IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

DEANNA L. KLINE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Cause No. 3:15-CV-00041-CAN

)

CAROLYN COLVIN, )

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Deanna L. Kline (“Kline”) filed a complaint in this Court seeking reversal or

remand of the final decision denying her application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). 

As analyzed below, the Defendant’s decision as Acting Commissioner of Social Security

(“Commissioner”) was supported by substantial evidence, was legally sound, and is affirmed by

this Court.

I. PROCEDURE

On May 21, 2012, Kline filed an application for SSI with the Social Security

Administration (“SSA”), alleging disability beginning January 1, 2007. The SSA denied Kline’s

claim initially on October 8, 2012, and again upon reconsideration on October 31, 2012. On

December 6, 2012, Kline filed a request for an administrative hearing. The hearing was held on

August 29, 2013, before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) where Kline and an impartial

vocational expert appeared and testified. On October 25, 2013, the ALJ issued her decision

finding that Kline was not disabled at Step Five1

 of the disability evaluation process and denied

her application for SSI benefits. On November 4, 2013, Kline filed a request for review of the

ALJ’s decision with the Appeals Council. On November 26, 2014, the Appeals Council denied

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 Social Security regulations 20 C.F.R. § 416.945 provide a five-part test that ALJs must apply in determining

whether a claimant is entitled to disability benefits.
Kline’s request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. 

On January 27, 2015, Kline filed a complaint in this Court seeking reversal or remand of the

Commissioner’s decision. On June 5, 2015, Kline filed her Memorandum of Law in Support of

a Social Security Appeal. Thereafter, on September 10, 2015, the Commissioner filed a

responsive memorandum asking the Court to affirm the decision denying benefits. Kline did not

file a reply brief. This Court may enter a ruling in this matter based on the parties’ consent,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

Kline was born on March 18, 1991, making her 21-years old on the date of her SSI

application. She sought SSI based upon an alleged inability to work since 2007 due to a learning

disability, ADD, ADHD, depression, having an IQ of a 12-year old, and high blood pressure. 

At the ALJ hearing, Kline testified regarding her time spent in foster care, her past sexual

abuse, her history of drug and alcohol use, and her history of depression and of attempted

suicide. Kline lives in the “self sufficient” unit of a YWCA shelter for abused women and

women with addiction problems. Women in that unit are afforded more freedoms than other

residents and are required to perform various chores to earn their keep. Kline testified that she

occasionally watches her friend’s children, ages 9, 3, and 10-months, while at the shelter. When

doing so, she would color, and watch movies or television with the children. While on her own

at the shelter, Kline testified that she plays on her computer, watches television, and that she can

concentrate long enough to watch movies. Additionally, she does her own laundry, will go

shopping for food, and will go out to eat or to the movies when she has the money to do so. 

Kline also testified that medications did help with her symptoms of depression and sleeping

problems.

2
 At the hearing, the ALJ asked the vocational expert the following hypothetical question:

Please assume an individual of the same age, education, work experience as the

claimant. This individual would be able to perform work at all exertional levels,

and adding the following. Work would be limited to simple, routine, and

repetitive tasks; an occasional interaction with co-workers, supervisors, and the

public. Are there jobs in the national and regional economy such a person could

perform? 

Doc. No. 12 at 92-93. The vocational expert answered in the affirmative, listing several jobs that

such a hypothetical person could perform, which are available in significant numbers in both the

Indiana and the national economies. The vocational expert testified that all of the jobs he

identified are performed at independent workstations and are not fast-paced production line jobs. 

He further explained that such jobs would only involve one or two steps and would not require a

reading ability above the sixth grade level. 

After the hearing, the ALJ issued a written decision reflecting findings based on the fivestep disability evaluation prescribed by the SSA’s regulations. At Step One, the ALJ found that

Kline has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her application date of May 21, 2012,

which governs the start of any SSI benefits should she be eligible. 20 C.F.R. § 416.335. At Step

Two, the ALJ found that Kline has the following severe impairments: post-traumatic stress

disorder, depression, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, borderline intellectual functioning,

and obesity. At Step Three, the ALJ found that Kline does not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that meet(s) or medically equals the severity of a Listing.2

 The ALJ

then determined Kline’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), finding:

That [Kline] has the [RFC] to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels

but with the following nonexertional limitations: she can never climb ladders,

ropes or scaffolds or have more than occasional exposure to hazardous moving

machinery, raw chemicals or solutions, and unprotected heights. The work must

be limited to simple routine, repetitive tasks with only occasional interaction with

2

 Listed impairments are found in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d), 416.925,

and 416.926).

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co-workers, supervisors and the public, and free of fast-paced production rate

pace.

Doc. No. 12 at 24. 

At Step Four, the ALJ found that Kline has no past relevant work. At Step Five, the ALJ

found that, considering Kline’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, and based upon the

testimony of the vocational expert, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national

economy that Kline can perform. Based upon those findings, the ALJ determined that Kline had

not been disabled, as defined in the Social Security Act, since May 21, 2012. 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

On judicial review of the final decision of the SSA, the Commissioner’s factual findings

must be accepted as conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus,

an ALJ’s findings will be reversed only if they are not supported by substantial evidence or if the

ALJ has applied an erroneous legal standard. See Scrogham v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 685, 695 (7th

Cir. 2014). Substantial evidence is simply “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971);

Kepple v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 513, 516 (7th Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence may be less than

the weight of the evidence, but is more than a mere scintilla. Sheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697,

699 (7th Cir. 2004). To determine whether substantial evidence exists, the Court reviews the

record as a whole, but does not attempt to substitute its judgment for the ALJ’s by reweighing

the evidence, resolving material conflicts, or reconsidering facts or the credibility of witnesses. 

Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 836-37 (7th Cir. 2014). “Where conflicting evidence allows

reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is entitled to benefits,” the Court must defer

to the Commissioner’s resolution of that conflict. Binion v. Chater, 108 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir.

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1997). In reaching a decision, the ALJ must build a logical bridge from the evidence to her

conclusion, but she need not provide a complete written evaluation of every piece of testimony

or evidence. Murphy v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 2014). Minimally, an ALJ must

articulate her analysis of the evidence in order to allow the reviewing court to trace the path of

her reasoning and to be assured that the ALJ considered the important evidence. Scott v.

Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002). 

B. Issues for Review

In this case, the Court must not ascertain whether Kline is disabled, but rather, whether

the ALJ’s RFC determination for Kline is supported by substantial evidence. Kline contends

that the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ

improperly weighed the evaluations of consultative physicians, Dr. Turner-Campbell and Dr.

Holleman, and the ALJ made an erroneous credibility determination as to Kline’s concentration,

attention, and cognitive abilities. Secondarily, Kline contends that the ALJ’s Step Five analysis

was improper because she relied upon vocational testimony elicited in response to an incomplete

hypothetical question. Each of these arguments is addressed in turn.

1. The ALJ’s RFC Determination

An individual’s RFC demonstrates her ability to do physical and mental work activities

on a sustained basis despite functional limitations caused by any medically determinable

impairment(s) and its/their symptoms, including pain. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945; SSR 96-8p 1996. In

making a proper RFC determination, the ALJ must consider all of the relevant evidence in the

case record. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945. The record may include medical signs, diagnostic findings,

the claimant’s statements about the severity and limitations of symptoms, statements and other

information provided by treating or examining physicians and psychologists, third party witness

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reports, and any other relevant evidence. SSR 96-7p 1996. “Careful consideration must be

given to any available information about symptoms because subjective descriptions may indicate

more severe limitations or restrictions than can be shown by objective medical evidence alone.” 

SSR 96-8p. However, it is the claimant’s responsibility to provide medical evidence showing

how her impairments affect her functioning. 20 C.F.R.§ 416.912(c). Therefore, when the record

does not support specific physical or mental limitations or restrictions on a claimant’s work

related activity, the ALJ must find that the claimant has no related functional limitations. See

SSR 96-8p.

a. Dr. Turner-Campbell’s Assessment 

First, Kline argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of consultative examiner

Dr. Turner-Campbell, in which she stated that Kline “would not handle routine and/or nonroutine changes in the workplace.” Doc. No. 12 at 378. In addressing that opinion, the ALJ

noted:

While the consultative examiner [Dr. Turner-Campbell] opined that [Kline]

would not be able to handle routine and/or non-routine changes in the workplace,

the undersigned gives that portion of the opinion little weight. The cognitive and

personality functioning evaluation [performed by Dr. Holleman] indicated that

[Kline] worked persistently at tasks and managed her frustration well-during

difficult tasks which is inconsistent with the consultative examiner's [Dr. TurnerCampbell's] opinion that the claimant could not even handle routine changes in

the workplace.

Doc. No. 12 at 30. The thrust of Kline's argument is that the ALJ's determination that Kline

could perform work that was "limited to . . . routine, repetitive tasks" conflicts with other

medical evidence, and that the ALJ is improperly picking and choosing between medical

evidence. 

An RFC finding is a legal determination, rather than a medical one, and the ALJ is required

to consider and weigh all the evidence in determining the functional limitations resulting from a

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claimant's impairment to the extent that they were supported by the record; an ALJ is not

required to accept any one opinion in its entirety. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.927(e), 416.946; SSR

96-5p, 1996 WL 374183; Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 306 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1995); Dixon v.

Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1177 (7th Cir. 2001). An ALJ properly discounts an opinion that is

inconsistent with and not supported by other evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c). An ALJ may

not pick and choose the evidence that favors her final decision. See Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300,

307 (7th Cir. 1995).

Notably in Diaz, the SSI claimant asserted that the ALJ inappropriately relied on a medical

opinion stating that he was capable of performing a range of sedentary work, which requires

sitting for approximately six hours per day, when another medical opinion reflected that he was

limited in his ability to sit for periods in excess of fifteen minutes. Id. The court noted that an

ALJ may not select and discuss only that evidence that favors her ultimate conclusion, but must

articulate, at some minimum level, her analysis of the evidence to allow the appellate court to

trace the path of her reasoning. Id. The court opined that an ALJ's failure to consider an entire

line of evidence falls below the minimal level of articulation required. Id. The court held that

the ALJ met the minimal articulation requirement finding evidence throughout his decision that

he considered the medical opinion in question, even though he only assigned it a lesser weight. 

Id. at 307-08. 

Here, like in Diaz, the ALJ did not fail to consider an entire line of evidence, but rather,

she expressly considered Dr. Turner-Campbell’s opinion and assigned it a lesser weight. 

Specifically, the ALJ demonstrated that Dr. Turner-Campbell's opinion was inconsistent with the

opinion of consultative examiner Dr. Holleman. The ALJ referenced Dr. Holleman’s notes on

Kline’s behavior during two hours of psychological testing, in which she performed well in

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multiple tasks leading the doctor to conclude that Kline could in fact handle routine and/or nonroutine changes in the workplace. In further support of her conclusion that Dr. TurnerCampbell’s opinion was inconsistent with medical evidence in the record, the ALJ noted the

opinion of Kline’s case manager, Judy Darnel. In Darnel’s opinion that Kline was restricted in

her ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods, the ALJ found support

to include a limitation in Kline’s RFC of routine and repetitive work. Doc. No. 12 at 30. As a

result, the ALJ’s decision satisfies the articulation standard set forth in Diaz. 

Moreover, Kline herself asserts that had the ALJ properly assessed Dr. Turner-Campbell's

opinion that Kline "would possibly be found disabled." Doc. No. 17 at 10. Thus, Kline

concedes that if Dr. Turner-Campbell’s opinion were weighed more heavily as she requests, a

finding of disability would merely be a possibility. However, reversal is only warranted when

the record compels a contrary result. See Borovsky v. Holder, 612 F.3d 917, 921 (7th Cir. 2010). 

Therefore, remand would not be appropriate here regardless.

 In summary, the ALJ sufficiently articulated her rationale for discounting Dr. TurnerCampbell’s opinion and built the necessary logical bridge from the evidence to her conclusion.

b. Dr. Holleman’s Assessment

Next, Kline, again, makes an argument that the ALJ improperly picked and chose

evidence when evaluating Dr. Holleman’s opinion. Over a page and a half of her brief, Kline

presents a scattershot of portions of Dr. Holleman’s opinion, including references to Kline’s

memory and concentration deficits that she contends support a finding that she cannot perform

repetitive tasks. Kline asserts that the ALJ’s decision to the contrary fails to explain why Dr.

Holleman’s limitations were rejected. 

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The level of analysis Kline demands of the ALJ is not in line with the applicable legal

standard. An ALJ need not specifically address every piece of evidence in the record, but must

present a “logical bridge” from the evidence to her conclusion. O’Connor-Spinner v. Astrue,

627 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2010). The ALJ’s decision demonstrates that she gave careful

consideration to Dr. Holleman’s opinion, as the decision is replete with discussion of the

opinion. See Doc. No. 12 at 26, 29, 30. After completing her last discussion of Dr. Holleman’s

opinion, the ALJ then notes that she “has accounted for the claimant’s memory and

concentration deficits by limiting her to work that is simple, routine and repetitive, free of fastpaced production rate.” Doc. No. 12 at 31 (emphasis added). Thus, the ALJ considered exactly

the parts of Dr. Holleman’s opinion that seem to concern Kline here in determining that Kline

could perform repetitive work. Moreover, Kline fails to mention that Dr. Holleman did not

conclude that she was so limited that she could not work. See Doc. No. 17 at 8-10; Doc. No. 12

at 625-32. Dr. Holleman did indicate that Kline would “prefer not to take a leadership role,” and

“would likely do better if she is not required to multi-task,” but noted that she should continue

“to explore potential career options.” Doc. 12 at 631. These opinions are consistent with, and

provide substantial evidence in support of, the ALJ’s determination that Kline is limited to

simple, routine, repetitive tasks with only occasional interaction with others. Therefore, the ALJ

sufficiently articulated her reasoning for her treatment of Dr. Holleman’s opinion. 

c. Credibility Determination of Kline’s Mental Impairments

Kline’s final challenge to the RFC determination is based upon the ALJ’s purported error

in assessing Kline’s credibility with respect to her concentration, attention, and cognitive

abilities. An ALJ must follow a two-step process, determining first whether there are underlying

medically determinable physical or mental impairments that could be reasonably expected to

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produce the claimant’s symptoms, and second determining whether the intensity, persistence,

and limiting effects of the claimant’s symptoms to determine the extent to which they limit the

claimant’s functioning. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929, SSR 96-4p, 96-7p. At the hearing, Kline

testified that she is unable to work due to depression, concentration problems, and her emotions. 

The ALJ found that Kline’s medically determined impairments could be reasonably expected to

cause her alleged symptoms, but the ALJ did not find Kline’s statements concerning “the

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [those] symptoms [to be] entirely credible.” Doc. 12

at 25. 

An ALJ’s credibility finding is entitled to great deference and should be upheld unless

patently wrong. See Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413-14 (7th Cir. 2008); Schmidt v. Astrue,

496 F.3d 833, 843 (7th Cir. 2007). Reviewing courts examine whether a credibility

determination was reasoned and supported; only when an ALJ’s decision “lacks any explanation

or support . . . will [the court] declare it to be ‘patently wrong.’” Elder, 529 F.3d at 413-14

(internal citations omitted). An ALJ must only give reasons for the weight given to a claimant’s

statements sufficient to provide a fair sense of how she assessed the claimant’s testimony. See

SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186. An ALJ complies with SSR 96-7p, and the Court will affirm her

finding, so long as she “gives specific reasons that are supported by the record.” Skarbek v.

Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 505 (7th Cir. 2004). A claimant’s contentions, which “are nothing more

than a rehash of the medical records that do not point to any specific evidence contradicting the

ALJ’s conclusions” will not support reversal. Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 747 (7th Cir.

2005).

Here, Kline’s credibility argument is simply a rehash of the medical records without any

specific citation to evidence contradicting the ALJ’s finding. Kline makes a blanket statement,

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without any further direction, that medical evidence within her submission to the Court supports

her position. Doc. No. 17 at 11-12. Moreover, in her decision, the ALJ gave reasons for her

credibility assessment, citing all of the activities that Kline engages in, including: doing chores

and taking classes at the YWCA, watching her friend’s children, looking for a part-time job,

painting, coloring, watching television, using a computer, playing games, watching movies for at

least an hour, completing high school and a semester of college, and more. Doc. 12 at 25-31. 

Consequently, the ALJ has provided adequate explanation for her credibility determination and,

as such, it is not patently wrong and deserves deference.

2. Step Five Analysis

Last, Kline asserts that the ALJ's Step Five determination that Kline is capable of

performing other work in the national economy is not supported by substantial evidence. The

Step Five determination was based upon the opinion of vocational expert Ronald Malik, who

Kline contends relied on an "incomplete hypothetical question" in reaching his opinion. Kline's

argument is essentially that the Step Five analysis is erroneous because it flows from the

erroneous RFC determination. However, the ALJ was not required to include in her questioning

to the vocational expert any limitations that she did not find to be credible or supported by the

evidence. Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 520-21 (7th Cir. 2009). Because the ALJ's RFC

determination is not changed as a result of this opinion and order, the hypothetical question was

not incomplete, and this argument also fails. 

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IV. CONCLUSION

Because the ALJ properly evaluated consultative opinions of Dr. Turner-Campbell and

Dr. Holleman and because the ALJ’s credibility determination of Kline’s concentration,

attention, and cognitive abilities was not patently wrong, this Court concludes that the ALJ’s

RFC determination is supported with substantial evidence. Thus, this Court AFFIRMS the

Commissioner’s decision pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). [Doc. No. 17]. The

Clerk is instructed to term the case and to enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner.

SO ORDERED.

Dated this 12th day of February, 2016

S/Christopher A. Nuechterlein

Christopher A. Nuechterlein

United States Magistrate Judge

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