UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 1:13-CR-62-TLS

)

JOSHUA R. MACKIN )

OPINION AND ORDER

The Defendant, Joshua R. Mackin, is charged with being a felon in possession of a

firearm, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He has filed a Motion to Suppress Tangible

Evidence and Statements [ECF No. 107], arguing for the suppression of items police seized from

him during an arrest, and statements he made to police during or after his arrest. In response

[ECF No. 110], the Government asserts that the police had probable cause to arrest the

Defendant and to conduct a search of his person incident to his arrest. The Government, pointing

to the existence of an arrest warrant and to case law permitting searches incident to arrest,

maintains that no evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve the Motion in its favor. Likewise,

the Government submits that no evidentiary hearing is necessary regarding the admissibility of

any statements the Defendant made to arresting officers, as they were not tainted by an unlawful

search. Moreover, in addition to the fact that voluntary statements are not subject to Miranda

warnings, the Government maintains that it does not intend to introduce any such statements

unless they become necessary for impeachment. The Defendant has not responded to the

Government’s assertions.

 Evidentiary hearings to resolve motions to suppress are not automatically required.

United States v. McGaughy, 485 F.3d 965, 969 (7th Cir. 2007). Rather, a court need only

conduct a hearing “‘when the allegations and moving papers are sufficiently definite, specific,
non-conjectural and detailed enough to conclude that a substantial claim is presented and that

there are disputed issues of material fact which will affect the outcome of the motion.’” Id.

(quoting United States v. Villegas, 388 F.3d 317, 324 (7th Cir. 2004)). The Seventh Circuit has

“emphasized the necessity of materiality in any factual disputes that are presented to the district

court as a predicate for an evidentiary hearing.” Id. The burden is on the defendant who is

seeking an evidentiary hearing to specifically allege a definite, material, factual issue that is in

dispute. Id.

Here, the Defendant has not met that burden. In his brief presentation of the background

facts, the Defendant notes the address where police officers encountered the Defendant on

August 2, 2013. He describes how, after he walked out of the residence, he was immediately

seized and searched. The police recovered a handgun and ammunition. In the argument section

of his Motion, the Defendant submits that a seizure of a citizen and subsequent search require

“reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” (Def.’s Motion 2, ECF No. 107) (citing Terry v.

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). The Defendant maintains that he had a “reasonable expectation of

privacy when he left the home” and was immediately seized. (Id.)

The Defendant’s argument wholly ignores the existence of a valid arrest warrant.

Attached to the Government’s Response in Opposition is a copy of the warrant for the

Defendant’s arrest, which directed the Sheriff of Allen County and any Law Enforcement

Agency to arrest Joshua Mackin and hold him without bail. The warrant had no expiration date,

and indicates that it was served on August 3, 2013. The Defendant makes no challenge to the

arrest warrant, which is critical because police have probable cause to arrest an individual if

there is a valid arrest warrant outstanding on that person. United States v. Johnson, 383 F.3d 538,

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545 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Marshall, 70 F.3d 68, 69 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The felony arrest

warrant gave the police a basis for arresting [the individual named in the warrant].”). A warrant

is proof that a neutral judicial officer has already reviewed the facts and made a determination

that probable cause exists to arrest. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981). 

Additionally, “police are entitled to search the persons and possessions of everyone

arrested on probable cause, with or without any reason to suspect that the person is armed or

carrying contraband.” United States v. Jackson, 377 F.3d 715, 716 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing

Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)).

“Where there is a lawful custodial arrest, a full search of the person is not only an exception to

the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a reasonable search under that

Amendment.” United States v. Thomas, 512 F.3d 383, 387 (7th Cir. 2008).

Because the Defendant has not identified any factual issues that are in dispute and would

affect the outcome of his Motion, the Court declines to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Because

the undisputed facts are that the Defendant was arrested pursuant to a valid arrest warrant, and

then searched incident to that arrest, his request to suppress tangible items is denied. 

As to the request to suppress any statements the Defendant made to the police, the

Motion appears to be moot, as the Defendant relies solely on a fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree

argument. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 214 F.3d 836, 838–39 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that

because the defendant was in lawful custody, no Fourth Amendment violation could have caused

his confession and it was admissible). Because the Defendant’s arrest and the search incident

thereto did not violate the Fourth Amendment, there is no basis to argue that any statements he

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made were tainted by such a violation.1

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress

Tangible Evidence and Statements [ECF No. 107]. The Jury Trial set for May 17, 2016, and the

Final Pretrial Conference set for May 2, 2016, at 11:00 AM, are CONFIRMED.

SO ORDERED on January 14, 2016.

 s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

1 Even though volunteered statements are not barred by the Fifth Amendment, Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966), the Government indicates that it does not intend to introduce any

statements the Defendant volunteered to officers on August 2, 2013. However, if the Defendant elects to

take the stand and then contradicts statements he made to officers following his arrest, the Government

reserves the right to use any of his post-arrest statements for impeachment purposes. See Harris v. New

York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (“The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to

use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.”).

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