IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________ No. 93-2459 Summary Calendar

_______________

CLYDE URA CAIN, SR., Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS HEARST CORPORATION, d/b/a the Houston Chronicle Publishing Company, Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

_________________________ (August 30, 1993) Before GARWOOD, SMITH, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

CERTIFICATE FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, PURSUA NT TO T EX . C ONST . ART . 5, § 3- C, and T EX . R. A PP . P. 114.

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS AND THE HONORABLE JUSTICES THEREOF:

1. S TYLE OF THE C ASE . The style of the case in which this certificate is made is Clyde Ura Cain, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant v. Hearst Corporation,2

d/b/a the Houston Chronicle Publishing Company, Defendant-Appellee , No. 93-2459 in the United States Court of Appe als for the Fifth Circuit, on appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

2. S TATEMENT OF THE C ASE . The plaintiff-appellant , Clyde Cain, is a prison inmate serving a life sentence for murder. He filed suit in Texas state
court on January 6, 1993, against the defendant-appellee, Hearst Corporation, d/b/a the Houston Chronicle Publishing Company ("the Chronicle"), alleging that an article regarding his convic tion, published in the H OUSTON C HRONICLE on June 30, 1991, invaded his privacy by placing him in a false l ight by stating that he had been associated with a crime organization known as the Dixie Mafia when in fact, according to Cain, he had no association with
any such group. The Chronicle removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. The Chronicle moved for dismissal under F E D . R. C IV . P.12(b)(6), arguing that Cain's alleged cause of action was identical to a libel complaint and thus bar red by the one-year statute of limitations in T EX . C IV . P RAC . & R EM . C ODE A NN . § 16.002 and that,
moreover, Texas does not recognize the "false light" tort. Cainresponded that he "seeks recovery under the recognized legal theory of false light invasion of privacy" subject to the two-year
statute of limitations, presumably referrin g to T E X . C IV . P RAC . &
R EM . C ODE A NN . § 16.003. The district court granted the motion,3

citing Hurlbut v. Gulf Life Ins. Co. , 749 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. 1987), and reasoning therefrom "that irrespective of what the plaintiff may call his suit, it is, nevertheless, a suit in libel." The district court entered final judgment on May 3, 1993. Cain filed a notice of appeal on May 10, 1993.

3. Q UESTIONS C ERTIFIED . a. Does Texas recognize the tort of false light invasion of privacy? b. If Texas recognizes the tort of false light invasion of privacy, which statute of limitations governs a c tions brought pursuant thereto?
We disclaim any intention or desire that the Supreme Court of Texas co nfine its reply to the precise form or scope of the question certified.

4. T HE P ARTIES . The parties are Clyde Ura Cain, Sr., plaintiff-appellant, and Hearst Corp oration, d/b/a the Houston Chronicle Publishing Company, defendant-appellee.

5. T HE A TTORNEYS . Cain appears pro se . His address is as follows: 401418 Ellis I Unit Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division Huntsville, TX 773434

The Chronicle is represented by the following attorney: William W. Ogden Ogden, Gibson & White, L.L.P. 1750 Pennzoil South Tower 711 Louisiana Houston, TX 77002-3095

QUESTIONS CERTIFIED.