COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Fitzpatrick and Annunziata 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

DABNEY C. ROBERTSON (LANG) 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 3046-96-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 SEPTEMBER 16, 1997 

JAMES L. ROBERTSON 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HANOVER COUNTY 

Richard H. C. Taylor, Judge 

 C. Thomas Mustian (Mustian & Parker, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 No brief or argument for appellee. 

 Dabney C. Robertson (Lang) (wife) appeals the trial court's 

award of equitable distribution in her divorce from James L. 

Robertson (husband). She contends that the trial court erred 

when it calculated the amount of the credit awarded to husband 

from the proceeds of the sale of the marital home. She also 

contends that the trial court's decision to award the parties 

"their respective retirement accounts" is "confusing." For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm. 

 I. 

CALCULATION OF HUSBAND'S MORTGAGE CREDIT 

 Wife contends that the trial court erred when it calculated 

the amount of the credit it awarded to husband for paying wife's 

share of the parties' mortgage since their separation (mortgage 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

credit). She argues that the trial court's conclusion that 

husband's mortgage credit from September, 1993 through July, 1996 

was $6,701 was erroneous because the trial court failed to give 

sufficient credit to her for paying husband's share of child 

support during this time period. We disagree. 

 The trial court's award of a mortgage credit to husband was 

akin to a monetary award. Thus, we review the trial court's 

calculation of husband's mortgage credit according the legal 

principles applicable to such awards. 

 Code § 20-107.3, which governs awards of equitable 

distribution, "is intended to recognize a marriage as a 

partnership and to provide a means to divide equitably the wealth 

accumulated during and by that partnership based on the monetary 

and non-monetary contributions of each spouse." Williams v. 

Williams, 4 Va. App. 19, 24, 354 S.E.2d 64, 66 (1987). "Where an 

equitable distribution is appropriate, then all of the provisions 

of Code § 20-107.3 must be followed." Artis v. Artis, 4 Va. App. 

132, 136, 354 S.E.2d 812, 814 (1987). The court must determine 

"the legal title as between the parties," and "the ownership and 

value" of all of the parties' property and then classify this 

property as "marital," "separate," or "part separate and part 

marital." Code § 20-107.3(A). After this is done, the court may 

(1) order the division or transfer, or both, of jointly owned 

marital property, (2) apportion and order the payment of marital 

debts, or (3) grant a monetary award to either party. See Code 
 3 

§ 20-107.3(C), (D). The court must determine the amount of its 
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award of any of these remedies "upon the factors listed in [Code 

§ 20-107.3(E)]." Code § 20-107.3(C), (D). Subject to these 

enumerated statutory factors, "[t]his division or transfer of 

jointly owned marital property [, the apportionment of marital 

debts], and the amount of any monetary award, . . . is within the 

sound discretion of the trial court." Dietz v. Dietz, 17 Va. 

App. 203, 216, 436 S.E.2d 463, 471 (1993). 

 On appeal, the trial court's award of equitable distribution 

will not be reversed "unless it appears from the record that the 

chancellor has abused his discretion, that he has not considered 

or has misapplied one of the statutory mandates, or that the 

evidence fails to support the findings of fact underlying his 

resolution of the conflict in the equities." Robinette v. 

Robinette, 10 Va. App. 480, 486, 393 S.E.2d 629, 633 (1990) 

(citations omitted). 

 We hold that the trial court did not commit reversible error 

when it calculated the amount of husband's mortgage credit 

according to the commissioner's method. First, the trial court 

correctly followed the mandates of Code § 20-107.3, and all of 

its factual findings are supported by evidence in the record. 

The trial court incorporated the commissioner's report into its 

final order. In his report, the commissioner determined the 

ownership and value of the marital home and classified it as 

marital property. The commissioner also determined that the 

mortgage obligation was incurred prior to the dissolution of the 
 5 

parties' marriage. The commissioner then considered the evidence 

relevant to each of the statutory factors of Code § 20-107.3(E). 

 Our review of the commissioner's findings indicates that they 

are supported by credible evidence. 

 In addition, we cannot say that the method used by the 

commissioner and adopted by the trial court to calculate the 

amount of husband's mortgage credit was an abuse of discretion. 

Pursuant to Code § 20-107.3(D), once the trial court decided to 

award husband a monetary award in the form of a credit against 

the proceeds from the sale of the marital home, it was required 

to base the amount of this award "upon (i) the equities and the 

rights and interests of each party in the marital property, and 

(ii) the factors listed in [Code § 20-107.3(E)]." In determining 

the amount of husband's mortgage credit, the commissioner 

considered all of the enumerated factors of Code § 20-107.3(E) 

including other factors that he deemed "necessary . . . to 

consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary 

award." The additional factors considered by the commissioner 

included the fact that husband had paid wife's share of the 

monthly mortgage since the parties separated and that husband had 

declined to financially support the parties' children since that 

time. Based on these considerations, the commissioner developed 

a method of calculating husband's mortgage credit that accounted 

for his nonpayment of child support. The result of the 

commissioner's method ultimately reduced husband's mortgage 
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credit from $14,456 to $6,701.1

 Based on our review of the trial 

court's analysis, we conclude that it was within the proper 

exercise of its discretion when it calculated husband's mortgage 

credit by applying the commissioner's method to account for 

husband's nonpayment of child support. 

 We disagree with wife that Code § 20-107.3 compelled the 

trial court to calculate husband's mortgage credit in the manner 

prescribed in her brief. Code § 20-107.3(D) does not mandate 

that a trial court use specific formulas to calculate monetary 

awards in specific factual situations. Instead, the 

determination of the amount of a monetary award in a given case 

is within the discretion of the trial court subject to its 

consideration of the factors of Code § 20-107.3(E). See Dietz, 

17 Va. App. at 216, 436 S.E.2d at 471. Wife's method of 

calculating husband's mortgage credit is merely one of many 

methods that was available to the trial court when it exercised 

its discretion to grant husband such a credit. 

 II. 

THE PARTIES' RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS 

 Wife also contends that the trial court's award regarding 

the parties' retirement accounts was "confusing." Wife concedes 

that the trial court's award of the retirement accounts was not 

 

 1$14,456 is wife's share of the total mortgage payments made 

by husband from September, 1993 through July, 1996 [(35,100 x 

.32) + (10,400 x .31)]. The mortgage credit actually awarded to 

husband for this time period under the commissioner's method was 

$6,701. 
 7 

an abuse of discretion. Instead, she asks us to remand the trial 

court's award regarding the retirement accounts "to properly 

address which . . . pension plans" were included in the award. 

Because the trial court's order indicates that it intended to 

include both the parties' individual retirement accounts and 

husband's employer-sponsored pension plan in its award regarding 

the parties' retirement accounts, we disagree. 

 At the hearing before the commissioner, the parties offered 

evidence regarding their individual retirement accounts and 

husband's employer-sponsored pension plan. The parties testified 

that they each had an "individual retirement account" that they 

established in their individual names during the marriage. 

Regarding husband's employer-sponsored pension plan, the evidence 

proved that husband's employer provided husband with a pension 

plan and that husband's vested benefit "under the 10 years 

certain and life annuity option" was currently $279 per month 

starting in 2010. 

 In his report, the commissioner stated that "the parties 

stipulated . . . that each would keep their respective individual 

retirement accounts." He made no mention of husband's 

employer-sponsored pension plan. Wife objected to the omission 

of the pension plan from the commissioner's recommended award of 

equitable distribution. In its final order, the trial court 

ordered "that the parties keep their respective retirement 

accounts." We conclude that the trial court's deletion of the 
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word "individual" from the language used by the commissioner 

indicates its clear intention to include husband's 

employer-sponsored pension plan in its award of equitable 

distribution and to award the full amount of the plan to husband. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's award 

of equitable distribution. 

Affirmed.