alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF DEFENDANT

Scott Sagaria (State Bar No.217981)

sjsagaria@sagarialaw.com

Elliot Gale (State Bar No. 263326)

egale@sagarialaw.com

Joe Angelo (State Bar No. 268542)

jangelo@sagarialaw.com

SAGARIA LAW, P.C.

3017 Douglas Blvd., Ste. 100

Roseville, California 95661

Telephone: (408) 279-2288

Facsimile: (408) 279-2299

Attorneys for Plaintiff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA — SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

BETTY GRINDER,

Plaintiff,

vs.

EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, 

INC.; et. al.,

Defendants.

Federal Case No.: 3:17-CV-00343-WHA

PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY 

DISMISSAL OF DEFENDANT 

COMENITY, LLC PURSUANT TO 

FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL 

PROCEDURE 41(A)(1)

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff Betty Grinder, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 41(a)(1), hereby voluntarily dismisses Defendant Comenity, LLC as to all claims in 

this action, with prejudice.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) provides, in relevant part:

41(a) Voluntary Dismissal 

(1) By the Plaintiff

(a) Without a Court Order. Subject to Rules 23(3), 23.1(c), 23.2, and 66 and any 

applicable federal statute, the plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court 

Case 3:17-cv-00343-WHA Document 59 Filed 06/19/17 Page 1 of 2
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PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF DEFENDANT 

order by filing: 

a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a 

motion for summary judgment. 

Defendant Comenity, LLC has neither answered Plaintiff’s Complaint, nor filed a motion 

for summary judgment. Accordingly, the matter may be dismissed against it for all purposes and 

without an Order of the Court. 

Dated: June 19, 2017 Sagaria Law, P.C. 

By: /s/ Elliot W. Gale

Elliot W. Gale

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Betty Grinder 

Case 3:17-cv-00343-WHA Document 59 Filed 06/19/17 Page 2 of 2
Maurice DORVILUS, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 12-9706.

Supreme Court of the United States

May 13, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.

Justice KAGAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 92 (Friday, May 12, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 25694-25695]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-11762]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------


COMMITTEE FOR PURCHASE FROM PEOPLE WHO ARE BLIND OR SEVERELY DISABLED

Procurement List; Proposed Additions

AGENCY: Committee for Purchase From People Who Are Blind or Severely 
Disabled.

[[Page 25695]] ACTION: Proposed additions to Procurement List.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Committee has received proposals to add to the Procurement 
List a commodity and a service to be furnished by nonprofit agencies 
employing persons who are blind or have other severe disabilities.

COMMENTS MUST BE RECEIVED ON OR BEFORE: June 12, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Committee for Purchase From People Who Are Blind or Severely 
Disabled, Crystal Square 3, Suite 403, 1735 Jefferson Davis Highway, 
Arlington, Virginia 22202-3461.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Beverly Milkman (703) 603-7740.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This notice is published pursuant to 41 
U.S.C. 47(a)(2) and 41 CFR 51-2.3. Its purpose is to provide interested 
persons an opportunity to submit comments on the possible impact of the 
proposed actions.
    If the Committee approves the proposed additions, all entities of 
the Federal Government (except as otherwise indicated) will be required 
to procure the commodity and service listed below from nonprofit 
agencies employing persons who are blind or have other severe 
disabilities.
    I certify that the following action will not have a significant 
impact on a substantial number of small entities. The major factors 
considered for this certification were:
    1. The action will not result in any additional reporting, 
recordkeeping or other compliance requirements for small entities other 
than the small organizations that will furnish the commodity and 
service to the Government.
    2. The action does not appear to have a severe economic impact on 
current contractors for the commodity and service.
    3. The action will result in authorizing small entities to furnish 
the commodity and service to the Government.
    4. There are no known regulatory alternatives which would 
accomplish the objectives of the Javits-Wagner-O'Day Act (41 U.S.C. 46-
48c) in connection with the commodity and service proposed for addition 
to the Procurement List.
    Comments on this certification are invited. Commenters should 
identify the statement(s) underlying the certification on which they 
are providing additional information.
    The following commodity and service have been proposed for addition 
to Procurement List for production by the nonprofit agencies listed:

Commodity

Shower Pail, Collapsible
    8465-00-935-6649
NPA: North Bay Rehabilitation Services, Inc., San Rafael, California

Service

Janitorial/Custodial, IRS Service Center Complex, Memphis, Tennessee
NPA: Memphis Goodwill Industries, Inc., Memphis, Tennessee
Beverly L. Milkman,
Executive Director.
[FR Doc. 95-11762 Filed 5-11-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6820-33-P
Randy H. KILPATRICK, petitioner, v. FLORIDA.

No. 12-7672.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 15, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, denied.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELIEZAR SALCEDO,

Petitioner,

v.

WARDEN,

Respondent.

No. 2:17-cv-0229 KJN P

ORDER

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed an application for a writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner paid the $5.00 filing fee.

The application attacks a conviction issued by the San Francisco County Superior Court. 

While both this court and the United States District Court in the district where petitioner was 

convicted have jurisdiction, see Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973), any 

and all witnesses and evidence necessary for the resolution of petitioner’s application are more 

readily available in San Francisco County. Id. at 499 n.15; 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d). 

Accordingly, in the furtherance of justice, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter is 

transferred to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.

Dated: February 13, 2017

salc0229.108

Case 3:17-cv-00842-EDL Document 3 Filed 02/13/17 Page 1 of 1
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.8

S/M REAL ESTATE FUND VII, LTD.



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of S/M Real Estate Fund VII, Ltd. (the
"Partnership") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2002, as filed with
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Sandy
Robison, Chief Financial Officer of the general partner of the Partnership,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (3)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (4)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Partnership.


                                    S/M REAL ESTATE FUND VII, LTD.

                               BY:  SM7 APARTMENT INVESTORS INC.
                                    General Partner


Date: August 9, 2002                BY:    /s/ Sandy Robison
                                           -------------------------------
                                    Name:  Sandy Robison
                                    Title: Chief Financial Officer, Vice
                                           President, Secretary and Controller
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

MICHAEL A. MAXIE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO. 3:12-CV-765 RM

)

SUPERINTENDENT )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Michael A. Maxie, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas corpus petition trying to challenge

his convictions for battery on a pregnant woman and interfering with the reporting of a

crime by the Elkhart Superior Court under cause number 20D01-0812-FC-102 on February

28, 2011. This petition must be dismissed because it is a mixed petition. “[F]ederal district

courts may not adjudicate mixed petitions for habeas corpus, that is, petitions containing

both exhausted and unexhausted claims.” Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 273 (2005). 

Mr. Maxie presents three grounds for relief. In both Ground One and Ground Two,

Mr. Maxie argues that his attorney on direct appeal was ineffective. He says he presented

these two grounds to the Indiana Supreme Court during his direct appeal. Mr. Maxie

presents several claims in each ground and it is possible that he might have presented other

portions of these grounds during his direct appeal. It is not possible, though, that he

properly presented an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim during his direct

appeal. Such a claim can only be raised during a post-conviction relief proceeding. Mr.

Maxie filed a post-conviction relief petition in the state trial court on April 27, 2012, and it

case 3:12-cv-00765-RLM document 5 filed 12/10/12 page 1 of 2
is still pending in that court. As such, the claims he has raised in his post-conviction

petition are not yet exhausted and this court can’t adjudicate this mixed habeas corpus

petition. 

This petition must be dismissed, unless dismissal would prevent federal habeas

review. Dolis v. Chambers, 454 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2006). The Indiana Supreme Court

denied transfer of Mr. Maxie’s direct appeal on February 29, 2012, so the one-year statute

of limitation began on May 30, 2012, when the time for filing a petition for certiorari

expired. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The statute of limitations was tolled when Mr. Maxie

filed his post-conviction relief petition on April 27, 2012. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Therefore,

the entire one-year period still remains; Mr. Maxie hasn’t yet lost a single day. The statute

of limitation won’t start again until the conclusion of the post-conviction proceeding and

appeals. Dismissing this petition won’t deprive him of the opportunity for federal habeas

review and a stay would not be appropriate in this case. 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

pursuant to SECTION 2254 HABEAS CORPUS RULE 4. 

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: December 10 , 2012

 /s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr. 

Judge

United State District Court

case 3:12-cv-00765-RLM document 5 filed 12/10/12 page 2 of 2
EXHIBIT
32.1


CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED
 PURSUANT
TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Annual Report of First Quantum Ventures, Inc., (the
"Company"), on Form 10-K for the period ended June 30, 2009 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), each of
the undersigned, in the capacities and on the dates indicated below, hereby
certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:





1.           The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.           The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operation of the
Company.





Date:
October 22, 2009


By:   /s/ Andrew
Godfrey
 Andrew
Godfrey
 Chief
Executive Officer
 Chief
Financial Officer
DECLARATION OF PAUL J. NICOLETTI

I, Paul J. Nicoletti, do hereby declare:

1. My name is Paul Nicoletti and I am over the age of 18 and am otherwise

competent to testify.

2. The facts stated herein are based upon my personal knowledge.

3. On May 9, 2013, I received a Court order granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to

Serve a Third Party Subpoena on Defendant’s ISP for the purpose of obtaining the Defendant’s

identifying information.

4. The Order specifically instructed that Plaintiff refrain from directly contacting the

Defendant. As such, I instructed my staff not to contact the Defendant and to keep his

information secure.

5. On May 9, 2013, I served a subpoena on Comcast Holdings Corporation and I

received the response on June 24, 2013.

6. At no point did I, my staff, or Plaintiff’s representatives contact the Defendant.

7. On July 5, 2013, because service had not been completed on Defendant, I filed a

Motion for Extension of Time which erroneously advised that Plaintiff was “in the process of

discussing the matter with Defendant to ascertain their intentions with respect to litigation or an

early settlement.”

8. This statement was included in the motion by mistake. To explain, settlement

discussions have been a frequent reason in my other cases to request an enlargement of time to

serve Defendant. And, a prior motion from another case was used to draft the subject motion.

Unfortunately, the inaccurate sentence was not removed from the draft which was used as the

template for the subject motion.

case 2:13-cv-00085-JVB-JEM document 16-1 filed 07/18/13 page 1 of 2
9. Undersigned sincerely apologizes to the Court for any inconvenient this error may

have caused.

FURTHER DECLARANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

DECLARATION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I hereby declare under penalty of perjury under the laws

of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on this 16th day of July, 2013.

PAUL J. NICOLETTI

By: /s/ Paul Nicoletti

case 2:13-cv-00085-JVB-JEM document 16-1 filed 07/18/13 page 2 of 2
Exhibit 10.(b)





EXHIBIT 10 (b) 

RULE 30a-2(b) CERTIFICATION 

 











In connection with this report on Form N-CSR for the registrant as furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned hereby certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

 




	
(1) 
	
the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as applicable; and 

		
	
(2) 
	
the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the registrant. 

		







  


		By:	/S/ BRIAN T. ZINO 
	 		Brian T. Zino 
	 		Chief Executive Officer 
	 		 
		Date:	March 5, 2004 
	 		 
		By:	/S/ LAWRENCE P. VOGEL 
	 		Lawrence P. Vogel
	 		Chief Financial Officer
	 		 
		Date:	March 5, 2004
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO. 3:13-CR-22 RM 

)

DEANDRE GRANT )

ORDER

No objections have been filed to the magistrate judge’s findings and

recommendations upon a plea of guilty issued on March 21, 2013. Accordingly,

the court ADOPTS those findings and recommendations [docket # 10], ACCEPTS

defendant Deandre Grant’s plea of guilty, and FINDS the defendant guilty of

Count 1 of the Information, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641. 

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: April 11, 2013 

 /s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr. 

Judge, United States District Court

Northern District of Indiana
I 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1315

To allow small public water systems to request an exemption from the requirements of any national primary drinking water regulation for a naturally 

occurring contaminant, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 15, 2005

Mr. OTTER (for himself, Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. FLAKE, Mr. CANNON, and Mr. 

DOOLITTLE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL

To allow small public water systems to request an exemption 

from the requirements of any national primary drinking 

water regulation for a naturally occurring contaminant, 

and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Small Community Op5 tions for Regulatory Equity Act of 2005’’. 
2

•HR 1315 IH 

1 SEC. 2. EXEMPTION FOR NONPROFIT SMALL PUBLIC 

2 WATER SYSTEMS RESPECTING NATURALLY 

3 OCCURRING CONTAMINANTS. 

4 The Safe Drinking Water Act (42 U.S.C. 300f et 

5 seq.) is amended by inserting after section 1416 the fol6 lowing: 

7 ‘‘EXEMPTION FOR NONPROFIT SMALL PUBLIC WATER

8 SYSTEMS RESPECTING NATURALLY OCCURRING CON9 TAMINANTS

10 ‘‘SEC. 1416A. (a) EXEMPTION.—A State exercising 

11 primary enforcement responsibility for public water sys12 tems under section 1413 (or the Administrator in any non13 primacy State) shall exempt any nonprofit small public 

14 water system that submits a request in accordance with 

15 subsection (b) from the requirements of any national pri16 mary drinking water regulation for a naturally occurring 

17 contaminant. 

18 ‘‘(b) REQUEST.—To seek an exemption under this 

19 section, a nonprofit small public water system—

20 ‘‘(1) shall submit a written request to the State 

21 exercising primary enforcement responsibility with 

22 respect to the system (or the Administrator in any 

23 nonprimacy State); and 

24 ‘‘(2) shall include in such request a finding 

25 under subsection (c). 

26 ‘‘(c) ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY.—
3

•HR 1315 IH 

1 ‘‘(1) FINDING.—To seek an exemption under 

2 this section, a nonprofit small public water system 

3 must find that compliance by the system with the 

4 national primary drinking water regulation involved 

5 is not economically feasible. 

6 ‘‘(2) NO REVIEW.—A finding by a nonprofit 

7 small public water system under this subsection shall 

8 not be subject to judicial or administrative review. 

9 ‘‘(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

10 ‘‘(1) The term ‘naturally occurring contami11 nant’ includes arsenic, radon, radium, uranium, and 

12 any contaminant that is a disinfection byproduct (in13 cluding bromate, chlorite, haloacetic acids, and total 

14 trihalomethanes). 

15 ‘‘(2) The term ‘small public water system’ 

16 means a public water system serving 10,000 or 

17 fewer persons.’’.

Æ
#### James Fernando TOWNES, a/k/a James Vernando Townes, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF TULSA, OKLAHOMA; Rico Yarbrough; Eddie Parrish, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 03-5140.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

May 10, 2004.

James Fernando Townes, McAlester, OK, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Larry V. Simmons, Asst. City Attorney, Office of the City Attorney, Michael C. Romig, Andrew T. Rees, City Attorney Office, Tulsa, OK, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before KELLY, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judge.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

PAUL KELLY, JR., Circuit Judge.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Plaintiff James Fernando Townes, a/k/a James Vernando Townes, proceeding pro *657se, appeals from an order of the district court granting defendants’ motions to dismiss in this action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We affirm.

The district court, after affording Mr. Townes an opportunity to amend his complaint, which he declined to do, dismissed his complaint holding that he had failed to state a claim against the City of Tulsa and that the defendant City of Tulsa police officers were entitled to qualified immunity. On appeal, Mr. Townes maintains that he did state a claim against the City of Tulsa. He also argues that the defendant officers are not entitled to qualified immunity because they subjected him to malicious prosecution and false imprisonment by falsely accusing him of possession of cocaine.

The parties are familiar with the facts and we need not repeat them here. ‘We review the district court’s ruling as to defendant[s]’ motion to dismiss de novo.” *Steele v. United States,*19 F.3d 531, 532 (10th Cir.1994).

Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs on appeal, we hold that Mr. Townes indeed did fail to state a claim against the City of Tulsa. Further, the defendant officers are entitled to qualified immunity as they reasonably believed that probable cause existed to arrest Mr. Townes, a holding born out by the fact that the trial court bound him over for trial. *See, e.g., Taylor v. Meacham,*82 F.3d 1556, 1564 (10th Cir.1996). This determination, of necessity, defeats Mr. Townes’ claims of malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. *See id.*(malicious prosecution); *Atkins v. Lanning,*556 F.2d 485, 487 (10th Cir.1977) (false imprisonment); *J.C. Penney Co. v. O’Daniell,*263 F.2d 849, 851 (10th Cir.1959) (in Oklahoma, probable cause is a defense in false imprisonment cases).

We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court for substantially the reasons stated in its order of August 6, 2003.

*

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Christopher STALLWORTH v. STATE

CR-16-1209

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

February 2, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Reh. denied.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Manuel CHAIREZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 03-10879

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 28, 2004.

Linda Marie Dedman, US Attorney’s Office, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Gary D. Smart, Arlington, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before REAVLEY, JOLLY and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Manuel Chairez appeals his guilty plea conviction and sentence for being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, Chairez argues that his verbal motion to withdraw his guilty plea should have been granted because his plea was not voluntary. The district court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion as Chairez has failed to show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal of his guilty plea. *See United States v. Carr,*740 F.2d 339, *343-44 (5th*Cir.1984).

Chairez also argues that the district court erred in applying the enhancement provision found in § 2K2.1(b)(5) of the Sentencing Guidelines, because there was no evidence that Chairez possessed a firearm in connection with another felony offense. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law of this Circuit, we hold that the district court did not clearly err in applying the enhancement of § 2K2.1(b)(5), because there was sufficient evidence to prove that Chairez possessed a firearm in connection with a felony offense within the meaning of § 2K2.1(b)(5). *United States v. Munoz,*150 F.3d 401, 416 (5th Cir.1998); *United States v. Condren,*18 F.3d 1190, 1193, 1199-1200 (5th Cir. 1994); *United States v. Armstead,*114 F.3d 504, 512 (5th Cir.1997).

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.