IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

SCOTT S. ROENIGK, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) NO. 1:14-CV-150

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, )

COMMISSIONER OF THE )

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court for review of the

Commissioner of Social Security’s decision denying Disability

Insurance Benefits to Plaintiff, Scott Stephen Roenigk. For the

reasons set forth below, the decision of the Commissioner is

AFFIRMED.

BACKGROUND

On January 9, 2012, the Plaintiff, Scott Stephen Roenigk

(“Roenigk”), filed an application for Disability Insurance

Benefits (“DIB”). Roenigk alleged that he was disabled due to

bi-polar disorder. The Social Security Administration denied his

initial application and also denied his claim on reconsideration. 

On February 7, 2013, the Plaintiff appeared with counsel, Vernos

J. Williams, at an administrative hearing before Administrative

Law Judge (“ALJ”) William D. Pierson (“Pierson”). (Tr. 24-68). 

At this hearing, Roenigk amended his request for benefits to a

request for a closed period of time beginning on August 1, 2010,
and ending March 5, 2012. Testimony was provided by Roenigk and

Sharon Ringenberg (a vocational expert or “VE”). (Tr. 24-68). 

On May 13, 2013, ALJ Pierson denied the claimant’s DIB claim,

finding that Roenigk was not disabled during the relevant time

period because he could perform a significant number of jobs in

the national economy, despite his limitations. (Tr. 9-19).

On May 13, 2013, Roenigk requested that the Appeals Council

review the ALJ’s decision and the request was denied on April 23,

2014. (Tr. 1). Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision became the

Commissioner’s final decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(a)(2005). 

The claimant has initiated the instant action for judicial review

of the Commissioner’s final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

405(g). 

DISCUSSION

Review of Commissioner’s Decision

This Court has authority to review the Commissioner’s

decision to deny social security benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any

fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be

conclusive....” Id. Substantial evidence is defined as “such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate

to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,

401 (1971)(quotation omitted). In determining whether

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substantial evidence exists, the Court shall examine the record

in its entirety, but shall not substitute its own opinion for the

ALJ’s by reconsidering the facts or reweighing the evidence. 

Jens v. Barnhart, 347 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 2003). With that

in mind, however, this Court reviews the ALJ’s findings of law de

novo and if the ALJ makes an error of law, the Court “may reverse

without regard to the volume of evidence in support of the

factual findings.” White v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 369, 373 (7th Cir.

1999). 

As a threshold matter, for a claimant to be eligible for

benefits under the Social Security Act, the claimant must

establish that he is disabled. To qualify as being disabled, the

claimant must be unable “to engage in any substantial gainful

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous

period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. §§

423(d)(1)(A) and 1382(a)(1). To determine whether a claimant has

satisfied this statutory definition, the ALJ performs a five-step

evaluation:

Step 1: Is the claimant performing

substantial gainful activity: If yes, the

claim is disallowed; if no, the inquiry

proceeds to step 2.

Step 2: Is the claimant’s impairment or

combination of impairments “severe” and

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expected to last at least twelve months? If

not, the claim is disallowed; if yes, the

inquiry proceeds to step 3.

Step 3: Does the claimant have an

impairment or combination of impairments that

meets or equals the severity of an impairment

in the SSA’s Listing of Impairments, as

described in 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P, App.

1? If yes, then claimant is automatically

disabled; if not, then the inquiry proceeds

to step 4.

Step 4: Is the claimant able to

perform his past relevant work? If yes, the

claim is denied; if no, the inquiry proceeds

to step 5, where the burden of proof shifts

to the Commissioner. 

Step 5: Is the claimant able to

perform any other work within his residual

functional capacity in the national economy:

If yes, the claim is denied; if no, the

claimant is disabled. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v) and 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); see

also Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 n. 8 (7th Cir. 1994).

In this case, the ALJ found that Roenigk suffered from the

following severe impairments: bipolar disorder and obesity. (Tr.

11). The ALJ found that Roenigk did not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the

severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and

404.1526). Id. The ALJ also found that Roenigk had the residual

functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform:

medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R.

404.1567(c) except he can lift 25 pounds

frequently and 50 pounds occasionally; can

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sit 6 hours out of an 8-hour workday; can

stand/walk 6 hours out of an 8-hour workday;

is limited to superficial interaction with

co-workers, supervisors, and the public, when

superficial is defined as occasional casual

contact not involving prolonged conversation,

although contact with supervisors would still

involve necessary instructions; and is

limited to simple, routine and repetitive

tasks in low stress jobs with no more than

occasional decision-making and occasional

changes in the work setting.

