1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) PARICHEHR FARZAM, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 12-35 (RMC) ) JEFFREY SHELL, CHAIRMAN, THE BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS ) ) ) ) Defendant. 1 ) )
MEMORANDUM OPINION This case revolves around assignm ents given (and not) to a tele vision reporter at the Voice of America’s Persia n News Network, an entity under th e Board of Broadcasting Governors. Reporter Parichehr Fa rzam alleges that she was reta liated against for filing complaints that VOA violated the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court earlier transferred tw o counts to the Court of Federa l Claims, Dkt. 99, and the Board now moves for summary judgment on the two remaining counts afte r discovery. Based on undisputed facts, the Court will grant the motion.
I. FACTS None of the following facts is in genuine dispute. Ms. Farzam is a United States citizen who was born and lived i n Iran until she came to the Un ited States at the time of the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Ms . Farzam worked in various capac ities in the Iranian government

1 Mr. Shell, the present Chairma n of the Broadcasting Board of G overnors, is substituted for the original defendant, Walter Isaacson. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). The Court refers to the Defendant as the Board in this opinion.2 before the Revolution, including in the Prime Minister’s office as executive director of Taavon, an official government magazine t hat covered agricultural polic ies. In 2000, she began working as a contract employee in VOA’s Persian Service, a radio broadc ast service, covering the 2000 presidential election. She becam e a full-time employee of VOA in 2001. Defendant Jeffrey Shell is the c hairman of the Broadcasting Boa rd of Governors (the Board), an agency of the Un ited States Government that dis tributes news via radio, television, internet, and other me dia sources to individuals ar ound the world through broadcasters such as Voice of A merica (VOA). VOA now has a Cen tral News Desk that gathers news and disseminates it to VOA’ s approximately 45 different la nguage services. Def. Statement of Material Facts [Dkt. 56] (Def.’s Facts) ¶ 14. The Central News Desk has two (2) White House correspondents who ga ther information and provide i t to the individual language services to translate and use i n its television n ews content as each language service deems appropriate. Id. ¶ 15. In 2004, Ms. Farzam and other employ ees of the Persian Service were detailed to work at Radio Farda, which was pa rt of Radio Free Europe and us ed employees from the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) a nd VOA. During this time, Ms. Farzam and her colleagues continued to be paid by VOA but r eceived directions and day-to- day assignments from Radio Farda. While working at Radio F arda (although based in the Uni ted States), Ms. Farzam served as a radio broadcaster whose re sponsibilities included covering the White House. She therefore qualified for a “hard pass” as a n accredited news representativ e to the White House. Ms. Farzam also held press creden tials from the State Department and Congr ess. Ms. Farzam occasionally traveled with the White House pr ess corps and covered the 2004 presidential election and the 2006 mid-term elections for R adio Farda. In March 2008, she co nducted a radio interview of3 President George W. Bush in the W hite House, with a colleague f rom VOA. In March 2006, while on detail to R adio Farda, Ms. Farzam filed an equal employment opportunity (EEO) compla int against the Board, alleg ing gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civ il Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 20 00e, § 2000e-3(a), retaliation, 2 and unequal pay under the E qual Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206, § 215 (a)(3). The charge was resolved on March 26, 2008 when both pa rties agreed to a settle ment that provided for Ms. Farzam’s promotion to a GS-12 grad e (retroactive to April 2004) ; designated within-grade and quality-step increases through A pril 2007 with a further step i ncrease in 2009; back pay, overtime pay, and any applicable ret irement benefits; and attor ney fees and costs of $ 9,000. Def. Mem., Ex. 78 [Dkt., 59-15] (2008 Settlement Agreement). T he agreement, signed while Ms. Farzam was still on detail t o Radio Farda, was executed for the Board by the Director of the Persian News Network, SheilaGandji, among others. All employees of the Board ended their details to Radio Farda i n 2008 and returned to work at the Persia n News Network (PNN), formerly th e Persian Service. Upon her return to the Persian News Network on July 8, 2008, Ms. Farzam was asked to make the transition from radio broadcaster to television news reporter a s part of her new job duties and responsibilities. She was also a ssigned to the PNN’s flagship news program, “News and Views.” Ms. Farzam complains that she was then “disallowed from continu ing to report from the White House, had repor ting assignments and reports dis allowed and not broadcast, and was subjected to other responsib ility and work product curtailm ents and diminutions . . . in

2 The record does not reveal what Ms. Farzam’s pre-2006 EEO ac tivity might have been. Title VII was amended in 1972 to cover th e federal government, from w hom a plaintiff may seek compensatory damages but not punitive damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)(1); see also Marcus v. Geithner, 813 F. Supp. 2d 11. 21 (D.D.C. 2011); McAlister v. Potter , 733 F. Supp. 2d 134, 146 (D.D.C. 2010).4 retaliation for her prosecu tion of her 2006 [Title VII and Equa l Pay Act] complaint.” Pl. Opp’n to Def. Mot. Summ. J. [Dkt. 59] ( Opp’n) at 3. Specifically, sh e alleges the following series of retaliatory acts:

 After the Settlement Agreement , the Board “engaged in additiona l acts of retaliation.” A m. Compl. ¶ 10;

 After July 2008 and “up until several months ago,” Ms. Farzam’s “efforts to initiate work projects and undert ake correspondin g activities . . . were in numerous instances resisted. S he was limited in large part to doing translations and preparing the contents of pack ages for television” or given no assignments at all. Id. ¶ 11;

 After her return to VIOA in J uly 2008, Ms. Farzam was not allow ed to travel to cover domestic or international conferences, including G-8 and G-20 conferences, although less experienced collea gues were allowed to cover some of those meetings. Id. ¶ 12;

 After her return to VOA in Jul y 2008, Ms. Farzam was not provid ed necessary audio equipment to record interviews. Id. ¶ 13;

 “[U]p until several months ago,” t he Persian News Network “fail ed to broadcast reports Plaintiff prepared,” inc luding stories on President-Ele ct Obama’s visit to President Bush just before t he inauguration on January 20, 2009 and a report on a news conference held by the F irst Lady Michelle Obama. Id. ¶ 14;

 In November 2008, the Persian News Network created a special te am for covering inauguration events (in Janua ry 2009) but failed to include Ms. Farzam despite her experience. Id. ¶ 15;

 The Persian News Network failed to renew Ms. Farzam’s credentia ls for press coverage of the White House, State Department, or Congress, as those credentials expired in February 2009, Mar ch 2009, and April 2009, respectiv ely. Id. ¶ 16;

 On August 26, 2010, the Persian New s Network did not approve Ms . Farzam’s request to cover Congressman Chris Van Hollen at the National P ress Club and the Persian News Network fa iled to respond tim ely to her reques t to cover a Q&A news conference by Senators J ohn Cornyn and Robert Menendez to be held on September 30, 2010, so that she was unable to do so. Id. ¶ 17;

 On November 3, 2010, Ms. Farzam was r equired to attend a refres her course in journalism and preparing pack aging, along with many new employe es, although she had been doing these tasks for many years at VOA. Id. ¶ 18;5  On November 16, 2010, Ms. Farzam informed her supervisor that s he had independently attended the awar d ceremony of a National Medal b y President Barack Obama and prepared a re port, with exclusive photos, but her supervisor refused to use her report and assigned it to another employee w ho had not attended the ceremony. Id. ¶ 19;

 The Persian News Network changed Ms. Farzam’s status in January 2011 from essential to non-esse ntial employee without prior notice. She alleges that “[n]onessential employees can be subj ected to reductions in force mor e easily than essential employees.” Id. ¶ 20. Ms. Farzam contacted an EEO counsel or about alleged retaliationon August 18, 2010 and filed a formal complaint on Nove mber 19, 2010. Opp’n at 3. The instant lawsuit was f iled on January 10, 2012; Ms. Farzam f iled an Amended Complaint on February 7, 2012 before an Answer was filed. The Amended Complai nt originally asserted four separate counts: (1) retaliation in violation of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); (2) retaliation in viola tion of Title VII of the Civi l Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e[]; (3) breach of the 2008 Settle ment Agreement; and (4) u nequal pay in violation of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2069(d). On November 21, 2012, pursuant to United States v. Tohono O’Odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723, 1727 (2011), this Court transferred Counts III and IV of the Amended Complaint to the U.S. Court of F ederal Claims and retained onlyCounts I and II. See Farzam v.
Isaacson , 905 F. Supp. 2d 95 (D.D.C. 2012). Importantly, Counts I and II no longer include Ms. Farzam’s claim that the Board’s alleged breach of the Settlemen t Agreement was itself a retaliatory act. See id. at 97 (“Due to this transfer, this Court will not consider fact s concerning the breach of the settlement a greement as a basis for retaliati on because such facts are based on ‘substantially the same operative facts’ as the breach-of-contr act claim.”) (quoting Tohono
O’Odham Nation , 131 S. Ct. at 1731). The remaini ng allegations of retaliatio n are therefore only those alleged in paragraphs 10- 20 of the Amended Complaint, spe cified above. Because6 paragraph 10 of the Amended Compl aint merely presents a general ized accusation of “additional acts of retaliation,” however , the focus properly belongs on paragraphs 11-20, analyzed below. The Board moved for summar y judgment on July 18, 2014 which Ms. Farzam opposes. After full discovery a nd briefing, the matter is ripe for decision.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Summary Judgment Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine disput e as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Ci v. P. 56(a); accord Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). Moreover, s ummary judgment is prop erly granted against a party who “afte r adequate time for discovery and upon motion . . . fails to make a showing sufficient to establi sh the existence of an element e ssential to that party = s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summar y judgment, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255. A nonmoving party, however, must establish more tha n “the mere existence of a scin tilla of evidence” in support of its position. Id. at 252. In addition, the nonmovi ng party may not rely solely on allegations or conclusory statements. Greene v. Dalton , 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is appropriate if the ev idence “is merely colorable, o r is not significantly probative,”
Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted), or if the non-movant fails to offer “evidence on which the jury could reasonably f ind for the [non-movant].” Id. at 252. District courts use “special caution” when considering summary judgment in7 employment discrimination or ret aliation actions due to “the po tential difficulty for a plaintiff . . . to uncover clear proof of discrimi natory or retaliatory intent. ” Nurriddin v. Bolden , 40 F. Supp. 3d 104, 115 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation omitted). “Nevertheless, t he plaintiff is not relieved of h[er] obligation to support h[er] allega tions with competent evidence .” Id . “As in any context, where the plaintiff will bear the bur den of proof at trial on a dispo sitive issue, at the summary judgment stage, he bears the burden of pr oduction to designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute re quiring trial.” Mason v. Geithner , 811 F. Supp. 2d 128, 175 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Ricci v. DeStefano , 557 U.S. 557, 585 (2009)).
B. Retaliation Under Title VII Title VII protects federal employees from retaliation for hav ing asserted their rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). To prove unlawful retaliation under T itle VII, an employee must establish three elements: (1) that she made a charge or op posed a practice made unlawful by Title VII; (2) that the employer took a materially adverse a ction against her; and (3) that the employer took the action because of her protected conduct. Allen v. Johnson , 795 F.3d 34, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing McGrath v. Clinton , 666 F.3d 1377, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). The second two elements differ from their discrimination c ounterparts in i mportant respects. Retaliatory conduct need not reac h the same level of adversity as discriminatory conduct. See generally Mogenhan v. Napolitano , 613 F.3d 1162, 1165-66 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White , 548 U.S. 53, 60-61, 67-68 (2006)). In other words, “Title VII’s substa ntive [discrimination] provisio n and its anti-reta liation provision are not coterminous” because the “ scope of the anti-retaliation provision extends beyond workplace-related or employment -related retaliat ory acts and ha rm.” Steele v. Schafer , 535 F.3d 689, 695 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Burlington N. , 548 U.S. at 67). So instead of “affecting the8 terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” as discriminat ion must, retaliatory conduct need only “dissuade[] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Mogenhan , 613 F.3d at 1166 (quoting Burlington N. , 548 U.S. at 68). Nonetheless, this material adversity requires “more than ‘ those petty slights or minor ann oyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience.’” Bridgeforth v. Jewell , 721 F.3d 661, 663 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Burlington N. , 548 U.S. at 68). Retaliation also differs from di scrimination in its causation: retaliation claims must be proved according to tradi tional principles of but-for c ausation. Univ. of Tex. SW Med.
Ctr. v. Nassar , 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013) (“[A] plaintiff making a retaliation claim under § 2000e-3(a) must establish that his or her protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.”). Thus, there is no “mixed motive” retaliation. Cf. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. , 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015) (contrasting Nassar ’s but-for standard in the retaliation contex t with the more “relaxe[d]” s tandard in Title VII’s mixed-motive discrimination provision, 42 U.S .C. § 2000e-2(m)). However, bu t-for causation does not mean that retaliation must be the only cause of the employer’s action—merely that the adverse action would not have occurred absent the retaliatory motive. Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC , 737 F.3d 834, 846 & n.5 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Fowler V. Harper et al., 4 Harper, James and Gray
on Torts § 20.2, at 100–101 (3d ed.2007) (coll ecting cases); W. Page Ke eton et al., Prosser and
Keeton on Torts § 41, at 264–66 (5th ed.1984)); accord Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc. , 758 F.3d 819, 828 n.1 (7th Cir. 2014). Finally, retaliation claims ba sed only on circumstantial eviden ce are subject to the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See Allen , 795 F.3d at 39. The McDonnell Douglas framework proceeds as follows.9 The plaintiff must first make aprima facie case (1) that she i s a member of a protected class; (2) that she suffered materially adve rse action; and (3) that the u nfavorable action gives rise to an inference of retaliation. Youssef v. F.B.I. , 687 F.3d 397, 401-02 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Stella v.
Mineta , 284 F.3d 135, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Brown v. Brody , 199 F.3d 446, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The burden then shifts to t he defendant, which must “ar ticulate some legitimate, non[retaliatory] reason” for its action. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). If it does, then the pl aintiff must show by a prep onderance of the evidence that the reasons advanced by the employer were merely a pretext to hide retaliation. Id. 3 On a motion for summary judgment, once an employer articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action(s), the plaintiff’s pr ima facie case is only relevant in the

3 The D.C. Circuit has recently expounded upon the “multiple way s in which circumstantial evidence may support an inference that an employer’s stated rea son for a challenged employment action was not the a ctual reason,” an d that the real reason was prohibited discrimination or retaliation: The temporal proximity of an adverse action close on the heels of protected activity is a common and highly probative type of circumstantial evidence of retaliation. See Hamilton [ v. Geithner ], 666 F.3d [1344,] 1357-59 [(D.C. Cir. 2012)]. Other common ways of proving invidious motive—whether retaliation or discrimination—include pointing to evidence that the employer treated other, similarly situated employees better; that the em ployer is “lying about the underlying f acts” of its decision; that the re were “changes and inconsistencies” i n the employer's given reasons f or the decision; that the employer failed to “follow established procedures or criteria”; or that the employer's “general treatm ent of minority employees” (or, in the retaliation context, employees who asserted their Title VII rights) was worse than its treatment o f nonminorities (or employees who did not assert their Title VII rig hts). Brady [ v. Office of Sergeant at Arms ], 520 F.3d [490,] 495 & n. 3 [(D.C. Cir. 2008)]. Invidious motive may also be inferred from “‘an error too obvious to be unintentional.’” Grosdidier v. Broad. Bd. of Governors , 709 F.3d 19, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Fischbach v. D.C. Dep't of Corr. , 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Allen v. Johnson , 795 F.3d 34, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2015).10 context of the evidence as a whole. Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms , 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008). “[I]n consideri ng an employer’s motion for s ummary judgment or judgment as a matter of law in those circumst ances, the district court mustresolve one central question: Has the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable juryto find that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason an d that the employer intentionally discriminated against the empl oyee on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or na tional origin?”
Id. (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502, 507-08, 511 (1993); U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens , 460 U.S. 711, 714-16 (1983)).
C. Retaliation Under the Equal Pay Act The EPA itself does not prohibi t retaliation aga inst employee s for filing claims. However, Section 15(a)(3) of the F air Labor Standards Act (FLSA ) makes it unlawful “to discharge or in any other manner di scriminate against any emplo yee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter.” See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). That chapt er, as amended, includes the EPA’s prohibition on gender-based wage discrimina tion. An EPA claimant who suffe rs retaliation may therefore seek relief under the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provisions. Courts essentially equate the e lements of retaliation under t he FLSA with those under Title VII. Benton v. Laborers’ Joint Training Fund , No. 14-cv-1073, 2015 WL 4736028, at *8 n.9 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 2015) (“Because the elements of a pr ima facie case of retaliation are essentially identical under t he FLSA and Title VII, . . . Title VII case law is ins tructive here.”) (quoting Cooke v. Rosenker , 601 F. Supp. 2d 64, 73 (D.D.C. 2009)). To establish a retali ation claim under the FLSA, “a plainti ff is required to show that[:] (1) he made an FLSA complaint or otherwise engaged in protected c onduct; (2) the defendant was a ware that he had engaged in11 protected activity; (3) the de fendant took an action that was m aterially adverse to the complainant and sufficient to di ssuade a reasonable employee fr om further protected activity; and that (4) there wa s a causal relationshi p between the two.” Del Villar v. Flynn Architectural Finishes, Inc. , 893 F. Supp. 2d 201, 213 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Caryk v. Coupe , 663 F. Supp. 1243, 1253 (D.D.C. 1987)). Absent direct evidence, retal iation claims under FLSA are subject to the burdenshifting framework of McDonnell Douglas , as described above. Wood v. SatCom Mktg., LLC , 705 F.3d 823, 828 (8th Cir. 2013).
G. Administrative Exhaustion: the EEO Process and Timeliness Federal employees must exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit under Title VII. Koch v. Walter , 935 F. Supp. 2d 164, 169 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing 29 U.S.C § 633a(b)-(d); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c); Payne v. Salazar , 619 F.3d 56, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). The same process applies to claims brought under Title VII, the ADE A, and the Equal Pay Act. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.103(a). Although the process applies to all three stat utes, however, there is no administrative-exhaustion require ment for allegations of retali ation under the Equal Pay Act. Such claims may be brought in fed eral court under Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), anytime within two years of the alleged violation (or w ithin three years if the violation was willful). Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407 with id. § 1614.408. The process required by Title VII begins when a federal employe e contacts an EEO counselor, which must be done within 45 days of a discrete act that is allegedly retaliatory.
Id. § 1614.105(a)(1); see also Woodruff v. Peters , 482 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2007). If the matter is not resolved through counseling, the employee must ti mely file an administrative complaint with the age ncy. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106(a)-(c). Afterthe agency has the opportunity to12 investigate the matter, the com plainant may demand either an im mediate final decision from the agency or a hearing before an EEOC administrative judge. Id. §§ 1614.106(e)(2), 1614.108(f). A complainant may file a civil action within 90 days of receipt of the final decision from the agency or at any time after a complaint has been pending for at least 180 days. Id. § 1614.407. The administrative filing requi rement applicable to federal emp loyees “essentially functions as a statute of limita tions for Title VII actions.” Carter v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit
Auth. , 503 F.3d 143, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Because untimely exhaust ion of administrative remedies is an affirmative defe nse, a defendant bears the burde n of proof. Bowden v. United
States , 106 F.3d 433, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing Brown v. Marsh , 777 F.2d 8, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). “Filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEO C is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal c ourt, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. , 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). The exhaustion require ment “should never be allowe d to become so formidable a demand that it obscures the clear congressional purpose of root ing out every vestige of employment discrimination withi n the federal government.” Brown , 777 F.2d at 14 (quotation marks and alterations omitted). Thus, the requirement that a f ederal employee contact an EEO counselor within 45 days of a disc riminatory act can be equitab ly tolled. Steele v. Schafer , 535 F.3d 689, 693 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing Stewart v. Ashcroft , 352 F.3d 422, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). 4

4 Equitable tolling under Title VII f or federal employees functi ons as it does for employees in the private sector. See Gantt v. Mabus , 857 F. Supp. 2d 120, 128 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Zipes , 455 U.S. at 393-94); Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs , 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990)). The invoking litigant bears the burden of est ablishing two elements: (1) tha t she has been pursuing her rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in her way. Gantt , 857 F. Supp. 2d at 128 (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo , 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). Tolling i s to be “exercised only in extraordinary and carefu lly circumscribed instances.” Mondy v. Sec’y of the Army , 845 F.2d 1051, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1988).13 Administrative exhaustion applies differently to “continuing” violations than to “discrete” violations. See generally Nat’l R.R. Corp. v. Morgan , 536 U.S. 101 (2002). Under the continuing-violation doctrine articulated in Morgan , “if the alleged acts constitute one similar pattern or practice and at leas t one illegal act took place wit hin the filing period, then the complaint of discrimination is not time-barred and acts outside the statutory period may be considered for purposes of liability.” Mayers v. Laborers’ Health & Safety Fund of N. Am. , 478 F.3d 364, 368 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Singletary v. Dist. of Columbia, 351 F.3d 519, 526 (D.C. Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). T he legal principle is subject to “two crucial limiting principles.” Mayers , 478 F.3d at 368. First, it does notapply to “[d]iscrete act s such as termination, failure t o promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire” because “[e]ach incident of discrimination and eac h retaliatory adverse employm ent action constitutes a separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice.’” Id. (quoting Morgan , 536 U.S. at 114). Second, the plaintiff alleging a conti nuing violation must “must allege that at least one ‘act contributing to the claim occur[red] w ithin the filing period.’” Mayers , 478 F.3d at 368 (quoting Morgan , 536 U.S. at 117).
III. ANALYSIS The alleged retaliatory acts are recited above and are found inparagraphs 11-20 of the Amended Complaint. The B oard argues that all of Ms. Far zam’s allegations should be dismissed, because they are untimely or because they fail as a matter of law. In support of the latter, the Board argues that Ms. Farzam has failed to demonstr ate (1) a materially adverse employment action; or (2) a cau sal connection between her prior EEO activity and the alleged retaliation (insofar a s none of the alleged retaliators knew of her prior protected activity).
A. Preliminary Matters14 The Court first addresses Ms. F arzam’s objection to the declara tion of Steven Springer, submitted by the Board. Mr. Springer was not identif ied by the Board in its Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures, as some one “likely to have discoverable i nformation . . . that [the Board] may use to support its claims or de fenses.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (a)(1)(A)(i). The Board concedes as much, but rejoins that Mr. Spr inger “did not provide testimo ny regarding the factual allegations underlying Plaintiff’s Complaint.” Pl. Reply [Dkt. 60] (Reply) at 15. Because the Rule plainly encompasses information that may be used to suppor t any defenses , that argument fails. And because Mr. Springer’s name was never disclosed to Ms. Farzam, she did not seek to depose him. It would prejudice Ms. Farzam to admit such testim ony at this juncture, and the Court will therefore disregard t he Springer Declaration, Def. M em., Ex. 4 [Dkt. 56-4]. Witnesses other than Mr. Spri nger uniformly testified, however, that editors had discretion over which stories t o approve and which reporters to assign at Persian News Network and Ms. Farzam does not disagree or offer contradicting evidenc e. Sheila Gandji, a Director of the PNN, testified that “stori es are pitched and they are vette d by the editorial group.” Dep. of Sheila Gandji, Mot., Ex. 1 [Dkt . 56-1] (Gandji Dep.) Tr. at 153 :4-153:15. Maja Drucker, another Director of PNN, affirmed that “a n editor has the last word as to what will be part or not be a part of any given program.” Dep. of Maja Drucker, Mot., Ex. 6 [Dkt. 56-6] (Drucker Dep.) Tr. at 25:8-26:1. In addition, Seyed Ali Sa jjadi, a Senior Managing E ditor of “News and Views,” stated that the edito r “is responsible for everything [that] go es on air,” and also “is in charge of using the resources in the best possible way.” Dep. of Seyed A li Saijadi, Mot., Ex. 10 [Dkt. 56- 10] (Saijadi Dep.) Tr. at 112: 5-112:11. Further, Joy Wagner te stified that this is “[t]he way it works in every newsroom that I’ve ever worked in.” Dep. of Joy Wagner, Mot., Ex. 2 [Dkt. 56- 2] (Wagner Dep.) Tr. at 152:14-153:4.15 Second, the Court will dismiss tw o bases for retaliation, alleg ed in the Amended Complaint but since withdrawn. Ms. Farzam now concedes that “t he requirement that Plaintiff undergo training in November[] 2010” was not a retaliatory act. See Opp’n at 49; Am. Compl. ¶ 18. She also admits that the “fa ilure to select Plaintiff for a GS-13 Broadcaster position for which she applied in September 2009” does not present a timely cause of action because it was not administratively exhausted. See Opp’n at 49; Am. Compl. ¶ 22. T hese allegations will be dismissed. Third, Ms. Farzam did not respond to the Board’s arguments as t o other allegations, thereby waiving them. Texas v. United States , 798 F.3d 1108, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Local Civil Rule 7(b); Wannall v. Honeywell, Inc. , 775 F.3d 425, 428 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). The Court will dismiss, therefore, the allegation that the Pers ian News Network retaliated against Ms. Farzam when it failed to broad cast her “report on a news co nference held by First Lady Michelle Obama,” Am. Compl. ¶ 14. Finally, the parties seem to have strayed outside the pleadings . There are references by both sides to allegat ions that are not made in th e Amended Complaint. Only those claims in the Amended Complai nt are before the Court. Jo v. Dist. of Columbia , 582 F. Supp. 2d 51, 64 (D.D.C. 2008) (“It is well-esta blished in this district that a plaintiff cannot amend his Complaint in an opposition to a defe ndant's motion for summary judgment.”); Sharp v. Rosa Mexicano, D.C., L.L.C., 496 F.Supp.2d 93, 97 n. 3 (D.D.C. 2007) (st ating that plaintif f may not, “through summary judgment brie fs, raise [ ] new claims . . . be cause [the] plaintiff did not raise them in his complaint”); accord Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald and Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that clai ms raised for the first time in an opposition to a motion for summary judgment are not properly before the court). In this c ase, Counts I and II expressly16 confine themselves to paragra phs 7-20 of the Amended Complaint; hence, no other allegations will be addressed. 5
B. Administrative Exhaustion The Board argues first that ma ny of Ms. Farzam’s claims were no t exhausted in the pre-suit administrative process. 6 As noted above, the administrativ e process applies only to reta liation claims under Title VII. The Board’s motion must be denied, therefore, to th e extent it seeks to dismiss claims of retaliation under the Equal Pay Act (Count I). Those claims may be brought under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) within two years of the vi olation, or within three yea rs if the violation was willful, regardless of whether the EEO process was pursued. See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.408. The Board makes no statute-of-limitations argument a s to the Equal Pay Act retaliation claims. “Federal employees must exhaust their administrative remedies b efore filing suit” under Title VII. Mills v. Winter , 540 F. Supp. 2d 178, 184-85 (D.D.C. 2008). “Dismissal is required when a plaintiff fails to e xhaust [her] administrative remedies with respect to particular claims.” Ndondji v. InterPark, Inc. , 768 F. Supp. 2d 264, 276-77 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Rann v.

5 Paragraphs 7-9 merely recount Ms. Farzam’s prior EEO activity, and do not allege any retaliatory acts on the Board’s part. Those acts are alleged i n ¶¶ 10-20. 6 Specifically, the Board moves to dismiss the following allegat ions: (1) that “ on approximately July 7, 2008, and up until several m onths ago, Plaintiff’s effo rts to initiate w ork projects . . . were in numerous instances resisted” ( Am. Compl. ¶ 11); (2) that “on approximately July 7, 2008, she was not allowed to travel to c over domestic conferences . . .” ( Id. ¶ 12); (3) that “on approximately July 7, 2008, she w as not provided audio equipmen t needed to do interviews” ( Id. ¶ 13); (4) that “on approximately July 7, 2008, and up until se veral months ago, BBG failed to broadcast reports Plaintiff prepared . . .” ( Id. ¶ 14); (5) that “[i]n a pproximately November of 2008, PNN created a special commi ttee for covering inaugurationissues but did not even appoint Ms. Farzam as a committee member . . . ” ( Id. ¶ 15); and (6) that P NN did not renew her press credentials to cover th e White House, State Department, and Con gress in February 2009, March 2009, and April 2009, respectively. ( Id. ¶ 16).17 Chao , 346 F.3d 192, 194-95 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). In this case, Ms. Fa rzam first contacted an EEO counselor on August 18, 2010. Many of t he alleged retaliatory acts, by their own terms, occurred in 2008 and 2009—one or two years before her initial EEO contac t. See generally Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7-16. A federal employee complaining of discrimination must contact a n EEO counselor within 45 days of the date of the a lleged retaliatory action. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106(a)-(c); Mills , 540 F. Supp. 2d at 184-85. Ms. Farzam makes no argument that VOA failed to notify its employees of these requirements.
1. Waiver Ms. Farzam asks the Court to ignore the Board’s argument that s he failed to exhaust her administrative remedies because it waived the argum ent when it accepted and investigated her claims. Contrary to her argument, it is w ell established that “agencies do not waive a defense of untimely exhaustion merely by accepting and investig ating a discrimination complaint.” Bowden v. United States , 106 F.3d 433, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing Brown v.
Marsh , 777 F.2d 8, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). Ms. Farzam maintains that the Board did much more than “merely” accept and investig ate her case, urging that “the administrative process went forward.” Opp’n at 8. And indeed i t did, for more than a year , until at last it was scheduled for a hearing before an EEOC Admini strative Judge in November 2011 at the EEOC’s office in San Antonio, Texas. Id. at 9. “Finding that transfer unacceptable,” id. , Ms. Farzam abandoned the administrative process. Thus, i f the Board failed to issue a f inal decision—either accepting or rejecting the AJ’s opinion—the adm inistrative process was prete rmitted because of Ms. Farzam’s voluntary action. Waiver is an equitable defense, Rann v. Chao , 346 F.3d 192, 195 (D.C. Cir. 2003), and Ms. Farzam has provide d no basis to find that the eq uities favor her.18 2. Exhaustion The law is clear that a federa l employee must contact an EEO Co unselor within 45 days of a discriminatory act or she could lose the legal rig ht to complain. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.105(a)(1), 1614.106(a)-(c). Congr ess adopted this timelin e in order to ensure that federal agencies have very quick notice of EEO complaints, so that theymight be timely investigated and, if meritorious, resol ved without litigation. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. , 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982); Bowdre v. Richardson , 131 F. Supp. 2d 179, 186 (D.D.C. 2001). Ms. Farzam does not dispute these strictures but advances two arguments co ncerning events that happened before July 3, 2010. 7 First, she argues that she was a victim of a continuing viola tion and that her seemingly late allegations were actually timely. Second, s he contends that she can nonetheless offer evidence concerning untimely allegations to s upport her timely claims of retaliation. Ms. Farzam grounds both arguments in National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan , 536 U.S. 101 (2002). In Morgan, the Supreme Court differentiated between “continuing violations” a nd “serial violations.” Id. at 114. As relevant here, the Supreme Court directly instructed that when di scriminatory or retaliatory act s are discrete , they must be the subject of separate complaints—e ven if the complained-of acts a re related. In other words, “[e]ach discrete discriminatory a ct starts a new clock for fili ng charges alleging that act.” Id. at 113. Thus, discrete acts that Ms. F arzam alleges were retaliat ory, but that occurred before July 3, 2010, are no longer subject to suit. The Court concludes that all of the acts of r etaliation alleg ed by Ms. Farzam that pre-date July 2010 were of a discre te nature and are not action able—with one exception,

7 This is 45 days prior to August 18, 2010, omitting July 4 (a f ederal holiday).19 addressed below. For example , the denial of permission to cove r certain news conferences, Am. Compl. ¶ 12, was a discrete and identifiable event. So, too, w as the denial of audio equipment “on approximately July 7, 2008.” Id. ¶ 13. Each of the reports that the Board “failed to broadcast,” id. ¶ 14, was denied at a discrete time—indeed, many of them are in dividually named in the Amended Complaint. Similarly, excluding Ms. Farzam from a specific committee, id. ¶ 15, and denying her press credenti als on specific dates, id. ¶ 16, were all discre te in nature. None of these alleged acts can said to be “continuing.” Ms. Farzam’s argument to the contrary evidences a misreading of Morgan . She argues that the term “discrete acts” only countenances “those w hich altered (or maintained) an employee’s fundamental employment status.” Opp’n at 5. As the Board points out, Ms. Farzam cites no support for this propos ition. And contrary to Ms. Far zam’s argument, Morgan merely gave examples of certain discrete acts that “are easy to identi fy,” such as termination and failure to promote. 536 U.S. at 114. That list was not exclusive, nor did it illustrate any unifying theme among discrete acts. The full sentence from Morgan reads: “Discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of tra nsfer, or refusal to hire are easy to identify.” Morgan , 536 U.S. at 114. At most, Morgan might be read to limit “discrete ac ts” to those that are “easy to identify.”
Id. But it leaves the door open to o ther discrete a cts that can t rigger the 45-day period. Ms. Farzam’s reliance on Mayers v. Laborers’ Health & Safety Fund is similarly misplaced. See Opp’n at 4-5 (citing 478 F .3d 364 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). In Mayers , the D.C. Circuit affirmed that Morgan limits a plaintiff’s invocati on of the continuing-violation do ctrine to “claims that by their nature o ccur not ‘on any particular day’ but ‘over a series of days or perhaps years.’” Mayers , 478 F.3d at 368 (quoting Morgan , 536 U.S. at 115). 8 Each of the discrete acts

8 It is not enough, as Ms. Farzam a rgues, that the alleged actio ns “are all in the nature of reducing20 relied on by Ms. Farzam, listed above, “occurred on the day tha t it happened.” Morgan , 536 U.S. at 110. Indeed, some of those dates are precisely identif ied in the Amended Complaint. None of the alleged acts can be s aid only to have “occurred” ov er a course of time. One alleged violation, however, i s not discrete in nature: the allegation that the Board engaged in a general refusa l to give Ms. Farzam assignmen ts or to let her pursue her desired stories. Am Compl. ¶ 11. None of those refusals may have, on its own, been a discrete retaliatory act—especially in l ight of the unrebutted evidence that editors exercised broad discretion in assigning stories to various reporters. But take n together, the repeated denial of work to a single reporter may ha ve constituted a “continuing vi olation” within the meaning of Morgan and Mayers

. In light of these repeated denial s, the question becomes “when a reasonable person would have been on notice that [her] employer engaged inacts of retaliation.” Farzam , 905 F. Supp. 2d at 98; see also Faison v. District of Columbia , 664 F. Supp. 2d 59, 66 (D.D.C. 2009) (“[A] plaintiff may not rel y on the continuing violation theory where she was aware of the discriminatory conduct at the time it occurred.”) (quoting Schrader v. Tomlinson , 311 F. Supp. 2d 21, 27 (D.D.C. 2004)). 9

or diminishing Plaintiff’s work responsibilities or work produc ts or the use of such work products.” Opp’n at 6. The common effect of the acts does not b ear on whether they were discrete. See Morgan , 536 U.S. at 113 (“[D]iscrete disc riminatory acts are not acti onable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges .”) (emphasis added).
9 See Vazquez-Rivera v. Figueroa , 759 F.3d 44, 51 (1st Cir. 2014) (“T he continuing violation doctrine is an equitable doctrine [applicable] where the discri mination is ongoing and filing is delayed ‘because the claimant needed to experience a pattern of repeated acts before she could be expected to realize that the i ndividual acts were discrimina tory in nature.’” (quoting Loubriel v. Fondo del Seguro del Estado , 694 F.3d 139, 144 (1st Cir. 2012)); Hawkins v. Hamlet, Ltd. , 296 F. App’x 918, 920 (11th Cir. 2008) ( “The continuing violati on doctrine is based on ‘the equitable notion that the stat ute of limitations ought not to b egin to run until facts supportive of the cause of action are or s hould be apparent to a reasonably p rudent person similarly situated.’” (quoting Hipp v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1222 (11th Cir. 2001)).21 On the uncontested facts, the Cour t has little doubt that a rea sonable employee would have realized the possibili ty of retaliation before July 3, 2010. 10 To this point, Ms. Farzam herself alleges that the “ First Act of Retaliation” was the Board’s failure to live up to its 2008 settlement agreement. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7-9. 11 The allegedly retaliatory breaches occurred “soon []after” the settlement ’s effective date of March 26, 200 8, and again “in July and August
2008.” Id. ¶ 7. Many “Acts of Retaliation” a lleged in the Amended Complai nt began “on approximately July 7, 2008.” Id. ¶¶ 11-14, 16. Without doubt, the Amended Complaint alleges that some of these acts continued “up until several months ago. ” Id. But the question is whether Ms. Farzam should reasonably have r ecognized that she was the t arget of illegal retaliation before then. Ms. Farzam previously alleged ret aliation, among other claims, and reached a settlement agreement. In this 2010 lawsuit, she alleges that the settlement agreement was immediately violated by VOA in 200 8 for retaliatory purposes, a nd almost immediately followed by further, allegedly retaliator y acts. A reasonable employee, most particularly one who had previously alleged retaliation a nd knew the concepts, would hav e recognized her potential claim before July 3, 2010. The Court concludes that Ms. F arzam should have acted sometime in the two
years between the date on which she alle ges retaliatory acts began an d her complaint to an EEO counselor. 12 On this record, although the rep eated denial of assignments c ould be construed as a

10 Ms. Farzam concedes that “a reasonable employee might come to believe at a time earlier than July 4, 2010 . . . that preceding act s were in retaliation for her EEO activitie s.” Opp’n at 7.
11 Although the merits of this al legation will be decided by the Court of Federal Claims, as an allegation in the Amended Complai nt, it remains probative of Ms . Farzam’s awareness of possible re taliation.

12 The ‘subsequent’ retalia tion allegedly began on July 7, 2008. Ms. Farzam complained to the EEO Counselor on August 18, 2010. Am. Compl. ¶ 41.22 continuing violation, Ms. Farzam cannot rely on that theory whe n she knew (or should have known) and acted on the alleged retaliation. Faison , 664 F. Supp. 2d at 66; Schrader , 311 F. Supp. 2d at 27. The Court will grant the Board’s motion for summary judgment on all Title VII claims that were not timel y brought to an EEO counselor. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11-16. The Court previously refrained from maki ng this ruling “on the current re cord,” not least because “Ms. Farzam [was] entitled to reso lution of all doubts in her favor. ” Farzam , 905 F. Supp. 2d at 98 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The record is now fully developed and there is no genuine di spute of material fact to p resent to a jury. Nonetheless, Ms. Farzam correct ly argues that the facts underly ing her untimely allegations could “constitute rel evant background evidence in a proceeding in which the status of a current practice is at issue.” Morgan , 536 U.S. at 113 (quoting United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans , 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977)). Because the remainder of her claims also fail, however, the point becomes moot. C. Summary Judgment as a Matter of Law In addition to its administrativ e-exhaustion arguments, VOA see ks summary judgment for allegations as to w hich material facts are not in dispute. The Court will address each of the allegations supporti ng Counts I and II in turn. 13
1. Reduced Responsibilities (Am. Compl. ¶ 11) The Amended Complaint alleges tha t Ms. Farzam’s efforts to “ini tiate work projects and undertake correspond ing activities” were rebuffed, and that she was limited to

13 As noted above, ¶ 10 of the Amended Complaint alleges merely p resents a generalized accusation of “additional acts of retaliation,” and will not be addressed.23 translations and the preparati on of packages for television fol lowing her return from Radio Farda in July 2008 and thereafter. See, e.g. , Am. Compl. ¶ 11. She claims that this limited work represented a connected series of retaliatory a ctions in respon se to her EEO complaint and settlement. See id. ¶ 11. Neither the Amended Compl aint nor her Opposition to VOA ’s motion for summary judgment provides re cord facts to support these gen eralized claims. General statements in opposition are insu fficient at the stage of summa ry judgment. Coleman v. Johnson , 19 F. Supp. 3d 126, 133 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[ T]he non-moving party’ s opposition must consist of more than mere unsupported allega tions or denials and must be s upported by affidavits, declarations or other competent evidence, setting forth specifi c facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”) ( citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). The general allegations in paragraph 11 will therefore be dismi ssed. What is more, multiple deponents’ sworn testimony—not contested by Ms. Farzam—describes a fluid assignmen t process at VOA, consistent with other 21st-century

newsrooms. 14 Both former directors of the P ersian News Netw ork testified t hat editors would routinely deny reporters’ request s to cover specific events. See Belida Dep. Tr. at 128:8-11; Drucker Dep. Tr. at 25:8-26:1. The Senior Managing Editor of “ News and Views,” to which Ms. Farzam was assigned in July 2008, t estified that “if everybody wants to assign himself or herself to do what they want, it doesn’t work. That’s anarchy.” Sajja di Dep. Tr. at 112:5-112:11. This testimony is uncontested. The Court finds that VOA’s change to a television format and need for coordinated reporting assignmen ts suffice as a “legitimate nonr etaliatory reason” for Ms.

14 Ms. Farzam argues that the Board ’s description of the “typical newsroom process” is “conclusory.” Opp’n at 39. Her a rgument overlooks the admissi ble, firsthand testimony from numerous witnesses whose tes timony supports the Board’s proposi tion—none of which (except the Springer declaration) is challenged by Ms. Farzam.24 Farzam’s changed or redu ced responsibilities. Under McDonnel Douglas , Ms. Farzam must show that VOA’s legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons are reall y pretexts for retaliation. Burdine , 450 U.S. at 253; Hairston v. Vance-Cooks , 773 F.3d 266, 275 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Her pretext argument fal ls short. She contends that she received no assi gnments on certain days. Mr. Sajjadi testified that “the news room nature” was such that “[ t]hat might happen to anybody,” an d that Ms. Farzam was not alone in that regard. Sajjadi Dep. Tr. at 105. Ms. Farzam off ers no contrary admissible evidence to contradict Mr. Sajjadi’s swo rn testimony. Instead, she call s it “rank speculation and circular and conclusory reasoning,” Opp’ n at 40. Mr. Sajjadi, a senior managing editor on “News and Views,” testified from firsth and knowledge; Ms. Farzam offers n o facts to dispute his testimony. Argument from her c ounsel does not suffice. Summary judgment on the allegat ions in paragraph 11 would there fore be entered in favor of the Board even if the claims wer e timely brought.
2. Denial of Permission to Atte nd Conferences (Am. Compl. ¶ 12) Two specific incidents of retal iation are alleged by Ms. Farzamin this paragraph: the failure of Persian News Netw ork to send her to the G-8 econ omic conference in Italy in June 2009 and to the G-20 economic conf erence in Pittsburgh in Septe mber 2009. Am. Compl. ¶ 12. Ms. Farzam did not complain about these non-assignments until m ore than a year after the fact, making her allegations stale, w ell beyond the 45-day period in which she should have contacted an EEO counselor (presuming that she might only suspect retalia tion at the second denial), and therefore untimely. Ms. Farzam does not explain why he r non-assignment to either co nference constituted a material adversi ty. Material adversity supportin g a claim of retaliation is meant “to separate significant from trivial harms.” Burlington Northern , 548 U.S. at 68. The challenged25 act must be of the sort that “we ll might have dissuaded a reaso nable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. , 538 U.S. at 68 (quotation marks omitted). Ms. Farzam argues only that neither Ms. Katz nor Mr. Saijadi “inqui re[d] or investigat[ed] as to Plaintiff’s past experience wh ile at Radio Farda and before in covering foreign and domestic political and diplomatic conferences.” See Opp’n at 32-34. Her argument does not demonstrate a materially adverse effect fro m her inability to attend the co nferences. Nor does Ms. Farzam adequatel y rebut VOAs proffered, nonretalia tory explanation: that “the Agency c hose to send a reporter who had a reputable on-air personality.” Mot. at 33-34. In response, Ms. F arzam again protests that nob ody looked at her resume to see whether she was a better candidate. See Opp’n at 32-33 (“It appears that . . . Ms. Katz did not inquire or investigate as to P laintiff’s past experience . . . . And Mr. Belida admitted he made no effort to find out Plaintiff’s wo rk experience . . . at least s uggesting that no one, including Mr. Sajjadi, informed him of it.”). S he describes these “failures to inquire and report” as “pretextual” evidence of retaliation but offe rs no facts that support that a ssertion. Nor does she substantiate her claims of “personal animus” or “biased approaches” by Ms. K atz or Mr. Sajjadi. Opp’n at 34. Because she cannot demonstrate that VOA’s reason was prete xtual, summary judgment would be entered in favor of VOA on this claim, were it timely. 15
3. Denial of Audio Equipment (Am. Compl. ¶ 13)

15 The Board also argues that none of the alleged retaliators kne w of Ms. Farzam’s prior EEO activity. To be sure, knowledge of prior protected activity by an alleged retaliator is a crucial element of Ms. Farzam’s claims of retaliation, on which she wou ld carry the burden at trial. See Jones v. Bernanke , 557 F.3d 670, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“We agree that Jones’s su pervisors could not have retaliated against hi m unless they had knowledge of hi s protected ac tivity.”). The testimony in the record is not as clear as the Board may sugges t. The Court need not address the depositions and affidavits here, however, because Ms. Farzam’s claims fail for other, independent reasons.26 Ms. Farzam complains that VOA refused to provide her “audio equ ipment needed to do interviews.” 16 Am. Compl. ¶ 13. VOA rejoins that such audio equipment was n ot issued to individual television reporters, who would be filming for broadcast. Mot. at 54 (ci ting Jonas Dep. Tr. at 52:20-53:7 (“It was very clear that she did not nee d a tape recorder to be a television reporter.”); Gandji Dep. Tr. at 154-155 (explaining that neithe r at VOA nor at any of Mr. Gandji’s other employers were te levision reporters assigned tap e recorders)). Ms. Farzam’s request merely demonstrated her lack of familiarity with her ne w medium. Nevertheless, tape recorders were available for te levision reporters should the ne ed arise. Mot. at 53 (citing Gandji Dep. Tr. at 139:8-139:19). Indeed, Ms. Farzam cannot recall a single instance when she requested the use of a tape r ecorder and was denied. Mot. at 5 5 (citing Farzam Dep. Tr. at 79:16-80:16). Ms. Farzam has faile d to demonstrate retaliation

. Ms. Farzam has not shown that VOA’ s failure to give her (or any other TV reporter) a personal tape record er was pretext. She points to an email where Ms. Katz wrote “Ha ha” concerning Ms. Farzam’s request, but omits the critical acc ompanying passage: “NOBODY has a tape recorder.” See Katz Dep., Ex. 42. Mr. Sajjadi’s testimony that he once had au dio equipment is not to the contrar y because VOA’s medium had chang ed from radio to television. Ms. Farzam’s evidence is insuffi cient to raise a material quest ion of fact and avoid summary judgment, which therefore wil l be granted on this allegation. 17

16 The only timeframe connected to this allegation is a very unsp ecific “[a]fter” her return to the Persian News Network on July 8, 2008. Id. Clearly, Ms. Farzam did not contact an EEO counselor until 2010. Therefore, this allegation is untimely a nd subject to dismissal on that ground, too.
17 Both parties also address VOA’s refusal to issue a cell phone to Ms. Farzam. See Mot. at 52- 53; Opp’n at 30-32. This claim is not evident on the face of t he Amended Complaint, however, which only alleges that Ms. Farzam was denied “audio equipment needed to do interviews .” Am. Compl. ¶ 13 (emphasis added) . For the reasons stated abov e, the Court will not consider any claim outside of the pleadings.27 4. Refusal to Renew Press Credential s For Ms. Farzam (Am. Compl. ¶ 16) Ms. Farzam covered the White Hous e during her four years at Rad io Farda and had White House credentials to access the White House and to tr avel with the press corps on occasional presidential trips. S he also interviewed President George W. Bush in the White House in March 2008. She anticipat ed that she would continue t o report on the White House, State Department, and Congress upo n her return to the Persian N ews Network in July 2008. That did not happen in the re-orga nized VOA, prompting Ms. Farz am to cry retaliation. Were this claim timely, which it is not, it would be subject to dism issal in light of t he undisputed facts. After VOA became a television bro adcaster, it reorganized its o perations. Instead of each of VOA’s 45 constituent language services sending its o wn reporter to the White House, State Department, or Capitol Hill, those jobs were consolidated . Mot. at 29 (citing Mahmoudi Dep. Tr. at 33:12-34:20). For ins tance, two reporters in VOA’s central news rooms went to the White House, when required, and sha red their reports with the l anguage specialists in English. The language services, including P ersian News Network, then tra nslated such parts of that news that each service chose to broad cast into the relevant language

. In the re-organized VOA, the P ersian News Network had neitherthe need nor the resources to establish its own, redundant White House repor ter when it could get Englishlanguage reports from VOA reporte rs working from the central ne ws room. See Gandji Dep. Tr. at 96:15-97 (explaining that “we do not need a White House corr espondent for [the Persian News Network]. The White House was covered by our central news corr espondent at that time.”);

To the extent that Ms. Farzam a lleges that a cell phone is “aud io equipment” that is “needed to do interviews,” she has provi ded no factual support. VOA demon strates a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason that it does not issue audio equipment (r ecorders or cell phones) to television reporters who are f ilmed or filming. Ms. Farzam offe rs no current facts to the contrary or evidence of pretext.28 Belida Dep. Tr. at 45:11-46:10 (“White House news releases inst antly popped up on the web [so] you don’t really need to leave your office to observe them in r ealtime.”). VOA’s internal reorganization, relieving the i ndividual language services of the need to report from the White House, State Department, or Cap itol Hill, provides a legitimate nonretaliatory reason for its failures to renew Ms. Farzam’s c redentials for t hose venues. Ms. Farzam’s response does not sho w a pretextual basis for VOA’ s otherwiseneutral actions. Her argument is grounded primarily in alleged “personal animus” and “personal bias” on the part of her supervisors. See Opp’n at 26-30. She accuses Ms. Katz of using “immoderate, emotional and eve n nasty language” in derogation o f Ms. Farzam. Opp’n at 27. But none of the ensuing citations b ears that out; each is a str aightforward evalua tion of her skills as a television reporter. Id. 18 The same is true of Mr. Sajja di, who Ms. Farzam can only clai m “made inconsistent statements about her performance and abiliti es.” Opp’n at 28. The Court sees no such conflict; Mr. Sajja di’s modest praise and rating o f “acceptable” hardly contradict his later surprise that Ms. Farzam was “rat[ed] as Outstanding in every category.” Id. at 29. Because this claim is untimely and VOA has shown that its reorg anization (which predated Ms. Farzam’s return fro m Radio Free Europe) was entire ly neutral as to Ms. Farzam’s EEO and EPA complaints, summar y judgment will be entered in fav or of the Board.

18 For example, Ms. Katz said that “Mrs. Farzam’s opinion of her experience differs greatly from the actual level of her ability and work,” that “Ms. Farzam doe s not have any TV camera skills of which I am aware” and that “ther e is little confidence in the q uality of her work.” Id. That is all straightforward analysis of a s ubordinate’s performance and abi lity. However, Ms. Katz did comment in an email that Ms. Farzam “is c ausing a lot of trouble lately.” Opp’n Ex. 5 (11/2/2010 Email Chain) at 1. The context of her c omment relieves it of any retaliatory vibration: Ms. Katz had just been told by Ms. Farz am, a subordinate, that she would rather not attend training that Ms. Katz had arranged for her. Ms. Katz thought t hat Ms. Farzam needed the training “more than most,” id. , and thus understandably viewe d the refusal as causing trouble for her.29 5. Coverage of the 2009 Inauguration (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 15) This complaint encapsulates Ms . Farzam’s broader distress upon her return to Persian News Network. As a radio reporter, she had credentials to critical feder al venues and she covered critical political issues. When she came back to Persi an News Network, she had to learn an entire new medium (televisi on) and, despite her assignment t o the premier news telecast, VOA’s reorganization deprived her of access to critical places, people and stories . To add insult to injury, Persian News Networ k expected her to undergo trainin g as a television reporter, when she had been reporting on r adio for many years. Barack Obama was elected Presi dent of the United States in Nove mber 2008 and was inaugurated in January 2009. The Persian News Network form ed a committee specifically to cover the inauguration, “but did not even appoint Ms. Farzamas a committee member despite the fact that she had previous ly done extensive reporting on pr esidential inaugurations.” Am. Compl. ¶ 15. Without authorizati on from an editor, Ms. Farzam nevertheless attended the inauguration, gained access to the White House with her press p ass, and prepared a report on President-elect Obama’s pre-inauguration visit with President B ush in the White House— including exclusive photos that she took herself. See Am. Compl. ¶ 14. The report was not aired, however, which Ms. Farzam c laims was an act of retaliati on. Id. The Board answers that it did no t televise Ms. Farzam’s inaugu ration-day story because it was not completed until the day after the inaugurati on, she had no video to accompany it, and it was not a story to whi ch she had been assigned. Con sistent with its prior planning, the Persian News Network had carrie d out lengthy inaugural coverage on the day of the inauguration. Ms. Farzam compla ins that “it appears that mostof the supervisory personnel involved in the selection proce ss were not made aware of Plaint iff’s past experience,” and that30 Ms. Saijadi, who knew of her pr ior work, “did not bring it up.” Opp’n at 35. Her argument does not support her burden to show tha t the Board’s proffered crite ria were a mere pretext for retaliation when it put someone other than Ms. Farzam on the pl anning committee and when it declined to televise her inauguration report because it was lat e, had no video, and was not her assignment. VOA has advanced additional reas ons for assigning others to cov er the inauguration: the live broadcas t was being simultaneously trans lated. According to Mr. Saijadi, simultaneous translation is not s omething that Ms. Farzam does well. Sajjadi Dep Tr. at 61:7-15 (“[Plaintiff] was not in the categ ory to be able to report that . We need people to be able [to] simultaneously translate what [t he] chief justice was saying, w hat elected persons [were] saying alongside to the White House and Congress. And Mrs. Farzam is n ot—we have only few reporters that are able to do s imultaneous translation.”). Ms. Farzam was also junior to all assigned reporters. In response, Ms. Farzam fails t o show pretext or that VOA’s all eged retaliatory animus was a but-for reason for its assignment choices. Her in sistence that she is a “good translator” does not undercut VOA’ s judgment that she was not a s good at simultaneous translation, which she does not address. Ms. Farzam notes thatsome of the other reporters who were assigned could not simulta neously translate, but does not address their seniority, relevant experience, and assigned jobs. C overing the 2009 Inauguration of President Barack Obama was clearly a “plum” assignment and V OA has presented legitimate no nretaliatory reasons for its choices. Ms. Farzam’s prior EEO-p rotected activity was, most r ecently, the se ttlement of her Equal Pay Act claim in March 2008, a full ten months before the inauguration. This timeframe does not support an inference of discrimination and Ms. Farzam fails to show evidence that31 retaliation was the but-for cause of VOA’s assignments. Judgme nt therefore will be entered in favor of the Board on this allegation. 6. Denial of Request to Cover Co ngressional Press Conferences (Am. Compl. ¶ 17) Ms. Farzam complains that i n August 2010 she was denied the opp ortunity to cover Congressman Van Hollen’s ap pearance at the National Press Club. Am. Compl. ¶ 17. Then in September 2010, she was denied the opportunity to cover a Question and Answer event with Senators Cornyn and Menendez. Id. These allegations are timely, as Ms. Farzam contacted the Board’s Office of Civil Rights in August 2010 and timely fi led an administrative complaint on November 19, 2010. Am. Compl. ¶ 41. They nonetheless fail in light of the undisputed facts. The uncontradicted testimony is that Ms. Farzam made both of th ese requests too late and without enough prior planning. See Sajjadi Dep. Tr. at 120-121 (“So she asked to cover an event without coming up wit h a plan for it. . . . And it wa s too late to accommodate her request. When you have to cover an event, you need to put toge ther things like a camera person, like a light person, like all crew s.”). Her late requests and lack of preparati on for backup with a television crew constitute leg itimate nonreta liatory reason for VOA’s denial of Ms. Farzam’s requests. In response, she argues that VOA’ s explanation is “belied” by E xhibit 97 to her memorandum, Dkt. 61-1. The exhibit is not the silver bullet th at Ms. Farzam hopes. It shows that in response to Ms. Farzam ’s 7:50 p.m. email asking to cove r Congressman Van Hollen’s press conference at 9:00 a.m . the next morning, the news desk c onditioned its approval: [W]e agree that if you can confirm a sit down interview with Congressman Van Holen and if he is willing to talk about Iran as well as the Midterm elections we are happy to send you. But if we are only going for the Press Confer ence then we ag ree that it’s not something we necessarily need to cover.32 Id. at 2 (emphasis added). Ms. Farzam was unable to fulfill the co nditions. She omits the emphasized language from her ar gument and completely fails to a ddress it. The conditions for approval thus stand unrebutted, a nd Ms. Farzam has failed to sh ow pretext. Concerning the Cornyn-Mendez press conference, see Am. Compl. ¶ 17, Ms. Farzam again sought authoriz ation too lat e in time. See Sajjadi Dep Tr. at 129:9-130:7 (“But she also requested a night before—la te at night before, 7:44—everyt hing is closed—p.m. for our business in VOA. And everybody comes back next day. So, basica lly, she sent her e-mail in a graveyard time that nobody can respond to it, nobody can do any thing about it until the morning.”). She thus similarly f ailed to request the coverage in time, as confirmed by similarly uncontradicted testimony. Compare Mot. at 43-44 with Opp’n at 41. This was a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for denying he r request, and Ms. Farzam has not shown otherwise. The allegations that the Board r etaliated against Ms. Farzam bydenying her requests to cover certain polit ical events on Capitol Hill will be dismissed. 7. Cancellation of Report on Medal of Honor (Am. Compl. ¶ 19 ) Ms. Farzam complains that on November 16, 2010, she “informed her supervisor that she had on her own initiativ e attended” a Medal of Honor p resentation ceremony but her story was not broadcast. Am. C ompl. ¶ 19. The Board answers t hat the ceremony was “not assigned” and “created without c onsultation with PNN’s editors. ” Mot. at 45. In opposition, Ms. Farzam does not address this r eason or try to show any pretext. Instead, Ms. Farzam focuses exclusively on who decided not to air her report. The Board asserts that Ms. Druc ker was the relevant decision maker. Ms. Farzam is “mystified” by that con tention, and claims that the decision was made by Mr. Sajjadi . Opp’n at 42. The identity o f the decisionmaker is not germane unless the act was reta liatory and the Board’s explanat ion merely a pretext to hide its33 intention to retaliate. Planning i ts news programs, the editor s at Persian News Network assign stories and anticipate televi sing them. The sudden insertion o f an unassigned story—that was neither an emergency nor expected —could cause havoc with the ca reful timing of television newscasts. Ms. Farzam overlooks the Board’s explanation and th us fails to demonstrate that it was either retaliatory or pretextual. Summary judgment therefore will be granted to the Board on this claim. 8. Relegation to Non-Essential Employee Status (Am. Compl. ¶ 20) Finally, Ms. Farzam complains that in January 2011, her statu s was changed from an “essential (emergency) employee” to a “non-essential employe e.” Am. Compl. ¶ 20. Her understanding is that non-essen tial employees “can be subjected to reductions in force more easily than essential employees.” Id. 19 The Board does not argue that this claim should have been exhausted, but does maintain t hat it fails as a matter of law. Ms. Farzam quotes from an Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Handbook for the proposition that “essent ial employees may be granted ex ceptions to the regular order of employees’ release due to ‘undue i nterruption’ of the agency’s work.” 20 And indeed, an agency is told to “consider the impact if a[n] essential employee[] is reached for a reduction in force action.” Id. This statement does not exempt t he employee from a reduction in force forever but “simply provides the agency with the option of postponing the a ction until a later date because of workload considerations.” Id. Even an essential employee will eventually be subject to a RI F in

19 In her opposition memorandum, Ms. Farzam includes additional a llegations, arguing that the term “essential” bearing “a meas ure of prestige” and carries wi th it “the opportunity, during emergency situations, of being in c harge of all aspects of broa dcasting a PNN program.” Opp’n at 43. 20 Handbook Action Item 17(h), available at http://archive.opm.gov/Reduction_I n_Force/agency_references/Han dbook/rih02b98.asp (last visited December 11, 2015).34 the absence of congressional f unding or other interruption in a gency operations. At the same time, the Board may under-appreciate the importance of being “essential.” To them, the term means an employee who must repo rt to work during inclement weather. See Mahmoudi Dep. Tr. at 77:1-77:16 (“ Essential people are if there is an earthquake, whatever, disaster, they ha ve to come . . . nonessentials are t hose that when the weather or whatever happens . . . you can get unsc heduled leave.”); Drucke r Dep. Tr. at 28:5-28:16 (“Essential personnel means if the re is a cataclysmic weather p roblem outside, if it snows, if it rains, if it’s a heat wave or what not [sic] and the government is closed [our employees] do not have to come to work unless they ’re designated e ssential person nel.”). The testimony gives short shrift to the potential colla teral consequences of being non-es sential, such as the inability to work when the office closes for other reasons, such as a government shutdown. In such circumstances, the difference between essenti al (working without pay) and non- essential (not w orking without pay) employees may be of some co nsequence if Congress were late r to fund, contrary to practice, salaries only for those who act ually worked during a shut-down. For purposes of a claim of retal iation, however, this Court fin ds that exclusion from the essential-employees lis t would be a “trivial harm[],” Burlington Northern , 548 U.S. at 68, and not materially adverse with in the meaning of that opini on. Ms. Drucker testified that designation as non-essential had no bearing on job performance, pay, promotion, or assignments. Drucker Dep. Tr. at 82:9-83:16. M s. Farzam marshals no facts t o the contrary. The rare circumstance above, in which the distinction could become relevant, is purely speculative and

remote. In addition, the Board states th at it designated the essentia l employees it did in a manner consistent with its bad-w eather understanding: those ide ntified were most geographically35 proximate to the office and coul d multi-task well to keep opera tions going. Ms. Farzam cites her prior experience in a “combine d role of master of ceremonies, p roducer and editor of radio programs . . . in 2002 and 2003,” Opp’n a t 43, to challenge the Board’s selections. Her past experience on radio just does not carry the weight of recent ex perience in television. The Court also finds that the Board’s designation of essential employees in January 2011 was too long after Ms. Farzam’s most recent protected EEO activ ity (ending in March 2008) to supply a causal connection in the a bsence of immediate evidence . For all of these reasons, summary judgment will be granted to the Board on this allegatio n. IV. CONCLUSION Only Counts I and II (alleging r etaliation) are left before t his Court. For the reasons stated above, after exami ning each claim in the Amended Complaint and the record evidence adduced in support of the m, the Court finds that they are either untimely, have no merit, or both. The Board’s motion for summary judgment [Dkt. 56] will be granted and judgment will be entered in the B oard’s favor. A memorializing order accompanies this memorandum opinion.