COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-12-00332-CV

JESSICA JACKSON HILL APPELLANT

V.

STEVEN HILL APPELLEE

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FROM THE 393RD DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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I. Introduction

In two issues, Appellant Jessica Jackson Hill appeals the property division 

in the trial court’s divorce decree, arguing that the trial court applied the wrong 

standard to value Appellee Steven Hill’s partnership interest in KPMG, LLP

(KPMG) by failing to account for commercial goodwill and for a guaranteed 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

income component included in the partnership agreement, leading to an unfair 

and unjust property division.

Steven concedes that while KPMG may have commercial goodwill, the 

community estate is not entitled to share in it because he has no equity or 

ownership interest in KPMG and his ability to share in its profits is limited and 

governed by the partnership agreement, which also defines ―guaranteed 

compensation‖ and sets out a computation that equates to his earned income. 

We affirm.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

Steven became a Class B principal in KPMG, a public accounting firm with 

approximately 1,900 partners and principals in the U.S. division, shortly after he 

married Jessica. At the final divorce hearing, Steven, Jessica, and their experts 

testified about Steven’s interest in KPMG, and in the divorce decree, the trial 

court awarded to Steven ―[a]ll interest he may own in the partnership known as 

KPMG, LLP., including his capital account with KPMG, LLP.‖ It also allocated to 

Steven ―[t]he loan against his KPMG, LLP[.], Partnership capital account.‖ The 

nature of Steven’s interest in KPMG determines the outcome of this appeal.2

 

2At oral argument, Jessica characterized Steven’s interest in KPMG as an 

interest in an ongoing Delaware limited partnership, while Steven described it as 

an interest in a ―faux‖ partnership in which Steven paid for the nontransferable 

right to a percentage of the firm’s capital account.
3

A. 2008 Partnership Agreement

The trial court admitted the 2008 Partnership Agreement (the Agreement) 

into evidence. The Agreement sets out that ―members‖ are its partners and 

principals and distinguishes between ―partners,‖ which it defines as ―other than 

Principals,‖ and ―principals,‖ which it defines as parties ―who are not Certified 

Public Accountants.‖ The Agreement also indicates that notwithstanding the 

different nomenclature, each principal’s relationship to the firm ―is intended to be 

that of a partner in a partnership,‖ with the same rights, privileges, and liabilities 

of partners, with some limitations.

One of the Agreement’s limitations in the definition of ―principals‖ is that 

principals ―shall not contribute to or have any interest in the capital of the Firm 

other than their contributions to their Deposit Accounts, which shall constitute 

loans to the Firm that shall be subordinated to other debts of the Firm as and to 

the extent provided in the By-laws.‖ Notwithstanding this definition, section 15.1 

of the Agreement states that each member agrees that the relationship created 

between each member and the firm and between the firm’s members ―is intended 

to be that of a partner in a partnership,‖ governed by the law, ―both statutory and 

common law, respecting partners and partnerships.‖

The Agreement provides for the disposition of the deposit account in the 

event of death. It also provides for disposition of the deposit account on 

withdrawal and retirement and the effect of separation in the event of death, 

retirement, any nontemporary type of withdrawal, or bankruptcy. When a 
4

member is ―separated,‖ the balance of his capital or deposit account, drawing 

account, and subordinated loan account ―shall be liquidated and distributed to‖ 

him in exchange for his interest in the firm, and any amounts that he owes the 

firm at the time of separation ―shall be paid prior to or simultaneously with 

payment‖ for the above accounts. The Agreement also provides, ―Except as 

specifically provided for herein or in the By-laws, no Member shall . . . mortgage, 

assign[,] or incorporate his or her interest in the capital, goodwill[,] or profits of

the Firm or any part thereof.‖

B. Jessica’s Expert

Jessica’s valuation expert Mike Hill testified that the fair market value of 

Steven’s KPMG partnership interest was $2.4 million

3

and that KPMG had 

goodwill ―in excess of just the individual partners.‖ Hill agreed that his August 23, 

2011 valuation report stated, ―This letter does not constitute a valuation report as 

defined by the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practices,‖ and that it 

 

3Hill stated that Steven owned a 0.124414 percent (essentially, a tenth of 

one percent) partnership interest in KPMG and that based on his compensation 

comparison for similar positions, Steven’s reasonable compensation was 

$700,000, making $800,000 of Steven’s $1.5 million average income attributable 

to the KPMG ownership interest. Applying a discount rate of around 33.3%, he 

arrived at the $2.4 million figure. Hill explained that a discount rate was the rate 

that he thought a willing buyer would expect to receive as a rate of return, and 

because this was excess income, ―it requires a higher rate of return than, say, 

normal income-based salary and so forth.‖ He also described the market for the 

share as ―a specific type of buyer that would have the skill set to be able to step 

in and receive the salary plus the excess income.‖ Hill also explained that he did 

not adjust for present value because the valuation covered a single period 

instead of a long-period discounted cash flow ―out a number of years.‖
5

was not a complete valuation report. He also acknowledged that his valuation 

report did not mention the Agreement and that his valuation report referred to 

tangible value but did not use the words ―good will‖ or make a distinction between 

commercial goodwill and personal goodwill. He agreed that his valuation result 

ignored the language in KPMG’s offer letter that stated, ―If you cease to be a 

member of KPMG, you will be entitled only to the compensation that has been 

earned and accrued through the date you cease to be a member of the firm.‖ Hill 

also acknowledged that he never spoke to Steven.

C. Steven’s Testimony

Steven testified that the capital account was actually a deposit account. At 

the time of the divorce hearing, Steven listed the value of his KPMG capital 

account at $715,000, with a loan amount of $700,900 to fund it, for a net 

community interest of $14,100, and he testified that his interest in KPMG should 

be the net value of his capital account less the outstanding loan balance.

D. Lauri Morrison’s Testimony

Lauri Morrison, KPMG’s national director in charge of partner care, gave 

the following testimony during her direct examination:

Q. Jessica Hill, Steve Hill’s wife, has a financial expert James 

M. Hill who stated that Steven Hill has a partnership interest of 

0.124414 percent which is about one-tenth of one percent.

What does that percentage number mean?

A. That’s the percentage of Steve’s capital or deposit 

account; overall, the sum of all partners’ capital deposit accounts as 

of 12/31/2010.
6

Q. And when you say ―his capital account,‖ are you talking 

about the gross number as opposed to the number after you 

subtract the loan?

A. Yes.

. . . .

Q. What is your understanding – does that percent – as to 

ownership interest, what does that percentage mean?

A. It doesn’t represent any equity or ownership interest in the 

partnership.

Morrison said that under the Agreement, Steven did not have any 

ownership interest that could be sold, transferred, or given away by him or that 

could be inherited from him and that the Agreement defined his rights and the 

limitations on those rights. Morrison said that to enter KPMG as a principal, 

Steven had to pay into the capital account, that he had secured the loan through 

a third-party lender to fund the $715,000 in the capital account, and that his loan 

balance for the account was $700,900, for a difference of $14,100.

4

 She 

explained that the loan’s purpose was ―[t]o help a partner or principal to fund their 

capital or deposit retirement‖ and that when a person entered KPMG as a partner 

or principal, he or she was required to pay a certain amount into the capital 

account.

 

4An August 18, 2011 letter from the KPMG partner in charge stated that if 

Steven voluntarily withdrew in August 2011 from KPMG, his principal deposit 

balance of $715,000 would be applied to pay off the outstanding principal 

balance (which at the time was $714,400), and Steven would receive a $600 

payment in settlement of his deposit account balance.
7

E. Steven’s Expert

Steven’s expert Bryan Rice testified that one of the most important issues 

involving valuation in connection with a divorce was ―[u]nderstanding if there can 

be—if there is any goodwill associated with an interest in a professional practice; 

and if so, is the goodwill attributed to what we commonly call personal goodwill or 

whether it’s commercial goodwill.‖ Rice gave two definitions of goodwill: the 

excess of a business’s purchase price over the fair market value of its net assets 

and the present value of the economic benefits that accrue to a business interest 

or the owner of a business interest that is represented by returns on the business 

interest in excess of normal expectations. He also divided goodwill into separate 

categories: tangible value (patents, trademarks, copyrights, processes, location), 

commercial (the excess of value that someone would pay for the business 

without the seller signing a covenant not to compete), and personal (value that is 

attributable to the time, toil, talent, skills, efforts, and reputation of the owneremployee).

Rice testified that the value of Steven’s interest was $14,100, the value of 

the capital account less the loan against it, and in his report, he stated, ―I 

understand that the partnership interest and the income from it serves as 

collateral for the debt.‖ In his report, he also stated:

A multi-owner professional practice may possess commercial 

goodwill when the firm is marketed and operated as a collection of 

individuals as opposed to a group of individual practices and/or has 

reached a critical mass of employees, market reach, shared 

knowledge, and business infrastructure. Owners of such a practice 
8

often own small minority interests in the firm and the impact of the 

departure of one minority partner from such a firm is generally not 

devastating to the entirety of the firm.

In his report, Rice opined that corporate governance is an extremely important 

factor in the valuation of interests in professional practices such as the KPMG 

interest.

Rice said that in making his valuation determination, he focused on the 

Agreement and the offer letter that Steven signed when he rejoined KPMG, and 

he stated,

[T]he only way to obtain value for your partnership interest is to sell it 

back to the firm. If it’s a partnership interest; a member’s interest; a 

principal’s interest, you sell it back to the firm. You get the capital 

account, you pay off the debt[,] and that’s what you get.

Rice had reviewed Hill’s report and expressed that Hill’s report was 

erroneous because ―[h]e appraised what he concludes to be a minority interest, 

about one-tenth of one percent interest; but he did not apply or did not justify why 

he did not apply any discount for lack of control or discount for lack of 

marketability which, of course, are extremely standard.‖ He further stated that 

the essence of Hill’s valuation was to normalize Steven’s compensation but that 

based on his own education and experience, ―you do not make normalizing 

adjustments when you are appraising a minority interest because the owner of 

the minority interest has no power to enforce those types of normalizing 

adjustments.‖ Rice also criticized Hill’s report for failing to set forth a 
9

methodology and for overstating value by applying the typical 33% cost of capital 

applicable to post tax benefit streams to Steven’s pretax benefit stream.

Finally, Rice pointed out that Hill had not addressed the outstanding debt 

against the partnership interest and that Steven’s August 13, 2003 offer letter 

stated, 

Your continuation as a member of the partnership and payment of 

compensation as described above is conditioned upon your 

satisfactory performance. For this purpose, your performance will be 

deemed satisfactory if you meet mutually agreed upon goals. If you 

cease to be a member of KPMG, you will be entitled only to 

compensation that has been earned and accrued through the date 

you cease to be a member of the firm.

Rice stated that he interpreted this to mean that Steven’s performance is what 

drove his compensation.

Rice classified Steven’s compensation as ―his distributive share of the 

earnings of the firm, and most of that is reported as self-employment income 

which connotes effort in exchange for the earning of the compensation.‖ Rice 

acknowledged that another component of Steven’s compensation was 

―guaranteed payments which are also payments to a partner from—for services 

rendered. So it’s all—he does receive some interest on his drawing account or 

capital account, as we call it, but that’s minimal.‖ Rice said that Steven was paid 

for his services, not for simply owning an interest in the entity, that Steven’s 

performance ―is what drives his compensation,‖ and that based on his own 

compensation comparison and Steven’s responsibilities, he had concluded that 

Steven’s $1.5 million compensation was reasonable.
10

F. Closing Arguments

During closing arguments, Jessica argued that KPMG was a partnership, 

not a corporation, that fair market value was the proper valuation, and that 

Mandell v. Mandell, 310 S.W.3d 531 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied), 

Von Hohn v. Von Hohn, 260 S.W.3d 631 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2008, no pet.), and 

Keith v. Keith, 763 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1989, no writ), were the 

cases that applied to determine her share of the community property with regard 

to Steven’s partnership interest. Steven argued that Hill’s valuation report was 

incomplete and nonstandard; that the ―partnership interest‖ was really a set of 

contractual rights defined and limited by the Agreement; that those rights were 

not salable, transferable, or assignable; and that the amount in the capital 

account under the Agreement was $14,100.

G. Trial Court’s Rulings

The trial court found that ―the partnership has a value of $14,000,‖ and 

stated,

Now, a couple of points just defined on the partnership valuation 

issue. I don’t find that the contract controls. But what I do find is

that the value attributable is all due to professional good will. I didn’t 

see any commercial good will in this matter. Logic tells me there is 

some, but it’s probably impossible to quantify. And even if there 

was, his ability to access it under the Frank Finn[5]decision, he 

couldn’t except by being employed in the future. Such as if this firm 

were to liquidate at some point in the future, he might get some 

piece of the—of the value. I note in particular that the concurring 

opinion of Ann Stewart [in Finn] . . . . 

 

5

Finn v. Finn, 658 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
11

She specifically noted you had to value the going concern of 

the partnership and then determine—which there was none of that 

here today, and then you have to determine whether there were 

conditions to getting it.

In the hearing on Jessica’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court added 

that it did not find the methodology used by Jessica’s expert appropriate for 

determining fair market value. In its findings of fact, the trial court stated that it 

had divided the community estate by allocating ―approximately 50%‖ to each 

party.

III. Marital Property

A. Standard of Review

The trial court is charged with dividing the community estate in a ―just and 

right‖ manner, considering the rights of both parties. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 

§ 7.001 (West 2006); Watson v. Watson, 286 S.W.3d 519, 522 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth 2009, no pet.). It has broad discretion in making a just and right division, 

and absent a clear abuse of discretion, we will not disturb that division. Halleman 

v. Halleman, 379 S.W.3d 443, 452 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.).

B. Valuation Standard

Jessica argues in part that the trial court incorrectly relied on Mandell

instead of Keith to value the partnership interest because the Agreement 

addresses only when a member is leaving KPMG and does not purport to 

address the value of a member’s interest on divorce or any other situation in 

which the member remains at KPMG. Jessica also argues that Steven’s 
12

valuation expert did not correctly apply the valuation method he urged the trial 

court to adopt because it ignored goodwill.

In Mandell, we contrasted earlier property division cases—Von Hohn, 

Keith, and Finn, which were cases in which partnership agreements did not 

address what would happen to a partnership interest in the event of divorce—

with the valuation of a closely held corporation’s stock. 310 S.W.3d at 540. The 

corporation’s shareholder agreement contained a specific contractual provision 

addressing stock ownership and value in the event of a shareholder’s divorce 

and restrictions on who could own and purchase the stock as well as the price at 

which it could be sold. Id. While we agree that the older partnership-related

cases appear more similar to the matter at hand,

6 we also note that the trial court 

expressly stated that with regard to the partnership valuation issue, ―I don’t find 

that the contract controls.‖

Jessica contends that goodwill is the key factor in valuing Steven’s 

partnership interest and that the Agreement’s restrictions should not be the sole 

method of establishing the value of his KPMG interest. In terms of valuation, 

there is a distinction between the goodwill that attaches to a professional person 

because of confidence in that individual’s skill and ability and the commercial 

 

6We noted in Mandell that stock in a closely held corporation is not the 

same as an interest in an ongoing partnership and that increases in a 

partnership’s value that accrue during the marriage may be a community asset 

while increases in a corporation’s net worth generally are not an asset of the 

community estate of each of the corporation’s shareholders. 310 S.W.3d at 539–

40.
13

goodwill of a business that arises from its location, its well-established and wellrecognized name, or something that otherwise separates it ―from the skills or 

attributes of an individual member.‖ Salinas v. Rafati, 948 S.W.2d 286, 290–91 

(Tex. 1997).7 ―Good will that exists separate and apart from a professional’s 

personal skills, ability, and reputation is divisible upon divorce.‖ Keith, 763 

S.W.2d at 952.

To determine whether goodwill that is subject to division upon divorce 

attaches to a professional practice, first, goodwill must be determined to exist 

independently of the personal ability of the professional spouse, and then if such 

goodwill is found to exist, the court must determine whether that goodwill has a 

commercial value in which the community estate is entitled to share. Von Hohn, 

260 S.W.3d at 638; see also Finn, 658 S.W.2d at 741 (noting that it is ―[w]ithout 

question [that] the goodwill of a long established firm has commercial value‖).

Steven testified that KPMG had approximately 1,900 partners and 

principals. This is similar, on a much grander scale, to the firm in Finn, in which 

there were twenty senior partners, twenty-two junior partners, and forty-three 

 

7

The supreme court cited Geesbreght v. Geesbreght, 570 S.W.2d 427

(Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1978, writ dism’d), as such an example. Salinas, 

948 S.W.2d at 291. In Geesbreght, a doctor owned shares in a professional 

corporation that employed fifty to 100 other doctors on a part-time basis to satisfy 

the corporation’s contracts with hospitals—accruing commercial goodwill—in 

addition to the professional goodwill that he accrued by providing medical 

services himself. 570 S.W.2d at 435–36. We concluded that when the contract 

relative to the sale or transfer of the owner-doctor’s stock set its price at $50,000, 

the trial court abused its discretion by taking the stock’s ―book value‖ of $16,000. 

Id. at 436.
14

associates, and the firm itself, operating under the names of two founding 

partners no longer with the firm, had been providing legal services for over ninety 

years; the husband-lawyer had been practicing at the firm for around twenty-five 

years. 658 S.W.2d at 741 (noting that a large part of the firm’s reputation for 

providing services was built upon the professional abilities of the husband’s 

predecessors in the firm as well as the abilities of his present partners and 

professional employees). As here, the firm partnership agreement in Finn made 

no provision for compensating a senior partner for the firm’s goodwill in the event 

of his death or withdrawal. Id. at 740, 742.

In contrast to the instant case, however, while the Finn court noted that the 

evidence in the case indicated that the husband’s law firm had goodwill 

independent of his professional abilities, see id. at 741, the trial court here heard 

vague and conflicting evidence about the existence and availability of commercial 

goodwill with regard to Steven’s interest in the firm. Specifically, Jessica’s expert 

Hill testified that he did not make a distinction between personal and commercial 

goodwill in his valuation report. Steven’s expert Rice defined the different types 

of goodwill and acknowledged that commercial goodwill could exist in a multiowner professional practice but opined that corporate governance, i.e., the 

Agreement, was an ―extremely important‖ factor in valuing a minority interest.

Rice also stated that while Steven received ―some interest‖ on his capital account 

outside of his guaranteed payments for services rendered, it was minimal, and 

had to be offset against the outstanding debt for the partnership interest. Rice 
15

considered Steven’s $1.5 million in compensation as reasonable, in comparison 

to Hill’s testimony that $800,000 of Steven’s compensation could be attributed to 

the ownership interest because his reasonable compensation was $700,000. To 

the extent, however, that the trial court had sufficient evidence upon which to 

conclude that commercial goodwill existed in some form, we continue our 

analysis to determine whether the trial court’s division of the community’s interest 

was ―just and right.‖ See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7.001.

In analyzing whether the community estate was entitled to share in the 

value of the law firm’s commercial goodwill, the majority in the Finn opinion 

stated that the extent of the husband’s interest was governed by the partnership 

agreement. 658 S.W.2d at 741. The partnership agreement’s terms did not 

provide for any compensation for accrued goodwill to a partner who ceased to 

practice law with the firm or any mechanism for him to realize the value of the 

firm’s goodwill. Id. at 741–42. Instead, it provided only that if he died or 

withdrew, he (or his heir) was entitled only to the amount contained in his capital 

account, any earned income that had not been distributed, and his interest in the 

firm’s reserve account, less 10% of his proportionate share in the accounts 

receivable for clients’ disbursement. Id.

The majority concluded that the husband’s lack of any legal right to realize 

the value of the firm’s goodwill ―is a decisive factor,‖ making the case 

distinguishable from Geesbreght, ―wherein the corporate structure provided a 

mechanism which enabled Dr. Geesbreght to realize the value of accrued 
16

goodwill by enhancing the value of his stock.‖ Id. at 742. The husband in Finn

could only realize the value of accrued goodwill in the partnership by continuing 

to practice law as a member of the firm, ―a circumstance depending not only on 

his own individual capacity, but also on the uncontrolled discretion of his 

partners.‖ Id. The majority held that such realization in the future was ―no more 

than an expectancy entirely dependent on the husband’s continued participation 

in the firm, and therefore, [was] not property in the community estate.‖ Id.

(comparing husband’s position to the physician-spouse in Nail v. Nail, 486 

S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. 1972), in which the supreme court concluded that the 

goodwill that the medical practice might have accrued at the time of the divorce 

was not property in the parties’ estate).

However, in a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart disagreed that the value 

of the law firm’s goodwill should not be considered in evaluating the community’s 

partnership interest because the goodwill enhanced the value of the community 

partnership interest. Id. at 749 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart found 

Geesbreght more analogous than Nail because the goodwill did not belong to the 

individual partners, and she disagreed that the partnership agreement controlled 

the value of individual partnership interests because ―[t]he asset being divided is 

the husband’s interest in the partnership as a going business, not his contractual 

death benefits or withdrawal rights.‖ Id. She therefore concluded that while the 

formula in the partnership agreement might represent the present value of the 

husband’s interest, it should not preclude a consideration of other facts, including 
17

consideration of partnership goodwill, if any. Id. (noting that whether the law firm 

possessed goodwill, and if so, its value were fact questions for the trier of fact).

We have previously followed Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion. Keith, 

763 S.W.2d at 953 (citing 658 S.W.2d at 749 (Stewart, J., concurring)). In Keith, 

the partnership agreement provided a method for determining the value of the 

business in the event that it was terminated due to withdrawal, other act, or death 

of one of the partners. Id. We concluded that because the partnership was not 

being terminated, ―the formula set forth in the partnership agreement with respect 

to death or withdrawal of the partner is not necessarily determinative of the value 

of a spouse’s interest in the ongoing partnership as of the time of divorce.‖ Id.

(emphasis added); see also Von Hohn, 260 S.W.3d at 634, 640 (following Finn

concurrence in holding that husband’s law firm partnership agreement did not 

control value of individual partnership interests in divorce).

But while the Agreement is only a factor to consider in the present value of 

the partnership interest here, see Keith, 763 S.W.2d at 953; Finn, 658 S.W.2d at 

749 (Stewart, J., concurring), as noted by Justice Stewart, the questions of 

whether a business possesses goodwill and if so, what the value of that goodwill 

consists of, are fact questions for the trier of fact—in this case, the trial court. 

See Finn, 658 S.W.2d at 749 (Stewart, J., concurring). Based on the evidence 

presented to the trial court, if it determined that Jessica’s expert lacked credibility 

and chose to believe the testimony of Steven’s expert and the testimony of 

Morrison, the KPMG national director in charge of partner care, about the status 
18

of the partnership interest,8then it could have reasonably reached the conclusion 

that it did—that the partnership interest had the lower value testified about by 

Steven and his expert, and that commercial goodwill, if any, was presently 

inaccessible based on, among other things, the status of the loan that Steven 

had taken out to buy into the firm, but that it might have value someday, in the 

post divorce future.9Therefore, we overrule this portion of Jessica’s two issues.

Jessica further argues that by failing to account for the ―guaranteed 

compensation component‖ in the partnership agreement, the trial court 

incorrectly reduced the community estate by $336,985 and reduced her interest 

by $168,492, resulting in an unjust and unfair property division. However, as 

pointed out by Steven during oral argument and based on our review of the 

record, Jessica did not raise this argument in the trial court below. Therefore, it 

 

8

The divorce decree specifically awarded to Steven ―[a]ll interest he may

own in the partnership known as KPMG, LLP., including his capital account with 

KPMG, LLP.,‖ along with the loan against that capital account. [Emphasis 

added.]

9

The trial court also noted, and the record supports, that neither of the 

parties nor their witnesses testified about the value of the partnership itself as a 

going concern. In Von Hohn, the wife’s expert valued the husband’s interest in 

the firm using an income approach, including the firm’s commercial goodwill but 

excluding personal goodwill and future time, toil, and labor, and the jury valued 

the husband’s interest at $4.5 million. 260 S.W.3d at 641. The Tyler court

nonetheless reversed the portion of the divorce decree pertaining to the division 

of the marital estate because the jury’s goodwill finding included pending, future 

earnings post divorce, which were the husband’s separate property. Id. at 641–

43.
19

is unpreserved.10 See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Banda v. Garcia, 955 S.W.2d 270, 

272 (Tex. 1997). We overrule the remainder of her two issues.

IV. Conclusion

Having overruled both of Jessica’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

BOB MCCOY

JUSTICE

PANEL: DAUPHINOT, MCCOY, AND MEIER, JJ.

DELIVERED: January 9, 2014

 

10We also note that Steven’s expert Rice explained that Steven was paid 

for his services and that his compensation came in the ―form of his distributive 

share of the earnings of the firm,‖ most of which was reported as ―selfemployment income‖ and another component of which involved ―guaranteed 

payments which are payments to a partner from – for services rendered,‖ in the 

form of minimal interest on his capital account. The Agreement defined 

―guaranteed compensation‖ as ―a payment or payments made to a Member, 

without regard to the income of the Firm, for services rendered to the Firm.‖ 

[Emphasis added.]