UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

FORT WAYNE DIVISION 

POLLY A. REED, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

 Defendant. 

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Case No. 1:14-CV-080 JD 

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Polly A. Reed was involved in a motorcycle accident on June 20, 2010. She 

experienced trauma to her left leg, which she asserts left her permanently unable to work, so she 

filed a claim for social security disability insurance benefits. The Commissioner of Social 

Security disagreed, finding after a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge that Ms. Reed 

still had the ability to return to her past work or to perform other jobs, so it denied her claim. Ms. 

Reed now seeks review of that decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). For the following 

reasons, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

Ms. Reed was a passenger on a motorcycle that was hit by a car on June 20, 2010. She 

suffered a fractured left tibia, and had surgery to insert a rod in her ankle. She also suffered open 

wounds over her left knee and leg, and underwent skin grafts to treat those injuries. She was 

hospitalized for eleven days. Her condition gradually improved, though she continued to 

experience pain, and her treating orthopedist cleared her to return to work on November 11, 

2010. On June 2, 2011, Ms. Reed filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits, alleging 

that she became disabled on June 20, 2010 due to the injuries she suffered on that date to her 
2 

ankle, leg, and knee, in addition to the high blood pressure, depression, and anxiety that she also 

experienced. After denying Ms. Reed’s application initially and upon reconsideration, the 

Commissioner held a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge on September 7, 2011. Ms. 

Reed testified at the hearing, as did an impartial vocational expert. 

The ALJ issued her decision on Ms. Reed’s claim on January 10, 2013. Proceeding 

through the five steps, the ALJ first found that Ms. Reed had not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity since her alleged onset date. She then found at step two that Ms. Reed had severe 

impairments, consisting of “residuals of a June 20, 2010, motorcycle accident . . . .” (R. 14). At 

step three, the ALJ found that Ms. Reed did not meet or equal any listing, so she then formulated 

Ms. Reed’s Residual Functional Capacity as follows: “[T]he claimant has the residual functional 

capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 414.157(b) except she can never climb 

ladders, ropes and scaffolds and can only occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, 

kneel, crouch or crawl.” (R. 16). Based on that RFC and the testimony of a vocational expert, the 

ALJ found at step four that Ms. Reed was capable of performing her past relevant work. The 

ALJ also considered step five, and found that Ms. Reed was able to perform jobs that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy. On the basis of the step-four and step-five findings, 

the ALJ concluded that Ms. Reed had not been under a disability from June 20, 2010, through 

the date of the decision. (R. 22). The Appeals Council denied Ms. Reed’s request for review, so 

the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.981. Ms. 

Reed timely filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for review of the 

Commissioner’s decision. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Because the Appeals Council denied review, the Court evaluates the ALJ’s decision as 

the final word of the Commissioner of Social Security. Schomas v. Colvin, 732 F.3d 702, 707 
3 

(7th Cir. 2013). This Court will affirm the Commissioner’s findings of fact and denial of 

disability benefits if they are supported by substantial evidence. Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 

673 (7th Cir. 2008). Substantial evidence consists of “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 

401 (1971). This evidence must be “more than a scintilla but may be less than a preponderance.” 

Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). Thus, even if “reasonable minds could 

differ” about the disability status of the claimant, the Court must affirm the Commissioner’s 

decision as long as it is adequately supported. Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008). 

It is the duty of the ALJ to weigh the evidence, resolve material conflicts, make 

independent findings of fact, and dispose of the case accordingly. Perales, 402 U.S. at 399–400. 

In this substantial-evidence determination, the Court considers the entire administrative record 

but does not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute the 

Court’s own judgment for that of the Commissioner. Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 

535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003). Nevertheless, the Court conducts a “critical review of the evidence” 

before affirming the Commissioner’s decision. Id. An ALJ must evaluate both the evidence 

favoring the claimant as well as the evidence favoring the claim’s rejection and may not ignore 

an entire line of evidence that is contrary to his or her findings. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 

881, 887 (7th Cir. 2001). Consequently, an ALJ’s decision cannot stand if it lacks evidentiary 

support or an adequate discussion of the issues. Lopez, 336 F.3d at 539. Ultimately, while the 

ALJ is not required to address every piece of evidence or testimony presented, the ALJ must 

provide a “logical bridge” between the evidence and the conclusions. Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 

471, 475 (7th Cir. 2009). Furthermore, conclusions of law are not entitled to deference; so, if the 

Commissioner commits an error of law, reversal is required without regard to the volume of 
4 

evidence in support of the factual findings. Binion ex rel Binion v. Chater, 108 F.3d 780, 782 

(7th Cir. 1997). 

III. DISCUSSION 

Disability benefits are available only to those individuals who can establish disability 

under the terms of the Social Security Act. Estok v. Apfel, 152 F.3d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 1998). 

Specifically, the claimant must be unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason 

of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in 

death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security regulations create a five-step sequential 

evaluation process to be used in determining whether the claimant has established a disability. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v). The steps are to be used in the following order: 

 1. Whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; 

 2. Whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment; 

 3. Whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals one listed in the regulations; 

 4. Whether the claimant can still perform relevant past work; and 

 5. Whether the claimant can perform other work in the community. 

Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001). 

At step three, if the ALJ determines that the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meets or equals an impairment listed in the regulations, disability is acknowledged 

by the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). However, if a listing is not met or 

equaled, in between steps three and four, the ALJ must then assess the claimant’s Residual 

Functional Capacity (“RFC”), which is defined as the most a person can do despite any physical 

and mental limitations that may affect what can be done in a work setting. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. 

The ALJ then uses the RFC to determine whether the claimant can perform his or her past work 
5 

under step four and whether the claimant can perform other work in society at step five. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). The claimant has the initial burden of proof in steps one through four, 

while the burden shifts to the Commissioner in step five to show that there are a significant 

number of jobs in the national economy that the claimant is capable of performing. Young v. 

Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004). 

Ms. Reed raises four arguments in support of her claim that the ALJ erred in denying her 

benefits. Two of her arguments relate to the ALJ’s credibility analysis, in that she asserts the ALJ 

improperly overemphasized her daily activities and also failed to adequately consider her work 

history. Ms. Reed also argues that the ALJ failed to incorporate the limiting effects of her neck 

and shoulder impairments into her RFC, and did not consider the combined impact of all of her 

impairments. Last, Ms. Reed argues that even if she was not disabled as of the date of the ALJ’s 

decision, she was disabled for at least a 12-month period after her injury, so the ALJ should have 

awarded her benefits for that closed period. The Court addresses each argument in turn. 

A. Credibility 

First, Ms. Reed argues that the ALJ committed reversible error in discounting her 

credibility. Because the ALJ is “in the best position to determine a witness’s truthfulness and 

forthrightness . . . [the] court will not overturn an ALJ’s credibility determination unless it is 

‘patently wrong.’” Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 310–11 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Skarbek v. 

Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 504–05 (7th Cir. 2004)). However, “an ALJ must adequately explain 

[her] credibility finding by discussing specific reasons supported by the record.” Pepper v. 

Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367 (7th Cir. 2013). 

In arguing that the ALJ improperly discounted her credibility, Ms. Reed first argues that 

the ALJ overemphasized her daily activities by failing to acknowledge that she had to take rests 

during the day. However, this argument patently misreads the ALJ’s decision, which referenced 
6 

Ms. Reed’s rest periods multiple times. The ALJ first noted Ms. Reed’s daily activities during 

her step-two analysis, where she stated, “The claimant and her husband both reported that she 

has no problem with personal care (Exhibits 3E and 4E). Consistent with the information in the 

reports, the claimant testified that she cooks daily and does household chores but needs to take 

breaks due to her alleged physical impairments.” (R. 15). The ALJ next addressed Ms. Reed’s 

daily activities during her recitation of Ms. Reed’s testimony at the hearing. The ALJ noted Ms. 

Reed testified that she “can stand for 20 minutes as long as she mostly stands on her good leg 

and then must sit down because she gets tired” and that she “can walk for four to five minutes 

with her cane before she has to rest.” (R. 16–17). The ALJ continued, noting that on a typical 

day, Ms. Reed: 

[H]elped her husband who is an amputee from the motorcycle accident get ready 

for work; did dishes; rested and watched television; and then did housework 

including vacuuming, sweeping and dusting resting 15 to 30 minutes in between 

rooms. One the housework was done, the claimant said that she watched television 

and checked Facebook on the computer to see what her friends were up to. She 

indicated that she started dinner at 3 and then after dinner she watched her husband 

work on their motorcycle . . . . After her husband worked on the motorcycle for half 

an hour, the claimant indicated that they watched television when they returned to 

the house and then went to bed at 9 p.m. 

(R. 17 (emphases added)). Given this discussion, Ms. Reed is simply mistaken in arguing that the 

ALJ “glosse[d] over” the fact that she rested throughout the day and engaged in low-exertional 

activities. 

In addition, Ms. Reed never actually articulates how she believes this alleged error 

affected the ALJ’s analysis. In fact, it does not appear to the Court that the ALJ relied on Ms. 

Reed’s daily activities at all in discounting her credibility or finding that she was not disabled. 

The ALJ’s decision never states that Ms. Reed’s testimony or any other limitations in the record 

were inconsistent with her daily activities. Nor does it suggest that the ALJ extrapolated from 

Ms. Reed’s daily activities that she must have been able to work full time. Accordingly, the 
7 

Court cannot find that the ALJ improperly considered Ms. Reed’s daily activities in any manner 

that would undermine the decision. 

Second, Ms. Reed argues that the ALJ erred in her credibility analysis by failing to 

adequately consider Ms. Reed’s work history. Ms. Reed’s brief states, “[t]he ALJ does not 

mention or analyze Plaintiff’s excellent work history,” [DE 17 p. 15 (emphasis in original)], but, 

again, that is inaccurate—the ALJ discussed Ms. Reed’s work history at multiple points in the 

decision. In considering whether to include any limitations due to Ms. Reed’s cognitive abilities, 

the ALJ noted, “the claimant’s earnings records show that she worked above the level of 

substantial gainful activity at semi-skilled jobs up until the time of her accident.” (R. 20). Then, 

at the step-four analysis, which looks at whether a claimant is able to perform her past relevant 

work, the ALJ extensively considered Ms. Reed’s work history. She discussed that Ms. Reed 

worked as a molder, which she performed at the light exertional level; a machine tender, which 

she performed at the light exertional level; and a short order cook, which she performed at the 

medium exertional level.1

 (R. 20). Therefore, Ms. Reed’s statement that the ALJ did not even 

mention her work history is simply incorrect. 

Thus, what remains of Ms. Reed’s argument is only that the ALJ did not give this 

evidence the weight Ms. Reed would like in evaluating her credibility. Citing Springer v. Colvin, 

No. 1:13-cv-185-WCL, 2014 WL 3075342, at *8 (N.D. Ind. July 2, 2014), Ms. Reed contends 

that she was “entitled to substantial credibility” due to her work history. [DE 17 p. 15]. In 

Springer, the plaintiff had worked for years even while suffering from substantial health 

problems, which the ALJ relied on to conclude that the plaintiff’s limitations must not be 

 

1

 Since her past work was at the light and medium exertional levels, Ms. Reed’s statement that 

she “labored at arduous work almost her entire life” appears quite overstated. [DE 17 p. 14].
8 

disabling. Id. at *7. After noting that the “case is being remanded anyway,” the court criticized 

the ALJ for using the plaintiff’s “‘can do’ attitude” against him and suggested that the ALJ 

reconsider that aspect of the analysis on remand. Id. at *8. As multiple other courts in this district 

have observed, though, “there is no requirement to give ‘substantial credibility’ to a disability 

claimant with a good work record.” Loveless v. Colvin, No. 4:14-cv-36-JVB, 2015 WL 1608808, 

at *4 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 10, 2005); see also Stark v. Colvin, No. 1:14-cv-108-JVB, 2015 WL 

1780066, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 17, 2015) (“[T]he ALJ was not required to single out Plaintiff’s 

work history as a substantial factor in favor of her credibility.”); Hill v. Colvin, No. 1:13-cv-331-

RL, 2014 WL 6984349, at *13 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 10, 2014) (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that 

the ALJ erred by failing to consider her work history in support of her credibility). In addition, 

unlike the plaintiff in Springer, there is no indication that Ms. Reed had to overcome any health 

limitations during the time period that she worked—she does not claim to have had any 

limitations prior to her motorcycle accident, and she has not returned to work since that date. 

Springer thus offers Ms. Reed little support, and the ALJ did not err in declining to single out 

Ms. Reed’s work history in support of her credibility. 

To the contrary, the Court finds that the ALJ’s analysis of Ms. Reed’s credibility was 

adequately supported and was not patently wrong. Notably, other than the general objections 

above, Ms. Reed does not identify any particular statements that the ALJ did not credit but 

should have. In fact, there is rather little of consequence that Ms. Reed testified to or stated in the 

records that the ALJ did not accept. Ms. Reed testified that she used a cane a few times a day, (R. 

31), and the ALJ did not include such a limitation. In explaining why, the ALJ stated, “Despite 

the claimant’s allegation that she needs a cane, as discussed above, Dr. Smith’s most recent 

examination findings indicate that the claimant’s gait is stable and without an assistive device 
9 

and Dr. Wright’s treatment records do not mention either the use of or a need for a cane.” (R. 

19). That explanation mirrored the ALJ’s previous, more general comment that Ms. Reed’s 

statements were “not entirely consistent with or supported by the medical and other evidence,” 

and provided a valid reason for omitting such a limitation. (R. 17). 

Ms. Reed also testified that she could walk for four to five minutes before resting, which 

the ALJ did not include in the RFC. However, the ALJ noted multiple times that Ms. Reed’s gait 

and station were observed as normal during office visits, and she also gave significant weight to 

the reviewing physicians’ assessment, which did not include such a limitation, which shows the 

ALJ’s logic in that respect. In addition, Ms. Reed testified that she could sit for 15 minutes, after 

which she would stand for up to 20 minutes at a time, and the ALJ did not include a sit/stand 

option in the RFC. However, the ALJ expressly found, based on testimony by the vocational 

expert, that Ms. Reed would not be disabled even if she had such a limitation, so omitting that 

limitation could not have impacted the ALJ’s conclusion as to whether Ms. Reed was disabled. 

(R. 19). The Court cannot find that any of these explanations were patently wrong, as would be 

required to reverse the ALJ’s credibility assessment, so it rejects Ms. Reed’s credibility 

arguments as bases for granting relief. 

B. Neck and Shoulder and Other Impairments 

Ms. Reed next argues that the ALJ failed to adequately consider and incorporate 

limitations relative to her neck and shoulder conditions in the RFC. In making a proper RFC 

determination, the ALJ must consider all of the relevant evidence in the record, even as to 

limitations that are not severe. Id. An ALJ must evaluate both the evidence favoring the claimant 

as well as the evidence favoring the claim’s rejection and may not ignore an entire line of 

evidence that is contrary to her findings. Golembiewski v. Barnhart, 322 F.3d 912, 917 (7th Cir. 

2003); Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 888 (7th Cir. 2001). Nevertheless, an ALJ need not 
10 

provide a written evaluation of every piece of testimony and evidence. Golembiewski, 322 F.3d 

at 917. Instead, an ALJ need only minimally articulate her justification for accepting or rejecting 

specific evidence of disability. Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir. 2008); Rice v. 

Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 371 (7th Cir. 2004). 

Here, Ms. Reed first complained of pain in her neck and arm in August 2012, which was 

over two years after her alleged onset date, and less than a month before the administrative 

hearing. There is thus comparatively little evidence in the record about these conditions or about 

what limitations they may impose on Ms. Reed’s ability to work. At an appointment with Dr. 

Wright on August 30, 2012, x-rays of Ms. Reed’s spine and shoulders showed “minimal 

spondylosis at C5 and C6” and “mild glenohumeral degenerative joint disease.” (R. 18, 387). A 

treatment note from September 12, 2012, also references cervical stenosis and radiculitis among 

Ms. Reed’s diagnoses. After reviewing the relevant evidence, the ALJ found that any limitations 

Ms. Reed experienced based on these conditions would be covered by limiting her to light work, 

which the ALJ had already imposed for Ms. Reed’s leg conditions. Ms. Reed argues that the 

ALJ’s explanation of this finding was insufficient, but the Court disagrees, as the ALJ’s 

discussion of the evidence allows the Court to trace her reasoning to this finding. 

Specifically, as the ALJ noted, Ms. Reed’s testimony at the hearing was that she “had a 

sore spot on her right arm.” (R. 17, 45). She did not testify that this soreness caused any 

particular limitations. Likewise, there is little indication in the medical records as to the extent of 

any limitations these conditions imposed, and none of the doctors ever gave Ms. Reed any workrelated limitations for these conditions.2

 The primary findings were that Ms. Reed experienced 

 

2

 Ms. Reed does not argue, and thus the Court does not consider, whether the ALJ should have 

sought further input from medical sources as to any limitations caused by these conditions. 
11 

pain with certain movements, such as extension and right rotation of the cervical spine or 

resistive wrist extension. However, Ms. Reed also testified at the hearing that when she took her 

pain medications—the only side effect of which was dry mouth—her pain went from four or five 

out of ten to one out of ten. (R. 17). Thus, given the limited evidence of any limitations and the 

ALJ’s consideration of the pertinent evidence, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in 

declining to impose any additional limitations based on these conditions. 

Furthermore, the ALJ offered a second reason why these limitations would not need to be 

included in the RFC. Specifically, she found that “[t]here is no indication in the evidence that 

these [neck and arm] issues will be durational, i.e., lasting for twelve continuous months . . . .” 

(R. 14). As the ALJ discussed in connection with the RFC, Ms. Reed testified that she had been 

experiencing neck and arm pain only for the last two months. In addition, the last medical record 

submitted to the ALJ (which was from the same day as the hearing) occurred only three weeks 

after Ms. Reed first reported these symptoms to her doctor.3

 Because a claimant must be unable 

to work “for a continuous period of not less than 12 months” in order to receive disability 

benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), this finding presents an independent reason why the ALJ 

need not have included these limitations in the RFC. See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509 (“Unless 

your impairment is expected to result in death, it must have lasted or must be expected to last for 

a continuous period of at least 12 months.”). If, as the ALJ found, Ms. Reed was not disabled 

before the neck and arm conditions, and those impairments could not be expected to last at least 

12 months, then Ms. Reed will not have met the durational requirement. Ms. Reed does not 

address this finding or present any argument as to why the Court should upset it, so the Court 

 

3

 The underlying conditions are likely not the sort of things that go away, but this inquiry is 

concerned with the duration of the limitations imposed by those conditions, not the conditions 

themselves. Barnhart v. Wilson, 535 U.S. 212, 217–23 (2002). 
12 

finds for both of those reasons that the ALJ did not err in declining to include additional 

limitations in Ms. Reed’s RFC for her neck and arm conditions. 

Ms. Reed also makes a cursory and undeveloped argument that the ALJ failed to properly 

consider the limiting effects of her hypertension, urge incontinence, and hematuria, and thus did 

not consider the combined effects of all of her impairments, as required. The Court finds that any 

argument on this topic is waived for failure to even minimally develop and support the argument. 

Regardless, there is no evidence in the record that any of those conditions imposed any 

limitations whatsoever on Ms. Reed’s ability to work, so there was nothing for the ALJ to 

consider in that respect, and this would not have presented a basis for relief. 

C. Closed Period of Disability 

Finally, Ms. Reed argues that the ALJ erred by failing to consider whether she had been 

disabled for a closed period of at least 12 months, even if she was not still disabled by the time of 

the ALJ’s decision. A claimant need not be disabled as of the date of the hearing or of the ALJ’s 

decision in order to qualify for disability benefits. Masso v. Colvin, No. 1:14-cv-4250, 2015 WL 

3687106, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 10, 2015); Calhoun v. Colvin, 959 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1075 (N.D. 

Ill. 2013) (“It is a fundamental principle in social security jurisprudence that a claimant does not 

need to have a current disability to qualify for benefits.”); Brown v. Massanari, 167 F. Supp. 2d 

1015, 1016–17 (N.D. Ill. 2001). Rather, a claimant is entitled to disability benefits if they were 

disabled for any continuous period of at least 12 months. Jackson v. Astrue, No. 09 C 50028, 

2010 WL 4793309, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 2010); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (defining 

“disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months”). Therefore, even if an ALJ finds that a claimant is 

not disabled as of the date of the decision, they must still consider whether the claimant was 
13 

unable to engage in substantial gainful activity for any continuous period of at least 12 months 

since the alleged onset date. 

Here, Ms. Reed argues that the ALJ erred by failing to consider the possibility of a closed 

period of disability, and that she should have awarded benefits at least from June 20, 2010, the 

date of her accident, through November 18, 2011, when an x-ray showed stable healing of the 

fracture. Ms. Reed is correct insofar as she notes that the ALJ’s decision does not contain an 

express statement that she separately considered and rejected a closed period of disability. 

However, after defining “disability” as the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity 

by reason of any impairments that “ha[ve] lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous 

period of not less than 12 months,” the ALJ found that Ms. Reed “has not been under a disability 

within the meaning of the Social Security Act from June 20, 2010, through the date of this 

decision.” (R. 12). Thus, the ALJ did find, at least implicitly, that Ms. Reed had not been 

disabled for a continuous period of at least 12 months during that timeframe. In addition, the 

decision’s discussion of the evidence in support of the RFC finding makes abundantly clear that 

the ALJ found the RFC to be in effect well within the 12-month period after Ms. Reed’s injury, 

as she relied substantially on evidence from within that period. And because the ALJ found that 

the limitations in the RFC were not disabling for Ms. Reed, it necessarily follows that the ALJ 

concluded that Ms. Reed was not disabled for a period of at least 12 months following her injury. 

The ALJ began her discussion of the medical evidence by stating, “Although the claimant 

suffered severe injuries to her left leg as a result of her motorcycle accident, the medical 

evidence does not support her allegations that the residuals from her injuries continue to cause 

disabling limitations.” (R. 17). On its own, this statement is ambiguous as to how long the ALJ 

believed the limitations continued, but the ALJ then stated, “In fact a November 10, 2010, 
14 

orthopedic re-check note [by Dr. Wright, Ms. Reed’s treating orthopedist] stated that the 

claimant could return to work on November 11, 2010, with regular duties 20 weeks after her left 

knee debridement and placement of the rod in her tibia.” (Id.) The ALJ also noted from that 

treatment note that the examination included normal findings and full left ankle strength, and that 

the x-ray showed that the fractures were healing well. 

The ALJ continued her discussion of the evidence by noting a number of other medical 

records that were dated within the first 12-month period after Ms. Reed’s injury. Ms. Reed’s next 

appointment after November 10, 2010, was on April 18, 2011 with Dr. Smith, her primary care 

physician, during which Ms. Reed reported pain in her ankle. Dr. Smith’s examination findings 

included minimal edema in Ms. Reed’s left leg and a slow gait assisted by a cane, and Dr. Smith 

referred Ms. Reed to a podiatrist, Dr. Bussema. Ms. Reed met with Dr. Bussema on April 22, 

2011. He noted some decreased range of motion, but also noted that the x-rays were normal and 

that the neurological and dermatological findings were normal. The ALJ further noted that Ms. 

Reed did not see Dr. Bussema again after receiving the custom orthotics from him, which 

occurred on June 10, 2011—still within the first 12-month period. (R. 350). In addition, Ms. 

Reed returned to Dr. Smith again on June 17, 2011 (also within the 12-month period), 

complaining only of stress and depression. The ALJ noted that Dr. Smith’s musculoskeletal 

examination findings were normal and that Ms. Reed’s gait and station were normal. (R. 18, 

311). The ALJ also gave significant weight to the State agency reviewing physicians’ residual 

functional capacity assessments. The first of those assessments, by Dr. Sands, was signed on July 

18, 2011, just after the 12-month period. (R. 381). However, Dr. Sands’ assessment was based 
15 

entirely on records from within the first 12 months after the accident.4

 Thus, by giving Dr. 

Sands’ assessment significant weight and by adopting an identical RFC, the ALJ clearly found 

that this RFC had taken effect before the conclusion of the 12 month period. 

Further, although the ALJ also cited several records from outside the initial 12-month 

period, the ALJ did not cite any material improvements after that period that would suggest the 

RFC would have changed. In fact, Ms. Reed argues that the closed period of disability should 

extend until November 18, 2011, because an x-ray taken on that date showed that her ankle was 

stable. Yet, an x-ray taken over a year earlier on November 10, 2010 (when Ms. Reed’s doctor 

cleared her to return to work), contained similar findings (R. 17–18, 321), as did another one 

taken on April 29, 2011 (R. 18, 346). And as noted, the reports of the two agency reviewing 

physicians, on which the ALJ placed significant weight, both predated November 18, 2011, so 

there is no question that the ALJ believed the RFC was in effect well before that date. The only 

evidence the ALJ cited from after the first 12-month period that might have represented an 

improvement in Ms. Reed’s leg conditions was that on August 22, 2012, Dr. Smith noted that 

Ms. Reed was walking without an assistive device, whereas previous notes by Dr. Smith 

mentioned that she was using a cane. However, the ALJ also noted that Dr. Wright, the 

orthopedist, had never prescribed or mentioned the use of a cane. And the reviewing physicians 

did not recommend any limitation for requiring an assistive device, so there is no reason to 

believe that Dr. Smith’s later note affected the RFC. 

 

4

 Ms. Reed had only one doctor’s visit between June 20, 2011—the anniversary of the 

accident—and the date Dr. Sands completed his report on July 18, 2011, and the Commissioner 

did not request those records until August 25, 2011, so Dr. Sands could not have considered 

them in his assessment. (R. 354, 358). In any event, the ALJ’s description of these records was 

that the musculoskeletal findings “were again normal,” (R. 18), indicating that they would not 

have altered the ALJ’s findings as to the initial 12-month period.
16 

These facts distinguish this case from others in which courts in this circuit have reversed 

due to the ALJs’ failures to consider a closed period of disability. In Brown, for example, the 

ALJ had relied heavily on a doctor’s opinion from nearly three years after the alleged onset date. 

167 F. Supp. 2d at 1020. Likewise, the ALJ’s conclusion in Calhoun was “based in substantial 

part on extremely recent evidence.” 959 F. Supp. 2d at 1075. In both cases, it was thus unclear 

whether the ALJ would have found the same limitations during previous periods that may have 

justified a closed period of disability. Conversely, in Fleming v. Astrue, 448 F. App’x 631, 634 

(7th Cir. 2011), the Seventh Circuit found that the ALJ had adequately considered a closed 

period of disability where they relied on medical records and an assessment by a state-agency 

physician from within the proposed period of disability. And in Schumacher v. Barnhart, 196 F. 

Supp. 2d 716, 724 (N.D. Ill. 2002), the ALJ cited substantial evidence from within the proposed 

period in formulating the RFC, and the claimant’s condition had not materially changed over 

time, so the ALJ’s rejection of a closed period of disability was appropriate. 

Here, as just discussed, the ALJ relied substantially on evidence and opinions from 

within the first 12 months after Ms. Reed’s accident. There is also no indication in the record 

suggesting that her limitations changed materially over the time period covered by the ALJ’s 

discussion, which commenced about five months after the accident when Ms. Reed’s treating 

physician cleared her to return to work. Therefore, even absent an express statement from the 

ALJ as to when the RFC took effect, it is clear that she believed that the RFC was in effect 

before 12 months had passed after the accident. Since a claimant must be disabled for a 

continuous period of at least 12 months in order to qualify for disability benefits, Ms. Reed was 

thus ineligible for benefits, and the ALJ did not err by declining to award at least a closed period 

of disability. 
17 

IV. CONCLUSION 

The Court finds that the Commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence 

and was adequately reasoned, so the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s denial of Ms. Reed’s 

claim for disability benefits. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of the 

Commissioner. 

 SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED: August 18, 2015 

 /s/ JON E. DEGUILIO 

 Judge 

 United States District Court