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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

___________________________

2nd Circuit Court-Lebanon Family Division

No. 2018-0013

IN THE MATTER OF HALEY ST. PIERRE AND ADAM THATCHER

Argued: March 6, 2019

Opinion Issued: May 31, 2019

Family Legal, PC, of Concord (Jay Markell on the brief and orally), for the 

petitioner.

Decato Law Office, of Lebanon (R. Peter Decato on the brief and orally), 

for the respondent.

LYNN, C.J. The respondent, Adam Thatcher, appeals an order of the 

Circuit Court (Luneau, J.) granting the emergency motion of the petitioner, 

Haley St. Pierre, to relocate with her child to Florida. We affirm.

I

The following facts were found by the trial court, or are otherwise 

supported by the record and undisputed on appeal. The respondent and the 

petitioner met in August 2012. Later that year, they moved in together, having 

developed a romantic relationship. In February 2013, the petitioner traveled to 

New York for a weekend, where she had sexual relations with Colby Santaw, 

her former boyfriend. Shortly thereafter, she discovered that she was 

pregnant. Upon learning of the pregnancy, she informed the respondent that 

he was the father, and notified Santaw that he was not. The respondent, 

having been made aware of the petitioner’s intimate relations with Santaw, 
2

asked the petitioner if Santaw could be the father. The petitioner assured the 

respondent that the child was his.

The child was born on October 31, 2013. An affidavit of paternity was 

completed by the parties at the hospital following the child’s birth. Prior to 

signing the affidavit, the parties were informed by hospital staff that if they 

thought there was a chance that the respondent was not the father, they 

should not sign the affidavit. Section II of the affidavit, labeled “Information 

About the Child’s Natural Father,” included the following declaration above the 

father’s signature line:

I am signing this Affidavit voluntarily and of my own free will. No 

force has been used upon me, and no threats or promises made to 

me by anyone. I understand that by signing this Affidavit I am 

declaring I am the natural father of the child named above . . . and 

accept financial and legal responsibility for the child and shall be 

subject to the child support provisions of RSA 168-A:2. I 

understand that a signed Affidavit is a finding of paternity equal to 

a finding by a court of law.

Following completion of the affidavit by the parties, the respondent was listed 

as the child’s father on the birth certificate.

The parties married in January 2014, and, citing irreconcilable 

differences, divorced in July 2015. Following the divorce, the petitioner 

rekindled her relationship with Santaw. On a trip together in October 2015, 

the petitioner and Santaw began discussing the birthdate of the child. After 

considering the timing of his intimate relationship with the petitioner and the 

child’s date of birth, Santaw believed that he might be the child’s father. This 

belief was strengthened when he compared baby pictures of the child to his 

own baby pictures, and noticed a resemblance. Shortly thereafter, the 

petitioner and Santaw agreed to conduct genetic testing. In October 2015, 

these test results confirmed that Santaw was the child’s biological father.

Following this discovery, the petitioner, as a self-represented litigant, 

filed a “Petition to Change Court Order” in the trial court, requesting that the 

court amend the parties’ parenting plan, instituted after their divorce, by 

removing the respondent’s name from the child’s birth certificate, changing the 

child’s last name, and granting the petitioner full custody. In support of this 

request, the petitioner stated that the respondent was not the child’s biological 

father, that the biological father was filing for custody rights, and that the 

biological parents (the petitioner and Santaw) now lived together and wished 

“to keep the biological nuclear family intact.” Santaw intervened, requesting 

that the court award him parental rights as the child’s biological father, issue a 

parenting plan describing those parental rights, and change the child’s last 

name to “Santaw.”
3

The respondent filed an answer and counterclaim in December 2015, in 

which he asserted that he stood in loco parentis to the child because he had 

intentionally accepted the rights and duties of natural parenthood. He further 

claimed that, although he was not the child’s biological father, he was her 

“psychological parent,” as he had demonstrated “a full commitment to raising 

and caring for [her].” He stated that it was the court’s duty to “protect the 

interests of the child in custody determinations,” and asked that the court deny 

the relief requested by the petitioner and Santaw, and instead award him 

primary physical responsibility of the child.

On March 17, 2017, following a hearing in which the parties and Santaw 

testified, the trial court issued an order. The court explained that, pursuant to 

RSA 5-C:28, III, a party challenging an affidavit of paternity beyond 60 days 

from its filing must do so in “a court of competent jurisdiction.” See RSA 

5-C:28, III (2013). The court further stated that, under federal law, the 

challenge must be made “on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of 

fact.” See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(iii) (2012). The trial court concluded that 

Santaw, as a “putative father,” had standing to challenge the affidavit of 

paternity, and that, “[b]ased on the weight of credible evidence,” he had 

succeeded in proving either fraud or material mistake of fact. In so finding, the 

court explained that in completing the affidavit of paternity, the parties had 

either been ignorant of the fact that the respondent was not the biological 

father, and therefore made a material mistake of fact, or they had deliberately 

disregarded the fact, in which case they had committed a fraud. The court 

further found that Santaw was the child’s biological father, and ordered that 

the paternity affidavit be rescinded and the birth certificate amended to reflect 

this fact. The court declined to issue a parenting plan between the petitioner 

and Santaw so long as they “are an intact couple,” and also declined to change 

the child’s last name, explaining that the issue “was not sufficiently addressed 

or developed at the hearing,” and that, regardless, it was a decision that the 

petitioner and Santaw could make together.

The trial court also ruled that, because the respondent had been married 

to the petitioner, he would retain his status as a stepparent and therefore 

would “not lose his ability to ask for parenting rights and responsibilities” over 

the child. The court found that the respondent has “a very strong bond with 

the child” that “is in the nature of a parental bond.” The court further found

that the respondent had raised the child since birth, and concluded that it 

would be in the child’s best interests for the respondent to have parenting time

with her.

The court next turned to the petitioner’s request, made in a motion filed 

prior to the hearing, to relocate the child to Florida where, at that time, Santaw 

resided and the petitioner was planning to move. The court determined that 

the petitioner had not met her burden by a preponderance of the evidence to 

show that the relocation of the child was for a legitimate purpose. See RSA 
4

461-A:12, V (Supp. 2016). The court noted that while the petitioner was 

engaged to Santaw, the two were not yet married. The court further noted that 

the petitioner did not yet appear to have any job prospects in Florida and that 

if she stayed in New Hampshire, Santaw would be able to travel from Florida to 

be with her. In addition, the court concluded that the respondent had met his 

burden to show that relocation was not in the child’s best interests, as his 

contact with the child would be greatly affected by the move because he would 

no longer be able to be a regular participant in the child’s life. “Based on the 

weight of the credible evidence,” the court determined that, “at th[at] time,” 

relocation to Florida was “not a necessary move” for the child. The court 

vacated the parenting plan between the respondent and the petitioner and 

issued a parenting schedule to be followed by the respondent.

Almost four months later, on July 6, 2017, the petitioner filed an 

emergency motion to suspend the respondent’s parenting time. Her motion 

was based on the following alleged facts: (1) on July 3, 2017, the child was with 

the respondent when she fell into a bonfire and suffered severe burns; (2) the 

respondent did not notify the petitioner of the injury until almost 13 hours 

later; (3) the respondent did not take the child to a hospital or otherwise treat 

her wounds; and (4) when the petitioner took the child to the hospital, she was 

treated for second degree burns. The petitioner notified the trial court that 

there were active investigations by the New Hampshire Division for Children, 

Youth and Families, the Vermont Department for Children and Families, and 

the Vermont State Police into the respondent’s conduct. She asserted that, due 

to the “gross negligence” of the respondent, the trial court should award her 

sole parental responsibility over the child and allow the child to move to 

Florida.

On July 27, 2017, following a hearing, the trial court issued an

adjudicatory order on the petitioner’s emergency motion. The court found that 

the child, while under the respondent’s supervision, had fallen into a campfire 

and sustained “serious burns on her arms, thumb and back as a result, which 

may require surgery.” The court further found that the respondent had failed 

to notify the petitioner of the injuries until the following day, and that, while 

his friend had consulted with a doctor, who examined pictures of the child’s 

injuries over the phone, the respondent had not taken the child to obtain 

medical assistance. In addition, the court found that when the petitioner took 

the child to the hospital the following afternoon, she was transported to a burn 

center in Boston, Massachusetts for specialized care, due to the level and 

location of her burns. The trial court concluded that the accident was 

“avoidable,” and that there was reason to modify, on a temporary basis, the 

allocation of decision-making responsibilities, as well as the parenting 

schedule.

The trial court also reconsidered its decision on the child’s relocation to 

Florida. The court found that the parties’ circumstances had changed since 
5

the initial hearing, and that, most notably, the petitioner and Santaw were now 

married. The court concluded that “[b]eing able to be with her husband” was a 

“legitimate reason” for the petitioner to relocate, and further concluded that it

was reasonable for her to relocate to Florida, given that Santaw’s business is 

located there, and he is unable to move the business because of its statespecific nature. The court next considered whether the respondent had shown 

that relocation was not in the child’s best interests. Again, the court noted that 

circumstances had changed since its initial order. The court found that the 

respondent’s delay in contacting the petitioner about the child’s injuries 

exemplified the petitioner’s assertions that the respondent does not 

communicate with her. The court stated that the parties’ inability to 

communicate was a “legitimate issue,” as the child “is very young, and depends 

on the adults to communicate adequately about her needs to keep her safe.” 

The court explained that it had “some concerns” about the respondent’s “ability 

to properly supervise” the child, as well as concerns about his decision-making 

abilities. The court found that “[n]o satisfactory explanation” had been made 

as to why the child had been allowed to be so close to the fire pit, and

concluded that the respondent’s delay in communicating with the petitioner 

and in seeking medical care was “not justified.” The court further found that 

the incident was “concerning,” and declared that it met the standard for 

modification of a parenting plan. See RSA 461-A:11, I(c) (Supp. 2016).

In light of these findings, the court concluded that it was in the best 

interests of the child to award primary residential responsibility to the 

petitioner and allow the petitioner and the child to relocate to Florida. The 

court delayed the relocation to provide the respondent with “a chance to 

normalize his relationship” with the child. In addition, the court ordered that, 

after the move, the respondent could see the child “for an extended three day 

weekend [in New Hampshire] around the Thanksgiving and Christmas 

holidays,” and for “extended weekends” in New Hampshire during the months 

of April, June, and August. The court directed that, for the remainder of the 

year, the respondent travel to Florida to spend one long weekend with the child 

each month. The respondent thereafter filed this appeal.

II

The family division of the circuit court has equitable powers in cases, 

such as this one, that lie within its subject matter jurisdiction. See RSA 490-

D:2 (Supp. 2018), :3 (2010); Fam. Div. R. 2.1. These equitable powers are

“broad and flexible,” allowing the family division “to shape and adjust the 

precise relief to the requirements of the particular situation.” In the Matter of 

Neal & DiGiulio, 170 N.H. 671, 678 (2018) (quotation omitted); accord Dunlop 

v. Daigle, 122 N.H. 295, 300 (1982). A court exercising its equitable powers 

“will order to be done that which in fairness and good conscience ought to be or 

should have been done,” and will “administer all relief which the nature of the 

case and facts demand.” In the Matter of Neal, 170 N.H. at 678 (quotation 
6

omitted). We review the trial court’s decision whether to grant equitable relief 

for an unsustainable exercise of discretion. Id. In so doing, “we determine 

whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the 

discretionary judgment made.” Id. (quotation omitted). “The party asserting 

that a trial court order is unsustainable must demonstrate that the ruling was 

unreasonable or untenable to the prejudice of his case.” Id. (quotation 

omitted).

As an initial matter, the respondent asserts that Santaw lacked standing 

to challenge the affidavit of paternity. He argues that RSA 5-C:28 permits 

challenges only by signatories to the affidavit, and not by third parties. We 

need not address this claim, however, as we conclude that the petitioner, a 

signatory to the affidavit, challenged the affidavit when she filed her “Petition to 

Change Court Order.”

RSA 5-C:28 provides that “[a] parent or legal guardian may request to 

rescind an affidavit of paternity from the clerk of the city or town where the 

birth occurred within 60 days of the filing of an affidavit.” RSA 5-C:28, I 

(2013). “After the 60-day rescission period has passed, any challenge to the 

affidavit shall be decided only by a court of competent jurisdiction.” RSA 

5-C:28, III. Here, the petitioner filed her petition outside of the 60-day 

rescission period, and, thus, to comply with the statute, she was required to 

file it in a “court of competent jurisdiction.” See RSA 5-C:28, III; RSA 490-D:2; 

Fam. Div. R. 2.1; see also In the Matter of Neal, 170 N.H. at 675. The 

petitioner met this requirement by filing her petition in the family division of 

the circuit court. See RSA 490-D:2; Fam. Div. R. 2.1.

