UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

MICHAEL ALLEN HOLLON, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO. 2:13-CV-52 WL

)

WILLIE PURCELL, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Michael A. Hollon, a pro se prisoner, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (DE 1.)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the complaint and dismiss it if the action

is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who

is immune from such relief. Courts apply the same standard as when addressing a motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006). To

survive dismissal, a complaint must state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bissessur

v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 603. Thus, a “plaintiff

must do better than putting a few words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader,

might suggest that something has happened to her that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson

v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, the

court must bear in mind that “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se

complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 
The complaint is not overly detailed, but it can be discerned from the complaint and

attachments that Mr. Hollon was removed from his prison job afer he failed to give a urine

sample in accordance with prison policy. Mr. Hollon believes that his due process rights were

violated in connection with his termination. (Id. at 3-4.) The law is clear, however, that prisoners

have neither liberty nor property interests in their prison work assignments. Dewalt v. Carter,

224 F.3d 607, 613 (7th Cir. 2000); DeTomaso v. McGinnis, 970 F.2d 211, 212 (7th Cir. 1992).

Thus, Mr. Hollon cannot base a due process claim on the loss of his prison job. See Dewalt, 224

F.3d at 613. Although Mr. Hollon believes the prison’s decision was unfair, “[f]ederal courts are

not boards of appeal in prison administration. Error in carrying out a lawful state program does

not violate the Constitution.” DeTomaso, 970 F.2d at 214. Accordingly, these allegations fail to

state a plausible claim for relief.

Mr. Hollon also claims that he was mistreated in connection with the urine test, because

the guard failed to recognize that he had medical problems which made it difficult for him to

give a sample.1

 The bulk of his allegations center on the guard’s failure to comply with internal

prison policies, but a violation of prison policy or other state law cannot create liability under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. See Sobitan v. Glud, 589 F.3d 379, 389 (7th Cir. 2009) (“By definition, federal

law, not state law, provides the source of liability for a claim alleging the deprivation of a federal

constitutional right.”); Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (observing that 42

1 When asked to provide documentation of his medical condition, a member of the

medical staff stated that he did not have any condition which would make him unable to provide

a urine sample, and that he was taking medication which, if anything, would make him urinate

more frequently. (DE 1-1 at 14.) Mr. Hollon appears to take issue with this opinion, stating that

he was taking another medication for irritable bowel syndrome which, in his words, “Any

medical person, or informed lay person would know, would cause dehydration.” (Id.)

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U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state statutes or

administrative regulations). 

Mr. Hollon also alleges that the guard made him feel pressured and upset by telling him

he needed to hurry up, but even assuming the guard’s statements rose to the level of verbal

harassment, they would not be actionable. See DeWalt, 224 F.3d at 612 (“[S]imple verbal

harassment does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, deprive a prisoner of a protected

liberty interest or deny a prisoner equal protection of the laws.”); Dobbey v. Ill. Dep’t of

Correction, 574 F.3d 443, 446 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[H]arassment, while regrettable, is not what

comes to mind when one thinks of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishment.”). 

Mr. Hollon further alleges that while he trying to give a urine sample, he strained so hard

that he defecated on himself. (DE 1 at 3.) No doubt this incident was unpleasant and

embarrassing for Mr. Hollon, but the court cannot discern how his own bodily functions could

establish deliberate indifference on the part of prison personnel. See Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d

469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that “deliberate indifference” means the defendant “acted in an

intentional or criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant must have known that the plaintiff

was at serious risk of being harmed and decided not to do anything to prevent that harm from

occurring even though he could have easily done so.”). Although the Eighth Amendment entitled

him to the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” which includes access to showers

and hygiene items needed to keep himself clean,2 Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir.

2

 Mr. Hollon expresses concern that without his state pay he will be unable to buy

hygiene items needed to keep himself clean, but as indicated above he has a right to adequate

hygiene items even if he cannot afford to pay for them. See Gillis, 468 F.3d at 493; Farnham,

394 F.3d at 482-83.

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2006), he makes clear that after he defecated, one of the guards took him to his cell, let him use

the toilet, and let him take a “special shower to clean off body waste.” (DE 1-1 at 10-12.) In sum,

Mr. Hollon’s allegations do not state a plausible claim for relief.

For these reasons, this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

SO ORDERED. 

ENTERED: February 13, 2013 s/William C. Lee 

William C. Lee, Judge

United States District Court

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