T h e H on or abl e Ja mes G

. Car r , Se n i or U n i t ed St at es D i s t r i ct J u dg e f or * t he N o rt hern D i st ri ct of O hi o , s i t t i ng by desi gnat i o n.

F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

H ORACE G OZ ON F R I EN D ,

Plaintif f-Appellant ,

v.
E RI C H. H OL DER , J R ., Attorney Ge ne ra l; D EP AR TMENT OF H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY ; U NI TED S T A T ES C I TI Z EN S HI P AND I MMI GR ATI ON S ER VI CE S ,

Defendants-A

ppellees

. No. 10-55906

D.C. No. 8:09-cv-00165- J VS-AN

OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court fo r t he Ce ntr a l D istri c t of

Ca lif or nia J ames V. Selna , District J udg e, Presiding Argued and Submitted F e br ua ry 13 , 2 01 3—Pa sa de na , Ca lif or nia Filed Apr il 30, 2013

B e fo re : Ma

rs ha S. B e rzo n a

nd Pa ul J. Watf or d, Cir c uit J udg es, and James G. Carr , Senior District J udg e. *

Opinion by

J udg e WatfordF R I EN D V

. H OL DER

2

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es no part o f the o pi ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s ** b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. SUMMAR

Y **

Im m igration The pa nel af firmed the district c ourt’s sum mary judgme nt dismiss al of Hor ace Gozon Friend’ s action bro u ght under 8 U .S. C. § 15 03 (a ) s e e kin g a de c larator

y jud g me nt t

hat he is a United Stat es citizen, although he was born in the Phili ppine I slands, beca

use his fathe r wa s a U.S. citizen.

I n Friend v. Reno , 172 F.3d 638 ( 9th Cir. 1999), this court he ld t hat F ri e nd ’s fathe r c ou ld no t tr ans mit c iti zen sh ip t o h im under Revise d Statutes § 1993, the law in e ffe ct when he was born in 1931, b ec au s e his father never resided in the United State s. I n th e pr e se nt c a se , th e pa ne l he ld t hat th e Natio na lity Ac t of 19 40 , w hic h li be ra lize d th e re sid e nc y re qu ir e me nt, did not apply retroa ctively

to Frie nd.

CO UN SEL
Do ug la s D . Jan ic ik ( argue d) , St e pto e & John so n L L P, Pho e nix, A ri zon a , f

or Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt.
Cr a igA. De fo e (a

rgue d) , T ri al A tto rn e y ; T ony Wes t, Assistant At torney

Gene ral; J. M ax W eintraub, Senior L iti g a tio n Couns el, Uni tedS tat es D epar tm ent of J us ti ce, C ivi l Di vis ion , f

or De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s.F R I EN D V

. H OL DER 3
OP IN ION WATFORD, Circuit J udg e:
The plaintiff in this action, Hor ace Fr iend, contends that he i s , an d h a s b e e n s i n c e b i rt h , a U n i t e d S t a t e s c i t i z e n. Hi s long que st to obtain official re cog nition of th at status beg an in 1990, when he first applied for a cer tificate of citizenship. Mr. Fr iend claimed to be a ci t i zen under Revised Statutes § 1 99 3, the re le va

nt law in e ff

e c t at th e tim e of

his bir th i n 1931. Section 1993 provided:
All children he retofor e born or her eaf ter born out of the l imits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers we re or m ay b e at the tim e of the ir birth citizens thereof, a re de c lare d to be c iti zen s o f t he U nit e d St a te s; but the rig hts of citizenship shall not desce nd to children whose fathe rs neve r re sided in the Un ite d St a te s.
Mr. Fr iend was bor

n in the Phili ppine I slands, which we re then a ter ritorial possession of the United States but we re nonetheless deeme d “out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States” for

purpos es o f § 1993. See F riend v. Re no , 17 2 F. 3d 63 8, 64 2 (9t

h Cir. 19 99 ). Mr . Fr ie nd ’s fathe r wa s a United States citizen at the time of Mr. F riend’s birth, a nd had lived his en t i re life in the Phili ppines. Mr. F riend’s mot he r w a s a no n- c iti zen

natio na l of

the Un ite d St a te s.
When Mr. Fr iend first ca

me bef ore this cour

t in 1999, we reje cted his citizenship claim under Revised Statutes § 1993. Friend , 172 F.3d at 648. We held that althoug h Mr. Fr iend’s fa the r w a s a Uni te d St a te s c iti zen , h e c ou ld n ot t ra ns mit hisF R I EN D V

. H OL DER

4

Se ct i on 201( e) of

t h e 194 0 A ct pr ov i ded: “ T h e f ol l owi n g s h al l be 1
n a tio n a ls a n d c iti z e n s o f t h e U n ited S ta te s a t b irth: . . . A p e rs o n b o rn in
an o utl yi ng p o ss e ss io n o f t he U nit ed S t ates o f

p are nts on e o f

wh o m i s a c iti z e n o f t h e U n ited S ta te s w h o re sid e d in the U n ited S ta te s o r o n e o f i ts out l y i n g po s s e s s i on s pr i or t o t h e bi r t h of s u c h pe r s on
. ” S e c t i on 201(e )
w a s r e pe a l e d i n 19 52 ; i t s c u r r e n t a n a l og u e c a n be f ou n d a t 8 U

. S. C. § 14 0 1 (e). citizenship t o his son under § 1993 bec ause he had ne ver r e s id e d “ in the Uni te d

St a te s , ” a s th e s tatute r e qu ir e d

. We re je c te d M r. F ri e nd ’s argume nt that his fathe r’ s r e sid e nc e in the Philippi nes should q u al ify as re sidence in the United States. Id. at 645.
I n so holding, we n o t ed that if Mr. Friend’ s claim had been g overne d by the Nationality Act of 1940 (the 1940 Act), he would indeed be a citizen. Friend , 172 F.3d at 643. The 19 40 Ac t supe rs e de d § 19 93 and , amon g oth e r t hin g s, liberalized the applica ble r es idency

require ment for transmitting citizenship to children born abroa d by allowing the citizen pare nt to have re sided in either the United States or one of its outl ying posse ssions prior to th e ch i l d ’s birth. SeeNationality

Act of 1940, Pub. L . No. 76- 8 5 3 , § 201(e) , 54 S tat. 1137, 1138. Be cause the Philippi ne I slands wer e 1
c on sid e re d a

n o utl yingpo sse ssi on

of the Un ite d St a te s unti l 1946, se e Ra ba ng v . I

NS , 35 F.3d 1449, 1451 (9th Cir. 1994), Mr. Fr iend’s father would have satisfied § 201(e) ’s re sidency require ment. Friend , 172 F.3d at 643. Bu t we made c lear that “ Re v. Stat. § 19 93 is the statut e tha t c on tr ols the outc ome of this case , ” b eca

use the a

pplicable law

g overning tr ans mitta l of

c iti zen sh ip is or din ari ly

“ the statut e that w a s in eff ect at the time o f t he child’s birth.” Id. at 641 (interna l quotation marks omitted).F R I EN D V

. H OL DER 5

Our rulingdid not end the matter. Mr . Fr iend subsequently fi led a se cond application for a c ertificate of
c iti zen sh ip, thi s ti me g ro un din g his c la im o n th e 19 40 Ac t, notwithstanding our ear lier conclusion that Revised Statutes § 1 99 3 w a s c on tr oll ing . Wh e n w e de c ide d Mr

. F ri e nd ’s fi rs t a pp e a l, h e be lie ve d h is p are nts ha d b e e n ma rr ie d at t he time of his birth. Mr. Fr iend now cla ims that newly dis co vere d
e vid e nc e , n ot a

va ila ble e arl ie r, sh ow s th a t in fa c t his pa re nts did not m ar ry u n til 1958, when he wa s 27 y ear s old. Mr. F ri e nd argue s th a t, a s a

c hild bo rn ou t of

we dlo c k, he is
cover ed by

a spe ci al provision of the 1940 Ac t that made § 201(e) applicable retroa ctivel y to children born out of wedlock before the Act’s eff ective date. SeeNationality Act of 1940 § 205, 54 Stat. at 1139–40. After the United States Citi zenship a

nd I mmigration Services denie d his application
and dis mis se d h is a dmi nis tr a tiv e a pp e a l, M r. F ri e nd

fi le d th is action under

8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) see king a decla ratory judgme nt that he is a citizen of the United States. The district court rule d ag ainst Mr. Fr iend on cross-motions for summar y jud g me nt, g ra

nti ngthe g ov e rnme nt’ s motio n an d de nyinghis

. L ike the district cour

t, we find it u n n ece ssary

to resolve whethe r M r
. F r ie n d w a s in f a c t b o r n o u t o f w e d lo c k . For purposes of this dec ision w e will assume that he wa s. Even wi th t hat f a c tua l hu rdle c le are d, ho we ve r, tw o s e pa ra te obstacles ba

r Mr. F ri en d ’s citizenship claim under the 1940 Ac t.
The fir st ob s t acle relates to the retr oactivity issue. The 1940 Act w as o b v iously

not the law in ef

fec t at the time of Mr. Fr iend’s birth in 1931, so he must establish that the Act applies r etroactively

to individuals born before its effe ctive date. Co n g r e s s p a s s e d th e 1 9 4 0 A c t in v ie w o f the ba c kg ro un d r

ule that “ a statut e c ann ot be c on str ue d to op e rateF R I EN D V

. H OL DER

6 retrospe ctively

unles s the leg islative intention to t hat ef fec t unequivoca lly

appea rs.” Miller v. United States , 2 94 U.S. 435, 439 (1935).
We do not think the provisions of the 1940 Ac t on which Mr. Fr iend re lies ref

l ect a leg islative intention that they should a pply retroa ctively

. Section 201(e) of the Act—the provision that liberalized t he re sidency require ment in a
manner favor able to Mr

. Fr iend—does not itself say any thing about apply i n g retroa ctively to individuals born before the 1940 Act’s effe ctive date

. See supra note 1. But Mr. F riend contends that § 205—the pr ovision applicable to childre n born out of we dlock, which incorporate s § 201(e) —contains langua g e makin g § 20 5 re tr oa c tiv e
. We qu ote be low the fi rs t of § 2 05 ’s tw o p ara g ra

ph s ( the on ly on e that c ou ld p ote nti a lly
a p p ly h e r e ) , an d it a li c iz e th e la n g u a g e o n w h ic h M r. F riend
re lie s: The provisions of sec tion 201, subsections (c) , (d), (e) , and (g ), and section 204, subsec tions (a) and (b) , here of apply , as of t h e d a t e of bir th , to a child born out of wedlock, pr ovided t h e p a t e r n i t y i s e s t a b l i s h e d d u r i n g m i n o r i t y, by leg itimation, o r adjudication of a
c omp e te nt c ourt

. Natio na lity Ac t of 19 40 § 20 5, 54 Stat. a t 11 39 (e mph a sis added)

. We do not believe the italicized phra se can be c onstrued
a s e xten din g the statut e ’s re a c h r e tr oa c tiv e ly

. That phra se ins te a d d e sc ri be s th e po int a t w hic h on e ’s c iti zen sh ip s tatus , if su c c e ssf ull y e sta bli shed, take s e ff

e c t. T he statut e is
re tr oa c tiv e in t

hat se ns e —it c on fe rs c iti zen sh ip as of the dateF R I EN D V

. H OL DER 7

of t he chi ld ’ s b ir

th , e v e nif

th e c h il d ’ s p a te r

n it y is n ot established until y ear s later. See T ua n Anh Nguy e n v . I

NS , 533 U.S. 53, 72 ( 2 001) (inter pretingsucce ssor statute, 8 U. S.C. § 1409(a)); Miller v. Albright , 5 2 3 U

. S. 4 2 0 , 431 (1 99 8) (o pin ion of

Ste ve ns , J.) (s ame ). Th e ita lic ize d p hr a se do e s n ot s pe ak to wh e the r t he statut e a

pp lie s to indiv idua ls born bef ore the 1940 Act’s e ffe ctive date

. I f there wer e any

doubt on that score, it is dispelled by the langua g e of

the se c on d p ara g raph of § 2 05 , w hic h Co ng re ss did make a pplic ab l e to individuals born befor e the Ac t’s ef fe ct i v e d at e. I n d o i n g s o , h o we v er , C o n gre s s u s edl an gu age (italicized below) not found in the f irst para g raph:

I n the abse nce of

such leg itimation or adjudication, the c hild, whe ther bo rn be for e or after the effectiv e d

a t e of t his Act , if the mother had the nationality of th e United States at the t ime of the c hild’s birth, and had previously

resided in the United States or one of its outly ingpo sse ssi on s, sh a ll b e he ld t o have a c qu ir e d at bi rt

h h e r n a tio na lity

status

. Natio na lity

Ac t of 19 40 § 2 05 , 5 4 St a t. a

t 1 140 ( e mph a sis added) . Had Cong ress intende d to m ak e the first paragraph of § 2 05 retroac tiv e , it

wo uld have inc lud e d th e same lang uag e in that pa ra gra p h as we ll. See R ussello v. United States , 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).
A sec ond obstacle ba

rs Mr. F riend’s c laim, even if we
wer e to c o n s tr

u e th e f ir s t p ar a g r a

p ho f § 2 0 5 a s apply ing
re tr oactive ly . T he fi rs t pa ra g ra phof § 2 05 re qu ir e s, a s a condition prec edent to ac quiring citizenship, that the child’s pater nity have been e stablished by leg itimation orF R I EN D V

. H OL DER

8

M r
. Fr i en d a s s er t s t h at t he f o rme r I mmi g r at i on a n d N at u r al i za t i on 2 Ser vi ce ( I N S) di d not cons t r ue § 20 5’ s l egi t i mat i on req ui r ement as a p p lying re tro a c tive ly. B u t t h e IN S in te r p r e ta tio n lette r h e c ites m e re ly st ates that t he 1 9 4 0 A ct’ s age l i m i t o n legit i m ati o n d o es no t a p p l y t o t ho se seeki ng ci t i zenshi p unde r ea rl i er a c t s , w h i c h h a d n o s u c h a g e l i m i t

. I NS In te rp . L tr. 3 0 9 .1 , 2 0 0 1 W L 1 3 3 3 8 6 1 , at *2 & n .1 3 (O c t. 2 0 0 1 ); M at t er of L– , 3 I. & N

. D ec. 22 5 , 22 5

– 2 6 (B IA 19 4 8 ). adjudication du rin g m ino rit y , which at the time r eleva nt here was up to age 21. Ablang v. Reno , 52 F.3d 801, 803 (9th Cir. 19 95 ); see Nationality

Act of 1940 § 101( g ), 54 Stat. at 1137. (That wa s a cha

ng e fr om p ri o r law; under Revised Statutes § 199 3 , th e St a te D e p artm e n t h a d p e r mi tt e d c h il dr e nborn ab ro adan d

o u to f w ed l o ckt o ac qu i re ci t i z en s h i p th ro u gh their citizen father

so long a s the fathe r leg itimated the child,
even a fter the ag e of ma

jority

. S e e M il le r , 523 U.S. at 462 (Ginsburg , J ., dissenting) .) Mr. Friend c oncede s that he
c ann ot s a tis fy

thi s co nditi on . H e c on te nd s th a t hi s p a te rn ity
wa s e stab lishe d b y

le g iti matio n w he n h is p are nts marr ie d in 1958, but that occur

red when he was 27 y ear s old, well after the per iod of minority

ended. Mr . Fr iend ca

n n o t cl aim the benef it of § 205’s retr oactive a pplication—an d with it the
a ssi sta nc e of § 201 (e )’ s li be ra lize d r e sid e nc y re qu ir e me nt— but at the s ame tim e asse rt that he is exempt from complying wi th § 20 5’ s le g iti matio n r e qu ir e me nt. 2
We need not re solve Mr. F riend’s a lternative a rgument that § 205 violates equa l protection princi p l es. Mr. F riend contends that g rantingmothers the bene fit of § 205’s retroa ctive application in the s econd para g raph of the statute, but denying that benef

it to fa t h er s i n the first par agraph, results in unconstitutional gende r discrimination. Even if we
were to ag re e wi th t

hat argume nt, the re me dy wo uld be to make the first para g raph of § 205 retroa ctive. See W auchope
v . U .S

. Dep ’t of S tate , 985 F.2d 1407, 1418 ( 9th Cir. 1993).F R I EN D V

. H OL DER 9

Th a t wou l d

s t i l l l e av e M r
. F r i e n d

u n a b l e t o m e e tth e f

i r st para g raph’ s require ment that his p aternity have be en e s t a b l i s h e d b y l e g i t i m a t i o no r

a d j u d i c a t i o nd

ur i n g m i n o r i ty. Th a t r e qu i r e m e n t , a l t h o u g h i mp o s e d o n l y o n f a th e r s, is constitutional. See Tuan Anh Nguyen , 533 U.S. at 62, 70; Ablang , 52 F .3 d a t 80 5– 06

. Thus , it wo uld surv ive even if Mr

. F r ie n d

p r e v a il e d

o nh is e qu a l p r o te c ti o nar g u me nt reg arding the g ender

discriminatory

nature of § 205’s
re tr oa c tiv e e ff

e c t.
AF F IRMED.