UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

JONATHAN P. LYNCH, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 3:13-cv-01364-PPS

 )

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Jonathan P. Lynch, a pro se prisoner, filed this habeas corpus case attempting to

challenge a prison disciplinary hearing (WCC 13-09-595) where he lost 60 days earned

credit time and was demoted from Credit Class 1 to Credit Class 2. The Respondent

acknowledges that this petition is not moot merely because Lynch has been released

from prison. The Respondent recognizes that this case could proceed if Lynch could

obtain relief which would shorten the duration of his time on parole. However, the

Respondent has moved to dismiss and argues that this petition is moot because Lynch’s

parole will end on July 14, 2014, even if he were to prevail in this case. 

Here is how the Respondent explains the argument. Lynch was released to

parole on February 21, 2014. DE 14-2. If he had not been disciplined, he could have been

released on October 13, 2013. Parole lasts for up to 24 months after release from prison,

but not longer than the end of the defendant’s sentence. Ind. Code § 35-50-6-1. So if

Lynch were to prevail in this case, the date when his 24 months of parole would end
would be in October 2015, rather than February 2016. However, Lynch’s current

sentence (which he began serving on January 13, 2013) was only for 1 year 6 months

and 2 days. DE 14-2. His sentence will end on July 14, 2014. DE 14-2. Thus, his parole

must end on July 14, 2014, and would have done so even if he’d been released on

October 13, 2013, or some other date before February 21, 2014. Credit time would affect

when Lynch was released on parole, not when his parole ends.

Lynch has not responded to the motion to dismiss nor otherwise disputed the

accuracy of the records submitted by the Respondent. Those records support the facts

and dates presented by the Respondent. Therefore I will accept them as true. Based on

those dates, it is clear that this case is moot for the reasons argued by the Respondent.

See Eichwedel v. Curry, 700 F.3d 275, 279 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The best that [Petitioner] can do

is to point to the possibility that he might have served a shorter period of incarceration

before beginning his period of supervised release. All he can suggest is that prison

authorities might have seen fit to grant him a reduction in the days he had to serve. Such

a deficiency is not sufficient to establish a continuing controversy . . . . Moreover, even if

[Petitioner] had been guaranteed additional good-conduct credits, a ruling in his favor

would not redress his injury. The fact remains that he is now released and the amount

of time that he spent in prison cannot be undone.”); cf. White v. Ind. Parole Bd., 266 F.3d

759, 763 (7th Cir. 2001) (“If the disciplinary hearing is deemed defective, the court may

order Indiana to terminate White’s parole when it would have expired, but for the

Board’s decision . . . .”); see also Herbst v. Sevier, 430 Fed. Appx. 530 (7th Cir. 2011).

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For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss (DE 13) is GRANTED. 

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: May 20, 2014 /s/ Philip P. Simon 

Chief Judge

United States District Court

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