(Tr. at 14). 

After considering Roenigk’s age1, education2, work

experience3 and RFC, the ALJ relied upon the testimony of the VE

and concluded that Roenigk was not disabled and not entitled to

DIB because he was capable of making a successful adjustment to

other work that existed in significant numbers in the national

economy. (Tr. 18). Thus, Roenigk’s claim failed at step five of

the evaluation process. 

 Roenigk asserts that the ALJ committed several errors

requiring reversal. While Roenigk is not represented by counsel

at this time, he nonetheless bears the burden of showing that the

ALJ committed reversible error. Cadenhead v. Astrue, 410 F.App’x

982, 994 (7th Cir. 2011)(pro se litigants “must present arguments

supported by legal authority and citations to the record.”). 

1

Roenigk was born on November 27, 1960. (Tr. 17). 

2

Roenigk has at least a high school education and is able to

communicate in English. (Tr. 17). 

3

In the past fifteen years, Roenigk has worked as a pension

analyst. (Tr. 17). 

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This Court will give Roenigk a certain degree of latitude given

his pro se status, but he must nonetheless satisfy his burden of

proof. With this guidelines in mine, each of Roenigk’s arguments

will be addressed in turn. 

 First, Roenigk complains about the length of time the SSA

took to decide his claim: it took the Appeals Council almost a

year to decide not to review the case. The timing of the

decision not to grant review provides no basis for appeal. 

Furthermore, any error in denying his request for review is not

reviewable by this Court. See Eads v. Sec’y of HHS, 983 F.2d

815, 817 (7th Cir. 1993)(noting that, where the Appeals Council

has refused to review a case, the decision reviewed by this Court

is the decision of the ALJ).

 Roenigk also points out that he is seeking benefits for a

closed period beginning on August 10, 2010, and ending on March

5, 2012. Unfortunately, his hearing before the ALJ did not take

place until 11 months after the end of the closed period. He

does not claim that he was disabled within the meaning of the SSA

at the time of his hearing - only that he was disabled during the

prior closed period. As a result of the timing of the hearing,

Roenigk believes the ALJ unfairly judged whether he was disabled

from August 10, 2010, until March 5, 2012, based on his

appearance at the hearing 11 months later. While the timing of

the hearing in this case was unfortunate, Roenigk has not

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provided any citation to the record which demonstrates that the

ALJ failed to properly consider the prior period of time.

Additionally, Roenigk notes that the work he obtained

following his alleged period of disability paid substantially

less than his past relevant work: 46% according to Roenigk’s

calculations. This is irrelevant. The relevant inquiry is not

whether he can perform work that would yield income comparable to

his prior income level. The relevant inquiry is whether he can

perform any other work within his residual functional capacity in

the national economy. 

Similarly, Roenigk argues in his reply brief that the SSA

does not deny that he is “disabled” and that he had paid into the

system, and states that, “I qualify to receive disability

benefits based on my lifetime contributions.” (DE #15 at 2). 

That is not how this works. First, having an impairment, even a

serious impairment (as Roenigk clearly does and the ALJ

acknowledges), does not entitle one to benefits. Paying into the

system (or in Social Security lingo, earning sufficient sums of

money to have enough qualifying quarters during the preceding 10

year period) is only one requirement to obtaining benefits. 

Here, that qualification was undoubtedly met. No one is arguing

that Roenigk did not have enough qualifying quarters to receive

benefits. Because this was not the basis on which his claim for

benefits was denied, the fact that he has “paid in” adequately is

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not relevant to this appeal. 

Next, Roenigk quibbles with the fact that the ALJ stated in

his decision that he was “not disabled, and has not been

disabled.” (Tr. at 19). Roenigk asserts that he has in fact

been deemed disabled by the SSA in the past: he received benefits

in the mid-1980s. While this may be error, it is not the sort of

error that requires reversal. This error is likely the result of

the Social Security Administration’s insistence on utilizing

boilerplate language in their decisions. It is not entirely

clear whether the ALJ actually failed to appreciate that Roenigk

had previously received benefits or simply failed to adequately

edit the boilerplate language of the order. Even assuming that

he failed to appreciate that Roenigk had once received benefits,

knowing this would not likely alter the ALJ’s current

understanding of the medical records and opinions that informed

his decision that Roenigk was not disabled within the meaning of

the Social Security Act during the time in question. 

Furthermore, Roenigk argues that the ALJ’s “findings of fact

and conclusions of law in finding #4 are not correct.” (DE #12

at 2). In challenging “finding #4,” Roenigk is challenging the

ALJ’s decision at Step 3 of the sequential analysis. At Step 3,

the ALJ found that Roenigk did not meet or medically equal the

severity of Listing 12.04, Affective Disorders. In considering

Listing 12.04, the ALJ found that there was medical documentation

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that Roenigk suffered mild restrictions in activities of daily

living, moderate difficulties in social functioning, and moderate

difficulties in concentration, persistence or pace. He also

found that Roenigk suffered one episode of decompensation of

extended duration. Roenigk argues that he indeed had marked

restrictions in his activities of daily living, maintaining

social functioning, and maintaining concentration, persistence,

or pace, and that he also suffered repeated episodes of

decompensation of extended during. He relies solely on his own

statements about the severity of his symptoms, citing to no

medical evidence whatsoever. Unfortunately for Roenigk, to be

found disabled at Step 3 of the sequential analysis, there must

be medical documentation to support these assertions. He has not

pointed to any medical records that would support a finding that

his impairments met or equaled the criteria of Listing 12.04. 

Likewise, this Court’s review of the record does not reveal that

any medical source found that Roenigk either met or equaled the

criteria for Listing 12.04. 

Roenigk also argues that the ALJ’s RFC is incorrect and that

the ALJ’s findings and conclusions at Step 5 are not supported by

substantial evidence. According to Roenigk, the history of his

getting and losing jobs during the relevant time period

demonstrates that he could get work but could not keep it. While

Roenigk is working successfully now (or was at the time his brief

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was filed) he maintains that, during the relevant time period, he

could not work. According to Roenigk, this is the nature of his

illness, and it is quite possible that at some point in the

future he will again be unable to work. 

The ALJ stated several reasons for his RFC finding. The ALJ

acknowledged difficulties with social functioning but noted that

there was not a medical opinion indicating that his limitations

in this area would prevent superficial interactions with coworkers and supervisors for 12 consecutive months. (Tr. at 14). 

The ALJ noted that Roenigk did work part time during the time

period at issue and even worked full time very briefly. (Tr. 14). 

The ALJ also noted that the medical evidence did not establish

that difficulties in concentration were more limited than noted

in the RFC. (Tr. at 14). In fact, the ALJ noted, treatment notes

from Roenigk’s therapists during the relevant time showed

adequate attention and concentration during much of the period

for which Roenigk seeks benefits. (Tr 14-15). The ALJ also

noted that the episode beginning in January of 2011 resulted in a

change of Roenigk’s medication, and he has not suffered any

further episodes since that change. (Tr. at 16). 

This Court, in reviewing the ALJ’s decision, does not

reweigh the evidence. If there is substantial evidence to

support the ALJ’s decision, even if this Court would have reached

a contrary decision, the decision must be affirmed. See Jens v.

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Barnhart, 347 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 2003)(“The issue before

this court is whether the ALJ’s findings were supported by

substantial evidence, not whether [the claimant] is

disabled....[I]f the findings of the Commissioner of Social

Security are supported by substantial evidence, they are

conclusive.”). Here, the ALJ relied upon substantial evidence to

support his decision. In this circumstance, the fact that a

different ALJ may have looked at the same evidence and reached a

different conclusion does not warrant reversal. 

Lastly, Roenigk raised several arguments in his reply brief

that were not raised in his opening brief. For example, he

argues that the ALJ misapplied the special technique to evaluate

his mental health condition, that the SSA should have sought an

independent medical evaluation, that the ALJ is not a licensed

psychiatrist and was not qualified to diagnose mental illness,

and that the medical records do not adequately reflect the

severity of his illness due to limited treatment during the

relevant time period. While this Court understands that Roenigk

is representing himself, that does not absolve him from the need

to follow the rules. Arguments not raised in the opening brief

are waived. See Young v. Colvin, No. 1:13–cv–01602, 2015 WL

1190095, at *7 n.5 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 13, 2015); Citizens Against

Ruining the Env't v. EPA, 535 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2008) (“It

is improper for a party to raise new arguments in a reply because

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it does not give an adversary adequate opportunity to respond.”). 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Commissioner of Social

Security’s final decision is AFFIRMED.

DATED: August 10, 2015 /s/ Rudy Lozano, Judge 

United States District Court

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