Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 357 

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS 

DIVISION IV 

No. CV-15-961

J. DAVID JOHN 

APPELLANT

V.

MEGAN MARIE BOLINDER 

APPELLEE

Opinion Delivered: AUGUST 24, 2016

APPEAL FROM THE BENTON 

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. DR-10-1327] 

HONORABLE DOUG SCHRANTZ, 

JUDGE

APPEAL DISMISSED 

KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge

Appellant J. David John and appellee Megan Marie Bolinder were never married, 

but share a son, Isaiah, who was born on March 12, 2010.1

 On February 9, 2012, the trial 

court entered an order awarding primary custody of the child to Megan, while awarding 

David visitation and ordering him to pay child support. The trial court awarded David 

visitation with the child for one week per month, while also awarding him extended 

visitation in the summer. On February 27, 2014, the trial court entered an order decreasing 

David’s nonsummer visitation to one weekend per month based on the child’s enrollment 

in school, with the remainder of the visitation schedule to remain the same.

On November 26, 2014, David filed a motion for the release of Megan’s medical 

and psychological records back to age twenty-five. On April 28, 2015, David filed a motion 

to modify child support, confirm length of summer visitation, or alternatively to modify 

 1

 David lives in Chicago, Illinois, and Megan lives in Bentonville, Arkansas. 
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 357 

2 

summer visitation. In that motion, David requested that his child-support obligation be 

reduced during the time he exercised his summer visitation with his son. David also 

requested more summer visitation than he had been previously exercising due to the drastic 

reduction in his nonsummer visitation.

A hearing on David’s motions was held on May 27, 2015. At that hearing, as well 

as at a subsequent hearing, it was noted by the parties that there was also an unresolved

contempt motion that had been filed by Megan against David. 

On June 30, 2015, the trial court entered an order denying David’s request for the 

release of Megan’s medical records and denying David’s motion to modify summer visitation 

based on its determination that David had failed to prove a material change in circumstances. 

The trial court did, however, slightly alter the summer-visitation schedule in its order. 

David now appeals from the June 30, 2015 order, arguing that the trial court erred in 

denying his request for medical records and further erred in its ruling with respect to 

visitation. 

We must dismiss David’s appeal because the trial court’s order is not final and 

appealable. Rule 2(a)(1) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure−Civil provides that 

an appeal may be taken from a final judgment or decree entered by the trial court. For a 

judgment to be final, it must dismiss the parties from the court, discharge them from the 

action, or conclude their rights to the subject matter in controversy. McIntosh v. McIntosh, 

2014 Ark. App. 723. An order is not final when it adjudicates fewer than all the claims or 

the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties. Id. Moreover, where the order reflects 

that further proceedings are pending, which do not involve merely collateral matters such 
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3 

as attorney’s fees, the order is not final. Harold Ives Trucking Co. v. Pro Transp., Inc., 341 

Ark. 735, 19 S.W.3d 600 (2000). The underlying policy of this rule is to avoid piecemeal 

appeals; even though an issue on which a court renders a decision might be an important 

one, an appeal will be premature if the decision does not, from a practical standpoint, 

conclude the merits of the case. Norman v. Norman, 342 Ark. 493, 30 S.W.3d 83 (2000).

In the order David attempts to appeal, the trial court ruled on the medical-records 

and visitation issues. However, it specifically reserved ruling on David’s motion to modify 

child support. Additionally, the trial court’s order set David’s motion to modify child 

support, as well as Megan’s petition and amended petition for contempt, for a trial at a later 

date. Because the trial court’s order does not resolve all of the disputed issues and reflects 

that further proceedings are pending, the order is not final and we lack jurisdiction to review 

it.2

 Therefore, we dismiss the appeal without prejudice. 

 Appeal dismissed. 

 KINARD and WHITEAKER, JJ., agree. 

Williams & Anderson PLC, by: Marie-Bernarde Miller and Bonnie Joan Johnson, for 

appellant. 

Keith, Miller, Butler, Schneider & Pawlik, PLLC, by: Mason L. Boling and Kristin L. 

Pawlik, for appellee. 

 2 In David’s reply brief, he acknowledges that the child-support and contempt issues 

remain pending before the trial court, but he asserts without citation to authority that these 

are merely collateral matters that do not affect the finality of the order. However, we do 

not agree, and our conclusion is supported by our prior holdings. See Burton v. Templeman, 

2015 Ark. App. 101; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 98 Ark. App. 47, 249 S.W.3d 847 (2007).