UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

DENAR ROYAL, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) No. 3:13 CV 400

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Denar Royal, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding. (DE # 1.) In ISP #13-01-0482, a hearing

officer found Royal guilty of battery by bodily waste in violation of disciplinary code

#A102. (DE # 8-7.) The charge was initiated on January 31, 2013, when Sergeant A. Neal

wrote a conduct report stating as follows:

On the above date and time offender Royal #995156 threw urine on offender

Cornett #206176 (Range tende[r]). While he was picking up the breakfast

trays on the range I saw evidence of the urine on the trays and range ground.

I escorted offender Royal #995156 to IDUIE104 without further incidents.

(DE # 8-1.)

On February 1, 2013, Royal was formally notified of the charge and given a copy

of the conduct report. (DE # 8-1; DE # 8-2.) He pled not guilty, requested a lay advocate,

and waived the 24-hour notice requirement. (DE # 8-2.) He requested witness

statements from inmate Antwon Cornett and Sergeant Gothard (first name unknown),

and requested review of the surveillance video as physical evidence. (Id.) Statements

were obtained from the two requested witnesses. Cornett returned the form stating
simply, “No knowledge.” (DE # 8-3.) Sergeant Gothard stated as follows: “I Sgt Gothard

shook down Offender Royal [sic] property when it came from DCH. His property was

wet, I do not know if it was urine or not.” (DE 8-4.) Prior to the hearing, the hearing

officer reviewed the video as Royal requested, and summarized it as follows:

When viewing the camera I see an offender walking down DCH 400 east

range at 6:01, he gets about halfway down and then turns back around off the

range where Sgt. Neal is standing. Sgt. Neal unlocks the gate to let the

offender off the range. Sgt Neal then starts walking down the range, he stops

about halfway down speaks to someone in a cell and then continues walking

off the range.

(DE # 8-5.)

On February 8, 2013, a hearing was conducted on the charge. (DE # 8-7.) Royal

made the following statement in his defense: 

My toilet was flooded and there was water everywhere. I asked ofc. Scott to

move me, I had all my stuff packed, I also asked him to get Sgt. Neal. Sgt [sic]

came and got me and started escorting me to MSU and I had no ide[a] why.

The supposed victim even states he has no knowledge of the incident.

(DE # 8-7.) The hearing officer considered this statement, along with the witness

statements, the video evidence, and staff reports—which included confidential

documents—and found him guilty. (Id.) His administrative appeals were denied

(DE # 8-8, DE # 8-9), and he then filed this petition.

The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees prisoners certain procedural due

process rights in prison disciplinary hearings: (1) advance written notice of the charges;

(2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision-maker; (3) an opportunity to

call witnesses and present documentary evidence in defense, when consistent with

2
institutional safety and correctional goals; and (4) a written statement by the fact-finder

of evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418

U.S. 539 (1974). To satisfy due process, there must also be “some evidence” in the record

to support the guilty finding. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455

(1985). 

As an initial matter, the respondent requests that the confidential documents,

consisting of a page from the prison’s log book and another confidential document, be

maintained under seal due to security concerns. (DE # 9.) Upon review, the court agrees

that these documents contain sensitive information, the disclosure of which could be

harmful to other individuals or compromise the security of the facility. Accordingly, the

motion will be granted. See Henderson v. United States Parole Comm’n, 13 F.3d 1073, 1078

(7th Cir. 1994); Wells v. Israel, 854 F.2d 995, 999-1000 (7th Cir. 1988). 

Royal first claims that he was denied the opportunity to present the log book as

exculpatory evidence. (DE # 1 at 4.) A prisoner has a limited right to present witnesses

and evidence in his defense consistent with correctional goals and safety. Wolff, 418 U.S.

at 566. A hearing officer has considerable discretion with respect to witness and

evidence requests, and may deny requests that threaten institutional safety or are

irrelevant, repetitive, or unnecessary. Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003).

Furthermore, due process only requires access to witnesses and evidence that are

exculpatory. See Rasheed-Bey v. Duckworth, 969 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992).

“Exculpatory” in this context means evidence that “directly undermines the reliability

3
of the evidence in the record pointing to [the prisoner’s] guilt.” Meeks v. McBride, 81

F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 1996). The denial of the right to present evidence will be

considered harmless unless the prisoner shows that the evidence could have aided his

defense. See Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 2011).

Here, Royal has not demonstrated that the log book was exculpatory. He argues

that the log book showed Sergeant Neal was “engaged in shift change” at the time of

the incident, which in his view proved that “the nature of the conduct report was

ambiguously written rather than explicit, and the time of the incident was a deception

and intent to mislead.” (DE # 1 at 4.) It is unclear what he means by this statement, but

the video evidence conclusively showed Sergeant Neal on the unit at the time of this

incident. (DE # 8-5.) Furthermore, the time of the incident was never in dispute. Royal

acknowledged that he was in his cell when Cornett walked by collecting trays; his

defense was that he did not throw anything at Cornett, and that the area was wet from

an overflowing toilet. (DE # 8-7.) Nothing in the log book bolsters this defense or

otherwise exculpates him from the charge. To the extent the log book had any

exculpatory value, it is clear that the hearing officer considered it in reaching his

decision. (See DE # 8-7.) That is all Royal was entitled to under Wolff. See White v. Ind.

Parole Bd., 266 F.3d 759, 768 (7th Cir. 2001) (prisoner’s rights were not violated when

evidence he claimed was exculpatory was considered by the disciplinary board, even

though he was not permitted to view this evidence himself). Accordingly, this claim is

denied. 

4
Royal’s remaining two claims challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. (DE # 1

at 4-5.) In reviewing a disciplinary sanction for sufficiency of the evidence, “courts are

not required to conduct an examination of the entire record, independently assess

witness credibility, or weigh the evidence, but only determine whether the prison

disciplinary board’s decision to revoke good time credits has some factual basis.”

McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999). “[T]he relevant question is

whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached

by the disciplinary board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56 (emphasis added). A habeas court

will overturn the hearing officer’s decision only if “no reasonable adjudicator could

have found [the prisoner] guilty of the offense on the basis of the evidence presented.”

Henderson v. United States Parole Comm’n, 13 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994).

Furthermore, a hearing officer is permitted to rely on circumstantial evidence to

establish guilt. See Hamilton v. O’Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir. 1992).

Here, Royal argues that “before any criminal action can be levied against me . . .

there must be a corpus delecti or damaged party who has filed a verified complaint that I

damaged him.” (DE # 1 at 4.) Royal misunderstands the nature of a prison disciplinary

proceeding. This was not a “criminal action,” and the hearing officer was not required

to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 457. Instead, the

standard is whether there is “some evidence” to support the guilty finding. Id. Here, the

record shows that Sergeant Neal reported that Royal threw urine on Cornett, and he

saw urine on the trays Cornett was collecting and on the ground nearby. The video

5
confirmed the date and time of the incident, as well as the basic aspects of Sergeant

Neal’s account. Although Cornett stated that he had “no knowledge” of the incident,

perhaps to avoid getting involved in the matter, his statement did not exculpate Royal.

Nor did the requested witness statement from Sergeant Gothard, which instead

confirmed that Royal’s property was wet with an unknown substance.

Furthermore, there is other evidence supporting the finding of guilt which the

respondent has submitted under seal. This evidence was kept from Royal, but “prison

disciplinary boards are entitled to receive, and act on, information that is withheld from

the prisoner and the public[.]” White, 266 F.3d at 767. Due process does require that

confidential information bear sufficient indicia of reliability. Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d

527, 535 (7th Cir. 1995); Henderson, 13 F.3d at 1077. This court has reviewed the

confidential evidence that has been submitted, and without revealing its contents,

concludes that it contains reliable evidence of Royal’s guilt. That evidence, in addition

to Sergeant Neal’s report, is sufficient to support the hearing officer’s determination. See

Hill, 472 U.S. at 457 (due process is satisfied as long as “the record is not so devoid of

evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise

arbitrary”); see also Moffat v. Broyles, 288 F.3d 978, 981 (7th Cir. 2002) (witness statements

constituted some evidence); McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786 (conduct report provided some

evidence to support disciplinary determination). Accordingly, Royal has not

demonstrated an entitlement to habeas relief.

6
For these reasons, the respondent’s motion to maintain documents under seal

(DE # 9) is GRANTED. The petition (DE # 1) is DENIED. 

SO ORDERED.

Date: February 7, 2014

s/James T. Moody 

JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT