2021 UT App 108

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

C.R. ENGLAND AND 

INDEMNITY INSURANCE CO. OF NORTH AMERICA,

Petitioners,

v.

LABOR COMMISSION AND MANSOOR HAKEM,

Respondents.

Opinion

No. 20200181-CA

Filed October 15, 2021

Original Proceeding in this Court

Christin Bechmann and Jeffrey A. Callister, 

Attorneys for Petitioners

Ryan J. Schriever and W. Andrew Penrod, Attorneys

for Respondent Mansoor Hakem

JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and RYAN D. TENNEY concurred.

ORME, Judge:

¶1 C.R. England and its insurer, Indemnity Insurance Co. of 

North America, petition for judicial review of the Utah Labor 

Commission’s order directing it to pay temporary total disability 

(TTD) benefits to Mansoor Hakem. Hakem filed what he styled a 

“cross-appeal” seeking further TTD benefits. We decline to 

address Hakem’s purported cross-appeal because our rules of 

appellate procedure and the relevant statutory provisions do not

allow for cross-petitions in proceedings for judicial review of 

agency action. We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider 

Hakem’s “cross-appeal,” which was filed more than 30 days 

following entry of the final order. On the merits of England’s 

petition, we set aside the Commission’s order directing England 

to pay TTD benefits because the order was not supported by 
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substantial evidence and instruct the Commission to reconsider 

its order consistent with the guidance in this opinion.

BACKGROUND1

¶2 On June 9, 2015, Hakem was injured while working for 

England.2 Hakem then filed a claim with England for TTD

benefits.3 It is not clear in the record, however, when England 

began paying these benefits. On October 2, 2015, England made 

an offer of light-duty work to Hakem, which Hakem rejected on 

October 14, 2015. Despite this rejection, England claims to have 

continued paying TTD benefits totaling $54,510 to Hakem. At 

some point in 2016, it appears that England discontinued making 

TTD benefit payments. Again, the timing of this discontinuation 

is not entirely clear in the record, and this is the focus of 

England’s petition for review.

 

1. “In reviewing an order from the Commission, we view the 

facts in the light most favorable to the Commission’s findings 

and recite them accordingly.” O'Connor v. Labor Comm'n, 2020 

UT App 49, n.1, 463 P.3d 85.

2. Because the crux of England’s petition for review concerns the 

timing and amount of the TTD benefit payments, and because 

we ultimately do not address the issues Hakem raises, we have 

no need to recite all the facts regarding Hakem’s injury and

treatment or the findings made by the medical panel, the 

administrative law judge, and the Commission regarding that 

injury.

3. England also paid over $30,000 toward Hakem’s medical bills,

but because England does not raise any issue with these 

expenses, we do not mention them further.
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¶3 In December 2016, Hakem filed a claim with the 

Commission seeking TTD benefits from June 10, 2015, until the 

date on which he achieved maximum medical improvement. In 

its answer to Hakem’s claim, England asserted that it had 

already paid Hakem $54,510 in TTD benefits, but it failed to 

include any dates for those payments. In September 2018, the 

matter proceeded to a hearing before an administrative law 

judge (the ALJ). During the hearing, England orally affirmed 

that it made TTD benefit payments to Hakem. First, it asserted 

that it paid TTD benefits to Hakem “until he was released at 

maximum medical improvement,” and later it argued that 

“[Hakem] is requesting TTD benefits from June 10, 2015, through 

the present,” even though England “paid . . . these benefits 

through October.” These are the only two references England 

made during the hearing to its prior payments of TTD benefits,

and England did not provide, as far as we can tell from the 

record, any evidentiary support for these assertions or even 

specific dates of payment. All England asserted was that it paid 

benefits through “October,” without specifying a year. To 

confuse matters more, at the end of the hearing Hakem informed 

the ALJ that he was now claiming TTD benefits “from October 

14, 2015, to a date of medical stability.” This time period 

included many months during which England claimed to have

already paid TTD benefits.

¶4 The ALJ then referred the case to a medical panel and 

subsequently denied further TTD benefits to Hakem. In his 

order, however, the ALJ seems to have confused the dates in 

question. The ALJ began the order by first stating, with our 

emphasis, that “[t]he panel’s opinion will assist the Court in 

determining the relevant question of whether [Hakem] retained 

the ability to perform any work after October 2, 2016.” The ALJ

continued, again with our emphasis, that 

[b]ased on the different opinions, the Court 

referred this issue to a medical panel in order to 
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assist the Court in determining whether [Hakem] 

could return to light-duty work or if he was 

restricted from all work at any point after October 

2, 2015. 

The medical panel determined [Hakem] did not 

have a biomechanical impairment in function, but 

he was limited in his ability to function due to his 

pain and required light duty [restrictions] after 

October 2, 2015. . . . Therefore, because light-duty 

work was made available to [Hakem] and he failed 

to accept the work, he is not entitled to total 

disability compensation after October 13, 2014.

¶5 Hakem sought review of the ALJ’s order by the 

Commission. The Commission affirmed the ALJ’s order but 

amended it, sua sponte, in an attempt to fix the ALJ’s apparent

confusion about the operative dates. It stated that the ALJ’s 

decision to deny Mr. Hakem [TTD benefits] seems 

to be based on CR England’s proffer of light-duty 

work on October 2, 2015, and his effective refusal 

of such assignment. [The ALJ] then sought to 

ensure Mr. Hakem’s ability to perform light-duty 

work as of that date by posing such question to the 

medical panel, but erroneously describing the date 

as 2016 rather than 2015. Despite this error, [the 

ALJ] relied on the panel’s opinion that Mr. Hakem 

could work light duty as evidence that the proffer 

of such work from CR England was appropriate.

The parties have not attempted to bring 

these errors to light on review. Instead their 

present dispute focuses on the medical panel’s 

conclusions. 

The Commission further explained:
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After considering the evidence on this point, the 

Commission agrees with [the ALJ] that Mr. Hakem 

has not established entitlement to [TTD] benefits 

beginning October 14, 2015, as CR England had 

made a proffer of light-duty work to him by that 

date. However, Mr. Hakem is entitled to [TTD]

benefits for certain periods during which he was 

not able to perform even light-duty work.

¶6 The Commission concluded, after reviewing Hakem’s 

medical records, that Hakem was released from all work by his 

doctor on February 3, 2016, and then released only for light-duty 

work on June 15, 2016. The Commission thus ordered England to 

pay Hakem $14,899.40 in TTD benefits for that February-to-June 

time period. England then filed a request for the Commission to 

reconsider its order, arguing that its decision to award TTD 

benefits to Hakem from February 3, 2016, to June 14, 2016, was 

“not supported by sufficient evidence” and “erroneously sets 

aside [the] findings of . . . [the ALJ] based on a typographical 

error.” On January 29, 2020, the Commission denied the motion,

stating that substantial evidence existed from Hakem’s medical 

records to show that Hakem was released from all work from 

February 3, 2016, to June 14, 2016, and should receive benefits for 

that time period.

¶7 On February 26, 2020, within 30 days of the Commission’s 

final order, England filed a petition for review in this court.

Hakem then purported to file a “cross-appeal” on March 5, 2020, 

asserting error with the ALJ’s and the Commission’s decisions

regarding the offer for light-duty work and the denial of further 

benefits on that basis.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶8 Hakem raises multiple issues in his cross-petition. But we 

must first determine whether we have jurisdiction to consider 
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the petition. “Questions about appellate jurisdiction are

questions of law.” See Zion Village Resort LLC v. Pro Curb U.S.A.

LLC, 2020 UT App 167, ¶ 21, 480 P.3d 1055 (quotation 

simplified). And because we determine that we lack jurisdiction

to consider it, we are required to dismiss Hakem’s petition. See 

id.

¶9 England asserts that the Commission erred in granting 

TTD benefits to Hakem for the period of February 3, 2016, to 

June 14, 2016, because England had already paid those benefits 

to Hakem, resulting in Hakem receiving a double benefit.

Because this is a factual issue, we review the Commission’s order 

for substantial evidence. Utah Am. Energy Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 

2021 UT App 33, ¶ 12, 484 P.3d 1195. “A decision is supported 

by substantial evidence if there is a quantum and quality of 

relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind 

to support a conclusion.” Ivory Homes, Ltd. v. Utah State Tax

Comm'n, 2011 UT 54, ¶ 11, 266 P.3d 751 (quotation simplified).

ANALYSIS

I. Jurisdiction Over Hakem’s Cross-Appeal

¶10 The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) governs 

judicial review of state agency action. See Utah Code Ann. 

§§ 63G-4-101 to -601 (LexisNexis 2018). UAPA states that “[a] 

party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency 

action within 30 days after the date that the order constituting 

the final agency action is issued[.]” Id. § 63G-4-401(3)(a). And 

“[t]o seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from 

formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a 

petition for review of agency action with the appropriate

appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the 

appropriate appellate court.” Id. § 63G-4-403(2)(a). Rule 14 of the 

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, in turn, states that “[w]hen a 

statute provides for judicial review by or appeal to the Supreme 
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Court or the Court of Appeals of an order or decision of an 

administrative agency, . . . a party seeking review must file a 

petition for review . . . within the time prescribed by statute[.]”

Utah R. App. P. 14(a). Rule 18 further directs that “[a]ll 

provisions” of the rules of appellate procedure “are applicable to 

review of decisions or orders of agencies, except that Rules 3 

through 8 are not applicable.” Id. R. 18. Thus, rule 4, which 

allows parties to cross-appeal in appeals arising from judicial

proceedings, does not apply to proceedings for review of agency 

decisions. See id. R. 4(d); Watson v. Labor Comm'n, 2020 UT App 

170, ¶ 1 n.1, 480 P.3d 353 (noting that “because the rules of 

appellate procedure do not allow for a cross-petition in the 

administrative context, akin to a cross-appeal in a judicial 

proceeding, each party must file its own petition for review if 

they both wish to contest the administrative agency’s ruling”).

We note that UAPA likewise does not contain a provision 

allowing cross-petitions. Instead, it directs that parties shall file 

petitions for review within 30 days of an agency’s final order. See 

Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401(3)(a).

¶11 Thus, parties wishing to challenge any part of an agency 

decision governed by UAPA must file their own petition for 

review within 30 days of the agency’s final order. See id.; Utah R. 

App. P. 14(a). And “[w]e cannot infer a right to file a

cross-petition within an additional period of time where the 

Utah Legislature did not include such a provision in UAPA,”

Viktron/Lika Utah v. Labor Comm'n, 2001 UT App 8, ¶ 7, 18 P.3d 

519, particularly given that our rules expressly exclude the 

availability of that procedural tool, see Utah R. App. P. 18.

¶12 In this case, the Commission’s order became final on 

January 29, 2020, when it denied England’s motion for 

reconsideration. Both parties then had 30 days to file a petition 

for review with this court. England timely filed its petition for 

review on February 26. Hakem, on the other hand, did not file a 

petition for review within that 30-day window. Rather, he filed a 
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“cross-appeal” on March 5. And, as noted above, our caselaw, 

the applicable rules, and UAPA clearly indicate that crossappeals or cross-petitions are not available when we review 

agency action.4 See Watson, 2020 UT App 170, ¶ 1 n.1; Viktron/Lika

Utah, 2001 UT App 8, ¶ 7. Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to 

consider Hakem’s cross-petition. And even if we were to 

construe it as a petition for review under the statute, see 

Viktron/Lika Utah, 2001 UT App 8, ¶ 8 (“We may construe a filing 

with this court according to its content, regardless of its 

caption.”), we would nonetheless lack jurisdiction to consider 

the issues raised because it was filed outside the 30-day 

deadline.5 Therefore, we are required to dismiss Hakem’s cross-

 

4. We acknowledge this court’s role in Hakem’s confusion on his 

ability to file a “cross-appeal,” as we accepted his briefs and 

even charged and collected a cross-appeal filing fee. We 

permitted the “cross-appeal” to move along until it was placed 

with a panel for resolution on its merits. We regret our failure to 

detect the problem sooner, and we should have dismissed the 

“cross-appeal” before the parties spent time and resources in 

briefing it. But ultimately, mistakes on a court’s part cannot 

overcome a lack of jurisdiction. See In re adoption of Baby E.Z., 

2011 UT 38, ¶ 25, 266 P.3d 702 (“Because subject matter

jurisdiction goes to the heart of a court’s authority to hear a case, 

it is not subject to waiver and may be raised at any time[.]”) 

(internal citations omitted). We will direct our clerk of court to 

refund the cross-appeal filing fee charged to Hakem because it 

was improvidently collected.

5. At oral argument before this court, Hakem asserted that 

because UAPA grants us “jurisdiction to review all final agency 

action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings,” see Utah 

Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(1) (LexisNexis 2018) (emphasis added), 

and because England filed a petition for review within 30 days, 

we have jurisdiction over the issues Hakem raises because they 

(continued...)
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petition.6 See Barney v. Division of Occupational & Pro. Licensing, 

828 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (“If the court concludes 

 

(...continued)

were dealt with in the Commission’s order. This is an expansive 

view of jurisdiction that we cannot adopt. In essence, Hakem is 

asserting that once a party files a petition for review of an agency 

action, the opposing party has unlimited time to raise issues of 

its own because that first petition vested the court with plenary 

jurisdiction over all aspects of the agency’s ruling. This does not 

comport with UAPA, which requires parties to file their petitions 

for review within 30 days, see id. § 63G-4-401(3)(a), and we see 

nothing in the statute, applicable rules, or caselaw that would 

allow for this expansive approach to our jurisdiction.

6. We do, however, renew our concern with the current statutory 

and rule-based scheme in place for judicial review of agency 

action. We see wisdom in a rule, akin to what exists in an appeal 

from a judicial proceeding, that allows for cross-petitions in 

proceedings for judicial review of agency action. Not only would 

this increase judicial efficiency, as we recently explained in 

Watson v. Labor Commission, 2020 UT App 170, ¶ 1 n.1, 480 P.3d 

353, it would also undoubtedly benefit the parties in these 

situations. For example, after an order has been issued by an 

agency, one side may not be completely satisfied with the order 

but may be satisfied enough that it does not believe it worth the 

trouble to file a petition for review and pursue further 

proceedings just to fine tune the decision substantially in its 

favor. But if the opposing party files a petition for review and 

the substantially prevailing party is to find itself before the 

appellate court anyway, that party should have the opportunity 

to raise issues in a cross-petition. This is the very logic that 

permits cross-appeals in the context of judicial proceedings, and 

we can think of no reason why that procedure would not work 

as well in the administrative review context. We therefore 

(continued...)
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that it does not have jurisdiction, it retains only the authority to 

dismiss the action.”) (quotation simplified).

¶13 At oral argument before this court, Hakem, citing Hamer

v. Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13 (2017), 

argued that our procedural rules that explicitly do not allow for 

cross-petitions cannot dictate jurisdiction in our review of 

agency proceedings. See Utah R. App. P. 4, 14, 18. Even aside 

from the fact that UAPA itself requires parties to file a petition 

within 30 days and does not provide a party with the possibility 

of a cross-petition, this argument is unavailing for two 

additional reasons. 

¶14 First, UAPA directs that parties petitioning for review 

must file a petition “with the appropriate appellate court in the 

form required by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate 

court.” Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(2)(a) (emphasis added). 

Thus, the statute that grants this court jurisdiction over these 

reviews also grants the Supreme Court the ability to control that 

jurisdiction through its rules. Hamer clearly does not apply as it 

dealt with jurisdiction in the federal context, see 138 S. Ct. at 17

(“Only Congress may determine a lower federal court’s

subject-matter jurisdiction.”) (emphasis added) (quotation 

otherwise simplified), and not in a state context where the state 

legislature grants a court the authority to manage jurisdiction 

through its own rules.

 

(...continued)

believe our Supreme Court should direct its Advisory 

Committee on the Rules of Appellate Procedure to consider

amendments to the applicable rules that would enable parties in 

administrative proceedings to file cross-petitions. And to the 

extent that statutory changes are needed to effect such a change, 

appropriate statutory amendments should also be considered by 

our Legislature.
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¶15 Second, our Supreme Court has held that the applicable 

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure have “jurisdictional effect.” 

State v. Lara, 2005 UT 70, ¶ 12, 124 P.3d 243 (quotation 

simplified). Specifically, deadlines for filing notices of appeal are 

“jurisdictional in nature.” State v. Collins, 2014 UT 61, ¶ 22, 342 

P.3d 789 (quotation simplified). The same is true for petitions for 

judicial review, and courts are “depriv[ed] . . . of jurisdiction” 

when petitions for review are untimely filed. Union Pacific R.R.

Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2000 UT 40, ¶ 25, 999 P.2d 17. See 

also Ortega v. Ridgewood Estates LLC, 2016 UT App 131, ¶ 30, 379 

P.3d 18 (“We are bound by vertical stare decisis to follow strictly 

the decisions rendered by the Utah Supreme Court.”) (quotation 

simplified).

¶16 For these reasons, we dismiss Hakem’s cross-appeal for 

lack of jurisdiction.

II. TTD Benefits

¶17 England’s main argument7 asserted in its timely petition 

for review is that the Commission erred, not because it 

 

7. England raises two additional issues. First, it asserts that the 

Commission’s order was arbitrary and capricious because the 

Commission “raised the typographical error without involving 

the parties or taking the time to verify whether the period was 

even in dispute.” Because we instruct the Commission to 

reconsider its decision on the basis that its order was not 

supported by substantial evidence, giving it the opportunity to 

remedy any error, we have no need to address this ancillary 

issue. 

 Second, England asserts its due process rights were violated 

when the Commission corrected the ALJ’s order sua sponte. We 

briefly address this issue because it may arise again if the 

Commission finds that England did not make the payments it 

(continued...)
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determined that Hakem was entitled to TTD benefits, but

because it awarded a double benefit to Hakem by requiring 

England to pay a second round of TTD benefits for the period 

from February 3, 2016, to June 14, 2016. There clearly was 

confusion on the part of the ALJ, and possibly on the part of the 

Commission, concerning the dates relevant to Hakem’s 

entitlement to benefits. We will not directly wade into that 

debate because England has asserted on review that “[i]n the 

end . . . the dates do not matter because it does not change the 

outcome of the case, specifically, [England] had already paid 

sixty-nine weeks of TTD.”

¶18 In the proceedings before the Commission, however, 

there was scant evidence of these payments. England directs us 

to only two locations in the record, and we are unaware of any 

 

(...continued)

claims to have made and reinstates its original order. See State v.

Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 61, 192 P.3d 867 (stating that when “there are 

other issues presented on appeal that will likely arise” on 

remand, we may “exercise our discretion to address those issues 

for purposes of providing guidance on remand”).

 We disagree with England that the Commission erred in 

fixing a typographical error sua sponte. Pursuant to Utah Code 

section 34A-2-420(1), the Commission is granted “continuing” 

jurisdiction over each case before it and “may from time to time 

modify or change a former finding or order of the commission.” 

Furthermore, our Supreme Court has held that “the power of the 

Commission as to its continuing jurisdiction . . . is extended to 

the right to rescind, alter, or amend orders, decisions, or awards 

on good cause appearing therefor.” Frito-Lay v. Utah Labor

Comm'n, 2009 UT 71, ¶ 25, 222 P.3d 55 (quotation simplified). 

Thus, the Commission has the prerogative to adjust awards and 

correct mistakes, and it did not violate England’s due process 

rights in attempting to correct the mistakes it saw here. 
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others, where it provided “evidence” of these payments. It first 

cites its answer to Hakem’s claim for benefits in which it simply 

asserted that it had already paid $54,510 in TTD benefits to 

Hakem from the date of the injury. Second, it cites its assertions 

in the hearing before the ALJ when it claimed that it paid TTD 

benefits to Hakem “until he was released at maximum medical 

improvement” and that “[Hakem] is requesting TTD benefits 

from June 10, 2015, through the present,” even though it “paid 

. . . these benefits through October.” England did not submit any 

documents substantiating these assertions, and neither the ALJ 

nor the Commission made any findings premised on England’s 

assertions.

¶19 On review, England claims that it “submitted the 

undisputed summary of benefits paid showing [it] had paid 

Hakem $54,510 in [TTD benefits].” But then to back up this 

claim, England cites its answer to Hakem’s claim and nothing 

else, let alone a location in the record where we might find the 

“summary of benefits” it allegedly paid. Nor is such a summary 

attached as an exhibit to its answer. England then contends that 

we can derive the dates of the payments through simple math. 

Hakem was entitled to $790 per week in TTD benefits. By taking 

the $54,510 England asserts it paid and dividing it by $790,

Hakem received sixty-nine weeks of payments. And sixty-nine 

weeks from June 9, 2015, ends on October 4, 2016. Thus, England

claims that it clearly made payments to Hakem during the 

period of February 3, 2016, to June 14, 2016, and that the 

Commission ordered it to pay duplicative TTD benefits to 

Hakem for that period.

¶20 While the math appears to be correct, on review we are 

unable to directly grant the relief England seeks because of the 

evidentiary gaps in the record regarding these payments. First, 

there is no evidence of when England actually began making 

payments to Hakem; it could have been the exact day of 

Hakem’s injury, as England claims, but we cannot determine 
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that and have no way of knowing on which dates England 

actually made payments. Second, and most importantly, there 

simply is nothing in the record to substantiate England’s specific 

claim that it paid a total of $54,510 in TTD benefits. There are no 

documents in the record detailing what Hakem received and

when. England is essentially asking us to make a finding, 

without any substantive record evidence, that it made the 

payments during the disputed time period and then direct the 

Commission to rescind its order requiring England to make 

additional payments. This is something we typically will not do.

See Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997) (“If the

appellate court determines that the findings of fact are

insufficient to support the conclusion, the appellate court 

normally remands the matter . . . for further proceedings.”).

¶21 But we do recognize the basic merit of England’s 

complaint and set aside the Commission’s order because it is 

not, so far as we can ascertain, supported by substantial 

evidence. The Commission ordered England to pay 

approximately 18 weeks of TTD benefits, and there is some 

indication in the record that England had already made 

payments applicable to that time period. Thus, we set the 

Commission’s order aside and instruct it to determine whether 

England had already made TTD payments from February 3, 

2016, to June 14, 2016, as England claimed before the ALJ. The 

Commission is to ensure that no payments it required England 

to make were duplicative. If England did, in fact, already make 

these payments during that time period, then the Commission 

shall decline to award Hakem any further TTD benefits. If the 

Commission finds that England did not make those payments, 

or at least did not make all of them, then it can simply reinstate 

or adjust its original order, as appropriate.
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CONCLUSION

¶22 Because UAPA and our rules of appellate procedure do 

not allow for cross-petitions in proceedings for judicial review of 

agency action, we do not have jurisdiction to consider Hakem’s 

“cross-appeal,” and we have no option other than to dismiss it. 

On the merits of England’s petition, we set aside the 

Commission’s order on the ground that it is not supported by 

substantial evidence and direct the Commission to determine 

whether England has already paid Hakem all TTD benefits to 

which he is entitled.