18-2031 Edwards v. Rochester Inst. of Tech.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT



### SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERM ITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCU MENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SU MMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seco nd Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthou se, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 17 th day of December, two thousand nineteen.

PRESENT: D ENNIS J ACOBS , S USAN L. C ARNEY , M ICHAEL H. P ARK , Circuit Judges

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_________________________________________ S HARON E DWARDS , Plaintiff-Appellant , v. No. 18-2031

R OCHESTER I NSTITUTE OF T ECHNOLOGY , D R

. D ONALD B OYD , Defendants-Appellees

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_____________ _______________ _____________ FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Prat hima Reddy, The Reddy Law Firm LLC, Buffalo, NY. FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Mary E. Shepard (Victoria S. Gleason, on the brief ), The Wolford Law Firm LLP, Rochester, NY.2 Appeal from a judgment of the United Stat es District Court for the Western District of New York (Geraci, C

. J. ).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREO F, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment entere d on March 30, 2018, and the decision and order dated June 18, 2018, are AFFIRMED

. Plaintiff-Appellant Sharon Edwards (“Edwards”) appeals from a summary judgment of the United States District Court for th e Western District of New York (Geraci, C

. J

.), in favor of Defendants-Appellees Rochester Inst itute of Technology (“RIT”) and Dr. Donald Boyd, on Edwards’s employment discrimination and retaliation claims. She also appeals the District Court’s order denying her motion for reconsideration. On appeal, Edwards seeks review insofar as those orders address her retaliatory termination claim. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, th e procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal, to which we refer onl y as necessary to explain our deci sion to affirm the District Court’s judgment and order. The following statement of facts is taken fr om the undisputed porti ons of the parties’ filings. Edwards, an African-American woman, began working in May 2003 as an Operations Coordinator at Venture Creations (“VC”), a bu siness incubator owned and operated by RIT. Throughout her employment at VC, Edwards experienced performa nce difficulties and conflicts with co-workers, as she admits. In 2007, RIT hired William Jones (“Jones”) to help with operations at VC. Jones became Edwards’s supervisor in mid-2010, fi rst serving as Interim Director, and then in 2011, as Executive Director. In 2011, Jones spoke with staff at VC’s Human Resources department on multiple occasions with regar d to Edwards’s performance issues. Human Resources staff counseled Jones on ways to assi st Edwards in improving her performance. On October 6, 2011, Edwards and Jones had an altercati on regarding the installation of a carpet. Edwards averred in her affidavi t that Jones was “physically and verbally aggressive toward her” in that altercation but di d not specify what Jones allegedly did or said.3 J.A. at 131. During its investigation of the incident, RIT suspended both Edwards and Jones with pay. After the investi gation, RIT formally repriman ded Jones for his conduct. Soon after the altercation, Edwards took short-term disability leave in connection with a foot surgery, and in April 2012, af ter Edwards returned from leave, her new supervisor, Dr. Ryne Rafaelle (“ Rafaelle”), provided her with a detailed work plan to address her performance-related issues. The work plan ou tlined specific tasks that Rafaelle expected her to accomplish. These included, among other responsibilities, submitting invoices in a timely fashion, obtaining keys for VC companie s, obtaining updated certificates of insurance, and taking minutes at staff meetings. Over th e following weeks, Edwards failed to comply with the expectations set forth in the work plan. On May 1, 2012, Rafaelle met with Edwards to determine whether she had a ccomplished her work-plan tasks, and during that meeting, Edwards admitted that she had not. RIT immedi ately terminated Edwards, the day of her meeting with Rafaelle, for failing to perf orm the essential functions of her job. Edwards commenced this action against RI T in September 2010, alleging racial discrimination. Three years later, in Septem ber 2013, Edwards filed her second amended complaint. It added racial and gender discrimi nation and retaliation claims pertaining to her termination. On March 30, 20 18, the District Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to all of Edwards’s cl aims, and soon after denied her motion for reconsideration. Edwards now appeals the Distri ct Court’s conclusion with respect to her retaliatory termination claim, arguing that sh e raised genuine issues of material fact.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of su mmary judgment, “examining the evidence in the light most favorable to, and drawing all inferences in favor of, the nonmovant.” Huebner v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc. , 897 F.3d 42, 50 (2d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). We review a District Court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. Empresa Cubana del Taba co v. Culbro Corp., 541 F.3d 476, 478 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). In ruling for Defendants, the District Co urt concluded that Edwards made out a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation. Because it also found that RIT proffered legitimate,4 non-discriminatory reasons for terminating Edwa rds, however, the cour t ruled that evidence presented by Edwards did not show that reta liatory animus was the but-for cause of her termination or that Edwa rds showed pretext. On appeal, Edwards contends that the Dist rict Court incorrectly determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to her “cat’s paw” theory of liability in particular. A “cat’s paw” th eory of liability refers to a situation in which an employee is fired by a supervisor who himself has no discriminatory motive, but who has been manipulated by a subordinate who does have such a motive. See Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Serv., Inc., 835 F.3d 267, 271-73 (2d Ci r. 2016). In both the District Court and now on appeal, Edwards asserts that evidence in the record de monstrates that Jones predetermined that he would terminate Edwards and manipulated RIT to bring about the termination, in retaliation against her for her lawsuit and her in ternal complaints against Jones. For substantially the same reasons as those set forth by the District Court in its thorough opinion, we conclude that Defendants were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Edwards’s arguments to the c ontrary are not persuasive. The only evidence Edwards offers to support her assertion that Jo nes both bore discriminatory animus against her and influenced RIT’s decision to terminate he r is that Jones was one of five individuals whom Rafaelle contacted to determine whethe r Edwards completed certain tasks set out in her April work plan, and that Jones and Edwa rds had an altercation. Edwards adduces no evidence, however, to suggest that Jones influenced RIT’s te rmination decision. The record evidence shows that Jones did not have aut hority over Edwards when she was terminated. Although Rafaelle consulted with Jones before terminating Edwards, Rafaelle also spoke with four other RIT employees, with two tena nts, and with Edward s herself, to learn whether Edwards had performed her assigned duties. The evidence was consistent, and Edwards admitted that she did not complete the assigned tasks. Thus, we see no genuine issue of material fact related to the reason fo r termination or suggesting that Jones covertly effected the termination. We are similarly unpersuaded that the Distri ct Court abused its discretion in denying Edwards’s motion for r econsideration with respect to he r retaliatory termination claim.5 Edwards argues that “for argument’s sake,” this Court should “not accept the district court’s statement that it did in fact review Exhibits 99-100 and 101-105” in considering Edwards’s motion for reconsideration. Appellant’s Br. at 43. Accepting this argument would require this Court to assume that the District Court did not review exhibits notwithstanding its mention of Exhibits 99 throug h 105 in explaining its conclu sion that Edwards failed to identify an intervening change of law or any new relevant evidence. This will not do. We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denyin g Edwards’s motion to reconsider.

* * * We have considered Edwards’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment and order of the District Court are AFFIRMED

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FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court