FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JUAN CASTILLO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE 

COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 19-56093

D.C. No.

2:18-cv-09067-

FMO-JEM

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Fernando M. Olguin, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted July 7, 2020

Pasadena, California

Filed August 17, 2020

Before: Richard A. Paez and Bridget S. Bade, Circuit 

Judges, and Jack Zouhary,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Bade

* The Honorable Jack Zouhary, United States District Judge for the 

Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
2 CASTILLO V. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

SUMMARY**

Employee Retirement Income Security Act

Affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action 

under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, the 

panel held that 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) does not authorize an 

award of attorney’s fees incurred during the administrative 

phase of the ERISA claims process.

In administrative proceedings, plaintiff filed a successful 

appeal from defendant’s reduction of his long-term disability 

benefits to account for his rollover of his pension benefits 

into an individual retirement account. Plaintiff subsequently 

filed a civil action under § 1132(a)(3), alleging that 

defendant, the administrator of the ERISA plan, breached its 

fiduciary duties of prudence and loyalty by delaying its 

determination of the effect of plaintiff’s rollover of his 

pension benefits and failing to inform him that it was 

considering an offset based on the rollover. Plaintiff sought 

an order surcharging defendant for his losses, measured by 

the amount of attorney’s fees he was forced to incur to get 

defendant to reverse the reduction of his disability benefits.

The panel held that the attorney’s fees incurred in an 

administrative proceeding did not constitute “appropriate 

equitable relief” under § 1132(a)(3). The panel reasoned 

that allowing an award of such fees would contravene this 

court’s decision in Cann v. Carpenters’ Pension Trust Fund 

for Northern California, 989 F.3d 313 (9th Cir. 1993), which 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
CASTILLO V. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. 3

held that such awards would undermine ERISA’s purpose of 

ensuring plan soundness and stability. The panel noted, 

moreover, that ERISA’s express fee-shifting provision, 29 

U.S.C. § 1132(g), authorizes an award of attorney’s fees 

incurred in a civil action but is silent as to fees incurred in an 

administrative proceeding. Under the expressio unius

canon, this silence gives rise to the inference that 

§ 1132(a)(3) does not authorize such fees.

COUNSEL

Elizabeth Hopkins (argued), Kantor & Kantor LLP,

Northridge, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Misty A. Murray (argued), Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Los 

Angeles, California, for Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

BADE, Circuit Judge:

This appeal requires us to decide whether § 502(a)(3) of 

the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 

(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), authorizes an award of 

attorney’s fees incurred during the administrative phase of 

the ERISA claims process. We hold that § 1132(a)(3) does 

not authorize an award of such fees and therefore affirm the 

judgment of the district court.

I

Plaintiff Juan Castillo was a participant in an employee 

benefit group welfare plan governed by ERISA, 
4 CASTILLO V. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

administered by Defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance 

Company (MetLife), and sponsored by his employer, 

Verizon Communications (Verizon). In 2013, after he 

became disabled, Castillo began collecting long-term 

disability (LTD) benefits under the plan, retired from 

Verizon, and rolled his pension benefits into an individual 

retirement account (IRA).

Four years later, in December 2017, MetLife informed 

Castillo it would reduce his LTD benefits, effective 

November 1, 2013, to account for the pension rollover. 

MetLife withheld future benefits and sought to recover over 

$50,000 in benefits paid between 2013 and 2017. Castillo 

retained counsel and appealed MetLife’s decision 

administratively. In July 2018, MetLife reversed its 

determination, resumed LTD payments, and paid Castillo 

over $8,500 in withheld benefits.

Castillo subsequently filed this civil action under 

§ 1132(a)(3). He alleged MetLife breached its fiduciary 

duties of prudence and loyalty by, among other things, 

“repeatedly failing, for nearly four years after learning that 

Mr. Castillo rolled over his pensions into an IRA, to 

determine the effect of this rollover on Mr. Castillo’s LTD 

benefits,” and “never informing Mr. Castillo during that 

period that it was considering an offset based on the pension 

rollover, and therefore that it might require him to repay a 

great portion of the benefits he received over that period.” 

The complaint sought “[a]n order surcharging MetLife for 

the losses sustained by Mr. Castillo, . . . measured by the 

amount of attorney’s fees that he was forced to incur to get 

MetLife to reverse its arbitrary and unsupported reduction of 

his LTD benefits and demand for repayment.”

MetLife moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it 

failed to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty and, in the 
CASTILLO V. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. 5

alternative, that Castillo was not seeking “appropriate 

equitable relief” under § 1132(a)(3). The district court 

granted the motion to dismiss, rejecting MetLife’s first 

argument but agreeing with MetLife that “attorney’s fee 

awards are not ‘other appropriate equitable relief’” under 

§ 1132(a)(3). Castillo timely appealed.

II

“We review de novo the district court’s decision to grant 

a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, as well as its 

interpretation of ERISA.” Bassiri v. Xerox Corp., 463 F.3d 

927, 929 (9th Cir. 2006).

III

To determine whether attorney’s fees incurred by an 

ERISA plan participant or beneficiary in an administrative 

appeal are recoverable as “appropriate equitable relief” 

under § 1132(a)(3), we first consider the statutory structure. 

As relevant here, ERISA provides for two types of actions: 

a claim for denial of benefits under § 1132(a)(1)(B), and a 

claim for breach of fiduciary duty under § 1132(a)(3).

A

A claim for denial of benefits ordinarily begins with an 

administrative review procedure. ERISA mandates an 

opportunity for administrative review, see 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1133(2); 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h)(1), and we have 

treated completion of this administrative review as a 

prudential exhaustion requirement, see Vaught v. Scottsdale 

Healthcare Corp. Health Plan, 546 F.3d 620, 626 (9th Cir. 

2008) (“[A]n ERISA plaintiff claiming a denial of benefits 

‘must avail himself or herself of a plan’s own internal review 

procedures before bringing suit in federal court.’” (quoting 
6 CASTILLO V. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

Diaz v. United Agric. Emp. Welfare Benefit Plan & Tr., 

50 F.3d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1995))).

If the administrative review affirms the denial of 

benefits, the claimant may obtain judicial review under 

§ 1132(a)(1)(B), which states that “[a] civil action may be 

brought . . . by a participant or beneficiary . . . to recover 

benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce 

his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights 

to future benefits under the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1132(a)(1)(B).

Furthermore, if the claimant achieves “some degree of 

success on the merits” in the civil action, Hardt v. Reliance 

Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 245, 255 (2010) 

(quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 694 

(1983)), “the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable 

attorney’s fee and costs of action” to the claimant, 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1132(g)(1). This fee award, however, applies solely to 

fees incurred in the judicial proceeding; fees incurred during 

“the administrative phase of the claims process” are not 

recoverable under § 1132(g). Cann v. Carpenters’ Pension 

Tr. Fund for N. Cal., 989 F.2d 313, 314 (9th Cir. 1993); 

accord McElwaine v. US West, Inc., 176 F.3d 1167, 1172 n.8 

(9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).

B

ERISA also provides a claim for breach of fiduciary 

duty. Just as trust law imposes duties on trustees, ERISA 

imposes duties on plan fiduciaries. A fiduciary, for instance, 

must “discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the 

interest of the participants and beneficiaries and . . . with the 

care, skill, prudence, and diligence . . . [of] a prudent man.” 

29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
CASTILLO V. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. 7

A fiduciary who breaches these duties is subject to suit, 

and a claim for breach of fiduciary duty may be brought 

under § 1132(a)(3).1 As the Supreme Court explained in 

Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 492 (1996), 

§ 1132(a)(3) “authorize[s] ERISA plan beneficiaries to bring 

a lawsuit . . . that seeks relief for individual beneficiaries 

harmed by an administrator’s breach of fiduciary 

obligations.”2

An individual bringing a claim under § 1132(a)(3) may 

seek “appropriate equitable relief,” which refers to “‘those 

categories of relief’ that, traditionally speaking (i.e., prior to 

1 Section 1132(a)(3) states:

A civil action may be brought . . . by a participant, 

beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or 

practice which violates any provision of this 

subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain 

other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such 

violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this 

subchapter or the terms of the plan . . . .

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (emphasis added).

2 Relying on Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, AFLCIO v. Murdock, 861 F.2d 1406, 1414 (9th Cir. 1988), where we said 

that “[a] fiduciary’s mishandling of an individual benefit claim does not 

violate any of the fiduciary duties defined in ERISA,” MetLife contends 

that an “alleged mishandling of claims does not breach any fiduciary 

duty under ERISA” and that § 1132(a)(3) “does not apply to allegations 

of wrongdoing in connection with the processing of individual benefit 

claims.” Amalgamated Clothing, however, addressed claims under 

§ 1109 and § 1132(a)(2), not claims under § 1132(a)(3). See id. at 1413 

n.11. While § 1109(a) “gives a remedy for injuries to the ERISA plan as 

a whole, but not for injuries suffered by individual participants as a result 

of a fiduciary breach,” Wise v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 600 F.3d 1180, 

1189 (9th Cir. 2010), § 1132(a)(3) is “broad enough to cover individual 

relief for breach of a fiduciary obligation,” Varity, 516 U.S. at 510.
8 CASTILLO V. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

the merger of law and equity) ‘were typically available in 

equity.’” CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 439 (2011) 

(quoting Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 

361 (2006)). This relief may include surcharge—the relief 

Castillo seeks here. See Gabriel v. Alaska Elec. Pension 

Fund, 773 F.3d 945, 955–58 (9th Cir. 2014).

Because § 1132(a)(3) “act[s] as a safety net, offering 

appropriate equitable relief for injuries caused by violations 

that § 502 does not elsewhere adequately remedy,” Varity, 

516 U.S. at 512, relief is not available under § 1132(a)(3) 

“where Congress elsewhere provided adequate relief for a 

beneficiary’s injury,” id. at 515. Thus, a claimant may not 

bring a claim for denial of benefits under § 1132(a)(3) when 

a claim under § 1132(a)(1)(B) will afford adequate relief. 

Claims under § 1132(a)(1)(B) and § 1132(a)(3), however, 

“may proceed simultaneously so long as there is no double 

recovery.” Moyle v. Liberty Mut. Ret. Benefit Plan, 823 F.3d 

948, 961 (9th Cir. 2016) (as amended).

Like a claimant asserting a denial-of-benefits claim 

under § 1132(a)(1)(B), a claimant asserting a claim for 

breach of fiduciary duty under § 1132(a)(3) may obtain an 

award of attorney’s fees under § 1132(g). This award, 

however, does not include fees incurred in an underlying 

administrative proceeding. See McElwaine, 176 F.3d 

at 1172 n.8; Cann, 989 F.2d at 314–17.

C

In this case, Castillo won his claim for denial of benefits 

at the administrative level. Accordingly, he does not assert 

a claim for denial of benefits under § 1132(a)(1)(B). He 

does, however, assert a claim for breach of fiduciary duty 

under § 1132(a)(3), and the remedy he seeks is an order 
CASTILLO V. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. 9

surcharging MetLife for the attorney’s fees he incurred 

during the administrative proceedings.

Castillo contends this award of attorney’s fees is 

“appropriate equitable relief” under § 1132(a)(3). This 

contention rests, up to a point, on valid premises. First, 

surcharge is an available remedy under § 1132(a)(3). As the 

Supreme Court explained in Amara:

Equity courts possessed the power to provide 

relief in the form of monetary 

“compensation” for a loss resulting from a 

trustee’s breach of duty, or to prevent the 

trustee’s unjust enrichment. Restatement 

(Third) of Trusts § 95, and Comment a (Tent. 

Draft No. 5, Mar. 2, 2009) . . . ; [J.] Eaton[, 

Handbook of Equity Jurisprudence] §§ 211–

212, at 440 [(1901)]. Indeed, prior to the 

merger of law and equity this kind of 

monetary remedy against a trustee, 

sometimes called a “surcharge,” was 

“exclusively equitable.”

563 U.S. at 441–42; see also 4 Spencer W. Symons, A

Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence § 1080, at 229–30 (5th ed. 

1941); George Gleason Bogert & George Taylor Bogert, The

Law of Trusts & Trustees § 862, at 34–36, 49–50 (Rev. 2d 

ed. 1995 and 2019 Cumulative Supp.). Through surcharge, 

a beneficiary may seek “make-whole relief,” Amara, 

563 U.S. at 442—“the remedy that will put the beneficiary 

in the position he or she would have attained but for the 

trustee’s breach.” Skinner v. Northrop Grumman Ret. 

Plan B, 673 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2012).
10 CASTILLO V. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

Second, the surcharge remedy may, in a court’s 

discretion, include an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing 

beneficiary:

The “make whole” objective . . . of recovery 

from a trustee [through surcharge] may 

include, in an appropriate case, the attorney 

fees and other litigation costs of a successful 

plaintiff . . . . This element of recovery, 

however, is a matter of judicial discretion and 

not a routine part of trustee liability for 

breach of trust . . . . Among the facts and 

circumstances courts consider in exercising 

their judgment in these matters are the nature 

and extent of trustee misconduct in 

committing the breach, the conduct of the 

trustee in presenting the accounting or 

defending the surcharge action, and the 

significance of imposing costs on the trustee 

as a deterrent to misconduct.

Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 100 cmt. b(2) (2012); see 

also Dardovitch v. Haltzman, 190 F.3d 125, 145–47 (3d Cir. 

1999); Bogert, supra, § 871, at 184–96.3

3 To obtain an award of attorney’s fees in a common law action for 

breach of trust, a beneficiary need not show that the action benefitted the 

trust estate generally, as MetLife contends. To be sure, such benefit may 

support an award of fees. See Bogert, supra, § 871, at 187–91. In 

exercising its discretion, however, “the court may consider other factors” 

as well, “such as the nature and extent of the defendant’s wrongful 

conduct, and whether there was good faith on the part of the defendant.” 

Id. at 193–94 (footnote omitted); see also Dardovitch, 190 F.3d at 145–

47. Thus, at common law, fees may be awarded in cases falling outside 

the common fund doctrine or the substantial benefit rule.
CASTILLO V. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. 11

Third, because “§ 502 does not elsewhere adequately 

remedy” Castillo’s injury, Varity, 516 U.S. at 512, he may 

seek relief under § 1132(a)(3). MetLife contends, however, 

that Castillo is precluded from proceeding under 

§ 1132(a)(3) because he has adequate remedies under other 

aspects of ERISA’s remedial scheme. Specifically, MetLife 

argues that a claimant whose claim is grounded in the denial 

of benefits may seek administrative review and, if that 

process is unsuccessful, may file a claim for benefits under 

§ 1132(a)(1)(B). These alternative remedies, however, are 

not adequate under the circumstances of this case, because 

they do not afford the “make-whole relief,” Amara, 563 U.S. 

at 442, Castillo seeks—reimbursement of the attorney’s fees 

he incurred in the administrative proceeding. Castillo, 

therefore, may proceed under § 1132(a)(3).

These valid premises, however, carry Castillo’s claim 

only so far. His argument does not adequately account for 

two factors that counsel against an award of attorney’s 

fees—our decision in Cann and our obligation to read 

§ 1132(a)(3) in conjunction with § 1132(g).

1

In Cann, 989 F.2d 313, we held that attorney’s fees 

incurred in an administrative proceeding are not recoverable 

under § 1132(g), ERISA’s express fee-shifting provision.4 

We reached this conclusion for two reasons. First, this 

provision authorizes the award of “a reasonable attorney’s 

fee and costs of action,” and we noted that “[t]he word 

4 Section 1132(g) states: “In any action under this subchapter (other 

than an action described in paragraph (2)) by a participant, beneficiary, 

or fiduciary, the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s

fee and costs of action to either party.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).
12 CASTILLO V. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

‘action’ generally designates only proceedings in court, not 

administrative proceedings.” Id. at 316. Second, we 

concluded that an award of fees incurred in an administrative 

proceeding would undermine ERISA’s purpose:

[I]n the ERISA context, the congressional 

purpose emphasized promotion of “the 

soundness and stability of plans with respect 

to adequate funds to pay promised benefits.” 

29 U.S.C. § 1001(a). This purpose might be 

undermined by awards which, by 

encouraging plans to pay questionable claims 

in order to avoid liability for attorneys’ fees, 

could reduce their “soundness and stability.” 

Since the validity of a particular claim is not 

always immediately obvious, plans may need 

to challenge those which the trustee in good 

faith believes are invalid without expanding 

its risk by a double or nothing bet on 

attorneys’ fees. Also, some claimants and 

some plans may use informal internal review 

procedures, accomplished by nonlawyers, 

perhaps union or other employee 

representatives and plan representatives; a 

nonliteral reading of the statute which 

exposed the loser to the prevailing party’s 

attorneys’ fees might undermine such a 

process.

Id. at 317.

The rule Castillo proposes is at odds with Cann in two 

ways. First, Castillo would allow claimants to accomplish 

under § 1132(a)(3) what Cann precludes them from 

accomplishing under § 1132(g). Under Castillo’s proposed 
CASTILLO V. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. 13

rule, the availability of attorney’s fees for the administrative 

phase of a benefits dispute would turn on whether the 

claimant could successfully recharacterize a denial-ofbenefits claim as a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. If a 

denial of benefits could be characterized as a breach of 

fiduciary duty, the claimant could recover attorney’s fees for 

the administrative proceeding under § 1132(a)(3); if the 

claimant could not characterize the benefits dispute as a 

breach of fiduciary duty, those fees would be unavailable. 

We are not persuaded that the availability of fees should turn 

on the claimant’s characterization of the benefits dispute or 

that ERISA should be interpreted in a way to incentive 

claimants to characterize denial-of-benefits claims as 

breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims.

Second, in Cann we held that an award of attorney’s fees 

incurred during the administrative phase of the claims 

process would undermine ERISA’s purpose in promoting 

plan soundness and stability. Although Cann addressed 

attorney’s fees under § 1132(g) rather than § 1132(a)(3), its 

reasoning extends, at least to some extent, to § 1132(a)(3).5

5 We say “at least to some extent” to acknowledge that our reasoning 

in Cann may not extend fully to § 1132(a)(3). Under § 1132(g), fees are 

broadly available; a claimant need show only “some degree of success 

on the merits.” Hardt, 560 U.S. at 255 (quoting Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. 

at 694). Common law trust principles, by contrast, appear to require 

something more for an award of fees, such as misconduct or bad faith on 

the part of the trustee. See Bogert, supra, § 871, at 193–94; Restatement 

(Third) of Trusts § 100 cmt. b(2) (2012). Thus, good faith denials of 

benefits of the kind we highlighted in Cann might not result in an award 

of attorney’s fees under § 1132(a)(3) if § 1132(a)(3) follows the common 

law standard. Even if this is the case, however, Cann’s reasoning applies 

at least to some extent to § 1132(a)(3). At oral argument, moreover, 

Castillo’s counsel suggested that the Hardt standard would govern an 
14 CASTILLO V. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

2

Castillo’s interpretation of § 1132(a)(3) also fails to 

accord sufficient weight to § 1132(g). “[S]tatutory 

interpretation must account for both ‘the specific context in 

which . . . language is used’ and ‘the broader context of the 

statute as a whole.’” Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 

302, 321 (2014) (second alteration in original) (quoting 

Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)). 

Therefore, our interpretation of § 1132(a)(3) must account 

for § 1132(g). On its face, nothing in § 1132(g) defeats 

Castillo’s contention that attorney’s fees incurred in an 

administrative proceeding are recoverable under 

§ 1132(a)(3); instead, § 1132(g) authorizes an award of fees 

incurred in a civil action but does not expressly prohibit an 

award of fees incurred in connection with an administrative 

proceeding.6

We consider it significant, however, that § 1132(g) 

expressly addresses the subject of attorney’s fees, 

affirmatively authorizing an award of fees in civil actions, 

while making no mention of fees incurred in the 

administrative proceedings mandated by the statute. “Under 

the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, there is a 

presumption ‘that when a statute designates certain persons, 

award of fees under § 1132(a)(3), in which case Cann’s reasoning would 

extend fully to the circumstances of this case.

6 For this reason, MetLife’s reliance on the general/specific canon is 

misplaced. Under that canon, “[i]f there is a conflict between a general 

provision and a specific provision, the specific provision prevails.” 

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of 

Legal Texts 183 (2012). Because the general and specific provisions at 

issue here—§ 1132(a)(3) and § 1132(g)—do not conflict, this canon 

does not apply.
CASTILLO V. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. 15

things, or manners of operation, all omissions should be 

understood as exclusions.’” Copeland v. Ryan, 852 F.3d 

900, 907 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Boudette v. Barnette, 

923 F.2d 754, 757 (9th Cir. 1991)).

“The force of any negative implication, however, 

depends on context.” NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 

940 (2017) (quoting Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S.

371, 381 (2013)). “The expressio unius canon applies only 

when ‘circumstances support[ ] a sensible inference that the 

term left out must have been meant to be excluded.’” Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 

Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 81 (2002)). Here, the 

circumstances support such an inference. Under the rules 

governing attorney’s fees, “Congress must provide a 

sufficiently ‘specific and explicit’ indication of its intent to 

overcome the American Rule’s presumption against fee 

shifting.” Peter v. Nantkwest, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 365, 372 

(2019) (quoting Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness 

Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 260 (1975)). Legislating against the 

backdrop of these rules, Congress expressly addressed the 

question of attorney’s fees under ERISA but omitted any 

reference to fees incurred in the administrative proceedings 

mandated by the statute. The circumstances therefore 

support the inference that Congress did not authorize an 

award of fees incurred in such proceedings. This inference, 

considered alongside Cann, persuades us that § 1132(a)(3) 

does not authorize an award of attorney’s fees incurred 

during the administrative phase of the ERISA claims 

process.

IV

Because § 1132(a)(3) does not authorize the award of 

attorney’s fees Castillo seeks, the district court properly 

dismissed the complaint. We affirm on this ground and so 
16 CASTILLO V. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

we need not address MetLife’s contention that Castillo’s 

complaint failed to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

MetLife’s motion for judicial notice (Dkt. 15) is DENIED. 

Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.