Filed 4/26/17 (sent for posting 4/27/17)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ALEXANDER POU,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B269349

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA425723)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 

County of Los Angeles, Michael A. Tynan, Judge. Affirmed.

Leonard J. Klaif, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Supervising Deputy 

Attorney General, and Michael J. Wise, Deputy Attorney 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION

Defendant and appellant Alexander Pou appeals the trial 

court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized as a 

result of a warrantless entry and search of his home by law 

enforcement officers. Because we conclude the officers’ initial 

entry and search was justified under the emergency aid exception 

to the warrant requirement, we affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On June 2, 2014, City of Los Angeles Police Department 

Officer Michael Ramsey was on patrol in the Hollywood Hills 

area with his partner Officer Anaya. Around 12:10 p.m., they 

received a radio call about a “screaming woman,” as well as 

“distressed moaning,” at 2314 Jupiter Drive. They responded to 

that address with their lights and sirens activated. 

Upon arrival at the location, Officers Ramsey and Anaya 

met with their field supervisor, Sergeant Lloyd Parry, who had 

arrived before them. The two officers approached the front door 

of the residence and “could hear several people inside the 

residence arguing.” The arguing was “very loud,” but the officers 

could not understand what was actually being said. The officers, 

however, could hear that both male and female voices were part 

of the “loud argument.” In addition, Officer Anaya observed from 

outside that two males inside the residence were making gestures 

similar to that of people engaged in an argument.

Officer Ramsey knocked on the door and announced his 

presence as law enforcement “multiple times.” Eventually, 

defendant answered the door with another male. Officer Ramsey 

informed defendant that the officers had received a radio call 

about a woman screaming at that address and that they needed 
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“to come in and look at the apartment to make sure everybody 

was okay,” a precaution that was consistent with their training 

and experience. Defendant told the officers several times that he 

did not want them to enter his house. 

The officers nonetheless entered the residence to make sure 

that everyone inside was in fact unharmed. Inside the residence, 

Officer Ramsey observed two females sitting on a couch in the 

living room. The officers “made sure [the two women] were okay” 

and then searched the rest of the house for additional occupants

to check on their well being. 

Following standard procedure, the officers looked into 

closets and the other rooms in what Officer Ramsey described as 

a “very large residence.” While continuing on with a “quick 

search of the house” for additional occupants, the officers saw 

what they believed to be narcotics in a closed bedroom closet. 

Prior to swinging the closet door open, the officers could not 

necessarily tell whether the door was to a closet or some other 

room. The officers advised Sergeant Parry about the items they 

had discovered and called a narcotics unit to respond to the 

location. 

Ultimately, narcotics officers responded to the location and 

obtained a search warrant for the residence. When officers 

executed that warrant, they located and seized 14.02 grams of 

cocaine, .077 grams of methylone or MDMA, scales, and money. 

In addition, the officers retrieved a handgun from a safe under a 

nightstand in the house. 

Because the officers had not located a victim at the 2314 

Jupiter Drive location, Sergeant Parry conducted a follow-up 

investigation by speaking to the person who had made the initial 

report of the screaming woman. The person who made the report 
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returned to the scene and explained that he was an Uber driver 

who had been called to the 2314 Jupiter Drive address to give 

somebody a ride. The Uber driver, however, explained that his 

report about a screaming woman pertained to the house across 

the street from 2314 Jupiter Drive. 

Further investigation by Sergeant Parry revealed that an 

“incident recall” printout did, in fact, state that the incident was 

“across from 2314 at a house.” According to Sergeant Parry, the 

information in the incident recall printout would have been input 

into the police computer system by the person who took the 

telephone report of a screaming woman. Like Officers Ramsey 

and Anaya, however, Sergeant Parry responded to 2314 Jupiter 

Drive because the radio broadcast he heard was for that address 

and not some location “across” from 2314 Juniper Drive. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant was charged in a two-count information with 

possession of cocaine for sale in violation of Health and Safety 

Code section 11352 (count one) and possession of ecstasy for sale

in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11378 (count two). 

The information alleged as to both counts that in the commission 

of the charged crimes, defendant was personally armed with a 

firearm within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022, 

subdivision (c). 

Following the preliminary hearing, the trial court heard 

argument on defendant’s motion to suppress evidence pursuant 

to Penal Code section 1538.5, denied the motion, and held 

defendant to answer. Eventually, defendant entered into a plea 

bargain pursuant to which he pleaded guilty to count 2, and 
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count 1 was dismissed. The firearm allegations as to both counts

were also dismissed. 

The trial court ultimately sentenced defendant to eight 

months imprisonment on count 2, to run consecutively to the 

sentence in another criminal case (case number KA109209). 

Defendant timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, defendant contends that the trial erred by 

denying his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a 

search warrant obtained because law enforcement officers

entered his residence without a warrant or consent and saw 

illegal narcotics. We conclude the outcome of this appeal is 

dictated by our Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Troyer

(2011) 51 Cal.4th 599 (Troyer), and hold that the officers’ entry 

into the home and search of the premises for occupants therein 

was reasonably justified by the emergency aid exception to the 

warrant requirement.

A. Standard of Review

In reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion to 

suppress, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings if 

supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 

Cal.4th 872, 891.) We review de novo whether the search was 

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment based on the facts 

found. (Ibid.; People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 255.)
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B. The Emergency Aid Exception

In Brigham City v. Stuart (2006) 547 U.S. 398, 400 

(Brigham City), the United States Supreme Court established the 

so-called emergency aid exception, holding that “police may enter 

a home without a warrant when they have an objectively 

reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously 

injured or imminently threatened with such injury.” In that case, 

law enforcement officers had entered the defendant’s home and 

made arrests for disorderly conduct and other related offenses 

when responding to a 3:00 a.m. call regarding a loud party at the 

residence. (Id. at p. 401.) Before entering the home, the officers 

heard shouting from inside and saw that an altercation was 

taking place inside between four adults and a juvenile. (Ibid.) 

The altercation included, among other things, the adults 

attempting to restrain the juvenile; the juvenile breaking free 

and hitting one of the adults in the face, causing that adult to 

spit blood into a nearby sink; and the adults thereafter pressing 

the juvenile against a refrigerator with such force that it moved 

across the floor. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court concluded that the 

officers were justified in making a warrantless entry under the 

circumstances because “the need to protect or preserve life or 

avoid serious injury” was an exigency or emergency that obviated 

the requirement of a warrant. (Id. at p. 403.)

Three years later, the Supreme Court provided additional 

guidance concerning application of the emergency aid exception

in Michigan v. Fisher (2009) 558 U.S. 45 (Fisher). In Fisher, 

responding to a complaint of a disturbance involving a man 

“going crazy,” a police officer in Michigan entered defendant

Fisher’s home without a warrant, which led to Fisher pointing a 

gun at the officer and Fisher’s consequent arrest for assault with 
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a dangerous weapon and possession of a firearm during 

commission of a felony. (Id. at pp. 45-46.) Prior to entering the 

home, the police had observed: the truck on Fisher’s driveway 

was smashed; there were damaged fenceposts along the property 

and broken house windows; and blood was present on the hood of 

the truck, on clothes inside the truck, and on one of the doors to 

the house. (Ibid.) The police also could see Fisher inside the 

house with a cut on his hand, screaming and throwing things. 

(Id. at p. 46.) When the officers knocked on the door, Fisher 

initially refused to answer. (Ibid.) When they asked him 

whether he needed medical attention, Fisher ignored such 

questions and “demanded, with accompanying profanity, that the 

officers go get a search warrant.” (Ibid.)

The Michigan Court of Appeals had found that the 

warrantless entry into Fisher’s house violated the Fourth 

Amendment because “the situation ‘did not rise to the level of 

emergency justifying the warrantless intrusion into a residence.’” 

(Fisher, supra, 558 U.S. at p. 48.) In so holding, that court 

acknowledged there was evidence from which the police could 

have reasonably inferred that an injured person was on the 

premises, but nonetheless concluded that “‘the mere drops of 

blood did not signal a likely serious, life-threatening injury’’’ 

necessitating the warrantless entry. (Ibid.)

In reversing the Michigan court, the Supreme Court in 

Fisher, supra, 558 U.S. 45 found the lower court’s reasoning 

“flaw[ed],” explaining that “[e]ven a casual review of Brigham 

City[, supra, 547 U.S. 398] reveals . . . [o]fficers do not need 

ironclad proof of ‘a likely serious, life-threatening’ injury to 

invoke the emergency aid doctrine.” (Id. at p. 49.) The Supreme 

Court thus clarified that “‘[t]he role of a peace officer includes 
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preventing violence and restoring order, not simply rendering 

first aid to casualties’ [citation]. It sufficed to invoke the 

emergency aid exception that it was reasonable to believe that 

Fisher hurt himself (albeit nonfatally) and needed treatment that 

in his rage he was unable to provide, or that Fisher was about to 

hurt, or had already hurt, someone else.” (Ibid.) Underlying the 

Supreme Court’s holding was its reasoning that the emergency 

aid exception “requires only ‘an objectively reasonable basis for 

believing’ [citation] that ‘a person within [the house] is in need of 

immediate aid’ [citation].” (Id. at p. 47.)

Two years later, our Supreme Court had occasion to 

expound on the emergency aid exception in Troyer, supra, 51 

Cal.4th 599. In Troyer, our Supreme Court emphasized that 

invocation of the emergency aid exception to justify a warrantless 

search only requires an objectively reasonable basis by law 

enforcement to believe that someone on the premises is in need of 

immediate aid. (Id. at p. 605.) As the court explained, this 

approach is based on “some measure of pragmatism” in that, “[i]f 

there is a grave public need for the police to take preventive 

action, the Constitution may impose limits, but it will not bar the 

way. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 606.) Thus, our Supreme Court 

rejected the suggestion that application of the emergency aid

exception must be established by proof amounting to probable 

cause, which would require officers at the time to form “‘a 

reasonable ground for belief of guilt’ that is ‘particularized with 

respect to the person to be searched or seized.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) 

The court explained that such a requirement would not make 

sense in an emergency situation “where the police must make 

split-second decisions as to whether someone is in need of 

immediate aid.” (Ibid.) Indeed, the court observed that “[p]eople 
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could well die in emergencies if police tried to act with the calm 

deliberation associated with the judicial process. [Citation.]” 

(Ibid.)

The court in Troyer, supra, 51 Cal.4th 599 further noted 

that, in applying the objective reasonableness standard, the 

police may even permissibly make mistakes if objectively 

reasonable, explaining that “when we balance the nature of the 

intrusion on an individual’s privacy against the promotion of 

legitimate governmental interests in order to determine the 

reasonableness of a search in the circumstances of an emergency 

[citation], we must be mindful of what is at stake.” (Id. at p. 606.) 

Accordingly, our Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he possibility 

that immediate police action will prevent injury or death 

outweighs the affront to privacy when police enter the home 

under the reasonable but mistaken belief that an emergency 

exists.” (Ibid.)

The court in Troyer, supra, 51 Cal.4th 599 thus found the 

emergency aid doctrine justified the warrantless search of 

defendant’s home by police responding to a dispatch report of 

shots fired at the location. When police arrived, they found on 

the front porch a male administering aid to a female victim who 

had been shot multiple times, as well as another male on the 

porch with a head wound and blood streaming onto his face. (Id. 

at p. 603.) When the wounded female could not provide 

information to the officer because she was “in obvious distress,” 

the officer questioned the “excited and agitated” wounded male, 

who said that two individuals were involved who fled in a vehicle. 

(Ibid.) When the officer asked the wounded male if anyone else 

was inside the residence, which had blood on the front door, the 

male first stared at the officer for 15 to 20 seconds without 
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responding, then said he “did not think so,” and finally said “no” 

after taking a long pause. (Ibid.) The police then entered the 

house to look for victims and suspects. (Id. at p. 604.) Based on 

the foregoing, the court held that “[u]nder the circumstances, and 

inasmuch as [the police] did not know who had been the 

aggressor, an objectively reasonable basis existed to enter the 

residence to search for additional victims.” (Id. at pp. 608-609.)

After the police entered the home and found nothing 

downstairs, they expanded their search upstairs, “continuing to 

look in places where a body could be.” (Troyer, supra, 51 Cal.4th 

at p. 604.) That upstairs search led to entry into a locked 

bedroom, where the police saw balls of marijuana and an 

electronic scale, which, in turn, led to a search warrant for the 

home; the seizure of marijuana, firearms, and $9,000 cash; and 

the arrest of the defendant on charges arising from his possession 

of those items in his residence. (Ibid.) The court rejected the 

defendant’s contention that the scope of the officers’ search was 

unreasonable, explaining: “[T]he scope of a warrantless search 

‘must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its 

initiation.’ [Citation.] Here, the same facts that justified entry 

into the residence justified a search of places where a victim 

could be, which included the upstairs bedroom.” (Id. at p. 612.)

Notably, the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Troyer, supra, 

51 Cal.4th 599, that the warrantless entry and full search of the 

defendant’s residence was objectively reasonable, was not 

undermined by the fact that no additional victims or suspects 

relating to the shots fired emergency were ultimately found in 

the house. The court specifically noted that “[a] ‘hindsight 

determination that there was in fact no emergency’ does not 
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rebut the objectively reasonable basis for believing that someone 

in the house was injured or in danger. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 613.)

C. The Search of Defendant’s Residence

The search of defendant’s house falls squarely within the 

emergency aid exception as shaped by Brigham City, supra, 547 

U.S. 398, Fisher, supra, 558 U.S. 45, and Troyer, supra, 51 

Cal.4th 599. Here, the officers were told by the radio dispatch 

operator that someone had reported hearing a screaming woman 

and distressed moaning at the location. Upon arrival, consistent 

with the radio dispatch call information, the officers could hear 

from the outside loud voices—both male and female—engaged in 

an argument inside the house. One officer additionally saw 

through the window that two males in the house were gesturing 

as if arguing. Under these circumstances, it was objectively 

reasonable for an officer to believe that immediate entry was 

necessary to render emergency assistance to a screaming female 

victim inside or to prevent a perpetrator from inflicting 

additional immediate harm to that victim or others inside the 

house.

The objective reasonableness of the decision to enter and 

search was bolstered by the fact that there was a delay before 

any occupant answered the door in response to the police 

knocking and identifying themselves multiple times. Under the 

circumstances, the delayed reaction by the occupants of a house 

from which loud arguing could be heard would have roused an 

officer’s suspicions. In Troyer, supra, 51 Cal.4th at page 608, the 

court cited with approval a federal appellate decision (Causey v. 

City of Bay City (6th Cir. 2006) 442 F.3d 524, 530) holding that 

police reasonably conducted an emergency aid search after 
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receiving assurances that no one was injured, because the officers 

could have inferred the person offering such assurances was 

concealing an injured person or was being intimidated by an 

unseen attacker. Here, too, it was reasonable for the officers to 

enter defendant’s house without a warrant, even after defendant 

told them several times he did not want them to enter.

Further, we find the scope of the search here was 

reasonably tied to the apparent emergency with which the 

officers were presented. The location was a “very large house,” 

and, under the emergency aid exception, the officers were entitled 

to conduct an emergency search of all places in the house where a 

body (victim or suspect) might have been hiding or lying in wait, 

including the closet in which the drugs were found. The fact that 

the officers at the commencement of the search encountered an 

additional male and observed two females sitting in the living 

room whom they verified “were okay” did not mean the 

emergency search could go no further. As the court observed in 

Troyer, supra, 51 Cal.4th at page 609, “ordinary, routine common 

sense and a reasonable concern for human life justified [the 

police] in conducting a walk-through search truly limited in scope 

to determine the presence of other victims [citation]” where the 

police had no information whether there was only one victim.

Here, it was objectively reasonable for the police to 

continue with their emergency search because they had yet to 

find the screaming woman whom they reasonably could have 

concluded under the circumstances had been hidden away, 

harmed further, or silenced in some other part of the large house 

after the police had alerted the occupants to their presence. 

Moreover, at that point in the search, the officers had neither

located nor prevented from causing further harm any perpetrator 
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who might have been arguing with and causing harm to the 

screaming woman. It was, therefore, reasonable for the officers 

to continue with their emergency search to find the victim or 

suspect in order to prevent further immediate harm.1

Finally, the fact that the officers mistakenly searched the 

wrong location does not undermine the reasonableness of their

decision to conduct the search based on the information they had 

at the time. Both of the officers and the sergeant were informed 

by the radio dispatch broadcast that the location of the screaming 

woman was 2314 Jupiter Drive. They had no reason to question 

the accuracy of the reported address when they responded to that 

location. Indeed, from an objective standpoint, the seeming 

accuracy of the address was confirmed (albeit incorrectly) upon 

arrival when the officers heard loud arguing coming from that 

precise location and saw two men engaged in an argument 

therein. Based on these facts, it was objectively reasonable for 

the officers to conduct an emergency search of 2314 Jupiter 

Drive, even though it later turned out that the original distress 

1 For these reasons, defendant’s reliance on People v. 

Ormonde (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 282 is misplaced. In that case, 

the officers had no objectively reasonable basis to search the 

defendant’s apartment because they had already arrested the 

defendant for battery outside the apartment and “[n]one of the 

police officers who testified articulated any reason to believe that 

other victims or suspects were involved in the battery, or inside 

the apartment.” (Id. at pp. 291-292). Here, by contrast, at the 

initiation of the search, the officers had yet to confirm the 

whereabouts or identity of any victims or suspects—all of whom 

were likely to be found, if anywhere, in the house from where the 

screaming and arguing came.
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call concerned a location across the street.2 We do not with a

“hindsight determination” upend the officers’ objectively 

reasonable conclusion that an exigency existed at the location 

simply because we subsequently learn of contrary facts unknown 

to the officers at the time they made their decision.3 (See Troyer, 

supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 613; see also Hill v. California (1971) 401 

U.S. 797, 804 [search incident to arrest valid where arresting 

officers had a “reasonable, good faith belief” that the man they 

mistakenly arrested was another man for whom they had 

2 Defendant concedes in his opening brief that the officers’

decision to search was objectively reasonable, stating: “Based on 

the facts which the officers believed to be true, it was not 

unreasonable for them to make the initial entry.” Defendant’s 

contention is that the legality of the search should be evaluated 

in light of information the dispatch operator possessed as to the 

true location for the call, but Troyer, supra, 51 Cal.4th at page 

613, makes clear we must look to what the officers making the 

decision to search knew at the time.

3 People v. Ramirez (1983) 34 Cal.3d 541 (Ramirez), which 

defendant calls “instructive” on this point, is inapposite. In 

Ramirez, the court suppressed evidence from a booking search 

after it was determined that the warrant in the computer system 

providing the basis for the defendant’s arrest had been recalled 

months earlier. Not only does Troyer, supra, 51 Cal.4th at page 

613, instruct that we must look to what the officers knew at the 

time of the search, but it would appear subsequent United States 

Supreme Court precedent has entirely undermined Ramirez’s 

efficacy. (See Herring v. United States (2009) 555 U.S. 135, 146-

148 [holding that exclusionary rule suppression should not apply 

where law enforcement personnel were negligent in failing to 

expunge from their computer system a warrant that led to the 

defendant’s arrest and a search incident thereto].)
15

probable cause and sought to arrest]; People v. Espino (2016) 247 

Cal.App.4th 746, 760 [upholding arrest as lawful where officers 

made “good faith mistake of fact” that a diamond in the 

defendant’s pocket was crack cocaine].)

DISPOSITION

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION 

KIN, J.*

We concur:

TURNER, P. J.

KRIEGLER, J.

* Judge of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, 

appointed by the Chief Justice under article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.