UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

Briette Lapland, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Case No. 3:14-cv-1665 

 ) 

Willow-Brookes Solutions LLC, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

COMPLAINT WITH JURY DEMAND 

 Now comes the Plaintiff, Briette Lapland, by and through her attorneys, and for 

her Complaint, against the Defendant, Willow-Brookes Solutions LLC, Plaintiff alleges 

and states as follows: 

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

 1. This is an action for damages for violations of the Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., and for defamation under Indiana 

state law. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 

 2. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337 and 1367, 

and 15 U.S.C. §1692k(d). This jurisdiction includes supplemental jurisdiction with 

respect to any pendent state claims. 

 3. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because a 

substantial part of the events and omissions giving rise to this claim occurred in this 

District. 
PARTIES 

4. Plaintiff is an individual who was at all relevant times residing in 

Warsaw, Indiana 

5. Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3), as she is a 

natural person allegedly obligated to pay a debt. 

6. At all relevant times, Defendant acted as a “debt collector” within the 

meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6), in that it held itself out to be a company collecting a 

consumer debt allegedly owed by Plaintiff. 

7. The aforementioned alleged debt is a “debt” within the meaning of 15 

U.S.C. § 1692a(5), in that it is an alleged obligation of to pay money arising out of a 

transaction in which the money, property, insurance and/or services which are the 

subject of the transaction were primarily for personal, family and/or household 

purposes. 

8. On information and belief, Defendant is a limited liability company of the 

State of New York, which is not licensed to do business in Indiana, and which has its 

principal place of business in Amherst, New York. 

FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS 

9. Utilizing the phone number of 716-877-0606, Defendant contacted Plaintiff 

on numerous occasions. 

10. Defendant contacted Plaintiff through employees, agents and/or 

representatives who identified themselves as “Tom,” “Richard Ross,” “Anthony Scott” 

and “Jeff Webber.” 
11. One or more of Defendant's representatives contacted Plaintiff at her place 

of employment, at telephone number 574-269-6700, on numerous occasions prior to 

June 11, 2013. 

12. On multiple occasions, Plaintiff advised Defendant’s employees, agents 

and/or representatives that she could not take Defendant’s calls at her place of 

employment and asked that they not call here there again. Plaintiff also advised 

Defendant’s employees, agents and/or representatives that she was represented by an 

attorney with respect to the alleged debt. 

13. Despite Plaintiff having told Defendant's employees, agents and/or 

representatives that she was not permitted to take calls their while she was at work, 

Defendant called Plaintiff’s place of employment in attempts to collect the alleged debt 

on or about August 20, 2013, September 24, 2013 and January 31, 2014. 

14. Moreover, Defendant's employees, agents and/or representative, who 

identified himself as Richard Ross (“Ross”), discussed the alleged debt with Plaintiff’s 

co-worker, Priscilla Goon (“Goon”), on or about June 11, 2013 and other dates. Ross 

told Goon that he needed to set up a time to drop off litigation papers because Plaintiff 

was being sued. Ross also told Goon that Plaintiff was committing fraud. 

15. In addition, Defendant’s employees, agents and/or representatives 

continued to contact Plaintiff after she told them that she was represented by an 

attorney with respect to the alleged debt. 
16. During one phone call, a woman posing as a representative of a law firm 

called Plaintiff and transferred her to Ross, who stated that his call involved criminal 

activity and that if Plaintiff did not comply, legal action would be taken. 

 17. Defendant’s egregious acts were compounded by the fact that Plaintiff 

had filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy case on March 31, 2013. She received a discharge in 

bankruptcy on July 8, 2013 and the bankruptcy case was closed on September 9, 2013. 

18. In its attempts to collect the alleged debt as outlined above, Defendant 

violated the FDCPA. 

19. As a result of Defendant’s actions as outlined above, Plaintiff has suffered 

and continues to suffer personal humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish and 

emotional distress. 

COUNT I 

20. Plaintiff incorporates all allegations and statements above as though 

reiterated herein. 

 21. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(2) by communicating with a person 

other than Plaintiff and stating to such person that Plaintiff owed an alleged debt. 

COUNT II 

22. Plaintiff incorporates all the allegations and statements above as though 

reiterated herein. 

23. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(3) by communicating more than 

once with a person other than Plaintiff regarding the alleged debt. 

COUNT III 
24. Plaintiff incorporates all the allegations and statements made above as if 

reiterated herein. 

25. Defendant violated 15 USC § 1692(c)(a)(2) by communicating with 

Plaintiff after Defendant had been advised that Plaintiff was represented by an attorney 

with respect to the alleged debt. 

COUNT IV 

26. Plaintiff incorporates all the allegations and statements made above as 

though reiterated herein. 

 27. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692(c)(a)(3) by communicating with 

Plaintiff at her place of employment where Defendant knew or had reason to know that 

Plaintiff’s employer prohibited her from receiving such communications. 

COUNT V 

28. Plaintiff incorporates all the allegations and statements above as though 

reiterated herein. 

 29. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) by communicating with someone 

other than Plaintiff in connection with the collection of the alleged debt without a 

proper purpose. 

 
COUNT VI 

30. Plaintiff incorporates all the allegations and statements made above as if 

reiterated herein. 

31. Defendant violated 15 USC § 1692d(5) by causing Plaintiff’s and her 

employer’s telephone to ring and/or engaging Plaintiff in conversation repeatedly and 

continuously with the intent to annoy, abuse and/or harass. 

COUNT VII 

32. Plaintiff incorporates all the allegations and statements above as though 

reiterated herein. 

 33. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3) by falsely representing or 

implying that its employee was an attorney or was communicating on behalf of an 

attorney. 

COUNT VIII 

34. Plaintiff incorporates all the allegations and statements above as though 

reiterated herein. 

 35. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) by threatening to take action that 

could not legally be taken and/or that was not intended to be taken. 

COUNT IX 

36. Plaintiff incorporates all the allegations and statements above as though 

reiterated herein. 

 37. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(7) by falsely representing or 

implying that Plaintiff committed a crime or other conduct in order to disgrace her. 
COUNT X 

38. Plaintiff incorporates all the allegations and statements above as though 

reiterated herein. 

 39. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692e(10) by using a false, 

deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of the 

alleged debt. 

COUNT XI 

40. Plaintiff incorporates all the allegations and statements above as though 

reiterated herein. 

 41. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f by using an unfair or unconscionable 

means to attempt to collect the alleged debt. 

COUNT XII 

42. Plaintiff incorporates all the allegations and statements above as though 

reiterated herein. 

43. Defendant’s employees, agents and/or representative made defamatory 

statements to Plaintiff's employer and co-workers that Defendant's call concerned 

criminal activity of the Plaintiff. 

 44. Plaintiff is a private figure within the meaning of Indiana law. 

 45. Defendant's statements as set forth above caused harm to Plaintiff's 

reputation at work, with her employer and with her co-workers. 

 46. By reason of the foregoing, Plaintiff suffered substantial damages and is 

entitled to recover actual damages, compensatory damages and punitive damages. 
 47. Moreover, damages are presumed to have occurred because the 

defamatory statements of the Defendant and its representatives constitute defamation 

per se. 

JURY DEMAND 

Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all issues in this action, except for any issues 

relating to the amount of attorneys’ fees and litigation costs to be awarded should 

Plaintiff prevail on any of her FDCPA claims in this action. 

PRAYER FOR RELIEF 

Plaintiff prays for the following relief: 

A. Judgment against Defendant for Plaintiff’s actual damages suffered as a 

direct and proximate result of Defendant’s violations of the FDCPA, pursuant to 15 

U.S.C. §1692k(a)(1); 

B. Judgment against Defendant for $1,000 in statutory damages for 

Defendant’s violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 

§1692k(a)(2)(A); 

C. Judgment against Defendant for Plaintiff’s reasonable attorneys’ fees and 

costs incurred in this action, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692k(a)(3), and any other legal 

and/or equitable relief as the Court deems appropriate; 

D. Judgment in an amount in excess of $75,000 for actual and compensatory 

damages by reason of Defendant's defamatory statements, and punitive damages in an 

amount in excess of $150,000 by reason of Defendant's defamatory statements, so as to 
punish Defendant and to disincline Defendant from engaging in such reprehensible 

defamatory conduct in the future. 

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 

 Briette Lapland 

 

 By: /s/ David B. Levin 

 Attorney for Plaintiff 

David B. Levin 

IL Attorney No. 6212141 

UpRight Law LLC 

25 E. Washington Street 

Suite 400 

Chicago, IL 60602 

Phone: 312-878-1867 

Fax: 866-359-7478