IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Marriage of:

MISTY BOWHAY (FKA FATHREE),

Respondent,

and

JOHN FATHREE,

Appellant.

DIVISION ONE

No. 80756-1-I

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

DWYER, J. — John Fathree appeals from the superior court’s order 

compelling him to give Misty Bowhay numerous firearms pursuant to the terms of 

a separation agreement that was incorporated into their dissolution decree. 

Fathree contends that the superior court’s order is unenforceable against him 

because it is “void for vagueness.” Additionally, Fathree asserts that the superior 

court erred by concluding that Bowhay was entitled to any firearms that were not 

already in her possession when the parties executed the separation agreement. 

Because Fathree does not establish an entitlement to relief, we affirm.

I

John Fathree and Misty Bowhay were married on April 10, 2012. On 

August 20, 2018, Bowhay filed a petition for dissolution in the Whatcom County 

Superior Court. On November 20, 2018, Fathree and Bowhay filed an amended 

petition for dissolution, which included a separation agreement that was signed 
No. 80756-1-I/2

2

by both Fathree and Bowhay.1 This separation agreement provided, in pertinent 

part:

Property Awarded to Petitioner [Bowhay]

• Petitioner shall keep 100% of her retirement

• New Safe to be purchased by Respondent and provided to 

Petitioner

• Guns

• Refrigerator

• Photos

• 2016 Jeep Grand Cherokee . . .

. . . .

Petitioner shall be awarded all other property in her possession

Property Awarded to Respondent [Fathree]

2012 Dodge Ram 2500 . . .

Respondent shall be awarded all other property in his possession.

On December 21, 2018, a court commissioner entered an order granting

the petition for dissolution and adopting the separation agreement. Bowhay 

subsequently filed a motion for contempt. This motion also requested an order to 

compel Fathree to comply with the requirements of the dissolution decree. In a 

declaration that was filed with her motion, Bowhay asserted that Fathree had 

violated the terms of the separation agreement by denying her access to the 

firearms that she was entitled to under the agreement. Attached to her 

declaration was an exhibit, entitled “Exhibit A,” which provided a list of the

firearms that Bowhay desired. In this declaration, Bowhay stated that the 

firearms contained within this list were “registered in [her] name.” 

On August 8, 2019, a hearing was conducted before a court 

commissioner. During the hearing, Bowhay stated that she was not seeking all

 1 Fathree and Bowhay also filed a petition for dissolution on August 31, 2018. Attached 

to this petition was a different separation agreement, which is not the subject of this appeal. 
No. 80756-1-I/3

3

of the firearms that were in the parties’ possession when the separation 

agreement was executed. Rather, Bowhay explained that she was seeking only 

those firearms that were “registered in her name.” That same day, the 

commissioner entered an order, which provided: “Respondent shall return all 

firearms registered in petitioner’s name to her within 30 days of todays [sic] date.” 

On August 16, 2019, Fathree filed a motion for revision. On September 

13, the superior court heard the motion. During the hearing, Fathree’s counsel

argued that, when the commissioner “made the ruling saying [Bowhay] gets the 

guns registered in her name, and vice-versa for [Fathree], that was an 

impermissible modification of a divorce decree.” The superior court concluded 

that, under the terms of the separation agreement, Bowhay was entitled to all of 

the firearms owned by the parties when the agreement was executed, not just 

those registered in her name. However, because Bowhay was not requesting all 

of the firearms, the superior court ordered Fathree to give to Bowhay only those 

firearms that she had requested:

THE COURT: Well, if you think that the commissioner’s 

ruling was wrong, and you want a de novo review of that by me, 

and you want me to instead rule that all of the guns go to her 

including the ones registered to him, I can give you that. I mean, 

that’s what I would find under this contract.

. . . .

[FATHREE’S COUNSEL]: Well, we certainly don’t want that.

THE COURT: Right, and so that’s the alternative because 

the only part about the commissioner’s ruling that I disagree with --

well, I don’t disagree with it. I just think the reason she said the 

wife gets the guns registered to the wife is because that was a 

concession that they made, that’s all we want, but under this 

particular contract, it could be read that all of the guns go to the 

wife, because that’s what it says. That’s the plain language.

[FATHREE’S COUNSEL]: It says guns. It doesn’t say all of 

the guns. It’s ambiguous in that respect. 
No. 80756-1-I/4

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THE COURT: Well, that’s my finding. So you can appeal it if 

you want to.

[FATHREE’S COUNSEL]: I don’t -- hope -- I don’t want to 

appeal it, but I do want to register my exception for the record if 

that’s the case.

THE COURT: Okay. So I’m going to order that the guns, 

and I’m just going to order the ones that are registered to her.

[BOWHAY’S COUNSEL]: That’s all she wants.

THE COURT: It’s previously been conceded, and those 

need to be . . . turned over to her.

On October 18, 2019, the superior court entered a written order on 

Fathree’s motion for revision. This order provided: “The court declines to revise 

the commissioner’s orders compelling the Respondent to return all firearms to 

the Petitioner. Respondent shall immediately return all firearms registered in 

Petitioner’s name (as requested by Petitioner) to her by no later than 10/30/19.”2 

Fathree appeals.3

II

Fathree contends that the superior court’s order on his motion for revision 

is “void for vagueness.” According to Fathree, Washington law does not require 

individuals to register their firearms and “[w]ithout an itemized list of exactly 

which firearms are at issue, it is impossible for [him] to comply with the court 

order as currently worded.” Fathree is wrong.

 2 Where, as here, “the superior court makes a decision on revision, ‘the appeal is from 

the superior court’s decision, not the commissioner’s.’” State v. Ramer, 151 Wn.2d 106, 113, 86 

P.3d 132 (2004) (quoting State v. Hoffman, 115 Wn. App. 91, 101, 60 P.3d 1261 (2003)). 3 Bowhay contends that Fathree’s notice of appeal does not meet the requirements of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure because it did not contain the superior court’s order on the motion 

for revision. See RAP 5.3(a) (“The party filing the notice of appeal should attach to the notice of 

appeal a copy of the signed order or judgment from which the appeal is made.”). However, the 

notice of appeal does, in fact, contain this order. 

Bowhay also asserts that Fathree failed to timely file a “motion for discretionary review.” 

However, Fathree appealed from a final order after judgment and is not seeking discretionary 

review. Thus, the rules pertaining to discretionary review do not apply. See RAP 2.2(a)(13).
No. 80756-1-I/5

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As an initial matter, we note that the vagueness doctrine does not apply to 

court orders. Rather, its application is limited to statutes and 

ordinances. See, e.g., City of Seattle v. Eze, 111 Wn.2d 22, 26, 759 P.2d 366 

(1988) (“An ordinance or statute is ‘void for vagueness if it is framed in terms so 

vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its 

meaning and differ as to its application.’” (quoting O’Day v. King County, 109 

Wn.2d 796, 810, 749 P.2d 142 (1988))).

In any event, the superior court’s order on Fathree’s motion for revision is 

not vague. This order provided: “The court declines to revise the commissioner’s 

orders compelling the Respondent to return all firearms to the Petitioner. 

Respondent shall immediately return all firearms registered in Petitioner’s name 

(as requested by Petitioner) to her by no later than 10/30/19.” In support of her

motion to compel, Bowhay attached an exhibit, which provided a list of all the 

firearms that she stated to be “registered in [her] name.” The superior court’s 

order clearly requires Fathree to return these firearms to Bowhay.

Accordingly, Fathree’s assignment of error fails.

III

Fathree next asserts that the superior court erred by interpreting the 

separation agreement as entitling Bowhay to all of the firearms in the parties’ 

possession when the agreement was executed.4 Because the separation 

agreement had only one reasonable interpretation, we disagree.

 4 As already explained, under the superior court’s order, Fathree is required to give 

Bowhay only those firearms that she requested in her motion to compel. Even though the 

superior court concluded that, under the plain terms of the separation agreement, Bowhay was 

entitled to all of the firearms owned by the parties when the agreement was executed, Bowhay 
No. 80756-1-I/6

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“When the parties to a separation agreement dispute its meaning, the 

court must ascertain and effectuate their intent at the time they formed the 

agreement.” In re Marriage of Boisen, 87 Wn. App. 912, 920, 943 P.2d 682 

(1997). “The intent of the parties is determined by examining their objective 

manifestations, including both the written agreement and the context within which 

it was executed.” Boisen, 87 Wn. App. at 920. “Generally, this is true even when 

the separation agreement has been incorporated in a dissolution decree, 

because the parties’ intent will be the court’s intent.” Boisen, 87 Wn. App. at 920. 

“If the agreement has only one reasonable meaning when viewed in context, that 

meaning necessarily reflects the parties’ intent.” Boisen, 87 Wn. App. at 920. “If 

the agreement has more than one reasonable meaning, a question of fact is 

presented and this court reviews the trial court’s determination for substantial 

evidence.” In re Estate of Petelle, 8 Wn. App. 2d 714, 720, 440 P.3d 1026 

(2019), aff’d, 195 Wn.2d 661, 462 P.3d 848 (2020). “But where there is no 

reliance on extrinsic evidence, interpretation of a contract is a question of law we 

review de novo.” Petelle, 8 Wn. App. 2d at 720. “‘[W]e attempt to determine the 

parties’ intent by focusing on the objective manifestations of the agreement, 

rather than on the unexpressed subjective intent of the parties.’” Petelle, 8 Wn. 

App. 2d at 720 (alteration in original) (quoting Hearst Commc’ns, Inc. v. Seattle 

Times Co., 154 Wn.2d 493, 503, 115 P.3d 262 (2005)).

 

limited her request to only those firearms that were listed in the exhibit attached to her motion to 

compel.
No. 80756-1-I/7

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Here, the separation agreement between the parties has only one 

reasonable meaning. Again, this agreement provided:

Property Awarded to Petitioner

• Petitioner shall keep 100% of her retirement

• New Safe to be purchased by Respondent and provided to 

Petitioner

• Guns

• Refrigerator

• Photos

• 2016 Jeep Grand Cherokee . . .

. . . .

Petitioner shall be awarded all other property in her possession

Property Awarded to Respondent

2012 Dodge Ram 2500 . . .

Respondent shall be awarded all other property in his possession.

The only reasonable interpretation of this agreement is that Bowhay was

entitled to all of the firearms owned by the parties when the agreement was 

executed. Indeed, the agreement provides that the property to be awarded to 

Bowhay included “Guns.” Additionally, under this agreement, each party is 

entitled to “all other property” that was in his or her possession. (Emphasis 

added.) Thus, under a plain reading of the agreement, the “other property” that 

was in the parties’ possession did not include “Guns.”

Fathree contends that the meaning of the agreement is ambiguous 

because it does “not specify which guns or how many guns” Bowhay was entitled 

to. We disagree. The lack of modifying language indicates that “Guns” meant

“all guns.” The superior court was correct.

Next, Fathree asserts that the agreement is ambiguous because the 

phrase “Respondent shall be awarded all other property in his possession” 

means that he was entitled to those firearms that were in his possession when 
No. 80756-1-I/8

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the agreement was executed. Not so. Under the agreement, Bowhay was 

awarded the “Guns.” Thus, there were no “guns” that were “other property.” The 

superior court correctly so ruled.

The superior court did not err.

IV

Bowhay requests an award of attorney fees pursuant to RAP 18.9. 

Bowhay asserts that she is entitled to such an award because Fathree filed a 

frivolous appeal. See Mahoney v. Shinpoch, 107 Wn.2d 679, 692, 732 P.2d 510 

(1987). We deny Bowhay’s request.

Affirmed.

WE CONCUR: