UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Plaintiff Joseph Wayne Butler seeks judicial review of the final decision of Defendant 

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security, who denied his application for Disability 

Insurance Benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(i), 423 et seq. For the 

following reasons, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision. 

A. Procedural Background 

 On June 9, 2009, Plaintiff applied for disability benefits due to a disabling condition that 

began on February 15, 2009. (R. 132.) Plaintiff’s claim was denied on October 23, 2009, and 

upon reconsideration on December 8, 2009. (R. 70, 82.) Plaintiff then requested a hearing before 

an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (R. 88.) 

 On December 21, 2010, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was not entitled to Social Security 

disability benefits. (R. 48–58.) The ALJ found as follows: 

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act 

through December 31, 2013. 

JOSEPH WAYNE BUTLER, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

MICHAEL ASTRUE, 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration, 

Defendant. 

Case No. 1:12-CV-6 JVB 
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2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 15, 

2009, the alleged onset date. 

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease 

and degenerative joint disease. 

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that 

meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1. 

5. The claimant has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light 

work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) but should never climb ladders, 

ropes, scaffolds; should only occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, 

stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl; and should only occasionally engage in 

overhead reaching with the upper left extremity. 

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work. 

7. The claimant was born on August 12, 1963, and was 45 years old on the 

alleged disability date, which is defined in the Social Security Act as a 

younger individual. (Age 18–49.) 

8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate 

in English. 

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability 

because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a 

finding that the claimant is “not disabled” whether or not the claimant has 

transferable job skills. 

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual 

functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the 

national economy that the claimant can perform. 

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security 

Act, from February 15, 2009, through the date of this decision. 

(R. 53–58.) 

The ALJ’s opinion became final when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for 

review on September 28, 2011. (R. 63–66.) 

B. Factual Record 

(1) Plaintiff’s Background 

Plaintiff was born on August 12, 1963. (R. 132.) He completed the tenth grade, later 

received a General Equivalency Degree, and is able to communicate, read, and write in English. 
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(R. 8, 171.) Plaintiff has a lengthy work history, which includes working as a molding machine 

operator, a molding machine foreman, and a steel erector. (R. 152.) 

 Plaintiff currently lives in an apartment with a roommate. (R. 179.) He testified that his 

day consists of caring for his dogs, reading, watching television while using a heating pad, 

talking on the telephone, and preparing meals. (R. 179.) Plaintiff further testified that he will take 

his dogs for a walk, visit his mother, and shop for food, but all activities are dependent upon the 

level of his back pain. (R. 180–185.) 

(2) Medical Evidence 

Between 1995 and 2000, Plaintiff underwent extensive medical treatment for a variety of 

injuries and conditions. Plaintiff encountered three primary medical issues during this time. First, 

Plaintiff suffered from neck, left shoulder, and left arm pain that resulted from a shoulder injury 

in June 1995. (R. 589.) He re-injured this shoulder a month later doing manual labor, was placed 

on limited duty, and scheduled for physical therapy. (R. 585.) Plaintiff was eventually cleared to 

work without any restrictions from his shoulder injury. (R. 421.) Next, Plaintiff had surgery, 

which was successful, to address carpal tunnel syndrome in his right arm. (R. 376–385.) Finally, 

in January 2000, Plaintiff was diagnosed with depression, alcohol abuse, marijuana abuse, and 

cigarette abuse after threatening to harm himself and his family with a firearm. (R. 321–326.) 

On August 6, 2007, Plaintiff had a T7–11 fusion back surgery as a result of a crush injury 

sustained at work one week earlier. (R. 530, 532, 542.) In April 2008, after a sometimes painful 

rehabilitation period, Plaintiff returned to work with a weight restriction and the option to take 

longer breaks as needed. (R. 220, 224.) Plaintiff was able to compete his required duties without 

significant difficulty. (R. 218.) 
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In the summer of 2009, Plaintiff again sought treatment for thoracic back pain. On July 

19, 2009, Plaintiff went to Parkview Occupational Health Center and was told to use cold packs 

for his pain, exercise regularly, and return to work without restrictions. (R. 280.) Plaintiff 

returned to the hospital in August and received the same direction from the doctor. (R. 277.) 

On August 27, 2009, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Sohail, at the behest of the Disability 

Determination Bureau. (R. 251.) During the examination Plaintiff denied decreased range of 

motion or weakness in his upper extremities and stated that he was capable of sitting or standing 

for fifteen to thirty minutes, walking three to five blocks, and lifting forty to fifty pounds. (R. 

251.) After examining Plaintiff, Dr. Sohail concluded that “[c]laimant has severe back pain 

secondary to spinal fusion . . . moderately-severe neck pain and stiffness . . . [and] severe pain 

associated with rigidity in most of spine. In view of above mentioned medical handicaps, 

claimant is unable to do any light job. (R. 254.) Dr. Sohail also noted that Plaintiff was in visible 

pain while being examined and was unable to move on or off the examining table with ease. (R. 

252.) 

In October 2009, Dr. Whitley, a state agency reviewing physician, reviewed Plaintiff’s 

medical record and prepared a Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment. (R. 284.) Dr. 

Whitley assessed the record and found that Plaintiff could perform light-level work that included 

occasionally carrying up to twenty pounds. (R. 285.) Light work would also include standing, 

walking, or sitting about six hours in an eight hour work day, so long as breaks were provided. 

(Id.) Dr. Whitley also felt Plaintiff was limited to only occasionally climbing ramps or stairs, 

balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling, and could never climb a ladder rope or 

scaffolds. (R. 286.) 
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In April and May 2010, Plaintiff visited Dr. Lazoff, a pain management physician, on the 

referral of one of his providers from Parkview Occupational Health Center. (R. 489, 510.) Dr. 

Lazoff observed that Plaintiff had generalized tenderness along his spine, but “the range of 

motion along his cervical spine is functional and within normal limits.” (R. 513.) During the May 

visit, Plaintiff reported that the oral steroids made him feel better, but once he went off them his 

pain symptoms returned. (R. 510.) Plaintiff also reported that his pain fluctuated between a “2 

and 7” on a ten-point scale and Dr. Lazoff observed that he was not in any acute or chronic 

distress during the appointment. (Id.) Dr. Lazoff concluded his report by stating he would 

recommend an epidural injection since “the oral steroids worked great” and Plaintiff should 

continue regular work activities. (Id.) 

(3) Plaintiff’s Testimony 

At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that he has headaches, back pain, and neck pain that 

keep him from working. (R. 10.) Plaintiff also briefly discussed his treatment with Dr. Lazoff, 

who was managing medications to deal with his back pain (R.15.) Next, Plaintiff described his 

daily schedule of activities to the ALJ. These included lying or sitting with a heating pad for 

forty-five minutes to an hour, preparing meals, napping, simple chores, and taking short walks to 

relieve his back discomfort. (R. 17–20.) Plaintiff then testified to the specifics of his neck and 

back pain and that he is not engaged in any physical therapy or exercise as they increase his pain. 

(R. 21–24.) Plaintiff then outlined that he could only bear to walk, stand, and sit for fifteen to 

twenty minutes per day. (R. 24–25.) Finally, Plaintiff testified that he had gone back to work 

after his medical issues between 1995 and 2000 and would like to work if he were physically 

able. (R. 31–32.)
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(4) Vocational Expert’s Testimony 

Vocational Expert (“VE”), Glee Ann Kehr, testified at Plaintiff’s hearing before the ALJ 

on August 6, 2010. (R. 32.) The ALJ presented the VE with a hypothetical profile regarding 

Plaintiff’s condition and his potential employment opportunities. (R. 35.) The ALJ’s hypothetical 

question assessed that Plaintiff could not perform any of his past work. (Id.) The VE testified that 

jobs were available for someone with Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity. (R. 36–37.) The VE 

relayed that someone with Plaintiff’s residual functioning capacity could serve as a counter clerk, 

information clerk, office helper, account clerk, address clerk, or telephone clerk. (Id.) In 

Plaintiff’s region there are approximately 40,000 jobs that fall into these categories. (R. 37–38.) 

The ALJ then asked the VE if all of Plaintiff’s subjective testimony were credible and 

supported by the medical evidence would there be any work he could undertake. (R. 38.) The VE 

replied that Plaintiff would not be able to sustain a forty hour work week, so no jobs would be 

available to him. (Id.)

 (5) ALJ’s Decision 

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (R. 48.) 

The ALJ classified Plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease and degenerative joint disease as severe 

impairments. (R. 53.) However, Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically equal one of 

the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. 54.)

The ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled and has the residual functional capacity to 

perform light work as defined by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). (Id.) However, the ALJ did note that 

Plaintiff can only engage in light work if he is not required to climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds 
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and only occasionally climbs ramps and stairs, balances, stoops, kneels, crouches, crawls, and 

engages in overhead reaching. (Id.) 

The ALJ addressed Plaintiff’s statements regarding his “constant, sharp, burning” back 

pain and other ailments when making the decision. (R. 55–57.) The ALJ relied heavily upon the 

medical opinions and notes from Plaintiff’s own physicians. (R. 56.) The ALJ found the opinions 

of Dr. Lazoff and the Parkview Occupational Health Center to be consistent, reliable, and 

supported by the medical evidence in the record. (Id.) The ALJ was also influenced by these 

physicians repeatedly recommending that Plaintiff return to work with very few restrictions. (Id.) 

The ALJ also considered the examination of Plaintiff by Dr. Sohail and his conclusion that 

Plaintiff is unable to do any light work. (R. 56–57.) The ALJ opined that this conclusion was 

largely based on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and was the polar opposite of Dr. Lazoff and 

Parkview Occupational Health Center doctors who saw Plaintiff numerous times over a longer 

and more regular interval. (R. 57.) 

While drafting the order, the ALJ made one misstatement and one mischaracterization of 

Plaintiff’s testimony. The ALJ misstated the extent of Plaintiff’s daily walking activities. The 

Plaintiff testified that he was only able to walk a few blocks at a time. (R. 24.) In the order the 

ALJ stated that Plaintiff “will go for an hour-long walk before lunch.” (R. 55.) The ALJ also 

mischaracterized Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the amount of time he spent on the couch or 

chair in the afternoon. In the order the ALJ stated that Plaintiff “will sit for about half of the 

afternoon on the couch.” (R. 55.) Plaintiff actually testified that he uses a heating pad in the 

afternoon and switches back and forth between lying on the couch and sitting on the chair.

Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred in denying his application for social security disability 

benefits and has appealed the decision. According to Plaintiff, the ALJ erred in determining that 
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he was not credible and in finding that his residual functional capacity allowed light work. (DE 

14, Pl.’s Br. at 11.) 

C. Standard of Review 

This Court has the authority to review Social Security Act claim decisions under 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g.) The Court will uphold an ALJ’s decision if it is reached under the correct legal 

standard and supported by substantial evidence. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 

351 (7th Cir. 2005.) Substantial evidence consists of “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 

401 (1971.) This Court will not reconsider facts, re-weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in the 

evidence, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Boiles v. 

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005.) This Court will, however, ensure that the ALJ built 

an “accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion so that, as a reviewing court, 

we may assess the validity of the agency’s ultimate findings and afford a claimant meaningful 

judicial review.” Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002.) 

D. Disability Standard 

To qualify for Disability Insurance Benefits or Supplemental Security Income claimants 

must establish that they suffer from a disability. A disability is an “inability to engage in any 

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to 

last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A.) The Social 
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Security Administration established a five-step inquiry to evaluate whether a claimant qualifies 

for disability benefits. A successful claimant must show:

(1) he is not presently employed; (2) his impairment is severe; (3) his impairment is 

listed or equal to a listing in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) he is not 

able to perform his past relevant work; and (5) he is unable to perform any other 

work within the national and local economy. 

Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 699–700 (7th Cir. 2004.) 

An affirmative answer leads either to the next step or, on steps three and five, to a finding 

that the claimant is disabled. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001.) A negative 

answer at any point other than step three stops the inquiry and leads to a finding that the claimant 

is not disabled. (Id.) The burden of proof lies with the claimant at every step except the fifth, 

where it shifts to the Commissioner. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000.) 

E. Analysis

Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred in denying his application for social security disability 

benefits and has appealed the decision. Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred in denying his application 

for social security disability benefits and has appealed the decision. According to Plaintiff, the 

ALJ erred in determining that he was not credible and in finding that his residual functional 

capacity allowed light work. (DE 14, Pl.’s Br. at 11.) Plaintiff does not challenge the first four 

steps of the five step inquiry as to whether a claimant qualifies for disability benefits. 

Accordingly, this court will only examine whether the ALJ relied on substantial evidence in 

determining if Plaintiff is unable to perform any other work within the national and local 

economy. 

(1) Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s credibility determination
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An ALJ’s credibility finding is entitled to “considerable deference” and will only be 

overturned if patently wrong. Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 2009). “This 

deferential standard acknowledges that the reviewing court does not have the opportunity to hear 

and see witnesses, as the ALJ does.” Sims v. Barnhart, 442 F.3d 536, 537–38 (7th Cir. 2006). 

The ALJ must consider the claimant’s level of pain, medication, treatment, daily activities, and 

limitations and must justify the credibility finding with specific reasons supported by the record. 

Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2009); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c) (2010); see also

SSR 96-7p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 4. An ALJ may find that an individual’s statements are “credible 

to a certain degree.” SSR 96-7p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 4. 

 Here the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “descriptions of pain are generally consistent with the 

medical evidence of record.” (R. 55.) However, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff’s testimony 

regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his neck and back pain were not 

credible because they were inconsistent with the treatment records of every physician who has 

regularly treated him. (Id.) 

The ALJ’s credibility determinations were not patently wrong. The ALJ explained the 

credibility decision in a rational and logical manner and it was supported by substantial evidence 

in the record. The ALJ’s findings took into account the Plaintiff’s testimony and the medical 

evidence regarding Plaintiff’s ability to perform a light level of work with some physical 

restrictions. While the ALJ misstated some of Plaintiff’s testimony, these misstatements were not 

the sole basis for his residual functional capacity finding. (Id.) These misstatements, concerning 

Plaintiff’s daily walking activities and afternoon regimen of sitting and lying down, merely 

served as an introduction to the ALJ’s main finding and rationale that a light residual functional 

capacity is appropriate because of the medical treatment records of Dr. Lazoff and Parkview 
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Occupational Health Center. (Id.) This finding is supported by numerous treatment notes from 

various physicians stating that Plaintiff has responded well to drug treatment and should engage 

in physical exercise or activity to assist in his recovery. The ALJ also emphasized that while he 

gave some weight to Dr. Sohail’s report, he found the conflict between this report and others 

caused by Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, not different medical findings. (R. 56–57.) 

 Since the ALJ relied on substantial evidence of record to make his credibility 

determinations, and they were not patently wrong, Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred in his 

credibility determination fails. See, e.g., Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 504 (7th Cir. 2004.) 

(“An ALJ is in the best position to determine a witness’s truthfulness and forthrightness; thus, 

this court will not overturn an ALJ's credibility determination unless it is patently wrong.”) 

(2) The ALJ properly concluded that Plaintiff is able to perform a light level of work

 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in finding that his residual functional capacity 

allowed him to perform light work so long as Plaintiff could work within certain physical 

limitations. Since Plaintiff’s previous work was not sedentary, the burden shifts to Defendant to 

show that Plaintiff can perform some other job. Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 

1993). 

The regulations define light work as being able to lift items weighing no more than 

twenty pounds and being able to walk, sit, or stand for some periods of time. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1567(b). Claimants who can perform light work are also deemed capable of performing 

sedentary work unless they have a significant loss of manual dexterity or are unable to sit for 

long periods of time. Claimants can perform sedentary work if they can (1) sit up for 

approximately six hours during an eight-hour workday, (2) occasionally lift objects weighing up 
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to ten pounds, and (3) occasionally walk or stand for no more than two hours during an eighthour workday. See Edwards, 985 F.2d at 339; Social Security Ruling 83-10.

In this case, the ALJ relied on both medical and non-medical evidence in assessing 

Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity to do light work. The ALJ’s finding is supported by 

substantial evidence including: reports from Plaintiff’s treating physicians, Dr. Lazoff and the 

staff of Parkview Occupational Health Center; Plaintiff’s positive response to drug and steroid 

treatment; and Plaintiff’s own statements regarding his ability to perform basic work-related 

activities such as standing, household chores, sitting, and walking. The ALJ deliberated with a 

sufficient amount of information to allow him to serve as the final arbiter of all facts for the 

Commissioner of Social Security. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2.)

The ALJ’s decision adequately analyzed the state agency physicians’ reports on 

Plaintiff’s residual functioning capacity, as well as reports from Plaintiff’s own physicians. A 

critical element of the ALJ’s decision, which exhibits careful thought and consideration of the 

evidence, was the discussion of the conflict between Dr. Lazoff’s treatment notes, the Parkview 

staff’s treatment notes, and Dr. Sohail’s conclusions. The ALJ’s findings demonstrate that 

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints about his condition were considered but were insufficient to 

change the ruling because of the overwhelming amount of conflicting medical evidence. 

 The ALJ considered relevant evidence and reasonably concluded that Plaintiff could 

perform light work as long as the proper physical restrictions were adhered to in the work place. 

Therefore, it was rational and logical for the ALJ to find that Plaintiff’s impairments were 

severe, but not to the extent that Plaintiff could not perform light work where some physical 

restrictions were in place. Accordingly, the Court must affirm the ALJ’s decision regarding 

Plaintiff’s ability to perform a light level of work with some physical restrictions. 
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F. Conclusion

 The ALJ decided Plaintiff’s claim using the correct legal standard and the decision was 

supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the ALJ’s decision is affirmed. 

 SO ORDERED on March 20, 2013. 

 s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

        JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN

        UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE