United States District Court

Northern District of Indiana

JASON R. CRAIG, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Civil Action No. 2:13-CV-92 JVB

v. )

)

DAVID LANE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Jason R. Craig, a pro se prisoner, filed a motion for preliminary injunction and a motion

to reconsider the screening order. (DE 16, 17.) The court addresses each in turn.

I. Motion for Preliminary Injunction

In his motion for a preliminary injunction, Craig complains that he has serious medical

problems that have been ignored since his arrival at the Porter County Jail, specifically, that he is

not receiving adequate treatment for sciatica and mental health issues. (DE 17.) He moves for an

order requiring David Lain (incorrectly sued as “David Lane”), the Sheriff of Porter County, to

arrange for immediate “examinations and a plan of treatment by a qualified specialist in pain, and

one in mental health,” and to carry out whatever treatment they recommend. (DE 17-1 at 3.) Sheriff

Lain has responded to the motion. (DE 28.) The deadline has passed for Craig to file a reply, and

to date, none has been received. Instead, Craig filed a motion asking that the Sheriff be held in

“contempt” for failing to file a timely response.1

 (DE 32.) The Sheriff did file a timely response,

however, so this motion will be denied.

1 It appears that Craig’s motion crossed in the mail with the Sheriff’s response, which was mailed to Craig

at the jail on July 1, 2013. (DE 28 at 15.) The court waited 14 days beyond the deadline for Craig’s reply, but as

stated none has been received, although he filed various documents pertaining to other issues during this period. (See

DE 30, 31, 32, 33, 39.) 
“[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be

granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v.

Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, the moving party must

demonstrate that he or she has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, lacks an adequate

remedy at law, and will suffer irreparable harm if immediate relief is not granted. Girl Scouts of

Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts of U.S., Inc., 549 F.3d 1079, 1086 (7th Cir. 2008).

Under the Eighth Amendment, inmates are entitled to adequate medical care.2 Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To establish liability, a prisoner must satisfy both an objective

and subjective component by showing: (1) his medical need was objectively serious; and (2) the

defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that medical need. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

834 (1994). A medical need is “serious” if it is one that a physician has diagnosed as mandating

treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for

a doctor’s attention. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). Deliberate indifference

means that the defendant “acted in an intentional or criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant

must have known that the plaintiff was at serious risk of being harmed and decided not to do

anything to prevent that harm from occurring even though he could have easily done so.” Board v.

Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted). 

For a medical professional to be deliberate indifference to an inmate’s medical needs, he or

she must make a decision that represents “such a substantial departure from accepted professional

judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base

2 The complaint reflects that during part of these events Craig was a pretrial detainee, during which time

the Fourteenth rather than the Eighth Amendment applied. Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 473 (7th Cir. 2009). The

governing standards are functionally equivalent, however, and “anything that would violate the Eighth Amendment

would also violate the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. 

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the decision on such a judgment.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008). A mere

disagreement with medical professionals about the best course of treatment does not establish

deliberate indifference, nor does negligence or even medical practice, since “the Eighth Amendment

does not codify common law torts.” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011). Moreover,

prisoners are not entitled to demand specific types of medical care, nor are they entitled to the “best

care possible.” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Maggert v. Hanks, 131

F.3d 670, 671-72 (7th Cir. 1997) (“A prison is not required by the Eighth Amendment to give a

prisoner care that is as good as he would receive if he were a free person, let alone an affluent free

person.”). When an inmate has received some form of treatment for a medical condition, to establish

deliberate indifference he must show that this treatment was “so blatantly inappropriate as to

evidence intentional mistreatment likely to seriously aggravate his condition.” Arnett, 658 F.3d at

751.

Here, the evidence shows that upon Craig’s arrival at the jail in September 2012, he reported

to a nurse that he was on several medications: Thorazine, Xanax, Neurontin, Wellbutrin, Norco,

Soma, and Cymbalta. (DE 28-2, Harris Aff. ¶ 10.) Nursing staff called several different pharmacies

to confirm current prescriptions for these medications, and they were able to confirm all but the

Neurontin. (Id.) Craig was later seen and prescribed Thorazine by the jail physician, Dr. Nadir AlShami, who diagnosed him with schizoid affective disorder and drug addiction.3

 (Id. ¶ 11.)

Thorazine is a drug commonly used to treat schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders. (Id.) A few

weeks later, Craig complained of some side effects from the Thorazine, including facial twitching,

3 Jail medical records reflect that Craig has a history of heroin and cocaine abuse. (DE 28-2, Medical

Records at 22, 33.) A few days after his arrival at the jail, a nurse noted that he appeared to be having withdrawal

symptoms. (Id. at 8.) The doctor prescribed two medications to address his withdrawal symptoms, and he was also

monitored by nursing staff twice a day during a five-day period. (Id.; DE 28-2, Harris Aff. ¶¶ 8-9.) 

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and also complained about back pain. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) On October 9, 2012, he was seen again by the

doctor, who prescribed Artane to address the side effects of Thorazine. (Id. ¶ 13.) The doctor

examined Craig’s back but did not find any limitation in his range of motion. (Id.)

In January 2013, the doctor saw Craig again to assess his progress, and decided to change

his medication from Thorazine to Haldol, an anti-psychotic medication also used to treat

schizophrenia. (Id. ¶ 14.) His notes reflect that he also diagnosed Craig with a personality disorder.

(Id.) A few weeks later Craig complained about side effects of Haldol, and in response Dr. Al-Shami

ordered an increase in the Artane. (Id. ¶ 15.) Craig was seen again by the doctor in February 2013,

and complained that he was not doing well on Haldol. (Id. ¶ 16.) The doctor put him back on

Thorazine, and also prescribed Neurontin, an anti-inflammatory pain medication, to address what

Craig described as shooting pains in his back. (Id.)

On March 4, 2013, Craig sent a letter to Sheriff Lain asking to be seen by a psychiatrist. (DE

28-1, Lain Aff. ¶ 3.) In response, on March 11, 2013, Craig was taken to be evaluated by an outside

mental health provider, Porter Starke Services, Inc. (“PSS”). (Id. ¶ 4; DE 28-2, Harris Aff. ¶ 18.) A

doctor at PSS recommended that Craig be treated with monthly injections of Risperdal, a powerful

anti-psychotic medication. (DE 28-2, Harris Aff. ¶ 19.) The jail complied with that recommendation,

and since that date Craig has been receiving regular injections of the drug. (Id.; DE 28-2, Medical

Records at 9-21.)

In April 2013, Craig was seen again by Dr. Al-Shami and reported that he wanted the

Neurontin increased due to increased pain in his back. (DE 28-2, Harris Aff. ¶ 17.) In response, Dr.

Al-Shami increased the dosage. (Id.) Craig was seen again by Dr. Al-Shami in June 2013, and

reported increased pain in his right leg and back, although the doctor’s notes reflect that during his

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assessment, Craig did not appear to be in acute distress. (Id. ¶ 18.) His diagnosis was sciatica,

“chronic pain—not serious.” (Id.) The doctor prescribed ibuprofen in addition to the Neurontin for

pain. (Id.)

In May 2013, Craig was seen again by a doctor from PSS, who recommended that the

Risperdal be continued, and that he also be given Wellbutrin. (Id. ¶ 20.) The jail complied with these

recommendations and gave him the additional medication. (Id.) Craig was seen again at PSS on June

18, 2013, and it was determined that his Wellbutrin should be increased. (Id. ¶ 21.) The jail complied

with this recommendation. (Id.)

As of July 1, 2013, the jail has a new medical care provider, Correctional Care Solutions

(“CCS”), which will provide a registered nurse to be on duty 24 hours a day; licensed practical

nurses to be on duty during day and evening hours; a nurse practitioner who will be at the jail twice

a week; a mental health counselor who will be present at the jail 40 hours a week; and a physician

and psychiatrist who will be on call 24 hours a day. (Id. ¶ 24; DE 28-1, Lain Aff. ¶¶ 5-7.) Craig will

be receiving care from these providers during his remaining time at the jail. (DE 28-2, Lain Aff. ¶ 7.)

Based on the above, Craig has not demonstrated that he is entitled to the extraordinary

remedy of a preliminary injunction. Far from establishing that his medical problems are being

ignored, the record shows that he is presently under the care of medical professionals and is

receiving several medications to address his health issues. Craig apparently disagrees with the

medical judgments of these providers and believes they should be doing more for him. However,

the Constitution does not entitle him to the medical treatment of his choice, nor does it entitle him

to care that is good as he would receive if he were a free person, let alone an affluent free person.

Maggert, 131 F.3d at 671-72; Forbes, 112 F.3d at 267. Based on the documents before the court,

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Craig has not demonstrated that the treatment he is presently receiving is “so blatantly inappropriate

as to evidence intentional mistreatment likely to seriously aggravate his condition.” Arnett, 658 F.3d

at 751. Accordingly, his motion for a preliminary injunction will be denied.

II. Motion to Reconsider

Craig also moves for reconsideration of the screening order, specifically, the dismissal of his

claim alleging denial of access to the courts. (DE 16.) As was fully explained in the screening order,

a prisoner can only proceed on a claim for denial of access to the courts if he identifies some

prejudice to a potentially meritorious legal claim. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996); Marshall

v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2006). Craig did not do so in his complaint, nor does he do

so in the present motion.

If Craig’s complaint left any doubt, his motion makes clear that he is complaining about a

temporary lack of access to writing materials and the delay of his legal mail during a two-week

period when he was housed in segregation for disciplinary reasons. (DE 16-1.) In his motion he

argues that he was prejudiced by these conditions because the lack of writing materials caused him

to file a “hastily prepared complaint” in this case. (DE 16-1 at 2.) The record belies this argument.

Craig states that he was released from segregation on April 16, 2013 (DE 16-1 at 2), and his

amended complaint was not due until May 1, 2013. (See DE 7.) He could have requested additional

time to prepare his complaint if he felt it was needed, but he did not do so; instead he filed it on

April 26, 2013, several days prior to the deadline. (DE 9.) This pleading cannot reasonably be

characterized as “hastily prepared.” It was 55 pages long with attachments, cogent, and highly

detailed. Based on Craig’s allegations, the court permitted him to proceed on claims against nine

individual defendants, including the sheriff, and on a policy claim against the private company that

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provided medical care at the jail. (DE 13.) Under these circumstances, Craig has not plausibly

alleged that his right of access to the courts was denied. See Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422,

1430 (7th Cir. 1996) (inmate’s ability to file current lawsuit demonstrated that his right of access

to the courts had not been unlawfully infringed). In short, the court finds no basis in the motion to

warrant reconsideration of the screening order.

For these reasons, the court:

(1) DENIES the motion for a preliminary injunction (DE 17); 

(2) DENIES the motion for “contempt” (DE 32); and

(3) DENIES the motion to reconsider (DE 16).

SO ORDERED on July 25, 2013.

 s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

Joseph S. Van Bokkelen

United States District Judge

Hammond Division

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