IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION

MAURICE BROWN, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) No. 2:15-CV-118 

 ) 

21ST MORTGAGE CORPORATION ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

 

OPINION AND ORDER

 

 This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to 

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for Lack of Subject-Matter 

Jurisdiction or, alternatively, for Failure to State a Claim, filed 

on June 12, 2015. For the reasons set forth below, this motion is 

GRANTED. Brown’s complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

BACKGROUND 

On March 30, 2015, Maurice Brown (“Brown”) filed a pro se 

complaint against 21st Mortgage Corporation (“21st Mortgage”). The 

arguments presented in Brown’s complaint are extremely difficult 

to follow. Brown claims that jurisdiction is based on the First 

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and he asserts that 21st
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Mortgage discriminated against him based on his race and 

disability. 

It appears that 21st Mortgage sought and received a 

foreclosure judgment against Brown in an Indiana state court. 

Brown appealed that judgment. 21st Mortgage then filed a motion 

to dismiss the appeal. In that motion, it appears that 21st

Mortgage represented that the property at issue was unoccupied. 

Brown’s appeal was unsuccessful. 

In this action, Brown contends that, when 21st Mortgage 

represented in the motion to dismiss that the property was not 

occupied, it knew the statement was untrue. Brown also contends 

that 21st Mortgage assumed he was a substandard reader because he 

is black, and that 21st Mortgage acted with the intention of 

bothering his disabilities. Brown seeks punitive damages to deter 

21st Mortgage from similar conduct in the future. 

In response to Brown’s complaint filed in this Court, 21st

Mortgage has filed the instant motion to dismiss. 21st Mortgage 

asserts that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction both 

because he has failed to state a federal claim and because his 

claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. Additionally, 

21st Mortgage argued that, if not barred, Brown’s claims should be 

dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for 

failure to state a claim. Brown did not file a response to the 

instant motion. This matter is ripe for adjudication. 
3 

DISCUSSION 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a 

defendant may move to dismiss claims over which the federal court 

lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Federal courts are courts of 

limited jurisdiction. Hart v. FedEx Ground Package System Inc., 

457 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2006). The party asserting 

jurisdiction has the burden of establishing that the cause lies 

within the federal court’s limited jurisdiction. Id. Furthermore, 

this Court has an obligation to ensure that it has proper subject 

matter jurisdiction over each lawsuit that it brought in this 

Court. See Wernsing v. Thompson, 423 F.3d 732, 743 (7th Cir. 2005). 

In order to avoid dismissal for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, a plaintiff must demonstrate that either diversity 

jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction exists. Bovee v. 

Broom, 732 F.3d 743, 744 (7th Cir. 2013). Diversity jurisdiction, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1332, requires complete diversity of 

citizenship between the plaintiffs and the defendants and the 

proper amount in controversy (more than $75,000). Neuma, Inc. v. 

AMP, Inc., 259 F.3d 864, 881 (7th Cir. 2001). Brown has not 

alleged diversity jurisdiction and nothing in Brown’s complaint 

suggests that there is diversity of citizenship between the 

parties. 
4 

Federal question jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 

1331, requires that the action arise “under the Constitution, laws, 

or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “Ordinarily, 

the basis for federal-question jurisdiction must be apparent from 

the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint.” Crosby v. 

Cooper B-Line, Inc., 725 F.3d 795, 800 (7th Cir. 2013); see also 

Northeastern Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Wabash Valley Power 

Association, 707 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2013). The only mention of 

any federal constitutional provision, law or treaty in Brown’s 

complaint are references to the First Amendment. The First 

Amendment to the Constitution guarantees “the right of the people 

... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. 

