### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jul y

1, 200 8

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. LEON FL AN NEL

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 03-07354 Car olyn Wad e Blackett , Judge

No. W2007-00678-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled October 13, 2008

The de fenda

nt, L eon F lannel, wa s convicted by jury of one count of murder in perpe tration of a the ft

and on e c ount o f p re me dit a te d mu rd e r. He wa s sen te nc e d to life imp ri so nme nt fo r bot h c on vic tio ns , wh ic h w e re me rg e d. Th e de fe nd ant now a pp e a ls, arguin g that: ( 1) the e vid e nc e wa s in su ff ic ie nt t o

su sta in h is c on vic tio ns and his c on vic tio n fo r mur de r in pe rp e tr a tio n o f a the ft wa s unc on sti tut ion a l; (2 ) t he tr ia l c ourt

fa ile d to pr op e rl y

e xer c is e it s du ty as thir

te e nth jur or ; ( 3) the tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in failing to gr ant the def

endant’ s motion t o suppress his statement t o police; (4) the trial cour t erre d in q ua lify in g certa in s ta te wi tne sse s a s e xpe rt s; ( 5) the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in a dmi tti nga

le tte r i nto evidenc e without proof of chain of custody and prope r au t h en t i ca t i on; (6) the tria l court made improper c omments reg ardingwitness qualification a nd jury instruction; and (7) c umulative err or in the trial proce eding s require s relief . After a thoroug h re v i ew of

the re cord, w e af

firm the jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ourt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

J.C. M C L IN , J
., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS and A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined.

Phylli s A luk o ( on

a pp e a l) and

W illiam E . Ro bil io a

nd Kathy Ke nt ( a t tr ia l) , A ssi sta

nt P ub lic De fe nd e rs , M e mph is, Te nn e sse e , f or the a pp e lla nt, L e on F lann e l.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney Gene ral a

nd Reporter ; David H. F indley , Assi s t an t Attorney Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . G ibb on s, Di str ic t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; a

nd Pa ul G oo dma

n a nd Tracy e Jone s, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

TRIAL TE STIMONY-2-

The followingrele vant testimony was pre sented at the defendant’s trial. Tammie Robinson
te sti fi e d th a t sh e wa s a c los e fr ie nd of the vic tim , D a vid

Coo pe r. Ac c or din g to R ob ins on , th e vic tim

wa s a nurs e wh o h a d w or

ke d at th e Pe na l F arm , M e mph is M e nta l H e a lthI ns tit ute and Spr ingGate Rehabilitation Center. The victim was also homosex ual and had previously met partne rs wher e he worke d. She last saw the victim on May 10, 2003, the Saturday

befor e Mother’ s Day . After being unable to conta ct the victim and finding the victim’s car parke d in the driveway and the door s locked

a t th e vi cti m’ s ho us e , Ro bin so n b e c a me wo rr ie d. She e ve ntu a lly c a lle d p oli c e and

a sk e d th e m to forc i b l y en t er the victim’s home. On cr oss-examination, Robi nson acknow ledg ed that she w as

awa re that the vi ctim had int imate relationships with two men and that the vi ctim had an a rg ument wi th o ne of

the m.

Offic er John St andridg e of the Memphis Police D epar tment testified that on May 12, 2003, around 3:00 a .m., he re ceive d a dispatch r eg ardingan ala rm ca ll fo r the re sidence located a t 1005 E l i z ab et h L an e. Up o narri v al
, h e c h ec k edt h e p re m i s es fo r s i gn s o f a b re ak -i n

. Of fi ce r S t an dri d ge

rec ounted that the doors of the re sidence appea red to be locked a

nd nothing a

ppear ed wr ong , so he issued a “Me tro Fa lse Alarm Notice” for David Daube rt, who was listed as the owner repr esentative for the r esidenc e. Of

fice r Standridg e stated that he could not reca ll whether a car was pa rked in the drivewa y or whe ther a

ny lights we re on in the r esidenc e.

Offic er Webb K irkdoffe r of the Memphis Poli ce D epar tment testified that on May 15, 2003, around 4:00 p.m., he a

nd another

office r we nt to the victim’s home located at 1005 Eliz abeth L ane. Of fi c e r K ir kd of fe r e xpla ine d tha t the y vis ite d the vic tim ’s ho me be c a us e po lic e ha d r e c e ive d a

c a ll to chec k on the vi ctim who had not been seen for about a wee k. Offic er K irkdoffe r stated that whe n he ar rived, a s i l v er SUV w as par ked outside the home in the dr iveway . The victim’s neig hbors informed him that the victim was usually home when the SUV was parked in the dr iveway . Offic er Kirkdoff er r eca lled that he knocke d on the door but rec eived no r esponse. Af ter c heckingthe house, he found the storm door was ope n but the inside door was locked. Howeve r, he obse rved no sig ns of brea k-in or damag e to the house or the vic tim’s SUV. Theref ore, O ffice r Kirkdof

fer elec ted not to forcibly

enter the victim’s home.

Donald Cooper, the v i ct i m ’s fa t her, te stified that he talked to the vic tim by phone on Mother’s Day

. L ater that wee k, Mr. Cooper a nd his wife ca lled the victim severa l times but receive d no resp o n s e

. M r

. Co o p e r s tate d th a t h e g r e w c o n c e r n e d a b o u t th e v ic ti m a f

te r le ar n in g th at the vic tim ’s vo ic e ma il a c c ounts we re fu ll. Mr

. Coo pe r r e c ounte d th a t he and his wi fe dr ov e fr om t

he ir h o m e i nA l a

b a m a t o t h e i r s o n ’ s h o m e i nM e mp h i s i no r d e r t o c h e c k o nh i m an d

s e e i f h e w a s o k a y. Mr. Cooper noted that he used a spare key to enter his son’s house. A fter w alking throug h the house, he found the victim dead
, l y i ng on his bed in the bedroom. Mr. Coope r ac knowledg ed that the victim owne d a .25 caliber pistol. He further noted that he was awa re of the vict i m ’s s ex ual orientation.

Severa l Memphis police office rs testified re g ardingtheir role in secur ing the cr ime scene and the re c ov e ry

and c oll e c tio n o f e vid e nc e . Po lic e Of fi c e r An tho ny Rud olp h tes tif ie d tha t he wa s w ith Mr. Cooper whe n the victim was found. Of fice r Rudolph observed the victim ly ing on his ba ck on-3-

the bed with a larg e amount of bl ood around the victim’s head. Offic er Rudolph t estified that the victim’s house was ne at and c lean a nd, other than observing a g un holster and a beer bottle on the coff ee ta ble, nothing a

ppear ed amiss. Police Off icer Scott Reed testified that he found no sig ns of forc ed entr

y into the victim’s house and the house w as v er y n ea t. Poli ce O ffice r Mar y Pickens testified that she photog raphe d the cr ime scene and pre pare d a sketc h of th e b edroom. Of fice r Pickens noted that seve ral .25 c aliber shell casing s wer e found under the victim and the victim’s bed. A loa de d g un c lip c on ta ini ng .2 5 c a lib e r bu lle ts wa s fo un d in the liv ing ro om un de r a t abl e. S ix empty beer bottles and a c ardboa

rd bee r conta iner we re a lso found in the victim’s house.

Dr. Te resa

Campbell, a forensic patholog ist for the Medica l Ex aminer’ s Offic e, testified that the victim’s autopsy

reve aled that the vic tim suffere d multipl e g unshot wounds to his fac e and head, and he die d as a result. Acc ording to Dr. Campbell, the pre sence of g unpowder stippli ng and soot around the victim’s wounds indicated that the g un was fir ed no more than six inches a way from the

v i c t i m ’ s f a c e an d h e a d

. O t h e r t h an t h e g u n s h o t w o u n d s , t h e v i c t i m h a d n o o t h e r i n j u r i e s t o h i s b o dy. No alcohol or

drug s were found in the victim’s blood, though it was possible for a small amount of alcohol to dissipate from the vic tim’s blood over time.

Pa ul Pic ke ns te sti fi e d th a t he liv e d in the vic tim ’s ne ig hb or

ho od bu t di d n ot k

no w the vic tim

. He r ecounte d that he found the victim’s wallet on the sidewa lk se vera l streets aw ay from the victim’s hou s e t h e M onday

afte r Mother’ s Day . He attempted to return the w allet seve ral times but was unable to c ontact the victim. Mr. Pickens rec alled that the victim’s w allet contained the vi ct im’s name, phone number a

nd addre ss, about $25 in cash, a nd cre dit car ds. Mr. Pickens eve ntually turned the victim’s wallet over

to police.

Kee iy ona Hill testified that she wa s the forme r g irlfriend of the def endant. She r eca lled that the de fe nd ant a

nd the vi ctim me t e a c h o the r at a ph y sic a l r e ha

bil itatio n a

nd nurs ingfa c ili ty

in Memphis and became friends. On a Monday morning in May 2003 around 2:00 a .m., the defe ndant called her and told her that he was at t he victim ’s hous e. The defenda nt told her that he had g one over to the vic tim’s house at t he victim ’s request. The de fenda nt indicated he w as upset bec ause he did not want to have se x with the victim and the victim should not have “put him in some ty pe of sit ua tio n. ” Th e de fe nd ant s a id t hat he pla y e d a sle e p wh ile a t the vic tim ’s ho us e . Wh e n th e vic tim fe ll a sle e p, the de fe nd ant fo un d the vic tim ’s g un . T he de fe nd ant s a id h e wa nte d to kil l th e vic tim and stea l his vehicle. Ms. Hill ex plained that she trie d to calm the def endant a nd urg ed him to leave the victim’s house and g et a hotel room. Ms. H ill stated that she had Caller I D which identifie d the inc omi ngc a ll a s c omi ngfr om t he vic tim

. Serg eant John Oliver of the Memphis Police Depa rtment testified that he participated in the inv e sti g a tio n o f t

he vic tim ’s ho micide. Afte r r e vie w o f t he ph on e re c or ds fr om t

he vic tim ’s c e ll phone, Serg eant Oliv er d i s co v er ed that ca lls had been ma de to a Ke eiy ona Hill in Marianna
, Ar ka ns a s and to a

L a mon te Willi a ms a

nd Da mie n F lann e l in

Mic hig an a

ro un d th e e sti ma te d ti me of the victim’s homicide. Af ter talking to these individuals, Serg eant Oliver discovere d that none of these individuals knewthe victim but all of these individuals knewthe def endant. Ser g eant Oliver then obtained a

n arr est war

rant for the def endant. The defe ndant was eventua lly taken into custody-4-

in Marianna , Arka

nsas and tra

nsported to Me mphis. After the defe ndant arr ived in Memphis, he was

a dv ise d of h is Miranda rig hts a nd signe d a waiver of rig hts f orm. The de fenda

nt made a statement to Memphis police which wa s transcr ibed, th en s i gn ed by the def endant. In his statement, the d ef en d an t ad mitted that he shot the victim mul tiple times in t he hea d with the victim’s gun. T he defe ndant said that af

ter drinkingsever al bee rs with the victim at the victim’s hou se, he shot the victim while he was sitting in his bedr oom. The def endant f urther e x plained:

We was riding and we swung by [t he victim’s] house. He k n ew that I didn’t like g uy s, he kn e w I

lik e wo me n, bu t he

. . . [w a s] tr y ingto g e t me be hin d c los e d d oo rs

. Whe n h e tr ie d to pu ll [it ] ou t and tr ie d to suc k it, an d I pu sh e d him b a c k a nd tol d h im “No, br o. You doing too much.” The n h e t o l d me, “I ain’t askingnobody

for nothing, I make my own money , and y ou be asking me for money .” That’s all it took. Iwas re ady

to g o on and take him under. Prior to that, he had the gun sitti ng on the dresse r

. . . , and he le t me see it, and I told him, “L et me look at that.” H e hande d it t o me and

le t me loo k at it . I

pu t [a s] ma

ny ho le s a s I c ou ld p ut i n h im.

I n h is s ta te me nt, the de fe nd ant a lso no te d th a t he too k th e vic tim ’s ke y s and cell p ho ne wi th h im when he left t he victim ’s hous e but threw them awa y in a field next t o a g as station. He mentioned that he wa s g oing to take off in the victim’s ve hicle but he could not g et the doors open. He sa id he

ma de ph on e c a lls fr om the vic tim ’s ph on e to Ke e iy on a , his br oth e r, Da mie n, and his c ou sin , L a mon t, be fo re he sh ot t

he vic tim

.

Nathan G athrig ht testified that he worke d with the Memphis Police Depa rtment as an e x pert in latent fing erpr int ex amination and identification. Accor ding to Mr. G athrig ht, a fing erpr int found on the cardboar d beer container matched the defe ndant’s finge rprint at seven points. Mr. Gathrig ht noted that it was widely

acc epte d t h at a s even point match of a fing erpr int constitut ed a positive identification.

Ronald Go odwin, an investig ator with the District Attorne y ’s Off ice, testified tha

t he was g iven a three pag e letter by an inmate in the Shelby County J ail. Ba rtlett Poli ce Ca

ptain David Cupp
te sti fi e d that he ha d e xpe ri e nc e in ha nd wr iti ng ana ly sis and wa s qu a lif ie d a s an ex pert . C aptai n C u p p t es t i fi edt h at an ex am i n at i o n o f p o rt i o n s o f t h e p ri n t edh an dwr i t i n g co n t ai n edi nt h e t h re e p age letter, c ompare d to known handwr iting exemplars fr om the defe ndant, established that the de fenda nt wrote the letter. Ba s ed o n C ap t ain Cupp’s testimony , the letter a long w ith the exemplars were
enter ed into evidenc e as a n exhibi t. I n the letter, the d ef en d an t ad mitted to kil ling the vic tim and wanted K eeiyona Hill killed for talking to the police about the c rime. The le tter indicate d that the d ef en d an twa s t h e a u t h o r. T h e l et t er al s o n o t edt h e f

o l l o wi n g:

On e nig ht I

wa s w ith thi s whi te bo y name Da vid Coo pe r. [H]e pic k me up t oo k me to h is h ou se and

he ha d s ome nic e th angs in h is h ou se so Itho ug ht h e ha d s ome

mon e y

. . . . [We] d

ru nk a fe w b e e rs , h e fe ll a sle e p

. . . I fo un d the pis tol

. Iwo ke him up and robbe d him. I asked him wher e the money was at, he told me he didn’t have any so Ihit him s ix times in the head took his wallet and the littl e money he had and-5-

a watch and c ell phone and I called my

bitch Kee iy ona on t he phone a nd Itold her Iwas a bout to kill this white boy but to keep it rea l he was a lrea dy dead. . . .

The de fenda

nt did not testi fy

but called Dr. Fr ed S teinberg
, a forensic psy cholog ist, to testify on his behalf. Dr. S teinbergtestified that he a dminist ere d sever al tests to determine the defe ndant’s intelligenc e, beha

vior, and c og nitive abilities. Dr. S teinberg noted that the def endant’ s I Q was 74, wh ic h w a s in th e b o r d e r li n e r an g e o f in te ll e c tu a l f un c ti o n in g

. H e a ls o te s te d p o o rly on sever al psy cholog ical tests, indicating that he tended to ha ve poor judgme nt, impulsive behav i o r, a short attention span, a te ndency to favor simple solutions to complex problems, and did not per ceive the world i n t h e s am e way

most people perc eived it. The de fenda nt rea d rea sonably

well. He ha d an

e ig hth g ra de re a din g a

bil ity , b ut h is r e a din g c omp re he ns ion wa s at th e thi rd

g ra de le ve l.

Dr. Steinberg t estified that the de fenda nt had suffe red he ad injuries in 1996 and 2002, requiring hospitaliz ation in a reha bilitation ce nter. Howeve r, Dr. Steinberg testified that he did not believe the defe ndant’s hea d injuries contributed to his mental problems. He noted:

Ifound him to have, as I said, poor reality testing. There was no evidence of ac tive ps y c ho sis a t th e tim e Ite ste d h im, bu t he ’s hi g h r isk to r e la ps e un de r c e rt a in

c ir c ums tanc e s, no t on ly be c a us e of his c og nit ive a

bil iti e s o r l a c k o f, bu t a lso , b e c a us e of his histo ry o f psy chotic thinking. H e’s pr one to a lot of impulsivity . He’ s very

concr ete, a

nd, of co u rs e, his intellectual functioning was in the borde rline ar ea. Th e se thi ng s c ulm inate in p oo r j ud g me nt.

On c r o s s

- e x amination, Dr. Steinbergacknow ledg ed that the de fenda nt had no psy chosis, was competent at the time of the cr ime, and wa s not committ able a s a dang er to himself or othe rs. When shown the three pag e l et t er , Dr. Steinbergacknow ledg ed that the languag e and tone of the letter differ ed fr om what the def endant r elated to him. Specific ally , Dr. Steinbergacknow ledg ed that the le tte r’ s in dic a tio n th a t th e de fe nd ant d e c ide d to ro b th e vic tim
, th en kill h im, did no t su g g e st impulsi vity . Howeve r, Dr. Steinber g su ggested that the de fenda nt wrote this letter in jail and probably took a “mac ho approa ch” be cause his circumstanc es had c hang ed at the time of writing the letter.

B a se d o n th e fo re g oin g pr oo f, the jur y fo un d th e de fe nd ant guil ty of on e c ount o f m

ur de r i n perpe tration of a the ft and one count of fir st deg ree preme ditated murder

. T h e d ef en d ant was

se nte nc e d to lif

e imp ri so nme nt f

or bo th c on vic tio ns . T he tr ia l c ourt me rg e d th e c on vic tio ns

.

AN AL YSI S

I. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence

The de fenda

nt challeng es the suff

iciency of t he evidence for his convictions for f irst deg ree preme ditated murder and first deg ree murder in pe rpetration of a theft. Specifica lly , the def endant

asser ts that t h er e wa s insufficient proof from which a

rational jury

could infer

that the def

endant-6-

formed the requisite int ent t o commit preme ditated murder or for med the intent nec essar

y to deprive the victim of any

proper ty

. The defe ndant also submits that his c onviction for murde r in perpe tration of a the ft vio la te s h is f

e de ra l and

state c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts

.

Our r e vie w b e g ins wi th t

he we ll- e sta

bli sh e d rul e that onc e a jur y fi nd s a de fe nd ant guil ty , h is

or her p res um pt ion of

inn oc e nc e is r e mov e d a

nd re pla c e d w itha

pr e su mpt ion

of g uil t. State v. Evans , 838 S.W .2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992)

. There fore , on appea l, the convicted de fenda nt has the burd e n of de mon str a tin g to thi s cou rt wh y the e vid e nc e wi ll not su pp or t the jur y ’s ve rd ic t. State v. Car ru the rs , 3 5 S. W.3 d 5 16 , 5 57 -5 8 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) ; Sta te v. Tugg le , 639 S.W .2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). To mee t this burden, the defendant must establish that no “rational trier of f act” could have found the e ssential elements of the crime be y ond a reasonable doubt. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 30 7, 31 9 ( 19 79 ); State v. Ev ans , 1 08 S.W. 3d 23 1, 23 6 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) ; see T e n n

. R

. A p p

. P

. 1 3 ( e )

. In contra st, the jury ’s verdic t a pproved by the trial judge acc redits the state’s witnes s es an d resolves all conflicts in favor of the state. Sta te v . H arris , 8 39 S.W. 2d

54 , 7 5 ( Te nn . 1 99 2) . T he state is entitled to the strong est leg itimate view of the evidenc e and a ll reasona ble infer ence s which may be draw n from that evide nce. Car ru the rs , 35 S.W .3d at 558. Questions conce rningthe cr edibility of the wi tne sse s, con fl ict s in tria l te sti mony , th e we ig ht a nd va lue to b e g ive n th e e vid e nc e , a nd a ll fa c tua l iss ue s ra ise d by the e vid e nc e are re so lve d by the tr ie r of fact and no t t hi s cou rt

. State v. B land
, 9 5 8 S. W. 2 d

6 5 1
, 6 5 9 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 7 )

. We d o n o t a tt e mp t t o r e

- w e ig h o r

r e

- e v a lu a te the evidenc e. State v. Rice , 184 S.W .3d 646, 662 (Tenn. 2006) . L ikewise, we do not replac e the jury ’s infere nces dr awn f

rom the cir cu m s t anti al evidenc e with our own infe renc es. Sta te v . R e id , 91 S.W .3d 247, 277 (Tenn. 2002)

.

A. Prem editated Murder

I n challeng ing his c onviction for pre meditated murde r, t he defenda nt argues t hat the proof

a t tr ia l sh ow e d h e did no t inte nti on a lly kil l the vic tim , b ut r a the r, he kil le d th e vic timin s e lf -d e fe ns e

or un de r s tr on g pr ov oc a tio n d ue to t he vic tim ’s un we lc ome se xua l a dv anc e s to wa rd him

. A pre meditated killing is one “ done after the exerc ise of re flec tion and judgme nt.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 202(d). To be preme ditated, the intent to kill mus t have be en for med bef ore the act itself, a

nd the ac cused must be suff iciently fre e fr om excitement and passion. Id . An intentional
act r equire s that the pers o n h ave the desire to e ng ag e in the conduc t or ca use the re sult. Id . § 39-11-106( a)( 18). Whether preme ditation is prese nt is a question of fac t f or the jury , and it may

be inferr ed from the circ umstances surrounding the killing. State v. Y oung , 196 S.W .3d 85, 108 (Tenn. 2006). In particula

r, the use of

a dea dly wea p o n u p o n an u narme d victim and decla rations by the defe ndant of a

n intent to kill are fac tors which support a f inding of preme ditation. See B land , 958 S.W .2d at 660.

Viewingthe evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the state, t he proof established that the de fe nd ant w a s u

ps e t be c a us e the vic tim ma de un wa nte d sexua l adv anc e s tow ard him . The pr oo f a lso

es t ab l i s h edt h at t h e d ef

en d an td ec i d edh e w an t edt o ro b t h e v i ct i m

. At s o m e p o i n ti nt h e e v en i n g, the def endant pr etende d to fall aslee p and the victim went to his bedroom a n d fe l l as l ee p . The-7-

de fe nd ant t oo k th e vic tim ’s g un , w ok e the vic timup , d e mand e d mo ne y fr om h im, and

sh ot h im multip le tim e s in

the fa c e a nd

he a d. Th e e vid e nc e fu

rt he r s ho ws that th e de fe nd ant c a lle d h is g i r l f r i e n d f r o m t h e v i c t i m ’ s c e l l p h o n e an d b r a g g e d a b o u t h i s i n t e n tt o k i l l t h e v i c t i m

. A c c o r d i n g l y,
we c onclude that a

rational jury could find bey ond a reasonable doubt that the def endant e x erc ised ref lection and judg ment prior to killing the victim, and thus, the killing w as i n t en t i o nal and preme ditated. See Te nn . Co de Ann. § 3 9- 13 -2 02 (a ), (d ). Th e iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t.

B. Mur der in Perpetration of a Theft

I n challeng ing his conviction for mur der in pe rpetration of a theft, the de fenda nt argues that there was insuffic ient p ro o f o f his intent to commi t the underlying f elony , which in this case w as the ft

. As applica

ble to this iss ue, first degre e m u rd er is a “killing of another committed in the perpe tration of or attempt to perpetrate any . . . theft.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a) (2). “ No

c ulp a ble me nta l st a te is r e qu ir e d for con vi cti on un de r s ub div isi on (a )( 2)

. . . e xce pt t

he int e nt t o commit the enu m er ated offense s or ac ts . . . .” Id . § 39-13-202( b). The killing must occur in the perpe tration of the enumer ated of fense

. See State v. Hinton , 42 S.W .3d 113, 119 (Tenn. Crim. App. 20 00 ) ( c itatio ns omi tte d) . T he kil lin g may pr e c e de , c oin c ide wi th, or fo llo w the of

fe ns e and sti ll be in t he pe rp e tr a tio n o f t

he of fe ns e , so lon g a s the re is a c on ne c tio n in tim e , p la c e , a nd c on tin uit y of ac tion. See S t a te v. Buggs , 995 S.W .2d 102, 106 (Tenn. 1999) . I n the instant case , the

enumer ated of

fense is theft. “A person commi ts theft of proper ty if, with intent to deprive the ow ner

o f p ro p er t y , t h e p er s o nkn o wi n gl y o b t ai n s o r ex er ci s es co n t ro l o v er t h e p ro p er t y wi t h o u tt h e o wn er 's eff ective c onsent.” Id . § 39-14-103. Proof of the intention to commit t he under ly ing o ff en s e and at wha t point it exis ted is a question of fa ct to be dec ided by the jury afte r consider ation of all the fac ts and circ umstances. See Buggs
, 995 S.W .2d at 107. The guilt of the defe ndant as we ll as any fac t require d to be proved may be established by direc t evidenc e, by circ umstantial evidence , or by a combination ther eof. Se e Sta te v . P e nd e rg ra ss , 13 S.W .3d 389, 392-93 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1999).

Take n in the l ight most favor able to the state , the proof e stablished that the def endant we nt to the vi ctim’s house and observed that the victim had some nice be longing s. The def endant a nd the victim drank some beers and the victim fell asleep. T he def endant f ound the victim’s g un, woke the victim up and demande d money . The de fenda nt hit the victim in the head, and at some point, shot the victim multiple times in the fac e. The de fenda nt took the victim’s wallet, watch, a nd cell phone. The de fe n d ant ca lled his girlf riend a nd told her he w anted to kill the victim and steal his vehicle. The de fenda

nt attempted to take the vic tim’s vehicle, but he c ould not figur e out how to o p en the doors. The victim’s wallet was eventua lly rec overe d from a f

ield sever al stree ts from the victim’s home. Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the jur y co u l d find bey ond a re asonable doubt that the defe ndant intended to de prive the victim of proper ty and his conduc t in kill ing the victim was done in p e rp e tr a tio n o f t

he the ft . T he iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t.

C. Con stitu tional

ity of Murder in Perpetration of a Misdem eanor Theft-8-

Wit hout citation to prevailing leg al authority
, the defendant contends that his conviction of fi rs t de g re e mur de r in the pe rp e tr a tio n of a the ft vio la te s his “ fe de ra l and state c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts to due proc ess, equa l protec t i o n an d

. . . constitutional protection ag ainst crue l and unusual punishment.” The de fenda nt submit s that the underly ing offe nse for which he w as convic ted was

a mis de me a no r t

he ft (l e ss t ha n $ 50 0) and no t a

fe lony the ft (o ve r $ 50 0) . H e a sse rt s th a t a misdemeanor the ft is not an inhere ntly dang erous offense ; and ther efor e, a c onviction of first deg ree murder ba sed on a misde me a n o r th e f t violate s his constitut ional rig hts. The def endant a cknowledg es that he fa iled to preser

ve the issue in his motion for new tria l but requests that we revie w the issue fo r p la in e rr or . In r e bu tta l, t he state su

bmi ts that th e de fe nd ant’ s argume nt i s il log ic a l on the ba sis that “its very

application would raise equal protec tion issues, since a differ ence of one c ent -- w hich would s eparate f

elony theft fr om misdemeanor thef t -- would per

mit otherwise similarly -situated defe ndants to a

void pr osecution for

the more se rious crime of murder in the pe rpetration of a theft.”

At the ons et of our r eview, w e note that this court in Sta te v . Co lli e r V . H arris ha s p re vio us ly

ana ly zed wh e the r a

c on vic tio n f

or fi rs t de g re e mur de r i n th e pe rp e tr a tio n o f a thef t is unconstitutional. No. 02C01-9603-CR-00 0 9 5
, 1997 WL 746021 (Tenn. Crim. App., at J ackson, Dec . 3, 1997) affirmed after remand
, Sta te v . Co lli e r V . H arris , No. W1999-02144-CCA-RM-CD, 1999 WL 1532323 (Tenn. Crim. App., at J ackson, Dec

. 29, 1999), perm. app. de nied (Tenn. 2000)

. InHa rri s , th is c ourt

dis c us se d th e iss ue a s f

oll ow s:

Def endant a rg ues that the extension of the “f elony ” murde r rule to his convic tion of fi rs t de g re e mur de r i n th e pe rp e tr a tio n of mis de me ano r t he ft vio la te s th e du e pr oc e ss and equa l protection cla

uses of th e Four

teenth Amendme nt of the United States Constit ution. Our Supreme Court re cently upheld t he constitutionality of this statute. State v. W

alker , 893 S.W .2d 429 (Tenn. 1995) . Whil e De fenda nt challeng es the issue on a sl ightly differ ent basis due to his conviction of first deg ree murder in the perpe tration of a misdemeanor theft, the result is the same. The leg islative intent of
t h e s t at u t e i s t o b e a s ce rt ai n edfr o m t h e n atu ra l an d o rd i n ary m ea n i n g o f t h e l an gu age used. Car

so n Cre e k Va c ati on Re

so rts
, In c

. v . S

tat e , 865 S.W .2d 1, 2 (Tenn. 1993) ; Nat ion al Ga s Di

str ibu tor s, In c . v . S tat e , 8 0 4 S

. W

. 2 d 6 6 (T en n

. 1 9 9 1 ). T h e l an gu age of the statute is such that f irst deg ree murder is “ [a] rec kless killing of anothe r committed in the perpe tration of, or attempt to perpetrate any

. . . theft . . .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202( a)( 2). Def endant asser

ts that be cause the amount stolen was only thirty dollars ($30.00), t h e t h ef t cannot r esult in a felony murder c onviction. The cle ar an d p la in me an in g o f

th e la n g u a g e in th e s tatute is th a t a

r e c k le s s k il ling committed in the perpe trati o n o f any theft is considere d first deg ree murder,

re g ard le ss o f t

he mon e tary

va lue of th e pro perty

wh ic h is the su

bje c t of the the ft

. Whil e the te rm

“ fe lony mur de r” ha s lon g be e n a

te rm us e d to de sc ri be the statut e in question, we note that the term “f elony murder” does not appe ar in the c urre nt version of the Code. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-202. . . . .

Ha rri s , 1997 WL 746021, at *9.-9-

Plain error

revie w extends only to a

n obvious e rror which aff

ects the substantial r ights of the de fe nd ant. Th e c ri te ri a fo r fi nd ing pla in er ro r ar e dif

fi c ult to s a tis fy . We wi ll n ot r e c og nize pla in

err or unless the followingfive fa ctors ar e est ab l i s h ed: (1) the rec ord must clear ly establish what

occur red in the tria l court; (2) a clea r and une quivocal rule of l aw must have bee n brea ched; ( 3) a substantial rig ht of t he defenda nt must have been adverse ly aff ecte d; (4) the acc used did not waive the issue for ta ctical r easons; and ( 5) consider ation of t he error is nece ssary to do substantial just ice

. Sta te v . S mi th
, 2 4 S

. W

. 3 d

2 7 4
, 2 8 2

- 8 3 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 0 ) ( qu o t i n g State v. Adk isson , 899 S.W .2d 626, 641-42 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1994)). All five f actor s must be established, and c onsideration of a ll five fac tors is unnece ssary

if any one fa ctor indicates that relief is not warra

nted. Id. at 2 8 3. The defe ndant has the burden of per suasion reg ardingplain err or cla ims. See United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993).

Given our previous determination of t his issue in Ha rri s , it is our view that the def endant ha s not car ried his burde n of demonstrating plain e rror . Specifica lly , we note that the defe ndant has not sh o wn t hat a c lear

and unequivoc al rule of law wa s brea ched, or

that a substantial rig ht of the de fe nd a nt w a s a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d

. W e w o u l d a l s o p o i n t o u t t h a t i t i s t h e u n l aw f u l k i l l i ng in pe rp e tr a tio n o f t

he the ft and no t an inc re a se in m on e tary va lue that make s th is o ff e ns e “ inh e re ntl y dang erous” and re quires appr opriate p u n is hme nt i n

relation to it s seriousness. Ac cording ly , the issue is w ith ou t me ri t.

II. Th irte enth Juror

The de fenda

nt conten d s t hat the trial c ourt failed to a ppropriate ly

exercise its role a s thi rt e e nth jur or and re qu e sts a

ne w tri a l.

Rul e 33 of

the Te nn e sse e Rul e s of Cri min a l Proc e dure imp os e s a duty on the tr ia l c ourt

to

serve as the thirtee nth juror in ever y criminal ca se. See State v . Carter , 896 S.W .2d 119, 122 (Tenn. 1995). I f the trial c ourt disag ree s with the jury about the we ight of the evidence, Rul e 33 author izes the trial court to g rant a new trial. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 33(d). The trial court is not requir ed to make

an ex plicit statement on the record, but instead, when the t rial court simply overr ules a motion for new trial, this court may presume that the trial court ha s serve d as the thirtee nth juror and a pproved the j ury ’s verdict. Sta te v . M oa ts , 906 S.W .2d 431, 434 (Tenn. 1995). Only if the re cord c ontains statements by

the trial court indicating disag ree ment or dissatisfac tion with the jury ’s ver dict or evidenc ing the trial court’ s ref usal to act a s the thirteenth juror ma y the re viewing court re verse the trial court’ s judgme nt. Carter , 896 S.W .2d at 122.

At the c o n c lu s io n o f th e h e ar in g o n th e mo ti o n f o r n e w tr ia l, th e tr ia l c o u rt o v e r ruled the de fe nd ant’ s mo tio n f

or ne w tri a l. I

n d oin g so , th e c ourt

ma de the fo llo wi ngre mark s:

Th e Co urt has re vie we d th e Mo tio n f or Ne w T ri a l. I

he ard y our a rgume nts respe ctively and believe that there was sufficie nt e vidence to convict the def endant

. . . . That the judge
, as thirteenth juror, should not have found an y t h i n g d i ffe rent tha nw h a t t

h e ju r y f o u n d

. T h a t t

h e r e w a s n o r e a s o nf

o r th e ju d g e in

th is p arti c u la r-10-

case to act as a t h irteenth juror beca use the jur[y ] came bac k with a unanimous

ve rd ic t. T hat th e mot ion fo r Jud g me nt o f A c qu itt a l w as pro perly de nie d b y

thi s Court

. Contrary to the defendant’s contention, we find nothing in the t rial court’s statements to indicate that the cour t was not satisfied with the verdic t or that it disagr eed w ith the jury about the we ight of

the

e vid e nc e . A c c or din g ly , th e re wa s n o v iol a ti on of Ru le 33(d ), and the de fe nd ant i s n ot e nti tle d to relief on this iss ue.

III . M ot ion to Suppr e ss

The de fenda

nt challeng es the a dmissibi lity of his statement to police. Spec ifically , the defe ndant ar g ues that the trial c ourt err ed in de ny ing the motion to suppress his state ment to police be c a us e hi s st ate me nt w a s n ot k no wi ng ly and vo lun tari ly

g ive n. Th e de fe nd ant a sse rt s th a t hi s int e llectua l and

me nta l de fi c ie nc ie s p re c lud e d a va lid wa ive r o f h is Miranda rig hts and the police

c oe rc e d h im i nto g ivi nga state me nt.

At the supp r e s sion hearing , Marvin F rac tion, a police off icer in Marianna , Arka

nsas, testified that he kn e w the de fe nd ant. Af te r l e arn ingtha

t th e Me mph is Pol ic e De pa rtme nt ha d iss ue d a

n a rr e st

wa rr ant f or the de fe nd ant, Of

fi c e r F ra c tio n co nta c te d th e de fe nd ant’ s r e la tiv e s and a sk e d th e m to have the defe ndant contac t him. Shortly there afte r, the de fenda

nt came to the police station. The defe ndant denied a

ny involvement in the murder of the v i ct i m , David Cooper. O ffice r F rac tion

re c a lle d tha t he pla c e d the de fe nd ant u nd e r a rr e st a nd a dv ise d th e de fe nd ant o f h is Miranda ri g hts

. At the tim e , th e de fe nd ant a pp e are d to be c a lm a

nd wa s a c tin g no rm a l.

Mark Miller, a

police off

icer with the Memphis Poli ce D epar tment, tes t i fi ed that he and another office r transpor

ted the def

endant ba ck to Memphis a fter the defe ndant waive d extradition. Offic er Miller r ecal l ed t h at the def endant a nd the other police office r talked spor adica lly about various topics during the trip back to Me mphis. Offic er Miller rec ounted that the defen d an t was

c a l m an d c o o p e r at i v e an d

d i d n o ta p p e ar t o b e d e f i c i e n ti nan y w ay.
Serg eant John Oliver of the Memphis Police De partment testified that when the de fenda nt

arr ive d at th e po lic e statio n h e a dv ise d th e de fe nd ant o f h is Miranda rig hts. Offic er O liver re called that he a lso a sk e d th e de fe nd ant t o r e a d th e a dv ic e of ri g hts fo rm

ou t lo ud and the de fe nd ant d id s o without any

difficulty . Offic er O liver fur ther noted that the defe ndant sig ned and dated the advice of ri g hts fo rm . T he re a ft e r, Of fi c e r O liv e r a

nd ano the r p oli c e of

fi c e r i nte rv iewed th e def

e nd a nt i n a lar g e room re g ardingthe homicide of the victim, David Cooper. Ac cordingto Office r Oliver, the de fe nd ant a c kn ow le dg e d th a t he kn e w the vic tim and ha d b e e n at hi s h ome bu t sa id h e le ft and did not know any

thing a bout the victim’s de ath. Howeve r, the defe ndant cha ng ed his story

afte r being

c on fr on te d w ithph on e re c or ds wh ic h s ho we d s e ve ra l c a lls we re ma de fr om t he vic tim ’s ph on e to friends of the def endant. The victim then confessed that he shot the vi ctim beca use the victim had

ma de un wa

nte d s e xua l a dv anc e s to wa rd s h im.-11-

Of fi c e r O liv e r r e c ounte d tha t the a tmo sp he re duri ng the int e rv ie w wa s re la xed and inf or ma l. Of fi c e r O liv e r n ote d that the de fe nd ant wa s g ive n fo od or de re d fr om Wen dy ’s and wa s a llo we d to

use the bathroom and g et water whene ver he asked. The defe ndant was made comforta ble and at no tim e wa s th e de fe nd ant t

hr e a te ne d o r c oe rc e d p ri or to g ivi ng a fo rm a l sta te me nt. Of fi c e r Oli ve r s a id that the de fe nd ant wa s adv ise d onc e a g a in o f h is Miranda rig hts pr ior to g iving a for mal statement which wa s transcr ibed by a ty pist. Once transcr ibed, t he defenda nt rea d the statement a

nd made one

c ha ng e , ad di nghis a dd

re ss i n A rk ans a s. Th e de fe nd ant t he n s ig ne d th e state me nt. Ac c or din g to Of fi c e r O liv e r, the de fe nd ant n e ve r g a ve any ind ic a tio n th a t he did

no t un de rs tand

his Miranda ri g hts

.

Dr. F red Steinber g testified that an e x amination of the de fenda nt’s high school education

rec ords and a battery of neuropsycholog ical tests indicated that the de fenda nt had an I Q of 74, whic h was in the b o rd erline r ang e of intellig ence . The tests also re veale d that the def endant r ead at the seventh g rade level but his rea ding c om p rehe nsion was at the third g rade level. Relying on a computer analy sis of the text of the Miranda war nings, D r. Steinbergopined that an unde rstanding of the Miranda wa

rn ing s r e qu ir e d s ome on e wi th a fo ur th g ra de re a din g c omp re he ns ion le ve l. Howeve r, Dr. Steinberg ac knowledg ed that the c omputer ana ly sis was susceptible to a ma rg in of

e rr or . D r. Ste inb e rgop ine d th a t th e de fe nd ant had a te nd e nc y to s olv e c omp le x pro ble ms w ith sim ple so lut ion s, wh ic h o ft e n r e su lte d in po or jud g me nt.

After hear ing the fore g oing e vidence , the trial cour t ruled that the stateme nt was g iven

vo lun tari ly

a nd wa s n ot t a ke n in

vio la tio n o f t

he de fe nd ant’ s Miranda rig hts. The cour t stated the fo llo wi ngin p e rt ine nt p art :

Her e, the f

acts re veal that the D efe ndant, with o u t an y prompting f

rom the police, voluntarily arr ived at the M aria nna Arkansas Police station af ter he lear ned he wa s wanted f

or questioning . The De fenda nt wa s ap p ri s ed of his rights at eve ry jun c tur e inc lud inga ft e r h e wa s arr e ste d, pr ior to the p re -s ta te me nt i nte rv ie w w ith Serg eant Oliver

and Serg eant Sims
, and ag ain befor e the f ormal statement wa s made. Th e De fe nd ant h a d th e ri g hts fo rm re a d alo ud to him , the de fe nd ant r e a d th e ri g hts fo rm a lou d to the of

fi c e rs and fi na lly , th e De fe nd ant r e a d th e ri g hts fo rm qu ie tly to himself. The Def

endant made no attempt to a sk questions about the rig hts form nor did he ask for

a lawy er. A ll three off

icer s who ca

me into contact with the De fenda nt t es t i fi edt h at h e ap p ea re d n o rm al an d

wa s co h er en tan d

re s p o n s i v e t o qu es t i o n i n g. When the Def

endant wa s g iven the opportunity to look over his formal state ment for any neede d corr ections, he a dded his addre ss an d p l ac ed h is init ials by it. And

a lth ou g h the he art of the De fe nd ant’ s argume nt s e e ms t o b e that hi s w a ive r o f r ig hts was not voluntary

and knowingdu e to possible cog nitive dy sfunction ca used by injuries to his he ad, the expert he proff ere d ag ree d with the State’s attorne y when he argued that any

problems the De fenda

n t may have ha d wer e not ca

used by a hea d injury . I n fac t, the expert never testified t hat he found any evidenc e of a deg ener ative br a in d iso rd e r b ut r a the r t e sti fi ed th at th e De fe nd ant h a d a low I Q s c or e and

his

rea ding le vel was at the seventh g rade level whe rea s his compre hension was at a third-12-

g rade level. Ac cordingto the expe rt , the Miranda war ning w hich the De fenda

nt signe d is at the fourth g rade level, which is not sig n i fica ntly highe r than the De fe nd ant’ s re a din g c omp re he ns ion le ve l and a c tua lly low e r tha n his re a din g le ve l.

. . .

. . . .

. . . The re cord is fr ee of any sug g estion other than a n asser tion by the Def endant in his Motion to S uppress Statements that police re sorted to phy sical or psy cholog ical pre ssure to elicit the statements from him. To bolster his alleg ation of

coer cion, the only

thing the D efe ndan t p o i n t s t o i s the fac t that he was taken to a “small room” a

nd “enc losed with various off icer s.” In real i t y , the Def endant wa s taken to a sta

ndard inter

view room in the homicide office wher e he wa s interviewe d by two office rs . . . .

I t is un dis pu te d tha

t the De fe nd ant wa s a de qu a te ly a pp ri se d of

his Miranda rig hts before the interviewby having them rea d to him and he himself r eadingthem

a lou d to the of

fi c e rs . D ur ingthe int e rv ie w, th e Defe nd ant w a s o ff e re d a me a l,

a llo we d wate r, a llo we d to us e the re str oo m w he n a sk e d, and ne ve r r e qu e ste d to us e the telephone nor stop the int er v i ew. Further more, be fore the Def

endant’ s formal
state me nt w a s ta

ke n, he wa s ag a in re -a dv ise d of his ri g hts and take n to a

c ub ic le in an open are a in the main off ice of the homicide bure au to g ive the stateme nt. . . . L astly , from the time the Def endant arr ived at the homicide off ice until the statement was sig ned, only fo u r hours had pa ssed. These fac ts hardly mirror the situations wher e the c ourt has found ove r over rea ching measure s by

the police. . . .

(Interna l footnotes and citations to authority omitted).

When review ing the trial court’ s ruling on a m otion to suppress, the court’s f indings of f

act

are pr e su me d c or

re c t un le ss the e vid e nc e c on ta ine d in the re c or d p re po nd e rate s a g a ins t th e m. See State v. Daniel , 12 S.W .3d 420, 4 23 (Tenn. 2000) . “Que stions of credibility of the witnesse s, the weig ht and value of the evidence, and resolution of conf licts in the evidence are matters entr usted to the trial judge as the trier of fac t.” State v. Lawrence
, 154 S.W .3d 71, 75 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting State v. Odom , 9 28 S.W. 2d 18 , 2 3 ( Te nn . 1 99 6) ). Th e pr e va ili ngpa rt y is e nti tle d to the str on g e st leg itimate view of the e vidence and all re asonable and leg itimate infere nces that may be dra wn from that evidenc e . State v. Hick s , 55 S.W .3d 515, 52 1 (T en n

. 2 0 0 1). Howe ver, a ppellate r eview of

a tr ia l c ourt ’s c on c lus ion s of law and a pp lic a tio n of law to fa c ts on a mot ion to s up pr e ss e vid e nc e is a de novo r eview. See State v . Nicholson
, 18 8 S.W. 3d 64 9, 65 6 ( Te nn . 2 00 6) ; State v. W alton , 41 S.W .3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001)

.

Both the U nited States and Tenne ssee Constitutions protec t the accu sed fr om compelled self-inc rimination. See U.S. Const. amend. V; Tenn. Const. art. I
, § 9. As a re sult, poli ce of fice rs

are prohibited from using statements made by the accused during custodial interrog ation unless the-13-

a c c us e d h a s b e e n p re vio us ly a dv ise d o f h is o r h e r c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht t o r e ma in s ile nt and ri g ht t o

an a t t o r n e y , an d t h e a c c u s e d kn o w i n g l y , v o l u n t ar i l y an d i n t e l l i g e n t l y w a i v e s t h o s e ri g hts

. See Miranda v. Arizona
, 3 8 4 U

. S

. 4 3 6
, 4 4 4 ( 1 9 6 6 )

. W h e t h e r w a i v e r o f a r i g h ti s v o l u n t ar i l y, k

n o w i n g l y, and intellige ntly

made is dete rmined by the t otality of t he circumstance s under which the rig ht was waived. See State v . Middlebrooks , 840 S.W .2d 317, 326 (Tenn. 1992)

.

“A d ef en d an t’s subjective pe rce ption alone is not sufficient to justify a conc lusion of involuntariness in the constitu t i onal sense.” Sta te v . S mi th , 933 S.W .2d 450, 455 (Tenn. 1996) (citations and inter

nal quotations omitt ed). “ The prima ry consideration in determining the admissibili ty

of the e vidence is w h et h er t h e confession is an ac t of fre e will.” Sta te v . B e rry , 141 S.W .3d 549, 577-78 (Te nn. 2004). A c onfession i s not voluntary when “ the behavior of the state ’s law enf orce ment officia ls was such a s to overbea r” the will of an ac cused an d “bringabout confe ssions not freely s el f- d etermined.” Id

. (c i t i n g Sta te v . Ke lly , 603 S.W .2d 726, 728 (Tenn. 1980)). In deter

mining whe ther a

defe ndant validly

waived his rights, the c ourt must consider the following fac tors: (1) the de fenda nt’s ag e, educ ation or intellige nce le vel, o r p re v i ous experience with the judicial sy stem; ( 2) the repe ated and prolong ed nature of the interrog ation, including t he leng th of detention prior to the confe ssion; (3) the lack of any advice reg arding h i s co n s t i t u tional rig hts; (4) the unnec essar y delay in bring ing the defe ndant bef ore a mag istrate prior to the confe ssion; (5) the def

endant’ s intox ication and ill health at the t ime the confession was made ; (6) the depr i v at i o n of food, slee p or medica l attention; (7) any phy sical abuse or threa

ts made to the defe ndant. See State v . Huddleston , 924 S.W. 2d 66 6, 67 1 ( Te nn . 1 99 6) ; State v. Re adus , 764 S.W .2d 770, 774 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988)

.

I n the instant case , the trial cour t found that while the de fenda nt had a low I Q, the def

endant’ s eig hth g r a d e r e a d in g le v e l an d th ir d g r a d e r e a d in g c o mp r e h e n s io n le v e l a ll o w e d h im to r ead a nd understand the Miranda war nings g iven. The c ourt found that the def endant wa s coher ent and responsive to poli ce questioning. The court also found that the de fenda nt exhi bited intelligenc e and compre hension of his statement by rea ding ove r his formal statem ent and a dding his a ddress a nd ini tia lin g the c ha

ng e . In a dd iti on , th e re c ord est ablish e s th a t va ri ou s p oli c e of

fi c e rs re pe a te dly inf or me d th e de fe nd ant o f h is Miranda ri gh t s , t h at a w ai v er o f r i gh t s wa s m em o ri al i z edi nwr i t i n g, and that the de fenda

nt rea d the waive r of r ights for m aloud and to himself. The r ecor d further shows that th e de fe nd ant ha d the a bil ity fo r an a ly

tic a l thou g ht a s h e c ha

ng e d h is s tor

y wh e n c on fr on te d w ith the vic tim ’s ph on e re c or ds and a tte mpt e d to c a st h ims e lf a s th e vic timof

un wa nte d s e xua l a dv a nc e s. I t is clear that the trial court took i n t o co n s i d eration the defe ndant’s mental state , education, and int e lli g e nc e in f

ind ingtha

t th e de fe nd ant’ s st a te me nt w a s k no wi ngand vo lu nt ary . T he c ourt a lso found that the police office rs used no c oerc ive tactics w hen interrog ating the def endant. The evidenc e in the re cord doe s not preponder ate a g ainst the trial cour t’s finding s that the defe ndant was

a dv ise d o f h is Miranda rig hts, that he knowing ly waived those rig hts, and that he voluntarily g ave

a s t a t e m e n t

. T h e r e f

o r e , t h e d e f

e n d an t ’ s s t a t e m e n t w a s p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d an d h e i s n o t e n t i t l e d to relief on this iss ue.

IV . A dm iss ion of Ex pe r t T e st im ony-14-

Th e de fe nd ant c on te nd s th a t th e tr ial cou rt erred in q ua lif y ingDa vid Cup p a s a

n e xpe rt in handwr iting ana ly sis and Nathan G athrig ht as an e x pert in fing erpr int analy sis. The defe ndant cites McD aniel v. CSX Transp., Inc
., 955 S.W .2d 257 (Tenn. 1997), and asser ts that Cupp and Gathrig ht

wer e not prope rly

qualified a s exp er t s beca use their wor

k had not bee n tested, their r espec tive

rese arc h was ins u f

f ic ie nt, th e ir

opinions had not been subjec t to peer- revie wed studies or publication, and their r esea

rch disclose d no potential rate of er ror.

The de cision to admit expert testimony is within the discre tion of the trial cour t and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discre tion. Se e Coev . S tat e , 17 S.W .3d 193, 226-27 (Te nn. 2000); Sta te v . B all

ar d
, 855 S.W .2d 557, 562 (Tenn. 1993) . “The abuse of discretion standa

rd conte mplates that befor e re versa l the rec ord must show that the co u rt ‘a p p l ied an incor rec t leg al standar d, or

re a c he d a de c isi on whi c h is a g a ins t lo g ic or re a so nin g that c a

us e d a n in jus tic e to t

he pa rt y complaining .’” State v. Coley
, 3 2 S

. W

. 3 d 8 3 1
, 8 3 3 (T en n

. 2 0 0 0 ) ( qu o t i n g State v. Shirley , 6 S.W .3d 243, 247 (Tenn. 1999) ), overruled on other grounds by State v. Cope land , 226 S.W .3d 287 (Tenn. 2007).

Rules 702 and 703 of the Te nnessee Rules of Evidence gover n the admissibilit y

of expert testimony and ser ve to scre en out expert opinions that are ba sed on u n t rust worthy fac ts or that do
not substantially

assist the trier of f

act in dete rmining a

n issue. See M

cDaniel
, 955 S.W .2d at 266. Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Ev ide nc e 70 2 p ro vid e s:

I f scientific , technica l, or ot h er specialized knowledg e will substantially assist the
tr ie r o f f a c t to un de rs tand

the e vid e nc e or

to d e te rm ine a

fa c t in iss ue , a wi tne ss qualified a s an expert by

knowledg e, skill, e x p er i en ce , training , or educ ation may testify in the form of a

n opinion or otherwise.

I n addition, Tennesse e Rule of Evide nce 703 r equire s the expert’s opinion to be suppor ted by tr us tw or thy fa c ts o r d a ta

“ of a ty pe re a so na

bly re lie d u po n b y e xpe rt s in

the part icular f

ie ld i n forming opinions or infere nces upon the subject.” Severa l non-def initive factors ma

y be conside red by the trial cour

t when eva luating the reliability of the e x pert’s opinion: (1) w hether the data a nd the methodology

upon which the e x pert for mulates an opinion has bee n tested; (2) w hether the evidenc e has bee n subjected to pe er r eview or publication; ( 3) whether a potential rate of err or is known; (4) whether the evidenc e is g ener ally accepted in the community involved in the body

of spec ialized knowledg e; and ( 5) whe ther the e x pert’s r esea rch in the f

iel d has bee n conducte d independe nt of litigation. McD aniel , 9 55 S.W. 2d a t 26 5; s ee also State v . Steve ns , 78 S.W .3d 817, 834 (Tenn. 2002). Howeve r, the application of these f actor s may

or may not be nec essar

y dependingupon the i ssue, the expert’s e x pertise, a nd the subject of the expert’s opinion. Steve ns , 7 8 S. W. 3 d a t 8 3 3. I ndeed, the deter

minative fac tors are whether the witness is qualified to g ive an infor med opinion on the subject at issue, and whethe r the re asoning or m ethodolog y underlying the expert’s opinion i s sufficie ntly

reliable

. Id

. a t 8 3 4

. N o ta b ly
, “ th e c o u rt ma

y ma k e a f in d in g o f r e li a

b il it y if the expert’s conc lusions are suff iciently straig htforwa

rd and supported by a ra

tional expl anation which

rea sonable [persons] could acc ept as more corr ect than not c orre ct.” Id

.-15-

Be fore rende ring an opinion reg ardingthe handwr iting re sults, C upp testified that in 1999 he had r ece ived t raining in handwriting analy sis by the Secr et Service Aca demy . Cupp noted that he had utilized his training on many occa sions

. He t es tified that for the last eig ht y ear s, he had conducted handwr iting ana ly sis for the F eder al B urea u of Investig ation (F BI ), the Sec ret Servic e,

sever al law e nforc ement ag encie s in Tennessee , and seve ral ba nks and lending instit utions. Cupp also testified that he w as a member of two profe ssional associations: The National Association of Do c ume nt E xami ne rs and Th e Natio na l A sso c ia tio n o f F ra ud Spe c ia lis ts. Cupp n ote d th a t th e se associations re quired twe nty hours of c redited c ourses a nd ong oing pr actice . Cupp acknowle dg ed that he wa s unable to bec ome ce rtified by the Amer ican Bo ar d o f Fo rensic D ocument Examiners beca use he la cked a

colleg e deg ree

. Gathrig ht testified that he tra ined at the F BI Aca demy

in 1976 and worke d as a f inge rprint examiner since be ing tr ained. He also noted that during his care er he completed numer ous training

course s including two advanc ed finge rprint i dentification course s in 1990. Gathrig ht testified that he wa s cer

tified by the state of Tenne ssee to instruc t on latent fing erpr int identific ation. Gathrig ht furth e r n o te d th a t h e h a d

te s ti f ie d n u me r o u s ti me s a t t

r ia l a s ane xp e rt i nth e ar e a o f f in g e r print examination and identification. Acc ording to Gathrig ht, a 2000 FB Istudy showed that the probability of two fing erpr ints be ing the same was one in two hundr ed billion. However , Gathrig ht d i d n o tc i t e t h e n a m e o f

t h e s tu dy n o r

e x p r e s s t h e m e t h o d o l o g y u n d e r l yi n g t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e s tu dy.

The trial c ourt found Cupp and Gathrig ht to b e ex p er t s based upon their profe ssional experience and wor

k in their respe ctive fie lds an d u p o n t h e cour t’s understandingthat fing erpr int identification and ha

ndwriting analy sis we re g ener ally acc epted as reliable

. The c ourt furthe r noted that the cr edibility

of the e x perts’ te stimony

and how it applied to the ca se wa s ultim ately for the jur

y to d e c ide . “ Th e ob

je c tiv e of the tr ia l c ourt ’s g a te -k e e pin g fu nc tion is to ens ure th a t ‘ an e xpe rt , whether basing testimony

upon profe ssional studies or persona l ex p er i ence , employ s in the courtroom the sa

me level of

intellectual rig or that ch ar ac t er i z es t he pra ctice of an expert in the rele vant field.’” Br own v . Cr ow n Eq ui pm e nt C or p ., 181 S.W .3d 268, 275 (Tenn. 2005)

. Acc ording ly , we disce rn no abuse of discre tion by the trial court in qualify

ing Cupp a

nd Gathrig ht as experts in their re spective f ields as nothing in the r ecor d demonstrates that the court’s de cision

was re ndere d “ag ainst logic or re asoning .”

V. Adm issib ility of

Evid ence

The de fenda

nt argues that the trial c ourt err ed in admitting a let t er p u rported to have bee n written by

the def endant without a pr oper showingof cha in o f cu s t o d y and without proper authentication of the letter. The st at e co unters, ar g uing that the letter wa s proper ly authenticated. Havingrevie wed the r ecor d on appea l, we ag ree with the state.

Gene rally , the admissibilit y of evide nce r ests within the discretion of the tria l court, and the court’s de cision to admit evidence will be reve rsed only upon the showing of a b u s e of that discretion. See, e .g., State v. Cannon , 254 S.W. 3d 28 7, 29 5 ( Te nn . 2 00 8) ; State v. Van Tran , 864 S.W .2d 4 6 5
, 4 7 7 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 3 )

. A n a b u s e o f d is c r e ti o n o c c u r s w h e n th e tr ia l c o u rt a p p li e s an-16-

incorre ct leg al standar d or re ache s a conc lusio n that is ill og ical or unr easona ble and c auses a

n injusti ce to the pa

rty complaining

. Se e, e.g ., Ho we ll v . S tat e , 185 S.W .3d 319, 337 (Tenn. 2006)

. Rule 901 of t he Tennessee Rules of Evidence states as follows: “The require ment of authe ntication or identification as a condition prec edent to admissibility is satisfied by

evidenc e suff

icient to the court to support a f

inding by the trier of fac t that the m atter in question is what it s proponent c laims.” The methods of a

uthentication or identification in Rule 901(b) a re various and include but are not limi te d to : ( 1 ) te s ti mo n y f r o m a w it n e s s w it h kn o w le d g e th a t a matt e r is w h a t it is c laimed, (2) “compa rison by the trier of

fac t or by

expert witnesses wi t h specimens whic h have be en authenticated,” a

nd (3) “ [a] ppear ance , contents, substance , i n t erna l patterns, or othe r distinctive char acte ristics, taken in conjunc tion with circumstance s.” Tenn. R. Evid. 901(b) (1), ( 3), (4)

.

Proof of chain of

custody is another method of

identification or a

uthentication. See State v

. Ferguson , 741 S.W .2d 125, 127 (Tenn. Crim. A p p

. 1 9 8 7 ) (st ating that tang ible evidenc e may be proper ly introduced e ither whe n identified by a witness or the chain of custody is established). “T he purp os e of

the c ha in o f c us tod

y is t o ‘ de mon str a te that th e re ha s been no tampe ri ng , lo ss, substitut ion, or m istake wit h respe ct t o the evidenc e.’” Sta te v . S c ott , 33 S.W .3d 746, 760 (Tenn. 2 0 0 0 ) ( qu o t i n g State v. Braden , 8 67 S.W. 2d 75 0, 75 9 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 93 )) . H ow e ve r, the state is n ot r e qu ir e d to pr ov e the ide nti ty of tang ibl e e vid e nc e be y on d a ll p os sib ili ty of do ub t, n e ith e r i s th e s tate r e qu ir e d

to e xc lu d e e v e r

y p o s s ib il it

y o f ta mp e r ing

. Id . Rather, “ the evidenc e may be admitted when the c ircumstance s surrounding the evidence reasona bly establish the identity

of the evidenc e and its integ rity .” Id .; see also State v. H olloman , 835 S.W .2d 42, 46 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

At trial, Ronald Goodwin, an investig ator with the District Attorne y ’s Off ice, testified that he an d O f

f i c e r B u t t e r i c k o f t h e S h e l b y C o u n t y S h e r i f f ’ s D e p art m e n t w e r e i n t e r

v i e w i n g a n in ma te from the loca l jail as part of an investigation unrelated t o the def endant’ s case . After

the interview
, Offic er B utterick a ccompa nied the inmate ba ck to his cell, at which time, the inmate g ave O ffice r Butter ick the letter

in question. Office r B utterick c aug ht up with Goodwin at the Sheriff ’s Off ice and g ave him the letter . Goodwin re called that he made a photocopy of t he letter , then passed the orig inal lett er o n t o s o meone in the District Attorne y ’s Off ice whe re it wa s sent to the Tenne ssee Bur eau of I nvestig ation for f

inge rprint testing . Whil e on the stand, G oodwin was shown the le tter in question and identified the letter as the letter

that had come into his poss ession.

Th e re a ft e r, Da

vid Cup p w a s p re se nte d by the state and qu a lif ie d b y the c ourt a s an e xpe rt

in handwr iting ana ly sis. Cupp opined that the def endant wa s the author of

the letter in que stion. Cupp testified that he r eac hed this conclusion af ter c omparing portions of the printed ha ndwriting contained in th e le tt e r to kn o w nh an dw r it in g e xe mp la r s f r o m t h e d e f e n d an t. Sp e c if

ic a ll y , Cupp noted that the letter

in question c o n t ai n ed t h e def endant’ s printed sig nature . Cupp compare d the sim ila ri tie s o f t he sig natur e in the le tte r w iththe de fe nd ant’ s p ri nte d s ig natur e on his wa ive r o f r ig hts form, sig ned stateme nt to police, and t wo inmate g rieva nce f orms filled out and sig ned by the de fe nd ant. B a se d o n G oo dw in a nd Cup p’ s te sti mony , th e tr ia l c ourt a llo we d the le tte r a lon g wi th the known exemplars to be e ntere d into evidence . The letter beg ins with the following introduc tion: “What’s up B rother[,] my name is L E ON FLAN NEL . . . I ’m from Mar ianne Ar kansas. I ’m-17-

curr entl y i n j ail in Memphis, Tennessee beca use of a snitch.” The le tter re fer s to the defe ndant’s former g irlfriend, K eeiyona Hill, as t he sni tch. The letter also notes the victim, David Cooper , by

name and re la te s h owthe a

uth or of the le tte r k ill e d th e vic tim

.

As to the defe ndant’s asse rtion that the state fa iled to establish chain of c ustody , we note that pr oo f o f c ha in o f c us tod

y is re qu ir e d only wh e n the e vid e nc e of fe re d is not re a dil y

ide nti fi a ble or is susceptible to alter ation and ther e is rea son to b el i ev e t h at it may have be en tamper ed with,

s u b s t i t u t e d
, o r a l t er ed

. Ac co rd i n g t o R u l e 9 0 1
, t h er e a re m an y m et h o d s fo r a u t h en t i ca t i n g a d o c u m e n t

. N o n e t h e l e s s , w e d i s c e r n n o f a i l u r e b y t h e s t a t e i ne s t a

b l i s h i n g p r o o f

o f c h a i no f c u s t o dy. As noted above , Goodwin testi fi ed t h at t he orig inal letter wa s g iven to him. W hile on the stand, Goodwin examined the letter in que stion and confirme d that the letter befor e him wa s the same letter he had r ece ived. Ther efor e, Goodwin’ s testim ony rea sonably

established the identity

of the letter

and its int e g ri ty . T he de fe nd ant’ s a sse rt ion in t his re g ard is w ith ou t me ri t.

We now addre ss the crux of the issue, that is, w hether the letter was prope rly authenticated. Th e de fe nd ant a sse rt s th a t th e le tte r w a s n ot p ro pe rl y a uth e nti cat ed bec a

us e the e xemp lars / sp e c ime n s u s e d f

o r c o mp ar i s o n w e r e n o t p r o p e r l y a u t h e n t i c a t e d an d w e r e t o o f e w i n n u m b e r

to support Cupp’s opinion that the de fenda nt w as the author of the letter. H aving revie wed the r ecor d,

we a re f ully satisfied that the letter

was prope rly

authenticated. Rule 901(b)( 2) per mitted Cupp, an expert witness, to a

uthenticate the letter afte r compar ing its ha ndwritten text t o au thenticated han dw r itte n s p e c im e n s f

r o m th e d e f

e n d an t, a s w a s d o n e in th is c a s e

. T h e d e f e n d an t pr esents no authority for his asse rtion that the s t at e m u s t produce a thre shold number of known

e xemp lars /sp e c ime ns be fo re an e xpe rt wi tne ss c an ma

ke a va lid c omp ari so n. Th e reco rd c le a rl y ref lects that the de fenda

nt’s handwr iting spec imens contained i n t h e waiver of rig hts form and

s tatement to police wer e proper ly authenticated throug h the testimony of Serg eant J ohn Oliver, a wi tne ss w ithkn ow le dg e . T e nn

. R. E vid . 9 01 (b )( 2) . In a dd iti on , it is c omp le te ly

a c c e pta ble to o bta in handwr it in g an d

s ig n a tu r e e xe mp la

r s f o r c o mp ar is o nf

r o m p u b li c r e c o r d s an d

o f f ic ia l f il e s , a s the
state did w hen it use d the defe ndant’s inmate g rieva nce f orms. See id. 901(b)( 7). More over, e ven assuming othe rwise, we note that the letter contained spe cific a

nd distinctive infor

mation a bout the crime a s well as per sonal matters whic h only the defe ndant would know. Thus, the conte nts of the letter provide d support for the c onclusion that it was written by the def endant a s the state cla imed. See id. 901. Acc ording ly , the court did not abuse its discr etion in a dmitti ng the letter beca use there was suff icient evidenc e to support the finding that the def endant a uthored the le tter in question.

IV. Im proper Com m ents and In struct ion

The de fend an tco mp l ai n s t h at t h e t ri al co u rt m ad e i mp ro p er co m m en t s i nqu al i fy i n g an expert witness in the prese nce of the jury . The de fenda

nt sugg ests that the cour

t’s comments diminished the c re dib ili ty

of de fe ns e c ouns e l.

Con tr ary to t he de fe nd ant’ s c omp la int
, we fi nd no thi ngimp ro pe r i n th e c ourt ’s c omm e nts

. I n ruling that a witness qualifie d as an e x pert, the c ourt first not ed that def ense c ounsel had done an excellent job questioning the w itness pursuant to the McD aniel fac tors. The c ourt then noted that-18-

it was rely

ing on a more rec ent ca se discussing the application of the McD aniel fac tors. Next, the court found that t h e wi t n es s wa s an ex pert pursua nt to “case law and . . . T ennesse e Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, but the ultimate dec ision as what [the witness] say s and how it applies to the

case is ulti mately

up to the jury .” The court then a nnounced:

You wil l g e t a

ju r y in s tr u c ti o nf r o m t h is Co u rt a s to h o w y o uar e to e v a lu a te the opinion of an expert. All Ihave done at this point i s to say that he is qualified a s an expert to te stify at this trial

. . . . I have not g iven an opinion a s to what he’s g oing to testify to, as to how it applies to this case. I ’m o n l y saying that he has be en tender ed and the Court has ac cepte d him as an expe rt i n the ar ea of fing erpr int examination.

Mo re ov e r, the re c or d e sta bli sh e s th a t th e de fe nd ant did no t ob je c t to the c ourt ’s c omm e nts to the jury

or ra ise this issue in a motion for new trial. Ac cording ly , the def endant has wa ived the iss ue fo r a

pp e llate re vie w an d noth ingin t he re c or d s ug g e sts that th e de fe nd ant i s e nti tle d to pla in

err or re view. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36(a), Te nn. R. App. P. 3(e); Tenn. R. App. P. 36.

The de fenda

nt also complains that the “manne r in which the tria l [ court] ga ve the jury instructions for murder

in the perpe tration of thef

t a nd preme ditated murder

cre ated a situation where

a juror might have believed that the [court] was commenting on the streng th of the evidenc e.” T he de fe nd ant s ub mit s th a t th e c ourt pla c e d mor e e mph a sis on a g uil ty ve rd ic t th an a

no t g uil ty

ve rd ic t.

We have re vie we d the jur y ins tr uc tio ns and

fi nd that th e tr ia l c ourt

g a ve e qu a l e mph a sis to all possible verdicts, and spe cifica lly instructed the jury

that if they

found that the state ha d failed to meet its burden of proof on all char g es and lesser- included offenses, they wer e to re turn a ve rdict of “ no t g uil ty .” No thi ngin t he re c or d in dic a te s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt ’s ins tr uc tio ns c a us e d the jur

y to infer that the court was in favor of or a g ainst the defe ndant. Fur thermore , we note that the defe ndant has wa ived his rig ht to raise this issue on appea l beca use he failed to object to t he instruction at trial and fa iled to raise the issue in a motion for new tria l. See Te nn

. R. A pp . P. 36 (a ); Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 3(e) . Acc ording ly , the def endant is not entitled to relief on this iss ue.

VI I. Cum ula ti ve Er r or s

The de fenda

nt contends that the c umulative eff ect of the errors in this case deprive d him of his right to a f

air trial a nd due proc ess. Howe ver, w e find no mer it to thi s claim in light of our pr e vio us de te rm inatio ns

.

CO NC LU SION

Ba sed upon our r eview of the re cord a

nd the par ties' briefs, w e af

firm the judg ments of the
tr ia l c ourt

.-19- ___________________________________ J .C. McL I

N, J UDGE