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RANDY RENICK (CA Bar No. 179652)

(Email: rrr@hadsellstormer.com)

CORNELIA DAI (CA Bar No. 207435)

(Email: cdai@hadsellstormer.com)

HADSELL STORMER RENICK & DAI, LLP

128 North Fair Oaks Avenue, Suite 204

Pasadena, California 91103-3645

Telephone: (626) 585-9600

Fax: (626) 577-7079

Lead Plaintiffs’ Counsel 

[Additional Counsel Listed on Next Page]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA – OAKLAND

JON VALLIERE, EILEEN FOSTER, ANTONIO 

GARCIA, and SAMANTHA WEST, individually 

and on behalf of all similarly situated current and 

former employees,

Plaintiffs,

v.

TESORO REFINING AND MARKETING 

COMPANY LLC, TESORO LOGISTICS GP, LLC, 

and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, 

 

Defendants.

JINETRA BONNER, individually, on behalf herself 

and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

TESORO REFINING & MARKETING 

COMPANY, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability 

Company; and DOES 1 through 100 inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 4:17-cv-00123-JST

Assigned to the Hon. Jon S. Tigar

PLAINTIFFS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND 

MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND 

REIMBURSEMENT OF COSTS

DATE: December 16, 2020

TIME: 2:00 p.m.

PLACE: Oakland Courthouse, 

 Courtroom 6, 2nd Floor

[Declarations and Exhibits filed concurrently 

herewith]

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JAY SMITH (CA Bar No. 166105)

(Email: js@gslaw.org)

JOSHUA F. YOUNG (CA Bar No. 232995)

(Email: jyoung@gslaw.org)

GILBERT & SACKMAN

A LAW CORPORATION

3699 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1200

Los Angeles, California 90010

Telephone: (323) 938-3000

Fax: (323) 937-9139

TIMOTHY D. COHELAN (CA Bar No. 60827)

(Email: tcohelan@ckslaw.com)

MICHAEL SINGER (CA Bar No. 115301)

(Email: msinger@ckslaw.com)

J. JASON HILL (CA Bar No. 179630)

(Email: jhill@ckslaw.com)

COHELAN KHOURY & SINGER

605 “C” Street, Suite 200

San Diego, CA 92101

Telephone: (619) 595-3001

Fax: (619) 595-3000

Attorneys for Plaintiffs John Valliere, Eileen Foster, Antonio Garcia,

Samantha West, and Jinetra Bonner on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page (s)

I. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1

II. BACKGROUND SUMMARY............................................................................................2 

III. THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT .................................................................................4

IV. ARGUMENT.......................................................................................................................5

A. Plaintiffs’ Fee Request for 25% of the Fund, $3,812,500, is Reasonable

Under Both the Percentage of the Fund and Lodestar Method................................5

1. Using the Percentage of Fund Method, Class Counsel's

Fee Request Is Reasonable...........................................................................6

a) Class Counsel Achieved an Excellent Result. .................................7

b) Class Counsel Litigated the Case on a Contingency

Basis and Faced Considerable Risk. ................................................8

c) The Skill and Quality of the Work Performed

by Class Counsel Merits Approval of the

Requested Fee Award. ...................................................................10

d) The Amount Requested to Compensate Class Counsel is

Reasonable in Comparison to Awards in Similar Cases................11

2. Based on Fees Calculated under the Lodestar Method,

Class Counsel’s Fee Request is Also Reasonable......................................12

a) Class Counsel’s Hourly Rates are Reasonable. .............................12

b) Plaintiffs’ Lodestar Amount for Hours Expended

Is Reasonable. ................................................................................12

c) An Upward Multiplier of 1.84 Is Modest and Justified

in this Case.....................................................................................15

B. The Costs that Class Counsel Seek for Reimbursement Are Reasonable. ............16

V. CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................17

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

In re Activision Sec. Litig.,

723 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1989)................................................................................................... 5

Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Sys. Lab., Inc.,

226 Cal. App. 4th 26 (2014) ............................................................................................................. 12

Augustus v. ABM Securities Services, Inc.,

2 Cal. 5th 257 (2016) ...................................................................................................................... 1, 9

Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp.,

297 F.R.D. 431 (E.D. Cal. 2013) .................................................................................................. 6, 10

Bell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,

No. 2:12-cv-02499 .............................................................................................................................. 9

In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.,

654 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2011) .......................................................................................................... 4, 6

Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert,

444 U.S. 472 (1980)............................................................................................................................ 4

Bravo v. Gale Triangle, Inc.,

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77714 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2017)................................................................. 11

In re Businessland Sec. Litig.,

1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8962 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 1991).................................................................. 17

Bussey v. Affleck,

225 Cal. App. 3d 1162 (1990) .......................................................................................................... 17

Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc.,

523 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2008) ............................................................................................................ 12

Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.,

162 Cal. App. 4th 43 (2008) ......................................................................................................... 5, 11

In re Consumer Privacy Cases,

175 Cal. App. 4th 545 (2009) ....................................................................................................passim

Craft v. City of San Bernardino,

624 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2008) ............................................................................................ 16

Dyer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

303 F.R.D. 326 (N.D. Cal. 2014)...................................................................................................... 16

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Cases

In re Equity Funding Corp. Sec. Litigation,

438 F. Supp. 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1977) ................................................................................................. 10

Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.,

150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998) .................................................................................................... 12, 15

Harris v. Marhoefer,

24 F.3d 16 (9th Cir. 1994) ................................................................................................................ 17

Hensley v. Eckerhart,

461 U.S. 424 (1983).......................................................................................................................... 14

In re Heritage Bond Litig.,

2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13555 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2005) ............................................................ 9, 11

Heritage Pac. Fin., LLC v. Monroy,

215 Cal. App. 4th 972 (2013) ........................................................................................................... 12

In re Immune Response Sec. Litig.,

497 F.Supp.2d 1166 (S.D. Cal. 2007)............................................................................................... 17

Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat., Inc.,

1 Cal. 5th 480 (2016) ................................................................................................................ 4, 5, 12

Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. Inc.,

231 Cal. App. 4th 860 (2014) ....................................................................................................... 5, 11

Lealao v. Beneficial Cal., Inc.,

82 Cal. App. 4th 19 (2000) ......................................................................................................... 12, 15

Linney v. Cellular Alaska P’ship,

151 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 1998) ............................................................................................................ 7

Lusby v. Gamestop Inc.,

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42637 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2015).................................................................. 6

Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n,

67 F.3d 1470 (9th Cir. 1995) .............................................................................................................. 4

Martin v. AmeriPride Servs.,

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61796 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 2011)................................................................... 11

Moore v. Jas H. Matthews & Co.,

682 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1982) ............................................................................................................ 14

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Cases

Navarro v. Servisair,

2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41081 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2010) ................................................................ 11

Norris v. Mazzola, 

2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41081 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2010) ...................................................................... 16

In re Omnivision Techs.,

559 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2007).............................................................................................. 5

Ontiveros v. Zamora,

303 F.R.D. 356 (E.D. Cal. 2014) ...................................................................................................... 16

Ozga v. U.S. Remodelers, Inc.,

2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91196 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2010).................................................................. 11

In re Pac. Enter. Sec. Litig.,

47 F.3d 373 (9th Cir. 1995) ................................................................................................................ 8

Reed v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc.,

2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 255 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2014)........................................................................ 16

Schiller v. David’s Bridal, Inc.,

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80776 (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2012)............................................................... 4, 6

Serrano v. Unruh,

32 Cal.3d 621 (1982) ........................................................................................................................ 14

Sproul v. Astrue,

2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12667 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2013).................................................................... 9

Stewart v. San Luis Ambulance, Inc.,

878 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2017) .............................................................................................................. 9

Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala,

1 F.3d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1993).............................................................................................................. 5

In re Vitamin Cases,

110 Cal. App. 4th 1041 (2003) ......................................................................................................... 14

Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.,

290 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2002) ...................................................................................................passim

Vo v. Las Virgenes Mun. Water Dist.,

79 Cal. App. 4th 440 (2000) ............................................................................................................. 14

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Cases

In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig.,

19 F.3d 1291 (9th Cir. 1994) .............................................................................................................. 4

Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.,

91 Cal. App. 4th 224 (2001) ........................................................................................................... 6, 7

Statutes

Cal. Lab. Code § 226 ................................................................................................................................ 1

Cal. Lab. Code § 226.75 (eff. Sept. 20, 2018).......................................................................................... 9

Cal. Labor Code § 887 (eff. Dec. 19, 2018) ............................................................................................. 9

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§17200 et seq. ................................................................................................... 2

Labor-Management Relations Act Section 301........................................................................................ 1

PAGA...............................................................................................................................................passim

Rules

Fed. Rule of Civ. Pro. 23(h)...................................................................................................................... 3

Fed. Rule of Civ. Pro. 30(b)(6)............................................................................................................. 1, 2

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TO DEFENDANTS AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on December 16, 2020, at 2:00 p.m., in Courtroom 6 of the 

above-entitled court, at 1301 Clay Street, Oakland, CA 94612, Plaintiffs John Valliere, Eileen Foster, 

Antonio Garcia, Samantha West, and Jinetra Bonner on behalf of themselves and others similarly 

situated current and former employees (collectively “Plaintiffs”), will move and hereby do move for an 

award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $3,812,500 (25% of the common fund) and costs in the amount 

of $49,093.73.

The motion will be based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the foregoing notice, points 

and authorities, and declarations and exhibits filed concurrently herewith, and the pleadings, records,

and files in this action.

DATED: September 4, 2020 HADSELL STORMER RENICK & DAI LLP

By: s/ Randy Renick

Attorneys for Plaintiffs 

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Jon Valliere, Eileen Foster, Antonio Garcia, Samantha West, and Jinetra Bonner (“Plaintiffs”), 

on behalf of themselves and the class which has been certified for purposes of settlement, submit this 

motion seeking an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $3,812,500 (25% of the settlement fund) 

and the reimbursement of costs in the amount of $49,093.73 from a proposed $15,250,000 class action 

settlement (“Settlement”) reached in this action with Defendants Tesoro Refining and Marketing 

Company LLC and Tesoro Logistics GP, LLC (“Defendants” or “Tesoro”). The fees and costs are 

sought in connection with the class action settlement of wage and hour claims brought on behalf of

all current and former employees of Defendants (or any of their affiliates or successors) 

who worked a rotating 8-hour, 10-hour, or 12-hour shift in operations at any time during 

the Class Period at the i) Martinez Refinery or Chem Plant in Martinez, California; ii) the 

Los Angeles Refinery, Carson Operations, in Carson and Long Beach, California; iii) the 

Los Angeles Refinery, Wilmington Operations, in Wilmington, California; iv) the Tesoro 

Logistics terminal facilities at the Martinez Refinery; and v) the Long Beach Terminal, 

T2, Berth 121, and East Hynes in Long Beach, Carson, Signal Hill, and/or Wilmington, 

California,

at any time during the period from July 19, 2013 through the date of Preliminary Approval (June 26, 

2020). Attached as Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Randy Renick (“Renick Decl.”) filed concurrently 

herewith is a true and correct copy of the Joint Stipulation of Class Action Settlement and Release

(“Settlement Agreement”), as amended by Exhibit 2, the Amendment to Joint Stipulation of Class 

Action Settlement and Release, which was preliminarily approved by this Court on June 26, 2020. Dkt. 

#117. The Settlement provides that Plaintiffs may seek reasonable fees and costs. Renick Decl., ¶14; 

Ex. 1 thereto, ¶¶ 51-57. 

Based on all of the relevant circumstances, the fees requested at the Ninth Circuits’ 25% of the 

fund benchmark is reasonable under the percentage of the fund with lodestar cross-check method. The 

high caliber skill and expertise of Class Counsel, and efficient litigation of the action, resulted in a 

settlement that confers a substantial benefit to the Class. Indeed, the estimated 1557 Class Members will 

receive an average payment of $7,204.56. In addition, there was considerable risk that litigation of the 

action, taken by Class Counsel on a contingency basis, would continue for many more years if the 

matter had not settled. Courts of this district and circuit have awarded fees in the amount of 25% of the 

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fund in similar cases with these same factors present. They have also found these factors warrant a 

positive multiplier for purposes of a lodestar cross-check, including ones much larger than the 1.84

multiplier sought here.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court award attorneys’ fees in the amount of 

$3,812,500 (25% of the common fund) and costs in the amount of $49,093.73.

II. BACKGROUND SUMMARY1

On January 10, 2017, Plaintiffs Chris Azpeitia, Eileen Foster, Antonio Garcia, and Samantha 

West commenced this class action against Defendants in Jon Valliere, et al. v. Tesoro Refining and 

Marketing Company, LLC, Tesoro Logistics GP, LLC, Case No. 3:17-cv-00123-JST, asserting, among 

other things, that Defendants require refinery, plant, and logistics operators to maintain radios during 

rest breaks in violation of the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of Wage Order No. 4-2001 in 

the Augustus v. ABM Securities Services, Inc., 2 Cal. 5th 257, 260 (2016) (“Augustus”) decision, which 

held rest periods cannot be “on call.” Dkt. #1. On March 21, 2017, Plaintiff amended the complaint to 

add claims under PAGA. Dkt. #21. Renick Decl., ¶¶ 15-16.

On April 17, 2017, Defendants moved to dismiss and strike portions of the amended complaint

on the grounds that Plaintiffs’ claims were preempted by Section 301 of the Labor-Management 

Relations Act, among other reasons. Dkt. #25. On July 21, 2017, the Court granted Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss as to Plaintiffs’ UCL claim under Labor Code § 226 and their claim for disgorgement under 

the UCL, and it denied the motion in all other respects. Dkt. #43. Renick Decl., ¶ 16.

On March 22, 2017, Plaintiff Jinetra Bonner commenced a class action in the Superior Court of 

California, County of Sacramento, Case No. 34-2017-00209750, against Defendants entitled Jinetra 

Bonner v. Tesoro Refining & Marketing Company LLC. On July 25, 2017, Bonner was related to the 

Azpeitia class action. Dkt. #27. On October 12, 2017, a Consolidated Class Action Complaint for 

Damages, Restitution, and Injunctive Relief was filed in Jon Valliere, et al. v. Tesoro Refining and 

Marketing Company, LLC, et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-00123-JST, consolidating the two actions and 

replacing Plaintiff Chris Azpeitia with Plaintiff Jon Valliere. Dkt. #56. Defendants answered the 

1 This motion includes only a summary of the relevant background as Plaintiffs will be filing a separate 

motion for final approval to be heard on the same date as the instant motion wherein the case history and

facts will be more fully set out.

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Consolidated Class Action Complaint on October 26, 2017, Dkt. #57. Renick Decl., ¶¶ 17-20. 

Both prior and subsequent to the filing and consolidation of the actions, Plaintiffs conducted a 

diligent investigation of Defendants’ wage and hour policies and practices with regard to rest breaks so 

as to evaluate liability and damages. Renick Decl., ¶¶ 21-23. In addition, in early 2018, the depositions 

of the following individuals were taken: Plaintiff Bonner on February 12, 2018; Plaintiff Valliere on 

February 14, 2018; and the FRCP 30(b)(6) witness Karen Kawano regarding Tesoro’s Los Angeles area 

facilities on February 15, 2018. Id.

Following agreement to attend a first mediation in April 2018, Defendants produced, and 

Plaintiffs reviewed, Defendants’ payroll data, the applicable base hourly rates, the number of operators 

and the number of shifts during the Class Period. Renick Decl., ¶ 24. Plaintiffs reviewed the extensive 

payroll data which allowed them to calculate the estimated total amount of damages for which 

Defendants would be liable were Plaintiffs successful in their efforts to certify the class and prevail at 

trial. Id. After a full day of negotiations, an agreement could not be reached. Id.

On July 18, 2018, the Parties attended a second mediation with David Rotman, an experienced 

and well-regarded wage and hour class action mediator in San Francisco. No settlement was reached.

Renick Decl., ¶ 25. Thereafter, the Parties aggressively litigated their respective positions. Plaintiffs 

interviewed dozens more putative Class Members about their job duties and responsibilities, and they 

obtained declarations in support of their class certification motion. Plaintiffs also took a FRCP 30(b)(6) 

deposition of Justin Lawrence regarding Tesoro’s Martinez locations on September 6, 2018. 

Defendants took the depositions of three putative Class Members, Larry Dorsz on September 10, 2018; 

Jay Shah on September 11, 2018; and Joe Bugby on September 13, 2018. Renick Decl., ¶¶ 26-27.

While Plaintiffs moved forward with drafting their class certification motion, Mediator Rotman 

remained involved and ultimately negotiated the proposed Settlement accepted by the Parties in midNovember 2018. The Settlement was then reduced to a written Joint Stipulation of Class Action 

Settlement and Release (the “Settlement Agreement”) and executed by all parties. Renick Decl., ¶ 28; 

Ex.1 thereto.

In conjunction with the proposed Settlement, the Parties stipulated to and filed with the Court’s 

approval Plaintiffs’ First Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint (“FACCAC”), which states 

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the following allegations: 1) Defendants did not provide Plaintiffs and the putative Class with compliant 

uninterrupted and off-duty rest breaks, and did not pay premium wages for non-compliant rest breaks; 

2) a derivative claim for not providing accurate wage statements; 3) penalties under PAGA, and 4) 

California Business & Professions Code §§17200 et seq. for unfair business practices based on the 

alleged non-compliant rest breaks, Dkt. #87-89. Renick Decl., ¶ 29.

On May 8, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Order Granting Preliminary Approval. Dkt. 

#90. On June 6, 2019, Class Members Rogers, McDonald, and Dumont filed a Partial Objection to the 

Preliminary Approval Motion asserting that the Settlement “conflicts with the [collective bargaining 

agreements] because it does not account for the Unions’ rights to dues deductions from the portion of 

the class members’ settlement payments allocated back wages.” Dkt. #96 at 5. Defendants and 

Plaintiffs filed responses to the objection on June 14 and 18, 2019, respectively, Dkt. #99-100. Renick 

Decl., ¶ 30.

On October 18, 2019, the Court issued an order denying preliminary approval noting two 

deficiencies to be corrected: the narrowing of the Class Members’ release, and the increasing of the 

Notice Response Deadline from 45 to 60 days for Class Members to submit objections and to request 

exclusion from the Settlement. Dkt. #106 at 8, 9. The Court declined to withhold preliminary approval 

on the basis of the objection, Dkt. #106 at 10. Renick Decl., ¶ 31.

The deficiencies identified by the Court were corrected as reflected in the Amendment to Joint 

Stipulation of Class Action Settlement and Release, Ex 2 to Renick Declaration, and Plaintiffs filed an 

unopposed renewed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement Agreement on November 18, 2019, 

see Dkt. #107. The Court granted the renewed Motion for Preliminary Approval on June 26, 2020, Dkt. 

#117. Renick Decl., ¶ 32.

III. THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

The total non-reversionary settlement amount is $15,250,000 paid by Defendants for the benefit 

of the Class. Dkt. #117 at 3; Renick Decl., Ex. 1, ¶ 32. The Settlement provides for cash payment to 

members of the settlement class according to the number of qualifying 8, 10, and 12-hour shifts worked 

by each Class Member during the class period; additional service awards not to exceed $7,500 for each 

of the five named Plaintiffs; $50,000 to penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”), 

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with 75% of the PAGA penalties ($37,500) being paid to the California Labor and Workforce 

Development Agency (“LWDA”) and 25% of the PAGA penalties ($12,500) being paid to Settlement 

Class Members who do not opt out; an estimated $45,000 to CAC Services for claims administration;

and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Renick Decl., ¶ 11, Ex. 1, ¶¶ 18, 32, 39, 44, 48, 50, 88.

IV. ARGUMENT

A. Plaintiffs’ Fee Request for 25% of the Fund, $3,812,500, Is Reasonable Under Both 

the Percentage of the Fund and Lodestar Method.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h) provides that “[i]n a certified class action, the court may 

award attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). Federal courts apply state law in diversity actions to determine “not only the right 

to fees, but also in the method of calculating the fees.” Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 67 F.3d 

1470, 1478 (9th Cir. 1995); accord Schiller v. David's Bridal, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-00616-AWI-SKO, 2012 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80776, at *42-43 (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2012). 

The common fund doctrine provides that “‘when a number of persons are entitled in common to 

a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs for the benefit of all results in the 

creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs may be awarded attorney’s fees out of 

the fund.’” Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat., Inc., 1 Cal. 5th 480, 497 (2016); see also Boeing Co. v. Van 

Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980)(“[A] litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit

of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee from the fund as a 

whole.”). Under California law, the choice of a fee calculation method for a fee award from a class 

action common fund “is generally one within the discretion of the trial court, the goal under either the 

percentage or lodestar approach being the award of a reasonable fee to compensate counsel for their 

efforts.” Laffitte, supra, 1 Cal. 5th at 504. Similarly, under Ninth Circuit law, “[w]here a settlement 

produces a common fund for the benefit of the entire class, courts have discretion to employ either the 

lodestar method or the percentage-of-recovery method” to award attorney’s fees. In re Bluetooth 

Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing In re Mercury Interactive Corp., 

618 F.3d 988, 992 (9th Cir. 2010)); Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002). 

“As always, when determining attorneys’ fees, the district court should be guided by the fundamental

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principle that fee awards out of common funds be ‘reasonable under the circumstances.’” In re Wash. 

Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291, 1296 (9th Cir. 1994).

In the last few decades, both federal and state courts have regularly approved a percentage fee 

calculation in determining a fee award where the class action settlement establishes a common fund for 

the benefit of the class out of which the attorney’s fee is awarded. Laffitte, 1 Cal. 5th at 493-94 (citing 

federal and state cases). In Laffitte, the California Supreme Court approved the percentage of the fund 

calculation under California law, holding that “trial courts have discretion to conduct a lodestar crosscheck on a percentage fee . . . [or] to forgo a lodestar cross-check and use other means to evaluate the 

reasonableness of the requested percentage fee.” Id. at 506. 

Courts have recognized a number of reasons and advantages in adopting the percentage of fund 

method for the fee calculation. In re Omnivision Techs., 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 

A primary reason is that “a percentage-of-the-fund approach more accurately reflects the economics of 

litigation practice,” which is “result-oriented.” Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 1261, 1269 (D.C. 

Cir. 1993). In a common fund case, as here, “the monetary amount of the victory is often the true 

measure of success, and therefore it is most efficient that it influence the fee award.” Id. In addition, 

courts have found use of the percentage of the fund method to be the “better practice” because it “will 

encourage plaintiffs’ attorneys to move for early settlement, provide predictability for the attorneys and 

the class members, and reduce the time consumed by counsel and court in dealing with voluminous fee 

petitions.” In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1378-79 (N.D. Cal. 1989). 

The Court, therefore, should apply a percentage of fund and lodestar cross-check approach. Its 

application will confirm that the requested fee award of 25% of the settlement fund, $3,812,500, is 

reasonable.

1. Using the Percentage of Fund Method, Class Counsel’s Fee Request Is 

Reasonable.

In approving the percentage of the fund method, the California Supreme Court in Laffitte

instructed only that courts “may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate 

percentage of the fund created.” 1 Cal. 5th at 503 (emphasis added). Looking to the range of fee 

awards, one-third of the total potential recovery is regularly awarded in California as a “reasonable” fee 

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in common fund cases. Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. Inc., 231 Cal. App. 4th 860, 878 (2014) 

(concluding that award of one-third the common fund was “consistent with, and in the range of, awards 

in other class action lawsuits”); In re Consumer Privacy Cases, 175 Cal. App. 4th 545, 557 n.13 (2009) 

(“‘Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is 

used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.’”); Chavez v. Netflix, Inc., 

162 Cal. App. 4th 43, 66 (2008)(same). Plaintiffs here request a fee award of 25% of the settlement 

fund, which is well below the average one-third of the recovery regularly awarded in such cases. 

“As there is no definitive set of factors that California courts mandate or endorse for determining 

the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees in the context of a common-fund percentage-of-the-benefit 

approach, [federal courts] consider the reasonableness of the percentage requested in light of the factors 

endorsed by the Ninth Circuit, with the 25 percent award as a starting point.” Schiller, 2012 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 80776, at *47 (applying percentage of the fund method in wage and hour class case); see, e.g., 

In re Consumer Privacy Cases, 175 Cal. App. 4th at 557 n.13 (citing Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona 

Citrus Growers, 904 F. 2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990)). Courts in the Ninth Circuit “typically calculate 

25% of the fund as the ‘benchmark’ for a reasonable fee award, providing adequate explanation in the 

record of any ‘special circumstances’ justifying a departure.” In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. 

Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit has identified a number of factors that 

courts may consider when determining whether an award is reasonable and whether a departure from 

the benchmark is appropriate, including: (1) the results achieved; (2) the risk of litigation; (3) the skill 

required; (4) the quality of work performed; (5) the contingent nature of the fee and the financial 

burden; and (6) the awards made in similar cases. See Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp., 297 

F.R.D. 431, 449 (E.D. Cal. 2013)(citing Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1047). 

As addressed herein, the fee award requested by Class Counsel at the Ninth Circuit’s 25% 

benchmark falls well within what has been deemed reasonable ranges under both California and Ninth 

Circuit law and is supported by the Vizcaino factors.

a) Class Counsel Achieved an Excellent Result.

Class Counsel achieved an excellent result in this case (the first Vizcaino factor). “The overall 

result and benefit to the class from the litigation is the most critical factor in granting a fee award.” 

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Lusby v. Gamestop Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42637, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2015). “Compromise 

is inherent and necessary in the settlement process . . . . [E]ven if the relief afforded by the proposed

settlement is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is 

no bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement 

in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.” Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc., 

91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 250 (2001)(internal quotations omitted). A settlement, therefore, need not obtain 

100% of the damages and may, in fact, provide only a fraction of the recovery sought to be found fair 

and reasonable. Linney v. Cellular Alaska P’ship, 151 F.3d 1234, 1242 (9th Cir. 1998); Wershba, 91 

Cal. App. 4th at 250.

Here, the net settlement to be distributed to the Class after the reduction of the LWDA payment 

for PAGA penalties, attorney’s fees, costs, incentive awards, and administration is $11,217,500.00.

2

 

Renick Decl., ¶ 12. The average payment to each of the 1557 Class Members is $7,204.56 with a 

median of $8,452.65. Class members who worked the highest number of Qualifying Shifts during the

almost seven year class period will receive as much as $15,261.89. Id. Class Counsel estimates the 

gross settlement is approximately 50% of the total damages that Plaintiffs could have recovered on the 

rest break and derivative claims. Id., ¶ 13. Thus, the financial benefit conferred upon the class is 

significant, and the settlement is an excellent result for the Class. See Renick Decl., ¶ 12; Declaration of 

Joshua F. Young (“Young Decl.”), ¶ 21; Declaration of Michael D. Singer (“Singer Decl.”), ¶¶ 9-10.

b) Class Counsel Litigated the Case on a Contingency Basis and Faced 

Considerable Risk.

The risk of further litigation and contingent nature of the fee and the financial burden, the 

second and fifth Vizcaino factors, favor approval of the requested fee award. See In re Pac. Enter. Sec. 

Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 379 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding fees justified because of the complexity of the issues 

and the risks).

Plaintiffs faced a considerable risk of further litigation here. Plaintiffs filed the case shortly after 

2 This calculation assumes that Plaintiffs seek the full amount of estimated costs of $100,000. As 

Plaintiff’s request for costs is only $49,093.73, the amount available to the Class increases by 

$50,906.27, resulting in a slight increase to the amount to be distributed to each Class Member. 

Plaintiffs will provide an exact calculation in connection with the Motion for Final Approval. Renick 

Decl. ¶ 12. 

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the California Supreme Court’s decision in Augustus v. ABM Security Services, Inc., 2 Cal. 5th 257 

(2016). While Plaintiffs believed that the decision provided clear guidance regarding employers’ rest 

break obligations under California law and confirmed Defendants’ failure to provide its operators with 

lawful rest breaks, courts have diverged in their interpretation and application of the decision. See, e.g., 

Bell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 2:12-cv-02499 JAM-CKD, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55442, at *5 

(E.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2017)(concluding Augustus not applicable because the court did not consider an onpremises rest break policy which does not require employees to remain on call); Stewart v. San Luis 

Ambulance, Inc., 878 F.3d 883, 886–87 (9th Cir. 2017)(concluding Augustus did not control question of 

whether ambulance employers are required to relieve ambulance attendants working 24-hour shifts of 

all duties during rest periods and certifying question to California Supreme Court). In addition, the 

California legislature has since been active in enacting exceptions. See Cal. Lab. Code § 226.75 (eff. 

Sept. 20, 2018)(employees holding safety-sensitive positions at petroleum refineries exempt from rest 

break laws to the extent they are required to carry radios, respond to emergencies, and remain on the 

employer’s premises during their shifts); Cal. Labor Code § 887 (eff. Dec. 19, 2018)(“[E]mergency 

ambulance employees shall remain reachable by a portable communications device throughout the 

entirety of each work shift.”). Renick Decl., ¶ 43.

Indeed, with class claims for violation of rest break and other wage and hour laws, litigation can 

extend for many years due to the many hurdles facing plaintiffs in class actions. See., e.g., Renick Decl., 

¶¶ 40-41 (class actions involving overtime, living wage, and/or meal and rest break violations litigated 

five years, six years, and more than 10 years before resolving). Accordingly, many more years of 

litigation and an appeal was a very real possibility here. 

Second, the fact that Class Counsel litigated this case on a contingency fee basis and has

foregone payment since the outset of the litigation supports the percentage sought in the instant motion. 

Renick Decl., ¶¶ 39, 44; Young Decl., ¶ 14; Singer Decl., ¶¶ 12, 15. “Courts are loathe to penalize 

experienced counsel for efficient representation under contingency agreements.” Sproul v. Astrue, 2013 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12667, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2013). “Courts consistently recognize that the risk of 

non-payment or reimbursement of expenses is a factor in determining the appropriateness of counsel’s 

fee award.” In re Heritage Bond Litig., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13555, at *68 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 

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2005). Thus, Class Counsel’s vigorous but efficient litigation of this case on a contingency fee basis 

with no certainty of recovery of its fees and costs supports an award of 25% of the common fund in 

attorneys’ fees. 

c) The Skill and Quality of the Work Performed by Class Counsel 

Merits Approval of the Requested Fee Award.

The experience, ability, and quality of Class Counsel’s work, the third and fourth Vizcaino 

factors, support the requested fee award. Class Counsel in this case has extensive experience 

successfully litigating wage-and-hour class actions, as well as other types of employment actions. 

Renick Decl., ¶¶ 4-10; Ex. 5 thereto; Young Decl., ¶¶ 2-5, 7; Exhibit 1 thereto; Singer Decl., ¶¶ 2-8.

These attorneys, at the firms Hadsell Stormer Renick & Dai, Gilbert & Sackman, and Cohelan Khoury,

& Singer have been recognized for their skill and expertise in the field of employment and class action 

litigation. Id. The skill of these attorneys, the reputation of the firms, and the attorneys’ contributions to 

public interest communities throughout California, have been consistently recognized across by the 

legal community. Id. Moreover, Hadsell Stormer Renick & Dai and Gilbert & Sackman have extensive 

experience litigating on behalf of oil refinery operators, and Gilbert & Sackman has previous experience 

litigating wage and hour claims against these very defendants. Renick Decl., ¶ 42; Young Decl., ¶¶ 5-6.

This Court can note that defense counsel in this case is also highly skilled. Cf. In re Equity 

Funding Corp. Sec. Litigation, 438 F. Supp. 1303, 1336-37 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (“[P]laintiffs’ attorneys in 

this class action have been up against established and skillful defense lawyers, and should be 

compensated accordingly.”). The defendants in this case are represented by attorneys from a wellregarded law firm representing a sophisticated client with formidable resources.

Class Counsel’s high-quality and effective representation of the class is further evidenced by 

Plaintiffs’ success against Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint and 

Defendants’ subsequent desire to mediate twice prior to protracted motion work, including class 

certification. See Renick Decl., ¶ 10. Indeed, Defendants’ counsel is familiar with Gilbert & Sackman’s 

high caliber skill, expertise, and work as Defendants faced the same counsel in a prior wage and hour 

class action that was litigated for four years. Young Decl., ¶ 6. See, e.g., Barbosa v. Cargill Meat 

Solutions Corp., 297 F.R.D. 431, 449 (E.D. Cal 2013) (In awarding fees, the court recognized the 

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“specialized skill” of Class Counsel in wage-and-hour law was an “asset to Class Members” and found

the “quality of the work performed was good.”). 

d) The Amount Requested to Compensate Class Counsel is Reasonable 

in Comparison to Awards in Similar Cases.

The final Vizcaino factor – comparable awards in similar cases – supports Class Counsel’s 

request for 25% of the common fund. Federal courts “have consistently approved of attorney fee 

awards over the 25% benchmark[,]” specifically at a rate of “30% or higher[.]” In re Heritage Bond 

Litig., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13555, at *18 n.12 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2005). This range is consistent 

with California law. See Laffitte, 231 Cal. App. 4th at 878 (one-third of the fund); In re Consumer 

Privacy Cases, 175 Cal. App. 4th at 557 n.13 (one third of the recovery); Chavez, 162 Cal. App. 4th at 

66 (same). In fact, fifty percent has generally been accepted as the “upper limit, with 30-50% commonly 

being awarded in cases in which the common fund is relatively small.” Martin v. AmeriPride Servs., 

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61796, at*22-23 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 2011). 

Under the very circumstances here, where Class Counsel achieves a positive result quickly and 

prior to extensive motion practice or class certification, courts in this district and others of this Circuit 

have consistently found the 25% of the fund benchmark to be an appropriate fee award. See, e.g., 

Navarro v. Servisair, No. C 08-02716 MHP, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41081, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 

2010)(finding “a 25% fee consistent with the Ninth Circuit benchmark” appropriate where class action 

settlement reached “relatively quickly without litigating any motions for summary judgment or class 

certification”); Bravo v. Gale Triangle, Inc., No. CV 16-03347 BRO (GJSx), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

77714, at *47-48 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2017)(finding award of the standard 25% fee benchmark 

appropriate where settlement “was a favorable result” “but not exceptional” and “reached after two 

mediations and before the case had reached class certification or otherwise participated in motion 

practice”); Ozga v. U.S. Remodelers, Inc., No. C 09-05112 JSW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91196, at *7-8 

(N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2010)(concluding a deviation upward from 25% benchmark to 29% appropriate 

where Plaintiff’s counsel obtained an excellent result, received an overwhelmingly positive reaction to 

the settlement, and faced a significant risk in prosecuting the case given the uncertain state of California 

law in similar wage and hour cases but “reached this settlement quickly and did not engage in any 

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motion practice”); see also Young Decl., ¶ 15-16; Singer Decl., ¶¶ 13-14 (collection of state and federal 

cases approving fee requests equal to or more than the amount sought here). 

2. Based on Fees Calculated under the Lodestar Method, Class Counsel’s Fee 

Request is Also Reasonable.

Under both California and Ninth Circuit law, a lodestar cross-check on a percentage fee is 

acceptable. Laffitte, 1 Cal. 5th at. at 506; Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1043. In addition, the court “may 

increase or decrease [the lodestar] amount by applying a positive or negative ‘multiplier’ to take into 

account a variety of other factors, including the quality of the representation, the novelty and 

complexity of the issues, the results obtained, and the contingent risk presented.” Lealao v. Beneficial 

Cal., Inc., 82 Cal. App. 4th 19, 26 (2000); see Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1029 (9th Cir. 

1998) (identifying same factors).

a) Class Counsel’s Hourly Rates are Reasonable.

In order to calculate the lodestar, a court must determine the reasonable hourly rate for the 

services rendered by class counsel. Consumer Privacy Cases, 175 Cal. App. 4th 545, 556 (2009). A 

reasonable rate is typically based upon the prevailing market rate in the community for similar work 

performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation. Heritage Pac. Fin., LLC v. 

Monroy, 215 Cal. App. 4th 972, 1009 (2013). Generally, the “market rate” is based on the rates in the 

community where the court is located. Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Sys. Lab., Inc., 226 Cal. App. 

4th 26, 71 (2014); Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008). 

As set forth in the supporting declarations of counsel, the hourly rates applied here are consistent 

with the attorneys’ and paralegals’ skill and experience and reflect the prevailing market rates. Renick 

Decl., ¶¶ 45-56; Young Decl., ¶¶ 16-18; Singer Decl., ¶¶ 18-20; Exhibit 2 thereto. The requested rates 

are also consistent with and comparable to rates approved by courts in this district. Renick Decl., ¶¶ 47-

56.

b) Plaintiffs’ Lodestar Amount for Hours Expended Is Reasonable.

Below are charts reflecting the hours worked on this case by the three firms representing the 

class, Hadsell Stormer Renick & Dai, Gilbert & Sackman, and Cohelan Khoury & Singer:

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HADSELL STORMER RENICK & DAI:

Attorney or Paralegal Current 

Hours

Hourly

Rate

Current 

Lodestar

Randy Renick (Partner) 452.3 $875.00 $395,762.50

Cornelia Dai (Partner) 211.2 $775.00 $163,680.00

Elizabeth Song (Associate) 27.9 $450.00 $12,555.00

Springsong Cooper (Associate) 204.6 $425.00 $86,955.00

Attorney Totals 896.0 $658,952.50

Maria Stroud (Paralegal) 59.8 $300.00 $17,940.00

Non-Attorney Totals 59.8 $17,940.00

TOTALS: 955.8 $676,892.50

• GILBERT & SACKMAN:

Attorney or Paralegal Current 

Hours

Hourly 

Rate

Current 

Lodestar

Jay Smith (Shareholder) 50.6 $850.00 $43,010.00

Joshua F. Young (Shareholder) 717.4 $750.00 $538,050.00

Ben O'Donnell (Shareholder) 55.6 $500.00 $27,800.00

Attorney Totals 823.6 $608,860.00

Darcy Laparra (Paralegal) 0.2 $300.00 $60.00

Non-Attorney Totals 0.2 $60.00

TOTALS: 823.8 $608,920.00

• COHELAN KHOURY & SINGER:

Attorney or Paralegal Current 

Hours

Hourly 

Rate

Current 

Lodestar

Timothy D. Cohelan (Founding Partner) 24.4 $900.00 $21,960.00

Isam C. Khoury (Founding Partner) 29.8 $875.00 $26,075.00

Michael D. Singer (Managing Partner) 411.1 $875.00 $359,712.50

Diana M. Khoury (Partner) 189.5 $725.00 $137,387.50

J. Jason Hill (Partner) 350.7 $600.00 $210,420.00

Kristina De La Rosa (Associate) 64.5 $500.00 $32,250.00

Attorney Totals 1,070.0 $787,805.00

Amber Worden (Paralegal) 7.8 $200.00 $1,560.00

Matthew Atlas (Paralegal) 17.8 $170.00 $3,026.00

Non-Attorney Totals 25.6 $4,586.00

TOTALS: 1,095.6 $792,391.00

Renick Decl., ¶ 33, Exhibit 3 thereto; Young Decl., ¶ 10, Exhibit 2 thereto; Singer Decl., ¶¶ 10, 16, 

Exhibit 1 thereto.

The combined lodestar for the three firms at the time of the filing of this motion is 

$2,078,203.50. This lodestar requires a multiplier of 1.84 to be equivalent to the fee amount sought 

here. Plaintiffs’ counsel expects to spend an additional 50 hours meeting with class members, preparing

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the motion for final approval, finalizing the motion for attorney’s fees and costs, resolving claims, and

working with the claims administrator to ensure that the settlement amount is properly allocated to class 

members; and distributed to each class member.

3 Renick Decl., ¶ 34. Thus, an even smaller multiplier is 

required after inclusion of these additional hours.

Generally, hours are reasonable if “at the time rendered, [they] would have been undertaken by a 

reasonable and prudent lawyer to advance or protect his client’s interest.” Moore v. Jas H. Matthews & 

Co., 682 F.2d 830, 839 (9th Cir. 1982). Class Counsel are “entitled to compensation for all hours 

‘reasonably spent unless special circumstances would render an award unjust.’” Vo v. Las Virgenes 

Mun. Water Dist., 79 Cal. App. 4th 440, 446 (2000)) citing Serrano v. Unruh, 32 Cal.3d 621, 639 

(1982)). Such special circumstances do not exist in this case.

Hours reasonably worked should include time spent drafting and revising pleadings, meeting 

with clients and opposing counsel, and preparing the case for class certification and multiple mediation 

sessions. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983); Serrano, supra, 20 Cal. 3d at 49. Taking into 

account the common fund factors analysis above, the time submitted by Class Counsel was reasonably 

necessary to achieve success in the litigation: a Joint Settlement Agreement conferring substantial 

benefits to the Settlement Class Members. Consumer Privacy Cases, supra, 175 Cal. App. 4th at 556-

57 (“a lodestar calculation may be enhanced on the basis of a percentage-of-the-benefit analysis”); In re 

Vitamin Cases, 110 Cal. App. 4th 1041, 1052 (2003). 

As detailed in the declarations accompanying this motion, Class Counsel have spent a total of 

2875.2 hours litigating this case. Renick Decl., Ex. 3 (955.8 hours); Young Decl., Ex. 2 (823.8 hours); 

Singer Decl., ¶ 16, Ex. 1 (1095.6 hours). Class Counsel has described the work performed in their 

declarations and submitted summary charts showing the total hours spent by each timekeeper at each of 

the three firms, broken down by the following categories: (1) Investigation and Factual Research; 

(2) Discovery; (3) Pleadings, Briefs, and Pretrial Motions; (4) Court Appearances and Preparation; (5) 

Mediation & Settlement; (6) Litigation Strategy, Analysis, and Case Management; and (7) Class 

Certification. Renick Decl., ¶¶ 33-34, Ex. 3 thereto; Young Decl., ¶ 10-12, Ex. 2 thereto; Singer Decl.,

3 Prior to the hearing on the motion, Class Counsel will file supplemental declarations to update the 

number of hours worked and lodestar achieved. Renick Decl., ¶ 34; Young Decl., ¶ 13; Singer Decl., ¶ 

11.

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¶¶ 10, 16, 17, Ex. 1 thereto. The hours reflect contemporaneous time records of attorneys and paralegals 

from each firm. Renick Decl., ¶¶ 36-38; Young Decl., ¶ 10; Singer Decl., ¶ 10. The declarations of 

Class Counsel demonstrate that the hours spent in litigating this case are reasonable in light of the 

important benefits conferred upon the settlement class, and of the contentious law and motion practice, 

the amount and nature of discovery conducted, the number of Defendants’ employees and former 

employees included in both the investigation and the settlement class, mediation preparation, and 

continuing investigation and negotiation of the settlement well after the parties agreed upon the general 

terms of the settlement. See generally Renick Decl.; Young Decl.; Singer Decl. Given the wealth of 

experience of the partners at the three firm leading this case, all the attorneys and paralegals who have 

assisted with any aspect of the litigation have been efficient, avoiding duplication and unnecessary 

work; however, to the extent work could have been inefficient or duplicative, Class Counsel exercised 

billing judgment and excluded unnecessary hours from their calculation of the lodestar. Renick Decl., ¶¶

37-38; Young Decl., ¶ 19; Singer Decl., ¶ 21.

c) An Upward Multiplier of 1.84 Is Modest and Justified in this Case.

Based on the total lodestar of $2,078,203.50, the lodestar cross-check requires a 1.84 multiplier 

to be equivalent to the fee amount sought here. An upward multiplier is supported by the factors 

California and federal courts consider for this determination. See Lealao, 82 Cal. App. 4th at 26; see 

Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1029. Here, Class Counsel achieved a very successful result with a relatively large

recovery for individual class members, an average payment to each of the 1557 Class Members is 

$7,204.56. Renick Decl., ¶ 12; Young Decl., ¶ 9. Further, given the aggressive litigation position taken

by Tesoro, it was likely that the action would be highly contested and lengthy given the inherently 

complex nature of class actions and the manner in which the prior wage and hour class actions

involving the same defendants and the same counsel on both sides were litigated. Renick Decl., ¶¶ 40-

41; Young Decl., ¶ 6. In addition, this case was taken on a contingency basis by experienced and wellregarded counsel. Renick Decl., ¶¶ 4-10, 39, 44; Ex. 5 thereto; Young Decl., ¶¶ 2-5, 14; Ex. 1 thereto;

Singer Decl., ¶¶ 2-8, 12, 15.

Indeed, with the presence of these same factors, the court in Reed v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., No. 

12-cv-02359 JM (BGS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 255, at *26-28 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2014), approved a 25 

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percent of $11.7 million settlement fee award which was supported by a lodestar cross-check with a

much higher 2.9 multiplier. The court found that approval of the 2.9 multiplier was supported by the 

frequent approval by the Ninth Circuit of even higher multipliers. Id. at *28 (citing Vizcaino, 290 F.3d 

at 1051 n.6). In Vizcaino, supra, 290 F.3d at 1052-54, the Ninth Circuit listed 34 common fund cases 

that were decided between 1996 and 2001 in which the fees were awarded as a percentage of the 

common fund. In 24 of these cases, a lodestar-times-multiplier analysis was also used. Id. The 

multipliers in these 24 cases were as high as 19.6, and the average multiplier was 3.32. Id. See also

Dyer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 303 F.R.D. 326, 334 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (applying 2.83 multiplier); Craft 

v. City of San Bernardino, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (court ordered attorneys’ fee of 

25% of the settlement fund, where lodestar cross-check showed a multiplier of 5.2). 

For these reasons, the Court should approve Plaintiffs’ request for a fee award of $3,812,500—

25 percent of the $15,250,000 settlement fund—supported here by a lodestar cross-check with a 1.84

multiplier.

B. The Costs that Class Counsel Seek for Reimbursement Are Reasonable.

Class Counsel also seeks reimbursement of $49,093.73 in total costs incurred in prosecuting this 

case to date. At preliminary approval, estimated costs were up to $100,000. Renick Decl., ¶ 12. 

Plaintiffs’ costs are set forth in detail in the declarations of Class Counsel. See Renick Decl., ¶ 57

($21,420.82), Exhibit 4 thereto; Young Decl., ¶ 20 ($15,890.37), Exhibit 3 thereto; Singer Decl., ¶ 22

($11,782.54), Exhibit 3 thereto. 

“There is no doubt that an attorney who has created a common fund for the benefit of the class is 

entitled to reimbursement of reasonable litigation expenses from that fund.” Ontiveros v. Zamora, 303 

F.R.D. 356, 375 (E.D. Cal. 2014). As one commentator noted, "the prevailing view is that expenses are 

awarded in addition to the fee percentage." Conte, Attorney Fee Awards, § 2.08 at pp. 50-51 (2d Ed. 

1977). Indeed, courts routinely reimburse class counsel for the costs incurred in prosecuting cases on a 

contingent fee basis. See In re Businessland Sec. Litig., No. C-90-20476-RFP, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

8962, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 1991), and cases cited therein. The recovery of costs is to include all out 

of pocket costs not part of overhead which are typically billed to a client. Bussey v. Affleck, 225 Cal. 

App. 3d 1162 (1990); Norris v. Mazzola, No. 15-cv-04962-JSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 208610, at *40 

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(N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2017) (citing Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1994)).Harris v. 

Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1994) (reasonable out of pocket costs of the type ordinarily billed to 

paying clients are recoverable). 

All of the categories of costs sought here are typically billed to a client. Renick Decl., ¶ 58. The 

costs sought by Class Counsel are reasonable and were necessarily incurred in order to advance the 

litigation for the benefit the class. Renick Decl., ¶ 57; Young Decl., ¶ 20; Singer Decl., ¶ 22. They, 

therefore, should be reimbursed. See In re Immune Response Sec. Litig., 497 F.Supp.2d 1166, 1178 

(S.D. Cal. 2007).

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant Plaintiffs’ motion 

for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $3,812,500 (25% of the settlement fund), and reimbursement of 

costs in the amount of $49,093.73.

DATED: September 4, 2020 HADSELL STORMER RENICK & DAI LLP

By: s/ Randy Renick

Attorneys for Plaintiffs 

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