UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TETYANA DORSANEO,

Plaintiff,

v.

EDWARD MATTHEW DORSANEO,

Defendant.

Case No. 17-cv-00765-VC 

ORDER GRANTING THE MOTION 

FOR LEAVE TO AMEND AND THE 

MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT 

ON THE PLEADINGS

Re: Dkt. Nos. 25, 32 

Tetyana Dorsaneo, a lawful permanent resident residing in the United States, filed this 

suit against Edward Dorsaneo, her ex-husband, to enforce a Form I-864 affidavit of support. An 

I-864 is a contract between the government and the sponsor of a person seeking to immigrate to 

the United States, in which the sponsor agrees to provide the immigrant the support necessary to 

maintain her income at not less than 125 percent of the federal poverty limit. 8 U.S.C. § 1183a. 

Tetyana's complaint alleges that Edward signed an I-864 in connection with her application for 

adjustment of status, that his duty to provide support commenced when she obtained legal 

permanent resident status on February 5, 2014, and that he breached his obligation by failing to 

support her. After Edward answered the complaint, Tetyana filed a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings. Edward opposed the motion and filed a motion for leave to amend his answer. 

The motion for leave to amend the answer is granted. Therefore, the pleadings now 

include the amended answer. In the amended answer, Edward admits he signed the I-864 as part 

of his petition for Tetyana's adjustment of status. See Amended Answer ¶ 23.1 Edward does not 

 

1

Edward attached to his answer an exhibit he alleged to be a "true and accurate copy of the I-864 

Affidavit." The Court will therefore treat this document as part of the answer. United States v. 
2

contest that he has not paid Tetyana any financial support. See Flora v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan 

Ass'n, 685 F.2d 209, 211 (7th Cir. 1982) ("For purposes of determining whether a material issue 

of fact exists, uncontested allegations to which a party had an opportunity to respond are taken as 

true."). His argument is that he has no obligation to pay, or should be excused from any such 

obligation, because he signed the I-864 in reliance on Tetyana's statement to him that she wanted 

to "create a family" with him, and this statement turned out not to be true. Edward alleges that 

Tetyana knew her statements about wanting to create a family were false when she made them, 

and that she said those things to persuade Edward to help her immigrate to the United States. 

These allegations form the basis for three affirmative defenses asserted in Edward's answer: 

fraud in the inducement, estoppel, and fraud in the execution. 

Fraud in the inducement cannot be a defense to an I-864 enforcement action. Permitting 

a sponsor to evade his support obligation by asserting a defense of fraud in the inducement is 

inconsistent with the purpose of the I-864 requirement, because it would place lawful permanent 

residents at risk of becoming dependent on the government for subsistence. The statute and 

implementing regulations show that the purpose of the support obligation is to ensure that 

family-sponsored immigrants do not become a "public charge." 8 U.S.C. § 1183a. The support 

obligation terminates only after the immigrant has obtained citizenship or circumstances have 

changed such that the immigrant no longer requires support. See 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(e) (providing 

that the support obligation terminates when the sponsored immigrant: (1) becomes a citizen; (2) 

has worked 40 qualifying quarters of coverage; (3) ceases to be a lawful permanent resident and 

departs the United States; (4) obtains a new grant to adjustment of status, supported by a new 

affidavit of support; or (5) dies). Furthermore, the support obligation cannot be disavowed 

unless the sponsor submits the disavowal in writing "before the decision on the adjustment 

application." Id. § 213a.2(f). A Congressional committee report describes the affidavit support 

requirement as a plan to "discourage[e] welfare-based immigration" and "to provide for the 

 

Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). 
3

economic well-being of the members [that families] bring into the United States." H. Comm. On 

Budget, Welfare and Medicaid Reform Act of 1996, H.R. Rep. 104-651, at 6 (1996). It also 

explains that the sponsorship agreement "would be made legally binding and would apply until 

the immigrant becomes a citizen." Id. at 1327. These requirements, and this history, show that 

the support obligation, once undertaken, cannot be excused unless there is no longer a risk that 

the I-864 beneficiary will become a public charge. 

Moreover, the defense of fraudulent inducement only renders a contract voidable; to 

escape the contract obligations, an aggrieved party must rescind the contract. Restatement 

(Second) of Contracts § 164. The statute nowhere suggests that sponsors may seek – or that 

courts may exercise their equitable power to grant – a rescission remedy in an action to enforce 

an I-864. This, too, supports the idea that sponsors may not avoid their support obligations by 

raising the defense of fraudulent inducement. 

Existing Ninth Circuit precedent indirectly supports this notion as well. Specifically, the 

Ninth Circuit has held that a premarital agreement does not terminate an obligation of support, 

explaining that "[t]he right of support conferred by federal law exists apart from whatever rights 

[a sponsored immigrant] might or might not have under [state] divorce law." Erler v. Erler, 824 

F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Liu v. Mund, 686 F.3d 418, 419-

20 (7th Cir. 2012)).

It does not appear that any court has held to the contrary. A handful of district courts 

have touched on the question whether fraudulent inducement is a viable defense to an I-864 

enforcement action, but all those cases appear to have been resolved based on a lack of evidence 

of fraud, with some suggesting that even if there was such evidence the sponsor would remain 

obligated to pay, and others suggesting in dicta that such evidence would lift the obligation. 

Compare Shah v. Shah, No. 12-cv-04648, 2013 WL 12157867, at *4 n.9 (D.N.J. Oct. 28, 2013) 

("It is not clear that allowing a sponsor to avoid his obligation under the affidavit would serve 

Congress's purpose in providing for I-864 affidavits, as the sponsored immigrant might end up as 

a public charge."), with Matloob v. Farhan, No. 11-cv-01943, 2014 WL 1401924, at *3 (D. Md. 
4

Apr. 9, 2014) ("Where a sponsored immigrant 'never intended to enter into a lasting marital 

relationship, but was merely using the sponsor to gain immigrant status,' it could be argued that 

the marriage was the result of fraudulent inducement on the part of the sponsored immigrant.") 

(quoting Cheshire v. Cheshire, No. 05-cv-00453, 2006 WL 1208010, at *4 (M.D. Fla. May 4, 

2006)). The better argument is that even if the sponsor presents legitimate evidence of 

fraudulent inducement, he has borne the risk of being fraudulently induced into sponsoring 

someone, and must satisfy his financial obligations regardless.

Estoppel, another of Edward's affirmative defenses, fails for the same reason. The 

defense is not authorized by the statute or its implementing regulations, and allowing it interferes 

with the purpose of the I-864 affidavit requirement. 

Unlike fraud in the inducement or estoppel, fraud in the execution arises when "a party 

executes an agreement 'with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge 

of its character or its essential terms.'" Sw. Admin. Inc. v. Rozay's Transfer, 791 F.2d 769, 774 

(9th Cir. 1986). It holds the potential to render a contract void from the start. Id. There's no 

need to address whether such a defense is available in I-864 enforcement actions because 

Edward's allegations foreclose the possibility of fraud in the execution. Edward hasn't alleged 

that, at the time he executed the Form I-864, he didn't know what he was signing. To the 

contrary, he has alleged that, in the course of petitioning for Tetyana's adjustment of status, he 

and Tetyana attended an initial interview with a government employee during which the 

employee explained that the I-864 "was for possible reimbursement to the government if Plaintiff 

collected social services from the government." Amended Answer ¶ 24. This forecloses any 

defense based on the assertion that Edward thought he was signing some other contract. 

It is thus clearly established from the pleadings that, starting on February 5, 2014, 

Edward owed Tetyana financial support and he has breached that duty by failing to pay. 

However, the pleadings do not establish the absence of a terminating event (as set forth in the 

regulations) sometime after Edward's support obligation commenced. Nor do they establish an 

answer to the question whether Edward may offset the support obligation by any income Tetyana 
5

has earned. See Erler, 824 F.3d at 1179-80. Therefore, the motion for partial judgment on the 

pleadings is granted on Edward's breach of his I-864 support obligation.

2

 Discovery must 

proceed on the amount of financial assistance Edward owes, and that question must be resolved 

either on summary judgment or at trial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 31, 2017

______________________________________

VINCE CHHABRIA

United States District Judge

 

2

To the extent Edward moves to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 

12(c), the motion is denied.