alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
FDA Proposes

Sunscreen Monograph Updates

September 2021

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates sunscreens to

ensure they meet safety and effectiveness standards. To improve the 

quality, safety, and effectiveness of sunscreens, FDA issued a proposed 

order that describes updated proposed monograph requirements for 

sunscreens. Sun safety is important for everyone, including people of all 

skin tones. Consumers should continue to use sun protection measures, 

including using broad spectrum sunscreen of SPF 15 or higher, as this 

important update to the monograph moves forward.

Highlights of FDA’s Proposals 

Sunscreen active ingredient safety and effectiveness

Two ingredients (zinc oxide and titanium dioxide) are proposed to be safe and 

effective for sunscreen use and two (aminobenzoic acid (PABA) and trolamine 

salicylate) are proposed as not safe and effective for sunscreen use. FDA proposes 

that it needs more safety information for the remaining 12 sunscreen ingredients 

(cinoxate, dioxybenzone, ensulizole, homosalate, meradimate, octinoxate, 

octisalate, octocrylene, padimate O, sulisobenzone, oxybenzone, avobenzone). 

1

2

5

3

4

Sunscreen dosage forms

Sunscreen sprays, oils, lotions, creams, 

gels, butters, pastes, ointments, and 

sticks are proposed as safe and 

effective. FDA proposes that it needs 

more data for sunscreen powders.

New proposed sun protection factor 

(SPF) and broad spectrum 

requirements

• Raise the maximum proposed labeled 

 SPF from SPF 50+ to SPF 60+ 

• Require any sunscreen SPF 15 or higher 

 to be broad spectrum

• Require for all broad spectrum products 

 SPF 15 and above, as SPF increases, 

 broad spectrum protection increases

New proposed label requirements 

• Include alphabetical listing of active ingredients on the front panel

• Require sunscreens with SPF below 15 to include “See Skin Cancer/Skin Aging alert” 

 on the front panel

• Require font and placement changes to ensure SPF, broad spectrum, and water 

 resistance statements stand out

Sunscreen-insect repellent combination 

products proposed not safe and effective

www.fda.gov
---

EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION
1350AND RULE 13a-14(b) OR RULE 15d-14(b)OF THE U.S. SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

In connection with the amendment to the Annual Report of EMC
Metals Corp. (the "Company") on Form 10-K/A Amendment No. 2 for the year ended
December 31, 2011 (the "Report"), the undersigned, in the capacities and on the
date indicated below, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his
knowledge:

| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of
      Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
  and                                   
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |    |                                                                                                                                                                 
| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
      in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
      operations of the Company.

|Dated: June 5, 2012 | /s/ Edward
      Dickinson 
|------------------- | ---------------------------
|                    | Edward Dickinson           
|                    | Principal Financial Officer

---
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, et al., petitioners, v. EME HOMER CITY GENERATION, L.P., et al.

No. 12-1182.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 24, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted limited to the questions presented by the petition in No. 12-1182. The case is consolidated and a total of one hour is allotted for oral argument.
Frank THON, petitioner, v. Philip HEATH, Superintendent, Sing Sing Correctional Facility.

No. 12-9722.

Supreme Court of the United States

Aug. 30, 2013.

Petition for rehearing denied.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 97-2600

MARY R. WILLIAMSON, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Paul Trevor Sharp, Magistrate Judge. (CA-96-735-2) Submitted: May 29, 1998 Decided: June 22, 1998 Before HAMILTON and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Tomi W. Bryan, Lisa W. Bullard, BRYAN, BULLARD & HOUGLAN, P.C., Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Walter C. Holton, Jr., United States Attorney, Gill P. Beck, Assistant United States Attorney, Arthur J. Fried, General Counsel, Charlotte Hardnett, Principal Deputy General Counsel, John M. Sacchetti, Acting Associate General Counsel, Meeka M. Savage, Office of the General Counsel, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. S 636(c) (1994). 2 PER CURIAM: Mary Williamson appeals from the magistrate judge’s * ordergranting the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment and affirming the Commissioner’s denial of social security benefits. We review the denial of social security benefits to determine whether the Commissioner has applied the correct legal standards and whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence. See Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Although substantial evidenceis greater than a mere scintilla, it may be less than a preponderance. See Shively v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 987, 989 (4th Cir. 1984). We have reviewed Williamson’s assertions and allegations of error under this standard and conclude that the magistrate judge’s entry of judgment in favor of the Commissioner was proper. Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because thefacts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

          <ARTICLE>           5
          <LEGEND>            THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL IN-
                              FORMATION EXTRACTED FROM NIAGARA CORPORATION
                              AND SUBSIDIARIES AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
                              ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
                              STATEMENTS.
          </LEGEND>
                 
          <S>                           <C>
          <PERIOD-TYPE>                 3-MOS
          <FISCAL-YEAR-END>             DEC-31-1997
          <PERIOD-START>                JAN-01-1997
          <PERIOD-END>                  MAR-31-1997
          <CASH>                        1,230,201 
          <SECURITIES>                  0         
          <RECEIVABLES>                 10,442,352
          <ALLOWANCES>                  245,000   
          <INVENTORY>                   14,176,975
          <CURRENT-ASSETS>              25,862,733
          <PP&E>                        24,277,222
          <DEPRECIATION>                2,583,922     
          <TOTAL-ASSETS>                51,182,064    
          <CURRENT-LIABILITIES>         12,937,319
          <BONDS>                       0      
          <COMMON>                      3,669  
          <PREFERRED-MANDATORY>         0           
          <PREFERRED>                   0           
          <OTHER-SE>                    15,872,989  
          <TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  51,182,064
          <SALES>                       21,184,880  
          <TOTAL-REVENUES>              21,184,880  
          <CGS>                         18,167,557  
          <TOTAL-COSTS>                 18,167,557 
          <OTHER-EXPENSES>              2,078,745  
          <LOSS-PROVISION>              0  
          <INTEREST-EXPENSE>            396,788  
          <INCOME-PRETAX>               556,271 
          <INCOME-TAX>                  205,820  
          <INCOME-CONTINUING>           350,451  
          <DISCONTINUED>                0      
          <EXTRAORDINARY>               0   
          <CHANGES>                     0   
          <NET-INCOME>                  350,451   
          <EPS-PRIMARY>                 .10    
          <EPS-DILUTED>                 .10    
                  

</TABLE>
Kenneth BROWN, Appellant, v. Lauren BROWN, Appellee.

Case No. 5D18-1263

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Opinion filed June 28, 2019 Rehearing Denied July 18, 2019

Jaime T. Halscott, of Halscott Megaro, P.A., Orlando, for Appellant.

Mercedes R. Wechsler, Mercedes R. Wechsler, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The former husband, Kenneth Brown, appeals the final judgment dissolving his marriage to the former wife, Lauren Brown. He challenges the timesharing, equitable distribution of marital assets and debt, retroactive support, and attorney's fee award on appeal. Because the former husband has not provided this Court with the necessary transcripts of the proceedings below, we are precluded from addressing whether the trial court's decisions on these matters are without evidentiary support. *See* *Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee*, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979) ; *see also* *Rayess v. Bitar*, 254 So. 3d 1197 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018). We must affirm unless the former husband can demonstrate that "fundamental error appears on the face of the appealed order." *Murphy v. Murphy*, 948 So. 2d 864, 865 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). The former husband has made no such showing in this case.

AFFIRMED.

EVANDER, C.J., ORFINGER and HARRIS, JJ., concur.
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains notices of meetings published under

the ‘‘Government in the Sunshine Act’’ (Pub.

L. 94-409) 5 U.S.C. 552b(e)(3).

Sunshine Act Meetings Federal Register

24967

Vol. 60, No. 90

Wednesday, May 10, 1995

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

COMMISSION

DATE AND TIME: May 22, 1995, 2:00 P.M.

(Eastern Time).

PLACE: Conference Room on the Ninth

Floor of the EEOC Office Building, 1801

‘‘L’’ Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

20507.

STATUS: Part of the Meeting will be open

to the public and part of the Meeting

will be closed.

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED:

Open Session

1. Announcement of Notation Votes.

2. Consideration of Task Force

Recommendations on the Relationship With

FEPAs.

Closed Session

Litigation Authorization: General Counsel

Recommendations.

Note: Any matter not discussed or

concluded may be carried over to a later

meeting. (In addition to publishing notices

on EEOC Commission meetings in the

Federal Register, the Commission also

provides a recorded announcement a full

week in advance on future Commission

sessions.) Please telephone (202) 663–7100

(voice) and (202) 663–4074 (TTD) at any time

for information on these meetings.

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION:

Frances M. Hart, Executive Officer on

(202) 663–4070.

This Notice Issued May 8, 1995.

Frances M. Hart;

Executive Officer; Executive Secretariat.

[FR Doc. 95–11704 Filed 5–8–95; 3:31 pm]

BILLING CODE 6750–06–M

FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION

Farm Credit Administration Board;

Amendment to Sunshine Act Meeting

SUMMARY: Pursuant to the Government

in the Sunshine Act (5 U.S.C.

552b(e)(3)), the Farm Credit

Administration gave notice on May 8,

1995 of the special meeting of the Farm

Credit Administration Board (Board)

scheduled for May 9, 1995. This notice

is to amend the agenda by correcting an

item in the open session of that meeting.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Floyd Fithian, Secretary to the Farm

Credit Administration Board, (703) 883–

4025, TDD (703) 883–4444.

ADDRESSES: Farm Credit

Administration, 1501 Farm Credit Drive,

McLean, Virginia 22102–5090.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Parts of

this meeting of the Board were open to

the public (limited space available), and

parts of this meeting were closed to the

public. The open session of the agenda

for May 9, 1995, is corrected as follows:

Open Session

C. New Business

2. Other

—Reaffirmation of Regulatory Philosophy

Dated: May 5, 1995.

Floyd Fithian,

Secretary, Farm Credit Administration Board.

[FR Doc. 95–11595 Filed 5–8–95; 9:27 am]

BILLING CODE 6705–01–P
Milorad Teodor OLIC, petitioner, v. CALIFORNIA.

No. 12-8595.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 15, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, denied.
Joe MALDONADO, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 12-9068.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 15, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 1 9
- 0199 IN THE MATTER OF: S.G.
- H.M., JR.,

A Former Youth Under the Age of 18 ,

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including July 22 , 2020 , within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

June 15 2020

06/15/2020

Case Number: DA 19-0199
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

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8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WAYMO LLC,

Plaintiff,

 v.

UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.;

OTTOMOTTO LLC; and OTTO

TRUCKING LLC,

Defendants. /

No. C 17-00939 WHA

SECOND ORDER RE

HEARING ON MOTION TO

CONTINUE

Plaintiff Waymo LLC shall bring Sasha Zbrozek to the hearing tomorrow on Waymo’s

motion to continue the trial date. Possibly, he may be placed under oath and examined.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 19, 2017. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 2:13-CR-8-JTM-PRC

 )

IMARU JONES, )

Defendant. ) 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

UPON A PLEA OF GUILTY BY DEFENDANT IMARU JONES

TO: THE HONORABLE JAMES T. MOODY,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Upon Defendant Imaru Jones’ request to enter a plea of guilty pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure, this matter came for hearing before Magistrate Judge Paul R. Cherry, on

April 10, 2013, with the consent of Defendant Imaru Jones, counsel for Defendant Imaru Jones, and

counsel for the United States of America.

The hearing on Defendant Imaru Jones’ plea of guilty was in full compliance with Rule 11,

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, before the Magistrate Judge in open court and on the record.

In consideration of that hearing and the statements made by Defendant Imaru Jones under oath

on the record and in the presence of counsel, the remarks of the Assistant United States Attorney and

of counsel for Defendant Imaru Jones,

I FIND as follows:

(1) that Defendant Imaru Jones understands the nature of the charge against him to which the

plea is offered;

(2) that Defendant Imaru Jones understands his right to trial by jury, to persist in his plea of not

guilty, to the assistance of counsel at trial, to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and his

right against compelled self-incrimination;
(3) that Defendant Imaru Jones understands what the maximum possible sentence is, including

the effect of the supervised release term, and Defendant Imaru Jones understands that the sentencing

guidelines apply and that the Court may depart from those guidelines under some circumstances;

(4) that the plea of guilty by Defendant Imaru Jones has been knowingly and voluntarily made

and is not the result of force or threats or of promises;

(5) that Defendant Imaru Jones is competent to plead guilty;

(6) that Defendant Imaru Jones understands that his answers may later be used against him in

a prosecution for perjury or false statement;

(7) that there is a factual basis for Defendant Imaru Jones’ plea; and further,

I RECOMMEND that the Court accept Imaru Jones’ plea of guilty to the offense charged in

Count 1 of the Indictment and that Defendant Imaru Jones be adjudged guilty of the offense charged

in Count 1 of the Indictment and have sentence imposed. A Presentence Report has been ordered. 

Should this Report and Recommendation be accepted and Imaru Jones be adjudged guilty, a sentencing

date before Senior Judge James T. Moody will be set by separate order. Objections to the Findings and

Recommendation are waived unless filed and served within fourteen (14) days. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

So ORDERED this 10th day of April, 2013.

s/ Paul R. Cherry 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE PAUL R. CHERRY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

cc: All counsel of record

Honorable Rudy Lozano
Lee Curtis TATE, petitioner, v. Officer ROCKFORD, et al.

No. 12-8691.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 15, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.
II 

109TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 1458 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

DECEMBER 7, 2006 

Received 

AN ACT 

To require any Federal or State court to recognize any 

notarization made by a notary public licensed by a State 

other than the State where the court is located when 

such notarization occurs in or affects interstate commerce. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


pwalker on PRODPC60 with BILLS
2 

HR 1458 RDS

1 SECTION 1. RECOGNITION OF NOTARIZATIONS IN FEDERAL 

2 COURTS. 

3 Each Federal court shall recognize any lawful notari4 zation made by a notary public licensed or commissioned 

5 under the laws of a State other than the State where the 

6 Federal court is located if— 

7 (1) such notarization occurs in or affects inter8 state commerce; and 

9 (2)(A) a seal of office, as symbol of the notary 

10 public’s authority, is used in the notarization; or 

11 (B) in the case of an electronic record, the seal 

12 information is securely attached to, or logically asso13 ciated with, the electronic record so as to render the 

14 record tamper-resistant. 

15 SEC. 2. RECOGNITION OF NOTARIZATIONS IN STATE 

16 COURTS. 

17 Each court that operates under the jurisdiction of a 

18 State shall recognize any lawful notarization made by a 

19 notary public licensed or commissioned under the laws of 

20 a State other than the State where the court is located 

21 if— 

22 (1) such notarization occurs in or affects inter23 state commerce; and 

24 (2)(A) a seal of office, as symbol of the notary 

25 public’s authority, is used in the notarization; or 


pwalker on PRODPC60 with BILLS
3 

HR 1458 RDS

1 (B) in the case of an electronic record, the seal 

2 information is securely attached to, or logically asso3 ciated with, the electronic record so as to render the 

4 record tamper-resistant. 

5 SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. 

6 In this Act: 

7 (1) ELECTRONIC RECORD.—The term ‘‘elec8 tronic record’’ has the meaning given that term in 

9 section 106 of the Electronic Signatures in Global 

10 and National Commerce Act (15 U.S.C. 7006). 

11 (2) LOGICALLY ASSOCIATED WITH.—Seal infor12 mation is ‘‘logically associated with’’ an electronic 

13 record if the seal information is securely bound to 

14 the electronic record in such a manner as to make 

15 it impracticable to falsify or alter, without detection, 

16 either the record or the seal information. 

Passed the House of Representatives December 6, 

2006. 

Attest: KAREN L. HAAS, 

Clerk. 


pwalker on PRODPC60 with BILLS
Farid John POPAL, petitioner, v. NEW YORK.

No. 12-9741.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 17, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Appellate Division, Supreme Court of New York, Second Judicial Department, denied.
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 92 (Friday, May 12, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Page 25716]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-11720]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
[Docket No. RP95-277-000]


Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co.; Notice of Compliance 
Filing

May 8, 1995.
    Take notice that on May 4, 1995, Williston Basin Interstate 
Pipeline Company (Williston Basin), tendered for filing revised tariff 
sheets to Second Revised Volume No. 1 of its FERC Gas Tariff.
    Williston Basin states that the revised tariff sheets revise 
Section 17 of Williston Basin's FERC Gas Tariff, Second Revised Volume 
No. 1 to conform to the Commission's Order No. 577 issued March 29, 
1995 in Docket No. RM95-5-000.
    Williston Basin has requested that the Commission accept this 
filing to become effective May 4, 1995, the effective date of Order No. 
577.
    Any person desiring to be heard or to protest said filing should 
file a motion to intervene or protest with the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 825 North Capitol Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 
20426, in accordance with the Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's 
Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214). All such 
motions or protests should be filed on or before May 15, 1995. Protests 
will be considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate 
action to be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to 
the proceeding. Any person wishing to become a party to the proceeding 
must file a motion to intervene. Copies of this filing are on file with 
the Commission and are available for public inspection.
Lois D. Cashell,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 95-11720 Filed 5-11-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M