IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

PAUL FLETCHER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Cause No. 2:14-CV-231

vs. )

)

HOEPPNER WAGNER & EVANS, )

LLP, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Fletcher’s

Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Order Dated March 8, 2017, filed by

pro se Plaintiff, Paul Fletcher, on March 27, 2017 (DE #165). For

the reasons set forth below, the objection (DE #165) is OVERRULED. 

BACKGROUND

Magistrate Judge Cherry entered an order on March 8, 2017,

inter alia, denying Fletcher’s motion to vacate or amend a previous

court order and denying the motion to amend the scheduling order. 

(DE #160.) Fletcher has been seeking for a long time now to extend

the discovery deadline in this case/reopen discovery. Pro se

Plaintiff, Fletcher, filed the instant objection to this order on

March 27, 2017 (DE #165). Defendant, Hoeppner Wagner & Evans, LLP

(“HWE”), filed a response in opposition on April 10, 2017 (DE
#172), and Defendant, Wayne Golomb, also filed a response in

opposition on April 10, 2017 (DE #173). Fletcher filed a reply

with accompanying exhibits on April 20, 2017 (DE #176). As such,

this motion is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff requests this Court review Magistrate Judge Cherry’s

ruling “de novo.” (DE #165 at 1.) However, a district court's

review of any discovery-related decisions made by a magistrate

judge is governed by Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Rule 72(a) provides that, "[t]he district judge in the

case must consider timely objections and modify or set aside any

part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law." 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The clear error standard means the district

court can overturn the magistrate judge's ruling only if the

district court is left with the definite and firm conviction that

a mistake has been made. Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., Ltd.,

126 F.3d 926, 943 (7th Cir. 1997). “Clear error is an extremely

deferential standard of review, and will only be found to exist

where the ‘reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” 

Pinkston v. Madry, 440 F.3d 879, 888 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting

Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)). In

conducting this review, this Court does not ask whether the finding

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is the best or only permissible conclusion, nor does it substitute

its own conclusions for the magistrate judge’s. Herz v. Diocese of

Fort Wayne-S. Bend, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-122 RM, 2012 WL 3870528, at

*1 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 5, 2012). “A respect for this standard is

important, given the pivotal role that magistrate judges play in

overseeing the conduct of the sort of complex pretrial discovery

typified by this case.” Gargiulo v. Baystate Health Inc., 279

F.R.D. 62, 64 (D. Mass. 2012). 

As a preliminary matter, HWE’s opposition brief contends that

the objection is untimely. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

72(a), an objection to a Magistrate’s order must be filed “within

14 days after being served with a copy” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). On

March 27, 2017, Plaintiff filed his objection to Magistrate Judge

Cherry’s order dated March 8, 2017 (or 19 days after the order was

entered). However, when service is made by mail, like in this case

with the pro se Plaintiff, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(d)

allows an additional three days to respond. Fed. R. Civ. P 6(d)

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C)(mail)). As such, Fletcher had

17 days after March 8, 2017, to file his objection (which would

have landed on Saturday March 25, 2017), and Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 6(a)(1)(C) provides that when the last day of the period

is a Saturday, the period continues to run until the end of the

next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Thus,

Plaintiff had until Monday, March 27, 2017, to file his objection,

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and he timely filed his objection on that day. 

Even though Fletcher’s objection was timely filed, it still

fails because Fletcher has failed to demonstrate how Judge Cherry’s

order is clearly erroneous. Magistrate Judge Cherry’s March 8, 2017

order appropriately analyzed and addressed the issues presented by

Fletcher in several motions he has made attempting to extend or

reopen discovery in this case. In that order, Judge Cherry turned:

to the relief Plaintiff seeks in the Motion to

Vacate (ECF 142), namely reconsideration of the

Court’s December 20, 2016 Order, which denied

Plaintiff’s November 29, 2016 Motion to Reconsider

the Court’s November 15, 2016 Order, which had

denied Plaintiff’s October 21, 2016 Motion to Amend

the Scheduling Order. In other words, Plaintiff

asks the Court to reconsider the denial of his

requests to extend the October 28, 2016 discovery

deadline and other pretrial deadlines.

(DE #160 at 7.) Magistrate Judge Cherry meticulously went through

the lengthy procedural history in this case, and he noted in the

November 15, 2016 order, he found Plaintiff had not made a showing

of good cause for the requested extension of time and denied the

motion. (DE #160 at 9.) Then, in the interests of justice, the

Court considered a pro se reply brief (that had previously been

stricken) in ruling on the December 20, 2016 order, finding “there

were still no dates associated with any of the discovery to show

why the discovery could not have been completed by the discovery

deadline.” (Id. at 10.) Magistrate Judge Cherry went on to

analyze the additional “factual detail provided by Plaintiff” and

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found it “does not constitute good cause for extending the

discovery deadline because the information does not explain why

this discovery, if relevant, could not have been completed by the

discovery deadline.” (DE #160 at 12.) 

Fletcher has not pointed to anything clearly erroneous or

contrary to law in Judge Cherry’s order. Magistrate Judge Cherry

has spent significant time appropriately analyzing multiple motions

to extend or reopen discovery in this matter. Nothing in the

current motion, including Fletcher’s references to an alleged

mental incapacity problem with an attorney, justify why the

requested discovery could not have been completed by Attorney

Boynton during the almost two years that she was involved in this

matter. In sum, Fletcher has failed to establish that there is any

part of the Magistrate Judge’s decision that should be modified or

set aside as clearly erroneous or contrary to law. See, e.g.,

Jones v. City of Elkhart, No. 2:10-CV-402-TLS, 2012 WL 2458606, at

*2 (N.D. Ind. June 27, 2012) (denying motion to reconsider

magistrate judge’s order where the plaintiff failed to show it was

clearly erroneous or contrary to law). 

Finally, the Court notes that HWE requests sanctions in the

form of reasonable attorney fees for having to defend against this

motion (DE #172 at 8). Plaintiff has the right under Rule 72 to

timely object to a Magistrate Judge’s order. As such, the request

for sanctions is DENIED. 

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff Fletcher’s

Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Order Dated March 8, 2017 (DE

#165), is OVERRULED. 

DATED: April 25, 2017 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

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