UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

MARINA ROSS, on behalf of JACK L. ROSS, 

deceased, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. Case No. 3:14-cv-1968-JVB-CAN 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Acting Commissioner of 

Social Security Administration, 

 

 Defendant. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 Plaintiff Marina Ross seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision to deny her 

deceased husband, Jack L. Ross, disability insurance and supplemental income benefits. She asks 

this Court to reverse the administration’s decision or, alternatively, remand the case to the 

agency for reconsideration. 

A. Facts

Mr. Ross injured his left shoulder at work in November 2008. (R. at 25.) A subsequent 

magnetic resonance imaging of his left shoulder revealed mild degenerative changes and a lowgrade tear of his supraspinatus tendon. Id. After his injury, Mr. Ross continued to complain of 

shoulder pain. In January 2009, his orthopedic physician, Dr. Steven Wynder, performed an 

arthroscopic glenoumeral debridement and subacromial decompression. Id. At a follow-up 

examination, Dr. Wynder opined that Mr. Ross could not lift above waist, push or pull with his 

left arm, or climb ladders. (R. 469.) Mr. Ross stopped working six months after his injury, on 
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May 15, 2009. (R. at 25.) 

In September 2009, Mr. Ross had a second MRI of his left shoulder. (R. at 26.) It showed 

moderate degenerative changes in his acromioclavicular joint and a partial tear in his 

supraspinatus tendon. Id. Two months later, Mr. Ross applied for disability insurance and 

supplemental income benefits, alleging that he could no longer work as grinder, welder, tester, 

and machinist because of obesity, degenerative disc disease and an annular tear in her spine, 

degenerative joint disease in her right knee, and the loss of use of his left shoulder. (Pl.’s Br. at 

3); (R. at 31.) The following month, Mr. Ross underwent a second arthroscopic surgery, which 

debrided his gleonohumeral joint. (Pl.’s Br. at 3.) 

Mr. Ross’s applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. (Pl.’ Br. at 1.) He 

requested a hearing. Id. A hearing was held and thereafter, Administrative Law Judge Yvonne 

Stram determined that Mr. Ross was not disabled. (R. at 100–02.) Furthermore, she determined 

that Mr. Ross was able to perform a variety of light duty work despite his limitations. Id. 

However, because Mr. Ross turned fifty-five on August 11, 2011, ALJ Starm deemed Mr. Ross 

disabled in accordance with the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (f/k/a “GRID”). Id. Mr. Ross 

appealed this decision, challenging the onset date. (R. at 26.) While his appeal was pending, 

Mr. Ross died. (R. at 17.) His wife, Marina Ross was substituted as an interested party. Id. In 

February 2013, the Appeals Council affirmed ALJ Starm’s decision in part and remanded the 

case for reconsideration of the onset date. Id. 

On remand, ALJ Kathleen Eiler presided over a supplemental hearing. At the conclusion 

of the hearing, Ms. Ross requested another hearing if there was any doubt about the onset date. 

Her request was denied. Id. On July 26, 2013, ALJ Eiler found that Mr. Ross was not disabled 

before August 10, 2011, but did become disabled beginning on that date as a result of turning 
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fifty-five. At step-one of the disability analysis, she recognized that Mr. Ross had not engaged in 

gainful employment since May 15, 2009. (R. at 20.) At step-two, she acknowledge that Mr. 

Ross’s alleged impairments were severe and could reasonably cause his alleged symptoms. Id. 

At step-three, she found that despite Mr. Ross’s impairments, he could perform light duty work. 

(R. at 23.) At step-four, she concluded that Mr. Ross could not perform any of his past relevant 

work. (R. at 24.) At step-five, she determined that Mr. Ross was able to perform numerous light 

duty jobs in the national economy. Nonetheless, ALJ Eiler found that Mr. Ross was disabled as 

of August 11, 2011 because he turned fifty-five years old. (R. at 102.) ALJ Eiler’s decision 

became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied Ms. Ross’s 

request to review it. 

A. Standard of Review 

This Court has authority to review Social Security Act claim decisions under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g). The Court will uphold decisions that apply the correct legal standard and are supported 

by substantial evidence. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005). 

The Court will, however, ensure that the ALJ built an “accurate and logical bridge” from 

evidence to conclusion. Thomas v. Colvin, 745 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2014). 

B. Disability Standard

The Commissioner has established a five-step inquiry to evaluate whether a claimant 

qualifies for disability benefits. A successful claimant must show:

(1) he is not presently employed; (2) his impairment is severe; (3) his impairment 

is listed or equal to a listing in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) he is 

not able to perform his past relevant work; and (5) he is unable to perform any 

other work within the national and local economy. 
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Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 699–700 (7th Cir. 2004).

A “no” at any step other than step three means that the claimant is not disabled. Zurawski 

v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001). A “yes” leads either to the next step or, on steps 

three and five, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. Id. The claimant bears the burden of 

proof at every step except step five. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000).

C. Analysis 

Ms. Ross argues that the ALJ misapplied Social Security Ruling 83–20 in finding that 

Mr. Ross did not become disabled until August 11, 2011. She insists that this case should be 

remanded so the ALJ may call an expert to determine his disability onset date. She does not 

challenge the ALJ’s RFC findings and, in fact, raises a purely legal question: whether the ALJ 

should have applied SSR 83-20. 

Ms. Ross also argues that the ALJ impermissibly relied on the GRID to find her husband 

disabled. 

(1) SSR 83-20 is inapplicable 

If the ALJ finds that the claimant is disabled, then she must establish the onset date of 

disability. See SSR 83–20, at *1. It follows, then, “[w]ith no finding of disability, there [is] no 

need to determine an onset date.” Eichstadt v. Astrue, 534 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2008). Here, 

the ALJ deemed Mr. Ross disabled on August 11, 2011, the day he turned fifty-five. (R. at 33.) 

Under 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, a claimant with little skill and advanced age (fiftyfive or older), with the ability to perform light duty work is considered disabled. ALJ Eiler did 

not find that Mr. Ross was disabled at any other point of her analysis, nor did ALJ Starm in the 
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administrative proceedings. (R. at 17.) Instead, ALJ Eiler found that Mr. Ross’s categorical shift 

from being a “closely approaching advanced age” to an “advanced age” rendered him disabled. 

This categorical shift does not trigger SSR 83–20. Patterson v. Colvin, No. 1:13-cv-553, 2014 

WL 2511625 at *2 (S.D. Ind. June 3, 2014) (slip opinion). Moreover, where the ALJ has never 

found the claimant to be disabled, she does not need to apply SSR 83–20. Compare Campbell v. 

Chater, 932 F. Supp. 1072, 1076–77 (N.D. Ill. 1996), with Kenefick v. Astrue, 535 F. Supp. 2d 

898, 907 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 

(2) ALJ did not err in applying the grid 

Next, Ms. Ross argues that the ALJ’s reliance on the grid to find her husband disabled was 

improper. (Pl.’s Br. at 11.) She cites Allen v. Sullivan, 977 F.2d 385, 389 (7th Cir. 1992), and 

Warmonth v. Bowen, 798 F.2d 1109, 1110 (7th Cir. 1986), for support. (Pl.’s Br. at 7.) These 

cases are unavailing to her cause. In Allen, the Court reversed that ALJ’s decision denying Allen 

social security benefits in part because the ALJ failed to consider relevant evidence and instead 

relied on the grid to determine that he was not disabled. 977 F.3d at 388. Unlike Allen, however, 

ALJ Eiler did not rely on the grid to deny Mr. Ross disability benefits. To the contrary, she used 

the grid to award him disability. Additionally, ALJ Eiler thoroughly examined the record, 

including the Ross’ testimony about Mr. Ross’s impairments, his daily living activities, x-rays, 

MRIs, and the treating and state-consulting physicians’ opinions. (R. at 26–30.) 

In Warmonth, the Court explained: 

Application of the grid is precluded, however, in cases where a claimant’s nonexertional limitation restricts the full range of employment opportunities at the level 

of work that he is physically capable of performing; in such cases, resolution of the 

issue generally will require consultation of occupational reference materials or the 

services of a vocational expert. 
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798 F2d at 1110 (citations omitted). 

The Court went on to quote Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 462 n. 5 (1983) for the 

proposition that “the regulations provide that the rules [of the grid] will be applied only 

when they describe a claimant’s abilities and limitations accurately.” 798 F.2d at 1110. 

With this frame-work in mind, the Court reversed the lower courts award of summary 

judgment to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, because the ALJ relied 

“exclusively” on the grid at her step-five analysis, and remanded the case to determine 

whether there exist a significant number of sedentary jobs that Warmoth can perform 

despite his respiratory ailment. Id. at 1111–13. As previously stated, ALJ Eiler did not rely 

solely on the grid for any of her determinations. At step-five, she consulted a vocation 

expert and posed hypothetical questions consistent with Mr. Ross’s residual functional 

capacity. (R. at 50–53.) Ms. Ross does not contest Mr. Ross’s RFC. Thus, ALJ Eiler’s use 

of the grid was permissible. 

E. Conclusion 

The Court affirms the decision of the Acting Commissioner. 

SO ORDERED on March 31, 2016 

 S/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

 JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE