you receive the entire presentence report including the 

proposed conditions of supervised release? 

MR. SCHMID: Yes, I did, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: Thank you. Same question, Mr. Stevens. 

MR. STEVENS: Yes, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: Did you have an opportunity to discuss those things with Ms. Shorter? 

MR. STEVENS: We did, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Shorter, did you receive a copy of the presentence 

report which included the proposed conditions of supervised release? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor, I did. 

THE COURT: Okay. Did you have an opportunity to review those things? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I did, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: And did you discuss them with your attorney, Mr. Stevens? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I did. 

[DE 106 at 5]. And later during the sentencing hearing, this was said: 

THE COURT: . . . As to the conditions of your supervised release, the Court has made an 

independent judgment based upon the 3553(a) factors discussed as to the appropriateness 

of the conditions with reference to yourself. I find that the following conditions of 

supervision are reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the offense of 

conviction, to the history and characteristics of yourself, and to the purposes of 

sentencing, other than punishment; that they involve no greater deprivation of liberty than 

reasonably necessary for the relevant purposes of sentencing; and that, where applicable, 

they are consistent with the policy statements of the Sentencing Commission. Moreover, 
15 

the Court believes these conditions are justified by the rationales attached to each, as 

stated in the presentence report. While on supervised release, the defendant shall comply 

with the conditions of supervised release that this Court now adopts as set forth in 

paragraphs 89 through 99 of the presentence report . . . Does either party have any 

objections to these conditions? Mr. Schmid? 

MR. SCHMID: No, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: Mr. Stevens? 

MR. STEVENS: No, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Stevens, does the defendant want me to read to her each 

of the conditions of supervision, or does she waive that reading? 

(Attorney-client discussion held off the record.) 

MR. STEVENS: We'd waive that, Judge. 

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I would also remind the probation department that 

within 72 hours of Ms. Shorter's placement on supervision after release from custody, the 

defendant shall be required to report in person to the nearest supervision unit of the 

probation office. During that meeting, the probation officer is directed to remind the 

defendant of the conditions of her supervision and also to consider whether to 

recommend to the Court any modifications of or additions to those conditions in light of 

any changes in her circumstances since the sentencing hearing. 

[DE 106 at 78-80]. 

Shorter does not attempt to account for these previous sworn statements which indicate 

that she reviewed and discussed with her attorney the conditions of supervision and the rationales 

for them. The record also shows that she discussed with Mr. Stevens whether to waive their re-
16 

reading by the Court. Accordingly, the Court need not (and does not) consider Mr. Stevens’ 

affidavit in reaching its conclusion that Shorter is not entitled to a new hearing on her § 2255 

petition to show that she perjured herself at a prior hearing. See, e.g., Thompson v. United States, 

732 F.3d 826, 829 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Peterson, 414 F.3d 825, 827 (7th Cir. 2005). 

In addition, Shorter fails to point out a single problematic condition, or how a re-reading 

of those conditions already listed in the PSR would have assisted her. Nor has Shorter bothered 

to provide an explanation as to why she believes any particular condition was inappropriately 

imposed. Thus, Shorter has not presented sufficient facts to support her claim. Having said that, 

should Shorter’s circumstances change such that a specific condition ought to be reconsidered, 

nothing prevents her from seeking an amendment of the conditions consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 

3583(e). United States v. Neal, 810 F.3d 512, 516 (7th Cir. 2016). Ultimately, Shorter is unable 

to show that Mr. Stevens acted deficiently with respect to her supervised release conditions, or 

that she suffered some prejudice relative to their imposition. Therefore, the Court denies 

Shorter’s motion. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United 

States District Courts, the Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a 

final order adverse to the applicant.” A certificate of appealability may be issued “only if the 

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c); Rule 11, Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District 

Courts. The substantial showing standard is met when “reasonable jurists could debate whether 

(or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or 

that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 & n.4 
17 

(1983)); see Young v. United States, 523 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 2008). Here, for the reasons just 

discussed, the Court does not find that Shorter has made a substantial showing of the denial of 

any constitutional rights, or that any issues in this motion are adequate to deserve encouragement 

to proceed further. The Court therefore denies the issuance of a certificate of appealability. 

The Court advises Shorter that pursuant to Rule 22(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, when the district judge denies a certificate of appealability, the applicant may request 

a circuit judge to issue the certificate. The Court further advises Shorter that any notice of appeal 

of this judgment must be filed within 60 days after the judgment is entered. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a); 

Guyton v. United States, 453 F.3d 425, 427 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that “the time to contest the 

erroneous denial of [the defendant’s] first § 2255 motion was within 60 days of the decision”). 

V. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS Shorter’s motion to supplement [DE 

134], DENIES her motion for relief under § 2255 [DE 120], and DENIES the issuance of a 

certificate of appealability. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly. 

 SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED: December 11, 2018 

 

 /s/ JON E. DEGUILIO 

 Judge 

 United States District Court