UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

______________________ _________________ GREG LOPEZ; RODNEY PELTON; STEVEN HOUSE, Plai ntiffs - Appellants,

v. JENA GRISWOLD, Colorado Secretary of State, in her official capacity; JUDD CHOATE, Director of Election, Colorado Department of State, in his offi cial capacity,
De fendants - Appellees. No. 22-1082 (D.C. No. 1:22- CV-00247-JLK) (D. Colo.)

______________________ ____________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

______________________ ____________________ Before BACHARACH , EID , and ROSSMAN , Circuit Judges.

______________________ _____________________ The Colorado Constitution is desi gned to encour age political candidates to limit their expenditures. This desi gn is based on statutory limitations on contribution s. If candidates agree to limit their expenditures, supporters of these candid ates can contribute up to twice the statutory

* This order and judgment does not co nstitute binding pr ecedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But the order and judgmen t may be cited for its persuasi ve value if otherwise appropriate. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### February 13, 2023 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 22-1082 Document: 010110812136 Date Filed: 02/13/2023 Page: 12 limits in some circumst ances. Colo. Const. ar t. XXVIII, § 4(5). By allowing supporters to double their co ntributions, the st ate constitutional provision was intended to encourage can didates to limit th eir expenditures. This appeal arises from a challenge to these provisions. Two candidates and a contributor challe nged these provisi ons during the 2022 election cycle. In confronting these ch allenges, the district court denied a request for a preliminary injunction that would have suspended these provisions during the pendency of the underlyi ng suit. This appeal challenges the deni al of the preliminary injunction. The defendants argue that the entire appeal is moot, noting that the 2022 election has passed. For this ar gument, the defend ants bear the burden. WildEarth Guardians v. Public Serv. Co. of Colo. , 690 F.3d 1174, 1183 (10th Cir. 2012). We conclude that the defe ndants have satisfied their burden.
1. The Colorado Constitution’s me thod of limiting spending Colorado generally limit s the amount that some one can contribute to a candidate in primary and general elections. See 8 Colo. Code Regs. § 1505-6:10.17.1(i) (2019) (setting limits on spending for candidates running for governor and state senate ). But a candidat e’s supporters can make contributions that double the general limits if

 the candidate agre es to limit campaign sp ending to a specified amount and Appellate Case: 22-1082 Document: 010110812136 Date Filed: 02/13/2023 Page: 23  an opponent raises at least 10% of the applicable limit and declines to cap expenses at the specified limit. Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 4(5). The challengers to this scheme included

 candidates running in 2022 for gove rnor (Greg Lopez) and the state senate (Rodne y Pelton) and

 a contributor (Steven House).
2. Challenge by the gubernator ial candidate (Mr. Lopez) Mr. Lopez lost in the 2022 primary, and he concedes that his appeal is moot. Given Mr. Lopez’s concession , we dismiss his appeal as moot. See Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk , 569 U.S. 66 , 72–73 (2013) (assuming without decidi ng that the claim was moot in light of the claimant’s concession in earlier proc eedings that an offer of judgment would moot the claim).
3. Challenge by the senatorial candidate (Mr. Pelton) The defendants ar gue that Mr. Pelton’s cl aim became constitutionally moot when the 2022 election ended. But we need not a ddress constitutional mootness because Mr. Pelton’s appeal is at least prudentially moot. 1

1 We need not address constitutional mootness before prudential mootness. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp. , 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) (“[A ] federal court has leew ay ‘to choose among threshold grounds for deny ing audience to a case on the merits.’” (quoting Ruhrgas AG v. Ma rathon Oil Co. , 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999))); see also Charles Allen Wright, Arthur R. Mill er, and Edward H. Cooper, 13B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris § 3533.1, at 763 (3d ed. 2008) (“It also is appropriate Appellate Case: 22-1082 Document: 010110812136 Date Filed: 02/13/2023 Page: 34 Under the doctrine of prudential moot ness, we can treat an appeal as moot when the po tential injuries are remote enough for the district court to withhold equitable relief. Jordan v. Sosa , 654 F.3d 1012, 1024, 1029, 1033–34 (10th Cir. 2011). This doctrine applies here. Mr. Pelton opposes mootness, arguing that when he campaigns again, he would again confront the same pr ovisions that encourage spending limits. 2 A future candidacy might ordinarily prevent mootness. See Citizen Ctr. v. Gessler , 770 F.3d 900, 907 (10th Cir. 2014) (concluding that a claim for a prospective in junction wasn’t moot becau se the requested relief could affect future elect ions). Here, though, an in jury to Mr. Pelton’s future candidacy would requ ire us to indulge two layers of speculation. First, it is unclear when the disputed spending provisions would affect Mr. Pelton. These provisions would affect Mr. Pelton only when he campaigns again. Colo. Rev. Stats. § 1-45-110(1); Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 4(3). Mr. Pelton wo n the 2022 general election, 3 so he wouldn’t

to invoke a prudential pr inciple without confront ing the uncertain line between Article III and prud ential grounds . . . .”).

2 Mr. Pelton also argues that the spending limit hurts his ability to pay off his campaign debts for the 2022 election. But the disputed spending provision doesn’t restrict his ability to raise money. Given the absence of a restriction on raising money, Mr. Pelt on doesn’t explain how the disputed spending provision impairs his ability to pay off his ex isting campaign debts.

3 We take judicial notice of Mr. Pelton’s victory in the 2022 election for state senate. See Senator Rodney Pe lton, Colora do General Assembly Appellate Case: 22-1082 Document: 010110812136 Date Filed: 02/13/2023 Page: 45 face reelection until 2026. See Colo. Const. art. V, § 3(1) (“Senators shall
be elected for the term of four years.”). Although Mr. Pelton intends to run for office in the future, he has not indicated which office he intends to seek or when he would accept the spending limit. He could conceivably start raisi ng money now for a campaign four years away. But Mr. Pelton doesn’t ne ed to decide wh ether to limit spending until he starts campai gning for a future election. See Colo. Rev. Stats. § 1-45-110(1); Colo. Co nst. art. XXVIII, § 4(3). Second, we can’t predic t how long the prelim inary injunction would last, for it would end when the dist rict court issues a final judgment. United States ex rel. Bergen v. Lawrence , 848 F.2d 1502, 1512 (10th Cir. 1988). And the district cour t has plowed ahea d during the pend ency of this appeal. For example, the district court set deadlines

 in April 2023 fo r discovery and

 in May 2023 for disp ositive motions. In light of these deadli nes, the district court will likely enter a final judgment before Mr. Pelton could reach the spendi ng limit. Given the two layers of specul ation, Mr. Pelton’s appeal is prudentially moot because the possibility of an interim injury rests on

(last accessed Jan. 26, 2023), https://leg.colorad o.gov/legislators/rodpelton; see also Mont. Green Party v. Jacobsen , 17 F.4th 919, 927 (9th Cir. 2021) (taking judicial no tice of election results under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b)(2) based on th e state’s public website). Appellate Case: 22-1082 Document: 010110812136 Date Filed: 02/13/2023 Page: 56 speculation. See Jordan v. Sosa , 654 F.3d 1012, 1024–25 (10th Cir. 2011) (noting that a request for injunctive relief would become moot if continued susceptibility to an inju ry was speculative).
4. Challenge by the contributor (Mr. House) Mr. House challenges the provisions increasing the st atutory caps on contributions to candidates. The disputed spending provisions don’t restrict the amount of money that Mr. House can contribute. Gr anted, state law elsewhere caps contributions. But Mr. House isn’t ch allenging those caps ; he challenges only the provision that allows an increase in those caps. For this challenge, Mr. House argues that other contributors might be able to contribute more than he can. But any comp laint about this difference would be pr udentially moot for tw o reasons. First, no contributor can contribute more to a particular candidate than he can. Second, any possible inju ry to Mr. House would rest on too much speculation to justify a preliminary injunction. We don’t know who Mr. House will support in futu re elections, whether those candidates will accept or decline the spen ding limit, whet her those candidates will face opponents, or whet her those opponents would accept or decline the spending limit. Without know ing these things, a cour t could just speculate whether another contributor would be able to donate more than Mr. House. Appellate Case: 22-1082 Document: 010110812136 Date Filed: 02/13/2023 Page: 67 So his appeal is prudentially moot. See Jordan v. Sosa , 654 F.3d 1012, 1024–25 (10th Cir. 2011).
5. Conclusion We lack appellate jurisdiction because

 Mr. Lopez concedes that his appeal is moot,

 Mr. Pelton’s appeal is prudentially moot because the applicability of the disputed spending provision rests on speculation, and

 Mr. House’s appeal is prudentially moot because the possibility of an injury in future electio ns would rest on speculation. So we dismiss the appeal as moot. 4
Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge

4 Because we dismiss the appeal as moot, we don’t address the merits of the plaintiffs’ appellate arguments. Appellate Case: 22-1082 Document: 010110812136 Date Filed: 02/13/2023 Page: 7