2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit
10-13-2004 

# Gr ee n v . Robinson P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t N o . 01-4291

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Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. It h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2004 D e c i sion s b y a n author i z e d a dmini s tr at or of V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/237* Honorable Jose ph E. Irena s, Seni or United St ates Dis tri ct Judge for the Dist rict of New Jersey, sitting by

designation. NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

No. 01-4291

RAMEE K. D. GREEN,

Appellant

v. WILLIE ROBI NSON; JOHN DOE; W ILL IA M J. FI SH ER , AS SIS TA NT DI ST RIC T A TT OR NE Y, IN THEIR PERSONAL/ INDIVI DUAL CAPACITY

On A ppeal from the Un ited States District Co urt for the Easte rn D istrict of P enns ylvania (D istrict Co urt N o. 97-cv-3005 ) Distri ct Judge: Honorable Norm a L. Sha piro

Arg ued: October 1, 2004 Bef ore: ROTH and CHERTO FF Circuit Judges , andIRENAS, * Senior District Judge
. (Fil ed October 13, 2004 ) ROBERT A. LONG JEREM Y D. KE RNO DLE (Argued) Covington & Burling 12 01 Pe nn sy l va ni a A ve nu e, N. W. Washington, D.C. 20004 Counsel for

Appellant1 The statute o f limitatio ns fo r Gre en’s S ection 198 3 m aliciou s pros ecutio n claim is

gov erned by the statu te of lim itations f or pe rsona l injury claim s prov ided b y Penn sylvania law , wh ich is two years. See Wilso n v. G arcia , 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann . § 5524(2 ). 2 PEDR O A. RA MO S, City Solici tor ELISE BR UHL , Assis tant Ci ty Solici tor, Appeals (Argued) Cityof Philade lphia Law Department 1515 Arch Street , 17th Fl oor Philadelphia, PA 19102 Counsel for

Appellee

OPI NION

CH ER TO FF , Circuit

Judge. Ramee K.D. Green seeks to pur sue a mali cious pr osecuti on clai m filed January 3, 2001 against

Philadelphia Poli ce Officer Wil lie Robi nson based on hi s May 9, 1995 acquittal of

firearms charges . The District Court dis missed the clai m as time- barred and we wi llaff

irm. Green init

iall y fi led a pro s e Secti on 1983 complaint on April 25, 1997 within t he two-year stat

ute of limitations for malicious prosecuti on claims. 1 His complaint , though, allege d that d efen dant W illiam J. F isher, A ssistant D istrict Atto rney, had malic iously pursued the charges a nd had, t o that e nd, induc ed Officer Robins on and his John Doe police partner

to tes tify

falsel y at

tri al. (App. 34-43. ) The District Court dismis sed the false testi mony claims agains t Officer s Robinson and Doe foll owing the scr eening3

provided for by the Prison L itigation Refo rm A ct (PLR A), 28 U .S.C. § 191 5(e)(2), be ca us e o f th e im m un ity f ro m da m ag es fo r tr ial tes tim on y pr ov id ed by Briscoe v. LaHue , 460 U .S. 325 (198 3). (App. 12-15. ) The clai ms against Fisher proceeded and the origi nal comp laint was filed an d served o n Fisher. Green then re quested t

hat his case be admini strativel y st ayed pe nding res oluti on of a petition he file d un der P enns ylvania’s P ost-C onv iction R elief A ct (PC RA ) seek ing to overturn a state court murde r convict ion. Fi sher was al so the pr osecutor in the murde r

cas e an d Gre en s oug htth e s ta y bec aus e he evi den tl y bel ie ved th athi s pe ndi ng PC RA petit ion which ass erted mal icious prosecution agai nst Fis her could ha ve an “impact on [his] Section 1 983 claim alleging ma licious prosecu tion.” (App . 50.) The D istrict Court granted his req uest and the case w as stayed until Septem ber 19, 20 00. (Ap p. 18-19.) Up on re open ing, G reen, re prese nted b y couns el, filed a mo tion to a men d his orig inal c om plain t and alleg e a m alicio us p rose cutio n cla im a gain st O ffic er R obi nso n. (App. 56-61. ) Green’s motion was grant ed and he fil ed his amended complaint on Jan uar y 4, 20 01. ( Ap p. 62 -67 .) O ffic er R obi nso n w as th en s erv ed f or th e fir st tim e. (A pp. 7 2.) Robinson fil ed a motion for summary j udgment, as serting that the mali cious prosecution claim w as barred b y the statute of limitations. (App. 74 .) The D istrict Court granted hi s motion, finding t hat the January4, 2001 mali cious pr osecuti on clai m was time-b arred b ecau se it did n ot relate b ack to the A pril 25, 1 997 com plaint p ursua nt to4

Federal Rul e of CivilProcedure 15( c)(3) , si nce Robinson had not been provide d notice of the cl aim unti l he was served in January 2001. The Court further found that the di smissal of the cl aims agai nst Robinson i n the ori ginal c omplaint was proper even t

hough Green was not provi ded an opportuni ty to fir st amend his complaint , because any amendment of the o rigin al fa lse te stim ony c laim s w oul d ha ve b een futil e. (App. 16-27. ) The District Co urt e nter ed s um ma ry judg me nt in fav or o f O ffic er R obi nso n on Oc tob er 2 5, 20 01. (A pp. 2 7.) Gre en ap pe al ed th e d ec is io n of th e Di st ri ct Cou rt an d wa s appo in te d c oun se l. On appeal, he rais es thr ee arguments . Fir st, he asserts that the Distri ct Court c ommitted

revers ible e rror when i t fai led to i nform him of his oppor tunit y t o amend his complai nt prior to dis missal under the PLRA. Second, he assert s that the Dist rict Court shoul d have consider ed his r elation-back c laim purs uant to Rul e 15(c)( 2) which appli es to addi tions of cl ai ms a gai nst

exi stin g partie s, in st eadof 1 5( c) (3 ) whi ch appl ie s t o ad di ti ons of c la ims against new partie s. Third, he ass erts that e ven if Rule 15( c)(3) applie s, he has sati sfied its stri ctures because i ts time li mit for not ice upon a new party can be extended for “good cause,” which he asserts i s present here. Thi s Court hear d the argument s of the parties on October 1, 2004 and will address each i n turn. A. Gre en firs t argue s that the Distric t Cou rt com mitted revers ible erro r wh en it dism issed h is origin al com plaint w ithout p rovid ing h im no tice that h e cou ld am end h is5

complaint

to st ate a vi able cl aim. We disagree. Und er the PL RA , a district court “shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determ ines tha t . . . the action . . . seeks m oneta ry relief ag ainst a d efen dant w ho is immune from such rel ief. ” 28 U.S.C. § 1915( e)(2) (B)(i ii) . Pri or to di smissal , though, “the court must i nform the pl ainti ff that he has lea ve to amend withi n a set period of ti me, unless amendment would be inequi table or futi le. ” Grayson v. Mayview Stat e Hosp. , 293 F.3d 103, 108 ( 3d Cir. 2002) (citing Shane v. Fauver , 213 F.3 d 11 3, 11 6 (3 d C ir. 20 00) ). Here, the Distri ct Court was not requir ed to inf

orm Green of his opportunit y t o amend bec aus e am end me nt w oul d ha ve b een futil e. Green’s ori ginal c omplaint focuses i ts al legations on Assi stant Distri ct Attorney Fisher, assert

ing that Fisher mal icious ly pursued fi rearms charges agains t Green and used Robinson to do so. The sole basi s for l iabil ity asserted against

Robinson was that

Fisher convinced hi m to testifyfalsel y at Green’s trial . Robinson was i mmune from damages for this testimony pur suant t o Briscoe v. LaHue , 460 U .S. 325 (198 3). A n op portu nity to amend the claim, therefore, was futil e as no amount of r epleadi ng could have negated Ro bin son ’s im mu nity fro m a claim bas ed o n hi s trial t estim ony. Gre en arg ues, tho ugh , that am endm ent of his co mp laint co uld n ot hav e bee n fu tile because he was abl e to amend his complaint to st ate the malici ous prosecut ion claim for wh ich R obin son is n ot imm une. G reen’s ame nded com plaint, tho ugh , com pletely changed the fac tual t

heory of the cas e, focusi ng the al legations on Robinson i nstead of2 Green also contends that the Dist rict Court shoul d not have vi ewed amendment as fu tile be ca us e h e a lle ge d i n p as sin g t ha t R ob in so n f als ely a rre ste d h im . T o t he co nt ra ry, Green was arrested on October 28, 1992. As of the date of the originalApril 25, 1997 complaint , the two-y ear st atute of limi tati ons for a fal se arr est ci vil rights clai m had alrea dy ex pire d. See Montgomery v. De Simone , 159 F.3d 120, 126 & n .4 (3d Cir. 199 8). This was all the more reason to regard further amendment of the comp laint against Ro bin son as f utile
. 6 Fisher. This is not a case where the pro s e plai ntiff clearly intende d to plea d a differ ent lega l theo ry wh ich w oul d su ppo rt a cl aim bas ed o n th e sa me alleg ed f acts . Cf. Abbott v. Latshaw , 164 F.3d 141, 149 (3d Cir. 1998). Here, the complai nt was onlycapable of correct ion thr ough an amendment that fundamentall y change d the al leged fact ual scenari o. Under thes e circ umstances, the Dist rict Court was not r equired to predict that Gre en, in a com plaint th at allege d that F isher h ad m aliciou sly prosec uted h im, actu ally intende d to all ege that

Robinson had done so. Consideri ng the fact s as al leged i n the complaint , the Distri ct Court appropri atel y determined that amendment was futile, and this Court willaffirm i ts deci sion on this i ssue. 2 B. Green next ass erts that t he District Court

incorr ectl y appl ied the relat ion-back stand ard o f Ru le 15(c )(3) inste ad of 15(c )(2) to h is malic ious p rosec ution c laim. R ule 15(c)( 2) appli es to amendments which assert a new clai m or defense agai nst an exi sti ng party ; Rule 15(c )(3) applies to amendments which add c laims against a new party . Green assert s that

Rule 15(c)( 2) should apply here becaus e Robinson was named in the origi nal complaint . This Court

disagr ees and fi nds that the Dist rict Court appropriate ly applie d7

Rule 15(c)( 3) because Robi nson was, i n essence, a new partyto the a ction when the

amen ded co mplaint w as filed. He w as dismissed from the lawsuit on J une 3, 19 97 bef ore the ori ginal c omplaint

was filed a nd before he was served. As a res ult, he never re ceived notice of the l awsuit until he was s erved with t he amended complaint

in January 2001, almost four

year s after

the st atute of limi tati ons had run. In determining whether a party is a “new part

y” s o that Rul e 15(c)( 3) -- r ather t han (c)( 2) -- s hould apply , court s conside r whether t he defendant had t

imelynotice that t

he orig inal c om plain t wa s file d an d th at he wa s on e of its inte nde d de fen dan ts. See, e. g. , Delga do-Bru net v. Clark , 93 F .3d 33 9, 344 (7th C ir. 1996 ). As a result, w here a party is not n ame d in the com plaint, o r is nam ed as a “Jo hn D oe” d efen dant, a nd h as no reaso n to know that he i s an int ended party i n the la wsuit, the rel ation ba ck inquir y i s governed by the n ew par ty stand ard of R ule 1 5(c )(3). See Singletary v. Pa. De p’t of Co rr. , 266 F.3d 186 , 194 ( 3d C ir. 2001 ); Wa yne v. Jarv is , 197 F.3d 1098, 11 02-03 (1 1th Cir. 199 9); Delgado-Brunet , 93 F .3d at 3 44; Cox v. Treadway , 75 F.3d 2 30, 240 (6 th Cir. 1996 ); B ar ro w v. W eth er sf iel d P ol ice D ep 't , 66 F.3d 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1995). I n determi ning whether Rule 15( c)(2) or 15(c) (3) appl ies, the focus i s on whether the defendant had ti mel y notic e that

th e pl ai nt if

f s oug htto as se rt

cl ai ms a gai nst

hi m. The D istrict Court approp riately applied Rule 15 (c)(3) to the relation-back inquiry because Robinson was di smissed from the lawsuit before the complaint

was filed a nd, as a resul t, was never

served with the complai nt or pr ovided noti ce unti l January 2001 that8

Green sought t o assert

clai ms against

him. He had no noti ce that he was the intended defendant i n this acti on untilalmost four year s after

the st atute of limi tati ons on the malici ous prosecut

ion claim had run. The Court, t herefore, will af

firm the Distri ct Cou rt’s application of R ule 15(c)(3) to this m atter. C. Finally , Green argues that he satisfi ed the requirements of Rule 15(c)(3) because he h as “ goo d ca use ” fo r his f ailur e to p rov ide ti me ly notic e of the a ction to R obi nso n. Under Rule 15(c)( 3), a cl aim rel ates bac k to the t imely -fil ed complaint

if it “arose out

of the conduct , tr ansacti on, or occur rence set forth or atte mpted to be se t fort h in the original plead ing” a nd if within t he period pr ovided byRule 4(m) for s ervice of the summons and complaint , the partyto be brought in by amendment (A) has re ceived suc h notice of the institution of the action that the party w ill not be prejud iced in mai nt ai ni ng a

de fe ns e o n the merit s, an d ( B) kne w orsh oul d ha ve kno wn that, but for a mi stake conc erning t he identity

of the prope r party, the action w ou ld ha ve be en br ou gh t ag ain st t he pa rty. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) (2)-( 3). The period provi ded by Rule 4(m) for se rvice of the summons and complaint is “120 day s after

the fi ling of t

he complaint ” unless the “pl ai nt if f s hows goo d cause for

th e fa il ur e, ” i n whi ch c as e “t he c ourt s hal l e xt end th e t ime for serv ice f or a n ap pro pria te pe riod .” Fe d. R . Civ . P. 4 (m)
. Here, Robinson was fi rst s erved on January 5, 2001, long a fter t he 120 days for

se rv ic e h ad pa ss ed af

te r t he fi li ng o f the Apr il25, 199 7 c omp la in t. Gre en ha s n otsh own “good cause” for this delay, which w as largelycaused by his own request to staythe case3 In his motion for a s tayof the feder al proce edings, Green linke d this case to t he PCR A case as follows:

In plai ntiff ’s cri minal proc eedings now under appe al the re is an issue concerni ng [Fisher ’s] mal icious prosecution of procuring and subornating witnesse s to t esti fy fal selyagainst plaint iff, simil ar to pl ainti ff’s Section 1983 Claims i n which a favorabl e ruli ng may neces sari ly implythe invali dity

of plai ntiff ’s st ate convi ction. (A pp. 4 8.) 9 for alm ost thre e years w hile his P CR A p etition w as pe ndin g in state cour t. Wh ile it is true t hat Green would have been a ble to s erve Robinson wit hin the 120- day period absent the PLRA screening of hi s complaint , it is al so clear

that Gree n did not i ntend to s erve Ro binso n w ith a m aliciou s pros ecutio n claim at that tim e. Instea d, G reen ta ilored h is initia l com plain t in th is m atter to d ove tail w ith h is PC RA alleg ation s ag ains t Fish er. ( See Ap p. 45 -50 .) 3 His cho ic e t o al te r h is th eory onl y afterhi s un suc ces sf ul PCRA petition , and to now focu s its allega tions o n R obin son, m akes clear th at the d elay in this matter was not caused bythe PLRA screening. Rather, delaywas the dir ect re sult of Gre en’s ta ctical de cision to susp end c onsid eration of this matte r so tha t he co uld stre ngthen and pur sue hi s PCRA c la im. Thi s do es not pr ovi de g ood cau se to extend ti me for ser vice i n this matter . Therefor e, this Court will af firm the decisi on of the Dist rict Co urt.