alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1420 

To prohibit as indecent the broadcasting of any advertisement for a 

medication for the treatment of erectile dysfunction. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 17, 2005 

Mr. MORAN of Virginia (for himself, Mr. DUNCAN, and Mr. ROSS) introduced 

the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and 

Commerce 

A BILL 

To prohibit as indecent the broadcasting of any advertisement for a medication for the treatment of erectile dysfunction. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Families for ED Ad5 vertising Decency Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. DEFINITION OF INDECENCY. 

7 Within 6 months after the date of enactment of this 

8 Act, the Federal Communications Commission shall revise 

9 the Commission’s interpretations of, and enforcement poli-
2 

•HR 1420 IH 

1 cies concerning, section 73.3999 of the Commission’s reg2 ulations (47 CFR 73.3999), relating to indecent material 

3 that no licensee of a radio or television broadcast station 

4 shall broadcast on any day between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m., 

5 to treat as indecent for such purposes any advertisement 

6 for a medication for the treatment of erectile dysfunction. 

7 This section shall not require treating as indecent any 

8 product placement or other display or mention merely of 

9 the trademarked name or generic name for such a medica10 tion. 

Æ
Eric Leo WRIGHT, petitioner, v. CALIFORNIA.

No. 12-8946.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 22, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, denied.
Schedule



 EXHIBIT 10m4 
  
 Schedule identifying substantially identical agreements, among Fortune Brands, Inc. (“Fortune”) and each of the following persons, to the Agreement constituting
Exhibit 10m3 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Fortune for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2003. 
  
 Name 
  
 Mark Hausberg 
 Mark A. Roche
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

KIMBERLY SUE KRAEMER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:14-CV-170 

)

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION and ORDER

Pro se Plaintiff has filed a “Motion for the Court to Order McNeely Stephenson Thopy

and Harrold to Answer Interrogatories/Discovery Filed on June 2, 2014,” asking that the Court

compel Defendant Law Offices of McNeely Stephenson Thopy and Harrold to answer certain

discovery “submitted almost a year ago in which they were Court ordered to [a]nswer.” (Docket

# 129.)

But Plaintiff’s motion to compel is premature. A preliminary pretrial conference has yet

to occur in this case, and discovery has not even commenced. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d) (“A party

may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule

26(f), except in a proceeding exempted from initial disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(B), or when

authorized by these rules, by stipulation, or by court order.”). 

And even if discovery had commenced, Plaintiff failed to “include a certification that

[she] has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make

disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1);

see N.D. Ind. L.R. 37-1(a) (“A party filing any discovery motion must file a separate
certification that the party has conferred in good faith or attempted to confer with other affected

parties in an effort to resolve the matter raised in the motion without court action.”). 

Furthermore, there is no discovery dated June 2, 2014, of record. Nor does Plaintiff

attach the purported discovery requests to her motion. See N.D. Ind. L.R. 26-2(b) (“A party who

files a motion for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) or 37 must file with the motion those parts of

the discovery requests or responses that the motion pertains to.”). Accordingly, the Court

suspects that Plaintiff is referring to discovery she requested from Defendant in a state case

concerning an unrelated auto accident. (See Docket # 11 at 1.) This Court, however, has no

jurisdiction over discovery ongoing in a state court case. (See Docket # 50 at 1, 101 at 1.) 

For all of these reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to compel (Docket # 129) is DENIED.

 SO ORDERED.

 Dated: August 5, 2014 s/Roger B. Cosbey

Roger B. Cosbey

United States District Court
EX-34.4
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

To the Board of Directors of Fifth Third Mortgage Company

We have examined management's assertion, included in the accompanying
Management's Report on Assessment of Compliance with SEC Regulation AB
Servicing Criteria, that Fifth Third Mortgage Company (the "Company") complied
with the servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d) of the Securities and
Exchange Commission's Regulation AB for the residential mortgage loans sold to
non-government-sponsored entities for which the Company served as servicer,
that were completed on or after January 1, 2006 platform (the "Platform") as of
and for the year ended December 31, 2007, excluding criteria 1122(d)(1)(iii),
1122(d)(2)(iv), 1122(d)(3)(i)(c), 1122(d)(4)(xi), 1122(d)(4)(xii), and
1122(d)(4)(xv), which management has determined are not applicable to the
activities performed by the Company with respect to the Platform. Exhibit A to
management's assertion identifies the individual asset-backed transactions
defined by management as constituting the Platform. Management is responsible
for the Company's compliance with the servicing criteria. Our responsibility is
to express an opinion on management's assertion about the Company's compliance
with the servicing criteria based on our examination.

Our examination was conducted in accordance with attestation standards
established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, as
adopted by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States), and,
accordingly, included examining, on a test basis, evidence about the Company's
compliance with the applicable servicing criteria, including tests on a sample
basis of the servicing activities related to the Platform, determining whether
the Company performed those selected activities in compliance with the
servicing criteria during the specified period, and performing such other
procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. Our procedures were
limited to selected servicing activities performed by the Company during the
period covered by this report and, accordingly, such samples may not have
included servicing activities related to each asset-backed transaction included
in the Platform. Further, an examination is not designed to detect
noncompliance arising from errors that may have occurred prior to the period
specified above that may have affected the balances or amounts calculated or
reported by the Company during the period covered by this report. We believe
that our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. Our
examination does not provide a legal determination on the Company's compliance
with the servicing criteria.

In our opinion, management's assertion that the Company complied with the
aforementioned applicable servicing criteria as of and for the year ended
December 31, 2007 for the residential mortgage loans sold to non-government-
sponsored entities for which the Company served as servicer, that were
completed on or after January 1, 2006 platform is fairly stated, in all
material respects.


/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP

Cincinnati, Ohio
February 29, 2008
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002I, Tracy A. Kern, as Chief Financial Officer of CHAD Therapeutics, Inc. (the “registrant”), herebycertify that:(1) I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of CHAD Therapeutics, Inc.; (2) Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in lightof the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to theperiod covered by this quarterly report; (3) Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presentedin this quarterly report; (4) The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: (a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is madeknown to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisquarterly report is being prepared;  (b) Paragraph omitted;  (c) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and proceduresand presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosurecontrols and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and  (d) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting; and(5) The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions): (a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;and  (b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.     Date: November 14, 2005 /s/ Tracy A. Kern         Tracy A. Kern    Chief Financial Officer of CHAD Therapeutics, Inc.
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 95 (Wednesday, May 17, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Page 26457]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-12134]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------

INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
[Investigation No. 731-TA-699 (Final)]


Stainless Steel Angle From Japan

Determination

    On the basis of the record<SUP>1 developed in the subject 
investigation, the Commission determines, pursuant to section 735(b) of 
the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. Sec. 1673d(b)) (the Act), that an 
industry in the United States is not materially injured or threatened 
with material injury, and the establishment of an industry in the 
United States is not materially retarded, by reason of imports from 
Japan of stainless steel angle, provided for in subheading 7222.40.30 
of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, that have been 
found by the Department of Commerce to be sold in the United States at 
less than fair value (LTFV).

    \1\The record is defined in sec. 207.2(f) of the Commission's 
Rules of Practice and Procedure (19 CFR 207.2(f)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Background

    The Commission instituted this investigation effective November 10, 
1994, following a preliminary determination by the Department of 
Commerce that imports of stainless steel angle from Japan were being 
sold at LTFV within the meaning of section 733(b) of the Act (19 U.S.C. 
Sec. 1673b(b)). Notice of the institution of the Commission's 
investigation and of a public hearing to be held in connection 
therewith was given by posting copies of the notice in the Office of 
the Secretary, U.S. International Trade Commission, Washington, DC, and 
by publishing the notice in the Federal Register of December 7 (59 FR 
63106). The hearing was held in Washington, DC, on March 30, 1995, and 
all persons who requested the opportunity were permitted to appear in 
person or by counsel.
    The Commission transmitted its determination in this investigation 
to the Secretary of Commerce on May 10, 1995. The views of the 
Commission are contained in USITC Publication 2887 (May 1995), entitled 
Stainless Steel Angle from Japan: Investigation No. 731-TA-699 (Final).

    Issued: May 11, 1995.

    By order of the Commission.
Donna R. Koehnke,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 95-12134 Filed 5-16-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7020-02-P
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This schedule  contains summary financial  information  extracted from Form 10-Q
for the quarter ended September 30, 1998 for May Drilling Partnership 1983-3 and
is qualified in its entirety by reference to such Form 10-Q.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0000711310
<NAME>                        May Drilling Partnership 1983-3
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                         208
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  157
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               365
<PP&E>                                         16,606
<DEPRECIATION>                                 16,065
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 906
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          13
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                     893
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   906
<SALES>                                        594
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               601
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  237
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                364
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<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            364
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   364
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  16.08
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  16.08
        


</TABLE>
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

FORT WAYNE DIVISION 

CCT ENTERPRISES, LLC, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO: 1:14-cv-249

)

KRISS USA, INC. )

)

Defendant. )

PLAINTIFF’S CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Plaintiff, CCT Enterprises, LLC (“CCT”), by counsel, makes the following Corporate 

Disclosure Statement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1:

1. CCT has no parent corporations. 

2. No publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of CCT’s stock. 

s/ Daniel D. Bobilya 

Daniel D. Bobilya, #22901-49

Conor S. Slocum, #30132-02

Bonahoom & Bobilya, LLC

110 West Berry St., Suite 1900

Fort Wayne, IN 46802

Ph: (260) 969-0516

Fax: (260) 969-0537

dan@b-blegal.com

conor@b-blegal.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff,

CCT Enterprises, LLC

USDC IN/ND case 1:14-cv-00249-JD document 15 filed 08/28/14 page 1 of 1
**Investment Spending 2003-2007**in Millions

|                | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 |
|---------------------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Investment Spending | $27  | 108  | 62   | 25   | 12   |
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

FORT WAYNE DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) 

) 

v. ) Cause No. 1:13-CR-89-HAB 

) 

CHARLES SEALS ) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Charles Seals’ letter to the Court (ECF 

No. 182), which this Court construed liberally as a Motion for Compassionate Release pursuant to 

3582(c)(1). (ECF No. 184). The Government responded on September 14, 2021, asserting that the 

Defendant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. (ECF No. 187). Seals did not file a reply. 

Because the Government is correct that Seals failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, 

Defendant’s motion will be DENIED. 

For most of the life of the COVID-related compassionate release phenomenon, there was 

considerable confusion as to whether exhaustion of remedies was jurisdictional, a claimsprocessing rule, or wholly unnecessary. That confusion was resolved, at least in this circuit, by the 

Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Sanford, 986 F.3d 779 (7th Cir. 2021). There, the 

Court answered affirmatively the question of “whether the exhaustion requirement is a mandatory 

claim-processing rule and therefore must be enforced when properly invoked.” Id. at 782 (original 

emphasis). Where, as here, the Government raises exhaustion as a defense (see ECF No. 115 at 6– 

9), a defendant must demonstrate that he has presented his request for release to the warden at his 

facility, and either: (1) he has exhausted administrative appeals (if the request was denied); or (2) 

he has waited “30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility” 

to seek relief from the Court. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Exhaustion is required each time a 

USDC IN/ND case 1:13-cr-00089-HAB-SLC document 188 filed 10/20/21 page 1 of 2
defendant seeks compassionate release. United States v. Cain, 2021 WL 388436 at *4 (D. Maine 

Feb. 3, 2021) (collecting cases). 

Here, Seals’ initial letter to the Court did not assert that he had exhausted his administrative 

remedies and, since he failed to reply to the Government’s response raising the issue, Seals has 

failed to demonstrate that he has done so. Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude from 

Defendant’s filings that he has met the threshold exhaustion requirement. 

Unless and until Defendant exhausts his remedies and demonstrates that exhaustion, the 

Court cannot consider the merits of his compassionate release request. Therefore, his Motion for 

Compassionate Release (ECF No. 182) is DENIED. 

SO ORDERED on October 20, 2021. 

 s/ Holly A. Brady 

JUDGE HOLLY A. BRADY 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

2 

USDC IN/ND case 1:13-cr-00089-HAB-SLC document 188 filed 10/20/21 page 2 of 2
Carlton BROWN, petitioner, v. Mitch PERRY, Warden.

No. 12-8754.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 15, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________

m 01-30106

_______________

DAVID M. MCELROY;

LAURA MCELROY,

INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR CHILD, DAVID R. MCELROY,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

VERSUS

CUDD PRESSURE CONTROL, INC.; APACHE CORPORATION,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

m 00-CV-1162-N

_________________________

February 11, 2002
2

Before SMITH and DEMOSS, Circuit Judges,

and DUPLANTIER, District Judge.*

PER CURIAM:

**

David McElroy appeals a summary judgment denying his claim for damages allegedly

resulting from a blowout on an offshore oilrig

near the one on which he was working. We

have reviewed the briefs and pertinent portions

of the record and have heard the arguments of

counsel. We conclude that the district court

committed no reversible error in granting

summary judgment.

AFFIRMED.

* District Judge of the Eastern District of

Louisiana, sitting by designation.

** Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court

has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) 3:13-cv-01276-PPS

 )

KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, in her official )

capacity as Secretary, United States )

Department of Health and Human Services, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL

On Friday, December 20, 2013, I entered an order denying Notre Dame’s motion for a

preliminary injunction against enforcement of the part of the Affordable Care Act that requires

employers to provide employees with health insurance that covers contraceptive services. (DE

40.) Within an hour, Notre Dame had filed its notice of interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) and a motion for a preliminary injunction pending appeal. (DE 43, 41.)

Nothing had changed within that short span of time. I remain persuaded of my analysis of the

issues. 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(c) authorizes the trial court to grant an injunction pending an appeal of

the denial of an injunction. The appellate court has the same power under Rule 62(g). “[A]n

application with regard to an injunction ordinarily must be made in the first instance to the

district court under Rule 62(c) and it is only if relief is not obtained there that the appellate court

will consider acting under Rule 62(g).” Wright, Miller, et al., 11 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2904

(3d ed. 2013).
Notre Dame’s cursory motion offers no new arguments, relying entirely on its briefing

and oral argument in support of its earlier request for a preliminary injunction. (DE 42 at 2.) 

The same standard for preliminary injunctive relief is cited. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers,

Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 2000). I have already concluded, after as thorough an analysis

as I was able to muster, that the “low likelihood of Notre Dame’s success on the merits tips the

sliding scale towards denial of the preliminary injunction that Notre Dame seeks.” (DE 40 at

39.) The same conclusion precludes my issuance of the requested preliminary injunction pending

appeal. I will deny Notre Dame’s motion, and the university is of course free to request the same

relief from the Seventh Circuit. 

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff University of Notre Dame’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal

(DE 41) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: December 23, 2013

/s/ Philip P. Simon 

Philip P. Simon, Chief Judge

United States District Court

2