UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

SHIRLEY HINTON-TRIGG on )

behalf of D.H., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO. 1:12-CV-00010

)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Shirley Hinton-Trigg, on behalf of her minor granddaughter D.H., appeals to the

district court from a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”)

denying her application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”).1 (Docket # 1.) For the

following reasons, the Commissioner’s decision will be AFFIRMED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Hinton-Trigg applied on D.H.’s behalf for SSI in November 2008, alleging disability as

of June 1, 2007. (Tr. 131-37.) The Commissioner denied the application initially and upon

reconsideration. (Tr. 74-86.) A hearing was held on July 15, 2010, before Administrative Law

Judge (“ALJ”) John Pope, at which D.H. and Hinton-Trigg, who were represented by counsel,

testified. (Tr. 11-39.) On August 23, 2010, the ALJ rendered an unfavorable decision,

concluding that D.H. was not disabled. (Tr. 45-58.) The Appeals Council denied her request for

1

 All parties have consented to the Magistrate Judge. (Docket # 13); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
review, at which point the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1-

10, 411-15.) 

Russell filed a complaint with this Court on January 12, 2012, seeking relief from the

Commissioner’s final decision. (Docket # 1.) She advances just one argument in this

appeal—that the ALJ improperly evaluated whether she met Listing 111.07B4, the listing for

cerebral palsy. (Opening Br. of Pl. in Social Security Appeal Pursuant to L.R. 7.3 (“Opening

Br.”) 12-15.)

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

A. D.H.’s Testimony at the Hearing

D.H. alleges disability due to cerebral palsy, asthma, a learning disorder, and a history of

disruptive behavior disorder. (Opening Br. 2.) At the hearing, D.H., who was fourteen years old

at the time, testified that she had just completed eighth grade, which included special education

classes, and planned to attend high school in the fall; she lived with her grandmother, stepgrandfather, and uncle in a one-story home. (Tr. 17-19.) She said that she does not have any

physical problems. (Tr. 20.) 

On a typical school day, D.H. gets up at 6:00 a.m., independently performs her self care,

and walks to the bus with friends. (Tr. 21-23.) She takes the bus back home after school and

then does homework in her room for an hour; afterwards, she plays outside for several hours.

(Tr. 22-23.) She eats dinner around 8:00 p.m., watches television in her room, and then goes to

bed. (Tr. 23.) She can prepare her own meals and grocery shop, but does not do any other chores

around the house. (Tr. 23-24.) She participated in cheerleading in sixth and seventh grades, but

2

 In the interest of brevity, this Opinion recounts only the portions of the 747-page administrative record

necessary to the decision.

2
was not currently involved in a sport, explaining that she needed to focus on her homework. (Tr.

24.) She has numerous neighborhood friends that she spends time with every day, and they go

shopping, to the movies, and to restaurants. (Tr. 25-26.) D.H. said that she has no problems

concentrating when in school or in getting along with her friends. (Tr. 26.) 

B. Hinton-Trigg’s Testimony at the Hearing

Hinton-Trigg testified that it takes forty-five minutes in the morning for D.H. “to get her

balance together” due to her cerebral palsy. (Tr. 28.) She elaborated that she has to help D.H.

get up and put her shoes on “to keep her from falling.” (Tr. 29.) D.H. is supposed to do some

chores around the house, but Hinton-Trigg often has to remind her to do so (Tr. 35-36); D.H.

can, however, prepare simple meals (Tr. 36). 

Hinton-Trigg stated that D.H. is not coordinated and that other kids laugh at her when she

tries to participate in sports (Tr. 29); she also has “a little trouble” riding a bike (Tr. 35). HintonTrigg said that D.H. does not receive any treatment for her cerebral palsy and that her doctor had

dismissed her. (Tr. 30.) Hinton-Trigg thought that D.H. had poor handwriting, but that her

coloring of pictures was much better than when she was a young child. (Tr. 33-34.) 

 In addition, Hinton-Trigg reported that D.H. has a learning disability and attention deficit

disorder (“ADHD”); she receives tutoring at least twice a week because she was failing about

every class. (Tr. 29-30.) D.H. also takes medication for asthma, which does not cause her side

effects. (Tr. 30-33.) Hinton-Trigg testified that D.H. gets along well with younger children, but

gets upset with children her own age when she cannot do what they do and they call her names.

(Tr. 36.) She at times wants to get into physical fights. (Tr. 37.) 

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C. Medical Evidence Prior to D.H.’s Alleged Onset Date of June 1, 2007

In April 1999, a school psychologist evaluated D.H. as a preschooler and diagnosed her

with a mild mental handicap. (Tr. 402-05.) She was also seen by a physician for a history of

possible seizures. (Tr. 648-49.) A 24-hour video electroencephalogram, however, was entirely

within normal limits. (Tr. 646.) Similarly, in April 2001, an overnight sleep study was normal.

(Tr. 643.) 

In June 2001, D.H. saw Dr. Daniel Cummiskey at Fort Wayne Orthopaedics for her

cerebral palsy. (Tr. 613-14.) She had been diagnosed with right-sided hemiplegia and reportedly

tripped at times. (Tr. 613.) On exam, she had some difficulty hopping on her left foot and when

she ran she pronated her left arm more than her right. (Tr. 613.) He concluded that she had a

“[v]ery mild case of cerebral palsy” and thought that she was going to do “really quite well.” (Tr.

613.) He recommended “absolutely no intervention” and that she be treated “totally as a normal

child without any restrictions.” (Tr. 614.) 

In February 2002, D.H. saw Dr. Joe Ottinger, a pediatric neurologist, for her cerebral

palsy; he thought that she was “quite stable” and progressing fairly well. (Tr. 637.) She

displayed mild left upper extremity weakness and somewhat hyperactive reflexes in the lower

extremities. (Tr. 637.) She walked “fairly well,” but had a slight spastic quality to her gait when

she ran, more so on the left than the right. (Tr. 637.) 

In March 2002, D.H. underwent testing by another school psychologist. (Tr. 396-99.) 

Her IQ scores were average, and her basic reading and math reasoning were within the range

expected for her age. (Tr. 396-99.) 

In March 2003, D.H. saw Dr. Ottinger for her seizures. (Tr. 626.) He thought she was

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doing quite well on the Trileptal in that it had controlled her seizures, even though it made her

sleepy. (Tr. 626.) He cut back slightly on her dosage to decrease her fatigue. (Tr. 626.) 

In December 2003, Dr. Houda Taki noted that D.H. had full range of motion of her lower

extremities and opined that she was doing “reasonably well” except for fine motor control. (Tr.

610.) She complained of some anterior knee pain. (Tr. 610.) That same month, Dr. Cummiskey

wrote “[t]o whom it may concern” that D.H., who was seven years old at the time, had a mild

case of cerebral palsy and needed an individualized education program, at least with respect to

her gym class. (Tr. 576.) He penned that her cerebral palsy “affects significant fine motor

control in the upper extremities, and certainly makes her a bit less coordinated involving

activities with her lower extremities.” (Tr. 576.) 

In March 2004, Dr. Ottinger noted that D.H. was “pretty stiff” when she first gets up in

the morning, but otherwise does well. (Tr. 621.) He found her strength and reflexes satisfactory.

(Tr. 621.) He continued the Trileptal for her seizures. (Tr. 621.) 

In January 2005, Dr. Ottinger documented that D.H. had been seizure-free for two years.

(Tr. 619.) He thought that her biggest problem was that she was having trouble in school,

particularly with comprehension. (Tr. 619.) He decided to wean her off of the Trileptal. (Tr.

619.)

In March 2005, D.H. scored in the lower limits of the low average range on the ABES-R,

which measured her adaptive behavior and adjustment in the academic setting. (Tr. 278-91.) Her

general cognitive ability, as estimated by the WISC-IV, was in the borderline range, and her fine

motor/perceptual development appeared to be within the low average range. (Tr. 278-91.)

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D. Medical Evidence After D.H.’s Alleged Onset Date of June 1, 2007

 From February 2008 to April 2009, D.H. received psychotherapy from therapist Teddy

Ramsey on a monthly basis. (Tr. 446-59, 501-20.) 

On January 10, 2009, Dr. Michael Holton examined D.H. at the request of the Social

Security Administration. (Tr. 523-25.) On physical exam, she had no difficulty with tandem

walking, hopping, or squatting, but at times slightly favored her right lower extremity when heel

and toe walking. (Tr. 524-25.) Her muscle tone and strength were normal in all four extremities,

and no asymmetry was noted in active range of motion. (Tr. 525.) Dr. Holton’s impression was

a history of asthma, a history of cerebral palsy with minimal right-side motor weakness, and

psychological concerns and learning disability. (Tr. 525.)

That same month, Wayne Von Bargen, Ph.D., performed a psychological evaluation at

the Social Security Administration’s request. (Tr. 527-33.) On intelligence testing, D.H.

obtained a full scale IQ of 79, which falls at the upper end of the borderline range. (Tr. 528.) On

the general ability index, she scored an 81, which falls in the low average range; Dr. Von Bargen

found that this index was likely a better measure of overall learning ability than her full scale IQ

score. (Tr. 529.) He thought that a classification of “learning disorder” was a better description

of D.H.’s level of functioning than borderline intellectual functioning. (Tr. 529.) He diagnosed

D.H. with a disruptive behavior disorder and a learning disorder. (Tr. 529.)

In February 2009, J. Gange, Ph.D., and Steven Roush, M.D., state agency doctors,

reviewed D.H.’s record and concluded that her impairment or combination of impairments were

severe, but did not meet or equal a listing. (Tr. 561-66.) They found that she had a less than a

marked limitation in acquiring and using information, no limitation in attending and completing

6
tasks, no limitation in interacting or relating with others, no limitation in moving about and

manipulating objects, no limitation in caring for herself, and no limitation in health and physical

well-being. (Tr. 563-64.) Four months later, F. Kladder, Ph.D., and Joseph Gaddy, M.D., also

state agency doctors, reviewed D.H.’s record and reached the same conclusions. (Tr. 567-72.)

In June 2009, D.H. was evaluated by Dr. Patricia Bader of the Northeast Indiana Genetic

Counseling Center. (Tr. 585-86.) She noted that D.H. had fetal alcohol syndrome features and,

after testing, diagnosed her with fetal alcohol syndrome and cerebral palsy. (Tr. 583-84.) 

Hinton-Trigg reported on a return visit to Dr. Bader that D.H. was refusing to take her

medications, was having mood swings, and was getting low grades in school. (Tr. 583.) 

In August 2009, Dr. Barbara Gelder evaluated D.H. and diagnosed her with an anxiety

disorder, ADHD by history, rule out organic encephalopathy, prenatal exposure to teratogens,

fetal alcohol syndrome, ataxia, cerebral palsy on the right side, and biological parent-child

problem. (Tr. 599-601.) Several months later, Dr. Gelder performed a neuropsychological

examination. (Tr. 587-98.) D.H. rated her current level of depression as a “five” on a ten-point

scale, but denied any thoughts of hurting herself; she reported significant problems with racing

thoughts, obsessive thinking, worries, inattention, and in understanding oral instructions. (Tr.

589.) Dr. Gelder noted that D.H.’s attention span and concentration were adequate with

occasional encouragement. (Tr. 589.) 

Hinton-Trigg responded to the Personality Inventory for Children that Dr. Gelder

administered, and the results suggested that D.H. was experiencing significant emotional and

behavioral maladjustment in comparison to children of her chronological age. (Tr. 589.) The

results indicated, however, that the profile should be interpreted with caution in that the

7
responses were likely to have been made without adequate attention to, or comprehension of, the

inventory items. (Tr. 589.) Dr. Gelder also administered the Rorschach to D.H., which suggested

that she frequently overlooks the subtle nuances of social interpersonal situations, arrives at

decisions without having given them much thought, and selects a course of action in which she

has little emotional investment. (Tr. 589.) She feels most comfortable in clearly-defined and

well-structured situations. (Tr. 589.) She is not likely to recognize the kinds of behaviors that

are expected in various situations, placing her at risk for behaving in ways that offend others and

for being socially and emotionally withdrawn. (Tr. 589.) D.H.’s visual information processing

and abstract reasoning skills were borderline. (Tr. 592.) Results of the NEPSY-II indicated that

she did not appear to have difficulty reading the emotional responses of others. (Tr. 593.) She

did, however, have difficulty understanding mental functions such as belief, intention, deception,

emotion, imagination, and pretending. (Tr. 593.) On the Vineland on Adaptive Behavioral

Scales, D.H. scored in the mildly impaired range of functioning in communication, daily living

skills, and socialization. (Tr. 594.) 

Dr. Gelder concluded that D.H.’s emotional profile was significant for clinical levels of

inattention, distractibility, anxiety, depression, and problematic adaptive functioning; her overall

adaptive behavior composite was mildly impaired. (Tr. 594.) Dr. Gelder’s impression was that

D.H.’s profile was consistent with an individual who has congenital factors contributing to her

difficulties with resulting long-term consequences. (Tr. 594.) These consequences include:

inattention, distractibilitiy, impulsivity, problems with planning and organizing, social skills

deficits, lowered frustration tolerance, and a tendency to become overwhelmed with less

stimulation than most individuals. (Tr. 594.) She is often inappropriate in her response,

8
inefficient when determining which elements of a situation need attention, “forgets” important

and necessary aspects of the total situation, reaches incorrect conclusions, and engages in

inappropriate behavior. (Tr. 595.) From August to November 2009, D.H. participated in

counseling sessions with a therapist in Dr. Gelder’s office. (Tr. 658-704.) 

In March 2010, D.H.’s school plan summary indicated that she communicates her wants

and needs effectively, gets along well with peers and adults, is very kind, and easily makes and

maintains friendships. (Tr. 740-42.) She does, however, have a temper when teased to the

extreme. (Tr. 740.) She was working below expectation levels and did not like to get extra help.

(Tr. 740.) 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Section 405(g) of the Act grants this Court “the power to enter, upon the pleadings and

transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42

U.S.C. § 405(g); see 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). The Court’s task is limited to determining whether

the ALJ’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, which means “such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Schmidt v.

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The decision will be reversed

only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if the ALJ applied an erroneous legal

standard. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7thCir. 2000).

To determine if substantial evidence exists, the Court reviews the entire administrative

record but does not re-weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or

substitute its judgment for the Commissioner’s. Id. Rather, if the findings of the Commissioner

9
are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive. Id. Nonetheless, “substantial

evidence” review should not be a simple rubber-stamp of the Commissioner’s decision. Id.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The Law 

To be disabled for purposes of SSI benefits, a child “must have a ‘physical or mental

impairment, which results in marked and severe functional limitations, and which can be

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period

of not less than 12 months.’” Brindisi ex rel Brindisi, 315 F.3d 783, 785 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting 

42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i)). The Social Security Administration has adopted a three-step

process for determining whether a child is disabled. Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 416.924. 

“First, if the child is engaged in substantial gainful activity, his or her claim is denied.”

Brindisi, 315 F.3d at 785 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a)). “Second, if the child does not have a

medically determinable ‘severe’ impairment or combination of impairments, then his or her

claim is denied.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a)). “Finally, for a child to be considered

disabled, the child’s impairment(s) must meet, medically equal, or functionally equal the

requirements of a listed impairment . . . .” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a)). “To find an

impairment functionally equivalent to a listing, an ALJ must analyze its severity in [six] ageappropriate categories and find an ‘extreme’ limitation in one category or a ‘marked’ limitation

in two categories.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a)). 

B. The ALJ’s Decision

On August 23, 2010, the ALJ issued the decision that ultimately became the

Commissioner’s final decision. (Tr. 45-58.) He found at step one of the three-step analysis that

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D.H. was an “adolescent” under 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(g)(2) and had not engaged in substantial

gainful activity after the SSI application date. (Tr. 48.) At step two, the ALJ concluded that

D.H.’s history of cerebral palsy, asthma, a learning disorder, and history of disruptive behavior

disorder were severe impairments. (Tr. 48.) The ALJ determined at step three, however, that

D.H.’s impairment or combination of impairments were not severe enough to meet or equal a

listing. (Tr. 48-49.) Accordingly, her claim for SSI was denied. (Tr. 57.) 

C. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Finding 

That D.H. Did Not Meet or Equal Listing 111.07B4

In her sole argument in this appeal, Hinton-Trigg contends that the ALJ improperly

evaluated whether D.H. met or medically equaled Listing 111.07B4, the listing for cerebral

palsy. Ultimately, Hinton-Trigg’s argument is unavailing, as the ALJ’s step-three finding is

supported by substantial evidence.

 The listings describe impairments that are considered presumptively disabling when

specific criteria are met. 20 C.F.R. § 416.925(a); 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1; see Kastner

v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 642, 646-67 (7th Cir. 2012). To meet or medically equal a listed impairment,

a claimant must satisfy all of the criteria of the listed impairment. Kastner, 697 F.3d at 647;

Ribaudo v. Barnhart, 458 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2006); Maggard v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 376, 379-80

(7th Cir. 1999). The claimant bears the burden of proving that her condition meets or medically

equals a listed impairment. Ribaudo, 458 F.3d at 483; Maggard, 167 F.3d at 379-80. 

To satisfy Listing 111.07, a claimant must have a diagnosis of cerebral palsy, with:

A. Motor dysfunction meeting the requirements of Listing 111.06 or 101.03; or

B. Less severe motor dysfunction (but more than slight) and one of the following:

 1. IQ of 70 or less; 

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 2. A seizure disorder, with at least one major seizure in the year prior to the

application for disability; 

 3. Significant interference with communication due to speech, hearing, or visual

defects; or 

 4. A significant emotional disorder. 

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1.

Here, at step three, after considering Listings 112.05 (mental retardation), 112.11

(ADHD), and 103.03 (asthma), the ALJ specifically considered Listing 111.07:

Finally, for claimant’s history of cerebral palsy, the undersigned considered

listing 111.07. However, the medical record indicates that claimant has a very

mild case of cerebral palsy and according to her treating physician, she has no

physical restrictions. Therefore, there is no severe motor dysfunction or less

severe motor dysfunction with an IQ less than 70; a seizure disorder; significant

interference with communication due to speech, hearing, or visual defect; or a

significant emotional disorder.

(Tr. 49 (internal citations omitted).) D.H. argues that the ALJ’s step-three finding is not

supported by substantial evidence. More specifically, she contends that the record, when

reviewed fairly, shows that she meets Listing 111.07B4 in that her motor dysfunction is “more

than slight” and she has a “significant emotional disorder.”3

With respect to the first prong, D.H. cites seven pieces of medical evidence that the ALJ

purportedly ignored that she contends demonstrates her motor dysfunction is “more than slight”:

1. A May 2001 sleep study noting abnormal twitching and jerking in her sleep;

2. Several of Dr. Cummiskey’s notes from 2001 to 2004 reflecting that D.H.

“trips at times” (Tr. 613), had bilateral knee pain (Tr. 610), and reported

“significant morning stiffness and pain” (Tr. 607);

3. Dr. Cummiskey’s December 2003 letter addressed “To whom it may concern”

3 There is no dispute that D.H. has a diagnosis of cerebral palsy. 

12
recommending that D.H. be given an individualized education program, at least

for gym class, and representing that her “mild case of cerebral palsy . . . affects

significant fine motor control in the upper extremities, and certainly makes her a

bit less coordinated involving activities with her lower extremities” (Tr. 576);

4. An “observation request” from her 2001 school records, with boxes checked

for poor handwriting skills, lack of gross motor coordination, difficulty with tasks

requiring eye-hand coordination, and “works exceptionally slowly” (Tr. 324);

5. Dr. Ottinger’s March 8, 2005, note on a prescription pad representing that

D.H.’s mild cerebral palsy and history of a seizure disorder “may certainly affect

learning and/or school performance, though [he] cannot predict exactly how her

learning may be affected” (Tr. 577);

6. Dr. Holton’s January 10, 2009, examination documenting D.H.’s reported

history of cerebral palsy with some right-sided weakness upon prolonged or

repetitive activity (Tr. 523-25); and

7. The results of a June 2009 MRI consistent with a history of cerebral palsy (Tr.

578). 

(Opening Br. 13.) 

D.H.’s argument that the ALJ “cherry-picked” the record and ignored this evidence

purportedly unfavorable to his conclusion, however, is unpersuasive. “[A]n ALJ need not

mention every snippet of evidence in the record . . . .” Arnett v. Astrue, 676 F.3d 586, 592 (7th

Cir. 2002). Rather, an ALJ “must connect the evidence to the conclusion, [and] in so doing, he

may not ignore entire lines of contrary evidence.” Id.; see also Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471,

477 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Although an ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence in the record,

the ALJ may not ignore an entire line of evidence that is contrary to the ruling.”). 

Here, the ALJ adequately connected the evidence of record to his conclusion that D.H.’s

motor dysfunction was no more than slight and, in so doing, did not ignore an entire line of

evidence unfavorable to his conclusion. In fact, the ALJ did explicitly mention several of the

pieces of evidence that D.H. cites. For example, he considered the claimant’s subjective report

13
of minimal unilateral weakness, but concluded that it did not interfere with normal functioning,

such as her ability to participate in cheerleading. (Tr. 55.) In that regard, he considered that

despite Hinton-Trigg’s claim that D.H. does not participate in sports because of purported

balance and coordination difficulties, D.H. testified that she quit cheerleading after two years in

the sport in order to improve her grades, not because of coordination or motor challenges. (Tr.

55.) The ALJ also explicitly mentioned Dr. Cummiskey’s December 2003 letter representing

that D.H.’s mild case of cerebral palsy affected her fine motor control and made her a bit less

coordinated in activities with her lower extremities. (Tr. 57.) The ALJ at the same time,

however, considered Dr. Cummiskey’s documentation in his own file that D.H. had a very mild

case of cerebral palsy and should be treated as a normal child without any restrictions or physical

therapy intervention. (Tr. 57 (citing Tr. 614).) 

Furthermore, the only evidence that Hinton-Trigg points to dated after D.H.’s alleged

onset date of June 1, 2007—Dr. Holton’s January 2009 evaluation and the June 2009 MRI—

merely reflect her subjective report of D.H.’s symptoms or confirm D.H.’s diagnosis of cerebral

palsy. (See Tr. 523-25, 578.) But “medical opinions upon which an ALJ should rely need to be

based upon objective observations and not amount merely to a recitation of a claimant’s

subjective complaints.” Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 370-71 (7th Cir. 2004). Furthermore,

the relevant inquiry is the degree of claimant’s limitations during the relevant period, not the

diagnosis that she was assigned. See Hodges v. Astrue, No. 1:09-cv-216, 2010 WL 3717256, at

*9 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 14, 2010); see also Brown v. Astrue, No. H-08-2299, 2010 WL 1257804, at

*8 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2010) (emphasizing that the listings criteria are “demanding and

stringent, and the mere diagnosis of a condition will not suffice” (internal quotation marks and

14
citation omitted)). Therefore, these snippets fall short of constituting an “entire line of evidence”

that the ALJ inappropriately ignored. See, e.g., Waldron v. Astrue, No. 1:11-cv-340, 2012 WL

4866353, at *12 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 12, 2012) (rejecting claimant’s argument that the ALJ “cherrypicked” the record where the evidence at issue fell short of an “entire line of evidence”).

Moreover, in reaching his step-three finding, the ALJ relied upon the assessments of Drs.

Gange, Roush, Kladder, and Gaddy, the state agency physicians and psychologists who

concluded that D.H.’s impairments did not meet or equal a listing. They completed Disability

Determination and Transmittal forms at the initial and reconsideration levels and concluded that

D.H. was not disabled. (Tr. 40-41, 60-63.) The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has articulated

that “[t]hese forms conclusively establish that consideration by a physician . . . designated by the

Commissioner has been given to the question of medical equivalence at the initial and

reconsideration levels of administrative review.” Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 700 (7th Cir.

2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, “[t]he ALJ may properly

rely upon the opinion of these medical experts.” Id. (citing Scott v. Sullivan, 898 F.2d 519, 524

(7th Cir. 1990)); see also SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *2. 

Not to be deterred, Hinton-Trigg, citing Ribaudo v. Barnhart, 458 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir.

2006), argues that the state agency doctors reviewed the record and rendered their opinions

before her attorney submitted Dr. Cummiskey’s documentation and certain school records, and

thus that the ALJ erred by relying on the state agency doctors’ opinions. But Ribaudo is

distinguishable, as there the Commissioner argued that the Disability Determination and

Transmittal forms completed by the state agency doctors, standing alone, cured the ALJ’s failure

to even mention the applicable listing or contradictory evidence in the record. 

15
But here, as explained above, the ALJ specifically analyzed Listing 111.07B4, discussed

Dr. Cummiskey’s records, and provided more than a “perfunctory analysis” of the Listing. (Tr.

49, 55, 57); Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004) (“In considering whether a

claimant’s condition meets or equals a listed impairment, an ALJ must discuss the listing by

name and offer more than a perfunctory analysis of the listing.”); see generally Buckhanon ex

rel. J.H. v. Astrue, 368 F. App’x 674, 678-79 (7th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (collecting cases and

stating that “tidy packaging” is not required for an ALJ’s decision because courts read them “as a

whole and with common sense”). That is, this is not a case where the ALJ failed to discuss

significant contrary medical evidence added to the record after the state agency doctors issued

their report. See, e.g., Leonard ex rel. Bernard v. Astrue, No. 08 C 6464, 2010 WL 4705152, at

*10 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2010) (explaining that obtaining an updated opinion from the state

agency doctors on medical equivalence may be indicated where the ALJ fails to discuss

additional medical evidence that could change the state agency doctors’ earlier decision). 

 Once boiled down, Hinton-Trigg’s argument amounts to merely a plea to this Court to

reweigh the evidence with the hope that it will come out in her favor this time. But of course,

the Court is not allowed to substitute its judgment for the ALJ by “reweighing evidence,” and

thus her plea is unavailing. Cannon v. Apfel, 213 F.3d 970, 974 (7th Cir. 2000); see Schmidt v.

Apfel, 201 F.3d 970, 972 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute our

own judgment for that of the ALJ.”). 

 In sum, the ALJ’s conclusion that D.H. had “no more than slight” motor dysfunction and

thus did not satisfy Listing 111.07B4 is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ minimally

articulated his reasoning with respect to D.H.’s medical and school records, and the snippets of

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evidence that Hinton-Trigg cites to do not rise to “an entire line of evidence” that would

constitute a failure-to-articulate error by the ALJ. Carlson, 999 F.2d at 181. Therefore, HintonTrigg fails to carry her burden of establishing that D.H. meets or equals all of the criteria of

Listing 111.07B4. See Bellmore v. Astrue, No. 4:08-cv-94, 2010 WL 1266494, at *14 (N.D. Ind.

Mar. 25, 2010); see generally Scheck, 357 F.3d at 702 (“It is axiomatic that the claimant bears

the burden of supplying adequate records and evidence to prove their claim of disability.”).

Accordingly, the ALJ’s step-three finding will be AFFIRMED.4

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons articulated herein, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. The

Clerk is directed to enter a judgment in favor of the Commissioner and against Hinton-Trigg.

SO ORDERED. 

Enter for this 22nd day of January, 2013.

S/Roger B. Cosbey 

Roger B. Cosbey,

United States Magistrate Judge

4 Hinton-Trigg does not argue that D.H. functionally equals the listings, and thus has forfeited any

challenge in that regard. See Rogers v. Barnhart, 446 F. Supp. 2d 828, 851 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (citing Carter v. Tennant

Co., 383 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2004)). To determine whether a child functionally equals the listings, the ALJ

assesses how a child functions in six domains: (1) acquiring and using information, (2) attending and completing

tasks, (3) interacting and relating with others, (4) moving about and manipulating objects, (5) caring for yourself,

and (6) health and physical well-being. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1). If the child’s impairments cause “marked”

limitations in two domains or an “extreme” limitation in one domain, the impairments functionally equal the listings

and the child will be found disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(d). Here, the ALJ concluded that D.H. had a “less than

marked” limitation in acquiring and using information and no limitation in any of the other five domains, which is

consistent with the findings of the state agency doctors. (Tr. 49-57, 561-72.) 

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