UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

IV’LEANIA PARKER, )

)

Plaintiff )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 2:14-CV-10 RLM

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant )

OPINION AND ORDER

Iv’leania Parker seeks judicial review of the final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security denying her applications for disability insurance

benefits and Supplemental Security Income under the Social Security Act, 42

U.S.C. §§ 423 and 1381. The court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). For the reasons that follow, the court affirms

the Commissioner's decision.

Ms. Parker previously applied for disability benefits in July 2008. After a

hearing and a supplemental hearing in 2010, an ALJ determined that while Ms.

Parker was disabled during the period March 2007 through February 2009,

medical improvement occurred, and her disability ended, as of March 1, 2009. In

her current petition, Ms. Parker asserts disability as of May 5, 2011, due to

several physical impairments. Her application for benefits was denied initially, on
reconsideration, and after an administrative hearing on June 11, 2013, where she

was represented by counsel.

In evaluating Ms. Parker’s new disability claim, the ALJ considered the

documentary evidence presented at the hearing and testimony from Ms. Parker

and vocational expert Clifford M. Brady. Applying the agency’s standard five-step

analysis (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520), the ALJ found that Ms. Parker

(1) had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 5, 2011;

(2) had severe physical impairments, including status-post bilateral

mastectomy and reconstruction, degenerative disc disease of the

cervical spine, and fibromyalgia;

(3) didn’t have an impairment or combination of impairments that met

or equaled the severity of any impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,

Subpt. P, App’x 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526,

416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926); and

(4) had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as

defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a), with some

physical limitations, and could perform her past relevant work as a

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The ALJ concluded that Ms. Parker “has the residual functional capacity to perform 1

sedentary work . . . as [she] can lift and/or carry 10 pounds occasionally and lesser weights

frequently; stand and/or walk for up to 2 hours in an 8-hour workday; and sit for up to 6 hours

in an 8-hour workday. [She] can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds but can occasionally climb

ramps and stairs; and occasionally balance, stoop, and crouch but never kneel or crawl. [Ms.

Parker] must avoid concentrated exposure to wetness, including slippery, uneven surfaces, and

concentrated exposure to hazards, including unprotected heights and dangerous machinery.” Rec.,

at 25 [ALJ Decision (Aug. 15, 2013), at 5].

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loan interviewer and a correspondence review clerk (20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1565 and 416.965), as well as other occupations, including, but

not limited to, a telephone solicitor (7,500 jobs regionally and

650,000 nationally) and a receptionist (8,500 jobs regionally and

750,000 nationally).

The ALJ concluded that Ms. Parker wasn’t disabled within the meaning of

the Act and wasn’t entitled to benefits. When the Appeals Council denied her

request for review in December 2013, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision

of the Commissioner of Social Security. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 107 (2000);

Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010). This appeal followed.

Ms. Parker contends that the ALJ ignored important evidence in the record,

that his findings aren’t supported by substantial evidence, and that he improperly

minimized the effects of her fibromyalgia. She asks the court to either reverse the

Commissioner's decision and award benefits or remand the case for further

proceedings.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issue before the court isn’t whether Ms. Parker is disabled, but whether

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision that she is not. Scott v. Astrue,

647 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 2011); Nelms v. Astrue, 553 F.3d 1093, 1097 (7th Cir.

2009). Substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

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might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402

U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010). In

reviewing the ALJ’s decision, the court can’t reweigh the evidence, make

independent findings of fact, decide credibility, or substitute its own judgment for

that of the Commissioner, Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 513 (7th Cir. 2009);

Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 434-435 (7th Cir. 2000), but, instead, “will conduct

a critical review of the evidence, considering both the evidence that supports, as

well as the evidence that detracts from, the Commissioner’s decision.” Briscoe v.

Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005). While the ALJ isn’t required “to

address every piece of evidence or testimony presented, he must provide a ‘logical

bridge’ between the evidence and the conclusions so that [the court] can assess

the validity of the agency’s ultimate findings and afford the claimant meaningful

judicial review.” Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010).

