IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

RONALD WARD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 2:14-CV-00001

)

SOO LINE RAILROAD )

COMPANY d/b/a CANADIAN )

PACIFIC, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings, filed by Defendant, Soo Line Railroad

Company d/b/a Canadian Pacific (“CP Rail”), on February 6, 2017 (DE

#95). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion for Judgment on

the Pleadings (DE #95) is GRANTED. Count I of the complaint (DE

#65-1), and Count III of the Second Amended Complaint (DE #28) are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Additionally, the Clerk is ORDERED to

CLOSE this case. 

BACKGROUND

As set forth in this Court’s previous order dated June 21,

2016 (DE #73), this case has a lengthy history. Plaintiff Ronald

Ward (“Ward”) alleges he was injured on June 8, 2013, while sitting

on a locomotive engineer’s seat that collapsed. Ward was then
employed by defendant CP Rail, and was assigned to operate a

locomotive on a job commonly known as the “Windsor (Canada) to

Elkhart (Indiana)” job. Ward’s injury allegedly occurred in

Windsor, Ontario, Canada. 

On January 2, 2014, Ward filed a federal complaint against CP

Rail under Cause Number 2:14-CV-1. The Court later granted Soo

Line’s uncontested motion for judgment on the pleadings, and

dismissed Counts I and II of Ward’s Second Amended Complaint. (DE

#40.) Count III of the Second Amended Complaint remained pending

against CP Rail, and is the subject of the instant motion for

judgment on the pleadings.

On June 3, 2015, Ward filed a separate cause of action in

Illinois state court, alleging claims against: (1) CP Rail, (2)

Nordic, (3) Seats, (4) GE, and (5) Knoedler, Inc. d/b/a Knoedler

Manufacturers, Inc. (“Knoedler”). (DE #65-1.) The state court

complaint (“Complaint”) was removed to federal court, transferred

to this division of the Northern District of Indiana, and opened as

Cause Number 2:15-CV-400. Cause Numbers 2:14-CV-1 and 2:15-CV-400

were consolidated, with all filings to be filed only in Cause

Number 2:14-CV-1. Count I of the Complaint alleged negligence

against Soo Line. Count II alleged strict product liability,

manufacturer defect, and design defect of the locomotive seat

against Seats. Count III alleged negligence against Seats. Counts

VI and VII alleged the same theories of liability, respectively,

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against Nordic. Count VIII alleged that GE negligently installed

the locomotive seat that injured Ward, and failed to report

problems with the seat and its installation instructions.

Seats, Nordic and GE filed a motion to dismiss with this Court

(DE #55), arguing that the Locomotive Inspection Act (“LIA”), 49

U.S.C. § 20701, et seq., preempts all of Ward’s claims against

them. This Court entered an order granting that motion on June 21,

2016 (DE #73), dismissing Counts II, III, VI, VII, and VIII of the

complaint (DE #65-1) because they were preempted by the LIA. Count

I of the complaint (DE #65-1) remained pending.

In front of the Court now is CP Rail’s motion for judgment on

the pleadings for Count I of the complaint (DE #65-1), stating a

claim for negligence against CP Rail; and Count III of the Second

Amended Complaint (DE #28), stating a very similar claim for

negligence against CP Rail. CP Rail’s argument in its initial

memorandum is in its entirety:

Plaintiff’s state common law negligence claims

against CP Rail center on a broken locomotive seat. 

These negligence claims are no different than the

claims he asserted against Seats, Inc. and GE. 

Those claims failed because this Court determined

that Plaintiff asserted “state law claims alleging

[. . .] negligence, with no mention of any federal

standard of care, or any violation thereof.” 

Plaintiff’s negligence claims against CP Rail also

contain “no mention of any federal standard of

care, or any violation thereof.” His state common

law claims against CP Rail are therefore preempted

by the LIA.

(DE #96 at 2-3.)

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In response, Plaintiff argues that the common law negligence

claims against CP Rail are not preempted by the LIA, FELA, or any

other federal statutes. (DE #101 at 3.) He contends the

negligence claims are completely different than the barred claims

of strict products liability, manufacturer defect, and design

defect of the locomotive seat. (DE #101 at 5.) 

CP Rail filed a reply on April 7, 2017 (DE #104). In its

reply, CP Rail relies heavily upon Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods.

Corp., 565 U.S. 625, 631 (2012), arguing that the claims of

negligent maintenance and inspection of the seat, and failure to

warn Plaintiff that the seat was dangerous, are claims that focus

on the locomotive seat, and are preempted by the LIA. 

Plaintiff filed a sur-reply on April 10, 2017, arguing that

the LIA “does not preempt state law claims for failure to warn an

employee of a dangerous, unsafe condition of an engineer’s seat.” 

(DE #105-1 at 1.) Finally, CP Rail filed a response to the surreply, citing to Kurns, and arguing that Court found state law

failure to warn claims are specifically preempted by the LIA. (DE

#110.) This motion is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.

DISCUSSION

A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(c) “is reviewed under the same standard as a

motion to dismiss under 12(b) . . . .” Flenner v. Sheahan, 107

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F.3d 459, 461 (7th Cir. 1997); see also R.J. Corman Derailment

Servs., LLC v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local Union 150,

335 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003). Where a party moves for

judgment on the pleadings, “the motion should not be granted unless

it appears beyond doubt that the non-moving party cannot prove

facts sufficient to support his position.” Housing Auth. Risk

Retention Group, Inc. v. Chicago Housing Auth., 378 F.3d 596, 600

(7th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). 

In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court

must accept as true “all well-pleaded allegations” and view them in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, as well as accept

as true all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the allegations. 

R.J. Corman, 335 F.3d at 647; see also Forseth v. Village of

Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 368 (7th Cir. 2000). 

In granting the motions to dismiss filed earlier in this case

by Nordic, Seats, and GE, this Court set forth the purpose of the

LIA and its preemptive effect. (DE #73 at 5-17.) The LIA sets

standards for locomotives and its “parts and appurtenances,”

generally requiring them to be “in proper condition and safe to

operate without unnecessary danger of personal injury.” 49 U.S.C.

§ 20701(1). The Supreme Court held in Napier v. Atlantic Coast

Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1926), that the Boiler Inspection Act

(“BIA,” which is LIA’s predecessor), “occupied the field of

regulating locomotive equipment . . . so as to preclude state

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legislation . . . .[and] was intended to occupy the field . . .

[and] extends to the design, the construction, and the material of

every part of the locomotive and tender and of all appurtenances.” 

Id. at 607, 611. 

In Kurns, the Supreme Court reiterated that the LIA preempts

the whole field of regulating locomotive equipment. 565 U.S. 625.

That case involved a plaintiff who alleged state common-law claims

of defective design and failure to warn of the dangers posed by

asbestos in locomotives and locomotive parts. The Court in Kurns

directly decided the issue of “whether the LIA pre-empts

petitioners’ state-law claims that respondents defectively designed

locomotive parts and failed to warn [plaintiff] of dangers

associated with those parts.” Id. at 630. It found that

“Petitioners’ common-law claims for defective design and failure to

warn are aimed at the equipment of locomotives. Because those

claims ‘are directed to the same subject’ as the LIA, Napier

dictates that they fall within the pre-empted field.” Id. at 634.

The Supreme Court directly addressed the failure to warn claim, and

reasoned that the “gravamen” of the plaintiff’s failure to warn

claims was still that he suffered harmful consequences resulting

from his exposure to asbestos contained in locomotive parts. Id.

at 635. “Because petitioners’ failure-to-warn claims are therefore

directed at the equipment of locomotives, they fall within the preempted field defined by Napier.” Id. at 635. 

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In this case, Count I of the complaint (DE #65-1), which

contains the most exhaustive list of negligence claims, states that

CP Rail was guilty of one or more of the following acts or

omissions:

(a) Carelessly and negligently failed to provide

the Plaintiff with a reasonably safe place to work;

(b) Carelessly and negligently failed to maintain

and keep in good condition the engineer’s seat on

locomotive 8905;

(c) Carelessly and negligently failed to have its

mechanical department inspect the engineer’s seat

on locomotive 8905;

(d) Carelessly and negligently failed to warn the

Plaintiff of the dangerous and unsafe condition of

the engineer’s seat on locomotive 8905, when the

Defendant knew or in the exercise of ordinary care

should have known, of both the risk of harm and

unsafe condition of its engineer’s seat;

(e) Carelessly and negligently permitted the

engineer’s seat on locomotive 8905 to be and remain

in an unsafe and dangerous condition;

(f) Carelessly and negligently permitted engineer’s

seats to be installed in its locomotive cabins,

including the locomotive Plaintiff was operating on

June 8, 2013, when it knew or should have known of

the dangers and unsafe conditions caused by faulty

installation;

(g) Carelessly and negligently permitted engineer’s

seats to be installed in its locomotive cabins when

it knew or should have known that the engineer’s

seats being installed were inadequate and below the

standards of the industry. 

(DE #65-1 at 3.) 

At first blush, these allegations seem to all be directed at

the engineer’s seat in the locomotive, which seems to be preempted

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as part of the entire locomotive field in accordance with the LIA.

Plaintiff makes two main arguments about why the negligence claims

should not be barred by the LIA. First, he details the purpose of

the FELA and cites to cases holding that the FELA does not reach

common law claims that do not interfere with the FELA statute’s

legislative purpose. Second, he argues the common law claims

revolve around providing a safe work place to employees; therefore,

the claims do not involve regulating locomotive equipment and are

not preempted by the LIA. Both of these arguments are

unpersuasive. 

First, Plaintiff cites to several FELA cases in its response

memorandum in an attempt to argue that the negligence claims are

not preempted by the LIA. Plaintiff relies heavily on HarrisScaggs v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (E.D. Wis. 1998),

which involved an employee’s complaints of racially derogatory

comments and state law emotional distress claims. There, the court

found that “plaintiffs’ claims for negligent and intentional

infliction of emotional distress in this action are not cognizable

under the FELA” and the claims were thus not preempted under FELA. 

Id. at 1183-86. However, Harris-Scaggs deals with FELA preemption

which only provides conflict preemption (preempting only state law

claims which are in direct conflict with the FELA), but the LIA

provides a much more-encompassing field preemption. See Kurns, 565

U.S. at 631 (“We deal here only with the latter, so-called field

8
pre-emption.”). Unlike FELA, the LIA “occup[ies] the entire field

of regulating locomotive equipment to the exclusion of state

regulation.” Id. at 637. Not only does Harris-Scaggs deal with a

different statute, but it is also distinguishable because it

involves racially derogatory comments made to a railroad employee. 

Harris-Scaggs did not involve an injury sustained from locomotive

equipment. 

Lancaster v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 773 F.2d 807, 815 (7th

Cir. 1985), also involved the FELA and a tort unrelated to

locomotive equipment (supervisor’s harassing misconduct), as did

Ray v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 938 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1991)

(analyzing the FELA and supervisor’s harassment of employee). 

Shaffer v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 11 C 970, 2011 WL

4916493 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2011), involved a retaliatory discharge

claim. None of these cases shed any light on the specific issue in

this case - whether Plaintiff’s common-law claims or state safeworkplace claims are preempted by the LIA. 

Plaintiff’s second main argument is that the claims against CP

Rail are for negligent acts or omissions in failing to create a

safe work environment, and thus do not invoke “regulating

locomotive equipment” like the claims previously dismissed against

the other defendants. (DE #101 at 5-7.) The plain words of the

complaint render this argument inaccurate. Plaintiff has alleged

CP Rail negligently:

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failed to provide the Plaintiff with a reasonably

safe place to work . . . failed to maintain and

keep in good condition the engineer’s seat . . .

failed to have its mechanical department inspect

the engineer’s seat . . . failed to warn the

Plaintiff of the dangerous and unsafe condition of

the engineer’s seat . . . permitted the engineer’s

set on locomotive 8905 to be and remain in an

unsafe and dangerous condition . . . permitted

engineer’s seats to be installed in its locomotive

cabins . . . when it should have known of the

dangers and unsafe conditions caused by faulty

installation; [and] . . . permitted engineer’s

seats to be installed in its locomotive cabins when

it knew or should have known that the engineer’s

seats being installed were inadequate and below the

standards of the industry. 

(DE #65-1 at 3.) All of these claims are centered on the safety of

the locomotive seat. Indeed, that is the only part of the

locomotive to which Plaintiff refers when alleging CP Rail failed

to provide him with a safe workplace. 

Plaintiff cites Indiana Code Section 22-1-1-10, arguing the

public policy of the state is for every employer to furnish safe

employment for their employees. (DE #101 at 7.) Yet, the Supreme

Court tackled this question head on in Napier v. Atlantic Coast

Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1926), where the Plaintiff argued a

Georgia statute which prescribed an automatic door to the firebox

and a Wisconsin statute which required a cab curtain, were not

preempted by the Boiler Inspection Act (LIA’s predecessor). The

purpose of the Georgia statute was to protect “the health of the

fireman by protecting him from exposures to extremes of heat and

cold,” protect their eyesight, and protect the employees in the

10
event of an explosion in the fire box. Napier, 272 U.S. at 609-10. 

The purpose of the Wisconsin statute was “to protect engineers and

firemen from the weather during the winter season.” Id. at 610. 

Therefore, those statutes, like Indiana Code section 22-1-1-10,

were focused on providing a safe workplace for railroad employees. 

And yet the Supreme Court found those statutes based on workplace

safety did not prevent LIA preemption. Napier ruled that the LIA

manifests “the intention to occupy the entire field of regulating

locomotive equipment” by reserving for the federal agency the

authority to “set[] the standard” by which a locomotive’s “fitness

for service shall be determined.” Id. at 611-12. That Court went

on to explain the preempted field “extends to the design, the

construction, and the material of every part of the locomotive and

tender and of all appurtenances.” Id. at 611. And that the LIA

preempts state requirements directed at the locomotive equipment

“however commendable or however different their purpose.” Id. at

613.

 In this case, Plaintiff’s negligence claims against CP Rail

are all based upon whether CP Rail failed to provide safe

locomotive equipment; therefore, the claims are preempted by the

LIA. “Because the injured engineer’s negligence and productliability claims may affect ‘the design, the construction, and the

material’ of locomotives, these claims would fall within the

preempted field broadly defined by Napier and Kurns.” BNSF Ry. Co.

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v. Seats, Inc., No. 4:16-CV 3121, 2017 WL 318636, at *4 (D. Neb.

Jan. 23, 2017) (quoting Napier, 272 U.S. at 611). 

The Court notes that in its sur-reply memorandum, Plaintiff

concedes that the LIA “preempts state law claims as to design,

construction, maintenance, installation of locomotive seats.” (DE

#105-1 at 1.) However, Plaintiff still contends that the LIA “does

not preempt state law claims for failure to warn an employee of a

dangerous, unsafe condition of an engineer’s seat.” Id. The

Supreme Court directly addressed and rejected this argument. In

Kurns, the petitioners argued that “even if their design-defect

claims are pre-empted, their failure-to-warn claims do not suffer

the same fate.” Kurns, 565 U.S. at 634. The Petitioners in Kurns

contended that claims did not fall within the LIA’s preemption

because “the basis of liability for failure to warn . . . is not

the design or manufacture of a product, but is instead the failure

to provide adequate warnings regarding the product’s risks.” Id.

The Supreme Court could not have been clearer in finding: 

We disagree. A failure-to-warn claim alleges that

the product itself is unlawfully dangerous unless

accompanied by sufficient warnings or instructions. 

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability §

2(c) (1997) (A failure-to-warn claim alleges that a

product is defective “when the foreseeable risks of

harm posed by the product could have been reduced

or avoided by the provision of reasonable

instructions or warnings by the seller or other

distributor, . . . and the omission of the

instructions or warnings renders the product not

reasonably safe”); see also id., Comment l, at 33

(“Reasonable designs and instructions or warnings

both play important roles in the production and

12
distribution of reasonably safe products”). Thus,

the “gravamen” of petitioners’ failure-to-warn

claims “is still that [plaintiff] suffered harmful

consequences as a result of his exposure to

asbestos contained in locomotive parts and

appurtenances.” 620 F.3d at 398, n.8. Because

petitioner’s failure-to-warn claims are therefore

directed at the equipment of locomotives, they fall

within the pre-empted field defined by Napier, 272

U.S., at 612. . . . For the foregoing reasons, we

hold that petitioners’ state-law design-defect and

failure-to-warn claims fall within the field of

locomotive equipment regulation pre-empted by the

LIA, as that field was defined in Napier. 

Kurns, 565 U.S. at 635-38. 

Moreover, the Kurns Court also directly addressed the

petitioners’ contention that “the LIA’s pre-emptive scope does not

extend to state common-law claims, as opposed to state legislation

or regulation.” Kurns, 565 U.S. at 637. It found that Napier held

the LIA “occup[ied] the entire field of regulating locomotive

equipment” to the exclusion of state regulation. Id. (quoting

Napier, 272 U.S. at 611-12.). And “[t]hat categorical conclusion

admits of no exception for state common-law duties and standards of

care.” Kurns, 565 U.S. at 637. The Kurns Court therefore

“conclude[d] that state common-law duties and standards of care

directed to the subject of locomotive equipment are pre-empted by

the LIA.” Id. As such, the failure to warn claims fell within the

field of locomotive equipment regulation and were pre-empted by the

LIA. Id.

Similarly, in this case, the gravamen of Plaintiff’s failure

to warn claims is that he suffered harm as a result of the

13
engineer’s seat in the locomotive. These claims fall within LIA’s

preemption, as dictated by Kurns. Moreover, this is consistent

with this Court’s earlier ruling on June 21, 2016, on the previous

motion to dismiss, where this Court already acknowledged that

“[t]he Supreme Court has held that ‘state-law design-defect and

failure-to-warn claims fall within the field of locomotive

equipment regulation pre-empted by the LIA.’” Ward v. Soo Line

R.R. Co., No. 2:14-cv-00001, 2016 WL 3402772, at *3 (N.D. Ind. June

21, 2016). This Court concluded that Plaintiff’s claims against

Seats and Nordic fell “squarely within the field of locomotive

equipment regulation contemplated by the LIA” and cited, inter

alia, Estate of Brust v. ACF Indus., LLC, 127 A.3d 729, 737 (N.J.

Super. Ct. 2015) (“state law claims for defective design of the

locomotive equipment, and for failure to warn about its risks, fall

within the field preempted by the LIA”); Bonner v. Union Pacific

R.R. Co., No. CV03-134, 2005 WL 1593635, at *10 (D. Idaho Jul. 6,

2005) (holding LIA preempted common law claim for failure to warn);

Law v. General Motors Corp., 114 F.3d 908, 910-12 (9th Cir. 1997)

(holding LIA preempted claims including failure to warn). Id. at

*3. 

Plaintiff starts off his response brief by arguing that if his

claims are preempted, he would be deprived of a valid claim against

his employer, which would be a violation of his constitutional

right of access to the courts. (DE #101 at 1-2.) This argument

14
was considered by the Court in Mehl v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 417

F.Supp.2d 1104, 1120 (D. N.D. 2006), where injured residents of a

community near railroad tracks brought an action against railway

companies stemming from a train derailment. In analyzing whether

the state law tort claims against the railroad were preempted by

the Federal Railroad Safety Act and pertinent regulations, the

Court reasoned:

While federal preemption often means that there is

no remedy to a claimant, in many instances

unfortunately this result is necessary to vindicate

the intent of Congress. By pervasively legislating

the field of railroad safety, Congress demonstrated

its intent to create national standards and to

preempt state regulation of railroads. If state

common law tort claims were permitted to proceed

despite this Congressional intent, on the ground

that the purported tortfeasor had in some way

allegedly failed to comply with the federal

standards, then manufacturers would inevitably b[e]

subjected to varying interpretation of the federal

regulations in the different states. Inevitably,

these tort actions would generate precisely those

inconsistencies in railroad safety standards that

congressional action was intended to avoid.

Mehl, 417 F.Supp.2d at 1120 (quoting Ouellete v. Union Tank Car

Co., 902 F.Supp. 5, 10 (D. Mass. 1995)). This Court concurs with

the logic articulated in Mehl. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Motion for Judgment on

the Pleadings (DE #95) is GRANTED. Count I of the complaint (DE

#65-1), and Count III of the Second Amended Complaint (DE #28) are

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DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Additionally, the Clerk is ORDERED to

CLOSE this case. 

DATED: May 8, 2017 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

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