FILE 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 

STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) 

) 

.Respondent, ) No. 87740-8 

) 

v. ) En Bane 

) 

JOSH SANCHEZ, ) fJUll8 2013 ) Filed 

Petitioner. ) 

) 

) 

WIGGINS, J.-When a juvenile sex offender is returned to the community, 

Washington law requires local authorities to determine the risk posed by the juvenile 

and to notify the community accordingly. Petitioner Josh Sanchez, a juvenile sex 

offender, argues that the legislature shifted risk determination from local law 

enforcement to a state committee within the Department of Corrections (DOC). For 

this reason, he argues that the superior court should not release his offender 

information to the King County Sheriff's Office. However, Sanchez misreads the 

statute: while the legislature did grant new authority to the DOC, it did so in addition 

to the prior authority granted to local law enforcement, thus imposing a parallel 

responsibility on both entities. We therefore hold that the juvenile court may properly 

release the evaluation of Sanchez that resulted in his receiving an alternative 

disposition for his sex offense. 
No. 87740-8 

Sanchez also contends that this disclosure to local law enforcement violates 

his constitutional and statutory rights to privacy. However, because the legislature 

had a rational basis for requiring its release to local law enforcement and because 

RCW 13.50.050 will prevent any subsequent public disclosure of his information, his 

right to privacy was not unduly curtailed. 

STATUTORY BACKGROUND 

Sanchez's case is governed by two separate but related statutory schemes: 

statutes providing for alternative dispositions for juvenile sex offenders and statutes 

requiring public notice of a sex offender's release. A preliminary overview provides 

the background. 

A. Special sex offender disposition alternative (SSODA) 

Juveniles facing a first-time conviction for certain sex offenses in Washington 

may seek a clement alternative to traditional sentencing called a special sex 

offender disposition alternative (SSODA). See RCW 13.40.162. If a juvenile is 

SSODA eligible, the court may order an evaluation to determine the offender's 

amenability to treatment. /d. At a minimum, this evaluation must include a 

description of the juvenile's offense history, psychological evaluation, social and 

educational history, employment situation, his or her version of the facts in the case, 

and proposed treatment terms. RCW 13.40.162(2)(a)(i)-(v), (b )(i)-(v). The court then 

considers whether this alternative sentence will benefit the offender and the 

community. RCW 13.40.162(3). The typical SSODA sentence includes two years of 

outpatient treatment under a probation officer's supervision. /d. 

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B. Sex offender assessment and public notice 

In 1990, the legislature first enacted present-day RCW 4.24.550, requiring 

local law enforcement to notify the public when a sex offender was released from 

confinement. LAWS OF 1990, ch. 3, § 117. The statute requires local officials to 

assess each sex offender and assign a risk level (1, II, or Ill, with Ill being the most 

likely to reoffend). This assessment then determines the nature and extent of public 

notice. However, because it placed responsibility for assigning risk levels solely 

under the purview of local law enforcement, the original scheme raised two 

concerns: first, that similarly situated offenders would receive disparate treatment 

across jurisdictions, and second, that local authorities would lack sufficient 

information to reach accurate decisions. H.B. REP. on Engrossed Substitute S.B. 

5759, at 2, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1997). 

The legislature addressed these concerns in Laws of 1997, chapter 364, 

which created a role for the State in the risk assessment process. These 

amendments established an end-of-sentence review committee (ESRC) under the 

DOC tasked with assessing the risk posed by newly released sex offenders. RCW 

72.09.345(3), (5)(a). The amendments also required juvenile courts to "provide local 

law enforcement officials with all relevant information on offenders allowed to remain 

in the community in a timely manner." RCW 4.24.550(6). As we discuss in greater 

detail below, these amendments did nothing to displace local law enforcement's role. 

Rather, they established parallel authority for both the ESRC and local authorities in 

the risk assessment process. 

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No. 87740-8 

C. Juvenile sex offender notice and Substitute S.B. 5204 

Then, in 2011, the legislature passed Substitute S.B. 5204, which amended 

RCW 72.09.345 to add provisions pertaining to juveniles. See LAWS OF 2011, ch. 

338, § 5. These required the ESRC to assess the public risk posed by juveniles 

convicted of a sex offense in addition to the prior requirements for sex offenders 

generally. !d. § 5(3). Thus, the legislature made clear that the ESRC's risk 

assessments and narrative notices would apply with equal force to both juvenile and 

adult sex offenders. However, Substitute S.B. 5204 did nothing to alter the duties 

that RCW 4.24.550 imposed on local law enforcement. 

FACTS 

Thirteen-year-old Josh Sanchez pleaded guilty to one count of first degree 

child molestation in juvenile court. In lieu of a traditional sentence, he qualified for a 

SSODA that placed him on probation in a treatment center for two years. 

In order to prevent the Department of Social and Health Services from using 

his SSODA evaluation in dependency proceedings, Sanchez moved under GR 15 to 

seal the evaluation. The King County Superior Court initially granted Sanchez's 

motion, but it vacated the order three days later after learning that SSODA 

evaluations are released to the King County Sheriff's Office as a routine part of the 

sheriff's office's duty to carry out a risk assessment. The court authorized the 

probation department to release Sanchez's SSODA evaluation to the sheriff's office, 

but stayed that disclosure to give the defense time to file a notice of appeal. 

Sanchez appealed and moved for a stay of the trial court's order to release 

his SSODA evaluation. The Court of Appeals initially granted a temporary stay, but 

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No. 87740-8 

ultimately denied the motion and lifted the stay. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 

trial court, and we granted review. State v. Sanchez, 169 Wn. App. 405, 279 P.3d 

999, review granted, 175 Wn.2d 1023, 291 P.3d 253 (2012). 

ANALYSIS 

The meaning of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo. Dep't of 

Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002) (citing State v. 

Breazeale, 144 Wn.2d 829, 837, 31 P.3d 1155 (2001); State v. J.M., 144 Wn.2d 472, 

480, 28 P.3d 720 (2001 )). The object of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and 

carry out the legislature's intent. /d. 

This court looks to the plain and ordinary meaning of statutory language to 

determine legislative intent. In turn, we discern plain meaning from "all that the 

Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative 

intent about the provision in question." Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 11. 

Additionally, if possible, we will construe a statute's language so as to find it 

constitutional. City of Seattle v. Montana, 129 Wn.2d 583, 589-90, 919 P.2d 1218 

(1996). 

I. RCW 4.24.550 provides for the release of SSODA evaluations to local law 

enforcement 

The statutory provisions governing sex offender risk assessment demonstrate 

the legislature's intent to create a cooperative intergovernmental system involving 

both state and local authorities. The statutes require both the ESRC and local law 

enforcement to make parallel determinations based on the same information. But 

Sanchez argues otherwise: he contends that a SSODA evaluation is irrelevant to the 

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No. 87740-8 

sheriff's office's assessment, and also that the legislature has now placed risk 

assessment solely under the purview of the DOC's end of sentence review 

committee (ESRC). However, the plain meaning of these statutes contradicts 

Sanchez's arguments. 

A. SSODA evaluations are "relevant information" within the meaning of RCW 

4.24.550(6) 

RCW 4.24.550(6) requires the juvenile court to "provide local law enforcement 

officials with all relevant information on offenders allowed to remain in the 

community in a timely manner." This information then helps local officials make an 

informed risk assessment as required by RCW 4.24.550. Sanchez, however, argues 

that his SSODA evaluation is not "relevant information" within the statute's meaning. 

While RCW 4.24.550(6) does not define "relevant," reading that provision in 

its broader statutory context clarifies the term's meaning. If a statute does not define 

its own terms, we may look to related statutes. And where possible, statutes should 

be read together to achieve a '"harmonious total statutory scheme . . . which 

maintains the integrity of the respective statutes."' State ex ref. Peninsula 

Neighborhood Ass'n v. Dep't of Transp., 142 Wn.2d 328, 342, 12 P.3d 134 (2000) 

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Employco Pers. 

Servs., Inc., v. City of Seattle, 117 Wn.2d 606, 614, 817 P.2d 1373 (1991)). As the 

related statute RCW 13.50.050(6) makes clear, the release of juvenile offense 

records "shall be governed by the rules of discovery and other rules of law 

applicable in adult criminal investigations and prosecutions." Reading these two 

provisions together, we conclude that the statutory scheme governing juvenile 

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No. 87740-8 

offense records is best served by adopting the definition of relevance contained in 

the Washington Rules of Evidence. Therefore, information is relevant to a sex 

offender risk assessment if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact 

that is of consequence to the determination ... more probable or less probable than 

it would be without the evidence." ER 401. 

Under this definition, SSODA evaluations are indisputably relevant to a 

juvenile sex offender's risk assessment. An examiner conducting a SSODA 

evaluation and a law enforcement agency performing a risk assessment must 

address the same question: what risk does the offender pose to the community? 

Compare RCW 13.40.162(2)(b) ("The examiner shall assess and report regarding 

the respondent's amenability to treatment and relative risk to the community.") with 

RCW 4.24.550(6)(b) ("Local law enforcement agencies that disseminate information 

pursuant to this section shall ... assign risk level classifications to all offenders 

about whom information will be disseminated .... ").As described above, a SSODA 

examiner considers a juvenile offender's social, educational, and employment 

situation as well as his or her offense history, alleged deviancy, and version of the 

case's facts. For law enforcement officials performing roughly the same assessment, 

the information compiled by a SSODA examiner is more than relevant; it is 

practically dispositive. 

B. Substitute S.B. 5204 did not divest local law enforcement of its RCW 4.24.550 

authority 

Sanchez further argues that as of Substitute S.B. 5204's passage, only the 

ESRC and not the sheriff's office is authorized to conduct risk assessments. But the 

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No. 87740-8 

legislation made no such change. The ESRC's authority to conduct sex offender risk 

assessments dates back to 1997 when the legislature created RCW 72.09.345, 

which both established the committee and assigned it that task. See RCW 

72.09.345(2), (3); LAWS OF 1997, ch. 364, § 4. In Substitute S.B. 5204, the 

legislature merely amended RCW 72.09.345(3) to include juveniles amongst those 

sex offenders whom the ESRC was required to assess (see LAWS OF 2011, ch. 338, 

§ 5(3)). The language that "local law enforcement agencies ... shall ... assign risk 

level classifications to all offenders about whom information will be disseminated" 

remains intact. RCW 4.24.550(6)(b). 

The ESRC's inclusion in the risk assessment process was never intended to 

displace local law enforcement's role, but to better support and inform it. RCW 

72.09.345(2) explicitly states that the purpose of the ESRC's risk assessments is 

"for public agencies to have the information necessary to notify the public as 

authorized in RCW 4.24.550 .... " To fulfill this purpose, the statute directs the 

ESRC to "issue to appropriate law enforcement agencies, for their use in making 

public notifications under RCW 4.24.550, narrative notices regarding the pending 

release of sex offenders from the department's facilities." RCW 72.09.345(7). A local 

authority is then required to consider the ESRC's risk assessment. RCW 

4.24.550(6)(a). But they need not follow it: local officials may depart from the State's 

classification, so long as they give notice and explain their reasons for doing so. 

RCW 4.24.550(1 0). Therefore, contrary to Sanchez's view, the present statutory 

scheme grants the ESRC and local law enforcement concurrent authority to perform 

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No. 87740-8 

sex offender risk assessments, and it provides for them to collaborate toward that 

end. 

II. Releasing Sanchez's SSODA evaluation to the sheriff's office will not violate 

his privacy rights 

Sanchez also argues that releasing his SSODA evaluation would violate his 

constitutional right to privacy, as well as his right to confidentiality under various 

state and federal statutes. A SSODA evaluation may contain sensitive, privileged, or 

embarrassing information, including details regarding a juvenile's social situation or 

alleged deviant behaviors. See RCW 13.40.162(2)(a). Therefore, indiscriminately 

releasing such an evaluation to the public, or to an agency without need or authority 

to review it, could raise legitimate privacy concerns. However, because the 

legislature had a rational basis for authorizing its release to local law enforcement 

and because the confidentiality statutes at issue allow for its release as required by 

law while prohibiting its disclosure to the public at large, Sanchez's rights are not 

violated here. 

A. Release of Sanchez's SSODA evaluation would not violate his constitutional 

right to privacy 

While Sanchez does enjoy a constitutional right to confidentiality, it is not 

without limits. The United States Supreme Court has recognized an individual's right 

to privacy under the federal constitution in two contexts: the right to make certain 

decisions without government intrusion (autonomy) and the right to prevent the 

disclosure of personal information (confidentiality). Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 

599-600, 97 S. Ct. 869, 51 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1977). While this court has acknowledged 

an individual's interest in confidentiality, we have not recognized it as a fundamental 

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No. 87740-8 

right under either the federal or state constitution. O'Hartigan v. Dep't of Pers., 118 

Wn.2d 111, 117, 821 P.2d 44 (1991 ). Rather, we apply a rational basis test: 

"disclosure of intimate information to governmental agencies is permissible if it is 

carefully tailored to meet a valid governmental interest, and provided the disclosure 

is no greater than is reasonably necessary." /d. (citing Peninsula Counseling Ctr. v. 

Rahm, 105 Wn.2d 929, 935, 719 P.2d 926 (1986)). 

The legislature had a rational basis for authorizing the release of Sanchez's 

SSODA evaluation to the sheriff's office. The State has a legitimate interest in 

ensuring that local law enforcement is sufficiently well informed to make an accurate 

assessment of the risk posed by released sex offenders. See H.B. REP. on 

Engrossed Substitute S.B. 5759. And as we concluded above, a SSODA evaluation 

is highly relevant to this assessment. The sheriff's office requires this information for 

the same reason as does the SSODA examiner: to accurately assess the risk of 

whether the juvenile will reoffend in the future. Sanchez makes no credible argument 

that releasing his SSODA evaluation is a greater disclosure than is reasonably 

necessary to meet this need. 

B. Release of Sanchez's SSODA evaluation would not violate his statutory right 

to privacy 

Sanchez also argues that releasing his SSODA evaluation to the sheriff's 

office would violate statutory controls on the disclosure of juvenile offense records. 

Washington classifies records pertaining to a juvenile's criminal offense into three 

categories: the official juvenile court file, which includes court filings, findings, 

orders, and the like; the "social file," which contains reports of the probation 

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No. 87740-8 

counselor; and other miscellaneous records. RCW 13.50.01 0(1 ). While the official 

court file is open to the public unless sealed, RCW 13.50.050(2), all other juvenile 

offense records are generally confidential. RCW 13.50.050(3). Because it is 

essentially the SSODA examiner's report, Sanchez's SSODA evaluation is part of 

the social file and is therefore confidential. 

However, RCW 13.50.050 provides for the disclosure of confidential juvenile 

offense records under certain circumstances. Specifically, these files may be 

released "as provided in this section, RCW 13.50.01 0, 13.40.215, and 4.24.550." 

RCW 13.50.050(3). As discussed above, RCW 4.24.550(6) requires juvenile courts 

to "provide local law enforcement officials with all relevant information on offenders," 

which includes SSODA evaluations, so that local officials can make an accurate risk 

assessment. In other words, RCW 13.50.050 makes an express exception for the 

release of SSODA evaluations to local law enforcement for the purpose of making 

sex offender risk assessments. Therefore, releasing Sanchez's evaluation to the 

sheriff's office does not violate the statute's confidentiality requirement. 

C. Whether the sheriff's office may release Sanchez's SSODA evaluation is not 

an issue ripe for review 

Sanchez expresses concern that if his SSODA evaluation were released to 

the sheriff's office, it could subsequently be released to the public pursuant to the 

Public Records Act (PRA), chapter 42.56 RCW, thereby divulging sensitive and 

personal information. But as far as the record shows, no one has actually filed a 

PRA request for any information of Sanchez's. There is no need for us to consider 

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the merits of a purely hypothetical request for Sanchez's SSODA evaluation. 

Accordingly, we decline to reach the PRA issue at this time. 

D. Sanchez's SSODA evaluation is not protected as a medical record 

Because his SSODA evaluation contains mental health reports, Sanchez 

contends that it is protected from disclosure to the sheriff's office by chapter 70.02 

RCW and the federal Health Information Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 

(HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936. We disagree. 

While it is certainly true that chapter 70.02 RCW and HIPAA protect mental 

health records, see RCW 70.02.01 0(5)(a); 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(4 )(b), that protection 

is conditional. Chapter 70.02 RCW specifically provides for the release of health 

care information, without authorization by the patient, if "required by law." RCW 

70.02.050(2)(b). Similarly, HIPAA permits the release of personally identifying 

medical information to law enforcement by court order. 45 C.F.R. § 

164.512(f)(1)(ii)(A). Therefore, neither HIPAA nor chapter 70.02 RCW applies where 

a court, acting pursuant to statutory mandate (here, RCW 4.24.550), orders the 

release of medical information to law enforcement. 

E. Court rules do not prevent the release of Sanchez's SSODA evaluation 

Finally, Sanchez cites the rules of discovery in support of his asserted privacy 

interest in the SSODA evaluation. He discusses CrR 4.7(d), which allows defendants 

to request discoverable information from the prosecuting attorney, and CrR 

4.7(h)(3), which concerns the custody of materials used by the prosecution during 

trial. However, these rules do not purport to create a privacy right on the part of the 

defendant. Nor are they relevant to the present case; Sanchez is not requesting 

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information from the State, nor is the State holding information on Sanchez pending 

trial. 

In his briefing, Sanchez also refers obliquely to GR 15, which sets out a 

general procedure for sealing, destroying, or redacting court records. However, to 

seal a record is "to protect [it] from examination by the public and unauthorized court 

personnel." GR 15(b )(4) (emphasis added). Therefore, even if the juvenile court 

ultimately orders his records sealed, this would not prevent their release to the 

sheriff's office. As with his contentions about RCW 13.50.050 (discussed above), 

Sanchez's argument again seems to conflate a release to local law enforcement 

with full public disclosure. 1 

CONCLUSION 

Neither the statutes governing maintenance and release of SSODA 

evaluations, nor the constitutional, statutory, or rule-based privacy concerns 

asserted by Sanchez, bar the release of his SSODA evaluation to local law 

enforcement officials. Rather, RCW 4.24.550 requires the juvenile court to provide 

the evaluation to local law enforcement to better inform their statutorily mandated 

risk assessment of sex offenders. For these reasons, we hold that the juvenile court 

may properly release Sanchez's SSODA evaluation to the sheriff's office. 

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 

1 Sanchez also offers several policy arguments to discourage the release of SSODA 

evaluations to local law enforcement. However, because the statutory scheme at issue 

on this point is clear and unequivocal, we do not address those arguments. See Duke v. 

Boyd, 133 Wn.2d 80, 87, 942 P.2d 351 (1997). 

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WE CONCUR. 

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