### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON SE PT E MB E R 2 4, 200 4 S es sio n SHE LI A L. GODW IN v . FRED SANDERS Direc t Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Madison Coun ty

No. 14-1362 Rober t W. Ne well, Ju dge

No. W2003-02239-C OA-R3-JV - F iled Janu ary 10, 2005

This case arises out of a petition to re open pate rnity proce eding s filed by

Appellant. When Appellee re fu se d to su bmi t to a

DN A t e st, Ap pe llant fi led a pe tit ionto f

indAp pe lle e in c on te mpt of c ou rt
. Th e tria l c ou rt

re fu se d to fi ndAp pe lle e in c on te mpt a ndde te rm ine d th a t A pp e lle e ne e d n ot s ub mit to a DNA te st. Appellant filed her notice of a

ppeal and seeks r ev i ew b y t h i s C o u rt . For the fo llo wi ng re a so ns , w e a ff irm th e tria l c ou rt
. Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Juvenile Court Affi rm ed A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which D AVI D R.F ARMER , J ., and H O LLY M. K I RBY , J ., joined. Shelia L . Godwin, Appellant, pro s e Fr ed Sander s, Appellee , (no brief filed; no repr esentation)

OP IN ION F acts and P roce dural Hi story On J anuary 30, 1987, Fr ed S ander s (“Sande rs” or “Appe llee”) was determined by court orde r to b e thebio log ic al fat her of P.G . ( “ P.G .” or

“ Chi ld” ), bo rnMay

2, 19 86 . Sh e lia

Go dw in (“G odwin,” “A ppellant,” or collectively

with Sanders, the “ parties” ) is P.G.’s mother, who filed the petition to establish S ander s’ paternity of P.G. on Aug ust 21, 1986. After the parties took a blood te st, it w a s d e te rm ine d th a t “ [t]he re lativ e c hanc e of pate rn ity , a ssu mi ng a 50 % prior c hanc e , is 99.06%.” Subseque ntly , the tri al court entere d an orde r establishing Sanders a s P.G.’s biologica l fathe r and se tting child support at $30.00 pe r we ek. Although the rec ord does not establish an exact date , at some point Godwin beg an denying that Sanders wa s P.G.’s biological father and instead insisted t hat an attorney , Nathan PrideP ri d e i s no t a pa rt y t o t hi s act i o n. 1

“ D N A” i s a n a cr on y m for de ox y r i bon u cl ei c ac i d. 2

A p p are ntl y, S an d ers c ha ng ed his p o si t i o n a nd wit hd rew his co nse nt t o sub je ct him self t o a D N A t est 3 b e c a u se p a te rn ity h a d a lre a d y b e e n e sta b lishe d b y a b lo o d tes t. -2- (“ P ri d e” ), wa s P

. G. ’s b i o l o gi ca l fa th er . Go d wi n fi l ed a pe t i t i o n t o re o p en th e p at er n i t y p ro ce ed i n gs 1 and re quested that t h e co u rt o rder Sanders to take a DNA test to establish he was not P.G.’s 2 biological father . At a hea rin g o n May

23, 2003, the trial court ordere d the parties to submitto a DNA test to establish whe ther Sande rs was P.G.’s biological fathe r. Another hearing was he ld on J uly 23, 2003, and the tria l court entere d an orde r denying G odwin’s petition for a D NA test and found, based on prior court order s, that Sanders was the biological f ather of P.G. Godwin filed a

3 motion for a new trial which wa s denied by the trial court. Subsequently , Godwin filed a petition t o h o l dS an d er s i n co n t em p to f c o u rtfo r v i o l at i n g t h e c o u rt ’s o rd er fr o mt h e M ay2 3 , 2 0 0 3 , h eari n g. On Octobe r 1, 2003, the trial co u rt d en i ed Godwin’ s petition to hol d Sanders in conte mpt for ref using the DNA test, and Godwin appe aled to this Court presenting the follo wi n g i s sues, as we perc eive them, f

or our r eview: I

. Whe the r the tria l c ou rt e rr e d w he n it

de nie d G od wi n’ s p e tit ionto c omp e l Sand e rs to take a DNA test to establish whe ther he is P.G.’s biologica l father ; I I

. Whe the r the tria l c ou rt e rr e d when it den ied G od wi n’ s p e tit ionto h oldSa nd e rs in c on te mpt of c ou rt fo r r e fu sin g to s ub mit

to a DN A t e st; I I I

. Whether t he trial court erre d when it found t hat S ander s was P.G.’s biolog ical father a nd that Sand e rs wa s the pe rs onwh o to ok theblo odte st o ri g inally

e sta bli sh ing his p a t e r n i t y; I V. Whe the r S a nd e rs wa s a c re dib le wi tne ss; V. Whether Godwin is entitled to relief pursuant to the Americ ans with Disabilities Act of 1973 as amended in 1990; and VI

. Whe the r P ri de a ndc ou ns e l f or Sa nd e rs , Lind a

Tay lor , h a d a

c on fl ic t of

int e re st. F or thefo llo wi ng re a so ns , w e a ff irm th e tria l c ou rt
. Stand ard of Review Whe n a tria l c ou rt sit s wi tho ut a jury in a c ivi l a c tio n, were vie w i ts f ind ing s o f f

a c t de novo aff ording its fi n dings a

presumption of cor

rec tness unless the evidenc e pre ponderates otherwise

. Ten n. R. A pp . P. 13 (d ); State ex re l. Duck v . W illiams , N o . 0 2 A 0 1

- 9 6 0 4

- J V

- 0 0 0 8 4 , 1 9 9 7 WL 675459, at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 1997) . “No pr esumption of corr ectne ss attache s to the trial court’s c on cl u s i o n s o f l aw. W illiams , 1 9 9 7 W L

6 7 5 4 5 9 , at* 2 (c i t i n g Carvell v. Bottoms , 900 S.W .2d 23, 26 (Tenn. 1995) ). We r e vie w a

tria l c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio n o f c on te mpt a nd the c ou rt ’s ma nn e r of de a lin g wi th c o n te mp t u n d e r a n ab u s e o f d is c r e ti o n s tan d ar d o f r e v ie w. S l a u g h t er v. Slaughter , No. E2003--3-

01146-COA-R3-CV, 2004 Te nn. App. LEXI S 106, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. F eb. 23, 2004) ( citing Robinson v. Air Draulics Eng’g Co. , 3 77 S.W. 2d90 8 ( Te nn . 1 96 4) ); see also State ex rel. Phillips v. Knox , No. E2000-02988- COA-R3-JV, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXI S 867, at *11- 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. No v . 2 9 , 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Robinson , 377 S.W. 2da t 91 2; Qu ali ty Fi rst Sta ffi ng Se rv . v . Ch as e -C

av e tt Serv., I nc. , No. 02A01-9807- CH-00205, 1999 WL 281312, at * 3 (T en n . Ct. App. May 7, 1999)). We w ill no t f

inda n a bu se of a tria l c ou rt ’s dis c re tio n u nle ss s uc h c ou rt ’s de c isi onwa s a g a ins t lo g ic or re ason i n g an d cause d an injustice or injury to the complaining party
. Knox , 2001 Tenn. App. LE XIS 8 6 7 , at* 1 2 (c i t i n g Marcus v. Marc us , 9 9 3 S

. W

. 2 d5 9 6 , 6 0 1 (T en n . 1 9 9 9 ) ( q u o t i n g Ba lla rd v. He rzke , 924 S.W .2d 652, 661 (Tenn. 1996) )). The de cision of the trial c ourt on the c re d i b i l i t yof witnesses is entitled to g reat weig ht in this court. Any conflict in testimony

requiring a d et ermination of the c re dib ili ty

of a wi tne ss o r w itn e sse s is fo r the tria l c ou rt a nd bin din g ontheapp e llate c ou rt un le ss f ro m othe r r e a l e vid e nc e theapp e llate c ou rt is c omp e lle d to c on c lud e to t h e c o n tr a ry. Hudson v. Capps , 6 5 1 S

. W

. 2 d2 4 3 , 2 4 6 (T en n . C t
. Ap p . 1 9 8 3 ) ( ci t i n g State ex re l. Balsinger v. Town of M

ad iso nv ill e , 435 S.W .2d 803, 807 (Tenn. 1968) ). DNA Test

for Pat ernity Appellant beg ins by

arg uing that the trial court err ed when it denied her petition to subj ect Sanders to a D NA test to determine if he wa s P.G.’s biological father. The trial c ourt determined that, und er t h e d o ct rine of re s ju dic ata , Appellant wa s barr ed fr om relitigating the issue of P.G.’s paternity

. The Tenne ssee Supreme Court has addre ssed the re quirements of re s ju dic ata a s f oll ow s: Th e te rm “ re s ju dic ata ” is define d as a “ rule that a final judgme nt r ender ed by a court of compe tent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rig hts of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute ba r t o a subsequent ac tion inv olv ing thesame c laim, de ma ndor c aus e of a c tio n . . . . To be a

pp lic able , it re qu ir e s ide nti ty of c aus e of a c tio n, or pe rs ona ndpa

rtie s to a c tio n, a ndof

qu a lity in persons for or ag ainst whom claim is made.” B lack' s L aw Dic tionary 1172 (5th ed. 1979) (c itations omi tted). We have rec entl ydiscussed the doc trine and its re lated c ou nte rp art , c oll a te ral e sto pp e l, a s f oll ow s: The doc trine of re s ju dic ata ba rs a se c on d s uit

bet ween the s a me pa rtie s o r the ir

privi e s o n th e same c aus e of a c tio n w ithre sp e c t to a ll iss ue s w hic h w e reor

c ou ld h a ve be e n li tig a te d inthefo rme r s uit

. Col late ral e sto pp e l op e rate s to ba r a se c ond s uit

be tw e e n th e same parties and their privies on a differ ent cause of action only as to issues wh ic h w e rea c tually

lit ig a te d andde te rm ine d inthefo rm e r s uit

.O ur decis i o n on t hi s i ss ue p ret erm its issu e s three and fo ur abo ve. T he f i nd i ng t hat Sand ers i s t he 4 b i o l o gica l f athe r o f

P .G

. i s a f

i nd i ng m ad e b y t he t rial co urt i n the J an ua ry 19 8 7 o rd er, an d , t he refo re, t he i ssue i s r es ju d ic a ta
. A d d i t i o nal l y , i m p l i ci t i n t he January 1 9 8 7 ord er i s t he f i nd i ng t hat Sand ers was the indi vi d ual t hat t o o k t he bl ood t es t t o e s t abl i s h h i s pat er n i t y , an d, t h er ef or e, t h i s i s s u e i s a l s o re s ju d ic a ta
. Fi nal l y , becau s e t he t r i al cour t r el i ed u pon t h e Ja n u ar y 198 7 o rder est abl i s h i n g Sa n der s ’ pa t er n i t y , t h e i s s u e of Sa n der s ’ c r edi bi l i t y i s a l s o pr et er mi t t ed. Fur t her , we not e t hat , ev en i f su ch i s s ue wer e n ot pre t er mi t t ed, t her e i s not hi ng i n t he r ecor d t o s ug ges t t hat Sander s was no t credibl e at any po i nt i n t he l i t i gat i o n. -4- Goek e v . W

o o ds , 7 77 S.W. 2d34 7, 34 9 ( Te nn . 1 98 9) (q uo tin g fr om Massengill v. Sc ott , 738 S.W .2d 629, 631 (Tenn. 1987) ). Re s ju dic ata a ndc oll a te ral e sto pp e l app ly only i f t h e prior judg ment conclude s the rig hts of the parties on the merits. A. L. Kor nm an Co. v . Me tro

po lit an Go v 't of

Nas hv ill e & Da v ids on Cou nty , 216 Tenn. 205, 391 S.W .2d 63 3 , 6 3 6 (Tenn. 1965). One de fending on the basis of re s ju dic ata or collater al estoppel must de monstrate that 1) the judgme nt in the prior ca se wa s final and conc luded the rig hts of the party ag ainst whom the defe nse is asserted, and 2) bo th c a se s in vo lvethesa me pa rtie s, thesame c aus e of

a c tio n, or

ide nti c a l is su e s. Scales v. Scale s , 564 S.W .2d 667, 670 (Tenn. A pp. 1977), cert. de nied , (Tenn. 1978)

. Ri c ha rd so n v . Te nn . B d. of D e nti str y , 9 13 S.W. 2d44 6, 45 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 5) ; se e als o S tate ex re l. Ru sse ll v . W

e st , 115 S.W .3d 886, 890 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). We find no err or in the t rial court’s decision to deny Appellant’s pe tition t o subject Appe llee to a DNA test. I n this c ase, the same pa rties from the f

irst suit are involved in Appellant’ s second suit. The issue of paternity was litigated and determined on the merits. The judg ment from January 1987 was final and concluded the rig hts of t he parties on the i ssue of P.G.’s paternity . We further note that Ap pellant proc eede d to file petitions to enforceAppellee ’s child support obligation pursuant to the orde r est ab l i s h i n g Appellee ’s paternity . Not only does this prior orde r pre clude Appellee from relitig ating this issue, but it also prec ludes Appellant fr om bring ing another pe tition on the sa me iss ue . Th is issu e is re s ju dic ata
. Th e re fo re , we a ff irm the de c isi on of

thetria l c ou rt
. 4
P e ti ti on fo rCo nt e m pt Next, Appellant a

rg ues that the trial court erre d when it denied he r petition to hold Appellee in contempt for r efusing to submitto a DNA test. As noted above, we revie w the manne r in which a trial c ourt handles issues of c ontempt under an abuse of discretion standa rd of r eview. Slaughter , 2004 Tenn. App. L

EXI S 1 06, at *8 (c iting Robinson v. Air Draulics Eng’g Co. , 377 S.W .2d 908 (T e nn . 1 96 4) ); see also Knox , 2 0 0 1 T en n . Ap p . LE XIS 8 6 7 , at* 1 1 -1 2 (c i t i n g Robinson , 377 S.W .2d at 912; Quality First Staffing Se rv. v. Chase-Cavett Serv., I nc. , No. 02A01-9807- CH-00205, 1999 WL 281312, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. May 7, 1999)). I nitially , we note that, in its order direc ting the parties to submit to a DNA te st, the trial court state s th a t “ [c]o nte mpt

c ha rg e s may be br ou g ht a g a ins t a ny on e vi ol a tin g thi s O rd e r. ” (e mph a sis a dd e d) . Furthe r, g ive n th a t th e tria l c ou rt wa s c or re c t w hen it det ermine d th a t it wa s impr op e r t o relitig ate the issue of whether Appellee was P.G.’s biological father , we c annot say that the trial courtFu r t h er , w e n ot e t h at Appel l an t in her br i ef doe s n ot poi n t t o a n y s pec i f i c pr ov i s i on s of

t h e Act n or 5
e x p la in h o w the A c t ap p lies to the c irc u m sta n c e s o f this l iti g a tio n . O u r ru le s o f a p p e llate p ro c e d u re re q u ire a b rie f t o co nt ai n “ [a]n argum ent
. . . s et t ing fo rth t he co nt ent i o ns o f t he ap p el l ant wi t h res p ect t o t he i ss ues present ed , and t he reasons t herefo r, i ncl ud i ng t he reasons why t he co nt ent i o ns requir e ap p el l at e rel i ef , wi t h ci t at i o ns t o t he aut ho ri t i es and a p p ro p ria te re fer e n c e s to the re c o rd

. . . re lied o n . . . . ” T e n n . R . A p p . P . 2 7 (a )( 7 ) (2 0 0 4 ). T h o u g h A p p e llan t r e fer s to t he A ct i n general , s he d o es not ref er t hi s C o urt t o any specif i c p rovis i o ns i n t he A ct , f ai l s t o m ake references t o any t hi ng a p p e a rin g in the re c o rd , an d fails to sta te w h y he r c o n c lus o ry sta te m e n ts w a rr a n t ap p e llate re lief.

In add i t i o n, t ho ugh we d o not st at e t hat A p p el l ant ’ s al l egat i o ns wo ul d warrant revers al , we no t e t here 6 i s no t hi ng i n t he reco rd, and A p p el l ant c i t es us t o no t hi ng in t he reco rd, t o s up p o rt ei t her t he al l egat i o n t hat T ayl o r and P r i de former l y wor ked i n t he s ame l aw of f i ce or t hat Ap pel l ant ’ s daug ht er an d T ay l or’ s s on ha ve t he s ame bi ol ogi cal f at her. -5- err ed and a

bused its discretion when it denied A ppellant’s petition to find Appellee in contempt of court for his refusa l to submi t to a DNA test. There fore , we a ffirm the tria l court’s de cision denying Appellant’s pe tition t o bring contempt cha rg es ag ainst Appellee

. Am eric ans w ith Disabi lities Act Appellant ar g ues that, pursuant to the Americans with Disabiliti es Ac t, her c ivil rights have been violate d in this l itigation. We haverevie wed the rec ord and it appear s that Appellant is raising this issue for the first time on appeal. I n g ener al, a party is not entitl ed to re lief on an issue r aised for the f irst time on appeal. Lawre nc e v . S tan for d , 655 S.W .2d 927, 929 (Tenn. 1983) ; Sta te ex re l. Comm’r ex rel. Said Dep’ t v. Morrow , No. 02A01-9607- CV-00156, 1996 Tenn. A pp. LEXI S 725, a t *6 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . N ov . 1 2, 19 96 ); Southland Express v. Sc rap Metal Buye rs of Tampa, Inc. , 895 S.W .2d 335, 341 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). Appellant failed to r aise any violations of the Americ ans with Disabiliti es Ac t in any proce eding or motion in the trial court below, and, there fore , we de cline to a ddre ss this iss ue onthi s a pp e a l. 5 Co nflic t o f Int e r e st Finally , Appellant asse rts that counsel for Appellee, Linda Taylor (“T ay lor”), violate d the Code of Profe ssional Conduct for attorne y s. Specifica lly , Appellant ar g ues that Taylor had a conflict of interest when repr esenting Appellee ag ainst her be causeTaylor forme rly worke d in the same law prac tice with Pride, whom she a lleg es to be the biolog ical father of P.G. Additionally , in her brie f, Appellant alleg es that a c onflict exist ed for Taylor bec ause A ppellant’s oldest daug hter and Taylor’s oldest son have the same biologic al father. As state d above, a party i s n o t entitled to relief on an issue raised for the first time on appe al. Lawrence , 655 S.W .2d at 929; Morrow , 1996 Tenn. App. LEX I S 72 5, a t *6 ; So uth lan d E x pre ss , 8 95 S.W. 2da t 34 1. We hav e re vie we d th e re c or d andit appea rs that this issue was neve r raised in the trial court. There fore , we de cline to addr ess this issue on app e a l. 6-6- Conclusion For the rea sons stated above, we aff irm the dec ision of the trial court. Costs of this appea l ar e t a x e dt o A p p e l l a n t , S h e l i a L

. G o d w i n , f

o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ary.

___________________________________ ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE