UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff/Respondent, )

) CAUSE NO. 2:15-CV-387-PPS

v. ) 

) ARISING FROM 2:13-CR-135-PPS-APR

NATHAN DEMAR HUEY-DINGLE, )

)

Defendant/Petitioner. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Nathan Demar Huey-Dingle’s seeks to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. [DE 60.] Huey-Dingle challenges his sentence on the

grounds that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. He presents ten different

claims of ineffective counsel, all of which, he says, occurred because his attorney was

resigned to accepting a plea agreement in his case, rather than fighting the charges. 

Huey-Dingle signed a plea agreement that contained an explicit waiver of his right to

appeal and seek relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Because his plea was made knowingly

and voluntarily and he does not allege facts to show ineffective assistance of counsel in

negotiating the waiver, Huey-Dingle’s motion is denied.

Background

Huey-Dingle was charged by Superseding Indictment with a Mann Act violation,

a Travel Act violation, and Sex Trafficking by Force, Fraud, or Coercion. [DE 29.] The

grisly facts that led to his conviction are that Huey-Dingle was taking his girlfriend

around the Midwest and prostituting her. On one of the trips from Chicago to
Indianapolis, an argument broke out between two. Huey-Dingle pulled the car over on

the side of Interstate 65 near Lafayette and proceeded to beat his girlfriend to death. 

(There was a second woman in the car who witnessed the gruesome events). HueyDingle entered into a plea agreement with the government in which he pled guilty to

the three counts. [DE 39 at 3.] In exchange, the government agreed not to file any

additional charges against him arising out of the conduct in question,and the State of

Indiana agreed to dismiss state charges pending against him for the same conduct. [DE

39 at 4.] By pleading guilty, Huey-Dingle was able to avoid the death penalty charge

that he was facing in state court. In the plea agreement before this court, Huey-Dingle

stated: 

I declare that I offer my plea of guilty freely and

voluntarily and of my own accord, and no

promises have been made to me other than those

contained in this agreement, nor have I been

threatened in any way by anyone to cause me to

plead guilty in accordance with this agreement.

[DE 39 at 9.] Huey-Dingle’s written plea agreement contained an express waiver of his

right to file a § 2255 motion stating: 

I understand that the law gives a convicted

person the right to appeal the conviction and the

sentence imposed; I also understand that no one

can predict the precise sentence that will be

imposed and that the Court has jurisdiction and

authority to impose any sentence within the

statutory maximum set for my offense(s) as set

forth in this plea agreement. With this

understanding and in consideration of the

government’s entry into this plea agreement, I

2
expressly waive my right to appeal or to contest my

conviction and all components of my sentence, or the

manner in which my conviction or my sentence was

determined or imposed, to any Court on any ground,

including any claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel unless the claimed ineffective assistance of

counsel relates directly to the negotiation of this plea

agreement, including any appeal under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3742 or any post-conviction proceeding,

including but not limited to, a proceeding under

28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

[DE 39 at 5 (emphasis added).]

On May 28, 2014, a change of plea hearing occurred at which Huey-Dingle

indicated to me that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights. [DE 62 at 18-19.]

The hearing was conducted in the presence of Huey-Dingle’s attorney and fully

complied with the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. At the

hearing, I found Huey-Dingle to be fully competent and capable of entering an

informed plea. [DE 62 at 39.] I then accepted the plea agreement that he had entered

into with the government and adjudged him guilty. Id. At a sentencing hearing on

October 17, 2014, I sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of 540 months, as per his

plea agreement. [DE 63 16-17.] 

Huey-Dingle timely filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 making ten claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Specifically, Huey-Dingle claims his counsel was ineffective in that he allegedly: (1) did

not review probable cause for a search warrant; (2) did not interview “potential

witnesses for the defense or interview government witnesses;” (3) did not speak with

3
Huey-Dingle on a regular enough basis to discuss their defense strategy; (4) did not

challenge “the government’s case of filing for suppression of evidence to prepare for

trial;” (5) did not challenge sentencing enhancements; (6) failed to file, or meet with

Huey-Dingle about filing, an appeal; (7) committed too many cumulative errors that

“prejudiced [Huey-Dingle’s] opportunity at a fair result in the court proceedings;” (8)

gave “erroneous” advice to “induce” Huey-Dingle to plead guilty; (9) gave erroneous

advice “in conjunction with prosecution about giving more time to petitioner about a

murder in the state that had nothing to do with his present case;” and (10) performed

ineffectively and non-adversarially and such performance exposed Huey-Dingle “to

numerous cumulative errors that had a pervasive effect on the entire evidentiary

picture” of his case. [DE 60 at 7-9.] 

Discussion

A motion under § 2255 allows a federal prisoner “in custody . . . claiming the

right to be released” to attack his sentence on the grounds that it was imposed “in

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without

jurisdiction to impose such a sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the

maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. §

2255. Relief under § 2255 is reserved for extraordinary situations. Prewitt v. United

States, 83 F.3d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 1996). 

The appeal waiver in Huey-Dingle’s plea agreement, however, limits the

arguments eligible for consideration by this Court. In the Seventh Circuit, only two

4
claims under § 2255 are available to an individual who waived the right to appeal his

right to bring a collateral attack under § 2255: (1) that the defendant received ineffective

counsel with regard to the waiver or plea agreement as a whole and its negotiation,

United States v. Smith, 759 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 2014); or (2) that the waiver was not

knowingly or voluntarily made. See Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 1142, 1145 (7th Cir.

1999); United States v. Rhodes, 330 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2003); Mason v. United States, 211

F.3d 1065, 1068 (7th Cir. 2000). 

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show

that 1) his counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,”

and 2) “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Hinton v. Alabama, 134

S.Ct. 1081, 1088 (2014); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-94 (2009). If the

defendant cannot establish both of these factors, the claim fails. Rastafari v. Anderson,

278 F.3d 673, 688 (7th Cir. 2002). In applying this test, the court is “highly deferential to

counsel,” and there is a “strong presumption that counsel’s decisions constitute

reasonable litigation strategy.” United States v. Scanga, 225 F.3d 780, 783-784 (7th Cir.

2000) (internal quotations omitted). Furthermore, not every ineffective assistance of

counsel claim can overcome a waiver. Hurlow v. United States, 726. F.3d 958, 966 (7th

Cir. 2013). The court rejects “broad, unsupported assertions of ineffective counsel, as

well as garden variety attacks raised in the guise of a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

5
I have reviewed Huey-Dingle’s motion and the descriptions he provided of the

grounds under which he seeks relief and have concluded that an evidentiary hearing is

not necessary here. Nine of the ten issues Huey-Dingle seeks to raise are precluded by

the waiver language of his plea agreement. In raising those issues (grounds 1-7, 9 and

10), he did not explicitly allege that his waiver was not entered into knowingly or

voluntarily, nor did he allege that he received ineffective assistance of counsel with

respect to his negotiation and acceptance of the agreement.

Ground 8 is the only claim available to Huey-Dingle. In it, he claims that his

“counsel [was] ineffective for giving erroneous advise[sic] to induce a guilty plea from

petitioner without investigating [the] case.” [DE 60 at 8.] In claiming that his lawyer

gave him “erroneous advise[sic] to induce a guilty plea,” Huey-Dingle fails to provide

the court with any specifics about what advice was given, why it was “erroneous,” or

how it induced him to plead guilty. [DE 60 at 8.] Huey-Dingle’s claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel with regard to the plea is precisely this type of “broad,

unsupported” assertion that the court rejects. Because he offers only such unsupported

assertions, Huey-Dingle cannot show that his attorney’s conduct fell below the objective

standard of reasonableness. His claim, therefore, fails.

Huey-Dingle likewise fails to establish that his plea was involuntary or

unknowing as a result of his attorney’s alleged deficient performance. In his plea

agreement, Huey-Dingle expressly stated that he understood the maximum possible

sentences set forth in his plea agreement and that he entered in his “plea of guilty freely

6
and voluntarily and of my own accord, and no promises have been made to me other

than those contained in this agreement, nor have I been threatened in any way by

anyone to cause me to plead guilty in accordance with this agreement.” [DE 39 at 9.] 

At his change of plea hearing, conducted in the presence of his attorney, Huey-Dingle

confirmed that he understood the charges against him, his right to persist in a not guilty

plea, and the possible maximum statutory sentence he could receive. [DE 62 at 10-12,

26.] In fact, while under oath, Huey-Dingle agreed that he and his attorney had fully

reviewed the plea agreement, which includes the appeal waiver, and that his attorney

was able to answer all of the questions that he had about the content of the agreement. 

[Id. at 9.] A defendant’s statements at the plea colloquy are presumed to be true and

may be considered as evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver. See United States v.

Chavers, 515 F.3d 722, 724 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Jemison, 237 F.3d 911, 917 (7th

Cir. 2001). The record establishes that Huey-Dingle entered into the plea agreement

knowingly and voluntarily and he fails to present any evidence to the contrary. 

The waiver in Huey-Dingle’s plea agreement also bars his remaining claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel, all of which deal with his attorney’s general defense

strategy and not the negotiation of the plea agreement. Courts consistently have held

that “a voluntary and knowing waiver of an appeal is valid and must be enforced.” 

United States v. Rhodes, 330 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Sines, 303

F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 859, 860 (7th Cir. 2001). 

Waivers are enforceable “if its terms are clear and unambiguous and the record shows

7
that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into the agreement.” United

States v. Blinn, 490 F.3d 586, 588 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). As discussed above,

the record is clear that Huey-Dingle entered into the plea agreement knowingly and

voluntarily. His additional claims are, therefore, barred.

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Huey-Dingle’s motion to vacate, set aside or correct

his sentence under § 2255 [DE 60] is DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

The clerk shall enter final judgment accordingly. 

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: October 14, 2016

s/ Philip P. Simon______________

PHILIP P. SIMON, CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8