UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

LAFAYETTE DIVISION

WAYNE ALLEN FENDER, DONNA MARIE )

PULOUS, and HEATHER MOCK, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

) 4:14-CV-024 

vs. ) (4:14-CV-061)

)

SARAH SAILORS, SALLY HERNANDEZ, ) 

ASHLEY PETERS, PATRICK MANAHAN, )

CHRISTIAN BRAMLAGE, KURTIS FOUT, )

DCS, THE STATE OF INDIANA, )

ABIGAIL DIENER, SAMANTHA DAGENAIS,)

and ANALEI WHITLOCK, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on: (1) the complaint filed by

pro se plaintiffs, Wayne Fender and Donna Marie Pulous, on March

10, 2014 (cause no. 4:14-cv-024, DE #1); (2) the complaint filed by

pro se plaintiffs, Wayne Fender, Donna Marie Pulous, and Heather

Mock, on August 7, 2014 (cause no. 4:14-cv-061, DE #1); (3) the

motion to supplement, filed by pro se plaintiffs, Wayne Fender,

Donna Marie Pulous, and Heather Mock, on September 18, 2014 (cause

no. 4:14-cv-061); and (4) the motions to dismiss filed by the

various defendants in both cause numbers as related to the

aforementioned complaints (cause no. 4:14-cv-024, DEs #23 & #34;
cause no. 4:14-cv-061, DEs #21, #26, #29, #31, #34.) For the

reasons set forth below, the Court: 

(1) STRIKES both complaints; 

(2) DIRECTS the clerk to place cause number 4:14-cv-024

on a blank pro se Complaint 42 U.S.C. § 1983 form and

send it to plaintiffs Wayne Fender, Donna Marie Pulous,

and Heather Mock; 

(3) GRANTS plaintiffs until May 7, 2015, to submit an

amended complaint; 

(4) CAUTIONS plaintiffs that if they do not respond by

that deadline, this case will be dismissed without

further notice;

(5) DENIES the motion to supplement as moot; 

(6) DENIES the motions to dismiss as moot; and 

(7) DIRECTS the clerk to close the case in cause number

4:14-cv-061. 

BACKGROUND

Pro se plaintiffs, Wayne Fender and Donna Marie Pulous, filed

their original complaint in cause number 4:14-cv-024 on March 10,

2014. Although written on a standard Complaint 42 U.S.C. section

1983 form, the form itself only lists the alleged causes of

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action;1 the supporting facts and “evidence” are incorporated by

reference over sixty plus additional pages. On May 5, 2014,

several defendants, namely the State of Indiana, DCS, Sarah

Sailors, Sally Hernandez, Ashley Peters, and Judge Kurtis Fouts,

filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing it was unintelligible and failed to state any claims for relief. On May 13,

2014, plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to the motion to

dismiss and later filed a supplement to that response. On August

7, 2014, pro se plaintiffs Wayne Fender and Donna Marie Pulous,

along with additional pro se plaintiff Heather Mock, filed another

complaint, this time in cause number 4:14-cv-061. That complaint,

also written on a standard section 1983 form, added several new

defendants to the list. For the causes of action section,

plaintiffs only stated that “we provided paperwork that gives a

clear-cut view of our evidence.” That attached paperwork spans the

course of over one-hundred and seventy pages. Plaintiffs later

filed a motion to supplement that complaint with another sixteen

pages of single-spaced argument and “evidence.” On August 12,

2014, defendant Patrick Manahan filed a motion for judgment on the

pleadings in cause number 4:14-cv-024 for failure to state a claim,

arguing that “it is difficult to discern what the plaintiffs

1

 The complaint lists defamation of character, discrimination, libel,

constitutional infringement, religious bias, perjury, filing false report, false

accusations, alternative healing bias, and family bias as supposed causes of

action. 

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believe Patrick Manahan did wrong, much less why he is a defendant

here.” 

On September 22, 2014, defendants, Sarah Sailors, Sally

Hernandez, Ashley Peters, Kurtis Fouts, DCS, and the State of

Indiana, filed a motion to consolidate the two cases pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) and Local Rule Rule 42-2. On

October 21, 2014, the motion to consolidate was granted by

Magistrate Judge John E. Martin, who stated that “the cases involve

common issues of law and fact relating to the removal of a child

from the care of [plaintiffs]. Trying the cases separately would

require duplication of efforts, both on behalf of the parties and

of the Court, and might result in inconsistent results.” Judge

Martin directed that all future filings were to be made in cause

number 4:14-cv-024 only. Prior to that time, however, the

following filings were made in cause number 4:14-cv-061: (1) on

September 26, 2014, defendant, Analei Whitlock, filed a motion to

dismiss, arguing that plaintiffs’ complaint was “unintelligible”

and failed to state any valid claims; (2) on September 29, 2014,

defendants, Ashley Peters and the State of Indiana, filed a motion

to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint arguing that it was “unintelligible,” failed to state a claim for possible relief, and was

actually just an improper attempt to amend the original complaint

in cause number 4:14-cv-024; (3) on September 30, 2014, defendant,

Samantha Dagenais, filed a motion to dismiss or for a more definite

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statement, arguing that plaintiffs’ complaint including the

attached “evidence” was “so lengthy and incomprehensible” that it

failed to state any “coherent or intelligible” claims; (4) also on

September 30, 2014, defendant, Abigail Diener, filed a motion to

dismiss, arguing that plaintiffs’ complaint was “illogical,” devoid

of any factual basis, and failed to meet federal pleading

standards; and (5) on October 6, 2014, defendant, Christin

Bramlage, filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the complaint and

“evidence” together were “so lengthy and incomprehensible” that

they failed to contain any “coherent or intelligible” claims. 

Plaintiffs filed responses to the motions, along with several

supplements and/or status updates, some of which were stricken by

Magistrate Martin for failure to comply with the Local Rules, and

none of which shed any real light on the nature of plaintiffs’

claims.

 

ANALYSIS

“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a

pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and

citations omitted). Nevertheless, “parties [must] make their

pleadings straightforward, so that judges and adverse parties need

not try to fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud.” United States

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ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir.

2003). They must “be presented with sufficient clarity to avoid

requiring a district court or opposing party to forever sift

through its pages . . . .” Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1436

(7th Cir. 1990). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires

that complaints contain a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Vicom, Inc.

v. Harbridge Merchant Servs., Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 775-76 (7th Cir.

1994) (“A complaint that is prolix and/or confusing makes it

difficult for the defendant to file a responsive pleading and makes

it difficult for the trial court to conduct orderly litigation.”)

and Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1436 (7th Cir. 1990) (a

complaint “must be presented with clarity sufficient to avoid

requiring a district court or opposing party to forever sift

through its pages in search” of the plaintiff’s claims). In sum,

Rule 8 requires a complaint to be presented with “intelligibility

sufficient for a court or opposing party to understand whether a

valid claim is alleged and [,] if so [,] what it is.” Vicom, 20

F.3d at 775. Wordy, redundant, and seemingly interminable

complaints violate the letter and the spirit of Rule 8 and may be

dismissed with leave to refile. Id. at 776. Here, plaintiffs’

complaints fail to meet these standards. Therefore the complaints

will be STRICKEN, and plaintiffs will be given time to file an

amended complaint in cause number 4:14-cv-024 only. 

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The amended complaint needs to contain a short and plain

statement of what happened to plaintiffs to give rise to their

claims. They need to state when these events occurred and clearly

explain how each defendant was involved with each claim that they

are raising against that defendant. Additionally, the complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim that is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded

factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at

556). Legal conclusions can provide a complaint’s framework, but

unless well-pleaded factual allegations move the claims from

conceivable to plausible, they are insufficient to state a claim.

Id. at 680. “[C]ourts are not bound to accept as true a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555, citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (quotation

marks omitted). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds

of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise

a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption

that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if

doubtful in fact).” Id. (quotation marks, citations and footnote

7
omitted). “[I]n considering the plaintiff’s factual allegations,

courts should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the

elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements.”

Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). “[W]here the

well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the

mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it

has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal at

679 (quotation marks and brackets omitted). Thus, “a plaintiff

must do better than putting a few words on paper that, in the hands

of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has happened

to her that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v. Citibank,

N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original). 

However, the plaintiffs should not resort to attaching voluminous

pages of documents or “evidence” in place of the requirements

stated above. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court:

(1) STRIKES both complaints; 

(2) DIRECTS the clerk to place cause number 4:14-cv-024

on a blank pro se Complaint 42 U.S.C. § 1983 form and

send it to plaintiffs Wayne Fender, Donna Marie Pulous,

and Heather Mock; 

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(3) GRANTS plaintiffs until May 7, 2015, to submit an

amended complaint; 

(4) CAUTIONS plaintiffs that if they do not respond by

that deadline, this case will be dismissed without

further notice;

(5) DENIES the motion to supplement as moot; 

(6) DENIES the motions to dismiss as moot; and 

(7) DIRECTS the clerk to close the case in cause number

4:14-cv-061. 

DATED: March 31, 2015 /s/Rudy Lozano, Judge

United States District Court

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