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*********************************************** 
IN RE MARCQUAN C.*

(AC 45087)

Moll, Clark and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent mother appealed to this court from the trial court’s judgment

denying her motion to revoke the commitment of her minor child to

the custody and care of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children

and Families. The mother claimed that the court erred in finding that

cause for commitment continued to exist. Held that the trial court’s

determination that the mother did not meet her burden to prove that

cause for commitment no longer existed was legally correct and factually

supported; there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the

court’s conclusion, including the testimony of the petitioner’s two witnesses that the mother had not adequately addressed her issues relating

to her ability to collaborate effectively with the Department of Children

and Families and to parent the minor child in a manner that would

afford him both physical and emotional safety.

Argued April 4—officially released May 18, 2022**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Families to adjudicate the respondents’ minor child uncared

for, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district

of New Haven, Juvenile Matters, where the court, Conway, J., adjudicated the child uncared for and ordered

protective supervision with custody vested in the respondent mother; thereafter, the court, Conway, J., extended

the period of protective supervision and sustained an

order of temporary custody vesting custody of the minor

child with the respondent father; subsequently, the court,

Hon. Richard E. Burke, judge trial referee, vacated the

order of temporary custody and ordered shared custody

and guardianship of the child between the respondent

parents with primary physical custody vesting in the

respondent father; thereafter, the court, Hon. Richard

E. Burke, judge trial referee, sustained an order of temporary custody vesting custody of the minor child in the

petitioner; subsequently, the court, Hon. Richard E.

Burke, judge trial referee, granted the motion filed by

the petitioner to open and modify the dispositive order

of protective supervision, and committed the child to the

custody of the petitioner; thereafter, the court, Conway,

J., denied the respondent mother’s motion to revoke

commitment, and the respondent mother appealed to

this court, Bright, C. J., and Prescott and Suarez, Js.,

which dismissed the appeal; subsequently, the court,

Hon. Richard E. Burke, judge trial referee, denied the

respondent mother’s motion to revoke commitment, and

the respondent mother appealed to this court. Affirmed.

David B. Rozwaski, assigned counsel, for the appellant

(respondent mother).

Seon Bagot, assistant attorney general, with whom, on

the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and Evan
O’Roark and Nisa Khan, assistant attorneys general, for

the appellee (petitioner).
Opinion

DiPENTIMA, J. The respondent mother, Monica C.,

appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying her

motion to revoke the commitment of her minor child,

Marcquan C., to the custody of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families (commissioner).1 On

appeal, the respondent contends that the court erred in

finding that cause for commitment continued to exist.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, which are either undisputed or

were found by the court, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. Marcquan C. is the

twelve year old child of the respondent and the father.

On September 6, 2016, the Department of Children and

Families (department) received its first referral concerning Marcquan from the Emergency Mobile Psychiatric

Services (EMPS).2 EMPS had responded to Marcquan’s

school after receiving a report that Marcquan, who was

five years old at the time, was exhibiting destructive

behaviors and was attempting to run out of the school

building. Marcquan also made concerning statements

about bringing a knife to school and about being fearful

of returning home because his mother beats him with a

belt. EMPS then contacted the respondent, but she

refused to go to the school. The respondent told EMPS

to contact the department to take Marcquan because she

did not want nor did she have time to deal with his

behaviors. The commissioner did not take custody of

Marcquan at that time and he remained in the care and

custody of the respondent. EMPS recommended that the

respondent engage Marcquan in mental health treatment

at the Yale Child Study Center. Marcquan was subsequently enrolled in therapy at the Yale Child Study Center

where he saw an outpatient clinician on a weekly basis.

In November, 2016, the department received its second

referral concerning Marcquan. According to the referral

from Marcquan’s school, Marcquan continued to exhibit

out of control behavior and had wrapped a cord around

his neck.

On January 13, 2017, the commissioner filed a petition

with the Superior Court alleging that Marcquan was being

neglected. On May 16, 2017, the neglect petition was

orally amended to allege only that Marcquan was uncared

for. That same day, the court adjudicated Marcquan

uncared for. The court ordered that Marcquan remain in

the care and custody of the respondent under protective

supervision for a period of six months. On October 12,

2017, the order of protective supervision was extended

for an additional six months. The commissioner filed a

motion to modify the order from protective supervision to

commitment on December 20, 2017. The parties agreed,

however, that Marcquan would remain in the respondent’s care provided that she (1) permit the department

access to her home, (2) sign releases, and (3) cooperate
with the department in securing a male mentor for Marcquan.

On February 5, 2018, Marcquan appeared in school

with a swollen eye and lines resembling belt marks on

his temple. The respondent admitted to disciplining Marcquan by ‘‘beating’’ him on the buttocks with a belt. The

respondent theorized that while doing so, she might have

inadvertently struck him on the head with the belt.

According to Marcquan, this was not an isolated incident.

Marcquan expressed concern that one day the respondent would get so mad that she might shoot him.

On February 7, 2018, the department filed an affidavit

seeking permission to place Marcquan in an out-of-home

placement. The affidavit alleged that the respondent had

‘‘exerted excessive physical discipline on [Marcquan],’’

that she was ‘‘unable to control her impulses,’’ and that

she had ‘‘unaddressed mental health issues.’’ That same

day, the court vested temporary custody of Marcquan

with his father. On April 11, 2018, with the parties’ consent, the court vacated the order of temporary custody.

The court ordered that the father and the respondent

share custody and guardianship of Marcquan, with the

fatherhavingprimaryphysicalresidence.Protectivesupervision remained in place until August 11, 2018.

Nevertheless, on July 10, 2018, at an in-court review

hearing, the father reported that he could no longer

care for Marcquan due to Marcquan’s out of control

behavior. As a result, the department invoked a ninetysix hour hold of Marcquan. On July 12, 2018, the court

concluded that Marcquan was ‘‘in immediate physical

danger from [his] surroundings,’’ ‘‘[a]s a result of said

conditions, [his] safety [was] endangered and immediate removal from such surroundings [was] necessary

to ensure [his] safety,’’ and ‘‘continuation in the home

[was] contrary to [his] welfare.’’ The court therefore

vested temporary care and custody of Marcquan with

the commissioner. The court also set forth specific

steps to facilitate reunification between the respondent

and Marcquan.3

On July 17, 2018, the commissioner filed a motion to

open and modify the order of protective supervision and

to modify the disposition to an order of commitment.

In support of the motion, the commissioner incorporated, by reference, an affidavit prepared by a department social worker dated July 12, 2018. The affidavit

provided that Marcquan’s father had informed the court

that he could no longer care for Marcquan and that

the respondent was admitted to a local hospital under

observation and thus was also unable to care for Marcquan. According to the affidavit, there were no other

known potential family resources for Marcquan. The

affidavit concluded that Marcquan had ‘‘no responsible

caretaker to provide for his needs and immediate removal

from such surroundings [was] necessary to ensure the

child’s safety.’’
A hearing was held on July 27, 2018, and the court

granted the commissioner’s motion to modify the order

of protective supervision and committed Marcquan to

the care and custody of the commissioner. Since that time,

Marcquan has remained committed to the care and custody of the commissioner, and the father has had no

further involvement with the department. Marcquan

was placed in nonrelative foster care until September

4, 2019, when he was placed with his godmother.

On September 30, 2019, the respondent filed her first

motion to revoke commitment of Marcquan to the care

and custody of the commissioner. Before the court held

a hearing on the motion to revoke commitment, the

commissioner filed a motion, on October 19, 2019, seeking a psychological evaluation of both Marcquan and

the respondent. The court held a hearing on the commissioner’s motion for psychological evaluation on October

29, 2019. The court subsequently denied the motion

based on its belief that issuing a court-ordered psychological evaluation would be futile due to the respondent’s refusal to cooperate.

The court held a hearing on the respondent’s first

motion to revoke commitment on November 25, 2019,

and December 18, 2019. On December 26, 2019, the

court, Conway, J., issued a memorandum of decision.

The court found that, although the respondent participated in supervised visits with her son, she continued

to make inappropriate comments and to engage in inappropriate conversations in Marcquan’s presence. Additionally, she failed to develop skills or a working knowledge of positive and effective forms of discipline. The

court also found that the respondent struggled to collaborate effectively with social workers from the department, noting that, by September, 2019, the case had

been assigned to the department’s sixth social worker.

The court further determined that any benefits the

respondent had derived from her weekly counseling

sessions were not ‘‘carrying over’’ to her reunification

efforts with Marcquan or her ability to properly care for

him. The court found that there had been no discernable

improvement regarding the respondent’s ability to conform her behavior so as to make it in Marcquan’s best

interest to return to her care. The court explained that

without a credible psychological evaluation, it was

impossible to understand or predict how the respondent

would react to and with others, including Marcquan.

The court further explained that ‘‘past and present reality has stalled Marcquan’s return to [the respondent’s]

care and has undoubtedly negatively impacted Marcquan’s fragile well-being.’’ The court thus reconsidered

its prior denial of the commissioner’s motion for a psychological evaluation and ordered the respondent to

participate in a court-ordered psychological evaluation.

On the basis of the record before it, the court denied

the first motion to revoke commitment on the ground
that the respondent failed to establish that cause for

commitment no longer existed. The court explained

that the respondent ‘‘has to understand that until she

demonstrates an ability to collaboratively and effectively interact with [the department] and service providers and she demonstrates a sustained ability to parent

Marcquan in a manner which affords him both physical

and emotional safety, reunification is highly unlikely.

While no guarantee, her participation in a court-ordered

evaluation and her sustained and effective follow through

with treatment recommendations may potentially be

the key to a reinvigorated reunification process.’’

The respondent then appealed from the court’s order

requiring her to participate in a psychological evaluation. This court dismissed the respondent’s appeal, concluding that the order for a psychological evaluation

was not part of the court’s judgment denying the respondent’s motion to revoke commitment and was not otherwise an appealable final judgment. See In re Marcquan

C., 202 Conn. App. 520, 523, 246 A.3d 41, cert. denied,

336 Conn. 924, 246 A.3d 492 (2021). A court-ordered

psychological evaluation never occurred. Rather, the

respondent arranged her own psychological evaluation

with Ralph Balducci, a psychologist.

On April 26, 2021, the respondent filed her second

motion to revoke commitment, which is the subject of

the present appeal. The court held a hearing on the

motion on July 1, 2021. At the beginning of the hearing,

the court granted the commissioner’s motion for judicial notice concerning prior hearings. The respondent

called Balducci as a witness before testifying herself.

The commissioner called Lucy Hernandez, Marcquan’s

therapist, and Andre Turner, a social worker previously

assigned to the case, to testify.

In a memorandum of decision dated September 21,

2021, the court, Hon. Richard E. Burke, judge trial

referee, concluded that grounds for commitment continued to exist and, therefore, denied the respondent’s

motion to revoke commitment. The court incorporated

by reference the memorandum of decision, dated December 26, 2019, denying the respondent’s first motion to

revoke commitment. The court also made the following

additional findings of fact: ‘‘The respondent mother

stated that she gets ‘triggered’ by [the department]. At

one visit to the [department] offices on May 7, [2021]

she was asked by security to take out her identification

from her wallet to show it. The respondent mother

thought that seeing it through the plastic opening in

her wallet should be sufficient. Security did not agree

and the respondent mother got ‘triggered.’ In addition to

using racially charged language, the respondent mother

told the [department] social worker that she would have

him ‘touched,’ which he stated was a serious threat of

harm. This took place in the presence of Marcquan. In

the prior memorandum of decision denying [the respon-
dent’s] motion to revoke, [the court] stated that: ‘The

respondent mother has to understand that until she

demonstrates an ability to collaboratively and effectively interact with [the department] and service providers and she demonstrates a sustained ability to parent

Marcquan in a manner which affords him both physical

and emotional safety, reunification is highly unlikely.’

. . . Without question, [the respondent] has been

unwilling or unable to collaborate with [the department]. Her behavior has gone far beyond a lack of

collaboration.’’ The court therefore concluded that

grounds for commitment continued to exist and denied

the respondent’s second motion to revoke commitment.

This appeal followed.4

We begin by setting forth the legal principles and

standard of review that govern our analysis of the

respondent’s claim on appeal. ‘‘A motion to revoke commitment is governed by [General Statutes] § 46b-129

(m) and Practice Book § 35a-14A. Section 46b-129 (m)

provides: ‘The commissioner, a parent or the child’s

attorney may file a motion to revoke a commitment,

and, upon finding that cause for commitment no longer

exists, and that such revocation is in the best interests

of such child or youth, the court may revoke the commitment of such child or youth. No such motion shall

be filed more often than once every six months.’ ’’ In

re Zoey H., 183 Conn. App. 327, 344, 192 A.3d 522, cert.

denied, 330 Conn. 906, 192 A.3d 425 (2018).

‘‘Pursuant to § 46b-129 (j) (2), a trial court, prior to

awarding custody of [a] child to the department pursuant to an order of commitment . . . must both find

and adjudicate the child on one of three [statutorily

defined] grounds: uncared for, neglected or [abused].

. . . Adjudication on any of these grounds requires factual support, and [t]he trial court’s determination thereafter as to whether to maintain or revoke the commitment is largely premised on that prior adjudication.

. . . Accordingly, [t]he court, in determining whether

cause for commitment no longer exists . . . look[s] to

the original cause for commitment to see whether the

conduct or circumstances that resulted in commitment

continue to exist.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Santiago

G., 318 Conn. 449, 470, 121 A.3d 708 (2015).

Practice Book § 35a-14A provides in relevant part:

‘‘Where a child or youth is committed to the custody

of the [c]ommissioner . . . the commissioner, a parent

or the child’s attorney may file a motion seeking revocation of commitment. The judicial authority may revoke

commitment if a cause for commitment no longer exists

and it is in the best interests of the child or youth.

Whether to revoke the commitment is a dispositional

question, based on the prior adjudication, and the judicial authority shall determine whether to revoke the

commitment upon a fair preponderance of the evidence.
The party seeking revocation of commitment has the

burden of proof that no cause for commitment exists.

If the burden is met, the party opposing the revocation

has the burden of proof that revocation would not be

in the best interests of the child. . . .’’

‘‘Pursuant to § 46b-129 (m) and Practice Book § 35a14A, the moving party bears the burden of proving that

a cause for commitment no longer exists; if he or she

is successful, the court then must determine whether

revocation of commitment is in the best interest of the

child.’’ In re Zoey H., supra, 183 Conn. App. 344–45.

‘‘Our Supreme Court has held that a natural parent,

whose child has been committed to the custody of a

third party, is entitled to a hearing to demonstrate that

no cause for commitment still exists. . . . The initial

burden is placed on the [person] applying for the revocation of commitment to allege and prove that cause for

commitment no longer exists. . . . If the party challenging the commitment meets that initial burden, the

commitment to the third party may then be modified

if such change is in the best interest of the child. . . .

The burden falls on the persons vested with guardianship to prove that it would not be in the best interests

of the child to be returned to his or her natural parents.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 350–51.

‘‘On appeal, our function is to determine whether the

trial court’s conclusion was legally correct and factually

supported. We do not examine the record to determine

whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached . . . nor do we retry

the case or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses.

. . . The determinations reached by the trial court . . .

will be disturbed only if [any challenged] finding is

not supported by the evidence and [is], in light of the

evidence in the whole record, clearly erroneous.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Brooklyn O., 196

Conn. App. 543, 548, 230 A.3d 895 (2020). In the present

appeal, the respondent does not challenge any specific

factual finding made by the trial court. As a result, we

review the record to determine whether the trial court’s

conclusion was legally correct and factually supported.

The respondent claims that the trial court erred in

denying her second motion to revoke commitment.5 Specifically, the respondent contends that ‘‘the trial court

in its decision essentially found that cause for commitment continued to exist because of the respondent’s

inability to effectively work with [the department].’’ In

her view, the trial court only referenced ‘‘one specific

instance as a factual basis to support this finding which

was the [department] office visit.’’6 We conclude that

there was sufficient evidence in the record to support

the court’s conclusion that cause for commitment still

existed.

At the hearing on the respondent’s second motion to
revoke commitment, the court heard testimony from

Lucy Hernandez, Marcquan’s therapist. Hernandez testified that Marcquan was very quiet and withdrawn, but,

depending on his placement, his mood would change.

Hernandez explained that Marcquan was diagnosed

with dysthymia, a depressive order, the symptoms of

which include a depressed mood, irritability, anger, low

self-esteem, and appearing withdrawn. When asked

whether Marcquan’s symptoms were ever exacerbated

or aggravated after interaction with the respondent,

Hernandez testified: ‘‘I clinically believe that there are

some impacts of his behavior and his mood. I think a

lot of it has to do with frustration and irritability that

he has described in sessions of whether it be feeling

stuck in between, but also [split] amongst individuals.’’

Hernandez also testified that Marcquan generally became

more withdrawn after his visits with the respondent.

According to Hernandez, Marcquan has stated that he

was not interested in engaging in family therapy because

he would not want the respondent to hurt Hernandez’

feelings. Hernandez testified that Marcquan needs a

nurturing, structured environment.

The court also heard the testimony of Andre Turner,

a social worker employed by the department who previously had been assigned to the case in May, 2020, but

then subsequently was removed from the case due to

threats made by the respondent. According to Turner,

the commissioner’s main concern regarding the respondent was her history of physically and verbally abusing

Marcquan. Turner testified that the respondent had not

participated in a court-ordered psychological evaluation, despite Judge Conway’s order to do so.7 When

asked about the lack of visitation between the respondent and Marcquan, Turner testified that Marcquan did

not want any in-person visits with the respondent

because of the respondent’s history of negative behavior. Turner further testified that during one in-person

visit in May, 2021, after the respondent arrived at the

department office, an incident occurred between the

respondent and a security guard. According to Turner,

the security guard advised the respondent that she was

required to show him her identification, and the respondent showed it to him through her clear wallet. Turner

testified that the security guard then asked the respondent to take her identification out of the wallet, at which

point the respondent started to become disagreeable.

Turner averred that he advised the respondent that if

she was unable to follow the security guidelines, then

he would not be able to facilitate the visit. According

to Turner, the respondent then began to scream at him,

called him names, made racist and derogatory remarks,

and threatened him. Marcquan witnessed the entire incident and began crying. Turner also testified that the

respondent had a history of making inappropriate statements in the presence of Marcquan, and that he was

not the first social worker to whom the respondent
had made derogatory comments. Finally, when asked

whether the respondent had accomplished some of the

court-ordered specific steps, Turner testified ‘‘no.’’

On the basis of our review of the record, we conclude

that the court’s determination that the respondent did

not meet her burden to prove that cause for commitment no longer existed was legally correct and factually

supported. The testimony of the commissioner’s two

witnesses provided sufficient evidence from which the

court could have found that cause for commitment continued to exist. Specifically, the testimony supported

the court’s conclusion that the respondent had not adequately addressed her (1) issues relating to her ability

to collaborate effectively with the department, and (2)

ability to parent Marcquan in a manner that would

afford him both physical and emotional safety.8

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142

(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this

appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open

for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon

order of the Appellate Court.

** May 18, 2022, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,

is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 The mother, Monica C., is hereinafter referred to as the respondent. The

father, Mark B., although also a respondent in the underlying proceedings,

is not participating in this appeal and for clarity is hereinafter referred to

as the father.

The attorney for the minor child has submitted a statement, pursuant to

Practice Book § 79a-6 (c), adopting the commissioner’s brief on appeal.

2 EMPS is a community based emergency service intended to provide

children and families with immediate access to in-person care when a child

is experiencing an emotional or behavioral crisis. EMPS is funded by the

department.

3 The specific steps set forth by the court on July 12, 2018, instructed the

respondent: (1) to keep all appointments set by or with the department and

to cooperate with home visits by the department or Marcquan’s attorney;

(2) to inform the department of her and Marcquan’s location at all times;

(3) to take part in counseling and to make progress toward identified treatment goals; (4) to submit to random drug testing; (5) to refrain from the

use of illegal drugs and the abuse of alcohol or medicine; (6) to cooperate

with service providers; (7) to cooperate with court-ordered evaluations or

testing; (8) to sign releases allowing the department to communicate with

service providers to check on attendance, cooperation, and progress towards

identified goals; (9) to sign releases allowing Marcquan’s attorney to review

her medical, psychological, psychiatric, and educational records; (10) to

maintain adequate housing and legal income; (11) to notify the department

concerning any changes in the makeup of her household to make sure

that the change would not hurt the health and safety of Marcquan; (12) to

cooperate with any restraining or protective order or safety plan approved

by the department to avoid domestic violence incidents; (13) to attend and

complete an appropriate domestic violence program; (14) to not get involved

with the criminal justice system and to follow any conditions of probation

or parole; (15) to visit Marcquan as often as the department permitted; (16)

to inform the department of any person she would like the department to

investigate and to consider as a placement resource for Marcquan; and (17)

to tell the department the names and addresses of the grandparents of

Marcquan.

4 The respondent appeals only from the judgment of the trial court denying

her second motion to revoke commitment.

5 Although the respondent argues that the court erred in denying her

second motion to revoke commitment, she concedes that revocation would

not necessarily be in the child’s best interests at this time because the
commissioner has not properly engaged the respondent and her child with

appropriate services. The respondent requests that this court reverse the

judgment of the trial court denying her second motion to revoke commitment, ‘‘remand the case back to the trial court with instructions to stay the

decision on the motion to revoke, and order the parties to fully cooperate

with a court-ordered psychological evaluation to include the respondent,

the minor child, and if appropriate, an interactional between the respondent

and child, and to follow the recommendations of the evaluator, and then

to hear additional evidence on the outcome of the implementation of the

recommendation before issuing a final ruling.’’ We reject the respondent’s

particular request for relief because we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

6 The respondent also argues, in the alternative, that ‘‘it was not clearly

demonstrated that it was in the best interest of the child to deny the motion

to revoke when appropriate services to facilitate reunification were not

implemented.’’ We note, however, that the party seeking revocation of commitment has the burden to prove that no cause for commitment exists. Only

if the movant satisfies that burden does the burden shift to the party opposing

the revocation to show that revocation would not be in the best interests

of the child. See In re Zoey H., supra, 183 Conn. App. 344. We need not

address this argument because we affirm the court’s conclusion that the

respondent failed to satisfy her burden of proving that no cause for commitment continued to exist.

7

In its memorandum of decision, the court found that the respondent

credibly argued that, at some point, the department did not cooperate with

the court-ordered psychological evaluation as it related to the child-parent

relationship.

8 The respondent also argues that she ‘‘did demonstrate that she continued

to be engaged in ongoing therapy and that contrary to . . . Turner’s testimony that [she] had not addressed the concerns regarding her anger issues

and its impact on parenting, [she] offered expert testimony to the contrary.’’

However, ‘‘we repeatedly have held that [i]n a [proceeding] tried before a

court, the trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses

and the weight to be given specific testimony. . . . Where there is conflicting evidence . . . we do not retry the facts or pass on the credibility of the

witnesses. . . . The probative force of conflicting evidence is for the trier

to determine.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Arroyo v. University of

Connecticut Health Center, 175 Conn. App. 493, 513, 167 A.3d 1112, cert.

denied, 327 Conn. 973, 174 A.3d 192 (2017); see also In re Brooklyn O.,

supra, 196 Conn. App. 548 (‘‘[w]e do not examine the record to determine

whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than the

one reached . . . nor do we retry the case or pass upon the credibility of

the witnesses’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).