UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) 

v. ) Cause No. 3:13-CV-1020 JD

)

SGT. BERRY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Robert A. Williams, a pro se prisoner, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (DE 1.) The

court must review a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to

state a claim, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A. To survive dismissal, a complaint must state a claim for relief that is plausible on

its face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 603. Thus, a

“plaintiff must do better than putting a few words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative

reader, might suggest that something has happened to [him] that might be redressed by the law.”

Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010). Nevertheless, the court must bear in

mind that a pro se complaint is entitled to liberal construction, “however inartfully pleaded.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

Here, Williams is complaining about an injury he suffered while working in the kitchen at

Westville Correctional Facility (“Westville”). He claims that in early May 2013, he noticed that one

of the tables in his work area had “jagged and sharp edges exposed,” which in his view created a
hazardous condition. He complained to the kitchen supervisor, Mr. Turnipseed (first name

unknown), whose response was, “Do I look like fucking maintenance, ain’t shit I can do about that,

I pass out food, duh.” (DE 1 at 6.) He then filed a grievance about the table, but no one responded

to it. On May 20, 2013, Williams was working in the kitchen when he caught his arm on the table,

“ripping a deep gash into plaintiff’s arm approximately 5.5 cm x 1.5 cm.” (Id.) He immediately went

to one of his supervisors, Mr. Hines (first name unknown), to report the injury. According to

Williams, Mr. Hines “hysterically yelled” for one of the correctional staff members, Sgt. Berry (first

name unknown). Sgt. Berry was apparently some distance away, and Mr. Hines had to call for him

five or six times. He eventually responded, asking, “What the fuck do you want?” He then examined

Williams’s injury, which required Williams to remove the oven mitt he was using to stop the

bleeding. Sgt. Berry asked Mr. Hines why he had not called him over the radio, to which Mr. Hines

responded that he did not have a radio. At this point Lt. Battles (first name unknown) approached,

and also looked at Williams’s arm. He claims Lt. Battles made a joking comment that Williams

should try not to “bleed in my chow hall.” Lt. Battles, Sgt. Berry, and Mr. Hines then discussed what

should be done to obtain medical care for Williams, since they were in the middle of serving a meal

to inmates. It was decided that an Lt. Battles would call for an escort to take Williams to urgent care.

Officer Willis (first name unknown) arrived “minutes later,” and took Williams to urgent care, where

he received 11 stitches to close the wound on his arm. Williams claims medical staff also gave him

a pass which excused him from having to go to work for the next three days so that he could rest.

He claims he told Officer Dilworth (first name unknown) several times that he had a pass, but the

officer refused to call anyone in the “count room” to check on the pass, and instead responded,“I

don’t give a fuck about your arm, do I look like a nurse? . . . [G]et your ass to the kitchen.” Williams

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claims he was forced to work in the kitchen for the next three days even though he had a medical

pass, which caused him pain and suffering.

Williams first claims that several of the defendants are liable for failing to maintain a “hazard

free work environment.” To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, an inmate must satisfy both

an objective and subjective prong. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The objective

prong asks whether the alleged deprivation or condition is “sufficiently serious” as to have resulted

in “the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id.“The Eighth Amendment

forbids knowingly compelling an inmate to perform labor that is beyond the inmate’s strength,

dangerous to his or her life or health, or unduly painful.” Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir.

2011) (internal citation omitted). Failure to provide a prisoner with necessary protective gear or

exposing him to unnecessary risk in a prison job can therefore violate the Eighth Amendment. Id.

(collecting cases).

To satisfy the subjective prong, the prisoner must show that the defendant acted with

deliberate indifference to his health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. This is a high standard. As

the Seventh Circuit has explained:

[C]onduct is deliberately indifferent when the official has acted in an intentional or

criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant must have known that the plaintiff

was at serious risk of being harmed and decided not to do anything to prevent that

harm from occurring even though he could have easily done so.

Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted). Deliberate indifference is “something approaching a total unconcern for [the plaintiff’s]

welfare in the face of serious risks, or a conscious, culpable refusal to prevent harm.” Duane v. Lane,

959 F.2d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 1992).

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Here, Williams is suing nine different defendants, but the only individual alleged to have

personal knowledge of the condition of the table prior to Williams’s injury was Mr. Turnipseed, the

kitchen supervisor. He alleges that he alerted Mr. Turnipseed to this hazard, but Mr. Turnipseed

rudely brushed off his complaint without passing it along to the appropriate personnel or otherwise

taking any steps to protect inmates from injury. As a result, he suffered a serious cut to his arm.

Giving Williams the inferences to which he is entitled at this stage, he has alleged enough to proceed

further against Mr. Turnipseed. 

Williams also names Mr. Turnipseed’s employer, Aramark Company, a private company

which provides meals at the prison. A private company may be held liable for constitutional

violations when it performs a state function. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988). However, there

is no general supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Aramark cannot be held liable simply

because it employs Mr. Turnipseed. Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001).

A private company performing a state function can also be held liable to the same extent as a state

actor under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See Rice v.

Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 675 (7th Cir. 2012) (Monell framework applies to private company

providing medical care at prison). Here, however, Williams does not allege, nor can it be plausibly

inferred, that Aramark had an unconstitutional practice or policy that caused his injury. Rather, he

alleges that his injury occurred because Mr. Turnipseed failed to address the problem when he

alerted him to it. Williams has not alleged a plausible constitutional claim against Aramark, and so

this defendant will be dismissed. In a similar vein, Williams mentions an unnamed maintenance

employee, referred to as “John Doe #3,” but he does not allege that this individual had any advance

knowledge of the condition of the table or other personal involvement in these events. See Burks v.

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Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009) (under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 government actors can be held

liable only for their “own misdeeds . . . not for anyone else’s.”); Billman v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 56

F.3d 785, 789 (7th Cir. 1995) (observing that a defendant must have both the subjective knowledge

and the authority over the challenged issue to be held liable for deliberate indifference).

Accordingly, he will also be dismissed as a defendant.

Williams next alleges that several of the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his

medical needs. Under the Eighth Amendment, inmates are entitled to adequate medical care. Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To establish liability, a prisoner must satisfy both an objective

and subjecting component by showing: (1) he had an objectively serious medical need; and (2) the

defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that medical need. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. A

medical need is “serious” if it is one that a physician has diagnosed as mandating treatment, or one

that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.

Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). On the subjective prong, the prisoner must

show the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

Deliberate indifference is “something approaching a total unconcern for a prisoner’s welfare in the

face of serious risks,” or a “conscious, culpable refusal” to prevent harm. Duane, 959 F.2d at 677.

Incompetence, negligence, or even gross negligence do not suffice. Ortiz v. Webster, 655 F.3d 731,

736 (7th Cir. 2011); Pierson v. Hartley, 391 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 2004). In other words, “the

Eighth Amendment does not codify common law torts.” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th

Cir. 2011). When an inmate has received some form of treatment for a medical condition, to

establish deliberate indifference he must show that the treatment was “so blatantly inappropriate as

to evidence intentional mistreatment likely to seriously aggravate his condition.” Id. Furthermore,

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inmates are not entitled to demand specific medical treatment, nor are they entitled to the “best care

possible.” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d

670, 671-72 (7th Cir. 1997) (“A prison is not required by the Eighth Amendment to give a prisoner

care that is as good as he would receive if he were a free person, let alone an affluent free person.”). 

Here, it is apparent from the complaint that Williams received medical treatment for the cut

on his arm, and he does not name any medical staff as defendants, nor does he complain about the

quality of the care that he received. Instead, his complaint is that Sgt. Berry and Lt. Battles did not

act quickly enough in taking him to the medical unit when he cut himself. A delay in providing

proper medical care can be actionable under the Eighth Amendment when it exacerbates the

plaintiff’s medical problem or otherwise causes him injury. Arnett, 658 F.3d at 752-53. Here,

Williams estimates that it was approximately 30 minutes from the time he cut himself to the time

he was treated by medical staff in urgent care. This was not a significant delay under the

circumstances, and is perhaps shorter than a free person might experience waiting in a hospital

emergency room for medical care. See Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 466 (7th Cir. 2009) (no

Eighth Amendment violation where inmate received medical care for shoulder injury within two and

half hours, since “[a]n unincarcerated individual may well consider oneself fortunate if he receives

medical attention at a standard emergency room within that short of a period of time.”); see also

Curry v. St. Joseph Hospital, No. 1:12cv140-PS (N.D. Ind. order dated May 4, 2012) (citing study

and noting that average emergency room visit takes approximately four hours). 

Although it might have been possible for staff to act quicker, Williams has not alleged

anything approaching deliberate indifferent to his medical needs. Instead, when custody staff was

alerted to his injury, they took immediate steps to assess the seriousness of the injury and then to

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determine how best to obtain medical care for Williams given that the cafeteria was full of inmates

and staff could not leave their posts. Sgt. Berry called for an escort, who arrived “minutes later” and

took Williams immediately to urgent care. Williams has not alleged an exacerbation of his injury

or similar problems because of the 30 minutes it took for him to be seen by medical staff. Instead,

he alleges that once he arrived at urgent care the nurses stitched his wound and released him back

to his cell. Williams appears upset about the insensitive language used by Sgt. Berry and Lt. Battles,

but rude language—though unprofessional—does not give rise to a constitutional claim. DeWalt v.

Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2000) (rude language or verbal harassment by a state actor

“while unprofessional and deplorable, does not violate the Constitution.”). Accordingly, Sgt. Berry

and Lt. Battles will be dismissed as defendants.

As to Officer Dilworth, Williams claims the officer forced him to work even though he had

a painful injury to his arm. He further alleges he told Officer Dilworth repeatedly that he had been

given a pass from medical staff, but Officer flatly refused to check on this and essentially told

Williams he did not care about his injury. Although as non-medical staff Officer Dilworth might

ordinarily be entitled to defer to medical staff regarding Williams’s care, here Williams alleges that

Officer Dilworth actually prevented the orders of medical staff from being carried out, even though

a quick check would have revealed the existence of his medical pass. The complaint can be read to

allege that having to work with his injury caused Williams undue pain and suffering. Giving

Williams the inferences to which he is entitled at this stage, he has plead enough to proceed on a

claim of deliberate indifference against Officer Dilworth.

 Williams also mentions two unnamed “count room” employees, John Does #1 and #2, as

well as Capt. Frierson (first name unknown), who supervises correctional staff, apparently in

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connection with his claim about having to report to work. However, Williams does not allege, nor

is there a basis to plausibly infer, that any of these individuals were personally aware of and turned

a blind eye to Williams’s medical issues. They cannot be held vicariously liable for Officer

Dilworth’s refusal to check on Williams’s medical pass. See Burks, 555 F.3d at 595. Accordingly,

they will be dismissed as defendants. 

For these reasons, the court:

(1) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed against Mr. Turnipseed in his individual capacity

for monetary damages for deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s health and safety in violation of

the Eighth Amendment;

(2) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed against Officer Dilworth in his individual

capacity for monetary damages for deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s medical needs in

violation of the Eighth Amendment;

(3) DISMISSES Sgt. Berry, Lt. Battles, John Does #1-3, Capt. Frierson, and Aramark

Company as defendants;

(4) DISMISSES any and all other claims contained in the complaint;

(5) DIRECTS the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service of process on Mr. Turnipseed and

Officer Dilworth; and

(6) ORDERS Mr. Turnipseed and Officer Dilworth to respond, as provided for in the

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, only to the claims for which the plaintiff has been granted

leave to proceed in this screening order.

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SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: November 27, 2013

 /s/ JON E. DEGUILIO 

Judge

United States District Court

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