### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Assigned on Briefs O

ctober 17, 2000
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RONALD W. BYRD
Appeal from the Criminal Court for Sullivan County No. S41,685 Phyllis H. Miller, Judge

No. E2000-00118-CCA-R3-CD December 6, 2000

The Defendant, Rona

ld W. Byrd, wa

s convicted of cr

iminal trespass, a

Class C misdemeanor

. In this appeal as of right, heasserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. We hold that the evidence was suffi cientto support the conviction, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appe al as of Right; Judgme

nt of the Criminal C

ourt Affirmed.

D AVID H. W ELLES , J., delivered the op inion of the court,

in which J OHN E VERETT W ILLI AMS , J. and W ILLI AM B. A CREE , J R ., S P .J., joined. Donald E. Spurrell, Johnson City, Tennessee, for the appellant, Ronald W. Byrd.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; R. Stephen Jobe, Assistant Attor ney Gener

al; Greeley Wells, District Attorney General; and Robert H. Montgomery, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION

The D efendant was charged with the offense of aggr avated criminal trespass, a Clas s B misdemeanor. After a jury trial, he was found guilty of the lesser included offense of cr iminal trespass, a Class C misdemeanor. He was sentenced to thirty day s in jail and received a $50.00 fine.

The proof at trial show

ed that on July 2

3, 1998, the Defe

ndant t el ephoned Senator Fred Thompson's office in Blountville, Tennessee, and he spoke with Kathy Tipton, a case wo

rker with Senator Thompson’s office, regarding a grievance the Def endant had with the Department of Justice. The Defendant informed Ms. Tipton that he hadbeen a postal worker in Colorado and that he was
a whistle blower. He further told Ms. Tipton that he had written the Department of Justice a letter several years ear

lier, and he want

ed Senator Thompso

n’s assistance in

determinin

g why he had received no response. Ms. Tipton informed the Defendant that s

he would need him to

sign a release
so that she could get information about his letter from the federal agency. The Defe ndant responded-2-

that “if he wrote anything else, he'd go to the c ommode and throw up. He was tired o f letter writing.” The conversation took several turns, with the Defendant at

times beco ming “inti midating” andtelling Ms. Tipton that he did not care about her rules, regulations or procedures, while at other times being “complian

t.” The conversa

tion ended with

the Defendant sa

ying that he

would get Ms. Tipton whatever she needed. Although Ms. Tipton had not previously had any contact with the Defendant, she had heard his name before. She had received an e-mail from Senator Tho mps on's Nas hvi lle off ice two days before which warned t he employees to contact someone immediately if the Defendant made an appearance

at any of the Senator’s offices. After s he ended th

e telephone conversation with the Defendant,

Ms. Tipton contacte

d Lieutenant D

oug Brewer of

the Tri-Cities Air

port Public Safety Department. Senator

Thompson’s office was located in the Tri-Cities Airport, and Ms. Tipton was the only employee there that day

. She contacted L

t. Brewer bec

ause she was afraid the Defendant might show up at her office.

Ms. Tipton asked Lt. Brewer for a photograph of the Defendant, which Lt. Brew er was able to procure. Ms. Tipt

on told Lt. Bre

wer that she was a

fraid of the Def

endant a nd that she did not want to meet with him. As a result, Lt. Brewer waited with Ms. Ti pton in her o ffice to see if the Defendant would arrive. About 2:30 that afternoon, Ms. Tipton saw the Defendant coming down the escalator. Lt. Brewer left the office to intercept the D efendant, and Ms. Tipton locked the door.

Lt. Brewer, who wa

s dressed in

a police uniform, a

pproached the D

efendant and as

ked him to identify hims

elf, which he did.

The Defendant wa s carrying a manilla envelope packet, and he told Lt. Brewer

that he wanted to d

eliver the packe

t to Ms. Tipton. Lt

. Brewer testified that he

told the Defendant that Ms. Tipton did not want to meet him and that she was afraid of him, and he offered the Defen dant two alternatives to meeting with Ms. Tipton. He said that he told the Defendant

he would deliver the packet to Ms. Tipton and let the Defendant

watch through th

e glass window, or the Defendant could mail the packet to Ms. Tipton. The Defendant refused to accept either option; he told Lt. Brewer that he wanted to e xercis e his constitutional right to speak to h

is representati

ve. Lt. Brewer said that he informed the Defendant that a persona l meeting “was not going to happen because she was afraid.” When the Defendant

continued to assert his desire to meet Ms. Tipton, Lt. Brewer

asked the Defendant to leave. Lt. Brewer testified that the Defendant then told him, “I was violating his civil rights, [and] that he would have me arrested.” Lt. Brewer again aske d the Defen dant to leave, and the Defendant refused. At this point, Lt. Brewer ar rested the Defendant. Lt. Brewer said that the Defendant made no attempt to leave prior to being arrested, and he did not believe that the Defendant had any intentions of leaving without personally delivering the packet to Ms. Tipton.

The Defendant testified at trial on his own behalf. For the most part, he confirmed the events described by Ms. Tipton and Lt. Brewer. However , he claimed that while Lt. Brewer informed him that Ms. Tipton did not wish

to speak with him, L

t. Brewer never

told him that Ms. Tipton

was afraid of him. He said that

he had no reason to believe Ms. Tipton would be afraid of him. The Defendant testified that he felt he ha

d a right to

be in a public place and that he was exercising his constitutional-3-

right to file a grieva

nce with the Senat

or’s o ffi ce. He was surprised when he was arrested. He testified that he never dir ectly said,

“I'm not lea

vin g.” However, he admitted that he would not accept any of Lt. Brewer's options. He asserted that it was his right to hand-deliver the package, and that is what he wanted to do.

On cross-examination

, the Defendant admitte d that he had been convicted of attempted aggravated

kidnapping in Sullivan County four months earlier, although he described the conviction
as “railroading through this politically charged case.” He also admitted that he had contacted three different senators and

one congresswoman

in Colorado about his grievance, as well as Congressman Jenkins’ office in Tennessee . He said that h e had received no resolution of his problem. He was very angry

that he had received no help from these offices, and he stated, “I figured that there ha d to be something going on for people to flat out deny that there was something wrong with what was going on with a whistle blower and a nonunion member who was being rather shabbily treated, like crimes and other activities.” He said that he hoped Ms. Tipton was a “di sinteres ted party” who would be intereste

d in helping him.

On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Tennessee Rule of Appellat e Procedure 1 3(e) prescri bes that “[ f]indings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury shall be set aside i f the eviden ce is insuf ficient to support th e findings by the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Evidence is sufficient if, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). In ad dit ion , be caus e con vic tio n by a tri er of fact des tro ys the presumption of innocence andimposes a presumption of guilt, a convicted criminal defendant bears the burden of showing that the evidence was insufficient. McBee v. State , 372 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tenn. 1963); see also State
v. Evans , 838 S.W. 2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992 ) (citing State v. Grace , 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1976), and State v. Brown , 551 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tenn. 1977)); State v. Tuggle , 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982); Holt v. State , 357 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Tenn. 1962).

In its review of the e

vidence, an appe

llate court must af

ford the State “th

e strongest leg

itimate view of the evidence

as well as all rea

sonable and leg

itimate in

ferences that may be drawn therefrom.” Tuggle , 639 S.W.2d at 914 ( citing State v. Ca bbage , 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978)). The court may

not “re-weigh or re-evaluate the evidence” in the record below. Evans , 838 S.W.2d at 191 (cit ing Cabbage , 571 S.W.2d at 836). Likewise, should the review ing court find particular conflicts in the trial testimony, the court must resolve them in favor of the jury ve rdict or trial court judgment. Tuggle , 639 S.W.2d at 914.

For t he Defenda nt to be convicted of criminal trespass, the State had to prove that the Defendant

entered or remained on property knowing that he did not have the owner's effective consent to do so. SeeTenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-405(a). Knowledge that a person does not have the owner's effe cti ve co nse nt t o en ter or r ema in o n pr ope rty m ay b e inf erred where no

tice against entering or remaining is given by “[p]ersonal communication to the person by the owner or by
someone with apparent authority to act for the owner.” Id. § 39-14-405(a)( 1). It is a def ense to the-4-

offense of criminal tresp

ass if the proper

ty was open t

o th e pub lic when the person entered and remained, if the person’s conduc t did not sub sta nti all y int erfe re wi th t he o wne r’s use of t he p rop ert y, and if the person immediately left the premises upon request. Id. § 39-14-405(b). Lookingat the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, weconclude that a rational jury could have easily foun

d the existence of t

he elements

of criminal tresp

ass beyond a

reasonable doubt. Although the Defendant lawfully entered a public building, he remained on the premises after being told twice by Lt. Brewer to leave. Lt. Brewer, who was a public safety officer at the airport andwho was wearing his unifor m, had t he apparent authority to act on behalf of the owner of the airport. Because the Defendant did not leave immediately upon request by L t. Brewer, the statutory defense was inapplicable. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE