IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

JEREMIE SHENEMAN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 3:15-CV-103

)

ROBERT TRUITT, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the “Civil Legal

Malpractice Complaint under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1332", filed by

Plaintiff, Jeremie Sheneman, a pro se prisoner, on March 9, 2015.

For the reasons set forth below, the complaint is DISMISSED without

prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

Jeremie Sheneman (“Sheneman”) brings suit against, Robert D.

Truitt, the court-appointed attorney who represented him in two

2011 wire fraud prosecutions: United States v. Sheneman, 3:10-CR120 (N.D. Ind. Filed September 9, 2010), and United States v.

Sheneman, 3:10-CR-126 (N.D. Ind. Filed October 13, 2010). He

alleges Attorney Truitt was negligent in his representation and

brings a state law claim against him for legal malpractice. 

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Sheneman has brought suit here claiming this court has subject

matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship.

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a Court must review a prisoner

complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious,

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A. In determining whether the complaint states a

claim, a court applies the same standard as when deciding a motion

to dismiss under FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v.

Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal,

a complaint must state a claim for relief that is plausible on its

face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03

(7th Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. at 603. The court must bear in mind,

however, that “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally

construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must

be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 

Because jurisdiction is the first question in every federal

case, Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541

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(1986), the court must address whether it has subject matter

jurisdiction. “In order to support diversity jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. sec. 1332, two basic requirements must be satisfied: (1)

complete diversity of citizenship between the plaintiffs and the

defendants and (2) the proper amount in controversy (more than $

75,000).” Neuma, Inc. v. AMP, Inc., 259 F.3d 864, 881 (7th Cir.

2001). The complaint shows the parties have complete diversity of

citizenship. That satisfies the first inquiry.

While Sheneman seeks $10,000,000 in compensatory and punitive

damages, it must be determined if it is legally possible for

Sheneman to recover $75,000 on this claim. See Back Doctors Ltd. v.

Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins.,637 F.3d 827, 830 (7th Cir. 2011)

(“[U]nless recovery of an amount exceeding the jurisdictional

minimum is legally impossible, the case belongs in federal

court.”). The Seventh Circuit has recently faced the identical

issue this Court here. See Banks v. Preston Humphrey, LLC, No. 14-

3766, 2015 WL 1840665 (April 23, 2015). In Banks, the plaintiff

was convicted of drug charges and sued his court-appointed attorney

for legal malpractice. The Seventh Circuit noted that, “[b]ecause

Banks did not pay [the court-appointed attorney] to represent him,

the only plausible damages to Banks from [the attorney’s] allegedly

compromised advice to plead guilty would be for the time that Banks

has been wrongly convicted. Id. at *2 (citing Lafler v. Cooper,

132 S.Ct. 1376, 1384-85 (2012)). But, because his conviction was

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still intact, the Seventh Circuit noted that the possibility of

damages for a wrongful conviction was eliminated. Id. at *2

(citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)). As a result,

Banks’ actual damages could not meet the jurisdictional threshold. 

Id. at *3. And, because Banks was not entitled to recovery

punitive damages, the Seventh Circuit dismissed Banks’ case for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id.

Sheneman, like Banks, did not pay for his court-appointed

counsel to represent him. Thus, the only actual damages Sheneman

could recover due to Truitt’s alleged malpractice would be for the

time that Sheneman has been wrongly incarcerated. However, because

Sheneman’s convictions are still intact, (see 3:10-CR-120 and 3:10-

CR-126), he can not recover for any such damages. As a result, a

recovery of punitive damages would be the only way Sheneman could

meet the amount in controversy requirement. 

In Indiana, “punitive damages may be awarded only upon a

showing of willful and wanton misconduct such that the defendant

subjected other persons to probable injury, with an awareness of

such impending danger and with heedless indifference of the

consequences. Or where the defendant acted maliciously,

fraudulently, oppressively, or with gross negligence and the

conduct was not the result of a mistake of law or fact, honest

error of judgment, overzealousness, mere negligence or other such

noniniquitous human failing.” Yost v. Wabash College, 3 N.E.3d

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509, 523-24 (Ind. 2014) (citations and quotations omitted). 

Here, Sheneman alleges his attorney was negligent in providing

representation. Sheneman complains that Attorney Truitt failed to

disclose pretrial discovery to him and also failed to make various

arguments on Sheneman’s behalf at trial. In sum, he alleges

Attorney Truitt was simply unprepared to defend the case. (DE 1 at

4, ¶ 22; at 5.) While Sheneman’s complaint pleads a breach of

professional duty, (Id. at 2 ¶ 5), it does not plead intentional

misconduct. Thus, punitive damages are unavailable in this case.

There is no theoretical possibility that Sheneman can meet the

amount in controversy requirement. As such, this case must be

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Though it is

usually necessary to permit a plaintiff the opportunity to file an

amended complaint when a case is dismissed sua sponte, see Luevano

v. Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2013), that is unnecessary

where the amendment would be futile. Hukic v. Aurora Loan Servs.,

588 F.3d 420, 432 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[C]ourts have broad discretion

to deny leave to amend where . . . the amendment would be

futile.”). Such is the case here. Until Sheneman’s convictions are

overturned, his legal malpractice claim against his court appointed

attorney can not meet the amount in controversy requirement, no

matter how it is pled.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, this case is the complaint is

DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

DATED: June 12, 2015 /s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge 

United States District Court

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