UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

JOSHUA R. JONES, ET AL., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

) CAUSE NO. 2:14-CV-26-PPS

v. )

)

TOWN OF HIGHLAND INDIANA, )

ET AL., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This case involves the tragic shooting of a mentally ill man, Joshua Jones, inside

his home by a police officer who was called there to respond to a domestic dispute. 

Jones was 27 at the time and suffered from schizophrenia. He lived in the home with

his mother. The police were called to the residence because Jones’ odd and frightening

behavior made his mother concerned for her safety. Two officers arrived at the

residence and a struggle involving Jones, his mother, and the two officers ensued,

which ultimately resulted in one of the officers fatally shooting Jones. Jones’ mother

filed this action on behalf of herself, Jones, and Jones’ estate against the officers and

several others alleging claims of excessive force, wrongful death, and intentional

infliction of emotional distress. Several of the claims and defendants were previously

dismissed, and because I find that the shooting, while immensely tragic, was a

reasonable use of force, the remaining claims are now disposed of on the defendants’

motion for summary judgment.
Background

At the time of his death, Joshua Jones was 27 years old, stood 5 foot 7 inches tall,

and weighed 177 pounds. [DE 31-5 at 2.] Jones lived with his mother, Marcella Amos,

in a second floor apartment in Highland, Indiana. [DE 28-1 at 6; DE 28-8 at 141.] Jones

was diagnosed with schizophrenia in 2008 and had a history of being noncompliant

with his prescribed medications. [DE 28-8 at 39-41, 112, 214.] Amos testified that

people were often misled by Jones’ size, and described Jones as having been “extra

strong” since he was a child. [DE 31-2 at 3.] Since the age of five, Jones had been taking

martial arts lessons on and off. Jones attempted to join the U.S. Marine Corps in the fall

of 2008 but was sent home after a week and a half due to mental illness. [DE 28-8 at 59.]

Jones has an unfortunate history of prior commitments to mental health facilities. 

In January 2009, Amos had Jones committed to a mental ward in Merrillville, Indiana

after Jones was not acting himself one night—he broke his cell phone by throwing it

down, and it “seemed like he didn’t understand English.” [Id. at 35, 38.] At some point

after Jones’ first commitment, Amos visited the Highland Police Department to let them

know that, although her son was not violent, she might need their help to have him

committed a second time. [Id. at 36–38.] Amos testified that she “might have talked to

the police chief” during this visit. [Id. at 36.] During Jones’ second commitment—this

time at St. Margaret in Dyer, Indiana—Amos testified that it “took three to four

policemen” to restrain Jones and “they kind of had to eventually body-slam him.” [DE

31-2 at 3.] Amos had Jones committed for a third time, this time to St. Catharine’s. [Id.

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at 22]. On this third occasion, two Highland Police Officers and two paramedics took

Jones away. The record is unclear on the date of these last two commitments, except

that his commitment to St. Catherine’s occurred after his commitment to St. Margaret. 

After his commitment in 2009, Jones was prescribed medication for his

schizophrenia, which initially consisted of monthly shots, but at the time of his

commitment at St. Margaret, he wasn’t taking his shots. [DE 28-8 at 37–39.] By January

2012, Jones was supposed to take four pills every day; two milligrams of risperidone

twice a day, and two milligrams of benzodiazepine twice a day. [Id. at 42.] Jones died

on Tuesday, January 31, 2012, just after midnight. The last time he took any of his

prescribed medication was Sunday, January 29, 2012, and it was only a half-dose. [Id. at

41.] And Jones did not take any of his medication the four days prior to that. [Id. at

41–42.]

According to Amos, her son “had been acting different” on Monday, January 30. 

[Id. at 43.] In the afternoon, he “came and kind of put his arm around [Amos’] neck

from behind,” which Amos said was out of character for Jones despite him saying that

he was just playing around. [Id. at 43–44.] Amos says that Jones had “weird, strange

looks on his face” and was “acting strange, watching [her].” [Id. at 44.] Jones also

cursed earlier in the day, which Amos says he didn’t normally do, when she asked if he

was going to take his medication. [Id.] But when Amos asked Jones if he needed to talk

to someone or go to the doctor, he responded “No, I don’t need to talk to anyone.” [Id.

at 60.] 

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Some time later that day, Jones entered Amos’ bedroom holding a knife with one

hand while bending the blade of the knife with the other. [DE 28-8 at 44, 52–53.] Amos

told Jones “about three or four times” to put the knife back, and he did so when he saw

that Amos was about to get up from her bed. [Id. at 52.] Some time after this incident,

while Amos was going to the kitchen to return a plate of food, Jones reached out to

touch her neck at a “pulse point,”something Jones had learned about in his martial arts

classes. [Id. at 54.] Amos blocked him. [Id.] Jones then told Amos that it looked like

she had a lump on her neck, so Amos proceeded to the bathroom to check. [Id.] As

Amos was on her way, Jones asked her what she was scared of and why she was

“running.” [Id.] Amos responded that she wasn’t running and that she wasn’t afraid;

she was “just looking to see if there [was] a lump on [her] neck.” [Id.] In fact, Amos was

afraid because Jones was near a container full of knives. [Id. at 46, 123.] 

After checking her neck in the bathroom, Amos went back to her bedroom,

locked her door, and blockaded the door. [Id. at 45, 54.] Amos says she blockaded the

door based on instinct since Jones was not acting normal. To put it plainly, she was in

“safety mode.” [Id. at 46.] In fact, Amos was so alarmed by Jones’ behavior that while

blockaded in her bedroom, she texted her mother instructing her to call the police,

which her mother did. [Id. at 46-47.]

This is when Officer Orth and Corporal Anderson came into the picture. After

the 911 call from Amos’ mom, both were dispatched to Amos’ home for a domestic

disturbance “possibly between a mother and son.” [Id. at 140.] An ambulance was also

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dispatched to Amos’ home so that Jones could be taken to the hospital for medical

attention. [Id. at 143.] Before Orth and Anderson rang the buzzer of Amos’ house,

Jones asked his mother if she called the police. [Id. at 47.] She feigned ignorance and

asked Jones what the police were there for and told him to let them in. [Id.] “[R]ight

before the buzzer rang,” Amos heard Jones “fumbling like he might have picked up a

knife.” [Id.] Amos “hurried up” and texted her mother again imploring her to call the

police immediately and let them know that she thought Jones picked up a knife. [Id.] 

Jones let the officers in and Amos slowly came out of her room. [Id. at 48.] Orth,

Anderson, and Amos talked in the living room area of the house. Amos told the officers

that her son was schizophrenic and recounted the strange things he had done earlier

that day, including that he had threatened her with a knife. [Id. at 67, 142; DE 9 at 5–6.] 

So the officers well knew that they were dealing with someone with a serious mental

illness. Amos asked Jones to move out of the kitchen area, away from the knives, and

into the living room. [DE 28-8 at 48.] 

In the meantime, Amos’ mom called 911 as Amos had requested. This call came

into dispatch at 12:51 am on January 31. She told the dispatcher, consistent with what

Amos had told her, that Jones “might have a knife.” [Id. at 13–14.] 

Meanwhile, back inside the Amos apartment, Amos asked Jones to show the

officers the knife he had earlier, but Jones denied having a knife. [DE 28-1 at 19.] While

Orth, Amos, and Jones were in the living room area talking, Anderson stepped away to

talk to dispatch on his radio. [Id.] The dispatcher informed Anderson that Jones might

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have a knife. [DE 28-8 at 14.] At that moment, Jones suddenly lunged at his mom and

hit her in the face, knocking her onto her back in the hallway. [Id. at 49–50; DE 28-1 at

19.] Jones jumped on her and started swinging at her. [DE 28-8 at 50.] 

The parties offer somewhat differing versions of what happened next. Amos

testified that as Jones was on top of her on the floor of the hallway, Orth struggled with

Jones and ended up on top of him. [Id.; DE 31-2 at 10.] Amos was on her back, Jones

was directly on top of her and facing her, and Orth was on Jones’ back also facing

Amos. [DE 31-2 at 10.] Jones was moving his arms about in a sort of “[g]et off me”

motion. [Id.] Orth then said “Tase him, tase him,” and Anderson, who was standing

away from the struggle, responded by saying “I’m coming. I’m coming.” [Id. at 11.] 

Anderson came over and positioned himself on top of Orth. [Id.] Amos then heard

Jones yell and felt a “sparkling” sensation, but didn’t see Anderson deploy his taser. 

Amos then rolled out from underneath Jones and into the kitchen, and then she stood

up. [Id.] 

At this point, Jones was pinned face down underneath Orth, who managed to

restrain Jones’ dominant right arm and put his knee in Jones’ back, while Anderson was

standing by. [Id. at 11, 12, 20, 22.] Amos couldn’t see where Jones’ left arm was, but

didn’t see Jones get hold of Orth’s baton or reach for his gun while she was in the

apartment. [Id. at 14, 20.] Amos says that Jones was “glued to the ground.” [Id. at 14.]

Amos acknowledged that when she retreated to the kitchen, Jones continued to struggle

with the officer, prompting Amos to yell to him to stop putting up a struggle. [Id.] 

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Amos testified that she then scrambled out of the apartment and shut the door behind

her. [Id.] She says that it was just a matter of seconds between when she crawled out

from underneath the pile up to when she exited the apartment. [Id. at 26.] When Amos

was right outside the door, she heard Jones saying “Get off me, get off me” and making

a noise like “Uh, uh, uh.” [Id. at 14.] A few seconds later, she heard three gunshots. [Id.

at 14–15.] 

Amos testified that it was “less than ten seconds or so” from when she last saw

Jones pinned to the ground to when she heard the three gunshots. [Id. at 27.] She didn’t

hear any sounds of a struggle while outside her apartment door and didn’t hear any

more shots while exiting the apartment building. [Id. at 20, 27.] Amos testified that, in

total, it was “[m]ore or less” thirty seconds from when Amos exited her apartment to

when she made it outside of the building. [Id.] Amos stated in an interview with a

Highland Police detective the night of the shooting that she was in fear for her life and

that the she believed that the officers acted to save their lives that night. [DE 28-1 at 33.]

Under the officers’ version of the events, Jones was facing Orth—not

Amos—during the struggle on the floor of the hallway. [DE 31-1 at 28–29.] Orth

attempted to restrain Jones and get him in handcuffs. [Id. at 7-8.] Jones was resisting

Orth’s restraint, striking him in the facial area once or twice, and Orth lost his handcuffs

during the struggle. [Id. at 8–9.] Jones then grabbed for Orth’s gun “and tried to get it

out of the holster.” [Id. at 8.] Orth clamped down on his gun with both his hands and

7
yelled out that Jones was trying to get his gun. [Id. at 9–10.] Orth recalls hearing Jones

say “give me your gun” and being punched in the face a few times. [DE 28-1 at 57.] 

There was a struggle for Orth’s gun, which was holstered on his right side next to his

baton. Anderson came over and put his hand on top of Orth’s and Jones’ hands, then

deployed his taser on Jones seconds later. [Id. at 10; DE 28-1 at 57.] The taser’s log

indicates that Anderson first deployed it 12 seconds after 12:58am. [DE 28-8 at 11.] 

After Anderson deployed his taser, he backed down the hallway and reloaded a second

taser cartridge. [DE 28-1 at 47.] According to the officers, Amos left the house some

time during this struggle, but they don’t know exactly when that was. [Id, at 47, 59.]

At some point during the struggle, according to the officers, Jones got hold of

Orth’s baton, located only inches away from Orth’s gun on his right side. [DE 31-1 at

14; DE 28-2 at 144.] Jones grabbed the baton with his non-dominant left hand and

struck Orth in the back of his head with it once or twice. [DE 28-8 at 145; DE 31-1 at 14-

15.] For her part, Amos testified that while she did not see Jones with the baton in his

hand, she had no reason to disbelieve that he had taken it and attacked the officers with

it once she left the apartment. [DE 31-2 at 11, 17.] 

After hitting Orth with the baton this first time, Jones went toward Anderson. 

[DE 28-1 at 57.] Orth then heard Anderson’s taser go off again in the living room. [Id. at

58.] The taser log shows that Anderson deployed his taser 34 seconds after 12:58am,

exactly 22 seconds after he first deployed it. [DE 28-8 at 11.] Jones then came back at

Orth, hitting him in the hand once or twice with the baton. [DE 28-1 at 58.] After

8
attacking Orth, Jones advanced toward Anderson with the baton in hand. [Id. at 50.] 

Jones swung the baton at Anderson, striking him in his left arm. [Id. at 51.] Jones

backed up, looked towards the hallway, and then “focused back on [Anderson]” and

started to come towards him again. [Id. ] While getting up from the floor, Orth saw

Jones advancing with the baton raised high toward Anderson, who was backed up

against the hallway door. [Id. at 58.] Anderson says he considered himself in a life and

death struggle, so he drew his firearm. [Id. at 51.] Anderson says he fired two or three

times, but Jones continued to advance with the baton raised, so he fired another four or

five times, after which Jones fell to the ground. [Id.] Orth’s version varies slightly: he

says he heard four shots, then two shots, then saw Jones collapse. [Id. at 58.] Anderson

then got on his radio and said, “Shots fired.” [Id.]

Orth estimates that the whole struggle, from when Jones first struck his mother,

to when Anderson first shot Jones, lasted approximately a minute. [DE 28-8 at 154.] 

This estimate seems accurate as it is corroborated by the fact that the total time from

when the dispatcher told Anderson that Jones might have a knife, which was when the

struggle started, to when Anderson said “shots fired” over the radio, was between 38

and 51 seconds. [Id. at 14.]

The defendants provide the affidavit of Dr. William Smock, who determined that

both Orth and Anderson’s medical history and statements were consistent with the

physical evidence and the injuries on their bodies. [Id. at 194-95.] According to Dr.

Smock, there was evidence that Officer Orth sustained blunt force trauma to his head as

9
a result of being struck by Jones, which caused a scalp hematoma. [Id.] Anderson also

sustained blunt force trauma to his arms and hands. [Id.] Dr. Smock determined that

Jones was shot eight times. [Id. at 197.] According to Dr. Smock, the bullet wounds also

support the officers’ version of events. [Id. at 198.] One of the bullets that entered

Jones’ body ricocheted off of the baton, flattening the bullet, and leaving a

corresponding mark on the baton. [Id.] A bullet that entered Jones’ left hand resulted

in a wound path consistent with Jones swinging the baton with his left hand. [Id. at

199.] And another bullet, which “entered the back of Jones’ neck with a downward

trajectory,” suggests that Jones was either advancing toward Anderson or “charging at

[him] with his head lowered.” [Id.] The defendants also provide reports from two

police practices experts who determined that Anderson’s use of deadly force was

consistent with law enforcement standards and practice. [Id. at 175; DE 28-21 at 11.] 

Amos filed this suit on her own behalf, on behalf of her son, and on behalf of her

son’s estate against the Town of Highland, Dan Vasser (individually and in his official

capacity as President of Highland Town Council), the Highland Police Department,

Peter Hojnicki (individually and in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Town

of Highland), Corporal Shawn Anderson (individually and in his official capacity as

Corporal in the Highland Police Department), and Officer Brian Orth (individually and

in his official capacity as an officer in the Highland Police Department). 

Some of the claims were previously dismissed either voluntarily or by order of

the Court. Here’s what remains: (1) a section 1983 claim for excessive force against

10
Corporal Anderson and Officer Orth in their individual capacities; (2) a section 1983

claim under Monell against the Town of Highland; and (3) a state law claim for

wrongful death against the Town of Highland. [DE 14 at 15.] 

The defendants now seek summary judgment on these remaining claims. [DE

27.] Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

Discussion

I will begin with the defendants’ argument that they are entitled to summary

judgment on Amos’ excessive force claim against Corporal Anderson and Officer Orth. 

Corporal Anderson claims to have been faced with an imminent threat of death or great

bodily harm in his encounter with Jones, thus justifying his use of deadly force. [DE 28

at 11-15.] A police officer’s use of deadly force is a seizure within the meaning of the

Fourth Amendment and so it must be reasonable. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7

(1985). Deadly force may be used if the officer has probable cause to believe that a

suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officer. Muhammed v. City of

Chicago, 316 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12); Sherrod v.

Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc). The suspect need not necessarily be

armed with a firearm to justify the use of deadly force. See Sherrod, 856 F.2d at 805

(suspect was unarmed); City & Cty. of San Francisco, Calif. v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765,

1775, 191 L. Ed. 2d 856 (2015) (suspect was armed with a knife). So when a police

11
officer “believes that a suspect’s actions places him, his partner or those in the

immediate vicinity in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, the officer can

reasonably exercise the use of deadly force.” Sherrod, 856 F.2d at 805.

The relevant inquiry is objective. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).

The officer’s subjective good or bad intentions do not enter into the analysis. See id. 

And there’s no room for Monday morning quarter-backing. This means that courts

must view the matter “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather

than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 396. Moreover, the reasonableness

calculation must be a pragmatic one taking into account “the fact that police officers are

often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense,

uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a

particular situation.” Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 756 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Graham,

490 U.S. at 396-97). 

The central issue for this claim, therefore, is when Anderson fired his weapon,

whether it is more likely than not that he reasonably believed that he was in imminent

danger of death or serious bodily harm. The evidence relied upon by the defendants

indicates that it is. It is undisputed that Jones was schizophrenic, not taking his

medication, was “extra strong” for his size and trained in martial arts, and was acting

bizarrely in the hours preceding his death—so much so that Amos went into “safety

mode” and blockaded herself in her bedroom and texted her mother to call the police.

Amos explained these events, including that Jones had schizophrenia, was not acting

12
like himself, and had threatened her with a knife, to the officers during their meeting in

the living room before Jones assaulted his mom.

It also is undisputed that while Amos, Jones, and Orth were in the living room,

and Anderson had stepped away to talk to dispatch and learned that Jones may have a

knife, Jones suddenly lunged at his mom and hit her in the face, knocking her into the

hallway. While the accounts of what happened next differ in some respects, it is

undisputed that there was a pile up of Amos, Jones, and Orth on the floor of the

hallway and Jones was tased by one of the officers, the effects of which were felt by

Amos on the bottom of the pile. At some point, and the record is admittedly unclear on

when exactly this happened, Amos freed herself from the pile and scurried out of the

apartment. She testified that as she freed herself and walked out, she saw that Jones

was pinned to the floor underneath Orth, who had restrained Jones’ right arm and put

his knee in Jones’ back. But according to Amos, Jones was still struggling with the

officer when Amos left the apartment; she had asked him to stop struggling before

leaving the apartment. [DE 31-2 at 14]. 

The officers say that at some point after Jones was tased, Anderson backed away

to reload his taser and Jones got hold of Orth’s baton, striking Orth with it once or twice

in the back of the head and then went for Anderson, who again tased Jones, who turned

around and went back for Orth, hitting him in the hand once or twice. The officers say

that Jones then advanced on Anderson with Orth’s baton in hand, swinging it and

striking Anderson again. Jones then backed away, looked towards the hallway, and

13
again started advancing towards Anderson with Orth’s baton raised high and

Anderson was backed up against a door. It was at this point that Anderson considered

himself in a life and death struggle, drew his firearm, and fired several shots at Jones

until he ceased to advance and fell to the ground. 

As I mentioned, the record is unclear on exactly where Amos was during the

critical time when Jones wrestled the baton away from Orth. Amos says that she did not

see Jones get hold of the baton and she was already outside by the time Jones was shot. 

But recall that she also conceded that she had no reason to disbelieve the officers’

testimony that at some point, Jones got a hold of one of the officers’ batons. [DE 31-2 at

11, 17]. With Jones being deceased, there are no other eye-witnesses to the shooting and

the events immediately prior to it. All we have to go on are the officers’ accounts. And

it’s important to keep in mind that events moved rapidly that night. The entire

struggle, from when Jones first lunged at Amos to when he fell to the ground after

being shot, lasted approximately one minute. 

The officers’ testimony about what happened after Amos left the apartment is

corroborated by a forensic expert. The expert testified that the physical evidence

showed that Jones had the baton at the time Anderson employed deadly force. Indeed,

both Orth and Anderson had evidence of blunt force trauma used against them. And

there is evidence that one of the bullets ricocheted off of the baton before entering Jones’

body, thus confirming that Jones had the baton at the critical time. What’s more, the

trajectory of the bullets shows that Jones was advancing on Anderson when the shots

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were fired. In addition, reports from two police practice experts, submitted by

defendants and unrebutted by Jones, confirm that the use of deadly force was consistent

with law enforcement standards and practice. “Officer Anderson’s deployment of

deadly force in this case was proper and justified in accord with and consistent with

standards of police practices and procedures and in accord with the universal training

and instruction provided to law enforcement officers in the United States with respect

to the circumstances which present a need for the use of deadly force in the texts of the

record in ths case.” [DE 28-8 at 189.]

Amos points to several facts that she believes are material and in dispute to

combat the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this issue, but those facts are

either not material to the issue or require impermissible speculation on my part to

create a potential dispute. For example, while the direction that Orth was facing in the

pile up that occurred when Jones attacked Amos [DE 31 at 3-4] may be disputed, this

fact is not material to the issue of whether Anderson reasonably believed he was in

imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm. Furthermore, the fact that Amos did

not see Jones attempt to touch Orth’s gun [id. at 4-5] and did not see Jones gain control

of Orth’s baton [id. at 4] does not mean that these events did not occur and only asks me

to speculate that they may have not. Similarly, Amos also offers the fact that the police

never tested Orth’s baton for Jones’ prints [id. at 4], that Jones was right handed [id. at

5], and that Jones was pinned to the ground when Amos left the apartment [id. at 4] as

an invitation for me to impermissibly speculate that maybe Jones did not ever have

15
control of Orth’s baton. But that would all be speculation on my part. Amos is inviting

this kind of speculation because she admittedly did not see what happened in the

apartment after she left. So at the end of the day, the officers’ testimony regarding what

happened inside that apartment after Amos left remains uncontradicted and, based on

the evidence, Anderson had probable cause to believe that he was in imminent danger

of death or serious bodily injury, and it was, therefore, reasonable for him to use deadly

force. Anderson’s actions, therefore, did not violate Jones’ constitutional rights. 

Furthermore, because I find that Anderson did not violate Jones’ constitutional rights,

Orth cannot be subjected to bystander liability, as Amos argues [DE 31 at 17-18]. Yang

v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994). For these reasons, summary judgment is

granted as to the excessive force claim against Orth and Anderson.1

The defendants also move for summary judgment on Amos’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983

unconstitutional custom, policy, or practice claim against the Town of Highland,

premised on Monell liability. Amos claims the Town permitted excessive use of police

force to such an extent that it constituted a policy or custom. (Compl. ¶¶ 27-37.) “[T]o

prevail on a Monell claim, the plaintiff must establish (1) that he suffered a

constitutional injury, e.g., he was a victim of excessive force by a police officer, and (2)

that the city authorized or maintained a custom of approving the unconstitutional

conduct.” Thompson v. Boggs, 33 F.3d 847, 859 (7th Cir. 1994). 

1

Because I find that the officers did not violate Jones’ constitutional rights, there

is no need for me to delve into the officers’ qualified immunity argument. Scott v.

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007).

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Here, Amos fails on the first step because, as discussed above, Jones did not

suffer a constitutional injury because Anderson had probable cause to believe that he

was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury when he shot Jones, and it

was, therefore, reasonable for him to use deadly force. “Neither the City nor the police

officers’ supervisor can be held liable on a failure to train theory or on a municipal

policy theory absent a finding that the individual police officers are liable on the

underlying substantive claim.” Estate of Phillips v. City of Milwaukee, 123 F.3d 586, 597

(7th Cir. 1997). As the Supreme Court of the United States held:

[N]either Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436

U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), nor any other of

our cases authorizes the award of damages against a municipal

corporation based on the actions of one of its officers when in

fact the jury has concluded that the officer inflicted no

constitutional harm. If a person has suffered no constitutional

injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that

the departmentalregulations might have authorized the use of

constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point.

Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (1986) (per curiam). Because Jones did not suffer a

constitutional injury, Amos’ Monell claim against the Town of Highland cannot be

sustained and the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim is granted.

The lone remaining claim is Amos’ wrongful death claim, which is grounded in

state law. The principle of comity would normally encourage me to relinquish

supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim and to hold that dismissal applies only

to the federal side of the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Hansen v. Bd. of Trs. of Hamilton

Southeastern Sch. Corp. , 551 F.3d 599, 608 (7th Cir. 2008). 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) provides

17
that “[t]he district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim

. . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction.” But “[w]hile a district court may relinquish its supplemental jurisdiction if

one of the conditions of § 1367(c) is satisfied, it is not required to do so.” Hansen, 551

F.3d at 608 (emphasis in original); see also Williams Elecs. Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 479 F.3d

904, 907 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that it is a presumption and not a rule that if federal

claims drop out before trial, the district court should relinquish jurisdiction over the

state-law claims). Supplemental jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion and its

justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience, comity, and

fairness to litigants. Hansen, 551 F.3d at 608. Because Amos’ wrongful death claim

arises from the exact same conduct as her federal claims, the claims are inextricably

intertwined and, having already decided the issue in this Opinion, it would make no

sense for me to dismiss this claim to be litigated in state court costing both the state

judiciary and the parties more time and money. Hansen, 551 F.3d at 608. As such, I will

rule on this final claim.

Indiana’s wrongful death statute provides that “[w]hen the death of one is

caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the personal representative of the

former may maintain an action therefor against the latter, if the former might have

maintained an action had he or she, as the case may be, lived, against the latter for an

injury for the same act or omission.” Ind. Code § 34-23-1-1. Indiana law provides that a

law enforcement officer is justified in using deadly for if the officer “has probable cause

18
to believe that deadly force is necessary . . . to effect an arrest of a person who the officer

has probable cause to believe poses a threat of serious bodily injury to the officer or a

third person.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-3. For the reasons explained above, I find that

Anderson’s use of deadly force was reasonable because he had probable cause to

believe the he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury. For these

reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Amos’ wrongful death claim

against the Town of Highland is granted.

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment [DE 27]. Because this Opinion and Order disposes of all remaining

claims, the Court DIRECTS the clerk to ENTER FINAL JUDGMENT. The clerk shall

treat this civil action as TERMINATED. All pending dates and motions in this case are

VACATED.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: September 6, 2016

_s/ Philip P. Simon_______________

PHILIP P. SIMON, CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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