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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

LANA R. CANEN, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

DENNIS CHAPMAN, in his 

Individual capacity as the 

Deputy for the Elkhart 

County Sheriff Department, 

and 

MARK DAGGY, in his 

Individual capacity as 

Officer of the Elkhart 

Police Department 

Defendants. 

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NO. 3:14–CV-315 

OPINION AND ORDER

 This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary 

Judgment filed by Plaintiff Lana Canen on June 11, 2015 (DE# 28), 

Defendant Dennis Chapman’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on 

September 10, 2015 (DE# 41), the Motion to Strike Defendant 

Chapman’s Statement of Facts and Memorandum in Support of Motion 

for Summary Judgment and in Response to Plaintiff Lana Canen’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff on October 19, 2015 

(DE# 50), and the Motion to Strike Affidavit of Dennis Chapman 

filed by Plaintiff on October 19, 2015 (DE# 51). For the reasons 

set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (DE # 28) 
2 

is DENIED, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (DE# 41) is 

GRANTED, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant Chapman’s 

Statement of Facts and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 

Judgment (DE# 50) is DENIED, and Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike 

Affidavit of Dennis Chapman (DE# 51) is DENIED. The Clerk is 

hereby ORDERED to DISMISS the claim against Defendant Chapman WITH 

PREJUDICE and to CLOSE this case.

BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff Lara Canen (“Canen”) was convicted of the murder of 

Helen Sailor (“Sailor”) based in part on latent fingerprint 

evidence found on a plastic container in Sailor’s apartment.1 

Defendant Dennis Chapman (“Chapman”), a crime lab technician with 

the Elkhart County Sheriff’s Department (“Sheriff’s Department”), 

testified as an expert at Canen’s criminal trial, opining that the 

latent print belonged to Canen. Canen denied ever being in 

Sailor’s apartment. During Canen’s post-conviction relief (“PCR”) 

proceeding, another fingerprint examiner reviewed the evidence, 

and excluded Canen as the source of the latent print. After reexamining the evidence, Chapman admitted that he had been mistaken 

 

1 Both parties refer to the fingerprint found in Sailor’s apartment as a “latent 

print,” as compared to a “known print.” Chapman describes latent prints as 

invisible, unknown fingerprints found at a crime scene, and known prints as the 

records of fingerprint patterns recorded digitally or with fingerprint ink or 

powder on identification cards, fingerprint cards or ten-print cards. (DE# 42 

at 7.) Chapman does not dispute these descriptions. 
3 

in opining that Canen was the source of the print. The State court 

granted Canen’s PCR petition and vacated her conviction. By that 

time, Canen had served eight years in prison. 

In 2014, Canen filed this action alleging federal claims under 

42 U.S.C. section 1983 against Chapman in his individual capacity 

as deputy for the Sheriff’s Department, and an Elkhart City Police 

Department (“ECPD”) police officer.2 Canen claims that Chapman 

violated her right to due process by holding himself out as an 

expert in fingerprint identification and failing to inform the 

State prosecutor that he lacked qualifications and certainty as to 

the source of the latent print. Canen and Chapman have filed and 

fully briefed the instant motions for summary judgment. Canen 

also filed two motion to strike, which the Court will address 

first. 

DISCUSSION 

Motions to Strike 

Canen filed two motions to strike regarding Chapman’s motion 

for summary judgment briefing. She first seeks to strike the 

Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary 

Judgment of Chapman and in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment (“Statement of Facts,” DE# 42) because it was 

 

2 The claims against the ECPD police officer were dismissed by stipulation of 

the parties. (DE# 60.) 
4 

filed as a standalone document that is neither part of Chapman’s 

memorandum nor identified as an appendix. Local Rule 56-1(a) 

requires that a brief supporting a summary judgment motion or the 

brief’s appendix include a section labeled “Statement of Material 

Facts” that identifies the facts that the moving party contends 

are not genuinely disputed. N.D. Ind. L.R. 56–1(a). Canen also 

urges the Court to strike the Memorandum of Law in Support of 

Chapman’s Motion for Summary Judgment and in Response to Canen’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment (“Chapman Memorandum,” DE# 43) as it 

allegedly exceeds 25 pages in violation of Local Rule 7–1(e). See

N.D. Ind. L.R. 7-1(e)(1) (“Supporting and response briefs 

(excluding tables of contents, tables of authorities, and 

appendices) ordinarily must not exceed 25 pages.”). While the 

Chapman Memorandum is 24 pages long, Canen argues that the Chapman 

Memorandum would be 45 pages long if the Court were to include the 

Statement of Facts. 

As Chapman points out, the Statement of Facts is not subject 

to the page limitation of Local Rule 7-1. Mayes v. City of Hammond, 

IN, 442 F. Supp. 2d 587, 595 & n.1 (N.D. Ind. 2006) (noting that 

a “motion for summary judgment . . . is permitted to present the 

statement of material facts . . . in a separate appendix, which 

itself is subject to no page limitation”); Estate of Rice ex rel. 

Rice v. Correctional Med. Servs., No. 3:06-CV-697, 2009 WL 1748059, 

at *6 (N.D. Ind. June 17, 2009), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on 
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other grounds sub nom. Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 

F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2012) (“A statement of material facts filed in 

support of a motion for summary judgment doesn’t count against the 

twenty-five page limitation.”). While Canen arguably has a point 

about the manner in which Chapman filed his Statement of Facts, 

and whether it strictly complies with the Local Rule 56-1(a), this 

amounts to “much ado about nothing and warrant[s] no further 

discussion.” Nabors v. Wells Fargo, No. 1:11–CV–273, 2013 WL 

3013353, at *15 (N.D. Ind. June 17, 2013) (denying motions to 

strike that asserted the parties’ failure to strictly comply with 

Local Rules); see Peele v. Burch, 722 F.3d 956, 961 (7th Cir. 2013) 

(“a district court’s decision whether to apply a local rule 

strictly or to overlook any transgression is one left to the 

district court’s discretion”). The motion to strike the Chapman 

Memorandum and Chapman’s Statement of Facts is DENIED. 

In a separate motion, Canen moves to strike portions of the 

Affidavit of Dennis Chapman (“Chapman Affidavit”, DE# 42-1) as a 

“sham affidavit.” A “‘sham affidavit’ is an affidavit that is 

inadmissible because it contradicts the affiant’s previous 

testimony . . . unless the earlier testimony was ambiguous, 

confusing, or the result of a memory lapse.” Cook v. O'Neill, 803 

F.3d 296, 298 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). “[A]n affidavit 

can be excluded as a sham only where the witness has given ‘clear 

answers to unambiguous questions which negate the existence of any 
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genuine issue of material fact.’” Castro v. DeVry Univ., Inc.,

786 F.3d 559, 572 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). An 

affidavit that is an amplification rather than contradiction of 

prior testimony is not within the “sham” exclusionary rule. Cook, 

803 F.3d at 298. “[W]hen considering a motion to strike portions 

of an affidavit in support of a motion for summary judgment, courts 

will only strike and disregard the improper portions of the 

affidavit and allow all appropriate recitations of fact to stand.” 

Martin v. Indiana, No. 1:12–cv–69, 2015 WL 4899008, at *1 (N.D. 

Ind. Aug. 17, 2015) (citations omitted). 

Canen moves to strike several portions of the Chapman 

Affidavit that address his prior training or experience: 

13. . . . In August 2000, I [Chapman] attended a four 

week training program that was taught by the Indiana 

State Police. The program was designed to enhance skills 

and teach detectives how to process crime scenes, 

collect fingerprints, shoe impressions, tire 

impressions, and reconstruct crime scenes by drawings. 

My course textbook was titled, Techniques of Crime Scene 

Investigations, Barry A.J. Fisher. I also participated 

in the lecture titled, Latent Prints. 

(DE# 42-1 ¶ 13.) Canen claims that to the extent that this 

paragraph suggests that Chapman’s coursework involved training on 

latent print comparison, it is inconsistent with his testimony at 

the PCR Hearing that this training did not involve latent 

fingerprint comparisons, and only involved “processing crime 

scene[s].” (See DE# 51-1 at 5-6 (“Q. Okay, was there anything in 

that course that assisted with your – with comparing latent 
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fingerprints? A. No, . . . that was processing crime scenes.”) 

Chapman responds that Paragraph 13 is not inconsistent with prior 

testimony. At a deposition in November 2014, Chapman testified 

that the program trained students how to process crime scenes, 

including “[h]ow to collect fingerprints.” (DE# 42-2 at 23-24.) 

Chapman notes that the lectures within that program would be 

consistent with processing crime scenes. Chapman’s testimony at 

the PCR Hearing did not identify any program lectures or describe 

their content. The Court finds that Paragraph 13 expands upon, 

rather than conflicts with, Chapman’s prior testimony. Therefore, 

the motion to strike Paragraph 13 is denied. 

15. As a crime scene technician with the ECSD, one of 

my responsibilities included examining fingerprints. . 

. . 

(DE# 42-1 ¶ 15.) Canen argues that, to the extent that Paragraph 

15 suggests that Chapman’s job responsibilities included comparing 

fingerprints, it is inconsistent with his deposition testimony 

that he did “some” fingerprint comparisons, but that it was not 

part of his job. (DE# 51-2 at 2-3.) Chapman responds that 

Paragraph 15 is not inconsistent with his prior testimony. The 

Court agrees. The prior testimony cited by Canen refers to 

Chapman’s job responsibilities when he first became a detective in 

1999 and was assigned to property crimes. (Id. at 2.) At trial, 

Chapman testified that one of his responsibilities as a crime lab 
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technician was to examine and compare fingerprints. (DE# 42-4 at 

618.) The motion to strike Paragraph 15 is denied. 

22. Based on my prior training with the FBI and 

continued work with the ECSD after I left the FBI, I 

believed I had the appropriate experience and training 

to analyze the fingerprints related to the Helen Sailor 

murder investigation. 

(DE# 42-1 ¶ 22.) Canen argues that Paragraph 22 is inconsistent 

with Chapman’s prior testimony. At Canen’s PCR hearing, Chapman 

testified that when he “testified at trial that he did print 

comparisons,” he referred to comparisons of known prints, not 

latent prints. (DE# 51-1 at 13; cf. DE# 42-4 at 618 (testifying 

at trial that he made “maybe 100 or so” fingerprint comparisons in 

the past several years, without indicating whether they were known 

or latent print comparisons).) At the PCR hearing, the State asked 

Chapman, “when you were asked to look at this latent [print] of 

Ms. Canen, did you ever consider saying, you know what, maybe I 

shouldn’t?” Chapman replied, “Yes.” (DE# 51-1 at 14.) When the 

State asked why Chapman did not bring this to someone’s attention, 

he replied, “Well, I was trying to help out Elkhart County.” (Id.) 

Canen interprets this testimony as admitting that Chapman had 

misgivings due to his limited experience with latent print 

comparisons. 

Chapman responds that Paragraph 22 reflects his opinion that, 

when asked by ECPD to compare fingerprints from the investigation, 

he felt he had appropriate experience and training to analyze crime 
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scene fingerprints. Chapman asserts that he never testified that 

his reservations about comparing the fingerprints were due to lack 

of training or experience in latent print comparison. Chapman 

explains that while he considered that “maybe [he] shouldn’t” look 

at the latent prints, he was not asked a follow-up question 

regarding why he felt this way. He points to his deposition 

testimony that he felt pressure about analyzing the prints due to 

“time constraints”; he had Elkhart County work to do, and his 

partner was out of town at training. (DE# 42-2 at 30-31.) “Even 

where a subsequent affidavit is contradictory to prior sworn 

deposition testimony, . . . a court may accept the statement in 

the affidavit if the party presents a suitable explanation for the 

discrepancy, such as a confusing deposition question, 

circumstances indicating a lapse of memory, relevant new 

information discovered after the original testimony, or ambiguous 

or incomplete earlier testimony.” Martin, 2015 WL 4899008, at *7 

(citations and quotations omitted). The Court finds the State’s 

questions at the PCR hearing regarding Chapman’s consideration of 

whether he should look at the fingerprint evidence, and resulting 

testimony, are ambiguous and open to interpretation. Therefore, 

the motion to strike Paragraph 22 is denied. 

Canen’s motion to strike the Chapman Affidavit is DENIED. 
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Summary Judgment Standard 

Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine 

dispute of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 

2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). Not every dispute between the 

parties makes summary judgment inappropriate; “[o]nly disputes 

over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary 

judgment.” Id. In determining whether summary judgment is 

appropriate, the court must construe all facts in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences 

in that party’s favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th 

Cir. 2010). 

While the movant bears the initial burden of production to 

inform the district court why a trial is not necessary, these 

requirements “are not onerous” where the nonmovant “bears the 

ultimate burden of persuasion on a particular issue.” Modrowski 

v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 2013). A party may move 

for summary judgment based on either “affirmative evidence that 

negates an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim” or by 

“asserting that the nonmoving party’s evidence [is] insufficient 
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to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim.” 

Id. at 1169 (citation and internal quotations omitted). A party 

opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion may not rely 

on allegations or denials in his own pleading, but rather, must 

“marshal and present the court with the evidence [he] contends 

will prove [his] case.” Goodman v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 

F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). If the nonmoving party fails to 

establish the existence of an essential element on which he bears 

the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is proper. Massey 

v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2006). 

Facts 

The Murder Investigation and Trial 

 On Thanksgiving Day 2002, Sailor, an elderly tenant of the 

Waterfall Highrise Apartments, was murdered in her apartment. 

During the murder investigation, the ECPD discovered a latent print 

on a plastic container in Sailor’s apartment that was believed to 

have been handled by the murderer. The ECPD eventually suspected 

that two other apartment complex residents, Canen and Andrew Royer 

(“Royer”), were involved in Sailor’s murder. 

The ECPD sent the latent print evidence and known print 

samples from various suspects, including Canen, to Chapman at the 

Sheriff’s Department for analysis. An ECPD detective sent the 

fingerprint evidence to Chapman because he understood Chapman to 

be a latent print examiner, and the Indiana State Police Laboratory 
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would have taken longer to perform the examination.3 Chapman 

examined the evidence and concluded that the latent print on the 

container matched Canen’s left pinkie finger. 

The ECPD interviewed Royer regarding Sailor’s murder. Royer, 

who has mental health issues, made multiple statements in which he 

confessed to murdering Sailor. However, the details in his 

statements conflicted. In some statements, he claimed that Canen 

was in Sailor’s apartment. Royer was charged with Sailor’s murder. 

When the ECPD interviewed Canen regarding Sailor’s murder, 

she denied ever being in Sailor’s apartment, and continued to deny 

it after being told that her fingerprint was found in Sailor’s 

apartment. On September 2, 2004, Canen was charged with Sailor’s 

murder. 

Prior to trial, the State prosecutor Vicki Becker (“Becker”) 

allowed Canen’s attorney to review the prosecutor’s entire file, 

including Chapman’s report. Canen’s attorney hired a retired ECPD 

detective to analyze the latent print. He examined the print, and 

found two points of similarity, but no points of difference. As 

such, he could not give a conclusive opinion as to whether the 

latent print was a match with Canen’s known print. Canen’s 

attorney did not seek a pre-trial deposition of Chapman, or move 

to exclude Chapman’s testimony. 

 

3 Chapman denies ever telling any representative of the ECPD or the State 

prosecutor that he was an expert in latent fingerprint analysis. 
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In August 2005, Canen and Royer were tried jointly for 

Sailor’s murder. At trial, the State offered evidence against 

Canen including, but not limited to, testimony regarding Canen’s 

relationship with Royer, testimony that Canen made false 

statements that she was out of town on the day of Sailor’s murder, 

testimony regarding Canen’s denial of having been inside Sailor’s 

apartment, and the latent print evidence. 

Chapman testified at the trial regarding his analysis of the 

latent print. He described his prior experience as a fingerprint 

examiner with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), and his 

participation in a twelve-week FBI training program in which he 

learned how to classify and examine fingerprints. (DE# 30-1 at 

129-30.) He testified that he was assigned to the Sheriff’s 

Department crime laboratory after attending the Integrated Indiana 

Law Enforcement Crime Scene Training School in the fall of 2000. 

(Id. at 132.) He also testified: 

Q. . . . And in the lab as a full time detective 

technician, is it one of your responsibilities to examine 

as well as compare fingerprints? 

A. Yes, it is. 

Q. Based on your experience, have you been able to make 

fingerprint comparisons in the past several years? 

A. Yes, I have. 

Q. Any idea how many comparisons you’ve made? 

A. Not right off the top of my head. Several –- maybe 

100 or so. 

. . . 

Q. . . . Do you also have training and experience in 

attempting to recover latent prints from a crime scene? 

A. Yes. 
14 

Q. Is that part of your responsibilities at the sheriff’s 

department? 

A. Yes, it is. 

(DE# 30-1 at 132-33.) Chapman then explained how he matched 

Canen’s known print card to the latent print taken from Sailor’s 

apartment, and opined that the latent print matched Canen’s known 

print. Canen’s attorney did not cross-examine Chapman regarding 

his qualifications as an expert, object to his testimony, request 

an opportunity to voir dire Chapman, or offer a witness to refute 

Chapman’s testimony. (See id. at 148-50; DE# 42-10 at 18-25.)4

The jury convicted Canen and Royer of murder. Canen’s 

conviction was affirmed on appeal, Canen v. State, 852 N.E.2d 1054 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2006), and the Indiana Supreme Court denied 

transfer. Canen v. State, 860 N.E.2d 591 (Ind. Sept. 19, 2006). 

 PCR Proceedings 

 In August 2009, Canen petitioned for post-conviction relief 

based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Canen’s new 

attorney retained a certified latent print examiner to conduct an 

 

4 During a deposition in 2014, State prosecutor Becker testified that she had 

worked with Chapman on cases involving fingerprint analysis prior to the Canen 

trial, and that she was aware of his credentials and experience with the FBI 

and Sheriff’s Department crime laboratory. (DE# 42-10 at 8-9.) Becker 

testified that she had understood that Chapman “had personally performed over 

100 evaluations of latent print comparisons.” (DE# 30-5 at 5.) She also 

testified that she “was assuming that it was latent print comparisons, 

especially in light of the fact that when he was doing known print comparisons, 

he was doing 40 an hour.” (Id.) Becker testified that when she “asked [Chapman] 

specifically, ‘Do you have training and experience in attempting to recover 

latent prints from a crime scene,[’] and he says, ‘Yes,’, ‘Is that part of your 

responsibilities at the Sheriff’s Department,’ ‘Yes, it is,’ [she] would have 

thought that that would have been sufficient to show that we’re talking about 

latent prints here.” (Id. at 5.) 
15 

independent comparison of the fingerprint evidence used at trial. 

The examiner concluded that Canen was not the source of the latent 

print found on the container in Sailor’s apartment. Chapman then 

re-examined the evidence and concluded that he erred in opining 

that the latent print matched Canen’s known print. 

At the PCR hearing, Chapman testified that his original 

opinion was wrong, and that he believed that his opinion changed 

after reviewing the other expert’s report because he had received 

more latent print examination training in 2006 (after Canen’s 

trial), and because he had more experience “looking at a lot of 

prints” since he conducted the Canen fingerprint analysis. (See

DE# 30-2 at 22, 29.) Chapman explained that when he testified at 

trial that he had conducted fingerprint comparisons, he was 

referring to known prints. (Id. at 32.) Chapman was asked if, 

when the ECPD asked him to look at the latent print evidence in 

the Sailor murder, he considered saying “maybe I shouldn’t,” 

Chapman testified, “Yes.” (Id. at 33.) When asked why he did not 

bring this to someone’s attention, he responded that he “was trying 

to help out Elkhart City.” (Id.) 

The State requested a continuance to have the Indiana State 

Police Laboratory (“State Police”) examine the fingerprint 

evidence. The State Police excluded Canen as a source of the 

latent print. The State court granted Canen’s PCR petition, 

finding that the discovery of Canen’s exclusion as the source of 
16 

the latent print qualified as newly discovered evidence. (DE# 30-

3 at 6, 8 (finding the evidence satisfied the nine elements 

required to merit PCR relief) (citing Carter v. State, 738 N.E.2d 

665, 671 (Ind. 2000)).)5 Canen’s conviction was vacated and the 

State dismissed the criminal case against her. After eight years 

of incarceration, Canen was released. 

Chapman’s Experience and Training with Fingerprint Analysis 

From 1976 to 1978, Chapman worked for the FBI as a fingerprint 

examiner. Before beginning work as a fingerprint examiner, Chapman 

attended a twelve-week FBI training program on how to classify and 

compare fingerprints. As an FBI fingerprint examiner, he 

classified fingerprint cards and manually searched FBI fingerprint 

files for matches; he did not examine latent prints. After 

resigning from the FBI in 1978, Chapman worked at the Cook Nuclear 

Plant in a security position for approximately six years. In that 

position, he reviewed fingerprint cards to ensure that they were 

acceptable for submission. 

The Sheriff’s Department hired Chapman in November 1993. In 

January 1994, he attended the Indiana Law Enforcement Academy 

(“ILEA”), which was a twelve-week training program. Part of the 

 

5 The State court also found that, given Chapman’s trial testimony regarding 

his qualifications, “there was no reason for [Canen’s] trial counsel to question 

the qualifications of Detective Chapman to conduct latent fingerprint 

comparisons. Furthermore, the Record establishes that trial counsel did hire 

a retired detective to verify Detective Chapman’s conclusion, who formed an 

opinion that [Canen] may have been the source of the latent print. For these 

reasons, the court cannot conclude that trial counsel’s performance at [Canen’s] 

trial was ineffective.” (DE# 30-3 at 5.) 
17 

ILEA curriculum pertained to fingerprints. After graduating from 

ILEA, Chapman began working at the Sheriff’s Department as a 

patrolman. His duties as patrolman included dusting for and 

retrieving fingerprint impressions from crime scenes. Chapman was 

promoted to detective in January 1999, and was assigned to 

investigate property crimes. On occasion, the Sheriff’s 

Department Records Division gave fingerprint cards to Chapman to 

compare and analyze. Chapman performed comparisons when there was 

a question about a suspect’s identity. He would compare the tenprint cards and determine if the prints were from the same person. 

In August 2000, Chapman attended the Integrated Indiana Crime 

Scene School, a four-week training course taught by the Indiana 

State Police. Chapman testified that this program trained students 

how to process crime scenes, collect fingerprints, shoe 

impressions, tire impressions, and how to reconstruct a crime scene 

by drawing. The Chapman Affidavit asserts that, as part of this 

program, Chapman participated in a lecture entitled, Latent 

Prints. (DE# 42-1.) As noted above, Canen disputes that this 

program involved training on making latent print comparisons 

because Chapman testified at the PCR hearing that this training 

program dealt with processing crime scenes, not latent print 

comparisons. Canen also maintains that Chapman never testified 

that any of the training programs he attended involved latent print 

comparison. 
18 

After completing the training program in 2000, Chapman became 

one of two crime lab technicians for the Sheriff’s Department. As 

a crime lab technician, Chapman examined and compared known prints 

on ten-print cards. He examined latent prints that were taken 

from a crime scene and compared them to known prints. In addition 

to examining latent prints at the request of the Sheriff’s 

Department, the police departments of Goshen City and Elkhart City 

asked Chapman to examine latent prints taken from crime scenes. 

From the time Chapman first became a Sheriff’s Department crime 

lab technician until the time when he was asked to examine the 

fingerprints relating to the Sailor case, Chapman estimates that 

he had conducted approximately thirteen fingerprint examinations 

involving latent prints taken from crime scenes, and numerous 

additional fingerprint examinations involving the comparison of 

ten-print cards. 

Section 1983 Claim 

Canen’s claim against Chapman arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

which provides a federal cause of action any time an individual, 

who, under color of state law, deprives another of any right, 

privilege, or immunity as provided by the Constitution and laws of 

the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Canen alleges that Chapman 

violated her constitutional rights by withholding from the State 

prosecutor his alleged lack of qualifications to perform latent 

fingerprint analysis, thus ensuring that the prosecutor could not 
19 

disclose the information to Canen. “[T]he suppression by the 

prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request 

violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt 

or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of 

the prosecution.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 

1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). This obligation extends to police 

officers in certain circumstances. See Newsome v. McCabe, 256 

F.3d 747, 752 (7th Cir. 2001) (“If officers are not candid with 

prosecutors, then the prosecutors’ decisions – although vital to 

the causal chain in a but-for sense - are not the important locus 

of action. Pressure must be brought to bear elsewhere. 

Prosecutors kept in the dark by the police . . . won’t improve 

their performance with or without legal liability for their 

conduct. Requiring culpable officers to pay damages to the victims 

of their actions, however, holds out promise of both deterring and 

remediating violations of the Constitution.”). 

To establish a Brady violation, Canen must prove that the 

evidence at issue was: (1) favorable to accused, either being 

exculpatory or impeaching; (2) suppressed by the government, 

either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) material, that is, there 

is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed 

to the accused, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. Carvajal v. Dominguez, 542 F.3d 561, 566-67 (7th Cir. 

2008) (citations omitted); Boss v. Pierce, 263 F.3d 734, 739-40 
20 

(7th Cir. 2001); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 

(1972). Evidence is not suppressed under Brady where the accused 

could have discovered the evidence through “reasonable diligence.” 

Carvajal, 542 F.3d at 567 (citation omitted). In addition, “the 

Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment] is simply not 

implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended 

loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property.” Daniels v. 

Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328, 106 S. Ct. 662, 663 (1986) (emphasis 

in original); see, e.g., Harris v. Kuba, 486 F.3d 1010, 1014 (7th 

Cir. 2007) (stating that liability under § 1983 “cannot be founded 

on negligence”) (citations omitted). 

Canen argues that Chapman’s lack of experience with latent 

print identification was favorable, material, and suppressed 

evidence under Brady. Canen asserts that if she had been informed 

of Chapman’s lack of qualification before trial, her trial attorney 

could have used the information for impeachment purposes, or to 

exclude Chapman from testifying. The parties dispute whether 

Chapman was qualified to testify as an expert, whether he believed 

himself qualified to conduct the latent print comparison prior to 

Canen’s trial, and whether he was intentionally misleading about 

his qualifications prior to and during Canen’s trial. 

It is undisputed that Canen’s attorney did not seek to depose 

Chapman prior to trial, or move to exclude his testimony. During 

the trial, Canen’s attorney did not cross-examine Chapman 
21 

regarding his qualifications, or seek to voir dire him regarding 

his qualifications. Given these undisputed facts, the Court has 

doubts as to whether Canen’s alleged lack of experience and 

training was suppressed for purposes of Brady, that is, that this 

evidence was not otherwise available to Canen through the exercise 

of reasonable diligence. See Carvajal, 542 F.3d at 567 (finding 

no Brady violation where testifying officers “were accessible to 

the defense,” noting “[i]t is [the defendant’s] responsibility to 

probe the witnesses,” and that “there was nothing preventing [the 

defendant] from discovering and drawing out [a] discrepancy 

between the officers’ stories”); see generally Buie v. McAdory, 

341 F.3d 623, 625 (7th Cir. 2003) (“That a witness may give false 

or mistaken testimony . . . is not an independent constitutional 

violation. What the Constitution provides is assurance that 

evidence may be tested by cross-examination and by contrary 

proofs.”) (citations omitted). While the Court has doubts as to 

whether an officer who testifies as an expert violates an accused’s 

right to due process by failing to disclose a lack of training or 

experience, it need not resolve this issue because Chapman is 

immune from suit. 

Qualified Immunity 

In response to Canen’s claim that Chapman should have 

disclosed his alleged lack of qualification prior to trial, Chapman 

asserts that he is immune from suit based on the doctrine of 
22 

qualified immunity.6 Qualified immunity shields officials from 

civil liability so long as their conduct “does not violate clearly 

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 

U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009) (quotation 

omitted). Canen carries the burden of defeating Chapman’s claim 

of qualified immunity. Molina ex rel. Molina v. Cooper, 325 F.3d 

963, 968 (7th Cir. 2003). “Whether a government official is 

entitled to qualified immunity is a legal question for resolution 

by the court, not a jury.” Purtell v. Mason, 527 F.3d 615, 621 

(7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). 

In determining whether an official is entitled to qualified 

immunity, the Court must ask two questions: “(1) whether the facts, 

 

6 Because Canen relies upon Chapman’s allegedly intentionally misleading trial 

testimony that he had made “maybe 100 or so” fingerprint comparisons, Chapman 

also argues that he has absolute immunity from suit based on his trial testimony. 

The Court agrees. Witnesses, including experts and police officers, have 

absolute immunity for the content of their testimony at trial. See Briscoe v. 

LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 345, 103 S. Ct. 1108, 75 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1983); Latta v. 

Chapala, 221 Fed. Appx. 443, 444-45 (7th Cir. 2007) (witnesses testifying at 

trial possess absolute immunity in actions under § 1983) (citing Briscoe, 460 

U.S. 325). The Seventh Circuit has held that a witness’s pretrial preparation 

is also immune from suit. See Latta, 221 Fed. Appx. at 445 (“The absolute 

immunity applicable to witnesses covers the preparation for testimony as well 

as its delivery in court.”) (citation omitted); Nwoke v. Palmer, 116 Fed. Appx. 

761, 763 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that Briscoe would offer “a hollow immunity” 

if a party “could turn around and say, in effect: ‘True, your delivery of bad 

testimony is immunized, but preparing to deliver that testimony is not, so I 

can litigate the substance of your testimony.’”) (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 

919 F.2d 1230, 1245 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd in part on other grounds, 509 U.S. 

259, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 125 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1993). Canen does not respond to 

Chapman’s absolute immunity argument. Rather, she characterizes Chapman’s 

failure to disclose his alleged lack of training and experience as a failure to 

disclose exculpatory evidence prior to trial. Even if Chapman’s alleged failure 

to disclose a lack of qualification prior to trial is not barred by absolute 

immunity, it is barred by qualified immunity for the reasons provided herein. 
23 

taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, make out a 

violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether that 

constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the 

alleged violation.” Burton v. Downey, 805 F.3d 776, 784 (7th Cir. 

2015) (quoting Williams v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 749, 758 (7th 

Cir. 2013)). The Court has discretion to decide which of the two 

prongs of the qualified immunity analysis to address first. 

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. 

Regarding the second prong, a clearly established right “must 

be sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have 

understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Reichle v. 

Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093, 182 L. Ed. 2d 985 (2012) (internal 

quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted). Courts “do 

not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must 

have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond 

debate.” Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083, 

179 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (2011) (emphasis added, citations omitted). 

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed courts: 

“not to define clearly established law at a high level 

of generality.” al–Kidd, [563 U.S.] at 742, 131 S. Ct. 

2074. The dispositive question is “whether the 

violative nature of particular conduct is clearly 

established.” Ibid. (emphasis added). This inquiry 

“‘must be undertaken in light of the specific context of 

the case, not as a broad general proposition.’” Brosseau 

v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198, 125 S. Ct. 596, 160 L. Ed. 

2d 583 (2004) (per curiam) [(citation omitted)]. 
24 

Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308, 193 L. Ed. 2d 255 (2015) 

(emphasis in original). A plaintiff “can demonstrate that the 

right was clearly established by presenting a closely analogous 

case that establishes that the [defendant’s] conduct was 

unconstitutional or by presenting evidence that the [defendant’s] 

conduct was so patently violative of the constitutional right that 

reasonable officials would know without guidance from a court.” 

Estate of Escobedo v. Bender, 600 F.3d 770, 780 (7th Cir. 2010) 

(citations omitted). The Court looks to controlling precedent 

from the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit, and, in the absence 

of controlling precedent, cases from other circuits “to ascertain 

whether there was such a clear trend in the case law that the 

recognition of the right by a controlling precedent was merely a 

matter of time.” Id. at 782. 

Chapman argues that Canen does not have a due process right 

that has been violated, and that even if a jury were to determine 

Chapmen violated Canen’s right to due process, such right was not 

“clearly established” at the time the action occurred. Canen 

asserts that Chapman is not entitled to qualified immunity because 

Chapman “knew he was unqualified and considered telling others 

this fact, but elected not to.” (DE# 29 at 24.) She argues that 

Chapman’s failure to disclose his alleged lack of experience 

violated a clearly established right “because it has long been 

established that an expert’s training and education are relevant 
25 

to the weight of his testimony and evidence showing that the expert 

has little to no training and experience in the field is 

impeaching.” (DE# 49 at 23-24.) But the general proposition that 

an expert’s training and experience is relevant and may be 

impeaching does not answer “whether the violative nature of 

[Chapman’s] particular conduct is clearly established.” Mullenix, 

136 S. Ct. at 308 (emphasis in original, citations omitted). Canen 

must show that an expert’s obligation to disclose a lack of 

training or experience was a “clearly established” constitutional 

right at the time of her criminal trial. 

The cases upon which Canen relies do not set forth a 

constitutional right requiring an expert to disclose a lack of 

experience or training. Canen cites United States v. Benson for 

the proposition that “[a]n expert’s opinion is helpful only to the 

extent that the expert draws on some special skill, knowledge, or 

experience to formulate that opinion; the opinion must be an expert

opinion (that is, an opinion informed by the witness’ expertise) 

rather than simply an opinion broached by a purported expert.” 

941 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1991), mandate recalled and amended by

957 F.2d 301 (1992) (emphasis in original, citations omitted). 

This general proposition does not support Canen’s proposed due 

process right to an expert’s disclosure of a lack of qualification. 

In Benson, the Seventh Circuit found that it was an abuse of 

discretion to admit the testimony of an Internal Revenue Service 
26 

agent who “did not give helpful expert testimony” based on any 

special skill or knowledge, but rather, “simply told the jury whom 

to believe.” Id. at 604-05. The Seventh Circuit did not indicate 

that the agent was required to volunteer his lack of qualification. 

Rather, it noted that “Benson’s attorney conducted a thorough 

cross-examination of [the agent], exposing his lack of 

qualification to opine on many of the matters he did.” Id. at 

605. 

Canen cites Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., for 

the proposition that “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation 

of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of 

proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky 

but admissible evidence.” 509 U.S. 579, 596, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 

L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993). The Court notes that this excerpt from 

Daubert highlights the adversarial nature of challenging an 

expert’s opinion by means of cross-examination and contrary proof. 

Setting that aside, this general proposition is not sufficient to 

show that the “particular conduct” at issue, i.e., an expert’s 

failure to disclose a lack of qualification, violates a clearly 

established constitutional right. 

Canen also cites Newsome v. McCabe, in which the Seventh 

Circuit held that officers were not entitled to qualified immunity 

because it had been clearly established that officers could not 

withhold exculpatory information about fingerprints. 256 F.3d 
27 

747, 752-53 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). In Newsome, the 

officers had failed to alert the prosecutors that Newsome’s 

fingerprints did not match those they had obtained at the scene of 

the crime, among other alleged misconduct. Id. at 749. Canen 

relies upon the Seventh Circuit’s query, “was it clearly 

established . . . that the police could not withhold from 

prosecutors exculpatory information about fingerprints[?] The 

answer is yes: The Brady principle was announced in 1963,” to 

assert that Chapman is not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 

752. But Canen stretches Newsome too far, and ignores the Supreme 

Court’s admonition against “define[ing] clearly established law at 

a high level of generality.” Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (citation 

omitted). Here, Canen does not assert that Chapman withheld 

exculpatory information about the fingerprint evidence he 

analyzed. Rather, she claims that Chapman deliberately failed to 

disclose his alleged lack of qualification to make a fingerprint 

comparison. Thus, the “particular conduct” addressed in Newsome

is markedly different from the misconduct alleged by Canen. 

Canen has not provided the Court with any case law from the 

Seventh Circuit, or any other circuit court, holding that an 

expert’s failure to disclose a lack of qualification violated a 

clearly established constitutional right at the time of Canen’s 

trial. At a minimum, existing precedent has not placed this 

constitutional question “beyond debate.” al–Kidd, 563 U.S. at 
28 

741. Because Canen has not satisfied her burden to show that 

Chapman’s alleged failure to disclose a lack of qualification 

violated a clearly established right, her claim against Chapman is 

barred by qualified immunity. Therefore, Canen’s motion for 

summary judgment is DENIED, and Chapman’s motion for summary 

judgment is GRANTED. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment (DE# 28) is DENIED, Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (DE# 41) is GRANTED, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike 

Defendant Chapman’s Statement of Facts and Memorandum in Support 

of Motion for Summary Judgment (DE# 50) is DENIED, and Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Strike Affidavit of Dennis Chapman (DE# 51) is DENIED. 

The Clerk is hereby ORDERED to DISMISS the claim against Defendant 

Chapman WITH PREJUDICE and to CLOSE this case. 

DATED: February 22, 2016 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge 

 United States District Court