UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KATRINA MEANS, et al., :

:

Plaintiffs, : Civil Action No.: 11-cv-0382 (RC)

:

v. : Re Document No.: 21, 26, 27

:

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, :

:

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SUSTAINING PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE’S REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION AND ADOPTING THE REMAINING FINDINGS OF THE MAGISTRATE’S 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs, Katrina Means et al., were the prevailing parties in an administrative due 

process hearing brought pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”). 

Plaintiffs then moved for reasonable attorney’s fees as a result of that litigation. The issue was 

referred to Magistrate Judge Kay, whose July 17, 2013 Report and Recommendation (“R&R II”) 

found that 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i) precluded the plaintiffs from recovering fees after 

February 27, 2013. This is because Judge Kay’s October 11, 2012 Report and Recommendation 

(“R&R I”) awarded the plaintiffs less money than the defendant offered in their February 27, 

2013 Offer of Judgment. Plaintiffs now object to Judge Kay’s findings in the R&R II, arguing 

that the Offer of Judgment was ambiguous and thus does not bar recovery of fees generated after 

that date. Defendant asks the Court to overrule the plaintiffs’ objection and adopt the 

magistrate’s report. Defendant also raises a new objection to the magistrate’s report, that 

awarding fees-on-fees in IDEA litigation is wholly unconstitutional. Because the Court finds that 
2

the defendant’s offer of judgment was not greater than the plaintiffs’ actual recovery, and that the 

defendant did not properly object to the magistrate’s failure to consider his constitutional 

argument, it sustains the plaintiffs’ objections. The Court adopts the magistrate’s report and 

recommendation in part and amends in part.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The IDEA Proceeding 

Plaintiffs were the prevailing parties in an administrative due process hearing on March 

25, 2010. Following this, defendant, the District of Columbia, agreed to reimburse the plaintiffs

for “reasonable and documented attorney’s fees.” Dismissal Order at 2, Docket No. 10, Ex. 5. 

The plaintiffs submitted two invoices for attorney’s fees and costs totaling $29,550.69. Pls.’ 

Statement of Material Facts ¶ 5, n.1, Docket No. 10, Ex. 1. Defendants, through D.C. Public 

Schools (DCPS) paid $12,976.58 of the plaintiffs’ requested amount. Plaintiff then filed suit in 

this Court for the remaining $16,574.11. Pls.’ Statement of Material Facts 10-1 ¶¶ 7 10, 12.

B. The Magistrate’s First Report and Recommendation

Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the unpaid attorney’s fees, totaling 

$16,574.11, was submitted by this Court to Magistrate Judge Kay for a report and 

recommendation. See generally Docket No. 21, 22, 25. Judge Kay recommended that this Court 

grant in part and deny in part the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, awarding plaintiffs 

$9,910.92 in unpaid fees. Oct. 11, 2012 Report and Recommendation, Docket No. 14. On 

February 27, 2013, after Judge Kay had issued R&R I but before the report had been adopted by 

this Court, the defendant made an offer of judgment to the plaintiff for $13,000.00 to settle all 

claims. Def’s Opp’n to Pls’ Mot. for Atty’s Fees and Costs, Ex. 1, Docket No. 22. The plaintiffs
3

did not communicate further and the offer was rejected through inaction. Def.’s Opp’n at 13. On 

March 7, 2013, this Court adopted Judge Kay’s R&R I for an award of $22,887.50, offset by the 

$12,976.57 paid by the defendant, leaving $9,910.92 to be paid. Id.

C. The Magistrate’s Second Report and Recommendation and the Instant Action

The plaintiffs now ask for $19,737.48 in fees and costs (fees on fees) 1for work done on the 

motion for attorney’s fees. Pls.’ Mot. Atty Fees and Costs, Docket No. 21. The plaintiffs seek

reimbursement for 38.3 hours of work by Elizabeth Jester, the plaintiffs’ attorney, and 0.8 hours 

of work by Mary Williams, Ms. Jester’s paralegal, totaling $19,457.00. Id. Ms. Jester’s hourly 

rate is $505.00 and Ms. Williams’s hourly rate is $145.00. See id. Thus far, the defendant has not 

made any payment for these fees. On July 17, 2013, Judge Kay filed a second Report and 

Recommendation (R&R II) on the plaintiffs’ motion, resolving two issues regarding the 

plaintiffs’ proposed fees-on-fees amount: 1) the total number of hours for which plaintiffs could 

receive reimbursement of attorney’s fees, and 2) the reasonable hourly rate for those 

compensable hours. 

1. Judge Kay reduced the number of hours for which plaintiffs could receive attorney’s fees

Plaintiffs proposed 40.1 total hours worked on the fees-on-fees litigation. Judge Kay 

subtracted 1 hour of Ms. Jester’s work relating to the plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim as it was

dismissed, and 3.8 hours of Ms. Jester’s work regarding objections to R&R I. R&R II at 5. Judge

Kay noted that the plaintiffs had no right to fee recovery on those actions because this Court 

decided both claims against the plaintiffs. See id. 

 

1

Fees on fees litigation refers to the claim brought by a party who is awarded attorney’s 

fees, seeking compensation for the hours spent in bringing the underlying claim. Here, the instant 

action is to recover the attorney’s fees incurred while the plaintiffs’ attorneys sued the defendant 

for the remaining balance on their invoice. 
4

Judge Kay also found that the plaintiffs could not claim any work done after February 27, 

2013, the date of the defendant’s offer of judgment. R&R II at 6. Under 20 U.S.C. 

§1415(i)(3)(D)(i), plaintiffs cannot be awarded attorney’s fees for work done after being offered 

a settlement sum higher than the subsequent award granted by the district court. Because the 

$13,000 the defendant offered was more than the $9,910.92 this Court awarded when this Court 

adopted R&R I, Judge Kay subtracted 7.3 hours for the work Ms. Jester claimed after February 

27, 2013. R&R II at 7. Judge Kay thus found that plaintiffs were owed for 27 hours worked on 

the fees-on-fees litigation. Id. 

2. Judge Kay adjusted downward the reasonable hourly rate for attorney’s fees using the Laffey 

Matrix

Once the total number of reimbursable hours had been determined, Judge Kay next 

calculated the reasonable hourly rate for those hours, using the Laffey matrix. In Laffey v.

Northwest Airlines, Inc., the D.C. Circuit adopted a matrix, which provides presumptively 

reasonable hourly rates for complex litigation based on the attorney’s years of experience, skill, 

and expertise. See generally Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 572 F.Supp. 354 (D.D.C.1983), 

rev'd on other grounds, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C.Cir.1984). The United States Attorney’s Office for the 

District of Columbia has updated this matrix to account for cost of living increases. 2Rooths v. 

District of Columbia, 803 F.Supp.2d 56, 61 (D.D.C. 2011). Using this updated matrix, Judge 

Kay found that the “reasonable” hourly rate for Jester’s attorney’s fees was only a portion of the 

Laffey rates. See R&R II at 7-8 (citing Rooths, 802 F. Supp.2d at 62-63).

 

2

The Laffey Matrix is available at 

http://wwwjustice.gov/usao/dc/divisions/civil_Laffey_Matrix_2003-2012.pdf. 
5

Sister courts have previously used 50% of the Laffey rates as a reasonable per hour 

charge for non-complex litigation over attorney’s fees. See R&R II at 8 (citing cases where feeon-fee litigation entitled the plaintiffs to one-half the applicable rate under the Laffey matrix).3

 

Judge Kay applied the same rates to calculate plaintiffs’ fees and recommended $6,306.63 in 

compensation for labor relating to the fees-on-fees litigation.4Id. at 10. Judge Kay also 

recommended reimbursement for additional costs incurred by plaintiffs, including costs for filing 

the complaint, summons, copying, postage, and mileage. The recommended reimbursement for 

these costs totaled $516.98. Id. In sum, for all fees and costs relating to the plaintiffs’ fees-onfees claim, Judge Kay recommended $6,823.61 Id. at 11. 

Defendant did not file a timely objection to R&R II but now attempts to revive its

original argument that the IDEA does not permit fees-on-fees at all. Def. Opp’n to Obj. R&R II, 

ECF No. 28. Plaintiffs timely object to Part I of Judge Kay’s recommendation, which excludes

hours worked after the defendant’s February 27, 2013 offer of judgment. Pl’s. Obj. R&R II, ECF 

No. 27. Plaintiffs argue: 1) that R&R II improperly discounted work done after the defendant’s 

offer of judgment; and 2) that it is improper for this Court to consider objections to R&R II not 

timely raised by the defendant. Pl’s. Reply Def. Opp’n Pls.’ Obj. R&R II, ECF No. 29. 

 

3

This finding converted Jester’s hourly rate to $247.50 before May 31, 2012 and $252.50 

for work on and after June 1, 2012. Id at 9. Williams’s hourly rate of $145 received a 75% 

reduction, creating a rate of $108.75 per hour. Id. Judge Kay then imposed a different hourly rate 

for Jester’s travel time. Id. Finding support in Bucher v. D.C., 777 F.Supp.2d69, 77 (D.D.C. 

2011), he reduced the travel time rate to $126.25, half of Jester’s suggested hourly rate.

4

This breaks down to 4.4 hours at $237.50, 7.9 hours at $247.50, 11.6 hours at $252.50, 

0.8 hours at $108.75, and 2.3 hours at $126.25. 
6

III. LEGAL STANDARD

District courts must apply a de novo standard of review when considering objections to, 

or adoption of, a magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation. Gardrill v. District of 

Columbia, 930 F.Supp.2d 35 (D.D.C. 2013); Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 466 F. 

Supp. 2d 229, 255-56 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)); 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(B); LcvR 72.3. “A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in 

part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Heiser, 466 F.Supp.2d at 

255-56; see also Smith v. D.C., 846 F. Supp. 2d 197, 199 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 

72(b)(3)); Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, (2003) (noting that a district court is “free to do as it 

sees fit with [a] magistrate judge's recommendations” made under authority of 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)). 

This Court must thus determine whether the Magistrate’s award recommendation 

comports with this Court’s own understanding of IDEA awards in fees-on-fees litigation. Under 

the IDEA, this Court has the discretion to “award reasonable attorney’s fees as part of the 

costs...to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability” in an administrative 

proceeding. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). “Courts typically determine the reasonableness of 

attorney’s fees based on the ‘number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied 

by a reasonable hourly rate.’” Jackson v. District of Columbia, 696 F.Supp.2d 97, 101 (D.D.C.

2010) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433(1983)); see also In re North, 59 F.3d 

184, 189 (D.C.Cir.1995). Plaintiffs may submit an “invoice that is sufficiently detailed to ‘permit 

the District Court to make an independent determination whether or not the hours claimed are 

justified.’” Holbrook v. District of Columbia, 305 F.Supp.2d 41, 45 (D.D.C. 2004), (quoting 

Nat'l Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Sec'y of Def., 675 F.2d 1319, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
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IV. ANALYSIS

A. This Court does not consider the merits of Defendant’s claim that a fees-on-fees award 

under the IDEA is unconstitutional

Defendant did not timely object to the Magistrate’s R&R II. Defendant now raises an 

objection for this Court’s review, arguing that any award of fees-on-fees compensation under the 

IDEA is unconstitutional. This Court does not reach the merits of the argument, dismissing the 

objection because it was not timely raised. 

Under 28 U.S.C. §636(b), a court shall hear objections to a magistrate’s report and 

recommendation, if such objection has been timely raised (i.e. within 14 days). 28 U.S.C. 

§636(b)(1); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b) (providing that “[A] party may serve and file 

specific, written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations” of a magistrate judge 

within 14 days after being served with a copy of the report and recommendation, and thereby 

secure de novo review by the district court); LCvR 72.3(c) (mandating that district courts 

conduct de novo review of a magistrate’s recommendations only if objection is made pursuant to 

the specificity and filing requirements set forth in 72.3(b)). Whether a district court must also 

review untimely filed objections to a magistrate’s report and recommendation is an issue to be 

determined by each circuit. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 152 (1985) (upholding a Sixth Circuit 

rule that precluded district courts from reviewing de novo untimely objections because 

“Congress, in enacting §636(b)(1)(C)...did not preclude treating the failure to object as a 

procedural default, waiving the right to further consideration of any sort.”) After Thomas, a 

waiver rule is neither mandated by §636(b)(1)(C), nor precluded if a circuit wishes to adopt such 

a rule. 
8

The D.C. Circuit has not yet ruled on this issue. See Powell v. United States Bureau of 

Prisons, 927 F.2d 1239, 1247-48 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (recognizing the question regarding de novo 

review but declining to rule on the issue because of other substantive errors in the magistrate’s 

report). Although the majority in Powell did not reach this issue, Judge Sentelle’s dissenting 

opinion did reach the issue and agreed with the majority view, that a district court may exercise 

de novo review under 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) if, and only if, the party has made a timely and 

specific objection to the magistrate’s report. Id. (“While this Court has never directly addressed 

the issue, I find the view espoused by the majority of circuits – that a failure to object to an issue 

ends entitlement to a de novo review of that issue – to be more persuasive.”) Judge Sentelle cites 

favorably to the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Nettles v. Wainwright, which emphasized that judicial 

efficiency mandated such a rule, even for pro se plaintiffs. 677 F.2d 404, 409-10 (5th Cir. Unit B 

1982). According to the Nettles court, 

It is reasonable to place upon the parties the duty to pinpoint those portions of the 

magistrate’s report that the district court must specially consider. This rule 

facilitates the opportunity for district judges to spend more time on matters 

actually contested and produces a result compatible with the purposes of the 

Magistrates Act. 

Id. at 410; see also Thomas ̧ 474 U.S. at 148 (“Absent such a rule...the district court 

[would be forced] to review every issue in every case, no matter how thorough the magistrate’s 

analysis...[the] result would be an inefficient use of judicial resources.”); Douglass v. United 

Services Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1421 (5th Cir. 1996) (same); Park Motor Mart, Inc. v. Ford 

Motor Co., 616 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding that the purpose of the Magistrates Act is to 

relieve judge’s workload; if party does not file objections, it is therefore not entitled to later 

review). In essence, these courts have held that an untimely objection to the magistrate’s report 

and recommendation constitutes a waiver of that issue. 
9

Other district courts to consider this issue have followed this reasoning. See e.g., Self v. 

LaValley, 2013 WL 1294448, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that a contrary rule would 

“undermine compliance with ...deadlines, unnecessarily prolonging already old cases”); United 

States v. Asbury, 2006 WL 1597559, at *1 (W.D.N.C.) (following the 4th Circuit’s rule that a 

party waives their right to de novo review if an objection is either untimely or overly general); 

Webb v. Califano, 468 F.Supp. 825, 830-1 (E.D.Cal. 1979) (finding waiver of review by the 

district court; “[h]aving failed to object within the time provided, the parties cannot mandate a de 

novo review; they may only suggest it.”). The advisory notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 confirm this 

understanding. FED. R. CIV. P. 72. The 1991 amendment to Rule 72 intended to “assure that 

objections to magistrate’s orders that are not timely made shall not be considered.” FED. R. CIV. 

P. 72(b), advisory note to the1991 amendment.

Here, Defendant concedes that he did not timely raise his constitutional objection. Def’s 

Resp’n Pl’s Opp’n at 6. Because this Court finds Judge Sentelle’s and other circuits’ reasoning 

persuasive, and because defendant did not timely raise its objection to the magistrate’s report and 

recommendation, this Court does not consider the merits of defendant’s constitutional objection 

to fees-on-fees awards under the IDEA. 

B. The plaintiffs are entitled to fees incurred after the defendant’s offer of judgment

In R&R II, Judge Kay found that the plaintiffs could not claim fees for any work done after 

February 27, 2013, the date of the defendant’s offer of judgment. This is because the defendant 

offered $13,000 to settle all claims, which Judge Kay found to be a higher amount than the 

award eventually accepted by this Court on March 7, 2013. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 68, an offer of 

judgment greater than plaintiffs’ actual award would bar recovery for work completed after the 

offer of judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 68 Plaintiffs now object to the Magistrate’s recommendation 
10

to exclude those hours. Plaintiffs argue: 1) that the settlement terms as offered are ambiguous, 

and that under an alternate reading, the settlement offer of $13,000 was less than the amount 

actually awarded to the plaintiffs, and 2) that their rejection of defendant’s offer was 

“substantially justified” because they had, in good faith, determined that the likelihood of 

obtaining an award of fees in excess of $13,000 was significant. Because this Court finds that the 

plaintiffs’ actual recovery is higher than defendant’s offer of judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 is not 

implicated and the plaintiffs are entitled to attorney’s fees after February 27, 2013. This Court 

does not reach the issue of substantial justification. 

The IDEA provides that fees: 

may not be awarded and related costs may not be reimbursed ... for services 

performed subsequent to” the submission of the offer where (1) defendants have 

submitted a “written offer of settlement to a parent”; (2) the offer is made within 

the time limits set forth in Rule 68; (3) the offer is not accepted within ten days; 

and (4) “the relief finally obtained by the parents is not more favorable to the 

parents than the offer of settlement.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i).

B.L. Through Lax v. D.C., 517 F. Supp. 2d 57, 60 (D.D.C. 2007). There is one exception to this 

rule. Attorney’s fees may still be awarded to a prevailing party for work done after a defendant’s 

settlement offer if the prevailing party “was substantially justified in rejecting the settlement 

offer.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(E). The IDEA specifically incorporates the limits set forth in Rule

68, which states in relevant part: 

At least 14 days before the date set for trial, a party defending against a claim may 

serve on an opposing party an offer to allow judgment on specified terms, with 

the costs then accrued.... If the judgment that the offeree finally obtains is not 

more favorable than the unaccepted offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred 

after the offer was made.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 68 (emphasis added). “The burden is on the oferror to make a clear and precise 

offer that will be readily comparable to any judgment that may be obtained” and “in determining 

the meaning of the offer, the court is to look to the language of the offer” alone. Jones v. 
11

Fleetwood Motor Homes, Inc., 127 F.Supp.2d 958, 968 (D.Ill. 2000). Thus, ambiguities will be 

construed against the party who drafted the offer. Id. To determine whether a defendant’s offer 

of judgment is greater than plaintiffs’ actual award, the court must first enquire whether 

defendant’s offer includes pre-offer costs and attorney’s fees. Goos v. National Ass’n of Realtors, 

68 F.3d 1380, 1382 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1996). If the pre-offer fees and costs are included in 

defendant’s offer, then “[t]he proper comparison is between the amount of the settlement offer 

on the one hand, and the sum of the damages award and the pre-offer costs and attorneys’ fees on 

the other.” Alfonso v. Aufiero, 66 F.Supp.2d 183, 202-3 (D.Mass. 1999) (citing to Marek v. 

Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 7 (1985)). Post-offer costs on the other hand should not be included in 

determining whether the settlement offer is greater than plaintiffs’ actual recovery. Marek, 473 

U.S. at 7. (noting that the inclusion of post-offer costs for Rule 68 analysis would violate the 

purposes of the Rule, as “post-offer costs merely offset part of the expense of continuing the 

litigation to trial”). 

Defendant offered plaintiffs $13,000 to settle all claims “inclusive of reasonable and 

statutorily allowable attorneys’ fees and costs accrued to date.” Def’s Opp’n. to Pl’s Mot. for 

Atty’s Fees and Costs, Exh. 1, at 1. This Court does not find the offer ambiguous. The only claim 

remaining at the time of the offer was the plaintiffs’ claim of attorneys’ fees for work performed 

on the IDEA suit. Defendant offered $13,000 to settle the remainder of the attorneys’ fees claim

and any additional fees and costs associated with work on that claim. Thus, the $13,000 is 

intended to compensate plaintiffs for the remaining $16,574.11 requested by the plaintiffs, as 

well as any fees-on-fees. 

Plaintiffs’ actual recovery is greater than $13,000. Judge Kay recommended, and this Court 

accepted an award of $9,910.92 for plaintiffs’ work on the IDEA litigation. R&R I at 14. Judge 
12

Kay recommended $6,823.61 for fees and costs associated with plaintiffs’ work on their motion 

for attorney’s fees, up until February 27, 2013. R&R II at 11. Together, plaintiffs were awarded 

$16,734.53 for work completed up until the date of defendant’s offer of judgment. Because

$16,724.53 is greater than defendant’s offer of $13,000, this Court finds that Rule 68 is not 

implicated. Plaintiffs are thus entitled to reasonable fees for work completed after February 27, 

2013. 

C. Calculation of fees-on-fees for hours worked after February 27, 2013

Judge Kay recommended, and the parties do not contest, an hourly rate of $252.50 for 

work done after June 1, 2012, on the fees-on-fees litigation. This represents 50% of the Laffey

matrix hourly rate. R&R II at 9, Docket No. 26; see, e.g., Wright, 883 F.Supp.2d at 135–36

(D.D.C. 2012) (reducing rate to half of the maximum Laffey rate for fee litigation); Garvin v. 

Gov't of D.C., 910 F. Supp. 2d 135, 141 (D.D.C. 2012). This Court adopts the recommended rate 

to calculate the reasonable fees appropriate for work completed by Ms. Jester after February 27, 

2013. 

To determine the number of reasonable hours spent on this claim after February 27, 2013, 

this Court looks to plaintiffs’ submitted invoice, which details the date, time expended, and a 

description of the work done. Pls.’ Mot. Atty’s Fees and Costs, Ex. 1. Ms. Jester reported 7.3 

hours after February 27, 2013 for reviewing correspondence from opposing counsel regarding a 

settlement offer, reviewing this Court’s order adopting Judge Kay’s recommendation, and 

drafting and finalizing the motion for attorney’s fees. These hours are reasonable, non-
13

duplicative, and non-frivolous. Therefore, this Court adds $1,800.335to the Magistrate’s 

recommendation of the plaintiffs’ fees and costs. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court sustains the plaintiffs’ objections to the July 17, 

2013 Report and Recommendation and concludes that (1) the offer of judgment was not greater 

than the plaintiffs’ actual recovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68; (2) the plaintiffs 

are entitled to attorney’s fees and costs incurred after February 27, 2013; and (3) that the 

plaintiffs shall be awarded a total of $8,623.946for attorney’s fees incurred in this fees on fees 

litigation.

7

 An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and 

contemporaneously issued.

Dated: November 20, 2013 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS

United States District Judge

 

5

This represents the rate of $252.50 per hour for the additional 7.3 hours Ms. Jester 

incurred in litigation to obtain attorney’s fees. 

6

This Court accepts all other factual findings of the magistrate’s report and 

recommendations as they were uncontested by the parties in this case.

7

The Court notes that at a certain point fees-on-fees litigation unnecessarily protracts 

litigation and becomes so far removed from the original adjudication that the prevailing parties 

claim may be too attenuated. While Wright, 883 F.Supp.2d 132 at 134, decided that the time 

spent drafting a motion for fees and costs is too attenuated, this court has not joined in that 

conclusion. But see Garvin, 910 F.Supp. 2d. at 138-39 (“[T]he unavailability of “fees on fees” 

awards in IDEA cases would essentially render the attorney’s fees provision of the IDEA 

unenforceable, causing a party to forfeit any outstanding balance due to the prohibitive cost of 

the litigation to recover it. The inability to enforce the attorney’s fees provision would, in turn, 

undermine Congress' goal in enacting the fee-shifting provision by making it more difficult for 

families to secure legal representation to enforce a child's rights under the IDEA”). However, 

fees on fees on fees, as may be pursued by the plaintiff for the successful adjudication of the 

current claim, may be too removed to be compensable.