# FILE

IN THE SUPREMECOURTOFTHE STATE OFWASHINGTON

STATE OFWASHINGTON, ) ) .Respondent, ) No. 

### 87740-8 ) v. ) En Bane ) JOSH SANCHEZ, ) 

## fJUll8 2013 ) Filed Petitioner. ) ) ) WIGGINS, J.-When a juvenile sex offender is returned to the community, Washington law requires local authoritiesto determinethe risk posed bythejuvenile and to notify the community accordingly. Petitioner Josh Sanchez, a juvenile sex offender, argues that the legislature shifted risk determination from local law enforcementto a state committee within the Department ofCorrections (DOC). For this reason, he argues that the superior court should not release his offender information to the King County Sheriff's Office. However, Sanchez misreads the statute: while the legislature did grant newauthorityto the DOC, it did so in addition to the prior authority granted to local law enforcement, thus imposing a parallel responsibility on both entities. Wetherefore holdthatthejuvenile court may properly release the evaluation of Sanchez that resulted in his receiving an alternative dispositionfor hissex offense.No. 87740-8 Sanchez also contends that this disclosure to local law enforcement violates his constitutional and statutory rights to privacy. However, because the legislature had a rational basis for requiring its release to local law enforcement and because RCW 13.50.050will prevent any subsequent public disclosure of his information, his rightto privacywas not unduly curtailed. STATUTORY BACKGROUND Sanchez's case is governed by two separate but related statutory schemes: statutes providing for alternative dispositions forjuvenile sex offenders and statutes requiring public notice of a sex offender's release. A preliminary overview provides the background. A. Specialsexoffenderdisposition alternative (SSODA) Juveniles facing afirst-time conviction for certain sex offenses in Washington may seek a clement alternative to traditional sentencing called a special sex offender disposition alternative (SSODA). See RCW 13.40.162. If a juvenile is SSODA eligible, the court may order an evaluation to determine the offender's amenability to treatment. 

### /d. At a minimum, this evaluation must include a description of the juvenile's offense history, psychological evaluation, social and educational history, employmentsituation, his or herversion ofthe facts in the case, and proposed treatmentterms. RCW 13.40.162(2)(a)(i)-(v), (b)(i)-(v). The courtthen considers whether this alternative sentence will benefit the offender and the community. RCW 13.40.162(3). The typical SSODAsentence includes two years of outpatienttreatment underaprobation officer'ssupervision. 

### /d.

2No. 87740-8 B. Sexoffenderassessmentandpublicnotice In 1990, the legislature first enacted present-day RCW 4.24.550, requiring local law enforcement to notify the public when a sex offender was released from confinement. LAWS OF 1990, ch. 3, 

### § 117. The statute requires local officials to
assess each sex offender and assign a risk level 

### (1, II, or Ill, with Ill being the most likelyto reoffend). This assessmentthen determinesthe nature and extent of public notice. However, because it placed responsibility for assigning risk levels solely under the purview of local law enforcement, the original scheme raised two
concerns: first, that similarly situated offenders would receive disparate treatment
across jurisdictions, and second, that local authorities would lack sufficient information to reach accurate decisions. H.B. REP. on Engrossed Substitute S.B. 5759, at2, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1997). The legislature addressed these concerns in Laws of 1997, chapter 364, which created a role for the State in the risk assessment process. These amendments established an end-of-sentence review committee (ESRC) under the DOC tasked with assessing the risk posed by newly released sex offenders. RCW 72.09.345(3), (5)(a). The amendments also requiredjuvenile courtsto "provide local law enforcementofficialswith all relevant information on offenders allowedto remain in the community in a timely manner." RCW 4.24.550(6). As we discuss in greater detail below, these amendmentsdid nothingto displace local lawenforcement's role. Rather, they established parallel authorityfor both the ESRC and local authorities in the risk assessment process.



### 3No. 87740-8 

### C. Juvenile sexoffendernoticeandSubstitute S.B. 5204 Then, in 2011, the legislature passed Substitute S.B. 5204, which amended RCW 72.09.345 to add provisions pertaining to juveniles. See LAWS OF 2011, ch. 338, 

### § 5. These required the ESRC to assess the public risk posed by juveniles convicted of a sex offense in addition to the prior requirements for sex offenders generally. !d. 

### § 5(3). Thus, the legislature made clear that the ESRC's risk assessments and narrative noticeswould applywith equal force to bothjuvenile and adult sex offenders. However, Substitute S.B. 5204 did nothing to alter the duties that RCW4.24.550 imposed on local lawenforcement. FACTS Thirteen-year-old Josh Sanchez pleaded guilty to one count of first degree child molestation in juvenile court. In lieu ofatraditional sentence, he qualified fora SSODAthat placed him on probation in atreatmentcenterfortwoyears. In orderto preventthe Department ofSocial and Health Services from using his SSODAevaluation in dependency proceedings, Sanchez moved underGR 15to seal the evaluation. The King County Superior Court initially granted Sanchez's motion, but it vacated the order three days later after learning that SSODA evaluations are released to the King County Sheriff's Office as a routine part ofthe sheriff's office's duty to carry out a risk assessment. The court authorized the probation departmentto release Sanchez's SSODAevaluation to the sheriff's office, butstayedthatdisclosureto givethedefensetimetofile a noticeofappeal. Sanchez appealed and moved for a stay ofthe trial court's order to release his SSODAevaluation. The Court ofAppeals initially granted a temporary stay, but


### 4No. 87740-8 ultimately denied the motion and lifted the stay. The Court ofAppeals affirmed the trial court, and we granted review. State v. Sanchez, 169 Wn. App. 405, 279 P.3d 999, reviewgranted, 175Wn.2d 1023, 291 P.3d 253 (2012). ANALYSIS The meaning of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo. Dep't of Ecology

### v. Campbell

### &Gwinn, LLC, 146Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002) (citing State v. Breazeale, 144Wn.2d 829, 837, 31 P.3d 1155 (2001); State 

### v. J.M., 144Wn.2d 472, 480, 28 P.3d 720 (2001)). The object ofstatutory interpretation is to ascertain and carryoutthe legislature's intent.

### /d. This court looks to the plain and ordinary meaning of statutory language to determine legislative intent. In turn, we discern plain meaning from "all that the Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision in question." Campbell 

### & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 11. Additionally, if possible, we will construe a statute's language so as to find it constitutional. City ofSeattle 

### v. Montana, 129 Wn.2d 583, 589-90, 919 P.2d 1218 (1996). 

### I. RCW 4.24.550 provides for the release of SSODA evaluations to local law enforcement The statutory provisions governing sex offender risk assessmentdemonstrate the legislature's intent to create a cooperative intergovernmental system involving both state and local authorities. The statutes require both the ESRC and local law enforcement to make parallel determinations based on the same information. But Sanchezarguesotherwise: he contendsthat aSSODAevaluation is irrelevantto the



### 5No. 87740-8 sheriff's office's assessment, and also that the legislature has now placed risk assessment solely under the purview of the DOC's end of sentence review committee (ESRC). However, the plain meaning of these statutes contradicts Sanchez'sarguments. A. SSODA evaluations are "relevant information" within the meaning ofRCW 4.24.550(6) RCW4.24.550(6) requiresthejuvenilecourtto "provide local lawenforcement officials with all relevant information on offenders allowed to remain in the community in a timely manner." This information then helps local officials make an informed risk assessmentas required by RCW4.24.550. Sanchez, however, argues that his SSODAevaluation is not"relevant information"within thestatute's meaning. While RCW 4.24.550(6) does not define "relevant," reading that provision in its broaderstatutory context clarifiesthe term's meaning. Ifastatute does notdefine its own terms, we may lookto related statutes. And where possible, statutes should be read together to achieve a '"harmonious total statutory scheme

. . . which maintains the integrity of the respective statutes."' State ex ref. Peninsula NeighborhoodAss'n 

### v. Dep't ofTransp., 142 Wn.2d 328, 342, 12 P.3d 134 (2000) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Employco Pers. Servs., Inc., v. CityofSeattle, 117 Wn.2d 606, 614, 817 P.2d 1373 (1991)). As the related statute RCW 13.50.050(6) makes clear, the release of juvenile offense records "shall be governed by the rules of discovery and other rules of law applicable in adult criminal investigations and prosecutions." Reading these two provisions together, we conclude that the statutory scheme governing juvenile



### 6No. 87740-8 offense records is best served by adopting the definition of relevance contained in the Washington Rules of Evidence. Therefore, information is relevant to a sex offender risk assessment if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is ofconsequencetothe determination

... more probable or less probablethan itwould bewithoutthe evidence." ER 401. Under this definition, SSODA evaluations are indisputably relevant to a juvenile sex offender's risk assessment. An examiner conducting a SSODA evaluation and a law enforcement agency performing a risk assessment must address the same question: what risk does the offender pose to the community? Compare RCW 13.40.162(2)(b) ("The examiner shall assess and report regarding the respondent's amenability to treatment and relative risk to the community.") with RCW4.24.550(6)(b) ("Local law enforcement agencies that disseminate information pursuant to this section shall

... assign risk level classifications to all offenders aboutwhom informationwill be disseminated

....").Asdescribed above, a SSODA examiner considers a juvenile offender's social, educational, and employment situation as well as his or her offense history, alleged deviancy, and version ofthe case'sfacts. For lawenforcementofficials performing roughlythe same assessment, the information compiled by a SSODA examiner is more than relevant; it is practicallydispositive. B. Substitute S.B. 5204 didnotdivestlocallawenforcementofits RCW4.24.550 authority Sanchez further argues that as of Substitute S.B. 5204's passage, only the ESRC and notthe sheriff's office is authorized to conduct risk assessments. Butthe



### 7No. 87740-8 legislation made no such change. The ESRC's authorityto conduct sex offender risk assessments dates back to 1997 when the legislature created RCW 72.09.345, which both established the committee and assigned it that task. See RCW 72.09.345(2), (3); LAWS OF 1997, ch. 364, 

### § 4. In Substitute S.B. 5204, the legislature merely amended RCW 72.09.345(3) to includejuveniles amongst those
sex offenderswhom the ESRC was required to assess (see LAWS OF2011, ch. 338, 

### § 5(3)). The languagethat "local law enforcement agencies

... shall

...assign risk level classifications to all offenders about whom information will be disseminated" remains intact. RCW4.24.550(6)(b). The ESRC's inclusion in the risk assessment process was never intended to displace local law enforcement's role, but to better support and inform it. RCW 72.09.345(2) explicitly states that the purpose of the ESRC's risk assessments is "for public agencies to have the information necessary to notify the public as authorized in RCW 4.24.550

...." To fulfill this purpose, the statute directs the ESRC to "issue to appropriate law enforcement agencies, for their use in making public notifications under RCW 4.24.550, narrative notices regarding the pending release ofsex offendersfrom the department'sfacilities." RCW72.09.345(7).Alocal authority is then required to consider the ESRC's risk assessment. RCW 4.24.550(6)(a). Butthey need notfollow it: local officials may departfrom the State's classification, so long as they give notice and explain their reasons for doing so. RCW 4.24.550(10). Therefore, contrary to Sanchez's view, the present statutory scheme grantsthe ESRC and local law enforcementconcurrentauthorityto perform

8No. 87740-8

sex offender risk assessments, and it provides for them to collaborate toward that end.

II. Releasing Sanchez's SSODA evaluation to the sheriff's office will not violate his privacy rights Sanchez also argues that releasing his SSODA evaluation would violate his constitutional right to privacy, as well as his right to confidentiality under various stateand federal statutes.A SSODAevaluation may contain sensitive, privileged, or embarrassing information, including details regarding ajuvenile's social situation or alleged deviant behaviors. See RCW 13.40.162(2)(a). Therefore, indiscriminately releasing such an evaluation to the public, orto an agencywithout need orauthority to review it, could raise legitimate privacy concerns. However, because the legislature had a rational basis for authorizing its release to local law enforcement and because the confidentiality statutes at issue allowfor its release as required by law while prohibiting its disclosure to the public at large, Sanchez's rights are not violated here. A. Release ofSanchez's SSODA evaluation wouldnot violate his constitutional righttoprivacy While Sanchez does enjoy a constitutional right to confidentiality, it is not without limits. The United States Supreme Court has recognized an individual's right to privacy under the federal constitution in two contexts: the right to make certain decisions without government intrusion (autonomy) and the right to prevent the disclosure of personal information (confidentiality). Whalen 

### v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600, 97 S. Ct. 869, 51 

### L. Ed. 2d 64 (1977). Whilethis court has acknowledged
an individual's interest in confidentiality, we have not recognized it as afundamental
9No. 87740-8 right under eitherthe federal or state constitution. O'Hartigan 

### v. Dep't ofPers., 118 Wn.2d 111, 117, 821 P.2d 44 (1991). Rather, we apply a rational basis test: "disclosure of intimate information to governmental agencies is permissible if it is carefully tailored to meet avalid governmental interest, and provided the disclosure is no greaterthan is reasonably necessary." /d. (citing Peninsula Counseling Ctr. 

### v. Rahm, 105Wn.2d 929, 935, 719 P.2d 926 (1986)). The legislature had a rational basis for authorizing the release of Sanchez's SSODA evaluation to the sheriff's office. The State has a legitimate interest in ensuring that local lawenforcement is sufficientlywell informedto make an accurate assessment of the risk posed by released sex offenders. See H.B. REP. on Engrossed Substitute S.B. 5759. And as we concluded above, a SSODAevaluation is highly relevantto this assessment. The sheriff's office requires this information for the same reason as does the SSODA examiner: to accurately assess the risk of whetherthejuvenilewill reoffend in thefuture. Sanchezmakes no credible argument that releasing his SSODA evaluation is a greater disclosure than is reasonably necessaryto meetthis need. B. Release ofSanchez's SSODA evaluation wouldnot violate his statutoryright toprivacy Sanchez also argues that releasing his SSODA evaluation to the sheriff's office would violate statutory controls on the disclosure ofjuvenile offense records. Washington classifies records pertaining to a juvenile's criminal offense into three categories: the official juvenile court file, which includes court filings, findings, orders, and the like; the "social file," which contains reports of the probation

10No. 87740-8 counselor; and other miscellaneous records. RCW 13.50.010(1). While the official court file is open to the public unless sealed, RCW 13.50.050(2), all otherjuvenile offense records are generally confidential. RCW 13.50.050(3). Because it is essentially the SSODA examiner's report, Sanchez's SSODA evaluation is part of thesocialfile and is therefore confidential. However, RCW 13.50.050 provides for the disclosure of confidential juvenile offense records under certain circumstances. Specifically, these files may be released "as provided in this section, RCW 13.50.010, 13.40.215, and 4.24.550." RCW 13.50.050(3). As discussed above, RCW 4.24.550(6) requires juvenile courts to "provide local lawenforcement officialswith all relevant information on offenders," which includes SSODAevaluations, so that local officials can make an accurate risk assessment. In other words, RCW 13.50.050 makes an express exception for the release of SSODAevaluations to local law enforcement for the purpose of making
sex offender risk assessments. Therefore, releasing Sanchez's evaluation to the sheriff's office does notviolatethe statute's confidentiality requirement. 

### C. Whetherthe sheriff's office mayrelease Sanchez's SSODA evaluation is not an issue ripe forreview Sanchez expresses concern that if his SSODA evaluation were released to the sheriff's office, it could subsequently be released to the public pursuant to the Public Records Act (PRA), chapter 42.56 RCW, thereby divulging sensitive and personal information. But as far as the record shows, no one has actually filed a PRA request for any information ofSanchez's. There is no need for us to consider

11No. 87740-8 the merits of a purely hypothetical request for Sanchez's SSODA evaluation. Accordingly, we declineto reach the PRAissue atthistime. D. Sanchez's SSODA evaluationis notprotectedas

### a medicalrecord Because his SSODA evaluation contains mental health reports, Sanchez contends that it is protected from disclosure to the sheriff's office by chapter 70.02 RCW and the federal Health Information Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936.Wedisagree. While it is certainly true that chapter 70.02 RCW and HIPAA protect mental health records, see RCW 70.02.010(5)(a); 42 U.S.C. 

### § 1320d(4)(b), that protection is conditional. Chapter 70.02 RCW specifically provides for the release of health
care information, without authorization by the patient, if "required by law." RCW 70.02.050(2)(b). Similarly, HIPAA permits the release of personally identifying medical information to law enforcement by court order. 45 C.F.R. 

### § 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(A).Therefore, neither HIPAAnorchapter 70.02 RCW applieswhere
a court, acting pursuant to statutory mandate (here, RCW 4.24.550), orders the release ofmedical informationto lawenforcement. 

### E. Courtrules do notpreventthe release ofSanchez's SSODA evaluation Finally, Sanchezcites the rules ofdiscovery in support ofhis asserted privacy interestin the SSODAevaluation. He discusses CrR4.7(d), which allows defendants to request discoverable information from the prosecuting attorney, and CrR 4.7(h)(3), which concerns the custody of materials used by the prosecution during trial. However, these rules do not purportto create a privacy right on the part ofthe defendant. Nor are they relevant to the present case; Sanchez is not requesting
12No. 87740-8 information from the State, nor is the State holding information on Sanchez pending trial. In his briefing, Sanchez also refers obliquely to GR 15, which sets out a general procedure for sealing, destroying, or redacting court records. However, to seal a record is "to protect [it]from examination bythepublicand unauthorized court personnel." GR 15(b)(4) (emphasis added). Therefore, even if the juvenile court ultimately orders his records sealed, this would not prevent their release to the sheriff's office. As with his contentions about RCW 13.50.050 (discussed above), Sanchez's argument again seems to conflate a release to local law enforcement with full publicdisclosure. 1 CONCLUSION Neither the statutes governing maintenance and release of SSODA evaluations, nor the constitutional, statutory, or rule-based privacy concerns asserted by Sanchez, bar the release of his SSODA evaluation to local law enforcement officials. Rather, RCW 4.24.550 requires the juvenile court to provide the evaluation to local law enforcement to better inform their statutorily mandated risk assessmentofsex offenders. Forthese reasons, we hold thatthejuvenile court may properly release Sanchez's SSODA evaluation to the sheriff's office. Accordingly, the CourtofAppeals is affirmed.

1 Sanchez also offers several policy arguments to discourage the release of SSODA evaluations to local law enforcement. However, because the statutory scheme at issue on this point is clearand unequivocal, we do not addressthose arguments. See Duke

### v. Boyd, 133Wn.2d 80, 87, 942 P.2d 351 (1997). 13No. 87740-8

WE CONCUR.

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