UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. Case No. 3:13-CR-51 JD

(2) LORENZO COBEN

OPINION AND ORDER

 The incarcerated Defendant, Lorenzo Coben, proceeding pro se, has moved for a 

reduction in his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). (DE 209.) For the reasons 

herein, the motion will be denied. 

A. Background 

 In 2013, Mr. Coben was found guilty, after pleading guilty, to using a firearm in relation 

to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The crime of violence at issue was a 

bank robbery where Mr. Coben pointed a firearm at a bank teller’s head, demanded money, and 

received approximately $13,000. Mr. Coben and his accomplices then attempted to launder the 

money through a casino and dispose of the getaway vehicle. Mr. Coben committed these acts 

while serving sentences of probation and parole. Further, Mr. Coben directed the actions of his 

accomplices. Mr. Coben was apprehended after fleeing from the police and engaging in a car 

chase. The money from the bank robbery has never been recovered. The Court sentenced Mr. 

Coben to 264 months of imprisonment. (DE 155.) Mr. Coben remains incarcerated with an 

anticipated release date in 2035.

 Mr. Coben filed this motion for a reduction in sentence in September 2022. The Court 

referred Mr. Coben’s motion to the Federal Community Defender’s Office, which determined 

that it was unable to assist him. Therefore, the Court will consider Mr. Coben’s own 

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submissions. The Government has filed their response to the motion, Mr. Coben has filed his 

reply, therefore the motion is ripe for decision. 

B. Legal Standard 

A court generally cannot modify a sentence once the sentence has been imposed. 18 

U.S.C. § 3582(c). However, an exception to that general rule allows a court to modify a sentence, 

after considering the factors under § 3553(a), if “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant 

such a reduction,” the reduction is consistent with policy statements issued by the Sentencing 

Commission, and the defendant has submitted such a request to the warden at least 30 days 

before filing a motion or has fully exhausted all administrative rights within the Bureau of 

Prisons (“BOP”). 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). This analysis proceeds in two steps. United States 

v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569, 576 (7th Cir. 2021) (cert. denied 142 S. Ct. 1363 (2022)). At the first 

step the defendant must identify an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting a sentence 

reduction. Id. If the defendant establishes such a reason, the district court, in the discretion 

conferred by the statute, considers any applicable § 3553(a) factors as part of determining what 

reduction to award the defendant. Id. 

The application notes to the Sentencing Guidelines offer some examples of when 

extraordinary and compelling reasons may be present. Those include when the defendant is 

suffering from a terminal illness or is suffering from a serious physical or medical condition that 

substantially diminishes his ability to provide self-care within the prison. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 n.1. 

See United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1181 (7th Cir. 2020) (finding the substantive aspects 

of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 and its Application Notes provide a “working definition” of “extraordinary 

and compelling reasons” that can guide a court’s discretion “without being conclusive”). 

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In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, “§ 3582(c)(1)(A) contemplates a sentence 

reduction for specific individuals based on the individuals’ particular circumstances of where 

[she] is housed and [her] personal health conditions.” United States v. Council, 2020 WL 

3097461, at *5 (N.D. Ind. June 11, 2020); see also United States v. Melgarejo, 2020 WL 

2395982, at *3 (C.D. Ill. May 12, 2020). In determining whether there is an extraordinary and 

compelling reason to modify a term of imprisonment, the Court may consider (1) the specificity 

of the defendant’s COVID-19 concerns, (2) whether the defendant has a medical condition that 

makes her especially susceptible to the dangers of COVID-19, (3) the age of the defendant, and 

(4) the extent that the defendant’s release would mitigate or aggravate the COVID-19 pandemic. 

See Council, 2020 WL 3097461, at *5–7; United States v. Barrett, 2020 WL 3264112, at *3 

(N.D. Ind. June 17, 2020); see also United States v. Davis, 2020 WL 1951652, at *1–2 (N.D. 

Ind. Apr. 23, 2020) (applying similar factors to consider whether there was a “compelling 

reason” for pretrial release due to the COVID-19 pandemic).

C. Discussion 

Having reviewed Mr. Coben’s submissions, the Court finds Mr. Coben has not 

established an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting modification of his sentence. 

Mr. Coben raises a single complete argument that he possesses an extraordinary and 

compelling reason for modification. The reason is that a change in law subsequent to his 

sentencing would have affected how his advisory Sentencing Guidelines recommendation was 

calculated. At his sentencing, Mr. Coben was subject to the career offender enhancement under 

the Guidelines. 

The career offender enhancement under the Guidelines requires, among other elements 

not in dispute, that “the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of 

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violence or a controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Mr. Coben argues that one of the 

two required prior felony convictions for his career offender enhancement was the crime of 

violence of resisting a law enforcement officer in violation of Indiana Code § 35-44-3-3.1 Mr. 

Coben argues that the Seventh Circuit subsequently held in United States v. Bennett that this 

statute, as was in effect when he was sentenced, does not constitute a crime of violence. 863 F.3d 

679, 681–82 (7th Cir. 2017). Mr. Coben argues that if sentenced today his Guidelines sentence

recommendation would only be a range of 85-105 months instead of the 262-327 months

recommendation used during his sentencing. He argues this means he would be “ineligible” for 

the 22-year sentence which was ultimately imposed. 2

The Government’s reply to this argument is that under Seventh Circuit precedent, a claim 

of error at the defendant’s sentencing does not constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason 

for release. The Government is correct on this point. The Seventh Circuit has held it is improper 

to use a § 3582 motion to challenge a potential error in a sentence as “[t]o allow otherwise would 

circumvent the normal process for challenging potential sentencing errors, either through the 

direct appeal process or collaterally through a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.” United States v. 

Martin, 21 F.4th 944, 946 (7th Cir. 2021). The Seventh Circuit has also repeatedly stated that 

judicial decisions subsequent to a sentencing do not constitute an extraordinary and compelling 

reason for modification of a sentence. United States v. King, 40 F.4th 594, 596 (7th Cir. 2022) 

(holding that a subsequent Circuit decision finding the defendant’s prior drug conviction did not 

1 Mr. Coben’s conviction for this offense was December 1, 2010. (DE 145 at 8.) 

2 Mr. Coben does not challenge that the statutorily required minimum sentence for his offense 

was seven years, or that the statutorily allowed maximum sentence was life. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Therefore Mr. Coben would be eligible for a 22-year sentence regardless of his 

Guidelines calculation. The Court construes Mr. Coben’s argument as suggesting the Court would have 

reached a different outcome in sentencing if his Guidelines were calculated differently. 

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qualify for an enhancement was not an extraordinary and compelling reason for sentence 

modification); United States v. Brock, 39 F.4th 462, 465 (7th Cir. 2022) (holding that subsequent 

judicial decision, even if “announcing new law or a new interpretation of an existing statutory 

provision–cannot alone constitute an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason authorizing a 

reduced sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A)”). Therefore, Mr. Coben’s argument regarding a 

subsequent change in law cannot serve as an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release 

and his motion will be denied. 

 Mr. Coben also argues in his reply brief, for the first time, that the ongoing Covid-19 

pandemic may constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release. (DE 221 at 2–

3.) However, the Court finds this argument to be waived on two grounds. First, this argument is 

waived as underdeveloped. Mr. Coben briefly states the legal standard for when the risk of 

Covid-19 exposure may constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason but provide no 

explanation as to how he satisfies that standard. Notably, Mr. Coben does not identify any 

chronic medical condition that afflicts him and may substantially increase his risk of serious 

illness or death from contracting Covid-19. Mr. Coben’s cursory and underdeveloped argument 

is therefore waived. Shipley v. Chi. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 947 F.3d 1056, 1062–63 (7th Cir. 

2020) (Arguments which are underdeveloped, cursory, and lack supporting authority are 

waived). Second, this argument would be waived as it was raised for the first time in Mr. 

Coben’s reply brief. White v. United States, 8 F.4th 547, 552 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[A]rguments 

raised for the first time in [a] reply brief are waived because they leave no chance to respond.”). 

 Moreover, even if this argument were not waived Mr. Coben could not establish that his 

risk of Covid-19 exposure creates an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release. This is 

because Mr. Coben is fully vaccinated against Covid-19 (DE 217-1) and the Seventh Circuit has 

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held that for most inmates “the availability of a vaccine makes it impossible to conclude that the 

risk of COVID-19 is an extraordinary and compelling reason [for release].” United States v. 

Broadfield, 5 F.4th 801, 803 (7th Cir. 2021). Mr. Coben offers no explanation why he is different 

from the vast majority of prisoners or why a vaccine is insufficient to offer him effective relief. 

The Court will not craft such an explanation for him. Shipley, 947 F.3d at 1063 (holding that the 

courts will not craft arguments and perform legal research on a party’s behalf). Therefore, Mr. 

Coben has not established an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release based on the 

Covid-19 pandemic. 

D. Conclusion 

For those reasons, the Court DENIES Mr. Coben’s motion for compassionate release or 

reduction in sentence. (DE 209.) 

 SO ORDERED. 

ENTERED: November 29, 2022 

 /s/ JON E. DEGUILIO

Chief Judge 

United States District Court 

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