Affirmed and Opinion filed June 7, 2012.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-11-00630-CR

MERCEDEZ LESHION JONES, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 232nd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1280521

O P I N I O N

Appellant Mercedez Leshion Jones appeals from her conviction for aggravated 

robbery. After appellant pleaded guilty, the trial court held a sentencing hearing, found 

her guilty, and sentenced her to fifteen years in prison. In a single issue, appellant 

contends that the State failed to offer sufficient evidence to support her conviction as 

required under article 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. We affirm.
2

Procedural Background

Appellant was indicted for, among other things, aggravated robbery with a deadly 

weapon, specifically

on or about OCTOBER 3,2010, [appellant] did then and there unlawfully,

while in the course of committing theft of property owned by NOAH 

HUNTER, and with intent to obtain and maintain control of the property,

intentionally and knowingly threaten and place CORY-ANN NEIL in fear 

of imminent bodily injury and death, and . . . did then and there use and 

exhibit a deadly weapon, namely, A FIREARM.

1

Appellant pleaded guilty to this offense in writing on April 27, 2011, concurrently 

waiving her rights to a jury, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and against selfincrimination. At the same time, she also signed a written confession and agreed to an 

oral or written stipulation of evidence.

Appellant entered her plea in open court to Judge Lee Duggan, a visiting judge 

sitting for Judge Mary Lou Keel. Appellant was not sworn in for these proceedings, and 

the State did not introduce appellant’s written confession or any oral or written 

stipulation as to the evidence against her. Judge Duggan accepted the guilty plea but 

deferred a finding as to appellant’s guilt or innocence. Pursuant to an agreement between 

appellant and the State, Judge Duggan ordered the preparation of a Presentence 

Investigation Report (PSI).

Judge Keel presided over the sentencing hearing, taking testimony from one of the 

victims as well as from the other victim’s father and appellant herself.2 Judge Keel also 

represented that she had reviewed the PSI, which included a police offense report, 

although the PSI was not introduced into evidence and is not a part of the record on 

appeal. Judge Keel did not state that she took judicial notice of the court’s file. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, Judge Keel found appellant guilty and sentenced her to fifteen 

 

1 Appellant was also charged with aggravated assault and aggravated rape, but these charges were 

dropped apparently as part of the agreement under which appellant pleaded guilty to the aggravated 

robbery charge.

2 The witnesses’ testimony is discussed in more detail below.
3

years’ imprisonment.

Governing Law

Although the United States Constitution does not require substantiation of a guilty 

plea in state court, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 1.15 does provide this 

additional procedural safeguard. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 1.15; Menefee v. State, 287 

S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Under the article, a court may not enter a 

conviction in a felony case based on a guilty plea unless evidence is presented 

establishing guilt in addition to and independent of the plea. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 

1.15; Menefee, 287 S.W.3d at 13-14. The evidence does not have to establish the 

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but must embrace every element of the 

offense charged. Staggs v. State, 314 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2010, no pet.).

Evidence substantiating a guilty plea can take several possible forms. Menefee, 

287 S.W.3d at 13. Article 1.15 itself states that a defendant may consent to the 

presentation of evidence either by oral testimony or in written form, or to an oral or 

written stipulation of what the evidence would be, without necessarily admitting to its 

veracity or accuracy. Id. Additionally, courts have recognized that a defendant may 

enter a sworn written confession, or may testify under oath in open court, admitting his or 

her culpability or at least acknowledging generally that the allegations against him or her 

are in fact true and correct. Id. A deficiency in one form of proof may be compensated 

for by other competent evidence in the record. Id. at 14. Evidence adduced at a 

sentencing hearing may also suffice to substantiate a guilty plea. See id. at 18-19 

(remanding in part for determination of whether evidence at sentencing hearing was 

sufficient); Menefee v. State, No. 12-07-00001-CR, 2010 WL 3247816, at *1, *6-7 (Tex. 

App.—Tyler 2010, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (finding evidence at 

sentencing hearing was sufficient).
4

Analysis

Appellant signed a written confession that was also signed as approved by Judge 

Duggan. A written confession approved by the court, and thus considered by the court, 

can be sufficient to substantiate a guilty plea even if not introduced into evidence. See, 

e.g., Palacios v. State, 942 S.W.2d 748, 750 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. 

ref’d); Rexford v. State, 818 S.W.2d 494, 495-96 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, 

pet. ref’d). The circumstances in the present case are to some degree distinguishable 

from those in Palacios and Rexford. Here, the judge who approved the confession, Judge 

Duggan, was not the judge who subsequently found appellant guilty, and there is no 

indication in the record that Judge Keel, who did find appellant guilty, considered the 

confession. The confession was not introduced into evidence at the sentencing hearing

presided over by Judge Keel, and Judge Keel did not take judicial notice of the court’s 

file or indicate that she had reviewed the file generally or the confession specifically. 

However, we need not consider whether the written confession could nonetheless 

substantiate the guilty plea because the evidence adduced during the sentencing hearing 

was sufficient to substantiate the plea.

As stated above, appellant was indicted for aggravated robbery with a deadly 

weapon. In order to substantiate appellant’s plea of guilty to the offense as charged, the 

State was required to present evidence that appellant, while in the course of committing 

theft of property owned by Noah Hunter and with intent to obtain or maintain control of 

that property, intentionally or knowingly threatened or placed Cory-Ann Neil in fear of 

imminent bodily injury or death through use or exhibition of a deadly weapon, 

specifically a firearm. See Tex. Penal Code §29.03. Under the law of parties, appellant 

could be held “criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another 

if acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, 

encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense.” Id. §

7.02(a)(2).

3

 A conviction under the law of parties requires a showing that, at the time of 

 

3 At the sentencing hearing, the State urged the judge to find appellant guilty under the law of 
5

the offense, the parties were acting together, each contributing to their common purpose. 

Ransom v. State, 920 S.W.2d 288, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Mere presence of an 

accused at the scene of an offense will not support a conviction under the law of parties, 

but it is a circumstance, which combined with other facts, may show that the accused was 

a participant. Valdez v. State, 623 S.W.2d 317, 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).

In her testimony at the sentencing hearing, Neil, a high school student at the time,

described events occurring in the early morning hours of October 3, 2010. According to 

Neil, she had arranged to meet her friend Hunter and was talking to him on the telephone 

regarding when and where to meet when Hunter was approached by several people, one 

of whom had a gun. Hunter sounded “nervous and a little freaked out.” The phone “cut 

off,” after which Neil attempted to call Hunter back numerous times before he again 

answered. Within 15 seconds, a different male voice came over the phone. This person 

instructed Neil to meet them and not call the police. Neil was afraid and was concerned 

about what was happening to Hunter. The male called Neil back several times before she 

arrived at a high school football field where she saw Neil standing with appellant and 

three males, one of whom had a gun. 

Neil further described that Hunter was hit several times, including at least once 

with the gun. Neil herself was forcibly raped by two of the males. Afterwards, when one 

of the males again began to sexually assault Neil, appellant said, “Stop . . . [l]et’s just get 

the money.” Appellant and the three males then discussed “what they were going to do . . 

. to get money and stuff.” The group walked to Hunter’s house, where appellant went 

around a corner to make sure no one was there and was “on lookout,” while Hunter went 

inside, apparently to get his ATM card. They then walked to a gas station near a grocery 

store. Two of the males, including one with the handgun, stayed with Neil at the gas 

 

parties. It is well settled that the law of parties may be applied in a case even when no such allegation is 

contained in the indictment. Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Montoya v. 

State, 810 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); see also Conner v. State, Nos. 01-01-00433-CR, 01-

01-00434-CR, 01-01-00435-CR, 2001 WL 1383113, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 8, 2001, 

no pet.) (not designated for publication) (applying law of parties in article 1.15 substantiation analysis). 

Appellant does not argue otherwise in this appeal.
6

station, while appellant and the remaining male took Hunter inside to withdraw money 

from an ATM. When appellant, Hunter, and the one male returned from the grocery store 

with the money, appellant and the three males discussed how to split the money. Finally, 

Neil and Hunter were allowed to leave, but only after Neil was told that she had to deliver 

at least $200 to them or they would hurt her brother. Neil believed that the telephone 

number she was supposed to call when she had the money was appellant’s number.

In her testimony, appellant corroborated much of Neil’s testimony regarding the 

events of October 3, 2010; however, appellant attempted to minimize her role in the 

events, stating that as the only female in the group, she was afraid that something would 

happen to her if she tried to leave. Appellant specifically acknowledged knowing that 

one of the males had a handgun prior to the beginning of the encounter with Hunter, and 

she acknowledged receiving some of the money that Hunter withdrew from the ATM.

This evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that appellant was criminally 

responsible for aggravated robbery. The evidence demonstrated that at the time of the 

offense, the parties were acting together, each contributing to their common purpose. 

The evidence further demonstrated that in the course of committing theft of property 

owned by Hunter and with the intent to obtain or maintain control of that property, 

appellant or her accomplices intentionally or knowingly threatened or placed Neil in fear 

of imminent bodily injury or death through use or exhibition of a deadly weapon, 

specifically a firearm. Accordingly, the evidence substantiates appellant’s guilty plea, 

and we overrule her sole issue on appeal.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Martha Hill Jamison

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Christopher, and Jamison.

Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).