In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 02-2957

ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

SOUTH TEC DEVELOPMENT WAREHOUSE, INC.,

Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

R.R. DONNELLEY & SONS COMPANY,

Third Party Defendant-Appellee.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 97 C 5720—George M. Marovich, Judge.

____________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 21, 2003—DECIDED JULY 23, 2003

____________

Before CUDAHY, MANION and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge. The Illinois Central Railroad

Company (IC) sued South Tec Development Warehouse,

Inc., seeking to recover demurrage charges assessed for

rail shipments between September 1994 and December

1995. South Tec denied liability for the demurrage charges

and joined R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company as a third party
2 No. 02-2957

defendant, arguing that Donnelley and not South Tec

should pay any charges. Following a referral to the Surface Transportation Board (STB) for determinations on

certain issues, the district court granted summary judgment to the IC and Donnelley, holding South Tec solely

liable for the demurrage. South Tec appeals. Because

we believe that key issues remain unresolved, we reverse

and remand for reconsideration.

I.

In 1991, the IC was courting the business of Donnelley, a

printing company which receives a great deal of paper at

its facility in Mattoon, Illinois. Donnelley had been using

other carriers, but was interested in switching to the IC if

the IC could provide a single-line, through rate for paper

shipments that would actually make an intermediate

stop at a warehouse for storage. The IC introduced Donnelley to South Tec, a warehouse in Kankakee, Illinois, that

could store Donnelley’s shipments. The entire arrangement was memorialized in two complementary contracts,

one between the IC and Donnelley and the other between

Donnelley and South Tec. There was no express contract

between South Tec and the IC.

Under the agreements, boxcars of paper ultimately

destined for Donnelley were first transported by the IC

from Donnelley’s paper suppliers to South Tec in Kankakee.

Upon arrival in Kankakee, South Tec was responsible for

unloading, categorizing, organizing and storing the paper,

after which the railcars were released. When needed by

Donnelley, the paper was reloaded onto either railcars or

trucks for transportation to Mattoon. According to the

agreement between the IC and Donnelley, the shipments

on their way to South Tec were to be accompanied by bills

of lading stating, “Car to Stop at South Tec Warehouse,

Kankakee, Il. Freight Charges Cover Shipment to Ulti-
No. 02-2957 3

1 Demurrage is “a charge exacted by a carrier from a shipper

or consignee on account of a failure on the latter’s part to load

or unload cars within the specified time prescribed by the

applicable tariffs; the purpose of the charge is to expedite the

loading and unloading of cars, thus facilitating the flow of

commerce, which is in the public interest.” Black’s Law Dictionary 432 (6th ed. 1990).

mate Destination,” while the shipments as they continued

on to Donnelley were to be covered by bills of lading stating, “This Is to Certify That Product Previously Moved in

I.C.R.R. ROADHAUL to Kankakee, IL. Freight Charges

Paid on Inbound Movement to Kankakee.” In practice, the

consignors of the shipments bound for South Tec used

a wide variety of language to denote the shipments’ destination. This arrangement apparently worked well, and

South Tec and Donnelley renewed their contract in 1993.

Problems began in late 1994. Until then, South Tec had

promptly unloaded the IC railcars as they arrived in

Kankakee. However, starting in September 1994 and at

least through December 1995, due in part to a dramatic

increase in the amount of paper shipped, South Tec began

to accumulate delays in unloading. According to the IC,

so many cars piled up in the Kankakee railyard that

the delay was affecting the IC’s operations with respect

to its other shippers. The IC began to assess demurrage

charges against South Tec for these delays.1

 This assessment was thought to be in line with Item 2060-D of the

IC’s tariff, which provides that demurrage “will be billed

to the consignor at origin, the consignee at destination

and the party for whom the car is held if enroute.” IC

Freight Tariff IC 9000-F (issued Jan. 21, 1994), Memo. of

Law in Supp. of Donnelley’s Mot. for Entry of an Order to

Stay These Proceedings and Referral to the STB Ex. 5,

Record at 14 (IC Tariff). By the end of December 1995,

a total of $160,170 in demurrage charges were billed to
4 No. 02-2957

South Tec but unpaid. Because of this balance and because

South Tec’s delays were threatening to “close down” the IC’s

Kankakee railyard, the IC imposed an embargo on the

Donnelley shipments, leading Donnelley to assume responsibility for future demurrage charges in order to have

the embargo lifted.

There still remains the unpaid $160,170 in demurrage

charges that accrued up to December 1995. The IC sued

South Tec in the Northern District of Illinois for these

unpaid charges. South Tec claimed that it was not liable

for these charges because it was not the consignee of the

shipments, and joined Donnelley as a third party defendant. Donnelley moved to stay the district court proceedings and refer the case to the STB, which has exclusive

jurisdiction over “transportation by rail carriers, and the

remedies provided in [49 U.S.C. §§ 10101 et seq.] with

respect to rates, classifications, rules . . . , practices, routes,

services, and facilities of such carriers.” 49 U.S.C.

§ 10501(b)(1). Donnelley argued in its motion that three

issues should be resolved by the STB: 1) whether the IC’s

demurrage charges were unreasonable, because the IC

unilaterally modified its demurrage tariff allegedly in

order to generate revenue rather than to promote the

efficient use and distribution of freight cars, 2) whether

the IC’s tariff was unreasonable and discriminatory because it assessed demurrage charges for enroute delays,

making shippers such as Donnelley potentially liable for

demurrage at more than one location and 3) whether

boxcar traffic of the type at issue was deregulated during

the relevant time period. South Tec joined in this motion,

which the district court granted in part. Pursuant to its

decision, the district court asked the STB, 1) whether the

IC’s demurrage rate was unreasonable, 2) whether the

method by which the IC calculated the charges was unreasonable and 3) whether the practice by which the IC’s

demurrage charges accrue is discriminatory with respect

to shippers such as Donnelley.
No. 02-2957 5

The STB rejected all of Donnelley’s and South Tec’s

arguments. South-Tec Dev. Warehouse, Inc., STB Docket

No. 42050 (Nov. 13, 2000), available at 2000 STB LEXIS

666 (STB Decision). However, while the STB found for the

IC that demurrage charges could be assessed for the

Kankakee delays, the STB declined to answer whether

South Tec or Donnelley should be held responsible for

these charges:

South-Tec also argues that it was not the actual consignee of any of the shipments for which IC seeks

demurrage, but rather was Donnelley’s agent, and

therefore may not be held liable for demurrage charges

on shipments destined for Donnelley.

. . . [W]e find that there is a sufficient record before us

to determine that IC could properly assess demurrage

for South-Tec’s undue delay of rail cars . . . , but that

South-Tec’s liability depends on whether or not it

was acting as Donnelley’s agent in its handling of the

shipments. Because of deficiencies in the record,

however, we can not resolve the agency question, which

was raised by the parties, but which was not referred

by the court.

Id. at 2-3.

Back in district court, all three parties moved for summary judgment. The district court reasoned that the only

way that South Tec could have escaped liability was to

have complied with 49 U.S.C. § 10743(a)(1), which requires a consignee that is an agent, in order to avoid

liability for charges, to provide a carrier with written

notice of its status as an agent prior to delivery. The district court found that because South Tec had not complied with the statute’s notice requirement, it was liable

for the demurrage charges even if it was acting as an agent

for Donnelley in receiving the IC shipments. The district

court also found that there was no indemnification agree-
6 No. 02-2957

ment between South Tec and Donnelley and granted

summary judgment to Donnelley, defeating the third party

complaint in a ruling not appealed. South Tec appeals the

district court’s grant of summary judgment to the IC.

II.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo, examining the facts in the light most favorable

to the opposing party and drawing all reasonable inferences

in its favor. See Haywood v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 323 F.3d

524, 529 (7th Cir. 2003). The district court’s grant of

summary judgment will be affirmed if “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322 (1986).

We begin our analysis by examining the basis for the

district court’s decision, and then we ask whether, despite

its apparent errors, it might have reached the right result.

A.

The district court here relied on two authorities: the

STB’s decision and 49 U.S.C. § 10743(a)(1). We find that

the two do not fully support the district court’s conclusions.

Going in reverse order, let us first consider 49 U.S.C.

§ 10743(a)(1):

§ 10743. Liability for payment of rates

(a) (1) Liability for payment of rates for transportation for a shipment of property by a shipper or

consignor to a consignee other than the shipper
No. 02-2957 7

or consignor, is determined under this subsection

when the transportation is provided by a rail

carrier under [49 U.S.C. §§ 10101 et seq.]. When

the shipper or consignor instructs the rail carrier transporting the property to deliver it to a

consignee that is an agent only, not having beneficial title to the property, the consignee is liable

for rates billed at the time of delivery for which

the consignee is otherwise liable, but not for additional rates that may be found to be due after

delivery if the consignee gives written notice to the

delivering carrier before delivery of the property—

(A) of the agency and absence of beneficial

title; and

(B) of the name and address of the beneficial

owner of the property if it is reconsigned

or diverted to a place other than the place

specified in the original bill of lading.

(emphasis added). As recounted above, the district court

relied on this statute to require that South Tec have

given notice to the IC of its status as an agent of Donnelley. In applying this statute, however, the district

court did not answer a critical preliminary question: Was

South Tec a consignee? As emphasized above, the statute

applies only to agents who are also consignees, and not

to agents who are not consignees. See Middle Atl. Conference v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 1109, 1120 (D.D.C. 1972)

(three judge panel) (noting that “a careful reading of [a

predecessor of § 10743] . . . speaks only to . . . certain

narrow situations of warehousemen . . . who appear as

consignees on the bill of lading, but in no way can be read

to impose liability on an agent not a party to the contract”) (emphasis in original). In order for us to uphold the

application of this statute, the district court or the STB

must have found South Tec to be the consignee of the
8 No. 02-2957

disputed shipments. However, whether South Tec was a

consignee is a question answered by neither the STB nor

the district court.

We believe that this question was ignored because

somewhat unclear language in the STB’s decision led the

district court to assume that the question of South Tec’s

consignee status, or its equivalent, had been answered

in the affirmative. In its motion for summary judgment, the

IC had argued to the district court that “[u]nder the

clear language of the STB’s order[,] if South Tec is Donnell[e]y’s agent, then liability passes through South Tec to

Donnell[e]y,” and “[i]f South Tec is not Donnell[e]y’s agent,

then South Tec is liable directly.” IC’s Memo. in Supp. of

Mot. for Summary J. at 3, Record at 34. The phrasing of

this argument suggests that South Tec is liable in any

event, but can be indemnified by Donnelley in the event

that South Tec was Donnelley’s agent. According to this

argument, the IC must recover, from South Tec if not from

Donnelley “through South Tec,” its demurrage charges in

the instant lawsuit. Apparently, the district court agreed

with this reading of the STB’s decision. See Tr. of Proceedings, Dec. 19, 2000, at 4 (“The question of who owes

[the amount of the charges] is the question of agency. But

it is owed.”). The IC continues to argue before us, consistent with its earlier arguments and the district court’s

order, that the STB “dispositively ruled that South Tec

may be held liable for [the] IC’s claimed demurrage charge”

and that the STB’s decision stands as “res judicata” on

the issue. IC Br. at 10-12.

This reading of the STB’s decision is much too broad.

While there is certainly some language in the STB’s

decision to support these conclusions, see, e.g., STB Decision at 4-5 (“[O]nce South-Tec accepted the shipments, it

(or Donnelley, if South-Tec was acting as Donnelley’s

agent) became liable for the demurrage charges.”), the STB

went to great lengths to explain that Donnelley, and
No. 02-2957 9

2 Any decision as to South Tec’s consignee status would have

been outside the scope of the issues referred to the STB by the

district court and, therefore, only dictum. The issues referred

to the STB did not involve the questions of who or what was liable

for demurrage charges; they only involved the reasonableness

of the charges and whether the way they were assessed was

discriminatory. See STB Decision at 3 (noting that the agency

question was not referred by the district court).

not South Tec, is liable if South Tec was acting as Donnelley’s agent, see, e.g., id. at 2, 3, 5. And, in the language

of the STB’s decision, whether South Tec was an agent

is directly tied to the question of whether South Tec was

a consignee. See id. at 2 (“South-Tec also argues that it

was not the actual consignee of any of the shipments for

which IC seeks demurrage, but rather was Donnelley’s

agent, and therefore may not be held liable for demurrage charges on shipments destined for Donnelley.”) (emphasis added); id. at 6 (“IC’s primary collection theory as to

South-Tec—that South-Tec was the consignee of the shipments delivered to Kankakee rather than an undisclosed

agent—can neither be proved nor disproved on this record.”)

(emphasis added). The STB had declined to address—

appropriately, since the question was not referred to

it 2

—whether South Tec was an agent and whether South

Tec was a consignee. Both questions remained to be

resolved by the district court.

Adding to the lack of clarity was the apparent approval

by the STB of Item 2060-D of the IC’s tariff, which provides that demurrage “will be billed to the consignor at

origin, the consignee at destination and the party for

whom the car is held if enroute.”

[South-Tec and Donnelley] also argue that IC’s

demurrage charges do not apply on their face because

the tariff does not expressly provide for the collection of

demurrage at a “storage-in-transit” point such as
10 No. 02-2957

South-Tec’s warehouse. [South-Tec and Donnelley] do

not explain, however, why the “party for whom the car

is held if enroute” language in the tariff is not broad

enough to embrace South-Tec. Moreover, IC points out

that South-Tec was not just a storage-in-transit point

essential to the transportation, but was in fact identified on the bills of lading as the consignee of the shipments to its Kankakee warehouse. In those circumstances, once South-Tec accepted the shipments, it (or

Donnelley, if South-Tec was acting as Donnelley’s

agent) became liable for the demurrage charges.

STB Decision at 4-5. Some of the parties and the district

court may have read this passage to mean that parties

responsible for loading and unloading at intermediate

stopping points, e.g., a warehouse such as South Tec,

could be held responsible for demurrage charges even if

they are not consignees or consignors. Indeed, such an

approach may even have some logical appeal, since

South Tec was, arguably, most directly responsible for

unloading the cars in a timely manner. This reading,

however, is inconsistent with the language of both the

tariff and the STB’s decision.

The paragraph of the STB’s decision quoted above merits detailed analysis. In the second sentence, the STB

appears to endorse the collection of demurrage from

South Tec by stating that the tariff is “broad enough to

embrace South Tec.” This sentence, however, must be

read in conjunction with the previous sentence and the

posture of the case before the STB. The first sentence

poses the question being answered by the paragraph:

whether demurrage can be collected “at a ‘storage-in-transit’ point such as South Tec’s warehouse.” Id. (emphasis

added). Critically, we note that this is not the same question as whether demurrage can be collected from South

Tec. The STB had before it South Tec and Donnelley as

petitioners and the IC as respondent. In deciding that
No. 02-2957 11

the tariff was broad enough to apply to delays at warehouses, the STB held that someone could potentially be

held liable for the Kankakee delays—in a sense, that

the delays count as demurrage—but did not hold that

South Tec itself could be held liable. Textually speaking,

the last word of the second sentence of the passage quoted

above refers not to South Tec the corporate entity, but

to South Tec the location of the delays.

The question of who could be billed under the tariff is

introduced in the latter part of the paragraph, which asks

whether South Tec was just a storage-in-transit point or

a consignee. As the STB’s decision explains, South Tec

becomes a properly billed party under the tariff “in [the]

circumstance[ ]” that, as the IC argued, it “was not just

a storage-in-transit point essential to the transportation,

but was in fact identified on the bills of lading as the

consignee of the shipments.” STB Decision at 4. The

implication of this statement is that South Tec cannot

be billed under the tariff if it was not the consignee. In sum,

while the tariff may be broad enough to include the

Kankakee delays, see STB Decision at 4 (noting that the

tariff may provide for demurrage assessment at a point

such as South Tec’s warehouse), the STB’s decision imposes liability on South Tec only if South Tec was the

consignee, and “not just a storage-in-transit point.”

A close reading of Tariff Item 2060-D supports our

understanding of the STB’s decision. We read the last

phrase of the relevant tariff, “the party for whom the car

is held if enroute,” to have two possible meanings. According to the first interpretation, there are two parties in

some sense responsible for the demurrage here: the party

holding the car (an agent such as South Tec) and “the party

for whom” it is held (the principal, in this case, Donnelley).

Under this interpretation, the tariff’s language indicates

that only Donnelley can be properly billed. This reading of

the tariff is consistent with another tariff section, IC
12 No. 02-2957

3 Or, perhaps, the IC is arguing that South Tec was both the

holder of the cars and the party for whom the cars were held.

Because the tariff reads “the party for whom the car is held”

rather than the simpler “the party holding the car,” we are

not inclined, under these facts, to collapse the party holding and

the party for whom held into one entity.

4 One might ask why, if “the party for whom” cannot refer to nonconsignees, this “third category” of properly billed parties is

included in the tariff at all. From its context, we understand “the

party for whom” to refer to either the consignee or the consignor.

That is, according to Tariff Item 2060-D, demurrage “at origin” is

charged to the consignor, demurrage “at destination” is charged

to the consignee and demurrage “enroute” is charged to the

consignor or the consignee, depending on for which the car is

being held. Although no consignor’s liability is at issue here,

consignor liability might enter the picture if an excessive volume

of shipments coupled with other factors contributed to the

conditions justifying demurrage charges. In other words, there

may well be situations in which “the party for whom” a car is

(continued...)

Tariff Item 2000-A, which refers to users of the railroad

rather than the railroad itself as the parties performing

the holding. See IC Tariff Item 2000-A (“All railroad and

privately owned cars held for or by consignors or consignees

are subject to [the demurrage section of the tariff] . . . .”)

(emphasis added). According to the second interpretation,

the IC is the holder of the car, while either South Tec or

Donnelley is “the party for whom” it is held. This interpretation, under which South Tec becomes a billable party

under the tariff even though not a consignee, is the one

that the IC would have us believe the STB adopted.3

 We

note, however, that this reading of Tariff Item 2060-D

is inconsistent with Tariff Item 2000-A. Id. (suggesting that

cars are held by users of the railroad, rather than by

the railroad itself). And it is inconsistent with the significance placed by the STB on South Tec’s consignee status.4
No. 02-2957 13

(...continued)

held at an intermediate point may be the consignor rather than

the consignee.

5 We rejected, in Evans Products, 729 F.2d at 1113-14, the theory

that the general rule of agency law that an agent that refuses

to disclose the identity of its principal is personally liable for

charges incurred on behalf of the principal, see Restatement

(Second) of Agency § 321, permits railroads to broaden their tariffs

to reach non-consignee agents. As the Restatement makes

clear, this rule of law only applies where an agent is actually

entering into a contract on behalf of the principal. Here, it does

not appear that South Tec ever entered into an agreement

with the IC.

A review of the case law reveals that whether South Tec

was the consignee is properly the central issue here. See,

e.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Ametek, Inc., 104 F.3d 558, 563

(3d Cir. 1997) (holding that demurrage could not be assessed against a warehouse that was not a consignee or

other party to the transportation contract); Middle Atl.

Conference, 353 F. Supp. 1109 (holding in an exhaustive

opinion that a proposed tariff was unlawful to the extent

that it attempted to impose liability for demurrage charges

upon non-parties to the transportation contract). If South

Tec was not the consignee, the case law supports imposition of liability against South Tec only under very limited

circumstances. “Liability for freight charges may be imposed only against a consignor, consignee, or owner of the

property, or others by statute, contract, or prevailing

custom.” Evans Prods. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n,

729 F.2d 1107, 1113 (7th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).5

The IC has not indicated any applicable statute holding

non-consignees responsible for demurrage charges. We

are convinced by the comprehensive survey of the law in

Middle Atlantic Conference, 353 F. Supp. at 1116-20, that

no industry-wide custom permits such a practice. Thus,

we are left with the conclusion that South Tec would
14 No. 02-2957

be liable only if it were a consignee or if it contractually

assumed responsibility for the demurrage charges. See

Ametek, 104 F.3d at 563 (noting that a non-consignee

agent can contractually assume liability for demurrage

charges); Middle Atl. Conference, 353 F. Supp. at 1121-22

(same).

B.

Was South Tec a consignee? The IC pleaded in its initial

complaint that South Tec was the consignee of the disputed shipments, perhaps in recognition of the fact that

non-consignees generally cannot be held responsible for

demurrage charges. See IC Complaint, para. 8, Record at 1.

In applying 49 U.S.C. § 10743(a)(1), the district court

seemingly assumed that South Tec was a consignee, perhaps out of a mistaken belief that the STB had decided the

issue. Although we believe that the consignee status

of South Tec is an issue best considered by the district

court on remand, we briefly consider whether the district

court’s assumption that South Tec was a consignee may

have been correct.

Two district courts have addressed somewhat analogous situations. In CSX Transportation, Inc. v. City of

Pensacola, 936 F. Supp. 880 (N.D. Fla. 1995), a railroad

sought to recover demurrage fees assessed against the

Port of Pensacola. The Pensacola court held that because

the Port was not a party to the transportation contracts

under which the shipments to the Port were made, the

Port, as a matter of law, could not be held liable for demurrage assessed under the railroad’s tariff. Id. at 885.

The Pensacola court relied on the fact that none of the

bills of lading on shipments to the Port listed the Port as

a consignee. See id. at 884.

In Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Matson Navigation Co., 383 F. Supp. 154 (N.D. Cal. 1974), a railroad
No. 02-2957 15

sought to recover demurrage charges assessed against

Matson, which received railroad shipments that were

sent onward by sea to their final destinations in Hawaii.

On most of the shipments, Matson was not listed as a

consignee on the bills of lading. The district court held

that, as long as Matson was not listed on the bills of lading as the consignee, Matson could not be liable for demurrage charges because Matson was not a party to the

transportation contract under which the shipments

were made. Id. at 157. With respect to the shipments

where Matson was listed on the bills of lading as the

consignee, the court held that if “the sole difference between the two situations was the shipper’s unilateral

decision whom to name as consignee,” that unilateral action was not enough to make Matson a party to the transportation contract and liable for demurrage fees. Id. at 157-

58; see also Evans Prods. Co., 729 F.2d at 1113 (“No liability exists merely on account of being named in the bill

of lading . . . .”).

The facts here are similar to those in Matson. According to South Tec, ninety percent of the freight moving

through South Tec was from the paper supplier Champion,

which consistently named Donnelley as the consignee of

the paper it shipped. See Def.’s Rule 56.1(A)(3) Statement,

at para. 7 & Webber Aff. Ex. A., Record at 30. The agreement between the IC and Donnelley actually required

that the bills of lading list South Tec as a “stop,” with

Donnelley as the “ultimate destination.” Id. at Beaumont Dep. Ex. 2.

In its appellate brief, the IC makes no detailed argument

as to why South Tec was a consignee (and therefore liable for demurrage), relying instead on its argument that

the STB’s decision was “res judicata” as to South Tec’s

liability. The IC’s theory as to South Tec’s consignee

status appears to stem from South Tec’s being listed as

the consignee on some of the bills of lading for the paper
16 No. 02-2957

shipments. As noted above, however, being listed by third

parties as a consignee on some bills of lading is not

alone enough to make South Tec a legal consignee liable

for demurrage charges, although it, coupled with other

factors, might be enough to render South Tec a consignee.

From the actions of the IC as reported by South Tec, it

is apparent that the IC understood South Tec not to be

a consignee but an agent for Donnelley. See id. at para.

12 (“The IC delivered to South Tec shipments for which

the bills of lading never even mentioned South Tec or

Kankakee, but rather, identified only Donnelley or

some other entity as consignee and only Matoon, IL as

the destination.”). To the extent that some form of notice may play a role in the determination of consignee

status, see R. Franklin Unger, Trustee of the Ind. Hi-Rail

Corp., Debtor—Pet. for Decl. Order—Assessment and Collection of Demurrage and Switching Charges, STB Docket

No. 42030 at 6 n.13 (June 14, 2000), available at 2000 STB

LEXIS 333, at *11 n.13; but see supra note 2, it appears that the IC had ample notice of the relationship

between South Tec and Donnelley.

On remand, guided by the principles that we have

discussed, the district court should attempt to determine

who was the legal consignee (or consignees) of the paper

shipments in question and presumably liable for the

demurrage charges. The district court may also consider

whether South Tec contractually assumed responsibility

for the demurrage charges, although the record currently

shows no such assumption. To the extent that the agency

status of a legal consignee may be a factor, the notice

provisions of 49 U.S.C. § 10743(a)(1) may still be relevant.
No. 02-2957 17

III.

Therefore, the judgment of the district court is REVERSED

and REMANDED for further proceedings not inconsistent

with this opinion.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—7-23-03