NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

IN RE JAMES E. STOLLER

______________________ 

2014-1271

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Application No. 

11/217,904.

______________________ 

Decided: January 15, 2015 

______________________ 

MATHEW R.P. PERRONE, JR. Law Office of Mathew 

R.P. Perrone, Jr., of Algonquin, Illinois, argued for appellant. 

BRIAN T. RACILLA, Associate Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of 

Alexandria, Virginia, argued for appellee. With him on

the brief were NATHAN K. KELLEY, Solicitor, and JAMIE L.

SIMPSON, Associate Solicitor. 

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, MOORE, and CHEN, Circuit 

Judges.
2 IN RE STOLLER

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

James Stoller appeals from the decision of the Patent 

Trial and Appeal Board affirming the examiner’s rejections of all pending claims in Mr. Stoller’s patent application. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm-in-part, 

reverse-in-part, and remand. 

BACKGROUND

Mr. Stoller’s U.S. Patent Application No. 11/217,904 is 

directed to a multilayered winter turf cover for a golf 

green. The cover, as shown in Figure 2 below, has a 

“laminated” structure including a bottom polyethylene

layer 112 and a top polyethylene layer 114 with a scrim 

(i.e., fabric) layer 116 secured between the top and bottom 

layers. In a preferred embodiment, the scrim layer is 

“laminated” between the top and bottom layers “using a 

molten polymer.” The ’904 application touts the advantages of the laminated structure, including increased 

moisture protection, easier removal, and increased durability. 

Claims 21-37 of the ’904 application are pending on 

appeal. Claim 35 is the broadest claim and recites a twolayer cover, with a scrim layer “laminated” to one polyethylene layer, i.e., it requires only two of the three layers 

described in the preferred embodiment shown in Figure 2. 

All other claims, however, recite the three-layer laminat-
IN RE STOLLER 3

ed structure of Figure 2. Based on this differing claim 

scope, the examiner rejected the claims under different 

combinations of references, rejecting claim 35 as anticipated by U.S. Patent Publication No. 2004/0013824 

(Sibbet), and rejecting all other claims as obvious over 

Sibbet in view of one or more secondary references. The 

Board affirmed all rejections. Mr. Stoller appeals. We 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4). 

ANALYSIS

I. Anticipation Rejection of Claim 35

The Board affirmed the examiner’s rejection of claim 

35’s two-layer laminated structure as anticipated by 

Sibbet. Sibbet discloses a turf cover constructed from two 

separate covers that are fastened together by stringing 

nylon loops through a series of grommets around the 

cover’s perimeter. Sibbet Fig. 2 (below), ¶¶ 27-30. The 

bottom cover 20 is made of polyester mesh, and the top 

cover 30 is made of polyethylene. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. A

chopped straw insulating layer 40 is disposed between the 

bottom and top covers. Id. ¶¶ 28, 37. 

The examiner found that Sibbet’s mesh cover 20 discloses the claimed scrim layer and top cover 30 discloses

the claimed polyethylene sheet. The examiner also interpreted “laminated” as “covered or layered” and concluded 
4 IN RE STOLLER

that Sibbet’s mesh cover 20 was “laminated” under that 

construction. Prior to this rejection by the examiner, Mr. 

Stoller had appealed a previous rejection in the prosecution of the same application to the Board. In that appeal, 

the Board similarly construed laminated as “a structure 

formed from several layers.” During Mr. Stoller’s second 

Board appeal, which led to the present appeal to us, Mr. 

Stoller argued that the Patent Office’s construction was 

unreasonably broad and that Sibbet’s mesh cover was not 

laminated to the top cover under the broadest reasonable 

interpretation. The Board affirmed the examiner’s finding that Sibbet’s two layers were laminated under the 

broadest reasonable interpretation of that term. 

The parties’ dispute on appeal centers on the construction of “laminated.” Mr. Stoller argues that the 

broadest reasonable construction of laminated is “fused, 

bonded, pressed, or adhered together into a unitary 

structure.” The Patent Office argues that the Board 

correctly construed the term as describing a “structure 

formed from several layers.” We review the Patent Office’s construction de novo. Rambus Inc. v. Rea, 731 F.3d 

1248, 1252 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

We hold that the Patent Office erred in construing

“laminated” to require only layering, such that it encompasses Sibbet’s perimeter-tied covers. Much like Sibbet’s 

cover, a scarecrow’s shirt includes two layers of material 

sewn together at the perimeter with straw stuffed between them. Under the Patent Office’s construction the 

front and back of the scarecrow’s shirt would be laminated. This is not within the ambit of the broadest reasonable construction.

Claim construction begins with the plain language of 

the claims. The American Heritage Dictionary defines 

“laminated” as “composed of layers bonded together,” or 

“arranged in laminae; laminate.” THE AMERICAN 
IN RE STOLLER 5

HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 

2006) (emphasis added). To support its construction of 

“laminated,” the Board cited to the definition of “laminate” in an online version of the same dictionary. The 

definition the Board appears to have relied upon was “to 

make by uniting several layers.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Despite the fact that the definitions of both “laminated” 

and “laminate” include the notion of bonding or uniting 

the two layers together, this feature is notably missing 

from the Patent Office’s construction. 

The ’904 application does not define “laminated,” but 

its discussion of laminated structures supports the plain 

language requirement of bonding or otherwise uniting the 

two layers together. It describes an exemplary method of 

laminating two sheets using a molten polymer that solidifies to form a single sheet. ’904 application at 6. It also 

repeatedly explains that laminating the sheets together—

both via the preferred molten polymer embodiment and 

generally—improves tear resistance and durability of the 

unitary cover. Id. at 3-4, 6, 8. 

We thus agree with Mr. Stoller that the broadest reasonable interpretation of “laminated” is “fused, bonded, 

pressed, or adhered together into a unitary structure.” 

This construction is consistent with the plain meaning of 

“laminated” and “laminate,” requiring layers that are 

bonded together or otherwise form a unitary structure. It 

is also consistent with the specification’s discussion of 

“laminated” as exemplified by a polymer bond and used to 

improve the tear resistance of a resulting unitary cover. 

Sibbet does not disclose that mesh cover 20 is “laminated” to top cover 30 under this construction. Sibbet’s 

only disclosed means for connecting the two covers is the 

loop and grommet system disclosed above, which is akin 

to sewing the edges of the covers together. If this embodiment fell within the definition of laminated, so too would 
6 IN RE STOLLER

the scarecrow’s shirt or opposing sides of a bean bag or 

teddy bear. In fact, Sibbet itself distinguishes the loop 

and grommet system from prior art laminated covers, 

providing further support that one of skill would not 

conclude that Sibbet’s layers are laminated. Sibbet ¶ 6.

We do not turn a blind eye to the many references in 

this record that demonstrate that laminating two (or 

more) layers together was well-known in the art. The 

only rejection of claim 35 before us, however, is a § 102 

rejection based only on Sibbet. That rejection is not 

supported in the record. Accordingly, we reverse the 

rejection of claim 35. 

II. Obviousness Rejections of Remaining Claims

The Board affirmed the rejections of claims 21-34 and 

36-37 as obvious over Sibbet in view of U.S. Patent No. 

6,739,088 (’088 Stoller), or as obvious over Sibbet in view 

of ’088 Stoller and one or more of U.S. Patent Nos.

3,252,251 (Simmons) and 213,932 (Powell). Each of these

claims requires a three-layer laminated structure similar 

to the ’904 application Figure 2 embodiment discussed 

above. As the examiner recognized, Sibbet only discloses 

two layers and thus does not disclose a three-layer laminated structure. However, ’088 Stoller indisputably 

discloses lamination, and, more particularly, a three-layer 

laminated structure with two polyethylene sheets laminated to a central foam layer. Oral Argument at 4:37-

4:52, 6:11-6:19, available at http://oralarguments.cafc.

uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2014-1271.mp3; ’088 Stoller 

Fig. 11. That is, the claimed three-layer laminated structure differs from the ’088 Stoller three-layer laminated 

structure by replacing ’088 Stoller’s central foam layer 

with the claimed scrim layer. Oral Argument at 4:37-

5:18. Compare ’088 Stoller Fig. 11 with ’904 application 

Fig. 2. To reject each of the remaining claims, the examiner thus combined Sibbet’s scrim and polyethylene layers
IN RE STOLLER 7

with ’088 Stoller’s three-layer laminated structure, rendering obvious the claimed three-layer laminated structure with a central scrim layer. The Board’s erroneous 

construction of “laminated” does not affect the obviousness rejections of the remaining claims because ’088 

Stoller indisputably discloses a laminated structure under 

the proper construction of that term, and the combination 

of Sibbet and ’088 Stoller renders obvious the claimed 

three-layer laminated structure. 

Mr. Stoller additionally argues that the obviousness 

rejections are improper for various reasons. For example, 

Mr. Stoller argues that it would not have been obvious to 

combine certain references, that the references teach 

away from the claimed subject matter, and that the 

combination of references does not teach additional features in the claims. We have considered each of Mr. 

Stoller’s additional arguments regarding the obviousness 

rejections and do not find them to be persuasive. Because 

the Board’s findings underlying its obviousness rejections 

are supported by substantial evidence, we affirm the 

rejections of claims 21-34 and 36-37. 

CONCLUSION

Because the Board’s obviousness rejections are supported by substantial evidence, but the anticipation 

rejection of claim 35 is not, we affirm-in-part, reverse-inpart, and remand. 

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART, AND 

REMANDED

COSTS

No costs.