1

 Mr. Jordan is not the natural father of Jocelynn Jordan. Mr. Jordan is aware of this fact. However, Mr.

Jordan’s name is listed on the child’s birth certificate and he has executed an Affidavit of Paternity, under oath, affirming

that he is the father of Jocelynn.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

January 23, 2003 Session

JAMES S. JORDAN, JR. v. KELLY K. JORDAN

A Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County

No. CT-007590-01 The Honorable Rita L. Stotts, Judge

No. W2002-00854-COA-R3-CV - Filed February 19, 2003

This case involves the enrollment of a foreign divorce decree, enforcement of the child

support obligation therein, and the modification of the visitation privileges set out in the decree. The

trial court enrolled the foreign decree, entered judgment for arrearages and child support, and

amended the enrolled judgment as to the visitation privileges for Father. Father appeals. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

W. FRANK CRAWFORD, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ALAN E. HIGHERS, J. and HOLLY KIRBY

LILLARD, J., joined.

Richard A. Gordan, Memphis, For Appellant, James S. Jordan, Jr.

Mitchell D. Moskovitz, Adam N. Cohen, Memphis, For Appellee, Kelly K. Jordan

OPINION

 On June 2, 1999, Kelly K. Jordan (“Ms. Jordan,” “Appellee,” or “Mother”) and James S.

Jordan, Jr. (“Mr. Jordan,” “Appellant,” or “Father”) were divorced by decree of the Circuit Court of

Mobile County, Alabama. Ms. Jordan was granted “custody, physical care, and control” of the

parties’ two children, Jocelynn Jordan (d/o/b April 20, 1995)

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 and Presleigh Jordan (d/o/b December

22, 1997). Mr. Jordan was given visitation rights and ordered to pay $898.00 per month in child

support. Mr. Jordan was also ordered to reimburse Ms. Jordan for one-half of the children’s

uninsured medical expenses, and to pay for one-half of the children’s schooling expenses.

On February 14, 2001, Ms. Jordan and the two children moved from Mobile County,

Alabama to Shelby County, Tennessee. Sometime in early 2001, Mr. Jordan was laid off by his

Alabama employer. On or about June 1, 2001, Mr. Jordan accepted a position in Shrewsbury,

Massachusetts.
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On December 20, 2001, Ms. Jordan filed a Petition to Enroll Foreign Decree of Divorce and

for Civil Contempt (the “First Petition”) in the Circuit Court for the Thirtieth Judicial District at

Memphis. On January 25, 2002, Ms. Jordan filed an Amended Petition to Modify Final Decree of

Divorce and for Injunctive Relief and to Place File Under Seal (the “Second Petition”). The Second

Petition reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

4. Mother alleges that there presently exists a substantial and material

change in circumstances such that the visitation awarded to Father in

the parties’ Final Decree of Divorce be modified. Specifically,

Mother alleges that Father relocated to Shrewsbury, Massachusetts in

May of 2001, and that he currently resides with his paramour...

5. Mother alleges that, due to Father’s relocation, his failure to

exercise parenting time and Father’s recent threats, the visitation

schedule set forth in the parties’ Final Decree is no longer in the best

interests of the parties’ minor children.

6. Mother alleges that this Honorable Court should modify the Final

Decree of Divorce to set a specific visitation schedule determined to

be in the manifest best interest of the parties’ minor children, and that

any visitation awarded be supervised, and occur in Shelby County,

Tennessee.

7. After Father was served with Mother’s Petition to Enroll Foreign

Decree of Divorce and for Civil Contempt, Father left message on

Mother’s answering machine, acknowledging that he had an $18,000

arrearage owing to Mother. Father further threatened to utilize “half”

of that money to pay a private investigator to track down the natural

father of the parties’ oldest child. Mother alleges that said individual

has a history of physical abuse towards Mother.

On January 25, 2002, the trial court issued an Ex Parte Order of Protection against Mr.

Jordan. The matter was set for hearing on February 8, 2002. At that hearing, Ms. Jordan testified

as to the nature of her relationship with Jocelynn’s natural father and of the need for the court to

issue an injunction to enjoin Mr. Jordan from contacting this man and discussing anything about the

children or Ms. Jordan. Richard A. Gordon made a special appearance on behalf of Mr. Jordan.

Before any cross-examination of Ms. Jordan could occur, the court cautioned Mr. Gordon as follows:

“Well, I [the Court] think if you [Mr. Gordan] were to ask her [Ms. Jordan] anything other than

something going to jurisdiction that you would be waiving it.” Upon that recommendation, Mr.

Gordon asked no questions. On February 28, 2002, the trial court entered an order styled Order

Injunctive Relief; Continuance; and Placing File under Seal.

On March 8, 2002, Ms. Jordan filed an Amended Petition (the “Third Petition”). The Third

Petition specifically alleged that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Mr. Jordan pursuant
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to T.C.A. § 36-5-2201 and/or T.C.A. § 20-2-214, and that the court had proper jurisdiction in all

respects under T.C.A. § 36-6-201 et seq.

By special appearance of his attorney, Mr. Jordan filed a Motion to dismiss the First Petition

on March 8, 2002. Also by special appearance, Mr. Jordan filed Responses to the

First Petition and the Second Petition.

The matter was set for hearing on March 12, 2002. Mr. Jordan made a motion to bifurcate

the hearing, separating consideration on the issue of jurisdiction from consideration on the merits.

At the March 8, 2002 hearing, the court denied Mr. Jordan’s motion to bifurcate. An Order on the

Motion to Bifurcate was entered on March 28, 2002. 

Before the hearing on March 12, 2002, Mr. Jordan filed a Motion to dismiss the Second and

Third Petitions for lack of jurisdiction. At the hearing, Mr. Gordon again declined to cross-examine

Ms. Jordan for fear of waiving Mr. Jordan’s objection to the court’s having personal jurisdiction.

Following the hearing, the trial court granted the relief sought in all of Ms. Jordan’s petitions. On

March 28, 2002, the court entered an Order of Protection against Mr. Jordan and an Order granting

Ms. Jordan’s petitions (the “Final Order”). The Final Order reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

2. Father’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction shall

be and hereby is denied. This Honorable Court specifically finds that

it has proper subject matter and personal jurisdiction to adjudicate all

claims before it.

3. The Final Decree of Divorce heretofore entered by the Circuit

Court of Mobile County, Alabama, shall be and hereby is registered

and enrolled for all purposes.

4. Father is in willful contempt of Court for failure to pay child

support in accordance with the Final Decree of Divorce, and for

failure to reimburse Mother for extracurricular activity fees, private

school, and other related expenses, in the total amount of $19,161.

Said sum shall be reduced to judgment, for all of which execution

shall issue if necessary.

5. The Final Decree of Divorce shall be modified to reflect that

Father’s parenting time with the parties’ minor children shall occur

only in Shelby County, Tennessee, and that same be supervised.

Pending further orders of the Court, Father shall be entitled to

supervised parenting time at the Exchange Club of Memphis one (1)

weekend per month from 9:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. on Saturday, and

from 9:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. on Sunday. Father shall provide

Mother with at least two (2) weeks notice of his intent to exercise said

supervised parenting time.
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On March 28, 2002, the matter was again before the trial court upon motion by Mr. Jordan

to determine whether the seal imposed by the court upon the court file extended to the pleadings,

transcripts and communications being provided to Mr. Jordan’s Alabama attorney. On April 3, 2002,

the trial court entered an Order on that motion, which states, in pertinent part, that:

1. [Mr. Jordan’s] attorney may provide only copies of the orders

entered in this cause to [Mr. Jordan’s] Alabama attorney and said

attorney’s name must be disclosed to the court;

2. [Mr. Jordan’s] said Alabama attorney may apply to this court for

additional information from the court file should said attorney

determine the need to do so.

Pursuant to this Order, Mr. Gordon submitted a Notice to the court on April 3, 2002,

indicating the Alabama attorney’s name and address. Mr. Jordan filed notice of appeal on April 8,

2002. On May 24, 2002, the trial court entered an Order Partially Lifting Seal for the express and

limited purpose of preparing the record on appeal.

On July 5, 2002, Mr. Jordan, by special appearance, filed a Motion for Stay and Further

Relief Pending Appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 63. On August 26, 2002, Ms. Jordan filed an

Affidavit of judgment debtor’s last known address for the purpose of requesting the issuance of an

execution of garnishment. 

On appeal, Mr. Jordan raises four (4) issues for our review, as stated in his brief:

I. The trial court erred in ruling that Tennessee had proper

jurisdiction over the person of Appellant.

II. The trial court erred in ruling that Tennessee had proper

jurisdiction to modify the parties’ Alabama final decree concerning

visitation.

III. The trial court erred in refusing to bifurcate the hearing as to

jurisdiction from the hearing on the merits.

IV. The trial court erred in placing such a broad seal in this matter as

to prevent disclosure of communications and court pleadings to

Appellant’s Alabama attorney in related Alabama proceedings

between the same parties.

I. The trial court erred in ruling that Tennessee had 

proper jurisdiction over the person of Appellant.
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 We first note that the trial court’s determination of personal jurisdiction over Mr. Jordan

is a question of law. As such, our review of the trial court order is de novo upon the record with

no presumption of correctness accompanying the trial court’s conclusions of law. See Tenn. R.

App. P. 13(d); Waldron v. Delffs, 988 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); Sims v. Stewart,

973 S.W.2d 597, 599-600 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

From our reading of the record and his brief, Mr. Jordan does not dispute the validity of

Tennessee’s enrolling the Alabama decree in the Circuit Court of Shelby County. Rather, his sole

contention is that Tennessee may not enforce that properly enrolled decree because Tennessee

lacks personal jurisdiction over Mr. Jordan. We cannot agree. 

T.C.A. § 36-5-2606 outlines the procedure necessary to contest the validity or

enforcement of a registration order. The statute reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

(a) A nonregistering party seeking to contest the validity or

enforcement of a registered order in this state shall request a hearing

within twenty (20) days after the date of mailing or personal service

of notice of the registration. The nonregistering party may seek to

vacate the registration, to assert any defense to an allegation of

noncompliance with the registered order, or to contest the remedies

being sought or the amount of any alleged arrearages pursuant to §

36-5-2607 (Contest of Registration or Enforcement).

(b) If the nonregistering party fails to contest the validity or

enforcement of the registered order in a timely manner, the order is

confirmed by operation of law.

The language of T.C.A. § 36-5-2606 is clear. The nonregistering party (in this case Mr.

Jordan) must request a hearing within twenty (20) days after personal service of the notice of

registration. In this case, Ms. Jordan filed the First Petition on December 20, 2001 and Mr.

Jordan was served with this First Petition sometime in late December. From the record, we find

that Mr. Jordan’s first attempt to contest the validity or enforcement of the Alabama decree was

not made until the first hearing in this matter on February 8, 2002. At that time, Mr. Jordan,

through special appearance of his attorney, raised the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction.

From the record, it appears that Mr. Jordan’s first contest to the validity or enforcement of

the Alabama decree was made well beyond the twenty (20) day cut-off. While we note that lack

of personal jurisdiction is a valid defense to the validity or enforcement of a registered order

under T.C.A. § 36-5-2607, T.C.A. § 36-5-2606 makes it clear that such defense must be raised

within twenty (20) days after the date of mailing or personal service of notice of the registration. 

Under the statute, Mr. Jordan’s failure to contest the court’s lack of personal jurisdiction in a

timely manner results in the order being confirmed by operation of law. Once there has been

confirmation of a registered order, Mr. Jordan is precluded, under T.C.A. § 36-5-2608 from
2

 § 36-2-219 addresses temporary emergency jurisdiction, which is not necessary in this case.

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asserting any defenses (i.e. lack of personal jurisdiction), which could have been raised at the

time of registration: See T.C.A. 36-5-2607(a)(1) (2001) and T.C.A. § 36-5-2608 (2001).

However, we note that Mr. Jordan’s absence from this state or more importantly the

absence from this jurisdiction of any source for collecting the judgment will require Ms. Jordan

to proceed with the Tennessee judgment for enforcement where Mr. Jordan’s assets may be

found. T.C.A. § 36-5-2603 provides:

36-5-2603. Effect of registration for enforcement. - (a) A support

order or income-withholding order issued in another state is registered

when the order is filed in the registering tribunal of this state.

(b) A registered order issued in another state is enforceable in the

same manner and is subject to the same procedures as an order issued

by a tribunal of this state.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in this part, a tribunal of this state

shall recognize and enforce, but may not modify, a registered order if

the issuing tribunal had jurisdiction. 

II. The trial court erred in ruling that Tennessee had proper jurisdiction

 to modify the parties’ Alabama final decree concerning visitation.

To determine whether Tennessee has appropriate subject-matter jurisdiction to modify

Alabama’s final decree concerning visitation, we turn to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction

and Enforcement Act (the “UCCJEA”). § 36-6-218 addresses the court’s jurisdiction to modify

foreign decrees and reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

Except as otherwise provided in § 36-6-2192, a court of this state may

not modify a child-custody determination made by a court of another

state unless a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial

determination under § 36-6-216(a)(1) or (2) and:

* * *

(2) A court of this state or a court of the other state determines that

the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not

presently reside in the other state.
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Clearly two criteria must be met in order for a Tennessee court to have jurisdiction to

modify the Alabama decree at issue in this case. First, the Tennessee court must have jurisdiction

to make an initial determination under § 36-6-216(a)(1) or (2). § 36-6-216(a) of the UCCJEA

reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

(a) ...a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child

custody determination only if:

(1) This state is the home state of the child on the date of the

commencement of the proceeding...

 T.C.A. § 36-6-205(7) defines “Home state” as follows: “‘Home state’ means the state in which a

child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six (6) consecutive months

immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding.” In the instant case, we

find that Tennessee is the home state of Jocelynn Jordan and Presleigh Jordan. Ms. Jordan

moved to Tennessee with the two children on February 14, 2001. The First Petition was filed on

December 20, 2001. The definition of “Home state” is, therefore, met in this case. 

Consequently, we find that the first criterion for jurisdiction to modify the foreign decree under

T.C.A. § 36-6-218 is satisfied.

The second applicable criterion for jurisdiction to modify the foreign decree requires a

determination that the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not

presently reside in the other state (i.e. Alabama). It is clear that Ms. Jordan and the children no

longer reside in Alabama. It is Mr. Jordan’s residential status that is at issue here. In the Final

Order, the trial court concludes that “Father’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction

shall be and hereby is denied. This Honorable Court specifically finds that it has proper subject

matter and personal jurisdiction to adjudicate all claims before it.”

Since this case was tried by the trial court sitting without a jury, we review the case de

novo upon the record with a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact by the trial court. 

Unless the evidence preponderates against the findings, we must affirm, absent error of law.

Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). However, in this case, the trial court made no findings of fact. The Final

Order simply concludes, without explanation, that the court has personal and subject-matter

jurisdiction. Pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 13(c), we are limited to the facts “established by the

evidence in the trial court and set forth in the record and any additional facts that may be

judicially noticed or are considered pursuant to rule 14.” Here, there was nothing found as a fact

to which we may attach the presumption of correctness. Therefore, we will review the record de

novo to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies. Brooks v. Brooks, 992 S.W.2d

403, 405 (Tenn.1999) (citing Devorak v. Patterson, 907 S.W.2d 815, 818 (Tenn. Ct. App.1995);

Goodman v. Memphis Park Comm'n, 851 S.W.2d 165, 166 (Tenn. Ct. App.1992); and Kelly v.

Kelly, 679 S.W.2d 458, 460 (Tenn. Ct. App.1984)).
-8-

Turning to the record in this case, we find that the evidence presented by Mr. Jordan to

support his claim that he does not reside in Massachusetts consists of his Motion to Dismiss filed

March 8, 2002. This Motion asserts, in pertinent part, that: 

2. Respondent has at all times remained a resident of the State of

Alabama and has never been a resident of the State of Tennessee;

3. Respondent is a registered voter in the State of Alabama...

4. Respondent maintains an Alabama drivers’ license and not that of

any other State;

5. Respondent has continuously maintained his primary residence in

the State of Alabama where his belongings and furnishings remain;

6. Respondent’s parents, grandparents and siblings are also residents

of the State of Alabama;

7. Respondent was laid off from his employment in Alabama during

2001 and was unable to secure suitable employment in the area for a

period of three months;

8. Respondent only took employment in the New England area

through his labor union when no suitable employment could be

located in Alabama;

9. Respondent is temporarily staying in Massachusetts where he is

currently working in Massachusetts and New Hampshire and expects

to return to Alabama at any time once employment prospects there

improve;

10. Respondent initially stayed at several local motels until he

recently rented a furnished room in a home in Shrewsbury,

Massachusetts;

11. Respondent collected unemployment compensation from the

State of Alabama during 2001 and continues to direct and receive

correspondence at his Alabama address;

12. Respondent has had no contacts with the State of Tennessee;

At the March 12, 2002 hearing, Mr. Jordan’s attorney reiterated the above points in

arguing his client’s position. Concerning the question of where Mr. Jordan presently resides, Ms.

Jordan testified at that hearing as follows:
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Q. You have heard Mr. Gordon make certain statements about where

your ex-husband resides. You have had the opportunity to investigate

the veracity of the statements or the allegations–

A. Yes, I have.

* * *

A. ...once he [Mr. Jordan] had moved there [to Massachusetts] and

began living at his Banaster address in July, he–we were on speaking

terms and we were talking. He did at that time inform me that he

really liked it there. He had met a lady by the name of Jennifer

Latino, and was residing with her. He enjoyed the weather and did

not have any intentions on moving back to Alabama, and further

alleged that he was not going to pay the arrearage or the portion of

school that he was required to pay. In that, he was trying to save up

to buy a home there.

Q. Have you had an occasion to review any documentation that

reflects where he now suggests he resides?

A. Yes.

Q. And what documentation have you had the opportunity to review?

A. He purchased and registered a vehicle within the state of

Massachusetts, and it does have a Massachusetts tag, as well as–I

investigated that he is paying taxes there on that vehicle within

Shrewsbury, Massachusetts, the city that he resides.

We first note that the statute at issue (T.C.A. § 36-6-218), and specifically the second

criterion outlined in that statute requires that the children, and the parents not presently reside in

Alabama in order for a Tennessee court to have jurisdiction to modify the visitation decree. While

we concede that Mr. Jordan’s domicile remains in Alabama in that he has no present intention to

permanently reside in another state, and while the evidence indicates that Mr. Jordan retains a

residence in Alabama, the question before us is where Mr. Jordan presently resides. Black’s Law

Dictionary 1176 (5th ed. 1979) defines “reside” as follows:

Reside. Live, dwell, abide, sojourn, stay, remain, lodge. To settle

oneself or a thing in a place, to be stationed, to remain or stay, to

dwell for a time...

Id. (citations omitted).
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From the evidence before us, it is clear that Mr. Jordan presently resides in Massachusetts.

From his own sworn statement in the Motion to Dismiss filed March 8, 2002, Mr. Jordan admits that

he is “staying in Massachusetts where he is currently working.” Although Mr. Jordan qualifies this

statement with the word “temporarily,” as noted above, the issue is not whether he intends to stay

in Massachusetts (that would go to the issue of domicile), nor whether he has a residence in Alabama

(one may have more than one residence). But even if a person has several homes, no one can be at

two places at once. Consequently, a person may presently reside only at one of his or her homes.

Therefore, the question is simply this: where was Mr. Jordan residing when this action commenced?

The evidence before us yields only one answer and that is Massachusetts. The comment to the

official text states in pertinent part: “In other words, a court of the modification state can determine

that all parties have moved away from the original state.” 

For the foregoing reasons, we find that both criteria outlined in T.C.A. § 36-6-218 have been

met in this case. Tennessee, therefore, has subject-matter jurisdiction to modify the custody order

found in the Alabama decree. 

III. The trial court erred in refusing to bifurcate the 

hearing as to jurisdiction from the hearing on the merits.

Based upon our finding, under Issue I above, that Mr. Jordan failed to raise the defense of

lack of personal jurisdiction within twenty (20) days after the date of mailing or personal service

of notice of the registration, we find this issue to be moot.

IV. The trial court erred in placing such a broad seal in 

this matter as to prevent disclosure of communications and

 court pleadings to Appellant’s Alabama attorney in related 

Alabama proceedings between the same parties.

As set forth above, the trial court placed this file under seal due to the sensitive parentage

issues, as well as the history of the mother’s relationship with Jocelynn’s biological father. Mr.

Jordan now submits that the seal imposed by the trial court is overly broad and, as such,

interferes with his constitutional right to counsel. The record indicates that Mr. Jordan did move

the trial court to “determine whether the seal placed by the court in this cause extends to

communications and pleadings being provided to respondent’s Alabama attorney....” Although

Mr. Jordan asked for clarification on the parameters of the court’s seal, we find no indication in

the record to suggest that he raised the issues of the seal being overly broad or having any impact

on his right to counsel. It is a well settled principle of law that issues not raised in the trial court

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. See Lovell v. Metro. Gov’t, 696 S.W.2d 2 (Tenn.

1985); Lawrence v. Stanford, 655 S.W.2d 927 (Tenn. 1983). Consequently, this issue is without

merit.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Order of the trial court. Costs of this appeal are

assessed to the Appellant, James S. Jordan, Jr., and his surety.
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__________________________________________

W. FRANK CRAWFORD, PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.