UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAROLD HELLUMS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 3:15-CV-85 TLS

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Harold Hellums, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas corpus petition raising two grounds to

challenge his conviction and 50-year sentence for attempting to deal methamphetamine as a 

habitual offender by the Daviess Superior Court under Cause Number 14D01-9904-CF-278. 

(Habeas Corpus Pet. 1, ECF No. 1.) “Federal habeas review . . . exists as a guard against extreme 

malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction 

through appeal.” Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted).

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any 

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the 

adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

[This] standard is intentionally difficult to meet. We have explained that clearly 

established Federal law for purposes of §2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings, as 

opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions. And an unreasonable application of

those holdings must be objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear 

error will not suffice. To satisfy this high bar, a habeas petitioner is required to 
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show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was 

so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 

disagreement.

Donald, 135 S. Ct. at 1376. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

A. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

In Ground One, Hellums argues that his three public defenders provided him with 

ineffective assistance of counsel during his pre-trial and trial proceedings. In its opinion on 

appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, the Court of Appeals of Indiana explained the 

sequential representation of Hellums by these three attorneys.

On April 16, 1999, Attorney Tim Dant (Attorney Dant) was appointed as 

counsel. On September 10, 1999, Attorney Dant filed a motion to withdraw as 

Hellums’ counsel, which was granted by the trial court. Five days later, on 

September 15, 1999, Attorney Dant, sitting as Judge Pro Tempore, granted the 

State’s Motion on the Habitual Offender Enhancement and set the matter for an 

initial hearing. On October 12, 1999, Attorney J. D. Dwyer (Attorney Dwyer) was 

appointed but he withdrew on March 23, 2000, due to illness. Thereafter, on April 

17, 2000, Attorney Christopher Ramsey (Attorney Ramsey) was appointed to 

represent Hellums.

(Hellums v. State, No. 14A01-1402-PC-67, slip op. at 2–3 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2014), ECF No. 

6-11.)

Under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant is entitled to “effective assistance of 

counsel—that is, representation that does not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness 

in light of prevailing professional norms.” Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 7 (2009) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). To prevail on such a claim, the petitioner must show that counsel’s 

performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). On the deficiency prong, “[t]he question is whether an 

attorney’s representation amounted to incompetence under prevailing professional norms, not 

whether it deviated from best practices or most common custom.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 
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U.S. 86, 105 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court’s review of counsel’s 

performance is deferential, and there is an added layer of deference when the claim is raised in a 

habeas proceeding. Id. (“[T]he question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The 

question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s

deferential standard.”). Furthermore, “counsel ‘need not be perfect, indeed not even very good, 

to be constitutionally adequate.’” McAfee v. Thurmer, 589 F.3d 353, 355–56 (7th Cir. 2009) 

(quoting Dean v. Young, 777 F.2d 1239, 1245 (7th Cir. 1985)).

In assessing counsel’s performance, the court must “evaluate [counsel’s] performance as 

a whole rather than focus on a single failing or oversight, ” Ebert v. Gaetz, 610 F.3d 404, 411–12 

(7th Cir. 2010), and must respect its “limited role in determining whether there was manifest 

deficiency in light of information then available to counsel,” Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 125 

(2011). Counsel is given significant discretion to select a trial strategy based on the information 

known to him at the time. See Yu Tian Li v. United States, 648 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 2011) 

(“So long as an attorney articulates a strategic reason for a decision that was sound at the time it 

was made, the decision generally cannot support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”); 

United States v. Lathrop, 634 F.3d 931, 937 (7th Cir. 2011) (observing that as long as counsel’s 

reasons were not “‘so far off the wall that we can refuse the usual deference that we give tactical 

decisions by counsel,’ his performance will not qualify as deficient” (quoting Cage v. 

McCaughtry, 305 F.3d 625, 627 (7th Cir. 2002))).

On the prejudice prong, the petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “In assessing prejudice under Strickland, the question 
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is not whether a court can be certain counsel’s performance had no effect on the outcome or 

whether it is possible a reasonable doubt might have been established if counsel acted 

differently.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 111. “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, 

not just conceivable.” Id. at 112. Where it is expedient to do so, the court may resolve an 

ineffective assistance claim solely on the prejudice prong, because if the petitioner cannot 

establish prejudice, there is no need to “grade” counsel’s performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

697.

1. Attorney Dant

Hellums argues that Attorney Dant:

failed to conduct a professional investigation into the facts and circumstances of 

this case, failed to conduct professional interviews of available defense witnesses, 

failed to file the Motion for Speedy Trial requested by Hellums, failed to depose 

State witnesses, violated attorney-client responsibility by acting as Special Judge 

against Hellums within a few days after withdrawing from the case, failed to 

communicate and consult with Hellums, and failed to timely file the alibi defense.

(Habeas Corpus Pet. 3.)

The Respondent argues that the Special Judge issue is procedurally defaulted because it 

was not properly presented to the State courts. Although the Court of Appeals of Indiana found 

that claim was defaulted because it “was available to be raised on direct appeal,” (Hellums, No. 

14A01-1402-PC-67, slip op. at 8), it also found that “Hellums’ claim must fail as he did not 

demonstrate that, in the absence of this perceived ineffectiveness, the outcome of this case would 

have been different,” (id. at 12.) Moreover, “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may be 

denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies 

available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). Therefore, the court will consider 
5

the merits of all of Hellums’s allegations that Attorney Dant provided ineffective assistance of 

counsel. 

Hellums argues that:

Had Dant conducted a professional investigation Dant would have 

discovered that Hellums was not involved in Tim Meinhart’s meth operation, and 

that Hellums broke off his engagement to Zoe Meinhart when she refused to take 

legal action against her ex-husband. Hellums never returned to the Meinhart 

property. Had Dant investigated, Dant would then have discovered that the 

Probable Cause Affidavit of April 8, 1999 by Officer Todd Church falsely 

claimed that Harold Hellums was at the meth trailer at the time of the police raid 

on March 18, 1999. This false claim was based on the hearsay statement of 

Rhonda [Roland],

1 who was involved with Tim Meinhart in the manufacture of 

meth and who was found by police at the meth trailer at 3:30 A.M. on March 18, 

1999. [Roland]’s information was wrong, because the person who ran away from 

the trailer at the time of the police raid was Matt Hayes, who admitted that fact in 

his deposition and in his trial testimony. Hayes also testified that Harold Hellums 

was not at the trailer or in the house at the time of the police raid, and further that 

Hellums was never on the Meinhart property during the month of March.

Had Dant interviewed Zoe Meinhart or Amanda Meinhart, Dant would 

have learned that Hellums moved out of the Meinhart residence at the end of 

February 1999, and never returned. Dant would also have learned that Hellums 

opposed Tim Meinhart’s meth operation on Zoe’s property, resulting in the 

physical confrontation between Tim Meinhart and Hellums. Further, Dant failed 

to professionally interview Lionel Bogard, Matt Hayes, and Kim Traywick, key 

witnesses who would have affirmed that Hellums was never on the Meinhart 

property at the time of the police raid or at any time during March, 1999.

(Mem. Law Supp. Traverse to Resp’t’s Order to Show Cause 12–13, ECF No. 9.) The Court of 

Appeals of Indiana found that Hellums had not demonstrated prejudice because there was no 

indication that “the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (Hellums, No. 14A01-

1402-PC-67, slip op. at 6.) Given the facts in the record, that was not an unreasonable 

determination. 

 1 The Petitioner spells this individual’s last name as “Rowland,” but the trial transcript spells her last name 

as “Roland.” For consistency, this Court will refer to this individual as “Roland.”
6

Attorney Dant did not represent Hellums at trial. Rather, he represented him for only five 

months at the beginning of the case. Hellums has not even alleged, much less demonstrated, that 

any of the information he wanted gathered became unavailable as a result of delay. Indeed, much 

of the information was either personally known to Hellums, presented at his trial, or contradicted 

during his trial. At his initial hearing on April 19, 1999, Hellums testified under oath that he 

lived with Zoe Meinhart and helped pay bills. (Trial Tr. vol. 2, 14–15, June 18, 2001, ECF No. 

12.) Amanda Elaine Meinhart testified that in March 1999, she and her brother lived with 

Hellums and her mother, Zoe Meinhart. (Id. vol. 3, 342.) Amanda also testified that Hellums had 

been living there for about seven months, (id. at 343), and that Hellums was at the house on 

March 18, 1999, both during the day and that evening, (id. at 345.) She further testified that 

Hellums “spent most of the time in the trailer,” which had been at the house for a month or two

(id. at 346), and the trailer was visited by his friends, including Tim Meinhart, Matt Hayes, and 

Scotty Rayhill, (id.) According to Amanda’s testimony, Matt Hayes came to the house looking 

for Hellums that evening. (Id. at 352.) Amanda also testified that Rhonda Roland came to the 

house looking for Tim Meinhart. (Id. at 350.)

Rhonda Roland testified that she had known Hellums “all [her] life,” (id. vol. 2, 164), and 

that she was at the trailer on March 18, 1999, when the police arrived, (id. at 167.) She testified 

that Hellums, Tim Meinhart, and Scotty Rayhill were in the trailer. (Id.) She further testified that 

Hellums handed her a jar and ran from the trailer when the police arrived. (Id. at 168.) Roland

testified that she told the police that Hellums fled from the trailer just before they arrived, (id. at 

172), which she recounted as Hellums fled after Matt Hayes opened the trailer door and alerted 

them that the police were coming, (id. at 174.)
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Lionel A. Bogard testified that he owned the trailer and stored it at Rhonda Roland’s 

sister’s house in January 1999. (Id. vol. 3, 425.) He testified that, in February, he rented the 

trailer to Tim Meinhart and it was moved to Zoe Meinhart’s house. (Id. at 425–26.) Matthew 

Hayes testified that he went to Zoe Meinhart’s house on March 17, 1999. (Id. at 435.) He 

testified that he returned on March 18, 1999 in the early morning, and found Rhonda Roland, 

Scotty Rayhill, and Tim Meinhart in the trailer. (Id. at 436.) Hayes testified that he told them 

about the police and then walked around the house. (Id. at 438.) Although Hayes testified that

Hellums was dating Zoe Meinhart at the time, he stated that he did not know if Hellums lived in 

the house with her (id. at 441–42) and he did not see Hellums in the trailer or at the house, (id. at 

440.) Based on this testimony from Amanda, Roland, Bogard, and Hayes, Hellums has not 

demonstrated that the Court of Appeals of Indiana acted unreasonably by finding that his trial 

would not have had a different outcome, even if Attorney Dant had conducted a more thorough 

investigation. 

In his Petition, Hellums alleged that Attorney Dant was ineffective for not filing a speedy 

trial motion. The Court of Appeals of Indiana also adjudicated this claim and found that Hellums 

had not demonstrated that “the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (Hellums, 

No. 14A01-1402-PC-67, slip op. at 6.) In his Traverse, Hellums makes only a single reference to 

the speedy trial motion, which appears in the title for this section of his brief and merely 

identifies that he raised this claim in his Petition. (Mem. Law Supp. Traverse 12.) Hellums has 

not argued this issue or explained how its adjudication was unreasonable. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d), habeas corpus relief can only be granted where the State court’s adjudication of a

claim was unreasonable. Because Hellums has not presented any basis for finding the State’s 

adjudication unreasonable, this alleged deficiency is not a basis for habeas corpus relief.
8

Hellums also argues that “alibi witnesses were not interviewed or called to testify due to 

the gross incompetence and indifference of public defender Dant, who failed to file a Notice of

Alibi Defense. As a result, Hellums was severely prejudiced because the jury never heard

available exculpatory evidence before rendering a verdict in this case.” (Mem. Law Supp. 

Traverse at 16.) The Court of Appeals of Indiana adjudicated this claim and found that there was 

no factual basis for filing a notice of alibi. (Hellums, No. 14A01-1402-PC-67, slip op. at 7.)

Although Hellums argues that exculpatory evidence existed, he did not produce that evidence 

during his post-conviction relief proceedings. As such, there is no basis for finding that the State 

court adjudication was unreasonable or that there is any basis for habeas corpus relief on this 

issue. 

Hellums also claims that Attorney Dant “violated attorney-client responsibility by acting 

as Special Judge against Hellums within a few days after withdrawing from the case.” (Habeas 

Corpus Pet. 3.) The Court of Appeals of Indiana explained 

that Attorney Dant acted as judge pro tempore a mere five days after he withdrew 

his representation. In this temporary position, Attorney Dant signed the order 

granting the State’s Motion on the Habitual Enhancement. However, as 

ineffective assistance of counsel refers to the quality of an attorney’s 

representation of a client, it logically follows that the conduct of the attorney after 

representation has ended is not covered by this doctrine. Rather, Hellums’ 

allegation is more properly characterized as a conflict of interest between 

Attorney Dant’s duties as Hellums’ counsel and his obligations as a judge pro 

tempore.

(Hellums, No. 14A01-1402-PC-67, slip op. at 7.) In his Traverse, Hellums asserts that he “did 

not argue that Dant’s actions were a conflict of interest,” but rather “that Dant would have 

recognized Hellums [sic] name within 5 days after his withdrawal if he had rendered zealous

advocacy during the 5 months of his representation, and this failure to recognize Hellums is clear 
9

proof that Dant had ignored his client during the 5 months of his representation.” (Mem. Law 

Supp. Traverse 14–15.)

Neither theory is a basis for habeas corpus relief because Hellums has not demonstrated 

that he was prejudiced in either scenario. To the extent that signing the motion adding a habitual 

offender count was a conflict of interest, Hellums has not demonstrated that the motion would 

not have been granted by some other judge if Attorney Dant had recused himself. To the extent 

that Hellums is merely arguing that not remembering his name is prima facie proof of prior 

deficient performance, he still has not demonstrated prejudice based on any of the alleged 

omissions of Attorney Dant. Therefore, Hellums’s assertions that Attorney Dant provided 

ineffective assistance of counsel are not a basis for habeas corpus relief. 

2. Attorney Dwyer

Hellums argues that: 

Public defender J.D. Dwyer failed to conduct a professional investigation 

into the facts and circumstances of this case, failed to interview available defense 

witnesses, and failed to act as a zealous advocate for Hellums due to his serious 

illness from cancer, in that Dwyer was effectively dying from cancer during his 

representation of Hellums. Hellums was prejudiced by the lack of effective 

representation during pretrial due to Dwyer’s illness.

(Habeas Corpus Pet. 3.) The Court of Appeals of Indiana found that the record “fails to satisfy 

the showing that Attorney Dwyer’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness.” (Hellums, No. 14A01-1402-PC-67, slip op. at 8.) Hellums argues that he “was 

severely prejudiced” by Attorney Dwyer’s omissions. (Mem. Law Supp. Traverse 18.) However, 

as with Attorney Dant, he has not even alleged, much less demonstrated, that any of the 

information he wanted gathered became unavailable as a result of delay. The ruling of the Court 
10

of Appeals of Indiana was not unreasonable and Hellums’ allegations against Attorney Dwyer 

are not a basis for habeas corpus relief. 

3. Attorney Ramsey

Hellums argues that: 

Public defender Chris Ramsey failed to conduct a professional 

investigation into the facts and circumstances of this case, failed to conduct 

professional interviews of available defense witnesses, failed to depose State 

witnesses, failed to communicate and consult with Hellums, failed to object and 

challenge prejudicial evidence and perjured testimony, and failed to prepare

Hellums [sic] trial testimony.

(Habeas Corpus Pet. 3.) The Court of Appeals of Indiana found that “Attorney Ramsey was 

prepared for trial and performed effectively. Merely because Hellums did not agree with 

Attorney Ramsey’s efforts and strategy, this disagreement does not raise to [sic] an ineffective 

assistance of counsel issue.” (Hellums, No. 14A01-1402-PC-67, slip op. at 9–10.) The Court of 

Appeals of Indiana summarized Attorney Ramsey’s actions during the trial court proceedings:

Attorney Ramsey unsuccessfully objected and requested a mistrial when the State 

added the attempted dealing in methamphetamine charge on the second day of 

trial. Likewise, Attorney Ramsey objected to the jury instruction related to this 

added attempt charge. He also unsuccessfully requested more time to prepare a 

defense on those grounds. Attorney Ramsey objected to the habitual offender 

charge and filed a notice of alibi. He objected to a witness’ testimony as being in 

violation of an order in limine. According to Hellums’ count, Attorney Ramsey 

objected fifty-seven times at various points during the trial, all of which were 

overruled.

(Id. at 9.)

In his Traverse, Hellums lists four specific instances where he believes Attorney Ramsey 

was ineffective. First, Hellums argues that Attorney Ramsey was ineffective because he did not 

challenge the probable cause affidavit. Hellums argues that Rhonda Roland lied when she told 

the police “that the third male subject who had taken off running was an Eddie Hellums (Harold 
11

E. Hellums).” (App. to Br. Def.-Appellant vol. 1, 18, Aug. 28, 2001, ECF No. 12.) It appears that 

Hellums believes that because Matthew Hayes testified that he (Matthew Hayes) fled from the 

trailer, the arrest warrant for Hellums was invalid and he should not have been put on trial.

However, he provides no explanation for why the police should not have believed Rhonda 

Roland.

“Probable cause exists if, at the time of the arrest, the facts and circumstances within the 

[officer’s] knowledge ‘are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in 

believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed . . . an offense.” Lawson v. 

Veruchi, 637 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Chelios v. Heavener, 520 F.3d 678, 686 (7th 

Cir. 2008)). Here, Roland was apprehended at the trailer and accurately told the police that it 

contained a methamphetamine lab before they searched it. (App. to Br. Def.-Appellant 18.) At 

the time she was apprehended, she also told the police that Hellums had fled the trailer. The 

corroboration of the trailer’s contents provided a sufficient basis for the police to believe her 

when she identified Hellums. At trial, Attorney Ramsey called Matthew Hayes as a defense 

witness. Hayes testified that he fled the trailer. His testimony was not conclusive proof that 

Roland was lying when she testified at trial that Hellums fled the trailer. Indeed, it was not even 

a direct contradiction. At most, it was merely a potential inconsistency for the jury to weigh. 

Therefore, it was not unreasonable for the Court of Appeals of Indiana to have found that 

Attorney Ramsey was not ineffective for having failed to challenge the probable cause affidavit. 

Second, Hellums argues that Attorney Ramsey was ineffective because he “did not 

challenge the false statements and sworn testimony of Tim Meinhart, who had attempted to 

coerce his daughter, Amanda Meinhart, into falsely testified [sic] that Hellums was involved 

with Tim Meinhart’s meth operation and that Hellums was at the meth trailer at the time of the 
12

police raid.” (Mem. Law Supp. Traverse 19.) However, Tim Meinhart did not testify during 

Hellums’s trial, so there was no testimony for Attorney Ramsey to have challenged. Amanda 

Meinhart testified, but she did not testify that Hellums was involved in the methamphetamine 

operation, or that he was at the trailer when the police arrived. Instead, she testified that Hellums 

“made wooden jewelry boxes” in the trailer. (Trial Tr. vol. 3, 348.) Moreover, Attorney Ramsey 

elicited on cross examination that Amanda had been contacted and asked to lie under oath. (Id. at 

351.) On re-direct, she testified that Tim Meinhart had asked her to lie. Therefore, it was not 

unreasonable for the Court of Appeals of Indiana to find that Attorney Ramsey was not 

ineffective regarding the testimony of Tim Meinhart.

Third, Hellums argues that Attorney Ramsey was ineffective because he did not

interview him adequately to be prepared for trial. He argues that Attorney Ramsey “advised the 

post-conviction court that he could not properly represent Hellums [with Hellums being housed 

at the Indiana State Farm] since he could not afford to travel 200 miles for just one client.” 

(Mem. Law Supp. Traverse 19.) This is not true. During the post-conviction hearing Hellums 

asked Attorney Ramsey, “Do you feel that you was adequately prepared for a jury trial on the 

day that we went with me so far away?” (Post-Conviction Relief Tr., vol. 1, 34, May 5, 2014, 

ECF No. 12.) In response, Attorney Ramsey stated, “I mean as far as I recollect, yes.” (Id.) Later 

during that hearing, Hellums asked, “Isn’t true that you was prepared . . . for the five charges that 

they had on me?” (Id. at 47.) Attorney Ramsey responded, “I would like to think I was, yes. . . . I 

mean my exact recollection, I didn’t ask for a continuance prior to trial or the day of trial and so I 

would say, yes, I was prepared to argue the . . . or prepared to do the case.” (Id.) Therefore, it 

was not unreasonable for the Court of Appeals of Indiana to have found that Attorney Ramsey 

was not ineffective by not being prepared for trial.
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Fourth, Hellums argues that Attorney Ramsey was ineffective because he “never learned 

of the numerous defense witnesses who could present testimony supporting Hellums [sic] actual 

innocence claim, and as a result the jury never heard all the material and relevant facts of this 

case before rendering the guilty verdict on attempting to deal meth.” (Mem. Law Supp. Traverse 

19 (internal quotation marks omitted).) Despite alleging that numerous witnesses would have 

testified that he was innocent, Hellums did not submit the testimony of any such witnesses 

during his post-conviction relief proceedings. Because he did not present any evidence 

demonstrating that these witnesses ever existed, it was not unreasonable for the Court of Appeals 

of Indiana to have found that Attorney Ramsey was not ineffective.

Specifically, Hellums argues that “Ramsey failed to properly challenge the false 

testimony of jail house informant, Mark Frazer, who received compensation for his cooperation 

with the State and his testimony that Hellums had confessed his guilt to Frazer in the county 

jail.” (Mem. Law Supp. Traverse 19–20.) However, he gives no explanation as to what he thinks 

should have been done. On direct examination, the prosecuting attorney elicited testimony from 

Frazer about the plea agreement, which required that he testify against Hellums. Frazer testified 

that, under the plea agreement, “I was to provide truthful testimony against Harold Hellums, and 

I was to provide truthful testimony against Ronald D. Osborne in exchange for an open Class B 

felony with a ten year cap.” (Trial Tr. vol. 3, 310.)

On cross examination, Attorney Ramsey elicited testimony that, but for the plea 

agreement, the maximum sentence for a Class B felony was 20 years and that he received 10 

years because of the plea agreement. (Id. at 316.) Attorney Ramsey also had Frazer admit that 

three other charges were dismissed (id.), as well as testimony that Frazer had been convicted of 

six crimes of dishonesty, (id. at 327–29.) Attorney Ramsey then cross examined Frazer about his 
14

conversations with Hellums in the jail. (Id. at 329–35.) On re-cross examination, Attorney 

Ramsey had Frazer testify that the State had provided him with the street clothes he was wearing 

at trial so that he would not have to appear in a prison uniform. (Id. at 341.) Based on the record, 

there is nothing unreasonable about the Court of Appeals of Indiana finding that Attorney 

Ramsey did not render ineffective assistance. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

In Ground Two, Hellums argues that his appellate public defender, Greg Lewis, provided 

ineffective assistance of counsel because he “failed to challenge on direct appeal the defective 

probable cause affidavit that was based on hearsay, failed to challenge the Attempted Dealing 

instruction, and failed to raise the late filing of amended charges.” (Habeas Corpus Pet. 4.) The 

Respondent argues that Ground Two is procedurally defaulted because Hellums did not present 

those issues to the State courts. “To avoid procedural default, a habeas petitioner must fully and 

fairly present his federal claims to the state courts.” Anderson v. Benik, 471 F.3d 811, 814–15 

(7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Boyko v. Parke, 259 F.3d 781, 788 (7th Cir. 2001)). “This means that

the petitioner must raise the issue at each and every level in the state court system, including 

levels at which review is discretionary rather than mandatory.” Lewis v. Sternes, 390 F.3d 1019, 

1025–26 (7th Cir. 2004).

In his Traverse, Hellums did not dispute that this ground is procedurally defaulted and a 

review of the record demonstrates that it is. On appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, 

Hellums raised an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim in his petition to transfer, but 

he did not mention any of the three instances that he has included in his habeas corpus petition. 

Rather, he argued that “Greg Lewis was ineffective for improperly raising an issue of 

amelioration which had no merit, and for failing to raise public defender Dant’s conflict of 
15

interest by Dant’s failure to file the alibi defense due to the lack of investigation and interviews, 

and Dant’s acting on behalf of the State as a pro temp judge after his withdrawal.” (Pet. to 

Transfer 12, ECF No. 6-12.) Thus, the alleged instances of ineffective appellate counsel are 

procedurally defaulted. 

Nevertheless, procedural default can be excused, “if the petitioner can . . . demonstrate 

that the district court’s failure to consider the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice.” Richardson v. Lemke, 745 F.3d 258, 272 (7th Cir. 2014). To demonstrate a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice, the petitioner must prove that “constitutional error has resulted in the 

conviction of one who is actually innocent of the crime.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 

(1995). Hellums argues that “[t]his case represents a fundamental miscarriage of justice 

[because] . . . . There was no credible, reliable evidence that Harold Hellums was involved in the 

manufacture or attempted dealing of illegal drugs.” (Mem. Law Supp. Traverse 20.) “[T]enable 

actual-innocence gateway pleas are rare: ‘A petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement 

unless he persuades the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting 

reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” McQuiggin v. 

Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329). A petitioner who 

asserts actual innocence “must demonstrate innocence; the burden is his, not the state’s . . . .” 

Buie v. McAdory, 341 F.3d 623, 626–27 (7th Cir. 2003). To do so, he must come forward “with 

new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness 

accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.

Here, Hellums has not provided any new evidence. This alone precludes finding that he 

has demonstrated actual innocence. Hellums argues that Rhonda Roland’s testimony that she saw 

him at the trailer with others where methamphetamine was being manufactured should not be 
16

believed because it was contradicted by the testimony of others at trial. But contradictory 

testimony was presented at trial and the discrepancies were argued during closing. (Trial Tr. vol. 

3, 472–77.) The jury found Hellums guilty. He did not raise a freestanding claim that there was 

insufficient evidence to have done so. But even if he had, “[t]he standard of review [for such a

claim] is a rigorous one: evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is sufficient to 

support a conviction so long as any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the 

offense to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jones v. Butler, 778 F.3d 575, 581 (7th 

Cir. 2015) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Here, such a claim, even if it 

had been raised, would not be a basis for habeas corpus relief because the evidence most 

favorable to the State includes testimony that he handed Rhonda Roland a glass jar and fled from 

the trailer where methamphetamine was being manufactured when the police arrived. It also 

includes Mark Frazer’s testimony that Hellums confessed. As such, there was sufficient evidence

presented at trial for a rational juror to have found Hellums guilty. Hellums has not overcome 

procedural default and Ground Two is not a basis for habeas corpus relief. 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the Court must consider 

whether to grant a certificate of appealability. To obtain a certificate of appealability under 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c), the petitioner must make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right by establishing “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) 

the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were 

adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For the reasons previously explained, 
17

Hellums has not done so. There is no reason to encourage him to proceed further and he will be 

denied a certificate of appealability.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Habeas Corpus Petition [ECF No. 1] is DENIED. Harold Hellums

is DENIED a certificate of appealability. The clerk is DIRECTED to close this case. 

SO ORDERED on May 17, 2016.

s/ Theresa L. Springmann

THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FORT WAYNE DIVISION