UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

HAROLD A. HAGGERTY, III, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 3:12-CV-006 PS

 )

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

On December 13, 2010, Harold A. Haggerty, III, was found guilty of Assault/battery

upon another person, with a weapon or inflicting serious bodily injury in violation of A-102 by

the Westville Correctional Facility Prison Disciplinary Hearing Body (DHB) in case WCC 10-

12-0085. After appealing, his sanction was reduced to the loss of 60 days earned credit time, 42

days loss of commissary, and one year in segregation. 

Haggerty seeks habeas relief and he lists four grounds on his petition.1

 First, he argues

that there was no weapon involved nor mentioned. Second, he argues that the victim did not

suffer any serious injuries. Third, he argues that the victim did not say that Haggerty harmed

him. Though listed separately, all of these arguments amount to a single claim that the evidence

was insufficient to find him guilty. In evaluating whether there is adequate evidence to support

the findings of a prison disciplinary hearing, “the relevant question is whether there is any

evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.”

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985). “In reviewing a decision for some evidence,

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 Haggerty alleges that there were a number of prison policy violations, but “[i]n conducting habeas review,

a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).
courts are not required to conduct an examination of the entire record, independently assess

witness credibility, or weigh the evidence, but only determine whether the prison disciplinary

board’s decision to revoke good time credits has some factual basis.” Id. (quotations marks and

citation omitted). Even a conduct report alone can provide sufficient evidence to support a

finding of guilt. McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999). 

Here, the report of Sgt. Godfrey is sufficient to support the finding of guilt. Sgt. Godfrey

observed a video of the relevant events and wrote a report describing them. The victim entered

his own cell at 8:54 pm. At that time, he was uninjured and his clothing was undamaged. At 8:59

pm, Haggerty and two other inmates enter the cell. At 9:02 pm, the four men exit the cell. The

victim “had a torn shirt, a bloody left eye, and holding his bloody mouth.” ECF 1-2 at 2.

Haggerty argues that there was no mention of a weapon, but since he was found guilty of

assault/battery with a weapon OR causing serious bodily injury, the presence of a weapon is not

necessary for him to be guilty. Haggerty argues that the victim’s injuries were not severe enough

to constitute serious bodily injury, but under Indiana law, serious bodily injury includes injuries

resulting in extreme pain. Indiana Code § 35-41-1-25(3) (“‘Serious bodily injury’ means bodily

injury . . . that causes . . . extreme pain . . ..”). Here, the victim’s bloody eye and bloody mouth

are some evidence that he suffered extreme pain. Furthermore, “determining where the line

should be drawn between the lesser and the greater battery offense in this case is a question of

state law. The state of Indiana has the right to determine what constitutes ‘serious bodily injury,’

and the resolution of this matter does not implicate the federal Constitution. See Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S. Ct. 475, 116 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1991); Dellinger v. Bowen, 301

F.3d 758, 764 (7th Cir. 2002).” Calligan v. Wilson, 362 Fed. Appx. 543, 545 (7th Cir. 2009).

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Haggerty’s third sufficiency argument is that the victim did not say that Haggerty harmed him.

This argument is nearly identical to the unsuccessful one presented in Hill where the United

States Supreme Court found that disciplinary action was warranted against an inmate who was

one of three seen fleeing from the scene of an assault even though the victim denied that the

accused had assaulted him. Id., 472 U.S. at 456-57. “The Federal Constitution does not require

evidence that logically precludes any conclusion but the one reached by the disciplinary board.”

Hill, 472 U.S. at 457. Because there is some evidence that Haggerty committed the charged

violation, habeas corpus relief if not available on any of his first three grounds. 

Finally, Haggerty argues that he was denied the right to obtain a statement from the

victim. Though an accused inmate has the right to present relevant, exculpatory evidence, Wolff

v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974), here Haggerty waived that right when he was screened. 

See Sweeney v. Parke, 113 F.3d 716, 720 n.5 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The law of this circuit does not

entitle a prisoner to wait until the day of his hearing to request to call witnesses.”). On the

screening report, Haggerty indicated that “I do not wish to call any witnesses.” ECF 1-2 at 6.

Therefore he was not denied due process when the DHB found him guilty without attempting to

obtain a statement from the victim. 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED

pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 4. 

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: January 12, 2012

s/ Philip P. Simon 

PHILIP P. SIMON, CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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