J-A22015-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.J. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: J.J.

No. 327 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered February 12, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County

Civil Division at No(s): 2016-0566

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED AUGUST 30, 2016

Appellant J.J. appeals from the order of the Centre County Court of 

Common Pleas ordering that he be committed to outpatient treatment 

through SunPointe Health, or other designated program approved by the 

treatment team and Centre County MH/ID, for a period not to exceed 90 

days. We affirm.

On February 10, 2016, a petition for involuntary mental health 

treatment under Section 304 of the Mental Health Procedures Act of 1976 

seeking the involuntary commitment of J.J. was filed. On February 11, 

2016, a mental health review officer conducted a commitment hearing. That 

same day, the officer recommended that the court commit J.J. to involuntary 

outpatient treatment for a period not to exceed 90 days. On February 12, 

2016, the trial court ordered that J.J. be committed to outpatient treatment 
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for a period not to exceed 90 days. On February 16, 2016, J.J. filed a 

petition for review of certification to involuntary mental health treatment. 

On February 17, 2016, the trial court denied the petition. On February 24, 

2016, J.J. filed a timely notice of appeal.1 Both Appellant and the trial court 

complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.

Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:

Whether the state lacked sufficient evidence to justify a 

commitment under the Mental Health Procedures Act as it 

presented no evidence of overt acts which would support a 

reasonable conclusion that death or serious physical 

debilitation or serious bodily injury were likely imminent if 

Appellant were not forced to undergo psychiatric 

treatment?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

“In reviewing a trial court order for involuntary commitment, we must 

determine whether there is evidence in the record to justify the court’s 

findings.” In re T.T., 875 A.2d 1123, 1126 (Pa.Super.2005) (quoting 

Commonwealth ex rel. Gibson v. DiGiacinto, 439 A.2d 105, 107 

(Pa.1981)). “Although we must accept the trial court’s findings of fact that 

have support in the record, we are not bound by its legal conclusions from 

those facts.” Id.

The Mental Health Procedures Act provides:

____________________________________________

1

 Although Appellant’s 90-day period of involuntary commitment has ended, 

Appellant’s issue is not moot because it is capable of repetition and may 

evade review. See In re Woodside, 699 A.2d 1293, 1296 

(Pa.Super.1997).
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§ 7304. Court-ordered involuntary treatment not to 

exceed ninety days

(a) Persons for Whom Application May be Made.--(1) 

A person who is severely mentally disabled and in need of 

treatment, as defined in section 301(a), may be made 

subject to court-ordered involuntary treatment upon a 

determination of clear and present danger under section 

301(b)(1) (serious bodily harm to others), or section 

301(b)(2)(i) (inability to care for himself, creating a 

danger of death or serious harm to himself), or 

301(b)(2)(ii) (attempted suicide), or 301(b)(2)(iii) (selfmutilation).

50 P.S. § 7304. Pursuant to the Act:

A person is severely mentally disabled when, as a result of 

mental illness, his capacity to exercise self-control, 

judgment and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and 

social relations or to care for his own personal needs is so 

lessened that he poses a clear and present danger of harm 

to others or to himself.

50 P.S. § 7301(a). Pursuant to section 7301(b)(2)(i), clear and present 

danger to himself can be shown by establishing that within the past 30 days:

(i) the person has acted in such manner as to evidence 

that he would be unable, without care, supervision and the 

continued assistance of others, to satisfy his need for 

nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self 

protection and safety, and that there is a reasonable 

probability that death, serious bodily injury or serious 

physical debilitation would ensue within 30 days unless 

adequate treatment were afforded under this act.

50 P.S. 7301(b)(2).

“It is well-settled that involuntary civil commitment of mentally ill 

persons constitutes deprivation of liberty and may be accomplished only in 

accordance with due process protections.” In re R.D., 739 A.2d 548, 554 

(Pa.Super.1999) (quoting In re Hutchinson, 454 A.2d 1008, 1010 
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(Pa.1982)). “The appropriate standard of proof for certification of extended 

involuntary treatment is clear and convincing evidence.” In re Hancock, 

719 A.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Pa.Super.1998). “Requiring clear and convincing 

evidence that an individual represents a clear and present danger to himself 

or others places the burden squarely on the facility or individual attempting 

to commit the individual involuntarily.” Id.

The trial court found the following:

Here, the [c]ourt is satisfied that Petitioner had sufficient 

evidence to justify a commitment under the Mental Health 

Procedures Act. At the hearing, Dr. Timothy Derstine, 

Appellant’s treating psychiatrist, testified that Appellant 

suffers from schizoaffective disorder bipolar type.

Dr. Derstine testified that Appellant currently poses a 

danger to himself because of nonadherence to his 

treatment. Without his medication, Appellant is not safe, 

and is unable to meet his basic needs without the care and 

assistance of others. Dr. Derstine explained that without 

the requested treatment, there is a reasonable probability 

that Appellant’s deterioration will lead to disability and 

debilitation within thirty days as a result of his mental 

illness.

The Court accepts Dr. Derstine’s testimony as credible and 

persuasive. He has been treating Appellant for 

approximately four years, and recognizes that Appellant is 

currently below his experienced psychiatric baseline. Dr. 

Derstine also recognizes a pattern of deterioration that 

involves missed appointments and medication, recurrent 

phone calls to the office, followed by hospitalization.

Appellant’s condition has worsened in the past 30 days. 

Appellant was hospitalized, where he received an injection 

of his medication. Dr. Derstine explained that Appellant is 

in a period of vulnerability of relapse because his 

medication requires an oral and injectable component.
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Appellant’s candid testimony supports his need for 

treatment. Appellant was unable to answer direct 

questions, and his testimony indicates that he would not 

continue the necessary treatment. Dr. Derstine testified 

that each time there is a decomposition it is more difficult 

to return to the previous baseline, and it can take up to 

nine months to return to that baseline, if at all. Such facts 

support a reasonable conclusion that physical debilitation 

or disability were likely imminent if Appellant was not 

ordered to undergo treatment.

For the forgoing reasons, the [c]ourt maintains that its 

Order of March 7, 2016 was properly entered and 

respectfully requests that its decision not be disturbed.

1925(a) Opinion, 3/21/2016, at 2-3.

Further, contrary to Appellant’s argument, the petitioner did not need 

to establish an overt act that occurred. Rather, when involuntary treatment 

is based on section 7301(b)(2), there need not be an overt act. See In re 

S.C., 421 A.2d 853, 857 (Pa.Super.1980) (“If no overt act is shown, 

commitment may only be justified if: ‘... the person has acted in such 

manner as to evidence that he would be unable, without care, supervision 

and the continued assistance of others, to satisfy his need for nourishment, 

personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety, and that 

there is a reasonable probability that death, serious bodily injury or serious 

physical debilitation would ensue within 30 days unless adequate treatment 

were afforded under the act.’ 50 P.S. § 7301(b)(2)”); In Re S.B., 777 A.2d 

454, 457-59 (Pa.Super.2000).

The record supports the trial court’s finding that clear and convincing 

evidence established that physical debilitation or disability were likely if 

Appellant did not undergo treatment.
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Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/30/2016