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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

TAMIKA WILSON, 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

LEAR SEATING CORPORATION, 

 Defendant. 

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NO. 2:14–CV-374 

 

OPINION AND ORDER

 This matter is before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment, filed by Lear Seating Corporation (“Lear”) on 

May 5, 2016 (DE #19), and Defendant’s Motion to Strike Inadmissible 

Hearsay Evidence filed by Lear on July 1, 2016 (DE #29). For the 

reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(DE #19) is GRANTED, and Defendant’s Motion to Strike (DE #29) is 

GRANTED. Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED with prejudice and 

the Clerk is DIRECTED to CLOSE this case. 

BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Tamika Wilson (“Wilson”) had been employed by Lear 

from 2000 until 2013. In January 2012, Wilson filed a complaint 

of sexual harassment by a co-worker, and as a result, Lear fired 
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the co-worker. Wilson alleges that after the termination of this 

co-worker, she was subjected to severe and pervasive harassment 

and retaliatory conduct by her other co-workers and her supervisor. 

In June 2013, Wilson filed a charge of sex discrimination and 

retaliation with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

(“EEOC”). Three months after filing this charge, Lear suspended 

Wilson for performance. Lear terminated Wilson’s employment on 

October 28, 2013. 

Wilson filed this action asserting that Lear had retaliated 

against her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Lear denies that it violated 

Title VII, and filed the instant motion for summary judgment. This 

motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for adjudication. Lear 

also filed a motion to strike certain evidence Wilson submitted in 

response to Lear’s summary judgment motion. Wilson did not respond 

to Lear’s motion to strike. 

DISCUSSION 

Motion to Strike 

Lear’s motion to strike urges the Court to strike the alleged 

declarations of union representative Sherri Franciski 

(“Franciski”) as inadmissible hearsay. Wilson failed to respond 

to this motion, which is a sufficient reason to grant it. See

generally Wojtas v. Capital Guardian Tr. Co., 477 F.3d 924, 926 
‐3‐ 

(7th Cir. 2007) (failure to oppose an argument constitutes waiver). 

“It is the function of the Court, with or without a motion to 

strike, to carefully review the evidence and to eliminate from 

consideration any argument, conclusions, and assertions 

unsupported by the documented evidence of record offered in support 

of the statement.” Wajvoda v. Menard, Inc., No. 2:11–CV–393, 2015 

WL 5773648, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2015) (citations omitted). 

As such, the Court will consider the merits of Lear’s motion to 

strike. 

In response to Lear’s motion for summary judgment, Wilson 

relies on evidence that Franciski said that “there’s a witch hunt 

after you [Wilson]. They do not want you in here.” (DE #27-1 at 

40.) The only evidence that Wilson cites to support this assertion 

is testimony from her own deposition. Because she offers 

Franciski’s statements “to prove the truth of the matter asserted,” 

the statements are hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c); see Rogers v. 

Waukegan Pub. Sch. Dist. 60, 924 F. Supp. 2d 940, 946 (N.D. Ill. 

2013) (disregarding plaintiff’s testimony as hearsay where he 

testified to the statement of an out-of-court declarant in an 

attempt to establish the truth of the matter asserted by the 

declarant - that a group was “out to get” plaintiff and wanted to 

replace him). “A party may not rely upon inadmissible hearsay to 

oppose a motion for summary judgment.” Gunville v. Walker, 583 
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F.3d 979, 985 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Therefore, 

Lear’s motion to strike (DE #29) is GRANTED. 

Motion for Summary Judgment 

Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine 

dispute of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 

2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). Not every dispute between the 

parties makes summary judgment inappropriate; “[o]nly disputes 

over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary 

judgment.” Id. To determine whether a genuine dispute of material 

fact exists, the Court must construe all facts in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences 

in that party’s favor. See Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 

(7th Cir. 2010). 

A party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion 

may not rely on allegations in her own pleading but rather must 

“marshal and present the court with the evidence she contends will 

prove her case.” Goodman v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 

651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). “[I]nferences relying on mere 
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speculation or conjecture will not suffice.” Stephens v. Erickson, 

569 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). If the 

nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an essential 

element on which she bears the burden of proof at trial, summary 

judgment is proper. See Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th 

Cir. 2006). 

Facts 

In August 2000, Lear hired Wilson to work at Lear’s facility 

in Hammond, Indiana, where she assisted in assembling vehicle 

seats. Wilson was represented by UAW and its Local 2335 (“Union”). 

