1 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

 SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

JOHN W. BLOCH, III, ) 

 ) 

Petitioner ) 

 ) 

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 3:14-CV-1868 RLM 

 ) (Arising out of 3:12-CR-2 RLM) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

 ) 

Respondent ) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

In April 2012, a jury found John W. Bloch, III guilty of illegal possession 

of a firearm. After two appeals, the court sentenced Mr. Bloch to a total of 105 

months imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release, and 

the court of appeals affirmed the sentence. See United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 

862 (7th Cir. 2016). Mr. Bloch’s petition to vacate, set aside, or correct his 

sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, [Doc. No. 78], his motions to amend or 

supplement his petition, [Doc. Nos. 109, 114], and his motion to compel, [Doc. 

No. 124], are before the court.1 For the following reasons, the court denies his 

motions and his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

I. Background 

The factual background underlying Mr. Bloch’s conviction is set out in 

 

1 Mr. Bloch filed his motion to vacate while his third appeal was pending, so the court 

deferred ruling pending disposition of the appeal. [Doc. No. 111]. 
2 

detail in the court of appeals’ opinion addressing Mr. Bloch’s first direct appeal. 

See United States v. Bloch, 718 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2013). The court assumes the 

reader’s familiarity with the underlying facts of this case, but will briefly 

summarize the facts relevant to issue presented in Mr. Bloch’s motion and his 

petition. 

After getting two calls reporting gunshots in the vicinity, one of which 

specifically identified Kirsten Steven’s apartment as the source of the gunfire, 

Elkhart police officers responded to the apartment and knocked on the door. Mr. 

Bloch—visibly intoxicated and somewhat combative—opened the door. The 

officers told Mr. Bloch to step outside, handcuffed him, and asked Ms. Steven, 

Mr. Bloch’s girlfriend, to step outside as well. After the officers were told that a 

young child was sleeping in the apartment, they conducted a sweep of the 

apartment to see if anyone was injured. The officers found a loaded Glock 

handgun sitting on a nightstand and an SKS assault rifle in an open closet, both 

in plain view. Next to the rifle, officers found 54 rounds of ammunition in a clip 

and discovered 144 rounds of ammunition for the handgun nearby. As the 

officers removed the firearms from the apartment, Mr. Bloch professed 

ownership of the guns and complained that the officers were taking them. 

Because Mr. Bloch was a convicted felon who couldn’t possess a firearm lawfully, 

he was arrested. He continued to protest the seizure of the weapons even after 

his arrest. A jury convicted Mr. Bloch of illegal possession of a firearm. 
3 

II. Discussion 

The rules governing petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provide that 

once a motion is filed, “[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the motion and any 

annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not 

entitled to relief in the district court, the judge shall make an order for its 

summary dismissal and cause the movant to be notified.” Rule 4(b) of the Rules 

Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts. After 

reviewing the record in this case, the court finds that Mr. Bloch’s motion can be 

resolved without a hearing. See Bruce v. United States, 256 F.3d 592, 597 (7th 

Cir. 2001); Daniels v. United States, 54 F.3d 290, 293 (7th Cir. 1995). 

A. Motion to Amend 

Mr. Bloch moves to amend and/or supplement his § 2255 motion 

contending that there have been “some changes” in his case and “some issues 

that were not apparent to the Defendant when the initial . . . Petition was 

submitted,” but he didn’t identify what those changes and issues were or what 

claims he’d like to add or modify, or provide a copy of the proposed amended 

petition. The court deferred ruling on the motion to amend to allow Mr. Bloch to 

supplement his motion with a copy of the proposed amended § 2255 petition, 

[Doc. No. 111], which he did. [Doc. No. 114]. 

The Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings don’t contain a provision 

for amending motions for collateral review, so the court must look to Fed. R. Civ. 
4 

P. 15(a) to determine whether leave to amend should be granted in this case. 

Johnston v. United States, 196 F.3d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 1999). Rule 15(a)(2) 

provides that leave to amend should be freely granted “when justice so requires.” 

“Under Rule 15, a court may deny the amendment due to undue delay, bad faith, 

dilatory motive, prejudice or futility.” Rodriguez v. United States, 286 F.3d 972, 

980 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Bethany Pharmacal Co. v. QVC, Inc., 241 F.3d 854, 

861 (7th Cir.2001)). 

In his amended petition, Mr. Bloch seeks to add a third claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel against his trial counsel, arguing that his trial counsel was 

unconstitutionally ineffective because he didn’t challenge the multiplicity of the 

charges in the indictment. Mr. Bloch contends that being charged with violations 

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) violated his Fifth and Sixth 

Amendment rights. The court disagrees. As the court of appeals noted in ruling 

on Mr. Bloch’s first appeal, the government was free to pursue both counts 

through trial, so any pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment or a count of the 

indictment would have failed. See United States v. Bloch, 718 F.3d at 643. And 

to the extent Mr. Bloch seeks to challenge his counsel’s failure to object to the 

court sentencing him on both counts, that issue was addressed on appeal, see 

id. at 643–644, and resolved on remand, [see Doc. Nos. 67, 95], so he can’t show 

prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (holding that 

an ineffective assistance claim fails if the petitioner can’t “show that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of 
5 

the proceeding would have been different”). Because this ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim has no merit, it would be futile for Mr. Bloch to amend his § 

2255 petition.2 Accordingly, the court denies the motion to amend. See Indep. 

Tr. Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 943 (7th Cir. 2012) (“it is 

well settled that a district court may refuse leave to amend where amendment 

would be futile”).

 B. Motion to Compel 

Mr. Bloch’s motion to compel asks the court to order the government to 

respond to his petition. The court ordered the government to respond to his 

original petition, [Doc. No. 97], and the government responded. [Doc. No. 101]. 

To the extent Mr. Bloch seeks an order directing the government to respond to 

his amended petition, no response is required because the court denied his 

motion to amend. 

C. § 2255 Petition: First Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim 

Suppression Motions 

The first claim in Mr. Bloch’s § 2255 petition alleges that his trial counsel, 

Brian May, provided ineffective assistance because he didn’t (1) file a motion to 

suppress evidence seized during a search of Kristen Steven’s apartment, (2) 

 

2 Mr. Bloch didn’t seek to add any other claims in his proposed amended petition and 

the other proposed changes to his petition aren’t substantive, so they don’t affect the 

analysis of the merits of his claims. 
6 

challenge the seizure of Mr. Bloch, or (3) contest the validity of an anonymous 

911 call. To prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Mr. Bloch 

must show both (1) that his attorney’s performance was objectively unreasonable 

in its deficiency such that he was denied the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth 

Amendment, and (2) that this deficient performance prejudiced his defense, 

rendering the outcome of the proceedings against him unreliable. Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. at 687; Cates v. United States, 882 F.3d 731, 736 (7th 

Cir. 2018). If Mr. Bloch’s can’t make a showing on both prongs, his claims must 

be dismissed. See Jones v. Page, 76 F.3d 831, 840 (7th Cir. 1996). 

When a claim of ineffective assistance is premised on an attorney's failure 

to file a motion to suppress, the defendant must prove that the motion would 

have been meritorious, and that but for counsel=s error, he would not have been 

convicted. United States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 360 (7th Cir. 2005). The 

defendant bears the burden of establishing that the law enforcement officer’s 

conduct violated the constitution. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 

(1980); United States v. Longmire, 761 F.2d 411, 417 (7th Cir. 1985). 

1. Legality of the Search of Ms. Steven’s Apartment 

Mr. Bloch first alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective because he 

didn’t move to suppress evidence seized during the search of Ms. Steven’s 

apartment. Mr. Bloch doesn’t challenge the scope or the duration of the search, 
7 

he only contends that his constitutional rights were violated because the officers 

entered Ms. Steven’s apartment without a warrant.3

Warrantless searches of protected areas are generally presumed to be 

unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless the search falls within an 

established exception to the search warrant requirement. United States v. 

Delgado, 701 F.3d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Schmidt, 

700 F.3d 934, 937 (7th Cir. 2012)). “[T]he government may overcome this 

presumption by demonstrating that, from the perspective of the officer at the 

scene, a reasonable officer could believe that exigent circumstances existed and 

that there was no time to obtain a warrant.” Id. (quoting United States v. 

Schmidt, 700 F.3d at 937). 

“Exigent circumstances exist, for example, when officers must render 

emergency assistance to an injured [person] or to protect a [person] from 

 

3 The government argued in its response to Mr. Bloch’s petition that a Fourth 

Amendment challenge isn’t cognizable in the context of a § 2255 petition and that Mr. 

Bloch lacks standing to challenge the search because he didn’t have a legitimate 

expectation of privacy in Ms. Steven’s apartment. These aren’t grounds for dismissing 

his ineffective assistance claims. First, as Mr. Bloch correctly notes in his reply brief, 

his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to bring a motion to suppress 

is cognizable in a petition for post-conviction release. See, e.g. Owens v. United States, 

387 F.3d 607, 607 (7th Cir. 2004). With regard to the standing issue, Mr. Bloch asserts 

in his reply brief that he had keys to Ms. Steven’s apartment, had permission to be there 

in her absence, kept clothes there, and “continuously visited and frequently stayed the 

night as a[n] overnight house guest at the [apartment].” [Doc. No. 108 at 6]. Although 

those factual allegations aren’t verified, the court assumes for purposes of this opinion 

that Mr. Bloch would have had standing to challenge the search of Ms. Steven’s 

apartment. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990) (overnight guest had legitimate 

expectation of privacy in the premises which was protected by Fourth Amendment and 

thus had standing to challenge warrantless entry, even if guest has no legal interest in 

premises). 
8 

imminent injury.” United States v. Schmidt, 700 F.3d at 937 (quoting Kentucky 

v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011)). See also Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, 751 

F.3d 542, 557–558 (7th Cir. 2014). Whether exigent circumstances existed is a 

mixed question of fact and law. United States v. Schmidt, 700 F.3d at 937. “This 

emergency aid exception does not depend on the officers’ subjective intent or the 

seriousness of any crime they are investigating when the emergency arises. It 

requires only an objectively reasonable basis for believing . . . that a person 

within [the house] is in need of immediate aid.” Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 

47 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Undisputed evidence showed that officers were justified in entering and 

searching Ms. Steven’s apartment without a warrant. The evidence presented at 

trial showed that the police received not one, but two reports of gunshots fired 

in the area. The first identified the general vicinity of the shooting and the second 

specifically identified Ms. Steven’s apartment as the location of the shooter. 

When officers arrived at the apartment, Mr. Bloch appeared to be intoxicated 

and was verbally combative. The officers were told that there was at least one 

other person—a child—inside the apartment. 

Mr. Bloch hasn’t presented any facts which, if true, would show that the 

warrantless entry and search wasn’t justified.4 He doesn’t dispute that a gun 

 

4 Mr. Bloch makes the argument, without citing to supporting evidence, that the officers 

deliberately created the exigency when they knocked on the door, seized him, and 

searched the apartment, which would vitiate the grounds for the search. The court 

disagrees. Mr. Bloch doesn’t deny that shots were fired, argue that the officers fired the 

shots that were reported, or present any other evidence that would allow the court to 
9 

was fired, that officers were responding to a “shots fired” call at night in a 

residential neighborhood, that the officers hadn’t yet located the gun, or that the 

officers hadn’t conclusively determined that there were no shooting victims in 

the apartment. “[P]olice officers and other emergency personnel must be able to 

assist persons in danger or otherwise in need of assistance . . . [and] [w]hen 

police are acting in a swiftly developing situation . . . a court must not indulge 

in unrealistic second-guessing.” Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, 751 F.3d 542, 

559 (7th Cir. 2014) (quotations and citations omitted). 

The officers reasonably believed that shots had been fired, that the shooter 

was located in Ms. Steven’s apartment, and that the gun hadn’t been recovered, 

but they didn’t know who the shooter was, how many people were inside the 

apartment, or if anyone had been hurt. The court of appeals described what the 

officers encountered at Ms. Steven’s apartment as exigent circumstances, United 

States v. Bloch, 718 F.3d at 640, and has found that similar circumstances 

justified officers’ warrantless entry into a protected area to determine if there 

were any injured victims inside. See e.g., United States v. Schmidt, 700 F.3d 934 

(a report of gunshots in the neighborhood, bullet holes in a nearby car and the 

duplex, and a trail of spent casings justified the warrantless search of a home’s

curtilage to determine if anyone was injured); United States v. Taylor, 179 F. 

App'x 957, 960 (7th Cir. 2006) (exigent circumstances supported the warrantless 

 

find that the officers deliberately created the exigency. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 

at 462. 
10 

search of a home to determine if anyone was injured where a dispatcher told 

police of gunshots in the home and spent and live casings were found on the 

property); United States v. Kempf, 400 F.3d 501, 503 (7th Cir. 2005) (a 

warrantless search was reasonable when police officers “did not know the exact 

details of the shooting, where the gun was located, whether the gun was loaded, 

who else may have been in the house, or whether anyone in the house may have 

been involved in the shooting”); United States v. Collins, 110 F. App'x 701, 704 

(7th Cir. 2004) (911 call reporting shots fired at an apartment complex, police 

hearing shots upon arrival, and the only activity observed in the defendant’s 

apartment justified the warrantless search to determine if someone might be in 

need of aid). 

Based on the record before it, the court finds that exigent circumstances 

justified the warrantless search and, accordingly, Mr. Bloch can’t prove that a 

motion to suppress on this issue would be meritorious, so this ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim fails. See United States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 

360 (7th Cir. 2005). 

2. Legality of the Seizure of Mr. Bloch 

Mr. Bloch next argues that Mr. May was ineffective because he didn’t move 

to suppress his statements professing ownership of the firearms made while he 

was detained during and immediately following the officers’ search of the 
11 

apartment.5 Mr. Bloch asserts that when the officers arrived at the front door of 

the apartment, they seized him at gunpoint without probable cause or 

reasonable suspicion that he committed or was committing a crime. He contends 

the statements attributed to him at trial professing ownership of the firearms 

should have been suppressed because they were made while he was unlawfully 

seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

Trial testimony demonstrated that the officers detained Mr. Bloch and 

would not allow him to leave while they searched the apartment, so he was seized 

for Fourth Amendment purposes. See Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 

772 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696 (1981)). “An 

official seizure is ordinarily unreasonable unless it is supported by probable 

cause, even where no formal arrest is made,” id., but in some circumstances, a 

seizure of a person absent suspicion of criminality won’t offend the Fourth 

Amendment. See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (holding that the 

seizure of a person incident to the execution of a search warrant doesn’t violate 

the Fourth Amendment). This is such a case. “[J]ust as exigent circumstances 

permit a warrantless home entry, emergencies may justify a warrantless seizure 

[of an occupant] in the home.” Armijo ex rel. Armijo Sanchez v. Peterson, 601 

 

5 To the extent Mr. Bloch contends that his trial counsel should have challenged the 

detention itself as unlawful or the manner of detention (that he was handcuffed) as 

excessive, those arguments aren’t persuasive because he can’t demonstrate prejudice. 

“[T]he proper remedy [for such a claim] would have been a suit against the officers under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983,” not a claim pursuant to § 2255. See United States v. Howard, 729 

F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 2013).
12 

F.3d 1065, 1073 (10th Cir. 2010). The court already found that exigent 

circumstances supported the warrantless search of Ms. Steven’s apartment, so 

the officers’ seizure of Mr. Bloch incident to that search didn’t violate his Fourth 

Amendment rights. See id. Accordingly, he can’t show that a motion to suppress 

would have been successful in suppressing his statements made while seized. 

Mr. Bloch’s brief doesn’t specifically argue that his Fifth Amendment rights 

were violated, but he contends that he was under de facto arrest when he made 

the statements he seeks to suppress. Construing his petition liberally, as the 

court must, see Gaylord v. United States, 829 F.3d 500, 505 (7th Cir. 2016), the 

court understands him to also claim that his trial counsel should have moved to 

suppress his statements while he was detained outside of Ms. Steven’s 

apartment because he was in custody and his statements were elicited in 

violation of his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda. 

A statement made during a custodial interrogation by a person who has 

not been informed of, and waived, his privilege against self-incrimination and his 

right to counsel isn't admissible in a criminal proceeding. Miranda v. Arizona, 

384 U.S. 436 (1966). The suspect must be both in custody and subject to 

interrogation to trigger the Miranda warning requirement. Id. at 467. 

“For Miranda purposes, a suspect is ‘in custody’ when he is ‘deprived of 

his freedom of action in any significant way.’ ” United States v. Snodgrass, 635 

F.3d 324, 327 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Thompson, 496 F.3d 807, 

810 (7th Cir. 2007)). Mr. Bloch was handcuffed and Officer Haigh testified at trial 
13 

that he was detained and couldn’t leave, so he was “in custody” for Miranda

purposes. 

Interrogation means express questioning as well as “any words or actions 

on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and 

custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an 

incriminating response.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). The 

test is “whether a reasonable objective observer would have believed that the law 

enforcement officer’s statements to the defendant were reasonably likely to elicit 

an incriminating response.” United States v. Swanson, 635 F.3d 995, 1002 (7th 

Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted). “[V]oluntary incriminating statements 

are not subject to Miranda warnings and are admissible as evidence.” Id. at 

1001–1002. 

Mr. Bloch doesn’t point to any evidence that would allow the court to 

conclude that he was interrogated. He notes that the “officers stated in their 

police reports[ ] and trial testimony that the petitioner claimed ownership of the 

two weapons.” [Doc. No. 79 at 23–24]. But he doesn’t claim that any officer’s 

words or actions elicited his statements. Officer Lanzen’s police report indicates 

that he was speaking with Mr. Bloch when the statements were made, but it 

describes them as “spontaneously uttered statements about his guns and having 

them to protect his family.” [Doc. No. 78–1 at 6]. This suggests that they were 

voluntary incriminating statements rather than statements elicited by an 

officer’s questioning, so they wouldn’t have been subject to suppression. Absent 
14 

evidence that Mr. Bloch was subject to interrogation when he made the 

incriminating statements, Mr. Bloch can’t show that a motion to suppress on 

Fifth Amendment grounds would have been successful. 

3. Cause Provided by the Anonymous 911 Call 

Mr. Bloch also argues that his trial counsel was unconstitutionally 

deficient because he didn’t file a motion to suppress on the theory that the 

anonymous 911 call didn’t provide the officers cause to search Ms. Steven’s 

apartment and detain him. Mr. Bloch relies on Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 

(2000), in which the Supreme Court held that that an uncorroborated 

anonymous tip couldn’t justify a Terry stop. 

To the extent J.L.—a case about a Terry stop—applies to the officers’ 

search of Ms. Steven’s apartment and the seizure of Mr. Bloch, this case is quite 

different. First, in J.L. there was a single, uncorroborated anonymous call to 

police; in this case there were two separate calls about gunshots fired in the area, 

the second of which identified Ms. Steven’s apartment as the source of the 

gunfire. Second, J.L. “did not hold that all anonymous or uncorroborated tips 

are unreliable,” United States v. Hicks, 531 F.3d 555, 558–559 (7th Cir. 2008), 

or address a call reporting an emergency, rather it “dealt with a situation in 

which there was no apparent need for haste.” United States v. Wooden, 551 F.3d 

647, 650 (7th Cir. 2008). After reviewing relevant court of appeals’ decisions, 

Judge Pallmeyer concluded that “the emergency exception clearly applies where 
15 

an anonymous caller reports shots fired.” Williams v. Edwards, No. 10 C 1051, 

2012 WL 983788, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2012). The court agrees and, 

accordingly, Mr. Bloch can’t demonstrate that a motion to suppress on this issue 

would have been meritorious and his claim fails. 

D. § 2255 Petition: Second Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim 

Failure to Call a Witness 

Mr. Bloch’s next claim is that his trial counsel was ineffective because he 

didn’t call Ms. Steven as a witness in his defense.6 Ms. Steven was Mr. Bloch’s 

girlfriend and the lessee of the apartment in which the firearms were discovered 

by police. Mr. Bloch didn’t include an affidavit from Ms. Steven describing the 

testimony she would have offered at trial, but argues in his petition that she 

would have been a star witness for the defense and would have testified, as she 

told the police officers at the scene, that she owned the firearms, not Mr. Bloch. 

“The Constitution does not oblige counsel to present each and every 

witness that is suggested to him,” United States v. Balzano, 916 F.2d 1273, 1294 

(7th Cir. 1990), but an attorney representing a criminal defendant has a duty to 

make “some investigation into the prosecution’s case and into various defense 

strategies” or to “make a reasonable decision that makes particular 

 

6 To the extent Mr. Bloch seeks to argue that his trial counsel was ineffective because 

he didn’t call other witnesses, those arguments aren’t persuasive because he didn’t 

identify the potential witnesses and make a specific, affirmative showing of the 

testimony those witnesses would have offered at trial. See Patel v. United States, 19 

F.3d 1231, 1237 (7th Cir. 1994). 
16 

investigations unnecessary.” Brown v. Sternes, 304 F.3d 677, 691 (7th Cir. 2002) 

(quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 (1986)). “Where a petitioner 

claims his trial counsel failed to call a witness, he must make a specific, 

affirmative showing as to what the missing evidence would have been and prove 

that this witness’s testimony would have produced a different result.” Patel v. 

United States, 19 F.3d 1231, 1237 (7th Cir. 1994). 

To succeed on this claim, Mr. Bloch must show prejudice. “To establish 

prejudice, the defendant must show that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different.’ ” United States v. Best, 426 F.3d 937, 945 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 694). Ms. Steven’s potential testimony, as 

described by Mr. Bloch in his petition, falls short of that showing. First, 

testimony by Ms. Steven regarding the ownership of the firearms wouldn’t bear 

on whether Mr. Bloch possessed the firearms for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 

922(g)(1) because a defendant can possess a firearm without owning it. See

United States v. Lane, 267 F.3d 715, 718 (7th Cir. 2001). Mr. Bloch doesn’t 

indicate that Ms. Steven’s would have testified that he never was in physical 

contact with or constructively possessed the firearms recovered from her 

apartment, which is what the government was required to prove for the jury to 

convict Mr. Bloch of illegal possession of a firearm. See United States v. Bloch, 

718 F.3d at 642. 

And Mr. Bloch can’t show that there is a reasonable probability that the 
17 

jury wouldn’t have convicted him if the jurors heard Ms. Steven’s testimony. The 

jury heard a recording of Mr. Bloch claiming ownership of the firearms and 

demanding that the officers return them to him at the scene of the search, which 

“is quite reliable as evidence of possession.” Id. at 643. The jury also heard 

testimony that Mr. Bloch told his chess partner at the county jail that he kept 

the guns at Ms. Steven’s apartment and lamented not having hid them more 

effectively. The court of appeals held that “[Mr.] Bloch’s own statements at the 

scene and in the jail, considered separately or together, were easily sufficient to 

establish his possession of the firearms.” Id. Mr. Bloch hasn’t shown that it is 

reasonably probable that Ms. Steven’s testimony would have led to a different 

result, so he can’t demonstrate prejudice. Accordingly, this claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel also fails. 

III. Conclusion 

For the reasons stated, the court: 

1) DENIES the motions to amend and/or supplement the § 2255 

petition [Doc. Nos. 109, 114]; 

2) DENIES the motion to compel [Doc. No. 124]; and 

3) DENIES the motion to vacate [Doc. No. 78]. 

SO ORDERED. 

ENTERED: September 18, 2018 

 /s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr. 

Judge, United States District Court 
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cc: J. Bloch, III