UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 1:13-CR-62-TLS

)

JOSHUA R. MACKIN )

OPINION AND ORDER

The Defendant, Joshua R. Mackin, is charged with being a felon in possession of a

firearm, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Officers arrested the Defendant pursuant to an

arrest warrant, and the charge stems from a search incident to that arrest. This matter is before

the Court on the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence [ECF No. 158], filed on February 3,

2017, which is the Defendant’s third motion to suppress. The Defendant “moves the Court to

suppress all property seized from the defendant by arresting offices [sic], all observations made

by the arresting officers and all statements made by the Defendant.” (Mot. 1.) 

The Defendant’s only articulated ground for the request is that officers did not have a

search warrant to enter the residence where he was arrested upon exiting the back door. The

Defendant has not explained how his current Motion differs from the one he filed on September

12, 2016, and the Court cannot discern a difference. In the September motion, the Defendant

moved for the suppression of evidence officers obtained when they entered upon the real estate

without a search warrant. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Steagald v. United States,

451 U.S. 204 (1981), the Defendant argued that a “[search] warrant is required before entering

onto the real estate of a third person in order to arrest an individual who is the subject of [an

arrest] warrant.” (Mot. 2, ECF No. 145]. That motion was the Defendant’s second motion to

suppress, his first being limited to the issue of whether officers had sufficient confirmation of his
identity prior to seizing him while executing the arrest warrant.1

On November 14, 2016, the Court issued an Opinion and Order [ECF NO. 153] denying

the Defendant’s second motion without a hearing because, under Steagald’s holding, if officers

entered a third party’s residence to effect an arrest, “the third party herself may have a Fourth

Amendment claim against the officers.” United States v. Jackson, 576 F.3d 465, 468 (7th Cir.

2009); see also United States v. Agnew, 407 F.3d 193, 19 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Steagald protected the

interests of the third-party owner of the residence, not the suspect himself.”); United States v.

Kaylor, 877 F.2d 658, 663 n.5 (8th Cir. 1989) (“Steagald addressed only the right of a third party

not named in the arrest warrant to the privacy of his or her home. This right is personal to the

homeowner and cannot be asserted vicariously by the person named in the arrest warrant.”).

Because the Defendant is not in the category of persons who are protected by the holding in

Steagald, his motion did not present a substantial claim for which disputed issues of material fact

would impact the outcome. Accordingly, the Court determined that no evidentiary hearing was

necessary for resolution of the Defendant’s motion. 

The Court also issued a separate Opinion and Order [ECF No. 152] addressing the

Defendant’s claim that his seizure violated the Fourth Amendment because “the Government did

not prove that the police could identify the individual coming out the back door of the home and

that it turned out being Joshua Mackin after the seizure is not sufficient to justify the seizure.”

(Br. in Supp. 5, ECF No. 146.) The Court concluded that the arrest was proper under the Fourth

1 The Defendant attempted to challenge the officers’ failure to obtain a search warrant during the

evidentiary hearing scheduled for the first motion to suppress. However, the Court limited the evidentiary

hearing to the issue that was specifically set forth in submissions related to the first motion—that of the

Defendant’s identity—and invited the Defendant to file a separate motion challenging the lack of a search

warrant.

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Amendment and, so too, was the search incident to the arrest. 

The purpose of an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress is to resolve material

factual disputes between the parties. United States v. Villegas, 388 F.3d 317, 324 (7th Cir. 2004)

(holding that a hearing is not required in the absence of factual disputes). Material facts are those

that would make a difference in the outcome of the motion. Id. The Defendant’s most recent

Motion presents no new facts or issues, and no reason for the Court to revisit its previous

Opinion and Order. In fact, the Defendant appears to have overlooked the portion of the docket

where the issue he presents was decided. He asks the Government to withdraw its objection to

his Motion, citing the fact that his previous evidentiary hearing was limited to the identity issue.

In doing so, the Defendant gives no recognition to the Court’s separate finding—related to his

separate motion—that he is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing related to his claim that the

officers needed to obtain a search warrant before arresting him. 

In an attempt to consider all possible avenues the Defendant may be advancing, the Court

notes that the Defendant cited Winthrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 688–89 (1993), for the

proposition that “[a] Motion to Suppress Evidence should be heard as it relates to constitutional

issues by separate hearing rather than through an objection being made during a jury trial, for

judicial economy and to avoid such lengthy hearing or arguments being held outside the

presence of the jury.” (Resp. 2, ECF No. 160.) The Defendant has not developed a coherent

argument with respect to this case, and it is “[t]he parties—not the courts—[that] must research

and construct available legal arguments.” United States v. Collins, 796 F.3d 829, 836 (7th Cir.

2015) (first citing Pine Top Receivables of Ill., LLC v. Banco de Seguros del Estado, 771 F.3d

980, 987 (7th Cir. 2014), then quoting United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 877 (7th Cir. 2003)).

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The Winthrow case citation does not support the asserted proposition, but refers to the standard

for determining the voluntariness of a confession. And although the Defendant also cites

generally to both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments elsewhere in his Motion, he does not further

identify the basis for an independent Fifth Amendment challenge. Rather, he ties the

Government’s ability to use of his statements back to the alleged Fourth Amendment violation,

arguing that any statements he made cannot be used “since the officers had no search warrant to

enter the premises.” (Mot. 1.) As should be clear by now, the Court does not believe that the

search warrant issue necessitates an evidentiary hearing: the issue was presented in the

September 12, 2016, Motion [ECF No. 145]; and decided against the Defendant in the Court’s

November 14, 2016, Opinion and Order [ECF No. 153].

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress

Evidence [ECF No. 158]. The telephonic final pretrial conference is CONFIRMED for April

17, 2017, at 11:00 AM, and the jury trial is CONFIRMED to begin on Tuesday, May 2, 2017, at

9:00 AM before Judge Theresa L. Springmann.

SO ORDERED on February 23, 2017.

 s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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