UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

BRAD LEE WIGENT, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. Case No. 3:14-cv-1591-JVB-CAN 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Acting Commissioner of 

Social Security Administration, 

 

 Defendant. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 Plaintiff Brad Lee Wigent seeks judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s 

decision denying him disability insurance benefits, and asks this Court to remand the case to the 

agency. For the reasons discussed below, the Commissioner’s decision is remanded for further 

consideration. 

A. Overview of the Case

 Plaintiff alleges that he became disabled on June 30, 2011, due to sleep apnea, 

hidradenitis, and schizophrenia. (R. at 16.) Plaintiff also suffers from learning disability and 

anxiety. (R. at 16.) Administrative Law Judge David Bruce determined that the schizophrenia, 

learning disability, and anxiety were severe, but also concluded that Plaintiff was nonetheless 

able to work. (R. at 24.) On February 22, 2013, the ALJ denied Plaintiff benefits. (R. at 24.) The 

ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s final decision when the Social Security Appeals 

Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (R. at 5.) 
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B. Standard of Review 

This Court has authority to review Social Security Act claim decisions under 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). The Court will uphold an ALJ’s decision that applies the correct legal standard and is 

supported by substantial evidence. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th 

Cir. 2005). The Court will, however, ensure that the ALJ built an “accurate and logical bridge 

from the evidence to his conclusion.” Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002). 

C. Disability Standard 

The SSA has established a five-step inquiry to evaluate whether a claimant qualifies for 

disability benefits. A successful claimant must show: 

(1) he is not presently employed; (2) his impairment is severe; (3) his impairment 

is listed or equal to a listing in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) he is 

not able to perform his past relevant work; and (5) he is unable to perform any 

other work within the national and local economy. 

Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 699–700 (7th Cir. 2004). 

 A “no” at any point other than step three means that the claimant is not disabled. 

Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001). A “yes” leads either to the next step or, on 

steps three and five, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. Id. The claimant bears the burden 

of proof at every step except step five. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000). 

D. Analysis 

Plaintiff argues that: the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff can do simple repetitive work with 

limited contact with others is not supported by substantial evidence; the ALJ did not properly 

assess the severity of Plaintiff’s hidradenitis and sleep apnea; and the ALJ made credibility 

determinations that are not supported by substantial evidence. 
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(1) The ALJ failed to address all medical evidence as required by 20 C.F.R. 404.1527 

Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c), the Social Security Administration must evaluate “every 

medical opinion” received. But the ALJ’s decision in this case inexplicably fails to address the 

opinion of Dr. Turner-Campbell, a psychologist who examined Plaintiff at request of the state 

disability determination agency, and whose opinion is highly supportive of Plaintiff’s disability 

claim. (R. at 384–389.) Notably, Dr. Turner-Campbell’s opinion does not stand alone, but 

supports the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician. (R. at 408–440.) 

This unexplained omission of Dr. Turner-Campbell’s report means that the ALJ’s 

decision does not build the requisite bridge from evidence to conclusion. As a result, the Court 

cannot determine whether the conclusion that Plaintiff is not disabled was supported by 

substantial evidence. 

(2) The ALJ did not err in judging Plaintiff’s hidradenitis and sleep apnea as non-severe 

 Plaintiff bears the burden of proof to show that his conditions are severe. Plaintiff has 

provided very little evidence to support the conclusion that his hidradenitis and sleep apnea are 

severe; what evidence he does provide predates the disability onset date. (R. at 17.) Plaintiff 

provides a compelling alternative reading of the evidence, but that is not enough. The ALJ’s 

interpretation does not have to be the best one. It just has to be supported by substantial 

evidence. Given how little evidence suggests that Plaintiff’s hidradenitis and sleep apnea have 

been severe within the alleged disability period, the ALJ’s determination was reasonable. 

 (3) The ALJ’s credibility determination was not patently wrong
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 ALJ credibility determinations are entitled to deference because the ALJ is “in a special 

position to hear, see, and assess witnesses.” Murphy v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Courts will not overturn such a credibility determination unless it lacks any explanation or 

support. Id. at 816. A credibility determination will be upheld as long as it is explained in a way 

that allows the court to determine that the ALJ logically based the determination on specific 

findings and record evidence. Id. In this case, the ALJ provided a logical explanation for the 

credibility determination: the Plaintiff’s statements were not consistent with the bulk of the 

evidence in the record. (R. at 21–22.) Of course, after properly addressing Dr. TurnerCampbell’s opinion, the ALJ may need to revisit this credibility determination as well. 

E. Conclusion 

The Court finds that because the ALJ did not address a medical opinion that supports 

Plaintiff’s claim, the ALJ failed to build a logical bridge from evidence to conclusion. Therefore, 

the Court remands the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

SO ORDERED on September 24, 2015. 

 S/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

 JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE