See H aug v. Carter , No
. 0 3 -0 3 -00476-CV, 2004 Tex . App. L EXI S 6817, at *31 1 (Tex. App.—Austin J uly 29, 2004, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (af firming the district court’s judg ment for the pla intiffs). 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 5 -00 330 -CV

RobertTrotte r G if

t F und for Th om as U/A/D 5-3-81, a/k/a Robert Tr otte r G if t Trust for Thomas U/A/D 5- 3-82, and Th om as S. Trotter , Appellan ts
v. Trinity Universal Ins urance Com pany , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 353RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. GN30487 1 , HO NORAB LE MARGARET A. COO P ER , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N This appea l arises from an ins uranc e covera g e dis pute under a Commercia l Gener al L iability (CGL ) policy . After

he wa s sued by

sever al lot owners in a subdivision he had deve loped, appellant Thoma s S. Trotter, who had a cted throug h t h e R o b ert Trotter Gift F und for Thomas U/A/D 5-3- 81 (collec tively , “Trotter ”), r equeste d a def ense a nd indemnity

under his CGL policy with Trinity

Universa l I nsuranc e Company
. Trinity declined, in the view that “the plaintiff does not seek to r ecove r damag es for Bodily I njury or P roper ty Damag e caused by

an occ urre nce or Personal Injury

or Adver tising I njury

cause d by

an off ense a s defined.” Trotter ultimately incurre d lia bil ity and lit ig a tio n e xpe ns e s in

thi s und e rl y inglaws uit
. Trotter sue d Trinity , asser ting that the 12

car rier br eac hed the insura

nce c ontrac t by

ref using to de fend a

nd indemnify

him and that Trinity ’s failure t o d ef

end him violated the insuranc e code . Trotter soug ht actual damag es, additional dama g e s, and

a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. Tr ini ty

c ounte rc la ime d f

or de c lara tor y jud g me nt t

hat it ha d no du ty to defe nd Trott er u nder the CGLpolicy and for attorney ’s fe es. On c ross-motions for summary judgme nt, the district c ourt g rante d Trinity ’s motion, denie d Trotter’ s, and re ndere d judgme nt that T ro t t er t ak e n o t h i n g. Trotter a ppeals, bring ing f

ive issues cha lleng ing ( 1) the district cour t’ s summary judgme nt on Trinity ’s dec lara t o ry claim that the ca rrier had no duty

to defe nd Trotter; a

nd (2) the court’s d en i al o f summary judgme nt on Trotter’s c laims that Trinity (3) br eac hed the CGL

policy contra ct by

failing to defe nd him, (4) violated the ins u ra n ce code, a nd (5) br eac hed the policy contra ct by

failing to indemnify

him. For the r easons e x plained b el o w, we aff irm the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

We reviewthe district court’s summary judgme nt de novo. ValenceOperating Co.

v . D or se tt , 1 64 S.W. 3d

65 6, 66 1 ( Te x. 20 05 ); Pr ov ide nt L ife& Acc ide nt I ns . Co . v . Kn ott , 128 S.W .3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). Summary judgme nt is proper when there a re no disputed issues of mater ial fac t and the movant is entit led to judgme nt as a matter of law. Te x . R. Civ. P . 166a(c ); Shell Oil Co. v. Khan , 1 3 8 S
. W
. 3 d 2 8 8 , 2 9 1 (T ex . 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g Kno tt , 1 2 8 S
. W
. 3 d at 215-16). Where, a s here , both pa

rties move for summary judgme nt a nd the district court g rants one motion
and de nie s th e oth e r, we shou ld r e vie w the su mma ry -j ud g me nt e vid e nc e pr e se nte d b y bo th s ide s, deter mine all questions presente d, and re nder the judgme nt the district court should have r ender ed. Texas W orkers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Patient Advoc a t es o f Tex. , 136 S.W .3d 643, 648 (Tex. 2004);3

FM Pr op s. Op e ra tin g Co. v. City of A us tin , 22 S.W .3d 868, 872 (Tex. 2000) . We must affirm the summary judgme nt if any

o f t he summary -judg ment g rounds ar e mer itorious. Patient Advocate s , 13 6 S. W.3 d at 64 8; FM

Pr op s. , 22 S.W .3d at 872. Th e c e ntr a l qu e sti on

in t his a pp e a l is wh e the r, a s a

ma tte r o f l aw, Tr ini ty

ha d a du ty
un de r t he CG Lpo lic y to de fe nd Tr ott e r a g a ins t th e un de rl y ingsu it. To de te rm ine wh e the r T ri nit y had a duty to de fend Trotter, we look to the “eig ht c orner s” of the petition in the underly ing suit and the insuranc e policy

(the “ four c orner s” of e ach instrument) , compar ing the fa ct s al l eged in the petition with the policy

lang uag e to deter

mine whether

the petition alleg es ac ts within t he policy ’s scope of cover ag e. See A llstat e Ins. Co. v. H allman , 159 S.W .3d 6 4 0 , 6 4 3 (T ex . 2005); N a t i onal Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Me rchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc. , 9 3 9 S. W. 2 d 1 3 9 , 1 41 (Tex. 1997). When applying this rule, we are to f ocus on the fa ctual alleg ations that show the orig ins of the a lleg ed dama g es rather than on the leg al theories pleade d, g ive a liber al interpre tation to the fac tual alleg ations, and re solve doubts in favor o f co v er age. Hallman , 159 S.W .3d at 643; Merc hants Fast Motor L ines, Inc. , 9 39 S.W. 2d a t 141
. W her e the pe tit ion do e s n ot s ta te fa c ts sufficie nt to clea

rly bring the case wit hin or wit hout the policy ’s cove rag e, the insure r is obligated t o d e f e n d i f t h e r e i s , p o t e n t i a l l y, a c a s e u n d e r t h e c o mp l a i n tw i t h i nt h e c o v e r a g e o f t h e p o l i c y. Me r ch a n t s Fast Motor Lines, Inc. , 9 3 9 S
. W
. 2 d at 1 4 1 (q u o t i n g Hey den Newport Chem. Corp. v. Southern Gen. I

ns. Co. , 387 S.W .2d 22, 26 (Tex. 1965)). F urther, w e ar e not conc erne d with the tr u th o r f a ls it y o f th e p le a dings. S

ee Trini ty Unive rsal Ins. Co. v. Cowan , 945 S.W .2d 819, 821 (Tex. 1997) (duty to defe nd is trigg ere d solely by fac tual pleading s and languag e of policie s, without
re g ard to t ruth o r f a lsi ty of ple a din g s)
. I f an ins ur e r ow e s a du ty to d e fe nd any of the c la ims a g a ins t4

its insured, that duty

extends to t he entire suit. See U tica Nat’l Ins. Co. v. American I ndem. Co. , 1 4 1 S
. W
. 3 d

1 9 8 , 2 0 3 ( T e x. 2 00 4) ; C U L l o yd ’s v. M

ain St. Homes, Inc

. , 79 S.W .3d 687, 692 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.).

We b e g in o ur

ana ly sis by re vie wi ng the fa c tua l a lle g a tio ns in t he un de rl y inglaws uit
. See Cowan , 9 45 S.W. 2d

a t 82 1. Th e pla int if

fs we re a g ro up of ind ivi du a ls w ho ha d p ur c ha se d lo ts in the Thurman Be n d E s t ates subdivision on L ake T ravis (the “under ly ing pla intiffs”). The defe ndants included Tr otter, the de veloper o f T h u rm an B end Estates. The underlying pla intiffs
a lle g e d th a t: At various times beg inning in 1994 throug h 1996, Plaintiffs solicited information a bo ut T hurm an B e nd

Es ta te s . . . . D e fe nd ant s . . . repr esent e d to Pla int if fs that a one-a cre homeowner s’ l akeside park would be conve y ed by [Trotter] t o the Thurman Be nd Owner s’ Association f o r t he bene fit of all of the ow ners of lots in Thurman B e nd Es ta te s. I t wa s re pr e se nte d that the pa rk c ou ld have fa c ili tie s c on sis te nt w ith those found in other lakeside pa rks, including , but not l i m ited to, boat trailer a nd automobile p a

r k in g , r e c r e a

ti o n a l a r eas, ba rbeque pit(s), picnic fa cilities, a boat launc h and spac e to build a boat dock and/or swim platform. Plaintiffs were led to believe that a true park f

or the be nefit of Thur

man B end lot owner s would be convey ed by Def endant Tr ust.

“ Sub sta nti a tin g thi s r e pr e se ntatio n, ” the un de rl y ingpla int if fs a dd e d, “ a De c lara

tio n of Cov e na nts , Conditi ons, and Restrictions for Thur man Bend Est ates S ubdivision (“D ecla ration”) was sig ned and filed by Def

endant Tr otter . . . in J uly , 1995, which re prese nted that [Trotter] would convey to the Thurman B end Owne rs’ Assn. a ‘lake side park a

rea ease ment an d an ac cess easeme nt for the usag e by all Owner s.’” Th e un de rl y ingpla int if

fs fu rt he r a lle g e d th a

t “ [b ]a s e d u p o n a nd in r e lia nc e up on the se
re pr e se ntatio ns , in 19 94 thr ou g h 1 99 6, Pla int if fs pa id s ub sta

nti a l amou

nts of mon e y to p ur c ha se lot s5

in Th u rm an Be n d Estates . . . .” H oweve r, the unde rlying pla intiffs pled, Trotter a nd the other de fe nd ants ult imate ly

fa ile d to pr ov ide the re pr e se nte d e a se me nt. Th ey all eg e d th a t de fe nd a nts

“ fa ile d to dis c los e the tr ue natur e of

the ‘p ark ’” and

that “ [t]his fa ilure to di scl ose a nd fa lse
re pres e ntatio ns we re ve ry ma te ri a l f

a c ts w hic h in du c e d Pl a int if fs to a g re e to p ur c ha se their Thurma

n Be nd lots.” S peci fi cal ly , th e un derl y in g pl aintif fs e la bo ra te d, Tr ott e r “ so ld L ot N umb e r 1 8 to Def endant [ Robert L .] Haug in Febr uary 1996” and “ signe d a Gr ant of Ea sements dated F ebrua ry 26 , 1 99 6 .
. . to Thur

man Be nd Es ta te s Own e rs ’ As so c ia tio n for the be ne fi t of all of the [lot ] ow ne rs ” on L ot 18. The ea sement, whose te rms wer e neg otiated “without any input or knowledg e of the
c ur re nt T hurm an B e nd

Es ta te s p ro pe rt

y ow ne rs ,” “ c re a te d a

‘B oat L a un c h E a se me nt’ wh ic h c ou ld be used ‘ only

for ing ress a

nd eg ress fr om L ake T ravis.’” Fur ther, the g rant of e aseme nt prohibited “‘[a]ctiviti es of e x tended dur ation’” w ithin the area s of the ease ment outside of a 20- foot strip. “The tw e nty (2 0) fo ot ea se me nt str ip i s la nd re se rv e d b y

the L ow e r C olo ra do Riv e r Auth or ity fo r t he ri se
and fa ll o f L ake Trav is” tha

t “ is o n a re la tiv e ly se ve re inc lin e wi th a

ve ry ro c ky surf a c e makin g it unsuitable for most re cre ational ac tiviti es.”

The unde rly ing pla intiffs added that, “ Prior to J uly , 1998, the Plaintiffs not knowing about the ‘B oat L aunch E aseme nt’ used t h e p ro p erty as a pa rk, [with] such ac tiviti es as, pa rking vehicles a

nd boat trailer s, rec reating a nd picnicking .” In J uly

19 9 8 , at t h e first meeting of the Thurman B end Owne rs’ Assoc iation, Haug “stated that the ease ment was solely for ing ress a

nd eg ress,” but “those Plaintiffs that hear d him tho u gh t t h at he wa s ref err ing to the a cce ss ease ment only , not the park e aseme nt.” Howe ver, “ on April 5, 2000, it was made c lear when De fenda

nt Haug6

s en ta le t t er

t o al l T h u rm an Be n d

l o to wn er s ” e x p l i ci t l y

p ro h i b i t i n g “‘ p ar k i n g, fi s h i n g, p i cn i ck i n g, loi te ri ng , c a mpi ng , in c lud ingfi re s, [or ] sw imm ing ’” on his lot , a nd that, “ be c a

us e the e a se me nt d id
no t a llo w d oin g a ny

thi ngof e xten de d d

ur a tio n, un a tte nd e d v e hic le s w ou ld b e to wed.” At thi s juncture, “ Plaintiffs learne d for the f irst time that the park whic h had bee n previously repr esente d
wa s in fa c t me re ly

an e a se me nt t o la

un c h a bo a t. Th e re wa s no p ark .” Th e y a dd e d th a t, “Ne e dle ss to say , the Pla i n t i ffs wonde red w hat happe ned to the one- acr e homeowne rs’ pa rk that wa s repr esente d by

Def endants . . . .” The unde rly ing pla intiffs alleg ed, under the hea ding of

“Ac tionable Conduct,”
De fe nd ants ’ r e pr e se ntatio ns c on c e rn ingthe natur e of the “ pa rk ” and the ir fa ilure to dis c los e and

fa lse e xplana

tio ns we re ve ry

ma te ri a l f

a c ts w hic h in du c e d Pl a int if fs to purcha se their Thurman Bend l ots. Had the true nature of the Boat L aunch E aseme nt “par k” bee n fully

disclosed, Plaintiffs would not have purc hased the lots.
Th e pla int if

fs ple d c a us e s o f a c tio n f

or DT PA v iol a tio ns (b a se d o n mi sr e pr e se ntatio ns, fai lur e to disclose, and unc onscionability), brea ch of the sales contr act, br eac h of the De clar ations, statutory and common-la

w fra u d , n egl i gen tm i s re p re s en t at i o n , t o rt i o u s i n t er fe re n ce , an d ci v i l conspi rac y . The plaintiffs also pled that the de fenda nts were equitably estopped from prohibiting the use of L ot 18 as a park and also sought a de clar ation construing the Dec larations to permit certain re cre ational activitie s o n L o t 1 8
. F in a ll y , th e p la in ti f f s s o u g h t r e f

o r mati o n o f th e g r an t o f e a s e me n t based on mut ua l or un ilate ra l mi sta

ke . T he pla int if

fs so ug ht un sp e c if

ie d a c tua l dama g e s, a dd iti on a l da ma g e s, and the de clar atory

and equitable relief

alre ady noted.Trotter doe s not assert that the unde rlying pla intiffs alleg ed either “bodil y injury ” or 2 “phy sical injury

to tang ible proper

ty , including a ll resulting loss o f use of that proper ty ” under Coverag e A. 7

Th e Thur man B e nd

Ow ne rs’ As soci a tio n in te rv e ne d a s p la int if fs , c iti ng“ the same basis as the Plaintiffs’ suit.” I t soug ht r elief including ref ormation of the De clar ations and g rant of
ease ment or, in the alter

native, monetar

y damag es. We now compar e the underlying pla intiffs’ fa ctual alleg ations to the CGLpolicy provisions. Trotter conte nds that the pleading s invoked a duty to de fend under both Cover ag e A a nd C o v e r a g e B o f

t h e p o l i c y. Cov e r a g e A, B od ily

I nju ry and Pr op e rt y Da ma g e L ia bil ity , p ro vid e s th a t T ri nit y “ wi ll pa y tho se su ms that th e ins ur e d b e c ome s le g a lly ob lig a te d to pa

y a s d a ma g e s b e c a

us e of ‘bodi ly inj ur y ’ o r ‘ pr op e rt

y dama g e ’ t o wh ic h thi s ins ur anc e a pp lie s. [Tr ini ty ] wil l ha

ve the ri g ht a

nd du ty to d e fe nd any ‘s uit ’ s e e kin g tho se dam ages. . . .” How e ve r, Cov e ra g e A a lso pr ov ide s: “ Th is ins ur anc e a

pp lie s to ‘b od ily inj ur

y ’ or ‘p ro pe rt

y dama g e ’ on ly if the ‘b od ily injury ’ or ‘prop e rt y dama g e ’ i s c a

us e d b y an ‘ oc c ur

re nc e ’ t hat take s p la c e in t

he ‘c ov e ra g e te rr ito ry .’ ” “ Pr op e rt y dama g e ” is define d in

the po lic y

a s e ith e r “ [p]hy sic a l in

jur y to t ang ibl e pr op e rt

y , in c lud inga ll
re su lti nglos s o f u se of th at pro per ty ,” or “ [l]oss of

us e of tang ibl e pr op e rt

y that is no t phy sic a lly inj ur e d. ” “ Oc c ur

re nc e ” is d e fi ne d a s “ an a c cid ent , in c lud ing c on tin uo us or re pe a te d e xpos ur e to substantially

the same g ener al har

mful conditions.” Tr ott e r a rgue s th a t th e un de rl y ingpla int if fs a lle g e d a “ los s of us e of tang ibl e pr op e rt y t h a ti s n o tp h ys i c a l l y i n

j u r e d ”

— s p e c i f

i c a l l y, t h e p l a i n t i f

f s ’ i n a b i l i t y t o u s e L o t1 8 ( i n d i s p u t a b l y a piece of “ta

ng ible proper

ty ”) a s a lake side park. Tr ott e r f ir st r e lie s o n th e un derlyingpla int if fs ’ 28

alleg ations that the defe ndants “re prese nted to Plaintiffs that a one-a cre homeowner s’ lakeside pa rk would be conve y ed” c onsis tent with prior re prese ntations or understanding s, y et the g rant of
ease ment ultimately

convey ed only

a tw enty -foot roc ky

strip, and “the Plaintiffs wonde red w hat happene d to the one-a cre homeowner s’ par k that was repr esente d by Def endants.” Trinity

responds that while L ot 1 8 i s “tangible pr operty”—prope rty “ca pable of being handled or

touched” or that “may be seen, weig hed, measure d, and estimated by the phy sical sense s,” see Lay v . Aetna Ins. Co. , 599 S.W .2d 684, 686 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1980, writ ref’d n.r .e.)—the underly ing pla intiffs al l ege d o n ly

that Trotter failed to g r an t th e m th e p r o mi s e d r ig h t to u s e L o t 1 8 , n o t a loss of use of that pr operty
.

We ag ree with Trinity . “ Los s of us e of tang ibl e prop e rt

y ” in t he po lic y pla inl y
c on te mpl a te s so me pr e e xistin g interes t in us ingthe “ tang ibl e pr op e rt y ” (h e re , L ot 1 8) wh os e deprivation would constitut e “loss of use .” The un derly ing pla intiffs alleg ed instead that the defe ndants’ ac tions caused the absenceof su c h an int e re st. With ou t an in te re st i n L ot 1 8 th a t w ou ld
a llo w the un de rl y ingpla int if fs to use it, the un de rl y ing pla int if fs ne c e ssa ri ly c ou ld not

state a c la im for the loss of that use.

Trott er al s o argues that the unde rlying pla intiffs stated a “ loss of use” of L ot 18 throug h their alleg ations that, “Prior to July 1998, the Plaintiffs not knowingabout the ‘B oat L aunch Ea se me nt’ us e d th e pr op e rt y a s a pa rk , [w ith ] suc h ac tiv iti e s as park ingve hic le s, and bo a t tr a ile rs , rec reating a

nd picnicking ,” but that “on Apr il 5, 2000, it was made clea r whe n Def

endant Ha ug sent a l et t e rt o al l T h u rm an Be n d l o to wn er s ” e x p l i ci t l y

p ro h i b i t i n g “p ar k i n g, fi s h i n g, p i cn i ck i n g, l o i t e r i n g , c a mp i n g , i n c l u d i n g f i r e s , s w i m m i n g , ” an d

t h a tu n a t t e n d e d

v e h i c l e s w o u l d

b e t o w e d
. In9

other wor ds, as Trotter

puts it, “[t] he plaintiffs alleg ed they wer e using the prope rty

as a pa rk and f or parking , among other things, and then they could no long er use the prope rty for picnic king, pa

rking vehicles, a

nd other a ctivities—i.e., they lost the use of that prope rty .” Trinity counter s that even if suc h prior use is assumed to have been by permission, lic e ns e , o r “ t h a t t h e U n d e r l y i n g P l a i n t i f f s s o m e h o w p o s s e s s e d an e a s e m e n t t o u s e L o t 1 8 a s a lake sid e pa

rk ,” the de pr ivatio n o f t

he se so rt s of no n- po sse sso ry int e re sts wo uld no t c on sti tut e a “ los s of us e of tang ibl e pr op e rt

y .” Poi nti ngto d e c isi on s f ro m ot he r jur isd ic tio ns , Tr ini ty

ur g e s th a t “ los s
o f u s e o f t an g i b l e p r o p e rt y” c o n t e mp l a t e s a p o s s e s s o r y r a t h e r t h an i n t an g i b l e i n t e r e s ti nt h a tp r o p e rt y. See Kazi v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. , 1 5 P. 3d

22 3, 22 9 ( Ca l. 2 00 1) ; cf. Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Camaley

Energy Co. , 364 F. Supp.2d 600, 606 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (alleg ati o n s o f c o nstructive evictions from lea seholds stated cla im for “loss of use of tang ible proper ty ”). I n sum, Trinity

argues that the “alleg ed im pairment of a li cense [or ease ment] t o use non-owne d proper ty for r ecr eational purp os e s e vid e nc e s a c on ne c tio n to th e pr op e rt y that is sim

ply too te nu ou s to c on sti tut e los s o f u se of tangible proper

ty .” Trotter r eplies that under

the plain lang uag e o f t h e C GL p olicy , the “loss of use of tang ible proper

ty ” is not limit ed to possessory interests. He emphasizes that the “e ight c orner s rule” does not permit cour

ts to read languag e into policies that is simpl y not there. See G ehan Home s, Ltd. v. Employ ers Mut. Cas. Co. , 146 S.W .3d 833, 843 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pe t. filed).

We ag ree with Trinity

that these alleg ations did not state a cove red c laim for loss of
use of tang ible proper

ty
. Whatever rig hts the underly ing plaintiffs conce ivably alleg ed they obtained in L ot 18 thr ou g h pri or us a g e , the ir a lle g e d sub se qu e nt “l os s of u se ” wa s c a us e d b y c on du c t th a t isAm on g oth e r c on te ste d iss ue s, the pa rt ie s dis pu te the e xten t to wh ic h thi s C ou rt sh ou ld 3 consider our

judgme nt and opinion in the underlying suit whe n resolving the covera g e issue. 10 not an “oc curr ence ” under the policy . The “ loss of use” on whic h Trotter r elies her e wa s cause d,
acc ording to the pleading s, by Haug ’s actions in A pril 2000, “sen[ding] a letter to all Thurman B end lot ow ne rs ” e xplic itl y

pr oh ibi tin g “ pa

rk ing , f ish ing , pic nic kin g , lo ite ri ng , c a mpi ng , in c lud ingfi re s, [or] swimming” on his lot, and stating that, “bec ause the ease ment did not a llow doing a ny thing of extended duration, unattende d vehicles w ould be towed.” An “oc cu rr ence” unde r the policy , by contra st, is “an ac cident, including continuous or repeate d exposure to substantially the same g ener al harmful c onditions.” “Acc ident” is not defined in the policy , but the supreme c ourt has held that an injury is acc idental “if f

rom the viewpoint of the insure d, [i t is] not the natura l and pr ob a ble c on se qu e nc e of

the a c tio n o r o c c ur

re nc e wh ic h p ro du c e d th e inj ur y ; or in oth e r w or ds , if

the inj ur y c ou ld n ot r e a so na

bly be anti c ipate d b y

the ins ur e d, or

wo uld not ordinarily

follow from the a ction or occ urre nce w hich ca used the injury .” Mid-Century I

ns. Co. v. Lindsey , 9 9 7 S
. W
. 2 d 1 5 3 , 1 5 5 (T ex . 1 9 9 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Re pu bli c Nat ’l

LifeIn s. Co. v . H e y war d , 5 36 S.W. 2d 54 9, 55 7 (T e x. 19 76 ))
. “ [B ]oth the a c tor ’s int e nt an d th e re a so na bly fore seea ble ef fec t of his conduct bea

r on t he determinations of whether an occur renc e is ac cidental.” Id . The a lleg ation that Haugdeliberately sent this le tter to enfor ce his rig hts relative to the a ctual
ease ment is not susceptible to being construed a s an “a ccide nt.”

We h old that th e un de rl y ingpla int if fs did no t a lle g e a

“ los s of use o f t ang ibl e proper ty ” ca used by an “oc curr ence ” wit h i n C overa g e A. We express no opinion reg ardingother i s s u e s b r i e f

e d b y t h e p art i e s c o n c e r

n i n g t h e s c o p e an d

m e an i n g o f

“ l o s s o f u s e o f t an g i b l e p r o p e rt y”
or “ oc c ur re nc e ” and

the a pp lic a tio n o f t

he se te rm s to the un de rl y ingple a din g s. 3See H

aug, 2004 Tex. App. L EXI S 6817. This Court aff irmed t he district cour

t’s judgme nt refor

ming the g rant of e aseme nt to provide a “ L ake Side Par k Are a Ea sement” in whic h activit i es such as “picnicking , swimming, sunbathing , [and] fishing” wer e expressly permitted. Id . The district cour t based its judg ment on finding s of uni latera l mist ake by Trotter’ s attorney

coupled with Ha

ug ’s fra ud and mutual mistake. Id. a t *8- 9. Whe n re je c tin g Ha

ug ’s su ff ic ie nc y c ha lle ng e to t

he se fi nd ing s, thi s Court rea ched only

the unilatera l mist ake issue. Id . at *18-19. Trinity objects to any

consideration of H

a ug in o ur de te rm inatio n o f w he the r i t ha d a du ty to defe nd Trotter, e mphasizi ng that our scope of re view is limit ed to the plea dings. Tr otter re sponds that “[t] he under ly ing outc ome is not cited as extrinsic evidence to s h o w the cla im was cove red [but ] . . . t o show that the plea ding in the c ase be low—i.e., four o f t h e ei gh t corne rs—was br oad enoug h to allow evidenc e of a cover ed cla im”—specificall y , mistake. Ultimately , for the r easons we e x plain above, Haug

and the que stion of whether the under ly ing pla intiff

s pled a mistake that c on sti tut e d a

c ov e re d “ oc c ur

re nc e ” have no be ari ngon the de c isi ve iss ue s in our c ov e ra g e ana ly sis
. 11 Trotter a lso arg ues that the underly ing pleading s alleg e claims within Coverag e B of the CG Lpo lic y . Co ve ra g e B , “ Pe rs on a l and Ad ve rt isi ngI nju

ry L ia bil ity ,” pr ov ide s: [Trinit y ] wil l pay

those sums that the insured bec omes leg ally obli gat ed t o pay

as damag es bec ause of

“per sonal injury ” or “adve rtising injury ” to which thi s insurance a pp l i e s . [T r i n i t y ] w i l l h a v e t h e r i g h tan d d u t y t o d e f e n d an y “ s u i t ” s e e k i n g t h os e dama g e s. The po li c y

d e f in e s “ p e r s o n a l i n

ju r y , ” in r e le v an t p art, a s “ [t ]h e w r o n g f u l e v ic ti o nf

r o m, w r o n g f

ul entry into, or invasion of the right of private oc cupanc y of a r oom, dwelling or

premises that a

person occupie s by or on behalf of i ts owner , landlord, or lessor.” Trotter arg ues that the c laims asserted ag ainst him were pote ntially cov er ed as an “ invasion of the rig ht of private oc cupanc y of . . . premises.” He r elies ag ain on the alleg ations that the plaintiffs had be g un to use L ot 18 as a pa rk and that their ac cess to the pr operty was late r re stricted.12 Tr ini ty re sp on ds th at th e un de rl y ingpla int if fs did no t a lle g e any

“ ri g ht o f p ri vate
oc c up ancy ” in L ot 1 8 th a t c ou ld h a ve be e n “ inv a de d. ” I t a dd s th a t th e te rm “ ri g ht o f p ri vate
oc c up anc y ” in t

he “ pe rs on a l in

jur y ” de fi nit ion

ha s b e e n h e ld b y

Te xas c ourt s to re fe r t o th e ri g hts

“ a sso c ia te d w ithan in div idu a l’ s a c ts o f i nh a bit ingthe pr e mis e s, and no t to the ri g hts a sso c ia te d w ith the individual’s rig hts to use and enjoy the inhabited pre mis es . ” See D ecorativeCtr. of Houst on
v. Employe rs Cas. Co. , 833 S.W .2d 257, 261 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied)
. The Cor pu s Ch ri sti c ourt

a lso he ld t

hat c ov e ra g e fo r a

ny “ ‘o the r i nv a sio n of t

he ri g ht o f p ri vate occupa ncy ’ does not apply outside the landlord-tena nt sc enar io, or when the occupie r has a ve sted interest in the occ upancy of the prem ises.” Id. at 263. I t rea soned that, under e jus de m ge ne ris principles, the policy ’s re fer ence to “other r ight of private oc cupanc y ” wa s i m m ed iately prec eded b y “ w r o n g f

u l e v ic ti o n ” an d “ w r o n g f

u l e n tr y , ” an d mu s t h a v e b e e n in te n d e d to e n c o mp a s s actions of the same g ener al ty

pe o r re fe r t o an si milar invasion of intere sts. Id. at 261-62. See also id. at 261 n.4 (collec ting c ases)
.

Trotter attempts to di stinguish Dec orative Center of Houston and similar ca ses on the basis that the policies at issue define d “per sonal injury ” as “wr ong ful eviction from, wr ong ful entry into, or other

inv a sio n of the ri g ht of pr ivate oc c up anc y of a ro om, dw e lli ngor

pr e mis e s, ” wh ile his CGLpolicy

with Trinity

omitted th e word “other.” Some c ourts have de emed that distinction signific ant. See Ne w Cast le C o unty v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. , 243 F.3d 744, 751- 53 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding , in a ca se involving claims arising from zoning a nd permitting de cisions, that “invasion of the rig ht of private occupa ncy ” under

policy with simi lar languag e wa s ambig uous). On the other

hand, a T exas feder al cour t rejec ted a similar ar g ument in a suit involvi ng cl ai ms by13

a hote l t en ant aga inst the hotel owner, “ finding the slight diff ere nce in the w ording of the two policies has no pra ctical e ffe ct.” Patel v. Northfield Ins. Co. , 940 F. Supp. 995, 1 0 0 0 (N .D. Tex. 1996). Rely ing on Dec orative Center of Houston , the Patel c o u rth e l d

t ha t “[w]it ho ut a landlord-tena

nt relationship or vested pr operty rig ht, there is no duty

to defe nd for a

n ‘invasion of the rig ht of private oc cupanc y .’” Id. a t 10 02 (“ in t his c a se the re wa s n o in te rf e re nc e wi th t

he ri g hts of pr ivate oc c up anc y ” by

a thi rd pa rt y ’s se xua l a ssa

ult of a ho te l g ue st, bu t in ste a d “ int e rf e re nc e wi th the rig ht to use and enjoy the prope rty ”).

We conclude that a

ny proper ty interest alleg ed by

the under ly ing pla intiffs is not one
wh o s e alleg ed infring ement would constitute an “ invasion of the rig ht of private oc cupanc y .” Trotter d o e s n o td i r e c tu s t o an y c a s e h o l d i n g t h a tane a s e m e n tc o n s t i tu t e s a “ r i g h to f p r i v a t e o c c u

p a n c y” whose “ invasion” g ives rise to a c overe d claim under a CGL policy , and the sole ca ses nationwide of which w e ar e aw are have he ld to the contrar y . Liberty Mut. In s . C o . v. East Cent. Okla. Elec

. Coop. , 9 7 F .3 d 38 3, 39 0- 91 (1 0th Cir . 1 99 6) ; se e als o E

v e rg ro w I nd us . Co ., In c . v . Th e Tra v e le rs Ins. Co. , 37 Fe d. Appx. 300, 301-02 (9th Ci r. 200 2 ). W e ar e p ersuaded that this is the corre ct
c on c lus ion

un de r T e xas l aw a s w e ll. Th e CG L po li cy ’s refe re nc e to “ inv a sio n o f r ig ht o f p ri vate occupa ncy ” is immediately

prec eded by

ref ere nces to w rong ful eviction and wrong ful entry . Under the contra ct construc tion principles of e jus de m ge ne ris , th is wo uld or din ari ly imp ly int e nt t o li mit the scope of the followingterm—“inva sion of rig ht of private occupa ncy ”—to the same g ener al ty pe
or nature as wrong ful eviction and wr ong ful entry
. Dec orative Ctr. of Houston , 833 S.W .2d at 261- 62 . Witho ut e xha

us tiv e ly a dd re ssi ngthe precise pa

ra me te rs of a CG Lpo lic y ’s “ ri g ht o f p ri vate
oc c up anc y ” un de r T e xas law, we c on c lud e that th e c la ime d n on po sse sso ry

int e re sts ma de the ba sisI n his fi ft h iss ue , Tr ott e r su g g e sts that th e fa c t f ind ing s in the un de rl y ingsu it m ay

imp lic a te 4 T ri n i t y ’s dut y

to indemnify

him even if it had no duty to defe nd. S

e e U ti c a Na t’ l I

n s . Co. v. Ame rican Indem . Co. , 141 S.W .3d 198, 203 (T ex . 2 0 04) (duty to indemnify

for losses c overe d un de r a po lic y is se pa

rate and dis tin c t f ro m th e du ty

to d e fe nd ); Trini ty Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan , 945 S.W .2d 819, 821-22 (Te x . 1997) (in contr ast to the duty to defe nd, whose e x istence is contr olled by wh e the r t

he ple a de d f

a c tua l a lle g a ti on s, li be ra lly c on str ue d, po te nti a lly

a sse rt a c ov e re d c la im, the e xiste nc e of

a du ty to i nd e mni fy

de pe nd s u

po n t he tr ue fa c ts und e rl y inga c la im) ; but see GuideOneElite Ins. Co. v. Fielde r Rd. Baptist Chur ch , 197 S.W .3d 305, 310 (Tex. 2006) (noting that th e du ty to defe nd un de r a CG Lpo lic y

is o ft e n d e fi ne d mo re br oa dly tha n th e du ty

to ind e mni fy

); S t a t e F a rm L l o y d s v . C

. M

. W. , 53 S.W .3d 877, 889 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pe t. d e nie d) (“ Th e du ty

to d e fe nd is b ro a de r t

ha n th e du ty to i nd e mni fy , an d whe re the re is no d uty to defe nd under the terms of the policy , there can be no duty to indemnify .”). Tr ot t er ci t es the fo llo wi ngfi nd ing s:

! Trott er repr e se nte d o ra lly and in w ri tin g that th e Thur

man B e nd

Es ta te s lo t ow ne rs wo uld have the us e of

a pa rk on L a ke Tr a vis
. ! Trotter intende d the Gra nt of Ease ment for L ot 18 would include a lake side park. ! The Gr ant of Ea sement for L ot 18 failed to set for

th the intentions of Trotter. ! The fa ilure of the G rant of E aseme nt to set forth the full ag ree ment was a mutual mistake by all the par ties. Alternatively , the failure to se t f orth the full ag ree ment reg ardingthe par k was a unilater al mistake by

Trotter. ! Tr ott e r w a s li a

ble fo r 25% of

the pla int if

fs ’ atto rn e y s’ fe e s, ba se d o n h is c on tr ibutor y fa ult
. None of these finding s co u l d g ive rise to a duty to indemnify

wher e, as w e have deter

mined, the un de rl y ingpla int if

fs did no t a lle g e a

“ los s of use of tang ibl e pr op e rt y .” We o ve rr

ule Tr ott e r’ s f

if th issue. 14 of the un de rlyingsu it a

re so c le arl y

dis tin g uis ha

ble fr om t

he g e ne ra l ty

pe or natur e of

pr op e rt y interests implicated by wrong ful eviction or wrong ful entry that their alleg ed infring ement could not potentially

be a c overe d “invasion of right of pr ivate occ upancy .” Patel , 9 40 F . Su pp . at 10 02 ; see also East Cent. Okla. Elec. Coop. , 97 F.3d at 390-91.

We c on c lud e that T ri nit

y did no t ha ve a du ty to d e fe nd

Tr ott e r. As thi s h old ingis de c isi ve of

a ll o f T ro tte r’ s is su e s, we ov e rr ule the m. 415 CO NC LU SION Hav in g o v e r

r u le d T r o tt e r ’ s is s u e s o n a p p e a l, w e a f

f ir m th e ju d g me nt of the dis tr ic t c ourt
.

Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pembe rton and Waldrop Affir med Filed: September

13, 2007