14-2637-cv 

Owens v. Textron Fin. Corp. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or 

after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and 

this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this Court, a 

party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “summary 

order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by 

counsel. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 

Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 14th 

day of January, two thousand fifteen. 

PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

 CHESTER J. STRAUB, 

 Circuit Judges, 

 LORNA G. SCHOFIELD,

*

 District Judge. 

 

FRANK OWENS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. No. 14-2637-cv 

TEXTRON FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

 

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: MORTON I. BAUM, Monticello, NY. 

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: MITCHELL A. KARLAN (Gabriel Gillett, on the 

brief), Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, New 

York, NY. 

 * The Honorable Lorna G. Schofield, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 

York, sitting by designation. 
2 

 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for Southern District of New 

York (Vincent L. Briccetti, Judge). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED. 

Plaintiff Frank Owens appeals from the District Court’s July 15, 2014 judgment dismissing 

his amended complaint concerning the loss of his investment in Gaffken & Barriger Fund, LLC, a 

real-estate investment fund. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the 

procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 

We review de novo a grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6). Carpenters Pension Trust Fund of St. Louis v. Barclays PLC, 750 F.3d 227, 232 (2d Cir. 2014). “A 

pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to 

dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 

Upon de novo review of the record and relevant law, we conclude that the District Court 

properly dismissed plaintiff’s amended complaint, substantially for the reasons stated in its thorough 

and well-reasoned July 14, 2014 decision—namely, plaintiff has failed to explicitly identify any legal 

claims aside from a vague reference to “New York public policy.” To the extent plaintiff’s claim is 

premised on fraud, plaintiff has failed to plead such a claim with particularity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

9(b). 

We have considered all of the arguments raised by plaintiff on appeal and find them to be 

without merit. For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the District Court’s July 15, 2014 

judgment. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk