In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 11-3358

ELIZABETH HOPPE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LEWIS UNIVERSITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:09-cv-03430—Edmond E. Chang, Judge.

ARGUED MAY 22, 2012—DECIDED AUGUST 31, 2012

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and WILLIAMS and

TINDER, Circuit Judges. 

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Elizabeth Hoppe is a tenured

professor in the Philosophy Department at Lewis University. She lost the privilege of teaching aviation ethics

after the new chair of the Aviation Department, William

Brogan, deemed her unqualified for the position because

she had no formal training in aviation, she had never

worked in the industry, and she had not obtained any
2 No. 11-3358

degrees or certifications relevant to the field. During

the two years before her removal from the aviation

ethics course, Hoppe filed a series of charges with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, requesting

an accommodation for her clinically diagnosed “adjustment disorder” and accusing the university of discrimination and retaliation.

Hoppe sued Lewis University for discrimination

and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities

Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

At the close of discovery, the district court awarded

summary judgment in favor of the university on all of

Hoppe’s claims. Hoppe appeals, first arguing that the

district court erred by finding that she could not perform her essential job functions and that Lewis University

provided her a reasonable accommodation. We agree

that there was no evidence of Hoppe’s job functions

or her inability to perform them, but the undisputed

evidence shows that the university offered Hoppe

three different accommodations, which she rejected,

and no rational trier of fact could find that the university’s efforts were unreasonable. Hoppe also argues

that the district court overlooked material fact disputes

relevant to her retaliation claims. We disagree. Hoppe

has no evidence of a causal link between her protected

activity and Brogan’s decision, so she has failed to make

a prima facie showing of retaliation. Summary judgment

in the university’s favor, therefore, was appropriate and

so we affirm.
No. 11-3358 3

I. BACKGROUND

As this is an appeal from an award of summary judgment, we must construe the facts in the light most favorable to Elizabeth Hoppe, the non-movant below. See

Montgomery v. American Airlines, Inc., 626 F.3d 382, 389

(7th Cir. 2010). We do so in the narrative that follows.

In 1999, Lewis University hired Elizabeth Hoppe as

an assistant professor in the Philosophy Department,

situated within the College of Arts and Sciences. About

six years later, in 2005, Hoppe received a promotion to

associate professor with tenure. Hoppe served as the

chair of the Philosophy Department between August 2004

and August 2006.

Hoppe’s rise up the ranks resulted in part from her

skills as an excellent teacher of philosophy. But she

also branched out to teach courses in other faculties,

identifying aviation ethics as her sub-specialization. In

the fall of 2003, Hoppe began teaching part-time in the

Aviation Department while concurrently maintaining

a full-time load in the Philosophy Department. At the

time, Hoppe had no formal training in aviation, no

relevant work experience, and no degrees or certifications associated with the industry. Hoppe taught at

least one aviation ethics course each academic year

until February 2009, when William Brogan, the newly

appointed chair of the Aviation Department, stripped

her of those duties. Brogan’s decision and the events

preceding it are the focal point of this litigation.

Hoppe took a sabbatical in August 2006, based in

part on the recommendation of the dean of the College
4 No. 11-3358

of Arts and Sciences, Dr. Angela Durante. The dean told

Hoppe to “step away from the University environment”

and requested that she vacate her office because the

Education Department, which had loaned out the space,

needed it back for accreditation. A few months later,

in January 2007, Hoppe filed an associational discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission on behalf of a Hispanic colleague whom

she believed had suffered racial discrimination. After

returning from sabbatical, Hoppe received an office

assignment in the Philosophy Department’s academic

building. But Hoppe refused to use the assigned space.

Instead, she removed her name from the door and modified her course syllabi to alert her students that office

hours and appointments would occur elsewhere.

Hoppe has not actually used an office at the university

since the spring semester of 2007.

On July 27, 2007, Hoppe filed a second charge of discrimination with the EEOC, this time alleging retaliation.

Hoppe claimed that she had been “subjected to worsened terms and conditions of employment, including

unwarranted disciplinary action, failure to inform her

of a security concern when other faculty members were

informed, and altered job responsibilities.” As one example, Hoppe cited the fact that the dean no longer

recognized her as the “go to” person for participation

in university committees and affairs. Before filing her

first charge of discrimination, Hoppe had served on at

least one faculty search committee every year, but in

the succeeding four years, she served on only one

such committee. Faculty search committee members

were not paid for their service.
No. 11-3358 5

Hoppe claimed to have also experienced other retaliation, including: (1) not being selected to participate in

the final program review of the Philosophy Department,

(2) not receiving a particular research grant for which

she had applied, (3) being reported to the dean for

missing meetings and required to supply a doctor’s note,

(4) being out of communication with Dean Durante,

and (5) being identified as one of a dozen people who

“might have a problem or issue or be angry” and who

might be responsible for two harassing letters that

the Dean Durante received and reported to police.

In August 2007, Dr. Kathleen Zachary diagnosed

Hoppe with “adjustment disorder with anxiety and

depressed moods.” Because of her disorder, Hoppe at

times avoided the internet and enlisted the assistance

of her friends, her therapist, or her attorney to read and

summarize electronic messages. Hoppe once went a

full month without personally checking her voice

mail or opening her postal mail. Hoppe’s adjustment

disorder was allegedly exacerbated by certain individuals at Lewis University. One such person was Professor George Miller, the chair of the Philosophy Department. Hoppe had an office in the same academic

building as Professor Miller—they were the department’s

only permanent faculty members—but being near

or interacting with him allegedly heightened Hoppe’s

anxiety.

On August 27, 2008, Hoppe’s doctor sent a letter to

Lewis University requesting that Hoppe’s office be relocated to accommodate her disorder. The letter did not
6 No. 11-3358

identify a campus location that would be suitable for

Hoppe, so Lewis sent a letter back asking the doctor to

clarify the accommodation request and delineate the

factors likely to aggravate Hoppe’s condition. Hoppe

brought the university’s letter to her doctor and,

on September 30, 2008, Hoppe’s doctor forwarded the

university a second accommodation request. The second

letter again failed to specify a suitable location or the

particular stressors that Hoppe needed to avoid. Nevertheless, the university offered Hoppe three office

options, each located in the same building as her temporary assignment. Hoppe rejected all three.

In October 2008, Hoppe chaperoned students from

the aviation department on a field trip to Federal Express. Brogan later received complaints about

Hoppe’s behavior during the trip. Hoppe had experienced vertigo and she took prescription medication to

treat her symptoms. During a dinner later that evening,

Hoppe drank two glasses of wine, even though her

doctor had recommended that she avoid alcohol after

taking her medication, and behaved in a manner that

struck the FedEx representatives as unprofessional.

About one month later, Brogan met with Hoppe to

discuss the complaints he received and to notify her that

she would no longer teach aviation ethics. Brogan told

Hoppe that she was not qualified to teach the course.

He said nothing about the FedEx trip, however. Rather,

Brogan maintained that his decision had nothing to do

with Hoppe’s professionalism and she could continue

to accompany the department on trips in the future.
No. 11-3358 7

Brogan and Hoppe met a second time on February 26,

2009, shortly after Hoppe’s attorney notified Lewis University that it had failed to accommodate Hoppe’s disability. During this second meeting, Brogan told Hoppe

that she had been permanently barred from teaching

courses offered by the Aviation Department. He cited

her lack of qualifications and her “behavior” during the

FedEx trip as reasons for his decision. About two

months later, Hoppe filed a third charge of discrimination with the EEOC, alleging disability discrimination

and retaliation.

On January 19, 2010, Lewis University received a third

letter from Hoppe’s doctor requesting an accommodation. The letter asked that Hoppe be moved to a different

“location.” Despite the university’s express requests,

Hoppe’s doctor again did not identify a suitable office

or who or what was contributing to Hoppe’s difficulties.

Three days later, Lewis offered Hoppe an office in a

different building. Hoppe accepted the new office

space, but never moved in.

Hoppe sued Lewis University for discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate a disability. She

asserted six claims: (1) associational discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e et seq.; (2) retaliation under Title VII; (3) associational discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981;

(4) retaliation under section 1981; (5) discrimination and

failure to accommodate in violation of the Americans

with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; and

(6) retaliation under the ADA. At the close of discovery,

the district court granted summary judgment in favor
8 No. 11-3358

of the university on all six claims. The court held that

Hoppe could not perform her essential job functions, that

the university made a good faith effort to reasonably

accommodate her, and that Hoppe failed to identify

evidence of a casual connection between her protected

activity and her removal from the aviation ethics course.

Hoppe’s appeal seeks to revive all but her associational

discrimination claims.

II. ANALYSIS

We review an award of summary judgment de novo.

O’Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 630 (7th

Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate only if

“there are no genuine issues of material fact and judgment as a matter of law is warranted for the moving

party.” Gross v. PPG Indus., Inc., 636 F.3d 884, 888 (7th

Cir. 2011). Our review consists of “examin[ing] the

record in the light most favorable to [the party], against

whom summary judgment was granted, resolving all

evidentiary conflicts in [her] favor and according [her]

the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be

drawn from the record.” O’Leary, 657 F. 3d at 630 (citations omitted). We will affirm only if “no reasonable

trier of fact” could find in favor of the non-moving

party. Id. 

A. Hoppe’s ADA Discrimination Claim

To establish disability discrimination, a plaintiff must

prove that (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the
No. 11-3358 9

ADA, (2) she is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, either with or without a reasonable accommodation, and (3) she suffered from an adverse

employment action because of her disability. Nese v.

Julian Nordic Const. Co., 405 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2005).

“If an ADA plaintiff establishes a prima facie case,

the burden shifts to the employer to offer a legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision. If

the employer succeeds, then the burden reverts to the

plaintiff to show that there is a genuine dispute of

material fact that the proffered reason for the employment action is pretextual.” Id. (citation omitted).

The district court found no genuine dispute regarding

Hoppe’s inability to perform the essential functions of

her job and the university’s reasonable effort to accommodate her disability. Hoppe argues that the record

does not support the district court’s finding that she

could not perform her essential job functions. She also

contends that by finding that Lewis University provided

her a reasonable accommodation, the district court resolved a material fact dispute and did not view the evidence in the light most favorable to her. We agree with

her on the first point, but not on the second.

The ADA requires an employer to make reasonable

accommodations to allow a “qualified individual with a

disability” to perform the essential functions of her job.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Federal regulations instruct

courts to consider the following categories of evidence

when deciding an employee’s essential job functions:

(i) The employer’s judgment as to which functions

are essential;
10 No. 11-3358

Indeed, this fact was undisputed until Hoppe’s deposition 1

testimony supposedly surprised the university with details of

(continued...)

(ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; 

(iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function; 

(iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; 

(v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement;

(vi) The work experience of past incumbents in

the job; and/or 

(vii) The current work experience of incumbents

in similar jobs.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).

The record contains no evidence of Hoppe’s essential

job functions. The district court, therefore, had no evidentiary basis for concluding that “[c]ommunication

with students, committees, fellow professors, and administrators are a necessity for a teaching position, where

the object of the profession is to communicate and pass

on knowledge.” But even if we accept the court’s conclusion, Hoppe has identified record evidence to

support her insistence that she can in fact perform the

identified functions. First and foremost, the university’s

answer to Hoppe’s complaint admits that Hoppe can

perform her essential job functions. That admission

likely should have ended the court’s inquiry. Addi- 1
No. 11-3358 11

(...continued) 1

her disability. The sticking point for the university is Hoppe’s

admission that her adjustment disorder prevented her from

checking her voicemail and sending postal mail for a month on

one prior occasion and that in the past she checked her email

once per week. But this evidence does not prove that Hoppe’s

disorder prevents her from ever doing these things, or doing

them without a reasonable accommodation. In fact, Hoppe

testified that she often enlisted the assistance of others to

check and relay her messages when her disorder prevented

her from personally doing so.

tionally, there is no dispute that Hoppe has been and

remains employed with Lewis University. Hoppe’s past

and present employment are probative of her abilities

as well. See Miller v. Illinois Dep’t of Transp., 643 F.3d

190, 197 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding plaintiff could perform

essential job function because, among other things, plaintiff “was asking only that he be allowed to work as he

had worked successfully for several years.”). The university adduced nothing to contradict Hoppe’s claim that

she can perform her essential job functions, and even

if it had done so that evidence would have created a

material fact dispute, so the district court should not

have granted summary judgment on that basis. But the

district court was correct that no rational trier of fact

could find that Lewis University failed to offer Hoppe

a reasonable accommodation.

An employer satisfies its duty to reasonably accommodate an employee with a disability when the

employer does what is necessary to allow the employee
12 No. 11-3358

to work in reasonable comfort. Vande Zande v. State of

Wisc. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F. 3d 538, 546 (7th Cir. 1995).

An employer need only provide a qualified individual

with a “reasonable accommodation, not the accommodation [the employee] would prefer.” Rehling v. City of Chi.,

207 F.3d 1009, 1014 (7th Cir. 2000). “To determine

the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be

necessary for the [employer] to initiate an informal,

interactive process.” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)).

An employer can take no solace in its failure to engage

in this process in good faith if what results is an unreasonable or inappropriate accommodation offer. See id.

at 1016. And an employee who fails to uphold her

end of the bargain—for example, by not “clarifying

the extent of her medical restrictions”—cannot impose

liability on the employer for its failure to provide a reasonable accommodation. Steffes v. Stepan Co.,

144 F.3d 1070, 1073 (7th Cir. 1998). The undisputed evidence in the record shows that Hoppe did not provide

the university with the information it needed and requested and the university took reasonable steps

even without this information to accommodate Hoppe’s

disability. The university therefore is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

In Steffes, faced with a similar fact pattern, we held

that an employer is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law if an employee refuses to cooperate in good faith

during the interactive process. Id. at 1073. The disabled

employee in that case, Joan Steffes, suffered from

chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, which made it

dangerous for her to be exposed to certain chemicals.
No. 11-3358 13

Steffes worked in the warehouse of a chemical company,

Stepan. The employer had offered Steffes a job in the

warehouse on the condition that her doctor clarify

the extent of her work restrictions and certify that Steffes

could safely work around certain, identified chemicals.

Steffes’s doctor informed Stepan that Steffes could work

in “the store room where the accompanying list of

chemical[s] are in containers” but “[she] has had respiratory problems if she is exposed to chemical spills in

which vaporization occurs.” Id. at 1072. Stepan found

the letter deficient because it did not reflect the actual

conditions in the warehouse, and “Steffes did not

attempt to get more comprehensive assurances from

her physician in response to the company’s concerns.” Id.

We affirmed summary judgment because Stepan could

not be held liable for failing to provide a reasonable

accommodation on account of Steffes causing a

breakdown in the interactive process. Id. at 1072-73.

Hoppe argues that summary judgment should not

have been granted in this case because, like in EEOC v.

Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 793 (7th Cir. 2005), the

employer caused the interactive process to break

down and, as a result, her disability was not reasonably

accommodated. But Sears is a very different case. The

employer there knew of the employee’s nerve damage

in her right leg and her doctor’s recommendation that

she be given a parking spot closer to the building, access

to the apparel stockroom to eat lunch, and access to

the shoe stockroom as a shortcut to her workstation.

Even so, the employer did not make its facility “readily

accessible to and useable by” the employee in ac-
14 No. 11-3358

cordance with her doctor’s recommendation, but instead

it “either rescinded” the accommodations it had

previously made or “reprimand[ed] [the employee]

when she tried to use them.” Id. at 803. That did not

happen here.

The letter from Hoppe’s doctor, like the plaintiff’s

letter in Steffes, lacked specific details about what steps

were necessary to reasonably accommodate Hoppe’s

disability. Although Hoppe allegedly told Ayers

that she did not want an office in the same building as

Professor Miller, there is no evidence that Ayers or

the university’s human resources department—the recipient of Hoppe’s past doctor’s letters—knew that the recommendation had come from Hoppe’s doctor. And there is

no dispute that the university sent Hoppe’s doctor at

least two letters requesting specific information to no

avail. Unlike in Sears, Hoppe’s doctor never provided

an adequate response to the university’s request, but

the university still offered Hoppe three different office

locations. Consequently, no rational trier of fact could

find that the university failed to participate in good faith

in the ADA-required interactive process or that it failed

to offer Hoppe a reasonable accommodation. Summary judgment was therefore appropriate on Hoppe’s

ADA claim.

B. Hoppe’s Retaliation Claims

Hoppe’s remaining claims relate to the university’s

allegedly retaliatory conduct. The district court granted

summary judgment in favor of the university on these
No. 11-3358 15

claims because, among other things, the record lacked

evidence tending to show a causal link between Hoppe’s

protected activity and her removal from the aviation

ethics course. Hoppe argues that the court overlooked

the temporal proximity between the two, ignored her

evidence that both Brogan and Ayers knew about her

protected activity, and failed to accept her evidence

that the university’s articulated justifications were

pretextual.

Title VII forbids retaliation against anyone who “ ‘has

opposed any practice made an unlawful employment

practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge,

testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].’ ”

Loudermilk v. Best Pallet Co., 636 F.3d 312, 314 (7th Cir.

2011) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). Section 1981 and the

ADA also prohibit retaliation. See CBOCS West, Inc. v.

Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008) (Section 1981);

Kersting v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 250 F.3d 1109, 1117 (7th

Cir. 2001) (ADA).

A plaintiff may establish retaliation under the direct

or indirect method of proof. See Weber v. Universities

Research Ass’n, Inc., 621 F.3d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 2010). Hoppe

neither alleged nor provided evidence of any similarly

situated employees not subjected to the same adverse

action, so she may only proceed under the direct method

of proof. Silverman v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 637

F.3d 729, 740 (7th Cir. 2011). “To avoid summary judgment on a retaliation claim under the direct method,

[the plaintiff] must produce evidence from which a
16 No. 11-3358

jury could conclude: (1) that she engaged in a statutorily

protected activity; (2) that she suffered a materially

adverse action by her employer; and (3) there was a

causal link between the two.” Bernuzzi v. Bd. of Educ. of

City of Chi., 647 F.3d 652, 664 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation

an internal quotation marks omitted).

There is no dispute that Hoppe engaged in statutorily

protected activity by filing her charges of discrimination

and requesting a reasonable accommodation for her

disability. With the exception of her removal from the

aviation ethics course, the retaliatory conduct that

Hoppe complains about objectively does not rise to the

level of being materially adverse. See Burlington Northern

and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006). Hoppe

offers no authority for classifying the complainedabout conduct as anything other than mere snubs or

slights. And there is no evidence to suggest that the

adverse actions in question produced or were likely to

produce an injury or harm, economic or otherwise.

Hoppe argues that losing a share of one’s teaching responsibility might “dissuade[] a reasonable [professor]

from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”

See id. Because the university has not contested this

point, forfeiting any argument it might have on the

issue, we will assume that Hoppe’s removal from the

aviation ethics course constitutes an adverse action. See

Tyler v. Runyon, 70 F.3d 458, 464 (7th Cir. 1995). But it is

the third, rather than the first or second, element under

the direct method of proof that presents the biggest

obstacle to Hoppe’s claim: there is no evidence of a
No. 11-3358 17

causal link between Hoppe’s protected activity and her

removal from the aviation ethics course.

Hoppe first argues that the “temporal proximity”

between her protected activity and the materially

adverse action is sufficient to avoid summary judgment.

While that is normally true, see Burnell v. Gates Rubber Co.,

647 F.3d 704, 710 (7th Cir. 2011), Hoppe first engaged

in protected activity two-and-a-half years before she

was removed from the aviation ethics course. See Lalvani

v. Cook Cnty., 269 F.3d 785, 790 (7th Cir. 2001) (explaining temporal proximity requires that “an adverse

employment action follows close on the heels of protected

expression”). More importantly, Hoppe has failed to

identify any evidence that Brogan, the person who removed her from the position, knew of her protected

activity or that her protected activity was “a substantial

motivating factor” in Brogan’s decision. See Leitgen v.

Franciscan Skemp Healthcare, Inc., 630 F.3d 668, 675 (7th

Cir. 2011). Without such evidence, Hoppe’s temporal

proximity argument fails. See Arizanovska v. Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc., 682 F.3d 698, 705 (7th Cir. 2012) (“There is

no indication that [the plaintiff’s] EEOC charge was a

factor, much less a substantial motivating factor, for [the

defendant] to require her to take a leave of absence.”).

Hoppe next argues that Dean Ayers, not Brogran,

was the final decisionmaker responsible for removing

her from the aviation ethics course. There is no dispute

that Ayers knew about Hoppe’s EEOC charges and her

request for an ADA accommodation. But Hoppe’s

evidence—which includes the university’s bylaws and
18 No. 11-3358

Hoppe has not advanced a cat’s paw theory of liability. 2

See Hicks v. Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook Cnty., 677 F.3d 781, 790

(7th Cir. 2012) (“ ‘[I]f a supervisor performs an act motivated

by [a discriminatory or retaliatory] animus that is intended

by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and

if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment

action, then the employer is liable’ ” (quoting Staub v. Proctor

Hosp., ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1194 (2011)). Even if she

had, there is no evidence that Ayers persuaded Brogan to

remove Hoppe from the aviation ethics course. See id.

testimony from the Provost, Dean Durante, and Professor

Miller suggesting that the dean approves the schedule

of classes and has supervisory authority over department chairs—does not establish Dean Ayers as the

ultimate decisionmaker. Sure the dean “approve[d]” the 2

schedule of classes, but it does not follow that she had

veto power over the courses taught and the professors

who taught them. Hoppe has no evidence to prove that

to be the case.

Hoppe’s final argument is about pretext. She insists

that a reasonable jury might disbelieve Brogan’s stated

rationale for removing her from the aviation ethics

course. For support, Hoppe points to her past experiences teaching the course, her positive performance

evaluations in teaching philosophy, and the fact that

Brogan removed her from the aviation ethics course

shortly after he spoke to Dean Ayers. These are all legitimate bases for finding pretext. See Sylvester v. SOS Children’s Villages Illinois, Inc., 453 F.3d 900, 904 (7th Cir. 2006)

(describing women employees who received positive
No. 11-3358 19

evaluations before sexual harassment charges but were

fired for poor performance afterward); Appelbaum v.

Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 340 F.3d 573, 579 (7th Cir.

2003) (“One can reasonably infer pretext from an employer’s shifting or inconsistent explanations.”); Miller,

643 F.3d 190, 200 (7th Cir. 2011) (remanding retaliation

claim for trial because the plaintiff “presented sufficient

evidence from which a finder of fact could genuinely call

into question [the defendant’s] honesty.”). But Hoppe

faces antecedent problems.

First, Hoppe identifies no evidentiary basis for inferring a causal connection between her protected

activity and her removal from the aviation ethics

course. Hoppe was given permission to teach the course

from the department chair, not Brogan. There is no evidence that Brogan knew about Hoppe’s protected activity.

And Hoppe was only removed from the course after

Brogan became chair of the Aviation Department, two-anda-half years after Hoppe filed her first discrimination

charge with the EEOC. Second, the university never

attempted to justify her removal from the aviation ethics

course on the grounds of poor performance, so her past

positive evaluations in teaching (philosophy) are

inapposite. See Fortier v. Ameritech Mobile Commc’ns, Inc.,

161 F.3d 1106, 1113 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Although, in some

circumstances, previous employment history may be

relevant and probative in assessing performance at

the time of termination, its limited utility must also be

recognized.”). Finally, Hoppe offers no evidence to contradict Brogan’s claim that she was unqualified to teach

the aviation ethics course when she lost the position. At
20 No. 11-3358

the time, Hoppe had never worked in the aviation industry, she had no formal training in aviation, and she

held no degrees or certifications relevant to the field.

While it is true that Brogan initially told Hoppe that he

was removing her because she lacked the necessary

qualifications to teach the course and later added her

unprofessional demeanor during the FedEx trip as a

secondary justification, this evidence comes to bear on the

pretext inquiry only after the plaintiff makes a prima

facie showing of retaliation. See Lalvani, 269 F.3d at 790

(“When an adverse employment action follows close on

the heels of protected expression, and the plaintiff can

show that the person who decided to impose the adverse

action knew of the protected conduct, the causation

element of the prima facie case is typically satisfied.”).

Hoppe has failed to make that showing here.

III. CONCLUSION

For the above-stated reasons, the district court’s

grant of summary judgment in favor of the university

is AFFIRMED.

8-31-12