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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

DAVID J. PORTER, 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

CITY OF HAMMOND, CITY OF HAMMOND 

POLICE DEPARTMENT, OFFICER 

MATTHEW SIEGFRIED, and SERGEANT 

F. DELGADO, 

 Defendants. 

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NO. 2:13–CV-00319 

OPINION AND ORDER

 This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment, filed on June 15, 2017. (DE #39.) For the 

reasons set forth below, the motion (DE #39) is GRANTED. The Clerk 

is ORDERED to DISMISS this case WITH PREJUDICE and to CLOSE this 

case. 

BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff David J. Porter (“Porter”) filed a complaint 

against Defendants City of Hammond, City of Hammond Police 

Department, Officer Matthew Siegfried and Sergeant F. Delgado 

(together, “Defendants”), alleging that Defendants violated 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution when they illegally tased, beat, and arrested him 

during a traffic stop on August 15, 2015. Defendants have filed 
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a motion for summary judgment claiming there are no genuine issues 

of material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law. The instant motion is fully briefed and ripe for 

adjudication. 

DISCUSSION 

Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine 

dispute of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Not 

every dispute between the parties makes summary judgment 

inappropriate; “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the 

outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude 

the entry of summary judgment.” Id. In determining whether 

summary judgment is appropriate, the deciding court must construe 

all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and 

draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Ogden v. 

Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010). “However, our favor 

toward the nonmoving party does not extend to drawing inferences 

that are supported by only speculation or conjecture.” Fitzgerald 

v. Santoro, 707 F.3d 725, 730 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). 

 A party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion 

may not rely on allegations or denials in her own pleading, but 
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rather must “marshal and present the court with the evidence she 

contends will prove her case.” Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 

621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). If the nonmoving party fails 

to establish the existence of an essential element on which he or 

she bears the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is proper. 

Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2006). 

Facts 

On August 15, 2011, Porter was riding as a passenger in a 

vehicle driven by his nephew, Josiah Porter (“Porter’s nephew”) in 

Hammond, Indiana. (Ex. 2 at 62, 69.) They were pulled over by 

Officer Siegfried (“Siegfried”) around midnight for failing to dim 

high beams for oncoming traffic. (Ex. 4 at 8-10.) Porter listened 

to the verbal exchange between his nephew and the officer. Porter 

explained that his nephew was “trying to beat the ticket, so he’s 

giving him all these excuses,” in a “passionate like” manner. (Ex. 

2 at 74.) Porter’s nephew testified that Siegfried asked him to 

step out of the car, while Porter stated that Siegfried removed 

his nephew from the car. (Ex. 3 at 12; Ex. 2 at 87.) Siegfried 

began to pat Porter’s nephew down at the hood of his squad car, 

which was parked directly behind the car in which Porter was a 

passenger. (Ex. 2 at 90.) As he started this, Porter stepped out 

of the passenger side of the car. (Id. at 92.) Porter repeatedly 

yelled, “Why are you detaining him?” (Id. at 92.) According to 

Porter, the police officer responded by yelling something 
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repeatedly and pointing, though Porter denies that he could make 

out those instructions. (Id. at 92, 102.) Porter’s nephew 

testified that Officer Siegfried was telling Porter, “Get back in 

the car. Get back in the car.” (Ex. 4 at 16.) Porter concedes 

that the officer was probably telling him to stop interfering. 

(See id. at 97-98.) 

According to Porter, as he persisted in asking Siegfried why 

he was detaining his nephew, Siegfried rushed at him, grabbed his 

neck with both hands and choked him. (Id. at 104, 106; cf. Ex. 7 

at 30 (Siegfried’s testimony that Porter “charge[d] at me”).) The 

two fell to the ground struggling in a bear hug, with no choking 

going on. (Ex. 2 at 111-12.) Porter was hanging onto the officer’s 

body when they fell to the ground. (Id. at 114, 116.) According 

to Porter’s nephew, it as a “mutual fall” not on top of each other; 

“[t]here was a tussle; they both fell.” (Ex. 4 at 18.) Once on 

the ground, the two tussled in a sort of bear hug for about two 

minutes. (Ex. 2 at 115.) During that time, Siegfried called for 

backup on his lapel radio. (See id. at 121.) It seemed to Porter 

that the officer blacked out for a moment and stopped to take a 

breather. (Id. at 124.) Porter’s nephew observed Porter and 

Siegfried tussling on the ground for five or six minutes. (Ex. 4 

at 19.) Siegfried testified that his weapon was in his unfastened 

holster when the Porter reached around his waist. (Ex. 7 at 30.) 

