UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

THEODORE ROBERT, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:15 CV 173

)

CITY OF SOUTH BEND, INDIANA, )

et al., )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION and ORDER

This matter is before the court on defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff

Theodore Robert’s complaint. (DE # 10.)

I. FACTS

Plaintiff is an African-American male who, at all times relevant to this case, was

employed by the City of South Bend as a police officer. Plaintiff claims, amongst other

things, that he experienced discrimination in the form of retaliation. Plaintiff contends

that defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) et

seq., and the First Amendment.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants have moved to dismiss plaintiff’s claims under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A judge reviewing

a complaint under a RULE 12(b)(6) standard must construe it in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party, accept well-pleaded facts as true, and draw all inferences in

the non-movant’s favor. Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007); Reger Dev., LLC v.
Nat’l City Bank, 595 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 2010). Under the liberal notice-pleading

requirements of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, the complaint need only

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). To satisfy RULE 8(a), “the statement need only ‘give the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”

Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

“While the federal pleading standard is quite forgiving, . . . the complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ray v. City of Chicago, 629 F.3d 660, 662-63 (7th Cir. 2011);

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. A plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). To meet this standard, a complaint

does not need detailed factual allegations, but it must go beyond providing “labels and

conclusions” and “be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, 40 F.3d 247,

251 (7th Cir. 1994) among other authorities). As the Seventh Circuit recently explained,

a complaint must give “enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a

story that holds together.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010). 

However, the plaintiff does not need to plead facts that establish each element of

a cause of action and, “[a]t this stage the plaintiff receives the benefit of imagination, so

long as the hypotheses are consistent with the complaint.” Sanjuan, 40 F.3d at 251. Even

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if the truth of the facts alleged appears doubtful, and recovery remote or unlikely, the

court cannot dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim if, when the facts pleaded

are taken as true, a plaintiff has “nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to

plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570.

III. DISCUSSION

This motion requires little discussion. The Seventh Circuit has stated that

plaintiffs alleging employment discrimination “may allege these claims quite

generally.” Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008). “A complaint need

not ‘allege all, or any, of the facts logically entailed by the claim,’ and it certainly need

not include evidence.” Id. (quoting Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998)

(emphasis in original)). “[I]n order to prevent dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint

alleging [racial] discrimination need only aver that the employer instituted a (specified)

adverse employment action against the plaintiff on the basis of her [race].” See Tamayo,

526 F.3d at 1084; see also Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1028 (7th Cir.

2013) (same); Huri v. Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 11 C 3675, 2012 WL 1431268, at *3

(N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2012) (“For a Title VII discrimination claim, a plaintiff must allege

facts that plausibly suggest that the defendant employer ‘instituted an adverse

employment action against [the plaintiff] on the basis of her’ protected characteristic.”

(quoting Joren v. Napolitano, 633 F.3d 1144, 1146 (7th Cir. 2011))). While Swanson was

decided in the context of Title VII claim, the rationale appears equally applicable to First

Amendment retaliation claims. In this case, Counts I and II of plaintiff’s complaint

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present plausible allegations of retaliation under Title VII and the First Amendment,

and dismissal is not warranted at this time. However, defendants are correct that Title 

VII permits suit against only employers, not individual employees, Sattar v. Motorola, 

Inc., 138 F.3d 1164, 1168 (7th Cir. 1998), so plaintiff’s Title VII claim against all 

defendants except the City of South Bend must be dismissed.

Count III of plaintiff’s complaint is a different story. Though plaintiff is

represented by counsel in this case, Count III is virtually unintelligible from a legal

standpoint, and the court can discern no actual claim therein. Plaintiff appears to have

made a number of complaints to the City about racial issues and received no response,

but it is unclear how these circumstances translate into a legal claim. Accordingly,

Count III is dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion to dismiss (DE # 10) is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED,

in part.

SO ORDERED.

Date: March 15, 2016

s/James T. Moody

JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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