### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ugus t 10
, 200 4 S es sio n

STA TE OF TENNES SEE v . KEVI N DEWI TT FORD AND CLIFFORD SY LVE STERWRIGHT

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty Nos. 2001-A- 600 and 2001-A-601 J. Randall Wyatt, Jr ., Judge

No. M2003- 00957-CCA -R3-C D - F iled March 23, 2005

The a ppellants, Kevin De witt Ford and Clifford Sy lvester Wright, eac h pled g uiltyin the Davidson CountyCriminal Court to m ultiple counts of ag g rava ted robbery

. Appellant F ord re ceive d a total eff ective sentenc e of fifty y ear s incar cer ation in the Tenne ssee De partment of Corr ection. Appe llant Wri g ht r e c e ive d a tota l ef fe c tiv e se nte nc e of fo rt y -f ive y e ars inc arc e ratio n. As a c on dit ion of

the ir pleas, the a

ppellants attempted to re serve certified questions of law c oncerning the trial court’ s r u ling on their motions to suppress. Upon revie w of the r ecor d and the p ar t i es ’ brief s, we c onclude that Appellant Wrig ht failed to prope rly rese rve a certified question of l aw. Additionally , we c onclude that the trial court proper ly denied Appellant For d’s motions to suppress. There fore
, we aff irm the judgme nts of the trial court.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt s o f the Cr im ina l C our t a r e Affir m e d.

N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., d el i v er ed t he opinion of the c ourt, in which G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J ., joined.

Peter J. S trianse, Na shville, Tennessee , for the a ppellant, Keve n Dewitt For d.

Michae l H. Sneed (at trial and on appea l) and Ron Munkeboe (at trial), Nashville, Te nnessee , for the

app e lla nt, Clif

fo rdSy lve ste r Wrig ht.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; El iza be th B . M arn e y , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y G e n e r a l; Victor S. J ohnson, I I I , District Attorney Gene ral; and Shar on Br o x an d J ames Todd, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound-2-

The re cord on a

ppeal r evea ls that as a re sult of an investig ation, office rs with the Metropolitan Police Depa rtment (Metro) Armed Robbery Division s u p ec t ed the appellants of a

near ly y ear-l o ng spree of ag g ravated robbe ries. Ac cording ly , Detec tive Mike Chastain and other office rs with Metro beg an a month-long surveillance of the a ppellants

. On No v ember 17, 2000, during this surveillance, D etec tive Chastain observe d the appe llants meet at Panac he B eauty Salon (Panac he), w hich salon wa s owned by Appellant Ford. Appellant W rig ht got into Appellant F ord’s vehicle, and Appellant For d then drove Appellant Wright to the intersec tion of Herman Street a nd 17 Avenue wher e a stolen 1992 White Dodg e Cara van wa s located. A ppellant W ri gh t exit ed th Appellant F ord’s ve hicle and g o t i n to the Caravan. The a ppellants drove a way

from the location, with Appellant For d driving his vehicle c losely behind App ellant Wright in the Car avan. T he office rs initiated pursuit. Appellant Wright ultimately abandone d the Cara van. Appe llant Wright g ot into Appellant Ford’ s veh i cl e, an d the pair dr ove bac k to Appellant Wright’s ve hicle, which vehicle w as loca ted in the par king lot of Pana che.

Subsequently , on November 20, 2000, Detec tive Chastain witnessed the appe llants meet at Panache . Appellant F ord drove Appellant Wrig ht to 383 Hay wood L an e wh er e a stolen r ed Jeep Cherokee w a s lo c a te d

. A p p e ll a n t W r ig h t g o t i n to th e Ch e r o k e e a n d d r o v e o n N o le n s v il le Roa d toward dow ntown, with Appellant For d closely fo l l o wi n g. When the appellants re ache d the Thompson L ane a

rea , they appea red to be “ca sing” sever al businesses in the area

. Appellant Wrig ht then aba ndoned the Cher okee, a nd Appellant F ord ag ain drove Appellant Wrig ht to his vehicle.

B a se d u po n th e fo re g oin g , D e te c tiv e Cha sta in se c ur e d tw o arr e st wa rr a nts fo r e a c h a

pp e lla nt, char g ing the m with the thefts of t he two vehicles. Additionally
, six sear ch warra nts wer e sec ured fo r p re mis e s a sso c ia te d wi th the app e lla nts . O n th e mornin g of De c e mbe r 5 , 2 00 0, the app e lla nts

wer e ar rested. T he appe llants were taken to the Criminal J ustice Center (CJ C) while the sea

rch

war rants we re e x ecute d. At the CJ C, police f ir s t interviewe d Appellant Wrig ht, then Appellant F ord. During the interview s, the appe llants impl icated the mselves in a series of ag g ravated robbe ries.

Sub se qu e ntl y , th e app e lla nts fi le d mo tio ns to s up pr e ss the ir state me nts , a lle g ing the i l l e g a lit y of their a rre sts, the lack of pr obable c ause unde rly ing the sear ch w arr ants, and the c oerc ive atmosphere surrounding their conf essions. A hearing was held on the m otions to suppress. After hearing pr oof, the trial court overr uled the appellants’ motions to suppress. There afte r, Appe llant F or d ple d g uil ty

to s e ve n c ou nts of

a g g ra vate d r ob be ry , r e c e ivi ng a tot a l e ff e c tiv e se nte nc e of

fi ft y y ear s. Appellant W rig ht pled guilty to six counts of agg ravated robbery
, rec eiving a total ef fec tive

se nte nc e of

fo rt y -f ive y e ars

. As a c on dit ion of the ir ple a s, the app e lla nts re se rv e d the ri g ht to r a ise

certified questions of law r eg arding the trial court’s ruling on their motions t o s u p p re s s . Be fore revie wing the appe llants’ complaints reg arding their motions to suppress, we must first determine whether they proper ly rese rved c ertified que stions of law.

II. Ana lys is

A. Certified Q uestions of L aw-3-

Rule 37(b)(2) (i) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Criminal Proce dure pr o v ides that an a ppellant may appea l from any judgme nt of conviction occurring a s a re sult of a g uiltyplea if the following

re qu ir e me nts are me t:

(A) T he judg ment of convic tion, or oth er d ocument to which suc h jud g me nt r e fe rs that is fi le d b e fo rethe no tic e of app e a l, mus t c on ta in a stateme nt of the ce rtified question of law rese rved by defe ndant for appellate revie w;
(B ) The que stion of law must be stated in the judg ment or docume nt so as to identify

cle arly the scope and limits of the leg al issue

re se rv e d;

(C) The judg ment or doc u m ent m ust refle ct that the ce rtified question was ex pressly rese rved with the consent of the state and the trial judg e; and

(D ) T he judg ment or docume nt must reflec t that the defe ndant, the state, and the trial judg e ar e of the opi nion that the ce rtified question is disposi tive of the c ase.

Ad dit ion a lly , in Sta te v. Pr e sto n, 75 9 S. W.2 d 64 7, 65 0 (T e nn

. 19 88 ), ou r s up re me c ou rt e xplic itl y pr ov ide d p re re qu isi te s to app e llate c on sid e ratio n o f a c e rt if ie d q ue st io n of

la w u nd e r R ule 37(b)( 2)(i). The court stated:

Reg ardle ss of what has appea red in prior petitions, orders, c olloquy in open court o r o therwise, the final orde r or judg ment from which the time beg ins to run to pursue a T.R.A.P. 3 appe al mus t contain a statement of the dispositive ce rtified question of l aw rese rved by defe ndant for a

ppellate r eview and the question of law must be stated so as to clea

rly identify the scope and the limits of t he leg al issue

rese rved.

I d.

This court ha s repe atedly cautioned that “[b] eca

use the pre requisites enunc iated in Preston

are ma nd a tory , f

a ilu re to p ro pe rl y

re se rv e a c e rt if ie d qu e sti on of

la w p ur su a nt t o Pr e sto n w ill re su lt in t h e d i s m i s s a l o f t h e ap p e a l

. ” S t a t e v

. A n d r e a M c C r a w , N o

. 0 3 C 0 1

- 9 9 0 3

- C R

- 0 0 1 0 6
, 2 0 0 0 WL 250146, at *2 (T en n

. C ri m

. App. at Knoxvill e, Mar . 7, 2000) (c iting State v. Pender g rass, 937 S.W .2d 83 4
, 8 3 8 (T en n . 1996)). In State v. Armstrong , 126 S.W .3d 908, 912 (Tenn. 2003) , our supreme co u r t a g a in c o n s id e r e d th e Pr e s to n /R u le 3 7 r e q u ir e me n ts a n d c o n c lu d e d th a t s u b s ta n ti al compliance with the di ct at es of Preston wa s not sufficient to prope rly certify a question of law

.-4-

Howeve r, Armstrong provided that a trial court c ould take cor rec tive action prior to the judg ment becoming final in order

to comply

with Preston. See Armstrong , 126 S.W .3d at 912.

I n th e ins ta nt c a se , A pp e lla nt Ford com pli e d w ith the stric tur e s p ro vid e d in Pr e sto n. Hi s ju dgmen ts of

c on vic tio n s pe c if

ic a lly pr ov ide that he e nte re d c on dit ion a l pl e a s o f g uil t w hil e
re se rv ing c e rt if

ie d qu e sti on s of la w. Mo re ov e r, the jud g me nts of c on vic tio n e xplic itl y inc or po rate by ref ere nce an attache d “Adde ndum to J udg ment” which clea rly outlines the certified questions of law. The addendum wa s signe d by the trial court, the appellant, a nd the State. There fore , Appellant F or d’ s c e rt if

ie d q ue sti on s o f l a w a

re pr op e rl y

be fo re thi s c ou rt

. Appellant Wrig ht, however , did not strictlyfollow the dictate s of Preston. None of Appellant Wright’s judg ments of conviction provide that he ente red a conditional g uiltyplea while r eser ving

a ce rtified question of law . Further, t h e j u d gm ents of convic tion do not ex plicitlyincorporate by ref ere nce a ny

document which sta tes Appellant Wrig ht’s certified quest i o n o f l aw. There a re documents in the re cord sty led “Adde ndum to J udg ment of C o n v i ct i on,” purporting to be attachme nts to Appellant Wright’s judg ments of conviction. Howe ver, the se adde ndums do not fra me Appellant Wrig ht’s certified question of l aw, nor were they signe d by

the trial court or the Sta te . T he do c ume nts pr ov ide that “ [t]he sc op e a ndlim its of the le g a l is su e re se rv e d is mor e fu lly set forth in [Appellant Wright’s] Motion t o suppress an d t h e C ourt’s memora ndum opinion and order , filed on April 7, 2003.” Numerous issues ar e ra ised in these docume nts. I t is not t he burde n
o f th is c o u r t to f

e rr e t o u t a n ap p e ll a n t’ s c e r ti f ie d q u e s ti o n o f la w

. I n s te a d
, th e b u r d e n is on an appellant to e n s u re c ompliance with the r equire ments of Rule 37 and Preston. See Preston, 759 S.W. 2d a t 650. Ac c or din g ly , we mus t c on c lud e that A pp e lla nt Wrig ht f a ile d to pr op e rl y

c e rt if y his question of law for appellate re view. See State v. Ca rlos E. Br y an, No. M2001-02705- CCA-R3-CD, 20 02 WL 31 76 92 00 , a t *2 (T e nn . Cri m. App . at N a sh vil le , D e c . 1 1, 20 02 ). Th e re fo re , w e wi ll addre ss only

the issues raise d by

Appellant F ord’s c ertified que stions of law.

B . M oti on s to Sup pr e ss
App ellan t F or d’ s c e rt if

ie d q ue sti on s st e m f

ro m th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s de nia l of his mot ion s to suppress. I n revie wing a trial c ourt’s dete rminations reg arding a suppression hearing , “[q] uestions of c re dib ili ty

of the wi tne sse s, the we ig ht a nd va lue of the e vid e nc e , a ndre so lut ion of c on fl ic ts i n the evidenc e ar e matter s entrusted to the trial judg e as the t rier of fac t.” State v. Odom
, 928 S.W .2d 18 , 2 3 ( Te nn . 1 99 6)

. Th us , “ a tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t in a su pp re ssi on he ari ng wi ll b e up he ld unle s s th e e v id e nce pr eponder ates other wise.” I d. Neve rtheless, a ppellate c ourts will review thetrial court’s a pplication of law to the facts purely de novo. S ee State v. Walton
, 41 S.W .3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001). F urthermor e, the State, a s the prevailing party , is “ entitled to the strong est leg itimate view of the evidence adduce d at t he suppre ssion hearing as we ll as all rea sonable a nd leg itimate infere nces that may be dra wn from that e vidence .” Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23.

