IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

JASON KEEL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) NO. 3:14-CV-1492

)

CORIZON MEDICAL SERVICES, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is a complaint filed by Jason Keel, a pro se

prisoner, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (DE 1.) For the reasons set

forth below, the Court: (1) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed

against Dr. Michael Mitcheff in his individual capacity for

monetary damages for denying him proper medical treatment for his

hand; (2) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed against Dr. Michael

Mitcheff in his official capacity for injunctive relief related to

his current need for medical treatment for his hand; (3) DISMISSES

Dr. Noe Marandet, Kimberly Myers, Mrs. Frye, Mrs. Ivers, Shalana

Seifert, Dr. Benjamin R. Loveridge, and Corizon Medical Services;

(4) DISMISSES any and all other claims contained in the complaint;

(5) DIRECTS the United States Marshals Service to effect service on

Dr. Michael Mitcheff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and (6)

ORDERS Dr. Michael Mitcheff to respond, as provided for in the

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, only to the claims for which the
plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening

order.

BACKGROUND

Jason Keel, a pro se prisoner, filed this action on May 2,

2014. (DE 1.) He alleges that medical staff at Miami Correctional

Facility (“Miami”) have denied him proper treatment for several

debilitating medical conditions in violation of the Eighth

Amendment.

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review a

prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,

or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. In determining whether the

complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard as

when deciding a motion to dismiss under FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir.

2006). To survive dismissal, a complaint must state a claim for

relief that is plausible on its face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ.

Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

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defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 603. The

court must bear in mind, however, that “[a] document filed pro se

is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.

89, 94 (2007). 

According to the detailed complaint, Keel suffers from several

chronic conditions, including degenerative disc disease, right

shoulder pain, “electrical like pains” in his right arm and hand,

neck pain, and inability to hold anything with his left hand. He

claims that these impairments cause him difficulty carrying out

daily functions, including brushing his teeth, tying his shoes, and

washing himself in the shower. Upon his arrival at Miami in May

2012, he was examined by Dr. Noe Marandet. Dr. Marandet listened to

his complaints and looked at an MRI report that Keel provided to

him. After speaking with Keel Dr. Marandet determined that he would

continue his current prescription of Neurontin for pain. He told

Keel that he did not think Dr. Michael Mitcheff, the regional

medical director for Corizon Medical Services (“Corizon”), would

approve any additional medications.

In May 2013, after Keel put in requests for medical care

complaining that he was in pain and having muscle spasms, he was

seen again by Dr. Marandet. After speaking with Keel, Dr. Marandet

prescribed a muscle relaxer, Soma, for a 7-day period. Dr. Mitcheff

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approved this medication. Keel claims that the Soma helped

significantly, but after the prescription ran out it was not

renewed. Keel was seen again by Dr. Marandet in July 2013, and the

doctor placed him on Vicodin for a 7-day period. He also referred

him for physical therapy. At the end of the month, Dr. Marandet saw

him again and ordered an x-ray of his left hand and upper spinal

area. He placed him on Soma and Tramadol for 14 days for pain and

muscle spasms. Dr. Mitcheff approved these medications.

On August 5, 2013, Keel was experiencing significant pain in

his neck, shoulder, and face, loss of vision in his right eye, and

problems with his balance. He was taken to the medical unit, and

after examining him Dr. Marandet ordered that he be taken to an

outside hospital for evaluation. He was treated at the emergency

room of Howard Health Hospital. A CAT scan was performed but, in

Keel’s words, “[t]hey could not find the exact cause of my loss of

vision.” He was given a shot of morphine for pain. The doctor at

Howard advised him that the pain was likely due to muscle spasms

and tension in the tendons in his neck. That same day he was

released and returned to Miami.

The following day he was still in pain and was taken to the

medical unit. Dr. Marandet examined him and decided to place him in

the medical isolation unit in the infirmary. Keel asked for the

additional medications that had been recommended by the emergency

room doctor, but Dr. Marandet responded that in his view Keel’s

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current medications were appropriate. Keel remained in the

infirmary for 10 days. He asserts, without elaboration, that he

“had to lie to the physician so that I could be released from the

infirmary.”

On August 19, 2013, he was seen again by Dr. Marandet. He

reported that the Ultram, Soma, and Neurontin were working well.

Dr. Marandet ordered these medications for an addition 30 days. Dr.

Mitcheff approved this request. During September 2013, he was seen

on four occasions by medical staff. He complains that Dr. Benjamin

R. Loveridge was rude to him during a visit and told him he would

be transferred to the infirmary if he continued to have medical

problems, which Keel viewed as some type of threat. He was also

seen by Nurse Shalana Seifert. She had the doctor examine Keel for

a problem with his ear, and he was prescribed antibiotics and

Tylenol. Keel claims that Nurse Seifert was rude to him and

referred to him as a “cry baby.” At some point after these visits

Dr. Loveridge took Keel off the Soma and Ultram.

On September 30, 2013, he was seen again by Dr. Marandet. Keel

asked if he could be placed back on Soma and Ultram, but Dr.

Marandet told him those medications were not appropriate for longterm use. Dr. Marandet continued to prescribe Neurontin, but

decreased the dosage. Dr. Mitcheff approved the decrease. On

October 18, 2013, Keel was seen at an “emergency visit” by Dr.

Kevin Krembs due to pain and numbness he was experiencing. Dr.

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Krembs made a referral for him to be placed back on Soma and

Ultram, but Dr. Mitcheff did not approve this referral. He was seen

again by Dr. Krembs a few days later, and the doctor ordered that

his Neurontin be increased. Dr. Mitcheff did not approve this

request. During November and December 2013 he was seen by Dr.

Loveridge and other medical staff. Dr. Loveridge gave him an

injection of another medication in his left hand, and also ordered

an increase in the Neurontin. Dr. Mitcheff would not approve the

increase in Neurontin but ordered alternative treatments of

ibuprofen, Aleve, and Tylenol.

Around this period Keel filed a formal grievance complaining

about his medical care. (DE 1-1 at 3.) In considering his

grievance, the health services director noted that Keel had a

“history of polysubstance abuse” and that he had changed his

account of the origin of his chronic pain on several occasions,

including claiming he had fallen, was in a motor vehicle accident,

and was in a bike accident. She noted that in 2012 he underwent xrays of his spine, a CT scan, and an MRI, and all of them were

normal, except to show mild arthritis in his back. She noted

several doctor’s reports indicating that his complaints of pain

were not consistent with their physical examination. 

She further noted that he had been treated at an outside

hospital and underwent a CT scan of his head, which was normal. She

noted that he complained of an inability to use his right arm, but

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had been observed on camera in his cell (unbeknownst to him), and

was seen moving his arm in all directions, shifting through papers,

making his bed, and shaking out his blankets. She noted that the

physical therapist who had treated Keel noted normal exams with

full range of motion, and opined that he was “medication

dependent.” Accordingly, the director found no medical basis for

changing or increasing any of Keel’s medications, and denied his

grievance.

In February 2014, Keel was seen by Kimberly Myers, a nurse

practitioner. She examined him but declined to change his

medications, explaining that she had never seen him before and

could not adequately gauge whether his pain had worsened. He asked

to see a neurologist or hand specialist, but she told him she was

not sure that this could be done before his release date in July

2014. Keel claims Nurse Myers was supposed to give him an injection

for his hand but did not do so. He saw Nurse Myers again on March

7, 2014, and she confiscated a sling he was wearing on his right

arm because it had not been medically ordered. She also refused his

requests for additional pain medication, and suggested to him that

she thought his complaints were exaggerated.

On March 14, 2014, he was seen by Dr. Marandet. He was being

housed in the segregation unit at that time. He requested Vicodin

for pain, but Dr. Marandet told him narcotics were not allowed in

the segregation unit. On March 28, 2014, he saw Dr. Marandet again,

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and the doctor told him he thought he needed surgery on his hand,

but he did not think Dr. Mitcheff would approve the surgery since

Keel was due to be released from prison in a few months. The doctor

ordered Ultram for 14 days, but Dr. Mitcheff denied this request.

To date Keel has not been scheduled for surgery or other outside

treatment by a hand specialist, although he claims to still have

significant problems with his hand. 

Keel further claims that during this period he contacted Mrs.

Frye (first name unknown), the health care administrator for

Corizon, and Nurse Ivers (first name unknown), the Corizon nursing

administrator, on multiple occasions. He claims that they either

did not respond or told him there was nothing they could do because

it was up to the doctors to decide what medications he received.

Based on these events, Keel seeks damages against Dr.

Mitchell, Dr. Marandet, Dr. Loveridge, Nurse Myers, Nurse Seifert, 

Mrs. Frye, and Nurse Ivers, along with their employer, Corizon, for

violating his Eighth Amendment rights. He also seeks injunctive

relief regarding his ongoing need for hand surgery and pain

management. 

 Under the Eighth Amendment, inmates are entitled to adequate

medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To

establish liability, a prisoner must satisfy both an objective and

subjecting component by showing: (1) his medical need was

objectively serious; and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate

8
indifference to that medical need. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

834 (1994). A medical need is “serious” if it is one that a

physician has diagnosed as mandating treatment, or one that is so

obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity

for a doctor’s attention. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th

Cir. 2005). 

On the subjective prong, the plaintiff must establish that the

defendant “acted in an intentional or criminally reckless manner,

i.e., the defendant must have known that the plaintiff was at

serious risk of being harmed and decided not to do anything to

prevent that harm from occurring even though he could have easily

done so.” Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005). For

a medical professional to be held liable for deliberate

indifference, he or she must make a decision that represents “such

a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment,

practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person

responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.”

Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008); see also

Holloway v. Delaware County Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1074 (7th Cir.

2012) (“[T]he prison physician, as the inmate’s acting primary care

doctor, is free to make his own, independent medical determination

as to the necessity of certain treatments or medications, so long

as the determination is based on the physician’s professional

9
judgment and does not go against accepted professional

standards.”).

A mere disagreement with medical professionals about the

appropriate course of treatment does not establish deliberate

indifference, nor does negligence or even medical practice, since

“the Eighth Amendment does not codify common law torts.” Arnett v.

Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011). When an inmate has

received some form of treatment for a medical condition, to

establish deliberate indifference he must show that the treatment

was “so blatantly inappropriate as to evidence intentional

mistreatment likely to seriously aggravate his condition.” Id.

Although prisoners are entitled to a minimum level of adequate

care, they are not entitled to demand specific types of medical

treatment, nor are they entitled to the “best care possible.”

Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997); see also

Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671-72 (7th Cir. 1997) (“A prison

is not required by the Eighth Amendment to give a prisoner care

that is as good as he would receive if he were a free person, let

alone an affluent free person.”). 

Giving Keel the inferences to which he is entitled at this

stage, he has alleged a serious medical need, specifically, chronic

and painful conditions which interfere with his daily functioning.

On the second prong, the court addresses each defendant in turn.

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As to Dr. Marandet and Dr. Loveridge, even giving the

complaint liberal construction, the court cannot conclude that Keel

has alleged a plausible deliberate indifference claim against them.

Instead, Keel’s allegations reflect that these doctors examined him

regularly, prescribed a variety of medications to address his pain,

referred him for physical therapy and diagnostic testing, and sent

him for outside treatment at a hospital. Although Keel apparently

believes they should have done more for him, his mere disagreement

with doctors over the proper course of treatment does not establish

deliberate indifference. See Arnett, 658 F.3d at 751; see also Ray

v. Wexford, 706 F.3d 864, 866 (7th Cir. 2013)(prisoner with

arthritis failed to establish deliberate indifference where he was

under the care of doctors, underwent x-rays, and received pain

medication, even though the inmate was “sure . . . physicians could

do better” with additional diagnostic testing); Norfleet v.

Webster, 439 F.3d 392, 395-96 (7th Cir. 2006)(difference of opinion

over treatment of inmate’s painful condition did not establish

deliberate indifference). Accordingly, these doctors will be

dismissed as defendants.

As to Nurse Seifert, Mrs. Frye, and Nurse Ivers, there is no

indication they had authority to order different medications or

otherwise interfere with the treatment decisions of Keel’s doctors.

Nor can they be held liable for the actions of the doctors or other

medical staff, since “Section 1983 does not establish a system of

11
vicarious responsibility.” Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 593

(7th Cir. 2009). As the Seventh Circuit has explained:

Bureaucracies divide tasks; no prisoner is entitled to

insist that one employee do another’s job. The division

of labor is important not only to bureaucratic

organization but also to efficient performance of tasks;

people who stay within their roles can get more work

done, more effectively, and cannot be hit with damages

under §1983 for not being ombudsmen. [The] view that

everyone who knows about a prisoner’s problem must pay

damages implies that [a prisoner] could write letters to

the Governor of Wisconsin and 999 other public officials,

demand that every one of those 1,000 officials drop

everything he or she is doing in order to investigate a

single prisoner’s claims, and then collect damages from

all 1,000 recipients if the letter-writing campaign does

not lead to better medical care. That can’t be right. 

Id. at 595. At most, Keel has alleged that these defendants failed

to intervene with the doctors on his behalf in response to his

complaints. This does not give rise to an actionable constitutional

claim. Id. Keel also feels the nurses were rude to him,

particularly Nurse Seifert who allegedly called him a “cry baby.”

However, this type of verbal harassment——while unprofessional——is

not actionable under the Constitution. DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d

607, 612 (7th Cir. 2000) (observing that verbal harassment or rude

comments by prison staff does not violate the Constitution); Patton

v. Przybylski, 822 F.2d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 1987) (unprofessional

conduct does not violate the Constitution). Accordingly, these

defendants will be dismissed.

 As to Nurse Practitioner Myers, Keel complains that she had

him placed him in the infirmary after he complained about being in

12
pain. However, the court cannot conclude that it violates the

Eighth Amendment to place an inmate complaining of chronic pain in

the infirmary, where he could be more closely observed and

monitored. Keel is also upset that she suggested he was

exaggerating about his pain, but nothing required her to credit his

subjective complaints without making her own medical judgment

regarding his need for treatment. See Olson v. Morgan, —F.3d—, 2014

WL 1687802, at *4 (7th Cir. Apr. 30, 2014) (observing that prison

staff “are neither required nor expected to believe everything

inmates tell them”). Indeed, Keel acknowledges in his complaint

that he lied to medical staff on another occasion. The attachments

also reflect that by the time Keel saw Nurse Myers, he had

undergone several diagnostic tests which revealed normal results.

Keel has not alleged a plausible deliberate indifference claim

against this defendant under Eighth Amendment standards.

Accordingly, she will be dismissed as a defendant. 

As to Dr. Mitcheff, the complaint indicates that he approved

various forms of treatment and medication for Keel during his time

at Miami. Keel’s mere disagreement with some of Dr. Mitcheff’s

treatment decisions does establish that the doctor turned a blind

eye to his medical needs. However, giving the complaint liberal

construction, Keel claims he was told by another physician in late

March 2014 that he is in need of hand surgery. He further alleges

that Dr. Mitcheff will not approve the surgery or send him for

13
outside treatment because he is due to be released from prison

soon, and not because of any legitimate medical reason. Keel

further alleges that his hand is causing him significant problems

and interfering with his ability to function on a daily basis.

Giving him the inferences to which he is entitled, he has alleged

enough to proceed on a claim against Dr. Mitcheff regarding the

treatment of his hand. See Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 442-43

(7th Cir. 2010) (inmate had viable constitutional claim where

evidence suggested that jail dentist “simply concluded that [the

plaintiff] could endure his pain until his transfer back to the DOC

several weeks later, when [he] would be the DOC dentist’s problem,

not hers”). 

Finally, Keel sues Corizon. It appears he is trying to hold

the company liable because it employees the individual medical

staff involved in his care. However, there is no general respondeat

superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Chavez v. Ill. State

Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Johnson v.

Dossey, 515 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[A] private corporation

is not vicariously liable under § 1983 for its employees’

deprivations of others’ civil rights.”). A private company

performing a state function can be held liable to the same extent

as a state actor under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of

New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675

F.3d 650, 675 (7th Cir. 2012) (Monell framework applies to private

14
company providing medical care at correctional facility). Here,

however, the plaintiff does not allege, nor can it be plausibly

inferred, that Corizon had an official practice or policy that

caused his injury. Instead, the crux of his complaint is that

individual medical staff made poor decisions in providing him care.

Accordingly, Corizon will be dismissed as a defendant.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the court: 

(1) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed against Dr. Michael

Mitcheff in his individual capacity for monetary damages for

denying him proper medical treatment for his hand; 

(2) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed against Dr. Michael

Mitcheff in his official capacity for injunctive relief related to

his current need for medical treatment for his hand;

(3) DISMISSES Dr. Noe Marandet, Kimberly Myers, Mrs. Frye,

Mrs. Ivers, Shalana Seifert, Dr. Benjamin R. Loveridge, and Corizon

Medical Services;

(4) DISMISSES any and all other claims contained in the

complaint;

(5) DIRECTS the United States Marshals Service to effect

service on Dr. Michael Mitcheff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d);

and

15
(6) ORDERS Dr. Michael Mitcheff to respond, as provided for in

the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, only to the claims for which the

plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening

order.

DATED: May 16, 2014 /s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

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