UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

TIMOTHY SKRYNNIKOV, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE 

ASSOCIATION, 

Defendant. 

Civil Action No. 11-0609 (GK) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Plaintiff Timothy Skrynnikov ("Plaintiff" or "Skrynnikov") 

brings this action against Defendant Federal National Mortgage 

Association ("Defendant" or "Fannie Mae") alleging retaliation 

under the Federal False Claims Act ("FCA"), 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et 

seq., and interference with his rights under both the Federal 

Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., 

and the related District of Columbia Family and Medical Leave 

Act ("DCFMLA"), D.C. Code § 32-501 et seq. 

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to 

Dismiss and Its Motion to Compel Arbitration [Dkt. No. 2 6] . 

Upon consideration of the Motion, Opposition [Dkt. No. 29], and 

Reply [Dkt. No. 30], and the entire record herein, and for the 

reasons set forth below, the motion to compel arbitration is 

granted. 
I . BACKGROUND1 

Fannie Mae is a government-sponsored corporation chartered 

by Congress, with its headquarters in the District of Columbia. 

SAC § 5. Skrynnikov was employed by Fannie Mae as a Senior 

Financial Analyst from October 9, 2007 until November 13, 2009, 

when his employment was terminated. SAC ~~ 6, 38. Skrynnikov 

alleges that Fannie Mae eliminated his position in retaliation 

for his investigation into and disclosure of purported 

falsehoods in executive compensation data that Fannie Mae 

reported to the United States Senate Committee on Finance in 

March 2009. SAC ~~ 11-17, 38-42. Skrynnikov also alleges that 

the elimination of his position interfered with his rights under 

the FMLA and DCFMLA because it came at the conclusion of an 

approved medical leave of absence. Id. ~~ 26-38, 43-50. 

When Skrynnikov applied for his job in October 2007, he 

signed an application form acknowledging that "as a condition of 

employment, all Fannie Mae employees must agree to be bound by 

Fannie Mae's Dispute Resolution Policy, which requires that 

certain employment-related claims be submitted to arbitration 

before a suit can be brought on them in court." De f . ' s Mem. P . 

& A., Ex. 1 ("Employment Application") at 4 [Dkt. No. 26-1]. 

1 The facts set forth herein are taken from the Second Amended 

Complaint ("SAC") [Dkt. No. 23] and the undisputed facts set 

forth in the parties' briefs and exhibits. 

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Similarly, when Skrynnikov signed and accepted Fannie Mae's 

offer of employment, he did so subject to the understanding that 

Fannie Mae's Dispute Resolution Policy required him "to submit 

certain employment-related claims to the mandatory arbitration 

process for final resolution prior to filing these claims in a 

court of law. " Def.'s Mem. P. & A., Ex. 2 ("Offer Letter") 

[Dkt . No. 2 6-2] . 

The Dispute Resolution Policy, a copy of which accompanied 

Fannie Mae's Offer Letter, provides that a Fannie Mae employee 

is required to arbitrate "all claims . against Fannie Mae . 

involving a legally-protected right, that directly or 

indirectly relate to his or her employment or the termination of 

that employment [.]" Def. 's Mem. P. & A., Ex. 3 ("Dispute 

Resolution Policy" or "Policy") § 2 [Dkt. No. 26-3]. The Policy 

elaborates that the claims to which it applies .may "involv [e] 

rights protected by any federal, state, or other governmental 

constitution [sic], statute, ordinance, regulation, or common 

law." The Policy also states that "[t] he arbitrator will 

resolve all disputes over the interpretation and applicability 

of the Policy, and over the arbitrability of all matters 

presented under it." Id. § 16. 

On March 23, 2011, Skrynnikov filed this case against 

Fannie Mae asserting a qui tam claim under the FCA on behalf of 

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the United States, as well as various employment-related claims 

on his own behalf. [Dkt . No. 1] . On March 27, 2012, 

Skrynnikov's qui tam claim was dismissed on motion of the 

Government pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (c) (2) (A). [Dkt. Nos. 

17, 18]. In his Second Amended Complaint [Dkt. No. 23], 

Skrynnikov brings claims solely on his own behalf for 

retaliation under the FCA, and for interference with his rights 

under the FMLA and DCFMLA. SAC §§ 39-50. It is undisputed that 

Skrynnikov did not submit these claims to arbitration before 

commencing this action. 

On November 6, 2012, Fannie Mae moved to dismiss the FMLA 

and DCFMLA claims pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, and to compel arbitration of the FCA claim. 

[Dkt. Nos. 26, 27-1] . Fannie Mae also requested that if the 

Court did not dismiss the FMLA and DCFMLA claims, it compel 

arbitration as :to those claims as well. On January 7, 2013, 

Skrynnikov filed his Opposition to Fannie Mae's Motion [Dkt. No. 

29], and on January 14, 2013, Fannie Mae filed its Reply [Dkt. 

No. 30] . 

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW2 

A motion to compel arbitration is effectively "a request 

for summary disposition of the issue of whether or not there 

ha [s] been a meeting of the minds on the agreement to 

arbitrate [,] 11 and therefore such a motion is properly reviewed 

under the summary judgment standard of Rule 56(c) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. Aliron Int'l, Inc. v. Cherokee Nation 

Indus., Inc., 531 F. 3d 863, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted) . 

"Under this standard, the party seeking to compel 

arbitration must firs·t present 'evidence sufficient to 

demonstrate an enforceable agreement to arbitrate. ' 11 Fox v. 

Computer World Servs. Corp., No. 12-0374 (ABJ), 2013 WL 385610, 

at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 2013) (quoting Hill v. Wackenhut Servs. 

Int'l., 865 F. Supp. 2d 84, 89 (D.D.C. June 7, 2012)). The 

burden then shifts to the opposing party "to show that there is 

a genuine issue of material fact as to the making of the 

agreement [] 11 so as to preclude the court from deciding the 

motion to compel as a matter of law. Haire v. Smith, Currie & 

Hancock LLP, No. 12-749 (JDB), 2013 WL 751035, at *2 (D.D.C. 

Feb. 28, 2013) (citing Hill, 865 F. Supp. 2d at 89). To sustain 

2 The Court does not reach Fannie Mae's, arguments for dismissal 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), and, therefore, does not set 

forth that standard of review. 

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its burden, the nonmoving party must "'go beyond the pleadings 

and by [its] own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" 

Amirmotazedi v. Viacom, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 2d 256, 260 (D.D.C. 

2011) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 

(1986); Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 

1987)). 

III. ANALYSIS 

A. Legal Standard Under the Federal Arbitration Act 

The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") , 9 U.S. C. § 1 et seq., 

governs the enforcement of an arbitration agreement such as the 

one at issue in this case. 3 The FAA provides, in relevant part, 

that "[a] written provision in any . contract evidencing a 

transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a 

controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . shall 

be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds 

as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 

contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. 

Although "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party 

cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he 

3 The Dispute Resolution Policy states that it "is 

to arbitrate pursuant to the FAA" and must "be 

enforced, and governed under the FAA." Policy § 16. 

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an agreement 

interpreted, 
has not agreed to so submit[,]" United Steelworkers of Am. v. 

Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960), the FAA 

"establishes a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 

agreements." CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, -- U.S. --, 132 S. 

Ct. 665, 669 (2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted) . 

Therefore, as our Court of Appeals has emphasized, "any doubts 

concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in 

favor of arbitration [.]" Wolff v. Westwood Mgmt., LLC, 558 F. 3d 

517, 520 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. 

Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 u.s. 1, 24-25 (1983)). This 

principle applies "even when the claims at issue are federal 

statutory claims, unless the FAA's mandate has been 'overridden 

by a contrary congressional command. '" CompuCredi t Corp. , 132 

S. Ct. at 669 (quoting Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 

u.s. 220, 226 (1987)). 

Although the Supreme Court has long recognized and enforced 

a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements," 

Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24, it has also made 

clear that there is an exception to this policy: the question 

whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute to 

arbitration, i.e., the "question of arbitrability" is "an issue 

for judicial determination [u]nless the parties clearly and 

unmistakably provide otherwise [.] " AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. 

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Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 649, 106 S. Ct. 

1415, 89 Lawyers Ed. 648 (1986) (emphasis added). As the court 

will discuss infra at III.B.1., in this case, the actual 

language in the Policy is clear and unmistakable. 

B. The Dispute Resolution Policy Requires Each of the 

Pending Disputes to Be Submitted to Arbitration 

When a party invokes the FAA to compel arbitration, the 

Court first must determine whether there is a valid agreement to 

arbitrate. See, e.g., Johns v. Newsmax Media, Inc., 887 F. 

Supp. 2d 90, 97 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Nelson v. Insignia/Esg, 

Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 143, 150 (D.D.C. 2002)). The Court then 

must assess whether the specific dispute falls within its scope. 

Id. In answering these questions, ordinary state-law contract 

principles apply. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 

u.s. 938, 944 (1995) . 4 

1. There Is a Valid Agreement to Arbitrate 

In support of its Motion to Compel, Fannie Mae has 

submitted copies of Skrynnikov's Employment Application, Fannie 

Mae's Offer Letter, and its Dispute Resolution Policy. 

Skrynnikov' s signature on the Employment Application and Offer 

Letter evidences his acceptance of the Dispute Resolution 

4 Skrynnikov's opposition papers assume that District of 

Columbia law applies to the arbitration agreement. Pl.'s Opp'n 

at 7-8. Since Fannie Mae does not dispute this assumption, the 

Court will apply District of Columbia law. 

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Policy, particularly because these documents emphasize the 

Policy's requirement that he submit "certain employment-related 

claims to the mandatory arbitration process for final resolution 

prior to filing [such] claims in a court of law." Offer Letter 

at 1; see also Employment Application at 4 ("I acknowledge that, 

as a condition of employment, all Fannie Mae employees must 

agree to be bound by Fannie Mae's Dispute Resolution Policy, 

which requires that certain employment-related claims be 

submitted to arbitration before a suit can be brought on them in 

court."). 

Under District of Columbia law, "'one who signs a contract 

has a duty to read it and is obligated according to its terms.'" 

Curtis v. Gordon, 980 A.2d 1238, 1244 (D.C. 2009) (quoting Pers 

Travel, Inc. v. Canal Square Assocs., 804 A.2d 1108, 1110-11 

(D.C. 2002); see also Hughes v. CACI, Inc.-Commercial, 384 F. 

Supp. 2d 89, 96 (D.D.C. 2005) ("[A] signature on a contract 

indicates 'mutuality of assent' and a party is bound by the 

contract unless he or she can show special circumstances 

relieving him or her of such an obligation.") 

quotation marks omitted) . 

(ci·tation and 

Skrynnikov does not deny that he signed Fannie Mae's 

Dispute Resolution Policy, and does not suggest that any special 

circumstances exist which would relieve him of his obligations 

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under the Policy. Instead, he cites several cases addressing 

arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements for 

the proposition that the arbitration agreement in this case is 

unenforceable because it is not "clear and unmistakable" and 

contains only "sweeping broad statements." Pl.'s Opp' n at 10 

(citing, inter alia, Carson v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 325, 

331-32 (4th Cir. 1999)). 

However, Skrynnikov did not accept the Dispute Resolution 

Policy as part of a collective bargaining agreement, and 

therefore, the stricter standard applicable in collective 

bargaining cases is not applicable in this case. See, e.g., 

Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80-81 

(1998) (distinguishing "union's waiver of the rights of 

represented employees" from "individual's waiver of his own 

rights," and noting that "clear and unmistakable" standard did 

not apply to latter); Carson, 175 F.3d at 331 ("collective 

bargaining agreements to arbitrate [,] unlike contracts 

executed by indi victuals, must be 'clear and unmistakable. '") 

(emphasis added) (citing Wright, 525 U.S. at 79-80). 

Therefore, the Dispute Resolution Policy is not 

unenforceable simply because it uses broad and inclusive 

language. See Brown v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp., 211 F.3d 

1217, 1221 (11th Cir. 2000) ("A party cannot avoid arbitration . 

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because the arbitration clause uses general, inclusive 

language, rather than listing every possible specific claim."). 

Finally, the actual language in the Policy is, in fact, 

clear and unmistakable. 

2. Each of the Pending Disputes Falls Within the 

Scope of the Arbitration Agreement 

Skrynnikov also argues that even if the agreement is 

enforceable, it only applies to "a small subset of the possible 

claims [he] might bring," and does not apply to his FCA claim 

because he did not "explicitly or by implication, agree to 

arbitrate claims under the False Claims Act." Pl.'s Opp'n at 9-

The District of Columbia "adheres to an objective law of 

contracts, meaning that the written language embodying the terms 

of an agreement will govern the rights and liabilities of the 

parties regardless of the intent of the parties at the time they 

entered into the contract, unless the written language is not 

susceptible of a clear and definite undertaking, or unless there 

is fraud, duress, or mutual mistake." Dyer v. Bilaal, 983 A.2d 

349, 354-55 (D.C. 2009) (citation and internal punctuation marks 

omitted) . In determining whether a contract is susceptible of a 

clear and definite interpretation, courts examine the document 

5 Skrynnikov does not address whether the Policy applies to his 

FMLA and DCFMLA claims. 

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on its face and give the language its plain meaning. Tillery v. 

Dist. of Columbia Contract App. Bd., 912 A.2d 1169, 1176 (D.C. 

2006) (citation omitted). 

The Dispute Resolution Policy states that it applies to any 

"claims that an employee might make against Fannie Mae 

involving a legally-protected right, that directly or indirectly 

relate to his or her employment or the termination of that 

employment [ . ] " Policy § 2 (emphasis added) . This language, 

which is broad and inclusive, has previously been held to apply 

to whistleblower claims similar to Skrynnikov's. See Taylor v. 

Fannie Mae, 839 F. Supp. 2d 259, 264 (D.D.C. 2012) (retaliation 

claim under Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower provision subject to 

Fannie Mae's Dispute Resolution Policy); Kimpson v. Fannie Mae 

Corp., No 06-18 (RWR), 2007 WL 1020799, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 

2007) (noting "inclusive and comprehensive language of the 

policy"). 

More importantly, even if the scope of the arbitration 

agreement is ambiguous, as Skrynnikov contends, the Policy 

provides that "[t] he arbitrator will resolve all disputes over 

the arbitrability of all matters presented under it[,]" 

Policy § 16 (emphasis added) , and thus it "clearly and 

unmistakably" reserves the authority to decide which claims are 

arbitrable to the arbitrator, rather than the court. See 

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Carson, 175 F.3d at 330 ("Those who wish to let an arbitrator 

decide which issues are arbitrable need only state that 'all 

disputes concerning the arbitrability of particular disputes 

under this contract are hereby committed to arbitration,' or 

words to that clear effect.") . That is precisely what Fannie 

Mae has written into its Policy. Therefore, Skrynnikov's FCA 

claim must be submitted to the arbitrator who will decide 

arbitrability issues. 

C. Fannie Mae's Rule 12(b) (6) Defenses Must Also Be 

Submitted to Arbitration 

Fannie Mae also asks the Court to dismiss Skrynnikov's 

DCFMLA claim on statute of limitations grounds, and his FMLA 

claim for failure to state a cause of action. Def.'s Mem. P & A 

at 9-12. Fannie Mae argues that because these claims fail "[o]n 

the face of the complaint," they do not involve any "legally 

protected right(s)," and therefore, may be dismissed outright by 

the Court pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6), rather than being referred 

to arbitration. Id. at 14. 

However, Fannie Mae's Dispute Resolution Policy expressly 

provides that claims brought under the FMLA (and by logical 

extension, the DCFMLA) are subject to arbitration. See Policy § 

2 ("For example, claims asserting rights protected by the . 

Family and Medical Leave Act would be covered by the Policy."). 

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The Policy also states that "[i]f [Fannie Mae] contends that [a] 

claim was not made within the time limit [set by law for 

bringing suit on that claim in court] the arbitrator may be 

requested to decide the issue before any hearing on the 

substance of the claim." Policy § 6 (emphasis added) . The 

Policy further contemplates that if Fannie Mae "assert [s] that 

the employee's claim is barred because it does not involve a 

legally-protected right, the arbitrator may be requested 

to rule on this issue as a preliminary matter before conducting 

a hearing on the substance of the ~mployee's claim." Policy § 2 

(emphasis added) . 

Thus, it is perfectly clear that the arbitration agreement 

commits the resolution of Fannie Mae's defenses under Rule 

12(b)(6) to the arbitrator, not the court. 6 "By its terms the 

[FAA] leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a 

district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall 

direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to 

which an arbitration agreement has been signed." Dean Witter 

6 Even if the Dispute Resolution Policy was silent on this 

issue, judicial precedent also supports the referral of Fannie 

Mae's Rule 12(b) (6) defenses to arbitration. See Howsam v. Dean 

Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) ("' [P]rocedural 

questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final 

disposition' are presumptively not for the judge, but for an 

arbitrator, to decide.") (emphasis in original) (citing John 

Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964)). 

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Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985) (emphasis in 

original) (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4); see also Nat'l R.R. 

Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 850 F.2d 756, 759 (D.C. 

Cir. 1988) ("It is a necessary corollary of the principle that 

'arbitration is a matter of contract' that when the parties have 

provided that a particular type of dispute should be settled in 

arbitration, rather than in litigation, a court may not override 

that agreement by itself deciding such a dispute.") (emphasis in 

original) . 

Moreover, although parties may waive their right to 

arbitration by acting "'inconsistently with the arbitration 

right,'" Khan v. Parsons Global Servs., Ltd., 521 F.3d 421, 425 

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted), Fannie Mae has made clear 

that, notwithstanding its request for dismissal of the FMLA and 

DCFMLA claims under Rule 12(b) (6), it is not waiving its right 

to arbitrate those claims. See Def.'s Mem. P & A at 14 ("If 

th[e] court . does not dismiss [the FMLA and DCFMLA claims] , 

then [they] must be compelled to arbitration for further 

proceedings inasmuch as the claims at issue fall 

squarely within the agreement to arbitrate [.] "); Def. 's Reply 

Br. at 5 ("Any Surviving Claims 

Arbitration"). 

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Should be Sent to 
Accordingly, the Court will enforce the arbitration clause 

in its entirety, deny Fannie Mae's Rule 12(b) (6) Motion without 

prejudice, and refer the Rule 12(b) (6) issues to arbitration. 

C. The Case Will Be Stayed 

The FAA provides that when the court is satisfied that the 

issues before it are subject to arbitration, the court shall 

"stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been 

had in accordance with the terms of the agreement [ . ] " 9 u.s.c. 

§ 3. Accordingly, this action will be stayed pending conclusion 

of arbitration. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Fannie Mae's motion to compel 

arbitration is GRANTED, and its motion to dismiss pursuant to 

Rule 12 (b) (6) is DENIED without prejudice to renewal in 

arbitration. An Order shall accompany this Memorandum Opinion. 

May 8, 2013 

Gladys 

/s;{i'~~ K~1 

United States District Judge 

Copies to: attorneys on record via ECF 

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