alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906**

**OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection withthe Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Universal American FinancialCorp. (the “Registrant”) for the quarter ended March 31, 2007, as filedwith the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”),Richard A. Barasch, Chief Executive Officer of the Registrant, and Robert A.Waegelein, Chief Financial Officer of the Registrant, each hereby certifies,pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of his knowledge:

(1)   The Reportfully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2)   The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.
| Date: May 10, 2007 |   | /s/ RICHARD A.  BARASCH  |
|-------------------------|--------|--------------------------|
|                    |   | Richard A. Barasch       |
|                    |   | Chief Executive Officer  |
|                    |   |                     |
| Date: May 10, 2007 |   | /s/ ROBERT A.  WAEGELEIN |
|                    |   | Robert A. Waegelein      |
|                    |   | Chief Financial Officer  |

 

*A signed originalof this written statement required by Rule 13a-14(b) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934 and 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 has beenprovided to the Registrant and will be retained by the Registrant and furnishedto the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.*

*This certificationaccompanies the Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Actof 2002, and shall not be deemed filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of1934, as amended, or otherwise subject to the liability of that Section. Thiscertification is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of theRegistrant under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of1934, irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in suchfiling.*

----
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

MARY MITCHELL (deceased), by her son 

and next friend, RICHARD MITCHELL, and 

KIMBERLY MOORE, on behalf of 

themselves and all other class members, 

 Plaintiffs, 

v. CAUSE NO.: 2:12-CV-523-TLS 

LVNV FUNDING, LLC; RESURGENT 

CAPITAL SERVICES, L.P.; and ALEGIS 

GROUP, LLC, 

 Defendants. 

ORDER 

This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Entry of Final 

Approval Order [ECF No. 214], filed on April 2, 2020. The Plaintiffs seek the entry of a 

(Proposed) Final Approval Order [ECF No. 214] that is unopposed by the Defendants and has 

been submitted to the Court. 

Finding the Final Approval Order fair, reasonable, and consistent with statutory goals, the 

Court GRANTS the Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Entry of Final Approval Order [ECF No. 

214] and APPROVES and ADOPTS, with slight modifications and corrections, the (Proposed) 

Final Approval Order [ECF No. 214]. The Court DENIES as moot the Plaintiffs’ Motion for 

Entry of Final Approval Order [ECF No. 206]. The Court will enter the Final Approval Order by 

separate docket entry. 

SO ORDERED on April 13, 2020. 

 s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

 CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

USDC IN/ND case 2:12-cv-00523-TLS document 215 filed 04/13/20 page 1 of 1
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-02-00710-CV

Michelle Jahner, Appellant

v.

Mark Jahner, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 98-12325, HONORABLE SCOTT H. JENKINS, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Michelle Jahner and appellee Mark Jahner have filed a “Joint Motion to

Vacate Order and Remand.” The parties have informed this Court that they have settled all matters

in dispute and request that this Court vacate the August 8 , 2002, final judgment and remand the

cause to the trial court for entry of an order in conformity with the mediated settlement agreements

executed by the parties. We grant the motion, vacate the judgment, and remand for rendition of a

judgment in accordance with the parties’ settlement agreement. S ee Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(2)(B) (in

a ccordance with parties’ agreement, court may set aside trial court judgment and remand to tri a l

court for rendition of judgment in accordance with agreement).

Mack Kidd, Justice

Before Justices Kidd, B. A. Smith and Patterson

Dismissed on Joint Motion

Filed: August 14, 2003
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5

<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
REGISTRANT'S FORM 10-Q FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 1997 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
INCLUDED IN SUCH REPORT.
</LEGEND>

<CIK>   0000711604
<NAME>  CARLYLE REAL ESTATE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP - XIII

       
<S>                    <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>          3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>      DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>           MAR-31-1997

<CASH>                          5,898,459 
<SECURITIES>                      374,085 
<RECEIVABLES>                   4,250,976 
<ALLOWANCES>                         0    
<INVENTORY>                          0    
<CURRENT-ASSETS>               10,523,520 
<PP&E>                         65,954,286 
<DEPRECIATION>                       0    
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                 79,425,805 
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>          61,150,071 
<BONDS>                        62,826,773 
<COMMON>                             0    
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                0    
<PREFERRED>                          0    
<OTHER-SE>                    (49,457,867)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>   79,425,805 
<SALES>                         5,115,519 
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                5,213,279 
<CGS>                                0    
<TOTAL-COSTS>                   2,993,104 
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                  215,256 
<LOSS-PROVISION>                     0    
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>              2,835,106 
<INCOME-PRETAX>                  (830,187)
<INCOME-TAX>                         0    
<INCOME-CONTINUING>              (797,482)
<DISCONTINUED>                 72,171,405 
<EXTRAORDINARY>                55,183,784 
<CHANGES>                            0    
<NET-INCOME>                  126,557,707 
<EPS-PRIMARY>                      342.38 
<EPS-DILUTED>                      342.38 

                


</TABLE>
Antonio RODRIGUEZ, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 12-9463.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 29, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied.
**
**EXHIBIT 31**

**CERTIFICATIONS**

I, Ron Hooper, certifythat: 

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Sabine Royalty Trust,for which Simmons Bank acts as Trustee; 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a materialfact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in allmaterial respects the financial condition, distributable income and changes in trust corpus of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

4. I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(c)and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)), or for causing such controls and proceduresto be established and maintained, for the registrant and I have: 

a) Designed such disclosure controls andprocedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under my supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to me by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

b) Designed such internal controlover financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under my supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements forexternal purposes; 

c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report my conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurredduring the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting; and 

5. I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting,to the registrant’s auditors: 

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 
By: /s/ Ron Hooper
Ron Hooper

SVP, Royalty Trust Management

Simmons Bank

Date: August 7, 2019 
**
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A20D0086. PARAMOUNT CAPITAL INVESTMENTS, LLC v. GOLDMAN

SACHS & CO., LLC.

Paramount Capital Investments, LLC filed a garnishment action against

Goldman Sachs & Co. and others,seeking to collect a judgment it had obtained against

Alberto Galvez, whom Paramount alleged had an account with Goldman. When

Goldman failed to file an answer, the trial court entered default judgment against

Goldman and in favor of Paramount. Goldman moved to set aside the default

judgment on the ground, that, among other things, Paramountfailed to perfectservice.

The trial court granted the motion, vacated and set aside the default judgment.

Paramount then filed this application for discretionary appeal. We, however, lack

jurisdiction.

Generally, a party must follow the discretionary appeal procedure to appeal an

order in a garnishment case. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (4). However, “[t]he grant of

a motion to set aside a default judgment . . . leaves the case pending in the trial court

below and is not a final judgment.” Laff Lines, Ltd. v. Dimauro, 186 Ga. App. 24, 25

(366 SE2d 375) (1988) (emphasis in original);see also Wright v. Wright, 139 Ga. App.

60 (228 SE2d 9) (1976) (“In this garnishment case the trial courtset aside a judgment

against the garnishee but did not terminate the garnishment proceeding. This order is

not a final judgment”). Because the order that Paramount wishes to appeal is not a

final judgment, Paramount was required to comply with the interlocutory appeal

procedure set forth in OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). See Laff Lines, 186 Ga. App. at 25.

Although Paramount did file a discretionary application, OCGA § 5-6-35, which

governs discretionary appeal procedure, does not excuse a party seeking appellate

October 10, 2019
review of an interlocutory order from complying with the additional requirements of

OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). See Bailey v. Bailey, 266 Ga. 832 (471 SE2d 213) (1996);

compare Principal Lien Svcs. v. NAH Corp., 346 Ga. App. 277, 279 (814 SE2d 4)

(2018) (garnishor properly filed discretionaryapplication from trial court order thatset

aside default judgment and dismissed garnishment action).

Paramount’sfailure to complywith the interlocutory appeal procedure deprives

us of jurisdiction to consider this discretionary application, which is hereby

DISMISSED.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

10/10/2019
Detroit HINES, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 12-9937.

Supreme Court of the United States

July 22, 2013.

Petition for rehearing denied.

Justice KAGAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-02-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                         154,628
<SECURITIES>                                   196,382
<RECEIVABLES>                                  284,982
<ALLOWANCES>                                    16,507
<INVENTORY>                                    107,334
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               744,978
<PP&E>                                         488,134
<DEPRECIATION>                                 281,422
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 965,565
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          574,207
<BONDS>                                         85,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,137
<OTHER-SE>                                     297,942
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   965,565
<SALES>                                        619,314
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               619,314
<CGS>                                          556,379
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  556,379
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                80,640
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,435
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 14,730
<INCOME-TAX>                                       737
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             13,993
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    13,993
<EPS-BASIC>                                    $0.12
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    $0.12


</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1496 Introduced in House (IH)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1496

    To return general aviation to Ronald Reagan Washington National 
                                Airport.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 6, 2005

Mr. Young of Alaska (for himself, Mr. Mica, Mr. Oberstar, Mr. Costello, 
 and Ms. Norton) introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
           the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To return general aviation to Ronald Reagan Washington National 
                                Airport.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Return of General Aviation to Ronald 
Reagan Washington National Airport Act of 2005''.

SEC. 2. AIR CHARTER AND GENERAL AVIATION OPERATIONS AT RONALD REAGAN 
              WASHINGTON NATIONAL AIRPORT.

    Notwithstanding any law, regulation, or agency policy or directive 
that has the effect of generally prohibiting general aviation aircraft 
from landing at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, not later 
than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
Transportation, acting through the Federal Aviation Administration, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall permit the 
resumption of nonscheduled, commercial air carrier air charter and 
general aviation operations at Ronald Reagan Washington National 
Airport.
                                 <all>
```
CERTIFICATIONS



I, Winnie Wong, certify that:



1.

I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of Alianza Minerals Ltd.;



2.

Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3.

Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4.

The Companys other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the Company and have:



a)

Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the Company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



b)

Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principals;



c)

Evaluated the effectiveness of the Companys disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



d)

Disclosed in this report any change in the Companys internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the annual report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Companys internal control over financial reporting; and



5.

The Companys other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Companys auditors and the audit committee of the Companys board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



a)

all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the Companys ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



b)

any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the Companys internal control over financial reporting.





Date:   January 31, 2017





/s/  Winnie Wong

Winnie Wong,

Chief Financial Officer
Wilbur Delmas WHITEHEAD, petitioner, v. CHESAPEAKE OPERATING, INC., et al.

No. 12-1188.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 3, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

TYRONE FRAZIER, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO. 3:13-CV-1335-TS

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Tyrone Frazier, a pro se prisoner, filed this habeas corpus petition attempting to

challenge his guilty plea for Possession of Marijuana and his sentence of two years probation by

the Marion Superior Court on March 10, 1988. To obtain habeas corpus relief, a petitioner must

be “in custody.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). This requires that the “habeas petitioner be ‘in custody’

under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed.” Maleng v. Cook,

490 U.S. 488, 490–91 (1989). Here, Frazier’s probation on this conviction ended decades ago

and— though he is currently in prison—he is not “in custody” on this charge. Because he is not

“in custody” on the conviction he is attempting to challenge, this court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction. See Id. at 493. 

For the foregoing reasons, this case is DISMISSED for want of subject matter

jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED on December 23, 2013.

 s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FORT WAYNE DIVISION