NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 14-1812

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DAVID CROCKETT,

Appellant

v.

SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,

d/b/a SEPTA; PASQUALE T. DEON, SR., in his individual capacity;

JACK K. LEARY, in his individual capacity;

FAYE MOORE, in her individual capacity;

JOSEPH M. CASEY, in his individual capacity;

LUTHER DIGGS, in his individual capacity;

PAT NOWAKOWSKI, in his individual capacity;

BERNARD COHEN, in his individual capacity;

JEFFREY KNUPPEL, in his individual capacity;

JAMES B. JORDAN, in his individual capacity;

NICHOLAS J. STAFFIERI, in his individual capacity

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-12-cv-04230)

District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson

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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

January 12, 2015

Before: AMBRO, FUENTES, and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 30, 2015)
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OPINION*

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AMBRO, Circuit Judge

David Crockett appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his due-process claim 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority 

(“SEPTA”) and ten individual defendants. Because Crockett has failed to allege that his 

harm stemmed from any affirmative act (as opposed to passive inaction), we affirm. 

I.

On September 1, 2010, a trap door on Crockett’s SEPTA train “sprang forward, 

striking [him] on his right leg and slam[ing] down on his left foot.” Crockett alleges that 

the incident can be traced to a mechanical defect that SEPTA has known about since the 

1980s yet has failed to fix. He subsequently filed a putative class action in the U.S. 

District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on behalf of himself and all other 

passengers riding on his train that day. Specifically, he brought negligence claims 

against SEPTA, and he brought a § 1983 due-process claim against SEPTA and the 

individual defendants based on a state-created danger theory of liability.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss Crockett’s § 1983 claim under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing, among other things, that Crockett failed to 

allege adequately the elements of a state-created danger claim. The District Court 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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granted the motion, leaving only Crockett’s state-law tort claims. The parties 

subsequently settled these claims with an agreement that Crockett could appeal the 

District Court’s dismissal of his § 1983 claim. This appeal followed. 

II.

Our review of a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) is plenary. Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 

159, 163 (3d Cir. 2010). “Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only 

if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds that plaintiff’s claims lack facial 

plausibility.” Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011). In 

undertaking that inquiry, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Heightened Independence & Progress, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 

693 F.3d 345, 351 (3d Cir. 2012).

III.

Reading the facts in the light most favorable to Crockett, we agree with the 

District Court that he has not pled a plausible due-process claim under a state-created 

danger theory. This doctrine, which is an exception to the general rule that a state is not 

required to protect citizens from harm, only applies when state actors acted affirmatively 

either to expose a plaintiff to danger or to render him more vulnerable to harm. Bright v. 

Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2006). Crockett’s claim fails because he 

has not alleged that his harm stems from any affirmative act. 
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Our decision in Searles v. SEPTA, 990 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1993), is directly on 

point. There we held that the plaintiff’s allegations “that [the] defendants failed to secure 

the motor properly” on a SEPTA train, “and also failed to discover the alleged dangerous 

condition despite numerous purported maintenance inspections,” could not proceed under 

the state-created danger theory of liability because “the fundamental cause of danger was 

a failure to act.” Id. at 793 (emphasis added). Likewise, while Crockett contends state 

officials acted by forgoing daily inspections, passive inertia, resulting in nothing being 

done, falls short of an “affirmative act in the traditional sense.” Id. That Crockett 

attempts to “restat[e] the [d]efendants’ inaction as an affirmative failure to act does not 

alter the passive nature of the alleged conduct.” Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 179 

(3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 824 (2013).

* * *

Because we conclude that Crockett failed to allege that defendants took any 

affirmative act to place him in danger, we need not reach the District Court’s alternative 

grounds for dismissing Crockett’s § 1983 claim. We thus affirm.