UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

FORT WAYNE DIVISION 

DANIEL KOCH, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiffs, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Cause No. 1:14-CV-72-HAB 

 ) 

JERRY W. BAILEY TRUCKING, INC., ) 

and ESTATE OF JERRY W. BAILEY, ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 When the parties settled, they left the Court to determine the award for Plaintiffs’ attorney 

fees and costs. That issue is now fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 264, 269, 274). Plaintiffs have also, on 

order of this Court, provided an accurate accounting of their attorney fees using then-prevailing 

rates. (ECF No. 276). In total, Plaintiffs seek an attorney fee award of $201,820.00 and a costs 

award of $5,729.36. 

 The Court recognizes Plaintiffs’ statutory right to attorney fees and costs. But the amount 

requested by Plaintiffs is not reasonable under the relevant factors. As a result, Plaintiffs will be 

awarded $70,000.00 in attorney fees and $3,836.09 in costs. 

A. Procedural History 

 This case began more than seven years ago with the filing of a complaint and, ten days 

later, an amended complaint. (ECF Nos. 1, 8). The amended complaint asserted a collective action 

for failure to pay overtime wages under federal law, a class action for failure to pay wages under 

Indiana law, and an individual action by Plaintiff Koch for failure to pay wages under Indiana law. 

 In May 2014, the parties filed a joint stipulation to conditionally certify both the class and 

collective actions. (ECF No. 28). But the parties did not define the class claims, requiring an order 

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from the Court directing them to do so. (ECF No. 29). The Court also had concerns, based on 

Plaintiffs’ counsel Ronald Weldy’s disciplinary history, whether Attorney Weldy could fairly and 

adequately represent the interests of the class. As a result, the parties were ordered to brief Attorney 

Weldy’s competency as class counsel. (ECF No. 30). 

 In December 2014, the Court denied the parties’ stipulation for certification. (ECF No. 35). 

The Court found that Attorney Weldy’s disciplinary history, as well as his conduct in other cases 

before the Court, rendered him incapable of representing the class. After Plaintiffs moved to 

reconsider, the Court vacated its December 2014 Order. (ECF No. 51). 

The parties then again stipulated to conditional certification (ECF No. 58), which 

stipulation was granted in June 2015. (ECF No. 59). Even so, the parties could not agree on the 

class definitions or how the opt-in notices were to be returned. The Court ultimately rejected 

Plaintiffs’ proposed revisions to the class definitions, revised the definitions itself, and forbade 

potential class members from returning the opt-in forms by any means other than mail. (ECF No. 

68). 

Nearly two years into the litigation, Plaintiffs sought leave to amend their complaint to add 

another named plaintiff and another cause of action. (ECF No. 83). Defendants objected and the 

Court ultimately agreed with Defendants, finding that the proposed amendment had been 

unreasonably delayed and would be prejudicial to Defendants. (ECF No. 92). 

For the next two years there was little court action. It appears from the docket that the 

parties spent this time conducting discovery and engaging in settlement discussions. Those 

discussions included an unsuccessful judicial settlement conference with Magistrate Judge Susan 

Collins. (ECF No. 118). 

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In April 2018, Defendants moved to decertify the class and collective actions. (ECF No. 

126). Defendants also moved for summary judgment. (ECF No. 128). Plaintiffs cross-moved for 

summary judgment while also opposing the motion to decertify. (ECF Nos. 149). Following the 

filing of responses, replies, sur-replies, and motions to strike, the Court decertified the class and 

collective actions in May 2019. (ECF No. 182). The Court found that Plaintiffs overstated the 

number of potential class members at the certification stage and that, considering the actual number 

of opt-ins, the suit could be maintained as individual actions. 

After another amendment to the complaint in December 2019, the parties again crossmoved for summary judgment. The Court entered an order on the cross-motion in August 2020. 

(ECF No. 225). In summary, the Court found that Defendant Linda Bailey could not be held 

personally liable, but that the remaining Defendants had violated both state and federal wage laws. 

The Court further found that Jerry Bailey’s personal liability, as well as Defendants’ intent to 

violate wage laws, were matters for a jury to determine. 

Armed with this order, the parties again participated in a judicial settlement conference 

with Magistrate Judge Collins in November 2020. (ECF Nos. 236–37). This time, settlement was 

reached. The total amount recovered by all Plaintiffs was $60,642.69, roughly 60% of the damages 

claimed in affidavits submitted as part of the summary judgment briefs. Plaintiffs moved three 

times to extend their deadline to move for attorney fees and costs. Plaintiffs then determined that 

they needed a final judgment before they could collect attorney fees and costs. After more delays, 

the Court approved the parties’ settlement agreement in January 2021 and entered judgment for 

Plaintiffs two months later following the execution of the settlement agreements. (ECF No. 260). 

Plaintiffs moved for attorney fees in April 2021. After continuances on both sides, the 

motion was fully briefed in late-June 2021. The Court reviewed the briefs and ordered Plaintiffs 

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to submit attorney fees reflecting the rates in effect at the time services were rendered. That 

accounting has now been tendered to the Court. 

B. Legal Analysis 

1. Attorney’s Fees 

 The award of attorney fees to a prevailing plaintiff in a Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) 

claim is mandatory. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“The court in such action shall, in addition to any 

judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the 

defendant, and costs of the action.”). Still, district courts have “wide latitude” in determining the 

amount of the fee. Uphoff v. Elegant Bath, Ltd., 176 F.3d 399, 406 (7th Cir. 1999). 

a. Reasonable Billing Rate

 Generally, when calculating attorney’s fees, a district court will determine a “lodestar 

amount by multiplying the reasonable number of hours worked by the market rate.” Bankston v. 

State of Ill., 60 F.3d 1249, 1255 (7th Cir. 1995). The market rate is “the rate that lawyers of similar 

ability and experience in the community normally charge their paying clients for the type of work 

in question.” McNabola v. Chicago Transit Auth., 10 F.3d 501, 519 (7th Cir. 1993) (citation 

omitted). “The attorney’s actual billing rate for comparable work is ‘presumptively appropriate’ 

to use as the market rate.” People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 90 F.3d 1307, 1310 (7th 

Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). If the district court cannot determine the attorney’s actual billing rate 

because, for example, the attorney has no fee-paying clients, then the district court should look to 

the next best evidence. Id. The next best evidence of an attorney’s market rate includes evidence 

of rates other attorneys in the area charge paying clients for similar work and evidence of fee 

awards the attorney has received in similar cases. Id. at 1310–12. The burden of proving the market 

rate is on the party seeking the fee award. See McNabola, 10 F.3d at 518. That said, once an 

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attorney provides evidence establishing his market rate, the opposing party has the burden of 

proving why a lower rate should be awarded. See People Who Care, 90 F.3d at 1313. 

 Attorney Weldy has provided billing rates to the Court for himself, his associate, and his 

paralegal. Attorney Weldy’s rate was between $325.00 and $400.00 per hour over the seven years 

of this case, his associate’s $200.00 per hour, and his paralegal’s between $125.00 and $150.00 

per hour. That said, there is no evidence that Attorney Weldy has ever charged any client these 

amounts. Recognizing this, Attorney Weldy has provided the Court with affidavits from two 

attorneys, Christopher Myers and Robert Kondras, Jr., both of whom testified that their current 

rates are $400.00 per hour. 

 The Court sees two problems with these affidavits. First, Attorney Myers regularly appears 

before this Court, so the Court is familiar with his practice. Attorney Myers’ employment practice 

is mainly, if not entirety, plaintiff-based and contingent. The Court doubts that any of Attorney 

Myers’ clients have ever paid the claimed $400.00 per hour rate.1

 His affidavit, then, does little to 

help the Court determine a reasonable billing rate. 

 Attorney Kondras’ affidavit is only marginally more helpful. Attorney Kondras’ office is 

in Terre Haute, Indiana, more than two hundred miles from the Fort Wayne Federal Courthouse. 

He, too, appears to represent employees exclusively2

, presumably on a contingent fee basis. 

Attorney Kondras does identify cases in which he was awarded a $400.00 billing rate, but none of 

those cases are from the Northern District; three are from the Southern District of Indiana3

, and 

one from California. Those awards are helpful, but ultimately limited by geographical differences. 

1

 In 2015, this Court found that a reasonable hourly rate for Attorney Myers was $350.00. Myatt v. Gladieux, 2015 

WL 6455387 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 23, 2015). In that case, Attorney Myers also claimed that his hourly rate was $400.00. 

Id. at 2. 2

 https://www.hkmlawfirm.com/attorney/kondras-robert-p-jr/ 

3

 The cases in which Attorney Weldy was awarded his claimed rates suffer from the same problem, as all identified 

cases are from the Southern District of Indiana. (See ECF No. 264 at 9–10). 

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 The only evidence this Court has of a rate that a client paid comes from Defendants’ 

counsel, Theodore Storer. Attorney Storer’s billing rate was between $300.00 and $350.00 per 

hour over the course of this litigation. These numbers strike the Court, who practiced in the 

employment law area on behalf of both employers and employees before taking the bench, as far 

more reasonable in this district. See Batt v. Micro Warehouse, Inc., 241F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 

2001) (“Although the district court must consider [fee awards and fees charged by practitioners of 

comparable skill and experience], it is entitled to determine the probative value of each submission 

and must arrive at its own determination as to a proper fee.”) (quotations omitted). 

 Because of how long this case has been pending, the Court must also consider how to 

accommodate for the time value of money. The Supreme Court has observed that courts have 

accounted for delay in payment “either by basing the award on current rates or adjusting the fee 

based on historical rates to reflect its present value.” Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens 

Counsel for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 716 (1987) (emphasis added). While it is possible to find 

authority to the contrary, see Matter of Cont’l Sec. Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 571 (7th Cir. 1992), “the 

courts in this circuit generally use current rates.” Skelton v. Gen. Motors Corp., 860 F.2d 250, 255 

n.5 (7th Cir. 1988). 

 Having determined that Attorney Storer’s billing rate more accurately represents a 

reasonable hourly rate, the Court will follow the lead of its sister courts in applying current rates 

over the course of the entire litigation. Thus, the Court finds that the market rate for use in the 

lodestar calculation is $350.00 for each hour reasonably worked on this case.4

4

 Defendants do not challenge the billing rates for Attorney Weldy’s associate or paralegal. Thus, the Court will accept 

those rates as reasonable. 

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b. Hours Reasonably Worked 

 Plaintiffs have no right to bill every hour spent on litigation to their opponent. Instead, a 

prevailing party must exercise “billing judgment” to “exclude from a fee request hours that are 

excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is 

obligated to exclude such hours” from bills to their own client. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 

424, 434 (1983). When reducing hours requested, the Court must provide “a concise but clear 

explanation.” Tomazzoli v. Sheedy, 804 F.2d 93, 97 (7th Cir. 1986). 

 The Court has reviewed Attorney Weldy’s billing submission line by line. Having done so, 

the Court has identified several areas where the hours claimed are “excessive, redundant, or 

otherwise unnecessary.” 

i. Adequacy of Class Counsel 

 Attorney Weldy did not come into this case with a clean slate before the Court. He has 

prior discipline for inattention to client matters and, perhaps more importantly, had mishandled (at 

least in the Court’s estimation) a case then-pending before the Court. As a result, before the Court 

addressed the merits of the proposed class and collective actions, it questioned whether Attorney 

Weldy could act as class counsel. Attorney Weldy eventually convinced the Court of his 

competence and was permitted to stay on as Plaintiffs’ counsel. He now seeks to shift fifteen of 

his own hours, and 16.1 of his associate’s hours, to Defendants for time spent addressing the 

Court’s concerns. 

 The Court does not believe that these hours should be part of a fee award. Attorney Weldy 

did not advance the interests of his clients by fighting to preserve his appearance. To the contrary, 

the concerns over his abilities delayed the case by nearly six months. Instead, Attorney Weldy 

advanced his own interests in future fees. This was a reasonable business decision on his part. That 

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said, given the bases of the Court’s concerns, it does not believe that Defendants should be made 

to bear the costs for Attorney Weldy’s financial self-preservation. These hours will be deducted 

from the lodestar calculation. 

ii. Creating a Damages Spreadsheet 

 From October to December 2016, Attorney Weldy’s paralegal billed 26.4 hours for 

entering information into a damages spreadsheet. Some eight months later, Attorney Weldy spent 

19.2 hours finalizing the spreadsheets. These hours, and more devoted to damages, were 

challenged by Defendants in their response brief. (ECF No. 269 at 6). Unfortunately, no other 

information or argument related to these hours was provided in Plaintiffs’ reply. 

 While the number of paralegal hours seem excessive on their face, it is the timing of the 

hours that concerns the Court the most. Remember, this time was spent before the decertification 

of the class and collective actions. It is likely, then, that some of those hours are devoted to entering 

information for individuals who did not become plaintiffs in this case. Plaintiffs have made no 

effort to more specifically identify the tasks undertaken during these hours, complicating the 

Court’s task. The Court is, then, left to use its best guess in determining the appropriate number of 

hours to credit. Since the actual number of plaintiffs was around one-fifth of the number of class 

members originally represented to the Court, and since the challenged hours were spent while the 

class and collective actions were still certified, the Court finds that the same reduction is 

appropriate. As a result, the Court will permit five hours of paralegal time for creating the damages 

spreadsheet to be transferred to Defendants. 

 The Court also questions how, and why, Attorney Weldy spent nearly twenty hours 

“finalizing” spreadsheets created by his paralegal. Was he rechecking every entry? Confirming the 

math? True, much of this time is block-billed with tasks like “analyze documents produced” and 

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“calculate damages for class members,” but these seem to be little more than double-checking the 

work of the paralegal. The “documents produced” were presumably used by the paralegal in 

creating the spreadsheet and, if the spreadsheet was accurate, “calculating damages” should have 

involved little more than looking to the bottom line.5

 Ultimately, the lack of detail in these entries 

leads the Court to question the amount of time appropriately billed to Defendants. See Valerio v. 

Total Taxi Repair & Body Shop, LLC, 82 F. Supp. 3d 723, 744–45 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (“[c]ourts 

should not permit recovery for administrative or clerical tasks, such as organizing file folders, 

preparing documents, and copying documents.”). The Court finds that 19.2 hours is excessive but 

will allow five hours of attorney time for reviewing the documents and spreadsheets. 

iii. Summary Judgment Practice 

 There were two rounds of summary judgment practice in this case: one pre-decertification 

and one post-decertification. By the Court’s calculations, Attorney Weldy billed sixty-one hours 

(not including motions related to briefing schedules or evidentiary issues) during the first round of 

briefing. This briefing was ultimately rendered moot; when the Court decertified the class and 

collective actions, it denied the cross-motions for summary judgment as moot. (ECF No. 195). In 

the second round, Attorney Weldy billed another 30.8 hours, again exclusive of ancillary issues. 

In total, Attorney Weldy billed nearly ninety-two hours to summary judgment briefs alone. 

 The Court has reviewed the briefs both when it ruled on summary judgment and now in 

the context of the fee claim. Attorney Weldy’s briefing was not inconsequential. His primary brief 

in the first round was forty-eight pages, forty-three pages in the second round. Even so, the 

majority of both filings was devoted to the recitation of facts. The legal arguments took up only 

5

 Plaintiffs’ reply asserts that some calculations “had to be redone on multiple occasions because a flaw with an 

equation to calculate hours or damages was found and remedied.” (ECF No. 274 at 8). This is an explanation, but not 

a basis for holding Defendants responsible for the initial errors. 

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sixteen pages in the first brief, fourteen in the second. The Court is not discounting the importance 

of facts in summary judgment proceedings, but when Plaintiffs’ briefs are looked at in this light, 

the length becomes less remarkable. 

 That said, the Court is mostly concerned by the similarities between the two rounds of 

briefing. If one compares ECF Nos. 150 and 222, the primary summary judgment briefs, they will 

find that the briefs are largely identical. There are differences, of course: the second brief 

incorporates additional facts from intervening depositions, for instance. All the same, the legal 

issues were the same in both rounds of briefing. Given the similarities, the Court questions how 

Attorney Weldy can justify more than thirty hours to prepare a second round of briefing that was 

largely a cut-and-paste version of the first. 

 Nor were the issues particularly complex. If one omits the discussion of the standard of 

review, Plaintiffs’ primary brief for the second round of briefing cites just five cases when 

discussing the merits of the claims, and another four when discussing tolling. (ECF No. 222). The 

factual underpinning for Plaintiffs’ claims, that they were not paid for pre- and post-trip 

inspections, was largely undisputed. These briefs did not write themselves, but they were also not 

so difficult that they should have taken four full days of effort to draft. 

 As a result, the Court finds that sixty hours were reasonably spent by Plaintiffs briefing the 

summary judgment issues. Thus, 31.8 hours will be disallowed. 

 Applying these adjustments to Plaintiffs’ claimed hours, and incorporating hours that 

Plaintiffs abandoned in their reply along with more hours billed for preparing the fee briefs, the 

Court finds that these hours are properly billable to Defendants: 

 Attorney Weldy: 362.4 hours 

 Attorney Derringer: 8.1 hours 

 Paralegal: 43.2 hours 

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Multiplying these hours by the rates above, the Court finds that the lodestar calculation is $126,840 

for Attorney Weldy, $1,620 for Attorney Derringer, and $6,480 for the paralegal. In total, the 

lodestar figure is $134,940. 

c. Modifications to the Lodestar Calculation 

 With the lodestar figure calculated, the Court now turns to the parties’ requested 

modifications to that figure. Plaintiffs assert that the lodestar figure should be enhanced by fifty 

dollars per hour on account of what they call the “excellent result” obtained. (ECF No. 274 at 7). 

Not so, Defendants counter, asserting instead that the lodestar figure should be reduced because of 

the decertification of the class and collective actions. (ECF No. 269 at 3–5). The Court agrees with 

Defendants. 

 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly said that enhancements to the lodestar 

figure may be awarded only in “rare” and “exceptional” circumstances. Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. 

Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 552 (2010) (collecting cases). This is because “the lodestar figure includes 

most, if not all, of the relevant factors constituting a ‘reasonable’ attorney’s fee.” Pennsylvania v. 

Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 566 (1986). The quality of an 

attorney’s performance generally should not be used to adjust the lodestar “[b]ecause 

considerations concerning the quality of a prevailing party’s counsel’s representation normally are 

reflected in the reasonable hourly rate.” Id. 

 On the other hand, “[i]f ... a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success, the 

product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate 

may be an excessive amount.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436. In such a case, the district court has the 

discretion to reduce the modified lodestar amount to reflect the degree of success obtained. See id. 

at 436–37. 

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 As did the district court in Dominguez v. Quigley’s Irish Pub, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 2d 674 

(N.D. Ill. 2012), the Court finds the Second Circuit’s decision in Barfield v. New York City Health 

and Hospitals Corp., 537 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2008) to be on point. There, the plaintiff sued on behalf 

of herself and others similarly situated for violations of the overtime provisions of the FLSA. The 

district court denied the request to certify the collective action. After the plaintiff’s individual case 

was settled, she requested statutory attorney fees. Among other reductions, the district court 

reduced the lodestar figure by fifty percent based on the failure of the collective action. 

 Challenging on appeal the reduction in a manner nearly identical to Plaintiffs here, the 

plaintiff in Barfield argued that “a motion for FLSA collective action certification is not a claim 

and, thus, failure on such a motion does not support a fee reduction.” Id. at 152. The Second Circuit 

rejected this argument. 

A district court's assessment of the “degree of success” achieved in a case is not 

limited to inquiring whether a plaintiff prevailed on individual claims. Both the 

quantity and quality of relief obtained, as compared to what the plaintiff sought to 

achieve as evidenced in her complaint, are key factors in determining the degree of 

success achieved. Indeed, this comparison promotes the court’s central 

responsibility to make the assessment of what is a reasonable fee under the 

circumstances of the case. 

Id. (citations and quotations omitted). Finding that the “plaintiff’s primary aim in this litigation, as 

reflected in her complaint and in the first four months of litigation . . . was to certify a collective 

action,” the Second Circuit found that the fifty percent reduction was appropriate based on the 

plaintiff’s limited success: “[i]n this respect the district court got it exactly right: the 

reasonableness of the attorney’s fees incurred linked directly to the ability to maintain the case as 

an FLSA collective action.” Id. at 153. 

 In many respects, the Court believes that the class and collective actions were more 

“primary” in this case than in Barfield. While the collective action in Barfield was a focus for only 

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four months, the parties here labored under the class and collective action for five years. Two out 

of the three counts in the Amended Complaint are addressed solely to the class and collective 

actions. But perhaps the most compelling evidence is the speed with which this case settled once 

the class and collective actions were decertified. While the case languished as a class and collective 

action, the parties resolved this matter in only eighteen months once the specter of class liability 

was removed. The individual claims were never the drivers of this case for either side. 

 Plaintiffs, understandably, focus on the initial certification. They assert that “[g]etting a 

class and/or collective action certified is a rare skill amongst Hoosier attorneys.” (ECF No. 264 at 

12). Maybe, but certification was not exactly one of the twelve labors of Hercules. The request for 

certification was jointly made. The only reason for the Court’s initial rejection of the certification 

request was its misgivings about Attorney Weldy. When one further considers that the certification 

was based on a wildly inaccurate estimate of potential class members, Attorney Weldy’s demand 

for plaudits rings hollow. 

 At base, the facts of the matter are that Plaintiffs recovered only a fraction of the damages 

claimed in the summary judgment briefs6

, which were themselves only a fraction of the recovery 

anticipated when suit was filed. This is not an “excellent result” for Plaintiffs. To the contrary, it 

reflects “success” that merits a downward modification to the lodestar figure. As a result, the Court 

finds that an award of $70,000.00 represents a reasonable fee in this case. It closely approximates 

the actual recovery obtained and reflects both the lodestar figure and the limited success achieved. 

2. Costs 

 As Defendants note, recoverable costs are listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Those costs are: 

(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; 

6

 Plaintiffs have moved to strike references in Defendants’ damages brief to Plaintiffs’ demands at settlement. (ECF 

No. 277). The Court has not considered that evidence in reaching its conclusion, and therefore DENIES the motion as 

moot. 

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(2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for 

use in the case; 

(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; 

(4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where 

the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case; 

(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title; [and] 

(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and 

salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under section 

1828 of this title. 

Id. A district court may not tax a prevailing party’s costs to the losing party unless the specific 

expense is authorized by this statute. Little v. Mitsubishi Motors N.A., Inc., 514 F.3d 699, 701 (7th 

Cir. 2008). 

 There is agreement between the parties that $3,836.09, representing the filing, 

videographer, and court reporter fees, are properly taxed. The remaining amount in dispute, 

$1,893.27, represents “parking, hotel stays, mileage, postage, and copies7

.” (ECF No. 274 at 9). 

Plaintiffs do not argue that these are costs authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Instead, they claim, 

citing Indiana authority, that the amount should be “added to the attorney fee requested since they 

are costs normally billed with attorney fees.” (ECF No. 274 at 9). 

 In line with the directive in Little, the Court will not assess the extra-statutory costs to 

Defendants. Moreover, without any federal authority authorizing the taxing of costs as fees, the 

Court declines Plaintiffs’ invitation to do so. Thus, the Court will assess costs in the amount of 

$3,836.09. 

7

 The Court recognizes that copies can qualify as costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4), but Plaintiffs have not tried to show 

that the copies were “necessarily obtained for use in the case.” 

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C. Conclusion 

 For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Award of Statutory Attorney’s Fees, Costs and 

Designation of Evidence (ECF No. 263) is GRANTED in part. Attorney’s fees of $70,000.00 and 

costs in the amount of $3,836.09 are awarded in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants. 

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Portions of Defendants’ Opposition (ECF No. 277) is DENIED as 

moot. 

SO ORDERED on July 16, 2021. 

 s/ Holly A. Brady 

JUDGE HOLLY A. BRADY 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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