IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

SUSAN E. PRAMUK )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

) CAUSE NO.2:13-CV-068

VS. )

)

NORTHWESTERN MEDICAL IMAGING, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to

Dismiss, filed on August 28, 2013. (DE #21). For the reasons set

forth below, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and the complaint is

DISMISSED with prejudice.

BACKGROUND

Pro se plaintiff Susan E. Pramuk (“Pramuk”), filed this 42

U.S.C. § 1983 action, utilizing a form provided by the Clerk’s

Office, against Northwestern Medical Imaging (“NMI”) on February 19,

2013. (DE #1). The complaint states the following:

Exploiting my results of MRI, to Cheryl Montalbow

Rahmany, possibly removing frames from moving

pictures and deleting specific frames, as to

conseal [sic] results, so that I would not

receive medical treatment. I am a legal pro se

in the Court. Cheryl Montalbow Rahmany knows to

stay out of my medical.

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(Comp. ¶ 1, pg. 2). 

Pramuk then lists the following statutes as authority for the

suit: 

VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000

et seq. Section Rehabilitation of Civil Rights

1973 29 U.S.C. Education Amendments of 1972 20

U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.)

Section 794, 8555 (ii) Title VI and XVI of the

Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. §§291 et seq

HIPAA 1996 (42 U.S.C. § 132 od-2)

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability

Act of 1996 

HIPAA (42 USC §1320 d-2)

(DE #1, pg. 2).

Pramuk asks for $500,000 in damages “plus all the monies to heal

this problem within my person.” (DE #1, pg. 3). Pramuk also asks

for the “arrest for the Northwestern Medical Imaging for changing

films an [sic] concealing evidence of worm larvae poisoning.” (Id.).

On March 8, 2013, the Court dismissed the complaint for nonpayment of the filing fee. (DE #4). The suit was re-opened on April

5, 2013, after Pramuk paid the filing fee. (DE #9). NMI filed the

instant Motion to Dismiss on August 28, 2013. (DE #21). NMI asks

the Court to dismiss Pramuk's complaint for failure to state a claim

for three reasons: (1) Pramuk’s complaint does not comply with

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8’s requirement that the complaint be

presented with intelligibility sufficient for counsel to determine

whether a valid claim is alleged and what it is; (2) NMI is not a

state actor, and (3) Pramuk has failed to state any claims against

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NMI for violations of the multiple statutes listed in her complaint. 

Pramuk did not file a response brief within the time allotted, and

the matter is now ripe for adjudication. 

DISCUSSION

In determining the propriety of dismissal under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all facts alleged in

the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519,

520 (7th Cir. 2001). A complaint is not required to contain detailed

factual allegations, but it is not enough merely that there might be

some conceivable set of facts that entitles the plaintiff to relief. 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007),

abrogating in part Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). A

plaintiff has an obligation under Rule 8(a)(2) to provide the grounds

of his entitlement to relief, which requires more than labels and

conclusions. Id. at 1965. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should

be granted if the complaint fails to include sufficient facts to

state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Factual allegations, taken as

true, must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level. Id. Moreover, a plaintiff may plead himself out of court if

the complaint includes allegations that show he cannot possibly be

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entitled to the relief sought. Jefferson v. Ambroz, 90 F.3d 1291,

1296-97 (7th Cir. 1996).

The Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

which provides a cause of action to redress the violation of

federally secured rights by a person acting under color of state law.

Burrell v. City of Mattoon, 378 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2004). To state a

claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege violation of rights

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must

show that a person acting under color of state law committed the

alleged deprivation. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988). The first

inquiry in every § 1983 case is whether a state actor has deprived

the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the

United States.

To state a claim under § 1983, it is essential that the person

who committed the alleged wrongful conduct was “acting under color of

state law.” Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 284 (7th Cir. 1994). If

the person did not act “under color of state law,” the action against

him must be dismissed. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838

(1982). The United States Supreme Court defined the phrase “acting

under color of [state] law” as “misuse of power, possessed by virtue

of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed

with the authority of state law.” Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184

(1961) (citations omitted). The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state

actors, and private individuals in collaboration with state

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officials, from using a “badge of authority” to deprive individuals

of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S.

158, 161 (1992). 

Here, Pramuk makes no allegations of state action by NMI. The

Complaint is one confusing paragraph followed by a string of

statutes, lacking any facts that could give rise to a claim under §

1983. But even putting the state action problem aside, Pramuk has

failed to state a claim under each of the substantive statutes she

relies upon, as explained below. 

Most of the statutes that Pramuk cites prohibit discrimination

in one context or another. She cites to Title VI of Civil Rights Act

of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq., which prohibits discrimination by

programs or activities that receive federal funds. Similarly, Pramuk

cites to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681

et seq., which prohibit discrimination by education programs

receiving Federal financial assistance. Pramuk also cites to

“Section Rehabilitation of Civil Rights 1973 29 U.S.C.” in her

complaint. The Court presumes that she intended to cite to the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, codified as 29 U.S.C. § 701, which

prevents discrimination against those with disabilities by those

receiving federal funds under the statute. There is nothing in

Pramuk’s complaint other than the citation to these statutes that

suggests she is alleging discrimination of any kind, and her

complaint contains no allegations that NMI was receiving federal

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financial assistance. Pramuk has wholly failed to explain why she

believes NMI would be liable under any of the aforementioned

statutes. 

Pramuk additionally cites tp “Section 794, 8555 (ii) Title VI

and XVI of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 291 et seq).” 

The Court presumes that Pramuk intended to cite to Sections 794 and

855 of the Public Health Services Act, which are codified as 42

U.S.C. §§ 295m and 296g, and additionally Title VI and Title XVI of

the Public Health Service Act, which are codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 291

and 300. 42 U.S.C. §§ 295m and 296g prohibit discrimination based on

sex for admissions to any school of medicine if the school wishes to

receive grants, loans, or subsidies from the federal government. 

There are no allegations in the complaint that could give rise to a

claim under these statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 291 exists to improve

medical facilities, and also appears wholly irrelevant to the facts

alleged in the complaint. Likewise, 42 U.S.C. § 300 relates to

government assistance given to family planning services, and Pramuk

makes no allegations that would give rise to any claim pursuant to §

300. 

Pramuk also cites the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1320d et seq. 

Pramuk cannot bring a claim pursuant to HIPAA because congress did

not create a private right of action under HIPPA. Carpenter v.

Phillip, 419 Fed.Appx. 658, 659 (7th Cir. 2011). 

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In short, Pramuk’s complaint is woefully inadequate under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. It fails to include sufficient

facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face and

must be dismissed. In fact, the complaint is not just deficient - it

is frivolous - and the dismissal will therefore be with prejudice. 

CONCLUSION

For the above stated reasons, the Motion (DE #21) is GRANTED. 

Pramuk’s complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

DATED: December 23, 2013 /s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

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