UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

EUGENE WELLS, )

Petitioner, )

) 

v. ) No. 3:14 CV 1748

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Eugene Wells, a pro se prisoner, filed this habeas corpus petition challenging the

prison disciplinary hearing (WCC 13-09-207) that was held at the Westville Correctional

Facility on January 21, 2014. The Disciplinary Hearing Body (DHB) found him guilty of

Assault on Staff in violation of A-117 and sanctioned him with the loss of 365 days earned

credit time. Wells raises four grounds in his petition.

First, he argues that the hearing officer was not impartial because it was the same

officer who had heard the original case against him before his adminstative appeal

resulted in a rehearing. 

An inmate facing disciplinary charges has the right to an impartial

decisionmaker. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 571. But “the constitutional standard for

impermissible bias is high,” Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003),

and an adjudicator is entitled to a presumption of “honesty and integrity”

absent clear evidence to the contrary, see Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95

S. Ct. 1456, 43 L. Ed. 2d 712 (1975). Due process requires disqualification of a

decisionmaker who was directly or substantially involved in the underlying

incident, Gaither, 236 F.3d at 820, and we have assumed that a decisionmaker

might likewise be impermissibly biased if his spouse is a crucial witness in

the proceeding, see Eads v. Hanks, 280 F.3d 728, 729 (7th Cir. 2002). A hearing

officer is not automatically deemed biased, however, simply because he

adjudicated or was involved in a previous disciplinary charge against the

prisoner. See Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666-67; Pannell, 306 F.3d at 502. 
Perotti v. Marberry, 355 Fed. Appx. 39, 43 (7th Cir. 2009). Here, Wells has not alleged that

the hearing officer was in any way involved in the underlying incident. Rather, his sole

allegation is that the hearing officer had previously adjudicated a case against him – albeit

the same case which was subsequently remanded for a new hearing. Nevertheless,

previous involvement with prior hearings does not make the hearing officer

presumptively biased. Indeed, both State and federal judges commonly preside over cases

remanded for retrial. Therefore Ground One is not a basis for habeas corpus relief.

Second, Wells argues that he was denied the ability to obtain a witness statement

from Sgt. Gentry. Though an inmate has a right to present relevant, exculpatory evidence,

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974), “[p]rison officials must have the necessary

discretion to keep the hearing within reasonable limits.” Id. at 556. Here, the conduct

report was written by Sgt. Gentry and thus Wells was not denied the opportunity to have

the DHB consider his testimony. Though Wells was prevented from questioning Sgt.

Gentry about the report, an inmate in a prison disciplinary hearing has no right to confront

or cross-examine witnesses. Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003); see Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (“Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a

criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings

does not apply”). Ground Two is not a basis for habeas corpus relief.

Third, Wells argues that he was found guilty of Assault with a Weapon in violation

of A-102 even though there was no evidence he had a weapon. Perhaps that was the

finding during his first hearing, but that is not what happened during the rehearing that is

at issue in this habeas corpus proceeding. Here, the DHB found Wells guilty of Assault on

2
Staff in violation of A-117. (DE #2 at 6.) This charge does not require a weapon. Moreover,

the facts reported in the Conduct Report state that Wells “threw his shower shoe out of the

cuff port and struck Officer Major above the left eye.” (DE #2 at 4.) Though shower shoes

are not traditionally considered weapons, here Wells used the shower shoe as a weapon.

Therefore Ground Three is not a basis for habeas corpus relief.

Fourth, Wells argues that the sanctions were excessive because he was punished

more harshly during the rehearing than he was during the original hearing. However,

harshness is not a valid basis for challenging a DHB punishment that is within the range of

the offence for which the inmate was found guilty. Cf. United States ex rel. Long v. Pate, 418

F.2d 1028, 1031 (7th Cir. 1970) (Where a sentence is “within the range established by the

legislature . . . this court will not [on habeas corpus review] question the trial judge’s

discretion in imposing sentence, nor will it question the refusal of the Illinois Supreme

Court to reconsider appellant’s petition for reduction of sentence.”) Here, the punishment

imposed was within the limits permitted by The Disciplinary Code for Adult Offenders.*

Therefore Ground Four is not a basis for habeas corpus relief.

For these reasons, the habeas corpus petition is DENIED pursuant to Section 2254

Habeas Corpus Rule 4. This case is DISMISSED. 

SO ORDERED.

Date: July 21, 2015

s/James T. Moody 

JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

*

Violations of A-117 may be punished with the loss of 12 months earned credit time “with

justification from the Hearing Officer.” Policy 02-04-101 at 37. See http://www.in.gov/idoc/3265.htm. 

The conduct report notes that Wells caused a severe injury resulting in $3,232.41 in medical bills.