UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

LAFAYETTE DIVISION 

KEVIN D. MILLER, 

 PLAINTIFF, 

 VS. 

CAROLYN COLVIN, ACTING 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 DEFENDANT. 

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CAUSE NO. 4:13-CV-16-RLM-APR

OPINION and ORDER 

Kevin D. Miller seeks judicial review of the final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security denying his applications for Disability 

Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income benefits under Title II, 

42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., and Title XVI, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., of the Social 

Security Act respectively. The court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c). For the reasons that follow, the court 

reverses and remands this case to the Social Security Administration for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Miller asserts that he has been disabled since November 15, 2011 

due to mental impairments and pain in his knees. His applications for benefits 

were denied initially, upon reconsideration, and following an administrative 

hearing at which he was represented by counsel. At that hearing, the 
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administrative law judge heard testimony from Mr. Miller and vocational expert 

Thomas A. Gusloff. The ALJ found that Mr. Miller had some severe mental and 

physical impairments but didn’t have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that met the severity of those impairments that are considered 

conclusively disabling. Further, the ALJ found that Mr. Miller couldn’t perform 

his past work, but could perform certain jobs available in the national 

economy. The ALJ concluded that Mr. Miller wasn’t disabled within the 

meaning of the Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g). The Appeals Council denied 

review of the ALJ’s decision, making the ALJ’s decision the final determination 

of the Commissioner. The parties agree that the matter is properly before this 

court. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

 The court must affirm the Commissioner’s determination if it is 

supported by substantial evidence, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Scott v. Astrue, 647 

F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 2011), which means “such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also Jones v. Astrue, 623 

F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010). The court can’t re-weigh the evidence, make 

independent findings of fact, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its 

own judgment for that of the Commissioner, Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 

513 (7th Cir. 2009), but in reviewing the ALJ’s conclusions, “[t]he court will 
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conduct a critical review of the evidence, considering both the evidence that 

supports, as well as the evidence that detracts from, the Commissioner’s 

decision, and the decision cannot stand if it lacks evidentiary support or an 

adequate discussion of the issues.” Briscoe v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 

(7th Cir. 2005). The ALJ isn’t required “to address every piece of evidence or 

testimony presented, but must provide a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence 

and the conclusions so that [the court] can assess the validity of the agency’s 

ultimate findings and afford the claimant meaningful judicial review.” Jones v. 

Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010). 

III. DISCUSSION

 The Social Security Administration uses a sequential five-step analysis to 

determine if a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. The first step 

considers whether the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity. The 

second step evaluates whether an alleged physical or mental impairment is 

severe, medically determinable, and meets a durational requirement. The third 

step compares the impairment to a list of impairments that are considered 

conclusively disabling. If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed 

impairments, then the applicant is considered disabled; if the impairment does 

not meet or equal a listed impairment, then the evaluation continues. The 

fourth step assesses a claimant’s residual functional capacity and ability to 

engage in past relevant work. If a claimant who can engage in past relevant 
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work isn’t disabled. The fifth step assesses the claimant’s RFC, as well as his 

age, education, and work experience to determine whether the claimant can 

engage in other work. If the claimant can engage in other work, he is not 

disabled. See Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 673-674 (7th Cir. 2008). 

 Using the standard five-step evaluation for determining disability, the 

ALJ found that although Mr. Miller suffered from a post-surgery left knee, a 

torn meniscus in his right knee, osteoarthritis in both knees, a schizoaffective 

disorder, and cannabis dependence, none of these severe impairments met the 

criteria of an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the SSI Regulations (20 C.F.R. 

Part 404, Subpart P, Appx. 1). He then found that while Mr. Miller was unable 

to perform his past work as a carpenter, drywall applicator, siding applicator, 

or construction worker, he could perform a significant number of jobs available 

in the national economy. 

 Mr. Miller contends the ALJ committed a number of errors. Regarding his 

mental impairments, Mr. Miller argues the ALJ didn’t properly address his GAF 

scores and should have obtained an updated medical opinion. Although these 

arguments aren’t dispositive, the court finds the ALJ’s conclusions regarding 

Mr. Miller’s mental impairments aren’t supported by substantial evidence. 

Thus, the court needn’t consider Mr. Miller’s arguments that the ALJ didn’t 

explain the basis for the mental residual functional capacity assessment and 

didn’t properly analyze the state agency doctor opinions, his physical residual 

functional capacity, or his credibility. 
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A. Step Three 

As already noted, the ALJ recognized that Mr. Miller had been diagnosed 

with a schizoaffective disorder and cannabis dependence. Step three of the 

ALJ’s analysis compared these mental health impairments to a list of 

conclusively disabling impairments. At this step, the ALJ relied on the following 

evidence: Mr. Miller’s function report; a Disability Determination Bureau report 

of contact dated April 12, 2012; a Field Office disability report from February 

28, 2012; and a report compiled in April 2012 by Raymond Bucar, Ph.D. who 

evaluated Mr. Miller for the Indiana Disability Determination Bureau. The ALJ 

determined that Mr. Miller had mild restrictions in his activities of daily living, 

moderate difficulties with social functioning, moderate difficulties with 

concentration, persistence, or pace, and no episodes of decompensation which 

had been of extended duration. The ALJ found that Mr. Miller had sufficient 

adaptability to maintain extensive daily activities and could function outside 

the home. Ultimately, the ALJ concluded the severity of Mr. Miller’s mental 

impairments didn’t meet or medically equal the criteria of a listing. 

In the daily living section in particular, the ALJ noted that Mr. Miller 

didn’t like to take and needed reminders to take his medication, took more time 

than usual to bathe and dress, was able to do laundry, clean, and wash dishes, 

and could prepare simple meals, drive a car, go shopping, pay bills, count 

change, and handle bank accounts. At an October 2011 appointment at the 
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Regional Mental Health Center, however, Mr. Miller reported that he was 

homeless. Mr. Miller again reported that he was homeless at a September 2012 

appointment and explained that he couldn’t go to a shelter because he was 

uncomfortable being around a lot of people. The ALJ’s conclusion that Mr. 

Miller’s mental impairments only mildly restricted his daily living activities is 

perplexing and lacks evidentiary support when a month before the hearing, Mr. 

Miller was homeless and living out of his truck. 

B. Step Four 

The fourth step assesses Mr. Miller’s residual functional capacity and 

ability to engage in past relevant work.

GAF Scores 

The Global Assessment of Functioning Scale measures psychological, 

social, and occupational functioning on a hypothetical continuum of mental 

health-illness from 0 to 100, with 100 reflecting superior functioning. AMERICAN 

PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 

DISORDERS 34 (4th ed. 2000). A GAF score of 41-50 denotes: “[s]erious 

symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent 

shoplifting) OR any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school 

functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep a job).” Id. A GAF score of 51-60 

denotes: “[m]oderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect and circumstantial speech, 

occasional panic attacks) OR moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or 
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school functioning (e.g., few friends, conflicts with peers or co-workers).” Id. 

Mr. Miller’s GAF scores, in chronological order, were as follows: 50 (2003); 45 

(Apr. 2004); 51 (Nov. 2004); 45 (Aug. 10, 2006); 35-40 (Aug. 25, 2006); 55 (Aug. 

28, 2006); 30-35 (Nov. 2006); 45 (Dec. 2006); 53 (Apr. 2011); 48 (Oct. 2011); 48 

(Jan. 2012); and 50 (July 2012). Only the last two scores were from 

assessments after the onset date. 

The ALJ acknowledged that Mr. Miller had been given GAF “scores of 40 

and 50, thereby suggesting he would likely experience serious to major 

impairment in several areas.” The ALJ further noted that GAF scores are an 

assessment of the claimant’s functioning at a specific point in time and can 

change dramatically in a short period of time. The ALJ concluded that the GAF 

scores therefore provide “no indication of the claimant’s overall level of 

functioning over an extended period” of time and are of “very little value in 

determining disability.” Nevertheless, the ALJ “considered the claimant’s GAF 

scores when assessing his residual functional capacity.” 

Mr. Miller argues that the ALJ’s rejection of the GAF scores as probative 

evidence is error because GAF ratings are an important consideration in the 

disability evaluation process. He cites Campbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299 (7th 

Cir. 2010), and Spiva v. Astrue, 628 F.3d 346 (7th Cir. 2010). In both cases, 

the ALJ erroneously ignored parts of the record, including the GAF scores, 

which suggested disability. 627 F.3d at 306-307; 628 F.3d at 351. The 

Commissioner cites Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419 (7th Cir. 2010), and 
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contends that the ALJ isn’t required to consider GAF scores because a GAF 

score doesn’t reflect a clinician’s opinion of a claimant’s functional capacity. Id. 

at 425. The Commissioner’s assertion goes too far. Neither regulations nor case 

law require an ALJ to determine a claimant’s disability based entirely on the 

GAF score, Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d at 425, but they also don’t eliminate the 

ALJ’s need to consider the evidence altogether. So, the ALJ can’t ignore the 

GAF scores, but he doesn’t have to base his findings entirely on them. 

The ALJ acknowledged Mr. Miller’s GAF scores and that the scores in the 

record suggest “he would likely experience serious to major impairment in 

several areas.” The ALJ didn’t outright reject or ignore the evidence, as Mr. 

Miller suggests. On its face, the ALJ’s decision considers the GAF scores in the 

record, so the court must go beyond the mere mention of the scores to decide 

whether the ALJ’s analysis of Mr. Miller’s mental residual functional capacity 

was adequate. 

Pre-Onset Symptoms 

For the pre-onset date symptoms, the ALJ referenced the treatment notes 

of Mark O. Carter, M.D. from May 2011 and Kelley Eshenaur, NP in October 

2011. The ALJ noted that Mr. Miller reported hearing voices and having 

schizophrenia since he was a child, received psychiatric treatment from 2003 

to 2004 and in 2006, and received treatment for attention deficit disorder and 

underwent an initial assessment for outpatient counseling services in 2011. 

Nevertheless, the ALJ said that just before his alleged onset date, Mr. Miller 
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was found to be oriented to person, place, and time, had a normal mood and 

affect, and his behavior, thought content, and judgment were normal. Mr. 

Miller highlights the contradictory April 2011 notes of Caryn Brown, Psy.D., 

HSPP who prepared a mental status consultative examination report for the 

Indiana Disability Determination Office, in which Mr. Miller reported that “he 

has a person, named Dave, that talks to him, tells him what to do, and 

comments on his actions[,] . . . . that these are not his thought[s,] and that the 

experience disturbs him.” In the same assessment, Ms. Brown found that Mr. 

Miller was indeed oriented to person, place, and time and cooperative, but 

appeared irritable and his mood was flat. Ms. Brown commented that Mr. 

Miller’s thought processes appeared logical and no evidence of hallucinations 

emerged during the assessment. Mr. Miller also references an October 2011 

report compiled by Cami Antrim, MA, LMHC, LCAC in which Mr. Miller 

reported that “he has heard voices since age 5, although notes the intensity 

has increased in the past 2 years. Notes they can ‘terrorize me’ (lately) or 

comfort (past).” At this time, Mr. Miller was homeless and living out of his 

truck. Ms. Antrim rated Mr. Miller’s thought content in the following categories: 

preoccupations – personal problems (financial concerns, homelessness, job 

problems); perceptions – auditory hallucinations; and delusions – within 

normal limits. She characterized Mr. Miller’s mental health symptoms as 

“Severe/Acute” and gave him a GAF score of 48. The ALJ’s conclusion that Mr. 

Miller’s thought content was normal isn’t supported by the evidence. 
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Post-Onset Symptoms 

The ALJ said that after the alleged onset date, Mr. Miller had been 

down/depressed, his affect had been blunted/flat, and his insight had 

occasionally been poor. The ALJ further noted that Mr. Miller continued to 

complain of auditory hallucinations and admitted to being a chronic marijuana 

user. Nonetheless, the ALJ found that Mr. Miller had been cooperative, alert, 

oriented to person, place, and time, and his thought process had been logical 

and goal-directed. The ALJ concluded that Mr. Miller had demonstrated normal 

cognition and reasoning and intact judgment, memory, attention, and 

concentration. The ALJ considered the April 2012 state agency psychological 

consultant opinion of Ann Lovko, Ph.D. and the summary affirmation of that 

opinion by state agency psychological consultant Joelle J. Larsen, Ph.D. in 

June 2012. Dr. Lovko concluded, and Dr. Larsen agreed, that Mr. Miller was 

capable of performing semi-skilled tasks and capable of relating, on at least a 

superficial basis, with co-workers and supervisors on an ongoing basis. The 

ALJ noted that the consultants didn’t have the opportunity to review later 

submitted evidence or hear Mr. Miller’s testimony at the hearing. 

Consequently, the ALJ added limitations to the consultants’ assessments and 

concluded that Mr. Miller could perform sedentary work with only superficial 

conduct with the public on routine matters and with only occasional co-worker 

contact and supervision. 
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Mr. Miller emphasizes the reports of Candice Hunter, M.D. who treated 

Mr. Miller in July and September 2012, after the state agency psychological 

consultants reviewed his treatment records.1 On July 23, 2012, Mr. Miller 

reported: he heard “more voices now;” one guy/voice was usually helpful; he 

talked back to the voices; and he received special messages from TV, radio, and 

signs. The report noted a blunted affect, a logical, goal directed thought 

process, auditory hallucinations, and a GAF score of 50. On September 26, 

2012, Mr. Miller reported that he was homeless and couldn’t go to a shelter 

because he was uncomfortable being around a lot of people and the voices 

continued and most recently were singing. 

The parties disagree about who had the burden to develop the record in 

light of the new evidence. The crux of whether the ALJ was required to obtain 

an updated medical opinion from a medical expert turns on whether the new 

evidence might cause the initial medical opinion to change. SSR-96-6P; 

Buckhanon ex rel. J.H. v. Astrue, 368 F. App’x 674, 679 (7th Cir. 2010). Mr. 

Miller’s mental state seems to have deteriorated between the time the 

consultants reviewed his records and the hearing, but the notes are from a 

relatively short period of time and don’t reveal a new diagnosis. Cf. Campbell v. 

Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 309 (7th Cir. 2010) (new treatment records from a 

fifteen-month period that included additional diagnoses would affect a doctor’s 

 

1 Mr. Miller referenced a third report dated October 2011. The state agency 

psychological consultants reviewed his treatment records in 2012, so this report was 

included in their analysis. 
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assessment of the claimant’s mental functional capacity). It’s not clear that the 

reports would change the consultants’ opinions. The court also can’t say the 

ALJ assumed the role of a doctor when he found the more recent evidence and 

Mr. Miller’s testimony at the hearing warranted more restrictive limitations 

than those recommended by the consultants. See Harlin v. Astrue, 424 F. 

App’x 564, 568 (7th Cir. 2011) (ALJ improperly assumed the role of doctor to 

the extent the ALJ projected how a doctor would have testified had she seen 

the additional evidence); Richards v. Astrue, 370 F. App’x 727, 731 (7th Cir. 

2010) (ALJ improperly applied limitations to areas that no medical professional 

had rated for the claimant). The ALJ, therefore, didn’t have a duty to more fully 

develop the record, but the ALJ was required to build a logical bridge between 

the evidence and his conclusions. Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th 

Cir. 2010). The court can’t see how that bridge can stand. At the most recent 

appointments in the record, Mr. Miller reported getting special messages from 

TV, radio, and signs and hearing singing voices. He was homeless and wouldn’t 

go to a shelter because he didn’t like to be around a lot of people. The ALJ 

glossed over the auditory hallucinations and focused on Mr. Miller’s normal 

cognition and reasoning and intact judgment. The new medical evidence 

doesn’t support the ALJ’s conclusions. 

C. State Agency Psychological Consultants 
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At step three, the ALJ gave significant weight to the April 2012 state 

agency psychological consultant opinion of Ann Lovko, Ph.D. and the summary 

affirmation of that opinion by state agency psychological consultant Joelle J. 

Larsen, Ph.D. in June 2012. At step four, however, the ALJ gave little 

evidentiary weight to their opinions. The ALJ modified their assessments at 

step four to account for more recent evidence and Mr. Miller’s testimony at the 

hearing. The ALJ doesn’t explain why a similar modification wasn’t also 

necessary at step three. The ALJ’s inconsistent treatment of the state agency 

psychological consultant opinions at different steps in the evaluation process 

further weakens the logical bridge between the evidence and the ALJ’s 

conclusions. 

IV. CONCLUSION

The ALJ’s decision isn’t supported by substantial evidence and doesn’t 

provide a logical bridge between the evidence and the ALJ’s conclusions. Jones 

v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010). The Commissioner’s denial of 

benefits is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED with instructions to return 

the matter to the Social Security Administration for further proceeding 

consistent with this opinion. 

 SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED: September 25, 2014 
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 /s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr. 

 Judge 

 United States District Court