The Hammond facility had rules of employee conduct, a sexual 

harassment policy, and a progressive discipline system. Lear’s 

sexual harassment policy provides that “[n]o associate will suffer 

reprisal or retaliation as a result of reporting complaints of 

sexual harassment.” (DE #21-2 at 5.) Under the progressive 

discipline system, employees who violate rules or engage in 

misconduct may receive a series of increasingly more severe 

corrective actions. In the event of sufficiently serious 

misconduct, Lear could skip a step in the progression and implement 

serious corrective action such as suspension or discharge. Upon 

the request of the Union, Lear could agree to repeat a step rather 

than moving to the next step in the progression. 
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On January 17, 2008, Wilson received a verbal warning for 

violating the rule against wasting time or loitering during work 

hours. Three years later, on January 19, 2011, Wilson received a 

verbal warning for violating the rule against making scrap, rework or careless workmanship. Wilson received a verbal warning 

for the same conduct a few weeks later, on December 1, 2011. On 

December 21, 2011, Wilson received a verbal warning for wasting 

time or loitering during work hours. Wilson doesn’t recall the 

circumstances surrounding of any of these verbal warnings.1

On January 27, 2012, Wilson submitted an incident report to 

Barbara Sacha (“Sacha”), the human resource manager at Lear’s 

Hammond facility. In that report, Wilson accused co-worker Xavier 

Curtis (“Curtis”) of making inappropriate sexual gestures. Sacha 

investigated Wilson’s complaint and discharged Curtis effective 

February 1, 2012. Wilson was satisfied with this outcome. 

Wilson testified that after Curtis was terminated, she 

continued to be harassed by other male co-workers. She identified 

                                                            

1 Lear’s discipline policy states that a verbal warning will remain 

on an employee’s record for three months, but if the employee 

subsequently receives a written warning, both disciplines remain 

on the employee’s record for six months, and if the employee 

receives a second warning, all disciplines remain on the employee’s 

record for one year. A suspension remains on an employee’s record 

for one year. While Wilson argues that her employment record 

should have reflected only those disciplines that occurred within 

one year of her termination on October 28, 2013, she does not 

dispute that she received disciplines after October 28, 2012, 

including suspensions. 
‐7‐ 

several members of Lear management who allegedly turned a blind 

eye to this harassment, including supervisors Akelius Lloyd 

(“Lloyd”), Clint Barnard (“Barnard”), and Darryl Harper 

(“Harper”). Wilson recalled occasions when supervisors would walk 

past her work area and “just shake their heads” while co-workers 

were making indecent gestures. (DE #27-1 at 21.) At one point, 

Harper told Wilson that he would not hug her because “he would be 

afraid that [she] would turn him in.” (Id. at 36.) 

On February 21, 2012, Wilson received a verbal warning for 

wasting time or loitering during work hours. On March 12, 2012, 

she received a written warning for making scrap, re-work or 

careless workmanship. Three days later, on March 15, 2012, Wilson 

received a written warning for leaving her work station. Wilson 

does not recall the details surrounding any of these disciplines. 

On March 22, 2012, Wilson received a final warning for creating or 

contributing to an unsanitary condition, but this warning was 

rescinded under an agreement between Lear and the Union. 

On April 27, 2012, Wilson submitted an incident report 

alleging that two co-workers had made inappropriate sexual 

gestures. Lear’s assistant human resources manager Monica Holt 

(“Holt”) and a Union representative investigated Wilson’s 

complaint by interviewing Wilson, the two co-workers Lamontrye 

Edmond (“Edmond”) and Keith Barrington (“Barrington”), and other 
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employees.2 None of the employees interviewed corroborated 

Wilson’s complaint. One employee allegedly stated that he had 

“seen male [sic] [and] females frown at [Wilson], because, they 

say she got someone fired, some say she’s crazy.” (DE #21-7 at 

20.) Holt and the Union representative provided Edmond and 

Barrington with copies of Lear’s rules of personal conduct and 

harassment policies “as a reminder of expected/prohibited 

behavior.” (Id. at 8.) They also met with Wilson to advise her 

of the investigation results, and encouraged her to report any 

additional concerns. 

On May 31, 2012, Wilson received a final warning for wasting 

time and loitering during work hours. On September 20, 2012, she 

received a final warning for refusing to adhere to reasonable 

orders, not performing job assignment, or restricting output. 

