UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

JON K. RIVERS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) 3:13-cv-00066-PPS

)

CAROLYN COLVIN, )

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Claimant Jon K. Rivers seeks review of the final administrative decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security to deny his application for disability insurance benefits. Rivers

has a history of cognitive difficulties, anxiety, and depression which he alleges stems from a

concussion he sustained when a beam fell on him during his time in the military in the 1970s. He

applied for disability benefits in 2009, alleging disability beginning December 15, 2008. After a

hearing, the Administrative Law Judge denied Rivers’s claim. On appeal, Rivers claims that the

ALJ erred in several respects. I disagree that the ALJ’s decision was deficient, especially not to

the degree required for reversal under the deferential standard of review I must apply here.

Therefore, because I find that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence as

discussed below, I AFFIRM it. 

BACKGROUND

Rivers is in his late fifties and has earned an associates degree in electronics. [Record at

266.] During the fifteen years before filing his disability claim, Rivers held jobs as a welder,

security guard and production lapping worker. [R. at 205, 211.] He claims to have been fired

from “probably fifty jobs or more,” attributing his inability to hold a job to psychiatric issues. [R.

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at 204, 320.] While the record does not confirm the loss of fifty or more jobs, it does say that

Rivers was fired from his job as a security guard in December 2008 after falling asleep in his car,

which he claims was due to a medication he was taking. [R. at 204, 320.] This is the same month

Rivers listed as his disability onset date. [R. at 166.] However, it wasn’t until approximately two

months later, in February 2009, that Rivers claims he stopped working after being “involuntarily

laid off,” presumably from a different job.1 [R. at 204.]

Rivers contends that his psychiatric problems stem from an accident which occurred

during his time in the army. Rivers was in the Army Engineering Unit from May of 1974 until he

was honorably discharged in May of 1977. [R. at 49.] Rivers suffered a concussion in either

1974 or 1975, after a metal beam hit him in the head. [R. at 204, 227, 321, 372.] Rivers contends

that he has suffered from memory difficulties, post-traumatic stress disorder and high anxiety

since that time. [R. at 352, 371-72.] 

While Rivers has never been hospitalized due to psychiatric problems, he was treated by

an outpatient mental health counselor/therapist and saw a psychiatrist throughout 1991. [R. at

320.] Additionally, over the years Rivers has been prescribed a variety of medications to treat his

psychiatric issues, which include post-traumatic stress disorder and depression. [R. at 276.] He

reports he was prescribed Desyrel in 1985, and then Prozac in the 1990s. [Id.] Rivers was first

prescribed Zoloft in 1995, and he took that for 12 years. [R. at 321.] 

In January 2008 Rivers saw a clinical social worker and complained of “bad depression”

and a “new memory problem.” He was given a refill for Zoloft, and was referred for a

psychiatric evaluation. [R. at 308-10.] A year later, in March 2009, Rivers called the VA

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 The record also contains information that Rivers was fired in December 2009 from a job at Caterpillar for charges

of intimidation of other staff. [R. at 372.] However, it is unclear whether this is a mistake, as this seems to conflict

with other information in the record, and at the hearing Rivers indicated he was actually fired for intimidation in

November 2006. [R. at 55.]

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complaining of trembling in his hands. [R. at 305.] That same month, Rivers had a primary care

consultation, and his examining physician questioned whether his trembling was caused by

energy supplements or another recreational drug. [R. at 299-300.] A drug test ruled out

recreational drug use. [R. at 316.] A few months later, in July, Rivers reported that his hand

tremor had stopped after discontinuing use of an energy supplement. [R. at 289.] Shortly after

this, on August 12, 2009, Rivers filed his original application for Social Security benefits. This

claim was ultimately denied. [R. at 266.]

In November 2009 Rivers saw Dr. Pate for a consultative psychological examination

regarding his pending claim. [R. at 320-23.] Rivers complained of trouble concentrating,

reported hearing voices in his head, and said that he thinks about suicide every day. [R. at 320,

322.] Dr. Pate diagnosed dysthymia, ruled out a personality disorder, and assessed a Global

Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score of 60. [R. at 323.] A month later, Dr. Johnson, a

psychological consultant for the Disability Determination Bureau, performed a Psychiatric

Review Technique evaluation and concluded that Rivers suffered from an impairment under

Listing 12.04 (affective disorders), but suffered only mild or moderate limitations as a result of

his dysthymia. [R. at 327-44.] At that time, Dr. Johnson also assigned Rivers a GAF score of 60.

[R. at 343.]

In January 2010, Rivers went to the VA complaining of memory problems, anxiety, and

personality changes. [R. at 352.] While at the VA, Rivers met with Dr. Lydon for a psychiatric

evaluation. [R. at 371.] Dr. Lydon administered a Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MOCA),

recording a score of 22/30. [R. at 372.] Dr. Lydon diagnosed Rivers with a cognitive disorder

and an anxiety disorder and depression, and assessed a GAF score of 45. [R. at 374.] Dr. Lydon

explained that Rivers would “benefit from a comprehensive neuropsychological evaluation to

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determine extent of psychiatric and cognitive difficulty.” [Id.] That same month Rivers filed his

reconsideration for Social Security benefits, which was denied. [R. at 266.] Following this

second denial, in May 2010 Rivers requested a hearing before an ALJ. [Id.]

Approximately six months after requesting a hearing, in November 2010, Rivers went to

the VA Hospital emergency room complaining of having taken too much of his medication. [R.

at 382.] Dr. Goodman examined Rivers and noted that the majority of Rivers’s problems have

historically been psychiatric. [Id.] Dr. Goodman recorded a past medical history of paranoia,

depression, and cognitive impairment, but does not appear to have done any new or independent

assessment of Rivers’s psychological state. Dr. Goodman admitted Rivers to the Indiana

Veteran’s Home due to an “inability to care for himself and having some increasing difficulty in

walking.” [Id.] In February of 2011, Dr. Goodman completed a Medical Provider Questionnaire

for Listings 12.04 and 12.06, concluding that Rivers met the requirements for listing 12.06

(anxiety-related disorders), but was unable to determine if he met listing 12.04 (affective

disorders). [R. at 385-93.] Additionally, shortly after his admission to the Veteran’s Home but

before his administrative hearing, in December 2010, Rivers’s medical records indicate (with

almost no explanation) that he was diagnosed with paranoia and dementia. [R. at 437.]

In July 2011 Rivers appeared, represented by counsel, for his hearing before the ALJ.

Medical experts Dr. Lee Fischer and Dr. Don Olive appeared at the hearing, as well as

Vocational Expert Michael Blankenship. [R. at 43-101.] At the hearing Rivers testified that he

had been living in a Veterans Home for the past seven months, and was no longer driving due to

concentration problems. [R. at 47, 49-50.] He also testified that, despite holding “a small, menial

job” at the Veterans home pushing nonambulatory patients to physical therapy, he was unable to

work because of memory and concentration problems. [R. at 50, 65, 94.] Dr. Olive testified that

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Rivers had been admitted to the Veterans home “predominantly for physical reasons,” and felt

that Rivers would be capable of simple, repetitive tasks or unskilled work with no strict

deadlines or production quotas and only occasional contact with other people. [R. at 90-93.]

Finally, vocational expert Mr. Blankenship testified that a hypothetical individual of Rivers age,

education and work experience, with no physical limitations but with the designated mental

limitations, could perform the following “medium,” unskilled positions: hospital cleaner, hand

packager, and stores laborer. [R. at 95, 98-99.] Rivers’s attorney asked if there were any job for

an individual who is unable to stay on task for one third of the workday, and Mr. Blankenship

answered that he was not aware of any such job. [R. at 99.]

The ALJ issued a decision denying Rivers benefits in August 2011. [R. at 24-38.] The

ALJ employed the five-step analysis standard in disability benefits cases. At step one, the ALJ

confirmed that Rivers had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his application date.

[R. at 26.] At step two, the ALJ concluded that Rivers suffered from the following severe

impairments: cognitive disorder, depression, and anxiety. [Id.] At step three, the ALJ determined

that Rivers did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically

equals the severity of a listed impairment. [R. at 27-29; 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix

1.] After considering the entire record, the ALJ found that Rivers had the residual functional

capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, but with the following

nonexertional limitations: work limited to simple and repetitive tasks, commensurate with

unskilled work; work limited to no more than occasional contact with the general public, coworkers, and supervisors; and work that does not require fast paced production standards. [R. at

29-36.] At step four, the ALJ found that Rivers was unable to perform any of his past relevant

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jobs. [R. at 36.] However, at step five the ALJ found that there were a significant number of jobs

in the national economy that Rivers could perform. [R. at 36-37.]

The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the

Commissioner. [R. at 4-8.] Rivers timely sought review of that decision by filing this case.

DISCUSSION

My review of an ALJ’s decision to deny Social Security benefits is limited to

determining whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Jens v. Barnhart, 347

F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 2003). “Evidence is substantial if it is sufficient for a reasonable person

to accept as adequate to support the decision.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). In other words, the ALJ’s decision, if supported by substantial evidence and reached

under the correct legal standard, will be upheld even if reasonable minds could differ as to the

appropriate conclusion. See Schmidt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 970, 972 (7th Cir. 2000). It is not my job

to re-weigh evidence, choose among conflicting versions of events, decide questions of

credibility, or substitute my own judgment for the ALJ’s. Jens, 347 F.3d at 212.

To receive disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must be

“disabled” as defined by the Act at 42 U.S.C. § 423(d). 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). A claimant

qualifies as disabled if he is unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of

any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in

death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Moreover, a claimant’s physical or mental impairment or

impairments must be of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but

cannot, considering his age, education and work experience, engage in any other kind of

substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).

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Rivers objects to the ALJ’s decision based on the analysis under the anxiety disorder

listing, the ALJ’s decision to afford little weight to Dr. Goodman’s medical opinion, the ALJ’s

failure to discuss Rivers’s back injury, and the ALJ’s assessment of Rivers’s ability to work.

Rivers argues that these failures ultimately led to a faulty assessment of the jobs that Rivers can

perform. [DE 24 at 2.]

Rivers argues that the ALJ’s analysis of Rivers’s anxiety disorder with respect to Listing

12.06 (anxiety-related disorders) was perfunctory and erroneous because the ALJ simply wrote

that “with regards to Listing 12.06, the medical evidence does not show the claimant’s complete

inability to function independently outside the area of his home.” [R. at 29.] Rivers then goes on

to list a series of places in the record that he claims demonstrate that his mental impairments met

or equaled 12.06, and then criticizes the ALJ’s reliance on other medical opinions to conclude

that Rivers’s mental impairment did not meet or equal Listing 12.06. [DE 24 at 16-20.]

However, I believe that the ALJ’s analysis of Listing 12.06 was neither perfunctory nor

erroneous. Rivers is essentially asking me to reassess the evidence in the record and overrule the

ALJ’s determinations of the credibility of medical opinions, but I can’t do either of those things.

And while it is true that the ALJ initially only briefly stated that Rivers was not unable to

function outside his home, he later explained that finding in great detail. [R. at 32-34.] 

Under 12.06, Rivers had to show that he suffered from certain symptoms and that, as a

result, he suffered from marked limitations in certain areas of daily living or he was completely

unable to function independently outside of his home. The ALJ thoroughly considered all of the

medical opinions in the record and found that Rivers suffered from no more than moderate

difficulties in the relevant areas of functionality, which means Rivers’s impairment didn’t rise to

the “marked” level. [R. at 27-28.] The ALJ’s findings comport with the state psychiatric

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evaluations in the record, and with the testimony of the doctor who reviewed the record and

testified at the hearing. [R. at 84-88, 320-26, 341-42.]

The heart of Rivers’s objection is to the ALJ’s decision that Rivers did not show a

complete inability to function outside his home. Rivers points to his admission to the Veteran’s

Home by Dr. Goodman on the stated basis that Rivers was unable “to care for himself and

having some increasing difficulty in walking.” [R. at 442.] Dr. Goodman also noted that “the

majority of [Rivers’s] problems have been psychiatric.” [R. at 442.] The ALJ’s opinion indicates

that he reviewed and considered Dr. Goodman’s opinion, but that he gave it little weight, instead

affording more weight to the medical opinion of the testifying Dr. Olive because the ALJ found

that “opinion persuasive and consistent with the medical evidence of record.” [R. at 33.] 

A treating physician’s opinion receives controlling weight only “if it is well supported by

medical findings and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record.” Clifford v.

Apfel, 227 F.3d. 863, 870 (7th Cir. 2000). “But once well-supported contradicting evidence is

introduced, the treating physician’s evidence is no longer entitled to controlling weight and

becomes just one more piece of evidence for the ALJ to consider.” Bates v. Colvin, 736 F.3d

1093, 1099-1100 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover,

“[a]n ALJ is not required to accept a doctor’s opinion if it is brief, conclusory, and inadequately

supported by clinical findings.” Gildon v. Astrue, 260 Fed. Appx. 927, 929 (7th Cir. 2008)

(citations and quotation marks omitted). 

The ALJ was well within his purview in giving substantial weight to the psychiatric

evidence in the record and Dr. Olive’s testimony, and in giving little weight to Dr. Goodman’s

evaluation, which decisions the ALJ fully explained in his opinion. First, although Dr. Goodman

evaluated Rivers for admission to the Veteran’s Home, their relationship is unclear, and there is

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no indication that it had the length and regularity that typically justifies affording great weight to

the treating doctor’s opinion. See Jacoby v. Barnhart, 93 Fed. Appx. 939, 942 (7th Cir. 2004).

Second, and relatedly, Dr. Goodman’s records related to Rivers are conclusory, sparse, and

inconsistent. Finally, also relatedly, the ALJ found Dr. Goodman’s opinion unsupported in the

record. [R. at 34.] 

Rivers also argued that the ALJ didn’t build a logical bridge between the evidence and

his finding that Rivers is able to do certain kinds of work. Rivers’s argument was again based on

Dr. Goodman’s findings that Rivers couldn’t function outside the home, as well as Rivers’s own

testimony that he had been unable to keep a job. [DE 24 at 20-25.] The ALJ was justified in

largely discounting Dr. Goodman’s unsupported and unexplained opinion for the same reasons

discussed previously. Furthermore, to the extent that Dr. Goodman’s opinion was that Rivers

couldn’t work (because he couldn’t function outside the home), that goes beyond a doctor’s

bailiwick and into the ALJ’s. A claimant is not entitled to benefits just because a physician finds

him “disabled” or “unable to work” or even eligible for benefits under some standard other than

the Social Security Act. Gildon, 260 Fed. Appx. at 929. Here, that opinion is even more tenuous

because it is unclear from the record what criteria Dr. Goodman applied in finding Rivers unable

to care for himself such that Rivers was admitted to the Veteran’s Home. See Clifford, 227 F.3d

at 874 (“[T]he ALJ is not bound by findings made by either a governmental or nongovernmental

agency concerning whether the claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.904. . . . [T]he ALJ

must independently determine if a claimant is ‘disabled’ as defined solely in the Social Security

Act.”).

As for Rivers’s testimony, the ALJ considered and evaluated it. Rivers argues that the

ALJ “erred by improperly dismissing the claimant’s allegations that he could not sustain the

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mental demands of work activity.” [DE 24 at 24.] This argument fails for a few reasons. A

claimant can testify to facts, but, as with a doctor’s opinion, the ALJ doesn’t need to accept the

claimant’s own opinion about his ability to work – if the ALJ did have to accept the claimant’s

own evaluation of his capacity for work, the whole disability insurance claim process would be

pointless. The facts that Rivers testified to support the ALJ’s finding that Rivers has the capacity

for some limited work: Rivers regularly runs, lifts weights, reads, watches television, and,

notably, works as a patient transporter in the Veteran’s Home. [R. at 34.] With respect to mental

limitations, the ALJ assessed Rivers’s testimony and credibility along with the record and the

testimony of the other witnesses, and then came to reasoned conclusions in his opinion.

Rivers’s own testimony also scuttles his argument that the ALJ’s decision is deficient

because it doesn’t discuss Rivers’s back issues. There is a radiology report buried in the record

indicating degenerative disease in Rivers’s spine, although there was “no acute abnormality.” [R.

at 397.] However, no doctor, not even Dr. Goodman, expressed the opinion that the back issues

restricted Rivers’s ability to work. In fact, Rivers “testified that he could stand for several hours,

walk a couple of miles, and sit for two to four hours at a time. He further indicated that he could

lift and carry up to approximately twenty-five pounds, but acknowledged that he had no formal

weight restrictions placed on him by a physician.” [R. at 35, 59-60, 64.] While the ALJ did not

specifically ask about Rivers’s back, he asked about all of the activities that would evidence a

limiting back injury, and adequately addressed Rivers’s physical abilities in his opinion. See

Outlaw v. Astrue, 412 Fed. Appx. 894, 897 (7th Cir. 2011) (“An ALJ need not discuss every

piece of evidence, but must logically connect the evidence to the ALJ’s conclusions . . . .”).

Finally, the ALJ factored in Rivers’s mental conditions in restricting his RFC to unskilled

work and only minimal interaction with the public. Specifically, the ALJ found that Rivers’s

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abilities limited him to unskilled work involving “no more than occasional contact with the

public, co-workers, and supervisors,” and not “requiring fast paced production standards.” [R. at

36.] Rivers’s mild to moderate limitations do not necessarily result in a complete inability to

work – that’s the point of the latter steps of the disability benefits analysis, which analyze the

ability to work even with a disability. The ALJ’s findings regarding residual ability to work are

reasonable given Rivers’s medical history and track the opinions of the doctors who testified at

the hearing. [R. At 82-92.] See Outlaw, 412 Fed. Appx. at 897 (finding that limiting the

claimant’s RFC to include only unskilled work, with no public contact, did provide reasonable

accommodations for the claimant’s mental limitations).

The ALJ considered all of the evidence in the record and the testimony at the hearing,

and came to reasoned conclusions supported by substantial evidence. It is a rare case that doesn’t

present some conflicting evidence, and it is the ALJ’s job to evaluate the conflicting evidence, to

assign appropriate weight to the various pieces, and to come to a decision based on a

comprehensive analysis. The ALJ did that here, and so I affirm his decision. 

CONCLUSION

The ALJ provided legitimate and reasoned bases for his opinion. While reasonable minds

could differ on the outcome, the only issue here is whether the ALJ’s conclusion was supported

by substantial evidence, and it was. Accordingly, the decision of the ALJ is AFFIRMED. 

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: March 31, 2014 /s/ Philip P. Simon

PHILIP P. SIMON, CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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