SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-1036-22 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

KARIF FORD, a/k/a KARIF 

H. KING, KHYRE KING, and 

KHY-RE KING, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

___________________________

Submitted on March 6, 2024 – Decided March 26, 2024 

Before Judges Firko and Vanek. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 14-09-2285.

Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Brian F. Plunkett, Designated Counsel, on 

the brief). 

Theodore N. Stephens II, Essex County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Frank J. Ducoat, Special 

Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, 

of counsel and on the brief). 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-1036-22

PER CURIAM 

Defendant Karif Ford appeals from an August 8, 2022 Law Division order 

denying his pro se petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an 

evidentiary hearing. Defendant is currently serving a twenty-year prison 

sentence after pleading guilty to his role in the carjacking at the parking deck of 

The Mall at Short Hills in Millburn, which resulted in the death of Dustin 

Friedland. Defendant contends he is entitled to PCR because evidence was 

improperly withheld from the grand jury, there was an inadequate basis for his 

conviction, and he received ineffective assistance of both plea and appellate 

counsel. After a careful review of the record and decisional law, we affirm the 

denial of defendant's PCR petition for substantially the same reasons set forth 

in Judge Michael L. Ravin's1 thorough, twenty-four-page written decision. 

I.

A full recitation of the facts underlying defendant's plea is delineated in 

our prior opinion on the direct appeal, State v. Ford (Ford I), No. A-5095-17 

(App. Div. Apr. 21, 2020), where we affirmed defendant's conviction and 

sentence. In the interest of brevity, we summarize only the facts pertinent to 

defendant's PCR petition. 

1

 Judge Ravin handled all of the matters referenced in this opinion. 
3 A-1036-22

On December 15, 2013, defendant and three co-defendants, Kevin 

Roberts, Hanif Thompson, and Basim Henry, ventured to The Mall at Short Hills 

with the intention of stealing a car. The group selected a Range Rover in the 

parking deck that was occupied by Friedland and his wife. Thompson and 

Roberts approached Friedland and a struggle ensued. Thompson hit Friedland 

with a gun and then shot him in the head. Thompson and Roberts forced 

Friedman's wife out of the Range Rover and drove the car out of the parking 

garage. Defendant and Henry fled in the car they arrived in. Emergency 

responders took Friedland to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead. 

That night, defendant recounted the details of the incident to his brother, 

who reported what he learned to the police. On December 19, 2013, defendant 

met with detectives who informed him of his rights before proceeding with a 

recorded interview. Defendant provided a detailed account of the incident, 

including the extent of his involvement. 

On September 19, 2014, a grand jury returned Indictment No. 14-09-2285, 

charging defendant, Thompson, Roberts, and Henry with second-degree 

conspiracy to commit carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:15-2(a) (count one); 

first-degree carjacking by purposely or knowingly putting the occupants in fear 

of immediate bodily injury, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(2) (count two); first-degree 
4 A-1036-22

felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) (count three); first-degree purposeful 

and/or knowing murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) (count four); second-degree 

unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count five); and seconddegree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) 

(count six). Defendant was separately charged in Indictment No. 14-09-2286 

with second-degree certain persons not to possess weapons, N.J.S.A. 

2C:39-7(b). 

Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence collected during a search 

of his residence pursuant to a warrant. The judge denied the motion on 

December 1, 2015. 

On October 10, 2017, defendant pleaded guilty to count two, first-degree 

carjacking under N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(2). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the 

State dismissed the remaining charges against defendant and recommended a 

custodial sentence not to exceed twenty years. On January 18, 2018, defendant 

was sentenced to twenty years in prison with eighty-five percent parole 

ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, 

and the remaining counts were dismissed. The judge entered an amended 

judgment of conviction with the parties' consent on April 10, 2018 to properly 

include defendant's jail credit. 
5 A-1036-22

Defendant appealed, arguing his motion to suppress evidence should have 

been granted and he received a sentence that was disproportionate to his 

culpability as compared to co-defendants. On April 21, 2020, we affirmed 

defendant's amended judgment of conviction and sentence. Ford I, slip op. at 1. 

We stated: 

Defendant's sentence was commensurate with the 

serious nature of this carjacking, in which Friedland 

was not merely put in fear of immediate bodily injury 

but was murdered. Defendant's contention that he 

should be sentenced to the lower end of the sentencing 

range for the carjacking offense is patently without 

merit. 

[Id. at 21.] 

The Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for certification. State v. Ford, 

243 N.J. 271 (2020). 

On October 16, 2020, defendant filed a pro se PCR petition arguing that 

the indictment should have been dismissed because the State's grand jury 

presentation was based in large part on hearsay, the State produced an 

unqualified witness to testify as to Friedland's cause of death, and the State 

failed to produce exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. Defendant further 

asserted his conviction should be vacated for prosecutorial misconduct, he is 

entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because the factual basis set forth during his
6 A-1036-22

plea allocution was insufficient, and there is evidence of his innocence. 

Defendant also argued that he only pleaded guilty because of ineffective 

assistance of his trial counsel who told him to plead guilty without first obtaining 

a report prepared by law enforcement and failed to move to dismiss the 

indictment based upon the deficiencies in the State's presentation. Finally, 

defendant argued his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to properly 

assert errors that should have been raised by counsel on direct appeal. 

On August 8, 2022, Judge Ravin denied defendant's PCR petition in a 

comprehensive written decision, finding in part as follows: 

Here, the record reflects, and the parties do not dispute 

that the victim was shot in the head and subsequently 

died. Whether or not the State presented an expert to 

the grand jury about how the victim died would not 

have changed the outcome of the grand jury at all. It 

would not have caused an indictment to not be returned. 

Thus, [defendant] has not shown that barring this issue 

would cause fundamental injustice to him. 

Regarding [defendant's] argument that the State failed 

to present co[-]defendant Roberts'[s] statement wherein 

Roberts states that [defendant] refused to participate in 

the carjacking, the [c]ourt finds that such information 

is not exculpatory. . . . 

. . . . 

[T]rial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a 

motion to dismiss the indictment as such a motion 

would have been futile, for all the reasons the [c]ourt 
7 A-1036-22

explained in the previous section of its opinion. It is 

not ineffective assistance of counsel for trial counsel 

not to file a meritless motion. State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 

601, 619 (2007). 

. . . . 

[Defendant's] prosecutorial misconduct claim could 

have been raised on direct appeal or at an earlier 

proceeding and thus it is procedurally barred pursuant 

to Rule 3:22-4. . . . 

. . . . 

[Defendant] argues that while the individual errors of 

trial counsel may not rise to the level required to

demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, the 

cumulative effect of all his errors led to the deprivation 

of a fair trial for [defendant]. In analyzing each of 

[defendant's] individual arguments, this [c]ourt 

explained its reasons for finding that trial counsel did 

not err. As the [c]ourt finds that trial counsel did not 

err, there is no cumulative effect of such errors so as to 

deprive [defendant] of a fair trial. 

. . . . 

The [c]ourt previously discussed why the deficiency at 

the grand jury and prosecutorial misconduct claims 

were meritless. Thus, the [c]ourt finds that appellate 

counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise these 

meritless claims on appeal. 

. . . . 

Here, there was such overwhelming evidence against 

[defendant] implicating him in the offenses for which 

he was charged via accomplice and co-conspirator 
8 A-1036-22

liability, even though he was not the shooter and did not 

get out of the car. . . . Therefore, [defendant] fails to 

demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that his claim will 

ultimately succeed on the merits, and this [c]ourt need 

not hold an evidentiary hearing to decide this PCR.

This appeal follows. Defendant raises the following contentions for our 

consideration: 

POINT I 

DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO [PCR] BECAUSE 

THE INDICTMENT AGAINST HIM WAS 

IMPROPERLY OBTAINED WHEN THE STATE 

WITHHELD CRITICAL INFORMATION FROM 

THE GRAND JURY. 

POINT II 

DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO WITHDRAW HIS 

PLEA OF GUILTY AS A MATTER OF DUE 

PROCESS OF LAW BECAUSE AN INADEQUATE 

FACTUAL BASIS WAS PROVED FOR THE CRIME 

OF CARJACKING. 

POINT III 

THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DENYING [PCR] 

OR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING BECAUSE BOTH 

PLEA AND APPELLATE COUNSEL RENDERED 

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE WHEN TRIAL 

COUNSEL FAILED TO SEEK DISMISSAL OF THE 

INDICTMENT, FAILED TO CONDUCT NEEDED 

INVESTIGATION, FAILED TO DISCUSS TRIAL 

STRATEGY, AND PRESSURED DEFENDANT TO 

PLEAD GUILTY; AND WHEN APPELLATE 

COUNSEL FAILED TO RAISE ISSUES RELATED 
9 A-1036-22

TO THE STATE'S PRESENTATION TO THE 

GRAND JURY. 

II. 

PCR is New Jersey's response to the federal writ of habeas corpus. State 

v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992). To succeed in obtaining PCR, a defendant 

must "establish, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that he [or she] is 

entitled to the requested relief." State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992) 

(quoting State v. Marshall, 244 N.J. Super. 60, 69 (Law Div. 1990)). 

Where, as in this matter, a PCR court does not conduct an evidentiary 

hearing, we review the PCR court's factual findings and legal conclusions de 

novo. See State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 421 (2004). Determining whether 

counsel's performance was ineffective for purposes of the Sixth Amendment to 

the United States Constitution requires analysis under the standards formulated 

in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984), and adopted by the 

Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). To prevail on a claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must meet the two-prong test of 

establishing that: (l) counsel's performance was deficient and counsel made 

errors that were so egregious that counsel was not functioning effectively as 

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; and (2) the 

defect in performance prejudiced defendant's right to a fair trial such that there 
10 A-1036-22

exists a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. 

"Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are particularly suited for postconviction review because they often cannot reasonably be raised in a prior 

proceeding." State v. Hess, 207 N.J. 123, 145 (2011) (quoting Preciose, 129 

N.J. at 460). To establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

a defendant must present legally competent evidence rather than "bald 

assertions." State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). 

For the reasons that follow, we affirm Judge Ravin's conclusion that defendant 

has not met this standard. 

III. 

 We proceed to consider defendant's argument that an evidentiary hearing 

should have been held on his PCR petition as to his allegations of ineffective 

assistance of counsel at both his plea hearing and on direct appeal. Pursuant to 

Rule 3:22-4(a), we consider defendant's contentions regarding plea counsel's 

deficiency only if we find his appellate counsel was ineffective since, otherwise, 

the issues should have been raised on direct appeal and would be procedurally 

barred at this juncture. 
11 A-1036-22

We agree with Judge Ravin's well-supported conclusion that defendant's 

appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue defendant's contention 

that the indictment against him should have been dismissed. Specifically, 

defendant alleges that the State withheld exculpatory evidence from the grand 

jury which resulted an overreaching indictment that was non-reflective of the 

evidence in totality. 

"Judicial involvement with and review of the grand jury is generally 

limited." State v. Shaw, 241 N.J. 223, 239 (2020). "At the grand jury stage, the 

State is not required to present enough evidence to sustain a conviction." State 

v. Feliciano, 224 N.J. 351, 380 (2016). "As long as the State presents 'some 

evidence establishing each element of the crime to make out a prima facie case,' 

a trial court should not dismiss an indictment." Ibid. (quoting State v. Saavedra, 

222 N.J. 39, 57 (2015)). "An indictment should be disturbed only on the 'clearest 

and plainest ground[s],' and 'only when the indictment is manifestly deficient or 

palpably defective.'" Shaw, 241 N.J. at 239 (alteration in original) (first quoting 

State v. Perry, 124 N.J. 128, 168 (1991); then quoting State v. Hogan, 144 N.J. 

216, 229 (1996)). 

Defendant's claim that he is entitled to PCR because the indictment against 

him was improperly obtained is both procedurally barred and substantively 
12 A-1036-22

without merit. Under Rule 3:10-2(c), a defense based on a deficient indictment 

must be raised before trial. No such relief was requested here. However, 

defendant asserts it proper for us to consider his argument regarding the grand 

jury because the ineffective assistance of both his trial and appellate counsel 

would render a fundamental injustice under Rule 3:22-4(a)(2) if we did not. 

We are unpersuaded and find no merit to defendant's argument that his 

plea or appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to raise the issue of 

exculpatory evidence not being presented to the grand jury. Defendant 

predicates his claims of exculpatory evidence on a December 20, 2013 interview 

between detectives and co-defendant Roberts, which set forth: 

ROBERTS: [Co-defendant Henry] parked so we could 

just look right at the truck. 

[DETECTIVE]: Okay. . . . Do you see [Friedland] 

approaching the car? 

ROBERTS: No, I ain't see nobody approaching the car. 

The lights blinked [indicating the car had been 

unlocked]. 

[DETECTIVE]: Okay. 

. . . . 

ROBERTS: So then I went to go [steal the car], and

[Thompson's] 1ike, come on, let's go get it. And this 

guy right here is like, [n]ah, I ain't doing that sh[*]t. He 
13 A-1036-22

said, [n]ah, f[*]ck that. He's like, [y]ou always scared 

of some sh[*]t, like. 

[DETECTIVE]: So . . . [t]his guy, Karif Ford . . .

 ROBERTS: He – 

[DETECTIVE]: – said he's not doing it. 

ROBERTS: He said, I ain't doing that sh[*]t. And he 

said, f[*]ck that. So then bra is 1ike, [y]o. He's like, 

[y]o, bra, you going to come with me? I'm like, y'all 

just got me all up here. Like, f[*]ck. I said, [w]ell, 

come on, man. I thought we going to take the truck. 

Get the truck. Let's get the f[*]ck out of here. 'Cause 

y'all got me hold – y'all holding me up, like. 

. . . . 

[DETECTIVE]: So Mr. Ford said he wasn't doing it[?] 

ROBERTS: He ain't with that sh[*]t. 

[Emphasis added.] 

We agree with Judge Ravin's determination that this exchange does not 

constitute exculpatory evidence pursuant to the decisional factors set forth in 

Hogan, 144 N.J. at 237-38. A "prosecutor's duty arises only if the evidence 

satisfies two requirements: it must directly negate guilt and must also be clearly 

exculpatory." Id. at 237. "[U]nless the exculpatory evidence at issue squarely 

refutes an element of the crime in question, that evidence is not within the 

prosecutorial duty we have set forth." Ibid. (emphasis omitted). 
14 A-1036-22

The second requirement, that the evidence in question 

be "clearly exculpatory," requires an evaluation of the 

quality and reliability of the evidence. The exculpatory 

value of the evidence should be analyzed in the context 

of the nature and source of the evidence, and the 

strength of the State's case. For example, if the 

exculpatory evidence in question is eyewitness 

testimony, potential bias on the part of the eyewitness 

may affect the prosecutor's obligation to present the 

witness's testimony to the grand jury. Similarly, the 

exculpatory testimony of one eyewitness is not "clearly 

exculpatory" if contradicted by the incriminating 

testimony of a number of other witnesses. Moreover, 

an accused's self-serving statement denying 

involvement in a crime, although such a statement 

directly negates guilt, ordinarily would not be 

sufficiently credible to be "clearly exculpatory," and 

need not be revealed to the grand jury. 

[Id. at 237-38.] 

Evidence which "requir[es] the grand jury to make a credibility judgment" 

is not clearly exculpatory. State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J. Super. 363, 427 (App. 

Div. 1997). We agree with Judge Ravin's conclusion that the "[s]tatements of 

witnesses or co[-]defendants frequently change, are frequently recanted, and 

may be unreliable; therefore, they are not clearly exculpatory." We add only 

that given (1) defendant's admission in his first interview with detectives he 

learned of his co-defendants' plan to steal a vehicle when they entered the 

parking garage for the second time and (2) the overwhelming evidence 

connecting defendant to the location of the shooting and to his co-defendants, 
15 A-1036-22

we see sufficient indication of contradictory information. As a result, the 

singular interview from co-defendant Roberts does not amount to clearly 

exculpatory evidence under our decisional law. 

We decline to disturb Judge Ravin's finding that defendant has not 

established a prima facie case under Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, since even if 

appellate counsel had raised all of the arguments defendant now deems worthy, 

there is no showing the result would have been different in order to warrant an 

evidentiary hearing. An evidentiary hearing is only required where the PCR 

petition has a reasonable probability of being meritorious. State v. Jones, 219 

N.J. 298, 311 (2014) (explaining that when "view[ing] the facts in the light most 

favorable to the defendant," the court should hold an evidentiary hearing if "the 

PCR claim has a reasonable probability of being meritorious"). Judge Ravin 

properly concluded that defendant's PCR petition did not have "a reasonable 

probability of being meritorious" and, therefore, no evidentiary hearing was 

necessary. Ibid. 

The "mandate" that PCR counsel advance all arguments proffered by a 

defendant regardless of their likelihood of success "does not apply to appellate 

counsel." State v. Gaither, 396 N.J. Super. 508, 515 (App. Div. 2007). "[A] 

defendant does not have a constitutional right to have appellate counsel raise 
16 A-1036-22

every non-frivolous issue that defendant requests on appeal." Ibid. Therefore, 

we affirm Judge Ravin's reasoned conclusion that defendant's argument is both 

procedurally barred and substantively without merit, so appellate counsel was 

not ineffective for failing to raise it. As this is the only substantive argument 

defendant presents in his merits brief as to the ineffectiveness of his appellate 

counsel, we concur with Judge Ravin that defendant has shown no 

ineffectiveness on the part of his appellate counsel. 

In light of this analysis, we similarly find no merit to defendant's assertion 

that plea counsel should have moved to dismiss the indictment against him based 

on the same argument that the grand jury improperly returned the indictment 

charging him with carjacking because the State withheld exculpatory evidence. 

Just as appellate counsel was not ineffective for declining to bring this argument, 

we see no deficiency in plea counsel declining to assert a losing argument 

because there was no clearly exculpatory evidence withheld from the grand jury. 

"[C]ounsel is not obligated to raise issues or advance arguments which are 

obviously frivolous or specious." State v. Hughes, 128 N.J. Super. 363, 369 

(App. Div. 1974). 

Based on the above analysis, we further conclude that there has been no 

fundamental injustice inflicted on defendant pursuant to Rule 3:22-4(a)(2) such 
17 A-1036-22

that this court should grant PCR. Accordingly, we affirm Judge Ravin's decision 

not to grant defendant relief based on his assertion that the State withheld 

evidence from the grand jury or that either his plea or appellate counsel was 

deficient for not previously raising this argument. 

IV. 

Since we have affirmed Judge Ravin's conclusion that defendant's 

appellate counsel was not ineffective, defendant's remaining arguments as to the 

ineffectiveness of his plea counsel are procedurally barred under Rule 3:22-4 as 

issues that could have been raised on direct appeal. Defendant asserts that 

preclusion of our consideration of these claims, however, amounts to a 

fundamental injustice under Rule 3:22-4(a)(2). We disagree. Nevertheless, we 

will briefly address each of defendant's arguments regarding plea counsel's 

effectiveness in turn. 

Aside from the claims related to proofs presented to the grand jury, 

defendant sets forth three allegations of ineffectiveness of his plea counsel: (1) 

counsel failed to conduct required evidentiary investigations before defendant 

accepted the State's plea offer; (2) counsel did not discuss trial strategy with 

defendant; and (3) counsel pressured defendant into accepting the State's plea 

offer. 
18 A-1036-22

As to defendant's assertion that plea counsel conducted insufficient 

investigation by failing to seek a report from law enforcement, we substantially 

agree with the analysis set forth by Judge Ravin. There is ample evidence in the 

record that plea counsel did seek out the report, including through motion 

practice. Furthermore, defendant's own certification in support of his PCR 

petition sets forth that his plea counsel made "repeated request[s] for this 

report." We fail to see how this admission lends itself to defendant's claim for 

ineffectiveness and see no further merit in this assertion. 

The analysis set forth in defendant's merits brief intertwines his remaining 

arguments by asserting that failing to discuss trial strategy was part of how plea 

counsel pressured him into pleading guilty. Specifically, defendant asserts that 

but for counsel's undue pressure, he would not have pleaded guilty. 

Our "scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential." 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669. "An attorney is entitled to 'a strong presumption' 

that he or she provided reasonably effective assistance, and a 'defendant must 

overcome the presumption that' the attorney's decisions followed a sound 

strategic approach to the case." State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 578-79 (2015) 

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 
19 A-1036-22

Aside from the assertions that we have already discussed and found 

unconvincing, defendant's merits brief lacks any specific reference to how he 

was pressured by counsel to plead guilty. Without facts to support the argument, 

we conclude there was insufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of 

effectiveness afforded to counsel. In this regard, defendant has not met his 

burden, and we are unable to consider this argument further. We see no error in 

Judge Ravin's determination that defendant has not established a prima facie 

showing of ineffective assistance as to his plea counsel.

V.

We next consider defendant's assertion that he is entitled to withdraw his 

guilty plea because there was an inadequate factual basis to establish he was 

guilty of carjacking. First, defendant is procedurally barred from raising this 

argument on this PCR appeal. Defendant does not argue in his brief that 

appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to raise this issue on direct appeal. 

Thus, defendant’s argument of inadequate factual basis for the crime of 

carjacking is barred under Rule 3:22-4(a)(1) as an issue that could have been 

brought up on direct appeal and was not. 

Even if we were to consider defendant's belated argument, we are 

unconvinced that withdrawal of the guilty plea is supported by the record and 
20 A-1036-22

prevailing law. "A trial judge's finding that a plea was voluntarily and 

knowingly entered is entitled to appellate deference so long as that 

determination is supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State 

v. Lipa, 219 N.J. 323, 332 (2014). A presumption of reasonableness attaches to 

the sentence where, as in this matter, a defendant receives the exact sentence 

agreed upon. State v. S.C., 289 N.J. Super. 61, 71 (App. Div. 1996). 

"An appellate court is in the same position as the trial court in assessing 

whether the factual admissions during a plea colloquy satisfy the essential 

elements of an offense." State v. Tate, 220 N.J. 393, 404 (2015).2 We 

unequivocally disagree with defendant's assertion that his plea colloquy lacked 

2

 Where, as is the case in defendant's PCR appeal, "the issue is solely whether 

an adequate factual basis supports a guilty plea, a Slater analysis is 

unnecessary." Tate, 220 N.J. at 404 (citing State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 157-

58 (2009)). 

[T]rial judges are to consider and balance four factors 

in evaluating motions to withdraw a guilty plea: (1) 

whether the defendant has asserted a colorable claim of 

innocence; (2) the nature and strength of defendant's 

reasons for withdrawal; (3) the existence of a plea

bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal would result in

unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the 

accused. 

[Slater, 198 N.J. at 157-58 (2009).] 
21 A-1036-22

the factual basis to support his conviction. Defendant pleaded guilty to 

carjacking under N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(2), which sets forth: 

A person is guilty of carjacking if in the course of 

committing an unlawful taking of a motor vehicle . . . 

or in an attempt to commit an unlawful taking of a 

motor vehicle he [or she]: 

. . . . 

(2) threatens an occupant or person in control with, or 

purposely or knowingly puts an occupant or person in 

control of the motor vehicle in fear of, immediate 

bodily injury . . . . 

[N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(2).] 

Further, our statutory framework for co-conspirator liability sets forth that 

defendant is unable to deflect culpability simply because he was not the one to 

pull the trigger or drive the Range Rover away from the scene. 

a. A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by 

his own conduct or by the conduct of another person

for which he is legally accountable, or both. 

b. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of 

another person when: 

. . . . 

(3) He is an accomplice of such other person in 

the commission of an offense; or 

(4) He is engaged in a conspiracy with such other 

 person. 
22 A-1036-22

[N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6.] 

On October 10, 2017, defendant testified in part as follows at his plea 

allocution: 

[DEFENDANT]: On December 15th, 2013, I went to 

Short Hills Mall in Millburn to steal a car and it turned 

into a carjacking. 

 . . . . 

[DEFENDANT]: I was part of the agreement to the 

carjacking, where they threatened the occupants of the 

car with force. 

. . . . 

[DEFENDANT]: When we went to steal the car, then 

there was – it turned into a carjacking. 

. . . . 

[DEFENDANT]: My understanding we was going to 

steal a car, not to use force to take the car but that's what 

happened in the process. 

. . . . 

[DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL]: Did certain of 

the occupants of . . . the car that you went [to the mall] 

in, leave the car? 

[DEFENDANT]: What do mean, leave the – 

[DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL]: Leave the car 

that you four went to the mall in? 
23 A-1036-22

[DEFENDANT]: Yes. 

[DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL]: And . . . are 

they the ones that approached the [Range Rover and 

Friedland]? 

[DEFENDANT]: Yes. 

[DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL]: And was that 

done as part of your plan to steal that car? 

[DEFENDANT]: Yes. 

[DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL]: And did these 

people get into a confrontation or a conflict or a fight 

with the person that they approached who was the 

occupant of the [Range Rover]? 

[DEFENDANT]: Yes. For sure. 

[DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL]: And was that 

part of your plan to steal this car? 

[DEFENDANT]: Yes. 

[DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL]: And during the 

course of that was Mr. Friedland shot? 

[DEFENDANT]: I believe yes. 

. . . . 

THE COURT: Has anyone threatened you or pressured 

or coerced you to get you to plead guilty? 

[DEFENDANT]: No. 

. . . . 
24 A-1036-22

THE COURT: Well, is your plea of guilty entirely 

voluntary and of your own free will? 

[DEFENDANT]: Yes. 

. . . . 

THE COURT: Are you yourself guilty of the crime to

which you're pleading guilty to? You yourself. Are 

you guilty of the crime to which you are pleading 

guilty? 

[DEFENDANT]: Yes. 

THE COURT: Has [defendant's trial counsel] 

represented you during these proceedings, met with 

you, explained everything to you, and answered every 

single one of your questions? 

[DEFENDANT]: Yes. 

THE COURT: Are you absolutely satisfied with his 

services? 

[DEFENDANT]: Yes. 

We reject defendant's argument that there was an insufficient factual basis 

to support his guilty plea to carjacking. The plea allocution which set forth a 

factual basis for defendant's participation in the plan to carjack by force 

complies with prevailing law. N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(2); Rule 3:9-2; see also State 

v. Gregory, 220 N.J. 413, 419 (2015) ("The factual basis for a guilty plea can be 

established by a defendant's explicit admission of guilt or by a defendant's 
25 A-1036-22

acknowledgment of the underlying facts constituting essential elements of the 

crime."). Defendant testified he had a plan with co-defendants to steal a vehicle. 

Although defendant asserted he did not think force was part of the plan 

originally, it was his intention that the group steal a car and the resulting 

altercation with Friedland was part of that plan. Ultimately, the plan to obtain 

the vehicle by force through the confrontation was successful and led to the 

death of Dustin Friedland. 

To the extent we have not addressed defendant's remaining arguments, we 

are satisfied they lack sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in this

written opinion, Rule 2:11-3(e)(2). 

Affirmed.