21556 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 84 / Tuesday, May 2, 1995 / Notices

recordings will be permitted only

during those portions of the meeting

that are open to the public, and

questions may be asked only by

members of the Committee, its

consultants, and staff. Persons desiring

to make oral statements should notify

the ACNW Executive Director, Dr. John

T. Larkins, as far in advance as

practicable so that appropriate

arrangements can be made to allow the

necessary time during the meeting for

such statements. Use of still, motion

picture, and television cameras during

this meeting may be limited to selected

portions of the meeting as determined

by the ACNW Chairman. Information

regarding the time to be set aside for this

purpose may be obtained by contacting

the ACNW Executive Director prior to

the meeting. In view of the possibility

that the schedule for ACNW meetings

may be adjusted by the Chairman as

necessary to facilitate the conduct of the

meeting, persons planning to attend

should check with the ACNW Executive

Director if such rescheduling would

result in major inconvenience.

Further information regarding topics

to be discussed, whether the meeting

has been cancelled or rescheduled, the

Chairman’s ruling on requests for the

opportunity to present oral statements

and the time allotted therefor can be

obtained by contacting the ACNW

Executive Director, Dr. John T. Larkins

(telephone 301/415–7360), between 7:30

a.m. and 4:15 p.m. EDT.

Dated: April 26, 1995.

Andrew L. Bates,

Advisory Committee Management Officer.

[FR Doc. 95–10724 Filed 5–1–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

[Docket No. 50–293]

Boston Edison Company; Pilgrim

Nuclear Power Station; Receipt of

Petition for Director’s Decision Under

10 CFR 2.206

Notice is hereby given that by letter

dated March 10, 1995, Mary Elizabeth

Lampert and 62 other persons request

that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) take action with

regard to the Pilgrim Nuclear Power

Station operated by the Boston Edison

Company (the licensee).

Petitioners request that during the

March 25, 1995, refueling outage and InVessel Visual Inspection conducted by

the licensee, certain technical concerns

be addressed, and that before Pilgrim

goes back on-line, appropriate repairs be

made or corrective action be taken, and

that the NRC discuss the status of such

repairs and corrective actions with the

public in Plymouth, Massachusetts.

Petitioners also request that the NRC

terminate its policy of issuing Notices of

Enforcement Discretion (NOED) and

commence enforcing NRC regulations

again. Finally, Petitioners request that

the letter be treated as a Petition

pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206.

As the bases for their requests,

Petitioners identify three groups of

technical concerns: (1) Age-related

deterioration of 25 safety related reactor

internals; (2) parts and components

‘‘known to be a problem at Pilgrim,’’

including the core shroud, water level

indicators, QA for fuel pool cooling

system during loss-of-coolant accident/

loss-of-coolant protection, coolant

protection, motor-operated valves,

containment integrity, drywell liner

corrosion vulnerability, station blackout

vulnerability, and Rosemount

transmitters; and (3) parts and

components ‘‘potentially a problem at

Pilgrim,’’ including potential fuel rod

corrosion and substandard and/or

counterfeit parts. Additionally,

Petitioners contend that allowing a

reactor to operate under an NOED

cannot pose less risk to the public

health and safety than keeping the

reactor shut down until NRC regulations

are met.

The Petition is being evaluated

pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of the

Commission’s regulations. The Petition

has been referred to the Director of the

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. As

provided by Section 2.206, appropriate

action will be taken on this Petition

within a reasonable time.

A copy of the Petition is available for

inspection at the Commission’s Public

Document Room at 2120 L Street, NW.,

Washington, DC 20001.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 19th day

of April 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

William T. Russell,

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95–10732 Filed 5–1–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

Appointments to Performance Review

Boards for Senior Executive Service

AGENCY: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission.

ACTION: Appointment to Performance

Review Boards for Senior Executive

Service.

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) has announced the

following appointments to the NRC

Performance Review Boards.

The following individuals are

appointed as members of the NRC

Performance Review Board (PRB)

responsible for making

recommendations to the appointing and

awarding authorities on performance

appraisal ratings and performance

awards for Senior Executives:

New Appointees:

Lawrence J. Chandler, Assistant General

Counsel, Office of the General

Counsel

Richard L. Bangart, Director, Office of

State Programs

Leonard J. Callan, Regional

Administrator, Region IV

Ronald M. Scroggins, Deputy Chief

Financial Officer/Controller, Office of

the Controller

Ashok Thadani, Associate Director for

Technical Assessment, Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation

In addition to the above new

appointments, the following members

are continuing on the PRB:

Stephen G. Burns, Associate General

Counsel, Office of the General

Counsel

John C. Hoyle, Secretary of the

Commission, Office of the Secretary

James L. Blaha, Assistant for Operations,

Office of the Executive Director for

Operations

Frank J. Miraglia, Deputy Director,

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Bill M. Morris, Director, Division of

Regulatory Applications, Office of

Nuclear Regulatory Research

Elizabeth Q. Ten Eyck, Deputy Director,

Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and

Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material

Safety and Safeguards

The following individuals will

continue as members of the NRC PRB

Panel that was established to review

appraisals and make recommendations

to the appointing and awarding

authorities for NRC PRB members:

Hugh L. Thompson, Jr., Deputy

Executive Director for Nuclear

Materials Safety, Safeguards and

Operations Support, Office of the

Executive Director for Operations

Karen D. Cyr, General Counsel, Office of

the General Counsel

James L. Milhoan, Deputy Executive

Director for Nuclear Reactor

Operations, Regulatory Operations,

and Research, Office of the Executive

Director for Operations

All appointments are made pursuant

to Section 4314 of Chapter 43 of Title

5 of the United States Code.

EFFECTIVE DATE: May 2, 1995.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

James F. McDermott, Secretary,

Executive Resources Board, U.S.
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 84 / Tuesday, May 2, 1995 / Notices 21557

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555, (301) 415–7516.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 25th day

of April 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

James F. McDermott,

Secretary, Executive Resources Board.

[FR Doc. 95–10728 Filed 5–1–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

[Docket No. 50–410]

Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine

Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 2);

Exemption

I

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation

(NMPC or the licensee) is the holder of

Facility Operating License No. NPF–69,

which authorizes operation of Nine Mile

Point Nuclear Station Unit 2 (the

facility/NMP2), at a steady-state reactor

power level not in excess of 3323

megawatts thermal. The facility is a

boiling water reactor located at the

licensee’s site in Oswego County, New

York. The license provides among other

things, that it is subject to all rules,

regulations, and Orders of the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the

Commission or NRC) now or hereafter

in effect.

II

Section III.D.1.(a) of Appendix J to 10

CFR Part 50 requires the performance of

three Type A containment integrated

leakage rate tests (ILRTs), at

approximately equal intervals during

each 10-year service period of the

primary containment. The third test of

each set shall be conducted when the

plant is shutdown for the 10-year

inservice inspection of the primary

containment.

III

By letter dated March 9, 1995, NMPC

requested temporary relief for NMP2

from the requirement to perform a set of

three Type A tests at approximately

equal intervals during each 10-year

service period of the primary

containment. The requested exemption

would permit a one-time interval

extension of the second Type A test by

approximately 18 months (from the

April 1995 refueling outage, to the late

1996 refueling outage).

The licensee’s request cites the

special circumstances of 10 CFR 50.12,

paragraph (a)(2)(ii), as the basis for the

exemption. The existing Type B and C

testing programs are not being modified

by this request and will continue to

effectively detect containment leakage

caused by the degradation of active

containment isolation components as

well as containment penetrations. The

licensee has analyzed the results of the

previous Type A tests performed at

NMP2. Two Type A tests (including the

preoperational test) have been

conducted from 1986 to date with no

failures. Therefore, application of the

regulation in the particular

circumstances is not necessary to

achieve the underlying purpose of the

rule.

IV

Section III.D.1.(a) of Appendix J to 10

CFR Part 50 states that a set of three

Type A leakage rate tests shall be

performed at approximately equal

intervals during each 10-year service

period.

The licensee proposes an exemption

to this section which would provide a

one-time interval extension for the

second Type A test by approximately 18

months. The Commission has

determined, for the reasons discussed

below, that pursuant to 10 CFR

50.12(a)(1) this exemption is authorized

by law, will not present an undue risk

to the public health and safety, and is

consistent with the common defense

and security. The Commission further

determines that special circumstances,

as provided in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are

present justifying the exemption;

namely, that application of the

regulation in the particular

circumstances is not necessary to

achieve the underlying purpose of the

rule.

The underlying purpose of the

requirement to perform Type A

containment leak rate tests at

approximately equal intervals during

the 10-year service period, is to ensure

that any potential leakage pathways

through the containment boundary are

identified within a time span that

prevents significant degradation from

continuing or becoming unknown. The

NRC staff has reviewed the basis and

supporting information provided by the

licensee in the exemption request. The

NRC staff has noted that the licensee has

a good record of ensuring a leak-tight

containment. All Type A tests have

passed with significant margin and the

licensee has noted that the results of the

Type A testing have been confirmatory

of the Type B and C tests which will

continue to be performed. The licensee

stated in its submittal that a visual

internal and external inspection of the

mechanical and structural integrity of

the containment shell is completed

during every refueling outage. The NRC

staff considers these inspections provide

an important added level of confidence

in the continued integrity of the

containment boundary.

The NRC staff has also made use of

the information in a draft staff report,

NUREG–1493, which provides the

technical justification for the present

Appendix J rulemaking effort which

also includes a 10-year test interval for

Type A tests. The integrated leakage rate

test, or Type A test, measures overall

containment leakage. However,

operating experience with all types of

containments used in this country

demonstrates that essentially all

containment leakage can be detected by

local leakage rate tests (Type B and C).

According to results given in NUREG–

1493, out of 180 ILRT reports covering

110 individual reactors and

approximately 770 years of operating

history, only 5 ILRT failures were found

which local leakage rate testing could

not detect. This is 3 percent of all

failures. This study agrees well with

previous NRC staff studies which show

that Type B and C testing can detect a

very large percentage of containment

leaks. The NMP2 experience has also

been consistent with these results as

previously noted.

The Nuclear Management and

Resources Council (NUMARC), now the

Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), collected

and provided the NRC staff with

summaries of data to assist in the

Appendix J rulemaking effort. NUMARC

collected results of 144 ILRTs from 33

units; 23 ILRTs exceeded 1.OLa. Of

these, only nine were not due to Type

B or C leakage penalties. The NEI data

also added another perspective. The NEI

data show that in about one-third of the

cases exceeding allowable leakage, the

as-found leakage was less than 2La; in

one case the leakage was found to be

approximately 2La; in one case the asfound leakage was less than 3La; one

case approached 10La; and in one case

the leakage was found to be

approximately 21La. For about half of

the failed ILRTs the as-found leakage

was not quantified. These data show

that, for those ILRTs for which the

leakage was quantified, the leakage

values are small in comparison to the

leakage value at which the risk to the

public starts to increase over the value

of risk corresponding to La

(approximately 200La, as discussed in

NUREG–1493). Therefore, based on

these considerations, it is unlikely that

an extension of one cycle for the

performance of the Appendix J, Type A

test at NMP2 would result in significant

degradation of the overall containment

integrity. As a result, the application of

the regulation in these particular

circumstances is not necessary to