J-S22040-18

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

 Appellee

v.

MUAAWIYA MUHAMMAD 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1647 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 12, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County 

Criminal Division at No.: CP-23-CR-0004256-2015

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and PLATT*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED AUGUST 21, 2018

Appellant, Muaawiya Muhammad, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed on April 12, 2017, following his jury trial conviction of 

persons not to possess a firearm, and firearms not to be carried without a 

license.1 Specifically, he challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to 

suppress the firearm, and the court’s admission of testimony of one of the 

officers on scene. We affirm.

We take the factual and procedural history in this matter from our 

review of the certified record and the trial court’s November 21, 2017 opinion. 

On June 14, 2015,2 at approximately 12:15 a.m., Chester City Police Officer 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105 and 6106, respectively.

2 Some documents in the certified record denote the incident date as June 15, 

2015. However, the transcribed notes of testimony from trial, and the police 

criminal complaint both state June 14, 2015, therefore, we use that date.
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Patrick Flynn observed trash being thrown out of the driver’s side rear window

of a white Chevrolet Lumina in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6501, which 

prohibits discarding rubbish. (See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/06/16, at 14, 

16; N.T. Trial, 11/03/16, at 29, 32). Officer Flynn activated his flashing lights 

and siren and attempted to stop the vehicle. Instead of pulling over, the 

vehicle accelerated through a red light, made a right turn, and approached a 

park. All four doors of the vehicle opened, and while it was still coming to a 

stop all four occupants got out of the car and ran in different directions. (See 

N.T. Suppression Hearing, at 17-20). Officer Flynn chased an individual, later 

identified as Laron Chandler, who exited from the passenger side rear door of 

the vehicle. (See id. at 22).

Officer Arthur Grenier, also of the Chester Police Department, heard 

Officer Flynn make a radio call about the stop, and responded to it. He saw

the vehicle come to a stop, and the occupants run, observing Appellant and 

one other occupant run toward him, both clutching their waistbands. (See id.

at 40-41). Suspecting that Appellant might be holding a firearm, Officer 

Grenier ordered him to stop. After Appellant did not respond, Officer Grenier 

deployed a Taser. Appellant continued running and Officer Grenier gave 

chase. Soon thereafter, Appellant tripped on a curb and fell to the ground. 

As he was falling, he pulled a firearm from his waistband, which firearm fell 

from his right hand, and slid across the asphalt. (See id. at 45, 48). Appellant 

got up from where he fell and continued running. He was eventually 

apprehended about a block and a half away; once he was secure, Officer 
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Grenier returned to where the firearm landed and retrieved it. (See id. at 48-

49).

Appellant was arrested and charged with felon in possession of a 

firearm, firearms not to be carried without a license, resisting arrest,3

tampering with evidence,4 and disorderly conduct.5 (See Information, 

8/12/15, at 1-2). On September 11, 2015, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion seeking, among other things, to suppress evidence of the handgun 

recovered during pursuit. (See Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, 9/11/15, at 

unnumbered pages 2-3). The trial court conducted a suppression hearing on 

July 6, 2016. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied the 

suppression motion, concluding that “Officer Grenier acquired probable cause 

when he saw [Appellant] fleeing the car and with [Appellant] holding his 

waistband in the way that he did. As he testified, the probability that there 

was something there that [Appellant] was trying to protect from falling or 

concealing was great.” (N.T. Suppression Hearing, at 73-74). 

A one-day jury trial commenced on November 3, 2016. At trial, the 

Commonwealth offered the testimony of Officer Flynn who described the initial 

summary code violation for discarding rubbish, and ensuing chase. The trial 

court overruled Appellant’s objection, and permitted Officer Flynn to describe 

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3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5104.

4 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4901(1).

5 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(b).
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the incident. Officer Flynn testified that after he attempted to pull over the 

vehicle it fled and eventually drove into a park wherein all four car doors 

opened and the occupants began to flee. (See N.T. Trial, at 42-43). He stated 

that

The back right passenger had a black and red hoodie on and he 

was almost right in front of me when I got out of the car. As I got 

out, I saw him and when I looked at him, he started pulling a gun 

out of his waistband so I chased him. So we went running this 

way, up this alley. . . .

(Id. at 43). Officer Grenier also testified, consistent with his testimony at the 

suppression hearing, that he chased and apprehended Appellant, who fled 

from the drivers’ side rear of the vehicle.

After the Commonwealth completed its case in chief, the trial court 

granted Appellant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal on the charges of 

tampering with evidence and resisting arrest. (See id. at 165-68). 

Thereafter, the jury found Appellant guilty of person not to possess a firearm, 

and firearms not to be carried without a license. (See id. at 208; Verdict 

Sheet, 11/03/16).

On April 12, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant to not less than 

sixty, nor more than 120 months of incarceration for possession of firearm 

prohibited, and imposed a concurrent sentence of not less than forty-two, nor 

more than eighty-four months of incarceration for firearms not to be carried 

without a license. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on April 21, 2017, 
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which the trial court denied on April 25, 2017. Appellant filed a timely notice 

of appeal on May 22, 2017.6

Appellant raises two questions on appeal:

A. Whether the [h]onorable [t]rial [c]ourt committed [an] error of 

law and abuse of its discretion, and denied Appellant his rights 

under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution and Article 1 Sections 8 and 9 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution when it denied Appellant’s pre-trial 

motion to suppress the firearm recovered by police during foot 

pursuit of the Appellant, where the pursuit by police constituted a 

seizure of the Appellant, and where the pursuit was undertaken 

without probable cause, reasonable suspicion or any other lawful 

justification whatsoever[?]

B. Whether the [h]onorable [t]rial [c]ourt committed [an] error of 

law and abuse of its discretion in admitting into evidence at trial, 

testimony by police that another person, one Laron Chandler, ran 

from the automobile at the same time as the Appellant, that 

Chandler was also pursued by police and that Chandler discarded 

a firearm during the pursuit, where Appellant was not charged 

with conspiring with Chandler to possess either the handgun 

Appellant had or the one that Chandler had, so that evidence that 

Chandler discarded a handgun was irrelevant and therefore 

inadmissible[?] . . .

(Appellant’s Brief, at 4-5) (some argument omitted). 

In his first issue, Appellant claims that the trial court erred when it 

denied his motion to suppress the firearm he dropped while fleeing. (See id.

at 13-23). Specifically, Appellant claims that Officer Grenier lacked 

reasonable suspicion that he was engaging in criminal activity, and therefore, 

the chase constituted an unconstitutional seizure. (See id.). We disagree.

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6 Pursuant to the trial court’s order, Appellant filed a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal on July 3, 2017. The trial court entered its 

opinion on November 21, 2017. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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When reviewing the propriety of a suppression order, an 

appellate court is required to determine whether the record 

supports the suppression court’s factual findings and whether the 

inferences and legal conclusions drawn by the suppression court 

from those findings are appropriate. Where the record supports 

the factual findings of the suppression court, we are bound by 

those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn 

therefrom are in error. However, where the appeal of the 

determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of 

legal error, the suppression court’s conclusions of law are not 

binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the 

suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.

Commonwealth v. Foglia, 979 A.2d 357, 360 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc), 

appeal denied, 990 A.2d 727 (Pa. 2010) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted).

It is well-settled that

A police officer may detain an individual in order to conduct 

an investigation if that officer reasonably suspects that the 

individual is engaging in criminal conduct. Commonwealth v. 

Cook, 558 Pa. 50, 735 A.2d 673, 676 (1999). “This standard, 

less stringent than probable cause, is commonly known as 

reasonable suspicion.” Id. In order to determine whether the 

police officer had reasonable suspicion, the totality of the 

circumstances must be considered. [See] In re D.M., 566 Pa. 

445, 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (2001). In making this determination, 

we must give “due weight to the specific reasonable inferences 

the police officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his 

experience.” Cook, 735 A.2d at 676 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 

U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). Also, the 

totality of the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an 

examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal 

conduct. Rather, “even a combination of innocent facts, when 

taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police 

officer.” Cook, 735 A.2d at 676.

Id.

“Flight by the suspect can be considered suspicious activity, but flight 

alone does not give rise to reasonable suspicion.” Commonwealth v. 
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Taggart, 997 A.2d 1189, 1193 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal denied, 17 A.3d 

1254 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). However, “nervous, evasive behavior 

such as flight is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.” 

Commonwealth v. Freeman, 757 A.2d 903, 908 (Pa. 2000) (citation 

omitted). Additionally, a suspect grabbing his waistband, a movement that 

police know is often associated with hiding a weapon, is another relevant 

factor in determining reasonable suspicion. See Foglia, supra at 361. 

Furthermore, “a combination of circumstances, none of which taken alone 

would justify a stop, may be sufficient to achieve a reasonable suspicion.”

Commonwealth v. Riley, 715 A.2d 1131, 1135 (Pa. Super. 1998), appeal 

denied, 737 A.2d 741 (Pa. 1999) (citation omitted); see also

Commonwealth v. Moore, 446 A.2d 960, 962 (Pa. Super. 1982) (“Though 

flight alone will not justify a stop, a combination of circumstances, none of 

which taken alone would justify a stop, may be sufficient.”) (citations 

omitted).

In the instant case, the evidence at the suppression hearing 

demonstrated that Appellant fled from the police, while holding his waistband, 

after police observed him throwing trash out the drivers’ side rear window of 

the automobile, in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6501. Given the totality of these 

circumstances, and considering the specific reasonable inferences made by 

the police at the time, we conclude that reasonable suspicion existed to detain 

Appellant. See Foglia, supra at 360; Riley, supra at 1135. Appellant’s first 

issue does not merit relief.
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In his second issue, Appellant claims that the trial court erred when it 

denied his motion in limine and admitted evidence that another occupant of 

the vehicle, Laron Chandler, was in possession of and discarded a handgun. 

(See Appellant’s Brief, at 23-27). He claims that the evidence was irrelevant 

to the charges against him, that it did little to show the complete story of the 

case, and that its probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice. (See id.). Thus, he argues the trial court abused its discretion. 

We disagree.

Our standard of review is well settled.

Admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the 

trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial 

court clearly abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion is not 

merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or 

misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or 

partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.

Commonwealth v. Tyson, 119 A.3d 353, 357–58 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en 

banc), appeal denied, 128 A.3d 220 (Pa. 2015) (citations omitted).

“Evidence is relevant if . . . it has any tendency to make a fact more or 

less probable than it would be without the evidence [ ] and . . . the fact is of 

consequence in determining the action.” Pa.R.E. 401(a)-(b). “All relevant 

evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by law. Evidence that is 

not relevant is not admissible.” Pa.R.E. 402. “The court may exclude relevant 

evidence if its probative value is outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair 

prejudice[.]” Pa.R.E. 403. “[A]ll evidence in a criminal proceeding is 
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prejudicial to the defendant, and . . . relevant evidence is to be excluded only 

when it is so prejudicial that it may inflame the jury to make a decision based 

upon something other than the legal propositions relevant to the case.” 

Commonwealth v. Colon, 846 A.2d 747, 753 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal 

denied, 870 A.2d 320 (Pa. 2005) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Initially, we note that Rule 404(b) prohibits admission of other crimes 

or acts to show a defendant’s bad character. Here, in contrast, the evidence 

in question regarded the crimes or acts of Mr. Chandler. See Pa.R.E. 404(b); 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 160 A.3d 127, 146 (Pa. 2017), cert. denied, 

138 S. Ct. 508 (2017) (concluding that Rule 404(b) was not implicated where 

the subject testimony was “not evidence of any particular ‘crime, wrong or 

act’ by [Appellant].”). Thus, we consider Appellant’s arguments about the 

relevance and unfair prejudice concerning the evidence of Mr. Chandler’s 

crimes, not whether admission of the testimony complied with Pa.R.E. 404(b).

Appellant claims that Mr. Chandler’s fleeing from the vehicle while 

possessing a handgun “bore no relationship to the charges against [him,]” and 

therefore should not have been admissible. (Appellant’s Brief, at 26; see id.

at 25-26). He contends that because he was not charged as an accomplice to 

Mr. Chandler, evidence that he possessed a handgun was irrelevant. (See id.

at 26). We disagree.

Rule 401 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence provides a broad 

definition of relevant evidence, as evidence is relevant if it logically 

tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact 
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at issue more or less probable, or supports a reasonable inference 

or presumption regarding the existence of a material fact. Even 

evidence that merely advances an inference of a material fact may 

be admissible. . . .

Johnson, supra at 146 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Here, Officer Flynn’s statement about chasing the back right passenger

(Chandler) after the occupants fled into the park, was relevant to the jury’s 

understanding of the events that took place after the occupants of the vehicle 

fled. The fact that Officer Flynn saw that the back right passenger had a gun 

was relevant to explaining why he decided to chase that passenger as opposed 

to the other occupants of the vehicle. (See N.T. Trial, at 46). Additionally, 

evidence of the conduct of one of the other passengers in the same vehicle is 

part of the same sequence of events and, therefore, forms part of the natural 

development of facts. Thus, we conclude that Officer Flynn’s statement was 

relevant. See Commonwealth v. Cole, 135 A.3d 191, 196 (Pa. Super. 

2016), appeal denied, 145 A.3d 162 (Pa. 2016) (finding evidence relevant 

when it increased jury’s understanding of events). 

Appellant next claims that the statement should not have been admitted 

because its probative value was outweighed by its undue prejudice in violation 

of Pa.R.E. 403. Specifically, he contends that the “evidence tended to 

demonstrate some other plan on the part of all the occupants of the car, a 

matter that was not of concern to the jury,” and that “[t]he jury could easily 

infer[] guilt on the part of Appellant based on the possession of a handgun by 

one of the other occupants of the vehicle.” (Appellant’s Brief, at 27). 

Appellant’s argument does not merit relief.
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Evidence is not unfairly prejudicial simply because it harms a 

defendant’s case, rather Rule 403’s bar “is limited to evidence so prejudicial 

that it would inflame the jury to make a decision based upon something other 

than the legal propositions relevant to the case.” Commonwealth v. Foley, 

38 A.3d 882, 891 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 60 A.3d 535 (Pa. 2013) 

(citation omitted). While evidence that Mr. Chandler possessed a gun could 

possibly support an inference that Mr. Chandler committed a crime, there is 

no reason to believe that it would improperly inflame the jury to find Appellant 

guilty. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

admitting the evidence. See Tyson, supra at 357-58.

Moreover, we would conclude that the admission of this evidence, if 

error, would constitute harmless error. The harmless error doctrine “reflects 

the reality that the accused is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial.” 

Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 671 (Pa. 2014), cert. denied, 

135 S. Ct. 164 (2014) (citation omitted). Harmless error exists if the error 

did not prejudice the defendant (or prejudice was de minimis), if the evidence 

was merely cumulative of other untainted evidence, or if the properly admitted 

evidence was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of error so 

insignificant that the error could not have contributed to the verdict. See id. 

Here, the properly admitted evidence of Appellant himself being in possession 

of a firearm overwhelmingly established his guilt of persons not to possess a 

firearm and firearms not to be carried without a license, as to render any error 
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in the admission of evidence that Chandler possessed a firearm insignificant 

by comparison and therefore harmless. See id.

Thus, we conclude that Officer Flynn’s statement was relevant to the 

jury’s understanding of events, and did not cause unfair prejudice. Therefore, 

we discern no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in admitting Officer Flynn’s 

testimony. See Tyson, supra at 357-58. Appellant’s second issue does not 

merit relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/21/18