UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 1:14-CV-67-TLS

)

CYNTHIA J. GERARD, ROBERT E. )

GERARD, and TREASURER, ALLEN )

COUNTY INDIANA, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

On March 5, 2014, the United States of America filed a Complaint [ECF No. 1] against 

Defendants Cynthia J. Gerard, Robert E. Gerard, and the Treasurer of Allen County Indiana

seeking unpaid taxes and a judgment that the United States can enforce collection against the 

property of Robert Gerard, which was formally owned by Robert and Cynthia Gerard as tenants 

by the entirety. On November 23, 2015, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 

[ECF No. 27], which was denied on September 8, 2016 [ECF No. 37]. On August 10, 2017, this 

case was transferred to Chief Judge Theresa L. Springmann for all further proceedings [ECF No. 

38]. The Plaintiff has now filed a Motion for Reconsideration [ECF No. 43] of the prior 

Summary Judgment Order under Rule 54(b). At this time, the Court will not consider the merits 

of the Plaintiff’s substantive arguments. Instead, the Court will consider only whether 

reconsideration is appropriate.

The Plaintiff argues that the Opinion and Order denying its Summary Judgment Motion 

is too vague for the parties to adequately determine what factual issues remain in dispute. The 

Plaintiff moves for reconsideration as to some, but not all, of the issues on which it initially 
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moved for summary judgment. The Plaintiff argues that this Court should reconsider the 

Plaintiff’s Motion because it believes that certain disputes can be resolved at present, narrowing 

the issues for trial and conserving judicial resources. First, the Plaintiff argues that there can be 

no genuine dispute as to the amount of taxes owed by Defendant Cynthia J. Gerard because the 

only defect raised in the Defendants’ Response Brief [ECF No. 33] was cured by the Plaintiff’s 

Reply [ECF No. 35], and the Plaintiff is concerned that the previous judge failed to fully 

consider that cure in coming to his conclusion. The Plaintiff also argues that there can be no 

dispute that Defendant Roger Gerard cannot qualify as a “Purchaser” under the relevant statute,

as a matter of black letter law. The Plaintiff argues specifically that there is no factual issue

related to his “Purchaser” status to present to the jury because any factual issues are rendered 

moot by the preceding question of law. Finally, the Plaintiff argues that the dispute regarding the 

value of Defendant Cynthia’s interest in the property turns on a question of the rights and 

interests of tenants by the entirety to the subject property, which is a question of law that the 

Court should resolve prior to any presentation to the jury.

The Defendants respond to the Plaintiff’s arguments on purely procedural grounds, i.e., 

that the Plaintiff has not met its burden to show that a motion for reconsideration is proper. They

do not address the substance of the Plaintiff’s arguments.

“Unlike motions to reconsider final judgments, which are governed by Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 59 or 60, a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order [under Rule 54(b)] may 

be entertained and granted as justice requires.” Azko Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 909 F. Supp. 

1154, 1159 (N.D. Ind. 1995). Rule 54(b) provides in relevant part:

[A]ny order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all 

the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the 

action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the 
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entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and 

liabilities.

“The beneficial aspect of distinguishing between the two methods of relief is readily apparent 

when the strict standard for granting relief under Rule 60(b) is contrasted with the practically 

unbridled discretion of a district court to reconsider a previous interlocutory order [under Rule 

54(b)].” Fisher v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 152 F.R.D. 145, 149 (S.D. Ind. 1993). A court 

may reconsider prejudgment interlocutory decisions at any time prior to final judgment. In re 

949 Erie St., Racine, Wis., 824 F.2d 538, 541 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Cameo Convalescent Ctr., 

Inc. v. Percy, 800 F.2d 108, 110 (7th Cir. 1986)).

The Court finds that reconsideration of the Summary Judgment Order would be in the 

interests of justice. As the Court has had no prior involvement with this case, it is not privy to the 

previous judge’s reasoning for denying the Plaintiff’s Motion, and the brevity of the September 

8, 2016, Order leaves the Court with no ability to discern such reasoning. The Court agrees that 

there is a potential for simplifying issues at trial by narrowing their scope and believes that 

reconsideration of the issues will allow the parties to address the issues that remain in genuine 

dispute.

The Court is cognizant of the “law of the case” doctrine, which advises that when a case 

has been transferred to a second judge, the second judge should “abide by the rulings of the first 

judge unless some new development, such as a new appellate decision, convinces him that his 

predecessor’s ruling was incorrect.” Fujisawa Pharm. Co. v. Kapoor, 115 F.3d 1332, 1339 (7th 

Cir. 1997). “[W]hile a district judge should carefully consider the propriety of re-examining a 

prior ruling of another district judge in the same case, when good reasons appear for doing so . . . 

the ‘law of the case’ doctrine must yield to rational decision-making.” Peterson v. Lindner, 765 
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F.2d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 1985). The Court does not believe that granting the Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Reconsideration runs afoul of this doctrine. It is unclear to the Court exactly what conclusions 

the previous judge drew regarding certain disputed issues and, thus, what exactly the “law of the 

case” is. Accordingly, for potential conservation of resources, the Court finds it in the interests of 

justice to grant the Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The Court notes that at this juncture, the Defendants have not substantively responded to 

the Plaintiff’s concerns about the prior ruling and instead opposed the Plaintiff’s Motion on 

procedural grounds. By separate order, the Court will set a telephonic conference to confirm

outstanding disputes and set an appropriate briefing schedule.

Therefore, the Court GRANTS the Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider [ECF No. 43]. 

SO ORDERED on October 23, 2017.

s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT