UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

LUCKY WEAH, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Cause No.: 3:14-cv-01988-PPS-CAN

)

CITY OF SOUTH BEND, INDIANA; )

SOUTH BEND POLICE DEPARTMENT; )

SOUTH BEND POLICE OFFICER )

ANDREW HINES AND SOUTH BEND )

POLICE OFFICERS CURRENTLY UNKNOWN, )

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

The Plaintiff claims that his damages and the conduct of the individual Defendants was 

directly and proximately caused by the actions and inactions of the City. The Plaintiff alleges in 

his third cause of action that: 

“[T]he City.... encouraged, tolerated, ratified, and has been deliberately indifferent to the 

following policies, patterns, practices, and customs, and to the need for more or different training, 

supervision, investigation, or discipline in the areas of:

a. the use of force by police officers;

b. the proper exercise of police powers, including but not limited to the making of an 

arrest, the use of force, and the provision of aid to injured persons;

c. the failure of police officers to exercise due care while engaging in high speed motor 

vehicle pursuits that needlessly place innocent motorist (sic) and pedestrians at high 

risk of death and serious bodily injury;

d. the failure to adopt an adequate policy to guide police officers in high speed motor 

vehicle pursuits.”

The Plaintiff makes no factual assertion as to how the City encouraged, ratified or was 

deliberately indifferent to more training or different training, supervision, investigation, or 

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discipline in the areas listed in his complaint. The contentions made by the Plaintiff are merely 

legal conclusions or conclusory allegations.

In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility standard a court must 

accept the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true, but legal conclusions and conclusory 

allegations merely reciting the elements of the claim are not entitled to this presumption of truth. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, at 1951, 173 L.Ed. 2d 868 (2009). The “[f]actual 

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed. 2d 929 (2007). A complaint must 

contain “allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)” and entitlement to relief. 

Id. At 557.

The Seventh Circuit, in McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2011),

interpreted Twombly and Iqbal to require the Plaintiff to “provide some specific facts” to support 

the legal claims asserted in the complaint. The degree of specificity required is not easily quantified, 

but “the Plaintiff must give enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story 

that holds together.” Brooks v. Ross, 579 F.3d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 2009). The Plaintiff fails to provide 

specific facts that support his legal claims against the City; his third cause of action is nothing more 

than conclusory allegations and therefore are not entitled to a presumption of truth.

The Plaintiff further argues in his third cause of action that the City is liable because it failed 

to adhere to a plethora of things and this led subordinates to commit some wrongs against the 

Plaintiff; however, even if true, knowledge of subordinates’ misconduct is not enough; the 

Defendants must have intended the “forbidden” outcome to occur. Vance v. Rumsfield, 701 F.3d 

193 (7th Cir. 2012). The Plaintiff has presented nothing by way of facts to support this contention.

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In §1983 actions a Plaintiff must identify a municipal policy or custom that caused an injury. 

Liability is not imposed on a municipality unless the deliberate action attributable to the 

municipality itself is the moving force behind the Plaintiff’s deprivation of federal rights. Bryan 

County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997). The Plaintiff has failed to allege how the City was the 

moving force behind the injury that was alleged or that there is a causal link between the municipal 

action and the deprivation of federal rights.

Because the Plaintiff failed to assert any facts that support a cause of action against the City, 

the Motion to Dismiss, regarding the Plaintiff’s §1983 claims, pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6), should 

be granted for the City.

Respectfully submitted,

/s Jeffrey L. Sanford 

Jeffrey L. Sanford, Atty No. 14111-71

Deputy City Attorney

227 W. Jefferson Blvd., Suite 1200

South Bend, Indiana 46601

(574) 235-9241

Attorney for the Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 

served upon Jeffrey E. Kimmell, Attorney for Plaintiff, 218 W. Washington Street, Suite 600, South 

Bend, IN 46601 by depositing same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid this 5

th day of 

November, 2014.

s/Jeffrey L. Sanford 

Jeffrey L. Sanford

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