UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

LAFAYETTE DIVISION 

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK,

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,

SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO CHASE 

FINANCE LLC, 

 PLAINTIFF, 

 VS. 

MICHAEL A. ROBERTS, 

 DEFENDANT. 

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CAUSE NO. 4:14-CV-5-RLM-PRC

OPINION and ORDER 

In Cass Circuit Court cause number 09C01-1101-MF-00003, plaintiff 

JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, successor by merger to Chase 

Home Finance LLC, recovered a judgment and decree of foreclosure against the 

owner of real property located at 1465 North State Road 17, Logansport, IN 

46947. Chase purchased the property at the Sheriff’s Sale, then filed a writ of 

assistance to evict defendant Michael A. Roberts, who claims he is a tenant of 

the premises. Mr. Roberts removed the state action to the Northern District of 

Indiana and filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis in the District 

Court. He claims the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 

111-22, §§ 701-704, 123 Stat. 1632, 1660-1662 (2009) amended by Pub. L. No. 

111-203, § 1484, 124 Stat. 1376, 2204 (2010), preempts state law, creates a 

private cause of action, and that a federal forum for state-law unlawful detainer 

actions won’t disturb the balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities. 
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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), Chase moves to remand the case to state 

court and for payment of just costs and actual expenses, including attorney 

fees, incurred as a result of improper removal. 

Mr. Roberts argues that Chase was required to assert a cause of action 

under the PTFA to evict a residential tenant of a foreclosed landlord, but Chase 

artfully pleaded its complaint to avoid the Act. A defendant can remove a state 

court civil action to federal district court on the basis of federal question if the 

suit asserts a claim or right arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of 

the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441. “The presence or absence of 

federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ 

which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is 

presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar 

Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). A plaintiff “may avoid federal 

jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law” in the complaint, Id., but can’t 

avoid removal by failing to plead necessary federal questions. Rivet v. Regions 

Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998). When Congress intended for a 

federal law to replace or preempt a state law claim, “[a]rtful pleading on the 

part of a plaintiff to disguise federal claims by cleverly dressing them in the 

clothing of state-law theories will not succeed in keeping the case in state 

court,” and the defendant may remove such claims. Franciscan Skemp 

Healthcare, Inc. v. Central States Joint Bd. Health & Welfare Trust Fund, 538 

F.3d 594, 596-597 (7th Cir. 2008). In Wescom Credit Union v. Dudley, No. CV 
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10-8203 GAF (SSx), 2010 WL 4916578, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2010), the 

court found that the PFTA doesn’t create a federal cause of action that replaces 

state-law unlawful detainer actions, so the Act doesn’t preempt state law. 

Mr. Roberts disagrees, and contends that a private, federal right of action 

exists under the PTFA. He cites Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), and argues 

that he is one of the class for whose benefit the Act was enacted, the language 

of the Act, the legislative history, and the lack of any other specified 

enforcement mechanism indicate that the legislature intended to create a 

remedy, a cause of action is consistent with the underlying purpose of the Act, 

and while evictions are traditionally relegated to state law, Congress intended 

to break tradition. Chase cites several cases in the Ninth Circuit and one from 

the Northern District of Illinois in which courts have determined that the PTFA 

doesn’t create a private cause of action. The courts found that nothing in the 

text of the statute explicitly creates a private cause of action and nothing in the 

legislative history, statutory language, or statutory context indicates that 

Congress intended to create a private cause of action. Falk v. Perez, No. 12 CV 

1384, 2013 WL 5230632, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2013) (citing Logan v. U.S. 

Bank National Ass’n, 722 F.3d 1163, 1173 (9th Cir. 2013)); Martin v. LaSalle 

Bank Nat. Ass’n, No. 10CV1775 BTM(BGS), 2011 WL 9583, at *1 (S.D. Cal. 

Jan. 3, 2011); Nativi v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., No. 09-06096 PVT, 2010 

WL 2179885, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2010). Mr. Roberts offers no new or 

different evidence regarding the text and legislative history of the Act, so the 
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court declines to find that a private cause of action exists under the PTFA or 

that the Act preempts state law. 

Alternatively, Mr. Roberts claims the court has federal question 

jurisdiction pursuant to Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & 

Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005), because the PTFA is essential to the claims and 

a federal forum won’t disturb the balance of federal and state judicial 

responsibilities. As Mr. Roberts himself admits, however, state law traditionally 

controls evictions. Regardless, the PTFA isn’t essential to Chase’s claims 

against Mr. Roberts. The Act offers certain protections to bona fide tenants 

when the federally-related mortgaged property that they lease is foreclosed 

upon. Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 

702, 123 Stat 1632, 1660-1661 (2009). The mortgagor under the contract, 

however, isn’t a bona fide tenant. Id. Mr. Roberts claims that he is a bona fide 

tenant of the property. Chase contends that Mr. Roberts is the mortgagor and 

the borrower whose note and mortgage were the basis for the foreclosure action 

preceding the eviction. The docket sheet in Cass Circuit Court cause number 

09C01-1101-MF-00003 lists Michael A. Roberts, Tina A. Roberts, and Warners 

Greenhouse as defendants. The complaint on note and to foreclose mortgage 

was filed on December 27, 2010. On November 14, 2012, default judgment was 

entered against Michael Roberts. As the mortgagor, Mr. Roberts isn’t a bona 

fide tenant protected by the PTFA. Chase’s claims don’t raise a federal issue, 

and Chase properly asserted its claims in state court. 
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Chase claims that Mr. Roberts removed the case to federal court in order 

to delay and increase the cost of the proceedings. Consequently, Chase seeks 

attorney fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), which allows for recovery of “just 

costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of 

the removal” in an order remanding the case. As the mortgagor, Mr. Roberts 

likely couldn’t have sincerely believed he was also a tenant, or renter of the 

property, protected by the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act. Neither party 

explains the timeline of events in the underlying state court action. Chase 

referred to, but didn’t submit, the related state court documents. The court 

was able to glean from Mr. Roberts’ removal notice and the public docket sheet 

in the underlying case that the property was sold back to Chase on January 

16, 2013, and the first writ of assistance was entered in April 2013, but later 

withdrawn. A second writ of assistance was entered on January 9, 2014, and 

the Cass County Sheriff’s Department sent a letter dated January 14, 2014, 

directing Mr. Roberts to vacate the property within a week. Mr. Roberts filed 

the notice of removal a few days later. The timing of the removal suggests that 

it was a delay tactic. But the facts the court was able to gather don’t show that 

Mr. Roberts was clearly trying to delay the proceedings or increase the 

litigation costs. Regardless, under § 1447(c), prevailing parties are 

presumptively entitled to recover the attorney fees incurred in defending 

against removal, Garbie v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 211 F.3d 407, 411 (7th Cir. 
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2000), and Chase is entitled to its costs and other expenses, including attorney 

fees.

For the foregoing reasons, the court lacks jurisdiction over the 

underlying state court action. Accordingly, the court GRANTS Chase’s motion 

to remand and for payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including 

attorney fees (Doc. No. 3), DIRECTS Chase to submit an itemized statement of 

its costs and actual expenses, and DENIES as moot Mr. Roberts’ application to 

proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2). 

 SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED: February 18, 2014 

 /s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr. 

 Judge 

 United States District Court