IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

MICHAEL S. JONES, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 3:13-CV-909

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Michael S. Jones, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas petition

challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding. (DE 1). For the

reasons set forth below, the petition (DE 1) is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

In Cause Number # BTC-11-08-337, Jones was found guilty of

attempting/aiding an arson. (DE 5-3.) The charge was initiated on

August 16, 2011, when Corrections Officer L. Montgomery wrote a

conduct report stating as follows: 

On 8-16-2011 at approx. 1005 AM I Ofc. Montgomery viewed

on DDorm’s security cameras an incident that happened on

Aug. 11, 2011 at approx. 433 PM. I observed Offender

Jones #133357 pick up a soot tower1 from cube #5 between

beds #19, #20, #21, #22 and carry it to his bed area

between beds #1, #2, #3, #4 and remove the soot from the

tower, and store it in cube #5 bed #4 locker, that’s

where I picked up the soot tower at.

1 The record does not contain a clear explanation of what a “soot tower”

is, but it appears to be some part of a boiler or furnace with incendiary

qualitites.
There was evidence of a soot tower that had been burning

in the East restroom shower area that left a burnt spot

on the floor.

(DE 5-1.)

On August 18, 2011, Jones was formally notified of the charge.

(DE 5-2.) He pled not guilty, requested a lay advocate, and did not

request any witnesses or physical evidence. (Id.) On August 23,

2011, a hearing was held on the charge. (DE 5-3.) In his defense,

Jones made the following statement: “I never burned any tower. I

did remove the soot from the tower.” (Id.) Based on the evidence,

the hearing officer found him guilty. (Id.) The hearing officer

imposed a suspended sanction from a prior disciplinary case, as a

result of which Jones lost earned time credits and received a

credit-class demotion.(Id.) His administrative appeals were denied.

(DE 5-4.)

DISCUSSION

 When prisoners lose earned time credits in a disciplinary

proceeding, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause guarantees

them certain procedural protections: (1) advance written notice of

the charge; (2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial

decision-maker; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present

documentary evidence when consistent with institutional safety and

correctional goals; and (4) a written statement by the fact-finder

of evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.

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Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). To satisfy due process,

there must also be “some evidence” in the record to support the

hearing officer’s determination. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst.

v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). 

Jones raises two claims in his petition, both of which can be

read as challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Specifically,

he argues that he should not have been found guilty because there

was no video of him actually burning anything, and because another

inmate allegedly admitted to starting the fire in the bathroom. (DE

1 at 4.) 

In reviewing a disciplinary determination for sufficiency of

the evidence, “courts are not required to conduct an examination of

the entire record, independently assess witness credibility, or

weigh the evidence, but only determine whether the prison

disciplinary board’s decision to revoke good time credits has some

factual basis.” McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir.

1999). “[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in

the record that could support the conclusion reached by the

disciplinary board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56 (emphasis added). The

court will overturn a guilty finding only if “no reasonable

adjudicator could have found [the prisoner] guilty of the offense

on the basis of the evidence presented.” Henderson v. United States

Parole Comm’n, 13 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994). Additionally,

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circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.

See Hamilton v. O’Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir. 1992).

Here, Jones was found guilty of aiding or attempting to commit

an arson. (DE 5-3.) There is sufficient evidence in the record to

support this determination. Jones was seen on video in possession

of an incendiary object, and that same object was later used to

burn an area of the restroom floor. Jones did not deny he was in

possession of the object. Although he is correct that there was no

direct evidence of him actually starting the fire, direct evidence

is not required in this context. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 457

(“Although the evidence in this case might be characterized as

meager, and there was no direct evidence identifying any one of

three inmates as the assailant, the record is not so devoid of

evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without

support or otherwise arbitrary.”); Hamilton, 976 F.2d at 345

(circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support guilty finding).

 Jones argues that he should not have been found guilty because

another inmate admitted starting the fire, but he does not provide

any evidence to support this contention. Even if the court assumes

this is accurate, Jones was convicted of attempting or aiding an

arson, not arson. Thus, even if another inmate actually started the

fire, there is sufficient evidence that Jones improperly aided him

by providing the means for doing so. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 457 (due

process is satisfied as long as “the record is not so devoid of

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evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without

support or otherwise arbitrary”); Moffat v. Broyles, 288 F.3d 978,

981 (7th Cir. 2002) (witness statements constituted some evidence);

McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786 (conduct report alone provided some

evidence to support guilty finding). Therefore, Jones has not

established a violation of his due process rights. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the petition (DE 1) is

DENIED.

DATED: April 11, 2014 /s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

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