alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
3oz.

2oz.

1oz.

4oz.

EVITAR

MEJORES

MEDIDOR DE ELECCIÓN DE PESCADO

BAJO

ALTO

NIVEL DE

MERCURIO

BUENAS

NIÑOS

EL CONSUMO DE

PESCADO El pescado tiene 

nutrientes clave que 

ayudan al desarrollo 

del cerebro del niño. 

4 onzas

es más o menos 

el tamaño de la 

palma de la mano 

de un adulto

¿Por qué es nutritivo el pescado para los niños? 

El pescado tiene nutrientes clave que 

ayudan al desarrollo del cerebro del niño: • La colina también contribuye al desarrollo de la 

médula espinal del bebé.

• El hierro y el zinc fortalecen el sistema 

inmunitario de los niños.

• El pescado es una fuente de otros nutrientes 

como proteínas, vitamina B12, vitamina D, yodo 

y selenio también.

¿Qué tipo de pescado debe comer mi hijo?

Coma 2 porciones a la semana de la lista 

de las “Mejores opciones”.

¿Cuánto debe comer mi hijo?

Una porción es más o menos:

1 onza – de 1 a 3 años

2 onzas – de 4 a 7 años

3 onzas – de 8 a 10 años

4 onzas – de 11 años

Los niños más pequeños también pueden 

comer pescado. Puede incorporar 

alimentos nutritivos como el pescado para 

complementar la leche materna o la fórmula 

para bebés en la dieta de su bebé una vez que 

tenga unos 6 meses de edad.

Incluya en la dieta de su hijo una variedad 

de pescados de la lista de las “Las mejores 

opciones”, que son más bajos en mercurio.

• Almeja

• Arenque

• Atún, enlatado 

claro (incluye el 

bonito)

• Bacalao

• Bagre o pez gato

• Boquerón o 

anchoa

• Caballa

• Caballa del 

Pacífico

• Calamar

• Camarón

• Cangrejo

• Cangrejo de río

• Corvina

• Eglefino

• Eperlano

• Gado o abadejo

• Langosta 

americana o 

espinosa

• Lenguado

• Lisa o pargo

• Lucio

• Merlán o 

pescadilla

• Merluza

• Ostra

• Palometa

• Perca, de agua 

dulce y de mar

• Pescado blanco

• Platija o lenguado

• Raya

• Róbalo

• Sábalo

• Salmón

• Sardina

• Solla 

• Tilapia

• Trucha, de agua 

dulce

• Vieira

* La lista de las “Mejores opciones” de pescado que se muestra 

arriba es una de las tres categorías de pescado de este 

asesoramiento. La tabla completa describe las “Mejores opciones”, 

las “Buenas opciones” y las “Opciones a evitar”. 

Para obtener más información sobre cómo elegir opciones saludables 

y seguras en cuanto al pescado, visite www.fda.gov/fishadvice.

GRASAS 

OMEGA-3 

GRASAS 

OMEGA-6 COLINA HIERRO

Las mejores opciones*
Robert F. ROBINSON, et al., petitioners, v. Timothy J. COOK, Sr., et al.

No. 12-1246.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 17, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied.
Tony Wayne ANDERSON and Terry Weldon Anderson, petitioners, v. Rick THALER, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institution Division.

No. 12-9139.

Supreme Court of the United States

May 13, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.
William GEORGE, petitioner, v. NEW YORK.

No. 12-8573.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 1, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of New York denied.
Order entered January 2, 2020

In The



## Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 19

- 00752

- CV

JULES DYLAN STUER, Appellant

V.

SUSAN DUESLER, Appellee

On Appeal from the 298th Judici al District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC

- 18

- 07494



### O RDER

Before the Court is appellant’s December 23, 2019 “Letter and Request for Motion to

Reverse, Remit, and Remand.” We DENY appellant’s motion.

/s/ ROBERT D. BURNS, III

CHIEF J USTICE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO. 1:13-CR-20

)

GLENDA R. BRICKEY )

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

UPON A PLEA OF GUILTY

TO: THE HONORABLE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN, JUDGE, 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Upon Defendant’s request to enter a plea of guilty pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules

of Criminal Procedure, this matter came on for hearing before U.S. Magistrate Roger B. Cosbey,

on June 13, 2013, with the written consents of the defendant, counsel for the defendant, and

counsel for the United States of America.

The hearing on defendant’s plea of guilty was in full compliance with Rule 11, Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure, before the Magistrate Judge in open court and on the record.

In consideration of that hearing and the statements made by the defendant under oath on

the record and in the presence of counsel, the remarks of the Assistant United States Attorney and

of counsel for defendant,

I FIND as follows:

(1) that defendant understands the nature of the charge against her to which the plea is

offered;

(2) that the defendant understands her right to trial by jury, to persist in her plea of not

guilty, to the assistance of counsel at trial, to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and
her right against compelled self-incrimination;

(3) that the defendant understands what the maximum possible sentence is, including the

effect of the supervised release term, and defendant understands that the Sentencing Guidelines

apply and that the Court may depart from those guidelines under some circumstances;

(4) that the plea of guilty by the defendant has been knowingly and voluntarily made and

is not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from the plea agreement between the

parties;

(5) that defendant is competent to plead guilty;

(6) that the defendant understands that her answers may later be used against her in a

prosecution for perjury or false statement;

(7) that there is a factual basis for the defendant’s plea; and further,

I RECOMMEND that the Court accept the defendant’s plea of guilty and that the

Defendant be adjudged guilty of the offense charged in Count 1 of the 2-count Indictment, and

have sentence imposed. A Presentence Report has been ordered. Should this Report and

Recommendation be accepted and the Defendant adjudged guilty, sentencing will be scheduled

before Judge Theresa L. Springmann by separate order and notice. Objections to the Findings

and Recommendation are waived unless filed and served within fourteen (14) days. 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(B).

DATED this 13th day of June, 2013.

/s/ Roger B. Cosbey 

Roger B. Cosbey

United States Magistrate Judge

2
EXHIBIT 3

FILED UNDER SEAL

Case 3:17-cv-00939-WHA Document 1060-3 Filed 07/31/17 Page 1 of 1
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WAYMO LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.17-cv-00939-WHA (JSC)

ORDER RE: OTTO TRUCKING’S 

MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITIONS

Re: Dkt. No. 1438

Otto Trucking seeks to compel depositions of four Waymo employees related to their 

knowledge of Mr. Levandowski’s involvement with Odin Wave and Tyto. (Dkt. No. 1438.) 

Waymo objects on the grounds that it has not waived its attorney work-product privilege as to the 

investigation conducted by its security team (the “Security Investigation.”). Otto Trucking’s 

motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

The Court agrees that Waymo has not waived the privilege as to its Security Investigation. 

That does not mean, however, that it can shield from discovery witnesses who have percipient 

knowledge of Mr. Levandowski’s involvement in side businesses just because the witnesses were 

discovered during the investigation. From the record it appears that Andrew Barton-Sweeney has

percipient knowledge of these entities and/or Mr. Levandowski’s alleged side businesses, that is, 

knowledge acquired separate and apart from any Security Investigation. If so, Waymo shall make 

him available for a deposition, not to exceed two hours, and limited solely to his knowledge of 

Odin Wave, Tyto, and any other side businesses engaged in by Mr. Levandowski. Waymo’s 

opposition does not address this witness, or Nathaniel Fairfield, discussed below.

Nathaniel Fairfield appears to have obtained his knowledge from current Uber employee 

Gaeten Pennecot. However, the record suggests that Mr. Fairfield may have additional 
2

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2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

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12

13

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

information regarding Odin Wave. Accordingly, Otto Trucking may take his deposition with the 

same limitations as apply to Mr. Barton-Sweeney.

As Mr. Krafcik and Ms. Bijnens do not appear to have knowledge separate from that 

acquired during the privileged investigation, Otto Trucking’s motion to compel their further 

depositions is denied.

Mr. Levandowski’s involvement with side businesses is at issue in this lawsuit; indeed, 

Waymo previously moved to compel documents regarding Tyto and Odin Wave.

The depositions shall occur on or before September 15, 2017.

This Order disposes of Docket No. 1438.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 11, 2017

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge
Gerald Adrian WHEELER, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 12-9471.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 29, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.
David Lee WILLIS, petitioner, v. FLORIDA.

No. 12-6914.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 15, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                       1,250,512   
<SECURITIES>                                         0  
<RECEIVABLES>                                  460,768  
<ALLOWANCES>                                     5,057  
<INVENTORY>                                          0  
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,782,631  
<PP&E>                                       9,242,098  
<DEPRECIATION>                               3,677,432  
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               6,420,439  
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          242,460  
<BONDS>                                        399,840  
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0  
<PREFERRED>                                          0  
<COMMON>                                             0  
<OTHER-SE>                                   5,778,139  
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 6,420,439  
<SALES>                                      3,459,748  
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             3,493,696  
<CGS>                                        1,308,892  
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,390,561  
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0  
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0  
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              27,120  
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 78,225  
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0  
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             78,225  
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0  
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0  
<CHANGES>                                            0  
<NET-INCOME>                                    78,225  
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        3  
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        3  
                                           



</TABLE>
H

!

!

!

!

!

!

Wholesaler Distributor Supplier(s) Manufacturer Pharmacy or Hospital 

(Primary) 

Wholesaler Distributor Repackager (Secondary) 

A Drug Supply Chain Example From Supplier to Patient
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

KENNETH WILLIS GIBBS-EL, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO. 1:13-CV-257 RM

)

SUPERINTENDENT )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Kenneth Willis Gibbs-El, a pro se prisoner, filed this habeas corpus petition

challenging a prison disciplinary hearing that the Disciplinary Hearing Body (DHB) at

the Miami Correctional Facility conducted on July 2, 2013, under cause number MCF

13-06-189. The Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the case was moot

because the finding of guilt had been vacated, the sanctions restored, and the case

remanded for a re-hearing. 

Mr. Gibbs-El argues that the respondent hasn’t demonstrated that the finding of

guilt was vacated and the sanctions restored. Mr. Gibbs-El hasn’t submitted anything

demonstrating that they were not. The respondent filed a letter signed by counsel for

the Indiana Department of Correction stating that the sanctions have been vacated and

the case remanded for rehearing. Absent any contradictory evidence, that letter is

sufficient evidence to demonstrate that this case is moot. 

Mr. Gibbs-El argues that the motion to dismiss is untimely and he filed a motion

asking for default because the respondent didn’t respond by the deadline. The original

case 1:13-cv-00257-RLM document 15 filed 02/18/14 page 1 of 2
deadline for a response was November 26, 2013. The respondent sought and was

granted an enlargement of time before that deadline expired. The new deadline was

January 30, 2014. The motion to dismiss was filed on that day. The motion is timely and

there is no basis for default. Moreover, it is unclear what benefit Mr. Gibbs-El believes

would be achieved if the motion to dismiss were denied and his habeas corpus petition

were granted by default. The Indiana Department of Correction already has vacated the

proceeding and restored his time. He has already won and there is no case left for this

court to decide. 

For the foregoing reasons, the motion for default (DE 13) is DENIED; the motion

to dismiss (DE 11) is GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED. 

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: February 18 , 2014

 /s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr. 

Judge

United State District Court

2

case 1:13-cv-00257-RLM document 15 filed 02/18/14 page 2 of 2
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined 

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

____________________

No. 01-10240

Summary Calendar

____________________

DIANNE MARIE HARPER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP.,

doing business as Lockheed

Martin Aeronautics Company,

 Defendant-Appellee.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:00-CV-450-Y

--------------------

September 17, 2001

Before KING, Chief Judge, and HIGGINBOTHAM and BENAVIDES, Circuit

Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Invoking, inter alia, Title VII, Dianne Marie Harper brought

this action alleging that she has subjected to sex-based

discrimination. On the motion of the defendant, the district

court dismissed her second amended complaint, with prejudice, for

insufficient service of process, lack of subject-matter
2

jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim. Harper appeals but

fails to develop any legal or factual support for the position

that service on the defendant was sufficient. This court “will

not raise and discuss legal issues that [Harper] has failed to

assert.” Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813

F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). The failure to challenge the

district court’s determination that she did not effect proper

service of process renders Harper’s appeal without merit and thus

frivolous. See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir.

1983). Because the appeal is frivolous, it is dismissed. See

5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

DISMISSED.
Bruce GARCIA, petitioner, v. Debra K. SAUERS, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Forest.

No. 12-8796.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 1, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.
Scott Thomas BOYLE, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 12-1216.

Supreme Court of the United States

May 13, 2013.

*2372Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied.
Miguel ANDRADE, petitioner, v. Phillip HEATH, Superintendent, Sing Sing Correctional Facility.

No. 12-9602.

Supreme Court of the United States

May 20, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied.
case 3:13-cv-00052-PPS-CAN document 2 filed 01/25/13 page 1 of 1
Arnoldo ZAZUETA-MIRANDA, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 12-1139.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 15, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

VS.

GIGI MONIQUE RILEY

)

)

)

)

)

CAUSE NO. 3:13-CR-6-RLM

O R D E R

No objections have been filed to the magistrate judge’s findings and

recommendations upon a plea of guilty issued on February 14, 2013.

Accordingly, the court ADOPTS those findings and recommendations (Doc. No.

9), ACCEPTS defendant Gigi Monique Riley’s plea of guilty, and FINDS the

defendant guilty of Counts 1 through 4 of the Information, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 286 and 18 U.S.C. § 287.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: March 7, 2013

 /s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr. 

Judge

United States District Court
QuickLinks
 -- Click here to rapidly navigate through this document









































 
 

  Exhibit 10.3.20    
    


[WESTAFF
LOGO] 


August 28,
2008 


Sean
Wong

spwongcpa@hotmail.com 



Dear
Sean: 


        This
letter is to confirm our verbal offer of employment to you as VP, Controller in Westaff's Corporate office in Walnut Creek California, reporting to me Christa Leonard, SVP and CFO.
Your official start date will be Monday, September 22, 2008, with a starting salary of $175,000 per year with a sign on bonus of $17,500 on your start date and $17,500 in 90 days. You
are also eligible for participation in the Company's annual bonus plan program commensurate to your position level and no less then 25% of your base salary. You will be eligible for three weeks of
vacation per year based upon the standard vacation accrual of the company's vacation policy. 


        In
addition to the above, upon successful completion of the following you will be eligible for a $17,500 dollar bonus: 



	•
	Consultant-free in the accounting department by an agreed upon date;   



	•
	Year end audit completed timely;   



	•
	Timely and accurate completion of the 10K; 




        Pending
Board approval, you will also be eligible to participate in the Company Stock Incentive Plan. It is anticipated that you will be awarded 75,000 Stock Options. 


        Should
you be terminated from the company within your first 12 months of employment due to the company relocating its headquarters further than a 35 mile radius of 298 N. Wiget
Lane, Walnut Creek, CA or following a company change your job is eliminated, you will receive 6 months of base pay as severance pay. 


        This
offer is contingent upon a satisfactory pre-employment evaluation which includes reference verification and a background investigation. 



        Westaff
engages in fair competition. We have no interest in any confidential information or trade secrets that belong to your former employers. We ask that you not share such information
and secrets with us. 


        Sean,
we look forward to your formal acceptance of this offer by signing and returning a copy of this letter to me. We believe that you will enjoy your association with Westaff and that
you will be a significant contributor to our team. Meanwhile, if you have any questions, please contact Debra Banks, Human Resource Representative at (925) 952-2540. 



Sincerely, 


/s/
Christa C. Leonard

Christa C. Leonard

SVP & Chief Financial Officer 



					
	 
	 	ACCEPTED	 	Sean Wong






  Sean Wong
	 
	 	 DATE
	 	 9/4/08








 














QuickLinks



Exhibit 10.3.20
INEPAR S.A. INDUSTRIA E CONSTRUCOES, petitioner, v. IRB-BRASIL RESSEGUROS S.A.

No. 12-1143.

Supreme Court of the United States

May 20, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of New York denied.
OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, et al., petitioners, v. Tomas Maynas CARIJANO, et al.

No. 12-385.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 22, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
In re Omar GENT, petitioner.

No. 12-9522.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 22, 2013.

Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.
1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 36979

STATE OF IDAHO

,

Plaintiff-Respondent

,

v.

ALEJANDRO PINEDA FARFAN

,

Defendant-Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 2010 Unpublishe d Opinion No. 540

Filed: June 30, 2010

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho,

Jerome County. Hon. John K. Butler , District Judge.

Judgment of conviction and unified sentence of eight years, with a minimum period of confinement of two , for felony driving under the influence

, affirmed

.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Justin M. Curtis, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasd en, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

______________________________________________

Before LANSING, Chief Judge; GUTIERREZ, Judge;

and MELANSON, Judge

PER CURIAM

Alejandro Pineda Farfan pled guilty to felony driving under the influence . I.C. § 18

-

8004, 18

- 8005(7) . In exchange for his guilty plea, additional charges were dismissed. The

district court sentenced Farfan to a unified term of eight years, with a minimum period of

confinement of two

. Farfan appeals.

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the

factors to be considered in evaluating the reason ableness of the sentence are well established and

need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez , 121 Idaho 114, 117

- 18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014

-
15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez , 106 Idaho 447, 449

- 51, 680 P.2d 869, 871

- 73 (Ct. App.

1984); State v. Toohi ll , 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing2

the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver , 144 Idaho

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record

in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

Therefore, Farfan ’s judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
Closing Remarks

Drug Amount Reporting 

Jennifer Forde

Regulatory Counsel

Office of Regulatory Policy

CDER | US FDA

Reporting Drug Amount Under Section 510(j)(3) of the FD&C Act –

September 8, 2022
www.fda.gov 2

Closing Remarks

• Importance of drug amount data

• Questions regarding report content:

– CDER: DrugAmountReporting@fda.hhs.gov

– CBER: 800-835-4709 or 240-402-8010

– CVM: 240-402-7082 or CVMSurveillance@fda.hhs.gov

• Questions regarding submission process:

EDMSupport@fda.hhs.gov
Talvin Taquane LAWING, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES

No. 12-9304.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 15, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.
L.E.R., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D18-715

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed June 19, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.