UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 01-4333

JAMES MICHAEL HILL,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston.

Charles H. Haden II, Chief District Judge.

(CR-00-215)

Submitted: January 29, 2002

Decided: February 21, 2002

Before WILKINS, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Brian A. Glasser, BAILEY & GLASSER, L.L.P., Charleston, West

Virginia, for Appellant. Charles T. Miller, United States Attorney, R.

Booth Goodwin, II, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston,

West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 
OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

James Michael Hill pled guilty to aiding and abetting the distribution of cocaine under 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1) (West 1999 & Supp.

2001) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1994), and was sentenced to ninety-six

months imprisonment. (J.A. 129-30). Hill’s attorney has filed a brief

under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Counsel states that

there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but raises the following

issues, whether: (1) Hill’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary;

(2) the district court had jurisdiction to accept the guilty plea for an

unspecified amount of cocaine; (3) Hill’s sentence is invalid in light

of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); and (4) Hill’s sentence was properly enhanced under the Sentencing Guidelines for use

of a weapon and obstruction of justice. For the reasons that follow,

we affirm. 

First, the record reveals that Hill’s plea of guilty was knowing and

voluntary and that the district court did not commit reversible error

in conducting its Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy with him. United States

v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400, 402 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. DeFusco,

949 F.2d 114, 117 (4th Cir. 1991). 

Second, Hill argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to

accept his guilty plea to aiding and abetting the distribution of an

unspecified amount of cocaine. This claim fails under this court’s

recent decision in United States v. Dinnall, 269 F.3d 418, 424 (4th

Cir. 2001). In Dinnall we upheld the defendant’s guilty plea conviction to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute an unspecified

amount of cocaine base but remanded for the district court to resentence Dinnall within the twenty-year statutory maximum conviction

under 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(C). Id. at 420-24. Thus, in the instant

case, the district court had jurisdiction to accept Hill’s guilty plea. 

Third, we decline Hill’s invitation to adopt the reasoning in United

States v. Flowal, 234 F.3d 932 (6th Cir. 2000), in which the Sixth Circuit suggested that Apprendi is implicated whenever a factual finding

exposes a defendant to a higher sentence. Flowal is inconsistent with

the Apprendi opinion itself, and we have held that Apprendi does not

2 UNITED STATES v. HILL
require the government to submit to a jury facts relevant to sentence

enhancements that do not extend the sentence beyond the statutory

maximum. United States v. Kinter, 235 F.3d 192, 201-02 (4th Cir.

2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1393 (2001). 

Finally, Hill argues that his sentencing enhancements for possession of a dangerous weapon under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) (2000) and for obstruction of justice under USSG

§ 3C1.1 were erroneous. Because Hill failed to object to these

enhancements in the district court, we review the claims only for plain

error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993); United

States v. Cedelle, 89 F.3d 181, 184-86 (4th Cir. 1996). Testimony at

the sentencing hearing reveals that Hill did carry a nine-millimeter

pistol during at least one drug transaction and that he threatened the

life of a witness who cooperated with the government. Accordingly,

we find that both enhancements were proper. 

We have examined the entire record* in this case in accordance

with the requirements of Anders, and find no meritorious issues for

appeal. Accordingly, we affirm. This court requires that counsel

inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court

of the United States for further review. If the client requests that a

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be

frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw

from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof

was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

*This review includes the issues raised in Hill’s supplemental pro se

informal briefs. 

UNITED STATES v. HILL 3