I n h is j ud g me nts , A pp e lla nt F or d s e ts o ut h is c e rt if ie d q ue sti on s o f l a w a s f

oll ow s:-5- I n the trial Court, [Appellant F ord] moved to suppr ess his confession to c omm itt ing a

se ri e s o f Ag g ra vate d Ro bb e ri e s o n s e ve ra l g ro un ds : (1 ) that [Ap pe lla nt F or d] wa s arr e ste d pu rs ua nt to tw o fac ia lly insufficient ve hicle thef

t warr ants, both o f wh i ch failed to state an offe nse, in contra vention of the F ou rt h Amendment to the United States Constit ution, Article 1, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constit ution, Tenn.R.Crim.P . Rules 3 & 4, a nd T.C.A. § 40-6-205; ( 2 ) t h a t [A p p e l l a n t F o r d ’ s ] s u b s e q u e n t c o n f e s s i o n w h ic h is inext rica bly intertwined with the prior unlawful a

rre st, is a fruit of the exploi tation of the poisonous arr est; (3) that the police officer s who int e rr og a te d [A pp e lla nt F or d] ig no re d h is r e qu e st fo r c ou ns e l a ndhis rig ht to rema in silent in violation of the Fif th Amendment; (4) that the po lic e of fi c e rs wh o inte rr og a te d [App e lla nt F or d] fa ile d to ho no r h is Six th Amendment rig ht to counsel which attache d upon the issuance of the two thef

t of property

war rants issued som e 14 hours prior to the interrog ation; ( 5) that the police off icer s who interrog ated [Appellant For d] i g nored his re quest to use the telephone i n violation of T.C.A. § 4 0- 7- 10 6( b) ; ( 6) that [Ap pe lla nt F or d’ s] w a ive r o f h is Si xth Amend me n t rig h t t o c o u n s e l an d h is r e s u lt in g c o n f e s s io n w e re involuntary ; (7) that the police office rs who ar rested and later interrog ated [Appellant F ord] f ail ed to explain their rea son for

arr e sti ng him

a nd fai led to sh ow him

the arr e st a ndse arc h w arr a nts in violation of T.C.A. § 40-7-106( a); (8) that the police off icer s who

arres ted [Ap pe lla nt F or d] f a ile d to take him

be fo re a ma g ist rate without “unnece ssary

delay ” in violation of Tenn

. R

. C rim.P. 5(a) ; and, as a corollary , (9 ) that the sea rch w arr ant that was se rved on [Appellant Ford’ s] business at the time of his ar rest on De cembe r 5, 2000 was issued without p ro b ab le ca use, without “evide nce of the fac t committed,” and without a nexus be tween the alleg ed robbe ries and the plac e to be se arc hed.

We will address these issues in a n order differ ent from that in which the y wer e ra ised.

1. Ar re st

On appea l, A ppellant For d first complains that the ar rest wa rra nts were fac ially

insufficient beca use the unde rly ing a ffidavits of complaint “fa iled to state offe nses.” Specifica lly , the appe llant

ma int a ins that

[u] pon car eful scr utiny of the Af

fi davits, it is clear that De tective Chastain claims that [A ppellant] Ford wa s merely prese nt for the alleg ed t ra n s g ression of [Appellant] W rig ht and not that he committed them. Both Aff idavits state that [Appellan t ] For d drove-6- [Appellant] Wright to the alre ady -stolen vehicle s, followed [Appellant] Wright while he m o v ed t h e vehic les, and then dr ove [Appellant] Wright bac k to his car. The se fa cts do no t justi fy the i s s u a n c e o f

A rr e s tW arr a n t s f

o r T h e f to f P r o p e r t y.

Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal Proce dure 4( b) provides that in the application for the issuance of an a rre st war rant, “[t ]he finding of

probable cause shall be base d upon evidenc e, which ma y be hear s a y in w h o le o r in p ar t p r o v id e d th e r e is a s u b s tan ti a l b a s is f o r b e li e v in g th e source of the hear say to be cr edible and f

or believing that there is a fac tual basis for the information furnished.” Probable cause is “a r easona ble g round for

suspicion, supported by

circ umstances indicative of an ill e g a l a c t.” Sta te v. He nn ing , 9 75 S.W. 2d29 0, 29 4 (T e nn . 1 99 8) . M or e ov e r, we no te that c ou rt s sh ou ld d e te rm ine the e xiste nc e of pr ob able c a us e a ft e r a sse ssi ng a ll o f the inf orma tio n a va ila

ble to the offic er at the time of arr est. See State v. Woods, 806 S.W.2d 205, 212 ( Tenn. Crim. App. 1990).

Regar d l es s , “a n arr est war rant is not require d in order to e ffe ctuate an arr est for a felony offe nse.” State v. L ewis, 36 S.W .3d 88, 97 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). An offic er ma y arr est a pe rson wi tho ut a wa rr a nt “ [w]he n a

fe lon y ha s in fa c t bee n co mmi tte d, a nd the of fi c e r ha s r e a so na

ble c a us e for believing the person arr ested to ha ve committed it.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 7-103(a )(3) (2003). There fore
, “the pr oper inquiry in the case at bar

is not whether the w arr ant was la wful, but whethe r the ar rest itself wa s lawful.” L ewis, 36 S.W.3d at 98.

I n the i nstant case , in the affidavit of complaint under ly ing the issuance of the sea rch w arr ant reg arding the theft of a

1992 Whit e Dodg e Cara van, De tective Chastain stated that Appellant F ord dr ov e fr om a

re sid e nc e to his bu sin e ss, Pa na c he
, wh ic h bu sin e ss i s lo c a te d at 17 00 Jef fe rs on Str e e t. At Panache , Appellant F ord met with Appellant Wrig ht. Appellant For d then drove Appellant Wright to the loca tion where the Cara van, which the owner h ad reported stolen, was located. Ap pe lla nt Wrig ht dro ve the Cara va n, wh ile Ap pe lla nt F or d f oll ow e d. Ap pe lla nt Wrig ht e ve ntu a lly abandone d the Cara van, and A ppellant For d drove him back to Panache . The fa cts underlying the

arr est war rant for the theft of a

Red J eep Che rokee are almost identical to the fore g oing f acts.

Moreove r, we note that at the suppre ssion hearing
, Detec tive Chastain testified that during the thefts, it was “ obvious” that Appellant F ord and A ppellant Wright we re ope rating toge ther. Appellant F ord took Appellant Wrig ht to the location of the stolen ve hicles. On e ach oc casion, Appellant Wrig ht drove the ve hicles, withA ppellant For d following closely behind. Afte r Appe llant Wri g ht be g a n dri vin g wi th A pp e lla nt F or d f oll ow ing , th e y

ma de the sa me la ne c ha ng e s a ndturns

. Appellant F ord picke d up Appellant Wrig ht when he a bandoned the vehicles.

