1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

GLENDA RENEA HENSLEY, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

ACTING COMMISSIONER OF 

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

Defendant. 

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NO. 2:14–CV-0208 

OPINION AND ORDER

 This matter is before the Court for review of the Commissioner 

of Social Security’s decision denying Disability Insurance 

Benefits and Supplemental Security Income to Plaintiff Glenda 

Renea Hensley. For the reasons set forth below, the decision of 

the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.

BACKGROUND 

 On March 29, 2011, Glenda Renea Hensley (“Hensley”) filed an 

application for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits 

(“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 

section 401, et seq., and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) 

under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. section 1381, 

et. seq. Hensley alleges that her disability began on January 29, 

2010. The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied her 
2 

initial applications and also denied her claims upon 

reconsideration. 

Hensley requested a hearing, and on January 15, 2013, Hensley 

appeared with a non-attorney representative, Bryan Woodruff, at an 

administration hearing before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) 

David R. Bruce. Testimony was provided by Hensley and vocational 

expert Thomas A. Grzesik. On February 20, 2013, the ALJ issued a 

decision denying Hensley’s claims, finding her not disabled 

because she is capable of making a successful adjustment to other 

work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. 

(Tr. 28.) 

Hensley requested that the Appeals Council review the ALJ’s 

decision, but that request was denied. Accordingly, the ALJ’s 

decision became the Commissioner’s final decision. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 422.210(a). Hensley initiated the instant action for judicial 

review of the Commissioner’s final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

section 405(g). 

DISCUSSION1

Facts 

Hensley was born in 1974, and was 35 years old at the onset 

of her alleged disability. (Tr. 43.) She has a high school 

                                                            

1 These facts have been borrowed liberally from parties’ briefs.
3 

education. (Tr. 44.) Hensley’s past relevant work was as a film 

developer operator and a deli cutter/slicer. (Tr. 65.) 

In 2010, Hensley met with doctors regarding her back pain. 

In April 2010, Shanu Kondamuri, M.D., diagnosed lumbar 

degenerative disc disease, lumbar radiculitis and annular tears at 

L4-L5 and L5-S1, and recommended physical therapy, epidural 

steroid injections, and medications. (Tr. 280.) Dr. Kondamuri 

opined that Hensley’s “disease is not that severe and I would not 

support the use of Norco or other short acting potentially 

addictive opioid medications on a long term basis.” (Id.) 

On May 13, 2010, Hensley was hospitalized after the police 

found her inhaling aerosol. (Tr. 295.) Hensley claimed she was 

“getting high but was not trying to kill herself.” (Id.) She 

exhibited poor insight and judgment, reported some anxiety, and 

was depressed, but not suicidal. (Id.) Hensley was diagnosed 

with major depression and substance abuse. (Id.) She was 

prescribed Cymbalta and directed to follow-up with an outpatient 

substance abuse program. (Tr. 296.) 

On May 22, 2010, Hensley was hospitalized after the police 

found her unresponsive with two empty cans of aerosol. (Tr. 290.) 

She indicated that she was trying to commit suicide due to numerous 

stressors in her life. (Id.) Hensley was informed that because 

of her multiple hospitalizations secondary to her depression and 

substance abuse, they would “try to court commit her to treatment.” 
4 

(Id.) Treatment notes indicate that she was not compliant on an 

outpatient basis, in that she did not follow up or take her 

medication. (Id.) They found an inpatient treatment program for 

her, and on June 2, 2010, Hensley “stated she was doing much 

better, not depressed, not suicidal, not homicidal. No anxiety.” 

(Id.) She was diagnosed with major depression and bipolar 

disorder, and was prescribed Cymbalta, Risperdal, and Soma. (Tr. 

291.) 

On July 16, 2010, Hensley was hospitalized on an emergency 

detention order secondary to major depression with suicidal 

ideation. (Tr. 284.) At the time of admission, she appeared very 

depressed and claimed to be hearing voices. She had symptoms of 

racing thoughts, decreased sleep, tearfulness, and anxiety. (Id.) 

Treatment notes state that “[o]n past admission [Hensley] stated 

that she was just getting high and to avoid going to jail she 

stated she was suicidal,” but admitted to being suicidal on this 

occasion. (Id.) A court ordered outpatient compliance with 

medications and outpatient follow-up. (Id.) Hensley was informed 

that if she did not comply with treatment “she will most likely be 

taken back to court for state commitment to the hospital.” (Tr. 

285.) On August 10, 2010, Hensley indicated that she was feeling 

well, had no depression, suicidal thoughts, hallucinations, or 

delusions. (Id.) She was diagnosed with bipolar disorder with 

psychotic features and polysubstance abuse. (Id.) 
5 

On August 17, 2010, Hensley was hospitalized for a possible 

medication overdose after her boyfriend had a difficult time waking 

her. (Tr. 870.) She denied taking too many medications or 

intentionally overdosing. (Id.) She was diagnosed with overdose 

of narcotics and benzodiazepines, fatigue, drug dependency, 

bipolar disorder, lumbar disc displacement, and chronic pain. 

(Id.) She was prescribed medications and discharged after two 

days. (Tr. 871.) 

On September 16, 2010, Mathew Castelino, M.D., performed a 

mental status examination (“MSE”) of Hensley, which revealed 

problems with her mood, sleep, anxiety, and anger. (Tr. 380.) 

Dr. Castelino prescribed Risperdal, Depakote, and Cymbalta, and 

subsequently, Seoquel. (Id., Tr. 384.) 

On November 11, 2010, Darryl L. Fortson, M.D., replaced 

Hensley’s previous primary care physician. (Tr. 312.) Hensley 

reported a diagnosis of juvenile rheumatoid arthritis and 

complained of back pain and right hip and knee pain. (Id.) Hensley 

had tenderness in the low back, painful range of motion in the 

knees, and positive straight leg raising. (Id.) Dr. Fortson 

diagnosed rheumatoid arthritis and low back pain, and prescribed 

Percocet, and Valium, among other medications. (Id.) 

On January 5, 2011, Hensley met with Manjari Malkani, M.D. 

(Tr. 317.) Hensley reported multiple joint pains, including knee 

and back pain. (Id.) Dr. Malkani reviewed an MRI from 2009, which 
6 

revealed mild disc degeneration at L3-4, L4-5, and L5-S1, 

associated mild broad-based disc protrusions and posterior 

marginal fissuring of L4-5 and L5-S1 disc space. (Tr. 318.) Dr. 

Malkani diagnosed chronic low back pain, chronic bilateral knee 

pain, and weight gain, and requested blood tests. (Id.) On 

January 19, 2011, Hensley met with Dr. Malkani again, and was 

diagnosed with fibromyalgia, vitamin D deficiency, low back pain, 

and depression. (Tr. 315.) Dr. Malkani recommended treatment with 

Cymbalta and follow-up with a pain clinic. (Id.) 

On January 20, 2011, Hensley told Dr. Fortson that she was 

feeling worse, and was having severe muscle spasms even after 

taking medications. (Tr. 445.) Dr. Fortson prescribed Percocet, 

Soma, and Xanax. (Id.) On February 18, 2011, Hensley complained 

to Dr. Fortson about back pain, despite starting physical therapy. 

(Tr. 444.) On April 6, 2011, Hensley told Dr. Fortson that her 

pain was such that she could “hardly walk” despite taking 

medication. (Tr. 442.) Dr. Fortson diagnosed acute lumbar disc 

herniation. (Id.) 

On April 7, 2011, an MRI of her lumbar spine revealed normal 

alignment of the lumbar spine, no compression fracture, an L3-4 

broad-based disc bulge, broad-based disc bulges with annular disc 

tears at L4-5 and L5-S1, multilevel spondylosis, with no central 

canal stenosis and no neural foraminal compromise. (Tr. 360.) 
7 

On April 13, 2011, Dr. Castelino completed a 

Psychiatric/Psychological Impairment Questionnaire regarding 

Hensley.2 (Tr. 244-51.) Hensley was diagnosed with 

schizoaffective disorder. (Tr. 244.) The clinical findings 

supporting this diagnosis included poor memory, social withdrawal, 

emotional lability, inappropriate affect, delusions or 

hallucinations, decreased energy, manic syndrome, recurrent panic 

attacks, psychomotor retardation, paranoia or inappropriate 

suspiciousness, generalized persistent anxiety, difficulty 

thinking or concentrating, suicidal ideation or attempts, and 

disturbances with perception, sleep, and mood. (Tr. 245.) 

Hensley’s primary symptoms were found to be mood swings ranging 

from depression to mania, very low energy, and low self-esteem. 

(Tr. 246.) Hensley was found to be “markedly limited” in her 

abilities to: remember locations and work-like procedures; 

understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions; 

maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; perform 

activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be 

punctual within customary tolerance; sustain ordinary routine 

                                                            

2 The ALJ’s decision addresses this questionnaire, identifying it 

as “the assessment of Dr. Castnuo.” (Tr. 25.) While the 

questionnaire was directed to “John Castnuo, M.D.,” the signature 

of the doctor who completed the questionnaire is unclear. (Tr. 

244, 251.) Both parties represent that the questionnaire was in 

fact completed by Dr. Castelino. (DE## 11 at 21 & n.55, 16 at 9 

& n.2.) 
8 

without supervision; interact appropriately with the general 

public; maintain socially appropriate behavior and adhere to basic 

standards of neatness and cleanliness; respond appropriately to 

changes in the work setting; travel to unfamiliar places or take 

public transportation; and set realistic goals or make plans 

independently. (Tr. 246-249.) Hensley was “moderately limited” 

in her abilities to understand and remember one or two-step 

instructions; ask simple questions or request assistance; and be 

aware of normal hazards and take appropriate precautions. (Id.) 

Dr. Castelino opined that Hensley was incapable of handling “even 

low stress” work. (Tr. 250.) 

On April 15, 2011, Hensley asked Dr. Fortson to increase her 

pain medication because she could not get out of bed without taking 

medication and waiting for it to “kick in.” (Tr. 441.) Dr. 

Fortson diagnosed lumbar disc disease and prescribed Percocet, 

among other medications. (Id.) 

In April and May 2011, Hensley met with Randolph Chang, M.D., 

complaining of chronic low back pain. (Tr. 473-74.) Dr. Chang 

recommended, and Hensley received, two epidural steroid injections 

during that time. (Tr. 469-72.) In June 2011, Dr. Chang performed 

a right hip bursa injection (Tr. 476), and a right lumbar 

paraspinous muscle multiple trigger point injection on Hensley. 

(Tr. 519.) 
9 

On June 3, 2011, Teofilo Bautista, M.D., performed a physical 

evaluation of Hensley at the request of the SSA. (Tr. 423.) 

Hensley claimed to have auditory and visual hallucinations. (Id.) 

She refused to do range of motion testing of the back due to low 

back pain. (Tr. 425.) An examination revealed pain, tenderness, 

and muscle spasms in the lumbosacral area, and pain and tenderness 

in the right hip area and right knee. (Id.) The weakness in the 

right lower extremity measured at 4/5. (Id.) Dr. Bautista 

diagnosed chronic low back pain with degenerative disc disease at 

L3-4, L4-5, and L5-S1, with mild disc protrusion and right hip 

pain, right knee pain, mild scoliosis, and a history of 

fibromyalgia. (Id.) 

On June 8, 2011, Raymond Bucur, Ph.D., performed a 

psychological evaluation of Hensley at the request of the SSA. 

(Tr. 430-36.) Dr. Bucur diagnosed schizoaffective disorder, panic 

disorder with agoraphobia, mood disorder, and ruled out 

polysubstance disorder (presumably based on Hensley’s denial of 

substance abuse). (Tr. 431-32, 436.) Dr. Bucur indicated that 

Hensley did not appear to be able to manage her own funds, and 

gave her a GAF score of 40. (Id.) 

On June 9 and 14, 2011, Hensley met with Dr. Castelino, and 

an MSE revealed anxiety and disturbed mood and sleep. (Tr. 610, 

614.) Hensley was prescribed Seroquel, Cymbalta, Ambien, and 

Latuda. (Tr. 610.) 
10 

On June 26 and July 6, 2011, state agency medical consultant 

J. Sands, M.D., reviewed Hensley’s file and completed a Physical 

Residual Functional Capacity Assessment. (Tr. 538-46.) Dr. Sands 

opined that Hensley could lift twenty pounds occasionally and ten 

pounds frequently, sit, stand and walk for about six hours in an 

eight-hour workday, and had some postural limitations. (Tr. 539-

40.) Dr. Sands noted Hensley’s slight limping gait due to right 

hip and knee pain, and a limitation in her knees. (Tr. 539.) He 

opined that Hensley’s medically determinable impairments could 

reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms, but the 

intensity of the symptoms and their impact on functioning were not 

consistent with the totality of the evidence. (Tr. 543.) State 

agency medical consultant J. Eskonen, D.O., reviewed the file and 

affirmed Dr. Sands’ opinion without comment on September 16, 2011. 

(Tr. 566.) 

On July 12, 2011, state agency medical consultant Donna 

Onversaw, Ph.D., completed a Mental Residual Functional Capacity 

Assessment of Hensley. (Tr. 547-64.) Dr. Onversaw found that 

Hensley was either “not significantly limited” or “moderately 

limited” in understanding, memory, sustained concentration and 

persistence, social interaction, and adaption. (Tr. 547-48.) She 

opined that while Hensley may have difficulty with more complex 

tasks, she retains the ability to perform and complete tasks 

without special considerations or accommodations. (Tr. 550.) Dr. 
11 

Onversaw remarked that progress notes did not reveal ongoing 

hallucinations or delusions as claimed by Hensley, and that the 

severity suggested in Dr. Castelino’s April 2011 opinion “is not 

consistent with the numerous progress notes from mid ’10 up to 

current.” (Tr. 549-550.) Dr. Onversaw opined that Hensley’s 

functional limitations were only mild or moderate. (Tr. 561.) 

State agency reviewing consultant Joelle Larsen, Ph.D., affirmed 

Dr. Unversaw’s opinion on September 14, 2011. (Tr. 565.) 

On July 19, 2011, Hensley told Dr. Chang that her prior 

injections helped, but she still had a very tender area in her 

lumbar spine. (Tr. 579.) Dr. Chang performed a right lumbar 

paraspinous muscle trigger point injection. (Id.) 

On July 28, 2011, Hensley complained to Dr. Fortson that her 

medications were not working; she was having a lot of pain in her 

back and hip. (Tr. 570.) Dr. Fortson diagnosed 

spondyloarthropathy and major depression, and prescribed Percocet 

and other medications. (Id.) 

On August 11, 2011, Marc Levin, M.D., examined Hensley to 

determine if she was a candidate for a spinal cord stimulator. 

(Tr. 577.) Hensley described chronic low back pain radiating into 

the right leg, and had begun using a cane. (Id.) An examination 

revealed an antalgic gait, an inability to elevate herself on her 

heels or toes, blunted deep tendon reflexes in the lower 

extremities, and patchy motor strength. (Tr. 578.) Dr. Levin 
12 

reviewed the 2011 MRI of her spine and found “some mild changes 

without any significant foraminal or central stenosis and no loss 

of disc height.” (Id.) Dr. Levin diagnosed fibromyalgia and 

chronic pain, and opined that her pain was not being generated 

from her spine. (Id.) 

On August 12, 2011, Hensley complained to Dr. Fortson of 

shoulder pain, restless extremities, and pain that was a “15” out 

of ten, for which Dr. Fortson prescribed medication. (Tr. 569.) 

On September 27, 2011, Hensley reported to Dr. Fortson that she 

had been involved in a motor vehicle accident. (Tr. 716.) Dr. 

Fortson diagnosed fibromyalgia, excessive use of sedating 

medications, and motor vehicle accident trauma, and prescribed 

several medications. (Id.) 

On October 7, 2011, Hensley was admitted to Methodist Hospital 

after a drug overdose. (Tr. 772.) She denied trying to kill 

herself; she stated she took one extra sleeping pill and her 

boyfriend could not awaken her. (Id.) Her diagnoses were major 

depression, drug overdose, and suicide attempt. (Id.) 

On October 16, 2012, Hensley underwent a hysterectomy. (Tr. 

1027.) Her physical examination for this surgery found a normal 

spine, no CVA tenderness, and extremities within normal limits. 

(Tr. 1029-30.) 
13 

On October 24, 2011, Dr. Castelino’s MSE of Hensley revealed 

anxiety and mood and sleep disturbances. (Tr. 616.) Her 

medications were refilled. (Id.) 

On November 1, 2011, Hensley reported to Dr. Chang that the 

most recent trigger point injection gave her only a few weeks of 

relief. (Tr. 651.) An examination revealed “a lot” of myofascial 

trigger points in the lumbar region and bursitis in the hips. 

(Id.) On November 29, 2011, Hensley informed Dr. Chang that her 

pain had returned to the level she had six months before, and was 

radiating down to her ankle with foot numbness. (Tr. 649.) An 

examination revealed some mild antalgic gait, sacroiliac joint 

tenderness, and diffuse paraspinous muscle tenderness in the 

lumbar and thoracic area. (Id.) Dr. Chang prescribed medication 

and recommended additional injections. (Id.) In December 2011 

and January 2012, Hensley received additional epidural steroid 

injections. (Tr. 644-45, 647-648.) In February 2012, Hensley 

told Dr. Chang she was about 50% improved after the latest 

injection. (Tr. 642.) 

On January 13, 2012, Hensley complained to Dr. Fortson of not 

feeling well, and that she had not had access to her medications. 

(Tr. 741.) Dr. Fortson observed that she was having mild 

withdrawal symptoms, and noted that Hensley “has not been truthful 

with me in the past concerning her meds.” (Id.) Dr. Fortson found 

that Hensley had no focal deficits and a normal gait, and diagnosed 
14 

lumbago, major depressive disorder, and opioid type dependence. 

(Id.) On January 19, 2012, Hensley told Dr. Fortson that the pain 

in her hip and back was an eight on a ten-point scale. (Tr. 742.) 

On February 16, 2012, Dr. Fortson completed a functional capacity 

form, checking boxes indicating that Hensley had “significant” 

limitations with standing, walking, lifting, pushing, pulling, 

bending, squatting, reaching above her shoulders, and performing 

other activities. (Tr. 719.) 

On March 7, 2012, an MRI of Hensley’s lumbar spine revealed 

small broad based posterior herniation of L5-S1 disc, with annular 

fissure causing mild narrowing of the central canal and neural 

foramina bilaterally, diffuse bulge of the L3-4 and L4-5 discs, 

causing mild narrowing of the central canal and neural foramina 

bilaterally, mild facet arthropathy at L4-5 and L5-S1, and minimal 

retrolisthesis of L3 vertebra over L4 and L4 over L5. (Tr. 672-

73.) 

On May 17, 2012, Hensley met with Candice Hunter, M.D., 

complaining of hallucinations and disturbed sleep, despite trying 

various medications for insomnia. (Tr. 1074.) An MSE revealed an 

anxious affect, difficulties expressing her thoughts, fair 

judgment, fair insight, and a GAF score of 50. (Tr. 1076.) Dr. 

Hunter diagnosed bipolar disorder and polysubstance dependence, 

and prescribed medications. (Tr. 1076-77.) 
15 

On May 22, 2012, Hensley complained to Dr. Chang of severe 

back pain radiating to the right lower extremity, which had 

worsened over the previous month. (Tr. 1053.) An examination 

revealed a slight antalgic gait and a 50% range of motion of the 

lumbar spine, 100% range of motion of lower extremities, and a 

lack of documented focal, neurological, or motor deficits. (Tr. 

1053-55.) Dr. Chang diagnosed low back pain with radiculopathy in 

the right lower extremity; multiple lumbar disc protrusions, 

severe stenosis, degeneration, and spondylosis; chronic pain 

syndrome; myofascial pain syndrome; and a history of depression 

and anxiety. (Id.) Dr. Chang recommended another epidural steroid 

injection and continued medications. (Tr. 1054.) 

On July 11, 2012, Hensley told Dr. Hunter that she had not 

slept for several days and she was having auditory hallucinations 

of music playing. (Tr. 1073.) An MSE revealed a tired mood, 

blunted affect, difficulty expressing thoughts, fair insight, and 

intact judgment. (Tr. 1072.) Dr. Hunter prescribed medications. 

(Id.) On August 10, 2012, Hensley told Dr. Hunter that she thought 

she was sleep walking, so Dr. Hunter substituted one of her 

prescription medications. (Tr. 1070-71.) Her mood was better, 

but she had a blunted affect. (Id.) 

On August 12, 2012, Dr. Fortson completed a Multiple 

Impairment Questionnaire supplied by Hensley’s counsel. (Tr. 681-

88.) He diagnosed lumbosacral spondylosis, major depression, 
16 

opioid dependence, and juvenile rheumatoid arthritis. (Tr. 681.) 

Hensley’s primary symptoms were back pain with radiculopathy, 

depression, and drug-seeking behavior with multiple accidental 

drug overdoses. (Tr. 682.) She had constant severe radicular 

pain in the back, legs, right hip, and both knees. (Tr. 682-83.) 

Hensley’s pain was moderately severe, and her fatigue was severe. 

(Tr. 683.) Dr. Fortson opined Hensley was able to sit for four 

hours, and stand or walk for one hour, in an eight-hour workday. 

(Id.) When sitting, she needed to move around once or twice per 

hour for fifteen to twenty minutes. (Tr. 683-84.) He opined that 

Hensley could occasionally lift ten pounds and carry five pounds, 

had significant limitations performing repetitive reaching, 

handling, fingering, and lifting, and had moderate limitations 

using arms for reaching. (Tr. 684-85.) Dr. Fortson opined that 

Hensley is “severely disabled” (Tr. 687), and that her pain, 

fatigue, or other symptoms were constantly severe enough to 

interfere with her attention and concentration. (Tr. 686.) He 

noted that Hensley is bipolar and exhibits dependency and selfdestructive behavior. (Id.) Dr. Fortson found Hensley is not a 

malingerer, and was incapable of tolerating “even ‘low stress’” 

work. (Id.) He estimated Hensley would be absent from work, on 

the average, more than three times a month as a result of her 

impairments or treatment. (Tr. 687.) 
17 

On September 14, 2012, Dr. Hunter completed a 

Psychiatric/Psychological Impairment Questionnaire regarding 

Hensley. (Tr. 796-803.) She diagnosed Hensley with bipolar 

disorder. (Tr. 796.) The clinical findings supporting this 

diagnosis included sleep disturbance, mood disturbance, delusions 

or hallucinations, difficulty thinking or concentrating, and 

suicidal ideation or attempts. (Tr. 797.) Dr. Hunter opined that 

Hensley was “moderately” limited in the ability to: carry out 

detailed instructions; maintain attention and concentration for 

extended periods; work in coordination with or proximity to others 

without being distracted; make simple work related decisions; 

complete a normal workweek without interruptions from 

psychologically based symptoms and perform at a consistent pace 

without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods; interact 

appropriately with the general public; and, accept instructions 

and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors. (Tr. 

798-800.) Dr. Hunter opined that Hensley was “mildly” limited in 

understanding and memory, adaption, and sustained concentration 

and persistence. (Tr. 799-800.) According to Dr. Hunter, Hensley 

was incapable of tolerating “even ‘low stress’” work. (Tr. 802.) 

Dr. Hunter estimated that Hensley would be absent from work, on 

the average, more than three times a month as a result of her 

impairments or treatment. (Tr. 803.) 
18 

On November 2, 2012, Hensley reported to Dr. Hunter increased 

depression since her hysterectomy and hypersomnia. (Tr. 1066.) 

An MSE revealed a down mood, a blunted affect, slow speech, intact 

judgment and fair insight. (Tr. 1067.) Dr. Hunter increased her 

Cymbalta and continued with other medications. (Id.) On December 

14, 2012, Dr. Hunter observed Hensley was somewhat tremulous. (Tr. 

1063.) An MSE revealed an anxious mood and affect, slow speech, 

intact judgment and fair insight. (Tr. 1064.) Dr. Hunter 

prescribed Xanax and Ritalin, and continued her other medications. 

(Tr. 1065.) 

Hearing Testimony 

At the hearing, Hensley testified that she stopped working 

because she was having back pain and mental issues. (Tr. 47.) 

She had difficulty waiting on customers because of her social 

anxiety. (Id.) She described her back, hip and knee pain as 

constant. (Tr. 52-53.) Hensley testified that she could not work 

because “can’t even hardly move,” requires “medication just to be 

able to get out of bed,” and rarely leaves her house due to panic 

attacks. (Tr. 48.) She explained that injections dulled her pain 

for a couple of months, physical therapy did not work, and she 

“cannot find a doctor that will do surgery.” (Tr. 49.) She takes 

several medications for pain, depression and anxiety, and 

medications just dull the pain. (Tr. 50-51, 53.) She testified 

that she uses a cane to walk due to her hip and knee pain. (Tr. 
19 

50, 60.) Hensley estimated she can sit for fifteen minutes at a 

time, stand for fifteen minutes, walk about half-a-block, and lift 

a gallon of milk. (Tr. 53-54.) She had not driven in six months 

due to hip pain. (Tr. 44.) 

Hensley testified that sometimes she does not sleep, and has 

difficulties with her memory. (Tr. 54.) She described auditory 

and visual hallucinations, but her medication helps. (Tr. 55.) 

She maintained that, at the time of the hearing, she was not using 

any drugs not prescribed by a doctor. (Tr. 51.) Her symptoms did 

not improve when she was not using substances. (Tr. 52.) Hensley 

testified that she had abused poly-substances in attempt to commit 

suicide multiple times in the past. (Tr. 62.) 

Hensley noted that she recently broke up with her boyfriend, 

but he still lives with her and helps her. (Tr. 58.) Her exboyfriend cleans the house, and lifts the groceries when they go 

shopping. (Tr. 57.) In a typical day, she spends a lot of time 

in bed watching TV or using a laptop to play games and Facebook. 

(Tr. 56-57.) She takes care of her own personal needs, such as 

dressing and eating. (Tr. 57.) 

The ALJ asked the vocational expert (“VE”) to assume an 

individual of Hensley’s age, education, and work history who was 

limited to light work except she could only occasionally climb 

ramps and stairs, never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolding, 

occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl, and limited 
20 

to simple, routine, repetitive tasks and simple work-related 

decisions, frequent contact with supervisors and co-workers, no 

more than occasional interaction with the public on a superficial 

basis where public contact was not an integral part of the job, 

and the use of a cane in the right hand. (Tr. 65.) The VE 

testified that such an individual could not perform any of 

Hensley’s past relevant work. (Id.) Such an individual could 

work as a production assembler, a small parts assembler, and an 

electronics worker. (Tr. 66.) According to the VE, if the 

individual were also limited to a low stress job that was not done 

at a production-rate pace such as assembly line work, but was more 

goal-oriented work, she could work as a cleaner or housecleaner, 

a cafeteria room attendant, and a dishwasher.3 (Tr. 66-67.) An 

individual who was also required to stand for five minutes after 

every fifteen minutes of sitting would be unable to work at the 

light or sedentary level. (Tr. 67-68.) The VE testified that an 

individual who misses work three times a month could not do any of 

the jobs discussed. (Tr. 69.) 

Review of Commissioner’s Decision 

This Court has authority to review the Commissioner’s 

decision to deny social security benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

                                                            

3 The VE later noted that if the hypothetical individual was limited 

by the use of a cane, the housecleaner position would be 

eliminated. (Tr. 68.)
21 

“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any 

fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 

Id. Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant evidence as 

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 

1420, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971) (citation omitted); see Moon v. 

Colvin, 763 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting “[t]his 

deferential standard of review is weighted in favor of upholding 

the ALJ’s decision”). In determining whether substantial evidence 

exists, the Court shall examine the record in its entirety, but 

shall not substitute its own opinion for the ALJ’s by reconsidering 

the facts or reweighing the evidence. See Jens v. Barnhart, 347 

F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 2003). While a decision denying benefits 

need not address every piece of evidence, the ALJ must provide “an 

accurate and logical bridge” between the evidence and his 

conclusion that the claimant is not disabled. Schreiber v. Colvin,

519 Fed. App’x 951, 957-58 (7th Cir. 2013). 

As a threshold matter, for a claimant to be eligible for DIB 

or SSI benefits under the Social Security Act, the claimant must 

establish that she is disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) and 

1382(a)(1). To qualify as being disabled, the claimant must be 

unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of 

any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can 

be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be 
22 

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To determine whether a 

claimant has satisfied this statutory definition, the ALJ performs 

a five-step evaluation: 

Step 1: Is the claimant performing substantially 

gainful activity? If yes, the claim is 

disallowed; if no, the inquiry proceeds to 

Step 2. 

Step 2: Is the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments “severe” and expected to last at 

least twelve months? If not, the claim is 

disallowed; if yes, the inquiry proceeds to 

Step 3. 

Step 3: Does the claimant have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets or 

equals the severity of an impairment in the 

SSA’s Listing of Impairments, as described in 

20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1? If yes, 

then claimant is automatically disabled; if 

not, then the inquiry proceeds to Step 4. 

Step 4: Is the claimant able to perform his past 

relevant work? If yes, the claim is denied; 

if no, the inquiry proceeds to Step 5, where 

the burden of proof shifts to the 

Commissioner. 

Step 5: Is the claimant able to perform any other work 

within his residual functional capacity in the 

national economy? If yes, the claim is 

denied; if no, the claimant is disabled. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v) and 416.920 (a)(4)(i)-(v); 

see also Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 n.8 (7th Cir. 1994). 

In this case, the ALJ found that Hensley had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since January 29, 2010, her alleged 

onset date. (Tr. 15.) The ALJ found that Hensley suffered from 
23 

the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease; 

degenerative joint disease; obesity; depressive disorder; 

schizoaffective disorder; bipolar disorder; anxiety disorder; and 

a history of poly-substance abuse (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) and 

416.920(c)). (Id.) The ALJ further found that Hensley did not 

have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or 

medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926). 

(Tr. 16.) 

The ALJ made the following Residual Functional Capacity 

(“RFC”) determination: 

[T]he claimant has the [RFC] to perform light work as 

defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except the 

claimant is able to occasionally climb ramps and stairs 

but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; the 

claimant is able to occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, 

crouch, and crawl. The claimant is limited to simple 

routine repetitive tasks, simple work related decisions 

(identified as SVP 1 and 2 type jobs), and low stress 

jobs (work that is not done at production pace but more 

goal oriented). The claimant is able to have frequent 

contact with supervisors and coworkers and no more than 

occasional interaction with the public on a superficial 

basis. The claimant must be allowed the use of a cane 

when ambulating. 

(Tr. 18.) Based upon Hensley’s RFC, the ALJ found that Hensley is 

unable to perform her past relevant work as a photo shop manager 

and deli worker. (Tr. 26-27.) However, the ALJ found that Hensley 

was capable of performing other work that exists in significant 
24 

numbers in the national economy, including cafeteria room 

attendant, cleaner, and dishwasher. (Tr. 28.) 

Hensley believes that the ALJ committed two errors requiring 

reversal. First, Hensley asserts that the ALJ failed to follow 

the treating physician’s rule by giving little weight to Hensley’s 

treating physicians. Second, Hensley argues that the ALJ failed 

to properly evaluate her credibility. 

ALJ’s Evaluation of Treating Physicians’ Opinion Evidence 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider the factors 

set forth in 20 C.F.R. section 404.1527(c) when weighing the 

opinions of the treating physicians in this case. Pursuant to 

Section 404.1527(c)(1), the opinions of treating physicians are 

entitled to greater weight than those of examining and nonexamining physicians. While an ALJ generally affords “more weight 

to the opinion of a source who has examined a claimant than to the 

opinion of a source who has not, the weight ultimately given to 

that opinion depends on its consistency with and objective medical 

support in the record; the quality of the explanation the source 

gave for the opinion; and the source’s specialization.” Givens v. 

Colvin, 551 Fed. App’x 855, 860 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation 

omitted). An ALJ may discount a treating physician’s opinion if 

it is inconsistent with the medical record. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(c)(2), (4). 
25 

Treating Physician Dr. Fortson 

The ALJ gave “little weight” to Dr. Fortson’s opinion that 

Hensley has significant exertional and functional limitations and 

that she is “totally” and “severely disabled.” (Tr. 26.) An ALJ 

may “discount a treating physician’s medical opinion if the opinion 

is inconsistent with the opinion of a consulting physician or when 

the treating physician’s opinion is internally inconsistent, as 

long as he minimally articulates his reasons for revising or 

reflecting evidence of disability.” Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 

833, 842 (7th Cir. 2007). Here, the ALJ discounted Dr. Fortson’s 

opinions because they were inconsistent with his treatment notes 

from January 2012, Dr. Chang’s findings from May 2012, and a 

clinical examination in October 2012. (Tr. 26.) Dr. Fortson’s 

January 2012 examination found that Hensley had no focal deficits 

and a normal gait. (Tr. 26, 741.) Dr. Chang’s May 2012 examination 

found a lack of documented focal, neurological, or motor deficits. 

(Tr. 26, 1053-55.) Hensley’s October 2012 examination found that 

Hensley had a normal spine, no CVA tenderness, and extremities 

within normal limits. (Tr. 26, 1028-30. 

Hensley argues that the ALJ erred by relying on only these 

three clinical examinations. An ALJ should not use a “‘soundbite’ approach to record evaluation,” choosing only the findings 

that support his conclusion, and ignoring other evidence 

consistent with the treating doctor’s reports. Scrogham v. Colvin, 
26 

765 F.3d 685, 698 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Hensley 

maintains that Dr. Fortson’s opinions regarding her physical 

limitations were supported by clinical and diagnostic findings, 

and that the ALJ failed to identify any other substantial evidence 

contradicting his opinions. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2) and 

416.927(c)(2) (giving controlling weight to a treating physician’s 

opinion that is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical 

and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with 

the other substantial evidence in your case record”). 

The decision reflects that the ALJ considered Dr. Fortson’s 

records. (See, e.g., Tr. 20 (citing Dr. Fortson’s treatment notes 

at Ex. 33F/9), 21 (citing Dr. Fortson’s treatment notes at Ex. 

38F/140), 26 (citing Dr. Fortson’s opinions and treatment notes).) 

He also considered other diagnostic and clinical findings, 

including: diagnostic testing and the 2012 MRI showing only mild 

or minimal abnormalities in her lumbar spine (Tr. 21 (citing Tr. 

690, 909, 1060)), diagnostic testing showing minimal degenerative 

changes to her knee (id. (citing Tr. 813)); clinical examinations 

showing tenderness, decreased range of motion of the spine, and 

crepitus of the knees (Tr. 21 (citing Tr. 278-81)); an August 2011 

visit with a spinal specialist noting abnormalities to her deep 

tendon reflexes and motor, but a subsequent September 2011 

examination finding no focal deficits (id. (citing Tr. 577-78, 

943)); examinations showing normal straight leg raise testing, 
27 

normal sensory, lack of joint abnormalities, no sacroiliac joint 

tenderness, fair range of spinal motion, and no focal deficits 

(id. (citing Tr. 280, 508)); January 2012 notes indicating no focal 

deficits and normal gait (id.); March 2012 notes indicating she 

was neurologically normal as to strength and coordination (id. 

(citing Tr. 734)); and May 2012 notes showing no abnormalities in 

her extremities, intact sensations in her lower extremities, only 

a “slight” antalgic gait, the ability to walk on heels and toes, 

good motor strength, and full range of motion in her lower 

extremities (id. (citing Tr. 1053)). 

Hensley also argues that the ALJ failed to consider the 

factors provided in 20 C.F.R. sections 404.1527 and 416.927 in 

weighing Dr. Fortson’s opinion. See SSR 96-2p (treating source 

medical opinions “must be weighed using all of the factors provided 

in 20 CFR 404.1527 and 416.927”). If a treating opinion is not 

entitled to controlling weight, the ALJ must determine what weight 

to assign it by considering “the length, nature, and extent of the 

treatment relationship; frequency of examination; the physician’s 

specialty; the types of tests performed; and the consistency and 

support for the physician’s opinion.” Larson v. Astrue, 615 F.3d 

744, 751 (7th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted); see 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(c)(2). Depending on how these factors apply, an opinion 

from a non-examining source may be entitled to more weight than an 

opinion from a treating source. See, e.g., Polchow v. Astrue, No. 
28 

10 CV 6525, 2011 WL 1900065, at *13 (N.D. Ill. May 19, 2011) 

(citing Hofslien v. Barnhart, 439 F.3d 375, 376–77 (7th Cir. 2006)) 

(finding the decision to afford greater weight to non-examining 

physicians’ opinions than those of the treating psychologist was 

supported by substantial evidence)). While the Seventh Circuit 

has criticized decisions that “said nothing regarding this 

required checklist of factors,” Larson, 615 F.3d at 751, it has 

“made clear that an ALJ need not explicitly weigh every relevant 

factor to conclude that a treating physician’s opinion should be 

discounted, as long as the ALJ otherwise articulates why it is 

inconsistent with the record.” Greathouse v. Colvin, No. 1:14–

CV–00805–JMS–DKL, 2015 WL 506276, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 6, 2015) 

(citing Schreiber, 519 Fed. App’x at 959). 

Here, while the ALJ did not explicitly weigh each factor in 

discussing Dr. Fortson’s opinion, his decision makes clear that he 

considered many of the factors, including Dr. Fortson’s treatment 

relationship with Hensley, the consistency of his opinion with the 

record as a whole, and the supportability of his opinion.4 See

                                                            

4 Hensley insists that Dr. Fortson’s opinions are “consistent with 

examining neurosurgeon, Dr. Levin, who opined that Ms. Hensley’s 

description of her pain was ‘truly being generated from the spine,’ 

based on the MRI findings (Tr. 578).” (DE# 11 at 25.) A review 

of the record reveals that this was not Dr. Levin’s opinion; 

indeed, it was the opposite: “It is not our impression at this 

time that the pain that she is describing in her back and leg is 

truly being generated from her spine, especially with the 

appearance of her MRI.” (Tr. 578 (emphasis added).) Moreover, 

the ALJ relied on Dr. Levin’s opinion in issuing this decision, 
29 

Schreiber, 519 Fed. App’x at 959. The Court finds that the ALJ 

built an “accurate and logical bridge” between the evidence and 

his conclusion, id., and sufficiently articulated reasons for 

affording little weight to Dr. Fortson’s opinion. Elder v. Astrue, 

529 F.3d 408, 415 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted) (noting the 

“very deferential standard” that the Seventh Circuit has deemed 

“lax,” under which an ALJ need only “minimally articulate” reasons 

for considering evidence). 

Non-Examining Medical Consultants 

Hensley argues that the ALJ erred by affording “great weight” 

to the opinions of non-examining state agency medical consultants 

Dr. J. Sands and Dr. Eskonen. (DE# 11 at 22-23.) She insists 

that the opinions of these non-treating, non-examining sources who 

reviewed an “unknown portion of the complete medical file” should 

not supplant Dr. Fortson’s opinions. (DE# 11 at 24.) Courts 

expect “a sound explanation for the weight assigned to the medical 

opinions” where a “treating physician’s opinion was given only 

some weight while the opinion of a non-examining State agency 

physician, who did not review the entire record, was given great 

weight.” Pennington v. Colvin, No. 3:14–CV–1628, 2015 WL 4093345, 

at *5 (N.D. Ind. July 7, 2015); see Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 

                                                            

noting that “upon seeking treatment from specialists, it was 

reported that the claimant is not a candidate for surgical 

intervention or the insertion of a spinal stimulator.” (Tr. 21 

(citing Dr. Levin’s opinion).)
30 

834, 839 (7th Cir. 2014) (courts “await a good explanation” when 

an ALJ rejects an examining source’s opinion in favor of a nonexamining source’s opinion). “An ALJ can reject an examining 

physician’s opinion only for reasons supported by substantial 

evidence in the record; a contradictory opinion of a non-examining 

physician does not, by itself, suffice.” Gudgel v. Barnhart, 345 

F.3d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 2003). 

The ALJ gave great weight to Dr. Sands’ and Dr. Eskonenon’s 

opinions that Hensley is capable of less than the full range of 

light exertional activity, with similar postural limitations found 

in the RFC. (Tr. 25.) But the ALJ did not rely on these opinions 

alone. Rather, he found that these opinions were supported by 

“the lack of significant focal, motor or neurological deficits, as 

well as the conservative nature of treatment.” (Tr. 25; see Tr. 

21-22 (describing this evidence in detail).) The ALJ considered 

these opinions in his analysis of the entire record, including 

treatment notes showing few abnormalities, conservative treatment, 

inconsistencies, non-compliance and mild test results. (Tr. 19-

25.) The Court finds that this evidence supports the ALJ’s 

conclusion that Hensley’s severe impairments do not cause an 

inability to work at a light level with additional work 

limitations. See Schofield v. Colvin, No. 1:14-CV-1197, 2015 WL 

4724920, at *9 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 10, 2015). 
31 

Treating Physicians Dr. Castelino and Dr. Hunter 

Hensley argues that the ALJ erred by giving “little weight” 

to the opinions of treating physicians Dr. Castelino and Dr. 

Hunter. (See Tr. 25-26.) In April 2011, Dr. Castelino diagnosed 

Hensley with schizoaffective disorder and opined that she had 

“moderate” to “marked” limitations with concentration, 

persistence, social interactions, and adaptation, and was unable 

to tolerate “even low stress” work. (Tr. 25, 244-51.) In 

September 2012, Dr. Hunter diagnosed Hensley with bipolar 

disorder, and opined that she had “mild” to “moderate” limitations 

with understanding, memory, concentration, persistence, and social 

interactions, and was unable to tolerate “even low stress” work. 

(Tr. 25, 796-803.) 

The ALJ afforded little weight to Dr. Castelino’s opinions 

because they were inconsistent with Hensley’s MSEs and her capacity 

to maintain a relationship with a significant other. (Tr. 25.) 

Hensley insists that Dr. Castelino provided appropriate medical 

support for his opinions, and thus, his opinions were entitled to 

controlling weight. Hensley points to the clinical findings in 

Dr. Castelino’s opinion indicating that she had poor memory, 

perceptual disturbance, mood and sleep disturbances, emotional 

lability, blunt, flat or inappropriate affect, social withdrawal 

or isolation, delusions or hallucinations, decreased energy, manic 

syndrome, recurrent panic attacks, anhedonia or pervasive loss of 
32 

interests, psychomotor retardation, paranoia, generalized 

persistent anxiety, feelings of guilt or worthlessness, difficulty 

thinking or concentrating, and suicidal ideation or attempts. (Tr. 

245.) 

In her brief, Hensley cites several MSEs to support Dr. 

Castelino’s clinical findings. While these MSEs indicate 

disturbed mood and sleep, anxiety, and anger, they do not support 

Dr. Castelino’s other findings. (See DE# 11 at 26 (citing Tr. 380 

(noting issues with mood, sleep, anger, and anxiety), 382 (same), 

610 (noting issues with mood and sleep), 614 (noting issues with 

mood, sleep, and anxiety)).) The ALJ considered a series of 

Hensley’s MSEs and found them without significant psychiatric 

symptomology, despite some abnormality as to mood, sleep and 

anxiety. (Tr. 23-24.) As the ALJ noted, the MSEs documented 

Hensley as within normal limits as to orientation, appearance, 

affect, memory, concentration, and cognition, and failed to 

identify significant memory, concentration or cognition 

difficulties. (Tr. 24 (citing Hensley’s nearly monthly MSEs from 

late 2010 through 2012).) 

Hensley asserts that the ALJ erred by discounting Dr. 

Castelino’s opinion of “marked social limitations” based on her 

relationship with her boyfriend. (Tr. 25.) While Hensley asserts 

that her relationship with her boyfriend did not work out, at the 

time of the hearing, he was still living with and helping her. 
33 

(Tr. 44.) Courts have found evidence of such relationships to be 

persuasive. See Williams v. Colvin, No. 12-cv-802, 2013 WL 

4501049, at *12 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 22, 2013) (affirming ALJ’s finding 

of no marked difficulties with social functioning where claimant 

had a girlfriend); Sutherland v. Astrue, No. 2:11-cv-24, 2012 WL 

911898, at *10 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 15, 2012) (affirming ALJ’s rejection 

of doctor’s opinion of “marked limitation” based in part on 

claimant’s relationship with her boyfriend and daughter). The 

Court finds that the ALJ did not err in considering evidence 

regarding Hensley’s relationship with her ex-boyfriend, and notes 

that the ALJ afforded her some limitation regarding her ability to 

socially interact by including “no more than occasional 

interaction with the public on a superficial basis” in the RFC. 

(Tr. 18.) 

Hensley argues that the ALJ also erred by giving little weight 

to Dr. Hunter’s opinions. (Tr. 25.) Dr. Hunter opined that 

Hensley was “incapable of even low stress” work and that she would 

miss work more than three times a month due to her impairments. 

(Tr. 802-03.) The ALJ found these opinions to be inconsistent 

with Dr. Hunter’s clinical findings that Hensley had no more than 

moderate limitations in any area of mental functioning. (Tr. 25, 

799-801.) Hensley maintains that there is “no reason why moderate 

limitations . . . in multiple areas of daily mental functioning 

cannot preclude an individual from handling even low stress work 
34 

or resulting multiple absences from work each month.” (DE# 11 at 

27.) But Dr. Hunter found only mild limitations with several 

functions relating to the workplace, such as abilities to carry 

out simple instructions, perform activities within a schedule, 

“maintain regular attendance,” sustain an ordinary routine without 

supervision, “get along with co-workers or peers,” and respond 

appropriately to changes in the work setting. (Tr. 799-801.) 

These findings adequately support the ALJ’s conclusion that there 

is “little correlation between [Hensley’s] mild to moderate 

limitations and her inability as to even low stress work and 

multiple absences from work.” (Tr. 25.) 

The ALJ also found Dr. Hunter’s opinions to be inconsistent 

with Dr. Chang’s May 2012 assessment that Hensley was oriented, 

with a normal mood and affect, without signs of anxiety or 

agitation, and displayed a good and normal memory. (Tr. 25, 1053-

43.) The ALJ concluded that Dr. Chang’s assessment was consistent 

with the totality of Hensley’s individualized treatment, which was 

without significant psychiatric symptomology. (Tr. 25-26; see Tr. 

24.) Furthermore, the ALJ found that Dr. Hunter’s opinions were 

inconsistent with her December 2012 treatment notes that Hensley 

was “alert, oriented, cooperative, without psychomotor agitation, 

coherent in thought process and without delusion or hallucination, 

displaying normal cognition, intact memory, average intelligence, 

intact judgment, fair insight, and intact concentration and 
35 

attention.” (Tr. 26 (citing Tr. 1064).) Hensley claims that 

treatment records confirm Dr. Hunter’s clinical findings of sleep 

and mood disturbance, delusions or hallucinations, difficulty 

thinking or concentrating, and suicidal ideation or attempts. (DE# 

11 at 27.) The records cited by Hensley support findings of sleep 

and mood disturbance, and some difficulty expressing thoughts, but 

do not support other findings. (See id. (citing Tr. 1063-64 (MSE 

finding Hensley without delusions or hallucinations, alert, with 

normal cognition, and not suicidal), 1066-67 (same), 1068-69 

(same), 1070-71 (same); 1072-73 (without delusions, normal 

cognition, not suicidal); 1074-77 (same).) 

Finally, Hensley argues that the ALJ failed to address the 

factors of Section 404.1527 in considering the opinions of Dr. 

Castelino and Dr. Hunter. As discussed above, an ALJ is not 

required to “explicitly weigh every relevant factor to conclude 

that a treating physician’s opinion should be discounted,” as long 

as he articulates why that opinion is inconsistent with the record. 

Greathouse, 2015 WL 506276, at *7. Here, the ALJ noted that both 

doctors were treating physicians and explained why their opinions 

were neither supported by nor consistent with the rest of the 

record. (Tr. 25-26.) This is sufficient. See Henke v. Astrue, 

498 F. App’x 636, 640 n.3 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding it “is enough” 

for an ALJ to note a lack of medical evidence supporting an opinion 
36 

and its inconsistency with the rest of the record, where the ALJ 

did not explicitly weigh every factor). 

ALJ’s Credibility Determination 

 Hensley claims that the ALJ erred in finding that her 

statements regarding the intensity, persistence and limiting 

effects of her symptoms were not fully credible to the extent they 

are inconsistent with the RFC assessment. (Tr. 19.) Because the 

ALJ is best positioned to judge a claimant’s truthfulness, this 

Court will overturn an ALJ’s credibility determination only if it 

is “patently wrong.” Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 504 (7th 

Cir. 2004). However, the ALJ must articulate specific reasons for 

discounting a claimant’s testimony as being less than credible, 

and cannot merely ignore the testimony or rely solely on a conflict 

between the objective medical evidence and the claimant’s 

testimony as a basis for a negative credibility determination. 

See Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 746-47 (7th Cir. 2005); SSR 

96-7p (requiring ALJs to articulate “specific reasons” behind 

credibility evaluations; the ALJ cannot merely state that “the 

individual’s allegations have been considered” or that “the 

allegations are (or are not) credible.”). The ALJ must make a 

credibility determination supported by record evidence and be 

sufficiently specific to make clear to the claimant and to any 

subsequent reviewers the weight given to the claimant’s statements 
37 

and the reasons for that weight. Lopez ex rel Lopez v. Barnhart, 

336 F.3d 535, 539-40 (7th Cir. 2003). 

Here, the ALJ provided sufficient support for his credibility 

finding. He considered Hensley’s daily activities, which included 

doing laundry, preparing simple meals, and spending time with her 

ex-boyfriend. (Tr. 17, 19.) The ALJ also noted “inconsistencies 

in the record as to reports made by [Hensley], which indicates 

that the information obtained from [her] may not be entirely 

reliable.” (Tr. 19.) For example, the ALJ addressed records 

showing that Hensley had reported paranoia and audio 

hallucinations while hospitalized, but upon learning that she 

would be taken to court for possible State commitment, she suddenly 

improved and reported that she felt well, and was without audio or 

visual hallucinations, paranoid thoughts, depression, suicidal 

thoughts, or manic symptomology. (Tr. 23, 285.) The ALJ also 

considered Dr. Fortson’s notes that Hensley “has not been truthful 

with me in the past.” (Tr. 20, 741.) Hensley does not contest 

these findings. 

In assessing Hensley’s credibility, the ALJ also found that: 

(1) “objective diagnostic testing” did not support the intensity, 

persistence and limiting effects of Hensley’s alleged symptomology 

(Tr. 19-20); (2) Hensley’s physical and mental treatments were 

conservative in nature (Tr. 20); (3) Hensley made inconsistent 

statements about using aerosol cans to “get high” or commit suicide 
38 

(id.); and (4) she was non-compliant with her psychotropic 

medications between hospitalizations (Tr. 23). Hensley objects to 

each of these findings. 

Hensley argues that the ALJ erred by concluding that the 

clinical and diagnostic evidence do not support her alleged 

limitations. In support of her position, Hensley refers in cursory 

fashion to the opinions of “three separate treating doctors,” and 

“the fact that numerous treating and examining physicians found 

otherwise.” (DE# 11 at 29.) Because Hensley failed to cite to 

the record for these assertions, the Court can only presume she 

intends to refer to the opinions of Drs. Fortson, Castelino and 

Hunter. Because the Court has found that the ALJ did not err in 

assigning little weight to these opinions, the Court finds this 

argument to be unpersuasive. 

Hensley also asserts that a credibility determination cannot 

be made solely on the basis of objective medical evidence. See

SSR 96-7p. However, an ALJ is entitled to consider the objective 

medical evidence, or lack thereof, as a factor in assessing 

credibility, and “may properly discount portions of a claimant’s 

testimony based on discrepancies between [the c]laimant’s 

allegations and objective medical evidence.” Crawford v. Astrue, 

633 F. Supp. 2d 618, 633 (N.D. Ill. 2009); see Arnold v. Barnhart, 

473 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[S]ubjective complaints need 

not be accepted insofar as they clash with other, objective medical 
39 

evidence in the record.”). While the ALJ articulated reasons for 

considering clinical and diagnostic evidence, he did not rely 

solely on this evidence in assessing Hensley’s credibility. (Tr. 

20-21.) He considered several other factors, including Hensley’s 

medical treatment, medications taken, daily activities, work 

history, opinions, allegations of pain, and inconsistencies in her 

statements and complaints. (Tr. 19-26.) 

Hensley asserts that the ALJ erred by characterizing her 

physical and mental treatment as “conservative.” (Tr. 20.) She 

insists that her treatment of spinal injections and narcotic pain 

medications should have been considered more than conservative. 

But see Olsen v. Colvin, 551 Fed. App’x 868, 875 (7th Cir. 2014) 

(characterizing epidural steroid injections as “conservative 

treatment” was supported by substantial evidence) (citation 

omitted). The ALJ addressed Hensley’s injections and medications, 

stating that “there is specific evidence that [Hensley’s] 

physicians do not consider her to be a candidate for more 

aggressive treatment (such [as an] insertion of a spinal stimulator 

or the undertaking of surgical intervention).” (Tr. 20; see Tr. 

21.) The ALJ also noted Dr. Kondamuri’s opinion that Hensley’s 

spinal disease “was ‘not that severe’ and that the use of addictive 

opioid-based medications was not supported.” (Tr. 21.) Regarding 

Hensley’s mental treatment, the ALJ relied upon records indicating 

“more or less normal” MSEs and a lack of significant psychiatric 
40 

symptomology. (Tr. 22.) Hensley’s MSEs were consistently “without 

significant abnormality” upon discharge from hospitalization, 

though the ALJ acknowledged that records from Hensley’s most recent 

hospitalization indicate that she had some memory and cognitive 

deficits with decrease insight and judgment. (Tr. 22-23.) The 

ALJ considered these abnormalities, and thus limited her 

concentration, persistence and pace. (Tr. 23.) Hensley’s MSEs 

from her individualized treatment fail to indicate significant 

memory, concentration or cognition difficulties. (Tr. 24.) Given 

the deference that courts show to an ALJ’s factual determination, 

the Court will not question the ALJ’s finding that Hensley’s 

physical and mental treatments were conservative. Simila v. 

Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 519 (7th Cir. 2009). 

Finally, Hensley takes issue with the ALJ’s findings that 

Hensley made inconsistent statements about using aerosol cans to 

attempt suicide or to “get high,” and that she was sometimes noncompliant with taking medication. (Tr. 23-24.) She maintains 

that there is no evidence that she engaged in ongoing substance 

abuse or that non-compliance contributed to her disability, and 

argues that the ALJ failed consider evidence that her severe mental 

impairments resulted in “impaired insight and judgment.”5 (DE# 11 

                                                            

5 The Court notes that while Hensley asserts that her insight and 

judgment were impaired, the records she cites mostly indicate that 

her judgement was “intact” and her insight was “fair.” (DE# 11 at 

30 (citing Tr. 1064 (“Judgement: Intact” and “Insight: Fair”), 
41 

at 30); see, e.g., Jelinek v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805, 814 (7th Cir. 

2011) (noting ALJs should consider alternative explanations for 

non-compliance with treatment when dealing with claimants 

suffering from severe mental conditions before concluding that 

non-compliance supports an adverse credibility inference). While 

the ALJ cited Hensley’s non-compliance with treatment, it was but 

one of many factors considered in assessing her credibility. See 

Griggs v. Astrue, No. 1:12–CV–00056, 2013 WL 1976078, at *8 (N.D. 

Ind. May 13, 2013) (affirming ALJ’s decision where “sporadic 

compliance with treatment was just one of several factors that the 

ALJ considered when assessing her credibility”). Even if the ALJ 

misconstrued the evidence of Hensley’s non-compliance, the other 

evidence on which he relied was sufficient to support the 

conclusion that Hensley’s complaints were not entirely credible. 

The ALJ’s credibility determination was supported by evidence 

in the record and this Court cannot say that the credibility 

determination was “patently wrong.” See Skarbek, 390 F.3d at 504; 

Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 546 (7th Cir. 2008) (“an ALJ’s 

credibility assessment will stand as long as there is some support 

in the record”) (quotation and brackets omitted). Therefore, the 

                                                            

1067 (same), 1069 (same), 1072 (same), 1076 (same), and 295 

(Hensley had “poor insight and judgment [upon hospitalization]. . 

. . She began to have better insight and judgment.”); see Tr. 296 

(“Insight and judgment improved.”).)
42 

ALJ’s credibility determination, which is entitled to special 

deference, is affirmed. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, the Commissioner of Social 

Security’s final decision is AFFIRMED. 

DATED: September 9, 2015 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge 

 United States District Court