J-S70033-14

2014 PA Super 256

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

 v.

PETER ALLEN TREADWAY

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1217 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 7, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County,

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-15-CR-0001794-2010

BEFORE: LAZARUS, MUNDY, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

OPINION BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 13, 2014

Peter Allen Treadway (Appellant) appeals from his aggregate judgment 

of sentence of 100 to 200 years of imprisonment for his convictions for 45 

counts of various sex crimes. We affirm.

A prior panel of this Court offered the following succinct summary of 

the facts of this case.

[Appellant] sexually abused his stepdaughter. This 

depravity continued for years. The victim testified that the 

abuse began when she was nine or ten years old and that 

[Appellant] first had sexual intercourse with her when she turned 

eleven. By the time the victim was thirteen or fourteen years 

old, [Appellant] had sex with her “every day or multiple times a 

day.” Eventually the victim became pregnant. The victim, with 

[Appellant’s] assistance, obtained an abortion in a hospital.

After a four-day trial, the jury convicted [Appellant] of a 

multitude of sexual offenses and counts. The trial court 

sentenced [Appellant] to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 

100 to 200 years.
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Commonwealth v. Treadway, 64 A.3d 278 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(unpublished memorandum at 2) (citation to trial transcript omitted). 

On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions, but 

determined that his sentence was illegal. Appellant was sentenced under 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9718.2,1“a statute that was implemented well after the convicted 

criminal conduct and which increased the punishment imposed by the law in 

effect at the time the crime was committed.” Id. at 5. Furthermore, 

Appellant was sentenced based on the age of the victim at the time of the 

acts, although the jury made no factual determination about when the acts 

occurred, in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 

(2000). Id. at 7. Therefore, this Court vacated Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence and remanded for resentencing. However, this Court expressly 

noted that “[n]othing in this memorandum is to be construed as precluding 

the trial court on re-sentencing from exercising its discretion to impose a 

sentence up to the statutory maximum provided for each offense—and 

running those sentences consecutively.” Id. at 8 n.4. 

After remand, the trial court did just that, again imposing an 

aggregate sentence of 100 to 200 years of imprisonment by sentencing 

Appellant to, by and large, consecutive statutory maximum sentences. The 

 

1 Section 9718.2 provides enhanced penalties and mandatory minimum 

sentences for sexual offenders who have one or more prior convictions for 

sex crimes. 
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trial court subsequently denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion, and 

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. 

Appellant presents one question to this Court: “Did the trial court 

abuse its discretion in imposing an aggregate sentence of 100-200 years of 

imprisonment which was excessively harsh and violated fundamental norms 

of sentencing under the facts and circumstances of the case?” Appellant’s 

Brief at 5. 

Appellant’s question challenges the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. Accordingly, we bear in mind the following.

A challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence must be 

considered a petition for permission to appeal, as the right to 

pursue such a claim is not absolute. Two requirements must be 

met before we will review this challenge on its merits. First, an 

appellant must set forth in his brief a concise statement of the 

reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the 

discretionary aspects of a sentence. Second, the appellant must 

show that there is a substantial question that the sentence 

imposed is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code. The 

determination of whether a particular issue raises a substantial 

question is to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. In order to 

establish a substantial question, the appellant must show actions 

by the trial court inconsistent with the Sentencing Code or 

contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing 

process.

Commonwealth v. Bowen, 55 A.3d 1254, 1262-63 (Pa. Super. 2012), 

appeal denied, 64 A.3d 630 (Pa. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. Super. 2004)). 

Appellant’s brief contains a statement of the reasons upon which he 

relies for allowance of appeal as to the discretionary aspects of his sentence. 
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Therein, Appellant claims that the imposition of consecutive statutory 

maximum sentences, all but guaranteeing that Appellant will spend the rest 

of his life in jail, raises his aggregate sentence to an excessive level. 

Appellant’s Brief at 14. 

“Generally, Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing court discretion to 

impose its sentence concurrently or consecutively to other sentences being 

imposed at the same time or to sentences already imposed. Any challenge 

to the exercise of this discretion ordinarily does not raise a substantial 

question.” Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d 526, 533 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(internal quotation omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pass, 914 A.2d 

442, 446–47 (Pa. Super. 2006)). “[T]he key to resolving the preliminary 

substantial question inquiry is whether the decision to sentence 

consecutively raises the aggregate sentence to, what appears upon its face 

to be, an excessive level in light of the criminal conduct at issue in the case.” 

Commonwealth v. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 581, 587 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

The trial court summarized Appellant’s criminal conduct as follows:

At trial the victim testified that Appellant began molesting 

her when she was only nine or ten years old, that Appellant had 

vaginal intercourse with her by the age of eleven, and that by 

the time she was thirteen or fourteen Appellant was forcing her 

to have sex with him “everyday or multiple times a day.” She 

testified that Appellant had sex with her vaginally, orally, and 

anally. She testified that Appellant had sex with her in the 

kitchen, the bathroom, the living room, the hallways and the 

bedrooms of the home that the victim shared with Appellant and 

from which she had no real escape. She testified that Appellant 

purchased costumes for her to wear prior to intercourse, 
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installed a stripper pole in her bedroom, made her wear 

handcuffs during intercourse, and sometimes tied her to the bed. 

When she was approximately thirteen, Appellant actually 

“branded” the victim by repeatedly burning her lower back with 

a heated paperclip that Appellant had formed into the shape of a 

heart. The victim also testified that Appellant never wore a 

condom during intercourse because it “didn't feel as good” to 

him. In 2008, when she was fifteen, Appellant impregnated the 

victim8and then accompanied her to the hospital where she 

underwent an abortion. Appellant signed the paperwork 

consenting to the abortion as the victim’s “Dad.” Appellant’s 

sexual reign of terror continued unabated until December of 

2009, when the victim was seventeen years old [and had begun 

dating a teenage boy]. She moved out of Appellant’s home two 

[months] later[, having revealed Appellant’s abuse to her 

boyfriend, to live in the home of her boyfriend and his parents. 

The police became involved shortly thereafter]. 

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8 DNA testing on the fetal tissue revealed that there was a 

99.9999 [percent] probability that Appellant was the father 

of the fetus.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/4/2014, at 3-4 (citations to trial transcript omitted). 

The trial court further noted that this was not Appellant’s first offense; he 

was previously convicted of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a 12-

year-old victim. Id. at 4. 

When considered in a vacuum, a sentence of 100 to 200 years might 

seem extreme. However, viewed in the context of Appellant’s conduct, we 

cannot conclude that the sentence was manifestly excessive. Compare 

Prisk, 13 A.3d at 533 (holding sentence of 633 to 1,500 years of 

imprisonment was not excessive given Prisk’s “systematic sexual abuse of 

his stepdaughter, which occurred on an almost daily basis over the course of 

six years”) with Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1273 (Pa. 
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Super. 2013) (holding Dodge raised a substantial question that aggregate 

sentence of approximately 40 to 80 years of imprisonment was excessive 

where only low-value property crimes were involved). Accordingly, we hold 

that Appellant does not raise a substantial question that the trial court 

abused its discretion in imposing an aggregate sentence of 100 to 200 years 

of imprisonment given the gravity of the offenses, the impact on the victim, 

Appellant’s failure to be rehabilitated after his first conviction for sexually 

abusing a minor, and the need to protect the public from Appellant.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/13/2014