alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
What is the Office of Regulatory Affairs Training System?

The Office of Regulatory Affairs Training System – ORA LearnED is a 

cloud-based technology that allows the Office of Training, Education, 

and Development the ability to manage its training portfolio and 

service its internal and external customers. The new ORA LearnED 

will provide access to design, develop, and deliver training content in a 

multitude of modalities including but not limited to self-paced online training, virtual instructor led training, as well 

as live training course events. This system replaces OTED’s legacy Pathlore LMS. 

Why is ORA deploying this new LMS?

The Pathlore Learning Management System has become antiquated and no longer will be able to handle the needs 

of OTED learners. The new LMS was acquired as ORA’s new Learning Management System—ORA LearnED, which 

maximizes efficiency and flexibility in a learner’s experiences. Its single point of entry reduces time spent logging in 

as well as the time to manually request certificates, view learner training, and associated records. 

What are the benefits of ORA LearnED? 

Students can view the course catalog, request trainings, view their transcript, print out certificates of course 

completion as well as search and explore training opportunities and connect with others in the system through 

communities and playlists to learn more. Students can also add information to their transcript on courses they 

attended outside the system to include as prerequisites to OTED courses they wish to attend. 

What will FDA’s public health partners be able to do in the ORA LearnED system? 

FDA’s public health partners will have the capability to access and view the course catalog before requesting 

registration. Once logged into the system, users will be able to utilize the system to its fullest function and 

capabilities. Public health partners can search the course catalog, launch online training, view transcripts, and print 

certificates of completion. 

Can I still access UL ComplianceWire Courses? 

UL ComplianceWire Courses will still be available and can be accessed through a link within the Office of Regulatory 

Affairs Training System – ORA LearnED. This is a new feature to accommodate learners and provide one location to 

access training.

Want to learn more?

Keep an eye out on this page for further 

updates to the status of ORA’s LearnED.

Introducing the New Office of Regulatory Affairs 

Training System – ORA LearnED

OFFICE OF REGULATORY AFFAIRS

The Office of Regulatory Affairs is a 

division of the Food and Drug Administration

In 2022, ORA will be transitioning to a new learning 

management system (LMS) known as the Office of 

Regulatory Affairs Training System – ORA LearnED.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MAQUET CARDIOVASCULAR LLC,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SAPHENA MEDICAL, INC., and

ALBERT CHIN,

Defendants. /

No. C 16-07213 WHA

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

According to Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Corley, this action settled on October 3 of this

year (see Dkt. No. 173). As of the date of this order, however, no dismissal has been filed on

the docket. The parties shall SHOW CAUSE in writing by JANUARY 4, 2018, AT NOON why this

action should not be dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 26, 2017. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Third Amendment to Employment Agreement



 EXHIBIT 10.3 
 THIRD AMENDMENT 
 TO 
 EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
 This Third Amendment to Employment Agreement (“Third
Amendment”) dated as of December 22, 2008 is made and entered into by and between Mercury Computer Systems, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation (the “Company”), and Robert E. Hult (the “Executive”). 
 WHEREAS, the Company and the Executive are parties to an Employment Agreement dated March 8, 2007 and amended September 26, 2007 and
December 14, 2007 (the “Employment Agreement”); and 
 WHEREAS, the parties hereto desire to amend the Employment Agreement to
comply with the requirement of Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended; and 
 WHEREAS, capitalized terms used
herein and not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Employment Agreement. 
 NOW, THEREFORE, in
consideration of the mutual covenants contained herein, the Company and the Executive agree as follows: 
 1.
Section 5(b)(i) of the Employment Agreement is amended by deleting said subsection and substituting therefor the following: 
 “(i) the Company shall continue to pay the Executive’s Base Salary for one year (the ‘Severance Amount’). The Severance Amount shall be paid out in substantially equal bi-weekly salary continuation installments over a
12-month period beginning with the first payroll date that occurs 30 days after the date of termination.” 
 2.
Section 5(c)(i) of the Employment Agreement is amended by deleting the second sentence thereof and substituting therefor the following: 
 “The Consulting Amount shall be paid out in substantially equal bi-weekly installments, beginning with the first payroll date that occurs 30 days after the date of termination.” 
 3. All other provisions of the Employment Agreement shall remain in full force and effect according to their respective terms, and nothing
contained herein shall be deemed a waiver of any right or abrogation of any obligation otherwise existing under the Employment Agreement except to the extent specifically provided for herein. 
 4. The validity, interpretation, construction and performance of this Third Amendment shall be governed by the laws of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. 
 5. This Third Amendment may be executed in several counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an
original but all of which together will constitute one and the same instrument. 







 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned officer, on behalf of Mercury Computer Systems, Inc., and the
Executive have hereunto set their hands as an agreement under seal, all as of the date first above written. 
  

			
	MERCURY COMPUTER SYSTEMS, INC.
		
	By:	 	 /s/    MARK
ASLETT        

		 	 Mark Aslett
 PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
 [PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE
OFFICER]

	
	EXECUTIVE
		
	 	 	 /s/    ROBERT E.
HULT        

		 	 Robert E. Hult
 SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND
 CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
 [PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER]



  

 2
LaSalle Logo
            
            
            LaSalle Bank
      N.A.
              135 South
      LaSalle Street
              Suite
      1625
              Chicago,
      IL  60603
              
              Global Securities and Trust
      Services


Annual
Statement of Compliance





VIA:
EMAIL





Merrill
Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc.


c/o
Global Commercial Real Estate


4 World
Financial Center, 16th
Floor


250 Vesey
Street


New York,
New York 10080


Attention:
David M. Rodgers





Re:
            Pooling
      and Servicing Agreement (the "Agreement") dated as of August 1, 2007 among
      Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc., as depositor, KeyCorp Real Estate
      Capital Markets, Inc. as Master Servicer No. 1, Wells Fargo Bank, National
      Association, as Master Servicer No. 2, Midland Loan Services, Inc., as
      Special Servicer, and LaSalle Bank National Association, as Trustee and
      Custodian, relating to ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-8, Commercial
      Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
  2007-8.





I,
Barbara L. Marik, a Senior Vice President of LaSalle Bank National Association,
as Trustee and Custodian hereby certify that:





1.  A review
of the activities of the Trustee and Custodian during the preceding calendar
year and of the performance of the Trustee and Custodian under the Agreement has
been made under my supervision; and





2.  To the
best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Trustee (and as Custodian) has
fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects
throughout such year or a portion thereof.





Date:
March 19, 2008




LaSalle
Bank National Association, as Trustee and Custodian








/s/
Barbara L. Marik


Barbara
L. Marik


Senior
Vice President
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-7634

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

HARRY T. KEELING, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C. Turk, District Judge.

(CR-93-62-R, CA-96-622-R)

Submitted: March 13, 1997 Decided: March 19, 1997

Before HALL, ERVIN, and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Harry T. Keeling, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Julie C. Dudley, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals from the district court's order granting in

part and denying in part his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994),

amended by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,

Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. We have reviewed the record

and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error.

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss on

the reasoning of the district court. United States v. Keeling, Nos.

CR-93-62-R; CA-96-622-R (W.D. Va. Oct. 11, 1996). We deny Appellant's motion requesting transcripts at government expense because

the appeal does not present a substantial question. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

MICHELLE LEAL, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 2:13-CV-318-JPK

)

TSA STORES, INC. d/b/a THE SPORTS )

AUTHORITY, )

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court sua sponte. The Court must continuously police its subject 

matter jurisdiction. Hay v. Ind. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 312 F.3d 876, 879 (7th Cir. 2002). The 

Court must dismiss this action if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(h)(3). Currently, the Court is unable to determine if it has subject matter jurisdiction over this 

litigation.

A previous defendant in this litigation, East Coast Cycle Supply, Inc. invoked this Court’s 

subject matter jurisdiction via diversity jurisdiction by filing a Notice of Removal to federal court. 

The party seeking federal jurisdiction has the burden of establishing that subject matter jurisdiction 

exists. Smart v. Local 702 Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 562 F.3d 798, 802-03 (7th Cir. 2009). Here, 

though, that defendant was granted summary judgment in its favor. The Court will turn to the 

remaining defendant to establish subject matter jurisdiction.

For the Court to have diversity jurisdiction, Plaintiff Michelle Leal and Defendant TSA 

Stores, Inc. must be citizens of different states, and the amount in controversy must be more than 

$75,000. In the Notice of Removal, Plaintiff’s citizenship and the amount in controversy are 

properly alleged.
2

However, the Notice of Removal alleges that Defendant TSA Stores, Inc. is a “Colorado 

corporation.” (Notice of Removal ¶ 4, ECF No. 3). This allegation is insufficient for the purpose 

of determining citizenship. Corporations “are deemed to be citizens of the state in which they are 

incorporated and the state in which they have their principal place of business.” N. Trust Co. v. 

Bunge Corp., 899 F.2d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)). The Seventh 

Circuit has further held that, “in cases with corporate parties, it is necessary to allege both the state 

of incorporation and the state of the principal place of business, even if they are one and the same.” 

Karazanos v. Madison Two Assocs., 147 F.3d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted).

While it is likely known to the parties, the record before the Court does not reveal whether TSA 

Stores, Inc. was, at the time of removal, a “Colorado corporation” because it was incorporated 

there, had its principal place of business there, both, or something else entirely.

Therefore, the Court hereby ORDERS Defendant TSA Stores, Inc. to FILE a 

supplemental jurisdictional statement as to its citizenship on or before August 8, 2019, at 

11:00 a.m. (C.S.T.) or to be prepared to address the issue at the scheduled status conference.

So ORDERED this 1st day of August, 2019.

s/ Joshua P. Kolar

MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOSHUA P. KOLAR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
LARRY GRIFFIN SPECIAL NEEDS TRUST and Willie Earl Griffin, petitioners, v. ACS RECOVERY SERVICES, INC., et al.

No. 13-182.

Supreme Court of the United States

Nov. 12, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

v. ) CASE NO.: 1:13-CR-64-TLS 

)

HAYLEY VANDURMEN )

ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on the Findings and Recommendation of the United States

Magistrate Judge [ECF No. 47], filed on April 8, 2014. The Defendant has waived objection to the

Findings and Recommendation, and the Court, being duly advised, adopts the Findings and

Recommendation [ECF No. 47] in its entirety and accepts the recommended disposition. Subject to

this Court’s consideration of the Plea Agreement pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

11(c), the plea of guilty to the offense charged in Count 1 of the Indictment is hereby accepted, and

the Defendant is adjudged guilty of such offense. 

The notice of sentencing and pre-sentence scheduling deadlines will be issued by separate

order.

SO ORDERED on May 2, 2014.

 s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
ACCEPTED12-15-00039-CRTWELFTH COURT OF APPEALSTYLER, TEXAS6/10/2015 3:54:54 PMCATHY LUSKCLERK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

DANIEL SEAL, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO. 3:13-CV-367 RM

)

SUPERINTENDENT )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Daniel Seal, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas corpus petition challenging a prison

disciplinary proceeding held at the Westville Correctional Facility on December 5, 2012.

The Disciplinary Hearing Body (DHB) found him guilty of Possessing a Controlled

Substance and deprived him of 48 days of earned credit time. Mr. Seal was charged after

a shakedown of his bed area discovered a green plant material hidden in the post at the

bottom of his bunk bed. He presents three grounds in his petition. 

First, he argues that the “green plant material” was not tested by a laboratory.

“Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full

panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Though prisoners have a right to submit relevant

exculpatory evidence, they don’t have the right to create evidence that doesn’t already

exist. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (“Prison officials must have the

necessary discretion to keep the hearing within reasonable limits.”) and Freitas v. Auger,

837 F.2d 806, 812 n.13 (8th Cir. 1988) (“Freitas was not entitled to a polygraph examination
. . ..”). See also Rhatigan v. Ward, 187 Fed. Appx. 889, 890-891 (10th Cir. 2006) and Arthur

v. Ayers, 43 Fed. Appx. 56, 57 (9th Cir. 2002) (inmates are not entitled to laboratory testing

of substances). This ground is not a basis for habeas corpus relief.

Second, Mr. Seal argues that he was assigned to the top bunk and that the material

was found in the leg of the bottom bunk. Third, he argues that the bedpost was also

accessible to the other three inmates housed in the room with him. In sum, he argues that

there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty because the untested green plant material

was found in a common area. In evaluating whether there is adequate evidence to support

the findings of a prison disciplinary hearing, “the relevant question is whether there is any

evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary

board.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-456 (1985). “The Federal Constitution does

not require evidence that logically precludes any conclusion but the one reached by the

disciplinary board.” Id. at 457. Because Mr. Seal had direct access to the bed post, the DHB

had some evidence to find him guilty. See Hamilton v. O'Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir.

1992) (discovery of weapon in area controlled by four inmates created twenty-five percent

chance of guilt supporting disciplinary action). Moreover, because the green plant material

was found hidden in a bed post, the DHB had some evidence for concluding that it was a

controlled substance. 

2
For the foregoing reasons, the habeas corpus petition is DENIED pursuant to 2254

Habeas Corpus Rule 4. 

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: July 31 , 2013 /s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr. 

Judge

United State District Court

3
Michael Charles DeSUE, petitioner, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

No. 12-9814.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 24, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, denied.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

THOMAS LEGG, JR., ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Cause No. 3:12-cv-844-JTM-CAN 

 ) 

NEW ENGLAND COMPOUNDING ) 

PHARMACY, INC. a/k/a NEW ) 

ENGLAND COMPOUNDING CENTER; ) 

AMERIDOSE, LLC; ALAUNUS ) 

PHARMACEUTICAL, LLC; BARRY ) 

CADDEN; LISA CADDEN; ) 

and GREGORY CONIGLIARO, ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR 

EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 

The Court, having reviewed Defendants’ Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to 

Respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint, and being duly advised in the premises, hereby GRANTS 

Defendants’ Motion. Defendants are hereby granted an extension up to an including March 25, 

2013 to respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

SO ORDERED this 21st day of February, 2013. 

 s/Christopher A. Nuechterlein 

 Magistrate Judge, Christopher A. Nuechterlein 

U.S. Northern District Court 

Distribution: 

Douglas A. Mulvaney 

Stutsman & Mulvaney 

1300 Cassopolis Street 

P.O. Box 1337 

Elkhart, Indiana 46515 

Dina M. Cox / Kameelah Shaheed-Diallo 

Robert M. Baker IV / Janelle P. Kilies 

LEWIS WAGNER, LLP 

501 Indiana Avenue, Suite 200 

Indianapolis, IN 46202 

case 3:12-cv-00844-JTM-CAN document 20 filed 02/21/13 page 1 of 1
LOREN DATA CORPORATION, petitioner, v. GXS, INC.

No. 12-1273.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 17, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.
Manuel MELO, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 12-9132.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 15, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied.
Alex C. JORDAN, petitioner, v. MISSOURI.

No. 12-10101.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 17, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Missouri, Eastern District, denied.
case 2:13-cv-00085-JVB-JEM   document 1-1   filed 03/05/13   page 1 of 8

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case 2:13-cv-00085-JVB-JEM   document 1-1   filed 03/05/13   page 8 of 8
Terrance Lamar JACKSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D19-1614

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

June 6, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

DENIED.
United States District Court

Northern District of Indiana 

CHARLES KINGERY, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 3:13-CV-1012 JVB

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Charles Kingery, a pro se prisoner, is serving a 55-year sentence for a murder and robbery

committed in Marion County, Indiana. State v. Kingery, No. 49G03-9302-CF-01748. He filed a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (DE 1.) This Court has previously

set out the procedural posture of this case in detail. (DE 14.)

Kingery’s habeas petition raises one claim: that his enhanced murder sentence violates

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). (DE 1 at 4.) In the respondent’s recent filing, he

concedes that Kingery’s sentence does, in fact, run afoul of Blakely and the respondent requests one

hundred eighty (180) days to commence resentencing proceedings so that the State of Indiana may

sentence Kingery in a manner that satisfies the procedural requirements of Blakely. (DE 22.) 

In a case such as this, habeas corpus relief must be conditionally granted. "Conditional writs

enable habeas courts to give States time to replace an invalid judgment with a valid one." Wilkinson

v. Dotson , 544 U.S. 74, 87 (2005) (Scalia J., concurring). Thus, the State of Indiana is free to

resentence Charles Kingery, providing that it files appropriate documents in the State trial court

seeking such relief within 180 days of this Order.

Accordingly, the court GRANTS a conditional writ of habeas corpus. The State of Indiana

may either release Charles Kingery or commence proceedings to resentence him within one hundred
eighty (180) days. The respondent is ORDERED to file a notice in this court within 180 days of

this Order demonstrating that the State of Indiana has either released Charles Kingery or initiated

resentencing proceedings against him. 

SO ORDERED on December 10, 2014.

 s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

Joseph S. Van Bokkelen

United States District Judge

Hammond Division

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