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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

BILLY BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v.

ALERIS SPECIFICATION ALLOYS, 

INC. and WABASH ALLOYS, LLC,

Defendant.

Case No.3:14-cv-00041-PPS-CAN

DEFENDANT’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant Aleris Specification Alloys, Inc. (“Aleris” or “Defendant”), 1 by counsel, 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) and Local Rule 56.1 of the United States 

District Court for the Northern District of Indiana submits the following Brief in Support of its 

Motion for Summary Judgment. 

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Billy Brown (“Brown”), earned just under $100,000 annually as a non-union 

Production Supervisor for Aleris at its Wabash, Indiana facility. Brown exercised supervisory 

authority over approximately 18 employees on the ingot line. Among his numerous executive 

responsibilities, he: (1) trained employees; (2) ensured his reports complied with safety 

regulations; (3) determined needs for overtime staffing and requests for time off; 

(4) administered progressive discipline; (5) determined materials needed for daily production; 

(6) directed the ingot line production process; (7) resolved complaints among employees and by 

 1 Wabash Alloys, LLC, formerly a subsidiary of Aleris International, Inc., was liquidated as part 

of Aleris International, Inc.’s emergence from bankruptcy effective June 1, 2010. Thus, Wabash 

Alloys, LLC no longer exists as a legal entity. In addition, effective February 2015, Aleris 

Specification Alloys, Inc. became known as Real Alloy Specification, Inc. For the purposes of 

this motion, we will refer to the Defendant as “Aleris.” 

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employees regarding working conditions; and (8) made evaluations and recommendations on 

employee status which were given particular weight. Aleris properly classified Brown as an 

exempt executive employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et 

seq. Brown is not entitled to overtime compensation under the FLSA. Aleris is entitled to 

summary judgment as a matter of law on the only claim asserted in Brown’s Complaint, for 

unpaid wages pursuant to the FLSA. 

II. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS NOT IN DISPUTE2

A. Aluminum Production at Aleris’s Wabash Facility. 

Aleris’s Wabash, Indiana specification alloy facility (the “Wabash facility”) produces 

molten and ingot aluminum. (Deposition of Billy Brown (“Brown Dep.”) at 22:22-23:20). 

Furnace Power Equipment Operators (“FPEOs”), Furnace Operators (“FOs”), and Utility 

Equipment Operators (“UTOs”) perform the first line production work on the ingot line. (Brown 

Dep. 24:2-14, 26-23-27:9, 28:16-29:11). FPEOs feed material into the furnace at the top of the

production line. (Brown Dep. 26:23-27:9). FOs melt the material in the furnace and pour the 

resulting molten into molds. (Brown Dep. 28:16-29:11). UTOs produce the ingot off the line 

when it becomes solid and proceed to stamp, paint, tag, and band the product before sending it to 

shipping. (Brown Dep. 24:2-14, 29:5-11). 

Every new production employee is hired as a UTO, and the Collective Bargaining 

Agreement (“CBA”) negotiated between Aleris and the International Brotherhood of 

Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers Local 140 (the “Union”)

then controls seniority and dictates when employees are able to bid to be hired into a different 

 2 For the purposes of summary judgment only, Defendant interprets all facts in a light most 

favorable to Brown. 

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position. (Deposition of Tony Whitt (“Whitt Dep.”) at 13:4-14:1; Declaration of Tony Whitt 

(“Whitt Decl.”) at ¶¶4-5, 7, 10, Ex. A). Consistent with the requirements of the CBA, newlyhired UTOs are placed on a 60-day probationary period. (Whitt Decl. ¶9, Ex. A). During that 

time, Operations Managers and Site Directors relied on feedback from Production Supervisors 

regarding the UTO’s performance. (Whitt Decl. ¶9). After the 60-day probationary period, new 

employees are placed on the seniority roster and the CBA governs their eligibility for additional 

training or promotions. (Whitt Dep. 13:4-14:1; Whitt Decl. ¶10, Ex. A). Between 2011 and 2013, 

first line production employees earned between $13.00 and $18.00 per hour. (Declaration of Joy 

Parson (“Parson Decl.”) at ¶5). 

FPEOs, FOs, and UTOs work under the direction of a Production Supervisor. (Brown 

Dep. 23:25-24:20; Whitt Dep. 15:3-6). Production Supervisors are managed by the Operations 

Manager, who reports directly to the Site Director or Plant Manager overseeing plant operations.

(Brown Dep. 28:8-9; Whitt Dep. 5:4-5, 6:11-15; Deposition of Joseph Russell (“Russell Dep.”) 

at 10:10-14). Joseph Russell was the Plant Manager from September 2007 until January 2013.

(Russell Dep. 6:18-20, 7:22-24). Tony Whitt replaced Russell in January 2013. (Whitt Dep. 5:4-

5; Whitt Decl. ¶2).

B. Brown’s Employment and Job Responsibilities at Aleris.

Brown worked for Aleris3 from 1972 until his resignation on June 26, 2013. (Brown Dep.