II. DISCUSSION

A.

Ms. Parker first claims the ALJ “completely ignored important evidence in

the record for no apparent reason,” specifically complaining that the ALJ’s

decision didn’t mention the results of the MRI of her brain (dated April 4, 2013)

or her CT scan (dated April 16, 2013). Ms. Parker says “[t]he conclusion of both

tests was demyelination, a degenerative process that causes problems with nerve

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impulse conduction, and more particularly multiple sclerosis,” Pltf. Memo., at 9-

10, and the ALJ’s failure to mention the MRI and CT scan “is a failure to consider

all relevant evidence and should result in a remand.” The court can’t agree.

The written reports don’t support Ms. Parker’s claim that each test resulted

in a diagnosis of demyelination: the MRI report notes a possibility of 2 3

“demyelinating plaques,” the report of the later CT scan doesn’t mention 4

“demyelinating plaques” or “demyelination,” and neither report concludes that Ms.

Parker has carpal tunnel syndrome or multiple sclerosis. But, Ms. Parker says,

even if the objective tests didn’t identify her condition as carpal tunnel syndrome,

her examining physicians believed she had that condition, so the ALJ shouldn’t

have concluded that the problems she had with her hands wasn’t a disabling

condition.

Ms. Parker complains that the ALJ didn’t mention the MRI or CT scan in his

decision, but she hasn’t explained how those reports qualify as relevant evidence.

Ms. Parker hasn’t stated that the tests resulted in any follow-up treatment by Dr.

Abu-Aita (who ordered the tests), she doesn’t claim the tests changed her course

Demyelination is defined as the “breakdown of the fatty sheaths that surround and

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insulate nerve cells,” AMA COMPLETE MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 443 (2003).

Brain MRI Radiology Report, Impression: “Very few periventricular and subcortical white

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matter hyperintensity foci bilaterally. This is a nonspecific finding and could represent

demyelinating plaques but could also be sequela of chronic small vessel ischemic disease.” Rec.,

at 655.

CT Head Scan Radiology Report, Impression: “No evidence of acute intracranial disease.

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A collection of a few cortical veins in the right parasagittal convexity corresponds to possible

abnormality seen in the brain MRI. No mass or abnormal enhancement.” Rec., at 654.

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of treatment or medications, and she hasn’t argued that the tests confirmed a

disabling condition. An ALJ isn’t required to address “every piece of evidence or

testimony in the record, [but] the ALJ’s analysis must provide some glimpse into

the reasoning behind [the] decision to deny benefits.” Simms v. Astrue, 599 F.

Supp. 2d 988, 997 (N.D. Ind. 2009); see also Murphy v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 815

(7th Cir. 2014) (“In reaching its decision, the ALJ must build a logical bridge from

the evidence to his conclusion, but he need not provide a complete written

evaluation of every piece of testimony and evidence.”). The ALJ discussed Ms.

Parker’s testimony and reviewed the medical evidence in his report and based on

those considerations concluded that Ms. Parker’s hand pain wasn’t so disabling

to preclude her from performing her past relevant work. While Ms. Parker

complains that the ALJ had “tunnel vision regarding the EMG,” she hasn’t offered

any explanation about her conclusion in that regard nor has she explained how

the non-specific results of the MRI and CT scan could have affected the ALJ’s

decision. Ms. Parker hasn’t shown that the ALJ “ignored important evidence for

no apparent reason.” 

B.

Ms. Parker next claims the ALJ’s findings with respect to the following

issues aren’t supported by substantial evidence. 

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Glaucoma

Ms. Parker contends the ALJ’s conclusion that her glaucoma isn’t a severe

impairment is inconsistent with the treatment records for her condition. She had

laser surgery on both eyes in 2013 and was prescribed medicated eye drops, but

even with the use of those drops, she continued to have headaches and problems

with the pressure in her eyes. Ms. Parker claims the ALJ’s statement that her

doctor “‘just recommended drops’ reflects a complete misunderstanding of

glaucoma and its treatment and is not consistent with the treatment records. . .

. The treatment options at the Deen Gross Eye Center include the use of

medicated eye drops, laser treatments and surgery. The very purpose of the

various treatments is to prevent further damage to the optic nerve.” Pltf. Memo.,

at 11. 

In reviewing the medical records relating to Ms. Parker’s glaucoma, the ALJ

found that Ms. Parker:

initially went to the Deen Gross Eye Center in December 2011

complaining of blurry vision since her glaucoma surgery 10-12 years

ago. The doctor opined that [she] had POAG in her left eye and just

recommended drops. The doctor noted in March 2012 that [she]

responded well to the treatment, and he found in May 2012 that her

condition was stable. [Ms. Parker] did not return to the doctor until

March 2013 when she complained of irritation in her eye when she

rubbed it. The doctor noted that [her] vision was 20/40, and he again

prescribed drops. In May 2013, the doctor indicated that [she] had no

visual complaints and that her eyes felt okay. [She] recently

underwent two laser treatments in May and June 2013 on her left

eye, and she has just complained of a little irritation. 

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Rec., at 24. The ALJ noted, as well, that the records from the Deen Gross Eye

Center contain “no evidence of any decreased vision” and report that Ms. Parker

“has responded well to treatment.” Rec., at 24. 

Contrary to Ms. Parker’s claim, the ALJ didn’t merely state that her

physicians had “just recommended drops” for her glaucoma; he considered her

past glaucoma surgery, her laser treatments, and her care at the Deen Gross Eye

Clinic. Ms. Parker says she has pain, blurry vision, and headaches that last all

day, but none of the treatment records from the Deen Gross Eye Clinic contain

any restrictions on, or recommendations of limitations to, her activities. She

testified at the hearing that she is able to read, watch television, and drive. Rec.,

at 55, 58. Substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s conclusion that

Ms. Parker’s glaucoma is “non-severe.” See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,

401 (1971) (“Substantial evidence . . . [is] more than a mere scintilla. It means

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support

a conclusion.”). 

Carpal Tunnel Syndrome

Ms. Parker contends the ALJ’s conclusion that her wrist and hand pain isn’t

a severe impairment isn’t supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

As already discussed, the ALJ examined the record of Ms. Parker’s

complaints of hand pain and the treatment she received for that condition. He

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noted that an EMG of her upper extremities showed no evidence of radiculopathy

or carpal tunnel syndrome, but that the MRI of her spine showed evidence of

cervical spondylosis; reports from the consultative examination were that she had

normal grip strength and fine finger manipulation; none of the records from her

treating physicians included any limitations on her activities; and no “medical

source has mentioned findings equivalent in severity to the criteria of any listed

impairment, either individually or in combination.” Rec., at 24.

The ALJ noted in his report that even though Ms. Parker had undergone

surgery for carpal tunnel syndrome, she reported to her doctors and testified at

the hearing that she continued to experience pain in her hands. The ALJ also

cited the following evidence in the record, which shows that

– Robert Stannard, M.D., treated Ms. Parker in March 2012 for

neck pain; 

– Dr. Stannard referred her to Dr. George Abu-Aita, a

neurologist, the following month with complains of neck pain and

numbness of her hands;

– an April 2012 MRI of her spine showed cervical spondylosis

and possible neck spasms;

