UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

GREGORY D. SOBIN, )

)

Petitioner, )

) No. 3:14 CV 2044 

v. )

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Gregory D. Sobin, a pro se prisoner, filed an amended habeas corpus petition 

(DE 7) challenging the prison disciplinary hearing (WCU 14-09-577) where the Westville 

Correctional Facility Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) found him guilty of Violating 

a State Law in violation of prison rule A-100 because he falsely reported that he had 

been sexually assaulted by a guard. On October 7, 2014, the DHB deprived him of 180 

days earned credit time and demoted him to credit class 2. In his petition Sobin raises 

three grounds.

In Ground One, Sobin alleges that he was denied exculpatory evidence. An 

inmate has a right to present relevant, exculpatory evidence during a prison 

disciplinary hearing. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). However, prisoners do 

not have the right to present evidence which “would be irrelevant, repetitive, or 

unnecessary.” Pannell v. McBride, 306 F.3d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 2002). Due process only 

requires access to witnesses and evidence that are exculpatory. Rasheed-Bey v. 

Duckworth, 969 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992). Exculpatory in this context means evidence 
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which “directly undermines the reliability of the evidence in the record pointing to [the 

prisoner’s] guilt.” Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 1996). Moreover, the 

denial of evidence is harmless unless the prisoner shows that the evidence could have 

aided his defense. See Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 2011).

Here, Sobin requested a copy of the State law that he had violated: Indiana Code 

35-44.1-2-3 False Reporting. However, the statute was the legal standard to be applied. 

It was not evidence. It could not have undermined the reliability of other evidence 

considered by the DHO. Nevertheless, Sobin was not denied the opportunity to have 

the DHO consider the statute because a copy is a part of this record. DE 11-3 at 4. 

Sobin requested the audio recording of his interview with internal affairs. He 

also requested video showing the shakedown of his cell on August 30, 2014, and 

August 31, 2014. The DHO listened to the audio recording. DE 11-3 at 3. The DHO 

reviewed the video for August 31, 2014. DE 11-3 at 2. However, there was no video 

from August 30, 2014, to be reviewed. DE 11-3 at 1. The hearing officer did not refuse to 

consider the August 30, 2014, video; it simply did not exist. This was not a denial of due 

process. The DHO considered all of the available evidence that Sobin requested. Sobin 

also objects that he did not receive summaries of the audio and video reviews. Though 

that may have violated prison policy, habeas corpus relief is not available for the 

violation of a prison rule. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). (“In conducting 

habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the 

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). Moreover, not giving him a copy 
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of those summaries was harmless because the evidence was considered and neither was 

exculpatory. See Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (harmless error analysis 

applies to prison disciplinary proceedings). Therefore Ground One is not a basis for 

habeas corpus relief.

In Ground Two, Sobin argues that there was no evidence that he was guilty of 

false reporting. “[T]he findings of a prison disciplinary board [need only] have the 

support of some evidence in the record. This is a lenient standard, requiring no more 

than a modicum of evidence. Even meager proof will suffice, so long as the record is not

so devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without support 

or otherwise arbitrary.” Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (quotation 

marks and citations omitted). Here, the evidence shows that Sobin reported being

sexually assaulted on August 31, 2014, when a guard “reached into the cuff port while 

he was handcuffed and grabbed his genitals.” DE 11-1 at 1. The video evidence shows 

that did not happen. DE 11-3 at 2. Sobin argues that he was mistaken about the date and 

that the assault occurred on August 30, 2014. That could be true or it could be an 

additional lie to cover for his previous lie. It is not for this court on habeas review to 

independently assess his credibility. Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000). 

The DHO clearly did not believe him. Sobin reported being sexually assaulted on 

August 31, 2014, and the video evidence is sufficient to support finding that to have 

been a false report. Therefore Ground Two is not a basis for habeas corpus relief. 
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In Ground Three, Sobin argues that the DHO was biased and retaliated against 

him by finding him guilty. However, “even assuming fraudulent conduct on the part of 

prison officials, the protection from such arbitrary action is found in the procedures 

mandated by due process.” McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 787 (7th Cir. 1999).

An inmate facing disciplinary charges has the right to an impartial 

decisionmaker. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 571. But “the constitutional standard for 

impermissible bias is high,” Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003), 

and an adjudicator is entitled to a presumption of “honesty and integrity” 

absent clear evidence to the contrary, see Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 

95 S. Ct. 1456, 43 L. Ed. 2d 712 (1975). Due process requires disqualification 

of a decisionmaker who was directly or substantially involved in the 

underlying incident, Gaither, 236 F.3d at 820, and we have assumed that a 

decisionmaker might likewise be impermissibly biased if his spouse is a 

crucial witness in the proceeding, see Eads v. Hanks, 280 F.3d 728, 729 (7th 

Cir. 2002). A hearing officer is not automatically deemed biased, however, 

simply because he adjudicated or was involved in a previous disciplinary 

charge against the prisoner. See Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666-67; Pannell, 306 F.3d 

at 502.

Perotti v. Marberry, 355 Fed. Appx. 39, 43 (7th Cir. 2009). Here, there is no indication that 

the DHO was a witness to the event or involved in its investigation. Neither has Sobin 

demonstrated a due process violation. Therefore Ground Three is not a basis for habeas 

corpus relief.

For these reasons, the habeas corpus petition is DENIED. The clerk is 

DIRECTED to enter judgment and close this case.

SO ORDERED.

Date: March 8, 2016

s/James T. Moody__________________

JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT