NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STEPHEN FRANK KARBAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

VIVIAN BALTIERRA, Deputy Warden at 

Eyman Complex, Cook Unit Prison; 

STEVEN BRENNAN, Corrections Office 

(Captain) #2304 at Eyman Complex; 

CHARLES L. RYAN, Director, Arizona 

Department of Corrections; RON LEE, 

Security Operations Manager at Arizona 

Department of Corrections, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 21-15548 

D.C. No. 2:19-cv-04377-DWL 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Dominic Lanza, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 17, 2022**

Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

Arizona state prisoner Stephen Frank Karban appeals pro se from the district 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAY 24 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 21-15548 

court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims. We 

review de novo. Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 2016) 

(summary judgment); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and 

remand.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Karban’s due 

process claim against defendant Brennan because Karban failed to raise a genuine 

dispute of material fact as to whether the temporary loss of privileges resulting 

from a disciplinary violation that was dismissed through the prison’s 

administrative appeal process imposed an atypical and significant hardship. See 

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (under the Due Process 

Clause, a prisoner may challenge a state disciplinary action only if it “deprives or 

restrains a state-created liberty interest in some ‘unexpected manner’” or “imposes 

some ‘atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 

incidents of prison life’” (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995))).

However, summary judgment was improper on Karban’s retaliation claim 

against defendant Baltierra. The record reflects that, approximately two weeks 

after Karban filed a grievance, Baltierra requested Karban be transferred. In the 

transfer request, Baltierra stated Karban was “not a yard problem, [and] likes 

paperwork.” Additionally, Karban submitted a declaration stating that he had not 
3 21-15548 

had issues with other inmates or staff prior to his transfer. Taking this evidence in 

the light most favorable to Karban, a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to 

whether Baltierra retaliated against Karban. See Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 

1269 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth elements of a retaliation claim in the prison 

context); Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that prison 

officials may not rely on an otherwise legitimate penological interest “as a cover or 

ruse to silence and punish [an inmate] because he filed grievances”). We reverse 

and remand for further proceedings on this claim.

The district court properly dismissed Karban’s access-to-courts claim 

against defendants Ryan and Lee because Karban failed to allege facts sufficient to 

establish these defendants caused an actual injury to a nonfrivolous claim. See

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-54 (1996) (setting forth elements of an accessto-courts claim and explaining that that right of access to the courts is the “right to 

bring to court a grievance that the inmate wishe[s] to present,” not a right “to 

litigate effectively once in court” (emphasis omitted)).

Karban’s motion for appointment of counsel (Docket Entry No. 20) is 

denied.

The parties will bear their own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.