UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

STACY C. STRIBLIN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Cause No. 2:13-cv-22-PPS 

vs. )

)

SHERIFF JOHN BUNCICH, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Stacy C. Striblin, a pro se prisoner, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (DE 1.) 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, I must review the complaint and dismiss it if the action is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and (b). 

To survive dismissal, a complaint must contain enough to state a claim for relief that is plausible

on its face and to raise the right to relief above the speculative level. See Bissessur v. Indiana

Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 603. Nevertheless, I must bear in mind

that “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 

Here, Striblin alleges that he contracted Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus Aureus

(“MRSA”) due to unsanitary conditions at the Lake County Jail.1

 Specifically, he alleges that

1 Striblin is no longer housed at the jail and is currently at the Miami Correctional Facility. (DE 8.)
the jail holding cells and sleeping areas were “unsanitized, nasty, [and] filthy,” because detainees

were not given proper cleaning supplies by the guards. He alleges that he complained about

these conditions on multiple occasions, including writing letters to Sheriff John Buncich, but

nothing was done to fix the problem. He further alleges that after he contracted MRSA, he was

not given adequate medical treatment by jail medical personnel. Specifically, he alleges that

Valeirae Kalanaras, the jail medical director, and Dr. Choi Eunjin and Dr. Agusti (first name

unknown), both jail physicians, were aware that he was in need of outside medical treatment by a

specialist, but instead treated him with “cheap & general medications and antibiotics.” He

further alleges that Dr. Eunjin “willingly performed a bogus surgical incision” on a boil he had

under his arm, which did not alleviate the problem or the pain he was experiencing. 

Because Striblin was a pretrial detainee when these events occurred, the Fourteenth

rather than the Eighth Amendment applies. See Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 473 (7th Cir.

2009). The governing standards are functionally equivalent, however, and “anything that would

violate the Eighth Amendment would also violate the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. In

evaluating an Eighth Amendment claim, courts conduct both an objective and a subjective

inquiry. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The objective prong asks whether

the alleged deprivation is “sufficiently serious” so that “a prison official’s act results in the

denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. Although “the Constitution

does not mandate comfortable prisons,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981), inmates

are entitled to be provided with adequate food, clothing, shelter, bedding, hygiene materials, and

sanitation. See Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2009); Gillis v. Litscher, 468

F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006). Conditions of confinement may establish a constitutional

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violation in combination when each condition alone would not satisfy the standard. See Gillis,

468 F.3d at 493. 

On the subjective prong, the prisoner must show the defendant acted with deliberate

indifference to his health or safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. To be deliberate indifferent,

“the defendant must have known that the plaintiff was at serious risk of being harmed and

decided not to do anything to prevent that harm from occurring even though he could have easily

done so.” Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Reed v. McBride, 178

F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 1999) (where inmate complained about severe deprivations but was

ignored, he established a “prototypical case of deliberate indifference”). 

Inmates are also entitled to adequate medical care. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

104 (1976). To establish liability, a prisoner must satisfy both an objective and subjective

component by showing: (1) his medical need was objectively serious; and (2) the defendant

acted with deliberate indifference to that medical need. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. A medical

need is “serious” if it is one that a physician has diagnosed as mandating treatment, or one that is

so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention. 

See Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). For a medical professional to be held

liable for deliberate indifference, he or she must make a decision that represents “such a

substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to

demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” 

Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008). 

Here, Striblin alleges that the conditions at the jail were so dirty and unsanitary that they

caused him to develop a MRSA, a chronic and painful condition he will have for many years. 

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He further alleges that he complained many times about the conditions, including to Sheriff

Buncich, but nothing was done to ameliorate the problem. Giving him the inferences to which

he is entitled, he has alleged enough to proceed on a claim for deliberate indifference against

Sheriff Buncich.

Striblin further asserts that the three medical defendants failed to properly treat his

MRSA, a serious and chronic medical condition. The complaint can be plausibly read to allege

that the defendants chose a particular course of treatment not for a legitimate medical reason, but

because it was cheaper than sending him for outside treatment. Taking his allegations as true, he

has alleged a plausible deliberate indifference claim against these defendants.

For these reasons, the court:

(1) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed on a Fourteenth Amendment claim against

Sheriff John Buncich in his individual capacity for money damages for housing him under

substandard conditions at the Lake County Jail, causing him to contract MRSA;

(2) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed on a Fourteenth Amendment claim against

Valeirae Kalanaras, Dr. Choi Eunjin, and Dr. Agusti in their individual capacities for money

damages for denying him adequate medical care for MRSA;

 (3) DISMISSES any and all other claims contained in the complaint;

(4) DIRECTS the United States Marshals Service to effect service of process on Sheriff

John Buncich, Valeirae Kalanaras, Dr. Choi Eunjin, and Dr. Agusti; and

(5) ORDERS that Sheriff John Buncich, Valeirae Kalanaras, Dr. Choi Eunjin, and Dr.

Agusti respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1,

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only to the claims for which the pro se plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this

screening order.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: August 14, 2013.

s/ Philip P. Simon 

PHILIP P. SIMON, CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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