[Cite as State v. Wem, 2014-Ohio-2326.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

COSHOCTON COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Plaintiff-Appellee 

-vsSHAWN C. WEM 

 Defendant-Appellant 

JUDGES: 

Hon. William B. Hoffman, P. J. 

Hon. John W. Wise, J. 

Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

Case No. 13 CA 20 

O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal Appeal from the Municipal Court, 

Case No. TRC 1300616 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: May 29, 2014 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

CHRISTIE M. L. THORNSLEY JEFFREY G. KELLOG 

ASSISTANT LAW DIRECTOR ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER 

760 Chestnut Street 239 North Fourth Street 

Coshocton, Ohio 43812 Coshocton, Ohio 43812 
[Cite as State v. Wem, 2014-Ohio-2326.]

Wise, J. 

{¶1} Appellant appeals the July 29, 2013, decision of the Coshocton County 

Municipal Court denying his motion to suppress. 

{¶2} Appellee is the State of Ohio. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

{¶3} On April 24, 2013, Rickie Workman an employee of the Coshocton Village 

Inn and Suites called the Coshocton County Sheriff to report a possible intoxicated 

driver. Mr. Workman identified himself and his place of employment and advised the 

dispatcher that a male who appeared to be intoxicated, later identified as Appellant 

Shawn C. Wem, came into the hotel and took a large number of brochures from a rack 

located by the front door. (T. at 6). This rack of brochures is about 15 feet from the 

clerk's desk. (T. at 9). Mr. Workman stated that Appellant was stumbling and staggering. 

At one point, Appellant nearly fell down as he was looking at the brochures. (T. at 6) 

Appellant never spoke to Mr. Workman and never got close enough to him for Mr. 

Workman to smell the odor of alcohol. (T. at 6). Mr. Workman further testified that when 

Appellant left the lobby, he walked north. Mr. Workman knew there were no vehicles 

parked in that direction, so he went to the front door to watch Appellant. (T. at 6). He 

observed Appellant turn around and walk to the south end of the hotel. Appellant then 

got into his vehicle and drove toward McDonald's. Mr. Workman went back into the 

hotel and contacted the Sheriff’s Office. (T. at 6). 

{¶4} The Dispatch Narrative stated: "Rick Workman of Coshocton Village Inn 

and Suites advised a male subject came into the hotel and took a bunch of brochures, 
Coshocton County, Case No. 13 CA 20 3 

got into a silver Jeep Liberty and drove over to McDonalds drive-thru. FOE9857 was the 

license plate. Unit 42 went out for a test." (T. at 19). 

{¶5} Deputy Adam Mast was dispatched to investigate. Dispatch advised 

Deputy Mast that "an employee of Coshocton Village Inn and Suites said a man had 

come in and picked up a bunch of brochures from their brochure rack and he appeared 

to be drunk and got in his silver or gray Jeep and wound up in the McDonald's parking 

lot. And the clerk said he appeared to be intoxicated." (T. at 14). 

{¶6} Deputy Mast testified that when he arrived at McDonald's, Appellant's 

vehicle was stopped in the drive through. Deputy Mast parked his cruiser and 

approached Appellant's vehicle. Deputy Mast did not activate his sirens or lights. (T. at 

16-17). Deputy Mast advised Appellant that he had received a report that Appellant was 

under the influence and asked that Appellant pull over so he could conduct field sobriety 

tests to see if Appellant was able to drive. (T. at 15-16). Deputy Mast reported that he 

could not smell the odor of alcohol at this time. Appellant pulled over into a parking spot. 

(T. at 16-17). 

{¶7} Appellant was subsequently arrested and taken to the Coshocton County 

Jail for a breath test. 

{¶8} On April 24, 2013, Appellant was charged two counts of Operating a 

Vehicle under the Influence in violation of R.C. §4511.19(A)(1)(a) and 

§4511.19(A)(1)(d). 

{¶9} Appellant was set for arraignment on April 30, 2013. Appellant failed to 

appear on that date so a bench warrant was issued. Appellant was picked up on the 
Coshocton County, Case No. 13 CA 20 4 

bench warrant and appeared for the arraignment on May 10, 2013. Appellant entered a 

not guilty plea. 

{¶10} On July 12, 2013, Appellant filed a motion to suppress. 

{¶11} On July 17, 2013, a hearing on the motion to suppress was held. 

{¶12} On July 29, 2013, the trial court denied Appellant's motion to suppress. 

{¶13} On August 7, 2013, Appellant entered a no contest plea. 

{¶14} Appellant now appeals, assigning the following error: 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶15} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE.”

I.

{¶16} Appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding reasonable suspicion 

of criminal activity in this case. We disagree. 

{¶17} Appellate review of a trial court's decision to deny a motion to suppress 

involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Long, 127 Ohio App.3d 328, 332, 

713 N.E.2d 1 (4th Dist .1998). During a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the 

role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to 

evaluate witness credibility. State v. Brooks, 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 154, 1996–Ohio–134, 

661 N.E.2d 1030. A reviewing court is bound to accept the trial court's findings of fact if 

they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Medcalf, 111 Ohio App.3d 

142, 145, 675 N.E.2d 1268 (4th Dist.1996). Accepting these facts as true, the appellate 

court must independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial 

court's conclusion, whether the trial court's decision meets the applicable legal 
Coshocton County, Case No. 13 CA 20 5 

standard. State v. Williams, 86 Ohio App.3d 37, 42, 619 N.E.2d 1141 (4th Dist.1993), 

overruled on other grounds. 

{¶18} There are three methods of challenging a trial court's ruling on a motion to 

suppress on appeal. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court's finding of fact. In 

reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether the trial 

court's findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. See, State v. 

Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982); State v. Klein, 73 Ohio App.3d 486, 

597 N.E.2d 1141(4th Dist 1991). Second, an appellant may argue the trial court failed to 

apply the appropriate test or correct law to the findings of fact. In that case, an appellate 

court can reverse the trial court for committing an error of law. See, Williams, supra. 

Finally, an appellant may argue the trial court has incorrectly decided the ultimate or 

final issues raised in a motion to suppress. When reviewing this type of claim, an 

appellate court must independently determine, without deference to the trial court's 

conclusion, whether the facts meet the appropriate legal standard in any given case. 

State v. Curry, 95 Ohio App.3d 93, 96, 620 N.E.2d 906 (8th Dist.1994). 

{¶19} In the case sub judice, Appellant challenges the stop of his vehicle. An 

investigative stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution if the police have reasonable suspicion that “the person stopped is, or is 

about to be, engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 

101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). Reasonable suspicion can arise from information 

that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. Alabama v. White, 496 

U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). But it requires something more 

than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
Coshocton County, Case No. 13 CA 20 6 

27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). “[T]he Fourth Amendment requires at least a 

minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 

119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed .2d 570 (2000). 

{¶20} In the case sub judice, the police received a call from an identified 

informant. Where the information possessed by the police before the stop was solely 

from an informant's tip, the determination of reasonable suspicion will be limited to an 

examination of the weight to be given the tip and the reliability of the tip. Id. at 299, 720 

N.E.2d 507. Courts have generally identified three classes of informants: the 

anonymous informant, the known informant from the criminal world who has provided 

previous reliable tips, and the identified citizen informant. Id. at 300, 720 N.E.2d 507. An 

identified citizen informant may be highly reliable, and therefore a strong showing as to 

other indicia of reliability may be unnecessary. Id. Thus, courts have routinely credited 

the identified citizen informant with greater reliability. Id.

{¶21} Here, Appellant does not contest that the caller in this case was a reliable 

identified citizen informant. Rather, Appellant asserts the officer lacked sufficient 

probable cause to effectuate the stop as the officer did not personally observe 

Appellant's impaired driving. 

{¶22} In Maumee v. Weisner (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 295, the Ohio Supreme 

Court held: 

{¶23} “Having resolved this issue, we emphasize that our categorization of the 

informant as an identified citizen informant does not itself determine the outcome of this 

case. Instead it is one element of our totality of the circumstances review of this 

informant's tip, weighing in favor of the informant's reliability and veracity. Continuing 
Coshocton County, Case No. 13 CA 20 7 

our review, we believe that the informant's basis of knowledge also furthers his 

credibility. Typically, a personal observation by an informant is due greater reliability 

than a secondhand description. Gates, 462 U.S. at 233-234, 103 S.Ct. at 2329-2330, 76 

L.Ed.2d at 545. Here, the citizen's tip constituted an eyewitness account of the crime. 

His version of that night was not mere rumor or speculation. It was a firsthand report of 

the events as they happened. Also significant is the fact that the tip was an exact relay 

of the circumstances as they were occurring. Immediately upon witnessing the events, 

the citizen described them to the dispatcher. This immediacy lends further credibility to 

the accuracy of the facts being relayed, as it avoids reliance upon the informant's 

memory. 

{¶24} “We also believe the informant's motivation supports the reliability of his 

tip. According to the evidence, the informant reported that Weisner was weaving all over 

the road. He made this report from the perspective of a motorist sharing the road with 

another motorist driving erratically. We can reasonably infer from these circumstances 

that he considered Weisner a threat to him personally, as well as to other motorists and 

that he was motivated, therefore, not by dishonest and questionable goals, but by his 

desire to eliminate a risk to the public's safety. 

{¶25} “Taken together, these factors persuade us that the informant's tip is 

trustworthy and due significant weight. The informant was an identified citizen who 

based his knowledge of the facts he described upon his own observations as the events 

occurred. As a result, his tip merits a high degree of credibility and value, rendering it 

sufficient to withstand the Fourth Amendment challenge without independent police 
Coshocton County, Case No. 13 CA 20 8 

corroboration. Accordingly, the dispatch based upon this tip was issued on sufficient 

facts to justify Patrolman Roberts's investigative stop.” 

{¶26} “The simple corroboration of neutral details describing the suspect or other 

conditions existing at the time of the tip, without more, will not produce reasonable 

suspicion for an investigatory stop.” State v. Ramsey (Sept. 20, 1990), Franklin App No. 

89AP-1298, unreported. “A tip which standing alone would lack sufficient indicia of 

reliability may establish reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop if it is 

sufficiently corroborated through independent police work.” Id.

{¶27} Upon review, we find that Mr. Workman’s statements to the dispatcher 

included sufficient information to provide reasonable suspicion that Appellant was 

operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Mr. Workman provided 

the dispatcher with the make and color of Appellant's vehicle, along with the license 

plate number. Mr. Workman advised dispatch that he witnessed Appellant stumbling, 

staggering and nearly falling down in the hotel lobby. He further relayed to dispatch that 

he followed Appellant outside where he observed Appellant head in the wrong direction 

before eventually locating his car and driving away in the direction of the McDonald’s 

restaurant. 

{¶28} Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding there was reasonable 

articulable suspicion for the stop based on suspicion of criminal activity. 

 
Coshocton County, Case No. 13 CA 20 9 

{¶29} Appellant’s sole Assignment of Error is overruled. 

{¶30} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Municipal Court of 

Coshocton County, Ohio, is hereby affirmed. 

By: Wise, J. 

Hoffman, P. J., and 

Delaney, J., concur. 

JWW/d 0502