UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

JAMES SILCOX, )

)

Petitioner, )

) Case No. 3:13-CV-234-JVB

v. )

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

James Silcox, a pro se prisoner, filed this habeas corpus petition challenging the prison

disciplinary hearing (MCF 13-01-52) that was held on January 11, 2013, where he was found

guilty by the Discipline Hearing Body (DHB) at the Miami Correctional Facility of violating the

law by interfering with the reporting of a crime in violation of A-100, deprived of 180 days

earned credit time, and demoted to credit class 2. Silcox raises four grounds in his petition. 

First, Silcox alleges that the sanctions were excessively harsh. However, harshness is not

a valid basis for challenging a DHB punishment that is within the range of the offence for which

the inmate was found guilty. Cf. United States ex rel. Long v. Pate, 418 F.2d 1028, 1031 (7th

Cir. 1970) (Where a sentence is “within the range established by the legislature . . . this court

will not [on habeas corpus review] question the trial judge’s discretion in imposing sentence, nor

will it question the refusal of the Illinois Supreme Court to reconsider appellant’s petition for

reduction of sentence.”) Here, the punishment imposed was within the limits permitted by The

Disciplinary Code for Adult Offenders1

 for a Class A offense. Therefore Ground One is not a

basis for habeas corpus relief.

1

 Maximum punishments are set out on page 37 of Policy 02-04-101. See http://www.in.gov/idoc/3265.htm.
Second, Silcox alleges that the hearing officer was not an impartial decision maker. 

An inmate facing disciplinary charges has the right to an impartial decisionmaker.

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 571. But “the constitutional standard for impermissible bias is

high,” Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003), and an adjudicator is

entitled to a presumption of “honesty and integrity” absent clear evidence to the

contrary, see Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S. Ct. 1456, 43 L. Ed. 2d 712

(1975). Due process requires disqualification of a decisionmaker who was

directly or substantially involved in the underlying incident, Gaither, 236 F.3d at

820, and we have assumed that a decisionmaker might likewise be impermissibly

biased if his spouse is a crucial witness in the proceeding, see Eads v. Hanks, 280

F.3d 728, 729 (7th Cir. 2002). A hearing officer is not automatically deemed

biased, however, simply because he adjudicated or was involved in a previous

disciplinary charge against the prisoner. See Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666-67; Pannell,

306 F.3d at 502. 

Perotti v. Marberry, 355 Fed. Appx. 39, 43 (7th Cir. 2009). Here, Silcox has not provided any

explanation for why he believes that the hearing officer was biased. There is no indication in the

record that the hearing officer was otherwise involved in the underlying incident or its

investigation. Therefore this unsupported allegation is insufficient to warrant habeas corpus

relief. 

In his Third and Fourth Grounds, Silcox presents different reasons why he believes there

was insufficient evidence to find him guilty. He alleges that the evidence was contradictory. 

However, “[t]he Federal Constitution does not require evidence that logically precludes any

conclusion but the one reached by the disciplinary board.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,

457 (1985). Alternatively, he alleges that because he did not know that there was a criminal

investigation or that Elmore was a suspect, he could not have interfered with the reporting of a

crime. 

The Report of Conduct charged Silcox with relaying a message to “Ms. Elmore NOT to

cooperate, or speak with anyone about” a case involving Offender Thomas in violation of

2
Indiana Code 35-45-2-5. (DE 4-1 at 1.) That statute provides that “[a] person who, with the

intent to . . . conceal . . . a crime, knowingly or intentionally interferes with or prevents an

individual from . . . making a report to a law enforcement officer; commits interference with the

reporting of a crime, a Class A misdemeanor.” In his traverse, Silcox argues that he had a First

Amendment right to ask his sister to tell Roberta Elmore not to talk to anyone. The DHB listened

to a phone call with his sister and Silcox does not dispute the accuracy of its Summary of

Evidence. (DE 4-1 at 2.) Rather he merely argues that the summary does not say that he

mentioned Offender Thomas or the police during that call. However, Thomas’s statement says

that he asked Silcox to call Roberta Elmore and ask her not to talk to anyone. (DE 4-3 at 3.) This

links the call back to Thomas. Though Thomas also said that he did not tell Silcox why he did

not want Elmore to talk to anyone, DHD did not have to believe that statement. Moreover, even

if Thomas did not tell Silcox the reason for the request, it was not unreasonable for the DHB to

have concluded that Silcox believed that his call was an attempt to prevent Elmore from talking

to the police. Federal courts do not independently assess witness credibility or re-weigh the

evidence in prison disciplinary cases. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985). 

[T]he findings of a prison disciplinary board [need only] have the support of some

evidence in the record. This is a lenient standard, requiring no more than a

modicum of evidence. Even meager proof will suffice, so long as the record is not

so devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without

support or otherwise arbitrary. Although some evidence is not much, it still must

point to the accused’s guilt. It is not our province to assess the comparative

weight of the evidence underlying the disciplinary board’s decision. 

Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks, citations, parenthesis,

and ellipsis omitted). Here, it was not an unreasonable inference for the DHB to have concluded

that the purpose of Silcox’s statements to his sister was an effort to prevent Roberta Elmore from

3
talking to the police about Offender Thomas. As such, there is sufficient evidence that he was

guilty of violating the law. 

For the foregoing reasons, the habeas corpus petition is DENIED. 

SO ORDERED on February 24, 2015.

 S/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

4