2021 UT 27

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DAVID ALLEN ARNOLD

Respondent,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES

Petitioners.

No. 20191014

Heard April 8, 2021

Filed July 9, 2021

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

Department of Workforce Services, Salt Lake City

The Honorable Ryan Rock

No. 19-A-02986-R

Attorneys:

David Allen Arnold, Roosevelt, pro se

Amanda B. McPeck, Salt Lake City, for petitioners

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT authored the opinion of the Court in which

ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, JUSTICE HIMONAS, JUSTICE PEARCE,

and JUSTICE PETERSEN joined.

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, opinion of the Court:

Introduction

¶1 After David Arnold was temporarily laid off from his job, 

the Department of Workforce Services (the Department) denied him

unemployment benefits because he indicated on his application that 

he was not available to accept full-time work. Because Mr. Arnold 

would be returning to his former employer, the Department deferred 

the requirement that he actively seek employment while receiving 

benefits but still required him to be able and available to accept fulltime work under Utah Code section 35A-4-403. Mr. Arnold appealed 

the denial of his benefits, arguing that the deferral from actively 

seeking work should also grant him a deferral from being available 

to accept full-time work. After the administrative law judge (ALJ) 
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Opinion of the Court

2

and the workforce appeals board both denied his appeal, the court of 

appeals reversed on summary disposition. It held that interpreting 

section 35A-4-403 to require a claimant who had obtained a worksearch deferral to nevertheless be able and available to accept fulltime employment worked an absurd result. But because this 

requirement ensures a claimant will return to work as soon as work

becomes available and comports with the purpose of the statute, we 

disagree and reverse the court of appeals.

Background

¶2 After Mr. Arnold‟s wife, who is blind, experienced 

complications following a major surgery, Mr. Arnold and his 

employer agreed that he would be laid off temporarily so that he 

could take care of her and because work was slow. When Mr. Arnold 

filled out the application form for unemployment insurance benefits, 

he had to mark whether he was “able, ready, and willing to accept 

full-time work.” Mr. Arnold answered, “No.” Under the comment 

section at the bottom, Mr. Arnold stated, “[M]y wife is 100 percent 

blind and is having complications from her hysterectomy surgery. [I] 

have been caring for her.” Another note on the application stated 

that “[client] said he is taking care of his wife. He hopes to be 

[available] in a couple of weeks but [is] unsure when.”

¶3 Because Mr. Arnold would be returning to his former 

employer, he obtained a deferral from the requirement that he 

actively seek fulltime employment while receiving benefits. But 

because the Department requires a claimant who obtains a worksearch deferral to nevertheless comply with the other requirements, 

and because Mr. Arnold was not available to accept full-time work, 

the Department denied his claim for unemployment benefits.

¶4 Mr. Arnold appealed the denial of his claim. The ALJ 

affirmed after Mr. Arnold testified at the hearing that he was not 

available to work full-time while caring for his wife, estimating he 

would need to help her for another two weeks. The ALJ denied 

benefits because Mr. Arnold failed to meet the criteria that he be 

available to accept full-time employment. Mr. Arnold appealed the 

decision to the workforce appeals board, and the board affirmed the 

ALJ. Mr. Arnold then appealed to the court of appeals. The divided 

court vacated the board‟s decision on summary disposition, finding 

in a 2-1 vote that the requirement worked an absurd result. The 

Department filed a petition for certiorari, which we granted. We 

have jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to Utah Code section 

78A-3-102(3)(j).
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Opinion of the Court

3

Standard of Review

¶5 The appropriate standard of review “depends on the type of 

agency action alleged to be erroneous.”

1 Here, the court of appeals 

found that the plain language of the statute produced an absurd 

result. This presents a question of statutory interpretation. We 

review for correctness the interpretation of a statue, granting no 

deference to the court of appeals.2 And on pure questions of law, 

“we have retained for the courts the de novo prerogative of 

interpreting the law, unencumbered by any standard of agency 

deference.”3

Analysis

¶6 The court of appeals vacated on summary disposition the 

board‟s decision to deny Mr. Arnold unemployment benefits, 

holding it produced an absurd result to interpret Utah Code section

35A-4-403 as requiring a claimant who had obtained a work-search 

deferral to nevertheless be able and available for full-time work.4 The 

Department contends that this requirement does not work an absurd 

result because it ensures that the claimant will go back to work if 

called upon to return earlier than anticipated. We agree with the 

Department.

¶7 Section 35A-4-403 provides that a claimant “is eligible to 

receive benefits for any week if the division finds” the claimant 

meets certain requirements. The two requirements at issue here are 

that the claimant is “able to work and is available for work during 

each and every week for which the individual made a claim for 

benefits”

5 and has “acted in a good faith effort to secure employment 

during each and every week . . ., except as provided in Subsection 

_____________________________________________________________

1 Murray v. Utah Lab. Comm’n, 2013 UT 38, ¶ 23, 308 P.3d 461.

2 Nichols v. Jacobsen Constr. Co., 2016 UT 19, ¶ 13, 374 P.3d 3.

3 Hughes Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Utah Lab. Comm’n, 2014 UT 

3, ¶ 25, 322 P.3d 712.

4

It is not clear to us why, in a case where the court of appeals 

reverses and applies the absurdity doctrine, it would do so in a 

summary fashion. While the Department did not brief this issue, we 

find it unusual and question whether such a ruling is appropriate for 

summary disposition.

5 UTAH CODE § 35A-4-403(1)(c).
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(4).”6 Subsection (4) provides that the Department “may, by rule, 

waive or alter” the work-search requirement when the claimant is 

“attached to regular jobs.”7In other words, the statute requires that 

the claimant actively seek for employment unless granted a worksearch waiver and also requires the claimant to be able and available 

to accept full-time work. The statute does not authorize the 

Department to waive the able-and-available requirement.

¶8 Although it is a “well-settled principle of statutory 

construction that this court looks „first to the plain language of the 

statute‟ when interpreting meaning,”8in this case, the court of 

appeals found that the plain language of the statute produced an 

“absurd result” because any applicant granted a work-search 

deferral will not be employed during the deferral period regardless 

of availability. We recognize that in many cases the claimant will 

remain unemployed regardless of availability status when granted a 

work-search deferral. But we disagree that this plain language 

produces an absurd result. Rather it ensures the claimant is available 

to return to work if called upon at an earlier date and it is consistent 

with the purpose of the statute to not “subsidize activities which 

interfere with immediate reemployment.”9

I. We Reverse the Court of Appeals and Hold That Mr. Arnold

Was Properly Denied Unemployment Benefits Because He

Was Not Available to Accept Full-Time Employment

¶9 The court of appeals rejected the Department‟s 

interpretation of Utah Code section 35A-4-403. On summary 

disposition, the divided court held in a 2-1 vote that if a claimant is 

granted a work-search deferral, refusing to waive the able and 

available to work requirement “worked an absurd result” on the 

interpretation of the statute because Mr. Arnold was excused from 

working in either event. The Department counters that the statute‟s 

requirement of availability even when having obtained a worksearch exemption ensures the claimant can return to work as soon as 

such work becomes available and also comports with the purpose of 

_____________________________________________________________

6

Id. § 35A-4-403(1)(b).

7

Id. § 35A-4-403(4).

8 Savage v. Utah Youth Vill., 2004 UT 102, ¶ 18, 104 P.3d 1242 

(quoting Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 

1997).

9 See UTAH ADMIN. CODE r.994-403-112c(2).
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Opinion of the Court

5

the statue to provide benefits only to those who, but for lack of work, 

would be employed full-time. We agree with the Department and 

reverse the decision of the court of appeals.

A. The Department’s Interpretation Does Not Produce an Absurd 

Result

¶10 The court of appeals held that it worked an absurd result to 

interpret section 35A-4-403 as requiring a claimant who has obtained 

a work-search deferral to nonetheless be able and available to work. 

The Court concluded that regardless of availability, the claimant 

would nonetheless be unemployed during the deferral time because 

“nobody gets offered a job when they aren‟t applying for jobs.”10

Noting that the availability to work “in a theoretical sense” during 

the deferral period “is neither here nor there,” the court reasoned 

that “allowing someone to forgo looking for a job is tantamount to 

excusing them from working.”11 The Department counters that the 

rules properly interpret the eligibility requirements of the statute, 

ensuring that the claimant can return to work with their employer as 

soon as such work is available. We agree with the Department.

¶11 Although it is a “well-settled principle of statutory 

construction” that a court looks “„first to the plain language of the 

statute‟ when interpreting meaning,” the absurdity doctrine dictates 

that a court “should not follow the literal language of a statute if its 

plain meaning works an absurd result.”12 This doctrine “reform[s] 

unambiguous statutory language”13 to “preserve[] legislative intent 

by construing the statute in a way that ensures that the statutory text 

does not operate in an unintended, absurd manner.”14 This is a 

“narrow, exacting standard” that is “satisfied only if the legislature 

could not reasonably have intended the result.”15

_____________________________________________________________

10 Arnold v. Workforce Services, No. 20190551-CA, slip op. at 4 

(Utah Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2019).

11 Id.

12 Savage, 2004 UT 102, ¶ 18 (citations omitted).

13 Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 27, 387 P.3d 1000 (alteration in 

original) (citation omitted).

14 Garfield Cnty v. United States, 2017 UT 41 ¶ 23, 424 P.3d 46.

15 Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 28; see also Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch 

P'ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 26, 267 P.3d 863 (citation omitted) (stating that 

(continued . . .)
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¶12 For example, in Bagley v. Bagley we examined whether the 

plain language of the wrongful death and survival action statutes 

produced an absurd result.16 A widow, the heir and personal 

representative of her late husband‟s estate, brought a wrongful death 

claim against herself as the driver who had allegedly caused the fatal 

car accident. We concluded that the plain statutory language 

“permit[ted] a person acting as an heir or personal representative to 

sue him or herself as an individual for damages.”17 The defendant 

argued that allowing suit against oneself produced an absurd 

result.18 But we recognized that the legislature could have 

reasonably intended this result because the suit could benefit other 

heirs and creditors of the estate. Because of such benefits, we 

concluded that the legislature could have rationally intended suit 

against oneself.

19

¶13 But in State ex rel. Z.C., we found that the plain language of 

a child sex abuse statute produced an absurd result when applied to 

two minors who had been engaged in a consensual sexual 

relationship.20 The statute defined a perpetrator of child sex abuse as 

a “person” and a “child” as a “person under the age of [fourteen].”21

Under this language, and because each minor was under the age of 

fourteen, the State classified each one as a victim and also charged 

each one as a perpetrator.

22 We acknowledged that under the 

statute‟s plain language a “child” is a “person.” But we also 

recognized that although “the plain language interpretation of a 

statute enjoys a robust presumption in its favor, it is also true that [a 

legislative body] cannot, in every instance, be counted on to have 

said what it meant or to have meant what it said.”23 And we held 

 

the “result must be so absurd that the legislative body which 

authored the legislation could not have intended it”).

16 Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶¶ 23–32.

17 Id. ¶ 23. 

18 Id. ¶ 25.

19 Id. ¶¶ 30–31.

20 State ex rel. Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 5, 165 P.3d 1206.

21 Id. ¶ 7 (citation omitted).

22 Id. ¶ 1.

23 Id. ¶ 11 (alteration in original) (quoting FBI v. Abramson, 456 

U.S. 615, 638 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
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Opinion of the Court

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that the language allowing the State to charge a child “as both a 

victim and a perpetrator of child sex abuse for the same act leads to 

an absurd result that was not intended by the legislature.”

24

¶14 As illustrated by our holdings in Bagley and Z.C., if we find 

a rational explanation for the plain language of a statute, the 

absurdity doctrine will not apply and we will follow the plain 

language. In our present case, the plain language of the statute 

allows waiver of the work-search requirement but not of the ableand-available requirement. And we conclude there is a rational 

explanation for allowing the waiver of the first requirement without 

allowing waiver of the second. As the Department points out, 

requiring a claimant to be able and available for work even if 

granted a work-search deferral helps ensure the claimant will return 

to work as soon as called upon. When viewed in this light, retaining 

the able-and-available requirement under these circumstances is 

reasonable. It may well be that an employer, suffering from a 

seasonal downturn, or from a temporary closure, would develop the 

need for an increase in or return to production earlier than 

anticipated. And the employer would then call upon the laid-off 

workers to immediately return.

¶15 We addressed the issue of a claimant‟s availability during a 

work-search deferral in Dorsey v. Department of Workforce Services.

25

In Dorsey, the claimant was granted a work-search deferral because 

he would be returning to his former employer. But he was 

nevertheless denied unemployment benefits for violating the 

Department‟s per se ban on international travel during that period.

26

We noted that the claimant called his employer “on a few occasions”

to see if he was needed back earlier than anticipated, and that he 

could have returned to the United States within twenty-four hours.27

We concluded that the Department‟s ban was not compatible with 

the statute‟s availability requirement because “‟a claimant in San 

Diego and a claimant in Tijuana‟ may be „equally able to return‟” for 

immediate work.28 Rather, we found that the determinative question 

_____________________________________________________________

24 Id. ¶ 5.

25 Dorsey v. Dep’t of Workforce Servs., 2014 UT 22, 330 P.3d 91.

26 The rule prohibited international travel lasting longer than two

weeks. Id. ¶¶ 6–9.

