In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 19-2698

SHARON LYNN BROWN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

POLK COUNTY, WISCONSIN, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 3:18-cv-391 — William M. Conley, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED APRIL 28, 2020 — DECIDED JULY 13, 2020

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, RIPPLE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Sharon Brown was a detainee at 

the Polk County Jail who underwent a physical search of her 

body cavities. The institution had a written policy authorizing 

such a search to be conducted by medical personnel when 

there was reasonable suspicion to believe an inmate was internally hiding contraband. Fellow inmates had reported that 

Brown was concealing methamphetamine inside her body, 

and that prompted jail staff to invoke the policy. Officers took 
2 No. 19-2698

Brown to a hospital, where a doctor and nurse inspected both 

her vagina and rectum. The search revealed no drugs. 

Brown sued Polk County and several jail officials under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a violation of her Fourth Amendment 

rights. The defendants moved for summary judgment, and 

the district court granted the motion, concluding that the defendants had reasonable suspicion that Brown was concealing 

contraband, their suspicion justified the cavity search, and the 

ensuing search was reasonable. We agree and affirm. 

I

Sharon Brown landed in the Polk County Jail in May 2017 

after an arrest for shoplifting. The record does not reveal 

whether a judge ordered the detention or whether Brown was 

held while awaiting an initial presentment in court. The next 

day, Jacqueline Duke, an inmate who shared her housing 

unit, told Correctional Officer Steve Hilleshiem that Brown 

was hiding “a large amount” of methamphetamine in a body 

cavity. Officer Hilleshiem had little background information—he did not know Duke or Brown, what either inmate 

was in for, or whether they had any relationship—but he relayed the allegation to Nurse Donna Johnson, who was more 

familiar with Duke.

Nurse Johnson’s prior dealings with Duke had left her untrusting of her word, so she decided to consult Amy Nelson, 

who she considered to be a more reliable inmate living in the 

unit. Nelson corroborated Duke’s accusation with more detail. She said Brown had told other inmates that she was hiding between a quarter gram and an “eight ball”—which 

amounts to about 3.5 grams—of methamphetamine inside her 

body. According to Nelson, the drugs were not sealed 
No. 19-2698 3

properly, so Brown had been looking for somewhere else to 

hide them. Nelson further reported that she had seen Brown 

use the bathroom multiple times and that other inmates were 

worried.

Nurse Johnson discussed the situation with Officer Hilleshiem and other staff members, and the group collectively 

decided to request a cavity search. Polk County has a policy 

that allows a detainee’s body cavities to be searched when an 

officer has “reasonable grounds to believe that the person is 

concealing weapons, contraband, or evidence in a body cavity, or otherwise believes that the safety and security of the jail 

would benefit from a body cavity search.” The policy defines 

“body cavity search” as “an inspection and penetration of the 

anal or vaginal cavity of a person that is conducted manually, 

by means of an instrument,” or “in any other manner.” It further provides that the search must “be performed only by 

medical personnel licensed in the State of Wisconsin.” Officer 

Hilleshiem contacted Chief Deputy Wes Revels, the jail’s administrator, for approval and expressed his view that officials 

had gathered enough evidence to justify a search under the 

policy. Based on those representations, Chief Deputy Revels 

authorized the search.

Officers took Brown to a local hospital, where a doctor and 

nurse performed the search in a private room without any officers present. The doctor first administered an ultrasound of 

Brown’s abdomen. The procedure revealed no contraband. 

He then conducted a vaginal exam by inserting a speculum to 

spread and hold open the vaginal walls to see inside. This 

exam was brief and similar to a routine pelvic exam or a pap 

smear. The rectal exam began in much the same manner—the 

doctor used a speculum to widen the anus and peer inside. 
4 No. 19-2698

But during the procedure, the doctor’s headlamp failed. With 

the speculum remaining in her anus, Brown had to wait while 

the doctor looked for an alternate light source. In the end, the 

search yielded no contraband.

The parties dispute how long these exams lasted. Brown 

testified that the ultrasound took about five minutes and the 

vaginal exam “didn’t take long at all.” As for the rectal exam, 

Brown did not say how long it lasted but explained that when 

the doctor’s headlamp failed, “it seemed like it took forever 

for them to find a light that worked.” For their part, the defendants point to the testimony of a police officer who transported Brown from the jail to the hospital. He estimated that 

“under a minute” elapsed between the time the medical personnel entered the room and when Brown left.

Brown sued the County, Officer Hilleshiem, and Chief 

Deputy Revels. She contended that the Fourth Amendment 

requires jail officials to get a warrant based on probable cause 

before ordering a body cavity search and that the defendants’ 

failure to do so violated her constitutional rights. And because 

the jail’s express policy permitted that practice, she sought to 

hold the County liable under Monell v. Department of Social 

Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 

The defendants successfully moved for summary judgment. The district court concluded that the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable suspicion to justify the kind of 

search Brown underwent and that the officers had just that. 

The court also found the search to have been conducted reasonably, as it was performed by medical professionals in a 

private, hygienic location and lasted only a short time. Finding no constitutional violation, the court concluded that the 

Monell claim failed too.
No. 19-2698 5

Brown now appeals.

II

Incarceration curbs constitutional protections but it does 

not extinguish them. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). 

Among a pretrial detainee’s retained but limited rights is the 

Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of “[t]he right of the people 

to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches 

and seizures.” The inspection of Brown’s body cavities was a 

search to which the Fourth Amendment applies, and the defendants are wise to leave that undisputed. See Florence v. Bd. 

of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318 (2012) 

(applying the Fourth Amendment to a strip search of a pretrial detainee). 

But the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches, 

only unreasonable ones. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 

446–47 (2013). We evaluate reasonableness by balancing “the 

need for the particular search against the invasion of personal 

rights that the search entails.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 

(1979). In doing so, we consider “the scope of the particular 

intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.” 

Id.

Summary judgment is appropriate only if the defendants 

have shown that no material facts are in dispute and they are 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P.

56(a). We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment, viewing all facts in the light most favorable to 

Brown and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor. See 

Hackett v. City of S. Bend, 956 F.3d 504, 507 (7th Cir. 2020). 
6 No. 19-2698

A

Our usual starting point for the reasonableness inquiry is 

whether government officials had “some quantum of individualized suspicion” necessary to justify the search. King, 569 

U.S. at 447 (quoting United States v. Martinez–Fuerte, 428 U.S. 

543, 560–61 (1976)). But individualized suspicion is not an “irreducible” constitutional mandate. Id. Suspicionless searches 

are permitted in limited circumstances, like when they serve 

“special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement.” City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). 

Indeed, twice the Supreme Court has confronted circumstances under which the special context of a jail—with the 

unique challenges it presents—allows for suspicionless 

searches of pretrial detainees’ body cavities.

In Bell v. Wolfish, the Court upheld the constitutionality of 

a jail policy requiring all inmates to undergo a strip search, 

including a visual examination of their body cavities, every 

time they returned from a contact visit. 441 U.S. at 558–60. In 

so holding, the Court emphasized the government’s interest 

in performing such searches, observing that “[a] detention facility is a unique place fraught with serious security dangers” 

and “[s]muggling of money, drugs, weapons, and other contraband is all too common an occurrence.” Id. at 559. Even pitted against the significant privacy invasion that these searches 

posed to the inmates, the gravity of the jail’s security interests 

nevertheless tipped the scale away from a particularized suspicion requirement and instead counseled in favor of a 

broader, categorical rule authorizing visual strip searches following contact visits. See id. at 560. 

The Supreme Court reinforced this holding in Florence v. 

Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington, rejecting 
No. 19-2698 7

a Fourth Amendment challenge to a jail policy that authorized 

an invasive search, which again included visual inspections 

of body openings, during the intake process for pretrial detainees. 566 U.S. at 324, 339. In Florence, too, the Court underscored the acute threat of contraband in the jail setting. See id. 

at 332–34 (explaining how drugs can embolden aggression, 

contraband can be used as underground currency, and prohibited items can become weapons). It therefore concluded 

that the search procedure “struck a reasonable balance between inmate privacy and the needs of the institutions.” Id. at 

339.

The search in this case does not similarly belong in the 

“closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches.” Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 

(1997). In no way do Bell and Florence declare detainees’ bodies open for search at any time and under any circumstance. 

Nor do the defendants urge the adoption of any new broad 

rule authorizing searches of pretrial detainees. Put another 

way, the “touchstone” of the controlling Fourth Amendment 

inquiry remains reasonableness. King, 569 U.S. at 448. And in 

the circumstances before us here, reasonableness requires a 

finding of particularized suspicion. 

A core purpose of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard is to constrain government officials’ discretion 

and thus “safeguard the privacy and security of individuals 

against arbitrary invasions.” See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 

648, 654 (1979) (citations omitted). The searches at issue in Bell

and Florence concerned policies that applied broadly to all detainees following contact visits and upon their entry into a facility. See 441 U.S. at 558 (evaluating a policy subjecting inmates to strip search “after every contact visit with a person 
8 No. 19-2698

from outside the institution”); 566 U.S. 318 at 324 (considering 

a policy making “all arriving detainees” subject to search). 

That general applicability both advanced important institutional interests (of preventing contraband) and protected the 

inmates from being singled out for a search at the whim of a 

guard, even without the safeguard of an individualized suspicion requirement. See King, 569 U.S. at 447–48 (explaining 

that there is no need for individualized suspicion where “all 

arrestees” were subject to the search). 

Brown was not searched as part of a practice that applied 

to everyone housed in the Polk County Jail. She alone was selected for a search, and a quite invasive one at that. In these 

circumstances, the search must be supported by reasonable 

suspicion. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8 (1985) 

(“Exceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion 

are generally appropriate only where the privacy interests implicated by a search are minimal and where other safeguards 

are available to assure that the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to the discretion of the official 

in the field.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). That conclusion finds corroboration in some of our prior cases that have 

required reasonable suspicion for individualized visual strip 

searches conducted after an arrest or during the booking process. See United States v. Freeman, 691 F.3d 893, 901 (7th Cir. 

2012); Kraushaar v. Flanigan, 45 F.3d 1040, 1045 (7th Cir. 1995). 

Brown would have us adopt a higher standard of suspicion and require a warrant based on probable cause. For support, she points to Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) 

and Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985), cases addressing physical—as opposed to visual—searches of people’s bodies undertaken to obtain evidence. Schmerber involved a warrantless 
No. 19-2698 9

blood draw performed on a hospitalized man who had just 

been arrested for driving while intoxicated, see 384 U.S. at 

758–59, and Winston concerned a surgery to retrieve a bullet 

from a detainee’s body to be used as evidence in a prosecution 

for robbery, see 470 U.S. at 755. Neither implicated jail security, the interest that weighs so heavily in the balance of the 

search here.

Bell and Florence underscore the necessity of a jail’s ability 

to search those under its care for contraband, for the protection of all within its walls. Our conclusion that the precise 

searches at issue in those cases differ from the one here in the 

scope of discretion does not in any way undermine the importance of these interests. They apply with equal force and 

distinguish Brown’s search from the ones in Schmerber and 

Winston. A search conducted for the safety of the jail is one 

that furthers special needs beyond the normal need for law 

enforcement, and “the public interest is such that neither a 

warrant nor probable cause is required.” King, 569 U.S. at 447 

(quoting Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990)). 

Brown correctly observes that the search she underwent 

was more invasive because it was not just visual but also involved a physical intrusion into the most private parts of her 

body. No doubt she is right on that score. But given the heft 

of the security interest at stake, the invasion to her privacy 

was not so much greater that it pushes the threshold suspicion 

requirement into probable cause. The Fourth Amendment required Polk County jail officials to have only reasonable suspicion that she had concealed contraband inside her body before moving forward with the search.

And they did. Officer Hilleshiem and Chief Deputy Revels 

relied on tips from both inmates Duke and Nelson, and a 
10 No. 19-2698

credible tip from a reliable informant can support reasonable 

suspicion. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146–47 (1972). 

Nelson’s information in particular bore several signs of reliability—Nurse Johnson considered her to be credible and her 

account was detailed, based on firsthand observations, and recounted recent events. See United States v. Cherry, 920 F.3d 

1126, 1133–34 (7th Cir. 2019). Chief Deputy Revels authorized 

the search in reliance on Officer Hilleshiem’s representation 

that the evidence was sufficient to support a search under the 

County’s policy, so the collective-knowledge doctrine imputes knowledge of the reported information to him. 

See United States v. Williams, 627 F.3d 247, 252 (7th Cir. 2010). 

This leaves no issue of fact as to the existence of reasonable 

suspicion. 

B

The inquiry does not end there. That the defendants met 

the requisite level of individualized suspicion is just one component of the search’s reasonableness. We must go on to consider the scope of the search, the manner in which it was conducted, and the place in which it occurred. See Bell, 441 U.S. 

at 559. “Urgent government interests are not a license for indiscriminate police behavior.” King, 569 U.S. at 448. 

We strain to conceive of a search more invasive than the 

one performed on Brown. Even a visual scan of a bare body is 

an extraordinary interference with privacy. See Bell, 441 U.S. 

at 558–60; Tinetti v. Wittke, 479 F. Supp. 486, 491 (E.D. Wis. 

1979), aff’d and adopted, 620 F.2d 160, 160–61 (7th Cir. 1980) (describing “the visual inspection of the anal and genital areas” 

as “demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing, repulsive, signifying degradation and submission”). In Brown’s case, it was not only
No. 19-2698 11

someone visually inspecting her naked body and closely examining the most private parts but someone who did so by 

making physical contact, prying open her vagina and anus. 

A privacy invasion of that magnitude must be carried out 

with careful attention to limiting its scope and minimizing the 

intrusion. The defendants did that. The search was performed 

pursuant to a written policy with defined procedures that required reasonable suspicion and approval from the jail’s chief 

deputy. So, too, was it conducted in a medical setting by licensed medical professionals. See Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 

590 F.3d 31, 44 (1st Cir. 2009) (observing that doctors conducting search in a hygienic setting weighed in favor of reasonableness). And Brown was afforded some measure of privacy, 

undergoing the search outside the presence of any officers. Cf.

Campbell v. Miller, 499 F.3d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding 

unreasonable a strip search where “the police inexplicably 

did not even afford [the arrestee] the dignity of doing it in a 

private place”). 

The search was also completed within a reasonable 

timeframe. By Brown’s own account, the ultrasound and vaginal exam proceeded swiftly. The untimely failure of the doctor’s headlamp added some length to the ordeal, minutes that 

surely felt like an eternity to Brown. But the accidental delay 

cannot be attributed to the defendants. And the only evidence 

we have of the total duration of the search, all exams combined, comes from the transporting officer, who testified that 

it was very brief. 

With these observations, we do not prescribe constitutional mandates or minimums. Other cases are sure to present 

different facts showing different levels of care—in some cases 

more, in others less—taken by jail officials in authorizing and 
12 No. 19-2698

executing a challenged search. The reasonableness inquiry is 

fact intensive. For today’s case we conclude no more than that 

the factors present here would leave a rational jury with no 

option but to find the search reasonable. 

III

Nobody disputes the invasiveness of the search that 

Brown underwent. Her body was laid bare not just for visual 

inspection but for physical prodding, an intrusion of privacy 

to the highest degree. Her incarcerated status did not strip her 

of the Fourth Amendment’s protection. Nor, however, does 

the Fourth Amendment ignore the realities of the jail setting 

and its attendant security risks. The balance of the intrusion 

to Brown and the weight of jail safety concerns comes out to 

a requirement of reasonable suspicion to justify the search. A 

rational jury could reach no other conclusion than that the defendants complied with the threshold suspicion requirement 

and executed the search reasonably, meaning there was no 

constitutional violation. That finding defeats the Monell claim 

too. See Hall v. City of Chi., 953 F.3d 945, 955 (7th Cir. 2020). 

For these reasons, we AFFIRM.