SUPERIOR COURT

OF THE

STATE OF DELAWARE

PAUL R. WALLACE

JUDGE

LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER

500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 10400

WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801

(302) 255-0660

Submitted: September 14, 2023

Decided: December 13, 2023

Mr. Michael D. Chambers

SBI# 246261

James T. Vaughn Correctional Center

1181 Paddock Road

Smyrna, DE 19977

Abigail E. Rodgers, Esquire

Chief Prosecutor – New Castle County

Department of Justice

Carvel State Office Building

820 North French Street, 7th Floor

Wilmington, Delaware 19801

Todd E. Conner, Esquire 

Chief Deputy

Dawn M. Williams, Esquire

Assistant Public Defender

Office of Defense Services

Carvel State Office Building

820 North French Street, 3rd Floor 

Wilmington, Delaware 19801

RE: State v. Michael D. Chambers

I.D. No. 0311009491A

Dear Mr. Chambers and Counsel:

The Court has reviewed Mr. Chambers’ latest pro se filing docketed 

September 14, 2023, through which he asserts he is due a certificate of eligibility

to seek review of his sentence under Title 11, Section 4214(f) and that the Court

should order the Office of Defense Services (ODS) to further assist him in his

efforts to obtain relief under § 4214(f).1 At bottom, Mr. Chambers suggests that 

the Court should grant him a certificate of eligibility because he has maximized 

his rehabilitative efforts and believes he now meets the eligibility requirements 

for such extraordinary relief.

2

 

1 D.I. 151.

2

Id. at 2 (positing that if he “were sentenced today [he] wouldn’t even be declared an 

Habitual Offender, or if so would not have received a 25 year sentence for 1447A”).
State v. Michael D. Chambers

I.D. No. 0311009491A

December 12, 2023

Page 2 of 5

The legislation enacting Section 4214(f) called for this Court to establish 

procedural rules to govern the filing of and proceedings on certain sentence 

modification petitions. The Court has adopted Special Rule of Procedure 

2017-1 for that purpose. That rule provides that pro se applications will not be 

considered unless the Court expressly grants a petitioner permission to proceed 

pro se. The Court has not granted Mr. Chambers such permission, but it appears

his latest filing is instigated by ODS’s notification that it cannot file a request for 

a certificate of eligibility on his behalf.3

For the sake of completeness, the Court has reviewed: Mr. Chambers’

request; the record in his case; and, the applicable law and Court rules. Those 

materials were examined to see if he might arguably satisfy the exacting threshold 

requirements for § 4214(f) eligibility4thus warranting any further ODS 

involvement. Mr. Chambers does not. 

After a three-day jury trial, Mr. Chambers was convicted of drug and 

firearms charges he committed in November 2003.5 At the time he committed 

these crimes, Mr. Chambers had at least three prior felony convictions and was

subject to sentencing enhancement as a habitual criminal offender.6 So, prior to 

his sentencing, the State filed a petition to declare him a habitual criminal 

offender.7 The Court granted that motion and sentenced Mr. Chambers 

accordingly.8

Resultingly, Mr. Chambers is serving, inter alia, a sentence of 25 years 

imprisonment imposed under the Habitual Criminal Act. The individual 

components of Mr. Chambers’ current cumulative sentence are: 

3 D.I. 150. 

4

See State v. Lewis, 2018 WL 4151282, at *1-2 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2018), aff’d, 2019 

WL 2157519 (Del. May 16, 2019) (describing the requirements that must be met before the 

Court will issue a certificate of eligibility to seek relief via 11 Del. C. § 4214(f)).

5 D.I. 29. 

6

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4214(a)(2003) (providing that a person who has been thrice 

previously convicted of a felony and is thereafter convicted of another felony may be declared 

a habitual criminal).

7 D.I. 38. 

8 D.I. 47-48. 
State v. Michael D. Chambers

I.D. No. 0311009491A

December 12, 2023

Page 3 of 5

- Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony 

(PFDCF) (IN06-05-0449)—25 years at Supervision Level V 

(to be served under the then-extant provisions of 11 Del. C. 

§ 4214(a));

- Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine (IN06-05-0447)— 

Two years at Supervision Level V, suspended in whole for 

two years at Supervision Level IV, suspended after serving 

six months at Supervision Level IV for 18 months at 

Supervision Level III; 

- Use of a Dwelling for Keeping Controlled Substances (IN06-

05-0448)—One year at Supervision Level V, suspended in 

whole for one year at Supervision Level III; and

- Illegal Possession of Alazopram (IN06-05-0453)—costs of 

prosecution.

9

 

The effective date of Mr. Chambers’ sentence is January 26, 2007.

10

Since then, Mr. Chambers’ convictions and sentence were affirmed on 

direct appeal11 and he has filed various unsuccessful motions seeking vacatur of 

his convictions and sentence. This includes no less than seven motions for 

postconviction relief,

12 a motion for sentence modification,13 and three state 

habeas petitions.

14

 

The Court now turns to his latest volley and whether Mr. Chambers

satisfies the exacting threshold requirements for § 4214(f) eligibility. 

9 Sentencing Order, State v. Michael D. Chambers, ID No. 0311009491A (Del. Super. Ct. 

Jan. 26, 2007) (D.I. 49).

10 Sentencing Order, at 1. 

11 D.I. 60. 

12 D.I. 52, 56; D.I. 63, 69; D.I. 71, 74; D.I. 79, 85; D.I. 97, 99; D.I. 103, 106; D.I. 113, 115; 

and D.I. 122, 125. 

13 D.I. 111-112. 

14 D.I. 129, 132; D.I. 134, 137; and 138, 141. 
State v. Michael D. Chambers

I.D. No. 0311009491A

December 12, 2023

Page 4 of 5

“[T]o be eligible to petition for sentencing relief under § 4214(f), an inmate 

serving a sentence (or sentences) imposed under the pre-2016 Habitual Criminal 

Act must meet both a type-of-sentence and the time-served requirement.”

15

 

Mr. Chambers may meet the first in regard to the PFDCF conviction for which 

he was sentenced as a habitual criminal, but he doesn’t satisfy the second.

Mr. Chambers was sentenced to the minimum required for his PFDCF 

conviction—25 years of imprisonment under the then-extant four-strikes 

provision of the Habitual Criminal Act.16 One might become time-served eligible 

for § 4214(f) relief only “after [he] has served a sentence of incarceration equal to 

any applicable mandatory sentence otherwise required by th[e current provisions of 

the Habitual Criminal Act] or the statutes describing said offense or offenses, 

whichever is greater.”17 

Under either of the current provisions of the Habitual Criminal Act applicable 

to Mr. Chambers and his PFDCF conviction—§ 4214(c) or (d)—the habitual 

criminal portion of his sentence for that crime would be no less than the minimum 

mandatory term of 25 years of unsuspended imprisonment he is currently serving.

18

 

15 Yelardy v. State, 2022 WL 9632128, at *2 (Del. Oct. 14, 2022) (emphasis added) (citations 

and quotation marks omitted); State v. Harris, 2022 WL 472518, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 

14, 2022). 

16 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4214(a)(2003) (“[A]ny person sentenced pursuant to this 

subsection shall receive a minimum sentence which shall not be less than the statutory 

maximum penalty provided elsewhere in this Title for the fourth or subsequent felony which 

forms the basis of the State’s petition to have the person declared to be an habitual criminal 

except that this minimum provision shall apply only when the fourth or subsequent felony is a 

Title 11 violent felony, as defined in § 4201(c) of this title.”). 

17 Id. at § 4214(f) (2023).

18 See id. at § 4214(c) (providing habitual criminal sentenced for a triggering fourth felony, 

when that felony is a Title 11 violent felony and at least one of his priors was a Title 11 violent 

felony, must receive the statutory maximum for that triggering Title 11 violent felony); id. at 

§ 4214(d) (providing one sentenced under this provision also must receive a minimum sentence 

of the statutory maximum penalty provided elsewhere in Title 11 for the triggering felony that 

form the basis of the habitual criminal petition). When Mr. Chambers committed his crimes 

in 2003, PFDCF was a class B violent felony with a statutory maximum of 25 years 

imprisonment. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §1447A, 4201(c) and 4205(b)(2)(2003). And 

Mr. Chambers no doubt had by then amassed no less than three prior convictions for Title 11 

violent felonies. See D.I. 38 (State’s habitual criminal petition evidencing Mr. Chambers’ 1995 

conviction for first-degree assault, 1999 conviction for second-degree robbery, and 2000 
State v. Michael D. Chambers

I.D. No. 0311009491A

December 12, 2023

Page 5 of 5

Simply put, he is nowhere close to time-served eligibility for release. 

Accordingly, to the extent Mr. Chambers’ filing that he entitles an 

application for “Affirmative Relief” is deemed a pro se certificate of eligibility 

under Del. Super. Ct. Spec. R. 2017-1(c) it must be DENIED, with prejudice. 

He is manifestly ineligible for relief under 11 Del. C. § 4214(f) and the Court 

need not enlist ODS to pursue an application for relief that is going nowhere.

19

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Paul R. Wallace, Judge

cc: Prothonotary-Criminal

Investigative Services Office

conviction for second-degree assault); see also Sentencing Transcript, at 4-6 (D.I. 126)(the 

State laying out those prior convictions during the habitual criminal hearing and 

Mr. Chamber’s response: “There’s no objection on my part to the State’s offer, Your Honor.”). 

Mr. Chambers’ mistaken belief that today his PFDCF would not be considered a triggering 

Title 11 violent felony seems to be a product of his errant reliance on current 11 Del. C. 

§ 3901(d). That statute only governs which violent felonies mandate consecutive sentencing. 

It does nothing to remove PFDCF from 11 Del. C. § 4201(c)’s list of violent felonies. PFDCF 

is now and always has been defined as a Title 11 violent felony. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 

§ 4201(c) (1996); id. (2023). So, it would still count as a trigger when figuring Mr. Chambers’

habitual criminal eligibility and slotting under the current Habitual Criminal Act. Id. at 

§ 4214(c) (2023); id. at § 4214(d)(2023).

19 See, e.g., Clark v. State, 2018 WL 1956298 (Del. Apr. 24, 2018) (this Court does not err 

by denying appointment of counsel when an inmate clearly does not meet § 4214(f)’s eligibility 

requirements); State v. Rowan, 2022 WL 896260, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct Mar. 28, 2022).