alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION
1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, David C. Scott, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the annual report of 3PAR Inc., on Form 10-K for the annual report period ended March 31, 2008 fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in such Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of 3PAR Inc.



|                    |  |  |  |                                                
|------------------- |  |  |  | -----------------------------------------------
|Date: June 12, 2008 |  |  |  | /s/    DAVID C. SCOTT                          
|                    |  |  |  | David C. Scott                                 
|                    |  |  |  | President, Chief Executive Officer and Director
|                    |  |  |  | (Principal Executive Officer)                  

I, Adriel G. Lares, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the annual report of 3PAR Inc., on Form 10-K for the annual report period ended March 31, 2008 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in such Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of 3PAR Inc.



|                    |  |  |  |                                                      
|------------------- |  |  |  | -----------------------------------------------------
|Date: June 12, 2008 |  |  |  | /s/    ADRIEL G. LARES                               
|                    |  |  |  | Adriel G. Lares                                      
|                    |  |  |  | Vice President of Finance and Chief Financial Officer
|                    |  |  |  | (Principal Financial Officer)                        

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 has been provided to 3PAR Inc. and will be retained by 3PAR Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request. This certification accompanies the Form 10-K to which it relates, is not deemed
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (whether made before or
after the date of the Form 10-K), irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing
Armando Heredia SANTA CRUZ, petitioner, v. CALIFORNIA.

No. 12-10222.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 24, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Justice BREYER took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-17-0000681

25-JAN-2019

07:54 AM
Linda LANUS, as personal representative of the Estate of Eric K. Lanus v. UNITED STATES.

No. 12-862.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 27, 2013.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Justice THOMAS, dissenting from denial of certiorari.

Petitioner Linda Lanus asks the Court to revisit our decision in *Feres v. United* *2732*States,* 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950), which interpreted the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) to deny military personnel the ability to recover for injuries resulting from the negligence of federal employees. I would grant the petition to reconsider *Feres* ' exclusion of claims by military personnel from the scope of the FTCA.

The FTCA is a sweeping waiver of sovereign immunity that, under specified circumstances, renders the Government liable for money damages for a variety of injuries caused by the negligence of Government employees. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). As written, the FTCA "renders the United States liable to *all* persons, including servicemen, injured by the negligence of Government employees." *United States v. Johnson,* 481 U.S. 681, 693, 107 S.Ct. 2063, 95 L.Ed.2d 648 (1987) (SCALIA, J., dissenting). While the Act contains a number of exceptions to this broad waiver of immunity, "none generally precludes FTCA suits brought by servicemen." *Ibid.* Congress contemplated such an exception, *Feres, supra,* at 139, 71 S.Ct. 153, but codified language that is far more limited. See § 2680(j) (excluding from waiver "[a]ny claim arising out of the *combatant activities* of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, *during time of war* " (emphasis added)).

Nevertheless, in *Feres,* the Court held that "the Government is not liable under the [FTCA] for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service." 340 U.S., at 146, 71 S.Ct. 153. There is no support for this conclusion in the text of the statute, and it has the unfortunate consequence of depriving servicemen of any remedy when they are injured by the negligence of the Government or its employees. I tend to agree with Justice SCALIA that "*Feres* was wrongly decided and heartily deserves the widespread, almost universal criticism it has received." *Johnson, supra,* at 700, 107 S.Ct. 2063 (internal quotation marks omitted). At a bare minimum, it should be reconsidered.

The instant petition asks the Court to do just that. I would grant this request. Private reliance interests on a decision that *precludes* tort recoveries by military personnel are nonexistent, and I see no other reason why the Court should hesitate to bring its interpretation of the FTCA in line with the plain meaning of the statute. I, therefore, respectfully dissent from the Court's decision to deny this petition.
Karen Ann McCALL, petitioner, v. Catherine KENDALL, Superintendent, Leath Correctional Institution.

No. 12-9555.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 3, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.
Ricky L. STEELE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D19-0940

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed June 12, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES W SCHUBERT,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, et 

al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-00856-KAW 

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Re: Dkt. No. 59

On February 8, 2017, Plaintiff James W. Schubert brought the instant suit against 

Defendants The Bank of New York Mellon and Bank of America, N.A., asserting claims for quiet 

title and declaratory relief. (Dkt. No. 1-1.) Defendants subsequently moved to dismiss the case. 

(Dkt. No. 14.) On June 14, 2017, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, but gave 

Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint to add claims based on an alleged breach of the 

settlement agreement. (Dkt. No. 42 at 18.) 

Plaintiff, however, did not file an amended complaint. Instead, Plaintiff filed a request that 

the Court amend its dismissal order to deny leave to amend so that Plaintiff could appeal the 

Court’s dismissal. (Dkt. No. 45 at 1-2.) The Court denied Plaintiff’s request, explaining that the 

proper procedure would be for Plaintiff to file a written notice of intent not to file an amended 

complaint, which would allow the Court to enter final judgment dismissing all claims with 

prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 47 at 2.)

On July 17, 2017, Plaintiff filed his notice of intention not to file an amended complaint. 

(Dkt. No. 48.) On July 18, 2017, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s case with prejudice and entered a 

final judgment. (Dkt. Nos. 50, 51.) Plaintiff subsequently appealed the case. (Dkt. No. 54.)

On April 3, 2019, the Ninth Circuit upheld the Court’s dismissal order on the merits. (Dkt. 
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

No. 57 at 2, 5.) Because Plaintiff could state a claim that was not barred by res judicata, however, 

the Ninth Circuit vacated the final judgment and remanded the case back to the Court to give 

Plaintiff “a final opportunity to amend his complaint consistent with this disposition.” (Id. at 5.)

On April 25, 2019, the Ninth Circuit’s judgment took effect. On May 6, 2019, the Court 

ordered Plaintiff to file an amended complaint by June 3, 2019. (Dkt. No. 59.) As of the date of 

this order, Plaintiff has not filed his amended complaint. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS 

Plaintiff to show cause, by June 20, 2019, why the case should not be dismissed for failure to 

prosecute by: (1) filing his amended complaint, and (2) explaining why Plaintiff failed to comply 

with the Court’s prior order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 11, 2019

__________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

ISMAEL MENDOZA,

 Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

 Appellee.

§

§

§

§

§

§ 

No. 08-12-00125-CR 

Appeal from the

120th Judicial District Court

of El Paso County, Texas 

(TC# 20100D04944) 

J U D G M E N T

The Court has considered this cause on the record and concludes there was no error in the 

judgment. We therefore affirm the judgment of the court below. This decision shall be certified 

below for observance.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 25TH DAY OF APRIL, 2014.

YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rivera, and Rodriguez, JJ.
Kenneth MITAN, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 12-1373.

Supreme Court of the United States

Aug. 30, 2013.

Petition for rehearing denied.
Case 5:05-cv-01668-RMW Document 30 Filed 01/25/06 Page 1 of 2
Case 5:05-cv-01668-RMW Document 30 Filed 01/25/06 Page 2 of 2
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION

In connection with the periodic report
of Abraxis BioScience, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the year ending December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I, Mitchell K. Fogelman, Principal Financial Officer of the
Company, hereby certify as of the date hereof, solely for purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code, that to the best of my knowledge:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at the dates and for
the periods indicated.
| | --- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                     |  |  |  |                                                  |  | 
|-------------------- |  |  |  | ------------------------------------------------ |  | 
|Date: March 12, 2010 |  |  |  | /S/ MITCHELL K. FOGELMAN                         |  | 
|                     |  |  |  | Mitchell K. Fogelman Principal Financial Officer |  | 

This certification accompanies this Report on Form 10-K pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by such Act, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the Exchange Act). Such certification
will not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Exchange Act, except to the extent that the Company specifically incorporates it by reference.
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 86 (Thursday, May 4, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Page 22070]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-11000]



=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Bureau of Land Management
[CA-020-5101-10-B038; CACA-31406, NVN-57250]


Alturas 345 Kilovolt Transmission Line Project; California

AGENCY: Bureau of Land Management, Interior; Susanville District 
Office, California.

ACTION: Amendment to Notice of Availability of a Draft Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS No. 950068).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the California Public 
Utilities Commission (CPUC) have prepared a draft Environmental Impact 
Report/Statement (EIR/S) for the Alturas 345 kilovolt (KV) transmission 
line project proposed by Sierra Pacific Power Company (SPPCo) in BLM 
application number CACA-31406. The BLM notice of availability of the 
draft EIR/S was published in the Federal Register on March 9, 1995 (60 
FR 12967-12968), and provided a comment period on the draft EIR/S that 
ended May 3, 1995. This Amendment to the BLM notice of availability of 
a Draft EIR/S hereby extends the comment period until June 2, 1995. All 
comments on the Draft EIR/S for the Alturas 345 kilovolt (KV) 
transmission line project must be postmarked no later than June 2, 
1995, and must be sent to: Julie Halligan/Peter Humm, CPUC/BLM; c/o 
Aspen Environmental Group; 30423 Canwood Street, Suite 218, Agoura 
Hills, CA 91301. For information call Peter Humm, BLM Project Manager, 
at (916) 257-0456.

    Dated: April 27, 1995.
John Bosworth,
Acting District Manager.
[FR Doc. 95-11000 Filed 5-3-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310-40-M
[PROPOSED] ORDER

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THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

NIKKI BELL, an individual, on 

behalf of herself and all others 

similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

vs. 

DEPARTMENT STORES 

NATIONAL BANK, a South Dakota 

Entity; FDS BANK, an Ohio 

Corporation; MACY’s 

INCORPORATED, an Ohio 

Corporation; and DOES 1 through 

50, inclusive, and each of them,

 Defendants.

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Case No.: 3:17-cv-00102-VC

CLASS ACTION

[Proposed] ORDER

[Fed. R. Civ. Proc., Rule 

41(a)(1)(A)(i)]

Assigned to Hon. Vince Chhabria

Complaint filed January 9, 2017
[PROPOSED] ORDER

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TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

The Court, having reviewed Plaintiff NIKKI BELL’s (“Plaintiff” or 

“Bell”) Request for Dismissal with Prejudice of Her Individual Claims Only, 

along with the corresponding Declaration of John P. Kristensen submitted in 

support thereof, hereby GRANTS Plaintiff’s Request for Dismissal. 

IT IS ORDERED as follows:

Plaintiff Bell’s individual claims are hereby dismissed with prejudice, 

while the claims of the putative Class members are dismissed without prejudice.

Because the dismissal of Plaintiff’s individual claims will not affect the interests 

of the Putative Class members, it is FURTHER ORDERED that notice of this 

dismissal need not be provided to the Putative Class members.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April _____, 2017

Hon. Vince Chhabria

Judge of the United States District 

Court

19
In re Alfred WHITE, petitioner.

No. 12-9253.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 15, 2013.

Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-6119
ROBERT LEONARD HUFFMAN, JR., Plaintiff - Appellant, versus HOUSTON NORRIS, Lt. Watch Commander; ALLEN SELLERS, Correction Officer; ROBBIE HUGHES, Correction Officer, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, District Judge. (CA-04-316-3) Submitted: March 24, 2005 Decided: March 31, 2005 Before WIDENER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Robert Leonard Huffman, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. John Adrian Gibney, Jr., THOMPSON & MCMULLAN, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Robert Leonard Huffman, Jr., appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. See Huffman v. Norris , No. CA-04-316-3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 20, 2005). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT 

Marketing Orders for 

NJOY ACE DEVICE, NJOY ACE POD CLASSIC TOBACCO 2.4%, NJOY ACE POD CLASSIC 

TOBACCO 5%, and NJOY ACE POD RICH TOBACCO 5% 

Marketed by NJOY, LLC 

The Center for Tobacco Products of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has carefully considered 

the potential environmental impact of these actions and has concluded that these actions will not have 

significant effects on the quality of the human environment. Therefore, environmental impact 

statements are not required. 

NJOY LLC wishes to continue marketing four electronic nicotine delivery system (ENDS) products in 

interstate commerce in the United States and submitted to FDA four premarket tobacco product 

applications to obtain marketing orders under the provisions of section 910 of the Federal Food, Drug, 

and Cosmetic Act. 

The Agency prepared the programatic environmental assessment (PEA), dated April 22, 2022, in 

accordance with the Council on Environmental Quality's regulations (40 CFR 1500-1508) implementing 

the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and FDA’s NEPA regulations (21 CFR 25.40) to support the 

finding of no significant impact. The evidence supporting this finding is contained in the attached PEA, 

which is available to the public upon request. 

The PEA evaluates potential environmental effects due to manufacturing, use, and disposal of the new 

products. No increased or new types of environmental impacts due to manufacturing the new products 

are anticipated. FDA does not foresee that use of the new products would result in new or different 

environmental impacts. FDA believes that the disposal of the new products is the same as the disposal 

conditions of other ENDS components and closed e-liquids that are currently marketed in the United 

States. Therefore, FDA does not foresee significant adverse impacts to the environment due to the 

proposed actions from manufacturing, use, and disposal of the new products. 

Digitally signed by Luis G. Valerio -S 

Date: 2022.04.22 09:13:00 -04'00' 

Approved by 

Luis G. Valerio, Jr., Ph.D., ATS 

Associate Director 

Division of Nonclinical Science 

Office of Science 

Center for Tobacco Products 

U.S. Food and Drug Administration
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1511 Introduced in House (IH)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1511

    To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide a 5-year 
      extension of the credit for electricity produced from wind.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 6, 2005

  Mr. Foley (for himself, Mr. Pomeroy, Mr. Kennedy of Minnesota, Mr. 
    Smith of Washington, Mrs. Davis of California, Mr. Snyder, Mr. 
  Abercrombie, Mr. Hayworth, Ms. Woolsey, Mr. Inslee, Ms. Hooley, Mr. 
 Lincoln Diaz-Balart of Florida, Mr. DeFazio, Mr. Baird, Mr. Simpson, 
  Mrs. Capps, Mr. Udall of New Mexico, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Bonilla, Mr. 
   Sanders, Mr. Otter, Mr. Weller, Mr. Doggett, Mr. McCrery, and Mr. 
   Sherman) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide a 5-year 
      extension of the credit for electricity produced from wind.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. 5-YEAR EXTENSION OF CREDIT FOR ELECTRICITY PRODUCED FROM 
              WIND.

    Section 45(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to 
wind facility) is amended by striking ``2006'' and inserting ``2011''.
                                 <all>
```
Mark SMAKAJ, et al., petitioners, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General.

No. 12-1275.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 17, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.