12:13-15, 92:3-7, Ex. J). He became a Production Supervisor in or around 1982, and held this 

position until his resignation. (Brown Dep. 13:15-25) (“I was a union guy for probably about 10 

or 11 years, and then I went into salary or into boss”). As a Production Supervisor, Brown was 

responsible for overseeing the employees and the production on the ingot line. (Brown Dep.

 3 Brown worked for Aleris’s predecessor, Wabash Alloys, LLC, until 2007. (Deposition of Joy 

Parson (“Parson Dep.”) at 9:14).

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22:24-25). When he became a Production Supervisor, he was no longer a union employee.

(Brown Dep. 21:15-17). 

1. Production Supervisor position description. 

Brown performed the same work and had the same responsibilities throughout his time as 

a Production Supervisor. (Brown Dep.at 40:4-16; 42:15-43:11, 50:3-20, Exs, E, F, G). His most

recent job description included the following responsibilities:

• Monitor production output and quality data. Maintains time and production 

records. Compiles reports for management review. Provides hands-on operation 

of furnaces with responsibility for optimizing recoveries.

• Directly supervises up to 15 production employees.

• Improve safety performance by continuously increasing a level of awareness and 

improving the safety culture of employees to reduce, if not eliminate, accidents 

and injuries. [...]

• Implement safety communication and training to establish safer working 

practices.

• Training employees; planning, assigning and directing work; appraising 

performance, disciplining employees; addressing complaints and resolving 

problems.

• Schedules and directs employees in assignment and completion of production 

work. Creates and trains a team of workers to achieve or exceed budgeted 

production goals while maintaining compliance with environmental and other 

regulatory requirements. [...]

• Checks the types, quantity, and availability of materials needed to complete the 

production requirements for the shift. Checks records from the previous shift, and 

alerts maintenance of potential equipment problems.

• Establishes or adjusts work procedures to meet schedules. Determines overtime 

work schedule and approves time cards.

• Completes on a daily basis all production information to be entered into 

Oracle/Excel.

• Interprets instructions, specifications, or job orders to employees.

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• Conducts meetings with employees and ensures compliance with all health, 

safety, and environmental regulations, and company policies and procedures.

• Analyzes and resolves or assists workers in resolving work related problems.

• Provides relief supervision on weekends, nights, and holidays or as needed. [...]

(Brown Dep. 50:7-20, Ex. G). Brown performed all of these responsibilities as a Production 

Supervisor. (Id.). He regularly worked without direct supervision, especially on weekends. 

(Brown Dep. 39:16-17, Exs. E, G).

2. Daily operation of the ingot line. 

Brown was primarily responsible for directing the work of the employees on the ingot 

line. (Brown Dep. 41:16-20, Ex. E). He directly supervised approximately six employees per 

shift, and had supervisory authority over approximately 18 total employees. (Brown Dep. 29:15-

30:7, 46:15-18, 51:18, 56:3-6, Ex. H). During his shifts, he shared supervision of UTOs with the

molten line Production Supervisor and the Shipping Supervisor. (Brown Dep. 46:15-18).

Together, the supervisors decided where the UTOs were needed throughout a shift. (Brown Dep.

30:8-20).

Based on the order sheet Brown received at the start of each shift, he would decide what 

materials were needed for that day’s production, make sure the employees he supervised 

performed their roles satisfactorily to complete the order, address any problems that arose on the 

line, and take responsibility for the quality of the final product that came off the line. (Brown 

Dep. 31:24-33:11, 36:13-16, 44:16-20; Russell Dep. 15:14-18). Because of his significant 

personal knowledge and experience with this process, Brown’s opinion was weighed in setting 

realistic production goals for workers on his line. (Russell Dep. 16:20-17:2).

During each shift, Brown sampled alloys during the production process and decided 

which additional materials were needed after testing to produce the correct metal, requested the 

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necessary materials to continue production, and maintained the related production and furnace 

records. (Brown Dep. 45:5-46:7, 57:4-61:5, Ex. G). These records are necessary for reporting 

plant activity to regulatory bodies such as the Environmental Protection Agency. (Id.; Whitt. 

Dep. 30:1-5; Russell Dep. 18:20-25). Because of this role, production supervisors provide critical 

advice regarding procurement of materials for the furnace. (Brown Dep. Ex. G; Whitt Dep. 20:7-

21, 23:5-7).

Once materials were procured and the line was ready to operate, Brown directed the 

production process by telling FPEOs how much material to put in at the beginning of the line. 

(Brown Dep. 24:18-23). He then monitored the line throughout his shift, deciding when to slow 

or speed up production, as he was personally responsible for ensuring completion of production 

goals. (Brown Dep. 27:19-28:15, 41:24-42:1, Exs. E, G). In fulfilling his role as a Production 

Supervisor, Brown participated in the work of the employees he supervised on an as-needed 

basis to ensure that production continued, sometimes for as much as 50 percent of a shift.

(Brown Dep. 117:13-14, 118:16-119:6; Russell Dep. 19:24-20:3). However, his primary 

responsibility was supervising the line. (Russell Dep. 20:16-18; Brown Dep. 123:6-9, Exs. E, G).

Brown was never assigned to perform manual labor, but rather used his own discretion to fill in 

if needed. (Brown Dep. 47:22-48:1, 117:13-14).

3. Supervisory authority over ingot line employees.

In addition to directing the production process, Brown exercised general supervisory 

authority over the employees on the ingot line. (Brown Dep. 42:6-9, Exs, E, G). He was 

responsible for providing employees with coverage so they could take designated breaks 

throughout their shifts. (Brown Dep. 47:22-48:12). He resolved complaints between employees 

and complaints from employees regarding working conditions. (Brown Dep. 49:15-22. Exs. E,

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G). He supported his employees and tried to boost their morale so they would be more 

productive, by informing them of their production numbers. (Brown Dep. 110:9-12). Brown was 

personally responsible for training new employees on his shift, or assigning their training to an 

experienced employee to ensure the training was completed. (Brown Dep. 25:11-26:1, 124:3-13, 

Ex. G; Whitt Dep. 14:6-12). He also validated the newly trained employee’s skills confirmation 

sheet certifying that the new employee had been adequately trained, and he provided feedback 

when managers asked how his employees were doing. (Brown Dep. 110:18-22; Whitt Dep. 14:6-

12). 

4. Responsibility for safety compliance. 

Brown ensured that his employees complied with safety regulations by wearing hard hats 

and glasses and following other safety procedures throughout their shift. (Brown Dep. 38:25-

39:2, 42:10-12, Exs. E, G; Whitt Dep. 29:3-5; Russell Dep. 17:5-12). His role in safety 

enforcement at the plant was “probably the most critical in the organization,” as Production 

Supervisors are responsible for communicating safety expectations to their crew at the start of a 

shift and enforcing the safety rules consistently. (Brown Dep. Ex. G; Whitt Dep. 27:20-28:5). In 

addition to leading crew safety meetings at the beginning of his shift, Brown participated with 

management in reviewing and amending the safety rules as necessary. (Brown Dep. Ex. G; Whitt 

Dep. 27:20-28:5; Russell Dep. 17:5-12).

5. Control over employee schedules.

Because the line employees were union members, the CBA governed their schedules and 

overtime policies, but Brown was responsible for implementing the policies on a day-to-day 

basis. (Brown Dep. Exs. E, G; Russell Dep. 13:4-14:15). Brown decided when someone on his 

shift needed to work overtime, approved requests for time off, and confirmed when his 

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employees had worked overtime. (Brown Dep. 37:18-20, 38:8-10, 38:23-24, Ex. G; Whitt Dep.

19:23-21:1). He also had the authority to record his employees’ hours in the time and attendance 

system, pursuant to the terms of the CBA. (Whitt Dep. 19:23-21:1). Brown made manpower 

recommendations to the Plant Manager when he needed additional employees. (Brown Dep., Ex. 

E; Whitt Dep. 12:4-10). Production supervisors have authority to interview prospective UTO 

candidates, although Brown did not recall doing so. (Whitt Dep. 11:3-13; Brown Dep. 119:23-

24). 

6. Authority to discipline and influence personnel decisions.

Finally, Brown had authority to administer progressive discipline, including verbal 

warnings, written warnings, and suspensions, and he exercised this authority if an employee on 

his shift did something wrong or inappropriate. (Brown Dep. 49:23-50:2, Exs. E, G; Whitt Dep.

15:19-17:16; Russell Dep. 11:16-25). Production Supervisors could require an employee to leave 

until the organization contacted them about whether they could return to work. (Id.; Whitt Dep.

15:19-17:16). No individual at Aleris has absolute authority to terminate an employee; it is a 

group decision-making process. (Whitt Dep. 16:20-17:3).

C. Brown’s Compensation.

For the duration of his employment, Brown was paid for all of the hours he recorded on 

his timesheets. (Brown Dep. 88:11-14, 100:2-5). Between January 2011 and his resignation in

June 2013, Brown earned a base salary of between $70,000 and $80,000 per year. (Brown Dep.

91:15-22). In addition to his base salary, Brown earned straight overtime pay for all hours he 

recorded over 80 in a two-week period. (Brown Dep. 87:2-7). Aleris calculated Brown’s straight 

hourly rate by dividing his annual base salary by 2080, the number of regular work hours in a 

year. (Parson Decl. ¶8). Brown’s base salary in 2011 was approximately $71,000.00, creating a 

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straight hourly rate of approximately $34.00 per hour. (Parson Decl. ¶¶9, 10, Ex. A). His total 

compensation in 2011 was approximately $98,800.00. (Id.) His 2012 base salary was 

approximately $73,050.00, determining his related hourly rate of approximately $35.00 per hour.

(Parson Decl. ¶11, Ex. A). His total compensation in 2012 was approximately $98,000.00. (Id.)

His 2013 salary was approximately $75,060.00, creating a straight hourly rate of approximately 

$37.00 per hour. (Parson Decl. ¶12, Ex. A). Upon his resignation in June 2013, Brown had 

earned approximately $55,458.00 year to date. (Id.)

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(a) provides the Court may properly grant summary 

judgment where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “In deciding whether genuine issues of 

material fact exist, the court construes all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party 

and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Blake v. Univ. of Notre 

Dame Du Lac, No.: 3:08-CV-00070-WCL, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57170, *2 (N.D. Ind. July 6, 

2009) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). A motion for summary 

judgment is not defeated by the “‘mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the 

parties’” or “‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.’” Blake, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

57170 at *2 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Illinois, Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 

692 (7th Cir. 2000)). “The party seeking summary judgment on a claim on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial may discharge its burden by showing an absence 

of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Blake, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57170 at *3 

(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)).

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IV. ARGUMENT

Brown was an executive employee exempt from FLSA overtime requirements and is not 

entitled to any unpaid wages. The FLSA requires employers to pay employees overtime 

compensation for any hours worked in excess of 40 in a work week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).

Certain employees are exempt from the FLSA’s overtime pay requirements. 29 U.S.C. § 

213(a)(1). Because Brown was exempt under Section 213(a)(1), Aleris was not required to 

compensate him for overtime and his FLSA claim fails as a matter of law.

The FLSA provides a complete minimum wage and overtime pay exemption for “any 

employee employed in a bona fide executive...capacity.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (“Executive 

Exemption”). An employee qualifies for the Executive Exemption if he or she satisfies the 

elements enumerated by 29 C.F.R. § 541.100(a), which states than an employee must:

1) Be compensated on a salary basis at a rate of not less than $455 per week;

2) Have the primary duty of management of the enterprise in which the 

employee is employed or of a customarily recognized department or 

subdivision thereof;

3) Customarily and regularly direct the work of two or more other employees; 

and

4) Have the authority to hire or fire other employees or make suggestions and 

recommendations as to the hiring, firing, advancement, promotion or any 

other change of status of other employees which are given particular weight.

29 C.F.R. § 541.100; Grass v. Damar Servs., Inc., 2014 WL 2773027, at *9 (S.D. Ind. June 19, 

2014). Because Brown’s work as a Production Supervisor satisfied each of these elements, he 

was an executive employee exempt from FLSA overtime requirements.

A. Brown’s salary was significantly more than $455 per week. 

To qualify as a “bona fide executive,” an employee must receive a salary of at least 

$455.00 per week (approximately $23,000.00 per year). 29 C.F.R. § 541.100(a)(1). Brown’s base 

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salary in 2011 was $71,000.00, and he actually earned approximately $98,800.00 with the 

addition of straight pay for overtime. (Parson Decl. ¶10, Ex. A). In 2012, his salary was 

$73,050.00, and he actually earned $98,000.00. (Parson Decl. ¶11, Ex. A). In 2013, his salary 

was $75,060, and he actually earned $55,458.00 for the first six months of 2013. (Parson Decl.

¶12, Ex. A ). Brown’s salary significantly exceeded the necessary $455 per week. 4

B. Brown’s primary duty was management of a customarily recognized 

department.

To qualify as an exempt executive employee, an employee must have as a primary duty 

the management of the enterprise in which he or she is employed or of a customarily recognized 

department or subdivision thereof. 29 C.F.R. § 541.100(a)(2). Brown meets each of the three 

subparts of this test. 29 C.F.R. § 541.100 et seq.

1. The ingot line is a customarily recognized department or subdivision. 

A “customarily recognized department or subdivision is intended to distinguish between 

a mere collection of employees assigned from time to time to a specific job or series of jobs and 

a unit with permanent status and function. A customarily recognized department or subdivision 

must have a permanent status and a continuing function.” 2 9 C.F.R. § 541.103(a). The FLSA 

regulations make clear, however, that 

 4 To the extent Brown claims that Aleris did not consider him an exempt employee because it 

paid him straight overtime compensation, such a claim is meritless. “An employer may provide 

an exempt employee with additional compensation without losing the exemption or violating the 

salary basis requirement, if the employment arrangement also includes a guarantee of at least the 

minimum weekly-required amount paid on a salary basis.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.604(b). Likewise, 

“[T]he exemption is not lost if an exempt employee who is guaranteed at least $ 455 each week 

paid on a salary basis also receives additional compensation based on hours worked for work 

beyond the normal workweek. Such additional compensation may be paid on any basis (e.g., flat 

sum, bonus payment, straight-time hourly amount, time and one-half or any other basis) . . .”.

Id Here, Brown was guaranteed his annual base salary, regardless of the hours he worked over 80 

in a two week period. He cannot argue that because Aleris paid him more than he was entitled to

receive, he is not properly exempt.

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[C]ontinuity of the same subordinate personnel is not essential to the existence of 

a recognized unit with a continuing function. An otherwise exempt employee will 

not lose the exemption merely because the employee draws and supervises 

workers from a pool or supervises a team of workers drawn from other recognized 

units, if other factors are present that indicate that the employee is in charge of a 

recognized unit with a continuing function. 

29 C.F.R. § 541.103(d).

A work shift can constitute a department or subdivision. West v. Anne Arundel County, 

Md., 137 F.3d 752 (4th Cir. 1998); Molina v. Sea Land Services Inc., 2 F.Supp.2d 185 (D. P.R. 

1998). In addition, “groupings” or “teams” may constitute a department or subdivision. 69 Fed. 

Reg. 22134 (Aug. 23, 2004), citing Gorman v. Continental Can Co., 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

30856 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 1986); Preamble to 29 C.F.R. 541.

The ingot line at the Wabash facility is a customarily recognized department or 

subdivision of Aleris’s operations with a permanent status. (Brown Dep. 22:24-25). The ingot 

line was one of the two primary production functions of the Wabash facility. (Brown Dep. 22:4-

23:4). In addition, Brown’s role within the department was consistent and permanent; he

performed the same supervisory role there for more than 30 years. (Brown Dep. 12:13-15).

Moreover, Brown supervised a distinct subdivision of the ingot production department when he 

supervised all employees on a particular shift. See West, 137 F.3d 752; Molina, 2 F.Supp.2d 185.

Therefore, Brown met the requirement that he manage a “customarily recognized department or 

subdivision.” 

2. Brown’s duties were “management” duties. 

There can be no genuine issue of fact that Brown’s primary duties were management in 

nature. The term “management” generally includes, but is not limited to, activities such as the 

following:

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[1] interviewing, selecting, and training of employees; [2] setting and adjusting their rates 

of pay and hours of work; [3] directing the work of employees; [4] maintaining 

production or sales records for use in supervision or control; [5] appraising employees’ 

productivity and efficiency for the purpose of recommending promotions or other 

changes in status; [6] handling employee complaints and grievances; [7] disciplining

employees; [8] planning the work; [9] determining the techniques to be used; [10]

apportioning the work among the employees; [11] determining the type of materials, 

supplies, machinery, equipment or tools to be used or merchandise to be bought, stocked 

and sold; [12] controlling the flow and distribution of materials or merchandise and 

supplies; [13] providing for the safety and security of the employees or the property; [14]

planning and controlling the budget; and [15] monitoring or implementing legal 

compliance measures.

29 C.F.R. § 541.102. This list is not intended to be exhaustive and other activities, evaluated on a 

case-by-case basis, may be considered managerial. 69 Fed. Reg. 22133 (Aug. 23, 2004); Hicks v. 

Mercedes-Benz U.S. Int'l, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1168 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (“the regulations 

are clear that these factors, while helpful, are not exhaustive.”).

Brown performed management duties that fall into at least 14 of the 15 categories listed 

above:

• Brown was responsible for training all of the employees on his line and verifying 

that they had been trained. (Brown Dep. 25:11-26:1, 124:3-13, Ex. G; Whitt Dep.

14:6-12). He had the ability to request additional employees and to interview 

prospective candidates. (Brown Dep. Ex. G; Whitt Dep. 11:3-13, 12:4-10). 

• While the CBA controlled all hourly employees’ rates of pay and standard hours 

of work (Russell Dep. 13:4-14:15), Brown decided when someone on his shift 

needed to work overtime and approved requests for time off. (Brown Dep. 37:18-

20, 38:8-10, 38:23-24; Whitt Dep. 19:23-21:1). Because the CBA was controlling, 

this is the most authority any manager could exercise over employees’ rates and 

hours. (Whitt Dep. 13:4-14:1).

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• Brown was responsible for directing all of the work on the ingot line. (Brown 

Dep. 31:24-33:11, 36:13-16, 44:16-20, Ex. G; Russell Dep. 15:14-18). 

• Brown maintained production and furnace records on every shift, which were 

integral both to the reporting requirements of the plant and for reference by senior 

management when procuring materials in the future. (Brown Dep. 45:5-46:7, 

57:4-61:5, Ex. G; Whitt Dep. 20:7-21, 23:5-7, 30:1-5; Russell Dep. 18:20-25).

Brown also used the production numbers in his supervisory capacity, sharing 

them with employees in order to boost morale. (Brown Dep. 110:9-12). 

• Although promotions were awarded based on the terms in the CBA rather than the

manager’s appraisal (Whitt Dep. 13:4-14:1), Brown provided feedback on his 

employees’ performance to senior management. (Brown Dep. 110:18-22). 

• Regarding the sixth and seventh categories, Brown handled complaints and 

grievances as they arose on each shift, and administered discipline when 

warranted. (Brown Dep. 49:23-50:2, Ex. G; Whitt Dep. 15:19-17:6; Russell Dep.

11:16-25). 

• Brown planned the operation of the ingot line at the start of each shift based on 

the day’s order sheet. (Brown Dep. 31:24-33:11, Ex. G).

• Brown used his experience to tell employees how much material to put in at the 

top of the line, and ensure the proper combination of materials went into the 

furnace in the course of production. (Brown Dep. 24:18-23, 45:5-46:7).

• Brown apportioned the work among the employees on the ingot line. (Brown Dep.

23:25-24:20). Brown also consulted with the molten line Production Supervisor 

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and the Shipping Supervisor to decide which manager needed UTOs throughout a 

shift. (Brown Dep. 30:8-20). 

• Because Brown was responsible for determining which materials went into the 

furnace on his shift, senior managers relied upon his input when they placed 

material orders. (Whitt Dep. 20:7-21, 23:5-7). 

• Brown controlled the flow of materials on the line during his shift, and would 

decide to add or remove material based on the pace of production. (Brown Dep.

27:19-28:15). He was responsible for completing the production schedule each 

shift. (Brown Dep. 42:2-9, Ex. G). 

• Brown was the primary manager responsible for the safety and security of the 

employees in his department and on his shift. (Brown Dep. Ex. G). This included 

ensuring that employees complied with safety regulations, communicating 

expectations to his crew at the start of each shift, enforcing the rules, and 

reviewing or amending them as necessary. (Brown Dep. 38:25-39:2, Ex. G; Whitt 

Dep. 27:20-28:5, 29:3-5; Russell Dep. 17:5-12).

• Brown’s furnace monitoring tasks were part of the facility’s compliance with 

legally required environmental standards. (Brown Dep. 60:5-13). 

Brown’s daily activities fit squarely within the activities identified as managerial by the 

regulations interpreting the executive exemption.

Moreover, Brown’s responsibilities are consistent with those of other production 

supervisors deemed to meet the requirements of the Executive Exemption. See Beauchamp v. 

Flex-n-Gate, LLC, 357 F.Supp. 2d 1010 (E.D. Mich. 2005). In Beauchamp, the Eastern District 

of Michigan held a production supervisor in a manufacturing facility that assembled and shipped 

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automotive assembly parts was an exempt executive employee. 357 F.Supp. at 1019. The Court 

relied primarily on plaintiff’s affirmation that he performed the duties in his position description, 

which included assigning work to production employees, estimating manpower to meet 

production needs, maintaining time and production records, resolving employee complaints, 

recommending changes to work procedure, requisitioning work materials, enforcing company 

policies, training employees, authorizing overtime, approving vacation, and disciplining 

employees. Id. at 1015. Brown’s position description, which he affirmed accurately represented 

his duties as a Production Supervisor, included nearly identical duties to those enumerated in 

Beauchamp. (See Brown Dep. Ex. G). For example, Brown was charged with maintaining time 

and production records, “planning, assigning, and directing work; appraising performance, 

disciplining employees; addressing complaints and resolving problems” and “determin[ing] 

overtime work schedule and approve[ing] time cards.” (Brown Dep. Ex. G). 

Similarly, in Haas v. Behr Dayton Thermal Prods., LLC, the Southern District of Ohio 

found a production supervisor in a plant that manufactures engine heating and cooling systems 

for the automotive industry satisfied the Executive Exemption. 2008 U.S. LEXIS 122184 at *70-

73 (S.D. Ohio 2008). There, the supervisor trained employees, maintained safety policies, 

disciplined, directed work, addressed work quality issues, counseled subordinates, assigned 

overtime consistent with union requirements, evaluated productivity, and determined techniques 

to be used. 2008 U.S. LEXIS 122184 at *70-73 (S.D. Ohio 2008). Brown’s duties are also 

identical to those production supervisor duties enumerated in Haas. For example, Brown played 

a critical role in training on the ingot line either by training employees himself or assigning them 

to a trainer, and by affirming that an employee’s training was complete. (Brown Dep. 25:11-

26:1, 110:18-22, 124:3-13, Ex. G; Whitt Dep. 14:6-12). He also played an active role in ensuring 

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that employees knew about and adhered to safety regulations on each shift. (Brown Dep. 38:25-

39:2, 42:10-12, Exs. E, G; Whitt Dep. 27:20-28:5, 29:3-5; Russell Dep. 17:5-12). He exercised 

control over overtime hours, consistent with the requirements of the CBA. (Brown Dep. Exs. E, 

G; Russell Dep. 13:4-14:15).

The Fifth Circuit also held that production supervisors at a foundry, manufacturing cast 

iron products, met the Executive Exemption where they planned and supervised the work of 

subordinate employees. Rainy v. McWane, Inc., 314 Fed. Appx. 693 (5th Cir. 2009). The lead 

plaintiff in that case testified that his primary duty was “[w]atching, making sure [the employees 

were] working safe and doing, putting out good work,” consistent with his job description, which 

stated he was responsible for “the planning and supervision of subordinate supervisors, hourly 

and incentive personnel.” 314 F. App'x at 695. Likewise, Brown’s primary duty was supervising 

employees and production on the ingot line. (Russell Dep. 20:16-18; Brown Dep. 123:6-9, Exs. 

E, G). Brown’s duties as a Production Supervisor were management duties pursuant to the 

FLSA. 

3. These duties were Brown’s “primary” duties.

Brown’s management duties were his primary duties. “Primary duty” means the 

“principal, main, major or most important duty that the employee performs.” 29 C.F.R. § 

541.700(a). In determining an employee’s primary duty, the key inquiry is the “character of the 

employee’s job as a whole.” Id. In considering whether a rule is an employee’s primary duty, a 

Court should look at: 

[1] the relative importance of the exempt duties as compared with other types of 

duties; [2] the amount of time spent performing exempt work; [3] the employee’s 

relative freedom from direct supervision; and [4] the relationship between the 

employee’s salary and the wages paid to other employees for the kind of nonexempt work performed by the employee.

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Id. Like the regulations defining “management,” these factors are intended as a useful guide and 

are not intended to be exhaustive. See Hicks, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 1168.

First, Brown acknowledges that performing the exempt managerial duties outlined above 

was the most important part of his work from 1982 through his resignation in 2013. (Brown Dep.

41:16-20, 122:6-9, Exs. E, F, G).

Second, although the amount of time spent performing exempt work is a “useful guide,” 

time alone “is not the sole test.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(b). The regulations expressly state 

“[N]othing in this section requires that exempt employees spend more than 50 percent of their 

time performing exempt work. Employees who do not spend more than 50 percent of their time 

performing exempt duties may nonetheless meet the primary duty requirement if the other 

factors support such a conclusion.” Id. “[C]oncurrent performance of exempt and non-exempt 

work does not disqualify an employee from the executive exemption if the requirements of 

§541.100 are otherwise met.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.106. “Occasional” tasks performed as the “means 

for an exempt employee to properly carry out exempt functions and responsibilities are 

considered exempt work.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.707. 

Brown sometimes performed manual tasks for approximately 50 percent of a shift. 

(Brown Dep. 118:16-119:6). However, this was not his primary duty on any shift. (Brown Dep.

22:24-25; Ex. G). Brown was never assigned to perform manual labor, but rather used his own 

discretion to fill in if needed. (Brown Dep. 47:22-48:1, 117:13-14). Whenever Brown performed 

manual labor alongside his crew, he did so in order to fulfill his primary duty of ensuring that 

production continued on schedule. (Brown Dep. 122:12-124:2). Brown’s primary duty was 

management and supervision; manual labor was merely a means to that end. The second element 

of the “primary duty” analysis is satisfied.

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Brown met the third “primary duty” factor because he Brown regularly worked without 

direct supervision, especially on weekends. (Brown Dep. 39:16-17, Exs. E, G). Brown managed 

his shift without any day-to-day supervision.

Finally, Brown’s salary was significantly higher than his subordinates’. Compare Parson 

Decl. ¶5 with ¶¶9-12, Ex. A). Brown earned a base salary of $71,000 in 2011, $73,050.00 in 

2012, and $75,060.00 in 2013. (Parson Decl. ¶¶10-12, Ex. A). With the addition of straight 

overtime pay, his compensation each year was close to $100,000.00. (Id.) Conversely, the hourly 

employees Brown supervised on the ingot line earned between $13.00 and $18.00 per hour

between 2011 and 2013. (Parson Decl. ¶5). Assuming 2080 hours a year, the average first line 

employee would earn between $27,040 and $43,680 a year. For these reasons, Brown’s job 

responsibilities and compensation meet every factor in the “primary duty” element of the 

Executive Exemption. 

C. Brown’s personnel recommendations were given particular weight.

An exempt executive employee must either have “the authority to hire or fire other 

employees” or his “suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring, firing, advancement, 

promotion or any other change of status of other employees must be given particular weight.” 29 

C.F.R. § 541.100(a)(4). No individual at Aleris has absolute authority over hiring and firing 

decisions due to the controlling CBA. (Whitt Decl. ¶¶5-10, Ex. A). There is no dispute, however,

that Brown had significant influence over personnel decisions within the confines of the CBA. 

Every new production employee at the Wabash facility is hired as a UTO. (Whitt Dep.

13:4-14:1; Whitt Decl. ¶7). Consistent with the requirements of the CBA, newly-hired UTOs are 

placed on a 60-day probationary period. (Whitt Decl. ¶9). During that time, Operations Managers 

and Site Directors rely on feedback from Production Supervisors regarding the UTO’s 

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performance. (Whitt Decl. ¶9). Consistent with the requirements of the CBA, after the 60-day 

probationary period, new employees are placed on the seniority roster and the CBA governs their 

eligibility for additional training or promotions. (Whitt Dep. 13:4-14:1; Whitt Decl. ¶10). Also 

pursuant to the CBA, no individual at Aleris has absolute authority to terminate an employee; it 

is a group decision-making process. (Whitt Dep. 16:20-17:3). 

Within this context, however, there is no dispute that Brown had the authority to:

• Request the organization hire additional manpower for his line (Brown Dep., Ex. E; 

Whitt Decl. ¶8); 

• Train new employees (Brown Dep. 25:11-26:1, 124:3-13, Ex. G); 

• Independently resolve employee complaints (Brown Dep. 49:15-22, Exs. E, G);

• Validate new employees’ skills confirmation sheet to management (Whitt Dep. 14:6-12);

• Provide feedback regarding employee performance (Brown Dep. 110:18-22, Exs. E, G);

• Administer progressive discipline (Brown Dep. 49:23-50:1, Exs. E, G); and

• Suspend employees while the organization considered termination (Id.).

Brown’s influence over personnel actions equals or exceeds the duties of other supervisors who 

qualify for the Executive Exemption.

An employee’s suggestions and recommendations may be deemed to have “particular 

weight” in workplaces where a higher level manager's recommendation has more importance,

where the employee does not have authority to make the ultimate decision as to the employee's 

change in status, and where hiring and firing is controlled by a separate institution, such as a 

staffing agency or a union. 29 C.F.R. § 541.100(a)(4); Beauchamp, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 1016; 

Haas, 2008 US Dist. LEXIS 122184 at *82; see also Schreckenbach v. Tenaris Coiled Tubes, 

L.L.C., 2013 U.S. LEXIS 6744 at *19 (S.D. Tex. 2013). 

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In Beauchamp, the company hired new employees through a temporary agency, but the 

temporary workers’ production supervisor recommended retention. 357 F. Supp. 2d at 1016. The 

Court concluded this practice “comports with the regulatory requirement that an executive's 

suggestions and recommendations as to hiring ‘are given particular weight.’” Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. 

§ 541.100(a)(4); 29 C.F.R. § 541.105). Following the same standard, the Haas Court also found 

production supervisors met the “particular weight” standard where they had authority to suspend 

employees and “to make recommendations about the retention” of employees in a workplace 

with a controlling CBA. 2008 U.S. LEXIS 122184 at *86. The plaintiff production supervisor in 

Shreckenbach likewise had the authority to suggest discipline, and management routinely 

followed his suggestions. 2013 U.S. LEXIS 6744 at *19. Finding that the supervisor’s influence 

was enough to satisfy the “particular weight” test, the Court stated “If final decision-making 

authority were the test for determining whether a person was an executive or administrative 

employee, few would ever qualify as such an employee under the regulations.” Id. Rather, 

supervisors may satisfy this element where they evaluate workers and then provide 

recommendations regarding their retention to primary decision makers. See Rainy, 314 Fed. 

Appx. at *693 (finding that supervisor had hiring authority where he evaluated provisional 

workers and provided recommendations regarding their retention).

Analogous to the exempt supervisors in Haas, Shreckenbach, and Rainy, Brown made 

manpower recommendations when he needed additional employees, administered discipline, and

provided feedback regarding employees’ performance when called upon to do so by his 

managers. (Brown Dep. 110:18-22, Exs. E, G; Whitt Decl. ¶¶8, 9). This feedback was considered 

when evaluating the employees. (Id.). Further, Brown administered progressive discipline, 

including suspensions while the organization considered whether to terminate an employee.

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(Brown Dep. 119:23-24, Exs. E, G; Whitt Dep. 15:19-17:16). This was a significant amount of 

decision-making authority consistent with other managers bound by the CBA. (Id.) At a 

minimum, Brown’s personnel recommendations were given “particular weight” and he met this

element of the Executive Exemption. 

D. Brown customarily and regularly directed the work of more than two 

employees.

Finally, Brown does not dispute that at all times during his tenure as a production 

supervisor, he supervised approximately six employees per shift on the ingot line by performing 

the managerial duties described above. (Brown Dep. 46:15-18). This satisfies the number of 

subordinates required by 29 C.F.R. § 541.100(a)(3) to meet the Executive Exemption.

V. CONCLUSION

Aleris properly classified Brown as an executive employee exempt from the FLSA’s 

overtime requirements. He was not entitled to time and a half compensation for any hours over 

40 worked in a week in addition to the nearly $100,000 he earned annually. Aleris does not owe 

Brown for any unpaid wages. Brown’s claim should be dismissed as a matter of law. 

Respectfully submitted,

/ s / Alan L. McLaughlin

Alan L. McLaughlin (#10182-49)

Emily L. Connor (#27402-49)

LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.

111 Monument Circle, Suite 702

Indianapolis, IN 46204

Telephone: 317.287.3600

Facsimile: 317.636.0712

E-mail: amclaughlin@littler.com

 econnor@littler.com

Attorneys for Defendant, Aleris Specification 

Alloys, Inc. and Wabash Alloys, LLC

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have this 25th day of September, 2015, filed a copy of the foregoing 

Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment electronically. Notice of this

filing will be sent to the following parties by operation of the Court’s electronic filing system. 

Parties may access this filing through the Court’s system.

William A. Ramsey

Barrett McNagny

215 East Berry Street

Fort Wayne, Indiana 46802

war@barrettlaw.com

/ s / Alan L. McLaughlin

Alan L. McLaughlin

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