J-S22043-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.G., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: YORK COUNTY CHILDREN 

AND YOUTH

No. 1922 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered October 25, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Juvenile Division at No.: CP-67-DP-0000220-2016

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., MOULTON, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED JULY 06, 2017

York County Office of Children, Youth, and Families (“CYF”, “YCOCYF”, 

or the “Agency”), appeals from the status review order entered on October 

25, 2016, directing CYF, as a sanction for civil contempt of the trial court’s 

August 16, 2016, order, to reimburse N.T.-C., (“Paternal Grandmother”), the 

paternal grandmother of the subject child, K.G., (“Child”) (a female born in 

2001), in the amount of $540 for the costs of an abortion Child underwent. 

We vacate the order, insofar as it finds CYF in contempt, and imposes the 

$540 sanction on CYF. 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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On July 26, 2016, CYF filed a motion for emergency protective custody 

with regard to Child after an alleged altercation between Child and her 

mother, A.G.-S., (Mother), along a roadside. On July 27, 2016, the trial 

court entered an order placing Child in the protective custody of CYF. A 

master held a shelter care hearing on July 28, 2016. On August 3, 2016, 

the trial court entered the master’s recommendation for shelter care and its 

shelter care order, dated July 28, 2016.1 

In the meantime, on August 2, 2016, CYF filed a petition to adjudicate 

Child dependent. On August 16, 2016, the trial court held a hearing on the 

dependency petition. CYF was represented by Attorney Kristina Bange. 

Gilliam Woodward, the attorney appointed to serve as guardian ad litem

(“GAL”) for Child, was also present. Father and Mother were present in the 

courtroom, as well. CYF presented the testimony of Seth Reed, a police 

officer for Hellam Township who responded to the call about the roadside 

disturbance between Mother and Child on July 25, 2016. N.T., 8/16/16, at 

13-14. CYF then presented the testimony of Kalene Leh, the caseworker for 

CYF assigned to Child’s case. Id. at 21-22. Attorney Woodward crossexamined both witnesses.

At the close of the testimony, the trial court stated:

____________________________________________

1 On August 10, 2016, the trial court again entered the July 27, 2016 order 

for emergency protective custody of Child.
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THE COURT: I do make the finding that the child is dependent as 

that term is defined by the [Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302]. 

Based on the allegations outlined in the petition, we find that the 

evidence is credible, that there was some sort of altercation that 

occurred, that [F]ather has indicated that he is not a resource 

for his daughter.

She has some delinquency matters pending in Lancaster County, 

and based on all the evidence presented, we do find that she is a 

dependent child. We do find that it is appropriate to have her 

placed with the paternal grandparents. They are interested in 

serving as foster parents and will complete appropriate 

paperwork in order to be approved.

Goals shall be set forth and established for both parents. The 

primary goal will be reunification. We do make the concurrent 

goal of adoption. It is hoped that she can achieve reunification 

within a reasonable period of time, but the agency shall pursue 

other permanent goals. In the event that permanent legal 

custodianship is more appropriate, we can revisit that at the 

next review period – review hearing.

We do direct that the family team meeting marked as 

Exhibit 1 will be incorporated into the record and that the agency 

assist the family in securing appropriate services for the child, 

noting that she is going to be residing in Lancaster County.

We do authorize the GAL – the GAL to request and do 

direct the agency to schedule an evaluation for the child 

pursuant to 32 Pa.C.S.A. Section 31 – I’m sorry, 3201. [sic] [18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3201 (Abortion Control Act)]. 

A copy of this Order adjudicating the child dependent will 

be provided to all parties in court today. We remind the parents 

of their right to be represented by counsel.

This matter will be reviewed every 90 days. They are entitled to 

counsel of their choosing. They are also entitled to file an appeal 

of this [c]ourt’s decision within 30 days of today’s date.

Okay.

Once you receive a copy of the Order, you can step out.
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ATTORNEY BANGE: Your Honor, I didn’t hand up the 

Court-ordered services. I think it was referenced in the 

proposed order.

THE COURT: Were there any changes to the Court-ordered 

services and conditions?

We do incorporate the Court-ordered services and conditions 

attached hereto and the provisions contained therein. 

There is a change to the medical and educational rights. It’s 

granted to the agency.

Attorney Bange, I’ve granted medical and educational 

rights to the agency. We can revisit that at the next hearing. 

N.T., 8/16/16, at 42-45 (emphasis added).

On August 16, 2016, the trial court entered an adjudication finding 

Child dependent, and an order of disposition, which provided as follows:

AND NOW, this 16th day of August , 2016, after consideration of 

the petition presented by the York County Children and Youth 

Services Agency, it is ORDERED that the child is found, by clear 

and convincing evidence, to be a Dependent Child pursuant to 

the Pennsylvania Juvenile Act at 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302 ‘Dependent 

Child’.

DEPENDENT CHILD PURSUANT TO

(1) The child is without proper care or control, subsistence, 

education as required by law, or other care or control necessary 

for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Findings of fact are as follows: The minor child, [K.G.,] is fifteen 

years of age, and had been residing with her mother, [A.G.-S]. 

On July 25, 2015, York County Office of Children, Youth & 

Families was advised of a domestic dispute between the mother 

and the minor child in a motor vehicle. Allegations received 

were that the mother pulled the car off to the side of the road 

and physically assaulted the child. The mother allegedly left the 
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child along the roadside on the Route 30 Bridge between 

Lancaster County and York County. York County Office of 

Children, Youth & Families attempted to implement a safety plan 

with the family, however, the situation escalated into a verbal 

altercation which resulted in the York City Police Department 

being dispatched to the home. The minor child was residing with 

the paternal grandmother, [N.T.-C.], in Lancaster County, 

Pennsylvania, throughout the school year and was spending the 

summer months with her mother and maternal grandmother. 

The minor child is currently on probation in Lancaster County, 

Pennsylvania, on a charge of Hindering Apprehension[,] which 

she received in May, 2014. On May 11, 2016, the minor child 

received three new charges through Lancaster County Juvenile 

Probation, two counts of Disorder [sic] [Co]nduct, and one count 

of Simple Assault. The child was placed on house arrest and an 

ankle monitor. The child cut off the ankle monitor and since that 

time has been residing with her mother in York County, 

Pennsylvania. The mother was recently released from Muncy 

State Correctional Institution. Father [T.S.] resides in 

Mooresville, North Carolina. The paternal grandparents, [N.T.-

C.] and [R.C.], have come forward as a placement resource for 

the child. The paternal grandparents have been approved as 

emergency caregivers for the child.

CHILD REMOVED FROM HOME

The Court finds that based upon the findings of abuse, neglect 

and/or dependency of the minor child, it is in the best interest of 

the child to be removed from the home of [A.G.-S.] and [S.T.] 

Relationship: Mother and Father.

REASONABLE EFFORTS

Further, the [c]ourt hereby finds that to allow this child to 

remain in the home would be contrary to the child’s welfare, and 

that [p]reventive services were not offered due to the necessity 

for emergency placement. The lack of services was reasonable 

under the circumstances. This level of effort was reasonable due 

to the emergency nature of the situation, safety considerations, 

and circumstances of the family.

CUSTODY/PLACEMENT
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PLACEMENT – The Child is to be placed, by the agency, in 

emergency caregiver placement with the paternal grandparents, 

[N.T.-C.] and [R.C.], pending approval for participation in the 

Kinship Program. The Child’s placement is the least restrictive 

placement that meets the need of the Child and there is no less 

restrictive alternative available, in that due to the father residing 

out-of-state, issues of domestic violence between mother and 

child, and the paternal grandparent willing to be a resource for

the child, placement with the paternal grandparents as 

emergency caregivers is the least restrictive alternative 

available. 

CONDITIONS – The dependent child is subject to the following 

conditions – see Court-Ordered Services/Conditions Appendix 

incorporated herein by reference.

CURRENT PLACEMENT – Child’s Safety

The child is safe in the current placement setting.

CURRENT PERMANENT PLACEMENT PLAN

The current placement goal for the child is return to parent or 

guardian. The projected date by which the goal for the child 

might be achieved is: within six to twelve months.

The following [s]ervices are necessary to achieve the 

permanency plan – see Court-Ordered Services/Conditions 

Appendix incorporated herein by reference.

EDUCATION/HEALTH/EVALUATIONS

The following is necessary to ensure the stability and 

appropriateness of the Child’s education: the minor child shall 

attend Phoenix Academy, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, for 

the upcoming 2016-2017 school year.

PROGRAMS/INITIATIVES

The court recognizes the following initiatives or programs have 

been or will be used:

Family Finding

Family Group Decision Making with individual and family.
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FAMILY FINDING

The court orders the Agency to engage and continue in family 

finding until further order of court.

MEDICAL CONSENT

It is further ORDERED that if the child is in the legal custody of 

the county agency as defined by the Juvenile Act at 42 Pa.C.S. 

§§ 6301-6355, the County Children and Youth Services Agency 

has the authority to consent to routine treatment of the child.

FINANCIAL SUPPORT

It is further ORDERED and DECREED that the individual(s) 

legally responsible for the financial support of the child shall pay 

support to the county in an amount as determined by the Family 

Court Division.

INDIAN STATUS

The child is not Indian as defined in 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4), and 

the Indian Child Welfare Act does not apply to these 

proceedings.

FINDINGS/ORDERS

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS: 

The Concurrent Goal for the minor child is: Adoption.

Father does acknowledge that the child is dependent. He 

believes she requires services that he is not able to secure 

and[,] due to his work schedule, he is not available for his 

daughter. Maternal grandmother was approached to establish a 

safety plan and further disputes erupted. After the child was 

placed at YDC, a family team meeting was held and the family 

identified the paternal [grand]parents as an appropriate 

placement for the child. The parties agreed that the child has 

mental health concerns that need to be addressed. All parties 

also agreed that the child would reside with the paternal 

grandparents.
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Evidence was presented that there was a physical altercation 

between the child and her mother on the Wrightsville Bridge. 

Mother left the child on the bridge and drove away. Two 

Wrightsville police and Officer Reed were called. She [Child] was 

evaluated by EMS at the Rutters and scratches were found on 

her shoulders. Mother was charged with endangering the 

welfare of a child, simple assault and harassment. She remains 

incarcerated at this time.

Medical and educational rights: Children Youth and Families is 

granted medical and educational rights.

THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS:

CYF shall immediately make a 32 Pa.C.S.A. § 3201 medical 

appointment as requested by the GAL and the GAL is authorized 

to represent the child in an action pursuant to 32 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 3201 et seq[.,] specifically § 3206(c). [sic]

CYF shall notify Lancaster County Juvenile Probation of the 

child’s placement. The paternal [g]randparents shall cooperate 

with CYF and Lancaster County Juvenile Probation and ensure 

that the child attends all scheduled appointments and hearings. 

They shall cooperate with services and ensure that the child is 

immediately enrolled in school in the district where the 

grandparents reside and shall attend Phoenix Academy.

Such disposition having been determined to be best suited to the 

protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child. 

 

Trial Court Adjudication and Disposition Order, 8/16/16, at 1-3 (emphasis 

added). 

The Appendix to the August 16, 2016 Adjudication and Disposition 

Order provided, in pertinent part:

COURT-ORDERED SERVICES/CONDITIONS:

AGENCY’S RESPONSIBILITIES:
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The Agency shall, at its earliest opportunity, develop a case plan 

which shall implement the goal, and which is to [be] 

accomplished as soon as practical.

The Agency shall assist in providing referrals to appropriate 

agencies so that the persons named herein are able to timely 

obtain services set forth in this ORDER.

The Agency shall provide to the persons who are directed to 

obtain services reasonable assistance to obtain necessary 

financing for the services, HOWEVER, unless the Agency 

expressly assumes financial responsibility, the Agency shall NOT 

BE LIABLE to pay for the services provided to any individual. 

* * *

MEDICAL AND EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS:

We hereby grant to CYF the right and authority to make 

appropriate and necessary decisions concerning the education of 

the minor(s), including, if necessary, the decision to enroll the 

minor(s) in an appropriate school district, special school, special 

classes, and the authority to participate in and approve any 

individualized education plan for a minor.

We hereby grant to CYF the right and authority to make 

reasonable and appropriate medical decisions for the minor(s), 

including the authority to consent to emergency and long-term 

medical treatment. This authority does not grant the authority 

to make decisions contrary to sound medical opinion or advice, 

nor does this authority grant the right to direct that medical care 

shall be withheld from a minor.

* * *

Appendix to Trial Court Adjudication and Disposition, 8/16/16, at 1, 3 

(emphasis added). 

On August 29, 2016, Attorney Woodward, the GAL, filed a motion to 

modify the August 16, 2016 order. In the motion, the GAL stated that, in 

the August 16, 2016 order, Child was adjudicated dependent, and physical 
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and legal custody were transferred to CYF, as were medical and educational 

rights. The GAL alleged that CYF had expressed reluctance to arrange and 

attend certain medical appointments as ordered in the August 16, 2016 

order; however, Paternal Grandmother was willing to schedule and attend all 

medical appointments on behalf of Child. The GAL requested that medical 

and educational rights be transferred to Paternal Grandmother. The GAL 

indicated that CYF was in agreement with such transfer, as was Father, but 

the GAL had been unsuccessful in contacting Mother about the requested 

transfer. Thus, the GAL requested the trial court to modify the August 16, 

2016 order to grant medical and educational rights to Paternal Grandmother. 

On October 25, 2016, the trial court held the 90-day status review 

hearing. Child was present with the GAL. Mother and Paternal 

Grandmother, Child’s emergency caregiver, were present. N.T., 10/25/16, 

at 2. Attorney Wanda Neuhaus, counsel for CYF, and Kate Wilhelm, the 

assigned caseworker, were also present. Id. 

During the status review hearing, Attorney Woodward stated that Child 

would like to return to Mother’s home. N.T., at 23-24. Attorney Woodward 

then stated the following:

The other thing I wanted to bring up is Grandmother did 

pay for [Child] to have a medical procedure and the Agency will 

not reimburse her without a Court Order. I would request the 

Court order Children and Youth to reimburse Grandmother, since 

she went out of her way to ensure that the medical procedure 

occurred in a timely manner after the Agency refused to do so.

THE COURT: How much did you pay for the medical procedure?
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PATERNAL GRANDMOTHER: $540.

THE COURT: You have 14 days to reimburse.

ATTORNEY NEUHAUS: May we approach?

THE COURT: There’s no approaching. I directed the Agency to 

make the appointment. They refused to make the appointment. 

It is the Agency’s lack of follow through that has caused 

[Paternal Grandmother] to outlay the money, and the Agency is 

paying her back.

Had they made the arrangements for the medical 

appointment and gave [sic] some other information and at least 

complied with my order, I would have been sympathetic for the 

Agency, but they’re paying her back. I don’t care what it was 

for. They’re paying her back, the [$]540. If you want to take 

that up on appeal, be my guest. I am not discharging 

jurisdiction. You have 14 days to come up with the money 

somehow.

I’m not discharging jurisdiction. I would consider returning 

her to her [m]other if there are certain safeguards and services 

in place, so what are those services? That Mother indicates she 

can get the counseling initiated immediately? I don’t agree. You 

can’t play the game of going back and forth.

I know you’ve both accommodated her, but you see where 

that has gotten her. You see that the boy is in Lancaster. I 

don’t think it’s appropriate, based on what you’re telling me, to 

allow her to return to Lancaster where it’s easy to fall back into 

the pattern of violating curfew.

She has to have responsibility, because the next thing you 

know, she’s going to violate probation, and then she will be in a 

more secure setting. 

There’s a more lax attitude, I would say, with regard to 

restrictions at times on the dependency side. We can be very 

strict on the dependency side. But when you get to the 

delinquency side, I have no control over that case. That is in 

another jurisdiction, and she’s subject to the conditions of that 

jurisdiction.
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* * *

I’m finding the Agency in contempt of the Court Order for 

its complete lack of follow through with the directives of this 

[c]ourt. Particularly, as it relates to the medical care of the 

child, it causes me concern about the Agency and some 

caseworkers, not Ms. Wilhelm, but their ability to do their job. 

And apparently the caseworker is no longer with the Agency or I 

would have addressed it directly with her.

As it is, the dependency shall continue. Legal and physical 

custody shall remain with York County Children and Youth. 

Placement shall be at the York County Development Center until 

such time as [Mother] is able to secure services in her home 

upon enrollment in an appropriate educational setting. With the 

start of in-home services and counseling, the child can be 

removed – can be moved to Mother’s care with a modification of 

placement. That petition being submitted to chambers. 

I do now transfer medical and educational rights to be 

shared between York County Children and Youth and Mother. 

Both shall make appropriate decisions regarding the medical and 

educational care of the child.

* * *

N.T., 10/25/16, at 25-29 (emphasis added).

In the October 25, 2016 status review order, the trial court stated:

REASON FOR HEARING

This Status Review Hearing is being held to address the status of 

the minor child’s placement and progress of all parties.

REVIEW OF SERVICES

The services ordered at the dispositional hearing pursuant to 

Rule 1512 have been put into place by the County Children and 

Youth Services Agency (‘Agency’).

CHILD’S SAFETY
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The child is safe in the current placement setting.

ORDER OF COURT – On the basis of the above findings, IT 

IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

FURTHER FINDINGS

The court further finds:

Mother: The mother reports that she graduated from Shelly 

truck driving school and continues to receive services through 

OVR. She resides with her mother in York. Mother does not 

believe that the child is applying herself. The mother stated that 

she is a resource for her daughter and that she is now willing to 

work with services. The caseworker is making a referral for a 

Catholic Charities team for mother.

Father: The father has had no recent contact with YCOCYF. The 

caseworker has left messages. Mail was sent to [F]ather’s 

address and was returned.

Child: The child is enrolled in Phoenix Academy in Lancaster 

County schools. Her grandparents are not sure if they can keep 

the child in their care. She was initially on house arrest and she 

did well. However, once she was removed from home 

monitoring, her behavior deteriorated. She goes out late at 

night in violation of the curfew. They believe that she would be 

better served in her mother’s care.

She continues to have issues at school. She has had bad 

interaction and has walked out in class. Juvenile Probation 

remains involved. She was adjudicated delinquent in Lancaster 

County and sentenced to probation.

She was directed to attend the Pulse program at LCYIC, attend 

individual counseling and cooperate with York County CYF.

Review of Services: The services have NOT been put in place as 

directed. The agency has failed to refer for family based or 

youth advocate services.

Clear and convincing evidence has been presented to find that it 

is contrary to her welfare to remain in the care of her mother 

and grandmother until services can be put in place.
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The Court further finds that the agency has failed to comply with 

the order for adjudication and is in contempt of the court order.

FURTHER ORDERS

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT:

The adjudication of dependency of the minor child, [K. G.], shall 

continue.

The agency shall immediately, and within 14 days, reimburse 

[Paternal Grandmother] $540.00. [T]he court further transfers 

placement of the child to York County Youth Development Center 

until services can be put in place in Mother’s home. The [c]ourt 

hereby transfers medical and educational rights to CYF and 

Mother. They shall share in making appropriate medical and 

educational decisions for the child until further order of court.

The child shall immediately be enrolled in school in York County 

in an appropriate educational setting. Upon enrollment in 

school, the start of an inhome team and counseling, the child 

may return to the care of her mother with ongoing services 

being provided to the family.

Such disposition having been determined to be best suited to the 

protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.

Status Review Order, 10/25/16, at 1-2 (emphasis added).

In its brief on appeal, CYF raises two issues, as follows:

1. Did the Trial Court err in ordering a Governmental Child 

Welfare Agency to reimburse the minor’s grandmother the 

amount of out-of-pocket costs paid by the Grandmother for the 

performance of an abortion for a dependent minor?

2. Did the Trial Court err in making a finding of contempt against 

the Child Welfare Agency when: (a) there was no notice to the 

Child Welfare Agency of the allegations of contempt; (b) there 

was insufficient evidence that the Child Welfare Agency was in 

contempt; and (c) there was insufficient evidence that the 

amount ordered to be paid to Paternal Grandmother represented 
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damages sustained by Paternal Grandmother by reason of the 

Agency’s conduct in failing to follow the court’s directive? 

CYF’s Brief, at 5.

CYF first argues that the trial court erred in ordering CYF, a 

governmental child welfare agency[,] to reimburse Paternal Grandmother 

the amount of her out-of-pocket costs for the performance of an abortion on 

Child. CYF states as follows:

York County Office of Children, Youth and Families is a 

governmental entity created pursuant to the Child Protective 

Services Law. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302(b). As such, it is funded with 

public funds from the Federal Government, the Commonwealth 

of Pennsylvania and the County Government. State law provides 

that no public funds “shall be expended by an [sic] State or local 

government agency for the performance of an abortion.” 62 P.S. 

§ 453. It is noted that there is an exception to this prohibition, 

if the abortion is needed to protect the health of the [m]other or 

when the pregnancy is caused by rape or incest. 62 P.S. § 453. 

These circumstances were not proved at the hearing. The [trial 

court’s] Order to reimburse the Paternal Grandmother for costs 

of an abortion violates both the Pennsylvania Constitution and 

the law of the Commonwealth.

Further, the purpose of the local child welfare agency, such 

as YCOCYF, is to: “establish in each county protective services 

for the purpose of investigating the reports swiftly and 

competently, providing protection for children from further 

abuse,” and to provide services “to ensure the child’s well-being 

and to preserve, stabilize and protect the integrity of family life.” 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302(b). The Juvenile Act governs both the 

county child welfare agency and the Juvenile Court and provides 

as the purpose: “to provide for the care, protection, safety and 

wholesome mental and physical development of children”. . . . 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(b). Throughout [t]he Juvenile Act, the 

Court is charged with protecting the health, safety, protection, 

and physical, mental or moral welfare of the child. 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 6301 et seq. It would be contrary to the purposes of both the 

Child Protective Services Law[, 23 Pa.C.S. § 6301 et seq.,] and 

[t]he Juvenile Act[, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301 et seq.,] for the Child 
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Welfare Agency to fund and promote abortions. By ordering the 

Agency to reimburse [Paternal] Grandmother for this cost, the 

[trial court] has compromised these statements of purpose - to 

protect children, even unborn children.

CYF’s Brief, at 11-12.2

In its second claim, CYF argues as follows:

There are two bases to find that the Trial Court erred in 

finding YCOCYF in contempt of the [trial court’s] Orders - one 

procedural and one based upon lack and insufficiency of 

evidence.

Firstly, there was no notice provided to YCOCYF regarding 

the allegations of contempt in general and specifically. While 

neither [t]he Juvenile Act nor the Rules of Dependency Court 

Procedure provide specific procedure for a finding of contempt, 

the requirement of notice is basic to all legal provisions 

regarding contempt. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 5401 and 231 Pa.Code 

Rule 1915.12 (custody contempt); 234 Pa.Code Rule 140 

(contempt proceedings before Magisterial District Judge): 42 

Pa.C.S. § 4136.

All of these rules and statutes require that a person 

accused of contempt of a court order be provided notice of the 

accusation of contempt in general and also be provide notice of 

the specific acts that are the basis for the allegation of contempt. 

The purpose of the notice requirement is to allow the accused 

the opportunity to make a defense. No such notice was provided 

in this case. As a result, YCOCYF did not have the opportunity to 

prepare a defense and/or have the necessary witnesses present 

to defend these allegations. Therefore, this finding was made 

without a full and fair hearing.

Secondly, there is insufficient evidence to support a finding 

of contempt. “Because contempt is an extraordinary remedy 

____________________________________________

2

In support of its constitutional argument, CYF cites Article 3 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides, “No money shall be paid out of 

the treasury, except on appropriations made by law. . . .” CYF’s Brief, at 15 

(citing Pa. Const. Art 3, § 24). 
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and because it exposes the offending party to fines or 

punishment,. . ., it is strictly interpreted.” By a preponderance 

of the evidence, the testimony must show that the failure to 

comply with the order was “volitional” and with “wrongful 

intent”. Harcar v. Harcar, 982 A.2d 1230, 1235 (Pa. Super. 

2009); Barrett v. Barrett, 368 A.2d 616, 621 (Pa. Supreme 

1997). The mere showing of noncompliance or even misconduct 

is not sufficient. Lachat v. Hinchcliffe, 769 A.2d [481, 488 

(Pa. Super. 2001)]. 

In the case at bar, there is insufficient evidence to support 

a finding of contempt. With regard to the medical appointment, 

there was positively no evidence that the Agency failed to act; 

there is only evidence that the [Paternal Grandmother] was 

willing to act and did act. With regard to providing services, 

such as therapy and family-based services, the evidence shows 

unequivocally that the caseworker did make multiple attempts 

regarding these services. The family did not want to be involved 

in the in-home family-based services; therefore, the Agency 

made numerous efforts to work through the geographical 

barriers to individual therapy. When it became apparent that 

the child was not going to stay in Lancaster County (the day or 

two before the hearing), and would potentially return to York 

County with her [m]other, the Agency immediately made a 

referral to Catholic Charities for a Family-Based Team to work 

with Mother and K.G. Evidence was also provided that the 

caseworker maintained contact with the Lancaster County 

Juvenile Probation Officer [(“JPO”)] (as required by the Court 

Order of August 16, 2016) and that as a result of the difficulties 

in obtaining individual therapy, JPO enrolled K.G. in the PULSE 

program. These facts do not support a finding of willful, 

volitional action with bad intent.

Further, even if there was a failure to act [on the part of 

CYF] in scheduling the medical consultation associated with the 

Abortion Control Act, there was no loss or out of pocket expense 

to the Paternal Grandmother. Such a medical appointment can 

be paid for with public funds and would have been covered by 

Medical Assistance. It is the abortion itself which would not have 

been covered and which would have caused out of pocket 

expense to the Paternal Grandmother. YCOCYF was not (and 

could not have been) ordered to pay for the abortion. Therefore, 

there is no connection between the alleged failure to follow the 

court order and the reimbursement of $540.00.
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CYF’s Brief, at 12-14.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently set forth our standard of 

review in a dependency case as follows.

“The standard of review in dependency cases requires an 

appellate court to accept findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the 

record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the 

lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law.” In re R.J.T., 

608 Pa. 9, [27], 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). We review for 

abuse of discretion[.] 

In Interest of: L.Z., A Minor Child, 641 Pa. 343, 360, 111 A.3d 1164, 

1174 (2015).

Section 6302 of the Juvenile Act defines a “dependent child” as:

[a] child who:

(1) is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, 

education as required by law, or other care or control necessary 

for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals. A 

determination that there is a lack of proper parental care or 

control may be based upon evidence of conduct by the parent, 

guardian or other custodian that places the health, safety or 

welfare of the child at risk[.]

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302. 

In In re G., T., 845 A.2d 870 (Pa. Super. 2004), this Court clarified 

the definition of “dependent child” further.

The question of whether a child is lacking proper parental care or 

control so as to be a dependent child encompasses two discrete 

questions: whether the child presently is without proper parental 

care and control, and if so, whether such care and control are 

immediately available. 
J-S22043-17

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Id. at 872 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also In re J.C., 

5 A.3d 284, 289 (Pa. Super. 2010). Additionally, we note that “[t]he burden 

of proof in a dependency proceeding is on the petitioner to demonstrate by 

clear and convincing evidence that a child meets that statutory definition of 

dependency.” G., T., 845 A.2d at 872.

With regard to a dependent child, in In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614 (Pa. 

Super. 2002) (en banc), this Court explained:

[A] court is empowered by 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(a) and (c) to 

make a finding that a child is dependent if the child meets the 

statutory definition by clear and convincing evidence. If the 

court finds that the child is dependent, then the court may make 

an appropriate disposition of the child to protect the child’s 

physical, mental and moral welfare, including allowing the child 

to remain with the parents subject to supervision, transferring 

temporary legal custody to a relative or public agency, or 

transferring custody to the juvenile court of another state. 42 

Pa.C.S. § 6351(a).

Id. at 617.

Regarding the disposition of a dependent child, section 6351(e), (f), 

(f.1), and (g) of the Juvenile Act provides the trial court with the criteria for 

its permanency plan for the subject child. Pursuant to those subsections of 

the Juvenile Act, the trial court is to determine the disposition that is best 

suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of 

the child.

Section 6351(e) of the Juvenile Act provides in pertinent part:

(e) Permanency hearings.—
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(1) [t]he court shall conduct a permanency hearing for 

the purpose of determining or reviewing the permanency 

plan of the child, the date by which the goal of 

permanency for the child might be achieved and whether 

placement continues to be best suited to the safety, 

protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the 

child. In any permanency hearing held with respect to 

the child, the court shall consult with the child regarding 

the child’s permanency plan in a manner appropriate to 

the child’s age and maturity. . . .

(2) If the county agency or the child’s attorney alleges 

the existence of aggravated circumstances and the court 

determines that the child has been adjudicated 

dependent, the court shall then determine if aggravated 

circumstances exist. If the court finds from clear and 

convincing evidence that aggravated circumstances exist, 

the court shall determine whether or not reasonable 

efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removing the 

child from the child’s parent, guardian or custodian or to 

preserve and reunify the family shall be made or continue 

to be made and schedule a hearing as provided in 

paragraph (3).

* * *

42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(e).

Section 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act prescribes the pertinent inquiry for 

the reviewing court:

(f) Matters to be determined at permanency hearing.-

At each permanency hearing, a court shall determine all of 

the following:

(1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness 

of the placement. 

(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of 

compliance with the permanency plan developed for the 

child. 
J-S22043-17

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(3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating 

the circumstances which necessitated the original 

placement. 

(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current 

placement goal for the child. 

(5) The likely date by which the placement goal for 

the child might be achieved. 

(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize 

the permanency plan in effect. 

(6) Whether the child is safe. 

(7) If the child has been placed outside the 

Commonwealth, whether the placement continues to be 

best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental 

and moral welfare of the child.

* * *

(9) If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of 

the last 22 months or the court has determined that 

aggravated circumstances exist and that reasonable 

efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove the 

child from the child’s parent, guardian or custodian or to 

preserve and reunify the family need not be made or 

continue to be made, whether the county agency has filed 

or sought to join a petition to terminate parental rights 

and to identify, recruit, process and approve a qualified 

family to adopt the child unless:

(i) the child is being cared for by a relative best 

suited to the physical, mental and moral welfare of 

the child;

(ii) the county agency has documented a 

compelling reason for determining that filing a 

petition to terminate parental rights would not 

serve the needs and welfare of the child; or

(iii) the child’s family has not been provided with 

necessary services to achieve the safe return to 
J-S22043-17

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the child’s parent, guardian or custodian within the 

time frames set forth in the permanency plan.

* * *

(f.1) Additional determination. — Based upon the 

determinations made under subsection (f) and all relevant 

evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall determine one 

of the following:

(1) If and when the child will be returned to the child’s 

parent, guardian or custodian in cases where the return 

of the child is best suited to the safety, protection and 

physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.

(2) If and when the child will be placed for adoption, and 

the county agency will file for termination of parental 

rights in cases where return to the child’s parent, 

guardian or custodian is not best suited to the safety, 

protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the 

child.

(3) If and when the child will be placed with a legal 

custodian in cases where return to the child’s parent, 

guardian or custodian or being placed for adoption is not 

best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental 

and moral welfare of the child.

(4) If and when the child will be placed with a fit and 

willing relative in cases where return to the child’s parent, 

guardian or custodian, being placed for adoption or being 

placed with a legal custodian is not best suited to the 

safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare 

of the child.

(5) If and when the child will be placed in another living 

arrangement intended to be permanent in nature which is 

approved by the court in cases where the county agency 

has documented a compelling reason that it would not be 

best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental 

and moral welfare of the child to be returned to the 

child’s parent, guardian or custodian, to be placed for 

adoption, to be placed with a legal custodian or to be 

placed with a fit and wiling relative.
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(f.2) Evidence. – Evidence of conduct by the parent that places 

the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk, including 

evidence of the use of alcohol or a controlled substance that 

places the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk, shall be 

presented to the court by the county agency or any other party 

at any disposition or permanency hearing whether or not the 

conduct was the basis for the determination of dependency. 

(g) Court order.— On the basis of the determination made 

under subsection (f.1), the court shall order the 

continuation, modification or termination of placement or 

other disposition which is best suited to the safety, 

protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the 

child.

* * *

42 Pa.C.S. § 6351 (some emphasis added).

In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, the trial court stated as follows: 

[T]he [c]ourt does hereby adopt its Status Review Order 

October 25, 2016 as the place on the record where the reasons 

for the decision are found and supplements as follows:

This Court considered the credible evidence presented at 

the Adjudication Hearing held on August 16, 2016, the Status 

Review Hearing held on October 25, 2016, and the evidence 

admitted into the record. Appellant argues that the [c]ourt 

abused its discretion by ordering the Agency to reimburse the 

minor child’s Paternal Grandmother, [N.T.-C.], the amount of 

$540.00, reflecting the out-of-pocket costs paid by Grandmother 

regarding the subject minor child, [K.G].

At an Adjudication hearing held on August 16, 2016, the 

Court directed1, inter alia, that the Agency to [sic] schedule an 

‘evaluation for the child’ pursuant to the Abortion Control Act. 

Hr’g Tr. 44:1 (August 16, 2016)(emphasis added). The [c]ourt 

also indicated that the GAL could represent the minor child in 

subsequent related proceedings “based on information obtained 

as a result of that evaluation”. Hr’g Tr. 44: 3-4 (August 16, 

2016). The [c]ourt further directed the Agency to refer the 

family for Family Based Services and Youth Advocate. The 

Agency then willfully refused to schedule a medical appointment 

for the minor in direct contradiction of the [c]ourt’s directive. 
J-S22043-17

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The GAL, in its Motion to Modify Order of August 16, 20162, 

requested this [c]ourt to transfer Medical and Educational rights 

to Paternal Grandmother due to the Agency’s “reluctance to 

arrange and attend certain medical appointments as Ordered on 

August 16 2016.”3 The [c]ourt then determined that it was in 

the best interest of the child to transfer medical rights to 

Paternal Grandmother4and later to Mother to ensure that the 

child received timely and appropriate medical care.

It is disingenuous of the Agency to now argue in opposition 

of this [c]ourt’s directives from the Order of August 16, 2016, as 

the Agency indicated its support for the directives off the record, 

made no objection to the directives at the time the Order was 

entered, and did not appeal or preserve an objection at any time 

subsequent to the [c]ourt entering that Order. It is only now, 

after the Agency is found in contempt for failure to follow 

directives of the [c]ourt, that the Agency raises an objection to 

the initial directives, which included the Agency making a 

medical appointment for the child.

The Court found that the Agency repeatedly ignored this 

[c]ourt’s directives. At the hearing on October 25, 2016, this 

[c]ourt not only found that the Agency ignored directives to 

make a medical appointment for the child; it also found that the 

Agency failed to provide any services to the child or the family. 

The Agency showed a deliberate indifference to the directives of 

this [c]ourt and to the welfare of the child.

At the hearing held on October 25, 2016, the [c]ourt

directed the Agency to reimburse Paternal Grandmother for 

expenses paid on behalf of the minor child, as the [c]ourt found 

that the Agency failed and refused to comply with [c]ourt 

directives, particularly the directive to schedule the child for a 

medical consultation.

The [c]ourt found that any out-of-pocket expenses 

Paternal Grandmother incurred were due to the Agency’s failure 

to follow Court directives. In addition, the record shows that due 

to Agency’s failure to provide the minor child with the 

appropriate medical care, as was directed by the Court per the 

Order of Adjudication and Disposition of August 16, 2016, the 

GAL requested a change in legal custody related to medical 

decisions for the child. No objection was made by the Agency 

and no appeal was taken. Since the Agency refused to ensure 
J-S22043-17

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that the child was timely seen by a physician, Paternal 

Grandmother was forced to make medical appointments for the 

child at her expense. On the Order of August 16, 2016, the 

[c]ourt directed the Agency to “immediately make a [18] 

Pa.C.S.A. §32016 medical appointment as requested by the GAL 

and the GAL is authorized to represent the child in an action 

pursuant to [18] Pa.C.S.A. §3201 et seq, specifically §3206(c).” 

Id. at 3. This [c]ourt failed to find anywhere in the record 

where the [c]ourt ordered the child to undergo an abortion, or 

otherwise directed the Agency to arrange or pay for any such 

procedure.

The [c]ourt found the Agency “in contempt of the Court 

Order for its complete lack of follow through with the directives 

of [the] Court” and as this [c]ourt stated, the lack of follow 

through causes this [c]ourt “concern about the Agency and some 

caseworkers. . . ability to do their job.” Hr. Tr. 29: 3-8 (October 

25, 2016). To be punished for contempt, a party must not only 

have violated a court order, but that order must have been 

“definite, clear, and specific.”7 We find that the Order of August 

16, 2016 was very clear in its directive to the Agency, and we 

find that supported a finding that the Agency willfully did not 

comply. This [c]ourt entered this finding of contempt after a full 

hearing, scheduled by the Agency, where the GAL and the 

Agency provided evidence that supported a finding that the 

Agency had willfully chosen to ignore the [c]ourt’s directives 

throughout the time of the Agency involvement with the child. 

The purpose of the Status Review is to ensure that the services 

directed were being provided by the Agency. The court found no 

services were provided. The sanction upon the Agency, of the 

fine made payable to Paternal Grandmother, is compensation for 

the damage Paternal Grandmother sustained by reason of the 

Agency’s conduct in failing to follow the [c]ourt’s directives.

The [c]ourt notes a culture at the Agency where 

caseworkers choose what directives to follow. The purpose of 

the Juvenile Act is for the Court to ensure that the best interest 

of the child is a paramount consideration, and the Agency must 

follow the directives of the [c]ourt to protect the child.

Based on reliable and credible evidence that demonstrated 

Appellant’s [CYF’s] continuing pattern of inability to follow 

[c]ourt directives, the [c]ourt found that the Agency was in 

contempt of the [c]ourt Order and was sanctioned appropriately.
J-S22043-17

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Competent evidence on the record supports the outcome.

___________________________________________________

1 The Court notes that the service requirements for the Agency 

and family are outlined in the Court Ordered services and 

conditions that was prepared by the Agency and presented for 

incorporation.

2

Filed August 29, 2016.

3 Motion to Modify Order of August 16, 2016.

4 By Order dated August 30th, 2016, this [c]ourt granted [N.T.-C. 

(Paternal Grandmother)] “the right and authority to make 

reasonable and appropriate medical decisions for the minor(s), 

including the authority to consent to emergency and long-term 

medical treatment”.

5 By the Status Review Order dated October 25, 2016, this 

[c]ourt transferred medical rights to both CYF and Mother.

6 We note [that] in the Order the statute was incorrectly stated 

as 32 Pa.C.S.A. § 3201 et seq.

7 Lachat v. Hinchcliffe, 769 A.2d 481, 488 (Pa. Super. Ct. 

2001)(quoting Marian Shop Inc. v. Baird, 448 Pa.Super. 52, 

670 A.2d 671, 673 (1996).)

Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 12/23/16, at 1-7 (emphasis in original) 

(footnotes in original).

The statute to which the trial court referred, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3201, is 

known as the Abortion Control Act. Section 3205 of the Abortion Control act 

relates to the informed consent of the woman upon whom the abortion is to 

be performed. Section 3205 provides:

§ 3205. Informed Consent
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(a) General rule.— No abortion shall be performed or induced 

except with the voluntary and informed consent of the woman 

upon whom the abortion is to be performed or induced. . . . 

18 Pa.C.S. § 3205.

Section 3206 of the Abortion Control Act provides as follows:

§ 3206. Parental consent.

(a) General rule.--Except in the case of a medical 

emergency, or except as provided in this section, if a pregnant 

woman is less than 18 years of age and not emancipated, or if 

she has been adjudged an incapacitated person under 20 Pa.C.S. 

§5511 (relating to petition and hearing; independent 

evaluation), a physician shall not perform an abortion upon her 

unless, in the case of a woman who is less than 18 years of age, 

she first obtains the informed consent both of the pregnant 

woman and of one of her parents; or, in the case of a woman 

who is an incapacitated person, she first obtains the informed 

consent of her guardian. In deciding whether to grant such 

consent, a pregnant woman’s parent or guardian shall consider 

only their child’s or ward’s best interests. In the case of a 

pregnancy that is the result of incest where the father is a party 

to the incestuous act, the pregnant woman need only obtain the 

consent of her mother.

(b) Unavailability of parent or guardian.--If both parents 

have died or are otherwise unavailable to the physician within a 

reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, consent of the 

pregnant woman’s guardian or guardians shall be sufficient. If 

the pregnant woman’s parents are divorced, consent of the 

parent having custody shall be sufficient. If neither any parent

nor a legal guardian is available to the physician within a 

reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, consent of any 

adult person standing in loco parentis shall be sufficient.

(c) Petition to court for consent.--If both of the parents or 

guardians of the pregnant woman refuse to consent to the 

performance of an abortion or if she elects not to seek the 

consent of either of her parents or of her guardian, the court 

of common pleas of the judicial district in which the applicant 

resides or in which the abortion is sought shall, upon petition 

or motion, after an appropriate hearing, authorize a physician 
J-S22043-17

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to perform the abortion if the court determines that the 

pregnant woman is mature and capable of giving informed 

consent to the proposed abortion, and has, in fact, given such 

consent.

(d) Court order.--If the court determines that the pregnant 

woman is not mature and capable of giving informed consent or 

if the pregnant woman does not claim to be mature and capable 

of giving informed consent, the court shall determine whether 

the performance of an abortion upon her would be in her best 

interests. If the court determines that the performance of an 

abortion would be in the best interests of the woman, it shall 

authorize a physician to perform the abortion.

(e) Representation in proceedings.--The pregnant woman 

may participate in proceedings in the court on her own behalf 

and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem to assist her. The

court shall, however, advise her that she has a right to court 

appointed counsel, and shall provide her with such counsel 

unless she wishes to appear with private counsel or has 

knowingly and intelligently waived representation by counsel.

(f) Proceedings.—

(1) Court proceedings under this section shall be 

confidential and shall be given such precedence over 

other pending matters as will ensure that the court may 

reach a decision promptly and without delay in order to 

serve the best interests of the pregnant woman. In no 

case shall the court of common pleas fail to rule within 

three business days of the date of application. A court of 

common pleas which conducts proceedings under this 

section shall make in writing specific factual findings and 

legal conclusions supporting its decision and shall, upon 

the initial filing of the minor’s petition for judicial 

authorization of an abortion, order a sealed record of the 

petition, pleadings, submissions, transcripts, exhibits, 

orders, evidence and any other written material to be 

maintained which shall include its own findings and 

conclusions.

(2) The application to the court of common pleas shall be 

accompanied by a non-notarized verification stating that 

the information therein is true and correct to the best of 
J-S22043-17

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the applicant’s knowledge, and the application shall set 

forth the following facts:

(i) The initials of the pregnant woman.

(ii) The age of the pregnant woman.

(iii) The names and addresses of each parent, 

guardian or, if the minor's parents are deceased 

and no guardian has been appointed, any other 

person standing in loco parentis to the minor.

(iv) That the pregnant woman has been fully 

informed of the risks and consequences of the 

abortion.

(v) Whether the pregnant woman is of sound mind 

and has sufficient intellectual capacity to consent 

to the abortion.

(vi) A prayer for relief asking the court to either 

grant the pregnant woman full capacity for the 

purpose of personal consent to the abortion, or to 

give judicial consent to the abortion under 

subsection (d) based upon a finding that the 

abortion is in the best interest of the pregnant 

woman.

(vii) That the pregnant woman is aware that any 

false statements made in the application are 

punishable by law.

(viii) The signature of the pregnant woman. 

Where necessary to serve the interest of justice, 

the orphans’ court division, or, in Philadelphia, the 

family court division, shall refer the pregnant 

woman to the appropriate personnel for assistance 

in preparing the application.

(3) The name of the pregnant woman shall not be 

entered on any docket which is subject to public 

inspection. All persons shall be excluded from hearings 

under this section except the applicant and such other 
J-S22043-17

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persons whose presence is specifically requested by the 

applicant or her guardian.

(4) At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence relating 

to the emotional development, maturity, intellect and 

understanding of the pregnant woman, the fact and 

duration of her pregnancy, the nature, possible 

consequences and alternatives to the abortion and any 

other evidence that the court may find useful in 

determining whether the pregnant woman should be 

granted full capacity for the purpose of consenting to the 

abortion or whether the abortion is in the best interest of 

the pregnant woman. The court shall also notify the 

pregnant woman at the hearing that it must rule on her 

application within three business days of the date of its 

filing and that, should the court fail to rule in favor of 

her application within the allotted time, she has the right 

to appeal to the Superior Court.

(g) Coercion prohibited.--Except in a medical emergency, no 

parent, guardian or other person standing in loco parentis shall 

coerce a minor or incapacitated woman to undergo an abortion. 

Any minor or incapacitated woman who is threatened with such 

coercion may apply to a court of common pleas for relief. The 

court shall provide the minor or incapacitated woman with 

counsel, give the matter expedited consideration and grant such 

relief as may be necessary to prevent such coercion. Should a 

minor be denied the financial support of her parents by reason 

of her refusal to undergo abortion, she shall be considered 

emancipated for purposes of eligibility for assistance benefits.

(h) Regulation of proceedings.--No filing fees shall be 

required of any woman availing herself of the procedures 

provided by this section. An expedited confidential appeal shall 

be available to any pregnant woman whom the court fails to 

grant an order authorizing an abortion within the time specified 

in this section. Any court to which an appeal is taken under this 

section shall give prompt and confidential attention thereto and 

shall rule thereon within five business days of the filing of the 

appeal. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania may issue such 

rules as may further assure that the process provided in this 

section is conducted in such a manner as will ensure 

confidentiality and sufficient precedence over other pending 

matters to ensure promptness of disposition.
J-S22043-17

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(i) Penalty.--Any person who performs an abortion upon a 

woman who is an unemancipated minor or incapacitated person 

to whom this section applies either with knowledge that she is a 

minor or incapacitated person to whom this section applies, or 

with reckless disregard or negligence as to whether she is a 

minor or incapacitated person to whom this section applies, and 

who intentionally, knowingly or recklessly fails to conform to any 

requirement of this section is guilty of “unprofessional 

conduct” and his license for the practice of medicine and 

surgery shall be suspended in accordance with procedures 

provided under the act of October 5, 1978 (P.L.1109, No.261), 

known as the Osteopathic Medical Practice Act, the act of 

December 20, 1985 (P.L.457, No.112), known as the Medical 

Practice Act of 1985, or their successor acts, for a period of 

at least three months. Failure to comply with the requirements 

of this section is prima facie evidence of failure to obtain 

informed consent and of interference with family relations in 

appropriate civil actions. The law of this Commonwealth shall 

not be construed to preclude the award of exemplary damages 

or damages for emotional distress even if unaccompanied by 

physical complications in any appropriate civil action relevant to 

violations of this section. Nothing in this section shall be 

construed to limit the common law rights of parents.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3206 (emphasis added).

In In re Doe, 613 Pa. 339, 33 A.3d 615 (2011), our Supreme Court 

set forth the only published interpretation of the court’s responsibilities 

under section 3206(c), which is known as the “judicial bypass” section. Id.

at 342, 357-358, 33 A.3d at 617, 627. The Supreme Court determined that 

the appellate courts must follow an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing 

a trial court’s maturity/capacity determination under the judicial bypass 

section. Id. at 353-354, 33 A.3d at 624. The Supreme Court explained:

“[a]n abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but 

if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or 

the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result 
J-S22043-17

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of partiality, prejudice, bias or illwill . . . discretion is abused.” 

An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an 

appellate court might have reached a different conclusion based 

on the record before it. A trial court’s exercise of discretion, 

however, is not unfettered.

Id. at 355-356, 33 A.3d at 626.

In In re Doe, the Supreme Court reviewed the Superior Court’s ruling 

on the trial court’s denial of a minor child’s petition for judicial authorization 

of an abortion under section 3206(c) of the Abortion Control Act. Likewise, 

in In re L.D.F., a panel of this Court reviewed the trial court’s denial of a 

minor child’s petition for judicial authorization of an abortion under section 

3206(c) of the Abortion Control Act. Notably, both cases involved a petition 

filed by the minor child seeking to have judicial authorization of an abortion 

under section 3206(c) of the Abortion Control Act, and evidentiary hearings 

on the petitions. In contrast, the present appeal did not involve petitions 

under section 3206(c) of the Abortion Control Act and an evidentiary 

hearing. 

With regard to CYF’s due process argument, we observe:

Formal notice and an opportunity to be heard are 

fundamental components of due process when a person may be 

deprived in a legal proceeding of a liberty interest, such as 

physical freedom, or a parent’s custody of her child. Both notice 

and an opportunity to be heard must be afforded at a meaningful 

time in a meaningful manner. As previous panels of this Court 

have explained: [n]otice, in our adversarial process, ensures 

that each party is provided adequate opportunity to prepare 

and thereafter properly advocate its position, ultimately exposing 

all relevant factors from which the finder of fact may make an 

informed judgment. 
J-S22043-17

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Everett v. Parker, 889 A.2d 578, 580 (Pa. Super. 2005) (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).

When reviewing contempt orders, we must consider that:

Each court is the exclusive judge of contempts against its 

process. The contempt power is essential to the preservation of 

the court’s authority and prevents the administration of justice 

from falling into disrepute. When reviewing an appeal from a 

contempt order, the appellate court must place great reliance 

upon the discretion of the trial judge.

Langendorfer v. Spearman, 797 A.2d 303, 307 (Pa. Super. 2002) 

(quoting Garr v. Peters, 773 A.2d 183, 189 (Pa. Super 2001)). “The court 

abuses its discretion if it misapplies the law or exercises its discretion in a 

manner lacking reason.” Godfrey v. Godfrey, 894 A.2d 776, 780 (Pa. 

Super. 2006). Additionally, “[i]n proceedings for civil contempt of court, the 

general rule is that the burden of proof rests with the complaining party to 

demonstrate, by preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is in 

noncompliance with a court order.” Lachat v. Hinchcliffe, 769 A.2d 481, 

488 (Pa. Super. 2001). However, a mere showing of noncompliance with a 

court order, or even misconduct, is never sufficient alone to prove civil 

contempt.” Id. Moreover, we recognize that:

To sustain a finding of civil contempt, the complainant must 

prove certain distinct elements: (1) that the contemnor had 

notice of the specific order or decree which he is alleged to have 

disobeyed; (2) that the act constituting the contemnor’s violation 

was volitional; and (3) that the contemnor acted with wrongful 

intent.

Stahl v. Redcay, 897 A.2d 478, 489 (Pa. Super. 2006).
J-S22043-17

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Here, the trial court went well beyond the scope of the Juvenile Act 

proceedings and determinations set forth in section 6302 and 6351 of the 

Juvenile Act and went to a matter appropriately included in Abortion Control 

Act proceedings. Section 3206 of the Abortion Control Act expressly sets 

forth the procedures for judicial bypass in order for a minor to have an 

abortion under court direction. Not only did CYF have no notice of a petition 

for a judicial bypass under section 3206 of the Abortion Control Act, because 

none was filed, but it also lacked notice of any contempt proceedings against 

it, because no petition for contempt was filed, either. There was no petition 

under section 3206 of the Abortion Control Act or any contempt petition 

before the trial court when the court imposed the sanction of requiring CYF 

to reimburse Paternal Grandmother $540 for the amount of money she paid 

for Child’s abortion. CYF certainly was not on notice that, by delaying a few 

days in taking Child to a physician, between the August 16, 2016 

dependency order and the August 30, 2016 order, in which the court 

transferred medical rights to Paternal Grandmother, having to pay for the 

cost of child to undergo an abortion was even a possible sanction to be 

imposed on CYF. This is especially true where there is nothing in the 

Abortion Control Act that would appear to require an agency to pay for an 

abortion for a minor child, even a minor child who proceeds under the 

judicial bypass section, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3206(c), and the trial court does not 

cite any such authority. Thus, we conclude that the trial court could not 
J-S22043-17

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indirectly order CYF to pay for Child’s abortion under the Abortion Control 

Act, by means of a contempt finding and sanction, where it could not do so 

directly under the Abortion Control Act.

Accordingly, we find that the trial court abused its discretion, as it 

failed to follow proper procedure when it found CYF in contempt of court, 

and sanctioned CYF, requiring it to reimburse Paternal Grandmother for the 

cost of Child’s abortion. We are constrained to vacate the trial court’s order 

finding CYF in contempt and directing CYF to pay Grandmother $540, and 

remand the matter for further dependency proceedings under the Juvenile 

Act. 

Order vacated, in part, insofar as it imposes a $540 sanction on CYF; 

case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judge Shogan joins the Memorandum.

Judge Moulton concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/6/2017