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________________________________ Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 48909

Chie f Justice Justices Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Clifford W. Taylor Robert P. Young, Jr. 

# Opinion

Stephen J. Markman FILED MARCH 26, 2003

DENNIS EGGLESTON, as Personal Representative of the Estate of LOUISA EGGLESTON, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 121208 BIO-MEDICAL APPLICATIONS OF DETROIT, INC. and FRESENIUS MEDICAL CARE, Defendants-Appellees, and JAMES LAWSON, D.O., and JAMES LAWSON, D.O., P.C., Defendants.

PER CURIAM This case presents the question whether a successor personal represen tati ve has two years after appointment to file an action on behalf of an estate under the wrongful death saving statute, MCL 600.5852, or whether the two-year period is measured from the appointment of the initial personalrepresentative. The Court of App eals affirmed summary dispositionfor defendants, holding that the plain language of the statute refers only to one set of letters of authority issued to the personal representative. 248 Mich App 640; 645 NW2d 279 (2001). However, the Court of Appeals misread the statute and then relied on that erroneous reading inreaching its decision. We reverse the judgments of the circuit court and the Court of Appeals because the statutorylanguage simply provides that the two-year grace period is measured from the issuance of letters of authority. I Decedent received kidney dialysis treatment from defendants-appellees on June 21, 1996. She died the next day. Decedent’s widower was appointed temporary personal representat ive and issued letters of authority on April 4, 1997. He died on August 20, 1997. Plaintiff, the son of the decedent and the first personal representative, was appointed successor personal representative, and letters of authority were issued to him on Decem ber 8, 1998. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging medical malpractice on June 9, 1999. Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7). Defendants argued that the action is barred by the two-year statute of limitations, MCL 600.5838a(2), which, theyclaimed, expired on June 21, 1998, two years after decedent’s last t reatme nt. Defendants also argued that the
2wrongful death saving statut e, MCL 600.5852, does not apply because the complaint was not filed within two years after the appointment of the first personal representative on April 4, 1997. Plaintiff respondedthat another two-year period began whenhe was appointed as successo r personal representative. The circuit court agreed with defendants and granted summary disposition. Onappeal as of right, the Court of Appeals aff irmed . The Court characterized plaintiff’s argument as one advocating
an“expansive r eadi ng” of the statute, whereas the law requires that the saving provision be given a “ na rrow reading,” citing this Court’s decision in Li ndse y v Harper Hosp , 455 M ich 56, 65; 564 NW2d 861 (1997). The Court held that the statute should instead be construed and applied according to its plain terms. 1 Furthermore, the plain language of the saving cla use refers to one set or “the” letters of authority, not multiple letters of authority. The statute applies to “the” personal representative, not “a” personal representative, which might suggest that any personal representative who receives letters of authori ty, initially or as a successor, has two years to file a claim. Clearly, if the Legislature had in te nded that the two-year grace period beginanew each time an appointment is terminated and a new a ppointment made, it could have easily done so by specifically stating as much. Absent language to that effect, we are bound to construe the saving provision s trictl y: the two-year limitation period begins when the probate court issues the letters of authorit y to the

1 The Court of Appeals did not explain how, if at all, a “narrow rea ding” of the statute would differ from its plain meaning. 3personal representative, regardless of whether the court later appoints one or more successor personal representatives. [248 Mich App 649.] Plaintiff has applied for leave to appeal. II We review de novo the interpretation and application of
a statute as a question of law. If the language of a statute is clear, no further analysis is necessaryor allowed. Miller v Mercy Mem Hosp , 466 Mich 196, 201; 644 NW2d 730 (2002). III The questionpresented is of first impression. Although the Court of Appeals purported to construe and apply the plain language of MCL 600.5852, the Court misquoted the statute by inserting “the” before “letters of authority.” If a person dies before the perio d of limitations has run or within 30 d ays after the period of limitations has run, an action which survives by law may be commenced by the pers onal representative of the deceased person at a ny time within2 years after [the] letters of authority are issued although the period of limitations has run. But an action shall not be brought under this provisionunless the personal representative commences it within 3 years after t he period of limitations has run. [ Id .] The Court rel ied on this misquotation in holding that a personal representative must bring anaction within two years after the initial letters of authority are issued to the first personal representative. This is not, however, what the statute says. The statute simply provides that an action may be commenced by the personal representative “at any time within2 years after letters of authority are issued although 4the period of limitations has run.” Id . The language adopted bythe Legislature clearly allows an action to be brought withintwo years after letters of authority are issued to the personal representative. The statute does not prov ide th at the two-year period is measured from the da te letters of authority are issued to the initial personal representative. Plaintiff was “the personal representative” of the estate and filed the complaint “ wit hin 2 years after letters of authority[were] issued,” and “within 3 years after the period of limitations ha[d] run.” MCL 600.5852. The action was therefore timely. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of th e circuit court and the Court of Appeals and re mand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings. MCR 7.302(F)(1). Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Clifford W. Taylor Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman

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