### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE Fe br ua ry 15, 200 5 S es sio n

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. JOSEP H WILSON

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Robertson County

No. 02-0331 M ichael R. Jones, Judge

No. M2003- 02151-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Jun e 16, 2005

De fe nd a nt w a s in dic te d fo r e va din g arr e st, a Cla ss E fe lon y , in c ou nt on e ; fo r c arj a c kin g , a Cla ss B felony , in count two; for re ckless enda ng erme nt of Off icer Billy Moy er, a Class E felony , in count three ; for re ckless enda ng erme nt of Offic er J oe MacL eod, a Class E f elony , in count four; for

driving

on a ca ncele d, suspended or revoke d license, subsequent offe nse, a Class A misdemeanor, in c ount five; and r esisting a

rre st, a Class B misdemea nor, in count six . Following a jury trial, Def endant wa s found g uiltyof Class E felony evading arr est, car

jacking
, rec kless endang erme nt of Offic er Moy er,
a nddr ivi ng on a

re vo ke d li c e ns e in c ou nts on e , tw o, thr e e a ndfi ve . D e fe nd a nt w a s f ou ndno t g uil ty of re ckless enda ng erme nt of Offic er MacL eod and resisting arr est in c ounts f our and six

. The trial

c ou rt se nte nc e d D e fe nd a nt as a Ra ng e I I , mult ipl e of fe nd e r, to t wo y e ars fo r the fe lon y e va din g arr e st conviction, twelve y ear s for the c arja cking conviction, two y ear s for the r ec k less endang erme nt conviction, and e leven months, twenty -nine da y s for th e d ri v i ng on a re voked license conviction. The trial c ourt order ed De fenda nt to serve his sentenc es conc urre ntly for a n eff

ecti v e s en t ence of tw e lve y e ars . O n a

pp e a l, D e fe nd a nt a

rg ue s th a t th e e vid e nc e wa s in su ff ic ie nt t o s up po rt

his convictions for c arja cking and re ckless endang erme nt, and that the trial c ourt err ed in not inst ructing t h e j u ry on robbery and theft of property as lesser included offe nses of car jacking

. Followin g a tho ro ug h r e vie w o f the re c or d, we a ff ir m th e jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Circ uit Court Aff

irm ed

T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in whi ch G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., and D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., joined.

Merrily n Fe irman, Na shville, Tennessee (on appe al); and A na Escoba r, Na shville, Tennessee (at trial), for the appe llant, J oseph Wilson.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral and Reporter ; Preston Shipp, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; John W es l ey C arney , J r., District Attorney Gene ral; and D ent Morriss, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, the State of Tenne ssee.-2- OP IN ION

I. Bac kgr ound

At the time of the o f

f e n ses, Off icer Billy Moy er w ith the Springfie ld Poli ce D epartment knew that a wa rra nt for De fenda n t ’s ar

rest wa s outstanding. He had information that Defe ndant was stay ing in a

trailer pa

rk on C hildress Street. Ar ound midnight on J uly 1, 2002, Offic er Moy er spotted a vehic le matching the desc ription of Def endant’ s car parke d in front of one of the tra ilers in the trailer pa

rk. A man w as sitting on the hood of the car

. Offic er Moy er approa ched the man on foot. Ther e we re a

pproxi matel y t we nty -five to thirty people outside that e vening , and one of the by standers y elled, “Police.” The man jumped into his red car and drove off be fore Offic er Moy er could positively

identify him as Defe ndant. Off

icer Moy er r adioed f

or assistance and drove in the opposite direction of the red c ar. H e interc epted the c ar on Cent ra l Av enue, identified Def endant as the drive r, and a ctivated his eme rg ency equipment. Off

icer J oe Mac L eod ca

ug ht up with Office r Mo y e r’ s a ndDe fe nd a nt’ s v e hic le s a t th is p oin t.

At trial, Off

icer s Moy er a nd MacL eod described the ensuing chase as follows. Afte r Off icer Moy er turne d on his blue lights, Def endant turned onto Childress Street at a high r ate of

speed, r an a stop sign, a nd drove ba ck to t he tra iler par k. Def endant dr ove over

a cur b and into a cr owd of pe op le wh o ha d g a the re d in re sp on se to the po lic e sir e ns . D e fe nd a nt d ro ve in b e tw e e n tw o tr a ile rs , jumped out of the moving vehicle, a nd fled on foot. Of fice r Moy er le ft his patrol ca r and pur sued Def endant on f

oot. He eve ntually

drew close e noug h t o De fenda nt to tackle him, but Defe ndant eluded his g rip.

Offic er Ma cL eod, acc ompanied by a police dog on a lea sh, caug ht up with Office r Moy er a nd Def endant. Of

fice r Mac L eod told Def

endant three times to g et on the g round bec ause he was unde r
arr e st. De fe nd a nt tur ne d to ru n, a ndOffi c e r M a c L e odre le a se d th e do g ’s le a sh . T he do g bit De fe nd a nt o n th e arm , a ndDe fe nd a nt f e ll d ow n. Ab ou t se ve nty -five pe op le ha d g a the re d b y thi s time. Someone in the crowd ran over and hit the dog wit h a trash can. The dog re lease d Def endant’ s arm, and Def

endant ran back into the trailer park toward the parking space s in f ront of lots four and five.

Tw o c ars we re pa rk e d in fr on t of the tr a ile rs , o ne of wh ic h w a s a

bla c k Po nti a c Gr a ndAm

. Redrickous [sic] Burr wa s sitti ng in the car listening to music. Off icer Moy er sa id that Defe ndant enter ed the Pontiac f

rom the passe ng er side, wh i le Off icer MacL eod said that De fenda nt entere d throug h the driver’ s side. Offic er MacL eod said that Mr. B urr’ s ey es “w ere wide open,” and he w as “fr antic” a nd “sca

red.” Mr. B urr sa id, “g et him out of my car , J oe Mac k.”

Def endant sque ezed into the driver’ s seat underneath Mr. Bur r and pushe d Mr. B urr towa rd the driver ’s side door which was open. Offic er Ma cL eod appr oache d the Pontiac and unlea shed the police dog ag a in

. T h e p o li c e d o g b it D e f e n d a n t o n th e ar m. O f

f ic e r M o y e r w a s s ta n d in g b y

the Pontiac’s front bumper . Def endant started the Pontiac and beg an to drive of f with both the driver ’s side door and the passeng er door open. The Pontiac pinned Off icer Moy er a g ai n s t t he ca

r par ked-3-

in the next spac e, and the passeng er door brushe d ag ainst him as Defe ndant pulled out of the pa rking space

. The poli ce dog was st ill holdi ng on to Defe ndant’s arm when the c ar be g an to move. Of fice r Moy er dr ew his g un but did not shoot beca use Mr. B urr was on top of Def endant. Mr. B urr c raw led

ou t of th e c ar f

ro m th e pa sse ng e r s ide . O ff ic e r M oy e r y e lle d a

c omm a ndto the do g to r e le a se its hold, and the dog fell aw ay from the Pontiac.

Offic ers Moy er an d MacL eod re turned to their patrol car s and pursue d Def endant down Richard Stree t and then Elm wood S tree t wher e De fenda nt wrec ked the Pontiac. De fenda nt fled once

a g a in o n f

oo t, and Of

fi c e r M a c L e odun le a sh e d th e po lic e do g . T he po lic e do g la tc he d o nto Def endant’ s arm and br oug ht him to the ground. The office rs wer e able to handcuf f De fenda nt at thi s p oin t.

On cr oss-examination, Office r Moy er sa id that he did not see a wea pon on Def

endant during the cha se. He ag ree d that the Pontiac’s open car door did not hit him hard e noug h to cause the door to close. Off

icer Moy er sa id that he did not seek medic al treatment after the cha se wa s over. Of

fice r Mo y e r c on c e de d th a t he didno t a c tua lly se e De fe nd a nt s ta

rt the Pon tia c bu t a ssu me d h e did so beca use Mr. B urr wa s holding up both of his arms when the c ar started.

Mr. B urr testified that he was sitting in his mother’ s Ponti ac lis t en i n g t o m usic when De fe nd a nt c a me up to his c ar. Mr

. B ur r sa id that he ha d he ard of De fe nd a nt bu t did no t pe rs on a lly know him. The key

was in the ig nition because Mr. B urr ha d turned on the car ’s elec trical sy stem

s o th a t h e c o u ld o p e r a te th e CD p lay e r

. M r

. B u rr s a id D e f e n d a n t g o t in to th e Po n ti a c throug h the driver’ s side, and Mr. B urr g o t out of the ca r on the pa sseng er side. Mr . Bur r said that De fenda nt started the c ar.

On cr oss-examination, Mr. Burr said that he was not pushe d out of the ca r but rathe r exited “on his own fr ee w ill.” Mr. Bur r said that he did not see the police dog bite Def endant. He said that he wa s no t sc are d of the po lic e do g a nd jus t ho pe d tha t the do g didno t bi te him

du ri ng the inc ide nt. Mr. Burr denied that he was scar ed of D efe ndant, denied that he said anything to Of fice r Mac L eod, and denie d that there was a nother c ar pa rked ne x t to the Ponti ac.

On r ed i re ct , M r. Bur

r denie d that he told the prosec utor befor e trial that someone had put “pre ssure” on him about his testim ony , and he de nied that he talked about the ca se with any one. Mr. Bur r said that he did not know Of fice r Mac L eod.

The de fense offe red two w itnesses who had be en part of the cr owd at the c rime sce ne. Br andon Northington said that he was standing on the corner of Childress Street and Centra l Street when De fenda nt stopped his red ca r and be g an running

. Mr. Northing ton sa id the police dog was
ve ry a g g re ssi ve , a nd he sa w De fe nd a nt fi g ht wi th the do g

. Mr

. No rthin g ton sa id that De fe nd a nt d id not pull Mr. Burr

out of the Pontiac. He said that Def endant walked up to the Pontiac’s driver ’s side, and Mr. B urr g ot out of t he car from the passenge r side. Mr. Northington said that the of fice rs wer e
n o ts t a n d i n g c l o s e t o t h e P o n t i a c w h e n D e f e n d a n td r o v e a w a y.-4-

On cr oss-examination, Mr. Northing ton e stimated that he was standing about six ty fee t away from the Pontiac. He admitted that he knew Mr. B urr, but denie d, on redire ct examination, that he and Mr. B urr ha d discussed Mr. Northington’s testimony prior to trial

Clark Moffe tt said he was standing acr oss the street whe n Def endant dr ove off in the Pontiac. He sa id tha t De fe nd a nt wa s ru nn ing to g e t a way fr om the po lic e do g . M r. Mo ff e tt s a id tha t he did

n o ts ee t h e P o n t i ac ’s ca r d o o r s t ri k e Of fi ce r Mo y er , an d h e di d n o ts ee t h e c ard ra g t h e p o l i ce d o g.

II. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence

Def endant c halleng es the suff iciency of the e vidence support i n g his convictions for

car ja c k in g a n d r e c k le s s e n d a n g e r me n t. Wh e n a d e f e n d a n t c h a ll e n g e s th e s u f f ic ie n c y o f the

c on vic tin g e vid e nc e , w e mus t r e vie w the e vid e nc e in a lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to the pr os e c uti on in de te rm ini ng wh e the r a

ratio na l trie r o f fa c t cou ld h a ve fo un d a ll the e sse nti a l e le me nts of the c ri me bey ond a re asonable doubt. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct . 2781, 2789, 61 L . Ed. 2d 560 (1979). Onc e a jury finds a def endant g uilty , his or her pr esumption of innocenc e is remove d and re place d with a pre sumption of guilt. State v. Black , 815 S.W .2d 166, 175 (Tenn. 1991)

. The de fe nd a nt ha s the bu rd e n of ov e rc omi ng thi s pr e su mpt ion , a ndthe Sta te is e nti tle d to the str on g e st leg itimate view of the e vidence along with all rea sonable infe renc es which ma y be dra wn from that evidenc e. Id

.; Sta te v . Tu gg le , 639 S.W .2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1 9 8 2 ). The jury is presumed to have resolved all conflicts and dr awn a ny rea sonable infe renc es in favor of the State. State v. Sheffield, 676 S.W .2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984) . Questions concer n i n g t he cr edibilityof witnesses, the w eig ht and value to be g iven the evidenc e, and all fac tual issues raised by the evidenc e are resolved by the trier of fac t and not this court. State v. Bland
, 958 S.W .2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997) . These r ules are applicable to findings of g uilt predicate d upon direc t evidence , ci rc u m s t an tial evidence , or a combination of both direc t and circ umstantial evidence

. Sta te v . M att he ws , 805 S.W .2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)

. A. Carjac king Conviction

Def endant wa s convicted of

the offe nse of c arja cking which is define d as “the intentional or knowing taking of a motor vehicle from t he possession of another by use of: (1) [a] deadly wea pon; or (2) [f] orce or intimidation.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-404( a). D efe ndant does not dispute that he intentionally

took Mr. Bur

r’s c ar f rom his possession, and neither pa rty contends that Defenda nt

wa s a rm e d d ur ing the inc ide nt. De fe nd a nt a rg ue s, ho we ve r, that th e evi den ce d oe s n ot s up po rt a finding that h e used for ce or intimi dation to take Mr. B urr’ s car . Def endant a rg ues that Mr. B urr te sti fi e d th a t he g ot o ut o f h is c ar “o n [his] own fr e e wi ll, ” a nd that he wa s not s c are d o f D e fe nd a nt. Mr. B urr said that he was just try ing to g et out of t he way

. The State, on the othe r hand, a rg ues that Offic er Moy er te stified that Mr. B urr a ppear ed to be “ exci t ed” a nd “upset.” Offic er Ma cL eod described Mr. Burr as “fr antic” a nd “sca red.” Both off

icer s said that Def

endant slid under Mr . Bur r until Mr. Burr was “ sitti ng ” in Def endant’ s lap, and that Mr. B urr wa s pushed up ag ainst the driver ’s side door as the police dog lunge d at Def endant throug h the open door . Offic er Moy er said that Mr. Bur r mana g ed to g et out of the c ar by cra wling out of

the passeng er side door

.-5-

The de termination of whe ther De fenda nt used force or intimi dation to steal Mr. B urr’ s car
r e s t e d w i t h t h e j u r y’ s a s s e s s m e n to f t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f

t h e w i t n e s s e s

. B a s e d o n i t s v e r d i c to f g u i l t y, the jury obviously acc redited the testimony of Off icer s Moy er a nd MacL eod that De fenda nt force d his way in to M r

. B u rr ’ s c ar , th a t M r

. B u rr w a s in th e f r o n t s e a t o f th e c ar w h il e th e p o li c e dog attacke d Def

endant, an d that Mr. B urr e scape d from the c ar by cra wling out of

the passeng er side door. We conc lude that the evide nce w as suffic ient for a rational trier

of fa ct t o conclude bey ond

a re asonable doubt that Defe ndant committed the offe nse of c arja cking by forc e and intimidation. Def endant is not entitled to relief on this iss ue.

B. Rec kless Endang erme nt

De fe nd a n tar g u e s t h a tt h e e v i d e n c e w a s i n s u f f i c i e n tt o s u p p o r th i s c o n v i c t i o n o f r e c k l e ss endang erme nt because there was no proof that he knew that Offic er Moy er w as any wher e nea r the Pontiac when De fenda nt drove the c ar away

. I n other wor ds, Defe ndant contends tha t there w as no evidenc e that he c onsciously disreg arde d a substantial risk of injury to others by

his driving.

“A pe rson commits an offe nse who re cklessly eng ag es in conduc t w hich place s or may place another person in imminent dang er of death or bodily injury .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 1 0 3(a)

. “‘Rec kless’ re fer s to a person w ho acts recklessly with respec t to circumstance s surrounding the

c on du c t or

the re su lt o f the c on du c t w he n th e pe rs on is a wa re of bu t c on sc iou sl ydis re g ard s a
su bs ta nti a l a nd un

jus tif ia ble ri sk that the c ir c ums ta nc e s e xist or the re su lt wi ll oc c ur

. Th e ri sk mus t be of suc h a natur e and deg ree that its disreg ard constitutes a gross deviation from the standar d of

car e that an or dinary

person would exercise under all the circ umstances a s viewed f rom the ac cused person’ s standpoint.” Id . § 39-11-106( 31).
We find that the proof, taken in a lig ht m o s t fa vorable to the State, supports a finding that De fe nd a nt wa s a wa

re of the ri sk c re a te d by his dr ivi ng a nd c on sc iou sly dis re g ard e d it. As the Sta te arg ues, the c hase ha d been going on for some time when De fenda nt appropriated Mr. B urr’ s vehicle. Offic er Moy er ha d pursued De fenda nt in his patrol car, and then on foot afte r De fenda nt abandone d the re d car . The police dog had attac ked De fenda nt once a nd was ag ain hol ding on to De fenda nt’s arm with his teeth. Of

fice r Moy er te stified that Offic er MacL eod was standing by the open driver’s side door with the police dog

. Offic er Moy er was s tanding by the P ontiac’s front fende r nex t to a another car parke d next t o the P o n t i ac

. When Defe ndant beg an to drive of f, Off icer Moy er w as pinned betwe en the Pontiac a nd the par ked ca r. Offic er Moy er sa id he was a fra id his legs we re g oing to be cr ushed. The Pontiac’ s open ca r door br ushed ag ainst Offic er Moy er a s Defe ndant drove out of the pa rking space . Ba sed on our r eview of the rec ord, we find the evidenc e sufficie nt to support De fe nd a nt’ s c on vic tio n o f r e c kle ss e nd a ng e rm e nt.

III. Lesser Included O ff enses

At the conc lusion of the proof, the trial court instruct ed the jury on the offe nse of unauthorized use of a n automobile as t h e o n l y lesser inc luded offe nse of the c harg ed off ense of

car jacking . Rely ing on Sta te v

. Kerr y L . Do well
, N o

. M 2 0 0 2

- 0 0 6 3 0

- CC A

- R3

- CD
, 2 0 0 3 WL-6-

21486978 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, J une 27, 2003) perm. to appeal de nied (Tenn. N ov. 24, 2003), De fenda nt arg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in fa iling to instruct the jury on the offe nses of robbery and thef t of property

as lesser included off

enses of car jacking

.

I n Do we ll
, a pa ne l of thi s Co urt he ld w ith ou t a na ly sis that “ bo th r ob be ry a ndthe ft of pr op e rt y
are lesser inc luded offe nses u n d er b oth (a) a nd (b) of the Burns analy sis.” Do we ll
, 2 0 0 3 WL 21486978, at *15. I n Burns , our S u p re m e Court concluded that an offe nse is a lesser included offe nse if:

(a) all of its statutory el em ents are included within the statutory elements of the offe nse cha

rg ed; or (b) it fai ls to m e e t th e de fi nit ion in p art (a ) o nly in the re sp e c t th a t it

c on ta ins a statutory element or

elements e stablishing (1) a differ ent mental state indicating a lesser kind of c ulpability ; and/or (2 ) a le ss s e ri ou s h arm or ri sk

of ha rm to the sa me pe rs on , p ro pe rt y or pu bli c interest. . . .

State v. Burns , 6 S.W .3d 453, 466-67 (Te nn. 1999). B y definition, then, a spec ifically define d lesser offe nse ca nnot be a lesse r off ense of a spec ifically

define d g reater off

ense unde r bo th part (a ) and (b) of the Burns analy sis. We observe, how ever , that offe nses containing alternative elements, such

a s a g g ra va te d ass a ult , for e xamp le , may ha ve on e fo rm of a ssa ult qu a lif y a s a le sse r i nc lud e d o ff

e ns e under pa rt (a) , and another form of assault qualify under pa rt (b). Eve n under this sce nario, howe ver, the lesser included offe nse must fall into either the “( a)” cate g ory , or the “ (b)” cate g ory , but not both.

I n c ou nt t wo of

the ind ic tme nt, De fe nd a nt w a s c ha rg e d w ith c arj a c kin g , w hic h is un la wf ull y taking a motor vehic le from the posse ssion of an o t h er , to wit: Mr. Burr , by forc e or intimidation. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-404. Robbery is defined a s (1) the intentional or know ing, ( 2) theft of property , (3) from the person of another, (4) by violence or putting the pe rson in fea r. Id

. § 39-13- 401(a) . Theft is def

ined as (1) knowing ly

obtaining or exercising control over property , (2) without the owner ’s eff

ective consent, and (3) with the intent to deprive the owner of the prope rty

. Id . § 39- 14-103.

Theft is cle arly a lesser included offense of robbery under part (a) of the Bu rn s analy sis. See State v. Bo wles , 5 2 S. W.3 d 6 9, 79 -8 0 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) ; Sta te v . Le wis , 36 S.W .3d 88, 99-100 (Te nn. Crim. App. 2000). That is, all of the statutory elements of the ft are included within the statutory elements of r obbery

. See B urns , 6 S.W. 3d a t 466. I t is the us e of vio le nc e or pu tti ng the pe rs on in fea r that ele vates a

theft to a robbe ry

. Bowles , 52 S.W .3d at 8 0

. On e cannot, then, c ommit t he offe nse of robbery without also committing t he offense of theft. See State v . Allen , 69 S.W .3d 181, 1 8 8 (T en n

. 2 0 0 2 ) ( ci t i n g Bowles , 52 S.W .3d at 80).

An “owne r” is “a

person, other

than the def

endant, who ha s possession of . . . property

. . . and without whose c onsent the defendant has no authority to exert control over the property .” Te nn. Cod e An n. § 3 9- 11 -1 06 (2 6)

. Th us , the statut ory e le me nt of takin g “ fr om the pe rs on of a no the r” is included within both a ca rjac king of

fense and a r obbery

offe nse.-7-

On the other

hand, to “de prive,” as used in the de finition of a theft off ense, me an s to “(A) withh oldpr op e rt y

fr om the ow ne r p e rm a ne ntl y or fo r s uc h a

pe ri odof

tim e a s to su bs ta nti a lly dim ini sh the va lue or

e njo y me nt o f the pr op e rt y to the ow ne r; (B ) withh old pr op e rt y or c a us e it t o be withheld for

the purpose of

restoring it onlyupon pay ment of a r ewa rd or other

compensat i o n;
or (C ) d isp os e of

pr op e rt y or us e it or tr a ns fe r any int e re st i n it

un de r c ir c ums ta nc e s th a t ma ke its restoration unlikely .” Id . § 39-11-106( 8). A c arja cking offe nse does not re quire proof that the def e n d a n t t o o k

th e v e h ic le w ith th e in te n t t o “ d e p r iv e th e o w n e r o f th e p r o p e r ty ;” it

o n ly r e q u ir es proof that the de fenda nt took property “fr om the possession of another .” Com pa re Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-103 with § 39-13-404( a). The offe nse of thef t, th er ef o re , h as a statutory

element not included withi n the s tatutory elements of the offe nse of c arja cking . Thus, theft ca nnot be a Burns (a ) l e sse r i nc lud e d o ff

e ns e of c arj a c kin g

. B e c a us e ro bb e ry inc lud e s a ll o f the e le me nts of the ft wi thi n its statutoryelements, the of fense of robbe ry

is also not a lesser included offe nse of ca rjac king unde r part (a ) of the Burns analy sis.

I n order to be consider ed a Burns part (b) lesser inc luded offe nse, the a dditi onal statutory element must either “ establish a diffe rent menta l state indicating a les s er k i n d of culpa bility ” or “esta blish a less serious harm or risk of harm to the person, prope rty or public intere st.” Burns , 6 S.W .3d at 467. The statutoril y define d element, “with intent to deprive the owner of property ,” does
not ref lect a le sser kind of c ulpabili t y t h an “t ak i ng a vehic le from the posse ssion of another,” reg ardle ss of whethe r or not the two statutory el em en ts repre sent “diff

ere nt mental state[s] .” Nor

can w e conc lude that the s t at u t o ryelement, “ with the intent to deprive the ow ner of property ,” establishes “a

less serious harm or risk of harm” t o the s ame property (in this case a motor vehicle) than simplytaking possession of the vehicle from another

. The offe nses of robbery and theft ar e thus not lesser include d offe nses of c arja cking under pa rt (b) of the Burns a na ly sis

.
There fore , while it is abundantly clea r that theft of a vehicle is a much less serious crime tha n
c ar ja c k in g , th is d o e s n o t m ak e it a le s s e r in c lu d e d o f

f e n s e o f c ar ja c k in g u n d e r

the B u rns a na ly sis

. Since theft is an integ ral e lement of robbe ry , and robbe ry has bee n define d as an e levated f orm of theft, then robbe ry i s al s o n ot a lesser included off

ense of car jacking as def

ined in Bu rn s. See Bowles , 52 S.W .3d at 80.

Acc ording ly , we f

ind that the trial court did not er r in not char g ing theft and robbery as lesser included offe nses of car jacking

. As a result, we need not a ddress the State’s arg ument t hat Def endant ha s waived this i ssue on appea l under Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 40-18-110( c). Def endant is not entitled to relief on this iss ue.

CO NC LU SION

Af te r a tho ro ug h r e vie w o f the re c or d, we a ff ir m th e jud g me nts of

thetr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODAL

L , J UDGE