UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

TIMOTHY J. LAHRMAN, 

 PLAINTIFF, 

 VS. 

ELKHART COUNTY SUPERIOR

COURT NO. 2, ET AL., 

 DEFENDANTS. 

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CAUSE NO. 3:15-CV-26-RLM-CAN

OPINION and ORDER 

 This matter is before the court on the motions to dismiss filed by 

defendants Elkhart County Superior Court No. 2, Indiana Appellate Court, 

Elkhart County Circuit Court, State of Indiana, Office of Indiana Attorney 

General, and Indiana Supreme Court Division of State Court Administration, 

defendants Green Tree Servicing, LLC and Federal National Mortgage 

Association, and defendant Ocwen Financial Corporation. Plaintiff Timothy 

Lahrman proceeds pro se,1 and in the spirit of Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100 

(7th Cir. 1982), the court informed him of his obligation to respond to the 

 

1 Mr. Lahrman asked the court to appoint a guardian ad litem and counsel to represent 

him in this cause. The court denied the request as duplicative because Mr. Lahrman told the 

court that he was represented by a state-appointed guardian. The court then asked the alleged 

state-appointed guardian whether he intended to appear on Mr. Lahrman’s behalf in this suit. 

See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c) (A representative, next friend, or guardian ad litem may sue on behalf of 

an incompetent person.). That person informed the court that he had been appointed Mr. 

Lahrman’s guardian ad litem for the sole purpose of representing Mr. Lahrman’s interests in a 

1987 case in Allen Superior Court, and his appointment for that purpose concluded twenty-five 

years ago (although Mr. Lahrman has haunted him ever since). Without a state-appointed 

guardian (and with his motion for a guardian already denied), Mr. Lahrman proceeds pro se. 
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motions to dismiss. Mr. Lahrman hasn’t responded, and the time to do so has 

passed. 

I. BACKGROUND

 Mr. Lahrman says that he resided at 3004 Garden Boulevard in Elkhart, 

Indiana for the past twenty-two years. The property is owned by his companion, 

Cynthia Damron, who has intervened in this suit. Mr. Lahrman claims Ms. 

Damron granted him an ownership interest in the property. In 2005, Ms. 

Damron obtained a loan from GMAC Mortgage Corporation that she secured with 

the property. Four years later, Ms. Damron defaulted on the mortgage loan. 

GMAC Mortgage filed a foreclosure lawsuit in Elkhart Superior Court No. 2 in 

May 2010.2 Green Tree Servicing, LLC was later substituted for GMAC Mortgage 

as the plaintiff in that suit. 

Mr. Lahrman sought to intervene in the foreclosure suit in May 2013. 

Around the same time, Ms. Damron removed the suit to federal court. In 

September, this court found no basis for removal and remanded the foreclosure 

suit to the Elkhart Superior Court No. 2. 3:13-CV-482-RLM-CAN; Green Tree 

Servicing, LLC v. Damron, No. 13-3832, 557 F. App’x 588, 589 (7th Cir. June 9, 

2014). A few months later, Mr. Lahrman again moved to intervene in the suit. 

 

2 Ms. Damron secured a second loan with the property she owned located across the 

street at 2931 Garden Boulevard. According to the defendants, Ms. Damron defaulted on that 

loan as well, and the foreclosure proceedings related to 2931 Garden Boulevard ended with a 

foreclosure sale in 2012. 
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The Elkhart Superior Court No. 2 found that Mr. Lahrman lacked standing, and 

so denied his motion to intervene. Mr. Lahrman appealed the denial, but the 

Indiana Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely. In January 2014, 

Mr. Lahrman filed a lawsuit in Elkhart Circuit Court against Green Tree 

Servicing LLC, Ally Financial, Inc. d/b/a GMAC Mortgage, LLC, Federal National 

Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), and Mortgage Electronic Registration 

Systems, Inc.3 He alleged the defendants had committed many bad acts related 

to the loan and the foreclosure proceedings on the 3004 Garden Boulevard 

property. He later amended the complaint to add Green Tree’s attorneys as 

defendants. The Elkhart Circuit Court dismissed the suit based on Mr. 

Lahrman’s alleged lack of capacity and directed him to re-file the suit through 

his guardian. The defendants indicate that he hasn’t done so. The foreclosure 

suit concluded in May 2014, when the Elkhart Superior Court No. 2 entered 

judgment against Ms. Damron. 

Mr. Lahrman filed this suit in January 2015 and immediately asked the 

court to stop a sheriff’s sale of the property scheduled for January 28; the court 

denied the motion for emergency relief. The court also denied a later motion for 

emergency relief that sought to stop the enforcement of a writ of assistance 

obtained by the purchaser of the property. In this suit, Mr. Lahrman asserts the 

state government defendants discriminated against him by denying him the 

 

3 Mr. Lahrman also filed several motions related to the foreclosure on the 3004 Garden 

Boulevard property in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. 
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opportunity to participate in services, programs, and activities because of his 

disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. He alleges that the 

remaining defendants’ actions related to the loan and foreclosure proceedings on 

the 3004 Garden Boulevard property violated the Fair Housing Act and federal 

and state consumer protection laws. As to all defendants, Mr. Lahrman seeks to 

quiet title and alleges fraud upon the court/mortgage foreclosure fraud, 

mortgage servicing fraud, fraudulent inducement, tortious interference with the 

reasonable expectation of privacy and to the advantageous economic opportunity 

to build wealth through home ownership, and “nuisance ad infactum.” Finally, 

he accuses the Indiana Supreme Court Division of State Court Administration, 

the State of Indiana, the office of the Attorney General, and Fannie Mae of 

negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention. The defendants move to 

dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. They say the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars 

Mr. Lahrman’s claims, and that he doesn’t have standing to pursue the claims. 

Alternatively, the defendants say dismissal is appropriate pursuant to Rule 8 for 

failure to make plain allegations (Ocwen) and pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure 

to state a claim due to lack of capacity (Green Tree) and judicial immunity (state 

government defendants). Because the court concludes that it doesn’t have 

jurisdiction over the subject matter of Mr. Lahrman’s claims, the defendants’ 

requests for dismissal under other theories needn’t be considered by the court. 

Cook v. Winfrey, 141 F.3d 322, 325 (7th Cir. 1998). 
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court must first address the Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction. Winslow v. Walters, 815 F.2d 1114, 1116 (7th Cir. 

1987). To evaluate jurisdiction, the court takes all well-pleaded facts alleged in 

the complaint to be true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

plaintiff. Ezekiel v. Michel, 66 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1995). If necessary, the 

court “may properly look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint 

and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine 

whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists.” Id. (quoting Capitol Leasing 

Co. v. F.D.I.C., 999 F.2d 188, 191 (7th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)). 

Mindful of Mr. Lahrman’s pro se status, the court reads his complaint 

liberally. Hudson v. McHugh, 148 F.3d 859, 864 (7th Cir. 1998). The court will 

“give a pro se plaintiff a break when, although he stumbles on a technicality, his 

pleading is otherwise understandable.” Id. Nevertheless, the court is under “no 

obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.” Myles v. United 

States, 416 F.3d 551, 552-553 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 

225, 231 (2004)). 

III. DISCUSSION

The defendants contend that all of Mr. Lahrman’s claims arise from the 

state court foreclosure proceedings on the 3004 Garden Boulevard property. 
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Consequently, they argue this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the 

claims, which the state courts already decided. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine 

precludes the lower federal courts from reviewing state court decisions. Holt v. 

Lake Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 408 F.3d 335, 336 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Rooker v. 

Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 

U.S. 462, 482 (1983)). The doctrine typically applies when a state court 

proceeding concludes and the losing party “files suit in federal court complaining 

of an injury caused by the state-court judgment and seeking review and rejection 

of that judgment.” Id. (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 

U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). Several of Mr. Lahrman’s claims are de facto appeals of 

the state courts’ decisions and are barred without additional inquiry.4 First, the 

Elkhart Superior Court denied Mr. Lahrman’s motion to intervene in the 

foreclosure proceedings on the 3004 Garden Boulevard property. Mr. Lahrman 

directly challenges this decision in his claim titled “Action to Quiet Title by 

Occupying Claimant.”5 Second, the Elkhart Circuit Court dismissed Mr. 

Lahrman’s suit in which he challenged the foreclosure proceedings. Mr. Lahrman 

alleged common law fraud, breach of contract, violations of Indiana Code §§ 24-

 

4 That neither the state government defendants nor Ocwen were parties in the foreclosure 

proceedings on the 3004 Garden Boulevard property or Mr. Lahrman’s suit related to the 

foreclosure proceedings is irrelevant for the purpose of applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

Newman v. Indiana, 129 F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir. 1997). 

5 The defendants also argue Mr. Lahrman doesn’t have standing to bring suit challenging 

the foreclosure proceedings because he wasn’t the mortgagor of the property and he didn’t have 

an interest in the property. The court agrees that it likely also lacks jurisdiction over Mr. 

Lahrman’s claims because he doesn’t have standing. 
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5-0.5 et seq., the Deceptive Consumer Sales Act, Unfair and Deceptive Mortgage 

Practices, Unfair and Deceptive Mortgage Servicing Practices, Unfair and 

Deceptive Debt Collection Practices, and Unfair and Deceptive Mortgage 

Foreclosure Practices, tortious interference, “nuisance ad in factum,” and 

intentional infliction of emotional distress. Mr. Lahrman directly challenges the 

state court’s dismissal by making the following identical allegations in this suit: 

fraud upon the court, mortgage servicing fraud, fraudulent inducement, tortious 

interference, and “nuisance ad infactum.” The Elkhart Circuit Court dismissed 

the suit for reasons related to Mr. Lahrman’s capacity and so didn’t consider the 

merits of the claims. But even assuming dismissal was inappropriate, this court 

can’t review the state court’s decision. Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660, 664 (7th 

Cir. 2002) (“[N]o matter how erroneous or unconstitutional the state court 

judgment may be, the Supreme Court of the United States is the only federal 

court that could have jurisdiction to review a state court judgment.”). The court 

must dismiss the claims that are identical to the claims decided by the Elkhart 

Superior Court and the Elkhart Circuit Court. 

In addition to direct challenges of state court decisions, the RookerFeldman doctrine “precludes federal jurisdiction over claims inextricably 

intertwined with a state court determination,” id., if the plaintiff had a reasonable 

opportunity to raise the issue in state court proceedings. Id. at 668. The concept 

of “inextricably intertwined” claims has been described as metaphysical, Taylor 

v. Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 533 (7th Cir. 2004), but the “pivotal 
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inquiry . . . is whether the federal plaintiff seeks to set aside a state court 

judgment or whether he is, in fact, presenting an independent claim.” Brokaw v. 

Weaver, 305 F.3d 660, 665 (7th Cir. 2002). Mr. Lahrman’s claims related to the 

Fair Housing Act6 and federal and state consumer protection laws7 are 

allegations that overlap with Mr. Lahrman’s previously raised common law fraud 

allegations. In fact, they are identical claims, simply stated differently. In 

addition to likely being directly barred, the claims are inextricably intertwined 

with the state courts’ decisions. 

Mr. Lahrman also alleges the state government defendants violated the 

Americans with Disabilities Act, which at first glance seems distinguishable from 

the state court decisions related to the foreclosure proceedings. Yet in the first 

two paragraphs of the Americans with Disabilities Act allegation, Mr. Lahrman 

argues that he had an absolute right to assert his property rights in the 3004 

Garden Boulevard property, an absolute right to intervene in the programs, 

services, and activities in Elkhart Superior Court, and an absolute right to fair 

and equal access to the programs, services, and activities of the Elkhart Circuit 

Court, the Indiana Court of Appeals, and the Indiana Supreme Court Division of 

 

6 For example, paragraph 136 of the complaint alleges the defendants targeted and preyed 

upon Ms. Damron with a “scheme of discriminatory and fraudulent mortgage lending, mortgage 

servicing and mortgage foreclosure practices.” (Compl. 62, Doc. No. 1). 

7 For example, paragraph 145 of the complaint alleges Mr. “Lahrman and his companion 

have been victims of the Defendants’ unfair, deceptive, unscrupulous and fraudulent business 

practices namely the Defendants’ mortgage servicing and mortgage foreclosure practices.” 

(Compl. 65, Doc. No. 1). 
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State Court Administration. (Compl. 40-41, Doc. No. 1). He makes sweeping 

allegations about how the state government defendants didn’t accommodate his 

disability, but in truth, Mr. Lahrman again seeks to challenge the denial of his 

intervention in the foreclosure suit and the dismissal of his suit challenging the 

foreclosure proceedings. Finally, Mr. Lahrman claims the state government 

defendants negligently hired, trained, supervised, and retained judges and 

Fannie Mae negligently hired, trained, supervised, and retained mortgage 

servicers. But like the ADA claims, Mr. Lahrman is simply disguising yet another 

challenge to the state courts’ decisions. These claims are also inextricably 

intertwined with the state courts’ decisions. See Holt v. Lake Cnty. Bd. of 

Comm’rs, 408 F.3d 335, 336 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[A] litigant may not attempt to 

circumvent the effect of Rooker–Feldman and seek a reversal of a state court 

judgment simply by casting the complaint in the form of a civil rights action.”);

Wright v. Tackett, 39 F.3d 155, 157-158 (7th Cir. 1994). Mr. Lahrman’s 

continued assertions that he had an interest in the 3004 Garden Boulevard 

property and a right to intervene in the foreclosure proceedings show that his 

alleged injury was caused by the state courts’ decisions that prevented him from 

challenging the foreclosure proceedings, and not an independent injury that 

would give this court jurisdiction. 

Mr. Lahrman lost in state court and now seeks a ruling from a federal 

court about the same claims. He reiterated and restated his arguments in his 

many court filings related to the foreclosure proceedings on the 3004 Garden 
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Boulevard property, but at bottom, his grievance has always been, and remains, 

that he believes that he had an interest in the property and should have been 

involved in the foreclosure proceedings. He had ample opportunity to raise these 

claims in state court and he freely did so (albeit unsuccessfully). Mr. Lahrman’s 

complaint consists of the arguments rejected by the Indiana courts, and this 

court lacks jurisdiction to review their decisions. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS defendants’ motions to 

dismiss (Doc. Nos. 31, 33, & 35) for lack of jurisdiction. 

OTHER MOTIONS

Mr. Lahrman filed an objection and motion to disqualify the office of the 

Indiana Attorney General from representing the state government defendants in 

this case. He claims the Attorney General has a duty to protect him because he 

is under a state guardianship but has no duty to defend the state government 

defendants. Mr. Lahrman cites no case law, statutes, or rules of professional 

conduct to support his argument. Courts won’t disqualify counsel unless 

disqualification is absolutely necessary. Morgan v. Calderone, No. 1:07-CV763DFHJMS, 2008 WL 544681, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 28, 2008). Mr. Lahrman 

presented the court with nothing more than conjecture, so the court can find no 
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reason to disqualify the office of the Attorney General from representing the state 

government defendants. The motion to disqualify (Doc. No. 27) is DENIED. 

In February 2015, the court deferred ruling on Mr. Lahrman’s “Verified 

Motion/Petition for Emergency Preliminary Injunctive Relief With and/or 

Without Notice as an Emergency Temporary Restraining Order,” to the extent he 

sought a preliminary injunction, until he filed a separate motion as required by 

Local Rule 65-1. Mr. Lahrman didn’t file a separate motion, and the motion (Doc. 

No. 26) is now DENIED as moot. 

The court also DENIES as moot Ms. Damron’s “Notice to Join or Otherwise 

Intervene” (Doc. No. 23) to the extent the notice seeks the court’s permission to 

intervene. The case is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as to all 

plaintiffs. 

SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED: August 13, 2015 

 /s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr. 

 Judge 

 United States District Court