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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUDY SIMENTAL,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY ADAMS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-00801-SI 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 

AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Re: Dkt. No. 49

This is a pro se prisoner’s civil rights action in which the plaintiff complained of 

inadequate medical care at Pelican Bay State Prison and the California State Prison – Sacramento

(CSP-Sacramento). This action was dismissed on May 9, 2018, after the parties reached a 

settlement agreement at a settlement conference before Magistrate Judge Robert Illman on May 4, 

2018. See Docket Nos. 45, 46. 

This matter is now before the court for consideration of plaintiff’s recently-filed motion for 

a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to (a) prevent plaintiff’s transfer from 

CSP-Sacramento “while this action is pending or at the very least while settlement [nego]tiations 

are ongoing in this matter,” and (b) prevent prison officials from taking away plaintiff’s walker. 

Docket No. 49 at 1.

A temporary restraining order preserves the status quo and prevents irreparable harm until 

a hearing can be held on a preliminary injunction application. See Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. 

Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). A temporary 

restraining order is an “extraordinary remedy” that the court should award only when a plaintiff 

makes a clear showing that he is entitled to such relief. See Winter v. Natural Res. Defense 

Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). The standards for a temporary restraining order are the same 
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

as those for a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., 

Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). A plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a likelihood of 

success on the merits, (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm that would result if an injunction were 

not issued, (3) the balance of equities tips in favor of the plaintiff, and (4) an injunction is in the 

public interest. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.1 The irreparable injury must be both likely and 

immediate. See id. at 22; Caribbean Marine Services Co., Inc. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th 

Cir. 1988) (“A plaintiff must do more than merely allege imminent harm sufficient to establish 

standing; a plaintiff must demonstrate immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary 

injunctive relief.”)

Plaintiff is not entitled to a TRO or preliminary injunction to prevent his transfer or to keep 

his walker. There are several problems with his motion. 

First and foremost, the request to prevent plaintiff’s transfer from CSP – Sacramento is 

now moot because the transfer has occurred. The CDCR’s records show that plaintiff now is 

housed at Salinas Valley State Prison. (This information was obtained from the CDCR’s inmate 

locator website, available at https://inmatelocator.cdcr.ca.gov/default.aspx.)

Second, the dispute that forms the basis for the requested TRO/injunction is different from 

the dispute at issue in this action. The alleged wrongdoers (i.e., the prison doctors and custody 

officials who determined that plaintiff should be transferred and that his walker should be 

disallowed) identified in the motion are not defendants in this action. And the alleged wrongdoing

described in the motion (i.e., a non-defendant doctor’s retaliation in June 2018 for plaintiff’s 

medical grievance filed for lowering plaintiff’s pain medications) is not the same wrongdoing that 

was alleged in the first amended complaint (i.e., a claim for deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s 

medical needs regarding a cancerous tumor on his leg more than a year ago). A plaintiff is not 

 

1 Winter did not, however, completely reject the validity of the sliding scale approach to 

preliminary injunctions. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 

2011). Under the “sliding scale” approach used in the Ninth Circuit – also dubbed the “serious 

question” test in Alliance for Wild Rockies -- “the elements of the preliminary injunction test are 

balanced, so that a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” Id.

at 1131. Thus, even after Winter, “‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a hardship balance 

that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support issuance of an injunction, assuming the other two 

elements of the Winter test are also met.” Id. at 1132 (citations omitted).
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Northern District of California

entitled to injunctive relief based on claims not pled in the complaint because the “court’s 

equitable power lies only over the merits of the case or controversy before it.” Pacific Radiation 

Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 2015); see, e.g., id. at 636-38 

(district court properly denied plaintiff’s request for an injunction to prevent HIPAA violation, 

where plaintiff had not asserted a claim for a HIPAA violation).

Third, plaintiff’s argument in his motion for a TRO/injunction that he should not be 

transferred from CSP-Sacramento because it will be more difficult to get to court for settlement 

proceedings in this case does not make sense because this case is closed. Settlement negotiations 

are not ongoing, and no settlement conferences are upcoming. The parties reached a settlement 

and this action was dismissed two months ago. 

Fourth, because this action already has been dismissed, plaintiff does not show a likelihood 

of success on the merits and does not show the need for any interim relief until the merits are 

reached. Where the court concludes the movant has failed to show a likelihood of success on the 

merits, the court, in its discretion, need not consider whether the movant would suffer irreparable 

injury. Guzman v. Shewry, 552 F.3d 941, 948 (9th Cir. 2009).

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction is 

DENIED. Docket No. 49. Plaintiff is free to file a new civil rights action to complain of the 

wrongs described in his motion, but he cannot obtain relief in this action for those alleged wrongs. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 13, 2018

______________________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge