UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION

MATTHEW BOHANNON, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. Case No. 2:14-cv-247-JVB-JEM 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Acting Commissioner of 

Social Security Administration, 

 

 Defendant. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 Plaintiff Matthew Bohannon seeks judicial review of the Commissioner of Social 

Security’s decision denying him disability insurance benefits, and asks this Court to either 

reverse or remand the Commissioner’s decision. For the reasons discussed below, the 

Commissioner’s decision is remanded for further consideration.

A. Overview of the Case

 Plaintiff is in his fifties, has an eighth-grade education, and previously worked as a fastfood cook and deli slicer. (R. at 37‒38.) Plaintiff alleges that he became disabled on October 5, 

2006, due to a hip joint fracture. (R. at 28.) Following a hearing on March 19, 2013, 

Administrative Law Judge David Bruce determined that Plaintiff suffered from severe conditions 

including seizure disorder, osteoarthritis and late effects of hip replacement, cervical 

degenerative disc disease, and poly-substance abuse disorder. (R. at 30.) He concluded that 

Plaintiff could however do light work with certain limitations, including no standing for more 
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than four hours and no exposure to heights or hazards (R. at 38.) The ALJ’s decision became 

final when the Social Security Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (R. at 5.)

B. Standard of Review

This Court has authority to review Social Security Act claim decisions under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g). The Court will uphold an ALJ’s decision that applies the correct legal standard and is 

supported by substantial evidence. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th 

Cir. 2005). The Court will, however, ensure that the ALJ built an “accurate and logical bridge 

from the evidence to his conclusion.” Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002).

C. Disability Standard 

The Commissioner has established a five-step inquiry to evaluate whether a claimant 

qualifies for disability benefits. A successful claimant must show: 

(1) he is not presently employed; (2) his impairment is severe; (3) his impairment 

is listed or equal to a listing in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) he is 

not able to perform his past relevant work; and (5) he is unable to perform any 

other work within the national and local economy. 

Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 699–700 (7th Cir. 2004). 

 A “no” at any point besides step three means that the claimant is not disabled. Zurawski 

v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001). A “yes” leads either to the next step or, on steps 

three and five, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. Id. The claimant bears the burden of 

proof at every step except step five. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000).

D. Analysis 
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Plaintiff argues that: the ALJ did not have substantial evidence to support his finding that 

Plaintiff could stand for four hours, the ALJ made contradictory and erroneous determinations 

regarding Plaintiff’s credibility, and recent policy clarifications by the Commissioner require a 

finding of disability.

(1) The ALJ had no basis to find Plaintiff capable of standing for four hours

 The ALJ found that Plaintiff could do light work, as long as he did not have to stand for 

more than four hours. (R. at 37.) But the record contains no support for this four-hour limitation. 

In fact, the only medical evidence on this point is a physician’s recommendation that Plaintiff 

avoid “prolonged standing” because of his hip condition. (R. at 36.) Nothing in the record 

specifies what “prolonged” might mean. The four-hour limitation thus does not seem to have 

been based on any evidence at all. 

 Nor is this a trivial shortcoming. For example, if Plaintiff can only stand for two hours, 

that would mean he can only do sedentary work. SSR 83-10. And the Commissioner’s guidelines 

(the “grid rules”) indicate that if a claimant of Plaintiff’s age and education can only perform 

sedentary work, he is disabled. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2. Thus, the success of 

Plaintiff’s claim may well hinge on exactly how long he can stand during a working day. 

 The government argues that the ALJ’s error is nonetheless harmless because even if 

Plaintiff can only stand for a shorter length of time than four hours, he can still perform the 

specific jobs that the ALJ cited. But this argument calls for a closer look at the ALJ’s suggested 

jobs: “information clerk,” “marker,” and “mail clerk.” (R. at 38.) These job titles come from the 

Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), which dates in large part from 1977. As the Seventh 

Circuit has recently observed, the DOT does not reflect today’s job market. Herrmann v. Colvin, 

772 F.3d 1110, 1113 (7th Cir. 2014). And it seems unlikely that there are many jobs today that 
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solely involve telling customers how to buy bus tickets (information clerk), putting price tags on 

retail items (marker), or sorting mail into mailboxes (mail clerk). The ALJ’s opinion refers to no 

other evidence that such jobs exist in significant numbers today.

 The Commissioner bears the burden of showing that there are jobs Plaintiff can do. See

Clifford, 227 F.3d at 868. The Commissioner did not meet that burden here.

 Plaintiff further seeks a reversal without remand because of recent clarifications of Social 

Security Administration policy. Specifically, the Commissioner recently issued a new rule 

clarifying that if a claimant’s functional capacity is between two lines on the “grid,” the ALJ 

should apply the lower line. SSA POMS DI 25025.015 (Mar. 27, 2015). In other words, 

borderline cases are resolved in favor of disability. According to this standard, even if the ALJ’s 

four-hour limitation stands, Plaintiff is still disabled, because four hours is between the lightwork line (six hours) and the sedentary-work line (two hours), and the grid specifies that 

someone of his age and education who can only do sedentary work is disabled.

 But these grid rules aren’t absolute unless a claimant’s limitations are solely exertional. 

Fast v. Barnhart, 397 F.3d 468, 471‒72 (7th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff has both exertional and 

nonexertional limitations (needing to avoid heights and hazards). Accordingly, the grid rules 

only provide a framework to guide the ALJ’s decision. Therefore, even if the new rule would 

otherwise provide an appropriate basis for reversal, the case must be remanded so that the ALJ 

can apply the rule to Plaintiff’s specific case.

(2) The ALJ’s statements regarding Plaintiff’s credibility are not contradictory

 Plaintiff contests the ALJ’s judgments discounting his credibility, particularly regarding 

the severity of his symptoms. ALJ credibility determinations are entitled to deference because 

the ALJ is “in a special position to hear, see, and assess witnesses.” Murphy v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 
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811, 815 (7th Cir. 2014). Courts will not overturn an ALJ’s credibility determination unless it 

lacks explanation or support. Id. at 816. A credibility determination will be upheld as long as it is 

explained in a way that allows the court to determine that the ALJ logically based the 

determination on specific findings and record evidence. Id.

The ALJ stated several times in his opinion that he gave Plaintiff’s testimony “great 

credence,” yet subsequently rejected that testimony as not credible. (R. at 35‒37.) This word 

choice is certainly confusing. But although closely related, “credence” and “credibility” are not 

synonyms. The ALJ can give credence to Plaintiff’s subjective account, i.e. believe Plaintiff is 

telling the truth as to his own experience, but still conclude that Plaintiff’s subjective account is 

not credible as to his actual medical condition. And the ALJ provides ample reasons for finding 

that Plaintiff’s testimony is not credible, because it is inconsistent with medical evidence. (R. at 

35–36.) 

 Accordingly, the seeming inconsistency between “great credence” and a negative 

credibility judgment does not provide a separate basis for remand.

(3) The ALJ failed to address Plaintiff’s alleged inability to walk without a cane

 The ALJ reasonably declined to credit Plaintiff’s statements that he had been unable to 

move around without a walker at certain periods. (R. at 44.). But he did not address Plaintiff’s 

other contention that he cannot walk without a cane, even though Plaintiff testified about his 

cane use. (R. at 84–85.) Perhaps the ALJ had good reasons to disregard that testimony. But since 

those reasons are not set forth in the record, this Court cannot tell whether they were supported 

by substantial evidence. And if Plaintiff needs a cane to walk, that limitation should have been 

considered in evaluating his residual functional capacity. 
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 Because the ALJ did not explain why he rejected Plaintiff’s claim that he needs a cane to 

walk, this Court cannot adequately review the ALJ’s decision on that point. Accordingly, the 

case must be remanded on this ground as well.

E. Conclusion

The Court finds that the record does not support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff can stand 

for four hours per day or that Plaintiff can walk without a cane. The Court accordingly remands 

the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 SO ORDERED on December 28, 2015.

 s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

 JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE