NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 21a0302n.06

No. 20-5821

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

DANNY JONES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THOMAS VILSACK, Secretary, U.S. Department of 

Agriculture,

Defendant-Appellee.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE MIDDLE 

DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

BEFORE: GRIFFIN, WHITE, and READLER, Circuit Judges. 

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Danny Jones filed suit alleging that his employer, 

the United States Department of Agriculture, violated both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964 by retaliating against him in response to claims he filed with his employer’s Equal 

Employment Opportunity office, as well as the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by failing to alter his 

working conditions to accommodate his disabilities. The district court granted the Department’s

motion for summary judgment. We now affirm. 

BACKGROUND

For many years, Jones has been employed as a Soil Conservationist at the United States 

Department of Agriculture’s National Resources Conservation Service (the “Agency”). Today’s

suit traces back to events beginning in 2005. At the time, Lori Pittman, Jones’s co-worker, reported 

that Jones, then employed at the Agency’s Murfreesboro office, exposed himself at work. An 

ensuing internal investigation proved inconclusive, and no disciplinary action was taken. Jones
No. 20-5821, Jones v. Vilsack

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responded by filing a slander lawsuit against Pittman as well as an EEO complaint against the 

Agency, both of which alleged injury caused by Pittman’s purportedly false allegations. Around 

this same time, Pittman contacted the Agency’s EEO office to indicate that she no longer wanted 

to work with Jones. 

In the years to come, Jones would file a host of EEO complaints against the Agency

alleging retaliation for his engagement in various protected activities. Jones first alleged that the 

Agency, in retaliation for his initial EEO complaint and a lawsuit he had filed against the Agency,

retaliated against him by encouraging Pittman to file her own EEO complaint, which resulted in a 

second investigation and Jones’s temporary reassignment to the Agency’s Nashville office. Once 

temporarily reassigned to Nashville, Jones filed a request for a reasonable accommodation due to 

his mental health conditions. When the Agency delayed responding to that request and then 

permanently reassigned Jones to the Nashville office, Jones alleged that those actions constituted 

retaliation for his accommodation request. And when Jones requested additional accommodations 

that were later denied in part, Jones alleged that the partial denial was further evidence of 

retaliation as well as unlawful discrimination on the basis of his disability. Finally, Jones also 

alleged retaliation when he was reassigned to a different Soil Conservationist position than the one 

previously held. At the close of its review, the Agency concluded that no relief was warranted as 

to any of Jones’s EEO complaints and issued final agency decisions dismissing his claims. 

Failing on these administrative fronts, Jones filed this suit. In it, he alleged that the 

Agency’s conduct (detailed briefly above) amounted to retaliation, race discrimination (Jones is 

African American), and a failure to accommodate, in violation of Title VII and the Rehabilitation 

Act. Following discovery, the Agency moved for summary judgment on all claims. The 

magistrate judge recommended that the Agency’s motion be granted. With respect to Jones’s 
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retaliation claims regarding his temporary and then permanent reassignment to Nashville as well 

as the delay in addressing his accommodation request, the magistrate judge found that Jones failed 

to establish a prima facie case of retaliation due to the absence of a causal connection between his 

protected activity and the purportedly adverse actions taken against him. Likewise, as to his 

retaliation claim regarding the duties assigned to him following his permanent reassignment, the 

magistrate judge concluded that the Agency’s action was not “materially adverse,” as required to 

establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII. The magistrate judge also rejected 

Jones’s race-discrimination claims (due to a failure to exhaust) and failure-to-accommodate claims 

(due to the absence of a prima facie case). These latter two claims have not been pressed on appeal.

Jones submitted objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The 

district court disagreed with some of the magistrate judge’s reasoning, but ultimately granted the 

Agency summary judgment on all claims. Jones’s timely appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

Jones maintains that the district court erred in dismissing four of his retaliation claims. To 

establish a prima facie claim of retaliation under Title VII, Jones must show that: (1) he engaged 

in a protected activity; (2) the protected activity was known by the Agency; (3) the Agency took 

an action that was materially adverse to him; and (4) a causal connection existed between the 

protected activity and the materially adverse action. Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., Inc., 348 F.3d 

537, 542 (6th Cir. 2003). If Jones makes that showing, the burden shifts to the Agency to offer a 

legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for its actions. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 

792, 802 (1973). If the Agency does so, the burden shifts back to Jones “to show that the proffered 

reasons were not the true reasons for the employment decision, i.e., that the reasons were a pretext 
No. 20-5821, Jones v. Vilsack

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for retaliation.” Hubbell v. FedEx SmartPost, Inc., 933 F.3d 558, 568 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation 

omitted). 

We review the district court’s summary judgment decision de novo. Kenney v. Aspen 

Techs., Inc., 965 F.3d 443, 447 (6th Cir. 2020). Rule 56’s familiar language instructs that summary 

judgment is appropriate where the evidence, viewed in light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party, shows that there “is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists only 

where “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Baatz v. Columbia Gas 

Transmission, LLC, 929 F.3d 767, 771 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). 

I.

Jones first asserts that the district court erred in dismissing three of his retaliation claims 

due to his failure to satisfy the causation element of his prima facie case. To satisfy that element, 

Jones must demonstrate a causal connection between his protected activity (filing EEO 

complaints) and a materially adverse action (of which Jones alleges many). See, e.g., Hubbell, 

933 F.3d at 568. Jones’s claims fail unless he can show but-for causation, that is, “proof that the 

unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or 

actions of the employer.” Univ. of Texas S.W. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013); see 

also Eckerman v. Tenn. Dep’t of Safety, 636 F.3d 202, 209 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[P]laintiff must 

produce enough evidence of a retaliatory motive such that a reasonable juror could conclude that 

the [adverse employment action] would not have occurred but for his engagement in protected 

activity.”). An intervening cause between the protected activity and an adverse action dispels any 

inference of causation. Kenney, 965 F.3d at 450 (citing Kuhn v. Washtenaw County, 709 F.3d 612, 

628 (6th Cir. 2013)); Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., 682 F.3d 463, 471–72 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding 
No. 20-5821, Jones v. Vilsack

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that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a causal connection because his decision to leave the work

site was an intervening event). One factor relevant to determining whether causation is satisfied 

in this setting is whether an adverse action occurs close in time to the employer learning of a 

protected activity, what we refer to in our cases as “temporal proximity.” Imwalle v. Reliance 

Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 550 (6th Cir. 2008); Kenney, 695 F.3d at 449. Generally speaking, 

the more time that elapses between the employer learning of an employee’s protected activity and 

the subsequent adverse employment action, the less temporal proximity between those acts, 

thereby requiring more evidence of retaliatory motive from the employee. See Kirilenko-Ison v. 

Bd. of Educ. of Danville Indep. Schs., 974 F.3d 652, 664–65 (6th Cir. 2020); Yazdian v. ConMed 

Endoscopic Techs., Inc., 793 F.3d 634, 650 (6th Cir. 2015).

1. Second Investigation and Temporary Reassignment. Jones asserts that, following his 

EEO filing, the Agency retaliated against him by “encouraging Lori Pittman to accuse him of 

sexual harassment a second time,” which sparked an investigation and Jones’s temporary 

relocation to the Nashville office. Jones’s evidence, however, fails to establish a causal connection 

between his protected conduct and the Agency’s ensuing actions. 

Following the 2005 investigation into Jones’s alleged misconduct, Jones and Pittman 

returned to the Murfreesboro office for approximately six months. Although no major incident 

occurred during those six months, the two both testified to experiencing disruptions at work 

following Pittman’s allegations against Jones. Jones then filed a slander lawsuit against Pittman. 

That suit prompted Pittman to file an informal EEO complaint alleging sexual harassment and a 

hostile work environment, in which she requested that she no longer be required to work with 

Jones. The Agency in turn notified Jones that because he had been named an “alleged harasser,” 

the Agency was initiating an investigation, with Jones being temporarily relocated to the Nashville 
No. 20-5821, Jones v. Vilsack

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office. On this record, Pittman’s EEO complaint—her first time contacting the EEO after her 

initial exposure allegation against Jones—was an intervening, legitimate reason for the Agency to 

investigate Jones and temporarily relocate him. That intervening cause dooms Jones’s theory of 

causation. See, e.g., Kenney, 965 F.3d at 450; Kuhn, 709 F.3d at 628; Wasek, 682 F.3d at 472.

Resisting this conclusion, Jones points to a separate federal lawsuit he filed against the 

Agency, one that had been pending for well over a year at the time the Agency temporarily 

relocated Jones. Jones v. Johanns, No. 3:04-0883, 2005 WL 8175147 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 15, 2005), 

aff’d, 264 F. App’x 463 (6th Cir. 2007). Jones believes that the Agency used Pittman as a means 

by which to retaliate against Jones for this federal lawsuit. But Jones provides no evidence to 

support his accusation. And Pittman denied that anyone from the Agency encouraged her to file a 

complaint against Jones. All told, lacking evidence to support a causal connection between his

protected activity and the alleged adverse employment action, Jones fails to establish a prima facie 

case of retaliation. 

2. Delay in Reasonable Accommodation. Jones next argues that the district court erred in 

dismissing his claim that the Agency retaliated against him by improperly delaying action on (and 

ultimately denying in part) his two requests for a reasonable accommodation. As to the first 

request, in October 2006, approximately seven months into his temporary reassignment to 

Nashville, Jones verbally sought from then-State Conservationist James Ford an accommodation 

to work from home two days a week due to his depression, paranoia, and anxiety. In the district 

court, Jones described the Agency’s delay in accommodating him as evidence of race 

discrimination (in violation of Title VII) as well as a failure to accommodate (in violation of the 

Rehabilitation Act). On appeal, however, Jones characterizes the Agency’s delayed action solely 

as a Title VII retaliation claim, asserting that the delay in honoring his request for accommodation 
No. 20-5821, Jones v. Vilsack

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was done in retaliation for his earlier EEO filing. Because Jones abandoned his race-based and 

failure-to-accommodate claims on appeal, and because he failed to preserve in the district court 

the theory he presses today, Jones forfeited any claim regarding a delay in honoring his request for 

an accommodation. See Swanigan v. FCA US LLC, 938 F.3d 779, 796 (6th Cir. 2019); United 

States v. Robinson, 390 F.3d 853, 886 (6th Cir. 2004).

In any event, Jones fails to make a prima facie showing of retaliation. Jones characterizes

his verbal request to Ford to work from home as a formal request to the Agency for a reasonable 

accommodation. Ford, however, viewed the request simply as part of ongoing discussions 

regarding Jones’s EEO complaint, and thus did not act on the request. In January 2007, following 

Ford’s retirement, Jones followed up with the Agency. The Agency soon discovered that Ford

arguably had misunderstood Jones’s request, and that his direct supervisor was unaware of the

request. The Agency arranged to meet with Jones that same day to discuss the matter. Jones 

provided the Agency with a letter from his physician supporting his request. After informing Jones 

that the letter did not provide enough information for the Agency to make a decision, the Agency

directed Jones to submit additional medical documentation by March 16, 2007. When Jones failed 

to do so, the Agency denied his request. Yet upon later receiving additional information from 

Jones documenting his disability, the Agency approved his request to work from home two days a 

week. 

Temporal proximity considerations foreclose Jones’s argument. Jones amended his EEO 

complaint in March 2006 yet did not make his accommodation request until some seven months 

later, and seven months after his temporary assignment to Nashville. That length of time between 

an alleged adverse action and protected activity is too long to support an inference of causation. 

See Kenney, 965 F.3d at 449 (concluding that “a roughly 75-day delay between her protected 
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activity and an adverse employment action is not, standing alone, a convincing case for proving 

causation”); Cooper v. City of North Olmsted, 795 F.2d 1265, 1272 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding a fourmonth period was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation). Jones offers no other 

causation theory. And although Jones seemingly followed up on his initial verbal request by 

sending an email to Ford, it was not until January 2007 that he contacted anyone else. Once the 

Agency learned of the miscommunication, it met with Jones that day, and later approved his

request. We thus see no causal connection between Jones’s EEO filing and any delay in approving 

his request. 

