Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 100 / Wednesday, May 24, 1995 / Notices 27569

RECORD ACCESS PROCEDURES:

See ‘‘Notification’’ above.

CONTESTING RECORD PROCEDURES:

See ‘‘Notification’’ above.

RECORD SOURCE CATEGORIES:

Science and Technology Centers.

SYSTEM EXEMPTIONS FROM CERTAIN PROVISIONS

OF THE PRIVACY ACT:

None.

[FR Doc. 95–12632 Filed 5–23–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7555–01–M

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–443]

North Atlantic Energy Service

Corporation Seabrook Station, Unit No.

1; Environmental Assessment and

Finding of No Significant Impact

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an exemption

from Facility Operating License No.

NPF–86, issued to North Atlantic

Energy Service Corporation (the licensee

or North Atlantic), for operation of the

Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1 (Seabrook)

located in Rockingham County, New

Hampshire.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

This Environmental Assessment has

been prepared to address potential

environmental issues related to North

Atlantic’s application of February 17,

1995. The proposed action would

exempt North Atlantic from the

requirements of 10 CFR Part 50,

Appendix J, Paragraph III.D.1.(a), to the

extent that a one-time interval extension

would be granted for Type A testing.

The interval between the first and

second Type A tests in the first 10-year

containment inservice inspection period

would be extended by approximately 22

months from the November 1995

refueling outage to the September 1997

refueling outage.

The Need for the Proposed Action

The proposed action would permit

North Atlantic to defer the Type A test

from the November 1995 refueling

outage, thereby saving the cost of

performing the test and eliminating the

test period from the critical path time of

the outage. North Atlantic has stated

that the exemption request meets the

requirements of 10 CFR 50.12,

paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2)(ii). The

historical Type A tests have

demonstrated that Seabrook has a low

leakage containment. All three Type A

tests have been performed without a

single failure with as-found leak rates

being significantly lower than the

acceptance and design limits. The Type

B and C testing programs, i.e., the local

leak rate tests, are not being modified

and will continue effectively to detect

containment leakage caused by the

degradation of active containment

isolation components as well as

containment penetrations. It has been

the experience at Seabrook that any

significant containment leakage paths

are detected by the Type B and C tests

and that the Type A test results have

only been confirmatory of the results of

the Type B and C test results.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed

Action

The Commission has completed its

evaluation of the proposed action and

concludes that the proposed one-time

exemption would not increase the

probability or consequences of accidents

previously analyzed and the proposed

one-time exemption would not affect

facility radiation levels or facility

radiological effluents. North Atlantic

has analyzed the results of previous

Type A tests performed at Seabrook to

show good containment performance

and they will conduct the Type B and

C local leak rate tests which historically

have been shown to be the principal

means of detecting containment leakage

paths with the Type A tests confirming

the Type B and C test results. It is also

noted that North Atlantic will perform

the visual containment inspection

although it is only required by

Appendix J to be conducted in

conjunction with Type A tests. The NRC

staff considers that these inspections,

though limited in scope, provide an

important added level of confidence in

the continued integrity of the

containment boundary. The change will

not increase the probability or

consequences of accidents, no changes

are being made in the types of any

effluents that may be released offsite,

and there is no significant increase in

the allowable individual or cumulative

occupational radiation exposure.

Accordingly, the Commission concludes

that there are no significant radiological

environmental impacts associated with

the proposed action.

With regard to potential

nonradiological impacts, the proposed

action involves features located entirely

within the restricted area as defined in

10 CFR Part 20. It does not affect

nonradiological plant effluents and has

no other environmental impact.

Accordingly, the Commission concludes

that there are no significant

nonradiological environmental impacts

associated with the proposed action.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

Since the Commission has concluded

there is no measurable environmental

impact associated with the proposed

action, any alternatives with equal or

greater environmental impact need not

be evaluated. As an alternative to the

proposed action, the NRC staff

considered denial of the proposed

action. Denial of the application would

result in no change in current

environmental impacts. The

environmental impacts of the proposed

action and the alternative action are

similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

This action does not involve the use

of any resources not previously

considered in the Final Environmental

Statement for the Seabrook Station, Unit

No. 1.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

In accordance with its stated policy,

on April 11, 1995 the NRC staff

consulted with the New Hampshire

state official, Mr. George Iverson of the

New Hampshire Emergency

Management Agency regarding the

environmental impact of the proposed

action. On April 12, 1995 the NRC staff

consulted with the Massachusetts state

official, Mr. James Muckerheid of the

Massachusetts Emergency Management

Agency. The state officials had no

comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

Based upon the environmental

assessment, the Commission concludes

that the proposed action will not have

a significant effect on the quality of the

human environment. Accordingly, the

Commission has determined not to

prepare an environmental impact

statement for the proposed action.

For further details with respect to the

proposed action, see North Atlantic’s

letter dated February 17, 1995, which is

available for public inspection at the

Commission’s Public Document Room,

The Gelman Building, 2120 L Street,

NW., Washington, DC, and at the local

public document room located at the

Exeter Public Library, Fonders Park,

Exeter, NH 03833.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day

of May 1995.
27570 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 100 / Wednesday, May 24, 1995 / Notices

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Phillip F. McKee,

Director, Project Directorate I–3 Division of

Reactor Projects—I/II, Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95–12665 Filed 5–23–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

[Docket Nos. 50–445 and 50–446]

Texas Utilities Electric Company;

(Comanche Peak Steam Electric

Station, Units 1 and 2); Exemption

I

Texas Utilities Electric Company (the

licensee) is the holder of Facility

Operating License Nos. NPF–87 and

NPF–89 for the Comanche Peak Steam

Electric Station, Unit Nos 1 and 2

(CPSES) respectively. The operating

licenses provide, among other things,

that the licensee is subject to all rules,

regulations, and orders of the

Commission now or hereafter in effect.

The facilities consists of two

pressurized water reactors at the

licensee’s site in Somervell County,

Texas.

II

It is stated in 10 CFR 73.55,

‘‘Requirements for physical protection

of licensed activities in nuclear power

reactors against radiological sabotage,’’

paragraph (a), that ‘‘The licensee shall

establish and maintain an onsite

physical protection system and security

organization which will have as its

objective to provide high assurance that

activities involving special nuclear

material are not inimical to the common

defense and security and do not

constitute an unreasonable risk to the

public health and safety.’’

It is specified in 10 CFR 73.55(d),

‘‘Access Requirements,’’ paragraph (1),

that ‘‘the licensee shall control all

points of personnel and vehicle access

into a protected area.’’ It is specified in

10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) that ‘‘A numbered

picture badge identification system shall

be used for all individuals who are

authorized access to protected areas

without escort * * *’’ It also states that

an individual not employed by the

licensee (i.e., contractors) may be

authorized access to protected areas

without escort provided the individual

‘‘receives a picture badge upon entrance

into the protected area which must be

returned upon exit from the protected

area * * *’’

The licensee proposed to implement

an alternative unescorted access control

system which would eliminate the need

to issue and retrieve badges at each

entrance/exit location and would allow

all individuals with unescorted access

to keep their badges with them when

departing the site.

An exemption from 10 CFR

73.55(d)(5) is required to allow

contractors who have unescorted access

to take their badges offsite instead of

returning them when exiting the site. By

letter dated January 16, 1995 (TXX–

95012), as supplemented by letters

dated March 1 (TXX–95064), and April

3, 1995 (TXX–95089), the licensee

requested an exemption from certain

requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) for

this purpose.

III

Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, ‘‘Specific

exemptions,’’ the Commission may,

upon application of any interested

person or upon its own initiative, grant

such exemptions in this part as it

determines are authorized by law and

will not endanger life or property or the

common defense and security, and are

otherwise in the public interest.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the

Commission may authorize a licensee to

provide measures for protection against

radiological sabotage provided the

licensee demonstrates that the measures

have ‘‘the same high assurance

objective’’ and meet ‘‘the general

performance requirements’’ of the

regulation, and ‘‘the overall level of

system performance provides protection

against radiological sabotage

equivalent’’ to that which would be

provided by the regulation.

At the CPSES site, unescorted access

into protected areas is controlled

through the use of a photograph on a

combination badge and keycard.

(Hereafter, these are referred to as

badges.) The security officers at the

entrance station use the photograph on

the badge to visually identify the

individual requesting access. The

badges for both licensee employees and

contractor personnel who have been

granted unescorted access are issued

upon entrance at the entrance/exit

location and are returned upon exit. The

badges are stored and are retrievable at

the entrance/exit location. In

accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5),

contractor individuals are not allowed

to take badges offsite. In accordance

with the plant’s physical security plan,

neither licensee employees nor

contractors are allowed to take badges

offsite.

Under the proposed system, each

individual who is authorized for

unescorted access into protected areas

would have the physical characteristics

of their hand (hand geometry) registered

with their badge number in the access

control system. When an individual

enters the badge into the card reader

and places their hand on the measuring

surface, the system would record the

individual’s hand image. The unique

characteristics of the extracted hand

image would be compared with the

previously stored template in the access

control system to verify authorization

for entry. Individuals, including

licensee employees and contractors,

would be allowed to keep their badges

with them when they depart the site and

thus eliminate the process to issue,

retrieve and store badges at the entrance

stations to the plant. Badges do not

carry any information other than a

unique identification number.

All other access processes, including

search function capability, would

remain the same. This system would not

be used for persons requiring escorted

access, i.e., visitors.

Based on a Sandia report entitled, ‘‘A

Performance Evaluation of Biometric

Identification Devices’’ (SAND91–0276

UC–906 Unlimited Release, printed June

1991), and on the licensee’s experience

with the current photo-identification

system, the licensee stated that the false

acceptance rate for the hand geometry

system is comparable to that of the

current system. The biometric system

has been in use for a number of years

at several sensitive Department of

Energy facilities. The licensee will

implement a process for testing the

proposed system to ensure continued

overall level of performance equivalent

to that specified in the regulation. The

Physical Security Plan for CPSES will

be revised to include implementation

and testing of the hand geometry access

control system and to allow licensee

employees and contractors to take their

badges offsite.

The licensee will control all points of

personnel access into a protected area

under the observation of security

personnel through the use of a badge

and verification of hand geometry. A

numbered picture badge identification

system will continue to be used for all

individuals who are authorized

unescorted access to protected areas.

Badges will continue to be displayed by

all individuals while inside the

protected area.

Since both the badges and hand

geometry would be necessary for access

into the protected areas, the proposed

system would provide for a positive

verification process and the potential

loss of a badge by an individual, as a

result of taking the badge offsite, would

not enable an unauthorized entry into

protected areas.

For the foregoing reasons, pursuant to

10 CFR 73.55, the NRC staff has

determined that the proposed