UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

MAURICE JOHNSON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 3:14-cv-01546-PPS

 )

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Maurice Johnson, a pro se prisoner, filed this habeas corpus petition challenging

his conviction and sentence by the Lake County Superior Court on September 7, 1995,

under cause number 45G03-9401-CF-019. This petition is untimely. But even if it

weren’t, the claims raised by Johnson are without merit – so let me start there. 

Johnson says he belongs to the “Moorish American Nation” and all three of his

grounds for relief center on that supposed status. In Ground One, Johnson states that

he is “a freeborn Moorish American National and indigenous native, blood-descendant

to the Moorish Empire.” Docket Entry 2 at 5. Then at some length he explains why he

thinks this means that he cannot be subjected to the Rape and Criminal Deviate

Conduct laws of the State of Indiana for which he was convicted. In Ground 2, he states

that a treaty between the United States and Morocco “forbids Moorish moslems from

being tried in any christian court of law . . . .” DE 2 at 9. In Ground 3, Johnson states

that, “the use of all capital letters in my name indicates that I was brought into this

cause as a corporation without my ‘consent’.” DE 2 at 12. These arguments are
meritless. The Seventh Circuit, responding to a similar claim “that the federal courts

lack subject matter jurisdiction over [the defendant] and that the laws he is charged

with violating are inapplicable to him because he is a Native Asiatic Moorish National

Citizen,” wrote that “[t]his argument is frivolous.” United States v. Toader, 409 Fed.

Appx. 9, 13 (7th Cir. 2010); see also El v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., 710 F.3d 748, 750 (7th Cir.

2013) (explaining the “Sovereign Citizens” movement). “Laws of the United States

apply to all persons within its borders. Even if [the defendant] were not a citizen of the

United States (though he is, having been born here), he would be obliged to respect the

laws of this nation.” United States v. James, 328 F.3d 953, 954 (7th Cir. 2003).“Regardless

of an individual’s claimed status of descent, be it as a ‘sovereign citizen,’ a

‘secured-party creditor,’ or a ‘flesh-and-blood human being,’ that person is not beyond

the jurisdiction of the courts. These theories should be rejected summarily, however

they are presented.” United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011) (collecting

cases). So even if this petition were timely, it still wouldn’t present any basis for habeas

corpus relief. 

But as I noted at the outset, Johnson was convicted over 18 years ago, so this

petition is untimely in any event. Habeas Corpus petitions are subject to a strict oneyear statute of limitations. Question 18 on the form used by Johnson set forth this

statutory requirement and asked him to explain why he believes that his petition is

timely. Here is that portion of the statute which was printed on the form:

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(1) A one-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of --

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by

the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time

for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted

was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right

has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the

claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

In response, Johnson typed:

The petitioner states as fact and truth the following.

Was released on conviction after serving 18 and a half years in

prison on 9/1/2011. Because I refused to sign parole papers for the

reasons mentioned herein, I was re-arrested for parole violation on

9/11/2013. The purpose for this instrument is to vacate the original

sentence handed down by the LAKE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT,

because I’m being forced to complete the remainder of my sentence under

This cause, which was de facto from the start. I served 18 plus years from

a court that never had jurisdiction to compel me to perform.

DENATIONALIZATION, is a first degree criminal violation for any

government to enact upon a people under colorable amendments to its

constitutional laws, (see federal rule title 18, section 241-242, “NO ONE:

HAS THE RIGHT, ESPECIALLY UNDER CADGES, AND COURTS etc.)

TO DENATIONALIZE, DEPRIVE ANY RIGHTS, PRIVILEGE OR

IMMUNITIES BY REASON OF COLOR OR RACE.

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DE 2 at 19. 

Though this response makes clear that Johnson is challenging his original 1995

conviction (and not his 2013 parole violation), it says nothing about why this petition is

timely. Specifically, it makes no mention of any state action which prevented him from

filing this habeas corpus petition sooner. Neither does it say that the petition is based on

a newly recognized Constitutional right or newly discovered evidence. Moreover, none

of the claims raised in this petition give an indication that any of those three factors are

relevant to this case. Therefore §§ 2244(d)(1)(B), (C) and (D) are not applicable and the

one-year period of limitation began – pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(A) – when the judgment

became final upon the expiration of the time for seeking direct review. 

Johnson filed a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals of Indiana which affirmed

his conviction on July 29, 1998. Johnson v. State, 700 N.E. 2d 509 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)

(table), see also Indiana Clerk of Appellate Courts Online Docket,

https://courtapps.in.gov/Docket/Search/Detail?casenumber=45A059712CR00513.

Johnson did not file a petition to transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court. Id. The deadline

for doing so expired 30 days later on August 28, 1998. See Ind. R. App. P. 57(C). Because

he did not file a post-conviction relief petition (DE 2 at 2-3), the one-year period of

limitation for filing a habeas corpus petition expired on August 30, 1999. This habeas

corpus petition was not filed until nearly fifteen years later and it is therefore untimely. 

Finally, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the court

must consider whether to grant a certificate of appealability. When the court dismisses a

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petition on procedural grounds, the determination of whether a certificate of

appealability should issue has two components. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85

(2000). The petitioner must show that reasonable jurists would find it debatable both

whether the court’s procedural ruling was correct, and whether the petitioner states a

valid claim for the denial of a constitutional right. Id. at 484. As previously explained,

this petition is untimely and the claims it presents are meritless. Because there is no

basis for finding that jurists of reason would debate the correctness of this procedural

ruling or find a reason to encourage the petitioner to proceed further, I will not grant

him a certificate of appealability.

For the foregoing reasons, the court DISMISSES this habeas corpus petition

because it is untimely and DENIES a certificate of appealability.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: May 22, 2014 /s/ Philip P. Simon

Chief Judge

United States District Court

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