alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 18-3037

___________________________

Valerie LeMaster

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant

v.

Ditech Financial LLC, formerly known as Green Tree Servicing LLC; Federal

National Mortgage Association; Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees

 ____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota

 ____________

 Submitted: September 25, 2019

Filed: April 15, 2020

[Unpublished]

____________

Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

Since our stay of this appeal as to the Federal National Mortgage Association

(“Fannie Mae”) and Ditech Financial, LLC (“Ditech”) in light of Ditech’s

commencement of bankruptcy proceedings, the bankruptcy court confirmed the

bankruptcy plan. The plan includes a permanent injunction of claims that “interfere
with the implementation or consummation of the Plan.” The parties dispute whether

the claims against Fannie Mae and Ditech are barred by the injunction. But even if

the claims are not barred by the injunction, we affirm the dismissal of LeMaster’s

federal claims for lack of standing, see LeMaster v. Ditech Fin. LLC, 782 F. App’x

519 (8th Cir. 2019) (per curiam), and thus lack supplemental jurisdiction over

LeMaster’s state law claims against Fannie Mae and Ditech, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367;

ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 645 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 2011)

(“[I]f a plaintiff lacks standing to sue, the district court has no subject-matter

jurisdiction.”); 8th Cir. R. 47B. We thus affirm the district court and dismiss the

appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

______________________________

-2-
Exhibit 32.1




CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the Annual Report of Urban Barns Foods Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K/A for the period ending July 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Jacob Benne, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and


(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.




IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this certification as of the 14th day of December, 2010.




/s/ Jacob Benne


Jacob Benne


Chief Executive Officer
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 103 (Tuesday, May 30, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 28106-28107]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-13086]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
[Docket No. RP95-300-000]


Questar Pipeline Co.; Termination of Gathering Service

May 23, 1995.
    Take notice that on May 18, 1995, Questar Pipeline Company 
(Questar) filed, pursuant to Section 4 of the Natural Gas Act, a notice 
of termination of gathering service it provides to Chevron U.S.A. 
Production Company (Chevron).
    [[Page 28107]] Questar states that by letter of April 21, 1995, 
Chevron notified Questar of its election to terminate Contract No. TH-
112OH (Questar's Contract No. 00702 G-2) effective May 31, 1995, 
pursuant to Article 3 of the contract. Questar states that under the 
contract, it provided gathering service from Chevron's Government FS 
Prince #1 well through Questar's gathering Lateral Nos. 523-1 and 521. 
According to Questar, Chevron has expressed interest in purchasing 
Lateral No. 523-1 so that it could gather its own gas. The parties are 
currently negotiating a purchase and sale agreement for Lateral No. 
523-1 and expect to execute the agreement in the near future. Questar 
asserts that Lateral No. 523-1 was never certificated and that Chevron 
is the only customer receiving gathering service over this facility. 
Questar explains that Chevron's well is the only one attached to this 
facility, and since Chevron will be providing its own gathering service 
after the sale of the lateral, there are no continuity of service 
issues in connection with the proposed termination of this gathering 
service by Questar.
    Any Person desiring to be heard or to protest said filing should 
file a motion to intervene or protest with the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 825 North Capitol Street, NE., Washington, DC 
20426, in accordance with Secs. 385.211 and 385.214 of the Commission's 
rules of practice and procedure. All such motions or protests should be 
filed on or before May 31, 1995. Protests will be considered by the 
Commission in determining the appropriate action to be taken, but will 
not serve to make protestants parties to the proceeding. And person 
wishing to become a party must file a motion to intervene. Copies of 
this filing are on file with the Commission and are available for 
public inspection in the Public Reference Room.
Linwood A. Watson, Jr.,
Acting Secretary.
[FR Doc. 95-13086 Filed 5-26-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
#### UNITED STATES LEASING & HOLDING CO. v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

July 10, 1913.)

Appeal from Trial Term, New York County. Action for nuisance by the United States Leasing & Holding Company against the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company. Judgment for the plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed, and complaint dismissed. Robert A. I&utschback, of New York City, for appellant. Joseph A. Shay, of New York City, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The plaintiff neither alleged nor proved that the railroad was operated negligently or unreasonably. There is no find-lug of negligent or unreasonable use. The ease is almost identical with Friedman v. N. Y. & Harlem R. R. Co., 89 App. Div. 38, 85 N. Y. Supp. 404; affirmed 180 N. Y. 550, 73 N. E. 1123. See, also, McCarthy v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 189 N. Y. 40, 81 N. E. 549, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 465, 12 Ann. Cas. 840. Judgment reversed, and complaint dismissed, with costs.
Exhibit 32CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002The undersigned have executed this certification in connection with the filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the Company’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-K for the period ending June 30, 2009.  The undersigned hereby certify that to our knowledge:(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.Dated:   October 13, 2009                           /s/ Fred Zolla                                            Fred ZollaPresident and Chief Executive Officer(Principal Executive Officer)Dated:   October 13, 2009                          /s/ Craig Stout                                        Craig StoutChief Operating Officer and Interim Chief Financial Officer
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

SELECTSUN GMBH, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) 

v. ) No. 1:14 CV 215

)

PORTER, INC., d/b/a Thunderbird Products, )

and INTERNATIONAL NAUTIC, LLC, )

)

Defendants. )

O R D E R

This matter is before the court on Magistrate Judge Collins’ Report and

Recommendation (“R&R”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(b), Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 72(b), and Northern District of Indiana Local Rule 72-1(b). (DE # 130.)

Magistrate Judge Collins recommended that the court strike International Nautic’s

Answer (DE # 15, 78) and Motion to Dismiss (DE # 80), and enter a default judgment

against it as a sanction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f)(1), essentially

because International Nautic has abandoned this litigation. It is a limited liability

company which must be represented by an attorney, and it no longer is. 

Consistent with that abandonment, International Nautic did not object to the

R&R. Defendant Porter, Inc., did, however, primarily on the basis that a default against

International Nautic creates the risk of an inconsistent result. (DE # 133.)

International Nautic must conduct its own litigation, therefore Porter, Inc.’s

objection (DE # 133) is OVERRULED. Magistrate Judge Collins’ R&R (DE # 130) is

ADOPTED as the court’s opinion. Therefore, the court STRIKES International Nautic’s
Answer (DE # 15, 78) and Motion to Dismiss (DE # 80), and order default judgment

against it as a sanction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f)(1). In order to avoid

the possibility of inconsistent results, the court withholds entry of a final judgment on

the default until the conclusion of this litigation.

SO ORDERED.

Date: March 31, 2016

s/James T. Moody 

JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 91 (Thursday, May 11, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Page 25214]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-11608]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
[Docket No. RP93-36-014]


Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America; Notice of Refund Report

May 5, 1995.
    Take notice that on April 28, 1995, Natural Gas Pipeline Company of 
America (Natural) filed its report of refunds in the above referenced 
docket for the period June 1, 1993 through January 31, 1995.
    Natural states that the refunds were disbursed on March 31, 1995 
and that customers were served with calculations supporting their 
individual refunds at that time.
    Any person desiring to be heard or to protest said filing should 
file a motion to intervene or protest with the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 825 North Capitol Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 
20426, in accordance with Sections 385.214 and 385.211 of the 
Commission's Rules and Regulations. All such motions or protests should 
be filed on or before May 12, 1995. Protests will be considered by the 
Commission in determining the appropriate action to be taken, but will 
not serve to make protestants parties to the proceeding. Any person 
wishing to become a party must file a motion to intervene. Copies of 
this filing are on file with the Commission and are available for 
public inspection in the public reference room.
Lois D. Cashell,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 95-11608 Filed 5-10-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
Thomas Douglas SCOTT, petitioner, v. MULE CREEK STATE PRISON, et al.

No. 12-9884.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 24, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
#### MAGLAY, Respondent, v. SHERMAN, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

March 26, 1912.)

Action by William H. Maclay against Charlotte M. Sherman. No opinion. Motion granted, without costs.
[No. 22747-2-III.

Division Three.

January 20, 2005.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Kelly Jay Balles, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Spokane County, No. 03-1-03499-2, Tari S. Eitzen, J., entered February 2, 2004. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Schultheis, J., concurred in by Kato, C.J., and Brown, J.
I 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 157 

To direct the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to prepare a report 

about how the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 has been used by 

public and private sector employers to foster or exacerbate pay inequity, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 4, 2005 

Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD introduced the following bill; which was referred 

to the Committee on Education and the Workforce 

A BILL 

To direct the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

to prepare a report about how the Fair Labor Standards 

Act of 1938 has been used by public and private sector 

employers to foster or exacerbate pay inequity, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Equal Pay Improve5 ment Report Act of 2005’’. 
2 

•HR 157 IH 

1 SEC. 2. REPORT BY EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 

2 COMMISSION. 

3 Not later than one year after the date of enactment 

4 of this Act, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis5 sion, using information supplied by the Department of 

6 Labor, the Office of Management and Budget, and the 

7 General Accounting Office, shall submit a report to the 

8 Congress making findings and recommendations relating 

9 to how the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 

10 201 et seq.) has been used by public and private sector 

11 employers to foster or exacerbate pay inequities, especially 

12 such inequities based on an employee’s gender, race, color, 

13 religion, or national origin, or such other factor as the 

14 Commission finds relevant. 

Æ
USDC IN/ND case 2:14-cv-00249-JVB-JEM   document 23   filed 01/05/15   page 1 of 7

USDC IN/ND case 2:14-cv-00249-JVB-JEM   document 23   filed 01/05/15   page 2 of 7

USDC IN/ND case 2:14-cv-00249-JVB-JEM   document 23   filed 01/05/15   page 3 of 7

USDC IN/ND case 2:14-cv-00249-JVB-JEM   document 23   filed 01/05/15   page 4 of 7

USDC IN/ND case 2:14-cv-00249-JVB-JEM   document 23   filed 01/05/15   page 5 of 7

USDC IN/ND case 2:14-cv-00249-JVB-JEM   document 23   filed 01/05/15   page 6 of 7

USDC IN/ND case 2:14-cv-00249-JVB-JEM   document 23   filed 01/05/15   page 7 of 7
### The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judg e 1 

### for the Eastern District of Arkansas, sitting by designation. ___________ No. 96-1235

___________ Robert Anthony Williams, * * Appellant, * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the v. * Southern District of Iowa. * John Thalacker; Attorney * [UNPUBLISHED] General of the State of Iowa, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: November 22, 1996 Filed: January 17, 1997

___________ Before BEAM, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges, and MOODY, District Judge. 1

___________ BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Robert An thony Williams was convicted of murder in Iowa. On direct appeal, the state supreme court affirmed his conviction, but declined to consi derWilliams’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel an d pro secutorial misconduct. State v. Williams , 285 N.W.2d 248, 271 (Iow a 1979). T he court explained that the appropriate time to raise suc h argum ents in Iowa was in an action for post-conviction relief an d specifically reserved Williams’s right to do so. Id. Rather than pursuing these c laims in state court, however, Williams filed a federal habea s petition addressing o nly the claims the state court had considered on the mer its. That habeas petition was ultimately unsuccessful. Williams v
. Nix , 528 F. Supp. 664 (S.D. Iowa 1981), reversed , 700 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir.

### -2-

1983), reversed , 467 U.S. 431 (1984), on remand , 751 F.2d 956 (8th Cir.), cert denied , 471 U.S. 1138 (1985). Upon fully litigating the exhausted issues in federal court, Wi lliams ins titutedstate post-conviction proceedings, raising his ineffectiv e assist ance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct claims. The stat e courts denied relief. Williams then filed anoth er habeas action, alleging ineffective assistanc e and prosecutorial misconduct for the first time in fed eral court. The district court dismissed the subsequent petition o n these claims as an abuse of the writ. Williams appeals.
Wil liams asserts that it would be inequitable not to hear hi s heretofore unexhauste d claims because the law regarding the abuse-of-thewrit doctr ine was unclear when he decided to proceed in federal cour t ratherthan exhausting his state remedies. We have carefully considered this a rgument and have thoroughly reviewed the parties’ briefs and submissions. Upon such examination, we are conv inced the district court’s ruling was correct in all respects. Accordingly , we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 11 (Wednesday, January 18, 1995)]
[Sunshine Act Meetings]
[Page 3699]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-1236]





                Sunshine Act Meetings



Federal Register  / Vol. 60, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 18, 1995 / 
Sunshine Act Meetings
[[Page 3699]] 




Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

``FEDERAL REGISTER'' CITATION OF PREVIOUS ANNOUNCEMENT: January 10, 
1995, 60 FR 2623.

PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED TIME AND DATE OF MEETING: January 11, 1995, 10:00 
a.m.

CHANGE IN THE MEETING: The following Docket Number has been added on 
the Agenda scheduled for January 11, 1995:

Item No. Docket No. and Company

CAG-9--RP94-76-000, Carnegie Natural Gas Company
Lois D. Cashell,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 95-1236 Filed 1-13-95; 9:37 am]

BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
Exhibit 32.1

                           CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Castmor Resources Ltd. on Form 10-K for
the year ended August 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Alfonso Quijada, President, Chief
Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer of
the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)     The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2)     The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


Date: February 11, 2011

By /s/ Alfonso Quijada
Alfonso Quijada
Chief Executive Officer, President,
Chief Financial Officer and
Principal Accounting Officer
2020

Federal Deposit 

Insurance Corporation 

This Annual Report was produced by talented and dedicated staf. To these 

individuals, we would like to ofer our sincere thanks 

and appreciation. Special recognition is given to the following 

for their contributions: 

❏ Jannie F. Eaddy 

❏ Barbara A. Glasby 

❏ Financial Reporting Section Staf 

❏ Division and Ofice Points-of-Contact 

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
#### Jesus Castillo GIL; et al., Petitioners, v. John ASHCROFT, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 02-70999.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*518Submitted April 12, 2004.*

Decided April 28, 2004.

Jesus Castillo Gil, Sun Valley, CA, pro se.

Maria Del Carmen, Sun Valley, CA, pro se.

Mary Del Carmen Mary Del Carmen Castillo Camano, Sun Valley, CA, pro se.

Regional Counsel, Laguna Niguel, CA, District Counsel, Esq., Office of the District Counsel, Los Angeles, CA, Ronald E. LeFevre, Chief Legal Officer, Office of the District Counsel, Richard M. Evans, Esq., John L. Davis, U.S. Department of Justice, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, RYMER, and BEA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jesus Castillo Gil, Maria del Carmen Camano Garcia, and Mary del Carmen Castillo Camano, natives and citizens of Mexico, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming without opinion the decision of the Immigration Judge denying their applications for cancellation of removal. We dismiss in part, and deny in part, the petition for review.

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary determination that Mr. Gil failed to satisfy the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” requirement for cancellation of removal. *Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft,*327 F.3d 887, 892 (9th Cir.2003).

Petitioners’ equal protection challenges to NACARA and to IIRIRA lack merit. *See Jimenez-Angeles v. Ashcroft,*291 F.3d 594, 602-03 (9th Cir.2002); *Ram v. INS,*243 F.3d 510, 517-518 (9th Cir.2001).

Pursuant to *Desta v. Ashcroft,*No. 03-70477, petitioners’ motion for stay of removal included a timely request for stay of voluntary departure. Because the motion for stay of removal was granted, or continued based on the government’s filing of a notice of non-opposition, the voluntary departure period was also stayed nunc pro tunc to the filing of the motion for stay of removal, and this stay will expire upon issuance of the mandate.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part, DENIED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the *519courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### McCASKEY REGISTER CO. v. BLAISDELL.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.

May 9, 1912.)

Evidence (§ 441*)—Parol Evidence—Varying the Terms of a Written Contract.

In an action for the price of a cash register sold under a written contract, evidence of an oral contract with plaintiff’s salesman, giving the privilege of returning the register, if not satisfactory, etc., was inadmissible.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 203072047; Dec. Dig. § 441.*] Í

Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Fifth District.

Action by the McCaskey Register Company against Walter F. Blaisdell. From a judgment in the Municipal Court of the City of New York in favor of the defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed, and new trial ordered.

Argued April term, 1912, before SEABURY, GUY, and GERARD, JJ.

Yankauer & Davidson, of New York City (Raymond V. Ingersoll, of New York City, of counsel), for appellant.

Joseph B. Merkert, of New-York City, for respondent.

SEABURY, J.

The plaintiff sued to recover the value of a certain cash register sold and delivered by it to the defendant. The cash register was sold under a written contract, and the defendant in writing, acknowledged its receipt.

Upon the trial, the defendant was permitted to testify to an oral contract with the plaintiff’s salesman, in which the defendant claims it was agreed that, if the register was not satisfactory, he should have the privilege of returning it, and that the plaintiff would furnish to the defendant instructions as to the manner in which the register should be installed and used. The evidence offered by the defendant, upon which the learned court below seems to have given judgment for the defendant, was under familiar rules inadmissible to alter or vary the terms of the written contract upon which the plaintiff sued.

Judgment reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event. All concur.