UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

BRYAN R. HALL, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. Case No. 3:14-cv-2055 JVB 

 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Acting Commissioner of 

Social Security Administration, 

 

 Defendant. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 Plaintiff Bryan R. Hall seeks judicial review of the Acting Social Security 

Commissioner’s decision denying him disability insurance and supplemental income benefits, 

and asks this Court to remand the case. For the reasons below, the Court affirms the decision 

below.

A. Overview of the Case 

 Plaintiff is twenty-six years old. He alleges that he became disabled in October 2011, 

when he was almost twenty-two year old. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that 

Plaintiff had three severe impairments: major depressive disorder, agenesis of the corpus 

callosum, and urinary frequency. But while Plaintiff has suffered various psychiatric conditions 

since he was about six years old and the need for frequent urination since 2010, the ALJ found 

him able to perform several types of jobs in the regional economy.

 
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B. Standard of Review 

This Court has authority to review the Commissioner’s decision under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g). The Court must ensure that the ALJ has built an “accurate and logical bridge” from 

evidence to conclusion. Thomas v. Colvin, 745 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court will 

uphold decisions that apply the correct legal standard and are supported by substantial evidence. 

Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005). 

C. Disability Standard 

The Commissioner follows a five-step inquiry in evaluating claims for disability benefits 

under the Social Security Act:

(1) whether the claimant is currently employed; (2) whether the claimant has a 

severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment is one that the 

Commissioner considers conclusively disabling; (4) if the claimant does not have 

a conclusively disabling impairment, whether he can perform his past relevant 

work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the 

national economy.

Kastner v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 642, 646 (7th Cir. 2012).

 The claimant bears the burden of proof at every step except step five. Clifford v. Apfel, 

227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000).

D. Analysis 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed two errors: (1) he failed to give the appropriate 

weight to the opinion of Dr. Gary Elliott, Plaintiff’s neuropsychologist who had been treating 

him for five years; and (2) he didn’t support his credibility findings by the evidence in the case. 

 (1) The ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Elliott’s opinion is supported by substantial evidence
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 Plaintiff claims that the ALJ ignored the evidence from Dr. Elliott. Plaintiff focuses on 

the fact that, after examining him in 2011, Dr. Elliot stated in his notes that Plaintiff’s 

psychological status was such as to “essentially preclude his ability to live independently or to 

secure/maintain gainful employment for the time being.” According to Dr. Elliott, only little had 

changed two years later. The ALJ discounted this opinion “because, pursuant to SSR 96-5p, the 

ultimate issue of disability is one that is reserved solely to the Commissioner and, thus, cannot be 

determined by the claimant’s physician, regardless of the treating relationship . . ..” (Decision, 

DE 10 at 21.) 

 The Court agrees that this assertion from the ALJ is odd. After all, that a doctor’s opinion 

wades into the realm of legal findings is not a sufficient basis to discount it. If a doctor believes 

that a patient is unable to live by himself or be employed, such opinion may be important 

because the doctor’s opinion expresses the limits of the patient’s health. But the ALJ did not 

discount Dr. Elliott’s opinion just because he expressed what could be considered a legal 

determination. Rather, other than Dr. Elliott’s extreme restriction, no other treating or examining 

physician found Plaintiff to be so incapacitated. Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, Dr. 

Hinchman’s and Dr. Rohrer’s findings are inconsistent with Dr. Elliott’s. Dr. Hinchman’s notes 

show that Plaintiff had consistently showed stable thought content, fair-to-good memory and 

concentration, no suicidal or homicidal ideations, and a GAF score in 50s and 60s.1

 (Tr. 352, 

382—423.) Similarly, Dr. Rohrer found that Plaintiff had no gross or fine motor difficulties, had 

adequate eye contact, appropriate response, normal thought processes, normal thought content, 

and intact recent and remote memory. (Tr. 372—73.) Plaintiff also smiled and demonstrated 

 

1

 A GAF score of in the 51—60 range indicates some moderate symptoms or moderate difficulty in social, 

occupational, or school functioning. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) 32—35 

(4th ed. 2000). 
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appropriate humor. Id. He had four or five friends with whom he attended social events and had 

just broken up with a girlfriend. Moreover, although Plaintiff contends that he lost his job due to 

behavioral issues, the record shows that he quit his last job because his hours were reduced. (Tr. 

97—98, 371.) 

 Likewise, Dr. Elliott’s findings are contradicted by Dr. Timothy Onkka and Dr. Bradford 

Eaton. Both doctors found Plaintiff to be suffering only moderate symptoms or limitations. 

Similar to Dr. Hinchman, Dr. Eaton assessed a GAF score of 55. Dr. Amy Johnson, who is a 

state agency physician, also found Plaintiff’s condition to be in line with the opinions of these 

doctors. Dr. Alan Wax’s findings likewise contradicted Dr. Elliott’s and more so than the 

findings of all other doctors, but the ALJ found that Plaintiff was more limited than Dr. Wax 

thought. Hence, the record contains substantial evidence that supports the ALJ’s findings 

regarding Plaintiff’s mental condition. 

 The ALJ’s findings are appropriate as to polyuria as well. The medical evidence showed 

that Plaintiff’s treatment regarding this condition was conservative, that Plaintiff’s need to use 

the bathroom, while frequent, was not so excessive as to prevent him from working, and, in any 

case, the ALJ accounted for Plaintiff’s condition in the RFC by providing that he work only 

where he has ready access to a restroom. 

(2) The ALJ’s credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence 

 The ALJ’s credibility determinations are entitled to deference because the ALJ is “in a 

special position to hear, see, and assess witnesses.” Murphy v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 815 (7th 

Cir. 2014). Thus, a credibility determination will be upheld as long as it is explained in a way 

that allows the court to determine that the ALJ logically based the determination on specific 

findings and record evidence. Id. at 816. 
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 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not explain his credibility assessment beyond the often 

used boilerplate. Yet, this argument fails because the ALJ considered the subjective statements 

from Plaintiff and his mother in light of objective evidence in the record. The ALJ found that the 

objective evidence contradicted Plaintiff’s disability claims. He also noted that Plaintiff carried 

himself adequately at the hearing and understood all his questions. The Court is not convinced 

that the ALJ improperly assessed Plaintiff’s credibility.

E. Conclusion 

For these reasons the Court affirms the decision of the Acting Commissioner.

SO ORDERED on March 30, 2016.

 S/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

 JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE