UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

MARY TURNEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO. 1:13-CV-3

)

GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant General Motor’s (“GM”) Unopposed Motion for

Protective Order. (Docket # 22.) Because the Proposed Protective Order is deficient in several

ways, it will be DENIED.

First, the Proposed Protective Order’s definition of “Confidential” documents is

impermissibly broad. It allows GM to designate as “Confidential” any “[i]nformation or records

from the personnel file of any current or former employee of GM, or from any other file that

names or otherwise identifies any applicant or current or former employee of GM, or any

contract to which GM is a party, or in any way relating to any such contract, and the parties’

confidential financial or proprietary records or information, as well as all protected health

information produced by or regarding [P]laintiff.” (Proposed Protective Order. ¶ 1.)

Under Cincinnati Insurance, a protective order must only extend to “properly demarcated

categor[ies] of legitimately confidential information.” Citizens First Nat’l Bank of Princeton v.

Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943, 945-46 (7th Cir. 1999); see also MRS Invs. v. Meridian

Sports, Inc., No. IP 99-1954-C-F/M, 2002 WL 193140, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 6, 2002) (rejecting

proposed protective order because categories of protected information were overly broad and
vague); Cook Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 206 F.R.D. 244, 248-49 (S.D. Ind. 2001); Andrew

Corp. v. Rossi, 180 F.R.D. 338, 342 (N.D. Ill. 1998). Here, GM fails to formulate narrow,

demarcated categories of legitimately confidential information and instead advances a vague,

over-inclusive definition of “Confidential” that relies upon oblique terms such as “confidential”

or “proprietary.” 

For material to be protected, it “must give the holder an economic advantage and threaten

a competitive injury–business information whose release harms the holder only because the

information is embarrassing or reveals weaknesses does not qualify for trade secret protection.”

Cook, 206 F.R.D. at 248-49. Just because a party does not generally release certain information

to the public does not necessarily mean that the release of such information will rise to the level

of causing competitive harm or creating a competitive advantage for others. “[M]erely asserting

that a disclosure of the information ‘could’ harm a litigant’s competitive position is insufficient;

the motion must explain how.” Shepard v. Humke, No. IP 01-1103-C-H/K, 2003 WL 1702256, at

*1 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 28, 2003) (citing Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 547 (7th

Cir. 2002)). 

Furthermore, “not all information in an employee’s personnel file is considered private.”

Little v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., Inc., No. 04-1034, 2006 WL 1554317, at *4 (C.D. Ill.

June 5, 2006). For example, “there is nothing confidential about an employee’s job title, job

description, hiring date, or work assignment and location.” Id.; see also Smith v. City of Chicago,

No. 04 C 2710, 2005 WL 3215572, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 

In addition, the proposed Order seeks to protect entire documents, rather than just

protecting the actual confidential material through a method of redaction. See Cincinnati

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Insurance, 178 F.3d at 945 (stating that an order sealing documents containing confidential

information is overly broad because a document containing confidential information may also

contain material that is not confidential, in which case a party’s interest in maintaining the

confidential information would be adequately protected by redacting only portions of the

document). 

Finally, Cincinnati Insurance specifies that protective orders may only issue if the order

“makes explicit that either party and any interested member of the public can challenge the

secreting of particular documents.” 178 F.3d at 946. Here, the proposed order does not contain

such language.

It is important to remember that “the public at large pays for the courts and therefore has

an interest in what goes on at all stages of a judicial proceeding.” Id. at 945. That is, “[w]hat

happens in federal courts is presumptively open to public scrutiny.” Hicklin Eng’g, L.C. v.

Bartell, 439 F.3d 346, 348 (7th Cir. 2006). “People who want secrecy should opt for arbitration.

When they call on the courts, they must accept the openness that goes with subsidized dispute

resolution by public (and publicly accountable) officials. Judicial proceedings are public rather

than private property . . . .” Union Oil Co. of Ca. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000). 

Accordingly, a protective order “may not issue absent an appropriate showing of good

cause, as well as adherence to the other limitations the Seventh Circuit has emphasized apply to

such orders.” Shepard, 2003 WL 1702256, at *2. For these reasons, the Court DENIES approval

of the Proposed Protective Order submitted by GM. The parties may, however, submit a revised

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protective order consistent with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(7) and

Seventh Circuit case law.

SO ORDERED. 

Enter for this 28th day of October, 2013. 

S/ Roger B. Cosbey 

Roger B. Cosbey,

United States Magistrate Judge

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