Const. Amend. I. The Supreme Court has recognized the right to 

petition as “one of the most precious of the liberties safeguarded 

by the Bill of Rights.” BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 

524 (2002)(citation and internal quotations omitted). The right 

to petition the courts guaranteed by the First Amendment is not, 

however, an absolute right. See Wright v. DeArmond, 977 F.2d 339, 

347 (7th Cir. 1992); see also U.S. Postal Serv. v. Hustler 

Magazine, Inc., 630 F.Supp. 867, 872 (D.D.C.1986) (“While the right 

to petition Government is among the most precious of the liberties 

safeguarded by the Bill of Rights, we recognize that this right, 

like many rights, is not absolute but can be subject to reasonable 

limitations.”)(citation and internal quotations omitted). 
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Although Brown references the First Amendment and his right 

to petition the courts, the complaint does not appear to bring any 

claims that arise “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of 

the United States.” The mere mention of a constitutional provision 

is insufficient to provide subject matter jurisdiction where there 

is not also a claim arising under that provision. 

Assuming for a moment that Brown has stated a cause of action 

under the First Amendment such that this Court could exercise 

subject matter jurisdiction over his claim, Brown has another 

problem: the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would bar his claim. The 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal district courts from 

reviewing state court civil judgments, including all claims that 

are inextricably intertwined with those judgments. See District 

of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); 

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). The RookerFeldman doctrine is based upon recognition of the fact that lower 

federal courts generally do not have the power to exercise 

appellate review over state court decisions. In Rooker, the 

Supreme Court held that even if a state court decision was wrong, 

only that state’s appellate court has the power to reverse or 

modify that judgment, since the jurisdiction of federal district 

courts is strictly original. Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415-16. 

Similarly, the Supreme Court in Feldman held that “a United States 

District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a 
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state court in judicial proceedings.” Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482. 

This circuit has consistently emphasized that “[t]aken together, 

Rooker and Feldman stand for the proposition that lower federal 

courts lack jurisdiction to engage in appellate review of statecourt determinations.” Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 753 (7th 

Cir. 1993) (quotation omitted). “In order to determine the 

applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the fundamental and 

appropriate question to ask is whether the alleged injury by the 

federal plaintiff resulted from the state court judgment itself or 

is distinct from that judgment.” Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 

1365 (7th Cir. 1996). “If the alleged injury resulted from the 

state court judgment itself, Rooker-Feldman directs that the lower 

federal court lacks jurisdiction.” Id. The key element in a 

Rooker-Feldman analysis is whether the federal claim alleges that 

the injury was caused by the state court judgment, or, 

alternatively, whether the federal claim alleges an independent 

prior injury that the state court failed to remedy. Long v. 

Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir. 1999). 

“A plaintiff may not circumvent the effect of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine simply by casting [a] complaint in the form of a federal 

civil rights action.” Maple Lanes, Inc. v. Messer, 186 F.3d 823, 

825 (7th Cir. 1999). The Seventh Circuit has held that “[i]f the 

injury alleged resulted from the state court judgment itself, the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine dictates that the federal courts lack 
7 

subject matter jurisdiction, even if the state court judgment was 

erroneous or unconstitutional.” Rizzo v. Sheahan, 266 F.3d 705, 

713 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). 

Brown’s complaint is difficult to interpret. It appears, 

however, that Brown lost his state court battle with 21st Mortgage 

and that he believes he suffered that loss because of the false 

representation made by 21st Mortgage. While Brown does not 

explicitly ask this Court to review and reject the state court’s 

judgment, an assessment of what injuries the alleged false 

statement could have caused cannot be separated from a review of 

the state court judgment. As such, Brown’s claims are barred by 

Rocker-Feldman. Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction to hear these claims, and 21st Mortgage’s motion to 

dismiss is GRANTED.1 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s Complaint for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction or, 

alternatively, for Failure to State a Claim, filed on June 12, 

1 Because this Court has determined that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction 

over Brown’s claims, 21st Mortgage’s arguments under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) will not be addressed in detail. There are, however, 

serious problems with the instant complaint, and if the Court had subject 

matter jurisdiction, the complaint would have been dismissed under Rule 

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The complaint is vague, conclusory, 

and confusing, and does not give a defendant fair notice of the claims being 

brought or the grounds for such claims. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
8 

2015, is GRANTED. Brown’s complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE. 

DATED: January 29, 2016 /s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge 

United States District Court