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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

THE CELINA MUTUAL 

INSURANCE COMPANY, a 

member of a pool of 

companies known as Celina 

Insurance Group, 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

DANIEL L. GALLAS, 

CATHERINE D. GALLAS, 

FINISHING TOUCH CLEANING 

SERVICE, INC., GEOFFREY 

WENDT, NADIA WENDT, and 

WINDAM BREMER as Trustee 

of The Zenonas 

Puzinauskas Daughters’ 

Family Trust, 

 Defendants. 

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NO. 3:14–CV-1616 

OPINION AND ORDER

 This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary 

Judgment filed by Plaintiff, The Celina Mutual Insurance Company 

(“Celina”), on March 3, 2016 (DE #49). For the reasons set forth 

below, Celina’s Motion for Summary Judgment (DE #49) is GRANTED. 

The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to enter a DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

in favor of Celina declaring that under insurance policy number 

7114353-0, The Celina Mutual Insurance Company has no duty to 
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defend or indemnify Daniel L. Gallas, Catherine D. Gallas, and/or 

Finishing Touch Cleaning Service, Inc., against claims asserted by 

Geoffrey Wendt, Nadia Wendt and Windham Bremer as trustee of The 

Zenonas Puzinauskas Daughters’ Family Trust (whether individually 

or jointly) in case number 46D02-1303-CT-508 in the LaPorte County, 

Indiana, Superior Court. 

BACKGROUND 

 Celina filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a 

determination as to whether it owes a duty to defend or indemnify 

Defendants Finishing Touch Cleaning Service, Inc. (“Finishing 

Touch”), Daniel L. Gallas, and Catherine D. Gallas (together, 

“Gallas Defendants”) for claims brought by Defendants Geoffrey 

Wendt, Nadia Wendt, and Windam Bremer as Trustee of The Zenonas 

Puzinauskas Daughters’ Family Trust (together, “Wendt Defendants”) 

in a lawsuit pending in Indiana state court. In that lawsuit, the 

Wendt Defendants allege that they hired Finishing Touch to clean 

the glass in the windows and doors of their home in Beverly Shores, 

Indiana, and that Finishing Touch damaged parts of the windows and 

doors in doing so. Celina is defending the Gallas Defendants in 

the underlying lawsuit under a reservation of rights. 

 Celina filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of 

whether it is obligated to defend and indemnify the Gallas 

Defendants in the underlying lawsuit. Celina argues that the 
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claims in the underlying lawsuit are excluded from coverage under 

the insurance policy at issue. The Wendt Defendants and the Gallas 

Defendants (together, “Defendants”) filed responses to the motion, 

maintaining that the claims are not excluded from coverage. The 

Gallas Defendants also argue that Celina waived its right to deny 

coverage or is estopped from denying coverage. 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 

 Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine 

issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 

2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). Not every dispute between the 

parties makes summary judgment inappropriate; “[o]nly disputes 

over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary 

judgment.” Id. To determine whether a genuine dispute of material 

fact exists, the Court must construe all facts in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable 

inferences in that party’s favor. See Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 

F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010). A party opposing a properly 

supported summary judgment motion may not rely on allegations in 
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his own pleading, but rather must “marshal and present the court 

with the evidence [it] contends will prove [its] case.” Goodman 

v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). 

“[I]nferences relying on mere speculation or conjecture will not 

suffice.” Stephens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2009) 

(citation omitted). 

The party with the burden of proof on an issue can obtain a 

summary judgment “only where the evidence is so one-sided that it 

points inescapably” in the movant’s favor, and “every reasonable 

jury” would decide that the movant has met its burden of proof. 

Thorne v. Member Select Ins. Co., 899 F. Supp. 2d 820, 824 (N.D. 

Ind. 2012) (citations omitted). If the non-moving party fails to 

establish the existence of an essential element on which he bears 

the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is proper. Massey 

v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2006). 

FACTS 

The Underlying Lawsuit 

 Geoffrey Wendt (“Wendt”) and Nadia Wendt (together, the 

“Wendts”) hired Finishing Touch to clean the glass in the windows 

and doors of their home in Beverly Shores, Indiana, in June 2011.1 

After Finishing Touch’s employees finished their work at the 

                                                            

1 The Wendts lived in the home and were beneficial owners of the 

home at all times pertinent to this litigation.
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Wendts’ home, Wendt noticed white stains and spots on the glass, 

though the glass itself was not damaged. He contacted Daniel 

Gallas (“Gallas”), the owner of Finishing Touch, and asked that 

the employees return to the home and remove the spots from the 

glass in the windows and doors. According to Wendt, his agreement 

with Gallas was only for removing the spots on the glass, it was 

not to wipe down or clean, or perform any work on any portions of 

the home other than the glass. (DE #55-2, ¶7.) 

In August 2011, two of Finishing Touch’s employees returned 

to the Wendts’ home. Gallas testified that he told the employees 

to use a liquid product called OneRestore to remove the spots from 

the glass. The label of the OneRestore container instructs the 

user to “[a]lways test a small area first to determine applications 

and dwell time,” “not allow product to dry on surface,” and rinse 

the product off by using “a thorough, high pressure rinse.” (DE 

#55-6 at 7.) Gallas testified that he instructed the employees to 

“spray the window [with OneRestore], and use your window apparatus 

tools to apply water to rinse it off the window, and clean the 

window like you would normally clean the window, squeegee it off 

and wipe it off, wipe off the frames with their rags.” (DE #50-5 

at 5.) He testified that Finishing Touch “was hired to clean 

glass,” and that while he instructed the employees “to clean the 

windows,” this meant “to clean the glass” to them. (Id. at 6.) 

He also testified that when the employees “do a window-cleaning 
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job, the water is gonna get on the frame, no matter what you do. 

So, they’re trained to wipe off the frame. . . . That’s where the 

water drips.” (Id. at 7.) 

One of the Finishing Touch employees explained the process he 

used to clean the glass with OneRestore: 

[We] [g]ot our spray bottle, we sprayed the window, the 

glass part, and as soon as we got done spraying the 

window we used our sponge with the soapy water and we 

used a squeegee to get it off. And, you know, we wiped 

where the water sits on – like, because when we wiped 

with the squeegee, water usually goes down, right, so we 

wiped the bottom frame. 

(DE #50-4 at 6.) He did his “best just to spray the glass.” (Id. 

at 7.) The other employee testified that “[w]e just spray on the 

glass and right away with the sponge with the water and so we try 

to clean it up and then squeegee. And just dry a little bit of 

water that runs in the frame and that’s it.” (DE #50-3 at 7.) 

When asked what precautions were taken to prevent OneRestore from 

coming into contact with the window frames, sills, or cladding, he 

testified that “[w]e just dried it off with a towel. Any water or 

liquid that comes out, we dried it off with a towel.” (Id. at 8.) 

The Finishing Touch employees removed the spots from the glass 

using OneRestore without damaging the glass. 

 After the Finishing Touch employees had left the home, Wendt 

observed that the glass was clean and the water spots had been 

removed, but that the paint around the glass in the windows and 

doors was bubbling and blistering, and some paint was sliding off. 
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He also observed that the silicone seals and caulking of the 

windows had “turned to a soft rubbery bubblegum-like consistency 

and br[oke] into strands.” (DE #55-2, ¶11.) The Wendts’ home 

subsequently experienced condensation in the windows, and on cold 

days and nights, condensation would drip from the windows and form 

small puddles inside the home. (Id., ¶13.) The Wendts contacted 

Pella Windows and various contractors regarding these problems, 

and were advised that replacing the windows and doors would be 

less expensive than repairing them. The Wendts replaced the 

windows and doors, which caused damage to the siding shingles 

covering the home’s exterior, some interior woodwork and other 

parts of the home’s interior. The Wendts replaced the damaged 

siding shingles, damaged interior woodwork and repainted and restained parts of the home’s interior. 

 The Wendt Defendants filed a lawsuit against the Gallas 

Defendants in LaPorte County Superior Court No. 2 under Cause No. 

46D02-1303-CT-508 (“underlying lawsuit”). The complaint in the 

underlying lawsuit alleges that the Gallas Defendants carelessly 

and negligently allowed chemicals intended to clean the glass in 

the windows of their home to come in contact with the other 

portions of the windows and damaged them, including the window 

frames, casings, trim and sills. While the complaint only 

addresses the windows of the Wendts’ home, it is undisputed that 

the Wendt Defendants also allege damage to the glass doors of the 
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home in the underlying lawsuit. The Wendt Defendants seek to 

recover the cost to remedy and repair the damage to the windows, 

doors, siding shingles, interior woodwork and interior trim, and 

all other damages they suffered. 

 The Gallas Defendants submitted a claim to Celina for the 

defense of and indemnity for the underlying lawsuit. On April 22, 

2013, Celina agreed to provide defense for the allegations in the 

underlying lawsuit, subject to Celina’s reservation of rights. On 

June 6, 2014, Celina filed its complaint for declaratory judgment 

seeking a declaration that it is not legally obligated to defend 

or indemnify the Gallas Defendants in the underlying lawsuit. 

 The Policy 

 Celina had issued an all business coverage insurance policy 

number 7114353-0 to Finishing Touch as the named insured for the 

policy period of July 14, 2011, through July 14, 2012 (“Policy”). 

(DE #50-9.) Gallas and Catherine Gallas were also insureds under 

the Policy as executive officers, directors and/or stockholders of 

Finishing Touch. (Id. at 100.) The commercial general liability 

(“CGL”) coverage in the Policy states in relevant part: 

We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally 

obligated to pay as damages because of “bodily injury” 

and “property damage” to which this insurance applies. 

We will have the right and duty to defend the insured in 

any “suit” seeking those damages. However, we will have 

no duty to defend the insured against any “suit” seeking 

damages for “bodily injury” or “property damage” to 

which this insurance does not apply. . . . 
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(Id. at 92.) The Policy contains two relevant exclusions, which 

state that the insurance does not apply to: 

 j. Damage to Property 

 “Property damage” to: 

 . . . 

 (6) That particular part of any property that must 

be restored, repaired or replaced because “your 

work” was incorrectly performed on it. 

 . . . 

 Paragraph (6) of this exclusion does not apply to 

“property damage” included in the “productscompleted operations hazard”. 

. . . 

l. Damage to Your Work 

“Property damage” to “your work” arising out of it 

or any part of it and included in the “productscompleted operations hazard”. 

(Id. at 95-96.) The Policy defines “products-completed operations 

hazard” in relevant part as: 

a. Includ[ing] all “bodily injury” and “property 

damage” occurring away from premises you own or 

rent and arising out of “your product” or “your 

work” except: 

. . . 

(2) Work that has not yet been completed or 

abandoned. However, “your work” will be 

deemed completed at the earliest of the 

following times: 

(a) When all the work called for in your 

contract has been completed. 

. . . 

Work that may need service, maintenance, 

correction, repair or replacement, but which is 

otherwise complete, will be treated as completed. 

(Id. at 105.) 

The Policy defines “property damage” in relevant part as 

“[p]hysical injury to tangible property, including all resulting 
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loss of use of that property. All such loss of use shall be deemed 

to occur at the time of the physical injury that caused it. . . .” 

(Id.) According to the terms of the Policy, “your work”: 

a. Means: 

(1) Work or operations performed by you or on your 

behalf; and 

(2) Materials, parts or equipment furnished in 

connection with such work or operations. 

b. Includes 

(1) Warranties or representations made at any time 

with respect to the fitness, quality, 

durability, performance or use of “your work”, 

and 

(2) The providing of or failure to provide 

warnings or instructions. 

(Id. at 106.) 

DISCUSSION 

Defense under Reservation of Rights 

As an initial matter, the Gallas Defendants maintain that 

Celina waived its right to deny insurance coverage, or is otherwise 

estopped from denying coverage, because it elected to control the 

defense of the Gallas Defendants in the underlying lawsuit under 

a reservation of rights. They rely upon In re Lodholtz, 769 F.3d 

531 (7th Cir. 2014), to assert that under Indiana law, an insurer 

may not control the defense of its insured without acknowledging 

coverage. In Lodholtz, the Seventh Circuit describes an insurer’s 

effort to intervene in an underlying tort litigation while 

retaining its reservation of rights: 
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A reservation of rights is problematic from the 

insured’s standpoint. It creates a risk that the insurer 

will not put up a strong defense to the suit against the 

insured . . . , wishing to economize on legal expense 

and hoping to avoid having to indemnify the insured at 

all if the latter is hit with a judgment. Mindful of 

this danger, the Indiana courts forbid the insurer to 

control the defense of the insured without acknowledging 

coverage. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Young, 852 N.E.2d 8, 

13–15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); see also Travelers Indemnity 

Co. v. Dingwell, 884 F.2d 629, 638–40 (1st Cir. 1989). 

Such intervention in the defense of the suit would 

unfairly restrict the insured, who faces the very real 

risk of an uninsured liability, and grant the insurer a 

double bite at escaping liability. 

Id. at 533 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Lodholtz did not resolve the issue raised by the Gallas 

Defendants, that is, the relationship between an insurer’s defense 

under a reservation of rights and its right to challenge coverage. 

There, the insurer had attempted to intervene in the underlying 

tort litigation after making no appearance in the litigation and 

after the state court had entered a default judgment against the 

insured. The state court denied the insurer’s motion to intervene, 

and the court of appeals affirmed this decision. See id. The 

insured filed a federal action arguing that the state workers 

compensation act had deprived the Indiana courts of jurisdiction 

to entertain the tort litigation. Id. The Seventh Circuit held 

that the jurisdictional issue on which the insurer’s suit was based 

“was resolved against it by the Indiana courts, and that there 

[was] no ground for a collateral attack by another judicial system 

on that determination.” Id. at 534. 
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Magistrate Judge Nuechterlein considered and rejected the 

Gallas Defendants’ argument in his November 4, 2015, discovery 

order, correctly noting that Lodholtz “applied Indiana law related 

specifically to the issue of intervention in reaching its 

conclusion about the control of defense issue.” (DE #46 at 8 

(citing Young, 852 N.E.2d at 13-15).) The Court agrees that 

Lodholtz did not overrule “Indiana’s long-standing law on an 

insurer’s ability to protect its right to challenge coverage by 

defending under a reservation of rights or filing a declaratory 

action.”2 (Id. (citing Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Ault, 918 

N.E.2d 619, 625 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)). The Court incorporates by 

reference the Magistrate Judge’s prior ruling regarding this 

issue. Accordingly, the Court rejects the Gallas Defendants’ 

argument that Celina waived its right to deny coverage or is 

estopped from denying coverage because it elected to defend the 

Gallas Defendants in the underlying lawsuit under a reservation of 

rights. 

Policy Exclusions 

In Indiana, “[t]he interpretation of an insurance policy is 

primarily a question of law for the court, and it is therefore a 

question which is particularly suited for summary judgment.” 

Wagner v. Yates, 912 N.E.2d 805, 808 (Ind. 2009) (citation 

                                                            

2 The parties agree that Indiana law applies.
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omitted). Indiana courts interpret an insurance contract under 

the same rules of construction as other contracts. Westfield Cos. 

v. Knapp, 804 N.E.2d 1270, 1274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citation 

omitted). Courts “interpret an insurance policy with the goal of 

ascertaining and enforcing the parties’ intent as revealed by the 

insurance contract.” Id. “[C]lear and unambiguous language in an 

insurance policy should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, 

even if those terms limit an insurer’s liability.” Everett Cash 

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 926 N.E.2d 1008, 1012 (Ind. 2010) 

(citation omitted). “[A]n ambiguity is not affirmatively 

established simply because controversy exists and one party 

asserts an interpretation contrary to that asserted by the opposing 

party.” Beam v. Wausau Ins. Co., 765 N.E.2d 524, 528 (Ind. 2002) 

(citation omitted). 

“An insurance company’s duty to defend is broader than its 

duty to indemnify.” Newnam Mfg., Inc. v. Transcon. Ins. Co., 871 

N.E.2d 396, 401 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “If the pleadings reveal 

that a claim is clearly excluded under the policy, then no defense 

is required.” Id. “[W]here the insurer is aware of facts, not in 

the pleadings, which clearly disclose an absence of coverage, it 

can refuse to defend or clarify its obligation by means of a 

declaratory judgment action.” Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Mallon, 409 

N.E.2d 1100, 1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (citation omitted). Courts 

are to “determine the insurer’s duty to defend from the allegations 
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contained within the complaint and from those facts known or 

ascertainable by the insurer after reasonable investigation.” 

Newnam Mfg., Inc., 871 N.E.2d at 401. Indiana courts have 

considered extrinsic evidence in assessing an insurer’s duty to 

defend. See Ind. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. N. Vernon Drop Forge, 

Inc., 917 N.E.2d 1258, 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (considering 

extrinsic evidence in assessing an insurer’s duty to defend); 

Selective Ins. Co. of S.C. v. Erie Ins. Exch., 14 N.E.3d 105, 113 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (same). “[T]he insured has the burden of 

proving that the coverage applies, and the insurer, if relying on 

an exclusion to deny coverage, has the burden of demonstrating 

that the exclusion is applicable.” Bowman, Heintz, Boscia & 

Vician, P.C. v. Valiant Ins. Co., 35 F. Supp. 3d 1015, 1023 (N.D. 

Ind. 2014) (citation omitted). 

Celina argues that it has no duty to defend or indemnify the 

Gallas Defendants under the Policy for claims made in the 

underlying lawsuit. The Policy covers “property damage” caused by 

an “occurrence,” which is defined in part as an “accident.” (DE 

#50-9 at 105.) The Defendants contend that the Policy covers the 

property damage alleged in the underlying lawsuit because it was 

caused unintentionally.3 Celina does not dispute that the damage 

                                                            

3

The Wendt Defendants assert that Finishing Touch’s allegedly 

faulty use of OneRestore caused the damages alleged in the 

underlying lawsuit. The Gallas Defendants reserve the right to 
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to the windows and doors alleged in the underlying lawsuit 

constitutes “property damage” under the Policy. (DE #50 at 13 

n.6.) Nor does Celina assert a lack of coverage because no 

“occurrence” took place; rather, it maintains that coverage does 

not exist based on exclusion provisions in the Policy. (Id. at 16 

n.11.) Thus, for the purpose of this motion, the Court assumes 

that the alleged property damage was caused by an “occurrence” 

under the Policy. See Sheehan Constr. Co., Inc. v. Continental 

Cas. Co., 935 N.E.2d 160, 171-72 (Ind.) (“faulty workmanship may 

constitute an accident and thus an occurrence” under a CGL policy), 

modified on other grounds, 938 N.E.2d 685 (Ind. 2010).

Celina argues that the damages alleged in the underlying 

lawsuit are excluded from coverage under two Policy provisions: 

the “Damage to Property” exclusion and the “Damage to Your Work” 

exclusion. “Generally, insurers are allowed to limit liability in 

any manner which is not inconsistent with public policy.” Hoosier 

Ins. Co. v. Audiology Found. of Am., 745 N.E.2d 300, 309 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2001). A coverage exclusion is usually an affirmative 

defense, with the insurer bearing the burden of proof. Id. “[A]n 

unambiguous exclusionary clause is ordinarily entitled to 

enforcement.” Id. However, exclusions must be plainly expressed 

and clear, and any doubts as to coverage will be construed against 

                                                            

dispute liability for the alleged damages, and the alleged damages 

themselves, in the underlying lawsuit. (DE #56 at 1-2.)
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the insurer. Id. 

The Damage to Property exclusion excludes coverage for 

property damage to “[t]hat particular part of any property that 

must be restored, repaired or replaced because ‘your work’ was 

incorrectly performed on it.” (DE #50-9 at 96.) Defendants assert 

that this exclusion does not apply here because it “does not apply 

to ‘property damage’ included in the ‘products-completed 

operations hazard’” (“PCOH”). (Id.) The Policy defines the PCOH 

to include property damage arising out of “your work,” except for 

“[w]ork that has not yet been completed.” (Id. at 105.) “Work 

that may need service, maintenance, correction, repair or 

replacement, but which is otherwise complete, will be treated as 

completed.” (Id.) Because the Damage to Property exclusion does 

not apply to property damage included in the PCOH, the exclusion 

applies only if the insured’s work has not been completed. 

Defendants maintain that Finishing Touch’s work at the 

Wendts’ home was complete under the PCOH because it was work that 

needed correction, but was otherwise completed. Celina 

acknowledges that the Damage to Property exclusion only applies if 

the insured’s work is not yet complete, and does not dispute that 

Finishing Touch’s work was complete under the PCOH. (DE #59 at 3 

n.8.) Because the parties do not dispute that (1) the Damage to 

Property exclusion only applies where the insured’s work has not 

been completed, and (2) Finishing Touch’s work was complete under 
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the PCOH, the Court finds that the Damage to Property exclusion 

does not apply here. 

Turning to the Damage to Your Work exclusion, this provision 

excludes coverage for property damage to “‘your work’ arising out 

of it or any part of it and included in the [PCOH].”4 (DE #50-9

at 96.) In Indiana Insurance Company v. DeZutti, 408 N.E.2d 1275 

(Ind. 1980), the Supreme Court of Indiana considered whether a 

similar exclusionary clause eliminated coverage for an insured’s 

faulty workmanship.5 There, the insured was a general contractor 

who built and sold a house that subsequently suffered damage due 

to improper construction of the footings. Id. at 1276. The court 

considered the insured’s CGL policy and explained: 

What is covered by the policy is defective workmanship 

which causes personal injury or property damage not 

excluded under some provision of the policy. So if the 

insured’s breach of an implied warranty results in 

damage to property other than the insured’s work or 

product which is excluded by [the exclusionary clauses], 

the policy would provide coverage. To hold otherwise 

would effectively convert the policy into a performance 

                                                            

4 Unlike the Damage to Property exclusion, the Damage to Your Work 

exclusion applies to property damage “included in the [PCOH].” 

(DE #50-9 at 96.) Thus, this exclusion may apply where, as here, 

it is undisputed that the insured’s work was completed. 

5 DeZutti addressed an exclusionary clause similar to the Damage to 

Your Work exclusion, which provided that the policy did not apply 

to “property damage to work performed by or on behalf of the named 

insured arising out of the work or any portion thereof, or out of 

materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection therewith. 

. . .” 408 N.E.2d at 1277. Another exclusionary clause at issue 

in DeZutti provided that the policy did not apply to “property 

damage to the named insured’s products arising out of such products 

or any part of such products.” Id.
‐18‐ 

bond or guarantee of contractual performance and result 

in coverage for repair and replacement of the insured’s 

own faulty workmanship. This was not the intent and 

understanding of the parties at the time the policy was 

purchased. 

Id. at 1279 (emphasis added). “[T]he costs attendant upon the 

repair or replacement of the insured’s own faulty work is part of 

every business venture and is a business expense to be borne by 

the insured-contractor in order to satisfy customers. It is a 

business risk long excluded by comprehensive liability policies.” 

Id. The court noted that “[t]he same neglectful craftmanship may 

cause both a business expense of repair and a loss represented by 

damage to persons and property other than the insured’s own product 

or work.” Id. It explained that the policy “does not cover an 

accident of faulty workmanship but rather faulty workmanship which 

causes an accident.” Id. (citing Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 

405 A.2d 788, 796 (N.J. 1979)). 

The court held that the exclusionary clauses clearly excluded 

“coverage for damages to the insured’s product or work when such 

damages are confined to the product or work and caused by the 

product or work, or any part thereof. It is only damage to other

property arising out of the insured’s product or work which would 

be covered.” Id. at 1280 (emphasis in original). Whether an 

exclusion applies “depends upon the meaning of the insured’s ‘work’ 

which . . . is determined by who the insured is.” Id. “[T]he 

exclusion applies to what the insured or those on his behalf worked 
‐19‐ 

upon or produced.” Id. The court considered whether the insured’s 

“work” was the entire house that he had built, or only the 

footings. It found that coverage was excluded because the insured 

was a general contractor and his work was the entire house. Id. 

at 1280-81; see Sheehan Const. Co., 935 N.E.2d at 166 (noting that 

no coverage existed in DeZutti because “faulty workmanship by a 

contractor was specifically excluded based on the clear and 

unambiguous ‘business risk’ exclusionary clauses”); T.R. Bulger, 

Inc. v. Indiana Ins. Co., 901 N.E.2d 1110, 1115 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2009) (“business risk [of a contractor’s faulty work] is born by 

the contractor and is not insured by a CGL policy”); 

Transcontinental Ins. Co., RTW Indust., Inc., No. 1:02CV01733, 

2004 WL 1638221, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Jun. 30, 2004) (finding insurer 

had no obligation to defend or indemnify insured where CGL policy 

excluded the type of damage caused by insured’s work to insured’s 

product).

The parties agree that the Damage to Your Work exclusion does 

not exclude coverage for damage to other property arising out of 

Finishing Touch’s work. However, they disagree as to whether the 

damages alleged in the underlying lawsuit “are confined to 

[Finishing Touch’s] work and caused by the . . . work,” and thus, 

fall within the Damage to Your Work exclusion. DeZutti, 408 N.E.2d 

at 1280. The application of this exclusion depends upon the 

meaning of Finishing Touch’s “work.” See id. 
‐20‐ 

The Policy defines “your work” in relevant part as “work or 

operations performed by you or on your behalf.” (DE #50-9 at 106.) 

Celina maintains that Finishing Touch’s wiping of the window and 

door frames after spraying the glass with OneRestore was work 

performed by Finishing Touch, and thus, any resulting property 

damage is excluded from coverage under the Damage to Your Work 

exclusion. In support of this position, Celina relies upon 

Alverson v. Northwestern National Casualty Company, 559 N.W.2d 234 

(S.D. 1997). In that case, a masonry subcontractor damaged the 

windows of a residence while trying to clean them after splattering 

them with mortar. Id. at 236. In assessing whether the 

subcontractor’s CGL insurance policy covered the damage to the 

windows, the Supreme Court of South Dakota reasoned: 

[The policy] excludes damage to any property, which 

includes the windows, that must be replaced because 

“your work” was incorrectly performed on it. . . . 

“[Y]our work” is defined in the policy as “work or 

operations performed by you or on your behalf.” The 

window cleaning was “work” done “by” Alverson and his 

employees and it was done as part of the masonry 

contract. While work on windows was not included in the 

masonry contract, it became Alverson’s work to clean 

them incidental to the contract. 

Id. (emphasis added). The court found that the exclusion applied 

and there was no coverage. Id. 

Celina also relies on Lusalon, Inc. v. Hartford Accident and 

Indemnity Company, 511 N.E.2d 595 (Mass. 1987), in which the 

insured was a subcontractor that was hired to install concrete 
‐21‐ 

block at a construction site. While installing concrete block, 

the insured accidentally splattered mortar on an adjacent door and 

window frames. Id. at 596. The insured used a cleaning agent to 

remove the splattered mortar, but failed to properly remove the 

cleaning agent from the door and window frames. Id. When the 

door and window frames were painted, the paint peeled as a result 

of the cleaning agent. Id. The insurer argued that a policy 

exclusion eliminated coverage for property damage to “that 

particular part of any property, the restoration, repair or 

replacement of which has been made or is necessary by reason of 

faulty workmanship thereon by or on behalf of the insured.” Id. 

at 597. The insured maintained that the alleged property damage 

was not part of its work product. The court disagreed. 

“[C]ontrary to [the insured’s] characterization, [the insured’s] 

work did include cleaning up the mortar which its employees 

splattered on the door and window frames.” Id. at 598. The 

Lusalon court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the insurer 

where “[t]he insurance furnished was not intended to indemnify the 

plaintiff for damages resulting because the plaintiff furnished 

defective . . . workmanship in the cleanup and related work.” Id. 

at 599. In both Alverson and Lusalon, the policy exclusions 

applied to the insured’s work on windows, even though the insureds 

had not been hired to do such work. 

Defendants do not address or distinguish Alverson or Lusalon. 
‐22‐ 

Rather, they rely upon DeZutti to argue that the Damage to Your 

Work exclusion does not apply here. They maintain that Finishing 

Touch’s work was limited to glass cleaning because Finishing Touch 

was hired to clean only the glass in the windows and doors of the 

Wendts’ home. They liken Finishing Touch to a subcontractor, whose 

work “is merely a component part of a larger work or product. 

Thus, a subcontractor’s exclusion would be less encompassing and 

any damage to the larger work or item caused by his product or 

work would be damage to other property which would fall outside 

[the business risk] exclusions.” DeZutti, 408 N.E.2d at 1280. 

According to Defendants, the Damage to Your Work exclusion 

should not apply because the alleged damages were not to Finishing 

Touch’s work of cleaning glass, arising out of it or any part of 

it. It is undisputed that Finishing Touch’s use of OneRestore 

removed the spots from the glass in the windows and doors of the 

Wendts’ home, and did not damage the glass itself. Other parts of 

the windows and doors were allegedly damaged, including the window 

sills, frames, caulking and seals. Defendants insist that because 

the alleged damages are not “to” Finishing Touch’s work of glass 

cleaning and are not confined to that work, the Damage to Your 

Work exclusion does not apply. 

Defendants rely on Travelers Insurance Company v. Volentine, 

578 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979), in which the insured 

incorrectly repaired valves in a car, causing the valves to 
‐23‐ 

malfunction and destroy the engine. When the car owner sued the 

insured, the insurer claimed that the “your work” exclusion 

precluded coverage. The Texas Court of Appeals noted that the 

underlying lawsuit between car owner and the insured did not allege 

that the insured “performed work on any part of the engine except 

the valves.” Id. at 504. The court held that because the insured’s 

work was limited to repairing only the valves in the engine, the 

policy afforded coverage despite the “your work” exclusion. Id.; 

see also Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Cat Tech, L.L.C., 660 F.3d 216, 

221 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding “‘your work’ exclusion only precludes 

coverage for damage to that portion of Ergon’s property upon which 

Cat Tech performed repair services, defective or otherwise. It 

does not preclude coverage for any damage to Ergon’s property that 

Cat Tech did not repair or service.”) 

Defendants assert that “it was not necessary for Gallas or 

Finishing Touch to touch or come into contact with any portion of 

the windows or doors other than the glass in order to perform the 

limited service of removing white spots from the glass.” (DE #55 

at 22.) But the undisputed evidence demonstrates otherwise. As 

Gallas testified, “when [Finishing Touch employees] do a windowcleaning job, the water is going to get on the frame, no matter 

what you do. So, they’re trained to wipe off the frame.” (DE 

#50-5 at 7 (emphasis added).) When Gallas instructed the employees 

to use OneRestore, he told them to “clean the window like you would 
‐24‐ 

normally clean the window, squeegee it off and wipe it off, wipe 

off the frames with their rags.” (Id. at 5.) Finishing Touch 

employees also testified that they wiped the frames when they 

cleaned glass, and when they applied OneRestore to the glass in 

the windows and doors of the Wendts’ home. (See DE #50-3 at 7-9; 

DE #50-4 at 6.) When asked what precautions were taken to prevent 

OneRestore from coming into contact with the window frames, sills, 

and cladding, one employee explained, “[w]e just dried it off with 

a towel. Any water or liquid that comes out, we dried it off with 

a towel.” (DE #50-3 at 8.)6

The Policy states that “your work” “[m]eans . . . [w]ork or 

operations performed by you or on your behalf.” (DE# 50-9 at 106 

(emphasis added).) It does not limit “your work” to work that the 

insured was hired to do. Moreover, Indiana courts apply business 

risk exclusions “to what the insured or those on his behalf worked 

upon or produced.” DeZutti, 408 N.E.2d at 1280 (emphasis added). 

Given the undisputed evidence that Finishing Touch’s employees 

                                                            

6 Celina notes that to the extent that the Defendants were to argue 

that Finishing Touch did not work on the window caulking and seals, 

these parts of the windows were encompassed within the framing 

structure of the windows upon which Finishing Touch worked. (DE 

#59 at 6 n.10.) Defendants do not distinguish between the frames 

surrounding the glass and the caulking and sealing, but rather, 

maintain that it was not necessary for Finishing Touch to come 

into contact with any portion of the windows or doors other than 

the glass in order to remove the spots from the glass. (DE #55 at 

22.) As explained above, the undisputed evidence shows that 

Finishing Touch did come into contact with other portions of the 

windows and doors when cleaning the glass. 
‐25‐ 

were trained to wipe the frames surrounding the glass they cleaned, 

and that they wiped off the OneRestore that came in contact with 

the frames, sills and cladding, the Court finds that Finishing 

Touch performed work upon the frames, sills and cladding 

surrounding the glass of windows and doors of the Wendts’ home. 

As such, any property damage resulting from Finishing Touch’s work 

upon the frames, sills and cladding of the windows and doors of 

the Wendts’ home is eliminated from coverage by the Damage to Your 

Work exclusion.7

Celina also argues that the Wendt Defendants’ alleged damages 

to the shingle siding, interior woodwork, painting, and loss of 

use, are excluded from coverage. These damages were not caused by 

OneRestore coming into contact with these parts of the home, but 

                                                            

7 Celina also maintains that the Damage to Your Work exclusion 

applies to the damages to the windows and doors surrounding the 

glass because the damaged parts are “connected together or 

immediately adjacent to each other so as to constitute a collective 

unit.” (DE #50 at 20 (quoting Vinsant Elec. Contractors v. Aetna 

Cas. & Sur. Co., 530 S.W.2d 76, 76 (Tenn. 1975) (finding policy 

exclusion applied to damage to a switchboard because it was “a 

unit composed of many interrelated and interdependent parts”).) 

Defendants respond that an issue of fact exists as to whether the 

glass of a window or door is a single unit with the window or door, 

or a separate item of property. They note that if an insured files 

a claim for a window in which the glass was broken, the Policy 

does not cover the replacement of the entire window; rather, it 

covers the replacement of the glass in the window. (See DE #50-9 

at 65 (Celina “will determine the value of Covered Property in the 

event of loss or damage as follows: . . . d. Glass at the cost of 

replacement with safety glazing material if required by law.”).) 

The Court need not decide this issue because it is undisputed that 

Finishing Touch’s work included wiping down more than just the 

glass in the windows and doors.
‐26‐ 

rather, were caused by the replacement of the windows and doors. 

According to Celina, because the Policy affords no coverage for 

the damages to the windows and doors, there is also no coverage 

for the damages allegedly resulting from the replacement of the 

windows and doors. 

The Wendt Defendants maintain that after Finishing Touch 

allegedly damaged the windows and doors by improperly using 

OneRestore, the windows and doors experienced serious water 

condensation problems. They were advised that replacing the 

windows would be less expensive than repairing them, so they 

replaced the windows and doors. Replacing them “necessarily caused 

damage to siding shingles covering the Home’s exterior, parts of 

the interior woodwork, and other parts of the Home’s interior.” 

(DE #55 at 5 (citations omitted).) The Wendt Defendants sued the 

Gallas Defendants in part “for the cost to repair the parts of the 

Home necessarily damaged by replacing the windows and doors” and 

“for the temporary living expenses while the Home was uninhabitable 

during the repair and replacement process.” (Id. at 6.) Thus, 

the parties do not dispute that these alleged damages were the 

result of replacing the windows and doors. While Defendants argue 

that damages are an issue of fact, the issue before the Court is 

one of law, that is, whether the Policy excludes coverage for the 

damages allegedly caused by replacing the windows and doors. 
‐27‐ 

The Court has determined that any property damage resulting 

from Finishing Touch’s work upon the frames, sills and cladding of 

the windows and doors of the Wendts’ home is eliminated from 

coverage by the Damage to Your Work exclusion. The costs 

associated with replacing the windows and doors are likewise 

excluded under Indiana law. As DeZutti explained, “the costs 

attendant upon the repair or replacement of the insured’s own 

faulty work is part of every business venture and is a business 

expense to be borne by the insured-contractor in order to satisfy 

customers. It is a business risk long excluded by comprehensive 

liability policies.” 408 N.E.2d at 1279; see Sheehan Const. Co.,

935 N.E.2d at 166 (describing DeZutti as “holding that the CGL 

policy did not provide coverage to correct, repair or replace the 

contractor’s own poor workmanship”); Jim Barna Log Sys. v. Gen'l 

Cas. Ins. of Wis., 791 N.E.2d 816, 823-24 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) 

(discussing the allocation of risk in a CGL policy). 

Because the Court holds that the Damage to Your Work exclusion 

eliminates coverage for the claims alleged in the underlying 

lawsuit, that is, claims of damage to the windows and doors of the 

Wendts’ home, and damage attendant upon the replacement of the 

windows and doors, the Court will enter declaratory judgment in 

favor of Celina. 
‐28‐ 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, Celina’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (DE #49) is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED

to enter a DECLARATORY JUDGMENT in favor of Celina declaring that 

under insurance policy number 7114353-0, The Celina Mutual 

Insurance Company has no duty to defend or indemnify Daniel L. 

Gallas, Catherine D. Gallas, and/or Finishing Touch Cleaning 

Service, Inc., against claims asserted by Geoffrey Wendt, Nadia 

Wendt and Windham Bremer as trustee of The Zenonas Puzinauskas 

Daughters’ Family Trust (whether individually or jointly) in case 

number 46D02-1303-CT-508 in the LaPorte County, Indiana, Superior 

Court. 

DATED: January 30, 2017 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge 

 United States District Court