In the United States Court of Federal Claims 

No. 14-1024C 

(Filed: August 10, 2015) 

PETRO MEX, LLC, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

THE UNITED STATES, 

 Defendant. 

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Motion to Dismiss; Breach of Lease; 

RCFC 12(b)(1); Statute of Limitations; 

RCFC 17(a)(3); Mineral Leasing Act 

of 1920; Lease Operator Lacks Privity; 

Lease Owner Must Be Given 

Opportunity to Intervene 

 

 

Douglas J. Reynolds, Durango, Colorado, for plaintiff. 

Kara Westercamp, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, 

Washington, DC, with whom were Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant Attorney General, 

Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Director, and Allison Kidd-Miller, Assistant Director, for 

defendant. 

OPINION DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS 

Firestone, Judge. 

Pending before the court is the motion of the defendant, the United States (“the 

government”), to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the United States 

Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”), the complaint of plaintiff Petro Mex, LLC (“Petro 

Mex”) in this breach of contract action. In its complaint, Petro Mex alleges that the 

United States Department of the Interior (“DOI”), Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) 

breached the terms of two Federal oil and gas leases in Colorado, numbers COC0124705A (“Garfield Lease”) and COC-088586 (“Mesa Lease”) (together, “the Leases”), 
 2 

in two respects. First, Petro Mex alleges that the BLM breached the Leases by ordering 

Petro Mex to shut in the wells on the Leases for various violations and then required 

Petro Mex to stop production again after it cured the violations in the initial shut-in order. 

Second, Petro Mex alleges that the BLM breached the Leases when BLM terminated the 

Leases on August 26, 2009 for failing to produce oil and gas in paying quantities after a 

March 2009 inspection noted that Petro Mex had cured the original violations but did not 

have a compressor on site and thus could not produce any oil and gas. 

The government argues that the facts giving rise to the alleged breaches occurred 

more than six years ago and thus the case is time-barred under the statute of limitations 

set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2501.1

 In support of this argument, the government argues that 

all of the events fixing the government’s liability occurred in August 2008 when Petro 

Mex alleges that it notified BLM that it had fixed all violations but the BLM did not lift 

the shut-in order. According to the government, there was no separate order issued in 

October 2008 requiring Petro Mex to stop production and thus the only possible breach 

would stem from BLM’s failure to lift the shut-in order in August 2008. The government 

argues that BLM’s termination decisions also stem from the decision not to lift the shutin orders in 2008 because Petro Mex’s failure to produce stems from the continued effect 

of the shut-in orders. In the alternative, the government argues that, should Petro Mex’s 

breach of contract claims survive the statute of limitations challenge, the claims with 

 

1

 The statute provides, in relevant part: “Every claim of which the United States Court of Federal 

Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after 

such claim first accrues.” 28 U.S.C. § 2501. 
 3 

regard to the Mesa Lease still must be dismissed on the grounds that Petro Mex is not the 

lessee and thus is not in privity of contract with the government. The government 

contends that Petro Mex is the lease operator and a sub-lessee of the Mesa Lease and 

cannot bring a claim on behalf of the lessee. 

For the reasons that follow, the court finds that plaintiff’s complaint identifies an 

alleged breach beginning within the statute of limitations, and thus the complaint is not 

time-barred. Additionally, while the court also finds that plaintiff lacks privity of 

contract with regard to the Mesa Lease, time to cure the defect must be provided. 

Accordingly, the government’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS2

The Leases were issued pursuant to the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 

181. The BLM executed the Mesa Lease with United Producing Company, Inc. on July 

20, 1962 (effective September 1, 1962). Through a series of assignments and mergers of 

corporate entities, EnCana Oil & Gas (USA), Inc. (“EnCana”) acquired record title to the 

Mesa Lease in 1994. As the entity holding record title to the Mesa Lease, EnCana is the 

“lessee,” or leaseholder under 43 C.F.R. § 3100.0-5(i). Petro Mex holds an operating 

interest in the Mesa Lease and “is responsible under the terms and conditions of the lease 

for the operations conducted on the leased lands or a portion thereof.” Id. § 3100.0-5(a). 

Pursuant to the Mineral Leasing Act, operating rights are severable from record title 

interests and thus two entities can have interests in the same lease. Id. § 3100.0-5(c). 

 

2

 The facts are taken from the complaint and attached exhibits and are not disputed unless noted. 
 4 

The BLM executed the Garfield Lease with Celeste C. Grynberg on February 2, 

1965 (effective March 1, 1965). Through a series of assignments, Petro Mex acquired 

record title to the Garfield Lease in 2004. As the lessee, Petro Mex has “the obligation to 

pay rent, and the rights to assign and relinquish the lease.” Id. § 3100.0-5(i). Petro Mex 

alleges that, as of October 2008, the Garfield Lease had five wells, three of which were 

operational: Federal 15-9, 6-9-8-101,3

 and Government 5.

Under the terms of both leases, the “Rights of Lessee,” are set out as follows: 

SECTION 1. Rights of Lessee.—The lessee is granted the exclusive right 

and privilege to drill for, mine, extract, remove, and dispose of all the oil 

and gas deposits, except helium gas, in the lands leased, together with the 

right to construct and maintain thereupon, all works, buildings, plants, 

waterways, roads, telegraph or telephone lines, pipelines, reservoirs, tanks, 

pumping stations, or other structures necessary to the full enjoyment 

thereof, for a period of 10 years, and so long thereafter as oil or gas is 

produced in paying quantities; subject to any unit agreement heretofore or 

hereafter approved by the Secretary of the Interior, the provisions of said 

agreement to govern the lands subject thereto where inconsistent with the 

terms of this lease. 

Def.’s Mot., App’x 2 (emphasis added). “Production in paying quantities” is defined as 

“production from a lease of oil and/or gas of sufficient value to exceed direct operating 

costs and the costs of lease rentals, or minimum royalties.” 43 C.F.R. § 3160.0-5. The 

leases are also “subject to the terms and provisions of the Act of February 25, 1920 (41 

Stat. 437), as amended . . . and [are subject] to all reasonable regulations of the Secretary 

of the Interior now or hereafter in force, when not inconsistent with any express and 

specific provisions herein, which are made a part hereof.” Among the applicable 

 

3

 While the complaint lists the well number as 6-9-0-101, the shut-in order lists it as 6-9-8-101. 

Def.’s App. 26-27. 
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regulations is a provision that, “[w]hen necessary for compliance, or where operations 

have been commenced without approval, or where continued operations could result in 

immediate, substantial, and adverse impacts on public health and safety . . . or royalty 

income, the authorized officer may shut down operations.” 43 C.F.R. § 3163.1a(4). 

As set forth in the complaint, the dispute between Petro Mex and the defendant 

involves all four oil and gas wells on lands covered by the Leases, three on the Garfield 

Lease and one on the Mesa Lease. On April 25, 2008, BLM Field Office personnel 

inspected the Leases and issued several Notices of Incidents of Noncompliance for two 

wells on the Garfield Lease, including a major violation on the Federal 15-9 well. The 

Field Office personnel again inspected the Leases approximately one month later and 

found that none of the noncompliance issues had been resolved. Additionally, they found 

an additional major violation on the Government 5 well and a major violation on the 

Federal 2 well on the Mesa Lease. Following the second inspection, on May 27, 2008, 

the Field Office ordered all of the wells on both leases to be shut-in “until all leaks are 

corrected and all compliance issues are resolved.” The shut-in orders required the 

corrective action to be completed by May 30, 2008. The orders were issued pursuant to 

43 C.F.R. § 3163.1a(3). 

Petro Mex did not challenge the orders, and alleges that it corrected all the cited 

violations by the end of June 2008. Petro Mex alleges that it notified the Field Office of 

this fact and then unilaterally resumed production from the wells in August 2008. 

According to Petro Mex, sometime in late October 2008—which plaintiff estimates as 

October 24 or 25, 2008—the BLM informed Petro Mex by phone that the shut-in orders 
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had not been lifted and that Petro Mex had to again halt production. Petro Mex alleges 

that it complied with the BLM’s call and halted production on or about October 31, 2008. 

Thereafter, on March 30, 2009, the BLM re-inspected the wells and found that 

Petro Mex had resolved the compliance issues noted in 2008. However, in 

correspondence dated April 1, 2009, the BLM informed Petro Mex that the inspector 

found there was no field compressor for the wells on the Garfield Lease and thus there 

was no possibility of production of oil and gas from the wells. The BLM advised Petro 

Mex that the Leases would be terminated under 43 C.F.R. § 3107.2-2, unless, within 60 

days, Petro Mex commenced drilling or reworking operations, restored production, or 

otherwise proved that the wells were capable of producing oil or gas in paying quantities. 

Petro Mex alleges that it responded to the BLM about one month later, explaining 

that the wells were capable of production and that production had only been halted due to 

the May 27, 2008 shut-in orders and that Petro Mex had resumed production but was 

again shut down.4

 Petro Mex further alleges that it informed the BLM that it would 

resume production after the BLM lifted the shut-in order. Meetings between BLM 

personnel and Petro Mex followed, but the dispute over the compressor and 

disagreements over certain outstanding fines and a bond owed by Petro Mex were not 

resolved. 

 

4

 At the oral argument on the motion, plaintiff’s counsel explained that the wells were damaged 

due to non-use after production was stopped in October 2008. 
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Eventually, the BLM Field Office recommended to the State Director of BLM that 

BLM terminate the leases for lack of production. On August 26, 2009, the BLM State 

Director adopted the recommendation and terminated the Leases. Specifically, the State 

Director informed Petro Mex that the Leases were terminated because they were “no 

longer capable of producing oil or gas in paying quantities after October 1, 2008.” Def.’s 

App. 55. 

Petro Mex timely appealed the State Director’s decision to terminate the Leases to 

the DOI’s Interior Board of Land Appeals (“IBLA”) and on September 27, 2010, the 

IBLA reversed and remanded the State Director’s decision to terminate the Leases. The 

decision states, in relevant part: 

In the instant case, BLM has lost sight of the distinction between cancelling 

a lease with a well capable of producing oil and gas lease in paying 

quantities for noncompliance and terminating such a lease for 

nonproduction. The [Field Office] appears to have acted on the assumption 

that the failure to lift its shut-in orders due to new compliance concerns 

necessarily results in a cessation of production that renders these leases 

subject to termination under the [Mineral Leasing Act]. As we have found, 

the subject leases embrace wells that were producing at the time BLM 

issued the shut-in orders in May, as well as when Petro Mex mistakenly 

resumed operations in August 2008, and [the Field Office] refused to lift its 

shut-in orders because Petro Mex failed to comply with the authorized 

officers order to increase its bond (and pay a civil penalty to [the Minerals 

Management Service]). Not being allowed to resume production from 

these leases because of BLM’s shut-in orders is not synonymous with their 

not having wells capable of production. Petro Mex’s failure to comply with 

the authorized officer’s order renders the leases subject to cancellation 

through judicial proceedings, provided the procedures in 43 C.F.R. §§ 

3108.3 and 3163.1 are followed. 

Accordingly, . . . the August 26, 2009 decisions by the Colorado State 

Office to terminate [the Leases] are reversed and remanded for further 

action consistent with this decision. 
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Petro Mex, LLC, 180 IBLA 94, 105-06 (IBLA Dec. Sept. 27, 2010). Thereafter, Petro 

Mex allegedly “made demand” upon the Field Office to resume production on the Leases 

and, according to Petro Mex, resumed production in October 2010. 

On October 22, 2014, Petro Mex filed its complaint in this court, seeking damages 

for an alleged breach of contract. Petro Mex alleges that the government breached the 

Leases by ordering it to cease production in late October 2008 after Petro Mex had 

corrected the violations and resumed production. Petro Mex further alleges that the 

government breached the Leases by terminating the Leases on or about August 26, 2009, 

because the Leases, as a matter of law, should never have been terminated. The 

government filed its motion to dismiss on February 20, 2015. Oral argument on the 

motion was heard on July 21, 2015. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Standard Of Review 

When deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the 

court must first assume that all undisputed facts alleged in the complaint are true and 

must draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 

(2007)). If the defendant contests the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations, the court may 

look at evidence outside of the pleadings in order to determine its jurisdiction over a case. 

See Engage Learning, Inc. v. Salazar, 660 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Should the 

plaintiff fail to establish subject-matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence, 
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Banks v. United States, 741 F.3d 1268, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citation omitted), the court 

“must dismiss the action,” RCFC 12(h)(3). 

B. Petro Mex’s Action is Timely 

The government argues, in the first instance, that this court lacks subject-matter 

jurisdiction to entertain this case on the grounds that Petro Mex’s breach of contract 

action is barred by the six-year statute of limitations set in 28 U.S.C. § 2501. 

Specifically, the government argues that the action is barred because all the events fixing 

the government’s liability occurred and were known or should have been known to the 

plaintiff more than six years ago, when the government failed to lift the shut-in order in 

August 2008 after Petro Mex corrected the violations identified in the May 2008 shut-in 

orders. See FloorPro, Inc. v. United States, 680 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 

(quoting Goodrich v. United States, 434 F.3d 1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006)); see also Oja 

v. Dep’t of Army, 405 F.3d 1349, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. 

Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 48-49 (1998)). According to the government, Petro Mex’s claim 

accrued on or before August 2008—but no later than October 1, 2008—because the only 

potential breach by the BLM was its failure to lift the shut-in orders after Petro Mex 

alleges that it had remedied its noncompliance and so notified the BLM. The government 

argues that only one shut-in order was imposed, so the BLM’s reinforcement of that order 

could not be a separate breach. Additionally, the government states that it is unclear 

whether the alleged phone call instructing plaintiff to continue the shut-in order actually 

occurred, as it contends that the BLM does not make such requests without confirming it 

in writing. Further, the government argues that the decision to terminate Petro Mex’s 
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leases in 2009 does not give rise to a separate breach claim because Petro Mex’s failure 

to produce stems from the BLM’s same failure to lift the shut-in orders in August 2008. 

In response, Petro Mex argues that its complaint was timely filed because the 

government has mischaracterized its claims and that, when properly construed, the breach 

of contract claims were timely filed. First, Petro Mex argues that it is asserting a breach 

based on the BLM s decision in late October 2008 to order Petro Mex to stop production 

after the violations were corrected. Petro Mex has filed an affidavit asserting a breach 

based on a late October 2008 BLM phone call in which Petro Mex claims it was 

instructed by the BLM to stop the production it had resumed in August 2008. Second, 

Petro Mex argues that the BLM’s August 2009 termination decisions also breached the 

leases because, as the IBLA determined, they were legally wrongful. Petro Mex asserts 

that the breaches associated with termination of the Leases do not relate back to the 

original shut-in orders issued in May 2008 or to BLM’s actions taken in October 2008. 

Rather, Petro Mex claims that the termination decisions are separate from the shut-in 

orders because BLM based the terminations of the Leases on new compliance issues that 

were identified in 2009 involving the compressor and certain fines and a bond allegedly 

owed by Petro Mex. 

The court finds that plaintiff’s breach of contract claims are not barred by the 

statute of limitations for two main reasons. First, while the government argues that the 

breach alleged by plaintiff cannot be an actual breach, the government has not moved to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim. At this stage of the proceeding, the court must take 

plaintiff’s alleged breach claims at face value. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing 
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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56). As such, regardless of whether plaintiff has stated a valid 

claim for breach of contract, the court’s task at this juncture is to determine whether, 

assuming plaintiff has stated a valid claim for breach of contract, the claims were timely 

filed. Accordingly, the court rejects the government’s motion to dismiss based on the 

statute of limitations because the breach alleged by plaintiff occurred within 6 years of 

filing the complaint. Plaintiff does not challenge the BLM’s failure to timely respond to 

a request to lift the shut-in order in August 2008, as the government contends. Rather, 

plaintiff alleges that the BLM wrongfully told or ordered Petro Mex to shut-in during a 

phone call in late October 2008 after the violations on the Leases were allegedly 

corrected. While the evidence of the alleged date of the phone call, sometime after 

October 22, 2008, comes from plaintiff’s employees, the date and the occurrence of the 

phone call have not been disputed by the government. 5 While government argues that it 

has not been able to confirm that any phone call was made, the undisputed evidence 

presented before the court indicates that, for the purpose of determining whether the 

statute of limitations has run, Petro Mex was told to stop production on either October 24 

or 25, 2008. Accordingly, the breach claim based on the October shut-in is therefore 

timely filed. If, after discovery, the evidence establishes that there was no phone call, 

plaintiff’s breach claim will fail on the merits. 

 

5

 While the government contends that it is unlikely that the BLM called plaintiff to order the 

shut-in order to be resumed without confirming that in writing, the government acknowledges 

that it cannot offer evidence at this stage to rebut the affidavits submitted by plaintiff. Instead, 

the government claims only that a phone call without accompanying written correspondence is 

not standard BLM practice. 
 12 

Second, the court also cannot accept the government’s contention that plaintiff’s 

breach of contract claims based on the termination decisions stem from the original 

failure to lift the orders in August 2008. As plaintiff argues, the allegations made in its 

breach claim are based on the BLM’s finding that Petro Mex had failed to cure new 

compliance issues that were identified in 2009. Most importantly, Petro Mex alleges that 

the decision to terminate arose after the parties could not resolve the compression pump 

issue identified in the April 1, 2009 letter from the BLM. A review of the termination 

notices and IBLA decision support Petro Mex’s reading of the 2009 termination 

decisions. Accordingly, Petro Mex’s breach claims based on wrongful termination 

decisions were timely filed. 

C. Petro Mex’s Breach of Contract Claim Based on Its Operator Status 

The government also argues that Petro Mex’s breach of contract claims regarding 

the Mesa Lease must be denied because, as an operator, Petro Mex lacks privity of 

contract with the United States. First Hartford Corp. Pension Plan & Trust v. United 

States, 194 F.3d 1279, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1999). It is well-settled that, to maintain a cause 

of action for breach of contract, the plaintiff “must show that there is a contract directly 

between itself and the government, i.e., that there is privity of contract.” Estes Express 

Lines v. United States, 739 F.3d 689, 693 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Cienega Gardens v. 

United States, 194 F.3d 1231, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Anderson v. United States, 344 F.3d 

1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003)); Sullivan v. United States, 625 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 

2010) (quoting Erickson Air Crane Co. of Wash. v. United States, 731 F.2d 810, 813 

(Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
 13 

Here, the evidence presented by the government establishes that EnCana is the 

lessee of the relevant portion of the Mesa Lease and thus EnCana, not Petro Mex, has the 

contract with the government. 6 Petro Mex has not presented credible evidence to refute 

the title search presented by the government, which shows that EnCana owns the Lease 

and Petro Mex is the operator of the Lease. As a lease operator, Petro Mex does not have 

a direct contractual relationship with the government. See Harry L. Bigbee, 2 IBLA 23, 

27 (IBLA Dec. Mar. 1, 1971) (finding that an operating agreement “does not give rise to 

a contractual relationship between the United States and the operator even though the 

agreement binds the operator to fulfill the lessee’s obligation under the lease.”). As a 

result, Petro Mex is not in privity of contract with the government, and, “absent privity” 

between the government and Petro Mex, “there is no case.” Katz v. Cisneros, 16 F.3d 

1204, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 1994).7

 

6

 Petro Mex asserts that EnCana may not actually own the Mesa Lease and that Petro Mex may 

have acquired title, arguing that the government’s documents are not definitive on the issue. The 

government argues in response that no transfer of title was ever recorded with the BLM, that the 

government’s certified land examiner confirmed after an official search that EnCana was the title 

holder, Def.’s Supp. App. 1-3, and that EnCana has acted as the record title holder by receiving 

the leaseholder correspondence from BLM. Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to refute the 

evidence presented by the government, and instead argues only that there may have been a 

transfer not in the record. This argument is unavailing. 

7

 The court rejects Petro Mex’s contention that it has an implied-in-fact contract with the 

government based on its operator status. The regulations provide the following definitions: 

Operating rights owner means a person who owns operating rights in a lease. A 

record title holder may also be an operating rights owner in a lease if it did not 

transfer all of its operating rights. 

Operator means any person or entity including but not limited to the lessee or 

operating rights owner, who has stated in writing to the authorized officer that it is 

responsible under the terms and conditions of the lease for the operations 

conducted on the leased lands or a portion thereof. 
 14 

Nevertheless, the rules of this court provide: 

The court may not dismiss an action for failure to prosecute in the name of 

the real party in interest until, after an objection, a reasonable time has been 

allowed for the real party in interest to ratify, join, or be substituted into the 

action. After ratification, joinder, or substitution, the action proceeds as if 

it had been commenced by the real party in interest. 

RCFC 17(a)(3); see also Ground Improvement Techniques, Inc. v. United States, --- F. 

App’x ---, 2015 WL 4603693 at *5 (Fed. Cir. July 28, 2015) (quoting RCFC 17(a)(3)). 

Accordingly, the court will provide plaintiff with time to cure this defect. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the government’s motion to dismiss is DENIED. 

Plaintiff shall have 60 days to cure the privity defect. The government shall have 30 days 

from the filing of the amended complaint or plaintiff’s notice to the court that no 

amendment is necessary to file its answer. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

s/Nancy B. Firestone 

NANCY B. FIRESTONE 

Judge 

 

 

43 C.F.R. § 3160.0-5. Thus, the regulations are clear that an operator is not synonymous with 

a lessee and therefore does not mean that the party has a contractual relationship with the 

government.