Wilson does not remember the details of either of these final 

warnings. 

On September 20, 2012, Wilson submitted an incident report 

alleging that she had a confrontation with two co-workers in which 

a co-worker swore at her. The two co-workers submitted incident 

reports asserting that Wilson had sworn at a co-worker. Holt and 

                                                            

2 Lear’s human resources specialist Patricia Tarver (“Tarver”) 

emailed Holt on April 27, 2012, stating that Edmonds was completing 

an incident report against Wilson, asserting that “she is harassing 

him. Barb [Sacha] came in and inquired. GET READY!!!!!” (DE 

#25-10.) 
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a Union representative investigated the incident, including 

interviewing Wilson, the two co-workers, another employee, and 

supervisor Joseph Watson (“Watson”). They were unable to 

corroborate Wilson’s complaint. Wilson admits signing the 

September 20, 2012, incident report, but does not recall meeting 

with Holt or their investigation of the incident. 

On September 26, 2012, Wilson received a final warning for 

threatening, intimidating, coercing, abusive language or fighting 

with any employee or supervisor. She does not recall the 

circumstances surrounding this discipline. 

On October 4, 2012, Wilson submitted an incident report 

complaining that co-workers were harassing her by making faces and 

a cuckoo gesture behind her back and rubbing seats in an 

inappropriate manner. Wilson noted that “[e]very day since my 

incident with the sexual harassment case which lead to an employee 

being fired, I’ve had to indure [sic] mental pain [and] plain out 

harassment from some co-workers.” (DE #21-2 at 25.) She 

identified Jaime Moran (“Moran”) as one of the co-workers engaging 

in this conduct. (Id.) Sacha met with Wilson to discuss this 

complaint. 

Sacha emailed Holt on October 5, 2012, stating in part that 

Wilson “has filed another Incident form alleging that she has had 

to endure mental pain every day since the termination of Xavier 

Curtis – as if nothing has ever occurred between 2011 and today. 
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I know that isn’t true.” (DE #25-5.) Sacha and Holt interviewed 

Moran, supervisor Watson, and a co-worker who was a potential 

witness to the alleged misconduct. Moran denied Wilson’s 

allegations, and Sacha and Holt found him to be credible. Watson 

and the co-worker denied witnessing the alleged misconduct. Sacha 

asked Watson “to stay on the alert to any inappropriate behavior 

on the line so that he can address it.” (DE #21-7 at 51.) Sacha 

and Holt met with Wilson and a Union representative to explain 

that they had investigated the incident but could not substantiate 

her complaint. 

On January 16, 2013, Wilson was suspended for wasting time or 

loitering, but the suspension was rescinded under an agreement 

between Lear and the Union. On February 9, 2013, supervisor Dave 

Maple (“Maple”) emailed Holt and Tarver asking that Wilson be 

disciplined for wearing headphones in both ears while walking on 

the production floor. (DE #25-6 at 1.) Assistant materials 

manager Brant Johnson (“Johnson”), who had been copied on Maple’s 

email, responded, “[s]hould we send her for a drug test?” (Id.) 

Maple replied, “[i]f it was up to me, yes.” (Id.) Holt denied 

the request, stating that “[p]rogressive discipline is appropriate 

in this case.” (Id. at 2.) On February 13, 2013, Wilson was 

suspended for disregarding safety rules by wearing headphones in 

both ears while walking on the production floor. Wilson denied 
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doing so, and testified that Maple was lying about her wearing 

both headphones. 

On February 21, 2013, Wilson was suspended for making scrap, 

re-work or careless workmanship. Wilson believes she filed a 

grievance with the Union about this discipline, but the Union never 

responded to it. On March 12, 2013, Wilson was suspended for 

creating or contributing to unsanitary conditions. She does not 

recall the circumstances surrounding this discipline. On May 9, 

2013, Wilson was suspended for making scrap, re-work or careless 

workmanship by making defective seats. Wilson recalls being spoken 

to about making defective seats, and believes that that the seats 

were sabotaged. In all, seven different supervisors or plant 

superintendents, including Watson, Maple, Barnard, and Lloyd 

requested discipline for Wilson.3 Several of Wilson’s disciplines 

were issued by Lear’s human resources personnel Sacha, Holt and 

Tarver. 

On June 5, 2013, Wilson filed an EEOC Charge (“EEOC Charge”) 

alleging: 

In January of 2012 I filed a sexual harassment complaint 

against my co-worker, he was discharged. I am being 

harassed by my Supervisor and my co-workers, making my 

work environment hostile to work in. On May 9, 2013, I 

was suspended for four days, allegedly for having 12 

defective seats. My White male co-worker had defective 

seats also but he received no discipline. I feel this 

                                                            

3 After Curtis was discharged, Lear hired Barnard, Lloyd, and two 

other supervisors who recommended discipline for Wilson. (DE #21-

6 at 4.) 
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is retaliation because of the incident. My male coworkers get behind me on the line and make inappropriate 

jesters [sic] behind my back and the Supervisor does 

nothing. 

(DE #21-2 at 38.) Wilson identified Barnard as the supervisor and 

“Dave” (last name unknown to her) as the white male co-worker 

mentioned in the EECO Charge. (DE #27-1 at 34-35.) She testified 

that Dave built the allegedly defective seats in October 2013 

(after she filed the EEOC Charge), and admitted that it was 

possible that Dave received discipline without her knowledge. 

(Id.) Wilson did not discuss the EEOC Charge with her co-workers 

or Lear management. Lear’s production supervisors and 

superintendents were not informed that Lear had received the EEOC 

Charge. 

On September 25, 2013, supervisors Barnard and Lloyd emailed 

Lear’s new human resources assistant manager, Stacey Miller 

(“Miller”), about Wilson. Their emails asserted that Wilson had 

not completed her work on particular seats on September 24 and 25, 

2013, among other issues. Miller and Lear’s new human resources 

manager, Jose Guajardo (“Guajardo”), conducted an initial 

investigation. On September 30, 2013, Miller and Guajardo met 

with Wilson and Union representative Jamie Luna (“Luna”). Wilson 

insisted that she had built the seats correctly and that the seats 

had been sabotaged. Miller, Guajardo, Luna and Wilson met with 

William Bear (“Bear”), a seat repair worker. During that meeting, 
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Bear was repeatedly asked “if he had seen anything as far as the 

seats. And [Bear] said that he did not. He did not find anything.” 

(Id. at 39.) Wilson noted that she was not shown a repair log 

reflecting the allegedly defective seats.4 Wilson was suspended 

pending further investigation. 

Guajardo and Miller met with Barnard, Luna and Bear outside 

of Wilson’s presence. Bear then confirmed that on September 24, 

2013, he repaired eleven seats from the zone in which Wilson was 

working. Miller attests that Bear “reluctant[ly]” identified 

Wilson as the operator. (DE #21-4 at 5 (Miller Aff. ¶11).) 

Guajardo and Miller found no proof of sabotage. 

Guajardo and Miller found that Wilson had violated the rule 

against making scrap, re-work and careless workmanship. Miller 

attests that she and Guajardo decided to terminate Wilson’s 

employment “because it was the next step in the progressive 

discipline process.” (Id., ¶12.) They reviewed her discipline 

history and saw that Wilson had been disciplined at the suspension 

level for the past four disciplines, rather than progressing to 

the next step of termination. They concluded that Lear had given 

Wilson multiple breaks, but her performance had not improved. They 

did not consult with or seek input from any superintendent or 

                                                            

4 Lear maintains that Guajardo and Miller did not need a repair log 

because Lloyd’s and Barnard’s emails “specifically identif[ied] 

the seats at issue by their BSN number.” (DE #28 at 8; see DE 

#21-4 at 8, 10.)
‐14‐ 

production supervisor in making the decision to terminate Wilson. 

Wilson’s employment was terminated effective October 28, 2013. 

The Union filed a grievance on Wilson’s behalf. After Wilson 

was discharged, Lear offered Wilson a “last chance agreement,” 

which included a release of Wilson’s claims against Lear and the 

possibility of immediate discharge upon a future violation of 

certain rules of employee conduct. Wilson rejected this agreement. 

Lear has offered last chance agreements to other discharged 

employees. When Wilson filed for unemployment benefits, Lear 

disputed her benefits claim. Lear has disputed unemployment claims 

of other discharged employees who had not made internal complaints 

about unlawful discrimination or harassment or filed EEOC charges. 

Analysis 

The Complaint alleges that Lear retaliated against Wilson for 

engaging in the protected activity of making sexual harassment 

complaints about her co-worker, and filing EEOC charges alleging 

sex discrimination and retaliation. (DE #1, ¶38.) When attempting 

to establish a retaliation claim, a plaintiff may proceed under 

the direct or indirect methods of proof. Both methods of proof 

converge on the same question at issue here: “could a reasonable 

trier of fact infer retaliation”? Castro v. DeVry Univ., Inc., 

786 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2015). To establish retaliation under 

the direct method, “a plaintiff must prove (1) that she engaged in 

statutorily protected activity; (2) that she was subjected to an 
‐15‐ 

adverse employment action; and (3) that there was a causal 

connection between the two.” Greengrass v. Int'l Monetary Sys. 

Ltd., 776 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).5

Lear concedes that Wilson’s January 27, 2012 internal 

complaint and June 5, 2013 EEOC Charge constituted protected 

activity. For the purpose of the instant motion, Lear assumes 

that Wilson’s internal complaints on April 27, 2012, September 20, 

2012, and October 4, 2012, also constituted protected activity. 

(DE #20 at 15 n.6); see Castro, 786 F.3d at 570 n.4 (noting that 

informal complaints can constitute protected activity for purposes 

of Title VII retaliation claim). 

The Complaint alleges that Lear took adverse employment 

action against Wilson by: ignoring her complaints about severe and 

pervasive harassment by co-workers; targeting her for unwarranted 

and trumped-up discipline; attempting to lure Wilson into dropping 

her case by offering her the last chance agreement; and terminating 

                                                            

5 Under the indirect method, an employee must show that “(1) the 

employee engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) she was 

meeting her employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) she suffered 

an adverse employment action; and (4) she was treated less 

favorably than similarly situated employees who did not engage in 

statutorily protected activity.” Majors v. General Elec. Co., 714 

F.3d 527, 537 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). The Court need 

not analyze the record under the indirect method because Wilson’s 

response brief does not raise this method, and so this argument 

has been waived. See Hutt v. AbbVie Prod. LLC, 757 F.3d 687, 694 

(7th Cir. 2014). Nonetheless, such an argument would likely fail 

because Wilson failed to provide evidence of a similarly-situated 

comparator who had not engaged in protected activities and who was 

treated more favorably than she. See id. 
‐16‐ 

her, after which Lear opposed her unemployment benefits claim. 

(DE #1, ¶39.) Lear does not dispute that Wilson’s suspensions and 

termination constituted adverse employment action, and assumes 

that the verbal, written and final warnings that she received also 

constituted adverse employment action. (DE #20 at 16 n.7); see 

Ellis v. CCA of Tennessee LLC, 650 F.3d 640, 650 (7th Cir. 2011) 

(noting “suspension could qualify as an adverse employment 

action”); Castro, 786 F.3d at 564 (noting that termination is an 

adverse employment action). Lear challenges the allegations that 

it retaliated against Wilson by: (1) ignoring her complaints about 

harassment; (2) trying to lure her into accepting the last chance 

agreement; and (3) opposing her unemployment benefits claim. (DE 

#20 at 21-24.) Because Wilson offers no response to Lear’s 

arguments regarding these three allegations, she effectively 

abandons them. See generally Roe-Midgett v. CC Servs., Inc., 512 

F.3d 865, 876 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that undeveloped argument 

constitutes waiver); see also Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., No. 

3:09-CV-338-PPS, 2011 WL 1884339, at *2 (N.D. Ind. May 18, 2011) 

(finding plaintiff had abandoned a particular retaliation theory 

because she did not rely on it in her summary judgment briefing). 

Therefore, for the purpose of this motion, the Court finds that 

Wilson was subjected to adverse employment action when she was 

disciplined by being issued warnings and being suspended, and when 

she was discharged.
‐17‐ 

The question is whether there is a causal connection between 

Wilson’s protected activity and the adverse employment action. 

Wilson relies on a “cat’s paw” theory of liability to prove her 

retaliation claim, asserting that questions of fact remain as to 

whether Lear’s decision-makers were “the unwitting dupes” of the 

“retaliatory supervisors” who sabotaged her. (DE #25 at 1; see 

id. at 7-8 (citing Miller v. Polaris Labs., LLC, 797 F.3d 486, 492 

(7th Cir. 2015)). 

[T]he “cat’s paw” theory can apply when a biased 

subordinate who lacks decision-making power uses the 

formal decision-maker as a dupe in a deliberate scheme 

to trigger a discriminatory employment action. 

Liability under that theory can be imposed where a nondecision-making employee with discriminatory animus 

provided factual information or input that may have 

affected the adverse employment action. 

Matthews v. Waukesha County, 759 F.3d 821, 829 (7th Cir. 2014) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see Miller, 797 

F.3d at 490 (noting that the cat’s paw theory is premised on the 

ability of the culpable actor to use an innocent decision-maker as 

an unknowing tool of the former’s animus). To create a question 

of fact under the “cat’s paw” theory, a plaintiff must present 

“affirmative evidence that [somebody] improperly influenced the 

decision-makers.” Brown v. Advocate S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 

1101, 1108 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Speculation that 

improper influence may have existed is insufficient to carry this 

burden. Id. 
‐18‐ 

 In Miller v. Polaris Laboratories, LLC, Polaris fired Miller 

after she consistently failed to meet a processing quota. 797 

F.3d at 490. Polaris argued that its decision to fire Miller was 

the direct consequence of her poor performance. Id. Miller 

maintained that she was set up to fail for racially discriminatory 

reasons because her supervisor and a coworker had tampered with 

her work, and the decision-makers were unaware that her ability to 

meet her quota had been sabotaged. Id. The Seventh Circuit found 

that Miller had shown a dispute of fact regarding whether her 

supervisor and coworker were motivated by racial animus based on 

evidence that they had made racially derogatory comments about 

Miller. Id. at 491. The Seventh Circuit also found that an issue 

of fact existed regarding whether the supervisor and coworker took 

actions that proximately caused Miller’s termination based on 

evidence that the supervisor and coworker had been seen sabotaging 

Miller’s work on multiple occasions. Although Polaris had some 

evidence that Miller’s work could not have been manipulated to the 

extent that she claimed, the Court found that this evidence “[wa]s 

not ironclad.” Id. at 492. 

Here, Wilson maintains that Lear’s human resources department 

issued disciplines with little or no scrutiny based upon a 
‐19‐ 

supervisor’s request.6 Similar to the plaintiff in Miller, Wilson 

asserts that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether 

her supervisors harbored retaliatory animus against her for 

getting Curtis fired, and whether the supervisors turned a blind 

eye to other co-workers’ harassment of Wilson. In support, Wilson 

asserts that she was written up twelve times in the sixteen months 

after she made the sexual harassment complaint against Curtis in 

January 2012, four of which occurred in the two months after making 

the complaint.7 The Court notes that Wilson also received three 

verbal warnings in 2011, before she complained about Curtis. 

“Suspicious timing alone rarely establishes causation, but if 

there is corroborating evidence that supports an inference of 

causation, suspicious timing may permit a plaintiff to survive 

summary judgment.” Sklyarsky v. Means-Knaus Partners, L.P., 777 

F.3d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 2015). 

Wilson relies upon three statements by supervisors as 

evidence that Lear management had a negative attitude toward her: 

(1) supervisor Harper’s alleged statement that he would not hug 

Wilson for fear she would turn him in; (2) manager Johnson’s 

suggestion that Wilson take a drug test in response to supervisor 

                                                            

6 The human resources department personnel included Sacha, Holt and 

Tarver, who issued disciplines to Wilson in 2012 and 2013, and 

Guajardo and Miller, who discharged Wilson in October 2013. 

7 Wilson acknowledges that the March 22, 2012 write-up and January 

16, 2013 suspension were rescinded. 
‐20‐ 

Maple’s email requesting Wilson’s discipline in February 2013; and 

(3) Maple’s emailed statement, “[i]f it was up to me, yes,” in 

response to Johnson’s suggestion that Wilson take a drug test. 

(DE #27-1 at 36; DE #25-6.) Wilson offers no evidence that Harper, 

Johnson or Maple had a role in the decision to discharge her. 

Therefore, a trier of fact could not find that any of them 

influenced that decision. See Castro, 786 F.3d at 568 (holding 

that a reasonable trier of fact could not find that a supervisor 

influenced termination decisions where there was no evidence that 

he had any input in the decisions to terminate plaintiffs). Nor 

does Wilson offer evidence that Harper or Johnson influenced Lear’s 

decisions to discipline her. While Harper’s alleged statement 

could be interpreted as referring to Wilson’s sexual harassment 

complaint, “stray remarks that are neither proximate nor related 

to the employment decision are insufficient to defeat summary 

judgment.” Sun v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 473 F.3d 799, 

813 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Wilson does not offer any 

evidence that his remark was related to any discipline, or that 

Harper recommended discipline or otherwise “exercised a 

significant degree of influence” over any decision to discipline 

her. Id. (citation omitted). As for Johnson, Wilson offers no 

evidence that he harbored any retaliatory animus toward her, or 

that he recommended any discipline for her. To the extent that 

Johnson’s suggestion that Wilson take a drug test could be 
‐21‐ 

considered an attempt to exercise influence over Lear’s decision, 

the attempt was unsuccessful because Holt declined the suggestion. 

Although Maple recommended Wilson’s February 13, 2013 

discipline, Wilson offers no evidence that Maple harbored 

retaliatory animus toward her for filing internal complaints or 

EEOC charges. Maple’s email recommending discipline does not 

reference Wilson’s protected activity, and Wilson testified that 

she “never had any issues with [Maple].” (DE# 27-1 at 29.) 

“[P]laintiffs must produce evidence that a retaliatory motive 

actually influenced the decision-maker, not merely that it could

have.” Brown, 700 F.3d at 1108 (emphasis in original). 

Wilson does not assert that Barnard and Lloyd - the 

supervisors who provided the information that led to her discharge 

- made derogatory statements about her sexual harassment 

complaints. Wilson points to no evidence suggesting that Barnard 

or Lloyd harbored retaliatory animus against Wilson for submitting 

internal complaints of sexual harassment, or that they (or any 

other supervisors) were even aware of her EEOC Charge. The Court 

is “not required to draw inferences that, are supported by only 

speculation [or] conjecture.” Simpson v. Beaver Dam Cmty. Hosps., 

Inc., 780 F.3d 784, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

Wilson cites two emails between Lear’s human resources 

personnel as demonstrating their frustration with Wilson’s issues 
‐22‐ 

with other co-workers. On April 27, 2012, Tarver emailed Holt, 

relaying co-worker Edmonds’ complaint that Wilson was harassing 

him, and suggesting that Holt “GET READY!” (DE #25-10.) On 

October 5, 2012, Sacha emailed Holt to relay Wilson’s complaint 

“that she has had to endure mental pain every day since the 

termination of Xavier Curtis – as if nothing has ever occurred 

between 2011 and today. I know that isn’t true.” (DE #25-5.) 

Considered in the light most favorable to Wilson, these emails 

indicate that Lear’s human resources personnel knew that a coworker had a conflict with Wilson in April 2012, and that they 

questioned the credibility of Wilson’s October 2012 harassment 

complaint. However, the undisputed evidence shows that Lear 

investigated these complaints, including interviewing the parties 

involved and possible witnesses. Wilson does not question the 

efficacy of these investigations. Moreover, she offers no evidence 

that Tarver or Sacha recommended any discipline for Wilson, or had 

any role in her discharge. For these reasons, Wilson has failed 

to submit evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could 

conclude that she was disciplined and discharged in retaliation 

for filing internal sexual harassment complaints or EEOC charges. 

Even if Wilson had evidence of a retaliatory motive, Lear may 

show that Wilson would have been discharged even absent her 

complaints about harassment. See Lord v. High Voltage Software, 

Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 564 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 
‐23‐ 

1115, 197 L. Ed. 2d 185 (2017). Where an employer can make such 

a showing, then the alleged retaliatory motive was not “a but-for 

cause of [the employee’s] harm.” Id. (citation omitted). An 

employee can avoid summary judgment by showing that a material 

factual dispute exists on the question of pretext. 

To show pretext, an employee must present evidence 

suggesting that the employer is dissembling. The 

question is not whether the employer’s stated reason was 

inaccurate or unfair, but whether the employer honestly 

believed the reason it has offered to explain the 

discharge. To meet this burden, the employee must 

identify such weaknesses, implausibilities, 

inconsistencies, or contradictions in the employer's 

proffered reason that a reasonable person could find [it] 

unworthy of credence. 

Castro, 786 F.3d at 565 (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted); see O'Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 635 

(7th Cir. 2011) (“It is not the court’s concern that an employer 

may be wrong about its employee’s performance, or may be too hard 

on its employee. Rather, the only question is whether the 

employer’s proffered reason was pretextual, meaning that it was a 

lie.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Here, Lear meets the burden of presenting a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for its employment actions by providing 

evidence that it disciplined and discharged Wilson for repeatedly 

violating company rules. “Inconsistent performance – though not 

uniformly bad – is a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for 

termination.” Castro, 786 F.3d at 580 (citation omitted). Lear’s 
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decisions to discipline Wilson were based on seven different 

supervisors’ assertions that Wilson violated various rules of 

employee conduct. Its decision to discharge Wilson was based on 

Guajardo and Miller’s investigation of two supervisors’ 

allegations that Wilson violated rules by building seats 

improperly in September 2013. Because Lear offers legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reasons for disciplining and discharging Wilson, 

the burden shifts to Wilson to demonstrate that Lear’s proffered 

reasons are a pretext for retaliatory intent. 

Wilson cannot recall the details of most of the disciplines 

she received. She contends that genuine issues of material fact 

exist as to two events: whether she violated Lear’s rule against 

wearing two headphones in February 2013, and whether she improperly 

built seats in September 2013. Wilson maintains that Bear made 

conflicting statements regarding whether she improperly built 

seats in September 2013. When questioned in Wilson’s presence, 

Bear allegedly said that he did not see “anything” regarding the 

defective seats (DE #27-1 at 39), but later “reluctant[ly]” told 

Miller that Wilson was the operator in the zone producing the 

defective seats (DE #21-4 at 5 (Miller Aff. ¶11). Wilson argues 

that Bear’s statement to Miller is inadmissible hearsay because it 

is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. But Bear’s 

statement to Miller is not hearsay because Lear does not offer 

this evidence as proof of the truth of that statement. Rather, it 
‐25‐ 

is offered to prove that Guajardo and Miller conducted an 

investigation of Barnard’s and Lloyd’s allegations and decided to 

discharge Wilson for reasons other than her sexual harassment 

complaints. See Boutros v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., LLC, 802 F.3d 

918, 924 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that out-of-court statements 

“presented not for their truth but as evidence of Avis's reasons 

for suspending and then firing” the plaintiff to be “clearly 

probative” as to whether Avis fired the plaintiff for 

nondiscriminatory reasons); Smith v. Wilson, 705 F.3d 674, 679 

(7th Cir. 2013) (statements were not hearsay where “they were 

offered not to prove the truth of the matter asserted . . . but 

rather for the non-hearsay purpose of explaining Wilson's 

subsequent actions”). This evidence also goes to demonstrate 

Guajardo and Miller’s honest belief that Wilson improperly built 

the seats. See Pugh v. City of Attica, Ind., 259 F.3d 619, 627 

n.7 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that an out-of-court statement offered 

to prove employer’s honest belief that plaintiff had 

misappropriated funds was not hearsay); Brill v. Lante Corp., 119 

F.3d 1266, 1271 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that out-of-court 

statements concerning an employee’s performance problems were not 

hearsay because they went to the issue of the employer's “honest 

belief” concerning such problems). 

Moreover, where “the employer contends that the plaintiff’s 

job performance was wanting, the plaintiff must do more than 
‐26‐ 

dispute the validity of the employer’s criticisms.” O'Leary, 657 

F.3d at 635. “The question is not whether the employer’s stated 

reason was inaccurate or unfair, but whether the employer honestly 

believed the reason it has offered” to explain the adverse 

employment action. Id. Wilson proffers no evidence suggesting 

that Lear’s decision-makers did not believe that Wilson had 

violated the rules of employee conduct when deciding to discipline 

and discharge her. 

Wilson also contends that questions of fact exist as to 

whether supervisor Maple fabricated allegations that she violated 

the headphone rule in February 2013, whether supervisors Barnard 

and Lloyd fabricated allegations that she improperly built seats 

in September 2013, and why they would do so. Wilson relies on her 

own testimony that these supervisors were lying about her violating 

rules of employee conduct. But even assuming that the supervisors 

had lied, Wilson proffers no evidence that any of them recommended 

discipline for her in retaliation for her sexual harassment 

complaints. Because Wilson proffers no evidence of retaliatory 

animus, she fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to 

whether Lear’s reasons for disciplining and discharging her were 

pretextual. Therefore, the Court GRANTS summary judgment on 

Wilson’s retaliation claim. 
‐27‐ 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment (DE #19) is GRANTED, and Defendant’s Motion to 

Strike (DE #29) is GRANTED. Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED

with prejudice and the Clerk is DIRECTED to CLOSE this case.

DATED: June 14, 2017 /s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge 

 United States District Court