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– an EMG of her upper extremities in April 2012 showed no

evidence of carpal tunnel syndrome;5

– in July 2012, Ms. Parker underwent a consultative

examination by Dr. M. Siddiqui, whose report shows that Ms. Parker

told him that she has burning pain in her hands that sometimes

radiates up to her shoulders and that she has trouble lifting and

gripping well with her hands; based on his examination, Dr. Siddiqui

found that Ms. Parker didn’t appear to be in any acute distress,

ambulated with a normal gait, had diminished range of motion in her

lumbar spine but otherwise had a full range of motion, had trouble

squatting but had no issues performing heel-to-toe walking, had

generalized muscle tenderness with normal muscle and grip strength,

and could pick up and grip coins with both hands;6

– Ms. Parker began physical therapy in August 2012 for neck

and shoulder pain, which resulted in a recommendation of continued

therapy to improve her muscle strength and mobility in her neck and

 The following results were reported from Ms. Parker’s EMG: “[n]erve conduction studies 5

of both upper extremities were normal,” “[n]eedle electromyography of both upper extremities and

the lower cervical paraspinal muscles was normal,” and “[t]here is no electrodiagnostic evidence

of polyneuropathy, carpal tunnel syndrome, ulnar neuropathy, myopathy, brachial plexopathy, or

active cervical motor radiculopathy.” Rec., at 601.

 Dr. M. Siddiqui stated in his examination report that Ms. Parker’s muscle strength was

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“5/5 bilaterally,” her grip strength was “-5/+5 bilaterally,” she had positive Tinel and Phalen tests

bilaterally, and she “is able to pick [up] and grip coin well with both hands separately.” Dr. Siddiqui

found that Ms. Parker had a “possible recurrence of carpal tunnel syndrome.” Rec., at 595.

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shoulders based on an assessment that Ms. Parker had a decreased

range of motion in her neck, diminished strength in her upper

extremities, and mild to moderate tightness in her neck;

– she was examined by Dr. Abu-Aita again in February 2013 for

neck pain and he opined that she might have fibromyalgia; and

– she went to Mark Carter, M.D. in April 2013 to establish care;

Dr. Carter noted that Ms. Parker had diffuse myalgias and greater

than 10 tender points and prescribed Cymbalta for her fibromyalgia.

Rec., at 24, 26-28. The ALJ noted, too, that Ms. Parker had no “persistent

inflammation, deformity of one major peripheral joint, ankylosing spondylitis[,] or

repeated manifestations of inflammatory arthritis.” Rec., at 25.

In support of her claim that the ALJ’s opinion isn’t supported by substantial

evidence, Ms. Parker cites to medical records that she says evidences her hand

pain; the ALJ reviewed that same medical evidence in his decision. Ms. Parker

claims her wrists and hands constitute a severe problem that “is completely

documented by the treating physicians, the consultative physician, and physical

therapist,” Pltf. Memo., at 12; the ALJ recognized that she complained about hand

pain to her physicians and those physicians noted her complaints and

recommended treatment for her condition. And while Ms. Parker disagrees with

the ALJ’s conclusion that the medical evidence didn’t support her claim of

disabling pain or a requirement of limitations beyond those set forth in his

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decision, the court can’t “reweigh the evidence or substitute [its] own judgment for

that of the ALJ; if reasonable minds can differ over whether the applicant is

disabled, [the court] must uphold the decision under review.” Shideler v. Astrue,

688 F.3d 306, 310 (7th Cir. 2012). The ALJ’s review of the medical evidence and

Ms. Parker’s complaints of continued hand pain supports a finding that his

determination in this regard is grounded in substantial evidence in the record. 

Medical Evidence Listing

Ms. Parker next claims that although the ALJ considered listing 13.10 for

her breast cancer, he failed to apply listing 1.08 in 20 C.F.R. § 404, subpt. P, app.

1. Ms. Parker reports that between October 2011 and December 2012 she had

eight breast reconstruction surgeries. She maintains she equaled listing 1.08, and

“[b]ased on this consideration alone the case should be remanded with

instructions to pay [her] for at least a closed period of disability due to breast

cancer and its related treatment.” Pltf. Memo., at 14.

