T he H onorabl e T homas W
. P hi l l i ps, U ni t ed St at es D i s t r i ct Ju dge f or t he E as t er n D i s t r i ct of T enn es s ee, * si t t i ng by desi gnat i o n.

NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0526n.06 Case No. 08- 1937 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,
v. DAMOND MOSLEY, Defendan t-Appellant.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE E ASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIG AN

BEFORE: M OORE an d GILMAN, C ircuit Judges; P HILL IP S , District Judge. * THOMAS W. PHILLIPS, Distr ict Judge.
Def endant wa s convicted, a fter a bench tr ial, of beinga fe lon in possession of a firea rm. The trial judg e found that t h e sente ncing enhanc ement in the Ar med Care er Criminal Ac t applied and sentenc ed def

endant to 180 months of imprisonment. Def endant c halleng es his conviction and sentenc e, alleg ing: ( 1) the e v i d en ce wa s i nsufficie nt to support his conviction; (2) the trial cour t
err ed in acc epting a st ipulation by the parties that the fire arm a ffe cted inter state commer ce; ( 3) the trial court e rre d in acc epting expert testimony without r uling that the witness was qua lified to testify
as an e x pert witness; (4) his pr ior conviction for felonious assault was not a serious drugoffe nse or08- 1937

2

violent felony

under Michig an law; a

nd (5) the se ntencingenhanc ements under the Arme d Caree r Cr imi na l A c t are un c on sti tut ion a l. F ind ingno me ri t in de fe nd ant’ s argume nts , w e a ff ir m hi s conviction and se ntence
.

I. Bac kgr ound Def endant wa ived his rig ht to a jury trial, and trial commenc ed bef ore the Honora

ble Sean Cox in the Easter

n Di s t ri ct o f Michig an on Mar ch 20, 2008. Prior to ca lling the f irst witness, the g overnme nt placed two stipulations on the rec ord. The fir st stipul ation was that de fenda nt had bee n convicted of

a fe lony . The sec ond stipulation was that the firearm in question, a Sm ith & Wesson .40 caliber

semiautomatic pistol, was not manufac tured in the St at e o f Michig an and the ref ore trave led in and affec ted i nterstate commerc e. The g overnme nt then prese nted the testimony of the two office rs who ar

rested de fenda

nt, and Chana G udg er, a fore nsic technic ian with the Detr oit Pol ice De pa rtme nt.

The trial tra

nscrip t s h o ws that on November 1, 2007, at appr ox imately 12:30 a.m., two uniformed City

of De troit police offic ers observe d a black L incoln turn left without stopping at a re d light. The office rs made a U-turn, a ctivated the o v er h ea d l i gh ts and eff ecte d a tra ffic stop on the L incoln. Def

endant wa s the sole occ upant in the vehicle . After the office rs pulled the L incoln over, they parke d direc tly

behind the vehic le and ke pt the patrol ca r’s he adlig hts on to il luminate the inside of th e v e h ic le
. O f

f ic e r T o ma s ze w s k i a

p p r o a c h e d

o nth e p a s s e n g e r

s id e an d O f f ic e r Woodcum approa ched on the driver’ s side.08- 1937

3

As Tomaszewski approa ched, he saw the defe ndant make a downwa rd motion with his right
arm a nd rig ht shoulder. Tomaszewski shined his flashlig ht on the driver, but the driver ’s rig ht hand was not visible beca

use it was betwe en the dr iver’s se at and the passeng er seat. Tomaszewski saw the dr ive r p ull his ha

nd fr om be tw e e n the dr ive r’ s se a t and the pa sse ng e r se a t, pla c e his ha nd on his lap, and then g rab the steeringwhee l in a hurried ma nner.

Offic er W oodcum approache d the driver’s s ide door of t he vehicle and r equeste d defe ndant to pr esent his dr iver’s license, reg istration, a nd proof of insurance
. Def endant compli ed
. After Woodcum e n g a g e d in a b r ie f c o n v e r s a ti o n w it h d e f e n d an t, th e tw o o f

f ic e r s w a lk e d b a c k in the direc tion o f t h e p at rol vehicle. T omaszewski alerte d Woodcum that he had obser ved def endant making furtive g estures a s though he wer e attempting to conce al something i n t h e L i n co ln. The office rs immediately

returned t o t he L incoln. Woodcum asked def endant to exit the vehicle and obtained def

endant’ s consent t o s ear ch the c ar. D efe ndant g ot out of the L incoln and Woodcum patte d h im d ow n a

nd e sc or te d h im b a c k to th e pat rol c ar. To ma sze ws ki s e arc he d th e L inc oln betwee n the driver ’s seat a nd the ce nter c onsole, wher e he pr eviously had obser ved def endant’ s hand h i d d e nf r o m v i e w . H e s h i n e d

h i s f l a s h l i g h ti nt h e a

r e a an d o b s e r v e d anu p s i d e d o w nh an d g u n . It
wa s a loa de d .4 0 c a lib e r blu e ste e l a uto ma tic ha

nd g un . T he of

fi c e rs pla c e d d e fe nd ant u

nd e r a rr e st and the ve hicle wa s further sear ched, but no a dditional contraba nd was found.

On Novembe r 2, 2007, the fir ear m was sent to an e vidence lab, wher e C h an a Gudg er, a fore nsic technic ian, examined it for latent fing erpr ints. Gudg er was unable to lift a latent f inge rprint08- 1937

4

from the f irea rm or the live r ounds, but was able to lift a latent fing erpr int f rom the mag azine, which was then se nt to another unit for f urther a naly sis. This lat ent fing erpr int was later de termined unsuitable for c omparison purposes.

II. Ana lys is A. Substant i al Evidenc e Supports Def endant’ s 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1) Conviction.
Def endant f irst challeng es his co n v i cti on on the basis that there was insuffic ient evidenc e int ro du c e d at tr ia l to de mon str a te that he po sse sse d th e fi re arm fo un d in the c ar h e wa s d

ri vin g . T his court re views a defenda

nt’s sufficie ncy of t he evidence claim to consider “whethe r after viewing the evidenc e in the l ight most favor able to the pr osecution, anyrational trier of fa ct could have found the essential e lements of the crime beyond a re asonable doubt.” Jack son v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 31 9 ( 19 79 ); United States v. Copeland, 32 1 F .3 d 5 82 , 6 00 (6 Cir . 2 00 3) . I n unde rt a kin g thi s th analy sis, this court ne ither indepe ndently weig hs the evidenc e nor judge s the cre dibilit y of witnesses who testified at tria l. United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 996 ( 6 Cir. 1999). th

Def endant was char g ed with possession of a firea rm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1). The elements of being a felon in possession of a firea rm pursuant to § 922(g )(1)
are : (1) the de fenda

nt had a pr evious felony conviction; (2) the defe ndant possessed a firea rm; and (3) the f irea rm trave led i n or af

fec ted interstate c ommerce . Un ite d S tat es v . G ar

dn e r, 488 F.3d 700,08- 1937

5

713 (6 Cir. 2007). The pa rties stipulated to the first and t h i rd el ements at trial, so de fenda nt’s th insufficienc y

challeng e addr esses whe ther ther e wa s sufficient e vidence of possession.
Possession may

be either actua l or constructive. Actual possession means that the de fenda nt had phy sical control ove r the wea pon, wher eas constructive possession e x ists whe n a person doe s
no t ha ve a c tua l po sse ssi on bu t ins te a d kn ow ing ly ha s the po we r and the int e nti on a t a g ive n ti me to exercise dominion and contr ol over a n object, either direc tly or throug h others. Gardner , 488 F.3d at 713

. Moreove r, proof

that the person has dom inion over the premises where the firea rm is located is sufficient to e stablish c onstructive possession. Id. Both a ctual and c onstructive possession may be prove d by

circ umstantial evidence
. United States v. Murphy , 107 F.3d 1199, 1208 (6 Cir. 1997). th

I n this case, de fenda

nt was the sole oc cupant of the vehicle conta i n i n g t h e g un. Offic er Tomaszewski testified that as he initially approa ched the vehicle afte r the traff ic stop, he observe d defe ndant make move ments that were consistent with an individual who was attempting to conc eal something. Toma szewski further te stified that he re cover ed the firea rm in the prec ise are a whe re he
e arl ie r h a d s e e n d e fe nd ant’ s su sp ic iou s mo ve me nts . D e fe nd ant a rgue s that the e vid e nc e sh ow s o nly that he wa s p re se nt n e ar t he fi re arm

and th at mer e pr e se nc e a lon e do e s n ot s ho w the re qu isi te knowledg e, powe r or intention to ex erc ise control over the g un to prove c onstructive possession. Howeve r, this court has r ejec ted defendant’s arg ument in simil ar cases. See, e .g. , Murphy , 107 F.3d at 1208 (upholding conviction wher e def endant wa s the driver

and only occupa nt in a vehicle, a

nd the we a po n wa s f ound wi thi n c los e pr oximi ty

to w he re the de fe nd ant h a d b e e n s itt ing ); United States08- 1937

6

v. Newsome , 4 52 F .3 d 59 3, 60 9 (6 Cir
. 20 06 ) (u ph old ing c on vic tio n wh e re de fe nd ant wa s the on ly th person in the ve hicle whe re the g un was found underne ath his seat and de fenda nt appea red a s if he
wa s p ut ti ng so me thi ngun de r t he se a t) ; United States v. Carter , 355 F.3d 920, 925 ( 6 Cir. 2004) th (upholding conviction wher e police sa w the def endant attempting to conc eal the w eapon)
.

We conclude that, viewed in the lig ht most favorable to the prosec ution, the evidence was sufficie nt to support the trial court’s f inding that de fenda

nt posse ssed the firea

rm as cha rg ed in the indictment.

B. Sufficient evide nce suppor ted the trial c ourt’s finding that the fire arm had traveled in and a ffe cted inter state commer ce. The pa rties stipulated in Ex h i b i t T wo t hat the fire arm, a Smit h and Wesson .40 caliber handg un, was not manufa cture d in Michiga n and ther efor e traveled in and a ffect ed commer ce. During the trial, it wa s reve aled that the wea pon was stolen from Ohio and broug ht to Michiga n by unknown per son(s). De fenda nt failed to cha lleng e the stipulation at trial, but now asser ts that it was
e r r o r f o r t h e t r i a l c o u rtt o a c c e p tt h e s t i p u l a t i o nb e c a u s e “ a s t o l e n g un c an n o t a f

f e c t c o m m e r c e . ” In support of his a

rg ument, defe ndant re lies on Un ite d S tat es v . Lo pe z, 51 4 U .S. 54 9 ( 19 95 ), to s ug g e st that this court should use the test enunc iated in Lop e z, to determine wh et h er there was a nexus aff ectingcommerc e. Howeve r, def endant’ s relianc e upon Lopez is mispl ace d beca

use his position has bee n reje cted by

fede ral c ourts consi d er i n g t h e constitutionality of § 922(g )(1) afte r Lopez , inc lud ingthe Sixth C ir c uit Court of Ap pe a ls . See U

nited States v. Murphy

, 107 F.3d 1199 ( 6 Cir. th08- 1937

7

19 97 ); United States v. Napier , 2 33 F .3 d 3 94 (6 Cir . 2 00 0) ; see also, United States v . Costigan, No. th 00 -2 45 7, 20 01 WL 53 57 34 (1 Cir . M ar. 26 , 2 00 1) ; United States v. Santiago, 238 F.3d 213 ( 2 Cir. st d 2 0 0 1 ) ; Uni ted St at es v. G all im or e , 2 47 F .3 d 1 34 (4 Cir . 2 00 1) ; Un ite d S tat es v . D av is, 242 F.3d th 11 62 (9 Cir . 2 00 1) ; United St ates v. W esela, 22 3 F .3 d 65 6 ( 7 Cir . 2 00 0) ; Un ite d S tat es v . D orris , th th 23 6 F . 3 d 5 82 (1 0 Cir . 2 00 0) ; United States v. Gate wood , 84 F.3d 670 ( 3 Cir. 1996). th d

