UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

SIMS, COOK, and GALLAGHER 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Master Sergeant RAYMOND J. REYNARD 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20100351 

Headquarters, Fort Riley 

John Saunders, Military Judge 

Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Borcherding, Staff Judge Advocate 

For Appellant: Captain Matthew T. Grady, JA (argued); Colonel Mark Tellitocci, 

JA; Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan F. Potter, JA; Major Laura R. Kesler, JA; Major 

Richard E. Gorini, JA; Captain Matthew T. Grady, JA (on brief). 

For Appellee: Captain Kenneth W. Borgnino, JA (argued); Major Amber J. 

Williams, JA; Major Katherine S. Gowel, JA; Captain Kenneth W. Borgnino, JA (on 

brief). 

21 February 2012 

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SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

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Per Curiam: 

 A military judge, sitting as a general court-martial, convicted appellant, 

contrary to his pleas, of two specifications of rape of a child, and one specification 

of indecent assault, in violation of Articles 120 and 134, Uniform Code of Military 

Justice [hereinafter UCMJ], 10 U.S.C. §§ 920 and 934 [2005]. Pursuant to his pleas 

appellant was found not guilty of a third specification of rape, but was convicted of 

the lesser included offense of carnal knowledge, in violation of Article 120, UCMJ 

(2005). Appellant was sentenced to a dishonorable discharge and confinement for 

seven years. The convening authority dismissed the carnal knowledge specification 

and approved the remaining findings of guilt and the adjudged sentence. 
REYNARD—ARMY 20010351 

2

This case is before us for review pursuant to Article 66, UCMJ. Appellant 

raises three assignments of error, listing multiple sub-issues under these 

assignments. After considering the record of trial, appellant’s assignments of error, 

the government’s answer, matters submitted by appellant, and oral argument, we find 

that one of the sub-issues under Assignment of Error I merits discussion, but no 

relief. 

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Military Rule of Evidence [hereinafter Mil. R. Evid.] 414 states, in relevant 

part: 

(a) In a court-martial in which the accused is charged with an 

offense of child molestation, evidence of the accused’s 

commission of one or more offenses of child molestation is 

admissible . . . . . 

(d) For purposes of this rule, “child” means a person below the 

age of sixteen . . . . 

 The victim in this case, LK, was born on 8 May 1990 and was no longer 

considered a child for Mil. R. Evid. 414 purposes as of 8 May 2006, when she 

reached the age of sixteen. In response to a defense motion to suppress evidence, 

the military judge erred in finding Charge II to be a child molestation offense. 

During the time period alleged in the specification, between on or about 1 May 2007 

and 30 September 2007, LK was over the age of sixteen. Pursuant to Mil. R. Evid. 

414, Charge II was not a child molestation offense because the alleged victim was 

not below sixteen. Similarly, the military judge erred in concluding appellant’s 

alleged digital penetration of LK in 2007 was an act of child molestation and 

admissible under Mil. R. Evid. 414 because LK was not under sixteen at the time of 

the incident and therefore not a child. 

The government concedes the military judge erred in both instances, but 

argues the military judge also correctly admitted the allegation concerning the 2007 

digital penetration pursuant to Mil. R. Evid. 404(b). We agree. 

The military judge found this incident was relevant to the appellant’s “intent 

when he hugged [LK] and touched her bottom [the conduct alleged in] (Charge II). 

It is also relevant to show absence of mistake and indicates the [appellant’s] 

intention to resume their sexual relationship.” The military judge concluded his 

analysis on this issue by stating “the probative value outweighs its prejudicial 

effect.” 
REYNARD—ARMY 20010351 

3

Because we find the military judge properly admitted this incident under Mil. 

R. Evid. 404(b) as proof of appellant’s intent and absence of mistake, we will not 

disturb this conviction. One of the elements the government was required to prove 

in regards to Charge II was that appellant committed the assault with the intent to 

gratify his lust or sexual desires. An incident involving appellant digitally 

penetrating LK contemporaneously with the allegation contained in Charge II would 

clearly be illustrative of appellant’s intent to re-engage in a sexual relationship with 

LK. 

CONCLUSION 

On consideration of the entire record and the submissions of the parties, to 

include those matters raised personally by the appellant in his affidavit and pursuant 

to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982), we hold the findings of 

guilty and the sentence as approved by the convening authority to be correct in law 

and fact. Accordingly, the findings of guilty and the sentence are AFFIRMED.*

 FOR THE COURT: 

 MALCOLM H. SQUIRES JR. 

 Clerk of Court 

                                                           

*

 Appellant pleaded not guilty, without objection, to the Specification of Charge II 

which did not expressly allege the terminal elements of indecent assault in violation 

of Article 134, UCMJ. "[A] charge and specification challenged for the first time on 

appeal is liberally construed and will not be held invalid absent a clear showing of 

substantial prejudice to the accused -- such as a showing that the indictment is so 

obviously defective that by no reasonable construction can it be said to charge the 

offense for which conviction was had." United States v. Roberts, 70 M.J. 550, 553 

(Army Ct. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting United States v. Watkins, 21 M.J. 208, 209-10 

(C.M.A. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Cf. United States v. Fosler, 70 

M.J. at 225, 230 (C.A.A.F. 2011). The specification and charge can be reasonably 

construed to imply that appellant’s conduct was to the prejudice of good order and 

discipline and of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. Appellant was 

on notice of the charge against him and is protected against double jeopardy. 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR.                          

Clerk of Court

FOR THE COURT: