IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

FORT WAYNE DIVISION 

KENNETH R. NUCKOLS ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

vs. ) NO. 1:13-CV-267 

 ) 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ) 

COMMISSIONER OF THE ) 

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION ) 

 ) 

Defendant. ) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 This matter is before the Court for review of the 

Commissioner of Social Security’s decision denying Disability 

Insurance Benefits to Plaintiff, Kenneth R. Nuckols. For the 

reasons set forth below, the decision of the Commissioner is 

REVERSED and this case is REMANDED to the Social Security 

Administration for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. section 405(g). 

BACKGROUND 

 On October 22, 2010, the Plaintiff, Kenneth Nuckols, filed 

an application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). 

Nuckols alleged that his disability began on August 8, 2009, due 

to a fractured back (requiring spinal fusion), a titanium rod 

that ran from his knee to his ankle, sleep apnea, emphysema, 

left shoulder problems, and high blood pressure. (Tr. 20, 181). 
-2- 

The Social Security Administration denied his initial 

application and also denied his claims on reconsideration. On 

March 16, 2012, the Plaintiff appeared with counsel, Mark Mora, 

at an administrative hearing before Administrative Law Judge 

(“ALJ”) Warnecke Miller (“Miller”). (Tr. 35-70). Testimony was 

provided by Nuckols and Marie Kieffer (a vocational expert or 

“VE”). (Tr. 35-70). On June 6, 2012, ALJ Miller denied the 

claimant’s DIB claim, finding that Nuckols was not disabled 

because he could perform a significant number of jobs in the 

national economy, despite his limitations. (Tr. 20-29). 

 On June 29, 2012, Nuckols requested that the Appeals 

Council review the ALJ’s decision and the request was denied on 

July 19, 2013. (Tr. 1). Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision became 

the Commissioner’s final decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 

422.210(a)(2005). The claimant has initiated the instant action 

for judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

DISCUSSION 

 Nuckols was born on October 10, 1958. (Tr. 27). Nuckols 

alleges the following impairments: fractured back that required 

spinal fusion, titanium rod from knee to ankle, sleep apnea, 

emphysema, left shoulder problems, and high blood pressure. 

(Tr. 181). Nuckols has at least a high school education and is 
-3- 

able to communicate in English. (Tr. 28). In the past fifteen 

years, Nuckols has worked as a metal products fabricator. (Tr. 

27, 42-44). 

 The medical evidence1

 can be summarized as follows: 

Lumbar Spine 

Prior to his alleged onset date of August 8, 2009, Nuckols’ 

primary care physician, Dr. Thomas M. Lee, on June 16, 2008, 

diagnosed him with degenerative disk disease and degenerative 

joint disease and noted that the pain medication Tramadol was 

not working. (Tr. 291). By October 31, 2008, Dr. Lee noted 

increased back pain with right radicular leg pain. (Tr. 289). 

Nuckols worked for the next six months and while working on May 

13, 2009, suffered an injury resulting in severe back pain, 

which led to an emergency room visit. (Tr. 246). 

 Nuckols attempted physical therapy from May 27, 2009, 

through June 3, 2009. (Tr. 247). On July 21, 2009, an MRI of 

the lumbar spine confirmed the following: 

1. Multilevel degenerative lumbar spondylosis [;...] Grade 1 

Spondylolisthesis of L5 on S1; Severe L2-3 disc narrowing 

with mild central canal stenosis. 

2. Large left paracentral T10-T11 disc herniation or spinal 

stenosis and encroachment on the thoracic cord; 

3. Findings suspicious for right lateral L5-S1 disc 

protrusion with encroachment on the right L5-S1 neural 

foramen [...] 

(Tr. 250). 

 

1

 The medical evidence in this case is largely undisputed and the Court has 

therefore relied heavily on the facts as presented in Nuckols’ opening brief, 

supplementing and editing where necessary. 
-4- 

 Dr. Lee prescribed morphine sulfate to address the 

increased pain. (Tr. 289). At the May 8, 2009, August 14, 2009, 

and November 13, 2009, visits, Dr. Lee upgraded Nuckols back 

pain to chronic and continued to refill the morphine sulfate 

prescription. (Tr. 286-88). The morphine was supplemented with 

Tramadol at the August visit. (Tr. 287). On April 9, 2010, his 

neurosurgeon, Dr. Juluis Silvidi, fine-tuned the diagnosis 

(Right L5 radiculopathy with motor and sensory deficit and L5 

spondylosis with spondylolisthesis and right-sided foraminal 

disc protrusion). (Tr. 267). Then Dr. Silvidi performed an L5 

Gill laminectomy with L5-S1 spinal fusion on April 9, 2010 (Tr. 

302-304). On July 31, 2010, Dr. Silvidi released him back to 

work, warning him of the potential for L4-L5 deterioration in 

the future. (Tr. 304). Nuckols, at the time, also reported 

relief of right leg pain that was present preoperatively, with 

less residual back pain and had been physical active at home 

involving some tree trimming. Id. 

 In August 2010, Nuckols returned to work but was unable to 

continue after about three weeks due to back pain issues and 

pain medication concerns. (Tr. 56-57). On December 13, 2010, a 

State Agency consultative examiner, Dr. Melanie Gatewood, noted 

that Nuckols had “pulling” back pain during straight-leg-raise 

testing. (Tr. 324). Post-surgery radiographs, taken on 

December 13, 2010, by Dr. Joseph Gaddy, revealed L5-S1 
-5- 

spondylolisthesis, L4-L5 facet arthropathy, discogenic 

degenerative changes with narrowed interspaces at L2-L3, and 

mild dextroscoliosis. (Tr. 328). Dr. Gaddy identified range of 

motion deficits in the lumbar spine in relation to forward 

flexion, extension, and lateral flexion. (Tr. 326). Nuckols 

testified about significant back pain that was aggravated by 

activity, interfered with his sleep and persisted despite 

treatment with pain medication. (Tr. 47-48, 51, 59). The pain 

medication caused nausea and drowsiness, requiring Nuckols to 

take naps and to limit head movement during periods of nausea. 

(Tr. 61). 

 In May 2011, Nuckols sought emergency room treatment for 

right foot pain after falling off his motorcycle. He was 

described as alert, oriented, and cooperative and exhibiting 

appropriate mood and affect. (Tr. 351-67). 

Thoracic Spine and Cervical Spine 

Nuckols also testified that he suffered from mid-back pain. 

(Tr. 47). The MRI taken on July 21, 2009, identified a large 

left paracentral T10-T11 disc herniation or spinal stenosis and 

encroachment on the thoracic cord. (Tr. 250). These thoracic 

spine problems have not been surgically addressed, but Dr. 

Silvidi emphasized their seriousness by assigning a whole person 

permanent partial impairment rating of 8% according to the AMA 
-6- 

Guidelines. (Tr. 303). On examination December 13, 2010, the 

examining physician identified range of motion deficits in the 

cervical spine in relation to flexion, extension, and lateral 

flexion. (Tr. 326). 

Shoulders 

Nuckols described left shoulder problems that originated 

from an old motorcycle accident, causing his shoulder to pop out 

of socket and cause intense pain (Tr. 55-56). Despite the 

persistence of this problem over the years, Nuckols continued to 

work. Id. Dr. Gaddy, the State Agency consultative examiner, 

identified range of motion deficits in the left shoulder in 

relation to abduction, forward elevation, and internal rotation. 

(Tr. 326). Dr. Gaddy also identified right shoulder deficits 

in internal rotation. Id. Radiographs confirmed left 

acromioclavicular (“AC”) joint anthropathy. (Tr. 327). 

Lower Extremity (Unrelated to Lumbar Spine) 

Nuckols has chronic leg pain secondary to fracture repair 

with an intramedullary titanium rod from knee to ankle. (Tr. 

181, 243). 
-7- 

Other Medical 

Nuckols has also suffered from other medical problems. Dr. 

Lee diagnosed him with anxiety that is treated with Diazepam. 

(Tr. 390, 291). Dr. Lee also diagnosed him with long-term 

hypertension and prescribed Lisinopril. (Tr. 385; 390). Dr. 

Helen A. Borgenheimer diagnosed him with bilateral otitis media 

in January of 2012, and prescribed him antibiotics. (Tr. 413). 

Finally, he was treated for sleep apnea with uvulopalatoplasty. 

(Tr. 243). 

Nuckols’ Testimony 

 Nuckols testified that he suffers from constant back pain 

at a level “7” or “8” that is of cramping nature and feels like 

a dull knife is being stuck into his back. (Tr. 47). Nuckols 

stated that when he was trying to work, he was taking two pain 

pills per hour.2

 (Id.). He has taken Tramadol, Diazepam, and 

Tylenol Arthritis on an ongoing basis. (Tr. 47-48). Nuckols is 

allergic to most pain medications and has tried therapy where he 

 

2

 The Court notes that Nuckols’ testimony makes clear that this was not an 

ongoing circumstance, but the result of an attempt to work despite his pain. 

Both the ALJ’s opinion (Tr. 25) and the Commissioner’s brief (DE #24 at 7) 

state that he was taking two pain pills per hour without making the important 

clarification that this occurred for only a very brief period of time as a 

result of an attempt to return to work. (Tr. 47). In explaining why he 

cannot work, Nuckols stated in part: 

The pain. The pain pills. Nobody is going to let me 

work all day with eating pain pills all day to get 

through. ...I tried [to work], I tried, but it just 

wouldn’t work. I couldn’t do it. I was eating two 

pain pills an hour and that’s way too much. 

(Tr. 47). 
-8- 

was taught mind games to move his pain to another part of his 

body. (Tr. 48). He lies in a bed or recliner during the day 

and he naps during the day. (Tr. 49). When napping he claims 

that he must use a special wedge-shaped pillow. (Tr. 58). 

Nuckols also stated that his left arm pops out of the socket. 

(Tr. 55). He also claims that he is only able to stand for ten 

to fifteen minutes at a time, sit for twenty to thirty minutes 

at a time and can only lift twenty to forty pounds and walk just 

five blocks at a time. (Tr. 55-59, 62). He also stated that he 

can only drive short distances because he needs to stretch his 

back and that he wears a back brace. (Tr. 60). 

 Nuckols further testified that he has lung problems that 

cause him to experience shortness of breath. (Tr. 62). He also 

claims that his pain medication makes him nauseous. (Tr. 61). 

Nuckols continued by stating he could only hold his thirty-five 

pound granddaughter for five to ten minutes at a time. (Tr. 59) 

He further stated that it takes him over two hours to mow the 

lawn where it used to take him forty-five minutes, and after 

mowing he has to stay in bed for at least a day. (Id.). 

 Nuckols testified that recently he has been suffering from 

chronic earaches and sinusitis, which makes him nauseated and 

dizzy, that may make it so that he needs tubes inserted into his 

ears. (Tr. 40). Nuckols stated that prior to the hearing he 

could not afford to see a doctor for his back. (Tr. 236). He 
-9- 

also complained of headaches and not being able to play ball 

with his grandchildren. (Tr. 51, 221). Nuckols says he has 

sleep apnea and left shoulder problems and that he suffers from 

high blood pressure. (Tr. 181). Prior to the hearing he stated 

that he had trouble putting his pants on, difficulty bending and 

cannot always finish what he starts. (Tr. 192-95). He has 

difficulty squatting, kneeling and climbing stairs. (Tr. 196). 

 Nuckols daughter, Ms. Dodds also stated prior to the 

hearing that Nuckols has difficulty sleeping, mows sometimes but 

takes a lot of breaks and walks like an old grandpa. (Tr. 201- 

05). Ms. Dodds further stated that Nuckols has difficulty 

lifting, squatting, bending, standing, reaching, walking, 

sitting, kneeling, and climbing stairs. (Tr. 205). 

Review of Commissioner’s Decision 

 This Court has authority to review the Commissioner’s 

decision to deny social security benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any 

fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be 

conclusive . . . .” Id. Substantial evidence is defined as 

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 

U.S. 389, 401 (1971)(quotation omitted). In determining whether 

substantial evidence exists, the Court shall examine the record 
-10-

in its entirety, but shall not substitute its own opinion for 

the ALJ’s by reconsidering the facts or reweighing the evidence. 

Jens v. Barnhart, 347 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 2003). With that 

in mind, however, this Court reviews the ALJ’s findings of law 

de novo and if the ALJ makes an error of law, the Court “may 

reverse without regard to the volume of evidence in support of 

the factual findings.” White v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 369, 373 (7th 

Cir. 1999). 

 As a threshold matter, for a claimant to be eligible for 

benefits under the Social Security Act, the claimant must 

establish that he is disabled. To qualify as being disabled, the 

claimant must be unable “to engage in any substantial gainful 

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or 

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous 

period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 

423(d)(1)(A) and 1382(a)(1). To determine whether a claimant 

has satisfied this statutory definition, the ALJ performs a 

five-step evaluation: 

Step 1: Is the claimant performing 

substantial gainful activity: If yes, the 

claim is disallowed; if no, the inquiry 

proceeds to step 2. 

 Step 2: Is the claimant’s impairment or 

combination of impairments “severe” and 

expected to last at least twelve months? If 

not, the claim is disallowed; if yes, the 
-11-

inquiry proceeds to step 3. 

 Step 3: Does the claimant have an 

impairment or combination of impairments 

that meets or equals the severity of an 

impairment in the SSA’s Listing of 

Impairments, as described in 20 C.F.R. § 404 

Subpt. P, App. 1? If yes, then claimant is 

automatically disabled; if not, then the 

inquiry proceeds to step 4. 

 Step 4: Is the claimant able to perform 

his past relevant work? If yes, the claim is 

denied; if no, the inquiry proceeds to step 

5, where the burden of proof shifts to the 

Commissioner. 

 Step 5: Is the claimant able to perform 

any other work within his residual 

functional capacity in the national economy: 

If yes, the claim is denied; if no, the 

claimant is disabled. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v) and 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); see 

also Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 n. 8 (7th Cir. 1994). 

 In this case, the ALJ found that Nuckols suffered from the 

following severe impairments: chronic back pain from spinal 

fusion, emphysema, obesity, and chronic left shoulder pain. 

(Tr. 22). The ALJ also found that Nuckols does have a medically 

determinable mental impairment, anxiety, but his anxiety does 

not significantly limit his ability to perform basic workrelated activities. (Tr. 23). The ALJ found that Nuckols was 

at most, only mildly limited by his mental impairment in his 

ability to perform activities of daily living, maintain social 

functioning, and sustain concentration, persistence, or pace. 

(Tr. 24). 
-12-

 The ALJ found that Nuckols does not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the 

severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 

404.1526). Id. The ALJ found that Nuckols has the residual 

functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work as defined in 

20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) but with the following additional 

limitations: only occasionally able to push and pull, as well as 

reach overhead, with his left upper extremity; cannot climb 

ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and he can only occasionally climb 

ramps and stairs; can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, 

crouch, and crawl; must avoid concentrated exposure to pulmonary 

irritants such as fumes, odors, dust, gases, poorly ventilated 

areas, and chemicals. (Tr. at 24). After considering Nuckols’ 

age, education, work experience and RFC, the ALJ relied upon the 

testimony of a VE and concluded that Nuckols was not disabled 

and not entitled to DIB because he is capable of making a 

successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant 

numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 29). Thus, Nuckols’ claim 

failed at step five of the evaluation process. 

 Nuckols believes the ALJ’s opinion demonstrates that the 

ALJ committed several errors requiring reversal. Nuckols 

asserts that the ALJ’s credibility determination is inadequate 

because it contravenes the direction of the Seventh Circuit 
-13-

Court of Appeals in that the ALJ utilized disapproved 

boilerplate without identifying and analyzing specific material 

statements or testimony in relation to credibility. (DE #19 at 

12). Nuckols also alleges the ALJ erred by overemphasizing daily 

activities. Id. Nuckols further alleges that the ALJ failed to 

consider his consistent and arduous work history in determining 

his credibility. Id. Additionally, Nuckols alleges that it was 

an error not to incorporate the limiting effects related to the 

thoracic spine, cervical spine range of motion deficits, 

internal rotation deficit of the right shoulder, and internal 

rotation deficit of the left shoulder into the RFC, and that it 

was an error not to consider the combined impact of all 

impairments. Id. Finally, Nuckols alleges that the ALJ erred 

by failing to award at least a period of disability and by 

failing to provide a meaningful explanation for the conclusion 

that there has been no twelve-month period in which Nuckols has 

been unable to sustain full time work. Id. As a result of 

these errors, Nuckols asserts that the ALJ’s opinion should be 

reversed he should be awarded past-due and future disability 

insurance benefits and Medicare benefits. Id. In the 

alternative, Nuckols requests that this cause be remanded so 

that a new hearing can be held. Id. 
-14-

The ALJ’s Credibility Determination 

 Nuckols claims that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the 

credibility of his testimony by employing disapproved 

boilerplate language without identifying and analyzing specific 

material statements or testimony and overemphasized Nuckols 

testimony concerning daily activity. (DE #19 at 15-17). 

Because the ALJ is best positioned to judge a claimant’s 

truthfulness, this Court will overturn an ALJ’s credibility 

determination only if it is patently wrong. Skarbek v. 

Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 504 (7th Cir. 2004). “It is only when 

the ALJ’s determination lacks any explanation or support that [a 

court] will declare it to be ‘patently wrong.’” Elder v. Astrue, 

529 F.3d 408, 413-14 (7th Cir. 2008)(citing Jens v. Barnhart, 

347 F.3d 209, 213 (7th Cir. 2003)). However, when a claimant 

produces medical evidence of an underlying impairment, the ALJ 

may not ignore subjective complaints solely because they are 

unsupported by objective evidence. Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 

F.3d 737, 745-47 (7th Cir. 2005). Instead, the ALJ must make a 

credibility determination supported by record evidence and be 

sufficiently specific to make clear to the claimant and to any 

subsequent reviewers the weight given to the claimant’s 

statements and the reasons for that weight. Lopez v. Barnhart, 

336 F.3d 535, 539-40 (7th Cir. 2003)(emphasis added). 
-15-

 In evaluating the credibility of statements supporting a 

Social Security Application, the Seventh Circuit Court of 

Appeals has noted that an ALJ must comply with the requirements 

of Social Security Ruling 96-7p. Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 

936, 942 (7th Cir. 2002). This ruling requires that ALJs 

articulate “specific reasons” behind credibility evaluations; 

the ALJ cannot merely state that “the individual’s allegations 

have been considered” or that “the allegations are (or are not) 

credible.” SSR 96-7p. Furthermore, the ALJ must consider 

specific factors when assessing the credibility of an 

individual’s statement including: 

 1. The individual’s daily activities; 

 2. The location, duration, frequency and intensity of the 

individual’s pain or other symptoms; 

 3. Factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; 

 4. The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of 

any medications the individual takes or has taken to 

alleviate pain or other symptoms; 

 5. Treatment, other than medication, the individual 

receives or has received for relief of pain or other 

symptoms; 

 6. Any measures other than treatment the individual uses 

or has used to relieve pain or other symptoms; and 

 7. Any other factors concerning the individual’s 

functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or 

other symptoms. 

SSR 96-7p; see also Golembiewski v. Barnhart, 322 F.3d 912, 915-

16 (7th Cir. 2003). 
-16-

 As noted earlier, Nuckols is critical of the ALJ’s 

credibility determination because the ALJ relies on 

“boilerplate” language that has been criticized by the Court of 

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See Shauger v. Astrue, 675 

F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 2012); Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 

645 (7th Cir. 2012). The ALJ stated the following regarding 

Nuckols’ credibility: 

After careful consideration of the evidence, 

the undersigned finds that the claimant’s 

medically determinable impairments could 

reasonably be expected to cause the alleged 

symptoms; however, the statements made by 

the claimant and Ms. Dodds concerning the 

intensity, persistence and limiting effects 

of these symptoms are not credible to the 

extent they are inconsistent with the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity. 

(Tr. 26). In Bjornson, the Seventh Circuit noted: 

One problem with the boilerplate is that the 

assessment of the claimant’s “residual 

functional capacity” (the bureaucratic term 

for ability to work) comes later in the 

administrative law judge’s opinion, not 

“above” – above is just the foreshadowed 

conclusion of that later assessment. A 

deeper problem is that the assessment of a 

claimant’s ability to work will often . . . 

depend heavily on the credibility of her 

statements concerning the “intensity, 

persistence and limiting effects” of her 

symptoms, but the passage implies that 

ability to work is determined first and is 

then used to determine the claimant’s 

credibility. That gets things backwards. 

671 F.3d at 645. Yet, as noted by the Court in Adams v. Astrue, 
-17-

While this sort of boilerplate is 

inadequate, by itself, to support a 

credibility finding, its use, does not make 

a credibility determination invalid. Not 

supporting a credibility determination with 

explanation and evidence from the record 

does. 

880 F. Supp. 2d 895, 906 (N.D. Ill. 2012)(emphasis in original) 

(citations omitted). In Adams, the ALJ’s decision did not use 

the boilerplate language in a mechanical fashion, and the ALJ 

offered further explanation to support his conclusion that 

plaintiff’s claimed limitations were not supported by the record 

as a whole. Id. at 906-08. Accordingly, the Court determined 

that reversal was not warranted. 

 In this case, the ALJ considered some of the factors listed 

in SSR 96-7p. The ALJ discussed Nuckols’ activities of daily 

living at length. He considered the treatment Nuckols received 

and the medication he takes. But, as well as not discussing a 

few of the factors, the ALJ provided very little explanation of 

what it was about these considerations that caused the ALJ to 

believe that Nuckols was less than fully credible. The ALJ did 

not make the necessary connections between the facts and his 

credibility determination. The ALJ stated that: 

The residual functional capacity assessment 

is essentially consistent with (although 

slightly more restrictive than) the State 

Agency assessment that the claimant was able 

to perform light work that did not involve 

more than occasional climbing balancing, 

stooping, kneeling, crouching, or crawling 
-18-

(Ex. 16F, 19F). There is no medical opinion 

of record to support a more restrictive 

assessment of the claimant’s residual 

functional capacity than acknowledged by the 

undersigned or that fully corroborate the 

allegations made by the claimant and his 

daughter regarding his physical condition. 

The claimant’s activities also do not 

support a more restrictive assessment of his 

residual functional capacity or fully 

corroborate the aforementioned allegations 

made by the claimant and Ms. Dodds. The 

record reflects that the claimant is able to 

prepare simple meals, do some cleaning and 

laundry, watch news on the television, 

listen to music, drive, care for his 

personal needs independently, shop for 

groceries when he has money, and watch his 

grandchildren play ball at their games. He 

also stated that he sometimes went out to 

eat with his friends. The claimant’s 

daughter, Ms. Dodds, reported that he was 

able to ride his motorcycle (although not as 

long as he used to (Ex. 5E, 6E, claimant’s 

testimony). 

(Tr. 26). 

Here, the ALJ just used a recitation of daily activities as 

the basis for the credibility assessment as well as reciting 

some of the findings from the State Agency assessment. However, 

the ALJ’s recitation of daily activities is insufficient. In

Bjornson, the Court stated: 

The critical differences between activities 

of daily living and activities in a fulltime job are that a person has more 

flexibility in scheduling the former than 

the latter, can get help from other 

persons . . ., and is not held to a minimum 

standard of performance, as she would be by 

an employer. The failure to recognize these 
-19-

differences is a recurrent, and deplorable, 

feature of opinions by administrative law 

judges in social security disability cases. 

671 F.3d at 647. In this case, the ALJ did not take into 

account Nuckols’ statements about the need for rest after short 

periods of any activity, how physical activities aggravate pain 

which then lead to taking more pain medication, which makes him 

nauseous and drowsy. There was no connection to how the 

ability to perform minor daily activities can translate into the 

ability to sustain light work on a regular and continuous basis. 

The mere recitation of daily activities without more provides no 

meaningful basis for review and does not satisfy the 

requirements of the Bjornson line of cases. 

 The ALJ did not make the necessary connections between the 

facts and his credibility determination. See Villano v. Astrue, 

556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2009) (where an ALJ failed to 

analyze the factors set forth in SSR 96-7p, the ALJ did not 

build a logical bridge between the evidence and his conclusion 

that the claimant’s testimony was not credible). The VE 

testified, in regards to the amount of breaks Nuckols claims he 

needs and days off he would need, that the claimant would not be 

able to perform any of the jobs the VE listed with his 

restrictions even at a light level. (Tr. 68-69). The ALJ 

considered symptoms and the extent that the symptoms can 

reasonably be accepted as consistent with objective medical 
-20-

evidence and other evidence based on the requirements of 20 

C.F.R. 404.1529 and SSR 96-4p and 96-7p. However, in 

acknowledging this the ALJ did not explain how the record 

evidence undermined those allegations. The ALJ did point out 

that: 

Following his lumbar spine surgery, the 

claimant reported improvement in his back 

and leg pain to Dr. Silvedi. In July 2010, 

he told Dr. Silvedi that he was physically 

active at home involving tree trimming. Dr. 

Silvedi released the claimant to return to 

work without restrictions as of July 31, 

2010 (Ex. 11F), which was less than twelve 

full months since the alleged onset date. 

Dr. Silvedi subsequently gave the claimant a 

34% ppi rating (Ex. 11F). 

(Tr. 27). The ALJ needs to make a link between these facts and 

Nuckols’ credibility or it is irrelevant to this Court’s review 

of the credibility decision. Because the ALJ failed to build a 

logical bridge between the evidence and his determination that 

the claimant’s testimony was not credible, remand is required. 

Work History Consideration 

 Nuckols argues that the ALJ did not even discuss his 

consistent and arduous work history in determining credibility. 

(DE #19 at 17). A claimant with good work record is entitled to 

substantial credibility when claiming an inability to work 

because of a disability. Porter v. Chater, 921 F. Supp. 89, 90 

(D. Conn. 1996) (citing Rivera v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 719, 725 
-21-

(2d Cir. 1983). The ALJ is not required to discuss every piece 

of evidence but is required to build a logical bridge from the 

evidence to her conclusions. Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 

516 (7th Cir. 2009). Here as determined above, the ALJ did not 

build a logical bridge between the evidence and his 

determination that Nuckols’ testimony was not credible. Nuckols 

work history provides some support for a finding that claimant 

is credible and was discussed extensively at the hearing, but 

was not even mentioned in the decision. On remand, the ALJ 

should give consideration to Nuckols’ work history upon 

revisiting the issue of credibility. 

Nuckols’ Remaining Arguments 

 Having found remand necessary on the basis of the ALJ’s 

inadequate credibility findings, this Court finds no compelling 

reason to address Nuckols’ remaining arguments in detail. This 

Court has considered Nuckols’ request that this Court award 

benefits rather than remand the case for additional proceedings 

but finds remand more appropriate here. This Court makes no 

findings regarding the merits of Nuckols’ DIB claim. On remand, 

the ALJ should consider all of the evidence in the record, and, 

if necessary, give the parties the opportunity to expand the 

record so that the ALJ may build a logical bridge between the 

evidence and his conclusions. 
-22-

 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, the Commissioner of Social 

Security’s final decision is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED 

for proceedings consistent with this opinion pursuant to 

sentence four of 42 U.S.C. section 405(g). 

DATED: March 31, 2015 /s/ Rudy Lozano, Judge 

 United States District Court