UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

JOSHUA ROBINSON, )

)

Petitioner, )

) 

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 2:15-CV-234-PPS

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Joshua Robinson, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the

prison disciplinary hearing (MCF 15-03-47) that was held at the Miami Correctional

Facility on March 17, 2015. The Disciplinary Hearing Officer found him guilty of

Possession/Use of a Wireless Communication Device in violation of A-121 and

sanctioned him with the loss of 180 days earned credit time and demoted him to credit

class 2. Robinson raises four grounds in his petition.

In Ground One, Robinson argues that the sanctions were excessive because,

while they were within the guidelines, there is a variance in punishment at the prison

and he was punished too severely compared to inmates in his position. Harshness of

sanctions, however, is not a valid basis for challenging a punishment that is within the

range of the offense for which the inmate was found guilty. Cf. United States ex rel. Long

v. Pate, 418 F.2d 1028, 1031 (7th Cir. 1970) (Where a sentence is “within the range

established by the legislature . . . this court will not [on habeas corpus review] question

the trial judge’s discretion in imposing sentence, nor will it question the refusal of the

Illinois Supreme Court to reconsider appellant’s petition for reduction of sentence.”) 
Here, Robinson even admits that the punishment imposed was within the limits

permitted by Indiana’s Disciplinary Code for Adult Offenders for a Class A offense.

Ground One, therefore, is not a basis for habeas corpus relief.

In Ground Two, Robinson argues that the Disciplinary Hearing Officer was

biased and gave him the maximum punishment because his brother had been found

guilty of a similar offense. To the extent that this is an argument about the severity of

the punishment Robinson received, it is merely a restatement of the claim I rejected in

Ground One. To the extent that it is an argument that the hearing officer was biased

because of prior proceedings against his brother, that is not sufficient to overcome the

presumption of honesty and integrity to which an adjudicator is entitled. See Withrow v.

Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). A hearing officer is not automatically deemed biased

simply because he adjudicated or was involved in a previous disciplinary charge

against the prisoner. See Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666-67 (7th Cir. 2003); Pannell v.

McBride, 306 F.3d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 2002); Perotti v. Marberry, 355 Fed. Appx. 39, 43 (7th

Cir. 2009). Here, Robinson’s claim is even more tenuous than those cases because here

it is not a prior adjudication against him, but against his brother and Robinson has not

shown how the Disciplinary Hearing Officer’s familiarity with Robinson’s brother

actually biased Robinson. Ground Two, therefore, is not a basis for habeas corpus

relief.

In Ground Three, Robinson argues that the offense A-121, possessing a cell

phone, did not exist until March 1, 2015. Consequently, Robinson argues that he could

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not be written up for a violation of the “non-existent” rule on February 23, 2015. Here,

Robinson’s facts are just patently wrong. Rule A-121 prohibiting inmates from having

cell phones existed on February 23, 2015. [See DE 6-9 at 3.] Perhaps something about

the disciplinary rules changed on March 1, 2015, and A-121 was re-printed in a new or

revised version of the rules. Nevertheless, because the “no cell phone” rule existed

when Robinson was written up, Ground Three is not a basis for habeas corpus relief.

In Ground Four, Robinson argues that there are discrepancies on the Conduct

Report. The Report says that the incident occurred on “E housing unit, cell #126/126.” 

[DE 6-1 at 1.] But it also says that the phone was found in #437/438 and that Robinson

was assigned to E-437. [Id.] Clearly the Disciplinary Hearing Officer resolved this

discrepancy and it is not my place in a habeas corpus case “to assess the comparative

weight of the evidence underlying the disciplinary board’s decision.” Webb v. Anderson,

224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000). Moreover, Robinson does not dispute that he told the

Disciplinary Hearing Officer at the hearing, “My Bunkie didn’t have anything to do

with it. It was mine.” [DE 6-5 at 1.] Given his confession, he clearly was not confused

by the inclusion of a reference to a different cell. Robinson also argues that the

Disciplinary Hearing Officer violated several prison rules. The violation of a prison rule,

however, is not a basis for habeas corpus relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991).

(“In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a

conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). Ground

Four, therefore, is not a basis for habeas corpus relief.

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For these reasons, the habeas corpus petition is DENIED and the clerk is

DIRECTED to close this case. 

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: August 5, 2016

_s/ Philip P. Simon________________

PHILIP P. SIMON, CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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