UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

PATRICIA WOJTOWICZ, )

)

Plaintiff )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 2:12-CV-9 

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,1 )

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL )

SECURITY, )

Defendant )

OPINION AND ORDER

Patricia Wojtowicz seeks judicial review of the final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security denying her application for disability insurance

benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423. The court has jurisdiction

over this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). For the reasons that follow, the

court reverses the Commissioner’s decision and remands for further proceedings. 

Ms. Wojtowicz contends that she is disabled due to a learning disability. Her

claims were denied initially, on reconsideration, and after an administrative

hearing at which she was represented by counsel. 

At that hearing, the ALJ considered the documentary evidence presented at

that hearing, and testimony from Ms. Wojtowicz and her mother, and a vocational

expert. Applying the agency’s standard five-step analysis, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520,

1 Carolyn W. Colvin, the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, has been substituted

as the named defendant, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1).

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the ALJ found that Ms. Wojtowicz didn’t meet or equal the severity of any of the

impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, specifically Listing

12.02 (organic mental disorders) (step three). At step four, the ALJ found that Ms.

Wojtowicz had the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at

all exertional levels with nonexertional limitations (she was restricted to unskilled,

simple, repetitive, routine work, involving minimal interaction with others, and

couldn’t work in a highly social or face paced environment with high production

quotas). Based on those findings and the vocational expert’s testimony, the ALJ

found that Ms. Wojtowicz couldn’t perform her past relevant work as a bagger

(step 4), but was capable of performing numerous other jobs that were available

in significant numbers in the national economy given her age, education, work

experience, and residual functional capacity, such as feeder/off bearer, industrial

cleaner, and dishwasher. (step 5). The ALJ thus concluded that Ms. Wojtowicz 

wasn’t disabled within the meaning of the Act, and wasn’t entitled to benefits

through the date of his decision (August 16, 2010). 

The Appeals Council denied Ms. Wojtowicz’s request for review, making the

ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. Jones v.

Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010); Fast v. Barnhart, 397 F.3d 468, 470

(7th Cir. 2005). This appeal followed.

The ALJ’s opinion denying Patricia Wojtowicz’s application employed

boilerplate language in explaining the ALJ’s credibility determination:

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the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably

be expected to cause the alleged reported symptoms; however, the

claimant’s representations concerning the intensity, persistence and

limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible to the

extent they are inconsistent with the above residual functional

capacity assessment herein. Moreover, although the claimant is

alleging disability, the record shows that she is indeed able to sustain

substantial gainful work activity.

Court have justly criticized this language because of its unhelpfulness.

Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 2012); Parker v Astrue, 597 F.3d

920, 922 (7th Cir. 2010). If the sentence means what it says, one must read the

opinion from back to front, first identifying the ALJ’s residual functional capacity,

then looking to the claimant’s testimony, sorting out what supports the finding

(and hence was credible) from what doesn’t support the finding (and hence wasn’t

believed). Brindisi v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d 783, 787-788 (7th Cir. 2003). 

Use of the boilerplate language doesn’t require reversal; courts examine

whether the ALJ points to information that justifies her credibility determination.

See Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 311-312 (7th Cir. 2012); Getch v. Astrue,

539 F.3d 473, 483 (7th Cir. 2008). Still, the likelihood of reversal increases as the

claimant’s credibility becomes more central to resolution of the petition for

benefits. 

Ms. Wojtowicz’s credibility and the inferences her testimony supported are

critical to this case. Ms. Wojtowicz contends the ALJ erred by finding that Ms.

Wojtowicz didn’t have an impairment that met or equaled an impairment found

in the Listing of Impairments (step 3 of her analysis). Ms. Wojtowicz would have

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satisfied that step had the ALJ found that she met the requirements of Listing

12.02(C):

C. Medically documented history of a chronic organic mental disorder

of at least 2 years duration that had caused minimal limitation of

ability to do basic work activities, with symptoms or signs currently

attenuated by medication or psychosocial support, and one of the

following:

* * *

3. Current history of 1 or more years inability to function

outside a highly supportive living arrangement, with an

indication of continued need for such an arrangement. 

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P., App. 1, § 12.02(C). 

Everyone seems to agree that Ms. Wojtowicz fits that listing apart from an

inability to function outside a highly supportive living arrangement, on which the

parties disagree. Nor does disagreement seem to exist as to whether Ms.

Wojtowicz’s mother was providing her with a highly supportive living arrangement.

The dispute surrounds Ms. Wojtowicz’s ability to function outside the environment

her mother provides. On this issue, the ALJ found:

The record failed to show that the claimant is unable to live outside

of a highly supportive environment. Although the claimant lives with

her mother, she is able to work outside the home. She has also been

able to look for work, even if she requires help. 

An ALJ must build a logical bridge from the evidence to the result. See Giles

ex rel. Giles v. Astrue, 483 F.3d 483, 486 (7th Cir. 2007). The bridge from the

evidence to the ALJ’s determination that Ms. Wojtowicz can function outside her

home is difficult to make out. 

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In her brief in this court, the Commissioner understood the ALJ to mean

that Ms. Wojtowicz’s desire to work and regular searches reflect an ability to

function. The Commissioner’s brief sees the assistance she received from a state

agency job coach as further proof: “The fact that a state agency job coach was (and

is) helping her search for jobs, for the past two years, also detracts from her

allegations that she is disabled as it is very hard to believe that any state agency

would expend resources to assist an individual in finding a job if they believed

that the individual was not able to work because of a disability.” (Doc. 18 at 13). 

One can read the ALJ’s explanation as the Commissioner’s brief does, but

that reading creates no logical bridge. One who is neither employed nor receiving

disability benefits has little choice other than to seek work, and state job coaches

ordinarily don’t have discretion to refuse help to such a person. If Ms. Wojtowicz

had a job, her employment might tell us much about her ability to function

outside a highly supportive environment. That she conducts a job search that has

been unsuccessful even with the help of a job coach doesn’t support a finding that

she can function outside that highly supportive environment. 

That Ms. Wojtowicz can look for work tells us something about her ability

to function outside her home, but the record before the ALJ contained much more

evidence about her ability to function. The ALJ found some of that evidence to be

true. 

Evidence in the record indicated that Ms. Wojtowicz was in special

education classes throughout her school years and needed a tutor. Ms. Wojtowicz

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graduated from high school with poor grades. She had difficulty with social

relationships and had no friends. She would lose her temper with acquaintances,

customers, and her mother. The job coach had helped Ms. Wojtowicz with job

applications and transportation to job interviews for two years. She helped her

mother babysit a child. Ms. Wojtowicz testified that she was rarely alone with the

child; her mother said Ms. Wojtowicz handled the solo babysitting “pretty good.”

Ms. Wojtowicz couldn’t make change or handle her own finances; her mother

handled her finances for her. At home, Ms. Wojtowicz could wash and dry dishes

and vacuum, but couldn’t sort laundry, cook a meal, or drive. Her mother helped

her wash her hair. She could walk alone to a local movie theater and walk to a fast

food place on her way home. Ms. Wojtowicz’s mother helped her answer questions

during an interview; the answers that Ms. Wojtowicz personally gave consisted of

sentences of two or three words. 

Ms. Wojtowicz previously worked as a bagger at two grocery stores and as

an aide at a nursing home (she passed out food trays and wheeled residents to

appointments), always part-time. The vocational examiner testified that a person

described in the ALJ’s hypothetical — a 35-year-old high school graduate with no

exertional limitations but who was limited to unskilled, simple, routine, repetitive

jobs with minimal contact with the general public and co-workers, and no fast

pace or production quotas — couldn’t do Ms. Wojtowicz’s past work, but could do

some other jobs. Ms. Wojtowicz’s IQ is somewhere between 75 and 78. Although

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she didn’t claim disability on the basis of her physical condition, she suffers from

cerebral palsy. 

At age 35, Ms. Wojtowicz had never lived independently of her mother. 

Perhaps this record would support a finding that Ms. Wojtowicz can

function outside of her highly supportive home environment, or perhaps not.

Resolution depends on what the fact-finder makes of this evidence and what

inferences the fact-finder draws from it. Resolution might depend on what Ms.

Wojtowicz’s mother meant when describing her daughter’s ability to care for a tenyear-old without supervision as “pretty good.” Resolution might depend on how

long ago, and how well, Ms. Wojtowicz did the grocery bagging jobs the vocational

expert testified she could no longer do. Resolution might depend on whether the

fact-finder saw walking to and from the movie theater as an example of Ms.

Wojtowicz’s ability to handle herself outside the home, or rather as the most

independence she had ever managed to achieve outside the home. 

Whether Ms. Wojtowicz can function outside her highly supported home

environment is a question for the ALJ, not this court. But the court’s job is to

assure that a logical bridge connects the evidence and the ALJ’s finding. The ALJ’s

explanation of her finding is too skeletal for this court to do its job. Remand on

this point is needed. 

Remand is not needed with respect to Ms. Wojtowicz’s other arguments. Ms.

Wojtowicz believes the ALJ committed reversible error by failing to consider the

severity of Ms. Wojtowicz’s physical limitations under Listing 11.07 (cerebral

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palsy). The court disagrees. Ms. Wojtowicz sought disability based only a learning

disability, not any physical impairment; and, although represented by counsel,

didn’t present any evidence of any current physical impairments related or

unrelated to cerebral palsy. The medical records that were submitted included a

report of a May 28, 2008 physical exam at the McAuley Clinic, which showed no

physical abnormalities (AR 259-262), and medical records from Jones Clinic

covering the period from December 16, 1984 to December 18, 1989, that were also

unremarkable. The ALJ considered that evidence in assessing Ms. Wojtowicz

impairments, and found that there was no evidence of any significant physical

abnormalities. The law requires nothing more.

Ms. Wojtowicz contends that the ALJ breached her duty to develop and full

and fair record regarding her physical limitations secondary to cerebral palsy

when the ALJ failed to order a consultative physical examination, and failed to

considered both her physical and mental impairments in determining disability.

Again, the court disagrees.

The ALJ was entitled to exercise her discretion not to order additional

evidence, especially since Ms. Wojtowicz was represented by counsel at the

hearing, who could have requested additional consultation had he thought it

necessary. See Nicholson v. Astrue, 341 Fed. App’x 248, 254 (7th Cir. 2009) (“The

degree of the ALJ’s responsibility to take the initiative [to solicit additional

evidence] is influenced, if not entirely dictated, by the presence or absence of

counsel for the claimant.”); Glenn v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 814 F2d

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387, 391 (7th Cir. 1987) (Where an applicant is represented by an attorney, it may

be assumed that the applicant is making his “strongest case for benefits.”). Ms.

Wojtowicz sought disability based on a learning disability, not a physical

impairment, and didn’t present any evidence of a current physical impairment.

The medical records that were submitted showed no significant physical

impairments. The ALJ considered the impairments that were supported by the

record in determining disability, and the law requires nothing more. 

For all of these reasons, the court REMANDS the case to the Commissioner

of Social Security for further proceedings. 

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: March 29, 2013 

 /s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr. 

Judge

United States District Court

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