UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

 v. 

VERNADO MALONE 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Case No. 3:13-CR-104 JD 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Defendant Vernado Malone pled guilty to two counts of a three-count Indictment: 

Count 1 (Wire Fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343) and Count 3 (Aggravated Identity Theft, 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A). On August 13, 2014, the Court held a change of plea 

hearing, at the conclusion of which the Court accepted Mr. Malone’s pleas of guilty. Now 

before the Court are three motions: (1) a Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Pleas [DE 196], which 

was filed through counsel; (2) a pro se motion titled “Motion to Withdraw Counsel Due to 

Conflict of Interest/Ineffective Assistance of Counsel” [DE 199]; and (3) a pro se motion titled 

“Ineffective Assistance of Counsel” [DE 203]. 

The Court held a hearing on the pro se motions on November 25, 2014. In essence, Mr. 

Malone claims that his appointed counsel, Philip Skodinski, provided ineffective assistance. 

Such claims could require counsel to argue his own ineffective assistance in order to address the 

withdrawal of Mr. Malone’s guilty plea and potentially create a conflict of interest that 

necessitates his withdrawal from the case. See United States v. Ellison, 798 F.2d 1102, 1106 (7th 

Cir. 1986); United States v. Caban, 962 F.2d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 1992). At the conclusion of the 

hearing, the Court indicated that it would consider whether Mr. Malone’s allegations, if true, 

may entitle him to relief from his guilty pleas. Having now considered the matter, the Court 

determines that even if Mr. Malone’s allegations are true, they do not constitute a fair and just 
2 

reason to withdraw his pleas of guilty. Additionally, because no further evidence is required in 

ruling on the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas, the Court finds no conflict on the part of Mr. 

Skodinski. Accordingly, each of the motions is DENIED. [DE 196, 199, 203.] 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

On July 31, 2014, a plea agreement was filed, in which Mr. Malone agreed to plead guilty 

to Counts 1 and 3 of the Indictment. [DE 174.] That plea agreement included several 

provisions; those most applicable to the issues addressed here are: (1) a factual basis to support 

the defendant’s guilt as to both counts to which he was pleading guilty [¶9(b)], (2) a waiver of 

Mr. Malone’s appellate rights [¶9(e)], and (3) a stipulation that the loss amount for purposes of 

calculating the advisory Guidelines range was $120,000 [¶9(i)]. A change of plea hearing was 

scheduled for August 6. However, at the beginning of that hearing, Mr. Malone stated that he 

desired additional time to consult with Mr. Skodinski before pleading guilty. The change of plea 

hearing was rescheduled for the following week. 

The change of plea hearing was actually conducted on August 13, 2014. [DE 178, 186.] 

After inquiry, the Court found Mr. Malone competent to plead guilty, with the agreement of both 

counsel. The Court engaged in a lengthy colloquy with Mr. Malone, covering the factual basis to 

support his pleas of guilty, the rights he was giving up in the plea agreement, and many of the 

specific terms of the plea agreement. Relevant portions of the colloquy are quoted below, as 

necessary. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court accepted the pleas of guilty, ordered the 

Probation Office to prepare a presentence report, and set a date for sentencing. 

Through counsel, Mr. Malone filed a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty on October 

30, 2014. [DE 196.] That motion raised several grounds for withdrawing the plea, including: 

that Mr. Malone suffers from a low IQ, was not on his correct medication at the time of the 
3 

change of plea, and had limited independent memory of the crimes charged in this case; that Mr. 

Malone felt pressured to enter into the plea, even though he had not seen any discovery in the 

case; that Mr. Malone is concerned that his plea will waive his right to appeal the denial of his 

motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds; that Mr. Malone thought he was 

agreeing to a “cap” rather than a stipulation to loss amount for Guidelines purposes; and that Mr. 

Malone believes he has a meritorious defense. [Id.] The government responded in opposition 

[DE 200] and Mr. Malone filed a reply through counsel [DE 201]. 

Mr. Malone also submitted several pro se motions claiming that Mr. Skodinski must be 

removed due to either having provided ineffective assistance of counsel or because he has a 

conflict of interest. [DE 199; DE 203; DE 205; DE 207.] The filings raise a number of 

allegations against Mr. Skodinski; those relevant to the motion to withdraw the guilty plea are 

discussed below. 

II. Standard of Review 

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the Court’s acceptance of, 

and a defendant’s ability to withdraw, a plea of guilty. The rule states, in relevant part: “A 

defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere: . . . (2) after the court accepts the 

plea, but before it imposes sentence if: (A) the court rejects a plea agreement under Rule 

11(c)(5); or (B) the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d). Here, the Court did not reject the plea agreement, so subsection (A) is 

not available to Mr. Malone. Therefore, unless Mr. Malone can demonstrate a “fair and just 

reason” for withdrawing his pleas of guilty, the pleas will stand. 

Ineffective assistance of counsel can render a plea involuntary. To show ineffective 

assistance of counsel, a defendant “must show both that the counsel’s performance was 
4 

objectively unreasonable and that, but for counsel’s errors, the defendant would not have pled 

guilty.” United States v. Peliti, 576 F.3d 377, 383 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. 

Lundy, 484 F.3d 480, 484 (7th Cir. 2007)). If such a showing is made, then the ineffective 

assistance is a “valid basis for withdrawing a guilty plea.” Id.

III. Discussion 

Each of Mr. Malone’s arguments in support of withdrawing his plea are addressed, in 

turn, below. 

A. Mr. Malone’s Claims Are Disregarded To The Extent They Conflict With His 

Sworn Statements At His Change of Plea Hearing 

Mr. Malone makes a number of claims in support of his attempt to withdraw his pleas of 

guilty, both through counsel and in his pro se motions. However, the Court must view these 

claims in light of Mr. Malone’s sworn statements made at the change of plea hearing; in this 

case, many of the current claims conflict with Mr. Malone’s previous sworn statements. 

The Court is “generally justified in discrediting the proffered reasons for the motion to 

withdraw and holding the defendant to [his] admissions at the [plea colloquy].” United States v. 

Patterson, 576 F.3d 431, 437 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Messino, 55 F.3d 1241, 

1248 (7th Cir. 1995)). Additionally, “[c]laims of involuntariness or confusion that in the abstract 

seem like sufficient reasons to allow a defendant to withdraw his plea, or at least look into the 

matter further, may be insufficient in the context of a record containing substantial indications of 

voluntariness and lack of confusion.” Id. (quoting United States v. Trussel, 961 F.2d 685, 689 

(7th Cir. 1992)). In other words, “a motion that can succeed only if the defendant committed 

perjury at the plea proceedings may be rejected out of hand unless the defendant has a 
5 

compelling explanation for the contradiction.” Thompson v. United States, 732 F.3d 826, 830 

(7th Cir. 2013). 

Accordingly, the Court rejects several of the grounds raised by Mr. Malone because they 

are in direct contradiction with statements he made at the change of plea hearing. While Mr. 

Malone now claims he was “under pressure to enter the plea by certain deadlines,” [DE 196-1], 

he stated at the change of plea hearing that he felt like he had enough time to discuss his case 

with Mr. Skodinski. [DE 188 at 10:25–11:2.] Additionally, the Court previously continued the 

change of plea hearing to provide Mr. Malone with an additional week to consider whether he 

wanted to plead guilty and to consult with his attorney. No further continuance was sought at the 

August 13 hearing, nor did Mr. Malone ever suggest that he needed more time to consider 

whether to plead guilty. 

Next, Mr. Malone now claims that he has a low IQ and was not on his correct medication 

at the time of the change of plea hearing. Therefore, he argues, he did not properly understand 

the plea agreement or the change of plea hearing. Those statements also contradict Mr. Malone’s 

statements at his change of plea hearing. The Court specifically noted at the change of plea that 

it was cognizant of the mental health examinations previously received and engaged in a 

thorough colloquy with Mr. Malone regarding his understanding of the proceedings. Mr. Malone 

discussed his current and previous mental health treatments, as well as his medications. [DE 188 

at 7:21–24.] Mr. Malone was also questioned about his understanding of the proceedings: 

THE COURT: Do any of the ailments that you’ve talked about 

affect your ability to clearly understand these proceedings today? 

MR. MALONE: No. 
6 

THE COURT: Okay. You feel like you clearly understand what 

we’re doing today and that you understand the questions I’ve asked 

you so far? 

MR. MALONE: Yes. 

[Id. at 9:1–8.] Neither counsel had any doubt as to Mr. Malone’s competency to plead guilty on 

the day of the hearing. 

Moreover, the Court had the opportunity to observe Mr. Malone throughout the hearing, 

as well as during many other hearings during the course of this case. See United States v. Hoke, 

569 F.3d 718, 720–21 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[t]he only rational manner in which a judge may 

determine whether a plea is knowingly and voluntarily made, is to observe the defendant’s 

demeanor and responses to the court’s questions and to rely on the defendant’s sworn answers.”). 

Based on the Court’s observations, Mr. Malone appeared to fully understand the proceedings and 

his answers seemed both responsive and thoughtful throughout the hearing.1

Mr. Malone’s delay in moving to withdraw his pleas also draws into question the 

sincerity of his claimed confusion. Mr. Malone pled guilty on August 13, 2014; he claims to 

have directed Mr. Skodinski to file a motion to withdraw the pleas on September 30, 2014, [DE 

205] and the motion was actually filed on October 30, 2014 [DE 196]. Even assuming that Mr. 

Malone is correct about when he told Mr. Skodinski to file the motion to withdraw, it was six 

weeks after the change of plea hearing. This delay raises a strong presumption that Mr. Malone 

was not actually pressured or confused, but rather attempting to delay the resolution of this case. 

In light of all of these facts and his sworn testimony, Mr. Malone’s current claim that he 

did not understand the plea colloquy or plea agreement is afforded no weight. 

 

1

 The Court reaches this conclusion based solely on its own observations, without needing to consider the affidavits 

of the case agents attached to the government’s response in opposition. [DE 200-1; DE 200-2.] 
7 

Finally, Mr. Malone claims both that he lacked independent memory of the allegations 

against him and that he had not seen any discovery in support of the government’s case. These 

claims are incredible in light of the thorough factual basis that Mr. Malone agreed to in the plea 

agreement and stated—in his own words, at times—during the change of plea hearing. With 

respect to both counts to which Mr. Malone intended to plead guilty, the government made a 

thorough proffer as to what it believed the evidence would show if the case went to trial. [DE 

188 at 12:13–16:3, 20:21–21:21.] Mr. Malone explicitly agreed with those proffers [id. at 

16:10–13, 22:4–7] and then stated in his own words why he believed he was guilty [id. at 16:19–

19:17, 22:8–23:14].2

 That this factual basis was provided or agreed to by Mr. Malone discredits 

 

2

 In the reply, Mr. Malone argues that “The problem with the plea hearing, considering Mr. Malone’s mild mental 

retardation is that Mr. Malone is asked to agree or disagree with what others states [sic] he did. Mr. Malone did not, 

himself, recite what he did not make himself guilty.” [DE 201 at 2.] The Court respectfully disagrees. Mr. Malone 

did affirmatively state what he did that he believed made him guilty; those statements were followed by questions 

from the Court to flesh out the factual basis. Notably, Mr. Malone had no trouble expressing disagreement to certain 

of the Court’s questions, as evidenced by the following exchange: 

THE COURT: Okay. And then you call and you had these cards reissued to 

yourself? 

MR. MALONE: Not to myself, in the company names, to addresses of them. 

THE COURT: Okay. You had these cards reissued to company names? 

MR. MALONE: Yes. 

THE COURT: And you had them sent to certain places in South Bend? 

MR. MALONE: Different places other than South Bend. 

THE COURT: Okay. But including South Bend? 

MR. MALONE: Yes. 

THE COURT: Okay. And where else? 

MR. MALONE: Michigan, Texas, and, I believe it was, Tennessee. 

THE COURT: Okay. And then did you receive possession of each of those 

credit cards at the places you told them to send those cards to? 

MR. MALONE: Not all of them, no. 
8 

his claimed lack of memory and renders moot any claim that he should have reviewed discovery 

prior to the change of plea hearing. See United States v. Underwood, 174 F.3d 850, 854 (7th Cir. 

1999) (“a guilty plea entered by a defendant who does not see the prosecution’s hand in advance 

will still be voluntary if, as was true in this case, the plea follows disclosure of an adequate 

factual basis”). 

Each of these claims directly contradict the statements made by Mr. Malone under oath 

during his change of plea hearing. He offers no explanation for the contradiction. Accordingly, 

those reasons for withdrawal of the plea that conflict with Mr. Malone’s sworn statements are 

disregarded as a basis for withdrawal of his guilty plea. 

B. Any Confusion Regarding The Stipulated Loss Amount Is Not A Fair And Just 

Reason For Withdrawing Mr. Malone’s Plea 

Next, Mr. Malone argues that he did not understand one term of the plea agreement, 

regarding a stipulation as to the amount of damages for the purpose of calculating the advisory 

Guidelines range. The plea agreement states: “The parties stipulate that the amount of loss in 

this matter is $120,000.” [DE 174 at ¶9(i).] Mr. Malone now argues that he thought he was 

agreeing to a damages “cap” of $120,000 and that he would be free to argue for a lesser amount 

of damages. [DE 196 at 1; DE 196-1; DE 201 at 1–2.] Mr. Skodinski attached to the reply an 

email in which the government made one reference to the agreement as a “cap.” [DE 201 at 6.] 

In his pro se filings, Mr. Malone says that he was counseled by Mr. Skodinski that it was, in fact, 

a cap on damages. [DE 203 at 2, 6.] 

 

THE COURT: Not all of them, but some of them? 

MR. MALONE: Yes. 

[DE 188 at 17:17–18:12.] 
9 

Again, Mr. Malone’s contentions are undermined by his sworn statements at the change 

of plea hearing. The Court engaged in the following colloquy with Mr. Malone regarding the 

stipulated loss amount: 

THE COURT: Okay. Your plea agreement contains a stipulation 

or an agreement with the Government that, for purposes of 

applying the Sentencing Guidelines, the loss amount is $120,000. 

Do you understand that? 

MR. MALONE: Yes. 

THE COURT: That’s in your plea agreement, right? 

MR. MALONE: Yes. 

[DE 188 at 35:11–18.] This discussion is clear and indicates that Mr. Malone knew exactly the 

scope of the agreement and that it was a “stipulation” or “agreement,” rather than a cap. 

 Moreover, to the extent that the government’s email or any advice from Mr. Skodinski 

was misleading, the language of the plea agreement that Mr. Malone signed was unambiguous 

that the agreement was a stipulation to—not a cap on—the amount of damages. Where a plea 

agreement is unambiguous, the agreement is interpreted according to its plain meaning. United 

States v. O’Doherty, 643 F.3d 209, 217 (7th Cir. 2011). Here, the meaning is plain from the face 

of the agreement, which the Court made even more explicit in its questioning of Mr. Malone. 

Mr. Malone agreed at the change of plea hearing that there was a “stipulation or an agreement

with the Government that . . . the loss amount is $120,000.” [DE 188 at 35:11–14 (emphasis 

added).] Having stated that he was aware of and understood the agreement, the Court finds Mr. 

Malone’s now-professed confusion to be neither a fair nor just reason to withdraw his plea. See 

Holmes v. United States, No. 4:11-cr-2077-RBH, 4:14-cv-2846-RBH, 2014 WL 6749200, at *5 

(D.S.C. Dec. 1, 2014) (“Petitioner’s argument in her motion to vacate that she was led to believe 
10 

she could contest the loss amount—despite stipulating to an amount over a million dollars in the 

plea agreement and admitting on the record at the plea agreement [sic] that she caused a loss 

over one million dollars—is simply without merit and clearly contradicted by her sworn 

statements at the plea colloquy.”). 

C. Any Confusion Regarding The Appellate Waiver Is Not A Fair And Just Reason 

For Withdrawing Mr. Malone’s Plea 

Next, Mr. Malone argues that Mr. Skodinski was ineffective due to the scope of the 

appeal waiver contained in his plea agreement. Specifically, Mr. Malone contends that he wants 

to appeal this Court’s previous opinion denying his motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy 

trial grounds. [DE 207 at 1.] This argument was raised pro se by Mr. Malone and is somewhat 

unclear; Mr. Malone appears to argue either (1) that he wanted Mr. Skodinski to negotiate a 

conditional plea and that Mr. Skodinski failed to do so or (2) that he was counseled by Mr. 

Skodinski that he would still have the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss the 

indictment. 

Under either formulation, the argument fails to provide a fair and just reason to withdraw 

Mr. Malone’s plea. If his argument is the former, Mr. Malone knew that the plea agreement 

contained a full appeal waiver and made a knowing and intelligent decision to sign the 

agreement anyway. And it is clear that Mr. Malone understood the presence and scope of the 

appeal waiver. The Court engaged in the following colloquy, which started as the Court 

informed Mr. Malone as to the appeal rights he would have but-for the plea agreement: 

THE COURT: Okay. And do you understand that, under some 

circumstances, you or the Government may appeal your conviction 

or any sentence that I impose? Do you understand that? 

MR. MALONE: I thought I waived it. 
11 

THE COURT: I’m sorry? 

MR. MALONE: I believe I waived that issue. 

[DE 188 at 36:7–13.] The Court then went on to describe the waiver in the plea agreement, 

which Mr. Malone said he understood and had discussed with his attorney. 

Based on this discussion at the hearing, it is clear that Mr. Malone made a knowing and 

voluntary decision to waive his appellate rights. Even before being prompted, Mr. Malone 

acknowledged the appeal waiver and expressed no question or hesitation as to its scope. 

If Mr. Malone’s argument is that Mr. Skodinski misadvised Mr. Malone as to the scope 

of the appellate waiver, the Court finds the argument insufficient to allow Mr. Malone to 

withdraw his plea. First, such an argument is at odds with Mr. Malone’s comments at the change 

of plea hearing, which show that Mr. Malone believed he was waiving all appellate rights. 

Second, the Court finds no potential prejudice to Mr. Malone, both because the Court believes 

the correctness of its speedy trial ruling is not open to serious debate and because Mr. Malone 

has not stated that he would not have pleaded guilty without a conditional plea. Liss v. United 

States, 915 F.2d 287, 291 (7th Cir. 1990) (defendant “must demonstrate that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he ‘would not have pleaded guilty and would have 

insisted on going to trial.’”). 

Accordingly, the appeal waiver and its application to Mr. Malone’s desired appeal does 

not present a fair and just reason for withdrawing the plea. 

D. Mr. Malone Has Not Established That He Is Legally Innocent 

The next ground raised by Mr. Malone is that he “believes he has a meritorious defense.” 

[DE 196 at 1.] The argument was not developed in the initial brief and appears to relate only to 

the aggravated identity theft count. It was expanded on slightly in the reply. [DE 201 at 1 (“Mr. 
12 

Malone contends that his victims were only corporations, not individuals, and that he has never 

used the identity of a person.”).] 

Innocence, if true, can be a “compelling reason to withdraw a plea.” United States v. 

Newman, 755 F.3d 543, 545 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Hodges, 259 F.3d 655, 661 

(7th Cir. 2001)). Mr. Malone, however, makes an almost totally unsupported claim of 

innocence. He does not cite any case law in support of this argument or develop it in any 

meaningful manner, so the Court could deem the argument waived. See Mahaffey v. Ramos, 588 

F.3d 1142, 1146 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Perfunctory, undeveloped arguments without discussion or 

citation to pertinent legal authority are waived.”). 

But in any case, the Court’s own research does not support Mr. Malone’s claim of legal 

innocence. One court has recently found that a person’s unlawful use of the means of 

identification of a corporation is not prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. United States v. Hilton, 

701 F.3d 959, 967–69 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding section 1028A is fatally ambiguous regarding its 

application to the use of the means of identification of a corporation and vacating convictions). 

But here, Mr. Malone did not use the means of identification of a corporation. Rather, he 

admitted at the change of plea hearing that he used the means of identification—specifically the 

name and place of employment—of at least one specific individual in order to gain access to the 

corporate credit cards at issue. [DE 188 at 22:16–23.] The Court has not been able to locate any 

case holding that the individual whose means of identification is used must also bear the 

pecuniary loss occasioned by the identity theft in order to trigger the application of section 

1028A. Instead, several courts have upheld convictions in cases factually similar to this one. 

United States v. Hanson, No. CR 09-138 CAS, 2009 WL 2460887, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 

2009) (convicting defendant after bench trial, where defendant used corporate credit card and 
13 

name of actual authorized user to obtain services; “Defendant’s use of victim Clark Hayes’ name 

for defendant’s own economic gain and to further his access device fraud constitutes the use of a 

‘means of identification’ and is precisely the type of conduct Congress sought to proscribe.”); 

United States v. Cook, 336 F. App’x 875, 877 (11th Cir. 2009) (affirming conviction where 

defendant used the fake signature of an actual person who was authorized to draw on corporate 

account, even though checks were drawn on corporate account). 

In light of the arguments presented, Mr. Malone has not established that he has any 

colorable claim of innocence to support the withdrawal of his pleas of guilty. 

E. The Remaining Allegations of Ineffective Assistance Are Insufficient To Support 

Withdrawal of Mr. Malone’s Plea 

Finally, Mr. Malone makes several claims in his pro se filings as to the allegedly 

ineffective assistance provided by Mr. Skodinski. [See DE 199; DE 203; DE 205; DE 207.] In 

order to avoid unnecessarily creating a conflict of interest with Mr. Malone’s appointed counsel, 

the Court assumes for the purpose of this analysis that what Mr. Malone alleges is true. 

However, even assuming the truth of the allegations, the Court does not find that any of the 

claims has any merit to support the withdrawal of his guilty pleas. 

First, Mr. Malone claims that Mr. Skodinski was “ignoran[t] of the law during plea 

negotiations.” [DE 203 at 1.] Mr. Malone does not elaborate on the topics on which Mr. 

Skodinski was ignorant, but the argument seems to be predicated on Mr. Malone’s belief that a 

corporation may not be the victim of aggravated identity theft under section 1028A. As 

discussed above, that claim is without merit, so any ignorance of the argument by Mr. Skodinski 

would not be ineffective assistance. 
14 

Mr. Malone next claims that Mr. Skodinski confused the complaint and the indictment in 

his case. [DE 203 at 1.] However, even if true, there would be no prejudice to Mr. Malone, 

since he stated at the change of plea hearing that he had read the indictment and understood the 

nature of the charges against him. [DE 188 at 10:5–10.] 

Mr. Malone claims that Mr. Skodinski failed “to conduct any independent investigation 

into mitigating evidence” and failed “to investigate alibi(s).” [DE 203 at 1.] However, even if 

true, there is again no prejudice, as Mr. Malone himself admitted to an independent factual basis 

to support the guilty pleas. In light of that sufficient factual basis, the Court cannot see how any 

alibi or mitigating evidence could possibly have benefitted Mr. Malone or impacted his decision 

to plead guilty. 

Finally, Mr. Malone claims that Mr. Skodinski told him that Mr. Skodinski “shouldn’t 

have allowed Malone to enter a plea of [guilty].” [DE 230 at 1.] Even if Mr. Skodinski did 

make that statement after the change of plea hearing, the Court has considered each of the 

grounds raised and finds no basis to allow Mr. Malone to withdraw his plea of guilty. 

Additionally, the Court notes that Mr. Skodinski stated during the change of plea hearing that he 

was not aware of any reason why Mr. Malone should not plead guilty. [DE 188 at 42:14–16.] 

The remaining claims of ineffective assistance relate to a claimed breakdown between 

Mr. Malone and Mr. Skodinski. The Court previously rejected those grounds for removal of 

counsel during the November 25 hearing. [DE 206.] Additionally, they relate not to the decision 

to plead guilty, but rather to the ongoing relationship between Mr. Malone and Mr. Skodinski. 

Accordingly, they are not relevant to the issues addressed here. 
15 

F. Mr. Skodinski Is Not Under An Actual Conflict Of Interest 

 As noted by the Court during the November 25 hearing, Mr. Malone’s allegations at least 

raised the possibility of a conflict of interest on the part of his appointed counsel, since Mr. 

Skodinski may have been placed in the position of arguing his own ineffective assistance in 

order to support the pending motion. See United States v. Ellison, 798 F.2d 1102, 1106 (7th Cir. 

1986); United States v. Caban, 962 F.2d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 1992). Having found that the 

allegations would not support withdrawal of the plea even if true, the potential conflict has not 

risen to the level of an actual conflict. Accordingly, Mr. Malone’s requests to have Mr. 

Skodinski removed as appointed counsel are denied. 

IV. Conclusion 

For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Mr. Malone’s allegations, even if fully 

accepted by the Court, do not provide a fair and just reason for withdrawing his plea of guilty. 

The Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea is therefore DENIED. [DE 196.] Additionally, because no 

further evidence is required on these issues, no conflict has arisen that requires the withdrawal of 

defense counsel. The pro se motions to remove Mr. Skodinski are therefore DENIED. [DE 199, 

203.] The Court will contact the parties to set a date for sentencing.

 SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED: December 30, 2014 

 

 /s/ JON E. DEGUILIO 

 Judge 

 United States District Court