1

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

____________________

NO. 09-18-00164-CR

NO. 09-18-00165-CR

____________________

ROLAND KADERLI JR., Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

_______________________________________________________ ______________

On Appeal from the 75th District Court

Liberty County, Texas

Trial Cause Nos. CR33804 and CR33805

 

________________________________________________________ _____________

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

In these appeals, Roland Kaderli Jr.’s court-appointed appellate counsel 

submitted briefs in which he states that no arguable grounds exist to support 

Kaderli’s appeals from his convictions, following a trial by jury, of two felonies.1

 

1 The convictions Kaderli has appealed were consolidated and ultimately 

resolved by the same jury. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Kaderli guilty 

in Cause Number CR33804 of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Tex. Penal 
2

Based on our review of the record, we agree that no arguable issues exist to support 

Kaderli’s appeals.

After Kaderli appealed, appellate counsel filed briefs in which counsel

presented his professional evaluation of whether there were any issues that might 

have merit on which to base appeals. In both briefs, Kaderli’s counsel concludes that 

no issues that have merit can be argued to support Kaderli’s appeals.

2

After Kaderli’s appellate counsel filed the briefs, we gave Kaderli an 

extension of time so that he could file pro se responses in his appeals. Kaderli filed 

the same response in each appeal. Among the complaints in his response, Kaderli

 

Code Ann. § 22.02(a)(2) (West 2011) (defining aggravated assault as an assault 

during which the defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon). In Cause Number 

CR33805 the jury convicted Kaderli of driving while intoxicated, third or more. See

id. §§ 49.04, 49.09(b)(2) (West Supp. 2018) (elevating driving while intoxicated to 

a third-degree felony if the State established that the defendant had previously been 

convicted, two or more times, of driving while intoxicated). The indictments 

relevant to both of the appeals include enhancement counts which were based on 

Kaderli’s prior convictions for other felonies. In the punishment phase of the trial, 

Kaderli pleaded “true” to the enhancement counts, making him eligible for a 

sentence, on each conviction, ranging from twenty-five years to life. Id. § 12.42(d) 

(West Supp. 2018). Kaderli elected to allow the trial court to assess his sentences.

Following the punishment phase of the trial, the trial court sentenced Kaderli to thirty 

years in prison on each case. Unless otherwise noted, we cite to the current version

of the Texas Penal Code, as any revisions to the Penal Code since the date the State 

indicted Kaderli in the cases now at issue are not relevant to the disposition of 

Kaderli’s appeals.

2 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 

807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
3

argues: (1) both trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective; (2) he had valid 

statute of limitations defenses in both cases to the charged offense and to the State’s 

use of his prior felonies to enhance his punishment; (3) the State failed to call 

witnesses who could have provided testimony contradictory to the statements that 

the prosecutor made during his trial; (4) the State failed to timely disclose some of 

the exhibits the trial court admitted into evidence during trial; (5) the trial court erred 

when it overruled evidentiary objections and the motion to suppress that trial counsel 

raised in the trial; (6) the trial court erred when it refused to allow Kaderli’s expert 

to access the blood in the hospital’s possession so his expert could forensically 

analyze the blood for the presence of alcohol using a gas chromatograph; (7) the 

blood test results from the hospital should have been suppressed because the State 

obtained his medical records using a subpoena when it was required to obtain them 

with a search warrant; (8) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, prejudicing

Kaderli’s right to a fair trial; (9) Kaderli’s sentences were enhanced using 

convictions that violated his constitutional rights; and (10) the jury failed to fully 

and fairly consider the issues argued during his trial. 

Having reviewed the appellate record, the Anders briefs filed by appellate 

counsel, and Kaderli’s pro se response, we agree with counsel’s conclusion that no 

meritorious, non-frivolous issues exist that can be raised to support either of 
4

Kaderli’s appeals.

3 Accordingly, it is unnecessary to appoint new counsel to re-brief 

the appeals.

4 Therefore, the trial court’s judgments in Cause Number CR33804 and 

CR33805 are affirmed.

5

AFFIRMED.

_________________________

 HOLLIS HORTON

 Justice

Submitted on November 26, 2018

Opinion Delivered March 13, 2019

Do Not Publish

Before McKeithen, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.

 

3 With respect to Kaderli’s claim he received ineffective assistance of counsel, 

the record does not show Kaderli’s counsel filed a motion for new trial. Therefore,

his claim is not firmly founded in the record. See Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 

813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). While we agree that under the circumstances of 

Kaderli’s case that the charge of aggravated assault charge has a two-year limitations

period, the State indicted Kaderli within two years of the offense. See State v. 

Schunior, 506 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Thus, when the State re-indicted

Kaderli on the same charge, the tolling provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure 

operated to prevent the two-year statute from expiring on the charge Kaderli faced 

for aggravated assault. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 12.05(b) (West 2015).

4 Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (requiring 

court appointment of new counsel only if the appellate court determines that 

arguable grounds exist to support issues in the defendant’s appeal).

5 Kaderli may challenge our decision in these cases by filing petitions for 

discretionary review. See Tex. R. App. P. 68.