UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

FORT WAYNE DIVISION 

VALLEY FORGE INSURANCE

COMPANY, 

 PLAINTIFF, 

 VS. 

HARTFORD IRON & METAL, INC.

AND ALAN B. GOLDBERG (DBA

HARTFORD METAL & IRON), 

 DEFENDANTS. 

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CAUSE NO. 1:14-CV-006-RLM-SLC

OPINION and ORDER 

 

Plaintiff and counterclaim defendant Valley Forge Insurance Company 

sued Hartford Iron & Metal, Inc. and Alan B. Goldberg, seeking damages for 

breach of contract and declaratory judgment regarding the parties’ rights and 

obligations under a series of insurance policies and settlement agreements. This 

matter is before the court on Valley Forge’s motion for partial summary 

judgment. (Doc. No. 93). The motion concerns only the claims for declaratory 

relief: Valley Forge seeks a declaration that it has the right to control both the 

defense and the remediation of the Hartford Iron site free from interference by 

Hartford Iron.1 Also before the court are Valley Forge’s motion for clarification of 

the court’s ruling denying a preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 95), Hartford Iron’s 

motion for leave to file supplemental exhibits to its summary judgment response 

 1 The court refers to both Hartford Iron & Metal, Inc. and Alan B. Goldberg as 

“Hartford Iron” for purposes of this order. 
(Doc. No. 274), and Hartford Iron’s motion to seal one of its proposed 

supplemental exhibits (Doc. No. 276). 

For the reasons that follow, Valley Forge is not entitled to summary 

judgment on its declaratory relief claims. 

I. BACKGROUND

Because Valley Forge’s motion seeks only partial summary judgment, it 

isn’t necessary to recite in detail the evidence regarding storm water discharges 

at the Hartford Iron site and the remediation efforts thus far. 

This litigation arises from environmental contamination at a Hartford City, 

Indiana metal scrap yard. Hartford Iron operates the scrap yard, and Valley 

Forge provided several general liability insurance policies covering it. These 

insurance policies2 provide that Valley Forge has the right and duty to 

 2 Valley Forge offered one written policy as evidence, and provided the court with 

an affidavit from a Valley Forge attorney stating that this policy’s terms are 

representative of all policies issued to Hartford Iron. (Doc. No. 94-1, Thompson Affidavit, 

¶ 3). Hartford Iron disputes Valley Forge’s allegation that all the other policies contain 

the same or functionally equivalent terms, but doesn’t cite to any record evidence of 

conflicting terms in other policies or provide a sworn affidavit challenging the assertions 

made by Valley Forge’s affiant. Instead, Hartford Iron simply states that it “has not yet 

undertaken a comparison of each year’s policy terms” and so the court can’t assume 

the truth of Valley Forge’s claim that the policies are all comparable. (Doc. No. 173-1, 

Response Appx at p.29). At the summary judgment stage, Hartford Iron can’t simply say 

it disagrees with evidence offered by Valley Forge – it must point to specific evidence in 

the record contrary to Valley Forge’s factual allegations. Since Hartford Iron hasn’t done 

so, Valley Forge’s sworn statement that all the policies bear functionally equivalent 

terms is deemed admitted. Hartford Iron also insists that Valley Forge’s “Exhibit 2” cited 

in the affidavit isn’t an insurance policy but “an unrelated drainage study map.” This is 

incorrect. Exhibit 2 to the affidavit attached to Valley Forge’s motion for summary 

judgment is a document entitled “Commercial General Liability Coverage Form,” which 

appears to be the insurance policy in question. 
investigate, defend, and settle covered liability claims against Hartford Iron, and 

that: 

(c) [Hartford Iron] and any other involved insured must: 

... 

(3) Cooperate with [Valley Forge] in the investigation, settlement or defense 

of the claim or “suit”; and 

... 

(d) No insureds will, except at their own cost, voluntarily make a payment, 

assume any obligation, or incur any expense, other than for first aid, 

without [Valley Forge’s] consent. 

(Doc. No. 94-3, Section IV(2)). 

In August 2006, the Indiana Department of Environmental Management 

(“IDEM”) found that the scrap yard wasn’t in compliance with environmental 

regulations and issued a Notice of Violation to Hartford Iron. Valley Forge initially 

agreed to defend Hartford Iron, but disputes soon arose between the parties. In 

2009, IDEM and Hartford Iron entered into an Agreed Order concerning 

investigation and remediation at the site, and Valley Forge and Hartford Iron 

entered into their first settlement agreement allocating responsibility for 

complying with the IDEM order. 

Within two years the parties were again at odds about how to remediate 

the scrap yard, and Hartford Iron filed suit in state court against Valley Forge 

and the attorney Valley Forge had hired as Hartford Iron’s defense counsel in the 

IDEM action. Environmental violations at the site continued, and the EPA issued 

Hartford Iron a Notice of Intent to File Civil Administrative Complaint. IDEM also 

issued a Remediation Request in April 2012 requiring Hartford Iron to submit a 
plan to reduce the discharge of PCBs from the site. Hartford Iron submitted a 

plan in July 2012. 

The parties reached a second settlement agreement in December 2012. 

Both sides agreed to release all coverage, malpractice, and bad faith claims they 

might have had against each other to that point, and Valley Forge agreed to make 

an immediate payment to resolve all past damages and defense costs. As relevant 

to the summary judgment motion, the 2012 agreement establishes that: (1) 

Valley Forge may immediately appoint new defense counsel subject to Hartford 

Iron’s approval, which can’t be unreasonably withheld. The new defense counsel 

will defend against the EPA and IDEM claims, supervise the environmental 

consultant, and represent Valley Forge’s interests in prompt and cost effective 

remediation; (2) Valley Forge may immediately replace the former environmental 

consultant with August Mack. August Mack will immediately begin work to 

control storm water discharges, and will implement (at Valley Forge’s expense) 

any future remediation plans ultimately required and approved by IDEM or the 

EPA; (3) Valley Forge must defend and indemnify Hartford Iron as to the EPA 

penalty already imposed; (4) Valley Forge must defend and indemnify Hartford 

Iron with respect to the EPA and IDEM claims, and will “control the defense of 

these matters”; (5) Hartford Iron must “cooperate with Valley Forge, defense 

counsel, and August Mack” in implementing the remediation plan; and (6) 

August Mack and defense counsel must copy Hartford Iron on all 

correspondence relating to work at the site. 
Since the 2012 settlement, both the storm water discharge violations and 

the parties’ disputes over control of the defense have continued, and each side 

blames the other for the failure to achieve adequate remediation at the site. 

Hartford Iron takes the position that August Mack’s remediation efforts have 

been insufficient, and actually increased rather than abated the discharge of 

harmful chemicals into the groundwater. Valley Forge argues that August Mack’s 

remediation plans could have worked well, but were frustrated by Hartford Iron’s 

failure to cooperate in denying August Mack employees unfettered access to the 

scrap yard. 

Valley Forge filed this suit against Hartford Iron in January of 2014, 

seeking damages for breach of the 2012 agreement as well as a declaratory relief 

regarding Hartford Iron’s obligations under the agreement. The breach of 

contract claim alleges that Hartford Iron has failed to cooperate with Valley Forge 

and August Mack as required by the 2012 agreement, and that this failure to 

cooperate caused the ongoing storm water discharges and increased the costs of 

remediating the site. Valley Forge also sought a preliminary injunction that 

would prevent Hartford Iron from withholding its consent to the appointment of 

new defense counsel at Valley Forge’s expense. The court denied the preliminary 

injunction motion on March 9, 2015. (Doc. No. 58). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A district court must grant summary judgment if “the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to the interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and 

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine 

issue of material fact exists whenever “there is sufficient evidence favoring the 

nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). In deciding whether a genuine dispute 

exists as to any material fact, a court must view all the evidence and draw all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Weber v. Univ. 

