UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

KATHERINE SHEETS, )

 )

 Plaintiff, )

 )

 v. ) No. 4:12-CV-00065-APR

 )

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, )

Acting Commissioner )

of Social Security, )

 )

 Defendant, )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the court on the petition for judicial review filed by the plaintiff,

Katherine Sheets, on November 26, 2012. For the following reasons, the decision of the

Commissioner is AFFIRMED.

Background

The plaintiff, Katherine Sheets, filed an application for Social Security Income and

Disability Insurance Benefits on June 7, 2010, alleging that she became disabled on May 15,

2007. (Tr. 23) Her application initially was denied on August 5, 2010, and was denied upon

reconsideration on October 29, 2010. (Tr. 23) Sheets requested a hearing before an

administrative law judge (“ALJ”), and a hearing was held on August 31, 2011, before ALJ Mario

G. Silva. (Tr. 23) Sheets appeared and testified on her own behalf. (Tr. 37–79) Vocational

Expert (VE) Thomas A. Gusloff also testified at the hearing. (Tr. 23) Sheets was represented by

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counsel, James Balanoff. (Tr. 23) On September 22, 2011, the ALJ rendered a decision denying

benefits. (Tr. 32) On September 18, 2012, the Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s

decision, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 3–8) Sheets

filed this action for judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner on November 26,

2012.

At step one of the five step sequential analysis for determining whether an individual is

disabled, the ALJ found that Sheets had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 15,

2007, her alleged onset date. (Tr. 25) At step two, the ALJ determined that Sheets had the

following severe impairments: depression, posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), polyarthritis,

degenerative joint disease of the right shoulder, gastroesophageal reflux disease (“GERD”), and

obesity. (Tr. 25) The ALJ next found that Sheets’ impairments did not meet or equal one of the

listings in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 26)

The ALJ then determined that Sheets could perform less than a full range of light work in

that

claimant has the residual functional capacity to lift and carry up to 20 pounds

occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, stand or walk for about six hours of an

eight-hour workday, and sit for at least six hours of an eight-hour workday. She

can never crawl or climb ladders, ropes, scaffolds, or stairs; but she may

occasionally climb ramps, balance, stoop, kneel, or crouch. With regard to the

right dominant extremity, she must never engage in overhead lifting; and with

regard to her hands bilaterally, she is limited to frequent, but not constant, gross

manipulation or fingering. She is to avoid concentrated exposure to extreme

temperatures, excessive vibration, chemicals, and hazards (e.g. dangerous moving

machinery or unprotected heights); and she is to avoid even moderate exposure to

environmental irritants such as fumes, odors, dusts, or gases. Further, the

claimant is limited to performing simple, routine, and repetitive tasks; work that

does not require directing others or abstract though or planning; and work that

involves on simple work-related decisions and routine workplace changes. 

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 (Tr. 27–28) In determining the residual functional capacity (“RFC”), the ALJ followed a twostep process. (Tr. 28) First, the ALJ determined whether there was an underlying medically

determinable physical or mental impairment. (Tr. 28) Second, the ALJ evaluated the intensity,

persistence, and limiting effects of the claimant’s symptoms to determine the extent to which

they limited the claimant’s functioning. (Tr. 28)

The ALJ explained that Sheets’ medical impairments reasonably could be expected to

produce some of her claimed symptoms. (Tr. 28) Sheets alleged disability resulting from

osteoarthritis, degenerative joint disease of the shoulder, depression, and posttraumatic stress

disorder. (Tr. 28) Sheets testified that “her body will not allow” her to work because of chronic

pain. (Tr. 28) Further, Sheets stated that she did not use medication to treat her joint pain

because it caused her unwanted side effects. (Tr. 28) Moreover, Sheets stated that depression

plagued her for “her whole life” and that, on some days, she could not get out of bed. (Tr. 28)

However, the ALJ found that Sheets’ testimony concerning the intensity, persistence, and side of

effects of her symptoms was not credible to the extent that it was inconsistent with the RFC. (Tr.

28)

In reaching his conclusion, the ALJ first examined the medical evidence related to

Sheets’ physical impairments. (Tr. 28) Sheets’ history of chest and abdominal pain began in

2004 when she was diagnosed with Barrett’s esophagus, and her complaints of heart pain

continued through January 2007. (Tr. 28) In February 2009, Sheets complained of joint pain but

admitted that medications helped her pain. (Tr. 28) In April 2010, John Diveris, M.D.,

diagnosed Sheets with osteoarthritis in her right shoulder after she complained of shoulder pain,

muscle aches, joint pain, joint swelling, and joint stiffness. (Tr. 28) Sheets received

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corticosteroid injections, a prescription for Naprosyn, and physical therapy, and it was noted that

Sheets had “responded very nicely to [her prescribed treatment] in May 2010.” (Tr. 29) In July

2010, Shaveen Parvez, M.D., conducted a consultative physical examination on Sheets to

examine Sheets’ complaints of pain in both knees, her back, and her right shoulder. (Tr. 29) Dr.

Parvez observed that, aside from Sheets’ inability to squat, she seemed comfortable while seated

and “does not seem to be majorly restricted.” (Tr. 29) Sheets received additional corticosteroid

injections in January 2011 and March 2011. (Tr. 29) However, in August 2011, Sheets

complained of pain at St. Anthony Medical Center, at which point she was diagnosed with a

rotator cuff tear with impingement and chondromalacia of the glenohumeral joint. (Tr. 29)

Next, the ALJ reviewed the opinion evidence regarding Sheets’ physical impairments,

which he noted was “scarce.” (Tr. 29) First, the ALJ considered the RFC assessment conducted

in August 2010 by state agency medical consultant, J. Sands, M.D. (Tr. 29) The ALJ weighed

Dr. Sands’ opinion to the extent that it was consistent with objective medical evidence. (Tr. 29)

Specifically, the ALJ agreed with the limitation to work at the light exertional level and

occasional postural restrictions, however, the ALJ found that additional environmental and

postural limitations were needed. (Tr. 29)

Second, the ALJ assessed the opinion of Belinda Hubert, Ph.D. (Tr. 29) Medical records

from August 2011 detailed that Dr. Hubert was treating Sheets for depression, PTSD, and

chronic pain. (Tr. 29) In September 2011, Dr. Hubert performed an evaluation of Sheets’ ability

to do work-related activities. (Tr. 29) Dr. Hubert noted that Sheets, “suffers significant stressrelated deteriorations in ability to function, make decisions, [and] remember [due to] chronic

pain, major depression, and panic disorder.” (Tr. 29). The ALJ determined that there was

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“essentially no objective medical evidence in the record to support such extreme restrictions,”

because Sheets visited a mental health specialist only once and took anti-depressants for a little

over one year. (Tr. 29) Nonetheless, in formulating his decision, the ALJ gave significant

consideration to Sheets’ testimony regarding her claimed mental impairments and the side

effects of her medication, and the ALJ limited Sheets to performing simple, routine, and

repetitive tasks. (Tr. 30)

After reviewing Sheets’ physical impairments, the ALJ found that multiple factors

weighed against the credibility of Sheets’ statements regarding the severity of her impairments. 

(Tr. 30) First, no examining or treating physicians determined that Sheets was disabled or had

limitations greater than those in the RFC. (Tr. 30) The treatment records revealed that the

restrictions placed on Sheets by her treating doctor were inconsistent with Sheets’ allegations of

totally disabling pain. (Tr. 30) Second, Sheets responded well to her treatment, including her

medications, physical therapy, and diet. (Tr. 30) She also testified that her medications kept her

diabetes under control and that her shoulder surgery helped her maintain her ability to perform

household chores. (Tr. 30) Third, Sheets waited to undergo a substantial procedure on her right

arm for five years, despite alleging severe disabling pain. (Tr. 30) To explain her failure to seek

treatment earlier, she testified that she was, “afraid of doctors . . . afraid of what they might say

to me.” (Tr. 30). Fourth, the record did not clearly establish that Sheets’ alleged symptoms

imposed significant limitations on her ability to work because Sheets testified that her job loss

was caused by the economic downturn and not by her impairments. (Tr. 30) Further, the ALJ

considered Sheets’ testimony that six months after her alleged onset date, she only “probably”

would have been unable to resume past work. (Tr. 30) In addition, the ALJ noted that if Sheets

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was willing, but unable to work, she likely would not have waited four years after being laid off

to apply for disability benefits. (Tr. 30)

The ALJ also was influenced by Sheets’ testimony that she continued to receive

unemployment benefits six months after her alleged onset date. (Tr. 30) The collection of

unemployment benefits affirms that a recipient was “ready, willing, and able to accept

employment and perform the work.” (Tr. 30) (emphasis in the original). The ALJ also

considered the testimony of Denise Burkhalter, Sheets’ stepmother, and found it to be consistent

with Sheets’ testimony. (Tr. 31) Due to the consistency, the ALJ discounted the credibility of

Burkhalter’s testimony for the same reasons he discounted Sheets’. (Tr. 31) Overall, in

consideration of the previous factors, objective medical evidence, opinion evidence, and Sheets’

testimony, the ALJ found that Sheets’ impairments did not prevent her from participating in

basic work-related activities. (Tr. 31)

At step five, the ALJ concluded that Sheets could not perform past relevant work as a

laboratory tester or laboratory supervisor. (Tr. 31) However, the ALJ identified other jobs that

Sheets could perform, including a marker for retail (6,000 jobs regionally), mail clerk (2,000

jobs regionally), and cafeteria attendant (5,000 jobs regionally). (Tr. 31) The ALJ noted that he

relied on the VE’s testimony to reach these conclusions. (Tr. 31)

Discussion

The standard for judicial review of an ALJ’s finding that a claimant is not disabled within

the meaning of the Social Security Act is limited to a determination of whether those findings are

supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("The findings of the Commissioner of

Social Security, as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.");

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Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 361–362 (7th Cir. 2013); Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737,

744 (7th Cir. 2005); Lopez ex rel Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003). 

Substantial evidence has been defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept to support such a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420,

1427, 28 L. Ed.2d 852 (1972) (quoting Consolidated Edison Company v. NRLB, 305 U.S. 197,

229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed.2d 140 (1938)); See also Pepper, 712 F.3d at 361–362; Jens v.

Barnhart, 347 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 2003); Sims v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 424, 428 (7th Cir.

2002). An ALJ’s decision must be affirmed if the findings are supported by substantial evidence

and if there have been no errors of law. Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2013);

Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 368–369 (7th Cir. 2004); Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 593

(7th Cir. 2002). However, "the decision cannot stand if it lacks evidentiary support or an

adequate discussion of the issues." Lopez, 336 F.3d at 539.

Disability and supplemental insurance benefits are available only to those individuals

who can establish "disability" under the terms of the Social Security Act. The claimant must

show that she is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42

U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security regulations enumerate the five-step sequential

evaluation to be followed when determining whether a claimant has met the burden of

establishing disability. 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1520, 416.920. The ALJ first considers whether the

claimant is presently employed or "engaged in substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R.

§ § 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If she is, the claimant is not disabled and the evaluation process is

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over. If she is not, the ALJ next addresses whether the claimant has a severe impairment or

combination of impairments which "significantly limits . . . physical or mental ability to do basic

work activities." 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). Third, the ALJ determines whether

that severe impairment meets any of the impairments listed in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 401,

pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1. If it does, then the impairment is acknowledged by the Commissioner

to be conclusively disabling. However, if the impairment does not so limit the claimant's

remaining capabilities, the ALJ reviews the claimant's "residual functional capacity" and the

physical and mental demands of her past work. If, at this fourth step, the claimant can perform

her past relevant work, she will be found not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). 

However, if the claimant shows that her impairment is so severe that she is unable to engage in

her past relevant work, then the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to establish that the

claimant, in light of her age, education, job experience and functional capacity to work, is

capable of performing other work and that such work exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C.

§ 423(d)(2); 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1520(f), 416.920(f).

Sheets complains that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. She

argues that this was due in part to the ALJ’s erroneous credibility determination and his failure

to incorporate all of her alleged limitations into the RFC assessment. Her arguments seemingly

overlap, as she relies on her testimony and reports of pain as the basis for greater restrictions,

pointing to some objective medical evidence in the form of diagnoses, that may cause the type of

pain to which she testified. 

An ALJ’s credibility finding will not be overruled unless it is patently wrong. Powers v.

Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 435-36 (7th Cir. 2000). A decision is patently wrong if it “lacks any

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explanation or support.” Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 414 (7th Cir. 2008). The ALJ is

ultimately in the best position to observe the witnesses and evaluate their credibility. Powers,

207 F.3d at 435-36. Yet, to receive deference, the ALJ’s credibility determination must

acknowledge specific findings and explain them “in a way that affords meaningful review.” 

Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 2002).

Before reaching a credibility determination, the ALJ must consider all of the claimant’s,

“symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which [the claimant’s symptoms] can reasonably be

accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence”. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1529(a). Additionally, where a claimant’s subjective complaints could reasonably produce

the alleged symptoms, the ALJ must analyze the intensity and persistence of the claimant’s

symptoms through the use of, “medical history, the medical signs and laboratory findings, and

statements from [the claimant’s] treating or examining physician or psychologist, or other

persons about how [the claimant’s] symptoms affect [the claimant].” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c);

Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 843 (7th Cir. 2007). See also Indoranto v. Barnhart, 374 F.3d

470, 474 (7th Cir. 2004).

Furthermore, an ALJ must provide more than a, “single, conclusory statement . . . The

determination or decision must contain specific reasons for the finding on credibility, supported

by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specified to make clear to the

individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individuals

statements and the reasons for that weight,” when credibility is partially discounted due to

inconsistencies between the claimant’s complaints of pain and the medical evidence. SSR

96–7p, at *2. See Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 887–88 (7th Cir. 2001).

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Sheets contends that the ALJ erred in his credibility determination by failing to properly

consider her subjective complaints of pain where medically determined impairments could

reasonably be expected to produce such pain. In Indoranto v. Barnhart, 374 F.3d 470, 474 (7th

Cir. 2004), the ALJ discredited testimony that the claimant took hot baths several times a day to

alleviate pain merely by stating that the claimant’s testimony was uncorroborated by medical

evidence. Indoranto, 374 F.3d at 474. The court held that the ALJ’s credibility determination

was not supported by substantial evidence and reversed the finding. Indoranto, 374 F.3d at 475. 

The court elaborated that the record was filled with objective medical evidence supporting the

claimant’s statements and that there was, “nothing incredible or inconsistent about [her]

statements.” Indoranto, 374 F.3d at 475. Similarly, Sheets alleges that her subjective complaints

of pain were not properly considered in light of objective medical evidence. However, unlike

Indoranto, the ALJ considered Sheets’ complaints of pain and found a number of factors and

inconsistencies weighing against Sheets’ credibility. (Tr. 30)

Sheets first argues that the medical notes show that her conditions were progressing. Her

2009 blood tests for Rheumatoid Arthritis led to a diagnosis of Osteoarthritis. A shoulder x-ray

showed degenerative osteophyte and despite injections, she continued to complain of chronic

pain. Her medical notes revealed that she experienced pain all over and that she had joint

swelling and stiffness as late as April 2010. A subsequent bone density test showed that her

bone density was “below young normal”. She also went to the emergency room in February

2011 complaining of pain and swelling in both of her hands and was unable to move her fingers. 

In June 2011, she reported increasing pain in her shoulder. Sheets underwent an MRI that

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revealed acromioclavicular degenerative changes, fluid, a tear in her tendon, and tendinosis, and

she agreed to undergo surgery as a result. 

However, the record reflects that the ALJ considered all of this as he set forth her

medical treatment in a chronological time line. The ALJ noted Sheets’ complaints that her body

would not allow her to work. He summarized the medical evidence, explaining that the medical

notes included reports of pain, that she was diagnosed with osteoarthritis of the shoulder, that she

continued to complain of pain despite receiving injections, and that an MRI revealed

degenerative changes, fluid, and tendinitis, leading Sheets to agree to shoulder surgery. After

addressing the objective medical evidence, the ALJ explained that no doctor, treating or

consultative, who considered her physical conditions determined that Sheets was more limited in

her abilities than he found. This weighed against her credibility. For example, he explained that

the consultative physician noted that Sheets could ambulate normally, had a steady gait, and

appeared stable and comfortable. The ALJ further commented that given her complaints of

disabling pain, it would be logical that one of the doctors would have agreed that such disabling

restrictions were necessary. 

The ALJ did not stop there. He went on to address how Sheets’ treatment contradicted

her complaints of pain. In 2010, her medical notes reflected that she responded nicely to her

prescribed treatment with symptom improvement. Sheets also testified that her shoulder surgery

resulted in improvements in her abilities. Following her surgery she was able to perform some

household chores. She also stated that her medications kept her diabetes under control. The ALJ

also commented that it was counterintuitive to believe that someone who suffered such severe

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pain as Sheets testified to experiencing would not seek medical treatment for the simple reason

that she was scared of what the doctors might tell her. 

The record reflects that the ALJ considered that Sheets’ condition was worsening because

he set forth her medical history in a chronological time line. However, even if her condition was

becoming worse, this does not equate to a finding that her condition was as debilitating as she

testified. Her own testimony and the notes of her doctors revealed that her treatment was

helpful. None of the doctors believed such severe restrictions were necessary, and the ALJ’s

limitations were consistent or more restrictive than all of the medical opinions of record. Sheets

has not identified any subsequent notes that suggest that her shoulder surgery or other treatment

was not successful or that any doctors noted restrictions that would lead to a finding of disability. 

Although Sheets argues that she testified to the need to elevate her feet, which would have

exempted her from all gainful employment, this restriction was not noted by any doctors, and the

consultative physician stated that Sheets was able to ambulate normally and appeared stable and

comfortable during the consultative examination. The ALJ gave a very detailed explanation of

the reasons supporting his credibility finding and supported it with objective medical evidence. 

The court does not find that the ALJ’s credibility determination was patently flawed.

Sheets separately argues that the ALJ failed to consider some of the objective medical

evidence that would support her complaints of pain. Specifically, she argues that the ALJ failed

to incorporate her shoulder, arm, and hand limitations properly, and her testimony that she

needed to lay down for 6 hours out of an 8 hour workday. However, this relates back to the

credibility finding. The only evidence of such severe restrictions was Sheets’ own statements. 

None of the doctors opined that she could sit for only 20-30 minutes at a time or that she needed

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to elevate her feet. Although Sheets has identified diagnoses that could support such restrictions,

namely arthritis, this does not equate to finding that she was so restricted. Certainly, Sheets was

diagnosed with conditions that would impact her ability to move her fingers, arm, and shoulders,

and may cause swelling. However, the ALJ did a thorough job explaining why he did not find

that these conditions limited Sheets in the manner to which she testified. Sheets has not

identified any objective medical evidence that the ALJ overlooked and, as explained above, the

ALJ’s decision to discount her complaints of pain was well explained.

Based on the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED this 15th day of September, 2014

/s/ Andrew P. Rodovich

United States Magistrate Judge

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