In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo 

 

No. 07-20-00002-CR 

 

MARCUS BARRIOS, APPELLANT 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS 

On Appeal from the 364th District Court 

 Lubbock County, Texas, 

Trial Court No. 2019-418,748, Honorable William R. Eichman II, Presiding 

July 29, 2021 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and DOSS, JJ. 

Appellant, Marcus Barrios, was convicted following a jury trial of continuous sexual 

abuse of a child and was assessed an enhanced sentence of confinement for life without 

parole.1 In a single issue, Appellant asserts the State’s evidence at trial was legally 

insufficient to convict him. We disagree with Appellant and affirm the judgment.

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02 (West 2019).
2

Background

In November 2019, Appellant was indicted for committing two or more acts of 

sexual abuse against J.F., a child younger than fourteen years of age. The indictment 

alleged that from May 2010 through May 2017, Appellant committed three counts of 

indecency by contact with J.F. and four counts of aggravated sexual assault. See TEX.

PENAL CODE §§ 21.11, 22.021.

In December 2019, a four-day jury trial was held. The State’s evidence showed

that in May 2017, J.F. was living with her mother, stepfather (Appellant),

2 and sister. The 

family had returned to their home from a barbeque when Appellant, angry, stormed out 

of the house. J.F. and her sister spoke to each other and agreed to tell their mother how 

they felt about their parents arguing and about Appellant’s sexual abuse of the two 

children. J.F.’s sister told their mother Appellant had fondled her breasts and took them 

in his mouth after she had taken a bath. J.F. told her mother Appellant had been sexually 

abusing her for years, including acts of anal and vaginal penetration.3 The girls’ mother 

called the police. Investigating officers gathered J.F.’s sheets, which upon testing showed 

the presence of Appellant’s semen.

J.F. and her sister were taken to the Children’s Advocacy Center for an interview 

and examination. Terri Sanchez, a forensic interviewer, found J.F. to be engaging, 

friendly, and talkative. Sanchez also described J.F.’s sister as engaging and talkative,

2 At trial, Appellant was in his late forties.

3 J.F. also alleged Appellant first exposed himself to her when she was ten years old.
3

and who maintained good eye contact and stayed on track. J.F.’s and her sister’s 

accounts of sexual abuse by Appellant were consistent with their earlier outcries.

J.F. was examined by Loli Reyna, a sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE). J.F.

detailed several acts of sexual abuse by Appellant that had been occurring for years. 

Reyna noted that J.F.’s genitalia had suffered multiple lacerations that were consistent 

with the sexual acts alleged against Appellant. J.F. suffered a deep laceration to her anus 

and extensive injury to her rectum. Reyna indicated J.F.’s injuries were consistent with 

sexual abuse.

In addition to testimony from J.F.’s mother, sixteen-year-old J.F. took the stand to 

testify about her abuse by Appellant. J.F. provided a detailed account of the escalating 

sexual abuse she endured for more than six years. She testified that Appellant taught 

her how to masturbate him, that the two took turns engaging in oral sex, and how they 

engaged in anal and vaginal sex on a regular basis. J.F. testified that Appellant would 

wipe his ejaculate on her bedding4 or clothes. J.F. said she had told no one because she 

was embarrassed, and scared Appellant would hurt her.

Thereafter, the jury found Appellant guilty and sentenced him to confinement for 

life without parole. On appeal, Appellant contends the State’s evidence was insufficient 

to convict him because (1) J.F.’s motivation for making her outcry was her disappointment 

in her mother not leaving her marriage with Appellant; (2) J.F.’s testimony was indicative 

of a manic episode due to a bipolar disorder; (3) J.F.’s motive for making an outcry to her 

4 Forensic evidence reveals Appellant’s semen was found on one of J.F.’s red sheets. J.F. used 

the term “blankets” to describe the material J.F. would use for cleaning up his ejaculate and the bedding 

taken by the state for forensic testing. This semantic difference was resolved by the jury as a part of the 

assessment of the evidence. 
4

mother was anger; (4) Reyna’s findings and testimony do not establish with certainty that 

J.F. was sexually assaulted; and (5) J.F.’s testimony was generally not credible.

Legal Sufficiency—Standard of Review

We apply only one standard to evaluate the evidentiary sufficiency to support a 

criminal conviction beyond a reasonable doubt: legal sufficiency. Temple v. State, 390 

S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Under this standard, we examine all the 

evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether 

any reasonable juror could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (citing 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)). In a 

legal sufficiency review, circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence; a 

conviction can be supported solely by circumstantial evidence. Kuciemba v. State, 310

S.W.3d 460, 462 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Although we consider all the evidence admitted 

at trial, we do not reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence, nor do we 

substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume 

that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that 

determination.” Murray, 457 S.W.3d at 448-49.

To establish Appellant committed the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a 

child, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant, during 

a period of time thirty or more days in duration, committed at least two acts of sexual 

abuse against J.F., a child younger than fourteen years of age, while he was at least 
5

seventeen years of age at the time of each of the acts. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 

§ 21.02(b) (West 2019). An “act of sexual abuse” is defined as including an act that 

constitutes the offenses of indecency with a child; id. § 21.11(a),(c), and aggravated 

sexual assault. Id. § 21.02(c)(2 & 4); see id. § 22.021(a)(1)(B) (West 2019) (enumerating 

acts that constitute an offense of indecency with a child and aggravated sexual assault 

including causing penetration of a child’s anus or sexual organ, causing penetration of 

child’s mouth by actor’s sexual organ, and causing child’s sexual organ, anus, or mouth 

to contact or penetrate the mouth, anus, or sexual organ of another person). The State 

need not prove the exact dates of the abuse, only that “there were two or more acts of 

sexual abuse that occurred during a period that was thirty or more days in duration.” 

Brown v. State, 381 S.W.3d 565, 574 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012, no pet.); Lane v. State, 

357 S.W.3d 770, 773-74 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d).

Analysis

Appellant challenges his conviction by questioning J.F.’s motivation for her outcry, 

theorizing her allegations were the result of a manic episode, contending she was not a 

credible witness, and attacking Reyna’s inability to testify with certainty that J.F.’s injuries 

were caused by sexual intercourse. The uncorroborated testimony of a child victim is 

sufficient to support a conviction for indecency with a child as well as aggravated sexual 

assault. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07(a) (West Supp. 2020); Martinez v. State, 

178 S.W.3d 806, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (noting that article 38.07 deals with the 

sufficiency of evidence required to sustain a conviction for certain sexual offenses); 

Chapman v. State, 349 S.W.3d 241, 245-46 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2011, pet. ref’d). The 

State has no burden to produce any corroborating or physical evidence. Martinez v. 
6

State, 371 S.W.3d 232, 240 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); see also Lee 

v. State, 176 S.W.3d 452, 458 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004) (“The lack of physical 

or forensic evidence is a factor for the jury to consider in weighing the evidence.”), aff’d,

206 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Likewise, a child victim’s outcry statement alone 

can be sufficient to support a sexual assault conviction. See Jones v. State, 428 S.W.3d 

163, 169 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.); Tear v. State, 74 S.W.3d 555, 

560 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. ref’d).

Although J.F.’s testimony at trial, by itself, was sufficient evidence to convict 

Appellant, additional evidence also supported a finding of guilt. J.F.’s outcry to her 

mother, the consistent testimony from Reyna, the SANE exam results, and the results of 

forensic testing all support the jury’s verdict. We decline Appellant’s invitation to become 

a thirteenth juror. See Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

Although we consider all the evidence admitted at trial, we do not reevaluate the weight 

and credibility of the evidence, nor do we substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. 

Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750. See Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 408-09 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1997) (determination of what weight to give contradictory testimonial evidence is 

within the sole province of the jury, as it turns on an evaluation of credibility and 

demeanor). Appellant merely proffers alternative interpretations of the evidence that the 

jury possessed the power to consider and accept or reject. “When the record supports 

conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the 

verdict, and we defer to that determination.” Murray, 457 S.W.3d at 448-49. To the extent 

there were inconsistencies in the evidence, it was the jury’s duty to resolve those 

inconsistencies. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. We overrule Appellant’s single issue.
7

Conclusion

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

Lawrence M. Doss

 Justice

Do not publish.