IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

PATRICIA G. MENGERS, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) Case No. 14-CV-253-JED-TLW 

v. ) 

 ) 

ROUTE 66 RV’S, INC., GULF STREAM ) 

COACH, INC., and UNITED SERVICE ) 

PROTECTION CORP., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Before the Court is the Motion to Transfer Venue (Doc. 20), filed by defendant Gulf 

Stream Coach, Inc. (Gulf Stream) and the joinder in that motion, which was filed by defendant 

Route 66 RV’s, Inc. (Route 66) (Doc. 26). 

I. Background 

 In November, 2010, plaintiff purchased a 2011 recreational vehicle (RV), manufactured 

by Gulf Stream, from Route 66 in Claremore, Oklahoma. At the time of the purchase of the RV, 

plaintiff signed a Motorized Limited Warranty containing a forum selection clause, which 

provided that “[e]xclusive jurisdiction for deciding any claims, demands or causes of action for 

defects or representations of any nature or damages due from such defects or representations 

shall be in the courts in the State of Manufacture . . . [which] is Indiana.” (Doc. 20-2 at 3). 

Plaintiff initiated this action in Tulsa County District Court, alleging a claim for a violation of 

the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, as well as several common law claims and statutory claims 

under state law, in relation to problems with the RV. 
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 Pursuant to the forum selection clause, Gulf Stream requests that the Court transfer this 

action to the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division, as the federal venue for 

Nappanee, Indiana (the location of manufacture), which is in Elkhart and Kosciusko Counties in 

Northern Indiana. (Doc. 20 at 1-2, fn. 2). As noted, Route 66 filed a Consent to Transfer of 

Venue (Doc. 26), in which it expressly joins Gulf Stream’s request to transfer. Plaintiff did not 

file any response or opposition to the Motion to Transfer, and she, too, agrees that this case 

should be transferred to the Northern District of Indiana, as requested by Gulf Stream and Route 

66. (See Doc. 30 at 1 [plaintiff “respectfully submits that the proper forum ... should be the 

federal court in Indiana”]). 

 Defendant United Service Protection Corp. (USPC) also did not oppose the Motion to 

Transfer. However, after Gulf Stream filed another motion requesting that the Court enter an 

order on the Motion to Transfer (see Doc. 32), USPC responded (Doc. 33), indicating that the 

case should not be transferred at this time because USPC had not “consented to or confessed 

Gulf Stream’s Motion to Transfer.” (Id., p. 2). Despite USPC’s position, the record reflects that 

it did not oppose the Motion to Transfer. For example, USPC attached to its filing an email 

string in which its counsel stated that USPC “cannot consent to or join in Gulf Stream’s motion... 

However, we will not oppose Gulf Stream’s motion.” (Doc. 33-1) (emphasis added). In 

addition, under this Court’s Local Rules, “[e]ach party opposing a motion shall file ... a response 

within twenty-one (21) days from the date the motion was filed” and “any non-dispositive 

motion which is not opposed within twenty-one (21) days may be deemed confessed.” N.D. 

Okla. LCvR 7.2(e). USPC did not timely file a response in opposition under the Rule. 

 USPC seeks arbitration pursuant to an arbitration provision contained in a service 

agreement attached to its Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss (Doc. 29). Plaintiff 
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opposes that motion and asserts in a sworn affidavit that she never agreed to any document 

containing an arbitration provision, was never informed that the service agreement contained any 

arbitration provision, and was only provided and signed a one page document constituting the 

service agreement. (See Doc. 30-1, 30-2). She also asserts that she attempted to make a claim 

under the service agreement, but was repeatedly informed by USPC that plaintiff “never 

purchased” the coverage provided by the service agreement. (Doc. 30-2). Plaintiff also notes 

that USPC’s motion to compel arbitration simply attaches what it claims to be the service 

agreement, without any affidavit asserting that plaintiff was provided or agreed to the terms 

thereof. Hence, plaintiff has moved for leave to conduct discovery regarding the alleged 

agreement to arbitrate. (Doc. 31). 

II. Discussion 

 A forum selection clause may be enforced by a motion to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 

1404(a). Atlantic Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Western Dist. of Texas, 134 S. 

Ct. 568, 575 (2013). “When a defendant files such a motion . . . a district court should transfer 

the case unless extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience of the parties clearly 

disfavor a transfer.” Id. “[B]ecause the overarching consideration under § 1404(a) is whether a 

transfer would promote ‘the interest of justice,’ ‘a valid forum selection clause [should be] given 

controlling weight in all but the most exceptional cases.’” Id. at 581 (quoting Stewart Org., Inc. 

v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 33 (1988)) (alteration in original). Thus, “[w]hen the parties have 

agreed to a valid forum selection clause, a district court should ordinarily transfer the case to the 

forum specified in that clause.” Id.

 The Tenth Circuit has long held that forum selection “clauses are prima facie valid and 

should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be unreasonable under 
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the circumstances.” Milk ‘N’ More, Inc. v. Beavert, 963 F.2d 1342, 1346 (10th Cir. 1992). 

When venue is specified and accompanied by mandatory or obligatory language showing that 

jurisdiction is appropriate only in the designated forum, a forum selection clause will be enforced 

as mandatory. American Soda, LLP v. U.S. Filter Wastewater Group, Inc., 428 F.3d 921, 926-27 

(10th Cir. 2005). In American Soda, the court concluded that the forum selection clause, which 

provided for an “exclusive forum,” was mandatory and enforceable. Id. at 927. Here, the 

plaintiff agreed that “[e]xclusive jurisdiction” of claims against Gulf Stream would be “in the 

courts in the State of Manufacture . . . Indiana.” (Doc. 20-2 at 3). That clause is mandatory and 

will be enforced in the absence of a showing of exceptional circumstances or that transfer would 

be unreasonable. Atlantic Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 575; see also Milk ‘N’ More, 963 F.2d at 1346. 

 The Court finds that transfer pursuant to the forum selection clause is in the interest of 

justice, such that transfer is appropriate under § 1404(a) and Atlantic Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 575. 

Because no party opposed the Motion to Transfer, and plaintiff, Gulf Stream, and Route 66 all 

expressly assert that this case should be transferred, the Court does not find that enforcement will 

be unfair or unreasonable or that there exist extraordinary circumstances preventing transfer. 

The Court recognizes USPC’s argument that it is entitled to arbitration, but the Court is not 

persuaded that transferring the case at this time will be unreasonable or result in any prejudice to 

USPC. USPC has not provided any authority requiring determination of the motion to compel 

arbitration prior to a previously-filed (and unopposed) motion to transfer, which is based upon an 

agreed mandatory forum selection agreement. Nor has USPC identified any reason that the 

transferee court is incapable of deciding the issues presented by the motion to compel arbitration 

and plaintiff’s request for discovery relating thereto. USPC has not indicated that there is any 

jurisdictional problem or that it will be in any way prejudiced or inconvenienced by the Indiana 
5 

court, rather than this Court, determining the arbitration-related motions. If there exists a valid 

arbitration agreement between the plaintiff and USPC, the arbitration provision provides for 

submission to the American Arbitration Association, rather than to any Oklahoma-specific 

forum, and the district court in Indiana is certainly qualified to decide the arbitration-related 

motions. 

 Because Gulf Stream’s Motion to Transfer Venue is unopposed, and it is undisputed that 

the proper venue for plaintiff’s claims against Gulf Stream and Route 66 is the Northern District 

of Indiana under the mandatory forum selection clause which all parties agree that plaintiff 

signed, there is no reason that this action should not now be transferred. In addition, the 

discovery plaintiff seeks (if it is authorized by the transferee court) could potentially involve all 

parties. For example, Route 66, the seller of the RV to plaintiff, may have information regarding 

the alleged arbitration agreement and the information provided to plaintiff with regard thereto. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that it will be more efficient for one court to determine all issues, 

rather than this Court carving out specific discovery and arbitration-related issues between 

plaintiff and USPC (with Route 66 possibly having information relating thereto), while sending 

plaintiff to Indiana to litigate against Gulf Stream and Route 66 as is appropriate under the 

mandatory forum selection clause. Transferring all pending issues relating to all parties to the 

Northern District of Indiana will also alleviate any concern for potentially inconsistent 

determinations of issues, including any discovery issues that may involve the parties. 

III. Conclusion 

 For the foregoing reasons, Gulf Stream’s Motion to Transfer Venue (Doc. 20) and Route 

66’s joinder therein (Doc. 26) are granted. In light of this ruling, Gulf Stream’s separate Motion 

for Entry of Order Granting Its Motion to Transfer Venue (Doc. 32) is moot. The Court Clerk is 
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hereby directed to transfer this case to the United States District Court for the Northern District 

of Indiana, South Bend Division. 

 SO ORDERED this 8th day of July, 2014.