(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2013 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

EXECUTIVE BENEFITS INSURANCE AGENCY v. 

ARKISON, CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE OF ESTATE OF 

BELLINGHAM INSURANCE AGENCY, INC.
 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

No. 12–1200. Argued January 14, 2014—Decided June 9, 2014 

Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc. (BIA), filed a voluntary chapter 7

bankruptcy petition. Respondent Peter Arkison, the bankruptcy

trustee, filed a complaint in the Bankruptcy Court against petitioner

Executive Benefits Insurance Agency (EBIA) and others alleging the 

fraudulent conveyance of assets from BIA to EBIA. The Bankruptcy 

Court granted summary judgment for the trustee. EBIA appealed to

the District Court, which affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s decision 

after de novo review and entered judgment for the trustee. While 

EBIA’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit was pending, this Court held that 

Article III did not permit a Bankruptcy Court to enter final judgment 

on a counterclaim for tortious interference, even though final

adjudication of that claim by the Bankruptcy Court was authorized

by statute. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U. S. ___, ___. In light of Stern, 

EBIA moved to dismiss its appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Ninth 

Circuit rejected EBIA’s motion and affirmed. It acknowledged the

trustee’s claims as “Stern claims,” i.e., claims designated for final 

adjudication in the bankruptcy court as a statutory matter, but 

prohibited from proceeding in that way as a constitutional matter.

The Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that EBIA had 

impliedly consented to jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals also

observed that the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment could instead be 

treated as proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, subject to 

de novo review by the District Court. 

Held: 

1. Under the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act 
 

2 EXECUTIVE BENEFITS INS. AGENCY v. ARKISON 

Syllabus 

of 1984, federal district courts have original jurisdiction in 

bankruptcy cases and may refer to bankruptcy judges two statutory 

categories of proceedings: “core” proceedings and “non-core” 

proceedings. See generally 28 U. S. C. §157. In core proceedings, a 

bankruptcy judge “may hear and determine . . . and enter 

appropriate orders and judgments,” subject to the district court’s 

traditional appellate review. §157(b)(1). In non-core proceedings—

those that are “not . . . core” but are “otherwise related to a case 

under title 11,” §157(c)(1)—final judgment must be entered by the 

district court after de novo review of the bankruptcy judge’s proposed

findings of fact and conclusions of law, ibid., except that the

bankruptcy judge may enter final judgment if the parties consent,

§157(c)(2).

In Stern, the Court confronted an underlying conflict between the

1984 Act and the requirements of Article III. The Court held that 

Article III prohibits Congress from vesting a bankruptcy court with 

the authority to finally adjudicate the “core” claim of tortious 

interference. The Court did not, however, address how courts should 

proceed when they encounter a Stern claim. Pp. 4–8.

2. Stern claims may proceed as non-core within the meaning of 

§157(c). Lower courts have described Stern claims as creating a 

statutory “gap,” since bankruptcy judges are not explicitly authorized 

to propose findings of fact and conclusions of law in a core proceeding. 

However, this so-called gap is closed by the Act’s severability

provision, which instructs that where a “provision of the Act or [its]

application . . . is held invalid, the remainder of th[e] Act . . . is not

affected thereby.” 98 Stat. 344. As applicable here, when a court 

identifies a Stern claim, it has “held invalid” the “application” of 

§157(b), and the “remainder” not affected includes §157(c), which

governs non-core proceedings. Accordingly, where a claim otherwise

satisfies §157(c)(1), the bankruptcy court should simply treat the 

Stern claim as non-core. This conclusion accords with the Court’s 

general approach to severability, which is to give effect to the valid

portion of a statute so long as it “remains ‘fully operative as a law,’ ” 

Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 

561 U. S. 477, 509, and so long as the statutory text and context do

not suggest that Congress would have preferred no statute at all, 

ibid. Pp. 8–10. 

