UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

NANCY RUSSELL, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 

 Defendant. 

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Case No. 3:14-CV-01592 JD 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Plaintiff Nancy Russell applied for but was denied social security disability insurance 

benefits by the Social Security Administration. Russel is appealing the denial and the matter has 

been briefed [DE 15, 21], although no reply was filed. For the following reasons, the Court 

REMANDS this matter to the Commissioner for further proceedings. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

Russell filed her initial application for benefits on March 23, 2011, alleging an onset date 

of July 1, 20021

 due to degenerative disc disease, arthritis, and back pain. Russell indicated she 

stopped working on account of her physical condition, as well as having to take care of ill family 

members (Tr. 160). While she once noted having been on antidepressants since 1983 (Tr. 186, 

195), she clarified that in fact she had not been taking any medications for depression, anxiety, or 

psychiatric conditions since December 2009 (Tr. 176). In an updated disability report from 

September 2011, Russell claimed that she was experiencing more fatigue and sadness, and the 

onset of memory loss (Tr. 182). As of October 2011, Russell indicated that she did less and less 

 

1

 Although Russell’s attorney acknowledged an amended onset date of July 29, 2003, he had no problem with the 

ALJ’s considering the entire time frame, from the original onset date to Russell’s date last-insured, December 31, 

2007 (Tr. 19-26, 35). 
2 

because of pain/weakness, feeling sick, and having a lack of energy/desire, resulting in good 

days and bad days (Tr. 188-194). She reported having a more recent onset of neck issues (Tr. 

200), and having been recently diagnosed with an autoimmune disorder called mixed connective 

tissue disease, which helped explain the decline in her mental and physical state in the last 

several years (Tr. 195). 

In summary,2

 Russell’s medical records reflect that a lumbar x-ray taken on June 12, 

2000, showed moderate degenerative osteophytes (bone spurs) and moderate narrowing of the 

L5-S1 disc space (Tr. 408). In October 2001, Dr. David Miller, a pain specialist, observed that 

Russell had marked tenderness over her sacroiliac (SI) joints and diagnosed her with sacroiliitis 

(Tr. 249, 297). Dr. Miller administered steroid injections in her SI joints (Tr. 249). Russell 

continued treatment with Dr. Miller well into 2009 (Tr. 300, 306), with Dr. Miller documenting 

his course of treatment and exam findings with respect to Russel’s back pain, neck pain, right 

knee pain, and problems with sleeping and snoring (Tr. 214-283, 288-308). Dr. Miller also 

documented Russell’s complaints of these conditions and their resulting restrictions. Id. 

Russel’s medical records reveal that she also sought treatment primarily in 2004 and late 

2008 through 2012 from Dr. Minesh Patel, who specialized in internal medicine (Tr. 248, 253-

262, 276, 309, 319-338, 463-69, 477-91, 496-502). The medical records from Dr. Patel in 2004 

documented Russell’s complaints of, and Dr. Patel’s treatment for, her mid-back pain, shortness 

of breath, fatigue, sleeping difficulty, hypothyroidism, gastroesophageal reflux disease, 

hyperlipidemia, obesity, and attention deficit disorder (ADD). As of late 2008 (after Russell’s 

date last-insured), Dr. Patel continued treating Russell for her documented back and foot pain, 

 

2

 Russel’s relevant medical records are detailed with further specificity in the legal analysis section. See, infra. 
3 

arthralgia, asthma, liver cysts, obesity, high blood pressure, and high cholesterol. Dr. Patel also 

noted that Russell was having problems with depression and anxiety. 

Even after Russell’s date last-insured, Russel began a course of treatment with Drs. Biehl 

and Puranik, which involved a continuation of her pain medication and steroid injections for pain 

in her right knee, lower back, and neck (Tr. 309-310, 312-316, 346-351, 353, 356, 359-366, 370-

391, 446-455). 

With respect to her mental conditions, Russell’s medical records reveal that in April 

2004, she went to Lifepaths for an initial psychological evaluation (Tr. 505-09). She complained 

of depressive symptoms, anxiety, decreased concentration and energy, forgetfulness, and mood 

swings (Tr. 503-514). Russell was not taking any medications for mental impairments because 

she did not feel like anything had helped (Tr. 508), and she had never before seen a psychiatrist 

(Tr. 510). She was diagnosed with depression, anxiety, sleep disturbance, and alcohol abuse, and 

she was prescribed Effexor (Tr. 513). Russell sporadically continued treatment at Lifepaths, 

with records noting her having additional problems with forgetfulness and being easily 

distracted, until February 2005 when it was reported that she was feeling better (Tr. 504). 

At the administrative hearing with Administrative Law Judge Lawrence Levey (ALJ) on 

November 14, 2012, Russell was represented by counsel and she testified, along with vocational 

expert Pat Greene, Ph.D. (VE) (Tr. 31-59). Russell testified that throughout the entire claims 

period she had been taking anti-depressive medication (mostly prescribed by her family 

physician), Vicodin (or Hydrocodone), Meloxicam, as well as, an anti-anxiety medication on and 

off. She had previously worked for 25 years as a certified surgical technician, and indicated that 

she did not return to work because of the pain in her back, neck, and right knee, which caused 

her to suffer from standing, walking, and sitting limitations—despite taking pain and arthritis 
4 

medication and undergoing spinal injections (but declining surgical intervention due to the risks). 

Russell testified that her neck pain and stiffness caused her problems with neck movement, 

dizziness, and an inability to look in one direction for a long time. Russell believed that the 

arthritis in her hands prohibited her from using her hands on more than an occasional basis, or 

one-third of the day. Russell further explained that she’s had an ongoing problem with fatigue, 

the cause of which was unknown for some time. Russell testified that she sought treatment with 

a psychiatrist in 2004 and 2005 for her depression, which caused frequent sadness, crying spells, 

suicidal thoughts, mood swings, anger issues, problems socializing, and difficulty with memory, 

focus, and concentration. In describing a typical day around June 2007, Russell indicated that 

she woke up early and made coffee, packed her husband’s lunch, did laundry, washed dishes, 

and took care of her mom (with the assistance of caregivers). However, she had to take breaks 

from performing these tasks due to her pain. 

In the written opinion that followed (Tr. 19-26), the ALJ found that Russell suffered from 

the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease, hypercholesterolemia, obesity, 

occipital neuralgia, osteoporosis, and sleeping disorder. The ALJ believed that Russell’s 

impairments were severe but did not meet or medically equal the severity of one of the 

impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the Listings). In fact, Russell’s 

attorney acknowledged that no Listing was met or equaled (Tr. 36). 

The ALJ determined that Russell was less than fully credible regarding the severity of 

impairments, given (1) her essentially normal physical examinations after the onset date; and, (2) 

her self-reports (preceding her date last-insured) of being no more than mildly-to-moderately 

impaired with no problems walking or standing, able to engage in a full range of daily activities, 

and able to heavily care for ill family members. The ALJ indicated that “[d]espite the limited 
5 

physical findings and the claimant’s own reported level of functioning,” the ALJ included 

(unspecified) limitations associated with Russell’s cervical degenerative disc disease and 

complaints of severe neck and right knee pain; provided postural and environmental limitations 

as assessed by the state agency and as associated with her obesity; and limited her to simple, 

routine, and repetitive tasks due to fatigue and the effects of prescribed medication. 

Specifically, the ALJ found that Russell had the residual functional capacity (RFC)3

 to 

perform “light” work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) (i.e., lifting no more than 20 pounds 

at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds; sitting up to at 

least 6 hours in an 8 hour workday; and, standing/walking, in combination, up to at least 6 hours 

in an 8 hour workday), along with the following limitations: 

Option of alternating between sitting and standing, could only occasionally utilize 

her right lower extremity for pushing, pulling, and operation of foot controls, 

could only occasionally climb ramps or stairs, balance, and stoop, was precluded 

from climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and from kneeling, crouching, and 

crawling, could engage in only occasional rotation, flexion, and extension of her 

neck, was required to avoid concentrated exposure to excessive wetness, 

unprotected heights, and hazardous machinery, and due to her impairments, 

symptoms, and medications, was limited to performing simple, routine, and 

repetitive tasks. 

(Tr. 23). 

The ALJ presented a hypothetical question to the VE which was based on the ALJ’s RFC 

determination (listed above). Consistent with the VE’s testimony, the ALJ concluded that 

Russell was unable to perform any past relevant work as a surgical technician (which is a job 

Russell performed full time since 1982 until July 2002). However, the ALJ concluded that 

Russell could perform the jobs identified by the VE (which again, were based on the RFC listed 

above), including unskilled work as a ticket seller, hand packager, and assembler of small 

 

3

 Residual Functioning Capacity is defined as the most a person can do despite any physical and mental limitations 

that may affect what can be done in a work setting. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. 
6 

products.4

 As a result, the ALJ determined that Russell was not disabled. The Appeals Council 

denied review of the ALJ’s decision, making the decision the final determination of the 

Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.981; Schomas v. Colvin, 732 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 2013). 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

In reviewing the decision, the Court will affirm the Commissioner’s findings of fact and 

denial of disability benefits if they are supported by substantial evidence. Craft v. Astrue, 539 

F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008). Substantial evidence consists of “such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 

U.S. 389, 401 (1971). This evidence must be “more than a scintilla but may be less than a 

preponderance.” Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). Thus, even if “reasonable 

minds could differ” about the disability status of the claimant, the Court must affirm the 

Commissioner’s decision as long as it is adequately supported. Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 

413 (7th Cir. 2008). 

In this substantial-evidence determination, the Court considers the entire administrative 

record but does not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or 

substitute the Court’s own judgment for that of the Commissioner. Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. 

Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003). Nevertheless, the Court conducts a “critical review 

of the evidence” before affirming the Commissioner’s decision. Id. An ALJ must evaluate both 

the evidence favoring the claimant as well as the evidence favoring the claim’s rejection and may 

not ignore an entire line of evidence that is contrary to his findings. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 

881, 887 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Rather, an ALJ must “articulate at some minimal 

level his analysis of the evidence” to permit an informed review. Id. Consequently, an ALJ’s 

 

4

 The VE also testified that if Russell’s RFC were limited to sedentary work or she was off task more than ten 

percent due to pain or focus/concentration problems, then she would be unable to sustain employment (Tr. 57). 
7 

decision cannot stand if it lacks evidentiary support or an adequate discussion of the issues. 

Lopez, 336 F.3d at 539. Ultimately, while the ALJ is not required to address every piece of 

evidence or testimony presented, the ALJ must provide a “logical bridge” between the evidence 

and the conclusions. Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 2009). Furthermore, 

conclusions of law are not entitled to deference; so, if the Commissioner commits an error of 

law, reversal is required without regard to the volume of evidence in support of the factual 

findings. Binion v. Chater, 108 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir. 1997). 

III. ANALYSIS 

Disability and supplemental insurance benefits are available only to those individuals 

who can establish disability under the terms of the Social Security Act. Specifically, the 

claimant must be unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which 

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 

U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security regulations create a five-step sequential evaluation 

process to be used in determining whether the claimant has established a disability. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v). The steps are to be used in the following order: 

1. Whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; 

2. Whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment; 

3. Whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals one listed in the regulations; 

4. Whether the claimant can still perform relevant past work; and 

5. Whether the claimant can perform other work in the community. 

Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001). 

At step three, if the ALJ determines that the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meets or equals an impairment listed in the regulations, disability is acknowledged 
8 

by the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). However, if a Listing is not met or 

equaled, in between steps three and four, the ALJ must then assess the claimant’s RFC, which, in 

turn, is used to determine whether the claimant can perform her past work under step four and 

whether the claimant can perform other work in society at step five of the analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(e). The claimant has the initial burden of proof in steps one through four, while the 

burden shifts to the Commissioner in step five to show that there are a significant number of jobs 

in the national economy that the claimant is capable of performing. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 

995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004). 

In contesting the Commissioner’s denial of benefits, Russell argues that the 

Commissioner erred in four respects: (1) the ALJ misevaluated the medical opinions of record 

and gave insufficient reasons for disregarding evidence from Russell’s treating physicians, Drs. 

Miller and Patel; (2) the ALJ failed to consider Russell’s mental impairment in combination with 

her other limitations; (3) the ALJ’s credibility assessment was unsupported by substantial 

evidence; and (4) ultimately these errors affected the RFC determination, and as a result, the 

Commissioner failed to carry the burden at step five establishing that Russell was capable of 

performing jobs that existed in sufficient numbers. The Court agrees with Russell that the ALJ 

disregarded significant treatment received by Russell from Drs. Miller and Patel, and that the 

ALJ’s failure to adequately consider and weigh this medical evidence results in an inadequately 

supported RFC determination, thereby requiring remand. 

A) Weight Afforded Treating Physicians and Russell’s RFC 

An RFC assessment is to be based upon consideration of all relevant evidence in the case 

record, including medical evidence. SSR 96-5p. With respect to medical evidence, the ALJ must 

give controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion if it is well supported by medically 

acceptable diagnostic techniques and it is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence of 
9 

record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c); Elder, 529 F.3d at 415. When the treating physician’s opinion 

is not entitled to controlling weight, however—such as where it is not supported by the objective 

medical evidence, where it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record, or where 

it is internally inconsistent, see Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 871 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Knight 

v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 314 (7th Cir.1995))—then the ALJ should move on to assessing the 

value of the opinion in the same way he would any other medical evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(c)(2). 

Assessing what weight to afford the opinion depends on a number of factors, such as the 

examining relationship (with more weight given to an opinion of an examining source); the 

treatment relationship, which includes the length, frequency, and nature of the treatment; the 

degree to which the source presents relevant evidence to support the opinion; the consistency of 

the source’s opinion with the other evidence; whether the source specializes in an area related to 

the individual’s impairment; and any other factors tending to support or refute the opinion. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(c); Elder, 529 F.3d at 415. If the ALJ discounts the treating physician’s 

opinion after considering these factors, his decision must stand as long as he “minimally 

articulated his reasons—a very deferential standard that we have, in fact, deemed lax.” Elder, 

529 F.3d at 415 (citing Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir. 2008)). 

In explaining the RFC finding, the ALJ summarized almost seven years-worth of medical 

records (pre-dating December 31, 2007) from treating physicians Drs. Miller and Patel by simply 

stating that Russell had “several normal or essentially normal physical examinations.” (Tr. 24 

(citing Exhibit 1F)5

). The Commissioner unbelievably contends that this single statement reveals 

 

5

 The only other references made by the ALJ to Drs. Miller and Patel’s medical records pre-dating Russell’s lastinsured date, which were located in Exhibits 1F and 3F, referred to Russell’s having a normal social life (Tr. 11) and 

Russell’s own reported level of functioning (Tr. 28). 
10 

that the ALJ cited to substantial evidence in considering Russell’s treatment history and 

weighing the medical opinions (DE 21 at 4-5). 

The Commissioner’s argument is flawed6

 because although it is true that the ALJ cited to 

an exhibit which actually contained records from both Drs. Miller and Patel, the ALJ never 

bothered to specifically identify the examinations which supported the ALJ’s opinion. In other 

words, the exhibit referred to by the ALJ as containing “essentially normal” exams is over sixty 

pages long and there is no way to discern the specific records relied upon by the ALJ. In fact, 

the ALJ never once referenced Drs. Miller or Patel by name, nor noted that these were records 

from treating physicians. 

Even had the ALJ identified the “essentially normal” exams upon which he relied to 

determine Russel’s RFC, the ALJ failed to mention whether or not he considered the plethora of 

other medical records from Drs. Miller and Patel evidencing Russell’s ongoing ailments and 

limitations. For instance, in September 2002, Russell saw Dr. Miller for persistent right SI joint 

pain, for which she had been taking Vioxx (an anti-inflammatory) and an occasional Vicodin 

(narcotic pain medication), at which time Dr. Miller renewed Russell’s prescriptions (Tr. 296); in 

March 2004, Russell saw Dr. Patel with complaints of mid-back pain and shortness of breath (Tr. 

248, 260-62) and Dr. Patel concluded that Russell suffered from exertional dyspnea of an 

undetermined etiology, fatigue and tiredness (which could be related to a sleep disorder or 

underlying hypothyroidism), and gastroesophageal reflux disease; the following month, Dr. Patel 

assessed Russell with ADD, for which he tapered off Russell’s Prozac and prescribed a trial of 

Strattera (commonly prescribed for ADD) (Tr. 258-60); in November 2006, Dr. Miller saw 

Russell for congestion and problems with sleeping/snoring, and he diagnosed her with ‘sleep 

 

6

 Nor does Russell need to actually prove disability to warrant a remand, as the Commissioner argues in error (DE 

21 at 5). 
11 

disorder breathing’ (Tr. 221, 223-224, 226, 250); on December 21, 2006, Russell’s cervical spine 

x-ray taken on account of her neck pain and obstructed breathing revealed advanced 

degenerative changes in the cervical spine and diffused osteoporosis (Tr. 244); on December 28, 

2006, Russell saw Dr. Miller for neck pain, for which she had been taking her husband’s 

Vicodin, and Dr. Miller indicated that Russell had advanced multi-degenerative disc disease and 

facet changes, a restricted range of motion in unspecified joints, and prominent myofascial 

tender points in the left trapezius and scapulae (shoulder blades), for which Dr. Miller prescribed 

Vicodin, Daypro (anti-inflammatory), and Baclofen (muscle relaxant) (Tr. 295); cervical x-rays 

taken in December 2006 showed diffuse osteoporosis and advanced degenerative changes with 

slight narrowing at two levels of Russell’s cervical spine due to osteophyte (bone spur) formation 

(Tr. 244); and, in December 2007, Russell complained of persistent, intermittent, severe left 

occipital neck pain and had marked tenderness in that area to the touch (even though she was 

taking Effexor, Mobic, and Vicodin), which led Dr. Miller to diagnose Russell with occipital 

neuralgia and administer a nerve block with sedation (Tr. 292-94). Finally, in September 2012, 

Dr. Patel completed a medical source statement form in which he reported that Russell could 

only lift fewer than ten pounds frequently and occasionally; stand/walk for less than two hours 

total in an eight-hour day; sit for less than six hours total with frequent position changes needed 

to get comfortable; never perform most postural movements other than occasional balancing; 

occasionally reach, handle, and finger with her upper extremities; and had a limited ability to 

push/pull with her upper and lower extremities (Tr. 498-502, Exhibit 20F). 

Thus, a quick look at these medical records demonstrate that the ALJ’s single statement 

that Russell’s treating records contained “essentially normal” exams certainly did not satisfy the 

ALJ’s duty to develop the record and make findings about what the actual evidence showed, 20 
12 

C.F.R. § 404.1512(d), 1520b, nor did it adequately articulate the ALJ’s analysis so the 

undersigned could follow his reasoning. See Minnick v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 929, 938 (7th Cir. 

2015) (“The ALJ has a duty to fully develop the record before drawing any conclusions and must 

adequately articulate [his] analysis so that we can follow [his] reasoning.”). While it is true that 

an ALJ is not required to mention, or make note of every piece of evidence in his decision and in 

weighing the record medical evidence, see Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 517 (7th Cir. 2009), it 

is equally true that an ALJ may not ignore an entire line of evidence that is contrary to the ruling, 

Golembiewski v. Barnhart, 322 F.3d 912, 917 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted), and he must 

minimally articulate his reasons so that the Court is able to trace his path of reasoning. Diaz v. 

Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 307-08 (7th Cir. 1995) (The ALJ “must articulate, at some minimum level, 

his analysis of the evidence to allow the appellate court to trace the path of his reasoning . . . 

[and] [a]n ALJ's failure to consider an entire line of evidence falls below the minimal level of 

articulation required.”) (citations omitted). The ALJ contravened his duties in this respect by 

making a single overboard statement which failed to accurately characterized Russell’s treatment 

history and failed to sufficiently support the RFC’s assessment. 

Moreover, the ALJ never assessed the weight to be afforded to the exhibits which 

contained Drs. Miller and Patel’s various opinions/diagnoses during the relevant time frame. In 

determining the weight to be given, the ALJ should have discussed the nature of Russell’s 

treatment relationship with Drs. Miller and Patel (including the length, frequency, and nature of 

such ongoing treatment), their specialties in the area relating to Russell’s impairments, and the 

degree to which the treating physicians presented evidence (including here, objective testing) 

consistent with their opinions. For instance, with respect to Dr. Patel’s April 2014 treatment note 

indicating that a screening test revealed Russel had ADD and his September 2012 opinion 
13 

evidencing that Russell was far more restricted than the ALJ’s ultimate RFC determination, the 

ALJ never referred to these records and never discredited Dr. Patel’s opinions.7

 The ALJ’s 

failure in this respect violates the ALJ’s need to weigh the medical evidence and consider the 

factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) in the event the opinions were discounted. 

Ultimately, it is impossible for this reviewing court to tell whether the ALJ’s decision 

rests upon substantial evidence, and a remand is required here because the ALJ improperly 

ignored the medical records of treating physicians Drs. Miller and Patel which supported 

Russell’s disability claim. See Scrogham v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 685, 699 (7th Cir. 2014) (an ALJ’s 

“apparent selection of only facts from the record that supported [his] conclusion, while 

disregarding facts that undermined it, is an error in analysis that requires reversal.”). In addition, 

the ALJ’s insufficient analysis of Drs. Miller and Patel’s records and the weight afforded to their 

opinions affected the ALJ’s RFC findings about the extent of Russell’s limitations (Tr. 24). 

Until the ALJ supplies sufficient analysis of the records and reason to discount Russell’s treating 

physicians’ opinions, the Court is unable to conclude that the RFC is supported by substantial 

evidence. See SSR 96-5p; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a) (noting the ALJ must “assess [the claimant’s] 

residual functional capacity based on all the relevant evidence in [her] case record”). 

As a result, on remand the ALJ must acknowledge the treating physicians’ course of 

treatment and opinions, weigh the medical opinions, and explain whether the evidence would 

support further physical and mental limitations in the RFC. The ALJ should then explain how 

Russell’s limitations were accounted for in the RFC assessment. 

 

7

 Nor did the ALJ clarify whether Russell’s restrictions recorded by Dr. Patel in September 2012 were meant to 

signal that these were her restrictions at the time of the notation or during the insured period. 
14 

B) Russell’s Ability to Perform Work 

The ALJ found that Russell could not perform her past work (step four), but she was able 

to perform other jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy (step five). In 

deciding what work Russell was capable of performing, the ALJ relied on the VE’s testimony, 

which in turn relied on the ALJ’s hypothetical question—which was ultimately premised on the 

ALJ’s RFC determination. 

 The ALJ is required to incorporate into his hypotheticals those impairments and 

limitations that he accepts as credible. See Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 846 (7th Cir. 2007). 

Here, the ALJ’s insufficiently supported RFC findings about the extent of Russell’s limitations 

led the ALJ to ask hypotheticals of the VE based on some, as opposed to all, of Russell’s 

complaints. Once the ALJ provides an adequate analysis of the medical evidence and support for 

his RFC finding, which can then be used as the basis for the hypotheticals, the Court can assess 

whether a VE’s testimony can be relied upon as an accurate indicator for the type of work 

Russell is capable of performing.8

 But because it is the ALJ’s duty to assess the record evidence, 

explain the weight to be afforded to it, and determine the claimant’s actual limitations and 

resulting RFC, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545, 404.1546(c), steps four and five cannot be 

properly analyzed in this appeal. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004) (the ALJ 

 

8

 Admittedly, the Seventh Circuit has occasionally concluded that a VE has familiarity with the claimant’s 

limitations, despite any gaps in the hypothetical, when the record shows that the VE independently reviewed the 

medical record or heard testimony directly addressing those limitations and the VE considered that evidence when 

indicating the type of work the claimant is capable of performing. O'Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, n. 5 

(7th Cir. 2010) (citing Simila, 573 F.3d at 521; Young, 362 F.3d at 1003; Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 942 (7th 

Cir. 2002); Ragsdale v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 816, 819-21 (7th Cir. 1995); Ehrhart v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 

969 F.2d 534, 540 (7th Cir. 1992)). This exception does not apply here, since the VE reviewed only Russell’s 

vocational records, but not medical records, and the VE did not indicate in his responses to having relied on the 

medical records or the hearing testimony. Rather, the VE’s attention was on the limitations of the hypothetical 

person posed by the ALJ, rather than on the record itself or the limitations of the claimant herself. Id. (citing Simila, 

573 F.3d at 521; Young, 362 F.3d at 1003). 
15 

must determine the claimant's RFC before performing steps 4 and 5 because a flawed RFC 

typically skews questions posed to the VE); SSR 96-8p. 

 Because remand is appropriate for the reasons stated herein, the Court need not reach a 

decision on whether the ALJ’s credibility assessment was also in error. The remedy for these 

shortcomings is further consideration, not an award of benefits. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Russell’s request to remand the ALJ’s 

decision [DE 1]. Accordingly, the Court now REMANDS this case to the Commissioner for 

further proceedings consistent with this Opinion and Order. 

 SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED: September 21, 2015 

 /s/ Jon E. DeGuilio 

 Judge 

 United States District Court