UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

JULIE JAEGER, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 2:14-CV-36-JEM

)

VALPARAISO COMMUNITY )

SCHOOL CORPORATION, )

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 40], filed

by Defendant Valparaiso Community School Corporation on December 31, 2015. For the following

reasons, the motion is granted.

I. Procedural Background

On February 6, 2014, Plaintiff Julie Jaeger filed a Complaint alleging that Defendant fired

her from her employment with Defendant Valparaiso Community School Corporation in retaliation

for complaining about sexual harassment, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.1

On December 31, 2015, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff

filed a response on February 11, 2016, and on February 25, 2016, Defendant filed a reply.

The parties filed forms of consent to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate

Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case. 

Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

II. Summary Judgment Standard

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Plaintiff also included a claim for negligence, but in her response to the Motion for Summary Judgment

indicated that she is no longer proceeding on that claim.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that motions for summary judgment be

granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56 further requires the entry

of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party “who fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322

(1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate – in fact, is mandated –

where there are no disputed issues of material fact and the movant must prevail as a matter of law. 

In other words, the record must reveal that no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.” 

Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations and

quotations omitted).

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of

the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, that it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party may discharge its initial responsibility by simply “‘showing’ – that

is, pointing out to the district court – that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving

party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. When the nonmoving party would have the burden of proof

at trial, the moving party is not required to support its motion with affidavits or other similar

materials negating the opponent’s claim. Id. at 323, 325; Green v. Whiteco Indus., Inc., 17 F.3d

199, 201 n.3 (7th Cir. 1994); Fitzpatrick v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 916 F.2d 1254, 1256 (7th Cir.

1990). However, the moving party, if it chooses, may support its motion for summary judgment

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with affidavits or other materials, and, if the moving party has “produced sufficient evidence to

support a conclusion that there are no genuine issues for trial,” then the burden shifts to the

nonmoving party to show that an issue of material fact exists. Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill Assoc., 914

F.2d 107, 110-111 (7th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); see also Hong v. Children’s Mem’l Hosp., 993

F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1993).

Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the non-moving party

cannot resist the motion and withstand summary judgment by merely resting on its pleadings. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir. 1994). Rule 56(e)

provides that “[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address

another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact

undisputed for purposes of the motion [or] grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting

materials – including the facts considered undisputed – show that the movant is entitled to it . . . .” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2), (3); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986). 

Thus, to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact, the nonmoving party must “do more than simply show

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” but must “come forward with

‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)) (emphasis in original).

In viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all

facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all legitimate inferences in favor

of that party. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255; Srail v. Vill. of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 948 (7th Cir.

2009); NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-Am., Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 234 (7th Cir. 1995). A court’s role is not

to evaluate the weight of the evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, or to determine the truth

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of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. See Liberty

Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50.

III. Material Facts

Plaintiff began working for Defendant Valparaiso Community School Corporation in 1995,

and was a custodian assigned to Flint Elementary School until she was terminated in January of

2013.

In the summer of 2011, Johnson, a temporary employee began working with Plaintiff at Flint,

and in July of 2011 Plaintiff complained that he made inappropriate comments to her. Three days

after she reported his conduct to the administration, Johnson was removed from his employment. 

However, Plaintiff claims that his firing did not stop the harassment: Johnson called her, and would

periodically drive through the school parking lot. Plaintiff reported the continued harassment to the

principal of Flint several times, as well as to an administrator. Plaintiff met with the principal in

person in September or October of 2012 to complain about the harassment. In September she

requested transfer to another school to escape the harassment, and followed up on the request in

October or November or 2012. Plaintiff also reported the phone calls to the police.

In 2004, Plaintiff received a warning for taking extended breaks at work, and did not receive

any other discipline between that time and her termination. In January 2013, the Flint principal met

with Plaintiff to discuss her extended breaks and visitors who met her on school property. Plaintiff

asserts that she only took extended breaks with the permission of the principal, and the family visits

consisted of her sister visiting her for about an hour on one occasion and her husband occasionally

dropping off her lunch. She asserts that the breaks occurred after work was completed, when she and

other custodians would sit with the principal in the lounger, and the principal had never admonished

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her for her break routine. In January 2013, the principal and the assistant to the superintendent

recommended Plaintiff’s termination to the school board, and it was made effective January 17,

2013.

IV. Analysis

Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation under Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment based on race or national origin: “It shall 

be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with

respect to h[er] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such

individual’s race . . . or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). “An employee can establish

a prima facie case of retaliation by proceeding under either the direct or indirect method.” Roney

v. Ill. DOT, 474 F.3d 455, 459 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). For Plaintiff to “surviv[e]

summary judgment on her retaliation claim using the direct method, [she must] show ‘(1) she

engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action taken by

the employer; and (3) a causal connection between the two.’” Overly v. Keybank Nat’l Ass’n, 662

F.3d 856, 866 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Kodl v. Bd. of Educ. Sch. Dist. 45, Villa Park, 490 F.3d 558,

562 (7th Cir. 2007)). “The indirect method requires proof that (1) the employee engaged in

statutorily protected activity; (2) she was meeting her employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) she

suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) she was treated less favorably than similarly situated

employees who did not engage in statutorily protected activity.” Majors v. Gen. Elec. Co., 714 F.3d

527, 537 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Regardless of the method, the burden is always on the

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plaintiff to demonstrate that genuine issues exist for trial. Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325

F.3d 892, 897 (7th Cir. 2003). 

Defendant agrees that Plaintiff belongs to a protected class by virtue of her gender, undertook

a statutorily protected activity when she complained about harassment by a coworker, and suffered

a materially adverse employment action when she was fired. Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot

demonstrate that she was terminated in retaliation for protected activity. Plaintiff argues that there

is enough evidence to establish a causal connection between her complaint about the harassment and

her termination.

“In the absence of direct evidence (or, evidence that establishes the proposition without

resort to inferences from circumstantial evidence), a plaintiff can succeed under the direct method

by presenting sufficient circumstantial evidence such that a jury could infer retaliation.” Derosena

v. Gen. Bd. of Pensions & Health Benefits of United Methodist Church, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 2d 652,

669 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (citation omitted). “A convincing mosaic must include evidence from which

an inference of retaliatory intent could be drawn,” evidence like “(1) suspicious timing; (2)

ambiguous statements or behavior towards other employees in the protected group; (3) evidence,

statistical or otherwise, that similarly situated employees outside of the protected group

systematically receive better treatment; and (4) evidence that the employer offered a pretextual

reason for an adverse employment action.” Hobgood v. Ill. Gaming Bd., 731 F.3d 635, 643-44 (7th

Cir. 2013) (citations omitted); see also Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 860 (7th Cir. 2012);

Salas v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 493 F.3d 913, 924 (7th Cir. 2007). The Seventh Circuit Court of

Appeals makes it clear that “these categories of evidence are not exclusive, nor are they a set of

prongs of a circumstantial evidence,” but “[t]he ultimate question the parties and the court always

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must answer is whether it is more likely than not that the plaintiff was subjected to the adverse

employment action because of his protected status or activity” by considering the evidence presented

into context and as a whole. Hobgood, 731 F.3d at 644. “All reasonable inferences, of course, must

be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Only then can it be seen whether the plaintiff's evidence

amounts to a ‘convincing mosaic’ sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment or

judgment as a matter of law.” Id.

In this case, Plaintiff’s arguments focus on this mosaic of evidence. She argues that she last

complained in person about the harassment she was experiencing in September or October of 2012,

requesting transfer to escape the harassment in September 2012 and following up on that request in

October or November, and was terminated on January 17, 2013, only a few months later. “The

causal link of a retaliation claim is frequently established by showing that there was a suspiciously

short period of time between the employee’s complaint and the adverse employment action.” 

Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 781, 793 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Pantoja v. Am.

NTN Bearing Mfg. Corp., 495 F.3d 840, 849 (7th Cir. 2007). 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s complaints about harassment in fall of 2012 were not

statutorily protected activity. Defendant removed Johnson from his position as a temporary

employee in July 2011, and argues that the complaints Plaintiff made after that were for activity that

primarily occurred off of the school campus and were not statutorily protected complaints of

harassment based on her gender. As Defendant argues, even if Plaintiff’s fall 2012 complaints

comprise constitutionally protected activity, the few months between those complaints and her firing

are insufficient to establish an inference of retaliation. Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819,

828 (7th Cir. 2014) (“‘[S]tanding by itself,’ four months between the employee’s protected activity

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and his discipline could not support an inference that the two events were related. . . . Even intervals

shorter than four months are unlikely, standing alone, to establish the causation element of a

retaliation claim.”) (quoting Hughes v. Derwinski, 967 F.2d 1168, 1174 (7th Cir.1992); other

citations omitted). The time period is not so short as to be suspicious on its own.

Plaintiff also argues that two other employees were disciplined for similar behavior as what

she was allegedly fired for, but that they were only suspended from work, one for three days, one

for only a single day. They were both male, and did not complain of sexual harassment. Defendant

argues that a warning Plaintiff received nine years previously distinguishes her in a meaningful way

from these otherwise similar co-workers so that they cannot be comparators for the purposes of a

mosaic analysis. Plaintiff also admits that although all three were disciplined for taking extended

breaks, Plaintiff alone received an additional citation for hosting family members at the school. 

These other employees were not fired, but they were disciplined for taking extended breaks, as was

Plaintiff, and were not accused of hosting family members at the school, nor had they been subject

to warnings for taking extended breaks in the past. Plaintiff has not provided “evidence, statistical

or otherwise, that similarly situated employees outside of the protected group systematically receive

better treatment” than she did. Teruggi v. CIT Grp./Capital Fin., Inc., 709 F.3d 654, 659-60 (7th

Cir. 2013) (quoting Dickerson v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 522, 657 F.3d 595, 601 (7th

Cir.2011)). 

Plaintiff argues that Defendant is responsible for spoliation of the evidence that it used as

the reason for firing her. Defendant asserts that it was upon review of surveillance tapes that the

principal realized that the afternoon custodians were violating school policies. Although Plaintiff

does not argue that she did not take extended breaks, she argues that the principal knew about them

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and had never previously expressed disapproval. She also argues that Defendant is responsible for

spoliation of evidence. Plaintiff argues that by April 3, 2013, when she filed her EEOC Charge of

Discrimination, Defendant should have reasonably anticipated litigation in this case and should have

placed a document retention policy in place to avoid destroying relevant evidence, like the video on

which Defendant allegedly based the decision to fire Plaintiff and discipline her coworkers. She

argues that the Court should assume that the videos did not contain what Defendant claims they do

and/or that Defendant intentionally allowed the tapes to be destroyed to avoid liability. However,

although Defendant’s failure to keep the videotape might affect what evidence would be admissible

at trial, the failure of Defendant to produce the videotape is not sufficient, even considered alongside

Plaintiff’s other arguments, to create a mosaic of evidence of discrimination.

Defendant argues that the reasons given for the decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment

were not pretextual: she had previously been disciplined for taking excessive breaks, knew that her

job would be in jeopardy if she continued to take them, but still continued. Plaintiff does not point

to any specific evidence of pretext, ambiguous statements, or other indications of discrimination or

retaliation that might form part of the mosaic of evidence.

Plaintiff has failed to set forth any facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial, or

that a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant fired her as a result of her complaints of sexual

harassment and discrimination.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment [DE 40]. 

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The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Valparaiso

Community School Corporation and against Julie Jaeger as to her claims.

So ORDERED this 1st day of June, 2016.

s/ John E. Martin 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN E. MARTIN 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

cc: All counsel of record

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