1

Filed 6/10/13 In re Megan G. CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re MEGAN G., et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

CONTRA COSTA CHILDREN & 

FAMILY SERVICES BUREAU,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

HEATHER G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A134922

 (Contra Costa County

 Super. Ct. Nos. J1100593 & J1100594)

Heather G. appeals from juvenile court orders taking jurisdiction over her two 

children under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. She contends the court erred 

in overruling her demurrer to the petitions, and abused its discretion and violated her 

constitutional rights by unduly limiting cross-examination of her daughter. She further 

contends there was insufficient evidence to support the petitions.1 We affirm. 

 

1 Anticipating certain arguments would be raised by respondent, appellant 

additionally urges that if trial counsel failed to adequately preserve her claims regarding 

limitations on cross-examination, she received ineffective assistance of counsel. As 

respondent has expressly chosen not to raise the claims appellant anticipated, we need not 

address her ineffective assistance of counsel arguments.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

On April 6, 2011, the Contra Costa County Bureau of Children and Family 

Services (―Bureau‖) filed petitions alleging that Megan G. and Matthew G., then 11 and 

15 years old, respectively, came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 300.2 As subsequently amended,3both petitions alleged failure to protect under 

section 300, subdivision (b), in that appellant had failed to protect the child from 

appellant‘s live-in boyfriend Glenn E., ―who has physically and emotionally abused the 

child on an ongoing basis for at least three years.‖ Megan‘s petition alleged under 

section 300, subdivision (d), that Megan had been sexually molested in appellant‘s home 

by Glenn ―on at least three occasions over a two year period including touching her 

vagina with his hand and penis, touching her breasts and trying to get the child to touch 

his penis‖ (allegation d-1) and that appellant had failed to protect Megan from ongoing 

sexual abuse by Glenn in that despite being told by Megan that Glenn had touched her 

inappropriately, appellant did not believe Megan and failed to take any action to prevent 

further abuse (allegation d-2). Megan‘s petition additionally alleged under section 300, 

subdivision (d), that Megan was at risk of sexual abuse in appellant‘s home in that 

Matthew ―touched the child on her vagina on at least one occasion in December 2010 

while at her father‘s home and the child‘s mother refuses to believe the child‘s 

 

2

Further statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless 

otherwise specified.

3

The Bureau filed amended petitions as to both children on June 17, followed on 

June 20 by an additional amended petition as to Megan adding the allegations of sexual 

touching by Matthew.

The original petition concerning Megan alleged failure to protect under 

section 300, subdivision (b), in that appellant‘s boyfriend ―inappropriately touched‖ 

Megan in or about December 2008, and ―on two other occasions,‖ and Megan told 

appellant approximately one year prior to the filing of the petition but appellant did not 

take appropriate steps to protect Megan. The same facts were alleged under section 300, 

subdivision (d), to show that appellant had failed to protect Megan adequately from 

sexual abuse and that appellant knew or reasonably should have known Megan was in 

danger of sexual abuse. Matthew‘s petition alleged these same facts under section 300, 

subdivision (j), sibling abuse. 
3

disclosure.‖ Matthew‘s petition repeated the allegations concerning Megan‘s sexual 

abuse by Glenn to establish jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (j), based on 

sibling abuse. 

The case came to the Bureau‘s attention on April 1, 2011, when Megan‘s school 

principal contacted the police after Megan‘s school bus driver (who was also her 

neighbor) reported Megan having told her that appellant‘s boyfriend had touched 

Megan‘s breasts and genital area and that Matthew had also touched her sexually. In an 

interview that day, Megan told Detective Hart that in December 2008, while she was 

showering in Glenn‘s bathroom, Glenn came in wearing pajama bottoms but was naked 

when she got out of the shower. She had her arms clenched over her chest and he ―tried 

to pry her arms to make her touch his penis,‖ as well as touching her vagina with his 

hands and penis. In two other ―  ̳less severe‘ ‖ incidents, Glenn touched her chest and 

vaginal area over her clothes while she was doing homework at the computer and told her 

not to tell her mother. Megan said that she had told appellant about the shower incident 

about a year before, while they were watching a Dr. Phil show on the topic of telling 

someone if something inappropriate happened, and appellant believed her. Megan asked 

appellant not to discuss what she said with Glenn because ―they had nowhere else to go.‖ 

Megan also told the police that Matthew touched her on three occasions when they were 

visiting their father. Most recently, in December 2010, when Megan was sleeping on the 

living room couch and Matthew on the floor, he called her to the floor, put his hands 

down her pajama bottoms and touched her vagina. 

Officer Gillespie, who was present during this interview, noted that Megan was 

tearful and had difficulty speaking about what had happened to her, and that her 

statement was very detailed and stayed consistent when she was questioned. After the 

interview, Megan asked to talk appellant, who came into the office, sat across from 

Megan, crossed her arms and legs and said, ―  ̳What‘s going on.‘ ‖ Megan told her what 

she had told the police about Glenn and when appellant did not respond, Megan said, 

―  ̳Remember mom when I told you about when [Glenn] had touched me after I got out of 

the shower.‘ Mother said,  ̳You didn‘t tell me THAT.‘ Megan said  ̳Yes, I did. 
4

Remember, when we were watching Dr. Phil and he said that we should not be afraid to 

tell our parents if something bad was happening. I told you, you sent Matt out of the 

room and talked with me about it. But then you didn‘t do anything about it. Why didn‘t 

you do anything about it?‘ ‖ Megan began to cry; appellant kept her arms crossed and 

made an exhaling noise that made it clear she did not believe Megan. Appellant asked 

Gillespie what would happen now, hugged Megan once and left the room. Officer 

Gillespie found appellant‘s interaction with Megan ―uncharacteristically cold and harsh,‖ 

as she did not attempt to comfort the ―visibly sobbing‖ child. 

Officer Gillespie reported that appellant told him she had been with Glenn for 

10 years and lived with him since 2004; tensions were high because Glenn was difficult 

to live with and the children did not like him because he made them do chores and took 

away privileges. Appellant had recently returned to school in order to get a job and be 

able to move out of Glenn‘s house. She left the children with Glenn when she was at 

school, and on Tuesday evenings Megan stayed home with Glenn while appellant took 

Matthew to Boy Scouts. Megan never voiced concern about staying home alone with 

Glenn. Megan did not usually spend much time with Glenn and was not usually nice to 

him, but would say good morning or good night and sometimes hugged him. 

Appellant recalled that about a year before, while she was in the living room with 

Megan and Matthew, Megan complained about being touched by Glenn. Appellant asked 

her to describe what she was talking about but Megan had no description. Appellant 

looked at Matthew and ―they both shook their heads and said,  ̳No, he would never do 

that,‘ ‖ and Megan did not bring it up again. When the officer pressed for details, 

appellant became defensive and insisted Glenn had never molested Megan. Appellant 

said that she had been a victim of molest as a child and would ―  ̳[n]ever let her children 

stay in a house where they were in danger.‘ ‖ She said that she and Glenn allow the 

children privacy to shower and that Glenn helped her discipline the children but did not 

spank or physically discipline them. Appellant thought Megan might have made the 

accusations because she was angry with Glenn for grounding her. Officer Gillespie noted 
5

that appellant was so quick to defend herself or Glenn that it appeared she was not 

considering whether there was a possibility Megan‘s accusation could be true. 

As related in the Bureau‘s report, appellant told Detective Hart that she did not 

follow up when Megan told her about Glenn touching her inappropriately, saying Megan 

gave ―  ̳vague information, which did not sound credible.‘ ‖ Appellant said she wanted to 

end her relationship with Glenn but had nowhere else to go because he was the 

breadwinner, and that she had no knowledge of inappropriate touching by Matthew. 

One of Megan‘s friends told Officer Gillespie that Megan often said how much 

she dislikes Glenn, complaining about him spanking her too much, hitting her and 

making her do a lot of work around the house. In March, Megan said that when appellant 

was at school on Thursdays, Glenn would walk in while Megan was taking a shower and 

ask if she wanted help; on at least two occasions, he had ―come into the shower while she 

was taking a shower and touch[ed]  ̳her parts‘ ‖ and then ―  ̳jack[ed] off‘ ‖ (which the 

child described as ―touching his penis‖). Another friend said that Megan complained in 

March that after appellant went to school, Glenn would come into the bathroom while 

Megan was showering and ―try to touch her private parts,‖ and that this ―had been 

happening since she was nine years old and had happened more than once.‖ Megan 

described a time Glenn came into the shower with her, wearing his underpants, and said 

that once Glenn pretended to be tickling her and touched her breasts and vagina. 

Megan‘s friend told her to tell someone but Megan did not want to because she did not 

want to be taken away from her mother. Megan told her friend that she had tried to tell 

appellant but appellant did not believe her, and she thought appellant was afraid Glenn 

would assault her if she confronted him, and scared to deal with the incident because they 

had nowhere else to stay. 

Interviewed by Detective Hart, Matthew initially ―denied everything.‖ He did not 

remember being sent out of the room so appellant could talk to Megan about a Dr. Phil 

show, and said that at their father‘s house, Megan had moved to the floor while they were 

talking so they could be quieter and not get in trouble. He did not know about Glenn 

sexually touching Megan and denied that Glenn had touched him sexually. 
6

The bus driver, Ms. O‘Donnell, told Officer Gillespie that Megan said she had 

been showering in her parent‘s bathroom when Glenn came in, wearing pajama bottoms, 

and asked if he could help her shower. He left when she said no, but when she got out of 

the shower in a towel, he was naked in the bedroom. Megan told O‘Donnell that she told 

appellant about the incident and was not sure whether appellant had forgotten. Megan 

also said that Matthew had touched her breasts and vaginal area. 

An interview was scheduled for Megan on Monday, April 4, at the Children‘s 

Interview Center (CIC). Megan was to stay with her maternal grandmother, Pamela K., 

for the weekend. Appellant and Pamela were told that Glenn and Matthew were to have 

no contact with Megan; appellant could call but not discuss the allegations. At 5:45 p.m. 

that Sunday, Megan called the social worker saying she had lied about the allegations and 

had been angry with Glenn because he had grounded her. 

At the interview on April 4, Megan began by saying she ―had been thinking about 

things the wrong way‖ and ―now knows that what she said happened with [Glenn] was in 

fact a dream.‖ 4 Megan said she had believed what happened was real until Friday and 

thought she was telling the truth when she spoke to the police as well as when she told 

her friend at school. Her friend told her to tell the bus driver and she did so thinking that 

the bus driver would keep a secret. After thinking a lot over the weekend, she thought 

she might have had this dream because of the tickle fights she had with Glenn. In the 

dream, Glenn came into the bathroom with his pants on, left and then returned with 

nothing on. He asked if she wanted help with her shower and he was there when she got 

out; she saw his private parts; he picked her up and put her on the bed; her towel fell and 

he would not let her grab it; he tried to open her legs and to pin her down on the bed so 

she could not get the towel. Then the alarm went off for her to wake up. 

 

4

The Bureau‘s report states that the district attorney, Detective Hart, appellant and 

Christopher, the children‘s father, were also present. The DVD recording reflects that no 

one else was physically present in the room where the interview took place.
7

Megan said she felt confused, ―[o]ne side of her‖ feeling like it was a dream, 

another side feeling like it was real and another feeling like she ―took it all the wrong 

way.‖ She said the shower incident happened one time and tickling happened two times 

a day and sometimes two times a week. Megan said she would start the tickling, and 

Glenn ―accidently gets his thumb stuck in her shirt or her pants‖; these episodes would 

happen while appellant was at the store or in the bathroom, and Matthew had never seen 

Glenn tickle her. About a year before, while watching Dr. Phil, she told appellant Glenn 

had been inappropriate with her and gave details, and she thought appellant had talked to 

Glenn about it. 

Megan said appellant had come to her grandmother‘s house over the weekend to 

see how she was doing. During the weekend, Megan had flashbacks about how mad she 

was at Glenn for grounding her for a month. She told appellant why she was mad and 

appellant agreed with her. Megan wanted to go home and thought if she explained 

herself ―hard enough‖ at the interview, ―things can go back to normal.‖ She said 

appellant hoped they could go to counseling, and appellant could not eat or sleep over the 

weekend because she was worried Megan would be taken away. Megan said Glenn is 

―really nice,‖ takes them out to dinner, and is nice to appellant, and that they ―do cool 

stuff together.‖ He ―sometimes gets mad because he wants them to do chores‖ and he 

ignores Megan when he is mad at appellant. Megan also said Matthew had touched her 

accidentally and she thought ―she misunderstood what he was doing because he would 

never do anything to her.‖

The social worker spoke with appellant, who said she ―absolutely‖ knew neither 

Glenn nor Matthew would touch Megan. Megan had not told appellant about Glenn 

touching her. Megan had ―talked to her about the Dr. Phil show‖ but did not provide any 

details; Megan said Glenn had brought her a towel into her bathroom, and appellant told 

her there was nothing wrong with this and she must have misunderstood his intentions. 

Appellant said Megan was headstrong and in a rebellious stage, and had been ―  ̳butting 

heads‘ ‖ with Glenn, a stage Matthew had gone through with Glenn and grown out of. 

According to appellant, Megan ―does not know when to stop‖ and Glenn sometimes gets 
8

irritated when Megan continues tickling him after he tells her to stop. Tension between 

Glenn and Megan had been building and Megan had been holding a grudge. Two 

weekends before, while appellant was away, Megan was at a friend‘s house and Glenn 

told her to call him before noon. Megan called appellant at 12:02 p.m. and appellant told 

her to call Glenn; Glenn grounded her for a month and took away her phone for calling 

late. The day before Megan voiced her allegations, Glenn told her she could get off 

restriction early if she cleaned his truck, and Megan appeared happy when appellant 

dropped her at the bus stop on April 1, then appellant received the call from school. 

Appellant did not believe Matthew would touch Megan because the two could not 

stand to be around each other, and suggested Megan might have made the allegations 

because Matthew would not let her hang out with him or play with his Xbox. 

Appellant said that when she went to visit Megan over the weekend, Glenn told 

her to tell Megan he loved her and would forgive her. Appellant wanted Megan home 

and said they would attend family counseling. She said Glenn felt hurt about the 

allegations and Matthew was angry. 

Appellant told the social worker that Matthew had been diagnosed with Attention 

Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and Bipolar disorder as a young child and labeled as 

emotionally disturbed; he took various medications under the supervision of a 

psychiatrist and saw a counselor at school. Matthew told the social worker he did not 

want to discuss Megan‘s allegations, said he was ―  ̳blown away‘ ‖ that Megan would say 

this about him and asked, ―Why Glen[n] and me?‖ Matthew said that he got along 

―  ̳pretty good‘ ‖ with Glenn and that Glenn yelled when he was disturbed about his exwife and sometimes was moody. Matthew thought Megan needed to go to counseling by 

herself. He did not want to attend family counseling because he did not want to talk to 

Megan and said he talked openly and honestly with his school counselor. 

The children‘s father, Christopher, told the social worker that he called Megan on 

Friday night, after appellant told him Megan had reported Glenn and Matthew having 

done something to her. Megan sounded ―credible‖ to him. On Sunday, Christopher took 

Matthew out for lunch and Matthew said Megan was ―  ̳full of crap.‘ ‖ About 3:00 p.m., 
9

appellant called and led Christopher to believe she was going to ―bully Megan into saying 

that she made all this up,‖ saying ―she  ̳is not going to let any government agency take 

over our life.‘ ‖ Christopher came early to the interview on April 4 in order to let 

someone know he believed appellant had bullied Megan into changing her story. 

Christopher did not feel Megan was safe at appellant‘s house and wanted to take her 

home with him that day. He had been concerned about Megan living in Glenn‘s home 

because the children had told him that Glenn had thrown Matthew against a wall in the 

past, leaving no marks, and said they did not like Glenn. 

Appellant was told after Megan‘s interview that while Megan said her story had 

been a dream, her body language and difficulty maintaining the story made it apparent 

she had been coached or coerced. Appellant got angry, saying, ―  ̳This is crap. She made 

it up.‘ ‖ She also got angry when Detective Hart told her he was concerned about her 

inability to consider that something might have happened to Megan and advised her that 

Megan would not be returning home because there was a question about her safety. 

Pamela K. reported that on Sunday Megan was crying while sitting on the couch 

with appellant and Pamela told appellant she was not supposed to be talking to Megan 

about the case. Appellant took Megan out for ice cream, then later took her out and 

bought her new clothes; when they returned, Megan told Pamela, ―  ̳Now I‘m gonna say I 

made it all up.‘ ‖ Pamela asked appellant what she was doing. Pamela felt appellant did 

not want to rock the boat with Glenn. She said the children did not get along with Glenn, 

who was unpredictable, yelled at appellant and was possessive. Pamela had the children 

stay with her every other weekend, when Glenn‘s children came to visit, and said that 

when his children were there, Glenn treated Megan and Matthew like servants. Megan 

had told her two or three months before that she had watched a Dr. Phil show and told 

appellant that Glenn had touched her, but appellant did not want to hear it. 

Matthew‘s therapist, Will Bove, told the social worker that Matthew told him 

weekly ―how unhappy he is with [Glenn].‖ Appellant had expressed to Bove that she 

was trying to get her life together so she could leave Glenn; Bove felt she was trying 

―really hard‖ and the children were the most important thing to her. Bove said appellant 
10

struggled with her own mental health challenges, there were conflicts between her and 

Glenn that presented a challenge for the children, Glenn got stricter with the children 

when he was upset with appellant, and the children had spent all of the past summer with 

Pamela because Glenn threatened Matthew. Bove had never had any sexual concerns 

about Matthew. 

In recommending that a petition be filed, the social worker noted, along with 

Megan‘s allegations, that appellant did not have the capacity to keep Megan safe because 

she took no action after Megan told her about the shower incident and continued to refuse 

to consider that there had been any sexual inappropriateness; that although appellant was 

told not to talk to Megan about the case during the weekend preceding the interview, she 

took Megan out for ice cream and shopping, after which Megan said she was going to say 

she had lied to the police; and that Megan‘s recantation at the interview did not appear 

believable to observers. 

At the time of the April 7 detention hearing, Megan was living with Christopher 

and Matthew was living with appellant and Glenn. The Bureau recommended that 

Megan be detained in out-of-home placement and Matthew remain in appellant‘s custody 

with court-ordered services. The court detained both children from appellant‘s custody 

and suspended appellant‘s visitation pending the jurisdictional hearing. Megan was 

placed with Christopher and the court ordered no contact between Megan and Glenn. 

Matthew was temporarily placed with family friends.5

 

5 On May 18, the social worker informed the court that Matthew‘s caretakers had 

reported appellant making various attempts to contact Matthew in violation of the court‘s 

order prohibiting contact pending the jurisdictional hearing. A social work supervisor 

spoke with appellant, who said she thought supervised contact was permitted. When the 

social worker subsequently advised appellant not to contact Matthew until the court 

granted visitation, appellant denied having done so, became angry and emotional, and 

said the foster parents were being untruthful. At a hearing on May 19, the court 

admonished appellant that contact was prohibited. On June 20, the court issued an order 

to show cause regarding finding appellant in contempt of court for sending Matthew a 

text message on May 28, in violation of court orders. 
11

Megan was interviewed a second time at CIC on August 2. According to a 

summary of Detective Hart‘s description of the interview, after promising to tell the truth, 

Megan stated that Glenn ―  ̳got mad a lot‘ ‖ and spanked her and Matthew with his hands, 

a board or a belt, and that appellant knew about this. Glenn would make her pull down 

her pants when he spanked her on the buttocks, which would sometimes leave red marks 

for approximately one week. He once told her to cover herself when they went 

swimming because he did not want others to see the marks. Appellant once hit her with 

the board Glenn used, with Glenn urging her to ―  ̳hit hard.‘ ‖ Appellant once intervened 

when Glenn was attempting to hit Matthew.

Megan said she was upset that appellant did not believe her allegations of sexual 

abuse. She stated that when she was nine or ten years old, she was taking a shower in 

―  ̳Glenn‘s bathroom‘ ‖ and he walked in, ―  ̳butt naked‘ ‖ and asked if she wanted help 

washing her hair. He ―  ̳kept trying to get in the shower with her‘ ‖ while she was turning 

it on and getting in, then left but returned when she got out and asked if she ―needed help 

 ̳drying off.‘ ‖ She wrapped a towel around herself and walked to the hallway, then 

Glenn pushed her back into the bedroom and onto the bed, touched her chest/breasts and 

vaginal areas with his hands and tried to make her touch his penis. Glenn was naked. He 

stopped touching her when he heard her brother turn off the shower in the other 

bathroom. Megan told appellant about the incident but appellant did not seem to believe 

her. This was the only time Glenn touched her sexually in ―that  ̳extreme‘ manner,‖ but 

there were numerous other times when he would pull her shirt or pants down while 

―  ̳tickling‘ ‖ her and would ―  ̳look down‘ her shirt.‖ She also described Glenn 

approaching while she was doing homework at the desk, ―hitting her hand with his 

exposed penis‖ and urging her to touch it. She said this happened three or four times. 

Asked about saying ―  ̳something different‘ ‖ at her prior interview, Megan 

described appellant taking her for ice cream and trying to get her to change her story. 

Appellant did not believe that Megan was telling the truth about the allegations and told 

Megan to change her story so she would be able to come home, continuing to talk about 

the case even after Megan told her they were not supposed to discuss it. Megan came up 
12

with the idea of saying the events she had reported had been a dream and did not talk to 

appellant about this. 

Megan stated that she liked living at her father‘s house and felt safe there, but was 

―not thrilled‖ about living in Sacramento. She felt ―  ̳fine‘ ‖ about not being able to speak 

with appellant and did not want to see her. She said she would like to see her brother. 

She was ―clear‖ that the events she reported about Matthew had really happened. 

At the jurisdiction hearing on September 14, Megan testified that she did not recall 

what details she gave when she told her bus driver that Glenn and Matthew had molested 

her. She was upset when Ms. O‘Donnell told her she had to inform the authorities, 

because she had wanted what she said to be a secret between herself, the two friends who 

were with her, and O‘Donnell. Detective Hart came to school to talk to Megan and she 

told him the truth. When she went with her grandmother to Glenn‘s house to get her 

belongings, appellant was crying and packing a bag for her, and would barely talk to her 

when Megan tried to say goodbye. 

Concerning the shower incident, Megan testified that as she was about to get into 

the shower, Glenn came into the bathroom, naked, and asked if she needed help in the 

shower. She said no and tried to cover herself, he tried to get in the shower with her as 

she tried to push him out, and finally he left. After the shower, as Megan was walking 

down the hall to her room, Glenn pushed her back, picked her up and put her on the bed. 

He kept trying to look at her, she tried to cover herself, the towel dropped on the floor, he 

tried to open her legs as she resisted, and he finally kept her legs open and ―tried to get a 

good look at me.‖ He repeatedly told her to touch his penis, and she held her hands 

together so she could not. He touched ―the upper part‖ of her body. 

Megan did not remember the specifics of what she told her friends about Glenn‘s 

actions, but testified that everything she told them was true. 

Asked whether she had told appellant about the shower incident, Megan said that 

about a month after it, and a year before her disclosures to Ms. O‘Donnell, while 

watching an episode of Dr. Phil, ―out of nowhere‖ appellant told her not to be afraid to 

tell her ―anything.‖ Megan told her ―everything‖ and appellant looked at her and said 
13

―okay.‖ Appellant did not do anything about it and Megan thought appellant did not 

care. 

During the weekend before her first interview, appellant took Megan to Baskin 

Robbins and the Army store, and spoke with her about what Megan had told the police. 

Megan remembered saying, ―I am the victim here,‖ and thought appellant responded, ―I 

don‘t give a rat‘s A.‖ Megan felt appellant did not believe her and was trying to get her 

to change her story, because appellant kept asking whether Megan wanted to come home 

and told her, ―I don‘t know how you can change this whole thing around but you can 

try.‖ When Megan asked ―how,‖ appellant said, ―just change your story.‖ Megan came 

up with the idea of saying it was just a dream. 

Megan testified that she was lying when she said at her first interview that 

―everything was a dream‖ and that what she said in her second interview was true. She 

did not make up what she said about the shower incident or about how Glenn treated her 

and Matthew. Megan testified, ―I told my friends everything that‘s ever happened to me, 

like my life was a horror movie. It just happened over and over and over. Like Glenn 

would yell at us for no reason. He would spank us. And I was always terrified that like 

whenever my mom would pick us up at the bus stop Matt or I would ask her if Glenn was 

home yet. And I was—like felt scared if he was because—because somehow, someway 

Glenn had a bad day at work, so whenever he has bad days he usually would yell at us. 

And when he yelled at us, like, he would tell us to go, like, clean the backyard, go clean 

his room, go do the dishes and stuff like that. [¶] And I remember I have a recording on 

my iPod of him yelling at me because he said that I took too long of a shower and that I 

did the dishes wrong and to do them again. . . . He would, like, he shoved my brother 

against the wall twice, smacked him on the back of the head when he was eating, and 

then he shoved him against the sliding glass door.‖ 

Megan testified that Glenn spanked her with a belt, a hand, or a polished wooden 

board, and that appellant observed this ―[a] couple [of] times.‖ She thought appellant had 

once seen Glenn shove Matthew against the wall and had seen Glenn yell at her. Megan 

did not like Glenn but denied making up any of the allegations because she did not like 
14

him. On cross-examination by Christopher‘s attorney, Megan testified that aside from 

the shower incident, Glenn did not try to touch her or get her to touch him. 

The recordings of Megan‘s interviews at CIC were played at the jurisdictional 

hearing and admitted into evidence.6 

Matthew testified that he did not recall Megan saying anything about Glenn while 

they were watching a Dr. Phil episode with appellant, but he did remember a time in the 

car when Megan said something about Glenn inappropriately touching her and appellant 

said, ―what, he would never do that.‖ Matthew thought this was during a time when 

Megan was grounded. He remembered Megan getting grounded for calling Glenn a 

minute late, and that she stayed angry about it for a ―pretty long time,‖ but he did not 

remember whether this was close to April 1. During the month preceding April 1, Megan 

did not seem afraid to be near Glenn, and she would initiate the tickle fights that she and 

Glenn ―always‖ had. Megan would try to avoid Glenn when Glenn was in a bad mood or 

had yelled at them, as Matthew said they all did. 

Matthew did not remember what he said to the police officers on April 1. When 

asked whether the officers had asked him if he had ever sexually touched Megan, he 

asserted his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. He testified that Megan had lied 

about him in the past. 

Matthew acknowledged that he was telling the truth when he told the social 

worker that he got along ―pretty well‖ with Glenn, but stated that he was ―partly‖ afraid 

of Glenn. As he had previously told the social workers, he wanted to go home with 

appellant, but not with Glenn there. Matthew testified that Glenn was mentally abusive 

toward him and had been physically abusive in the past, most recently two or three years 

before. The physical abuse consisted of spanking and pushing Matthew; on one 

 

6

The recording of the first interview was viewed by the parties and court; the 

recording of the second was the subject of some dispute as to the need for the court to 

view the recording, technical difficulties in watching it and issues about transcribing it, 

and it was ultimately agreed that the DVD would be admitted for the court to watch on its 

own, without a transcript. 
15

occasion, Glenn grabbed Matthew by the back of the neck and slapped him. The mental 

abuse was name calling and being ―mean.‖ Glenn would become agitated use a loud and 

scary voice, and Matthew would be afraid for appellant‘s and Megan‘s safety and 

―sometimes‖ his own. Glenn would call appellant the ―B word‖ and ―tell her to F off,‖ 

and appellant and the children would leave because they ―couldn‘t deal with him.‖ On 

one occasion, appellant and the children stayed in the car overnight in a city park because 

Glenn either ―kicked [them] out‖ of the house or ―was being a total butt-head.‖ 

Matthew described having a dream in which appellant was looking in the attic and 

Glenn kicked the ladder, hurt her and left her lying on the floor. Matthew woke up 

worried about appellant. He told the social worker about this dream, as well as that 

Glenn had been physically abusive toward appellant. Matthew testified that one day 

―during all of this‖ appellant was crying and went into the room with Glenn, Glenn told 

her to stop a couple of times and then Matthew heard ―a sound like she got punched in 

the stomach, like she lost wind or something like that.‖ She came out of the room, no 

longer crying, Matthew asked if Glenn had hit her, and she denied it. Another time, 

Glenn was mad at Matthew, appellant was trying to protect Matthew and Glenn grabbed 

and pushed appellant. Matthew stated that Glenn and appellant both deny this but he saw 

it. Matthew thought the police had once been called to the house because of fights 

between appellant and Glenn. Glenn‘s moods were unpredictable and Matthew told 

appellant ―[a]ll the time‖ that he was concerned about Glenn‘s behavior. Matthew had 

tried to get appellant to leave Glenn ―[m]any times‖ but she said they had nowhere else to 

go. 

Pamela K. testified that prior to April 1, Megan told her ―something about the 

bathroom and a towel‖ but never said anything about ―touching.‖ Pamela asked if Megan 

wanted her to talk to appellant and Megan said ―no, don‘t say anything to mom because 

then she gets mad at me.‖ Pamela acknowledged that she had an interest in making sure 

her grandchildren were protected from abuse and that she had once called Child 

Protective Services because she felt appellant was yelling at Matthew a lot. She testified 

that the children complained to her about Glenn yelling at them a lot but she had not 
16

heard about physical abuse. Pamela knew that Glenn abused appellant because appellant 

told her so on an occasion in 2005 or 2006, when appellant needed Pamela to give her 

money to come over the bridge to Pamela‘s house. She had heard Glenn call appellant 

names like ―[b]itch.‖ Megan had told Pamela about having to spend a night in 

appellant‘s car in a park. Pamela had told appellant that she thought the situation was 

bad for the children and for appellant, and that appellant should live somewhere else. 

She testified that Glenn was ―a bully‖ and a ―controlling person.‖ 

Appellant‘s testimony was presented in a declaration.7 She stated that while 

watching the Dr. Phil show, Megan said something about ―Glenn, a towel and a shower‖ 

but she never said anything about Glenn touching her or ―went into any detail about any 

specific event.‖ She had ―no idea what Matt is talking about‖ regarding statements 

Megan made in the car. When asked by the police at Megan‘s school on April 1 if she 

thought Glenn could have done what Megan reported, appellant answered ―without 

hesitation, No way, not in a million years would he ever do anything like that.‖ 

Regarding the police report description of her conduct with Megan, appellant denied that 

she was ―cold and harsh,‖ stating that she was in shock and did not know how to act, and 

―couldn‘t say anything or ask about any details to Megan so I gave her a hug and walked 

out of the room.‖ 

Appellant stated that she was told she ―could not have any contact‖ with Megan 

during the weekend Megan stayed with Pamela, and that ―if I did see her I could not 

discuss this matter with her.‖ Appellant went to Pamela‘s that Saturday, asked Megan 

how she was doing, gave her a hug and told her Glenn wasn‘t mad at her, forgave her and 

wanted her home. Megan said she wanted to come home, appellant told her ―she had the 

power to do that,‖ Megan asked what to do and appellant said she did not know. On 

Sunday, appellant picked Megan up and took her to Baskin Robins. Megan spilled some 

 

7

The declaration was accepted by stipulation as an offer of proof, with the 

exception of certain portions as to which the court sustained objections. 
17

ice cream on her pants and, because Megan had only one pair of jeans for the weekend, 

appellant took her to the store to buy new jeans for Megan and for herself. 

About seven years before, after appellant and Glenn had an argument and 

appellant did not want to stay at the house, she left with the children and stayed in the car 

at the park because she did not have money for gas or the bridge. They ―  ̳camped‘ out‖ 

and the children had breakfast, were groomed and went to school the next day.

Appellant stated that Glenn would yell at the children when they did ―  ̳stupid‘ 

things such as, not doing their chores or for leaving the lights on after telling them several 

times to turn them off,‖ and if this did not work, he would ―give them sentences to write.‖ 

Once, Glenn ―yelled in Matt‘s face,‖ appellant got between them and ―nothing ever 

became of it.‖ Appellant never observed any physical abuse by Glenn toward the 

children. Glenn would spank the children ―maybe once on the bottom‖ and she was 

always in the room when he did. 

Megan started tickle fights by poking and tickling Glenn and would have a hard 

time stopping when he told her to. The night before Megan talked to the bus driver, she 

had tried to get Glenn into a tickle fight; he did not want to participate, she jumped on his 

back to get him to play and he ―picked Megan off his back and placed her on the couch.‖ 

Megan was laughing the whole time. 

Appellant said that Glenn‘s relationship with her children was ―kind of difficult‖ 

the first few years and it took some time for them to ―work together.‖ At one point Matt 

and Glenn butted heads because Matt was rebelling against Glenn; Matt grew out of this 

and the two became ―pretty good friends,‖ and then ―it was Megan‘s turn to rebel.‖ 

Megan gave appellant problems too, especially in trying to avoid doing chores. Megan 

―always liked Glenn‖ and he always thought of her as his daughter; they watched TV 

together and he took her to father/daughter dances at her request. Appellant said Glenn 

―always respected the kid‘s privacy‖ and knocked before entering any room, and 

appellant did not recall him ever walking in on Megan. The door to the bathroom in 

appellant and Glenn‘s bedroom was broken and when Megan took a shower there, she 

always locked the bedroom door. Megan would walk around the house in ―short shorts 
18

and spaghetti strap tight tank tops‖; Glenn was always telling her to ―  ̳put some clothes 

on‘ ‖ and appellant agreed but ―getting a pre-teen to wear what they don‘t want is not an 

easy task.‖ 

Appellant had never observed, and no one had ever told her about, ―any 

inappropriate touching by anyone.‖ Glenn called appellant names during arguments, 

which she attributed to his ―speaking out of anger,‖ and used words like ―  ̳Bitch‘ or 

states to  ̳F-off‘,‖ but this never bothered appellant. 

The court took judicial notice of the 2004 verdict in a criminal case in which 

Glenn was acquitted on charges of domestic violence against his ex-wife, and of the 

statement of decision in the dissolution of Glenn‘s marriage to his ex-wife, in which the 

court ordered Glenn to participate in a 52-week anger management course and found that 

although Glenn had been acquitted on the domestic violence charges, he was ―verbally, 

emotionally, and on occasion physically abusive‖ toward his ex-wife. 

At the conclusion of the evidence, petitioner argued that Megan‘s descriptions of 

tickling incidents in which Glenn got his finger stuck in her clothing were sufficient to 

establish sexual abuse under section 300, subdivision (d), that the inconsistencies in 

Megan‘s descriptions of the shower incident did not affect the essence of her report, and 

that her recantation was not credible. Matthew‘s attorney waived argument; 

Christopher‘s attorney and Megan‘s attorney supported the Bureau‘s position. 

Appellant‘s attorney urged that Megan was lying about the claimed abuse.8

 

8

In response to questions from the court, Megan‘s attorney initially acknowledged 

that the tickling incidents occurred. The court expressed difficulty accepting that Megan 

was lying about everything except the tickling because ―she was speaking in the same 

breath, with the same affect, and with the same dictions and same body language‖ with 

respect to the shower incident and the tickling. The court noted that while appellant and 

Matthew both described tickling fights between Megan and Glenn, only Megan testified 

that there were tickling incidents no one else saw: ―I think we‘re talking about two 

different kinds of tickling. The kind she was describing, the kind that she felt had an 

improper purpose, which she was then recanting in one time and saying it was not for an 

improper purpose, that‘s a different tickling to the kind of tickling that I think Matthew 

and maybe [appellant] observed.‖ Appellant‘s attorney clarified that she did not think 
19

On December 14, the court explained that it had to ―make a decision as to the 

credibility of all of the participants‖ because of the ―complete disagreement‖ between the 

Bureau and all parties other than appellant urging that appellant failed to protect Megan 

from Glenn molesting her, and appellant urging that Megan made up the entire story 

because of her disagreements with and ill feelings toward Glenn. The court noted that it 

could not evaluate Glenn‘s testimony and demeanor because neither side called him as a 

witness.9

The court concluded, ―based on the totality of the circumstances,‖ that it was not 

possible to reject Megan‘s testimony. Expressly recognizing that there were 

―inconsistencies, if not outright lies at times,‖ the court has concluded that ―in general the 

specificity and persistence with which these allegations were made, as well as her 

demeanor here in the courtroom under oath, are sufficient for the court to conclude that 

Children and Family Services have borne their burden of proof with respect to Megan.‖ 

The court did not believe Megan‘s story at her first interview that the shower incident 

was a dream, finding it ―not seem credible‖ that Megan ―would have such a dream and 

account it with such detail while accounting with the same level of detail the other 

incidents which are described as tickling incidents.‖ The court saw the first interview as 

demonstrating that Megan had realized the consequences of her report and was 

―grappling with how to get out from those allegations having been made so as to either be 

returned to her mother where she wanted to be or just to have the whole problem go 

away.‖ The court stated, ―It just defies my experience and my imagination that someone 

of such tender years will have the skill level necessary to concoct that kind of story,‖ and 

that Megan did not appear to be that manipulative or capable of ―such evildoing.‖ The 

court saw Megan as ―capable of misunderstanding situations‖ and ―capable of reacting in 

a teenage manner to things that she didn‘t approve of that [Glenn] did in his form of 

 

there were distinct types of tickling incidents and that Megan was fabricating anything 

about fingers getting caught in her clothing. 

9

The court had previously questioned appellant‘s attorney as to why Glenn had 

not testified, indicating it would have liked to hear Glenn deny the allegations. 
20

discipline of her,‖ and found this insufficient to allow the court to reject her testimony 

entirely. 

The court believed it was more likely that ―there was some incident in the shower 

between her and [Glenn], that that incident was traumatic and shocking to her, and that 

she did not deal with it in an adult manner, and she should have done so but did not, and 

that she is acting in a way that‘s not unusual for victims of these types of events to react 

to, which is they do not report the incidents at the first available opportunity and when 

they do they either minimize them or they describe them in a way that is insufficient for 

people to take the appropriate corrective action.‖ The court declined to find that Megan 

actually informed appellant about the shower incident a year and a half before because it 

was not clear from the record that she reported it this long before. 

The court found that the ―tickling incidents‖ were an independent basis for 

sustaining the allegations ―because this tickling of a child by a stepfather, even if it 

occurred above the clothing, would be inappropriate. But it didn‘t stop there. According 

to Megan the tickling went below clothing and fingers got stuck at inappropriate times.‖ 

However, the court found that appellant was not necessarily aware of this conduct and 

Megan did not claim to have told appellant about it. 

The court sustained the petition as to Megan but amended the language of the 

allegations under section 300, subdivision (d), to state that ―there was inappropriate 

sexual contact between‖ Glenn and Megan (allegation d-1). The court did not sustain the 

allegations that Glenn touched Megan‘s vagina and breasts and tried to get her to touch 

his penis, finding Megan‘s testimony on these specifics insufficient.10 The court also did 

not sustain the allegations concerning sexual touching by Matthew. 

The court sustained the petition as to Matthew with the same amendment, deleting 

the specific factual allegations that Glenn touched Megan‘s vagina and breasts and tried 

 

10 The court made a point of noting, however, that its decision not to sustain the 

specific factual allegations did not necessarily mean the incident did not happen, as it 

would not be unusual for a minor to be so traumatized by such as event as to not ―have 

the recall‖ for it. 
21

to get her to touch his penis, so that the petition referred only to Megan having been 

―sexually molested‖ by Glenn (allegation j-1). The court also did not sustain the 

allegation under section 300, subdivision (j), referring to appellant having been told that 

Glenn touched Megan inappropriately (allegation j-2).

In its report for disposition, the Bureau recommended that Megan‘s dependency be 

vacated, the petition dismissed, and Christopher granted sole physical and legal custody, 

with supervised visitation for appellant and no contact with Glenn. The Bureau 

recommended that Matthew be adjudged a dependent, with out-of-home placement, 

reunification services for both parents, visitation with Christopher, supervised visitation 

with appellant, and no contact with Glenn. Megan was living with Christopher and 

Matthew was living in a foster home. Appellant had told the social worker that she loved 

the children, wanted Matthew returned to her care and wanted Megan to remain with 

Christopher. Both children had said they did not want to return to appellant‘s care 

because appellant continued to live with Glenn. Christopher had said he loved both 

children and would like to have both in his care, but understood that it was best for the 

children to live separately at this time. Megan had been angry, hurt and depressed since 

learning that appellant wanted Matthew returned to her but not Megan. Appellant told 

the social worker that she did not believe Glenn sexually abused Megan and that he had 

at times been a strong disciplinarian. The Bureau did not believe the children could be 

safely returned to appellant‘s custody because of the children‘s disclosures. 

At the disposition hearing on February 1, 2012, appellant testified that she still 

lived with Glenn because she had nowhere else to go, that she did not think Glenn had 

treated her children inappropriately and that Glenn had never physically abused her but 

―might have called me a couple names every now and again.‖ She testified that she 

would move out of Glenn‘s home if she could and thought it would be best for her 

children if she did so. She had not talked to Glenn about wanting to leave him. 

Adopting the Bureau‘s recommendations, the court found clear and convincing 

evidence that the children‘s welfare required removing them from appellant‘s custody 

(§ 361, subd. (c)(1), (4)). The court vacated Megan‘s dependency and awarded sole legal 
22

and physical custody to Christopher, with appellant to have supervised visitation for one 

hour, once a month and no contact between Megan and Glenn. As to Matthew, the court 

ordered reunification services for appellant and Christopher, with visitation to be 

arranged by the Bureau, and no contact between Matthew and Glenn. 

Appellant filed timely notices of appeal on March 15, 2012. 

DISCUSSION

I.

Appellant argues that the sustained petitions fail to state a cause of action as to 

either of the children because the petitions do not contain a precise statement of facts. 

She further argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional 

findings.

―A dependency petition must contain a  ̳concise statement of facts, separately 

stated, to support the conclusion that the child upon whose behalf the petition is being 

brought is a person within the definition of each of the sections and subdivisions under 

which the proceedings are being instituted.‘ (§ 332, subd. (f).) If the parent believes that 

the allegations, as drafted, do not support a finding that the child comes within 

section 300, the parent has the right to bring a motion akin to a demurrer. (In re S. O.

(2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 453, 460.)

―When the facial sufficiency of a petition filed under section 300, subdivision (b) 

is challenged on review, we construe the well-pleaded facts in favor of the petition to 

determine whether the Agency pleaded that the parent or guardian did not supervise or 

protect the children within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (b). (In re Janet T.

(2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 386; In re Nicholas B. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1133.) 

A facially sufficient petition  ̳does not require the pleader to regurgitate the contents of 

the social worker‘s report into a petition, it merely requires the pleading of essential facts 

establishing at least one ground of juvenile court jurisdiction.‘ (In re Alysha S. (1996) 

51 Cal.App.4th 393, 399–400.)‖ (In re Kaylee H. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 92, 107–108.) 

―The purpose of the petition is to give a parent adequate notice of the allegations 

against him or her.‖ (In re Christopher C. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 73, 83.) ―Notice of 
23

the specific facts upon which removal of a child from parental custody is predicated is 

fundamental to due process‖ and ―necessary to enable the parties to properly meet the 

charges.‖ (In re Jeremy C. (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 384, 397; In re Jessica C. (2001) 

93 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1036–1037.) 

A number of cases have held that ―  ̳ ―[i]f the jurisdictional findings are supported 

by substantial evidence, the adequacy of the petition is irrelevant.‖ [Citation.]‘ ([In re] 

N.M. [(2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159,] 166, fn. omitted.)  ̳The only exception occurs when 

a parent claims a petition fails to provide actual notice of the factual allegations. Unless 

the alleged factual deficiencies result in a miscarriage of justice, the reversal of a 

jurisdictional order supported by substantial evidence is unwarranted.‘ (In re Javier G. 

(2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 453, 458–459.)‖ (In re John M. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1117, 

1123; In re Athena P. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 617, 626–627.) ―[A]fter a hearing on the 

merits has been held on the petition, the focus must necessarily be on the substance of the 

allegations found true by the juvenile court, not idiosyncratic particulars of the social 

worker‘s precise language. Anything less would allow parents to hold linguistic 

deficiencies in the petition as a kind of trump card by which they could attack a finding 

that a child fell within one of the descriptions of section 300, even though that finding 

was supported by substantial, indeed overwhelming evidence.‖ (In re Jessica C., supra, 

93 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1037–1038.)

Appellant urges us not to follow this rule because Athena P., supra,

103 Cal.App.4th 617, the case respondent offers in support of the rule, ―is the only case 

that has held so‖ and ―seemed to conflate waiver with sufficiency of the evidence issues.‖ 

Instead, appellant asks us to follow cases which have held that an inadequate petition 

requires reversal regardless of the sufficiency of the evidence. (In re Alysha S. (1996) 

51 Cal.App.4th 393, 396–400; In re Nicholas B., supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1132–

1137.)

As can be seen above, Athena P. is not the only case to hold that an inadequate 

petition does not require reversal where, after a hearing on the merits, substantial 

evidence supports jurisdiction. Alysha S. did not discuss the sufficiency of the evidence; 
24

its holding was that a facially sufficient petition is a prerequisite to the juvenile court 

assuming jurisdiction. (51 Cal.App.4th at p. 399.) Nicholas B. followed Alysha S. on this 

point. (88 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1136–1137.) In our view, Athena P. states the better view: 

If sufficient notice was provided to the parent and substantial evidence supports 

jurisdiction, deficiencies in the allegations of a petition are harmless error. (In re 

Athena P., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at pp. 627–628.) The result of the contrary rule would 

be to prolong juvenile dependency proceedings, even in cases where substantial evidence 

supports jurisdiction under section 300, contrary to ―the emphasis on expeditious 

processing of these cases so that children can achieve permanence and stability without 

unnecessary delay if reunification efforts fail.‖ (In re David H. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 

1626, 1640.)11

In any event, appellant‘s challenges to the sufficiency of the petitions are 

unavailing. With respect to section 300, subdivision (b), as sustained, the petitions 

alleged that the child ―has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, 

serious physical harm or illness . . . as a result of the failure or inability of his or her 

 

11 David H. referred to this emphasis on expeditious processing of dependency 

cases in explaining why it rejected the position taken by Alysha S. that a challenge to the 

sufficiency of a petition may be raised for the first time on appeal. (165 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1640.) Alysha S. has been criticized on this point repeatedly, by courts holding instead 

that a challenge to the sufficiency of a petition is forfeited if not raised in the juvenile 

court. (In re Christopher C., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th 73, 84–85; In re David H., supra,

165 Cal.App.4th 1626, 1637; In re James C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 470, 480; In re 

Athena P., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at pp. 627–628; In re S. O., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th 

453, 459; In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 328.)

The forfeiture issue has not been raised in the present case, as appellant demurred 

to the amended petitions. The Bureau opposed the demurrer and the court overruled it. 

The demurrer was directed to a different petition than the one actual sustained, since the 

juvenile court amended the petitions at the end of the hearing after declining to sustain 

certain of the specific factual allegations. While appellant did not specifically argue 

below that the allegations the court sustained were insufficient to support jurisdiction—

the claim she presses on appeal—her arguments in the demurrer that the allegations were 

uncertain and ambiguous were directed at the more general language that remained in the 

petition, not the particular factual allegations the court found were not supported.
25

parent or legal guardian to supervise or protect the child adequately‖ in that ―[t]he child‘s 

mother has failed to protect the child from the mother‘s live-in boyfriend [Glenn] who 

has physically and emotionally abused the child on an ongoing basis for at least three 

years.‖ Appellant contends this allegation was insufficient to state a cause of action 

because it merely states a conclusion, rather than facts that would give notice of the 

allegations against her, and fails to allege facts suggesting either child has or is likely to 

suffer serious physical harm. 

These arguments are not persuasive. With respect to notice, the petition made 

clear that the basis of jurisdiction was appellant‘s failure to protect the children from 

ongoing abuse by Glenn over the course of at least three years. The social worker‘s 

reports, and the children‘s testimony at the jurisdictional hearing provided specifics. (See 

In re John M., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1123–1124 [petition amended at ―fairly late 

stage in the proceedings‖ and ―by the time of the hearing the petition was accompanied 

by several DCFS reports,‖ so mother could not argue prejudicially inadequate notice of 

allegations against her].) The social worker‘s summary of Officer Gillespie‘s police 

report related Megan‘s friend saying that Megan complained that Glenn spanked her and 

hit her; Matthew‘s therapist told the social worker that the children had spent the entire 

summer with their grandmother because Glenn had threatened Matthew; at her second 

interview, Megan said that Glenn would hit her and Matthew with his hands, a board or a 

belt, sometimes leaving red marks that lasted about a week, and that appellant was aware 

of this. Megan testified that Glenn spanked her with a belt, a hand, or a polished wooden 

board, and shoved Matthew against the wall. Matthew described Glenn‘s past physical 

abuse, including spanking him, pushing him and on one occasion grabbing his neck and 

slapping him, and ongoing verbal abuse; he described an incident when he heard what he 

thought was Glenn hitting appellant, although he did not actually see this, saw Glenn grab 

and push appellant in an incident where she was trying to protect Matthew when Glenn 

was mad at him, and testified that he was concerned about the safety of his mother and 

sister, and sometimes himself, around Glenn. That appellant had notice of the specific 
26

facts underlying the allegations is demonstrated by the declaration she filed responding to 

them.

The petitions also sufficiently alleged facts suggesting a risk of serious physical 

harm to the children. ―[B]efore courts may exercise jurisdiction under section 300, 

subdivision (b) there must be evidence  ̳indicating the child is exposed to a substantial 

risk of serious physical harm or illness.‘ ‖ (In re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 

387–388, quoting In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 823.) ―[E]vidence of past 

events may have some probative value in considering current conditions . . . if 

circumstances existing at the time of the hearing make it likely the children will suffer 

the same type of  ̳serious physical harm or illness‘ in the future.‖ (In re Janet T., supra, 

93 Cal.App.4th at p. 388.) ―  ̳[A] court may find there is a substantial risk of serious 

future injury based on the manner in which a less serious injury was inflicted, a history of 

repeated inflictions of injuries on the child or the child‘s siblings, or a combination of 

these and other actions by the parent or guardian, which indicate the child is at risk of 

serious physical harm. . . .‘ ‖ (Ibid., quoting § 300, subd. (a).) 

In re Janet T., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 391, upon which appellant relies, found 

the factual allegations of a petition insufficient to support jurisdiction under section 300, 

subdivision (b). The allegation that the mother‘s failure to ensure the children attended 

school was deficient because no facts were alleged to demonstrate that the failure to 

attend school, although seriously detrimental in other ways, ―created a  ̳substantial risk‘ 

of suffering  ̳serious physical harm or illness.‘ ‖ (Janet T., at pp. 388–389.) The 

allegation that the mother had demonstrated mental and emotional problems was 

deficient because no facts were alleged to suggest how these problems created the 

requisite risk, and none of the facts described in the social workers‘ reports concerned 

conditions existing at the time of the hearing, events resulting from or caused by the 

mother‘s mental and emotional problems, or a current risk of serious physical harm due 

to those problems. (Id. at pp. 389–390.) Here, by contrast, the petition alleged 

appellant‘s current failure to protect the children from on-going physical abuse, and the 

facts brought forth in the reports and testimony made clear that the past incidents were 
27

likely to recur because appellant continued to live with Glenn and did not believe he 

posed any risk to the children.

Nor is the present case like In re Nicholas B., supra, 88 Cal.App.4th 1126. That 

case involved a minor who presented extreme behavioral challenges. One factual 

allegation based jurisdiction on a single past incident in which the mother inflicted an 

injury upon the child, but no facts were alleged to suggest a risk of such an incident being

repeated. (Id. at pp. 1133–1135.) Other factual allegations stated that six months of 

voluntary services had not resulted in reunification and the child continued to engage in 

behaviors the parents objected to; the Nicholas B. court found these allegations had a 

―tenuous connection to the failure to protect arising out of past infliction of physical 

harm.‖ (Id. at p. 1135.) Another allegation, that the child had been diagnosed with a 

conduct disorder, failed to set forth any facts indicating the parents were responsible for 

the child‘s emotional problems. (Id. at pp. 1133, 1136.) Finally, while there was a great 

deal of testimony about the ―physically intimidating, even abusive personality of the 

father and his physical acts against the minor,‖ the father was not mentioned in any of the 

petition‘s factual allegations. (Id. at p. 1135.) The present case involves neither a single 

past incident of abuse nor a perpetrator of abuse not mentioned in the petition.

Appellant also argues that section 300, subdivision (b), does not provide for 

jurisdiction based on ―emotional harm.‖ This much is true: Emotional harm in and of 

itself, absent serious physical harm or a risk of serious physical harm, is not a basis of 

jurisdiction under subdivision (b). (In re Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713, 718.)12 

 

12 Respondent attempts to validate emotional harm as a basis for jurisdiction under 

section 300, subdivision (b) by reference to two cases finding that domestic violence in 

the household where children are living amounts to a failure to protect under 

subdivision (b), In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183 and In re Sylvia R. (1997) 

55 Cal.App.4th 559. These cases do not support respondent‘s position. In re Heather A.

established jurisdiction under subdivision (b) based on allegations that the minors were 

―periodically exposed to violent confrontations between Father and [stepmother] which 

endanger their physical and emotional safety.‖ (52 Cal.App.4th at p. 194.) The case 

focused on risk of physical harm: Finding substantial evidence of continuing violence 

between the father and stepmother, the court stated, ―Obviously the children were put in a 
28

Jurisdiction based on emotional harm is the subject of subdivision (c), which ―requires 

the court to find that the child is suffering or at the risk of suffering  ̳serious emotional 

damage, evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive 

behavior toward self or others . . . .‘ (§ 300, subd. (c).)‖ (In re Daisy H., supra, 

192 Cal.App.4th at p. 717.) Subdivision (c) was not alleged as a basis of jurisdiction 

here.

But appellant‘s argument misses the mark because the petition did not purport to 

establish jurisdiction on the basis of emotional harm. Rather, the allegations under 

section 300, subdivision (b) refer to emotional abuse in alleging that appellant‘s failure to 

protect the children from Glenn‘s ongoing physical and emotional abuse created a 

substantial risk that they would suffer serious physical harm. In other words, emotional 

abuse is referred to in the petition as part of the background creating the alleged risk of 

serious physical harm, not as a basis for jurisdiction in its own right. 

The evidence supported the court‘s finding of jurisdiction under section 300, 

subdivision (b). As described above, Megan‘s friend told the police that Megan 

complained that Glenn spanked her and hit her; Megan said that Glenn would hit her and 

Matthew with his hands, a board or a belt, sometimes leaving red marks that lasted about 

a week, and that Glenn shoved Matthew against a wall; Matthew‘s therapist reported that 

the children had spent the summer with their grandmother because Glenn had threatened 

 

position of physical danger from this violence, since, for example, they could wander into 

the room where it was occurring and be accidentally hit by a thrown object, by a fist, arm, 

foot or leg, or by [the stepmother] falling against them. . . . [D]omestic violence in the 

same household where children are living is neglect; it is a failure to protect [the 

children] from the substantial risk of encountering the violence and suffering serious 

physical harm or illness from it.‖ (Ibid.) In re Sylvia R. reaffirmed that ―  ̳spousal abuse 

is detrimental to children‘ ‖ in terms of both physical and emotional harm. 

(55 Cal.App.4th at p. 562.) The case was not concerned with jurisdictional findings: Its 

discussion of spousal abuse came in the context of rejecting a father‘s argument that he 

was entitled to a hearing on whether orders terminating reunification services should be 

terminated because a spousal abuse charge that had been pending when the termination 

order was made had since been dismissed. (Id. at pp. 561–563.)
29

Matthew. Matthew described Glenn having spanked him, pushed him and on one 

occasion grabbed his neck and slapped him. Even without consideration of the evidence 

suggesting—albeit not necessarily proving—that Glenn was physically abusive toward 

appellant, the above described evidence was sufficient to establish that Glenn had been 

physically abusive toward the children in the past. Combined with the ample evidence of 

Glenn‘s temper and ongoing verbal abuse, and appellant‘s refusal to acknowledge any 

problem requiring intervention, the evidence supported the court‘s conclusion that the 

children were at risk of suffering serious physical injury due to appellant‘s failure to 

protect them. 

Under section 300, subdivision (d), the sustained petition concerning Megan 

alleged, ―The child has been sexually abused, or there is a substantial risk that the child 

will be sexually abused . . . by his or her parent or guardian or a member of the child‘s 

household‖ in that ―[t]he child has been sexually molested in her mother‘s home by the 

mother‘s live-in boyfriend [Glenn] on at least three occasions over a two year period‖ 

(allegation d-1) and ―The child‘s mother has failed to protect the child from ongoing 

sexual abuse by the mother‘s live-in boyfriend [Glenn] in that despite being told by the 

child that [Glenn] had touched her inappropriately, the mother did not believe the child 

and failed to take any action to prevent further instances of sexual abuse‖ (allegation d2). 

Appellant urges that these allegations fail to state a cause of action because they 

do not allege any specific act of molestation. We find it unnecessary to resolve whether a 

petition containing the allegations at issue here would be sufficient to withstand a 

challenge raised before trial. As we have said, after trial, if sufficient notice was 

provided to the parent and substantial evidence supports jurisdiction, deficiencies in the 

allegations of a petition are harmless error. (In re John M., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1123; In re Athena P., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at pp. 627–628.) Here, the allegations 

of the amended petition, filed on June 17, 2011, included specific sexual acts. Due to 

inconsistencies between Megan‘s accounts, the trial court did not sustain these specific 

allegations. Nevertheless, it concluded that there was ―some incident in the shower 
30

between her and [Glenn]‖ that was ―traumatic‖ and ―shocking‖ to Megan. Moreover, the 

court found that the tickling episodes Megan described were an independent basis for 

sustaining the allegations of sexual molestation, making clear that it believed Megan‘s 

description of incidents in which Glenn‘s tickling ―went below clothing and fingers got 

stuck at inappropriate times‖ despite appellant‘s characterization of the tickling episodes 

as innocent. The court specifically rejected Megan‘s statements at her first interview that 

Glenn did not have any inappropriate intent in these incidents, and found to the contrary. 

Although not specifically included in the allegations of the amended petition, appellant 

had notice of the tickling incidents as an additional basis of the section 300, 

subdivision (d) allegations and addressed them in her declaration. Substantial evidence 

supports the trial court‘s conclusion that these incidents constituted sexual abuse within 

the meaning of section 300, subdivision (d),13 and appellant does not argue otherwise on 

this appeal. 

Finally, appellant contends that Matthew‘s petition failed to state a cause of action 

under section 300, subdivision (j) because, as in appellant‘s challenge to the section 300, 

subdivision (d) allegations discussed above, no specific acts of molestation were alleged, 

and no specific facts were alleged to explain how Matthew was at risk of abuse due to 

Megan having been molested. The sustained petition alleged under subdivision (j) of 

section 300, that ―[t]he child‘s sibling has been abused or neglected . . . and there is a 

 

13 Section 300, subdivision (d), defines ―sexual abuse‖ by reference to Penal Code 

section 11165.1. That statute, in turn, defines ―  ̳sexual abuse‘ ‖ as including conduct 

violating enumerated statutes, the two relevant here being Penal Code section 288, 

subdivisions (a), (b), or (c)(1) (lewd or lascivious acts upon a child) and Penal Code 

section 647.6 (child molestation). Penal Code section 11165.1 further provides that 

―sexual abuse‖ includes, but is not limited to, ―intentional touching of the genitals or 

intimate parts (including the breasts, genital area, groin, inner thighs, and buttocks) or the 

clothing covering them, of a child, or of the perpetrator by a child, for purposes of sexual 

arousal or gratification, except that, it does not include acts which may reasonably be 

construed to be normal caretaker responsibilities; interactions with, or demonstrations of 

affection for, the child; or acts performed for a valid medical purpose.‖ (Pen. Code, 

§ 11165.1, subd. (b)(4).)
31

substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected . . .‖ in that ―[t]he child is at risk 

in his mother‘s care in that the child‘s sibling has been sexually molested in her mother‘s 

home by the mother‘s live-in boyfriend [Glenn].‖ 

Depending on the surrounding circumstances, sexual abuse of a female child may 

support jurisdiction over her male sibling under section 300, subdivision (j). (In re I.J. 

(2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 780.) In some cases, the risk to the male sibling may be of sexual 

abuse; in others, it may be risk of a different harm contemplated by the statute. 

―  ̳Subdivision (j) does not state that its application is limited to the risk that the child will 

be abused or neglected as defined in the same subdivision that describes the abuse or 

neglect of the sibling. Rather, subdivision (j) directs the trial court to consider whether 

there is a substantial risk that the child will be harmed under subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e) 

or (i) of section 300, notwithstanding which of those subdivisions describes the child‘s 

sibling.‘ ‖ (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 774, quoting In re Maria R. (2010) 

185 Cal.App.4th 48, 64.)

In any event, it is not necessary for us to determine whether jurisdiction would 

have been supported under section 300, subdivision (j). As we have said, substantial 

evidence supported the juvenile court‘s finding that Matthew came within the court‘s 

jurisdiction under subdivision (b) of section 300. Jurisdiction under section 300 may be 

based on any single subdivision. (In re Christopher C., supra,182 Cal.App.4th at p. 83;

In re Shelley J., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 330.)

II.

Appellant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion and violated her 

constitutional right to due process by unduly restricting her cross-examination of Megan. 

At the jurisdiction hearing on September 14, after Megan‘s direct testimony, 25 pages of 

the reporter‘s transcript in length, and 12 transcript pages of cross-examination, the court 

noted that Megan had been testifying for about an hour and asked if she wanted a break, 

which she did. After the break and a discussion between the court and counsel on matters 

unrelated to Megan‘s testimony, with 15 minutes remaining in the court day, the court 

told appellant‘s attorney it wanted the cross-examination finished because Megan had 
32

been on the witness stand for more than an hour and the court felt they were ―at the point 

of seriously diminishing returns.‖ Appellant objected that she would be deprived of due 

process if the court cut off her opportunity to point out ―all the inconsistent statements.‖ 

Explaining that its purpose was to spare Megan ―further trauma‖ that was ―not in the 

interest of reunification,‖ the court suggested that counsel make a ―general offer about the 

other inconsistencies, because there probably isn‘t a dispute about who she said what to 

at what point in time.‖ Counsel for the Bureau noted that the inconsistencies were all in 

the reports, and the court told appellant‘s attorney she was free to use the rest of the day 

to ask Megan about ―some really specific sizzler‖ but ―I just think she‘s already told you 

she lied at the first interview, and she told you why, and she‘s not being consistent about 

the pajamas or whether she was actually showering or about to shower or all of those 

little details. So I just don‘t want us to spend a whole hour of [a 12-year old] being crossexamined.‖ The court made clear it did not want the ―specter of more cross-examination 

hanging over [Megan‘s] head‖ until the next hearing date. 

Appellant‘s attorney asked the court if the proceedings were going to go beyond 

4:30 p.m., and the court responded, ―Not much, maybe five minutes, because we‘re not 

allowed to—P.J. decree.‖ Counsel said she might not be able to finish in that amount of 

time and the court told her it would not give more. She proceeded to cross-examine 

Megan, as reflected in an additional 13 pages of reporter‘s transcript, until the end of the 

court day. Commenting that it did not expect there to be much more testimony, if any, 

from Megan, the court told counsel, ―[i]f there is I want an offer of proof as to what it is 

specifically so that we can see whether it‘s contested.‖ Appellant‘s attorney said she 

would compile an offer of proof regarding Megan‘s testimony; the court confirmed that 

this was not required for other parts of the trial. The court stated that it would have 

Megan return to court if, after the next hearing, counsel persuaded the court that there 

was ―more stuff that Megan has to answer for.‖ When counsel objected that she could 

not be required to proceed by offer of proof in a jurisdictional trial, the court said it 

agreed, but stated, ―But I can sustain [Evidence Code section] 352 and did sustain 

objections, so your examination would be at an end.‖ Counsel explained that she did not 
33

object to the offer of proof requirement as to Megan‘s inconsistent statements but did 

object to having to provide her entire case by offer of proof because ―regarding a lot of 

other areas I want to go into I don‘t want to notice everybody what I‘m doing and where 

I‘m going before the witness testifies.‖ The court reiterated that it had ruled under 

Evidence Code section 352 that ―whatever probative value of questions was over as far as 

Megan was concerned‖ but that it was open to being persuaded by offer of proof or 

otherwise that there was sufficient reason to have Megan testify again. 

On October 28, appellant‘s attorney filed a document entitled ―Evidence of 

Further Cross-Examination of Megan [G.],‖ presenting in chart form five versions of 

Megan‘s descriptions of the shower incident and the touching by Matthew (referring to 

her reports to O‘Donnell, to Detective Hart, in the Detention/Jurisdiction Report, at the 

April interview and at the August interview). At the hearing on this date, with the next 

hearing date set more than a month away, the court directed appellant‘s attorney to fax to 

all parties and the court two days before the next hearing a list of the witnesses she 

intended to call, with short summaries of the expected testimony, so the court could ―start 

to cut the proceedings short‖ because it had ―a feeling that what is mentioned there is 

probably not really in dispute.‖14 When the hearing resumed on December 7, petitioner 

requested sanctions because appellant‘s attorney had not complied with the court‘s order. 

Appellant‘s attorney stated she had no recollection of the order and the parties ultimately 

reached agreements that avoided the need for further live testimony. Appellant‘s attorney 

later returned to the matter of Megan‘s cross-examination, saying that there were ―a lot‖ 

of questions she had for Megan. The court indicated that the question of Megan‘s 

testimony remained to be resolved after disposing of other issues, but no further 

discussion of it appears in the record. 

Appellant contends that the trial court violated her due process rights by limiting 

her cross-examination of Megan, the key witness in the case with respect to the sexual 

abuse allegations. Emphasizing the importance of cross-examination in evaluating a 

 

14 The other parties did not expect to call witnesses. 
34

witness‘s credibility, knowledge and recollection, and in fully developing the facts, she 

argues that the trial court erred in requiring an offer of proof before it would permit 

continued cross-examination.

A four-part test is used under California and federal law to determine ―what sort of 

process is due in a given judicial or administrative proceeding.  ̳This flexible balancing 

standard considers ―  ̳(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action, 

(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and 

the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, (3) the 

[dignity] interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds and consequences of the 

action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a responsible 

governmental official, and (4) the governmental interest, including the function involved 

and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 

requirement would entail.‘ ‖ ‘ ‖ (In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1246, quoting 

In re Malinda S. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 368, 383.)

Appellant relies on a series of cases establishing a parent‘s right to a contested 

dependency hearing. In In re Matthew P. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 841, de facto parents 

filed a petition for modification (§ 388) seeking to regain custody of children who had 

been removed from their care and sought to cross-examine the social worker who 

prepared the report. (Id. at p. 847.) The juvenile court refused to allow crossexamination under a rule of court giving the court discretion to hear section 388 motions 

on documentary evidence, without testimony. (Id. at pp. 847, 850.) In re Matthew P.

reversed the denial of the modification petition, finding that by relying solely on the 

social workers‘ reports, the court denied the de facto parents the opportunity to be heard 

that is fundamental to due process. (Id. at p. 851.) In re James Q. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 

255 involved a juvenile court‘s denial of a parent‘s request for a contested dependency 

review hearing on the basis that there had not been a sufficient offer of proof regarding 

evidence to be presented at such a hearing. Based upon consideration of the four factors 

described above, In re James Q. held, ―[a]s a matter of statutory construction and 

constitutional due process, we conclude the juvenile court cannot require a party to a 
35

review hearing to tender an offer of proof as a condition to obtaining a contested hearing. 

([Citations.]) A party must be able to make its best case, untrammeled by evidentiary 

obstacles arbitrarily imposed by the courts without legislative sanction. (Cf. In re 

Heather P. [(1989)] 209 Cal.App.3d [886,] 891.)‖ (81 Cal.App.4th at p. 266.) David B. 

v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 772, 779, agreeing with In re James Q., further 

stated, ―At review hearings, the agency bears the burden of proof. It would be anomalous 

indeed to require the opponent of proffered evidence to make an offer of proof as to 

anticipated weakness or errors in their adversary‘s evidence.‖ 

In a case where the parent bears the burden of proof, requiring an offer of proof 

may be appropriate. Upholding the juvenile court‘s denial of a parent‘s request for a 

contested section 366.26 hearing at which she could attempt to demonstrate the existence 

of one of the exceptions to termination of parental rights, In re Tamika T. (2002) 

97 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1122, held that because ―due process does not permit a parent to 

introduce irrelevant evidence, due process does not require a court to hold a contested 

hearing if it is not convinced the parent will present relevant evidence on the issue he or 

she seeks to contest.‖ Accordingly, ―a trial court does not deny due process if it requires 

a parent to make an offer of proof before it conducts a contested hearing on the issue of 

whether a parent can discharge his or her burden of establishing a statutory exception to 

termination of parental rights.‖ (Id. at p. 1116.)

Where the social services department has the burden of proof, however, 

―[p]recluding the parents from exploring and testing the sufficiency of the Department‘s 

evidence is fundamentally different than requiring them to describe evidence they will 

offer to prove a point. . . . It is one thing to require a parent to show he or she has 

relevant evidence to proffer on an issue on which he or she bears the burden of proof 

before scheduling a contested evidentiary hearing on that issue. It is quite another to 

deprive him or her of the opportunity to explore the strength of the agency‘s evidence 

that the child is likely to be adopted.‖ (In re Thomas R. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 726, 

732.)
36

Nevertheless, we cannot accept appellant‘s characterization that this is what the 

juvenile court did here. The court in the present case did not deny appellant a hearing or 

completely prevent her from cross-examining Megan. Rather, after a period of crossexamination, the court informed appellant that it would permit further questioning of this 

young witness only if appellant could convince the court there were relevant areas of 

questioning that had not already been pursued. The court made clear that it was aware of 

the many inconsistencies between Megan‘s various descriptions of the alleged abuse and 

aware that Megan had lied in some of those reports, and that it wanted to spare Megan the 

trauma of further cross-examination if that cross-examination was not going to produce 

evidence relevant to the court‘s decision. 

The cases upon which appellant relies, which involved complete deprivation of a 

parent‘s right to cross-examination and to present evidence, noted that juvenile courts 

have the authority to impose limitations on the proceedings. ―  ̳[T]he Evidence Code, 

among other statutory provisions, provides ample means for the courts to control 

contested proceedings in the dependency courts. [Citations.]‘ (In re James Q., supra, 

81 Cal.App.4th at p. 266.) Objections based on relevancy, undue time consumption, or 

any of the usual evidentiary objections contained in the Evidence Code are available to 

the parties.‖ (David B. v. Superior Court, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th 772, 779.) This is the 

authority the juvenile court exercised in the present case under Evidence Code 

section 352. It did not prevent appellant from cross-examining Megan. It prevented her 

from continuing the cross-examination beyond the point that the court felt appropriate in 

light of the matters at issue and the areas of questioning being pursued, absent appellant 

articulating the basis of a need for further questioning.

In re Amy M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 849, upon which appellant relies to 

emphasize the importance of her right to cross-examine Megan, also concerned a very 

different situation. There, dependency petitions alleged that one child had been sexually 

abused by her father, not protected by her mother, and suffered emotional harm, and that 

her younger brother, Michael, had suffered emotional harm. (Id. at pp. 860, 865.) The 

juvenile court refused to allow the parents to call Michael as a witness based upon 
37

testimony the court-appointed evaluator‘s opinion that testifying would be stressful for 

the child and cause him to suffer further emotional harm. (Id. at p. 864.) The court ruled 

that the damage to the child outweighed what he ―could do or could say‖ in testifying. 

(Ibid.) In re Amy M. found the parents‘ due process rights were violated by this ruling 

because the parents‘ expert disagreed with the court evaluator as to the cause of 

Michael‘s psychological distress, Michael‘s testimony could have had bearing on the 

court‘s evaluation of the competing expert opinions, there was no substitute for his 

testimony (such as prior testimony or reports containing his statements) and there was no 

evidence that testifying would be so traumatic as to permit a finding that he was an

unavailable witness under Evidence Code section 240.15 (Id. at pp. 865–866.)

As with the other cases upon which appellant relies, the due process violation in In 

re Amy M., supra, 232 Cal.App.3d 849, resulted from an order completely depriving the 

parents of an opportunity to evidence that could be critical to the jurisdictional 

determination. Here, as we have said, there was no such deprivation. Megan‘s 

statements were contained in the reports, the court saw the videotapes of her interviews, 

she testified at the hearing and she was cross-examined. The restriction imposed by the 

juvenile court simply was not analogous to that imposed in In re Amy M.

As explained in In re Thomas R., ―  ̳[w]hile a parent in a juvenile dependency 

proceeding has a due process right to a meaningful hearing with the opportunity to 

present evidence [citation], parents in dependency proceedings ―are not entitled to full 

confrontation and cross-examination.‖ [Citation.] Due process requires a balance. 

[Citation.] The state‘s strong interest in prompt and efficient trials permits the 

nonarbitrary exclusion of evidence [citation], such as when the presentation of the 

evidence will ―necessitate undue consumption of time.‖ (Evid. Code, § 352.) The due 

 

15 Evidence Code section 240 provides that a declarant may be ―  ̳unavailable as a 

witness‘ ‖ where expert testimony establishes ―that physical or mental trauma resulting 

from an alleged crime has caused harm to a witness of sufficient severity that the witness 

is physically unable to testify or is unable to testify without suffering substantial 

trauma. . . .‖ (Evid. Code, § 240, subds. (a)(3), (c).)
38

process right to present evidence is limited to relevant evidence of significant probative 

value to the issue before the court.‘ (Maricela C. v. Superior Court (1998) 

66 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1146–1147.)‖ (In re Thomas R., supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 733; 

see In re J.F. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 321, 335 [parent‘s due process right ―does not 

invalidate the court‘s authority to exclude evidence that is not of significant probative 

value to the issues before the court‖].)

The limitation the court imposed here did not prevent appellant from contesting 

the Bureau‘s evidence. As we have said, the court emphasized its awareness of the 

inconsistencies between Megan‘s reports and outright lies in some of them. Nor did the 

limitation on further cross-examination prevent appellant from telling her side of the 

story: The court understood that appellant did not believe the abuse occurred and that she 

believed that Megan made up the accusations because she was angry about Glenn‘s harsh 

discipline in general and his punishment for her calling later than instructed in particular. 

The court had abundant opportunity to assess Megan‘s credibility based on the recorded 

interviews and her testimony in court.

The orders are affirmed.

_________________________

Kline, P.J.

We concur:

_________________________

Lambden, J.

_________________________

Richman, J.