UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

WILLIAM COX, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CAUSE NO. 3:13-CV-350 PS 

vs. )

)

CAROL A. DILLON, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

William Cox, a pro se prisoner, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (DE 1.)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, I must review the complaint and dismiss it if the action is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Courts apply the

same standard under Section 1915A as when deciding a motion under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006). To survive

dismissal, a complaint must state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bissessur v.

Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 603. Nevertheless, a pro se

complaint must be liberally construed, “however inartfully pleaded.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 

Here, Cox claims that an attorney representing prison medical staff in a separate federal

lawsuit1

 improperly accessed his medical records in violation of the Health Insurance Portability

1 See Cox v. Levenhagen, et al., No. 3:12-CV-320 (N.D. Ind. filed Jun. 15, 2012).
and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) and various state laws. He sues the attorney, her law

firm, several doctors and nurses, the private company that employs them, and the superintendent

of Westville Correctional Facility, seeking $55 million in compensatory damages and $73

million in punitive damages for the invasion of his privacy rights. (DE 1 at 10.)

Upon review, Cox has not stated a plausible federal claim. He cannot pursue a claim

under HIPAA, because HIPAA does not provide a private right of action. See Dodd v. Jones, 623

F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir. 2010); Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 570-72 (5th Cir. 2006); see also

Carpenter v. Phillips, 419 Fed. Appx. 658, 659 (7th Cir. May 4, 2011) (detainee’s claim under

HIPAA was properly dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because HIPAA does not

provide a private right of action). Instead, the provisions of HIPAA are enforced by the Secretary

of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-5; Acara, 470

F.3d at 571.

Cox also claims the defendants violated Indiana Department of Correction (“IDOC”)

policies and other state laws in connection with the disclosure, but even if he is correct, this

would not give rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 See Sobitan v. Glud, 589 F.3d 379, 389

(7th Cir. 2009) (“By definition, federal law, not state law, provides the source of liability for a

claim alleging the deprivation of a federal constitutional right.”) (internal citation omitted); Scott

v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (observing that “42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects

2 Cox asserts in passing that “the United States Constitution prohibits what has been described.” (DE 1 at 4.)

I cannot discern any plausible constitutional claim in the complaint. Inmates have very limited privacy rights, and if the

disclosure of inmate medical information is actionable at all under the Constitution, it is in situations where prison

officials purposely disseminate highly sensitive medical information about an inmate to inflict psychological injury or

to expose him to harm by other inmates. See Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 522-23 (7th Cir. 1995). That is not even

close to what occurred here. Instead Cox claims an attorney obtained a copy of his medical records for use in his lawsuit

pertaining to the medical care he received for a knee problem, without a proper court order or his consent.

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plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws”). Cox may have some

remedy available in state court for these alleged violations, and I will dismiss his state law

claims without prejudice should he wish to pursue them. See Doe-2 v. McLean County Unit Dist.

No. 5 Bd. of Dirs., 593 F.3d 507, 513 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Ordinarily, when a district court

dismisses the federal claims conferring original jurisdiction prior to trial, it relinquishes

supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).”). However, I

offer no opinion about the wisdom of pursuing this course or the potential merit of any claim he

may have.

For these reasons, the federal claims contained in the complaint (DE 1) are DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and the state law claims are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: May 23, 2013.

 /s/ Philip P. Simon 

Philip P. Simon, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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