United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted December 20, 2018 

Decided December 21, 2018 

Before 

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge 

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge 

No. 18-1639 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

REGINA NANCY HEAVENER, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Central District of Illinois. 

No. 16-cr-40051-003 

Sara Darrow, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Regina Nancy Heavener pleaded guilty to four counts of distributing and 

conspiring to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, for which she 

faced a statutory minimum of 120 months’ imprisonment. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A). In the plea 

agreement and at the change-of-plea hearing, Heavener acknowledged that the court 

could not impose a sentence below this threshold unless the government, in its “sole 

discretion,” made a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) based on her substantial 

assistance. The government did not make such a motion at the sentencing hearing, 

which apparently surprised Heavener and her counsel. The district court sentenced 

Heavener to 120 months in prison on each of the four counts, to run concurrently. 

Although her plea agreement included a waiver of the right to appeal “any and all 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 18-1639 Page 2 

issues related to this plea agreement and conviction” or any sentence below the 

statutory maximum (life imprisonment), Heavener appealed. 

Heavener’s attorney asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. 

See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Heavener did not respond to counsel’s 

submission, see CIR. R. 51(b), which explains the nature of the case and addresses the 

issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. Because counsel’s brief 

appears to be an adequate effort to determine whether Heavener has any non-frivolous 

grounds for appeal, we limit our review to the subjects he discusses. See United States v. 

Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Counsel considers whether Heavener could challenge the validity of her guilty 

plea—and thus, the validity of the appeal waiver in her plea agreement—but properly 

concludes that doing so would be frivolous. See United States v. Gonzalez, 765 F.3d 732, 

741 (7th Cir. 2014). It is unclear whether counsel discussed with Heavener whether she 

wishes to challenge her guilty plea, as we require. See United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 

671 (7th Cir. 2002). But we need not reject counsel’s submission on this basis, for counsel 

has not identified any ground for challenging the voluntariness of the plea, and our 

own review of the record convinces us that none exists. See United States v. Zitt, 714 F.3d 

511, 515 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012). The 

district court engaged in the proper Rule 11 plea colloquy, during which it confirmed 

that Heavener understood the terms of the appellate waiver and ensured that she was 

pleading guilty of her own free will. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. Because the record 

demonstrates that Heavener knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty, and because the 

prison sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum, the near-total appeal waiver is 

enforceable. See Gonzalez, 765 F.3d at 741. 

Thus, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.