IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Robin Williams, Administrator of the :

Estate of Robin Taneisha Williams, :

Deceased, and Robin Williams, :

Individually, :

Appellants :

:

v. : No. 786 C.D. 2018

: ARGUED: March 14, 2019

Barry M. Searfoss and Warminster :

Township and Five Ponds Golf Club :

and Bump & Run Charity Golf and :

D’Angelo Foundation and D’Angelo :

and Company and Christine Cole :

and P.J. Hansen and Lisa Williams :

and Charles (“Tony”) Williams :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE CEISLER FILED: May 1, 2019

Robin Williams (Plaintiff), individually and as administrator of the estate of 

decedent Robin Taneisha Williams, appeals following entry of judgment in the 

Bucks County Court of Common Pleas1(trial court) on a verdict rendered in favor 

of Plaintiff after trial. This appeal involves two interlocutory pretrial orders 

sustaining the preliminary objections of Defendants Warminster Township 

(Township) and Five Ponds Golf Club (Golf Club) (jointly, Municipal Defendants), 

 

1 The Honorable Robert O. Baldi entered the orders at issue in this appeal. The Honorable 

James M. McMaster presided over the trial in this case.
2

and the preliminary objections of D’Angelo Foundation, D’Angelo & Company, 

Christine Cole, P.J. Hansen, and Charles and Lisa Williams (collectively, Agent 

Defendants). After thorough review, we affirm.

I. Background

In May 2012, the decedent was killed in a motor vehicle accident on the 

Pennsylvania Turnpike. Defendant Barry M. Searfoss (Searfoss), while driving

under the influence of alcohol, ran his pickup truck into the rear of the decedent’s

automobile, which was moving slowly because of engine failure.

Prior to the accident, Searfoss, a Pennsylvania State Trooper, was at the Golf 

Club attending a charity golfing event, ironically inspired by a 1997 drunk driving 

fatality. The Golf Club hosted the event. D’Angelo Foundation and D’Angelo & 

Company sponsored the event. According to Plaintiff’s complaint, Christine Cole, 

P.J. Hansen, and Charles and Lisa Williams were “agents” or “employees” of 

Municipal Defendants, D’Angelo Foundation, and D’Angelo & Company. 

Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 37a.

Searfoss paid a fee to attend the event. While there, he consumed alcoholic 

beverages to the point where he became legally intoxicated. He then drove his truck 

on the Pennsylvania Turnpike and caused the fatal accident. When tested after the 

accident, Searfoss’s blood alcohol level was 0.18.

In May 2014, Plaintiff filed suit against Searfoss, Municipal Defendants, and 

Agent Defendants.2 Relevant here, Plaintiff alleged Municipal Defendants and 

Agent Defendants were negligent in serving alcohol at the event without monitoring 

consumption, and specifically in serving Searfoss while he was visibly intoxicated. 

 

2 Plaintiff also sued Bump and Run Charity Golf (B&R), an entity of uncertain legal status. 

As discussed further below, B&R did not participate in the action.
3

Municipal Defendants and Agent Defendants filed preliminary objections

asserting governmental immunity, which the trial court sustained. Plaintiff filed an 

appeal, which this Court quashed as interlocutory and therefore premature. The case 

then proceeded against Searfoss.

In May 2018, the trial court held a two-day trial which resulted in a total 

verdict of $7,100,000 in Plaintiff’s favor against Searfoss. After judgment was 

entered on the verdict, Plaintiff filed a timely appeal challenging the trial court’s

interlocutory orders that sustained the preliminary objections of Municipal 

Defendants and Agent Defendants. This matter is now before us for disposition.

II. Issues

On appeal,3 Plaintiff presents several related arguments against applying

governmental immunity. She contends the statute commonly known as the Political 

Subdivision Tort Claims Act4(Tort Claims Act) does not immunize municipal golf

course liquor licensees from tort liability for serving alcoholic beverages to visibly 

intoxicated persons. Further, she asserts the Liquor Code5 does not provide local 

government liquor licensees with any exception from tort liability for serving 

alcoholic beverages to visibly intoxicated persons. Plaintiff also argues the Tort 

Claims Act does not provide immunity from liability to agents and employees of 

municipal golf course licensees for intentional, wanton, and willful conduct in

 

3 On appeal from an order granting preliminary objections, our standard of review is de 

novo and scope of review is plenary. Rohner v. Atkinson, 118 A.3d 486 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). We 

accept as true all well-pleaded, material, and relevant facts alleged in the complaint and every 

inference that may be fairly deduced from those facts. Id. We will sustain the preliminary 

objections when, under the facts as pleaded, it is clear the plaintiff will be unable to establish a 

right to relief. Id.

4

42 Pa. C.S. §§ 8541-8542.

5 Act of April 12, 1951, P.L. 90, as amended, 47 P.S. §§ 1-101–10-1001.
4

serving alcoholic beverages to visibly intoxicated persons who then cause injuries

to third persons away from the licensed premises. 

Additionally, Plaintiff insists her complaint averred material facts sufficient 

to support an award of punitive damages.

III. Discussion

A. Jurisdiction over the Appeal

As a threshold issue, we must determine whether this appeal is properly before 

us. Specifically, we must consider whether the judgment in this matter disposed of 

all claims against all parties, in that Defendant Bump & Run Charity Golf (B&R) 

was never formally dismissed as a party in the trial court. The record indicates 

Plaintiff served B&R with the complaint, but it does not reflect disposition of 

Plaintiff’s claim against B&R. To be final and appealable, an order ordinarily must 

dispose of all claims and all parties. Pa. R.A.P. 341(b)(1). Therefore, this Court 

directed the parties to address whether the trial court’s judgment disposed of the 

claim against B&R.

Plaintiff states that the complaint erroneously named B&R as a Defendant

when in reality it was simply the name of the event. Plaintiff suggests B&R was 

“not a person, corporation or business entity capable of being sued.” Appellants’ 

Br. at 8 n.1. However, Plaintiff fails to point to any record support for this averment. 

The complaint identified B&R as “a corporation or other entity duly organized 

and existing under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania [or] an 

organization or association of individuals or entities trading and doing business 

under such fictitious name . . . .” R.R. at 36a. Moreover, although B&R never 

appeared or answered the complaint, the record shows B&R was served in June 2014 

at its principal place of business, the residence of Defendant Christine Cole. Plaintiff 
5

did not discontinue her claims against B&R or request a determination of the finality 

of the trial court orders under Pa. R.A.P. 341(c). 

In order to resolve this issue, the parties have stipulated to dismissal of B&R 

as a party to the action. Confirmation of that stipulation was filed in this Court on 

April 3, 2019. Accordingly, the appeal is now properly before us.

B. Governmental Immunity of Liquor Licensees

Under the Tort Claims Act, as a general rule, governmental agencies enjoy 

immunity from tort liability; “no local agency shall be liable for any damages on 

account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the local agency 

or an employee thereof or any other person.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 8541. The exceptions to 

governmental immunity are set forth in Section 8542 of the Tort Claims Act, which 

permits imposition of liability for specific enumerated categories of acts, none of 

which is implicated here.6 See 42 Pa. C.S. § 8542(b).

Plaintiff argues Municipal Defendants and Agent Defendants are not entitled 

to governmental immunity as local agencies. Plaintiff also relies on the provisions 

of the Liquor Code as support for her argument that Municipal Defendants and Agent 

Defendants are not immune from liability.

1. Local Agency Immunity under the Tort Claims Act

Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in extending tort immunity to Municipal 

Defendants and Agent Defendants as local agency liquor licensees. Based on that 

contention, Plaintiff argues the trial court further erred by sustaining the preliminary 

 

6 We reject the suggestion raised at oral argument that Brewington v. City of Philadelphia, 

199 A.3d 348 (Pa. 2018) has any relevance to this case. Brewington concerned the real property 

exception to governmental immunity, distinguishing injuries caused by defects in real property 

from those arising out of negligent supervision in the absence of such defects. There is no defect 

in real property here. Even if Plaintiff could fit the averments of her complaint within the 

parameters of a negligent supervision claim, such a claim is not among the exceptions to 

governmental immunity. Thus, Brewington has no application here.
6

objections of Agent Defendants, because Agent Defendants do not have immunity 

if the Township and Golf Club do not have immunity. We discern no merit in 

Plaintiff’s arguments.

In Guinn v. Alburtis Fire Co., 614 A.2d 218 (Pa. 1992), our Supreme Court 

determined that local agency immunity shielded a volunteer fire company from 

liability for serving alcohol to a visibly intoxicated individual who later suffered an 

injury while walking home. The Court held a volunteer fire company’s 

governmental immunity is not limited to acts within the scope of its duties; volunteer 

fire companies are entitled to governmental immunity under 42 Pa. C.S. § 8541 even 

when they are not engaged in firefighting activities. The Court reasoned that “[t]he 

language of Section 8541 is clear and unambiguous. Section 8541 provides that a 

local agency is entitled to governmental immunity; it does not say that a local agency 

is entitled to governmental immunity only when acting within the scope of its 

duties.” Guinn, 614 A.2d at 220.

In Sphere Drake Insurance Co. v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 782 A.2d 510 (Pa. 

2001), our Supreme Court determined the Philadelphia Facilities Management 

Corporation (PFMC), a nonprofit corporation formed to manage the city-owned Gas 

Works, qualified as a local agency for purposes of governmental immunity. In 

making that determination, the Court noted that Section 8501 of the Judicial Code 

defines a “local agency” as a government unit other than the Commonwealth

government. 42 Pa. C.S. §8501. Under Section 102 of the Judicial Code, a 

“government unit” includes “any government agency.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 102. A

“government agency” is “[a]ny Commonwealth agency or any political subdivision 

or municipal or other local authority, or any officer or agency of any such political 

subdivision or employer.” Id. (emphasis added).
7

Plaintiff attempts to distinguish our Supreme Court’s decisions in Guinn and 

Sphere Drake supporting local agency immunity. Plaintiff maintains that our 

Supreme Court intended to limit its decision in Guinn to volunteer fire companies, 

which are not licensed by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (PLCB). Plaintiff 

also asserts that Sphere Drake did not involve liability under the Liquor Code. 

Plaintiff acknowledges the trial court’s observation that vocational-technical 

schools, port authorities, municipal parking authorities, county health departments, 

recorders of deeds, charter schools, and police departments have all been deemed

local agencies that enjoy immunity under the Tort Claims Act. See Tr. Ct., Slip Op., 

at 14. However, Plaintiff maintains that none of these entities are Liquor Code 

licensees. 

Plaintiff argues there is a distinction between entities with societal value, such 

as volunteer fire companies, and municipal golf courses that sell alcoholic 

beverages. A volunteer fire company provides protection for the life and property 

of its citizens at a fraction of the cost of a full-time municipal fire company. In 

contrast, a municipal golf club with a liquor license provides no necessary public 

function and differs little from a private golf club with a liquor license.

Contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments, we find both Guinn and Sphere Drake

applicable here. The trial court properly determined that the Tort Claims Act 

provides Agent Defendants with immunity from Plaintiff’s tort claims in this case. 

The purpose of the Tort Claims Act is to limit governmental exposure to tort liability. 

Sphere Drake. 

Notably, in Sphere Drake, our Supreme Court overruled this Court’s 

determination in Modern Shoppers World – Mt. Airy Corp. v. Philadelphia Gas 

Works, 643 A.2d 136 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) that PFMC was not a local agency for 
8

purposes of the Tort Claims Act. The Court found our conclusion in Modern 

Shoppers that only “traditional units of government” were “local authorities” for 

immunity purposes was “squarely at odds with the actual definition of ‘local 

authority’ provided in [Section 1991 of] the Statutory Construction Act [of 19727].” 

Sphere Drake, 782 A.2d at 515.

Here, the trial court properly determined Municipal Defendants are local 

agencies entitled to immunity under the Tort Claims Act. Sphere Drake; Guinn; 

Eger v. Lynch, 714 A.2d 1149 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). Plaintiff concedes in her 

complaint that Golf Club is owned and operated by the Township and that the 

Township owns the liquor license issued to Golf Club. R.R. at 36a. As agents of 

Municipal Defendants, Agent Defendants likewise enjoy immunity. The trial court 

correctly so found.

2. Local Agency Immunity and the Liquor Code

One who accepts a liquor license must be deemed to consent to all proper 

conditions and restrictions imposed by the Liquor Code in the interest of public 

morals and safety. Teazers, Inc. v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 661 A.2d 455 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1995). Here, Municipal Defendants hold a liquor license. Golf Club is one 

of 44 Pennsylvania municipal golf course liquor licensees. 

Plaintiff insists the Liquor Code does not exempt municipal golf course

licensees from its provisions. Plaintiff argues the Liquor Code and the Tort Claims 

Act should be construed together because both statutes provide for immunity and 

identify circumstances where liability may be found. See 1 Pa. C.S. § 1932(a)(b). 

Plaintiff argues that the specific legislative provisions of the Liquor Code 

must prevail over any inconsistent general provisions in the Tort Claims Act 

 

7

1 Pa. C.S. § 1991.
9

arguably covering the same subject matter. Thus, Plaintiff contends the specific 

provisions pertaining to the unlawful act of serving alcoholic beverages to a visibly 

intoxicated person in Sections 493(1) and 497 of the Liquor Code, 47 P.S. §§ 4-493

& 4-497, control over the immunity provisions of the Tort Claims Act. 

Plaintiff asserts that the intent of the Legislature in enacting the Liquor Code 

was to exercise plenary and exclusive control over the use and sale of alcoholic 

beverages. See Clement & Muller, Inc. v. Tax Review Bd. of Phila., 659 A.2d 596 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). Plaintiff observes that the Liquor Code’s provisions are 

liberally construed for the protection of the public welfare, health, peace and morals 

of the people of the Commonwealth.

Plaintiff contends Municipal Defendants were complicit in providing 

unlimited alcohol at the event for consumption over an extended period of time. 

Plaintiff argues Municipal Defendants, as liquor licensees, are bound by the conduct 

of their agents in serving a visibly intoxicated person. As such, they must share 

liability for their roles in creating the circumstances that resulted in the death of 

Plaintiff’s decedent. Plaintiff further argues that extending immunity to Municipal 

Defendants would permit these licensees to flaunt the tort liability provisions of the 

Liquor Code while performing no necessary governmental service to the public.

Under Section 493(1) of the Liquor Code, it is unlawful for any licensee of 

the PLCB, or any employee, servant or agent of a licensee, to furnish liquor or malt 

or brewed beverages to any visibly intoxicated person. 47 P.S. § 4-493(1). 

However, a licensee is not liable to third persons for injuries inflicted away from the 

licensed premises by a customer of the licensee, unless the licensee or his agent or 

employee served liquor or malt or brewed beverages to the customer while he or she 

was visibly intoxicated. 47 P.S. §4-497. 
10

Selling or permitting the sale of alcoholic beverages to a visibly intoxicated 

person constitutes negligence per se. Juszczyszyn v. Taiwo, 113 A.3d 853 (Pa. 

Super. 2015). If such conduct proximately causes the third-party plaintiff’s injury, 

the licensee may be found liable. Zygmuntowicz v. Hosp. Invs., Inc., 828 F. Supp. 

346 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Detwiler v. Brumbaugh, 656 A.2d 944 (Pa. Super. 1995). 

Here, Plaintiff asserts she established that Municipal Defendants served 

Searfoss while he was visibly intoxicated. Therefore, Plaintiff argues they are 

subject to liability as licensees under the Liquor Code.

We reject Plaintiff’s contention that the Liquor Code essentially preempts the 

Tort Claims Act for tort claims asserted under Sections 493(1) and 497 of the Liquor 

Code. By the plain terms of the Tort Claims Act, the General Assembly expressed 

its clear intention that no other statute or pronouncement will modify the immunity 

granted therein. The Tort Claims Act provides: “Except as otherwise provided in 

this subchapter, no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any 

injury to a person or property . . . .” 42 Pa. C.S. § 8541 (emphasis added).

Section 8541 of the Tort Claims Act provides governmental immunity from

liability on account of any injury unless the claim falls within one of the exceptions 

in Section 8542(b). None of the eight exceptions in Section 8542(b) covers a tort

claim for an off-premises injury inflicted by a third party. Consequently, even if

Plaintiff might otherwise have a tort cause of action under Section 497 of the Liquor 

Code, because that negligence claim does not fall within any exception to 

governmental immunity, Municipal Defendants are entitled to immunity. See 

McCarthy v. City of Bethlehem, 962 A.2d 1276 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (even though 

damages would otherwise be recoverable under common law or statute, the negligent 
11

act must fall within one of the narrowly construed exceptions to governmental 

immunity).

Plaintiff’s alternate argument that the Liquor Code and Tort Claims Act must 

be construed together pursuant to 1 Pa. C.S. § 1932 also fails. The purpose of the 

Tort Claims Act is to limit government exposure to tort liability. Sphere Drake. The 

preservation of the public treasury against the possibility of unusually large tort 

recoveries is an important government interest. Id. Thus, the Tort Claims Act serves 

a different purpose from that of the Liquor Code, which seeks to protect the public 

by regulating the sales and use of alcoholic beverages. Therefore, Plaintiff’s 

contention that the Liquor Code and Tort Claims Act must be construed together to 

permit tort claims against local government agencies with liquor licenses lacks merit.

For the above reasons, we hold that Municipal Defendants are entitled to 

governmental immunity from Plaintiff’s claims. See Sphere Drake; Guinn; Eger. 

C. Immunity for Intentional, Wanton, and Willful Conduct

In an alternative argument, Plaintiff asserts Agent Defendants lost their right 

to claim governmental immunity by engaging in outrageous and willful misconduct 

within the meaning of 42 Pa. C.S. § 8550. Plaintiff maintains Agent Defendants

intentionally served alcoholic beverages to a visibly intoxicated person who then 

caused an injury to a third person off the premises. Plaintiff alleges Agent 

Defendants knew that participants, including Searfoss, drove their motor vehicles to 

the event and would be driving home. Plaintiff asserts Agent Defendants acted with 

an evil motive when despite this knowledge, they willfully, wantonly, maliciously,

and intentionally provided unlimited alcoholic beverages to the participants for nine 

hours. Therefore, Plaintiff argues, they lost any immunity defense. Plaintiff argues 
12

the facts set forth in her complaint sufficiently alleged that Agent Defendants acted

with willful and malicious intent.

Plaintiff did not raise this argument in her pleadings or memoranda of law 

presented to the trial court. The trial court correctly concluded that Plaintiff waived 

this issue by raising it for the first time in this appeal. Pa. R.A.P. 302(a); Schmidt v. 

Boardman Co., 11 A.3d 924, 941 (Pa. 2011); Sovich v. Estate of Sovich, 55 A.3d 

1161 (Pa. Super. 2012) (issues raised for the first time on appeal are waived). 

In addition, in Pennsylvania, a civil complaint must not only apprise the 

defendant of the claim being asserted, but also summarize the facts essential to 

support the claim. McShea v. City of Philadelphia, 995 A.2d 334, 339 (Pa. 2010). 

To that end, the complaint must disclose material facts sufficient to enable the 

adverse party to prepare its case. Id. Here, as discussed above, Plaintiff did not

attempt to assert a claim under 42 Pa. C.S. § 8550 until she filed her Pa. R.A.P.

1925(b) Statement. Consequently, Plaintiff’s complaint failed to apprise Agent 

Defendants of the willful misconduct claim against them. McShea.

Further, to establish intentional and willful misconduct for purposes of waiver 

of governmental immunity under 42 Pa. C.S. § 8550, a plaintiff must show that the 

defendant desired to bring about the result that occurred. Pettit v. Namie, 931 A.2d 

790, 801 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). Allegations of gross and culpable negligence, or even 

wanton and reckless behavior, are not the legal equivalent of pleading willful 

misconduct. See Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289 (Pa. 1994) (willful 

misconduct under 42 Pa. C.S. § 8550 means willful misconduct aforethought).

Here, Plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege that Agent Defendants had the 

requisite intent aforethought to provide Defendant Searfoss with so much alcohol 

that he would assuredly drive his truck into another vehicle. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 
13

willful misconduct claim under 42 Pa. C.S. § 8550 was ineffective to overcome the 

immunity of Municipal Defendants and Agent Defendants.

D. Punitive Damages

A demand for punitive damages is not a separate cause of action; it depends 

on the viability of the claim to which it relates. See Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, 

Inc., 555 A.2d 800, 802-03 (Pa. 1989) Therefore, because Municipal Defendants

and Agent Defendants are entitled to governmental immunity, Plaintiff’s demand for 

punitive damages also fails. Id.

IV. Conclusion

A tort claim under Sections 493(1) and 497 of the Liquor Code does not fall 

within any of the exceptions to governmental immunity in the Tort Claims Act, 42 

Pa. C.S. § 8542. The trial court properly determined Municipal Defendants and 

Agent Defendants are shielded by governmental immunity. Accordingly, based on 

the foregoing discussion, we affirm the trial court’s orders sustaining the preliminary 

objections of Municipal Defendants and Agent Defendants and dismissing 

Plaintiff’s claims against them.

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

Judges McCullough and Fizzano Cannon did not participate in the decision of this 

case.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Robin Williams, Administrator of the :

Estate of Robin Taneisha Williams, :

Deceased, and Robin Williams, :

Individually, :

Appellants :

:

v. : No. 786 C.D. 2018

:

Barry M. Searfoss and Warminster :

Township and Five Ponds Golf Club :

and Bump & Run Charity Golf and :

D’Angelo Foundation and D’Angelo :

and Company and Christine Cole :

and P.J. Hansen and Lisa Williams :

and Charles (“Tony”) Williams :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 1

st day of May, 2019, the judgment of the trial court is

AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge