United States District Court

Northern District of Indiana 

JASON WALDEN, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Civil Action No. 3:13-CV-1223 JVB

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Jason Walden, a pro se prisoner, filed an amended petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding. (DE 9.) In WCC #12-04-0194, a hearing officer

found Walden guilty of engaging in sexual conduct. (DE 16-3 at 1.) The charge was initiated on

April 7, 2012, when Officer T. Nash wrote a conduct report stating as follows:

On the above date and approx. time Walden, Jason #170280 was involved in a sexual

act with Inghels, Shane #988545. I ofc. Nash was doing my rounds down A4 North

wing, as I walked the other offenders called out “movie on” (she’s coming). As I

approached the room Walden #170280 was sitting on top of Inghels #988545 they

both had their boxers and pants down. Both offenders pulled their pant[s] and boxers

up. I then order[ed] both offenders to give me their I.D.s. They began to tell me that

they [were] exercising, horse playing and they also stated they always “do this”.

Before this sexual act took place I saw both offenders kissing on each other[’s]

bodies.

(DE 16-1 at 1.)

On April 12, 2012, Walden was charged with engaging in sexual conduct and given a

copy of the conduct report. (DE 16-2 at 1-2.) He pled not guilty, declined the assistance of a lay

advocate, and waived the 24-hour notice requirement. (DE 16-2 at 1.) He did not request any

physical evidence, but requested witness statements from fellow inmates Jose Yanes, Joshua

Carlisle, and David Payton. (Id.) Statements were obtained from all three witnesses prior to the

hearing. (DE 16-3 at 2-4.) Carlisle stated that Walden and Inghels had been doing “reverse sit-
ups or Roman chairs,” and that they were “sweaty from many sets of the workout as usual.” (DE

16-3 at 2.) Yanes also stated that there was “no type of sexual activity going on between them,

just a routine workout.” (Id. at 4.) Payton reiterated that the two men were merely “working out,”

and claimed that Officer Nash was mistaken about what she saw. (Id.)

On April 23, 2012, a hearing was conducted on the charge. (DE 16-3 at 1.) Walden made

the following statement in his defense: “The conduct report is wrong. We were wrestling, we

tried to tell her we were horseplaying [and] working out.” (Id.) Based on the evidence, the

hearing officer found him guilty. (Id.) As a result he lost 20 days of earned time credits, among

other sanctions. (Id.) His administrative appeals were denied. (DE 16-4; DE 16-5.)

 The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees prisoners certain procedural due process rights in

prison disciplinary hearings: (1) advance written notice of the charges; (2) an opportunity to be

heard before an impartial decision-maker; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present

documentary evidence in defense, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional

goals; and (4) a written statement by the fact-finder of evidence relied on and the reasons for the

disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). To satisfy due process, there must

also be “some evidence” in the record to support the guilty finding. Superintendent, Mass. Corr.

Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). 

The petition is not a model of clarity, but Walden raises a number of claims that appear to

be based on violations of internal prison policies. He asserts that Officer Nash engaged in

“official misconduct” by failing to break the two inmates up as soon as she saw them kissing,

apparently in violation of an internal “no tolerance” policy. He also complains that the hearing

officer abused his discretion in imposing the sanction, and in failing to treat him the same as the

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other inmate involved. However, even if he is correct that prison rules were violated, this would

not entitle him to federal habeas relief. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)

(habeas relief is only available for a violation of the U.S. Constitution or other federal laws);

Hester v. McBride, 966 F. Supp. 765, 775 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (violation of Indiana Department of

Correction policy in disciplinary proceeding could not support grant of habeas relief, since

federal habeas court “does not sit to correct any errors of state law”). These claims are denied.

Walden also claims that his due process rights were violated because he was not given a

copy of an incident report written by Sergeant C. Herr. (DE 9 at 2.) A prisoner has a limited right

to witnesses and evidence consistent with correctional goals and safety. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566.

A hearing officer has considerable discretion with respect to witness and evidence requests, and

may deny requests that threaten institutional safety or are irrelevant, repetitive, or unnecessary.

Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003). Furthermore, due process only requires

access to witnesses and evidence that are exculpatory. See Rasheed-Bey v. Duckworth, 969 F.2d

357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992). “Exculpatory” in this context means evidence that “directly undermines

the reliability of the evidence in the record pointing to [the prisoner’s] guilt.” Meeks v. McBride,

81 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 1996). The denial of evidence will be considered harmless, unless the

prisoner shows that the evidence could have aided his defense. See Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841,

847 (7th Cir. 2011). 

Here, Walden signed the screening notice which reflected that he did not request any

physical evidence. (DE 16-2 at 1.) He requested three witness statements, but these were

obtained and considered by the hearing officer. (DE 16-3 at 1-4.) Walden cannot fault the

hearing officer for failing to provide him with evidence he did not properly request. See Piggie v.

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McBride, 277 F.3d 922, 925 (7th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, Walden has not explained (nor can the

court discern) how the incident report had any exculpatory value. Instead the report merely

provided a second-hand account of Officer Nash’s eyewitness account, and stated that both

inmates refused medical treatment after the incident. (DE 16-1 at 2.) Nothing in the report

undercuts the evidence of Walden’s guilt. To the extent the report had any exculpatory value, the

hearing officer considered it in reaching his decision, which is all that Walden was entitled to

under Wolff. See White, 266 F.3d at 768 (prisoner’s rights were not violated when evidence he

claimed was exculpatory was considered by the disciplinary board, even though he was not

permitted to view this evidence himself). 

In a related vein, Walden argues that he was denied witnesses. (DE 9 at 3.) The record

belies this claim. As recounted above, Walden requested three witness statements at the time of

screening, and these statements were obtained and considered by the hearing officer. (DE 16-3 at

1-4.) Walden’s real complaint appears to be that the hearing officer did not credit these

statements, but there is nothing in Wolff that required him to do so. It was the hearing officer’s

job to assess the relative credibility of the witnesses, and this court is not permitted to reweigh

the evidence to make its own determination of guilt or innocence. McPherson v. McBride, 188

F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, these claims are denied.

Finally, Walden challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. (DE 9 at 2-4.) In reviewing a

disciplinary sanction for sufficiency of the evidence, “courts are not required to conduct an

examination of the entire record, independently assess witness credibility, or weigh the evidence,

but only determine whether the prison disciplinary board’s decision to revoke good time credits

has some factual basis.” McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786. “[T]he relevant question is whether there

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is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary

board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56. The court will overturn the hearing officer’s decision only if

“no reasonable adjudicator could have found [the prisoner] guilty of the offense on the basis of

the evidence presented.” Henderson v. United States Parole Comm'n, 13 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th

Cir. 1994). Furthermore, the hearing officer is permitted to rely on circumstantial evidence to

establish guilt. See Hamilton v. O’Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir. 1992).

Upon review, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the guilty finding.

Officer Nash reported that as she was making her rounds, she saw Walden sitting on top of

another inmate. Both inmates had their pants and underwear pulled down. Although Walden and

his witnesses claimed the two were only exercising, the evidence does not have to point to only

one logical conclusion to be constitutionally adequate. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 457. Rather, the

question is whether there is some evidence to support the determination made by the hearing

officer. Based on the record, the court cannot conclude that the hearing officer’s decision was

arbitrary or without evidentiary support. See id. (due process is satisfied as long as “the record is

not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or

otherwise arbitrary”); Moffat v. Broyles, 288 F.3d 978, 981 (7th Cir. 2002) (witness statements

constituted some evidence); McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786 (conduct report provided some

evidence to support disciplinary determination). Accordingly, this claim is denied.

For these reasons, the petition (DE 9) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED on August 18, 2014.

 s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

Joseph S. Van Bokkelen

United States District Judge

Hammond Division

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