IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

WILLIAM ANDREWS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 3:13-CV-1019

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

William Andrews, a pro se prisoner, filed an amended habeas

corpus petition challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding. (DE

4.) The court is obligated to review the petition and dismiss it if

“it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits

that the petitioner is not entitled to relief[.]” RULE 4 OF THE RULES

GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES. For the reasons set forth below, the

petition (DE 4) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

BACKGROUND

In cause number ISP # 13-05-0280, Andrews was found guilty of

possession/use of a controlled substance. The charge was based on

the fact that Andrews had tested positive for marijuana in a drug

test conducted on May 18, 2013. (DE 4-1 at 4.) He was originally

found guilty on May 29, 2013, but the facility head reversed the

guilty finding on appeal because Andrews had not received 24 hours

notice prior to the hearing. (DE 4-1 at 1.) The case was remanded

for a new hearing. (Id.) On remand, he was again found guilty. (Id.

case 3:13-cv-01019-RL document 6 filed 11/07/13 page 1 of 3
at 8.) As a result, he lost 30 days of earned time credits, among

other sanctions. (Id.) Thereafter, he filed a petition seeking

federal habeas relief. (DE 1.) His original petition was stricken

as unduly vague (DE 3), and he then filed the present petition. (DE

4.)

DISCUSSION

When prisoners lose earned time credits in a disciplinary

proceeding, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause guarantees

them certain procedural protections: (1) advance written notice of

the charge; (2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial

decision-maker; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present

documentary evidence when consistent with institutional safety and

correctional goals; and (4) a written statement by the fact-finder

of evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). 

Here, Andrews raises one claim in his petition: that his

constitutional rights were violated because he did not receive 24

hours notice prior to the original hearing. (DE 4 at 2.) He is

correct that this is one of the rights afforded by Wolff, but the

documents he submits show that the facility head corrected this

procedural error by granting him a new hearing. Andrews

nevertheless asserts that under the principle of “fruit of the

poisonous tree,” the entire charge had to be thrown out. (DE 4-1 at

2

case 3:13-cv-01019-RL document 6 filed 11/07/13 page 2 of 3
7.) There is no such principle or requirement under Wolff.1 He may

be trying to argue that double jeopardy principles prevented the

facility from retrying him on this same charge, but he is

incorrect. Double jeopardy principles do not apply in the prison

disciplinary context. See Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717, 722 (7th

Cir. 1996).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the petition (DE 4) is

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to RULE 4 OF THE RULES GOVERNING

SECTION 2254 CASES.

DATED: November 7, 2013 /s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

1 Although unclear, he may be referencing the exclusionary rule, which

requires the suppression of evidence in a criminal case when it was wrongfully

obtained by police in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Brock v. United

States, 573 F.3d 497, 499 (7th Cir. 2009). Evidence obtained as a result of an

illegal search or seizure is sometimes referred to as the “fruit” of a

“poisonous tree.” See generally United States v. Slone, 636 F.3d 845, 849 (7th

Cir. 2011). This rule has no conceivable applicability here.

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case 3:13-cv-01019-RL document 6 filed 11/07/13 page 3 of 3