alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
SCPW-18-0000577
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI # I

_________________________________________________________________ CHARLES VITALE, NINA VITALE, Individually and in their Representative Capacities and on Behalf of a Class of All Persons

S imilarly Situated, Petitioners,

vs. THE HONORABLE DEAN E. OCHIAI, Judge of the Circuit Court of the

First Circuit, State of Hawai # i, Respondent Judge,
and D.R. HORTON, INC.; D.R. HORTON-SCHULER HOMES, LLC, Respondents.

_________________________________________________________________ ORIGINAL PROCEEDING (CIV. NO. 15-1-1347-07)
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (By: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, Pollack, and Wilson, JJ.)

Upon consideration of petitioners Charles and Nina Vitales’ petition for writ of mandamus, the documents attached thereto and submitted in support thereof, and the record, it appears that petitioners fail to demonstrate that they have a clear and indisputable right to the requested relief, that they lack alternative means to seek relief, and that the respondent judge committed a flagrant and manifest abuse of discretion or exceeded his jurisdiction in considering the motion for leave to Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCPW-18-0000577 23-JUN-2020 01:43 PMfile a third amended complaint. Petitioners, therefore, are not

entitled to the requested extraordinary writ. See Kema v. Gaddis, 91 Hawai # i 200, 204-05, 982 P.2d 334, 338-39 (1999) (a writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that will not issue unless the petitioner demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to relief and a lack of alternative means to redress adequately the alleged wrong or obtain the requested action; where a court has discretion to act, mandamus will not lie to interfere with or control the exercise of that discretion, even when the judge has acted erroneously, unless the judge has exceeded his or her jurisdiction, has committed a flagrant and manifest abuse of discretion, or has refused to act on a subject properly before the court under circumstances in which he or she has a legal duty to act); Honolulu Advertiser, Inc. v. Takao, 59 Haw. 237, 241, 580 P.2d 58, 62 (1978) (a writ of mandamus is not intended to supersede the legal discretionary authority of the trial courts, cure a mere legal error, or serve as a legal remedy in lieu of normal appellate procedure). Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for writ of mandamus is denied.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai # i, June 23, 2020. /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald /s/ Paula A. Nakayama /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna /s/ Richard W. Pollack /s/ Michael D. Wilson

2
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1566 Introduced in House (IH)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1566

To provide a technical correction to the Federal preemption of State or 
 local laws concerning the markings and identification of imitation or 
            toy firearms entering into interstate commerce.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 12, 2005

   Mr. Issa introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                    Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To provide a technical correction to the Federal preemption of State or 
 local laws concerning the markings and identification of imitation or 
            toy firearms entering into interstate commerce.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Toy Gun Marking Improvement Act''.

SEC. 2. PREEMPTION OF STATE OR LOCAL LAWS CONCERNING THE MARKINGS AND 
              IDENTIFICATION OF IMITATION OR TOY FIREARMS.

    Section 4(g) of the Federal Energy Management Improvement Act of 
1988 (15 U.S.C. 5001(g)) is amended by striking ``which provide for 
markings'' and all that follows through ``firearm developed prior to 
1898; or'' and inserting the following: ``relating to markings, 
identification, or sale of toy, look-alike, and imitation firearms. No 
State or local subdivision shall--
            ``(1) prohibit the sale or manufacture of any look-alike, 
        nonfiring, toy or collector replica of an antique firearm 
        developed prior to 1898; or''.
                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT 32.1
 
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 Menachem M. Schneerson, the President, Chief Executive Officer, and Director of Watchtower, Inc. (the “Registrant”), certifies, under the standards set forth and solely for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to his knowledge, the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Registrant for the year ended December 31, 2010 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in that Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.
 
 Date: March 21, 2011

By: /s/Menachem M. SchneersonName: Menachem M. Schneerson

Title:   President, Chief Executive Officer

and Director (Principal Executive Officer)
 A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

WHITLEY MANUFACTURING, INC., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO: 1:15-cv-95

)

SYNERGY BUILDING SOLUTIONS )

& LOGISTICS, LLC, )

 )

 Defendant. )

OPINION and ORDER

This case was removed to this Court from the Whitley Circuit Court by Defendant

Synergy Building Solutions & Logistics, LLC, based on diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1332(a). (Docket # 1.) The Notice of Removal alleges that Plaintiff Whitley

Manufacturing, Inc., is an Indiana corporation with its principal place of business in Indiana; and

that Defendant Synergy Building Solutions & Logistics, LLC, is a Colorado limited liability

company with its principal place of business in Colorado. (Not. of Removal ¶ 2.) 

 But the Notice of Removal is inadequate because it fails to properly allege the citizenship

of Defendant. The state in which a limited liability company (“LLC”) is organized is immaterial

for purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction; an LLC’s citizenship “for purposes of . . .

diversity jurisdiction is the citizenship of its members.” Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729,

731 (7th Cir. 1998). 

Therefore, the Court must be advised of the identity of each member of Synergy Building

Solutions & Logistics, LLC, and such member’s citizenship. Hicklin Eng’g, L.C. v. Bartell, 439

1
F.3d 346, 347 (7th Cir. 2006); see generally Guar. Nat’l Title Co. v. J.E.G. Assocs., 101 F.3d 57,

59 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining that the court would “need to know the name and citizenship(s)”

of each partner for diversity jurisdiction purposes). Moreover, citizenship must be “traced

through multiple levels” for those members who are a partnership or an LLC, as anything less

can result in a remand for want of jurisdiction. Mut. Assignment & Indem. Co. v. Lind-Waldock

& Co., LLC, 364 F.3d 858, 861 (7th Cir. 2004). 

Accordingly, Defendant is ORDERED to supplement the record by filing an amended

notice of removal on or before May 7, 2015, that properly alleges its citizenship.

SO ORDERED.

Enter for this 23rd day of April 2015.

/s Susan Collins 

Susan Collins,

United States Magistrate Judge 

2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

JOHN SPARKS, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 2:14-CV-40-JTM-PRC

)

NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY )

COMPANY, )

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff[’]s Statement Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 37(a)(5)(B) [DE 34], filed by Plaintiff John Sparks on October 19, 2015. Defendant

Norfolk Southern Railway Company has not filed a response, and the time to do so has passed.

This matter originates in a Motion to Compel filed by Plaintiff on August 14, 2015. The

motion sought disclosure of documents Defendant had claimed as privileged in responding to

Plaintiff’s discovery requests. Defendant turned over some of the documents, but claimed the

remaining documents were protected by privilege. After the motion was fully briefed, the Court

denied the motion.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 provides that, if a Motion to Compel is denied, a court

“must, after giving opportunity to be heard, require the movant, the attorney filing the motion, or

both to pay the party . . . who opposed the motion its reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the

motion, including attorney’s fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(B). The Rule provides exceptions if the

motion was substantially justified or if other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Id.

Additionally, subpart (a)(5)(A) of Rule 37 provides that, if the requested discovery is turned over

after the motion is filed, then the party turning over the discovery should be required to pay the

movant’s reasonable expenses. Since the matter of expenses was not discussed in the original
motion, the Court ordered additional briefing.

Though the motion to compel was denied (which weighs in favor of requiring Plaintiff to pay

Defendant’s reasonable expenses), some discovery was turned over after the filing of the motion

(which weighs in favor of requiring Defendant to pay Plaintiff’s reasonable expenses). Based on

these facts and the fact that Defendant did not file a response arguing for an award of fees, the Court

finds that the circumstances of this motion make an award of expenses unjust and DECLINES to

award fees in this instance. Plaintiff John Sparks and Defendant Norfolk Southern Railway

Company shall each bear their own expenses incurred in making or defending the Motion to

Compel.

SO ORDERED this 9th day of November, 2015.

s/ Paul R. Cherry 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE PAUL R. CHERRY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2
EXHIBIT 32

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB (the "Report") of
Cambridge Holdings, Ltd. (the "Company") for the quarter ended December 31,
2004, each of the undersigned Gregory Pusey, the President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Company, and Jeffrey G. McGonegal, the Senior Vice
President-Finance and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of the undersigned's knowledge and
belief:

     (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

Dated:  February 14, 2005          /s/ Gregory Pusey
                                   --------------------------------------------
                                   Gregory Pusey, President and
                                   Chief Executive Officer


Dated:  February 14, 2005          /s/ Jeffrey G. McGonegal
                                   --------------------------------------------
                                   Jeffrey G. McGonegal, Senior Vice President-
                                   Finance and Chief Financial Officer



                                   * * * * *



A signed original of the written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Adrian MACIAS, petitioner, v. CALIFORNIA.

No. 13-6257.

Supreme Court of the United States

Nov. 18, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, denied.
Neal CRISPIN, petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.

No. 13-99.

Supreme Court of the United States

Dec. 9, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.
Third Amendment to Credit Agreement



 EXHIBIT 10.1 
  
 THIRD AMENDMENT TO CREDIT AGREEMENT 
  
 This THIRD AMENDMENT TO CREDIT AGREEMENT, effective December 18th, 2003 (“Third Amendment”), amends that certain Credit Agreement, dated April 16th, 2001, by and between Neoforma, Inc., fdba Neoforma.com, Inc., a Delaware corporation (“Neoforma”), and VHA Inc., a Delaware corporation
(“VHA”), as amended to date (the “Agreement”). The capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein have the respective meanings given to them in the Agreement. 
  
 RECITALS 
  
 WHEREAS, Neoforma and VHA wish to reduce the amount of the Maximum Loan Amount from $25,000,000 to $15,000,000; and

  
 WHEREAS, Section 8.8 of the Agreement states, in part, that
the Agreement may be modified or amended only by a writing signed by both parties hereto. 
  
 NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises made herein and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree to the following:

  

	 	1.	Amendment of Section 1.10.    Section 1.10 of the Agreement provides: 

  

	 	1.10	Maximum Loan Amount.    The term “Maximum Loan Amount” means $25,000,000. 

  
 Section 1.10 is hereby revised in its entirety, such that
Section 1.10 is revised to state: 
  

	 	1.10	Maximum Loan Amount.    The term “Maximum Loan Amount” means $15,000,000. 

  

	 	2.	All Other Terms Unchanged.    Except as expressly modified by this Third Amendment, all terms of the Agreement shall remain in full force and
effect. 

  

	 	3.	Governing Law.    This Third Amendment shall be governed by and construed under the internal laws of the State of California and shall be binding
upon the parties hereto in the United States and worldwide. The federal and state courts of California shall have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate any dispute arising out of this Second Amendment. 

  

	 	4.	Counterparts.    This Third Amendment may be executed in two or more counterparts, each of which will be deemed an original, but all of which
together will constitute one and the same instrument. 

  
 IN WITNESS
WHEREOF, this Third Amendment has been executed, effective as of the date first written above. 
  

									
	NEOFORMA, INC.	 	 	 	VHA INC.
					
	By:	 	     /s/    ANDREW GUGGENHIME

	 	 	 	By:	 	     /s/    ROBERT CHAPEL


	Title:	 	     CFO

	 	 	 	Title:	 	     CFO



  
 [Signature Page to
Third Amendment to Credit Agreement]
USDC IN/ND case 3:14-cv-00315-RL   document 36-33   filed 07/14/15   page 1 of 2

USDC IN/ND case 3:14-cv-00315-RL   document 36-33   filed 07/14/15   page 2 of 2
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 104 (Wednesday, May 31, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Page 28429]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-13230]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
U.S. Geological Survey


Indonesia; Comprehensive Geographic Information System 
Development

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) 
is planning to enter into a Cooperative Research and Development 
Agreement (CRADA) with a consortium of U.S. industries and academic 
institutions. The purpose of the CRADA is to develop a comprehensive 
geographic information system for the Government of Indonesia. Any 
other parties interested in pursuing the possibility of a CRADA for 
similar kinds of activities should contact the USGS.

DATES: This notice is effective immediately.

ADDRESSES: Information on the proposed CRADA is available to the public 
upon request at the following location: U.S. Geological Survey, Office 
of International Geology, 12201 Sunrise Valley Drive, Reston, Virginia 
22092.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Dr. Jack Medlin of the U.S. Geological Survey, Office of International 
Geology, at the address given above; telephone (703) 648-6062; fax 
(703) 648-4227.

    Dated: May 22, 1995.
P. Patrick Leahy,
Chief, Geologist.
[FR Doc. 95-13230 Filed 5-30-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310-31-M
#### In re: Jamshid FARSHIDI, Petitioner.

No. 06-1014.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 27, 2006.

Decided: May 5, 2006.

Jamshid Farshidi, Petitioner Pro Se.

Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Petition denied by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Jamshid Farshidi petitions for writ of mandamus. He seeks an order directing the district court to vacate its orders in his employment discrimination action, disqualifying the judge involved in the case, and compelling the Defendant to compensate him for lost salary and benefits.

Mandamus relief is available only when the petitioner has a clear right to the relief sought. *See In re First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn.,*860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir.1988). Further, mandamus is a drastic remedy and should only be used in extraordinary circumstances. *See Kerr v. United States Dist. Court,*426 U.S. 394, 402, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976); *In re Beard,*811 F.2d 818, 826 (4th Cir.1987). Mandamus may not be used as a substitute for appeal. *See In re United Steelworkers,*595 F.2d 958, 960 (4th Cir.1979).

The relief sought by Farshidi is not available by way of mandamus. Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED*
Claude TOWNSEND, petitioner, v. NEW JERSEY TRANSIT.

No. 12-11004.

Supreme Court of the United States

Nov. 12, 2013.

Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* denied.
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 99 (Tuesday, May 23, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 27372-27373]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-12549]



=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

[Treasury Directive 16-25]


Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Equity in the Transfer of Federal 
Funds; Delegation of Authority

Dated: May 15, 1995.
    1. Delegation. By the authority granted to the Fiscal Assistant 
Secretary by Treasury Order (TO) 101-05, this Directive delegates to 
the Commissioner, Financial Management Service, the authority to 
perform any duty or function of the Secretary prescribed or required 
pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3335 and 6503, including the issuing of 
regulations which are binding on executive agencies and govern the 
timely disbursement of Federal funds and entering into agreements with 
States concerning transfers of Federal funds to States.
    2. Redelegation. The Commissioner, Financial Management Service, 
may redelegate this authority in writing, and it may be exercised in 
the individual capacity and under the individual title of each official 
receiving such authority, except that regulations must have the 
approval of the Commissioner .
    3. Regulations. The issuance of any regulations pursuant to this 
Directive shall be in accordance with Treasury Directive 28-01, 
``Preparation and Review of Regulations.''
    4. Authorities.
    a. The Cash Management Improvement Act of 1990, Public Law 101-453, 
104 Stat. 1058, as amended, codified at 31 U.S.C. 3335, 6501, and 6503.
    b. TO 101-05, ``Reporting Relationships and Supervision of 
Officials, Offices and Bureaus, Delegation of Certain Authority, and 
Order of Succession in the Department of the Treasury.''
    5. Expiration. This Directive shall expire three years from the 
date of issuance unless superseded or cancelled prior to that date. 
[[Page 27373]] 
    6. Office of Primary Interest. Office of the Commissioner, 
Financial Management Service.
Gerald Murphy,
Fiscal Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 95-12549 Filed 5-22-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-25-P
----

----

|   | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and |
|--------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at the dates and for the periods indicated. |
|--------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                                        |   |                    |   |
|---------------------------------------------|--------|-------------------------|--------|
| Date:    April 14, 2011 |   | /s/ Cheng-Yu Wang       |   |
|                                        |   | Cheng-Yu Wang           |   |
|                                        |   | Chief Financial Officer |   |

----
#### In the Matter of MAPLE-WHITWORTH, INC., Debtor. Michael N. Sofris, aka Sofris, Appellant, v. Maple-Whitworth, Inc.; United States Trustee; Larry Weinstock; Mica Bintu-Brown; and Emanuel Perez, Appellees.

No. 07-56537.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Dec. 9, 2008.

Filed March 11, 2009.

Michael N. Sofris, Michael N. Sofris APC, Beverly Hills, CA, for the appellant Michael N. Sofris, aka Sofris APC.

Jerry Kaplan; David Scott Kadin, Kap-lan, Kenegos & Kadin, Beverly Hills, CA, for the appellee Maple-Whitworth, Inc.

Before: JOHN T. NOONAN and BARRY G. SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges, and SUZANNE B. CONLON,* District Judge.

*

 The Honorable Suzanne B. Conlon, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

CONLON, District Judge:

This court’s February 10, 2009 opinion recounts that Sofris, joined by others in the Mayman-Nathan faction, filed an involuntary Chapter 7 petition against Maple-Whitworth under 11 U.S.C. § 303(a)-(b). *Michael N. Sofris, APC v. Maple-Whitworth, Inc. (In re Maple-Whitworth, Inc.),*556 F.3d 742, 744 (9th Cir.2009). This statement adopts the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s characterization of the involuntary petition as a Chapter 7 petition. *Michael N. Sofris, APC v. Maple-Whitworth, Inc. (In re Maple-Whitworth, Inc.),*375 B.R. 558, 563 (9th Cir. BAP 2007). Sofris filed a notice of errata stating that the involuntary petition was a Chapter 11 petition. No objection to the notice of errata has been filed. The record confirms that the involuntary petition sought relief under Chapter 11. The February 10, 2009 opinion is corrected to reflect that the involuntary petition invoked Chapter 11, not Chapter 7.
Gabriel MARQUEZ, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 12-9689.

Supreme Court of the United States

July 22, 2013.

Petition for rehearing denied.