Interim Decision #2327 

MATTER OF TAJER 

In Deportation Proceedings 

'A-20597132 

Decided by Board October17, 1974 

Respondent hid been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude. Section 241(b)(1) of the 

Immigration and Nationality A4 provides that such a conviction will not support a 

deportation charge, where at a time after such conviction, a full and unconditional 

pardon is granted by the President of the United States or a Governor of any State, as 

appropriate. It may be considered a Governor's pardon where the state has a constitutional provision for such authority to be exercised by the Board of Pardons, and such 

Board so exercises that power. 

CHARGE: 

Order: Act of I952LSection 241(a)(4) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(4)1—Convicted of a crime 

involving moral turpitude committed within five years after 

entry. 

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Fred F. Filsoof, Esquire 

Filsoof and Mykal 

1416 Gaslight Tower 

235 Peachtree Street, N.E. 

Atlanta, Georgia 30303 

• 

This is an appeal from the immigration judge's denial of the respondent's motion to reopen and reconsider his decision of October 17, 1973 

to deport the respondent on the above-stated charge. Oral argument is 

requested by the respondent. Oral argument will be denied. The matter 

will be remanded for further proceedings. 

The record relates to a single female, native and citizen of Iran, who 

was admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant student with 

permission to remain to September 3, 1973. On August 30, 1973 she was 

convicted upon her plea of nolo contendere, in the Criminal Court of 

Fulton County, Georgia, for the crime of theft. The court ordered her to 

pay a fine of $100 and be confined in prison for a term of 12 months. She 

paid the fine and her sentence was suspended. On March 27, 1974 the 

respondent was granted an unconditional pardon by the State Board of 

Pardons and Paroles. 

Section 241(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act specifies that 

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Interim Decision #2327 

the provisions regarding deportation for a crime or crimes involving 

moral turpitude "shall not apply (1) in the case of an alien who has 

subsequent to such conviction been granted a full and unconditional 

pardon by the President of the United States or by the Governor of any 

of the several States." 

By amendment to Art. V, sec. 1, par. 12 of the Georgia Constitution 

of 1877, which was made part of the Constitution of 1945, the State 

Board of Pardons and Paroles was made a constitutional body. The 

Constitution and the Act (Code Ami. §2-3011) confer on the Board 

practically all the clemency powers formerly conferred upon the Governor (Code Ann. § 77-511). 

The pardon granted the respondent is unconditional and is an executive pardon duly granted by executive authority as provided in the 

Constitution of the State of Georgia. It meets the requirements of that 

portion of section 241(b), supra, limiting the grant of a pardon to the 

President of the United States or the Governor of a State. The limiting 

provisions of section 241(b) were designed by Congress to eliminate the 

effectiveness of a legislative pardon, Matter of R—, 5 L & N. Dec. 612 

(BIA 1954). The pardon here under consideration is the only unconditional executive pardon that can be obtained in the State of Georgia. We 

recognize executive pardons granted by a State which has constitutional 

provision for executive pardons to be issued by other than the Governor 

of a State, Matter of .D , 7 I. & N. Dee. 476 (BIA 1957). 

In the circumstances, we shall remand this matter to the immigration 

judge to have the pardon received into evidence. The immigration judge 

can then make a new decision on the record. 

ORDER: The request for oral argument is denied. 

Further order: The case is remanded to the immigration judge for 

further proceedings in accordance with the foregoing opinion. 

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