Clearly , a thef

t of the vehic les had be en committed. T he ar rest wa rra nts alleg e that the

ve hic le s w e re wo rth mo re than $ 1, 00 0, bu t le ss tha n $ 10 ,0 00 , r e nd e ri ng the of fe ns e s Cl a ss D felonies. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-103 (2003) and 39- 14-105(3) (2003). Thus, our next i nquiry is w he the r D e te c tiv e Ma so n r e a so na bly be lie ve d th e app e lla nt c omm itt e d the of fe ns e . Se e L e wi s, 3 6 S. W. 3 d a t 9 8 ; s e e a ls o St a te v

. Ro b e r t A

. Cu mm in s , N o

. W2 0 0 0

- 0 0 2 7 7

- CC A

- R3

- CD
, 2 0 0 1 WL 9 1 2 7 9 2
, a t * 5 ( T e n n

. C r i m

. A p p

. a t J a c k s o n , A u g

. 1 0
, 2 0 0 1 ) ( “ O u r c o u r t s m ak e l i t t l e , i f a n y,A p p e llan t F o rd d o e s n o t ch a llen g e the se a rc h e s o f his re sid e n c e s. 1

-7- distinction between the te rms ‘re asonable cause ’ and ‘ probable cause ’ in determining whe ther ther e exis ts a basis for a n arr est.”).

De te c tiv e Cha sta in state d that it wa s “ ob vio us ” that the tw o me n w e re wo rking in c on c e rt

. Alt h o u gh Appellant Ford conte nds that “[u] pon car eful scr utiny of the Af

fidavits, it is clear that Detec tive Chastain claims that [Appellant] For d was merely prese nt for the alleg ed transactions of [Ap pe lla nt] Wr ig ht a ndno t th a t he c omm itt e d th e m,” we no te that

[p] rese nce and companionship with the perpetrator of a f elony befor e and af ter the c ommissi on of the o f f e nse ar e cir cumstance s from which one’s pa rticipat i o n i n t he crime may be infe rre d. No particular a ct

ne e d b e sh ow n. I t is no t ne c e ssa ry fo r on e to take a

ph y sic a l pa

rt in the crime. Mere encour ag ement of the principal is suffic ient.

Sta te v. B a ll, 97 3 S. W.2 d 2 88
, 29 3 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ). We c on c lud e that the fo re g oin g fa c ts

wer e suff icient to establish Appellant F ord’s pa rticipation in the crimes of vehicle theft. Ther efor e, Ap pe lla nt F or d’ s a

rr e st w a s la wf

ul.

2. Searc h

Appellant F ord nex t contends that the s ear ch warra nt for his busi ness “wa s issued without probable cause , without ‘evidenc e of the fac t c ommitt ed,’ and without a nexus between the a lleg ed robberies and the pla ce to be sear ched.” Our supre me court has explained that 1

[t ]he Fourth Amendme nt to the Un i t ed States Consti tution requires that sear ch wa

rra nts issue o n l y“upon proba ble cause, supported by Oath or a ffirma tion.” Article I , Section 7 of the Te nnessee Constit u t i o n prec ludes the issuance of wa rra nts ex cept upon “evide nce of

the fa ct committed.” The ref ore, unde r bot h the fe dera l and state c onstitut ions, n o war rant is to be issued except upon probable cause

.

He nn ing , 9 75 S.W. 2da t 29 4 ( fo otn ote omi tte d) . In th is s ta te , “ a fi nd ing of pr ob able c a us e supporting issuanc e of a

sear ch wa

rra nt must be based upon evide nce inc lud ed i n a written and

sw or n a ff ida vit .” I d. Spe c if

ic a lly , “ [i]n o rd e r t o e sta

bli sh pr ob able c a us e , a n a ff ida vit mus t se t f orth fac ts from which a

rea sonable c onclusion may be dra wn that the contr ab an d wi l l be found in the pla c e to b e se arc he d p ur su a nt t o th e wa rr a nt. ” State v. No rris, 47 S.W. 3d45 7, 47 0 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 2000). We note t hat “‘aff idavits must be looked at and rea d in a commonsense and pra ctical

manner ’, and . . . the finding of proba ble cause by

the issuing mag istrate is en t i tled to gr eat defe renc e.” State v. B ry an, 769 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tenn. 1989) (quoting St at e v. Melson, 638 S.W .2d 342, 357 (Tenn. 1982) ).In the re c o rd , t h e na m e o f t h e b u sin e ss is a lso sp e lled “K lip p e r S e n sa tio n s.” 2

-8- Detec tive Chastain’s af

fidavit supporting the issuance of the sea rch w arr ant was more than four pa g es in l en gt h. I n the af fidavit, Dete ctive Chastain stated tha t for seve ral months there had been “ a series of armed robb er i es o ccur ring in the Nashville Da vidson County are a.” T he modus op e ra nd i of

the c ri me s, wh ic h D e te c tiv e Cha sta in d e sc ri be d in de ta il, in di cate d th a t th e sa me
su sp e c ts c omm itt e d a ll o f the c ri me s. Th e re we re thr e e su sp e c ts i nv olv e d in the ro bb e ri e s. Th e fi rs t suspect wa s a “male black 62 to 65 inche s tall and chubby .” The second subjec t was a “ male blac k 66 to 69 inches tall and thin

. ” T h e t h i rd suspec t’s heig ht and weig ht were unknown bec ause he normally drove the “g etaway

vehicle.”

I n investigating the relate d case s, Detec tive Chastain discovere d that during the robbe ry of an Amoco F ood Shop, one of the suspects had dropped a small white hand towel on the g round. On the towel, written in ink, were the words “Clipper Sensations.” Detect i v e Chastain re viewed the 2 business license f

or Clipper Sensations and discove red that Appellant For d was the listed owne r. Appellant F ord’s phy sical desc ri p t ion, “[m] ale blac k, 64 inches tall, 150 lbs.,” wa s simil ar to that of one of the suspects. Appellant For d had a history of armed robbe ry and vehic le thefts. His fe dera l conviction for ba nk robbery had a similar modus oper andi to the cur rent string of robbe ries.

The a ffidavit also c ontained the s u rv eil lance information re g arding Appellant F ord and Appellant Wrig ht transporting stolen vehicles. Appe llant Wright’s description, “[ m] ale blac k, 67 incles tall, 180 lbs.,” was simil ar to a nother suspect in the robberies. The a ppellants wer e obser ved fre quenting Panache at 1700 J eff erson Stree t, which was a lso the same addr ess Appellant F ord used for the busine ss Clipper Sensations. Appellant F ord wa s observe d working at 1700 J eff erson Stree t on a fe w occ asions.

I n summation, Detective Chasta in stated:

Ba sed on surve illance and observations it appea rs to this Affiant that t h e s e t w o s u b

j e c t s a r e e a c h l i v i n g a tt w o s e p ar a t e l o c a t i o n s

. It appea rs that [Appellant Ford] and [Appel lant Wright] are not g ainfully employ ed. The s e s u b

j ects ha ve bee n observe d spending money at various stores and g as stations. [Appellant Ford] and [Appellan t W rig ht] have use d 1700 J eff erson Stree t as a mee ting place prior to committing crime s. Both [Appellant For d] and [Appellant Wrig ht] match the same or simil ar description o f t he suspects t hat were described in the s erie s of armed robberies we have be e n in ve sti g a tin g . T he y ha ve drive n v e hic le s th a t are c on sis te nt w ith what has be en desc ribed as b eing used in the series of armed robberies we ha ve bee n investigating. [Appellant F ord ] has been convicted of

arme d robbery

wher e the method of operation he used was the sa me or similar in the series of armed robbe ries we have be en inv e sti g a tin g . [A pp e lla nt F or d] ha s a lso be e n a rreste d f or ve hic leA p p a re n tly, C lip p e r S e n sa tio n s a n d P a n a c h e w e re o p e ra te d o u t o f t h e sa m e b u ild ing

. 3

W e no te tha t A p p e llan t F o rd faile d to sp e c ify w h a t ev id e n c e se iz e d fro m 1 7 0 0 J e ff e rs o n S tre e t he w ish e d to 4

b e su p p re sse d . In a n y e v e n t, a n y e v id e n c e se iz e d a s a re su lt o f t h is se a rc h w a s a d m issib le

.
-9- theft. [Appellant Wright] has a reco rd for we apons and dr ug offe nses. [Appellant Ford] and [ Ap p ellant Wright] have be en observe d transporting stolen vehicles that a re c onsist ent with what has bee n described as used in the series of arme d robberies we ha ve been inve stiga ting. The wea p o n s used in the series of armed robberies we ha ve bee n investigating a re that of a black revolve r and a lar g e silver semi automatic handg un. [Appellant W rig ht] has bee n observe d wea

ring a hat a nd g loves that are simil ar to what has bee n described as what the suspects wore during in the series of robberies t h at we ar e i n v es t i gat i n g.

Ba sed upon the fore g oing, a sear ch war rant for Appellant For d’s business at 1700 J eff erson Stree t was g rante d. 3

We co nc lud e that the re wa s suf fi c ie nt pr ob able c a us e fo r the iss ua nc e of the se arc h w arr a nt. Ap pe lla nt F o r d ’ s p h y s i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n m a t c h e d t h a t o f a s u s p e c t i n a s e r i e s o f r o b b e r i e s ; hi s companion, Appe llant Wright, also matche d the desc ription of one of the suspects; Appe llant Ford had committed the same or similar crime pr eviou s l y ; t h e appellants were se en driving vehicles simil ar to those involved in the robberies; a nd a towel be aring the name of Appellant F ord’s business, Clipper Sensations, had bee n left at the sc ene of one of the crimes.

Appellant F ord also conte nds that the aff idavit did not establish a sufficient ne x us betwee n the e vid e nc e so ug ht a ndthe pr e mis e s to be se arc he d. Ou r s up re me c ou rt ha s e xpou nd e d th a t

[a] n aff idavit in support of a sea

rch w arr ant m ust set forth fa cts from wh ic h a re a so na ble c on c lus ion mig ht be dr a wn that th e e vid e nc e is i n the place to be sea

rche d. The nex us betwee n the place to be sea rche d and the items to be seized may be esta blished by

the ty p e of c rime, the nature of the items, and the normal i n fe re nces w here a criminal would hide the evide nce.

State v. Smit h, 868 S.W .2d 561, 572 (Tenn. 1993) (citations omitted). I n the instant case , Detec tive Chastain stated that the a ppellants fre quented 170 0 J ef fer son Street, particularly befor e the commission of crimes. Additionally , a towel be aring the name of Appellant F ord’s business, Clipper Sensations, which was operate d out of 1700 J eff erson St ree t, was found at t he sce ne of one of the crimes. I n li g h t o f th e s e f a c ts , w e c o n c lu d e th a t s u f f ic ie n t e v id e n c e e xis te d to p r o v id e a nexus betwee n the location to be sear ched and the crimes committed. Accor dingly , the trial court did not

e rr in r e fu sin g to s up pr e ss the fr uit s o f s e arc h o f 1 70 0 Jef fe rs on Str e e t. 4-10-

Additionally , we note that Appellant For d complains that he wa s not shown a sea rch w arr ant for 1700 Jeffe rson Street. How ever , Detec tive Chastain ’s t estimony reve als that a sea

rch w arr ant

was g iven to A ppellant For d upon entry into the business. By

overr uling Appe llant Ford’ s motion to su pp res s, the tr ia l c ou rt imp lic itl y

a c c re dit e d D e te c tiv e Cha sta in’ s te sti mon y . T his iss ue is wi tho ut m e ri t.

3. Sta te me nts
Finally , Appellant F ord ra ises multipl e issues re lating to his statements to law enf orce ment

a ft e r his arr e st. Spe c if

ic a lly , A pp e lla nt F or d c on te nd s th a t hi s c on fe ssi on wa s th e re su lt o f h is

un la wf ul a rr e st, his re quest s for c ou ns e l a ndfo r the us e of a te le ph on e we re de nie d, his ri g ht t o
rema in silent was ig nored, his Six th Amendment rig ht to counsel was not honore d, he wa s not shown his arr e st w arr a nt andwa s u na wa re of the natur e of the c ha

rg e s a g a ins t hi m, andhis wa ive r o f h is rig hts was involuntary . Appellant F ord ar g ues that all of t h e fore g oing f actor s contributed to the involuntariness of his confe ssion. Accor dingly , he maintains that his c onfession should have be en suppressed.

Gene rally
, the Fif

th Amendment to the United States Constitut ion and Article I , Section 9 of the Te nnessee Constit ution provide a privileg e ag ainst self-incrimination to t hose ac cused of criminal ac tivity , making an inquiry into the voluntariness of a c onfession nec essary

. See State v. Callahan, 979 S.W.2d 577, 58 1 (Tenn.1998) . Howeve r, if an a ccuse d is informed of his Miranda rig hts and knowing ly

and voluntarily

waives those rig hts, he may waive the privileg e ag ainst selfincrimination. I d. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 479-78, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612, 1630 (1966)) . Additionally , the trial judg e’s f indings of fac t at the motion to suppress hea ring are
acc or d e d th e w e ig h t o f

a ju r y v e r d ic t. Se e St a te v

. T a te , 6 1 5 S. W. 2 d 1 6 1
, 1 6 2 ( T e n n

. Crim

. A p p. 1981). Ac cording ly , the trial court’s decision is binding upon this court if the dec ision is s upported by a pre pondera nce of

the evidenc e. Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 22-23.

This court must consider “ the totality of the c ircumstance s to d et er m ine whethe r the

c o n f e s s io n is a d mi s s ib le

. ” St a te v

. G r a d y E

. Sh o f f n er, No. 0 3 C0 1

- 9 4 0 3

- CR

- 0 0 1 1 3
, 1 9 9 5 WL 3 8 2 6 2 8
, a t * 3 ( T e n n

. Crim

. A p p

. a t K n o xv il le
, Ju n e 2 7
, 1 9 9 5 ) ( c it in g St a te v

. K e ll y , 603 S.W .2d 726, 728-29 (Te nn. 1980))

. Ac co rding ly , we c onsider the f ollowing f

actor s in determining the voluntariness of a

confe ssion: the appellant’s age; ed u cation or intelli g ence level; pre vious experience with the police; the re peate d and prol o n g ed natur e of the interrog ation; the leng th of detention prior to the confession; the l ack of any advice as t o constitutional rights; the unnec essary delay in bring ing the appellant be fore the mag istrate prior to the co n fe s s i o n ; the appe llant’s intox ication or ill health at the t ime the conf ession was g iven; depriva tion of food, sleep, or medical attention; any

phy sical abuse ; and threats of abuse. See State v. Huddleston, 924 S.W .2d 666, 671 (T e nn . 1 99 6) . F urthe rm or e , th is c ou rt ha s st a te d:

Coercive police ac tivityis a nec essary prer equisite in order to f

ind a confe ssion involuntary

. The cruc ial question is whether the behavior of the state ’s of

fi c ia ls wa s “su c h as to ove rb e ar [the a pp e lla nt’ s] w ill-11- to resist and bring about confessions not fre ely self-de termined.” The question must be answer ed with “c omplete disreg ard” of whe ther or

no t th e a c c us e d w a s tr

uth fu l in the state me nt.

State v. Phill ips, 30 S.W .3d 372, 377 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (citations omitted).

I n the instant case , the trial court found:

A f te r h e ar in g te s ti mo n y a n d c ar e f u ll y r e v ie w ing the videotapes of the i nterrog ation[s] of the [appellants], the Court finds that th e [ap pe lla nts ’] rig ht u nd e r the F if th andSixth A me nd me nt[s ] have not be en violated. . . .

The Co u r t is o f th e o p in io n th a t [A p p e ll a n t] Wr ig h t d idnot reque st an attorney

althoug h there may have been a brief mention of making a phone call. The Court f urther notes that both [ appellants’] statements were volunt ary

. I t is acknow ledg ed that there was a delay b e tw e e n th e arr e s t a n d th e ta k in g o f th e [ap p e ll a n ts ] b e fore a mag istrate, but it was rea sonable under all of the circumstances surrounding the questioning and proc essing of t h e [appellants] and the ava ilabilityof only one off ice f or the int er v i ew s of the [appellants] who wer e being interviewe d one afte r the o t her. Furthermore , there was no promise of l enienc y made, although ther e may have be en an implied bene fit for their c ooperation.

Fi rs t , we n o t e t h at Ap p el l an t Fo rd wa s t h i rt y y ea rs o l d at t h e ti m e o f t h e s u p p re s s i o n h ea ri n g. He as s er t ed t h at h e gr ad u at ed fr o mh i gh s ch o o l an d h ad n o p ro b l e m s r e a d i n g o r w ri t i n g. Ad dit ion a lly , w e no te th at App e lla nt F or d o wn e d h is o wn bu sin e ss at th e tim e of the of fe ns e s. App e ll a n t F o r d h a d p r e v io u s ly b e e n c o n v ic te d in f e d e r a l c o u r t o f b a n k r o b b e r y

. A p p e ll ant For d testified that he wa s rea d his rights when he was a rre sted for ba nk robbery . He a dmitted that he was

awa re of his rights be fore he g ave a statement in the instant case

. Appellant F ord wa s arr ested a t approximately 11:45 a.m. on Dec ember 5, 2000. He wa s taken to the CJC while police e x ecute d various sea rch warr ants. Detec tive Chastain arrived at the CJC at app ro xima te ly

5:0 0 p .m. a ndinf

orme d A pp e lla nt F or d tha t if h e wi sh e d to ta lk, the y wo uld have to w ait for the interview room, then occupie d by Appellant Wright, to be vacated. Appellant For d was g iven a Sprite to drink and pe anut butter c rac kers to eat. He wa s all owed to g o to the restroom. While at the CJ C, Appellant For d’s hands wer e cuffed in front of his body
, and sometimes he was cuff

ed by a single hand to a chair

. Serg eant Fr eddie Stromatt, who w as pre sent as Appe llant For d was de tained in the CJ C, testified that Appellant F ord appe are d to be in “p er fe ct l y fi ne and normal” phy sical condition in the CJ C.-12-

As one of his spec ific complaints, Appellant F ord cla ims that his confession was tainted by his ill eg al ar

rest. As we earlier conc lu d ed
, h is arre st was not unlawful. Ac cording ly , Appellant For d’s conf

ession was not influenc ed by an illeg al ar

rest.
Ap pe lla nt F or d n e xt ar g ue s th a t la w e nf or c e me nt d id n ot h on or

his inv oc a tio n of hi s Fif

th Am e nd me nt rig ht t o r e ma in s ile nt o r h is r e qu e st f or c ou ns e l. Ag a in, we no te that bo th the F if th Amendment to the United States Constit ution a nd Article I , section 9 of the T ennesse e Constituti on provide prote ction ag ainst compulsory self-inc rimination. To this end, “‘ [o] nce w arning s have be en g iven, . . . [i] f the individual indicates in any manner , at any

time prior to or during questioning, tha t he wishes to re main silent, the interrog ation must cease . At that point, he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Ame ndment privileg e.” State v. Crum p , 8 3 4 S

. W .2d 265, 269 (Tenn. 1992) (quoting Miranda, 384 U .S. at 473-74, 86 S. Ct. at 1627).

I n the instan t ca s e, Detective Chastain testified that Appellant For d never reque sted an attorney , nor did he indicate his desire to re main silent. Detec tive Chastain maintained that Appellant F ord expressed his willingne ss to speak with po l i ce

. W e conclude that in over ruling Appellant F ord’s motions to suppress, the t rial court implicitl y acc redited the testimonyof De tective Chastain. There fore , Appellant F ord’s F ifth Amendment rig hts were not violated.

Both the Six th Amendment t o the Unit ed S tates C onstitut ion and Article I , Section 9 of the Tenne ssee Constitution gra nt the criminally acc used the rig ht to c o u n s el

. See State v. B ly e, 130 S.W .3d 776, 779 (Tenn. 2004) . Howeve r, this rig h t o n l y at t ache s after the initiation of adversa

ry
c ri min a l pr oc e e din g s. I d. a t 780. F or e xamp le , the ri g ht to co un se l atta c he s “ a t th e tim e a n a rr e st

war rant issues, a pr eliminary hearing is he ld (if n o ar re s t warr ant is issued), or a n indictment or prese ntment is returned.” State v. J ackson, 889 S.W .2d 219, 222 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). I n the ins ta nt c a se , the re is no dis pu te that two ar re st wa rr a nts we re iss ue d, c ha

rg ing Ap pe lla nt F or d w ith theft. Thus, his Six th Amendment rig ht to an attorney was a ctivated a s to those offense s.

Howeve r, we note that “‘ [t ]he Si x th Amendment rig ht . .

. is of fense specific . I t cannot be invoked once for a ll future prose cutions, for it doe s not attach until a prosecution is commenc ed.’” Sepulveda v. State, 90 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting McNe il v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175, 111 S. Ct . 2204, 2207 (1991)) . Moreove r, “‘ [o] nce f ormal cri m i n al proceeding s beg in, the Sixth A me nd me nt r e nd e rs ina dmi ssi ble in the pr os e c uti on ’s c a se -i n- c hie f s ta te me nts “ de lib e rate ly elicited” f rom a de fenda nt without an express wai v er of the rig ht to counsel.’” State v. T err ance L ewis, No. W2003-00356-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 22125, at *7 (Te nn. Crim. App. at J ackson, Jan. 30, 2004) (quoting State v. L and, 34 S.W.3d 516, 523 (Ten n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. 2000)). The re is no ind ic a tio n th a t A pp e lla nt F or d ma de inc ri min a tin g state me nts a s a re su lt of int e rr og a tio n pri or to h is interview w ith Detective Cha stain. Acc ording to Detec tive Chastain, Appellant F ord wa s advised of his Miranda rights prior to the i nterview
, and Appellant For d signe d a waiver of those rig hts, key among them now being the rig ht to counsel. Ther efor e, we must now address Appe llant Ford’ s
c on te nti on that he didno t va lid ly wa ive his ri g ht t o c ou ns e l und er eith e r the F if th o r S ixth Am e nd me nts

.-13-

Appellant F ord conte nds that police coe rce d his waiver of rig ht s and his confe ssion in a

nu mbe r o f w a y s. F ir st, he c omp la ins that po lic e c oe rc e d h is c oo pe ratio n b y re fu sin g to e xpla in h is ri g hts du ring th e fi rst ho ur s o f c us tod y . T he e nti tle me nt t o M ir a nd a pr ote c tio ns is l imi te d to situations invol ving c ustodial interrog ation or its functional equiva lent. See S tate v. Ji mmy Albert Warren, N o. W2004-00107-CCA-R9-CD, 2004 WL 3140905, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. at J ackson, Dec . 15, 2004), application for perm. to appeal f iled, (F eb. 14, 2005). A dmittedly , Appellant F ord was not g iven Miranda

warnings at the time of his ar rest. R eg ardle ss, Appellant For d was not interrog ated prior to 8:30 p.m. on Dec ember 5, 2000, when the interview beg an. Ac cording ly , he was not entitled t o h i s rig hts before the custodial interr og ation. Detec tive Chastain testified that Ap pe lla nt F or d w a s r e a d h is ri g hts be fo re the int e rv ie w i n w hic h h e ma de inc ri min a tin g state me nts

. Specifica lly , Detec tive Chastain testified that he thoroug hly discussed Appe l lant For d’s Miranda ri gh t s wi t h h i m , an d Ap p el l an t Fo rd s u b s eq u en t l y s i gn ed a wa i v er o f t h o s e ri gh t s b ef o re q u es t i o n i n g. See State v. C arte r, 16 S.W .3d 762, 767 (Tenn. 2000) (stating that proof that a defe ndant was ma de

awa re of his Miranda rig hts, although not c onclusive, we ighe d in favor o f t h e admi ssion of a confe ssion into evidence)

. Ap pe lla nt F or d a lso c on te nd s th a t la w e nf or c e me nt faile d to e xpla in the re a so n f or his arr e st and failed to show him the war rants for his arre st. Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 40-4-106( a) (2003) pr ovides that “[w]hen arre sting a person, the office r shall inform t he person of the off icer ’s authority and the c ause of

the ar rest, and e x hibit the war

rant if the office r has one, except when the person is in the ac tual commission of the offe nse or is pursue d immediately afte r an e scape .”

At the suppression hearing, Detec tive Chastain testified that at approximately 11:45 a.m. on Dec ember

5, 2000, he went to Pana che, Appellant For d’s place of business, to arre st Appellant For d

a ndto e xec ute a

se arc h w arr a nt f

or t he prem is es. Whe n th e of fi c e rs e nte re d Pa na c he , “ We d id

announce who we w ere and advise d that [Appellant Ford] did have a war rant for his arre st and that

we we re c on du c tin g a

se arc h w arr a nt the re .” F urthe r, De te c tiv e Cha sta in s ta te d, “ I be lie ve I didte ll him that there was a theft war rant. He did know
, and we did ide ntify ourselves as Metro Robbery Detec tives. I

believe he probably

put two and two tog ether in his mi nd and re alized wh at he wa s under a rre st fo r, als o.” Reg ardle ss, Detec tive Chastain maintained that he inf ormed the a

ppellant of t he felony theft charg es. Howe ver, D etec tive Chastain conce ded that Appe llant Ford w as neve r g iven a c opy

of the a rre st warr ants.

The fa cts adduc ed at the suppr ession hearing r evea l that Detec tiv e C h as t ain informed Appellant For d of the char g es ag ainst him; howe ver, Detec tive Chastain failed to c omply with the in s tr u c ti o n s o f T e n n e s s e e Co d e A n n o tate d s e c ti o n 4 0

- 4

- 1 0 6 ( a ) b y e xh ib it in g th e arr e s t w arr a n ts

. We note that Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 40-6-216( a) (2003) provides that a criminal defenda nt

or his a tto rn e y

sh a ll ha ve the ri g ht to re qu e st an d re c e ive a c op y of a n ar re st wa rr a nt at a re a so na ble tim e . Fro m the re c or d, it is unc le ar at wh a t poin t App e lla nt F or d wa s ser ve d with a c op y of the arr e st

war rants. Reg ardle ss of this shortcoming, we conclude that Appellant F ord wa s not prejudiced by failing to r e c e iv e a c o p y o f th e arr e s t w arr a n ts im me d iate ly a f te r h is arr e s t. Se e St a te v

. H il l, 638 S.W .2d 827, 830 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982); see also United S tates v. Buc kner, 717 F .2d 297, 301 (6 th Cir. 1983); United States v. Turcotte, 558 F .2d 893, 896 (8 Cir. 1977). th-14-

Appellant F ord also contends that there was an “unnec essary delay ” betwe en his arr est and his pr e se ntatio n to a ma g ist rate

. Rul e 5( a ) of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ri min a l Pr oc e du re pr ov ide s:
Any person arr ested except upon a capia s pursuant to an indictment

or prese ntment sha ll be taken without unne cessa ry delay b ef

o re t he

near est appropriate mag istrate of the county from which the war

rant for a rre st issued, or the county in which the alleg ed off

ense oc curr ed if the ar rest wa s made without a wa rra nt unless a citation is issued pursuant to Rule 3.5.

Ou r s up re me c ou rt

“ ha s h e ld tha t if

a n in div idu a l is no t br ou g ht b e fo re a ma g ist rate wi thi n 7 2 h ou rs , there has bee n ‘unnec essary d el ay

. ’” Carter, 16 S.W.3d at 768; see also Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d at 670. Fur

ther, our c ourts have f

ound that there was no unne cessa ry delay when a defe ndant was

n o t t ak en b ef

o re a mag istrate for

twelve to thirtee n hours af ter his ar rest. See State v. D avis, 141 S.W .3d 600, 625 (Tenn. 2004) (appe ndix ).

Appellant F ord wa s arr ested a t approxim ately 11:45 a.m. on Dec ember 5, 2000 . He wa s taken befor e the night commissioner at approximately 12:00 a .m. on Dec ember 6, 2000, a delay of just over twelve hours. The delay was attributable to police executing the sea rch w arr ants and the wait for the interview room. We conclude that there was no unne cessa ry delay in bring ing A ppellant For d befor e the nig ht commissioner. Reg ardle ss, “a c on fe s s i o n o btained during a period of

un ne c e ssa

ry de la y is n ot a uto ma tic a lly

su pp re sse d. ” I d. A c on fe ssi on is e xclu de d o nly if the tot a lit y of the c ircumstance s reve als that the statement wa s not voluntarily g iven. I d.

Appellant F ord also maintains that police thre atene d him “with a fifty -one (51) y ear term of incar cer ation under the Hobbs Act a s punishment for fa ilure to confe ss.” Appellant F ord testified that he wa s repe atedly

threatened by Detec tive Chastain with fede ral prose cution under the Hobbs Act. Howe ver, D etec tive Chastain denied e ver me ntioning the Hobbs Act, g oing so far as to say that he had ne ver he ard of

the Hobbs Ac t. The trial court found no coer cion on the part of police, a nd

we se e no re ason to fault this finding.

Ap pe lla nt F or d c omp la ins that poli c e c oe rc e d his wa ive r of ri g hts a nd c on fe ssi on by “ fa lse ly telling him that his cousin [Appella n t Wright] was alrea dy cooper ating and had implicate d him.” We note that testimony at the suppression hearing r evea led that Appellant Wrig ht was interview ed pr ior to Ap pe lla nt F or d, a ndAp pe lla nt Wrig ht c on fe sse d to the ro bb e ri e s. Ac c or din g ly , p oli c e did not “fa lsely ” inform Appellant For d of Appellant W rig ht’s cooper ation. We can ha rdly see w here

an ac curate portray al of the e vidence ag ainst Appellant F ord wa s “coe rcive .”

Appellant F ord mai n t ai n s that police promised him lenienc y if he c onfesse d. Detec tive Chastain and Serg eant St ro m att both expl icitly denied making any

promises in exchang e for Ap pe lla nt F or d’ s c on fe ssi on . How e ve r, De te c tiv e Cha sta in te sti fi e d that “ c oo pe ratio n a lw a y s d oe s, in my opinion, he lp the subject out w hen an investigation like this is – is occur ring .” Promises of leniency do not per se r ender

a confe ssion inadmissible; confe ssions after pr omises of lenienc y are-15-

e xclu de d o nly

if the pr omi se s we re su ff

ic ie ntl y sig nif

ic a nt to o ve rb e ar the su bje c t’ s w ill . Se e Sta te v. Smit h, 933 S.W .2d 450, 455-56 ( T en n

. 1 9 9 6). In the instant case , we c an find no c oerc ion sufficie nt to overbea

r Appe llant Ford’ s will.

Appellant Ford also complains that he was denied a telephone c all. There is no dispute that Appellant F ord aske d to ca l l h i s gi rl friend or fianc é prior to the inter view. Te nnessee Code An no ta te d sec tio n 4 0- 7- 10 6( a ) ( 20 03 ) p ro vid e s th a t a n a c c us e d s ho uldbe a ff or de d o ne ph on e c a ll prior to booking , pref

era bly within one hour of be ing a rre sted. Howe ver, of

fice rs t estified that Appellant F ord wa s not permitted to make a te lephone c all while the sea rch w ar ra n t s wer e being executed bec ause of

the risk of loss of evide nce. Re g ardle ss, when De tective Chastain a rrived at the CJ C, he knew tha t the sear ch wa rra nts had bee n executed and the loss of evidenc e wa s no longe r an issue. Thus, it is clear that Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 40-7-106( a) w as violated. A violation of this statute does not automatically rende r a statement inadmissible. I t is but one f actor to consider in determining the voluntariness of an accused’ s statement. S ee State v. Clay brook, 736 S.W.2d 95, 103 (Tenn. 1987)

.
After examining all of the e vidence , we c onclude that Appe llant Ford k nowing ly and voluntarily

waived his rig hts to counsel and to re main silent. Additionally , Appellant F ord knowing ly

and voluntarily

made a statement to police, implicating himself in the crimes to which he later pled g uilty . We find no rea son to o v err ule the trial c ourt’s ruling on Appellant F ord’s motions t o suppress.

III. Conclusi on

F i n d i n g n o r e v e r s i b l e e rr o r , w e a f f i r m t h e j u d g m e n t s o f t h e tr i a l c o u r t i n r e g a rd s to bo th Ap pe lla nt F or d a ndAp pe lla nt Wrig ht.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEEOGLE, J UDGE