NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

TYRELL HENDERSON, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-30136 

D.C. No. 

4:16-cr-00010-BMM-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Brian M. Morris, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 12, 2018**

Portland, Oregon

Before: WARDLAW and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and LEFKOW,*** District 

Judge.

Tyrell Henderson appeals from his conviction for two counts of involuntary 

manslaughter in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1112, 1153(a). As the parties are 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Joan Lefkow, United States District Judge for the 

Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUL 16 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. Assuming without deciding that the district court erred in allowing the 

government to introduce evidence of Henderson’s prior federal conviction at trial, 

the alleged error did not affect Henderson’s substantial rights. See United States v. 

Segal, 852 F.2d 1152, 1155–56 (9th Cir. 1988); see also United States v. Olano, 

507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). Henderson argues that he was prejudiced by the alleged 

error because the jury was presented with “two plausible but conflicting” accounts 

of the car accident and the jury’s verdict thus depended on its view of his 

credibility. United States v. Jimenez, 214 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2000). But 

Henderson provides no reason to believe that his version of events, which 

contravenes all the physical evidence, as well as lay and expert testimony,

presented at trial, is plausible. We therefore decline to grant Henderson a new trial 

on this ground. See United States v. Glenn, 667 F.2d 1269, 1273 (9th Cir. 1982).

2. The district court did not err in denying Henderson’s motion for a new 

trial based on his Brady/Giglio claim. The government concedes that the evidence 

at issue—that one of the government’s witnesses was the subject of two unrelated 

misconduct investigations—was favorable to Henderson and was inadvertently 

suppressed. See United States v. Kohring, 637 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2011). But 

the government also rightly maintains that no prejudice ensued from the omission
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of this impeachment evidence. See id. At trial, the witness in question provided

testimony that was cumulative of other evidence presented to the jury. See Turner 

v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1885, 1893–95 (2017). And given the strength of the 

government’s other evidence against Henderson—including photographs of the 

scene, the surviving victim’s testimony, and expert and lay witnesses who testified 

about the accident—Henderson has failed to establish materiality, as the third 

prong of the Brady/Giglio test requires. See Kohring, 637 F.3d at 901–02.

AFFIRMED.