27 Id. ¶ 4.

28 Id. ¶ 17 (citing Dorsey v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2012 UT App 

364, ¶ 21, 294 P.3d 580).
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for benefit eligibility was whether the claimant was able to respond

“quickly enough” to accept “any opportunity for work.”29

¶16 Although in Dorsey we primarily addressed the 

circumstances under which a claimant‟s travel interferes with 

availability, our holding recognized that even when not required to 

search for work, the able-and-available requirement helps ensure a 

claimant will immediately return to work if called upon earlier than 

anticipated.

¶17 Disallowing waiver of the able-and-available requirement

also comports with the purpose of unemployment benefits.

30

“Unemployment compensation is designed to ease the burden of 

those who are generally available in the labor market but for whom 

no suitable gainful employment is available. It was not created to 

ease the burden of those who for one reason or another are not 

generally available”

31 or “to subsidize activities which interfere with 

immediate reemployment.”32

¶18 For this reason, it follows that a presumption of 

unavailability is imposed on any claimant involved in an activity 

that takes up more than half the time, even when that individual has 

been granted a work-search deferral.33 For example, if the claimant is 

unable to work “due to a temporary disability and the employer has 

agreed to allow the claimant to return to the job” when able, the 

claimant is not eligible for benefits.34 So although unemployment 

_____________________________________________________________

29 Id. (citing Dorsey, 2012 UT App 364, ¶ 21).

30 Although the purpose of a statute cannot serve to contravene 

the statute‟s plain language, see id. ¶ 21, it may serve to support the 

statute‟s plain language.

31 York v. Morgan, 517 P.2d 301, 302 (1973). See also U.S. Dep‟t of 

Labor, Employment and Training Admin., Advisory System 

Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 10-20, § 4(b) (March 

12, 2020) https://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/attach/UIPL/UIPL_10-

20.pdf (explaining that the able and available requirements “test[] 

whether the fact that an individual did not work for any week was 

involuntary due to the unavailability of suitable work”).

32 UTAH ADMIN. CODE r.994-403-112c(2).

33 UTAH ADMIN. CODE r.994-403-112c(2)(a); see also UTAH CODE 

§ 35A-4-403(4).

34 UTAH ADMIN. CODE r.994-403-111c(3)(a).
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may be due to circumstances “beyond the control of the claimant,”35

a claimant does not qualify for unemployment benefits unless able 

and available to accept immediate work.36

¶19 We note that Utah Code section 35A-4-403 does not require 

the Department to grant work-search deferrals but merely permits 

the practice. However, this rule reflects the reality that “searching for 

work is likely to be futile when an employee has an offer to return to 

full-time work within a short period of time.”37 But the rule should 

not be used to “create a loophole for employees to use 

unemployment benefits in lieu of paid leave or to subsidize unpaid 

leave during periods when they are unavailable to work.”38 And if 

we were to permit abuse of this practice by requiring the 

Department to waive the current availability requirements, the 

agency could simply refuse to grant work-search deferrals.

¶20 Because the able-and-available requirement helps ensure 

that a claimant will be able to respond for immediate work if called 

upon to return earlier than anticipated and because the purpose of 

the statute is to provide benefits to those who are unemployed but 

who are nonetheless able and available to work, we conclude that it 

does not produce an absurd result to follow the plain language of the 

statute. We reverse the court of appeals and hold that under Utah 

Code section 35A-4-403 Mr. Arnold was properly denied 

unemployment benefits because he was not available to accept fulltime work.

Conclusion

¶21 We reverse the court of appeals and hold that following the 

plain language of Utah Code section 35A-4-403, in requiring a 

claimant who has obtained a work-search deferral to be nonetheless 

able and available to accept full-time employment, does not produce 

an absurd result. Rather, it helps ensure a claimant will return to 

_____________________________________________________________

35 UTAH ADMIN. CODE r.994-403-112c(1).

36 See UTAH CODE § 35A-4-403.

37 Arnold v. Workforce Servs., No. 20190551-CA, slip op. at 6 (Utah 

Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2019) (Forster, J., dissenting).

38 Id.; see also Steinhauer v. Dep’t of Workforce Servs., 2014 UT App 

121, 327 P.3d 1238 (per curiam) (finding an employee‟s request for a 

leave of absence from his part-time job to focus on preparing for the 

ski season disqualified him for unemployment benefits after being 

laid off from his full-time job).
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Opinion of the Court

10

work when called upon and comports with the purpose of the 

statute. We hold that the Department properly denied Mr. Arnold‟s 

claim for unemployment during the time he was taking care of his 

wife because he was not available to accept full-time work.