NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

__________________________ 

CHARLES W. JOHNSON, 

Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, SECRETARY OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

__________________________ 

2011-7180 

__________________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in case no. 09-3377, Judge Mary J. 

Schoelen. 

_________________________ 

Decided: June 11, 2012 

_________________________ 

CHARLES W. JOHNSON, of Martinsburg, West Virginia, 

pro se. 

ALEXANDER V. SVERDLOV, Trial Attorney, Commercial 

Litigation Branch, Civil Branch, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondentappellee. With him on the brief were TONY WEST, Assistant Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director, 
JOHNSON v. SHINSEKI 2

and STEVEN J. GILLINGHAM, Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief were DAVID J. BARRANS, Deputy Assistant 

General Counsel, and CHRISTA A. SHRIBER, Attorney, 

United States Department of Veterans Affairs, of Washington, DC. 

__________________________ 

Before DYK, SCHALL, and REYNA, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

Charles W. Johnson appeals the final decision of the 

United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 

(“Veterans Court”) that affirmed the decision of the Board 

of Veterans Appeals (“Board”) denying him entitlement to 

an effective date earlier than November 18, 1999, for the 

award of Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) pension 

benefits. Johnson v. Shinseki, No. 09-3377, 2011 WL 

1827867 (Vet. App. May 11, 2011). We dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction. 

DISCUSSION

I. 

Mr. Johnson served on active duty in the United 

States Marine Corps from August 1974 to September 

1976. In March 1996, he filed a claim with the VA for 

non-service connected pension benefits. Pursuant to 38 

U.S.C. § 1521(a), such benefits are paid to a “veteran of a 

period of war who meets [certain service requirements] 

and who is permanently and totally disabled from nonservice connected disability not the result of the veteran’s 

willful misconduct.” The regional office (“RO”) denied the 

claim in May 1996 and Mr. Johnson did not appeal. 

In March 2004, Mr. Johnson filed a request to reopen 

his claim. The following month, the RO awarded nonservice-connected pension benefits, effective from March 
3 JOHNSON v. SHINSEKI

25, 2004, the date the RO received the request to reopen. 

There then ensued a period of time during which Mr. 

Johnson sought an earlier effective date for his benefits. 

In December 2007, the VA issued a decision granting an 

effective date of November 18, 1999 for the benefits. 

Asserting, however, that his medical records established 

that he was disabled as early as 1996, Mr. Johnson appealed to the Board. Subsequently, on May 13, 2009, the 

Board rendered a decision in which it denied entitlement 

to an effective date earlier than November 18, 1999. In re 

Johnson, No. 05-13 864 (Bd. Vet. App. May 13, 2009). 

The basis for the Board’s decision was its conclusion that 

the preponderance of the evidence did not support a 

finding that Mr. Johnson was permanently and totally 

disabled prior to November 1999. Id. at 8.

On appeal to the Veterans Court, Mr. Johnson argued 

that, in its decision, the Board had failed to provide an 

adequate statement of reasons and bases for its decision. 

He also contended that the VA had not complied with its 

duty to assist him because it had failed to obtain certain 

medical records. Mr. Johnson argued further that the 

Board had improperly weighed the evidence and had 

failed to consider all the evidence of record. The Veterans 

Court rejected all three of Mr. Johnson’s arguments. As 

far as the first argument was concerned, the court noted 

that the Board had discussed at length the pertinent 

medical records and had provided a detailed discussion of 

the evidence. Johnson, 2011 WL 1827867 at *3-*4. 

Accordingly, the court determined that the Board’s decision was supported by sufficient reasons and bases. Id. at 

*4. Addressing the duty-to-assist argument, the court 

pointed out that Mr. Johnson had not identified any 

specific records that the VA had failed to obtain. Further, 

it concluded that, to the extent there were missing records, there was no evidence that the absence of the 
JOHNSON v. SHINSEKI 4

records had prejudiced Mr. Johnson. Id. at *5. Finally, 

the Veterans Court determined that the Board’s factual 

findings relevant to the effective date issue were not 

clearly erroneous and that Mr. Johnson had not identified 

any evidence that the Board failed to consider. Id. at *4. 

The court therefore affirmed the Board’s decision; this 

appeal followed. 

II. 

This court's ability to review a decision of the Veterans Court is limited. Pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), we 

may review “the validity of a decision of the [Veterans] 

Court on a rule of law or of any statute or regulation . . . or any interpretation thereof (other than a determination as to a factual matter) that was relied on by the 

[Veterans] Court in making the decision.” We have 

exclusive jurisdiction “to review and decide any challenge 

to the validity of any statute or regulation or any interpretation thereof brought under [38 U.S.C. § 7292], and to 

interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, to the 

extent presented and necessary to a decision.” 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7292(c). However, except to the extent that an appeal 

presents a constitutional issue, we “may not review (A) a 

challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a challenge to 

a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular 

case.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). 

On appeal, Mr. Johnson argues that the Veterans 

Court and the Board did not properly consider the evidence regarding his disabilities and that the Veterans 

Court therefore erred in affirming the Board’s ruling that 

he was not entitled to an effective date earlier than November 18, 1999 for his pension benefits. This clearly is a 

challenge to a factual determination, a matter over which 

we lack jurisdiction. See Bastien v. Shinseki, 599 F.3d 

1301, 1305-06 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (dismissing for lack of 
5 JOHNSON v. SHINSEKI

jurisdiction because the appeal required the review of 

factual determinations). Mr. Johnson also contends that, 

in its decision, the Veterans Court erred in its interpretation of certain statutes and regulations, specifically: 38 

U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1), 38 U.S.C. § 1521(a), and 38 C.F.R. 

§§ 4.16, 4.17. Examination of the Veterans Court’s decision, however, makes it clear that the court did not interpret any of these provisions, but rather applied their 

requirements to the facts of the case. This also is a determination which we do not have jurisdiction to review. 

See Leonard v. Gober, 223 F.3d 1374, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 

2000) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction because the 

appeal involved the application of law to the facts of the 

case). 

III. 

Because all of Mr. Johnson’s arguments on appeal are 

fact-based, they are beyond our jurisdiction. The appeal 

is therefore dismissed. 

Each party shall bear its own costs. 

DISMISSED