NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

GILBERT ARMENTA CARRASCO, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 21-0162 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR 2018-002261-001

The Honorable Laura J. Giaquinto, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Linley Wilson

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Mark E. Dwyer

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 1-27-2022
STATE v. CARRASCO

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court, 

in which Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Chief Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

C A M P B E L L, Judge:

¶1 This appeal is presented to us pursuant to Anders v. California, 

386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969). Defense counsel 

has searched the record on appeal and advised us there are no meritorious 

grounds for reversal. The defendant, Gilbert Carrasco, was given the 

opportunity to file a supplemental brief but did not do so. Our obligation is 

to review the entire record for reversible error, viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to sustaining the convictions and resolving all 

reasonable inferences against Carrasco. State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537, 

¶ 30 (App. 1999); State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293 (1989). Having done so, 

we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On a Friday night in March 2018, a few minutes before 9 p.m., 

two cars approached the entry gate of a fenced parking lot at a Target 

warehouse in Phoenix. The driver of the second car, a Target employee, 

watched as the first car, a silver hatchback, rammed into the closed gate and 

squeezed through, knocking the gate off the tracks. The employee called 

911; another employee who was watching the hatchback on the lot’s 

surveillance cameras called the Phoenix police. They reported the 

hatchback was circling around inside the lot, driving “real fast” and “real 

crazy.”

¶3 Officers Goldsmith and Johnson arrived at 9:08 p.m. After 

trying unsuccessfully to open the broken entry gate, the officers gained 

entry though the lot’s exit gate about five minutes later. As they entered the 

fenced lot, they saw the silver hatchback inside, driving towards the exit. 

The officers stopped the car, finding Carrasco at the wheel and, in the back 

seat, his one-year-old daughter and a poodle. The driver side of his car was 

dented from front to rear and missing door handles and a side view mirror. 

Carrasco told Officer Goldsmith that he was “just trying to get [his] baby 

home” and that another police officer had led him into the parking lot. 
STATE v. CARRASCO

Decision of the Court

3

¶4 Carrasco’s eyes were bloodshot and watery; his breath

smelled like alcohol; and his words were somewhat slurred. His behavior 

oscillated from calm to agitated and belligerent. He was swaying and 

unable to stand still, and he rambled about his life, his enemies, and his fear 

of being ambushed. Carrasco admitted to drinking alcohol earlier that 

morning and afternoon but denied being on drugs. The officers attempted 

to perform a field sobriety test, but Carrasco was uncooperative and nearly

fell over at the start of the only task he attempted. 

¶5 The officers arrested Carrasco and transported him to the 

station. During the carride, Carrasco said the “only reason he [rammed into 

the gate] is because the Mexican Mafia was chasing him.” At 11:07 p.m., 

Officer Mancha drew Carrasco’s blood, pursuant to a warrant. Carrasco’s 

blood alcohol content was .106, and his blood tested positive for

unmetabolized THC and methamphetamine.

¶6 The State charged Carrasco with three counts of aggravated 

driving under the influence, each a class 6 felony. See A.R.S. § 28-

1381(A)(1)–(3) (defining offenses for driving under the influence of alcohol 

or drugs while “impaired to the slightest degree,” with a blood “alcohol 

concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours of driving,” and while 

under the influence of certain drugs); see also A.R.S. § 28-1383(A)(3)(a)

(offense aggravated if committed while person under age 15 is in vehicle).

At a settlement conference in January 2019, Carrasco expressed intent to 

accept a plea bargain but requested a continuance of several days to put his 

affairs in order before going into custody. The court granted the 

continuance, but Carrasco absconded.

¶7 In May 2019, Carrasco was tried in absentia.

1 Officers 

Goldsmith, Johnson, and Mancha testified on behalf of the State, as did the 

forensic scientist who tested the blood alcohol levels in Carrasco’s blood. 

The State also offered pictures of the car and the gate, recordings of the calls 

to 911 and the police, and footage from Officer Goldsmith’s body camera

and the surveillance cameras. The jury found Carrasco guilty on all three 

counts, and after a hearing, the trial court found he had three prior felony 

convictions. Carrasco turned himself in later, in 2021, and the court then 

1 The trial court warned Carrasco that he could be tried in absentia should 

he fail to appear. Carrasco acknowledged his duty to appear and to 

maintain contact with his attorney in his signed release order. Carrasco had 

contact with his counsel’s office the week after he first failed to appear, but 

then remained out of contact in the three months leading up to the trial. At 

sentencing, Carrasco admitted to absconding. 
STATE v. CARRASCO

Decision of the Court

4

sentenced him to concurrent, presumptive terms of imprisonment of 3.75 

years for each of the three counts. Carrasco timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

¶8 After a thorough review of the record, we find no reversible 

error. Clark, 196 Ariz. at 541, ¶ 50. The record reflects that, at all critical 

stages of the proceedings against him, except the trial, Carrasco was present

and represented by counsel. Regarding the trial, Carrasco waived his right 

to be present by voluntarily absconding, and he was still represented by 

counsel. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 9.1; see also State v. Sanchez, 116 Ariz. 118, 120 

(App. 1977) (affirming waiver finding where court warned defendant he 

could be tried in absentia, conditions of release required maintaining 

contact with his attorney, and he made no effort to ascertain trial date 

following continuance requested by his attorney). The evidence presented 

supports the convictions, and the sentences imposed fall within the range 

permitted by law. See A.R.S. § 13-703(C), (J). As far as the record reveals, 

these proceedings were conducted in compliance with Arizona’s Rules of 

Criminal Procedure and Carrasco’s constitutional and statutory rights.

CONCLUSION

¶9 For the reasons above, we affirm Carrasco’s convictions and 

sentences.

¶10 Unless defense counsel finds an issue that may be 

appropriately submitted to the Arizona Supreme Court, his obligations are 

fulfilled once he informs Carrasco of the outcome of this appeal and his 

future options. State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584–85 (1984). Carrasco has 

30 days from the date of this decision to proceed, if he wishes, with a pro 

per motion for reconsideration or petition for review.