1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
RGI EVENTS & PUBLIC RELATIONS, LLC, Plaintiff,

v. AL QURM MANAGEMENT CONSULTANCY, et al. , Defendants. Civil Action No. 18-1828 (BAH) Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER This removed action raises D.C . contract and tort law claims r elated to event planning services that the plaintiff, RGI Events & Public Relations, LLC (“RGI”), provided to defendant Al Qurm Management Consultancy (“AQC”), a corporation, and two of AQC’s employees, Bassma El-Afghani and Maria Chin (the “Individual Defendants”). See Compl., ECF No. 1-1; Defs.’ Resp. to Order to Show Cau se (“Defs.’ Resp. to Order”) ¶2, ECF No. 27. As discussed below, this Court lacks jurisd iction to review the merits of th ose claims. Accordingly, this action shall be remanded to the Superior Court of the District of Colu mbia (“D.C. Superior Court”).
I. BACKGROUND RGI initially filed thi s action in D.C. Superior Court against three defendants—AQC, a corporation, and two AQC employ ees, Bassma El-Afghani and MariaChin—asserting D.C. law claims for breach of contract, m isappropriation of trade secret s, and tortious interference with business relations. See Compl.; Defs.’ Resp. to Order ¶ 2. The defendants removed the case to this Court, see Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1, w hich removal RGI did not contes t. Subsequently, defendant AQC file d counterclaims against RGI, as well as a third-party complaint against Rachael Glaws , the sole member of RGI, and tw o others. See AQC’s Answer,2 Third-Party Compl., and Countercl s., ECF No. 6; AQC’s Suppl. Co untercls. with Exs., ECF No. 9. The Individual Defendants als o filed a third-party complain t against Ms. Glaws. See Individual Defs.’ Third-Part y Compl., ECF No. 7. The parties t hen filed several dispositive motions against each other. Sp ecifically, pending before the C ourt are (1) the Individual Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dis miss RGI’s Complaint, ECF No. 8; (2) RGI’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, E CF No. 12; and (3) RGI and Rachael Glaws’s Joint Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Counterclai ms and Third Party Complaints, o r a Motion for Summary Judgment in the Alternative, ECF No. 14. The Court, in reviewing the pa rties’ filings, questioned its su bject matter jurisdiction sua sponte and ordered the defendants, w hich bear the burden of pleading jurisdiction in this removed action, to show cause why the Court has diversity juris diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
See Min. Order (Feb. 9, 2019). The defendants submitted a sparse r esponse totaling three paragraphs. See Defs.’ Resp. to Order. RGI did not file any opposition. For t he reasons explained below, upon considerationof the defendants’ response and the entire record, the Court concludes jurisdiction is lacki ng. Thus, this action is remand ed to D.C. Superior Court, and the pending motions are denied as moot.
II. LEGAL STANDARD “[A]ny civil action brought in a S tate court of which the distr ict courts of the United States have original juris diction, may be removed by . . . the defendants, to the di strict court of the United States for the distri ct and division embracing the p lace where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “When it appear s that a district court la cks subject matter jurisdiction over a case that has been removed from a state court, the district c ourt must remand the case . . . , and the court’s order remanding the c ase to the state court whence it came ‘is not reviewable on3 appeal or otherwise.’” Republic of Venezuela v. Philip Morris Inc. , 287 F.3d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and quoting id. § 1447(d)). Due to the statutory prohibition of appellate review of remanded cases , the legal standard for remo val has largely been developed by the district courts. The defendants, as the parties seeking the exerc ise of federal court jurisdiction over this removed case, “bear[] the burden of pleading” the basis for jur isdiction. Novak v. Capital Mgmt. & Dev. Corp. , 452 F.3d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (inte rnal quotation marks and citation omitted); Apton v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc. , 233 F. Supp. 3d 4, 11 (D.D.C. 2017). If the defendants are unable to make this showing, a “court must reman d the case.” Johnson–Brown v.
2200 M Street LLC , 257 F. Supp. 2d 175, 177 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 14 47(c)). “In light of the significant fe deralism concerns involved, this court ‘strictly construes the scope of its removal jurisdiction.’” Moses v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc. , No. 11-cv-00822 (BJR), 2012 WL 113375, at *2 (D.D. C. 2012) (quoting Breakman v. AOL LLC , 545 F. Supp. 2d 96, 100 (D.D.C. 2008)); accord Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Wilson , No. 18-cv-2381 (RC), 2019 WL 340717, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 28, 2019). Even “[w]here the need t o remand is not self-evident, the court must resolve any ambiguities concerning the propriety of removal in favor of remand.” Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Hormel Foods Corp. , 249 F. Supp. 3d 53, 56 (D.D.C. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Johnson–Brown , 257 F. Supp. 2d at 177).
III. DISCUSSION The defendants contend that this action is properly removed, ba sed on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Notice of Removal ¶ 3. 1 Section 1332 provides that federal

1 The defendants also initially invoked federal question jurisd iction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, claiming that RGI’s D.C. law claims “arise under” the “United Nations Convention onthe Law Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of Goods” (“U.N. Convention”), a “treaty of the United States.” Notice of Removal ¶ 3. The defendants later abandoned this theory, specifying only diversi ty as the “basis for this C ourt’s jurisdiction.” Joint4 courts have “original jurisdic tion of all civil actions where t he matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and is between . . . citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state.” Id. § 1332(a)(2). Thus, subjec t matter jurisdiction over any action raised in divers ity must satisfy a two-prong in quiry: the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000, and the litigants must be diverse from one another. See id. The defendants have not sufficientl y pleaded either requirement, ne ither of which is apparent on the face of the Complaint.
A. Amount in Controversy Diversity jurisdiction requires that the “t he matter in controv ersy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000.” Id. § 1332(a). RGI’s Complaint incl udes three counts for damages. Compl. ¶¶ 28–52. Count I seeks $38,655.33 for a br each of contract cl aim against AQC only. Id. ¶¶ 28– 32. Counts II and III—for misappropr iation of trade secrets an d tortious interference with business relations, respectively—i nclude claims against all thr ee defendants. Id. ¶¶ 33–52. For each of these latter two counts , damages are “in excess of $50, 000.” Id. ¶¶ 43, 52. Thus, none of RGI’s claims exceed $75,000. Undaunted, the defendants argue f or two amount-in-controversy c alculations, based on aggregation of RGI’s claims , to satisfy the $75,000 threshold. In the defendants’ view, aggregated damages for (1) RG I’s claims against AQC, in Counts I through III, equal “at least $138,655.33,” Notice of Removal ¶ 3; a nd (2) the claims against all three defendants, in Counts II and III, exceed $100,000, Defs.’ Resp. to Order ¶ 3. Each c alculation is reviewed in turn.

Report of Rule LCvR 16.3(c) Pla nning Meeting at 4, ECF No. 21. RGI’s D.C. law claims for breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, and tortious interference do not remotely raise a federal question. See Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson , 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) (“Sin ce a defendant may remove a cas e only if the claim could have been brought in federal court . . . the question for removal jurisdiction must also be determined by reference to the ‘well-pleaded complaint.’”).5 First, the defendants initially argued, in a single sentence an d without legal authority, that the amount-in-controversy require ment is met because “the Plain tiff has alleged damages in the amount of at least $138,655.33.” No tice of Removal ¶ 3. Altho ugh the defendants’ cursory explanation fails to indicate w hich aggregation rule justifies using this amount, the defendants appear to have aggregated all of R GI’s claims against AQC in Co unts I through III. A plaintiff’s claims “against a single defendant” may be aggreg ated to satisfy the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold. Gordon v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. , 467 F.2d 717, 725 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Snyder v. Harris , 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969)); accord Organic Consumers Ass’n v. R.C. Bigelow, Inc. , 314 F. Supp. 3d 344, 350 (D.D.C. 2018). Aggregating RGI’s claims against AQC, however, does not result in an amount in controversy above $75,000. C ount I seeks $38,655.33 from AQ C, Compl. ¶ 32, and the remaining two Counts, which inclu de claims agains t all three de fendants, do not specify a separate amount in controversy f or the claims against AQC, see id. ¶¶ 33–52. Therefore, the aggregated amount in controversy f or RGI’s claims against AQC i s unknown. See McIntosh v. Gilley , 753 F. Supp. 2d 46, 62 (D.D.C. 2010) (“[ J]urisdiction under s ection 1332(a) can only be sustained against those defendant s whose respective controversi es individually involve matters exceeding the jurisdictional amount.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Middle Tenn. News Co. v. Charnel of Cincinnati, Inc. , 250 F.3d 1077, 1081 (7th Cir. 2001) (denying aggregation for a plaint iff’s multiple claims against a defendant because the plaintiff had not “alleged a separate amount in controversy against” the defendant). Second, after the Court questione d the defendants’ initial aggr egation theory and ordered the defendants to clarify why a ggregation is permissible, see Min. Order (Feb. 9, 2019) ¶ 3, the defendants submitted a bare, one-paragraph explanation, Defs.’ Resp. to Order ¶ 3. This time,6 the defendants claimed that the amount-in-controversy requireme nt may be satisfied by aggregating Counts II and III, for more than $50,000 each, because these counts include misappropriation and tortious inter ference claims against all three defendants. Id. This aggregation theory suffers a fatal flaw, however. “Claims against multiple defendants can be aggregated only w hen the defendants are joint ly liable to the plaintiff.” GenopsGroup LLC v. Pub. House Invs. LLC , 67 F. Supp. 3d 338, 342 (D.D.C. 2014) (collecting cases); accord Theus v. Ally Fin., Inc. , 98 F. Supp. 3d 41, 46 (D.D.C. 2015); McIntosh , 753 F. Supp. 2d at 62; Rogers v. Nathan , 721 F. Supp. 1393, 1394 (D.D.C. 1989). Removing defendants may demonstrate jo int liability by, for example, poi nting out that the plaintiff “seek[s] to hold defendants jointlyliable,” or providing “indi cia of corporate relationship” between the defendants to show j oint liability will attach. GenopsGroup LLC , 67 F. Supp. 3d at
342. Here, the defendants have not show n that aggregation of the cla ims in Counts II and III, for the defendants to meet the $75,000 threshold, is appropriat e under a joint liability rationale. Indeed, the defendants concede that RGI’s “Complaint makes no e xplicit reference to ‘joint and several liability,’” Defs.’ Resp. to Order ¶ 3, and RGI has bee n silent about whether it seeks to hold the defendants jointly liable . Moreover, aside from stati ng that the Indivi dual Defendants are “employees of AQC,” id. ¶ 2, the defendants fail to prov ide any information about the Individual Defendants’ roles with in AQC’s corporate structure t o demonstrate that the Individual Defendants may be held liable for acts by AQC, or for each othe r’s acts. See Middle Tenn. News
Co. , 250 F.3d at 1081 (finding aggregati on inappropriate when ther e was “no evidence that justifies piercing the corpor ate veil and holding [an individua l defendant] liable for corporate debts”); N. Am. Fin. Grp., LLC v. Suburban Air Sys., Inc. , No. 96 CIV. 2330 (JSM), 1996 WL7 345790, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 1996) (refusing to aggregate c laims on the basis that the individual defendants were “ow ners and employees of” a defendan t corporation). Similarly, the defendants leave unanswered wheth er AQC may be held liable for the Individual Defendants’

acts. See N. Am. Fin. Grp., LLC , 1996 WL 345790, at *1 (concl uding aggregation was impermissible when “no basis” w as provided for holding a defend ant corporation “vicariously liable for” individual defendant s’ actions). Thus, the “defend ants have not suggested—let alone demonstrated—that they are joint ly liable for” the claims in Co unts II and III. GenopsGroup
LLC , 67 F. Supp. 3d at 342. In a last gasp argument, the de fendants contend that Counts II and III “refer to the damages caused by and claimed coll ectively against ‘the Defenda nts,’” implicitly indicating that RGI seeks to hold all three defe ndants jointly liable. Defs.’ Resp. to Order ¶ 3. The defendants offer no legal support for this position. See id. Indeed, contrary to the defendants’ position, aggregation has been found to be i nappropriate when the sole ba sis for purported jo int liability is the fact that a single count includes claims against multiple d efendants. See Shirk v. Gonzales , No. 17-CV-1129 MCA/KK, 2018 WL 2411601, at *3 (D.N.M. May 29, 2 018) (explaining that even though “Count II is brought a gainst both Defendants,” aggr egation would be inappropriate because “neither party addresse[d ] whether Defendants would be jointly liable und er Count II”). Furthermore, contrary to the de fendants’ suggestion that the al legations in Counts II and III are “collectively” against t he defendants, Defs.’ Resp. to Order ¶ 3, the Complaint identifies “separate and distinct” torts by each of the Individual Defenda nts, suggesting joint liability may not be contemplated, GenopsGroup LLC , 67 F. Supp. 3d at 342. For example, RGI’s misappropriation and tortious inter ference claims are rooted inallegations that Individual Defendant El-Afghani wrongfully c alled RGI’s “print media vendo r” and “transportation8 vendor” to obtain “sensitive and c onfidential information,” Com pl. ¶¶ 21–24, while Individual Defendant Chin separately emaile d RGI’s “hotel management” cont act to obtain other “sensitive, confidential financial information,” id. ¶ 26. The Complaint does not allege that these two defendants acted together or w ere directed by AQC to engage in those allegedly wrongful acts. Additionally, the misappropriati on and tortious i nterference cl aims stem from confidentiality obligations in RGI’s event-planni ng services contr act with AQC, see id. ¶¶ 7, 34, 47, and the defendants admit that RGI has notalleged the Individual Defend ants are “parties to any contract” with RGI, Defs.’ Resp. to Order at 3 n.1; see also GenopsGroup LLC , 67 F. Supp. 3d at 342 (concluding a plaintiff did not“seek to hold defendants jointl y liable” because the “plaintiff’s claims arise out of separate contracts”). Although the Complaint includes a llegations that the “Defendant s” wrongfully contacted RGI’s vendors to obtain confidential information, see, e.g. , Compl. ¶¶ 18, 27, suggesting collective action, other allegati ons appear to separate liabili ty among the defendants, see, e.g. , Compl. at 3–4 (claiming liability due to the “individual co-def endants’ intentiona l interference”); id. ¶ 23 (alleging a tort committed by I ndividual Defendant El-Afg hani alone); id. ¶ 26 (pleading tort committed by AQC, “by and thro ugh” Individual Defendant Ch in, without reference to Individual Defendant El-Afgha ni). Aggregation in the face of s uch ambiguity is inappropriate. See Devito v. Wood , No. 2:09-CV-423-FtM-36DNF , 2011 WL 13175834, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2011) (denying request for aggreg ation because “[i]n some pa ragraphs,” the plaintiff appeared to be asserting claims against defendants jointly, and “[i]n ot her paragraphs,” the plaintiff appeared to be suing an indivi dual defendant “as an individual” ); see also Johnson–Brown , 257 F. Supp. 2d at 177 (“Where the need t o remand is not self-evide nt, the court must resolve any ambiguities concerning the propriety of removal in favor of rem and.”).9 The defendants fail to show th at aggregation of Counts II and I II is proper. Thus, the amount-in-controversy requireme nt has not been satisfied, and d iversity jurisdict ion is lacking.
B. Diversity of Citizenship Second, even if the amount-in-c ontroversy requirement had been satisfied, jurisdiction under § 1332 requires diversity of citizenship between the part ies, such as when the action is between “citizens of a State and c itizens or subjects of a fore ign state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). The defendants allege diversity because RGI, a limited liabilit y company, is “domiciled in Washington, D.C.,” and the three defendants are all citizens of the United Arab Emirates. See Notice of Removal ¶ 3; Defs.’ Resp. to Order ¶¶ 1–2. In releva nt part, the defendants posit that RGI is “domiciled in” Washington, D.C. since the Complaint list s RGI’s business address in Washington, D.C., and RGI filed a “ ‘domestic entity’ business l icense filing” with the D.C. government. Defs.’ Resp. to Order ¶ 1. The defendants’ rationale ignores the Court’s order, which aske d the defendants to provide RGI’s citizenship unde r § 1332, and explained that an L LC’s citizenship is determined by the citizenship of its members. See Min. Order (Feb. 9, 2019) ¶ 1 (citing Carden v. Arkoma
Assocs. , 494 U.S. 185, 195–96 (1990), and Hoch v. Eli Lilly & Co. , 736 F. Supp. 2d 219, 220–21 (D.D.C. 2010)). Thus, when an LLC ’s sole member is an individu al, the LLC’s citizenship is determined by that individual’s domicile. See Herbin v. Seau , 317 F. Supp. 3d 568, 572 (D.D.C. 2018) (“For purposes of assessi ng diversity jurisdiction, an in dividual is a citizen of the state in which she is domiciled.” (citing Prakash v. Am. Univ. , 727 F.2d 1174, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1984))). Domicile, in turn, requires “‘phys ical presence in a state’ as well as the ‘intent to remain there for an unspecified or indef inite period of time.’” Id. (quoting Prakash , 727 F.2d at 1180). Here, the defendants merely allege that RGI’s sole member, Rach ael Glaws, “resides in Virginia.” Defs.’ Resp. to Order ¶ 1. This “residency allegat ion,” however, “raises a threshold10 problem” because “an allegation of residence alone is insufficient to establish the citizenship necessary for diversity jurisdiction.” Novak , 452 F.3d at 906 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The defendants neither provide Ms. Glaws’s domicile, nor suggest whether she inte nds to remain in Virginia. See Defs.’ Resp. to Order ¶ 1. The Court is unable to determine RGI’s citizensh ip due to the d efendants’ failure to provide Ms. Glaws’s domicile, eve n after the Court specificallyasked for “the state in which each member” of RGI “is domiciled.” See Min. Order ¶ 1 (Feb. 9, 2019). The defendants’ pleading defect is “not a mere technicality” because “[c]itizen ship is an essential element of federal diversit y jurisdiction,” Novak , 452 F.3d at 906, and the “party s eeking the exercise of diversity jurisdiction bears th e burden of plead ing the citizen ship of each and every party to the action,” id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, this action is remanded to D.C. Superior Court, and the three pending motions are denie d as moot. See Simon v. Mitchell , 199 F. Supp. 3d 244, 246 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Because a . . . district court, acting sua sponte , may raise the court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a court may also issue a remand order on its own initiative.”).
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Upon consideration of the memor anda, exhibits, and declarations submitted in support of, and opposition to, the pending moti ons, and the entire record h erein, for the reasons set forth in in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall REMAND this action to D.C. S uperior Court; and it is further
ORDERED that the Individual Defendants’ JointMotion to Dismiss RGI’s Compla int, ECF No. 8; RGI’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. 12; and RGI and Rachael Glaws’s11 Joint Motion to Dismiss Defendant s’ Counterclaims and Third Par ty Complaints, or a Motion for Summary Judgment in the A lternative, ECF No. 14, are DENIED as moot; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is di rected to close this case.
SO ORDERED

. Date: February 26, 2019

__________________________ BERYL A. HOWELL Chief Judge