UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

BARBARA CAUDILL on behalf of )

ZACHARY CAUDILL (DECEASED), )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

 v. ) CAUSE NO. 3:12-CV-00771-CAN

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ) 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

On November 27, 2012, Barbara Caudill filed a complaint in this Court on behalf of her

son, Zachary Caudill (“Zachary”), who died on December 24, 2011, while appeals in this matter

were pending. 1

 In her complaint, Caudill requests reversal or remand of the decision of the

Commissioner denying Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) to Zachary. On March 27, 2013,

Caudill filed her opening brief and on July 1, 2013, Defendant Acting Commissioner of Social

Security, Carolyn W. Colvin (“Commissioner”) responded. Caudill filed a reply brief on July

15, 2013. This Court may enter a ruling in this matter based on the parties’ consent, 28 U.S.C. §

636(c), and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

I. PROCEDURE

On June 9, 2009, Zachary filed an application for SSI, alleging disability since birth

caused by a pervasive developmental disorder, atypical autism, Asperger syndrome, and a heart

condition.2 (Tr. 174). His claims were originally denied on December 1, 2009, and also on

1

 Zachary died of sepsis related to pneumonia and a possible pulmonary embolism. Caudill filed her Notice

Regarding Substitution of Party Upon Death of Claimant with the Social Security Administration on February 13,

2013. (Tr. 7).

2

 Zachary also filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) on June 9, 2009. The DIB application

was denied on June 20, 2009, and never appealed. Therefore, Zachary’s SSI application is the only claim at issue

before this court. 
reconsideration on March 19, 2010. Zachary appeared before an administrative law judge

(“ALJ”) on July 18, 2011. 

On July 25, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision holding that Zachary was not disabled, as

defined in the Social Security Act, from June 9, 2009, the date of his SSI application, through the

date of the decision. Zachary requested review by the Appeals Council on September 21, 2011,

and the request was denied on October 2, 2012, making the decision of the ALJ the final

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. See Fast v. Barnhart, 397 F.3d 468, 470 (7th

Cir. 2005); 20 C.F.R. § 404.981. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Facts

Zachary was 20 years old when he applied for SSI and 22 years old on the date of the

ALJ’s decision. At the time of the hearing, he was taking a skill building class in preparation for

GED classes. He had briefly worked as a groundskeeper with his father’s employer.

In his application for SSI, Zachary alleged that he became disabled at his birth on

January 22, 1989. He alleged that he suffered from a pervasive developmental disorder, atypical

autism, Asperger syndrome, and a heart condition. His heart condition caused physical stamina

impediments, shortness of breath, chest pains, and dizziness. 

Due to his developmental and attention deficit disorders, Zachary had trouble with

concentration and articulation in school. When he was in the fourth grade, his mother withdrew

him and home-schooled him for the remainder of his education. At the time of the proceedings,

Zachary complained of restrictions in his ability to maintain attention and concentration for

prolonged periods of time. He also alleged that he had difficulties completing a normal workday

2
due to interruptions from psychologically based symptoms, acting appropriately with the general

public, and responding to changes in the work environment as a groundskeeper.

1. Claimant’s Hearing Testimony

At the ALJ hearing on July 18, 2011, Zachary testified that in school math was difficult

for him, and he took special education classes to help with his speech. He reported that he was

unable to carry more than seventy-five pounds and that his doctor told him not to carry more

than ten pounds. Zachary testified that he had been to the doctor six months before the hearing

and was told that his heart condition had not improved. 

Zachary further reported that he had difficulty with maintaining focus and with his

memory. He also said that he was able to use the computer for social media and games during

the day. In addition, Zachary indicated that he had an X-Box 360 game system he used about

four hours once or twice a week. He testified that he participated in physical activities with

family and friends by playing basketball and touch football, but noted that he would frequently

have to stop because of shortness of breath. He reported that he did social activities with family

and friends like going to restaurants, the movies, and church.

Zachary further testified that he briefly worked as a groundskeeper, with the company

that employed his father. He said that he had difficulty keeping up with the pace of the work

because he would get short of breath. He also indicated that he had difficulty understanding his

boss’s instructions. He also testified that he did chores at home, such as putting away dishes,

mowing the lawn, doing laundry, and cleaning his room.

2. Barbara Caudill’s Testimony 

3
Caudill stated at the ALJ hearing that she did not believe Zachary had exaggerated his

testimony about his mental or physical abilities, although she believed that he had

underestimated his challenges. She said that Zachary’s groundskeeper boss had expressed that

Zachary had trouble following instructions and interacting with the other employees. She also

said that Zachary had trouble with compromise. Caudill further testified that Zachary was

introverted and that he withdrew when conflict arose. She described him, however, as easy to

get along with as long as there was no conflict. 

Caudill also testified that she would not leave her son at home by himself for extended

periods of time because he would forget to do basic chores, like feed the dog. She said that she

did not believe that Zachary could live independently in a separate apartment. She also said that

she had to remind him daily to take his medicine, and two to three times a week he would still

not take it.

Caudill further testified that she did not think that Zachary fully understood his heart

doctor’s medical diagnosis. She also stated that when Zachary went to the movies or restaurants

with friends it was always with a sibling present or with an individual, such as his pastor. 

3. Psychological Evidence of Dr. Cadwell and Ms. Uceny

On January 12, 2009, Dr. Carrie Cadwell, at the recommendation of Zachary’s counselor,

Jillorna Uceny, began a psychological evaluation of Zachary. She analyzed reported symptoms,

functioning difficulties, background history, family history, behavioral observations, records,

and tests results. Dr. Cadwell diagnosed Zachary with a Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not

Otherwise Specified, otherwise known as Atypical Autism. (Tr. 253). She concluded that his IQ

was low average to below average, but that he was not grossly impaired in general intellectual

ability. She concluded, however, that his reading skills were well below average. 

4
Subsequently, Zachary sought further clinical treatment from Uceny, a licensed clinical

social worker, on four occasions between June 3, 2010, and March 24, 2011. She reported in her

initial meetings with Zachary that he had “a hard time cognitively” and felt “very overwhelmed.”

(Tr. 301). She reported in his mental impairment questionnaire, dated November 4, 2010, that

he had a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”)3 score of 63, but that his highest GAF score

in the past year had been 53. (Tr. 213). Uceny also noted his difficulty in thinking and

concentrating; social withdrawal or isolation; blunt, flat or inappropriate affect; and generalized

persistent anxiety. (Id.). She further commented on Zachary’s ability to work, noting that he was

seriously limited but not precluded in remembering work-like procedures; understanding and

remembering very short and simple instructions; maintaining regular attendance; and being

punctual with customary, usually strict tolerances. (Tr. 215). She found that Zachary could

sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision; work in coordination with or

proximately to others without being unduly distracted; complete a normal workday and work

week without limitations from psychologically based symptoms; and perform at a consistent

pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods. (Tr. 215–16). She further

found that Zachary could ask simple questions or request assistance; get along with co-workers

or peers without unduly distracting them or exhibit behavioral extremes; respond appropriately

to changes in a routine work setting; deal with normal work stress; and be aware of normal

hazards and take appropriate precautions. (Id.). However, Uceny also found that Zachary could

3

 A Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score is based on a 100-point scale rating an individual’s overall

psychological, social, and occupational functioning. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL

MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 34 (4th ed., text rev. 2000). A score between 51 and 60 suggests moderate

symptoms or moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g.. few friends, conflicts with peers

or co-workers). Id. A score between 61 and 70 suggests some mild symptoms or some difficulty in social,

occupational, or school functioning (e.g., occasional truancy, or theft within the household), but generally 

functioning pretty well, has some meaningful interpersonal relationships. Id.

5
not maintain attention for two hour segments, make simple work-related decisions, and accept

instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors. (Id.). In assessing

Zachary’s functional limitation due to his mental impairments, Uceny found that he had

“marked” restrictions in daily living and social functioning. (Tr. 217). Finally, she indicated that

Zachary had “frequent” deficiencies of concentration, persistence, and pace as well as “repeated”

episodes of decompensation. (Id.).

4. Agency Psychological Evidence 

On August 10, 2009, Dr. Kladder, at the request of the agency, prepared a Mental

Residual Functional Capacity Assessment, finding that Zachary was moderately limited in the

ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; to complete a normal

workday and work week without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to

perform at a constant pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods; to act

appropriately with the general public; and to respond appropriately to changes in the work

setting. (Tr. 256–57). He also concluded that Zachary had mild restrictions of activities of daily

living; moderate difficulties maintaining social functioning; and moderate difficulties in

maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. Dr. Kladder found that Zachary had no episodes

of decompensation of extended duration. 

5. Medical Evidence of Dr. Merchand and Dr. Randazzo

On October 6, 2008, Zachary met with Dr. Hector Merchand, a cardiologist, at the advice

of his family physician, Dr. Paul Russo, to review his echocardiogram. Dr. Merchand concluded

that Zachary had at least a moderate and probably severe calcific aortic valve stenosis with

moderate aortic valve sufficiency. (Tr. 246). He also determined that Zachary was

symptomatic, experiencing shortness of breath, chest pains, and dizziness. These symptoms,

6
however, were all secondary to Zachary’s significant aortic valve disease. Dr. Merchand

diagnosed Zachary with left ventricular hypertrophy.4

 Id.

In November of 2009, Zachary had another echocardiogram that was read by Dr. Thach

Nguyen who found mild left atrial enlargement, mild left ventricular hypertrophy and good

systolic function, heavy calcification of the aortic valve, mild to moderate aortic stenosis,

moderate aortic regurgitation, trace mitral regurgitation, and heavy calcification in the posterior

leaflet with trace mitral regurgitation. On September 30, 2010, Zachary met with Dr. Randazzo

who reviewed his echocardiogram. She determined that he had a systolic ejection murmur,

normal sinus rhythm, left ventricular hypertrophy or enlarged heart, bicuspid aortic valve, heart

racing, and shortness of breath. The last time Zachary visited Dr. Randazzo, she noted he had a

bicuspid aortic valve with regurgitation and that he was obese. She also noted that he was stable

and asymptomatic as to his heart condition.

6. Agency Medical Evidence

Upon receiving Zachary’s SSI application, the Social Security Administration

recommended that Zachary see Dr. Ralph Inabnit, an osteopathic physician, to evaluate his

medical impairments. Dr. Inabnit concluded that Zachary had Grade III Systolic ejection

murmur, obesity, possible pervasive developmental disorder, possible atypical autistic disorder,

and a possible learning disability. He then recommended that Zachary be seen by a psychiatrist,

have a mental status examination, have a chest x-ray, follow up with a cardiologist, and have a

review of his previous echocardiogram. Subsequently, Zachary had another echocardiogram that

was reviewed by Dr. Nguyen and on another occasion was reviewed by Dr. Randazzo as Dr.

4

Ventricular hypertrophy is an enlargement of the muscles of the heart’s main muscles chamber. MAYO CLINIC,

http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/left-ventricular-hypertrophy/DS00680.

7
Inabnit recommended. Zachary did not see a psychiatrist after Dr. Inabnit’s recommendation,

but he continued his therapy with Uceny.

7. Decision of the Administrative Law Judge

The ALJ found that Zachary had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 9,

2009, the application date. The ALJ identified pervasive development disorder, attention deficit

disorder, and aortic valve disease as severe impairments. He also found obesity and

hypertriglicerema as non-severe impairments. The ALJ determined that Zachary did not have an

impairment meeting or medically equaling an impairment listed in the Social Security

regulations. (Tr. 22–23).

The ALJ concluded that Zachary had the residual functional capacity to perform

sedentary work. (Tr. 25). He determined that Zachary could lift ten pounds occasionally and less

than ten pounds frequently. He also concluded that Zachary could stand and walk six hours of

the eight-hour workday, as well as sit for six of the eight hour work day. The ALJ further

determined that he could occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. He also stated

that Zachary had to refrain from concentrated exposure to extreme temperatures and extreme

humidity.

The ALJ determined that Zachary could perform simple, routine tasks and could

occasionally interact with co-workers, supervisors, and the general public. Finally, the ALJ

stated that Zachary could keep pace to meet quotas and complete tasks typically found in

unskilled labor. He adopted the vocational expert’s opinion finding that Zachary would be able

to perform the work of a production assembler, small parts assembler, and electronics worker,

which all had positions available in the local and national economy. Based on these findings, the

ALJ concluded that Zachary was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (Tr. 30). 

8
B. Standard of Review 

The Social Security Administration follows a five-step sequential process in order to

determine if a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). To find disability, the ALJ must

determine whether: (1) the claimant is presently employed in substantial gainful activity; (2) the

claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments that is severe; (3) the

claimant’s severe impairment meets or equals any severe impairment listed in the regulations;

(4) the claimant’s residual functional capacity leaves him unable to perform past relevant work;

and (5) the claimant is unable to perform any other work existing in significant numbers in the

national economy. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351-52 (7th Cir. 2005). The

ALJ must answer yes to step three or five in order to find disability. Id. at 352. The burden of

proof is on the claimant in steps one through four and shifts to the Commissioner at step five. 

Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004).

The Court will affirm the decision of the ALJ if it is supported by substantial evidence

and no legal error exists. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006). The Court affords de novo review to the

ALJ’s legal conclusions. Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2004). “Substantial

evidence” is more than a scintilla; it is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1995). 

The ALJ must have built a logical bridge from the evidence to the conclusion. Haynes, 416 F.3d

at 626. A reviewing court must not substitute its own opinion for the ALJ’s opinion, and it must

not reweigh evidence. Id. An ALJ’s decision must “sufficiently articulate [his] assessment of

the evidence to assure [the reviewing court] that the ALJ considered the important

evidence...[and to enable the reviewing court] to trace the path of the ALJ’s reasoning.” 

Carlson v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 180, 181 (7th Cir. 2003). An ALJ need not provide a “complete

9
written evaluation of every piece of testimony and evidence.” Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363,

370 (7th Cir. 2004). An ALJ’s decision cannot stand, however, if it lacks evidentiary support or

an adequate discussion of the issues. Id.

C. Issues for Review

Caudill contends that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s findings that (1)

Zachary’s obesity was not a severe impairment; (2) Zachary’s autism did not meet or medically

equal Listing 12.10 for Autistic Disorder; (3) Zachary could perform sedentary work; and (4)

jobs existed in the national economy that Zachary could perform given his residual functional

capacity. 

1. Severity of Zachary’s obesity impairment

Caudill first contends that the ALJ erred in the second step of the analysis, when he

determined that Zachary’s obesity was a non-severe impairment. Caudill argues that substantial

evidence shows that his obesity was a severe impairment because all of Zachary’s examining

doctors mentioned his obesity. Caudill asserts that both Dr. Inabnit and Dr. Randazzo diagnosed

Zachary with obesity. She points out that Zachary testified that he experienced chest pains and

shortness of breath. Caudill also contends that the ALJ did not provide enough information to

show how he determined that obesity was a non-severe impairment.

A severe impairment is found when the ALJ finds that a medically determinable physical

or mental impairment significantly limits an individual’s ability to do work. 20 C.F.R. §

416.920(c). Alternatively, a non-severe impairment causes minimal functional limitations on an

individual. SSR 02-1p. No specific level of weight or Body Mass Index (“BMI”) makes an

individual’s obesity severe on non-severe. Id. To evaluate whether obesity is severe, the ALJ is

required to make an individualized assessment of the impact of obesity on the claimant. Id. 

10
However, failure to label an impairment, such as obesity, as severe is not a reversible error when

the ALJ finds other severe impairments and the five-step analysis continues. Brown v. Astrue,

2009 WL 722299, at *10 (S.D. Ind. March 18, 2009). The second step of the analysis is to

eliminate consideration of individuals who only have slight impairments. Taylor v. Schweiker,

739 F.2d 1240, 1243 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1984). When a claimant does not mention how obesity would

have affected the ALJ’s five-step analysis, a court is not required to remand the decision.

Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 504 (7th Cir. 2004).

Here, the ALJ stated that no evidence was found to show that the obesity exacerbated the

cardiac condition. (Tr. 22). The ALJ also cited that Zachary, himself, never reported that his

obesity caused him any limitations. Id. The ALJ adopted the opinions of the doctors who

concluded that Zachary suffered from an aortic valve disorder, and these doctors factored

Zachary’s obesity into their overall diagnosis. Whether the ALJ fully articulated his rationale for

labeling Zachary’s obesity as a non-severe impairment is inconsequential, however. Even if the

Court remanded this case for the ALJ to articulate his reasoning further, it would not affect the

outcome of this case. Zachary’s other severe impairments forced the ALJ to continue the

analysis. See Brown, 2009 WL 722299, at *10. The regulations governing SSI do not include a

specific listing for obesity. SSR 02-1p. An ALJ may find that an individual with obesity meets a

listing only if the individual has another severe impairment. Id. ALJs must consider, however,

all impairments including non-severe impairments when determining a claimant’s residual

functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(2). As a result, Zachary’s obesity would

have been incorporated into the disability analysis regardless of whether it was labeled severe or

non-severe. Therefore, the Court finds no cause to reverse or remand at step two of the analysis.

2. Listing 12.10 – Autistic Disorder

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Caudill claims that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s determination that 

Zachary’s severe impairments did not equal Listing 12.10. This listing relates to autistic disorder

and other pervasive developmental disorders, which are shown by characteristics such as

qualitative deficits in the development of reciprocal social interaction, verbal and nonverbal

communication skills, and imaginative activity. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.10. In

order to meet the listing, the claimant has the burden of showing that he or she has two of the

following characteristics:

1. Marked restriction of daily living; or

2. Marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning; or

3. Marked difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace; or 

4. Repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration.

Id. In making a determination, the ALJ must discuss the listing by name and offer more than a 

“perfunctory analysis.” Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 670 (7th Cir. 2004). The ALJ does

not have to mention every piece of evidence, but the ALJ must take into account highly pertinent

evidence and make a connection between that evidence and the conclusion. Rice, 384 F.3d at

370. The ALJ’s decision must elaborate on significant medical history, including the

examination and laboratory findings and the functional limitations that were considered. 20

C.F.R. § 416.920(e)(4). An ALJ decision must be “based on medical evidence demonstrated by

medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” SSR 86-8.

Caudill argues that the ALJ wrongly ignored the opinions of Uceny, Zachary’s therapist

who opined that Zachary fit all the characteristics of part B in Listing 12.10 in her mental

12
impairment questionnaire. Caudill also contends that the ALJ failed to use any of the medical

history in the record to support his conclusion. 

Caudill misstates the ALJ’s opinion when he argues that the ALJ did not rely on medical

evidence and also ignored Uceny’s opinions. At the end of Section 3 of the opinion where the

ALJ determined that Zachary did not medically equal a listed impairment, the ALJ stated that his

determination of Caudill’s RFC “reflects the degree of limitation the undersigned found in the

‘paragraph B’ mental function analysis.” (Tr. 24). In the RFC determination, the ALJ considered

Uceny’s opinions along with the medical opinions of Dr. Inabnit, Dr. Kladder, and Dr. Cadwell. 

The ALJ offered an explanation of why he afforded Uceny little weight in his decision. 

The ALJ mentioned that Uceny’s determination that Caudill had all of the characteristics

required in “paragraph B” was inconsistent with her findings that Caudill had a “‘fair’ ability to

complete a normal work day and work week without interruptions from psychologically based

symptoms; perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable amount of rest periods; and

respond appropriately to changes in a routine work setting. (Tr. 27-28). Further, the ALJ

mentioned that Uceny found Caudill had the ability “to remember work-like procedures; to

understand, remember and carry out very short and simple instructions; to maintain regular

attendance; to sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision; and to work in

coordination with or in proximity to others without being duly distracted.” (Tr. 27).

While the ALJ offered no evidence to support his finding that Zachary had no episodes of

prolonged decompensation, the only mention of prolonged decompensation in the record is from

Uceny whose opinion lacked medical evidence in support. (Tr. 24). Because there was none, the

ALJ could not support his finding with medical evidence. Reversal and remand is only required

when the ALJ offers a “superficial” analysis of the listing. Rice, 384 F.3d at 270. Here, the

13
record as cited by the ALJ in his opinion supports his finding that Zachary did not meet Listing

12.10. 

3. The ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by substantial

evidence.

In order to continue with steps four and five in the disability process, the ALJ must make

a RFC determination. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). A RFC is an administrative assessment of the

maximum an individual can do despite the limitations imposed on his medically determinable

impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). In reaching a RFC determination, the ALJ considers

all allegations of physical and mental limitations, and bases the assessment on all relevant

evidence, such as medical history, reports of daily activities, the effects of treatment, and lay

evidence. SSR 96-8p. The ALJ must include a “narrative discussion describing how the

evidence supports a conclusion.” Id.

a. The ALJ’s findings that Zachary had a GAF score of 63 

Caudill argues that the ALJ erred by basing his decision that Zachary was capable of

sedentary work on the GAF score of 63 reported in the mental impairment questionnaire

completed by Uceny. Caudill contends that Uceny mistakenly wrote 63 on the questionnaire

because she had written on the same questionnaire that Zachary’s highest GAF score that year

was 53. (Tr. 213, 301). She argues that because the ALJ used an incorrect score to determine

Zachary’s RFC, substantial evidence does not support his findings. Caudill further argues that

the ALJ incorrectly interpreted Dr. Inabnit’s opinion by stating that Zachary had “normal

intelligence.” She claims that the ALJ “cherry picked” the words “normal intelligence” from the

Dr. Inabnit’s exam resulting in a determination inconsistent with the findings of the doctor. 

The Commissioner argues that even if the GAF score of 63 was incorrect, it was only one

factor in the ALJ’s determination. According to the Commissioner, the GAF score was not

14
determinative to the RFC finding. The Commissioner also argues that the 53 score could have

been the error and not the 63 score. The Commissioner further contends that the ALJ correctly

stated that Caudill had “normal intelligence.” He argues that because Dr. Cadwell’s findings

support Dr. Inabnit’s conclusion that Zachary had “normal intelligence,” the ALJ correctly

reflected the record in his RFC determination.

When evaluating a RFC determination, it is not the duty of the Court to reweigh evidence

or substitute its own opinion for that of the ALJ. Haynes, 416 F.3d at 626. The ALJ is only

required to minimally articulate his reasons for accepting or rejecting evidence. Elder v. Astrue,

529 F.3d 408, 415 (7th Cir. 2008). The ALJ must provide a “logical bridge” from the evidence

to his conclusion. Haynes, 416 F.3d at 626. Here, the ALJ’s decision stated that Zachary’s

score was 63, which is indicative of someone who has difficulty in social, occupational, or

school functioning but functions well with meaningful interpersonal relationships. (Tr. 27). The

ALJ supported this score with evidence that Zachary had difficulty with thinking or

concentrating and that he experienced social withdrawal, blunt affect, and generalized persistent

anxiety. Id. The ALJ also cited Uceny’s findings that Zachary had the ability to remember worklike procedures, to understand and carry out very short and simple instructions, and to work in

coordination with or in proximity to others without being duly distracted. Id. Based on the

evidence that the ALJ cited, the ALJ offered the “logical bridge” needed to support the

conclusion. See Haynes, 416 F.3d at 626. 

Caudill has failed to offer evidence showing how a score of 63 is inconsistent with the

record. Caudill does not offer evidence or argument that the ALJ impermissibly overlooked

evidence that would have clarified the difference in these two scores. Caudill has only provided

evidence that Uceny’s opinion in her overall evaluation on November 4, 2010 was consistent

15
with a GAF score of 53 and not 63. This Court has already found, however, that the ALJ

properly provided the logical bridge to determine that Uceny’s evaluation was faulty. Because

the ALJ has provided the logical bridge necessary to support his reliance on the 63 GAF score,

and Caudill has offered no further support outside of Uceny’s opinions that the 63 GAF score is

inconsistent with the record, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination. See

Haynes, 416 F.3d at 626. 

Furthermore, Dr. Inabnit’s findings supported the ALJ’s statement that Zachary had

normal intelligence. Dr. Inabnit noted that Zachary’s full scale IQ and general range of

intellectual functioning were in the low average and below average range. (Tr. 280). Although

his intellectual functioning was low, Dr. Inabnit did not find that Zachary was impaired in

intellectual functioning; cross verbal, non-verbal, visual, spacial, working memory; attention

skills, and visual motor processing speech. Id. Further, Dr. Inabnit found that Zachary was not

grossly impaired in his general intellectual ability. In addition, Dr. Cadwell stated that Zachary

was “anything but intellectually delayed and that he might struggle more in memory attention

skills and visual motor processing but was not impaired in these areas. (Tr. 280). Taking into

account both Dr. Inabnit’s opinion and Dr. Cadwell’s opinion, the ALJ built a logical bridge in

his opinion to his conclusion that Zachary had normal intelligence. Therefore, the ALJ’s

reliance on the GAF score of 63 and the conclusion Zachary had normal intelligence is supported

by substantial evidence when determining Zachary’s RFC. 

b. Weight of Dr. Cadwell’s opinion

Caudill also argues that the ALJ incorrectly stated that there was no credible medical

evidence to contradict that of the state agency psychologist, Dr. Kladder. Caudill asserts that Dr.

Cadwell’s finding that Zachary needed to live in a “supported environment” was inconsistent

16
with Dr. Kladder’s finding that Zachary had moderate limitations in social functioning and

concentration. Caudill further argues that because Dr. Cadwell was Zachary’s treating

psychologist, Dr. Cadwell’s opinion should have controlling weight.

In making a RFC determination, the ALJ is required “to minimally articulate his reason

for accepting or rejecting evidence.” Elder, 529 F.3d at 415. The ALJ gives controlling weight

to the opinions of a treating physician if the opinion is well-supported and consistent with the

record. SSR 96-2p. An ALJ must give “good reasons” for discounting the treating physician’s

opinion. Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 2011). When the ALJ does not give the

treating physician controlling weight in the decision, the ALJ must consider the length, nature,

and extent of the treatment relationship, frequency of the examination, the physician’s specialty,

the types of tests performed, and the consistency and supportability of the physician’s opinion. 

20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2).

In her argument, Caudill does not offer evidence to support her claim that the ALJ

impermissibly considered Dr. Cadwell a consulting physician rather than a treating physician. A

treating source is an acceptable medical source that has provided medical treatment or evaluation

to the claimant and who has, or has had, an ongoing treatment relationship with the claimant. 20

C.F.R. § 416.902. An ongoing treatment relationship exists when the claimant saw the medical

source frequently enough to be consistent with accepted medical practices for the treatment of

the medical condition. Bridges v. Astrue, 2012 WL 3204889, at *8 (N.D. Ind. August 1, 2012). 

The record indicates that Zachary met with Dr. Cadwell twice at the advice of his therapist, Ms.

Uceny. (Tr. 251). Two visits with a doctor do not establish the ongoing relationship necessary

for the doctor to qualify as a treating source. Yet Caudill does not explain why she believes Dr.

Cadwell was a treating physician. She only makes a bald assertion that Dr. Cadwell is. 

17
Moreover, Dr. Cadwell herself identified her two visits with Zachary as a “psychological

consultation.” (Tr. 251). Caudill has not demonstrated that the heightened standard presuming

controlling weight for treating physicians applies to Dr. Cadwell. The ALJ is only required to

minimally articulate his reasons for accepting or rejecting evidence. Elder, 529 F.3d at 415. 

Consequently, the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. Cadwell’s consultation was supported by the record

sufficiently explained his decision to afford Dr. Cadwell’s opinion substantial weight. 

Furthermore, Caudill does not provide evidence of the significance of the difference

between Dr. Cadwell’s finding that Zachary needed a “supported environment,” and Dr.

Kladder’s finding that Zachary had moderate limitations in social functioning and concentration.

Here, the ALJ did not provide testimony of the state agency doctor that contradicts Dr.

Cadwell’s opinion. The ALJ articulated Dr. Kladder’s opinion that Zachary failed to exhibit

significant deficits in social, daily, personal or cognitive functions, but that Zachary had

difficulties with concentration, persistence, and pace. (Tr. 28). Similarly, Dr. Cadwell

determined that Zachary was “anything but intellectually delayed.” (Tr. 254). In her opinion,

Zachary was not in an impaired range in intellectual functioning across verbal and non-verbal

visuospatial, working memory, attention skills, and visual processing speed. Id. Furthermore,

Dr. Cadwell found that Zachary was “capable of independent living with good support” and was

also “capable of supported employment.” Id. As such, the ALJ created the logical bridge

needed to explain the weight given to the opinions of Dr. Cadwell and Dr. Kladder. Therefore,

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination.

4. The ALJ’s determination that Zachary can perform other jobs in the

national economy

Under Medical Vocational Rule 201.27, a sedentary work RFC could justify a finding of

“not disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404 app. 2. If one of the findings of fact about the vocational factors

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and RFC are not the same as the corresponding criterion rule, the ALJ consults a vocational

expert (“VE”). 20 C.F.R. § 416.966(e). Here, the ALJ found that Zachary retained the RFC to

perform sedentary work, but only if he was limited to lifting and carrying ten pounds; sitting,

standing and walking for six hours in an eight hour work day; occasionally balancing, stooping,

kneeling, crouching and crawling. In addition, the ALJ found that Zachary must avoid

concentrated exposure to extreme heat, cold, and humidity; could only have occasional

interactions with co-workers, supervisors, and the public; and could keep pace and meet quotas

and complete tasks typical to unskilled work. (Tr. 25). Because of these additional limitations

to Zachary’s RFC, the ALJ consulted the VE to determine whether jobs existed for an individual

with Zachary’s age, education, work experience, and RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 416.966(e). 

Caudill argues that the ALJ’s determination that jobs existed in the national economy for

Zachary was not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ asked the VE to make a

determination based on the incorrect fact that Zachary had graduated from high school. The

Commissioner acknowledges that the ALJ misspoke in the opinion when he said that Zachary

had a high school education. Nonetheless, the Commissioner argues that even if the ALJ had

properly noted that Zachary did not graduate from high school, it would not have changed his

overall determination that Zachary was not disabled. 

When an ALJ cannot determine at step five if jobs exist in the national economy with

medical considerations alone, the ALJ consults the Medical Vocational Guideline grid. 20 C.F.R.

Pt. 404 Subpt. P §§ 200.00. These guidelines consider various vocational factors such as age,

education, and work experience in combination with the individual RFC to determine whether an

individual is able to engage in substantial gainful activity. Id. According to the grid, a person

with marginal education or a high school education, without work experience, and with

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Zachary’s RFC would not be considered disabled. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404 Subpt. P §§ 201.23,

201.24. In fact, even a young individual between 18 and 44, like Zachary; who is illiterate or

unable to communicate in English, unlike Zachary; and who has no past relevant work, is not

disabled. Id. However, the Medical Vocational Guidelines cannot be determinative on their own

in this case because Zachary suffered from additional limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404 app. 2. Yet at

the hearing, the ALJ did not state that the additional limitations had anything to do with

Zachary’s education. (Tr. 62-63). Furthermore, Caudill does not claim that they do. Therefore,

even if the ALJ were to correctly state that Zachary did not graduate from high school, it would

not change the disability determination based on the Medical Vocational Guidelines. Because

the Court is confident that the ALJ would reach the same result upon remand, the Court refuses

to remand based on the ALJ’s misstatement regarding Zachary’s education level. See McKinzey

v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884, 892 (7th Cir. 2011).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Caudill’s motion to reverse or remand is DENIED. [Doc.

No. 13]. This Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision pursuant to sentence four of 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). 

SO ORDERED

Dated this 23rd day of January, 2014. 

S/Christopher A. Nuechterlein

Christopher A. Nuechterlein

United States Magistrate Judge

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