UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

Patricia A. Shumaker, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. Case No. 1:13-CV-268-JVB-RBC 

Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration, 

 

 Defendant. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 Plaintiff Patricia A. Shumaker seeks judicial review of the final decision of Defendant 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, who denied her application for 

Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income disability benefits under the 

Social Security Act. For the following reasons, the Court affirms the decision of the 

Administrative Law Judge. 

A. Procedural Background 

Plaintiff applied for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income 

disability benefits in 2011, alleging disability beginning on June 30, 2009. (R. at 15.) Her claim 

was denied initially, as well as upon reconsideration. Plaintiff requested a hearing with an 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Id.) Her hearing was held before ALJ Warnecke Miller. On 

June 6, 2012, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has not been disabled as defined in the Social 

Security Act from her alleged onset date through the date of the ALJ’s decision. (R. at 27.) The 
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ALJ’s opinion became final when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on 

August 2, 2013. (R. at 1–3.) 

B. Factual Background 

(1) Plaintiff’s Background and Testimony

 Plaintiff is 50-years-old. (R. at 169.) Her highest level of education is the 10th grade. (R. 

at 173.) Since the alleged onset date of June 30, 2009, Plaintiff’s only income has been 

unemployment benefits. (R. at 22.) In the proceeding fifteen years before the hearing, Plaintiff 

worked as a housekeeper, molder-tender, and furniture assembler. (R. at 39–41.) 

 During Plaintiff’s six-year tenure as a housekeeper, she had to lift fifty pounds. (R. at 39–

40.) When she worked as a molder-tender, Plaintiff had to lift up to fifty pounds daily. (R. at 40.) 

As a furniture assembler, Plaintiff lifted up to seventy-five pounds. (R. at 43.) 

 Plaintiff claimed her disability began June 30, 2009, when she and her husband were in a 

motorcycle accident. (R. at 45.) Plaintiff testified that, since her accident, she can barely use her 

right arm, and has constant pain in her shoulder blade and arm socket. (R. at 45–46.) She 

attempts to control the pain with Tylenol, Ibuprofen, and rest. (R. at 46, 53.) Plaintiff previously 

took other medications for pain, but discontinued their use because they caused nausea and 

anxiety. (R. at 61.) Plaintiff told the ALJ that she can barely lift anything with her left arm, and 

her husband assists her with brushing her hair and getting dressed. (R. at 46–47.) She testified 

that on a ten-point scale, her daily pain is between a six and a nine. (R. at 59–60.) Plaintiff 

further testified that she spends her free time watching TV, playing computer games, sewing, 

gardening, and doing word searches. (R. at 49–51.) 
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 Plaintiff testified that she does the dishes at home, but stops after five minutes. (R. at 55.) 

Plaintiff further testified that she primarily eats with her left hand because of the pain in her right 

arm, and can’t reach an object two feet away from her. (R. at 56.) She stated that she only sleeps 

two or three hours every night because of the pain she feels if she sleeps on her back or right 

side. (R. at 57.) Plaintiff naps between five and thirty minutes throughout the day, but 

consistently awakens because of pain or nightmares. (R. at 57–58.) Plaintiff said that some days 

her pain is so great that she just lays in the sofa or recliner. (R. at 60.) 

 In addition to arm pain, Plaintiff testified that she suffers from headaches about twice a 

month that can last for several hours. (R. at 52–53.) Plaintiff also fractured her right big toe in 

the accident, and testified that she continues to suffer pain from it. (R. at 53–54.) This pain is 

aggravated when she walks down stairs, stands on her tiptoes, or walks barefoot. (R. at 54.) 

Plaintiff previously broke three bones in that foot, and had to shift her weight to her left foot 

when working. (R. at 54–55.) Plaintiff also stated that she is dyslexic and has had a poor memory 

since childhood. (R. at 58–59.) 

 Plaintiff’s husband testified that Plaintiff seems more forgetful since the motorcycle 

accident. (R. at 63.) He told the ALJ that he helps Plaintiff get dressed, open car doors, and get 

objects that are out of reach for her. (Id.) 

(2) Medical Evidence 

Plaintiff claimed that her severe, medically determinable impairments were dysthymic 

disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, borderline intellectual functioning, right clavicle and 

scapula fracture, obesity, and disorder of the right foot. (R. at 17.) 

 Plaintiff suffered a fractured right scapula, right clavicle, right humeral head, and right 
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big toe in a motorcycle accident in July 2008. (R. at 237). In addition Plaintiff fractured her ribs 

and suffered “road rash” on her right shoulder, upper arm, elbow and forearm. (Id.) Plaintiff was 

initially treated with a right shoulder sling and a cast shoe for her right toe. (R. at 242.) She was 

also prescribed Vicodin for pain. (Id.) The following month, Dr. David A. Goertzen, an 

orthopedist, prescribed Plaintiff physical therapy three times a week for six weeks to improve 

range of motion in her right shoulder. (R. at 330.) 

 Plaintiff’s condition continued to improve until she fell and hit her right shoulder in 

September 2008. (R. at 329, 423.) Ultimately, her clavicle did not heal properly, and in 

November 2008, Plaintiff underwent surgery to insert a plate and screws into it. (R. at 273.) 

Following the surgery, Plaintiff was again prescribed physical therapy. (R. at 324.) In December, 

Dr. Goertzen opined that Plaintiff’s condition had improved significantly, and she could return to 

work one-handed, or at full duty if she felt up to it. (R. at 320.) 

 In February 2009, Plaintiff told Dr. Goertzen she still suffered from a “bit of pain,” but 

she was found to only have trouble lifting overhead, and was cleared to return to work. (R. at 

318.) She was also discharged from occupational therapy. (R. at 278.) However, in May 2009, 

Plaintiff continued to complain of neck pain and underwent an MRI. (R. at 314.) The MRI found 

only a mild, broad-based central disc bulge at C5-6, and Plaintiff was referred to a sports surgeon 

for further evaluation. (R. at 314.) 

 Sports surgeon Dr. John Pritchard examined Plaintiff in June 2009. (R. at 311.) Dr. 

Pritchard found Plaintiff could forward flex her shoulder to 120 degrees and passively move it 

180 degrees. (Id.) Plaintiff continued to complain of pain in her shoulder, though Dr. Pritchard 

found Plaintiff’s fractures were healing well. (Id.) A CT scan found mild and moderate 

degenerative joint changes, and Dr. Pritchard recommended an arthroscopic shoulder surgery, 
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which took place the following month. (R. at 300.) The surgery revealed that Plaintiff suffered 

from a torn rotator cuff, which was repaired. (R. at 301.) In September 2009, Plaintiff’s passive 

range of motion was within the normal range. (R. at 294.) The following month, she actively 

forward-flexed to 120 degrees, and in November she was provided with a return to work slip. (R. 

at 292, 426.) 

 In January 2010, Plaintiff continued to complain of stiffness and tenderness where the 

metal plate was attached to her clavicle, though Dr. Pritchard noted the facture had completely 

healed and Plaintiff could forward flex to 160 degrees. (R. at 289.) Because of Plaintiff’s 

discomfort, Dr. Pritchard removed the plate in February 2010. (R. at 287.) An x-ray the 

following month found Plaintiff had “a little bit” of bone abnormality in her right shoulder, but 

Dr. Pritchard did not believe it caused her any significant problems. (R. at 283.) He advised 

Plaintiff to continue exercising and not pursue a job with “vigorous overhead lifting.” (Id.) The 

following year, Dr. Pritchard opined that Plaintiff had “approximately five percent impairment of 

the upper extremity or three percent impairment of the whole person” due to her “mild 

restrictions of strength and motion in the shoulder.” (R. at 333.) 

