UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

HIAWATHA WRIGHT, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CAUSE NO. 3:12-CV-034 PS 

vs. )

)

MICHAEL MOLLENHAUER, SCOTT BELL, )

STEPHEN VANCE, and SANDRA HARRIS, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Hiawatha Wright, a pro se prisoner, filed an amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

alleging that he was mistreated while at the LaPorte County Jail. Wright names four defendants

and he raises two distinct claims. First, he argues that the medical ward at the jail should not be

on lock-down. Second, he argues that he was denied medical treatment. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the complaint and dismiss it if the

action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief against a

defendant who is immune from such relief. Courts apply the same standard under Section 1915A

as when deciding a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v.

Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6), a complaint must state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bissessur v.

Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 602. Thus, a “plaintiff must do

better than putting a few words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might

suggest that something has happened to her that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v.
Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original). The court must bear in

mind, however, that “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se

complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 

Wright states that these events occurred while he was a pre-trial detainee. Pre-trial

detainees may not be punished without due process of law. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).

They are entitled to the procedural protections of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974),

before imposition of punishment. Nevertheless, not every act against an inmate constitutes

punishment, and a hearing is not necessary when a lock-down is implemented for legitimate

security reasons. See Zarnes v. Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285, 291 n.5 (7th Cir. 1995). Here, Wright

alleges that the entire cell block was locked down. He gives no indication that the lock-down

was implemented to punish him. 

Prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption

and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to

preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security. That

deference extends to a prison security measure taken in response to an actual

confrontation with riotous inmates, just as it does to prophylactic or preventive

measures intended to reduce the incidence of these or any other breaches of

prison discipline. 

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1986) (citations, ellipsis, and quotation marks omitted).

Because the complaint does not plausibly allege that the lock-down was intended to punish

Wright, he was not entitled to due process and he does not state a claim based on the lock-down

of his cell block. 

Wright also alleges that he was denied medical treatment at the jail. First he alleges that

he is charged for medications that are given to other inmates. Though the Fourteenth

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Amendment provides that state officials shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law,” a state tort claims act that provides a method by which a

person can seek reimbursement for the negligent loss or intentional deprivation of property

meets the requirements of the due process clause by providing due process of law. Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (“For intentional, as for negligent deprivations of property by

state employees, the state’s action is not complete until and unless it provides or refuses to

provide a suitable post deprivation remedy.”). Indiana’s tort claims act (INDIANA CODE § 34-13-

3-1 et seq.) and other laws provide for state judicial review of property losses caused by

government employees, and provide an adequate post-deprivation remedy to redress state

officials’ accidental or intentional deprivation of a person’s property. See Wynn v. Southward,

251 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Wynn has an adequate post-deprivation remedy in the

Indiana Tort Claims Act, and no more process was due.”). Therefore, Wright does not state a

claim for the money taken from his account to pay for medication that was given to other

inmates. 

Next, Wright alleges that unlicenced guards (rather than nurses) give him his medication.

In medical cases, the Constitution is violated only when a defendant was deliberately indifferent

to an inmate’s serious medical needs. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997).

Here, Wright does not allege that the medication was improperly dispensed, only that the guards

were not licenced to dispense it. The Constitution does not prohibit medication from being

dispensed by unlicenced guards and a prisoner “is not entitled to demand specific care [nor]

entitled to the best care possible.” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997). 

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Finally, Wright alleges that because of his medical condition, he requires additional

exercise. The complaint names four defendants: three non-medical staff and a nurse. “If a

prisoner is under the care of medical experts a non-medical prison official will generally be

justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 656

(7th Cir. 2005) (ellipsis omitted) quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3rd Cir. 2004).

Here, Wright has not plausibly alleged that the non-medical staff had any reason to second guess

his medical care. Therefore the three non-medical jail staff will be dismissed. 

“For a medical professional to be liable for deliberate indifference to an inmate’s medical

needs, [s]he must make a decision that represents such a substantial departure from accepted

professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person responsible

actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th

Cir. 2008) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Medical malpractice and incompetence do

not state a claim of deliberate indifference. Walker v. Peters, 233 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2000).

Neither does a mere “disagreement with medical professionals . . . state a cognizable Eighth

Amendment Claim under the deliberate indifference standard of Estelle v. Gamble [429 U.S. 97

(1976)].” Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 331 (7th Cir. 2003). Here, giving Wright the benefit

of the inferences to which he is entitled at the pleading stage of this proceeding, he has stated a

claim against Sandra Harris for denying him adequate exercise for his medical condition. 

For the foregoing reasons, the court:

(1) GRANTS Hiawatha Wright leave to proceed against Sandra Harris in her individual

capacity for monetary and punitive damages for denying him adequate exercise for his medical

condition in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment;

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(2) DISMISSES all other claims; 

(3) DISMISSES Michael Mollenhauer, Scott Bell, and Stephen Vance;

(4) DIRECTS the clerk to transmit the summons and USM-285’s for Sandra Harris to

the United States Marshals Service along with a copy of this order and a copy of the amended

complaint (ECF 6); 

(5) DIRECTS the United States Marshals Service, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to

effect service of process on Sandra Harris; and

(6) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that Sandra Harris respond, as

provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. IND. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the

claim for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order.1

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: March 15, 2012

s/ Philip P. Simon 

PHILIP P. SIMON, CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

1

 N.D. IND. L.R. 10-1(b) exempts answers to pro se complaints from the obligation to include a verbatim,

paragraph by paragraph recitation of the complaint. 

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