UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4317

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

DONNIE RAYVON VERDELL,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,

Jr., District Judge. (1:08-cr-00320-WO-1)

Submitted: November 18, 2010 Decided: November 29, 2010

Before SHEDD and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James B. Craven III, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Terry Michael Meinecke, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Donnie Rayvon Verdell pled guilty to conspiracy to 

distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846

(2006), and felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2006). He received a 168-month 

sentence. On appeal, counsel for Verdell has filed a brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting 

that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but 

questioning whether (1) Verdell’s appellate waiver is 

enforceable; (2) counsel below rendered ineffective assistance; 

(3) Verdell’s voluntary post-arrest statements were detrimental 

to him; and (4) Verdell’s sentence is reasonable. Although 

informed of his right to do so, Verdell has not filed a pro se 

supplemental brief. We affirm.

Counsel first challenges the enforceability of 

Verdell’s appellate waiver. However, the Government has not 

filed a motion to dismiss asserting the waiver, and we do not 

sua sponte enforce appellate waivers. See generally United 

States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing 

United States v. Brock, 211 F.3d 88, 90 n.1 (4th Cir. 2000)). 

Accordingly, we find this issue is moot.

We review a sentence for reasonableness under an 

abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 

38, 51 (2007). This review requires appellate consideration of 
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both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a 

sentence. Id. This court must assess whether the district 

court properly calculated the advisory Guidelines range, 

considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, analyzed any 

arguments presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained 

the selected sentence. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576 

(4th Cir. 2010) (“[A]n individualized explanation must accompany 

every sentence.”); United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 

(4th Cir. 2009) (same). In addition, this court presumes a 

sentence within a properly determined advisory Guidelines range 

is substantively reasonable. United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 

178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007).

We conclude that Verdell’s sentence is both 

procedurally and substantively reasonable. The district court 

properly calculated Verdell’s Guidelines range (262 to 327 

months of imprisonment), treated the Guidelines as advisory, and 

considered the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. See

United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007). 

Given the circumstances of Verdell’s case, the district court 

granted a downward variance to the twenty-year mandatory 

minimum, and then granted the Government’s motion for a thirty 

percent downward departure, based on Verdell’s substantial 

assistance, to 168 months’ imprisonment. The district court 

clearly based its sentence on its individualized assessment of 
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the facts of the case, and we conclude the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in imposing the chosen sentence.

Verdell also suggests counsel was ineffective in not 

raising defenses of jurisdiction and/or innocent possession of 

the firearm. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are 

not cognizable on direct appeal unless the record conclusively 

establishes that counsel provided ineffective assistance. 

United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2006). 

We find that Verdell’s claims are not ripe for review at this 

time.

As required by Anders, we have reviewed the record and 

find no meritorious issues for review.*

 * As counsel concedes, Verdell’s post-arrest admissions were 

voluntary and we find no meritorious issue for appeal in this 

regard. 

 Accordingly, we affirm 

the district court’s judgment and deny counsel’s motion to 

withdraw. This court requires that counsel inform Verdell in 

writing of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United 

States for further review. If Verdell requests that a petition 

be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be 

frivolous, counsel may then move in this court for leave to 

withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that 

a copy thereof was served on Verdell. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 
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presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED