UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

JOE ELIZONDO, )

Plaintiff, )

)

 v. )

) CAUSE NO.: 2:12-CV-36-PRC

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE )

Commissioner of the Social Security )

Administration, )

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on a Complaint [DE 1], filed by Plaintiff Joe Elizondo on

January 23, 2012, and Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of His Motion to Reverse the Decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security [DE 18], filed by Plaintiff on June 8, 2012. Plaintiff requests that

the October 12, 2010, decision of the Administrative Law Judge to deny him disability insurance

benefits be reversed. For the following reasons, the Court denies the Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of

His Motion to Reverse the Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 2, 2008, Mr. Elizondo filed for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) with the

U.S. Social SecurityAdministration (“SSA”) alleging that he became disabled on December 7, 2004. 

Mr. Elizondo’s application was initially denied on January 20, 2009, and again upon reconsideration

on February 10, 2009. 

On August 10, 2010, ALJ Michael Hellman held a video hearing at which Mr. Elizondo and

a vocational expert testified. On October 12, 2010, the ALJ issued a decision finding Mr. Elizondo

not disabled and denying him benefits. The ALJ made the following findings under the required

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five-step analysis:

1. The claimant last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security

Act on June 30, 2007.

2. The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the time

period from his alleged onset date of December 7, 2004 through his date last

insured of June 30, 2007 (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).

3. Through the date last insured, the claimant had the following severe

impairments: status post pacemaker implantation (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).

4. Through the date last insured, the claimant did not have an impairment or

combination or impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed

impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR

404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).

5. Through the date last insured, the claimant had the residual functional

capacity to perform the full range of medium work as defined in 20 CFR

404.1567(c). He can lift/carry 50 pounds occasionally and up to 25 pounds

frequently, stand/walk 6 hours in an 8 hour workday, and sit 6 hours in an 8

hour workday.

6. Through the date last insured, the claimant was capable of performing past

relevant work of front end loader (20 CFR 404.1565).

7. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security

Act, at any time from December 7, 2004, the alleged onset date, through June

30, 2007, the date last insured. (20 CFR 404.1520(f)). 

Mr. Elizondo filed a request for review, which the Appeals Council denied on November 23,

2011. Mr. Elizondo now requests judicial review of the ALJ’s October 12, 2010, decision, which

constitutes the final decision of the Commissioner.

The parties filed forms of consent to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate

Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case.

Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Background

Plaintiff was born on April 18, 1950. He was 54 years old on his alleged disability onset date

of December 7, 2004. Plaintiff has an eleventh grade education. He previously worked as a front

end loader and an industrial cleaner at a paint factory. His date last insured was June 30, 2007.

B. Medical Evidence

In 1997, Plaintiff broke his sternum in a car accident, but has not received ongoing treatment

for injuries resulting from the accident. On December 7, 2004, Plaintiff presented to a hospital with

syncopal episodes. Telemetry monitoring revealed an intermittent high grade atrioventricular

(“AV”) block. Plaintiff received a permanent pacemaker to afford him optimal protection from

bradyarrhythmia.

On December 20, 2004, and January 7, 2005, Plaintiff had follow-up appointments with Dr.

Dixon for his pacemaker. Plaintiff did not voice any complaints at these appointments. On January

28, 2005, Dr. Vijay Shah had Plaintiff undergo a nuclear treadmill stress test to detect exercise

induced ischemia. Dr. Shah concluded that Plaintiff had good exercise capacity and had no chest

pain or arrhythmia. Plaintiff had a negative EKG Stress Test, and nuclear imaging did not reveal

exercise induced myocardial ischemia. Plaintiff had follow up appointments with Dr. Dixon again

in October 2005, April 2006, October 2006, April 2007, and October 2007. Plaintiff did not voice

any complaints during these follow up visits and reported that he was doing well. Plaintiff also

underwent transtelephonic pacemaker evaluations in June, August, and December 2005; June,

August, and December 2006; February, June, August, and December 2007; and February, June, and

August 2008. At each of the appointments, Dr. Dixon noted normal transtelephonic and magnet

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evaluations. Plaintiff did not voice any complaints during these appointments.

In April, 2008, after his date last insured, Plaintiff went to Dr. Scott Kaufman for an

evaluation of his pacemaker, and returned for another evaluation in October, 2008. He did not report

any complaints at either visit.

On March 29, 2005, Plaintiff had an appointment at the USS Family Medical Center for a

hyperlipidemia check. He mentioned that he had back pain on his right side for two days. On July

30, 2007, Plaintiff complained to Dr. Dunning at the USS Family Medical Center that he had right

lower side and back pain for five days and that he was having trouble walking. Dr. Dunning

prescribed Plaintiff prescription strength Ibuprofen.

On February 13, 2009, Plaintiff visited Dr. Isidora Nantes for a hyperlipidemia check and

also complained of right lumbar pain after lifting something heavy. Dr. Nantes examined Plaintiff’s

right lumbar area, but found no CVA tenderness, no flank mass, and no tenderness on palpation of

the right lumbar area where Plaintiff was having achiness. Dr. Nantes also found hip flexion and

internal and external rotation at the bilateral hip joint to be normal. A straight leg raising test was

90 degrees on both sides, and Plaintiff was negative for eliciting radicular pain. Dr. Nantes did not

provide any treatment but instructed Plaintiff to take an over the counter medicine if it was really

sore.

On January 8, 2009, Dr. Richard Wenzler, a state agency reviewing physician, opined that

Plaintiff did not have a severe impairment prior to the date last insured. On February 10, 2009, Dr.

Fernando Montoya, another reviewing physician, affirmed Dr. Wenzler’s opinion.

C. Mr. Elizondo’s Testimony

At the Administrative Hearing held on August 10, 2010, Plaintiff testified that his primary

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complaints were from the broken sternum in 1997 and the pacemaker in 2004. He testified that he

used to work as a front end loader, but stopped working because he felt weak and tired. As of 2000,

he considered himself retired. Plaintiff testified that he would not have retired from his job as a front

end loader if not for his tiredness and back pain. From 2000 to 2004, Plaintiff did not work. 

Plaintiff alleges that he became disabled December 7, 2004, the day he presented to the hospital with

syncopal episodes. Plaintiff testified that due to his pacemaker he was not to be on a treadmill.

Plaintiff testified that a typical day between December 2004 and June 2007 included waking

up between four o’clock and five o’clock in the morning, showering, watching television, going

outside to check the weather, and eating. Plaintiff was able to dress, bathe, and feed himself. He

did his own grocery shopping to buy what he needed. Plaintiff maintained a valid driver’s license

and would drive himself. Plaintiff testified that he was tired all of the time. He stated that he did

not have energy and did not feel like doing anything.

There was a period of three or four months in 2006 when Plaintiff worked as an industrial

cleaner for a paint factory. Although the job was supposed to be part time, Plaintiff worked about

forty hours per week. Plaintiff’s responsibilities included cleaning up, sweeping, throwing the

garbage out, and moving paint cans. Plaintiff testified that he was allowed to work at his own pace,

which was slower than the normal pace, but that he quit because he was too tired to work eight hour

shifts and could not stand for eight hours. Plaintiff testified that he was going to be eased out of his

employment, but he quit before he could be fired.

Plaintiff testified that he is still tired all of the time and becomes short of breath. He stated

that he cannot walk long distances and is still not supposed to be on a treadmill. Plaintiff stated that

the doctor had not given him any treatment for these complaints, but told Plaintiff to not exert

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himself or get angry.

D. Vocational Expert Testimony

At the administrative hearing, the ALJ asked the VE to identify the work the Plaintiff

performed in the 15 years prior to June 30, 2007. The VE stated that the Plaintiff had been a front

end loader operator, which is classified as medium, semi-skilled work, by the Dictionary of

Occupational Titles (“DOT”). He also testified that the Plaintiff’s description of his work as a front

end loader indicated that Plaintiff actually did light work. The VE testified that Plaintiff’s work at

the paint factory as an industrial cleaner was medium, unskilled work. The VE testified that

Plaintiff’s prior work did not provide any transferrable skills to restricted light work.

E. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ determined that, as of his date last insured, Plaintiff suffered from the severe

impairment of status post pacemaker implantation, which did not meet or medically equal one of the

listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 CFR §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525

and 404.1526. The ALJ found that the Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform the

full range of medium work. The Plaintiff could lift/carry 50 pounds occasionally and up to 25

pounds frequently, stand/walk 6 hours in an 8 hour workday, and sit 6 hours in an 8 hour workday.

The ALJ determined that the Plaintiff’s medical impairment could cause his alleged

symptoms, but found the claimant’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects

of the symptoms were not entirely credible. The ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform his past

relevant work of a front end loader.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Social Security Act authorizes judicial review of the final decision of the agency and

indicates that the Commissioner’s factual findings must be accepted as conclusive if supported by

substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, a court reviewing the findings of an ALJ will

reverse only if the findings are not supported by substantial evidence or if the ALJ has applied an

erroneous legal standard. See Briscoe v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005). Substantial

evidence consists of “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Gudgel v.

Barnhart, 345 F.3d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 2003)).

A court reviews the entire administrative record but does not reconsider facts, re-weigh the

evidence, resolve conflicts in evidence, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its judgment for

that of the ALJ. See Boiles v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005); Clifford v. Apfel, 227

F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000); Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049, 1055 (7th Cir. 1999). Thus, the

question upon judicial review of an ALJ’s finding that a claimant is not disabled within the meaning

of the Social SecurityAct is not whetherthe claimant is, in fact, disabled, but whether the ALJ “uses

the correct legal standards and the decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Roddy v. Astrue,

705 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing O’Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir.

2010); Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 734-35 (7th Cir. 2006); Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d

664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004)). “[I]f the Commissioner commits an error of law,” the Court may reverse

the decision “without regard to the volume of evidence in support of the factual findings.” White

v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Binion v. Chater, 108 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir.

1997)).

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At a minimum, an ALJ must articulate his analysis of the evidence in order to allow the

reviewing court to trace the path of his reasoning and to be assured that the ALJ considered the

important evidence. See Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002); Diaz v. Chater, 55

F.3d 300, 307 (7th Cir. 1995); Green v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1995). An ALJ must

“‘build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [the] conclusion’ so that, as a reviewing

court, we may assess the validity of the agency’s final decision and afford [a claimant] meaningful

review.” Giles v. Astrue, 483 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Scott, 297 F.3d at 595)); see

also O’Connor-Spinner, 627 F.3d at 618 (“An ALJ need not specifically address every piece of

evidence, but must provide a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and his conclusions.”); Zurawski

v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he ALJ’s analysis must provide some glimpse into

the reasoning behind [the] decision to deny benefits.”).

DISABILITY STANDARD

To be eligible for disability benefits, a claimant must establish that he suffers from a

“disability” as defined by the Social Security Act and regulations. The Act defines “disability” as

an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable

physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A),

1382c(a)(3)(A). To be found disabled, the claimant’s impairment must not only prevent him from

doing his previous work, but considering his age, education, and work experience, it must also

prevent him from engaging in any other type of substantial gainful activity that exists in significant

numbers in the economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f),

416.920(e)-(f).

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When a claimant alleges a disability, Social Security regulations provide a five-step inquiry

to evaluate whether the claimant is entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).

The steps are: (1) Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity? If yes, the claimant is not

disabled, and the claim is denied; if no, the inquiry proceeds to step two; (2) Does the claimant have

an impairment or combination of impairments that are severe? If not, the claimant is not disabled,

and the claim is denied; if yes, the inquiry proceeds to step three; (3) Do(es) the impairment(s) meet

or equal a listed impairment in the appendix to the regulations? If yes, the claimant is automatically

considered disabled; if not, then the inquiry proceeds to step four; (4) Can the claimant do the

claimant’s past relevant work? If yes, the claimant is not disabled, and the claim is denied; if no,

then the inquiry proceeds to step five; (5) Can the claimant perform other work given the claimant’s

RFC, age, education, and experience? If yes, then the claimant is not disabled, and the claim is

denied; if no, the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v);see

also Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 699-700 (7th Cir. 2004).

At steps four and five, the ALJ must consider an assessment of the claimant’s RFC. The

RFC “is an administrative assessment of what work-related activities an individual can perform

despite [his] limitations.” Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1178 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing SSR

96-8p, 1996 WL374184 (Jul. 2, 1996); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)) (other citations omitted). The RFC

should be based on evidence in the record. Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 676 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing

20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3)). The claimant bears the burden of proving steps one through four,

whereas the burden at step five is on the ALJ. Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 886; see also Knight v. Chater,

55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1995). 

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ANALYSIS

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s credibility determination and RFC finding.

A. Credibility

The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting

effects of his symptoms were not credible. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s credibility determination

is not supported by the record and that the ALJ failed to specify the reasons for his credibility

finding. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s credibilityfinding was sufficiently articulated and

supported by substantial evidence.

In making a disability determination, the Commissioner will consider a claimant’s statements

about his or her symptoms, including pain, and how they affect the claimant’s daily life and ability

to work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). However, subjective allegations of disabling symptoms alone

cannot support a finding of disability. See id. The Regulations establish a two-part test for

determining whether complaints of pain contribute to a finding of disability: (1) the claimant must

provide objective medical evidence of a medically determinable impairment or combination of

impairments that reasonably could be expected to produce the symptoms alleged; and (2) once an

ALJ has found an impairment that reasonably could cause the symptoms alleged, the ALJ must

consider the intensity and persistence of these symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). The ALJ must

weigh the claimant’s subjective complaints, the relevant objective medical evidence, and any other

evidence of the following factors:

(1) The individual’s daily activities;

(2) Location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms;

(3) Precipitating and aggravating factors;

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(4) Type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication;

(5) Treatment, other than medication, for relief of pain or other symptoms;

(6) Other measures taken to relieve pain or other symptoms;

(7) Other factors concerning functional limitations due to pain or other symptoms.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). In making a credibility determination, Social Security Ruling 96-7p

states that the ALJ must consider the record as a whole, including objective medical evidence, the

claimant’s statement about symptoms, any statements or other information provided by treating or

examining physicians and other persons about the conditions and how they affect the claimant, and

any other relevant evidence. See SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 (Jul. 2, 1996).

An ALJ is not required to give full credit to every statement of pain made by the claimant or

to find a disability each time a claimant states he or she is unable to work. See Rucker v. Chater, 92

F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 1996). However, Ruling 96-7p provides that a claimant’s statements

regarding symptoms or the effect of symptoms on her ability to work “may not be disregarded solely

because they are not substantiated by objective evidence.” SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *6. An

ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to substantial deference by a reviewing court and will not

be overturned unless the claimant can show that the finding is “patently wrong.” Prochaska, 454

F.3d at 738.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity,

persistence and limiting effects of [his] symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent

with the above residual functional capacity assessment,” AR 20, is an impermissibly conclusory

post-hoc credibility determination. The Commissioner argues that the credibility determination is

supported by evidence.

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The ALJ must evaluate credibility before coming to a decision on the merits. Brindisi v.

Barnhart, 315 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2003). SSR 96-7p prohibits conclusory determinations that

“turn[] the credibility determination process on its head by finding statements that support the ruling

credible and rejecting those statements that do not.” Id. at 788. The ALJ’s “decision must contain

specific reasons for the finding on credibility, supported by the evidence in the case record, and must

be sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviews the weight the

adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and the reasons for the weight.” SSR 96-7p; see also

Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 2002).

If the sentence cited by Plaintiff encompassed the totality of the credibility finding in the

ALJ’s decision, it might indeed be improper. However, the ALJ’s decision indicates that he

considered a number of conflicts between Plaintiff’s statements and other evidence before

concluding that Plaintiff was less than credible, sufficiently articulating his credibility finding in

accordance with SSR 96-7p. For example, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff never complained to his

doctors about pain or physical limitations, and engaged in daily activities greater than would be

expected given his complaints.

Plaintiff also challenges this explanation, arguing that the ALJ failed to recognize the

difference between daily living activities and work activities. The Commissioner asserts that the

ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s daily activities as one of several factors in assessing credibility.

The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly criticized credibility determinations that equate a

plaintiff’s ability to take care of his personal hygiene, children, or household chores with the ability

to work. See, e.g., Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The critical differences

between activities of daily living and activities in a full-time job are that a person has more flexibility

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in scheduling the former than the latter, can get help from other persons . . . and is not held to a

minimum standard of performance, as she would be by an employer. The failure to recognize these

differences is a recurrent, and deplorable, feature of opinions by administrative law judges in social

security disability cases.”); Punzio v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 704, 712 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that a

plaintiff’s ability to complete activities of daily living does not mean that he can manage the

requirements of the workplace); Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 887 (asserting that daily activities, such as

doing laundry, helping children prepare for school, cooking, and washing dishes do not necessarily

undermine or contradict a claim of disabling pain); Gentle v. Barnhart, 430 F.3d 865, 867 (7th Cir.

2006) (“The administrative law judge’s casual equating of household work to work in the labor

market cannot stand.”). Although an ALJ may not equate the activities of daily living with work or

find a plaintiff less than credible simply because he does what is necessary to stay alive, it is

appropriate for the ALJ to consider daily activities as part of his credibility determination. SSR 96-

7p at *3; see also Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 844 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The ALJ also noted that

while [the plaintiff] claimed in her brief that her daily activities were ‘minimal,’ the record indicated

that she engaged in significant daily activities, including working part-time as a bookkeeper,

attending college classes, spending time with her granddaughter, babysitting, performing household

chores, preparing meals, taking vacations, socializing with family and friends, driving, and

reading.”); Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 505 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he ALJ stated that [the

plaintiff]’s testimony regarding his daily activities—that, among other things, he drove, did laundry

and household chores, and was able to cut grass on occasion—did not support a finding that he was

totallydisabled. The ALJfound that [the plaintiff]’s abilities and activities were more consistent with

the opinions of [physicians] than with his own testimony.”). In this case, the ALJ did not

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impermissibly equate Plaintiff’s daily activities with work activities, but concluded that the

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were not consistent with his daily activities. 

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJfailed to consider the record as a whole when coming to his

credibility determination, but instead improperly concluded that Plaintiff was not credible because

his claimed symptoms were not supported by the medical record. The Commissioner responds that

the ALJ relied not only on the medical record, but also on the Plaintiff’s statements, work history,

and daily activities.

While an ALJ may consider the lack of objective evidence in rejecting a Plaintiff's subjective

complaints, Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 519 (7th Cir. 2009), “the ALJ may not discredit a

claimant's testimony about [his] pain and limitations solely because there is no objective medical

evidence supporting it.” Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2009). In this case, the ALJ

considered Plaintiff’s daily activities, work activities, and statements to determine that he was not

entirely credible. He also considered the medical record, particularly noting that Plaintiff did not

complain to his physicians of physical difficulties, even while working at the paint factory after the

date of onset of disability. The Court recognizes that “[t]he fact that a person holds down a job

doesn't prove that he isn't disabled, because he may have a careless or indulgent employer or be

working beyond his capacity out of desperation.” Henderson v. Barnhart, 349 F. 3d 434, 435 (7th

Cir. 2003). However, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s assertion that the work at the paint factory was

too strenuous for him, and concluded that Plaintiff’s work was not a disqualifying substantial gainful

activity. The ALJ did find that Plaintiff’s job attendance indicated that his daily activities were

greater than what he had reported. 

The ALJ thoroughly described the reasoning behind his credibility determination and

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properly considered Plaintiff’s daily activities, work activities, statements, and medical record. The

Court concludes that his determination was not patently wrong and will not be disturbed.

B. Residual Functional Capacity

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform the full range

of medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c). Plaintiff argues that the RFC finding had no

specific basis in the record and failed to meet SSR 96-8p’s narrative requirement. The

Commissioner argues that the ALJ sufficiently articulated and supported his RFC analysis.

The RFC is a measure of what an individual can do despite the limitations imposed by his

impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). The determination of a claimant's RFC is a legal decision

rather than a medical one. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2); Diaz, 55 F.3d at 306 n.2. The RFC is an

issue at Steps Four and Five of the sequential evaluation process. SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184. 

“The RFC assessment is a function-by-function assessment based upon all of the relevant evidence

of an individual's ability to do work-related activities.” Id. at *3. The ALJ's RFC finding must be

supported by substantial evidence. Clifford, 227 F.3d at 873.

In arriving at a RFC, the ALJ “must consider all allegations of physical and mental

limitations or restrictions and make every reasonable effort to ensure that the file contains sufficient

evidence to assess RFC.” SSR 96-8p 1996 WL 374184, at *5. In addition, he “must consider

limitations and restrictions imposed by all of an individual's impairments, even those that are not

‘severe’” because they “may--when considered with limitations or restrictions due to other

impairments--be critical to the outcome of a claim.” Id.

The RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion describing

how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical

facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily

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activities, observations). In assessing RFC, the adjudicator must

discuss the individual’s ability to perform sustained work activities

in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis (i.e., 8

hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule), and

describe the maximum amount of each work-related activity the

individual can perform based on the evidence available in the case

record.

SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7 (footnote omitted). The ALJ “must build an accurate and

logical bridge from the evidence to [his] conclusion.” Steele, 290 F.3d at 941.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC has no basis in the record because he rejected the only

medical opinion in the record that supported his findings. The Commissioner responds that the RFC

is a legal decision left to the ALJ, and the ALJ is not required to rely on a physician’s opinion.

The reviewing state agency physician concluded that Plaintiff did not suffer from any severe

impairments, but the ALJfound that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairment of post pacemaker

implantation. Accordingly, the ALJ’s rejection of the reviewing physician’s findings was beneficial

to Plaintiff. If the ALJ had accepted the physician’s opinion, Plaintiff would have been found “not

disabled” at step 2.

The ALJ described the medical evidence, giving some weight to Plaintiff’s complaints and

also noting that Plaintiff’s treating physician did not put any work-related restrictions on Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJfailed to point to a medical basis for the specific limitations in the RFC. 

The RFC is not a medical finding, but reflects the ALJ’s determination of what a claimant is able

to do based on his assessment of the entire record. Diaz, 55 F.3d at 306 n.2. In this case, the ALJ

explained that “the record contains no opinions from treating or examining physicians indicating

that the claimant is disabled or even has limitations greater than those determined” by the ALJ and

reflected in the RFC. AR 21. If anything, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from greater

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impairments and had more functional limitations than those reflected in the medical evidence. He

properly considered the entirety of the record, including Plaintiff’s testimony, and drew the requisite

“logical bridge” from the evidence to his conclusions. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES the relief requested in Plaintiff’s Brief

in Support of His Motion to Reverse the Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security [DE 13] 

and AFFIRMS the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision.

SO ORDERED this 28th day of March, 2013.

s/ Paul R. Cherry 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE PAUL AR. CHERRY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

cc: All counsel of record

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case 2:12-cv-00036-PRC document 23 filed 03/28/13 page 17 of 17