UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 1:12-CR-86-TLS

)

TROY DITIWAY, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

The Defendant, Troy Ditiway, pleaded guilty to one count of possession of materials

depicting minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 2252(a)(4)(B). He is awaiting sentencing. This matter is before the Court on the Defendant’s

request for a sentence below the applicable advisory Sentencing Guidelines range based on the

statutory factors provided for such variances in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The Government argues that

the facts in this case do not warrant a variance. On October 15, 2013, the Defendant filed a

Sentencing Memorandum [ECF No. 40] arguing that the guideline sentence is greater than

necessary to comply with the purposes of punishment under § 3553(a) and raising certain

objections to the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR). The Government argued that the

advisory guideline range was reasonable. On March 24, 2014, the Court issued an Opinion and

Order [ECF No. 60] overruling the Defendant’s objections to the PSR. In that Order the Court

acknowledged the Defendant’s § 3553(a) arguments and noted that he would have an opportunity

to supplement and further develop his § 3553(a) arguments after an evidentiary hearing for the

presentation of evidence regarding the § 3553(a) factors. The Court held an evidentiary hearing

on this issue on May 8, 2014. Defense counsel and the Government decided that supplement
briefing was unnecessary, and the Court heard oral argument regarding the § 3553(a) factors. For

the reasons provided below the Court will sentence the Defendant to a term of imprisonment of

60 months.

BACKGROUND

The Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of approximately 710 images and 35 videos

of child pornography. In April 2012 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigated

communications involving the Defendant that included the transmission of child pornography

and in September 2012 law enforcement executed a search warrant of the Defendant’s apartment

and recovered nineteen items of digital media. The FBI found approximately 710 graphic images

and 35 videos of child pornography on two items of digital media and found no child

pornography on the other devices. An FBI review of the images indicated that the images

included depictions of sadomasochism and of prepubescent minors or minors under the age of

12.

On June 28, 2013, the Defendant and the Government entered a written Amended Plea

Agreement in which the Defendant agreed to plead guilty to the Indictment in return for the

Government’s recommendations that he receive a reduction for acceptance of responsibility and a

sentence equal to the minimum of the applicable guideline range. Also on June 28, 2013, the

Court conducted a change of plea hearing and accepted the Defendant’s plea of guilty to the

Indictment. The Court referred the matter to Probation and Pretrial Services for the preparation of

a presentence investigation report (PSR).

The PSR sets a base offense level of 18 under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(a). It applies an

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enhancement of two levels because the offense involved depictions of prepubescent minors who

had not attained the age of 12 years, § 2G2.2(b)(2); an enhancement of two levels because the

material was distributed by the Defendant, § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F); an enhancement of four levels

because the offense involved material portraying sadistic conduct or other depictions of violence,

§ 2G2.2(b)(4); an enhancement of two levels for use of a computer, § 2G2.2(b)(6); and an

enhancement of five levels based on the number of images possessed, § 2G2.2(b)(7)(D). The

PSR recommended a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1(a) and (b)

because the Defendant entered a timely guilty plea. This yielded a total offense level of 30.

Coupled with the Defendant’s criminal history category of I, the advisory guideline range of

imprisonment is reported in the PSR as 97 to 120 months. 

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Defendant is a 27-year-old male with no criminal history. He grew up in a stable

home with dedicated parents who emphasized the value of hard work and education. Both of his

parents worked outside the home, each carrying two jobs at times, to provide for their family. For

this reason, there were many times where the Defendant was watched and cared for by his sister,

who is 11 years older. During high school, when the Defendant was approximately 17 or 18 years

of age, the Defendant began skipping school and his grades began to suffer. In an effort to get the

Defendant’s attention and steer him back to a positive path, his father took the difficult step of

kicking the Defendant out of the house, which lasted roughly 3 months. At that time, the

Defendant was allowed to return home after admitting he was wrong and agreeing to resume his

education. The Defendant began to turn his life around and make more responsible decisions and

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eventually earned his high school diploma.

When the Defendant’s girlfriend gave birth to their son, the Defendant’s only child, he

continued to make responsible decisions to support his family. He moved into his own apartment

with his girlfriend and son and worked two part-time jobs to provide for his family.

Approximately six months after his now three-year-old son was born, the Defendant enrolled in

classes at Ivy Tech. He went to school during the day and worked during the evenings while

pursuing a degree in criminal justice. At the time of his arrest, he had completed 36 college

credits. 

The Defendant is by the accounts of his family a loving and caring father, who regularly

spent time with his son, including trips to the zoo and Science Central, an educational institution

in Fort Wayne, Indiana. The Defendant also frequently visited his parents, along with his sister

and her ten-year-old daughter, and enjoys a positive and healthy relationship with them. His

desire to be a good father and provider for his son motivated him, and the fact that his son was

present when he was arrested made it that much more difficult on the Defendant. He has

experienced feelings of shame and guilt for his actions and knows that he must face the

consequences of his actions, but he has also expressed that he is willing to do whatever it takes to

atone for his transgressions and make things right. He admit having an addiction to pornography,

which he asserts progressively got worse over the years until he participated in the offense

conduct, and now freely admits that he needs and wants help. The Defendant asserts that he never

paid or received money for any of the images, that his computer was password protected, and that

his did not intend to distribute child pornography but rather just viewed it himself. 

The Defendant has been incarcerated in protective custody for 23 hours per day in the

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Allen County Jail since his arrest at his own request, which stems from his desire to avoid any

potential conflict with other inmates that might detract from his goal to turn his life around. He

was very close to his mother, who passed away in January 2013 while the Defendant was

incarcerated in this matter. Throughout the course of the investigation the Defendant has

cooperated with authorities, has accepted responsibility for his actions, and has stated he is

prepared to face the consequences of his poor choices, but he looks forward to a second chance

on life and is eager to get the help necessary to deal with his addiction and return to society

where he can hopefully find a job that enables him to help other people.

ANALYSIS

When sentencing a defendant, the district court “must first calculate the Guidelines range,

and then consider what sentence is appropriate for the individual defendant in light of the

statutory sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 351

(2009); see also United States v. Panice, 598 F.3d 426, 441 (7th Cir. 2010) (setting forth the twostep process that a sentencing court must engage in to determine a defendant’s sentence); United

States v. Bush, 523 F.3d 727, 729 (7th Cir. 2008) (same). Here, the primary issue involves the

second step, the application of the criteria set forth in § 3553(a) to the facts and circumstances of

the Defendant’s particular case. In imposing a sentence, § 3553(a) requires a court to consider:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of

the defendant; 

(2) the need for the sentence imposed— 

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the

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law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational

training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most

effective manner.

(3) the kinds of sentences available;

(4) the advisory guideline range;

(5) any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission;

(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities; and

(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

After considering these factors, a court must impose a sentence that is sufficient, but not

greater than necessary, to satisfy the purposes of sentencing: just punishment, respect for the law,

deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation of the defendant. In making this

determination, a district court may not presume that the guideline sentence is the correct one.

Nelson, 555 U.S. at 352; Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007). When evaluating the

Guidelines recommendation, a court may consider whether the Sentencing Commission fulfilled

its “characteristic institutional role” in adopting the particular guideline, see Kimbrough v. United

States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007), and the court may reject any guideline on policy grounds, United

States v. Pape, 601 F.3d 743, 749 (7th Cir. 2010). Ultimately, a district court must make an

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independent determination, taking into account the types of sentences available, the other

relevant § 3553(a) factors, and the arguments of the parties. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.

38, 49–50 (2007).

The Defendant argues that the enhancements applied in his case (the computer

enhancement, the number of images enhancement, the enhancement for images of prepubescent

minors, and the enhancement for sadistic or masochistic images) should not be considered

because they would apply in nearly every case and, as such, are a poor indicator of the relative

level of fault between offenders. The Government argues that the advisory guidelines, including

the enhancements, are reasonable, and that the Defendant’s arguments that a guideline sentence

with the enhancements would make the sentence greater than necessary to comply with the

purposes of sentencing are within the sound discretion of the Court under consideration of the §

3553(a) factors.