Jones appears to argue that the Agency also retaliated against him by denying his separate 

request for a windowed workspace and Bose noise-cancelling headphones. But Jones forfeited 

this argument, not once, but twice. In his amended complaint, Jones’s retaliation claim relating to 

his accommodations request made no mention of the denial of a window or headphones as 

evidence of retaliation, an approach which he repeated in response to the Agency’s summary 

judgment motion. See United States v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 574 F.3d 329, 332 (6th Cir. 2009);

Brown v. VHS of Mich., Inc., 545 F. App’x 368, 372 (6th Cir. 2013). Nor did Jones object to the 

magistrate judge’s conclusion that Jones forfeited these claims, a forfeiture in its own right. See

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985) (requiring litigants to file specific and timely objections 

to a magistrate’s report and recommendation to preserve the right to appeal a subsequent order of 

the district court adopting that report); Berkshire v. Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2019) 

(describing a failure to object to a magistrate’s report and recommendation as a forfeiture). To the 

extent Jones argues on appeal that the denial of his request for a window and noise-cancelling 

headphones constitute a failure to accommodate his disability, he forfeited that argument as well,

by both not raising those accommodation denials in response to the Agency’s summary judgment 
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motion, and by failing to object to the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Jones did not establish a 

prima facie case.

3. Permanent Reassignment. Jones also alleges that his permanent reassignment to the 

Nashville office was a retaliatory measure in response to his EEO conduct. By way of background, 

Jones’s slander suit prompted Pittman to initiate an EEO action, which prompted Jones to file an 

amended EEO complaint. Twenty months later, Jones was permanently reassigned to the 

Nashville office. As the magistrate judge opined, temporal proximity considerations mitigated a 

finding of a causal connection between the filing of Jones’s first EEO complaint and his permanent 

reassignment, given the gap between the two. See Kenney, 965 F.3d at 450. Without additional 

evidence supporting a retaliatory motive on the part of the Agency, Jones fails to establish a causal 

connection. And even had he done so, the report recommending (and the Agency’s subsequent 

decision) that Jones and Pittman not be in the same office was issued around this same time—an 

intervening cause (and a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason) justifying the Agency’s decision to

permanently reassign Jones. See id. 

II.

Finally, Jones argues that the district court erred in concluding that he failed to demonstrate 

pretext to support his retaliation claim centered on the Agency’s decision to reassign him to a 

different Soil Conservationist position. The district court held that Jones had established a prima 

facie case of retaliation, yet had not established that the decision to reassign him was pretextual.

Roughly a year into Jones’s permanent reassignment to the Nashville office, the Agency 

moved Jones from the position of Soil Conservationist on the Geographical Information System 

staff to the position of Soil Conservationist on the Ecological Sciences staff. Jones claims that this 

change was made in retaliation for him filing a third EEO complaint to address his supervisor’s 
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alleged failure to provide reasonable accommodations. As evidenced by the Notification of 

Personnel Action, however, this “lateral reassignment” of position titles did not affect Jones’s pay 

plan, occupation code, grade, step, salary, or pay basis. In fact, the change largely appears to have 

been in name only: Jones remained a Soil Conservationist, and was simply reassigned from that 

position within the Geographical Information System staff to the same position within the 

Ecological Sciences and Planning staff. Because we agree with the district court that Jones failed 

to meet his burden to establish pretext, we need not consider whether this reassignment constituted

a materially adverse employment action sufficient to support a prima facie claim, which, in and of 

itself, is debatable. 

The Agency’s proffered legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for Jones’s change in position 

title was that the Tennessee branch of the Agency underwent a reorganization resulting in a 

vacancy in a Soil Conservationist position in Nashville. The Agency further explained that since 

Jones had already transferred to the Nashville office and had the requisite expertise to fill the 

position, the Agency was best served by having Jones fill this vacancy (and to have Pittman 

seemingly fill Jones’s prior Soil Conservationist position in Murfreesboro). The Agency also 

offered evidence of its practice of reassigning other employees to suit the Agency’s needs. 

Jones has not presented a genuine dispute of material fact that these reasons are pretextual. 

Rather, Jones contends that Pittman’s motive in making the 2005 allegation against Jones was that 

she wanted his job (which she seemingly got) and that the eventual reassignment of job duties was 

the culmination of a three-year conspiracy to achieve that end. And while Jones correctly notes 

that the district court conflated the Agency’s proffered reasons for Jones’s permanent relocation

to the Nashville office with its reasons for Jones’s reassignment of position, Jones does not point 

to any evidence that the asserted reasons for his position reassignment were untrue, were 
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insufficient to motivate the reassignment, or did not actually motivate the reassignment. See Tingle 

v. Arbors at Hilliard, 692 F.3d 523, 530 (6th Cir. 2012). The district court, therefore, properly 

dismissed this claim.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.