To meet listing 1.08, Ms. Parker must demonstrate “[s]oft tissue injury (e.g.,

burns) of an upper or lower extremity, trunk, or face and head, under continuing

surgical management . . . directed toward the salvage or restoration of major

function, and such major function was not restored or expected to be restored

within 12 months of onset.” 20 C.F.R. § 404, subpt. P, app. 1 § 1.08. Ms. Parker

claimed an upper body injury met the listing, so she was required to prove “an

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extreme loss of function of both upper extremities . . . that interferes very

seriously with [her] ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete

activities” such as “prepar[ing] a simple meal and feed[ing herself] . . . tak[ing] care

of personal” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 1.00(B)(2)(c).

The ALJ cited evidence in the record demonstrating that Ms. Parker had no

such extreme loss of function. The ALJ noted that Dr. Siddiqui found that Ms.

Parker had “full strength in her extremities.” Rec., at 25. Dr. Siddiqui opined that

Ms. Parker had normal muscle strength and intact grip strength and she was able

to pick up and grip a coin with both hands. Rec., at 595. Furthermore, as the ALJ

noted, Ms. Parker testified at the hearing that she cooked simple meals,

straightened up the house, and did the laundry. Rec., at 54. Finally, the ALJ

noted that no medical source found that Ms. Parker met any listing. Rec., at 24.

Ms. Parker bears the burden of demonstrating that she meets the criteria

specified in the listing. See Ribaudo v. Barnhart, 458 F.3d 580, 583 (7th

Cir.2006). In deciding whether Ms. Parker meets a listing, the ALJ must

adequately articulate the foundation for his conclusions. See Scott v. Barnhart,

297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir.2002). 

The ALJ adequately articulated a basis for concluding that Ms. Parker did

not meet listing 1.08. The ALJ analyzed medical evidence and testimony relevant

to listing 1.08 and noted that no medical source found that Ms. Parker met any

listing. The ALJ discussed relevant medical evidence about muscle and grip

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strength and considered Ms. Parker’s activities of daily living. While the ALJ didn’t

specifically discuss listing 1.08 in his opinion, such a failure alone doesn’t

necessitate remand unless the ALJ's analysis was perfunctory. See Ribaudo v.

Barnhart, 458 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir.2006). The ALJ’s analysis in this case was

not perfunctory. Rather, the ALJ adequately articulated a basis for concluding

that Ms. Parker didn’t meet listing 1.08. 

Credibility Determination

Ms. Parker next claims that the ALJ improperly discredited her testimony

and credibility, “disparag[ing] her testimony with the all too common and

unhelpful ‘not entirely credible’ remark.” Pltf. Memo., at 14. Ms. Parker claims

that “there is no explanation in the decision of why Ms. Parker’s credibility should

be questioned.” Pltf. Memo., at 15. According to Ms. Parker, the ALJ’s “faulty

credibility assessment, standing alone, should cause a remand of this case.” Pltf.

Memo., at 17. 

An ALJ’s credibility finding is afforded “considerable deference” and will be

overturned only if “patently wrong.” Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir.

2009). The ALJ must consider “the claimant’s level of pain, medication, treatment,

daily activities, and limitations” while also “justify[ing] the credibility finding with

specific reasons supported by the record.” Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 477 (7th

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Cir. 2009). A reviewing court “merely examine[s] whether the ALJ’s determination

was reasoned and supported.” Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008). 

In the course of his opinion, the ALJ discussed Ms. Parker’s level of pain,

medication, treatment, daily activities, and limitations and found discrepancies

that justified his credibility determination. The ALJ noted that while Ms. Parker

claimed that she suffered from constant weakness throughout her body following

her bilateral mastectomy, her physician reported that she was “doing well” after

her reconstructive surgeries and indicated she had “no major concerns.” Rec., at

27, 606. The ALJ noted that Ms. Parker testified at the hearing that she had

generalized pain that radiated throughout her body. Rec., at 27. The ALJ also

noted that Ms. Parker cooked simple meals, visited her family in Chicago, had full

strength in her extremities, and had an intact gait. Rec., at 27-28. Finally, the ALJ

noted that Ms. Parker claimed she carried everything with two hands and

regularly drops objects due to her carpal tunnel syndrome. Rec., at 26. The ALJ

noted that an EMG of her upper extremities demonstrated no evidence of carpal

tunnel syndrom. The ALJ noted, as well, that Dr. Siddiqui found that Ms. Parker

had intact grip strength and was “able to pick [up] and grip coin well with both

hands separately.” Rec., at 28, 595.

Ms. Parker claims that the ALJ’s credibility determination was insufficiently

articulated, but the inconsistencies between Ms. Parker’s statements about the

limiting effects of her impairments and the medical evidence in the record cited

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by the ALJ provide the support required for a credibility determination. “It is only

when the ALJ’s [credibility] determination lacks any explanation or support that

we will declare it to be patently wrong.” Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th

Cir. 2008). The ALJ’s analysis of the inconsistencies between Ms. Parker’s

statements and the medical evidence is sufficient so his credibility determination

is not patently wrong.

Age Determination

Ms. Parker next claims that the ALJ erred in considering her age in relation

to her ability to work. Ms. Parker notes the ALJ found that she was 48 years old

at the time of her disability’s alleged onset date, but stated that she wasn’t

disabled “through the date of this decision,” more than two years after the alleged

onset date, at which time she had reached 51 years of age. Rec., at 29–30. Ms.

Parker says age is highly relevant to disability determinations, so the ALJ’s

consideration of her age in his decision constitutes an error. Pltf. Memo., at 17.

Under the Social Security Administration’s regulations, a 48-year-old is a

“younger individual,” whereas a 51-year-old is a “person closely approaching

advanced age.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(d–e). Ms. Parker correctly notes that the

difference between a “younger individual” and a “person closely approaching

advanced age” can be significant for some disability determinations. The age

classification is particularly relevant to Ms. Parker’s case because the ALJ limited

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her to sedentary work, a limitation that triggers a disability determination for

people over 50 in some circumstances. Rec., at 25; see also 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,

subpt. P, app. 2, § 201.00(g) (under the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, a person

approaching advanced age and limited to sedentary work will ordinarily be found

to be disabled if that person has no transferable skills and cannot perform

relevant past work). The relevance of age categories under the regulations,

however, relates only to the ability of a claimant to adjust to new work. See 20

C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, § 201.00(g); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563 (noting that the

Social Security Administration considers advancing age to be a significant factor

in the claimant’s ability to adjust to a new type of work); Tom v. Heckler, 779 F.2d

1250, 1256 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming that “[u]nder the regulations, age plays an

important role in the determination of whether or not skills are transferable”). The

ALJ found Ms. Parker capable of performing past relevant work as a loan

interviewer and a correspondence review clerk. Rec., at 28. The ALJ’s finding that

Ms. Parker could perform past relevant work was a sound basis for his

determination that she wasn’t disabled at the alleged onset date, when she was

48 years old, and at the date of his decision, when she was 51 years of age. The

ALJ didn’t err when considering Ms. Parker’s age in his disability determination. 

C. 

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Ms. Parker lastly argues that even though the ALJ found that her

fibromyalgia was a severe impairment, he wrongfully minimized its effects and

failed to follow Social Security Rule 12-2p, which provides guidance on evaluating

fibromyalgia in disability claims. Ms. Parker specifically alleges that the ALJ failed

to follow SSR 12-2p when determining whether her condition met or medically

equaled a listing and in determining her residual functional capacity. 

First, the court must examine the ALJ’s consideration of Ms. Parker’s

fibromyalgia in his determination that she did not meet a listing. Because

fibromyalgia isn’t a listed impairment, Social Security Rule 12-2p requires an ALJ

to determine whether a claimant’s fibromyalgia medically equals a listing alone or

in combination with another medically determinable impairment, SSR 12-2p, and

adequately articulate the foundation for his conclusions. Scott v. Barnhart, 297

F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002). Ms. Parker bears the burden of demonstrating that

she meets the criteria specified in a listing. Ribaudo v. Barnhart, 458 F.3d 580,

583 (7th Cir. 2006).

The ALJ adequately articulated the foundation for his conclusion that Ms.

Parker did not meet a listing, despite his finding that her fibromyalgia was a

severe impairment. Even though the ALJ noted that no medical source found that

Ms. Parker met any listing, Rec., at 24, he analyzed whether Ms. Parker met

relevant listings, including 1.04 (disorders of the spine) and 14.09 (inflammatory

arthritis). Rec., at 24. While the ALJ didn’t mention her fibromyalgia in his

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analysis, he stated elsewhere in his opinion that he considered SSR 12-2p as it

relates to fibromyalgia. Rec., at 24. Furthermore, the ALJ considered listing 14.09,

the listing suggested by SSR 12-2p. The ALJ’s consideration of SSR 12-2p,

relevant listings, and the opinions of medical sources indicating that Ms. Parker

didn’t meet any listing constitutes an adequate articulation of a foundation for his

conclusion that Ms. Parker’s fibromyalgia didn’t medically equal a listing alone or

in combination with another medically determinable impairment. 

The court next examines the ALJ’s consideration of Ms. Parker’s

fibromyalgia in his residual functional capacity determination. The residual

functional capacity “represents the maximum a person can do – despite [her]

limitations – on a regular and continuing basis.” Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351,

362 (7th Cir. 2013). A court must uphold an ALJ’s residual functional capacity

determination “if the evidence supports the decision and the ALJ explains his

analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful

review.” Arnett v. Astrue, 676 F.3d 586, 591–592 (7th Cir. 2012). 

Social Security Rule 12-2p adds a requirement to the ALJ’s residual

functional capacity determination when fibromyalgia is found. The rule requires

that the ALJ “consider a longitudinal record whenever possible because the

symptoms of [fibromyalgia] can wax and wane so that a person may have bad days

and good days.” SSR 12-2p; Ingram v. Colvin, No. 1:13-CV-01081-SLD, 2014 WL

3704816, at *4 (C.D. Ill. July 25, 2014). 

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The ALJ noted medical evidence that indicated Ms. Parker suffered from

“generalized weakness due to her fibromyalgia and history of breast cancer,” so

he limited her standing and walking requirements. Rec., at 28. Recognizing that

the medical evidence indicated Ms. Parker’s fibromyalgia “restricts her ability to

lift heavier objects,” the ALJ limited her lifting requirements. Rec., at 28. And the

ALJ noted medical evidence indicating that pain from Ms. Parker’s fibromyalgia

required postural limitations, which he included in his findings. Rec., at 28.

Ms. Parker claims that “the only consideration of her fibromyalgia during

the assessment of her residual functional capacity was to find [that] her

statements were ‘not entirely credible.’” Pltf. Memo., at 19. Despite Ms. Parker’s

claim that the ALJ failed to adequately consider her fibromyalgia in his residual

functional capacity determination, the ALJ’s decision was based on substantial

evidence, he considered the longitudinal record, and he sufficiently explained his

analysis. Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination, and he

articulated his analysis with sufficient detail and clarity to permit meaningful

review, this court may not overturn it.

III. CONCLUSION

The ALJ did not ignore important evidence in the record; his findings that

Ms. Parker’s glaucoma as well as her wrist and hand pain were non-severe was

based on substantial evidence; he adequately articulated his determination that

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Ms. Parker didn’t meet or medically equal a listing; his credibility determination

was not patently wrong; his age determination was not in error; and he adequately

considered Ms. Parker’s fibromyalgia when determining whether she met or

medically equaled a listing and her residual functional capacity. Accordingly, the

final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: November 5, 2015 

 /s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr. 

Judge, United States District Court

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