UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

JASON L. SHEPPARD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) 

v. ) CAUSE NO. 3:14CV1669-PPS

)

OFFICERS DARCY MEADE, SHAUN )

MUDD, C. SUMMERS, T. ROCKEY, )

F. COURT, T. NICHOL, J. WINTERS, )

C. MARSH, J. JONES, D. SHINGLE, )

J. ZIMMER, E. KEELE, D. MEZA, )

SERGEANT CORY FIELDS, NURSE )

JAYNN STOOPS, OFFICER M. )

HOLDERMAN, DOCTOR COLLIER )

and DOCTOR AL SHANI, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Jason Sheppard filed this suit against 16 officers and employees of the

Kosciusko County Jail, and two doctors who were not county employees, alleging that

his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by their deliberate indifference to his

serious medical needs while he was in custody there. Sheppard has acknowledged on

the record that he intends to pursue his claims against only six of the defendants –

Officers Meade, Mudd, Summers, and Marsh, Sergeant Fields, and Nurse Stoops. [DE

91 at 1.] Now before me is a fully-briefed motion for summary judgment by the

Kosciusko County defendants. 

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party opposing summary judgment may not rely on

allegations or denials in his or her own pleading, but rather must “marshal and present

the court with the evidence she contends will prove her case.” Goodman v. Nat’l Sec.

Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment “is the put up or shut

up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would

convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events.” Springer v. Durflinger, 518

F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2008). 

FACTS

Sheppard was at the jail for two separate stretches of time – roughly five months

from late June to early December in 2012, and then again for approximately two months

from late November 2013 until the end of January 2014. Sheppard’s evidence supports

his assertion that in October 2012 when he began to experience severe pain in

connection with bloody bowel movements, he complained to jail officers verbally

and/or in writing each time it occurred, several times each week, including specifically

to defendant Meade. [DE 91-1 at ¶¶3-4.] Sheppard attests that his abdominal pain was

severe enough to double him over and lasted at least two hours. [Id. at ¶3.] Sheppard

says that Meade examined his rectal area and told him “it appeared swollen but was

fine.” [Id.] Sheppard claims that although he continued to make complaints to Meade

“at least 5 or six times,” he was not seen by a nurse until November 16, 2012. [Id.] On

that day, November 16, 2012, Sheppard was evaluated by defendant Jaynn Stroop, a

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nurse, who directed him to use hemorrhoid cream, and set up a doctor’s appointment

for Sheppard. [DE 83-1 at 4.] 

It was obvious that Sheppard had a severe problem because on November 20, a

medical progress note indicates that Sheppard was seen by a doctor (with an illegible

signature), who noted a rectal prolapse. [DE 83-1 at 5.] The doctor said that Sheppard

should be sent for a general surgery consult and that time was of the essence; the doctor

said it should be scheduled “ASAP.” [Id.] Sheppard was prescribed Miralax and

Metamucil for constipation. [Id.] 

Sheppard’s medical problem was so acute that he was actually released from the

jail on December 3 on a personal recognizance bond. The very next day he went to a

doctor’s appointment jail personnel had made for him with Dr. Funil Ramrakhiani. [Id.

at 21-22.] Dr. Ramrakhiani ordered upper and lower GI testing, and diagnosed

Sheppard as having polyps and severe hemorrhoids. [Id. at 23.] Sheppard visited Dr.

Ramrakhiani about six times. [Id. at 24.] Sheppard complained in his deposition

testimony that none of doctors he’s seen over three years have “told [him] anything,”

but just keep giving him creams and laxatives while he continues to bleed. [Id.] 

Sheppard has testified that a nurse on Dr. Ramrakhiani’s staff discussed with him a

possible surgical procedure to address his bowel issues. [Id. at 25.] 

When Sheppard returned to the Kosciusko County jail in November 2013, the

medical screening report dated November 26 reflected that he was then undergoing

treatment for hemorrhoids, for which he’d had a recent hospitalization. [DE 83-1 at 6.] 

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Sheppard reported experiencing rectal bleeding at that time. [DE 83-1 at 7.] In his

affidavit, Sheppard attests that his report of a recent hospitalization referred to the

upper GI procedure ordered by Dr. Ramrakhiani. [DE 91-1 at ¶19.] Sheppard was

housed in the medical section throughout the approximately two months of his second

period of incarceration at the jail. [DE 83-1 at 28.] 

Sheppard attests that in December 2013 he told defendant Meade about his

continued severe pain and rectal bleeding “on multiple occasions,” but that Meade did

not let him see a nurse or doctor, and he did not see the nurse until later that month. 

[DE 91-1 at ¶10.] Sheppard’s affidavit recounts an incident in December 2013 when his

bleeding ran down both legs and pooled on the floor. [Id. at ¶11.] Sheppard attests that

defendant Fields came to the cell and screamed at him, saying that “they weren’t going

to release me from the jail to get medical treatment and that I should just stop what he

called ‘the bull-shit,’” and that “it was my fault I was bleeding and in pain because I

had not gotten my condition fixed while I was still outside the jail.” [Id.] 

On December 10, 2013, Sheppard initiated a Sick Call Request to be seen by a

nurse for rectal bleeding. [Id. at 9.] A rectal bleeding protocol questionnaire was

completed on December 24, 2013, reflecting that examination revealed “massive

hemorrhoids” and that Sheppard had “bloody tissue stuffed in anus.” [Id. at 10.] The

questionnaire was signed by defendant Mudd and reviewed by a physician whose

signature is illegible. [Id. at 11.]

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The same day, Nurse Stoops signed a medical progress note reporting that

Sheppard “did not have upper GI as doctor requested,” because “[h]e doesn’t have

insurance” and is not working. [DE 83-1 at 12.] Stoop noted “[h]e can’t have anything

done on outside of jail.” [Id.] Sheppard’s deposition testimony suggests he had the

upper GI test, and instead it was a possible surgical procedure that he did not undergo,

because his lack of money and insurance prevented him from getting all the necessary

testing “to determine if [he] was appropriate for that procedure.” [DE 91-1 at ¶7.] 

Sheppard’s affidavit addresses this as well, with Sheppard explaining that he “did not

tell her that I failed to get an ‘upper GI,’” but “did tell her that [I] did not have

insurance or enough money to get my condition fixed during my release from the jail.” 

[DE 91-1 at ¶12.] Stoop’s treatment plan advised Sheppard to “keep medical aware of

his condition,” to use “warm moist cloths to rectum area,” “avoid straining during

bowel movements,” and “keep anal area clean and dry.” [DE 83-1 at 12.] 

In support of his summary judgment opposition, Sheppard submits and

expressly agrees to the accuracy of the jail’s Medication Administration Record. [DE 91-

1 at ¶24.] That record reflects that he was given Miralax and Metamucil daily from

November 21 through 29 and December 1 and 2, 2012, and was also given Colace1

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hemorrhoid cream. [DE 91-5.] Sheppard was seen by a physician on December 26,

2013, whose notes indicate that Sheppard had stopped his medication. [DE 83-1 at 13.] 

This appears to be further explained in a medical progress note dated December 28, in

1 Colace is a common stool softener laxative. 

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which Nurse Stoops noted that Sheppard “felt that the colace was too strong.” [Id. at

14.] Sheppard reported diarrhea-like stools. [Id.] Stoops explained that Sheppard

could reduce his dose from “1 tab of the colace instead of 2,” but reports “he refuses.” 

[Id.] Stoops listed three other treatment recommendations: to increase fluids, to eat soft

foods or chew food well, and to report to the medical department. [Id.] 

Sheppard’s affidavit describes his complaints on or around January 6, 2014 to

defendants Rockey and Court about severe pain and bleeding, but that he was not seen

by medical personnel that day. [DE 91-1 at ¶15.] In his affidavit, Sheppard attests that

during his second incarceration he was never “provided with medication that helped

with my severe pain or bleeding,” and that none of the steps he was advised to take

provided relief from either of those symptoms. [Id. at ¶16.] On approximately January

21, 2014, Sheppard was transferred to the Indiana Department of Correction. [Id. at ¶2.]

ANALYSIS

“[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the

‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted). “Correctional officials have

long been warned that they cannot ignore an inmate’s known serious medical

condition.” Orlowski v. Milwaukee County, 872 F.3d 417, 422 (7th Cir. 2017). The

Kosciusko County defendants do not dispute that Sheppard’s regular and persistent

rectal bleeding and pain constituted a serious medical need. [DE 93 at 4.] This

concession is appropriate, because “[a] medical condition need not be life-threatening to

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be serious; rather, it could be a condition that would result in further significant injury

or unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain if not treated.” Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d

610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 852 (7th Cir. 1999)). 

The seriousness of Sheppard’s medical condition is plainly suggested by the jail

doctor’s conclusion on November 20, 2012 that an urgent surgical consult was needed. 

[DE 83-1 at 5.] And even where defendants are not medical professionals, their

observations may nonetheless disclose a condition that is “so obvious that even a lay

person would perceive the need for a doctor’s attention.” Gayton, 593 F.3d at 620

(quoting Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 522 (7th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). 

Sheppard’s claims are pursued against the six individual defendants in their

individual capacities. [DE 59 at ¶2.] “[I]n order to hold an individual defendant liable

under §1983 for a violation of an inmate’s constitutional rights, the inmate must show

that the defendant was personally responsible for that violation.” Rasho v. Elyea, 856

F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2017). The defendants’ generalized argument for summary

judgment fails to address Sheppard’s theory of relief as against particular defendants. 

In his affidavit, Sheppard contends that when his problems started in October 2012, he

complained to “the jail officers,” identifying Meade in particular by name. [DE 91-1 at

¶4.] During his later period of incarceration at the jail, when his bleeding was even

more severe, he complained to jail staff including Meade, Mudd and Fields [DE 91-1 at

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¶¶9-11.]2

 As for Nurse Stoops, Sheppard attests that he repeatedly complained to her

about the severity of his pain and the ineffectiveness of the treatment measures he’d

been afforded, but he was never sent to the hospital nor “ever provided medication that

helped with [his] severe pain or bleeding” or with materials to clean himself. [DE 91-1

at ¶16.]

Analyzing the record as to Sheppard’s particular theories for various defendants’

liability, I find that there is substantial agreement about the medical treatment Sheppard

received, but that there are genuine disputes of material fact about what did not occur

that the Eight Amendment may have required. The first of these issues is the timeliness

of treatment based on Sheppard’s complaints to the jail officers. “Intentional delays in

medical care may constitute deliberate indifference, even if the inmate’s medical

condition is non-life threatening.” Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 722 (7th Cir. 2017). 

The defendants don’t dispute Sheppard’s claims about the frequency of his

complaints and the severity of the pain he complained about, but no explanation is

offered, much less an undisputed one, for the delay in treatment between his

complaints beginning in mid-October 2012 and his (apparently first) visit with Nurse

Stoops on November 16, 2012. Then upon his return to the jail on November 26, 2013,

Sheppard’s history of hemorrhoids and current rectal bleeding were noted on an intake

2

 Particular allegations concerning defendant Marsh are not specifically made by

either party in connection with the motion for summary judgment. In the absence of a

showing of meritorious undisputed fact by either side, summary judgment will not be

granted to defendant Marsh. 

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screening report. [DE 83-1 at 6-7.] Sheppard attests that in December 2013 he also

reported incidents of severe pain and bleeding to jail staff including defendants Meade,

Mudd and Fields, but the movants’ records don’t show a visit to medical personnel

until December 24, after Sheppard’s request for a sick call on December 10. [DE 91-1 at

¶9; DE 83-1 at ¶¶9-12.] “A delay in treatment may show deliberate indifference if it

exacerbated the inmate’s injury or unnecessarily prolonged his pain,” and “even brief,

unexplained delays in treatment may constitute deliberate indifference.” Perez v.

Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 777-78 (7th Cir. 2015). 

The argument portion of the Kosciusko County defendants’ brief suffers from a

lack of citations to the record, particularly where it asserts facts not addressed in its

“Undisputed Factual Matters.” For instance, the defendants claim that it is undisputed

that the jail records “denote that [Sheppard] made a number of requests for medical

treatment regarding his hemorrhoids” and that “[e]ach of these requests was responded

to by jail personnel.” [DE 82 at 8.] Their documentary evidence does not support these

claims, and Sheppard’s affidavit and deposition testimony contradict them. In addition,

the Kosciusko County defendants have not expressly claimed that the few sick call

requests they have submitted constitute all the requests Sheppard made for medical

attention. Sheppard points out that the sick call request forms submitted by the

defendants are computer-generated, not completed personally by Sheppard, and that

they do not contain “all of the information I reported about my symptoms, such as

information about my pain or its level.” [DE 91-1 at ¶18.] 

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Concerning responsibility for delays in treatment, the record also contains no

evidence explaining how inmate requests for medical treatment were handled or

scheduled. No conclusions can be drawn as to whether the officers to whom Sheppard

complained were responsible, or whether Nurse Stoops or other medical personnel

were responsible for delays in treatment.

Another issue precluding summary judgment in favor of the defendants

concerns whether defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to Sheppard’s

complaints of severe pain. Surprisingly, the Defendants offer no evidence – such as an

affidavit or deposition testimony from Nurse Stoops or any other medical authority – to

explain why Sheppard’s complaints of severe pain were not addressed or why the

medical treatment he was offered was an adequate response to those complaints.

Indeed, the defendants have offered no affidavits or deposition testimony from any of

the defendants on any issue. Failing to provide any evidence from one’s own client

isn’t usually a good recipe for getting summary judgment. In all events, unnecessarily

prolonging an inmate’s pain may show deliberate indifference. Perez, 792 F.3d at 777-

78. 

The jail personnel repeatedly invoke case law from the Circuit about non-medical

defendants relying on determinations by medical professionals. [DE 82 at 7; DE 93 at 3.] 

But this principle is of no help to them, because their argument for summary judgment

is not specific for each defendant and does not suggest how (or support with evidence

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that) any jail officer relied on any medical professional’s determination at any particular

point in Sheppard’s time at Kosciusko County Jail. [DE 82 at 7; DE 93 at 3.] 

CONCLUSION

The Kosciusko County defendants have failed to demonstrate that they are

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Jason Sheppard’s Eighth Amendment claims. 

Disputed questions of material fact exist concerning whether delay in medical treatment

for Sheppard’s complaints of severe pain and rectal bleeding, and the failure to address

his complaints of severe pain in particular, constituted deliberate indifference to his

serious medical needs. 

ACCORDINGLY:

The Kosciusko County defendants’ motion for summary judgment [DE 81] is

DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: February 20, 2018.

 /s/ Philip P. Simon 

United States District Judge

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