alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 82 (Friday, April 28, 1995)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 20916]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-10447]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------


DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
50 CFR Part 654

[Docket No. 950203034-5034-01; I.D. 092794B]
RIN 0648-AG23


Stone Crab Fishery of the Gulf of Mexico; Correction

AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Commerce.

ACTION: Final rule; correction.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This rule corrects the final rule to implement Amendment 5 to 
the Fishery Management Plan for the Stone Crab Fishery of the Gulf of 
Mexico, which was published on March 15, 1995.

EFFECTIVE DATE: April 14, 1995.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Peter Eldridge, 813-570-5305.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The final rule to implement Amendment 5, 
among other things, incorporated by reference certain sections of the 
Florida Administrative Code. One of the Florida citations that is in 
this rule, which originally appears at 60 FR 13918, March 15, 1995, was 
stated incorrectly.

Correction of Publication

    Accordingly, the publication on March 15, 1995 (60 FR 13918) of the 
final regulations (I.D. 092794B), which was the subject of FR DOC. 95-
6334, is corrected as follows:


Sec. 654.6  [Corrected]

    On page 13919, in the third column of Sec. 654.6, paragraph (a), 
line eight, correct the reference ``Rule 2N-8.001'' to read ``Rule 62N-
8.001''.

    Dated: April 24, 1995.
Gary Matlock,
Program Management Officer, National Marine Fisheries Service.
[FR Doc. 95-10447 Filed 4-27-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-22-F
STATE of Louisiana v. Will NEWSOME and Aaron Henderson

No. 2019-KK-0439

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 28, 2019

*On Supervisory Writs to the Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans*

PER CURIAM

Writ granted.

*306Pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(D), defendants have the burden of proof on a motion to suppress an out-of-court identification. The jurisprudence has established a multi-factor test for ascertaining whether a defendant has carried the burden of proof for suppressing an identification. *See, e.g.*, **State v. Higgins** , 2003-1980, p. 19 (La. 4/1/05), 898 So.2d 1219, 1233. While the test has multiple factors, globally it asks whether the identification was suggestive, and if so, whether there was a substantial likelihood of misidentification.

The trial court never reached the test described in **Higgins** , finding instead that there was no reasonable suspicion to detain five subjects, two of whom were eventually presented for a "show-up" identification to the armed robbery victim in this case. The trial court's finding of no reasonable suspicion to detain the subjects is insupportable on this record, which under the "totality of the circumstances" shows police had "a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person[s] stopped of criminal activity." **State v. Morgan** , 2009-2352, p. 5 (La. 3/15/11), 59 So.3d 403, 406. Here, the subjects were detained in close proximity to a car that had just been abandoned after a high speed chase to elude police, who were pursuing the car based on the victim's description of its involvement in the armed robbery. Accordingly, because the standard of reasonable suspicion to detain the defendants was met, the trial court erred in failing reach the legal issue of whether the defendants' identifications were suggestive and in failing to apply the factors described in **Higgins** .

From our review of the record, for purposes of defendants' motions to suppress the identifications, we accept that the identifications were suggestive. Police presented each defendant to the victim individually, after each was taken from the back of a police cruiser. Each defendant remained handcuffed with an officer standing beside him and a spotlight trained on him.

However, the present record does not lend itself to a full application of the **Higgins** test. We therefore remand for the trial court to conduct a separate evaluation of the five factors we adopted in **Higgins** on the issue of whether an identification presents a substantial likelihood of misidentification. Relatedly, we note the trial court's ruling that probable cause was lacking was a ruling premised on the trial court's having suppressed the identifications. Thus, on remand, after separately evaluating whether the show-up identification of each defendant is viable, the trial court shall evaluate whether probable cause exists as to each defendant.

Hughes and Genovese, JJ., would deny.
EXHIBIT B

FILED UNDER SEAL

Case 3:17-cv-00939-WHA Document 180-2 Filed 04/07/17 Page 1 of 1
<PAGE>
                                                                 Exhibit 10.45.1

  Schedule Identifying Substantially Identical Agreements to Exhibit No. 10.45.

Various subsidiaries of the Company each entered into loan agreement which is
substantially identical to the loan agreement filed under Exhibit 10.45. The
following table lists the borrower, lender and loan amount which differs from
that in exhibit 10.45 for each of the six loan agreements.

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
             Borrower                            Lender                             Loan Amount
             --------                            ------                             -----------
<S>                                       <C>                                      <C>
MHC Casa Village, L.L.C.                  Bank of America, N.A.                     $11,040,000
MHC Colony Park Limited Partnership       Bank of America, N.A.                      $5,825,877
MHC Heritage Plantation, L.L.C.           Wells Fargo Bank, National Association    $13,520,000
MHC Maralago Cay, L.L.C.                  Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital, Inc.     $21,600,000
MHC Quail Meadows Limited Partnership     Wells Fargo Bank, National Association     $5,280,000
MHC Santiago Estates Limited Partnership  Bank of America, N.A.                     $16,204,901
</TABLE>
I 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1255

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend the tax incentives 

for biodiesel. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 10, 2005

Mr. PETERSON of Minnesota introduced the following bill; which was referred 

to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend 

the tax incentives for biodiesel.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF BIODIESEL TAX CREDITS. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Sections 40A(e), 6426(c)(6), and 

5 6427(e)(3)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 are 

6 each amended by striking ‘‘2006’’ and inserting ‘‘2010’’. 

7 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

8 this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment 

9 of this Act.

Æ
Donavan Michael SLAGG, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 12-9200.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 15, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied.
COURT OF APPEALS

SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AMARILLO

MANDATE

THE STATE OF TEXAS

To the 29th District Court of Palo Pinto County, Greeting:

BEFORE our Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas, on May 31,

2018, the cause upon appeal to revise or reverse your judgment between

Raymond Sambow Vargas v. The State of Texas

Case Number: 07-18-00129-CR Trial Court Number: 16044

was determined and therein our said Court made its order in these words:

Pursuant to the opinion of the Court dated May 31, 2018, it is ordered, adjudged

and decreed that the appeal is abated and the cause is remanded to the 29th District

Court of Palo Pinto County, Texas for further proceedings in accordance with this

Court’s opinion entered this day.

o O o

WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of said Court of

Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas, in this behalf, and in all things to have it duly

recognized, obeyed and executed.

WITNESS, the Honorable Justices of our said Court, with the seal thereof

annexed, at the City of Amarillo on May 31, 2018.

Vivian Long

VIVIAN LONG, CLERK

FILE COPY
Amendment to Cabot Corporation Short-Term Incentive Compensation Plan



 Exhibit 10.4 
 AMENDMENT TO 
 CABOT CORPORATION 
 SHORT-TERM INCENTIVE COMPENSATION PLAN 
 Cabot Corporation, a Delaware corporation (the “Company”),
pursuant to Section VIII of the Cabot Corporation Short-Term Incentive Compensation Plan (the “Plan”) and Section 4.F of the Cabot Corporation Benefits Committee Amended and Restated Charter (the “Charter”), hereby amends
the Plan effective January 1, 2009, as follows: 
 A new Section VI is added as follows and the sections previously numbered VI and above are renumbered
accordingly: 
 “Unless an Award letter or other documentation establishing an Award provides a specified and objectively determinable
payment date or schedule to the contrary, all payments under the Plan will be made after the right to payment vests and in all events by March 15 of the calendar year following the calendar year in which the right to payment vests (or, if
later, by the 15th day of the third month following the end of the Company’s taxable year in which the right to payment vests). For purposes of the foregoing sentence, a right to payment will be treated as having vested when it is no longer
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. Payments hereunder are intended to fall under the short-term deferral exception to Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and shall be construed and administered
accordingly.” 
 In Witness Whereof, the Company has caused this Amendment to be signed by its
duly authorized officer this 31st day of December 2008. 
  

					
	CABOT CORPORATION
		
	By:	 	/s/ Robby D. Sisco
		 	Name:	 	Robby D. Sisco
		 	Vice President, Human Resources
```
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 88 (Monday, May 8, 1995)]
[Sunshine Act Meetings]
[Page 22606]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-11317]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

INTER-AMERICAN FOUNDATION BOARD MEETING

TIME AND DATE: May 17, 1995, 11:30 a.m.-3:30 p.m.

PLACE: 901 N. Stuart Street, Tenth Floor, Arlington, Virginia 22203.

STATUS: Open except for the portions specified as closed session as 
provided in 22 CFR Part 1004.4 (b).

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED:

    1. Approval of the Minutes of the February 2, 1995, Board 
Meeting.
    2. President's Report.
    3. Audit Committee Report.
    4. Report on Status of Foundation's Fiscal Year 1996 
Authorizations and Appropriations.
    5. Discussion on Future of the Foundation.
    6. Executive Session on Personnel Implications in Fiscal Year 
1996 (closed session).
CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION: Adolfo A. Franco, Secretary to the 
Board of Directors, (703) 841-3894.

    Dated: May 3, 1995.
Adolfo A. Franco,
Sunshine Act Officer.
[FR Doc. 95-11317 Filed 5-4-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7025-01-M
```
Tawanna HODGES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D18-3779

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

June 26, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WAYMO LLC,

Plaintiff,

 v.

UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.;

OTTOMOTTO LLC; and OTTO

TRUCKING LLC,

Defendants. /

No. C 17-00939 WHA

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION

TO FILE UNDER SEAL

In connection with defendants’ motion to strike certain trade secret claims, plaintiff

Waymo LLC moves to redact portions of two Court orders concerning asserted trade secret

number 96 (Dkt. Nos. 1408, 1416) on the basis that “there is a high likelihood that this

information tends to reveal Waymo’s trade secrets” (Dkt. Nos. 1428 at 2; 1428-1 ¶¶ 3–4). 

Waymo’s proposed redactions, however, are not “narrowly tailored” as required by Civil Local

Rule 79-5 to seek sealing only of asserted trade secrets. The breadth of the proposed redactions

is especially troubling given that defendants’ underlying motion to strike contends Waymo

failed to disclose its asserted trade secrets with reasonable particularity (see Dkt. No. 1108 at

4–8). In response, Waymo insists that asserted trade secret number 96 was adequately disclosed

because it remains “directed to specific implementations of Waymo’s trade secret LiDAR

designs” as opposed to general concepts (see Dkt. No. 1160 at 6–7 (emphasis in original)). Yet

Waymo seeks to redact Court orders that reveal nothing about its specific implementations. If

those orders could reveal what Waymo disclosed in its asserted trade secret number 96, then

Waymo may have disclosed no trade secret at all.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Nevertheless, Waymo’s administrative motion to file under seal is GRANTED with

respect to the highlighted portions shown in Exhibit A to this order and is otherwise DENIED. 

The orders in question will be redacted and filed on the public docket unless Waymo obtains

emergency relief from the Federal Circuit by SEPTEMBER 27.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 6, 2017. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DECLARATION OF CATHLIN TULLY IN SUPPORT OF FTC’S ADMIN. MOTION TO FILE UNDER 

SEAL PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT PAGE 1

CASE NO. 3:17-CV-00039 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

LAURA D. BERGER (FL Bar No. 11762) 

Federal Trade Commission 

901 Market Street, Suite 570 

San Francisco, CA 94103 

P: (202) 326-2471/F: (415) 848-5184 

lberger@ftc.gov; 

KEVIN H. MORIARTY (DC Bar No. 975904) 

CATHLIN TULLY (NY Bar) 

Federal Trade Commission 

600 Pennsylvania Ave N.W. 

Washington, DC 20580 

P: (202) 326-3644/F: (202) 326-3062 

kmoriarty@ftc.gov; ctully@ftc.gov 

Attorneys for Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 

____________________________________ 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ) 

 ) Case No. 3:17-cv-00039

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) 

 ) 

D-LINK CORPORATION ) 

 ) DECLARATION OF CATHLIN TULLY 

and ) IN SUPPORT OF FEDERAL TRADE 

 ) COMMISSION’S ADMINISTRATIVE 

D-LINK SYSTEMS, INC., ) MOTION TO FILE UNDER SEAL 

corporations, ) PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S

) COMPLAINT

 Defendants. ) 

___________________________________ ) 

1. I am an attorney for the plaintiff Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) in this matter. I submit 

this declaration in support of the FTC’s Administrative Motion to File Under Seal Portions of 

Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed concurrently with this declaration. Unless stated otherwise, I 
DECLARATION OF CATHLIN TULLY IN SUPPORT OF FTC’S ADMIN. MOTION TO FILE UNDER 

SEAL PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT PAGE 2

CASE NO. 3:17-CV-00039 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

make this declaration based on my own personal knowledge, and if called as a witness, I 

could and would testify competently as follows. 

2. The FTC’s complaint alleges facts in Paragraphs 10, 11, and 25 that the FTC obtained during 

the course of its non-public investigation of D-Link Systems, Inc. (“DLS”). In providing this 

information to the FTC, DLS designated this information as confidential pursuant to Section 

21 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57b-2. 

3. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct. 

Executed in Washington, DC, on January 5, 2017. 

 

 /s/ Cathlin Tully______________________ 

 

 CATHLIN TULLY
Vincent TERRY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D18-3778

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed July 2, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
IN RE: GRAND JURY SUBPOENA

NO. 2019-KK-0639

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 17, 2019

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.
I 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1239 

To require notice of exceptions applied by the Department of Defense to 

certain requirements to procure items made in the United States. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 10, 2005 

Mr. HAYES introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Armed Services 

A BILL 

To require notice of exceptions applied by the Department 

of Defense to certain requirements to procure items 

made in the United States. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Berry Amendment No5 tification Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO DOMESTIC SOURCE REQUIRE7 MENTS. 

8 (a) NOTICE.—Section 2533a of title 10, United 

9 States Code, is amended by adding at the end the fol10 lowing new subsection: 
2 

•HR 1239 IH 

1 ‘‘(k) NOTIFICATION REQUIRED WITHIN 7 DAYS

2 AFTER CONTRACT AWARD IF CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS AP3 PLIED.—In the case of any contract for the procurement 

4 of an item described in subparagraph (B), (C), (D), or 

5 (E) of subsection (b)(1), if the Secretary of Defense or 

6 of the military department concerned applies an exception 

7 set forth in subsection (c) or (e) with respect to that con8 tract, the Secretary shall, not later than 7 days after the 

9 award of the contract, post a notification that the excep10 tion has been applied on the Internet site maintained by 

11 the General Services Administration known as 

12 FedBizOps.gov (or any successor site).’’. 

13 (b) CLOTHING MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS COV14 ERED.—Subsection (b) of section 2533a of title 10, United 

15 States Code, is amended in paragraph (1)(B) by inserting 

16 before the semicolon the following: ‘‘and the materials and 

17 components thereof, other than sensors, electronics, or 

18 other items added to, and not normally associated with, 

19 clothing (and the materials and components thereof)’’. 

Æ
**Exhibit 34.1**

**REPORT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

Discover Bank 

We have examined management’s assertion, included in the accompanying Management’s Assertion on Compliance with Regulation AB Criteria, thatDiscover Bank (the “Bank”) complied with the servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d) of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulation AB for the asset backed securities transactions involving credit card receivablesconducted by Discover Card Master Trust I and Discover Card Execution Note Trust (the “Platform”) as of and for the year ended November 30, 2008, excluding the criteria set forth in Items 1122 (d)(1)(iii), (d)(1)(iv), (d)(2)(iii),(d)(2)(iv), (d)(2)(v), (d)(2)(vi), (d)(3)(iii), (d)(3)(iv), (d)(4)(i), (d)(4)(iv), (d)(4)(vi), (d)(4)(vii), (d)(4)(viii), (d)(4)(ix), (d)(4)(x), (d)(4)(xi), (d)(4)(xii), (d)(4)(xiii), (d)(4)(xiv), and (d)(4)(xv), which management has determined arenot applicable to the activities performed by the Bank with respect to the Platform. Appendix A to management’s assertion identifies the individual asset-backed transactions defined by management as constituting the Platform. Management isresponsible for the Bank’s compliance with the servicing criteria. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on management’s assertion about the Bank’s compliance with the servicing criteria based on our examination. 

Our examination was conducted in accordance with attestation standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, as adoptedby the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States) and, accordingly, included examining, on a test basis, evidence about the Bank’s compliance with the applicable servicing criteria, including tests on a sample basis of theservicing activities related to the Platform, determining whether the Bank performed those selected activities in compliance with the servicing criteria during the specified period and performing such other procedures as we considered necessary inthe circumstances. Our procedures were limited to selected servicing activities performed by the Bank during the period covered by this report and, accordingly, such samples may not have included servicing activities related to each asset-backedtransaction included in the Platform. Further, an examination is not designed to detect noncompliance arising from errors that may have occurred prior to the period specified above that may have affected the balances or amounts calculated orreported by the Bank during the period covered by this report. We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. Our examination does not provide a legal determination on the Bank’s compliance with the servicingcriteria. 

In our opinion, management’s assertion that the Bank complied with the aforementioned applicable servicing criteria as ofand for the year ended November 30, 2008, for the Platform is fairly stated, in all material respects. 

/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP 

Chicago, Illinois 

February 13, 2009
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WAYMO LLC,

Plaintiff,

 v.

UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 17-00939 WHA

ORDER RE DUE DILIGENCE

REPORT

At the conference on March 29, defense counsel indicated that, prior to the acquisition

of Otto Trucking LLC and Ottomotto LLC, Uber Technologies, Inc., obtained a due diligence

report prepared by a third party that may (or may not) have referenced the collection of

allegedly downloaded documents. Uber intends to put that report on a privilege log. Unless

privileged, the aforementioned due diligence report should be produced to plaintiff Waymo

LLC. If a claim of privilege is asserted, it should be very promptly claimed with all of the

required details disclosed. Any motion under the Fifth Amendment to suspend the production

or privilege log requirement must be brought by APRIL 4 AT NOON, if at all, so as to avoid delay

leading up to the hearing on May 3. Defense counsel shall immediately notify separate counsel

for Anthony Levandowski of this deadline.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 31, 2017. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:17-cv-00939-WHA Document 132 Filed 03/31/17 Page 1 of 1
Parker M. WELCH, DOC #158279, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-4029

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed June 19, 2019.

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.