UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

FORT WAYNE DIVISION 

RYAN A. DOTSON, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Case No. 1:15-cv-41 

 ) 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, ) 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,1

 ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

OPINION AND ORDER

 This matter is before the court on the petition for judicial review of the decision of the 

Commissioner filed by the plaintiff, Ryan A. Dotson, on February 5, 2015.2

 For the following 

reasons, the decision of the Commissioner is REMANDED. 

Background 

 The plaintiff, Ryan A. Dotson, filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits and 

Supplemental Security Income on July 5, 2012, alleging a disability onset date of June 30, 2012. 

(Tr. 17). The Disability Determination Bureau denied Dotson’s application on September 13, 

2012, and again upon reconsideration on November 19, 2012. (Tr. 17). Dotson subsequently 

filed a timely request for a hearing on November 30, 2012. (Tr. 17). A hearing was held on 

August 6, 2013, before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Maryann S. Bright, and the ALJ issued 

 1

 Nancy A. Berryhill is now the Acting Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Nancy A. Berryhill should be substituted for Acting Commissioner Carolyn W. 

Colvin as the defendant in this suit. No further action needs to be taken to continue this suit by reason of the last 

sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

2

 On January 8, 2016, this case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Susan L. Collins upon the parties’ 

consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and then was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Andrew P. Rodovich. On August 5, 

2016, the court ordered the parties to file any objection to Magistrate Judge Rodovich conducting all further 

proceedings in this case. Because neither party filed an objection, this court finds that the parties voluntarily consent 

to Magistrate Judge Rodovich under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 
2 

an unfavorable decision on September 13, 2013. (Tr. 17–29). Vocational Expert (VE) Dale A. 

Thomas, Dotson, and Dotson’s ex-wife, Melissa Dotson, testified at the hearing. (Tr. 17, 23). 

The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the 

Commissioner. (Tr. 1–13). 

 The ALJ found that Dotson met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act 

through December 30, 2016. (Tr. 19). At step one of the five step sequential analysis for 

determining whether an individual is disabled, the ALJ found that Dotson had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since June 30, 2012, the alleged onset date. (Tr. 19). At step two, the 

ALJ determined that Dotson had the following severe impairments: bipolar II disorder, panic 

disorder without agoraphobia with mild panic attacks, posttraumatic stress syndrome (PTSD), 

and obesity. (Tr. 20). At step three, the ALJ concluded that Dotson did not have an impairment 

or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed 

impairments. (Tr. 20). Specifically, she found that he did not meet Listings 12.04 or 12.06. (Tr. 

20). 

 In finding that Dotson did not meet the above listings, the ALJ considered the paragraph 

B criteria for mental impairments, which required at least two of the following: 

marked restriction of activities of daily living; marked difficulties in 

maintaining social functioning; marked difficulties in maintaining 

concentration, persistence, or pace; or repeated episodes of decompensation, 

each of extended duration. 

(Tr. 21-22). The ALJ defined a marked limitation as more than moderate but less than extreme 

and repeated and extended episodes of decompensation as three episodes within one year or once 

every four months with each episode lasting at least two weeks. (Tr. 21). The ALJ found that 

Dotson had moderate restrictions in daily living activities. (Tr. 21). She noted that Dotson was 

independent in his personal care but neglected his hygiene at times. (Tr. 21). Dotson testified 
3 

that he received reminders from his mother-in-law to shower and that he relied on his ex-wife to 

clean and grocery shop. (Tr. 21). However, the ALJ reported that Dotson was the primary 

caretaker of his infant son. (Tr. 21). 

 The ALJ found that Dotson had moderate difficulties in social functioning. (Tr. 21). 

When asked if he had ever been fired for problems getting along with others, Dotson testified at 

the hearing that he was fired for having a sexual relationship with a coworker. (Tr. 21). 

Dotson’s ex-wife testified that Dotson could not maintain a job for more than six months because 

he did not get along well with others. (Tr. 21). However, the ALJ noted that Dotson left home 

alone, worked part-time after the alleged onset date caring for adults with mental disabilities, and 

interacted without issue with clients. (Tr. 21). 

 The ALJ concluded that Dotson had moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, 

or pace. (Tr. 21). Dotson testified to memory problems, but the ALJ indicated his memory 

issues were moderate because he could handle a checkbook and he remembered pertinent 

information about his past employment. (Tr. 21). Moreover, the ALJ found that Dotson had not 

experienced any extended episodes of decompensation. (Tr. 21). 

 The ALJ concluded that Dotson did not satisfy the paragraph B criteria because his 

mental impairments did not cause at least two marked limitations or one marked limitation and 

repeated episodes of decompensation. (Tr. 22). Additionally, she concluded that Dotson did not 

satisfy the paragraph C criteria because the record was devoid of evidence of episodes of 

decompensation, potential episodes of decompensation, or an inability to function outside a 

highly supportive living arrangement or his home. (Tr. 22). 

 The ALJ then assessed Dotson’s residual functional capacity (RFC) as follows: 

the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform 

medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c) 
4 

except he is unable to engage in complex or detailed tasks, but can 

perform simple, routine, and repetitive tasks consistent with 

unskilled work; and is able to sustain and attend to task throughout 

the workday. He is limited to work in a low stress job, defined as 

having only occasional decision making required and only 

occasional changes in the work setting. The claimant is further 

limited from fast-paced work such as assembly line production 

work with strict productivity requirements. He is limited to 

superficial interaction with coworkers, supervisors and the public, 

with superficial interaction defined as occasional and casual 

contact not involving prolonged conversation or discussion of 

involved issues. Contact with supervisors still involves necessary 

instruction. 

(Tr. 22). The ALJ explained that in considering Dotson’s symptoms she followed a two-step 

process. (Tr. 22). First, she determined whether there was an underlying medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment that was shown by a medically acceptable clinical or laboratory 

diagnostic technique that reasonably could be expected to produce Dotson’s pain or other 

symptoms. (Tr. 22). Then she evaluated the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the 

symptoms to determine the extent to which they limited Dotson’s functioning. (Tr. 22–23). 

 Dotson application for disability benefits alleged that his bipolar disorder, borderline 

personality disorder, PTSD, and obsessive-compulsive disorder rendered him disabled. (Tr. 23). 

He reported on his Function Report that his anxiety caused memory and concentration problems, 

difficulty completing tasks, and getting along with others. (Tr. 23). Specifically, he indicated 

due to his anxiety at work he would cry in the parking lot and hide to call his wife. (Tr. 23). He 

reported that his medications caused several side effects. (Tr. 23). Dotson testified that he was 

the primary caretaker for his sixteen-month-old son with the help of his mother-in-law but that 

she worked during the day. (Tr. 23). Also, he reported that he attempted suicide after an 

altercation with his ex-wife but that he did not seek emergency treatment. (Tr. 23). He stated 

that he relied on his ex-wife to care for the home, mow the lawn, and grocery shop. (Tr. 23). 
5 

 Dotson’s ex-wife testified that they divorced because she could not afford the copays for 

Dotson’s therapy, but that they continued to live as husband and wife. (Tr. 23). She stated that 

Dotson would continuously call her from work because of his anxiety and occasionally his 

anxiety caused him to miss work because he would not get out of bed. (Tr. 23). She indicated 

that he was head-butted at work on August 14, 2011, and that his PTSD worsened after the 

incident, which led to his termination. (Tr. 23). Additionally, she testified that Dotson cared for 

their son, but that he required her assistance. (Tr. 23). 

 The ALJ found that Dotson’s impairments could cause some of his alleged symptoms, 

but that he was not entirely credible regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of 

the symptoms. (Tr. 23). Specifically, she gave Dotson’s testimony limited weight because there 

were many inconsistencies between it and the record. (Tr. 23–24). For example, she found that 

his work history, daily living activities, and the medical evidence was inconsistent with his claim 

of disabling anxiety. (Tr. 23–24). The ALJ noted that Dotson worked part-time, including 

skilled work after his alleged onset date, therefore, she found that his anxiety did not 

significantly interfere with his ability to work. (Tr. 23-24). Also, despite receiving assistance 

from his ex-wife and mother-in-law, the ALJ noted that Dotson was the primary caretaker for his 

infant son. (Tr. 24). 

 The ALJ indicated that Dotson did not report any medication side effects at several 

medication management visits despite claiming that all his medications caused side effects. (Tr. 

24). Additionally, Dotson reported problems with hygiene, yet he appeared well-groomed and 

reported taking four showers a day. (Tr. 24). The ALJ assigned little weight to Dotson’s exwife’s testimony because it lacked support from the medical records and she had a financial 

interest in Dotson receiving benefits. (Tr. 24). 
6 

 The ALJ then reviewed the medical evidence. (Tr. 24–26). She found that the record did 

not demonstrate a long history of mental health treatment. (Tr. 24). She indicated that Dotson 

first sought counseling in 2010 when his family experienced a traumatic event and that he began 

taking depression medication in early 2011. (Tr. 24). On July 15, 2011, Dr. Heidi Ehrhardt 

diagnosed Dotson with depression and bipolar disorder. (Tr. 24). In August of 2011, Dotson 

began treatment with Dr. Jay Fawver. (Tr. 24). Dr. Fawver prescribed several medications and 

Dotson was treated on a monthly basis at the Fawver Wellness Clinic through July 2012. (Tr. 

24). Dotson testified that he stopped treatment with Dr. Fawver because he did not recommend 

disability. (Tr. 24). 

 In August of 2012, Dotson began treatment with Dr. Samir Ishak who assessed him with 

anxiety disorder and prescribed several medications. (Tr. 25). At Dotson’s follow up 

appointment, he reported that he stopped using Abilify because it made him feel manic. (Tr. 25). 

In October 2012, Dotson saw Dr. Ehrhardt again and complained of psychological and memory 

problems. (Tr. 25). She recommended a neuropsychological evaluation and noted that Dotson 

had lost consciousness after a patient pushed him down at work. (Tr. 25). 

 After Dr. Ehrhardt’s recommendation, Dotson saw neuropsychologist Christina 

Stemmler, Psy.D. for complaints of disorientation, short-term memory loss, confusion, and 

disorganization. (Tr. 25). Dotson denied having attention problems despite his history of 

ADHD. (Tr. 25). He reported that his daily activities consisted of caring for his seven-monthold son and his horse. (Tr. 25). Dr. Stemmler found some memory and attention problems 

during her mental status examination and diagnosed Dotson with cognitive disorder, bipolar II 

disorder, ADHD, anxiety disorder, and a learning disorder. (Tr. 25). She concluded that Dotson 

could be experiencing residual deficits from a traumatic brain injury and recommended further 
7 

testing, more medication management, and psychiatric monitoring from Dr. Ishak. (Tr. 25). Dr. 

Ishak treated Dotson and noted that he was not experiencing any side effects from his 

medications. (Tr. 25). Dr. Ishak continued Dotson on his medications. (Tr. 25). Susan TielkerSharpe provided coping techniques during a counseling session after Dotson discussed his anger 

issues, insecurities, belief that he was disabled, grief over his grandfather’s passing, and 

dependency problems. (Tr. 25). 

 Dr. Stemmler performed a neuropsychological examination and recommended Dotson 

receive ongoing monitoring from his treating physicians and mental health providers. (Tr. 25). 

She supported Social Security disability temporarily, but she indicated that Dotson’s head injury 

did not prevent him from returning to gainful employment. (Tr. 25). Dotson reported isolation, 

neglecting his personal hygiene, worsening depression and anxiety, and failing to take his 

diagnosed Lithium for two weeks. (Tr. 25). Dr. Ishak requested Dotson be hospitalized due to 

his worsening depression symptoms and changes in behavior. (Tr. 25). Dr. Ishak assessed him 

with bipolar affective disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and panic attacks without 

agoraphobia. (Tr. 25-26). Dotson was hospitalized twice and discharged both times at his own 

request. (Tr. 26). 

 Dotson underwent an independent psychological evaluation with Revathi Bingi, Ed.D. 

who assessed him with bipolar disorder, most recent episode depressed, panic disorder with 

agoraphobia, PTSD, and OCD. (Tr. 26). Dotson reported symptoms of panic attacks, feelings of 

worthlessness, mind racing, excessive anger, poor focus, mood swings, and suicidal ideation. 

(Tr. 26). However, the ALJ noted that he correctly interpreted proverbs, identified similarities 

and differences between objects, recalled digits, and calculated simple math problems. (Tr. 26). 
8 

 Dr. Ishak opinioned that Dotson was unable to hold employment, however, Dotson was 

working at the time. (Tr. 26). Therefore, the ALJ assigned little weight to his opinion because 

he had treated Dotson for only three months and his opinion was inconsistent with Dotson’s 

current work activity. (Tr. 26). The ALJ assigned little weight to Dr. Fawver’s opinion that 

Dotson should remain off work because his mood was unpredictable and unstable. (Tr. 26). The 

ALJ concluded that Dr. Fawver had seen Dotson for only two months and that his limitations 

were not long-term. (Tr. 26). 

 Dr. Bingi found that Dotson did not have significant problems with cognition, but that he 

appeared to be dependent on his wife and assessed him with a Global Assessment of Functioning 

(GAF) score of 45. (Tr. 26). The ALJ assigned some weight to Dr. Bingi because he conducted 

a detailed psychological evaluation, but she discredited his opinion because he had met with 

Dotson only once and a GAF score was not dispositive or proof of an ongoing disability for 

Social Security purposes. (Tr. 26-27). The ALJ assigned great weight to the opinions of the 

State agency psychological consultants who concluded that Dotson retained the ability to carry 

out unskilled or semi-skilled tasks on a sustained basis in a competitive setting not requiring pace 

or intense concentration. (Tr. 27). 

 There are several other GAF scores in the record and each score was given some weight. 

(Tr. 27). The ALJ determined that the GAF scores showed that except for a brief period in July 

of 2013 Dotson’s treatment providers reported that his social, occupational, and school 

functioning were moderately impaired. (Tr. 27). The ALJ found the findings to be consistent 

with Dotson’s daily activities, work history, and the opinions of the State agency psychological 

consultants. (Tr. 27). 
9 

 At step four, the ALJ found that Dotson was unable to perform any past relevant work. 

(Tr. 27). Considering Dotson’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ concluded 

that there were jobs in the national economy he could perform, including electronics assembler 

(8,000 jobs locally and 114,000 jobs nationally), laundry worker (4,800 jobs locally and 298,000 

jobs nationally), and packer and hand packager (1,600 jobs locally and 56,000 jobs nationally). 

(Tr. 28). 

Discussion 

 The standard for judicial review of an ALJ’s finding that a claimant is not disabled within 

the meaning of the Social Security Act is limited to a determination of whether those findings are 

supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of 

Social Security, as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.”); 

Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1120–21 (7th Cir. 2014); Bates v. Colvin, 736 F.3d 1093, 1097 

(7th Cir. 2013) (“We will uphold the Commissioner’s final decision if the ALJ applied the 

correct legal standards and supported her decision with substantial evidence.”). Courts have 

defined substantial evidence as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to 

support such a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 

L. Ed. 2d 852 (1972) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 

217, 83 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1938)); see Bates, 736 F.3d at 1098. A court must affirm an ALJ’s 

decision if the ALJ supported her findings with substantial evidence and if there have been no 

errors of law. Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). However, 

“the decision cannot stand if it lacks evidentiary support or an adequate discussion of the issues.” 

Lopez ex rel Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003). 
10 

 Disability and supplemental insurance benefits are available only to those individuals 

who can establish “disability” under the terms of the Social Security Act. The claimant must 

show that he is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which 

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 

U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security regulations enumerate the five-step sequential 

evaluation to be followed when determining whether a claimant has met the burden of 

establishing disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The ALJ first considers whether the 

claimant is presently employed or “engaged in substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If he is, the claimant is not disabled and the evaluation process is over. 

If he is not, the ALJ next addresses whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination 

of impairments that “significantly limits . . . physical or mental ability to do basic work 

activities.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c); see Williams v. Colvin, 757 F.3d 610, 613 

(7th Cir. 2014) (discussing that the ALJ must consider the combined effects of the claimant’s 

impairments). Third, the ALJ determines whether that severe impairment meets any of the 

impairments listed in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 401, pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1. If it does, then 

the impairment is acknowledged by the Commissioner to be conclusively disabling. However, if 

the impairment does not so limit the claimant’s remaining capabilities, the ALJ reviews the 

claimant’s “residual functional capacity” and the physical and mental demands of his past work. 

If, at this fourth step, the claimant can perform his past relevant work, he will be found not 

disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). However, if the claimant shows that his 

impairment is so severe that he is unable to engage in his past relevant work, then the burden of 

proof shifts to the Commissioner to establish that the claimant, in light of his age, education, job 
11 

experience, and functional capacity to work, is capable of performing other work and that such 

work exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 

416.920(f). 

 First, Dotson has argued that the ALJ failed to consider all of his medically determinable 

severe impairments. At step two, the claimant has the burden to establish that he has a severe 

impairment. Castile v. Astrue, 617 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 2010). A severe impairment is an 

“impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [one’s] physical or mental 

ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 404.1521(a); Castile, 617 F.3d at 

926. Basic work activities include “the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs,” such 

as “walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling.” 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1521(b); Stopka v. Astrue, 2012 WL 266341, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2012). 

“[A]n impairment that is ‘not severe’ must be a slight abnormality (or a combination of slight 

abnormalities) that has no more than a minimal effect on the ability to do basic work activities.” 

Social Security Ruling 96-3p, 1996 WL 374181, at *1. Courts have characterized step two as a 

de minimis screening device that disposes of groundless claims. Johnson v. Sullivan, 922 F.2d 

346, 347 (7th Cir. 1990); Elkins v. Astrue, 2009 WL 1124963, at *8 (S.D. Ind. April 24, 2009) 

(citing Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 688 (9th Cir. 2005)); see Stopka, 2012 WL 266341 at 

*1 (listing cases supporting same). 

 The ALJ found that Dotson suffered from the severe impairments of bipolar II disorder, 

panic disorder without agoraphobia with mild panic attacks, posttraumatic stress syndrome 

(PTSD), and obesity. Dotson has argued that the ALJ failed to mention or discuss his medically 

determinable impairments of obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), borderline personality 

disorder, and cognitive disorder. The ALJ acknowledged that Dotson’s application for disability 
12 

benefits alleged that his bipolar disorder, borderline personality disorder, PTSD, and obsessive 

compulsive disorder rendered him disabled. (Tr. 23). The ALJ briefly discussed Dotson’s 

cognitive disorder. The ALJ noted Dr. Stemmler’s mental status examination findings and that 

she assessed Dotson with cognitive disorder, bipolar II disorder, ADHD, anxiety disorder, and a 

learning disorder. (Tr. 25). Also, the ALJ noted Dotson’s obsessive compulsive disorder after 

review of Dr. Bingi’s psychological evaluation that assessed Dotson with bipolar disorder, most 

recent episode depressed, panic disorder without agoraphobia, PTSD, and OCD. (Tr. 26). 

 A finding at step two that a medical condition is severe “is merely a threshold 

requirement.” Hickman v. Apfel, 187 F.3d 683, 688 (7th Cir.1999). The ALJ’s classification of 

an impairment as severe or non-severe is irrelevant past step two. All that is required of the ALJ 

is to consider the impact of all the impairments, severe and non-severe, on Dotson’s ability to 

work. See Raines v. Astrue, 2007 WL 1455890, at *7 (S.D. Ind. 2007). However, the ALJ 

cannot ignore a line of evidence that suggests a disability. See Golembiewski v. Barnhart, 322 

F.3d 912, 917 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he ALJ may not ignore an entire line of evidence that is 

contrary to the ruling . . . .”). Here, the ALJ found severe impairments at step two. The ALJ 

proceeded beyond step two, therefore, no error resulted from a failure to label an impairment as 

severe. See Raines v. Astrue, 2007 WL 1455890, at *7 (S.D. Ind. 2007). It is the claimant’s 

burden to establish his ailments and their symptomology. Castile v. Astrue, 617 F.3d 923, 926 

(7th Cir. 2010). 

 Dotson did not identify how the ALJ failed to consider his symptoms in combination or 

how any errors at step two caused an error later in the process. Moreover, he did not meet his 

burden to prove that the impairments were severe. Castile, 617 F.3d at 926. The ALJ found 
13 

severe impairments, proceeded through the evaluation process, and considered the aggregate 

effect of his impairments. 

 Next, Dotson has argued that the ALJ failed to engage in a legally sufficient step three 

analysis. Dotson indicated that it was appropriate for the ALJ to consider Listing 12.04 and 

12.06. However, he contends that the ALJ’s omission of Listing 12.02 for cognitive disorders, 

Listing 12.04 for affective disorders, and 12.06 for OCD was legal error. Dotson further 

contends that the ALJ’s omission of paragraph C criteria of Listing 12.02 and 12.04 was harmful 

and reversible error. 

 For a claimant to show that he met a listed impairment, he must have demonstrated that 

his impairment met each required criterion and bore the burden of proof in showing his condition 

qualified. Maggard v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 376, 380 (7th Cir. 1999). A condition that met only some 

of the required medical criteria, “no matter how severely,” cannot qualify as meeting a listing. 

Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530, 110 S.Ct. 885, 107 L.Ed.2d 967 (1990). 

 Section 12.00(A) of the social security regulations describes the structure of the Mental 

Disorder Listings. To show that he met the Mental Disorder Listing, the claimant must have 

submitted a set of medical findings that supported a diagnosis of one of the listed medical 

impairments. After the claimant has met this burden, the court must assess the severity of the 

impairment under paragraph B. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(a). Paragraph B sets forth the 

impairment-related functional limitations that are incompatible with the ability to do any gainful 

activity. The claimant’s functional limitations are assessed by using the four criteria set forth in 

paragraph B of the listings: Activities of daily living; social functioning; concentration, 

persistence, or pace; and episodes of decompensation. Listing 12.00(C); 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520a(c)(3). Each functional limitation must be evaluated to determine the severity, taking 
14 

into consideration “all relevant and available clinical signs and laboratory findings, the effects of 

[the] symptoms, and how [the claimant’s] functioning may be affected by factors including, but 

not limited to, chronic mental disorders, structured settings, medication, and other treatment.” 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(1). If the degree of limitation is none or mild in the first three categories 

and none in the fourth, the impairment is not severe. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d)(1). Otherwise, 

the court will proceed to determine whether the claimant met the criteria set forth by the Listing 

for the specific mental impairment for which he was diagnosed. 

 The ALJ did not discuss whether Dotson met the paragraph A criteria, so it is proper for 

the court to assume that he did meet the criteria. The ALJ found that Dotson had moderate 

restrictions in daily living activities, social functioning, and with concentration, persistence, or 

pace. (Tr. 21). Moreover, the ALJ found that Dotson had not experienced any extended 

episodes of decompensation. (Tr. 21). Because the ALJ did not find two marked limitations or 

one marked limitation and repeated episodes of decompensation, she concluded that Dotson did 

not satisfy the paragraph B criteria. (Tr. 22). 

 Dotson has indicated that paragraph C for Listing 12.06 was not satisfied. Specifically, 

with respect to Listings 12.02 and 12.04, “[t]he required level of severity for these disorders is 

met when the requirements in both A and B are satisfied, or when the requirements in A and C 

are satisfied.” 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App., §§ 12.02, 12.04. Dotson has argued that he 

satisfied the paragraph C criteria of Listing 12.02 for cognitive disorders and Listing 12.04 for 

affective disorders. To meet the C criteria the claimant must show:

Medically documented history of a [chronic organic mental disorder, for Listing 

12.02 and chronic affective disorder, for Listing 12.04] of at least two years 

duration that has caused more than a minimal limitation of ability to do basic 

work activities, with symptoms or signs currently attenuated by medical or 

psychosocial support and one of the following: 
15 

1. Repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration; or 

2. A residual disease process that has resulted in such marginal adjustment 

that even a minimal increase in mental demands or change in the 

environment would be predicted to cause the individual to decompensate; 

or 

3. A current history of one or more years’ inability to function outside a 

highly supportive living arrangement, with an indication of continued need 

for such an arrangement. 

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1, § 12.00. 

The ALJ concluded that Dotson did not satisfy the paragraph C criteria because the record was 

devoid of evidence of episodes of decompensation, potential episodes of decompensation, or an 

inability to function outside a highly supportive living arrangement or his home. (Tr. 22). 

 Dotson has argued that the potential for decompensation was evident in the treatment 

notes and consultative examiners’ observations, as well as his and his ex-wife’s reports. He 

indicated that the record supported the existence of a residual disease process that had resulted in 

such marginal adjustment that even a minimal increase in mental demands or change in the 

environment would be predicted to cause him to decompensate. Also, he contends that his 

cognitive disorder and bipolar disorder are medically documented chronic mental disorders of at 

least two years in duration. 

 The Commissioner indicated that the State agency doctors whom the ALJ gave great 

weight did not agree that Dotson met or equaled a listing. Also, the Commissioner has reiterated 

that Dotson’s ability to work past his alleged onset date was not reflective of the inability to do 

any gainful activity as required for the Listing. However, the ALJ did not reference the doctors’ 

opinions or Dotson’s work history when considering the paragraph C criteria. Even if there is 

evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s decision, principles of administrative law require the 
16 

ALJ rationally to articulate the ground for her decisions and confine the court’s review to reasons 

supplied by the ALJ. Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2002). 

 Dotson has failed to cite specific evidence to support his assertion. However, the ALJ 

failed to build a logical bridge that was persuasive. An ALJ must articulate, at a minimum, her 

analysis of the evidence in order to allow the reviewing court to trace the path of her reasoning 

and to be assured that the ALJ considered the important evidence. Wiszowaty v. Astrue, 861 

F.Supp.2d 924, 934 (N.D. Ind. 2012). There is no analysis of the evidence relied on to support 

the finding that Dotson did not satisfy paragraph C criteria. The ALJ may be able to articulate 

support from the evidence for her decision, but she failed to do so. The ALJ has a duty to 

develop the record fully before drawing conclusions and must adequately articulate her analysis, 

so the court can trace her path of reasoning. Herron v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 788 

F.Supp.2d 809, 818 (N.D. Ind. 2011). Therefore, this matter is remanded for the errors in the 

Step 3 analysis that require a more comprehensive discussion of the evidence by the ALJ. 

 Dotson has argued that the ALJ’s credibility finding was patently wrong. This court will 

sustain the ALJ’s credibility determination unless it is “patently wrong” and not supported by the 

record. Bates v. Colvin, 736 F.3d 1093, 1098 (7th Cir. 2013); Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 

843 (7th Cir. 2007); Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Only if the trier 

of fact grounds her credibility finding in an observation or argument that is unreasonable or 

unsupported . . . can the finding be reversed.”). The ALJ’s “unique position to observe a 

witness” entitles her opinion to great deference. Nelson v. Apfel, 131 F.3d 1228, 1237 (7th Cir. 

1997); Allord v. Barnhart, 455 F.3d 818, 821 (7th Cir. 2006). However, if the ALJ does not 

make explicit findings and does not explain them “in a way that affords meaningful review,” the 

ALJ’s credibility determination is not entitled to deference. Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 
17 

942 (7th Cir. 2002). Further, “when such determinations rest on objective factors or fundamental 

implausibilities rather than subjective considerations [such as a claimant’s demeanor], appellate 

courts have greater freedom to review the ALJ’s decision.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 

(7th Cir. 2000); see Bates, 736 F.3d at 1098. 

 The ALJ must determine a claimant’s credibility only after considering all of the 

claimant’s “symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which [the claimant’s] symptoms can 

reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.” 

20 C.F.R. ' 404.1529(a); Arnold v. Barnhart, 473 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[S]ubjective 

complaints need not be accepted insofar as they clash with other, objective medical evidence in 

the record.”); Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 703 (7th Cir. 2004). If the claimant’s 

impairments reasonably could produce the symptoms of which the claimant is complaining, the 

ALJ must evaluate the intensity and persistence of the claimant’s symptoms through 

consideration of the claimant’s “medical history, the medical signs and laboratory findings, and 

statements from [the claimant, the claimant’s] treating or examining physician or psychologist, 

or other persons about how [the claimant’s] symptoms affect [the claimant].” 20 C.F.R. 

' 404.1529(c); see Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 746–47 (7th Cir. 2005) (“These 

regulations and cases, taken together, require an ALJ to articulate specific reasons for 

discounting a claimant’s testimony as being less than credible, and preclude an ALJ from merely 

ignoring the testimony or relying solely on a conflict between the objective medical evidence and 

the claimant’s testimony as a basis for a negative credibility finding.”). 

 Although a claimant’s complaints of pain cannot be totally unsupported by the medical 

evidence, the ALJ may not disregard an individual’s statements about symptoms solely based on 
18 

objective medical evidence. SSR 16-3p, at *53

; see Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1125 (7th 

Cir. 2014) (“‘[T]he ALJ cannot reject a claimant’s testimony about limitations on his daily 

activities solely by stating that such testimony is unsupported by the medical evidence.’”) 

(quoting Indoranto, 374 F.3d at 474); Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751, 754 (7th Cir. 2004) 

(“If pain is disabling, the fact that its source is purely psychological does not disentitle the 

applicant to benefits.”). Rather, if the 

[c]laimant indicates that pain is a significant factor of his or her 

alleged inability to work, the ALJ must obtain detailed descriptions 

of the claimant’s daily activities by directing specific inquiries about 

the pain and its effects to the claimant. She must investigate all 

avenues presented that relate to pain, including claimant’s prior 

work record, information and observations by treating physicians, 

examining physicians, and third parties. Factors that must be 

considered include the nature and intensity of the claimant’s pain, 

precipitation and aggravating factors, dosage and effectiveness of 

any pain medications, other treatment for relief of pain, functional 

restrictions, and the claimant’s daily activities. (internal citations 

omitted). 

Luna v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 1994); see Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 

887-88 (7th Cir. 2001). 

 In addition, when the ALJ discounts the claimant’s description of pain because it is 

inconsistent with the objective medical evidence, she must make more than “a single, conclusory 

statement . . . . The determination or decision must contain specific reasons for the weight given 

to the individual’s symptoms, be consistent with and supported by the evidence, and be clearly 

 3

 The Social Security Administration updated its guidance about evaluating a claimant’s symptoms. See SSR 

16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 (effective March 28, 2016). SSR 16-3p superseded SSR 96-7p and removed the term 

“credibility” from the Administration’s policies. SSR 16-3p at *1. The new policy clarifies that an ALJ should not 

examine a claimant’s character similar to an adversarial proceeding when evaluating the claimant’s subjective 

symptoms. SSR 16-3p at *1. Although SSR 16-3p post-dates the ALJ hearing in this case, a regulation that clarifies 

rather than changes existing law is appropriate on appeal. Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 482–83 (7th Cir. 1993), 

overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561 (7th Cir. 1999). Because SSR 16-3p clarifies the 

Administration’s policies, this court will evaluate the ALJ’s findings under the Administration’s new guidance. See 

Roper v. Colvin, 2016 WL 3940035, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 2016) (finding it appropriate to consider the new 

regulation on appeal). 
19 

articulated so the individual and any subsequent reviewer can assess how the adjudicator 

evaluated the individual’s symptoms.” SSR 16-3p, at *9; see Minnick v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 929, 

937 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[A] failure to adequately explain her credibility finding by discussing 

specific reasons supported by the record is grounds for reversal.”) (citations omitted); Zurawski, 

245 F.3d at 887; Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 307–08 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that the ALJ must 

articulate, at some minimum level, her analysis of the evidence). The ALJ must “build an 

accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to her conclusion.” Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 887 

(quoting Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000)). A minor discrepancy, coupled 

with the ALJ’s observations is sufficient to support a finding that the claimant was incredible. 

Bates, 736 F.3d at 1098. However, this must be weighed against the ALJ’s duty to build the 

record and not to ignore a line of evidence that suggests a disability. Bates, 736 F.3d at 1099. 

 The ALJ found that Dotson’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and the 

limiting effects of some of his symptoms were not entirely credible. (Tr. 23). Dotson has argued 

that the ALJ failed to base her credibility analysis on the totality of evidence in the record, 

identified natural variations in symptoms as inconsistencies, and made generalizations about his 

veracity. 

 First, the ALJ found that Dotson’s daily activities were not suggestive of an individual 

with disabling anxiety. The ALJ noted that Dotson was the primary caretaker for his infant son 

for several hours a day. (Tr. 24). The Seventh Circuit has cautioned ALJs from equating a 

claimant’s care for a family member with an ability to work. Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 

838 (7th Cir. 2014). Also, the ALJ found Dotson incredible based on his testimony that he 

worked part-time after the alleged onset date as a Bed Checker at Lutheran Life Villages and as a 

Residence Supervisor at the Mentor Network of Indiana. The VE indicated that his work as a 
20 

Residence Supervisor had a Specific Vocational Preparation (SVP) level of 6 and was considered 

skilled work. (Tr. 23). Dotson was on the job for fourth months, part-time, and earned less than 

$3000.00. 

 Dotson has argued that the ALJ should have considered this an unsuccessful work 

attempt and that it should not have served as a negative credibility factor. Dotson has cited CFR 

404.1575 as his authority, which does not apply because it pertains to individuals who are selfemployed. The ALJ noted that Dotson did work after the alleged disability onset date, but this 

work activity did not rise to the level of substantial gainful activity. (Tr. 19). However, the ALJ 

explained that Dotson’s part-time employment was indicative that his anxiety did not 

significantly interfere with his ability to perform the work. (Tr. 24). 

 It was proper for the ALJ to consider Dotson’s daily activities as a factor when assessing 

the credibility of his claims. 20 ' C.F.R. 404.1529(c). The ALJ properly included in Dotson’s 

daily activities his ability to perform part-time work after his alleged onset date for several 

months. See Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 546 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Although the diminished 

number of hours per week indicated that [the claimant] was not at his best, the fact that he could 

perform some work cuts against his claim that he was totally disabled.”). The ALJ did not 

conclude that his part-time work demonstrated that he had the sufficient residual mental ability to 

work full time, rather his anxiety did not interfere with his ability to perform his work. See 

Eisaman v. Astrue, 2012 WL 3028040, at *10 (N.D. Ind. 2012). 

 The ALJ noted that Dotson made inconsistent statements about his hygiene. He testified 

that he had problems with hygiene, yet the treatment notes described him as well-groomed. 

Moreover, the records indicated that Dotson reported that he took four showers a day to help 

with his anxiety. Also, Dotson testified that he had side effects from all the medications, but his 
21 

medication management visits showed no side effects reported. (Tr. 24). Dotson has argued that 

a person who suffers from a mental illness will have better days and worse days, so a snapshot of 

any single moment says little about his overall condition. Punzio v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 704, 710 

(7th Cir. 2011). 

 Dotson contends that the ALJ misunderstood his mental health history. The ALJ 

indicated that the medical evidence of record did not reflect a long history of mental health 

treatment. (Tr. 24). Dotson indicated that his mental health treatment started during his 

childhood and that he reported his history to his numerous providers. The ALJ did omit 

evidence of mental health issues dating back to the 1990’s. The Commissioner has argued that 

the ALJ referred to Dotson’s treatment as an adult, before the alleged onset date. The ALJ cited 

evidence of counseling in 2010, medication for depression in early 2011, and his diagnosis of 

depression, likely mild bipolar, in 2011. (Tr. 24). The ALJ also noted that Dotson began 

treatment with Dr. Fawver in August 2011 and went to the Fawver Wellness Clinic on a monthly 

basis for medication management. (Tr. 24). The ALJ continued to discuss treatment history 

with Drs. Ishak and Stemmler. Finally, the ALJ reported that Dotson’s continued counseling 

with Susan Tielker-Sharpe from April 19, 2012 through May 22, 2013. The ALJ minimally 

articulated her findings regarding Dotson’s mental health treatment. 

 Dotson has argued that the ALJ treated the switch from Dr. Fawver to another doctor as 

an improper inconsistency. Dotson testified that he stopped seeing Dr. Fawver when he decided 

to seek disability because he did not recommend disability. Dotson indicated that the ALJ failed 

to inquire into if Dr. Fawver did not recommend disability in general or with respect to Dotson. 

However, the Commissioner noted that the ALJ did not cite Dotson’s leaving Dr. Fawver as a 

basis for impugning his credibility. 
22 

 Although the ALJ could have further explained her credibility finding it was not patently 

wrong. The ALJ provided sufficient support to build a logical bridge from the evidence to her 

credibility determination that Dotson could perform a range of activities, therefore he could do 

more than he claimed. Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 369 (7th Cir. 2013). However, because 

this matter is being remanded on a separate issue, the ALJ may further explain her credibility 

determination on remand. Specifically, she may address the issues Dotson has presented with 

her credibility finding. 

 Dotson made brief arguments regarding the ALJ assigning little weight to Dotson’s exwife’s testimony and the assessment of his GAF scores. Dotson contends that the ALJ 

overlooked his ex-wife’s testimony. Also, he has argued that the ALJ improperly dismissed the 

lower GAF scores without any legally sufficient reasoning. However, the court finds that Dotson 

has waived this argument for lack of development. Claimant's mere mention of facts pertinent to 

a claim of impairment does not qualify as having raised an issue. See DeSilva v. DiLeonardi,

181 F.3d 865, 867 (7th Cir.1999) (“A brief must make all arguments accessible to the judges, 

rather than ask them to play archaeologist with the record.”); Central States, Southeast and 

Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Midwest Motor Exp., Inc., 181 F.3d 799, 808 (7th Cir.1999) 

(arguments not developed in any meaningful way are waived); Bollas v. Astrue, 694 F.Supp.2d 

978, 990 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 

 Dotson has argued that the ALJ gave little weight to the treating and consulting 

physician’s opinions, while crediting the opinions from non-examining physicians. A treating 

source’s opinion is entitled to controlling weight if the “opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and 

severity of [the claimant’s] impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and 

laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence” in 
23 

the record. 20 C.F.R. ' 404.1527(d)(2); see Bates v. Colvin, 736 F.3d 1093, 1099 (7th Cir. 

2013); Punzio v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 704, 710 (7th Cir. 2011); Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 

842 (7th Cir. 2007). The ALJ must “minimally articulate her reasons for crediting or rejecting 

evidence of disability.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 870 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Scivally v. 

Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir. 1992)); see 20 C.F.R. ' 404.1527(d)(2) (“We will 

always give good reasons in our notice of determination or decision for the weight we give your 

treating source’s opinion.”). 

 “‘[O]nce well-supported contradicting evidence is introduced, the treating physician’s 

evidence is no longer entitled to controlling weight’ and becomes just one more piece of 

evidence for the ALJ to consider.” Bates, 736 F.3d at 1100. Controlling weight need not be 

given when a physician’s opinions are inconsistent with his treatment notes or are contradicted 

by substantial evidence in the record, including the claimant’s own testimony. Schmidt, 496 

F.3d at 842 (“An ALJ thus may discount a treating physician’s medical opinion if the opinion is 

inconsistent with the opinion of a consulting physician or when the treating physician’s opinion 

is internally inconsistent, as long as she minimally articulates her reasons for crediting or 

rejecting evidence of disability.”); see, e.g., Latkowski v. Barnhart, 93 F. App’x 963, 970–71 

(7th Cir. 2004); Jacoby v. Barnhart, 93 F. App’x 939, 942 (7th Cir. 2004). If the ALJ was 

unable to discern the basis for the treating physician’s determination, the ALJ must solicit 

additional information. Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1127 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Similia v. 

Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 514 (7th Cir. 2009)). Ultimately, the weight accorded a treating 

physician’s opinion must balance all the circumstances, with recognition that, while a treating 

physician “has spent more time with the claimant,” the treating physician may also “bend over 

backwards to assist a patient in obtaining benefits . . . [and] is often not a specialist in the 
24 

patient’s ailments, as the other physicians who give evidence in a disability case usually are.” 

Hofslien v. Barnhart, 439 F.3d 375, 377 (7th Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted); see Punzio, 

630 F.3d at 713. 

 Such evidence may contain medical opinions, which “are statements from physicians 

and psychologists ... that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of a claimant's 

impairment(s), including symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis,” physical and mental restrictions, 

and what the claimant can still do despite his or her impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2).

Medical opinions are to be weighed by the process set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). 

 Dotson began treatment with Dr. Fawver on August 11, 2011, and was treated on a 

monthly basis at the Fawver Wellness Clinic for medication management. (Tr. 24). On October 

4, 2011 and October 10, 2011, Dr. Fawver opinioned that Dotson should remain off work 

because his mood was not predictable or stable and indicated that he would reevaluate Dotson at 

the next appointment. The ALJ assigned little weight to Dr. Fawver’s opinion because at the 

time he had treated Dotson for only two months and the limitations given to Dotson were not 

long term. (Tr. 26). The record indicated that Dr. Fawver and/or nurse practitioners from the 

Fawver Wellness Clinic continued to treat Dotson from August 2011 to July of 2012 on a 

monthly basis. At subsequent visits, Dotson reported that he had reduced his work by half 

because all he wanted to do was lay around. Dotson described his symptoms as worsening 

despite medication and engaging in psychotherapy. (Tr. 333). 

 Dotson began seeing Dr. Ishak who assessed him with anxiety disorder on August 29, 

2012. The ALJ assigned little weight to Dr. Ishak’s opinion that Dotson was unable to hold 

employment because he had treated him for only three months. (Tr. 26). Also, the ALJ 

indicated that Dr. Ishak’s opinion was contradictory with Dotson’s work history because he was 
25 

currently working part-time. (Tr. 26). In July of 2012, Dotson reported that he was working on 

a part-time basis, but by December of 2012 he no longer was employed. The ability to work a 

few hours each week is significantly different from having the ability to work full-time. Larson 

v. Astrue, 615 F.3d 744, 752 (7th Cir. 2010). Dr. Ishak saw Dotson again on April 22, 2013 and 

recommended hospitalization due to worsening depression symptoms and marked changes in his 

behavior. (Tr. 25). The record indicated that Dr. Ishak treated Dotson from August 2012 until at 

least July of 2013. 

 The ALJ assigned little weight to the opinions of Drs. Fawver and Ishak because of the 

length of treatment. Also, Dr. Ishak’s opinion was inconsistent with Dotson’s work history. A 

treating source opinion is entitled to controlling weight if it is (a) well supported by medically 

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and (b) not inconsistent with other 

substantial evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. ' 404.1527(c)(2). The opinions need not be 

supported by all the evidence, there only needs to be no substantial contradictory evidence. 

POMS DI 24515.004.B.1. An ALJ “must offer ‘good reasons' ” for discounting a treating 

physician's opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)); Campbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 306 (7th 

Cir. 2010). The ALJ has failed to offer good reasons. 

 However, even if the ALJ properly refused to assign controlling weight, she still was 

required to determine what weight to assign to their opinions. “If an ALJ does not give a treating 

physician's opinion controlling weight, the regulations require the ALJ to consider the length, 

nature, and extent of the treatment relationship, frequency of examination, the physician's 

specialty, the types of tests performed, and the consistency and supportability of the physician's 

opinion.” Moss v. Astrue, 555 F.3d 556, 561 (7th Cir.2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(d)(2)). These factors are to be applied after the ALJ has determined that a treating 
26 

source will not be given controlling weight. See 20 C.F.R. ' 404.1527(c)(2). The 

Commissioner has argued that the ALJ was not required to detail every reason for discounting a 

treating physicians report. However, the ALJ’s decision failed to make clear that she was aware 

of and considered the other factors. 

 Dotson saw Dr. Stemmler who assessed him with cognitive disorder not otherwise 

specified, bipolar II disorder, ADHD, anxiety disorder, and learning disorder. She supported 

Social Security disability temporarily so Dotson could focus on his mental health care, but she 

indicated the nature of his head injury did not prevent him from being able to return to work. 

(Tr. 25). The ALJ did not assign any weight to her opinion, but did note it. The ALJ must 

determine what, if any, weight the treating physician’s opinion is to be given. Moss v. Astrue,

555 F.3d 556, 561 (7th Cir.2009). If the treating physician is not given controlling weight, the 

ALJ cannot simply disregard the opinion without further consideration and analysis. Campbell 

v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 308 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Even if an ALJ gives good reasons for not giving 

controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion, she has to decide what weight to give that 

opinion.”). 

 The ALJ assigned some weight to Dr. Bingi because he performed a detailed 

psychological evaluation. (Tr. 26). He diagnosed Dotson with bipolar disorder, most recent 

episode depressed, panic disorder without agoraphobia, PTSD, and OCD. Dr. Bingi had met 

with Dotson only once. He assessed Dotson with a Global Assessment of Function (GAF) score 

of 45. A GAF rating of 41-50 reflects “serious” impairment in social, occupational, or school 

functioning. However, the ALJ noted that the GAF score was not dispositive for Social Security 

disability purposes. The Commissioner indicated that Dr. Bingi’s opinion underlined that of the 

State agency reviewing doctors that found Dotson could carry out unskilled or semi-skilled tasks 
27 

on a sustained basis in a competitive setting not requiring rapid pace or intense concentration. 

(Tr. 27). However, the circuit court has made clear that what matters are the reasons articulated 

by the ALJ. Spiva v. Astrue, 628 F.3d 346, 353 (7th Cir. 2010); Larson v. Astrue, 615 F.3d 744, 

749 (7th Cir. 2010). 

 The ALJ’s weighing of medical evidence is conclusive if it was minimally articulated and 

supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 415 (7th Cir. 

2008); See Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir.2007) (substantial evidence “must be 

more than a scintilla but may be less than a preponderance.”). A contradictory opinion of a nonexamining source, like State agency psychological consultants does not by itself suffice. See 

generally Gudgel v. Barnhart, 345 F.3d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 2003). The ALJ assigned little 

weight to the treating source opinions of Drs. Fawver and Ishak based upon their short-term 

treating relationship with Dotson, yet credited the State agency psychological consultant with 

great weight who never established a treating relationship with Dotson. The ALJ failed to offer a 

“good reasons” for discounting the medical sources’ opinion. See Larson v. Astrue, 615 F.3d 

744, 749 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)). On remand the ALJ should 

revisit the weight given to the medical opinions. 

 Finally, Dotson has argued that the vocational findings are based on legal error and not 

supported by substantial evidence. SSR 96-8p explains how an ALJ should assess a claimant’s 

RFC at steps four and five of the sequential evaluation. In a section entitled, “Narrative 

Discussion Requirements,” SSR 96-8p specifically spells out what is needed in the ALJ’s RFC 

analysis. This section of the Ruling provides: 

The RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion describing how the 

evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory 

findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations). In 

assessing RFC, the adjudicator must discuss the individual’s ability to perform 
28 

sustained work activities in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing 

basis (i.e., 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule), and 

describe the maximum amount of each work-related activity the individual can 

perform based on the evidence available in the case record. The adjudicator must 

also explain how any material inconsistencies or ambiguities in the evidence in 

the case record were considered and resolved. 

SSR 96-8p (footnote omitted). Thus, as explained in this section of the Ruling, there is a 

difference between what the ALJ must contemplate and what she must articulate in her written 

decision. “The ALJ is not required to address every piece of evidence or testimony presented, 

but she must provide a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and her conclusions.” Getch v. 

Astrue, 539 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 

2000)); see Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1123 (7th Cir. 2014). Although the ALJ does not 

need to discuss every piece of evidence, she cannot ignore evidence that undermines her ultimate 

conclusions. Moore, 743 F.3d at 1123 (“The ALJ must confront the evidence that does not 

support her conclusion and explain why that evidence was rejected.”) (citations omitted). “A 

decision that lacks adequate discussion of the issues will be remanded.” Moore, 743 F.3d at 

1121. 

 Dotson has argued that the ALJ failed to consider his ability to sustain the activities cited 

in the RFC finding throughout an eight-hour day, five days a week. Dotson contends that the 

evidence shows he was unable to sustain a 9-20 hour per week part-time schedule and the added 

stress of a 40-hour week would not to be sustainable, as agreed by his doctors. The 

Commissioner has indicated that the ALJ apprised the VE of Dotson’s residual function capacity 

and both considered his ability to sustain the activities cited in the RFC. In hypothetical 

questioning to the VE, the ALJ did include work-related limitations to account for Dotson’s 

impairments to the extent that they were supported by medical evidence. Because this matter is 

being remanded on separated issues, the ALJ should also reconsider her step five finding. 
29 

 Based on the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner is REMANDED for 

further proceedings consistent with this order. 

 ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 2017. 

 /s/ Andrew P. Rodovich 

 United States Magistrate Judge