RECORD IMPOUNDED 

 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-0928-22 

NEW JERSEY DIVISION 

OF CHILD PROTECTION 

AND PERMANENCY, 

 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v. 

A.R., 

 Defendant, 

and 

H.L.C., JR.,

 Defendant-Appellant. 

__________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

GUARDIANSHIP OF 

H.C., III, and J.C., minors. 

__________________________

Submitted November 8, 2023 – Decided December 14, 2023 

Before Judges Gooden Brown and Natali. 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-0928-22

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, 

Docket No. FG-09-0126-20.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (James D. O'Kelly, Designated Counsel, on 

the briefs).

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Sara M. Gregory, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Renee Greenberg, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief). 

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, 

attorney for minors (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy 

Public Defender, of counsel; David B. Valentin, 

Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on

the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

Defendant, H.L.C., Jr., appeals from the November 4, 2022, judgment of 

guardianship that terminated his parental rights to his two sons, H.C., III, born 

in 2010, and J.C., born in 2016. Both children have been in the care of a resource 

parent since their removal in February 2019. The resource parent, a family 

member, is committed to adoption. A.R., the children's mother, executed an 

identified surrender of her parental rights to the resource parent, who is A.R.'s 
3 A-0928-22

aunt. As a result, A.R. is not participating in this appeal.1 The Law Guardian 

joins the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) in support of

termination. We affirm. 

On March 16, 2020, the Division filed a verified complaint to terminate 

defendant's parental rights and award the Division guardianship of the children. 

The complaint detailed defendant's long history of recurring incarcerations, 

unremitted substance abuse, unaddressed mental health issues, and lack of stable 

housing despite the Division's exhaustive efforts. A guardianship trial was 

conducted on diverse dates between August 19 and October 11, 2022. At the 

trial, the assigned Division adoption worker, defendant's drug counselor, the

psychologist who evaluated all the parties, and the resource parent testified for 

the Division. Numerous documentary exhibits were also admitted into evidence. 

In addition, a psychologist with a specialty in child psychology testified for the 

Law Guardian. Defendant, who was incarcerated at the time of trial, produced 

no witnesses. 

Following the trial, the trial judge rendered a comprehensive oral opinion 

on the record on October 26 and November 4, 2022, recounting her factual 

1

 Defendant and A.R. each have two older children with different partners. 

None of the four children are in either defendant's or A.R.'s custody and are not 

involved in this appeal. 
4 A-0928-22

findings and legal conclusions. Through the adoption worker's testimony, which 

the judge found "completely credible," the judge detailed the Division's 

extended involvement with the family dating back to 2007, and pointed out that 

the Division had filed for "custody, care and supervision" of the children in 2019 

because their mother "had relapsed, tested positive for cocaine, and . . . failed to 

participate in substance abuse treatment," while their father "was incarcerated." 

The judge explained that when the guardianship complaint was filed, 

"reunification had not occurred due to [A.R.'s] continued substance use and . . . 

mental health concerns" and defendant's habitual incarcerations, addiction 

problem, mental health issues, and chronic homelessness. 

The judge recounted that the Division's efforts at reuniting the family 

included providing "substance abuse assessments and treatments, random urine 

screens, psychological evaluations, psychiatric evaluations, individual 

counseling, parenting skills courses[,] domestic violence counseling, anger 

management counseling, family team meetings, bus cards for 

transportation, . . . security deposits for housing" as well as visitation with the 

children, "both supervised and therapeutic." Nonetheless, according to the 

judge, defendant "had not been compliant with getting treatment to address his 
5 A-0928-22

addiction to illicit substances," which included "PCP, heroin, and cocaine," and 

"had also been incarcerated repeatedly." 

The judge stressed that "[d]uring the [ten] years that [the Division] ha[d] 

been involved with the family, [defendant] ha[d] been in jail the majority of the 

time." The judge expounded that typically, "when [defendant] is first released 

from jail, he is very focused and very compliant. . . . but then unfortunately, he 

relapses and enters into a downward spiral" during which he "stops attending 

programs," has "no communication with anyone, including his children," and 

"basically goes missing." 

The judge explained that in the process of identifying a suitable placement 

for the children, the Division had evaluated several individuals, including 

various family members, all of whom were ruled out with the exception of the 

resource mother, the children's maternal grand aunt. The judge credited the 

testimony of the grand aunt, who confirmed her commitment to adopting the 

children and rebuffed Kinship Legal Guardianship (KLG) as a viable alternative. 

The judge was satisfied that the grand aunt's commitment to adoption was 

informed by a full understanding of the differences between KLG and adoption, 

as it had been explained to her "on many occasions" by "several [Division] 

workers." The judge further credited the testimony of the Law Guardian's 
6 A-0928-22

expert, who evaluated the grand aunt, the birth mother, and the children and 

opined that "[b]oth children . . . have primary attachment to the [grand aunt] 

after having lived with her for three[-]and[-]a half years." 

The judge found persuasive the expert's unrebutted opinion that the 

children's "best interest would be served by termination of parental rights 

followed by the adoption by [the grand aunt]" and that KLG "would not be in 

the boys' best interest" because "[t]hey desperately need[ed] permanency," 

particularly H.C., III who had "experienced two removals from his home with 

his mother," had "ADHD," was "deaf in one ear," and was "deal[ing] with 

posttraumatic stress disorder [PTSD]" from his exposure to domestic violence 

between A.R. and defendant.2 

The judge was also persuaded by the credible testimony of the Division's 

psychologist, who was qualified as an expert in both "psychology and substance 

abuse disorders" and "ha[d] evaluated the . . . family over a seven-year period." 

According to the expert, defendant's "diagnostic impressions" were "major 

depressive disorder, PTSD with panic attacks, opioid use disorder, antisocial 

and borderline personality traits." The expert opined that defendant was "unable 

2

 H.C., III was also diagnosed with "oppositional defiance disorder" and was 

under the care of a psychiatrist. During his prior removal, he had been placed 

in various treatment homes. 
7 A-0928-22

to parent today" or "in the foreseeable future" because he "[could not] prioritize 

the needs of [the] children over the need for drugs" and "his inability [would] 

not be remediated in the foreseeable future." Based on the bonding evaluations, 

the expert further testified that "the children were affectionate with [defendant] 

but not secure," while they "share[d] a significant, positive, reciprocal emotional 

attachment" to their grand aunt and looked to her to "meet their needs." 

The judge accepted the expert's unrebutted testimony that the children 

"desperately" needed permanency, particularly H.C., III, "because of his special 

needs," and "delaying permanency [would be] problematic." Although the 

expert acknowledged that "there [was] always a risk of harm" associated with 

"losing a connection with the biological parents permanently," he believed that 

adoption by the grand aunt "outweigh[ed] the harm of termination of parental 

rights" and "would do more good than harm because [the children were] thriving 

with the stability and consistency they [were] experiencing in that home." He 

stated that "placement with the [grand] aunt has mitigated any harm caused by 

separation from the biological parents" and opined that removal would be 

"disruptive" and "traumatic" and "very difficult to remediate." 
8 A-0928-22

Next, the judge applied the statutory "best interests of the child" standard, 

which authorizes the Division to initiate a petition to terminate parental rights 

if: 

(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been 

or will continue to be endangered by the parental 

relationship; 

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the 

harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to 

provide a safe and stable home for the child and the 

delay of permanent placement will add to the harm; 

(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide 

services to help the parent correct the circumstances 

which led to the child's placement outside the home and 

the court has considered alternatives to termination of 

parental rights; and 

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more

harm than good. 

[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).] 

 

The judge concluded the Division "ha[d] proven by clear and convincing 

evidence that it [was] in the child[ren's] best interest . . . to terminate the parental 

rights of defendant." As to prong one, the judge found that the children have 

been harmed because defendant 

has for the majority of these boys' lives been 

unavailable to them and will continue to be unavailable 

to them; has failed to address mental health issues; has 

no housing; has no employment; has been unable to 
9 A-0928-22

complete long-term residential drug programs or 

outpatient programs while not incarcerated; has been 

unable to remain uninvolved with the criminal justice 

system; and offers no viable plan to provide for their 

physical, intellectual, and emotional wellbeing. 

As to prong two, the judge found "defendant has not rectified the 

circumstances that led to the removal of his children," "has never acted as a 

primary caretaker to his now [eleven] and four-year-old sons," "is unable or 

unwilling to eliminate the harm [to his children], and delaying permanent 

placement will add to the harm." As to prong three, the judge determined "[t]he 

Division provided a comprehensive number of reasonable efforts . . . 

commencing long before the filing of the guardianship [complaint]," and had 

"explored" and "ruled out" numerous "relatives and friends." 

The judge was satisfied that "there [were] no alternatives to termination," 

explaining that the resource mother was "a relative . . . who ha[d] been involved 

with both children since their birth," was described by the children's mother "as 

a mother to her," and was aware of the differences between adoption and KLG 

and "did not want [KLG]." Further, the judge stressed that both experts testified 

that "adoption" rather than KLG "was in the best interest of the children." 

Finally, relying on the experts' uncontroverted opinions and the overwhelming 

evidence of defendant's failed efforts to properly parent his children, the judge 
10 A-0928-22

concluded that termination of defendant's parental rights "will not do more harm 

than good." The judge entered a memorializing order and this appeal followed. 

On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration: 

POINT I 

THE JUDGMENT OF GUARDIANSHIP MUST BE 

VACATED AND THE MATTER REMANDED FOR 

A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE COURT ABUSED 

ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO ENSURE 

THAT [DEFENDANT] RECEIVED HIS 

PRESCRIPTION MEDICATION ON EACH TRIAL 

DATE. WITHOUT MEDICATION, [DEFENDANT] 

WAS DENIED AN OPPORTUNITY TO 

MEANINGFULLY PARTICIPATE AT TRIAL. 

POINT II 

[DEFENDANT] RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT THE 

GUARDIANSHIP TRIAL. (NOT RAISED BELOW) 

POINT III 

[THE DIVISION'S] WILLFUL FAILURE TO ASSESS 

A FAMILY MEMBER WILLING TO RAISE THE 

CHILDREN REQUIRES A REVERSAL OF THE 

COURT'S JUDGMENT OF GUARDIANSHIP. 

Our scope of review in appeals from orders terminating parental rights is 

limited. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. T.D., 454 N.J. Super. 353, 

379 (App. Div. 2018). In such cases, we will generally uphold the trial court's 

findings, so long as they are supported by "adequate, substantial, and credible 
11 A-0928-22

evidence." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 552 (2014); 

see N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448-49 (2012) ("It 

is not our place to second-guess or substitute our judgment for that of the family 

court, provided that the record contains substantial and credible evidence to 

support the decision to terminate parental rights."). Such a decision should only 

be reversed or altered on appeal if the trial court's findings were "so wholly 

unsupportable as to result in a denial of justice." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. 

Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J. 494, 511 (2004) (quoting In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 

172 N.J. 440, 472 (2002)). 

"We accord deference to factfindings of the family court because it has 

the superior ability to gauge the credibility of the witnesses who testify before 

it and because it possesses special expertise in matters related to the family." 

F.M., 211 N.J. at 448 (citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). Even 

where the parent alleges "error in the trial judge's evaluation of the underlying 

facts and the implications to be drawn therefrom," deference must be afforded 

unless the judge "went so wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made." 

N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007) (first 

quoting In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 189 (App. Div. 1993), 
12 A-0928-22

then quoting C.B. Snyder Realty Inc. v. BMW of N. Am. Inc., 233 N.J. Super. 

65, 69 (App. Div. 1989)). 

Guided by these standards, we conclude that the judge's factual findings 

are amply supported by the credible evidence in the record, and her legal 

conclusions expressed in her comprehensive and well-reasoned oral opinion are 

unassailable. The judge reviewed the evidence presented at trial, made detailed 

findings as to each prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), and concluded that the 

Division met by clear and convincing evidence all the legal requirements for a 

judgment of guardianship. The judge's opinion tracks the statutory requirements 

of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), and comports with governing case law. See, e.g., 

F.M., 211 N.J. at 447-54; N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 

103-07 (2008); In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 347-63 (1999); In 

re Guardianship of DMH, 161 N.J. 365, 375-93 (1999); N.J. Div. of Youth & 

Fam. Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 604-11 (1986). 

With respect to the "best interests of the child" standard, defendant only 

challenges the judge's conclusion in connection with the second part of prong 

three, arguing the Division's failure to assess his brother, P.C., requires reversal 

of the judgment. P.C. was ruled out as a suitable placement for the children 

because his background check revealed prior criminal convictions, which 
13 A-0928-22

included weapons and drug related offenses. Admittedly, the Division failed to 

provide P.C. with an official rule-out letter. Nonetheless, the Division met its 

obligation to prioritize placement with a family member by placing the children 

with their grand aunt with whom they had a lifelong relationship, in whose home 

they were thriving, and with whom they were able to maintain family 

connections. 

"The Division must perform a reasonable investigation of . . . relatives 

that is fair, but also sensitive to the passage of time and the child's critical need 

for finality and permanency." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. J.S., 433 N.J. 

Super. 69, 87 (App. Div. 2013). Here, the Division performed the requisite 

investigation of P.C. The absence of a formal rule-out letter does not warrant 

reversing the guardianship judgment where the overwhelming evidence 

establishes that the best interests of the children were served by placement with 

their grand aunt. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. K.L.W., 419 N.J. 

Super. 568, 581 (App. Div. 2011) ("Delay of permanency or reversal of 

termination based on the Division's noncompliance with its statutory obligations 

is warranted only when it is in the best interests of the child."). 

Next, we address defendant's argument that the judge's "refusal to ensure 

[he] was properly medicated before each trial day began . . . was an abuse of 
14 A-0928-22

discretion that requires a reversal of the judgment" because the "failure deprived 

[defendant] of the opportunity for meaningful participation at trial." 

"Procedural due process standards require the opportunity for meaningful 

participation by the person at risk of limitation in any trial in which important 

rights or interests are to be adjudicated." Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. 

M.Y.J.P., 360 N.J. Super. 426, 468 (App. Div. 2003). Although such rights are 

implicated in an action for termination of parental rights, "[t]he requirements of 

due process do not confer a constitutional right of confrontation or mandate a 

parent's presence at the trial." Id. at 467. Still, "[d]ue process evaluations 

typically call for a balancing of pertinent factors in the situation at hand." Id. at 

468. 

To that end, 

[t]he protections needed to ensure due process 

where governmental action is to be taken depend on a 

careful balancing of three factors: (1) identification 

and specification of the private interest that will be 

affected by the official action; (2) assessment of the risk 

that there will be an erroneous deprivation of the 

interest through the procedures used, and the probable 

value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 

safeguards; and (3) evaluation of the governmental 

interest involved, including the added fiscal and 

administrative burdens that additional or substitute 

procedures would require. 
15 A-0928-22

[Id. at 465 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 

335 (1976)).] 

See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982) (applying Eldridge 

analysis to termination proceeding). 

In New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. K.S., we 

applied the Eldridge analysis to a termination proceeding and held that "[a] 

parent facing the termination of parental rights is entitled to every reasonable 

opportunity to produce evidence" in order to satisfy procedural due process. 445 

N.J. Super. 384, 394 (App. Div. 2016). Thus, we determined that where a parent 

wished to testify even after the close of evidence, "the trial court [was] 

constitutionally obligated to grant the request as long as it [did] not interfere 

with the children's 'essential and overriding interest in stability and 

permanency.'" Ibid. (quoting In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 26 (1992)). 

Some states "have held that a parent who is incarcerated or otherwise prevented 

from attending a termination trial can be afforded due process where the parent 

receives notice, is represented by counsel, and is given an opportunity to testify 

by telephone or deposition." M.Y.J.P., 360 N.J. Super. at 468. 

The question to be answered in a due process evaluation "is not whether 

particular procedures were used, but rather whether those procedures which 

were employed were appropriate and adequate to protect the interests at stake." 
16 A-0928-22

Id. at 467-68. That said, "'the precise method of participation'" afforded a parent 

in a termination proceeding "'should generally be left to the discretion of the 

trial judge.'" Id. at 468 (quoting In re Adoption of Edmund, 739 N.E.2d 274, 

277 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000)). Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not secondguess the judge's decision. See N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. A.B., 

231 N.J. 354, 366 (2017) ("'Trial judges are given wide discretion in exercising 

control over their courtrooms' and have 'the ultimate responsibility of 

conducting adjudicative proceedings in a manner that complies with required 

formality in the taking of evidence and the rendering of findings.'" (quoting N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. J.Y., 352 N.J. Super. 245, 264 (App. Div. 

2002))). An abuse of discretion "arises when a decision is 'made without a 

rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested 

on an impermissible basis.'" Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 

(2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v. I.N.S., 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 

1985)). 

Here, on August 19, 2022, the first day of trial, defendant, who was 

represented by counsel, appeared virtually from the Hudson County 

Correctional Facility. During voir dire, defendant confirmed for the judge that 

he wished to participate in the trial virtually from the correctional facility due 
17 A-0928-22

to medical issues. The judge approved defendant's request, advised him that she 

would allow him to speak privately with his attorney at any time during the trial, 

and informed him that if he changed his mind and wished to attend the trial in 

person, she would accommodate his request. 

Defendant also asked the judge if she could arrange for him to receive his 

medications early at the jail. The judge responded she could not "control how 

[his] medication[s were] administered" but she would direct the medical staff to 

consult with defendant so that he could discuss his needs with them. The judge 

cautioned defendant, however, that if he chose "not to join . . . via video link," 

the trial would proceed in his absence barring some "extenuating 

circumstances." At the end of the day's proceedings, defense counsel asked the 

judge to memorialize in the order her warning to defendant that if he refused to 

appear, the trial would proceed in his absence and the judge agreed. 

Defendant appeared for trial via Zoom on the following trial day, August 

23, 2022, but refused to appear for trial on August 24, 2022. The judge noted 

she had not been informed by jail personnel "of any particular issue with 

[defendant]," other than his "refus[al] to come down." Accordingly, the trial 

proceeded in defendant's absence, concluding the testimonial portion of the trial. 

On October 11, 2022, the judge reopened the record to address defendant's 
18 A-0928-22

letters to the court expressing concerns about "his medical treatment at the jail" 

along with other issues. During the proceeding, a Sheriff's officer provided

sworn testimony confirming that defendant had been transported to the 

courthouse that morning, had refused to come to the courtroom, and thereafter 

had been returned to the jail. The officer testified that defendant was not ill, and 

the Division's attorney submitted defendant's medical records from the jail, 

which showed "no medical issues . . . that would prevent [defendant] from 

appearing in court." 

Defense counsel indicated on the record that he was "perplexed" by 

defendant's nonappearance because he had met with defendant the day before 

and was under the impression that defendant intended to come to court. After 

confirming with defense counsel that defendant had not expressed any desire to 

testify, the judge proceeded in defendant's absence. The judge noted they had 

"done everything . . . to accommodate [defendant]" and to facilitate his 

participation in the trial, "even recess[ing] on one occasion to allow . . . 

[defendant] to meet with [another] attorney on other [pending] court matters." 

On October 26, 2022, when the judge began placing her oral decision on 

the record, defendant appeared via Zoom. As the judge delivered her opinion, 

defendant interrupted the judge, stating he had "just got[ten] a tooth pulled" and 
19 A-0928-22

"need[ed his] medication." Defendant also complained that he never received 

his medication before court despite the judge's prior assurances. The judge 

directed her staff to "send an email to the jail letting them know that [defendant 

was] complaining that he . . . need[ed] to be medicated." Thereafter, the judge 

continued delivering her decision without incident. On November 4, 2022, when 

the judge completed placing her oral decision on the record, defendant again 

failed to appear. Defense counsel again expressed surprise at defendant's 

absence but indicated he was ready to proceed. The judge continued in 

defendant's absence. 

Applying the Eldridge analysis, we are satisfied that under the

circumstances, defendant was afforded the opportunity for meaningful 

participation at trial and we discern no error in the procedure employed by the 

judge. At all times, defendant received notice of the trial proceedings, was 

represented by counsel, and was not deprived of an opportunity to testify or 

produce evidence. Defendant claims he was deprived of due process because 

the judge failed to ensure that he was properly medicated by jail personnel at the 

beginning of each trial day. However, defendant provided no medical records 

from the jail showing that he was deprived of prescribed medications, never 

specified the medications he was prescribed, nor explained how the timing of 
20 A-0928-22

the administration of the medications would affect his ability to participate in 

the trial. What's more, even if we accept as true defendant's claim that he was 

deprived of needed medications, he showed no signs of impairment or physical 

manifestations of illness on the days he attended the trial in a presumably unmedicated state. 

In the same vein, defendant argues that he received ineffective assistance 

of counsel because his attorney "ignored . . . [defendant's] pleas to be properly 

medicated" and failed to "ensure [defendant was] medicated prior to trial." 

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant "must meet the 

two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 

(1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 

claims asserted in matters involving the termination of parental rights [in New 

Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. B.R., 192 N.J. 301, 308-09 

(2007)]." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. P.D., 452 N.J. Super. 98, 

116 (App. Div. 2017). To meet the test, 

(1) counsel's performance must be objectively 

deficient—i.e., it must fall outside the broad range of 

professionally acceptable performance; and (2) 

counsel's deficient performance must prejudice the 

defense—i.e., there must be "a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result 

of the proceeding would have been different." 
21 A-0928-22

[B.R., 192 N.J. at 307 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694).] 

Unlike criminal cases, the B.R. Court "direct[ed] that claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel in termination cases be raised on direct appeal" given "'the 

need to stabilize the circumstances of the child.'" Id. at 310-11 (quoting Susan 

Calkins, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Parental-Rights Termination 

Cases: The Challenge for Appellate Courts, 6 J. App. Prac. & Process 179, 207 

(2004)). The Court noted: 

In many cases, the issue will be resolvable on the 

appeal record alone. For example, if the panel accepts 

as true appellant's representations regarding the 

lawyer's shortcomings but determines, on the basis of 

the full record, that the outcome would not have 

changed, that will be the end of it. 

[Id. at 311.] 

Such is the case here. Even accepting as true defendant's claims regarding 

his attorney's shortcomings, based on the overwhelming evidence supporting the 

judge's decision to terminate defendant's parental rights, the outcome would not 

have been different without the purported deficiencies. Thus, defendant cannot 

establish the prejudice prong to justify relief. We also reject defendant's 

contention that prejudice should be presumed under United States v. Cronic, 466 

U.S. 648 (1984). In Cronic, the United States Supreme Court identified three 
22 A-0928-22

rare instances in which counsel's performance is so deficient that prejudice is 

presumed. 466 U.S. at 659-62. None of the rare circumstances delineated in 

Cronic are present here. See also State v. Miller, 216 N.J. 40, 61-62 (2013) 

(determining there was "no authority in this Court for the expansion of the 

presumption of prejudice beyond the narrow parameters set in Cronic"). To the 

extent we have not specifically addressed a particular argument, we deem it 

without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.