If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

August 1, 2024

In re A. C. L. JOHNSON, Minor.

No. 369727

Berrien Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 2022-000015-NA

Before: CAMERON, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent1appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to the 

minor child, AJ, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) (reasonable likelihood of harm). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL

Respondent was fifteen years old when she gave birth to AJ in April 2020. At some point 

following AJ’s birth, respondent was placed into foster care. This case arose after respondent and 

AJ absconded from her foster-care placement. AJ was removed from respondent’s care and the 

trial court took jurisdiction over his case.

Respondent suffers from mental illness, which petitioner, the Michigan Department of 

Health and Human Services (DHHS), alleged impacted her ability to parent AJ. At some points 

throughout this case, respondent would comply with her mental-health treatment, and obtain

housing and employment. At other points, respondent would be noncompliant and would fail to 

engage in services. Respondent was also inconsistent in visiting AJ, and AJ’s therapist opined this 

inconsistency was severely impacting AJ’s stability and mental health. Because respondent was 

sometimes compliant with her case-service plan, the trial court allowed for multiple extensions 

before permitting DHHS to file a petition to terminate her parental rights. Eventually, however, 

 

1 The trial court also terminated the respondent-father’s parental rights, but he is not a party to this 

appeal.
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DHHS filed the petition, and the trial court granted it after finding statutory grounds for termination 

existed and that termination was in AJ’s best interests. This appeal followed.

II. STATUTORY GROUNDS

Respondent argues the trial court clearly erred by finding that termination of her parental 

rights was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). We disagree.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing 

evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been 

met.” In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 139; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). This Court reviews the 

trial court’s determination of statutory grounds for clear error. Id.; MCR 3.977(K). “A finding of 

fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 

has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the 

witnesses.” In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 296-297; 690 NW2d 505 (2004). “Appellate courts are

obliged to defer to a trial court’s factual findings at termination proceedings if those findings do 

not constitute clear error.” In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 90; 763 NW2d 587 (2009).

B. LAW AND ANALYSIS

Termination of parental rights is proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) when “[t]here is a 

reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the child will be 

harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.” “The harm contemplated under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(j) includes emotional harm as well as physical harm.” In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App 

252, 279; 976 NW2d 44 (2021).

In terminating respondent’s parental rights, the trial court recognized respondent’s history 

of instability with respect to her mental health. It noted that, while respondent had made progress 

with her mental health, there was no guarantee she would progress to a point where she could 

reunite with AJ. It further noted that respondent’s instability had negatively impacted AJ’s mental 

health. These findings were supported by the record. Respondent was inconsistent in complying

with her case-service plan, specifically her mental health treatment, and, in the periods in which 

she was not complying with her mental health treatment, respondent needed high-level 

intervention such as hospitalization. Moreover, respondent’s interactions with AJ and inconsistent 

visits negatively impacted AJ’s mental health. He would behave aggressively and suffer from 

night terrors when he was required to go to parenting-time visits. This is in contrast to the times 

parenting-time visits were suspended, during which AJ’s caretakers observed a considerable 

improvement in his behavior. Because the trial court’s findings are supported by the record, there 

was no clear error in its conclusion termination was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).

Respondent argues on appeal that the trial court should have declined to terminate her 

parental rights and instead offered her more time to complete her case-service plan. In making 

this argument, respondent fails to point to any authority showing why this refusal was in error; it 

is therefore abandoned. See In re Rippy, 330 Mich App 350, 362 n 5; 948 NW2d 131 (2019) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted) (“Insufficiently briefed issues are deemed abandoned on 

appeal.”). Respondent also suggests that the trial court’s findings in regard to her future mental 
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health was “speculative.” But, as noted, termination is proper if there is “reasonable likelihood” 

of harm. MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). Given the record evidence demonstrating respondent’s inability 

to maintain her mental stability, the trial court’s finding in this regard was not clearly erroneous.

Affirmed.

/s/ Thomas C. Cameron 

/s/ Michael J. Kelly 

/s/ Christopher P. Yates