J-S09015-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.S.M., A 

MINOR 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 612 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Dispositional Review Order Entered May 20, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Juvenile Division at No(s): 

CP-25-JV0000069-2021, 

CP-25-JV0000178-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: MAY 23, 2023

D.S.M. (“Appellant”), a minor, appeals from the dispositional review 

order dated April 20, 2022, and entered on the docket in the Court of Common 

Pleas of Erie County on May 20, 2022, which modified his placement after he 

was adjudicated delinquent for multiple offenses. After careful review, we 

affirm. 

The juvenile court provided the following procedural history and factual 

background in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion:

[Appellant] was adjudicated delinquent on August 17, 2021, after 

previously admitting to several allegations, including criminal 

mischief, possession of a firearm by a minor, discharge of a 

firearm into an occupied structure, reckless endangerment, theft 
J-S09015-23

- 2 -

by unlawful taking, and receiving stolen property.[1] The [c]ourt 

ordered that he be placed at Cornell Abraxas Academy 

[(“Abraxas”)] in Morgantown, Pennsylvania. His first four months 

at Abraxas were relatively positive, but unfortunately[,] by 

December [of that year], [Appellant’s] behavior declined. All told, 

12 physical interventions occurred at Abraxas between December 

14, 2021, and March 10, 2022. Despite [Appellant’s] escalating 

misconduct, Abraxas recommended at a review hearing[,] held in 

February of 2022[,] that he remain at the facility, believing it could 

still treat [Appellant’s] behavioral issues. After a few weeks, 

however, the facility was no longer so optimistic. On March 17, 

2022, Abraxas requested his removal, citing instances of 

aggression, such as attempting an assault on a peer, threatening 

to “jump” a staff member, and the breaking of a security camera 

and a large wooden table. 

At a disposition hearing held on April 20, 2022, the 

Commonwealth recommended placement at another secure 

facility. While counsel for [Appellant] agreed that “Abraxas just 

didn’t work” and “a change of scenery would work best for him[,]” 

he proposed “[g]etting him back home as a good alternate 

possibility.” [Appellant’s] mother proposed that he be released on 

probation to participate in a summer work experience program, 

and to engage in counseling with Dr. Parris Baker. Ultimately, the 

[c]ourt agreed with the Commonwealth’s recommendation, 

continuing the finding of delinquency and ordering him “relocated 

to a state secure juvenile facility with the first available bed.” The 

[c]ourt found this “to be the least restrictive means to address 

community protection, victim restoration, mental health and 

competency development.” 

Juvenile Court Opinion (“JCO”), 7/27/22, at 1-2 (citations to record and 

brackets in original omitted). 

____________________________________________

1 Appellant’s adjudication of delinquency for criminal mischief (18 Pa.C.S. § 

3304(a)(2)) was entered at docket no. CP-25-JV-0000069-2021 (“JV 69-

2021”). Appellant was adjudicated delinquent for the following offenses at 

docket no. CP-25-JV-0000178-2021 (“JV 178-2021”): possession of a firearm 

by a minor (18 Pa.C.S. § 6110.1(a)); discharge of a firearm into an occupied 

structure (18 Pa.C.S. § 2707.1(a)); and recklessly endangering another 

person (18 Pa.C.S. § 2705). The charges for theft by unlawful taking (18 

Pa.C.S. § 3921(a)) and receiving stolen property (18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a)) were 

withdrawn. 
J-S09015-23

- 3 -

The juvenile court entered its April 20, 2022 dispositional review order 

at both juvenile docket numbers (JV 69-2021 and JV 178-2021) on May 20, 

2022. Appellant filed a single, timely notice of appeal on May 20, 2022, listing 

both docket numbers from which he appeals, followed by a timely, courtordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal. Appellant now presents the following issues for our review:

A. Whether the [juvenile] court erred when it determined that 

Appellant needed further “treatment, rehabilitation and/or 

supervision” in a more restrictive facility instead of in a less 

restrictive setting such as a community type of setting (i.e., 

formal probation with outpatient and/or wrap around services) 

and/or an independent living type of placement due to 

Appellant’s age and/or other factors considered by the [juvenile 

c]ourt[?]

B. Whether the [juvenile] court erred when it determined that 

Appellant’s best placement option was Commit to State 

Placement ([Youth Development Center (“YDC”)]) (first bed 

available), which is further from [Appellant’s] home county 

than other placements that could accomplish the same 

“treatment, supervision and rehabilitation” goals that focus on 

education and/or personal safety instead of a less restrictive 

setting such as a community type of setting (i.e., formal 

probation with outpatient and/or wrap around services) and/or 

an independent living type of placement due to Appellant[’s] 

age and/or other factors considered by the [juvenile c]ourt[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 5. 

Before delving into the merits of Appellant’s claims, there are several 

preliminary matters that demand our attention. First, we must determine 

whether quashal of this appeal is required, due to Appellant’s failure to follow 

the proper practice under Rule 341(a) of filing separate appeals from an order 

that resolves issues arising on more than one docket. See Pa.R.A.P. 341, 
J-S09015-23

- 4 -

Official Note (“Where ... one or more orders resolves issues arising on more 

than one docket or relating to more than one judgment, separate notices of 

appeal must be filed.”); Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 977 (Pa. 

2018) (requiring quashal of an appeal where the appellant fails to file separate 

notices of appeal when appealing from a single order that resolves issues 

arising on more than one trial docket), overruled in part, Commonwealth 

v. Young, 265 A.3d 462 (Pa. 2022) (reaffirming Walker, but determining 

that Pa.R.A.P. 902 permits the appellate court, in its discretion, to allow 

correction of the error where appropriate).

Exceptions to Walker’s bright-line quashal rule have been established, 

such as where a breakdown of court operations has occurred. In 

Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157 (Pa. Super. 2019), the PCRA 

court advised the appellant that he could appeal from its order dismissing his 

PCRA petition pending at two separate docket numbers by filing within thirty 

days “a written notice of appeal[.]” Id. at 160 (emphasis in original). The 

lower court also utilized the singular in advising him where to file “[s]aid 

notice of appeal[.]” Id. (emphasis in original). “Hence, while Walker

required that [the a]ppellant file separate notices of appeal at each docket 

number, the PCRA court informed [him] that he could pursue appellate review 

by filing a single notice of appeal.” Id. We concluded that such misstatements 

regarding the manner in which an appeal could be effectuated amounted to 

“a breakdown in court operations” such that we could overlook the defective 

nature of the timely notice of appeal. Id. We, therefore, declined to quash 
J-S09015-23

- 5 -

pursuant to Walker and addressed the substance of the appeal. Id. See 

also Commonwealth v. Larkin, 235 A.3d 350, 352-54 (Pa. Super. 2020) 

(en banc) (reaffirming Stansbury and concluding that a breakdown in the 

court system occurred where the lower court advised Larkin that he had “thirty 

(30) days ... to file an appeal” from an order appearing on two dockets)

(emphasis is original).

Similarly, in Interest of K.M.W., 238 A.3d 465 (Pa. Super. 2020), the

mother filed a timely single notice of appeal from a decree that involuntarily

terminated her parental rights to her minor child on the adoption docket and 

changed the child’s permanency goal to adoption on the dependency docket. 

Id. at 468. The mother listed both lower court docket numbers on her single 

notice of appeal. Id. at 468-69. Notably, the trial court indicated to the 

mother that she could seek relief by filing a singular appeal from multiple 

lower court docket numbers. See id. at 470 (“This order shall become 

absolute as of course if no appeal is taken, within thirty (30) days, pursuant 

to Pa.R.A.P. 341.”) (emphasis added). We concluded that the trial court’s 

misstatement constituted a breakdown in court operations and, accordingly, 

declined to quash the appeal. Id.

In the matter sub judice, Appellant was notified of his right to file “a

direct appeal[,]” as well as the time constraints for filing such an “appeal” in 

a written post-dispositional rights colloquy signed by Appellant and his counsel 
J-S09015-23

- 6 -

on the date of the dispositional review hearing. See Pa.R.J.C.P. 610(D).2 

Throughout the two-paged colloquy, all references to Appellant’s right to an 

appeal were consistently made in the singular. There is no indication in the 

record that the juvenile court ever instructed Appellant to file two separate 

notices of appeal from its dispositional order which appears on both docket 

nos. JV 69-2021 and JV 178-2021. We believe the juvenile court’s failure to 

inform Appellant that separate notices of appeal were required to comply with 

Rule 341(a) and Walker constituted a breakdown in court operations. 

Accordingly, we decline to quash this appeal. See Int. of K.M.W., supra, 

Larkin, supra, and Stansbury, supra.

3

 

____________________________________________

2 Chapter 6, Part B of the Pennsylvania Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure 

governs the procedures for modifications and reviews of dispositional orders. 

Rule 610(D) provides that “[a] colloquy and inquiry of post-dispositional rights 

shall be conducted when a juvenile is aggrieved by a modification of the 

dispositional order.” Pa.R.J.C.P. 610(D). 

3 The Pennsylvania Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure dictate that “[a]fter 

entering disposition on the record, the court shall ensure that an attorney has 

reviewed the post-dispositional rights colloquy with the juvenile ... and conduct 

an independent inquiry to determine whether the juvenile understands: (a) 

the right to file a post-dispositional motion; (b) the right to file an appeal; 

[and] (c) the time limits for filing a post-dispositional motion and appeal....” 

Pa.R.J.C.P. 512(C)(1)(a)-(c) (emphasis added). See also Pa.R.J.C.P. 610, 

Comment (“For the colloquy and inquiry of post-dispositional rights, see Rule 

512(C).”). We note that, in the instant matter, the juvenile court asked 

Appellant’s counsel at the beginning of the review hearing whether he went

over Appellant’s post-dispositional rights with Appellant, to which counsel 

answered in the affirmative. N.T. Hearing, 4/20/22, at 2. The court then 

proceeded to ask Appellant, in a general manner, whether he “understood 

those rights[,]” and whether he had “any questions for [the court] concerning 

them?” Id. No further inquiry regarding Appellant’s understanding of his 

appellate rights took place on the record. We are not convinced that the 
J-S09015-23

- 7 -

Next, we must determine whether the order from which Appellant 

appealed is appealable, because appealability implicates our jurisdiction. 

Interest of J.M., 219 A.3d 645, 650 (Pa. Super. 2019). See also Kulp v. 

Hrivnak, 765 A.2d 796, 798 (Pa. Super. 2000) (“[S]ince we lack jurisdiction 

over an unappealable order[,] it is incumbent on us to determine, sua sponte

when necessary, whether the appeal is taken from an appealable order.”). It 

is clear that an initial order of disposition is a final order from which a juvenile 

may appeal as of right. See In re M.D., 839 A.2d 1116, 1118 (Pa. Super. 

2003). We have also established that this right to appeal does not extend to 

review orders that simply maintain the status quo. Id. at 1121 (“We hold ... 

that a committed juvenile does not have the right to appeal from a review 

order that continues his commitment in the same manner and place and that 

maintains the status quo.”). However, we have permitted appeals from review 

orders in cases where the order modifies the status quo. See In the Matter 

of R.B., 765 A.2d 396 (Pa. Super. 2000) (determining a dispositional review 

order that continued the juvenile’s placement and ordered him to submit to a 

medical evaluation was appealable due to the additional requirement of a 

medical evaluation, as it modified the original dispositional order). See also 

In re J.E.D., 879 A.2d 288, 291 (Pa. Super. 2005) (concluding that an order 

modifying the amount of restitution is appealable). Instantly, the order from 

____________________________________________

juvenile court complied with the mandates of Rules 610 and 512(C) here; 

however, due to our declining to quash on another basis, we need not reach 

a determination as to whether the court’s failure to strictly comply with Rules 

610 and 512(C) also constitutes a breakdown of court operations. 
J-S09015-23

- 8 -

which Appellant appeals terminates his placement at Abraxas and orders his 

transfer to a more secure, state juvenile facility, which is a clear modification 

of the manner and place of Appellant’s commitment. Hence, we deem this 

order to be appealable. 

Additionally, we question whether the passage of time has rendered this 

appeal moot. 

As a general rule, an actual case or controversy must exist at all 

stages of the judicial process, or a case will be dismissed as moot. 

An issue can become moot during the pendency of an appeal due 

to an intervening change in the facts of the case or due to an 

intervening change in the applicable law. In that case, an opinion 

of this Court is rendered advisory in nature. An issue before a 

court is moot if in ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter an 

order that has any legal force or effect. 

In re J.A., 107 A.3d 799, 811-12 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting In re D.A., 801 

A.2d 614, 616 (Pa. Super. 2002) (en banc) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted)). 

Nevertheless, this Court will decide questions that otherwise have 

been rendered moot when one or more of the following exceptions 

to the mootness doctrine apply: 1) the case involves a question of 

great public importance, 2) the question presented is capable of 

repetition and apt to elude appellate review, or 3) a party to the 

controversy will suffer some detriment due to the decision of the 

trial court. 

In re D.A., 801 A.2d at 616 (citations omitted). 

Instantly, Appellant asks us to reverse the May 20, 2022 dispositional 

review order transferring him to a more restrictive state secure facility. Unlike 

the criminal justice system, in which a criminal defendant’s judgment of 

sentence continues without further involvement by the trial court unless 
J-S09015-23

- 9 -

overturned on appeal, a juvenile’s disposition “is subject to frequent, 

mandatory review by the hearing court.” In re M.D., 839 A.2d at 1119. “[I]n 

the event a judge enters a disposition order that provides for commitment, 

the judge is required to review the propriety of that commitment every six 

months and must also hold a disposition hearing at least every nine months.” 

Id. (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 6353) (emphasis in original). 

At the time this appeal was filed, Appellant was placed at the Edmund 

L. Thomas Adolescent Center and was awaiting a bed to become available at 

a state secured juvenile facility. Appellant’s current placement status is 

unknown. The certified record indicates that a review hearing was scheduled 

for June 9, 2022, and because of the juvenile court’s obligation to hold periodic 

reviews, it is likely that additional dispositional review hearings have been held

since that date. Arguably, therefore, our decision in this appeal may not have 

any legal force or effect. See In re D.A., 801 A.2d at 616. Nevertheless, we 

conclude that we are able to decide this appeal, as it presents questions that 

are “capable of repetition and apt to elude appellate review,” and thus are 

excepted from the mootness doctrine. See In re J.A., 107 A.3d at 811-12 

(reviewing appeal rendered moot by trial court order entered after review 

hearing conducted while appeal was pending). We, therefore, proceed to 

address the merits of this appeal. 

In considering Appellant’s claims, we remain mindful that “a 

delinquent’s disposition is a duty vested in the discretion of the adjudicating 

juvenile court.” In re Love, 646 A.2d 1233, 1238 (Pa. Super. 1994) (citing 
J-S09015-23

- 10 -

42 Pa.C.S. § 6352). “[T]he discretion of the [j]uvenile [c]ourt implementing 

a disposition is broad, it is flexible[,] and the [j]uvenile [c]ourt has 

considerable power to review and modify the commitment, taking into account 

the rehabilitative progress or lack of it of the juvenile. Without extreme 

specificity as to the error by the court in imposing the commitment, there can 

be no basis for setting aside the disposition.” Id. at 1238 n.5. 

We review “a juvenile court’s dispositional order directing out-of-home 

placement for an abuse of discretion.” Interest of D.W., 220 A.3d 573, 576 

(Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). We will not disturb the disposition 

implemented by the lower court absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In re 

R.D., 44 A.3d 657, 681 (Pa. Super. 2012). “It is well settled that, under 

Pennsylvania law, an abuse of discretion occurs when the court has overridden 

or misapplied the law, when its judgment is manifestly unreasonable, or when 

there is insufficient evidence of record to support the court’s findings.” 

Interest of D.W., 220 A.3d at 576 (internal brackets and citation omitted). 

Moreover, we note that “in a juvenile proceeding, the hearing judge sits as 

the finder of fact. The weight to be assigned the testimony of the witnesses 

is within the exclusive province of the fact finder.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Here, Appellant contends that the juvenile court erred in terminating his 

placement at Abraxas and ordering his transfer to the “first bed available” at 

a state juvenile facility, which is a more restrictive setting. Appellant’s Brief 

at 9. He believes that placement at any YDC was unnecessary for the following 

reasons: Appellant turned 18 years old during his last placement; Appellant 
J-S09015-23

- 11 -

had an “excellent review” from Abraxas for the time period of August 2021 

through December 2021; during the period of December 2021 through 

February 2022, when the facility alleged Appellant’s behavior was “untenable,”

Appellant and/or his mother reported a number of complaints and/or 

grievances regarding Appellant’s treatment; Appellant had an “excellent 

review” from the Edmund L. Thomas Adolescent Center between March 2022 

and May 2022; Appellant made substantial progress on the community service 

hours, restitution, educational goals, and therapeutic goals ordered by the 

juvenile court; Appellant substantially followed the safety plan implemented 

by the placement facility; and it is in Appellant’s best interest for him to return 

home to his community and supportive family. Id. at 10-11. 

Appellant asserts that any behavioral issues previously alleged by 

Abraxas should not overshadow the “excellent reports” later received from the 

same facility and from the Edmund L. Thomas Adolescent Center. Id. at 11. 

He explains that his bad behavior was a result of abuse that he suffered from 

the staff at Abraxas and that his grievances against the staff led to retaliation 

in the form of more abuse towards Appellant. Id. “Appellant ... lost faith and 

focus in the staff and treatment goals as a result of that abuse.” Id. As soon 

as he was removed from Abraxas, Appellant asserts that he had a “complete 

and sudden” turnaround and that the trial court should have given this factor 

stronger consideration. Id. Appellant seeks immediate release from any YDC 

to formal probation with outpatient services and/or placement in an 

independent living facility, as he believes this would provide him with the 
J-S09015-23

- 12 -

necessary treatment, supervision and rehabilitation, and would allow for him

to be closer geographically to his family. Id. 

Importantly, we note the following purposes, relevant to this appeal,

underlying the Juvenile Act (42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301 – 6375):

(2) Consistent with the protection of the public interest, to provide 

for children committing delinquent acts programs of supervision, 

care and rehabilitation which provide balanced attention to the 

protection of the community, the imposition of accountability for 

offenses committed and the development of competencies to 

enable children to become responsible and productive members 

of the community. 

(3) To achieve the foregoing purposes in a family environment 

whenever possible, separating the child from parents only when 

necessary for his welfare, safety or health or in the interests of 

public safety, by doing all of the following:

(i) employing evidence-based practices whenever possible 

and, in the case of a delinquent child, by using the least 

restrictive intervention that is consistent with the protection 

of the community, the imposition of accountability for 

offenses committed and the rehabilitation, supervision and 

treatment needs of the child; and 

(ii) imposing confinement only if necessary and for the 

minimum amount of time that is consistent with the 

purposes under paragraphs (1), (1.1) and (2).

42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b). 

Our Supreme Court explained that the General Assembly incorporated 

balanced and restorative justice (“BARJ”) into the Juvenile Act via Act 33 of 

1995 to achieve these articulated goals. Interest of D.C.D., 171 A.3d 727, 

738 (Pa. 2017). 

Historically, BARJ stemmed from the clashing methodologies of 

the retributive justice theory, which prioritizes punishment, and 

an individual treatment philosophy, which focuses on the 
J-S09015-23

- 13 -

rehabilitation of offenders. BARJ was a compromise in this long 

debate which brought together aspects of both systems by 

requiring consideration of community protection, accountability, 

and competency development. 

First, community protection focuses on decreasing the risk to 

communities and providing communities with tools to manage the 

behaviors of juvenile offenders. BARJ aims to maintain 

community safety through developing short-term and long-term 

goals of changing and controlling juvenile offender behavior while 

developing mutual respect of citizens within the community. 

Next, accountability recognizes that a combination of adhering to 

the rules of the legal system and accepting full responsibility for 

offensive behavior facilitates positive moral development. The 

accountability factor helps juvenile offenders to reduce their 

likelihood of re-offense through acknowledging that their behavior 

affects other people and creating opportunities for offenders to 

repair the harm. Finally, competency development allows for 

juvenile offenders to forge skills that will allow them to contribute 

positively to the well-being of a community and ultimately allow 

offenders to gain a sense of belonging in a community. 

Id. at 738-39 (internal citations omitted). 

It is evident from the juvenile court’s opinion that it gave considerable 

thought to these BARJ principles and the goals of the Juvenile Act in reaching 

its determination regarding Appellant’s placement. In support of its decision 

to transfer Appellant to a state facility, the court opined:

First, placement on probation with restrictions or in an ... 

independent-living facility would not have furthered the BARJ 

goals of community protection, accountability, and competency 

development. Given [Appellant’s] increasingly belligerent 

behavior at Abraxas, which the [c]ourt found was “not sufficiently 

explained[,]” [placing Appellant] in an environment with less 

supervision would pose a substantial and unjustifiable risk to 

those around him, just as his behavior at Abraxas posed a 

substantial risk to both students and staff. While [Appellant] and 

his counsel may suggest that his inappropriate behavior was a 

result of factors unique to Abraxas[,] the [c]ourt was not willing 

to risk the safety of others on the hope that [Appellant] would be 
J-S09015-23

- 14 -

more successful in a less restrictive environment, at least without 

a proven track record of good behavior.... 

Indeed, at the hearing, the [c]ourt noted positively that it was 

impressed with [Appellant’s] ability to control his behavior at the 

Edmund L. Thomas Adolescent Center for the past 34 days, but 

given the repeated and serious instances of misconduct that 

occurred at Abraxas, that fact alone did not convince the [c]ourt 

that community protection (or other BARJ goals for that matter) 

were yet best served by a less restrictive placement. If 

[Appellant] is correct that his errant behavior is the result of 

factors unique to Abraxas, then further time at a more secure 

facility will provide more reliable, empirical evidence from which 

to accurately assess whether [he] remains a threat to himself or 

others outside of that facility. 

That leads to the second BARJ purpose, accountability. From 

December 2021 through March of 2022, [Appellant] did not 

demonstrate an ability to adhere to the rules of the legal system 

or accept full responsibility for his offensive behavior. Abraxas –

itself a controlled environment – proved inadequate to provide the 

necessary accountability. During his time at Abraxas, his 

likelihood of re-offense increased, not decreased. It defies 

common sense to believe a less secure environment than Abraxas 

could provide greater accountability where that facility could not. 

Counsel for [Appellant] asserted at the disposition hearing under 

review that release on probation would not be a “reward” because 

[Appellant] would be coming home with strict requirements. But 

it is difficult for the [c]ourt to conceive how it could be perceived 

by [Appellant] as anything other than a reward. In any event, it 

would not provide accountability for the misconduct that occurred

at Abraxas. To be sure, punishment and reward in the retributive 

justice sense is not a goal of BARJ, yet the accountability factor 

recognizes that a placement is, in part, a test of whether the 

juvenile will reoffend in the real world and whether they have 

adequately acknowledged that their behavior affects others, as 

well as an opportunity to seek rehabilitative treatment. 

[Appellant] had not proven that he achieved these goals at 

Abraxas, and so, there was insufficient credible evidence to 

suggest a less restrictive environment would yield better results 

than the empirically proven treatments a secure state facility can 

offer. 
J-S09015-23

- 15 -

As to the final BARJ purpose, competency, the [c]ourt noted at 

the hearing that [Appellant], “despite admonishment by the 

[c]ourt, continued in a significantly escalated fashion to engage in 

misconduct at the facility[,] establishing for the [c]ourt that he 

has, as [of] yet, failed to sufficiently incorporate into his life all of 

the things – especially aggression and anger, all of the things that 

[he’s] been taught to overcome those issues.” [It] further 

observed that “what’s concerning to the [c]ourt is [Appellant]

doesn’t have great recollection and perceives the potential that he 

might have blacked out during one of these things indicating a 

level of aggression at a significant level.” [Appellant’s] testimony

and the other evidence presented at the disposition hearing 

underscored the potential severity of his psychological trauma and 

established that he had yet to adequately address, from a 

therapeutic standpoint, the root causes of his aggression. A 

secure facility is better equipped to provide [Appellant] with the 

therapeutic tools he needs [to] further explore and put into 

practice these therapeutic goals. 

[Appellant’s] mother suggested [that] a summer work program 

and counseling from a professor with a Ph.D. and a background in 

social work would be able to satisfy [Appellant’s] therapeutic 

needs, but the [c]ourt found [that] the level of aggression 

exhibited by [Appellant] “would not be sufficiently addressed by 

the good-hearted efforts by Dr. Parris Baker and by Gary Horton 

through the UECDC Dream Build Live Program.” Rather, the 

[c]ourt found that a state placement program would employ better 

evidence-based programs and practices to meet [Appellant’s] 

significant psychological and behavioral needs. Moreover, a more 

traditional and empirically-proven academic setting was necessary 

given [Appellant’s] lackluster academic performance at Abraxas. 

JCO at 5-7 (citations to record omitted). 

Additionally, the juvenile court noted that Appellant’s age should not 

have any “talismanic bearing” on its determination regarding placement. Id.

at 7. Appellant has not cited any caselaw indicating that out-of-home 

placement is categorically less appropriate for a juvenile who attains the age 

of 18. Rather, as the juvenile court explained, “[o]ur Supreme Court has 

eschewed such absolute rules, emphasizing ‘juvenile courts are granted broad 
J-S09015-23

- 16 -

discretion in weighing the BARJ factors as appropriate to the individual child.’” 

Id. at 8 (quoting D.C.D., 171 A.3d at 742). Moreover, we acknowledge that 

the juvenile court will retain jurisdiction over Appellant until the age of 21. 

See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302 (defining “child” as “an individual who ... is under the 

age of 21 years who committed an act of delinquency before reaching the age 

of 18 years”). Instantly, the court concluded that Appellant “has not yet 

exhibited the requisite maturity to be released on any less restrictive 

placement.” JCO at 8. 

In response to Appellant’s claim that the court’s disposition was 

inconsistent with his supervision, rehabilitation, and welfare needs, and that 

returning home is in Appellant’s best interest, the court stated: “Given his 

behavior at Abraxas, [Appellant] is currently in need of more supervision, not 

less, and a secure state facility is best equipped to provide such supervision.” 

Id. It further emphasized that “such a facility is in the best position to provide 

the extensive therapeutic care that is necessary for [Appellant’s] 

rehabilitation. Thus, his overall welfare and well-being is best served in a 

secure and structured facility for now.” Id. 

The juvenile court also specifically addressed Appellant’s contention that 

he had complied with most of his education and/or counseling goals, noting 

that it made contrary factual findings. Id.

[Appellant] was in decline academically, getting grades as low as 

47% in both math and science and a 49% in reading. Nor were 

these grades the product of a good faith attempt at academic 

achievement. The [c]ourt found that, “other than art and gym, 

[Appellant] showed ... little effort to engage in any way in the 
J-S09015-23

- 17 -

academic programming.” Therapeutically, he fared little better. 

Although his counselor testified there was some progression, she 

also noted he only “sometimes” incorporated the coping skills 

discussed in therapy. That is a rather generous assessment 

considering the numerous instances of misconduct recorded at 

Abraxas since December of 2021. To reiterate, these instances of 

misconduct[] were not minor; they involved the breaking of a 

wooden table [and] a camera, the communication of threats, and 

several instances of physical restraint. In short, the assertion that 

[Appellant] was meeting his target education and therapeutic 

goals is belied by the factual record before the [c]ourt at the 

disposition hearing. 

Id. at 8-9 (citations to record omitted). 

Finally, in response to Appellant’s contention that his regression was the 

product of Abraxas staff and supervisors who allegedly harassed and bullied 

him, and that his misbehavior should therefore not be held against him, the 

juvenile court opined:

The [c]ourt did not ignore these concerning allegations, either 

when they were first brought to the [c]ourt’s attention or at the 

disposition hearing under review. As the [c]ourt reminded 

[Appellant’s] mother on the record, in a prior proceeding, it had 

taken the somewhat unprecedented step of admonishing Abraxas 

staff and ordering that certain individuals not have any direct 

contact with [Appellant]. That being said, the [c]ourt explained 

at the disposition hearing under review that, even accepting these 

allegations as true, [Appellant] nonetheless failed to abide by the 

[c]ourt’s admonishment to [Appellant] to stop such behaviors 

even after the problematic individuals were removed from the 

equation. On the contrary, the aggressive behavior continued to 

escalate. 

In failing to incorporate the therapeutic lessons he had learned in 

therapy, [Appellant] had shown that further and extensive 

treatment for his aggression and greater security measures were 

necessary for his supervision, rehabilitation, treatment, and 

welfare. It therefore was not an abuse of discretion to order 

placement at a secure facility even in light of the concerning 

allegations against employees at Abraxas. In terminating his 

placement at Abraxas, [Appellant] will have an opportunity at a 
J-S09015-23

- 18 -

second chance to prove his maturity in a secure and safe 

environment that can meet his substantial academic and 

psychological needs. 

Id. at 9 (citations to record omitted). We conclude that the juvenile court’s 

findings are well-supported by the record, and we discern no abuse of 

discretion in the court’s modification to Appellant’s placement. 

Accordingly, we affirm the dispositional review order entered by the 

juvenile court on May 20, 2022.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/23/2023