UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

BRUCE A. TRIGG, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CAUSE NO. 1:13-CV-344

v. )

)

FORT WAYNE CITY OF POLICE )

DEPARTMENT, et al., ) 

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the: (1) Verified Motion

for Attorney Fees and Mileage, filed by the plaintiff, Bruce A.

Trigg, on June 10, 2015 (DE #20); (2) Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment and Designation of Evidence, filed by the

defendants, the City of Fort Wayne, et al., on August 21, 2015 (DE

#29); and (3) Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of Bruce A.

Trigg’s Affidavit, filed by the defendants, the City of Fort Wayne,

et al., on October 5, 2015 (DE #37). For the reasons set forth

below, the Motion for Attorney Fees and Mileage (DE #20) is DENIED,

the Motion for Summary Judgment (DE #29) is GRANTED, and the Motion

to Strike (DE #37) is DENIED. All of the plaintiff’s claims are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this

case. 
BACKGROUND

On November 1, 2013, the plaintiff, Bruce A. Trigg (“Trigg”),

filed a complaint in the Allen Superior Court against the City of

Fort Wayne, the Fort Wayne Police Department, and Fort Wayne Police

Officer Anthony Shefferly (collectively, “Defendants”), bringing

claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sections 1983, 1985, and 1988 for

violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights along with

several state law claims. (DE #1.) Specifically, Trigg alleges

that he was falsely imprisoned when he was unlawfully detained by

Fort Wayne Police Officer Anthony Shefferly (“Officer Shefferly”)

and transported to the Allen County Jail, “where he was booked and

locked up for 34 days.” (Id. at p. 3.) In his complaint, Trigg

references “deprivation of his liberty, mental anguish,

humiliation, shock, stress, embarrassment, false arrest, battered

(sic) defamation, negligent infliction of emotional distress,

intentional infliction of mental distress and other damages and

injuries yet to be determined.” (Id.) Trigg claims that all

actions by Officer Shefferly were in reckless disregard of his

constitutional rights. (Id.) The case was removed to this Court

by Defendants on December 2, 2013. (DE #2.) Defendants filed

their answer on December 9, 2013. (DE #7.) After the discovery

period had concluded, this Court set the matter for a

status/scheduling conference on January 23, 2015, at 1:00 PM (CST)

in the United States District Court located in Hammond, Indiana

2
before the undersigned. (DE #15.) The docket entry directed that

“[c]ounsel for parties [were] required to attend this conference in

person.” (Id.) On the day of the status/scheduling conference,

Trigg appeared in person with his attorney, Samuel L. Bolinger

(“Attorney Bolinger”), but counsel for Defendants did not appear in

person as previously ordered. (DE #16.) Some time after the

status/scheduling conference was scheduled to begin, the Court was

able to contact counsel for Defendants, attorney Carolyn M. Trier

(“Attorney Trier”), via telephone, and the conference took place

telephonically with the Court advising the parties that the Court

reserved the right to issue sanctions against Defendants sua sponte

for failure to appear in person. (Id.)

On June 10, 2015, Trigg filed the instant motion for attorney

fees and mileage based on Attorney Trier’s failure to appear in

person for the status/scheduling conference. (DE #20.) Defendants

filed a response on July 2, 2015. (DE #23.) Trigg’s reply was

filed on July 7, 2015. (DE #24.) 

On August 21, 2015, after receiving permission from the Court

for filing beyond the dispositive motion deadline (see DEs #26 &

#27), Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment. 

(DE #29.) Trigg filed his response in opposition on September 21,

2015. (DE #33.) On October 5, 2015, Defendants filed a reply to

the motion for summary judgment (DE #35), along with the instant

3
motion to strike (DE #37). Trigg failed to file a response to the

motion to strike. Thus, all motions are now ripe for adjudication.

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND MILEAGE

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f) discusses sanctions and

provides that a court may, upon motion or sua sponte, “issue any

just orders . . . if a party or its attorney . . . fails to appear

at a scheduling or other pretrial conference . . . [or] fails to

obey a scheduling or other pretrial order.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

16(f)(1). Rule 16(f) also instructs that: 

[i]nstead of or in addition to any other

sanction, the court must order the party, its

attorney, or both to pay the reasonable

expenses—including attorney’s fees—incurred

because of any noncompliance with this rule,

unless the noncompliance was substantially

justified or other circumstances make an award

of expenses unjust.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f)(2). 

Trigg, through Attorney Bolinger, has filed the instant motion

for attorney fees and mileage, arguing that as a result of

Defendants’ failure to appear in person for the status/scheduling

conference that was set by this Court for January 23, 2015, at 1:00

PM (CST),1

 Trigg and Attorney Bolinger “made the conference for

naught” and incurred time and mileage costs in the amount of

$1,368.16. (DE #20, pp. 1-2.) Defendants filed a response,

1

 The Court’s notice for the status/scheduling conference states that

“[c]ounsel for parties are required to attend this conference in person.” (DE

#15.) 

4
including an affidavit of Attorney Trier, stating that, due to

apparent difficulties with the her email system and/or the

calendering of CM/ECF notifications, Attorney Trier was unaware of

the status/scheduling conference until she received a telephone

call from the Court’s chambers inquiring why she was not personally

present. (DE #23, pp. 1-4; DE #23-1.) Defendants submit that

Attorney Trier’s failure to personally appear was “the result of an

honest mistake and not due to any intentional failure on her part

to comply with the orders of this Court.” (DE #23, p. 4.) 

Defendants argue that the Trigg’s request for attorney fees and

mileage should be denied because she was present telephonically and

all matters that the Court intended to discuss at the

status/scheduling conference were fully addressed. (Id.) 

The Court agrees with Defendants. While it is not entirely

clear that Attorney Trier’s mistake was “substantially justified,”

the Court finds that the circumstances surrounding her failure to

appear in person make an award of expenses in this case unjust. 

Specifically, because the status/scheduling conference was

ultimately still held on January 23, 2015 (albeit with Attorney

Trier appearing telephonically), and all business was conducted as

intended (i.e. discussing the status of the case as related to

mediation and potential trial dates), neither Trigg himself (who

was never required by the Court to be in attendance at the

conference) nor Attorney Bolinger were prejudiced in any

5
significant way. Additionally, based on the reasons set forth in

Attorney Trier’s affidavit, the Court acknowledges that her failure

to appear in person seems to have been an honest mistake rather

than an intentional decision to ignore the orders of this Court. 

Therefore, the motion for attorney fees and mileage is denied. 

That said, Attorney Trier is cautioned that any similar future

failures before this Court will be viewed with extreme disfavor. 

MOTION TO STRIKE

In reference to a motion for summary judgment, “[a] party may

object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot

be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56(c)(4) provides that “[a]n affidavit or declaration used to

support or oppose a motion [for summary judgment] must be made on

personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in

evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to

testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). Thus,

the following statements do not comply with Rule 56(c) and should

be disregarded: (1) conclusory allegations lacking supporting

evidence; (2) legal argument; (3) self-serving statements without

factual support in the record; (4) inferences or opinions not

grounded in observation or other first-hand experience; and (5)

mere speculation or conjecture. Heltzel v. Dutchmen Mfg., Inc.,

6
No. 3:06-CV-0227, 2007 WL 4556735, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 20, 2007)

(citations omitted). Defendants have moved to strike several of

the statements contained in Trigg’s affidavit, arguing that one

statement contradicts Trigg’s prior sworn deposition testimony, and

several others are irrelevant to the matters at hand. 

It is the function of the Court, with or without a motion to

strike, to carefully review the evidence and to eliminate from

consideration any argument, conclusions, and assertions unsupported

by the documented evidence of record offered in support of the

statement. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. KPMG LLP, 412 F.Supp.2d 349, 392

(S.D.N.Y. 2006); Sullivan v. Henry Smid Plumbing & Heating Co.,

Inc., No. 04 C 5167, 05 C 2253, 2006 WL 980740, at *2 n.2 (N.D.

Ill. Apr. 10, 2006); Tibbetts v. RadioShack Corp., No. 03 C 2249,

2004 WL 2203418, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2004); Rosado v.

Taylor, 324 F.Supp.2d 917, 920 n.1 (N.D. Ind. 2004). Motions to

strike are heavily disfavored, and are usually only granted in

circumstances where the contested evidence causes prejudice to the

moving party. Kuntzman v. Wal-Mart, 673 F.Supp.2d 690, 695 (N.D.

Ind. 2009); Gaskin v. Sharp Elec. Corp., No. 2:05-CV-303, 2007 WL

2228594, at *1 (N.D. Ind. July 30, 2007). When ruling on the

instant motion for summary judgment, the Court is capable of

sifting through the evidence and considering it under the

applicable federal rules and caselaw, giving each statement the

7
credit to which it is due. Therefore, the motion to strike is

DENIED as unnecessary.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Standard

Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine

dispute of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct.

2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). Not every dispute between the

parties makes summary judgment inappropriate; “[o]nly disputes over

facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. To

determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the

Court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s

favor. See Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010). 

However, “a court may not make credibility determinations, weigh

the evidence, or decide which inferences to draw from the facts;

these are jobs for a factfinder.” Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767,

770 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). 

8
A party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion

may not rely on allegations in his own pleading but rather must

“marshal and present the court with the evidence [he] contends will

prove [his] case.” Goodman v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d

651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). “[I]nferences relying on mere

speculation or conjecture will not suffice.” Stephens v. Erickson,

569 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). If the

non-moving party fails to establish the existence of an essential

element on which he bears the burden of proof at trial, summary

judgment is proper. See Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th

Cir. 2006).

Initial Matters

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Trigg has conceded

the following in his response brief: any excessive force claims,

all claims arising under the Fourteenth Amendment, conspiracy

claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1985, any failure to intervene

claims, any claims of battery against Officer Shefferly, all

defamation claims, and all claims for punitive damages. Therefore,

the aforementioned claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

Additionally, Trigg has conceded that Officer Shefferly is entitled

to qualified immunity and immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims

Act (“ITCA”). Officer Shefferly’s immunity is duly noted by this

9
Court. Putting the immunity issue to the side, the rest of this

Court’s order will deal with only those claims that remain pending. 

Next, the Court notes that Defendants’ statement of undisputed

material facts consists of a recitation of Officer Shefferly’s

relevant affidavit testimony, excerpts from Trigg’s complaint and

deposition testimony, and a description of the Fort Wayne Police

Department (“FWPD”) motor vehicle tow and inventory policy. (See

DE #30, pp. 2-5.) Defendants accurately cite to the record in

support of their statement. (DE #29-1 through DE #29-4.) For his

statement of disputed material facts, Trigg has simply cut and

pasted Defendants’ statement of undisputed material facts as it

pertains to Officer Shefferly’s affidavit and his own complaint; he

then subsequently added what appears to be his version of events

regarding the traffic stop and arrest as set forth in his own

affidavit. (DE #34, pp. 1-5; see also DE #33-1.) However, Trigg

has not cited to the record at all for this later portion of his

statement. (DE #34, pp. 4-5.) It would be within the Court’s

discretion to simply ignore all assertions without appropriate

citation to the record, but, in the interests of justice, the Court

has considered the relevant and not otherwise inadmissable portions

of Trigg’s affidavit in its analysis. 

Because many of the facts are no longer material due to

Trigg’s concessions described above, the Court will not set forth

a separate section of facts in this order; rather, the material

10
facts will be referenced and cited in the appropriate analysis

sections. Briefly, the Court notes that the following facts are

undisputed. On November 14, 2012, at approximately 5:42 PM, Trigg

was pulled over at the corner of Wildwood Avenue and Clinton Street

by Officer Shefferly. After it was determined that Trigg did not

have a valid driver’s license, Officer Shefferly removed Trigg from

the vehicle and conducted a pat down search for weapons and an

inventory of the vehicle prior to it being towed. Trigg was

ultimately arrested for operating a vehicle without a license while

being a Habitual Traffic Violator - Life and for possession of a

Schedule III controlled substance. He was incarcerated in the

Allen County Jail for 34 days. 

Fourth Amendment Unlawful Arrest

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches

and seizures, and this protection has been extended to the states

through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); U.S. Const. Amend. IV. 

“[T]he existence of probable cause renders both traffic stops and

resulting warrantless arrests permissible.” Jones v. City of

Elkhart, Ind., 737 F.3d 1107, 1114 (7th Cir. 2013). Probable cause

is a “fluid” concept, and the court must evaluate whether “the

facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are

sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable

11
caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect

has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.”

Jones, 737 F.3d at 1114 (citing Thayer v. Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237,

246 (7th Cir. 2012)). In other words, the standard is an objective

one viewed from the perspective of a “reasonable person in the

position of the officer.” Id. In the context of a decision to

stop an automobile, probable cause is present when “the

circumstances confronting a police officer support the reasonable

belief that a driver has committed even a minor traffic offense.” 

U.S. v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2000). The Seventh

Circuit has held that an officer’s observation of a vehicle failing

to use a turn signal establishes probable cause for a traffic stop. 

See Williams v. Brooks, 809 F.3d 936, 943 (7th Cir. 2016); U.S. v.

Hernandez-Rivas, 513 F.3d 753, 759 (7th Cir. 2008). 

Here, Officer Shefferly’s affidavit states that, while on

patrol on the evening in question, he observed a Mercedes Benz

traveling through several alleyways located just east of Barr

Street in Fort Wayne, Indiana. He then observed the vehicle come

out onto Barr Street and turn westbound on Wildwood Avenue without

using a turn signal. Officer Shefferly states that he activated

his emergency red/blue lights and initiated a traffic stop at the

corner of Wildwood Avenue and Clinton Street based on the lack of

proper signaling when the vehicle initially turned from Barr Street

12
onto Wildwood Avenue.2 (See DE #29-1, p. 1.) Officer Shefferly’s

supplemental narrative indicates the same. (Id. at 4.) In support

of these details, Defendants have also submitted a DVD containing

Officer Shefferly’s in-car video for incident number 12F171402 on

November 14, 2012. (DE #28.) In his response brief and affidavit,

Trigg admits that he was later identified as the driver of the

vehicle seen in the video that was pulled over by Officer Shefferly

at the corner of Wildwood Avenue and Clinton Street. (DE #34, p.

6; DE #33-1, pp. 1-2.) However, he claims that the video doesn’t

pick up the lack of turn signal at the corner of Barr Street and

Wildwood Avenue, and he states that that particular vehicle “is not

my car.” (Id.) As such, Trigg argues that “[t]he traffic law

violation did not exist or justif[y] Officer Shefferly’s initial

stop” and that “Officer Shefferly did not have probable cause to

believe that Trigg had committed a traffic violation.” (DE #34,

pp. 6-7.) 

Trigg’s arguments fail. Seventh Circuit case law is clear

that “[w]hen the evidence includes a videotape of the relevant

events, the Court should not adopt the nonmoving party’s version of

the events when that version is blatantly contradicted by the

videotape.” Williams, 809 F.3d at 942 (citing Scott v. Harris, 550

U.S. 372, 379 (2007)). As in Williams, despite Trigg’s arguments

2

 A failure to signal a turn violates Indiana Code 9-21-8-25 which states:

“A signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given continuously during

not less than the last two hundred (200) feet traveled by a vehicle before

turning or changing lanes.” 

13
to the contrary, the video clearly depicts the incident. Even if

the vehicle driving in the alleyways cannot be definitively

identified as Trigg’s car from the video itself, it is abundantly

clear that the vehicle on Barr Street that turned westbound (or

right) onto Wildwood Avenue is the same car that was pulled over by

Officer Shefferly at the corner of Wildwood Avenue and Clinton

Street -- a car which Trigg admits is his.3 The video shows that

Officer Shefferly’s police cruiser is located directly behind the

vehicle in question as it travels down Barr Street and turns right

onto Wildwood Avenue. As Officer Shefferly continues to follow

that vehicle and makes a right onto Wildwood Avenue as well, no

other cars come between them. Officer Shefferly remains directly

behind the vehicle in question until it is pulled over at the

Corner of Wildwood Avenue and Clinton Street. 

Furthermore, it is also abundantly clear from the video that

the vehicle in front of Officer Shefferly’s cruiser on Barr Street

failed to use a signal when it turned right onto Wildwood Avenue. 

The video shows the vehicle’s turn signal flashing as it was

attempting to turn left from Wildwood Avenue onto Clinton Street

(seconds before Officer Shefferly activated the police cruiser’s

emergency lights); however, it does not depict similar flashing as

3

 Officer Shefferly’s police cruiser turns onto Barr Street at

approximately the forty-three second mark of the video, turns right onto Wildwood

Avenue at approximately the fifty-five second mark of the video, and activates

the emergency lights at approximately the one-minute and three second mark of the

video. 

14
the vehicle turned right onto Wildwood Avenue from Barr Street.4

The difference is obvious, and no objective viewer could find

otherwise. As such, it is undisputed that Officer Shefferly had

probable cause for the traffic stop and could lawfully arrest Trigg

for that traffic infraction.5 No reasonable jury could find that

this was an unlawful stop and arrest. See Williams, 809 F.3d at

942-43 (citing Jones, 737 F.3d at 1114). 

Trigg’s remaining cursory arguments -- that he was

“travel[ing] on a Moorish American Right to Travel” and that his

state court case arising from the November 12, 2012, arrest was

later dismissed -- are wholly without merit. See Wos v. Sheahan,

57 Fed. Appx. 694, 696-97 (7th Cir. 2002)(“The right to travel

guarantees citizens of one state the right to enter and leave other

states or to be treated as welcome visitors in other states, not

the right to drive a car without a license.”) (internal citations

omitted); see also Williams, 809 F.3d at 945 (state court dismissal

of the underlying crime for which plaintiff was arrested is

irrelevant to the determination of his federal unlawful arrest

claim).

Because it is undisputed that probable cause existed for the

traffic stop, all of Trigg’s remaining federal false arrest claims

4

 The vehicle in question turns right onto Wildwood Avenue at

approximately the fifty second mark of the video and activates its turn signal

at approximately the one-minute and one second mark of the video. 

5

 See footnote number two, supra. 

15
must fail. Once it was established that Officer Shefferly had

probable cause for the traffic stop, he could arrest Trigg without

violating the Fourth Amendment, even if Trigg was not operating a

vehicle after the life suspension of his license for being a

habitual traffic offender and/or was not found to be in possession

of a Schedule III controlled substance.6 Id. at 943; see also

Jackson, 627 F.3d at 638–39 (“[A]n arrest is reasonable under the

Fourth Amendment so long as there is probable cause to believe that

some criminal offense has been or is being committed, even if it is

not the crime with which the officers initially charge the

suspect.”) (alteration and emphasis in original) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted)). As such, summary judgment is

granted. 

Fourth Amendment Unlawful Search

The Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless searches, unless

the search falls under one of the recognized exceptions to the

6

 That said, the Court notes that independent probable cause existed for

Trigg’s arrest. According to Officer Shefferly’s affidavit (as is supported by

the supplemental narrative and the video itself), once he made contact with the

vehicle, Trigg handed him an Indiana Identification Card as opposed to a driver’s

license, and Trigg admitted that he did not have a driver’s license. (DE #29-1,

pp. 2, 4; DE #28.) Officer Shefferly verified through a BMV search that Trigg’s

status was a Habitual Traffic Violator - Life. (Id.) Trigg does not dispute

these facts with any admissible evidence, and, in his response brief, he goes so

far as to admit that “Trigg knew that his license was suspended for life and that

his operating a vehicle was against the law. Probable cause existed for Officer

Shefferly to arrest Trigg.” (DE #34, p. 7.) Because it is undisputed that

probable cause existed for the initial traffic violation, and independent

probable cause existed for operating a vehicle without a license, the Court need

not discuss Trigg’s claims with regard to his possession of a controlled

substance arrest. See Williams, 809 F.3d at 943. 

16
warrant requirement. U.S. v. Denney, 771 F.2d 318, 320 (7th Cir.

1985). Inventory searches constitute one such exception. See U.S.

v. Cherry, 436 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing U.S. v.

Wilson, 938 F.2d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1991)). “Searches conducted by

the police prior to towing a car are lawful if conducted pursuant

to standard police procedures aimed at protecting the owner’s

property—and protecting the police from the owner’s charging them

with having stolen, lost, or damaged his property.” Id. (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). As noted by the Seventh

Circuit, the Supreme Court has recognized that: 

local police departments routinely inventory

and secure the contents of impounded

automobiles. Doing so protects the police

from potential danger, protects the owner’s

property while it remains in police custody,

and protects the police against claims of

lost, stolen, or damaged property. An

inventory search is lawful if (1) the

individual whose possession is to be searched

has been lawfully arrested, and (2) the search

is conducted as part of the routine procedure

incident to incarcerating an arrested person

and in accordance with established inventory

procedures. Both the decision to take the car

into custody and the concomitant inventory

search must meet the strictures of the Fourth

Amendment. The decision to impound (the

‘seizure’) is properly analyzed as distinct

from the decision to inventory. 

U.S. v. Cartwright, 630 F.3d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal

citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

Here, Officer Shefferly’s affidavit and supplemental narrative

provide that he stopped Trigg for the traffic violation outlined

17
above, verified through a BMV search that Trigg’s status was a

Habitual Traffic Violator - Life, and then removed Trigg from the

vehicle to conduct a pat down search for weapons and an inventory

search of the vehicle because it was going to be towed. (DE #29-1,

pp. 2, 4.) Defendants have provided a copy of the FWPD Motor

Vehicle Tow and Inventory Policy (the “Policy”), which provides in

relevant part: 

I. Purpose:

The purpose of this policy is to provide

officers with guidelines for the tow and

inventory of motor vehicles. A motor vehicle

tow and inventory is proper and warranted when

part of a routine administrative caretaking

function authorized by the department. It is

designed to protect motor vehicles and their

contents while in police custody; to protect

the department and towing agencies against

claims of lost, stolen or damaged property;

and to protect departmental personnel and the

public against injury or damaged property due

to hazardous materials or substances that may

be in the vehicle. 

. . . 

III. Procedures:

A. Legal Authority to Inventory Motor Vehicles

1. A sworn member of the Fort Wayne

Police Department shall conduct a motor

vehicle inventory without a warrant and

probable cause when;

a. The vehicle has been lawfully

seized or impounded pursuant to the

arrest of the driver.

b. The vehicle is impounded for

violations.

. . . 

B. Scope of Motor Vehicle Inventories

1. The contents of all motor vehicles

that are lawfully impounded by the

department shall be subject to inventory,

18
in every case, in accordance with the

provisions of the policy.

2. An inventory shall be conducted at the

location where the vehicle is seized

unless it is unsafe or impractical to do

so . . . .

. . .

4. A motor vehicle inventory shall extend

to all areas of the vehicle in which

personal property or hazardous materials

may reasonably be found, including but

not limited to the passenger compartment,

trunk and glove compartment.

(DE #29-3, pp. 1-2.) During the inventory search of Trigg’s

vehicle, Officer Shefferly discovered narcotic substances that led

to Trigg’s arrest for possession of a Schedule III controlled

substance.7 (DE #29-1, pp. 1, 4.) 

Trigg asserts that the search of his vehicle was unlawful. In

Trigg’s response brief, his entire verbatim argument with regard to

this issue is that “[i]n this instance Trigg’s vehicle was not in

the custody of the Fort Wayne Police Department at the time of the

7

 In his affidavit and supplemental narrative, Officer Shefferly states

that he discovered “a small amount of a white rock like substance in the driver

side door compartment” and “a white pill in the center console inscribed with

‘Watson 387’ which was identified as Acetaminophen Hydrocodone, a Schedule III

controlled substance.” (DE #29-1, pp. 1, 4.) Officer Shefferly further states

that the pill was not contained in the proper container and that Trigg did not

have a valid prescription for the narcotic. (Id.) In his affidavit, Trigg

claims that he was “not aware of any drugs or alcohol in my vehicle at the time

of the stop by Officer Shefferly.” (DE #33-1.) As Defendants’ point out in

their motion to strike, because Trigg’s assertion that he was unaware of any

drugs in his vehicle at the time of the stop is directly contradicted by his

prior deposition testimony, it does not create a genuine dispute that would

thwart summary judgment. (DE #36-1, p. 2.) See e.g. Pourghoraishi v. Flying J,

Inc., 449 F.3d 751, 759 (7th Cir. 2006) (“A plaintiff cannot, however, create an

issue of material fact by submitting an affidavit that contradicts an earlier

deposition.”) Furthermore, Trigg provides no admissible evidence to dispute

Officer Shefferly’s statement that the white pill was not in the proper container

when it was discovered. (DE #36-1, p. 2.) And, more importantly, because

Officer Shefferly already had probable cause to arrest Trigg for the traffic

violations, Trigg’s knowledge of any narcotic substances found in the vehicle is

not relevant to the remaining issues at hand. 

19
search. It was done prior to it being towed. Also, Plaintiff was

physically searched. . . . Trigg did not authorize or consent to

the search of the vehicle or himself.” (DE #34, p. 8.)

Again, Trigg’s arguments fail. As described in the preceding

section, Trigg’s arrest was lawful. Furthermore, the search was

conducted as part of the Policy in accordance with established

inventory procedures designed to protect the vehicle, its contents,

the FWPD, and the towing agency. The Policy provides that an

inventory search is proper when a vehicle has been lawfully seized

or impounded pursuant to the arrest of the driver. Because Trigg

was arrested, in part, due to his lack of driver’s license and

status as a Habitual Traffic Violator - Life, it is clear that he

could not lawfully drive the car from the scene. Trigg does not

point to any evidence to suggest that he had an alternative in

place that would have made towing and impoundment unnecessary. See

Cartwright, 630 F.3d at 614. As such, the Policy authorized

Officer Shefferly to conduct the inventory search of the vehicle,

and there is no evidence that he did so in an improper manner. 

While Trigg argues that the search itself was improper because it

was done prior to the vehicle being towed, the Policy clearly

provides that the inventory search shall be conducted at the

location where the vehicle was seized unless it is unsafe or

impractical to do so. Trigg presents no evidence that it was

either unsafe or impractical to conduct the search on the street

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where Trigg was stopped. As such, the Court finds that it is

undisputed that Officer Shefferly acted in accordance with the

Policy. Finally, although Trigg makes no such argument to the

contrary, the Court finds that the Policy itself is comprehensive

and sufficiently standardized. See Id. at 614-15. As such,

summary judgment is granted. 

State Law False Arrest/Imprisonment

In Indiana, “false imprisonment is defined as the unlawful

restraint upon one’s freedom of movement or the deprivation of

one’s liberty without consent. A defendant may be liable for false

arrest when he or she arrests a plaintiff in the absence of

probable cause to do so.” Earles v. Perkins, 788 N.E.2d 1260, 1265

(Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (internal citations omitted). The existence

of probable cause dooms a common law action for false arrest and/or

false imprisonment. Row v. Holt, 864 N.E.2d 1011, 1016-17 (Ind.

2007). Because the relevant factors are the same, it is not

necessary to separately analyze a claim of false imprisonment that

stems from an allegedly false arrest. Id. at 1016 n. 4. 

Importantly, the Seventh Circuit has recognized that claims of

false arrest and false imprisonment brought pursuant to Indiana law

require “no different a showing of probable cause” than federal

unlawful arrest claims brought pursuant to section 1983 because

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“probable cause is an absolute defense” in either context. Jones,

737 F.3d at 1114.

Trigg argues that he was falsely arrested and imprisoned

without probable cause. Unfortunately for Trigg, as noted in

detail in the preceding sections, it is undisputed that probable

cause existed to arrest him. Thus, his state law claims of false

arrest and false imprisonment must also fail.

 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Motion for Attorney Fees

and Mileage (DE #20) is DENIED, the Motion for Summary Judgment (DE

#29) is GRANTED, and the Motion to Strike (DE #37) is DENIED. All

of the plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk

is DIRECTED to close this case. 

 

DATED: March 21, 2016 /s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

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