The Defendant has plead guilty to possession with intent to view material involving the

sexual exploitation of minors pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(4). Therefore, the Defendant is not

subject to the traditional mandatory minimum of five years of imprisonment associated with

child pornography convictions. Cf. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(b)(1)–(3). Rather, § 2252(b)(4) has no

statutory minimum term of imprisonment and a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years.

With a total offense level of 30 and a criminal history category of I, the Defendant’s guideline

sentencing range is 97–120 months imprisonment and supervised release of 5 years to life. The

Court is aware that the Commission and many other individuals and groups scrutinizing federal

sentencing have suggested a need to reassess the Guidelines with respect to child exploitation

crimes and consider reforms. In December 2012, the Commission submitted a report to Congress

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in which the Commission examined and critiqued federal sentencing policy in child pornography

cases. United States Sentencing Commission, Report to Congress: Federal Child Pornography

Offenses (2012), available at www.ussc.gov/ Legislative_ and_ Public_ Affairs/Congressional_

Testimony_ and_ Reports/ Sex_ Offense_ Topics/ 201212_ Federal_ Child_ Pornography_

Offenses/index.cfm. The Report focused primarily on non-production related offenses under

U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 and expanded on the Commission’s 2009 report, The History of the Child

Pornography Guidelines. Based on its extensive research, the Commission concluded that “the

current sentencing scheme results in overly severe guideline ranges for some offenders based on

outdated and disproportionate enhancements related to their collecting behavior.” Report to

Congress: Federal Child Pornography Offenses at 321. Significantly, the Department of Justice

agreed with the Commission’s general conclusions:

[T]he Department agrees with the Commission’s conclusion that advancements in

technologies and the evolution of the child pornography “market” have led to a

significantly changed landscape—one that is no longer adequatelyrepresented by the

existing sentencing guidelines. Specifically, we agree with the Report’s conclusion

that the existing Specific Offense Characteristics (“SOCs”) in USSG § 2G2.2 may

not accurately reflect the seriousness of an offender’s conduct, nor fairly account for

differing degrees of offender dangerousness. The current guidelines can at times

under-represent and at times over-represent the seriousness of an offender’s conduct

and the danger an offender possesses.

United States Department of Justice, Letter to the Honorable Patti B. Saris, Chair of the United

States Sentencing Commission, 1 (March 5, 2013), available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/

files/doj-letter-to-ussc-on-cp-report.pdf (last visited Aug. 7, 2013) (hereinafter “DOJ Letter”). To

comport with changes in technology and the means by which child pornography is produced and

distributed, the DOJ recommends that advisory sentencing ranges should be calculated based on:

how an offender obtains child pornography; the volume and type of child

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pornography an offender collects; how long an offender has been collecting child

pornography; the attention and care an offender gives to his collection; how an

offenders uses his collection once obtained; how an offender protects himself and his

collection from detection; and whether an offender creates, facilitates, or participates

in a community centered on child exploitation.

Id. at 2.

The Commission’s Report and the DOJ’s response further strengthen this Court’s belief

that the child pornography guidelines do not deserve the same weight inherent in other guidelines

because they did not result from careful study based in empirical analysis and national

experience, but are the result of congressional mandates. See, e.g., United States v. Huffstatler,

571 F.3d 620, 622–23 (7th Cir. 2009) (collecting district court cases relying on this rationale);

see also United States Sentencing Commission, The History of the Child Pornography

Guidelines (2009), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Research_Projects/

Sex_Offenses/20091030_History_Child_Pornography_Guidelines.pdf.

According to the United States Sentencing Commission, in 2010, in cases in which

U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 enhancements were applicable, the enhancements for possessing materials

depicting prepubescent minors (§ 2G2.2(b)(2)), use of a computer (§ 2G2.2(b)(6)), and number

of images (§ 2G2.2(b)(7)) applied in over 95% of cases. Report to Congress: Federal Child

Pornography Offenses at 209. The enhancement for possession of material portraying violence or

sadomasochistic conduct (§ 2G2.2(b)(4)) applied in 74% of all § 2G2.2 cases. Id.1

The frequency of the application of these enhancements does not necessarily render them flawed 1

and unworthy of this Court’s consideration, but a consequence of such frequent application of the

enhancements is that even ordinary first-time offenders often qualify for guideline sentences that

approach the statutory maximum based solely on sentencing enhancements that are inherent in the crime

of conviction. This, in turn, can lead to less of a distinction between the sentences of first-time offenders

and those who are more dangerous offenders, who, for example, distribute pornography for pecuniary

gain. This undercuts the directive in § 3553(a) to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense

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The four enhancements in this case (the computer enhancement, the number of images

enhancement, the enhancement for images of prepubescent minors, and the enhancement for

sadistic or masochistic images) lead to an inaccurate indication of the severity of the Defendant’s

offense and do not serve to promote the goals of punishment in this case.2

Innovations in digital cameras and videography as well as in computers and

Internet-related technology, such as peer-to-peer (“P2P”) file-sharing programs have

been used by offenders in the production, mass distribution (both commercial and

non-commercial distribution), and acquisition of child pornography. These

technological changes have resulted in exponential increases in the volume and ready

accessibility of child pornography, including many graphic sexual images involving

very young victims, a genre that previouslywas not as widelycirculated as it is today.

As a result of such changes, entry-level offenders now easily can acquire and

distribute large quantities of child pornography at little or no financial cost and often

in an anonymous, indiscriminate manner.

Several provisions in the current sentencing guidelines for non-production

offenses—in particular, the existing enhancements for the nature and volume of the

images possessed, an offender’s use of a computer, and distribution of

images—originally were promulgated in an earlier technological era. Indeed, most

of the enhancements, in their current or antecedent versions, were promulgated when

offenders typically received and distributed child pornography in printed form using

the United States mail. As a result, enhancements that were intended to apply to only

certain offenders who committed aggravated child pornography offenses are now

being applied routinely to most offenders. 

Id. at 312–313 (footnotes omitted).

The Sentencing Commission has previously criticized the two-level computer

enhancement, finding that the enhancement did not distinguish between serious commercial

distributors of online pornography and run-of-the-mill users. See United States Sentencing

and the history and characteristics of the defendant. 

Accounting for the Defendant’s base offense level of 18, see U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(a)(1), three level 2

credit for acceptance of responsibility, and criminal history category I, these four enhancements result in

an advisory guideline range of 97 to 120 months imprisonment as opposed to a range of 24 to 30 months

of imprisonment.

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Commission, Report to Congress: Sex Offenses Against Children Findings and

Recommendations Regarding Federal Penalties, 25–30 (1996), available at

http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/

Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Sex_Offense_Topics/199606_RtC_Sex_Crimes_Agains

t_Children/199606_RtC_SCAC.PDF. The Commission has reiterated this same concern in its

most recent report. See Report to Congress: Federal Child Pornography Offenses at 323–24

(“the 2-level enhancement for use of a computer . . . applies in virtually every case and, thus, fails

to differentiate among offenders with respect to their involvement in [online child pornography]

communities.”) “Because the vast majority of child pornography offenses now involve the use of

a computer,” the DOJ recommends that the computer enhancement “be eliminated and replaced

by others, . . . which better distinguish between different classes of offenders.” DOJ Letter at 4.

Although a computer can provide an effective means to transport material quickly in interstate

commerce, it is distributors, traffickers, and those desiring to entice children to engage in sexual

activity who most exploit the technology and increase the market for child pornography. 

For this Defendant, the computer enhancement does not correspond to an elevated

seriousness of his offense or to any of the purposes of sentencing. There is no indication that he

intended to sell or distribute images to others for profit or otherwise, and empirical data does not

show that using a computer as a means to possess and view pornography is a more serious or

culpable offense than viewing the same images if they had been received by another medium,

such as through the mail. Cf. United States v. Hanson, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1010–11 (E.D.

Wis. 2008) (stating that this enhancement is logically flawed because on-line pornography

generally comes from the same pool of images found in other formats). Accordingly, a two-level

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enhancement to the Defendant’s base offense level for the use of a computer yields a sentence

that is greater than necessary to achieve § 3553(a)’s purposes.

Likewise, the enhancement for the number of images does not further the purposes of

sentencing in this Defendant’s case. While the DOJ maintains that the number of images

enhancement should continue to be applied, it recognizes that “in light of the technologyfacilitated ease of obtaining larger child pornography collections, the numeric thresholds should

be substantially increased for each offense level, so as to better distinguish between occasional

and habitual collectors of child pornography.” DOJ Letter at 4. See also United States v. Diaz,

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720 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1042 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (“offenders readily obtain the necessary number of

images with minimal effort”); United States v. Burns, No. 07 CR 556, 2009 WL 3617448, at *7

(N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2009) (“the number and type of images received is frequently accidental”).

Although the Guidelines provide for a five-level enhancement for more than 600 images, a fourlevel enhancement for 300 to 600 images, a three-level enhancement for 150 to 300 images, or a

two-level enhancement for 10 to 150 images, these distinctions are not linked to any empirical

data pertaining to sentencing and the purposes of punishment, and in this case they do not

provide an accurate indication of culpability. Under the Guidelines, each video corresponds to 75

images for purposes of applying the enhancement—resulting in a finding that the Defendant

possessed more than 3,335 images. This additional five-point enhancement increases the

magnitude of the Defendant’s offense without a showing of corresponding culpability.

Accordingly, a five-level enhancement to the Defendant’s base offense level for the number of

 The maximum five-level enhancement under § 2G2.2(b)(7)(D) for possessing 600 or more 3

images applied to 67.6% of cases in 2010. Report to Congress: Federal Child Pornography Offenses at

209.

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images yields a sentence that is greater than necessary to achieve § 3553(a)’s purposes.

Under the facts of this case, the Court also finds the enhancement for possession of an

image of a prepubescent minor or minor who had not reached the age of twelve does not further

the purposes of punishment. In 2010 non-production cases, 96.3% of offenders possessed child

pornography depicting prepubescent minors or minors under the age of 12. Report to Congress:

Federal Child Pornography Offenses at 140–41. As other courts have noted, images of very

young children are sadly “typical of this crime,” and do not indicate increased culpability for

those receiving such images. Hanson, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 1009; Burns, 2009 WL 3617448, at

*13. There is no evidence that the Defendant specifically sought out prepubescent minors.

Consequently, the Court finds that applying this enhancement would not appropriately measure

the Defendant’s culpability under the facts of this case.

The enhancement for possession of sado-masochistic images also yields a sentence that is

greater than necessary to achieve § 3553(a)’s purposes. In 2010, U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) applied

in 74.2% of all cases. Report to Congress: Federal Child Pornography Offenses at 316.

Although originally intended to provide additional proportional punishment for aggravating

conduct, this enhancement now routinely applies to the vast majority of offenders. Moreover,

there is no evidence that the Defendant sought out sado-masochistic images. Accordingly, a fourlevel enhancement to the Defendant’s base offense level for possessing sado-masochistic images

yields a sentence that is greater than necessary to achieve § 3553(a)’s purposes.

For these reasons, the Court will not give deference to the increase in the advisory

Guideline sentence that is brought about by these specific offense characteristics.

The Defendant has asked the Court to sentence him below the advisory guideline range of

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97 to 120 months, and instead impose a sentence of 60 months. He argues that he is languishing

in the Allen County Jail and that only protective custody is keeping him alive. He contends that

he did not pay or receive money for the images and only saved them for his personal use, with no

intention to distribute the images. The Defendant argues that he has fully accepted responsibility

for his offense, that he wants help addressing his addiction to pornography generally, and that he

will use the opportunity to change and be a law-abiding, productive citizen after he has served

the necessary time for his offense. The Government argues that there are no grounds for a

variance in this case. The Government contends that the Defendant was raised in a good, stable

home, that he knew right from wrong, and that the collateral damage brought about by the

Defendant’s conduct is not grounds for a variance because all crimes have collateral damage.

In consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offense, the Court finds that the

Defendant did not seek pecuniary gain or exchange money in his acquisition of images; thus, he

did not contribute to any commercial market for child pornography. Nor was the Defendant

motivated to distribute images, but instead collected them for his personal use. In addition, the

Defendant was not involved in the production of child pornography but rather was a run-of-themill user who viewed the images privately.

In consideration of the characteristics of the Defendant, the Court finds that the

Defendant has no criminal history and appears, from his testimony before this Court, to be highly

motivated to never repeat the offending behavior. The Court finds that the Defendant’s family

circumstances, particularly his relationship with, or the care of, his son and his niece, is a

mitigating factor because he is at a low degree of offender dangerousness compared to other

offenders. The Defendant received punishment from his father for his poor choices as a teenager,

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including being kicked out of the house for truancy at school. He turned his life around after

punishment, however, and made responsible decisions for a significant period rather than

recidivate to truancy from school and apathy towards his education. The Court finds that, based

on the history and characteristics of the Defendant, he is at a low risk to recidivate. He has

demonstrated that he is capable of turning his life around not only for the short term, but for a

lasting change. He came from a good home, has good support from his family, and knows right

from wrong. As a teenager he strayed from the right path but got back on and did the right things,

taking responsibility for his actions and for his future. Due to the nature of his offense, he will

have many conditions as part of his supervised release, including registering as a sex offender

and monitoring of his computer, which will follow him for many years, further reducing the risk

of recidivism. 

The Court finds that the Defendant has genuine remorse and has not made excuses but

has accepted the consequences of his actions. He appears highly motivated not only to get

through the punishment he faces in this case, but to get better and to address and correct the

issues that have brought him before the Court in this matter. Prison is a great disincentive for

illegal conduct, and indeed it appears so for this Defendant, who has struggled during his time

spent in the Allen County Jail, languishing over the guilt and shame of his offense and his

circumstances he has brought upon himself and others. Yet he has not made excuses, but has

accepted responsibility for his actions, and he is eager to make a positive and lasting change in

his life, not only for himself, but for his family. Notwithstanding the amount of pornography in

this case, which is quickly and easily acquired with only a few keystrokes and drives the

guideline range in this case, the Defendant’s offense conduct appears to be an anomaly in his life.

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The history and characteristics of the Defendant show that he can turn his life around, and a

sentence of 60 months is not insignificant. 

The receipt, distribution, and possession of child pornography is a form of sexual

exploitation of the most vulnerable members of our society, and thus is a serious offense. Five

years of imprisonment is also a serious sentence, and it is sufficient to promote respect for the

law and to provide just punishment, deterrence, protection for the public, and rehabilitation. A

term of 120 months of imprisonment would no better serve these goals. The Court finds that 5

years of imprisonment, combined with supervised release, is sufficient time for the Defendant to

address those issues that caused him to disregard the well being of those who have been harmed

by his actions. The term of supervised release will provide additional time to monitor the

Defendant’s actions with respect to the possession of pornographic matter. Finally, this Court’s

review of similar cases across the country and in this Circuit suggests that a term of 5 years

would not create unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that a sentence of 60 months is sufficient to

meet the purposes of sentencing in this case and is consistent with the statute. The Sentencing set

for June 17, 2014, is VACATED and RESET to June 16, 2014, at 4:00 PM in U.S. District Court

- Fort Wayne before Judge Theresa L. Springmann.

SO ORDERED on June 9, 2014.

 s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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