UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

FORT WAYNE DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

v. CAUSE NO.: 1:15-CR-26-TLS 

CAMARI STINSON 

OPINION AND ORDER 

The Defendant, Camari Stinson, has pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm 

by a felon from December 29, 2014, continuing to February 25, 2015 (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), 

distributing a controlled substance on January 29, 2015 (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)), and possession 

of a firearm in furtherance of the January 29 drug trafficking crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). 

The Defendant’s plea of guilty to the charged offense of being a felon in possession of a 

firearm did not include as a factual basis any conduct related to a shooting on December 29, 

2014. When the probation officer drafted a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) in 

preparation for sentencing, it included as relevant conduct the Defendant’s participation in a 

shooting on December 29, 2014. The Defendant objects to the inclusion of these factual 

statements and the resulting enhancements to his guideline range. 

This Opinion and Order resolves the Defendant’s objection to the PSR. 

BACKGROUND 

The PSR contains a description of the offense conduct based on information that federal 

agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) obtained from a 

Confidential Informant (CI) through that CI’s reports, his monitored meetings with the 

Defendant, and a controlled drug buy, in which an undercover ATF agent also participated. The 
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offense conduct also contains information arising out of a traffic stop of a vehicle in which the 

Defendant was a passenger on February 25, 2015. The probation officer noted the following: 

For guideline calculation purposes, offense conduct, including all relevant conduct, 

involves the defendant’s use of the above firearm in an attempted murder resulting 

in serious bodily injury to the victim of the offense. In addition, this officer will 

consider the fact that the defendant distributed 3.38 grams of cocaine. As confirmed 

by the government and investigative documents, the defendant shot multiple times 

and told the CI that he was trying to kill the victim. He further stated he shot 

someone “in the ass” when he was at his cousin’s 16th birthday party on December 

29, 2014. The CI relayed this information to ATF and was sent back to get these 

admissions on an audio recording on January 15, 2015. On said date, the defendant 

had the firearm on him and showed it to the CI and indicated it was the one used in 

the shooting. In addition, on January 29, 2015, when the defendant delivered 

cocaine to the CI, in the presence of the UC, he again talked about using the gun to 

shoot someone. He had the firearm on his person at the time and showed it to the 

CI and UC. This interaction was both video and audio recorded. The victim was 

shot in the buttocks and had to go to the hospital to have the bullet removed. 

(PSR ¶ 25.) 

The relevant conduct impacted the base offense level. When calculating the offense level, 

the probation officer wrote, 

The guideline for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is USSG §2K2.1. Pursuant 

to USSG §2K2.1(c)(1)(A), §2X1.1 and then §2A2.1 are referenced when 

determining the offense level. USSG §2A2.1 provides a base offense level of 27. 

The base offense level is then derived from an offense level 27 plus 2 because the 

victim sustained serious bodily injury. USSG §§2A2.1(a)(2) and (b)(1)(B). 

(PSR ¶ 31 (setting base offense level at 29).) 

The Defendant filed an objection to the PSR that centers around the recitation of the 

offense conduct, particularly as it relates to relevant conduct for the felon in possession charge, 

including whether the Defendant used the firearm in an attempted murder that resulted in serious 

bodily injury.1

 The Defendant also filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. 

 

1 The Defendant also objected to the two-level increase in criminal history points under USSG § 4A1.1(d) 

based on the fact that he committed the instant offense while he was under a criminal justice sentence. 

That objection is no longer at issue. (See Reply 1, ECF No. 155 (acknowledging that he was under a 

criminal justice sentence and withdrawing the objection).) 
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After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the Court denied the Defendant’s motion to 

withdraw his guilty pleas [ECF No. 117], and set an evidentiary hearing on the objection to the 

PSR. The objection now having been fully briefed, is ripe for the Court’s consideration. 

ANALYSIS

 When sentencing a defendant, the district court “must first calculate the Guidelines range, 

and then consider what sentence is appropriate for the individual defendant in light of the 

statutory sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 351 

(2009); see also United States v. Panice, 598 F.3d 426, 441 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Nelson, and 

setting forth the two-step process that a sentencing court must engage in to determine a 

defendant’s sentence). This Opinion and Order is intended to resolve the issues related to the first 

step, calculation of the Guidelines range. 

Facts relevant to sentencing should be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. United 

States v. England, 555 F.3d 616, 622 (7th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Krieger, 628 F.3d 

857, 862 (7th Cir. 2010) (advising that sentencing factors that do not increase the defendant’s 

sentence beyond the statutory range may be found by the court at sentencing by a preponderance 

of the evidence). “A proposition proved by a preponderance of the evidence is one that has been 

shown to be more likely than not.” United States v. Davis, 682 F.3d 596, 612 (7th Cir. 2012). 

The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to sentencing, United States v. Dean, 414 

F.3d 725, 730 (7th Cir. 2005), and a court may rely on hearsay as long as the information “has 

sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy,” United States v. Rollins, 544 

F.3d 820, 838 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. 

Bradley, 628 F.3d 394, 400 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Sentencing judges necessarily have ‘discretion to 
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draw conclusions about the testimony given and evidence introduced at sentencing,’ but ‘due 

process requires that sentencing determinations be based on reliable evidence, not speculation or 

unfounded allegations.’”) (quoting England, 555 F.3d at 622). As such, “[a] district court may 

rely on facts asserted in the PSR if the PSR is based on sufficiently reliable information.” 

Rollins, 544 F.3d at 838. “The defendant bears the burden of proving that the PSR is inaccurate 

or unreliable,” and if he offers no evidence to question the PSR’s accuracy, the court may rely on 

it. Id. However, it is the Government’s burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 

an enhancement applies. United States v. Hines, 449 F.3d 808, 815 (7th Cir. 2006); United States 

v. Foutris, 966 F.2d 1158, 1160 (7th Cir. 1992). 

 Generally, the federal sentencing guideline applicable to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

922(g)(1), prohibiting possession of a firearm by a felon, is § 2K2.1, which provides for varying 

base offense levels depending on the offense and offender characteristics. See USSG § 2K2.1(a), 

(b). Additionally, § 2K2.1(c) provides for a “Cross Reference,” authorizing a sentencing court to 

look to other guidelines provisions to impose a higher sentence on an offender under certain 

circumstances. The “Cross Reference” provision states that “[i]f the defendant used or possessed 

any firearm or ammunition cited in the offense of conviction in connection with the commission 

or attempted commission of another offense . . . apply (A) § 2X1.1 (Attempt, Solicitation or 

Conspiracy) in respect to that other offense, if the resulting offense level is greater than that 

determined above.” “Another offense” is defined as “any federal, state, or local offense . . . 

regardless of whether a criminal charge was brought, or a conviction obtained.” USSG § 2K2.1, 

Application Note 14(C)). In determining whether subsection (c)(1) applies, a court must 

“consider the relationship between the instant offense and the other offense, consistent with 

relevant conduct principles, See § 1B1.3(a)(1)–(4) and accompanying commentary.” Id., 
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Application Note 14(E); see also USSG § 1B1.3(a) (instructing courts to consider all “relevant 

conduct” in determining the base offense level, specific offense characteristics, and cross 

reference adjustments). 

 Section 2X1.1, in turn, assigns offense levels for offenses of attempt, solicitation, or 

conspiracy not covered by a specific offense guideline. USSG § 2X1.1(b). This section, 

furthermore, contains its own cross-reference provision: “When an attempt, solicitation, or 

conspiracy is expressly covered by another offense guideline section,” the sentencing court must 

apply that guideline section. USSG § 2X1.1(c). Because § 2A2.1 expressly covers the offense of 

attempted murder, a sentencing court must apply that section rather than § 2X1.1(b). Under § 

2A2.1, a defendant receives a base offense level of 27 for attempted murder that does not qualify 

as first degree murder. USSG § 2A2.1(a)(2). The offense level is further increased by 2 levels if 

the victim sustained serious bodily injury. USSG § 2A2.1(b)(1).

 The Government’s position is that the relevant conduct in this case involves the 

Defendant’s use of the firearm cited in the offense of conviction to attempt a murder that, if 

accomplished, would have constituted second degree murder. Because his actions resulted in 

serious bodily injury, two levels are added for a base offense level of 29. The Government argues 

that it is not required to prove that a bullet from the Defendant’s firearm struck the victim, only 

that he used the firearm, and that this use constituted the offense of attempted murder. The 

Defendant, in addition to claiming that there is no way to establish by a preponderance of the 

evidence that a bullet from his weapon caused injury to any person on December 29, 2014, 

claims that he was not even present during the shooting. 
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 Evidence that the Defendant was present during the December 29, 2014, shooting 

consists of two varieties: first, the Defendant’s own statements to others, namely the CI and the 

undercover agent; second, ballistics testing that matched cartridge cases collected at the scene of 

the shooting to the firearm that the Defendant possessed in January 2015. 

 With respect to his statements, the Defendant testified that he only told the CI that he was 

involved in the shooting to enhance the Defendant’s credibility with the CI, who the Defendant 

had known for some time and understood was affiliated with a gang from Hammond (9/7/18 Tr. 

35–36 (“I was just trying to look cool. Like, where I’m from, you know, if people think that you 

done something, even if you didn’t do it, if they think you done it or anything like that, you have 

a tendency to be left alone or you look cool in certain people’s eyes, you know. Some of my 

stories, I was just trying to add up to his stories.”).) He claimed that he knew details about the 

shooting from other sources and from Facebook. The Defendant also discounts the second type 

of evidence that has a tendency to connect to him to the shooting. He testified that he obtained 

the firearm that is the subject of this case at some point in January 2015. 

 The Government contends that the Defendant’s assertions are not believable. “The 

chance that Stinson would take responsibility for a shooting he did not commit, that would be 

privy to extensive details of the shooting even though he had not spoken to his cousin in years, 

and that he would just happen to purchase the firearm used in the shooting just a couple of weeks 

later, from some stranger somewhere on the south side of Fort Wayne is astronomical.” (Gov’t 

Mem. 20.) The Court agrees that there is evidence from which one could suspect that the 

Defendant was the shooter for one of the five guns that was fired near Taylor Street on the 

evening of December 29, 2014. But the evidence is not as convincing as the Government 

presents. The Court heard evidence from the Defendant that he was not present at the date and 
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time in question. He was at a house located in that area earlier in the day, but only stayed for a 

short time to wish his niece a happy birthday. The person hosting the party confirmed this. The 

Court is entitled to give weight to this testimony, particularly as there were no other witnesses 

that testified that the Defendant was at the scene. The dark and grainy footage of the shooting 

obtained from a surveillance camera does not confirm any particular person’s participation in the 

shooting. 

It is feasible that many of the details of the shooting, particularly given its magnitude and 

the number of people involved, could have been learned from social media and other sources. 

The Defendant’s unwillingness to specifically identify those individuals does not convince the 

Court that they do not exist. Nor is it unbelievable that the Defendant would have taken credit for 

the shooting to give himself more credibility and standing among other persons known to engage 

in criminal conduct. The Defendant’s inability to identify the exact date on which he purchased 

the firearm, or from whom, could just have readily been a function of the illicit and informal 

nature of the transaction, as well as the significant passage of time. The evidence, when weighed, 

does not convince the Court that it is more likely than not that the Defendant was one of the 

shooters at Taylor Street, and that the shooting should be used as relevant conduct for purposes 

of computing the Defendant’s sentence. Because the Court finds that there is not sufficient 

evidence in the record before the Court to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

Defendant was present at the Taylor Street shooting, the Court need not address which criminal 

offense the conduct would have constituted, or whether it resulted in serious bodily injury. 

 The guideline range in this case should reflect that the Defendant distributed cocaine, that 

he possessed a firearm in furtherance of that drug trafficking offense, and that he was a person 

who was prohibited from possessing a firearm, having previously been convicted of a felony. 
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CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court SUSTAINS the Defendant’s objection to the PSR 

related to the base offense level for the felon in possession of a firearm offense, specifically that 

its calculation should not be based on a shooting that occurred on December 29, 2014. The PSR 

will be revised accordingly. 

SO ORDERED on April 22, 2019. 

 s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT