-1‐ 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

DAVID A. SCOTT, JR., 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

LEAR CORPORATION, DARRELL 

HARPER, LARRY PAYNE, BARBARA 

SACHA, and RYAN BRUCKNER 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

NO. 2:14–CV-107 

OPINION AND ORDER

 This matter is before the Court on Defendant Lear 

Corporation’s (“Lear”) Partial Motion to Dismiss, and Defendants 

Larry Payne, Barbara Sacha, Ryan Brueckner and Darrell Harper’s 

(together, “Individual Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss, filed on 

June 17, 2014. For the reasons set forth below, Lear’s partial 

motion to dismiss is DENIED, and the Individual Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The Individual Defendants are 

hereby DISMISSED from this case. 

BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff David A. Scott, Jr. (“Scott”) was employed by 

Lear in its plant in Hammond, Indiana, between October 2010 and 

April 2013. (See DE# 1-9.) On or about August 11, 2013, Scott 

filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) against Lear, alleging that he 
-2‐ 

sustained a workplace injury and was required to work light duty 

assignments, but that Lear denied him reasonable accommodation, 

and eventually terminated his employment after he complained (1) 

about his treatment and (2) that Lear had afforded female 

employees with medical conditions more favorable treatment than 

male employees. (See id.) The EEOC issued its Dismissal and 

Notice of Rights on March 19, 2014. (DE #1 at 8.) 

 Proceeding pro se, Scott filed his complaint in this Court 

on April 4, 2014, using a preprinted “Employment Discrimination 

Complaint.” (DE #1.) Scott’s claims are being made pursuant to 

the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) (42 U.S.C. § 12101), 

and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended 

(“Title VII”) (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-s). Jurisdiction for these 

claims is based on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a). The complaint 

names Lear and the Individual Defendants (together, the 

“Defendants”), and alleges violations of the ADA, gender 

discrimination, retaliation, harassment, and wrongful 

termination. Regarding Scott’s wrongful termination claim, the 

complaint states in part: 

On April 23, 2013 the defendants wrongfully terminated 

the plaintiff because of medical leave that they put 

me on because of a pending work related injury and 

wouldn’t allow me to return to work under their policy 

so a grievance was filed on my behalf on the 24th of 

April 2013 but no steps or meetings were held for 320 

day[s] and no contact to myself but straight to 

mediation and a denial of my grievance and being told 

that there [were] no other steps after mediation 
-3‐ 

except to agree to this $4,000 settlement and drop all 

pending charges I have against the defendants and the 

union. My grievance was for being terminated for 

medical leave and didn’t have anything to do with my 

other complaints or charges. . . . 

(DE# 1 at 7.) 

On June 17, 2014, Lear filed a partial motion to dismiss, 

seeking dismissal of Scott’s wrongful discharge claim. (DE# 

16.) On the same day, the Individual Defendants filed a motion 

to dismiss Scott’s complaint against them. (DE# 19.) In 

support of both motions, the Defendants submitted unsigned 

copies of the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) entered 

into by Lear’s Hammond Indiana Plant and the International 

United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers 

of America, UAW, and its affiliated Local Union 2335 (“Union”). 

(See DE## 21, 21-1, 22, 22-1.) The CBA was not attached to 

Scott’s complaint. 

 Scott filed responses to both motions to dismiss on 

September 2, 2014. (DE## 25, 26.) In those responses, Scott 

acknowledged the existence of the CBA and asked that “the CBA 

agreement be added in for support of my complaints.” (DE# 25 at 

3; DE# 26 at 4.) On September 11, 2014, Scott also filed a 

“Motion in Response to Lear Corporation and Defendants 

Submission in Support to Dismiss,” in which he asserted that 
-4‐ 

Lear and the Union never supplied him with a copy of the CBA 

during his employment.1 (DE# 27.) 

The Defendants filed their reply briefs on September 30, 

2014, attaching copies of two charges Scott had filed with the 

National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) and the EEOC against the 

Union in 2012 and 2013, respectively. (DE## 29, 30.) 

On October 9, 2014, Scott filed two surreply briefs, 

attaching three more NLRB charges that Scott had filed against 

Lear and the Union in 2014, as well as his correspondence with 

the NLRB and the Union president. (DE## 31, 32.) 

DISCUSSION 

Motion to Dismiss Standard 

 In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all facts 

alleged in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable 

inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See 

Parish v. City of Elkhart, 614 F.3d 677, 679 (7th Cir. 2010) 

(citation omitted). While a complaint is not required to 

contain detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff must allege 

facts that state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

                                                            

1 While entitled a “Motion,” this two-page document seeks a denial 

of the Defendants’ motions to dismiss, and therefore, will be 

treated as a supplemental brief in response to the motions to 

dismiss.
-5‐ 

face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 

173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements 

of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

do not suffice.” Id. at 678. “While a complaint . . . does not 

need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to 

provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires 

more than labels and conclusions. . . . Factual allegations 

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 

level on the assumption that all the allegations in the 

complaint are true.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (internal 

citations and quotations omitted). A pro se complaint, “however 

inartfully pleaded,” must be construed liberally, and is “held 

to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 

lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 

167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007) (quotation omitted); see Ambrose v. 

Roeckeman, 749 F.3d 615, 618 (7th Cir. 2014). 

When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court generally 

considers the factual allegations of the complaint and any 

reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those allegations. 

See Gessert v. United States, 703 F.3d 1028, 1033 (7th Cir. 

2013). The court may examine information from documents 

attached to a motion to dismiss “if they are referred to in the 

plaintiff’s complaint and are central to his claim.” Adams v. 
-6‐ 

City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 729 (7th Cir. 2014) 

(quotation omitted). Such documents may be considered by the 

court in ruling on the motion to dismiss without converting the 

motion into a motion for summary judgment. See Burke v. 401 N. 

Wabash Venture, LLC, 714 F.3d 501, 505 (7th Cir. 2013). 

However, this is a “narrow exception” to the general rule that 

consideration of extraneous material requires conversion to a 

summary judgment motion. 188 LLC v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 300 

F.3d 730, 735 (7th Cir. 2002). When extraneous materials are 

presented, it is within the court’s discretion either to exclude 

the materials and handle the case as a straightforward motion to 

dismiss, or to consider the materials and convert to summary 

judgment. See Levenstein v. Salafsky, 164 F.3d 345, 347 (7th 

Cir. 1998). If the court chooses conversion, the parties must 

have “a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that 

is pertinent to the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). 

Documents Submitted In Connection with the Motions to Dismiss 

 The parties submitted several documents for the Court’s 

consideration in ruling on the Defendants’ motions to dismiss: 

the CBA; multiple EEOC and NLRB charges filed by Scott against 

Lear and the Union; a letter from the NRLB to Scott; and email 

correspondence between Scott and the Union’s president. (DE## 
-7‐ 

21, 22, 29-1, 29-2, 30-1, 30-2, 32-1, 32-2.) None of these 

documents were attached to or mentioned in Scott’s complaint. 

The Defendants ask the Court to consider the CBA, arguing 

that it is central to Scott’s wrongful termination claim. 

Courts have considered collective bargaining agreements in 

ruling on motions to dismiss, even when they were not attached 

to a plaintiff’s complaint. See Minch v. City of Chicago, 486 

F.3d 294, 300 n.3 (7th Cir. 2007) (considering a collective 

bargaining agreement in resolving a motion to dismiss although 

it was not mentioned in the complaint, where plaintiffs’ due 

process claim rested upon the agreement’s provisions); Anastos 

v. Honeywell Intern., Inc., No. 3:10–CV–208-TLS, 2010 WL 

3526265, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 3, 2010); Pabst Brewing Co., 

Inc. v. Corrao, 176 F.R.D. 552, 556 (E.D. Wis. 1997). 

While Scott’s complaint does not specifically identify the 

CBA, it alleges that the Defendants fabricated that Scott had 

“violated the medical leave policy” in order to terminate his 

employment, and “wouldn’t allow [Scott] to return to work under 

their policy.” (DE# 1 at 6-7.) This “policy” presumably refers 

to the medical leave of absence policy provided in the CBA. 

(See DE# 22-1 at 34 (“Medical Leave of Absence” provision).) 

The complaint further alleges that “a grievance was filed on 

[Scott’s] behalf . . . but no steps or meetings were held,” 

presumably in violation of the CBA’s multi-step grievance 
-8‐ 

procedure. (Compare DE# 1 at 7 with DE# 22-1 at 6-10 (CBA’s 

“Grievance Procedure”).) Scott does not contest the 

authenticity of the CBA submitted by the Defendants, and asks 

the Court to add the CBA in support of his complaint in his 

responses to the motions to dismiss.2

 (See DE## 25, 26.) 

Because Scott’s complaint repeatedly refers to terms of the CBA, 

and his briefs acknowledge that the CBA is central to his 

wrongful termination claim, the Court will consider the CBA in 

ruling on the motions to dismiss.3

In support of their argument that Scott’s wrongful 

termination claim is untimely, the Defendants submit two charges 

Scott filed against the Union in January 2012 and August 2013. 

Scott submits (1) three NLRB charges he filed against the Union 

                                                            

2 While Scott filed a supplemental brief claiming that Lear did 

not provide him with a copy of the CBA during his employment 

(see DE# 27), he never asserts that he did not have a copy of 

the CBA, or was unaware of the terms of the CBA. The 

complaint’s allegations indicate that Scott was aware of the 

CBA’s terms at the time of his termination. (See DE# 1 at 6-7; 

see also DE# 32 at 3 (arguing in a subsequent surreply brief 

that Scott complied with the CBA’s terms prior to termination, 

where Lear allegedly terminated Scott for not “follow[ing] [the] 

CBA agreement by not turning in medical/restriction notes to 

human resources which is false because [Scott] did turn in the 

said medical notes”).) 

3

    The Defendants submitted unsigned copies of the CBA without 

accompanying affidavits explaining why the CBA was not signed. 

(See DE## 21, 22.) Because Scott does not contest the CBA’s 

authenticity, the Court will consider the CBA for the purpose of 

these motions. In future proceedings, any party seeking to rely 

upon the CBA should provide the Court with a fully executed copy 

of the CBA, or an explanation as to why no such copy is 

available.
-9‐ 

and Lear in March and May of 2014, (2) a June 2014 letter from 

the NLRB to Scott, and (3) email correspondence between Scott 

and the Union president in 2013-2014. The Court finds that the 

narrow exception articulated by the Seventh Circuit does not 

apply to these documents, and will not consider them in deciding 

the Defendants’ motions to dismiss. See Metz v. Joe Rizza 

Imports, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 2d 983, 988 (N.D. Ill. 2010) 

(refusing to consider documents submitted in response to motion 

to dismiss because they “are not central in determining whether 

Defendants engaged in these acts” alleged in the complaint). 

Because consideration of these documents would not change its 

analysis, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to 

convert the motions to dismiss into motions for summary 

judgment. See Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 583 (7th 

Cir. 2009) (affirming district court’s refusal to convert a 

motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment based on 

district court’s discretion). 

Scott’s ADA and Title VII Claims against the Individual 

Defendants Must Be Dismissed Because They Fail as a Matter of 

Law 

 The Individual Defendants argue that Scott’s ADA and Title 

VII claims against them should be dismissed because they were 

merely supervisors at Lear, and supervisors cannot be held 

individually liable under either the ADA or Title VII. 
-10‐ 

It is well-established in the Seventh Circuit that 

individuals who do not independently meet the statutory 

definition of “employer” cannot be held liable under Title VII 

or the ADA. See, e.g., EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 

55 F.3d 1276, 1282 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[I]ndividuals who do not 

otherwise meet the statutory definition of ‘employer’ cannot be 

liable under the ADA.”). Under both Title VII and the ADA, an 

employer is “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce 

who has fifteen or more employees . . . and any agent of such 

person.” 4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). A 

supervisor, in his individual capacity, does not fall within 

this definition of “employer.” See Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 

552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995). Thus, a “supervisor cannot be held 

liable in his individual capacity under the ADA or under Title 

VII.” Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 797 n.5 (7th Cir. 

1999). 

While the Individual Defendants are not referenced in the 

body of Scott’s complaint, the complaint does refer to “Lear’s 

management team,” “[Scott’s] supervisor, human resources,” 

                                                            

4

 The language designating “any agent of such person” as an 

“employer” was not intended to create liability for every agent 

of an employer. See DeVito v. Chicago Park Dist., 83 F.3d 878, 

882 (7th Cir. 1996). Agents are liable only if they otherwise 

meet the statutory definition of an “employer.” “For example, 

an agent of an employer is not liable under the ADA unless it 

has the requisite number of employees and is engaged in an 

industry affecting commerce.” Id. (internal quotations and 

brackets omitted).
-11‐ 

“Lear[’]s management team of supervisors and formans [sic],” 

“Lear’s team of supervisors, formans [sic] and Human Resources.” 

(DE# 1 at 3, 4.) In his response brief, Scott identifies 

defendants Larry Payne as “Plant Superintendent”, Darrell Harper 

as “Production Manager,” Ryan Brueckner as “Director-Human 

Resources,” and Barbara Sacha as “Human Resources Manager.” 

(DE# 25 at 2.) Scott argues that the Individual Defendants were 

not his supervisors, but rather, “people in management positions 

to protect the rights of employees when it comes to Lear’s 

company policies, civil rights and the employee/employer signed 

contract under the [CBA]. . . .” (Id.; see also DE# 31 at 1 

(arguing the Individual Defendants “were not supervisors they 

were higher up in management”).) Regardless of Scott’s 

terminology, his complaint does not allege any facts suggesting 

that Scott was employed by any of the Individual Defendants, or 

that they otherwise meet the definition of “employer” under 

Title VII or the ADA. Thus, the Court can reasonably infer that 

none of the Individual Defendants were Scott’s employer. 

Because the Individual Defendants cannot be held personally 

liable for the alleged Title VII or ADA violations, these claims 

against the Individual Defendants are DISMISSED. 
-12‐ 

Scott’s Wrongful Termination Claim 

 The Defendants argue that Scott’s wrongful termination 

claim is preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management 

Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185, and is a “hybrid” 

Section 301/fair representation claim (“hybrid Section 301 

claim”). As such, they assert that this claim is subject to a 

six-month statute of limitations. The Court will first consider 

whether Scott’s wrongful termination claim is a hybrid Section 

301 claim before turning to the statute of limitations issue. 

Scott’s Wrongful Termination Claim Is a Hybrid Section 301 

Claim 

National labor policy strongly favors private over judicial 

resolution of disputes arising under a collective bargaining 

agreement. See Truhlar v. U.S. Postal Serv., 600 F.3d 888, 891 

(7th Cir. 2010) (citing Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 

650, 652–53, 85 S. Ct. 614, 13 L. Ed. 2d 580 (1965)). Thus, 

where an employer and a union have contracted to resolve 

disputes through a grievance and arbitration process, a union 

member-employee must avail himself of these dispute-resolution 

mechanisms before turning to the courts for relief. See Bell v. 

DaimlerChrysler Corp., 547 F.3d 796, 803 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting 

litigation is “the last resort in resolving such disputes”). If 

the union takes an employee’s grievance to arbitration, both the 
-13‐ 

employee and the employer are “bound by the result subject only 

to extremely narrow judicial review.” Id. at 804. 

Section 301 is an exception to the national labor policy, 

in that it allows an employee to seek relief in federal court 

when a union breaches its duty to represent him fairly during 

private dispute resolution.5

 See id. at 803-04. Thus, an 

employee may bring a Section 301 claim if “his union completely 

bungles (or intentionally sabotages) an otherwise meritorious 

grievance” during the arbitration process. Truhlar, 600 F.3d at

891 (citation omitted). In such case, the employee may file a 

“hybrid” suit alleging that his union breached its duty of fair 

representation and that his employer breached the collective 

bargaining agreement. See DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of 

Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164-65, 103 S. Ct. 2281, 76 L. Ed. 2d 

476 (1983). The two claims are “inextricably interdependent.” 

Id. at 164. To prevail against the employer or the union, the 

employee “must not only show that [his] discharge was contrary 

to the contract but must also carry the burden of demonstrating 

a breach of duty by the Union.” Id. at 165 (quotation omitted). 

                                                            

5 Section 301 of the LMRA states in part: 

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer 

and a labor organization representing employees in an 

industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in 

any district court of the United States having 

jurisdiction of the parties. . . . 

29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
-14‐ 

The employee need not sue both the union and the employer, but 

he must make the showing against the union to proceed. See id. 

Where an employee brings a state law claim, Section 301 

preempts the application of state law “only if such application 

requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining 

agreement.” Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 

399, 413, 108 S. Ct. 1877, 100 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1988); see In re 

Bentz Metal Prods. Co., Inc., 253 F.3d 283, 285–286 (7th Cir. 

2004) (“preemption can extend beyond contract disputes to other 

state law claims if resolution of those claims is sufficiently 

dependent on an interpretation of a CBA”). Wrongful termination 

claims have been preempted by Section 301 where the claim’s 

resolution turned on the interpretation of a collective 

bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Chapple v. Nat’l Starch & 

Chemical Co. & Oil, 178 F.3d 501, 508–09 (7th Cir. 1999) 

(wrongful discharge claim preempted where the claim required the 

court to decide if the employer was acting within the scope of 

the collective bargaining agreement). 

Applying these principals, the Court concludes that Scott’s 

wrongful discharge claim is preempted by Section 301, and is 

properly characterized as a hybrid Section 301 claim. The 

complaint alleges that Scott was wrongfully terminated for 

“violat[ing] the medical leave policy,” and that he wasn’t 

allowed to return to work “under their policy.” (DE# 1 at 6-7.) 
-15‐ 

The complaint asserts that “a grievance was filed” the day after 

Scott was terminated, “but no steps or meetings were held for 

320 day[s],” and the parties went “straight to mediation.” (Id. 

at 7.) According to the complaint, Scott’s grievance was denied 

and Scott was told there were “no other steps” after mediation 

except to agree to a settlement pursuant to which he had to 

“drop all pending charges . . . against the defendants and the 

union.” (Id.) These allegations allude to breaches of the 

terms of the CBA by both the Defendants and the Union, including 

the CBA’s “Medical Leave of Absence” policy (see DE# 22-1 at 

34), and its “Grievance Procedure,” which sets forth multiple 

“Grievance Steps.” (See id. at 6-10.) As such, these 

allegations demonstrate that Scott’s wrongful termination claim 

is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the CBA’s 

terms. Because the CBA includes provisions for resolving 

employment disputes, Scott’s claim is not actionable apart from 

a successful claim that the Union breached its duty of fair 

representation. See Filippo v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Corp., Inc.,

141 F.3d 744, 748 (7th Cir. 1998). 

Thus, Scott’s wrongful termination claim is a hybrid 

Section 301 claim. 
-16‐ 

Scott’s Claim, as Pled, Is Not Barred by the Statute of 

Limitations 

Having determined that Scott’s wrongful termination claim 

is indeed a hybrid Section 301 claim, the Court considers 

whether Scott has plead facts that show this claim is barred by 

the appropriate statute of limitations. Although a statute of 

limitations defense is not usually part of a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion to dismiss, “when the allegations of the complaint reveal 

that relief is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, 

the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a 

claim.” Logan v. Wilkins, 644 F.3d 577, 582 (7th Cir. 2011).

A hybrid Section 301 claim is governed by a six-month 

statute of limitations. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172; 

Chapple, 178 F.3d at 505. The six-month limitations period 

begins to run when “a final decision on a plaintiff’s grievance 

has been made or from the time the plaintiff discovers, or in 

the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, 

that no further action would be taken on his grievance.” 

Chapple, 178 F.3d at 505 (internal quotation and citation 

omitted). The application of the statute of limitations “‘seems 

straightforward enough when a grievance has run its full course 

. . .’ suggesting that the statute begins running at the time 

the award is handed down.” Freeman v. Local Union No. 135 

Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers, 746 F.2d 1316, 
-17‐ 

1319 n.5 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 166 

n.16 (claim accrued when grievance committee’s decision 

rendered)). 

The limitations period “is tolled until intraunion remedies 

are exhausted, even if those remedies are ultimately determined 

to have been futile.” Frandsen v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. 

Clerks, Freight Handlers, Exp. & Station Employees, & Mo. Pac. 

R.R. Co., 782 F.2d 674, 684 (7th Cir. 1986). “[T]olling occurs 

while a plaintiff pursues specific internal union remedies 

through the designated channels; it does not occur while the 

plaintiff seeks whatever relief might be available.” Pantoja v. 

Holland Motor Exp., Inc., 965 F.2d 323, 329 (7th Cir. 1992). 

The policy behind the tolling rule is “to allow plaintiffs to 

exhaust internal union remedies without fear that later suits 

against the union for breach of the duty of fair representation 

will be time barred.” Id. at 328; see also Frandsen, 782 F.2d 

at 681 (noting “the national labor policy of encouraging workers 

to pursue internal union remedies, while ensuring them a 

judicial forum in which to resolve disputes”); Stevens v. Nw. 

Ind. Dist. Council, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 20 F.3d 720, 730 

(7th Cir. 1994) (“A union may be willing to address and remedy a 

violation raised in even an untimely complaint . . . but would 

seldom have that opportunity if the complaining member has 
-18‐ 

everything to lose and nothing gain by staying within the 

system.”). 

Because Scott’s hybrid Section 301 claim alleges that a 

grievance was filed on his behalf, the six-month statute of 

limitations is to be tolled until Scott’s intra-union remedies 

are exhausted, even if those remedies were ultimately futile. 

See Frandsen, 782 F.2d at 684. Scott filed the complaint on 

April 4, 2014. (DE# 1.) If the complaint alleges that Scott’s 

intra-union remedies were exhausted within the six months prior 

to filing (that is, sometime after October 4, 2013), it will not 

run afoul of the statute of limitations. 

Unfortunately, the exact timing of the exhaustion of 

Scott’s intra-union remedies is unclear. The complaint alleges 

that: (1) Scott’s grievance was filed on April 24, 2013; (2) a 

period of 320 days passed during which Scott was not contacted; 

(3) mediation occurred; and (4) Scott’s grievance was denied. 

(DE# 1 at 7.) The complaint does not allege when Scott’s 

grievance was denied.6

 

Drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most 

favorable to Scott, his pro se complaint can be read as alleging 

that his grievance was mediated 320 days after it was filed - in 

                                                            

6 While the Court has determined that it will not consider any 

documents submitted by the parties other than the CBA, the Court 

notes that even if it had considered these documents, they do 

not provide the date the grievance was denied.
-19‐ 

or about March 2014, and that the grievance was denied sometime 

during or after mediation.7 See Ambrose, 749 F.3d at 618 (courts 

are to construe pro se complaints liberally). The complaint’s 

allegation that Scott was told there was “a denial of my 

grievance and . . . no other steps after mediation” other than 

settlement infers that the denial was a final decision. (DE# 1 

at 7.) Because the complaint can reasonably be read as alleging 

that a final decision regarding Scott’s grievance occurred after 

October 4, 2013, Scott has not plead facts that show his claim 

is barred by Section 301’s six-month statute of limitations. 

The Defendants argue that Scott’s claim is untimely because 

Scott filed his complaint “more than six months after the 

Union’s prolonged inaction put him on notice that it would not 

pursue his grievance.” (DE# 17 at 5, DE# 20 at 6.) They 

concede that a grievance was filed, but focus on Scott’s 

allegation that no steps or meetings were held for 320 days 

after filing, and argue that Scott knew or should have known by 

August 2013 that the Union would not process his grievance. 

(See DE# 29 at 3, DE# 30 at 4 (asserting that Scott’s August 30, 

2013 EEOC charge against the Union demonstrates his knowledge 

                                                            

7

    Scott’s last surreply brief states the mediation occurred on 

March 17, 2014 (DE# 32 at 2). See Help at Home, Inc. v. Med. 

Capital, L.L.C., 260 F.3d 748, 752-53 (7th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff 

“may add [facts] by affidavit or brief in order to defeat a 

motion to dismiss if the facts are consistent with the 

allegations of the complaint.”).
-20‐ 

“that the Union would take no further action on his 

grievance”).) The Defendants do not address the allegations of 

the mediation or the denial of Scott’s grievance in any of their 

briefs. 

The Defendants cite to Metz v. Tootsie Roll Indus., Inc.,

715 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1983), and Christiansen v. APV Crepaco, 

Inc., 178 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 1999), as dispositive on this 

issue. The Court finds these opinions to be inapposite. In 

both Metz and Christiansen, the unions failed to file grievances 

on behalf of the plaintiffs within a specific time period set 

forth in the collective bargaining agreements. The Seventh 

Circuit held that “when a collective bargaining agreement 

requires that all grievances be brought within a certain time 

period, ‘under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, 

the failure and refusal of the Union to file the grievance 

within the specified time period amounted to a final decision.’” 

Christiansen, 178 F.3d at 914 (quoting Metz, 715 F.2d at 303). 

Here, in contrast, the complaint alleges that a grievance 

was filed on Scott’s behalf. The complaint further alleges that 

this grievance was mediated (albeit, after a significant delay), 

and was eventually denied. It is reasonable to infer that the 

Union was involved in both the mediation and the denial of 

Scott’s grievance. Thus, while Defendants argue that Scott knew 

or should have known that the Union would take no further action 
-21‐ 

on his grievance after it was filed, the complaint alleges that 

the Union did, indeed, take such action. 

Construed liberally, the pro se complaint can be read as 

asserting that, during the alleged “320 day” period prior to 

mediation, the Defendants and the Union failed to follow the 

proper procedures in processing Scott’s grievance; it does not 

necessarily allege that the Defendants and the Union failed to 

process Scott’s grievance at all. See Konen v. Int’l Bhd. of 

Teamsters, 255 F.3d 402, 406 (7th Cir. 2001) (claim was not time 

barred where evidence “was sufficiently vague about whether the 

Union had decided not to proceed to arbitration, and thus 

whether no further action would be taken on [plaintiff’s] 

grievance”) (quotation omitted); see also Frandsen, 782 F.2d at 

682 (“In hindsight it may seem perfectly clear whether or not a 

claim could have been resolved by the union itself. But that 

clarity may be illusory to the layman in the midst of unfolding 

events.”). 

The Court finds that Scott has not plead facts that show 

his hybrid Section 301 claim is barred by Section 301’s sixmonth statute of limitations. Therefore, Lear and the 

Individual Defendants’ motions to dismiss this claim are DENIED. 
-22‐ 

Scott’s Hybrid Section 301 Claim against the Individual 

Defendants Must Be Dismissed Because It Fails as a Matter of Law 

As explained above, the Court finds Scott’s wrongful 

termination claim to be a hybrid Section 301 claim because it is 

inextricably intertwined with consideration of the CBA’s terms. 

Section 301 claims “are confined to defendants who are 

signatories of the collective bargaining agreement under which 

they are brought. . . . [The LMRA] was not designed to impose 

personal liability on employees of corporate organizations.” 

Loss v. Blankenship, 673 F.2d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 1982) (quoting 

Ramsey v. Signal Delivery Serv., Inc., 631 F.2d 1210, 1212 (5th 

Cir. 1980)); see Baker v. Fleet Maintenance, Inc., 409 F.2d 551, 

554 (7th Cir. 1969) (affirming dismissal of wrongful discharge 

claim in violation of a collective bargaining agreement where 

defendant was not a party to the agreement); see also Teamsters 

Nat’l Auto. Transporters Indust. Negotiating Comm. v. Troha, 328 

F.3d 325, 329 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Since only parties to a contract 

can violate it, a plaintiff cannot possibly allege that a nonparty violated a collective bargaining agreement”). 

Here, the complaint does not allege that any of the 

Individual Defendants are parties to the CBA.8

 The complaint 

does not describe any of the Individual Defendants, but rather, 

                                                            

8

   The Court observes that the CBA identifies Lear and the Union 

as “both parties” and “the two parties” to the CBA. (DE# 22-1 

at 1, 2.) 
-23‐ 

refers generally to “supervisors,” “formans” [sic], “Lear’s 

management team,” and “Human Resources.” (DE# 1 at 3, 4.) In 

his response brief, Scott asserts that the Individual Defendants 

are “people in management positions.” (DE# 25 at 2.) Because 

the complaint lacks allegations that could bring the Individual 

Defendants within the scope of Section 301, it fails to state a 

claim for which relief could be granted. See Loss, 673 F.2d at 

946-47 (affirming dismissal of Section 301(a) claim against 

individual defendant because he was not a party to the 

collective bargaining agreement).9

 Therefore, Scott’s hybrid 

Section 301 claim against the Individual Defendants is 

DISMISSED.

 

                                                            

9

    The Court observes that the CBA’s unsigned signature page 

includes individual defendant “Ryan Brueckner, Division Human 

Resource Director” (“Brueckner”) as one of several signatories 

for Lear. (DE# 22-1 at 41.) The introductory paragraph of the 

CBA states that Lear and the Union entered into the CBA “through 

the duly authorized representatives of both parties.” (Id. at 

1.) “[W]here a CBA is executed on behalf of a corporation by an 

individual for whom the corporation is an alter ego, the 

controlling individual is the real employer and may be liable 

for breaches of the agreement on that basis.” Delange v. 

Curbow, 2:06-CV-379-PPS-APR, 2010 WL 1936202, at *2 (N.D. Ind. 

May 12, 2010) (citing Lumpkin v. Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 933 

F.2d 449, 460 (7th Cir. 1991) and Int'l Union of Operating 

Eng’r, Local 150, AFL–CIO v. Centor Contractors, Inc., 831 F.2d 

1309, 1312–13 (7th Cir. 1987)). Here, the complaint does not 

contain any allegations inferring that Lear was Brueckner’s 

alter ego, or other allegations that would warrant piercing the 

corporate veil. See id. at *3, *4 (dismissing LMRA claim 

against individual defendant who “signed the CBA only as an 

agent of [the party to the CBA], not in her individual 

capacity”). 
-24‐ 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, Lear Corporation’s Partial 

Motion to Dismiss (DE# 16) is DENIED. Individual Defendants 

Larry Payne, Barbara Sacha, Ryan Brueckner and Darrell Harper’s 

Motion to Dismiss (DE# 19) is GRANTED. The Individual 

Defendants are hereby DISMISSED from this lawsuit. 

 

DATED: November 4, 2014 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge 

 United States District Court