3. Section 157(c)(1)’s procedures apply to the fraudulent 

conveyance claims here. This Court assumes without deciding that 

these claims are Stern claims, which Article III does not permit to be

treated as “core” claims under §157(b). But because the claims assert 

that property of the bankruptcy estate was improperly removed, they

are self-evidently “related to a case under title 11.” Accordingly, they 
 

 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 3 

Syllabus 

fit comfortably within the category of claims governed by §157(c)(1).

The Bankruptcy Court would have been permitted to follow that 

provision’s procedures, i.e., to submit proposed findings of fact and

conclusions of law to the District Court for de novo review. Pp. 11– 

12. 

4. Here, the District Court’s de novo review of the Bankruptcy 

Court’s order and entry of its own valid final judgment cured any

potential error in the Bankruptcy Court’s entry of judgment. EBIA 

contends that it was constitutionally entitled to review by an Article 

III court regardless of whether the parties consented to bankruptcy 

court adjudication. In the alternative, EBIA asserts that even if such 

consent were constitutionally permissible, it did not in fact consent.

Neither contention need be addressed here, because EBIA received 

the same review from the District Court that it would have received 

had the Bankruptcy Court treated the claims as non-core proceedings

under §157(c)(1). Pp. 12–13. 

702 F. 3d 553, affirmed. 

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 12–1200 

EXECUTIVE BENEFITS INSURANCE AGENCY, PETITIONER v. PETER H. ARKISON, CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE

 OF THE ESTATE OF BELLINGHAM INSURANCE 

AGENCY, INC.
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
 

[June 9, 2014]

 JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 

In Stern v. Marshall, 564 U. S. ___ (2011), this Court 

held that even though bankruptcy courts are statutorily 

authorized to enter final judgment on a class of bankruptcyrelated claims, Article III of the Constitution prohibits 

bankruptcy courts from finally adjudicating certain of 

those claims. Stern did not, however, decide how bankruptcy or district courts should proceed when a “Stern 

claim” is identified. We hold today that when, under 

Stern’s reasoning, the Constitution does not permit a 

bankruptcy court to enter final judgment on a bankruptcyrelated claim, the relevant statute nevertheless permits a

bankruptcy court to issue proposed findings of fact and 

conclusions of law to be reviewed de novo by the district 

court. Because the District Court in this case conducted 

the de novo review that petitioner demands, we affirm the 

judgment of the Court of Appeals upholding the District 

Court’s decision. 
 

 

 

2 EXECUTIVE BENEFITS INS. AGENCY v. ARKISON 

Opinion of the Court 

I 

Nicolas Paleveda and his wife owned and operated two

companies—Aegis Retirement Income Services, Inc. 

(ARIS), and Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc. (BIA). By

early 2006, BIA had become insolvent, and on January 31,

2006, the company ceased operation. The next day, 

Paleveda used BIA funds to incorporate Executive Benefits Insurance Agency, Inc. (EBIA), petitioner in this case. 

Paleveda and others initiated a scheme to transfer assets 

from BIA to EBIA. The assets were deposited into an 

account held jointly by ARIS and EBIA and ultimately 

credited to EBIA at the end of the year. 

On June 1, 2006, BIA filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for

the Western District of Washington. Peter Arkison, the 

bankruptcy trustee and respondent in this case, filed a

complaint in the same Bankruptcy Court against EBIA

and others. As relevant here, the complaint alleged that

Paleveda used various methods to fraudulently convey

BIA assets to EBIA.1 EBIA filed an answer and denied 

many of the trustee’s allegations.

After some disagreement as to whether the trustee’s

claims should continue in the Bankruptcy Court or instead 

proceed before a jury in Federal District Court, the trustee

filed a motion for summary judgment against EBIA in the 

Bankruptcy Court. The Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment for the trustee on all claims, including the

fraudulent conveyance claims. EBIA then appealed that 

determination to the District Court. The District Court 

conducted de novo review, affirmed the Bankruptcy

Court’s decision, and entered judgment for the trustee. 

EBIA appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Ninth Circuit. After EBIA filed its opening brief, this 

—————— 

1The trustee asserted claims of fraudulent conveyance under 11

U. S. C. §544, and under state law, Wash. Rev. Code, ch. 19.40 (2012). 
 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

Court decided Stern, supra. In Stern, we held that Article 

III of the Constitution did not permit a bankruptcy court 

to enter final judgment on a counterclaim for tortious

interference, id., at ___, even though final adjudication of 

that claim by the Bankruptcy Court was authorized by

statute, see Part II–B, infra.2 In light of Stern, EBIA 

moved to dismiss its appeal in the Ninth Circuit for lack of

jurisdiction, contending that Article III did not permit 

Congress to vest authority in a bankruptcy court to finally

decide the trustee’s fraudulent conveyance claims. 

The Ninth Circuit rejected EBIA’s motion and affirmed

the District Court. In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc., 702 

F. 3d 553 (2012). As relevant here, the court held that 

Stern, supra, and Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 

U. S. 33 (1989),3 taken together, lead to the conclusion 

that Article III does not permit a bankruptcy court to

enter final judgment on a fraudulent conveyance claim

against a noncreditor unless the parties consent. 702 

F. 3d, at 565. The Ninth Circuit concluded that EBIA had 

impliedly consented to the Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction, and that the Bankruptcy Court’s adjudication of the

fraudulent conveyance claim was therefore permissible. 

Id., at 566, 568. The Court of Appeals also observed that 

the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment could instead be treated

as proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, subject 

to de novo review by the District Court. Id., at 565–566. 

We granted certiorari, 570 U. S. ___ (2013). 

—————— 

2As we explain below, see Part II–B, infra, the statutory scheme 

at issue both in Stern and in this case grants bankruptcy courts the

authority to “hear and determine” and “enter appropriate orders and

judgments” in “core” proceedings. 28 U. S. C. §157(b)(1). The statute 

lists counterclaims like the one brought in Stern as “core” claims. 

§157(b)(2)(C). 3 Granfinanciera held that a fraudulent conveyance claim under Title

11 is not a matter of “public right” for purposes of Article III, 492 U. S., 

at 55, and that the defendant to such a claim is entitled to a jury trial

under the Seventh Amendment, id., at 64. 
 

 

4 EXECUTIVE BENEFITS INS. AGENCY v. ARKISON 

Opinion of the Court 

II

 In Stern, we held that Article III prohibits Congress 

from vesting a bankruptcy court with the authority to 

finally adjudicate certain claims. 564 U. S., at ___. But 

we did not address how courts should proceed when they 

encounter one of these “Stern claims”—a claim designated

for final adjudication in the bankruptcy court as a statutory matter, but prohibited from proceeding in that way as 

a constitutional matter.4 

As we explain in greater detail below, when a bankruptcy 

court is presented with such a claim, the proper course

is to issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

The district court will then review the claim de novo and 

enter judgment. This approach accords with the bankruptcy statute and does not implicate the constitutional 

defect identified by Stern. 

A 

We begin with an overview of modern bankruptcy legislation. Prior to 1978, federal district courts could refer 

matters within the traditional “summary jurisdiction” of 

bankruptcy courts to specialized bankruptcy referees.5 

See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line 

Co., 458 U. S. 50, 53 (1982) (plurality opinion). Summary

jurisdiction covered claims involving “property in the 

actual or constructive possession of the [bankruptcy] 

court,” ibid., i.e., claims regarding the apportionment of 

—————— 

4Because we conclude that EBIA received the de novo review and 

entry of judgment to which it claims constitutional entitlement, see

Part IV–B, infra, this case does not require us to address whether EBIA 

in fact consented to the Bankruptcy Court’s adjudication of a Stern 

claim and whether Article III permits a bankruptcy court, with the 

consent of the parties, to enter final judgment on a Stern claim. We 

reserve that question for another day. 5Bankruptcy referees were designated “judges” in 1973. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50, 53, 

n. 2 (1982) (plurality opinion). 
 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

the existing bankruptcy estate among creditors. See 

Brubaker, A “Summary” Statutory and Constitutional 

Theory of Bankruptcy Judges’ Core Jurisdiction After 

Stern v. Marshall, 86 Am. Bankr. L. J. 121, 124 (2012).

Proceedings to augment the bankruptcy estate, on the

other hand, implicated the district court’s plenary jurisdiction and were not referred to the bankruptcy courts absent

both parties’ consent. See MacDonald v. Plymouth County 

Trust Co., 286 U. S. 263, 266 (1932); see also Brubaker, 

supra, at 128. 

In 1978, Congress enacted sweeping changes to the

federal bankruptcy laws. See 92 Stat. 2549. The Bankruptcy Reform Act eliminated the historical distinction

between “‘summary’” jurisdiction belonging to bankruptcy 

courts and “‘plenary’” jurisdiction belonging to either a

district court or an appropriate state court. Northern 

Pipeline, supra, at 54 (plurality opinion); see also 1 W. 

Norton & W. Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice §4:12,

p. 4–44 (3d ed. 2013). Instead, the 1978 Act mandated 

that bankruptcy judges “shall exercise” jurisdiction over 

“all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or 

related to cases under title 11.” 28 U. S. C. §§1471(b)–(c) 

(1976 ed., Supp. IV). Under the 1978 Act, bankruptcy 

judges were “vested with all of the ‘powers of a court of 

equity, law, and admiralty,’” with only a few limited exceptions. Northern Pipeline, 458 U. S., at 55 (plurality 

opinion) (quoting §1481). Notwithstanding their expanded

jurisdiction and authority, these bankruptcy judges were

not afforded the protections of Article III—namely, life

tenure and a salary that may not be diminished. Id., 

at 53. 

In Northern Pipeline, this Court addressed whether 

bankruptcy judges under the 1978 Act could “constitutionally be vested with jurisdiction to decide [a] state-law 

contract claim” against an entity not otherwise a party to

the proceeding. Id., at 53, 87, n. 40. The Court concluded 
 

6 EXECUTIVE BENEFITS INS. AGENCY v. ARKISON 

Opinion of the Court 

that assignment of that claim for resolution by the bankruptcy judge “violates Art. III of the Constitution.” Id., at 

52, 87 (plurality opinion); see id., at 91 (Rehnquist, J., 

concurring in judgment). The Court distinguished between cases involving so-called “public rights,” which may 

be removed from the jurisdiction of Article III courts, and

cases involving “private rights,” which may not. See id., at 

69–71 (plurality opinion); id., at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment). Specifically, the plurality noted that

“the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which is at 

the core of the federal bankruptcy power, must be distinguished from the adjudication of state-created private

rights,” which belong in an Article III court. Id., at 71–72, 

and n. 26. 

B 

Against that historical backdrop, Congress enacted the

Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 

1984—the Act at issue in this case. See 28 U. S. C. §151 

et seq. Under the 1984 Act, federal district courts have 

“original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 

11,” §1334(a), and may refer to bankruptcy judges any 

“proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related

to a case under title 11,” §157(a).6 Bankruptcy judges 

serve 14-year terms subject to removal for cause, 

§§152(a)(1), (e), and their salaries are set by Congress, 

§153(a).

The 1984 Act largely restored the bifurcated jurisdictional scheme that existed prior to the 1978 Act. The 1984 

Act implements that bifurcated scheme by dividing all 

matters that may be referred to the bankruptcy court

into two categories: “core” and “non-core” proceedings. See 

generally §157.7 It is the bankruptcy court’s responsibility 

—————— 

6 In addition, district courts may also withdraw such matters from the 

bankruptcy courts for “cause shown.” §157(d). 7 In using the term “core,” Congress tracked the Northern Pipeline 
 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

to determine whether each claim before it is core or noncore. §157(b)(3); cf. Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 7012. For core 

proceedings, the statute contains a nonexhaustive list of 

examples, including—as relevant here—“proceedings to

determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances.” 

§157(b)(2)(H). The statute authorizes bankruptcy judges 

to “hear and determine” such claims and “enter appropriate orders and judgments” on them. §157(b)(1). A final 

judgment entered in a core proceeding is appealable to the 

district court, §158(a)(1), which reviews the judgment

under traditional appellate standards, Rule 8013. 

As for “non-core” proceedings—i.e., proceedings that are

“not . . . core” but are “otherwise related to a case under 

title 11”—the statute authorizes a bankruptcy court to 

“hear [the] proceeding,” and then “submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court.”

§157(c)(1). The district court must then review those 

proposed findings and conclusions de novo and enter any

final orders or judgments. Ibid. There is one statutory 

exception to this rule: If all parties “consent,” the statute 

permits the bankruptcy judge “to hear and determine and 

to enter appropriate orders and judgments” as if the proceeding were core. §157(c)(2).

Put simply: If a matter is core, the statute empowers the

bankruptcy judge to enter final judgment on the claim,

subject to appellate review by the district court. If a matter is non-core, and the parties have not consented to final 

adjudication by the bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy 

judge must propose findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

Then, the district court must review the proceeding 

de novo and enter final judgment. 

—————— 

plurality’s use of the same term as a description of those claims that fell

within the scope of the historical bankruptcy court’s power. See 458 

U. S., at 71 (“[T]he restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which is

at the core of the federal bankruptcy power, must be distinguished from 

the adjudication of state-created private rights . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 

 

 

8 EXECUTIVE BENEFITS INS. AGENCY v. ARKISON 

Opinion of the Court 

C
 

Stern v. Marshall, 564 U. S. ___, confronted an underlying conflict between the 1984 Act and the requirements of 

Article III. In particular, Stern considered a constitutional 

challenge to the statutory designation of a particular claim

as “core.” The bankrupt in that case had filed a commonlaw counterclaim for tortious interference against a creditor to the estate. Id., at ___. Section 157(b)(2)(C), as

added by the 1984 Act, lists “counterclaims by the estate 

against persons filing claims against the estate” as a core

proceeding, thereby authorizing the bankruptcy court to 

adjudicate the claim to final judgment. See supra this 

page. The respondent in Stern objected that Congress had

violated Article III by vesting the power to adjudicate the

tortious interference counterclaim in bankruptcy court. 

Stern, 564 U. S., at ___. 

We agreed. Id., at ___. In that circumstance, we held, 

Congress had improperly vested the Bankruptcy Court 

with the “‘judicial Power of the United States,’” just as in 

Northern Pipeline. 564 U. S., at ___, ___ (slip op., at 21, 

38). Because “[n]o ‘public right’ exception excuse[d] the

failure to comply with Article III,” we concluded that 

Congress could not confer on the Bankruptcy Court the 

authority to finally decide the claim. Id., at ___. (slip op., 

at 21). 

III 

Stern made clear that some claims labeled by Congress

as “core” may not be adjudicated by a bankruptcy court in

the manner designated by §157(b). Stern did not, however, address how the bankruptcy court should proceed

under those circumstances. We turn to that question now.

The Ninth Circuit held that the fraudulent conveyance

claims at issue here are Stern claims—that is, proceedings

that are defined as “core” under §157(b) but may not, as a

constitutional matter, be adjudicated as such (at least in 
 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

the absence of consent, see n. 4, supra. See 702 F. 3d, at 

562. Neither party contests that conclusion.

The lower courts, including the Ninth Circuit in this 

case, have described Stern claims as creating a statutory 

“gap.” See, e.g., 702 F. 3d, at 565. By definition, a Stern 

claim may not be adjudicated to final judgment by the 

bankruptcy court, as in a typical core proceeding. But the 

alternative procedure, whereby the bankruptcy court 

submits proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, 

applies only to non-core claims. See §157(c)(1). Because 

§157(b) does not explicitly authorize bankruptcy judges to 

submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in 

a core proceeding, the argument goes, Stern created a 

“gap” in the bankruptcy statute. See 702 F. 3d, at 565. 

That gap purportedly renders the bankruptcy court powerless to act on Stern claims, see Brief for Petitioner 46–48, 

thus requiring the district court to hear all Stern claims in 

the first instance. 

We disagree. The statute permits Stern claims to proceed as non-core within the meaning of §157(c). In particular, the statute contains a severability provision that

accounts for decisions, like Stern, that invalidate certain 

applications of the statute: 

“If any provision of this Act or the application thereof 

to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this Act, or the application of that provision to persons or circumstances other than those as 

to which it is held invalid, is not affected thereby.” 98 

Stat. 344, note following 28 U. S. C. §151. 

The plain text of this severability provision closes the 

so-called “gap” created by Stern claims. When a court 

identifies a claim as a Stern claim, it has necessarily “held 

invalid” the “application” of §157(b)—i.e., the “core” label 

and its attendant procedures—to the litigant’s claim. 

Note following §151. In that circumstance, the statute 
 

 

 

10 EXECUTIVE BENEFITS INS. AGENCY v. ARKISON 

Opinion of the Court 

instructs that “the remainder of th[e] Act . . . is not affected

thereby.” Ibid. That remainder includes §157(c), which

governs non-core proceedings. With the “core” category no 

longer available for the Stern claim at issue, we look to 

§157(c)(1) to determine whether the claim may be adjudicated as a non-core claim—specifically, whether it is “not a

core proceeding” but is “otherwise related to a case under

title 11.” If the claim satisfies the criteria of §157(c)(1), 

the bankruptcy court simply treats the claims as non-core:

The bankruptcy court should hear the proceeding and 

submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 

to the district court for de novo review and entry of 

judgment.

The conclusion that the remainder of the statute may 

continue to apply to Stern claims accords with our general 

approach to severability. We ordinarily give effect to the

valid portion of a partially unconstitutional statute so long

as it “remains ‘“fully operative as a law,”’” Free Enterprise 

Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 

U. S. 477, 509 (2010) (quoting New York v. United States, 

505 U. S. 144, 186 (1992)), and so long as it is not “‘evident’” from the statutory text and context that Congress 

would have preferred no statute at all, 561 U. S., at 509 

(quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U. S. 678, 684 

(1987)). Neither of those concerns applies here. Thus, 

§157(c) may be applied naturally to Stern claims. And, 

EBIA has identified “nothing in the statute’s text or historical context” that makes it “evident” that Congress

would prefer to suspend Stern claims in limbo. 561 U. S., 

at 509.8 

—————— 

8To the contrary, we noted in Stern that removal of claims from core 

bankruptcy jurisdiction does not “meaningfully chang[e] the division of

labor in the current statute.” 564 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 37). Accepting EBIA’s contention that district courts are required to hear all Stern 

claims in the first instance, see Brief for Petitioner 46–48, would 

dramatically alter the division of responsibility set by Congress. 
Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

IV 

A 

Now we must determine whether the procedures set 

forth in §157(c)(1) apply to the fraudulent conveyance 

claims at issue in this case. The Court of Appeals held, 

and we assume without deciding, that the fraudulent 

conveyance claims in this case are Stern claims. See Part 

III, supra. For purposes of this opinion, the “application” 

of both the “core” label and the procedures of §157(b) to

the trustee’s claims has therefore been “held invalid.” 

Note following §151. Accordingly, we must decide whether 

the fraudulent conveyance claims brought by the trustee 

are within the scope of §157(c)(1)—that is, “not . . . core” 

proceedings but “otherwise related to a case under title

11.” We hold that this language encompasses the trustee’s

claims of fraudulent conveyance.

First, the fraudulent conveyance claims in this case are

“not . . . core.” The Ninth Circuit held—and no party 

disputes—that Article III does not permit these claims to

be treated as “core.” See Part III, supra. Second, the 

fraudulent conveyance claims are self-evidently “related to

a case under title 11.” At bottom, a fraudulent conveyance

claim asserts that property that should have been part of 

the bankruptcy estate and therefore available for distribution to creditors pursuant to Title 11 was improperly 

removed. That sort of claim is “related to a case under 

title 11” under any plausible construction of the statutory 

text, and no party contends otherwise. See, e.g., Celotex 

Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U. S. 300, 307, n. 5, 308 (1995) 

(“Proceedings ‘related to’ the bankruptcy include . . . suits

between third parties which have an effect on the bankruptcy estate”). Accordingly, because these Stern claims 

fit comfortably within the category of claims governed by

§157(c)(1), the Bankruptcy Court would have been permitted to follow the procedures required by that provision, 

i.e., to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 
 

12 EXECUTIVE BENEFITS INS. AGENCY v. ARKISON 

Opinion of the Court 

law to the District Court to be reviewed de novo. 

B 

Although this case did not proceed in precisely that

fashion, we affirm nonetheless. A brief procedural history 

of the case helps explain why. 

As noted, §157 permits a bankruptcy court to adjudicate

a claim to final judgment in two circumstances—in core

proceedings, see §157(b), and in non-core proceedings 

“with the consent of all the parties,” §157(c)(2). In this 

case, the Bankruptcy Court entered judgment in favor of

the bankruptcy trustee without specifying in its order

whether it was acting pursuant to §157(b) (core) or 

§157(c)(2) (non-core with consent). EBIA immediately

appealed to the District Court, see §158, but it did not 

argue that the Bankruptcy Court lacked constitutional 

authority to grant summary judgment. As a result, the 

District Court did not analyze whether there was a Stern 

problem and did not, as some district courts have done, 

relabel the bankruptcy order as mere proposed findings of 

fact and conclusions of law. See, e.g., In re Parco Merged 

Media Corp., 489 B. R. 323, 326 (Me. 2013) (collecting 

cases). The District Court did, however, review de novo 

the Bankruptcy Court’s grant of summary judgment for

the trustee—a legal question—and issued a reasoned 

opinion affirming the Bankruptcy Court. The District 

Court then separately entered judgment in favor of the 

trustee. See 28 U. S. C. §1334(b) (“[T]he district courts 

shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil

proceedings . . . related to cases under title 11”). 

EBIA now objects on constitutional grounds to the

Bankruptcy Court’s disposition of the fraudulent conveyance claims. EBIA contends that it was constitutionally

entitled to review of its fraudulent conveyance claims by

an Article III court regardless of whether the parties 

consented to adjudication by a bankruptcy court. Brief for 
 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

Petitioner 25–27. In an alternative argument, EBIA 

asserts that even if the Constitution permitted the Bankruptcy Court to adjudicate its claim with the consent of 

the parties, it did not in fact consent. Id., at 38. 

In light of the procedural posture of this case, however, 

we need not decide whether EBIA’s contentions are correct 

on either score. At bottom, EBIA argues that it was entitled to have an Article III court review de novo and enter 

judgment on the fraudulent conveyance claims asserted by 

the trustee. In effect, EBIA received exactly that. The 

District Court conducted de novo review of the summary

judgment claims, concluding in a written opinion that 

there were no disputed issues of material fact and that the 

trustee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In 

accordance with its statutory authority over matters 

related to the bankruptcy, see §1334(b), the District Court

then separately entered judgment in favor of the trustee.

EBIA thus received the same review from the District 

Court that it would have received if the Bankruptcy Court

had treated the fraudulent conveyance claims as non-core

proceedings under §157(c)(1). In short, even if EBIA is 

correct that the Bankruptcy Court’s entry of judgment was 

invalid, the District Court’s de novo review and entry of its

own valid final judgment cured any error. Cf. Carter v. 

Kubler, 320 U. S. 243, 248 (1943) (bankruptcy commissioner’s error was cured after the District Court “made 

an independent and complete review of the conflicting

evidence”).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals. 

It is so ordered.