Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

People v. Galloway, 2014 IL App (1st) 123004

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

DORIS GALLOWAY, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. First District, Fifth Division

Docket No. 1-12-3004

Filed September 30, 2014

Held

(Note: This syllabus 

constitutes no part of the 

opinion of the court but 

has been prepared by the 

Reporter of Decisions 

for the convenience of 

the reader.)

Defendant’s convictions for driving with a suspended license, failure 

to give information, and driving left of center were upheld over her 

contentions that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss 

based on a speedy trial violation and that her counsel was ineffective 

in miscalculating the speedy trial term and failing to file a timely 

motion to dismiss based on the violation of her right to a speedy trial, 

since a demand for a speedy trial is waived by a failure to appear on a 

“court date set by the court,” that is, the failure to appear on the date 

and time set by the court, and defendant’s late appearance on the date 

set by the court constituted a waiver of her speedy trial demand, and 

under those circumstances, her speedy trial rights were not violated 

and her counsel could not have been ineffective in failing to file a 

timely motion based on a violation of her right to a speedy trial.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Nos. TT-025-869, 

TT-025-870, TT-025-872; the Hon. Arthur P. Wheatley, Judge, 

presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.
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Counsel on

Appeal

Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and Rachel Moran, all of State 

Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, 

Tasha-Marie Kelly, and Katerina Alexopoulos, Assistant State’s 

Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Justices Gordon and Reyes concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Following a bench trial, defendant Doris Galloway was convicted of the misdemeanor 

offenses of driving with a suspended license and failure to give information in addition to the 

petty offense of driving left of center. The trial court subsequently sentenced defendant to 

concurrent terms of 30 days in the Sheriff’s Work Alternative Program (SWAP) for the 

misdemeanor offenses and supervision for the petty offense.

¶ 2 Defendant appeals, arguing that: (1) the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to 

dismiss on speedy trial grounds because her late appearance did not constitute a failure to 

appear; and (2) her trial counsel was ineffective for miscalculating the speedy trial term and 

failing to file a timely motion to dismiss on that basis.

¶ 3 In August 2010, the Chicago police department filed multiple complaints against 

defendant for failure to report an accident, driving while her license was suspended or revoked, 

driving to the left of the center, and failing to provide information. On September 28, 2010, 

defendant had her first court date and filed a written demand for a speedy trial. The case was 

continued on the State’s motion until December 16, 2010. At the December 16, 2010, court 

date, the State requested a four-week continuance.

¶ 4 On January 26, 2011, defendant did not appear at the scheduled court date. The trial court 

issued a bond forfeiture warrant. Defendant appeared at the next court date, March 8, 2011. 

Defense counsel moved to vacate the bond forfeiture, which the trial court granted. Defendant 

also made another written trial demand. On April 13, 2011, the parties appeared for a bench 

trial, but the State was unable to answer ready because the complaining witness was not 

present. The case was continued to June 28, 2011. Defendant continued filing her written trial 

demand.

¶ 5 On June 27, 2011, the day before the scheduled trial, defendant advanced the case and 

requested a continuance because she was to appear as a witness in an unrelated case. The trial 

court continued the case until August 4, 2011. On that date, the complaining witness was not 

present in court and the State requested a continuance.
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¶ 6 On September 20, 2011, the case was called for a bench trial and defendant was not 

present. The police officer witness was present and the State indicated that the complaining 

witness was on his way. The case was passed. At 10:50 a.m., the trial court called the case 

again, but defendant was not present. The case was passed again. Later, the case was called a 

third time and defendant still was not present. The State answered ready for trial with both 

witnesses present in court. Defense counsel stated that he attempted to contact her, but did not 

know where she was. The State asked for a bond forfeiture warrant to be issued, which the 

court granted. Later in the afternoon, the case was called a fourth time and defendant was 

present. Defendant stated that she went to the Skokie court house because she confused her 

court date with her son’s court date. The trial court vacated the bond forfeiture. The case was 

continued to November 29, 2011, on defendant’s motion.

¶ 7 On November 29, 2011, the State was unable to answer ready for trial because the 

complaining witness was not in court. The trial court continued the case until February 23, 

2012. Defendant filed another written demand for trial. At the February 23, 2012, court date, 

the State answered that it was not ready for trial. The case was continued until April 3, 2012.

¶ 8 On March 27, 2012, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges based on a speedy trial 

violation. In the motion, defendant argued that April 3, 2012, was the 284th day after her 

written demand for a speedy trial began on March 8, 2011. Defendant requested that the 

charges be dismissed because the State failed to bring her to trial within 160 days as required 

under sections 103-5(a) and (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 

5/103-5(a), (b) (West 2010)).

¶ 9 On April 3, 2012, the case was called three times and defendant was not present. The State 

requested a bond forfeiture and warrant for $5,000. The trial court issued the warrant, but noted 

that it would change the order if defendant appeared. Defendant was present when the case was 

called for the fourth time and the trial court vacated the warrant. The case was reset for the next 

day.

¶ 10 On April 4, 2012, the trial court heard arguments on defendant’s speedy trial motion to 

dismiss. The trial court denied defendant’s motion, finding that defendant’s failure to appear 

for trial on September 20, 2011, waived her earlier speedy trial written demand. 

¶ 11 On May 7, 2012, the trial court conducted a bench trial.

¶ 12 Sohial Ahmed testified that at approximately 1:40 p.m. on February 19, 2010, he was 

driving east on Peterson in Chicago. He proceeded into the turn lane to make a left turn onto 

California. When the light was green, he moved into the intersection to make his turn. At that 

time, defendant crossed the yellow lines, striking Ahmed’s car on the left side, striking the 

driver’s side mirror and the fender of Ahmed’s vehicle. Ahmed stated that he called 911 to 

report the accident and was told to come to the nearest police station to file a police report. 

Ahmed took a photograph on his phone of defendant’s license plate.

¶ 13 Both parties went to the police station. Ahmed said that they each told a police officer their 

version of the accident. After 15 to 20 minutes, the police officer asked defendant for her 

driver’s license and insurance. Defendant stated that she needed to retrieve the items from her 

car and left. Defendant never returned. Ahmed testified that defendant never gave him her 

name, address, phone number, or vehicle identification number.

¶ 14 Officer Virginia McLinn testified that she was a traffic specialist with the Chicago police 

department and she was assigned to follow up on this accident in May 2010. Officer McLinn 
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mailed a letter to Tanya Lae, the registered owner of the vehicle. Lae later informed the officer 

that defendant, her mother, had been driving on the day of the accident. Lae gave defendant’s 

name to the officer. Officer McLinn met with defendant on August 23, 2010. Defendant 

admitted that she was driving the vehicle that day because she needed to pick up her son’s 

medication. She told the officer that Ahmed hit her vehicle.

¶ 15 Following the officer’s testimony, the State introduced a certified copy of an abstract from 

the Secretary of State indicating that defendant’s license was suspended on February 19, 2010. 

The State rested. Defendant moved for a directed finding. The trial court granted the motion on 

the charge of failure to report an accident, but denied the motion as to the remaining charges.

¶ 16 Defendant testified on her own behalf. She admitted to driving on February 19, 2010, but 

denied that the accident occurred at approximately 1:40 p.m. She stated that the accident 

occurred around 3:10 or 3:15 p.m. She said she was driving east on Peterson and proceeded 

into the turn lane to turn left onto California. Defendant testified that Ahmed drove into the left 

turn lane and struck her car. She said his driver’s side mirror struck the passenger’s side mirror 

on her vehicle. She said there was a police officer across the street, but the officer could not 

leave his post. She went to the police station and waited for 9 or 10 minutes, but Ahmed never 

appeared. She said she told the officer she was leaving.

¶ 17 Following closing arguments, the trial court found defendant guilty of driving on a 

suspended license, failing to provide information, and driving left of center. Defendant filed a 

posttrial motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. The trial court subsequently 

sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of 30 days in the SWAP for driving on a suspended 

license and failing to give information, and sentenced defendant to supervision with a fine of 

$200 for driving left of center.

¶ 18 This appeal follows.

¶ 19 On appeal, defendant has raised two issues relating to her speedy trial demands. We first 

consider whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss for a speedy 

trial violation. Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying her March 27, 2012, 

motion to dismiss for a speedy trial violation. Specifically, she argues that her “mere lateness” 

to court on September 20, 2011, did not constitute a failure to appear on the date set by the 

court to waive her speedy trial demand. The State maintains that the motion to dismiss was 

properly denied because defendant failed to appear for the scheduled court date.

¶ 20 “In Illinois, a defendant has both a constitutional and a statutory right to a speedy trial.” 

People v. Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d 380, 385 (2006) (citing U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV, Ill. Const. 

1970, art. I, § 8, and 725 ILCS 5/103-5 et seq. (West 2002)). The speedy trial statute 

incorporates a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. Id. at 385-86.

¶ 21 Section 103-5(b) provides, in relevant part:

“Every person on bail or recognizance shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction 

within 160 days from the date defendant demands trial unless delay is occasioned by 

the defendant ***. The defendant’s failure to appear for any court date set by the court 

operates to waive the defendant’s demand for trial made under this subsection.” 725

ILCS 5/103-5(b) (West 2010).

¶ 22 Additionally, section 103-5(f) provides, in relevant part:

“Delay occasioned by the defendant shall temporarily suspend for the time of the delay 

the period within which a person shall be tried as prescribed by subsections [including 
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subsection (b)] of this Section and on the day of expiration of the delay the said period 

shall continue at the point at which it was suspended.” 725 ILCS 5/103-5(f) (West 

2010).

¶ 23 “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the 

legislature’s intent.” People v. Comage, 241 Ill. 2d 139, 144 (2011). “The legislature’s intent is 

best indicated by giving the statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. “To 

determine the plain meaning, we must consider the statute in its entirety and be mindful of the 

subject it addresses.” Id. Statutory construction is a question of law reviewed de novo. Cordell, 

223 Ill. 2d at 389.

¶ 24 Defendant’s trial was scheduled for September 20, 2011. When the case was called at 

9 a.m., defendant was not present and the State indicated that the complaining witness was on 

his way. The case was passed and later recalled at approximately 10:50 a.m. At that time, the 

State answered ready for trial, but defendant was still not present. The case was passed again. 

When the case was recalled a third time, defendant was still not present and her attorney 

indicated that he was unable to reach her. The court issued a bond forfeiture and warrant at that 

time. The record does not indicate the exact time, but sometime in the afternoon, defendant 

appeared in court. The trial court recalled the warrant, vacated the bond forfeiture, and the case 

was reset.

¶ 25 In People v. Zakarauskas, 398 Ill. App. 3d 451, 452-53 (2010), after several continuances 

by agreement, the defendant failed to appear on the day the trial was set, October 6, 2006. The 

trial court entered a bond forfeiture and warrant and continued the case for five days later, on 

October 11, 2006. The defendant appeared at that date and executed a new written speedy trial 

demand. The trial was reset for March 20, 2007, and on that date, the defendant moved to 

dismiss based upon the expiration of the speedy trial term. The trial court initially denied the 

motion, but on reconsideration, granted the motion and found that the failure to appear only 

suspended the term and consequently the speedy trial term was violated.

¶ 26 On appeal, the reviewing court observed that a 2000 amendment added the last sentence of 

section 103-5(b) about waiver. “From 1977 until the 2000 amendment of section 103-5(b), a 

delay occasioned by a defendant’s failure to appear in court suspended the 160-day speedy trial 

term.” Id. at 454.

“The plain language of section 103-5(b) as amended in 2000 manifested the 

legislature’s intent to distinguish a defendant’s failure to appear in court from other 

types of delay, a motion for a continuance, for example, either by the defendant or by 

agreement. We believe the 2000 ‘waiver’ amendment to section 103-5(b) controls the 

disposition of this case. Waiver includes the notion of relinquishment.” Id.

¶ 27 The court concluded that the defendant waived his speedy trial demand when he failed to 

appear in court. “A defendant’s failure to appear as required by recognizance constitutes a 

criminal offense. 725 ILCS 5/110-2 (West 2004). If we were to treat a BFW incident as 

comparable to a request for a continuance or other delay, a fugitive defendant would be entitled 

to the benefit of an earlier speedy trial demand when apprehended and again brought before the 

court.” Id.

¶ 28 Similarly, in People v. Minor, 2011 IL App (1st) 101097, the defendant made a written 

speedy trial demand, but later failed to appear in court on August 4, 2009, when the State 

answered ready for trial. The court passed the case until the afternoon, but when the defendant 

still did not appear, the court issued a bond forfeiture and warrant. The defendant appeared the 
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next day and the warrant was recalled. The trial was then set for January 6, 2010. On January 4, 

2010, the defendant moved to dismiss based upon a speedy trial violation. The trial court 

granted the motion, reasoning that the defendant offered an explanation for her absence which 

tolled the speedy trial period and was distinguishable from Zakarauskas. Id. ¶¶ 3-8.

¶ 29 The reviewing court disagreed on appeal and found no reason to depart from the reasoning 

in Zakarauskas. Id. ¶ 13. “The 2000 amendment to the speedy trial statute clarified that a 

defendant’s failure to appear in court operates as a waiver to a prior demand. Pub. Act 91-123, 

§ 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2000). The legislature, therefore, distinguished failures to appear from other 

‘[d]elays occasioned by the defendant.’ See 725 ILCS 5/103-5(f) (West 2006).” Id. ¶ 16.

“Applying the plain, unambiguous language of section 103-5(b) of the Code (725 ILCS 

5/103-5(b) (West 2006)), we conclude that defendant waived her initial speedy trial 

term beginning on April 21, 2009. The new speedy trial period began on October 19, 

2009, when she again filed a demand. The speedy trial term was not tolled, as argued 

by defendant. As a result, defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated as of 

January 6, 2010.” Id. ¶ 15.

¶ 30 Defendant contends that her late appearance in the afternoon of September 20 does not 

count as a failure to appear for purposes of waiving her speedy trial demand under section 

103-5(b). According to defendant, Zakarauskas and Minor are distinguishable because those 

cases involved the defendants’ “total failure to appear on the scheduled date, rather than a 

defendant who merely came late to court.” Defendant urges this court to interpret the term 

“court date set by the court” broadly to include an appearance at any time during business 

hours on the scheduled date. Thus, under this interpretation, defendant’s failure to appear for 

several hours after the scheduled court date would still be considered an appearance.

¶ 31 We disagree with defendant’s broad interpretation of “court date set by the court” to 

encompass arriving at any time during the court business hours. Such an interpretation would 

defeat the purpose of setting a case for trial at a set time and would permit a defendant to evade 

trial and avoid the deterrent of waiving a speedy trial demand. Section 103-5(b) provides for a 

defendant’s waiver of a speedy trial demand for “failure to appear for any court date set by the 

court,” which we find encompasses not only the date but the time set by the court. Contrary to 

defendant’s argument, this interpretation is not reading additional language into the statute. 

We hold, therefore, the “court date set by the court” is the date and time set by the court for the 

case under the plain language of the statute.

¶ 32 The court date at issue was 9 a.m. on September 20, 2011. Defendant’s arrival at court 

sometime in the afternoon was not the “court date set by the court.” The State’s witnesses were 

present and ready for trial. It is unreasonable to burden the prosecutors to hold the witnesses to 

remain at court all day in case a defendant might arrive later. The trial court passed and recalled 

the case three times before issuing a bond forfeiture and warrant. At that time, defendant had 

failed to appear in court and we find that when the bond forfeiture order was entered, the 

defendant failed to appear for the court date set by the court. She thereby relinquished her 

speedy trial demand. The fact that she appeared sometime later that afternoon does not change 

the fact that she failed to appear at the “court date set by the court” and the trial could not take 

place. As in Minor and Zakarauskas, the failure to appear at the court date set by the court 

waived defendant’s speedy trial demand. Since defendant waived her speedy trial demand on 

September 20, 2011, her speedy trial demand did not restart until November 29, 2011. At the 
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time of the March 27, 2012, motion to dismiss, the 160-day speedy trial period had not passed 

and the trial court properly denied her motion to dismiss.

¶ 33 Next, defendant contends that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a speedy 

trial motion to dismiss in May 2011 instead of March 2012.

¶ 34 Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are resolved under the standard set forth in 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court delineated a 

two-part test to use when evaluating whether a defendant was denied the effective assistance of 

counsel in violation of the sixth amendment. Under Strickland, a defendant must demonstrate 

that counsel’s performance was deficient and that such deficient performance substantially 

prejudiced defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To demonstrate performance deficiency, a 

defendant must establish that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. People v. Edwards, 195 Ill. 2d 142, 163 (2001). In evaluating sufficient 

prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. If a case may be disposed of on the ground of lack of sufficient 

prejudice, that course should be taken, and the court need not ever consider the quality of the 

attorney’s performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. “The failure of counsel to argue a 

speedy-trial violation cannot satisfy either prong of Strickland where there is no lawful basis 

for arguing a speedy-trial violation.” People v. Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d 380, 385 (2006).

¶ 35 Here, defendant contends her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to 

dismiss for a speedy trial violation after the term expired on May 28, 2011. The State responds 

that defendant waived her speedy trial demand when she failed to appear in court on January 

26, 2011, and her speedy trial demand started anew on March 8, 2011, making any motion 

futile. Defendant asserts that her failure to appear on January 26 did not waive her speedy trial 

demand because the case was not set for trial and defendant had previously agreed to a 

continuance so the speedy trial clock was not running.

¶ 36 We agree with the State that Zakarauskas and Minor are analogous to the present case. 

Contrary to defendant’s assertion, section 103-5(b) does not limit a defendant’s waiver to 

failure to appear for a court date for trial. The unambiguous language provides that a defendant 

waives a speedy trial demand by failing to appear “for any court date set by the court.” 725 

ILCS 5/103-5(b) (West 2010). Defendant’s interpretation that a failure to appear for a status 

date would add a limitation not present in the plain language of the statute. “Any court date” 

would clearly include a status date and the failure to appear on January 26, 2011, waived 

defendant’s speedy trial demand.

¶ 37 Additionally, defendant attempts to distinguish Zakarauskas by arguing that the court in 

that case specifically noted that the defendant had a demand running when he failed to appear. 

However, the case makes no such specification. The case stated that the defendant made his 

speedy trial demand in April 2006 and “[a]fter several continuances by agreement,” the trial 

was set for October 6, 2006, when the defendant failed to appear. Zakarauskas, 398 Ill. App. 

3d at 452-53.

¶ 38 The same situation is present in this case. Defendant made her initial speedy trial demand 

on September 28, 2010. At the December 16, 2010, court date, the State requested a 

continuance and defendant did not object, which amounts to an agreed delay. See People v. 

Patterson, 392 Ill. App. 3d 461, 467 (2009) (noting that a defendant has occasioned a delay 
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when he or she agreed to a continuance). Defendant then failed to appear at the next court date, 

January 26, 2011, and the trial court issued a bond forfeiture and warrant. Under section 

103-5(b), defendant’s failure to appear at that court date waived her speedy trial demand. Her 

speedy trial demand commenced anew when she made a written demand on March 8, 2011.

¶ 39 Since defendant’s speedy trial period began again on March 8, 2011, no speedy trial 

violation occurred as of May 28, 2011. Her trial counsel could not have been ineffective for 

failing to file a motion to dismiss when defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated. 

Defendant’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel argument therefore fails.

¶ 40 Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 41 Affirmed.