NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0736n.06 F iled: Dec em ber 3, 2008 No. 07-3808 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
Caro ly n R. Rus se ll Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. S tate of O hio, Depar

tment of Administrative Se rv ic e s; G e or g e He ss De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE S O U T H E R

N D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

Be for e : N ORRI S, R OG ER S, a nd K ETHL ED G E, C ir c uitJudg e s. ROGERS, Circuit Judge. Caroly n Russell, proce edingpro se, a ppeals the district c ourt’s g rant of summar

y judge ment in h er em p l o y ment discrimination suit aga inst the Ohio Depar tment of Ad min istrativ e Se rv ic e s ( “ OD AS” ) an d he r s up e rv iso r G e or g e He ss. Rus se ll b ro ug ht t his c ivi l rig hts suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Tit le VI I of t he C ivil R ights Ac t of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e,
a lle g ingtha

t he r e mpl oy e r f

a ile d to re c la ssi fy

or pr omo te he r be c a

us e of he r ra c e , r e ta liate d a g a ins t her for fili ng an EEOC claim, and fostered a n environment of hostility and socia l ostracism in the workplac e. Althoug h Russell appear s to have ha d a number of disappointin g , neg ative, and e ven unfair experience s in her wor kplace , she did not demonstrate that simi larly situated individuals of other ra ces w ere treated diffe rently from her
. She also did not demonstrate that the conditions in herNo. 07-3808

Ru sse ll v . O hio

- 2 - wo rk pla c e we re su ff

ic ie ntl y ob je c tio na ble or ra c ia lly mot ivate d to con sti tut e re ta liatio n or a ho sti le work e nvironment. Summary judgme nt in favor of

the def endants wa s appropr iate in this case.
I.
Ms. Rus se ll i s a

hig h s c ho ol g ra du a te wi th t wo y e ars of

po st- se c on da

ry e du c a tio n in b us ine ss manag ement and a ccount i n g. S h e beg an her car eer with the State of Ohio in 1962 perf orming
v ar i o u s c l e r i c a l f

u n c t i o n s . S h e b e g anw o r

k i n g f o r t h e D i v i s i o no f

E qu a l E mp l o ym e n tO p p o rtu n i t y, a divis i o n o f OD AS , in 1972 and was pr omoted to Administ rative A ssistant 2 (“AA2” ) in 1973. Russell wa s still classified as an AA2 at the time of this suit. Russell be g an working fo r O h i o’s Minority Set Aside Review B oard in 1 9 8 6 , an d i n 1995 came under the direc t supervision of the Boa rd’s direc tor, Sandra Dra

bik. Russell, be lieving her job r esponsibiliti es to be more e x tensive that tho s e o f anA A 2 , m a d e s e v e r a l u n s u c c e s s f u l r e qu e s t s t h a tD r a

b i k r e c l a s s i f y h e r . S o m e tim e the re a ft e r, Joy c e Tyle r- Cr a dd oc k, an Af ri c an- Am e ri c an, be g an su pe rv isi ng Rus se ll. Rus se ll a g a in made a n unsucce ssful reque st for re classification.
I n 1997, Russell filed a complaint ag ainst Drabik a nd Craddock with the EEOC. After the EE OC de nie d r e lie f, Rus se ll uns uc c e ssf ull y purs ue d h e r c la im in the fe de ra l di str ic t and a pp e llate courts
. Russell was transfe rre d from the Minority Set Aside Review B oard to the D ivision of Computer Service s sever al wee ks afte r she filed her EEOC complaint. Russell sti ll works for that division, currently

known as the O ffice of Tec hnology Service s Delivery

Division (“I TSD”).No. 07-3808

Ru sse ll v . O hio

- 3 - Def endant Ge org e Hess beg an supervising Rus sell in 2000. Accor ding to Russell, Hess put h er i nch ar ge o f a l l p er s o n n e l f u n ct i o n s , wh i ch i n v o l v edco o rd i n at i n g t h e h i ri n g p ro ce s s , b ei n g a liaison betwee n manag ers and the de partment’s pe rsonnel off ice, a nd respondingto questions from barg aining uni t em p l o y ees. H ess updated Russell’s position description on J une 19, 2002, but Russell alleg es that he e x cluded the hig her- level func tions she perfor med.
I n J uly 2002, Hess consolidated five divisions, including Russell’s, into a s i n gl e d i vision. Russell continued to perfor m t h e s am e d u t ies for the combined division under the c lassification AA2. Ar ound this ti me, s he once aga in beg an to work unde r Joy ce T y ler-Cra ddock, who ha d since become the Assistant Deputy Direc tor of I TSD. I n ear ly 2003, Russell beg an see king a n upg rade d classification within her AA cla ss series. Cra ddock sent Russell’s position descr iption to t he Of fice of Em plo y me nt S e rv ic e s f

or re vie w, and

tha t of fi c e no tif ie d Cr a dd ock that Ru sse ll w a s p ro pe rl y
c la ssi fi e d. Cr a dd oc k p re se nte d th e re su lts of the re vie w to H e ss, and the y de te rm ine d th a t Ru sse ll sh ou ld n ot b e re c la ssi fi e d. Hes s me t w ithRus se ll o n Apr il 4 , 2 00 3, to d isc us s th e de c isi on no t to upg rade her. Russell sent He ss an e-mail the s ame day expressing he r belief

that she had not be en
a dv anc e d f

or the pa st thir

ty y e ars be c a

us e of ra c ia l disc ri min a tio n. Oh io l aw p ro vid e s th a t a state employ ee ma

y reque st an audit of her

classification. Ohio Admin. Code 123:1-3-01(J); O hio Rev. Cod e § 1 24 .1 4( D) . Ru sse ll s a id s he di d not p ur su e thi s ave nu e be c a us e sh e fe lt i t w ou ld b e futil e to e x pect a job a

naly st to disag ree with the Deputy Direc tor and be cause she knewof audits that had resulted in downwa

rd re classification.No. 07-3808

Ru sse ll v . O hio

- 4 - I n J uly 2002, L isa Ba

rbee , a white female, w as re classified f rom Tra ining Super

visor to AA4. The re cl as s ification wa s latera l and did not affe ct B arbe e’s pa y rang e. The AA4 position was specific ally

in the are a of secur ity coordination and construction. Acc ording to Hess, Barbe e wa s
re c la ssi fi e d s o th a t he r j ob de sc ript ion wo uld mor e a c c ur a te ly

matc h h e r a c tua l dutie s. Rus se ll admits that she would not h av e rece ived that AA4 position as desc ribed, be cause she wa s not qualifi e d
. Sh e a ll e g e s , h o w e v e r , th a t B ar b e e ’ s n e w p o s it io nd e s c r ip ti o nd id n o t m a tc h h e r

a c tua l duties an d t h at Ru s sell was compe tent to perfor m Ba rbee ’s ac tual duties. Russell believes that
rec lassifying B arbe e’s position without posti ng the position for competitive bid denied Russell an opportunity

for a promotion.
Ar ound May 20 03 , A ng e la

Wei s, a wh ite fe ma le , jo ine d I TS D a s a n A A3 . We is f

or me rl y he ld a n A A3 po sit ion

in a dif fe re nt d ivi sio n th a t w a s e xpe ri e nc inglay of fs . We is tra

ns fe rr e d to Russell’s divisi on, althoug h no open AA3 position had be en posted. Hes s ap p ro v ed the transf er. Russell believes that if the position had bee n posted for a pplication, she would have been qua lified to apply . She there fore sees Weis’s transf er a s another missed oppor tunity for pr omotion. Russell alleg es that in J uly 2003, Hess ag ain re vised Ba rbee ’s position description and made her his per sonal assistant—a job Russell had repea tedly expressed intere st in and believed she was qu a lif ie d to pe rf or m. S he wa s n ot, ho we ve r, g ive n a c ha nc e to b id f

or the po sit ion , b e c a

us e He ss d id
no t po st i t.No. 07-3808

Ru sse ll v . O hio

- 5 - On Se p t e mb e r 2 9 , 2 0 0 3 , O D A S p o s t e d an o p e n i n g i n I T S D f o r a M an a g e m e n tAn a ly st Supervisor 2. The job include d position specific minimum qualifications (“ PSM Qs”). Russell wa s interested in the job, but she did not apply beca use the PSMQs disqualified her. Russell believe s the PSM Qs wer e extr an e o u s to th e jo b an d th a t H e s s a d d e d

th e m s p e c if

ic a ll y to p r e v e n t h e r

f r om applying. Cra ddock stated that she worke d with the Offic e of Employ ee Services to add the PSMQs in or d e r to n ar r o w w h a t w a s o th e r

w is e a v e r y b r o a d jo b d e s c r ip ti o nto a

d e s c r ip ti o nmo r e ta il o red to the require ments of the position. Craddock a nd Hess sele cted Patty M aga z ine, a white f emale, for the position in J anuar

y 2004. Russell alleg es that after Maga zine was hire d, Craddock tr ansfe rre d al l o f Ru s s e ll ’ s h ig h e r - le v e l d u ti e s to M a g a zi n e . Ru s s e ll c la im s th a t s h e th e r e a f te r w o rked unde r Mag azine perf

orming cler ical func tions that were be low Russell’s AA2 classification.
Russell filed a formal complaint with the EEOC on J une 2, 2004, acc using ODAS of ra cial discrimination and re taliation, and naming Hess and C raddoc k in the body of the c omplaint. Around the same time, she note d sever al occ urre nce s which she be lieves we re f urther instanc es of discrimination a

nd/or reta liation f

or filing her claim. Since 1997, Russell ha d worke d four ten- hour day s per we ek. In May

2004, Mag azine informed Russ ell that Russell’s schedule was be ing c hang ed to five eig ht-hour day s. When Russell requested to keep her for mer sche dule, Mag azine explained that a ll B us ine ss S up po rt Se rv ic e s p e rs onne l w e re no w r e qu ir e d to wo rk duringre g ula

r b us ine ss hours. Russell informed Mag azine, Craddock, a nd Hess that she bel ieved the tr eatment wa s ine qu ita ble , b e c a us e se ve ra l othe r em

plo y e e s with wh om Rus se ll wor ke d w e re a llo we d to ma int a inNo. 07-3808

Ru sse ll v . O hio

- 6 - their non-standa

rd schedules. Var ious superiors r esponded to Russell’s re quests by telling he r that tho se oth e r e mpl oy e e s w e re no t B us ine ss S up po rt Se rv ic e s p e rs onne l. Duringthe s u m m er o f 2004, Russell wrote thre e letter s conce rning Craddock—two to the Offic e of the Ohio I nspector G ener al and one to the EEOC. On Jul y 23, 2004, prior t o Russell’s second l et t er to the I nspector G ener al, Craddoc k sent a memora ndum to the ODAS Human Resource s Administrator asking for “ appropr iate ac tion to put a stop t o this ha ra ssment.” ODAS issued a findingon J anuar y 26, 2005, that Russell had a rig ht to file complaints with the Off ice of the Inspector G ener al and the E EOC. The De puty State C h i ef

I nformation Of

fice r also issued a memo to both women on April 20, 2005, reg arding “per formanc e ex pectations,” urg ing the m to treat
eac h other prof

essionally and to per form their jobs in a manne r consistent with the compa ny ’s policy that manag ers should trea t employ ees f

airly and that employ ees shoul d o b ey t h e instructions of
mana g e rs . Severa l other occ urre nces have made Russell uncomforta ble in her w orkplac e. The ODAS investigation report re veale d that sever al of Russell’s co-wor kers avoid her. On January 10, 2007, Mag azine issued a wr itten memorandum with the title “ve rbal re primand” to be place d in Russell’s file bec ause Russell completed an assig nment late. Russell sugg ests that this level of discipline for mis sin g a de a dli ne is n ot t

y pic a l for the of

fi c e . Rus se ll a lso a lle g e s th a t Ma g a zine re qu ir e s Ru sse ll to leave the office prec i s ely at the end of

her w orkday , but that Mag azine does not place such a condition on any

other e mploy ee.No. 07-3808

Ru sse ll v . O hio

- 7 - The EEO C dismi ssed Russell’s char g es o n No v ember 15, 2004, and she f

iled suit in t he district court on F ebrua

ry 11, 2005. She also petitioned for injunctive r elief on January 11, 2007, based on a lleg ations of continui ng hara ssment and retaliation in the workplac e. The district court g rant e d O D A S’ s mo ti o n

f o r s u mm ar y ju d g me n t a

n d d e n ie d Ru s s e ll ’ s p e ti ti o no nJu n e 1 4 , 2 0 0 7. Rus se ll n owa

pp e a ls.
II.
As an init ia l matte r, so me of Rus se ll’ s c la ims are tim e ba rr e d. Rus se ll f

ile d h e r a c tio n w ith t h e E E O C o nJ u n e 2 , 2 0 0 4
. In a “ d e f e r r a l ” s t a t e s u c h a s O h i o , an y i n s t an c e g i v i n g r i s e t o a

T i t l e V II claim must have oc curr ed within 300 day s of that date, me aning afte r Aug ust 7, 2003. See Amini

v . O b e r li n Co llege 2 5 9 F. 3 d 493, 498 (6th Cir. 2001). Russell filed her suit in fede ral c ourt on F e br ua ry 11 , 2 00 5. Any

ins tanc e g ivi ngri se to a 42 U. S.C. § 198 3 cla im mus t ha ve oc c ur re d w ith in two y ear s of that date, me aning afte r F ebrua ry 11, 2003. There fore , Russell’s claims stemming fr om Ba rbee ’s re c la s s if

ic a ti o na s anA A 4 in

Ju ly 2 0 0 2 ar e ti me b ar

r e d u n d e r b o th s tatute s . Ru s sell’s claims stemming f

rom her de nied reclassification in April 2003, Weis’s transfe r as an AA3 in J une 20 03 , and

B arb e e ’s re vis e d p os iti on de sc ri pti on

in Jul y 20 03 may

on ly pr oc e e d a s § 19 83 c la ims
a g a ins t H e ss. All th e oth e r c la ims tha t are no t ba se d o n r e ta liatio n ma y pr oc e e d a s § 19 83 c la ims ag ainst Hess and a s Title VI I claims ag ainst ODAS. Claims based on reta liation for filing an EE OC char g e may

only proce ed u n d er Title VI I
. Da yv . W ay neCou nty

Bd . o f A ud ito rs , 749 F.2d 1199, 1204 (6th Cir. 1984).No. 07-3808

Ru sse ll v . O hio

- 8 - Th e c on tin

uin g vio latio n d oc tr ine c ann ot b e us e d to e xten d the statut e of lim itatio ns in t his
case , beca use Russell alleg es discre te ac ts of discrimination. Russell ha s not a lleg ed a past violation that continues into the prese nt, such as unequa l pay that continues t o be paid une qually
. See E EOC v. Pe nton Indus. Publ’g. Co. , 851 F.2d 835, 838 ( 6th Cir. 1988). Rather, she has allege d a number
o f d i s c r e t e s i t

u a t i o n s wh e re he r e mpl oy e r m a de an a dv e rs e de c isi on re g ard inghe r e mpl oy

me nt s tatus
. She c ann ot u se the fa c t that so me of the c la ims fa ll w ith in t he statut e of

lim itatio n to re de e m th os e claims that do not. Courts have re cog nized “two narr owly limit ed exceptions” to the g ener al policy that the statute of limitations for an a ct of e mp l o y ment discrimination runs from the time the a ct
occur red: (1) wher e some pre sent discrim i n at o ry action g ives rise the c laim and (2) where the employ er ha s a long -standing policy of discrimination. Id. at 837-38. Reg ardingthe first exception, the Supreme Court c autions that “discre te discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barre d, even
w h e n th e y ar e r e late d to a c ts a ll e g e d in ti me ly f il e d c harg es.” N

a t i onal R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan , 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002). In other wo rd s , Russell cannot use the c ontinuing violation doctrine to e x tend the statute of limitations on discrete, de faulted c laims. As for the se cond exception, Russell i s not challeng ing a n officia l policy

of her employ er. Discrimination under § 1983 a nd discrimination under Title VI I are both proved throug h the McD onnell Douglas fra

mework, so the claims will be addressed tog ether
. Se e Gu tzw ill e r v . F e nik , 860 F.2d 1317, 1325 (6th Cir. 1988).
A.No. 07-3808

Ru sse ll v . O hio

- 9 - Rus se ll d oe s n ot s ur

viv e summa

ry jud g me nt o n a

ny of he r d isc ri min a tio n c la ims , b e c a us e sh e do e s n ot d e mon str a te se ve ra l nec e ssa ry e le me nts . Most

sig nif ic antl y , s he do e s n ot d e mon str a te that any of the a ctions taken by

her e mploy er or

conditions present in her office wer e linked to her
ra c e . We re vie w the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra nt of summa

ry jud g me nt de no vo , d

ra wi nga ll i nf

e re nc e s in favor of Russell. Johnson v. Karnes , 3 98 F .3 d 8 68 , 8 73 (6 th C ir. 2005 ). Sum mary jud g me nt i s
a pp ro pr ia te wh e re “ the ple a din g s, the dis c ov e ry and dis c los ur e mate ri a ls o n f

ile , a nd any a ff ida vit s show that there is no ge nuine issue as to any materia l fac t and that the movant is entitled to judgme nt
as a matter of law .” F ed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Summary judgme nt must be ente red a g ainst a par ty who, lik e Rus se ll, “ fa ils to m a ke a sh ow ingsu ff

ic ie nt t o e sta

bli shthe e xiste nc e of an ele me nt e sse nti a l to that party ’s ca se, an d o n wh i ch that party will bear the burden of

proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Cat re tt , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
I n her f ailure to re classify

claim, Russell may

be able to show that her job duties qualified he r f or re c la ssi fi c a tio n, bu t sh e do e s n ot p re se nt a pp ro pr iate c omp a

rator s to sh owthat si mil arl y situated non-mino ri t i es wer e tre ated diff ere ntly . To establish a prima f acie case of employ

ment discrimination under the f amiliar McD onnell Douglas standard, Russell must show: “(1) [s]he was a member of a pr otected c lass; (2) that [s] he suffe red an adve rse e mploy ment action; (3) that [ s]he was qua lified for the position; and (4 ) t h at a person outside the protec ted class wa s treate d more favor ably than [she wa s].” Braithwai te v. Timke n Co. , 2 5 8 F. 3 d 4 8 8 , 4 9 3 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 1 ). Al t h o u gh Russell satisfies the first two prong s an d m ay be able to establish a g enuine issue of fac t as to the t h i rd , s h e d o es n o ts at i s fy t h e f o u rt h p ro n g.No. 07-3808

Ru sse ll v . O hio

- 10 - Ap ply ing the thi rd pr on g to the sp e c if ic sit uatio n o f r e c la ssi fi c a tio n, Rus se ll m ay be a ble to show that she per formed job duties more advanc ed than those cover ed by her job de scription and, there fore , that she was qualified for rec lassification. Russell, who is classified as an A A2, alleg es that she perf

ormed various high- level tasks, first under Hess and later under Cra ddock, that excee ded the level of

responsibility

appropr iate for

an AA2. A ccor ding to H ess, Russell’s job descr iption was revie wed throug h the prope r channels and was determined to be appropriate. T he job desc riptions for the va rious levels of a dminist rative a ssistants are sufficie ntly open to interpre tation to create an issue of fa ct about whe ther Russell was wor king a bove her classification.
Russell does not, howeve r, show that the de cision not to reclassify her w as base d on rac ial discrimination, beca

use none of

th e n o n -m i n o ri t y

co mp ar at o rs s h e o ff

er s qu al i fy

as s i m i l ar l y

s i tu ated. Rus se ll n a me s a

numbe r o f whit e e mpl oy e e s w ho m sh e be lie ve s He ss r e c la ssi fi e d o r o the rw ise advanc ed, but she doe s not specify how they wer e similarly situated to he r other than that they wer e supervised by

Hess. Al t h o ug h “[t] he plaintiff ne ed not demonstrate an exact cor relation with the employ ee r ece iving more favor able tre atment i n order for the two to be considere d simil arly -situated

. . . th e e mpl oy e e wi th w ho m the pla int if f se e ks to co mpa

re him se lf or he rs e lf mus t be simi lar i n a ll of the re le v an t a s p e c ts
. ” E r ceg o vi ch v. Goody ear , 154 F.3d 344, 352 ( 6th Cir. 1998) (interna l
c itatio ns and

qu otatio ns omi tte d) (e mph a sis in o ri g ina l)
. Al tho ug h Rus se ll ne e d no t de mon str a te that these e mploy ees w ere simil arly situated to her in eve ry respe ct, s he would need to show that they pe rf or me d ta sk s r ou g hly

sim ila r to he r ow n an d that the y we re g ive n c la ssi fi c a tio ns hig he r t ha n h e rs .No. 07-3808

Ru sse ll v . O hio

- 11 - Rus se ll d oe s su

pp ly de ta ils a

bo ut B arb e e ’s re c la ssi fi c a tio n, a c ir c ums tanc e Rus se ll is ti me barr ed from raising
. Even so, the facts she recounts indicate that B arbe e wa s not simi larly situated to R us se ll. Pr ior

to h e r r e c la ssi fi c a tio n, B arb e e wa s a Tr a ini ngSup e rv iso r a

nd ha d d uti e s d ist inc tly differ ent from Russell’s. More over, B arbe e’s r ecla ssification was late ral, while Russell sought an upwar d rec lassification.
A lt h o u g h Ru s s e ll ma

y h a v e b e e n e n ti tl e d to a r e c la s s if ic a ti o n , s h e h a s n o t s h o w nthat her
e mpl oy e r’ s f

a ilure to re c la ssi fy he r wa s ba se d on ra c e be c a us e sh e ha s no t ide nti fi e d any sim ila rl y
s i tu a t e d n o n - m i n o r i t y e mp l o ye e s w h o w e r e t r e a t e d d i f f e r e n t l y.
Russell also face s difficulties in her failure- to-promote claim, beca use she did not apply

for
an y o f t h e posi tions for which she w as passe d over. Russell objects to the c ircumstance s under which thre e women in he r office were hired for jobs Russ ell would have liked to f ill, but none of the
s i t u at i o n s allows her to make a cle ar c ase unde r the four -prongtest. Apply ing the M c D o n n e ll Douglas standard to a

failure to promote claim, the plaintiff must show that: “(1) [s] he is a membe r of a pr otected c lass; (2) [s] he applied and was qualified for a promoti on; (3) [s] he wa s considere d for a nd denied the p romotion; and (4) other employ ees of

simil ar qua lifications who wer e not members of the protec ted class rec eived promotions.” Dews v. A.B. D ick Co. , 231 F.3d 1016, 1020- 21 (6th Cir. 2000). Russell’s alleg ations do not fit neatly within the McD onnell Douglas framework be cause she
never applied for

or wa s considere d for any of t he posi tions. However , the fa cts which she a lleg esNo. 07-3808

Ru sse ll v . O hio

- 12 - do ra ise the po ssi bil ity

tha t he r em plo y e r i nte nti on a lly

a vo ide d p os tin g job s f

or wh ic h Ru sse ll w ou ld have be en qualifie d. But e ven under a ver sion of the McD onnell Douglas te st a pp ro pr iate to t

he fa c ts of Russell’s situation, she would not be able to make out of claim of discrimination. For e ach of her alleg ations, Russell either fails to show that she wa s qualified for the job, fails to show that she wa s simil arly situated to the p er s o n who re ceive d the job, or fa ils to show that the nondiscriminatory
re a so ns g ive n f

or he r e mpl oy e r’ s a c tio ns we re pr e te xtua l.
I n J uly 2002, Ba rbee was re classified f

rom Tra ining Super

visor to AA4. Russell alleg es that Ba rbee ’s re classification placed B arbe e in a r ole that Russell could have filled had the position been posted for c ompetitive bid. Russ ell admits that she was not qualified for the AA 4 position as descr ibed, but she alleg es that she wa s qualified to p erform the duties B arbe e ac tually perf ormed, duties which Russell claims differ ed substantially from the du t i es put forth in the position descr iption.
Rus s e ll ’ s c la im

h an g s o ne s ta

b li s h in g e it

h e r th a t H e s s ma d e B ar

b e e ’ s jo b d e s c r iption int e nti on a lly

ina c c ur a te in o rd e r t o e xclu de Rus se ll o r t hat H e ss d id n ot p os t th e po sit ion in o rd e r t o exclude Russell. S he does not e stablish e ither point. Russ ell’s asser tions—that Bar

bee’ s rea l duties
wer e not those listed in her position description and that Rus s el l herself was qua lified to perf

orm Ba rbee ’s ac tual duties—are conjec tural and conclusory , and Russell “ca nnot rely on conjec ture or conclusory

acc usations” to survive summary judgme nt. Se e Ar e nd

alev . Ci ty of M e mp his , 519 F.3d 587, 605 (6th Cir. 2008).No. 07-3808

Ru sse ll v . O hio

- 13 - Ev e n if Rus se ll w e re to e sta

bli sha pr ima fa c ie c a se wi th re g ard to He ss’ s dec isi on no t to po st the job, nothing in the r ec o rd , o ther than Russell’s conc lusory alleg ations, sugg ests that Hess’s
e xplanatio n f

or the de c isi on

is p re te xtua l. I f Rus se ll e sta bli sh e s a pr ima fa c ie c a se , the burd e n s hif ts to her e mpl o y er to give a nondiscriminatory

rea son for its actions. De ws , 231 F.3d at 1021. The burden the n shifts back to Russell to show that her employ er’ s proffe red r easons are pretextual. Id. Wi th r e g ar d to h is d e c is io nn o t t o p o s t t h e A A 4 p o s it io nf

o r a p p li c a ti o n , H e s s e xp la in e d th a t the
rea son for re classifying B arbe e wa s not that the division needed a ne w e m p loy ee w ith the revised position description but that the revised de scription better matched the duties B arbe e alr eady perf ormed. Russell does not prese nt evidence to cast doubt on this plausible ex planation.
Simi lar a naly sis applies to Russell’s claims about W eis’s AA 3 p o s it io n. Even if Russell wer e to establish a prima fa cie c ase, she does not establish that He s s ’s explanation for Weis’s transfe r—that it was made as par t of a g ener al eff

ort to sa ve the jobs of employ ees in a downsizi ng div isi on —is pr e te xtua l.
Neither does Russell overc ome s ummary judgme nt with reg ard to he r employ er’ s decision to hire Mag azine for the Manag ement Analy sts Supervisor 2 position. Even assuming Russell was otherwise qua lified for the position, she does not show that Hess’s reason for a dding the d i s q ualifying PSMQs had any thing to do with her

rac e. Craddoc k, the Afr ican- Americ an woman pr ima ri ly re sp on sib le fo r ad din g the PSMQ s, e xpla ine d how the se sp e c if ic qu a lif ic a tio ns re late d to the job function. Russell’s c onclusory asser tion that the rea l r eason f

or the PSMQs was to exclude he r b a se d o n h e r r a c e is n ot s uf fi c ie nt t o o ve rc ome summa ry jud g me nt.No. 07-3808

Ru sse ll v . O hio

- 14 - Fundamentally , Russell does not show that race motivated any of t h e wor

kplace decisions of wh ic h sh e c omp la ins
. I n e a c h sit uatio n, e ith e r sh e do e s no t sh ow that tho se tr e a ted di ffe re ntl y from her wer e similarly

situated to her, or

her e mploy er c an off

er a valid, rac e-ne utral rea son for the de c isi on . Summa

ry jud g me nt w a s a

pp ro pr iate on

Rus se ll’ s d isc ri min a tio n c la ims
. B.
None of Russell’s claims of reta liation are sufficient to make out a prima fa cie c ase. She
e ith e r f a ils to e sta

bli shthat he r e mpl oy e r a c tua lly too k a ny a dv e rs e a c tio n a g a inst her or fa ils to establish that the adve rse a ction was c ausally linked to her EEO C claim. Russell first mentions Craddock’ s hara ssment complaint. Cra ddock’s complaint ultimately resulted in a n investigation by OD AS a nd a fi nd ingtha

t Ru sse ll w a s wi thi n he r ri g hts to f ile va ri ou s c ha rg e s and c omp la int s a g a ins t Cr a dd oc k. Rus se ll w a s n ot h arm e d b ut r a the r w a s v ind ic a te d by thi s p ro c e ss. To e sta

bli sha pr ima fac ie ca se of r etaliation, Russell must s how not only that she “e ng ag ed in a pr otected a ctivity ” and that he r “ e mpl oy e r kn ew of the e xer c ise of the pr ote c te d r ig ht, ” bu t a lso that “ an a dv e rs e employ m ent action was subsequently taken a g ainst” her

and that “the re w as a c ausal c onnection betwee n the protec ted ac tivity and the a dverse employ

ment action.” Nis wan de r v . Ci nc inn ati In s. Co. , 529 F.3d 714, 720 (6th Cir. 2008)
. Conducting an investigation a nd issuing a r eport in Russell’s fa vo r i s n ot a

n a c tio n a dv e rs e to R

us se ll.
Rus se ll n e xt poi nts to t

he De pu ty State CI O’ s “pe rf or manc e e xpe c tatio ns ” me mo. Rus se ll, who re peate dly

contac ted manag ement with var i o u s compl aints about her w ork environme nt, canNo. 07-3808

Ru sse ll v . O hio

- 15 - hardly complain that her

employ er issued a

response addre ssing some o f the ve ry conce rns she raised. T he fa ct that her

employ er’ s evaluation of the problem differ ed from Russell’s does not make her e mploy er’ s action mater ially adver se. In order

to establish an adver se employ ment action, “a pla int if f mus t show that a re a so na ble e mpl oy e e wo uld have fo un d the c ha lle ng e d a c tio n mate ri a lly adver se, which . . . me ans it well might have dissuaded a re asonable worke r fr om making or supporting a

char g e of discr imination.” Burlington N orthern and Sante Fe Ry . Co. , 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). A rea sonable e mploy ee w ould not be dissuaded fr om making a char g e of discr imination by the knowledg e that h er em ploy er mig ht evaluate her situation and r espond, albe it in a manner not fu l l y t o t h e e mp l o y ee ’s l i k i n g.
F ina lly , Ru sse ll a lle g e s th a t Ma g a zine g a ve her a neg a tiv e pe rf or manc e re vie w. Rus se ll
a sse rt s, bu t doe s not atte mpt to de mon str a te , that this re vie w wa s link e d to he r E EO C c la im. Whil e Ru s s e ll ma

y h a v e b e e nd is ma

y e d b y th e r e v ie w , th e a c t o f

f il in g an E E O C c la im

d o e s n o t i mm

u n iz e her f rom all neg ative fe edbac k in he r workplac e. To survive summary judgme nt, she must show a
c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o nb e t w e e nt h e E E O C c l a i m an d th e a c t i o nt h a ts h e a l l e g e s w a s r e t a l i a t o r y. Summary judgme nt is appropriate on the issue of re taliation.
C. Summary judgme nt is a lso a

ppropriate on the issue of hostile work e nvironment. Russell’s claim stems from the f

act that the O DAS investigation of C raddoc k’s complaint re veale d that sever al of Ru ss ell’s c o- wo rk e rs a vo id s pe a kin g to h e r. Rus se ll h a s n ot a lle g e d th a t he r c o- wo rk e rs ’No. 07-3808

Ru sse ll v . O hio

- 16 - comments wer e base d upon or motivated by rac e or r elig ion, an eleme nt of any hostile work environment claim. Ha

ffo rd , 1 8 3 F
. 3 d a t 5 1 2 ( e nu me r a ti n g th e e le me n ts o f a p r im a fa cie c ase)
. Mo re ov e r, me re so c ia l avo ida nc e wi tho ut m or e is n ot t he ki nd ha rm that g ive s r ise to a

c la im. Court’s are instructed to examine the “se verity ” of the alleg edly hostile behavior, including“whe ther it is phy sically

threatening or humiliating.” Ha ffo rd , 1 83 F .3 d at 512 . T he c ir c ums tanc e s Ru sse ll
asser ts are mild when e valuated by this standard.

D.
Th e natur e of

Rus se ll’ s h arm s d o n ot m a ke he r a cand id ate f or inj un c tiv e re lie f. Rus se ll
a lle g e s a numbe r o f h arm s— fo r i ns tanc e , th a t he r e mpl oy e r e xpos e s h e r t o d isp ro po rt ion a te discipline and refuses to allow her to rema in in her workspac e after the end of he r workda y —all of wh ic h a re ha rm s r e me dia

ble thr ou g h da ma g e s. “ Th e ba sis of inj un c tiv e re lie f i n th e fe de ra l c ourt s has alway s been irrepa

rable harm and inade quacy of leg al re medies.” Beac on Theaters v. W estove r , 359 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1959). The decision t o gra n t or deny injunctive relief

is within t he sound discretion of the district court. Kallst rom v. City of Columbus , 136 F.3d 1055, 1067 ( 6th Cir. 1998). T h e di s t ri ct co u rt co rr ec t l y n o t ed t h at R u s s el l ’s al l ege d h arm s co u l d b e fu l l y ad dr e s s e d t h ro u gh standard T itle VI Ireme dies and ther efor e that injunctive re lief wa s not appropriate.
III . For the fore g oing r easons, we AFF I RM the district court’s or der g rantingsummary judgme nt to O DA S and

Ge or g e He ss a

nd de nyinginj un c tiv e re lie f t o Ca ro ly n Ru sse ll.