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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CAUSE NO.: 2:13-cv-344-TLS-JEM 

 ) 

$183,026.36 in U.S. CURRENCY, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

 ) 

THE LITTLE HIPPIE, LLC, ) 

CHRISTY LEE JACKSON, and ) 

MARK PATRICK MCCRACKEN, ) 

) 

 Claimants. ) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 This matter is before the Court on the Claimants’, The Little Hippie, LLC, Christy Lee 

Jackson, and Mark Patrick McCracken, Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 11] filed on October 29, 

2013. The Government filed its Response [ECF No. 12] on November 12, 2013. The Claimants’ 

Reply [ECF No. 13] was filed on November 19, 2013. 

 On May 1, 2014, the Court entered an Order [ECF No. 14] referring the Claimants’ 

Motion to Magistrate Judge John E. Martin pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule 72-1. 

Upon review of the matter, Magistrate Judge Martin issued his Findings, Report and 

Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) & (C) 

[ECF No. 15], on June 30, 2014. Magistrate Judge Martin recommended that the Court deny the 

Claimants’ Motion. 

 In response to Magistrate Judge Martin’s Recommendation, the Claimants filed their 

Objection to the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge [ECF No. 16] 
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on July 9, 2014. The Government did not file a response. The Claimants’ Motion to Dismiss and 

Objection are ripe for ruling. 

 BACKGROUND

 The relevant facts of this case are not disputed. On April 19, 2013, law enforcement 

officers executed a search warrant at The Little Hippie Store. During the search, officers found 

344 packets of Blue Heaven, a controlled substance analogue. Officers also recovered $9,632.38 

in U.S. Currency and two $20,000 Financial Partners FCU Cashier’s Checks. The same day, law 

enforcement officers executed a search warrant at the residence of Claimant Christy Lee Jackson. 

During the search of Claimant Jackson’s residence, officers recovered $183,926.36 in U.S. 

Currency. 

 The Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) sent two notices of the seizure to the Claimants 

on June 12, 2013. A third notice was sent to the Defendants’ on June 19, 2013. The Notices 

explicitly state that “A PETITION, CLAIM, OR OTHER CORRESPONDENCE SHALL 

BE DEEMED FILED . . . WHEN RECEIVED BY THE DEA AT EITHER OF THE 

ADDRESSES NOTED ABOVE.” Pl. Ex. 1, ECF No. 12-2 (emphasis in original). The 

Claimants sent their claim to the seized money to the DEA on June 26, 2013, by certified mail. 

The DEA received the claim at its mail facility on July 1, 2013. The Government then filed its 

Complaint on September 25, 2013, 86 days after the claims were received by the DEA and 91 

days after the claims were mailed. 

 The Claimants argue that the Government’s Complaint is untimely because 18 U.S.C. 

§ 983(a)(3)(A), the statute that governs civil forfeiture proceedings, requires the Government to 

file a complaint no more than 90 days after the claimants file their claim. In this case, the 
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Government filed its complaint 91 days after the Claimants mailed their claim. Although unable 

to find supporting case law, the Claimants use a judicial economy argument to argue that the 

mailing date should be considered the date a claim is “filed.” The Claimants argue that if a claim 

is filed when it is received by the DEA, the filing date is a secret to all but the DEA mailing 

clerk. Thus, in order to determine the filing date, the Government must submit a lengthy affidavit 

and numerous exhibits that unnecessarily tax the resources of the Government and Court. 

According to the Claimants, if the claim is filed when it is received, the Court is also forced to 

rely on an interested party, Government’s forfeiture counsel, to determine when the claim was 

received. The Claimants argue that considering a claim filed on the day it is mailed is the most 

efficient way to interpret the statute because it only requires a certified mailing receipt to 

establish the filing date. Parties would immediately know the filing date, the Court’s docket 

would not be filled with unnecessary motions, and the Government would not be burdened with 

drafting lengthy affidavits. 

 The Government argues that the claim should be considered filed when it is received, not 

mailed. The Government argues that every court that has addressed the question has held that a 

claim is filed when it is received, and urges the Court to adopt the same rule here. The 

Government also points out that the Notice the Government sent to the Claimants specifically 

said any claim or correspondence would be considered filed when it was received by the DEA. 

The Claimants, therefore, knew when their Claim would be considered filed. Accordingly, the 

Government argues that the Claimants claim was filed on July 1, 2013, meaning that the 

Government’s Complaint was filed 86 days later and within the 90 day requirement of 

§ 983(a)(3)(A). 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 

A. Motion to Dismiss 

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 

must be decided solely on the face of the complaint and from any attachments included in the 

complaint. Miller v. Herman, 600 F.3d 726, 733 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) 

(documents attached to complaint are considered part of the complaint). Rule 12(d) requires that 

any motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim that includes matters outside of the pleadings be 

treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). See, e.g., Miller, 

600 F.3d at 733; Levenstein v. Salafsky, 164 F.3d 345, 347 (7th Cir. 1998). When a court treats a 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim as a motion for summary judgment, all parties must 

be given a reasonable opportunity to present all material that is pertinent to the motion. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(d). Although a district court should give notice when converting a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion into a motion for summary judgment, failure to do so does not necessarily mandate 

reversal. See Farries v. Stanadyne/Chicago Div., 832 F.2d 374, 377 (7th Cir. 1987); Milwaukee 

Typographical Union No. 23 v. Newspapers, Inc., 639 F.2d 386, 391 (7th Cir. 1981). A reversal 

is not necessary “‘where nothing else could have been raised to alter the entry of summary 

judgment.’” Farries, 832 F.2d at 377 (quoting Malak v. Associated Physicians, Inc., 784 F.2d 

277, 281 (7th Cir. 1986). Specifically, a potentially disputed material issue of fact must exist to 

justify reversal. Farries, 832 F.2d at 377. In the present case there are no disputed material facts 

and both parties presented evidence with their briefs on the matter. The Court therefore treats 

Claimants’ Motion to Dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. 

B. Summary Judgment 
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Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). To survive summary judgment, a nonmovant must be able to show that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict in her favor; if she is unable to “establish the existence of 

an element essential to [her] case, and on which [she] will bear the burden of proof at trial,” 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986), summary judgment must be granted. A bare 

contention that an issue of fact exists is insufficient to create a factual dispute, but the court must 

construe all facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, view all reasonable inferences 

in that party’s favor, see Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 491–92 (7th Cir. 2000), and 

avoid “the temptation to decide which party’s version of the facts is more likely true,” Payne v. 

Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting the often stated proposition that “summary 

judgment cannot be used to resolve swearing contests between litigants”). A material fact must 

be outcome determinative under the governing law. Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 

598–99 (7th Cir. 2000). “Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not deter summary judgment, even 

when in dispute.” Harney v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 526 F.3d 1099, 1104 (7th Cir. 2008). 

ANALYSIS 

18 U.S.C. § 983 governs the rules of civil forfeiture cases. After seizing private property, 

the Government is required to send notice to interested parties within 60 days of the date of 

seizure. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(A)(i). Any person who claims the property may file a claim with 

the appropriate Government agency. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(2)(A). The Government then has “90 

days after a claim has been filed” to file a complaint for forfeiture. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(A). At 

issue in the present case is when the Court should deem a claim “filed” in order to determine 
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when to start the 90-day time period. Although the Notices the Government sent the Claimants 

expressly stated that correspondences are deemed filed when received, 18 U.S.C. § 983 does not 

define the term “filed.” 

The Government argues that every court that has addressed this issue has held a claim is 

filed when it is received by the appropriate governmental agency. The Court’s independent 

research comes to the same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Real Prop. Located at 475 

Martin Lane, 545 F.3d 1134, 1141 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that the Government has 90 days to 

file complaint from the date the claim is received); Bentley v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms, & Explosives, 414 Fed. App’x. 28, 32 (9th Cir.2011) (holding that a “claim is ‘filed’ 

when it is received by the seizing agency, not when it is mailed”) (Stafford, W., concurring); 

United States v. $7,696.00 in U.S. Currency, No. 12-CV-116-LRR, 2013 WL 1827668 (N.D. 

Iowa 2013) (finding that the claim was not filed within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(A) 

until the appropriate agency received it); United States v. $36,110.00 in U.S. Currency, No. 4:08-

029-TLW, 2009 WL 692830, at *3 (D.S.C. 2009) (holding claim filed on receipt, not on 

mailing); United States v. $65,930.00 in U.S. Currency, 3:03CV01625(RNC), 2006 WL 923704, 

at *2 (D. Conn. 2006) (holding if Congress wanted to apply the mailbox rule it would have said 

so). 

In the Claimants’ Objection to the Report and Recommendation, they argue that none of 

the cases the Government and Magistrate Judge have cited are binding on this Court because 

they are not Seventh Circuit cases. The Claimants argue that Magistrate Judge Martin did not 

need to follow those decisions and should have been free to come to a different ruling. The 

Claimants are correct; rulings from district courts and other circuit courts do not have binding 

authority over this Court. See United States v. Glaser, 14 F.3d 1213, 1216 (7th Cir. 1994) 
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(holding district courts must follow Seventh Circuit decisions but owe no more than respectful 

consideration to views of other circuits); Gould v. Bowyer, 11 F.3d 82, 84 (7th Cir. 1993) 

(holding a district court ruling does not bind a judge in any other case). However, it is within the 

Court’s discretion to consider what other circuits are doing and adopt a consistent ruling. Colby 

v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 811 F.2d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Bearing in mind the interest in 

maintaining a reasonable uniformity of federal law and in sparing the Supreme Court the burden 

of taking cases merely to resolve conflicts between circuits, we give most respectful 

consideration to the decisions of the other courts of appeals and follow them whenever we 

can.”). 

Although none of the cases cited above are binding precedent on the Court, the Court 

finds those decisions persuasive and will adopt the position taken by the other circuit and district 

courts. The overwhelming majority of cases hold that a claim is deemed “filed” when it is 

received by the seizing agency. The Claimants’ do not cite, and the Court has not found, any 

cases where any court in any jurisdiction has determined that a claim is deemed “filed” for the 

purposes of civil forfeiture proceedings when the claim was mailed. Had Congress wanted the 

mailbox rule to apply to this situation, it could have said so. See United States v. $65,930.00, 

2006 WL 923704, at *2 (holding that nothing in the statute’s text or legislative history suggests 

Congress wanted the mailbox rule to apply to the filing of administrative claims and that 

Congress easily could have said so if it intended that a claim should be deemed filed when 

mailed). After respectful consideration of the views of the nonbinding courts in other circuits, the 

Court finds that adopting the rule that claims are deemed filed when received by the seizing 

agency “maintain[s] reasonable uniformity of federal law” and is consistent with the case law. 
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The Court notes the Claimants’ judicial economy arguments, but finds them 

unpersuasive, especially in light of the fact that the Notices the DEA sent the Claimants 

specifically told them, in bold and capital letters, that any correspondence would be considered 

filed when received. They knew before they ever sent their claim that the claim would be 

considered filed on the date it was received. The Claimants were on notice that their claim would 

be deemed filed on the day it was received and, because they sent their claim via certified mail, 

the Claimants easily could determine when the claim was delivered, contradicting their argument 

that the filing date is a secret and that the timeliness of the Government’s complaint must be 

challenged by a motion to dismiss just to determine whether the complaint was timely in the first 

place. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the OVERRULES Claimants’ Objections to the Report and 

Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge [ECF No. 16], ADOPTS the Magistrate 

Judge’s Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 15], and DENIES the Claimants’ Motion to 

Dismiss [ECF No. 11]. 

SO ORDERED on July 29, 2014. 

 s/ Theresa L. Springmann__________ 

THERESA L. SPRINGMANN 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FORT WAYNE DIVISION