IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON Inthe Matter ofthe Dependency of M.M., B.B., W.M., and B.H., Minor Children. No. 74168-3-1 DIVISION ONE UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED: January 25, 2016 Becker, J. — Tamara Milligan served as appointed counsel in a number ofGrays Harbor Superior Court dependency cases. She appeals June 2014 superior court orders that rendered "null and void" the court's 2011 orders granting her attorney fee requests related to four dependencies. Grays Harbor County intervenes as respondent. The 2014 orders invited Milligan to resubmit herfee requests with adequate supporting documentation of her hours, but Milligan did not do so. She contends that the court's 2014 orders violated her constitutional right to due process and exceeded the court'sjurisdiction. Because none ofthe court's orders was a final judgment or other decision determining or discontinuing the action, RAP 2.2 bars her appeal. We dismiss. BACKGROUND In September 2011, attorney Tamara Milligan submitted proposed orders for attorney fees infour Grays Harbor County Superior Court dependency casesNo. 74168-3-1/2
for which she served as assigned counsel. Milligan also used the name Tamara Milligan Darst. The proposed orders covered periods between 13 and 15 months and requested total fees and costs of $24,996. Judge Gordon Godfrey signed each ofthe ex parte orders without reviewing any supporting documentation. The court customarily relied on the court administratorto review files and confirm that fee requests were timely and supported by sufficiently detailed records before preparing payment vouchers. After the court administrator told Judge Godfrey that Milligan's fee 

### requests were untimely, inadequately supported, and excessive, Judge Godfrey and the administrator met with Milligan. Judge Godfrey told Milliganthat the 

### monthly or quarterly summaries she submitted insupport of her fee request were inadequate. He instructed herto file affidavits that included "detailed, daily time entries identifying the work performed." Thejudge informed Milliganthat the court would hold the four signed orders pending review of her affidavits. Milligan 

### did not submit any further documentation, and the court did not process the orders for payment. InDecember 2011, Milligan closed her law practice. On June 16, 2014, Judge David Edwards entered orders ineach ofthe 

### fourdependencies, voidingJudge Godfrey's 2011 orders: "The Order entered on September 12, 2011 ordering attorney fees is null and void. IfMs. Milligan-Darst wishes for the court to entertain a request for attorney fees she can properly note 

### it on the motion docket with supporting documentation ofher hours." While it is not clearfrom the record what prompted Judge Edwards to issue these orders,No. 74168-3-1/3 

### Milligan states that onJune 2, 2014, she renewed her fee requestbyrefiling certified copies ofJudge Godfrey's 2011 orders. 

### On July 15, 2014, Milligan appealed Judge Edwards' orders. In her 

### notices ofappeal, she did notinitially name orserve a respondent. In later 

### correspondence, she named as opposing counsel the Grays Harbor County deputy prosecuting attorney retained by the Department of Social and Health Services inthe underlying dependency actions. 

### On August 4, 2014, Judge Godfreyentered orders voiding his2011 orders, interms nearly identical to Judge Edwards' June orders: The order on the above cause number entered on September 12, 

### 2011 ordering attorney fees is null and void. As directed in2011, if 

### Ms. Milligan-Darstwishes for the court to entertain a requestfor attorney fees she can properly note it on the motion docket with supporting documentation ofher hours. 

### Milligan moved to vacate Judge Godfrey's August4 orders underCR 60. On October 1, 2014, Judge Edwards denied the motion. Grays Harbor County filed a motion to intervene inMilligan's appeal, arguing that the County "has a 

### very real interestin theoutcome oftheappeal" because theCounty's funds, and its process for requiring documentation of services priortodistributing attorney fees, "aredirectly at issue in the appeal." This court granted the motion. After this court called for a brief ofrespondent, the prosecutor informed the court that in view ofthe fact that the Departmenttook no position in the 

### attorneyfeecontroversy and theCounty had already intervened in the case, the Departmentwould not file a brief in the matter.No. 74168-3-1/4

ANALYSIS Milligancontends that Judge Edwards' June 2014 orders voiding Judge Godfrey's orders on attorney fees violated her constitutional right to due process. She asserts that she "was not informed ofthe court's action and was given no opportunity to contest entry ofthe orders." The County argues that because 

### Judge Edwards' orders were not finaljudgments, they are not appealable orders
under RAP 2.2. RAP 2.2 governs which decisions ofthe superior court a party may 

### appeal. Milligan argues that she may appeal Judge Edwards' orders underthree provisions of RAP 2.2(a): (1) Final Judgment. The finaljudgmententered in any action 

### or proceeding, regardless ofwhetherthejudgment reserves for future determination an award of attorney fees or costs. 

### (3) Decision Determining Action. Any written decision affecting a substantial right in a civil case that ineffect determines the action and prevents a finaljudgment or discontinues the action. 

### (10) Orderon Motion for VacationofJudgment. An order granting or denying a motion to vacate ajudgment. 

### Our Supreme Court has defined a finaljudgmentas '"such ajudgment as at once puts an end to the action by declaring that the plaintiffhas or has not entitled himselfto recoverthe remedy for which he sues.'" Reif v. LaFollette, 19 

### Wn.2d 366, 370, 142 P.2d 1015 (1943), quoting 1 Henry Campbell Black, A Treatise on the Law ofJudgments §21, at 31 (2d ed. 1902). 

### Ajudgment isfinal forpurposes ofappeal if"itfinally determines the rights 

### of the parties in the action and is not subject to de novoreview at a later hearing inthe same cause." Wlasiuk v. Whirlpool Corp., 76 Wn. App. 250, 255, 884 P.2dNo. 74168-3-1/5


### 13 (1994), citing Nesteqard v. Inv. Exch. Corp., 5 Wn. App. 618, 623-24, 489 P.2d 1142 (1971). Here, as Judge Edwards made clear, the orders voiding 

### Judge Godfrey's orders on attorney fees did notfinally determine the parties' rights or end the overall action. The opportunity to resubmit her fee requestwith adequate documentation reiterated Judge Godfrey's own oral instructions to 

### Milligan at their September2011 meeting—instructions that Milligan-Darstdoes not dispute she received but failed to follow. The orders here are akin to a dismissal of an action without prejudice. 

### Under RAP 2.2(a)(3), an appellant may not appeal a dismissal without prejudice unless its effect is to determine the action and prevent a finaljudgment or to discontinue the action. In re Dependency ofA.G., 127 Wn. App. 801, 807, 112 

### P.3d 588 (2005) (citing Munden v. Hazelriqq, 105 Wn.2d 39, 44, 711 P.2d 295 

### (1985)), review denied, 156 Wn.2d 1013 (2006). By the terms of the orders here, there is no barto a subsequentfee request by Milligan. Ratherthan determine

or discontinue the action or prevent a finaljudgment, these interlocutory orders 

### anticipate further action byMilligan, based on local rules and the court's

instructions. 

### As Milligan herself points out in her supplemental brief, "it is the practical effect of an orderwhich determines its appealability." A.G., 127 Wn. App. at 808. 

### Had Milligan presented her proposed orders, then sued the County for denying 

### payment, she would have a finaljudgmentfrom which to appeal. As it stands, however, the practical effect of the 2014 orders was to defer resolution of the attorney fee issue and giveMilligan another opportunityto adequately supportNo. 74168-3-1/6
herfee request. Therefore, Judge Edwards' orders are not finaljudgments or decisions determining the action and are not appealable under RAP 2.2(a)(1) or (3). For the same reason, Judge Edwards' denial of Milligan's CR 60 motion to vacate is not appealable under RAP 2.2(a)(10) because Judge Godfrey's August 2014 orders likewise invite Milligan to resubmit herfee requests with sufficient supporting documentation. Requiring finality before appeal conserves appellate energy and eliminates delays caused by interlocutory appeals. This rule also "emphasizes the deference that appellate courts owe to the trial judge as the individual initially called upon to decide the many questions of law and fact that occur inthe course of a trial. Permitting piecemeal appeals would undermine the independence 

### ofthe districtjudge, as well as the special role that individual plays in ourjudicial system." 

### Wlasiuk, 76 Wn. App. at 253-54, quoting Firestone Tire &Rubber Co. v. Risiord, 449 U.S. 368, 374, 101 S. Ct. 669, 66 L Ed. 2d 571 (1981). 

### The superior court has not yet had the opportunity to decide the questions of law and fact that would arise from a lawsuit brought by Milligan against the 

### County. Therefore, Milligan does not yet have an appealable finaljudgmentor other determinative order under RAP 2.2. 

### Milligan asks this court for attorney fees and costs on appeal under RAP 18.1, citing financial need and "legitimate and compelling issues" raised in her 

### appeal that merit a fee award. Because she provides no meaningfulargument or citation to authority showing her entitlementto attorney fees, she fails to comply with the requirements of RAP 18.1, and we decline her request.No. 74168-3-1/7 Appeal dismissed.

WE CONCUR: