* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that

merely decid e particular cases on the basis of well-settled

principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and

burdens on the legal profession." Pursuant to this Rule, we have

determined that this opinion should not be published and is not

precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local

Rule 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 96-30806

Summary Calendar

FREDERICK A. STRUVE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

YORAM RAZ,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

(95-CV-2181)

December 18, 1996

Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, DAVIS, and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Dr. Frederick Struve appe als the district court’s denial of2

his motion for payment of attorney’s fees and costs. Finding no

error, we affirm.

Struve sued Yoram Raz in state court in Louisiana, alleging

that Raz had slandered Struve as the result of written and oral

statements he had made concerning Struve’s integrity as a

researcher. Raz answered the complaint and added his former

employer, the Louisiana State University Medical Center (LSU-MC),

as a third-party defendant, contending that it would also be liable

to Struve and w ould have to indemnify Raz for any judgment paid.

Raz then removed the case to the United States District Court for

the Western District of Louisiana. No legal ground was provided in

his notice of removal. Rather, he apparently thought that because

he was involved as a plaintiff in a pending federal sui t against

LSU-MC, this was sufficient for the case to be removed. On its own

motion, the district court ordered the insta nt case remanded to

state court noting “a clear absen ce of federal subject matter

jurisdiction.”

Approximately two week s after the case was remanded, Struve

filed a motion for costs and attorney’s fees with the district

court under 28 U.S.C. § 1447( c), which provides that a court may

order payment of costs and attorney’s fees against a removing party

when the case is subsequently remanded to state court because of a

defect in the removal, whether it be technical or jurisdictional.

He requested that Raz be assessed with the expenses he incurred in

preparing a motion to remand and in preparing the motion for costs.3

The motion for remand was never filed; nevertheless, he asserts he

had begun to prepare one before the remand order was entered by the

court. The magistrate judge denied the motion by memorandum order

and the district court affirmed on the basis of that order.

The order first noted that Raz was proceeding pro se . While

the removal was “clearly improper,” the magistrate judge found that

it was prompted by “a misunderstanding of the concept of

supplemental jurisdiction in the removal context.” He noted that

this subject sometime s proves vexing for attorneys and concluded

that Raz did not act in bad faith. He also stated that while case

law indicated that bad faith was not a prerequisite for the

imposition of costs under this section, the absence of bad faith

combined with “the absence of any true need for plaintiff to incur

substantial fees or expenses in seeking a remand, warrants denial

of the relief sought.”

We undertook an analysis of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) in Miranti v.

Lee , 3 F.3d 925 (5th Cir. 1993). We there held that the district

court abused its discretion by imposing the cost of attorney’s fees

against a removing party where there was no “impropriety” in the

party’s removal of the ca se at the time of removal. We did not

hold that a district court must impose sanctions when a defendant

improperly removes a case to federal court, only that this is a

necess ary predicate for any sanction. The decision to impose

sanctions is one that lies within the sound discretion of the4

district court. We cannot say that the district court’s refusal to

assess attorney’s fees against a p ro se defendant who was

apparently confused about the law of supplemental j urisdiction

amounts to an abuse of discretion. Likewise, we find no error in

the court’s refusal to assess costs against this defendant.

AFFIRMED.