IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

WILLIAM HOLLY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 3:13-CV-1065

)

MARK SEVIER, et al., )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

William Holly, a pro se prisoner, filed a complaint on October

1, 2013, attempting to sue various defendants for the value of his

lost property. For the reasons set forth below, this case is

DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A because it is legally

frivolous and fails to state a claim for which relief can be

granted.

BACKGROUND

The papers filed by Holly are at first confusing, but upon

examination it is clear what he is trying to do. He begins by using

a habeas corpus form intended for challenging state court

convictions, but he is not attempting to challenge his conviction.

Rather he is challenging a Marion Small Claims Court judgment

dismissing that case on January 18, 2012. See Holly v. Sevier,

49K01-1109-SC-9282. Holly writes that the “clerk won’t transfer

case.” (DE #1 at 2.)

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Next, Holly attaches pages from this court’s Civil Rights

Complaint form. Here he lists five defendants and explains that in

the Marion Small Claims Court he sued for $581.15 for the loss of

his property by employees of the Indiana Department of Correction.

He also sought $5,000 in punitive damages, but his case was

dismissed. Holly argues that the defendants’ motion to dismiss was

perjury and that the state court’s have refused his efforts to

appeal. Finally, he attaches various paperwork from the Marion

Small Claims Court proceeding. 

DISCUSSION

“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a

pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and

citations omitted). Nevertheless, the court must review prisoner

complaints pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 

There are several reasons why this complaint must be

dismissed. To the extent that Holly is asking this court to relitigate the claims that were dismissed by the Marion Small Claims

court, any claims that were (or could have been) raised in that

prior action are barred the doctrine of res judicata. See Highway

J Citizens Group v. U.S. Dep’t Transp., 456 F.3d 734, 741 (7th Cir.

2006). 

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A fundamental precept of common-law adjudication,

embodied in the related doctrines of collateral estoppel

and res judicata, is that a right, question or fact

distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a

court of competent jurisdiction cannot be disputed in a

subsequent suit between the same parties or their

privies. Under res judicata, a final judgment on the

merits bars further claims by parties or their privies

based on the same cause of action.

Ross v. Bd. of Educ., 486 F.3d 279, 282 (7th Cir. 2007) (quotation

marks, ellipsis and citations omitted) (quoting Montana v. United

States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979)). 

To the extent that Holly is attempting to have this Court

review the judgment of the Marion Small Claims Court, his claims

are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See District of Columbia

Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v.

Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923 ). Simply put, the RookerFeldman doctrine “precludes lower federal court jurisdiction over

claims seeking review of state court judgments or over claims

‘inextricably intertwined’ with state court judgments.” Remer v.

Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 990, 996 (7th Cir. 2000). 

To the extent that Holly is arguing that his notice of appeal

was rejected by the state courts, such a claim would also have to

be dismissed. Putting aside that this federal court would not be

the correct venue for challenging events which occurred in Marion

County (which is located in the geographical boundaries of the

United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana),

the paperwork that Holly identifies as a notice of appeal is merely

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a request for a docket sheet. (See DE #1-1 at 20.) Additionally,

none of the named defendants are employees of the state courts, and

it is not plausible that they were involved in failing to transfer

the record despite Holly’s assertion that they are “like an

organized crime family.” (DE #1 at 14.) See Cooney v. Rossiter, 583

F.3d 967, 970-71 (7th Cir. 2009) (Allegations of a vast conspiracy

must meet a high standard of plausibility and a bare allegation of

a conspiracy does not state a claim.)

Moreover, even if Holly had not already litigated this claim

in state court, it would nevertheless still be dismissed because

though the Fourteenth Amendment provides that state officials shall

not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law,” a state tort claims act that provides a method by

which a person can seek reimbursement for the negligent loss or

intentional depravation of property meets the requirements of the

due process clause by providing due process of law. Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (“For intentional, as for

negligent deprivations of property by state employees, the state’s

action is not complete until and unless it provides or refuses to

provide a suitable post deprivation remedy.”) Indiana’s tort claims

act (INDIANA CODE § 34-13-3-1 et seq.) and other laws provide for

state judicial review of property losses caused by government

employees and provide an adequate post-deprivation remedy to

redress state officials’ accidental or intentional deprivation of

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a person’s property. See Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 593 (7th

Cir. 2001) (“Wynn has an adequate post-deprivation remedy in the

Indiana Tort Claims Act, and no more process was due.”) To the

extent that Holly might argue that preventing him from appealing

deprived him of a suitable remedy, it did not because Indiana also

provides a means of compelling the processing of his appeal. 

An action for mandate may be prosecuted against any

inferior tribunal, corporation, public or corporate

officer, or person to compel the performance of any:

 (1) act that the law specifically requires; or

 (2) duty resulting from any office, trust, or station.

INDIANA CODE § 34-27-3-1. See also Bramley v. Tipton Circuit Court,

835 N.E. 2d 479 (Ind. 2005). 

Finally, even if Indiana did not provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy, this claim is untimely. Though Holly argues

that he did not immediately learn of the loss of his property and

that it was not until 2011 that he knew it was gone, he must have

known of its absence when he filed a Tort Claim Notice on June 2,

2010. “Indiana’s two-year statute of limitations . . . is

applicable to all causes of action brought in Indiana under 42

U.S.C. § 1983.” Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug Enforcement Task Force,

239 F.3d 892, 894 (7th Cir. 2001). Thus, even if he learned of the

loss on the same day that he filed his Tort Claim Notice, the

statute of limitations for these claims expired more than a year

ago.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, this case is DISMISSED

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A because it is legally frivolous and

fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted.

DATED: October 24, 2013 /s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United State District Court

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