UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ RICHARD LYNN DOPP, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. RAY LARIMER; FRED SANDERS; FNU BRISOLARA, Doctor; FNU BEVAN, Doctor; GENESE McCOY, Defendants - Appellees. No. 17-6217 (D.C. No. 5:15- CV-00244-D) (W.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before LUCERO , HARTZ , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Richard Dopp appeals the district cour t’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. Exercising jurisdiction unde r 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I Before considering the meri ts of Dopp’s appeal, we must determine whether he may proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Pu rsuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a prisoner may not “bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

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Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 civil action” with in forma pauperis (“IFP” ) status if he had an action or appeal “dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted” on three prio r occasions “unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious phy sical injury.” Id. Noting that Dopp appears to have accrued more than three prior PLRA strikes, we entered an order to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to prepay the filing fee. In his response, Dopp does not deny th at he has three strikes, but instead argues that he qualifies under the imminent danger exception. The district court granted Dopp leave to proceed IFP below b ecause he advanced “s pecific, credible allegations of imminent dange r of serious physical harm.” Hafed v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 635 F.3d 1172, 1179 (10th Cir. 2011) (quotation and alteration omitted). Specifically, Dopp claimed that defendants were delibe rately indifferent to his cervical spinal impairment with nerve impingement, wh ich was causing him severe pain. However, after entering judgment in favor of defendants, the district court denied Dopp leave to proceed IFP on appeal because he merely re ferred generally to his prior filings. To file a civil action without prepayme nt of fees under th e imminent danger exception, “a prisoner must have alleged an imminent danger at the time he filed his complaint.” Id. It appears our court has not yet decided whether a prisoner must allege a threat of harm at th e time of an appeal to obtain IFP status on appeal. See id. at 1180 (noting the question but declining to reach it). The plain language of the statute indicates that such an allegation is required. See Woods v. Standard Ins. Co.,3 771 F.3d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir. 2014) (if a “statu te’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its te rms” (quotation omitted)). A prisoner with three strikes may not “bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action . . . unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” § 1915(g). By employing the di sjunctive and the present tense, the statute provides that a prisoner may not appeal with IFP status unl ess he is in danger. See Hafed, 635 F.3d at 1179 ( noting § 1915(g)’s use of the present tense). Several of our sibling circuits have concluded that the im minent danger issue should be assessed at the ti me of an appeal. See Will iams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[A] pr isoner who falls within the three strikes provision and seeks forma pauperis status ma y be required to show that an imminent danger exists at the time the notice of a ppeal is filed.”); Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 467 (3d Cir. 2013) (prisoner with three strikes “may proceed IFP if, at th e time she filed her appeal, she was under imminent danger of serious physical injury” (quotation omitted)), abrogated on othe r grounds by Parker v. Montgomery Cty. Corr. Facility/Bus. Office Manage r, 770 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2017); Martin v. Shelton, 319 F.3d 1048, 1050 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he requisite imminent danger of serious physical injury must exist at the time the compla int or the appeal is filed, not when the alleged wrongdoing occurred.”); Banos v. O’Guin, 144 F.3d 883, 885 (5th Cir. 1998) (deying IFP status on ap peal because appellant had not alleged “that he faced imminent danger of serious phy sical injury at the time th at his notice of appeal was filed”); see also Asemani v. U.S. Citiz enship & Immigration Servs., 797 F.3d 1069,4 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting the issue but declining to resolve it). The Williams decision provides the most exte nsive consideration of the issue, holding that courts should not “depart on appeal from the sta ndard . . . developed for determining imminent danger at the time of the filing of the complaint.” 775 F.3d at 1189. We agree. Given that appellate courts are “ill-equipped to e ngage in satellite litigation and adjudicate disputed fact ual matters” regarding “onl y a threshold procedural question—whether the filing fee must be paid upfront or later,” id. at 1189, 1190, the proper course is to apply the same standard at th e time a complaint is filed as when an appeal is taken. As the district court correctly ruled in granting IFP status below, a prisoner qualifies for the exception if he makes “sp ecific, credible allegations of imminent danger of serious physical ha rm.” Hafed, 635 F.3d at 1179 (quotation and alteration omitted). And we have previo usly held that a plaintiff’s particularized “allegations that Defendants have displayed a deliberat e indifference toward his serious medical needs and denied him adequate medical treatment are suffici ent to facially establish the PLRA’s imminent and serious danger re quirement for proceeding IFP.” Davis v. GEO Grp. Corrs., Inc., 696 F. App’x 851, 855 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished). Dopp alleged specific facts in his complaint, claiming that an inadequate ly treated spinal condition was causing him unbearable pain. In his response to our show cause order, he claims that the condition is worseni ng. We conclude Dopp has sufficiently alleged an imminent danger of serious physical injury. See Williams, 775 F.3d at 1190.5 II Although we conclude th at Dopp has cleared the th reshold requirements of § 1915(g), we nevertheless af firm the district court’ s dismissal of his action. 1
A Dopp challenges the district court’s gran t of summary judgment in favor of Dr. Fred Sanders and Nurse Ray Larimer on hi s deliberate indifference claim. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Timmons v. White, 314 F.3d 1229, 1232 (10th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To prevail on this claim, Dopp was required to show that his medical needs were “sufficiently serious” and that “the official knew of and disregarded an excessive ri sk to inmate health or safety.” Al-Turki v. Robinson, 762 F.3d 1188, 11 92 (10th Cir. 2014) (quotations and alterations omitted). A medical professional who serv es in a gatekeeping role may be deliberately indifferent if he unreasonably “delays or refuses to fulf ill that gatekeeper ro le due to deliberate indifference.” Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 12 11 (10th Cir. 2000). As the district court explained, Dopp has failed to proffer evidence showing that Dr. Sanders or Nurse Larimer were subj ectively indifferent to his medical needs. The record demonstrates that Dopp consiste ntly received treatm ent for his condition, that he was referred to an outside provide r for additional care, and that the outside

1 Because Dopp is proceeding pro se, we construe his filings liberally. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 11 06, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).6 provider rescheduled Dopp’s treatment on several occasions. On appeal, Dopp continues to assert disagreem ent with the tr eatment he received. However, he does not cite evidence sufficient to meet the subjective prong as to these defendants. See Self v. Crum, 439 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he subjective component is not satisfied, absent an extraordinary degree of neglect, where a doctor merely exercises his considered medical judgment. ”); Oxendine v. Kaplan, 241 F.3d 1272, 1277 n.7 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[A ] prisoner who merely disagr ees with a diagnosis or a prescribed course of treatment does not st ate a constitutional vi olation.” (quotation omitted)).
B Dopp also argues that the district c ourt erred in granting defendant Genese McCoy’s motion to dismiss. We review de novo a district c ourt’s dismissal for failure to state a claim. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214 , 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). A complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Tw ombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). We agree with the district court that Dopp failed to allege McCoy’s “personal involvement in the alleged constitutional viol ation” sufficient to state a § 1983 claim against her. See Stewart v. Beach, 701 F.3d 1322, 1328 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). Nor has Dopp alle ged that his claimed injuries were caused by a policy of McCoy’s sufficient to stat e a claim for supervisory liability. See Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1199 (10th Cir. 2010).7 C Lastly, Dopp contends that his claim re garding inadequate dental care should not have been dismissed for failure to e xhaust administrative re medies. “We review de novo the district court’s finding of failu re to exhaust admini strative remedies.” Jernigan v. Stuchell, 304 F. 3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2002) . Dopp argues that he was thwarted from completing the grievance pr ocess because prison o fficials returned a grievance under a restriction policy to which Dopp was subject without adequate explanation. We disagree. Prison offici als indicated they re turned the grievance because Dopp’s accompanying affidavi t was insufficient. Administrative requirements for the affidavit were set forth in plain la nguage and had been provided to Dopp. As we have previously held, an inmate subject to gr ievance restrictions “may not successfully argue th at he had exhausted his admi nistrative remedies by, in essence, failing to employ them.” Thomas v. Parker, 609 F.3d 11 14, 1118 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted).
III For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM . Dopp’s motion to proceed IFP is GRANTED . We remind Dopp of his obligation to continue making partial payments until his appellate filing fee is paid in full.

Entered for the Court

Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge