IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

TIMOTHY F. WOODS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) NO. 2:14-CV-83

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, )

COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL )

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court for review of the

Commissioner of Social Security’s decision denying Disability

Insurance Benefits to Plaintiff, Timothy F. Woods. For the

reasons set forth below, the decision of the Commissioner is

AFFIRMED.

BACKGROUND

In July of 2009, Plaintiff, Timothy F. Woods (“Woods”),

filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”)

and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), for a disability

alleged to have begun on December 27, 2007. (Tr. 15, 280, 283.) 

Woods’ claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration. 

(Tr. 15, 127-30.) Upon Woods’ written request, a video hearing

was held on January 11, 2011; Woods, who was represented by

attorney Charles F. Marlowe (“Attorney Marlowe”), and a
vocational expert (“VE”), Mr. Harding, testified. (Tr. 15, 101-

26.) On January 28, 2011, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”),

Curt Marceille, issued a decision that was unfavorable to Woods,

finding that he was not disabled. (Tr. 15, 134-44.) The Appeals

Council remanded the matter back to an ALJ, this time to ALJ

Edward Studzinski, for resolution of an issue involving medical

expert responses to interrogatories. (Tr. 15, 149-50.) Upon

remand, the ALJ was to proffer the medical expert responses to

interrogatories in accordance with Hallex I-2-5-42, obtain

additional evidence concerning Woods’ impairments with regard to

consultative examinations and existing medical evidence, and, if

warranted, give further consideration to Woods’ maximum residual

functional capacity (“RFC”). (Id.) On August 21, 2012, ALJ

Studzinski held a video conference hearing, at which Woods, who

was still represented by Attorney Marlowe, testified along a

medical expert and a VE. (Tr. 15, 47-100.) On October 11, 2012,

ALJ Studzinski issued a decision that was again unfavorable to

Woods, finding that Woods was not disabled during the relevant

time period. (Tr. 15-27.) 

On February 25, 2014, the Appeals Council denied Woods’

request for review. (Tr. 1-5.) In its notice to Woods, the

Appeals Council stated that, in addition to considering the

reasons Attorney Marlowe listed on the Order of Appeals Council

form, it also reviewed additional records provided after the

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October 2012 hearing.1 (Tr. 2.) The Appeals Council concluded

that the new information related to a later time period and did

not affect the decision about whether Woods was disabled

beginning on or before October 11, 2012. (Id.) The Appeals

Council advised Woods that if he wanted the Appeals Council to

consider whether he was disabled after that date, he would need

to apply again. (Id.) Accordingly, ALJ Studzinski’s decision

dated October 11, 2012, became the Commissioner’s final decision

in this matter. Woods has initiated the instant action for

judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

RELEVANT FACTS2

From February 2013 to July 2013, Woods treated at the Center

for Pain Management, generally with Dr. Simon Ho. (Tr. 699-707,

725-38.) At his initial assessment on February 1, 2013, he was

found to ambulate with difficulty, but to have a negative

straight-leg raise test bilaterally and to have 5/5 strength in

all extremities. (Tr. 727.) In late February, following an MRI,

Dr. Ho characterized Woods’ condition as failing to respond to

conservative measures “for at least three months.” (Tr. 733.) 

1

 The Appeals Council listed each set of documents that it considered by

name. 

2

 The Court has borrowed liberally from the Commissioner’s brief for this

section of the order; Woods has not pointed to any relevant facts whatsoever

in support of his position. 

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Dr. Ho administered a cervical interlaminar epidural on March 5,

2013, which substantially reduced Woods’ reported pain. (Tr.

734, 736.) On May 20, 2013, Woods underwent a diagnostic

cervical medial branch block. (Tr. 699.) At a follow-up

appointment the next month, he related that his post-procedure

pain was 0 out of 10 at its lowest. (Tr. 701.) He also noted a

“substantial increase in functional capacity.” (Tr. 701.) Dr.

Simon Ho again performed the block procedure in July of 2013 and

again achieved similar results. (Tr. 703-06.) 

Also beginning in February of 2013, Woods treated with

Edgewater Systems for his depression. (Tr. 709-24, 739-56.) 

Later notes generally assessed Woods as having “moderate

symptoms” which generally improved with treatment and medication 

(Tr. 711, 713, 715, 717, 719.) 

Woods also treated at St. Mary’s Medical Center in March of

2013. (Tr. 758.) These records appear to be the inpatient

hospital records associated with Woods’ March 5, 2013, epidural

injection. (Tr. 758-790.)

On September 26, 2013, Mrs. Rose Davis, M.A., a therapist,

completed a mental impairment questionnaire for Woods. (Tr.

693-98.) Mrs. Davis failed to indicate her frequency or length

of contact with Woods, but she opined that Woods had a GAF score

of 55, suffered poor concentration, mood swings, anger outbursts,

insomnia, rapid speech, blurred vision, severe back pain, and

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neck pain. (Tr. 693.) Mrs. Davis marked every listed mental

ability or aptitude needed to do (unskilled or skilled) work as

“unable to meet competitive standards.” (Tr. 695-96.) She also

opined that Woods could be expected to miss more than four days

of work per month. (Tr. 698.)

DISCUSSION

Review of Commissioner’s Decision

This Court has authority to review the Commissioner’s

decision to deny social security benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any

fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive .

. . .” Id. Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support

a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)

(quotation omitted). In determining whether substantial evidence

exists, the Court shall examine the record in its entirety, but

shall not substitute its own opinion for the ALJ’s by

reconsidering the facts or reweighing the evidence. Jens v.

Barnhart, 347 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 2003). With that in mind,

however, this Court reviews the ALJ’s findings of law de novo and

if the ALJ makes an error of law, the Court “may reverse without

regard to the volume of evidence in support of the factual

findings.” White v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1999). 

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As a threshold matter, for a claimant to be eligible for

benefits under the Social Security Act, the claimant must

establish that he is disabled. To qualify as being disabled, the

claimant must be unable “to engage in any substantial gainful

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous

period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. §§

423(d)(1)(A) and 1382(a)(1). To determine whether a claimant has

satisfied this statutory definition, the ALJ performs a five-step

evaluation:

Step 1: Is the claimant performing

substantial gainful activity: If yes, the

claim is disallowed; if no, the inquiry

proceeds to step 2.

Step 2: Is the claimant’s impairment or

combination of impairments “severe” and

expected to last at least twelve months? If

not, the claim is disallowed; if yes, the

inquiry proceeds to step 3.

Step 3: D o e s t h e c l a i m a n t h a v e a n

impairment or combination of impairments that

meets or equals the severity of an impairment

in the SSA’s Listing of Impairments, as

described in 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P, App.

1? If yes, then claimant is automatically

disabled; if not, then the inquiry proceeds

to step 4.

Step 4: Is the claimant able to perform his

past relevant work? If yes, the claim is

denied; if no, the inquiry proceeds to step

5, where the burden of proof shifts to the

Commissioner. 

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Step 5: Is the claimant able to perform any

other work within his residual functional

capacity in the national economy: If yes, the

claim is denied; if no, the claimant is

disabled. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v) and 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); see

also Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 n. 8 (7th Cir. 1994).

In this case, the ALJ found that Woods suffered from the

following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease and

obesity. (Tr. 18.) He also determined that Woods had “nonsevere” impairments related to his diabetes mellitus,

hyperlipidemia, and hypertension, all of which were controlled. 

(Id.) The ALJ opined that Woods’ mental impairment of depression

did not cause more than minimal limitations in his ability to

perform basic mental work activities and was thus also “nonsevere.” In making that determination, the ALJ noted that,

although the record indicated the claimant was diagnosed with

depression on July 31, 2012, by his primary care provider, the

record did not show that Woods had ever treated with or even met

with a psychiatric expert. (Id.) The ALJ also pointed out that

Woods’ diagnosis was made approximately a month before the date

of his decision; the ALJ stated that Woods had failed to allege

that he was disabled due to depression, or any other mental

impairment, in his original disability report and that the record

did not establish that such impairment would last a full twelve

months. (Id.) 

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Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that Woods did not have an

impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically

equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20

C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(d),

404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926). (Tr. 20.) 

The ALJ also found that Woods had the RFC to perform:

less than light work as defined in 20 C.F.R.

404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). Specifically,

the claimant can lift and carry twenty pounds

occasionally and ten pounds frequently. The

claimant can stand or walk for one hour at a

time and stand and/or walk for four hours

total in an eight-hour workday. The claimant

must be allowed to sit for five minutes after

standing for an hour. The claimant can sit

for two hours at a time. The claimant can

occisionally climb stairs and ramps, but

cannot climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. 

The claimant can occasionally balance, stoop,

kneel, crouch, and crawl. The claimant can

occasionally perform overhead reaching with

his upper extremities bilaterally. The

claimant can frequently, but not constantly,

operate foot controls bilaterally. The

claimant cannot work at unprotected heights

or perform work involving constant exposure

to unguarded, hazardous machinery. 

(Id.) 

After considering Woods’ age, education, work experience and

RFC, the ALJ relied upon the testimony of the VE and concluded

that Woods was not disabled and not entitled to benefits because

he was capable of making a successful adjustment to other work

that existed in significant numbers in the national economy. 

(Tr. 26.) Thus, Woods’ claim failed at step five of the

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evaluation process. 

 In his complaint, Woods states that the Commissioner’s

decision was erroneous because “[a]dditional evidence was

submitted and not considered in this decision.” (DE #1, p. 1.) 

He does not identify what evidence he is referring to. In his 

pro se brief, Woods states, in full and verbatim, that he is:

appealing this case due to evidence not

admitted for the Commissioner to make this

decision. The rules state you must have the

condition continuously for a period of 12

months and unable to work. First and far

most I’ve had this condition since December

2007. As stated in my medical records my

condition is disabling me to do anything

physically and mentally. The records which

was submitted October 2012 as stated in the

denial was not taken into consideration to

make this decision. I am still seeking

medical attention for my physical and my

mental disabilities. If need be I can submit

more supporting documentation from the date

of October 2012 to present. Your attention

to this matter would be greatly appreciated. 

(DE #14, pp. 1-2.) While Woods is not represented by counsel at

this time, he nonetheless bears the burden of showing that the

ALJ committed reversible error. See Cadenhead v. Astrue, 410 F.

App’x 982, 994 (7th Cir. 2011) (pro se litigants “must present

arguments supported by legal authority and citations to the

record”); McLachlan v. Astrue, 392 F. App’x 493, 494 (7th Cir.

2010) (dismissing pro se appeal because the brief did “not refer

to facts in the record or contain an argument consisting of more

than a generalized assertion of error”). “A generalized

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assertion of error is not sufficient to challenge an adverse

ruling, . . . and undeveloped or unsupported contentions are

waived.” Cadenhead, 410 F. App’x at 984 (citations omitted). 

Woods has not presented any legal authority in support of his

position, and he has not provided a single citation to the

record. He has not specified what evidence that was submitted

was allegedly not considered, and he has not identified any

evidence that was not submitted that should now be considered. 

Such a generalized assertion of error, devoid of any supporting

facts, law, or citation to the record, is not sufficient to

challenge the ALJ’s adverse ruling, and the Court finds that all

of Woods’ undeveloped and unsupported arguments are waived. To

the extent that Woods is arguing that the Appeals Council

improperly rejected evidence that was submitted subsequent to the

October 2012 hearing held by ALJ Studzinski,3 the Court agrees

with the Commissioner that the evidence was properly categorized

as not material to the time period in question.

Pursuant to Social Security Administration regulations,

“[i]f new and material evidence is submitted, the Appeals Council

shall consider the additional evidence only where it relates to

the period on or before the date of the administrative law judge

hearing decision.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970(b). If the Appeals

3

 This is how Woods’ argument is classified by the Commissioner in its

Memorandum in Support of the Commissioner’s Decision, and Woods has not filed

a reply to dispute or clarify that classification. 

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Council determines that the evidence is new and material, it must

evaluate the entire record, including the newly submitted

evidence, to determine if the ALJ’s decision is contrary to the

weight of the evidence. Id. A district court is tasked with

analyzing whether the Appeals Council made an error of law in

refusing that review, but “[i]n the absence of any such error . .

. the Council’s decision whether to review is discretionary and

unreviewable.” Perkins v. Chater, 107 F.3d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir.

1997). The Seventh Circuit has explained that “whether [an]

ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence is not the

same question as whether the Appeals Council properly rejected

[an] appeal.” Farrell v. Astrue, 692 F.3d 767, 770-71 (7th Cir.

2012).4

When it relates to that particular decision by the Appeals

Council, “new and material” evidence is defined as: 

1. Not part of the claim(s) record as of the

date of the ALJ decision;

2. Relevant, i.e., involves or is directly

related to issues adjudicated by the ALJ; and

3. Relates to the period on or before the

date of the ALJ decision, meaning it is: (1)

dated before or on the date of the ALJ

decision, or (2) post-dates the ALJ decision

but is reasonably related to the time period

adjudicated by the ALJ.

4

 Sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is not applicable where, as here, the

evidence the claimant wanted the court to consider was not “new” to the

district court because it had already been submitted to and rejected by the

Appeals Council. Farrell, 692 F.3d at 770.

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Lomax v. Colvin, 13–CV–331–JDP, 2014 WL 4265842, at *13 (W.D.Wis.

Aug. 28, 2014) (citing HALLEX I–3–3–6).5

Here, it is undisputed that the evidence was new to the

administrative record at the time of Woods’ application to the

Appeals Council, so the question at issue is whether the newly

submitted evidence was material. After review of the evidence in

the Supplemental Certification filed by the Commissioner (DE

#18), the Court agrees with the Commissioner that the Appeals

Council was correct in noting that such information was “new

information about a later time” and thus does “not affect the

decision about whether [Woods] was disabled beginning on or

before October 11, 2012.” None of the additional evidence cited

by the Appeals Council speaks to Woods’ condition as it existed

at the time of the ALJ’s decision, nor is it reasonably related

to the time period adjudicated by the ALJ. See Johnson v. Apfel,

191 F.3d 770, 776 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Bowen, 868

F.2d 921, 927 (7th Cir. 1989)) (“the evidence must ‘relate to the

claimant’s condition during the relevant time period encompassed

by the disability application under review.’”). Woods does not

identify any information that would reasonably have changed the

ALJ’s conclusion that he was disabled beginning on or before

October 11, 2012. The evidence contained within the Supplemental

Certification describes treatment that Woods received anywhere

5

 HALLEX is the Social Security Administration's internal Hearings, Appeals,

and Litigation Law Manual.

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from four to eleven months after the date of the decision. It

does not diagnose a previously undiagnosed condition, provide an

opinion expanding upon a relevant diagnosis as it existed during

the adjudicative period, or seek to fill any evidentiary gaps. 

As such, it was not error for the Appeals Council to determine

that the newly submitted evidence did not affect the ALJ’s

decision. 

Woods presents no further argument and does not identify any

other defect in the ALJ’s reasoning. As noted above, even pro se

litigants must present arguments supported by legal authority and

citations to the record, and a generalized assertion of error is

insufficient to challenge an ALJ’s ruling. See Cadenhead, 410 F.

App’x at 984, 994; McLachlan v. Astrue, 392 F. App’x at 494. 

This Court finds that the ALJ provided substantial evidence in

support of his decision. Woods was represented by counsel during

the administrative proceedings and had an adequate opportunity to

present all relevant evidence to the ALJ during the time period

in question and to fully develop the underlying medical record. 

Because Woods has failed to demonstrate that the ALJ committed

error at any step of his analysis, his appeal must be dismissed

and the ALJ’s decision must be affirmed. 

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Commissioner of Social

Security’s final decision is AFFIRMED.

DATED: September 30, 2015 /s/ Rudy Lozano, Judge 

United States District Court

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