Exhibit 10.2

First Commonwealth Financial Corporation

2011-2013 LONG-TERM INCENTIVE
PLAN



|1. | Purpose; Effective Date.
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This 2011-2013 Long-Term Incentive Plan (the Plan) of First Commonwealth Financial Corporation (the Company) is
designed to provide an incentive for the executive team to undertake efforts that are ultimately reflected in superior company performance relative to its Pennsylvania peers. The plan is intended to be a key part of providing a competitive and
attractive pay package necessary to attract and retain superior executive talent, and to build executive ownership in the Company. This Plan was approved by the Compensation and Human Resources Committee (the Committee) on
January 17, 2011, for the January 1, 2011 through December 31, 2013 performance period (the Performance Period). Each Award granted under this Plan shall be subject to the terms and conditions of the First Commonwealth
Financial Corporation Incentive Compensation Plan (the Master Plan). Each capitalized term which is not otherwise defined in this Plan shall have the meaning given to such term in the Master Plan.



|2. | Administration.
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The Plan
shall be administered by the Committee in accordance with Article 3 of the Master Plan.



|3. | Participants and Performance Goals.
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(a) Exhibit A identifies the Employees who have been selected by the Committee to become Participants in the Plan and the Target Share Award for each Participant and the Plan Performance Goals.

(b) The Performance Goals shall be calculated from the Companys publicly reported financial statements and shall be
defined as follows:

i. Return on Equity (ROE) Relative to Peers shall mean the Companys ROE
during the fiscal years ending December 31, 2012 and December 31, 2013, as publicly reported, relative to the Companys Peer Group, as reported through SNL Financial or other reporting service for each such fiscal year. For purposes
of calculating this Performance Goal, the relative ROE for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2012 shall be weighted 50% and the relative ROE for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2013 shall be weighted 50%. ROE is calculated for
purposes of this Plan as the Companys net income divided by the average daily shareholders equity.

ii.
Total Return to Shareholders (TRS) Relative to Peers is defined as the Companys cumulative TRS relative to the Companys Peer Group, as reported through SNL Financial or other reporting service. TRS is defined for purposes of this
Plan as the total change in the value of a share of Company stock over the Performance Period, plus the value of immediately reinvested dividends over the same period.



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(c) The Peer Group for purposes of this Plan shall mean the Pennsylvania Peer
Group designated by the Committee as of January 1, 2011 and disclosed in the Companys proxy statement for the 2011 annual meeting of shareholders. The Committee may add or remove members from the Peer Group from time to time during the
Performance Period if a member merges, is acquired or closed or otherwise ceases to be a meaningful comparator for the Company, in each case, as determined by the Committee. The Committee shall have discretion to adjust the relative performance of
the Peer Group as necessary to account for changes in the composition of the Peer Group during the Performance Period.



|4. | Calculation of Share Awards.
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A Participants Share Award shall be determined according to the following formula:

(Target Share Award X ROE Payout) + (Target Share Award X TRS Payout)

For purposes of this
formula:

Target Share Award shall mean the number of shares shown for the Participant in the Target Share
Award column of Table 1 on Exhibit A.

ROE Payout means the percentage shown in the ROE
Payout column of Table 2 on Exhibit A at the performance level for the ROE Relative to Peers Performance Goal. If the actual performance for ROE Relative to Peers falls between the Threshold and Target performance levels or between the
Target and Superior performance levels, the ROE Payout shall be interpolated between the percentage shown for the Threshold and Target performance levels or between the percentage shown for the Target and Superior performance levels, as the case may
be, as determined by the Committee in its sole discretion.

TRS Payout means the percentage shown in the TRS
Payout column of Table 2 on Exhibit A at the performance level for the TRS Relative to Peers Performance Goal. If the actual performance for TRS Relative to Peers falls between the Threshold and Target performance levels or between the
Target and Superior performance levels, the TRS Payout shall be interpolated between the percentage shown for the Threshold and Target performance levels or between the percentage shown for the Target and Superior performance levels, as the case may
be, as determined by the Committee in its sole discretion.



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|5. | Settlement of Share Awards.
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(a) Share Awards shall be settled in Restricted Stock as soon as practicable following the certification by the Committee of results for the Performance Period.

(b) Any shares of Restricted Stock issued pursuant to this Plan (i) may not be sold, transferred, pledged, assigned, or otherwise
alienated or hypothecated until the first to occur of (x) December 31, 2014, (y) the death of the Participant, or (z) a Change in Control; and (ii) shall be automatically forfeited and returned to the Company or cancelled if
the Participants employment terminates for any reason prior to the occurrence of one of the events described in clause (i) of this Section 5(b). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Committee, in its sole discretion, may cause all or
any portion of a Participants shares of Restricted Stock to vest prior to the occurrence of one of the events described in the preceding sentence.



|6. | Termination of Employment.
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Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in the Master Plan, if the Participant ceases to be a full-time employee of the Company for
any reason prior to the end of the Performance Period, the Participant will cease to be a participant in this Plan and will not be eligible to receive any Share Award pursuant to this Plan.



|7. | Miscellaneous Provisions.
|-- | -------------------------

(a) Claw-Back Rights. The Committee will have the sole and absolute authority to make retroactive adjustments to any Awards paid to
Participants where the payment was predicated upon the achievement of erroneous financial or strategic business results or conduct which the Committee determines, in its sole discretion, created unnecessary or excessive risk to the Company or
constituted dishonest or unethical conduct for the purposes of increasing the amount of the Participants Award. Where applicable, the Company will seek to recover any amount determined to have been inappropriately received by a Participant
under the Plan.

(b) Amendment or Termination. Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in the Master Plan, the
Committee has full power to amend, modify, suspend, or terminate the Plan or the Awards granted under the Plan to the extent the Committee deems necessary or advisable, in its sole discretion, to promote the safety and soundness of the Company or
any of its Subsidiaries, to comply with changes to applicable laws, regulations and regulatory guidance or under other extraordinary circumstances arising after the effective date of the Plan.

(c) Regulatory Approvals. The Plan and any Award made hereunder shall be subject to all applicable federal and state laws, rules
and regulations, and to such approvals by any government or regulatory agency as may be required.



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(d) No Effect on Employment or Service. Nothing in the Plan shall interfere with or
limit in any way the right of the Company to terminate any Participants employment or service at any time, with or without cause.

(e) No Right to Participation. No employee or officer of the Company or any subsidiary shall have the right to be selected to receive an Award under this Plan, or, having been so selected, have the
right to receive a future Award.

(f) Nontransferability of Awards. No Award granted under the Plan may be sold,
transferred, pledged, assigned, or otherwise alienated or hypothecated, other than by will, by the laws of descent and distribution. All rights with respect to an Award granted to a Participant shall be available during his or her lifetime only to
the Participant.



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