Filed 7/14/ 21 Davis v. WFP Securities Corp. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a) , prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.11 15.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

JAIMIE DAVIS,

Plaintiff and Appellant ,

v.

WFP SECURITIES CORP. INC. et al. ,
Defendant s and Respondent s

. G05 8 837
(Super. Ct. No. 30

- 201 9

- 0 1 0 88210 )

O P I N I O N

Appeal from a n order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Sheila Fell , Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part

. Motion to correct reporter’s transcript
d enied. Request for judicial notice d enied.

Jaimie Davis, in pro. per. , for Plaintiff and Appellant. Reif Law Group, Brandon S. Reif and Marc S. Ehrlich for Defendant and

R espondent Curtis Sathre III.2 No appearance for Defendants and Respondents WFP Securities Corp. Inc.
and John E. Schooler.

* * *

Jaimie Davis appeals from an order denying her petition to compel
arbitration , to stay judgment enforcement proceedings , and to vacate abstracts of judgment and liens entered against her

. Davis contends the trial court erred in denying her petition because of an earlier arbitration, which resulted in the Los Angeles Superior Court j udgment (judgment) being enforced by respondent Curtis Sathre III (Sathre).

We agree in part. Davis ’s affirmative claims for defamation and tortious debt collection practices against respondents WFP Securities Corp., Inc. (WFP) , John E.
Schooler (Schooler) , and Sathre ( respondents ) must be arbitrate d , contra ry to the trial
court’s order

. But we reject Davis ’s challenges to the remainder of the trial court’s order, including the portions denying her requests to stay judgment enforcement proceedings
and to vacate abstracts of judgment and liens entered against her

. Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the order denying Davis ’s petition to compel arbitration of her
affirmative claims ; we affirm the order in all other respects.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

WFP sol d investments , but it is now out of business. Davis was a former
client of WFP. Schooler was WFP’s president, and Sathre was a WFP employee.

Davis invested and apparently lost substantial funds with WFP

. She brought an arbitrati on proceeding against respondents, claiming t hey were negligent in recommending the investments. Respondents prevailed at arbitration and obtained an award of costs (later incorporated into the judgment) against her in the principal amount of $135,755.89.

Respondents obtained the judgment in 2012

. Sathre began making efforts to collect in 2018, when he filed lien notices in two other cases involving Davis

. In 2019,3

Sathre sought to conduct a j udgment debtor examination of Davis in Los Angeles County. At around the same time, Davis alleges she f irst became aware of defamatory testimony about her given by respondents in another matter. She also alleges respondents used illegal debt collection tactics, including stake

- ou ts outside her father’s
home as well as verbal harassment of her and her fathe r , and that these allege dly tortious

acts damaged her.

Davis filed a petition in Orange County Superior Court seeking an order compelling arbitration of her affi rmative claims against respondent s, staying judgment
collection efforts , and vacating the abstracts o f judgment and liens. In the petition, Davis
contended all controversies between herself and respondents fell within the scope of the arbitration provision entered in connection with her original agreement with WFP , which
stated in part: “To: WFP Securities, Inc. [¶] I agree that all controversies which may arise between us concerning any transaction, the construction, performance or breach of this or any other agreement between us, whether entered into prior, on or subsequent to the date hereof, or any other matter, shall be determined by arbitration in accordance with the rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. then in effect. I understand that judgement upon any arbitration award may be entered in any cou rt of competent jurisdiction.”

Davis argued any efforts by respondent s to enforce the judgment belonged in arbitration, pointing to another portion of the arbitration provision : “The parties are waiving their right to seek remedies in court, including t he right to jury trial.” In the alternative to stay ing enforcement of the judgment and vacating the abstracts and liens , Davis sought an order requiring respondent s to post a bond as a condi tion of maintaining any liens. Sathre opposed the petition, argu ing Davis’ s petition was “the latest in a series of transparent efforts she has made to avoid her obligations to pay a judgment4

entered by this Court 1 on July 10, 2012

. . . . ” Sathre contended (1) the arbitration agreement excluded postjudgment enforcem ent proceedings; (2) Davis failed to make a sufficient factual allegation of an arbitrable claim; (3) the petition should be dismissed as res judicata; (4) there were no grounds for a stay; (5) there was no legal basis for Davis ’s request to vacate the lie ns; and (6) there was no legal basis for a requirem ent of a bond.

The trial court denied Davis ’s petition. The court concluded judgment collection was not subject to arbitration, and the prior arbitration had satisfied the requirements of the arbitratio n agreement , so no further arbitration was necessary . Davis appealed.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Davis asserts the court erred in denying her petition. She argues the arbitration provision encompasses all controversies between the parties, and no

statut ory exemptions apply. Davis also contends further proceedings between the parties must be stayed pending the outcome of the new arbitration, and all abstract s of the judgmen t and liens should be removed. Finally , Davis asks us to order the parties specifically to JAMS in Las Vegas, where she resides.

Davis argues, respondent s concede, and we agree, the issues in this case are issues of law, not disputed fact , and the de novo standard therefore applies. ( Bautista v. Fantasy Activewear, Inc. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5 th 650, 655.)
1. Scope of the Arbitration Agreement
Davis asserts the broad language of the arbitration provision applies to all claims between the partie s. She cites t wo general rule s: (1) arbitration provisions are to be liberally construed ; and (2) this provision should be construed against respondent s as

1 The judgment was actually entered by Los Angeles Superior Court.5

the drafters of the contract . Sathre 2 counter s that Davis ’s interpretation of the arbitration provision as applicable to all claims at all times is “absurd.” Sathre cite s cases limiting
the reach of broad provisions which called for arbitration of all claims “arising from” or “relating to” the contract, and arg ue s Davis ’s claims do not arise from or relate to the investments purchased by Davis pursuant to the contract , concluding Davis’s claims
therefore fall outside the scope of the arbitration agreement.

The trial court did not reach th e s e issue s . Instead, t he trial court found the parties had already conducted an arbitration, and it impliedly conclude d the issues raised by Davis had been resolved through that process . But Davis ’s affirmative defamation and unlawful debt collection practices claims here are distinct from those claims which

were at issue in the prior arbitration

. W e must therefore determine whether these new
claims fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement.

“‘Arbitration is

. . . a matter of contract, and the parties may freely delineate the area of its application. The court’s role

. . . must be strictly limited to a determination of whether the party resisting arbitration agreed to arbitrate. A heavy presumption weighs the sca les in favor of arbitrability; an order directing arbitration should be granted “unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration [p rovision] is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.”’” ( Gravillis v. Cold

well Banker Residential Brokerage Co. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4 th 761, 771.)
The language of th e arbitration clause here is extraordinarily broad. It requires arbitration of “all controversies which may arise . . . concerning any transaction,
the construction, performance or breach of this or any other agreement .

. . , whether entered into prior, on or subsequent to the date hereof, or any other matter,” between the parties. Unlike the arbitration clauses in the cases cited by Sathre , this arbitr ation clause

2 Respondents WFP and Schooler did not file opposition to Davis’s petition.6

is not limited to matters “relating to” or “arising from” the contract; instead, it applies to matters relating to this contract, to other past or future contracts between the parties, or to “any other matter” between the parties. The provisi on contains no time limitation and
afford s no exceptions. On its face, it applies to any dispute between the parties. In the absence of any ambiguity, w e see no need to resort to canons of interpretation to resolve the question, but nonetheless note both the general rule in favor of arbitrability and the rule of construction again st the drafter support Davis ’s view.

We are not persuaded by Sathre’s contrary arguments

. He argue s the

contract between the parties should not “apply more broadly than the sin gle transaction contemplated thereby.” But the arbitration clause drafted by respondents expressly extends its application to “any other matter.” Sathre argue s there is no relationship
be tween the contract and Davis ’s claims. T he arbitration clause does not require such a relationship. Sathre’s citations to past cases involving narrower arbitration clauses are unavailing. We therefore conclude Davis’ s affirmative claims fall within the scope of the provision and must be arbitrated.
2. Stay of Proceedings
Davis ’s petition also sought an order staying judgment enforcement proceedings against her. The trial court declined to enter such an order, concluding it lacked authority to stay collection of the judgment. We agree with the trial court.

In general, j udgment enforcement proceedings are not arbitrable. ( Luster v.
Collins (1993) 15 Cal.App.4 th 1338, 1349.) Once a judgment following an arbitration is entered, it “has the same force and effect as, and is subject to all the provisions of law relating to, a judgment in a civil action of the same jurisdictional classification; and it may be enforced like any other judgment of the court in which it is entered, in an action of the same jurisdictional classification.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1287.4.) In other wor ds, once the arbitration is over, the impact of the arbitration agreement on the dispute ends. The judgment enforcement process is exclusively a judicial function.7 Further, the statute upon which Davis premises her request for a stay (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4) requires a stay only when a court “has ordered arbitration of a controversy which is an issue involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court

o f this State.” Davis ’s new claims do not involve a controversy which is an issue in Sathre’s ongoing efforts in court to collect the judgment. Instead, they involve only issues relating to alleged defamation and allegedly tortious extrajudicial enforcement efforts. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court properly declined to stay Sathre’s
efforts to enforce the judgment.
3. Removal of Abstracts of Judgment and Liens
Davis argues the arbitration agreement required the trial court to remove any abstracts of judgment or liens entered against her. She relies upon this language in the arbitration agreement: “The parties are waiving their right to seek remedies in court, including the right to jury trial.” But the arbitration agreement also expressly provides the parties may enter judgment upon any arbitration award entered pursuant to the

contract. Davis cites no statutory or decisional authority supporting her contention that a court order removing otherwise

- proper abstracts of judgment and liens based on a contractual arbitration clause is permit ted, much less required. We see no reason why it
should be. Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s refusal to enter an order removing
the abstracts of judgment or liens.
4. Choice of Arbitrator and Arbitral Forum
Davis argues the court should have order ed this matter to arbitration with JAMS in Las Vegas. She argues respondent s failed to oppose her choice of ar bitrator and
arbitral forum contained in her petition.

Preliminarily, we do not read Sathre’s opposition , and WFP and Schooler’s lack of opposit ion, to Davis ’s petition so narrowly. Sathre argued the matter was not
arbitrable at all , but still referred repeatedly to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ( FINRA ) arbitration rules and procedures, which were used in connection with8

the initial arbitration. 3 Presumably, if ordered to an arbitration, respondents would argue the contract requires arbitration before FINRA.

However, we decline to rule on this issue and instead defer it to the sound
discretion of the trial court in the first instance . The record provides us with insufficient information to determine, among other things, whether FINRA would even accept
arbitration of t he claims presented by Davis

. 5. Motion to Correct the Reporter’s Transcript and Request for Judici al

Notice On appeal, Davis moved to correct the reporter’s transcript of the hearing on her petition, specifying several instances in which she contends the reporter misheard her. Sathre also requested we take judicial notice of various documents relating primarily to his judgment enforcement efforts in Los Angeles Superior Court and related appellate proceedings. Davis’s requested corrections of the reporter ’ s transcript, and the
documents that Sathre ask s us to take judicial notice of do not impact our analysis. We
therefore de ny Davis’s motion and Sathre’s request for judicial notice.

DISPOSITION
The portion of the order denying Davis ’s petition to compel arbitration of
her affirmative claims is reversed. The order is affirmed in all other respects. I n the

3 The arbitration agreement calls for use of the arbitration rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. That entity merged with a div ision of the New York Stock Exchange to form FINRA.9

interests of ju stice and pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5), no costs
are awarded

.

GOETHALS , J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

BEDSWORTH, J.