IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

DONALD E. BAKER, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) NO. 3:13-CV-372

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Donald E. Baker, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas corpus

petition challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding. (DE 1). For

the reasons set forth below, the petition (DE 1) is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

On October 1, 2012, Baker was found guilty of threatening a

staff member under cause number ISP # 12-09-0275. The charge was

initiated on September 18, 2012, when Corrections Officer L.

Winters wrote a conduct report stating as follows: 

On 9-17-12 at Approx. 5:25 a.m. I Ofc. Winters was

standing inside checkpoint 5 as chow-lines were coming

back Offender Baker was pushing Offender Anglin

“Wheelchair” [through] the metal [detector]. Upon exiting

Offender Baker [and] Offender Anglin did not pass the

metal [detector] that is inside of ckpt 5. I ask Offender

Baker to come back [through], and clear it. Offender

Baker replied “I know that bitch.” I asked Offender Baker

what did he say, he said you heard me bitch. As Offender

Baker was walking pushing Offender Anglin he, Offender

Baker, was talking out loud saying out loud as Offender

Baker was walking down the sidewalk to F-dorm, “I’ll get

me an knife to stab that bitch.” Offender Anglin told
Offender Baker, “Who that bitch Winters” Offender Baker

replied, “Yea I hate that stupid bitch.”

(DE 4-1.)

On September 21, 2012, Baker was formally notified of the

charge and given a copy of the conduct report. (DE 4-1, 4-2.) He

pled not guilty and requested a lay advocate. (DE 4-2.) He

requested a statement from Anglin, and did not request any physical

evidence, but stated that he would bring his own statement to the

hearing. (Id.) A witness statement was obtained from Anglin, who

stated as follows:

I was outside of check point five, when Baker went back

to clear the metal detector, and before he got back

inside the officer went off on him and he said shut up

I’m going through the metal [detector], but he did not

say anything about stabbing her. She just made that part

up, she is just trying to start trouble with anybody.

This is not the first time we have had trouble with her,

there are two other witnesses in this case. One is Mr.

Petroff and other James Lofton.

(DE 4-3 at 8.) Statements were also submitted by Paul Petroff, a

GED instructor at the prison, and inmate James Lofton.1 Petroff

stated as follows:

On Monday September 17, 2012, at approximately 5:30 a.m. I,

Mr. Paul D. Petroff, was standing in Checkpoint 5 (the

Backstreet Checkpoint). I had just entered the building behind

offender Larry Anglin (#141199) and his wheelchair pusher 

(whose name I did not know). When the wheelchair pusher pushed

Mr. Anglin through the metal detector, the detector went off

(due to the metal contained in the wheelchair). As offender

Anglin and his wheelchair pusher continued on, Officer Winters

1 It appears from the record that Anglin contacted these witnesses and

asked them to submit statements. (DE 1-2 at 2, DE 4-3 at 6.) 

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told the wheelchair pusher that he would need to go through

the metal detector again.

When Officer Winters made this request, the wheelchair pusher

responded with several comments in a loud but mumbled manner.

I could determine that his tone was confrontational, but I

could not determine exactly what he said. Eventually, he did

go through the metal detector, and he was able to clear the

machine with no difficulty. Following his departure, Officer

Winters unlocked the door to Backstreet, and I exited the

Checkpoint and made my way to my assigned work station.

(DE 4-3 at 7.) Lofton stated as follows: 

About five seconds after Larry Anglin and his wheelchair

pusher entered checkpoint 5, so did I. When I entered the

checkpoint I heard the wheelchair pusher arguing with the

officer in the checkpoint. Although the argument

continued after I left the checkpoint, I did not hear the

wheelchair pusher threaten the officer in the checkpoint.

(DE 4-3 at 5.) 

On October 1, 2012, a hearing was held on the charge. (DE 4-3

at 1.) Baker submitted a statement describing his own version of

events. (DE 4-3 at 3-4.) He claimed that when Officer Winters told

him to go back through the metal detector, he told her to “kiss my

butt,” but claimed he did not threaten her. (Id.) He further

claimed that the officer “had it in” for him because he had filed

grievances against her in 2011. (Id.) Upon considering the conduct

report, the witness statements, and Baker’s own statement, the

hearing officer found him guilty. (Id.) Baker filed administrative

appeals, arguing that he did not receive a fair hearing because, in

his words, “I told [the hearing officer] I did not threaten Ofc.

Winters at any time, and she act[ed] like she didn’t care that I

said that.” (DE 4-4.) His appeals were denied. (DE 4-4, 4-5.)

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DISCUSSION

 When prisoners lose earned time credits in a disciplinary

proceeding, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause guarantees

them certain procedural protections: (1) advance written notice of

the charge; (2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial

decision-maker; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present

documentary evidence when consistent with institutional safety and

correctional goals; and (4) a written statement by the fact-finder

of evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). To satisfy due process,

there must also be “some evidence” in the record to support the

hearing officer’s determination. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst.

v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). 

Baker’s petition is not a model of clarity, but it is apparent

that he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.2 In reviewing

a disciplinary determination for sufficiency of the evidence,

“courts are not required to conduct an examination of the entire

record, independently assess witness credibility, or weigh the

evidence, but only determine whether the prison disciplinary

board’s decision to revoke good time credits has some factual

basis.” McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999).

2 Baker formulates his first claim as follows: “The DHB Officer abused her

discretion by ignoring the other witness statements and relying only on the

conduct report regardless of errors and falsehoods.” (DE 1-2 at 3.) “Abuse of

discretion” is not a cognizable claim under Wolff or Hill, but his claim can be

read to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on which the hearing officer

relied.

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“[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the

record that could support the conclusion reached by the

disciplinary board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56 (emphasis added). The

court will overturn a guilty finding only if “no reasonable

adjudicator could have found [the prisoner] guilty of the offense

on the basis of the evidence presented.” Henderson v. United States

Parole Comm’n, 13 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994). Furthermore, a

hearing officer is permitted to rely on circumstantial evidence to

establish guilt. See Hamilton v. O’Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 345 (7th

Cir. 1992).

Upon review, there is sufficient evidence to support the

hearing officer’s determination that Baker was guilty of

threatening. Officer Winters reported that Baker was upset with her

on the date of this incident when she told him to go back through

the metal detector. She reported that in response he called her a

bitch, and then stated loudly to Anglin that he would get a knife

“and stab that bitch.” (DE 4-1 at 1.) Baker claimed he never

threatened her, but his own statement corroborated other aspects of

Officer Winter’s account, including that he had been told to go

back through the metal detector and was angry as a result. (DE 4-3

at 3-4.) Anglin’s account also confirmed that Baker was perturbed

with Officer Winters during this incident. (DE 4-3 at 8.) Although

Anglin and Baker both claimed that Baker did not threaten Officer

Winters, the hearing officer was permitted to make her own

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assessment of their credibility, and was not required to simply

accept their accounts. Indeed, their accounts were not even

consistent with each other, since Anglin stated that Baker told

Officer Winters to “shut up,” whereas Baker claims he told her to

“kiss my butt.” (DE 4-3 at 4, 8.) 

Baker assigns much significance to the statements of Lofton

and Petroff, who he views as unbiased third-party witnesses, but

neither of their statements were actually exculpatory. Instead,

both confirmed that Baker had a verbal altercation with Officer

Winters on the date in question. Lofton stated that while he was

there he did not hear any threats, but he acknowledged that the

altercation was still going on when he left the area. (DE 4-3 at

5.) Petroff confirmed that Baker was angry with Officer Winters and

made several remarks to her in a loud and “confrontational” tone,

although he could not actually hear what was said. (Id. at 7.)

Neither of these statements directly undermine Officer Winters’

account.

The hearing officer was not required to credit Baker’s denials

or prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; the question is

solely whether there is “some evidence” to support her

determination, and that standard is satisfied. See Hill, 472 U.S.

at 457 (“Although the evidence in this case might be characterized

as meager, and there was no direct evidence identifying any one of

three inmates as the assailant, the record is not so devoid of

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evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without

support or otherwise arbitrary.”); see also Moffat v. Broyles, 288

F.3d 978, 981 (7th Cir. 2002) (witness statements constituted some

evidence); McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786 (conduct report provided some

evidence to support disciplinary determination). Accordingly, this

claim is denied.

Baker may also be claiming that he was denied the right to an

impartial decision-maker. In the prison disciplinary context,

adjudicators are “entitled to a presumption of honesty and

integrity,” and “the constitutional standard for improper bias is

high.” Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003). Due

process prohibits a prison official who was personally and

substantially involved in the underlying incident from acting as a

decision-maker in the case. Id. However, due process is not

violated simply because the hearing officer knew the inmate,

presided over a prior disciplinary case, or had some limited

involvement in the event underlying the charge. Id. 

Here, Baker does not clearly explain why he believes the

hearing officer was biased, but there is no indication that she was

involved in any way in the events underlying the charge. He appears

to believe the hearing officer violated internal prison policies in

connection with her handling of the case, but even if this is true,

it would not provide a basis for granting federal habeas relief.

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (federal habeas

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relief cannot be granted for violations of state law); Hester v.

McBride, 966 F. Supp. 765, 774-75 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (claim premised

on violation of prison policy was not cognizable in federal habeas

proceeding). He also suggests that she was biased because she

rejected his claim that he did not threaten Officer Winters, but

adverse rulings alone do not establish impermissible bias. Liteky

v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555–56 (1994). Baker has failed to

establish a violation of his federal due process rights. 

Baker also appears to claim that the hearing officer’s written

decision was inadequate. The written statement requirement is “not

onerous,” and to satisfy due process “[t]he statement need only

illuminate the evidentiary basis and reasoning behind the

decision.” Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007).

Here, the hearing officer’s report indicated that she considered

the witness statements, the conduct report, and Baker’s own

statement, and decided to credit the conduct report.3 (DE 4-3 at 1-

2.) Her statement is not lengthy, but it adequately identified the

evidence relied on and illuminated the basis for her decision,

which was that she chose to credit Officer Winter’s account over

Baker’s denials. The written statement the hearing officer provided

3 The conduct report originally stated in error that the incident occurred

on September 18, 2012, instead of September 17, 2012. (DE 4-1.) The hearing

officer confirmed with Officer Winters that September 17, 2012, was the correct

date, and that she had simply made a scriveners error in completing the report.

(DE 4-3 at 1-2.) Baker does not raise any argument that he was unable to mount

a defense or otherwise prejudiced by this minor error. Indeed, it is apparent

from his statement submitted to the hearing officer that he was well aware of the

underlying facts giving rise to the conduct report. (See DE 4-3 at 3-4.)

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satisfied the minimal requirements of due process, and therefore

this claim is denied.

Baker next claims that he was denied the right to present

exculpatory evidence. As the respondent points out, principles of

exhaustion that apply to federal review of criminal convictions

also apply to review of prison disciplinary proceedings. See Eads

v. Hanks, 280 F.3d 728, 729 (7th Cir. 2002); Markham v. Clark, 978

F.2d 993, 994-95 (7th Cir. 1992). Before seeking federal habeas

relief, a prisoner must take all available administrative appeals,

and must raise in those appeals any issue on which he seeks federal

review. Eads, 280 F.3d at 729. An inmate’s failure to properly

exhaust his claims in the state administrative process means the

claims are procedurally defaulted. Id.

Here, Baker did not raise any claim about the denial of

exculpatory evidence in his administrative appeals. (See DE 4-3.)

He cannot raise a claim here that was not properly presented in the

administrative process. Eads, 280 F.3d at 729. Baker filed a

traverse in support of his petition, but he did not respond to the

state’s procedural default argument. (See DE 7.) Thus, he has not

established cause and prejudice for setting aside his procedural

default, and the court cannot reach his claim on the merits. See

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); Harris v. McAdory, 334

F.3d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 2003).

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Assuming arguendo the court could reach this claim, Baker has

not demonstrated an entitlement to habeas relief. A prisoner has a

limited right to present witnesses and evidence in his defense

consistent with correctional goals and safety. Wolff, 418 U.S. at

566. A hearing officer has considerable discretion with respect to

witness and evidence requests, and may deny requests that threaten

institutional safety or are irrelevant, repetitive, or unnecessary.

Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666. Furthermore, due process only requires

access to witnesses and evidence that are exculpatory. See

Rasheed-Bey v. Duckworth, 969 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992).

“Exculpatory evidence” in this context means evidence that

“directly undermines the reliability of the evidence in the record

pointing to [the prisoner’s] guilt.” Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717,

721 (7th Cir. 1996). The denial of the right to present evidence

will be considered harmless unless the prisoner shows that the

evidence could have aided his defense. See Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d

841, 847 (7th Cir. 2011).

Here, the record shows that Baker requested a statement from

Anglin at the time of screening, and that statement was obtained

and considered. (DE 4-2, 4-3 at 8.) He also indicated that he would

be bringing his own statement to the hearing, which he did, and

this was also considered. (DE 4-2, 4-3 at 3-4.) There is nothing to

reflect that Baker requested any other exculpatory evidence when he

had the opportunity to do so, and he cannot fault the hearing

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officer for failing to consider evidence he did not properly

request. See Piggie v. McBride, 277 F.3d 922, 925 (7th Cir. 2002). 

Nor has he demonstrated prejudice. It appears Baker wanted to

obtain copies of grievances he filed against Officer Winters more

than a year prior to this incident. (See DE 1-2 at 8.) Such

evidence, even if it had been properly requested, would not

directly undermine Officer Winters’ account of what occurred on the

date in question. Furthermore, the hearing officer was already

aware from Baker’s statement that he believed Officer Winters had

fabricated the entire charge because of grievances he filed against

her. (DE 4-3 at 4, 8.) There is nothing to reflect that reviewing

the actual grievances from a year earlier would have made any

difference in her decision-making. In short, Baker has not

demonstrated a due process error, even if the court could consider

this claim. 

In a related vein, Baker claims that his rights were violated

because the entire charge was false. “[P]risoners are entitled to

be free from arbitrary actions of prison officials.” McPherson, 188

F.3d at 787. However, “even assuming fraudulent conduct on the part

of prison officials, the protection from such arbitrary action is

found in the procedures mandated by due process.” Id. In other

words, the protections to which Baker was entitled are the

protections afforded by Wolff, and as discussed above, he has not

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established a violation of his Wolff rights. Accordingly, he has

not demonstrated an entitlement to habeas relief.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the petition (DE 1) is

DENIED.

DATED: January 14, 2014 /s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

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