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United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JUAN QUINTANILLA VASQUEZ, et 

al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

LIBRE BY NEXUS, INC., 

Defendant. 

Case No. 17-cv-00755-CW 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE 

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT 

(Docket No. 90) 

 Before the Court is a motion for leave to file their Third 

Amended Complaint (TAC) by Plaintiffs Juan Quintanilla Vasquez, 

Gabriela Perdomo Ortiz and Victor Hugo Catalan Molina. Docket 

No. 90. Defendant Libre By Nexus, Inc. (LBN) opposes the motion. 

Plaintiffs also seek judicial notice of six filings with the 

California Insurance Commissioner and the Federal District Court, 

Central District of California in support of their Reply; this 

request is unopposed. Having considered the papers, the Court 

GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file their TAC. The Court 

also GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice. 

BACKGROUND 

 Count III of the Second Amended Complaint (SAC) alleges 

Defendant violated the “unlawful” prong of California’s Unlawful 

Competition Law (UCL) by violating California’s Insurance Code § 

1800, which prohibits a person from executing or delivering the 

undertaking of bail or bail bonds without a bail license. 

Plaintiffs now seek to amend Count III to include a violation of 

California Code Regulation Title 10, § 2081, a regulation 
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promulgated by the Insurance Commissioner pursuant to the 

Insurance Code, and limits bail licensees from charging or 

collecting money or other valuable considerations except for a 

number of specified limited purposes. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave of 

the court allowing a party to amend its pleading “shall be freely 

given when justice so requires.” Because “Rule 15 favors a 

liberal policy towards amendment, the nonmoving party bears the 

burden of demonstrating why leave to amend should not be 

granted.” Genentech, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 127 F.R.D. 

529, 530–531 (N.D. Cal. 1989). 

Courts consider five factors when assessing a motion for 

leave to amend: undue delay, bad faith, futility of amendment, 

prejudice to the opposing party and whether the plaintiff has 

previously amended the complaint. Ahlmeyer v. Nev. Sys. of 

Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 1051, 1055 n.3 (9th Cir.2009). Leave to 

amend should be granted with “extreme liberality.” DCD Programs, 

Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987). The Ninth 

Circuit has held that courts may decline to grant leave to amend 

for one or more of these reasons “only if there is strong 

evidence.” Sonoma Cnty Ass’n of Retired Employees v. Sonoma 

Cnty, 708 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2013). 

DISCUSSION 

Weighing these factors, the Court finds that LBN has not met 

its burden showing why leave to amend should be denied. LBN has 

shown that Plaintiffs could have sought amendment of their UCL 
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United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

count earlier, and indeed had opportunities to include the new 

allegation in their prior amended complaints. However, undue 

delay by itself is not sufficient to deny leave to amend. 

Johnson v. Serenity Transp., Inc., 15-cv-02004-JSC, 2015 WL 

4913266, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2015) (granting leave to amend 

because “the only factor that weighs in favor of denial is undue 

delay”); but see id. (“While delay alone is insufficient to 

justify denial of leave to amend, late amendments to assert new 

theories are not reviewed favorably when the facts and the theory 

have been known to the party seeking amendment since the 

inception of the cause of action.”) (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). LBN has not shown that the other factors 

tip in favor of denying leave to amend. LBN argues that 

Plaintiffs’ amendment is futile, contending for the first time 

that the Insurance Code provision for bail licensees does not 

apply to immigration bail bonds. LBN’s cited authority, an 

opinion issued by the California Office of the Attorney General, 

is inapplicable. At issue in the opinion was whether Insurance 

Code §§ 1800 and 1801 gave licensed bail agents authority to 

issue immigration bonds. 63 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 265, 1980 WL 

96834, at *4 (1980). The opinion held that the Insurance Code 

does not, in itself, authorize a licensed bail agent to execute 

immigration bonds, but explicitly stated that licensed bail 

bondsmen under Insurance Code § 1800 could seek authority through 

additional licenses. The opinion did not address whether the 

Insurance Code precludes the regulation of immigration bonds. 

Id. Indeed, the Insurance Commissioner and California’s 

Department of Insurance have asserted jurisdiction over 
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regulating immigration bonds and immigration bond agents. See 

Docket No. 99-1 (Plaintiffs’ RJN), Exs. 2-6 (order by the 

Insurance Commissioner and accusations by California’s Department 

of Insurance relating to immigration bonds and purportedly 

unlicensed immigration bondsmen). LBN’s futility argument would 

apply to the entirety of Count III and not only Plaintiffs’ new 

proposed amendment. LBN did not raise this argument in its 

Motion to Dismiss. There is no indication that Plaintiffs are 

acting in bad faith. 

LBN will not be unduly prejudiced if leave to amend is 

granted. This new theory proposed by Plaintiffs arises from the 

same set of facts and within the scope of Plaintiffs’ original 

theory under Count III. Additional discovery, if any, would be 

minimal. Discovery is currently ongoing. See Eminence Capital, 

LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Absent 

prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the 

remaining . . . factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 

15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.”) (internal citations 

and emphasis omitted). For the foregoing reasons, the Court 

GRANTS Plaintiffs leave to file their TAC. Plaintiffs have seven 

days from the date of this Order to file their TAC. Defendant 

need not file a new Answer. 

Plaintiffs’ unopposed request for judicial notice of six 

documents filed with the California Insurance Commissioner and 

the Federal District Court, Central District of California is 

GRANTED because they are all public records. Fed. R. Evid. § 

201; see also In re Icenhower, 755 F.3d 1130, 1142 (9th Cir. 

2014). 
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United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 3, 2018 

CLAUDIA WILKEN 

United States District Judge