FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  No. 09-50665

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.

v.  2:08-CR-01111-

DSF-1 NEVILLE KING,

Defendant-Appellant. OPINION 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

June 10, 2010—Pasadena, California

Filed June 25, 2010

Before: Dorothy W. Nelson and Ronald M. Gould,

Circuit Judges, and James S. Gwin,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Gwin

*The Honorable James S. Gwin, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation. 

9275
COUNSEL

Callie Glanton Steele, Deputy Public Defender, Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles, California, for the defendantappellant.

Daniel A. Saunders, Assistant United States Attorney, Office

of the United States Attorney, Los Angeles, California, for the

plaintiff-appellee.

OPINION

GWIN, District Judge:

Defendant Neville King appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his term of supervised release and imposing

additional supervised release conditions on the basis of five

violations of his supervised release conditions. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

9278 UNITED STATES v. KING
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

After a jury convicted King of charges of possessing

cocaine with the intent to distribute, the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Michigan sentenced him to

235 months of imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. King began his term of supervised release on

March 5, 2008. On September 8, 2008, the Eastern District of

Michigan transferred jurisdiction over King’s supervised

release to the Central District of California.

On May 28, 2009, King’s probation officer submitted a

report to the district court for the Central District of California

alleging seven violations of his supervised release conditions:

1. Associating with convicted felons by accepting telephone

calls from federal inmates between February 29, 2008

and September 10, 2008;

2. Associating with convicted felons by e-mailing federal

inmates between March 2, 2008 and December 1, 2008;

3. Associating with convicted felons by wiring money to

federal inmates;

4. Associating with convicted felon Anna Moore, a Coldwell Banker independent contractor for whom he worked

as an assistant, and failing to report that association to his

probation officer in his March and April 2008 monthly

reports;

5. Failing to submit truthful information to his probation

officer in his March and April 2008 monthly reports by

misrepresenting that he worked directly for Coldwell

Banker, when he actually worked for Anna Moore, an

independent contractor for Coldwell Banker;

6. Failing to follow the instructions of his probation officer

by failing to submit documentation of his employment

UNITED STATES v. KING 9279
with N-Vest, a real estate venture, from May 2008

through July 2008; and

7. Failing to make court-ordered monthly payments on his

fine.

Later, the government dismissed allegation 3, and King

admitted to allegation 7.

At the preliminary revocation hearing, King’s probation

officer asked the district court to modify King’s supervised

release conditions until the full revocation hearing. After

King’s counsel objected to the modification proposed by

King’s probation officer, the district court refashioned the

modification, subjecting King and his property (including any

computer “confined to his own use”) to search upon reasonable suspicion of a violation of supervision or of unlawful

conduct. Also, the district court ordered King “not to use a

computer that other individuals ha[d] access to.” King did not

object to the refashioned modification.

After a two-day hearing on the remaining allegations, the

district court sustained allegations 1, 2, 4, and 5, and dismissed allegation 6.

With respect to allegations 1 and 2, King’s probation officer testified that her investigation revealed—and, upon confrontation, King admitted—that he had regularly

communicated by telephone and e-mail with a number of

incarcerated felons. King’s probation officer also testified that

King generally admitted all of the violations in the petition on

three other occasions. The district court found King’s probation officer’s testimony credible.

With respect to allegation 4, King’s probation officer testified that, in addition to his three general admissions to the

entire petition, King specifically admitted failing to report his

knowledge that Anna Moore, his employer, was a felon.

9280 UNITED STATES v. KING
Moreover, although Moore testified that she never told King

that she was a felon, she admitted that King obtained his job

with her through King’s longtime close friend and Moore’s

ex-husband and drug trafficking co-conspirator, Kevin Moore.

With respect to allegation 5, King’s probation officer testified that, in addition to his three general admissions, King

specifically admitted to misrepresenting his employment position with Coldwell Banker. Moreover, the probation officer

testified that, according to Coldwell Banker, King had never

been employed there. And although Anna Moore testified that

she considered herself to work for Coldwell Banker, she

admitted that she was actually an independent contractor.

Having sustained allegations 1, 2, 4, and 5, the district court

sentenced King to nine months of imprisonment followed by

51 months of supervised release with several additional conditions, including (1) a condition that King subject himself and

his property to search upon reasonable suspicion of a violation of supervision or of unlawful conduct, and (2) a condition

that King not associate with inmates in state or local prisons.

From the district court’s judgment, King timely appealed to

this Court.

II. ANALYSIS

King raises multiple challenges to the district court’s revocation of his supervised release term and imposition of additional supervised release conditions.

A. Jurisdiction to Revoke Supervised Release for

Pre-Transfer Violations

[1] King first argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release for violations he committed before the transfer of jurisdiction from the Eastern District

of Michigan—a question of first impression in our circuit.

UNITED STATES v. KING 9281
King’s argument fails in light of the statutory text and structure, the absurd results it would yield, and the unanimous

opinions of our sister circuits.

[2] The text and structure of the statute authorizing transfer

of jurisdiction over individuals on supervised release indicates

that a transferee court has jurisdiction to revoke supervised

release for violations committed before transfer. That statute,

18 U.S.C. § 3605, provides that “[a] court to which jurisdiction is transferred under this section is authorized to exercise

all powers over the probationer or releasee that are permitted

by this subchapter or subchapter B or D of chapter 227”—

which includes the power to “revoke a term of supervised

release . . . if the court . . . finds by a preponderance of the

evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised

release,” id. § 3583(e)(3) (part of ch. 227, subchapter D).

Under this statutory structure, the transferee court steps into

the shoes of the transferor court—which, per § 3583(e), had

jurisdiction to revoke supervised release for pre-transfer violations. Section § 3605’s language does not limit the transferee court’s power to violations that occur after transfer.

If we were to adopt the contrary position (as King urges),

two incongruous consequences would follow. First, the contrary rule would create a “twilight zone” of immunity for violations committed—but not discovered—before transfer.

Second, the logic of King’s argument is not limited to the

transferee court’s jurisdiction to revoke supervised release; it

applies with equal force to the transferee court’s jurisdiction

to terminate or reduce the conditions of supervised release.

Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (power to “revoke a term of

supervised release”) with id. § 3583(e)(1) (power to “terminate a term of supervised release”) and id. § 3583(e)(2)

(power to “modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of supervised release”). Thus, for example, under King’s reading of

the statute, a transferee court would be powerless to terminate

or modify a supervised release term on the basis of the supervisee’s good behavior before transfer—forcing the supervisee

9282 UNITED STATES v. KING
to start at square one after each transfer. Cf. United States v.

Miller, 205 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 2000) (“ ‘Occasionally,

changed circumstances—for instance, exceptionally good

behavior by the defendant . . .—will render a previously

imposed term or condition of release either too harsh or inappropriately tailored to serve the general punishment goals of

section 3553(a).’ ”) (citation omitted). As a result, even if

§ 3605 were ambiguous, we would construe it to avoid these

absurd results. See, e.g., United States v. Middleton, 231 F.3d

1207, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000) (courts should “avoid, if possible,

a[ statutory] interpretation that would produce ‘an absurd and

unjust result which Congress could not have intended’ ”)

(quoting Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429

(1998)).

Moreover, two other circuits have rejected—and none have

adopted—King’s position. See United States v. Bailey, 257 F.

App’x 210, 212 (11th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (“[B]ased on

the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3605, the district court for

the Northern District of Georgia had the power to revoke Bailey’s supervised release as to the case transferred from Alabama, regardless of whether the conduct underlying the

revocation was pre-transfer or post-transfer . . . .”); United

States v. Fernandez, 379 F.3d 270, 275-76 (5th Cir. 2004)

(rejecting argument that “Congress intended only that after a

valid transfer of jurisdiction has taken place, the defendant’s

subsequent commission of a crime in the transferee district

would allow the transferee court to address the original supervised release along with the sentence for the new crime”;

instead concluding that “[§ 3605’s] legislative history clearly

indicates that the statute allows the transferor court . . . to

transfer jurisdiction after charges have been filed against the

releasee for a new offense committed . . . before any transfer

of jurisdiction”) (emphasis in original).

King’s reliance on United States v. Miller, 547 F.3d 1207

(9th Cir. 2008), is misplaced. There, we held only that a

defendant’s release under a pre-release program does not trigUNITED STATES v. KING 9283
ger the start of his term of supervised release (and thus the

applicability of his supervised release conditions). Id. at 1212-

13. Here, by contrast, there is no dispute that King’s violations occurred during his term of supervised release.

[3] We thus hold that a transferee court has jurisdiction

under 18 U.S.C. § 3605 to revoke a term of supervised release

for violations committed before the transfer of jurisdiction.

B. Constitutional Challenge to Condition Forbidding

“Associat[ion]” With Known Felons

[4] Second, King argues that the supervised release condition forbidding him from “associat[ing]” with known felons

was unconstitutionally vague—and in particular, that it failed

to adequately notify him that phone and e-mail communications with felons were forbidden. A supervised release condition “violates due process of law if it either forbids or requires

the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common

intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ

as to its application.” United States v. Soltero, 510 F.3d 858,

866 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citations and quotation

marks omitted).

[5] We have on several occasions held that conditions proscribing “association” with a clearly defined group are not

impermissibly vague. See id. at 867 (holding that supervised

release condition forbidding association with criminal street

gang members is not unconstitutionally vague); United States

v. Vega, 545 F.3d 743, 749-50 (9th Cir. 2008) (same); United

States v. Napulou, 593 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2010) (condition forbidding association with persons convicted of misdemeanors is not unconstitutionally vague).

In those decisions, we cabined the dictionary definition of

“associate” in three ways to avoid its potentially vague outer

boundaries. See The American Heritage Dictionary of the

English Language (4th ed. 2000) (“to spend time socially;

9284 UNITED STATES v. KING
keep company”); Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary

(11th ed. 2003) (“to come or be together as partners, friends,

or companions”). First, we explained that, consistent with the

fundamental presumption that “prohibited criminal acts

require an element of mens rea,” Vega, 545 F.3d at 750, nonassociation conditions prohibit only knowing contact with persons that the supervisee knows to be felons. See id.; Soltero,

510 F.3d at 867 n.9. We further limited the meaning of nonassociation conditions by emphasizing that “ ‘incidental contacts’ . . . do not constitute ‘association’ . . . .” Soltero, 510

F.3d at 866-67 (quoting Arciniega v. Freeman, 404 U.S. 4, 4-

5 (1971) (per curiam)); see also Neil P. Cohen, The Law of

Probation and Parole § 9:11 (2d ed. 1999) (“Courts routinely

hold that a probation or parole condition proscribing associating with a person or group refers to planned, prolonged contact as distinguished from chance or casual meetings.”).

Finally, we noted that “ ‘[i]f and when [supervised release] is

revoked, we will examine the findings to insure that [defendant’s] due process right to notice of prohibited conduct has

been observed and to protect him from unknowing violations.’ ” Vega, 545 F.3d at 750 (citation omitted) (alterations

in original). With these limitations, we concluded that “ ‘men

of common intelligence’ need not guess at the meaning of

‘association.’ ” Soltero, 510 F.3d at 867; see also Vega, 545

F.3d at 749; Napulou, 593 F.3d at 1045.

[6] Here, moreover, King’s probation officer testified that

she explained to King at the outset of his supervised release

term that he was not to have “any type of contact” with

known felons. A probation officer’s instructions are relevant

to whether a supervised release condition gives fair warning

of prohibited conduct. See United States v. Romero, 676 F.2d

406, 407 (9th Cir. 1982) (“In addition to the bare words of the

probation condition, the probationer may be guided by the

further definition, explanations, or instructions of the district

court and the probation officer.”).

[7] Together, the ordinary meaning of “associate,” our case

law, and King’s probation officer’s instructions adequately

UNITED STATES v. KING 9285
notified King that telephone and e-mail communications with

felons were prohibited. See Napulou, 593 F.3d at 1044 n.2

(observing, in summarizing evidence that defendant violated

non-association condition, that defendant “had been maintaining daily telephonic contact with Kahau after [defendant’s]

arrest and incarceration for association with Kahau”). We thus

hold that the non-association condition was not unconstitutionally vague.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence for Violation Findings

King next argues that insufficient evidence supports three

of the district court’s violation findings. On a sufficiency-ofthe-evidence challenge to a supervised release revocation, we

ask whether, “ ‘viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements’ of a violation” by “ ‘a preponderance of the evidence.’ ” United States v. Jeremiah, 493

F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).

[8] First, King challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

for the district court’s finding that the federal prison inmates

with whom King communicated by phone and e-mail were

felons (rather than federal misdemeanants). But King’s probation officer—whom the district court found credible—

testified that King specifically admitted having “been in telephonic and email contact with convicted felons” and that on

three other occasions King generally admitted all of the allegations in the petition. Additionally, King’s probation officer

testified that the Bureau of Prisons records she received indicated that King had been in “regular telephonic and e-mail

contact with a number of incarcerated felons.” No evidence in

the record indicated that any of the inmates with whom King

communicated were not felons. Viewing this evidence in the

light most favorable to the government, a rational judge had

ample room to find that the federal inmates with whom King

communicated were felons.

9286 UNITED STATES v. KING
[9] Second, King argues that the district court lacked sufficient evidence to find that at the time of the alleged violation,

he knew that his employer, Anna Moore, was a felon. At the

revocation hearing, King’s probation officer testified that

King specifically admitted failing to report his knowledge that

Moore was a felon and generally admitted all of the allegations in the petition on three other occasions. Moreover,

King’s probation officer testified that when she later confronted him about the violation allegation, he responded that

Moore’s status as a felon was “ ‘common knowledge.’ ”

1

Finally, although Moore testified that she never told King that

she was a felon, a rational judge could have concluded that

King learned of her felon status from other sources—namely,

from King’s close friend and Moore’s ex-husband and drug

trafficking co-conspirator, Kevin Moore, who helped King

secure his job as her assistant. This evidence, when viewed in

the light most favorable to the government, was sufficient for

the district court to find that King knew at the time of the violation that Moore was a felon.

[10] Third, King contends that the district court lacked sufficient evidence to find that his misrepresentation to his parole

officer that he worked directly for Coldwell Banker—rather

than for Moore, an independent contractor for Coldwell

Banker—was intentional. At the revocation hearing, King’s

probation officer testified that King specifically admitted to

having misrepresented his position with Coldwell Banker and

generally admitted all of the allegations in the petition on

three other occasions. And King never produced any documentation suggesting he worked directly for Coldwell

Banker; instead, the pay stubs he produced were from “123

Investment Inc.” and signed by Anna Moore. King empha1King argues that his response indicated his knowledge of Moore’s

felon status only at the time of the response—not at the time of the violation. But claiming that her felon status was “common knowledge” makes

sense as a defense to the allegation only if King was aware of her status

at the time of the violation. 

UNITED STATES v. KING 9287
sizes that Moore testified that she considered herself to work

for Coldwell Banker, but Moore never claimed to have told

King that he worked for Coldwell Banker. Although perhaps

open to other interpretations, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the government, this evidence was sufficient to

support the district court’s finding that King’s misrepresentation was intentional.

Thus, King’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges fail.

D. Due Process Challenge to Modification of

Supervised Release Conditions

Fifth, King argues that the district court violated his due

process rights at the initial revocation hearing when it modified his supervised release conditions pending the full revocation hearing by adding a computer search condition without

a prior hearing, as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(c). King’s argument is meritless. The district

court held a hearing before adding the computer search condition. Indeed, the district court refashioned the new condition

after King objected to the condition as proposed by King’s

probation officer. King did not object to the refashioned condition.

[11] King contends that Rule 32.1(c) prohibits the district

court from imposing new conditions without taking any evidence on or sustaining any of the alleged violations. But a

Rule 32.1(c) modification—as opposed to a Rule 32.1(b)

revocation—does not require an evidentiary hearing or a violation finding. Compare Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b) (providing

for, inter alia, right to evidentiary hearing and counsel before

“revocation”) with Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c) (providing for “a

hearing, at which the person has the right to counsel and an

opportunity to make a statement and present any information

in mitigation” before “modif[ication]”).

9288 UNITED STATES v. KING
E. Challenges to Additional Post-Revocation Conditions

Finally, King challenges the district court’s post-revocation

imposition of two additional supervised release conditions:

(1) the condition subjecting King and his property to search

upon reasonable suspicion of a violation of supervision or of

unlawful conduct, and (2) the condition prohibiting King from

associating with inmates in state or local prisons. We review

the district court’s imposition of supervised release conditions

for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Weber, 451 F.3d

552, 557 (9th Cir. 2006). The district court has “significant

discretion” and “ ‘wide latitude’ ” to impose supervised

release conditions reasonably related to, inter alia, the nature

and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s history and

characteristics, and the sentencing goals of deterring future

offenses, protecting the public, and rehabilitating the defendant. Id. (citation omitted); see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).

[12] Here, in light of the multiple supervised release violations that the district court found King to have committed and

his “complete and obvious pattern of deception” towards the

district court and his probation officer, the imposition of the

search condition was reasonably related to protecting the public and preventing recidivism. We thus hold that the district

court’s imposition of this condition was not an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Betts, 511 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir.

2007) (imposition of search condition with no reasonable suspicion requirement was not abuse of discretion).

[13] Likewise, because of those same considerations, and

also because of King’s history of communicating with

inmates in violation of more generally worded supervised

release conditions, the district court’s imposition of the noassociation-with-inmates condition was reasonably related to

King’s offense and history and to deterring further offenses.

United States v. Napulou, 593 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2010), cited

by King, is not to the contrary. Napulou held that a condition

forbidding association with persons with misdemeanor conUNITED STATES v. KING 9289
victions was not reasonably related to rehabilitation or public

safety because its sweep included many currently law-abiding

individuals and many individuals who had committed only

minor offenses. Id. at 1045-46. Here, by contrast, King’s condition forbids association only with individuals currently

imprisoned for any crime—thereby tending to exclude minor

misdemeanors (which rarely result in prison sentences) and

law-abiding individuals with long-past convictions.2

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

judgment revoking King’s supervised release term and imposing additional supervised release conditions.

AFFIRMED.

2King may, of course, obtain special permission to associate with a particular inmate. And as the government represented at argument, the nonassociation condition goes into effect only when King begins his supervised release term—not during his prison sentence. See also Neil P.

Cohen, The Law of Probation and Parole § 9:11 (2d ed. 1999) (“[C]ourts

have used common sense in interpreting nonassociation probation conditions. Often such a condition is part of a long list of terms that includes

service of a short jail sentence. Obviously, while in jail probationers cannot comply with a condition dictating that they refrain from associating

with persons with a criminal record. In such cases courts wisely hold that

the nonassociation condition does not go into effect until after the jail condition has been fulfilled.”) (footnotes omitted). 

9290 UNITED STATES v. KING