alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
---

EXHIBIT 32.2

|CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER     
|---------------------------------------------
|                                             
|PURSUANT TO                                  
|18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,                      
|AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO                       
|SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Amended Annual Report of Theron Resource
Group (the Company) on Form 10-K for the quarter ended May 31, 2010, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Amended
Annual Report), I, Jerry R. Satchwell, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|1. | the Amended Annual Report fully complies with the
      requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
      1934; and                               
|-- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|   |                                                                                                                                                                                
|2. | the information contained in the Amended Annual Report
      fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
      results of operations of the Company.

Date: August 29, 2011

/s/ Jerry R. Satchwell

Jerry R. Satchwell Chief Financial
Officer

---
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-13-00098-CR

Jose G. LECHLER,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 226th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2009CR6103

Honorable Sid L. Harle, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Delivered and Filed: February 20, 2013

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION 

Jose G. Lechler was convicted of harassment of a public servant, and on March 31, 2010, 

the trial court sentenced Lechler as a repeat offender to five years imprisonment. Lechler filed a 

notice of appeal and a motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal in the trial court 

on February 4, 2013.

A timely notice of appeal is necessary to invoke a court of appeals’ jurisdiction. Rodarte 

v. State, 860 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). When a defendant appeals a conviction and 

sentence, the notice of appeal is timely if filed within thirty days after the day sentence is 
04-13-00098-CR

- 2 -

imposed or suspended in open court, or within ninety days after sentencing if the defendant 

timely files a motion for new trial. Id. at 109–10; Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1996); TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2. A motion for extension of time to file the notice of 

appeal must be filed in the court of appeals within fifteen days of the deadline for filing the 

notice of appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.3.

We lack jurisdiction to entertain this appeal because the notice of appeal and motion for 

extension of time were not timely filed. Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1996); see Slaton v. State, 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (holding that if appeal is 

not timely perfected, court of appeals does not obtain jurisdiction to address merits of appeal, 

and court may take no action other than to dismiss appeal; court may not suspend rules to alter 

time for perfecting appeal); see also Ater v. Eighth Court of Appeals, 802 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1991) (explaining that writ of habeas corpus pursuant to article 11.07 of the Texas 

Code of Criminal Procedure governs out-of-time appeals from felony convictions). Accordingly, 

we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH
Hector DOMINGUEZ-GABRIEL, aka Kinko, aka John Richard Bellefleur, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 12-9801.

Supreme Court of the United States

May 20, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied.
Shontonio L. WITHERSPOON, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 12-10410.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 24, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.
Exhibit 31.1CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERI, Jeffrey F. O’Donnell, certify that:(1) I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of PhotoMedex, Inc.; (2) Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made,in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleadingwith respect to the period covered by this report; (3) Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respects thefinancial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report; (4) The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in ExchangeAct Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have: (a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, orcaused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known tous by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this report is being prepared;   (b) designed such internal control over financial reportingor caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designedunder our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding thereliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financialstatements for external purposes in accordance with generally acceptedaccounting principles;   (c) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’sdisclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report ourconclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based onsuch evaluation; and   (d) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscalquarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected,or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting; and (5) The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on ourmost recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors(or persons performing the equivalent functions): (a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses inthe design or operation of internal control over financial reportingwhich are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;and   (b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involvesmanagement or other employees who have a significant role in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                           OCT-2-1998
<PERIOD-START>                              OCT-4-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                APR-3-1998
<CASH>                                            1051
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    23340
<ALLOWANCES>                                       578
<INVENTORY>                                      19440
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 46847
<PP&E>                                           36889
<DEPRECIATION>                                   31665
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   66485
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            34522
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           118
<OTHER-SE>                                       25139
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     66485
<SALES>                                          63198
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 63198
<CGS>                                            44023
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    44023
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 18357
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                  1593
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 193
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    932
<INCOME-TAX>                                        54
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                878
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       878
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.08
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.08
        

</TABLE>
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CAUSE NO.: 1:13-CR-62-TLS 

 ) 

JOSHUA R. MACKIN ) 

OPINION AND ORDER

 On May 15, 2015, the Defendant, Joshua R. Mackin, through his counsel, filed a 

Supplemental Brief in Support of the Defendant’s Motion for Evidentiary Hearing Concerning 

Pending Motions Including: Motion to Suppress, Disciplinary Files and Disciplinary 

Determinations of Government Witnesses Officers Brown and Ramon [ECF No. 190], in violation 

of this Court’s April 25, 2017, Order [ECF No. 185]. As the Court indicated in its April 25 Order, 

the Court has taken the Defendant’s fourth Motion to Suppress [ECF No. 168] under advisement, as 

this matter is fully briefed and no further briefing is required, and the Court will rule upon the 

Motion on or before May 25, 2017. Also, as indicated in the April 25 Order, the Court has taken the 

Government’s first Motion in Limine [ECF No. 140] and the Defendant’s first Motion in Limine 

[ECF No. 162] under advisement. 

Accordingly, the Court ORDERS the Defendant’s Supplemental Briefing [ECF No. 190] 

STRICKEN from the record. Additionally, the Court notes that any further filings in violation of 

this Court’s Orders may provide a basis for sanctions. 

 SO ORDERED on May 15, 2017. 

 s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

 CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Exhibit 21

Zep Inc.

LIST OF
SUBSIDIARIES



|                                |  |                                                             
|------------------------------- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------
|Subsidiary or Affiliate         |  | State or Other Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Organization
|                                | 
|Zep IP Holdings LLC             |  | Georgia                                                     
|                                | 
|Old ABI, LLC                    |  | Delaware                                                    
|                                | 
|Dawn Chemical Company           |  | Delaware                                                    
|-Amrep, Inc.                    |  | Delaware                                                    
|-Amrep IP Holdings, LLC         |  | Delaware                                                    
|                                | 
|Acuity Specialty Products, Inc. |  | Georgia                                                     
|-Acuity Holdings, Inc           |  | Canada                                                      
|-Acuity Enterprise, LLC.        |  | Delaware                                                    
|-Zep Europe B.V.                |  | Netherlands                                                 
|-Zep Belgium S.A.               |  | Belgium                                                     
|-Zep Italia S.r.l               |  | Italy                                                       
|-Zep Industries B.V.            |  | Netherlands                                                 
|-Graham International B.V.      |  | Netherlands                                                 
|-Zep Benelux B.V.               |  | Netherlands                                                 
|-Zep Manufacturing B.V.         |  | Netherlands
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

ARRON L. DeCLUE, )

)

Petitioner, )

) CAUSE NO. 3:14-CV-209 RM 

vs. )

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Arron L. DeClue, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 seeking to challenge a prison disciplinary proceeding. (DE 1.) The court is obligated

to review the petition and dismiss it if “it plainly appears from the petition and any

attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. . . .” RULE 4 OF THE RULES

GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES.

According to the petition and attachments, in WCC #11-01-0006, DeClue was found

guilty of unauthorized possession of property. (DE 1 at 1; DE 1-1 at 4.) He was ordered to

pay restitution, assigned additional work duties, and deprived of commissary privileges

for 14 days. (DE 1-1 at 4.) Under the applicable law, a prison disciplinary proceeding can

be challenged in a habeas petition only if it lengthened the duration of the prisoner’s

confinement. Hadley v. Holmes, 341 F.3d 661, 664-65 (7th Cir. 2003); Moran v. Sondalle, 218

F.3d 647, 650-51 (7th Cir. 2000). Mr. DeClue’s disciplinary proceeding didn’t result in the

loss of earned-time credits or a credit-class demotion, and instead affected the severity

rather than the duration of his confinement. “More restrictive custody must be challenged
under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983, in the uncommon circumstances when it can be challenged at all.”

Montgomery v. Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 2001).

For these reasons, the petition (DE 1) is DISMISSED pursuant to RULE 4 OF THE

RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES.

SO ORDERED

ENTERED: February 7 , 2014. /s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr. 

Judge

United States District Court

2
Levonia T. GRAY, petitioner, v. Ray HOBBS, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction.

No. 12-9435

Supreme Court of the United States

May 13, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied.
Joseph FRANKLIN, petitioner, v. Al LUEBBERS, Warden.

No. 13-7419, 13A511.

Supreme Court of the United States

Nov. 20, 2013.

Application for stay of execution of sentence of death presented to Justice ALITO and by him referred to the Court denied. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied.

