2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

6-5-2012

Marilyn Kent v. Florence Vickers

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 12-1283

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"Marilyn Kent v. Florence Vickers" (2012). 2012 Decisions. Paper 882.

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DLD-164 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-1283

___________

MARILYN KENT,

Appellant,

v.

FLORENCE VICKERS

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 12-cv-00116)

District Judge: Honorable Juan R. Sanchez

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Summary Action

Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

April 19, 2012

Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: June 5, 2012)

___________

OPINION

___________

PER CURIAM

Marilyn Kent appeals pro se from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Pennsylvania’s order dismissing her complaint. Because this appeal does not 
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present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See

I.

3d 

Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.

In January, 2012, Kent filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in the 

District Court. Her complaint was entered on the District Court’s docket on January 17, 

2012, the same day that it granted Kent’s motion to proceed IFP and dismissed her 

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). 

Kent’s complaint, which is one in a series of actions involving her horses, appears 

to assert that, in December 2009, she and Florence Vickers entered into a contract to 

house Kent’s horses in Vickers’s barn. She contends that, throughout the next several 

months, her horses suffered due to the poor condition of the barn and that Vickers 

responded to her complaints by turning off the barn’s water supply. Kent was thus 

required to carry water to her horses. Kent asserts that Vickers threatened her, assaulted 

her, “bullied” her, harassed her, slandered her, and breached their contract. She also refers

to a claim for damages by Vickers, which she states is based on fraud and corruption. 

The District Court’s order dismissing the complaint explained that Kent, as a 

private citizen, did not have the right to bring a criminal case against the defendant nor 

could she proceed on a civil cause of action based on federal criminal laws. Additionally, 

the District Court stated that she had not met the requirements for bringing state law 

claims under the District Court’s diversity jurisdiction because she and the defendant are 

Pennsylvania residents. 
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Kent now appeals.

II.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District 

Court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) is plenary. 

Allah v. Seiverling

If a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal, a district court generally must first permit 

the plaintiff to file a curative amendment. 

, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). 

See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete 

Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007) (observing that, in civil rights cases, 

“leave to amend must be granted sua sponte before dismissing” the complaint). “Dismissal 

without leave to amend is justified only on the grounds of bad faith, undue delay, 

prejudice, or futility.” Alston v. Parker

Here, the District Court did not err in dismissing the complaint without providing 

Kent with an opportunity to amend her complaint because any such amendment would be 

futile. 

, 363 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).

See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). The 

District Court properly dismissed any criminal claims that Kent attempted to bring, as a 

private person does not have a “judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution . . . of 

another.” See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Additionally, to the 

extent that Kent attempted to raise any state law claims, the District Court properly 

determined that such claims would be futile because Kent cannot meet the requirements 

for proceeding under the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction. Although allegations of 

jurisdiction generally may be amended, in this case it is clear from the complaint that 
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both parties are Pennsylvania citizens and that the jurisdictional defect cannot be cured. 

See

For these reasons, we conclude that this appeal presents “no substantial question,” 

and will therefore summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 

28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

See 3d Cir. L.A.R.

27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.