He testified that he felt Porter tugging on the weapon in the 
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holster. (Id. at 38.) Porter denied going for Siegfried’s gun 

but testified that he might have grabbed Siegfried around his waist 

and torso. (Ex. 2 at 110, 113.) 

As Porter and Siegfried struggled, Porter heard his nephew 

yelling, “that’s my uncle,” and “[s]top it” or “y’all stop it.” 

(Id. at 115, 116.) He believes his nephew was yelling to both him 

and the officer. (Id. at 120.) Porter’s nephew testified that he 

“told my uncle to stop. Stop moving, stop doing everything, and 

just try to let the situation calm down, simmer down.” (Ex. 4 at 

19.) 

When Sergeant Delgado arrived at the scene, he did not know 

how the altercation started. (Ex. 3 at 12.) Radio dispatch had 

told him that somebody was fighting with an officer. (Id.) 

Porter’s nephew said to him, “You don’t need that taser. You can 

put that away. Everything is cool.” (Id.) Porter recalls hearing 

his nephew say, “it’s cool, don’t worry about it.” (Ex. 2 at 122.) 

Delgado found Siegfried and Porter wrestling around on the ground. 

They were both on their sides and seemed to be in an “equal 

scuffle.” (Ex. 3 at 7.) Porter testified that he kept holding 

onto Siegfried “for dear life.” (Ex. 2 at 119.) Porter’s nephew 

observed Porter squirming while the officers tried to hold him 

down before he was tased. (Ex. 4 at 25.) Delgado testified that 

he told Porter to “put his hands behind his back or you’re going 

to be tased;” Porter did not respond to this order. (Ex. 3 at 7.) 
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Delgado deployed the taser because he was concerned about getting 

on the ground to help the fight when another unrestrained subject 

was behind him. (Id. at 8.) 

Porter first claimed that he was handcuffed before he was 

tased, then testified that he was not sure whether he was cuffed 

before the taser or not. (Ex. 2 at 131.) He believes one hand 

was handcuffed before the taser was deployed because his hands 

were cuffed when they picked him up. (Id.) Porter’s nephew 

describes Porter’s hands at the time he got tased as being out 

“like Jesus on the cross.” (Ex. 4 at 25.) The video captured by 

Delgado’s taser shows that Porter’s arms were initially loose and 

in front of his body, then an officer deployed the taser and 

repeatedly ordered Porter to “put your hands behind your back,” 

and then Porter was handcuffed while on the ground. (Pl. Ex. 1.) 

Porter testified that other officers kneed him in the neck, 

kicked him in the ribs, thumbed him in the ear and punched him in 

the face. (Ex. 2 at 127-28.) Neither Porter nor his nephew can 

identify the officers who allegedly abused Porter in this manner. 

For his actions on August 11, 2015, Porter was later convicted of 

disorderly conduct. (Ex. 2 at 34.) He did not appeal his 

conviction. He had no medical bills arising out of this incident. 

(Id. at 138.) He did not go to a hospital; he healed himself after 

going to a clinic to check himself out. (Id. at 134-35.) 
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ANALYSIS 

City of Hammond Police Department 

Defendants maintain that the City of Hammond Police 

Department should be dismissed because it is a non-existent entity 

that cannot be sued. Porter does not respond to this argument, 

and therefore waives any argument that his claims against the City 

of Hammond Police Department are valid. See Johnson v. Gen. Bd. 

of Pension & Health Benefits of United Methodist Church, 733 F.3d 

722, 729 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that arguments not raised in 

opposition to a motion for summary judgment are waived); Laborers' 

Int'l Union of N. Am. v. Caruso, 197 F.3d 1195, 1197 (7th Cir. 

1999) (same). In Indiana, “[t]he ‘department’ of a city is merely 

a vehicle through which government fulfills its policy functions 

and is not a governmental entity unto itself.” City of Peru v. 

Lewis, 950 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citation omitted). 

Because “a non-existent entity cannot be sued,” the City of Hammond 

Police Department is dismissed from the action. Id. 

Claims of Wrongful Arrest, Seizure, Lack of Probable Cause 

and Wrongful Prosecution 

Defendants argue that summary judgment on Porter’s claims of 

wrongful arrest, seizure, lack of probable cause, and wrongful 

prosecution is appropriate, in part because he was convicted in 

state criminal court of disorderly conduct. See Mustafa v. City 

of Chicago, 442 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2006) (probable cause is 
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an absolute defense to § 1983 claims against officers for false 

arrest and false imprisonment); Purvis v. Oest, 614 F.3d 713, 723 

(7th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he evidence required to establish probable 

cause is considerably less than that required to sustain a criminal 

conviction.”). Porter advances no argument in support of these 

claims. When a plaintiff fails to defend a claim in response to 

a motion for summary judgment, the Court may deem the claim 

abandoned. See Maclin v. SBC Ameritech, 520 F.3d 781, 788 (7th 

Cir. 2008) (“In her response to [defendant's] motion for summary 

judgment, [plaintiff] failed to defend her claim against these 

arguments. She therefore abandoned the claim.”); Palmer v. Marion 

Cty., 327 F.3d 588, 597 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[B]ecause [plaintiff] 

failed to delineate his negligence claim in his district court 

brief in opposition to summary judgment or in his brief to this 

Court, his negligence claim is deemed abandoned.”). The Court 

treats Porter’s failure to respond to Defendants’ arguments as an 

abandonment of these claims, and grants summary judgment in 

Defendants’ favor on these claims.

Municipal Liability 

Defendants argue that Porter’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim fails 

because the City of Hammond has no policy or custom that enables 

officers to deprive citizens of their constitutional rights. 

Because Porter fails to address this issue in his memorandum in 

opposition, his argument on this issue is waived. See Johnson, 
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733 F.3d at 729 (holding that arguments not raised in opposition 

to a motion for summary judgment are waived); Caruso, 197 F.3d at 

1197 (same). Even if Porter had not waived this argument, his 

position would fail. A municipality may only be held liable for 

constitutional violations caused by the municipality through its 

own policy, practice, or custom. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. 

of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 

L.Ed. 2d 611 (1978). A municipality cannot incur liability in an 

action under Section 1983 merely because it employs a tortfeasor. 

Id. at 691. To recover under Monell, a plaintiff must establish 

that (1) he suffered a deprivation of a federal right; (2) as a 

result of an express municipal policy, a widespread custom, or a 

deliberate act of a decision-maker with final policymaking 

authority for the municipality; which (3) was the proximate cause 

of his injury. King v. Kramer, 763 F.3d 635, 649 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Here, Porter has failed to proffer any evidence of an alleged 

policy, practice or custom causing his alleged unconstitutional 

deprivation. See Cook v. Lain, No. 2:10–CV–411–PRC, 2013 WL 

866876, at *14 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 7, 2013) (granting summary judgment 

where plaintiff offered no evidence that defendant had an express 

policy, widespread practice or custom, or person with final 

policymaking authority that caused the alleged constitutional 

deprivation). As such, the Court grants summary judgment in favor 

of Defendant City of Hammond. 
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Defendants assert that, to the extent that Porter intended to 

sue Siegfried and Delgado in their official capacities, those 

claims fail. Porter failed to defend the official capacity claims 

in response to this argument, and therefore abandoned such claims. 

See Maclin, 520 F.3d at 788; Palmer, 327 F.3d at 597–98. Moreover, 

“[o]fficial-capacity suits . . . generally represent only another 

way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is 

an agent. As long as the government entity receives notice and an 

opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all 

respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the 

entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S. Ct. 

3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). To the extent Porter intended to assert claims against 

Siegfried and Delgado in their official capacities, such claims 

fail for the same reasons that his Monell claim against the City 

of Hammond fails. 

Excessive Force Claims 

Defendants also move for summary judgment on the excessive 

force claims against Siegfried and Delgado in their individual 

capacities.1 “An officer who has the right to arrest an individual 

                                                            

1 Individual capacity suits “seek to impose personal liability upon 

a government official for actions he takes under color of state 

law.” Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 165 (citation omitted). “[T]o be 

held individually liable, a defendant must be personally 

responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right. 

Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation 
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also has the right to use some degree of physical force or threat 

of force to effectuate the arrest.” Williams v. Brooks, 809 F.3d 

936, 944 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). “That right is 

circumscribed by the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard.” 

Id. Factors relevant to the reasonableness inquiry include “the 

severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an 

immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and 

whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade 

arrest by flight.” Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

396, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)). In determining 

whether an officer’s actions were reasonable under the 

circumstances, courts should view the matter “from the perspective 

of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 

vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citation omitted). 

Courts remain cognizant of “the fact that police officers are often 

forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are 

tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force 

that is necessary in a particular situation.” Williams, 809 F.3d 

at 944 (quoting Abbott v. Sangamon Cty., Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 724 

(7th Cir. 2013)). “[S]ummary judgment is often inappropriate in 

                                                            

and internal quotation marks omitted). The Complaint alleges that 

Siegfried and Delgado directly participated in the incident, and 

were “acting under the color of state law, were employees of and 

on duty” for the City of Hammond Police Department at the time of 

the incident. (DE #40-1, ¶15.)
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excessive-force cases because the evidence surrounding the 

officer's use of force is often susceptible of different 

interpretations.” Cyrus v. Town of Mukwonago, 624 F.3d 856, 862 

(7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). 

Officer Siegfried 

Defendants argue that the force used by Officer Siegfried was 

objectively reasonable and did not violate Porter’s rights. Porter 

disagrees, citing Morfin v. City of East Chicago, 349 F.3d 989 

(7th Cir. 2003). In that case, the plaintiff Morfin had allegedly 

interfered with law enforcement officers’ investigation of voting 

machines. Morfin testified that the officers grabbed him, twisted 

his arm, shoved him toward the wall and took him to the floor. 

Id. at 1005. To this point, Morfin had not resisted any police 

action and informed the officers that he was going peacefully, so 

they did not need to handcuff him. Id. After the officers took 

Morfin to the floor, he crossed his arms on his chest to prevent 

the officers from handcuffing him. Id. The Seventh Circuit 

reversed summary judgment in favor of the officers on Morfin’s 

excessive force claim, explaining that “[i]f a jury were to credit 

Mr. Morfin's version of events over that of the arresting officers, 

it could conclude that there was no reason for the officers to 

exert such force on Mr. Morfin.” Id. 

Here, the undisputed evidence shows that while Officer 

Siegfried was patting down Porter’s nephew, Porter exited the 
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vehicle and repeatedly yelled at Siegfried. In his response brief, 

Porter claims that Siegfried rushed at him without giving any 

orders or commands. (DE #43 at 4.) The proffered evidence does 

not support this claim. Porter testified that Siegfried pointed 

to the vehicle and yelled something at Porter, and Porter’s nephew 

testified that Siegfried told Porter to get back in the car. While 

Porter testified that he did not understand what Siegfried was 

saying, he conceded that Siegfried was probably telling him to 

stop interfering. The Court finds that there is no genuine issue 

of dispute regarding whether Siegfried gave orders to Porter, or 

whether Porter failed to follow those orders, before their physical 

altercation. 

According to Defendants, Siegfried testified that Porter’s 

refusal to get back in the car and his aggressive behavior forced 

Siegfried to abandon Porter’s nephew, leaving him unrestrained and 

not yet checked for weapons, that that when Siegfried approached 

Porter, Porter lunged at him and took a swing. (DE #46 at 7.) 

The only proffered testimony from Siegfried mentions that Porter 

“charge[d] at” Siegfried. (Ex. 7 at 30.) Even if Defendants had 

proffered additional testimony from Siegfried about this issue, 

the Court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable 

to Porter, which is the testimony that Siegfried rushed at Porter, 

grabbed his neck and choked him. It is undisputed that the 

Siegfried and Porter fell to the ground and tussled in a bear hug. 
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As they tussled, Siegfried felt Porter tugging on his gun in his 

unfastened holster. While Porter denied going for Siegfried’s 

gun, he testified that he might have grabbed Siegfried around his 

waist and torso. Siegfried called for backup, and they were still 

tussling on the ground when Sergeant Delgado arrived on the scene. 

Under the first Graham factor, the initial infraction—

Porter’s yelling at Siegfried while he attempted to pat down 

Porter’s nephew, who had been pulled over for a traffic violation—

was not a significant violation. Under the second factor, Porter 

posed a threat to Officer Siegfried when he got out of the vehicle 

during the traffic stop and refused repeated orders to get back in 

the car, especially since Siegfried was a single officer without 

cover. See Williams, 809 F.3d at 944. The third Graham factor, 

whether Porter was actively resisting arrest, is more complicated. 

Relying on Morfin, Porter maintains that he did not begin to resist 

Siegfried until after he rushed Porter, grabbed his neck and choked 

him. He insists that after they fell to the ground, he was hanging 

onto Siegfried in a bear hug to prevent Siegfried from seriously 

injuring him. Defendants respond that even if Siegfried had put 

his hands on Porter’s neck, his actions were not excessive because 

Porter does not claim that Siegfried touched his neck again, struck 

him or hurt him in any other way after they fell, but rather, that 

the two men struggled in a bear hug on the ground. In contrast to 

Morfin, Porter was not cooperative, failed to obey direct orders, 
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posed a safety threat to the single officer on the scene, and was 

not subdued by Siegfried. 

Defendants cite Williams v. Brooks, in which the Seventh 

Circuit found that an officer used a reasonable amount of force 

where the plaintiff refused to get back into his car during a 

traffic stop, thereby creating a safety concern for the arresting 

officers. 809 F.3d at 944. The Court finds Williams to be 

distinguishable because the force used in that case differs from 

the force alleged here. In Williams, the officer’s alleged force 

involved pushing the plaintiff against a car during his arrest. 

If a jury were to believe Porter, Siegfried rushed him, grabbed 

his neck and began to choke him. A dispute about how much force 

was used is material because it “bears directly on whether that 

force was a reasonable response to the situation faced by the 

officer.” Cyrus, 624 F.3d at 862. The Court finds that the 

proffered testimony creates a material issue of fact as to the 

amount of force Siegfried used which cannot be resolved on summary 

judgment. 

Officer Delgado 

Defendants argue that the force used by Officer Delgado was 

objectively reasonable and did not violate Porter’s rights. Porter 

alleges that Delgado’s use of a taser on him while he was on the 

ground constituted excessive force. “Courts generally hold that 

the use of a taser against an actively resisting suspect either 
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does not violate clearly established law or is constitutionally 

reasonable.” Abbott, 705 F.3d at 727 (citations omitted). They 

also “generally hold that it is unreasonable for officers to deploy 

a taser against a misdemeanant who is not actively resisting 

arrest.” Id. at 730 (citations omitted). 

It is undisputed that Sergeant Delgado responded to Officer 

Siegfried’s call for backup, and arrived on the scene to find 

Porter’s nephew unrestrained by the patrol car and Siegfried and 

Porter tussling on the ground. Delgado approached them, ordered 

Porter to put his hands behind his back, and when Porter failed to 

do so, Delgado deployed his taser. Delgado testified that he 

deployed the taser because he was concerned about getting on the 

ground to help the fight while another unrestrained subject was 

standing behind him. Porter claims that one wrist was handcuffed 

when he was tased, and his nephew testified that Porter’s arms 

were out “like Jesus on the cross.” (Ex. 4 at 25.) The video 

captured by Delgado’s taser shows that Porter’s arms were loose 

and in front of him before the taser was deployed, and that Porter 

was handcuffed behind his back after the taser was deployed. While 

the video does not clearly show whether Porter was partially 

handcuffed before being tased, there is no dispute that he was not 

fully handcuffed prior to being tased. 

In considering excessive force claims, courts are to be 

cognizant that “police officers are often forced to make split-
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second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and 

rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a 

particular situation.” Abbott, 705 F.3d at 724 (quoting Graham, 

490 U.S. at 397). An “officer’s single use of a taser to subdue 

a suspect, who repeatedly had refused lawful orders of the police, 

was a reasonably proportionate response where failing to use the 

taser could have resulted in an escalation of violence.” United 

States v. Norris, 640 F.3d 295, 303 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation 

omitted). Here, Delgado observed that Porter was resisting another 

officer and refusing lawful orders, and that another unrestrained 

subject was behind him. Given the “considerable leeway” courts 

are to afford “law enforcement officers’ assessments about the 

appropriate use of force in dangerous situations,” Abbott, 705 

F.3d at 724-25, the Court finds that Delgado’s single use of the 

taser to subdue Porter did not constitute excessive force. 

Qualified Immunity 

Defendants also raise qualified immunity as a defense to 

Porter’s excessive force claims. "Qualified immunity protects 

public servants from liability for reasonable mistakes made while 

performing their public duties." Findlay v. Lendermon, 722 F.3d 

895, 899 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). “Whether a government 

official is entitled to qualified immunity is a legal question for 

resolution by the court, not a jury." Purtell v. Mason, 527 F.3d 

615, 621 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). In determining 
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whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, a court 

makes two inquiries: "(1) whether the facts, taken in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff, make out a violation of a 

constitutional right, and (2) whether that constitutional right 

was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation." 

Burton v. Downey, 805 F.3d 776, 784 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation 

omitted). "Although the privilege of qualified immunity is a 

defense, the plaintiff bears the burden of defeating it." Betker 

v. Gomez, 692 F.3d 854, 860 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). 

The Court has found the Sergeant Delgado’s conduct did not 

constitute excessive force, and thus, Delgado is entitled to 

qualified immunity. 

As for Officer Siegfried, the Court must determine whether 

the constitutional right at issue was clearly established. At the 

time of Porter’s arrest, “it was of course clearly established 

that a police officer may not use excessive force in arresting an 

individual.” Holmes v. Village of Hoffman Estate, 511 F.3d 673, 

687 (7th Cir. 2007). For the purposes of the qualified immunity 

analysis, the Court assumes that Siegfried rushed at Porter and 

grabbed his neck before they fell and tussled in a bear hug on the 

ground. Because the force used by Siegfried was not “so plainly 

excessive that, as an objective matter, the police officers would 

have been on notice that [he was] violating the Fourth Amendment,” 

Porter must identify a “closely analogous case that established a 
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right to be free from the type of force” used. Findlay, 722 F.3d 

at 899 (citations omitted). Porter has not carried this burden. 

While he relies on Morfin, the facts in that case are 

distinguishable. Unlike Morfin, Porter was not cooperative, 

failed to obey Siegfried’s orders, posed a safety threat to the 

single officer on the scene, and was not subdued by Siegfried. 

“Given the short time frame, and the latitude that qualified 

immunity gives to officers to exercise judgment in tense and 

evolving situations, the Court cannot find that it was clearly 

established that this use of force was excessive under these 

circumstances, where [the plaintiff] was not yet handcuffed and 

had given no outward indication that he was not going to offer 

further resistance.” Jones v. City of Fort Wayne, No. 1:15-CV093 JD, 2017 WL 1059015, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 21, 2017). 

Therefore, the Court find that Officer Siegfried is entitled to 

qualified immunity. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, the Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment (DE #39) is GRANTED. The Clerk is ORDERED to 

DISMISS this case WITH PREJUDICE and to CLOSE this case. 

DATED: January 30, 2018 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge 

 United States District Court