Justice SCALIA took no part in the consideration or decision of this application and this petition.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-7745

JAY MIKAL BROOKS,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; RUSSELL W. DUKE, JR.,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, 

District Judge. (5:13-hc-02112-FL)

Submitted: January 21, 2014 Decided: January 24, 2014

Before MOTZ, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jay Mikal Brooks, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Jay Mikal Brooks appeals the district court’s order 

denying his self-styled motion for a writ of mandamus seeking to 

compel the North Carolina courts to release him. Brooks alleged

that North Carolina lacked jurisdiction over him because he is a 

flesh and blood Moorish American. It appears that, without 

providing notice to Brooks, the district court may have 

construed his motion as an initial petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012), and dismissed it 

without prejudice. Despite this possible error, see Castro v. 

United States, 540 U.S. 375, 383 (2003), we may affirm the 

district court’s denial of relief on any basis that is apparent 

in the record. See MM ex rel. DM v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville 

Cnty., 303 F.3d 523, 536 (4th Cir. 2002). 

We agree with the district court that Brooks’ claim is 

patently frivolous. Federal courts do not have jurisdiction to 

compel state officials to act, Gurley v. Superior Court of 

Mecklenburg Cnty., 411 F.2d 586, 587 (4th Cir. 1969), and 

mandamus relief is a drastic remedy that should be used only in 

extraordinary circumstances. Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 

394, 402 (1976); United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, 516-

17 (4th Cir. 2003). Because Brooks did not demonstrate in the 

district court a clear right to the relief sought, see In re 

First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1988), 
3

we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis and affirm the 

district court’s denial of relief.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED
1

Filed 6/21/16 P. v. Lougin CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL LOUGIN,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A146388

 (Alameda County

 Super. Ct. No. C172992)

Defendant Michael Lougin appeals following the denial of his motion to reduce a 

restitution fine. His court-appointed counsel has filed a brief seeking our independent 

review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 to determine 

whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. We conclude there are no issues 

requiring further review and affirm.

Lougin was charged with two counts of sexual acts with a child 10 years old or 

younger in violation of Penal Code section 288.7 with special allegations as violent 

felonies and an allegation of a prior felony. In accord with a negotiated disposition, 

Lougin entered no contest pleas to a single count of oral copulation by force in violation 

of section 288a, and sexual penetration by foreign object in violation of section 289. All 

other counts and enhancements were dismissed. 

On January 6, 2014, in accord with the plea agreement, Lougin was sentenced to 

two consecutive six-year prison terms. He was awarded 353 days pre-sentence credits. 

Among other fees and fines, he was ordered to pay a $5,000 restitution fine. 
2

On August 6, 2015, Lougin filed a petition to reduce or vacate the restitution fine on the 

grounds that the trial court did not consider his ability to pay the fine imposed. The court 

denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction because Lougin’s criminal proceedings were 

concluded and the judgment was final. Lougin appealed.

When the fine was imposed at Lougin’s sentencing on January 6, 2014, he was 

represented by counsel and made no objection. Thereafter, the judgment became final 

without appeal, and the court correctly concluded it had no jurisdiction to entertain 

Lougin’s petition filed more than 120 days after sentencing. (Pen. Code, § 1170 (d); 

People v. Superior Court (Cornelius) (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 343, 348.)

Lougin’s counsel has represented that he advised Lougin of his intention to file a 

Wende brief in this case and of Lougin’s right to submit supplemental written argument 

on his own behalf. He has not done so. Lougin has also been advised of his right to 

request that counsel be relieved.

Our full review of the record reveals no issue that requires further briefing.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

 

_________________________

Siggins, J.

We concur:

_________________________

McGuiness, P.J.

_________________________

Pollak, J.
Charles Lee GLOVER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D19-2280

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

July 17, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Denied.
exv10w7



 





Exhibit 10.7


The following additional executive officers have entered into an Executive
Non-Compete Agreement in the form attached as Exhibit 10 of Form 10-Q for the
quarter ended September 30, 1999. The number of shares of restricted stock
issued under Section 4 of the agreement is as follows.




    	 	 	 	 	 
	Executive
            Officers 
	 	Shares 
	

            
	 	 	

           	 
	Frank
            P. Bramble, Sr. 
	 	 	0
	

	Charles
            C. Krulak 
	 	 	0
	

	Douglas
            R. Denton 
	 	 	51,202
	

	Louis
            J. Freeh 
	 	 	0
	

	Kenneth
            A. Vecchione 
	 	 	55,140