1 M r. Jord an is no t the natur al father o f Joce lynn Jo rdan . M r. Jord an is aw are o f th is fact . However, Mr.

Jord an’s name is lis ted on the child’s b irth certifica te and he has exec uted a n Affida vit of Pa ternity, under oath, aff irming that he is the fat

her of Jocelynn. 

## IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT J ACKSON January 23, 2003 Ses sion JAMES S. JORDAN,JR. v. KELLY K. JORDAN A Direc t Appea l from th e Circuit Co urt for Sh elby Co unty No. CT-007 590-01 The Honorabl e Rit a L. St ott s, Ju dge

No. W2002-00854- COA-R3-CV - Fi led F ebruar y 19, 20 03

This case involves the enrollment of a foreig n divorce decree, en for cementof the child suppo rt obli gation therein, and the mod if ica tion of t

he vis itation pri vile ges set out i n the decr ee. The trial court enrolled the for eig n decr ee, ente red j udgment for arr ear age s and c hildsupport, and amended the e nrol led j udgment as t o the visi tation privile ges for Fath er. Father appe als . We a ff

ir m. Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Righ t; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

W. F RANK C RAWFORD , P.J., W.S., de live red t he o pinion of t

he court , in which A LAN E. H IGHERS , J. and H OLL Y K IRBY L ILLARD , J., joined. Richard A. G ordan, Me mphis, For App ellant, James S. Jordan , Jr. Mitchell D. Moskovitz, Adam N. Cohen, Memp his, For Appelle e, Kelly K. Jordan OPINION On June 2, 199 9, Kelly K. Jordan (“Ms. Jordan,” “A ppellee, ” or “ Mother” ) and James S. Jordan, Jr. (“Mr. Jordan ,” “ Appell ant, ” or “ Fathe r”) were divor ced bydecr ee of the Ci rcui t Cour t of Mo bile County, Alabama. Ms. Jordan was granted “cu stody , phy sica l care, and cont rol” of t he parties’ two chi ldre n, Jocel ynn J ordan (d/o /b Apr il 20, 1995 ) 1 and Presleigh J ordan (d/o /b December 22, 19 97 ). M r. J ord an wa s giv en vis itat ion righ ts a nd ord ere d to pa y $ 898. 00 per m onth in ch ild suppo rt. Mr. Jord an was also ordered to reim burse M s. Jordan for one-half of the children’s uninsured medical expenses, and to pay for one-half of the childre n’s schooling expenses. On Febru ary14 , 20 01 , M s. J ord an an d th e tw o c hil dre n m ov ed from M ob ile C ou nty, Alab ama to Shelby County, Tennessee . S omet ime in early 2001, M r. Jordan w as laid off by his Alaba ma emplo yer. O n o r ab ou t Ju ne 1, 2 00 1, M r. J ord an acc ep ted a po siti on in S hre ws bu ry, Massachusetts.

### -2-

On Decembe r 20, 200 1, M s. Jord an filed a Petition to En roll Fo reign Decre e of Divor ce and for Civil Contempt (the “First Peti tion”) in the Circuit Court for the Thirtieth Judicial Distri ct at Memphis. On Januar

y 25, 2002, Ms. Jordan fil ed an Amend ed Petition to Modify Final Decre e of Divorce and for Injunctive R elief and to Place File Under S eal (the “Se cond Petiti on”). The Second Petition reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

4. Mother alleges that t

here presentlyexists a substantialand material chan ge in circumstances such thatthe visitation awarded to Father in the part ies ’ Fi na l De cre e o f Div orc e b e m od ified . Sp eci fica lly, Mother alleges that Father relocated to Shrews bury, Massa chusetts in Ma y of 2001 , and th at he cu rrently resid es with his pa ramo ur... 5. Mothe r alleges that, due to Father’s reloca tion, his failure to exercise parenting ti me and Father’s recent threat s, t he vis itation schedu le set fort

h in the parties’ Final Decree is no longerin the best inte res ts of

the p arties’ minor

chil dren. 6. Mo ther alleges that this Hon orable Co urt should modify the Final Decree of

Divorce to set a specific visitation sched ule determin ed to be in the manifest best

interest of

the parties’ minor children, and that any visi tation awarded b e supe rvis ed, and occur in S h elb y Co un ty, Tennessee. 7. After Father

was s erved with M othe r’s Petitio n to E nroll F oreign Decr ee of Di vorce and f or Civ il Contempt , Fa ther lef t mes sag e on Mo ther’s answering machi ne, a cknowle dgi ng that he had an $ 18,000 arrearage owing to Mother. Father furt her threatened to utiliz e “h alf” of that money to pay a private investigator to track down the natural father of the parti es’ oldes t child

. Mother alleges that sai d individual has a history of physical abus e towards Mo ther. On Janua ry 25, 2002, the trial cou rt issued an Ex Parte Order of Protectio n against M r. Jordan. The mat

ter was se t f

or hearingon February 8, 2002. At that heari ng, Ms. Jordan testif ied as to th e na ture of her r ela tion ship with Jo celynn’s natural father and of the need for the cou rt to issu e an injunction to enjoin Mr. Jordan from contacting this man and di scuss ing any thin g abo ut the children or Ms. Jordan. Richard A. Gordon m ade a s p eci al appear ance o n behal f of Mr. Jor dan. Before any cros s-e xamina tionof Ms. Jordan could occur , the court cautioned Mr. Gordon as follows: “We ll, I [ the Court] think if you [Mr. Gordan] were to ask her [Ms. Jordan ] a nythi ng other than someth ing going to jurisdic ti on that you w ould b e waiving it.” Upo n that recom mend ation, M r. Gordon asked no quest ions

. On February 28, 2002, the trialcourt entered an order sty led Order Injunctive Relief; Co ntinuan ce; and Placin g File under Sea l. On March 8, 2002, Ms. Jo rdan filed an Am ended Petition (the “Th ird Petition”). The Third Peti tion specifically alleged that the t ria l cour t had pers onal j uris diction ove r Mr. Jordan pursu ant

### -3-

to T.C. A. § 36- 5-2201 a nd/or T. C.A. § 20 -2-214, an d that the cou rt had prop er jurisdiction in all res pect s under

T.C. A. § 36- 6-201 e t se q. By special ap pe ara nc e o f his atto rne y, Mr. Jor dan f ile d a Motio n to di smiss the F irs t Petiti on on March 8, 2002. Al so by speci al appear ance, Mr. Jor dan f ile d Respons es t o the Fir st Pe tition an d the Second Pe tition. The matter was s et for hearing on M arch 12, 20 02. M r. Jordan m ade a mo tion to bifurcate the he ari ng, separ ati ng co nside ration on t he is sue of

jur isdi cti on fr om consi dera tion on the merits. At the March 8, 2002 hearing, the court denied Mr. Jordan’s motion to bifurcate. An Order on the Mo tion to Bifurca te was entered on M arch 2 8, 20 02. Before the hearing on M arch 12, 20 02, M r. Jordan filed a M otion to dismi ss the Second and Third Peti tion s f

or l ack of jur isdi cti on. At

the h ear ing , Mr. Gordon a gai n decl ined t o cros s-e xamine Ms. Jordan for fear of waiving Mr. Jord an’s objectio n to the cou rt’s havin g personal juri sdic tion

. Foll owingthe hea ri ng, the trialcourt g ran tedthe re li ef soug ht i n al l of

Ms. Jo rda n’s pet it ions . On March 28, 200 2, the court entered an Order of Protection agai nst Mr. Jordan and an Or der g ranting Ms. Jordan’s petitions (the “Final Order”). The Final Order reads, in pert inent part, as follows: 2. Father’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction sha ll be and here by i s deni ed. This Hono rabl e Court speci fi cal ly fi nds that it has prop er subject matter an d person al jurisdiction to adjudicate all claims before it. 3. The Fi nal De cre e of Divor ce heretof

ore e nt er ed by the Circuit Cou rt of Mob ile County, Alabama, shall be and hereby is registered and enrolled for allpurposes. 4. Father is in willful contem pt of Cou rt for fail ure t o p ay child suppo rt in ac corda nce wi th the F inal Decre e of Divor ce, and f

or failure to reimburse M other for extracurricular acti vit y f ees, private schoo l, and other rela ted e xpenses , i n the tota l amount of $ 1 9 ,161. Said sum sh all be reduc ed to judg ment, for allof whi ch exe cuti on sh all i ssu e if n ece ssa ry. 5. The Final Decree o f Di vo rce shall be modifie d to refl ect that Father’s parenti ng time with t he partie s’ mi nor ch ildren sha ll occur only in Shelby County, Tennessee, and that sam e be s upervi sed. Pendin g further orders of th e Cou rt, Father shall be entitled to supervised pare ntin g t ime a t the Excha nge Cl ub of Memphi s one (1) weekend per mon th f

rom 9: 00 a.m. unti l 6: 00 p.m. on Saturday , and fr om 9:00 a .m. unti l 6: 00 p.m. on Su nday . Fa ther shal l pr ovide Mother with at

le ast two (2) weeks notice of his i ntent to exercise said supervised parenting time.

### -4-

On March 28, 2002 , the matter was again before the trialcourt upon motion by Mr. Jordan to determine w hether the seal im posed by the court upo n the cou rt fil e extended to the pleadings, transcripts and commu nications being provided to Mr. Jordan’s Alabama at to rney . On April 3, 2002, the trial court entered an Order on that motion , which states, in pe rtinent part, that:

1. [ Mr. Jo rdan’s] attorney may provid e only copies of the o rders entered in this cause to [Mr. Jordan’s] Alabama attorney and said attorney’s name m ust be disclo sed to the co urt; 2. [M r. J ord an ’s] s aid Ala ba ma atto rne y may app ly to this c ourtfor additional inf

orma tion from the court f ile should said attorney dete rmine the n eed t o do so. Pursua nt to this Or der, Mr. Gor don submi tte d a Noti ce t o the cour t on April 3, 2002, indi cat ing the Alabam a attorney’s name an d address . Mr. Jordan filed notice of appeal on Apri l 8, 2002. On M ay 24, 2002, the trial court entered an Orde r Par tia lly Li fting Seal for

the expre ss and limited purp ose of preparin g the record on ap peal. On July5, 2002 , Mr. Jordan, by special appearance, fil ed a Motion for Stay and Further Re lief Pendi ng Appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 63. On August 26, 2002, M s. Jordan filed an Affidavit of judgment debtor’s l ast known address for the purpose of requesting t he issuance of an exec ution of garnish men t. On app eal, M r. Jo rdan raise s fou r (4) is sue s for o ur re vie w, as state d in his b rief: I. The trial court erred in ruling th at Tenness ee had proper jurisdiction ov er the person of Appellan t. II. T h e trialcourt erred in r uling that Tennessee had proper juri sdic tion to mod if

y t he partie s’ Al abama f

inal decr ee con cer ning visi tation. III. The tri al court erred in refusing to bifurcate the h earing as to jurisdicti on from the hearing on the merit s. I V. The trial court erred in placi ng such a broad seal in this matter a s to prevent disclosure of communications and co urt pleadings to App ellant’s Alabama attorney in r elated Alabam a proc eedin gs between the same parties. I. The tr ial court

erre d in r uli ng that

Tenness ee had
prope r jurisdiction o ver the pers on of A ppellant.

### -5-

We first note that

the trialcourt’s determinati on of personal jurisdiction over Mr. Jordan is a question of law. As such, our review of the trial court order is de novo upon the record w ith no p resum ption of correc tness accom pan ying the trial co urt’s co nclu sion s of law

. See Tenn . R. App . P. 13(d); Wa ldron v. D elffs , 988 S.W .2d 182 , 184 (Ten n. Ct. App . 1998); Sims v. Stewart , 973 S.W.2 d 597, 5 99-600 (Tenn. C t. App. 199 8). From our

rea ding of t

he re cord and his brie f, Mr. Jor dan does not di spute the v ali dity of Tenne ssee’s enrolling the A labama d ecree in the Circu it Court of Shelb y County. Rather, his so le contention is that Tennessee may not enf orce that properlyenrolled decree because Tennessee lacks perso nal juri sdictio n ov er M r. Jord an. W e cann ot agree. T.C. A. § 36- 5-2606 outline s the proce dure n eces sar y t o cont est the va lidi ty or enforcement of a r egistr ation order. The stat ute reads, in pertinent part, as follows: ( a) A nonreg ist eri ng party seeki ng t o cont est the va lidi ty o r enf orce ment of a registered order in this state shall request a hearing within twenty (20) day s after the date of maili ng or personal service of notice of the registration. The no nregistering party may seek to vacate the registration, to asse rt any def ense t o an al leg ati on of noncom pliance with the regi stered order, or to contest the remedies be ing soug ht or

the amount of

any all ege d arrear age s purs uantto § 36-5-26 07 (Co ntest of Registration or En forcement). (b) If the n on regi ste rin g pa rty fai ls to co nte st th e v alid ity o r e nfor cement

of t he re gi stered ord er i n a ti melymanner , the order i s conf ir med by oper ati on of

la w. The langua ge of T.C.A. § 36-5 -2606 is clear. The nonregistering party (in this case M r. Jordan) must request

a hearingwithi n twenty ( 20) da ys af ter pers onal s ervi ce of

the n otic e of registration. In this case, Ms. Jorda n filed the First Petition on Decem ber 20, 20 01 and Mr. Jordan was se rved wi th this Fi rst Peti tion somet ime i n late Dece mber. From t he re cord, we f

ind that Mr. Jordan’s fir st attempt to contest the validityor enforcement of t he Alabama decree was not made unti l the f

irs t hearingin this ma tte r on Fe bruar y 8, 2002. At that t ime, Mr. Jor dan, thro ugh s peci al appear ance o f hi s attorn ey , r aise d the def ense o f l ack of

pers onal j uris diction. From the re cord, itappears t hat Mr. Jordan ’s f

irs t contest to the val idit y or enf orce ment of the Alabama decree was made well beyond the twenty (20) day cut-off. While we note that lack of personal jurisdi ction is a valid def ense to the validity

or enforcement of a regist ered order under T.C.A. § 36-5-2607, T.C.A. § 36-5-2606 makes it clear t hat such defense must be raised with in twe nty (20) d ays after the d ate of ma iling or p erson al servi ce of no tice of the registration

. Under t he st atut e, Mr. Jordan ’s f ail ure t o cont est the c ourt ’s l ack of pers onal j uris diction i n a ti mel y m anne r r esul ts in t he order bei ng c onf

ir med by oper ati on of

la w. Once there has been conf irma tion of a

reg ist ere d orde r, Mr. Jor dan is prec luded, underT.C. A. § 36- 5-2608 f rom2 § 36-2-219 addresse s temporary emergenc y juri sdiction, wh ich i s not ne cessary in thi s case. 

### -6- asse rti ng an y de fen ses ( i. e. l ack of pers onal j uris diction) , whi ch coul d have be en ra isedat t he time of registration: See T.C.A. 36 -5-2607 (a)(1) (2001) an d T.C.A. § 3 6-5-260 8 (2001 ). However, we note that

Mr. Jor dan’s absen ce f rom this s tat e or more impor tantly the absence from this juri sdiction of anysource for coll ecting the j udgment will require Ms. Jordan to pr oceed with t

he Tenne ssee judg ment f or enf orce ment whe re Mr. Jordan ’s a sset s may be found. T.C.A. § 36-5-2603 provides:

36-5- 2603. Effec t of

registr ation for en forc eme nt. - (a) A supp ort order or inco me-w ithho lding order issued i n another state is register ed when the order is fil ed in the regi stering t ribunal of this state. (b) A registered order issued in an other sta te i s enf orce able in the same manner

and i s subj ectto the same procedures as an order issued by a tribunal of this st ate. (c) Except as o therwise pro vided in this part, a tribunal of this state shall rec ogni ze andenf

orce , but may not modify, a registered order if the iss uing trib una l had ju risdictio n. II. The tr ial court

erre d in r uli ng that

Tenness ee had p roper juri sdic tion to modi fy the parti es’ Alabama fi nal de cree conce rning visi tat ion.

To dete rmin e wh eth er Te nn ess ee h as ap pro pria te su bje ct-m atter juris dic tion to m od ify Alabama ’s f

inal decr ee con cer ning visi tation, we turn to the Unif orm Chil d Custody

Juri sdic tion and Enfo rcem ent Act (the “UC CJ EA ”). § 3 6-6 -21 8 ad dres ses the c ou rt’s ju risd ictio n to mo dify foreig n decrees and reads, in perti nent part, as f ollows: Except as otherwi se pr ovided in § 36-6- 219 2 , a court of this state may not modify a chil d-custody determination made by a court of another state unles s a co urt of t his s tat e has juri sdic tion to make an initial dete rmination under§ 36-6- 216(a) (1) or ( 2) and : * * * (2) A court of this s tate or a court of the other s tate determines t hat the chil d, the chi ld’s pare nts, and any pers on acting as a pare nt do not presently reside in the other st ate.

### -7-

Clearly two criteria must be met in order for a Ten nessee co urt to have jurisd iction to modif y t he Alabama dec ree at i ssue i n thi s cas e. Fir st, the T enness ee cou rt must ha ve jur isdi cti on to make an in iti al de termination unde r § 36- 6-216( a)( 1) or (2) . § 36 -6- 216(a) of t he UCCJEA reads, in perti nent part, as f ollows: (a)

... a court of this state has juri sdiction to mak e a n initial child cus tod y dete rmin atio n on ly if: (1) This state is the ho me state of the chil d on t he dat e of the com men ceme nt of the proce edin g... T.C. A. § 36- 6-205( 7) def ines “Home st ate ” as f

ollo ws: “‘ Home state’ means t he st ate in whi ch a chil d li ved wit

h a par ent or

a per son ac tingas a pare nt f or at lea st s ix ( 6) con secutive mont hs imme dia tel y b ef

ore the comme ncem entof a ch il d cus tody

pro cee ding .” I n th e i nst antcas e, we find that Tennessee is t he home state of Jocelynn Jordan and Presleigh Jordan. Ms. Jordan moved to Tennes see wi th the two c hild ren on Febru ary14, 200 1. The Fir st Pe tition was fi led on Dec emb er 20, 2 001 . The d efinition of “Ho me sta te” is, the refore, me t in this c ase. Consequ ently, we find that the f irst criterion f

or jurisdicti on to modify the f oreign decree under T.C. A. § 36- 6-218 i s satisf ied. The second applicable criterion f or jurisdicti on to modify the f oreign decree r equires a dete rmination that

the chil d, the chi ld’s pare nts, and any pers on acting as a pare nt do not pres entl y resid e in t

he oth er s tat e (i .e. Alaba ma). I t i s cl earthat Ms. Jor dan and t

he chi ldre n no longer resi de in Alabama. It is Mr. Jordan’s residential status that i s at issue here. In t he Final Order , the trial court

concl udes that “ Fathe r’s Motion t o Dismi ss f or l ack of

pers onal j uris diction shall be and hereby is denied. This Honorable Court specifically finds that i t has proper subject matte r and p erson al jurisd iction to adju dicate all claim s before it.” Since this case was tri ed by the trial court si tting without a j ury, we review the case de novo upo n the re cord with a presu mpti on o f correctn ess of th e findin gs of fact by the tria l court. Unle ss t he e vide nce pre ponde rates a ga ins t the f indi ngs , we must

af fi rm, abs enterror

of la w. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). However, in this case, the trialcourt made no findings of f act. The Final Order simply concludes, without explanation, t hat the court has personal and subject-matter juri sdic tion . Pur suant

to Te nn. R. App. P. 13(c) , we are l imit ed to the f act s “es tabl ishe d by the evide nce i n the tri al c ourtand se t f orth in the re cord and any addit ionalfa cts that

may be judiciallynoticed or are considered pursuant to rule 14.” Here, there was nothing f ound as a fact to whi ch we may

att ach the pre sumpti on of corr ect ness. Ther efo re, we wil l r evie w the recor d de novo to dete rmine whe re the p repo nde rance of the ev iden ce lies. Brooks v. Brooks , 992 S .W.2d 403 , 405 (Tenn .199 9) (citin g Devorak v . Pat ters on , 907 S.W .2d 815 , 818 (Ten n. Ct. App .1995); Goo dm an v. M em phis Pa rk Co m m 'n , 851 S .W.2d 165 , 166 ( Tenn. Ct. App.1992) ; and Kelly v. Kelly , 679 S.W .2d 458 , 460 (Ten n. Ct. App .1984)).

### -8-

Turning to the record in this case, w e find that the evide nce presen ted by Mr. Jo rdan to support his claim that he does not reside i n Massachu setts consists of his Motion to Dismiss filed March 8, 2002 . This Mo tion asserts, in pertinen t part, that:

2. Responde nt has at a ll time s re maineda re side nt of the S tat e of Alabama and has nev er been a resident of the State of Tennessee; 3. Res pon den t is a registere d vo ter in the State o f Alaba ma... 4. Respondent maintains an Alabama drivers’ license and not that of any other Stat e; 5. Responde nt has continuously maintained his primaryresidence in the St ate of Al abama whe re hi s bel ongi ngs and fur nishi ngs remain; 6. Responde nt’s pare nts, gr andpar ents and siblings are also residents of the State of

Alabama; 7. Respondent w as laid off fr om his e mploy ment i n Alaba ma duri ng 2001 and wa s unable to secure suitable em ployment in th e area for a period of three months; 8. Respo ndent o nly took employment in the New England area t hrou gh his l abor u nion when no sui tabl e empl oyme nt cou ld be located in Alabama; 9. Respondent is tempo rarily stay ing in Mas sachuse tts where he is currently worki ng in Mas sachuse tts and New Hamp shire and ex pects to re turn to Alabamaat any time once em ployment p rospects there improve; 10. Responde nt ini tia lly sta ye d at s ever al l ocal motel s unti l he recently rented a fu rni sh ed roo m in a ho me in S hre ws bu ry, Massachusetts; 11. Respond ent c olle cte d unemplo ymen t compe nsat ion f rom the State of Al abama du ring2001 and c onti nues t o dir ectand r ecei ve correspondence at his Alabama address; 12. Responden t has had no contacts with the State of Tennessee; At the M arch 12, 20 02 hearin g, Mr. Jordan ’s attorney reiterated the abov e points in arguing his c lient’s positi on. Concerning the question of where Mr. Jordan presently r esides, Ms. Jordan testifi ed at that heari ng as foll ows:

### -9- Q. You h ave heard Mr. Gordo n mak e certain statemen ts about w here your ex-husb and resides . You hav e had the o pportun ity to investigate the veracityof the statements or the alleg ations– A. Yes, Ihave. * * * A.

... once he [Mr. Jordan ] ha d moved there [t o Massach uset ts] and began living at his Banas ter address in July , he– we were on speak ing term s and we were talking. He did at t hat time inform me that h e really li ked it

there. He had met

a la dy by

the name of

Jennifer Latino, and was res idin g wit h her. He enj oye d the weather a nd did not have any inten tions on m ovin g back to Ala bam a, a nd f urther alleged that he was n ot going to pay the arreara ge or the por tion of school that

he was requ ired to pay . In that , he was tr yi ng t o save up to buy a home there. Q. Have you had an occas i on to review any documentation that reflec ts where he now suggests he resides? A. Yes. Q. And what document ati on have y ou had the opportuni ty to revi ew? A. He pu rch ase d and re gi ste reda ve hic le wi thin the s tat e of Massachusetts, and it does have a Mass achuse tts tag , as well as–I investigated that h e is paying taxes there on th at vehicle with in Shrewsbury, Massachusetts, the city that he resides. We first note that t he sta tuteat i ssue ( T.C. A. § 36- 6-218) , andspeci fi cal ly the s econd cri terion outlined in th at statute requires that the ch ildren, and the p arents not presently re side in Alab ama in or der f

or a T enness ee cou rt to hav e jur isdi cti on to modi fythe v isi tation decree. Wh ile we conce de that Mr. Jordan ’s domi cil e re mains in Ala bama i n that

he has no pre sentint en tion to perman ently res ide i n another state, and while the evidence indicates that Mr. Jordan retai ns a residence in Alabam a, the question before us is where Mr. Jor dan presently resides

. Black’s Law Dictionary 1176 (5 th ed. 1979) defines “resi de” as follows:

Reside

. Live, dwell, abide, sojo urn, stay, re main, lod ge. To settle one self or a thing in a place, to be station ed, to remain o r stay, to dw ell for a time

... Id. (citations omitted).

### -10-

From the evidence before us, it is clear that Mr. Jordan presently res ides in Massachusetts. From his o wn sworn s tat ement in the Motion to Dismiss filed M arch 8, 200 2, Mr. Jordan admits that he is “ staying in M assac hus etts wh ere he is curren tly work ing.” Although Mr. Jo rdan qu alifies this statementwith the w ord “temp orarily,” as noted abov e, the issue is not wh ether he intends to stay in Mass achusetts (that would go to the is sue of domi cil e), norwhether

he ha s a resi denc e i n Alabama (one may have m ore than on e residence). But ev en if a per son has several homes, no one can be at two pla ces at o nc e. C on seq ue ntl y, a p ers on ma y p resently reside only at one of his or her homes. Therefore, the question is simply this: where was M r. Jordan residing when thi s action co mmenced? The evidence be for e us y iel ds only one ans wer an d that

is Mass achuse tts . The comment to the offic ial text state s in pertinent part : “I n other words, a court of the modification state can dete rmine that all parties have moved away from the orig inal state. ” For the foregoing reasons, w e find that both criteria ou tlined in T.C .A. § 36-6-218 have been met in this c ase. Te nne ssee, t herefore, has subject-matter j urisdiction to modifythe custody order foun d in th e Alab ama d ecree.

III. The trial court erred i n refusing to bifurcate the hearing as to jurisdiction from the hearing on the merits. Based upo n our f

indi ng, underI ssue I

above, that

Mr. Jor dan f

ail ed to rai se the def

ense o f lack of personal juri sdiction within twenty ( 20) days after the date of mailing or personal service of notice of the registration, we find this issu e to be mo ot.

IV. The tri al cou rt e rred i n plac ing su ch a bro ad seal in thi s matt er as to pre vent d iscl osure of communic atio ns and court plead ings to Appell ant’ s Alabama attorne y in r elat ed Alabam a proceedings between the same parties. As se t forth ab ove , the trial co urt plac ed this file und er seal d ue to th e sens itive p arenta ge issues, as well as the history of the mother’s relations hip with J ocelynn’s biolo gical father. Mr. Jordan now submit s tha t the sea l i mposed bythe t ria l cour t i s overly broad and, as su ch, inte rf ere s with his const itut

ionalri ght

to co unsel . The rec ord i ndica tes that Mr. Jor dan di d move the trial court to “determ ine whe ther the seal placed by the court in this caus e extends to com mun ication s and plead ings be ing pro vide d to res pon den t’s Alab ama a ttorne y....” Althou gh Mr. Jor dan asked for clarification on the parameters of the court’s seal, we find n o indication in the record to sugge st that he rai sed the issues of the sealbeing overly broad or having any impact on his right to cou nsel. It is a well settled principle of law that issues n ot raised in the trial court cann ot be ra ised for th e first time o n app eal. See Lov ell v. Metro. G ov’t , 696 S .W.2d 2 ( Tenn. 1985 ); Lawrence v. Stanford , 655 S .W.2d 927 (Tenn . 1983) . Cons equent ly , this i ssue i s without merit. For the foregoing reason s, we affirm the Order of the trial court. Cos ts of this appeal are ass ess ed to th e A pp ella nt, Ja me s S. Jo rda n, J r., an d h is s ure ty.

### -11- __________________________________________ W. FRANK CRAWFOR D, PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.