[Cite as State v. Hudson, 2017-Ohio-7406.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 105177

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

MARTEZ HUDSON

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED 

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-14-586423-C 

BEFORE: McCormack, J., E.A. Gallagher, P.J., and Boyle, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 31, 2017 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

David L. Doughten 

David L. Doughten Co. L.P.A. 

4403 St. Clair Avenue 

Cleveland, OH 44103 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Michael C. O’Malley 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: Mahmoud S. Awadallah 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

Justice Center, 9th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, OH 44113 
TIM McCORMACK, J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Martez Hudson appeals from his conviction following 

a guilty plea. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

Procedural and Substantive History

{¶2} In May 2014, Hudson and two codefendants were indicted on multiple 

charges, including murder, grand theft, tampering with evidence, and aggravated riot, 

stemming from a gang-related shooting at a March 2014 party. At his arraignment on 

July 8, 2014, Hudson pleaded not guilty to all counts. 

{¶3} On September 14, 2015, Hudson withdrew his not guilty plea and pleaded 

guilty to Count 2, murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A), and Count 7, tampering with 

evidence, in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1). The murder count included one- and 

three-year firearm specifications and a criminal gang activity specification. In exchange 

for his guilty plea, the state agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. 

{¶4} On December 22, 2015, the trial court sentenced Hudson to life with parole 

eligibility after 15 years on the murder in Count 2, to be served consecutively to a 

three-year term for the corresponding firearm specification. The trial court then 

sentenced Hudson to a concurrent three-year term for the tampering with evidence charge 

in Count 7. The trial court deleted the criminal gang activity specification at the state’s 

request. 
Guilty Plea

{¶5} In his first and only assignment of error, Hudson maintains that his guilty 

plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the court failed to 

advise him of his right to present a defense. 

{¶6} The underlying purpose of Crim.R. 11(C) is to convey certain information 

to a defendant so that he or she can make a voluntary and intelligent decision regarding 

whether to plead guilty. State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 479-480, 423 N.E.2d 115 

(1981). “The standard for reviewing whether the trial court accepted a plea in 

compliance with Crim.R. 11(C) is a de novo standard of review.” State v. Cardwell, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92796, 2009-Ohio-6827, ¶ 26, citing State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 

86, 364 N.E.2d 1163 (1977). 

{¶7} In order to ensure that a defendant enters a plea knowingly, voluntarily, and 

intelligently, a trial court must engage in an oral dialogue with the defendant in 

accordance with Crim.R. 11(C). State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 

(1996). Crim.R. 11(C) outlines the trial court’s duties in accepting guilty pleas: 

(2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a 

plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest 

without first addressing the defendant personally and doing all of the 

following: 

(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with 

understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum 

penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible 

for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at 

the sentencing hearing. 
(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant 

understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the 

court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and 

sentence. 

(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant 

understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to 

jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have 

compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, 

and to require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be 

compelled to testify against himself or herself. 

{¶8} Trial courts must strictly comply with the requirements related to the waiver 

of constitutional rights under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) in conducting plea colloquies, and a 

trial court’s failure to inform a defendant of any right in that subsection invalidates the 

plea. State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 1. “Strict 

compliance does not require an exact recitation of the precise language of the rule, but 

instead focuses on whether the trial court explained or referred to the right in a manner 

reasonably intelligent to that defendant.” State v. Schmick, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

95210, 2011-Ohio-2263, ¶ 8. 

{¶9} After a thorough review of the plea hearing, we conclude that the trial court 

fully complied with Crim.R. 11 in ensuring that Hudson’s plea was knowing, intelligent, 

and voluntary. 

{¶10} Here, the record indicates the court conducted a full Crim.R. 11 hearing 

before accepting Hudson’s plea. At the plea hearing, the state presented the charges, the 

maximum penalties for the charges, and the effects of Hudson’s plea as it related to the 

charges. 
{¶11} Subsequently, the court engaged Hudson in a Crim.R. 11 colloquy. Hudson 

advised the court that he was not under the influence of any medication or drugs. The 

court then thoroughly reviewed the constitutional rights that Hudson was waiving and 

made sure that he understood that he was waiving those rights by pleading guilty. 

Hudson confirmed that no threats or promises had been made to induce him to enter a 

guilty plea. 

{¶12} The court reviewed the nature of the charges with Hudson, as well as the 

maximum penalty for each charge. Hudson confirmed that he was satisfied with the 

representation he had received from his attorneys. Hudson also confirmed that there was 

nothing about the case or proceedings that he did not understand or would like explained 

more fully. The trial court accepted Hudson’s guilty plea, finding that it was voluntarily 

and knowingly entered after Hudson was fully advised of his constitutional rights. 

{¶13} Hudson maintains that the trial court failed to address Hudson directly and 

ask if he knew that he had a right to present a defense. Hudson bases this argument on 

the trial court’s failure to ask additional questions, such as whether Hudson had sufficient 

time to meet with his counsel and whether any possible defenses had been discussed. 

The trial court is not obligated to go beyond the requirements of Crim.R. 11 prior to 

accepting a guilty plea. State v. Williams, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 11MA131, 

2012-Ohio-6277, ¶ 39. A guilty plea is not rendered invalid because the defendant was 

not informed of a right or waiver not enumerated in Crim.R. 11. State v. Railing, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 67137, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 4703, 2 (Oct. 20, 1994). The trial 
court’s thorough explanation of Hudson’s rights was sufficient for strict compliance with 

Crim.R. 11. The court explained Hudson’s right to a trial by jury, to representation by 

an attorney, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, to have the state prove his guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which he cannot be compelled to testify against 

himself, and to subpoena witnesses on his own behalf. All of these rights are 

encompassed by the right to present a defense, and nothing in the record demonstrates 

that the court’s colloquy was deficient with regard to these rights. 

{¶14} Accordingly, in light of Hudson’s knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea 

agreement, Hudson’s assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶15} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. Case remanded to the trial court for 

execution of sentence. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

________________________________________ 

TIM McCORMACK, JUDGE 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J., and 

MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR