UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

MARY TURNEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO. 1:13-CV-3-TLS

)

GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

The Plaintiff, Mary Turney, claims that her employer, General Motors, LLC, has

discriminated against her on the basis of her gender in violation of Title VII and the Equal Pay

Act. She maintains that the Defendant then retaliated against her after she filed an EEOC Charge

complaining of the discriminatory pay. The Defendant has moved for summary judgment on all

claims asserted by the Plaintiff. Having now received the parties’ briefs and designated

evidentiary materials, the matter is ripe for the Court’s consideration.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is the moment in litigation where the non-moving party is

required to marshal and present the court with evidence on which a reasonable jury could rely to

find in his favor. Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). A court

should only deny a motion for summary judgment when the non-moving party presents

admissible evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact. Luster v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrs.,
652 F.3d 726, 731 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. 5443 Suffield Terrace, 607 F.3d 504,

510 (7th Cir. 2010); Swearnigen–El v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 602 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir.

2010)). The court’s role in deciding a motion for summary judgment “is not to sift through the

evidence, pondering the nuances and inconsistencies, and decide whom to believe. The court has

one task and one task only: to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any

material dispute of fact that requires a trial.” Waldridge v. Am. Heochst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920

(7th Cir. 1994). Material facts are those that are outcome determinative under the applicable law.

Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 427 (7th Cir. 1997). “Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not deter

summary judgment, even when in dispute.” Harney v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 526 F.3d

1099, 1104 (7th Cir. 2008).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Plaintiff is a current employee of General Motors, LLC. She began working in a

salaried position for the former General Motors Corporation at its Baltimore, Maryland,

assembly plant in 1983, and has worked in a variety of positions throughout her tenure with

GM.1

 The Plaintiff received a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering in 1998 and a

master’s degree in business in 2006, while working for GM.

Under GM’s pay grade system, salaried employees are assigned to a level ranging from

level 4 through level 9. This salary system contains descriptions of the degree of work

responsibilities that are commensurate with each of the levels, which are established by GM’s

1 Although General Motors LLC and the former General Motors Corporation are separate and

distinct legal entities, the Court will use GM to refer to either entity throughout this Opinion and Order.

2
corporate offices. Positions with more responsibilities are designated by higher levels. GM’s

corporate offices also establish the salary range that is attached to each level. The Plaintiff

received numerous promotions that elevated her from a level 4 to a level 8 in GM’s

compensation structure. In 2004, the Plaintiff was working as a paint production superintendent

and was classified as a level 8 salaried employee when she transferred to GM’s Fort Wayne,

Indiana, assembly plant because the Baltimore plant was closing. 

GM’s corporate office provides oversight and guidance to the plants on staffing

and the classification of salaried positions. However, local plant leadership has some autonomy

and discretion in setting the scope of work and responsibilities for jobs based on the unique

needs and operations of a plant. A plant human resources management (HRM) committee makes

personnel decisions regarding salaried employees at the Fort Wayne plant. From about 2009

through 2012, the following members of management within the Fort Wayne facility were on the

HRM committee: Mike Glinski, Plant Manager; Betty Romsek/Nick Kassanos, Assistant Plant

Manager; Mary Tonne, Controller; Ann Playter/Steve Andreen, Engineering Director; Rick

Baker/Rick Hinzpeter, Quality Director; Ann Scheider, Material Director; Steve Shreffler, Body

Area Manager; Steve Danielson/Bill Muzzillo, Paint Area Manager; Scott Landstra, General

Assembly Area Manager; and Jeff Sorensen, Personnel Director. The Lead Salary HR

Representative, Greg Brown, coordinated and facilitated the HRM committee meetings, but was

not a voting member of the HRM committee. 

In February 2009, the HRM committee decided to transfer the Plaintiff to the engineering

manager position, which was open because the former engineering manager, Asifhusen Khatri,

had been reassigned to production. The Plaintiff came into the position as a level 8A employee

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and her salary was $115,452. In 2009, the salary range for level 8 was between $69,000 and

$145,800. Khatri’s salary in the engineering manager position had been $116,952.

GM underwent a massive company-wide restructuring in 2008 and 2009 as a result of the

conditions that eventually forced it into bankruptcy. As part of the restructuring, and in an

attempt to create a leaner organization, GM corporate directed Fort Wayne management to

reduce the number of its level 8 positions. As a result, in May 2009, the Plaintiff’s engineering

manager position was leveled down from an 8 to a 7. The Plaintiff continued to perform the same

work and receive the same base salary. But by January 2010, her salary was capped at $118,440.

The Plaintiff had ongoing discussions with Ann Playter, the Engineering Director at the

Fort Wayne plant, about getting her position reinstated to a level 8, and Playter was supportive.

In May 2011, GM’s corporate HR asked Fort Wayne management to survey the plant’s salaried

positions affected by the bankruptcy restructuring to determine whether it was appropriate to

restore those positions to their former levels. The HRM committee collectively believed the

engineering manager position should be restored to a level 8. However, this change did not occur

until over a year later, in September 2012. During this time, the plant leadership engaged in

discussions about changing engineering from a centralized structure to a decentralized structure.2

If the plant moved to a decentralized structure, it was unlikely the engineering manager position

would be reinstated back to a level 8. Management ultimately decided to maintain a centralized

engineering structure, but did not decide this until late 2011. In 2011 was also when the

Engineering Director, Steve Andreen, began addressing performance issues with the engineering

2 The engineering manager position has more direct reports in a centralized structure. Conversely,

in a plant with a decentralized structure, the engineering manager has less responsibilities. One of the

other plants, Arlington, had a decentralized structure.

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department, particularly its responsiveness to production needs when breakdowns occurred. The

responsibility of the engineering department is to service production by troubleshooting

breakdowns, making continuous improvements, and installing new equipment. The Fort Wayne

plant was preparing to launch two new product lines that required a substantial installation of

new equipment. However, the plant was also experiencing a high level of equipment failure

because routine maintenance had previously been put off for lack of funds. This created a tension

between the amount of time required to meet deadlines for project work, and time spent on

maintenance work for existing production. However, according to the Plaintiff, her performance

review meeting at the end of 2011 was the first time she was instructed to shift the engineering

department’s focus from project work to production floor response and maintenance.

The Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC on August 6, 2012,

complaining of discrimination in her rate of pay. The next day, she visited Brown in the

personnel department to advise him that she filed a discrimination claim with the EEOC due to

GM’s failure to re-level her position back to a level 8. Brown advised only his supervisor,

Personnel Director Jeff Sorenson, of the Plaintiff’s Charge. Brown did not inform anyone else of

the Charge until after he received a formal notice from the EEOC on August 31, 2012, and there

was never any discussion in HRM Committee meetings about the Charge.

On August 31, 2012, the Plaintiff met with the Assistant Plant Manager, Nick Kassanos,

and the Material Director, Ann Schneider. They notified the Plaintiff that she was being

promoted and the engineering manager position was being reclassified to a level 8 effective

September 1, 2012. They also advised her that on November 1, 2012, she would be transferring

to a level 8 material shift leader position. Her reassignment was part of a series of moves at the

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superintendent level made by the HRM committee in an effort to cross-train, align skills sets,

and raise the level of expertise in various areas of the plant. It was not unusual within GM’s

structure to transfer or reassign salaried employees without seeking their input or providing them

with options. The Plaintiff was informed she would initially be assigned to third shift, but that

the Plaintiff and the other material shift leaders would eventually rotate shifts. During the

meeting, the Plaintiff expressed her disappointment at the material shift leader assignment. She

thought there would be less opportunity for overtime, wanted to remain in a technical

engineering role, and opposed working third shift. Schneider explained that the Plaintiff’s

engineering background would be helpful to the material department, and that Schneider herself,

as well as at least one other employee in the department, had engineering backgrounds similar to

the Plaintiff’s. The Plaintiff asked if she could remain in the engineering manager position or

apply for a maintenance superintendent position if one became available as a result of the other

lateral moves. Kassanos and Shneider advised the Plaintiff that the staffing decisions, which had

been made to develop each individual’s strengths and skill sets and to improve plant operations,

were final, and management needed to stabilize the organization through the launch of new

products.

The Plaintiff has continued to work in the material shift leader position at a level 8 pay

grade since November 1, 2012. She has worked overtime since transferring to the material shift

leader position, and she earns a shift premium of 10% of her base salary for working third shift.

Upon the Plaintiff’s reassignment, a job posting for her former engineering manager

position was posted internally. Brett Stillwell, who had been working as a level 8 general

assembly maintenance superintendent at Fort Wayne, applied and was selected for the position.

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He retained his level 8 classification upon his transfer to engineering. 

ANALYSIS

A. Equal Pay Act

The EPA prohibits employers from paying employees different wages based on gender.

See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); Warren v. Solo Cup Co., 516 F.3d 627, 629 (7th Cir. 2008). A prima

facie case of wage discrimination is established if a preponderance of the evidence shows that

the defendant (1) paid higher wages to a male employee, (2) for equal work requiring

substantially similar skill, effort and responsibilities, and (3) the work was performed under

similar working conditions. Warren, 516 F.3d at 629. A prima facie case does not require proof

of discriminatory intent. Id. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the

defendant to offer a gender neutral justification for the wage differential. Id. The statutory

defenses are bona fide differences bases on a seniority system, a merit system, a system that

measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, or a differential based on any other fact

other than sex. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).

Before the Court can discuss the elements of a prima facie case, it must determine what

the Plaintiff is claiming as an EPA violation. The Plaintiff alleges in her Amended Complaint

that from April 2009 until September 2012, the Defendant paid male employees higher wages for

jobs that required equal work, skill, effort and responsibility, and that the unlawful conduct was

willful. In the Plaintiff’s Brief in Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the

Plaintiff asserts that “she is not challenging her initial demotion under the EPA—such a claim

would fall outside of the statute of limitations.” (ECF No. 39 at 11.) An Equal Pay Act suit must

7
be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued, or within three years after the

cause of action accrued if the alleged violation was willful. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). The Plaintiff

filed her Complaint on November 13, 2012. Thus, she may lodge an EPA challenge to any pay

periods going back to November 13, 2009. 

The Plaintiff also clarifies in her Response Brief that she is comparing her position and

pay to the following male employees: (1) her predecessor, Asifhusen Khatri; (2) her successor,

Brett Stillwell; and (3) the engineering managers at GM’s other North American assembly

plants. 

1. Higher Wages to a Male Employee

When the Plaintiff became the engineering manager at the Fort Wayne facility, her salary

was less than what her male predecessor had been earning. Additionally, the Plaintiff has

identified several male engineering managers at other assembly plants that earned higher salaries

during the relevant period.

With respect to Stillwell, the Defendant notes that the Plaintiff’s salary was already

increased to $124,368 by the time Stillwell assumed the position. While this may rule out any

claim of disparate pay after September 2012—a claim the Plaintiff does not actually advance—it

does not render the evidence less germane to her claim that she was disparately paid during the

three years’ prior to being restored to a level 8, when her salary was capped at $118,440. See

Patkus v. Sangamon-Cass Consortium, 769 F.2d 1251, 1260 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The salary paid to

a successor who performs substantially the same work may provide a basis for an equal pay

action.”). Further, within 5 months, Stillwell’s salary was increased from $121,860 to $132,828. 

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The Plaintiff has identified male employees who were paid more than she and thus met

the first part of the prima facie test.

2. Equal Work 

In determining whether two jobs are equal, the Court must “look to the duties actually

performed by each employee, and not to his or her job description or title.” Dey v. Colt Constr.

& Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1461 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Soto v. Adams Elevator Equip. Co., 941

F.2d 543, 548 (7th Cir. 1991)). Those duties, however, need not be identical; the crucial inquiry

is “whether the jobs to be compared have a ‘common core’ of tasks, i.e., whether a significant

portion of the two jobs is identical.” Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1209 (7th Cir. 1989)

(citations omitted). Once the plaintiff establishes a common core, the court must ask whether any

additional tasks make the jobs “substantially different.” Id. (citation and quotation marks

omitted); see also Cullen v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 338 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2003).

The EPA specifies three separate elements that are to be considered in comparing job

duties: skill, effort, and responsibility. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). Each of these elements must

be met individually to establish a prima facie case, see 29 C.F.R. § 1620.14, but the appropriate

comparison is between the jobs at issue, not the individuals holding those jobs, Cullen, 338 F.3d

at 699 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1620.15(a)). See also Covington v. S. Ill. Univ., 816 F.2d 317, 323 n.9

(7th Cir. 1987) (“It seems clear from the legislative history of the Equal Pay Act that factors such

as experience and education operate as a defense rather than as part of the plaintiff’s prima facie

case.”). 

None of the evidence before this Court suggests that the experience, training, education,

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or ability required to perform the engineering manager job changed when Khatri was transferred

out of the position and the Plaintiff was transferred in. See 29 C.F.R. § 1620.15(a) (identifying

skill to include “consideration of such factors as experience, training, education, and ability”).

Neither does any designated evidence suggest there was a change in the effort needed to

accomplish the job or the responsibilities it entailed. Cf. Howard v. Lear Corp. EEDS &

Interiors, 234 F.3d 1002, 1005 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The additional skill, effort, and headache

involved in managing three to six times the number of workers in a more complex employment

environment rendered the [ ] positions . . . substantially different.”). According to the Plaintiff,

Khatri cross-trained her to perform the job and she assumed all of his duties.

The Defendant does not present any argument regarding the engineering position at the

Fort Wayne assembly plant in 2009, and thus does not dispute that the work involved was the

same before and after the Plaintiff filled the position. The same is true for the engineering

position when the Plaintiff’s successor took over. The Defendant’s focus in defense of the EPA

claim is on the Plaintiff’s attempt to compare her position with the engineering managers in

GM’s other assembly plants. The Plaintiff has cited to a common core of tasks that would require

similar skill, effort, and responsibility. But the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff’s statement

that all engineering managers supervised other engineers, managed project work, planned

production methods, and oversaw installation and repair of equipment is a “conclusory

description [that] glosses over significant differences among the engineering manager positions

across GM’s assembly organization.” (Def.’s Reply 2, ECF No. 47.) This argument has no teeth,

as the Defendant fails to describe any of these “significant differences” or establish that the

differences favor its position instead of the Plaintiff’s. For example, the Defendant notes that the

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skill and responsibilities required for oversight of projects or equipment would have differed

between Fort Wayne and other plants because they produced different vehicles. But the

Defendant does not suggest that the oversight for the other vehicles required more skill,

additional responsibilities, or an increased degree of effort. See 29 C.F.R. § 1620.15(a) (“If an

employee must have essentially the same skill in order to perform either of two jobs, the jobs

will qualify under the EPA as jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, even though

the employee in one of the jobs may not exercise the required skill as frequently or during as

much of his or her working time as the employee in the other job.”); 29 C.F.R. § 1620.16(a)

(“Where jobs are otherwise equal under the EPA, and there is no substantial difference in the

amount or degree of effort which must be expended in performing the jobs under comparison,

the jobs may require equal effort in their performance even though the effort may be exerted in

different ways on the two jobs.”); 29 C.F.R. § 1620.17(a) (“Responsibility is concerned with the

degree of accountability required in the performance of the job, with emphasis on the importance

of the job obligation.”). 

The Defendant also complains that the Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to

compare the number and type of engineers that reported to each engineering manager. But the

Defendant does not propose that the engineering managers in any of the other plants had more

employees directly reporting to them, or had more accountability based on those direct reports. 

On the other side, the Plaintiff has presented evidence that, between 2009 and 2012, her

position required a significant increase in engineering project work related to new equipment

that needed to be installed for assembly of heavy duty models that had previously been produced

in a different plant. The equipment for the new model was installed in the fall of 2009 and

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production of the heavy duty truck models began in January 2010. Also in 2010, GM authorized

the Fort Wayne Assembly Plant to increase production from two shift to three shift. The number

of people directly reporting to the engineering manager position increased. The period between

2009 and 2012 also saw the launch of two new product lines. A majority of the engineering

department’s work for the launch was completed before the Plaintiff moved out of the

engineering department in November 2012. In addition, the plant was experiencing a high level

of equipment failure caused by lack of routine maintenance being withheld for insufficient

funding. 

Still attacking the Plaintiff’s comparison of core duties, the Defendant argues that the

Plaintiff cannot rely on meetings she occasionally participated in or discussions she had with

other engineering managers to testify to the “specific skill, effort and responsibility attributed” to

other engineering manager’s jobs. The Defendant also describes the Plaintiff’s statements that

her responsibilities were greater than engineering managers in other plants as “conclusory”

because it is based on “limited information she accessed through a GM database” which “does

not accurately capture all responsibilities and skills required of each engineering manager job.”

(Def.’s Reply 3.) First, these arguments do not speak to the Plaintiff’s evidence concerning the

increase in her own job duties from 2009 to 2012 based on circumstances within the Fort Wayne

Assembly Plant—conditions that were verified by the Engineering Directors. Second, the

conversations and databases provided a basis for the Plaintiff’s personal knowledge and

inferences, which she specifically detailed in an affidavit, and the Defendant does not present

contradictory proof. Besides, the Plaintiff need not describe every responsibility and skill of each

manager; her assessment of the core duties is sufficient to create a triable issue of fact regarding

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the equality of the engineering manager positions. It is not true, as the Defendant argues, that the

Plaintiff’s admission that day-to-day responsibilities differed at each plant is the death knell of

her comparison. (Def.’s Reply 2 (arguing that the Plaintiff’s admission is “fatal to her claim”).)

This becomes even more evident when the Plaintiff “admission” is viewed within the context of

the deposition testimony from where it is taken:

Q. [H]ow do you know what the duties and responsibilities are of all the

engineering managers of other plants? I mean, what are you basing that

on?

A. I know that the core responsibilities of the engineering manager come

from corporate and go to the plants, and then whether it is centralized or

an area manager setup, they have certain responsibilities.

I know because I see their names in the ACAP system, so I

know they were responsible for ACAP. I see them submitting

through the Global Project Registration. I see their name on some

of the financial forecasting spreadsheets that I was responsible for.

So I have a somewhat good idea.

I have spoken with some of them on occasion when we

have a problem in our plant and they had similar equipment. So I

have spoken to the engineering manager at Lordstown, at Bowling

Green, at Spring Hill, at Hamtramck, so I know from that.

Based on a work chart, I can see how many people work

for them. That gives me a pretty good idea of what their profile is,

you know, as far as how their organization is set up. I know their

number of shifts. I know the product that they are building.

Q. And, I’m sorry, but where are you getting this information?

A. Organizational chart for the direct reports. The product is, you know, out

there, what they are building. The number of shifts, that is information that

we have that we use especially when we were getting ready to go from

two shifts to three shifts, we were talking to other plants that were

currently running three shifts, and when other plants went from two shifts

to three shifts, they were calling us, so you are pretty aware of what the

other plants are running, how many shifts.

I can see in the Global Project Registration which is a

listing of all of the project money that different plants have

requested. I can see not only my plant, but I can see all of the other

plants and I can see what type of project work they have out there.

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Those are just some of the examples of how I know what

they are involved in and what their responsibilities are.

Q. But as far as like day-to-day duties and responsibilities. I mean, it could be

different depending on the line of business, on the product for similar

positions at different plant; right? I mean the day-to-day responsibilities.

A. Yes.

(Pl.’s Dep. 80–82, ECF No. 34-1.) “Differences in responsibility must be substantial; to argue

that any difference in supervisory responsibility renders jobs unequal is manifestly incorrect as a

matter of law.” Fallon, 882 F.2d 1206, 1209 (7th Cir. 1989) (quotation marks omitted); see also

29 C.F.R. § 1620.17 (“Responsibility is concerned with the degree of accountability required in

the performance of the job, with emphasis on the importance of the job obligation.”).

The Defendant has not identified any differences in the engineering manager responsibilities,

much less presented argument that these differences were sufficiently substantial to render the

jobs unequal. 

Based on the foregoing, a jury could conclude that the engineering managers positions

across GM involved a common core of tasks or that a significant portion of the jobs were

identical. The Defendant’s evidence does not establish, as a matter of law, that the engineering

manager jobs performed by the Plaintiff’s predecessor, her successor, or the engineering

managers in the other assembly plants involved any additional tasks that made the jobs

substantially different.

3. Similar Working Conditions

There is no suggestion in the record that the engineering manager jobs, performed either

within the same facility or within other GM assembly plants in North America, were performed

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under different working conditions.

4. Affirmative Defense: Factors Other Than Sex

Once a plaintiff satisfies his or her prima facie case, the employer bears the burden of

showing that the pay disparity is due to: (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system

which measures earnings by quantity or quality or production; or (iv) a differential based on any

other factor other than sex. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). These are affirmative defenses on which the

employer bears the burden of persuasion. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188,

196–197 (1974); Dey, 28 F.3d at 1462; Fallon, 882 F.2d at 1211.

The Defendant relies on the last category, a differential other than sex, to explain the pay

disparity. First, the Defendant cites to financial constraints and restructuring on the verge of its

bankruptcy to explain the move from level 8 to 7. The Defendant argues that “[a]s conditions

stabilized, management considered reinstating the position to level eight, but initially chose not

to because of ongoing discussions about restructuring the engineering organization.” (Def.’s Br.

