IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) No. 2:15-CR-43

)

MOHAMED FADIGA, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the First Amended Motion to

Suppress, filed by Defendant, Mohamed Fadiga, on June 5, 2014. (DE

#23.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED. 

BACKGROUND

Defendant, Mohamed Fadiga (“Fadiga”), is charged with

possession of counterfeit or unauthorized access devices in

violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1029(a)(3). Fadiga has moved to

suppress all evidence obtained on or about March 17, 2015. In his

motion, Fadiga claims that the seizure was without lawful

authority. 

This Court held an evidentiary hearing on this matter on June

18, 2015, at which Kenneth Williams (“Officer Williams”), an

officer with the Hobart, Indiana police department, testified.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the instant
motion under advisement and gave the parties five days from the

receipt of the hearing transcript to file additional briefing. The

parties filed their additional briefs on July 7, 2015. (DE #33 &

DE #34.) 

FINDINGS OF FACT

In making the following findings of fact, the Court has

considered the briefs of the parties, the evidence presented, and

the credibility of the witness. Therefore, the Court finds as

follows:

On March 17, 2015,1

 Officer Williams was working in Jasper

County, Indiana in his capacity as part of the Domestic Highway

Enforcement Task Force (“Task Force”). The Task Force is loosely

associated with the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (“HIDTA”). 

The purpose of the Task Force involves all crimes in general,

including money laundering, narcotics, stolen vehicles, weapons

offenses, fraud (including re-encoded cards), counterfeit

merchandise, and stolen merchandise. As part of his training,

Officer Williams attended several interdiction schools locally and

throughout the country; this training included identifying

fraudulent and re-encoded cards. 

At approximately 3:42 PM on the date in question, as Officer

1

 The probable cause affidavit of Officer Williams mistakenly lists the

date of the incident as March 27, 2015. (DE #25-2.) Officer Williams

testified that this was a typographical error at the hearing. (DE #30, pp.

28, 30.) 

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Williams was traveling north on Interstate 65 (“I-65”), he observed

a vehicle with an expired plate and initiated a traffic stop. 

Officer Williams informed the driver, Mamadu Barry (“Barry”), why

he had pulled him over and asked to see his driver’s license and

vehicle information. Barry indicated that he did not know who the

owner of the vehicle was but that the passenger, Fadiga, did. 

Officer Williams asked Barry if he would exit the car and have a

seat in the front passenger seat of the police vehicle. 

Once Barry complied, Officer Williams returned to the car to

speak with Fadiga. Fadiga stated that he was going to Chicago to

pick up a friend from the airport and that the vehicle belonged to

a friend. Fadiga located a rental agreement. Neither Barry nor

Fadiga were listed as authorized drivers of the vehicle pursuant to

the rental agreement. Officer Williams asked Fadiga for his

driver’s license, and, as Fadiga was opening his wallet in his lap

to retrieve his license, Officer Williams observed numerous cards

in Fadiga’s wallet, inside every slot including the pocket where

cash is normally placed. The cards were “all over and literally

falling out of the money pocket of his wallet.” (DE #30, p. 37.) 

At that point, Officer Williams took the rental agreement

along with Fadiga’s license and returned to the police car to

conduct the traffic enforcement. While at the police car, Officer

Williams questioned Barry regarding his travel plans. Barry

indicated that he flew from Atlanta to Indianapolis to buy a car

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but that it turned out to be broken so he did not purchase it. He

was vague about the plans and indicated that Fadiga was the one who

knew all of the details about the remainder of the trip. Barry was

then issued a traffic warning for the expired plate. Officer

Williams subsequently asked for and received permission from Barry

to search the vehicle. 

Upon returning to the vehicle, Officer Williams also received

consent from Fadiga to search the vehicle, his person, and his

wallet. Fadiga reached into his pocket and handed Officer Williams

his wallet. Officer Williams again observed the numerous cards he

had seen earlier. Officer Williams handed Fadiga his wallet back

and asked Fadiga if he would have a seat in the back of the police

car. Fadiga complied. 

Officer Williams searched the vehicle and discovered a

shopping bag full of gift cards behind the passenger seat. There

appeared to be over 100 cards in the bag. He also located four

garbage bags filled with cartons of Newport Cigarettes in the

trunk. Both Barry and Fadiga denied that the items belonged to

them. 

Officer Williams then contacted Detective Sergeant Ogden of

the Hobart Police Department to bring a magnetic strip reader to

the location so that the status of the cards could be determined.2

2

 Officer Williams testified that he typically carries a card scanner

in his usual police vehicle; however, on March 17, 2015, he was driving a

different police vehicle that did not contain a scanner because his own

vehicle was being retrofitted for his canine. 

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Once Detective Sergeant Ogden arrived on the scene approximately

thirty-five minutes later, the cards from Fadiga’s wallet were

scanned, and it was determined that the magnetic codes on the back

of the cards did not match the number on the front of many of the

cards. As a result of the fraudulent cards, Fadiga was detained. 

Fadiga does not challenge these findings of fact.3 

 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Fourth Amendment protects persons from unreasonable

searches and seizures, and this protection has been extended to the

states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); U.S. Const.

Amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment prohibits a warrantless search,

unless the search falls under one of the recognized exceptions to

the warrant requirement. U.S. v. Denney, 771 F.2d 318, 320 (7th

Cir. 1985). If a search is conducted without a warrant, the

Government bears the burden of proving that an exception to the

3

 In his original motion to suppress (DE #21) and first amended motion

to suppress (DE #23), Fadiga pointed out that there is a possible conflict

(related to the timing of events) between the affidavits of Officer Williams

and Robert J. Gallowitch, a special agent with the Department of Homeland

Security Investigations (“Agent Gallowitch”). The Agent Gallowitch affidavit

essentially summarizes Officer Williams’ affidavit; however, the Gallowitch

affidavit first states that Officer Williams issued the warning ticket to

Barry and then states that Officer Williams observed the numerous cards in

Fadiga’s wallet. (See DE #25-1, p. 3.) This possible conflict was the reason

the Court scheduled a hearing on the matter. Fadiga has abandoned this

argument; he did not address it during the hearing or via his memorandum in

support of his motion to suppress. In any event, as stated above, the Court

finds that Officer Williams’ testimony is credible; thus, his version of

events is given full weight, especially in light of the fact that Agent

Gallowitch was not present on the scene during the matter in question. 

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warrant requirement existed at the time of the search. United

States v. Rivera, 248 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 2001). Ultimately,

the Fourth Amendment’s touchstone is reasonableness. Brigham City

v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 

Here, Fadiga does not dispute that the original traffic stop,

premised on the vehicle’s expired license plates, was lawful. 

Rather, he argues that the stop was illegally extended the moment

Officer Williams issued the traffic warning to Barry. The

Government, on the other hand, argues that Officer Williams had

reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop because of events

that occurred prior to the issuance of the warning. The Court

agrees with the Government. 

The Supreme Court has made it clear that “[a] seizure

justified only by a police-observed traffic violation . . . becomes

unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to

complete the mission of issuing a ticket for the violation.” 

Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015) (emphasis

added) (internal brackets and quotation marks deleted). The

Rodriguez Court likened a traffic stop to a Terry stop, noting that

the length of the stop depends on the seizure’s mission, such as

addressing the traffic violation and attending to related safety

concerns. Id. at 1614-15 (listing appropriate inquiries like

checking drivers’ licenses, inspecting a vehicle’s registration and

proof of insurance, and determining whether warrants exist against

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the occupants). The traffic stop becomes unlawful when unrelated

inquiries measurably extend the length of the seizure. Id. 

In Rodriguez, the defendant was pulled over for a minor

traffic violation. Id. at 1612. The officer approached the

vehicle, asked the defendant some questions, and requested to see

his driver’s license, proof of insurance, and registration. Id. at

1612-13. The officer ran a records check on the defendant (which

came up clean), and then he asked the defendant and the passenger

some questions as to what they were doing and where they were

going. Id. at 1613. The men answered his questions, and the

officer issued the defendant a written warning for the traffic

violation. Id. However, the officer testified that the men were

not free to leave at that point because he wanted to conduct a dog

sniff of the vehicle but needed to wait for another officer to

arrive on the scene. Id. Seven or eight minutes passed before the

second officer arrived; once he did, the original officer walked

his dog around the vehicle, and the dog alerted to the presence of

drugs. Id. 

The district court found that the dog sniff was not supported

by independent reasonable suspicion, and the court of appeals did

not review that determination. Id. at 1616. In fact, the district

court specifically noted that, apart from the “information given by

the dog,” the officer had nothing but a “rather large hunch.” Id.

at 1613. In making its holding, the Supreme Court commented on

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that distinction and stated that the issue remained open for the

Eighth Circuit on remand. Id. at 1616-17.

As the Seventh Circuit has recently reiterated: 

[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding

standard than probable cause not only in the

sense that reasonable suspicion can be

established with information that is different

in quantity or content than that required to

establish probable cause, but also in the

sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from

information that is less reliable than that

required to show probable cause. This is an

objective standard, based upon the facts

available to the officers at the moment of the

seizure. In determining whether officers had

the requisite particularized suspicion for a

Terry stop, we do not consider in isolation

each variable of the equation that may add up

to reasonable suspicion. Instead, we consider

the sum of all of the information known to

officers at the time of the stop. In other

words, courts examine the totality of the

circumstances known to the officer at the time

of the stop, including the experience of the

officer and the behavior and characteristics

of the suspect. Reasonable suspicion can

arise from behavior that may in other

circumstances be considered innocent; in other

words, context matters.

United States v. Ruiz, 785 F.3d 1134, 1141 (7th Cir. 2015)

(internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). 

Here, the Court finds that there was reasonable suspicion,

independent from the traffic violation, to extend the traffic stop. 

According to Officer Williams’ probable cause affidavit and

credible testimony, when he pulled the men over, Barry, who had an

out of state license, was not able to identify to whom the car he

was driving belonged; his only response to Officer Williams’

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inquiry was that Fadiga knew. When asked, Fadiga stated that the

car belonged to a “friend,” but when he procured a rental

agreement, it indicated that neither he nor Barry were authorized

to drive the vehicle.4 When Officer Williams asked Fadiga for his

license, he observed numerous cards in Fadiga’s wallet, inside

every slot including the pocket where cash is normally placed, to

the extent that the cards were “all over and literally falling out

of the money pocket of his wallet.” Then, upon returning to the

police vehicle where Barry was seated, Officer Williams asked Barry

about his plans, but he was vague and indicated that Fadiga was the

one who knew all of the travel details. While it was at this point

that Officer Williams chose to issue the traffic warning to Barry

for the expired plate, he already had reasonable suspicion of

criminal activity to extend the traffic stop. The typical

inquiries and requests involving the initial traffic violation had

produced atypical responses and results from the men, including an

obvious and unusual display of multiple cards from Fadiga. Officer

Williams utilized his training and experience in fraudulent

investigations to determine that a possibility of fraud existed

related to the cards that warranted further probing of the matter. 

4

 Fadiga makes much of the fact that Officer Williams testified that he

assumed he ran the vehicle’s plates and hence knew both the name of the owner

and that the car was not stolen before he pulled the men over for the traffic

violation; however, the Court sees no reason why Officer Williams was

unjustified in probing Barry and Fadiga for details, especially when it was

apparent from the initial seconds of the traffic stop that questions existed

as to whether they lawfully possessed the vehicle. 

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Fadiga insists that the extension was unjustified because a

“fat wallet in and of itself does not indicate the commission of

any crime.” (DE #33, p. 5.) While the Court agrees with this

statement, it was not the fat wallet alone that triggered Officer

Williams’ suspicions. Rather, it was a combination of the events

described above that led Officer Williams to his determination that

there was suspicion of card-related fraud. The Court finds, based

on the totality of the circumstances, that this determination was

reasonable. See Ruiz, 785 F.3d at 1141 (“Reasonable suspicion can

arise from behavior that may in other circumstances be considered

innocent; in other words, context matters.”).5 That said, the

5

 In his memorandum, Fadiga states, “counsel for Fadiga approached

[Officer] Williams and pulled his license out of his wallet and then extracted

19 credit cards from the wallet. Williams was then asked, ‘What is it about a

fat wallet that suggests crime to you?” and he responded, ‘Nothing.’” (DE #33,

p. 2.) While the Court is not suggesting that Attorney Bosch, counsel for

Fadiga, is being misleading, the Court feels that some clarification of the

record is necessary. In actuality, Attorney Bosch approached Officer Williams

at the witness stand, held his wallet over to the side, pulled his driver’s

license out of his wallet, shifted back towards the stand, and held the

license up for Officer Williams’ inspection. He then asked Officer Williams

if there was anything suspicions about it (the license), to which Officer

Williams replied, “No, sir.” (DE #30, p. 31.) Attorney Bosch then asked

Officer Williams whether he saw anything else suspicious, to which Officer

Williams again responded, “No, sir.” (Id. at 31-32.) Attorney Bosch walked

several feet over to the Court’s ELMO document projector, opened his wallet,

extracted nineteen cards from it, and placed them on the projector. (Id. at

32-33.) After some back and forth with Attorney Houston, counsel for the

Government, regarding the number of cards placed on the ELMO, Attorney Bosch

stated, “And please let the record show all 19 of them were in my wallet, and

Officer Williams said he didn’t see anything suspicious about them.” (Id. at

33.) Attorney Houston correctly noted that the question previously posed to

Officer Williams was related to the license rather than the credit cards. 

(Id.) Only then did Attorney Bosch ask Officer Williams, “What is it about a

fat wallet that suggests crime to you?” (Id. at 34.) Officer Williams

responded, “Nothing.” (Id.) Upon redirect, Officer Williams stated that he

did not see Attorney Bosch’s credit cards in his wallet when he was originally

approached at the witness stand. (Id. at 35-36.) On re-cross and re-direct,

Officer Williams clarified that while he saw Attorney Bosch take his license

out of his wallet, he did not see the credit cards in the wallet when Attorney

Bosch approached him. (Id. at 36-38.) Again, context matters. 

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Court does not find the Government’s argument that the observation

of numerous cards in Fadiga’s wallet was akin to a “plain view” or

“plain smell” case to be entirely persuasive. While it is true

that the cards were in plain view, the cards in and of themselves

were not obviously illegal or potentially dangerous in the same way

that marijuana or a firearm respectively would have been. Instead,

as described above, it was the combination of vague and uncertain

answers given by the men, a lack of authorization to drive the

vehicle as noted on the rental agreement, and the unusual display

of cards in Fadiga’s wallet that led to Officer Williams’

reasonable suspicion that fraudulent activity was underfoot.

Finally, the Court notes that the extension of the traffic

stop was limited in duration. Fadiga does not argue that the time

from the initial stop to the writing of the traffic warning was

unreasonable, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that

Officer Williams performed his duties in an inefficient or overly

delayed manner. Thus, the period in question is from the moment

the written warning was issued to Barry until the moment Fadiga

consented to the search. This period consisted only of Officer

Williams asking Barry for consent to search the vehicle (which he

voluntarily gave), walking back over to the vehicle, and gaining

voluntary consent6

 from Fadiga to search the vehicle, his person,

6

 Fadiga does not challenge the voluntariness of the consent (which was

given to Officer Williams verbally), and there is no indication in the record

to suggest that it was in any way involuntary. 

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and his wallet.7 Again, Fadiga does not specifically argue that

this particular period was too long; rather he focuses on the

thirty-five minute delay between the actual search and the arrival

of Detective Sergeant Odgen with the card scanner. However, this

argument misses the mark. A thirty-five minute delay attributed to

the arrival of the card-scanner was reasonable considering Fadiga

had already consented to the search and Officer Williams had

already discovered the cards in Fadiga’s wallet, the bag of gift

cards behind the seat, and the cartons of cigarettes. See Ruiz,

784 F.3d at 1144 (“The appropriate focus is the time that elapsed

between the initial stop and [the defendant]’s consent to search;

consent renders a search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment

unless given involuntarily.”) (citation and ellipses omitted). 

In sum, while the initial traffic stop was nominally extended

following the issuance of the written warning until the time Fadiga

gave his voluntary consent to search his person and the vehicle,

the Court finds that the extension was supported by independent

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and was thus lawful. 

Furthermore, the warrantless roadside search of the vehicle and

subsequent scan of the cards was justified by Barry and Fadiga’s

7

 As noted in the facts section above, Officer Williams did not search

the vehicle until he had gained consent from both men. When he did search the

vehicle, he found the shopping bag full of gift cards behind the passenger

seat and four garbage bags filled with cartons of Newport Cigarettes in the

trunk. It was only then that Officer Williams contacted Detective Sergeant

Odgen to bring the card scanner to the scene; it is clear that sufficient

probable cause of fraud existed at that point to justify a delay associated

with Detective Sergeant Odgen’s arrival. 

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consent. Therefore, Fadiga’s Fourth Amendment rights were not

violated. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the First Amended Motion to

Suppress, filed by Defendant, Mohamed Fadiga, on June 5, 2014 (DE

#23), is DENIED.

DATED: July 14, 2015 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

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