UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Plaintiffs, Lovetta Tindal and Gloria Moreno, are residents of Gary, Indiana, and patrons 

of the Main Branch of the Gary Public Library. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief following the 

decision by Defendants, Anthony Walker and the other members of the Gary Board of Library 

Trustees, to repurpose the Gary Main Public Library. The Board of Library Trustees voted to 

close the Main Branch of the Gary Library, convert the structure to the South Shore Museum and 

Cultural Center, and maintain the four neighborhood libraries located throughout Gary. Plaintiffs 

allege Defendants violated their constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments. Plaintiffs further allege, on state grounds, that Defendants are responsible for their 

constructive eviction from the Main Library, constructive possession of library funds, and 

constructive inurement. 

 Defendants moved to dismiss the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 

arguing that Plaintiffs have failed to properly state a claim with sufficient factual matter that is 

Lovetta Tindal and Gloria Moreno, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Anthony Walker, President of Gary 

Public Library Board of Trustees and 

Members Cynthia Watts, Rayfield Fisher, 

Nancy Valentine, Sadie Sheffield, 

Jonathan Boose, and Paula Nalls, 

 Defendants. 

Case No. 2:12-CV-40 JVB 
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plausible on its face.1

 Defendants’ motion requests the Court to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ federal 

and state claims. In their Response Plaintiffs ignore Defendants legal arguments. Instead, they 

state they are bringing suit against the Board members only in their official capacity and reiterate 

that they are still seeking injunctive relief. (DE 28, Pl.s’ Resp. at 1, 3.) 

 

A. Legal Standards 

(1) Motion to Dismiss

The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim 

is to test the sufficiency of the pleading, not to decide the merits of the case. See Gibson v. Chi., 

910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). Rule 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint must contain “a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” However, 

“recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 

suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).2

 As the Supreme Court has stated, “the tenet that a court must accept as 

true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. 

Rather, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 1940 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A complaint 

is facially plausible if a court can reasonably infer from factual content in the pleading that the 

defendant is liable for the alleged wrongdoing. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 

 

1

 Defendants do not explicitly invoke Federal Rule 12(b)(6) in their Motion to Dismiss (DE 19), but their arguments 

outline Plaintiffs’ failure to make a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

2 In Twombly the Supreme Court “retooled federal pleading standards, retiring the oft-quoted [Conley v. Gibson, 355 

U.S. 42, 47 (1957)] formulation that a pleading ‘should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears 

beyond doubt that the [pleader] can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” 

Killingsworth v HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618, (7th Cir. 2007). 
3 

The Seventh Circuit has synthesized the standard into three requirements. See Brooks v. 

Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). “First, a plaintiff must provide notice to defendants of 

her claims. Second, courts must accept a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, but some factual 

allegations will be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice to 

defendants of the plaintiff’s claim. Third, in considering the plaintiff’s factual allegations, courts 

should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or 

conclusory legal statements.” Id. 

Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, so a court must employ standards less stringent than if 

the complaint had been drafted by counsel. Fields v. Roswarski, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2866, at 

*1 (N.D. Ind., Jan. 11, 2008) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). A court is 

required to accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and “construe such allegations in 

favor of the plaintiff.” Id. (citing Roots P’ship v. Lands’ End, Inc., 965 F.2d 1411, 1416 (7th Cir. 

1992). Although ambiguities in the complaint should be interpreted in the plaintiff’s favor, 

Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 188 (7th Cir. 1994), a court does not need to struggle to find 

inferences favorable to the plaintiff which are not apparent on the face of the complaint, Coates 

v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 1977), or ignore factual allegations set 

forth in the complaint that undermine the plaintiff’s claim. City Nat’l Bank of Fla. v. Checkers, 

Simon & Rosner, 32 F.3d 277, 281 (7th Cir. 1994). 

2. Supplemental Jurisdiction of State Law Claims 

District courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when they 

are closely related to the federal claims presented to the court. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2012). The 

standard predominantly followed in the Seventh Circuit is for district courts to dismiss state 
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claims, without prejudice, when all federal claims have been dismissed before trial. Groce v. Eli 

Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1999). However, if state and federal claims “are so 

entangled” that “rejection of the latter probably entails rejection of the former,” the court should 

retain supplemental jurisdiction. Coe v. Cnty. of Cook, 162 F.3d 491, 496 (7th Cir. 1998). This is 

the preferred course of action when a state-law claim is clearly without merit because it spares 

overburdened state courts additional work that they do not want or need. Nelson v. Welch (In re 

Repository Techs. Inc.), 601 F.3d 710, 725 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Coe, 162 F.3d at 496). 

B. Discussion 

 (1) Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims 

Plaintiffs claim Defendants violated their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights 

entitling them to injunctive relief. While not stated by Plaintiffs, it is apparent they are invoking 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. Steele v. Trigg, 

1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 28955, at *3 (7th Cir. Nov. 3, 1992) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 

137, 144, n.3 (1979)). 

 In the Complaint the Plaintiffs quote the First Amendment but provide no further 

reasoning for why Defendants’ actions have limited their speech. (DE 1, Compl. at 1–3.) As 

explained in Ashcroft and Twombly, merely reciting elements of a cause of action and conclusory 

statements do not satisfy the standard for pleading. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 

(2009). 

Plaintiffs next assert their Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the closure of the 

Main Library. Plaintiffs claim their “home of knowledge” was subject to unlawful search and 

seizure due to the closure of the Main Branch of the Gary Public Library. The Fourth 
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Amendment’s use of the term seizure is interpreted as “some meaningful interference with an 

individual’s possessory interests in property.” Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) 

(citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). Plaintiffs have not properly alleged 

a violation of the Fourth Amendment as they have not shown any property interest in the library. 

See, e.g., Concealed Carry v. City of Chi., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17425, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 

30, 2003) (finding no unlawful seizure or violation of the Fourth Amendment present when 

protestors were forced to demonstrate at a different suitable location within the same public 

area).

Additionally, Plaintiffs maintain that Defendants have deprived them of their Fourteenth 

Amendment rights by enforcing “their own law and . . . depriving them of their liberty.” (DE 1, 

Compl. at 3.) This statement is too conclusory, even under the liberal construction standards 

applied for pro se plaintiffs, to entitle Plaintiffs to any relief. This blanket assertion does not 

indicate to the Court or Defendants which alleged actions correspond to these claims. See Burton 

v. City of Franklin, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78161, at *3–4 (S.D. Ind. July 18, 2011). 

(2) State Claims Against Defendants 

 Plaintiffs’ state law claims, articulated as “Constructive Eviction, Constructive 

Possession, and Constructive Inurement” (DE 1, Compl. at 4.), are so “entangled with the federal 

claims that the rejection of the latter . . . entails rejection of the former as well.” Coe v. Cook 

Cnty. 162 F.3d 491, 496 (7th Cir. 1998). Plaintiffs’ stated causes of action are too conclusory. 

Plaintiffs allege they have been denied access to the library, the Board is using library funds for 

the development of a museum, and “the Board of Library Trustees acclimatized employees and 

citizens to unfavorable conditions.” (DE 1, Compl. at 4.) No Indiana statute provides Plaintiffs a 
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property interest in municipality-controlled land that they could base their claims upon. Plaintiffs 

are clearly upset by the actions of the Library Board of Trustees, but the alleged state law 

violations do not entitle them to relief. 

C. Conclusion 

 The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a federal claim upon which relief can 

be granted. Plaintiffs Indiana state law claims fare no better and do not require further litigation 

in state courts. 

 As a result, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Dismissal (DE 18) and directs 

the Clerk to dismiss the entire case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

SO ORDERED on June 26, 2012. 

 S/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

 JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE