IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

MARCEY MEREDITH, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CAUSE NO. 2:14-CV-183

vs. )

)

LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF, )

et al., )

)

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on “Defendant Lake County

Sheriff’s Motion to Bifurcate § 1983 Monell Claims and Stay

Discovery and Trial on Those Claims,” filed by the Lake County

Sheriff, on December 11, 2015 (DE #72). For the reasons set forth

below, the motion is GRANTED. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 42(b), the Monell claims against the Lake County Sheriff

are BIFURCATED from the 42 U.S.C. section 1983 claims against the

individually-named defendants for both discovery and trial. All

discovery and trial of the Monell claims is STAYED pending

resolution of the claims against the individually-named defendants. 

The Court ORDERS that Plaintiff’s right to a jury trial on the

Monell claims is preserved. 

BACKGROUND

The plaintiff, Marcey Meredith (“Plaintiff”), filed a
complaint in this case on May 30, 2014. (DE #1). Plaintiff was

granted leave to file an amended complaint on January 6, 2015, and

the first amended complaint was docketed that same day. (DE #29 &

DE #30.) This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section

1983. According to the first amended complaint, on December 14,

2012, Plaintiff was a patron in a liquor store located in Gary,

Indiana, when she was approached by defendant Officer A. Thomas

(“Officer Thomas”) who asked her to step outside. (DE #30, p. 2.) 

When she exited the store, Officer Thomas grabbed her, slammed her

into a wall, and handcuffed her. (Id.) When she questioned this,

Officer Thomas and two other officers, Officer J. Corle (“Officer

Corle”) and Officer William T. Downs (“Officer Downs”), told her to

“shut-up bitch.” (Id.) Although she was not resisting, the

aforementioned officers allegedly slammed her onto the ground,

grabbed her hair, and began beating her head and face into the

cement. (Id.) One of the officers then shoved his knee into her

neck, picked her up, and dropped her onto the ground, which chipped

and loosened her tooth. (Id.) After the alleged beating, despite

being covered in blood, Plaintiff was taken to the Lake County Jail

instead of the hospital where she was held for two days without

appropriate medical treatment. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff alleges

that, during that time, she was only offered Tylenol for her

injuries by defendants Shawn Emola, RN (“Nurse Emola”) and Dr.

William Forgey (“Dr. Forgey”). (Id. at 5.) Ultimately, Plaintiff

2
was not charged with a crime and was released. (Id. at 3.) Upon

leaving the Lake County Jail, she was treated in the emergency room

for her injuries which included a chipped tooth, physical pain,

cervical strain, bruising, contusions, a black eye, a split lip,

and soreness to her face, head, body, and limbs. (Id.) 

Plaintiff lists the defendants in her first amended complaint

as the Lake County Sheriff (the “Sheriff”) in his official

capacity, and Officer Thomas, Officer Corle, and Officer Downs as

parties “acting in their individual capacity, within the scope of

their employment and under color of law” (collectively,

“individually-named Officer Defendants”). (Id. at 1.) Nurse Emola

and Dr. Forgey are also named in their “individual capacity,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and were acting under color of law

and within the scope of their employment.” (Id. at 5.) 

Based on the actions described above, Plaintiff brings her

claims against the individually-named Officer Defendants for

“excessive and unreasonable force, a false arrest, and unreasonable

seizure, in violation of Plaintiff’s federally protected rights

under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (Id. at 1.) In addition to or

in the alternative, she alleges those same claims under a “theory

of bystander liability” because the individually-named Officer

Defendants “watched as their fellow officers battered and subjected

the Plaintiff to excessive and unreasonable force, false arrest,

3
and unlawful seizure but failed to intervene to protect the

Plaintiff, in spite of having a meaningful opportunity to do so.” 

(Id. at 4.) She also alleges that the individually-named Officer

Defendants “denied Plaintiff adequate medical care for her

injuries, when they failed to take Plaintiff to the hospital

following her arrest” in violation of the Eighth and/or Fourteenth

Amendments and section 1983. (Id.) Her claims against the Sheriff

stem from the allegedly “unconstitutional/constitutionally

deficient policies, practices, procedures, and/or customs in effect

(including the custom and policy of inadequate training), that

resulted in the excessive and unreasonable force and false arrest

of Plaintiff in violation of her right to be free from unreasonable

seizure” pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and

section 1983. (Id. at 2.) Finally, her claims against Nurse Emola

and Dr. Forgey arise under the Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments

and section 1983 because they allegedly “denied her adequate

medical care and adequate pain management care for the serious

medical condition(s)” and “declined to permit the Plaintiff to be

sent to a hospital so that appropriate, adequate medical and pain

management care could be received.” (Id. at 5.) 

To the extent Plaintiff seeks damages against the Sheriff in

his official capacity, his claim is, in effect, an action against

the Sheriff’s Department, a municipality. Monell v. Department of

Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); Smith v. County of

4
Kosciusko, No. S91-5(RDP), 1991 WL 261766, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Nov.

15, 1991).

The Sheriff filed the instant motion to bifurcate on December

11, 2015. (DE #72.) In it, the Sheriff requests that the Court

bifurcate all of Plaintiff’s claims against the individually-named

Officer Defendants from Plaintiff’s section 1983 Monell claims

against the Sheriff’s Department and to stay discovery and trial on

the Monell claims until and unless Plaintiff first proves an

underlying constitutional violation against any of the

individually-named Officer Defendants. On December 18, 2015, the

Sheriff also filed a motion for extension of time to respond to the

pending Monell discovery until ruling on the motion to bifurcate

was complete. (DE #73.) Magistrate Judge Paul R. Cherry (“Judge

Cherry”) took the motion under advisement and ordered Plaintiff to

file a written response by December 30, 2015. (DE #74.) Plaintiff

filed a response in opposition to the motion for bifurcation on

December 21, 2015, but did not file a separate response to the

motion for extension of time. (DE #75.) The Sheriff filed a reply

on December 28, 2015. (DE #76.) Noting the lack of objection by

Plaintiff, on January 25, 2016, Judge Cherry granted the motion for

extension of time and stayed the deadline for the Sheriff to

respond to Plaintiff’s discovery requests pending a ruling on the

motion to bifurcate. (DE #77.) The motion to bifurcate is thus

ripe for adjudication. 

5
DISCUSSION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) states, in relevant

part, that “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite

and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more

separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party

claims. When ordering a separate trial, the court must preserve

any federal right to a jury trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). 

Bifurcation may be appropriate if one or more of the Rule 42(b)

criteria is met. See, e.g., Treece v. Hochstetler, 213 F.3d 360,

365 (7th Cir. 2000). Courts have broad discretion in deciding

whether to bifurcate issues presented in a case or to try them

separately. Krocka v. City of Chicago, 203 F.3d 507, 516 (7th Cir.

2000). Indeed, the district court’s exercise of its discretion to

bifurcate will be set aside on appeal “only upon a clear showing of

abuse.” Treece, 213 F.3d at 364-65. Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 26(d) also permits a court to stay discovery on Monell

claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d); see also Carr v. City of N.

Chicago, 908 F.Supp.2d 926, 927 (N.D. Ill. 2012). The decision of

whether to bifurcate is a case-specific analysis. Cadiz v. Kruger,

No. 06 C 5463, 2007 WL 4293976, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2007). 

The Sheriff argues that bifurcation will be more convenient

and efficient for the parties, it will avoid prejudice, expedite

the matter, and economize resources for the Court and parties

6
during the discovery process and trial. (DE #72, p. 2.) In

response, Plaintiff “agrees that discovery could be stayed on the

§ 1983 Monell claims” against the Sheriff, but she states, without

any argument or explanation, that it will “hardly ‘expedite and

economize’ the case” . . . “[i]f anything, it will drag it out and

cause this [C]ourt to continue the case and trial for another two

or three years.” (DE #75, p. 2.) 

In this case, the Monell claims center around allegations of

excessive force, a failure to intervene, and false arrest. 

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that there were

“unconstitutional/constitutionally deficient policies, practices,

procedures, and/or customs in effect (including the custom and

policy of inadequate training), that resulted in the excessive and

unreasonable force and false arrest of Plaintiff in violation of

her right to be free from unreasonable seizure.”1 (DE #30, p. 2.) 

The Court finds that these types of claims are well suited for

bifurcation. This is so because “[i]f a person has suffered no

constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police

officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have

authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite

beside the point.” City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796,

799 (1986) (emphasis in original). See also Swanigan v. City of

1

 The Court notes that Plaintiff does not appear to allege any

unconstitutional policies, practices, procedures, or customs related to the

denial of adequate medical treatment claims. (See DE #30, generally.)

7
Chicago, 775 F.3d 953, 962 (7th Cir. 2015) (“If the plaintiff fails

to prove a violation of his constitutional rights in his claim

against the individual defendants, there will be no viable Monell

claim based on the same allegations.”). Furthermore, “there can be

no liability under Monell for failure to train when there has been

no violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Jenkins v.

Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482, 492 (7th Cir. 2007).2 Thus, the Court

agrees with the Sheriff that it is logical to determine whether the

individually-named Officer Defendants violated Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights before requiring the Court (and the parties)

to expend resources litigating the Monell claims against the

Sheriff’s Department that might never be reached or adjudicated. 

In the event that the individually-named Officer Defendants are

found not to have committed the constitutional violations,

bifurcating the Monell claims would have served to avoid prejudice

to the Sheriff’s Department for unnecessarily defending these

claims. And should the individually-named Officer Defendants be

found liable, ultimately, Plaintiff’s right to a jury trial on the

Monell claims would be unaffected by bifurcation; in fact,

Plaintiff does not argue that she would be prejudiced by

2

 While the Seventh Circuit has left the door open for the possibility

that, when questions of qualified immunity are at play, a municipality could

be found liable under Monell even if its officers are not, such a hypothetical

concern is premature at this stage and could be appropriately determined at

the conclusion of a trial on individual liability. See Saunders v. City of

Chicago, 146 F. Supp. 3d 957, 969-70 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (citing Thomas v. Cook

Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 305 (7th Cir. 2010)). 

8
bifurcation in any concrete way. 

Efficiency, convenience, and economy also weigh in favor of

bifurcation. “[D]iscovery relating to the municipality’s policies

and practices, which (depending on the size of the police

department) can add significant time, effort, and complications to

the discovery process.” Medina v. City of Chicago, 100 F. Supp. 2d

893, 895 (N.D. Ill. 2000); see also Price v. Kraus, No. 2:15-CV331-PRC, 2016 WL 36982, at *2-3 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 1, 2016). Judges

throughout the circuit have recognized that oftentimes, “claims of

municipal liability require an extensive amount of work on the part

of plaintiff’s attorneys and experts, and an extraordinary amount

of money must be spent in order to prepare and prove them.” Moore

v. City of Chicago, No. 02 C 5130, 2007 WL 3037121, at *9 (N.D.

Ill. Oct. 15, 2007); see also Cruz v. City of Chicago, No. 08 C

2087, 2008 WL 5244616, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2008) (convenience

and efficiency would be best served through bifurcation, in part,

because of “extensive amount of work” associated with Monell

claims). In this case, the Sheriff argues that discovery related

to Plaintiff’s Monell claims would be a burdensome, time consuming,

expensive task because the Sheriff’s Department would have to

“locate, compile, and produce numerous documents” and engage in a

“detailed investigation” to answer Monell interrogatories. (DE

#72, p. 4.) The Sheriff further contends that:

[t]here will inevitably be depositions of

several fact witnesses relating to Plaintiff’s

9
Monell claims in addition to Fed. R. Civ. P.

30(b)(6) witnesses. Additionally, each party

will need to retain and defend against expert

witnesses, which will add to the discovery

process, add to ligation expenses, and

lengthen the trial of this matter. Thus,

bifurcating and staying discovery on the

Monell claims prevents the parties from

spending a daunting amount of time, resources,

and money participating in discovery that may

be ultimately unnecessary.

(Id. at 4-5.) Other than a brief and unelaborated upon statement

that bifurcation will “drag [the case] out and cause this [C]ourt

to continue the case and trial for another two or three years,”

Plaintiff does not specifically dispute any of the Sheriff’s

assertions. (DE #75, p. 2.) Plaintiff’s main concern appears to

be with the possibility that the Sheriff could be using the motion

“as a court-sanctioned means to prevent Plaintiff from receiving

discovery responses that she needs regarding each named officer.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff notes that she has sent discovery requests to the

defendants asking for “copies of all discipline given to Officers

Thomas, Corle, and Downs for any reason from the year 2006 through

today’s date” and interrogatories asking for further “details of

allegations made against the three officers for battery, excessive

force, police brutality or physical injury to a suspect, as well as

information regarding arrests made without probable cause, false

arrest or false imprisonment for the five (5) years preceding

Plaintiff’s Complaint.” (Id.) In his reply, the Sheriff points

out that he has not proposed staying the discovery related to the

10
individually-named Officer Defendants and is responding in good

faith to all of the non-Monell discovery. (DE #76, p. 2.) 

According to Plaintiff’s response and attached discovery

exhibits, it does appear that Plaintiff has misconstrued the

Sheriff’s bifurcation request. Her concern that she will be

prevented from undertaking in discovery related to the

individually-named Officer Defendants is misplaced. Rather, the

Sheriff’s argument is that limiting discovery to the individuallynamed Officer Defendants at this time (as opposed to allowing the

discovery related to the Monell claims against the Sheriff to

proceed concurrently) will expedite and economize the case. The

Court agrees that this is likely, especially given the general

nature of the policies, procedures, and/or customs described above3

that led to the alleged constitutional violations. See Price, 2016

WL 36982 at *3 (distinguishing general policy allegations from

specifically detailed ones and granting bifurcation); see also

Carr, 908 F. Supp. 2d at 933-34 (describing the additional cost,

time, and effort burdens related to Monell discovery as

distinguishable from discovery associated with the individual

claims and finding that “bifurcation is likely to allow some or all

of the parties to avoid those burdens.”) 

Based on the foregoing, and in light of Plaintiff’s apparent

misunderstanding regarding the extent of the Sheriff’s request, the

3

 Pages 7, supra & First Amended Complaint (DE #30, pp. 1-2). 

11
Court finds that the avoidance of prejudice and the interests of

justice, efficiency, convenience, and economy support bifurcation. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, “Defendant Lake County

Sheriff’s Motion to Bifurcate § 1983 Monell Claims and Stay

Discovery and Trial on Those Claims” (DE #72) is GRANTED. Pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b), the Monell claims against

the Lake County Sheriff are BIFURCATED from the 42 U.S.C. section

1983 claims against the individually-named defendants for both

discovery and trial. All discovery and trial of the Monell claims

is STAYED pending resolution of the claims against the

individually-named defendants. The Court ORDERS that Plaintiff’s

right to a jury trial on the Monell claims is preserved. 

DATED: September 13, 2016 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

12