Still, the respondent argues that, because the petition was not filed as a 

motion to rescind an affidavit of paternity or to disestablish paternity, and 

instead requested that the court amend the parenting plan, it was insufficient 

to challenge the affidavit. As we have previously pointed out, however, RSA 

5-C:28 does not define what procedures apply to the challenge of an affidavit of 

paternity beyond the 60-day rescission period. In the Matter of Neal, 170 N.H. 

at 675. Although RSA 5-C:27 sets forth specific procedures for completing a 

rescission of paternity form where a signatory is seeking to rescind the affidavit 

within the 60-day rescission period, see RSA 5-C:27 (2013), the legislature has 

declined to set forth instructions on challenging an affidavit outside of the 

60-day rescission period. See In the Matter of Neal, 170 N.H. at 675. Thus, 

because there are no procedural requirements set forth by RSA 5-C:28 as to 

how to proceed with a paternity challenge once the 60-day rescission period

has run, the respondent cannot show that the petitioner was noncompliant 

with any statutory mandate. See id.

We also find it noteworthy that the petitioner filed her “Petition to 

Change Court Order” as a self-represented litigant. Under our case law, selfrepresented parties “are bound by the same procedural rules that govern 
7

parties represented by counsel.” In the Matter of Birmingham & Birmingham, 

154 N.H. 51, 56 (2006). This mandate, however, does not prohibit courts from 

liberally construing pleadings by self-represented litigants, provided that the 

self-represented party pleads sufficient facts for the court to discern the correct 

cause of action. See Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997) 

(stating that, while being self-represented “does not insulate a party from 

complying with procedural and substantive law,” complaints filed by selfrepresented parties must be liberally construed). Furthermore, “[i]n this 

jurisdiction, pleadings are construed liberally, . . . and, if counsel can 

understand the dispute and the court can decide the controversy on its merits, 

the pleadings are adequate.” Robbins v. Seekamp, 122 N.H. 318, 322 (1982).

In her petition, the petitioner asked the trial court to remove the 

respondent from the child’s birth certificate, change the child’s last name, and 

grant her full custody of the child. She requested this relief based on the 

following facts: (1) that the respondent is not the child’s biological father; (2) 

that the biological father is filing for his custody rights; and (3) that both 

biological parents live together and wish to keep the biological nuclear family 

intact. Given the relief sought, as well as the factual basis alleged for that 

relief, the petitioner provided the trial court with enough information to discern

that the petitioner was effectively seeking to disestablish paternity in one 

person and establish it in another. Her intentions were apparent, given our 

decision in Bodwell v. Brooks, 141 N.H. 508 (1996), which states that the 

concept of dual paternity is not recognized in New Hampshire. See Bodwell, 

141 N.H. at 511; accord In re Paternity of D.L., 938 N.E.2d 1221, 1225 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2010) (stating that, following the execution of a voluntary 

acknowledgment of paternity, if paternity is established in another man, it 

follows that it must be disestablished in the first); Callahan v. Department of 

Revenue, 800 So. 2d 679, 683 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that “only one 

person can be the biological father of a child”). Indeed, this is precisely what 

the trial court accomplished when it named Santaw as the biological father and 

placed the respondent in the position of a stepfather.

The respondent also contends that an affidavit of paternity is the 

equivalent of a final judgment that, according to our case law, cannot be 

challenged through genetic testing. In support of this argument, the 

respondent relies primarily on our decision in In the Matter of Gendron & 

Plaistek, 157 N.H. 314 (2008), in which we held that the trial court erred in 

ordering genetic testing in support of the mother’s challenge to the paternity 

affidavit, as the testing was not in the best interests of the child. Matter of 

Gendron, 157 N.H. at 321.

In Matter of Gendron, the parties executed a “Voluntary Acknowledgment 

of Paternity” in Massachusetts following the birth of the child. Id. at 315. 

Almost three years later, the mother asserted, in a responsive court pleading, 

that the father was not the child’s biological father, and requested that the 
8

court order DNA testing to establish paternity. Id. at 316. The trial court 

ordered the father to submit to genetic testing, and he appealed. Id. at 316-17. 

Under Massachusetts law, a challenge to a voluntary acknowledgment of 

paternity, if made outside of the 60-day rescission period, must be brought 

within one year of the date of signing the acknowledgment. Id. at 318 (citing 

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209C, § 11(a) (2007)). Massachusetts law also dictates 

that, if the acknowledgment has not been challenged in accordance with the 

foregoing requirement, “‘no judicial proceeding shall be required or permitted to 

ratify [the] acknowledgement,’ and the acknowledgement ‘shall be recognized as 

a sufficient basis for seeking an order of support, visitation or custody with 

respect to the child without further proceedings to establish paternity.’” Id.

(quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209C, § 11(a)). Giving full faith and credit to 

Massachusetts laws regarding the establishment of paternity, we concluded

that, because the mother had filed her challenge almost three years after the 

execution of the acknowledgment, the acknowledgement had not created a 

presumption of paternity, as argued by the mother, but rather had established

paternity. Id. at 317-19. We stated that, because the acknowledgment 

established paternity, there was no need for additional proof of paternity. Id. at 

318-19. In so doing, we explained that “[c]ertainty and finality are particularly 

important in paternity determinations because stability and continuity of 

support, both emotional and financial, are essential to a child’s welfare.” Id. at 

321 (quotation omitted). Thus, we held that the trial court’s directive for the 

father to submit to genetic testing was not in the child’s best interests. Id.

We disagree with the respondent’s assertion that Matter of Gendron

prohibits the petitioner from challenging the affidavit of paternity through 

evidence of genetic testing. Unlike the Massachusetts statute, which places a 

one-year limitation on challenges brought outside of the 60-day rescission 

period, the New Hampshire statute does not put time constraints on challenges 

beyond the initial 60-day period. See RSA 5-C:28, III. Moreover, while a 

paternity affidavit executed in New Hampshire, much like in Massachusetts, 

has “the legal effect of establishing paternity without requiring further action,” 

the New Hampshire legislature has carved out an exception to this rule where 

the affidavit is “rescinded pursuant to RSA 5-C:28.” RSA 168-A:2 (2014). 

Thus, unlike in Massachusetts, a presumption of paternity executed in New

Hampshire does not become irrebuttable if unchallenged within a prescribed 

time period.

1 Cf. Bodwell, 141 N.H. at 511 (stating that presumption of 

paternity based on a marital relationship is rebuttable and that it may be 

challenged with blood tests).

The respondent also cites Matter of Gendron in support of his policy 

argument that disestablishment of his paternity is contrary to the best 

interests of the child because “[p]ublic policy demands that children have the 

 

1 We note that paternity petitions brought under RSA chapter 168-A, must be brought “within 18 

years of the date of the birth of the child in question.” RSA 168-A:12 (2014).
9

right to certainty in their relationships with their parents.” Matter of Gendron, 

157 N.H. at 321 (quotation omitted). As the Court of Appeals of Kentucky has 

noted, however, there are some circumstances, such as those presented here, 

where “DNA evidence must overshadow considerations related to public policy.” 

Ipock v. Ipock, 403 S.W.3d 580, 587 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013) (quotation omitted). 

Unlike our other cases cited by the respondent, see Watts v. Watts, 115 N.H. 

186 (1975); McRae v. McRae, 115 N.H. 353 (1975), this case is not one where a 

presumed father seeks, years later, to disprove his own paternity so as to avoid 

paying child support. See Watts, 115 N.H. at 188-89 (stating that the 

presumption of paternity could not be rebutted by blood tests because the 

“defendant ha[d] acknowledged the children as his own without challenge for 

over 15 years”); McRae, 115 N.H. at 355 (stating that “[t]o permit the husband 

to raise the question of paternity after an eight-year period of uninterrupted 

acquiescence . . . would contravene the policy of this State’s law to protect the 

child and the spouse from the belated resort to scientific proof in an effort to 

escape parental responsibility”). Indeed, the facts of this case are unique. 

Here, there are two men who desire to be the child’s legal father, and are 

willing to take on all of the responsibilities associated with that title. In a case 

such as this one, “justice is not arrived at where a court . . . adjudicates a man 

to be the father of a child while knowing full well that the biological 

relationship has been clearly disestablished.” Ipock, 403 S.W.3d at 587-88 

(quotation omitted).

Our recognition of the importance of honoring an admitted DNA test in 

the circumstances of this case does not undo our holdings in Watts and 

McRae, as a party may continue to rely on the doctrine of paternity by estoppel 

to prevent a legal father from disclaiming paternity. See Hansen v. Hansen, 

119 N.H. 473, 475 (1979) (stating that paternity may be established through 

“the establishment of an estoppel by one charged with the paternity because of 

his failure to question it after a substantial period of uninterrupted 

acquiescence” (quotation omitted)); Ipock, 403 S.W.3d at 588 (noting that the 

doctrine of paternity by estoppel affirms “the idea that a person who supports a 

child financially, physically and emotionally when he knew he was not [the] 

biological father should not be permitted to cease that support when it suits 

him”); see also Emily J. Stolzenberg, The New Family Freedom, 59 B.C. L. Rev. 

1983, 2016 (2018) (explaining that “estoppel functions to prevent an adult from 

disclaiming a parental role he or she had previously been fulfilling”). In 

addition, while the doctrine does not apply to the circumstances of this case, 

we can conceive of situations where application of the doctrine to a challenge 

presented by a biological father may be appropriate.

Next, the respondent argues that the trial court erred in rescinding the 

paternity affidavit because, in challenging the affidavit, the petitioner failed to 

prove fraud or material mistake of fact. As an initial matter, we note that the 

current version of RSA 5-C:28 does not require a party, challenging an affidavit 

of paternity outside of the 60-day rescission period, to demonstrate such proof. 
10

RSA 5-C:28, III. But see RSA 5-C:11, VII (2003) (repealed and reenacted in 

2005). However, the parties do not dispute the applicability of Title 42, 

Chapter 7, Subchapter IV, Part D of the Social Security Act (Title IV-D), which 

sets forth such a requirement, to the case before us. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 666(a)(5)(D)(iii) (requiring states that receive federal welfare funding under 

Title IV-D to establish procedures under which, after the 60-day rescission 

period, “a signed voluntary acknowledgement of paternity may be challenged in 

court only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, with the 

burden of proof upon the challenger” (emphasis added)). Thus, for the 

purposes of today’s decision, we assume, without deciding, that the 

requirements of Title IV-D apply.

In light of this federal requirement, we conclude that the court was 

correct in ruling that the petitioner met the burden of proving material mistake 

of fact in challenging the affidavit of paternity. As we have stated in the past, a 

trial court’s finding that a party signed an affidavit of paternity with the 

mistaken belief that he was the father is the equivalent of the court finding a 

“material mistake of fact.” In the Matter of Neal, 170 N.H. at 677, 679

(analyzing language in a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity executed in 

Maine); see also Bay County Prosecutor v. Nugent, 740 N.W.2d 678, 682 (Mich. 

Ct. App. 2007) (stating that where plaintiff established both that defendant 

signed the affidavit of paternity believing he was the biological father and that a 

DNA test later determined that someone else was the biological father, 

“[p]resentation of the unchallenged DNA evidence was sufficient to establish a 

mistake of fact”). The record supports the trial court’s finding that the parties

“were mistaken concerning the baby’s paternity.” Although the respondent 

admitted in the trial court that he had “doubts” about being the child’s 

biological father, he also testified that, at the time he signed the paternity 

affidavit, he believed that he was the child’s biological father. Furthermore, the 

petitioner testified that she informed the respondent that he was the biological 

father, and that she, too, believed that to be the truth at the time the affidavit 

was executed. Thus, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that, in 

signing the affidavit, the respondent was “relying on incorrect information [the 

petitioner] gave him about the child’s paternity.” See Bay County Prosecutor, 

740 N.W.2d at 682 (stating that “[r]egardless of whether defendant intended to 

be the father when he signed the affidavit . . . , and whether he intended to 

remain the legal father after he learned that he was not the child’s biological 

father, the evidence established that defendant’s decision to acknowledge 

paternity . . . was based, at least in part, on a mistaken belief that he was, in 

fact, the biological father”). Because we conclude that the evidence presented 

in the trial court is sufficient to uphold the trial court’s finding of a material 

mistake of fact, we decline to address the trial court’s alternative finding of

fraud.

The respondent next argues that the trial court erred when it allowed the 

child’s relocation in its ruling on the petitioner’s emergency motion. As stated 
11

above, however, the trial court, in reviewing the parties’ arguments, was 

exercising its “broad and flexible equitable powers . . . to shape and adjust the 

precise relief to the requirements of the particular situation.” In the Matter of 

Neal, 170 N.H. at 678. Given the broad discretion afforded the trial court, we 

will affirm the court’s determination so long as the record demonstrates an 

objective basis sufficient to sustain the court’s judgment. In the Matter of 

Heinrich & Curotto, 160 N.H. 650, 655 (2010). We conclude that the record 

does so here.

In reconsidering the petitioner’s relocation request, the trial court 

correctly applied RSA 461-A:12, V, which requires the party seeking to relocate 

to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) “[t]he relocation is for a 

legitimate purpose”; and (2) “[t]he proposed location is reasonable in light of 

that purpose.” RSA 461-A:12, V. As found by the trial court, and supported 

by the record, after the court first denied the petitioner’s relocation request,

circumstances had changed — the petitioner had married Santaw and desired

to reside in Florida with her now husband. In addition, Santaw’s state-specific 

business is located in Florida, making it difficult for him to move. Therefore, 

the record supports the court’s conclusion that the petitioner’s request to be 

with her husband was for a legitimate purpose, and that Florida was a 

reasonable location in light of that purpose.

The trial court, as required by the statute, next looked to whether the 

respondent had proven, “by a preponderance of the evidence, that the proposed 

relocation [wa]s not in the best interests of the child.” RSA 461-A:12, VI (Supp.

2016). Again noting that circumstances had changed since its initial decision 

on relocation, the trial court focused on the inability of the respondent to 

communicate effectively with the petitioner. The court found that this lack of 

communication was shown by the respondent’s delay in contacting the 

petitioner after the child sustained serious burns that required medical 

attention while in his care. The court stated that, given the child’s “very 

young” age and her dependency on the adults in her life “to communicate 

adequately about her needs to keep her safe,” the parties’ inability to 

communicate is a “legitimate issue.” Furthermore, after the occurrence of the 

child’s injuries, the court had concerns about the respondent’s “ability to 

properly supervise” the child. Given these findings, the court’s conclusion that 

the petitioner and the child should relocate to Florida was supported by the 

record.

Similarly, we also conclude that the trial court did not commit an error 

when it failed to consider, in its initial order, the respondent’s counterclaim 

requesting primary physical responsibility over the child. In rescinding the 

affidavit of paternity, awarding Santaw the status of legal and biological father 

of the child, and referring to the respondent as a stepparent, the trial court 

impliedly considered the respondent’s request. The respondent argues, 

however, that the court should have analyzed his request by applying the best-
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interests-of-the-child factors set forth in RSA 461-A:6. See RSA 461-A:6 (2018)

(amended Supp. 2018). Although the statute requires that the court “consider” 

the best interests of the child, see RSA 461-A:6, I, the court is required to set 

forth the reasons for its decision in a written order only if requested to do so by 

an aggrieved party, see RSA 461:A:6, VII. Here, there is nothing in the record 

to indicate that the respondent made such a request. Regardless, it is clear 

from the court’s order that it did consider the best interests of the child in 

making its determination. Indeed, the trial court stated that the respondent 

“has a very strong bond with the child which is in the nature of a parental 

bond,” and concluded that “[i]t would be in [the child]’s best interests for [the 

respondent] to have parenting time.”

In sum, we believe that the record supports the trial court’s rescission of 

the paternity affidavit based on its determination that there was a material 

mistake of fact made by the parties in executing the paternity affidavit. We 

further believe that there is sufficient basis in the record to support the trial 

court’s order granting primary custodial responsibilities to the petitioner and

allowing the relocation of the child to Florida. Accordingly, we affirm the trial 

court’s order.

Affirmed.

HICKS, BASSETT, HANTZ MARCONI, and DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.