### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE Se pte m be r 28, 200 4 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. DION A. RU SSEL L

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Sulli van Coun ty

No. S45067 P hylli s H. Miller, Judge No. S48064 R. Jerr y Beck, Judge

No. E2003-02346-CC A-R3- CD - F iled Dece m ber 15, 2004

On thi s c on so lid a te d a

pp e a l, the de fe nd a nt c ha lle ng e s th e ma nn e r andc on se cut iv e natur e of his sentenc es. Afte r ana ly zing the issues prope rly befor e us, we conclude that the trial court did not e rr in revoking the def

endant’ s probation on the former sente nce or in deny ing him probation on the latter. F urther, w e hold the conse cutive sente nces to be war rante d and prop er i n t his instance. Th e re fo re , w e a ff

ir m. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OS EP H M. T I PT ON and D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J J ., joined.

A. Phi lip L omo na c o, Kn oxvil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, Di on A. Rus se ll.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r, a ndB re nt C . Ch e rry , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

F acts

Th is a pp e a l conso lid a te s tw o c a se s: o ne inv olv ing dr ug po sse ssi on c ha

rg e s a ndtr a ff

ic vio la tio ns , a ndthe oth e r, a g g ra vate d p e rj ury . O n Se pte mbe r 2 5, 20 01 , th e de fe nd a nt, Di on Rus se ll, was indicted on one count ea ch of posse ssion o f a Sche dule I I I controlled substanc e (Dihy drocode none) f

or re sale, possession of a Schedule VI

controlled substance ( marijuana ), possession of drug para

pherna li a, fa i l u re to give a prope r sig nal, and violation of the lig ht law. F o ll o w in g a ju r y tria l b e f o r e Ju d g e Ph y ll is H

. M il le r , th e d e f e n d a n t w a s f

o u n d g u il ty o f the lesse r included off

ense of possession of a c ontr o l l ed substance, a Class A misdemeanor; possession of marijuana , a Class A misdemeanor ; possession of drug para pherna lia, a Class A misdemeanor ; and violation of

the light law , a Class C misdemeanor. He was sente nced to two c onsecutive se ntence sB ecause Jud ge M i l l er was a po t ent i al wi t ness i n t he p erjur y pro ceed i ngs, t he m at t er was t rans ferred t o and 1
heard be fo re Judge R

. Jerry B eck.
-2- of ele ven months, twenty -nine da y s on the drug possession char g es, with the re maining se ntence s running concur

rentl y

. T h e judg ments were filed on De cembe r 6, 2002. On January 3, 2003, the defe ndant’s trial counsel filed a Motion for N ew Trial based primarily on what counse l alleg ed wa s his own ineffe ctive assistanc e at tria l. Shortly t h er eafter, the de fenda nt retaine d new c ounsel who filed a Motion to Reconsider Sentenceand/or Ame nd[ed] Motion for New Trial on F ebrua ry 28, 2003.
On April 11, 2003, Judge Miller g rante d the def en d an t ’s motion and rec onsidered the previously

issued sentenc e. F ollowing a hearing, the court plac ed the de fenda nt on supervised probation and a llowed him to serve his conse cutive sente nces in the B rown Annex , an alternative sentenc ing pr og ram. Additi onally , the minutes of the court refle ct that the def endant or ally

withdrew his Motion for New Trial at that time. On April 22, 2003, ame nded judg ments were filed, re flec ting the g rant of pr obation and alternative sente ncing

. Approxim ately two months later, the State filed
a Motion to Revoke Probation or to Reconsider Sentence , claiming that the def endant ha d perjure d himself at the re sentenc ing he aring by answe ring neg atively when a sked if he ha d used marijuana in the prec eding months. In support of the motion, the State submitt ed the positive r esults of a drug
scre en administere d on the day of the he aring

. On September

12, 2003, the defe ndant pled g uilty , befor e J udg e R. Jerry Be ck, to ag g ravated perjury , a Class D felony , stemming from the testimony g iven at the re sentenc ing he aring

. At that 1 time, the court issued a sentenc e of two y ear s incarc eration, consecutive to the pr evious sentenc es issued by J ud ge M i l l er . On the same day , the def ense f iled a Notice of Appe al cha lleng ing the perjury sentenc e, which was amende d on October 13, 2003. The judgme nt w as ente red a nd filed on September 24, 2003.
On September

26, 2003, J udg e Miller re voked th e defenda nt’s probation on the initial
c h ar g e s a n d r e i n s t a t e d t h e o r i g i n a l e f f e c t i v e s e n t e n c e o f

t w e n t y- t h r e e m o n t h s , t w e n t y- e i g h td a ys confine ment, at seve nty -five pe rce nt relea se elig ibilit y ; contempo ra neously , the def ense f iled a Notice of Appea l. The re vocation orde r issued by J udg e Miller wa s filed on Octobe r 20, 2003.
On appe al, the def

en d an t arg ues that the sente nces f or all cha rg es should be ser ved on probation or, in the a lternative, that the sentenc es should be conc urre nt rather than conse cutive.

Ana lys is

I nitiall y , w e n o te th a t th e c o u r t’ s f in d in g s a t th e in it ia l s e n te n c in g h e ar in g , c o n d u c te d on De c e mbe r 6 , 2 00 2, are not pr op e rl y be fo re us be c a us e no tim e ly no tic e of

app e a l w a s f

ile d to prese rve this issue for our revie w. Gene rally , an appe al as of right is commenc ed by the fil ing of a no ti c e o f ap p e a l w i t h i n t h i r t y d a y s o f t h e e n tr y o f t h e j u d g m e n t b e i n g ap p e a l e d

. T e n n

. R

. A p p . P. 4(a) . Howeve r, if a motion for ne w trial is pending , the time for a ppeal is tolled until the disposi tion of the mot ion . T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 4 (c ). Al tho ug h th e de fe nd a nt i n th e pr e se nt c a se fi le d a tim e ly-3-

Motion for New Trial, t he re cord r efle cts that this moti on was ora lly withdrawn at the defe ndant’s
rese ntencing hearing, thus commencing the time for f iling the notice of appe al. The r ecor d further ref lects that the de fenda nt did not file a notice of appea l within the requisite time period there afte r; t h u s , w e w i l l n o te n t e r t a i n a c h a l l e n g e o f t h e o r i g i n a l s e n t e n c e o f t w e n t y- t h r e e m o n t h s a n d t w e n t yeig ht day s issued by

J udg e Miller in Dec ember 2002.

Th a t be ing state d, we do fi nd that the de fe nd a nt did , in fa c t, fi le tim e ly no tic e s o f a

pp e a l w ith reg ards to the r evocation of his probation on the drug possession char g es and as to the manner and
consec utive nature of hi s sentence for a g g ravated per jury . As such, these issues are proper ly befor e us , a ndou r ana ly sis wi ll b e c on fi ne d to the m. Drug Possession C harg es
A trial court may

revoke probation and order the imposit ion of the orig inal sentenc e upon a finding by

a pre ponderance of

the evidenc e that the pe rson has violated a condition of probation. Te nn . Co de An n. §§ 40 -3 5- 31 0, -31 1 (20 04). Mo re ov e r, the de c isi on to r e vo ke pr ob a tio n r e sts wi thi n th e so un d d isc re tio n of the tr ia l c ou rt

. Sta te v. Mit c he ll, 81 0 S. W.2 d 7 33 , 7 35 (T e nn . Crim. App. 1991). Thus, revoc ation of probation and a community corr ections sentenc e is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of revie w ra ther than a de novo standard. State v. H arkins, 811 S.W.2d 79 , 8 2 ( Te nn . 1 99 1) . D isc re tio n is abu se d o nl y if th e re c or d c on ta ins no su bs ta nti a l e vid e nc e to support the conc lusion of the trial court that a violation of probation or c ommunitycorr ection sentenc e has oc curr ed. I d.; State v. Greg ory , 946 S.W .2d 829, 832 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). Proof of a violation need not be established bey ond a rea sonable doubt, and the evidenc e need only show t h a tt h e tr i a l j u d g e e x e r c i s e d a c o n s c i e n t i o u s a n d i n t e l l i g e n tj u d g m e n t , r a t h e r t h a n a c t e d ar

b i tr ar i l y. Gre g ory , 946 S.W .2d at 832; State v. L eac h, 914 S.W .2d 104, 106 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)

.
I n the prese nt c ase, the trial court g rante d the def endant’ s Motion to R econside r Sentenc e by placing him on supervised probation and allowing him to serve his consec utive sentenc es in an
a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ing pr og ram. Ho we ve r, thi s att e mpt a t re ha bil itatio n fa ile d, in e sse nc e , b e fo re it beg an whe n th e def

endant c ommitt ed per

jury at the re sentenc ing he aring by testify ing that he had not rec ently

used marijuana

when, in fa ct, h e tested positive for dr ug s that very

day . At the
re vo c a tio n h e ari ng , th e c ou rt ini tia lly no te d that the de fe nd a nt’ s re c or d wa s “ a mil e lon g ,” a ndthat, althoug h he had the ability to do so, the defe ndant had f ailed to c o m p l et e his GED while on probation. The c ourt furthe r noted that t h e t ru t h is “the most basic thing ” and that the defe ndant d i s r e g ar d e d t h i s f

u n d a m e n t a l p r e m i s e o f

o u r c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e s ys t e mw h e n h e c o m m i t t e d p e r j u r y. I n sum, the court found that the defe ndant’s extensive r ecor d, as well as his lack of c andor, justified the re vocation of his probation.

We hold that the trial court’s decision to r evoke probation was a mply supported in the re cord. Be cause the court did not a buse its discr etion in revoking the def endant’ s probation and r einstating the se nte nc e s o n th e dr

ug po sse ssi on c ha

rg e s, we a ff

ir m.-4- Ag g ravated Perjury
Next, we addre ss the manner of sentenc e in the per

jury case . An espe cia l l y m i t igated or standard of

fende r convic ted of a

Class C, D, or E felony

is presumed to be a

favor able c andidate f

or alternative sentenc ing in the a bsence of evide nce to the c ontrary . Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102( 6) (2004). A trial court must presume that a defenda nt sentenc ed to eig ht y ear s or less, and f or whom incar cer ation is not a priority , is subject to alternative sentenc ing. State v. B yrd, 861 S.W.2d 377, 379-80 (Te n n

. C ri m

. Ap p. 1993). It is further pr esumed that a sentenc e other

than incar cer ation would result in succe ssful reha bilitation unl ess re butted by sufficie nt evidence in the rec ord. I d. at 380. Howeve r, although a defe ndant m ay be presumed t o be a favor able candidate f or alternative sentenc ing, the defe ndant has the burden of establishing suitabili ty for total probation. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303( b) (2004); State v. Bog g s, 932 S.W .2d 467, 477 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) . Even tho ug h p ro batio n mu st b e a uto ma tic a lly c on sid e re d, “ the de fe nd a nt is not au tom a tic a lly e nti tle d to probation as a

matter of l aw

. ” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303( b), Sentenc ing Commission Comments; S tate v. Ha

rtley , 818 S.W .2d 370, 373 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) . A def endant se eking full probation bea

rs the burde n on appea l of showing that the sente nce imposed is improper and that full probation will be in the best interest of the def endant a nd the public. State v. B aker , 966 S.W .2d 429, 434 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)

.
I n determining whe ther to g rant or de ny probation, a trial court should consider the circ umstances of

the offe nse, the de fenda nt’s criminal re cord, the defe ndant’s socia l history and pr e se nt c on dit ion , th e ne e d for de te rr e nc e , an d the be st inte re st of the de fe nd a nt an d the pu bli c . St a te v. Gre ar, 568 S.W.2d 285, 286 (Tenn. 1978); State v. Boy d, 925 S.W .2d 237, 244 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). The de fenda nt’s lack of cre dibilit y

is also an appr opriate c onsideration and r efle ct s on a defe ndant’s p o te n ti a l f

o r r e h ab il it a ti o n

. St a te v

. N u n le y , 2 2 S. W. 3 d 2 8 2 , 2 8 9 ( T e n n

. Crim

. A p p. 1999). I n summary , sentenc ing must be de termined on a case -by -ca se basis, tailoring eac h sentenc e to that pa rt ic ula r d e fe nd a nt b a se d u po n th e fa c ts o f that ca se a ndthe c ir c ums ta nc e s o f that de fe nd a nt. State v. Moss, 727 S.W .2d 229, 235 (Tenn. 1986)

. Ou r r e vie w o f the de fe nd a nt’ s se nte nc e is de novo on the re cord w ith a presumption that the trial court’ s determinations ar e cor rec t. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401(d) (2004). W h en t he trial
c ou rt fo llo ws the statut ory

se nte nc ing pr oc e du re a ndg ive s d ue c on sid e ratio n a ndpr op e r we ig ht t o the fa ctors and principles rele vant to se ntencing , this Court may not disturb the sentenc e. State v. Fletc her, 805 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).

I n the instant matter, the tria l court consider ed the ap plicable se ntencing principles and initiallynoted that it was “[r]equired to put the g ood fac tors on a sca le and we igh the m a g ainst any bad fa ctors.” In first addre ssing the f actor s favoring the defe ndant, the c o u rt found that he w as employ ed, paid c hild support, was working toward a GED, a nd had done “ okay ” on proba t i on. Ho we ve r, in a sse ssi ng the fa c tor s we ig hin g a g a ins t pr ob a tio n, the c ou rt a g a in g a ve g re a t w e ig ht t o the def endant’ s ext ensive c riminal rec ord, which inc luded “[a] serious rec ord as a juvenile,” a nd no less than four t ee n prior occ asions in which the def endant r ece ived a suspende d sentenc e or probation. F urther, the court found that the prior viol ent felony of ag g ravated assault and the prese nt-5-

fe lon y c ha rg e of a gg rava ted perj uryadd it io nal lywei ghed agai ns t gran ti ng pro bat io n to the de fe nd ant. I n s um, the tr ia l c ou rt

fo un d th a t “ [t]he un fa vo ra ble fa c tor s h e a vil y ou twe ig h[e d] a ny fa vo ra ble fac tors” and thus de nied the def endant pr obation.

We conclude that the defe ndant’s prior r ecor d, along with his a dmitted lack of c andor be fore the court, more than justify the trial court’s denial of pr obation. There fore , we a re pe rsuade d that the trial court properly

order ed co n fi nement on the a g g ravated per jury char g e, and w e will not disturb its decision.

Alternatively , the def

endant a rg ues that the sen t ence s should be concur rent rather than
consec utive. Howeve r, the re cord shows tha t the defe ndant s igne d a R equest for Acc eptanc e of Pl ea of Guilty and Waiver of Rights which stated that the perjury sentenc e would be c onsecutive to the sentenc es pre viouslyissued. The de fenda nt cannot now c omplain about a sentenc e to w hich he ha d ag ree d as part of his plea bar g ain ag ree ment with the State. Moreove r, it appea rs that the def

endant
was o n bail at the time he c ommitt ed ag g ravated per jury . There fore , Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal Procedur e 32(c )(3) (C) applies, mandating a consec utive sentenc e “for a fe lony wher e the de fenda nt
was re lease d on bail and the defe ndant is c onvicted of both off enses.” Thus, we c onclude that the trial court pr operly

issued a conse cutive sente nce.
Conclusion

Ba sed on the for eg oing and the re cord a s a whole, the sentenc es i mposed by the t rial court
are aff irmed.

___________________________________ J OHN EV ERETT WI LL I AMS, J UDGE