Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 84 / Tuesday, May 2, 1995 / Notices 21575

radiological event at the owner’s facility in

Indiana, Pennsylvania.

The NRC acknowledges that the Licensee

has taken corrective actions and is aware of

the Licensee’s past performance. However, in

this case, the NRC exercised discretion to

escalate the civil penalties, which supersedes

the normal application of the adjustment

factors, as explained above. In addition, civil

penalties are imposed, in part, to deter future

violations by not only the involved licensee,

but other licensees conducting similar

activities. See Enforcement Policy, Section

VI.B.

The civil penalties proposed in this case

are within the authority of the NRC. The

Licensee’s comparison of the civil penalty in

this case with civil penalties in other cases

does not bring NRC’s exercise of its lawful

authority into question. Of decisive

importance is the NRC’s clear authority to

exercise discretion in the choice of

enforcement sanctions and the ordering of

enforcement priorities. Advanced Medical

Systems, Inc., (CLI–94–6), 39 NRC 285, 320

(1994). A sanction is not rendered invalid

because it is more severe than that issued in

other cases. Id. As explained above, the NRC

acted within its statutory authority and the

bounds of the Enforcement Policy when NRC

exercised its discretion to escalate the civil

penalties in this case. A rigid uniformity is

neither required nor possible in enforcement

decisions, which inherently involve the

exercise of informed judgement on a case-bycase basis. Id. See also, Radiation

Technology, Inc., (ALAB–567), 10 NRC 533,

541 (1979).

NRC Conclusion

The NRC has concluded that: (1) With the

exceptions of Examples A.3 and G., the

violation occurred as stated in the Notice; (2)

Examples A.3 and G are being withdrawn; (3)

the withdrawal of these two examples of the

violation does not change the fact that the

violation occurred nor does it affect the

appropriateness of the amount of the civil

penalty assessed for the violation; and (4) an

adequate basis for mitigation of the civil

penalty was not provided by the Licensee.

Consequently, the proposed civil penalty in

the amount of $80,000 is being imposed.

[FR Doc. 95–10730 Filed 5–1–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

[Docket No. 50–244]

Rochester Gas and Electric Company

(R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant);

Exemption

I

Rochester Gas and Electric

Corporation (RG&E) is the holder of

Facility Operating License No. DPR–18,

which authorizes operation of R. E.

Ginna Nuclear Power Plant at steadystate power levels up to a maximum of

1520 megawatts thermal. The facility is

a pressurized water reactor located at

the licensee’s site in Wayne County,

State of New York. The license provides

among other things, that the facility is

subject to all rules, regulations, and

Orders of the Commission.

II

Appendix J of Part 50 of Title 10 of

the Code of Federal Regulations,

‘‘Primary Reactor Containment Leakage

Testing for Water-Cooled Reactors,’’

Section III.D.3, requires that Type C

leakage rate testing be performed each

reactor shutdown for refueling, but in

no case at intervals greater than 2 years.

By letter dated March 15, 1995, RG&E

requested a one-time Exemption from

two parts of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix

J, Section III.D.3. First, RG&E requests

an Exemption from performing Type C

tests during the 1995 refueling outage

except for isolation valves which have

maintenance performed on them or

valves which have not demonstrated

acceptable leakage during the previous

two leakage rate tests. Second, RG&E

requests an Exemption from performing

Type C tests within a 2-year interval, as

required by the regulation. RG&E

requests up to a 1-month extension of

the 2-year interval for 129 containment

isolation valves.

The last Type C tests were performed

during the 1994 refueling outage after

March 10, 1994. RG&E stated in the

March 15, 1995, letter that the 1996

refueling outage will commence on

March 31, 1996, with Cold Shutdown

reached on April 1, 1996. RG&E

requested an Exemption from the 2 year

test interval until April 10, 1996, an

interval 1 month greater than the

required 2 year test interval.

The R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant

has a total of 151 containment isolation

valves. RG&E has proposed to exempt

129 of these valves from Type C testing

during the 1995 refueling outage. The

other valves would be tested during the

1995 refueling outage either because

maintenance has been done on them or

they have not passed the RG&E’s

criterion for exemption of two

successful consecutive tests.

The NRC staff finds RG&E’s proposal

to be acceptable for several reasons. As

discussed in RG&E’s March 15, 1995

letter, the performance of the

containment isolation valves and the R.

E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant overall

containment integrity have been good.

The as-left Type A test leakage rate is

35% of La. The current Type B and C

as-left maximum path leakage rate is

61% of the 0.6 La Appendix J limit.

Therefore, there is reasonable assurance

that the 1-month extension of the 2-year

interval will not result in exceeding the

Appendix J limits.

In addition, RG&E has proposed to

limit the Exemption only to those valves

on which no maintenance has been

done and which have passed the last

two consecutive Type C leakage rate

tests. The NRC staff has granted similar

requests in the past. On February 2,

1994, the NRC staff granted a similar

Exemption to the River Bend Station

licensee, and by letter dated April 29,

1987, the NRC staff granted a similar

request to the Washington Public Power

Supply System, Unit 2 licensee.

The NRC staff, therefore, grants the

requested one-time Exemption to the R.

E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant licensee

subject to the condition that the

Exemption apply only to those valves

on which no maintenance has been

done and which have passed the last

two consecutive Type C leakage rate

tests. The Exemption is granted until

plant shutdown for the 1996 refueling

outage, not to extend beyond April 10,

1996.

III

Section 50.12 of the Commission’s

regulations permit granting an

Exemption from the regulations when

special circumstances are present.

According to 50.12(a)(2)(ii), special

circumstances are present whenever

application of the regulation in question

is not necessary to achieve the

underlying purpose of the rule.

The underlying purpose of Appendix

J, Section III.D.3, is to assure a leak tight

containment to mitigate the

consequences of an accident. The past

leakage rate data and available margin to

the allowed technical specifications, as

discussed above, are sufficient to assure

that the underlying purpose of

Appendix J, Section III.D.3, is achieved.

Accordingly, the Commission has

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR

50.12, this Exemption is authorized by

law, will not present an undue risk to

the public health and safety, and is

consistent with the common defense

and security.

Accordingly, the Commission hereby

grants an Exemption from 10 CFR Part

50, Appendix J, Section III.D.3.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the

Commission has determined that the

granting of the Exemption will have no

significant impact on the environment

(60 FR 20513).

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day

of April 1995.

This Exemption is effective upon issuance.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Steven A. Varga,

Director, Division of Reactor Projects—I/II,

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95–10734 Filed 5–1–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M