UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

NATHANIEL FLOWERS, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Case No. 1:13-cv-266 

 ) 

PRAIRIE FARMS DAIRY, INC., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

I. INTRODUCTION 

 Plaintiff Nathaniel Flowers is bringing this wrongful termination suit under 42 U.S.C. § 

1981, against his former employer, Defendant Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc. Upon filing his 

Complaint, Flowers moved to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Docket # 3.) That IFP was 

referred for a Report and Recommendation by District Judge Lozano on September 16, 2013, in 

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), and Northern 

District of Indiana Local Rule 72-1(b). After the Court set the Petition for hearing, Flowers 

filed a motion to amend his IFP application to which he attached an amended IFP application. 

(Docket # 6.) 

 On October 1, 2013, this Court held an evidentiary hearing in which Flowers testified in 

support of his IFP application, detailing his current financial status. (Docket # 8.) Based on 

that testimony, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends GRANTING Flower’s Motion to 

Amend Petition to Proceed IFP and that Flower’s Amended Petition to Proceed IFP be shown 

filed and GRANTED. This Report and Recommendation is based on the following facts and 

principles of law. 
II. FINDINGS OF FACT 

 Flowers testified that he filled out the initial Petition to proceed IFP without assistance, 

and since he had no job, no money and no assets he simply answered most questions as “N/A” 

(i.e., Not Applicable). That application does not square with Flowers’s Complaint, however, 

since he asserts there that he was fired in November 2012, but responds to the question 

concerning his employment within the previous twelve months—which encompasses November 

2012—as N/A. In Section 2 (“Employer”), Flowers wrote “Forge”—the temporary agency 

which assigned him to the Defendant in this case—but did not provide his Gross Monthly Pay. 

Flowers testified that when filling out the IFP application, he believed he was being asked about 

any income after his employment with the Defendant since the Court presumably knew—via his 

complaint—that he was terminated in November 2012. 

 In his amended application, Flowers provided his relevant employment history with 

Forge and stated that he was employed from February to November 2012 and made $2,800 per 

month. Flowers testified that he now lives with friends or his mother, gets meals at his mother’s 

house or at the Rescue Mission, and that his phone is paid for by his girlfriend. 

 Flowers testimony reaffirms the information in his amended application. Flowers is 

currently not employed, has no income from other sources, and has no assets. Finally, Flowers 

testified that he is unable to currently pay the filing fee, and has no prospective job opportunities 

despite continued efforts to obtain employment. 

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

The IFP statute makes it possible for a person to bring claims or assert defenses in federal 

court even if that person is unable to afford the fees and costs of litigation. See 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a)(1). To prevent abuse through the filing of false claims of indigency, the statute is 
guarded by a severe sanction: if “the allegation of poverty is untrue” then “the court shall dismiss 

the case.” Palmer v. Dollar Tree, No. 10 C 7340, 2012 WL 4795720, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 

2012) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A)). 

 Despite the statute’s apparent mandatory language, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 

and district courts have indicated some leeway in imposing the sanction of dismissal. Hrobowski 

v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 203 F.3d 445, 448 (7th Cir. 2000) (declining sanction of dismissal 

because plaintiff had not “reaped the benefits of in forma pauperis status”); Moorish Nat’l 

Republic v. City of Chicago, No. 10 C 1047, 2011 WL 1485574, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2011) 

(imposing monetary sanction rather than dismissal); Bray v. United Water, 2:10-CV-157, 2010 

WL 5231315, at *3 (imposing non-monetary sanction rather than dismissal). The cases indicate 

that “§ 1915(e)(2) requires the sanction of dismissal only when a petitioner says that she is 

indigent when [he] is not.” Palmer, 2012 WL 4795720, at *4. Thus, a misstatement in an IFP 

application can qualify as harmless when the petitioner is actually indigent. Id. at *3-4. 

 In this case, Flowers failed to correctly answer the employment question on his first IFP 

application, but he promptly amended it to provide the correct information and his omission was 

reasonable. Moreover, Flowers’s allegation of poverty is true. Accordingly, since Flowers is 

truly indigent, it is recommended that his amended IFP application be shown filed and granted. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Based on the previous findings of fact and conclusions of law, I recommend that the 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Petition to Proceed IFP be GRANTED, that Flower’s Amended 

Petition to Proceed IFP be shown filed and GRANTED, and his initial Petition be DENIED as 

moot. 
The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Report and Recommendation to counsel for

Plaintiffs and Defendant. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that within fourteen days after being

served with a copy of this recommended disposition a party may serve and file specific, written

objections to the proposed findings or recommendations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). FAILURE TO

FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN THE SPECIFIED TIME WAIVES THE RIGHT TO APPEAL

THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER. 

SO ORDERED. 

Enter for the 2nd day of October, 2013. 

 /S/ Roger B. Cosbey 

 Roger B. Cosbey 

 United States Magistrate Judge