### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON

Ja nuary20, 200 5 S es sio n STEP HAN IE TOD D WA TSON v. TIM OTHY JAM ES WA TSON An Appeal f

romthe Chancer y Court for Henderson County 14991 Jam es F . Butler, Chancellor

No. W2004-00633-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Augu st 24, 2005

This c a se is a

bo ut p are nta l r e loc a tio n a ndc hil d c us tod y . T he pa re nts of a min or c hil d d ivo rc e d in 2001. Both pare nts lived in L exington, Tenne ssee, and, at the time of the divorce , ag reed t o j oint custody . The c hild alternate d daily betwee n the parents’ hom es. I n 2002, the mother re marrie d and moved to M u rf

re es b o ro , Tenne ssee. The mother petitioned the c ourt to desig nate he r as primary residential pa

rent a nd allow her

to move the child with her to Murfr eesbor o. The father opposed the petition and asked the court to desig nate him as the primary residential pa rent. The trial court f

ound that it was in the child’s best intere st to move to Murfre esboro with the mother, and de signated her as primary

residential pa

rent. The fathe r appe aled. We af firm, finding that the evidenc e does not preponde rate ag ainst the trial court’s decision to desig nate mother as primary

residential pa

rent a nd permit the child to move with her.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; the Judg m e nt of t he Cha nc e r y C our t i s A ffirm e d

H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e Co u r t, inw h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., joined.

Har old F. Johnson, J ackson, f or def endant/appe llant TimothyJ ames Watson
Be tty Stafford Scott, Jackson, and Mary J o Middlebrooks, J ackson, f or plaintiff/appe llee Stephanie Todd Watson
OP IN ION Plaintiff/Appellee Stephanie Todd Watson (“Mother” ) and D efe ndant/Appellant Timothy J am es W at s o n (“Fathe r”) had a son, Christian, born July7, 1997. They wer e mar

ried on June 18, 1998, and lived in L exington, Tenne ssee. On Augu s t 3 0 , 2 0 01, Mother and F ather wer e g rante d a divorc e on the g rounds of irrec oncilable diff

ere nces. A t the time of the divorce , Mother and F ather ag ree d to a permanent pare nting plan ( “Plan”) . The Plan, incorpor ated into t he marital dissolut ion ag ree ment, g rante dFa t h e r a pp a r e n t l y c oa c h e d Ch r i s t i a n ’ s T

- ba l l t e a m. 1

-2- Mo the r andF a the r j oin t c us tod y of Christ ia n, a ndstate d that Mothe r andF a the r w ou ld a lte rn a te phy sical custody of Christian on a daily basis, that neither pa

rty would pay

child support to the other, and that major de cisions r ega rdi ng the child would be made jointly . Disag ree ments about joint decisions or modifications of the Plan were to be handled thr oug h mediation.

I n J une 2 0 0 2 , M o th e r r e ma rr ie d

. T h e r e a f

te r , in A p r il 2 0 0 3 , M o th e r f il e d a p e ti ti o n in the Hende rson County

Chance ry

Court, indicating that she planned to re locate to Murf ree sboro, Tenne ssee, a nd wanted Christian to move wit h her. Father did not ag ree to permit Christian to move. Mother and F ather attempted to r esolve their issues throug h mediation, as require d by the Plan, but
wer e unsucc essful in resolving the i ssues of a c hang e in custody and the pa

renting schedule for the non-custodial par ent. The pe tition asked the trial court to enter an or der on an interim pare nting plan.
Th e re vis e d p are nti ng plan s ub mit te d b y Mo the r p ro vid e d th a t th e c hil d would r e sid e wi th Mother during the wee k and with Father on every wee kend while the child was play ing T -ball and 1
every other we ekend a fter T-ball s eason ended. Mother’s proposed r evised pa renting plan desig nated Mother as the primary

residen t i al p ar ent and gr anted Mother the sole authority

to make major decisions re g arding the child.

I n J une 2003, Mo t h er p et i t i oned the c ourt to adopt her pr oposed Revised Plan as the perma nent par enting plan and a ppoint her as the primary residential pare nt. T he petition stated that Mother was reloc ating to Mur fre esboro in orde r to take a signific antly

better e mploy ment position, and, as a result of the move, t he parties’ original parenting schedule of rotating phy sical custody every oth e r d a y wo uldno lon g e r b e fe a sib le . M oth e r andF a the r a g re e d to a n in te ri m pa re nti ng sc he du le until a hearing c ould be held on the matter

. Also in J une 2003, F ather proposed to the trial court his ow n revised pare nting plan, w hich de sig nat e d h i ma s t h e p r i m ar y r e s i d e n t i a l p ar e n t

. F a t h e r ’ s p r o p o s e d p l a n p r o v i d e d t h a tt h e c hil d would reside w it h him during the school y ear with Mother having residential pa renting time on alternative wee kends, ex cluding T-ball season. Father’s pe tition asked the trial court to require that Mother pay

Father c hild support based on her income and reque sted that major dec isions reg arding the child be made jointly

. L ike Mother’ s petition, Father ’s proposed pe tition not ed that the origina l pare nting plan would no longe r be f easible due to Mother’s re location to Murfre esboro. A he aring on the matter w as held on July3, 2003 in the Chance ry Court for He nderson County

. At the hea

ring , Mother testified that she had searche d for a job in the L exington, Tenne ssee are a for about a y ear

befor e ac cept i ng the job in Murfre esboro. Mother said that she ac cepte d the Murfre esboro job bec ause it wa s in her fiel d , the salary was hig her, and it had a fle x ible schedule , wh ic h wo uld a llo w he r take c are of Christ ia n wh e n the ne e d aro se
. Mo the r te sti fi e d that sh e c ho se the spec ific neig hborhood in Mur fre esboro based on her internet sear ch for g ood schools in the are a. The re port from the internet was e ntere d into evidence at the hea ring , over F ather ’s objection.-3-

Mo the r a c kn ow le dg e d th at her c ur re nt h us ba nd , Joh n “ J. P.” Pa tte rs on , w a s f ro m mi dd le Tenne ssee, ha d extended family in middle Tennessee , including a child, and was living and w orking in middle Tennessee when they met. She maintained that these fac ts had no bea ring on her c hoice to acc ept a job i n M u rf

re es b o ro and move there . Mother also c oncede d that, in L exington, Father lived in the home in which the pa rties lived when Christian wa s born, attende d the churc h in which Christian was baptized, and that both Mother and Father had extended family in the L exington are a. Mother noted that one of her sisters had moved to Murf ree sboro. Mother testified that, since Christian was born, she had been his primary car eg iver, a nd that she wa s the pare nt who took him to doctor’s appointments, took off work to be with hi m during two surg erie s, and taug ht him to s wim and ride a bike. She attended Christian’s sc hool functions and Christian was close to he r par ents and g randpa rents.
Du ri ng the marria g e , M oth e r t e sti fi e d, F a the r ph y sic a lly abu se d he r a ndsh e wa s a fr a id o f h im. Mother conc eded that she did not confide in any one about the a lleg ed abuse until close to the time of the divorce

. During t h e h ea ri ng , Mother wa s asked why she had a g ree d to the orig inal share d pare nting plan, which pr ovided for joint custody . Mother explained: At the time my

conce rn wa s protecting me and Christian. I felt l i k e bec ause of [Father’ s] hi story

as far as the violent be havior toward me – Honestly I was ve ry scar ed of him. I felt like if I co u ld rea ch an a g ree ment with him that would not s et him off, that that would be in the best intere st of all of us to just – for me – to suc k it up and do it so that Christ ian and I

could move on.

I n her te stimony , Mother desc ribed a n incident that occ urre d af t er the divorce . On one
occa sion, the parties wer e arg uing while Mother was putting Christian in the c ar. F ather kicked the
c ar do or , c los ing it on Mo the r’ s le g s a nd inj uring he r sh ins

. Mo the r c a lle d the sh e ri ff a nd , a s a re su lt, Father wa s arr ested. Mother subsequently dropped the char g es, but nevertheless obt ained a restraining order ag ainst Father.
Mother also testified a

bout Fathe r’s c are for Christ i an
. M o t h er said that, after the divorce , Father took Christian to day car e at times whe n he had f ever , and that Father would often call Mother to p ic k u p Ch ri sti a n, e ve n th ou g h it wa s his turn to do so . M oth e r s a id that, w he n Ch ri sti a n w a s w ith F a t h e r , C h r i s t i a n , r a t h e r t h a n F a th e r , w o u l d d e c i d e w h e t h e r o r n o t C h r i s t i a n w o u l d t ak e a b a t h t h a td a y. Mother observed that F ather and Christian usually

ate ha mburg ers or

pizz a.
Mo the r w a s a sk e d a

bo ut w hy sh e wante d to c ha ng e the pa re nti ng plan. Mo the r s ta te d: . . .[A] fter the first of the y ear , afte r the first of this y ear , I had dec ided that with school
ap p r o a c h i n g t h a tC h r i s t i a n n e e d e d a m o r e r e g u l ar

s c h e d u l e t h a n t h i s e v e r y o t h e r d a y. And in light of everything e lse, I believed my self to be the primary car eg iver a nd theS ub sec t i o n c o f T .C .A

. § 3 6

- 6

- 1 0 8 st ates: 2 If t he p arent s are act ual l y s p end i ng s ub st ant i al l y eq ual i nt erval s o f t i m e wi t h the chil d and t he
r el oca t i n g pa r en t s ee k s t o mov e wi t h t h e ch i l d, t h e o t her pa r en t ma y , w i t h i n t h i r t y ( 30) da y s of
r ec ei pt of

n ot i ce , f i l e a pet i t i on i n oppos i t i on t o re mov al of t h e c h i l d. N o pre s u mpt i on i n f av or of
or a g ai n s t t h e r equ es t t o re l oca t e wi t h t h e ch i l d s h al l a r i s e. T h e cou r t s h al l de t er mi n e wh et h er or n ot t o permi t r el ocat i on o f

t he ch i l d bas ed upon t he bes t i nt er es t s of t he chi l d. T he cour t s hal l cons i der
a ll re le v a n t fa c to rs inc lud ing the fo llo w ing w h e re a p p lica b le : ( 1) T h e ex t en t t o w h i ch v i s i t at i on r i g h t s h av e bee n a l l owe d a n d e x er ci s ed; (2 ) W h e the r th e p rim a ry re sid e n tial p a re n t, o n c e o u t o f t h e ju risd ic tio n , i s like ly t o c o m p ly with
a n y ne w visita tio n a rr a n g e m e n t;
( 3) T h e l ov e, a f

fec t i on a n d e mot i on al t i es e x i s t i n g be t we en t h e par en t s a n d c h i l d; (c o n tinu e d ...)

-4- pe rs on that sh ou ld b e re sp on sib le fo r h im. I wa s g oin g to s e e k o ut f ull c us tod y . It ju st so ha pp e ns the tim ing thi ng mov e d – bu mpe d e ve rythi ng up a

little bit

. Father testified at the hearing a s well. During his testimony , Father de nied phy sically abusing Mother. F ather

acknow ledg ed, howeve r, being arr ested for slamming the ca r door on Mother

afte r the div or c e . H e a dmi tte d th a t, a s a re su lt o f the inc ide nt, a n o rd e r o f p ro te c tio n w a s is su e d a g a ins t hi m, wh ic h w a s late r e xten de d fo r a pe ri od of on e y e ar. Stil l, F a the r m a int a ine d th a t hene ve r i nte nd e d to harm Mother

. F a the r d e nie d th a t he of

te n a sk e d M oth e r or oth e rs to pic k up Christ ia n f ro m day c arewh e n it
wa s h i s t u rn t o d o s o
. He al s o d en i ed t h ath e h ad t ak en C h ri s t i an t o d ayca re wh en h e w as ru n n i n g a feve r. F ather

testified that Christian ate he althy food whe n he wa s with him.

Father stated that Christian had bec ome closer to his ex tended f

amily since Mother

and F ather divorce d. He sa id that, if he we re de signated the primary residential pa

rent, his mother, brothe r, and sister-in-law would be available to help h i m car e for Christian. Fathe r testified that Christian often expressed his desire to live with F ather in L exington.
Af te r h e ari ng a ll o f the te sti mon y , th e jud g e ma de the fo llo wi ng fi nd ing s:
I t appears that the parties divorced in Aug ust of 2001 and had a marital dissolution
a g re e me nt at th a t ti me , a nd a pe rm a ne nt p are nti ng plan th a t pr ov ide d f or ba sic a lly sp lit time, alternating the day s and then also alternating the weeke nds. I t’s worke d well up
u n t i l n o w. T h e m o t h erh as re m arri ed

. S h e h as m o v ed t o M u rf re es b o ro
. T h i s ch an ge of c ir c ums ta nc e s ma

ke s th is pla n tha t the y ha d a g re e d o n u nw or ka ble . T he c hil d a lso starting school pretty

soon also makes the pla n unworka ble. B oth parties see k to have the new pa

renting plan desig nation of primary residential pa

rent.
The trial c ourt noted that, in making its decision, i t relied on section 36-6-108 ( c) of the Tenne ssee Code A nnotated, which is applica ble when the pare nts spend substantially equal pa renting 2(

. . . con t i n u ed) 2 ( 4) T he di s po s i t i on of t he pare nt s t o provi de t he chi l d wi t h f oo d, cl ot hi ng , medi cal ca r e, ed ucat i o n and other necess ary care and the degree t o whi ch a p arent has b een t he p ri m ary caregi ver; (5) T he i m p o rt ance o f

co nt i nui t y i n t he chi l d ' s l i fe and t he l engt h of t i m e t he chi l d has l i ved i n a sta b le , sa tisf a c to ry e n v iro n m e n t; (6 ) T he st ab i l i t y of t he f am i l y unit o f t he p are nts; (7 ) T he m en t al and p hysi ca l he alt h o f t he p are nts; ( 8) T h e h ome, s ch ool a n d c ommun i t y r ec or d of t h e ch i l d; ( 9) T he r eas onabl e pr ef er enc e of

t he chi l d i f

t wel ve ( 12 ) y ear s of

ag e or ol der. T he cour t may h e a r th e p re fer e n c e o f a yo u n g e r c h ild up o n re q u e st. T h e p re fer e n c e s o f o ld e r c h ild re n sh o u ld
no rma l l y be gi ven great er wei ght t han t ho se of y o unger chi l d ren; ( 10 ) E vi dence of

phy s i cal or emo t i onal abus e t o t he chi l d, t o t he ot her par ent or t o any ot her p ers o n; and (1 1 ) T h e c h a ra c te r a n d b e h a v io r o f an y o the r p e rs o n w h o re sid e s in o r fre q u e n ts the ho m e o f a p a re n t an d su c h p e rs o n ' s inte ra c tio n s w ith the c h ild T

. C

. A

. § 3 6

- 6

- 1 0 8 (c) (20 0 1 ).

-5- tim e wi th the c hil d. Th e statut e g ov e rn s the po te nti a l re loc a tio n of the c hil d with a re loc a tin g pa

re nt, based upon the best interests of the child. T.C.A. § 36-6-108( c) ( 2001). The trial court stated:
The Court has to look t o the best interest of the child. It is essentially a dete rmination of the prima

ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt o f this c hil d. Th e Cou rt is d ir e c te d in th e st atute to consider the same statutory fac tors that the Tenne ssee Code se ts out that the Court should consider in setting custody initially . The fa cto rs ar e ex actly the same. The Cou rt ha s c on sid e re d th e pa

re nts ’ p are nti ng skill s, the ir re sp ect iv e situatio ns , th e ir compar ative fitness a s to potential prima ry re s i d enti al par ents. I considere d the exis tence and the nonexis tence – or the none x istence of a nucle ar f

amily . I ’ve looke d at who had be en the primary car eg iver ove r the c h i l d ’s short life-span – he’s f ive – about five and a half

, almost six – and who wa s the one who primarily looked to see the child’s nee ds were taken c are of.
Since the divorce i t’s been about equal. Be fore the di vorce I think that the mother was the primary

car eg iver, mother did it mostly ; not to say that the father did not perf orm well in taking car e of his child prior to the divorce . I t just appeare d that the mother wa s the one that was on the ground doing most of the stuff, g etting a ppointments, doing the things that mothers do so – And she did a g ood job. A nd that doesn’t mean he did a bad job. He did a

g ood job, too.
Whe n th ing s li ke that c ome to C ou rt , b a sic a lly the Cou rt ha s to l oo k at it

lik e thi s is my c hil d, I ’m the c hil d’ s f

a the r. Th e c hil d is le g a lly a wa rdof the Cou rt on c e a

div or c e is filed, and it’s a s if I

cannot take car e of my

own child and I

have to de cide whe re I ’m-6-

g oin g to p la c e thi s c hil d for a lo ng pe ri odof tim e . A ndI ’v e on ly

g ot t wo pe op le to choose f rom in the whole world. And so I ’ve g ot the fathe r and I ’ve g ot the mother.
The mother ha s moved. We live in a mobile society

. People move around a ll the time. People cha ng e jobs, people move their re sidence s. Children adjust. . . .
The be st interest of the c hild is t o move with the mother and to beprimarily with her du ri ng the sc ho ol y e ar. Th e be st int e re st of the c hil d is to b e wi th the fathe r p ri mari ly during the summer months. By order dated De cembe r 17, 2003, the court g rante d Mother’s motion to modify the par enting plan and appo i n t ed M other a s the primary residential pa

rent. Further, the court a llowed Mother to have Christ ian mo ve wi th h e r t o M ur fr e e sb or o. F ro m th is o rd e r, F a the r n ow app e a ls.

Father raises eleve n issues on appea l, which we w ill consolidate and re state. F ather asserts that the trial court tr eate d the case as a custody determination inst ead of

a par ental re location matter, and conseque ntly

that the trial court applied the wr ong leg al standar d. He c ontends that the t rial court erre d in c on c lud ing that on e of

the pa rt ie s h a d to be de sig nate d a s p ri mary re sid e nti a l pa

re nt. F a the r a sse rt s that the t rial court err oneously permitted evide nce of the parties’ beha vior prior to the divorc e, allowe d unauthenticated i nformation obtained ove r the interne t to be enter ed into evidenc e, and c ontends that the trial court failed to c onsider Christian’s pre fer ence that he live with Father. F inally , Father a rg ues that the issue of c ustody

had bee n decide d in the parties’ marital dissoluti on ag ree ment, incorporated int o th e div or c e de c re e , a ndwa s res judicata abs e nt a mat e ri a l c ha ng e in the c hil d’ s c ir c ums ta nc e s, and that the e vidence preponde rate s ag ainst the tri al court’s desig nation of Mother a s the primary
re sid e nti a l pa

re nt.
Since t h i s case was trie d by the trial court sitt ing w ithout a jury , we r eview the trial court’ s fa c tua l f ind ing s de novo acc ompanied by a pre sumption of corre ctness unless the pr eponder ance of the evidenc e is otherwise

. Cam pbell v. Florida St eel Corp. , 91 9 S.W. 2d 26 , 35 (T e nn
. 19 96 ); Te nn . R. App. P. 13(d). F or the e vidence to preponde rate ag ainst a trial court's finding of fac t, it must support another finding of fac t w ith g reater convincing ef fe ct. Walker v. Sidney Gilreath & As socs ., 40 S

. W

. 3 d 6 6 , 7 1 ( T e n n
. C t

. A pp .2 00 0) ; The Realty Shop, In c. v. R.R. Westm inst er Holding, In c. , 7 S.W .3d 581, 596 (Tenn. Ct. App.1999). T he trial court’s leg al conc lusions are re viewed de novo wi th no presumption of cor

rec tness. Campb e ll , 919 S.W .2d at 35. A trial c ourt’s custody determination is also review ed de novo wi th a pr e su mpt ion of c or

re c tne ss as to the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t un le ss the evidenc e preponde rate s ag ainst these finding s. Tenn. R. A pp. P. 13( d). Nev es v. Neve s , 2 0 0 4 WL 2866974, *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. De c. 13, 2004). On appe al, Father fir st asserts that the trial c ourt treated the ca se as a cus t o d y determination rathe r than a

pare ntal reloc ation, and that this wa s err or. Father bases this assertion on a rema rk by the tri al co u rt d u ri n g o p en i n g s t at em en t s t h at i t wa s “go i n g t o h av e to ru l e o n wh atb as i ca l l y i s a c h an ge of c us tod y ba sic a lly on e ith e r s ide .” Du ri ng thehe ari ng , c ou ns e l a ndthetr ia l j ud ge en gag e d in-7-

extensive discussion of whether thi s was a custody determination or a pare ntal reloc ation case or both. The following colloquy

took place:

MR. J OHNSON: I

do want to be unde rstood . . . that we ar e o n t h e issue of par ental
r e l o c a t i o n
. W e ’ r e n o to n t h e o r i g i n a l –o n t h e o r i g i n a l c u s t o d y. * * * MS. S COTT: Your Honor , . . . the same f actor s that are co n s i d er ed in the reloc ation statut e are a lso c on sid e re d inthe c omp arativ e fi tne ss ana ly sis

. THE COURT: Well, I ’ve looke d at t he st atute quit e a bit and the things that the c ourt is to look at in determining a case under Sec tion C. . . . [A] t this poi nt in tim e I ’m considering it to be a custody case arising out of a pa re nta l r e loc a tio n f

ili ng . I ’v e g ot t o d e te rm ine wh e the r o r n ot t o a llo w the c hil d to move with the mother or to ha ve the c hild stay here with the fathe r.
Af te r the he ari ng , th e tr ia l cou rt re ite rate d, a s det a ile d ab ov e , tha t it wa s r e lying on thefa c tor s se t f orth in T .C.A. § 36-6-108( c), the pare ntal reloc ation statute, to make its decision. Thus, it is clear that the trial court, in fa ct, consider ed the c ase to be a par ental re location ca se and applied the appropriate leg al standard. A s such, we f

ind no error

. Father a lso contends on appe al that the trial c ourt err ed in conc luding that one of the pa rties
wo uldha ve to b e de sig nate d a s p ri mary re sid e nti a l pa

re nt. Th is i s so me wh a t pu zzlin g , s inc e bo th parties r equeste d in their pleading s to be desig nated a s primary residential pa

rent. Moreove r, at the time of the hearing, Mother had alre ady moved to Murfre esboro, a pproxi mately

a two-hour

drive fr om L exington. Clearly

the parties could not continue their unusua l arrang ement of a lternating phy sical
c us tod y d a i l y
. W e f

i n d t h a t t h e tr i a l c o u r t , i n i t s r e m ar k s , w a s m e r e l y s t a t i n g t h e o b v i ou s, a nd his comments do not ref

lect application of an er

roneous leg al standar d.

F a the r a lso c on te nd s o n a pp e a l that the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in a llo wi ng te sti mon y re g ard ing fa c ts and cir cumstance s that occur red prior to the entry o f o ri gi nal permanent par enting plan. I ssues reg arding admission of evidenc e in Tenne ssee a re r eviewe d under an abuse o f d i scre tion standard. Dic ke y v . M c Cor d , 63 S.W .3d 714, 723 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p . 2001). Since ther e had ne ver be en a c ourt he ari ng on the re sid e nti a l pa re nti ng arr a ng e me nt f

or Christ ia n, the t

ri a l c ou rt ind ic a te d th a t th is testimonyprovided ne cessa ry backg round, and w e find no e rror in this determination.

F a the r a sse rt s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in a llo wi ng int o e vid e nc e Mo the r’ s re po rt on the qu a lit y of schools in the Murfre esboro are a, taken from a we b site called w ww.g reatschools.net. Father a rg ues that th is w a s n ot p ro pe rl y auth e nti c a te d a ndthu s not admissi ble . M oth e r t e sti fi e d th a t sh e us e d th is information, in part, to selec t a school for Christ ian and to ensure that she found a home in that school dis tr ic t. Th e tr ia l c ou rt a llo we d the re po rt int o e vid e nc e , ob se rv ing that “ sch oo ls , gove rn me nt, every body else posts information on the interne t.” Under the abuse of discretion standard of re view,
as noted above, we find this arg ument without merit. Dickey v. Mc Cor d , 63 S.W .3d 714, 723 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).-8-

Father further contends that the trial court err ed in f ailing to g ive enoug h weig ht to the pref ere nce of the six y ear

old child. Father testified that Christian had tol d him on numerous occa sions that he pre fer

red to stay with Fathe r. Under s ection 36-6-108 (c) (9) of the Tenne ssee Code A nnotated, a trial c ourt shall consider the “re asonable pref ere nce of the child if twelve (12) y ear s of ag e or olde r. The court may hear the pref ere nce of a y oung er c hild upon request.” T .C.A. § 36-6-108 (c ) (9) (2001). Th e c hil d’ s p re fe re nc e is o nly on e fa c tor

a ndthe “ pa

ramou nt c on sid e ratio n in a c us tod y c a se is the be st interest of the child.” Har ris v . Ha rri

s , 8 3 2 S

. W

. 2 d 3 5 2 , 3 5 3 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 1 9 9 2 ) ( ci t i n g Bah v. Bah , 668 S.W .2d 663, 665 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)). The trial c ourt permitted F ather ’s testimony on Christian’s statements to him about prefe rring to stay in L exington with F ather

. There is no indication that th e tr ia l c ou rt

didno t a c c or d app ro pria te we ig ht to the e vid e nc e
. Th is arg ume nt i s w ith ou t me ri t.
Father a lso arg ues that, once the parties had agr eed in the m arital dissolution ag ree ment that the y wo uldsh are joi nt c us to dy and alt erna te ph y sic a l c us tod y da ily , th e iss ue is re s ju dic ata and Mo the r c a nn ot s e e k a

c ha ng e in c us tod y abs e nt a ma te ri a l c ha ng e in the c hil d’ s c ir c ums ta nc e s. Th is
a rg ume nt is als o p e rp l e xi n g
. A tt h e t i m e o f t h e h e ar i n g , M o t h e r

h a d r e m arr i e d , a c c e p t e d a j o b in Murfre esboro a nd moved. Maintaining the same pa renting arr ang ement, with the parties living two hours apa rt, was not a f

easible option as e vidence d by the parties’ competing petitions to be designated p r im ar y r e s id e n ti a l p ar e n t. T h e p ar e n ta l r e lo c a ti o n s tatu te e xp r e s s ly p r o v id e s th e me c h a n is m f or a re loc a tin g pa

re nt t o p e tit ionfo r p e rm iss ionto h a ve the c hil d r e loc a te wi th the pa rent, and se ts f

orth the standar d to be applied in such a circ umstance. This is prec isely what the trial court did. We find
no e rr or in this

. Finally , Father c ontends that the trial court erre d in desig nating Mo t h er as t h e primary residential pa

rent. Indeed, the res o l u t i o n o f t his issue is difficult. Under the joint custody manag ement, both Mother a nd Father ha d b ee n ca ri n g, involved pare nts and an a ctive part of Christian’s daily

life. Howe ver, Mother ’s re location and Christian’s entry into g radeschool rende red rete ntion of the exist ing sc hedule impossibl e. The trial court wa s forc ed to choose betwee n two loving pare nts, both of w hom w anted to be desig nated primary residential pare nt. The trial court determined that Mo the r s ho uldbe de sig na t e d a s p ri m a ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt andha ve Christ ia n r e sid e prima ri ly wi th her during the school y ear . I t decided that Christi an would re side primarily wi t h Fa ther during the
su mme r. Ea c h p are nt w ou ld h a ve re sid e nti a l par e nti ng tim e wh e n Ch ri sti a n is re sid ing prima ri ly wi th the other pare nt. The trial court made this de termination based on the fac tors it discusse d above. F or this Court t o overturn the trial court’ s decision, the fa cts befor e us must support Fa t h er ’s proposed finding with gr eate r convinc ing e ffe ct. Walker v. Sidney Gilreath & As socs ., 40 S.W .3d 66, 71 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. 20 00 ); Realty Shop, I nc. v. R.R. Westm inst er Holding, In c. , 7 S.W. 3d58 1, 59 6 ( Te nn . Ct

. Ap p. 19 99 ); Nev es v. N

eve s , 2004 WL

2866974, *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. De c. 13, 2004). A fter a car eful revie w of the evidenc e, with defe renc e to the fa ct that the trial c ourt observe d the parties’ testimony and deme anor, w e cannot conclude that the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst the trial court’s decision to d e sig nate Mo the r a s p ri mary re sid e nti a l pa

re nt and to p e rm it Ch ri sti a n to re loc a te wi th h e r t o Murfre esboro.-9-

Th e de c isi on of

the tr ia l c ou rt

is affi rm ed. Co sts of

thi s a pp e a l a reta xedto the app e lla nt, TimothyJ ames Watson, for whic h execution may issue, if nec essary
.

_______________________________ HOLL Y M. KI RBY, JUDGE