UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CAUSE NO.: 1:13-CR-62-TLS 

 ) 

JOSHUA R. MACKIN ) 

OPINION AND ORDER

 The Defendant, Joshua R. Mackin, is charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, 

a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Officers arrested the Defendant pursuant to an arrest warrant, 

and the charge stems from a search incident to that arrest. This matter is before the Court on the 

Defendant’s fourth Motion to Suppress Evidence [ECF No. 168], filed on April 17, 2017. Pursuant 

to the same grounds for relief that the Defendant sought in his third Motion to Suppress [ECF No. 

158], the Defendant “moves the Court to suppress all property seized from the [D]efendant by 

arresting offices [sic], all observations made by the arresting officers and all statements made by the 

Defendant,” and requests a hearing. (fourth Mot. 1, ECF No. 168.)1

 The Defendant’s Prayer for 

Relief in this fourth Motion is identical to that of the Defendant’s third Motion. Additionally, the 

Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of the Defendant’s fourth Motion to Suppress, 

appended to the fourth Motion, is identical to that of the Memorandum of Law in Support of the 

Defendant’s third Motion. 

 Although the particular phrases used in the Defendant’s fourth Motion detailing the factual 

issues vary from his prior motions, the Defendant does not introduce any new facts or issues. 

Accordingly, the Defendant’s ultimate grounds for relief have already been previously heard and 

considered by this Court. The Defendant argues as grounds for relief the following: (1) the officers 

                                                            

1

 For reference throughout this Order, the Court will refer to the Defendant’s Motions as his First Motion 

[ECF No. 107], Second Motion [ECF No. 145], Third Motion [ECF No. 158], and Fourth Motion [ECF No. 

168], though the Defendant has not titled his Motions in this manner. 
2 

did not have a search warrant to enter the residence where the Defendant was arrested upon exiting 

the back door, thus, any items seized and statements made by the Defendant incident to the arrest 

are inadmissible; and (2) the dispatch did not contain reliable, credible, or sufficient information to 

identify the Defendant at the address where he was ultimately apprehended. The Defendant has not 

explained how this current fourth Motion differs from the third Motion he filed on February 3, 

2017, the second Motion [ECF No. 145] he filed on September 12, 2016, and the first Motion [ECF 

No. 107] he filed on November 24, 2015, and the Court cannot discern a difference. Moreover, the 

Defendant has not explained why his request for a hearing in this matter would cover evidentiary 

matters other than those covered in his previous briefing and/or the evidentiary hearing held on 

August 4, 2016. Accordingly, the Court denies the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence and 

request for a hearing. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

The purpose of an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress is to resolve material factual 

disputes between the parties. United States v. Villegas, 388 F.3d 317, 324 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding 

that a hearing is not required in the absence of factual disputes). Material facts are those that would 

make a difference in the outcome of the motion. Id. The Defendant’s most recent fourth Motion 

presents no new facts or issues, therefore, there is no reason for the Court to revisit its previous 

decisions. 

ANALYSIS 

A. Search Warrant 

 In both the Defendant’s second and third Motions, the Defendant moved for the suppression 

of evidence that the officers obtained when they entered upon the real estate where the Defendant 

was arrested without a search warrant. The Defendant is yet again seeking the same relief in the 
3 

form of suppression of items seized and statements made, and once more argues that the officers 

were required to have a search warrant. 

In his second Motion, the Defendant relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Steagald v. 

United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), to argue that a “[search] warrant is required before entering 

onto the real estate of a third person in order to arrest an individual who is the subject of [an arrest] 

warrant.” (second Mot. 2, ECF No. 145.) On November 14, 2016, this Court issued an Opinion and 

Order [ECF No. 153] denying the Defendant’s second Motion without a hearing because “Steagald

protected the interests of the third-party owner of the residence, not the suspect himself.” United 

States v. Jackson, 576 F.3d 465, 468 (7th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Agnew, 407 F.3d 193, 

19 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Kaylor, 877 F.2d 658, 663 n.5 (8th Cir. 1989) (“Steagald

addressed only the right of a third party not named in the arrest warrant to the privacy of his or her 

home. This right is personal to the homeowner and cannot be asserted vicariously by the person 

named in the arrest warrant.”). Because the Defendant is not in the category of persons who are 

protected by the holding in Steagald, his second Motion “did not present a substantial claim for 

which disputed issues of material fact would impact the outcome.” (Nov. 14, 2016, Order 2, ECF 

No. 153.) Accordingly, the Court determined that no evidentiary hearing was necessary for 

resolution of the Defendant’s Motion. 

 The Defendant again attempted to raise the same issue, arguing in his third Motion (as he 

does in this current fourth Motion) that the Court’s August 4, 2016, Evidentiary Hearing was 

restricted to the issue of the Defendant’s identity and thus, the issue regarding the alleged necessity 

for officers to have obtained a search warrant was undecided. On February 23, 2017, this Court 

issued an Opinion and Order [ECF No. 161] in which the Court held that the Defendant has 

“overlooked the portion of the docket where the issue he presents was decided” and, “[a]s should be 

clear by now, the Court does not believe that the search warrant issue necessitates an evidentiary 
4 

hearing: the issue was presented in the September 12, 2016, Motion; and decided against the 

Defendant in the Court’s November 14, 2016, Opinion and Order.” (Feb. 23, 2017, Order 3, 4 

(brackets omitted), ECF No. 161.) 

 With this pending fourth Motion, the Defendant is yet again asking the Court to revisit both 

its Orders of November 14, 2016, and February 23, 2017, without providing any additional facts, 

evidence, or legal basis that would necessitate such a reversal from this Court. In fact, the 

Defendant continues to cite to Steagald and Winthrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) (see fourth 

Mot. 8; Def.’s Resp. in Supp. of fourth Mot. to Suppress ¶¶ 26, 32, ECF No. 184), which this Court 

has held in its prior Orders as inapplicable in this case. The Court declines to revisit those Orders 

and the Court’s reasoning therein. The warrant issue has already been decided on multiple occasions 

by this Court, and this Court has repeatedly held that a hearing on this issue is not necessary. 

B. The Defendant’s Identity 

 The Defendant argues that the officers did not have sufficient confirmation of his identify 

prior to seizing him when executing the arrest warrant. However, the pertinent facts concerning the 

Defendant’s identity were already developed during the Evidentiary Hearing conducted on August 

4, 2016, and no other facts are necessary to resolve the issues that are presented in the Defendant’s 

current fourth Motion. 

The Evidentiary Hearing concerned the Defendant’s first Motion, filed on November 24, 

2015. At the start of the hearing, the Court clarified that the hearing was limited to the issue that 

was specifically set forth in the Defendant’s first Motion—that of the Defendant’s identity. (Tr. of 

Mot. to Suppress Evid. Hr’g 29:14–32:32, ECF No. 150.) The Defendant therefore had an 

opportunity to orally present his argument and cross-examine witnesses concerning the issue of the 

Defendant’s identity. In fact, on numerous occasions throughout the hearing, the Defendant 

objected and argued that the dispatch call and officer’s records failed to contain the requisite 
5 

information identifying the Defendant at the location where he was arrested. (Id. at 41:3–43:9; 

43:18–23; 45:11–46:7; 47:1–11; 50:5–51:12; 63:2–65:24; 68:3–69:4.) On another occasion, the 

Defendant conducted a voir dire of Officer Brown regarding the information available to him prior 

to arresting the Defendant. (Id. at 55:19–21; 56:2–63:2.) For each of the objections, the Court 

overruled the Defendant (id. at 43:10–13; 43:24; 46:8–9; 47:12–13; 51:14–22; 65:25; 69:5), 

explaining to defense counsel that he would have the opportunity to explore these issues on crossexamination (see, e.g., id. at 46:8–9 (“There are matters that [defense counsel] can inquire upon in 

cross examination . . . .”); 52:23–35 (“That is an item you can inquire on [] cross examination.”).) 

Defense counsel did so. (See id. at 80:17–97:5.) The Defendant was thus accorded a full opportunity 

in which to argue the identity issue. (see, e.g., 42:20–24 (Defense counsel argues, “[T]here’s 

insufficient content to support a basis to go to 723West DeWald concerning this arrest warrant. 

That’s the whole point that there is insufficient content within that dispatch to justify him going to 

that location.”).) 

Following the hearing and consideration of the parties’ briefing and oral arguments, the 

Court issued an Opinion and Order [ECF No. 152] on November 14, 2016, addressing the 

Defendant’s claim that his seizure violated the Fourth Amendment because “the Government did 

not prove that the police could identify the individual coming out the back door of the home and 

that it turned out being Joshua Mackin after the seizure is not sufficient to justify the seizure.” (Br. 

in Supp. of Def.’s first Mot. to Suppress 5, ECF No. 146.) The Court concluded that there was no 

identity issue because the “arrest was proper under the Fourth Amendment and, so too, was the 

search incident to the arrest,” explaining: 

The arrest warrant gave the police a basis for arresting the Defendant, Joshua Mackin. That 

is what they did. Even in situations where the police execute an arrest warrant on the wrong 

person, there is no violation of the Fourth Amendment if they acted reasonably under the

circumstances. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971). “[S]ufficient probability, not

certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 804. 

“Often, there will have been more than an officer could have done to confirm a suspect’s 
6 

identity. This will not render an arrest unconstitutional so long as the officer’s actions were 

reasonable under the circumstances.” Catlin v. City of Wheaton, 574 F.3d 361, 366 (7th Cir. 

2009) (involving arrest of the wrong person). 

Thus, even if the Court looked beyond the fact that the warrant provided Officer Brown with 

probable cause to arrest the Defendant, the circumstances show that Officer Brown acted 

reasonably under the circumstances in thinking that the Defendant was the same person who 

was named in the arrest warrant, and proceeding to arrest him. 

(Nov. 16, 2016, Order 3, 5–6, ECF No. 152.) 

Nevertheless, the Defendant argued the same identity issue in his third Motion to Suppress. 

The Court again affirmed its earlier holding in its February 23, 2017, Order. 

Once again, in his current fourth Motion to Suppress, the Defendant argues that the dispatch 

“failed to contain reliable, credible, or sufficient identifying information” to establish that the 

Defendant was at the location where he was apprehended. (fourth Mot. 1.) Yet again, the Court 

declines to revisit its earlier Orders. Not only has there already been a hearing on this point, but the 

Defendant raised this exact issue via objections in front of the Court, and the Court ruled on the 

Record multiple times. The Defendant also had an opportunity to cross-examine on this point. 

Finally, the Court has issued two separate Orders holding that the Defendant did not demonstrate 

that the identity issue presents a Fourth Amendment violation. As the Defendant has not raised any 

new arguments, cited to new case law, or otherwise changed his argument, the Court denies the 

Defendant’s fourth Motion to Suppress and request for a hearing. 

It should also be noted that the Defendant raises the issue of identity as a basis for his 

argument that the officers should have gone to a magistrate and obtained a separate search warrant 

to enter the property of a third person. (see Tr. of Mot. to Suppress Evid. Hr’g 31:7; fourth Mot. 1; 

Def.’s Resp. in Supp. of fourth Mot. to Suppress ¶ 14, 17.) As this Court has already ruled that the 

search warrant issue does not necessitate an evidentiary hearing, so too is this the case for the issue 

regarding identity. Therefore, the identity issue presents no issue of relevant factual dispute 
7 

necessitating another evidentiary hearing, especially since one has already been completed on this 

very point. 

C. Other Issues 

 In his fourth Motion, the Defendant also cites one time to the Sixth Amendment, and 

generally to the Fifth Amendment, arguing that the Defendant’s statements should be suppressed 

“as no Miranda Warnings were given to the defendant prior to any statements which are alleged to 

have been made by him at the time of the custodial arrest or thereafter until several hours later when 

he was at the police station.” (fourth Mot. 2.) The Defendant does not further identify the basis for 

an independent Fifth or Sixth Amendment challenge; rather, he ties the Government’s ability to use 

his statements back to the alleged Fourth Amendment violation. (See id.; see also Def.’s Resp. in 

Supp. of fourth Mot. to Suppress ¶ 30.)2 This Court has repeatedly held that the Defendant’s 

arguments concerning a Fourth Amendment violation do not require an evidentiary hearing because 

there are no issues of disputed facts and the legal basis cited by the Defendant is not applicable. 

Thus, there is no basis to argue that any statements the Defendant made were tainted by such a 

violation.

 Moreover, volunteered statements are not barred by the Fifth Amendment. See Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966). The Government also indicates that it does not intend to 

introduce any statements that the Defendant volunteered to officers on August 2, 2013, except for 

impeachment purposes. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (“The shield provided by 

Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of 

confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.”). 

                                                            

2

 In the other instance where the Defendant explains the merits of holding an evidentiary hearing pursuant to 

his Sixth Amendment challenge, the Defendant relies upon the Winthrow case. (see Def.’s Resp. in Supp. of 

fourth Mot. to Suppress ¶ 32.) However, this Court has held Winthrow is inapplicable. (See Feb. 23, 2017, 

Order 3–4). 
8 

 For all of these reasons, the Court holds that an evidentiary hearing regarding the Fifth and 

Sixth Amendment issues raised by the Defendant is not necessary. 

In the Defendant’s Response in Support of his fourth Motion, the Defendant “moves the 

Court to enter an Order in Limine that all statements made by him before Miranda Warnings were 

given; and in response to Miranda Warnings regarding request for an attorney or his post-arrest 

silence, should be excluded.” (Def.’s Resp. in Supp. of fourth Mot. to Suppress ¶¶ 30, 37.) 

Elsewhere, the Defendant requests a “preliminary ruling on Motion in Limine” on the Miranda 

issue. (Id. ¶ 39.) Because a motion in limine is a pretrial form of relief, the appropriate place to 

request relief in the form of a motion in limine is not in briefing on his fourth Motion to Suppress. If 

the Defendant seeks a motion in limine, the Court directs that defense counsel file a separate motion 

in limine, which the Court will consider along with all other outstanding pretrial motions. 

CONCLUSION

 For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES the Defendant’s fourth Motion to Suppress 

Evidence and request for evidentiary hearing regarding the same [ECF No. 168]. 

The Court SETS the telephonic final pretrial conference for May 30, 2017, at 12:00 PM, and 

the jury trial is CONFIRMED to begin on Tuesday, June 6, 2017, at 9:00 AM before Judge Theresa 

L. Springmann. 

 SO ORDERED on May 24, 2017. 

 s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

 CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT