J-A10022-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

WILLIAMS FIELD SERVICES COMPANY, 

LLC, 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellant 

v.

CLEO R. TEEL AND GLORIA D. TEEL, 

HUSBAND AND WIFE 

 Appellees No. 1475 MDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment Entered August 8, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County 

Civil Division at No: 2012-1959-CP

BEFORE: DONOHUE, ALLEN, and STABILE, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED AUGUST 25, 2014 

Appellant, Williams Field Services Company, Inc., appeals from the 

August 8, 2013 judgment entered in favor of Appellees, Cleo R. and Gloria 

D. Teel. We vacate and remand. 

This litigation arises from a Pipeline Right-of-Way and Compressor Site 

Grant agreement (the “Right-of-Way”) providing for pipelines to be laid and 

a compressor station to be built on Appellee’s 586-acre property in 

Susquehanna County. Appellees executed the Right of Way in 2007 with 

Cabot Oil & Gas Corporation (“Cabot”), Appellant’s predecessor-in-interest. 
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In addition, in 2008, Appellees and Cabot executed a Compressor Station 

Agreement (the “Compressor Station Agreement) providing further details 

concerning the compressor station to be built. The Right-of-Way gave Cabot 

the right to construct and maintain pipelines on Appellees’ property. The 

Right-of-Way provided that the location of any pipeline would be “subject to 

mutual consent [...], it being understood that such consent shall not be 

unreasonably withheld.” Right-of-Way, 10/6/07. The Right of Way also 

provided for Appellees to receive twenty dollars “per lineal rod for each rod 

of pipe laid” on Appellees’ property. Id. 

In 2010, Cabot assigned its rights in the Right-of-Way and Compressor 

Station Agreement to Appellant. In 2011, Appellant engaged Appellees in 

discussions about the location of a new pipeline, specifically a discharge line, 

to be constructed on Appellees’ property pursuant to the Right-of-Way. N.T. 

Trial, 7/10/13, at 86-87. Appellees, however, declined to consent to the 

construction of a new pipeline in accordance with the Right of Way. In 

response, instead of standing on rights acquired under the Right of Way, 

Appellant thereafter approached Appellees with a proposal for a new rightof-way agreement (the “Proposed Agreement”). Id. at 88. 

The Proposed Agreement would, among other things, govern the 

location of a discharge line and provide Appellees more financial 

compensation than the Right-of-Way. Id. at 48-49, 52-54. Appellant 

believed the parties verbally agreed to a location for the discharge line. Id.
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at 54, 103. Nonetheless, the parties never executed the Proposed 

Agreement because they could not agree on compensation. Id. Appellant 

offered testimony that one of its goals in pursing the Proposed Agreement 

was to arrive at a mutually acceptable location for the discharge line, 

regardless of whether the parties executed the proposed agreement or 

proceeded under the existing Right of Way. Id. at 37. When it became 

evident that agreement on the Proposed Agreement would not be had, 

Appellant undertook to commence construction of the discharge line under 

the terms of the executed Right of Way. Id. at 62, 68-69; Plaintiff’s Exhibit 

6. Appellant tendered compensation pursuant to the Right of Way, in 

response to which Appellees denied any agreement as to location of the 

discharge line and declined the compensation. Id. at 63; Plaintiff’s Exhibit 

7. When Appellant’s personnel arrived on Appellees’ property to begin 

preparations for the discharge line, Appellees ejected them. Id. at 68-69, 

135-37. 

Following its ejection from Appellees’ land, Appellant commenced this 

action on October 23, 2012 seeking permanent injunctive relief. The 

complaint upon which the Appellant proceeded to trial sought to enforce 

rights Appellant possessed under the executed Right of Way and Compressor 

Station Agreements. The parties proceeded to a non-jury trial on July 10, 

2013. At the conclusion of Appellant’s evidence, Appellees moved for a 

compulsory nonsuit. Appellees argued that the parties had not reached 
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mutual consent for location of the discharge line and therefore, Appellant did 

not meet its burden of proof. Id. at 139-40. In response, Appellant argued 

it was entitled to relief, since Appellees could not unreasonably withhold 

consent. Id. at 140. The trial court agreed it had to make a determination 

as to whether consent was unreasonably withheld. Id. at 141. It also 

stated that it felt the location selected was the best location anyone could 

have, as it was direct, along the road, and did not bother anyone too much, 

and that the location selected was a reasonable right-of-way area. Id. at 

139-41. Nonetheless, without any further explanation, the trial court 

granted Appellees’ motion for compulsory nonsuit reasoning that Appellant 

had not proven its case to merit the granting of a permanent injunction. 

Post-trial motions to remove the nonsuit were filed by Appellant and 

denied by the trial court. In its 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained 

that the Appellees’ consent was required under the Right of Way and never 

was obtained by Appellant. Trial Court Opinion, 10/1/13, at 3. It further 

explained that while Appellant argues that consent as to location was 

obtained, that hardly satisfied the consent requirement considering 

Appellees had issues with monetary compensation, among other things, and 

that other witnesses stated there were outstanding provisions presented by 

Appellant that had yet to be finalized. Id. at 4-5. The latter was an obvious 

reference to the terms not yet agreed to under the Proposed Agreement. 
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Judgment in favor of Appellees was entered on August 8, 2013, and 

this timely appeal followed. Appellant raises three issues on appeal: (1) the 

trial court erred in entering the nonsuit; (2) the trial court erred in 

considering inadmissible parol evidence; and (3) the trial court erred in 

declining to hold a hearing on Appellant’s post-trial motion. Appellant’s Brief 

at 5. We will confine our analysis to the first issue, which we consider 

dispositive. 

Rule 230.1 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure governs entry 

of nonsuit. The Rule permits entry of nonsuit on any cause of action for 

which the plaintiff, at the close of the plaintiff’s case, has failed to establish a 

right to relief. Pa.R.C.P. 230.1(a)(1). The trial court, in ruling on a motion 

for nonsuit, considers only the plaintiff’s evidence and any evidence 

favorable to the plaintiff introduced by the defendant. Pa.R.C.P. 

230.1(a)(2). 

The motion for compulsory non-suit allows a defendant to 

test the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence and may be entered 

only in cases where it is clear that the plaintiff has not provided 

sufficient evidence to establish all the elements necessary to 

maintain a cause of action. In making its determination, the trial 

court must give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable 

inferences arising from the evidence present and must resolve 

any conflict in favor of the plaintiff. 

Bugosh v. Allen Refractories Co., 932 A.2d 901, 913 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(citations omitted). We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to remove 

a nonsuit for abuse of discretion or error of law. Dietzel v. Gurman, 806 

A.2d 1264, 1268 (Pa. Super. 2002). We must resolve all evidentiary 
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conflicts in favor of the party against whom the trial court entered the 

nonsuit. Shay v. Flight C Helicopter Servs., 822 A.2d 1, 13 (Pa. Super. 

2003).1

 “A compulsory non-suit is proper only where the facts and

circumstances compel the conclusion that the defendants are not liable 

upon the cause of action pleaded by the plaintiff.” Mahan v. Am-Gard, 

Inc., 841 A.2d 1052, 1058 (Pa. Super. 2003) (emphasis added), appeal 

denied, 858 A.2d 110 (Pa. 2004).2

 

 

1

 Concerning the grant or denial of a permanent injunction, we must 

determine whether the trial court committed an error of law in finding the 

plaintiff established (or failed to establish) a clear right to relief. Buffalo 

Twp. v. Jones, 813 A.2d 659, 664 n.4 (Pa. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 

821 (2003). Our standard of review for a question of law is de novo. Id. 

To justify the award of a permanent injunction, the party seeking relief 

“must establish that his right to relief is clear, that an injunction is necessary 

to avoid an injury that cannot be compensated by damages, and that 

greater injury will result from refusing rather than granting the relief 

requested.” Kuznik v. Westmoreland Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 902 A.2d 

476, 489 (Pa. 2006). 

We observe that Appellant did not file an action seeking specific performance 

of the Right of Way. Showings necessary to receive the remedy of specific 

performance are similar, but not identical, to those required for a permanent 

injunction. “Specific performance is an equitable remedy that permits the 

court to compel performance of a contract when there exists in the contract 

an agreement between the parties as to the nature of the performance.” 

Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 31 (Pa. Super. 2006). “Specific 

performance should only be granted where the facts clearly establish the 

plaintiff’s right thereto, where no adequate remedy at law exists, and where 

justice requires it.” Id. 

2

 We believe the Dissenting Judge has not applied the correct standard of 

review. The case cited in the Dissenting Memorandum, Eckman v. Erie 

Ins. Exch., 21 A.3d 1203 (Pa. Super. 2011), does not involve entry of 

nonsuit. Rather, that case is simply an appeal from the denial of a motion 

for preliminary injunction. Id. at 1205. In stating her conclusion that “the 

trial court had ‘reasonable grounds’ for entering the nonsuit,” we believe the 
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Instantly, the trial court entered a nonsuit against Appellant because it 

believed the parties never reached mutual consent as to the location of the 

discharge line and that other provisions had yet to be finalized. Therefore, 

according to the trial court, Appellant had no chance of obtaining relief. We 

disagree. 

Our review of the record confirms that Appellant had the right, 

pursuant to the Right-of-Way, to construct pipelines on Appellees’ land 

subject only to a) Appellees’ consent to the location, which Appellees could 

not unreasonably withhold, and b) payment of certain compensation as 

required under the Right of Way. Right-of-Way, 10/6/07. Although the 

parties could not agree on compensation under the Proposed Agreement, 

 

Dissent has conflated two standards of review. Dissenting Memorandum, at 

2. The “reasonable grounds” language governs our review of entry or denial 

of a preliminary injunction. Eckman, 21 A.3d at 1206. In reviewing entry 

of a nonsuit, as set forth in Dietzel, we review the trial court’s decision for 

abuse of discretion or error of law. As explained infra, we conclude the 

latter occurred in this case. 

Further, the correct standard of review requires us to resolve evidentiary 

conflicts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the losing party, per 

Bugosh and Shay. In reasoning that “[t]he testimony at trial did not

establish that Appellant’s right to build a new discharge pipeline on the 

Teels’ property was ‘clear’ and ‘free from doubt[,]’” the Dissenting Judge has 

answered a question that is simply not before us. Dissenting Memorandum, 

at 5. Rather, we must discern whether Appellant produced sufficient 

evidence to obtain relief, resolving evidentiary conflicts and drawing 

reasonable inferences in Appellant’s favor. Indeed, the trial court’s ruling is 

sustainable only if the instant facts and circumstances “compel the 

conclusion” that a nonsuit was appropriate. Mahan, 841 A.2d at 1058. We 

believe the Dissent has placed on Appellant a far greater burden than is 

applicable here. 
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nothing of record suggests that the payment tendered by Appellant under 

the Right of Way was not in accord with the terms of that agreement.3

 As 

these were the only two conditions to be satisfied prior to Appellant being 

able to exercise its right to install a new pipeline under the Right of Way, the 

only issue that had to be resolved by the trial court was whether consent by 

Appellees was unreasonably withheld under the Right of Way. 

As for consent, the record reflects that Appellees insisted upon 

satisfaction of no less than 28 conditions before they would give consent to a 

location for the new pipeline. Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 8. All but one of these 

conditions is not to be found in the Right of Way. The one to be found in the 

Right of Way is condition 15 relating to location, which in fact comports with 

Appellant’s desire to locate its new pipeline in the right of way parallel to 

Button Road. N.T. Trial, 7/10/13, at 66; Plaintiff’s Exhibit 8. As there were 

only two conditions to be satisfied prior to installation of a new pipeline, the 

only one in dispute being mutual consent as to location not to be 

unreasonably withheld, we believe the trial court erred in granting Appellees’

motion for compulsory nonsuit on the basis that agreement on monetary 

compensation and other terms yet to be finalized had not occurred between 

the parties. 

 

3

 The record reflects that by check dated June 6, 2012, Appellant tendered 

payment of $8,000 to Appellees pursuant to the Right of Way. By letter 

dated June 14, 2012, the Appellees returned this payment indicating that 

they had not agreed to a location, but that they remained interested in 

discussing Appellant’s desire to install an additional pipeline on their 

property. Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 7. 
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The terms not yet finalized pertained to the Proposed Agreement, 

which was not the basis for Appellant’s suit for permanent injunctive relief. 

These additional terms were irrelevant to Appellant’s claims under the Right 

of Way. The only issue that had to be resolved by the trial court was 

whether Appellees acted unreasonably in not consenting to the proposed 

location of the pipeline. The reasonableness, or lack thereof, of Appellees’ 

refusal to consent is a question of law to be answered pursuant to the terms 

of the Right of Way. 4

 Though the trial court ultimately did not directly 

answer this question, the court telegraphed its belief the location selected 

was the best possible location. 

Appellant was entitled to the benefit of all its evidence and all 

favorable inferences therefrom in defense of the Appellees’ motion for 

compulsory nonsuit. Appellant’s evidence established that the parties 

arrived at a mutually agreeable location for the discharge line, and that 

Appellees refused to permit Appellant to install the discharge line in 

accordance with the Right of Way.5

 The trial court erred by not affording 

 

4

 The Dissent emphasizes Appellee’s refusal to give consent, but she does 

not address the possibility, based on the plain language of the Right of Way, 

that Appellant can obtain relief by virtue of Appellee’s unreasonable refusal 

to consent. Dissenting Memorandum, at 5. 

5

 We do not understand the basis for Dissenting Judge’s conclusion that 

Appellant has an adequate remedy at law. See Dissenting Memorandum, at 

6. The compressor station built pursuant to the Compressor Station 

Agreement was useful only to the extent that Appellant could run pipelines 

to and from it. Equitable enforcement of a contract affecting an interest in 

real estate is appropriate unless money damages are readily ascertainable. 
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Appellant the benefit of that evidence, and further by conflating the 

conditions precedent to Appellant’s right to locate its pipeline under the 

Right of Way with terms not agreed upon under the Proposed Agreement 

that were irrelevant to Appellant’s rights under the Right of Way. Clearly, at 

a minimum, Appellant produced sufficient evidence to preclude the granting 

of a compulsory nonsuit in favor of Appellees. The trial court erred by not 

applying the law applicable to entry of a nonsuit.6

 We therefore vacate the 

judgment and remand for further proceedings. 

Judgment vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Allen, J., filed a dissenting memorandum. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/25/2014 

 

See Petry v. Tanglwood Lakes, Inc., 522 A.2d 1053, 1055-57 (Pa. 1987). 

We discern no basis upon which to ascertain an amount of money damages 

stemming from Appellant’s inability to use the compressor station as 

contemplated in the Compressor Station Agreement and the Right of Way. 

6

 We address here only the basis given by the trial court for the granting of 

the nonsuit. The trial court’s decision only went so far as to address the 

contractual terms of what it thought controlled the outcome in this case. It 

did not address the other criteria for the granting of permanent injunctive 

relief. Accordingly, we leave those considerations for proceedings upon 

remand.