IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

ANNE R. HILL,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

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NO. 1:13–CV-331

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court for review of the

Commissioner of Social Security’s decision denying Disability

Insurance Benefits to Plaintiff Anne R. Hill (“Hill”). For the

reasons set forth below, the Commissioner of Social Security’s

final decision is AFFIRMED.

BACKGROUND

On July 1, 2011, Hill filed an application for Social

Security Disability Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social

Security Act, 42 U.S.C. section 401 et seq. She also applied for

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the

Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. section 1381 et. seq. Hill

alleged that her disability began on June 30, 2011. The Social

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Security Administration (“SSA”) denied her initial application

and also denied her claim upon reconsideration.

Hill requested a hearing, and on September 6, 2012, Hill

appeared with her attorney at an administration hearing before

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Maryann S. Bright. Testimony

was provided by Hill, Kim Stamate, Hill’s friend, and vocational

expert Robert L. Bond. On September 27, 2012, ALJ Bright issued

a decision denying Hill’s claims, and finding her not disabled

because she could perform a significant number of jobs in the

national economy, despite her limitations. (Tr. 7-24.)

Hill requested that the Appeals Council review the ALJ’s

decision, but that request was denied. Accordingly, the ALJ’s

decision became the Commissioner’s final decision. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 422.210(a). Hill has initiated the instant action for judicial

review of the Commissioner’s final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

section 405(g).

DISCUSSION

Facts

Hill was born in 1958, and was 52 years old on the alleged

disability onset date. (Tr. 18.) She earned her GED in 1992. 

(Tr. 165.) Hill worked as a press operator between March 1998

and June 2011. (Tr. 165.)

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Medical Evidence

In 1985, Hill underwent cervical fusion surgery at C5-C6. 

(Tr. 230.) In November 2010, Dr. Greg Chupp diagnosed Hill with

a neck strain. (Tr. 208.) On November 29, 2010, Dr. Chupp

reexamined Hill’s neck injury, found she was “doing well,” and

released her to full work with no restrictions. (Tr. 206, 208-

09.) Dr. Chupp’s notes indicate that Hill “states [she] feels a

lot [sic] better, ready to go back to work with no restrictions.” 

(Tr. 209.)

On December 11, 2010, Hill was treated for left shoulder

pain (Tr. 210). Hill was able to move “all extremities well,

other than the left shoulder,” and her neck was characterized as

supple with adequate range of motion. (Tr. 211.) X-rays of her

left shoulder revealed a hyperextension injury and a moderately

severe osteoarthritis with prominent osteophytic spurring around

the femoral head margins. (Tr. 218.) Hill was treated with

Toradol, Ultram, and a sling. (Tr. 214.)

An imaging study taken on December 16, 2010, revealed a

variety of issues with Hill’s left shoulder, including

osteoarthritis, tedinopathy, and acromioclavicular degenerative

joint disease. (Tr. 219-20.) On December 20, 2010, Hill’s

orthopedist, Dr. Barry Liechty, M.D., administered a cortisone

injection to Hill’s left shoulder. (Tr. 221, 226.) Hill

returned to work on December 21, 2010. (See Tr. 221.) On

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January 7, 2011, Hill accepted a voluntary layoff. (See Tr.

221.) Hill told Dr. Liechty that she would not pursue surgery on

her left shoulder during the lay off because her health insurance

was going away. (See Tr. 221.)

On January 17, 2011, Dr. Liechty diagnosed osteoarthritis in

the glenohumeral joint and mild tendinopathy in Hill’s left

shoulder. (Tr. 221.) On January 21, 2011, Hill met with another

doctor referred by Dr. Liechty to discuss left shoulder

replacement surgery. (Tr. 229.)

On May 25, 2011, Hill visited Dr. Liechty complaining of

left hip and groin pain that she had experienced for about a

year, knee pain that she had experienced for six months, and

difficulty with walking. (Tr. 230.) The records do not indicate

any complaint about Hill’s right shoulder. (See Tr. 230-31.) 

Dr. Liechty identified severe osteoarthritis in Hill’s left hip

and left knee medial pain. (Tr. 231.)

On July 5, 2011, Dr. Liechty performed the surgery for

Hill’s left hip replacement. (Tr. 241-42.) At that time, Hill

suffered left hip severe osteoarthritis with a bony defect in the

superior acetabulum. (Tr. 241.) The treatment notes reference

Hill’s left shoulder pain, but do not address her right shoulder. 

(See Tr. 238.)

On August 8, 2011, Hill met with Dr. Liechty for a postoperation follow-up. (Tr. 317.) His treatment notes indicate

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that Hill stated that she was not using any assistive device, and

was taking two Vicodin per week. (Tr. 317.) Dr. Liechty stated

that her replacement hip was in good alignment with progressing

healing. (Tr. 317.) He also noted Hill’s shoulder arthritis,

but did not mention her neck or spine. (See Tr. 317.) He

released Hill to work that involved no squatting, no lifting over

ten pounds, and no pushing or pulling. (Tr. 320.) On August 29,

2011, Dr. Liechty released Hill to work that avoided heavy

lifting, squatting, pushing, and pulling indefinitely. (Tr.

316.)

On August 20, 2011, consultative examiner Dr. David Ringel,

D.O., examined Hill. (Tr. 275-78.) Dr. Ringel noted that Hill

reported that she had last worked in June 2011, could dress and

feed herself without difficulty, could stand one to two hours at

a time and four hours out of an eight-hour work day, could walk

two blocks on level ground, could sit for two hours without

difficulty, could lift ten pounds, could drive for up to an hour,

could do most household chores (sweeping, mopping, vacuuming,

cooking, washing dishes and climbing stairs) in short intervals

with breaks. (Tr. 275.) He characterized Hill as mildly obese,

able to ambulate with a limp, and slow getting on and off the

examination table due to her left hip, which had been replaced

just over one month earlier. (Tr. 276.) He noted that she has

“a little bit of stiffness in her neck,” and complained of left

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knee pain. (Tr. 275.) Dr. Ringel further noted that Hill

required no assistive devices to walk, had 5/5 grip strength

bilaterally, and good thumb-finger opposition with no

abnormalities, had 5/5 motor strength in all proximal muscle

groups in all four extremities, and had intact sensation in all

four extremities. (Tr. 277.) He identified range of motion

deficits in Hill’s cervical spine, lumbar spine, hips, and both

shoulders (her left shoulder being “somewhat worse” than her

right). (Tr. 277-278.)

On September 18, 2011, state agency physician Dr. J. Sands,

M.D., reviewed Hill’s records and prepared a Physical Residual

Functional Capacity Assessment. (Tr. 281-88.) Dr. Sands opined

that Hill could lift twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds

frequently; sit up to six hours in an eight-hour workday with

normal breaks; stand and/or walk up to six hours in an eight-hour

workday with normal breaks; and reach only occasionally with her

left arm due to her history of severe left-arm osteoarthritis. 

(Tr. 282-84.) In making this RFC assessment, Dr. Sands noted

“rom [range of motion] loss to lumbar spine as well as

bilaterally shoulders.” (Tr. 282.)

On October 4, 2011, imaging of Hill’s lumbar spine indicated

that vertebral body heights appeared to be preserved, with no

acute bony pathology, minimal degenerative disc disease at the

L3-4 and L5-S1 disc spaces with no subluxation of vertebral

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bodies, and minimal atherosclerotic vascular changes in

associated soft-tissue. (Tr. 303.)

Dr. Sands reviewed additional evidence on October 2, 2011,

but did not change his assessment of Hill’s RFC. (Tr. 304.) On

November 1, 2011, state agency physician Dr. M. Ruiz, M.D., also

reviewed Hill’s records and affirmed Dr. Sand’s opinion. (Tr.

306.)

On November 10, 2011, Hill’s primary care physician, Dr.

Teresa Smith, M.D., diagnosed Hill with depression and treated

her with Zoloft. (Tr. 335-36.) Dr. Smith’s notes from that day

indicate that Hill complained of pain in her left shoulder and

that her gait was not abnormal, but do not reference any

difficulty in sitting, standing or walking. (Tr. 335.) Dr.

Smith’s subsequent notes indicate that the Zoloft was helping

Hill. (Tr. 332.) None of notes prepared by Dr. Smith reference

any complaints about Hill’s right shoulder or neck. (See Tr.

332-38.)

Hill’s Hearing Testimony

At the hearing before ALJ Bright on September 6, 2012, Hill

testified that she had stopped working on June 30, 2011, because

of problems with her hips and shoulders. (Tr. 29, 37.) Hill

testified that she drives a couple of times a week (Tr. 31), does

a little babysitting (Tr. 45), goes to church (Tr. 54), visits

her mother (Tr. 54-55), and does some housework, including

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cooking, dishes, laundry, and vacuuming (Tr. 55-56). Hill

testified that she can lift 10-15 pounds with her right arm. 

(Tr. 51.)

Hill testified that since her hip replacement surgery, she

experienced more pain in her left femur than her hip. (Tr. 39.) 

She further testified that she has had back pain for a long time,

including the period when she was working. (Tr. 40.) Using a

ten-point scale, Hill characterized her hip pain as a three, her

left shoulder pain as an eight, and her left femur pain as a

five. (Tr. 60-61.) She takes over-the-counter medication to

manage her pain. (See Tr. 59-60 (referring to aspirin, ibuprofen

and Advil).)

Ms. Stamate’s Hearing Testimony

Ms. Stamate testified that she has known Hill for 18 years,

and sees Hill at least once a week. (Tr. 62, 63.) She testified

that she helps Hill with housework and walking her dogs. (Tr.

62.) Ms. Stamate also testified that she believes Hill is in

pain, and has not seen Hill walk without a limp in over a year. 

(Tr. 62.)

Vocational Expert’s Hearing Testimony

Vocational expert Robert L. Bond (“VE”) testified that he

had assessed Hill’s past work experience, and classified it as

medium to heavy exertional level. (Tr. 64.) The ALJ posited

whether a hypothetical individual with Hill’s prior work

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experience could perform Hill’s past jobs, where this individual

can lift up to twenty pounds occasionally, lift or carry up to

ten pounds frequently, stand or walk for approximately six hours

per eight-hour workday, and sit for approximately six hours per

eight-hour workday with normal breaks; is limited to occasional

pushing or pulling with the left lower extremity and the left

upper extremity and occasional reaching in all directions,

including overhead on the left; and can occasionally climb ramps

and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl, but never

climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. (Tr. 65.) The VE responded

that such a hypothetical individual could not perform Hill’s past

jobs. (Tr. 65.) The ALJ then queried whether this hypothetical

individual could perform any work, and if so, asked the VE to

provide examples. (Tr. 65.) The VE responded that such an

individual could work light and unskilled jobs such as dealer

account investigator (DOT # 241.367-038), furniture rental

consultant (DOT # 295.357-018), and counter clerk (DOT # 249.366-

010). (Tr. 65.) The VE testified that this hypothetical

individual could still perform these jobs if the individual was

to avoid all crouching, pushing and pulling with the left lower

extremity and the left upper extremity, and reaching with the

left upper extremity. (Tr. 66.)

The ALJ posited whether these jobs could be performed by a

hypothetical individual with Hill’s prior work experience who can

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lift and carry up to ten pounds occasionally, stand or walk for

approximately two hours per eight-hour workday, and sit for

approximately six hours per eight-hour workday with normal

breaks; is limited to occasional pushing or pulling with the left

lower extremity and the left upper extremity and occasional

reaching in all directions, including overhead and on the left;

and can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop,

kneel, crouch, and crawl, but never climb ladders, ropes, or

scaffolds. (Tr. 66.) The VE responded that such a hypothetical

individual could not perform Hill’s past jobs or the jobs as

dealer account investigator, furniture rental consultant or

counter clerk. (Tr. 66.) The VE testified that such a

hypothetical individual would be limited to sedentary work, and

listed representative jobs of call-out operator (DOT # 237.367-

014), semiconductor bonder (DOT # 726.685-066), and registration

clerk (DOT # 205.367-030). (Tr. 67.)

Review of Commissioner’s Decision

This Court has authority to review the Commissioner’s

decision to deny social security benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any

fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive .

. . .” Id. Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support

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a decision.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971);

see Moon v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting

this is a “deferential standard of review . . . weighted in favor

of upholding the ALJ’s decision”). In determining whether

substantial evidence exists, the Court shall examine the record

in its entirety, but shall not substitute its own opinion for the

ALJ’s by reconsidering the facts or reweighing the evidence. See

Jens v. Barnhart, 347 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 2003). With that

in mind, however, this Court reviews the ALJ’s findings of law de

novo, and if the ALJ makes an error of law, the Court may reverse

without regard to the volume of evidence in support of the

factual findings. White v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 369, 373 (7th Cir.

1999).

As a threshold matter, for a claimant to be eligible for DIB

or SSI benefits under the Social Security Act, the claimant must

establish that she is disabled. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) and

1382(a)(1). To qualify as being disabled, the claimant must be

unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason

of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which

can be expected to result in death or which as lasted or can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To determine whether a

claimant has satisfied this statutory definition, the ALJ

performs a five-step evaluation:

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Step 1: Is the claimant performing substantially

gainful activity: If yes, the claim is

disallowed; if no, the inquiry proceeds to

Step 2.

Step 2: Is the claimant’s impairment or combination

of impairments “severe” and expected to last

at least twelve months? If not, the claim is

disallowed; if yes, the inquiry proceeds to

Step 3.

Step 3: Does the claimant have an impairment or

combination of impairments that meets or

equals the severity of an impairment in the

SSA’s Listing of Impairments, as described in

20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1? If yes,

then claimant is automatically disabled; if

not, then the inquiry proceeds to Step 4.

Step 4: Is the claimant able to perform his past

relevant work? If yes, the claim is denied;

if no, the inquiry proceeds to Step 5, where

the burden of proof shifts to the

Commissioner.

Step 5: Is the claimant able to perform any other

work within his residual functional capacity

in the national economy: if yes, the claim

is denied; if no, the claimant is disabled.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v) and 416.920 (a)(4)(i)-(v); see

also Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 n.8 (7th Cir. 1994).

In this case, the ALJ found that Hill suffers from the

following severe impairments: degenerative joint disease with

total replacement of left hip and osteoarthritis of the left

shoulder. (Tr. 12.) The ALJ specifically found that Hill’s

reported degenerative disc disease of the spine and mental

impairments of depression and alcohol did not qualify as severe

impairments. (Tr. 13-15.)

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The ALJ further found that Hill did not have an impairment

of combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the

severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525,

404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926). (Tr. 15.) The ALJ

considered the opinions of Hill’s orthopedist Dr. Liechty, the

consultative examiner, and the reviewing state agency physicians,

who opined that Hill could perform a limited range of light

exertion because of the problems with her left hip and shoulder. 

(Tr. 18.) The ALJ made the following Residual Functional

Capacity (“RFC”) determination:

[Hill] has the residual functional capacity to

perform light work as defined in 20 CFR

404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), except she can lift up

to 20 pounds occasionally, lift and carry up to 10

pounds frequently, stand or walk for approximately

6 hours per 8 hour day, and sit for approximately

6 hours per 8 hour workday, with normal breaks. 

She can occasionally climb ramps and stairs,

balance, stoop, kneel and crawl, but never climb

ladders, ropes or scaffolds, crouch, push or pull

with the left upper and lower extremities, or

reach in all directions (including overhead) with

the left upper extremity.

(Tr. 15.) Based upon Hill’s RFC, the ALJ found that Hill is

unable to perform her past relevant work as a press operator,

which was heavy work. (Tr. 18.) However, the ALJ found that

Hill is capable of performing certain light work jobs “that exist

in significant numbers in the national economy,” including work

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as a dealer account investigator, a furniture rental consultant,

and a counter clerk. (Tr. 19.)

Hill believes that the ALJ committed several errors

requiring reversal. First, Hill argues that the ALJ failed to

incorporate limitations related to her spine and right shoulder

into the RFC and failed to consider the combined impact of all of

her impairments. (DE# 16 at 15-18.) Second, Hill alleges the

ALJ rendered an improper credibility determination. (Id. at 18-

19.) Finally, Hill asserts that the ALJ failed to consider

Hill’s work history in determining her credibility. (Id. at 19-

20.)1

The ALJ’s RFC Determination

Hill argues that the ALJ erred in her RCF determination by

failing to incorporate the limitations relating to her lumbar

spine, cervical spine and right shoulder, and failing to consider

the combined impact of all Hill’s impairments.

In determining whether a plaintiff is disabled, an ALJ is

required to “consider all [the plaintiff’s] symptoms, including

pain, and the extent to which [the plaintiff’s] symptoms can

reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical

evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a). 

Moreover, in making an RFC determination, an ALJ “must consider

1

Because Hill does not challenge the ALJ’s determination regarding

any alleged mental impairment, the Court will not address the ALJ’s

evaluation of Hill’s mental impairment claim.

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all allegations of physical and mental limitations or

restrictions . . . and . . . limitations and restrictions imposed

by all of an individual’s impairments, even those that are not

‘severe.’” SSR 96-8p; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523 (“[W]e will

consider the combined effect of all of [the plaintiff’s]

impairments without regard to whether any such impairment, if

considered separately, would be of sufficient severity.”). 

Ultimately, the ALJ must support an RFC determination by “citing

specific medical facts . . . and nonmedical evidence.” SSR 96-

8p.

Hill first argues that the ALJ erred because her findings

relating to limitations in sitting, standing, and walking are

contradictory. More specifically, Hill claims that the RFC’s

limitations on sitting, standing and walking to six hours per

eight-hour day (Tr. 15) conflicts with the ALJ’s statement that

there are “no limits on sitting, walking, or standing” in Hill’s

RFC. (Tr. 17.) 

When reviewing an ALJ’s decision, “it is proper to read the

ALJ’s decision as a whole.” Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 370

n.5 (7th Cir. 2004). Reading the ALJ’s “no limits” statement in

context reveals that she was addressing just one of Hill’s

claimed impairments:

As for the allegations of low back pain, there are

only minimal degenerative changes in the lumbar

spine on the imaging study done on October 4, 2011

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(Ex. 11F). Without any nerve root compression,

loss of disc space height, or spinal stenosis, the

extent of low back pain and inability to sit,

stand, and walk alleged by the claimant is not

credible, particularly in light of the absence of

complaints of low back pain to treating

physicians. Consequently, there are no limits on

sitting, walking, or standing in the claimant's

residual functional capacity. . . .

(Tr. 17 (emphasis added)). The ALJ determined that the record

did not substantiate Hill’s claim that her low back pain affected

her ability to sit, stand, and walk, and thus, found this

particular claim to be not credible. For that reason, the ALJ

found that Hill’s alleged low back pain did not call for

limitations on sitting, standing, or walking. However, elsewhere

in the decision, the ALJ found that Hill’s left hip and left

shoulder impairments did call for limitations on her ability to

sit, stand, and walk. (See Tr. 15, 17, 18.) Reading the ALJ’s

decision as a whole, these findings are not contradictory.

Second, Hill argues that the ALJ improperly “played doctor”

by substituting her own medical judgments for that of the

physicians. An ALJ impermissibly plays doctor when he reaches

his own independent medical conclusions that are unsupported by

the record. See Myles v. Astrue, 582 F.3d 672, 677–78 (7th Cir.

2009). Here, Hill asserts that the ALJ used her own opinion to

fill evidentiary gaps when she commented that “[s]uch minimal

[degenerative and artherosclerotic vascular] changes [shown in

the October 2011 imaging study of Hill’s lumbar spine] would not

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be expected to cause significant pain without any nerve root

impingement or spinal stenosis.” (Tr. 13.) 

The ALJ made this statement in connection with assessing the

credibility of Hill’s claim of severe low back pain. In doing

so, the ALJ also considered the following evidence in the record: 

Hill had not had any epidural injections, physical therapy, or

other treatment for low back pain; Hill had not sought an

evaluation by a specialist for low back pain (unlike her left

shoulder pain); Hill’s orthopedist, Dr. Liechty, did not consider

any low back pain to be causing much pain or functional

limitation; Dr. Liechty only prescribed narcotic pain medication

before and during the period in which Hill was recovering from

her left hip replacement surgery; by August 8, 2011, Hill told

Dr. Liechty that she was only using one or two Vicodin tablets

per week and was not complaining of any low back pain to him;

there was no reason to expect that Hill would not continue to

improve with time after her hip surgery; Dr. Smith’s treatment

notes from 2011 and 2012 describe Hill’s gait as being without

abnormalities, and while they mention Hill’s left shoulder pain

in November 2011, they do not include any complaints of neck or

low back pain. (Tr. 13.) The ALJ found that, “[i]n light of the

lack of complaints to treating physicians,” Hill’s testimony

about her low back pain, and her functional limits from such

pain, was not credible. (Tr. 13); see Sienkiewicz v. Barnhart,

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119 Fed. Appx. 811, 817 (7th Cir. Jan. 6, 2005) (repeated failure

to seek medical treatment provided support for the ALJ’s

credibility finding). Consequently, the ALJ found that the

evidence failed to establish that Hill’s low back pain

constituted a severe impairment. (Tr. 13.)

The Court finds that the record supports the ALJ’s finding

that Hill’s low back pain did not constitute a severe impairment,

regardless of the ALJ’s statement about the pain expected from

the minimal degenerative changes shown in the imaging study of

Hill’s lumbar spine. See Denton v. Astrue, No. 08–2134, 2009 WL

2566955, at *7 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 2009) (noting the ALJ’s

alleged “playing doctor” comments were not necessary to the

decision, and were not inconsistent with the evidence in the

record). Even if the ALJ erred in making this statement, the

error is harmless because the record supports the ALJ’s finding. 

See Spiva v. Astrue, 628 F.3d 346, 353 (7th Cir. 2010) (an error

is harmless “[i]f it is predictable with great confidence that

the agency will reinstate its decision on remand because the

decision is overwhelmingly supported by the record.”); Shramek v.

Apfel, 226 F.3d 809, 813–15 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding the ALJ’s

disability determination even though the factors used to reject

the claimant’s credibility were not supported by the record,

because the ALJ’s error did not impact the outcome). 

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Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude the ALJ erred by failing

to include symptoms of Hill’s low back pain in the RFC.

Hill next argues that the ALJ’s RFC finding failed to

include greater functional limitations on Hill’s sitting,

standing, and walking based on range of motion deficits in Hill’s

cervical spine and lumbar spine. (See DE# 16 at 17 & n.60

(citing Tr. 278 (consultative exam report)).) The SSA has

explained that “[i]n assessing RFC, the [ALJ] must consider

limitations and restrictions imposed by all of an individual’s

impairments, even those that are not ‘severe.’” SSR 96-8p. 

While the RFC assessment must be based on all of the relevant

evidence in the case record,” the ALJ must consider “only

limitations and restrictions attributable to medically

determinable impairments” in making the RFC determination. Id.

(emphases in original). The ALJ must “build a logical bridge

from the evidence to his conclusion, but he need not provide a

complete written evaluation of every piece of testimony and

evidence.” Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 362 (7th Cir. 2013)

(quotation omitted).

Here, the ALJ found that the minimal functional limitations

from Hill’s neck and low back pain “do not further reduce her

capacity beyond the limitations imposed by her left hip and left

shoulder impairments.” (Tr. 13 (emphasis added).) The ALJ noted

that while “[Hill] has medically determinable disc disease,” the

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evidence “does not support a finding that it causes more than

minimal functional limits.” (Tr. 13.) 

The ALJ supported this determination with evidence from the

record. As discussed in detail above, the ALJ addressed evidence

relating to Hill’s low back. The ALJ also considered the

following evidence relating to Hill’s neck: Hill had cervical

fusion in 1985, and worked at medium to heavy jobs for many years

thereafter; Hill had not sought treatment for neck pain since the

alleged onset date in June 2011, “suggest[ing] that neck pain is

not that limiting and may only be related to her left shoulder

problems”; and, while Hill sought treatment for a neck strain in

November 2010, when she returned in December 2010, she was not

complaining of neck pain and had a full range of motion in her

neck, “suggest[ing] that the neck pain resolved before her

alleged onset date.” (Tr. 13.)

The ALJ adopted the limitations proposed by Hill’s

orthopedist and the state agency physicians. More specifically,

Dr. Liechty released Hill to work with limitations on lifting,

pushing, and pulling. (Tr. 317, 319.) The ALJ gave Dr.

Liechty’s opinion “great weight,” and accommodated these

limitations. (Tr. 15, 18.) State agency physicians opined that

Hill could sit up to six hours in an eight-hour workday with

normal breaks, and stand and/or walk up to six hours in an eighthour workday with normal breaks. (Tr. 282.) In opining on

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Hill’s limitations, the state agency physicians took into account

the range of motion deficits in Hill’s spine and both shoulders. 

(Tr. 282 (noting “rom [range of motion] loss to her lumbar spine

as well as bilaterally shoulders”).) The ALJ gave the state

agency physicians’ opinion “great weight,” and accommodated their

recommended limitations. (Tr. 15, 18.) Thus, while the ALJ did

not specifically address the range of motion deficits of Hill’s

spine and right shoulder, the limitations adopted by the ALJ

accommodated those deficits.2 Therefore, the Court finds

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision not to include

additional limitations to Hill’s sitting, standing, or walking. 

See Pepper, 712 F.3d at 362 (adequate discussion of the issues

does not need to contain a complete written evaluation of every

piece of evidence).

Finally, Hill argues that the ALJ failed to account for her

right shoulder problems in considering the combination of her

impairments. Hill points to range of motion deficits in her

right shoulder that were identified in her consultative exam.

(DE# 16 at 17.) However, “the diagnosis of an impairment does

not alone establish its severity or its resulting limitations.” 

Stanley v. Astrue, No. 1:11-CV-00248, 2012 WL 1158630, at *11 n.8

(N.D. Ind. Apr. 6, 2012) (citing Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d

751, 754 (7th Cir. 2004) and Estok v. Apfel, 152 F.3d 636, 640

2 The Court notes that no doctor opined that Hill’s impairments prevented her

from completing “light work” with the limitations adopted by the ALJ.

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(7th Cir. 1998)). At the hearing, Hill did not complain about

her right shoulder. Rather, she testified that she is righthanded, is able to use her upper right extremity, and does some

housecleaning, including vacuuming, which, as the ALJ noted,

“necessarily includes the use of at least one upper extremity.” 

(Tr. 17.) Because Hill is right-handed, the ALJ found that she

still has unlimited use of her dominant upper extremity. (Tr.

18.) In determining that Hill did not have a sufficient

combination of impairments, the ALJ specifically noted Hill’s use

of “at least one upper extremity for gross and fine motor

movements.” (Tr. 15.) Given the evidence in the record, the

Court finds that the ALJ did not err in not including Hill’s

right shoulder issues in the RFC determination. 

Credibility Determination

Hill claims that the ALJ failed to evaluate the credibility

of Hill’s testimony properly. Because the ALJ is best positioned

to judge a claimant’s truthfulness, this Court will overturn an

ALJ’s credibility determination only if it is patently wrong. 

Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 504 (7th Cir. 2004). However,

when a claimant produces medical evidence of an underlying

impairment, the ALJ may not ignore subjective complaints solely

because they are unsupported by objective evidence. See Schmidt

v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 746-47 (7th Cir. 2005). Instead, the

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ALJ must make a credibility determination supported by record

evidence and be sufficiently specific to make clear to the

claimant and to any subsequent reviewers the weight given to the

claimant’s statements and the reasons for that weight. See Lopez

v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539-40 (7th Cir. 2003).

In evaluating the credibility of statements supporting a

Social Security Application, the Seventh Circuit has noted that

an ALJ must comply with the requirements of Social Security

Ruling 96-7p. See Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 942 (7th

Cir. 2002). This ruling requires ALJs to articulate “specific

reasons” behind credibility evaluations; the ALJ cannot merely

state that “the individual’s allegations have been considered” or

that “the allegations are (or are not) credible.” SSR 96-7p. 

Furthermore, the ALJ must consider specific factors when

assessing the credibility of an individual’s statement including:

1. The individual’s daily activities;

2. The location, duration, frequency, and

intensity of the individual’s pain or other

symptoms;

3. Factors that precipitate and aggravate the

symptoms;

4. The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side

effect of any medications the individual

takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other

symptoms;

5. Treatment, other than medication, the

individual receives or has received for

relief of pain or other symptoms;

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6. Any measures other than treatment the

individual uses or has used to relieve pain

or other symptoms . . . ; and

7. Any other factors concerning the individual’s

functional limitations and restrictions due

to pain or other symptoms.

SSR 96-7p; see also Golembiewski v. Barnhart, 322 F.3d 912, 915-

16 (7th Cir. 2003). An ALJ is entitled to consider the objective

medical evidence, or lack thereof, as a factor in assessing

credibility, and “may properly discount portions of a claimant's

testimony based on discrepancies between [the c]laimant's

allegations and objective medical evidence.” Crawford v. Astrue,

633 F. Supp. 2d 618, 633 (N.D. Ill. 2009); see Arnold v.

Barnhart, 473 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[S]ubjective

complaints need not be accepted insofar as they clash with other,

objective medical evidence in the record.”); Smith v. Apfel, 231

F.3d 433, 439 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[A]n ALJ may consider the lack of

medical evidence as probative of the claimant's credibility.”);

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(2), 416.929(c)(2).

Hill argues that the ALJ rendered an improper credibility

determination by using “a variation of boilerplate language

disapproved of in Martinez v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir.

2011).” (DE# 16 at 18.) The ALJ used some boilerplate or

template language in initially assessing Hill’s credibility,

stating:

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After careful consideration of the evidence, the

undersigned finds that the claimant's medically

determinable impairments could reasonably be

expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however,

the claimant's statements concerning the

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of

these symptoms are not entirely credible. 

(Tr. 16.) Almost identical boilerplate language was used and

criticized in Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 644-45 (7th Cir.

2012). There, the Seventh Circuit noted:

One problem with the boilerplate is that the

assessment of the claimant's “residual functional

capacity” (the bureaucratic term for ability to

work) comes later in the administrative law

judge's opinion, not “above”—above is just the

foreshadowed conclusion of that later assessment. 

A deeper problem is that the assessment of a

claimant's ability to work will often . . . depend

heavily on the credibility of her statements

concerning the “intensity, persistence and

limiting effects” of her symptoms, but the passage

implies that ability to work is determined first

and is then used to determine the claimant's

credibility. That gets things backwards.

Id. at 645. Yet, as noted in Adams v. Astrue,

While this sort of boilerplate is inadequate, by

itself, to support a credibility finding, its use

does not make a credibility determination invalid. 

Not supporting a credibility determination with

explanation and evidence from the record does.

880 F. Supp. 2d 895, 906 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (emphasis in original;

citations omitted). In Adams, the ALJ’s decision did not use the

boilerplate language in a mechanical fashion, and the ALJ offered

further explanation to support his conclusion that the

plaintiff’s claimed limitations were not supported by the record

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as a whole. See id. Accordingly, the court determined that

reversal was not warranted. See id.

In this case, the ALJ found that some of Hill’s allegations

were not entirely credible because they are out of proportion to

the objective medical evidence. (Tr. 16.) The ALJ’s decision

“consider[ed] all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms

can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective

medical evidence and other evidence,” as well as “opinion

evidence.” (Tr. 15 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 404.1529,

416.927, 416.929 and SSRs 96-2p, 96-4p, 96-5p, 96-6p, 96-7p, and

06-3p.)

More specifically, the ALJ first set forth Hill’s hearing

testimony regarding her daily activities, symptoms, and

medications. (See Tr. 16.) She then addressed Hill’s treatment

history, finding that Hill had severe degenerative disease in her

left hip that caused pain, and had a total hip replacement. (Tr.

16.) A month after this surgery, the consultative physical exam

demonstrated significant stiffness and restricted motion in the

left hip area, and that Hill walked with a limp. (Tr. 16-17,

276-77.) The ALJ also noted that by August 2011, Hill was only

using one or two Vicodin per week for pain and no longer needed

to use a walker. (Tr. 17.) The ALJ remarked that Hill’s

testimony about severe pain in her femur when walking seemed less

than credible due to the lack of evidence of any complaint about

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it to her orthopedist, Dr. Liechty. (Tr. 17.) The ALJ also

considered evidence of a significant medical improvement in

Hill’s left hip, whereby Dr. Liechty released Hill to work that

did not require heavy lifting, squatting, pushing, or pulling

indefinitely. (Tr. 17, 280, 316.) The ALJ also considered the

subsequent treatment notes of Dr. Smith, Hill’s primary care

physician, which do not contain any complaints of hip, femur, or

back pain, but did state that Hill’s gait was not abnormal. (Tr.

17, 332-338.) While the ALJ found that no medical evidence

supported Hill’s allegations that her back and neck pain

increased since the alleged onset date, she did find that medical

evidence supported Hill’s continued left shoulder pain. (Tr.

17.) The ALJ also noted that pharmacy records indicate that

Hill’s last refill of Vicodin was in 2011, and she was only

taking Sertraline (Zoloft) and Naproxen in 2012, suggesting that

Hill’s hip pain and back pain were not as severe as she claimed

for at least 12 months. (Tr. 17.)

Regarding Hill’s claims of severe low back pain, the ALJ

considered the minimal degenerative changes in Hill’s lumbar

spine on the imaging study in October 2011, as well as the lack

of complaints of low back pain in Hill’s medical records. (Tr.

13, 17, 303.) The ALJ noted that Hill had never had any epidural

injections, physical therapy, or other treatment for low back

pain, had never been evaluated by a specialist for low back pain,

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and never asked to be referred to a specialist for low back pain. 

(Tr. 13, 17.) Regarding Hill’s alleged neck pain, the ALJ noted

that Hill had neck surgery in 1985, but recovered and worked at a

heavy job for many years. (Tr. 17.) The ALJ also noted that

while Hill sought treatment for a neck strain in November 2010,

she did not complain of neck pain when she returned to the

hospital for left shoulder pain in December 2010, or to any other

physician since the alleged onset date. (Tr. 17, 206-20.) The

dearth of complaints and medical treatment for neck and low back

pain supports the ALJ’s determination that Hill’s claims of

severe neck and low back pain were not credible. See

Sienkiewicz, 119 Fed. Appx. at 817 (repeated failure to seek

medical treatment provided support for the ALJ’s credibility

finding). The discrepancy between the degree of pain attested to

by Hill and that suggested by the medical evidence is probative

that Hill may be exaggerating her condition. For the ALJ “to

rely on this as evidence of a lack of complete candor cannot be

deemed patently wrong.” Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 435-36

(7th Cir. 2000). 

The ALJ found that Hill’s claims of left shoulder pain were

credible, given the evidence of osteoarthritis tendinopathy in

her shoulder, and decreased range of motion of the left shoulder

upon physical examinations. (Tr. 17, 229, 277.) The ALJ

acknowledged Hill’s inability to afford the recommended shoulder

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replacement surgery. (Tr. 17, 229.) The ALJ considered Hill’s

inability to lift, carry, and reach with the left upper

extremity, and included some limitations in her RFC accordingly. 

(Tr. 15, 17.)

In determining that Hill did not require additional

limitations, the ALJ relied upon Hill’s testimony that she does

some housecleaning, including vacuuming (which necessarily

include the use of an upper extremity), cooks, does laundry with

some limits on lifting, and babysits two small children parttime. (Tr. 17-18); see Schmidt, 395 F.3d at 747 (considering

claimant’s performance of daily activities as a factor when

discounting claimant's credibility). The ALJ noted Hill’s

testimony that she can use her right upper extremity (Tr. 17),

and the fact that Hill is right-handed and has not shown any

limits on handling and fingering with either hand. (Tr. 18.) 

The ALJ also found that Hill’s use of only aspirin and Naproxen

for pain suggests that the pain is not as limiting as she

testified. (Tr. 18.) The ALJ considered the opinions of Dr.

Liechty and the state agency physicians. Affording their

opinions “great weight,” the ALJ incorporated their suggested

restrictions into the RFC determination. (Tr. 18.)

In sum, the ALJ adequately built an accurate and logical

bridge between the evidence or records and her conclusion that

Hill’s testimony was not entirely credible. The ALJ gave reasons

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for discrediting Hill’s complaints in the hearing and cited to

medical evidence and other evidence of daily activities in the

record to support her decision. Although the ALJ may have used

some “template” language, the substance of the decision itself

supports her credibility determination. See Smith v. Astrue, No.

2:11-CV-32, 2012 WL 1435661, at *6 (N.D.W. Va. Apr. 24, 2012)

(noting that the ALJ’s findings were not “boilerplate language”

where the ALJ spent nearly three pages discussing evidence

supporting his credibility finding). Here, the ALJ sufficiently

analyzed and explained her credibility finding. The credibility

determination was supported by evidence in the record and this

Court cannot say that the credibility determination was “patently

wrong.” See Skarbek, 390 F.3d at 504; Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d

539, 546 (7th Cir. 2008) (even where some of the ALJ’s findings

concerning the claimant’s credibility were a bit harsh, “an ALJ’s

credibility assessment will stand as long as there is some

support in the record. . .” (quotation and brackets omitted)). 

Therefore, the ALJ’s credibility determination, which is entitled

to special deference, will be affirmed.

Hill’s Work History

Finally, Hill argues that the ALJ failed to consider her

consistent and arduous work history in determining her

credibility. (DE# 16 at 19-20.) She asserts that a claimant

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with a good work record is entitled to substantial credibility

when claiming an inability to work because of a disability. See

Springer v. Colvin, No. 1:13-CV-185, 2014 WL 3075342, at *8 (N.D.

Ind. July 2, 2014) (citations omitted).

In Springer, the plaintiff argued that the ALJ made several

errors in deciding that he was not disabled. The court agreed,

finding that the ALJ failed to: (1) build an accurate and logical

bridge between the evidence and her RFC conclusion; (2) fully

consider evidence of plaintiff’s medical problems; and (3) take

into account the combination effect of plaintiff’s medical

problems. See id. at *6. The court therefore remanded for

further proceedings. See id. The court also agreed with the

plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ’s credibility determination was

improper, finding that the ALJ had taken a few stray statements

and facts in the record out of context and used them to discredit

key medical findings. See id. at *7-*8. Finally, the plaintiff

asserted that the ALJ had relied upon “the faulty premise that if

impairments and/or pain were present for years and years and it

did not keep Plaintiff from working then, it would not keep him

from working now.” Id. at *7. Because the case was “being

remanded anyway,” the court further remanded for a more accurate

credibility determination, noting that “[a] long and continuous

past work record with no evidence of malingering is a factor

supporting credibility assertions of disabling impairments.” Id.

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at *8 (citing Allen v. Califano, 613 F.2d 139, 147 (6th Cir.

1980)).

Here, the ALJ considered Hill’s work history, and found that

Hill had worked as a press operator and at “medium to heavy jobs

for many years.” (Tr. 13, 18.) As explained in detail above,

the ALJ considered the evidence and found Hill’s complaints of

left shoulder pain to be credible, but found her complaints of

severe neck and low back pain to be less than credible. The ALJ

determined that Hill’s impairments rendered her unable to

continue to do heavy work as a press operator, and that she is

able to do light work with some limitations. (Tr. 17-19.) The

Court finds that the ALJ considered Hill’s work history, as well

as other factors, in assessing Hill’s credibility. For the

reasons set forth above, the Court holds that the ALJ’s

credibility determination is supported by the record, and not

patently wrong.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Commissioner of Social

Security’s final decision is AFFIRMED.

DATED: December 10, 2014 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

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