# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 20, 2018

Decided December 21, 2018

Before

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

No. 18-1639

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee

,

v

.

REGINA NANCY HEAVENER, Defendant-Appellant

. Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 16-cr-40051-003

Sara Darrow, J udge

.

O R D E R

Regina Nancy Heavener pleaded guilty to four counts of distributing and conspiring to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, for which she faced a statutory minimum of 120 months’ imprisonment. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A). In the plea agreement and at the change-of-plea hearing , Heavener acknowledged that the court could not impose a sentence below this th reshold unless the government, in its “sole discretion,” made a motion under 18 U.S. C. § 3553(e) based on her substantial assistance. The government did not make su ch a motion at the sentencing hearing, which apparently surprised Heavener and he r counsel. The district court sentenced Heavener to 120 months in prison on each of the four counts, to run concurrently. Although her plea agreement included a wa iver of the right to appeal “any and all NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited onl y in accordance with Fed. R. A pp . P. 32.1No. 18-1639 Page 2

issues related to this plea agreement an d conviction” or any sentence below the statutory maximum (life impris onment), Heavener appealed.

Heavener’s attorney asserts that the appe al is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Heavener did not respond to counsel’s submission, s ee C IR

. R. 51(b), which explains the nature of the case and addresses the issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. Because counsel’s brief appears to be an adequate effort to dete rmine whether Heavener has any non-frivolous grounds for appeal, we limit our review to the subjects he discusses. See United States v. Bey , 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).

Counsel considers whether Heavener coul d challenge the validity of her guilty plea—and thus, the validity of the appeal wa iver in her plea agreement—but properly concludes that doing so would be frivolous. See United States v. Gonzalez , 765 F.3d 732, 741 (7th Cir. 2014). It is unclear whether coun sel discussed with Heavener whether she wishes to challenge her guilty plea, as we require. See United States v. Knox , 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002). But we need not reject counse l’s submission on this basis, for counsel has not identified any ground for challeng ing the voluntariness of the plea, and our
own review of the record convinces us that none exists. See United States v. Zitt , 714 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Konczak , 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012). The district court engaged in the proper Rule 11 plea colloquy, during which it confirmed that Heavener understood the terms of the appellate waiver and ensured that she was pleading guilty of her own free will. See F ED

. R. C RIM

. P. 11. Because the record demonstrates that Heavener knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty, and because the prison sentence does not exceed the statutor y maximum, the near-total appeal waiver is
enforceable. See Gonzalez , 765 F.3d at 741.

Thus, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.