UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

ROBERT S. STACHON and ROBERT L. ) 

STACHON, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiffs, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Cause No. 2:12-cv-440 

 ) 

DOCK W. WOODWARD, JR., YELLOW ) 

TRANSPORTATION, AND YRC, INC., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 This matter is before the court on the Motion to Bifurcate the Issues of Liability and 

Damages [DE 88] filed by the defendants, Dock W. Woodward, Jr. and YRC, Inc., on September 

30, 2015. For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED. 

Background 

 This case arose from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on September 15, 2012. At 

approximately 1:55 a.m., the defendant, Dock Woodward, Jr., was driving a tractor trailer owned 

by the defendant, YRC, Inc., on a dark, unlit portion of Highway 41 outside Lowell, Indiana. 

While driving southbound on Highway 41, Woodward hit a pedestrian, Robert L. Stachon, the 

plaintiff. Stachon has alleged that Woodward negligently caused his injuries. 

Discussion 

 The defendants have requested the court to bifurcate the issues of liability and damages to 

avoid prejudice and to expedite and economize the trial. Rule 42(b) states: “For convenience, to 

avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or 

more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims. When ordering a 
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separate trial, the court must preserve any federal right to a jury trial.” Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 42(b). The decision to bifurcate a trial under Rule 42(b) is entirely within the trial 

court’s discretion. Houseman v. U.S. Aviation Underwriters, 171 F.3d 1117, 1121 (7th Cir. 

1999). “Like all rules of civil procedure, this rule is applied in conjunction with Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 1, which instructs that the rules shall be construed and administered to secure the 

just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” Toney v. Accor N. Am., 2010 WL 

2162626, at *1 (N.D. Ind. May 27, 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). First, 

the court must determine whether separate trials would avoid prejudice to a party or promote 

judicial economy. Balzer v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 2009 WL 1543524, at *2 (N.D. Ind. June 2, 

2009). Then it must decide whether bifurcation would prejudice a party unfairly. Balzer, 2009 

WL 1543524 at *2. Finally, bifurcation must not violate the Seventh Amendment. Balzer, 2009 

WL 1543524 at *2 (citing Houseman, 171 F.3d at 1121). The moving party has the burden to 

demonstrate that bifurcation would support judicial economy and not prejudice any parties. 

Toney, 2010 WL 2162626 at *1 (citations omitted). 

 First, the defendants have argued that separating liability and damages would avoid 

prejudice to them. They have claimed that Stachon’s serious injuries could sway the jury by 

sympathy to decide the liability issue in his favor. They have cited non-binding, persuasive 

authority from district courts outside this circuit to argue that potential sympathetic jurors 

warranted bifurcation. E.g., McKellar v. Clark Equip. Co., 101 F.R.D. 93, 95 (D. Me. 1984); 

Zofcin v. Dean, 144 F.R.D. 203, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). The defendants have stated that 

bifurcation would prevent the jury from deciding the liability issue based on sympathy or an 

emotional response from Stachon’s injuries. 
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 Next, the defendants have stated that separation would be more convenient for witnesses. 

The defendants have indicated that Stachon disclosed twenty-nine damages witnesses, which 

could require over a week of testimony, compared to six liability witnesses. The defendants 

have noted that they would call at least eight liability witnesses, including witnesses from out of 

state. Rather than requiring their witnesses to remain on call for days, the defendants have 

argued that bifurcation would provide a more definitive timeline. Moreover, they have claimed 

that Stachon’s liability witnesses, besides himself, would not testify regarding damages. 

Therefore, they have argued that bifurcation would not inconvenience his witnesses by requiring 

them to appear twice. 

 Finally, the defendants have argued that bifurcation would promote expedience and 

economy. The defendants have claimed that they were likely to prevail on liability, which would 

moot a second trial on damages. However, they have indicated that separation would not waste 

time given the lack of duplicative witnesses and evidence. They have stated that the same jury 

could hear testimony on damages immediately after deciding the liability issue, if necessary. 

 Although the defendants have argued that evidence of Stachon’s injuries would prejudice 

them through jury sympathy, they only have speculated that the testimony would cause 

prejudice. Mere speculation is insufficient to warrant a separate trial. Balzer, 2009 WL 1543524 

at *3 (citations omitted). Moreover, the court could temper any prejudice based on juror 

sympathy with cautionary warnings, limiting instructions, special verdict forms, or other jury 

instructions. See Real v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., 195 F.R.D. 618, 621 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (noting that 

the court could temper any prejudice from jury confusion through the above methods). The court 

believes that a jury can decide the liability issue in this case based on its merits, rather than being 

swayed by Stachon’s serious injuries or sympathy. 
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 The court agrees that bifurcation would be more convenient for the defendants’ 

witnesses. However, it also would be less convenient for Stachon’s witnesses. Although 

Stachon’s witnesses might not need to testify during both the liability and damages portions of a 

separated trial, bifurcation would simply switch scheduling issues from the defendants’ witnesses 

to Stachon’s damages witnesses. As the moving party, the defendants have the burden to 

demonstrate that bifurcation is appropriate. Making a trial less convenient for the non-moving 

party does not fulfill that burden. 

 Finally, the court is not convinced that the defendants will prevail on liability. This case 

involves a number of factual disputes, including competing expert opinions. The defendants 

cannot assume that they will prevail and relieve the court of the damages portion of the trial. 

Therefore, holding a single trial best serves judicial economy. Although the defendants may 

prevail on liability, the court does not find that the defendants’ possibility of success warrants 

bifurcation. Because the defendants have not demonstrated prejudice or promotion of judicial 

economy, the court does not need to address the possibility of a Seventh Amendment violation. 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Bifurcate the Issues of Liability and Damages 

[DE 88] is DENIED. 

 ENTERED this 2nd day of December, 2015. 

 /s/ Andrew P. Rodovich 

 United States Magistrate Judge