UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

JACQUELINE OBERLIN, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 

 v. Case No. 3:14-cv-2101-JVB-CAN 

 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Acting Commissioner of 

Social Security Administration, 

 

 Defendant. 

 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 Plaintiff Jacqueline Oberlin seeks judicial review of the Defendant‘s decision to 

deny her Disability Insurance and Social Security Income benefits. She asks this Court 

reverse the agency’s decision or, alternatively, remand the case to the agency for 

reconsideration. For the reasons discussed below, the Commissioner’s decision is 

remanded. 

A. Overview of the Case

 Plaintiff claims she became disabled on March 15, 2011, due to back pain, 

fatigue, and numbness in her hands. (R. at 14–16.) Administrative Law Judge David R. 

Bruce denied Plaintiff’s application for benefits. While the ALJ agrees Plaintiff’s 

degenerative disc disease and obesity constitutes a severe impairment, he found that it 

does not meet or equal a Listing found in the federal regulations. (R. at 15.) Moreover, 

the ALJ concluded Plaintiff is able to perform a significant number of jobs that exist in 

the national economy. (R. at 18-19.) The ALJ’s decision became final when the Social 
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Security Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request to review it. The Court addresses the 

other relevant facts in its analysis below. 

B. Standard of Review 

 This Court has the authority to review Social Security Act claim decisions under 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court will uphold an ALJ’s decision if it is reached under the 

correct legal standard and supported by substantial evidence. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. 

Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence consists of “such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). This Court will not 

reconsider facts, re-weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, decide 

questions of credibility, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Boiles v. Barnhart, 

395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005). This Court will, however, ensure that the ALJ built an 

“accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion so that, as a reviewing 

court, we may access the validity of the agency’s ultimate findings and afford a claimant 

meaningful judicial review.” Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002). 

C. Disability Standard 

 To qualify for disability benefits, the claimant must establish that he suffers from 

a disability. A disability is an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by 

reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be 

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous 

period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The SSA established a 
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five-step inquiry to evaluate whether a claimant qualifies for disability benefits. A 

successful claimant must show: 

(1) he is not presently employed; (2) his impairment is severe; (3) his 

impairment is listed or equal to a listing in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, 

Appendix 1; (4) he is not able to perform his past relevant work; and (5) he 

is unable to perform any other work within the national and local economy. 

 

Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 699–700 (7th Cir. 2004). 

 An affirmative answer leads either to the next step or, on steps three and five, to a 

finding that the claimant is disabled. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 

2001). A negative answer at any point other than step three stops the inquiry and leads to 

a finding that the claimant is not disabled. Id. The burden of proof lies with the claimant 

at every step except the fifth, where it shifts to the Commissioner. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 

F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000). 

 

D. Analysis 

 On appeal, Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in three aspects: (1) the ALJ did not 

obtain an independent State Agency medical expert opinion for determining whether 

Plaintiff’s impairments equaled the criteria of Listing 1.04; (2) ALJ improperly 

discounted the opinion of the treating physician; (3) ALJ improperly discounted 

Plaintiff’s credibility. 

(1) The ALJ failed to obtain an expert medical opinion for determining whether 

Plaintiff’s impairments equals a Listing 

A claimant is eligible for benefits if they have an impairment that meets or equals 

an impairment found in the Listing of Impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); 20 C.F.R. 
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Pt. 404, Subt. P, Appl. 1. The listings specify the criteria of impairments considered 

presumptively disabling. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a). 

An impairment is “medically equivalent to a listed impairment . . . if it is at least 

equal in severity and duration to the criteria of any listed impairment.” 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1526(a). An impairment will be found medically equivalent to a listing even if the 

claimant “did not exhibit one or more findings specified in a particular listing, or 

“exhibited all of the findings, but one or more of the findings is not as severe as specified 

in a particular listing.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526(b)(i). 

A finding of medical equivalence is determined by all the evidence in the case 

record excluding factors such as age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1526(c). “A finding of medical equivalence requires an expert’s opinion on the 

issue.” Minnick v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 929, 935 (7th Cir. 2015). Social Security Ruling 96-

5p clarifies the requirements as follows: 

In 20 CFR 404.1526 and 416.926, equivalence is addressed as a “decision 

on medical evidence only” because this finding does not consider the 

vocational factors of age, education, and work experience. A finding of 

equivalence involves more than findings about the nature and severity of 

medical impairments. It also requires a judgment that the medical findings 

equal a level of severity set forth in 20 CFR 404.1525(a) and 416.925(a); 

i.e., that the impairment(s) is “severe enough to prevent a person from doing 

any gainful activity.” This finding requires familiarity with the regulations 

and the legal standard of severity set forth in 20 CFR 404.1525(a), 

404.1526, 416.925(a), and 416.926. Therefore, it is an issue reserved to the 

Commissioner. 

S.S.R. 96-5p at 4. 
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Further, Social Security Ruling 99-6p also states the following: 

“[l]ongstanding policy requires that the judgment of a physician (or 

psychologist) designated by the Commissioner on the issue of equivalence 

on the evidence before the administrative law judge or Appeals Council 

must be received into the record as expert opinion evidence and given 

appropriate weight.” 

S.S.R. 96-6p at 3. 

As a result, an ALJ is required to obtain a state agency medical opinion when 

determining whether a claimant’s impairments in combination were medically 

equivalent to a listed impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2); S.S.R. 96-5p; S.S.R. 96-

6P. However, an ALJ is only required to obtain a signature of a state agency medical 

or psychological consultant on a Disability Determination and Transmittal form at 

the initial and reconsideration levels. Id. 

The Seventh Circuit recently considered a similar issue in remanding an ALJ’s 

decision to deny benefits. In Barnett v. Barnhart, the Indiana Department of Family and 

Social Services consulted the opinion of three State agency physicians regarding an 

application for disability benefits. Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 667 (7th Cir. 2004). 

The three physicians either examined the Plaintiff, reviewed medical findings, or filled 

out a Residual Functional Capacity Report. Id. at 667. However, none of the three State 

agency physicians were consulted on the issue of medical equivalency, nor could a form 

“that would otherwise satisfy the ALJ’s duty to consider an expert’s opinion on medical 

equivalence” be located. Id. at 670−671. 

The Court of Appeals concluded the ALJ failed to adequately discuss in his 

opinion whether the Plaintiff’s impairments met or equaled a Listing. Id. at 670. The 
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Court based the decision on the ALJ’s “perfunctory discussion of the listing” because the 

ALJ failed to compare the Plaintiff’s impairments with requirements of the applicable 

listing. Id. at 670 (“All that the ALJ ever said is that he believed Barnett’ testimony 

concerning the number of seizures she was experiencing . . . [W]e cannot discern if the 

ALJ ever considered whether Barnett’s impairments equals Listing 11.03 despite her 

assumed lack of credibility.”). Ultimately, these two errors factored into the Court of 

Appeals decision to remand. Id. at 670−671. 

Similar to the facts in Barnett, it is not discernable whether the ALJ considered 

the opinion of a State agency medical or psychological consultant in determining whether 

Plaintiff’s impairment equals Listing 1.04. In his opinion the ALJ stated “[b]ecause the 

record does not contain any State agency medical opinions, SSR 96-6p does not apply.” 

(R. at 18.) In concluding Plaintiff’s impairment did not meet or equal a Listing the ALJ 

stated the following: 

Based on comparison of the objective medical evidence and the 

requirements of the applicable listings, and in particular the musculoskeletal 

listings (1.04), I find the claimant does not have an impairment that meets 

or equals one of the listing impairments. Moreover, no treating or examining 

physician has indicated findings that would satisfy any listing impairment. 

(R. at 15.) 

Although the ALJ was not required to discuss a State agency medical opinion in 

depth, this does not mean the record can be completely devoid of an expert medical 

opinion regarding whether Plaintiff’s impairments equaled a Listing. 

While the State agency psychological consultant assessed Plaintiff’s residual 

functional capacity, an RFC assessment is different than a medical equivalency 

determination. (R. at 18.) Further, the record is devoid of any discussion on the issue of 
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medical equivalence by either Plaintiff’s primary care physician, any State agency 

medical or psychological consultants, or any physician at all. (R. at 17–18.) At a 

minimum, the ALJ had a duty show an expert considered the issue of medical 

equivalence. 

As a result, the ALJ erred by not relying on substantial evidence regarding the 

issue of medical equivalence, and for the reasons discussed above, the ALJ’s decision is 

remanded. 

SO ORDERED on March 30, 2016. 

 S/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

 JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE