[J-99-2013] 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

MIDDLE DISTRICT 

CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, STEVENS, JJ. 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee 

 v. 

FRED CHARLES MORAN, 

 Appellant 

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No. 39 MAP 2011 

Appeal from the order of Superior Court 

dated 08-16-2010 at No. 2281 EDA 2008, 

reconsideration denied 10-13-2010, 

affirming the judgment of sentence of 

Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, 

Criminal Division, dated 3-17-2008 at No. 

CP-23-CR-0004579-2007 

ARGUED: May 9, 2012 

SUBMITTED: December 17, 2013 

OPINION 

MR. JUSTICE EAKIN DECIDED: November 20, 2014

This appeal by Fred Charles Moran challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in 

support of his conviction for bribery in official and political matters, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4701. It 

also raises the question of whether this is a strict liability crime, and if not, requires us to 

determine the appropriate mens rea for such offense. We hold § 4701 is not a strict 

liability crime; the mens rea for this offense is the Crimes Code’s “default” culpability 

provision, id., § 302(c). As such, there was sufficient evidence to support appellant’s 

conviction. We further hold that while the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury 

regarding intent, such error was harmless here. Accordingly, we affirm. 

In 2003, appellant was an elected member of the Board of Commissioners of 

Haverford Township, Delaware County. The board decided to sell a 209-acre parcel of 

land on which the former Haverford State Mental Hospital was located. Appellant and 

Commissioner George Twardy comprised the “liaison committee” authorized to negotiate 
[J-99-2013] - 2 

with potential buyers on behalf of the township. The firm of Goldenberg-Pohlig (GP) 

entered a preliminary sales agreement with the board, pursuant to which GP would pay 

$30.65 million for 61 acres of the parcel, on which it would develop residential properties 

and build six ball fields; GP paid a refundable $5 million deposit to the township. 

In 2004, appellant and Twardy were removed from the liaison committee. One of 

their replacements, Commissioner Andrew Lewis, believed the agreement with GP was 

unworkable; he learned GP intended to develop an additional 15 acres beyond what it 

paid for, and the ball fields could not be constructed due to steep topography. The board 

formally rescinded the prior preliminary sales agreement and authorized the continuation 

of negotiations with GP. 

In November, 2005, the parties reached a new agreement; GP would pay $17 

million for 38 acres, on which it would develop “age-restricted” condominiums and 

carriage houses, along with single-family homes. The parties subsequently verbally 

altered its terms, such that GP would donate an additional $500,000 to the township for 

construction of a nature center or walking trails on the parcel; in exchange, the 

condominiums and carriage houses were more loosely designated as “age-targeted” and 

GP was no longer obligated to construct single-family homes. The board formally 

approved these new terms and authorized preparation of a written final sales agreement. 

On December 19, 2005, the board held a special public meeting to address a 

looming revenue shortfall for the upcoming year. During the meeting, as Lewis recalled 

in his trial testimony, appellant proposed accelerating the collection of real estate taxes as 

a way to raise revenue; particularly, he suggested having GP pre-pay $500,000 of the 

2006 realty taxes on the 38-acre parcel. See N.T. Trial, 11/19/07, at 104. When 

another commissioner asked appellant why GP would consider pre-paying these taxes, 

appellant responded, “[W]ell, maybe they want to accelerate this process, get it moving.” 
[J-99-2013] - 3 

Id. Appellant expressed displeasure with the prospect of budget cuts and stated the 

township “should have income coming in from [the parcel].” Id. Lewis suggested he 

and appellant call a representative of GP so appellant could present his proposal. Id. 

The next day, Lewis and appellant had a phone conversation with Michael Lawry, 

a principal with GP. Lewis informed Lawry the board was addressing a budgetary 

shortfall and told him appellant had a proposal. Appellant then said to Lawry, “[C]all it 

extortion, call it what you will. We need $500,000, and we’ll accelerate the zoning. 

We’ll get you the zoning approvals you need and accelerate the process.” Id., at 112. 

Lewis recalled Lawry asked whether the $500,000 was included in the $17.5 million, and 

appellant indicated it would be added to the purchase price. See N.T. Trial, 11/20/07, at 

93. Lawry responded he was not in a position to answer but would discuss the matter 

with others at GP and get back in touch with appellant and Lewis. A few minutes later, 

Lewis called Lawry back and told him, “I want no part of that conversation. Haverford 

Township is not in the business of selling zoning.” N.T. Trial, 11/19/07, at 113. Lewis 

testified he called appellant the next day and essentially told him the same thing. Id. 

No one from GP took any formal action in response to appellant’s offer, and the 

parcel’s sale price remained unchanged. The parties did not finalize a contract of sale 

until April, 2007, which the board formally approved in May, 2007. 

 In April, 2007, appellant was charged with three counts of bribery, one for each of 

the three subsections of 18 Pa.C.S. § 4701, which provides: 

(a) Offenses defined.--A person is guilty of bribery, a felony of the third 

degree, if he offers, confers or agrees to confer upon another, or solicits, 

accepts or agrees to accept from another: 

(1) any pecuniary benefit as consideration for the decision, 

opinion, recommendation, vote or other exercise of discretion 

as a public servant, party official or voter by the recipient; 
[J-99-2013] - 4 

(2) any benefit as consideration for the decision, vote, 

recommendation or other exercise of official discretion by the 

recipient in a judicial, administrative or legislative proceeding; 

or 

(3) any benefit as consideration for a violation of a known 

legal duty as public servant or party official. 

Id., § 4701(a). 

 At trial, appellant requested the trial court instruct the jury it could convict him only 

upon proof of the mens rea prescribed in 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(c), which provides general 

culpability requirements apply when a criminal statute does not include an explicit mens 

rea.1 The trial court denied appellant’s request, concluding in light of the language of § 

4701 and the compelling evidence of appellant’s intent, an instruction regarding § 302(c) 

was unnecessary. Over appellant’s objection, the trial court gave a jury charge on 

bribery that tracked the language of § 4701(a) and was substantially similar to 

Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Jury Instruction 15.4701B.2 During deliberation, the 

 

1

 Specifically, § 302(c) provides: “When the culpability sufficient to establish a material 

element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person 

acts intentionally, knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto.” Id. (emphasis added). 

2

 The trial court charged the jury: 

Ladies and gentlemen, you’ve been told here, and told again, that the 

Defendant, Fred Moran, has been charged with Bribery. In order to find 

him guilty of this offense[,] you must find the elements have been proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt. First, that the Defendant solicited from 

Michael Lawry the sum of $500,000 as additional payment for the purchase 

of township real estate, and also that the money was solicited as 

consideration for the decision, opinion or recommendation, vote or exercise 

of discretion in land or zoning approvals of the Defendant as a public 

servant. That [sic] is a Haverford Township commissioner. Or, also, the 

Defendant solicit[ed] from Michael Lawry the sum of $500,000 as additional 

payment for the purchase of township real estate, and also that the money 

was solicited as consideration for the decision, vote, recommendation, 

exercise of official discretion in land development and/or zoning approvals 

(continuedK) 
[J-99-2013] - 5 

jury twice requested the trial court repeat the definition of bribery; the trial court reread its 

initial charge both times, and appellant objected each time. The jury convicted appellant 

of all three counts of bribery, and he was sentenced to an aggregate term of six months 

probation and a $10,000 fine. 

 Following the denial of his post-sentence motions, appellant appealed to the 

Superior Court, arguing the evidence was insufficient to establish he acted with the intent 

to gain an unlawful benefit because he would not have received any direct or personal 

benefit from the $500,000 he solicited from GP and Lawry. Appellant further claimed the 

trial court abused its discretion in denying his requested jury charge regarding culpability 

as defined in § 302(c). 

 

(Kcontinued) 

of the Defendant, the administration [sic] or a legislative proceeding. Or 

also the Defendant solicited from Michael Lawry the sum of $500,000 as 

additional payment for the purchase of real estate, and that the money was 

solicited as consideration for a violation by the Defendant of the known legal 

duty as a public servant. Specifically, a Haverford Township 

commissioner. Under Pennsylvania law, a Haverford Township 

commissioner has a duty to faithfully discharge the duties of this office, and 

to refrain from receiving, directly or indirectly, any money or other value [sic] 

thing in the performance or nonperformance of any act or duty. The term 

benefits means a gain, or advantage or anything regarded by the Defendant 

as gain or advantage. The benefit did [not] have to be a direct benefit to 

the Defendant. The term benefit includes a benefit to any other person, 

political party or entity in whose welfare the Defendant was interested. The 

term public servant includes any Haverford Township commissioner. 

Public proceedings and votes on resolutions and ordinances concerning 

land development and zoning are conducted by the Haverford Township 

Board of Commissioners, and are there for [sic] administrative and 

legislative proceedings. If[,] after considering all of the evidence[,] you are 

satisfied that the elements of Bribery have been proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt, then you should find the Defendant guilty of Bribery. 

Otherwise, you must find the Defendant not guilty of this charge. 

N.T. Trial, 11/20/07, at 236-39. 
[J-99-2013] - 6 

 The Superior Court rejected appellant’s sufficiency claim and found no abuse of 

discretion in the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury in conformity with § 302(c). 

Commonwealth v. Moran, 5 A.3d 273, 275 (Pa. Super. 2010). In rejecting appellant’s 

sufficiency claim, the court first noted while § 4701(a)(1) premises a conviction on receipt 

of “pecuniary benefit,” 18 Pa.C.S. § 4701(a)(1), the definition offers no discussion of the 

extent to which a bribe must benefit a defendant directly,3 and “subsections (a)(2) and 

(a)(3) require only a ‘benefit,’ which need not be pecuniary[.]” Moran, at 279. Because 

the definition of “benefit” encompasses indirect gain,4 it was irrelevant that appellant 

would receive no personal enrichment from the transaction he proposed; the court found 

no ambiguity in § 4701 regarding the prohibited conduct or the recipient of the benefit: 

Plainly put, no person in public service may solicit a benefit as a quid pro 

quo for his exercise of the official discretion he holds. Although that 

prohibition extends, as [appellant] concedes, to those who would enrich 

themselves, it extends no less to those who, under color of government 

authority, extract a benefit payable to others. 

Moran, at 280 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, the court concluded appellant’s 

attempt to secure half a million dollars to enrich the township in exchange for his exercise 

of official discretion in expediting the zoning approval for GP fell within the ambit of 

conduct proscribed by § 4701. Id., at 280-81. 

 Turning to the issue of culpability, the court noted the level of intent was arguably 

implicit in the statute; the use of the phrase “solicits, accepts or agrees to accept,” which 

are inherently volitional terms, indicated culpability “depends upon evidence of a 

 

3

 18 Pa.C.S. § 4501 defines “pecuniary benefit” as: “Benefit in the form of money, 

property, commercial interests or anything else the primary significance of which is 

economic gain.” Id. 

4

 18 Pa.C.S. § 4501 defines “benefit” as: “Gain or advantage, or anything regarded by the 

beneficiary as gain or advantage, including benefit to any other person or entity in whose 

welfare he is interested K.” Id. (emphasis added). 
[J-99-2013] - 7 

conscious mind, actively engaged in retaining the prohibited benefit.” Id., at 281. The 

court acknowledged, however, it previously held the bribery statute does not specify the 

required level of culpability, and therefore, § 302(c)’s general culpability standard was the 

applicable mens rea for § 4701. Id., at 281-82 (quoting Commonwealth v. Parmar, 672 

A.2d 314, 318 (Pa. Super. 1996)).5 Thus, the court applied § 302(c)’s measure of 

culpability, as adopted in Parmar, and concluded the “circumstances coupled with 

[appellant]’s own blunt and forceful language ma[d]e his intent abundantly clear” and the 

evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. Moran, at 282. 

 Based on the language appellant used in the conversation and the circumstances 

surrounding it, the court further concluded the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury 

regarding the applicability of § 302(c)’s culpability provision was harmless error. Id., at 

283 (citation omitted). While noting under Parmar, “courts are well-advised to instruct 

the jury in accordance with [§ 302(c)] in prosecutions for bribery[,]” the court held § 4701’s 

language suggested a conviction must be based on evidence of consciously engaging in 

retaining the prohibited benefit; therefore, “[a] level of intent so implied in the substantive 

elements of [§] 4701, which exceeds the threshold enunciated by [§] 302, obviously 

satisfies [§] 302.” Id. Because appellant’s conduct was “flagrantly intentional,” the court 

concluded the absence of an instruction on § 302 did not affect the verdict; the trial court’s 

repeated instructions on the elements of the crime, using both § 4701 (defining bribery) 

and § 4501 (defining benefit), were ample to guide the jury’s deliberation. Id. 

Therefore, any error in refusing to charge the jury specifically on § 302(c)’s mens rea was 

 

5

 On appeal to this Court, the Superior Court’s decision was affirmed by an evenly 

divided Court. Commonwealth v. Parmar, 710 A.2d 1083 (Pa. 1998). The Superior 

Court did not reference or discuss this Court’s Parmar decision. 
[J-99-2013] - 8 

harmless, and appellant was not entitled to a new trial. Id. (citation omitted). 

Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of sentence. 

 Judge Kelly dissented from the conclusion that refusal to instruct on § 302(c)’s 

mens rea was harmless error. Relying on Commonwealth v. Woosnam, 819 A.2d 1198, 

1206-07 (Pa. Super. 2003) (holding failure to instruct jury on 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(4)’s 

mens rea requirement of negligence, as applicable to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3742, was reversible 

error warranting new trial), the dissent noted the jury twice asked the trial court to repeat 

the definition of bribery and appellant’s counsel argued the jury may have been confused 

by the lack of a culpability requirement in the bribery instruction given. Moran, at 284 

(Kelly, J., dissenting). Thus, the dissent could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury regarding § 302(c)’s culpability requirement 

did not contribute to the verdict; Judge Kelly would have remanded for a new trial. Id. 

(citation omitted). 

 We granted allocatur to address the following issues raised by appellant: 

(1) Did the trial judge abuse his discretion in refusing to grant [appellant]’s 

request that the jury be instructed that [appellant] cannot be convicted of 

bribery unless the Commonwealth proves that [appellant] acted with 

criminal intent? Could such an error be harmless in a case where the sole 

issue was whether [appellant] acted with criminal intent? 

(2) Was the evidence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

[appellant] was guilty of bribery under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4701 in the respect that 

there was inadequate proof that [appellant] acted with criminal intent? 

Commonwealth v. Moran, 17 A.3d 918 (Pa. 2011) (per curiam). 

I. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 

We will first address the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the requisite 

intent under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4701. Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient because 

although he “unwisely spoke of expediting the zoning process,” he did not do so with a 
[J-99-2013] - 9 

corrupt intent or the desire to gain an unlawful benefit. Appellant’s Brief, at 8. Appellant 

avers he engaged in no criminal solicitation since he was merely attempting to persuade 

GP to raise the purchase price it would pay for the parcel, and he neither requested nor 

received any personal pecuniary benefit from GP. Appellant discounts the trial court’s 

finding he would have received a benefit in the form of an enhanced political advantage in 

the eyes of township voters, reasoning such “voter reaction analysis” is purely speculative 

and could, in fact, trample on his constitutional rights to free speech and political 

association. Id., at 10-11. 

Appellant posits the Superior Court’s decision will create tremendous uncertainty 

among governmental officials, as well as entities and individuals with legitimate business 

interests before governmental bodies, since it allows any discretionary act by officials in 

exchange for action by an entity or individual, such as having a land developer install a 

park or improvements in exchange for the municipality’s waiver of an ordinance, to result 

in a criminal prosecution for bribery. Appellant asks this Court, as a matter of policy, to 

rule a public official should not be prosecuted for bribery simply because he used his 

public position to enhance the amount of money received by the political entity that 

elected him. Appellant contends the legislature did not enact § 4701 to punish 

aggressive politicians but, rather, to protect the public from elected officials seeking to 

achieve pecuniary or personal gain for themselves or their political allies. 

The Commonwealth responds that, under the plain meaning of § 4701’s language 

and § 4501’s definition of benefit, a person who offers to exercise official discretion in 

exchange for a benefit need not receive the benefit personally to be guilty; in this view, a 

person may be convicted as long as he is interested in promoting the welfare of a 

beneficiary on whose behalf he is soliciting the benefit. The Commonwealth contends 

the evidence proved appellant specifically linked the township’s expeditious zoning 
[J-99-2013] - 10 

approval to the payment of extra monies by GP; the township, an entity in which appellant 

was interested as a politically elected official, a public servant, and a taxpayer, would 

receive an extra $500,000 if appellant’s solicitation was successful. The Commonwealth 

echoes the trial court’s position that appellant would also receive a personal benefit in the 

form of esteem in the eyes of the community and fellow board members, as well as the 

enhancement of future political aspirations. The Commonwealth claims these personal 

rewards comport with § 4501’s definition of benefit, which includes “‘anything regarded by 

the beneficiary as gain or advantage.’” Commonwealth’s Brief, at 25 (emphasis omitted) 

(quoting 18 Pa.C.S. § 4501). 

The Commonwealth additionally maintains appellant’s position would create an 

affirmative “public servant” defense to the crime of bribery, exempting public officials if the 

value they want in return for their action benefits a political entity or the public. The 

Commonwealth argues such a defense would contravene the purpose of the statute, 

which it perceives as the prohibition of “‘selling political endorsement or special 

influence.’” Id., at 27 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 18 Pa.C.S. § 4701 cmt.). The 

Commonwealth finds support for this assertion from the comment to § 240.1 of the Model 

Penal Code (MPC), upon which § 4701 was based,6 which provides, “[P]ayments in 

order K to respond to extortionate threats by public officials are within the prohibition [of 

the bribery statute.]” MPC § 240.1 cmt. The Commonwealth views the exception 

appellant proposes as harmful to the public welfare since it creates the likelihood that 

favorable governmental action could be lawfully conditioned on the payment of money 

into the public treasury; this would present significant constitutional concerns, offending 

 

6

 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 4701 cmt. (specifying that statute was derived from MPC § 240.1). 

Model Penal Code § 240.1 differs only in that its subsection 2 does not cover legislative 

proceedings, as does § 4701(a)(2), and the placement of the word “recipient” is different 

in its subsection 1 than in § 4701(a)(1). 
[J-99-2013] - 11 

principles of equality, impartiality, and integrity, which have been the traditional hallmark 

of governmental decision making. 

Finally, the Commonwealth rejects the notion that appellant should be excused 

simply because he subjectively believed he was acting only to promote the township’s 

best interests. The Commonwealth contends such subjective belief is irrelevant under § 

4701 since the statute does not require proof appellant acted with a corrupt purpose; 

rather, in the Commonwealth’s assessment, all it must demonstrate is “the defendant’s 

intentional, knowing, reckless, or negligent conduct ‘with respect to each material 

element of the offense.’” Commonwealth’s Brief, at 31-32 (quoting 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 302(a)).7 

In his reply brief, appellant disputes the Commonwealth’s assertion that a 

conviction for bribery is proper where the benefits sought are for the public and not an 

individual. Appellant notes the legislature exempted from § 4501’s definition of benefit 

“‘advantages [sic] promised generally to a group or class of voters as a consequence of 

public measures which a candidate engages to support or oppose.’” Appellant’s Reply 

Brief, at 10 (quoting 18 Pa.C.S. § 4501). Appellant suggests “balancing of the 

Township’s budget and the ability to avoid the need for a tax increase certainly fits within 

this category.” Id. Appellant further contends the Commonwealth’s construction of 

benefit disregards the principle that penal statutes are to be strictly construed. Appellant 

points out municipal officials are duty bound “to govern in a manner that maximizes the 

interests, safety and welfare of the public[,]” id., at 11 (citing 53 P.S. § 65607); thus, 

appellant reasons, every discretionary action an elected official takes in furtherance of 

 

7

 Although in this portion of its brief, the Commonwealth seemingly endorses the 

Superior Court’s view, expressed in Parmar, that § 4701 incorporates the default 

culpability requirement of § 302(c), this position is at odds with its argument, infra, which 

rejects the incorporation of § 302(c)’s default culpability requirements into § 4701. 
[J-99-2013] - 12 

this duty may be viewed as enhancing political capital under the Commonwealth’s view, 

constituting conferral of a benefit, and hence criminal liability for the offense of bribery.8

Appellant’s sufficiency challenge is comprised of two basic claims: (1) he lacked 

the criminal intent required by § 4701 to be convicted of bribery since he did not act with 

corrupt motive in seeking to obtain extra money for the township in the sale of the parcel; 

and (2) the $500,000 increase in the purchase price did not constitute a benefit within the 

meaning of § 4501, since it would not have been received by him personally, but would 

instead have gone to the township. 

Disposition of appellant’s claims requires us to interpret §§ 4501 and 4701 to 

determine whether corrupt motive and personal benefit are required to sustain a bribery 

 

8 The Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Risk Management Association and the 

Pennsylvania State Association of Boroughs (amici) have filed an amicus brief on behalf 

of appellant, challenging the Superior Court’s statement that “‘no person in public service 

may solicit a benefit as a quid pro quo for his exercise of the official discretion he holds.’” 

Amicus Brief, at 13 (quoting Moran, at 280). Amici contend this is an overly broad 

interpretation of § 4701, and echo appellant’s claim this violates the principle of strict 

construction of criminal statutes. Amici further contend that, if the Superior Court’s 

decision is left to stand, it “would improperly criminalize legitimate negotiation, 

deliberation and decision-making by local governmental officials.” Id. They argue the 

term “interested” as used in § 4501’s definition of benefit — “any other person or entity in 

whose welfare [the beneficiary] is interested” — should be construed to mean a benefit 

provided to third parties or businesses in which a public official or a member of the 

official’s family has an interest. They contend this interpretation is consonant with the 

definition of “conflict of interest” contained in the State Ethics Act, see 65 Pa.C.S. § 1102, 

which amici aver should be read in para materia with the bribery statute. 

Amici also discuss general due process principles, noting a criminal statute that is 

not sufficiently definite in its terms and does not give persons of ordinary intelligence fair 

warning may be void for vagueness; amici seemingly suggest the Superior Court’s 

interpretation of the bribery statute may implicate these concerns. Appellant alludes to 

this concern as well. See Appellant’s Reply Brief, at 13. However, since appellant 

failed to raise any constitutional challenge to § 4701 below, we will not address such 

constitutional questions. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (issues not raised in lower court are 

waived and cannot be raised for first time on appeal). 
[J-99-2013] - 13 

conviction under § 4701. “Because statutory interpretation is a question of law, our 

standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. In matters of statutory 

interpretation, the General Assembly’s intent is paramount.” Commonwealth v. Hacker, 

15 A.3d 333, 335 (Pa. 2011) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (citing 1 

Pa.C.S. § 1921(a)). Generally, such “intent is best expressed through the plain 

language of the statute.” Commonwealth v. Hart, 28 A.3d 898, 908 (Pa. 2011) (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[w]hen the words of a statute are clear and 

free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing 

its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). “Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give 

effect to all its provisions.” Id., § 1921(a). In construing or applying a statute’s 

language, we may consult official comments that were published or generally available to 

the legislature prior to the statute’s enactment, to the extent such comments are 

consistent with the statute’s text. See id., § 1939. Finally, as §§ 4501 and 4701 are 

penal statutes, they are to be strictly construed, id., § 1928(b)(1), with any ambiguity 

being interpreted in favor of appellant, see Commonwealth v. Clegg, 27 A.3d 1266, 1269 

(Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). However, we are not required to give the words of penal 

statutes their narrowest possible meaning or to disregard their common, approved usage; 

penal statutes are to be read in accordance with the “fair import” of their terms. Hart, at 

908 (citations omitted). 

Turning to appellant’s claim that the Commonwealth was required to prove he 

acted with a corrupt motive, we find no such requirement in § 4701’s language. As 

previously noted, see n.6, supra, § 4701 almost entirely mirrors MPC § 240.1; thus, we 

consider the official comments to § 240.1, which had existed for nearly a decade at the 

time the legislature drafted § 4701. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1939. 
[J-99-2013] - 14 

The early version of § 240.1 originally defined bribery as the purposeful attempt to 

“influence corruptly” a public official. MPC § 208.10(1)(a) (Tentative Draft No. 8 1958). 

However, the comments to the final version of § 240.1 indicate the term “corruptly” was 

not included in the final version because the drafters believed this would obscure the 

section’s scope of coverage — for example, by incorrectly suggesting one who justifies 

his conduct by claiming he only sought to counter opposing offers or to influence an 

official into making the right decision would not be guilty of bribery. See MPC § 240.1 

cmt. at 196 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Thus, because our General Assembly chose 

to adopt the MPC’s formulation of bribery, which specifically deleted the limiting term 

“corruptly,” we may presume the legislature endorsed the MPC’s dispensation with the 

requirement of corrupt motive as an element of bribery. Since the legislature has chosen 

not to include such requirement, we will not rewrite § 4701 to supply it. See 

Commonwealth v. Mazzetti, 44 A.3d 58, 67 (Pa. 2012) (“This Court may not supply 

omissions in a statute, especially where it appears that the matter may have been 

intentionally omitted.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we 

reject appellant’s contention that his bribery conviction cannot be sustained because he 

lacked a corrupt motive.9 

Regarding appellant’s contention that he did not solicit a pecuniary or other benefit 

within the meaning of § 4501 because the money he solicited was to be paid to the 

township, not to him personally, the lower courts recognized § 4501 defines “benefit” 

 

9

 Appellant’s argument that he lacked corrupt motive loses much of its force when one 

considers his comment during the conversation — “[C]all it extortion, call it what you will.” 

N.T. Trial, 11/19/07, at 112. A public official’s offer to trade special treatment for money 

may be considered inherently corrupt, and appellant’s words bespeak clear awareness of 

the extortionate nature of his solicitation. These words also evoke the unspoken other 

side of the coin — the undeniable implication that if the party solicited does not pay, there 

will be no zoning approval, much less an accelerated process. 
[J-99-2013] - 15 

broadly, so as to include situations where a public servant solicits money, gain, or 

advantage for “any other person or entity in whose welfare he is interested[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 4501 (emphasis added). The definition covering solicitation on behalf of a third party, 

such as a family member or spouse, is obviously included in the ambit of the statute.10 In 

such situations, the public servant is still deemed the beneficiary, even though the benefit 

is received by a third party. 

Here, the question is whether the township is an “entity in whose welfare 

[appellant] is interested[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 4501. Appellant’s argument that his motive 

was solely to benefit the township clearly shows a considered interest, but neither § 4501 

nor any other portion of the Crimes Code explicitly defines “entity,” “interested,” or 

“welfare.” The parties advance conflicting yet viable interpretations of § 4701 as applied 

here, such that a latent ambiguity exists, requiring us to resort to principles of statutory 

construction for its resolution. See Commonwealth v. McCoy, 962 A.2d 1160, 1167 (Pa. 

2009) (principles of construction are implicated where neither party’s argument regarding 

interpretation of phrase in statute is so weak or implausible that statute can be called 

unambiguous). To ascertain the legislature’s intent, we may consider: the occasion and 

necessity for the statute; the mischief it remedies; the object to be attained; the former 

law, including other statutes regarding the same or similar subjects; and the 

consequences of a particular interpretation. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)(1), (3)-(6). 

In examining § 4701’s background, we find its official comment to be of particular 

significance. The comment establishes the General Assembly deliberately expanded 

 

10 See, e.g., MPC § 240.1 revised cmt. at 24, 26 (1980) (explaining “benefit” is defined 

comprehensively in order to “reach every kind of offer to influence official or political 

action by extraneous incentives [such as] an offer to admit the child of a judge to a 

particular school, college, or private club in exchange for favorable action on a case[,]” 

and further explaining an offer of money to a wife or relative of a public official is punished 

“on the same terms as K an offer directly to that official”). 
[J-99-2013] - 16 

the scope of the definition of benefit beyond conduct proscribed by § 4701’s predecessor 

statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4303 (repealed),11 to include “every possible type of offer made or 

designed to influence official action.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 4701 cmt. The comment further 

emphasizes “this section is intended to prohibit selling political endorsement or special 

influence.” Id. 

There could be no clearer indication of legislative intent: the conduct § 4701 was 

intended to address is the exchange of privileged treatment in any governmental process 

for something of value. To ensure equality and impartiality in the legislative, judicial, and 

administrative processes, public servants are prohibited from exercising their influence 

more favorably for any person or entity willing to pay something of value, regardless of 

whether that value inures to the benefit of the public servant or the entity served. The 

statute’s aim is to prevent the purchase of special influence and to ensure public servants 

retain the integrity in dealing that their position of public trust requires. Thus, payment to 

a governmental entity — such as the township — in exchange for the promise of special 

treatment — such as expediting the zoning process — by public servants who are officers 

or employees of that same body falls within § 4701’s purview.12

We emphasize our holding applies only to situations where a public servant seeks 

or receives a benefit on behalf of a governmental entity from a third party in exchange for 

 

11 The former bribery statute prohibited the payment, delivery, or alienation of any 

“money, goods or other thing” to a class of enumerated government officials: “any 

member of the General Assembly, or any officer or employe of this Commonwealth, or of 

any political subdivision thereof, or any judge, juror, justice, referee or arbitrator[.]” Id. 

12 We reject amici’s contention that the description of “benefit” found in the State Ethics 

Act’s definition of “conflict of interest” is controlling. See 65 Pa.C.S. § 1102. The Ethics 

Act imposes a civil, not criminal, penalty and, unlike § 4701, specifically limits the type of 

benefit prohibited (pecuniary) and the category of recipient (the official, his immediate 

family, or a business to which he or an immediate family member belongs). 
[J-99-2013] - 17 

the promise to exercise special influence in the governmental process. We do not read § 

4701 as applying to situations where public servants seek benefits for the governmental 

entity through the regular conduct of governmental affairs. It only becomes criminal 

where there is some offer of special treatment in exchange for something of value given to 

the official or the government entity he represents. From the standpoint of the public, 

and in particular the party solicited, it is patently improper for an official to condition 

successful or expedited completion of a legitimate process on payment of extra money — 

that extortionate process is what the bribery statute manifestly addresses. The public 

should not have the decisions of its officials affected by an applicant’s acceptance or 

refusal of extra demands appended to the requirements of the lawful process. Neither 

should an applicant face the dilemma of paying to obtain expeditious approval, or not 

paying and facing continued uncertainty, non-expeditious treatment, and the potential 

enmity of the soliciting township officials. While perhaps the product of factors not 

relevant here, we are compelled to note GP chose not to pay, and finalization of the 

November, 2005 agreement’s terms was not had for 18 months more. 

Public servants may negotiate for a higher sales price for an asset owned by the 

governmental entity, or negotiate restrictions or conditions on the use of public property 

being sold. They may seek, during the ordinary course of the zoning process, to reserve 

or acquire property for uses they deem beneficial to the public they represent. Section 

4701 does not hamper such negotiating abilities; to the extent the Superior Court’s 

decision may be read as such, as suggested by appellant and amici, we disavow it. 

What public servants may not do is condition a “decision, opinion, recommendation, vote 

or other exercise of discretion” upon a solicitation for benefits beyond those inherent in 

the underlying transaction. Negotiating a higher price before agreeing to sell is one thing 

— linking a higher price to expeditious approval of zoning matters is quite another. 
[J-99-2013] - 18 

Zoning approval may be a condition of sale, but it cannot be disregarded by the seller in 

return for money or other benefit. 

Applying these concepts to the instant matter, we conclude it was reasonable for 

the jury to find appellant’s conduct in soliciting the extra $500,000 from GP was not 

merely a continuation of the negotiation process or a savvy attempt to drive a hard 

bargain. Rather, this was a specific promise of preferential treatment to GP in the zoning 

process, in exchange for half a million dollars in excess of the purchase price. Clearly, 

the jury was warranted in finding this was an offer to sell a specific zoning process and 

outcome in exchange for a payment of money to the governmental body,13 and it was 

within the type of conduct § 4701 was intended to prohibit. Perhaps Commissioner 

Lewis put it best: a township cannot be in the business of selling zoning. 

II. TRIAL COURT’S REFUSAL TO CHARGE JURY ON CRIMINAL INTENT 

A. Applicability of 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(c)’s default culpability provision to 

offense of bribery in official and political matters 

We turn to appellant’s claim the trial court should have charged the jury that 18 

Pa.C.S. § 302(c)’s default culpability requirements apply to § 4701. Appellant, relying on 

the Superior Court’s decision in Parmar, argues § 4701 is not a strict liability statute and, 

therefore, § 302(c) applies. He further contends the failure to instruct the jury in this 

regard gave the jury the false impression that § 4701 is a strict liability offense and this 

was not harmless error because his state of mind during his phone conversation with 

Lawry was a critical issue. 

 

13 Section 4701(b) provides, “It is no defense to prosecution under this section that a 

person whom the actor sought to influence was not qualified to act in the desired way 

whether because he had not yet assumed office, had left office, or lacked jurisdiction, or 

for any other reason.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 4701(b). Thus, it is not an affirmative defense that 

the defendant lacked actual power to carry out the promised action. 
[J-99-2013] - 19 

The Commonwealth argues § 4701 does not include a culpable state of mind as an 

essential element of the offense, contending this signals the legislature’s intent to 

abandon the traditional mens rea requirement. The Commonwealth points to the official 

explanatory note to § 240.1 of the MPC, on which § 4701 is based, which specifies it 

“abandons the usual focus upon ‘corrupt’ agreements or a ‘corrupt’ intent[.]” 

Commonwealth’s Brief, at 16 (emphasis omitted) (quoting MPC § 240.1 explanatory note 

(2001)). The Commonwealth also notes the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Jury 

Instructions do not include a specific statement regarding criminal intent as an element of 

§ 4701. See Pa. SSJI (Crim) 15.4701A, 15.4701B. The Commonwealth further notes 

only a plurality in Parmar agreed § 302(c)’s default culpability provisions apply to § 4701, 

and thus, appellant’s reliance on that decision is misplaced. In the alternative, the 

Commonwealth contends any error in the omission of an instruction on intent was 

harmless because it did not alter the outcome of the trial; the record, including appellant’s 

own characterization that his actions might comprise extortion, contains irresistible 

evidence appellant’s statements to Lawry were undertaken with the specific purpose of 

extracting additional money in exchange for preferential treatment in the zoning process, 

i.e., with criminal intent. 

To determine the propriety of the trial court’s jury instruction, we must address the 

threshold issue of whether a mens rea is required by § 4701, and if so, which level. This 

is a question of law; thus, our standard of review is de novo and scope of review is 

plenary. Commonwealth v. Roebuck, 32 A.3d 613, 615 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). 

We note absolute liability criminal offenses are “generally disfavored,” and, absent indicia 

of legislative intent to dispense with a mens rea, a statute will not be held to impose strict 

liability. See Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 832 A.2d 418, 426-27 (Pa. 2003) (citations 

omitted). Although the imposition of strict liability is generally disfavored, this Court has 
[J-99-2013] - 20 

recognized the legislature may create statutory offenses dispensing with a mens rea in 

fields that are essentially non-criminal in order “to utilize the machinery of criminal 

administration as an enforcing arm for social regulations of a purely civil nature, with the 

punishment totally unrelated to questions of moral wrongdoing or guilt.” Commonwealth 

v. Koczwara, 155 A.2d 825, 827-28 (Pa. 1959). The penalty for such offenses 

concerning the public welfare is generally relatively light. Id., at 827. 

Although § 4701 does not contain an express culpability requirement, this does not 

mean the legislature intended to dispense with the element of criminal intent. See 

Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 924 A.2d 636, 638-39 (Pa. 2007) (mere absence of express 

mens rea requirement in statutory crime is not indicative of legislative intent to impose 

strict liability (citations omitted)). Rather, “there is a long-standing tradition, which is 

reflected in the plain language of [§] 302, that criminal liability is not to be imposed absent 

some level of culpability.” Id., at 639. Additionally, § 4701 is not a regulatory measure 

aimed at safeguarding the public welfare and health, nor is its penalty light, as is often the 

case with strict liability offenses; rather, it is a third degree felony punishable by up to 

three years imprisonment. Accordingly, we conclude § 4701 is not a strict liability 

offense; it requires proof of a mens rea. 

Regarding the level of mens rea required to sustain a conviction under § 4701, we 

have repeatedly held § 302 provides the default level of culpability where a criminal 

statute does not include an express mens rea. See, e.g., id. (holding where offense of 

luring child into motor vehicle does not express any mens rea requirement with regard to 

victim’s age, § 302(c) prescribes default culpability requirement); Commonwealth v. 

Ludwig, 874 A.2d 623, 630 (Pa. 2005) (observing generally where criminal statute does 

not expressly provide mens rea, General Assembly has provided default culpability 

provision in § 302(c), which determines appropriate element of culpability); Mayfield, at 
[J-99-2013] - 21 

427 (holding where relevant Crimes Code provision omits mens rea, § 302(c) supplies 

culpability). The comment to § 302 also supports this conclusion, providing: 

The purpose of this section is to clearly define the various mental states 

upon which criminal liability is to be based. Under existing law the words 

“wilfully” or “maliciously” are used in many cases. However, these words 

have no settled meaning. In some instances there is no expressed 

requirement concerning the existence of mens rea. These defects in 

existing law are remedied by this section which sets forth and defines the 

culpability requirements and eliminates the obscurity of the terms “malice” 

and “wilful.” 

18 Pa.C.S. § 302 cmt. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).14 

Thus, § 302 applies when a criminal statute does not express a specific mens rea. 

Section 4701 contains no language regarding mental state, and it is precisely this 

“defect[] in existing law” that § 302(c) was intended to remedy, see 18 Pa.C.S. § 302 cmt. 

We do not believe it was the legislature’s intent that mental state be intuited from the 

language of the statute; absent summary offenses or absolute liability crimes, if there is 

no express wording indicative of a discrete mental state, § 302(c) applies. Accordingly, 

as § 4701 includes no express culpability requirement, the Commonwealth must prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the public official was at least reckless in engaging in the 

conduct proscribed by the statute.15

 

14 Furthermore, the explanatory note to § 2.02(3) of the MPC, on which § 302(c) is based, 

see id. (“This section is derived from Section 2.02 of the Model Penal Code.”), provides 

when the General Assembly intends intent, knowledge, or recklessness to suffice for the 

establishment of culpability for a particular offense, “the draftsmen need make no 

provision for culpability; it will be supplied by this subsection.” MPC § 2.02 explanatory 

note (2001). Accordingly, the legislature’s refraining from providing an express 

culpability requirement in § 4701 indicates its intent that § 302(c)’s default mens rea 

apply. 

15 It is true that only a plurality of this Court in Parmar concluded § 302(c) provides the 

mens rea for § 4701. Three Justices would have affirmed the Superior Court (Justice 

Newman, then-Chief Justice Flaherty, and then-Justice Castille). The three Justices in 

(continuedK) 
[J-99-2013] - 22 

Because § 4701 is not a strict liability offense and requires intentional conduct, 

appellant was entitled to have the jury instructed regarding the applicable mens rea for 

the offense, which is provided by § 302(c). Therefore, the trial court erred in refusing to 

include such along with its instruction regarding § 4701’s elements. See Commonwealth 

v. Mason, 378 A.2d 807, 808 (Pa. 1977) (holding refusal to instruct jury concerning 

element of intent necessary to convict defendant of voluntary manslaughter was error). 

 B. Harmless error 

Having determined the trial court erred in its refusal to instruct the jury regarding 

the applicable mens rea, we must address whether such error was harmless. See 

Commonwealth v. Bullock, 913 A.2d 207, 217 (Pa. 2006). “[U]nder the harmless error 

doctrine, the judgment of sentence will be affirmed in spite of the error only where the 

reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to 

the verdict.” Id., at 218 (citation omitted). 

Here, the trial court’s jury charge tracked the language of § 4701(a) and the 

Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Jury Instructions. The jury was apprised that, in 

order to convict appellant, it had to find he solicited money as consideration for his 

proposed action as a public official. That is, the jury was instructed that a conviction 

required it to find he acted with the conscious objective of securing an additional payment 

 

(Kcontinued) 

support of reversal (Justices Zappala, Cappy, and Nigro) expressed no opinion regarding 

the applicability of § 302(c), as the main question in Parmar was whether the 

Commonwealth could prosecute a public official under § 4701, a general statute, instead 

of under the specific provisions of the State Adverse Interest Act and State Ethics Act. 

Therefore, while Parmar is not controlling, it is instructive. As this Court was evenly 

divided in Parmar, the Superior Court’s decision was affirmed, holding § 302(c) supplied 

the culpability level for § 4701; therefore, at the time of appellant’s trial, § 302(c) was the 

applicable mens rea, and the jury should have been so instructed. 
[J-99-2013] - 23 

from GP to the township in exchange for his exercise of official discretion in favor of GP. 

Such an instruction encompasses the definition of “intentional” within § 302; a fortiori, it 

encompasses knowing or reckless conduct. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(e). Indeed, there 

was no argument here that the call and its content were other than intentional, as 

described herein. It is only appellant’s lack of a deliberately corrupt motivation that was 

at issue, and as noted above, motivation is not an element of the crime. If the solicitation 

was less than intentional or knowingly made, this might have been error, but the 

solicitation itself simply cannot be described as unintentional or unknowing. 

Thus, the jury was advised appellant had to have acted intentionally to be 

convicted. Although the jury twice asked for the trial court to repeat its instruction, the 

reasons therefore are but speculation. There was nothing in the instructions given that 

could have led the jury to convict appellant of bribery on the basis of strict liability; all of 

the scenarios described as sufficient by the trial court required appellant to have acted 

with conscious objective toward each element of the statute, which elements we reiterate 

do not include a personal motive. See n.2, supra. Therefore, under these 

circumstances where the jury was not given the misimpression that § 4701 is a strict 

liability offense, and was made aware it had to find appellant acted intentionally in order to 

be guilty, we cannot find the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury regarding § 302(c) 

contributed to the verdict.

Order affirmed; jurisdiction relinquished.

Mr. Chief Justice Castille and Mr. Justice Stevens join the opinion.

Madame Justice Todd files a concurring opinion.

Mr. Justice Baer files a concurring and dissenting opinion, the dissenting portion of 

which is joined by Mr. Justice Saylor.