### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00273- CV

Lawr e nc e Whi te , A ppe lla nt

v.
P atric k Brow nin g, Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 53RD JUDICIAL DISTRI CT NO. GN203641 , HO NORAB LE DARLENE B Y RNE, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Pa tr ic k B ro wn ingsu e d L awr e nc e Whit e fo r i nju ri e s h e su sta ine d in

an a uto mob ile
co l l i sion with W hite. The jury awa rded B rowning damag es for future phy sical pain a

nd mental ang uish and for pa st and future losses of ea rning capa cit y . On ap peal, White argues that the trial
c ourt e rr e d in g ra nti ngB ro wn ing ’s mot ion

to e xclu de Whit e ’s e xpe rt wi tne ss. I n a dd iti on , h e a sse rt s that the evidenc e is neither le g ally nor fa ctually sufficie nt to support the j ury awa rds. We will affirm the jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
.2 BACK GR OUND B ro wn ingha s a

de g re e in b us ine ss a

nd e ng ine e ri ngand

is a sa le sma n a nd min or ity sto c kh old e r o f T e xonic s, a c omp any tha t sel ls hig h- te c h eq

uip me nt fo r bui ldi ngma c hin e s. Whit e and B rowning wer e involved in a motor v ehicle c ollisi on in October 2000. As a re sult of the
c oll isi on , B ro wn ing su sta ine d se ve ra l inj ur ie s, inc lud ing br uis ing , c ra c ke d bo ne s, and inj ur ie s to his fac e. I n addition, Br owning was diagnose d as suffering from a “close d head injury ,” which occur s when the ne ural c on nections ar e disrupted by a blow to the hea d or a r apid dec eler ation, aff ecting the ability to proce ss, org anize, and under stand information. Ultimately , Browning

fi l eds u i taga i n s tW h i t e, s ee k i n g t o re co v er damag es for injuries he sustained in the collision. Six ty day s befor e trial wa s orig inally set, Whit e desig nated Dr . Tallman as a pote ntial expert witness to contest, among other thing s, the diag nosis that Brown i n g had sustained a c losed hea d injury . I n response , Br owni n g fi l ed a motion to ex clude White’s expert alleg ing D r. Tallman was not desig nated within the time re quired by the rules of

civil proce dure. The di s t ri ct court g rante d the motion. Subs equently , the trial wa s postponed. At trial, Br owning
c l a i m e d t h e s e i n j u r i e s h a d a n e g a t i v e e f

f e c t o n h i s e f

f i c i e n c y an d e f

f e c t i v e n e s s i nt h e w o r

k p l a c e . In
a dd iti on , B ro wn ing

c la ime d th a t he su ff

e re d f ro m me mor

y los s and a los s in his a bil ity to c on c e ntr a te
as a r esult of the collision.

The jury found that ninety -five pe rce nt of the re sponsibili ty fo r t h e collision was attributable to Whit e and awa rded Br owning $890,012.67, including $500,000 f or future phy sical pain and menta l ang uish, $25,000 for loss of past earning capa city , and $150,000 for loss of future3

e arn ingc a

pa c ity . T he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt inc or po ra te d the ve rd ic t of

the jur y . Wh ite a

pp e a ls the jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
.
DI SCU SSIO N On appe al, White raises three issues. I n his first issue, he asserts that the district court
err ed in g ranting Br owning ’s motion to ex clude. In his second a n d t h i rd i ssues, he a rg ues the evidenc e is neither factua lly nor l eg ally sufficie nt to support the awards for future phy sical pain a nd mental anguish and for pa st and future loss of ear ning c apac ity
.
M ot ion to Exc lude

I n h is f ir st i ssu e , Wh ite a sse rt s th a t th e c ourt e rr e d in e xclu din g his e xpe rt wi tne ss. A trial cour

t’s decision to exclude an e x pert is re viewed f or an a buse of discr etion. Mentis v. Ba rn ar d , 8 70 S.W. 2d

14 , 1 6 ( Te x. 19 94 ); Frazin v. Hanley , 130 S. W. 3 d 3 7 3 , 3 7 7 ( T e x. App.—Dallas 2004, no pe t.). The test for abuse of di s cr et i o n i s n o t whether the re viewing court ag ree s the fac ts prese nt an appropriate case for the tr ial court’s a ction. See Cire v . Cummings , 134 S.W. 3d 83 5, 83 9 ( Te x. 20 04 ). A tr ia l c ourt a bu se s its dis c re tio n if it a c ts arb itr ari ly or un re a so na

bly
or wi tho ut r e fe re nc e to guid ingru le s o r p ri nc ipl e s. City of San Benito v. Rio Grande Valley Gas Co. , 109 S.W .3d 750, 757 (Tex. 2003).

The rule s of civil pr ocedur e provide deadlines f or whe n an expert must be desig nated. Unless otherwise order ed by a court, a party is require d to desig nate its expert witnesses within the later of the foll owing two dates: (1) 30 day s afte r t he opposi ng party reque sts the designation or (2)
w i t h i n 6 0 d ay s b e f

o r e t h e e n d o f t h e d i s c o v e r y p e r i o d , u n l e s s t h e e xp e rt i s t e s t i f y i n g f o r a pa rt y4

se e kin g a ff

ir ma tiv e re lie f i n w hic h c a se the pa rt y mus t de sig nate wi thi n 9 0 day s. Te x. R. C iv. P. 19 5. 2; see also id. 194.2(f) (allowing party to r equest name of opposing party ’s expert witnesses and subject matter of

witnesses’ testimony

). The pa rties ag ree d that the case i s g overne d by the level 2 discove ry

control plan of rule 190.3. Id. 190.1 (re quiring discovery control plan); 190.3. Unde r a le vel two discover y control plan, for c ases not ar ising unde r the family code, the discovery period be g ins when the suit is filed and continues until the ea

rlier of the foll owing dates: (1) 30 day s befor e the date set for trial, (2) nine months after the date the f irst oral deposition is taken, or ( 3) nine months a fter the due date of the first response to written discover y . Id. 190.3(b)( 1)(B ). Consequently , the level two discove ry period will end at least 30 day s befor e the date se t for trial. B eca use par ties not seeking aff

irmative re lief must designate expert witnesses 60 day s befor e the e nd of the discove ry period unless a cour

t orders oth e rw ise and be c a

us e the dis c ov e ry pe ri od

e nd s at le a st 3 0 d ay s b e fo re tr ia l, e xpe rt wi tne sse s mu st g ener ally be desig nated at least 90 day s befor e trial. See Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 90 .3 ; 19 5. 2; cf. W igfall v. Texas Dep’ t of Cri m. Justice , 137 S.W .3d 268, 272 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). I n th is c a se , th e dis tr ic t c ourt did no t or de r a

n a lte rn ativ e tim e fo r de sig natio n. Th e re fo re , b e c a us e Whit e, as the defe ndant, was not se eking aff irmative relief

, he wa s require d to desig nate his expert 90 day s befor e the tria l date.

Under rule 193.6, a

party who fa ils to t imely

identify a witnes s i s p rohi bited from introducing the testimony of the witness unless the court finds that (1) there was g ood cause for the failure to make the r esponse or (2) the f ailure to m ak e the r esponse will not unfairly surprise or
un fa ir ly pr e jud ic e the oth e r part

y . Te x. R. Civ. P. 193 .6 (a ). Th e burd e n o f e sta bli sh ingg oo d c a

us eThe trial dat e wa s u l timately moved to J anuar

y 12, 2004, afte r White requeste d a 1 continuance
. 5 or the lac k of unfa ir surprise or prejudice is on the party seekingto in t roduce the witness. Id. 193.6(b).
Tim e lin ess

Whit e contends that Tallman’s de signation on J uly 24, 2003, was timely . At the time, the tr ia l date wa s se t fo r Se pte mbe r 22 , 20 03 , wh ic h w a s o nly 60 da y s a ft e r t he de sig natio n. Whit e 1 contends that this desig nation was timely beca use rule 195.6 a llows amendment or suppleme ntation of written discove ry

reg arding

a testifying e x pert to be ma de up to 30 day s befor e trial. See Te x. R. Civ. P . 195.6 (stating supplementation and amendment g overne d by rule 193.5), 193.5 (specif y ing that amende d or supplemental r esponse must be made rea so n a b ly p r o mp tl y a f te r n e c e s s it y d isc overe d and that ame ndment or supplement made less than 30 day s befor e trial pre sumed not prompt).

I n support of this contention, Whit e cites to Da v is v. Da v is , No. 13-01-707- CV, 2003 Tex. App. L EXI S 4934 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christ i, J une 12, 2003, no p et
. ) (not designated for publication) and Lig

da v . W att s , N o . 1 4

- 0 0

- 0 0 9 1 9

- CV , 2 0 0 2 T e x. A p p . L E X I S 3 9 6 8 ( T e x. App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] May 30, 2002, no pet.) (not de signated for publication). In Da v is , the court c oncluded t h at t h e t ri al court did not abuse its discre tion in admitt ing the testimony of the experts desig nated 30 da

y s befor e trial. Da v is , T e x. Ap p. L EX I S 49 34 , at *1 0. Th e c ourt no te d th a t, althoug h rule 195.2 require s an expert be desig nated 60 or 90 day s befor e the e nd of the discove ry period, rule 195.6 allows amendme nt or supplementation 30 day s befor e trial. Id. at *9.6 I n Ligda , a par

ty supplemented its re sponse to interrog atories, whic h initially listed expert witnesses, and nam ed a new witness 41 da y s befor e trial. Ligda , 2 0 0 2 T e x . A p p . LE X IS 3968, at *1. At trial, L igda objected to the a dmission of the ex pert’s tes t imony alleg ing he was untimely desig nated. Id. at *2. The court conclude d that supplementing the discover y response 41 day s befor e tr i al was within the 30 day deadline of

rule 193.5, a

nd, there fore , the cour

t would not presume the amendment wa s not filed rea sonably promptly
. Id. at *8. Whit e ’s re lia

nc e on the pr e vio us tw o c a se s a nd ru le 19 3. 5 is mis pla c e d. The ba sis g iven for the motion to ex clude in Da v is was the witness’s failure to a ppear at a deposition, not the fa i lure to timely

desig nate a

witness. Da v is , 2003 Tex. App. L EXI S 4934, at *9. I n addition, the court c oncluded that the c omplaint was not prese rved for appeal because the trial court ne ver r uled on the motion. Id. Fur

ther, the c ourt conc luded that, eve n if there was e rror in its ruling, the er

ror was not re versible be cause it did not (1) probably cause the re n d i t i o n of an imprope r judg ment or (2) pr obably

preve nt the appellant f

rom prese nting the c ase to the court of a ppeals. Id. ; see Te x. R. App. P. 44.1(a) ( specify

ing r equire ments for re versible e rror ). Unlike the Ligda case , which involved supplementing exis ting written di scover y reg ardingan expert witness, White’s ac t i o n co ncer ned initial desig nation of an e x pert witness 60 da y s b e fo re tr ia l. F ur

the r, g ive n our sta

nd ard of re vie w, oth e r c ourt s c on c lud ingtha t it wa s no t an abuse of discretion to allow an e x pert to b e d es i gn at ed less than 90 day s befor e trial doe s not
ne c e ssi ta te a

fi nd ingtha

t e xclu din g an e xpe rt

no t des ig nate d w ith in t

he tim e pr e sc ri be d b y

statut e is an abuse of

discretion.Whit e also c ites to Best Industrial Uniform Supply Co. v. Gulf Coast All oy W elding, Inc. , 2 for the pr oposition t hat, eve n if his desig nation was untimely , excluding the witness’s testimony was err or. 41 S.W .3d 145 (Tex. App.—Amar illo 2000, pet. denied). In Be st , the trial cour

t did not allow one of the listed witnesses to be re place d wit h a cu rr en t employ ee of the company
. Id. at 147. F ur the r, wi tho ut t

he a bil ity to re pla c e the wi tne ss, the a ff e c te d p art y c ou ld n ot p ro c e e d o n th e me ri ts of the c ase. Id. at 148. The a ppellate c ourt reve rsed the judg ment of the trial c ourt. Id. at 149. Neither of these situations occ urre d in the prese nt c ase. Dr. Tallman was not a r eplac ement witness. Fur

ther, White was able t o p ro ce ed with a c ase on the merits afte r the e x clusion of Dr. Tallman and w as able to present the te stimony of anothe r expert, Dr. Tuc ker. 7 I n a dd iti on , rul e s 1 95 .2 and 19 5. 6 s e rv e dif

fe re nt p ur po se s. Rul e 19 5. 6, by

its te rm s, applies to “[a] party ’s duty to amend and supple me n

t w r it te n discovery

reg ardinga testifying e x pert.” Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 95 .6 . Ru le 19 5. 2, on the oth e r hand , ap pli e s to a pa rt y ’s du ty to i nit ia lly

de sig nate expert witnesses. Id. 195.2. To construe rule 195.6 as allowing a party to desig nate e x pert witnesse s within 30 day s of t rial would neg ate the 60 and 90 day deadlines spe cified in rule 195.2. Se e in r e K.L.V. , 109 S.W .2d 61, 63 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2003, pet. denied) (statutes should be c onstrued in way that g ives eff

ect to ea ch sente nce, c lause, phra se, and w ord if re asonably possible). A c c o r d i n g l y, w e h o l d

t h a tt h e d e s i g n a t i o no f

D r . T a l l m anw a s n o tt i m e l y. 2
Go od Cau se Whit e also c ontends that, even if the desig nation was untimely , g ood cause exis ted to allow the late de sign ation of his expert. Specifica lly , Whit e asse rts that he did not rea liz e he would need his own e x pert until another e x pert wa s deposed a nd that he quickly

obtained an expert witness upon rea liz ing the nece ssity . Whit e also c ontends that he be lieved desig nat i n g h i s expert 60 da y s b e fo re the Se pte mbe r tr ia l da te satis fi e d d isc ov e ry

a g re e me nts e xistin g be tw e e n th e pa rt ie s.8 I n April 2003, months be fore the September trial date, Dr. Horn, one of B rowning ’s ph y sic ians , te sti fi e d in a de po sit ion that B ro wn ing wa s su ff e ri ngfr om a

c los e d h e a d in

jur y . In h is t es t i m o n y , Dr
. Ho rn re l i edo nt es t s co n d u ct ed b y Dr
. T u ck er , an o t h er p h y s i ci an t re at i n g Br o wn i n g. Severa l months l ater , Whit e depose d Dr. Tuc ker. W hite contends that Dr. Horn misinterpre ted the tests conducted by

Dr. Tuc ker and that, afte r Dr. Tucke r was de posed, he r ealized it was nec essar y for him to obtain his own ex pert. Howeve r, W hite does not explain why he wa s unable to dete rmine that Dr. Hor

n had misinterpre ted, i n his deposition conducte d in April 2003, the tests perf ormed by Dr. Tuc ker until afte r deposingDr. Tuc ker in July 2003. Whit e a lso c on te nd s th a t D r. Ta llm an’ s des ig natio n 60 day s bef or e the tr ia l dat e in Septe mb e r

2 0 0 3 c o mp li e d

w it h d is c o v e r

y a g r e e me n ts a ll e g e d ly

e xis ti n g b e tw e e nth e p arti e s , and, there fore , g ood cause exis ts to ex cuse the untimely desig nation. Whit e propose d an orig inal trial date of April 25, 2003; howeve r, Br owning sug g ested a trial date of June 2, 2003 and sug g ested a deadline of

April 23, 2003, for White to desig nate his ex p er t wi tnesses. White prepar ed a joint discovery cont ro l p l an ag ree ing to the tr ial date a nd the expert desig nation deadline, but the c ourt did not sign the a g ree ment. The parties subsequently ag ree d to move the trial date to September 22, 2003. Whit e sent a

new pr oposed discover

y control plan that c ontained an Aug ust 8, 2003 deadline for de signating e x pert witnesse s. Au gu s t 8 was 44 da y s befor e the date set for trial. Howe ver, Br owning did not respond or a g ree to this proposed plan, and the c ourt neve r sig ned it.

Even a ssuming that the corr espondenc e betwe en the pa rties established a

discovery plan for the J une 2003 trial date, the parties ag ree d to move the trial date to September , the discover y deadlines ha d expired without W hite desig nati n g an ex p ert, and no subsequent ag ree ment was9

enter ed. Bec ause the orig inal ag ree ment had ex pired, be cause no subsequent ag ree ment had bee n
e nte re d, and be c a

us e the c ourt did no t iss ue an or de r sp e c if y ing dis c ov e ry

de a dli ne s c on tr ary

to t ho se speci f ie d b y s tatute , B r o w n in g w a s r e qu ir e d to d e s ig n ate h is e xp e rts w it h in th e ti me r e qu ir e d by statute. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 195.2.

Under t h es e c i rc u m s t an ce s , we ca n n o tco n cl u d e t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt abused its di scre tion in failing to conclude g ood cause was pre sent to justify the late de signa

tion of Dr. Ta llman. Unfair Surprise or Prejudice

F ur the r, Whit e a sse rt s th a t B ro wn ing wa s n ot h arm e d b y

the la te de sig natio n b e c a

us e the trial did not actua lly

occur until J anuar

y 2004, six months after the desig nation
. W e dis ag ree with Whi te’s conte ntion.

Whit e desig nated Dr
. Tallman in July 2003. Br owning filed a motion to exclude Dr. Tallman, and the motion wa s g rante d. The c ourt failed to f ind, based on the Septe mber 22, 2003 trial date, that a llowing Dr . Tallman to testify would not unf

airly surprise or prejudice Br owning
. The trial date w as moved be cause Whit e, not B rowning , soug ht and rece ived a c ontinuance. F urther, the
rec ord does not contain any evidenc e that Whit e made any attempt to reope n discovery afte r the trial was postponed. See id. 19 0. 5( b) (c ourt mus t a llo w a dd iti on a l di sc ov e ry re g ard ingma tte rs ma te ri a lly chang ing a fter disc overy cut off if trial postponed to more than three months afte r discover y ends). Under these c i rc u m s t an ce s , we ca n n o tco n cl u d e t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ab u s ed it s discretion by failing to conclude that Brow ning w ould not be unfairly surprised or

prejud i ce d b y

allowing W h i t e ’ s e x p e rtt o t e s t i f

y.10 Acc ord i n gl y , we hold the district cour t did not abuse its discretion in gr anting Br o wni ng ’s motion to ex clude. Se e Er se k v . D av is &Da v is, P. C. , 6 9 S
. W
. 3 d 2 6 8 , 2 7 1 ( T e x. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied) (Erse k d i d n o t d esig nate e x pert witness 90 da y s befor e trial a s require d by rule 195.2; court concluded that Ersek w as not allowed, unde r rule 195.6, to suppleme nt his origina l response, to de signate expert for f irst time).
Sanction Al te rn a tiv e ly , Wh ite c on te nd s th a t, e ve n if the de sig natio n wa s unti me ly , s tr iki nghis
e xp e rt w it

n e s s im p r o p e r ly im

p o s e d a s an c ti o n a g a in s t h im
. A s a s an c ti o n , Wh it e c o n te n ds the exclusion d i d n o t satisfy the re quirements spec ified in Chrysler Corp. v. Blackm on and Tra ns am e ric a Na tural G as Cor p. v . P owe ll
. Chrysler Corp. , 841 S.W .2d 844, 849 (Tex. 1992) (for
sanc tio n to be jus t, it mus t satis fy fo llo wi ngc on dit ion s: s anc tio n mu st h a ve dir e c t r e la tio ns hip wi th
c on du c t and sanc tio n must be no mor e se ve re tha

n n e c e ssa ry ); Po we ll , 8 1 1 S. W. 2 d 9 1 3 , 9 1 7 ( T e x. 1991) (same). We d isa g re e . Rul e 19 3. 6 pr oh ibi ts the a dmi ssi on of the te sti mony

fr om a n unti me ly desig nated witness unless g ood cause for the f ailure to timely

des i gn ate the witness is shown or a la ck of unfa ir

surp ri se or

pr e jud ic e to t

he oth e r p art ie s r e su lti ngfr om t he un tim e ly

de sig natio n is shown. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.6. The exclusion of expert testimony for admissibili ty rea sons has been c hara cter ized as a substantive def iciency rathe r than a

sanction under rul e 215. See G illie v. Boulas , 65 S.W .3d 219, 225 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pe t. denied); se e als o B ry so n v . R e id , No. 05- 03-01152-CV, 2004 Te x . App. L EXI S 6139, at * 4 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 12, 2004, no pet.) (e xclu sio n o f e xpe rt

du e to f a ilure to c omplete thr e sh old a dmi ssi bil ity

re qu ir e me nts ); Kernan v.Be cause we c onclude t h at t he district cour t did not abuse its discretion in excluding 3 Whit e’s e x pert witness, we need not a ddress White’s argument that the district co u rt ’s ac tion constituted reve rsible err or under rule 44.1 of the rules of appellate proce dure. See Te x. R. A pp . P. 44.1. 11 Cra tty , No. 14-00-0086 5 -C V, 2 0 01 Tex. App. L EXI S, at *5-6 (Te x . App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] Sept. 27, 20 0 1 , n o p e t. ) ( n o t d e s ig n a te d f o r p u b li c a ti o n ) ( tr ia l c o u rt h a d n o c h o ic e b u t t o e xc lude testimony of untimely

desig nated e x pert when g ood cause or l ack of unfair sur prise or pr ejudice not shown and whe n continuance not asked for ). Acc ording ly , having conclude d that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to find that g ood cause was pre sent or that B rowning would not be unfa irly

surprised or

prejudice d, we hold that the e x clusion of White’s expert was prope r. Th e re fo re , w e ov e rr

ule a pp e lla nt’ s f ir st i ssu e on

a pp e a l. 3 Legal and F actual Suf

fi ciency I n appel lant’s sec ond and third issues, he c ontends that the evide nce is leg ally and fac tually insufficient to support the jury ’s awa rds for f uture pa in and suffe ring and for past and futur e loss of ear

ning c apac ity
. I n a le g a l su ff ic ie nc y r e v i e w , a p p e llate c ourt s mu st v ie w t he e vid e nc e in t

he lig ht m os t favor able to the ve rdict, m u s t c r e d it favor able e vidence if rea sonable juror s could cre dit the evidence , and must disreg ard e vidence contra ry to the verdic t unless rea sonable juror s could not disreg ard the evidenc e. City of Keller v. W ilson , 200 5 Te x. L EX I S 43 6, a t *1- 2 (T e x. June 10 , 200 5)
. Th e te st for leg al suffic iency

is whether the evidenc e “at trial would enable re asonable and fa ir-minded people to re ach the verdic t under re view.” Id. at *66.12 When consideringa fa ctual suff iciency challeng e to a jury ’s ver dict, the re viewing
c ou rt mus t c o n s i d e r

an d w e i g h a l l o f

t h e e v i d e n c e , n o tj u s tt h e e v i d e n c e t h a ts u p p o rt s t h e v e r d i c t. Ma rit im e Ov e rse as Cor

p. v . E lli s , 9 71 S.W. 2d

40 2, 40 6- 07 (T e x. 19 98 ); Nip v. Checkpoint Sys., I nc. , 154 S.W .3d 767, 768-69 (Tex
. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2004, no pet.). The revie wing court may set aside the v er d i ct onl y if it is so contrary

to the overw helming w eig ht of the evide nce that the verdic t is clearly

wrongand unjust. Ma rit im e Ov e rse as Cor p ., 971 S.W .2d at 407. The re viewing
c ourt do e s n ot s e rv e a s a

fa c t- fi nd e r a

nd may no t pa ss u

po n th e wi tne sse s’ c re dib ili ty or su bs tit ute its judgment for

that of the jury , eve n if the evide nce w ould clear ly support a diffe rent re sult. Id
. I f the c ourt of a

pp e a ls de te rm ine s that the e vid e nc e su pp or ts the jur y ’s ve rd ic t, it is no t re qu ir e d to detail all the evide nce supporting the judgme nt when it aff irms the t rial court’s judgme nt for ac tual damag es. Id
. Fu tur e Ph

y sic al P ain an d M

e nta l A nguis h Whit e contends that the evidenc e does not support the jury awa rd for future phy sical pa in a nd me nta l anguis h. I n a sse ssi ngpe rs on a l in jur y dama g e s, the jur

y has wi de lat itu de in deter mining the a

mount of the awa

rd. Tagle v. Galvan , 155 S. W
. 3 d 510, 518 (Tex. App.—San An ton io 2 00 4, no pe t.) . T he pr oc e ss o f a wa rd ingdama g e s for ph y sic a l pai n an d suf fe ri ngis d if

fi c ult be c a us e the a lle g e d in

jur y is a su bje c tiv e , n on

pe c un iary los s. Dawson v. Briggs, 107 S.W .3d 739, 75 0 ( Te x. Ap p. —F or

t Wor th 2 00 3, no pe t.) ; se e Tag le , 155 S.W .3d at 518. Simi larly , beca

use it is an amorphous conc ept , t h e determination of damag es for mental anguish is left to the discretion of the jury
. See North Am. R ef r a ct o r y Co. v. Easter , 988 S.W .2d 904, 912 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied). Howe ver, the discre tion is l imited.13

Sa e nz v . F id. & Gu ar . I

ns . U nd e rwr ite rs , 925 S.W .2d 607, 614 (Tex. 1996). Ther e must be “‘ direc t evidenc e of the nature , duration, or seve rity of [the] mental anguish, thus establishing a substantial dis ru pti on in’ ” the pla int if

f’ s d a ily ro uti ne or

e vid e nc e of

a hig h d e g re e of me nta l di str e ss a nd pa in “‘that is more than mere worry , anxiety , vexation, embarra ssmen t , o r anger .’” See id. (quoting Pa rk way Co. v . W

oo dr uff , 901 S.W .2d 434, 444 (Tex. 1995)). F urther, the re must be e vidence the
awa rd is rea sonable a

nd fair c ompensation. Id. Whit e conte nds that the external, phy sical injuries B rowning complained of had heale d. Second, Whit e contends that the neurolog ical injuries complained of do not cause phy sical p a i n an d d o n o t r e qu i r e t r e a t m e n t w i t h p a i n r e l i e v e r s . T h e r e f o r e , W h i t e i n s i s t s t h e o n l y i n j u r y, i f a n y, that Br owning might suff

er f rom in the future is mental ang uish. Even so, Whit e ins ists the evidence d o e s n o ts u

p p o rtt h e $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 aw ar d b e c a u s e B r o w n i n g w a s a

b l e t o w o r

k e i g h th o u r s a

d a y, sometimes longe r, and be cause his primary complaint was one of conc entration and memo ry , not pain. Whit e also c o n t es t s the memory and conc entration claims. W hite points to a statement by

one o f W h i t e’s doctors stating B rowning had a mild memory problem prior to the collision and to a comment made by Br owning on a medical form befor e the collision questioning whether he had problems wit h his memory . Whit e also points to testimony from one of

Br owning ’s doctors stating that depre ssion, f or which Br owning was treated, can mimic the eff ec t s o f a h ead inj ur y . F ina lly , Wh ite c ite s to pr e vio us inj ur ie s a nd he a lthpr ob lems a s f

a c tor s r e la tin g to h is
c og nit ive dif

fi c ult ie s.One of Br owning ’s phy sicians noted in Br owning ’s m edica l rec ord t hat B rowning needs 4 to write down tasks he is r equire d to do in or der to r emember to perfor m the tasks. This statement was wr itten after

Br ownin g h ad m i ssed a doc tor’s appointment. Althoug h Br owning had reme mbere d he had a

n appointment, he we nt to the wrong doctor’s of fice
. 14 Simi la rl y , Wh ite argue s th a t B ro wn ing ’s e mot ion a l st a te do e s n ot c on sti tut e le g a lly or fa ctually

sufficie nt evidence to support an awar d o f m en tal ang uish. Further , Whit e conte nds there was no showingof a substantial disruption of Browning ’s daily routine resulting fr om mental ang uish. W e disag ree with this charac terization of the evidenc e.

Br owning ’s p h y s i ci an t es t i fi edt h at h e w as ab l e t o co n cl u d e t h at t he injuries B rowning
su sta ine d in

the c oll isi on

we re the c a

us e of his c ogni ti ve impa ir

me nts and

wa s a ble to r ule ou t a ll other possible ca

uses. Tests perf

ormed on Br owning indicated that Br owning was a n intelligent man but his attention span, ability to c oncentr ate, and memory are now impaired. Br owning ’s phy sician 4 fu rt he r t e sti fi e d th a t B ro wn ing ’s c og nit ive imp a ir me nts we re pe rm ane nt an d tha t Br ow nin g wo uld not improve in the future. Although Br owning had sustained two hea d injuries while in the military
and e xpe ri e nc e d o the r h e a lthpr ob le ms, he te sti fi e d th a t, u nli ke his pr e se nt i njur ie s, no ne of his previous hea lth issues had impaired his ability to perfor m his job. I n addition, Br owning ’s co-worker s testified t hat work inter actions with Br owning
are frustrating beca

use he forg ets to pe rfor

m a ssignments and forg ets conver sation topics while on the phone. The y

also testified that B rowning apol o gi z es re p eatedly when he is reminded of the
neces sity to complete a ta sk and blames himself f or his failure to perfor

m the task. Fur

ther, B ro wn ing te sti fi e d that so me of his c o- wo rk e rs fo un d th e a me lio ra tiv e a c tio ns he ha s to e ng a g e in at work, inc luding tape rec ording conver sations, to be humorous.15 Br owning also testified that he w a s c o n c e r n e d about beingable to save enoug h money for retire ment and was conce rned about his c ontinued ability to pr ovide for the financ ial well-be ing of his wife a

nd sister. He testified that, as a result of his injuries, he is frig htened a bout his future and about his job secur ity and that he is fr

ustrated by his c urre nt c ondition. I n addition, he testified that, as a r esult of his injuries, hi s re l at i o n s hip with his wife has suffe red a nd has bec ome more str e ssf ul b e c a us e c omm

un ic a tio n w ithhe r h a s b e c ome mor e dif fi c ult
. The e vidence prese nts more than conc lusory statements o f “me re e motion,” which have been held to not rise to the level of a compensa

ble injury
. Se e Lat

ha m v . Ca sti llo , 972 S.W .2d 66 , 70 (Tex . 1 99 7) ; se e als o Gunn Infiniti, Inc. v. O’ Byrne , 996 S.W .2d 854, 860-61 (Te x . 1999) (holding evidenc e that O’ By rne had experienc ed disappointment, mental pain, a ng uish, gr ief, a

nd ridicule fr om friends for

purcha se of c ar not sufficient evidence to support mental ang uish damag es beca use some testimony

d id n o t r e la te to mi s r e p rese ntations alleg edly made a nd rema ining testimony
c on c lus or y ); Saenz , 925 S.W .2d at 614 (menta l ang uish evidenc e, which only consisted of testim ony that pl a int if

f w a s a fr a id s he wo uld

los e he r h ome an d w a s w or ri e d a bo ut p ay ingme dic a l bi lls in future, w as leg ally

and fa ctually

insufficient to support cla im). After viewing the evidenc e in t he li g ht most favorable to Brow ning, a fter c rediting all evidenc e re asonable jurors could be lieve, and after disreg ardingall contra

ry evidenc e except that which jurors c ould not ignore , we c onclude leg ally sufficie nt e vidence exis ts to support the jury ’s
awa rd for future pain and suff ering
. See City of Keller , 2 0 0 5 T e x . L E X IS 4 3 6 , a t* 1

- 2
. S i m i l a r l y, afte r we ighing

the evidenc e, we c annot conc lude that the aw ard is so contra ry to the overw helming weig ht of the evide nce a s to be clearly wrongand unjust. See F ord Motor Co. v. Bland , 517 S.W .2d16

641 (Tex. App.—Waco 1 9 7 4 , writ ref ’d n.r.e .) (plaintiff suf

fer ing f rom closed he ad injury

afte r automobile collision recove red f or mental ang uish a fter his doc tor testified Bla nd was wor

ried a nd depre ssed about his future and af ter demonstrating impairment to cog nitive functions). Given the evidenc e pre sented re g ardingthe seve rity of B rowning ’s injuries, a jury could have conclude d that
an aw ard of

$500,000 was rea sonable and fair compensa tion. Theref

ore, w e hold that the evide nce is l e g a lly and fa c tua lly su ff ic ie nt t o s up po rt

the awa rd fo r f utu re pa in a nd su ff e ri ngand ov e rr ule Whit e’s se cond issue.
Pa st a nd Fu tur e Los s o

f E ar nin g Ca pa c ity Whit e a lso c onte nd s the e vid e nc e do e s not s up po rt the awa rd fo r p a st a nd futur e los s of ea rning capa city . Ear ning c apac ity is the ability

and fitness to work in g ainful employ ment for any ty pe of remune ration, including salary and commissions. Strauss v. Continental Ai rlines, Inc. , 67 S.W .3d 428, 435 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2002, no pet.). Be cause the amount of money a plaintiff mig ht ear

n in the future is a lway s uncer tain, the jury

has consider able discr etion in determining the amount. Tag le , 155 S.W .3d at 519.

To su pp or t an a wa rd of dama g e s f

or los s o f futur e e arn ingc a

pa c ity , th e pla int if

f m us t introduce e vidence sufficie nt to allow the jury to r easona bly measure ear

ning capa city

in monetary terms. Id . I n support, a plaintiff ca n i n t roduce evidenc e of pa st earning s; the plaintiff’s stamina,
e ff ic ie nc y , a nd a bil ity to w or k w ithpa in; the we a kn e sse s and de g e n e r a t ive c ha ng e s th a t w ill natur a lly result from the injury ; the plaintiff’s wor k-life e x pecta

ncy ; and the plaintiff’ s ag e, hea lth, and g ener al phy sical condition. Id. I n deter mining the suff

iciency of the e viden ce , we must determine if the damag es ar e prove d to the deg ree the ca se is susceptible. Strau ss , 67 S.W.3 d at 436 . The re mus tI n s u p p o rt o f h is c o n te n ti o n th a t th e e v id e n c e p r e s e n te d w a s in s u f f ic ie n t to s u

pport the 5 awa rd for future a nd past loss of ear

ning capa city , Whit e cites to Bonney v. San Antonio Transit

Co. , 32 5 S. W.2 d 117 , 121 (T e x. 19 59 ) (c ourt re mand e d ca se be c a us e e vid e nc e did

no t pr ov ide re a so na

ble measure of ea

rning capa city prior to injury ; only evidenc e prese nted was that plaintiff had oper ated watch business, was in excellent hea lth, was 39 y ear s old, was unable to r epair watche s beca

use of he a da c he s and imp a ir e d visi on , an d wa s now mana g e r of je we lr y sto re ); Dallas Ry

. & Terminal Co. v . G uth rie , 210 S.W .2d 550, 552 (Tex. 1948) (cour t held evidenc e fr om plaintiff stating howmuch he ma de pe r y e ar a

nd e vid e nc e of

lif e e xpe c tanc y

did no t ov e rc ome inc lus ion

of ina pp ro pr ia te evidenc e by

a c c o u nta nt; accounta

nt ga ve testimony

reg ardingwhat prof

its from business would have been ove r 28 y ear s, but te stimony was based on tax documents that we re e ither not produce d or not authenticated and we re not susce ptible to cross-examination); and Texas & N. O

. R. Co. v

. W o od , 17 be so me e vid e nc e tha

t the pla int if

f h a d th e c a

pa c ity to w or k p ri or to t he inj ur y and that hi s c a

pa c ity was impaire d as a r esult of the injury
. Tag le , 155 S.W .3d at 520. I f the e arningcapa city is impaired but not destroy ed, the e x tent of the loss is best shown b y co m p ar i n g ear nings be fore and af

ter the injury
. Strau ss , 6 7 S. W.3 d at 43 6. Ho we ve r, be c a us e the me a sure of

dama g e s is the los s o f c a

pa c ity to ear n money , not actua l lost earning s, proof of this injury does not nec essar ily

require showing an actua l loss of income. See P lainview Motels, Inc. v . Rey nolds , 127 S.W .3d 21, 35 (Tex. App.—Ty ler 2003, pet. denied)
.

Whit e c on te nd s th a t th e on ly e vid e nc e of

pa st a nd futur e e arn ingc a

pa c ity in t his c a se
are Br owning ’s testimony that “it’s very difficult to know how much [he ma de]” b ec au s e o f t he
uncer tainties of his business, Br owning ’s claim that he made one third of his normal income in 2003, and docume nts specifying the pay ments he re ceive d as commi ssions. W hite contends this evidenc e is i ns uf fi c ie nt. F ur

the r, Whit e a sse rt s tha t doc ume nts sp e c if y ing B ro wn ing ’s c omm iss ion inc ome
c on ta in a mou nts that are inc on sis te nt w ithinc ome inf or ma tio n co nta ine d in othe r doc ume nts . White
a lso po int s to te sti mony

by B ro wn ing ’s su

pe rv iso r statin g that Te xonic s ha d e xpe ri e nc e d a dr op in
overa ll sales over the last two y ear s as par tial expl anation for

Br owning ’s income r eduction. 5166 S.W .2d 141, 144-45 (Te x . Civ. App.—San Antonio 1942, no writ) (cour t concluded e vidence by pla int if f a mou nte d to un su

pp or te d c on c lus ion ; pla int if

f d id n ot t e sti fy

a bo ut n a tur e of

bu sin e ss, e.g ., number of e mploy ees, but testified expected to make $300 pe r we ek, wa s unable to work f or three months, a

nd g uessed his e arning capa city had been diminis hed by $5,000 over t h e p revious y e ar. On c ro ss e xami natio n, pla int if f a dmi tte d h e ra

n bus ine ss dur ingpe ri od

of inc a pa c ity bu t c ou ld not state how much money he made ). Th e se c a se s are dis tin g uis ha ble . B ro wn ing bro ug ht f or th e vid e nc e of

his e arn ingc a

pa c ity befor e and after

the injury

and evide nce of

his earning s. The evide nce w as base d on testimony and on documents that wer e prese nted at trial and constituted more than unsupported conclusions about h i s l o s s o f

e ar n i n g c a p a c i t y. 18 W e d i s ag ree with Whi te’s cha rac terization of the evidenc e. B rowning broug ht sufficie nt e vidence to suppor t the awa rd in this case . Br owning prese nted evidenc e that his mental impairments from the “ closed he ad in ju r y ” h a v e n e g atively

aff ecte d his work. He pr esente d evidenc e that he for g ets conve rsations, that he re peats himself, that he loses his train of thoug ht, and that he has problems c omprehe nding. H e testified that now, a s a result of the collision, it takes him much longe r, up to three or four times longe r, to perf orm his job functions and to perf orm the ca lculations
re qu ir e d f or his job . H e de mon str a te d th a t, a ft e r t he c oll isi on , h e re qu ir e s a ssi sta nc e fr om oth e rs to
ensure that his w ork is a ccur ate. Br owning also testified to ac tions he eng ag es in to function at wor k, inc lud inge xten siv e no te ta kin g and ta pe re c or din g of

me e tin g s. I n a dd iti on , B ro wn inga lso pr e se nte d e vid e nc e that hi s e ff ic ie nc y in t he wo rk pla c e ha s d e c re a se d d

ra ma ti cal ly and that th is chang e wa s noticed by

his co-wor

kers a nd his clients. Brow ning’ s co-w orker s testified that, prior to the collision, Browninghad bee n a self- sufficie nt and compete nt salesman but now re quired supervisi o n . T h ey further testified that B rowning has to be re minded sever al times to complete a single task. Fur

ther, a co-w orker

testified that B rowning ’s job was in jeopa rdy
.19 Br owning testified that he had planned on working for ten mor e y ear s and pre sented evidenc e that his sa les and, conse quently , his income have dropped since the collision. Brow ning prese nted evidenc e that his commission in come ha d dropped by

$12,500 betwee n 2001 and 2002 and by $12,500 betwee n 2002 and 2003. B rowning ’s commission sales actua lly incre ased be tween 2000 and 2001, but one of Br owning ’s co-w orker s explained that there is a la g time betwee n the time a
s a l e i s m a d e an d t h e t i m e a c o m m i s s i o n i s p a i d an d r e p o rt e d b e c a u s e c o m m i s s i o n s ar e o f

te n p a id months or y ear s after

a sale
. Simi larly , Br owning ’s co-w orker s testified that, befor e the c ollisi on, Br owning had enjoy ed sales equa l to or g reater than that of other sa lespeople in the c ompany . They further testified th a t, a f te r th e c o ll is io n , B r o w n in g ’ s s a le s dr o p p e d b e lo w th a t o f an y o th e r s a le s p e r s o n in the
c omp any and that B ro wn ing ’s sa le s d

ro pp e d b y fo rt y to s ixty pe rc e nt. After viewing the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to Br owning , afte r cr editing all evidenc e re asonable jurors could be lieve, and a fter disre g ardingall contra ry evidenc e ex cept that which jurors could not ig nore, w e conc lude leg ally sufficie nt evidence exis ts to support the jury ’s
awa rd f o r p a s t an d f

u tu r e lo s s o f e ar

n in g c a p a c it y . I n a d d it io n , a f

te r w e ig h in g th e e v id e n c e, we
c ann ot c on c lud e tha

t th e awa rd s are so c on tr ary to t

he ov e rw he lmi ngwe ig ht o f t he e vid e nc e a s to be cle arly wrongand unjust. There fore , we hold that the evidenc e is leg ally and fa ctually

sufficie nt to suppor t the jury ’s awa

rds for pa st and future loss of ear ning c apac ity

and over rule White’s third issue.20 CO NC LU SION Havingoverr

uled all three of appe llant’s i s s ues on appe al, we a ffirm the judg ment of the dis tr ic t c ourt
.

David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices B . A. Smith, P ury ear and Pember

ton: Opinion by

J ustice Pury ear ; ConcurringOpinion by

J ustice Pemberton Affir med Filed: January

19, 2006