Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 87 / Friday, May 5, 1995 / Notices 22373

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

Historically Black Colleges and

Universities Capital Financing

Advisory Committee; Meeting

AGENCY: Historically Black Colleges and

Universities Capital Financing Advisory

Committee; Education.

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

SUMMARY: This notice sets forth the

schedule and proposed agenda of a

forthcoming meeting of the Historically

Black Colleges and Universities Capital

Financing Advisory Committee. This

notice also describes the functions of

the Committee. Notice of this meeting is

required under Section 10(a)(2) of the

Federal Advisory Committee Act.

DATE AND TIME: May 12, 1995, 9:00 am–

12:00 am.

ADDRESSES: U.S. Department of

Education, Barnard Auditorium—Room

2413, Federal Office Building 10, 600

Independence Avenue, SW.,

Washington, DC 20202.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Lawrence P. Grayson, Executive

Director, Historically Black Colleges and

Universities Capital Financing Advisory

Committee, U.S. Department of

Education, Washington, DC 20202–

5139, telephone (202) 260–3259.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The

Historically Black Colleges and

Universities Capital Financing Advisory

Committee is established under section

727 of the Higher Education Act of

1965, as amended in 1992 (20 U.S.C.

1132c-6). The Council is established to

provide advice and counsel to the

Secretary of Education and the

designated bonding authority for the

Historically Black Colleges and

Universities Capital Financing Program

as to the most effective and efficient

means of implementing construction

financing on historically Black college

and university campuses and to advise

Congress regarding the progress made in

implementing the program.

The meeting of the Committee is open

to the public. The agenda includes a

briefing by members of the designated

bonding authority on progress to date in

establishing the program.

The pubic is given less than 15 days

notice of the meeting because of the

need to brief the members of the Board

and the unavailability of other suitable

dates.

Records are kept of all Committee

proceedings, and are available for pubic

inspection at the office of the

Historically Black Colleges and

Universities Capital Financing Advisory

Committee, U.S. Department of

Education, Washington, DC 20202–

5139, from the hours of 9:00 am to 4:00

pm.

David A. Longanecker,

Assistant Secretary for Postsecondary

Education.

[FR Doc. 95–11226 Filed 5–4–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4401–01–M

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Notice of Pre-Scoping Workshop for

the Stockpile Stewardship and

Management Programmatic

Environmental Impact Statement

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of Pre-Scoping Workshop

for the Stockpile Stewardship and

Management Programmatic

Environmental Impact Statement.

SUMMARY: The Department of Energy

(DOE) announces that it will conduct a

pre-scoping workshop for the Stockpile

Stewardship and Management (SS&M)

Programmatic Environmental Impact

Statement (PEIS). The purpose of the

pre-scoping workshop is to provide the

public with an opportunity to present

comments, ask questions, and discuss

concerns regarding SS&M activities with

DOE officials. An interactive format will

be used for the workshop. Input from

the pre-scoping workshop will assist

DOE in formulating the notice of intent

(NOI) for the SS&M PEIS, and refining

alternatives for consideration in the

PEIS.

The primary goal of the SS&M

program is to provide high confidence

in the safety, security, and reliability of

the nation’s stockpile and to ensure the

effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent

while supporting arms-control and

nonproliferation policy. Stockpile

Stewardship includes activities required

to maintain a high level of confidence

in the safety, reliability, and

performance of nuclear weapons in the

absence of underground nuclear testing,

and to be prepared to resume nuclear

testing if so directed by the President.

Stockpile Management activities

include dismantlement, maintenance,

evaluation, and repair or replacement of

weapons in the existing stockpile.

The workshop will afford interested

parties the opportunity to offer

suggestions regarding the appropriate

alternatives for performing the functions

necessary to carry out the Department’s

stockpile stewardship and management

missions. Through the National

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)

review process, DOE proposes to

develop a comprehensive strategy to

establish a long-range plan for Stockpile

Stewardship and Management.

DATES: The workshop will be held on

May 19, 1995, in the Main Auditorium

of the DOE Forrestal Building (1000

Independence Ave, S.E., Washington

D.C.) from 9:00 a.m.–4:00 p.m. Members

of the public who would like to attend

the pre-scoping workshop are asked to

call the Office of Reconfiguration’s tollfree telephone number at 1–800–776–

2765 to pre-register.

ADDRESSES: General questions

concerning the SS&M program can be

asked by calling the toll-free telephone

number, or by writing to: Stephen

Sohinki, Director, Office of

Reconfiguration, U.S. Department of

Energy, P.O. Box 3417, Alexandria, VA

22302.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For

general information on the DOE

National Environmental Policy Act

(NEPA) process, please contact: Carol

M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA

Policy and Assistance, EH–42, U.S.

Department of Energy, 1000

Independence Avenue, SW.,

Washington, D.C. 20585, (202) 586–4600

or 1–800–472–2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

In January 1991, the Secretary of

Energy announced that the Department

would prepare a PEIS examining

alternatives for the reconfiguration of

the Department’s nuclear weapons

complex (the Complex). The framework

for the Reconfiguration PEIS was

described in the January 1991 Nuclear

Weapons Complex Reconfiguration

Study (Reconfiguration Study), a

detailed examination of alternatives for

the future Complex. Because of the

significant changes in the world since

January 1991, especially with regard to

projected future requirements for the

United States’ nuclear weapons

stockpile, the Department concluded in

October 1994 that the framework

described in the Reconfiguration Study

no longer fit current circumstances or

supported any realistic proposal for

reconfiguration of the Complex (see 59

FR 54175 (October 28, 1994)).

Contributing factors to that conclusion

included public comments at the

September-October 1993

Reconfiguration PEIS scoping meetings,

the fact that no production of new

nuclear weapons was required for the

foreseeable future, budget constraints,

and the Department’s decision to

prepare a separate PEIS on Storage and

Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile

Nuclear Materials (Notice of Intent

published June 21, 1994, 59 FR 17344).
22374 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 87 / Friday, May 5, 1995 / Notices

As a result of these changed

circumstances, the Department

separated the Reconfiguration PEIS into

two PEISs: (1) a Tritium Supply and

Recycling PEIS to be completed by

November 1995; and (2) a Stockpile

Stewardship and Management PEIS.

The Draft PEIS for Tritium Supply and

Recycling has been completed and

issued to the public (60 FR 14433

(March 17, 1995)), public hearings were

held in April 1995, and a Final PEIS is

expected in October 1995.

With regard to the SS&M PEIS, during

the past six months the Department has

been developing the new framework to

support the SS&M program. That

preliminary framework, which is

described in a document entitled ‘‘The

Stockpile Stewardship and Management

Program’’, is now available on the

internet under DOE’s Home Page for

Defense Programs. That document is

also being mailed to those individuals

who had previously requested

information on the SS&M program.

Other individuals who would like to

receive that document can contact the

Office of Reconfiguration at the address

listed above or by calling the program’s

toll free number. At the pre-scoping

workshop, the framework contained in

‘‘The Stockpile Stewardship and

Management Program’’ will be

presented by DOE officials, and the

public will be provided the opportunity

to present comments, ask questions, and

discuss concerns with DOE officials.

Some general information regarding the

SS&M framework is provided below,

along with a description of the format

envisioned for the interactive prescoping workshop.

Purpose and Need for the SS&M

Program

By law [the Atomic Energy Act of

1954, as amended, 42 USC 2011 et seq.],

DOE is charged with providing nuclear

weapons to support the United States

nuclear deterrent policy. The mission of

the DOE nuclear weapons complex is to

provide the nation with safe, secure,

and reliable nuclear weapons and

components so that an effective nuclear

deterrent can be maintained into the

foreseeable future, and to accomplish

this in a way that protects the

environment as well as the health and

safety of workers and the public.

Recent changes in national security

needs have necessitated corresponding

changes in the way the Department

must meet its responsibilities regarding

the nation’s nuclear weapons. As a

result of international arms-control

agreements (in particular the START I

treaty and the START II protocol) and

unilateral decisions by the United

States, the nation’s stockpile will be

significantly reduced by the year 2003.

Consequently, the nation has halted the

development of new nuclear weapons,

has begun closing portions of the

Complex, and is considering further

consolidation or downsizing of its

remaining elements. In addition, the

nation is observing a moratorium on

nuclear testing and is pursuing a

comprehensive test ban treaty.

However, international dangers

remain and, as the President has

emphasized, nuclear deterrence will

continue to be a cornerstone of United

States national security policy. Thus,

the Department’s responsibilities for

ensuring the safety, security, and

reliability of the nation’s nuclear

weapons stockpile will also continue for

the foreseeable future.

Because of the moratorium on nuclear

testing, the termination of new weapons

development, and the closure of

production facilities, a new approach to

ensuring confidence in the stockpile is

needed. In announcing the extension of

the nuclear testing moratorium (July

1993), President Clinton reaffirmed the

importance of maintaining confidence

in the enduring U.S. nuclear stockpile

and the need to assure that the nation’s

nuclear deterrent remains unquestioned

during a test ban. By Presidential

Decision Directive and act of Congress

(P.L. 103–160), the Department of

Energy was directed to ‘‘establish a

stewardship program to ensure the

preservation of the core intellectual and

technical competencies of the U.S. in

nuclear weapons.’’

This new approach must more heavily

rely on scientific understanding and

expert judgment to predict, identify, and

correct problems affecting the safety and

reliability of the stockpile. This program

is essential if the nation is to properly

safeguard its nuclear weapons and

maintain an unquestioned nuclear

deterrent.

The Stockpile Stewardship and

Management Program is being

developed to meet the challenges

involved in ensuring the safety,

reliability, and performance of the

enduring stockpile. Three particular

challenges must be met:

• Fully supporting, at all times, the

nation’s nuclear deterrent with safe,

secure, and reliable nuclear weapons,

while transforming the nuclear weapons

complex (laboratories and production

facilities) to one that is more

appropriate for the smaller enduring

stockpile.

• Preserving the core intellectual and

technical competencies of the weapons

laboratories. Without nuclear testing,

confidence in the nation’s nuclear

deterrent will rest in large part with

confidence in the competency of the

people who must make the scientific

and technical judgments related to the

safety and reliability of nuclear

weapons.

• Ensuring that the activities needed

to maintain the nation’s nuclear

deterrent are consistent with the

nation’s arms-control and

nonproliferation objectives.

DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex

The current DOE nuclear weapons

complex consists of 8 major facilities

located in 7 states. Major facilities, and

their primary responsibilities within the

Complex, are listed in Table 1.

Currently, the Complex maintains the

capabilities to design and manufacture

nuclear weapons; provides surveillance

of and maintains nuclear weapons in

the stockpile; and retires and disposes

of nuclear weapons.

Table 1—The DOE Nuclear Weapons

Complex

Pantex Plant (Amarillo, Texas)—

Dismantles retired weapons;

fabricates high explosives

components; assembles high

explosives, nuclear components, and

nonnuclear components into nuclear

weapons; repairs and modifies

weapons; and evaluates and performs

nonnuclear testing of nuclear

weapons.

Savannah River Site (SRS) (Aiken,

South Carolina)—Tritium loading/

unloading and surveillance of

reservoirs.

Y–12 Plant (Oak Ridge, Tennessee)—

Maintains the capability to produce

and assemble uranium and lithium

components; recovers materials from

fabrication process and retired

weapons; produces nonnuclear

weapon components.

Kansas City Plant (KCP) (Kansas City,

Missouri)—Manufactures nonnuclear

weapons components.

Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory (LLNL) (Livermore,

California)—Research and

development of nuclear weapons;

designs and tests advanced

technology concepts; maintains

weapons design program; maintains

the capability to produce nuclear

components.

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)

(Los Alamos, New Mexico)—Research

and development of nuclear weapons;

designs and tests advanced

technology concepts; maintains

weapons design program; maintains

the capability to produce nuclear

components.
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 87 / Friday, May 5, 1995 / Notices 22375

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL)

(Albuquerque, New Mexico)—System

engineering of nuclear weapons;

designs and develops nonnuclear

components; field and laboratory

nonnuclear testing; and manufactures

nonnuclear weapons components.

Nevada Test Site (NTS) (Las Vegas,

Nevada)—Maintains capability to

conduct underground nuclear testing.

PEIS Alternatives

The Department’s preliminary views

concerning consideration of alternatives

for both the Stockpile Management and

the Stockpile Stewardship program

elements are described below:

Stockpile Management

Stockpile Management activities

include dismantlement, maintenance,

evaluation, and repair or replacement of

weapons in the existing stockpile. In the

past, a large weapons production

complex provided the capability and

capacity to rapidly fix problems in the

stockpile. However, the existing

production complex may be inefficient

and ineffective for a much smaller

enduring stockpile. Therefore, one of

the primary goals of the Stockpile

Management proposal will be to

downsize and/or consolidate functions

to provide an effective and efficient

production capability for the smaller

stockpile.

To ensure that the Department will be

able to carry out its stockpile

management responsibilities, the

following general functional capabilities

are needed and are expected to be

addressed in the SS&M PEIS:

• Nuclear weapons assembly/

disassembly and surveillance.

• High explosives fabrication and

surveillance.

• Nonnuclear component fabrication

and surveillance.

• Nuclear component fabrication and

surveillance.

Reasonable alternatives for each of the

functional capabilities will be

developed from the list of sites in Table

1. Under the no-action alternative, the

functions would remain at the locations

identified in Table 1. In addition to the

no-action alternative, the PEIS is also

expected to assess the alternatives of

downsizing (and upgrading if necessary)

facilities at the no-action sites, and

evaluate transferring or consolidating

the functions to other sites listed in

Table 1 that have existing facilities

which could be used for that functional

capability.

Stockpile Stewardship

Stockpile Stewardship includes

activities required to maintain a high

level of confidence in the safety,

reliability, and performance of nuclear

weapons in the absence of underground

nuclear testing, and to be prepared to

resume testing if so directed by the

President. While the nation’s nuclear

weapons stockpile is currently judged to

be safe, secure, and reliable, the average

age of the stockpile has never

significantly exceeded the current age of

12 to 13 years. Because the Department

cannot predict with certainty when agerelated changes affecting weapon safety

or reliability will occur, a conservative

assumption would be that problems will

arise more frequently as the weapons

age beyond their original 20- to 25-year

design lifetimes.

Historically, nuclear testing has

provided unambiguous confidence in

the safety and performance of weapons

in the stockpile. Without underground

nuclear testing, the Department must

rely on aboveground experimental and

computational capabilities, especially in

weapons physics, to predict the

consequences of the complex problems

that are likely to occur in an aging

stockpile.

Currently, enhanced aboveground

experimental and computational

capabilities are needed to assess and

predict the consequences of these

problems. An improved science-based

program with enhanced experimental

and computational capabilities is

necessary to maintain confidence in the

safety and performance of the nation’s

stockpile without nuclear testing. This

program must be technically

challenging so that it will attract the

high-quality scientific and technical

talent needed for future stewardship of

the stockpile.

Substantial advances in experimental

and computational capabilities are

needed to fill in those areas of nuclear

weapon science that are incomplete,

particularly gaps in our understanding

of physics and gaps in the data needed

for computational simulations of

weapons performance and model-based

assessments of safety and reliability.

Upgraded or new experimental

capabilities are required to validate

improved or new computational

models.

Without these enhanced capabilities,

the Department will lack the ability to

evaluate some safety and performance

issues, which could significantly affect

the stockpile. Consequently, desired

improvements in weapon safety and

security might be sacrificed because of

an inability to certify their performance.

It is also possible that, without these

enhanced capabilities, some nuclear

components exhibiting changes in

composition or structure would have to

be retired because the Department

would not be able to certify the

acceptability of repaired or modified

components.

Stockpile stewardship can be broken

down into three broad functional areas:

• Weapons Physics

• Materials Surveillance

• Computational Capabilities

In addition to the no-action alternative

of relying on existing capabilities in

each of these functional areas, the PEIS

will assess new or upgraded facilities in

each functional area to carry out the

Stockpile Stewardship mission. Only

the three weapons laboratories (LANL,

LLNL, and SNL) and the NTS are

expected to be considered in the

development of reasonable Stockpile

Stewardship site alternatives. The

existing configuration of these sites and

any potential new facilities or

significant upgrades to facilities will be

discussed.

SS&M Program Foundational

Framework

In the SS&M program, DOE will:

• Emphasize compliance with

applicable laws and regulations, and

accepted practices regarding industrial

and weapons safety; safeguarding the

health of Complex workers and the

general public; protecting the

environment; and ensuring the security

of nuclear materials and weapons

components.

• Safely and reliably maintain the

nuclear weapons stockpile as directed

by the President and mandated by

Congress.

• Minimize costs associated with the

weapons stockpile.

• Minimize the number and/or size of

weapons production sites.

• Maximize the transfer of

nonnuclear materials production

activities to the private sector.

• Maintain core intellectual and

technical competencies in nuclear

weapons.

• Sustain confidence in safety,

reliability, and performance of the

stockpile in the absence of underground

nuclear testing.

• Minimize the use of hazardous

materials and the number and volume of

waste streams.

• Provide for proper disposal of

hazardous, non-hazardous, and

radioactive waste.

PEIS Decisions

The PEIS and supporting cost,

technical, and schedule studies will be

prepared for the SS&M program. The

PEIS and the other studies will support

the following decisions:

• Identify the future components of

the SS&M program; and
22376 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 87 / Friday, May 5, 1995 / Notices

• Determine the configuration of the

nuclear weapons complex to

accomplish the SS&M program

requirements.

Pre-Scoping Workshop Format

The Department intends to hold a

plenary session at the beginning of the

workshop in which DOE officials will

more fully explain the framework for

the proposed SS&M program, including

preliminary alternatives for both

Stockpile Management and Stockpile

Stewardship. Following the plenary

session and any clarification and

discussion that results, the Department

intends for the participants to break out

into two smaller groups— one for

Stockpile Stewardship and one for

Stockpile Management— to allow for

more specific discussion. Arrangements

will be made so that interested members

of the public may attend both break out

sessions if they desire.

Next Steps

Following the pre-scoping workshop,

DOE will refine, as necessary, the SS&M

framework and proposed alternatives,

prepare a Notice of Intent for the SS&M

PEIS, and hold public scoping meetings

(to be conducted as interactive

workshops) regarding the alternatives to

be evaluated in the SS&M PEIS. DOE

intends to announce the location, date

and time for these scoping meetings/

workshops in a Notice in the Federal

Register, and by other means as

appropriate. The announcement will be

at least two weeks prior to any meetings.

Issued in Washington, D.C. this 2nd day of

May, 1995, for the United States Department

of Energy.

Victor H. Reis,

Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs.

[FR Doc. 95–11162 Filed 5–4–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6450–01–P

EERE-Denver Regional Support Office;

Notice of Solicitation

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of solicitation for

financial assistance applications; DEPS48–95R810534 heavy duty state/

municipal vehicle alternative fuel

demonstration.

SUMMARY: The Department of Energy,

Denver Regional Support Office,

pursuant to 10 CFR 600 announces its

intention to issue a competitive

solicitation and make financial

assistance awards to evaluate alternative

fuels in transportation in response to the

Alternative Motor Fuels Act of 1988

(AMFA) and the provisions of Public

Law 102–486, The Energy Policy Act of

1992.

AVAILABILITY OF THE SOLICITATION: To

obtain a copy of the solicitation, once it

is issued on or about May 1, 1995, write

to the U.S. Department of Energy,

Denver Support Office, 2801 Youngfield

St., Suite 380, Golden, CO 80401, Attn:

Louise S. Urgo, FY 1995, Heavy Duty

State/Municipal Vehicle Alternative

Fuel Demonstration Solicitation. Only

written requests for the solicitation will

be honored.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The U.S.

Department of Energy (DOE) is issuing

a solicitation to state energy offices,

inviting them to apply for the Heavy

Duty State/Municipal Vehicle

Alternative Fuel Demonstration

Program. Only one application will be

accepted from each state. The

participating state energy offices will

coordinate and conduct a heavy duty

municipal vehicle project to introduce

alternative fuel Original Equipment

Manufacturer (OEM) vehicles for

operation by state governments, local

school districts, and municipalities. The

incremental costs over conventional

vehicles for up to four (4) OEM

alternative fuel heavy duty vehicles per

project will be funded by DOE. The

types of vehicles to be considered are

those used directly by a state or a local

agency or for the sole purpose of

supporting a state or local agency.

Transit buses are excluded. Vehicles

will be fueled with ethanol, methanol,

natural gas, propane or biodiesel. The

DOE Support Offices will coordinate

this program’s activities in conjunction

and cooperation with the state energy

offices, providing assistance and

direction to interested participants. The

state energy offices, municipalities, and

local school districts will identify

refueling facilities. They are encouraged

to invite local utilities or fuel suppliers

to participate by investing in the

development of refueling facilities. The

award recipients will be responsible for

the collection and reporting of data/

information as specified by DOE on

alternative fuel and ‘‘control’’ vehicles

over a five year period. It is the intent

of this solicitation is to provide states

with practical experience in the use of

alternative fuel heavy duty vehicles to

promote their use and to increase

awareness of the availability and

benefits of alternative fuel vehicles.

FUND AVAILABILITY: Up to $1,200,000 is

available to fund financial assistance

awards. Awards will be limited to

$200,000 each. Only one application

will be accepted from each state. The

initial project and budget period will be

nine months from the date of award.

ELIGIBILITY: The DOE, Office of Energy

Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Office

of Alternative Fuels, is requesting

applications for a demonstration of

heavy duty municipal alternative fuel

vehicles from the 50 states, the District

of Columbia, the U.S. Virgin Islands, the

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any

territory of possession of the United

States. Interested municipalities, and

local school districts should contact the

appropriate state office for applications

for subawads. Financial Assistance for

this solicitation is authorized by the

DOE Reorganization Act, P.L. 95–91,

and the DOE Financial Assistance

Regulations, 10 CFR 600.

REVIEW, EVALUATION AND AWARD: Initial

review for completeness will be

performed at the Support Offices. The

applications will be evaluated by the

Office of Technical Assistance and the

Office of Alternative Fuels according to

the criteria set forth in the solicitation.

It is currently anticipated that the

review of applications will begin on or

about July 1, 1995. Selections will be

made by mid August, with anticipated

award issuance by September 30, 1995.

Awards may be either grants or

cooperative agreements, depending on

amount of substantial involvement

anticipated between the Department of

Energy and the recipient during

performance of the contemplated

activity.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

U. S. Department of Energy, Denver

Regional Support Office, 2801

Youngfield St., Golden, CO., 80201,

Attention: Louise S. Urgo, Contracting

Officer.

Issued in Golden, Colorado on April 26,

1995.

John W. Meeker,

Chief, Procurement, Go.

[FR Doc. 95–11163 Filed 5–4–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6450–01–P

Office of Fossil Energy

[FE DOCKET NO. 95–22–NG]

Progas U.S.A., Inc.; Order Granting

Blanket Authorization To Import and

Export Natural Gas From and To

Canada

AGENCY: Office of Fossil Energy, DOE.

ACTION: Notice of order.

SUMMARY: The Office of Fossil Energy of

the Department of Energy gives notice

that it has issued an order granting

ProGas U.S.A., Inc. authorization to

import up to 800 Bcf and to export up

to 200 Bcf of natural gas from and to

Canada. The term of the authorization is