IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

DERRICK R. WOODS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 2:13-CV-455

)

SHERIFF, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Petition under 28

U.S.C. Paragraph 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Derrick R.

Woods on December 9, 2013. For the reasons set forth below, the

petition (DE #1) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

DISCUSSION

Derrick R. Woods, a pro se prisoner, is attempting to avoid

being prosecuted by the State of Indiana for Dealing in Cocaine or

Other Narcotic Drug. “Ordinarily the attempt of a state prisoner to

obtain federal habeas corpus relief in advance of his state

criminal trial [is] completely hopeless.” United States ex rel.

Stevens v. Circuit Court of Milwaukee County, 675 F.2d 946, 947

(7th Cir. 1982). This is one of those ordinary cases. Though the

circuit in Stevens provided for a narrow exception to entertain

some double jeopardy claims, this case does not present a double

jeopardy claim.
[T]he relief he is seeking in this habeas corpus

proceeding is . . . to enjoin his state criminal trial.

So far as that objective is concerned it is immaterial

whether he is in custody pursuant to a previous

conviction, out on bond, or entirely at liberty while

awaiting trial. The relief he is seeking, though within

the broad remedial powers granted federal judges by the

habeas corpus statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 2243; cf. 28

U.S.C. § 2251 (stay of state-court proceedings), is

remote from the original purpose of habeas corpus-release

from unlawful incarceration. In addition, it violates the

principle of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 as construed in Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669

(1971), that federal courts do not lightly enjoin state

criminal proceedings.

Id.

Younger v. Harris teaches that federal courts should be

slow to enjoin state criminal proceedings. Against this

must be set the policy of effective enforcement of the

rights conferred by the double jeopardy clause. We think

the Younger policy is the weightier when the defendant is

not being asked to undergo a second trial. This

conclusion does not leave the defendant without remedy.

Stevens had available to him, and invoked, pretrial

remedies in the state courts, which rejected his double

jeopardy argument after considering it on the merits. We

do not think he was entitled to more . . ..

Id. at 949. 

So too in this case. To the extent that Woods believes that he

has a viable defense to the charges against him or that his case is

not being properly adjudicated, he can present those claims to the

State courts. 

In addition, Woods is attempting to challenge the revocation

of his bail. However, he has not yet presented this claim to the

Indiana Supreme Court as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). As

stated in the petition, Woods has not exhausted the remedies

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available to him by presenting this claim (or any other claim) to

the Indiana Supreme Court. Such a remedy exists and it is effective

as demonstrated in Vacendak v. State, 302 N.E. 2d 779 (Ind. 1973)

where the Indiana Supreme Court remanded a state habeas corpus

proceeding and ordered a bail hearing. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the petition (DE #1) is

DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

DATED: December 12, 2013 /s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United State District Court

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