M o reove r, this court has f ound that when a

defe ndant stipulates to cer tain fac ts, the g overnme nt is relieved of its burden of producing any other evidence in order to establish the fac t stipulated. S

ee Un i t ed S tates v. Ayoub , 4 98 F .3 d 5 32 , 5 46 -4 7 ( 6 Cir . 2 00 7) (h old ingthat a th stipul at i o nt h at t h e f

i re ar m “h adt ra v el edi nan d af fe ct edi n t er s t at e c o m m er ce ” w as s u ff i ci en tto prove the int e rs ta te ne xus e le me nt b e y on d a re a so na ble do ub t) . B e c a

us e de fe nd ant’ s Lopez

c ha lle ng e to the c on sti tut ion a lity

of § 9 22 (g )( 1) is witho ut m e ri t, t he tr ia l c ourt

did no t e rr in a c c e pti ngthe pa

rt ie s’ stipulation t hat the fire arm ha d trave led in and af fec ted interstate c ommerce .

C. The trial c ourt er re d by not qualifying the fore nsic technic ian as a n e xpe rt wi tne ss.
Next , d ef en d ant arg ues that the trial c ourt should not have re lied upon alleg ed expert testimony offe red by

the fore nsic technic ian who testified that no usa ble fing erpr ints could be lifted from the firea

rm at issue. The g overnme nt r esponds that the fore nsic technic ian testified as a fac t witnes s , n o t an ex p ert; there fore , the trial cour t was not requir ed to find that the witness wa s qu a lif ie d to te sti fy

a s an e xpe rt

wi tne ss.08- 1937

8

This court re views the admission or exclusion of expert evidenc e for an abuse of discre tion. United States v. De mjanjuk , 367 F.3d 623, 633 ( 6 Cir. 2004). A “tria l judge has broa d discretion th in the matter of the admission or exclusion of ex pert e vidence , and the c ourt’s ac tion is t o be sustained unless manife stl y er ro n eo u s.” Id. Moreove r, this discretion is particular ly broad in a bench tr ial. Id.
The testimony

of experts is gove rned by Rule 702 of the F eder al Rules of Evidenc e. That
ru le pr ov ide s: I f scientific , technica l, or other specia liz ed knowledg e will assist the

trier of fac t to understand the evidenc e or to deter mine a fa ct in issue, a witness qualifie d as an e x pert by knowledg e, skill, ex perie nce, training , or educ ation, may testify th ereto in the form of a

n opinion or otherw ise, i f (1 ) the testimony is based upon suff

icient fa cts or data, ( 2 ) t h e testi mony

is the product of r eliable pr inciples or methods, and (3) the wit ness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the fac ts of the ca se. Acc ording ly , a witness who testifies b a s e d o n “ s c ie ntific, technic al, or other specia liz ed knowledg e,” must be qualified as a

n expert to present such testimony , whether it is limit ed to fac ts or includes the expert’s opinion. The advisory committee notes support the c onclusion that an expert must be qu a l i f i e d t o p r e s e n tf

a c tan d / o r o p i n i o nt e s t i m o n y: Most of the literature assumes that experts te stify only in the form of op ini on s. The a ssumpt ion is l og ic a lly

un fo un de d. Th e ru le acc ording ly

rec og nizes that an expert on th e s t and may g ive a dis se rt a tio n o r e xpos iti on of sc ie nti fi c or

oth e r p ri nc ipl e s r e le va

nt t o the c a se , le a vin g the tr ie r o f f a c t to a pp ly the m to the fa c ts. Id. Advisory

Commi ttee Notes ( 1982 Proposed Rule).08- 1937

9

I n this case, Chana

Gudg er, the fore nsic technic ian who ana ly zed the firea

rm for la tent fing erpr ints, testified at trial as an expert witness. Acc ording ly , the t rial court was re quired to qualify her a s an expert witness. We have explained that “ lay testimony results from a proce ss of rea soning familiar in eve ry day

life, whe rea s an ex pert’s testimony results from a proce ss of rea soning w hich can be mastere d only

by specia lists i n the field.” Un ite d S tat es v . W hit e , 492 F.3d 380, 401 ( 6 Cir. th 20 07 ); se e als o U

nit e d S tat es v . S waf for d , 385 F.3d 1026, 1030- 31 (6 Cir. 2004) (noting that if a th police off icer is properly

qualified a s an expert, the off icer can te stify

reg ardingthe “c hara cter istics of cr iminal activity ,” including the hallmarks of drug d i s t ri b u t ion, the use of f irea rms in drug traff icking , and the usua l price of drug s). The gove rnment examined Gudg er a bout her prior experience examining fire arms and othe r ar ticles for finge rprints and the procedur es she e mploy ed. Gu dg e r t e sti fi e d th a t dur ing he r six y e ars a s a f or e ns ic te c hn ic ian w iththe De tr oit Pol ic e De pa

rtme nt, she examined over 5,000 pie ces of evidenc e for

latent finger

prints and examined betwee n 2,000 and 3, 00 0 f ir e arm s f or su c h f ing e rp ri nts : Q. I n about what perc entag e of those firea rms that y ou’ve pr ocesse d or bee n involved in the p ro cessingof, whe re you able to find late nt pr int s o n a

fi re arm ? A. Ab ou t tw o p e rc e nt. Q. And what are some of the r easons why y ou wer en’t a

ble to lift prints off of 98 pe rce nt of the g uns y ou’ve pr ocesse d? A. B eca use how it was ha

ndled. Although G rudg er’ s testimony was ba sed on h er pe rsonal obser vations of the fire arm, he r
co n cl u s i o n s we re dra wn fr o m t e c h n i ca l k n o wl ed ge o f f

o re n s i c s ci en ce t h at s h e l ea rn edt h ro u gh08- 1937

10

training and job experienc e. See U nited States v. Jone

s , 107 F.3d 1147, 1161 ( 6 Cir. 1997) (finding th
no err or in qualifying ha

ndwriting analy st as an expert base d on his ‘training experience s, his job responsibilities [ and] his y ear s of practical ex perie nce” ). Her testimony

included her

opinion, based
on he r t ra ini ngand

e xpe ri e nc e , a s to wh y

sh e did no t us ua lly

fi nd fi ngerpr in ts on

fi re a rm s. Additionally , the prosec utor offe red G udg er a s an ex pert witness, and the district cour t believed that she had “ technica l or other spe cialized knowledg e that would assist the trier of fa ct ” an d that she the re fo re ha d to be qu a lif ie d a s an e xpe rt
.

Be cause the testimony

that Gudg er of

fer ed wa s based on her te chnica l skill s and knowledg e, the district court e rre d when it fa iled to determine definitely whether Gudg er would be qualified a s an expert under Rule 702 reg ardle ss of whether her testimony was g oing to be strictly

fac t-based or whether she was g oing to of

fer her opinion. Howeve r, such e rror is not in all cases re versible; rather

“ r e v e r s i b l e e r

r o r o c c u r s o n l y w h e r e t h e d i s t r i c t c o u rt ’ s e r r o n e o u s a d m i s s i o n o f e v i d e n c e a f fe c ts a
s ubstantial rig ht of the par ty .” W hit e , 4 9 2 F
. 3 d a t 4 0 4 ( c it in g F e d
. R. E v id
. 1 0 3 ( a ) ) . “An e rror
a ff e c ts a de fe nd ant’ s su

bs tanti a l r ig hts if

it i s li ke ly

to h a ve ha d a

ny su bs tanti a l e ff

e c t on his conviction.” United St ates v. W hittingt on , 45 5 F .3 d 7 36 , 7 40 (6 Cir . 2 00 6) (c itatio ns omi tte d) ; see th als o Mitc he ll v . E

sp ar za , 540 U.S. 12, 17-18 (2003) (“A n err or is harmless ‘w hen it appea rs bey ond
a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b tt h a tt h e e r

r o r c o mp l a i n e d o f

d i d n o tc o n t r i b u t e t o t h e v e r d i c to b t a i n e d
. ’ ” )
. It follows, then, that our “ inquiry involves an assessment of the likelihood that the e rror aff ecte d the outcom e o f t h e ca s e. ” Schrand v. Fe deral Pac. Ele c. Co. , 8 5 1 F
. 2 d 1 5 2 , 1 5 7 ( 6 Ci r . 1 9 8 8 )
. We

th look, then, t o “the procee dings in their entirety , in light of the proofs at trial.” Be c k v . H aik , 377 F.3d08- 1937

11

624, 635 (6 Cir. 2004). Her e, we find that althoug h the trial cour t should have qualif

ied Gudg er th
as an ex pert witness, a

ny such er ror wa s harmless in the conte x t of this bench trial. Gudg er’ s testimony was that she could not identify defe ndant’s finge rprints on the fire arm, a fac t that did not h ar m d e f e n d an t. F u rth e r , a r e v ie w o f th e tr ia l tr an s c r ip t s h o w s th a t th e c o u rt d id n o t r e ly on Gudg er’ s testimony i n fi n d ing that the defe ndant possessed the f irea rm found in his vehicle, but rathe r relied on the t wo officers’ testimony conce rning the t raf fic stop and search of the def endant’ s vehicle. Conseque ntly , we find defe ndant’s substantial rig hts were unaff ecte d by the district court’s
err or.

D. De fe nd ant’ s p ri or c on vict io n for

fe lon iou s a ssa

ult qu a lif ie s a s a “ vio le nt f e lony ” un de r t

he Ar me d Ca re e r C ri min a l A c t.
Def endant’ s sentence was e nhance d pursuant to the Ar med Care er Criminal Ac t (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The ACCA au t h o ri z es an enha nced pr ison term for a

defe ndant who is (1) convicted of

being a felon in posse ssion of a firea rm, and (2) has “thre e pre vious convictions by any court . . . for

a violent fe lon y o r a serious drug offe nse, or both, committed on occ asions differ ent from one a

nother.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1). Def endant arg ues t hat he should not have be en subjec t to an enha nced se ntence under the ACCA beca use hi s prior conviction for felonious assault does not constitute a “violent fe lony ” under the statute. Be cause defe ndant di d not raise this issue below, the court re views his challeng e for plain err or. United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872- 73 (6 Cir. th 2004). To establish plain err or, defendant must show (1) error (2) that “wa s obvious or clear,” (3) that “ a ff e c te d d e fe nd ant’ s su

bs tanti a l r ig hts ” and (4 ) t

hat “ a ff e c te d th e fa ir

ne ss, int e g ri ty , o r p ub lic08- 1937

12

reputation of the judicial proc eeding s.” Un ite d Sta te s v . V on ne r, 516 F.3d 382, 386 ( 6 Cir. 2008). th

The ACCA def

ines “violent fe lony ” as any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term excee ding one y ear . . . that – (i ) has a s an ele ment the use, attempted use, or thre atene d use of phy sical for ce a g ainst the person of another ; or (ii) is burg lary , arso n , or extortion, invol ves use of explos ives, or otherwise involves c onduct that pre sents a ser ious potential risk of phy sical injury

to another. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2) (B ).
Michig an state la

w def ines t h e cr i m e of felonious assault, or assa ult with a dang erous
we a po n, a s f oll ow s: Sec. 82
. ( 1 ) E xc e p t a s p r o v id e d in s u b s e c ti o n( 2 ) , a

p e r s o nwho assaults another

person with a gun, revolve r, pistol, knife, iron bar , c lub , b ra ss k

nu c kle s, or

oth e r da ng e ro us we a

po n wi tho ut i nte nd ingto c omm it mur de r o r t o in fl ic t g re a t bodi ly harm le ss t ha n mu rd e r i s g uilty of a f elony punis h ab le by

imprisonment for not more than 4 y ear s or a f

ine of not more tha

n $2,000.00, or both. M.C.L .A. 750.82.08- 1937

13

The cr im e o f

f e lo n io u s a s s a

u lt u n d e r M ic h ig anla

w f it s w it h in th e A CC A ’ s s tatutor

y de fi nit ion of “ vio le nt cr ime ” be c a us e on e of its e le me nts is “the us e , att e mpt e d use , o r t hr e a te ne d u se of phy sical for ce a g ainst the person of another .” See 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2) (B )(I ). Althoug h defe ndant appea rs t o argue that mere possession of a wea pon is not a viol ent felony , he fails to address the fa ct that hi s p ri or

c on vic tio n invo lve d b oth po sse ssi on

of a da ng e ro us we a

po n a nd an a ssa ult
.

Be cause defe ndant’s prior Mic higa n conviction for f

elonious assault is defined a s including the use, attempted use, or threatened use of phy sical forc e ag ainst the person of anoth er , t h at
c on vic tio n c on sti tut e d a vio le nt fe lony un de r the AC CA
. Th e tr ia l c ourt , th e re fo re , d id n ot c omm it plain err or whe n it enhance d defe ndant’s sente nce pur suant to the ACCA.

E. Def

endant’ s mandatory

minimum sentenc e does not c onstitut e cr uel and unus ua l pu

nis hme nt i n v iol a tio n o f t he Ei g hth Am e ndme nt.
Def endant ne x t argues t hat hi s 180-month sentenc e, the mandatory minimum sentenc e under the AC CA , v iol a te s th e Ei g hth Am e ndme nt b e c a

us e it is dis pr op or

tio nate ly se ve re , and

be c a us e it is cruel a nd unusual. Howe ver, at oral argument, defe nse counsel a dmitted that this court a nd sever al oth e r c ourt s of a

pp e a ls have he ld that the mand a tor y min imum se nte nc e that th e AC CA re qu ir e s is
c on sti tut ion a l, see U

nited States v. W

arren , 973 F.2d 1304 (6 Cir. 1992) (holding that fiftee n y ear th
se nte nc e un de r the AC CA wa s no t “ c ru e l and unus ua l pu

nis hme nt” ); United States v. Pe digo , 879 F .2 d 131 5 (6 Cir . 198 9) (s e nte nc e s und e r t he AC CA are no t “ c ru e l and un us ua l” ); see also United th Sta te s v . R e y no lds , 21 5 F .3 d 1 21 0 ( 11 Cir . 2 00 0) ; Un ited St at es v. Vi lla r, 184 F.3d 801 ( 8 Cir. th th08- 1937

14

19 99 ); Un ite d S

tat es v . Ca rd

oz a , 1 29 F .3 d 6 (1 Cir . 1 99 7) ; United States v. Pre sley, 52 F.3d 64 (4 st th Cir . 1 99 5) ; Un ite d S

tat es v . H ay es, 91 9 F. 2d 12 62 (7 Cir . 1 99 0) ; Un ite d S tat es v . B ak

e r, 850 F.2d th 13 65 (9 Cir . 1 98 8) ; Un ite d Sta te s v . Te nd e rh olt , 14 9 F . App ’x 80 5 ( 10 Cir . 2 00 5) , b ut w ante d to th th prese rve the issue in the event the Supre me Court or this court dec ides the issue to the contra ry .

Def endant ne x t a

rg ues that the trial court should ha ve considere d his personal c ircumstance s in its sentencing analy sis, but the ACCA requires only that the district court find that de fenda nt was convicted of

being a fe lon in possession of a fire arm a nd t h at h e h as t hree prior convic tions for a violent felony

or a se rious drug offe nse, or both. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)
.

Be cause defe ndant was c onvicted of posse ssion of a fire ar m b y a fe lon, and the trial c ourt found that he ha d one prior c onviction f or a violent f

elony and two prior convic tions for serious drug offe nses, the trial c ourt proper ly enhanc ed his sentenc e under the ACCA.

III. Conclusi on Acc ording ly , we AF F IRM the district court’s judg ment and sente nce.