UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

AUDREY L. WERNER, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Cause No.: 2:14-CV-140-PRC

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on a Complaint [DE 1], filed by Plaintiff Audrey Werner on

April 25, 2014, and Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 16], filed on

August 29, 2014. The Commissioner filed a response on December 5, 2014, and Plaintiff filed a

reply on January 15, 2015.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff first filed for supplemental security income on September 30, 2011. The Agency

approved the claim on December 8, 2011, but then changed its determination on March 15, 2012,

finding her not disabled. She asked the Agency to reconsider, but on August 24, 2012, the Agency

reaffirmed its finding that she was not disabled. Plaintiff then asked for a hearing before one of the

Agency’s administrative law judges (ALJs), which took place by video on July 1, 2013, before ALJ

Edward P. Studzinksi. Plaintiff’s main representative was attorney Thomas J. Scully, but she was

represented by Skully’s associate Heather Garay at the hearing. 

The ALJ issued a written decision on October 11, 2013, concluding that Plaintiff was not

disabled based on the following findings.

1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September

30, 2011, the application date.
2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: colitis, peripheral artery

disease, and right shoulder bursitis.

3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments

that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments

in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

4. After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has

the residual functional capacity to lift and carry up to 10 pounds

occasionally, lesser weights more frequently, stand and/or walk about 2 hours

in an 8-hour workday, and sit about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday with

normal breaks. The claimant should not climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds,

but may occasionally climb ramps or stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or

crawl.

5. The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a dispatcher.

This work does not require the performance of work-related activities

precluded by the claimant’s residual functional capacity.

6. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security

Act, since September 30, 2011, the date the application was filed.

(AR 21-41). Plaintiff then sought review before the Agency’s Appeals Council, which denied her

request on February 24, 2014, leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481. On April 25, 2014, Plaintiff filed this civil action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) for review of the Agency’s decision.

The parties filed forms of consent to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate

Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case. This

Court thus has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Social Security Act authorizes judicial review of the final decision of the Agency and

indicates that the Commissioner’s factual findings must be accepted as conclusive if supported by

substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, a court reviewing the findings of an ALJ will reverse

only if the findings are not supported by substantial evidence or if the ALJ has applied an erroneous
legal standard. See Briscoe v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence

consists of “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Gudgel v. Barnhart,

345 F.3d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 2003)).

A court reviews the entire administrative record but does not reconsider facts, re-weigh the

evidence, resolve conflicts in evidence, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its judgment

for that of the ALJ. See Boiles v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005); Clifford v. Apfel, 227

F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000); Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049, 1055 (7th Cir. 1999). Thus, the

question upon judicial review of an ALJ’s finding that a claimant is not disabled within the meaning

of the Social Security Act is not whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled, but whether the ALJ “uses

the correct legal standards and the decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Roddy v. Astrue,

705 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing O’Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir.

2010); Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 734–35 (7th Cir. 2006); Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d

664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004)). “[I]f the Commissioner commits an error of law,” the Court may reverse

the decision “without regard to the volume of evidence in support of the factual findings.” White v.

Apfel, 167 F.3d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Binion v. Chater, 108 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir.

1997)).

At a minimum, an ALJ must articulate his analysis of the evidence in order to allow the

reviewing court to trace the path of his reasoning and to be assured that the ALJ considered the

important evidence. See Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002); Diaz v. Chater, 55

F.3d 300, 307 (7th Cir. 1995); Green v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1995). An ALJ must

“‘build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [the] conclusion’ so that [a reviewing

court] may assess the validity of the agency’s final decision and afford [a claimant] meaningful
review.” Giles v. Astrue, 483 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Scott, 297 F.3d at 595)); see

also O’Connor-Spinner, 627 F.3d at 618 (“An ALJ need not specifically address every piece of

evidence, but must provide a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and his conclusions.”); Zurawski

v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he ALJ’s analysis must provide some glimpse into

the reasoning behind [the] decision to deny benefits.”).

DISABILITY STANDARD

To be eligible for disability benefits, a claimant must establish that she suffers from a

“disability” as defined by the Social Security Act and regulations. The Act defines “disability” as

an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable

physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A),

1382c(a)(3)(A). To be found disabled, the claimant’s impairment must not only prevent her from

doing her previous work, but considering her age, education, and work experience, it must also

prevent him from engaging in any other type of substantial gainful activity that exists in significant

numbers in the economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f),

416.920(e)-(f).

When a claimant alleges a disability, Social Security regulations provide a five-step inquiry

to evaluate whether the claimant is entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).

The steps are: (1) Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity? If yes, the claimant is not

disabled, and the claim is denied; if no, the inquiry proceeds to step two; (2) Does the claimant have

an impairment or combination of impairments that are severe? If not, the claimant is not disabled,

and the claim is denied; if yes, the inquiry proceeds to step three; (3) Do(es) the impairment(s) meet

or equal a listed impairment in the appendix to the regulations? If yes, the claimant is automatically
considered disabled; if not, then the inquiry proceeds to step four; (4) Can the claimant do the

claimant’s past relevant work? If yes, the claimant is not disabled, and the claim is denied; if no,

then the inquiry proceeds to step five; (5) Can the claimant perform other work given the claimant’s

residual functional capacity (RFC), age, education, and experience? If yes, then the claimant is not

disabled, and the claim is denied; if no, the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v),

416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); see also Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 699-700 (7th Cir. 2004).

At steps four and five, the ALJ must consider an assessment of the claimant’s RFC. The RFC

“is an administrative assessment of what work-related activities an individual can perform despite

[his] limitations.” Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1178 (7th Cir. 2001). The RFC should be

based on evidence in the record. Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 676 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1545(a)(3)). The claimant bears the burden of proving steps one through four, whereas the

burden at step five is on the ALJ. Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 886; see also Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309,

313 (7th Cir. 1995).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff less than fully credible and that the

ALJ ignored contrary evidence and failed to build a logical bridge connecting the evidence to his

conclusions with regard to her mental and her physical impairments. The Court considers each

argument in turn.

A. Credibility

In making a disability determination, the ALJ must consider a claimant’s statements about

her symptoms, such as pain, and how the claimant’s symptoms affect her daily life and ability to

work. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a). Subjective allegations of disabling symptoms alone cannot

support a finding of disability. Id. In determining whether statements of symptoms contribute to a
finding of disability, the regulations set forth a two-part test: (1) the claimant must provide objective

medical evidence of a medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments that

reasonably could be expected to produce the alleged symptoms; and (2) once an ALJ has found an

impairment that reasonably could cause the symptoms alleged, the ALJ must consider the intensity

and persistence of these symptoms. Id.

The ALJ must weigh the claimant’s subjective complaints, the relevant objective medical

evidence, and any other evidence of the following factors:

1. The individual’s daily activities;

2. Location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms;

3. Precipitating and aggravating factors;

4. Type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication;

5. Treatment, other than medication, for relief of pain or other symptoms;

6. Other measures taken to relieve pain or other symptoms;

7. Other factors concerning functional limitations due to pain or other

symptoms.

See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3). An ALJ is not required to give full credit to every statement of pain

made by the claimant or to find a disability each time a claimant states she is unable to work. See

Rucker v. Chater, 92 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 1996). However, Ruling 96-7p provides that a

claimant’s statements regarding symptoms or the effect of symptoms on her ability to work “may

not be disregarded solely because they are not substantiated by objective evidence.” SSR 96-7p,

1996 WL 374186, at *6 (Jul. 2, 1996). “Because the ALJ is ‘in the best position to determine a

witness’s truthfulness and forthrightness . . . this court will not overturn an ALJ’s credibility

determination unless it is ‘patently wrong.’” Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 310-11 (7th Cir. 2012)

(quoting Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 504–05 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also Prochaska, 454 F.3d
at 738. Nevertheless, “an ALJ must adequately explain his credibility finding by discussing specific

reasons supported by the record.” Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Terry

v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 2009)).

The ALJ in this case found Plaintiff to be “less than fully credible” based on a number of

factors. He noted that Plaintiff had made arrangements to travel to Florida after her alleged onset

date, concluding that this demonstrated that her conditions didn’t prevent her from traveling out of

state. He noted that she had a history of prescription non-compliance. He also explained that she had

worked in the past despite her conditions and that her past work ended for reasons other than her

health. He mentioned that she alleged financial difficulty but had not investigated no- or low-cost

clinics in the past for routine care. He said that she had admitted to “a highly active daily life” and

that she did chores, went grocery shopping, and helped care for her young grandson.

Plaintiff had testified that her colitis caused her to have around seven to eight bowel

movements per day and that these resulted in about five accidents each week that required at least

fifteen minutes to clean up. The ALJ thought that she was exaggerating. He noted that she didn’t ask

to be excused during the hearing to use the bathroom and that, if she needed to use the bathroom and

experienced accidents as frequently as she alleged, he would have expected to see more

documentation in the medical records. Moreover, he pointed out that some of her statements to her

physicians indicated less severe colitis-related symptoms. With regard to her mental impairments,

the ALJ wrote that she was able to participate meaningfully in the hearing, which he thought cast

doubt on her alleged memory difficulties. The ALJ thus found her allegations of disability to be “less

than fully credible” to the extent they were inconsistent with his RFC determination.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s credibility determination was impermissibly vague as he

found her to be “less than fully credible,” without explaining in detail which portions of her
testimony he found credible and which he didn’t. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has

criticized such boilerplate assessments on many occasions for exactly this reason. See Parker v.

Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 921-22 (7th Cir. 2010); Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 2012).

But an ALJ’s use of the boilerplate language does not amount to reversible error if he “otherwise

points to information that justifies his credibility determination.” Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351,

367–68; see also Filus v. Astrue, 694 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2012).

Review of the ALJ’s analysis, however, reveals a number of problems. To begin with, the

ALJ had no right to hold Plaintiff’s inconsistent medication use against her as an “ALJ ‘must not

draw any inferences’ about a claimant’s condition from this failure unless the ALJ has explored the

claimant’s explanations as to the lack of medical care.” Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 679 (7th Cir.

2008) (quoting SSR 96-7p). Here, the ALJ said failed to ask Plaintiff about her medications aside

from possible side effects. However, he did note that she alleged financial difficulty and lack of

treatment due to insurance coverage issues. Financial hardship can be an acceptable reason for noncompliance. SSR 96-7p, at *8. But the ALJ put little stock her claims that she couldn’t afford

treatment, concluding instead that Plaintiff’s credibility was further undercut by her failure to seek

low- or no-cost health care. This too is a problem. There is nothing in the record indicating that

Plaintiff knew about or had tried to get no- or low-cost health care, and claimants are “entitled to

a decision based on the record rather than a hunch.” Wilder v. Chater, 64 F.3d 335, 338 (7th Cir.

1995).

The Commissioner appears to contend that any error on this point was harmless since the

claim of financial hardship finds little support in the record. She is correct that Plaintiff only points

to one piece of evidence to support her alleged hardship—a medical record from before the alleged

onset date stating that Plaintiff “had discontinued the medications because she has no medical
insurance or money.” (AR 705). But the Commissioner’s argument ignores the important fact that

her application for supplemental security income wasn’t rejected for excessive income. See Goins

v. Colvin, 764 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[The Plaintiff] applied for Supplemental Security

Income, which is a disability benefit available only to persons who have no more than $2000 in cash

or the equivalent. If she had had more, her application would have been denied without need to

obtain any medical evidence.”). The ALJ thus should have explored Plaintiff’s reasons for noncompliance and erred in concluding that her credibility was weakened by a failure to seek low- or

no-cost medical care.

The ALJ also erred in finding that Plaintiff was able to travel interstate without exploring

what sort of accommodations were required. The ALJ acknowledged that someone could be disabled

in Florida just as well as in Indiana and included this point only to show that she could travel out

of state. No doubt, if one were to take Plaintiff at her word, out-of-state travel, whether by car or

plane, would be complicated and made inconvenient (probably very inconvenient) by her symptoms.

But this fact alone, without evidence of what sort of specific activities were involved in her travel,

doesn’t show much of an inconsistency. Cf. Murphy v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 817 (7th Cir. 2014)

(“[T]he record does not indicate how going on vacation was inconsistent with Murphy's claimed

degree of physical limitation.”).

A more significant error is found in the way the ALJ discussed the severity of Plaintiff’s

colitis. He noted that she didn’t need to take a bathroom break during the hearing and noted that he

would have expected to have seen more documentation in the medical records if her symptoms were

as severe as she claimed. The first point is of little value. Going to bathroom eight times per day

means that, on average, the person needs to use the restroom every three hours. The hearing began

at 9:29 a.m. and ended at 10:33 a.m. There’s thus no logical inconsistency. And the ALJ’s inference
is further weakened by his acknowledgment that Plaintiff had already used the bathroom twice that

day, once immediately before the hearing. Plaintiff also explained that by managing what she ate

and drank she could ameliorate her symptoms somewhat, and she testified that she hadn’t eaten on

the morning before the hearing. 

The ALJ also appears to have concluded that the fact that Plaintiff’s bedroom was in her

daughter’s basement (she lives with her daughter to save money) undercut her credibility because

there was no bathroom in the basement. There’s no indication that this is her preference. That she

ended up in a guest bedroom and has a flight of stairs between her and the nearest restroom says

little about whether her bowel issues are as bad as she’s claimed. 

The Court does note that the ALJ also looked to more acceptable factors in evaluating the

severity of Plaintiff’s colitis, including inconsistences between what she had been telling her doctors

and what she testified to at the hearing. The ALJ was also correct to look at whether the medical

records supported Plaintiff’s claims, though his statement that he would have expected to see more

documentation is not very specific. Nevertheless, the errors regarding Plaintiff’s colitis are

significant and require remand.

The ALJ’s discussion of activities of daily living also leaves something to be desired. He

failed take into account how Plaintiff’s symptoms, in particular those related to her colitis, would

be much easier to accommodate at home than in the workplace. See Spiva v. Astrue, 628 F.3d 346,

352 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[A]n ability to engage in ‘activities of daily living’ (with only mild limitations)

need not translate into an ability to work full time.”). At home, Plaintiff can take a break to go to the

restroom without consequences. She can take as long as she needs, and if she has an accident, she

can take the necessary time to clean up or take a shower—options that are unlikely to be available

at work. The ALJ also noted that she would go to the grocery store, which would of course not be
as accommodating as the home. However, going grocery shopping for an hour or two is still quite

different from spending eight hours per day at work. One can take as many breaks as needed at the

grocers and there are no time pressures. And an accident at the grocery store—though doubtless

more distressing than one experienced at home—is still much more manageable than at a forty-hourper-week job. 

The ALJ’s analysis did include some sounder inferences with regard to activities of daily

living. For example, being active at home can suggest that Plaintiff’s shoulder problems weren’t as

bad as alleged or that she wasn’t depressed to the extent claimed. But a more detailed explanation

of the discrepancy would have been helpful.

Finally, the ALJ also discounted Plaintiff’s credibility because her conditions had been

longstanding but she had worked in the past despite these conditions and lost her job for reasons

unrelated to her disabilities. This conclusion is based on an erroneous reading of the record. It is true

that Plaintiff had been laid off for reasons that had nothing to do with her disability, but this

happened a decade before the alleged onset date at a time when she was not suffering from colitis.

The circumstances of someone’s firing might call into question that person’s credibility, but there’s

no indication of anything like that here and, at any rate, the ALJ didn’t say anything to that effect.

That Plaintiff had worked with some of her problems in the past does not mean that she is

exaggerating or faking it now. More (and more accurate) explanation is needed.

The ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s allegations of memory trouble were undercut by her

ability to participate meaningfully in the hearing also would have benefitted from a more thorough

explanation. She never alleged that she couldn’t follow an hour-long conversation. Rather, she

contended that she was unable to maintain concentration and pace at a full-time job.
In sum, the credibility analysis has flaws, especially with regard to how often Plaintiff needs

to go to the bathroom and how often she has accidents. These problems go to the heart of this case.

The finding is thus “patently wrong” and this case must remanded for a new hearing before the

Agency. 

B. Mental Impairments

The ALJ found at Step Two that Plaintiff suffered from medically determinable mental

impairments, but concluded that these impairments (memory issues, anxiety, and depression) did

not cause more than minimal limitation of Plaintiff’s ability to do basic mental work activities and

were thus not severe. He discussed the opinions of a number of experts, concluding that Plaintiff’s

anxiety and depression were well controlled by prescription medications. He considered the

“paragraph B” criteria and concluded that Plaintiff had mild restriction of activities of daily living;

mild difficulties in maintaining social functioning; and mild difficulties in maintaining

concentration, persistence, or pace. He also noted that she had not experienced any episodes of

decompensation. 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s analysis ignored contrary evidence and did not adequately

explain his conclusions. The first objection is not well taken; in fact, the ALJ’s analysis is quite

thorough. He provided a summary of each of the relevant evaluations of mental functioning and

explained, briefly, at the end of each why he did or didn’t accept the limitations that the expert had

put forward. He thus did confront the major lines of evidence contrary to his conclusions and

provided the requisite “minimal” explanation. 

However, Plaintiff has a point in complaining that the ALJ provided almost no explanation

for why he reached his ultimate conclusions. And some of the experts thought that Plaintiff’s mental

functioning was more limited than the ALJ concluded. As this case is being remanded on other
grounds, the conclusion that the limitations were mild should be explained in greater detail. It is also

worth considering on remand whether the fluctuations in GAF scores between the various care

providers and experts might be connected to the ebb and flow of symptoms that often accompany

problems such as anxiety and depression. See Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2011).

Plaintiff is also correct that the ALJ provided only a cursory explanation of how the mental

impairments were incorporated into the RFC finding. The ALJ is required to consider all of a

claimant’s impairments in combination when crafting the RFC, including those that are not severe

on their own. Golembiewski v. Barnhart, 322 F.3d 912, 918 (7th Cir. 2003); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523.

On remand, the ALJ should explain how Plaintiff’s medically determinable mental impairments

(whether severe or not) played into her residual functional capacity and if appropriate, should ask

the vocational expert about how any limitations would affect her ability to work.

C. Physical Impairments

 Plaintiff objects that the ALJ’s decision failed to explain how colitis affected her RFC and

never addressed Plaintiff’s testimony that she had to elevate her legs when sitting. Both points are

well taken. The ALJ said that the evidence demonstrated that the colitis—at least at the severity

Plaintiff was claiming—did not meet the durational requirements. But he found that it was a severe

impairment, which indicates that he thought it had some more than mild impact on her ability to

work, including, presumably, an increased need to go to the bathroom. But he made no finding about

what limitations he thought were appropriate. An ALJ’s RFC finding must be connected to the

evidence by a logical bridge. The explanation here is lacking and should be bolstered on remand so

that the connection between the evidence and the conclusions may be more readily traced. Likewise,

Plaintiff is correct that the ALJ never addressed her need to elevate her legs despite finding her

peripheral artery disease to be a severe impairment. This too should be explained on remand. 
CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the relief sought in the Plaintiff’s Brief in Support

of Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 16], REVERSES the final decision of the Commissioner of

Social Security, and REMANDS this matter for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion

and Order.

SO ORDERED this 25th day of August, 2015.

s/ Paul R. Cherry 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE PAUL R. CHERRY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT