UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

TIMOTHY MOORE, JR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:13-cv-134-PPS-RBC

)

J.E.A.N. TEAM TASK FORCE, )

and MARK STEFANATOS, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action brought by plaintiff Timothy Moore, Jr. in

relation to the forfeiture of $1,234.00 in cash stemming from his arrest and subsequent

plea of guilty to possession of cocaine. Moore alleges that his rights were violated when

cash found on his person during the arrest was seized and ultimately forfeited. Before

the Court is the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Docket Entry 22.) Despite

notices from the defendants and the Court about the effects of summary judgment,

Moore hasn’t responded, repeating what he did in the state forfeiture case. For the

reasons set forth below, the defendants’ motion will be granted. 

BACKGROUND

On December 2, 2011, Moore was pulled over in Marion, Indiana because his

license plates didn’t match his vehicle. The traffic officer found marijuana in the vehicle

and called defendant Detective Sgt. Mark Stefanatos, a member of the Joint Effort

Against Narcotics (J.E.A.N.) Team, to the scene. (Compl. at 2; DE 23 at 2.) After
arresting Moore and transporting him to Grant County Jail, Moore’s wallet and a bag of

crack cocaine were found on the floor of the police vehicle. At the jail, $1,234.00 in cash

and more crack cocaine were found on Moore’s person. Stefanatos gave Moore a receipt

for the money, seized it as evidence, and turned it over to the Grant County

Prosecutor’s Office. On December 7, 2011, Moore was charged with one count of

possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and one count of possession of marijuana.

(DE 23 at 2.) 

On March 2, 2012 the State of Indiana and the J.E.A.N. Team Drug Task Force

filed a complaint for forfeiture of the $1,234.00 against Moore in the Grant County

Superior Court pursuant to Ind. Code 34-4-30.1-1. (DE 24 Ex. 3.) Moore never

responded to this complaint. On April 4, 2012, the Grant Superior Court entered a

default judgment against Moore ordering forfeiture of the cash. (DE 24 Ex. 5.) The court

found that Moore’s failure to appear, answer, or otherwise respond to the forfeiture

complaint, either personally or by representative, during a period spanning longer than

twenty days after receipt warranted entering default judgment against Moore. (DE 24

Ex. 5 at 1.)

On April 26, 2013, Moore filed a complaint with this Court for reimbursement of

the $1234.00. (DE 1.) He also requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis, which was

granted. (DE 2, 3.) The case proceeded, and no discovery or other issues are reflected on

the docket. After the discovery deadline the defendants filed a motion for summary

judgment. (DE 22.) With their motion for summary judgment the defendants provided

the notice to Moore that the Local Rules of this District require when summary
judgment is sought against a self-represented party, which explains summary

judgment. (DE 25.) I allowed Moore months to respond, and out of an abundance of

caution gave him additional time and an additional warning about the effect of

summary judgment. (DE 30.) I have waited another two months, but Moore has been

completely silent. I now take up the motion for summary judgment unanswered by

Moore, as my previous Order stated I would.

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A

genuine dispute about a material fact exists only “if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In making this determination, the court construes

“all facts and reasonable inferences from the record in the light most favorable to [ ] the

non-moving party.” Moser v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 406 F.3d 895, 900 (7th Cir. 2005). 

Moore’s complaint contends that he wants his money reimbursed. He bases this

demand on his allegation that he was illegally pulled over and that his money was

seized without his signing paperwork. 

Defendants claim five grounds for a grant of summary judgment: (1) the District

Court lacks jurisdiction due to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (2) Moore has no claim

against Stefanatos; (3) the J.E.A.N. Team task force isn’t a suable entity; (4) Moore

wasn’t denied due process; and (5) in his individual capacity, Stefanatos is entitled to

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qualified immunity. The defendants’ first argument carries the day because, as it points

out, I don’t have subject-matter jurisdiction over this case.

The J.E.A.N. Team and Stefanatos contend that this Court lacks jurisdiction on

the issue of forfeiture due to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Under Rooker-Feldman, district

courts don’t have subject matter jurisdiction over claims seeking review of state court

judgments. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); District of Columbia

Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983); see, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. V.

Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we hold

today, is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases

brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments

rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court

review and rejection of those judgments.”); In re Lodholtz, No. 14-8015, 2014 U.S. App.

LEXIS 19107, at *8 (7th Cir. Oct. 6, 2014). In assessing “the applicability of the RookerFeldman doctrine, the fundamental and appropriate question to ask is whether the

injury alleged by the federal plaintiff resulted from the state court judgment itself or is

distinct from that judgment . . . .” Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir. 1996). If the

former then district courts have no jurisdiction. The doctrine applies to both claims

raised before the state court and claims that are inextricably intertwined with state court

actions. “Rooker-Feldman, therefore, requires a party seeking review of a state court

judgment or presenting a claim that a state judicial proceeding has violated their

constitutional rights to pursue relief through the state court system and ultimately to

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the Supreme Court,” bypassing the lower federal courts. Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp.,

182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999). 

The civil forfeiture proceeding regarding Moore’s money brought before the

Grant County Superior Court is indeed a proceeding before a state court. That state

court proceeding, which Moore didn’t bother to participate in, was the direct cause of

the forfeiture of Moore’s money. What he asks via the current lawsuit is essentially for

me to overturn the Indiana forfeiture decision based on the facts of the underlying case.

See, e.g., Van Jackson v. United States, 427 Fed. Appx. 524, 525 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding

Rooker-Feldman didn’t apply only because federal case was against the United States,

which wasn’t a party to the state-court forfeiture action); Warden v. Northwest Bank, No.

03C501862003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21698 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 2003). Thus, Moore’s claim is

subject to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and should have been challenged in state court —

not before this Court. Even giving Moore the benefit of the doubt and assuming his

rights were violated by the initial stop, search and seizure, the appropriate remedy

would have been the exclusion of the wrongfully seized evidence from court

proceedings, here the state forfeiture proceeding. See, e.g., One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v.

Pa., 380 U.S. 693, 702 (1965) (“In sum, we conclude that the nature of a forfeiture

proceeding . . . and the reasons which led the Court to hold that the exclusionary rule 

. . . is obligatory upon the States under the Fourteenth Amendment . . . support the

conclusion that the exclusionary rule is applicable to forfeiture proceedings such as the

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one involved here.”). The Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is therefore

granted.

Moore has not made this argument, but if he believes that the state trial and

appellate courts wrongfully denied him the opportunity to contest the forfeiture in

accordance with state law, the only federal venue in which he could contest these state

court decisions is the Supreme Court of the United States after proceeding in state court

as far as state law allows. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482-86; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415-16. There is,

however, no indication that he opposed the state forfeiture action at any level of state

court (hence the default judgment granting forfeiture).

CONCLUSION

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, Detective Sgt. Mark Stefanatos and the

J.E.A.N. TEAM Task Force’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and this

matter is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. (DE 22.) The clerk shall ENTER FINAL

JUDGMENT in favor of Detective Sgt. Mark Stefanatos and the J.E.A.N. TEAM Task

Force. The clerk shall treat this civil action as TERMINATED. All pending dates and

motions in this case are VACATED. 

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: October 23, 2014

/s/ Philip P. Simon 

PHILIP P. SIMON, CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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