 Dr. David Ringel examined Plaintiff in February 2011 in connection with her disability 

application. (R. at 334.) Dr. Ringel found that Plaintiff had limited motion and weakness in her 

right arm and could not raise it above her head. (R. 337). Plaintiff told the doctor she had some 

difficulty dressing herself, but was able to dress and undress herself without difficulty during the 

examination. (R. at 336.) 

 In May 2011, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Mark Reecer at the request of her attorney. 

(R. at 431). Dr. Reecer’s examination found that Plaintiff had decreased range of motion in her 

right shoulder and numbness in her right forearm, but normal strength in her shoulder. (R. at 
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431.) Plaintiff could not reach or lift above shoulder level, which Dr. Reecer found to be a 

permanent limitation. (R. at 432.) Dr. Reecer opined that Plaintiff had a twenty-three percent 

upper extremity impairment and a fourteen percent whole person impairment. (Id.) 

 In addition to her physical ailments, Plaintiff has been diagnosed with dysthymic 

disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and borderline intellectual functioning. (R. at 349.) 

Michael Scherbinski, a licensed clinical psychologist who examined Plaintiff, opined that she 

“will likely do best in a position that relies on lower level applied skills that are commensurate 

with her cognitive ability.” (Id.) 

(3) Vocational Expert’s Testimony 

Vocational expert Amy Kutschbach (“VE”) testified at Plaintiff’s hearing before the ALJ. 

(R. at 65–73.) The VE classified Plaintiff’s former jobs of hospital cleaner as medium, moldertender as heavy (R. at 67), and furniture assembler as medium. (R. at 67–68.) 

The ALJ provided the VE with several hypotheticals to evaluate, all of which included 

Plaintiff’s age, 10th grade education, and work experience. (R. at 68–71.) The first scenario also 

incorporated the limitations from Plaintiff’s RFC assessment. (R. at 68–69.) The VE opined that, 

under these facts, Plaintiff could not perform her past work, which was medium or heavy, but 

she could perform light unskilled work. (R. at 69.) Examples of positions in the regional 

economy were repack room worker (300-350 existing jobs), laundry worker (200-250 existing 

jobs), housekeeping cleaner (300-350 existing jobs). (R. at 69.) 

For the second hypothetical, the ALJ added the limitation that the claimant could never 

reach overhead with her right arm. (R. at 69–70.) The VE explained the positions she identified 

could accommodate that limitation. (R. at 70.) Another hypothetical built on the second but with 
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a different variable: only being able to tolerate superficial interactions with supervisors, coworkers and the public. (Id.) The VE again stated that the previously identified positions could 

accommodate that limitation. (Id.) The ALJ next asked if these jobs could accommodate an 

individual who would be off-task at least twenty-five percent of the work day. (Id.) The VE 

stated that such a person would be precluded from full-time employment. Finally, the ALJ asked 

the VE if any of the three hypothetical individuals previously mentioned could hold competitive 

employment if they had good days and bad days which kept them from making their scheduled 

shifts. (R. at 71.) The VE testified that someone absent once or twice a month on a consistent 

basis could not be employed full-time. (Id.) 

(5) ALJ’s Decision 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled as of the alleged onset date of June 30, 

2009. (R. at 26.) The ALJ determined that, since the alleged onset date, Plaintiff had multiple 

severe impairments: dysthymic disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, borderline intellectual 

functioning, status-post right clavicle and scapula fracture, obesity, and disorder of the right foot. 

(R. at 17.) Nonetheless, these did not meet any of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. at 18.) 

The ALJ further found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 

June 30, 2009 (R. at 17), nor was she able to perform her past relevant work since then (R. at 

26.) The ALJ determined that she could perform light work with certain limitations. (R. at 20), 

and several jobs exist in significant numbers in the local economy that Plaintiff could perform. 

(R. at 25–26.) 
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C. Standard of Review 

 This Court has the authority to review Social Security Act claim decisions under 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court will uphold an ALJ’s decision if it is reached under the correct legal 

standard and supported by substantial evidence. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 

351 (7th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence consists of “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 

401 (1971). This Court will not reconsider facts, re-weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in the 

evidence, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Boiles v. 

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005). This Court will, however, ensure that the ALJ built 

an “accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion so that, as a reviewing court, 

we may access the validity of the agency’s ultimate findings and afford a claimant meaningful 

judicial review.” Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002). 

D. Disability Standard

 To qualify for DIB or SSI benefits, the claimant must establish that she suffers from a 

disability. A disability is an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of 

any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in 

death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) established a 

five-step inquiry to evaluate whether a claimant qualifies for disability benefits. A successful 

claimant must show: 

(1) she is not presently employed; (2) his impairment is severe; (3) his impairment 

is listed or equal to a listing in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) she is 
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not able to perform her past relevant work; and (5) she is unable to perform any 

other work within the national and local economy. 

Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 699–700 (7th Cir. 2004). 

An affirmative answer leads either to the next step or, on steps three and five, to a finding 

that the claimant is disabled. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001). A negative 

answer at any point other than step three stops the inquiry and leads to a finding that the claimant 

is not disabled. Id. The burden of proof lies with the claimant at every step except the fifth, 

where it shifts to the Commissioner. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000). 

E. Analysis 

 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in four respects: (1) her assessment of Plaintiff’s 

credibility; (2) her consideration of Plaintiff’s work history; (3) her evaluation of Plaintiff’s 

obesity; and (4) her assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC. (DE 20 at 16–17.) 

 This Court must decide whether the ALJ’s assessments were reached under the 

correct legal standard and supported by substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is 

relevant and reasonably adequate to support the ALJ’s conclusions. See Briscoe, 425 F.3d 

at 351; Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. For the reasons explained below, the Court affirms 

the ALJ decision. 

(1) The ALJ did not legally err in his assessment of Plaintiff’s credibility. 

The ALJ’s credibility determination will not be reversed unless it is “patently wrong” and 

not supported by the record. Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 843 (7th Cir.2007); Prochaska v. 

Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir.2006) (“Only if the trier of fact grounds his credibility 

finding in an observation or argument that is unreasonable or unsupported . . . can the finding be 
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reversed.”). The ALJ’s “unique position to observe a witness” entitles his opinion to great 

deference. Nelson v. Apfel, 131 F.3d 1228, 1237 (7th Cir.1997); Allord v. Barnhart, 455 F.3d 

818, 821 (7th Cir.2006). However, if the ALJ does not make explicit findings and does not 

explain them “in a way that affords meaningful review,” the ALJ’s credibility determination is 

not entitled to deference. Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 942 (7th Cir.2002). 

Likewise, “[w]e will reverse an ALJ’s credibility determination only if the claimant can 

show it was ‘patently wrong.’” Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation 

omitted). “Patently wrong” is a high burden. Turner v. Astrue, 390 Fed. Appx. 581, 587 (7th Cir. 

2010). “An ALJ’s credibility determination need not be flawless.” Adams, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 905 

(citing Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 516 (7th Cir. 2008)). “It is only when the ALJ’s 

determination lacks any explanation or support that we will declare it to be ‘patently wrong’ . . . 

and deserving of reversal.” Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413–414 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations 

omitted). 

The ALJ must determine a claimant’s credibility only after considering all of then 

claimant’s “symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which [the claimant’s] symptoms can 

reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.” 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); Arnold v. Barnhart, 473 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir.2007) (“subjective 

complaints need not be accepted insofar as they clash with other, objective medical evidence in 

the record.”) If the claimant's impairments reasonably could produce the symptoms of which the 

claimant is complaining, the ALJ must evaluate the intensity and persistence of the claimant’s 

symptoms through consideration of the claimant’s “medical history, the medical signs and 

laboratory findings, and statements from [the claimant, the claimant’s] treating or examining 

physician or psychologist, or other persons about how [the claimant’s] symptoms affect [the 
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claimant].” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); Schmidt, 395 F.3d at 746-47 (“These regulations and cases, 

taken together, require an ALJ to articulate specific reasons for discounting a claimant's 

testimony as being less than credible, and preclude an ALJ from merely ignoring the testimony 

or relying solely on a conflict between the objective medical evidence and the claimant's 

testimony as a basis for a negative credibility finding.”). 

(a) ALJ’s use of boilerplate language 

Plaintiff first claims that the ALJ erred in using boilerplate language in his opinion. In 

recent years, the Seventh Circuit has criticized SSA ALJs for the use of “opaque” and 

“meaningless” boilerplate in decisions denying disability benefits without articulating specific 

factual support. Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2012); Parker v. Astrue, 597 F. 

3d 920, 922 (7th Cir. 2010). But “[w]hile this sort of boilerplate is inadequate, by itself, to 

support a credibility finding, . . . its use[ ] does not make a credibility determination invalid. Not 

supporting a credibility determination with explanation and evidence from the record does.” 

Adams v. Astrue, 880 F. Supp. 2d 895, 906 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (citing Richison v. Astrue, 462 Fed. 

Appx. 622, 625 (7th Cir. 2012). 

Plaintiff predominantly relies on Martinez v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2011) to 

argue that it was inappropriate for the ALJ to begin her analysis with the words “. . . claimant’s 

medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to some of the alleged 

symptoms. . .” (R. at 21.) The court in Martinez took issue with similar language because there 

was no explanation following it explaining which of Martinez’s statements were credible. 

Martinez at 697. The instant case is distinguishable because after the use of this boilerplate 

language, the ALJ specifically went on to discuss Plaintiff’s description of her daily activities, 
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her receipt of unemployment benefits, lack of treatment in the record and Plaintiff’s 

“unpersuasive appearance and demeanor while testifying at the hearing.” (R. at 22.) Thus, the 

ALJ’s use of boilerplate language did not amount to an error. 

 (b) ALJ’s consideration of daily activities 

Plaintiff next claims that the ALJ erred in overemphasizing her daily activities when 

coming to her credibility determination. Social security regulations provide that, along with 

medical evidence, activities of daily living will be taken into account in evaluating an applicant’s 

symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. However, an ALJ must recognize the critical differences 

between activities of daily living and working full-time. Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647 

(7th Cir. 2012). 

 The ALJ stated that “. . . the claimant has described daily activities which are not limited 

to the extent one would expect, given the complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations.” (R. 

at 22.) At no point did the ALJ even compare Plaintiff’s daily activities to work, making 

Bjornson inapplicable here. Furthermore, Plaintiff cites to nothing in the record that supports her 

contention that all of her daily activities were performed with her left arm slowly and with 

required breaks, nor did the Plaintiff describe her activities in this manner in her testimony 

before the ALJ. (DE 20 at 22.) Thus, the ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s daily activities, along 

with other evidence of her credibility, was appropriate under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529, and the ALJ 

did not err in her credibility finding. 

(2) The ALJ did not legally err in failing to consider Plaintiff’s work history 

Plaintiff next claims her lengthy work history should have been discussed in the ALJ’s 
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credibility finding. Plaintiff relies on cases from the Second and Sixth Circuits for this principle. 

However, a Plaintiff in the Seventh Circuit “is not entitled to a presumption of credibility based 

solely on his long work history.” Jones v. Apfel, 234 F.3d 1273 (7th Cir. 2000). Even in the 

Second Circuit, “work history is merely one of several factors bearing on credibility.” See, e.g., 

Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 502 (2d Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the ALJ did not err by refusing 

to consider Plaintiff’s work history. 

(3) The ALJ did not legally err in his evaluation of Plaintiff’s obesity 

SSR 02–1p defines obesity as a medically determinable impairment and requires 

adjudicators to consider its effects when evaluating a claimant’s disability. “The combined 

effects of obesity with other impairments can be greater than the effects of each of the 

impairments considered separately.” SSR 02–1p. Consequently, obesity must be considered for 

its incremental effect when combined with other impairments. It is the Plaintiff’s burden to 

articulate how her obesity exacerbated her underlying conditions and further limited her 

functioning. Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 736–37 (7th Cir. 2006). Where the Plaintiff is 

silent in this regard, the failure of the ALJ to explicitly address the claimant’s obesity under SSR 

02–1p is harmless error so long as the ALJ demonstrated that he reviewed the medical records of 

the doctors familiar with the claimant’s obesity. Id. 

Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s obesity was a severe impairment, and indeed 

specifically took the Plaintiff’s obesity into account along with Plaintiff’s other impairments by 

limiting her to light work with additional postural limitations. (R. at 20.) Plaintiff’s argument that 

the ALJ should have discussed her obesity’s effect on her functioning, pain, and endurance 

misplaces the burden put on her by Prochaska. (DE 20 at 22.) Accordingly, the ALJ did not err 
14 

in his evaluation of Plaintiff’s obesity. 

(3) The ALJ did not legally err in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC 

An ALJ must evaluate all relevant evidence when determining an applicant’s RFC, 

including evidence of impairments that are not severe. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(e). However, an 

ALJ is not required to discuss every snippet of information from the medical records that might 

be inconsistent with the rest of the objective medical evidence. See Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 

503, 516 (7th Cir. 2009). But an ALJ may not ignore entire lines of evidence. Zurawski v. Halter, 

245 F.3d 881, 888 (7th Cir. 2001). 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to take into account range of motion 

deficiencies Dr. Ringel found in examining Plaintiff. However, Dr. Ringel’s examination also 

found that Plaintiff could walk on heels and toes normally, squat without difficulty, and had no 

difficulty getting on and off an exam table or chair. (R. at 336–337.) Despite these findings, the 

ALJ still limited Plaintiff to light work with postural limitations, a far cry from Zurawski in 

which the ALJ ignored all medical evidence showing disability. As Dr. Ringel did not identify 

any work limitations, the ALJ did not err in his evaluation of the Plaintiff’s RFC. 

Plaintiff also mentions in a footnote that the ALJ ignored Plaintiff’s post-accident IQ 

scores. (DE at 16 n. 107.) However, this is simply incorrect as the ALJ’s RFC expressly stated 

that Plaintiff “cannot understand, remember or carry out detailed instructions, is limited to tasks 

that do not require frequent decision making, and cannot tolerate sudden or unpredictable 

workplace changes.” (R. at 22.) The ALJ also found that borderline intellectual functioning was 

among Plaintiff’s severe impairments. (R. at 17.) Furthermore, Plaintiff only states that “a strong 

argument can be made [for remand for failing to address the IQ scores],” rather than actually 
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making that argument. (DE at 16 n.107.) Such an argument is underdeveloped, and as the 

Commissioner correctly points out, the Seventh Circuit has “repeatedly held that undeveloped 

arguments are considered waived.” Clarett v. Roberts, 657 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir. 2011). As we 

have noted on previous occasions, “‘[i]t is not this court’s responsibility to research and 

construct the parties’ arguments,”’ and conclusory analysis will be construed as waiver. Spath v. 

Hayes Wheels Int’l–Indiana, Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 397 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. 

Lanzotti, 205 F.3d 951, 957 (7th Cir. 2000)). Thus, the ALJ did not err in his evaluation of 

Plaintiff’s RFC. 

 

F. Conclusion

The Court finds that the ALJ built an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his 

conclusions. Thus, the Court affirms the decision of the ALJ. 

SO ORDERED on March 9, 2015. 

 S/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

 JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE