UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

JAMES ANDERSON, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 2:14-CV-436-JEM

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, )

Acting Commissioner of the )

Social Security Administration, )

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on a Complaint [DE 1], filed by Plaintiff on November 26,

2014, and Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 20], filed on April 30,

2015. Plaintiff requests that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge be reversed and remanded

for further proceedings. On August 7, 2015, the Commissioner filed a response, and on September

4, 2015, Plaintiff filed a reply. For the following reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff’s request for

remand.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 30, 2011, Plaintiff filed an application for benefits alleging that he became

disabled on April 21, 2007. Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. 

On May 28, 2013, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Laurel J. Greene held a video hearing at

which Plaintiff, with an attorney representative, and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified. On June

10, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. The Appeals Council

denied Plaintiff’s request for review, leaving the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the

Commissioner.

The ALJ made the following findings under the required five-step analysis:
1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act

through December 31, 2012. 

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 21,

2007, his alleged onset date.

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: residuals from right

femur and left knee surgeries. 

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments

that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments

in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

5. The claimant has the residual functional capacity to lift and carry up to 20

pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently, stand and/or walk about 6 hours

in an 8-hour workday and sit about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday with

normal breaks. The claimant can occasionally climb ladders, ropes, or

scaffolds, and can occasionally walk on wet, uneven surfaces.

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work.

7. The claimant was 45 years old, which is defined as a young individual age

18-49 on the alleged disability onset date. The claimant subsequently

changed age category to closely approaching age.

8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate

in English.

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability

because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a

finding that the claimant is “not disabled” whether or not the claimant has

transferable job skills.

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual

functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the

national economy that the claimant can perform.

11. The claimant has not been under a disability from April 21, 2007, through the

date of the decision.

The parties filed forms of consent to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate

Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case. 

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Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). 

FACTS

Plaintiff has been diagnosed with diabetes melliuts, type II, and has difficulties with blurred

vision. He has a history of special education, below-average IQ, learning disabilities, anxiety, and

depression. After Plaintiff broke his femur in 1981, it was repaired by implanting a rod into it. In

August 2004, Plaintiff ruptured his anterior cruciate ligament and tore the medial meniscus in his

knee. He reports continued pain in his left knee and right hip, and uses a cane to aid in his balance

a few days per week.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Social Security Act authorizes judicial review of the final decision of the agency and

indicates that the Commissioner’s factual findings must be accepted as conclusive if supported by

substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, a court reviewing the findings of an ALJ will

reverse only if the findings are not supported by substantial evidence or if the ALJ has applied an

erroneous legal standard. See Briscoe v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005). Substantial

evidence consists of “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Gudgel v.

Barnhart, 345 F.3d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 2003)).

A court reviews the entire administrative record but does not reconsider facts, re-weigh the

evidence, resolve conflicts in evidence, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its judgment

for that of the ALJ. See Boiles v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005); Clifford v. Apfel, 227

F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000); Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049, 1055 (7th Cir. 1999). Thus, the

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question upon judicial review of an ALJ’s finding that a claimant is not disabled within the meaning

of the Social Security Act is not whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled, but whether the ALJ 

“uses the correct legal standards and the decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Roddy v.

Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing O’Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 618

(7th Cir. 2010); Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 734-35 (7th Cir. 2006); Barnett v. Barnhart,

381 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004)). “A reversal and remand may be required, however, if the ALJ

committed an error of law or if the ALJ based the decision on serious factual mistakes or omissions.”

 Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 837 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).

At a minimum, an ALJ must articulate her analysis of the evidence in order to allow the

reviewing court to trace the path of her reasoning and to be assured that the ALJ considered the

important evidence. See Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002); Diaz v. Chater, 55

F.3d 300, 307 (7th Cir. 1995); Green v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1995). An ALJ must

“‘build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [the] conclusion’ so that, as a reviewing

court, we may assess the validity of the agency’s final decision and afford [a claimant] meaningful

review.” Giles v. Astrue, 483 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Scott, 297 F.3d at 595)); see

also O’Connor-Spinner, 627 F.3d at 618 (“An ALJ need not specifically address every piece of

evidence, but must provide a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and his conclusions.”); Zurawski

v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he ALJ’s analysis must provide some glimpse into

the reasoning behind [the] decision to deny benefits.”).

DISABILITY STANDARD

To be eligible for disability benefits, a claimant must establish that he suffers from a

“disability” as defined by the Social Security Act and regulations. The Act defines “disability” as

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an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable

physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A),

1382c(a)(3)(A). To be found disabled, the claimant’s impairment must not only prevent him from

doing her previous work, but considering his age, education, and work experience, it must also

prevent him from engaging in any other type of substantial gainful activity that exists in significant

numbers in the economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f),

416.920(e)-(f).

When a claimant alleges a disability, Social Security regulations provide a five-step inquiry

to evaluate whether the claimant is entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).

The steps are: (1) Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity? If yes, the claimant is not

disabled, and the claim is denied; if no, the inquiry proceeds to step two; (2) Does the claimant have

an impairment or combination of impairments that are severe? If not, the claimant is not disabled,

and the claim is denied; if yes, the inquiry proceeds to step three; (3) Do(es) the impairment(s) meet

or equal a listed impairment in the appendix to the regulations? If yes, the claimant is automatically

considered disabled; if not, then the inquiry proceeds to step four; (4) Can the claimant do the

claimant’s past relevant work? If yes, the claimant is not disabled, and the claim is denied; if no,

then the inquiry proceeds to step five; (5) Can the claimant perform other work given the claimant’s

Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”), age, education, and experience? If yes, then the claimant

is not disabled, and the claim is denied; if no, the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); see also Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 699-700 (7th

Cir. 2004).

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At steps four and five, the ALJ must consider an assessment of the claimant’s RFC. The

RFC “is an administrative assessment of what work-related activities an individual can perform

despite [his] limitations.” Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1178 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing SSR 96-

8p, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)) (other citations omitted). The RFC

should be based on evidence in the record. Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 676 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing

20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3)). The claimant bears the burden of proving steps one through four,

whereas the burden at step five is on the ALJ. Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 886; see also Knight v. Chater,

55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1995). 

ANALYSIS

A. Residual Functional Capacity

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC assessment was incomplete and not properly determined. 

The Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence.

“The RFC is an assessment of what work-related activities the claimant can perform despite

h[is] limitations.” Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004); see also 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1545(a)(1); 416.1545(a)(1). In evaluating a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ is expected to take into

consideration all of the relevant evidence, including both medical and non-medical evidence. See

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(3); 416.945(a)(3). According to SSA regulations:

The RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion describing

how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical

facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily

activities, observations). In assessing RFC, the adjudicator must

discuss the individual’s ability to perform sustained work activities

in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis (i.e., 8

hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule), and

describe the maximum amount of each work-related activity the

individual can perform based on the evidence available in the case

record. The adjudicator must also explain how any material

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inconsistencies or ambiguities in the evidence in the case record were

considered and resolved.

SSR 96-8p at *7. Although an ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence, she must

consider all of the evidence that is relevant to the disability determination and provide enough

analysis in her decision to permit meaningful judicial review. Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870; Young, 362

F.3d at 1002. In other words, the ALJ must build an “accurate and logical bridge from the evidence

to his conclusion.” Scott, 297 F.3d at 595 (quoting Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir.

2002)).

Plaintiff argues that although the ALJ found that Plaintiff had limitations in concentration,

persistence, and pace, the RFC did not account for these limitations. The Commissioner argues that

because the limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace were mild, they were not a severe

impairment and did not significantly limit his mental ability to do basic work activities. 

“Although [] impairments may not on their own be disabling, that would only justify

discounting their severity, not ignoring them altogether. Moreover, . . . an ALJ must consider the

combined effects of all of the claimant’s impairments, even those that would not be considered

severe in isolation.” Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Martinez v. Astrue,

630 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Even if each problem assessed separately were less serious than

the evidence indicates, the combination of them might be disabling.”); Getch v. Astrue, 539 F.3d

473, 483 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[A]n ALJ is required to consider the aggregate effects of a claimant’s

impairments, including impairments that, in isolation, are not severe.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. §

404.1523); Golembiewski v. Barnhart, 322 F.3d 912, 918 (7th Cir. 2003)). 

In this case, the ALJ mentioned Plaintiff’s mild limitations in concentration, persistence, and

pace, as well as his learning disorder and depression, concluding that “the records failed to

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document more than minimal limitations as a result.” She considered the combination of depression

and a learning disability, but did not explain how those limitations might affect or further limit

Plaintiff’s physical ability to do work, nor did she explain how she took into account those

limitations into the RFC. The ALJ need not specifically include the limitations in the RFC, but she

must consider the combination of impairments, and explain how she incorporated the mental

limitations into the RFC. “In determining an individual’s RFC, the ALJ must evaluate all limitations

that arise from medically determinable impairments, even those that are not severe, and may not

dismiss a line of evidence contrary to the ruling.” Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir.

2009) (citing S.S.R. 96-8p; Golembiewski, 322 F.3d at 917); see also Underwood v. Colvin, No.

2:11-CV-354-JD-PRC, 2013 WL 2420874, at *2 (N.D. Ind. May 30, 2013) (“While it is true that

the ALJ need not specifically include limitations on concentration, persistence and pace in the RFC

finding, . . . the requirement that the ALJ “consider” such limitations has certainly been interpreted

to mean that a real “evaluation” of the effect of those limitations on the claimant’s ability to work

must take place. The ALJ did not do that, here. After finding mild limitations on concentration,

persistence and pace, the ALJ did not include those findings in the RFC; did not explain why or how

those findings were incorporated into the RFC as otherwise written; and in fact did not give any

indication that those findings were considered or evaluated at all in arriving at the RFC.”) (citations

omitted). 

In this case, the RFC does not address any mental, intellectual, or emotional limitations, such

as a limitation to unskilled work or work that does not require significant amounts of reading. 

Especially given the number of reports of low IQ, learning disorder, difficulty reading, and

depression, the failure to explain how the ALJ took Plaintiff’s mental and learning difficulties into

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account in the RFC or even minimally address the combined effects of Plaintiff’s impairments leaves

the Court unable to trace her reasoning. To the extent that the record does not contain enough

information to ascertain the effect of Plaintiff’s limitations on his ability to do work, including the

amount of time Plaintiff would be able to maintain concentration, persistence, and pace in a

workday, the ALJ is reminded of his responsibility to develop the record, which may include

ordering additional examinations or contacting medical sources to obtain records and evidence

necessary to making the determination. See, e.g., Barnett, 381 F.3d at 669 (“An ALJ has a duty to

solicit additional information to flesh out an opinion for which the medical support is not readily

discernable.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3); SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188 at *4 (July 2,

1996)); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(d)(1), 416.919(b)); see also Nelms v. Astrue, 553 F.3d 1093, 1098

(7th Cir. 2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.912(d)-(f), 416.919, 416.927(c)(3)) (other citations

omitted).

B. Credibility Assessment

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated his credibility. The Commissioner argues

that the ALJ’s opinion is supported by substantial evidence. 

The ALJ must weigh the claimant’s subjective complaints, the relevant objective medical

evidence, and any other evidence of the following factors:

(i) [The claimant’s] daily activities;

(ii) The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of [] pain or other

symptoms;

(iii) Precipitating and aggravating factors;

(iv)The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any

medication . . . ;

(v) Treatment . . . for relief of [] pain or other symptoms;

(vi) Any measures . . . used to relieve your pain or other symptoms

. . . ; and

(vii) Other factors concerning [] functional limitations and

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restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). In making a credibility determination, Social Security Ruling 96–7p

states that the ALJ must consider the record as a whole, including objective medical evidence, the

claimant’s statement about symptoms, any statements or other information provided by treating or

examining physicians and other persons about the conditions and how they affect the claimant, and

any other relevant evidence. See SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 (Jul. 2, 1996).

An ALJ is not required to give full credit to every statement of pain made by the claimant

or to find a disability each time a claimant states he or she is unable to work. See Rucker v. Chater,

92 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 1996). However, Ruling 96-7p provides that a claimant’s statements

regarding symptoms or the effect of symptoms on his ability to work “may not be disregarded solely

because they are not substantiated by objective evidence.” SSR 96-7p at *6. An ALJ’s credibility

determination is entitled to substantial deference by a reviewing court and will not be overturned

unless the claimant can show that the finding is “patently wrong.” Prochaska, 454 F.3d at 738.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff’s cane use not credible. In the

credibility portion of his opinion, the ALJ wrote: “While he testified that he has to use a cane to

ambulate, at no point in the records was the claimant’s gait categorized as impaired, limped, or

abnormal in anyway, nor was there any mention of a cane.” AR 20. She also noted that a cane had

not been prescribed. Not only do canes not require a prescription, but the ALJ even noted earlier

in the opinion that Plaintiff “uses a cane for stability and ambulation and has been doing so for 2 to

3 years as needed when his hip or knee condition is exacerbated.” AR 17 (emphasis added). 

Furthermore, as Plaintiff points out, a number of medical records do reflect impairment of Plaintiff’s

gait. See AR 274 (“Positive for: Gait disturbance.”); AR 308 (“[Plaintiff] has antalgic gait.”). 

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It is not apparent to the Court how Plaintiff’s use of ambulatory devices, even if only

occasional, makes his allegations of pain and limitation less credible rather than bolstering them. 

See Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 922 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Absurdly, the administrative law judge

thought it suspicious that the plaintiff uses a cane, when no physician had prescribed a cane. A cane

does not require a prescription.”); SSR 96-7p at *6 (“[A]llegations concerning the intensity and

persistence of pain or other symptoms may not be disregarded solely because they are not

substantiated by objective medical evidence.”). The regulations specifically remind ALJs to take

into account in their credibility determination that, for example, “[t]he individual’s daily activities

may be structured so as to minimize symptoms to a tolerable level or eliminate them entirely,

avoiding physical or mental stressors that would exacerbate the symptoms” and “the individual’s

symptoms . . . may be relieved with over-the-counter medications.” SSR 96-7p, at *8. The ALJ

failed to explain how use of non-prescribed medical devices or coping mechanisms shows that

Plaintiff’s allegations of pain are less than credible, rather than that Plaintiff uses assistive devices

because of the pain and weakness he experiences. In addition to raising questions about her

credibility assessment, the ALJ also did not include Plaintiff’s occasional need for a cane in the RFC

without explanation. See, e.g., Ross v. Barnhart, 119 F. App’x 791, 795 (7th Cir. 2004) (“‘The RFC

is an assessment of what work-related activities the claimant can perform despite her limitations.’ 

In considering a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ is expected to take into consideration all relevant evidence,

both medical and non-medical.”) (quoting Young, 362 F.3d at 1000); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1),

(a)(3); 416.1545(a)(1), (a)(3)). Although Plaintiff does not need to use a cane all of the time, the VE

testified that if he needed to use a cane while working, he would not be able to perform any of the

jobs described by the VE.

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Another important aspect of the ALJ’s credibility assessment was her mention of Plaintiff’s

daily activities as an indication that he suffers fewer limitations than alleged, including his ability

to occasionally babysit, clean, prepare meals, grocery shop, drive a car, and attend doctor’s visits

unaccompanied. Although she repeatedly mentions Plaintiff’s daily activities, she nowhere explains

how these basic acts of self-care, particularly given the reports that he performs them slowly, are

inconsistent with his limitations. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly criticized

credibility determinations that are based on a plaintiff’s ability to take care of his personal hygiene,

children, or household chores, as these alone are not sound bases for a credibility determination. 

See, e.g., Moss v. Astrue, 555 F.3d 556, 562 (7th Cir. 2009) (“An ALJ cannot disregard a claimant’s

limitations in performing household activities. The ALJ here ignored [the plaintiff]’s numerous

qualifications regarding her daily activities” and methods of coping with pain); Gentle v. Barnhart,

430 F.3d 865, 867 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The administrative law judge’s casual equating of household

work to work in the labor market cannot stand.”); Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 887 (asserting that daily

activities, such as doing laundry, helping children prepare for school, cooking, and washing dishes

do not necessarily undermine or contradict a claim of disabling pain). To the extent that the ALJ

was also using Plaintiff’s ability to perform some activities of daily living as indicating an ability

to perform full-time work, the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that a person’s ability to

perform daily activities does not indicate an ability to work outside of the home. See, e.g., Bjornson

v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The critical differences between activities of daily

living and activities in a full-time job are that a person has more flexibility in scheduling the former

than the latter, can get help from other persons . . . and is not held to a minimum standard of

performance, as she would be by an employer. The failure to recognize these differences is a

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recurrent, and deplorable, feature of opinions by administrative law judges in social security

disability cases.”); Punzio v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 704, 712 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[The Plaintiff’s] ability to

struggle through the activities of daily living does not mean that she can manage the requirements

of a modern workplace.”); Mendez v. Barnhart, 439 F.3d 360, 362 (7th Cir. 2006) (“We have

cautioned the Social Security Administration against placing undue weight on a claimant’s

household activities in assessing the claimant’s ability to hold a job outside the home . . . The

pressures, the nature of the work, flexibility in the use of time, and other aspects of the working

environment . . . often differ dramatically between home and office or factory or other place of paid

work.”).

The ALJ also notes that Plaintiff continued to work and look for work after his alleged date

of onset of disability and uses this as evidence that he is not disabled. Continuing to work after

disability begins does not necessarily mean that a person is not disabled. As the Seventh Circuit has

noted, “even persons who are disabled sometimes cope with their impairments and continue working

long after they might have been entitled to benefits.” Shauger v. Astrue, 675 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir.

2012); see also Gentle, 430 F.3d at 867 (“A person can be totally disabled for purposes of

entitlement to social security benefits even if, because of an indulgent employer or circumstances

of desperation, he is in fact working.”). Likewise, “[a] desperate person might force h[im]self to

work – or . . . certify that []he is able to work – but that does not necessarily mean []he is not

disabled.” Richards v. Astrue, 370 F. App’x 727, 732 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Gentle, 430 F.3d at

867; Hawkins v. First Union Corp. Long-Term Disability Plan, 326 F.3d 914, 918 (7th Cir.2003)).

There are a number of errors in the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s credibility, and on

remand, the ALJ is directed to thoroughly explain his credibility assessment in accordance with the

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applicable regulations and fully account for his cane use.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS the relief requested in Brief in

Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 20] and REMANDS this matter for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

SO ORDERED this 10th day of February, 2016.

s/ John E. Martin 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN E. MARTIN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

cc: All counsel of record

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