Affirmed and Opinion Filed April 26, 2022

In the

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-21-00006-CV

CYNTHIA RAMOS, Appellant

V.

DOMINGO H. CISNEROS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 14th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-00429

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Schenck, Carlyle, and Garcia

Opinion by Justice Carlyle

Domingo H. Cisneros1filed this lawsuit against his daughter Cynthia Ramos 

seeking to recover title to his home from Ms. Ramos and prevent her from evicting 

him. The trial court granted Mr. Cisneros’s motion for summary judgment against 

Ms. Ramos, which she challenges in this appeal. We affirm in this memorandum 

opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

1 Mr. Cisneros died after this appeal was filed but before this case was disposed of on appeal. We

“proceed to adjudicate the appeal as if all parties were alive.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 7.1(a)(1). 
–2–

Background

Mr. Cisneros filed this lawsuit on January 9, 2020. At that time, he was 80

years old and lived in a Dallas house he had purchased about one and one-half years 

earlier. His wife had died the previous year at age 79. They had eight children 

together, including Ms. Ramos.

The petition alleged (1) Mr. Cisneros “has various medical conditions which 

make it difficult for him to live by himself, including sporadic memory impairment, 

high blood pressure and related problems”; (2) following his wife’s death, Ms. 

Ramos “promised Plaintiff that if he gave her a deed to his house, that she would 

care for him and let him live in his home, comfortable and undisturbed, for the rest 

of his life, and provide him the care and companionship that he needed”; (3) on April

4, 2019, Mr. Cisneros “executed a deed to Defendant, reserving a life estate in his 

home”; (4) the deed “was executed for no consideration, and was instead induced by 

fraud, false promises, and due to the special relationship of trust and confidence that 

he had with Defendant”; (5) shortly after that, Ms. Ramos “falsely represented to 

Plaintiff that she was unable to obtain insurance on the home unless the title was 

solely in her name” and she “began again pressuring Plaintiff to execute another 

deed, granting her full title to the house”; (6) “acting under the false promises and 

fraudulent representations of Defendant, and in reliance upon the relationship of trust 

and confidence that he had in his daughter, based upon their special relationship, and 

the promises and assurances of his daughter, Plaintiff executed a second deed to 
–3–

Defendant on May 6, 2019”; (7) Ms. Ramos “shortly began refusing to cook for him, 

provide groceries for him, or treat him with the love and respect due to an aging 

parent”; and (8) “[s]ubsequent to securing conveyance of Plaintiff’s homestead 

through fraud, artifice, deceit, and exercise of undue influence, Cynthia 

Ramos . . . engaged in malicious and harassing conduct designed to intimidate and 

frighten her father into abandoning his home to allow her to consummate her 

unlawful theft thereof” and filed a proceeding to evict Mr. Cisneros from the house. 

Mr. Cisneros asserted claims for (1) “breach of fiduciary duty and imposition 

of constructive trust,” (2) “trespass to try title,” and (3) declarations that the two 

deeds are “invalid and unenforceable” and he is “owner of 100% of the fee simple 

interest” in the property. He also sought temporary and permanent injunctive relief, 

monetary damages, and attorney’s fees.

Following the March 12, 2020 issuance of citation, Ms. Ramos’s counsel filed 

a March 18, 2020 “Notice of Appearance” but did not file an answer at that time.

On July 23, 2020, Mr. Cisneros filed a traditional motion for summary 

judgment, contending the evidence established “the existence of a relationship of 

trust and confidence” between him and Ms. Ramos based on their family relationship

and other circumstances. He asserted Ms. Ramos breached that fiduciary relationship 

by “attempting to evict him and continuing to harass him, rather than giving him 

love, comfort, and support,” thus warranting “imposition of a constructive trust” in 

his favor. 
–4–

The evidence attached to the summary judgment motion included (1) a 

declaration of Mr. Cisneros with the two deeds attached, (2) his above-described 

petition, and (3) July 2020 deposition testimony of Atalia Garcia-Williams, the

attorney who prepared the two deeds. 

The summary judgment motion’s August 2020 Zoom hearing was reset for 

September 28, 2020, so the parties could proceed with mediation, but they did not 

settle the case. On September 25, 2020, Ms. Ramos filed (1) objections to Mr. 

Cisneros’s summary judgment evidence, (2) a motion to continue the summary 

judgment hearing, and (3) a motion for leave to file a late summary judgment 

response, with the proffered response and evidentiary exhibits attached. Mr. 

Cisneros opposed both motions. Additionally, Ms. Ramos filed a September 28, 

2020 general denial answer, which Mr. Cisneros moved to strike as untimely.

The trial court moved the summary judgment motion to its September 29, 

2020 “submission docket” and did not hold a Zoom or in-person hearing. The trial 

court signed a September 30, 2020 order stating that having considered, among other 

things, the motion and “the unopposed pleadings on file,” it was granting Mr. 

Cisneros’s summary judgment motion, and “[t]rial for determination of damages, if 

any, to be awarded to Plaintiff shall be set by the Court.” Mr. Cisneros moved to 

nonsuit his monetary relief claims and requested entry of final judgment. The trial 

court granted his motion for partial nonsuit and, several months later, signed a final 

judgment that stated:
–5–

The Court finds that prior to the total conveyance of [the 

property] to Defendant, there existed, as a matter of law, a confidential 

relationship of trust and confidence that Plaintiff had toward his

daughter, the Defendant herein, and Plaintiff was justified in relying 

upon the promises and assurances of his daughter in dealing with the 

Property.

The Court further finds that the Defendant promised and 

represented to Plaintiff that, if he conveyed his home to her, she would 

allow him to reside in his home for the remainder of his life, and that 

Defendant would provide care, support, love, and companionship for 

him in his aging years, but that in fact the Defendant did not intend to 

fulfill such promise and agreement at the time made, and Plaintiff

justifiably relied upon such promise to his material detriment.

The Court further finds that the representation of Defendant to 

Plaintiff that she was unable to obtain insurance on the Property unless 

he relinquished his life estate in the Property was false and fraudulent 

as a matter of law.

Since Defendant owed a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff, and paid 

nothing for conveyance of the home, Defendant bears the burden of 

proving the fairness of all transactions with Plaintiff.

Defendant has breached her fiduciary duties to Plaintiff.

The judgment imposed a constructive trust on the property for Mr. Cisneros’s benefit 

and stated the trial court “finds and declares” that the two deeds are “void and 

unenforceable.”

Ms. Ramos filed a motion to reconsider the granting of summary judgment 

and the “implied orders denying Defendant’s September 25, 2020 motions.” After a 

hearing, the trial court denied that motion.

Standard of review

We review a traditional summary judgment de novo to determine whether a 

party’s right to prevail is established as a matter of law. Dickey v. Club Corp., 12 

S.W.3d 172, 175 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. denied). The movant has the burden 
–6–

to show no genuine issue of material fact exists and it is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). In deciding whether a disputed material fact 

issue exists precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the nonmovant is 

taken as true. In re Berry, 280 S.W.3d 478, 480 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). 

Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the nonmovant and any 

doubts resolved in its favor. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex. 

2005). Where the trial court’s order does not specify the grounds for its summary 

judgment, we affirm if any of the theories presented to the trial court and preserved 

for appellate review are meritorious. Cmty. Health Sys. Prof’l Servs. Corp. v. 

Hansen, 525 S.W.3d 671, 680 (Tex. 2017).

“A summary judgment may be based on uncontroverted testimonial evidence 

of an interested witness . . . if the evidence is clear, positive and direct, otherwise 

credible and free from contradictions and inconsistencies, and could have been 

readily controverted.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). We review a ruling on the 

admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. Fleming v. Wilson, 610 S.W.3d 18, 

21 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam).

Analysis

In her first issue, Ms. Ramos contends the trial court erred by granting Mr. 

Cisneros’s summary judgment motion, and we address her arguments in turn.

The trial court did not misapply traditional summary judgment standards
–7–

We disagree with Ms. Ramos that the record shows the trial court “granted 

summary judgment by default” based “solely on the lack of a timely summary 

judgment response.” Though the trial court mentioned “the unopposed pleadings on 

file” in its September 30, 2020 order, nothing in the record shows the trial court 

granted the summary judgment by “default” without considering the evidence 

attached to the motion. 

We also disagree that the trial court granted unrequested relief. The petition’s 

“breach of fiduciary and imposition of constructive trust” claim specifically

requested “a decree declaring the deeds previously executed to Defendant to be void 

and of no force and effect.” The summary judgment motion incorporated the petition 

by reference and requested summary judgment regarding that claim.

Deficiencies in Mr. Cisneros’s proof did not defeat his right to judgment as a 

matter of law

Ms. Ramos’s objection that Mr. Cisneros’s declaration contained “numerous 

statements that cannot be easily controverted” did not specify any particular 

statements. Thus, we cannot agree the trial court abused its discretion by not granting 

that objection. See City of Dallas v. Rodriguez, No. 05-19-00045-CV, 2020 WL 

1486831, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 27, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (objections

to affidavit must be sufficiently specific).

Ms. Ramos’s remaining admissibility objections pertain to the alleged 

“conclusory” nature of the complained-of statements. “A conclusory statement is 
–8–

one that does not provide the underlying facts to support the conclusion.” Bastida v. 

Aznaran, 444 S.W.3d 98, 105 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.). Conclusory 

statements in affidavits are not competent evidence to support the grant of summary 

judgment because they are neither credible nor susceptible to being readily 

controverted. Id. 

Here, Ms. Ramos asserts (1) Mr. Cisneros’s “self-serving declarations that he 

had a ‘relationship of love and affection’ for his children and that ‘because Cynthia 

was [his] daughter, [he] felt the natural love, affection, trust, and confidence that 

parents usually place in their children’” are “conclusory recitations” of the legal 

standard and are incontrovertible, and (2) “[b]ecause Appellant cannot offer 

controverting evidence on her father’s state of mind, none of his self-serving 

testimony should be considered when establishing whether a special relationship of 

trust and confidence existed.” Additionally, Ms. Ramos argues, “The deposition 

testimony of the lawyer who drafted the deed doesn’t help Mr. Cisneros, either. There 

is no evidence that [Ms. Garcia-Williams] had the personal knowledge to swear that 

‘He trusted her.’ Nor did she offer any underlying facts sufficient to support her 

conclusory statement.”

Though Ms. Ramos describes particular statements as conclusory, other 

portions of the summary judgment evidence to which she did not object provide the 

necessary underlying factual support. Mr. Cisneros’s declaration described Ms. 

Ramos as his “loyal and loving daughter” whom he “trusted and relied upon” as he 
–9–

was struggling with health issues and devastated by his wife’s death. His declaration 

stated he and Ms. Ramos discussed and agreed that if he transferred his home to her, 

“she would live there with me and care for me, providing food, comfort, 

companionship, and support for the rest of my life,” and she made “express promises 

of comfort, affection, and support” to that effect. Both Mr. Cisneros and Ms. GarciaWilliams described a “custom in the Hispanic community for a child to live with a 

widowed parent after the loss of one parent, caring for the surviving parent, for the 

remainder of his/her life, and then to inherit the homestead after the surviving parent 

passes away,” which Ms. Ramos states in her appellate brief is a “tradition in the 

Hispanic community.” Additionally Ms. Garcia-Williams testified (1) Mr. Cisneros 

told her in the presence of Ms. Ramos and other family members that he wanted to 

give the house to Ms. Ramos and they had agreed he was going to “stay with 

Cynthia” and “live there for the rest of his life,” and (2) Ms. Ramos “was okay with” 

that. Thus, the declaration and deposition testimony furnished a factual basis for the 

statements regarding “trust and confidence.” See Rivera v. White, 234 S.W.3d 802, 

808 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (concluding affiant’s statements furnished 

underlying factual support and thus were not merely conclusory and could support 

summary judgment); see also Rodriguez v. Citibank, N.A., No. 04-12-00777-CV, 

2013 WL 4682194, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 30, 2013, no pet.) (mem. 

op.) (“logical conclusions based on stated underlying facts within the affidavit or 

attachments thereto are not improper conclusions and are probative”). 
–10–

Mr. Cisneros showed entitlement to summary judgment

To prevail on a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, the claimant must prove the 

existence of a fiduciary duty, a breach of that duty by the defendant, causation, and 

damages. Morrell v. Morrell, No. 09-20-00086-CV, 2022 WL 959943, at *15 (Tex. 

App.—Beaumont Mar. 31, 2022, no pet. h.) (citing First United Pentecostal Church 

of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 220 (Tex. 2017)). A fiduciary owes its 

principal a high duty of good faith, fair dealing, honest performance, and strict 

accountability. Avary v. Bank of. Am., N.A., 72 S.W.3d 779, 791 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

2002, pet. denied). A party fails to comply with its fiduciary duty “where influence 

has been acquired and abused, and confidence has been reposed and betrayed.” Lee 

v. Hasson, 286 S.W.3d 1, 14–15 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. 

denied). A profiting fiduciary bears the burden of showing the fairness of 

transactions between the fiduciary and the party to whom she owes a duty. Id. at 21;

see Morrell, 2022 WL 959943, at *15 (when plaintiff alleges self-dealing as part of

breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim, “a presumption of unfairness arises, which the 

fiduciary bears the burden to rebut”).

Though the existence of a confidential relationship is generally a question of 

fact, when the underlying facts are undisputed, the existence and breach of a

fiduciary duty are questions of law. Meyer v. Cathey, 167 S.W.3d 327, 330 (Tex. 

2005). “The existence of the fiduciary relationship is to be determined from the 

actualities of the relationship between the persons involved.” Morrell, 2022 WL 
–11–

959943, at *16 (quoting Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. 1962)). “In 

reviewing the relationship between the parties, factors we consider include the 

plaintiff’s advanced age and poor health and whether the plaintiff justifiably placed 

special confidence in the other party to act in her best interest.” Id. Subjective trust 

by one party in another does not establish the requisite relationship. Caserotti v. State 

Farm Ins. Co., 791 S.W.2d 561, 565 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, writ denied). “To 

impose an informal fiduciary relationship in a business transaction, the special 

relationship of trust and confidence must exist prior to, and apart from, the agreement 

made the basis of the suit.” Meyer, 167 S.W.3d at 330. 

As to the existence of a fiduciary duty, Ms. Ramos argues there is “no 

competent summary judgment evidence that Appellant had a pre-existing 

relationship or pattern of trust and confidence with her father,” nor is there “any 

evidence indicating that Ms. Ramos recognized that her father was relying on her.”

She contends “the evidence showed that Mr. Cisneros’s love and affection was a oneway street” and “[n]one of the evidence showed that the relationship was mutual and 

understood as such by both parties.” According to Ms. Ramos,

Here, Plaintiff’s summary judgment evidence would permit reasonable 

minds to conclude or infer that he deeded the house to his daughter not 

because of any special relationship of trust and confidence, but instead 

because of Hispanic custom, because of a promise he made to his wife, 

or because of a promise Appellant made to her mother before she passed 

away.
–12–

She argues that “[i]f anything, Mr. Cisneros’s evidence raised fact issues all by itself” 

and “[t]hus, the burden never shifted to Ms. Ramos.”

“An informal relationship may give rise to a fiduciary duty where one person 

trusts in and relies on another, whether the relation is a moral, social, domestic or 

merely personal one.” Morrell, 2022 WL 959943, at *16 (quoting Schlumberger 

Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 176 (Tex. 1997)). “A person’s trust and 

reliance upon a close member of her core family unit may give rise to a fiduciary 

duty when equity requires.” Id. at *15 (citing Young v. Fawcett, 376 S.W.3d 209, 214 

(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2012, no pet.)). “Where one person is accustomed to being 

guided by the judgment or advice of another or is justified in believing one will act 

in the best interest of another because of a family relationship, a confidential 

relationship may arise.” Id. (quoting Trostle v. Trostle, 77 S.W.3d 908, 914 (Tex. 

App.—Amarillo 2002, no pet.)). 

As described above, Mr. Cisneros’s declaration (1) described Ms. Ramos as 

his “loyal and loving daughter” whom he “trusted and relied upon” as he was 

struggling with health issues and devastated by his wife’s death and (2) stated Ms. 

Ramos made “express promises of comfort, affection, and support” and he made the 

transfer “in reliance upon the close relationship of trust and confidence that I had in 

her as my loyal and loving daughter, and based upon her promises and reassurance 

that if conveyed the house to her, that I would not be disturbed in my continued 

residence in the house for the remainder of my life, and would have the care, 
–13–

comfort, and companionship that I needed and desired in my aging years.” At the 

attorney’s office, Mr. Cisneros described his agreement with Ms. Ramos in her 

presence and Ms. Ramos “was okay with” that. We conclude Mr. Cisneros’s 

summary judgment evidence conclusively showed the parties had a relationship of 

trust and confidence before entering into the agreement in question and Ms. Ramos 

was aware her father was relying on her promises. See id. at *16 (factors to be 

considered in reviewing parties’ relationship include “plaintiff’s advanced age and 

poor health and whether the plaintiff justifiably placed special confidence in the 

other party to act in [plaintiff’s] best interest”); In re Whipple, No. 04-11-00645-CV, 

2013 WL 1641414, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 17, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. 

op.) (“Factors that may be considered in determining whether a confidential 

relationship existed include whether the plaintiff relied on the defendant for support, 

the plaintiff’s advanced age and poor health, and evidence of the plaintiff’s trust.”

(citing Young, 376 S.W.3d at 215)). 

Ms. Ramos’s summary judgment response and evidence did not “negate[] or 

present[] fact questions on the existence of a special relationship, breach of fiduciary 

duty, and fairness”

Ms. Ramos cites affidavits attached to her summary judgment response in 

which (1) she testified that her father “stated that he wanted to make this gift because 

his other children had homes already and because in his own words ‘this is what 

momma wanted’” and (2) her sister Margarita Amaro testified that “on April 11, 

2019, [Mr. Cisneros] executed a Statutory Durable Power of Attorney designating 
–14–

me as his attorney in fact for all of his financial and property transactions.” But even 

with every reasonable inference indulged in Ms. Ramos’s favor, the evidence she 

cites does not address or controvert the special relationship of trust and confidence 

Mr. Cisneros’s evidence conclusively demonstrated. 

As to breach, Ms. Ramos asserts “the trial court’s summary judgment order 

made two fact findings to establish breach of fiduciary duty: (1) that Ms. Ramos, by 

initiating eviction proceedings against Mr. Cisneros, broke her promise to allow him 

‘to reside in his home for the remainder of his life, and that Defendant would provide 

care, support, love, and companionship for him in his aging years;’ and that (2) ‘the 

representation of the Defendant to plaintiff that she was unable to obtain insurance 

on the home unless he relinquished his life estate was false and fraudulent as a matter 

of law.’”2 Her appellate arguments regarding Mr. Cisneros’s failure to conclusively 

prove breach focus solely on those two “findings.”

Because of the parties’ informal fiduciary relationship, Ms. Ramos bore the 

burden to rebut the presumption of unfairness. See Lee, 286 S.W.3d at 21; Morrell, 

2022 WL 959943, at *15. “Such fiduciaries must prove they acted in good faith and 

that the transactions were fair, honest, and equitable.” Lee, 286 S.W.3d at 21.

Regarding the threatened eviction, Ms. Ramos stated in her affidavit that 

several months after she and her family moved in, one of her brothers began coming

2 Despite that assertion, Ms. Ramos also states in a footnote in her appellate brief that “the order does 

not link its finding of a breach to any alleged misconduct by Ms. Ramos.”
–15–

over in the evenings to drink with Mr. Cisneros and they were “loud and disruptive.”

One night she asked her brother to leave and he and Mr. Cisneros became “abusive 

and violent” toward her and “threatened” her with a knife. She stated she “feared for 

[her] life and the lives of her family” and “had no option other than to ask my father 

to find another place to live.” This evidence did not address how the eviction she 

sought after a transfer for no consideration was fair, honest, and equitable to Mr. 

Cisneros. See Lee, 286 S.W.3d at 21.

Additionally, Ms. Ramos contends, “If the family attorney didn’t know, then 

Ms. Ramos surely cannot be held responsible, as a matter of law, for knowingly 

making a false or fraudulent statement regarding insurance requirements that 

supposedly breached a fiduciary duty.” She cites the attorney’s deposition testimony

regarding insurance and her own affidavit statements that she sought homeowner’s 

insurance after learning Mr. Cisneros “did not have any intention of buying 

insurance” and “[f]rom my discussion with State Farm, it was my understanding that 

I could not purchase homeowner’s insurance because I wasn’t considered the legal 

owner of the home.” Again, there is a logical disconnect: this evidence does not 

address her burden to show the transaction in question was fair, honest, and equitable 

to Mr. Cisneros. Id.

Moreover, though the trial court’s judgment mentions both the threatened 

eviction and the insurance-related representations, nothing in the judgment limits 

Ms. Ramos’s breach to those two matters. The judgment also describes Mr. 
–16–

Cisneros’s allegations that Ms. Ramos failed to provide the promised “care, support, 

love, and companionship for him in his aging years,” which included more than a 

place to live. Mr. Cisneros stated in his declaration, “Shortly after she got the second 

deed, [Ms. Ramos] refused to cook for me, or do my laundry, change my bed, and 

the like. Rather than providing the promised care and companionship to me as she 

had promised, instead Cynthia began refusing to cook for me [or] provide groceries 

for me . . . .” Ms. Ramos does not address or explain, and the record does not show, 

how any evidence raised a fact issue as to the alleged breach regarding care. 

We conclude the propriety of the trial court’s summary judgment would not 

have been affected by consideration of Ms. Ramos’s evidentiary objections and 

summary judgment response. Thus, because her remaining issues challenge the trial 

court’s “failure to consider” her September 25, 2020 motions and evidentiary 

objections, we need not reach those issues.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

210006f.p05 /Cory L. Carlyle/

CORY L. CARLYLE

JUSTICE
–17–

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

CYNTHIA RAMOS, Appellant

No. 05-21-00006-CV V.

DOMINGO H. CISNEROS, 

Appellee

On Appeal from the 14th Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-00429.

Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle. 

Justices Schenck and Garcia 

participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial 

court is AFFIRMED.

It is ORDERED that appellee DOMINGO H. CISNEROS recover his costs 

of this appeal from appellant CYNTHIA RAMOS.

Judgment entered this 26th day of April, 2022.