1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

 FORT WAYNE DIVISION

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CAUSE NO.: 1:13-CR-46-TLS 

 ) 

CHRISTOPHER R. SEALS ) 

OPINION AND ORDER

 The Defendant, Christopher R. Seals, was found guilty and convicted by a jury of armed 

bank robbery and aiding and abetting, violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 

(Count 1); use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c) (Count 2); and felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) 

(Count 3). An officer with the United States Probation Office prepared a Presentence 

Investigation Report (PSR) in anticipation of the Defendant’s sentencing. The Defendant objects 

to certain portions of the PSR, raising four issues: (1) whether the base offense level should be 

enhanced for reckless endangerment during flight; (2) whether the base offense level should be 

enhanced for physical restraint of a victim; (3) whether the base offense level should be 

enhanced for trafficking in firearms and stolen firearms; and (4) whether the Defendant 

possessed a firearm in connection with another felony offense.1

 The Government has a single 

objection: whether a four-level enhancement for possessing a firearm in connection with another 

felony offense is appropriate. The Court conducted an evidentiary hearing [ECF No. 87] during 

 

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 The Defendant also objects to two of the probation officer’s proposed conditions of supervised release; 

namely, the conditions regarding third-party notification and participation in a substance abuse treatment 

program. On February 12, 2015, the Court issued a Notice of Proposed Conditions of Supervised Release 

[ECF No. 81] that declined to impose all of the conditions contained in Part F of the PSR. Because the 

Court’s Notice declined to impose the two conditions of supervised release for which the Defendant 

objects, these objections are denied as moot. 
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which the parties presented argument regarding the propriety of the enhancements. The 

objections are ripe for ruling. 

FINDINGS OF FACT

Facts relevant to sentencing should be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. United 

States v. England, 555 F.3d 616, 622 (7th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Krieger, 628 F.3d 

857, 862 (7th Cir. 2010) (advising that sentencing factors that do not increase the defendant’s 

sentence beyond the statutory range may be found by the court at sentencing by a preponderance 

of the evidence). “A proposition proved by a preponderance of the evidence is one that has been 

shown to be more likely than not.” United States v. Davis, 682 F.3d 596, 612 (7th Cir. 2012). 

The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to sentencing, United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 

730 (7th Cir. 2005), and a court may rely on hearsay as long as the information “has sufficient 

indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy,” United States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 

838 (7th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Isom, 635 F.3d 904, 908 

(7th Cir. 2011) (“At sentencing, courts may rely on presentence reports containing even doublehearsay, i.e., statements by coconspirators to investigators, so long as those statements are 

reliable.”). At sentencing, “a district judge ‘may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, 

largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which 

it may come.’” United States v. Bautista, 532 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting United 

States v. Johnson, 489 F.3d 794, 796–97 (7th Cir. 2008)). “Sentencing judges necessarily have 

‘discretion to draw conclusions about the testimony given and evidence introduced at 

sentencing,’ but ‘due process requires that sentencing determinations be based on reliable 

evidence, not speculation or unfounded allegations.’” United States v. Bradley, 628 F.3d 394, 
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400 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting England, 555 F.3d at 622). “A district court may rely on facts 

asserted in the PSR if the PSR is based on sufficiently reliable information.” Rollins, 544 F.3d at 

838. “The defendant bears the burden of proving that the PSR is inaccurate or unreliable,” and if 

he offers no evidence to question the PSR’s accuracy, a court may rely on it. Id.

The Court conducted a four-day jury trial, beginning on September 16, 2014, and an 

evidentiary hearing on February 17, 2015. The Court incorporates by reference the record of this 

case, and will briefly recite some of the relevant facts. 

On February 14, 2013, three masked individuals entered the PNC Bank, located at 5610 

Coventry Lane, Fort Wayne, Indiana, and robbed the bank at gunpoint. The robbers approached 

from the back of the bank and entered through the front door. Two wore dark, hooded 

sweatshirts and black masks with small eyeholes pulled down over their faces, and one had a 

backpack. The robber with the backpack was carrying a gun as he went to the first teller station 

behind the teller counter, but the robber appeared to leave it on the floor by a teller’s chair before 

entering the vault, as seen by surveillance video. He was not carrying a gun when he exited the 

vault. The three robbers left the bank through the back door. 

 Immediately after the robbery, a revolver was found near one of the wheeled legs of the 

teller’s chair. It was loaded with Remington .38 special ammunition. DNA samples taken from 

the cartridges matched the DNA of the Defendant to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty. 

A cellular telephone (“cellphone”) was also taken during the robbery from one of the victim 

employees. It was later recovered from a remote area along the suspected getaway route. A latent 

fingerprint recovered from the phone was identified as having been made by Deyante Stephens, 

also known by the nickname “Pooter.” 

 On March 20, 2013, officers were involved in the pursuit of a black Infiniti sedan which 
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was associated with the Defendant and his brother, Charles Seals. Fort Wayne Police Department 

(FWPD) Officer Michael Bell spotted the Infiniti with at least two occupants, in the driver and 

front passenger seats. When Officer Bell activated his emergency lights, the Infiniti fled from the 

scene. A high-speed pursuit ensued, ending with a crash of the Infiniti. Two suspects exited the 

car and ran. A man named Nadir Armour remained in the back seat of the Infiniti. The two 

fleeing suspects were not located. 

 Crime scene technicians executed search warrants on the Infiniti and located the 

following evidence: a loaded Smith and Wesson pistol between the driver’s seat and the door 

opening; a white cellphone under the gun; a black cellphone on the passenger side floor; and a 

photocopy of the Defendant’s identification card and the driver’s carbon copy of a traffic citation 

issued to the Defendant in the front console. Additionally, in the back seat area, the officers 

located a black knit hat with hand-cut eyeholes, a bag containing a plastic bag of money, several 

boxes of ammunition in different calibers, and other items. The bag of money consisted of 531 

one-dollar bills and 700 ten-dollar bills. There was a box of 9mm Luger ammunition, a box of 

Remington .38 special ammunition, a box of .45 caliber ammunition, and 410 ammunition that 

could fit a .45 caliber gun. The officers found a dark blue, hooded sweatshirt, along with other 

clothing items, in the trunk. 

 A latent fingerprint was located on the gun from the Infiniti and identified as the 

fingerprint of the Defendant. Another latent fingerprint on the driver’s door window was 

identified as the fingerprint of the Defendant’s brother, Charles Seals. Downloaded data from the 

white cellphone indicated communications with “Pooter.” There were numerous communications 

and emails identifying the phone as belonging to Charles Seals. The black cellphone contained 

conversations about the acquisition of guns. A scanner radio application had been installed on 
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the phone on February 13, 2013. Numerous communications identified the black cellphone as 

belonging to the Defendant. It was also determined that the black cellphone was used in close 

proximity to the time of the flight and subsequent crash of the Infiniti. 

 The Defendant was identified as a suspect for the PNC Bank robbery after DNA results 

were received from the gun left behind at the PNC Bank. The Defendant was interviewed by 

police on May 1, 2013. The Defendant was shown a photograph of the gun and he identified it as 

being the gun used in the PNC robbery, but claimed his knowledge was based on television news 

coverage. He denied ever seeing the gun in person. He later admitted that the gun was a .38 but 

denied that his DNA would be found on any PNC evidence. After Special Agent Stewart showed 

the Defendant the DNA report regarding the gun abandoned at the PNC Bank, the Defendant 

switched his story and admitted buying, touching, and loading the gun prior to the bank robbery. 

He also admitted that the black cellphone recovered in the Infiniti belonged to him and provided 

the numeric code to unlock the telephone. As the interview continued, the Defendant’s story 

changed, and he admitted that his involvement in the bank robbery was to keep quiet, as “Pooter” 

and Charles Seals gave him money when they came back and told him to say nothing. The 

Defendant admitted that Charles Seals asked him to rob PNC Bank with him about three days 

before Valentine’s Day but that the Defendant was too scared to do it. 

 A three-count Indictment was filed on May 22, 2013, and on September 19, 2014, a jury 

convicted the Defendant of all three counts. The addendum to the PSR indicated that the 

Government and the Defendant had objections to the application of various enhancements to the 

Defendant’s base offense level as found in the PSR. On February 17, 2015, the Court held an 

evidentiary hearing during which the parties presented argument regarding the propriety of the 

enhancements. Having considered the complete record in this case and the parties’ arguments, 
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the Court will now discuss each objection in turn. 

ANALYSIS

A. Enhancement for Reckless Endangerment During Flight

The Defendant argues that the two-level enhancement for reckless endangerment during 

flight, pursuant to U.S.S.G. §3C1.2 and found in paragraph 27 of the PSR, is inappropriate 

because he was never identified as having been a passenger in the black Infiniti. The Defendant 

argues that he never admitted to being present in the car, and that the backseat passenger, Nadir 

Armour, identified Charles Seals as the driver but never identified the Defendant as being 

present in the car. Although the Defendant admits that his cellphone was in the car, he argues 

that any evidence suggesting that he was the front seat passenger in the car is merely 

circumstantial evidence. The Government argues that there is ample circumstantial evidence to 

establish that the Defendant was the front seat passenger in the car during the flight from police. 

Although the pursuing officer did not visually identify the Defendant as being the front 

passenger seat passenger of the Infiniti, there were numerous items found in the car connecting 

the vehicle with the Defendant. First, a photocopy of the Defendant’s identification card and the 

driver’s carbon copy of a traffic citation issued to the Defendant were found in the front console. 

Second, a black cellphone was located on the passenger floorboard, and subsequent analysis of 

the data and communications of the phone identified it as belonging to the Defendant. Evidence 

presented at trial indicated recent use of the phone in close proximity to the time of the car chase 

and accident. At roughly the 1:57:00 to 2:05:00 mark of the recorded interview of the Defendant 

on May 1, 2013, he admits that his black cellphone was lost in the Infiniti, and he then provided 

officers with the passcode necessary to unlock the phone. Further, at the 2:07:00 mark, the 
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following exchange occurred between the Defendant and the interviewing officer. 

Officer: “You were with him [Charles Seals] in the crash?” 

Defendant: “Yeah, cause that’s my car, that’s why.” 

Officer: “You weren’t driving.” 

Defendant: “I know.” 

Officer: “Your [expletive] brother was driving. You were riding shotgun and you 

have Tiger [Nadir Armour] in the backseat sitting with the dufflebag.” 

Other items found in the car included a white cellphone, identified as belonging to Charles Seals, 

and a loaded Smith and Wesson pistol, both found between the driver’s seat and the door 

opening. A latent fingerprint taken from the gun in the Infiniti was identified as belonging to the 

Defendant. A black knit hat with hand-cut eyeholes, a bag containing a plastic bag of money, and 

several boxes of ammunition in different calibers were found in the backseat area. A dark blue, 

hooded sweatshirt, along with other clothing items, was found in the trunk. 

 The Defendant previously objected to the admissibility of this evidence, but the Court 

overruled the Defendant’s objections in its May 7, 2014, Opinion and Order [ECF No. 47], 

finding that a reasonably jury could conclude that the Defendant was the front seat passenger of 

the car when it fled from police and that he was in possession of the items found in the car. The 

Court incorporates by reference its earlier Opinion and Order, and finds that the preponderance 

of the evidence shows that the Defendant was the front seat passenger in the Infiniti when it fled 

from police. The Court finds that after the Infiniti crashed, the Defendant and the driver, Charles 

Seals, fled from the scene on foot, leaving behind Nadir Armour in the backseat along with the 

various items of evidence in the car already described. 

 The Defendant knew, as he acknowledged in his interview, that he could not legally 
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possess a firearm because he was a convicted felon. The pistol found in the car, which included 

the Defendant’s latent fingerprint, as well as the ammunition, the items used in the robbery, and 

the proceeds from the robbery all provided incentive for the Defendant to flee from the police. It 

is of no consequence that the Defendant was the front seat passenger and not the driver, because 

after the high speed chase and crash, the Defendant and his brother both continued to flee from 

the scene and the evidence, leaving only Nadir Armour in the vehicle. 

 The Defendant bears the burden of showing that the PSR is not accurate or is unreliable, 

and must produce evidence beyond a bare denial that calls reliability of the alleged facts into 

question. United States v. Davis, 682 F.3d 596, 613 (7th Cir. 2012). The District Court may rely 

on factual information contained in the PSR “so long as it bears sufficient indicia of reliability to 

support its probable accuracy.” Id. A bare denial by the Defendant may be enough if the PSR 

contains only a “naked or unsupported charge,” but only after the Defendant’s evidence casts 

doubt on the reliability of the facts in the PSR does the burden shift to the government to 

demonstrate the accuracy of the information. Id.; United States v. Moreno-Padilla, 602 F.3d 802, 

809 (7th Cir. 2010). 

The Court finds that the Defendant has failed to produce evidence that reasonably 

questions the reliability of the facts in the PSR. To the contrary, the Government has produced 

evidence supporting the facts in the PSR that the Infiniti led police on a high-speed chase 

through a residential neighborhood that ended when the vehicle crashed into two separate 

vehicles on Bowser Avenue. The Court finds that the Defendant was the front seat passenger in 

this Infiniti, and that the Defendant continued to flee on foot after the crash. Consequently, the 

Court finds that the preponderance of the evidence shows that the Defendant’s high-speed flight 

from the police recklessly endangered the public and the police. As such, the two-level 
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enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight, pursuant to U.S.S.G. §3C1.2, is 

appropriate and the Defendant’s objection is overruled. 

B. Enhancement for Physical Restraint of a Victim

The Defendant argues that the two-level enhancement for physical restraint of a victim, 

pursuant to U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(4)(B) and found in paragraph 23 of the PSR, is inappropriate 

because he believes the evidence does not support the enhancement. 

The Government argues that there are multiple instances of physical restraint within the 

record that support the enhancement. First, two bank employees were moved at gunpoint to 

various locations in the bank over the course of the robbery. The lead teller, Brittany Dillman, 

who was approximately seven months pregnant at the time, was moved from her teller station to 

the vault, and for a moment a gun was pointed at her stomach. The manager, Bradford Ziebell, 

was moved from his office to the teller station, and then to the vault. Both bank employees were 

then told to stay in the vault and the door was closed on them at the end of the robbery. In 

addition, Ziebell was placed in handcuffs. The Government argues that the forced movement 

around the bank, at gunpoint, is enough to support application of the enhancement 

notwithstanding the fact the Ziebell was placed in handcuffs and both he and Dillman were shut 

inside the vault. 

The Government cites United States v. Black, 636 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 2011), to support the 

proposition that the physical restraint enhancement is proper even when based on the actions of 

the defendant’s accomplices. In Black, the defendant argued that his accomplice’s conduct—

ordering and forcing a bank teller to move to various places in the bank at gunpoint—did not 

constitute physical restraint because it was not similar enough to the examples of physical 
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restraint enumerated in the Guidelines, including tying, binding, or locking up the victim. Id. at 

899–900. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument and found that “the fundamental 

characteristic of the physical restraint enhancement is to punish one for depriving a person of his 

freedom of physical movement, which can be accomplished by means beyond those statutory 

examples.” In particular, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its finding in Taylor that “‘[w]hether a 

pointed gun is used to move a person into an unlocked room and keep him there, or used to move 

a person from one part of the robbery scene to another, the person’s freedom of movement is 

restrained as effectively as by shoving or dragging him into a room and locking the door.’” Id. at 

900 (quoting United States v. Taylor, 620 F.3d 812, 815 (7th Cir. 2010)). 

The Court finds that the preponderance of the evidence shows that the victims were 

physically restrained during the robbery. Not only were two bank employees forced, at gunpoint, 

to move to various locations around the bank, both were shut inside the vault at the end of the 

robbery. In addition, Ziebell, the bank manager, was placed in handcuffs. These actions clearly 

establish that both victims were deprived of their freedom of physical movement and were 

thereby physically restrained. As such, the two-level enhancement for physical restraint of a 

victim, pursuant to U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(4)(B), is appropriate and the Defendant’s objection is 

overruled. 

C. Enhancements for Trafficking in Firearms and Stolen Firearms

The Defendant argues that the four-level enhancement for trafficking of firearms, 

pursuant to U.S.S.G. §2K2.1(b)(5) and found in paragraph 34 of the PSR, and the two-level 

enhancement for stolen firearms, pursuant to U.S.S.G. §2K2.1(b)(4)(A) and found in paragraph 

33 of the PSR, are inappropriate because he believes there is insufficient evidence to support the 
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enhancements.2 

The Government argues that both enhancements are appropriate based on the trial 

evidence as well as statements made by the Defendant in an interview with law enforcement. 

While excerpts of the interview were presented at trial, the entire May 1, 2013, interview was 

admitted into evidence as Government’s Exhibit 55 during the evidentiary hearing. As for the 

firearms being stolen, the Government argues that the Defendant admits that the guns were 

stolen because he is unable to legally purchase guns, but that he would acquire guns for use by 

his brother and others at the Bowser residence. As for the trafficking of firearms, the 

Government argues that the Defendant admited during the interview that he and his brother were 

selling guns to co-Defendant Deyante Stephens and others. 

The Court has reviewed the interview of the Defendant and finds that the preponderance 

of the evidence shows that the Defendant trafficked in firearms and had possession of stolen 

firearms. During the interview, the officers asked the Defendant numerous times about guns. 

When asked if he knew the guns were stolen, the Defendant answered “yeah,” and when asked 

why he bought stolen guns, the Defendant responded “I can’t get [any] regular guns,” a reference 

to his status as a convicted felon. (Gov’t Ex. 55 at 52:00–56:00.) Later, the Defendant 

acknowledged that he would buy a lot of stolen guns, citing a need for protection because 

“people shoot at us, trying to kill us.” (Id. at 2:06:00–2:06:30.) The Defendant also informed 

officers that he set up the deals to buy the stolen guns as well as sell the guns, and that he and his 

associates would keep about five to six guns available at the Bowser Avenue residence. (Id. at 

 2

 The Addendum to the PSR mentions only an objection to trafficking of firearms and not to 

stolen firearms. However, because the parties discussed the issue of whether the firearms were stolen 

during their arguments at the February 17, 2015, evidentiary hearing, the Court will also address the 

potential stolen firearms objection. 
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52:00–57:00, 1:33:00–1:34:00.) The Defendant has not produced any evidence to question the 

facts in the PSR. Meanwhile, the Government has produced evidence establishing the credibility 

of the facts as laid out in the PSR. Consequently, the Court finds that the preponderance of the 

evidence shows that on multiple occasions the Defendant bought and sold stolen firearms. As 

such, the four-level enhancement for trafficking of firearms, pursuant to U.S.S.G. §2K2.1(b)(5), 

and the two-level enhancement for stolen firearms, pursuant to U.S.S.G. §2K2.1(b)(4)(A), are 

appropriate and the Defendant’s objection is overruled. 

D. Enhancement for Possession of a Firearm in Connection with another Felony 

Offense 

 Finally, the Government argues that a four-level enhancement for possession of a firearm 

in connection with another felony offense, pursuant to U.S.S.G. §2K2.1(b)(6)(B), is appropriate 

in this case. The Defendant argues that this enhancement is inappropriate because it is already 

covered under the Guideline calculations based on the Defendant’s conduct. 

U.S.S.G. §2K2.1(b)(6)(B) provides for a four-level enhancement if the defendant “used 

or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense; or possessed 

or transferred any firearm or ammunition with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it 

would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense.” The guidelines 

commentary explains that “in connection with” means the enhancement applies if the firearm 

facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating, another felony offense. U.S.S.G. §2K2.1, cmt. 

n.14. The guidelines commentary further explains that “[i]f the defendant used or transferred one 

of such firearms in connection with another felony offense (i.e., an offense other than a firearms 

possession or trafficking offense) an enhancement under subsection (b)(6)(B) also would apply.” 
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U.S.S.G. §2K2.1, cmt. n.13(D). 

 The addendum to the PSR indicates that the probation officer did not include an 

enhancement for possession of a firearm in connection with another felony offense for two 

reasons. First, the probation officer noted that the firearms in this case were possessed or 

trafficked. Specifically, the probation officer determined that the Defendant’s conviction for 

being a felon in possession of a firearm pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count 3) precluded 

application of the firearm involved in the bank robbery towards this enhancement. Second, the 

probation officer cited United States v. Johns, 732 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2013), for the proposition 

that it is impermissible double counting to apply a trafficking enhancement and an increase for 

knowledge that the weapon would be used in connection with another felony offense where the 

enhancements are based on the same conduct. 

 In Johns, the Seventh Circuit found that the district court erred in applying the other 

felony offense enhancement because the other felony enhancement and the trafficking 

enhancement were based on the same conduct—John’s transfer of the firearms to the 

Confidential Informant (CI) with knowledge that the CI was going to resell the firearms—and 

was impermissible double counting, which is expressly prohibited by Application Note 13(D) to 

§2K2.1. Id. at 740. The Government argues that the rule in Johns is inapplicable because it is not 

seeking to use the same offense conduct, namely trafficking, for both enhancements. Rather, the 

Government argues there are multiple other felonies which provide the support for application of 

the enhancement. First, the Government argues that the Defendant admitted to acquiring a 

community supply of guns for his buddies at the Bowser residence, who were also felons, which 

were used at various shootings and other crimes they wanted to commit. Second, the 

Government argues that the Defendant admitted to supplying a gun to his brother, Charles, and 
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selling a gun to Deyante Stephens, both of whom are felons. Third, the Government argues that 

the car chase involving the Infiniti was resisting law enforcement with a vehicle, which is a 

felony offense. 

 The Defendant argues, similar to the enhancement for reckless endangerment during 

flight, that only circumstantial evidence supports a finding that the Defendant was the front seat 

passenger in the Infiniti. For reasons already discussed, the Court finds that the preponderance of 

the evidence shows that the Defendant was the front seat passenger in the Infiniti and was in 

possession of the items located inside the car. Although the presence of other items, such as the 

proceeds from the bank robbery, would encourage the Defendant to flee, the Smith and Wesson 

pistol found between the front driver’s seat and the door opening is of particular relevance with 

respect to the other felony enhancement. A latent fingerprint taken from the gun was identified as 

belonging to the Defendant. As the Defendant acknowledged in his interview, he was aware that 

he could not legally possess a firearm. The Court finds that the firearm both facilitated, and had 

the potential to facilitate, another felony offense. The Defendant knew that if he was caught with 

the gun he would be guilty of felon in possession of a firearm, a felony offense. The record 

reflects that the Infiniti fled from police in a high-speed chase before it crashed, and then the 

occupants of the driver and front passenger seats continued to flee on foot. As already stated, the 

Court finds that these two individuals were the Defendant and his brother, Charles. As already 

determined, the Defendant led police on a high-speed chase that recklessly endangered the public 

and placed others in substantial risk of bodily injury. In Indiana, it is a felony offense to resist 

law enforcement by fleeing in a vehicle. I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1. Hence, the Defendant’s flight from 

the police in the Infiniti was another felony offense. The Court finds that the presence of the gun 

and the ammunition in the vehicle facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating, the other felony 
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offense of resisting law enforcement through flight in a vehicle. 

The burden is on the Defendant to produce evidence bringing these facts into question. 

While the Government provides ample evidence of the Defendant’s involvement with guns, the 

Defendant offers no evidence to question the reliability of the Government’s evidence. 

Therefore, the four-level enhancement for possession of a firearm in connection with another 

felony offense, pursuant to U.S.S.G. §2K2.1(b)(6)(B), is appropriate and the Defendant’s 

objection is overruled. For the same reasons, the Government’s objection is sustained. 

CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant’s objections to the PSR are OVERRULED. The 

Government’s objection to the PSR and request for an enhancement for possession of a firearm 

in connection with another felony offense is SUSTAINED. 

 SO ORDERED on February 19, 2015. 

 s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

 THERESA L. SPRINGMANN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT