FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V EN T H C IR C U IT SEPT 2, 2008 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 07- 1484 9

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 06-00229 -CV -2 DOUGLAS ASPHALT CO., JOEL H. SPIVEY, KYLE SPIVEY, Pl ai nt iff s- App el le es , ve rs us QORE, INC., APPLIED TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC., Defen da nt s, GEORGENE M. GE ARY, GLENN D URRENCE, GUOHUA L IAN, a.k .a. Geor ge Lian , PAUL V. MULLINS, GREG MAYO, LARRY MATTHEW S, HAROLD LINNENKOHL, RICK DOUDS, Defen da nt s- App el la nt s.Honora ble Donald M. Middlebrooks, United States D istrict J udg e for the Southern * District of F lorida, sitting by desig nation. 2 ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the S outhe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (S ep te m be r 2, 200 8) Be fo re W IL SO N , P RY O R and M ID D L E BR O O K S, Ci rc uit Jud ge s. * W IL SO N, Circuit Judge: Appe llants G eo rg en e M. G eary , G le n D ur re nc e, G uohu a “ G eo rg e” L ian, Paul V . Mullins, G rey

May o, L arry

Matthews, Harold Linnenkoh l, and Rick D ouds , ( co lle ct ive ly , “ G D O T of fi ci al s” ) ar e gove rnm en t of fi ci al s f or the G eo rg ia De partm ent of T ransportation (“ GD OT ”). T he GD OT officials appeal the district court’ s denial in part of their m otion for j udgm ent on the pleadin gs, finding th at the officials w ere not sh ielded from liabilityby

their defense of qualified imm un it y wit h re sp ectto App el le es ’ “ cl as s o f on e” eq ua l p ro te ct io n c la im . Appe lle es D ougl as A spha lt Co m pany , ahig hw ay

pavin g c ontra ct or , and i ts owners and principals, Joel H . S pivey and Ky le Spivey

(collectively , “ Douglas”) alleged that the GD OT wr ongl y singled Dougl as out and treated it differe ntly than all other paving con tractors in violation of the equal protection clause. B ecause a3

“ class of one” claim

is not legallycognizable under the circum stances of this case, and because Douglas failed to adequately allege a sim ilarly

situated com

parator, the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

in al low ing the c la im

to sur viv e the m oti on f

or j udgm en t on the ple ad ing s. I n so hol din g, w e re ly he av ily on the S upr em e Co urt’ s de ci sio n in E ngqu ist v . O re gon D ep art

m en t of A gri cu ltu re , ___

U . S. ___ , 128 S . Ct . 214 6,

___ L . E d. 2d. ___ , ( 2008 ), an op ini on that, due to its r ec en t pu bli catio n, w as not av ai la ble to the dis tr ic t c ourt f

or c onsi de ratio n. A cc or din gly , w e re ve rs e an d re m an d. I. BACKGROUND In199 6 and 2 000, the G D O T aw ar de d tw o c onstru ct ionc ontra ct s to D ougl as . T he 199 6 c ontra ct ( the “ I- 95 p ro

j ec t” ) re qui re d D ougl as to m ill and re sur fa ce appr oxi m at el y

e le ve n m ile s of

I nte rs tate 95 i n M ac In tos h and G ly nn Co unt ie s, G eo rg ia . T he 200 0 c ontra ct ( the “ I- 75 p ro

j ec t” ) re qui re d D ougl as to pave part s of

I nte rs tate 75, c ondu ct

br idg e re habil itatio n, and w ide n r oa ds i n Turner and Crisp Counties, Ge orgia. T he GD OT required that both projects w ere to be pe rfo rm edus in g asp eci fie d a m ou ntof h y dr at edli m e in th e as ph al t m ix . Hy drated lim e is used to reduce the susceptibil ity of the asphalt to m oistu re dam ag e an d, if

not use d inthe pr ope r am ount s, m ay r es ult in pothol es , str ipp ing or oth er pr obl em s. D ougl as ’ s pe rf orm an ce on the I -9 5 pr oj ec t sp anne d f ro m 199 6-4

1 9 9 7 an d , i n2 0 0 0 , th e G DOT i s s u edi t s ac ce p t an ce o f t h e w o rk . Do u g l as ’s perform ance on the I-75 proj ect encountered unanticipated delay s that culm inated in th e GDOT ass es si ng Dou gl as wit h $ 84 2,1 00 in li qu id at edda m ag es . I n 20 03, G D O T be gan no tic ing sur fa ce pr obl em s onboth po rt ion s of I -9 5 an d I -7 5 th at

w er e re pave d by

D ougl as . T he G D O T uti liz ed anum be r of te sti ng pr oc ed ur es to de te rmine the li m e co nte nt i n th e as pha lt. B ec au se the te st r es ult s show ed an in suf fi ci en cy of li m e, the G D O T r eque ste d th at D ougl as r ep la ce the defective asphalt. Douglas ref used, contending that the testing p rocedures w ere unr el ia ble and i na cc ur at e. O n January 26, 200 4, the G D O T de cl ar ed D ougl as in de fa ult on the I -9 5 pr oj ec t f

or f ai lin g to r em ove and r ep la ce se ve n lo ts o f as pha lt on I -9 5. O n Apr il 16, 200 4, the G D O T r eque ste d bi ds t o r ep av e the de fe ct ive portio ns o f I- 95 ( the “ I- 95 r ep av e pr oj ec t” ). A lth oughD ougl as w as the low es t bidd er, all bids were rej ected at that tim e. O n July2, 2004, the G DO T se nt a letter t o D o u g l a s s t a t i n g th a tt e s t s p e r f o rme do nth e I - 7 5 p r o

j e c t , w h i c hw e r e th e s ame te sts uti liz ed

on the I -9 5 pr oj ec t, sho w ed ins uf fi ci en t l im e co nte nt. A s it ha d do ne w iththe I -9 5 pr oj ec t, the G D O T r eque ste d th at D ougl as r em edy

the de fi ci en ci es . D ougl as ult im at el y

r ef use d, a ga in c ont en din g th at the te sts w er e fa

ulty and inaccurate.5

On J ul y 16 , 20 04 , th e GDOT in it ia te d are-b idof t he I-9 5 re pa vi ng pro ject. T he r e- bid

pr opos al c ont ai ne d aspe ci al pr ovi sio n, de sig ne d to e xpe dit e the pr oc es s, sti pul at ing that the ne wc ontra ct m ust be a cc ep te d by

the suc ce ssf

ul bidd er by 1:00 p .m . on July

27, 2004, and that such bi dder m ust sig n the contract an d e xe cute the pr ope r bond s no late r than 9: 00 a . m . on July 30, 200 4. F ai lur e to co m ply w iththe sti pul at ion s e quate d to ar ej ec tio n of the bid . D ougl as w as a ga in the low es t bi dde r an d w as ini tia lly aw ar de d th e co ntr ac t. T he G D O T did not not if y D ougl as of

it s su cc es sf

ul b id. T he f

our -d ay a cc ep tanc e pe ri od l ap se d on July 30, re sultin g in cancellation of the contract. Later that sam e day , the c ontract w as aw ar de d to the se co nd l ow es t bi dde r, S ea board Co nstru ct ionCo m

pany , a/k/ a Pl an t Im pr ov em en t Co m

pa ny (“ Pl an t Im

pr ov em en t” ). Als o o n t ha t s am e d ay , a GD OT repre sentative noti fied Plant Im provem ent that it was the successful bidder. Approxim ately

two m onth s later, on October 4, 2004 , the G DO T dec lared D ougl as in de fa

ult on the I -7 5 pr oj ec t f

or f ai lur e to r em ove and r ep la ce the de fe ct ive lot s of

a spha lt. O n Augus t 10 , 200 6, the G D O T r em ove d D ougl as f ro m th e li stof p ot en ti al bi dd ers forGDOT pro jects . In200 4 and 2 005, D ougl as sue d th e G D O T in the S upe ri or Co urts o f Fu lto n an d T ur ne r Co unt ie s, G eo rg ia , f

or br ea ch es of

c ontra ct . O n O ct obe r 10, 200 6, D ougl as f ile d th e ins tant a ct iona sse rt ing , int er a lia , an e qua l pr ote ct ionc la im6

unde r 42 U . S. C. § 19 83. D ougl as a lle ge d th at the G D O T of

fi ci al s kn ow ing ly uti liz ed f al se and i na cc ur at e te sts on the I -9 5 and I -7 5 pr oj ec ts, and that the te sts had never “been used for this purpo se in the known un iverse.” D ougl as further al le ge d th at

it w as sin gle d out f

or dis parate tr eatm en t by

the G D O T ’ s f

ai lur e to pr ov id e Dou gl as wit h n ot ic e o f it s s uc ces sf ul bi d. O n O ct obe r 1, 200 7, upo n th e G D O T of fi ci al s’ m oti on f

or j udgm en t onthe pleadings , the district court held that Douglas’ s equal protection claim survived the of fi ci al s’ de fe nse of

qua lif ie d im m uni ty . T he G D O T of

fi ci al s ti m el y

f ile d th ei r not ic e of appe al on O ct obe r 1, 200 7.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW W e re vie wthe de nia l of

am oti on f

or j udgm en t onthe ple ad ing s de no vo . Cannon v. City of W

est Palm Be ach , 25 0 F .3d12 99 , 13 01 (11 th Cir . 20 01 ). Judg m en t onthe ple ad ing s is appr opr iate w he n th er e ar e no m at er ia l f ac ts i n di sp ut e an d t he m ov in g p art y is en ti tl edto jud gm en t as a m at te r of law. I d. A ll fa ct s a lle ge d inthe c om

pla int m ust be a cc ep te d a s tr

ue and v ie w ed

in the li ght m os t fa vo rab le to th e n on m ov in g p art y . Id . L ike w ise , our

r ev ie wis de nov o “ [o ] n an in te rl oc uto ry appe al f ro m the denial of qualified im

m unity .” Kj el lse n v . M

ill s , 517 F. 3d 12 32, 1236 (11t h Cir. 2008 ).7 III. DISC USSION Q ua lif ie d im m uni ty pr ote ct s lawe nf

or ce m en t of

fi ci al s f ro m § 19 83 s uit s f

or ci vil dam ag es ari sin g f

ro m the dis ch ar ge of

the ir dis cr et ion ar

y f unc tio ns “ as lon g as their actions could reasonablyhave been though t consist ent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.” A nde rso n v . Crei ghton, 483 U.S . 635, 638, 107 S. Ct. 3034 , 3038, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987). I t is well established that a plaintiff se ek ing to ove rc om e the de fe ndant’ s pr ivi le ge of qua lif ie d im m uni ty m ust sho w (1 ) that the of

fi ce r vio late d he r fe de ra l c onst itutio na l or statut or y r igh ts, and ( 2) th atth os e ri gh ts were cl earl y est ab li sh edat t he ti m e th e o ffi cer a ct ed . Se e W ils on v. L ay ne , 5 2 6 U.S . 6 0 3 , 6 0 9 , 1 1 9 S. Ct . 1 6 9 2 , 1 6 9 7 , 1 4 3 L. Ed . 2 d8 1 8 (1 9 9 9 ). We fi rs t tur n to w he the r D ougl as ha s a sse rt ed the vio latio n of

ac onst itutio na l r igh t. T he “ cl as s of

one ” the or

y take n up by

D ougl as w as f

ir st e xpr es sly re co gni ze d by

the S upr em e Co urt i n Village of W illowbro ok v. Ole ch , 528 U. S. 562, 120 S . Ct . 107 3, 145 L . E d. 2d 1 060 (2 000) ( pe r curi am). I n Olec h , the V ill ag e of

W ill owbr ook co ndi tio ne d th e co nne ct ionof the pla int if

fs ’ pr ope rty

to the m uni ci pa l w at er

sup ply upo n th e gr an t of

a33- fo ot e as em en t, w hil e the V ill ag e requi redon ly a 15 -fo oteas em en t fr om othe r si m il arl y

si tu at edpro pe rty owne rs . Id . at 5 63 , 12 0 S . Ct. at10 74 . Olec h he ld that the pla int if fs suc ce ssf

ull y state d a cl as s- of -o ne c la im

by a lle gin g th at

the y w er e int en tio na lly

tr eate d di ff

er en tly f ro m8

oth er s si m ilarl y

sit uate d and the re w as no r at ion al ba sis f or the dif fe re nc e in tre at m en t. Id . a t 56 5, 120 S . Ct . a t 10 75. D ougl as , r el y ing on Olec h , a sserts that the G D O T int en tio na lly

tr eate d it dif fe re ntl y w ith out ar at ion al ba sis by : ( 1) autho ri zi ng i nva lid

te sti ng p ro ce dur es that w er e not pe rf orm ed on o the rs ; and ( 2) fa ili ng t o no tif

y D ougl as of

it s w inn ing bid

on the I -9 5 r e- pave pr oj ec t whe n P lant Im pr ovm en t, the se co nd- low es t bi dde r, w as so n oti fi ed . T he S upr em e Co urt r ec en tly r ev isi te d th e cl as s- of

-o ne the or

y in Engquist v. O re gon D ep art

m en t of A gri cu ltu re , ___

U . S. ___ , 128 S . Ct . 214 6, ___ L . E d. 2d. ___, (2008), where a

state em ploy ee alleged that she had been ef fectively laid off for “ arbitrar

y , vindictive, and m alicious reasons.” Id . at _

__ , 12 8 S . Ct. at21 49 . The C ourt began bysetting forth the “ long held view that there is a crucial dif fe re nc e, w ithr es pe ct

to co nst itutio na l ana ly sis , be tw ee n th e gove rnm en t ex er ci sin g ‘ the pow er

to re gul at e or

li ce nse , a s law m ak er , ’ and the gov er nm en t acting ‘ as proprietor, to m anage its internal operation.’ ” Id. at ___, 128 S. C t. at 2151 ( al te ratio n om itt ed ) (quot ing Ca fe te ria &R es t. W

ork er s v . M cElro y , 367 U. S. 886, 896, 81 S. C t. 1743, 6 L . E d. 2d 1230 (1961)). The C ourt explained th at

“ ‘ [t] he governm ent’ s interest in achieving it s goals as effec tively and effic iently

as poss ibl e is e le vate d f

ro m ar el at ive ly

sub or din at e int er es t whe n it a ct s a s so ve re ign to a significant on e when it acts as em ploy er. ’ ” Id . ( quot ing W

ate rs v . Ch urc hil l ,9

511 U . S. 661 , 675 , 114 S . Ct . 187 8, 188 8, 128 L . E d. 2d 6 86 ( 1994 ) (p lur al ity opi nio n) . T he gov er

nm en t, the re fo re , “ ha s si gni fi cantl y gr eate r le ew ay

in its de al ing s w ithc iti ze n e m

plo y ee s th anit

doe s whe n it

br ing s it s so ve re ignpow er to bear on citizens at lar ge.” Id . The C ourt further explained that em ploym ent decisionm aking is an en te rp ri se that i s “ of

te n su bj ec tiv e an d in div idu al iz ed , r es tin g onaw ide arr ay of factors that ar e difficult to articulate and qu antify .” Id . at _

__ , 12 8 S . Ct. at21 54 . T his is in c ontra st t o th e re gul at ioninOle ch , where “ the existence of a c lear standard a ga ins t whic h de part

ur es , e ve n f

or asin gle pla int if

f, c [an] be r ea dil y assessed.” Id . a t __

_, 128 S . Ct . a t 21 53. T o tr eat l ike e m plo y ee s di ff

er en tly is not to v iol at e the e qua l pr ote ct ionc lause ; r athe r, it is ana cc ep te d c onse que nc e of “ the broad discretion th at ty

pically chara cterize s the em

ploy er-e m

ploy ee r elationshi p.” Id . a t __ _, 128 S . Ct . a t 21 55. A s ar es ult , the Co urt he ld that “ the c la ss- of -o ne theory of equal protection has no app lication in th e public em ploym ent context.” Id . at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 2156. In ar riving at this conclusion , the C ourt was guided

“by the ‘ co m m on- se nse r ea liz at ionthat go ve rnm en t of fi ce s c oul d no t f

unc tio n if every em ploym ent decision b ecam e a c onsti tutio nal m atter. ’ ” Id . ( quot ing Co nni ck v . M ye rs , 461 U . S. 138 , 143 , 103 S . Ct . 168 4, 168 8, 75 L . E d. 2d 7 08 (1983)).10

W e have li ttl e tr oubl e ap ply ing the r ea soni ng i n E ngqu ist , dir ec te d at a

the gove rnm en t- em

plo y ee r el at ion shi p, to the c ir cum stanc es in thi s c as e inv olv ing a gove rnm en t- co ntr ac tor

r el at ion shi p. I n Board of Coun ty Comm issio ners v. U m be hr , 518 U. S. 668, 116 S. Ct. 2342 , 135 L. Ed. 2d 843 (1996), the Court ad dr es se d whe the r ind ep en de nt c ontra ct or s m ay br ing a§ 19 83 r et al iatio n c la im when a governm ent entity has acted against the contractor’ s exercise of free sp eech . Id . a t 67 1- 73, 116 S . Ct . a t 23 45- 46. H av ing ne ve r ad dr es se d th e iss ue in the ind ep en de nt c ontra ct or c ont ex t, the Co urt a

ppl ie d it s go ve rnm en t e m plo ym en t pr eced en ts to th e que st io n. Id . a t 67 3- 74, 116 S . Ct . a t 23 46- 47. I t di d so be ca use of the “ obvi ous” similari tie s be tw ee n go ve rnm en t e m plo y ee s and g ove rnm en t co nt ract or s wi th res pe ctto th e is su e. Id . a t 67 4, 116 S . Ct . 234 7. S pe ci fi ca lly , the Co urt e xpl ai ne d th at

“ [t ] he gov er

nm en t ne ed s to be f

re e to t er m inate both e mp l o ye e s an dc o n tr a c t o r s f o r p o o r p e r f o rman c e , t o i mp r o v e th e e f f i c i e n c y, ef fi ca cy , and r es pons ive ne ss o f se rv ic e to the pub lic , and t o pr ev en t the appearance of corr

uptio n.” Id . at 674, 116 S. Ct. at 2347. T he Court further ar tic ulate d th at

“ ab se nt c ontra ct

ua l, statut or

y , or c onst itutio na l r es tr ic tio n, the governm ent is entitled to term inate [em ploy ees and contractors] for no rea son at all.” Id . Just as in th e em

ploy ee context, and in th e absence of a re stricting cont ract11

or statut e, de ci sio ns i nvol vin g go ve rnm en t c ontra ct or s r equir e br oa d di sc re tio n that m ay r es t “ on a

w ide arr ay

of f ac tor s th at

are dif fi cu lt to art ic ulate and quantify .” E

ngqu ist , ___ U. S. at ___, 128 S. C t. at 2154 . W e hold, theref ore, that E ngqu ist c ontro ls this c as e an d m ak es c le ar that D ougl as f

ai le d to a sse rt

a co gn iz ab le rig htto equa l p ro te ct io n. Hav in g fo un d n o c on st itut io na l v io la ti on , we do no t re ach th e cl earl y

est ab li sh edpro ng of t he qu al ifi edimm un it y an al y si s. W e also agree with the alter native argum ent of the GD OT officials that D ougl as f ai le d to a de quate ly

a lle ge the similarl y

sit uate d c om

pone nt o f its c la ssof -o ne c la im . “ [T ] his c ir cu it, a lon g w ithoth er s, ha s ti ght en ed the appl ic at ionof Ru le 8 w ithr es pe ct

to § 19 83 c as es in ane ff ort t o w ee d out no nm er ito ri ous cl ai m s, re qui ri ng that a

§ 19 83 p la int if

f al le ge w ithsom e spe ci fi ci ty the f ac ts whic h m ak e out its claim .” G

JR I nv s. , I nc . v . Co unt

y of E sc am bia , 132 F . 3d 1 359, 136 7 ( 11th Ci r. 199 8) . Whe n a

§ 19 83 c la im

is ch al le nge d onqua lif

ie d im m uni ty gr ound s,

“ we are guided b oth bythe regular 12(b)(6) standard and by the heightened pleading requirem ent.” I d. Mo re part ic ularl y , w ithr es pe ct to a cl as s- of

-o ne claim , “ we are oblig ed to apply the ‘ sim ilarly

situated’ requirem ent with rigor. ” G rif fin I ndus . , I nc . v . I rv in , 496 F . 3d 1 189, 120 7 ( 11th C ir . 200 7) . I n th e com plaint, Douglas alleged that the GD OT officer s’ use of the testing procedures wa s unprecedented. T his is in sufficient. Douglas m ust do m ore than assert that12

oth er , uni de nti fi ed

c ontra ct or s w er e giv enbe tte r tr eatm en t. See G JR Invs. , I

nc. , 132 F.3d at 1367 -68 (“ Bare allegations that ‘other’ applicants, even ‘ all other’ ap pli cants , w er e tr eate d di ff er en tly do n ot s tate an e qua l pr ote ct ionc la im ; a com plaint m ust attem pt to sh ow in som e fa shion that these ‘ other’ applicants were sit uate d si m ilarl y

to the pla int if

f. ”) . D ougl as m

ust ide nti fy an in stanc e in whic h a sim ilarl y sit uate d c ontra ct or

c om ple te d it s pr oj ec t w ith out be ing sub

j ec t t o th e sa m e te st in g p ro cedur es . Se e id. at 1367 (dism issin g the class-of-one claim wher e the com plaint failed to “ present a single instance” in which the com parator w as sim ilarl y sit uate d to the pla int if

f) . B ec au se D ougl as did

not suf fi ci en tly pa rti cu la riz e a s im il arl y

si tu at edco m

pa rat or , itfai ls to st at e a cl as s- of -o ne cla im . W ithr es pe ct

to the a lle gatio n th at

the G D O T f

ai le d to pr ovi de D ougl as w ith not ic e of it s su cc es sf

ul b id o n th e I- 95 r ep av ing pr oj ec t, the c om pla int a ga in f ai ls to allege a sim ilarly

situated com

parator. A lthou gh Douglas, in this in stance, nam ed aspe ci fi c co m

parator ( Pl an t I m

pr ove m en t) , the c om

pla int f ai ls t o a lle ge that P lant I m

pr ove m en t w as similarl y

sit uate d “ in l igh t of

a ll the f ac tor s th at

w oul d ha ve be en ob

jecti ve ly reaso nabl e” t o t he GDOT offi ci al s. Griffin Indus. Inc. , 496 F. 3d at 12 07 ( hol din g th at pla int if f fa ile d to a lle ge the c om

parator w as similarl y sit uate d “ in l igh t of

a ll the f ac tor s th at

w oul d be r el ev an t t o an ob j ec tiv el y reasonable governm ental decisionm aker”) . As indicated by the district courtThe GD OT dec lare d Doug las to be in defa ult on the I -75 projec t on October 4, 2004, 1 approximately

two months after the bidding on the I -95 re pavingprojec t had conc luded. 13 below, Ge orgia law does notrequire the G DO T to aw ard the construction cont ract to the low es t bi dde r. R athe r, the appl ic ab le lawpr ovi de s th e G D O T w ith dis cr et ionto aw ar d th e co ntr ac t t o th e “ low es t reliable bi dd er.” Ga. Co de Ann . § 32 -2 -6 9( a) (e m

ph as is ad de d) . The co m

pl ai ntcle arl y

set s fo rth th atth e GDOT vie w ed D ougl as a s havin g pe rf

orm ed poo rl y on b oththe I -9 5 and I -7 5 pr oj ec ts, an d w as de cl ar ed

to be in de fa

ult on the I -9 5 pr oj ec t. T he re is no i ndi catio n inthe 1 com plaint th at Plant had a sim ilar history of poor perform ance w ith the GD OT . It co m es a s no sur

pr ise that D ougl as w oul d be tr eate d di ff er en tly giv enthat the G D O T w as sol ic iti ng b ids f or the r ep av ing of

the ve ry a spha lt that D ougl as ha d, in th e GDOT’ s eyes, i m

pr op erl y lai d. Gi ve n t he pri orhi st ory be twee n t he GDOT an d D ougl as , w e cannot

hol d th at D ougl as suf

fi ci en tly a lle ge d P lant I m

pr ove m en t as similarl y

sit uate d w ithr es pe ct

to the se le ct ionof

bid s onthe I -9 5 r ep av ing pr oj ec t. IV. CONCLUSION Be ca use w e hol d th at

D ougl as f

ai le d to e sta

bli sh a le ga lly c ogni za ble “ cl as s of one” claim , and because, alter natively , D ougl as failed to adequately allege a sim ilarl y sit uate d c om

parator , w e re ve rs e an d r em an d f or f urthe r pr oc ee din gs14

co nsi ste nt w iththi s op ini on. REVERSED AND REMANDED.