11-2615-ag

Chen v. Holder

BIA

A095 864 746

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

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At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan

United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of

New York, on the 27th day of April, two thousand twelve.

PRESENT:

BARRINGTON D. PARKER,

PETER W. HALL,

DENNY CHIN,

Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________

ZHU QING CHEN,

Petitioner, 

 v. 11-2615-ag

 NAC 

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

Respondent.

_____________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: Eric Y. Zheng, New York, New York.

 

FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney

General; Melissa Neiman-Kelting,

Senior Litigation Counsel;

Christopher Buchanan, Trial

Attorney, Office of Immigration

Litigation, United States Department

of Justice, Washington, D.C.
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UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the petition for review

is DENIED.

Petitioner Zhu Qing Chen, a native and citizen of the

People’s Republic of China, seeks review of the June 9,

2011, order of the BIA denying her motion to reopen. In re

Zhu Qing Chen, No. A095 864 746 (B.I.A. June 9, 2011). We

assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts

and procedural history of the case.

We review for abuse of discretion the BIA’s denial of

Chen’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred. See

Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam). 

An alien may file one motion to reopen, generally no later

than 90 days after the date on which the final

administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings

sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(I); 8

C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The time limitation does not apply

to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed

circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in

the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such

evidence is material and was not available and could not

have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 

8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). There is no dispute that Chen’s 2011

motion was untimely and number-barred; she had previously

filed one motion to reopen, and the final administrative

order was issued in 2007. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A),

(C)(I); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its

discretion when it held Chen failed to establish changed

circumstances in China that would render inapplicable the

time limitation for filing a motion to re-open.

First, the BIA reasonably found, based on Chen’s own

submissions, that conditions in China insofar as persecution

of unregistered religious groups is concerned had not

changed to any significant degree since well before Chen

left the country in 2001. Substantial evidence supports,

and the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining,

that Chen’s evidence failed to show that China consistently

and more harshly implemented a policy of religious

repression in all its provinces or that its suppression of
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underground churches in her native Fujian province has

increased since 2005. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546

F.3d 138, 169, 174 (2d Cir. 2008) (when the BIA considers

relevant evidence of country conditions in evaluating a

motion to reopen, this Court reviews the BIA’s factual

findings under the substantial evidence standard); see also

id. at 174 (affirming the BIA’s case-by-case analysis in

determining a well-founded fear of persecution when it finds

wide variances in how policies are enforced). Nor did the

BIA abuse its discretion by summarizing the evidence it

considered in this regard; the BIA was not required to parse

it point by point. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270,

273-75 (2d Cir. 2006); Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of

Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 338 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006). 

Second, yet somewhat in the same vein, Chen argues that

based on her own 2010 conversion to Christianity she will be

subject to the Chinese government’s human rights abuses in

the form of religious persecution. The BIA’s determination

that this evidence of Chen’s religious conversion does not

demonstrate a material change in country conditions is also

not an abuse of discretion. See Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d

85, 102-3 (2d Cir. 2011). As we have previously held, “The

law is clear that a petitioner must show changed country

conditions in order to exceed the 90-day filing requirement

for seeking to reopen removal proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. §

1003.2(c)(3)(ii). A self-induced change in personal

circumstances cannot suffice.” Wei Guang Wang, 437 F.3d

274. 

In sum, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying

Chen’s untimely and number-barred motion to reopen. See 8

U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(I), (ii); 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.2(c)(2), (3).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of

removal that the Court previously granted in this petition

is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in

this petition is DENIED as moot. Any pending request for 
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oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second

Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk