IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

JOSIAH BOYD, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 3:13-CV-337

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the motion to dismiss filed

by the respondent on September 3, 2013, and the motion to grant the

petition filed by the petitioner on September 18, 2013. For the

reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss (DE 10) is GRANTED

and the motion to grant the petition (DE 11) is DENIED. 

DISCUSSION

Josiah Boyd, a pro se prisoner initiated this case by filing

a Petition under 28 U.S.C. Paragraph 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus

attempting to challenge the prison disciplinary proceeding (MCF 12-

06-639) held at the Miami Correctional Facility on July 6, 2012.

Boyd was sanctioned with the loss of 60 days of earned credit time

and demoted to from Credit Class 1 to Credit Class 2. The

respondent has now filed a motion to dismiss arguing that, “Because

the conviction and sanction challenged in the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in this case have been vacated, this proceeding is

now moot and this Court lacks a case or controversy to adjudicate.”

case 3:13-cv-00337-RL document 12 filed 09/23/13 page 1 of 3
DE 10 at 2. In addition the respondent has submitted a letter from

the Indiana Department of Correction indicating that the sanctions

imposed as a result of that hearing were vacated and credited back.

DE 10-7. 

In response, Boyd filed a motion asking that the court grant

his habeas petition. Boyd argues that he has been re-tried and

found guilty again on July 23, 2013. He does not dispute that his

original loss of credit time was restored; rather he argues that it

was double jeopardy to have tried him a second time. However, this

habeas petition is a challenge to the July 6, 2012, hearing – not

the July 23, 2013, hearing. As to the July 6th hearing, it was

vacated. That is to say, Boyd won. Though the respondent conceded

by granting him a re-hearing, Boyd could not have obtained any

better result if he had litigated this case to a final judgment.

That is to say, even if this court had granted him habeas corpus in

this case and vacated the sanctions imposed on July 6th, the prison

could have still re-charged him with the same prison disciplinary

violation and given him a new hearing. 

Boyd argues that this is double jeopardy, but double jeopardy

is not applicable to prison disciplinary proceedings because such

a hearing does not constitute “prosecution” for double jeopardy

purposes. See Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 1996)

(holding that an acquittal in an earlier prison disciplinary

hearing did not bar a subsequent hearing to consider the very same

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charge); and Garrity v. Fiedler, 41 F.3d 1150, 1152-53 (7th Cir.

1994) (holding that prison disciplinary proceedings do not bar a

subsequent criminal prosecution for the same offense). 

Though Boyd could challenge the July 23rd hearing, he would

have to do so in a different habeas corpus case after he has

exhausted his administrative remedies. This case is about the July

6th hearing and there are no issues left to adjudicate about that

hearing. Thus, this case must be dismissed because there is no case

or controversy to adjudicate. See Hadley v. Holmes, 341 F.3d 661,

664 (7th Cir. 2003). 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the motion to dismiss (DE 10)

is GRANTED and the motion to grant the petition (DE 11) is DENIED. 

DATED: September 23, 2013 /s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United State District Court

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