18, ECF No. 34.) The Defendant then notes that complaints lodged by production managers

about the engineering department’s response time “raised concerns that plaintiff was not suited

for that position at [a] higher level.” (Id.)

Although the Defendant has submitted that Fort Wayne management was considering

reorganizing the engineering department to a decentralized structure, it has not explained why

the position was not releveled to the appropriate level for the status quo—that is, for a

centralized structure. It is undisputed that the HR committee regarded the level of work

performed in the engineering manager position worthy of a level 8 designation. Because there is

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evidence that the duties being undertaken supported a higher salary, a jury should decide

whether the Defendant’s failure to reinstate the position while management discussed a potential

structural change was a gender neutral reason for the delay. The Court does not make this

determination as a matter of law. The Defendant also maintains that there was not a consensus on

how to staff the position because area managers and assistant plant managers who oversaw

production did not believe that the engineering department was being responsive to production

needs, particularly with respect to breakdowns and issues with new equipment. But the Plaintiff

submits that she was not informed of problems with her performance until the end of 2011, and

there is no evidence that anyone was seeking to remove the Plaintiff from the engineering

manager position during this time based on her performance. The Defendant kept the Plaintiff in

the engineering manager position for nearly three years after it was reduced to a level 7. By all

accounts, the engineering department was under an extreme amount of stress during this time,

and the work load actually increased. Again, it would not be appropriate for the Court to ponder

the nuances and inconsistencies; a jury is entitled to weigh the facts to determine whether the

Defendant’s delay in paying the Plaintiff commensurate with the pay received by others who

performed the same level of work was based on her performance. The Court cannot make the

determination, as a matter of law, that these were gender neutral reasons for the Defendant’s

delay in releveling the engineering manager position.

With regard to Stillwell, the Plaintiff’s successor in the engineering manager position, the

Defendant argues that his pay differential was justified by the fact that he had a technical

maintenance background with GM, which the Plaintiff did not have. (Def’s Reply 7.) The

Plaintiff, however, has presented evidence that she also had a technical maintenance background

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with GM, having worked for ten years at GM’s Baltimore Assembly plant on the maintenance

side and five years as a maintenance supervisor. Even without this evidence, maintenance

experience was just one of the criteria that Andreen stated was necessary for filling the position,

with the others being an engineering degree or equivalent, and project management experience.

There is no testimony in the record that a technical maintenance background was more important

that any of the other factors, or that the Plaintiff did not meet the criteria for holding the position.

Because the review of factors impacting pay is highly fact-specific and the calculus of

factors will differ as to each employee and position, the Court cannot say as a matter of law that

sex played no role. Accordingly, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied as to

Plaintiff’s Equal Pay Act claim.

B. Title VII

The Plaintiff alleges in her Amended Complaint that the Defendant discriminated against

her on the basis of her sex by “paying its male engineering managers more than Plaintiff and by

classifying Plaintiff’s job at a lower level than her male counterparts.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 31, ECF

No. 18.) She argues that, under the direct method of proof, she has presented sufficient

circumstantial evidence of discrimination from which a jury could decide in her favor.

According to the Plaintiff, this evidence includes the fact that when the plant manager decided to

move her from a level 8 to level 7, he acted outside the recommendation of the HRM committee

and kept a male employee at a level 8 instead. The Plaintiff also disputes that her job

performance was a factor in the Defendant’s decision to keep her at a level 7 after financial

restrictions no longer required it.

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The Plaintiff acknowledges that corporate GM directed the Fort Wayne facility to reduce

its level 8 positions to level 7 for financial reasons, but proposes that the decision to relevel her

position instead of another position held by a male was suspect. To support her claim of

suspicious circumstances, the Plaintiff asserts that the plant manager, Mike Glinski,

independently made the decision to reduce her position despite the HRM committee’s consensus

to reduce the second shift lead superintendent to level 7 and keep the engineering manager

position at a level 8. The Defendant disputes the Plaintiff’s characterization. 

Ann Playter, the Engineering Director, was involved in the discussion regarding which

positions to reduce from level 8 to level 7. She testified that when the HR committee had to

choose between the second shift lead superintendent and the engineering manager there was a

consensus to keep the engineering manager at a level 8. However, this was with the

understanding that Glinski was going to make a pitch for corporate to allow the Fort Wayne

facility to get an extra level 8 manager that other plants were not allowed based on its production

volume and hours. This would permit Fort Wayne to then keep the lead superintendent, which

was a position unique to the Fort Wayne facility, as well as maintain the engineering manager

position at a level 8. When corporate did not accept Glinski’s argument about an extra level 8, he

had to decide which position was more important to the facility. Glinski made the decision to

relevel the engineering manager and keep the second shift lead superintendent, which he

believed was a critical position because of the rate and volume of Fort Wayne’s production.

According to Playter, the second shift lead superintendent managed other level 8 employees, so

it had to be maintained at a level 8. Accordingly, if Fort Wayne was going to keep the position,

the reduction had to impact another position. The engineering manager was the last management

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position discussed as an option, so Glinski made the final decision to reduce it to a level 7 and

meet corporate’s quota.

With this legitimate business explanation, and no evidence to dispute that it was the real

reason for the decision, no reasonable jury could find that gender was a motivating factor in

choosing to keep the second shift lead superintendent position and reduce the Plaintiff’s position

from level 8 to level 7. However, a jury could consider whether the Plaintiff’s gender was a

factor in keeping her at level 7 throughout her tenure in the position, even after the quota on

level 8 positions was lifted.

The Plaintiff presents evidence that her work load increased from 2009 through 2011,

and that the topic of bringing her position back to level 8 was raised by 2010, when the

Defendant began hiring additional level 8 employees. According to the Defendant, the Plaintiff

was not restored to level 8 at this time because Fort Wayne management was having ongoing

discussions about reorganizing the engineering department to a decentralized structure. Although

the decision was eventually made to keep the centralized structure, a jury could question the

Defendant’s reasons for keeping the Plaintiff at a lower pay throughout the discussions, as it is

undisputed that the level of work under the existing format supported a higher salary. The

Defendant also maintains that there was not a consensus on how to staff the position because of

the engineering department’s response breakdowns in production. On the other hand, the

Plaintiff was not informed of problems with her performance until the end of 2011, and she

continued to hold the position until late 2012. The engineering manager position required

attention to project work for new equipment, and responsiveness to production. The Defendant

does not suggest that balancing these two aspect of the job was not difficult, or unworthy of level

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8 pay, especially during the time frame the Plaintiff held the position. In fact, as mentioned

above, it acknowledges that the position was worthy of the level 8 designation. A jury should be

allowed to consider GM’s delay within the context of the entire record, including that fact that

the engineering managers for GM’s other production facilities, staffed by men, were designated

as level 8. See Ripberger v. Corizon, Inc., 773 F.3d 871, 877 (7th Cir. 2014) (Evidence that

others outside the protected class were systematically treated better can create an inference of

discriminatory intent.). 

A myriad of factors appears to have weighed into the timing of the decision to relevel the

position. The Plaintiff has presented evidence to permit a jury to consider the facts and testimony

and deliberate whether one of the factors for the seeming lack of urgency was the Plaintiff’s

gender. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2526 (2013) (explaining that,

under Title VII and its amendments, a plaintiff can obtain declaratory relief, attorney’s fees and

costs, and some forms of injunctive relief based solely on proof that race, color, religion, sex, or

nationality was a motivating factor in the employment action even if other factors also motivated

the decision, but an employer’s proof that it would still have taken the same employment action

would save it from monetary damages and a reinstatement order). Because the evidence viewed

in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff could lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict in her

favor, the Defendant’s request for summary judgment must be denied.

C. Retaliation Claim

The Plaintiff filed her EEOC Charge complaining of pay discrimination on August 6,

2012. She was moved to the material shift leader position on November 1, 2012. The Plaintiff

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claims that the Defendant’s decision to move her from the engineering manager position to the

material shift leader position was retaliation for her complaints of discriminatory pay. This job

change will only support a retaliation claim if it was a materially adverse action. See Brown v.

Advocate S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 2012) (direct method); Harper v.

C.R. England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 309 (7th Cir. 2012) (indirect, burden-shifting approach). An

action is materially adverse for purposes of retaliation if it “well might have dissuaded a

reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N. &

Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (quotation marks omitted). “[N]ot everything

that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action.” Stutler v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrs.,

263 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir.

1996)). 

The Plaintiff’s general assertions about overtime and the relative prestige of the two

positions do not convince the Court that her transfer to the material shift leader position was

materially adverse. The Plaintiff has received overtime pay in her new position, and has not

otherwise established that the transfer negatively impacted her wages, benefits, or career

prospects. The perception of less prestige is, on the current record, the Plaintiff’s alone. There is

no evidence that the job actually entails “objectively less desirable duties.” Lucero v. Nettle

Creek Sch. Corp., 566 F.3d 720, 729–30 (7th Cir. 2009) (stating that the plaintiff’s subjective

belief that one job was “more prestigious” than another was “her personal preference [that was]

not sufficient to establish an adverse action”). Accordingly, from an objective standpoint, the

Plaintiff’s transfer to a different department would not dissuade a reasonable professional

working at GM from bringing a charge of discrimination.

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In addition to failing to show that she suffered materially adverse actions, the Plaintiff

has not put forth evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the Defendant’s

employment decisions were made out of a desire to retaliate against the Plaintiff for filing the

EEOC Charge. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2417, 2528 (2013) (“Title

VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the

challenged employment action.”). A plaintiff may supply the necessary causal link through

circumstantial evidence from which a jury may infer intentional discrimination. Stephens v.

Erickson, 569 F.3d 779, 787 (7th Cir. 2009). Such circumstantial evidence may include

suspicious timing, ambiguous statements of animus, evidence other employees were treated

differently, or evidence the employer’s proffered reason for the adverse action was pretextual.

Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 860 (7th Cir. 2012). When the plaintiff has “assemble[d]

from various scraps of circumstantial evidence enough to allow the trier of fact to conclude that

it is more likely than not that discrimination lay behind the adverse action, then summary

judgment for the defendant is not appropriate.” Morgan v. SVT, LLC, 724 F.3d 990, 996 (7th Cir.

2013).

A close temporal connection between the protected act and the adverse employment

action, without more, is insufficient to support an inference of causation. Turner v. The Saloon,

Inc., 595 F.3d 679, 687 (7th Cir. 2010). Here, while there was a close temporal connection, the

Plaintiff has not established that the individuals who made the employment decision were aware

of the Plaintiff’s protected activity. But even if they were aware, the Defendant has identified a

legitimate business reason for the employment changes within the Fort Wayne plant. The

Plaintiff has not identified any weaknesses or implausibilities in the Defendant’s reason that

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would suggest it is not believable. See Coleman, 667 F.3d at 852–53 (citations omitted) (noting

that pretext can be shown by “identif[ying] . . . weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or

contradictions” in an employer’s asserted reason for taking an adverse employment action such

“that a reasonable person could find [it] unworthy of credence”). For example, she claims that

the Defendant did not follow normal practices when deciding to move her because Kassanos did

not talk to Andreen, the Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor. However, her designated evidence

does not establish a “normal practice.” And while she challenges whether Kassanos had enough

knowledge of her job duties to make an informed decision about the move, Schneider, the

Material Director, specifically told the Plaintiff that her engineering background would be useful

in her new position. In any event, pretext is “a deliberate falsehood” not “[a]n honest mistake,

however dumb.” Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 453 F.3d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 2006). Therefore,

the Court is not concerned with whether Kassanos made the right decision, but whether the

Plaintiff has presented evidence from which a factfinder could make the reasonable inference

that the Defendant made a retaliatory decision. She has not done this. 

The Plaintiff thinks it suspicious that GM moved so many other employees at the same

time. But again, she does not present any evidence to suggest that this particular practice was

unusual—or how moving other people in addition to the Plaintiff even logically supports an

inference that the Defendant was out to get the Plaintiff for her protected activity. The record

before the Court is that the Plaintiff’s reassignment was part of a series of moves at the

superintendent level made for purposes of crosstraining, and that it was not unusual within GM’s

structure to transfer or reassign salaried employees without seeking their input or providing them

with options. Given this evidence, it is hard to see how a rational jury could consider the

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circumstances surrounding the decision to be evidence of a retaliatory animus. Finally, the

Plaintiff notes that there is discrepancy in the record regarding whose idea it was to move the

Plaintiff, but has not explained how this discrepancy supports an inference of retaliation.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No.

33] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; the Plaintiff’s Motion for Oral Argument

[ECF No. 42] is DENIED; and the Plaintiff’s Request to File a Sur-Reply Opposing Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 49] is GRANTED, the Court having already

considered the entirety of the parties’ arguments.

SO ORDERED on February 10, 2015.

 s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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