The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, United States District Judge for the

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Eastern District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 97-2088

___________

Phyllis Rose-Maston, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

NME Hospitals, Inc., doing business *

as Lutheran Medical Center, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

 Submitted: December 12, 1997

 Filed: January 15, 1998

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Before BOWMAN, WOLLMAN, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Phyllis Rose-Maston (Rose-Maston) appeals from the district court’s1

entry of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, Lutheran

Medical Center (LMC), in her Title VII employment discrimination suit.

Because Rose-Maston failed to present evidence showing that LMC’s

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination were a pretext

for unlawful discrimination, we affirm.
In addition to Rose-Maston, two of the other six managers under Kraft’s direct 2

supervision were African-American females. Neither of these individuals experienced

any negative employment actions.

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I.

Rose-Maston, an African-American female, began working for LMC in

October of 1984 as Utilization Review Coordinator. She was promoted in 1991

to the position of Utilization Review Manager. In March of 1992, Glenn

Kraft (Kraft), a white male, was hired as LMC’s Chief Financial Officer

(CFO). As CFO, Kraft directly supervised the performance of seven

departmental managers, including Rose-Maston.2

Shortly after Kraft was hired, he and Rose-Maston began experiencing

difficulties in their working relationship. Rose-Maston was apparently

displeased with Kraft’s approach, which called for managers under his

control to function with minimal guidance and supervision. She felt that

this “hands off” approach failed to adequately apprise her of what was

expected of her. Kraft, on the other hand, expressed concern about Rose

Maston’s job performance, believing that she was unable to function

competently without constant feedback and supervision. In addition, he

believed that she lacked an understanding of the purposes and functions of

utilization review, and he found her reports to be inadequate and

confusing. Kraft was also concerned about Rose-Maston’s somewhat erratic

attendance.

In November of 1992, LMC decided to combine its Utilization Review and

Social Services departments into a single department. LMC anticipated

creating a new Case Management Director (CMD) position to head up the newly

created department. Kraft interviewed Rose-Maston and two other individuals

for the CMD position. Because LMC’s plans to merge the Utilization Review

and Social Services departments were not entirely formulated, and because

the CMD position was still largely
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undefined, LMC decided not to hire anyone immediately and tabled the

proposed position indefinitely.

Following Rose-Maston’s interview for the CMD position, her

professional relationship with Kraft continued to deteriorate. Although

Rose-Maston’s previous supervisors had generally given her satisfactory

performance evaluations, Kraft’s 1992 evaluation of her performance

indicated that Kraft was extremely dissatisfied with her sporadic attendance

and professional competence. Rose-Maston was absent from work on numerous

occasions and was often inexplicably unavailable during ordinary working

hours. Kraft’s concern about these repeated occurrences led him to begin

carefully monitoring her absences. Between August of 1992 and April of

1993, Rose-Maston was absent from work for all or part of the day on

seventeen separate occasions.

In January of 1993, Kraft provided Rose-Maston with an action plan

outlining specific tasks for her to complete and setting deadlines for the

completion of each task. This action plan proved to be largely

unsuccessful. Rose-Maston felt that the plan failed to provide her with

reasonable guidance, and consequently she failed to complete certain tasks

in a timely manner. In April, Kraft informed Rose-Maston that he was

unsatisfied with her performance of the tasks identified in the action plan.

Kraft and LMC Human Resources Director Jan Kosmal met with Rose-Maston at

this time to express their concerns and to inform her that they would

carefully monitor her work during the following thirty days and that her

employment status would be reevaluated at the end of that time.

On June 7, 1993, Kraft terminated Rose-Maston’s employment, citing

poor work performance and unacceptable attendance. Shortly thereafter, LMC

implemented its
LMC contends, and Rose-Maston does not dispute, that the duties and

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responsibilities of this position had changed considerably since the time of RoseMaston’s November interview.

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plan to combine the Utilization Review and Social Services departments and

hired a white male to serve as the director of the newly created Case

Management department.3

Following her dismissal, Rose-Maston filed this Title VII action,

alleging that LMC unlawfully discriminated against her on the basis of race

when it discharged her and when it failed to promote her to the CMD

position.

II.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same

standard as the district court. See Rabushka ex rel. United States v. Crane

Co., 122 F.3d 559, 562 (8th Cir. 1997). We will affirm if the evidence,

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that no

genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. See Herrero v. St. Louis University Hosp.,

109 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Although a party

moving for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating the absence of

any genuine issue of material fact, a nonmoving party may not rest upon mere

denials or allegations, but must instead set forth specific facts sufficient

to raise a genuine issue for trial. See Thomas v. Runyon, 108 F.3d 957, 959

(8th Cir. 1997); Ruby v. Springfield R-12 Public School Dist., 76 F.3d 909,

911 (8th Cir. 1996).

Rose-Maston’s claims of race discrimination are analyzed under the

burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973). Under this framework, a Title VII plaintiff has

the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of race

discrimination. See Hill v. St. Louis University, 123 F.3d 1114, 1119 (8th

Cir. 1997). If she is successful in establishing a prima facie
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case, a rebuttable presumption of discrimination arises. See id. The

burden then shifts to the defendant, who must articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. See id. Once

the employer articulates such a reason, the presumption of discrimination

disappears entirely and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the

employer’s proffered reason is merely a pretext for discriminatory animus.

See id. At all times, the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of proving

that she was illegally discriminated against on the basis of her race. See

Ruby, 76 F.3d at 912.

III.

To present a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, Rose Maston

was required to show “that [she] was a member of a protected class, that

[she] was qualified for the position, and that despite [her] qualification

[she] was displaced from the position.” Ruby, 76 F.3d at 911. As LMC

apparently concedes, Rose-Matson has met these requirements, thus creating

a rebuttable presumption of discrimination. See Hill, 123 F.3d at 1119.

LMC rebutted the presumption, however, by articulating legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for Rose-Maston’s discharge; namely, her irregular

attendance and her poor job performance.

Because LMC has produced nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, the presumption of discrimination

created by Rose-Maston’s prima facie case disappeared. See Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir.),

cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2510 (1997). Nonetheless, the elements which form Rose-Maston’s prima facie case were

not rendered irrelevant by the LMC’s production of a nondiscriminatory explanation. Id. As we explained in

Ryther,

[t]he elements of the prima facie case remain . . . and if they are accompanied by evidence of

pretext and disbelief of the defendant’s proffered explanation, they may permit the jury to find

for the plaintiff. 
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This is not to say that, for the plaintiff to succeed, simply proving pretext is necessarily enough. We emphasize

that evidence of pretext will not by itself be enough to make a submissible case if it is, standing alone, inconsistent

with a reasonable inference of age discrimination. Furthermore . . . the plaintiff must still persuade the jury, from

all the facts and circumstances, that the employment decision was based upon intentional discrimination.

Id. at 837-38 (emphasis in original).

The question, then, is whether Rose-Maston produced sufficient

evidence to support a reasonable inference that LMC’s proffered reason is

merely a pretext for race discrimination. See Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d

1026, 1036 (8th Cir. 1997); Moschetti v. Chicago, Central & Pacific R.R.

Co., 119 F.3d 707, 710 (8th Cir. 1997). Rose-Maston may prove pretext

either directly by showing that her employer was more likely motivated by

a discriminatory reason or indirectly by showing that her employer’s

explanation is unworthy of credence. See Harvey v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,

38 F.3d 968, 971 (8th Cir. 1994). Proof that LMC’s articulated reason

is unworthy of credence does not automatically entitle Rose-Maston to

judgment but may support an inference of discrimination. See Rothmeier

v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1334 (8th Cir. 1996). As we

went on to explain in Rothmeier,

[A] plaintiff can avoid summary judgment only if the evidence

considered in its entirety (1) creates a fact issue as to

whether the employer’s proffered reasons are pretextual and

(2) creates a reasonable inference that [race] was a

determinative factor in the adverse employment decision. The

second part of the test sometimes may be satisfied without

additional evidence where the overall strength of the prima

facie case and the evidence of pretext “suffice[s] to show

intentional discrimination.” The focus, however, always

remains on the ultimate question of law: whether the evidence

is sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether

the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff

because of the plaintiff’s [race].
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Id. at 1336-37 (citations omitted).

Rose-Maston contends that Kraft failed to adequately inform her of

her job duties and of his expectations for her. Kraft, however, made it

known to Rose-Maston that he expected managers under his supervision to

demonstrate high levels of independence and initiative. Although RoseMaston may have felt that Kraft’s approach was inappropriate and that more

direction would have been preferable, an employer’s failure to inform an

employee of what is expected of her is not evidence of discriminatory

animus. See Hill, 123 F.3d at 1119. Rose-Maston’s claim is nothing more

than an attack on the business practices of LMC and Kraft. “[T]he

employment discrimination laws have not vested in the federal courts the

authority to sit as super-personnel departments reviewing the wisdom or

fairness of the business judgments made by employers, except to the extent

that those judgments involve intentional discrimination.” Hutson v.

McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 781 (8th Cir. 1995). See also Day

v. Johnson, 119 F.3d 650, 657 (8th Cir. 1997) (“federal courts are not

self-appointed personnel managers, and they may not second-guess the

fairness or wisdom of an employer’s nondiscriminatory employment

decisions”). Title VII prohibits intentional discrimination based on

certain, discreet classifications; it does not prohibit employment

decisions based on other factors, such as job performance, erroneous

evaluations, personality conflicts, or even unsound business practices.

See Hill, 123 F.3d at 1120.

Rose-Maston also alleges that she was treated differently than

similarly situated white employees. Specifically, she submits that she

was subjected to an evaluation process different from that used with her

fellow employees and that certain white employees received promotions for

which they were not qualified. These unsubstantiated and conclusory

allegations are insufficient to support an inference of pretext. See

Davenport v. Riverview Gardens School Dist., 30 F.3d 940, 945 (8th Cir.
Rose-Maston argues that LMC failed to show that other similarly situated

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employees were treated in the same manner. This argument, however, misplaces the

burden of proof. As the plaintiff, Rose-Maston bears at all times the ultimate burden

of proving that she was illegally discriminated against. See Ruby, 76 F.3d at 912.

Thus, it was Rose-Maston’s burden to produce specific, tangible evidence showing a

disparity in the treatment of similarly situated employees. See Harvey, 38 F.3d at 972;

Lanear v. Safeway Grocery, 843 F.2d 298, 301 (8th Cir. 1988).

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1994) (“While evidence supporting this claim [of disparate treatment]

would be highly relevant to the issue of pretext, plaintiff presented no

such evidence other than his own unsubstantiated allegations”). RoseMaston points to no specific factual evidence supporting her claim,

choosing instead to rely upon bald assertions of favoritism. Conclusory

affidavits, standing alone, cannot create a genuine issue of material fact

precluding summary judgment. See Miller v. Citizens Security Group, Inc.,

116 F.3d 343, 346 (8th Cir. 1997); Jackson v. Anchor Packing Co., 994 F.2d

1295, 1303-04 (8th Cir. 1993).4

Finally, Rose-Maston asserts that her prior satisfactory evaluations

support an inference of pretext because they cast doubt upon LMC’s

assertions that she was incompetent. See Hutson, 63 F.3d at 779

(“demonstration of competence may serve as evidence of pretext when an

employee is discharged for incompetence”). Rose-Maston’s prior

evaluations, however, are not sufficient to defeat LMC’s motion for

summary judgment. These evaluations may show that Rose-Maston had

performed competently in the past, but they do not render her more recent

negative evaluations inherently untrustworthy. Rose-Maston offers no

evidence showing that LMC’s proffered explanations for her termination --

poor attendance and failure to complete assigned tasks -- are pretextual.

Indeed, she does not dispute that her attendance was poor or that she

failed to complete assigned tasks.
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In sum, because Rose-Maston failed to present any evidence that would

support a reasonable inference of pretext, we conclude that the district

court properly granted summary judgment against her on her claim of

discriminatory discharge.

IV.

We turn to Rose-Maston’s claim that LMC unlawfully failed to promote

her because of her race. Once again, we apply the burden-shifting

framework of McDonnell Douglas. To establish a prima facie case in a

failure-to-promote case, a plaintiff must show: (1) that she was a member

of a protected group; (2) that she was qualified and applied for a

promotion to an available position; (3) that she was rejected; and (4) that

a similarly qualified employee, not part of a protected group, was promoted

instead. See Shannon v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.3d 678, 682 (8th Cir. 1996);

Lidge-Myrtil v. Deere & Co., 49 F.3d 1308, 1310 (8th Cir. 1995).

We recognize that the threshold of proof necessary to make a prima

facie case is minimal. See Krenik v. County of LeSueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957

(8th Cir. 1995); Johnson v. Arkansas State Police, 10 F.3d 547, 551 (8th

Cir. 1993). Nonetheless, we agree with the district court’s conclusion

that Rose-Maston failed to establish the elements of a prima facie case.

She offers no evidence of the qualifications necessary for the CMD

position, nor does she offer any evidence regarding her own qualifications.

She instead makes conclusory assertions that she was qualified for the

position. This is insufficient to establish a prima facie case for

discriminatory failure to promote.

Further, even assuming that Rose-Maston has established a prima facie

case on her failure-to-promote claim, LMC has met its burden of

articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its failure to

promote Rose-Maston. Specifically, LMC contends that the person ultimately

hired to fill the CMD position was more qualified than Rose-Maston. RoseMaston offers no evidence that would support an inference
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that this reason is pretextual. In fact, she offers no evidence whatsoever

regarding the qualifications of the individual who ultimately obtained the

CMD position, and she stated in her deposition that she was entirely

unaware of that individual’s qualifications. Thus, the district court

properly entered summary judgment in favor of LMC on the failure-to-promote

claim.

The judgment is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.