UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

 HAMMOND DIVISION

WILLIAM R. TYLER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) 

v. ) Case No. 2:13-CV-331 JD

)

SHERIFF DAVID LAIN, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

William R. Tyler, a pro se prisoner, filed an amended complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C

§ 1983. (DE 18.) Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the complaint and dismiss it if

the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. To survive dismissal, the

complaint must state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd.

of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 603. Thus, the plaintiff “must do better than putting a few

words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has

happened to her that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403

(7th Cir. 2010). Nevertheless, the court must bear in mind that “[a] document filed pro se is to be

liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007). 
Here, Tyler complains about the conditions of his confinement at the Porter County Jail. His

complaint is not overly detailed, and in places is difficult to understand. However, this is Tyler’s

third attempt to state his claims, and given the nature of his filings it does not appear that allowing

further amendments will result in a better complaint. Therefore, the court will proceed to screening

the present complaint, attempting to discern any viable claims he may have and bearing in mind that

pro se filings are to be given liberal construction. To summarize Tyler’s allegations, he complains

about overcrowding which required him to sleep on the floor underneath a toilet “for months at a

time”; lack of proper response to his requests for medical care; incidents of excessive force by

correctional staff; and the confiscation of some of his legal materials when he was transferred to the

Indiana Department of Correction (“IDOC”). (DE 18.)

Tyler is now housed at an IDOC facility, but because he was a pretrial detainee when these

events occurred, the Fourteenth rather than the Eighth Amendment applies. Lewis v. Downey, 581

F.3d 467, 473 (7th Cir. 2009). The governing standards are functionally equivalent, however, and

“anything that would violate the Eighth Amendment would also violate the Fourteenth

Amendment.” Id. In evaluating an Eighth Amendment claim, courts conduct both an objective and

a subjective inquiry. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The objective prong asks

whether the alleged deprivation is “sufficiently serious” so that “a prison official’s act results in the

denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. Although “the Constitution does

not mandate comfortable prisons,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981), inmates are

entitled to be provided with adequate food, clothing, shelter, bedding, hygiene materials, and

sanitation. Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2009); Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488,

2
493 (7th Cir. 2006). Conditions of confinement may establish a constitutional violation in

combination when each condition alone would not satisfy the standard. Gillis, 468 F.3d at 493. 

On the subjective prong, the prisoner must show the defendant acted with deliberate

indifference to the inmate’s health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. As the Seventh Circuit has

explained:

[C]onduct is deliberately indifferent when the official has acted in an intentional or

criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant must have known that the plaintiff

was at serious risk of being harmed and decided not to do anything to prevent that

harm from occurring even though he could have easily done so.

Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted); see also Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 1999) (where inmate complained

about severe deprivations but was ignored, he established a “prototypical case of deliberate

indifference”). 

First, Tyler alleges that he was housed in an overcrowded cell with two beds for four people,

which required him to sleep on the floor near a toilet for several months. Giving him the inferences

to which he is entitled at this stage, he satisfies the objective prong of the inquiry. With respect to

the subjective prong, the complaint is not very detailed on this point, but it can be read to allege that

Tyler complained about the problem to Warden John Widup, Assistant Warden Ronald Gaytose, and

Sheriff David Lain, but they ignored his complaints. Giving him the inferences to which he is

entitled, he has stated enough to proceed further against these defendants.

Next, he alleges that he did not receive adequate medical care at the jail. To establish liability

for the denial of medical care, a prisoner must satisfy both an objective and subjective component

by showing: (1) his medical need was objectively serious; and (2) the defendant acted with

deliberate indifference to that medical need. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

3
97, 104 (1976). A medical need is “serious” if it is one that a physician has diagnosed as mandating

treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for

a doctor’s attention. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). For a medical professional

to be held liable for deliberate indifference, he or she must make a decision that represents “such a

substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate

that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Jackson v.

Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008). 

Here, Tyler complains that he suffers from a mental illness, had problems with “rotting”

teeth, and had an ailment which caused blood in his stool. He alleges that several of his requests for

care related to these conditions were ignored or there were delays in seeing the doctor, causing him

pain and suffering. Giving him the inferences to which he is entitled at this stage, he satisfies the

objective prong of the inquiry. With respect to the subjective prong, the complaint can be read to

allege that Megan Harris, the head nurse at the jail, was responsible for the mishandling of Tyler’s

medical requests. Giving him the inferences to which he is entitled, he has stated enough to proceed

further against this defendant.

Tyler next alleges two separate incidents of excessive force by correctional staff. First, he

claims that an incident occurred in September 2012, when he got in a dispute over his uniform with

Officer Michael Fishback. He claims Officer Fishback responded by choking him. In the second

incident, which occurred on an unknown date, Officer Donald Aleya allegedly tackled him to the

ground, and Officer Christopher Haig put a knee on his neck, smashing his face into the ground and

causing him pain in his mouth for approximately two weeks. 

4
The “core requirement” for an excessive force claim is that the defendant “used force not in

a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, but maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”

Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted). Several factors

guide the inquiry of whether an officer’s use of force was legitimate or malicious, including the need

for an application of force, the amount of force used, and the extent of the injury suffered by the

prisoner. Id. Here, as to the first incident, the complaint can be read to allege that Tyler was not

actively resisting during this incident, and that Officer Fishback used more force than was necessary

by choking him. Giving him the inferences to which he is entitled at this stage, he has alleged

enough to proceed further against Officer Fishback. As to the second incident, Tyler does not fully

describe what led to the use of force, but the complaint can be read to allege that he was not resisting

and that the amount of force used by the two officers was excessive under the circumstances and

caused him injury. Further factual development may show the officers acted reasonably under the

circumstances, but Tyler has alleged enough to proceed further against Officers Aleya and Haig.

Tyler also alleges that after the incident with Officer Fishback, he complained to his

supervisor, Captain Ron Taylor, but he failed to take any action. It is not entirely clear what Tyler

wanted Captain Taylor to do, but the captain cannot be held vicariously liable for Officer Fishback’s

actions solely because he is his supervisor. Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir.

5
2001). Tyler has not alleged a plausible basis for holding Captain Taylor liable for a constitutional

violation that he committed himself. Accordingly, he will be dismissed as a defendant.1

Next, Tyler complains that Officer Andrew Noel confiscated his law dictionary and other

legal materials when he was being transferred to IDOC. He also complains about inadequacies in

the jail law library and an inability to obtain legal copies. Inmates have a First Amendment right of

access to the courts, but there is no “abstract free-standing right” to a law library or to legal

materials. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). In other words, “the mere denial of access to

a prison law library or to other legal materials is not itself a violation of a prisoner’s rights; his right

is to access the courts,” and only if the defendants’ conduct prejudices a potentially meritorious legal

claim has the right been infringed. Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2006). Thus, to

state a claim, an inmate must “spell out” the connection between the denial of access to legal

materials and the resulting prejudice to a potentially meritorious legal claim. Id. The court must also

bear in mind that prison officials are afforded discretion in regulating how and when inmates are

given access to legal materials. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-52; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546

(1979). 

Here, Tyler alleges that some his legal materials were taken, that he had difficulties obtaining

legal copies, and that he received a “lack of help in [the] law library.” As explained above, this alone

1 Elsewhere in the complaint Tyler mentions a “restraint chair” (DE 18 at 4), but he does not provide any

information about the chair or what occurred in relation to it. Nor does he describe what any particular individual

might have done in connection with the chair that violated his rights. Even giving the complaint liberal construction,

the court cannot discern a plausible constitutional claim related to the chair. Tyler also mentions in passing that

someone named Benny Perez “grab[b]ed my dick and balls” (Id.), but he does not list this person as a defendant or

allege that he is employed by the jail. It appears this may be another inmate. Tyler cannot state a claim against a

private individual under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006). Nor has he

provided any detail from which a plausible failure-to-protect claim might be discerned. See Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d

904, 913 (7th Cir. 2005). If he believes he can add additional detail to allege a plausible claim, he is free to seek

leave to file an amended complaint.

6
does not give rise to an actionable First Amendment claim. He must spell out some type of prejudice

to a potentially meritorious legal claim, and he has not done so. Indeed, it appears the case he was

pursuing at the time was this one, and there has been no adverse action taken against him in this

case. Instead, he has been given several extensions of time to submit the documents needed to

proceed with this case, including after he left the jail. In sum, he has not alleged a plausible claim

for denial of access to the courts.

As a final matter, Tyler moves for in forma pauperis status (DE 19). He was already granted

leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this action, and so his motion will be denied as unnecessary.

He also moves for service of the complaint by the U.S. Marshal. (DE 20.) This motion will be

granted to the extent that service will be directed on the defendants as stated herein.

For these reasons, the court:

(1) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed on a claim against Jon Widup, David Lain, and

Ronald Gaytose in their individual capacities for monetary damages for housing him in an

overcrowded cell without adequate bedding;

(2) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed on a claim against Michael Fishback, Christopher

Haigh, and Donald Aleya in their individual capacities for monetary damages for using excessive

force against him;

(3) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed on a claim against Megan Harris in her individual

capacity for monetary damages for denying him adequate medical care;

(4) DISMISSES Robert Taylor and Andrew Noel as defendants;

(5) DISMISSES any and all other claims contained in the complaint;

7
(6) GRANTS the motion for service (DE 20), and DIRECTS the U.S. Marshals Service to

effect service of process on David Lain, John Widup, Ronald Gaytose, Megan Harris, Michael

Fishback, Christopher Haigh, and Donald Aleya pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d);

(7) ORDERS David Lain, John Widup, Ronald Gaytose, Megan Harris, Michael Fishback,

Christopher Haigh, and Donald Aleya to respond, as provided for in the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE and N.D. IND. L.R. 10-1, only to the claims for which the pro se plaintiff has been

granted leave to proceed in this screening order; and

(8) DENIES the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (DE 19) as unnecessary.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: March 7, 2014

 /s/ JON E. DEGUILIO 

Judge

United States District Court

8