UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

NExTT SOLUTIONS, LLC, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 3:13 CV 1030

)

XOS TECHNOLOGIES, INC., d/b/a )

XOS DIGITAL; and STRATBRIDGE, )

LLC; )

)

Defendants. ) 

OPINION and ORDER

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff NExTT Solutions, LLC, is an Indiana sports software company that

markets its products towards high-profile customers like the National Football League

(“NFL”) and college sports programs. In 2007, NExTT began discussing a possible

business relationship with defendant Stratbridge, LLC, a Delaware software company

with its principal place of business in Massachusetts. On May 29, 2009, the parties

entered into a licensing agreement (“the Contract”), under which Stratbridge was

permitted to use NExTT’s NFL scouting program in developing and marketing its own

products to the NFL. In July of 2012, Stratbridge sold its rights and obligations under

the Contract to another defendant, XOS Technologies, Inc., a Delaware company with

its principal place of business in Florida.

NExTT has sued both Stratbridge and XOS for breach of contract, breach of

fiduciary duties, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
fraudulent inducement. (DE # 1.) NExTT also seeks a declaratory judgment and an

accounting. (Id.) NExTT alleges that Stratbridge breached the contract by charging NFL

teams more than it should have, failing to make reasonable efforts to grow the scouting

program business, and mismanaging its contractual obligations to pursue opportunities

for royalty-bearing products. NExTT further alleges that Stratbridge ignored its

obligations under the Contract and instead used NExTT’s relationships with NFL teams

to market its own products.

Defendants Stratbridge and XOS moved to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction under FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(2) and, in the alternative, for

failure to state a claim under RULE 12(b)(6). (DE # 9.) NExTT opposed the motion to

dismiss and requested jurisdictional discovery. (DE # 12.) On May 14, 2014, this court

denied the motion to dismiss in part, holding that the court could properly exercise

specific personal jurisdiction over Stratbridge. (DE # 28.) The court also held that it

could not exercise specific jurisdiction over XOS, but that NExTT had made a colorable

showing of general jurisdiction with regard to that defendant. (Id.) Accordingly the court

withheld ruling on the motion to dismiss as to XOS and permitted plaintiff a chance to

conduct jurisdictional discovery. (Id.) The jurisdictional discovery period has ended,

and the parties have submitted supplemental briefs and evidence in accordance with

this court’s scheduling order. The motion to dismiss, as it pertains to this court’s general

jurisdiction over XOS, is now ripe for ruling.

2
II. LEGAL STANDARD

Though XOS has moved to dismiss pursuant to both RULES 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6),

only the former need be discussed in the present order. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE 12(b)(2) requires dismissal of a claim where personal jurisdiction is lacking.

After a defendant moves to dismiss under RULE 12(b)(2), “the plaintiff bears the burden

of demonstrating the existence of jurisdiction.” Purdue Research Found. v. SanofiSynthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2003). Where, as here, the district court rules

on a defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the submission of written materials

without holding an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make out a prima facie

case of personal jurisdiction. Id. The court must resolve factual disputes in the plaintiff’s

favor when evaluating whether that showing has been made. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A federal court’s personal jurisdiction over a defendant is established in a

diversity-jurisdiction case, such as this one, when the defendant is subject to the

jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is

located—here, Indiana. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A). Indiana law permits its courts to

exercise jurisdiction on any basis permitted by the Constitution of the United States.

IND. TR. R. 4.4(A). Thus, the statutory question merges with the constitutional one; if

Indiana constitutionally may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, its

long-arm statute will enable it to do so. uBid, Inc. v. GoDaddy Group, Inc., 623 F.3d 421,

425 (7th Cir. 2010).

3
The federal constitutional limits of a court’s personal jurisdiction in a diversity

case are found in the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, which “protects an

individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum

with which he has established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or relations.’” Burger King

Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 464, 471-72 (1985) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., Office

of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). “The nature of the

defendant’s contacts with the forum state determines the propriety of personal

jurisdiction and also its scope—that is, whether jurisdiction is proper at all, and if so,

whether it is general or specific to the claims made in the case.” Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601

F.3d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 2010). These two types of jurisdiction – general and specific –

require separate examination.

A. Specific Jurisdiction

At the end of its supplemental brief, NExTT asks the court to reconsider its holding

that this court cannot exercise specific personal jurisdiction over XOS. (DE # 36 at 16.)

Specific jurisdiction depends on contacts that demonstrate a real relationship between

the defendant and the forum state with respect to the transaction at issue. Purdue, 338 F.3d

at 780. NExTT argues that XOS could have reasonably predicted that it would be

answerable in a court situated in Indiana by pointing to the fact that XOS assumed all of

Stratbridge’s obligations under the Contract, knew that NExTT was an Indiana

company, and still owes several payments to NExTT.

4
As the court already explained in its prior order, the fact that XOS assumed

Stratbridge’s obligations under the Contract is not dispositive. The Seventh Circuit

distinguishes between a corporate successor, which has “chosen to stand in the shoes of

its predecessor and has chosen to accept the business expectations of those who have

dealt previously with that predecessor,” and an assignee, who has purchased certain

specific contractual rights and assumes certain specific obligations. Purdue, 338 F.3d at

784. While the former effectively absorbs the jurisdictional contacts of its predecessor,

the latter does not, and specific jurisdiction exists only if, after the purchase of the

assets, the assignee “so structured its business affairs that it reasonably could have

predicted that it would be answerable in a court situated in Indiana for its actions with

respect to these transactions.” Id. at 785.

In this case, it was – and still is – undisputed that XOS had no part in the

Contract’s negotiation or execution. Further, it remains undisputed that XOS acquired

the Contract from Stratbridge without purchasing all of or subsuming Stratbridge itself,

and that XOS and Stratbridge remained separate and distinct entities after the sale.

Accordingly, XOS does not “stand in the shoes” of Stratbridge for purposes of

establishing specific jurisdiction. NExTT’s remaining evidence – that XOS knew that

NExTT was an Indiana company and still owes payments to NExTT – do not convince

the court that NExTT “structured its business affairs” such that it could have predicted

that it would be answerable in an Indiana court for its actions with respect to the

Contract. As the court already explained in its prior order, these facts are not sufficient

5
to establish specific jurisdiction. See, e.g., Purdue, 338 F.3d at 781 (contracting with an

Indiana resident does not establish sufficient minimum contacts in Indiana); Federated

Rural Elec. Ins. Corp. v. Inland Power & Light Co., 18 F.3d 389, 395 (7th Cir. 1994) (mailing

of payments into the forum state is insufficient basis for specific jurisdiction). In sum, as

explained in the court’s prior order, and now rearticulated here, this court lacks specific

jurisdiction over XOS.1

B. General Jurisdiction

Unlike specific jurisdiction (which focuses on a defendant’s connections to a

forum state with respect to the transaction at issue), general jurisdiction permits a

defendant to be sued in the forum regardless of the subject matter of the litigation.

Purdue, 338 F.3d at 787. “[T]he constitutional requirement for general jurisdiction is

‘considerably more stringent’ than that required for specific jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting

United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 618 (1st Cir. 2001)). “General

jurisdiction is permitted only where the defendant has ‘continuous and systematic

general business contacts’ with the forum.” Id. (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,

 The parties have demonstrated that they intend to vigorously litigate the issues 1

in this case, including by asking the court to reconsider its prior orders. However, the

parties are advised that the court does not intend to revisit every ruling it makes in this

case. “It is well established that a motion to reconsider is only appropriate where a

court has misunderstood a party, where the court has made a decision outside the

adversarial issues presented to the court by the parties, where the court has made an

error of apprehension (not of reasoning), where a significant change in the law has

occurred, or where significant new facts have been discovered.” Broaddus v. Shields , 665

F.3d 846, 860 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds by Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965,

967 n.1 (2013) (emphasis added). Future requests which do not meet these criteria will

not be entertained.

6
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984)). Such contacts must be so extensive as to be

tantamount to the defendant being constructively present in the forum to such a degree

that it would be “fundamentally fair to require it to answer in [that forum] in any

litigation arising out of any transaction or occurrence taking place anywhere in the

world.” Id. (emphasis in original). The general jurisdiction standard is rigorous because

“the consequences can be severe: if a defendant is subject to general jurisdiction in a

state, then it may be called into court there to answer for any alleged wrong, committed

in any place, no matter how unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.”

uBID, 623 F.3d at 426.

In 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States clarified that general jurisdiction

cannot be premised solely upon “continuous and systematic” contacts with a forum

state; instead, general jurisdiction exists “when [defendants’] affiliations with the State

are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum

State.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)

(emphasis added). In January of 2014, the Supreme Court solidified its adherence to this

new “at home” standard, holding that an argument that general jurisdiction was

appropriate over any corporation that engages in substantial, continuous, and

systematic business in a foreign state was “unacceptably grasping.” Daimler AG v.

Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760-61 (2014). The Daimler court reiterated the “at home”

standard and stated that the affiliation between the defendant and the forum state must

be so continuous and systematic that the defendant is “comparable to a domestic

7
enterprise in that State.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758 n. 11. Both Daimler and Goodyear

emphasized that the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the

defendant’s domicile (which, in the case of a corporation, is the place of incorporation

and principal place of business). Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. 2853; Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 735. The

Supreme Court did not hold that a corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction

only in a forum where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business. However,

the court stated that a defendant might be subjected to general jurisdiction in some

other forum only in an “exceptional case.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761.

After Goodyear was decided in 2011, courts in this circuit have rarely found

general jurisdiction to exist. Perhaps tellingly, NExTT fails to cite any post-Goodyear

cases in its argument that general jurisdiction over XOS is appropriate. Nor was the

court able to locate many cases that could support its position. Perhaps one notable

exception is J.B. v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., No. 12-cv-385, 2013 WL 452807, at *2-3 (N.D.

Ill. Feb. 6, 2013), a case from the Northern District of Illinois where the district court

found (like many district courts dealing with pharmaceutical company defendants in

the past) that soliciting business, selling and marketing products, and employing a sales

team in Illinois justified general jurisdiction over the pharmaceutical giant. The Abbott

court considered the defendant’s argument that Goodyear created a new standard to be a

“narrow reading” of Goodyear. Id. at *2. The Abbott court reasoned that International

Shoe’s “continuous and systematic” standard was still good law that remained

essentially unchanged by Goodyear, with Goodyear simply providing additional possible

8
grounds for finding jurisdiction. Id. Of course, Abbott was decided after Goodyear but

before Daimler; if any doubts remained about Goodyear’s “at home” requirement, those

doubts were resolved when Daimler reiterated the standard in no uncertain terms. In

any event, this court is not bound by Abbott’s reasoning.

 It is easier to locate examples of post-Goodyear cases finding the absence of

general jurisdiction. For example, in Abelesz v. OTP Bank, 692 F.3d 638, 656 (7th Cir.

2012), the Seventh Circuit considered a plaintiff’s argument that two foreign defendants

should be subjected to general jurisdiction in the United States. The first defendant had

almost 5,000 accounts where the account holders had U.S. mailing addresses, and those

accounts were worth over $93 million. The second defendant had about 1,500 accounts

of that type, worth around $147 million. Both defendants had banking and contractual

relationships with U.S. banks and companies, with some of the contracts containing

forum-selection clauses designating U.S. fora as the place for dispute resolution, and

traveled to, advertised in, and targeted customers in the U.S. Despite these contacts, the

Abelesz court found that general jurisdiction did not exist. The court emphasized that

“the proper inquiry is not, as plaintiffs suggest, whether a defendant’s contacts ‘in the

aggregate are extensive.’” Id. at 656. Rather, the court reasoned, the question was

“whether the contacts ‘are so “continous and systematic” as to render [defendants]

essentially at home in the forum.’” Id. (quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851, alterations in

Abelesz). The court considered the fact that the defendants’ U.S. accounts amounted to

0.17 and 0.4 percent of their total accounts, respectively, as persuasive in finding that no

9
general jurisdiction existed. The court also found indications in the record that the

defendants were not “at home” in the U.S., such as the forum-selection clauses that

appeared in some contracts (after all, such a clause would not be necessary if the

defendants were already subject to jurisdiction in the U.S.), and correspondent banking

relationships (accounts used by foreign banks to offer services to their customers in

places where the banks have no physical presence). At the end of its analysis, the

Seventh Circuit concluded that the defendants’ contacts fell “well short” of the

“stringent ‘essentially at home’ standard.” Id. at 659.

Even pre-Goodyear, when an arguably more lenient and plaintiff-friendly

standard prevailed, the Seventh Circuit held in uBid v. GoDaddy Group Inc. that millions

of dollars in revenue, an extensive customer base, and widespread marketing and

targeting of potential customers did not suffice to establish general jurisdiction. 623 F.3d

at 426. In uBid, the defendant GoDaddy engaged in “extensive and deliberate” contacts

with Illinois by marketing and selling domain names. uBid, 623 F.3d at 426. GoDaddy,

which was headquartered in Arizona, put up billboards at various Chicago-area

stadiums, engaged in national advertising, and had a significant online presence; these

efforts resulted in “hundreds of thousands” of Illinois customers, and “many millions of

dollars in revenue” to the defendant in a single year. Id. at 424. Nevertheless, the

Seventh Circuit held that the district court lacked general personal jurisdiction over the

defendant. Id. at 426. The court reasoned:

It would be unfair to require GoDaddy to answer in Illinois for any

conceivable claim that any conceivable plaintiff might have against it.

10
Imagine an Illinois visitor to GoDaddy's headquarters in Arizona who

slipped, fell, and then sued for the injury, or a GoDaddy employee who

worked in Arizona, was fired, moved to Illinois, and then sued for wrongful

termination. There is no reason for GoDaddy to expect, as it goes about its

business of selling domain names in Illinois, that it is thereby exposing itself

to such lawsuits in Illinois. The district court correctly found that GoDaddy

is not subject to general jurisdiction in Illinois.

Id. at 426 (citations omitted).

With this precedent in mind, the court considers plaintiff’s contention that this

court may properly assert general jurisdiction over XOS. NExTT’s primary argument is

that XOS has maintained a nearly decade-long continuous relationship with five

customers in Indiana: the University of Notre Dame, Indiana University, Purdue

University, the Indianapolis Colts, and the Indiana Pacers. (DE # 36 at 4.) In the case of

Notre Dame, NExTT contends that the relationship extends back thirteen years. (Id. at

6.) NExTT also contends that XOS has pursued (and in some cases succeeded in

creating) business relationships with at least 15 other Indiana customers, mostly

universities. (Id. at 7, 15.) Perhaps most noteworthy are XOS’s five-year business

relationships with Ball State and Indiana State University, a relationship with the

University of Indianapolis spanning two years, a project for the NCAA which was

completed in 2012, and the fact that XOS hosts an annual webcast for the College

Football Hall of Fame in South Bend. (Id. at 8.)

NExTT contends that, over the last five years, XOS has earned a substantial

amount of revenue from Indiana customers. (DE # 36 a 8.) A chart showing XOS’s

revenue stream broken down by state for the past five years shows that XOS made

11
approximately $1.2 million from Indiana sources in 2009; almost $1.8 million in each of

the years 2010 and 2011; $1.4 million in 2012; $660,000 in 2013; and $304,000 so far in

2014. (DE # 33-10 at 2.) Over those five years, XOS generated a total of $7,136,963 from

its Indiana customers. (Id. at 9.) XOS did business with 48-49 states per year, and in

2009, Indiana was the 4th greatest source of revenue out of those 48-49 total states. (Id.

at 9.) In 2010, Indiana placed 3rd; in 2011, 4th; in 2012, 6th; and in 2013, 9th. (Id. in 10.)

XOS’s CEO testified that its Indiana revenue comprises approximately 5% of its total

revenue, though NExTT questions the veracity of this figure. (Id. at 9-10.) 2

 NExTT also points out that XOS routinely and frequently sends support staff into

Indiana—about 25 individuals total, who visited Indiana on 319 days of the five-year

period spanning 2009-2014. (Id. at 12.) Additionally, XOS has had at least four different

 NExTT takes issue with the fact that XOS’s CEO could not answer its questions 2

to NExTT’s satisfaction. (DE # 36 at 9-10 & n.3.) Accordingly, NExTT argues, it should

be entitled to additional discovery on the topics on which XOS’s CEO gave insufficient

testimony. The request is denied. As the parties undoubtedly have been well aware

since the question of jurisdiction was raised one year ago, it is NExTT’s burden to prove

that this court has personal jurisdiction over XOS in this case. NExTT was permitted a

sufficient period of time to conduct jurisdictional discovery, including deposing

whichever individuals it decided were necessary to obtain the information it sought.

The fact that NExTT did not obtain the information it wanted from the individuals it

chose to depose does not justify further delaying this case for additional jurisdictional

discovery. Further, NExTT’s approach of failing to raise the issue of extending

jurisdictional discovery until well after the close of that discovery period is not well

taken by the court. Finally, the piecemeal approach suggested by NExTT (for the court

to expend its time and resources considering the present motion, unless it decides to

find for XOS, in which case it should permit NExTT additional time to come up with

more information and present additional arguments) would not only permit NExTT

two bites of the proverbial apple, but would also create numerous inefficiencies for

XOS, this case’s schedule, and this court.

12
sales people covering Indiana over the last five years and sent five to six employees to

the NFL Combine each year. (Id.) Further, NExTT contends that XOS has made

hundreds of thousands of payments to vendors affiliated with its business endeavors in

Indiana and ships an unknown (presumably substantial) number of products into

Indiana in connection with its contracts with customers. (Id. at 9, 14.) Next emphasizes

that, in 2006, XOS purchased the assets of Sagio Software, which was based in South

Bend, Indiana. XOS then leased office space in South Bend for three years, from 2006 to

2009. (Id. at 13.) This office housed one employee, who after 2009 worked from his home

until he left the company in 2010. (Id. at 13.)

Finally, NExTT submits that XOS registered with the Indiana Secretary of State

as a foreign corporation, receiving a certificate of authority to conduct business in

Indiana in June of 2007. (DE ## 33-13, 33-14.) Based on the undisputed information

provided by NExTT purporting to be a screenshot of XOS’s information page from the

Secretary’s website, XOS first filed for a certificate of authority with the Secretary on

June 5, 2007. (DE # 33-13 at 2.) However, the Secretary’s website also states that XOS’s

certificate was “revoked” on December 27, 2010, and that it has been considered

“inactive” since then, though it is not clear who revoked the certificate (XOS or the

State) or for what reason. On January 25, 2013, XOS provided the Secretary with a

notice of change of registered agent. (Id.) Notably, the document also reveals that XOS

13
was incorporated in Delaware (DE # 33-14 at 6) and that XOS’s office is located in

Sanford, Florida. (DE # 33-13 at 2.)3

The evidence submitted by NExTT in response to XOS’s motion to dismiss

clearly establishes that XOS conducts business in Indiana, and XOS does not dispute

this proposition. Even though it has only a handful of consistent Indiana customers,

XOS has done business with those customers for, arguably, a decade or more. Over the

years, it has sometimes earned over $1 million (sometimes closer to $2 million) from its

Indiana customers in a one-year period. Further, it has employees physically present in

Indiana for a few months each year and has, in the past, been registered as a foreign

corporation doing business in the state. Of course, the quantity of customers and

amount of revenue enjoyed by XOS does not approach the extensive relationships and

multi-million dollar figures considered in cases like Abelesz and uBid (where, as

explained above, the Seventh Circuit found the defendants’ contacts with the forum

states to be inadquate). But even XOS’s relatively modest earnings with its smaller pool

of customers, along with the other facts apparent from the record, could demonstrate

 NExTT also moves to supplement the supplemental brief it filed in opposition 3

to XOS’s motion to dismiss. (DE # 39.) The motion is granted, though it helps NExTT

very little. The additional evidence NExTT submits consists of a “tweet” issued by

Purdue University’s football team on the social media website, Twitter, in which the

team indicates its excitement about new computers it received from XOS, and several

screenshots of XOS’s website wherein an Indiana team is mentioned, shown, or

provides a testimonial. These submissions do not add much to the evidence already

submitted by NExTT (that is, evidence demonstrating the generally uncontested fact

that XOS has a handful of valuable, long-term Indiana customers). Nonetheless, the

court has considered NExTT’s submissions.

14
that XOS conducts “continuous and systematic” business in Indiana. This is actually

what NExTT argues in its briefing, and to this extent, NExTT may be correct. But after

Goodyear and Daimler, “continuous and systematic” contacts with a forum state are no

longer sufficient to establish general jurisdiction. XOS’s contacts with Indiana must be

so continuous and systematic that XOS can be said to be “at home” in Indiana. This,

NExTT has not proven.

The extent of XOS’s contacts with Indiana are only part of the equation. As

Daimler instructs, the general jurisdiction inquiry does not focus solely on the

magnitude of the defendant’s in-state contacts. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762. “General

jurisdiction instead calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their entirety,

nationwide and worldwide. A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be

deemed at home in all of them.” Id. In this case, XOS appears to have stronger

affiliations with other states, namely Florida, where all of its officers reside, where its

office is located, and from where, over the last five years, it derived more revenue ($8.6

million total between 2009 and 2014) than it did from Indiana ($7.1 million for the same

time period). (DE ## 33-13, 33-14, 33-10 at 10.) Delaware, where XOS is incorporated, is

also a contender. See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. 2853; Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 735 (place of

incorporation and principal place of business are paradigm fora in which general

jurisdiction over a corporation is appropriate).

Further, when the totality of XOS’s contacts with Indiana are considered over the

past five years or more, it becomes clear that XOS’s connections to Indiana are on the

15
decline. XOS’s revenue from Indiana sources has decreased over time, with XOS

making approximately $662,000 in 2013, compared to the $1.2 million it made in 2009

and the $1.8 million it made in each of 2010 and 2011. At one point XOS had one

Indiana employee, whom XOS acquired as part of its purchase of Sagio, and maintained

an office for that employee in South Bend, Indiana; however, the lease was discontinued

in 2009, and the employee has not worked for XOS since 2010. XOS’s status with the

Indiana Secretary of State is now listed as “inactive.” In short, if XOS ever had a

commercial hayday in Indiana that might have justified the exercise of general

jurisdiction over it, that hayday is no longer.

Having considered the totality of the evidence submitted by NExTT, the court

finds that NExTT has failed to make a prima facie showing that general jurisdiction can

be asserted over XOS in this district under the “at home” standard articulated by

Goodyear and Daimler. If general jurisdiction could not be asserted over the defendants

in Abelesz and uBid, it certainly is not appropriate here. Further, if a visitor who slipped

and fell on the floor of XOS’s Florida office was permitted to sue XOS in Indiana based

on the Indiana contacts apparent from the record in this case, the “at home”

requirement set forth by Goodyear and Daimler would be virtually meaningless. See uBid,

623 F.3d at 426. There was no reason for XOS to expect, as it went about its business of

selling software and services in Indiana (and in 47 or more states around the country),

that it would be exposing itself to such lawsuits in Indiana. See id. Accordingly, the

16
court cannot exercise general jurisdiction over XOS, and NExTT’s claims against XOS

must be dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above and in the court’s prior order (DE # 28), the court

GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (DE # 9) as to

defendant XOS Technologies, Inc. d/b/a XOS digital, and DENIES the motion as to

defendant Stratbridge, LLC. Plaintiff’s motion to supplement its motion to dismiss is

GRANTED. (DE # 39.)

SO ORDERED.

Date: November 25, 2014

s/James T. Moody 

JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

17