IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

RICKY LYNN JACKSON, SR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 1:14-CV-368

)

DARRELL HIMELICK, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the amended complaint filed

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Ricky Lynn Jackson, Sr., a pro se

prisoner, on June 12, 2015. For the reasons set forth below, the

Court: (1) GRANTS Ricky Lynn Jackson, Sr., leave to proceed on a

Fourteenth Amendment claim for compensatory damages against Lt.

Jail Commander Cathy Lee in her individual capacity for taking his

medically prescribed extra mat on May 9, 2015; (2) DISMISSES all

other claims; (3) DISMISSES Sheriff Darrell Himelick and Captain

Randy Albertson; (4) DIRECTS the Clerk to transmit the summons and

USM-285 forms (DE 5-1 at 1-2 and DE 5-2 at 3) for Lt. Jail

Commander Cathy Lee to the United States Marshals Service along

with a copy of the amended complaint (DE 28) and this order; (5)

DIRECTS the United States Marshals Service, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(d), to effect service of process on Lt. Jail Commander Cathy

Lee; and (6) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that Lt.

Jail Commander Cathy Lee respond, as provided for in the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the
claim for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in

this screening order.

BACKGROUND

Jackson alleges that on September 25, 2014, after fighting

with a fellow inmate, Lt. Jail Commander Cathy Lee ordered that he

be placed in a one man holding cell and charged with fighting. He

alleges that he complained to the guard who placed him in the

holding cell that he needed immediate medical attention. He alleges

that guard told another guard who responded by repeating that Lt.

Lee had ordered that Jackson be placed in the holding cell. On

October 1, 2014, Lt. Lee visited his cell and had him taken to

medical for a free examination of his hand. Jackson alleges that he

also needed treatment for his back, but that she told him that he

was required to pay a $15.00 co-pay. On November 25, 2015, he was

seen by medical staff for his back and provided with treatment

which included an extra bed mat. On May 9, 2015, he alleges that

Lt. Lee took his extra mat without a doctor’s approval. Jackson

filed grievances about these events with Sheriff Darrell Himelick

and Captain Randy Albertson, but they did not respond. 

DISCUSSION

“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a

pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

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stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and

citations omitted). However, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the

court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it

if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against

a defendant who is immune from such relief. “In order to state a

claim under § 1983 a plaintiff must allege: (1) that defendants

deprived him of a federal constitutional right; and (2) that the

defendants acted under color of state law.” Savory v. Lyons, 469

F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006).

A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state

a claim that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility

when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Factual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on

the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true

(even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotation

marks, citations and footnote omitted). “[W]here the well-pleaded

facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not

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shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

679 (quotation marks and brackets omitted). Thus, “a plaintiff must

do better than putting a few words on paper that, in the hands of

an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has happened to

her that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A.,

614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original).

At the time of these events, Jackson was a pre-trail detainee

at the jail. “Although the Eighth Amendment applies only to

convicted persons, pretrial detainees . . . are entitled to the

same basic protections under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process

clause. Accordingly, [courts] apply the same legal standards to

deliberate indifference claims brought under either the Eighth or

Fourteenth Amendment.” Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 831 (7th

Cir. 2010). 

Jackson is suing Lt. Lee for ordering his placement in a one

man holding cell and charging him with fighting. Jackson argues

that he was acting in self defense. However, “inmates do not have

a constitutional right to raise self-defense as a defense in the

context of prison disciplinary proceedings.” Jones v. Cross, 637

F.3d 841, 848 (7th Cir. 2011). After the fight, it was necessary

for the jail to re-establish order and “[c]oncerns of security are

to be given ‘particular sensitivity.’” Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d

789, 800 (7th Cir. 2008). “[A] prison’s internal security is

peculiarly a matter normally left to the discretion of prison

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administrators [because p]rison administrators should be accorded

wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies

and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve

internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional

security.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1986)

(quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). Thus, Jackson has not

stated a claim for being placed in a holding cell or for being

charged with fighting.

Jackson alleges that Lt. Lee denied him medical treatment by

ordering his placement in the holding cell. However, he does not

allege that she knew of his injuries when she gave that order.

Though he alleges that he told guards that worked for her, there is

no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, so

the allegation someone else knew about his need for medical

treatment does not state a claim against her. George v. Smith, 507

F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007). “[P]ublic employees are responsible

for their own misdeeds but not for anyone else’s.” Burks v.

Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009). Nevertheless, it is

clear she knew of his need for medical treatment once she visited

his cell on October 1, 2014. However, she did not deny him medical

care on that date. Rather he had his hand examined by medical staff

without cost. Jackson complains that he needed treatment for his

back but that she denied him that treatment by requiring that he

pay a $15.00 co-pay. However, the Constitution does not require

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free medical care, Poole v. Isaacs, 703 F.3d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir.

2012), and Jackson had as much as $34.49 in his commissary account

on that day. DE 6 at 10. On many days thereafter and before he was

ultimately seen for his back on November 25, 2014, he had more than

$15.00 in his account, but he decided to spend it on other things.

DE 6 at 10-14. Because he was able to afford to pay for medical

treatment, Lt. Lee did not deny him care by requiring that he do

so. 

Jackson alleges that Lt. Lee took his medically prescribed

extra mat on May 9, 2015. In medical cases, the Constitution is

violated only when a defendant was deliberately indifferent to an

inmate’s serious medical needs. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364,

1369 (7th Cir. 1997). “[C]onduct is deliberately indifferent when

the official has acted in an intentional or criminally reckless

manner, i.e., the defendant must have known that the plaintiff was

at serious risk of being harmed and decided not to do anything to

prevent that harm from occurring even though he could have easily

done so.” Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005)

(quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). “Negligence on

the part of an official does not violate the Constitution, and it

is not enough that he or she should have known of a risk. Instead,

deliberate indifference requires evidence that an official actually

knew of a substantial risk of serious harm and consciously

disregarded it nonetheless.” Pierson v. Hartley, 391 F.3d 898, 902

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(7th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). It is not enough to show that

a defendant merely failed to act reasonably. Gibbs v. Franklin, 49

F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1995). Even incompetence does not state

a claim of deliberate indifference. Walker v. Peters, 233 F.3d 494

(7th Cir. 2000). Here, it is plausible to infer that Jackson is

alleging that Lt. Lee knew that his extra mat had been prescribed

by a doctor and that she was denying him medical treatment when she

took it. Therefore he will be granted leave to proceed on this

claim. 

Finally, Jackson alleges that Sheriff Darrell Himelick and

Captain Randy Albertson did not respond to his grievances. However,

“the alleged mishandling of [his] grievances by persons who

otherwise did not cause or participate in the underlying conduct

states no claim.” Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir.

2011). 

[The] view that everyone who knows about a prisoner’s

problem must pay damages implies that he could write

letters to the Governor of Wisconsin and 999 other public

officials, demand that every one of those 1,000 officials

drop everything he or she is doing in order to

investigate a single prisoner’s claims, and then collect

damages from all 1,000 recipients if the letter-writing

campaign does not lead to better medical care. That can’t

be right.”

Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009). Thus Jackson

does not state a claim against either Sheriff Himelick or Captain

Albertson and they will be dismissed. 

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court: (1) GRANTS Ricky

Lynn Jackson, Sr., leave to proceed on a Fourteenth Amendment claim

for compensatory damages against Lt. Jail Commander Cathy Lee in

her individual capacity for taking his medically prescribed extra

mat on May 9, 2015; (2) DISMISSES all other claims; (3) DISMISSES

Sheriff Darrell Himelick and Captain Randy Albertson; (4) DIRECTS

the Clerk to transmit the summons and USM-285 forms (DE 5-1 at 1-2

and DE 5-2 at 3) for Lt. Jail Commander Cathy Lee to the United

States Marshals Service along with a copy of the amended complaint

(DE 28) and this order; (5) DIRECTS the United States Marshals

Service, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to effect service of

process on Lt. Jail Commander Cathy Lee; and (6) ORDERS, pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that Lt. Jail Commander Cathy Lee

respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claim for which the

plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening

order.

DATED: August 10, 2015 /s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United State District Court

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