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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

KARIMA MONTGOMERY

Appellant No. 1428 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 1, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0010953-2013

BEFORE: OTT, J., DUBOW, J., and JENKINS, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED MARCH 29, 2016

Karima Montgomery appeals the judgment of sentence entered May 1, 

2015, in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. Montgomery was 

sentenced to a period of time served to 23 months’ imprisonment, followed 

by three years’ probation, after the trial court, sitting without a jury, found 

her guilty of burglary, conspiracy, criminal trespass, theft and receiving 

stolen property.1 On appeal, Montgomery challenges the weight of the 

evidence supporting her convictions. For the reasons below, we affirm.

The facts underlying Montgomery’s arrest, as summarized by the trial 

court, are as follows:

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3502, 903, 3503(a)(1)(ii), 3921, and 3925, respectively.
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On August 7, 2013, at or about 12:15 a.m., complainant, 

Wajeeha Sharif, accompanied by her six year old son, returned 

home from work and discovered [Montgomery], along with 

Rahneshia Harold Ellis and two other persons inside her home. 

She began screaming at which time the individuals fled her 

home exiting from the basement. She immediately contacted 

the police and advised them that there were people inside her 

house.

When the complainant entered her home she discovered 

that it had been ransacked. The contents of each drawer were 

emptied and strewn about, objects were scattered about in each 

room, and pictures slashed. She also noted that several items 

were missing including her pocketbook, a laptop computer, 

jewelry, and a gym bag. Complainant estimated that the value 

of the missing items was over $2,000.00.

The complainant was interviewed at police headquarters 

where she told police that she recognized some of the 

perpetrators because they attended school with her daughter. 

However, she did not know their last names. When police asked 

if she had any photographs of the perpetrators, complainant 

produced her daughter’s school year book. Police retrieved the 

year book and upon paging through it the complainant identified 

three of the perpetrators she saw inside her residence.[2]

The complainant did not give permission to any of the 

persons she saw the night of the incident to be inside her 

residence or to take any items therefrom. She also stated that 

she was 100% [] sure that [Montgomery] and Rahneshia Harold 

Ellis were two of the four persons she saw the night of the 

incident.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/9/2015, at 2-3 (record citations omitted).

____________________________________________

2 The complainant subsequently identified the fourth co-conspirator, Raydine 

Stanley, at Montgomery and Harold Ellis’s preliminary hearing. She stated 

Stanley “was sitting behind me.” N.T., 12/15/2014, at 13. Stanley later 

pled guilty for her role in the burglary. 
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Montgomery and Harold Ellis were subsequently arrested and charged 

with the above-stated crimes. They proceeded to a joint, nonjury trial, and, 

on December 15, 2014, were convicted of all charges.3 

Prior to the start of the sentencing hearing on May 1, 2015, 

Montgomery’s counsel made an oral motion for extraordinary relief, 

asserting the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. In support, 

counsel presented the testimony of Emily Smith, an investigator for the 

Defender Association of Philadelphia. Smith testified that she spoke with the 

complainant’s daughter, Fatima, who told Smith her mother admitted to her 

that she made a mistake and that Montgomery “had nothing to do with this.” 

N.T., 5/1/2015, at 14. When the trial court observed that the testimony was 

double hearsay, and the only way to introduce it as impeachment evidence 

was through Fatima herself, Montgomery’s counsel stated Fatima was 

unwilling to cooperate. Id. at 17. The trial court denied the motion, and 

sentenced Montgomery to three concurrent terms of time served to 23 

months’ imprisonment, followed by three years’ probation for the charges of 

burglary, conspiracy and criminal trespass. No further penalty was imposed 

on the remaining convictions.4 This timely appeal followed.5

____________________________________________

3 Stanley testified at trial that she committed the burglary with two other 

individuals, neither of whom was Montgomery, and specifically stated Harold 

Ellis was not involved. See N.T., 12/15/2014, at 31-40. 

4 Harold Ellis received the same sentence as Montgomery. See N.T., 

5/1/2015, at 57-58.
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Montgomery raises one issue on appeal:

Did not the trial court abuse its discretion by denying [] 

Montgomery’s post-trial motion for a new trial, as the verdict 

was so contrary to the weight of the evidence as to shock one’s 

sense of justice, where the Commonwealth presented the 

testimony of only one uncorroborated and inconsistent witness, 

and [] Montgomery completely refuted the witness’s 

identification testimony, such that a new trial is necessary in the 

interests of justice?

Montgomery’s Brief at 3.

When considering a challenge to the weight of the evidence, we must 

bear in mind:

A weight of the evidence claim concedes that the evidence is 

sufficient to sustain the verdict, but seeks a new trial on the 

ground that the evidence was so one-sided or so weighted in 

favor of acquittal that a guilty verdict shocks one’s sense of 

justice. 

Commonwealth v. Lyons, 79 A.3d 1053, 1067 (Pa. 2013) (citations 

omitted), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 1792 (U.S. 2014). Our review of a weight 

claim is well-established:6

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of 

discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

5 On May 11, 2015, the trial court ordered Montgomery to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Montgomery complied with the court’s directive, and filed an initial concise 

statement on June 1, 2015. After receiving an extension of time to 

supplement the statement, Montgomery filed a supplemental concise 

statement on July 9, 2015.

6 We note Montgomery properly preserved her weight of the evidence 

challenge by presenting an oral motion to the trial court prior to sentencing. 

See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(1).
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is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge 

has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, 

an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the 

findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing 

a trial court's determination that the verdict is against the weight 

of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for 

granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction 

that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the 

evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of 

justice. 

However, the exercise of discretion by the trial court in granting 

or denying a motion for a new trial based on a challenge to the 

weight of the evidence is not unfettered. The propriety of the 

exercise of discretion in such an instance may be assessed by 

the appellate process when it is apparent that there was an 

abuse of that discretion. This court summarized the limits of 

discretion as follows:

The term ‘discretion’ imports the exercise of judgment, 

wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion, 

within the framework of the law, and is not exercised for 

the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge. 

Discretion must be exercised on the foundation of reason, 

as opposed to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or 

arbitrary actions. Discretion is abused when the course 

pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, but 

where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where 

the law is not applied or where the record shows that the 

action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 753 (Pa. 2000) (internal 

citations omitted).

Montgomery asserts “the weight of the evidence was overwhelmingly 

in favor of acquittal.” Montgomery’s Brief at 12. She emphasizes the 

Commonwealth’s case rested upon the testimony of a single witness, the 

complainant, “who testified to an incredible story that was uncorroborated 
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by any physical evidence” and that her identification was “completely 

refuted” by the defense. Id. 

Specifically, Montgomery argues the complainant had a reason to lie 

about Montgomery’s involvement because she (Montgomery) was friends 

with the complainant’s daughter, the complainant did not like her daughter’s 

friends - whom she described as “females wanting to be males” - and 

Montgomery was involved in an altercation with the complainant’s daughter 

at school. Id. at 14. Further, Montgomery emphasizes the complainant 

described Montgomery’s hair on the night of the burglary as “twisted, little 

twisty braids.” Id., quoting N.T., 12/15/2014, at 16. However, 

Montgomery’s grandmother testified that Montgomery’s hair was never in 

twisted braids, but rather, had always looked as it did on the day of trial, 

which she described as “a mess.” Id. at 14-15. Additionally, Montgomery 

cites the testimony of Stanley, who admitted her involvement and named 

two other females, not Montgomery or Harold Ellis, as her co-conspirators. 

Montgomery also points out that Stanley testified she and Montgomery were 

not friends, so Stanley had no reason to lie for her. Lastly, Montgomery 

claims the complainant’s testimony regarding the number of people involved 

in the burglary was “inconsistent and contradictory.”7 Id. at 15. 

____________________________________________

7 Montgomery refers to the complainant’s testimony that, as she approached 

her home the night of the incident, she saw “a figure in [her] window.” N.T., 

12/15/2014, at 9. However, she never identified which of the four culprits 

that was. Id. at 21. Further, Montgomery asserts the complainant testified 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Accordingly, she argues “[t]he evidence in this matter, the testimony of 

[one] self-contradictory ... witness, cannot support the verdict in the face of 

conflicting evidence.” Id. at 16.

However, the trial court, which sat as fact-finder, concluded “the 

verdict does not shock the conscience.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/9/2015, at 4. 

The court explained:

The complainant identified [Montgomery] immediately after the 

incident as one of the four persons she observed in her 

residence. Complainant was certain of that identification 

because she knew [Montgomery], who was a friend of the 

complainant’s daughter. This Court, sitting as fact-finder was 

free to believe her testimony, and frankly the prior relationship 

between [Montgomery] and the complainant’s daughter was not 

only conceded but admitted.

Moreover, the fact that the guilty verdict herein was based 

solely on the testimony provided by the complainant does not 

render the verdict against the weight of the evidence. It is wellestablished that the uncorroborated testimony of a single person 

is sufficient to support a conviction. E.g. Commonwealth v. 

Trippett, 932 A.2d 188 (Pa. Super. 2007) (if believed by the 

factfinder, uncorroborated testimony of a victim is sufficient to 

sustain a conviction); Commonwealth v. Lamb, 455 A.2d 678, 

686 (Pa. Super. 1983) (“It is clear that the uncorroborated 

testimony of a co-conspirator, if believed, is sufficient to support 

a conviction in a criminal conspiracy prosecution.”); 

Commonwealth v. Budd, 140 A.2d 346 (Pa. Super. 1958) 

(testimony of drug-addict witness was sufficient to sustain 

conviction even absent corroboration).

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

on direct that she saw only three people in her home, but later, on crossexamination stated there were four people. See Montgomery’s Brief at 16. 

Our review of the record, however, reveals that the complainant consistently 

maintained there were four people involved in the burglary. See N.T., 

12/15/2014, at 9-10. 
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In addition, this Court did not find credible the testimony 

given by Raydine Stanley, who admitted her role in the incident 

and testified that [Montgomery] was not a participant. (N.T. 

12/15/14, 31). Ms. Stanley was previously convicted and 

sentenced when she testified and thus, had nothing to lose by 

testifying in favor of [Montgomery]. Her credibility was also 

undermined by her inability to identify the third person who 

allegedly participated in the burglary. (N.T. 12/15/14, 35). 

Finally, while the defense did present testimony 

questioning the description given by the complainant and good 

character evidence, this Court discounted the testimony because 

of the complainant’s certitude in her identification and the fact 

that the complainant got a good look at [Montgomery] the night

of the incident. 

Trial Court Opinion, 9/9/2015, at 4-5.

Our review of the notes of testimony from Montgomery’s trial reveals 

no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. The court determined 

the complainant’s testimony was credible, as was its prerogative. The fact 

that Stanley refuted the complainant’s identification of Montgomery was 

immaterial once the court determined Stanley’s testimony was not credible. 

Furthermore, as the Commonwealth notes in its brief, the testimony 

regarding Montgomery’s hair at the time of the burglary was provided by 

Montgomery’s grandmother, who “was obviously biased.” Commonwealth’s 

Brief at 7. The facts of this case turn solely on the credibility determinations 

of the fact-finder. Under these circumstances, and bound by our standard of 

review, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in finding the 

complainant credible, and Montgomery’s evidence incredible. See Widmer,

supra. Accordingly, no relief is warranted. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/29/2016