UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

JOHN M. KULCSAR, 

 Plaintiff, 

 

v. 

 

AUTOZONE, LLC, 

 Defendant. 

 Case No.: 3:15-CV-289-JVB-CAN 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Plaintiff Kulcsar sued his former employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964, as amended (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.). Plaintiff claims constructive discharge based on 

“pervasive age and sex—sex stereotyping discrimination,” harassment, and retaliation for 

reporting the discrimination and harassment. (Amend. Compl., DE 27 at 2.) Defendant 

AutoZoners, LLC,1

 moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim, under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

A. Standard for evaluating a motion to dismiss

 The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim 

is to test the sufficiency of the pleadings, not to decide the merits of the case. See Gibson v. Chi., 

910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). Rule 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint must contain “a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” However, 

“recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 

                                                            

1

 AutoZoners, LLC, claims Plaintiff improperly named it as AutoZone, LLC, in the amended 

complaint. 
2 

suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 555 (2007)).1

As the Supreme Court stated, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the 

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. Rather, “a 

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A complaint is facially 

plausible if a court can reasonably infer from factual content in the pleading that the defendant is 

liable for the alleged wrongdoing. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

The Seventh Circuit synthesized the standard into three requirements. See Brooks v. Ross, 

578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). “First, a plaintiff must provide notice to defendants of her 

claims. Second, courts must accept a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, but some factual 

allegations will be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice to 

defendants of the plaintiff’s claim. Third, in considering the plaintiff’s factual allegations, courts 

should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or 

conclusory legal statements.” Id.

                                                            

1

In Twombly, the Supreme Court “retooled federal pleading standards, retiring the oft-quoted 

[Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 42, 47 (1957)] formulation that a pleading ‘should not be dismissed 

for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the [pleader] can prove no set of 

facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank 

Nevada, N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2007). 
3 

B. Plaintiff’s amended complaint

 Plaintiff alleges the following. He involuntarily resigned from employment with 

Defendant on August 28, 2014, after five months of pervasive age and sex stereotyping 

discrimination, harassment, and retaliation for reporting the discrimination and harassment. 

Defendant failed to investigate his complaints thoroughly, and knowingly allowed the 

discrimination, harassment, and hostility to escalate. 

 On May 9, 2014, co-worker Quinton Cassell told Plaintiff that someone called the store 

to make a gun threat against Plaintiff. A few days later, two other co-workers, Glory Wendt and 

Jorge Marquez, apparently began telling Plaintiff that Cassell thought Plaintiff was incapable, 

slow, gay, and did not belong there. 

 On May 13, 2014, Marquez told Plaintiff that Cassell tried to have acquaintances make 

complaints in an effort to cause Plaintiff’s termination. The same day, Plaintiff reported this to 

Chris Carpio, the store manager. Yet no one addressed or recorded Plaintiff’s grievance. 

 On May 15, 2014, Carpio retaliated against Plaintiff by citing him for a minor infraction 

of a rule not commonly enforced. 

 On May 27, 2014, Wendt called Plaintiff from the store and Plaintiff heard Cassell say in 

the background, “you are no better than that faggot John.” 

 On May 28, 2014, Plaintiff reported this incident to Carpio. On the same day, Marquez 

told Plaintiff that Cassell said he knew how to deal with people like Plaintiff and knew how to 

get rid of him. Also on that day, two sequenced seals disappeared, making it impossible for 

Plaintiff to complete a particular task. (Plaintiff doesn’t say why the seals disappeared, but he 
4 

implies sabotage.) Carpio made Plaintiff pay for a cash register error greater than $30 and 

reprimanded him. 

 On June 3, 2014, Cassell failed to open the store on time, but did not receive any 

disciplinary action. 

 Through the end of June 2014, Carpio and Cassell heckled Plaintiff in front of customers 

about being bi-polar, having a low IQ, and having degenerative cognitive disease. (Plaintiff 

denies ever having these conditions.) Plaintiff complained to Carpio about this but Carpio was 

dismissive. 

 On July 8, 2014, Carpio issued Plaintiff a fourth corrective action. (Plaintiff presents 

reasons why this corrective action and two others were unjust. Plaintiff claims he received each 

corrective action within days of reporting harassment to Carpio.) Plaintiff claims he “was now 

being transferred to another location based upon performance issues that did not exist.” (Amend. 

Compl., DE 27 at 5.) Plaintiff claims the transfer was “essentially a demotion to a far smaller, 

less demanding and challenging location . . . to avoid addressing the underlying discrimination, 

harassment and retaliation.” (Id.) The attempted transfer humiliated Plaintiff. 

 On July 17, 2014, Lecta, an employee at the new store, called Plaintiff and told him she 

knew the transfer was based on pretext and that Plaintiff had no performance issues. Lecta 

(directly or indirectly—the complaint is unclear) confirmed Plaintiff’s suspicions that the 

difficulties resulted from his sexual orientation, which Plaintiff had not disclosed. 

 On July 19, 2014, co-worker Zalazar said to a customer near Plaintiff, “his gay ass is 

being transferred in a few days.” (Id. at 6.) Later that day, another co-worker told Plaintiff that 

Carpio and Cassell were mistreating Plaintiff because he is gay. 
5 

 On July 20, 2014, co-workers told Plaintiff that Cassell’s conduct was escalating to 

include threats of physical violence against Plaintiff. (Plaintiff does not allege Cassell made 

threats of physical violence to Plaintiff.) 

 Plaintiff then called the AutoZone employee hotline for the third time. He complained 

about the escalation of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. He complained of fearing for 

his safety and he complained about the pending transfer based on pretext. He eventually spoke 

with higher-level representatives. Plaintiff claims Rice, human resources generalist, selectively 

documented the information. 

 By July 28, 2014, the unjust transfer and corrective actions were repealed. Plaintiff called 

Bush, in divisional human resources, to ask why nothing had been done to correct the problems 

except repeal of the transfer and corrective actions. Bush told Plaintiff his claims were denied. 

 On August 15, 2015, Wendt and Cassell conspired to incite two customers against 

Plaintiff. One of these customers waited in his car in front of the store for an hour, watching 

Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff complained to Carpio, but nothing was done to redress the problem. Instead, on 

August 26, 2014, Plaintiff was reprimanded on the basis of false statements about customer 

complaints that never occurred and on the basis of false accusations of misconduct. 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not (and needs not) present neat counts delineating 

the claims. Instead, the amended complaint cites Title VII as its basis and provides: 

“CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE. PLAINTIFF INVOLUNTARILY 

RESIGNED 8/24/14 FOLLOWING 5 MONTHS OF PERVASIVE AGE 

AND SEX—SEX STEREOTYPING DISCRIMINATION, 

HARASSMENT AND RETALIATION FOR REPORTING THE 

DISCRIMINATION AND HARASSMENT.” 
6 

(Amend. Compl., DE 27 at 2.) The amended complaint provides the factual narrative 

summarized above, with the words “harassment,” “discrimination,” and “retaliation” sprinkled 

throughout. Defendant characterizes the amended complaint as attempting to state claims for age 

discrimination, sex stereotyping discrimination, hostile work environment based on age, hostile 

work environment based on sex stereotyping, constructive discharge, and retaliation.2

 In his 

response, Plaintiff does not challenge this characterization. Indeed, the only claims Plaintiff 

defends in his response are claims for “sexual harassment due to the stereotype of ‘maleness;’” 

constructive discharge due to the harassment; and age discrimination, harassment, and 

retaliation. 

 Defendant moves to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiff (1) failed to state a claim for 

age or gender discrimination or “sex stereotyping” discrimination, (2) failed to state a claim for 

hostile work environment based on age or gender or “sex stereotyping,” (3) failed to state a claim 

for constructive discharge, and (4) failed to state a claim for retaliation. 

C. Discussion 

Plaintiff brings his claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 

which prohibits certain employers3

 from discriminating “against any individual with respect to 

his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s 

race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” and prohibits certain employers from discriminating 

                                                            

2

 In an opinion decided July 28, 2016, and amended August 3, 2016, the Seventh Circuit 

followed the precedent that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual 

orientation. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2016). On October 11, 

2016, however, the Seventh Circuit granted rehearing en banc, and vacated the panel’s opinion. 

Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., No. 15-1720, 2016 WL 6768628, at *1 (7th Cir. Oct. 11, 2016). 

3

 Defendant does not dispute that it is an “employer” as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). 
7 

against any employee “because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 

practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in 

any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 

2000e-2(a)(1) and 2000e-3(a). Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for failure to 

exhaust administrative remedies and for failure to allege a materially adverse employment 

action. 

(1) Law 

(a) Exhaustion of administrative remedies 

 Plaintiff claims his resignation on August 28, 2014, following five months of pervasive 

age and “sex—sex stereotyping” discrimination, harassment, and retaliation for reporting the 

discrimination and harassment, constituted constructive discharge in violation of Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act. Plaintiff also claims he suffered other violations of Title VII. 

As a pre-requisite to bringing such claims in court, Plaintiff must exhaust his 

administrative remedies by filing a charge with the appropriate agency. Dandy v. United Parcel 

Serv., Inc., 388 F.3d 263, 270 (7th Cir. 2004). Title VII lawsuits must be based on the same 

claims as those stated in the EEOC charge, or at least must be “like or reasonably related to the 

allegations of the [administrative] charge and growing out of such allegations.” Teal v. Potter, 

559 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff may not bring a lawsuit for Title VII discrimination 

that does not grow out of an EEOC retaliation charge. Sitar v. Ind. Dep’t of Trans., 344 F.3d 720, 

727 (7th Cir. 2003). 
8 

Courts review the scope of an EEOC charge liberally. Huri v. Office of the Chief Judge of 

the Circuit Court of Cook County, 804 F.3d 826, 831 (7th Cir. 2015). The relevant litigated claim 

and the EEOC charge must, at a minimum, describe the same conduct and implicate the same 

individuals. Id. at 831–832. A claim of sex discrimination in an EEOC charge and a claim of sex 

discrimination in a complaint are not alike or reasonably related simply because they both assert 

some form of sex discrimination. Cheek v. W. and S. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 

1994). “The claims are not alike or reasonably related unless there is a factual relationship 

between them.” Id. The requirement of some specificity in an EEOC charge is not a mere 

technicality. Id.

A court will dismiss a claim in a complaint for failure to exhaust when the EEOC charge 

does not specifically describe the conduct giving rise to that claim. See Rush v. McDonald’s 

Corp., 966 F.2d 1104, 1111–12 (7th Cir. 1992). “An aggrieved employee may not complain to 

the EEOC of only certain instances of discrimination, and then seek judicial relief for different 

instances of discrimination.” Rush, 966 F.2d at 1110. 

To satisfy the exhaustion prerequisite, an EEOC charge must contain some detail, beyond 

a mere statement that “I believe I have been discriminated against on the basis of my race, 

Caucasian, gender, age (45), harassed and retaliated against in violation of Title VII . . . .” 

(EEOC Charge, DE 28 at 5.) See Rush, 966 F.2d at 1111. The Seventh Circuit held that “it will 

not suffice to file general charges with the EEOC . . . and then to expect that this allegation will 

permit all claims of . . . discrimination in a subsequent lawsuit.” Id. at 1112. 
9 

Here, Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge alleging discrimination based on race, sex, 

retaliation, age, and genetic information. Next to “OTHER,” Plaintiff claimed “Harassment.” 

(EEOC Charge, DE 28 at 5.) In this EEOC charge, Plaintiff claimed: 

1) He was constructively discharged due to a hostile work environment; 

2) Cassell enlisted friends to stage complaints against him; 

3) Plaintiff reported this to Carpio to no avail; 

4) Plaintiff received “write ups” and “felt compelled to refuse an unjust transfer”; 

5) Plaintiff “endured comments from Carpio and Cassel of being Bi-polar”; 

6) Cassell’s “escalating behavior” caused Plaintiff to fear for his safety; 

7) Other incidents of harassment “too numerous to list here”; 

8) An “August 15 incident” which “led to Respondent threatening” his employment and 

to his inability to remain in such a “toxic environment”; 

9) Discrimination based on race, with no supporting facts; 

10) Discrimination based on gender, with no supporting facts; 

11) Discrimination based on age, with no supporting facts; and 

12) Harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII and the ADEA, with no 

supporting facts. 

(Id.) 

 Defendant claims Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on his claims for 

discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and constructive discharge based on age and sexstereotyping. 
10 

(b) Materially adverse employment action, and alteration of working condition 

Title VII does not establish “a general civility code for the American workplace.” Oncale 

v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 

An essential element of every Title VII employment discrimination claim is a materially 

adverse employment action. “The requirement that a plaintiff show [he] suffered an adverse 

employment action as a result of [his] employer’s alleged discrimination is an element of any 

Title VII claim.” Chaib v. Ind., 744 F.3d 974, 982 (7th Cir. 2014). An adverse employment 

action must “materially alter the terms and conditions of employment.” Dass v. Chi. Bd. of 

Educ., 675 F.3d 1060, 1069 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Stutler v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 263 F.3d 698, 

703 (7th Cir. 2001). A reprimand, without more, is not an adverse employment action. Id. at 987. 

A mere inconvenience or a minor change in working conditions is not a materially adverse 

employment action. Nichols v. S. Ill. Univ., 510 F.3d 772, 780 (7th Cir. 2007). A lateral transfer 

not involving demotion in form or substance is not a materially adverse employment action. 

Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996). “[N]ot everything that 

makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action.” O’Neal v. City of Chi., 392 F.3d 

909, 911 (7th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Similarly, a Title VII harassment claim requires an allegation of harassment “sufficiently 

severe or pervasive so as to alter the condition of . . . employment and create a hostile or abusive 

atmosphere.” Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp., 472 F.3d 930, 940 (7th Cir. 2007). A hostile work 

environment exists where an employee experiences harassment “so severe or pervasive as to 

alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment.” Conley v. Vill. 

of Bedford Park, 215 F.3d 703, 712–13 (7th Cir. 2000). 
11 

 Likewise, a retaliation claim requires a materially adverse employment action, causally 

connected to Plaintiff engaging in statutorily protected activity. Gracia v. SigmaTron Int’l, Inc., 

842 F.3d 1010, 1019 (7th Cir. 2016). 

 Defendant argues Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be dismissed for failure to plead 

a materially adverse employment action, or an actionable alteration in the condition of 

employment. 

(2) Claims 

(a) Age-based claims 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint faces multiple problems regarding age-based claims, 

including problems related to the lack of exhaustion and materially adverse employment action. 

As a threshold matter, the amended complaint cannot state an age-based Title VII claim 

because there is no such thing, and the amended complaint does not even attempt to state an 

ADEA claim. The amended complaint purports to bring claims under Title VII based on 

discrimination, harassment, and retaliation involving Plaintiff’s age, but Title VII does not 

prohibit discrimination, harassment, or retaliation based on age. See Kremer v. Chem. Const. 

Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 465 n.4 (1982) (“No further mention was made of age discrimination, 

which is not covered by Title VII.”) The Age Discrimination in Employment Act does. 29 U.S.C. 

§ 621 et seq. But Plaintiff did not check the line next to this statute in the “BASIS OF CLAIM 

AND JURISDICTION” section of his amended complaint form. In other words, Plaintiff does 

not even purport to state an ADEA claim in his amended complaint. 
12 

 But even if he had checked the ADEA box—and another amendment could easily cure 

this—Plaintiff’s age claims still face an exhaustion problem because although the EEOC charge 

includes a mark in the “AGE” box, and although the EEOC charge says Kulcsar was 

discriminated against on the basis of his “age (45)” and references the ADEA, the EEOC charge 

provides no basis for thinking Kulcsar’s age factored into anything. Rush, 966 F.2d at 1111–12. 

 And even if the Court resolved this problem in Plaintiff’s favor by concluding that the 

age claims Plaintiff purports to bring in his lawsuit are “like or reasonably related to the 

allegations of the [administrative] charge” and grow out of such allegations, Plaintiff’s age 

claims still face a Rule 12(b)(6) problem. Plaintiff’s amended complaint makes no factual 

allegations about Plaintiff’s age or about anyone doing anything based on his age. To state a 

claim for age discrimination under the ADEA, Plaintiff must allege Defendant subjected him to 

adverse employment action because of his age. See Barton v. Zimmer, Inc., 662 F.3d 448, 453 

(7th Cir. 2011). To state a claim for retaliation related to age, Plaintiff must allege he engaged in 

statutorily protected activity, he suffered a materially adverse action, and the two are causally 

related. See id. at 455. 

Here, Plaintiff failed even to allege in his amended complaint anything about his age 

other than the bare legal conclusion that he suffered age-based discrimination, harassment, and 

retaliation. Plaintiff failed to allege any factual basis for thinking that his age had anything to do 

with anything. Plaintiff failed to allege that he engaged in any activity protected by the ADEA. 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to satisfy Iqbal and Twombly regarding any age-based 

claims. It fails to raise the prospects of Plaintiff’s claims regarding age above the speculative 

level to the plausible. 
13 

 Plaintiff attempts to cure this failure in his response to the motion to dismiss. He alleges 

that everyone in the store where he worked was under the age of 30; all the discrimination, 

harassment, and retaliation was committed by people younger than him; he was the only person 

who was “treated so egregiously and discriminated against”; and he was the only full-time 

employee in the store over the age of 40. But even in this response, Plaintiff fails to allege any 

facts to support a causal connection between his age and any adverse employment action. Merely 

alleging that the people who discriminated against him were younger than him is insufficient. 

 Therefore, the Court dismisses all of Plaintiff’s claims based on his age. 

(b) Gender/sex-stereotyping claims

 Plaintiff’s amended complaint also faces problems regarding gender/sex-stereotyping 

claims. 

 First, Plaintiff failed to exhaust these claims. In his EEOC charge, he checked the box 

next to “SEX” and he included the closing line: “I believe I have been discriminated against on 

the basis of my . . . gender . . . .” (EEOC Charge, DE 28 at 5.) But his EEOC charge mentions no 

facts to support any Title VII gender claim. This failure-to-exhaust alone requires dismissal of 

Plaintiff’s gender/sex-stereotyping claims. See Rush, 966 F.2d at 1111–12. 

 Second, Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails on its face to state a gender/sex-stereotyping 

claim. The Supreme Court identified sex-stereotyping as an impermissible form of 

discrimination. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989). Like other forms of 

discrimination, a claim for sex-stereotyping discrimination requires an allegation of an adverse 
14 

employment action. See Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1064 (7th Cir. 

2003). 

Similarly, a claim for sex-stereotyping harassment requires an allegation of harassment 

that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condition of employment and create a hostile 

or abusive atmosphere. See Kampmier, 472 F.3d at 940. And a claim for hostile work 

environment based on sex-stereotyping requires an allegation that the work environment was 

subjectively and objectively offensive and that the challenged conduct was severe or pervasive 

enough to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create a hostile or abusive working 

environment. See Huri, 804 F.3d at 833–34. 

 Yet Plaintiff failed to allege a materially adverse employment action regarding the 

gender/sex-stereotyping claims, and failed to allege harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive 

to alter the condition of employment and create a hostile or abusive atmosphere. 

 Plaintiff alleges Cassell told him on May 9, 2014, that a gun threat had been phoned into 

the store against Plaintiff, but Plaintiff does not allege Cassell fabricated this threat. Plaintiff 

alleges various instances of second-hand comments, but “the impact of second-hand harassment 

is obviously not as great as the impact of harassment directed at the plaintiff.” Gleason v. 

Mesirow Fin., Inc., 118 F.3d 1134, 1145 (7th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Plaintiff alleges various corrective or disciplinary actions taken against him, but these do not 

constitute materially adverse employment action, or alter the condition of his employment. 

Plaintiff alleges that for about a week toward the end of June 2014, Carpio and Cassell heckled 

Plaintiff about being bi-polar, having a low I.Q., and having degenerative cognitive disease, but 

these comments do not involve gender or gender-stereotyping. Plaintiff alleges his employer 
15 

considered transferring him to another location, but the transfer never actually happened, so it is 

not a materially adverse employment action or a material alteration of the condition of 

employment. Plaintiff alleges an incident on August 15, 2014, during which his co-workers 

incited two customers against him. But this does not rise to the level of a materially adverse 

employment action or a material alteration of the condition of employment. Plaintiff states no 

facts to support any allegation of danger. 

 Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s gender/sex-stereotyping claims. 

(c) Constructive discharge

 To plead a claim for constructive discharge, a plaintiff must allege facts that demonstrate 

“not only . . . that a hostile work environment exists but also that the abusive working 

environment was so intolerable that [his] resignation was an appropriate response.” Herron v. 

DaimlerChrysler Corp., 388 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2004). 

 Here, Plaintiff failed to bring an EEOC claim for constructive discharge based on age or 

gender/sex-stereotyping, and Plaintiff failed to allege facts in his amended complaint sufficient 

to state a claim for constructive discharge. 

 Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claim for constructive discharge. 

(d) Retaliation

To plead a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege: (1) he engaged in statutorily 

protected activity, (2) he was subjected to a materially adverse employment action, and (3) a 

causal connection between the two. See Huri, 804 F.3d at 833. 
16 

 Here, Plaintiff failed to bring an EEOC claim for retaliation involving any activity 

protected by Title VII. His EEOC charge merely alleged that on May 18, 2014, he reported 

efforts to stage complaints against him to a store manager and that he contacted “Corporate” in 

late July 2014 (about what he does not say in his EEOC charge) and “some corrective actions 

were taken” (again, the EEOC charge is vague). (EEOC Charge, DE 28 at 5.) Plaintiff thus failed 

to claim engagement in statutorily protected activities in his EEOC charge. Nor does Plaintiff 

claim in his amended complaint that he suffered any retaliation after he filed the EEOC charge. 

This is sufficient grounds to dismiss the retaliation claims. See Reynolds v. Tangherlini, 737 F.3d 

1093, 1009 –1100 (7th Cir. 2013). 

 Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s retaliation claims. 

D. Conclusion

 The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s amended complaint (DE 27). 

SO ORDERED on February 24, 2017. 

 s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

 JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE