ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

KENNEDY TANK & MFG. CO., INC. John R. Maley 

Craig J. Helmreich Peter J. Rusthoven 

Brandon K. Wiseman T. Joseph Wendt 

Scopelitis, Garvin, Light, Hanson & Feary, P.C. Barnes & Thornburg LLP 

Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana 

 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS 

HEMLOCK SEMICONDUCTOR OPERATIONS LLC 

AND HEMLOCK SEMICONDUCTOR, LLC 

A. Richard M. Blaiklock 

Charles R. Whybrew 

Edward D. Thomas 

Lewis Wagner, LLP 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

In the 

Indiana Supreme Court _________________________________ 

No. 49S02-1608-CT-431 

KENNEDY TANK & MFG. CO., INC., Appellant-Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff,

AND

HEMLOCK SEMICONDUCTOR OPERATIONS LLC AND

HEMLOCK SEMICONDUCTOR, LLC, Appellants, Third-Party Defendants,

 

v. 

EMMERT INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION 

D/B/A EMMERT INTERNATIONAL, Appellee-Plaintiff.

 

_________________________________ 

Appeal from the Marion Superior Court Civil Division 1, No. 49D01-1501-CT-2052 

The Honorable Heather A. Welch, Judge 

_________________________________ 

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-1507-CT-934 

_________________________________ 

January 3, 2017 

Rush, Chief Justice. 
2

After Emmert Industrial Corporation (“Emmert”) successfully transported an enormous 

process tower vessel from Indiana to Tennessee, the vessel’s manufacturer—Kennedy Tank & 

Manufacturing Company (“Kennedy”)—refused to pay nearly $700,000 in unforeseen 

transportation expenses. Emmert attempted to collect, but Kennedy still had not paid by the time 

a federal statute of limitations expired. Emmert eventually sued for breach of contract and unjust 

enrichment, and Kennedy raised the federal statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, arguing 

it preempts Indiana’s longer limitations period. On this issue of first impression, we disagree with 

Kennedy and hold that Indiana’s ten-year statute of limitations is not preempted. Emmert’s 

collection claim may therefore proceed. 

Facts and Procedural History 

Kennedy needed a process tower vessel transported from its headquarters in Indianapolis, 

Indiana, to Hemlock Semiconductor’s (“Hemlock”) location in Clarksville, Tennessee. The vessel 

was massive—about 280 feet long, 18 feet wide, and 16 feet tall, and weighing about 360,000 

pounds. Kennedy contracted with Emmert, an Oregon-based heavy-haul transporter, to get it to 

Clarksville. Their contract—which specified it should be interpreted under Indiana law—called 

for Kennedy to pay $197,650.00 plus additional unforeseen costs. 

Many of those additional unforeseen costs piled up. The I-64 bridge between Indiana and 

Kentucky unexpectedly closed, requiring an alternate route. This led to additional route surveys and 

permit applications in Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, and Tennessee. Altogether, construction delays, 

road closures, permit applications, safety escorts, and bureaucratic delays cost Emmert an additional 

$691,301.03. Despite these troubles, Emmert delivered the vessel on November 11, 2011. 

Emmert then tried to collect the additional costs from Kennedy. They discussed the dispute 

through January 2013, then considered arbitration from June to August 2014. But, in September 

2014, Kennedy refused to pay any additional charges, claiming to owe nothing because of the 

federal eighteen-month statute of limitations in 49 U.S.C. section 14705(a). Emmert then sued, 

alleging breach of contract and, in the alternative, unjust enrichment. 

Kennedy moved to dismiss Emmert’s complaint under Indiana Trial Rules 12(B)(1) and 

12(B)(6), relying on the eighteen-month federal statute of limitations. Emmert responded that 

dismissal was inappropriate because the federal statute did not preempt Indiana’s ten-year 
3

limitations period in Indiana Code section 34-11-2-11. Emmert also claimed that the parties’ 

settlement discussions equitably estopped Kennedy from asserting the federal statute of 

limitations. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, finding no preemption. 

Following the denial of its motion, Kennedy brought Hemlock into the case—alleging 

Hemlock’s responsibility for any additional charges—and filed this interlocutory appeal. The 

Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, finding that Indiana’s statute of limitations was 

preempted, Kennedy Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Emmert Indus. Corp., 53 N.E.3d 505, 509–11 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2016), and that Emmert waived the equitable estoppel issue on appeal, id. at 506 n.2. Emmert 

sought transfer, which we granted—thus vacating the Court of Appeals opinion. Ind. Appellate 

Rule 58(A). 

We now affirm the trial court, agreeing that Indiana’s statute of limitations is not preempted. 

Standard of Review 

We review the denial of Kennedy’s motion to dismiss de novo. Teaching Our Posterity 

Success, Inc. v. Ind. Dept. of Educ., 20 N.E.3d 149, 151 (Ind. 2014). To determine if this denial 

was appropriate, we must first determine whether Indiana’s statute of limitations is preempted—a 

question of law, Hardy v. Hardy, 963 N.E.2d 470, 473 (Ind. 2012), abrogated on other grounds by 

Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943 (2013), that we also review de novo, see Clippinger v. State, 

54 N.E.3d 986, 988 (Ind. 2016). 

Discussion and Decision 

Our analysis begins with a presumption against preemption, which Kennedy and Hemlock 

bear the burden to overcome. Yet here, Congress has provided no indication that it intended to 

impose a uniform national statute of limitations, and breach of contract collection actions are not 

an area of federal regulation. Furthermore, other jurisdictions addressing this issue provide little 

guidance and do not compel a different result. Kennedy and Hemlock thus fail to carry their burden 

to show that Indiana’s statute of limitations on contract collection actions is preempted.1

 

1

 Because Indiana’s statute of limitations is not preempted, we need not address Kennedy’s argument that 

49 U.S.C. section 14705(a) provides a statute of repose rather than a statute of limitations. We do note, 

though, that Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(1) is not a proper procedural vehicle for a motion to dismiss based 

on either type of statute. See R.L. Turner Corp. v. Brownsburg, 963 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ind. 2012); Gill v. 

Evansville Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 970 N.E.2d 633, 637 n.4 (Ind. 2012). 
4

I. Standard Principles of Federal Preemption Guide This Analysis.

It has “long been settled” that a preemption analysis begins with the presumption that 

federal statutes do not preempt state law. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2088 (2014). The 

presumption against preemption comes from two concepts “central to the constitutional design”—

the Supremacy Clause and federalism. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012). 

Although the Supremacy Clause2 gives Congress the power to preempt state law, federalism 

requires that we do not easily find preemption. See id. at 2501. In fact, we find preemption only if 

it is “the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Id. Kennedy and Hemlock, then, must show 

that clear and manifest purpose in order to overcome the presumption against preemption. Russ. 

Media Grp., LLC v. Cable Am., Inc., 598 F.3d 302, 309 (7th Cir. 2010). 

Congress can preempt state law in three ways: express preemption, field preemption, and 

conflict preemption. Basileh v. Alghusain, 912 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ind. 2009). Express preemption 

exists when Congress states the statute’s preemptive effect. Id. Field preemption applies when 

Congress creates “exclusive federal regulation of the area.” Id. And conflict preemption preempts 

a state law that conflicts with federal law. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501. 

This case involves only conflict preemption. Conflict preemption voids a state law in two 

different situations: (1) when it is “physically impossible” to comply with both the state and federal 

laws, Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 590 (2009), and (2) when the state law does “major damage” 

to the federal law’s purpose, Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. Indiana, 736 F.3d 1041, 1050 (7th Cir. 

2013) (quoting Hillman, 133 S.Ct. at 1950). See also Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 

64–65 (2002). 

The first type of conflict preemption—physical impossibility—is a “demanding defense” 

that asks whether any party could ever comply with the state and federal statutes. See Wyeth, 555 

U.S. at 573; Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 291 (1987) (finding no 

preemption when “compliance with both statutes ‘is theoretically possible’”). Because Emmert 

could have filed suit within the eighteen-month federal limitations period, physical impossibility 

preemption does not apply here. See Marsh v. Rosenbloom, 499 F.3d 165, 178 (2d Cir. 2007) 

 

2

 “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall 

be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 

Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
5

(finding no “physical impossibility” conflict preemption when a plaintiff could have complied with 

three-year and six-year limitations periods by filing suit within three years). 

Kennedy and Hemlock therefore rely on the second type of conflict preemption, arguing 

that Indiana’s statute of limitations does “major damage” to Congress’s purpose in enacting the 

federal statute of limitations. 

II. Indiana’s Statute of Limitations for Contract Collection Actions Does Not Do “Major 

Damage” to Congress’s Purpose. 

Indiana’s statute of limitations does not do “major damage” to Congress’s purpose because 

Congress used the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (“ICCTA”), Pub. L. No. 

104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (1995), to shift regulatory authority from the federal government to the 

states—not to assert federal authority over state-law collection actions. After all, we are primarily 

concerned with “the nature of the activities which the States have sought to regulate,” Chi. & N.W. 

Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317–18 (1981) (quoting San Diego Bldg. 

Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243 (1959)), and here, those activities are areas of state 

authority.

A. The federal statute of limitations’s purpose is not to create a uniform national standard.

Congress’s purpose is the “ultimate touchstone” for all types of preemption, Medtronic, 

Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, Local 1625 v. 

Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)), but it is especially important for the second type of 

conflict preemption, where a state law is preempted if it does “major damage” to the federal law’s 

purpose, Patriotic Veterans, 736 F.3d at 1050 (quoting Hillman, 133 S. Ct. at 1950). We conclude 

that Congress’s purpose for section 14705(a) was not to impose a standard national statute of 

limitations, and therefore Indiana’s longer period does not do “major damage” to the federal 

scheme.

We discern Congress’s purpose by “examining the federal statute as a whole and 

identifying its purpose and intended effects.” Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 

363, 373 (2000). The federal statute of limitations at issue here, 49 U.S.C. section 14705(a), is part 

of the ICCTA—which, as its name suggests and as discussed below, significantly reduced federal 

regulation of interstate commerce. The statute of limitations is straightforward: “A carrier 

providing transportation or service subject to [federal] jurisdiction . . . must begin a civil action to 
6

recover charges for transportation or service provided by the carrier within 18 months after the 

claim accrues.” 49 U.S.C. § 14705(a). Our inquiry, however, is not whether the federal statute is 

unclear, but whether applying Indiana’s longer statute would do “major damage” to the ICCTA’s 

overarching purpose of deregulation. We conclude it would not. 

Kennedy and Hemlock argue that the federal statute of limitations is meant to create a 

uniform national standard for interstate transportation and to encourage the diligent pursuit of 

claims once they are known. If Congress intended to provide a uniform national standard, it could 

easily have expressly made this statute of limitations a national one. For example, in certain 

environmental tort actions under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 

Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), that’s exactly what Congress did: 

[I]f the applicable limitations period for [a CERCLA] action (as specified in the 

State statute of limitations or under common law) provides a commencement date 

which is earlier than the federally required commencement date, such period shall 

commence at the federally required commencement date in lieu of the date 

specified in such State statute. 

42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1); see also CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2188 (2014) 

(“[Section 9658] by its terms preempts [state] statutes of limitations applicable to state-law tort 

actions in certain circumstances.”). If Congress thought state statutes of limitations “posed an 

obstacle to its objectives” in enacting the ICCTA, it could have simply preempted them. See 

Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 574. But while Congress did precisely that in section 9658, it did not do so 

here. See id. 

Instead of relying on the ICCTA’s text, then, Kennedy and Hemlock turn to a House of 

Representatives Report from the passage of the ICCTA. That report does note the importance of 

“Federal commercial rules established to ensure that all interstate transportation is subject to the 

same rules and procedures.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-311, at 85 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 

U.S.C.C.A.N. 793, 797. This language, though, refers to the Department of Transportation’s 

(“DOT”) responsibility to “oversee and maintain” certain “rules for operation” such as “leasing 

rules, uniform cargo loss and damage rules, rules for shipper payment, and perfecting security 

interest,” id. (emphasis added)—that is, the type of rules the agency enforces. Statutes of 

limitations, by contrast, are litigation rules enforced by courts, not by the DOT. And, the report 

characterizes these rules as requiring “very little effort or activity” to enforce, id.—which would 
7

not be the case if the DOT were required to monitor an abundance of state breach of contract suits 

and make statute of limitations determinations on each one. 

Kennedy and Hemlock therefore have not persuaded us that Congress intended to dictate a 

national statute of limitations. 

B. State collection actions are unlikely candidates for federal regulation because there is no 

uniformity vital to national interests.

Though neither the text nor the legislative history of section 14705(a) persuades us that 

state limitations periods are preempted, conflict preemption can apply if the state’s method is 

disruptive to Congress’s system. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505. 

In Arizona, for example, a state law making it a misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to 

apply for or perform work was preempted even though it shared a common purpose with federal 

law: to deter unlawful employment. Id. at 2494, 2505. By contrast, a California law survived 

preemption when it governed the maturity of avocados based solely on oil content while the federal 

government governed the maturity of avocados based on picking dates, sizes, and weights. Fla. 

Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 133, 139 (1963). While Arizona involved 

immigration and foreign relations—areas of intense federal concern, 132 S. Ct. at 2498–2500—

the maturity of avocados in Florida Lime “seem[ed] to be an inherently unlikely candidate for 

exclusive federal regulation” and was not “a subject demanding exclusive federal regulation in 

order to achieve uniformity vital to national interests,” 373 U.S. at 143–44. 

This contract collection case is far more like Florida Lime than Arizona. As discussed 

below, Congress has actually removed its prior exclusive federal regulation from contract actions 

related to interstate transport. In light of this deregulation, Kennedy and Hemlock have not met 

their burden to overcome the presumption against preemption. Indeed, two particular facets of the 

ICCTA show that contract collection actions represent “an unlikely candidate for exclusive federal 

regulation” and do not “demand[] exclusive federal regulation.” See Fla. Lime, 373 U.S. at 143–

44. 

1. The ICCTA removed the federal cause of action for breach of contract suits for unpaid 

freight charges. 

Interstate transportation used to be “among the most pervasive and comprehensive of 

federal regulatory schemes.” Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. at 318. Before the ICCTA 
8

deregulated the trucking industry, for example, the Interstate Commerce Act (“ICA”)—the 

ICCTA’s predecessor—required motor carriers to file a tariff with the Interstate Commerce 

Commission (“ICC”) and charge all shippers the tariffed rate. Gaines Motor Lines, Inc. v. 

Klaussner Furniture Indus., 734 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir. 2013). But the ICCTA voided nearly all 

of these tariffs, instead allowing private contracts with shippers. Id. at 302–03 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 

14101(b)). While the ICA provided a cause of action to recover unpaid charges, id. at 302 (citing 

Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 534 (1983)), the ICCTA did 

not, id. at 305 (holding the ICCTA does “not provide motor carriers with a federal cause of action 

when they sue a shipper for unpaid freight charges under a private contract”). Put simply, the 

ICCTA “does not provide either the motor carrier or the shipper with a federal statutory right to 

enforce in a routine breach of contract claim.” Id. 

This deregulation cuts strongly against Kennedy and Hemlock’s efforts to overcome the 

presumption against preemption. We simply cannot “draw from the text, structure, and history” of 

the ICCTA that Indiana’s statute of limitations “is an obstacle to the regulatory system Congress 

chose,” when that regulatory system relies entirely on state authority and state causes of action. 

See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505. For Congress to impose section 14705(a)’s statute of limitations 

on purely state causes of action, it must show its “clear and manifest purpose” to do so. See CSX 

Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 

331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). But while it could have made that purpose clear in the ICCTA, it did 

not. 

Indeed, the United States Supreme Court relied on Congress’s similar deference to state 

authority in a recent preemption case—CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175. There, the 

Court held that even when, as discussed above, Congress expressly preempted state statutes of 

limitations, it did not preempt state statutes of repose through conflict preemption. Id. at 2188. The 

Court reasoned that Congress left intact much state authority, including power over causes of 

action, scope of liability, burdens of proof, and rules of evidence. Id. So, it was not shown “that in 

light of Congress’s decision to leave those many areas of state law untouched, statutes of repose 

pose an unacceptable obstacle to the attainment of [the statute’s] purposes.” Id. Likewise here, 

Congress eliminated federal subject matter jurisdiction over collection actions like this one, 

leaving them solely to state authority through state causes of action. See Gaines Motor Lines, 734 
9

F.3d at 306–07. Waldburger, then, confirms our conclusion that Kennedy and Hemlock have not 

overcome the presumption against preemption.

2. Breach of contract collection cases do not demand exclusive federal regulation merely 

because they involve interstate transportation. 

“The case for federal preemption is particularly weak where Congress has indicated its 

awareness of the operation of state law in a field of federal interest, and has nonetheless decided 

to stand by both concepts and to tolerate whatever tension there [is] between them.” Wyeth, 555 

U.S. at 575 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166–67 (1989)). 

And here, despite their relation to interstate transportation—admittedly a field of federal interest—

these breach of contract collection cases rely completely on the operation of state law. 

To be sure, contract disputes related to interstate transportation used to be a field of “federal 

interest.” Congress began regulating interstate transportation in 1887 with the creation of the 

ICC—the first independent federal agency. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Rate Regulation and Antitrust 

Immunity in Transportation: The Genesis and Evolution of This Endangered Species, 32 Am. U. 

L. Rev. 335, 336 (1983). The ICC’s original purpose was to “protect the public from the 

monopolistic abuses of the railroads,” but that purpose shifted in the mid-1900s to “protect[ing] 

the transportation industry from the deleterious consequences of unrestrained competition.” Id. at 

337. Then, after 1975, the ICC reversed course again, decreasing federal regulation and working 

to stimulate competition. Id. This ultimately led to the demise of the ICC in 1995 through the 

ICCTA. Maureen E. Eldredge, Who’s Driving the Train? Railroad Regulation and Local Control, 

75 U. Colo. L. Rev. 549, 550–51 (2004). The ICCTA’s primary purpose “was to ensure the 

economic viability of the rail and trucking industries by eliminating federal economic regulation.” 

Id. at 550. 

Today, then, Congress has “indicated its awareness of the operation of state law” within 

many areas of interstate transportation. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 575. Relevant here, Congress 

turned over contract collection actions to the operation of state law in the ICCTA—reflecting its 

“goal of reducing federal involvement in motor carriers’ private contracts.” Gaines Motor Lines, 

734 F.3d at 304. This elimination of federal economic regulation shows Congress’s “awareness of 

the operation of state law in a field of federal interest,” Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 575, because Congress 

retained some federal regulation in the interstate transportation field but left these collection cases 
10

to state law. In so doing, Congress demonstrated there is no need for exclusive federal regulation 

and decided to “tolerate whatever tension” exists between state and federal law. See id. 

Because Congress created this coexisting system of state and federal regulations for 

interstate transportation, Indiana’s statute of limitations is not preempted. In the end, “preemption 

will not lie unless it is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 664 

(quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230). Kennedy and Hemlock have not shown that clear and manifest 

purpose and, therefore, fail to overcome the presumption against preemption. 

III. Other Jurisdictions Provide Little Guidance on Preemption. 

Few jurisdictions have addressed federal preemption of state statutes of limitations. The 

hodgepodge of decisions provides little guidance and does not change the conclusion that Congress 

did not preempt state statutes of limitations here. 

Three opinions cited by Kennedy and Hemlock simply conclude, without supporting 

analysis, that the ICCTA’s eighteen-month statute of limitations preempts longer state ones. 

Emmert Indus. Corp. v. Artisan Assocs., Inc., 497 F.3d 982, 989–90 (9th Cir. 2007); Arctic 

Express, Inc. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce NA, Inc., 366 B.R. 786, 792–93 n.2 (S.D. Ohio 2007); 

Exel Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Sigma Vita, Inc., 654 S.E.2d 665, 668–69 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). And 

most of the other decisions Kennedy and Hemlock cite merely apply the federal eighteen-month 

statute of limitations, without addressing this preemption issue at all.3 Without analysis on this 

preemption issue, these opinions provide no guidance. 

A few opinions, however, go the other way—applying state statutes of limitations instead 

of shorter federal ones, but still without addressing statute of limitations preemption. See Learning 

Links, Inc. v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., No. 03 Civ. 7902(DAB), 2006 WL 785274, at *5 

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2006) (unpublished); Owner-Operators Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. 

 

3

 See CGH Transp., Inc. v. Quebecor World, Inc., No. 06-6399, 261 F. App’x 817, 821 (6th Cir. Jan. 8, 

2008) (unpublished); La. Transp. v. Cowan Sys., LLC, No. 11-3435 (CCC), 2012 WL 1664120, at *3 

(D.N.J. May 10, 2012) (unpublished); Smith Bros. Trucking v. Baker Truck Brokerage Inc., No. 1:07-CV623, 2008 WL 4681641, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 21, 2008) (unpublished); B&J Transp., Inc. v. Swift & Co., 

No. 06-39-B-W, 2006 WL 3300392, at *3 (D. Me. Nov. 8, 2006) (unpublished); United Traffic Consultants, 

Inc. v. Gordon Trucking, Inc., No. 02-328-JE, 2003 WL 21397697, at *3 (D. Or. Mar. 25, 2003) 

(unpublished); C.H. Robinson Co. v. Paris & Sons, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1007–08 (N.D. Iowa 2001); 

Martin Moving and Storage, Inc. v. Baker, No. 3:97CV-690-S, 1999 WL 33756649, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 

4, 1999) (unpublished); Adv. Warehouse & Distribution Servs., Inc. v. Caliber Logistics Healthcare, Inc., 

No. 3-97-CV-3205-BD, 1998 WL 907011, at *2–3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 1998) (unpublished). 
11

Mayflower Transit, Inc., No. IP98-457-C B/S, IP98-458-C B/S, 2004 WL 6242347 at *5–6 (S.D. 

Ind. Dec. 14, 2004) (unpublished); Steve Marchionda & Assocs. v. Weyerhauser Co., 11 F. Supp. 

2d 268, 270–71 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). These inconsistent cases cannot carry Kennedy and Hemlock’s 

burden to show preemption and do not replace or change our own preemption analysis. 

 Moreover, Congress frequently leaves state statutes of limitations intact when enacting 

federal limitations periods—as four federal circuit courts of appeals have recognized in upholding 

state statutes of limitations in the face of shorter federal ones. The Ninth Circuit recently held that 

the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act’s three-year statute of repose did not preempt 

California’s four-year statute of limitations. Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels, 816 F.3d 1170, 1178–80 

(9th Cir. 2016). Likewise, the Fifth Circuit held that the two-year statute of limitations in the 

Federal Communications Act did not preempt Texas’s four-year limitations period. Castro v. 

Collecto, Inc., 634 F.3d 779, 787 (5th Cir. 2011). Next, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act’s one-year statute of limitations did not preempt Florida’s four-year 

statute of limitations. Cliff v. Payco Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 363 F.3d 1113, 1130 (11th Cir. 2004). 

And, finally, the Sixth Circuit held that the Clayton Act’s four-year statute of limitations did not 

preempt an Ohio law providing that no statute of limitations would bar certain claims. Pinney Dock 

and Transp. Co. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 1482 (6th Cir. 1988). 

While these cases do not involve ICCTA’s statute of limitations—and therefore provide 

limited guidance—they do show that Congress does not always preempt state law when enacting 

a federal statute of limitations. Because of these cases, Indiana is hardly an outlier in holding that 

the ICCTA’s statute of limitations does not preempt Indiana’s limitations period.4

 

Conclusion 

The ICCTA’s eighteen-month statute of limitations does not preempt Indiana’s ten-year 

statute of limitations governing breach of contract claims. Congress’s purpose was not to preempt 

state statutes of limitations, and Indiana’s statute of limitations does not do major damage to the 

ICCTA’s deregulatory purpose. Kennedy and Hemlock, therefore, have not carried their burden to 

establish preemption. We affirm the trial court. 

Rucker, David, Massa, and Slaughter, JJ., concur. 

 

4

 Because we find that Indiana’s statute of limitations is not preempted, we need not address the parties’ 

equitable estoppel arguments.