UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

BILL HATTER, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. Case No. 3:12-CV-851 JVB-CAN 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,1 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration, 

 

 Defendant. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 On December 19, 2012, Plaintiff Bill Hatter filed his Complaint in this Court, challenging 

the decision by Defendant Commissioner Carolyn W. Colvin denying his applications for 

Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. Hatter requests this Court to 

enter judgment in his favor or remand this matter to the Commissioner. For the reasons stated 

below, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision. 

A. Procedural Background 

Hatter applied for Disability Insurance Benefits on October 22, 2009, and Supplemental 

Security Income on June 17, 2010. (R. at 20). In both instances, Hatter alleged a disability onset 

date of November 16, 2008. (Id.). These claims were denied initially and again upon 

 

1

 On February 14, 2013, Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security 

Administration. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Carolyn W. Colvin is automatically substituted 

for Michael J. Astrue as the named Defendant. 

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reconsideration. (Id.). Hatter requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), 

which was held on October 4, 2011. (Id.). In an opinion dated October 17, 2011, the ALJ found 

that Hatter met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 

2013, and that he had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 16, 2008. (R. at 

22). Furthermore, the ALJ found that Hatter had the severe impairment of degenerative disk 

disease of the spine. (Id.). The ALJ held, however, that Hatter did not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. 

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 

Additionally, the ALJ found that Hatter retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 

to perform a reduced range of sedentary work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a), 416.967(a). 

Specifically, the ALJ found that Hatter can occasionally lift and carry up to ten pounds, sit, 

stand, or walk for one hour, and that he must adjust his position for five minutes after sitting for 

one hour. (R. at 20). The ALJ determined that Hatter could not use his right leg to operate foot 

controls, nor could he climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, or drive, operate machinery, or be 

exposed to unprotected heights, exposed flames, large bodies of water, or unguarded hazardous 

machinery. (Id.). Hatter could, however, occasionally climb ramps and stairs, as well as balance, 

stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. (Id.). Based on these findings, the ALJ determined that Hatter 

was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (R. at 30). 

Accordingly, the ALJ issued a decision denying Hatter’s application for benefits. (R. at 

30). The Appeals Council denied Hatter’s request for review. (R. at 5). As a result, the ALJ’s 

opinion became the Commissioner’s final decision. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481; Fast v. 

Barnhart, 397 F.3d 468, 470 (7th Cir. 2005). Hatter then filed the present action. 

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B. Factual Background 

(1) Medical Evidence 

Hatter was born in 1973, and was thirty-eight years old at the time the ALJ denied his 

application for disability benefits. He has a high school education and past relevant work as a 

welder. (R. at 40). Hatter suffers from lower-back pain that also travels into his legs. In 2004, 

Hatter began treatment with his family physician, Dr. Rex Allman, complaining of chronic lower 

back pain stemming from a previous accident at work. (R. at 332). Dr. Allman diagnosed 

lumbosacral strain with chronic back pain and stabilized Hatter’s back pain with prescription 

Adderall. (R. at 335, 342). Treatment notes indicate that Hatter’s back pain was well-controlled 

with the use of Adderall. (R. at 332, 333–37, 338–40, 343). At a March 27, 2009, follow-up with 

Dr. Allman, Hatter stated that he “fe[lt] well with no complaints.” (R. at 472). 

 Hatter saw Dr. Allman again on March 6, 2010. (R. at 470). He reported experiencing 

intermittent back pain and pain down his legs that worsened with prolonged standing or sitting. 

(Id.). Dr. Allman diagnosed Hatter with a lumbosacral sprain or strain. (R. at 471). In a 

handwritten note from that date, Dr. Allman opined that Hatter was unable to work due to 

chronic low back pain, which was made worse by sitting or standing for prolonged periods of 

time. (R. at 400). Dr. Allman also wrote a follow-up note on March 19, 2010, in which he stated 

that Hatter can only sit for sixty minutes, stand for ten to sixty minutes, walk two blocks, and 

that prolonged sitting or standing worsened Hatter’s low back pain. (R. at 397). Dr. Allman also 

indicated that Hatter had difficulty traveling due to low back pain that radiated to both legs. (Id.). 

 On June 11, 2010, Dr. Allman referred Hatter to neurologist Salman Wali, M.D., for a 

neurological exam. (R. at 474). Dr. Wali noted Hatter’s complaint of back pain, and that physical 

activity exacerbated the pain, and that the pain levels fluctuated throughout the day. (R. at 474, 

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476). Dr. Wali ordered an x-ray of Hatter’s lower back, as well as an EMG and nerve conduction 

studies of his legs. (R. at 476). Dr. Wali saw Hatter again on June 25, 2010, and reported that the 

x-ray exam, EMG and nerve conduction studies were all normal. (R. at 472). Dr. Wali 

recommended that Hatter receive trigger point injections into his lower back. (R. at 473). 

 On October 26, 2010, Hatter established care with neurosurgeon Roman Filipowicz, 

M.D. (R. at 625). Dr. Filipowicz noted Hatter’s history of back pain and ordered an MRI of his 

lower back. (Id.). The MRI showed a disc protrusion at the L4–L5 level of the spine, causing 

severe left neuroforamina stenosis and mild to moderate stenosis of the left aspect of the central 

canal, with likely nerve root compression at the L4–L5 level. (R. at 404). In a letter dated March 

4, 2011, Dr. Filipowicz stated that the MRI revealed a “good-sized disc herniation” at the L4–L5 

level, causing nerve root compression. (R. at 627). On March 15, 2011, Hatter elected to undergo 

an operation on his lower back. (R. at 418). Dr. Filipowicz performed a hemilaminotomy, a 

microdiskectomy at the L4–L5 level, and a nerve root decompression. (R. at 418–19). 

 Hatter followed-up with Dr. Filipowicz on April 1, 2011. (R. at 434). Dr. Filipowicz 

stated that Hatter still had back and leg pain, but it was better, and that he moved his legs “quite 

well.” (Id.). At another appointment on May 6, 2011, Dr. Filipowicz noted that Hatter’s strength 

and function improved after the operation, he was trying to not take pain medicine, was 

rehabilitating himself on his own, and was able to walk and complete small jobs around the 

house. (R. at 433). Dr. Filipowicz stated that Hatter still had bad days, and that his back problems 

made it difficult for him to return to work as a welder. (Id.). Dr. Filipowicz recommended that 

Hatter see either a physiatrist or physical therapist to receive a functional capacity evaluation. 

(Id.). 

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 Hatter saw Dr. Filipowicz again on August 8, 2011. (R. at 533). Dr. Filipowicz noted that 

Hatter’s back and legs hurt, and expressed concern that Hatter may have a problem with his disk 

if he did not improve. (Id.). Hatter underwent another MRI of his lumbar spine on August 16, 

2011. (R. at 530). The MRI results showed a possible residual disk fragment in the same area as 

Hatter’s first operation. (Id.). 

(a) Dr. Allman’s Lumbar Spine Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire 

 On March 31, 2010, Dr. Allman completed a Lumbar Spine Residual Functional 

Capacity Questionnaire. (R. at 485). Dr. Allman diagnosed Hatter with a lumbosacral strain 

resulting in clinical findings of back stiffness, muscle spasm, and moderately decreased range of 

motion in the lower back. (R. at 485–86). He noted that Hatter would often experience pain that 

was severe enough to interfere with his attention and concentration. (R. at 486). Dr. Allman also 

stated that Hatter could walk for five blocks, sit and stand continuously for two hours at a time, 

and sit and stand for about two hours in an eight-hour workday. (R. at 487). He also opined that 

Hatter must walk every fifty minutes for ten minutes, and that he would need to take an 

unscheduled break every hour for ten minutes. (Id.). Additionally, Hatter could frequently lift 

and carry ten pounds or less. (R. at 488). 

(b) Dr. Filipowicz’s Medical Source Statement 

In September 2011, Dr. Filipowicz completed a medical source statement assessing 

Hatter’s ability to perform work-related activities. (R. at 537–41). He stated that Hatter could 

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only occasionally lift or carry up to ten pounds. (R. at 537). Sitting, standing, and walking were 

limited to one hour each during an eight-hour day. (R. at 538). Hatter could not use either foot to 

operate foot controls. (R. at 539). He was limited to occasional climbing, balancing, stooping, 

kneeling, crouching, and crawling (R. at 541). Hatter was also limited to occasional exposure to 

unprotected heights, moving mechanical parts, and operation of a motor vehicle. (R. at 541). 

(2) Claimant’s Testimony 

At his hearing before the ALJ on October 4, 2011, Hatter stated that he is disabled 

because he experiences constant lower back pain that travels into his legs.2

 (R. at 46). He said 

that physical activity makes the pain worse and that he took muscle relaxants and pain medicine 

to lessen his symptoms. (Id.). Furthermore, Hatter said that his pain level was generally constant 

from 2008 through 2011. (Id.). Hatter testified that he can only sit for fifteen to twenty minutes 

before needing to get up and change position. (R. at 49). He also said that he can only stand for 

fifteen to twenty minutes at one time, and that he needs to lie down and rest two to three times 

per day for fifteen minutes to one-half hour. (R. at 49–51). Hatter said that during the day he 

checks e-mail, helps with household chores, assists his children with their school work, and is 

able to drive himself to appointments. (R. at 50–52). 

 

2

 While Hatter also alleged disability due to a depressive condition, the ALJ found that this was a non-severe 

impairment. (R. at 23–24). Furthermore, when the ALJ asked why Hatter is disabled, Hatter only mentioned his 

back pain, and does not raise the depressive condition as an issue on appeal. Therefore, the Court confines its 

analysis to Hatter’s allegations regarding his lower back problems. 

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C. Disability Standard

In reviewing disability decisions of the Commissioner of Social Security, the district 

court must affirm the ALJ’s decision so long as it is both supported by substantial evidence and 

free of legal error. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006); Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 

351 (7th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of such “relevant evidence 

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 

402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). This Court will not substitute its own opinion for that of the ALJ’s or 

re-weigh the evidence; however, it will conduct a critical review of the evidence, considering 

both the evidence that supports and detracts from the decision. Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 

336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003). The ALJ’s decision cannot stand if it lacks evidentiary 

support or an adequate discussion of the issues. Id. The ALJ must explain his analysis of the 

evidence with specific detail and clarity so as to build a logical bridge from the evidence to the 

conclusion, but does not need to provide a “complete written evaluation of every piece of 

testimony and evidence.” Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Diaz v. 

Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 308 (7th Cir. 1995)). This includes addressing uncontradicted evidence that 

supports a claimant’s disability. Stephens v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 284, 287 (7th Cir. 1985). The 

ALJ’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Haynes, 416 F.3d at 626. 

 Claimants will only qualify for benefits if they are found “disabled” under the Social 

Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). The Social Security Act defines “disability” as the 

“inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or 

can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 

423(d)(1)(A). Social Security regulations set forth a sequential five-part test to determine 

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whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1520, 416.920. This test requires the ALJ 

to consider whether: (1) the claimant is involved in substantial gainful activity; (2) the claimant 

has an impairment or combination of impairments that is severe; (3) the individual’s impairment 

meets or medically equals an impairment listed in the Social Security regulations; (4) the 

impairment precludes the claimant from performing past relevant work; (5) the national economy 

lacks a significant number of jobs that the claimant has the capacity to perform. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520, 416.920. The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, after which 

the burden shifts to the Social Security Administration at step five. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 

995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004). 

 A finding of disability requires an affirmative answer at either step three or step five. 

Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351–52 (7th Cir. 2005). At step three, if the 

impairment meets or medically equals any of the severe impairments listed in the Social Security 

Regulations, the impairment is acknowledged by the Commissioner and the claimant is found to 

be disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If, however, the claimant’s 

impairment does not meet a listing, the ALJ will then assess the claimant’s RFC to determine if 

the claimant can perform past relevant work, or other work available in the national economy. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv)–(v), 416.920(a)(4)(iv)–(v). 

D. Analysis

 The primary issue this Court must resolve is whether the ALJ made a proper RFC 

determination. Hatter argues that the ALJ’s opinion does not support his RFC determination 

because (1) the ALJ improperly discounted the medical opinion of Hatter’s treating physicians, 

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Drs. Allman and Filipowicz, and (2) the ALJ improperly evaluated Hatter’s credibility regarding 

his testimony about his pain symptoms. 

 The RFC is a judgment of an individual’s ability to perform physical and mental work 

activities on a sustained basis, despite having limiting impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 

416.920(e); SSR 96-8p. In making a proper RFC determination, the ALJ must consider all of the 

relevant evidence in the case record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The record includes 

medical signs, diagnostic findings, the claimant’s statements about the severity and limitations of 

medical impairments, statements and other information provided by treating or examining 

physicians and psychologists, third party witness reports, and any other relevant evidence in the 

record. See Martinez v. Astrue, No. 2:09-cv-62-PRC, 2009 U.S. Dist. WL 4611415, at *9 (N.D. 

Ind. Nov. 30, 2009); SSR 96-7p. 

1. The ALJ properly explained his reasons for discounting Dr. Allman’s and Dr. Filipowicz’s 

medical opinions.

 Hatter seeks a remand for further consideration of the medical opinions of Drs. Allman 

and Filipowicz. He contends that the ALJ erred by not assigning controlling weight to these 

opinions because they were his treating physicians. In determining the proper weight to accord 

medical opinions, the ALJ must consider factors including the claimant’s examining and 

treatment relationship with the source of the opinion, the physician’s specialty, the support 

provided for the medical opinion, and its consistency with the record as a whole. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1527(c), 416.927(c). A “treating source” is a medical professional who provides medical 

treatment or evaluation to the claimant and has or had an ongoing relationship with the claimant. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). An ongoing relationship exists when the medical record 

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shows that the claimant saw the source frequently enough to be consistent with accepted medical 

practices for the treatment of the medical condition. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). 

 An ALJ must give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight if it is well-supported 

by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and if it is consistent with 

other substantial evidence in the record. Hofslien v. Barnhart, 439 F.3d 375, 376 (7th Cir. 2006); 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2); SSR 96-8p; SSR 96-2p. Generally, ALJs weigh the 

opinions of treating sources more heavily because they are more familiar with the claimant’s 

conditions and circumstances. Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870. A claimant is not entitled to benefits, 

however, merely because a treating physician labels him as disabled. Dixon v. Massanari, 270 

F.3d 1171, 1177 (7th Cir. 2001). A medical opinion may be discounted if it is internally 

inconsistent or inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. Clifford, 227 F.3d at 

870. While ALJs are not required to award a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight, 

they must articulate their reasoning for not doing so. Hofslien, 439 F.3d at 376–77. The ALJ’s 

reasoning should be based on the relevant factors applied to all medical opinions, including the 

length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship; frequency of examination; the 

physician’s specialty; the types of tests performed; and the consistency and support for the 

physician’s opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2). 

 In this case, the ALJ analyzed several opinions by Drs. Allman and Filipowicz, as well as 

those of state reviewing physicians. In total, the record indicates that the ALJ evaluated about 

seven separate medical source opinions when determining Hatter’s RFC. (R. at 26–28). The ALJ 

first considered Dr. Allman’s March 2010 opinion, in which Dr. Allman stated that Hatter was 

unable to work. (R. at 26). The ALJ gave this opinion “very little weight” because the treatment 

notes from the office visit that day indicated that Hatter had no complaints. (See R. at 26, 402–

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04). The next opinions the ALJ considered were those of State agency physicians that opined that 

Hatter’s back condition was not a severe impairment. (R. at 26). He gave these opinions “very 

little weight” because he believed that Hatter did in fact have a severe impairment. (R. at 27). 

The ALJ then considered an opinion from Dr. Allman dated March 19, 2010, which the ALJ 

assigned “limited weight,” because “the medical evidence . . . does not fully support these 

limitations.” (R. at 27). Additionally, the ALJ gave “some weight” to the twenty-five pound 

lifting restriction given by Dr. Allman in December 2009. (Id.). Specifically, the ALJ found that 

Hatter was more restricted and limited to lifting no more than ten pounds. (Id.). 

 The ALJ then evaluated notes from Drs. Allman and Filipowicz made in February, 

March, and April 2011. (Id.). These opinions stated that Hatter was unable to work due to 

chronic back pain and his back surgery. The ALJ gave these opinions “limited weight,” finding 

that Hatter was temporarily unable to work before and after his back operation, and that he 

improved significantly after the surgery, noting Dr. Filipowicz’s recommendation that Hatter see 

a physiatrist or physical therapist to improve his physical abilities. (Id.). 

 Subsequently, the ALJ “reject[ed]” Dr. Allman’s March 2010 Lumbar Spine Residual 

Functional Capacity Questionnaire, because “it [was] inconsistent with the medical evidence of 

record.” (Id.). The ALJ stated that the medical evidence available at the time Dr. Allman gave 

the opinion was insufficient to support the limitations Dr. Allman noted. (Id.). Specifically, 

Hatter’s back pain was stable with the use of Adderall and objective diagnostic tests were 

generally unremarkable. (Id). Even though he rejected Dr. Allman’s Questionnaire, the ALJ 

agreed with that portion of the opinion indicating a need to alternate between sitting and 

standing, and he incorporated it into his final RFC. (Id.). 

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 The final medical opinion the ALJ considered was the medical source statement prepared 

by Dr. Filipowicz in September, 2011. (R. at 28). The ALJ adopted Dr. Filipowicz’s opinions 

regarding Hatter’s ability to lift and carry, sit, stand, and walk for one hour at a time, his need to 

never use his right foot to operate foot controls, and his ability to occasionally engage in postural 

activities except climbing ropes, ladders, and scaffolds. (Id.). The ALJ also found Hatter more 

limited than Dr. Filipowicz did regarding climbing ladders, ropes and scaffolds, and that he 

cannot drive or operate machinery, nor be exposed to unprotected heights, exposed flames, large 

bodies of water, or unguarded hazardous machinery. (Id.). The only portion of the opinion the 

ALJ did not adopt in his final RFC is Dr. Filipowicz’s statement that Hatter can only sit, stand, 

and walk for one hour each in total in an eight-hour workday, and that he could never use his left 

foot to operate foot controls. (Id.). 

 Hatter argues that the ALJ “credited his own interpretation of unspecified ‘objective 

evidence’ over substantial portions from the two long-term treating experts,” and that he 

“offer[ed] no more than vague reasons for rejecting the opinions provided by the treating 

physicians.” (DE 11, at 10). The Court is not persuaded, and finds that substantial evidence 

supports the ALJ’s decision. Initially, the ALJ noted Hatter’s long history of back pain and that it 

was well controlled with the use of prescription medicine up until 2010. (R. at 25). He then 

discounted Dr. Allman’s March 2010 opinion that stated Hatter was unable to work because the 

records from the same office visit state that Hatter had no complaints regarding his lower back. 

(R. at 26). The ALJ also gave limited weight to Dr. Allman’s second March 2010 statement 

regarding Hatter’s ability sit, stand, and walk because this opinion was prepared one year before 

Hatter’s back operation, and post-operative notes indicate that Hatter’s ability to walk and move 

improved significantly after the operation. (R. at 27). Additionally, the ALJ discounted Dr. 

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Allman’s Lumbar Spine Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire, completed in March 2010, 

because at the time of the report, Hatter’s pain was constant and unchanging, and the objective 

medical findings were unremarkable. (Id.). In his opinion, the ALJ noted that Hatter was unable 

to work before and after his March 2011 operation, but found that this restriction was only 

temporary due to his post-operative improvement, and buttressed by Dr. Filipowicz’s 

recommendation that Hatter begin physical therapy. (Id.). Finally, the ALJ adopted the majority 

of Dr. Filipowicz’s September 2011 medical source statement in his final RFC, discounting only 

that portion that was not substantiated by the record. Throughout his opinion, the ALJ referenced 

the relevant factors applied to medical opinions, including the length, nature, and extent of the 

treatment relationships, the frequency of examinations, Dr. Allman’s and Dr. Filipowicz’s 

specialties, the objective medical tests performed, and the overall consistency and support for the 

physician's opinion. In short, the Court finds that the ALJ reasonably articulated his reasons for 

not assigning Dr. Allman’s and Dr. Filipowicz’s numerous opinions controlling weight. 

2. The ALJ’s credibility determination was not patently wrong.

 In addition to disputing the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Allman’s and Dr. Filipowicz’s 

medical opinions, Hatter also challenges the ALJ’s credibility determination, asserting that he 

applied the wrong legal standard in assessing Hatter’s credibility. ALJs are in a special position 

to hear, see, and assess witnesses, so their credibility determinations are given special deference 

and will only be overturned if they are patently wrong. Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 311 (7th 

Cir. 2012). An ALJ’s credibility determination will only be considered patently wrong when it 

lacks any explanation or support. Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413-14 (7th Cir. 2008). 

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“Patently wrong” is a high burden. Turner v. Astrue, 390 Fed. Appx. 581, 587 (7th Cir. 2010). 

“In analyzing an ALJ’s opinion for such fatal gaps or contradictions, we give the opinion a 

commonsensical reading rather than nitpicking at it.” Castile v. Astrue, 617 F.3d 923, 929 (7th 

Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted). Furthermore, “careful consideration must be given to any 

available information about symptoms because subjective descriptions may indicate more severe 

limitations or restrictions than can be shown by objective medical evidence alone.” SSR 96-8p. 

Claimants are responsible, however, for providing medical evidence showing how the 

impairments affect their functioning. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512, 416.912. 

 In assessing a claimant’s subjective symptoms, particularly pain, the ALJ must follow a 

two-step process. SSR 96-7p. First, the ALJ must determine whether a medically determinable 

impairment exists that can by shown by acceptable medical evidence and can be reasonably 

expected to produce the claimant’s pain or other symptoms. Id. Second, after showing an 

underlying physical or mental impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the 

claimant’s pain or other symptoms, the ALJ must evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting 

effects of the impairment to determine the extent to which the symptoms limit the claimant’s 

ability to work. Id. Whenever a claimant’s statements about the symptoms and limitations of 

their impairment are not substantiated by objective medical evidence, the ALJ must make a 

finding on the credibility of the individual’s statements based on consideration of the entire case 

record. Id. 

Hatter’s main claim is that he suffers from low back pain that radiates into his legs. In 

determining the credibility of Hatter’s testimony regarding the symptoms associated with his 

pain, the ALJ concluded that his medically determined impairments could reasonably be 

expected to cause the symptoms he alleged in his testimony. (R. at 25). The ALJ found, however, 

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that his “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms 

[were] not credible to the extent they [were] inconsistent with the above [RFC].” (Id.). Hatter 

contends that the ALJ improperly evaluated the consistency of his testimony against the RFC 

instead of the evidence in the record. As Hatter correctly states, in Bjornson v. Astrue, the 

Seventh Circuit rejected an ALJ’s use of the exact same boilerplate language used in this case. 

671 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2012). The court in Bjornson, however, criticized the ALJ for not 

linking his conclusion to the evidence in the record. See 671 F.3d at 645. Moreover, even though 

the ALJ used boilerplate language, this alone “does not automatically undermine or discredit the 

ALJ’s ultimate conclusion if he otherwise points to information that justifies his credibility 

determination.” Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367–68 (7th Cir. 2013). 

 Hatter identifies two separate grounds for which he claims the ALJ erred in determining 

his credibility. First, he argues that the ALJ focused on medical records before his alleged onset 

date and then cherry-picked later medical records to support his credibility finding. (DE 11, at 

15). Next, he argues that the ALJ erred by improperly basing the credibility finding on Hatter’s 

apparent lack of discomfort at the disability hearing. (DE 11, at 16). Both of these points are 

without merit. 

 The ALJ began his credibility determination by focusing on Hatter’s testimony regarding 

his activities of daily living and his functional limitations, noting that Hatter is able to drive, 

check e-mail, help with chores, and help his children with homework. (R. at 25). The ALJ then 

discussed Hatter’s history of low back pain stemming from a previous injury. (Id.). Although 

Hatter alleged a disability onset date of November 2008, and stated at the hearing that his pain 

level was about the same from 2008 to 2011, the ALJ noted that the medical records indicate that 

Hatter’s low back pain was controlled and generally stable with the use of Adderall until 2010. 

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(Id.). He also considered the objective tests and exam results before Hatter showed a need for 

surgery in March 2011. (R. at 26). For example, the ALJ cited an “unremarkable” January 2010 

physical consultative exam, as well as normal x-ray, EMG, and nerve conduction studies of his 

legs performed in June, 2010. (Id.). The ALJ also discussed the Third Party Function Report 

completed by Hatter’s wife, giving it “some weight,” and disregarded those parts that were 

inconsistent with the RFC, and noted that Hatter’s wife may not be entirely objective in her 

analysis. (R. at 28). 

Additionally, the ALJ mentioned Hatter’s appearance during the hearing, noting that 

Hatter did not appear “overly uncomfortable during the hearing,” and that after Hatter switched 

from sitting to standing, he “appeared comfortable while standing.” (Id.). Contrary to Hatter’s 

assertion, the Seventh Circuit “ha[s] repeatedly endorsed the role of [ALJ] observation in 

determining credibility . . . .” Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 436 (7th Cir. 2000). Moreover, if an 

ALJ’s observation was “one of several factors that contributed to the [ALJ]’s credibility 

determination, we cannot say this rendered that judgment ‘patently wrong.’” Id. As noted above, 

the ALJ discussed the relevant medical and opinion evidence, including his observations of 

Hatter, and concluded that Hatter’s testimony regarding the limiting effects of his symptoms was 

not credible. (R. at 25). Moreover, he accommodated Hatter’s impairments by limiting him to 

sedentary work. Thus, the ALJ considered multiple factors in arriving at his credibility 

determination, and his opinion is not patently wrong. 

 In sum, the ALJ articulated the specific reasons he discounted Hatter’s testimony, 

including his activities of daily living and his medical history. This Court will not reweigh the 

record evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ, as Hatter invites. See Nelson v. 

Apfel, 131 F.3d 1228, 1234 (7th Cir. 1997). The ALJ’s reasons are properly supported by record 

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evidence and are sufficiently specific to make clear the weight given to Hatter’s testimony and 

the specific reasons for that weight. See SSR 96-7p. Therefore, the ALJ’s credibility 

determination did not lack explanation or support, and so is not patently wrong, and will be 

upheld. See Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 369 (7th Cir. 2013); Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 

306, 311 (7th Cir. 2012); Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413-14 (7th Cir. 2008). 

E. Conclusion 

 The Court finds that the ALJ’s decision was supported with substantial evidence and free 

of legal error. Therefore, Hatter’s motion to reverse or remand is DENIED. This Court 

AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The 

Clerk is instructed to term this case and enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner. 

SO ORDERED on October 7, 2013. 

 s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

 JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

case 3:12-cv-00851-JVB-CAN document 18 filed 10/07/13 page 17 of 17