COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Annunziata, Bumgardner and Clements 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

TERRANCE DELON SLEMMONS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2548-00-4 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III 

 MAY 8, 2001 

PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 James E. Swiger (Swiger & Cay, on briefs), 

for appellant. 

 Angela Lemmon Horan, Senior Assistant County 

Attorney (Sharon E. Pandak, County Attorney, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 

Terrance D. Slemmons appeals the denial of benefits for 

injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The Workers' 

Compensation Commission found the accident did not arise out of 

and in the course of his employment. The employee contends the 

commission erred when it concluded the special errand rule did 

not apply. Finding no error, we affirm. 

The employee was a patrol officer who normally worked from 

4:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. At the end of a shift, he arrested two 

persons and appeared before a magistrate to obtain felony 

warrants. The magistrate did not issue the warrants at that 
time but told the employee "to come back at 3:00 p.m. the next 

day." The employee's next shift began at 4:00 p.m. 

That afternoon, the employee left his home around 2:10 p.m. 

intending to return to the magistrate's office. The office was 

in the same building as the police department, and the ten-mile 

trip took about twenty minutes. The employee rode his personal 

motorcycle, wore plainclothes, and carried his badge, weapon, 

vest, and documents related to the warrants. While en route, a 

car hit his motorcycle and he sustained serious and permanent 

injuries. 

The deputy commissioner ruled the injury did not arise out 

of and in the course of the employment and the special errand 

rule did not apply. The deputy found "the claimant was not 

charged with a required task or duty connected to his 

employment, nor was he performing a special errand for a 

supervisor when the accident occurred." The commission affirmed 

the deputy's decision. The employee contends the commission 

erred because he was performing a special errand for the 

magistrate. 

Injuries sustained in an accident are compensable only if 

they arise out of and in the course of the employment. Mullins 

v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 10 Va. App. 304, 306, 391 S.E.2d 609, 

611 (1990). Injuries sustained by an employee going to or from 

work are generally not compensable. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. 

Co. v. Barnard, 236 Va. 41, 45, 372 S.E.2d 369, 371 (1988). 

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There are three recognized exceptions: (1) the employer 

provides the means of transportation or pays for the travel 

time, (2) the way used is the sole means of ingress and egress, 

and (3) the employee is charged with a task while on his way to 

or from work. Sentara Leigh Hosp. v. Nichols, 13 Va. App. 630, 

636, 414 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1992) (en banc). Only the third 

exception can apply to this case. 

The employee has the burden of proving an exception 

applies. Id. at 636, 414 S.E.2d at 430. He contends that 

cooperating with the magistrate's office was an essential part 

of his role as a police officer. He believed he had to, or 

should, comply with the magistrate's request to return at 

3:00 p.m. However, he conceded his supervisor had not 

instructed him to do so, the department wanted police officers 

to go to the magistrate's office during their normal duty hours, 

and he was not engaged in any law enforcement activity at the 

time of the accident. 

The deputy determined that the magistrate merely "advised" 

the employee to return at 3:00 p.m. The magistrate had no 

supervisory role over the employee, and the police department 

did not order its employees to report to the magistrate, 

although it did promote cooperation with the magistrate's 

office. The employee did not seek authorization to report to 

work early to obtain the arrest warrant from the magistrate. If 

the employee had made a request, his supervisor would have 

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encouraged the officer to wait until he was on duty. No 

evidence suggested the employee would have suffered any 

repercussions if he had reported to the magistrate at 4:00 p.m. 

The employer did not pay him overtime for coming in early and 

did not compensate him for mileage. 

The employee relies upon Harbin v. Jamestown Village Joint 

Venture, 16 Va. App. 190, 428 S.E.2d 754 (1993). In that case, 

the employee sustained injuries while en route to a business 

meeting. This Court held the injuries were compensable because 

the employee's supervisor directed him to attend the meeting. 

In this case, the employee was not acting under an order of his 

employer. 

In oral argument, the employee argued Graybeal v. Board of 

Supervisors of Montgomery County, 216 Va. 77, 216 S.E.2d 52 

(1975), and Thore v. Chesterfield County Board of Supervisors, 

10 Va. App. 327, 391 S.E.2d 882 (1990), were authority for 

applying the special errand rule. Neither case involves 

injuries received while coming or going to work nor the special 

errand rule. 

In Graybeal, a bomb planted on a family car at the home of 

a Commonwealth's Attorney exploded and injured him. The 

Commonwealth's Attorney had previously prosecuted the bomber who 

sought revenge for the successful murder prosecution. The Court 

held the employee was in the course of the employment because 

the injury originated in the employment. "The course from 

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prosecution to desire-for-revenge to injury was unbroken." 216 

Va. at 80, 216 S.E.2d at 54. 

 In Thore, a former deputy sheriff returned to testify at a 

trial and suffered injuries when she fell at the courthouse. 

Her supervisor directed her to comply with the Commonwealth's 

attorney's directions, who advised her to appear and testify 

because she was the arresting officer and indispensable. She 

was required to appear at the trial at a designated time. 

In the instant case, the employee was not under any 

supervisor's order to report to work early and had not sought 

permission to do so from his supervisor. He unilaterally 

elected to comply with the magistrate's request to appear at the 

magistrate's office at 3:00 p.m. He risked no repercussions if 

he went an hour later when his scheduled shift began. We 

conclude that the employee was not on a special errand while 

traveling to work. Accordingly, we affirm. 

Affirmed. 

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