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Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 48909 

Chie f Justice Justices 

Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Clifford W. Taylor Opinion Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED MARCH 26, 2003
 

DENNIS EGGLESTON, as Personal


Representative of the Estate


of LOUISA EGGLESTON, Deceased,
 

Plaintiff-Appellant,
 

v No. 121208
 

BIO-MEDICAL APPLICATIONS OF
 

DETROIT, INC. and FRESENIUS


MEDICAL CARE,
 

Defendants-Appellees,
 

and
 

JAMES LAWSON, D.O., and JAMES


LAWSON, D.O., P.C.,
 

Defendants.
 

PER CURIAM
 

This case presents the question whether a successor
 

personal representative has two years after appointment to
 

file an action on behalf of an estate under the wrongful death
 

saving statute, MCL 600.5852, or whether the two-year period
 

is measured from the appointment of the initial personal
 
representative. The Court of Appeals affirmed summary
 

disposition for defendants, holding that the plain language of
 

the statute refers only to one set of letters of authority
 

issued to the personal representative. 248 Mich App 640; 645
 

NW2d 279 (2001). However, the Court of Appeals misread the
 

statute and then relied on that erroneous reading in reaching
 

its decision. We reverse the judgments of the circuit court
 

and the Court of Appeals because the statutory language simply
 

provides that the two-year grace period is measured from the
 

issuance of letters of authority.
 

I
 

Decedent received kidney dialysis treatment from
 

defendants-appellees on June 21, 1996. She died the next day.
 

Decedent’s widower was appointed temporary personal
 

representative and issued letters of authority on April 4,
 

1997. He died on August 20, 1997.
 

Plaintiff, the son of the decedent and the first personal
 

representative, was appointed successor personal
 

representative, and letters of authority were issued to him on
 

December 8, 1998. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging
 

medical malpractice on June 9, 1999.
 

Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR
 

2.116(C)(7). Defendants argued that the action is barred by
 

the two-year statute of limitations, MCL 600.5838a(2), which,
 

they claimed, expired on June 21, 1998, two years after
 

decedent’s last treatment. Defendants also argued that the
 

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wrongful death saving statute, MCL 600.5852, does not apply
 

because the complaint was not filed within two years after the
 

appointment of the first personal representative on April 4,
 

1997. Plaintiff responded that another two-year period began
 

when he was appointed as successor personal representative.
 

The circuit court agreed with defendants and granted summary
 

disposition.
 

On appeal as of right, the Court of Appeals affirmed.
 

The Court characterized plaintiff’s argument as one advocating
 

an “expansive reading” of the statute, whereas the law
 

requires that the saving provision be given a “narrow
 

reading,” citing this Court’s decision in Lindsey v Harper
 

Hosp, 455 Mich 56, 65; 564 NW2d 861 (1997). The Court held
 

that the statute should instead be construed and applied
 

according to its plain terms.1
 

Furthermore, the plain language of the saving


clause refers to one set or “the” letters of
 

authority, not multiple letters of authority. The
 

statute applies to “the” personal representative,


not “a” personal representative, which might


suggest that any personal representative who
 

receives letters of authority, initially or as a


successor, has two years to file a claim. Clearly,


if the Legislature had intended that the two-year


grace period begin anew each time an appointment is


terminated and a new appointment made, it could


have easily done so by specifically stating as
 

much. Absent language to that effect, we are bound


to construe the saving provision strictly: the
 

two-year limitation period begins when the probate


court issues the letters of authority to the
 

1 The Court of Appeals did not explain how, if at all, a


“narrow reading” of the statute would differ from its plain


meaning.
 

3
 
personal representative, regardless of whether the


court later appoints one or more successor personal


representatives. [248 Mich App 649.] 


Plaintiff has applied for leave to appeal.
 

II
 

We review de novo the interpretation and application of
 

a statute as a question of law. If the language of a statute
 

is clear, no further analysis is necessary or allowed. Miller
 

v Mercy Mem Hosp, 466 Mich 196, 201; 644 NW2d 730 (2002).
 

III
 

The question presented is of first impression. Although
 

the Court of Appeals purported to construe and apply the plain
 

language of MCL 600.5852, the Court misquoted the statute by
 

inserting “the” before “letters of authority.”
 

If a person dies before the period of
 

limitations has run or within 30 days after the


period of limitations has run, an action which


survives by law may be commenced by the personal


representative of the deceased person at any time


within 2 years after [the] letters of authority are


issued although the period of limitations has run.


But an action shall not be brought under this


provision unless the personal representative


commences it within 3 years after the period of


limitations has run. [Id.]
 

The Court relied on this misquotation in holding that a
 

personal representative must bring an action within two years
 

after the initial letters of authority are issued to the first
 

personal representative. This is not, however, what the
 

statute says. The statute simply provides that an action may
 

be commenced by the personal representative “at any time
 

within 2 years after letters of authority are issued although
 

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the period of limitations has run.” Id. The language adopted
 

by the Legislature clearly allows an action to be brought
 

within two years after letters of authority are issued to the
 

personal representative. The statute does not provide that
 

the two-year period is measured from the date letters of
 

authority are issued to the initial personal representative.
 

Plaintiff was “the personal representative” of the estate
 

and filed the complaint “within 2 years after letters of
 

authority [were] issued,” and “within 3 years after the period
 

of limitations ha[d] run.” MCL 600.5852. The action was
 

therefore timely.
 

Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the circuit
 

court and the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the
 

circuit court for further proceedings. MCR 7.302(F)(1).
 

Maura D. Corrigan


Michael F. Cavanagh


Elizabeth A. Weaver
 

Marilyn Kelly


Clifford W. Taylor


Robert P. Young, Jr.


Stephen J. Markman
 

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