UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

LUIS E. CABAN, )

)

Plaintiff )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 1:13-CV-67 RLM 

 )

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,1 )

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL )

SECURITY, )

Defendant )

OPINION AND ORDER

Luis Caban seeks judicial review of the latest decision of the Commissioner

of Social Security denying his applications for disability insurance benefits and

Supplemental Security Income under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 423

and 1381 et seq. The court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). For the reasons that follow, the court reverses and

remands this case to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings.

The extensive procedural history in this case is well-documented, and

needn’t be repeated here. Mr. Caban has applied for disability insurance benefits

and SSI three times: (1) on March 30, 2006 asserting disability as of October 31,

2005; (2) on December 17, 2008 asserting disability as of November 15, 2008; and

(3) on July 1, 2010. All three applications were denied. When this court vacated

the ALJ’s November 19, 2008 decision denying Mr. Caban’s original applications

1 Carolyn W. Colvin, the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, has been substituted

as the named defendant, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1).
(A.R. 21-35) and remanded for further proceedings in July 2010, see Caban v.

Astrue, Cause No. 1:09-cv-192 (J. VanBokklen) (N.D. Ind. July 29, 2010) (A.R.

698-720), the Appeals Council ordered the Administrative Law Judge to “associate

all the claim files . . . offer [Mr. Caban] an opportunity for a hearing, take any

further action needed to complete the administrative record, and issue a new

decision.” (A.R. 650-51). The ALJ conducted a new hearing and issued a decision

on September 21, 2011 finding that Mr. Caban wasn’t disabled at any time from

October 31, 2005 through the date of his decision, and denied his applications for

benefits. 

The ALJ found that Mr. Caban had severe physical and mental

impairments, but “only his obesity, his degenerative disc disease and his affective

disorder caused ongoing limitations that lasted at least 12 months,” and that his

impairments alone and in combination didn't meet or equal the requirements of

a listed impairment (specifically Listings 1.04 and 12.00 et seq.), or preclude him

from performing his past relevant work as a general clerk, automobile sales

representative, and industrial sales representative. 

When the Appeals Council denied Mr. Caban’s request for review, the ALJ's

decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. Jones

v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010). Mr. Caban appealed for a second

time, arguing that the ALJ’s findings concerning the medical evidence and his

credibility, residual capacity, and ability to perform past relevant work aren’t

sufficiently explained or supported by the evidence. The court agrees.

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The issue before this court isn’t whether Mr. Caban is disabled, but whether

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision that he is not. Scott v. Astrue,

647 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 2011); Nelms v. Astrue, 553 F.3d 1093, 1097 (7th Cir.

2009). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,

401 (1971); Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010). In reviewing the

ALJ’s decision, the court can’t reweigh the evidence, make independent findings

of fact, decide credibility, or substitute its own judgment for that of the

Commissioner, Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 513 (7th Cir. 2009); Powers v.

Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 434-435 (7th Cir. 2000), but “conduct[s] a critical review of

the evidence, considering both the evidence that supports, as well as the evidence

that detracts from, the Commissioner’s decision.” Briscoe v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d

345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005). The ALJ isn’t required “to address every piece of evidence

or testimony presented, but he must provide a ‘logical bridge’ between the

evidence and the conclusions so that [the court] can assess the validity of the

agency’s ultimate findings and afford the claimant meaningful judicial review.”

Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d at 1160. The ALJ didn’t do so in this case. 

The ALJ didn’t identify or address Mr. Caban’s non-severe impairments and

the effect they might have had on his ability to engage in work-related activity,

steadfastly asserting that he wasn’t required to do so or had previously decided

that they weren’t substantiated or didn’t limit Mr. Caban’s ability to engage in

work-related activity. He is mistaken. 

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The regulations might not require an ALJ to specifically identify which

impairments are severe and which are non-severe at the second step of the

evaluation process, but he must consider all of the claimant’s impairments —

including impairments that are not severe — in determining the claimant’s

residual functional capacity at the fourth step. See Castile v. Astrue, 617 F.3d

923, 927 (7th Cir. 2010) (the ALJ must consider the aggregate effects of all of the

claimant’s impairments in the residual functional capacity assessment, including

those which are non-severe); 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(e), 404.1545, 416.92(e) and

416.945; SSR 96-8p. If the impact of non-severe impairments isn’t fully

considered, the decision must be reversed. Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 423

(7th Cir. 2010). The ALJ hasn’t done what’s required. He simply incorporated by

reference the discussion of the evidence in the two prior administrative decisions

issued in this case, “except, of course, insofar as they have been vacated,” leaving

it to the court to scour the record in search of relevant findings relating to Mr.

Caban’s many impairments. Even it were proper for the court to undertake such

an endeavor, the medical evidence presented at the hearing in 2011 indicates that

Mr. Caban’s condition might have deteriorated. For the reasons that follow, the

ALJ’s discussion of that evidence and his reliance on past findings regarding the

severity of Mr. Caban’s impairments in 2008 and 2010 is insufficient and

unsupported. 

The ALJ rejected in whole, or in part, the opinions of virtually every treating,

consulting, and examining medical source (Drs. Lazoff, Bretz, Dwyer, Sohail,

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Kamineni, Boen, Von Bargen), as well as the state agency’s reviewing physicians,

because they weren’t sufficiently supported by objective findings and/or weren’t

consistent with a functional capacity evaluation that was completed by Gina

Smith, a registered occupational therapist, on November 28, 2006 (finding that

Mr. Caban retained the capacity to perform a restricted range of light work activity

on a full-time basis (A.R. 257-310)) or with the ALJ’s subjective belief that Mr.

Caban was exaggerating his symptoms and was capable of working. 

Dr. Lazoff and Dr. Bretz were treating physicians, and as such their

opinions were entitled to “controlling weight” if they were “well supported by

medical findings and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the

record.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d at 870; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).

When a treating source’s opinion isn’t given controlling weight, the ALJ must

consider the following factors in deciding what weight to give it: “the length,

nature, and extent of the treatment relationship; frequency of examination; the

physician’s specialty; the types of tests performed; and the consistency and

support for the physician’s opinion.” Campbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 308 (7th

Cir. 2010; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). There’s no indication that the ALJ

considered those factors in this case.

The ALJ’s assessment of the consulting and examining physicians’ opinions

is similarly flawed. He found that they weren’t supported by objective findings and

were inconsistent with other evidence (Ms. Smith’s 2006 functional capacity

evaluation and the “credible portions” of Dr. Lazoff’s 2007 opinions (those portions

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that were consistent with Ms. Smith’s evaluation)). But “[a]n ALJ can reject an

examining physician’s opinion only for reasons supported by substantial evidence

in the record; a contradictory opinion of a non-examining physician does not, by

itself, suffice.” Gudgel v. Barnhart, 345 F.3d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 2003). 

The ALJ speculated that Mr. Caban might have exaggerated his symptoms

and limitations and that his treating and consulting physicians might have relied

on his subjective complaints in assessing the severity of his impairments. Having

found fault with virtually all of the treating and consulting physicians’ opinions,

the ALJ substituted his own medical judgment for theirs and concluded that Mr.

Caban wasn’t disabled, effectively making himself the doctor. His findings in that

regard are inadequate.See Kangail v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 627, 629 (7th Cir. 2006);

Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 870 (7th Cir. 2000); Green v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 780

(7th Cir. 2000).

While a claimant bears the burden of proving disability, the ALJ in a Social

Security hearing has a duty to develop a full and fair record. See Smith v. Apfel,

231 F.3d 433, 437(7th Cir. 2000); Luna v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 1994);

Thompson v. Sullivan, 933 F.2d 581, 585 (7th Cir. 1991). If the basis of the

physicians’ opinions wasn’t readily discernable or the ALJ needed clarification, he

"ha[d] a duty to solicit additional information to flesh out" their opinions. Barnett

v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 2004). He didn’t do that, and his findings

with respect to those opinions and the severity of Mr. Caban’s impairments aren’t

adequately supported by the record and are insufficient.

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To the extent the ALJ’s decision regarding the severity of Mr. Caban’s

impairments and his residual functional capacity was premised on his assessment

of Mr. Caban’s credibility, it too is insufficient. The regulations do not “require

objective medical evidence to corroborate statements about the intensity,

persistence, and functional effects of pain or other symptoms,” Pope v. Shalala,

998 F.2d 473, 482 (7th Cir. 1993), nor do they “require a finding of disabled every

time a claimant states that she feels unable to work.” Id. at 486. The ALJ must

evaluate a claimant’s subjective complaints in light of all the evidence, including

the claimant’s work history, the medical evidence, the claimant’s testimony and

general demeanor, personal observations, and other factors such as the nature,

location, onset, duration, frequency, radiation and intensity of any pain,

precipitating and aggravating factors; the type, dosage, effectiveness, and adverse

effects of any pain medication; treatment for relief of pain; daily activities and

functional restrictions. S.S.R. 88-13; Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 485-486 (7th

Cir. 1993). The ALJ didn’t do that in this case.

 The ALJ found that Mr. Caban’s statements about the severity and limiting

effects of his impairments weren’t credible primarily because they weren’t

supported by objective medical evidence. But as the court has previously

determined, the ALJ’s assessment of the medical evidence was inadequate. 

Whether Mr. Caban’s statements are credible and whether he is capable of

performing his past relevant work or other jobs are questions for the ALJ, not the

court. Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d at 513; Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d at 434-435.

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The court’s job is to assure that a logical bridge connects the evidence and the

ALJ’s finding, see Giles ex rel. Giles v. Astrue, 483 F.3d 483, 486 (7th Cir. 2007),

and the bridge isn’t complete in this case.

Neither substantial evidence or an adequate discussion of the issues

support the ALJ’s findings with respect to the severity and limiting effects of Mr.

Caban’s impairments. When, as here, the court can’t see an “accurate and logical

bridge between the evidence and the result,” remand is required. Sarchet v.

Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 1996).

Accordingly, the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is

REVERSED and the matter REMANDED.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: September 30, 2014 

 /s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr. 

Judge

United States District Court

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