alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                       2,296,511
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,296,511
<PP&E>                                      22,395,185
<DEPRECIATION>                              20,086,341
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,605,355
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          224,114
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,381,241
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,605,355
<SALES>                                     16,494,057
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            16,582,128
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,023,671
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             15,558,457
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                15,558,457
<EPS-BASIC>                                       1.07
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.07


</TABLE>
Rene TOKPAN, petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General.

No. 12-1293.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 17, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________ No. 95-40908 Summary Calendar

__________________ LEON LAVARN KENDRICK, Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA; BOB KURTZ, Warden, Billy Moore UNIT; Chief of Security, Billy Moore Unit; JESSIE LUCAS, Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 6:95-CV-584 - - - - - - - - - - April 18, 1996 Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Leon Lavarn Kendrick appeals the district court's denial of his motion for a preliminary injunction. Kendrick argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that he had not demonstrated the elements necessary for the issuance of an injunction. We have reviewed the record and Kendrick's briefNo. 95-40908 -2- and AFFIRM the district court's denial of the motion for the same
reasons adopted by the district court. Kendrick v. Correction Corp. , No. 6:95-CV-584 (E.D. Tex., Oct. 20, 1995).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO. 1:14-CR-14

)

PRENTICE A. BLAND )

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

UPON A PLEA OF GUILTY

TO: THE HONORABLE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN, JUDGE, 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Upon Defendant’s request to enter a plea of guilty pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules

of Criminal Procedure, this matter came on for hearing before U.S. Magistrate Susan Collins, on

February 25, 2015, with the written consents of the Defendant, counsel for the Defendant, and

counsel for the United States of America.

The hearing on Defendant’s plea of guilty was in full compliance with Rule 11, Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure, before the Magistrate Judge in open court and on the record.

In consideration of that hearing and the statements made by the Defendant under oath on

the record and in the presence of counsel, the remarks of the Assistant United States Attorney and

of counsel for Defendant,

I FIND as follows:

(1) that Defendant understands the nature of the charges against him to which the plea is

offered;

(2) that the Defendant understands his right to trial by jury, to persist in his plea of not

guilty, to the assistance of counsel at trial, to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and
his right against compelled self-incrimination;

(3) that the Defendant understands what the maximum possible sentence is, including the

effect of the supervised release term, and Defendant understands that the Sentencing Guidelines

apply and that the Court may depart from those guidelines under some circumstances;

(4) that the plea of guilty by the Defendant has been knowingly and voluntarily made and

is not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from the plea agreement between the

parties;

(5) that Defendant is competent to plead guilty;

(6) that the Defendant understands that his answers may later be used against him in a

prosecution for perjury or false statement;

(7) that there is a factual basis for the Defendant’s plea; and further,

I RECOMMEND that the Court accept the Defendant’s plea of guilty and that the

Defendant be adjudged guilty of the offenses charged in Counts 1 and 2 of the six-count

Indictment, and have sentence imposed. A Presentence Report has been ordered. Should this

Report and Recommendation be accepted and the Defendant adjudged guilty, sentencing will be

scheduled before Judge Theresa L. Springmann by separate order and notice. Objections to the

Findings and Recommendation are waived unless filed and served within fourteen (14) days. 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

DATED this 25th day of February 2015.

/s Susan Collins 

Susan Collins

United States Magistrate Judge

2
Pennsylvania Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure

Rule 101. Purpose, Application, and Construction of Rules.

[(A)](a) Purpose. These rules are intended to provide for the just determination 

of every delinquency proceeding and effectuate the purposes stated 

in the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b).

[(B)](b) Application. These rules establish uniform practice and procedure for 

courts exercising jurisdiction as provided in the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. 

§§ 6301 et seq., and shall be [construed] applied to secure uniformity 

and simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and the 

elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.

[(C) These rules shall be interpreted and construed to effectuate the 

purposes stated in the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b).

(D) To the extent practicable, these rules shall be construed in 

consonance with the rules of statutory construction.] 

(c) Construction. In the construction of the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Juvenile Court Procedure, the principles set forth in Pa.R.J.A. 104 

to 115 shall be observed.

 

[Official Note: Rule 101 adopted April 1, 2005, effective October 1, 2005.]
2

Rule 1101. Purpose, Application, and Construction of Rules.

[(A)](a) Purpose. These rules are intended to provide for the just determination 

of every dependency proceeding and effectuate the purposes stated 

in the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b).

[(B)](b) Application. These rules establish uniform practice and procedure for 

courts exercising jurisdiction as provided in the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. 

§§ 6301 et seq., and shall be [construed] applied to secure uniformity 

and simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and the 

elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.

[(C) These rules shall be interpreted and construed to effectuate the 

purposes stated in the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b).

(D) To the extent practicable, these rules shall be construed in 

consonance with the rules of statutory construction.] 

(c) Construction. In the construction of Pennsylvania Rules of 

Juvenile Court Procedure, the principles set forth in Pa.R.J.A. 104 

to 115 shall be observed.

[Official Note: Rule 1101 adopted August 21, 2006, effective February 1, 2007.

Committee Explanatory Reports:

Final Report explaining the provisions of Rule 1101 published with the 

Court’s Order at 36 Pa.B. 5571 (September 2, 2006).]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

TRAVIS CUNNINGHAM, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 3:13-CV-161

)

JUDGE RICK MAUGHMER, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Travis Cunningham, a pro se prisoner, began this case by

filing a document captioned, “Motion to File a 42 U.S.C. 1983 Act

Tort Claim Against Judge Rick Maughmer for Violation of Civil

Rights and Monetary Damages” on March 4, 2013 (DE #1). Because

Cunningham is proceeding pro se, the Clerk properly accepted this

as a complaint against Judge Rick Maughmer pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983. For the reasons set forth below, the court DISMISSES this

case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 

DISCUSSION

Travis Cunningham is suing state court Judge Rick Maughmer,

claiming the judge was biased against him during his criminal

trial. He alleges that Judge Maughmer permitted the trial to

continue with illegal and inadequate evidence. He alleges that the

Judge sentenced him more harshly than another defendant and also

gave him an additional 30 days for insolence even though he had not
done anything wrong. Judge Maughmer has absolute immunity for

judicial acts which are within the jurisdiction of his court. This

is true even if his “exercise of authority is flawed by the

commission of grave procedural errors.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435

U.S. 349, 359 (1978). Conducting trials, ruling on the

admissibility of evidence, and sentencing criminal defendants are

all within the jurisdiction of the state court. Therefore, the

claims against Judge Maughmer must be dismissed.

In addition, Cunningham states that he is suing the prosecutor

and the State of Indiana because she charged him with a C felony

and was unethical during his trial. These claims must also be

dismissed because, “in initiating a prosecution and in presenting

the State’s case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for

damages under § 1983.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431

(1976). “Absolute immunity shields prosecutors even if they act

maliciously, unreasonably, without probable cause, or even on the

basis of false testimony or evidence.” Cooper v. Parrish, 203 F.3d

937, 947 (6th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment precludes lawsuits in federal

court against a State for money damages unless Congress has

abrogated the State’s immunity from suit or the State has consented

to suit. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 183

F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 1999). Here, Indiana has not consented to

this suit, and Congress did not abrogate the State’s immunity

2
through the enactment of Section 1983. See Joseph v. Bd. of

Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 432 F.3d 746, 748 (7th Cir. 2005). 

Therefore, Cunningham does not state a claim against either the

prosecutor or the State of Indiana. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the court DISMISSES this case

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 

DATED: March 12, 2013 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

3
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                       2,643,159
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,643,159
<PP&E>                                      22,395,185
<DEPRECIATION>                              19,714,220
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               5,324,124
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          775,206
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,548,918
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 5,324,124
<SALES>                                     19,372,591
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            19,500,651
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  990,778
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             18,509,873
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                18,509,873
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.27
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.27
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Thunder Mountain Gold Inc, (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending March 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Robin S. McRae, Secretary/Treasurer, Director and Chief Financial Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/ Robin S. McRae

By  ____________________________________

Robin S.  McRae

Secretary/Treasurer and Director and Chief Financial Accounting Officer

Date:  May 15, 2006
Walter J. BRZOWSKI, petitioner, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.

No. 12-8872.

Supreme Court of the United States

Aug. 12, 2013.

Petition for rehearing denied.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Pamela Sue BLIZZARD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 03-4586.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted April 9, 2004.

Decided May 5, 2004.

Before WIDENER, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Pamela Sue Blizzard appeals her eighteen-month sentence imposed after the district court revoked her supervised release. Blizzard asserts that the district court did not provide adequate notice of its intent to sentence her above the recommended guideline range and that it should have compelled disclosure of evidence from a federal investigation of the halfway house where she was staying. We affirm.

Blizzard contends the district court was required to give her notice of its intention to depart from the recommended guideline range contained in *U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual*§ 7B1.4 (2002) and the grounds upon which such departure was based. We conclude, however, that no such notice is required because “Chapter 7’s policy statements are now and have always been non-binding, advisory guides to district courts in supervised release revocation proceedings.” *United States v. Davis,*53 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir.1995).

Blizzard’s second argument is that under *Brady v. Maryland,*373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the Government was obliged to provide her with information concerning an investigation into criminal conduct at the halfway house in which she lived. Brady requires the prosecutor to disclose material, favorable evidence to the defendant. According to Blizzard, information about the criminal investigation was material and favorable to her because it would have discredited the employees at the halfway house. However, because Blizzard admitted she used cocaine while residing at the halfway house, no employees of the halfway house testified against her. Accordingly, the information regarding the criminal investigation was neither material nor favorable to Blizzard, and we conclude there was no Brady error.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
Loren DAVID, petitioner, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, et al.

No. 12-1041.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 29, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied.
Roberta M. MATTHEWS, petitioner, v. Patrick R. DONAHOE, Postmaster General.

No. 12-9209.

Supreme Court of the United States

May 13, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-7249

DESTINED C. M. D. GEORGE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

C.O. PUCKETT, sued in individual and official capacity; C.O. OH, sued in 

individual and official capacity,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at 

Roanoke. James P. Jones, Senior District Judge. (7:19-cv-00846-JPJ-PMS)

Submitted: March 24, 2022 Decided: March 28, 2022

Before MOTZ, WYNN, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Destined C. M. D. George, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Destined C. M. D. George appeals the district court’s order accepting the 

recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on George’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

complaint for failure to demonstrate administrative exhaustion. We have reviewed the 

record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the 

district court. George v. Puckett, No. 7:19-cv-00846-JPJ-PMS (W.D. Va. July 22, 2021). 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED
Marco VENEGAS-REYNOSO, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 13-6694.

Supreme Court of the United States

Nov. 4, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
<PAGE>   1
[GRAHAM-FIELD LETTERHEAD]


October 7, 1997


Mr. Tom Fitzgerald, President
Van G. Miller & Associates, Inc.
1111 W. Marnan Drive
Waterloo, IA 50701


Re: Purchasing Agreement

Dear Tom:

This letter hereby sets forth the terms and provisions of the purchasing
agreement, by and among Graham-Field Health Products, Inc. ("Graham-Field"), VGM
& Associates, Inc. ("VGM") and U.S. Rehab, Inc.(SM) ("U.S. Rehab").

1) Three year agreement starting November 1, 1997.

2) Agreement covers all Graham-Field and related company products either
distributed or manufactured.

3) Total indicated purchased volume by VGM and U.S. Rehab members over three
years will equal or exceed $52,000,000 or a 15% compounded sales increase
(whichever is higher).

4) VGM and U.S. Rehab will receive from Graham-Field a 2% marketing and
administrative fee (paid monthly) on all products sold to members by
Graham-Field and Graham-Field related companies subject only to the limitations
of paragraph 5 and 6 below. Graham-Field will supply complete sales reports by
dealer on all products purchased on a timely basis.

5) VGM agrees to cooperate with and assist Graham-Field in negotiations with
manufacturers to obtain additional discounts based upon this agreement (above
Graham-Field's current pricing). VGM may elect to opt out of any such
discussions with manufacturers it has direct relationships with.

6) Graham-Field may elect not to pay the marketing/administrative fee (2%) to
VGM on any items not manufactured by Graham-Field unless and until negotiations
(as referred to in paragraph 5) succeed in obtaining at least an additional 2%
of gross margin (i.e.: 2% lower cost to Graham-Field) on the products in
question. If said negotiations succeed the fee will commence within
<PAGE>   2
Mr. Tom Fitzgerald, President
Van G. Miller & Associates, Inc.
October 7, 1997
Page 2


     30 days of any new pricing contract. Graham-Field may seek additional
     discounts which will inure only to its benefit.

7)   Pricing will be determined by Graham-Field but will generally be based on
     group volume and prices are expected to be the lowest available for
     similar volumes. Pricing may be tiered.

8)   A public announcement that we have entered into an "Agreement" may be made
     by Graham-Field upon acceptance by VGM.

9)   VGM may designate certain product lines as either "VGM only", "U.S. Rehab
     only" or both. Stated discounts shall only be allowed to members of the
     applicable group.

Assuming you agree with the terms set-out herein, please sign a copy of this
agreement and return it to us as soon as possible.

Very truly yours,

Graham-Field Health Products, Inc.

By:/s/
   ______________________________________________________


Its                                       10/7/97
   ______________________________________________________

      
    /s/   THOMAS G. FITZGERALD
_________________________________________________________
Agreed and accepted by Van G. Miller and Associates, Inc.


                10-7-97
_________________________________________________________
Date
TANH HUU LAM, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES

No. 12-10432.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 24, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 94 (Tuesday, May 16, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Page 26071]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-12010]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Office of the Secretary


Fitness Determination of Merlin Express, Inc.

AGENCY: Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary.

ACTION: Notice of Commuter Air Carrier Fitness Determination--Order 95-
5-12, Order to Show Cause.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Department of Transportation is proposing to find that 
Merlin Express, Inc., is fit, willing, and able to provide commuter air 
service under 49 U.S.C. 41738.

RESPONSES: All interested persons wishing to respond to the Department 
of Transportation's tentative fitness determinations should file their 
responses with Janet A. Davis, Air Carrier Fitness Division, X-56, Room 
6401, Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., 
Washington, DC 20590, and serve them on all persons listed in 
Attachment A to the order. Responses shall be filed no later than May 
25, 1995.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Janet A. Davis, Air Carrier Fitness 
Division, Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., 
Washington, DC 20590, (202) 366-9721.

    Dated: May 10, 1995.
Patrick V. Murphy,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs.
[FR Doc. 95-12010 Filed 5-15-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-62-P