1 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

JEFFREY PAUL MILLER, ) 

 ) 

Petitioner, ) 

 ) 

 vs. ) CAUSE NO. 3:17-CV-461 RLM 

 ) (Arising out of 3:14-CR-77 RLM-MGG) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

 ) 

Respondent. ) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 Jeffrey P. Miller pleaded guilty to a criminal information charging him with 

interstate transport of stolen goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 and money 

laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). The court sentenced Mr. 

Miller to a term of 135 months’ imprisonment and two years’ supervised release. 

Mr. Miller was also ordered to pay back over one million dollars in restitution. 

The judgment was affirmed on appeal and Mr. Miller is now before the court 

requesting that the court vacate his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 

2255. [Doc. No. 72]. For the following reasons, the court denies Mr. Miller’s 

motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

From the summer 2012 through January 2014, Jeffrey Miller stole large 

amounts of copper wire from his employer in Indiana, sold the wire in Michigan, 

and laundered some of his profits through casinos. After Mr. Miller’s arrest, Mr. 

Fred Hains was appointed as his counsel. Mr. Hains then conducted numerous 
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meetings and communications with Mr. Miller and the Government, and 

represented Mr. Miller throughout the entirety of the case. 

Mr. Hains met with Mr. Miller several times to discuss the case and 

possible plea agreement. This discussion included information and evidence 

surrounding the charges as well as specific terms and conditions of the plea 

agreement. Mr. Hains also explained the impact of the United States Sentencing 

Guidelines and outlined Mr. Miller’s probable offense level. During this 

conversation, possible offense level reductions and enhancements were 

discussed. Mr. Hains opined that acceptance of responsibility reduction would 

lower Mr. Miller’s offense level by three and didn’t anticipate any enhancements 

for being an “organizer” of the alleged criminal activity. Mr. Hains explained to 

Mr. Miller that the offense level calculation could change if more unfavorable 

facts came to light. 

Mr. Hains also communicated with the prosecution multiple times in tries 

to challenge various parts of the case and proposed plea agreement, including a 

recommendation for a lower sentence. These attempts were ultimately 

unsuccessful. The government showed willingness to provide Mr. Miller with a 

benefit if he continued to provide helpful information about other possible 

individuals associated with the charged theft and money laundering. Mr. Hains 

communicated his efforts and the governments posture to Mr. Miller. As Mr. 

Miller drew nearer to signing the proposed plea agreement, Mr. Hains further 

warned that Mr. Miller shouldn’t sign the agreement if any questions or concerns 

arose. Mr. Miller claims that Mr. Hains said that signing the plea agreement 
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would result in a lower term of incarceration, and that this convinced Mr. Miller 

to sign the agreement, and it would have had Mr. Miller not continued with illegal 

activity (manufacturing and using methamphetamine). 

The plea contained numerous provision, including one about Mr. Miller’s 

acceptance of responsibility. The provision stated that such acceptance was 

contingent on Mr. Miller’s continued cooperation. The government could also be 

released from the crediting Mr. Miller with acceptance of responsibility if Mr. 

Miller engaged in more criminal conduct including the use of controlled 

substances. During Mr. Miller’s change of plea hearing, he indicated that he had 

enough time to discuss the plea agreement and case with Mr. Hains and that 

Mr. Hains had satisfactorily represented him. Mr. Miller further stated that he 

was not under the influence of any substances. 

At sentencing, the government told the court that Mr. Miller had 

manufactured and used methamphetamine during the time between his change 

of plea and sentencing hearings. In light of this information the court rejected 

Mr. Miller’s acceptance of responsibility reduction and imposed a total of six 

levels of enhancement for use of sophisticated means and organizer status 

relating to Mr. Miller’s initial charges. Mr. Miller was sentenced to a total of 135 

months. Mr. Miller then directly appealed, asking he be resentenced. The 

Seventh Circuit rejected the appeal and affirmed this court’s sentence. United 

States v. Miller, 641 Fed. App’x. 563 (7th Cir. 2016). 
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II. DISCUSSION

Mr. Miller alleges that: 1) Mr. Hains never told him that continued substance 

abuse could result in the loss of relevant sentencing reductions; 2) Mr. Hains 

didn’t conduct a thorough investigation of the case; 3) Mr. Hains didn’t try to 

dismiss the criminal charges; 4) the plea agreement he signed was vague and 

absurd, and that no one explained to him the consequences of the plea; and 5) 

Mr. Hains didn’t tell him that he faced the possibility of a sentencing 

enhancement for being an “organizer.” The rules governing petitions filed under 

28 U.S.C. § 2255 provide that once a motion is filed: 

The motion, together with all the files, records, transcripts, and 

correspondence relating to the judgment under attack, shall be 

examined promptly by the judge to whom it is assigned. If it plainly 

appears from the face of the motion and any annexed exhibits and 

the prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to 

relief in the district court, the judge shall make an order for its 

summary dismissal and cause the movant to be notified. 

Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States 

District Courts. After reviewing the record in this case, the court finds that Mr. 

Miller’s petition can be resolved without a hearing. See Bruce v. United States, 

256 F.3d 592, 597 (7th Cir. 2001); Daniels v. United States, 54 F.3d 290, 293 

(7th Cir. 1995). 

The court construes Mr. Miller’s pro se petition liberally. Jackson v. 

Duckworth, 112 F.3d 878, 881 (7th Cir. 1997). Mr. Miller essentially alleges 

deficiencies in his representation with regards to the plea process through an 

ineffective assistance of counsel argument. Ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims applies to pleas. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (citing Missouri v. 
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Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 134-135 (2012)). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim, Mr. Miller must show both that his attorney’s performance “fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for his attorney’s errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-693 (1984). 

This is a difficult standard to meet; to prevail, Mr. Miller must show both “that 

counsel made errors so serious that ‘counsel’ was not functioning as the counsel 

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment” and “that counsel’s errors 

were so serious as to deprive [Mr. Miller] of a fair [result].” Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. at 687. Mr. Miller “bears a heavy burden” in proving that 

his counsel was consitutionally ineffective. Barker v. United States, F.3d 629, 

633 (7th Cir. 1993). The court can address the Strickland prongs in the order it 

sees fit, because an insufficient showing as to either of the prongs is fatal to a 

claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; McDaniel v. Polley, 847 F.3d 887, 893 (7th 

Cir. 2017). 

There is a strong presumption that counsel performed effectively. See

Berkey v. United States, 318 F.3d 768, 772 (7th Cir. 2003). “A court’s scrutiny 

of an attorney’s performance is ‘highly deferential’ to eliminate as much as 

possible the distorting effects of hindsight, and we ‘must indulge a strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance.’” Vinyard v. United States, 804 F.3d at 1225 (quoting 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687). In the context of guilty pleas, 

competent counsel “will attempt to learn all of the facts of the case, make an 
6 

estimate of a likely sentence, and communicate the results of that analysis before 

allowing his client to plead guilty.” Moore v. Bryant, 348 F.3d 238, 241 (7th Cir. 

2003). Counsel doesn’t need to “provide a precisely accurate prediction of the 

respective consequences of pleading guilty or going to trial.” United States v. 

Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 1996). Because reviewing courts shouldn’t 

second-guess counsel’s strategic choices, the burden of showing that counsel’s 

decisions fell outside the wide range of reasonable strategic choices “rest[s] 

squarely on the defendant.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 22–23 (2013). 

“[E]ven if counsel’s performance was deficient, a petitioner must also show 

that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,’ meaning ‘a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Eckstein v. 

Kingston, 460 F.3d 844, 848 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. at 694). “In the context of pleas a defendant must show the outcome of 

the plea process would have been different with competent advice.” Lafler v, 

Cooper, 566 U.S. at 163; Hill v. Lockahart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (“The 

defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s errors, he would have no have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 

on going to trial.”). 

A. Substance Abuse and Sentencing Reductions 

Mr. Miller first alleges that his attorney never told him that continued 

substance abuse could result in the loss of an acceptance of responsibility 
7 

reduction at sentencing. Mr. Miller misunderstands the terms of the acceptance 

of responsibility reduction as set out in ¶ 9(f) of his plea agreement. He argues 

that he did indeed accept responsibility and that this court should not have 

taken non-relevant circumstances into consideration when deciding whether to 

grant the acceptance of responsibility reduction. These circumstances, however, 

involved Mr. Miller’s use and production of methamphetamine between his 

change of plea hearing and his sentencing hearing. Mr. Miller’s use of illegal 

drugs explicitly violated term of ¶ 9(f) of the guilty plea he signed, which stated 

that Mr. Miller could lose the relevant reduction if he “engage[d] in additional 

criminal conduct including any personal use of controlled substances.” Petition 

To Enter A Guilty Plea, ¶ 9(f). According to Mr. Miller, Mr. Hains never told him 

that the plea agreement contained a provision that would result in the potential 

loss the three-level acceptance of responsibility reduction. Mr. Miller claims that 

he believed that once he had signed the plea agreement he had, in a sense, locked 

in his sentence and relevant reductions, regardless of what he did afterwards. 

Mr. Miller, however, has indicated on the record the opposite of what he 

now argues. During his plea hearing, the magistrate judge explained that the 

court wasn’t required to apply the government’s acceptance of responsibility 

recommendation. Mr. Miller affirmed that he understood the nonbinding nature 

of the relevant provision at this hearing. He acknowledged that he had enough 

time to discuss both the case and plea agreement with Mr. Hains. 

Mr. Miller cites Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) to argue that Mr. 

Hains never discussed with him consequences of conduct outside the plea that 
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could impact sentencing recommendations. Mr. Miller mischaracterizes the 

collateral consequences doctrine from Padilla. In Padilla, the Supreme Court held 

that the defendant’s counsel failed the first Strickland prong by not informing 

him that pleading guilty would result in his mandatory deportation. Id. at 359.1

Padilla considered “[d]eportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction,” not 

the consequences stemming from the defendant’s conduct before his sentencing, 

as in Mr. Miller’s case. Id. at 366 (emphasis added). Furthermore, our court of 

appeals has limited application of Padilla to the immigration and deportation 

context—no such issues are present here. See United States v. Reeves, 695 F.3d 

637, 640 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The Supreme Court created a rule in Padilla specific 

to the risk of deportation and we see no justification for extending that to the 

realm of future criminal sentence enhancements.”). Mr. Miller’s reliance upon 

Padilla is therefore misplaced. 

Further, the record supports the determination that Mr. Hains did discuss 

the plea with Mr. Miller. Mr. Miller stated at his plea hearing that this was so. 

Given Mr. Miller’s own knowledge and acceptance of the plea agreement, 

allegations that Mr. Hains should have done more to explain the conditions 

therein do not raise a reasonable probability that the outcome of any proceeding 

would have ended differently. See Bethel v. United States, 458 F.3d 711, 718 

(7th Cir. 2006) (finding that a defendant could not prove prejudice after he had 

                                                            

1 Padilla did not decide whether the defendant in that case was prejudiced by his counsel’s 

ineffective performance. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360. 
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affirmed he understood at his plea hearing that his guilty plea was nonbinding); 

See also Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. at 163; Hill v. Lockahart, 474 U.S. at 59. 

 

B. Case Investigation

Mr. Miller next alleges that Mr. Hains didn’t thoroughly investigate his 

case and merely convinced Mr. Miller to plead guilty without doing his due 

diligence. Mr. Miller cites no evidence for this claim. On the contrary, the records 

indicates that Mr. Hains met with Mr. Miller several times and communicated 

with the Government on multiple occasions to try to get a more favorable result 

for his client. Mere allegations, without supporting evidence, can’t overcome the 

strong presumption that counsel provided sufficient legal assistance. Strickland 

v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689; Richardson v. United States, 379 F.3d 485, 488 

(7th Cir. 2004). Mr. Miller hasn’t identified any evidence suggesting that Mr. 

Hains’s conduct and performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard. 

Mr. Miller also hasn’t shown that Mr. Hains acted bad faith, or that he 

didn’t “attempt to learn all of the facts of the case, make an estimate of a likely 

sentence, [or] communicate the results of that analysis” to Mr. Miller. Moore v. 

Bryant, 348 F.3d at 241; see also United States v. Fudge, 325 F.3d 910, 924 (7th 

Cir. 2003). Mr. Hains’s affidavit indicates that he made a concerted effort to serve 

his client and liaise with the Government. Without more, Mr. Miller has failed to 

show that Mr. Hains’s performance was constitutionally insufficient. See United 

States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 358–359 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 

U.S. 1097 (2006) (to prove inadequate performance, a defendant must show that 
10 

counsel did not try to learn the facts of the case and failed to make a good-faith 

estimate of a likely sentence); Spiller v. United States, 855 F.3d 751, 755–756 

(7th Cir 2017). When Mr. Hains communicated with Mr. Miller about a possible 

plea agreement, he provided the best prediction that he was able to make at that 

time. Absolute precision is not required at the plea-bargaining stage. U.S. v. 

Barnes, 83 F.3d at 939. Mr. Miller hasn’t identified any particular fact or issue 

in his case that Mr. Hains failed to investigate that would have affected Mr. 

Miller’s decision to plead guilty. 

Though Mr. Miller claims he lacked the requisite information intelligence 

to enter into a valid guilty plea, the standard for a defendant’s information when 

the defendant pleads guilty “upon the advice of counsel” depends upon a 

showing by the defendant that counsel’s advice fell below “the range of 

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Hill v. Lockahart, 474 

U.S. at 56 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). Mr. Miller 

has not shown that Mr. Hains’ advice and investigation fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Richardson v. United 

States, 379 F.3d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 2004). Nor has Mr. Miller provided any 

evidence that he was prejudice in any way – that he wouldn’t have plead guilty – 

even if his assertations were true. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. at 163; Hill v. 

Lockahart, 474 U.S. at 59. 
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C. Dismissal of Charges 

Mr. Miller next alleges that Mr. Hains provided ineffective assistance of 

counsel because he didn’t seek dismissal of the criminal charges against him. 

Mr. Miller suggests that his criminal activities were “local in nature” and don’t 

fall under federal jurisdiction. Mr. Miller was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 2314 and 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). Section 2314 criminalizes the transportation of any 

stolen goods in interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 2134. Under United States v. 

Rose, 590 F.2d 232, 236 (7th Cir. 1978), the mere intention to transport goods 

across state lines is sufficient to meet the “interstate commerce” requirement of 

§ 2314. The money laundering statute, § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) criminalizes making a 

financial transaction with property that one knows to be unlawfully gained to 

disguise that unlawful activity. Section 1956 defines “financial transaction” as 

one that “affects interstate . . . commerce” or uses a financial institution that 

engages in interstate commerce “in any way or degree.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(4). 

“[T]he connection required for a money laundering offense need only be 

‘incidental’ to the transaction or that interstate commerce must be affected only 

in ‘some’ manner.” United States v. Laurenzana, 113 F.3d 689, 692 (7th Cir. 

1997) (quoting United States v. Koller, 956 F.2d 1408, 1412 (7th Cir. 1992)). 

Mr. Miller admitted that he took copper wire from Indiana to Michigan and 

that he deposited the money he received for selling the wire into his bank 

accounts. Mr. Miller would deposit the gains from his copper wire sales after 

spending time at casinos, claiming that the deposits were his gambling winnings. 

Mr. Miller can’t reasonably claim that these transactions did not affect interstate 
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commerce—even under a narrow interpretation of interstate commerce, his acts 

fall under that definition for both crimes. Mr. Miller can’t successfully claim that 

Mr. Hains failed to provide effective assistance by not trying to dismiss the 

criminal charges on a meritless legal argument. Had Mr. Hains sought such a 

dismissal, his efforts would have most likely failed. An attorney’s decision not 

to pursue that strategy isn’t ineffective assistance of counsel under either prong 

of the relevant analysis. See Richardson v. U.S., 379 F.3d at 488–489; Lafler v. 

Cooper, 566 U.S. at 163; Hill v. Lockahart, 474 U.S. at 59. 

D. Vagueness of Plea Agreement 

 Mr. Miller claims that the plea agreement he signed was vague and absurd. 

He alleges that the agreement didn’t adequately explain what the government 

was required to prove and required Mr. Miller to waive his right to appeal without 

requiring the Government to give anything up on its end. The plea agreement 

doesn’t explicitly outline each element of the two crimes Mr. Miller was charged 

with, the Government outlined the precise elements of both crimes at Mr. Miller’s 

plea hearing. Immediately after the Government had finished outlining the 

elements, Mr. Miller affirmed to the magistrate judge that he knew and 

understood the elements of each crimes. Mr. Miller cites no authority for the 

proposition that a crime’s elements must be set for in the written plea agreement, 

and in any event, he wasn’t prejudiced by the agreement’s silence on the precise 

elements of the crimes of which he was indicted. See Torzala v. United States, 

545 F.3d 517, 523 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that after the defendant was read 
13 

“each of the crime’s elements . . . [defendant] affirmed that he understood . . . 

the elements of the offense.”). He was read each element with his attorney, Mr. 

Hains, present and had the opportunity to confer with counsel. The magistrate 

judge told Mr. Miller that he had could speak with his attorney during the plea 

hearing if he had any questions or concerns, and Mr. Miller noted that he 

understood this. 

Mr. Miller also mischaracterizes the plea agreement by claiming that the 

agreement only protects the Government. While the agreement does require Mr. 

Miller to waive his direct appeals rights, the Government agreed to recommend 

a particular sentence, agreed upon by both parties. The plea agreement is clear 

that the court wasn’t bound by the sentence recommended by the Government—

a fact reiterated at Mr. Miller’s plea hearing. Though he is correct that the 

Government didn’t specifically guarantee to Mr. Miller that the court would hand 

down a precise sentence, the Government made a meaningful concession. The 

Government also agreed to recommend a three-level reduction of Mr. Miller’s 

offense level contingent on his acceptances of responsibility as conditioned in 

¶ 9(f) of the plea agreement. Mr. Miller violated those conditions when he 

produced and used methamphetamine—he cannot now complain that the 

Government did not follow through on its promises when he failed to follow the 

terms of the agreement. Torzala v. United States, 545 F.3d at 523; Dowell v. 

United States, 694 F.3d 898, 901 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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E. “Organizer” Enhancement 

Finally, Mr. Miller alleges that Mr. Hains provided ineffective assistance 

because he didn’t tell Mr. Miller that he faced the possibility of an organizer 

enhancement. Notwithstanding that neither Mr. Hains nor the Government 

believed the organizer enhancement would apply when Mr. Miller pleaded guilty, 

Mr. Hains told Mr. Miller that his estimations of a possible sentencing range 

shouldn’t be taken as guaranteed fact, which the magistrate judge further 

underscored during Mr. Miller’s plea hearing. United States v. Cieslowski held 

that counsel’s “inaccurate prediction of a sentence” does not constitute deficient 

performance. United States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 359 (7th Cir. 2005), 

cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1097 (2006). Rather, if counsel tries to “learn all of the 

relevant facts of the case, make an estimate of a likely sentence, and 

communicate the results of that analysis to [his] client before allowing the client 

to plead guilty,” counsel has not performed deficiently. Bethel v. U.S., 458 F.3d 

at 717. 

Mr. Hains didn’t believe the organizer enhancement would be applied to 

Mr. Miller, and his affidavit indicates a reasonable basis for that belief. Mr. Miller 

essentially claims that Mr. Hains provided ineffective assistance because he 

didn’t predict that the organizer enhancement would be applied at a future date. 

This isn’t ineffective assistance of counsel. U.S. v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d at 359; 

Moore v. Bryant, 348 F.3d at 341 (“The attorney’s analysis need not provide a 

precisely accurate prediction of the respective consequences of pleading guilting 

or going to trial, [but] the scrutiny must be undertaken in good faith.”). As 
15 

indicated above, Mr. Miller’s contention on this point fails to satisfy the prejudice 

prong because he does not indicate that he would insisted on going to trial had 

Mr. Hains provided effective assistance. Mr. Miller only argues that he conviction 

be vacated. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. at 163; Hill v. Lockahart, 474 U.S. at 59. 

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court DENIES the motion to vacate [Doc. No. 

102]. 

SO ORDERED. 

ENTERED: June 10, 2019 

 /s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr. 

 Judge, United States District Court