## In the Court of Appeals S econd Appellate District o f Texas at Fort Worth

_______ ____________________ No. 02

- 19

- 00459

- CV

___________________________

On A ppeal from the 211th Dist rict Court Denton County, Texas Trial Court No. 15

- 02179

- 211

Before Gabriel, Kerr, and Birdwell, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr 

### I N THE 

### I NTEREST OF 

### M.K., A 

### C HILD2 MEMORAN DUM OPINION
After a bench trial , the tria l court terminat ed M other ’ s and Charles ’ s par ental

r i g hts to their daugh ter , Mary

. 1 O n ly Charles has appealed.
I n Charles ’ s first issue, he conten ds that the termination is improper becau se the D epartment of Family and Protective Ser vices never pro ve d his paternity . And in
Charl es ’ s second throug h n inth issues, he assert s that the evidence is insuffic i ent to
prove the eight grounds on which the trial court relied to terminate his rights. See Tex.
Fam. C ode Ann. § 16 1 .001( b)( 1) (B), ( C), (D), (E), (F), ( N), ( O), (P). 2
Beca use Charles ’ s paternity had b een determin ed in an earlier suit , we overrule
his first issue. And b ecause the evidence sup ports the trial court ’ s ( D) and (E) endangerment fin dings , we overrule Charles ’ s second and third issues. Fin ally , beca use our rulings on C h arles ’ s first three issu es make it unnecessary to dispose of his remaining issues , we deny them as moot . We affirm the t r i al court ’ s judgment.

1 We refe r to the child , M .K. , as Mary and to the father

— b ecause h e disputes his pate rnity

— as Charl es . We refer to o ther family mem bers by their re lationship to Mary. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b )(2) (requiring courts to use aliases to refer to minors in parental

- righ ts

- termination cases and

— if ne ede d to protect th e minors’ identities

— to also use aliases w hen referring to fam ily members); see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d).

2 Charles does no t challe nge the trial court ’ s finding that termination was in Mary ’ s best int erest
. See id. § 161.001( b )( 2 )

.3 Paternity In his first issue, Char les co ntends t hat because the Department neve r establ ishe d that he was Mary ’ s fathe r , the Department n ever established that he had
any parental rights to terminate

. We disagree

. A. Background a nd s ummary The Department broug ht two sequential termin ation proceedings aga inst
Ch arl es.
In the first one, t he trial court implicitly adjudic ated Charles as Mary ’ s father , awarded Charles posse ssory cons ervator s hip, and ord ered Char les to pay child
sup port
. In the current case, Charles reli es on th is order ’ s failure to expressly adjudic at e his paternity to sup port his argument. In the second termination p roceeding, precisely because Charles ’ s p a tern ity had already been reso l v e d, the pleadings and eviden ce never questi on ed that issue , and the

c ase proceed ed with the im plicit understanding that Ch arle s was Mary ’ s father

. On appeal, Charles r e lies on the re s ulting absence of evidence squarely addressing his
p aternity to further support hi s co ntention. Although Charle s argues thi s issue in terms of evidentiary sufficiency , we disag ree with hi s premise. The trial court dete rmi ned Charles ’ s paternity in the first proceeding , and Charles ne ver appealed that or der. By the time the Department fi led
th e secon d suit, Charles ’ s paternity was already res judicata.4 B. Disc ussion
I n 2015 , t he De part ment fi led a petit i on in which it identif ied Charles as Mary ’ s

“ allege d father, ” asked to determine Charles ’s pate rnity, and s ought to te rmina te hi s parental rights

. 3 An “ alle ged father ” is “ a man who alleges hi mself to be, or is alleged

t o be , the gen etic father or a possi ble geneti c f at her of a child, but whose patern ity has
not been det ermined. ” Id. § 101.0 015 (a). When a proceeding to adjudicate a child ’ s parentage is filed, “ [t] he cou rt shall rende r an order adj udi cating whether a man

a lleg ed or claiming to be the father is the pa rent of the child. ” See id. § 160. 636 (a) ; see also id. § 160. 6 01

. T hus, o ne way or another , this fi rst suit w as going to resolve
Charles ’ s paternity.
D NA te st ing lat er co rroborated that Cha rles was Mary ’ s father

. Afte r th e DNA results, t h e parties entered an ag r eed order i n late 2016 i n which the court :

• awar ded Mother managing co nservatorshi p ;

• awarded Charles possessory con ser vator s h ip ;

• order ed Charles to pay M o ther child support ; a nd

• dis missed the Department as a party. Within th is 201 6 order ,

3 T he par ental rights, if any, of even al leged fathers may be terminated

. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 160.404 , 161.002; In re D.T. , No. 02

- 13

- 00331

- C V, 2014 WL 261408 , at *2

– 3 (Tex. App.

— Fort W orth Jan. 23, 2014, no pet.) ( mem. op. ).5 • w hen identif y

in g the part ies, Charles is initially referred to a s Mary ’ s
“ a l leged father ” (his appellat ion in the Depart ment ’ s petitio n) a nd thereafter as “ F ather ” ;

• C harles is not identified merely as a “ posses sory conservator ” ; rather, he is ide n ti fied as a “ pare nt possessory conserv ator ” ;

• t he signature lin e for Cha rles ’ s atto rney in itiall y provided , “ Attorney for the Alleged Father [Char les] , ” b ut the wor d “ Alleged ” wa s c rossed through so that Charles ’ s attorney si gn ed as “ Attorney f or the All ege d Father [Charles] ” ; and

• Charles signed the order over t he signa ture li ne, “ [Charles ] Father of the Ch ild [M ary ]

. ” Although the agreed order doe s not express ly adjudicate Charles a s Mary ’ s father, it does so imp licitly. O nly “parents” pay child support. S e e id. § 154 .001 (a). A

“ p arent” is “ an individual who ha s est ablished a par ent

- child relat ionship under
Section 160.201. ” Id. § 160.102 ( 11). And a “ father

- child relationship is esta blished .

. . by .

. . an adjud ication of the man ’ s patern ity. ” Id. § 160. 2 0 1 ( b ) (3)

. W h atever the
order ’ s arguable flaws , Charles agreed to pay child support , and b y s o agreeing , Charles was also agr ee ing that he was Mary ’ s father. Given the DNA results, C harles
ha d no basis to di spute his patern ity in any event

. Charles also ackn owledged that he

was conced ing his patern i ty when both he and his attorney signed the agreed order above signature lines that expressly identified Char les as Mary ’ s father.
When c onstruing a judgment , c ourts sh ou ld consider the record and the written
instr ument ’ s entire c ontent
. Point Lookout West, Inc. v. Whorton , 742 S.W.2 d 277,
278 (Tex. 1987) (per curiam). And c ourts should construe judgments as a whole to6 harm oniz e and gi v e ef fect to all portions

. Id. Using these princi ples , w e hold that th e 2016 order esta blishe d

— that is, adju dicate d

— Charles as Mary ’ s fat her

. See id.
A fter the trial court signed th is order, Charles never a ppealed it

. Thereafter,
neither the partie s nor the cou rt ever questioned Charles ’ s p a tern i ty ; it was treated as a given

. In late 20 1 8, the De partment fi led a motio n to modify under the sa me cause number as the first proceeding and again s ought termination. This time , tho ugh, the
De partment identifie d Charles specif i cal ly as “ [t]h e father of the child [M ary ]

. ” And in this second procee d ing, unlike in the first, t he Depa r tment did not ask to adjudicate
Charles ’ s paternity.
Charles ente red a ge neral denial in which he identified himself as “ Respondent
Fat h er. ” Cha rles also admitted being M ary ’ s father in a July hear ing that preceded the
N ovember 2019 trial

. Th rough out the t ermi nation trial itself , Charles wa s identified as Mary ’ s father.
A t one p oint, when as ked wh y Mary ’ s attorn ey had rec ommended suspend ing
Charles ’ s and Mother ’ s visitation rights earlier in the case , a witness responded , “ The

re commendation was to suspend visit s due to it [ s] being traumatic for [Mary] to see the

— her biological parents. ” A nd during tr ial, t h e 2016 order adjudicating Char les ’ s p aternity was among the exhibit s admitted

— without objection

. Preci sely because
Ch arles ’ s pate rnity had already been reso l v ed in the first suit , paternity wa s not litigated in the sec ond

.7 Even in his notice of appeal , Ch arles i dentified hi m s elf as “ R esp on dent
Father , ” yet he now seeks to relitigate his pa ternity.
W e hold that by the tim e the Dep artment filed i ts seco nd te rmination petition,
Ch arle s ’s paternity wa s res judicata. S ee Engelman Irrigation Dist. v. S hie lds Bros., Inc. , 514 S.W.3d 746, 750 (Tex. 2017) ; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim , 315 S.W.3d 860,
862 (Tex. 2010). T he time to dispute paternity ha d p assed.
We ov er rule Ch ar les ’ s first iss ue. Grounds and Suffi cient Evi dence
In his rem ain ing issues, Char les attack s the suf ficiency of the evidence supporting the eight grounds for termination.
A. Standar d of r eview
1
. Genera lly
In a termination case, the State see ks n ot just to limit parental rights but to erase them per manently

— to divest the parent and child of all legal r ights, priv ileges, duties, and powe rs normally existing between them, except the c hild’s righ t to inher it.
Tex . Fam. Code Ann. § 161.20 6(b); Hol ick v. Smit h , 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). Consequently, “[w]hen the State see ks to sever permanently the rela tionsh ip be tween a parent and a chi ld , it must first obs erve fundamentally fair pr ocedures.” In re E.R. , 385 S .W.3d 552, 554 (Tex. 2012 ) (citing San tosky v . Kramer , 455 U.S. 745, 747

– 48,
102 S. Ct. 1388 , 1391

– 92 (1982)).8 Ter mination decisions must be suppo rted b y cle ar and convincing e viden ce . See
Tex. Fam. Cod e Ann. § § 161.001(b), .206(a); In re E.N.C. , 384 S.W.3 d 796, 802 (Tex.
2012 ). Due pr oces s deman ds this heightened standard because “[a] parent al rights
termination proceeding encumbers a value ‘fa r more pre c ious than any prope rty

r ight.’ ” E.R. , 385 S.W .3d at 555 (quoting Santos ky , 455 U.S . at 758

– 5 9, 102 S. C t. at 1397). Evidence is clear and convin cing if it “will produce in the mind of the tri er of
fact a firm beli ef or conviction as to the truth of the al l egations sought to be

es tablis hed.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007; E.N. C. , 384 S.W .3d at 802

. For a tri al court to terminate a parent

– chi ld rela tionship, the party seeking
termination must es tablish, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) th e parent’s actions satisfy jus t one of th e many predicat e grounds (currently up to 21) that a re listed in F amily C ode S ection 161.001(b )(1), and (2) termin ation is in the child’s best
interest under S ec tion 161.001(b)(2). Te x. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1 ), (2);
E. N .C. , 384 S.W.3d at 803; In re J.L. , 163 S.W.3 d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005).
R eg arding S ubs ection 161 .001(b)(1) g rounds, the supreme court rec entl y artic ulated an important qualification: if the trial court finds grounds u nder S ub section (b)(1)(D) or (E)

— both of w h ich involve endange ring a chil d’s physical or emotional
well

- being

— an a ppellate co urt must r eview the (D ) or (E) grounds on appeal be caus e they have potential collateral consequences for othe r children the parent may have

. See
Tex. Fam. Code Ann . § 161.00 1 (b)(1)(M) (providin g tha t a pr ior termination under (D) or (E) is a gro und for ter minatin g p arental righ ts to a different ch ild) ; In re N .G. ,9 57 7 S.W.3d 230 , 237 (Tex. 201 9) (per curium) (“[I]f a court of appeals aff irms the

te rmination on either [(D) or (E)] grounds, it must provide the deta ils of its analy sis.” )

. T ermination may not be based sole ly on the c hild’s best interest as determined by th e fa ctfinder und er S ection 161.001(b)( 2)

. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v

. Boyd , 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (T ex. 1987); In re C.D.E. , 391 S.W.3d 287, 295 (Te x. App

. — Fort Wo rth 20 12, no pet.).
2
. Legal s uf ficiency
I n evaluati n g the evidence for legal sufficiency in pare ntal

- ter mina tion cases, we
determi ne whether the evidence is such that a fact finder could reason ably form a firm
belief or conviction that the D epartm ent prove d both the particular ground for
terminati on and tha t termination is in the child’s best inte rest
. In re J.F. C. , 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002); see In re J.P.B. , 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005 ) (per curiam) . We
revi ew all the evidence in th e ligh t most favorabl e to th e finding and judgment, and

we r esolve a ny disputed facts in favor of the finding if a reason able factfin der could
have done so. J. F.C. , 96 S.W.3d at 266. We also must disreg ard all evidence th at a

reaso nable factfinder could ha ve dis believed, in ad dition to considering undisputed
eviden ce even if it is contrary to the finding. Id. That is, we con side r eviden ce f

avorable to terminatio n if a reasonable factfinder cou ld, and we disregard contrary
evidence u nless a reasonable factfi nder c ould not. See i d. In d oing our job, we cannot weigh wi tness

- c r ed ibility issues that depend on the witness’s appeara nce and
deme anor ; that is the factfind er’s province. J.P.B. , 180 S.W.3 d at 573. A nd even when10 credib ility issu es appear in the appellat e reco rd, we defer to the fa ctfinder’s
determinations as lon g as th e y are not unreasonable. Id.
3
. Factual s ufficiency
We mus t perfor m “a n exacting review of t he entire record” in determining
whether th e evidence is factu ally suffi cient to support terminat ing a parent

– child

re lations hip. In re A.B. , 437 S.W.3d 49 8, 500 (T e x. 2014). In a factual

- sufficiency
review , we give du e de ference to t he factfinder’s findin gs and do not supplant the judgm ent with ou r own. In re H.R.M. , 209 S.W. 3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) ( p er c u riam)

. We deter mine whether, on the entire record, a factfind e r c ould reasona bly form a firm conviction or belief that the paren t vi olated a n al leged ground and that termination is
in the child’s be st interest . Tex. Fam. Code An n. § 161.001(b); see I n re C .H. , 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002). If, in light of the entire rec ord, the dis puted evidence
that a reasonable factfinder could n ot h ave cred ited in favor of the findi ng is so significant that a fact finder coul d not reasonably ha ve formed a firm belie f or

c onviction in th e truth of its findi ng, then the evidence is f a ctu ally insuffi cient.
H.R.M. , 209 S.W.3d at 108.
B. Grounds under (D) and (E)
1
. Law

“ Endanger ” means to ex pose to loss or injury, or to j eopardize a child’s
emoti onal o r physical health

. Boyd , 727 S.W.2d at 5 33; In re J.T.G. , 121 S .W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. Ap p . — F ort Worth 2003 , no pet. )

. T he parent ’ s conduct need not be11 directe d at the chi ld n or must the child actu ally suffer injury in order to be endangere d
within the statut e’s meaning

. J.T.G. , 121 S.W.3d at 125

. Under (D), we examine evidence related to t he chi ld’s environm ent to determine if that environment endanger ed the c hild ’ s phy si cal or emotional well

b eing. T ex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D); J.T.G. , 121 S .W.3d at 125. A parent’s

c onduc t in the home c an create a n environment endanger ing a child’ s physical and

emot ional well

- being. J.T.G. , 121 S.W.3d at 125.

Under (E), we ask whether evid ence exist s that the parent had engaged in
conduct or knowingly placed the child wi th so meon e who had e nga ge d in co nduct

— inc luding acts , omissions, or failures to a ct

— that endanger ed the child ’ s physical or emotional well

- being. T ex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)( E ); J.T.G. , 121 S.W.3d at
125. Additionally, (E) requires not just a s ingle act or omissi on bu t rather a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious cour se of co n duct. J.T.G. , 121 S.W.3d at 125. We may conduct a consolidated review of (D) and (E) grounds when the evidence pertaining to both is interrelated, as i t is here. See In re M.R.J.M. , 280 S.W.3d
4 94, 503 (Tex. App.

— Fo rt Worth 200 9, no pet.) (op. on reh’g).
2
. Evidence
T he Departm ent previousl y removed Mary in 2015 after she had tested positive for methamphet amines at birth. Mother had a h istory of drug use and had be e n hom eless throug h much of her pregnancy. During the fi r st case, both parents cooperated with the Department , and the court ordered Mary returned to Mother

.12 As for Charles, the order allowed him on ly supervised visi ts with Mary un til he complied with drug testing

. Charles never submitt ed to d rug testing, but Mother let
him have unsupervised visit s anyway . The CAS A 4 worker thought that Cha r les ’ s having unsupervised visits u nder t hose cir cu mstances enda ngered Mary ’ s mental, emotional, or physical well

- being.
Char les ’ s unsupervised vi sits were not, however, what prompted the se cond
suit. T he Departme nt initiated that re moval in No vemb er 2018 after receiv ing a refer ral about Charles ’ s and Mother ’ s un stable housing and Mary ’ s being exposed to drug s. T he Department event ually located Mary at G randmother ’ s house. Mar y again

test ed positive f or methampheta m ines. At that time, Mary had been liv ing with A unt and U ncle at their home since October 2018; G randmother would babys i t Mary at Grandmother ’ s house during the day while Aun t and Un cle were at work

. 5 Aunt , U ncle, Gra ndmother, and
Grandfather were Mary ’ s c aregivers at that time , and a ll four tested ne g ative for drugs. Meanwhile, the Dep artment could not contact

— and t hus could not dr ug test

— either
Char les or Mother

.

4 Court

- appointed s pecial advocate. See In re J.P.

- L. , 592 S. W.3d 559, 571 n.16 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2019 , pet. d enied ).

5 Aunt explained that w hen Mar y first came into her home, A unt thought that t he situatio n would be te m p orary beca use Charles and Mother had just been evic ted, b u t Charles and Mother “ nev er d id get their lives t og ether. ”13 N onetheless, the testimony at trial was that Mary ’ s hair

- follicle drug test could
detect the presence of any drugs within a three

- month time frame. T he second
removal and Mary ’ s associated hair

- fol licle d rug testing occurred in Nov ember 2018. Thus, Mary could have been exposed to th e drugs detected in her hair

- follicle drug

test in Au gust or Septe mber , while she was still in Charles ’ s an d Mother ’ s car e

— and before Mary went into Aunt and Uncle ’ s home in October 2018

. Other evi dence tied Charles to methamphetamines. A fter the second rem oval, police incarcerated Charles twice in the Denton Cou nty Jai l for possession of methamp h e tamin es

— once in December 2018 a nd once in April 2019

— and a grand jury indict ed him for state

- j ail felonies for both offenses

. See Tex. Health & Safety
Cod e Ann. § 481.115( a), (b).
A nd other evidence linked Mot her to continued d rug use , too
. I n May or June
2019 , Mother g a ve b irth to an other child t hat tested positive for methamphetamines

. Ne ither Charles nor Mother appeared in Mary ’ s case until after th e Depar tme nt had removed this other child. One witness op in ed that neither Cha rles nor Mother
would have appeared in M ary ’ s c ase at all but for the Department ’ s removing Mary ’ s sibling

. Charles ’ s and Mother ’ s a ppearing i n Mar y ’ s cas e had consequen c es. I n Ju ly 2019, the trial court suspended C h arles ’ s and Mother ’ s visitations becaus e both had
ad mitted cont inuing and act ive drug use. T he CASA worker agreed with suspending
their visit at ion because n either parent had s een Mar y in “ a significant period of time ”14 a nd because neither had shown an y commitment to getting Mary back , unlike the y had in the first case

. The t rial court state d that visitation would resume only after each
had s ubmit ted a cl ean urine te st. But a fter that hearing, neither parent ever su bmitt ed

a urine test at all

. By the t ime of trial i n November 2019, n either Char les nor Mother ha d seen Mary in over a year. They had not even aske d the CA SA wor ker about their daughter

. T he C ASA worker tho ught that both Charles and Mother were still using drugs and

t hat both r emain ed homeless. She noted that d rugs and homeless ness had c aused Mary ’ s remova l in 2015 and that in Novembe r 2019, Charles and Mo ther were still

stru ggling with both issues

. T he Department ’ s conservatorship wo rker stated that neither Charles nor
Mother had initiated or participated in a ny services. T h us, she had n o drug

- test results
for Charl es. G rand father t estified that Mother was unfit to pare nt beca use she had had a drug pr oblem for about ei ght years and h ad struggled with homelessness for at l east the past two years. H e d id not know where Moth er currently liv ed, but he kne w that
she was sti ll living with Charles. Grandfath er th ought that i f Mary were returned to
Charles and Mother , Mary w ould be en d angered. From doctor s ’ reports, Grandfat her
believe d that Charles and Mot her ha d already ha rmed M ary ’ s e m otional and phys ical
well

- being.15 A unt testi fied that when Mary f ir st came into her home, Mary ’ s behavior
indicat ed that she had experience d trauma and loss. Mary we t her bed , had nightmares , and ex perienced night terrors. With time, Mary no longer exhibited those
behaviors. Aunt also asserted that Mary ’ s having tested pos itive for drugs was dangerous to Mary ’ s phys ical, mental, and emotional well

- b eing. Accor di ng to A unt , Charles and Mot her never stopped using drugs and never found housing

. Aunt said
that after th e second remov al, Charles and Mother never offered any support and never sent Mary any cards, gift cards, clothe s, shoes, or school suppli e s. 3. Discussion

a. Dru gs Charles used drugs. A parent ’ s use of illegal drug s

— and the drug ’ s effect on his
or he r ability t o parent

— may qualify a s endangering conduct. See In re J.O.A. , 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 200 9)

. Charles ar gues that there was no evidence at trial of a posi tive drug test for him. But that was because Charles had not submitted to drug testing. The court co uld have re asonabl y inferred that Charles avoided testing after
the 2016 order and both before and after the second removal in 2018 beca use he was
sti ll using drugs. See In re W. E.C. , 110 S.W.3d 231, 239 ( T ex. App.

— F ort Wor th 2003, no pet.).
b. Instability
Ch arles was homeless or , at the very least, lacked stable ho using. See In re
A.R.O. , 556 S.W.3 d 903, 911 (T ex. App.

— El Paso 2018, no pet.) (conside ring16 mothe r ’ s homelessness as evidence of conduct endange ring her child ’ s physical or
emotional well

- being)

. “A s a general rule, c onduct th at subject s a child to a life of

unce rtainty and instability end angers the ph ysical and emotional well

- being of a
child.” In re R.W. , 129 S.W.3d 732, 73 9 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).

c. Criminal conduct
Whil e the case was pending, Charl es had been arrest ed twice and was facin g

t w o i ndic t ments. C riminal conduc t, conviction s, a nd imprisonment are relevan t when
determini ng whether a parent has engaged in an endangering course of conduct. I n re S.R. , 452 S.W.3d 351, 360

– 61 (Tex. App.

— Housto n [ 14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied);
A.S. v . Tex. Dep ’ t of Family & Protectiv e Servs. , 394 S.W.3d 703, 712

– 13 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 2012, no pet.). Imprisonment alone is not an endangering c ourse of c onduct but is a fact properly considered on the endangerment iss ue. Boyd , 727 S.W.2d at 533

– 34.
If i nc a r cerat ed, Cha rles would not be av ailable to pa rent Mary ; only Mother would be

. d. M other And Charles remained with Mother, who, like Charles, used drugs. When
Mothe r gave birt h to Mary, Mary test ed p ositive for methamphetamines , and when
M other gave birth to another child while Mary ’ s case was p ending, that chi ld too

tes t ed positive for methamphetamines

. See M.R.J.M. , 280 S.W.3d at 502

– 0 6 (concluding evidence was factually sufficient to support term in ati on of fath er ’ s rights under ( D) and (E) when father allo wed child to remain with mother despite
k nowle dg e of mother ’ s past drug use ).17 e. Indiffe rence A f ter the Department removed Mary, Charles did not see her . He did not sen d
her so much a s a car d

. Not vis iting a child endangers a child ’ s emotional well

- being.
See A.R.O. , 556 S. W.3d at 911 ( “ [ Mother ] als o end a ngered [her c hild ’ s] emoti onal
well

- being by failing to regularl y visit with her

. ” ).
f. Mar y test ed positive
W hen the Department re moved Mary, she test e d positive for
metha mph etamines. Charles and Mother were the only p ersons who could have exposed Mar y to the drugs given that (1) M o ther permitted Charles unsupervised
visita ti on with Mary despite his noncompliance with the 2016 order, (2) Mother later
had another baby that tested positive f or methampheta mines, (3) Charles was later arrested twice for possess ion of methamphetamines, and (4 ) Mary ’ s other caregivers at the time of her removal in 2018 all tested negative with a hair

- follicle drug test.
g. Mary ex hibi ted tra umatized behavior
And when M ary came into Aunt ’ s care, both Aunt an d Grandfather believed
that Mary ’ s behavi or s uggest ed that she had experienced traum a while wi th Charles
and Moth er . Mary ’ s attorney had recommended suspending Charles ’ s and Moth er ’ s visitation rights because it was “ tra umatic for [Mary] to see .

. . her biological pare nt s. ”
After Ma ry had been l iv ing with Aunt and Uncle and af ter Grandmother had been babys itting her , Mary ’ s disconcerting behavior eventually stopped.18 h. Holding and ruling
We hold that the evidence suffi ces both legal ly and factually to support the findings that Charles

• know ing ly placed or knowingly allowed Ma ry t o remain in conditions o r surround ing s that endangered her physical or emotional well

- being and

• engaged i n conduct or knowingly place d Mary wit h persons who engaged in conduc t that endangered Mary ’ s phy sical or emotion al well

- being. See Tex. Fam. Co de Ann. § 161.002(b)(1)(D) , (E); J.F.C. , 96 S.W.3d at 265

– 66 (stat ing that to be legally sufficient, the evidence must be such that a factfinder coul d reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the Department ’ s allegations); C.H. , 89 S.W .3 d at 25 (stating that to be factually sufficient, on t he entire record, a factfinder must be able to reasonabl y form a firm conviction or belief t hat the parent violated an alle ged ground).
We overrule Char les ’ s second and third i ssues attacking the le ga l and factual
sufficien cy of the trial court ’ s (D) an d (E) fi n dings.
C. Ground s under (B), ( C), (F), ( N), ( O), and (P ) Having found the evidence lega lly and factually sufficient un der (D) and (E),
we need not address Charles ’ s iss ues attacking the remainin g grounds under ( B ) , (C), (F), (N), (O ), and (P)

. See N .G. , 577 S.W.3d at 237 n.1; E.N.C. , 384 S.W.3d at 803. We

t hus overrule as moot Cha rles ’ s rem a in ing evidentiary

- sufficiency i ssu es . Conclusion Having overruled all of Charles ’ s issues , we affirm the t rial court ’ s judgment.19 /s/ Elizabeth Kerr Elizab eth Kerr J ustice
Delivered: April 23, 2020