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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

DAVID RAGNONE, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

PORTER COUNTY, a Political 

Subdivision of the State of 

Indiana, DAVID LAIN, in his 

capacity as the Sheriff of 

Porter County, Indiana, MARY 

GAYDOS, in her capacity as an 

officer in the Porter County 

Sheriff’s Department, 

Defendants. 

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NO. 2:13–CV-164 

OPINION AND ORDER

 This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary 

Judgment, filed by Defendants Porter County, David Lain, and Mary 

Gaydos, on October 24, 2014 (DE # 24). For the reasons set forth 

below, the Motion (DE # 24) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 

Counts II, III, X, and XI are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE in their 

entirety. Counts I, IV, V, VI, VII against Defendant Porter County 

are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Counts V, VI, and VII against 

defendants Lain and Gaydos personally are DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. This case remains pending as to Count I against 

defendants Lain and Gaydos in their official capacities, Count IV 

against Defendant Lain in his official capacity, Counts V, VI, and 
2 

VII under a respondeat superior theory of liability, and Counts 

VIII and IX.

BACKGROUND 

 In 2013, Plaintiff David Ragnone (“Ragnone”) filed this 

action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 against Defendants Porter 

County, David Lain (“Lain”) in his capacity as Sheriff of Porter 

County, and Mary Gaydos (“Gaydos”) in her capacity as an officer 

of the Porter County Sheriff’s Department (together, 

“Defendants”), alleging federal claims of excessive force, denial 

and delay of medical attention, and inadequate supervision and 

training. Ragnone also raised several state law claims. After 

the close of discovery, Defendants filed the instant motion for 

summary judgment on October 24, 2014. (DE# 24.) Ragnone filed 

his response to Defendants’ motion on January 5, 2015. (DE# 30.) 

Defendants filed their reply to the motion on January 19, 2015. 

(DE# 32.) 

DISCUSSION 

Standard 

Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine 

dispute of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a 
3 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 

2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). Not every dispute between the 

parties makes summary judgment inappropriate; “[o]nly disputes 

over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary 

judgment.” Id. In determining whether summary judgment is 

appropriate, the court must construe all facts in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences 

in that party’s favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th 

Cir. 2010). “However, our favor toward the nonmoving party does 

not extend to drawing inferences that are supported by only 

speculation or conjecture.” Fitzgerald v. Santoro, 707 F.3d 725, 

730 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). 

While the movant bears the initial burden of production to 

inform the district court why a trial is not necessary, these 

requirements “are not onerous” where the nonmovant “bears the 

ultimate burden of persuasion on a particular issue.” Modrowski 

v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 2013). A party may move 

for summary judgment based on either “affirmative evidence that 

negates an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim” or by 

“asserting that the nonmoving party’s evidence [is] insufficient 

to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim.” 

Id. at 1169 (citation and internal quotations omitted). A party 
4 

opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion may not rely 

on allegations or denials in his own pleading, but rather, must 

“marshal and present the court with the evidence [he] contends 

will prove [his] case.” Goodman v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 

F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). If the nonmoving party fails to 

establish the existence of an essential element on which he bears 

the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is proper. Massey 

v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2006). 

Material Facts 

 In early May 2011, Ragnone was arrested on an invasion of 

privacy charge and held without bond at the Porter County Jail 

(“Jail”). (Compl. ¶ 10.)1 On May 15, 2011, Ragnone verbally 

argued with another inmate while in a pod area of the Jail. (DE# 

25-2 (Incident Report 11-1054).) Corrections officers asked 

Ragnone to step into the hallway to speak with them regarding the 

argument. (DE# 25-3 (Gaydos Aff. ¶ 8).) Gaydos advised Ragnone 

that he would be going to the disciplinary pod to serve a twentythree hour lockdown for arguing in violation of the Jail’s rules. 

(Id.) According to Gaydos, Ragnone became “irate and very 

 

1 The Complaint alleges Ragnone was both a pretrial detainee and a probation 

violator at the time at issue. (Compl. ¶¶ 10 & 26.) In his response brief, 

Ragnone asserts that this was an error, and that he was only a pretrial detainee 

because his probation was not revoked until after the incident at issue. (DE## 

30 at 7-8, 30-5, 30-6.) Defendants do not contest this fact, thereby conceding 

that Ragnone was a pretrial detainee during the incident. 
5 

aggressive” with the officers upon hearing this information, and 

refused to go to the disciplinary pod. (Id.) Ragnone testified 

at his deposition that he told the officers that he would not go 

to the disciplinary pod “willingly,” and that if they took him 

there, he would “put up a fight,” so they had a “better chance” of 

putting him into the “chair,” meaning the Jail’s Emergency 

Restraint Chair (“ERC”). (DE# 30-1 at 19-20; DE# 25-4 at 2.) 

Ragnone attests that he was not irate or aggressive, and asserts 

that he was not verbally or physically aggressive to the officers. 

(DE# 30-3 (Ragnone 2d Aff. ¶ 2).) 

Gaydos attests that two officers escorted Ragnone to the 

disciplinary pod, where Ragnone allegedly said that he would “bash 

his head against the wall,” became emotional, and started to cry. 

(DE# 25-3 (Gaydos Aff. ¶ 8).) Upon hearing Ragnone’s statement, 

Gaydos determined that he needed to be placed in the ERC to prevent 

him from harming himself. (Id.) Ragnone attests that Gaydos 

decided to place him in the ERC immediately upon his objection to 

going to the disciplinary pod, not while being transported there. 

(DE# 30-3 (Ragnone Aff. ¶ 2).) He denied threatening to harm 

himself or the officers. (DE# 30-1 at 4-5, 32.) 

Gaydos asserts that she followed the requirements under the 

Jail’s SOP 07-12 Section II, “Using the Emergency Restraint Chair,” 

when she decided to place Ragnone in the ERC, and when she secured 

him in the ERC. (DE# 25-3 (Gaydos Aff. ¶ 16); see id. at 21 (Jail 
6 

SOP 07-12).) The ERC contains a lap belt, wrist straps, shoulder 

straps, and ankle straps. (Id. at 22-23.) The shoulder straps 

are to be fastened “by passing the free ends over the shoulders 

and under the armpits, and securing the free ends to the shoulder 

strap clevises located on the back of the ERC, then tighten[ing] 

by pulling down on the should strap handle.” (Id. at 23.) Gaydos 

attests that the Jail’s officers are trained to make sure the ERC’s 

shoulder straps do not go around the inmate’s chest, head or neck. 

(DE# 25-3 (Gaydos Aff. ¶ 6).) 

After securing Ragnone in the ERC, Gaydos claims that she 

initiated a 15-minute observation log for Ragnone, pursuant to 

which Ragnone was observed every fifteen minutes. (Id. ¶ 9).) 

According to Defendants, various members of the Jail staff checked 

on Ragnone between 10:45 a.m. and 2:30 p.m. when he was released 

from the ERC. (Id.; DE# 25-3 at 32 (Ragnone Observation Log, May 

15, 2011).) Gaydos states that she performed a restraint check on 

Ragnone at 1:00 p.m. (DE# 25-3 (Gaydos Aff. ¶ 10).) She claims 

that Ragnone asked to remain in the ERC, which she noted in the 

observation log. (Id.; DE# 25-3 at 32.) 

Ragnone testified that after fifteen minutes into his 

confinement in the ERC, he told Gaydos that something was wrong 

and he could not breathe, and that she responded by tightening the 

straps. (DE# 30-1 9, 22, 28-29.) Ragnone testified that he began 

to notice breathing difficulties when the straps were put on, and 
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that after Gaydos tightened the straps, he experienced pain that 

seemed to get worse. (Id. at 22, 27.) Gaydos claims that Ragnone 

never indicated that the straps were too tight or that he had 

trouble breathing or chest pain. (DE# 25-3 (Gaydos Aff. ¶ 10, 13, 

17).) 

Gaydos attests that she checked on Ragnone around 2:00 p.m. 

with a nurse who took his vital signs, though he refused to perform 

the range of motion exercise. (Id. ¶ 11.) Ragnone testified that 

during his time in the ERC, he was not seen by any medical 

personnel, and was monitored only through a window, not in person, 

with the exception of someone offering him lunch, which he declined 

because he couldn’t breathe. (DE# 30-1 at 9-10.) Ragnone was 

released from the ERC around 2:30 p.m., and placed in a padded 

cell. (DE# 25-3 (Gaydos Aff. ¶ 12.) Ragnone testified that he 

was first seen by medical personnel after he was out of the ERC, 

at 3:30 p.m. (DE# 30-1 at 9-10.) 

Ragnone testified that his pain was reduced after he left the 

ERC, but gradually escalated as the afternoon progressed into the 

night. (Id. at 23.) By 9:30 or 10:00 p.m., he had to hold his 

hands above his head continuously in order to breathe, and was 

unable to sit or lie down, or do anything other than stand with 

his hands elevated, for approximately three hours. (Id. at 23-

24.) At approximately 11:30 p.m., Ragnone reported to Corrections 

Officer Dobson (“Dobson”) that he was having difficulty breathing, 
8 

and that the pain was bad if he put his arms down. (Id. at 12.) 

Dobson called the Jail’s doctor. (Id.) Around 1:00 a.m. on May 

16, 2011, Dobson informed Ragnone that he was going to the hospital 

for treatment. (Id.) Thereafter, Ragnone was transported to 

Porter Memorial Hospital (“Hospital”) via ambulance. (Id. at 12, 

15.) 

Ragnone was diagnosed with a spontaneous pneumothorax, or a 

collapsed lung. (DE# 25-9 at 23.) Ragnone testified that prior 

to surgery, he was asked to sign a document indicating that he was 

released from custody. (DE# 30-1 at 16.) Ragnone testified that 

at that time, he had just been given morphine and was allegedly 

unable to read the paper himself. (Id. at 15-16, 24.) Surgery 

was performed, and Ragnone remained at the Hospital until May 19, 

2011, when he was discharged and returned to the Jail. (DE# 25-9 

at 1.) Ragnone testified that he was taken back to the Jail 

without going through booking. (DE# 30-1 at 17, 25-26.) On May 

20, 2011, Ragnone expressed more pain in his chest, and returned 

to the Hospital for evaluation. (DE# 25-9.) Ragnone received a 

new medical prescription and returned to the Jail on the same date. 

(Id.) 

Porter County’s insurance carrier for inmate medical expenses 

refused to pay for Ragnone’s medical services because he “was NOT 

in County Custody when services were provided.” (DE# 30-7 

(emphasis in original).) Ragnone testified that he received bills 
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for his medical treatment at the Hospital, but never paid them. 

(DE# 25-4 at 5.) 

Ragnone testified that he had been placed in the ERC earlier 

in 2011, or the year before, for verbally refusing to return to 

his cell for “23-1 lockdown.” (DE# 30-1 at 8); DE# 30-2 (Ragnone 

Aff. ¶¶ 3-4).) Ragnone also testified that while he was acting as 

a trustee in the Jail, he observed over twenty other inmates being 

restrained in the ERC during one month of the summer of 2011. (DE# 

30-1 at 20-21.) According to Ragnone, these inmates were placed 

in the ERC as punishment for behavior such as arguing, fighting, 

and talking back. (Id. at 21, 31.) Ragnone claims that the upper 

straps of the ERC were always crossed over the inmates’ torsos. 

(DE# 30-3 (Ragnone 2d Aff. ¶ 4); see DE# 30-1 at 6-7.) 

Claims against Porter County 

As an initial matter, Defendants contend that none of 

Ragnone’s claims can be maintained against Porter County because 

it is a separate entity from the Porter County Sheriff’s Department 

(“Sheriff’s Department”), and is not responsible for the Sheriff’s 

actions. See Radcliff v. Cnty. of Harrison, 627 N.E.2d 1305, 1306 

(Ind. 1994) (finding “neither county had control over the actions 

of the sheriff” and could not be held liable for claims against 

the sheriff). The Sheriff’s Department is a separate entity that 

is responsible for the constitutional violations of its officers. 

Burton v. Lacy, No. 1:07-cv-0918, 2008 WL 187552, *4-*5 (S.D. Ind. 
10 

Jan. 18, 2008). Porter County cannot be held liable under a 

respondeat superior theory for the acts of the Sheriff’s employees 

because it has no agency relationship with the Sheriff or his 

department. See Delk v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Delaware Cnty., 503 

N.E.2d 436, 440 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); Estate of Drayton v. Nelson, 

53 F.3d 165, 167-68 (7th Cir. 1994) (concluding that since an 

Indiana county had no authority over the sheriff, it “cannot be 

blamed for any deficiency in the training or supervision of the 

defendant deputy sheriffs”). 

Ragnone does not defend the validity of his federal claims 

(Counts I-IV) against Porter County, noting that “[w]hatever merit 

[Defendants’ argument] may have for the § 1983 claims raised 

directly here, Porter County is the proper party for other claims 

within this complaint.” (DE# 30 at 15.) He does not attempt to 

defend his intentional and negligent infliction of emotional 

distress claims (Counts V-VI), negligent infliction of physical 

injury claim (Count VII), respondeat superior claim (Count X), or 

indemnification claim (Count XI) against Porter County.2 As such, 

the Court concludes that Ragnone has waived any argument that these 

claims against Porter County are valid. See Johnson v. Gen. Bd. 

of Pension & Health Benefits of United Methodist Church, 733 F.3d 

722, 729 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that arguments not raised in 

 

2 Ragnone does argue that Porter County is a proper defendant for two claims: 

constructive fraud (Count VIII) and breach of statutory duty to pay medical 

expenses (Count IX). The Court addresses this argument below. 
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opposition to a motion for summary judgment are waived); Palmer v. 

Marion Cnty., 327 F.3d 588, 597–98 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that 

a party abandoned his claim where he failed to delineate the claim 

in opposition to a motion for summary judgment); Laborers’ Int’l 

Union of N. Am. v. Caruso, 197 F.3d 1195, 1197 (7th Cir. 1999) 

(stating that arguments not presented in response to a summary 

judgment motion are waived). Counts I through VII, and Counts X 

and XI against Porter County are DISMISSED.3

Section 1983 Claims 

Ragnone asserts four claims against Lain and Gaydos pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides a federal cause of 

action any time an individual, who, under color of state law, 

deprives another of any right, privilege, or immunity as provided 

by the Constitution and laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 

1983. In asserting a Section 1983 claim, “a civil rights plaintiff 

must specify whether suit is brought against the defendant in his 

official capacity or in his individual capacity.” Hill v. 

Shelander, 924 F.2d 1370, 1372 (7th Cir. 1991). Individual 

capacity suits “seek to impose personal liability upon a government 

official for actions he takes under color of state law.” Kentucky 

v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 

(1985) (citation omitted). To be liable for the deprivation of a 

 

3 Because Counts X and XI were brought solely against Porter County, they are 

dismissed in their entirety. 
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constitutional right, the individual must personally participate 

in the deprivation, or must direct the conduct or have knowledge 

of or consent to the conduct. Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 

724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001). “Official-capacity suits . . . generally 

represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity 

of which an officer is an agent. As long as the government entity 

receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an officialcapacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated 

as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 165–66 

(internal citations and quotations omitted). 

In a Section 1983 suit, a municipality may not be held 

vicariously liable under the theory of respondeat superior.4 

Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 

658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). Instead, a 

municipality may only be held liable for constitutional violations 

caused by the municipality through its own policy, practice, or 

custom. To recover under Monell, a plaintiff must establish that 

(1) he suffered a deprivation of a constitutional right; (2) as a 

result of an express municipal policy, a widespread practice that 

is so permanent and well-settled as to constitute a custom with 

the final force of law, or a deliberate act of a decision-maker 

 

4 “Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for the acts 

of its employees which were committed within the course and scope of their 

employment.” Laffoon v. City of Portage, No. 2:09–cv–103, 2011 WL 2293331, at 

*10 (N.D. Ind. Jun. 8, 2011) (citation omitted). 
13 

with final policymaking authority for the municipality; that (3) 

was the proximate cause of his injury. King v. Kramer, 763 F.3d 

635, 649 (7th Cir. 2014). The municipal policy or custom must be 

“the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” City of 

Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L. 

Ed. 2d 412 (1989). 

Defendants argue that Ragnone’s Section 1983 claims are 

solely against Lain and Gaydos in their official capacities based 

on the allegations in the Complaint. (DE# 25 at 13-15.) The 

Seventh Circuit has held that “a complaint that does not make clear 

that it is brought in an individual capacity will be construed as 

having been brought only in an official capacity.” Guzman v. 

Sheahan, 495 F.3d 852, 860 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Yeksigian v. 

Nappi, 900 F.2d 101, 104 (7th Cir. 1990) (“In the absence of any 

express statement that the parties are being sued in their 

individual capacities, an allegation that the defendants were 

acting under color of law generally is construed as a suit against 

the defendants in their official capacities only.”)). “Even if 

there is some ambiguity as to whether the Plaintiff is suing the 

[] Defendants in their official capacities, the Seventh Circuit 

case law directs the Court to construe the Plaintiff’s claims as 

against the [] Defendants in their official capacities.” Brown v. 

Bowman, No. 1:09–CV–346, 2011 WL 1296274, at *14 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 

31, 2011) (citations omitted); see Miller v. Zaruba, No. 10 C 6533, 
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2013 WL 5587288, at *3 n.7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2013) (construing 

the complaint as being against a defendant in his official capacity 

where it did “not explicitly make clear that it is brought against 

[the defendant] in his individual capacity”) (citing Guzman, 495 

F.3d at 860). 

Here, the Complaint identifies defendants Lain, “in his 

capacity as the Sheriff of Porter County,” and Gaydos, “in her 

capacity as an officer in the Porter County Sheriff’s Department.” 

(Compl. at 1; see id. ¶¶ 6, 7.) The Complaint alleges that using 

the ERC as a means of punishment was the “policy and practice of 

the defendants.” (Id. ¶ 11.) It alleges that Ragnone’s placement 

in the ERC as a form of punishment, the length of that placement, 

the use of excessive force used against him in that placement, the 

failure to monitor his well-being while in the ERC, the 

denial/delay of medical attention, and his “release on 

recognizance” to avoid financial liability for his medical 

treatment “were each part or the result of an official policy or 

custom of the defendants Porter County and Sheriff Lain.” (Id. ¶ 

22.) The Complaint also alleges that Lain failed to adequately 

supervise and train police officers and jail employees, again 

referencing “policies and customs.” (Id. ¶¶ 30-32.) These 

allegations indicate Ragnone’s intent to sue Lain and Gaydos in 

their official capacities. 
15 

Ragnone fails to address the issue of Lain’s and Gaydos’s 

capacities in his response brief. He does argue that Defendants 

had a “custom or habit” both to use the ERC for punishment, and to 

use it in an improper manner (DE# 30 at 10), and that Lain had a 

“practice or custom” of depriving inmates of care (Id. at 12). 

Accordingly, the Court understands Ragnone to bring these claims 

against Lain and Gaydos solely in their official capacities. See 

Magee v. Housing Auth. of S. Bend, No. 3:09–CV–337, 2010 WL 

3000660, at *4 (N.D. Ind. July 28, 2010) (finding plaintiff sued 

defendants in their official capacities where neither the 

Complaint nor plaintiff specified whether the individual 

defendants have been sued in their individual or official 

capacities) (citing Guzman, 495 F.3d at 860). Because Ragnone 

failed to address the issue of Lain’s and Gaydos’s capacities in 

response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, any argument 

that he brought his Section 1983 claims against Lain or Gaydos in 

their individual capacities is waived. See Johnson, 733 F.3d at 

729. 

Where, as here, governmental employees are sued in their 

official capacities, the suit is treated as if the plaintiff has 

sued the municipality itself. See Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 166. 

Thus, the claims against Lain and Gaydos in their official 

capacities are claims against the Sheriff’s Department. Hooper v. 

Lain, No. 2:14–CV–358, 2015 WL 1942791, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 29, 
16 

2015); Burton, 2008 WL 187552, at *5 (“[N]aming the Sheriff in his 

official capacity is the same thing as bringing a suit against the 

Sheriff’s Department.”). 

Counts I and II - Excessive Force 

Counts I and II both allege Section 1983 excessive force 

claims. Courts evaluate a claim of excessive force “by reference 

to the specific constitutional standard which governs that right.” 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 

2d 443 (1989). Count I alleges excessive force under the Fourth 

and Fourteen Amendments.5 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment is the source of substantive rights for pretrial 

detainees. See Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 

650, 664 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 

535–37, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979)). Because Ragnone 

was a pretrial detainee at the time of the incident, the Due 

Process Clause is the applicable standard to evaluate Count I. 

“[U]nder the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be 

punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due 

process of law.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 535. As a consequence, “the 

proper inquiry” is whether the treatment of the detainee “amount[s] 

 

5 Defendants correctly assert that the Fourth Amendment is only appropriate for 

a claim of excessive force during an arrest. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 

(explaining that “claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force 

. . . in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a 

free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment”). Ragnone appears 

to concede this point, as he does not address it in his response brief. 
17 

to punishment.” Id. Here, Ragnone asserts that he suffered a 

constitutional violation when Gaydos confined him to the ERC for 

several hours as punishment for arguing with an inmate. The Due 

Process Clause “prohibits the use of bodily restraints in a manner 

that serves to punish a pre-trial detainee.” May v. Sheehan, 226 

F.3d 876, 884 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Using bodily 

restraints constitutes punishment if their use “is not rationally 

related to a legitimate non-punitive government purpose or they 

appear excessive in relation to the purpose they allegedly serve.” 

Id. (citation omitted); see also Biese v. Pollard, No. 14-CV-026, 

2014 WL 3894960, at *2 (E.D. Wisc. Aug. 7, 2014) (refusing to 

dismiss complaint alleging that inmate was in restraint chair for 

3.5 hours during which his complaints of pain were ignored). 

Defendants maintain that Ragnone was not confined in the ERC 

to punish him for arguing with another inmate, but rather, was 

confined in the ERC “in response to [his] behavior once he was 

informed that he was being sent to the disciplinary pod for 

violating the jail rules.” (DE# 25 at 24.) They point to Ragnone’s 

testimony that he told Gaydos that he would not go to the 

disciplinary pod willingly, and that they would have a better 

chance of putting him in the ERC. They also cite Gaydos’s 

affidavit testimony that Ragnone had cried and threatened to bash 

his head against the wall as justification for placing Ragnone in 

the ERC. But in Ragnone’s deposition, he denied crying and 
18 

threatening to harm himself or others. Ragnone also stated that 

Gaydos kept him secured improperly in the ERC for hours, and 

tightened the ERC’s straps when he complained of respiratory 

distress, which led to pain that increased over time. Defendants 

proffer Gaydos’s affidavit testimony that she secured Ragnone in 

the ERC pursuant to proper policy and was never told that he had 

difficulty breathing or was in pain. This conflicting testimony, 

when construed in the light most favorable to Ragnone, raises 

genuine issues of material fact as to whether his confinement in 

the ERC was rationally related to a legitimate non-punitive 

government purpose, or was excessive in relation to the purpose it 

allegedly served. 

Ragnone argues that liability for his excessive force claim 

is established through the Sheriff Department’s “custom or habit” 

of using the ERC for punishment, and using it in an improper 

manner. (DE# 30 at 10 (“acknowledg[ing] that it is not the 

official policy of the defendants to use the [ERC] for punishment, 

nor is the official policy to utilize the [ERC] in the manner in 

which it was used on Ragnone on May 15th. But it is their custom 

or habit to do both.”).) Absent an express policy, Monell

liability is only appropriate where the plaintiff introduces 

“evidence demonstrating that the unlawful practice was so 

pervasive that acquiescence on the part of policymakers was 

apparent and amounted to a policy decision.” Phelan v. Cook Cnty., 
19 

463 F.3d 773, 790 (7th Cir. 2006). “[T]here is no clear consensus 

as to how frequently such conduct must occur to impose Monell

liability, except that it must be more than one instance, or even 

three.” Thomas v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 303 

(7th Cir. 2009) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 

Defendants assert that Ragnone’s excessive force claim fails 

because he has alleged only a one-time incident, and has not 

established a pattern of violations similar to the alleged 

violation of his constitutional rights. In response, Ragnone 

points to his deposition testimony that he was placed in the ERC 

twice for punishment, with the straps crossed improperly over his 

chest. He also testified that he observed more than twenty inmates 

sent to the ERC for punishment in a thirty-day period. According 

to his affidavit, those inmates were secured in the ERC with the 

straps crossed over the upper torso in violation of official 

policy. Ragnone does not identify any of these inmates, or provide 

other evidence to corroborate this testimony. 

Defendants urge the Court to disregard Ragnone’s testimony 

that he saw inmates restrained in the ERC as punishment, claiming 

that “nothing” supports his assertions. (DE# 32 at 6.) They also 

contend that Ragnone’s testimony that inmates were placed in the 

chair as punishment is based on inadmissible hearsay from other 

inmates. “[U]ncorroborated, self-serving testimony, ‘[i]f based 

on personal knowledge or firsthand experience,’ may prevent 
20 

summary judgment against the non-moving party, as ‘such testimony 

can be evidence of disputed material facts.’” Montgomery v. Am. 

Airlines, Inc., 626 F.3d 382, 389 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Berry 

v. Chicago Transit Auth., 618 F.3d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 2010)); see 

Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[A] nonmoving 

party’s own affidavit can constitute affirmative evidence to 

defeat a summary judgment motion.”) (citation omitted). At the 

summary judgment stage, whether the movant’s evidence is more 

persuasive than the non-movant’s evidence is irrelevant. United 

States v. Funds in Amount of One Hundred Thousand One Hundred & 

Twenty Dollars ($100,120.00), 730 F.3d 711, 717 (7th Cir. 2013) 

(citation omitted). “The only question is whether the evidence 

presented, reasonably construed in the light most favorable to the 

non-movant, creates a genuine dispute regarding any material fact 

precluding judgment as a matter of law.” Id. 

Ragnone’s deposition and affidavit testimony regarding other 

inmates being restrained in the ERC is imprecise, unsubstantiated 

and self-serving. However, it appears to be based on Ragnone’s 

firsthand experience while he was a trustee at the Jail. 

Defendants point to no evidence that Ragnone’s knowledge was gained 

from other inmates, rather than his own personal observations. 

When construed in the light most favorable to Ragnone, this 

testimony creates a genuine issue of material fact. See Navejar 

v. Iyiola, 718 F.3d 692, 697 (7th Cir. 2013) (rejecting 
21 

“defendants’ erroneous contention that the district court may 

safely disregard his ‘self-serving’ evidence,” and reversing 

summary judgment on excessive force claim). Therefore, 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Count I against Lain 

and Gaydos in their official capacities is DENIED. 

Count II alleges excessive force under the Eighth Amendment. 

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from the infliction of 

“cruel and unusual” punishment. Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 

473 (7th Cir. 2009). Ragnone asserts that he was a pretrial 

detainee, and “not a prisoner subject to Eighth Amendment 

analysis.” (DE# 30 at 7.) He therefore concedes that his Eighth 

Amendment excessive force claim in Count II should be dismissed. 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Count II is GRANTED.

Count III - Denial and/or Delay of Medical Treatment 

Count III alleges that Defendants denied or delayed medical 

attention to Ragnone. “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment prohibits deliberate indifference to the serious medical 

needs of pretrial detainees. This provision applies essentially 

the same deliberate indifference analysis to detainees as the 

Eighth Amendment does to inmates.” Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. 

Cnty. of Madison, Ill., 746 F.3d 766, 775 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation 

and internal quotations omitted). 

Ragnone argues that the lack of medical staff on night duty 

at the Jail raises a material issue regarding “Lain’s practice or 
22 

custom of depriving inmates of round-the-clock care when needed” 

because “serious medical issues can arise with people at any hour 

of the day.” (DE# 30 at 11-12). Ragnone also asserts that Gaydos 

was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs because he 

complained to her of respiratory distress after being restrained 

in the ERC for fifteen minutes, and was not taken to the hospital 

until many hours later. Neither of these arguments establishes 

liability against Lain or Gaydos in their official capacities. 

“[D]eliberate indifference to inmates’ medical needs may 

indeed be demonstrated by proving that there are such systemic and 

gross deficiencies in staffing, facilities, equipment, or 

procedures that the inmate population is effectively denied access 

to adequate medical care.” Holmes v. Sheahan, 930 F.2d 1196, 1200 

(7th Cir. 1991) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 

However, Ragnone presents no evidence showing that the Sheriff’s 

Department had a practice or custom of refusing to provide 

reasonable medical care to inmates or detainees. The only evidence 

of any serious medical need is the one-time incident of Ragnone’s 

collapsed lung. Ragnone thus fails raise a genuine issue of 

material fact regarding his claims against Lain or Gaydos in their 

official capacities. See Flynn v. Garner, No. 1:10–cv–1569, 2012 

WL 6084623, at *4 n.1 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 6, 2012) (granting summary 

judgment for sheriff in his official capacity where plaintiff 

failed to present evidence of custom or policy of refusing to 
23 

provide reasonable medical care to inmates); Sanchez v. Garcia, 

No. 12 C 06347, 2015 WL 2097606, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 4, 2015) 

(granting summary judgment on a Monell claim alleging deliberate 

indifference to medical needs because “[a] single instance [was] 

insufficient to establish the existence of a widespread policy or 

practice”). Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Count 

III is GRANTED. 

Count IV - Inadequate Supervision and Training 

Count IV alleges that Lain inadequately supervised and 

trained police officers and jail employees regarding the detention 

and housing of inmates, including the proper use of the ERC, 

through “policies and customs exhibiting deliberate or conscious 

indifference to the constitutional rights of persons.” (Compl. ¶¶ 

30, 31.) Establishing Monell liability based on inadequate 

training or supervision requires proof of “deliberate 

indifference” on the part of the municipality. Sornberger v. City 

of Knoxville, Ill., 434 F.3d 1006, 1029 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations 

omitted). “This proof can take the form of either (1) failure to 

provide adequate training in light of foreseeable consequences; or 

(2) failure to act in response to repeated complaints of 

constitutional violations by its officers.” Id. at 1029-30 

(citations omitted). The Seventh Circuit “requires a high degree 

of culpability” to prove deliberate indifference on behalf of a 

municipality. Ellis v. Country Club Hills, No. 06–cv–1895, 2011 
24 

WL 1113032, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2011) (quoting Cornfield by 

Lewis v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1327 (7th 

Cir. 1993)). 

Ragnone takes no issue with the written policy for using the 

ERC. (See DE# 30 at 13 (noting “defendants’ submission sets out 

the proper use of the [ERC]”); DE# 25-3 at 21-23.) He contends 

that while officers may be trained not to place the ERC’s shoulder 

straps over a person’s chest, neck or head, he has observed that 

“the restraints are always employed in a manner that compromises 

respiration.” (DE# 30 at 10; see DE# 30-1, 30-3.) Deliberate 

indifference may be found “when a repeated pattern of 

constitutional violations makes the need for further training 

plainly obvious” to policymakers. Jenkins v. Bartlett, 487 F.3d 

482, 492 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation, ellipsis, and internal 

quotations omitted); see Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 131 S. 

Ct. 1350, 1360, 179 L. Ed. 2d 417 (2011) (“A pattern of similar 

constitutional violations by untrained employees” can “demonstrate 

deliberate indifference for purposes of [stating a] failure to 

train [claim].”) (citation omitted). As explained above, Ragnone 

testified that he observed more than twenty inmates secured in the 

ERC improperly during a thirty-day period. This testimony raises 

a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a pattern of similar 

constitutional violations existed. Therefore, Defendants’ motion 

for summary judgment as to Count IV is DENIED. 
25 

State Law Claims 

Counts V-VII – Intentional and Negligent Infliction Claims 

Ragnone asserts claims of intentional infliction of emotional 

distress (Count V), negligent infliction of emotional distress 

(Count VI), and negligent infliction of physical injury (Count 

VII). Defendants argue that these claims against Gaydos and Lain 

personally are barred by the Indiana Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”). 

Under the ITCA, “[a] lawsuit alleging that an employee acted within 

the scope of the employee’s employment bars an action by the 

claimant against the employee personally.” Ind. Code § 34–13–3–

5(b). The purpose of the ITCA is to “ensure that public employees 

can exercise their independent judgment necessary to carry out 

their duties without threat of harassment by litigation or threats 

of litigation over decisions made within the scope of their 

employment.” Bushong v. Williamson, 790 N.E.2d 467, 472 (Ind. 

2003) (citations omitted). A complaint that alleges that an 

employee acted within the scope of employment “provides an 

immediate and early indication that the employee is not personally 

liable.” Id. Such action against the employee is barred by the 

ITCA. Id. 

Here, Ragnone’s claims are clearly based on the alleged 

actions of Lain and Gaydos within the scope of their employment. 

The Complaint names Lain and Gaydos as defendants in their 

capacities as Porter County Sheriff and an officer of the Sheriff’s 
26 

Department, respectively. (Compl. at 1.) It repeatedly alleges 

that Lain and Gaydos were acting under color of state law, and 

within the scope of their employment. (Id. ¶¶ 8 (“defendants . . 

. acted under color of law, to-wit, under color of the statutes, 

ordinances, regulations, policies, practices and usages of the 

State of Indiana, Porter County, and the Porter County Sheriff’s 

Department”), 12 (“Gaydos . . . working under the authority and 

supervision of . . . Sheriff Lain, and acting under color of law, 

placed Ragnone in the [ERC] as punishment for ‘arguing’ with 

another inmate”), 22 (Ragnone’s alleged mistreatment was “the 

result of an official policy or custom of the defendants Porter 

County and Sheriff Lain”), 47 (alleging “Lain and Mary Gaydos were 

agents of Porter County and the Porter County Sheriff’s Department 

and acting at all times relevant within the scope of their 

employment”)). Ragnone does not respond to Defendants’ argument 

that Counts V, VI and VII against Lain and Gaydos personally are 

barred by the ITCA. Indeed, he does not mention the ITCA in his 

response brief. By failing to address this argument for summary 

judgment, he has abandoned these claims against Lain and Gaydos 

personally. See Palmer, 327 F.3d at 597-98; Caruso, 197 F.3d at 

1197. 

Ragnone cites Perkins v. Lawson, 312 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2002), 

for the proposition that respondeat superior liability exists in 

Indiana tort law, and that negligence claims may exist with a lower 
27 

burden than Section 1983’s “deliberate indifference” standard. 

(DE# 30 at 12.) In Perkins, the Seventh Circuit reversed the 

dismissal of a negligence claim against a sheriff sued in his 

official capacity based on a respondeat superior theory. 312 F.3d 

at 876 (citing Indiana case law). The Court focused on the 

elements of a negligence claim, and did not address the 

applicability of the ITCA. See id. Based on Ragnone’s discussion 

of Perkins, the Court understands that he intended Counts V, VI, 

and VII to impose respondeat superior liability on the Sheriff’s 

Department. 

Other courts have found that where the ITCA bars claims 

against the government employees personally, a plaintiff is 

limited to seeking relief against the government employer based on 

its derivative liability under principles of respondeat superior. 

See Bowens v. City of Indianapolis, No. 1:13–cv–00072, 2014 WL 

4680662, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 19, 2014) (citing Carver v. 

Crawford, 564 N.E.2d 330, 334 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990)); Laffoon, 2011 

WL 2293331, at *10 (holding state law claim against defendant 

officer was barred by the ITCA, noting that because the officer 

“was acting within the scope of his employment, the City of Portage 

is the sole defendant on the state law claim under respondeat 

superior”); Fidler v. City of Indianapolis, 428 F. Supp. 2d 857, 

866 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (opining that plaintiff could pursue his state 

law tort claims against the City, but not against the individual 
28 

officers). The Court holds that the ITCA bars Ragnone from seeking 

relief personally against Lain and Gaydos for Counts V, VI and 

VII. 

In their reply brief, Defendants argue that the Sheriff’s 

Department cannot be held liable for Gaydos’s actions under a 

respondeat superior theory because Ragnone fails to establish the 

elements of negligence. (DE# 32 at 11-12.) To recover under a 

theory of negligence, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) a duty on 

the part of the defendant to conform his conduct to a standard of 

care arising from his relationship with the plaintiff, (2) a 

failure of the defendant to conform his conduct to the requisite 

standard of care required by the relationship, and (3) an injury 

to the plaintiff proximately caused by the breach.” Trout v. Buie,

653 N.E.2d 1002, 1008 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Webb v. Jarvis, 

575 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ind. 1991)). Indiana courts have noted that 

summary judgment is generally inappropriate in negligence actions. 

See id. (citation omitted). Nevertheless, summary judgment is 

appropriate on the issue of breach of duty “where the facts are 

undisputed and a single inference can be drawn from those facts.” 

N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Sharp, 790 N.E.2d 462, 466 (Ind. 2003) 

(citation omitted). 

While Defendants maintain that Ragnone has not identified any 

duty owed to him, Ragnone asserts in his response brief that “the 

Sheriff’s obligations . . . begin with Indiana Code § 36-2-13-
29 

5(a)(7), which provides that ‘[t]he sheriff shall: . . . take care 

of the county jail and the prisoners there.’” (DE# 30 at 13 

(quoting Ind. Code § 36-2-13-5(a)(7).) Indiana courts have held 

that a sheriff has a statutory duty to take care of the jail and 

the prisoners under Section 36-2-13-5(a)(7), and “a duty to 

exercise reasonable care to preserve his prisoner’s health and 

safety.” Trout, 653 N.E.2d at 1008 (citation omitted). 

Defendants also assert that Ragnone has not identified any 

breach of care because his “sole argument” rests upon his own 

testimony that Gaydos inappropriately fastened the ERC’s shoulder 

straps on him in a crisscross fashion. (DE# 32 at 11.) Defendants 

point to Gaydos’s affidavit and a photograph of an ERC to show 

that the shoulder straps do not cross. As explained above, the 

parties’ conflicting testimony regarding how Ragnone was strapped 

into the ERC raises a genuine issue of material fact that precludes 

summary judgment. 

Finally, while Defendants concede that Ragnone suffered a 

collapsed lung, they argue that no evidence connects this injury 

to Ragnone’s confinement in the ERC. Indiana negligence law 

requires a “reasonable connection between a defendant’s conduct 

and the damages which a plaintiff has suffered.” Smith v. Beaty, 

639 N.E.2d 1029, 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted). 

There must be “causation in fact,” i.e., “the harm would not have 

occurred ‘but for’ the defendant’s conduct.” Id. A plaintiff 
30 

“must present evidence of probative value based on facts, or 

inferences to be drawn from the facts, establishing both that the 

wrongful act was a cause in fact of the occurrence and that the 

occurrence was a cause in fact of his injury.” Id. “Causation 

may be proven by circumstantial evidence if the evidence has 

sufficient probative force to constitute a basis for a legal 

inference rather than mere speculation.” Id. 

Defendants rely on Ragnone’s testimony that he noted 

something was “incorrect” about his breathing before Gaydos 

allegedly tightened the straps, and that he admitted that the 

straps were not restricting his ability to breathe before or after 

Gaydos allegedly tightened them further. However, Ragnone also 

testified that he told Gaydos that something was wrong and that he 

couldn’t breathe while in the ERC. He testified that after Gaydos 

tightened the straps in response to his complaints, he experienced 

pain that increased over time. When construed in a light most 

favorable to Ragnone, his testimony and reasonable inferences 

therefrom are sufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact 

regarding whether Gaydos breached her duty and whether this breach 

proximately caused Ragnone’s injury. Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment on Counts V, VI and VII against Lain and Gaydos 

personally is GRANTED. These claims remain pending under a 

respondeat superior theory of liability. 
31 

Counts VIII and IX – Constructive Fraud and Breach of 

Statutory Duty to Pay Medical Expenses 

Count VIII and IX relate to Porter County’s and Lain’s failure 

to pay Ragnone’s medical expenses. Count VIII asserts a 

constructive fraud claim. More specifically, it alleges that 

Porter County and Lain owed Ragnone a duty to provide and pay for 

his medical care, and that they violated this duty by deceptively 

representing that he needed to sign an acknowledgment of release 

in order to avoid financial responsibility for his medical care. 

(Compl. ¶ 42.) 

Count IX alleges that Porter County and Lain breached a 

statutory duty to pay medical expenses. (Id. ¶¶ 43-45.) While 

the Complaint does not identify the statutes on which Count IX is 

based, Ragnone relies upon Indiana Code sections 36-2-13-5(a)(7) 

and 36-2-13-18 in his response brief. Indiana courts have held 

that a sheriff’s duty to care for prisoners under Section 36-2-

13-5(a)(7) “includes the duty to pay for medical treatment.” 

Northeast Indiana Colon & Rectal Surgeons v. Allen Cnty. Comm'rs, 

674 N.E.2d 590, 592 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Health & Hosp. 

Corp. of Marion Cnty. v. Marion Cnty., 470 N.E.2d 1348, 1359 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1984)). Section 36-2-13-18 provides, in part: 

(d) A sheriff of a county may not release a person 

subject to lawful detention solely for the purpose of 

preventing the county from being financially responsible 

under IC 11-12-5 for health care services provided to 

the person. 
32 

(e) If a county violates subsection (d), the county 

remains financially responsible under IC 11-12-5 for 

health care services provided to the person released 

from lawful detention. 

(f) A county is financially responsible under IC 11-12-

5 for health care services provided to a person at a 

hospital if the person was subject to lawful detention 

by the sheriff at the time the person entered onto the 

hospital’s premises. 

Ind. Code § 36-2-13-18 (d)-(f). Defendants argue that Porter 

County is not the proper party to these claims because it has no 

agency relationship with the Sheriff’s Department and no control 

over Lain or Gaydos, and thus, there can be no respondeat superior

liability. (DE# 25 at 32-33.) In his response brief, Ragnone 

asserts that Porter County is liable under Section 36-2-13-18, 

rather than under a respondeat superior theory of liability.6

Defendants contend that no private right of action exists for 

Section 36-2-13-18. They acknowledge that determining whether a 

private right of action exists begins with an examination of 

legislative intent. However, rather than providing such 

examination, Defendants merely state in conclusory fashion that 

 

6 Ragnone also relies upon Indiana Code section 34-14-4-1 to argue that Indiana 

directs public entities like Porter County to pay judgments for civil rights 

violations for which its employees are liable. (DE# 30 at 16.) Section 34-

14-4-1 does not exist in the Indiana Code. Based on Ragnone’s description of 

the provision, the Court assumes that he intended to cite to Indiana Code 

section 34-13-4-1. While Section 34-13-4-1 addresses “personal civil liability 

under civil rights laws of employee acting within scope of employment,” it does 

not create a private right of action to sue a governmental entity to compel the 

entity to pay a judgment entered against an employee. Austin v. Niblick, No. 

1:93-cv-217, 2015 WL 1808998, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 21, 2015) (citing City of 

Muncie v. Peters, 709 N.E.2d 50, 56 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)). Thus, Section 34-

13-4-1 does not provide Ragnone with a private right of action against Porter 

County. 
33 

Section 36-2-13-18 was designed to “make sure that the medical 

care providers had an avenue to pursue costs associated with 

rendering medical care to county inmates, and not for [Ragnone] 

under this scenario.” (DE# 25 at 33-34.) They offer no legal 

support for this position, and the Court was unable to locate any 

case law on this issue. 

This Court is not “obliged to research and construct legal 

arguments for parties, especially when they are represented by 

counsel.” Nelson v. Napolitano, 657 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 2011) 

(citation omitted); see Matthews v. Waukesha Cnty., 759 F.3d 821, 

826 (7th Cir. 2014) (courts “will not consider arguments that are 

not supported by relevant law”); Vaughn v. King, 167 F.3d 347, 354 

(7th Cir. 1999) (“It is not the responsibility of this court to 

make arguments for the parties.”). Given the lack of legal support 

for Defendants’ private right of action argument, the Court finds 

this argument to be waived. See Matthews, 759 F.3d at 826; Arlin–

Golf, LLC v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 631 F.3d 818, 822 (7th 

Cir. 2011) (where the party “cited no relevant legal authority to 

the district court to support the proposition . . . the argument 

is waived”). 

Defendants also argue that Counts VIII and IX should be 

dismissed because Ragnone has not suffered any harm. (DE# 25 at 

34, DE# 32 at 13-14.) Defendants maintain - without citing any 

legal support - that Ragnone’s injury cannot be his medical 
34 

expenses because he never paid the medical bills that he received. 

Indiana courts appear to disagree. “An injured plaintiff is 

allowed to recover reasonable costs of necessary medical 

treatment, . . . and it is immaterial whether the bills for these 

expenses have been paid.” 9 Ind. Law Encyc. Damages § 23 (citing 

Indianapolis St. R. Co. v. Haverstick, 74 N.E. 34 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1905)). Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Counts VIII 

and IX is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment (DE # 24) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 

Counts II, III, X, and XI are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE in their 

entirety. Counts I, IV, V, VI, VII against Defendant Porter County 

are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Counts V, VI, and VII against 

defendants Gaydos and Lain personally are DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. This case remains pending as to Count I against Lain 

and Gaydos in their official capacities, Count IV against Lain in 

his official capacity, Counts V, VI, and VII under a respondeat 

superior theory of liability, and Counts VIII and IX. 

DATED: September 25, 2015 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge 

 United States District Court