UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4131

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

GLENN YOUNG,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Big Stone Gap. James P. Jones, 

District Judge. (2:14-cr-00004-JPJ-PMS-1)

Submitted: March 31, 2016 Decided: June 3, 2016

Before MOTZ and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Barry L. Proctor, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellant. John P. 

Fishwick, Jr., United States Attorney, Kevin L. Jayne, Special 

Assistant United States Attorney, Abingdon, Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted Glenn Young of bribery of a public 

official, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(A), (C) (2012),

and conspiracy to bribe a public official, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 371 (2012). On appeal, Young argues that the 

Government failed to present sufficient evidence to support 

these convictions and that the district court plainly erred in 

instructing the jury. Finding no error, we affirm.

I.

“We review [a] challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

de novo” and will “sustain the verdict if there is substantial 

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, 

to support it.” United States v. Engle, 676 F.3d 405, 419 (4th 

Cir. 2012). “Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable 

finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to 

support a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. 

Thus, “[a] defendant bringing a sufficiency challenge must 

overcome a heavy burden, and reversal for insufficiency must be 

confined to cases where the prosecution’s failure is clear.” 

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

To convict Young of bribing a public official, the 

Government had to prove that: (1) Kimberlee Crabtree, the nurse 

at the prison where Young was incarcerated, qualified as a 

public official; (2) Young corruptly gave, offered, or promised 
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something of value to Crabtree (directly or indirectly); and (3) 

Young did so with the intent “to influence any official act,” 18 

U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(A), or “to induce [her]. . . to do or omit to 

do any act in violation of [her] lawful duty,” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 201(b)(1)(C). 

We need not decide whether Crabtree’s actions—smuggling 

contraband into the prison and otherwise violating a variety of 

prison regulations to effectuate the scheme—qualify as “official 

acts” under § 201(b)(1)(A) because the Government presented 

ample evidence that Young violated § 201(b)(1)(C). See United 

States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 400 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc) 

(holding that “district court does not commit reversible error 

when it submits a legally adequate, although factually 

unsupported, theory of liability to the jury along with a 

factually supported and legally adequate theory of liability”). 

The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Government establishes that Young approached Crabtree in July or 

August of 2013 with an offer to pay her for any tobacco products 

she could transport into the prison. Crabtree agreed to the 

scheme because she needed money to help pay her daughter’s 

medical bills and, between August and October, she delivered 

several loads of tobacco products to Young. During the same 

time period, Young arranged for third parties to wire payments 

to Crabtree. We conclude that this evidence is sufficient to 
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support Young’s bribery conviction under § 201(b)(1)(C) and his 

related conspiracy conviction. See United States v. Alfisi, 308 

F.3d 144, 151 n.3 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that conviction 

under § 201(b)(1)(C) is “most appropriate in the case of bribes 

to induce actions that directly violate a specific duty, such as 

a prison guard’s duty to prevent the smuggling of contraband”).

II.

During deliberations, the jury asked the court whether it 

matters who initiated the transaction—Young or Crabtree. Young 

contends that the district court erred when it responded that 

the Government did not have to establish who initiated the 

transactions so long as it proved the elements of the offenses. 

Young suggests that the jury was concerned about the timing of 

the payments: did Crabtree provide the contraband first or did 

Young provide the payment first? 

Because Young did not object to the court’s instruction 

until after the jury returned its verdict, we review the 

propriety of the instruction for plain error. United States v. 

Tillery, 702 F.3d 170, 175 (4th Cir. 2012). To establish plain 

error, Young must demonstrate that (1) the district court 

committed an error; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error 

affected his substantial rights. Henderson v. United States, 

133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126 (2013). Moreover, the correction of such 

an error lies within our discretion, which we exercise only if 
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the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 1127 (brackets and 

internal quotation marks omitted).

We conclude that Young has not met this demanding burden. 

As we have explained, “the timing of the payment in relation to 

the official act for which it is made is (in theory) 

irrelevant.” United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 1014 

(4th Cir. 1998); see United States v. Fernandez, 722 F.3d 1, 19 

(1st Cir. 2013) (“[T]he timing of the payment may not provide a 

conclusive answer as to whether that payment is a bribe or a 

gratuity . . . .”). What matters is whether Young offered or 

promised to pay Crabtree with the intent to induce her to 

disregard her lawful duties. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(C). The 

district court, therefore, appropriately turned the jury’s focus 

from the timing of the payments to the elements of the crime. 

Finally, Young contends that the jury’s question indicates

that it had reason to believe that Crabtree offered to smuggle 

contraband into the prison before Young agreed to pay her. 

There is no evidence to support this assertion. Moreover, Young 

would be no less guilty under this scenario. Young would still 

be promising to pay a public official with the corrupt intent of 

inducing her to violate her lawful duties. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 201(b)(1)(C). Notably, Crabtree’s testimony established that 

she only agreed to the scheme because Young promised or offered 
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to pay her the money she needed for her daughter’s medical 

bills.

III.

We affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED