UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

 v. 

DANIEL HASLAM 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Case No. 3:13-CR-013 JD 

 3:13-CR-109 

 3:17-CV-653 

OPINION AND ORDER

Daniel Haslam was charged with a variety of firearm and controlled substance offenses 

arising out of his manufacturing of methamphetamine and his possession of firearms and 

silencers. He pled guilty in return for the government’s agreement to dismiss a count that would 

have carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 30 years. The parties agreed in the plea 

agreement to a binding floor of 180 months of imprisonment, and the Court accepted that 

agreement. Mr. Haslam later moved to withdraw his plea, but the Court denied that motion and 

ultimately sentenced Mr. Haslam to a term of 181 months. On appeal, Mr. Haslam argued that 

his plea was not knowing and voluntary and that the government breached the plea agreement. 

The court of appeals rejected both arguments and affirmed. 

Mr. Haslam now seeks to vacate his convictions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He argues that 

he is innocent of one count, that his sentence on another count is unlawful, and that he 

misunderstood the government’s ability to present evidence of other alleged criminal conduct at 

sentencing. He argues that each of these issues was the result of his attorney’s ineffective 

assistance. For the following reasons, the Court finds that Mr. Haslam is not entitled to relief and 

that no hearing is required on these claims, so it denies Mr. Haslam’s motion. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

Mr. Haslam came to the attention of law enforcement when a woman named Laci Sample 

reported that he battered her and confined her at his home. Ms. Sample had been dating Mr. 
2 

Haslam for a couple weeks at the time of the incident. She reported that Mr. Haslam became 

suspicious that she was an undercover officer, after which he began beating her and held her 

against her will over two days. She further reported that, during that time, Mr. Haslam repeatedly 

screwed and unscrewed several homemade silencers onto the end of a gun barrel, and that he 

fired multiple shots into the floor. In response to Ms. Sample’s report, officers executed a search 

warrant at Mr. Haslam’s home. They found evidence that he had been manufacturing 

methamphetamine. They also discovered several firearms and a number of devices that appeared 

to be homemade silencers. [DE 1]. 

Mr. Haslam was federally indicted on four counts. Count 1 charged that Mr. Haslam 

possessed an unregistered silencer, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). Count 2 charged that he 

manufactured methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Count 3 charged that he 

possessed firearms equipped with a silencer in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Count 4 charged that he possessed firearms as an unlawful user 

of controlled substances, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). Most notably, Count 3 carried a 

mandatory minimum sentence of 30 years of imprisonment because it involved a firearm 

equipped with a silencer. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii). 

Leading up to trial, the parties began negotiating a plea agreement under which the 

government would agree to dismiss Count 3 in return for an agreement to a binding floor of 15 

years of imprisonment. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C). The first plea agreement offered by the 

government had Mr. Haslam agreeing to plead guilty to the remaining three counts and to an 

information charging him with discharging a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 

which carried a 10-year minimum sentence, § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), as compared to the 30-year 

minimum in Count 3. The factual basis set forth in that plea agreement recounted Ms. Sample’s 
3 

allegations of battery and confinement. [DE 146-1 p. 6–7]. However, while Mr. Haslam was 

willing to admit to unlawfully possessing firearms and silencers and to manufacturing 

methamphetamine, he denied Ms. Sample’s allegations, so he was unwilling to accept that 

agreement. 

The government therefore offered an amended plea agreement that removed Ms. 

Sample’s allegations from the factual basis. The agreement still required Mr. Haslam to plead 

guilty to the information charging that he discharged a firearm in furtherance of a drug 

trafficking crime. Mr. Haslam denied that he discharged the firearm in furtherance of a drug 

trafficking crime, though. Accordingly, the government offered a third plea agreement under 

which the information charged only that Mr. Haslam possessed the firearm in furtherance of a 

drug trafficking crime, which carries a minimum sentence of 5 years. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). 

Mr. Haslam accepted that version of the plea agreement, and the Court referred the plea 

to a magistrate judge to conduct a change of plea hearing. At that hearing on September 19, 

2013, Mr. Haslam stated under oath that he had read and understood the plea agreement. [DE 92 

p. 18]. He also stated that there were not any promises that were causing him to plead guilty that 

were not contained in the written plea agreement. Id. p. 18–19. The plea agreement itself 

likewise stated, “[o]ther than what is contained in this plea agreement, no predictions, promises, 

or representations have been made to me as to the specific sentence that will be imposed or any 

other matter,” and that “no promises have been made to me other than those contained in this 

petition.” [DE 52 ¶¶ 9(l), 12]. The agreement further noted, “The defendant fully understands 

that the United States of America has reserved the right to tell the Sentencing Court the good 

things about him, and the bad things about him, and has reserved the right to fully inform the 

Court of the nature and extent of his offense(s).” Id. ¶ 9(g). After receiving all of the advisements 
4 

under Rule 11, Mr. Haslam pled guilty to possessing unregistered silencers (Count 1); 

manufacturing methamphetamine (Count 2); possessing firearms as an unlawful user of 

controlled substances (Count 4); and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking 

crime (the information). The magistrate judge recommended that the Court accept the pleas. 

At that point, the government sent the probation office a memorandum containing its 

version of the offense conduct, for use in preparing the Presentence Report. The government’s 

memorandum included Ms. Sample’s allegations of battery and confinement. Based on those 

allegations, the Presentence Report calculated the Sentencing Guidelines by using a crossreference to the guideline for unlawful restraint, and it also applied enhancements for serious 

bodily injury and restraining a victim, among other enhancements. Mr. Haslam, by counsel, 

submitted a number of objections to the Presentence Report. As relevant here, he argued that the 

Sample allegations were outside the scope of relevant conduct for his offenses of conviction, and 

he also denied the truth of those allegations. The Court thus set an evidentiary hearing, which 

spanned two days of testimony, and took the objections under advisement. At the 

commencement of that hearing on December 20, 2013, the Court accepted Mr. Haslam’s guilty 

pleas and the plea agreement. Up until that point, Mr. Haslam had an absolute right to withdraw 

his plea for any reason. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(1). He did not do so during that time, even after 

becoming aware that the government was raising the Sample incident and that those details were 

included in the Presentence Report. 

After the conclusion of hearing, though, Mr. Haslam did move to withdraw his guilty 

plea. His primary argument was that the government breached the plea agreement. He contended 

that, by deleting Ms. Sample’s allegations from the factual basis in the plea agreement, the 

government was agreeing not to raise any of those allegations at sentencing, and that the 
5 

government breached that agreement. He also argued in passing that, regardless of any promise 

by the government, his plea was not knowing and voluntary. The Court rejected both arguments. 

There was no evidence, either in the plea agreement itself or otherwise, that the government had 

ever agreed not to raise the Sample allegations at sentencing; though deleting those allegations 

from the plea agreement preserved Mr. Haslam’s right to contest those allegations at sentencing, 

it did not also prohibit the government from seeking to prove them. Thus, the government did not 

breach the agreement by presenting evidence in support of Ms. Sample’s allegations at 

sentencing. In addition, Mr. Haslam’s statements under oath at the change of plea hearing 

confirmed that his plea was knowing and voluntary, so the Court denied the motion to withdraw 

the plea. 

The Court thus proceeded to resolve the objections to the presentence report. It sustained 

some of Mr. Haslam’s and overruled others, but it generally credited Ms. Sample’s testimony 

that Mr. Haslam had beaten and confined her. The Court’s rulings resulted in a total guideline 

range of 211 to 248 months of imprisonment (151 to 188 months on the three counts of the 

indictment, plus 60 months on the § 924(c) count in the information). The Court then reconvened 

the sentencing hearing. After considering the aggravating and mitigating factors, the Court varied 

downward from that advisory guideline range and imposed a total sentence of 181 months of 

imprisonment—only one month above the binding floor in the parties’ plea agreement. 

Mr. Haslam appealed his convictions. He first argued that the government had breached 

an agreement not to raise the Sample incident at sentencing. He also argued that, even if the 

government had not made such an agreement, he believed that the government had done so and 

that Ms. Sample’s allegations could not be raised at sentencing, so his plea was not knowing and 

voluntary. The Seventh Circuit rejected both arguments and affirmed. United States v. Haslam, 
6 

833 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2016). Mr. Haslam’s convictions became final when the Supreme Court 

denied his petition for certiorari on January 23, 2017. Haslam v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 840 

(2017). Mr. Haslam then timely filed a motion to vacate his convictions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 

and that motion has been fully briefed. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Section 2255(a) of Title 28 provides that a federal prisoner “claiming the right to be 

released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States . . . may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or 

correct the sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). The Seventh Circuit has recognized that § 2255 relief 

is appropriate only for “an error of law that is jurisdictional, constitutional, or constitutes a 

fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Harris v. 

United States, 366 F.3d 593, 594 (7th Cir. 2004). Relief under § 2255 is extraordinary because it 

seeks to reopen the criminal process to a person who has already had an opportunity of full 

process. Almonacid v. United States, 476 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Kafo v. United 

States, 467 F.3d 1063, 1068 (7th Cir. 2006)). 

III. DISCUSSION 

Mr. Haslam offers three grounds in support of his motion. First, he argues that he is 

innocent of Count 1, for possessing unregistered silencers. Second, he argues that his sentence on 

Count 2, for manufacturing methamphetamine, is unlawful and that no term of imprisonment 

was authorized for that conviction. And third, he argues that at the time he entered his plea, he 

misunderstood the government’s ability to raise other criminal conduct at sentencing, in 
7 

particular the Sample incident. He makes each of these arguments through the lens of an 

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.1

The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 

enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. To 

prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show: (1) that his 

counsel’s performance was deficient, meaning that it fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness; and (2) that he was prejudiced by the deficiencies in his counsel’s performance, 

meaning that there is a reasonable probability that the results of the proceeding would have been 

different with effective representation. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 687 (1984). “To show 

prejudice in the plea bargaining context, a defendant must show that ‘there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded and would have insisted on 

going to trial.’” Gaylord v. United States, 829 F.3d 500, 506 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting United 

States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 359 (7th Cir. 2005)); see also Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 

163 (2012) (“In the context of pleas a defendant must show the outcome of the plea process 

would have been different with competent advice.”). In the sentencing context, a defendant must 

show that there is a reasonable probably that the results of the sentencing hearing would have 

been different but for the ineffective assistance. Fuller v. United States, 398 F.3d 644, 650 (7th 

Cir. 2005).

 

1

 The government argues that the first two claims are procedurally defaulted if they are presented 

as standalone claims. Mr. Haslam confirms in his reply, though, that he is bringing these claims 

only as ineffective-assistance claims, which cannot be procedurally defaulted. Massaro v. United 

States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003). The government also argues that the first two claims are barred by 

the waiver in Mr. Haslam’s plea agreement, but the Court need not reach that argument, as these 

claims plainly fail on their merits.
8 

A. Conviction for Possession of Unregistered Silencers 

Mr. Haslam first argues that he is innocent of the charge in Count 1 for possessing 

unregistered silencers, and that his attorney was ineffective for failing to advise him of that fact 

and for permitting him to plead guilty to that charge. Mr. Haslam argues that the statute does not 

permit or require him, as a mere possessor, to register the silencer, so it could not have been 

unlawful for him to possess it without registration. 

The statute makes it unlawful for a person “to receive or possess a firearm which is not 

registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record.” 26 U.S.C. 

§ 5861(d). As used in that provision, the term “firearm” includes silencers. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a). 

The elements of this offense are that (1) the defendant “consciously possessed what he knew to 

be a firearm,” (2) he “was aware of the features that brought his [firearm] within the realm of 

regulation,” and (3) “the firearm was unregistered.” United States v. Jamison, 635 F.3d 962, 

967–68 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and alterations omitted); see also Staples v. United 

States, 511 U.S. 600, 602–03 (1994) (“Section 5861(d) makes it a crime, punishable by up to 10 

years in prison, see § 5871, for any person to possess a firearm that is not properly registered.”); 

United States v. Sanders, 520 F.3d 699, 700 (7th Cir. 2008). 

Here, Mr. Haslam admitted to each of those elements at his change of plea hearing, [DE 

92 p. 23–25], so he is guilty of this offense. In arguing to the contrary, Mr. Haslam cites to 

§ 5841(b), which requires a “manufacturer, importer, [or] maker” to register each firearm, and 

requires the transferor of a firearm to register it to the transferee. Mr. Haslam argues that he was 

only a possessor of firearms, not a manufacturer, importer, or maker, so he was not required to 

register the firearms. And because he was not required to register the firearms, he concludes, he 

was allowed to possess them even if they were unregistered. That conclusion does not follow. 

Regardless of whether Mr. Haslam was required or permitted to register the firearms himself, 
9 

§ 5861(d) prohibits anyone from possessing a firearm that is not registered to him. Staples, 511 

U.S. at 602–03. Even accepting Mr. Haslam’s premise that the statute did not allow him to 

register the firearms,2

 all that would mean would be that he could not lawfully possess the 

firearms at all—not that he could possess them even if they were unregistered. The statute is 

explicit and makes it unlawful for a person to possess a firearm not registered to him. § 5861(d). 

Mr. Haslam did so and thus committed this offense. There is no further element of proof that the 

person would have been able to register the firearm if he tried. See Jamison, 65 F.3d at 967–68. 

Accordingly, Mr. Haslam’s attorney was not ineffective for advising him to plead guilty 

to this count, and this argument cannot support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

B. Sentence for Manufacturing Methamphetamine 

Mr. Haslam next argues that his attorney was ineffective for allowing him to be 

sentenced to a term of imprisonment on his conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine. He 

argues that this count, as charged and convicted, does not authorize any term of imprisonment, so 

the 121-month term of imprisonment that the Court imposed on this count was unlawful. 

Mr. Haslam was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1). As Mr. Haslam notes, § 841(a) only defines offense conduct, it does not specify any 

penalties. The penalties for that offense are set forth in various subparts under § 841(b), and they 

vary based on factors like the type and quantity of the substances in question. Because those 

factors can affect both the minimum and maximum statutory penalties, they must be charged in 

the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, either to the jury at trial or through the 

 

2

 This premise is itself flawed, though, as Mr. Haslam admitted in his plea agreement that he was 

manufacturing the silencers, [DE 52 ¶ 9(b)], meaning he was required to register them as a 

“maker” of silencers. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841(b); 5845(i).
10 

defendant’s admissions at a change of plea hearing. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013); 

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 

Mr. Haslam argues that he was only convicted under § 841(a), not any of the penalty 

provisions under § 841(b), so he could not have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment on 

that count. His argument fails, though, because he was charged with and admitted to all of the 

facts necessary to impose a sentence of up to 20 years under § 841(b)(1)(C). That provision 

authorizes a term of imprisonment of not more than 20 years “[i]n the case of a controlled 

substance in schedule I or II.” § 841(b)(1)(C). Methamphetamine is a schedule II controlled 

substance, so an offense involving methamphetamine will be subject to at least the 20-year 

maximum term in § 841(b)(1)(C). United States v. Macedo, 406 F.3d 778, 785 (7th Cir. 2005) 

(holding that methamphetamine is a schedule II controlled substance); Lugue v. Lynch, 640 F. 

App’x 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[A]ll forms of methamphetamine have been classified by 

regulation as Schedule II substances, subject to a 20-year maximum sentence, for the past 45 

years.” (emphasis omitted)). Here, the indictment charged in Count 2 that Mr. Haslam 

“knowingly and intentionally manufactured methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled 

substance.” [DE 15]. And Mr. Haslam admitted at his change of plea hearing that he 

manufactured methamphetamine. [DE 92 p. 26 (“I had taken some pills and manufactured some 

meth . . . .”)]. Thus, the facts necessary to impose a sentence under § 841(b)(1)(C) were charged 

in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.3

 

3

 To the extent Mr. Haslam’s complaint is that the indictment cites only to § 841(a)(1), and not 

also to the penalty provision of § 841(b)(1)(C), his argument fails, as an indictment need not 

include such a detail and the indictment does allege the facts necessary to trigger that provision. 

United States v. Ocampo, 890 F.2d 1363, 1373 (7th Cir. 1989) (“The indictment need not cite to 

an enhanced penalty provision, but instead must only make a defendant aware of the possibility 

that enhanced penalty provisions could apply.”); see also United States v. Phillips, 645 F.3d 859, 

861 (7th Cir. 2011) (“In order for an indictment to be sufficient, it must identify the elements of 
11 

In short, Mr. Haslam was not, as he claims, convicted for “a violation of § 841(a) 

alone”—he was charged and convicted for violating § 841(a) by manufacturing 

methamphetamine, a schedule II controlled substance that subjected him to the penalties in 

§ 841(b)(1)(C). Mr. Haslam’s 121-month sentence on that count was thus within the authorized 

range of imprisonment under the statute, and his attorney was not ineffective for failing to object 

to that term. 

C. Relevant Conduct at Sentencing 

Finally, Mr. Haslam argues that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance in connection 

with his guilty plea by failing to properly advise him about the government’s ability to present 

evidence of other alleged criminal conduct at sentencing. In particular, he argues that he believed 

that the plea agreement prevented the government from raising Ms. Sample’s allegations of 

battery and confinement. He asserts that if his attorney had properly advised him to the contrary, 

and he knew that the government could still bring the Sample incident up at sentencing, he 

would not have pled guilty but would have proceeded to trial. 

To establish the prejudice element for this claim, Mr. Haslam would have to prove that 

(1) because of his attorney’s ineffective assistance, he misunderstood the government’s ability to 

raise the Sample incident at sentencing, and (2) he would not have pled guilty absent that 

misunderstanding. See Thompson v. United States, 732 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that the 

defendant could not establish prejudice where the record showed he properly understood the 

consequences of his plea); Berkey v. United States, 318 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting an 

ineffective-assistance claim where, despite the defendant’s arguments to the contrary, his 

 

the crime, fairly inform the defendant of the charge so that he may prepare a defense, and enable 

the defendant to evaluate any double jeopardy problems. We have consistently held that nothing 

more is required.” (internal citations omitted)).
12 

statements at the change of plea hearing confirmed that he understood the sentencing process and 

his potential sentences, and that no promises were made to induce his plea). 

Mr. Haslam’s claim thus fails because this Court and the court of appeals have already 

concluded that Mr. Haslam did not plead guilty under any such misunderstanding. Those 

conclusions came in the context of finding that Mr. Haslam’s plea was knowing and voluntary, 

but the underlying facts and arguments are the same as to both inquiries. Mr. Haslam argued 

previously that he did not understand that the government could bring up the Sample incident at 

sentencing, so his plea was not knowing and voluntary. Haslam, 833 F.3d at 846 (“[Mr. Haslam] 

contends that he didn’t knowingly enter into the plea agreement because he mistakenly thought 

that it prevented the government from introducing the Sample evidence.”). He now argues that 

he did not understand that the government could bring up the Sample incident at sentencing, so 

he was prejudiced by his attorney’s ineffective assistance. Yet this Court denied Mr. Haslam’s 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea and the Seventh Circuit affirmed Mr. Haslam’s conviction on 

appeal, concluding that Ms. Haslam did understand the consequences of his plea, as confirmed 

by his statements under oath at the change of plea hearing. 

In particular, Mr. Haslam stated at the change of plea hearing that no promises were 

made to him that were causing him to plead guilty that were not contained in the written plea 

agreement. [DE 92 p. 18]. The plea agreement also notes twice that no promises were made other 

than those reflected in the agreement. [DE 52 ¶ 9(l) (“Other than what is contained in this plea 

agreement, no predictions, promises, or representations have been made to me as to the specific 

sentence that will be imposed or any other matter.”), ¶ 12 (“[N]o promises have been made to me 

other than those contained in this petition . . . .”). And the plea agreement does not contain any 

promise or representation that the government would not raise the Sample incident at sentencing. 
13 

Thus, Mr. Haslam’s sworn statements at the change of plea hearing foreclose his later 

claims that he thought the government had agreed not to raise that incident. As the Seventh 

Circuit explained on Mr. Haslam’s direct appeal: 

In his plea colloquy, Haslam told the magistrate judge under oath that he understood 

the plea agreement and that no promises were made to induce him to plead guilty 

other than those contained in the written plea agreement itself. These sworn 

statements directly contradict Haslam’s claim that he proceeded on the 

understanding that the government had made an extrinsic promise to refrain from 

presenting evidence of the Sample incident at sentencing. Haslam’s argument 

necessarily entails an assertion that he lied to the magistrate judge. The district 

judge was entitled to reject this assertion out of hand unless Haslam presented a 

compelling explanation for his perjury. United States v. Peterson, 414 F.3d 825, 

827 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[A] motion that can succeed only if the defendant committed 

perjury at the plea proceedings may be rejected out of hand unless the defendant 

has a compelling explanation for the contradiction.”). He did not do so. 

Haslam, 833 F.3d at 846–47. 

On top of that, Mr. Haslam stated in the plea agreement that he “fully understands that 

the United States of American has reserved the right to tell the Sentencing Court the good things 

about him, and the bad things about him, and has reserved the right to fully inform the Court of 

the nature and extent of his offense(s).” [DE 52 ¶ 9(g) (emphases added)]. Mr. Haslam stated 

under oath at the change of plea hearing that he had read the plea agreement and that he 

understood it. [DE 92 p. 18]. Mr. Haslam acknowledges this provision in his motion, and argues 

that his attorney was ineffective for allowing it to be in the plea agreement, thus permitting the 

government to raise the Sample incident. As just noted, however, Mr. Haslam knew that this 

paragraph was in the plea agreement (as he testified that he read and understood it). Id. With that 

knowledge, he still signed the plea agreement and still entered his guilty plea. Thus, Mr. Haslam 

cannot show that he was under any misunderstanding about the government’s ability to raise this 

incident at the time he entered his plea. 
14 

In sum, Mr. Haslam’s statements under oath at the change of plea hearing confirm that, 

notwithstanding any erroneous advice he may have received from his attorney, he nonetheless 

understood that the government was not prevented from raising the Sample incident at 

sentencing. Thus, he cannot show that he was prejudiced by any ineffective assistance, so his 

claim fails. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 142 (2012) (“Before a guilty plea is entered the 

defendant’s understanding of the plea and its consequences can be established on the record. 

This affords the State substantial protection against later claims that the plea was the result of 

inadequate advice.”); Thompson, 732 F.3d at 830 (“[The defendant] cannot show that [his 

attorney’s] alleged failure to clarify the sentencing consequences of pleading guilty to conspiracy 

was a ‘decisive factor’ in his decision to forgo trial because the district court’s explanation of the 

sentencing process at [the defendant’s] plea colloquy removed any possible prejudice of [the 

attorney’s] advice.”); Berkey, 318 F.3d at 773. 

For the same reasons, Mr. Haslam is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this claim. 

The dispositive facts underlying this claim have already been addressed at a hearing—the change 

of plea hearing—and Mr. Haslam’s sworn statements at that hearing preclude relief on this 

claim. Mr. Haslam does not attempt to account for those previous statements, and he is not 

entitled to a new hearing on this motion in order to show that he perjured himself at a prior 

hearing. Thompson, 732 F.3d at 829; Peterson, 414 F.3d at 827. Likewise, because no hearing or 

discovery is warranted on Mr. Haslam’s claims, he is not entitled to the appointment of counsel 

on this motion. Oliver v. United States, 961 F.2d 1339, 1343 (7th Cir. 1992). Therefore, the 

Court denies Mr. Haslam’s motion. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United 

States District Courts, the Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a 
15 

final order adverse to the applicant.” A certificate of appealability may be issued “only if the 

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c); Rule 11, Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District 

Courts. The substantial showing standard is met when “reasonable jurists could debate whether 

(or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or 

that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 & n.4 

(1983)); see Young v. United States, 523 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 2008). Here, for the reasons just 

discussed, the Court does not find that Mr. Haslam has made a substantial showing of the denial 

of any constitutional rights, or that any issues in this motion are adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further. The Court therefore denies the issuance of a certificate of 

appealability. 

The Court advises Mr. Haslam that pursuant to Rule 22(b) of the Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, when the district judge denies a certificate of appealability, the applicant 

may request a circuit judge to issue the certificate. The Court further advises Mr. Haslam that 

any notice of appeal of this judgment must be filed within 60 days after the judgment is entered. 

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a); Guyton v. United States, 453 F.3d 425, 427 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that 

“the time to contest the erroneous denial of [the defendant’s] first § 2255 motion was within 60 

days of the decision”). 

V. CONCLUSION 

For those reasons, the Court DENIES Mr. Haslam’s motion for relief under § 2255 [DE 

138], and DENIES the issuance of a certificate of appealability. The Clerk is DIRECTED to 

enter judgment accordingly. 
16 

 SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED: April 23, 2018 

 

 /s/ JON E. DEGUILIO 

 Judge 

 United States District Court