Research Assoc., Inc., 621 F.3d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 2010). The existence of an 

alleged factual dispute, by itself, won’t defeat a summary judgment motion; 

“instead, the nonmovant must present definite, competent evidence in rebuttal,” 

Parent v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 694 F.3d 919, 922 (7th Cir. 2012), and “must 

affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine 

issue of material fact that requires trial.” Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, Inc., 

476 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2007). It isn’t appropriate for the court to judge the 

credibility of the witnesses or evaluate the weight of the evidence; the only 

question on summary judgment is “whether there is a genuine issue of fact.” 

Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2009). Summary judgment 

is “not a dress rehearsal or practice run; it is the put up or shut up moment in 

a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a 

trier of fact to accept its version of events.” Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 

407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 
III. DISCUSSION

There are unquestionably disputes of material fact regarding the 

remediation efforts so far, the storm water discharges from the scrapyard, and 

who is responsible for the site’s ongoing noncompliance with environmental 

regulations. None of these disputes is material to the declaratory relief claims. 

Actual overruns of storm water don’t affect the legal issue presented in the 

summary judgment motion: whether, as a matter of law, Valley Forge retains the 

right to control the defense of the IDEM proceeding under the insurance policies 

and settlement agreements after filing this complaint. 

A. Hartford Iron’s motions to supplement and to seal 

Before reaching the merits of Valley Forge’s motion for summary judgment, 

the court must address the pending motions to supplement and to seal. On 

November 23, 2015, Hartford Iron filed its second motion3 for leave to file 

supplemental exhibits regarding summary judgment. (Doc. No. 274). The motion 

seeks to submit fifteen additional exhibits that didn’t exist or hadn’t been 

produced at the time Hartford Iron filed its summary judgment response, 

including further noncompliance reports from IDEM and communications 

regarding the remediation plan proposed by Hartford Iron’s preferred 

environmental contractor. Hartford Iron also filed a motion to seal one of the 

 3 The court granted Hartford Iron’s first motion to supplement its summary 

judgment response brief on September 8, 2015. (Doc. No. 193). 
fifteen supplemental exhibits on the grounds that it might contain Valley Forge’s 

privileged attorney-client communications. (Doc. No. 276). 

The court has reviewed the proposed exhibits, and none of them materially 

affect the court’s analysis of the summary judgment issues – they are largely 

cumulative of other evidence in the record, demonstrating only newly arisen 

examples of the same underlying disputes. Moreover, Hartford Iron’s motion to 

supplement doesn’t identify with particularity how any of these additional 

exhibits relate to the issues in the motion for partial summary judgment; all the 

motion says is that the exhibits “concern material facts for purposes of the 

motion.” While the reply to the motion provides more detail about the contents 

of the exhibits and what Hartford Iron believes them to show, it too doesn’t 

clearly connect them to the legal arguments presented in the summary judgment 

briefing.4 It isn’t the court’s responsibility to sift through the evidence to try and 

discern possible arguments that Hartford Iron hasn’t made. Because Hartford 

Iron hasn’t clearly identified the relevance of the proposed exhibits to the narrow 

legal issues currently before the court, the motion to supplement is denied and 

the court declines to consider these documents. 

 4 With regard to proposed supplemental exhibits 5-8, for example, Hartford Iron’s 

reply only states that the exhibits show IDEM approved the new Keramida system 

Hartford Iron wants to build to control storm water discharges. (Reply Mot. Supplement, 

Doc. No. 296 at 2-3). Hartford Iron recites that IDEM’s requirements as to the Keramida 

system “go to the heart of the conflict of interest” but does not elaborate as to how these 

documents show that a conflict exists. Other exhibits are similarly irrelevant to the 

partial summary judgment motion, as they simply show that the parties continue to 

send each other communications disputing who is responsible for the remediation 

failures. 
Because one of the proposed supplemental exhibits is an email from Valley 

Forge’s claims managers that might be seeking legal advice from attorneys, the 

court grants Hartford Iron’s motion to seal that document. While the court won’t 

consider the document in ruling on the summary judgment motion, the motion 

to seal is granted solely to ensure that potentially privileged communications 

aren’t publicly disclosed on the case docket. 

B. Summary Judgment Merits 

Valley Forge argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on its 

declaratory relief claims for three general reasons: (1) no conflict exists that 

would prevent Valley Forge from controlling the defense to the environmental 

claims; (2) even if a conflict exists with regard to the defense, the conflict doesn’t 

undermine Valley Forge’s right to control the remediation itself; and (3) the 2012 

settlement agreement should be enforced in any case because it is an armslength contract between counseled parties, and it would be unfair to abrogate 

Valley Forge’s bargained-for rights under that agreement.5 None of these 

arguments is persuasive. By filing a breach of contract action against Hartford 

 5 Hartford Iron raises several other issues in its response, arguing that: (1) Valley 

Forge can’t enforce the settlement agreements at issue because Valley Forge materially 

breached them first; (2) Valley Forge can’t “control” the defense because that would 

entail overriding the independent judgment of defense counsel, in violation of ethical 

rules; (3) there is no “control” left to exercise because the current remediation plan has 

been approved by IDEM and is legally required; and (4) Valley Forge fails to specify what 

it means by “control.” Because a conflict of interest prevents Valley Forge from exercising 

its contractual rights, summary judgment must be denied on that basis and it isn’t 

necessary to reach these issues. 
Iron that seeks recovery of the same remediation costs Hartford Iron says the 

insurance policies cover, Valley Forge created a conflict of interest that prevents 

it from controlling the defense and remediation as a matter of Indiana law. 

1. Right to Control the Defense 

Valley Forge’s chief argument is that there is no conflict of interest here 

that would prevent it from controlling the defense to the underlying IDEM and 

EPA claims and choosing defense counsel. In Valley Forge’s view, there is no 

reason to preclude it from exercising its contractual rights because it has already 

agreed to pay the costs of defending against the environmental claims in full. 

Because there is no dispute as to coverage, there is no conflict; defense counsel 

chosen by and answering to Valley Forge would have no incentive to defend the 

environmental claims in any way other than the most meritorious and costeffective. This position views both the dispute between these parties and the 

relevant law on conflicts too narrowly. There is sufficient risk of misaligned 

incentives to prevent an attorney from representing both Hartford Iron’s and 

Valley Forge’s interests consistent with his or her ethical obligations. 

Indiana’s ethical rule on attorney conflicts of interest is embodied in Rule 

of Profession Conduct 1.7, which provides that a lawyer may not represent a 

client if the representation involves a “concurrent conflict of interest” and defines 

a concurrent conflict as existing where: 

(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; 

or 
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients 

will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, 

a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer. 

(In. RPC Rule 1.7(a)). 

Such a conflict often exists between the respective interests of an insurer 

and insured when the defense to an underlying lawsuit or enforcement action 

may influence whether the claims is covered or not covered. In such a situation 

of misaligned incentive – where the attorney defending the underlying claim 

might have to select a defense that furthers the financial interest of the insured 

or the insurer, rather than both – the accepted practice has long been for the 

insurer to pay for independent defense counsel and exercise no control. See

Snodgrass v. Baize, 405 N.E.2d 48, 51 (Ind. App. 1980) (holding that in such a 

case the insurer should pay for counsel selected by the insured); All–Star Ins. 

Corp. v. Steel Bar, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 160, 165 (N.D. Ind. 1971) (noting that in 

such a situation the insurer “must either provide an independent attorney to 

represent the insured, or pay for the cost of defense incurred by the insured 

hiring an attorney of his choice”). 

As the court noted at the preliminary injunction hearing, Armstrong 

Cleaners, Inc. v. Erie Ins. Exch., 364 F. Supp. 2d 797 (S.D. Ind. 2005) is highly 

instructive in determining whether such a conflict exists in the general liability 

insurance context. In Armstrong Cleaners, IDEM notified the owner of a building 

that the building violated environmental regulations, and the owner sought 

contribution from the tenants who were renting the building for a dry cleaning 

business. When the tenants turned over defense of the lawsuit to their insurer, 
the insurer responded with a reservation of rights including an insistence that 

“pollution” was excepted from the insurance policy. The tenants asked the court 

to declare that the insurer had to pay the bills of independent defense counsel 

of the tenants’ choosing. The Armstrong Cleaners court noted that “not every 

reservation of rights poses a conflict for defense counsel” but rejected the 

insurer’s argument that a conflict exists only in particular easily identifiable 

categories of cases, concluding that the Rule 1.7 standard “cannot be confined 

to only its easiest and clearest applications” but rather “sweeps more broadly 

and looks more generally at the risk that an attorney’s representation of one 

client will be impaired by her relationship with another client or another entity 

paying the bill.” Armstrong Cleaners, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 808. The court went on 

to emphasize that evaluating the risk of conflict requires “close attention to the 

details of the underlying litigation” rather than any bright-line rule, and 

concluded that because counsel hired by the insurer would be conducting 

discovery on issues relevant to the underlying suit that would also be relevant to 

the coverage dispute (such as the tenants’ state of mind and the degree of care 

they exercised), a significant risk of conflict existed under Rule 1.7. 

Valley Forge argues that unlike Armstrong Cleaners – in which the 

underlying defense was to a lawsuit – this case involves only a notice of 

violations. IDEM won’t make explicit findings based on who was at fault; it will 

only demand that the problem be fixed and issue fines to Hartford Iron. Yet 

relative fault for the discharges is the basis for the breach of contract claims in 

the instant case. According to Valley Forge, no conflict therefore exists because 
the defense counsel it appoints for Hartford Iron has no way to manipulate the 

record in the environmental actions in a way that would support Valley Forge’s 

breach of contract claim before this court. It characterizes the dispute between 

the parties regarding the defense as a strategic disagreement rather than a 

serious conflict of interest.6

The court sees this situation as closely analogous to the one in Armstrong 

Cleaners. In the underlying environmental claims, IDEM and the EPA are 

alleging – and threatening penalties for – further discharge of contaminated 

storm water that occurred after August Mack began remediation work. Under 

Indiana law, a defendant in an environmental action “may assert defenses 

provided by law or equity, including a defense that damages ... were caused in 

whole or in part by a nonparty.” Ind. Code § 13-30-9-5. Not only is this a potential 

defense available to Hartford Iron, there is evidence in the record that it has 

actually been pursued; Ms. Dameron (Hartford Iron’s defense counsel during the 

initial stages of this case) has sent letters to IDEM encouraging the agency to go 

after August Mack and Valley Forge for the contamination rather than Hartford 

Iron, and has testified before this court that the blame-shifting strategy is the 

 6 The case Valley Forge points to for the premise that strategic or tactical disputes 

between an insurer and insured don’t give rise to a conflict of interest is a Texas state 

court case, N. Cnty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davalos, 140 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. 2004). Because the 

question of whether or not a conflict exists is governed by Indiana’s rules of professional 

conduct, Davalos isn’t instructive. It is also easily distinguishable; the insured in that 

case wanted control of the defense only because he wished to bring suit for his car 

accident injuries in a different venue than that favored by his insurer, and the court 

held this tactical squabble insufficient to create a conflict. There is little question here 

that the parties’ disagreements about the defense of the environmental claims extend 

beyond a single purely tactical issue, as Hartford Iron wants to make use of a defense – 

blaming August Mack – that is wholly contrary to Valley Forge’s interests.
only one she believes she can ethically pursue. (PI hearing transcript, at 137-

138). Hartford Iron’s defense with regard to at least the most recent storm water 

discharges is essentially that the fault lies not with it but with August Mack’s 

shoddy remediation work. This is in direct conflict with Valley Forge’s breach 

claim in this suit, which alleges that Hartford Iron’s bad faith failure to cooperate 

with August Mack is the cause of the ongoing storm water discharge problem. 

While IDEM may not make any written findings as to who is to blame, any 

defense counsel appointed for Hartford Iron but controlled by Valley Forge will 

need to decide which of the two masters to serve when gathering evidence and 

preparing reports about the storm water discharges. This conflict is sufficient to 

materially limit the attorney’s representation of Hartford Iron. 

Hartford Iron points to specific facts in the record that aptly demonstrate 

the conflict. At the preliminary injunction hearing, Ms. Dameron testified to an 

incident in which IDEM gave Hartford Iron notice that waste hadn’t been properly 

disposed of. She responded by sending a self-disclosure letter to IDEM which 

blamed the waste violation event on August Mack’s conduct. (PI hearing 

transcript, at 144-145). August Mack and Valley Forge then sent a letter to the 

agencies contradicting Ms. Dameron’s description of the incident. (Id. at 147). 

Ms. Dameron in her independent judgement as Hartford Iron’s counsel felt that 

the best way to avoid formal action on the waste violation was to lay the blame 

on August Mack, and the representations she made to the regulatory agencies 

directly contradicted the allegations in Valley Forge’s complaint identifying 

Hartford Iron as responsible for the delay in waste disposal. The conflict is only 
compounded by Valley Forge making inconsistent representations to the 

agencies; by contradicting Ms. Dameron’s explanation for the discharges, Valley 

Forge’s letter undermined the only defense to the violations Hartford Iron could 

offer. A similar incident involved a sworn witness statement prepared for a 

regulatory report by Scott Goldberg, a Hartford Iron employee, attesting to his 

personal observation of a storm water discharge event. (Doc. No. 45-8). Valley 

Forge’s attorney responded by insisting that Mr. Goldberg make changes to his 

statement, in a way that Ms. Dameron believed shifted blame for the discharge 

from August Mack to Hartford Iron. (PI hearing transcript, at 138-139). These 

examples illustrate the difficulty any attorney charged with representing both 

Hartford Iron’s and Valley Forge’s interests would encounter, and show that it is 

not only likely but virtually certain that the conflict will materially limit the 

attorney’s representation of Hartford Iron. 

Accordingly, the conflict of interest created by Valley Forge’s breach of 

contract claim against Hartford Iron prevents Valley Forge from controlling the 

defense to the environmental actions as a matter of law. 

2. Right to Control the Remediation 

Valley Forge also argues that even if a conflict exists with regard to the 

defense of the IDEM and EPA claims, it doesn’t impact its absolute right to 

control the remediation itself. This argument is based on characterizing the costs 

of the remediation as a “settlement” or “damages” rather than defense costs. 
As an initial matter, Valley Forge provides no authority for the proposition 

that a conflict that influences the defense to an environmental claim doesn’t also 

infect the remediation costs. Instead, it relies chiefly on two cases from Indiana 

in which courts upheld the right of insurers to refuse to pay settlements in 

conflict situations. In Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. C.M.A. Mortg., Inc., 682 F. 

Supp. 2d 879 (S.D. Ind. 2010), an insurer agreed to fund a mortgage company’s 

defense in a Fair Credit Reporting Act class action suit. Because the insurer 

decided to contest coverage, it agreed to pay for independent defense counsel 

and didn’t exercise control over the defense. When the independent defense 

counsel entered into a settlement with the class and demanded that the insurer 

pay it, the insurer refused, relying on a portion of the insurance contract that 

prohibited voluntary payments without the insurer’s consent. The court held 

that the insurer was within its rights to refuse to pay the settlement, given the 

clear language in the policy prohibiting voluntary payments. Similarly, in 

Klepper v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., 999 N.E.2d 86 (Ind. App. 2013), an insurer provided 

independent counsel for a class action suit but reserved its right to deny 

coverage, then refused to pay a settlement the insured entered into without its 

consent. The court held that the insurer didn’t breach its policy contract in 

refusing to pay the settlement, because language in the policy forbade the 

insured from making voluntary payments without the insurer’s consent. 

The situations in C.M.A. and Klepper differ from the circumstances here. 

In both those cases, the insurer was disputing coverage – and both courts 

highlighted this as an important factor in their holdings. The C.M.A. court 
emphasized that the insurer had reserved its rights to pay any part of the claim 

at all. See Am. Family v. C.M.A. Mortg., 682 F. Supp. 2d at 892 (noting that 

because the insurer reserved its rights “without being bound by any adverse 

‘determination’ resulting from a trial of the class action, then clearly it would 

also not be bound by any adverse ‘determination’ resulting from an agreement 

voluntarily entered into by CMA.”). Similarly, the Klepper court explained that 

what freed the insurer to repudiate the settlement was the dispute over coverage, 

as “for a settlement agreement to be binding on an insurer, coverage must be 

shown.” Klepper v. ACE, 999 N.E.2d at 95-96. 

By contrast, Valley Forge has stated repeatedly that it doesn’t dispute 

coverage and will pay all reasonably necessary remediation costs up to the policy 

limits. The insurers in C.M.A. and Klepper paid for defense counsel but sought 

to escape indemnifying the insured on the underlying FCRA claim at all; forcing 

them to be bound by the settlement before the coverage dispute was resolved 

would have nullified the right to contest coverage. They prevailed in court based 

on the insurance policy’s prohibition on voluntary payments. While that same 

provision exists in the policies here, it only prohibits voluntary payments without 

Valley Forge’s consent. Valley Forge has, in effect, already consented to the 

settlement at issue here – the Agreed Order with IDEM – but seeks to exercise 

control over how precisely the obligations under that settlement are met. 

While C.M.A. and Klepper involved settlements to traditional lawsuits, this 

case involves a defense to environmental regulatory enforcement. As other courts 

have noted, the distinction between “defense” and “indemnity” costs blur in 
environmental actions, in which investigations are open-ended and remediation 

is intended both to address past violations and to convince regulators not to 

proceed further against the violator. See Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. of Am. v. State, Dep't 

of Envtl. Prot., 143 N.J. 462, 476, 672 A.2d 1154, 1162 (1996) (counting as both 

“defense” and “indemnity” the costs of investigative activities that “kills two birds 

with one stone in the sense of fulfilling a defense obligation while also relieving 

the policyholder of a potential claim for damages.”). Valley Forge’s motion doesn’t 

draw a clear distinction between what activities in the ongoing environmental 

cleanup efforts it considers “remediation” as opposed to “defense,” and is silent 

as to who will make this (most likely hotly contested) determination. That defense 

and remediation activities are inextricably intertwined is also reflected in the 

2012 agreement itself, which specifies that defense counsel’s duties include 

overseeing the environmental contractors doing the remediation work. 

Accordingly, many of the same conflicts concerns presented by Valley 

Forge’s control over the defense are also implicated by control of the remediation. 

Valley Forge’s lawsuit attempts to avoid some of the costs of remediation on the 

grounds that Hartford Iron’s actions have prevented August Mack from fixing the 

problem. Were Valley Forge to exercise control over the remediation despite its 

lawsuit, it would have an incentive to prioritize fixing things for which it is 

unquestionably responsible while neglecting necessary work for which it believes 

Hartford Iron will ultimately foot the bill – even if doing so exposes Hartford Iron 

to a high risk of future enforcement action. For these reasons, Valley Forge is 
not entitled to summary judgment on its claim for declaratory judgment 

regarding control over the remediation. 

3. Enforcement of the Settlement Agreements 

Valley Forge’s third argument is that the 2012 settlement agreement 

should be enforced as written, because it was an arms-length contract negotiated 

between counseled parties and so not subject to the same presumptions against 

the insurer that govern insurance policies under Indiana law. It would be unfair, 

Valley Forge argues, to strip it of its rights to control the defense and remediation, 

because those rights were the only thing it got out of the settlement agreement 

in the first place. 

In light of the finding that a conflict of interest exists as a matter of law, 

this argument doesn’t require extended discussion. Even an otherwise valid, 

arms-length contract can’t require (or even permit) Hartford Iron’s appointed 

defense attorney to violate state ethical rules by providing a conflicted defense. 

While Valley Forge argues that this renders its rights to control the defense under 

the settlement agreement illusory, this is a conflict of Valley Forge’s own making. 

Had Valley Forge filed suit only for declaratory relief to clarify the parties’ 

obligations, no conflict would exist and Valley Forge would be free to enjoy its 

bargained-for right to control the underlying defense to the environmental 

actions. By seeking a damage remedy for breach of contract, however, Valley 

Forge effectively forfeited its control rights. Valley Forge’s claim for breach of 

contract seeks damages from Hartford Iron for the same incurred costs that 
Hartford Iron contends are covered under the insurance policies; by filing its 

complaint, Valley Forge in effect disputed its duty to pay for costs associated 

with the remediation of the Hartford Iron site. This created a conflict of interest 

for defense counsel hired by Valley Forge to represent Hartford Iron’s interests 

in the context of the IDEM and EPA enforcement actions, and as a matter of 

Indiana law, such a conflict of interest prevents Valley Forge from exercising its 

contractual rights to control no matter what the contract says. 

C. Valley Forge’s motion for clarification of the preliminary injunction ruling 

At the same time Valley Forge filed its motion for partial summary 

judgment, it also filed a motion asking for clarification of the implications of the 

court’s ruling denying the motion for a preliminary injunction. Valley Forge 

argues that clarification is necessary because Hartford Iron stopped cooperating 

with Valley Forge entirely and conducted the defense on its own after the 

preliminary injunction hearing, having seemingly interpreted the denial of the 

preliminary injunction to mean that it had the right to control the defense 

unilaterally from then on. Valley Forge’s motion asks the court to answer four 

questions about what the preliminary injunction ruling does or doesn’t entitle 

the parties to do going forward. 

No clarification of the preliminary injunction order is appropriate. The 

court denied Valley Forge’s request for a preliminary injunction because Valley 

Forge hadn’t shown likelihood of success on the merits of its declaratory 
judgment counts, and so wasn’t entitled to appoint new defense counsel for 

Hartford Iron without Hartford Iron’s consent at that time. After denying the 

motion, the court stated: 

I recognize that Hartford Iron might be back with a request for its own 

counsel, not subject to Valley Forge’s control, but funded by Valley Forge. 

And in light of today’s finding that a conflict exists for an attorney 

attempting to represent Hartford Iron while Valley Forge maintains control 

over the litigation, I don’t anticipate need for additional evidence, though I 

think it remains to determine what remedy or relief would be appropriate... 

(Doc. No. 60, p. 243). 

When the court said it didn’t think additional evidence would be needed, 

the statement was in the context of a potential competing motion for a 

preliminary injunction concerning Hartford Iron’s right of refusal on the selection 

of counsel. The court made no findings that control, or even influence, the rest 

of the litigation. Any such findings would have been inappropriate at that stage, 

because the only question before the court was whether Valley Forge had met 

the stringent standards for a preliminary injunction – standards that differ 

greatly from those that apply in other stages of this litigation. The court tried to 

make that point clear at the hearing: 

I have before me only one properly presented claim for preliminary 

injunction relief and that single claim is for the appointment of Mr. 

Hatchett as an additional attorney under the 2012 settlement agreement, 

and I can only rule on that claim, and I do so by denying Valley Forge's 

motion for a preliminary injunction. 

(Id.) 

 In any case, Valley Forge’s motion for clarification is now moot. While the 

court didn’t make a finding at the preliminary injunction hearing that a conflict 
of interest exists and prevents Valley Forge from controlling the defense as a 

matter of law, it makes such a finding in this order. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the court DENIES Valley Forge’s motion for partial 

summary judgment (Doc. No. 93), DENIES AS MOOT Valley Forge’s motion for 

clarification (Doc. No. 95), DENIES Hartford Iron’s motion for leave to file 

supplemental exhibits (Doc. No. 274), and GRANTS Hartford Iron’s motion to 

seal (Doc. No. 276). 

SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED: December 7, 2015 

 /s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr. 

 Judge 

 United States District Court