* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secr etary of Health and

Human Services in social security cases were transf erred to the Commissioner of Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. Pursuant to Fe d. R. App. Proc. 43(c), Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, is subs tituted for Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, as the defe ndant in this action. Although we have substituted the Commissioner for the Secretary in the caption, in the text we continue to refer to the Secretary b ecause she was the appropriate party at the time of the underlying decision.

** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 1/3/97 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

HAROLD BELL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security Administration, *

Defendant-Appellee. No. 95-7107 (D.C. No. CV-94-437) (E.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
Before TACHA, BALDOCK, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.-2-

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties' request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Claimant Harold Bell appeals from an order of the d istrict court affirming the final decision of the Secretary of Health and H uman Services denying his applications for social security disability and sup plemental security income (SSI) benefits. Claimant contends he has been disabled s ince 1979 due to multiple impairments including alcoholism, mental problems, tuberculosis and right heel fracture. The administrative law judge (ALJ) denie d benefits at step five of the five-part sequential process for determining disabi lity. See Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988)(discussing fi ve-step process). The ALJ determined that, while claimant could not return to his past medium work, he retained the residual functional capacity to perform light work and could perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy. The ALJ therefore concluded that claimant was not disabled. The Appe als Council affirmed, making the ALJ's determination the final decision of the S ecretary. We have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 2 8 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the Secretary's decision to determine whethe r it is supported by substantial-3-

evidence and whether the correct legal standards we re applied. Washington v. Shalala , 37 F.3d 1437, 1439 (10th Cir. 1994). Substantial evidence is adequate relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might acce pt to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Claimant's insured status expired on December 31, 1 985. Thus, to be entitled to disability benefits, he must prove he w as totally disabled by this date.
See Henrie v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Se rvs. , 13 F.3d 359, 360 (10th Cir. 1993). To be entitled to SSI benefits, claimant must show that he is totally disabled, but he cannot receive benefits fo r any period prior to the filing of his application in September 1992. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.335. Although it is not clear from his briefs whether he has dropped his cl aim for disability benefits, claimant's arguments on appeal address his claimed impairments in the 1990s. In any event, there is virtually no evidence to support a claim of disability prior to December 31, 1985, and we affirm the denial of disability benefits. We next address claimant's claim for SSI benefits. Claimant's first group of arguments challenges the ALJ's assessment of his mental residual functional capacity. He claims that assessment is not supported by substantial evidence because (1) the ALJ did notproperly relate the evidence to his conclusions recorded on the Psychiatric Revi ew Technique form; (2) the ALJ failed to properly develop the record by failin g to obtain psychiatric evidence-4-

for the twelve-month period prior to his denial dec ision; and (3) the ALJ failed to properly address the side effects of appellant's mi tigating medication. Claimant did not raise the first two arguments in the distr ict court. We therefore will not consider them. Crow v. Shalala , 40 F.3d 323, 324 (10th Cir. 1994). Claimant had a history of alcohol abuse. However, he stopped drinking in August 1992. He thus did not exhibit the loss of s elf-control necessary to establish disability based on alcoholism. See Coleman v. Chater , 58 F.3d 577, 579-80 (10th Cir. 1995). Claimant was diagnosed as having other mental health problems, though there was some question whether th ey were independent of his alcoholism, see Appellant's App., Vol. II at 242. None of claimant's treating physicians indicated that these problems were disab ling, and the ALJ found them to be adequately controlled through medication. Cl aimant contends that the ALJ failed to adequately consider claimant's testimony regarding the side effects of his medication (it made him drowsy), but there was conf licting evidence on the seriousness of these side effects. Credibility det erminations are the province of the ALJ. Hamilton v. Secretary of Health & Human S ervs. , 961 F.2d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir. 1992). We conclude that substantial evi dence supports the ALJ's determination that claimant's mental impairments di d not significantly compromise his ability to perform light work.-5-

Claimant also contends that the Secretary failed to meet her step-five burden because she improperly relied on the Medical -Vocational Guidelines (Grids), improperly equated unskilled work with non stressful work, and failed to elicit vocational testimony based on questions refl ecting his limitations. Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion that claimant's mental health impairments did not significantly compromise his ab ility to perform light work, the ALJ's reliance on the grids was permissible. S ee Gossett v. Bowen , 862 F.2d 802, 807-08 (10th Cir. 1988). We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

Entered for the Court

Mary Beck Briscoe Circuit Judge