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Michael P. Lehmann (SBN 77152) 

Christopher L. Lebsock (SBN 184546) 

Bonny E. Sweeney (SBN 176174)

Bruce J. Wecker (SBN 78530)

Samantha J. Stein (SBN 302034)

HAUSFELD LLP 

600 Montgomery St., Suite 3200

San Francisco, CA 94111 

Tel: (415) 633-1908 

Fax: (415) 358-4980 

Email: mlehmann@hausfeld.com

Email: clebsock@hausfeld.com

Email: bsweeney@hausfeld.com

Email: bwecker@hausfeld.com

Email: sstein@hausfeld.com

Michael D. Hausfeld (pro hac vice

forthcoming)

HAUSFELD LLP

1700 K Street, NW, Suite 650

Washington, DC 20006

Tel: (202)-540-7200 

Fax: (202)-540-7201

Email: mhausfeld@hausfeld.com

Eugene A. Spector 

Jeffrey L. Kodroff

William G. Caldes 

Jonathan M. Jagher

Len A. Fisher

(pro hac vice forthcoming)

SPECTOR ROSEMAN KODROFF & 

WILLIS, P.C.

1818 Market Street, Suite 2500

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Tel: (215) 496-0300 

Fax: (215) 496-6611

Email: ESpector@srkw-law.com

Email: JKodroff@srkw-law.com

Email: BCaldes@srkw-law.com

Email: JJagher@srkw-law.com

Email: LFisher@srkw-law.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

Craig Housenick, Ryan Margulis, Richard 

Rizzo, on behalf of themselves and all others 

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

Qualcomm Incorporated, a Delaware 

Corporation,

Defendant.

Case No. 5:17-cv-675

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR 

VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL AND 

STATE ANTITRUST LAWS, STATE 

UNFAIR COMPETITION LAWS, 

AND THE COMMON LAW OF 

UNJUST ENRICHMENT

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Plaintiffs, by and through their undersigned attorneys, bring this proposed class action 

and allege as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiffs and proposed class members are purchasers of cellular telephones 

and other cellular devices, such as computer tablets. In each such device, there is a modem 

chipset (also called a baseband processor), which allows the device to communicate and 

transmit voice and data across wireless networks controlled by wireless carriers, such as 

Verizon or Sprint. Plaintiffs bring this action against Defendant Qualcomm Incorporated

(“Qualcomm”) for its anticompetitive conduct in acquiring and maintaining monopolies over 

the modem chipset market and the licensing market for “standard essential patents” or “SEPs”

related to that technology. As a result of Qualcomm’s anticompetitive conduct, described 

below, Qualcomm has charged device manufacturers an excessive and unlawful royalty on the 

net selling price of each cellular device, which in turn has inflated the price paid by each enduser purchaser of such devices.

2. To communicate with an operator’s network, a cellular device must contain a 

modem chipset that complies with cellular communications standards that the network 

supports. Standard setting organizations (“SSOs”), comprised of device and device 

component manufacturers as well as others, collaborate to set technology requirements 

(“standards”) to ensure mass interoperability among all system components. Because a 

standard requires that devices utilize a specific technology, standard-compliant devices will, 

in some cases, infringe on certain patents for technology incorporated in the standard. Such 

patents are the aforementioned SEPs. SEP holders benefit by obtaining licensing fees and 

royalties associated with use of their technology. Given the power such standards may give 

SEP holders, before selecting a standard, SSOs consider various alternative technologies, and 

importantly, also require that the developers of these standards agree to license their 

technology on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (“FRAND”) terms. This ensures that 

competitors may use the technology rather than being excluded from the market, and device 

manufacturers may use the technology without being subjected to unreasonable terms.

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3. Qualcomm pioneered a technology known as Code Division Multiple Access 

(“CDMA”), which provided a means for cellular devices to communicate with their wireless 

networks. Qualcomm was, and continues to be, the dominant producer of CDMA-modem 

chipsets and also holds the largest number of SEPs for CDMA technology. 

4. Qualcomm used its early leverage over CDMA technology to control the 

modem chipset supply (and SEPs related to that technology) to unlawfully acquire and 

maintain its monopolies over these markets. CDMA became the standard used by Verizon 

and Sprint, which directly stemmed from Qualcomm’s promise to SSOs that it would comply 

with FRAND requirements if the SSOs adopted Qualcomm’s CDMA technology as their 

standard, rather than basing the standard on other technologies that competed with CDMA. 

As a result, device manufacturers such as Apple Inc. (“Apple”) had to incorporate 

Qualcomm’s CDMA technology for its devices to communicate with Verizon and Sprint. 

Thus, having agreed to license its technology on FRAND terms, Qualcomm’s technology has 

been incorporated into virtually every relevant cellular standard in the last several years. 

Qualcomm has targeted a total “service addressable market” that it claims was worth $23 

billion in 2015 and will be worth about $100 billion in 2020.1

5. Qualcomm, however, took unfair advantage of standard-setting process by 

taking and manipulating all of the benefits of that process while refusing to comply with the 

FRAND commitments it made to SSOs to induce them to select Qualcomm’s technologies for 

their standards. Among other things, Qualcomm (1) refused to license, or alternatively 

imposed onerous restrictions on licenses of, its SEPs to competing chipset makers; (2)

conditioned the supply of its CDMA chipsets on agreeing to Qualcomm’s license agreements 

for its entire patent portfolio, including non-SEPs; (3) entered into exclusive deals with 

certain cellular device manufacturers, such as Apple; and (4) ignored the requirements of 

SSOs to license its SEPs to patent users on FRAND terms to extract unreasonably high, 

unilaterally determined royalty payments. 

 1 Paige Tanner, Qualcomm Is Targeting $100 Billion Market By 2020, Market Realist (Mar. 

16, 2016), http://marketrealist.com/2016/03/qualcomm-targeting-100-billion-market-2020/. 

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6. Plaintiffs and the class of persons they seek to represent have been harmed by 

paying supracompetitive prices for the cellular devices they purchased. Qualcomm “parlayed 

its pioneering role in cellular technology into a patent-licensing business that generates most 

of its profits. Qualcomm charges a royalty on nearly every smartphone made, whether or not 

the device uses its chips.”2 Qualcomm admits in its Form 10-Q filed on June 29, 2016 with 

the Securities & Exchange Commission (“SEC”) that “[r]oyalties are generally based upon a 

percentage of the wholesale (i.e., licensee’s) selling price of complete licensed products, net 

of certain permissible deductions (including transportation, insurance, packing costs and other 

items).” (Emphases added). Qualcomm typically charges cellular device manufacturers up to 

5% of their product’s wholesale price—around $20 on a $400 phone. 

7. Qualcomm’s anticompetitive conduct has been investigated and met with 

condemnation by regulators around the world. On September 9, 2009, the Japanese Fair 

Trade Commission (“JFTC”) issued a cease and desist order against Qualcomm on the 

grounds that Qualcomm had violated its FRAND obligations. On February 10, 2015, the 

Chinese National Development & Reform Commission (“NDRC”) found that Qualcomm had 

abused its monopoly power and restricted competition in violation of the country’s AntiMonopoly Law, fining Qualcomm $975 million. On December 21, 2016, the Korea Fair 

Trade Commission (“KFTC”) fined Qualcomm $854 million (the largest fine in its history) 

for abuse of market dominance and anticompetitive conduct with respect to its licensing 

practices. 

8. Most recently, on January 17, 2017, the United States Federal Trade 

Commission (“FTC”) filed a civil suit against Qualcomm in this Court on January 17, 2017, 

challenging Qualcomm’s unlawful maintenance of a monopoly in baseband processors and

alleging Qualcomm has excluded competitors and harmed competition—to the detriment of 

consumers who, as a result, paid increased prices for cellular devices. See Federal Trade 

Commission v. Qualcomm Inc., Case No. 17-cv-220-LHK (N.D. Cal., filed Jan. 17, 2017). 

 2 Don Clark, Qualcomm’s Main Profit Driver is Under Pressure, The Wall Street Journal 

(Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/qualcomms-main-profit-driver-is-underpressure-1428967051.

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9. The FTC’s action has also spurred Apple to file an antitrust, intellectual 

property, and contract suit against Qualcomm. See Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., Case No. 

17-cv-0108-GPC/NLS (S.D. Cal., filed Jan. 20, 2017). In addition, Apple has commenced a 

$145 million patent action against Qualcomm in a Chinese intellectual property court.3

10. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated 

to recover for their injuries resulting from Qualcomm’s violations of Sections 2 and 3(b) of 

the Sherman Act, as well as violations of state antitrust and consumer protection laws. 

Plaintiffs seek monetary damages, injunctive relief, and any other available remedies to which 

they are entitled to as a result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct. 

II. PARTIES

 A. Plaintiffs

11. Plaintiff Craig Housenick is a resident of California. Mr. Housenick purchased 

an Apple iPhone 6 Plus for personal use and not for resale.

12. Plaintiff Ryan Margulis is a resident of Illinois. Mr. Margulis purchased an

Apple iPhone 6 Plus for personal use and not for resale. 

13. Plaintiff Richard Rizzo is a resident of Florida. Mr. Rizzo purchased an Apple 

iPhone 6 Plus for personal use and not for resale. 

 B. Defendant

14. Defendant Qualcomm is a Delaware corporation having its principal place of 

business at 5775 Morehouse Drive, San Diego, California 92121. Qualcomm develops, 

designs, licenses, and markets its digital communications products and services worldwide, 

primarily through its two main business segments: Qualcomm CDMA Technologies (“QCT”) 

and Qualcomm Technology Licensing (“QTL”), both wholly-owned subsidiaries of 

Qualcomm. QCT deals with equipment sales while QTL grants licenses or otherwise 

provides rights to use portions of Qualcomm’s patent portfolio. QCT is operated by 

Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. (“QTI”), another wholly-owned subsidiary of Qualcomm.

 3 Brian Heater, Apple files a $145 million patent suit against Qualcomm in China, TC’s 

Crunchboard (Jan. 25, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/01/25/apple-qualcomm-2/. 

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15. Qualcomm has extensive offices and employees throughout this District, 

including in San Francisco, Santa Clara, and Alameda counties,

4 and regularly conducts 

business here. Many of its licensees are also located in this District.

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

16. This action arises under Sections 4 and Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 

U.S.C. §§ 15(a) and 26, for Qualcomm’s violations of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 

U.S.C. § 2 and Section 3(b) of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3(b). The Court has subject 

matter jurisdiction over this claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337. 

17. Plaintiffs also bring claims under state laws as set forth herein. The Court has 

supplemental jurisdiction over these pendant state law claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d) and 

1367. Each of Plaintiffs’ state law claims arises out of the same factual nucleus as Plaintiffs’ 

federal law claims.

18. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 

U.S.C. § 22 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because a substantial part of the events giving rise to 

Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this District, and Qualcomm transacts business and maintains

facilities in this District and thus is subject to personal jurisdiction here. Qualcomm is 

engaged in interstate commerce, and its activities, including those activities that form the 

basis of this Complaint, substantially impact interstate commerce.

19. Millions of relevant cellular devices were purchased at artificially inflated rates 

in this District.

IV. INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT

20. Pursuant to the Northern District of California’s Civil Local Rule 3-2(c-e), the 

intradistrict assignment should be to the San Jose Division. This action arises in Santa Clara 

County because a substantial part of the events giving rise to these claims occurred there. 

Additionally, Qualcomm has offices in Santa Clara and San Jose, and third parties that have 

information relevant to this action, including leading cellular device manufacturers and 

 4 Qualcomm, Offices & Facilities, https://www.qualcomm.com/company/facilities/offices

(last visited Jan. 16, 2017).

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Qualcomm competitors, also have offices in Santa Clara County. As noted above, the FTC 

also filed a case in the San Jose Division concerning the same practices at issue in this case.

V. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 A. SSOs, SEPs, and FRAND Obligations

21. Interoperability and compatibility are critical for most modern electronic 

devices. A wireless network (such as those operated by AT&T, Verizon, and Sprint) must be 

able to communicate with cellular devices utilizing that cellular network and visa versa. 

Accordingly, their infrastructure and design, and the components underlying that 

infrastructure and design, must work together, regardless of which company made them.

22. Cellular devices contain a modem chipset – the core electronic unit that allows 

it to transmit and receive information (either voice telephone calls or data) to and from the 

wireless network. Specifically, these chipsets transmit information, via radio waves, to 

cellular base stations. Base stations, in turn, transmit information to and from telephone and 

computer networks. It is essential that all components involved in this transmission be able to 

communicate seamlessly with one another. 

23. Because of the multitude of devices and technologies, device designers, 

component manufacturers, and others have agreed to uniform standards to ensure the smooth 

operation of the wireless network and the cellular devices that connect to it. To achieve this, 

wireless network carriers, chipset manufacturers, cellular device manufacturers, and others 

have established SSOs, such as the European Telecommunications Standard Institute 

(“ETSI”), the International Telecommunications Union (“ITU”), the Institute of Electrical and 

Electronic Engineers (“IEEE”), and, in the United States, the Telecommunications Industry 

Association (“TIA”).

24. SSOs collaborate to set technology requirements that ensure mass 

interoperability among all system components. The technology incorporated into a standard

is typically chosen from among different options. Once incorporated and widely adopted, that 

technology is not always used because it is the best or the only option; it is used because it is 

necessary to comply with the standard. Competition is eliminated as alternatives cannot 

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comply with the standard. Additionally, to implement a technological standard, devices often 

need to incorporate a patented invention on which the standard is based. These are the SEPs 

discussed previously. Holders of patents essential to technology incorporated into a standard 

declare their patents as SEPs. Consequently, to be compliant with the applicable standard,

manufacturers of products using the patented technology generally need to license the SEP.

25. Antitrust law recognizes that, under certain circumstances, collaboration by 

industry participants can increase competition, innovation, product quality, and consumer 

choice. For example, in this context, collaboration allows consumers to be confident that 

cellular devices bought from different manufacturers will operate with each other and with the 

wireless network that they choose. Similarly, common standards allow component 

manufacturers, carriers, and others in the industry to invest in technological advancement with 

confidence that their products will work with wireless networks.

26. However, standards can pose challenges to device and device component 

manufacturers and can involve tradeoffs for consumers. For example, a company 

implementing standards in a product must use certain mandated technologies, even where 

many viable, and perhaps even superior alternatives exist. Once a standard is adopted, 

participants begin to make investments tied to the implementation of the standard. Because 

these participants may face substantial switching costs in abandoning initial designs and 

substituting a different technology, an entire industry can become “locked in” to a standard. 

27. The adoption of SEPs into technological standards also enhances the potential 

for abuse by the patent owner. “Patent hold-up” occurs when a SEP holder demands 

excessive royalties after companies are locked in to using a standard. Where standardized 

technologies are covered by patents, companies that choose to implement a standard in 

their products have no choice but to license those patents (and accept the licensor’s 

terms) or face a lawsuit if they use the technology without a license. “Royalty stacking”

arises when a standard implicates numerous patents. These royalty payments “stack” on top 

of each other and, in turn, inflate the cost of the product to the consumer. Royalty stacking 

can be a significant concern:

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The data show that royalty stacking is not merely a theoretical concern. 

Indeed, . . . we estimate potential patent royalties in excess of $120 on 

a hypothetical $400 smartphone—which is almost equal to the cost of 

device’s components. Thus, the smartphone royalty stack across 

standardized and non-standardized technology is significant, and those 

costs may be undermining industry profitability—and, in turn, 

diminishing incentives to invest and compete.5

28. To help alleviate these potential concerns, before agreeing to a particular 

standard, SSOs seek certain assurances from patent owners. Specifically, SSOs request that 

SEP holders agree to license their patents on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms, 

referred to as a SEP holder’s FRAND obligations. For example, the IEEE asks SEP holders 

to pledge that they will grant licenses to an unrestricted number of applicants on “reasonable, 

and nondiscriminatory” (or “RAND”) terms. If a patent holder does not choose to make 

this promise, the SSOs select a standard without using the patented technology. 

29. FRAND obligations are designed to, among other things, prevent SEP holders 

from wielding control over essential technology and restricting competition, development, 

and research related to the standard. SEP holders generally agree to FRAND terms because 

SSOs may exclude the holder’s technologies from the standard if it does not agree to FRAND 

terms. SEP holders also benefit from license fees and royalties they gain from cooperating 

with the SSO. 

30. The TIA has explained this point6:

Market‐driven Open Standards can help promote competition and 

innovation. Such standards are developed or ratified through a 

voluntary, open and consensus‐based process. 

This process is defined by flexible policies that balance incentives to 

participate in and contribute to the formulation of standards. This 

process benefits users and consumers by the broad implementation of 

 5 Joseph J. Mueller & Timothy D. Syrett, The Smartphone Royalty Stack: Surveying Royalty 

Demands for the Components within Modern Smartphones (May 29, 2014), 

https://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=171798724

41.

6 TIA, Approved 20 June 2008 by the Intellectual Property Rights Standing Committee of the 

TIA; TIA – A Leading Developer of Open Standards, tiaonline.org (June 20, 2008), 

http://www.tiaonline.org/standards/about/documents/TIA-IPR_20080620-

003_TIA_OPEN_STANDARDS-CLEAN_R4.pdf.

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the resulting standards. One element of a voluntary, open and 

consensus‐based process addresses the inclusion of patented 

technologies. The patent policies of standards organizations typically 

find a balance among differing interests. For example, implementers 

need to access and use patented technology included in the standard. 

Patent holders need to preserve their rights in a way that encourages 

them to contribute their innovative solutions to the standardization 

effort. “RAND” patent policies seek to provide this type of balance by 

helping to make that patented technology available to all on 

“reasonable and non‐discriminatory” (i.e., RAND) terms and 

conditions.

31. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has also noted in a 

case against Qualcomm:

[A] standard, by definition, eliminates alternative technologies. When 

a patented technology is incorporated in a standard, adoption of the 

standard eliminates alternatives to the patented technology. Although 

a patent confers a lawful monopoly over the claimed invention, its 

value is limited when alternative technologies exist. That value 

becomes significantly enhanced, however, after the patent is 

incorporated in a standard. Firms may become locked in to a standard 

requiring the use of a competitor’s patented technology. The patent 

holder’s [intellectual property rights], if unconstrained, may permit it 

to demand supracompetitive royalties. It is in such circumstances that 

measures such as FRAND commitments become important safeguards 

against monopoly power. 

Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).

32. When a SEP holder makes a FRAND promise to a SSO, implementers of the 

standard and their customers are third-party beneficiaries of that promise. FRAND 

obligations are more than a matter of a private contract between owners of technology, on the 

one hand, and SSOs and their other members (and implementers of the standard as intended 

third party beneficiaries), on the other. Instead, they are a critical precondition for antitrust 

tolerance of the industry collaboration on which standard-setting depends. 

//

//

//

//

//

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 B. The Cellular Industry and Qualcomm’s Dominance and Abuse of Power

33. Wireless standards have evolved in distinct generations, as consumers 

demanded more features and the industry responded by developing new innovations. The 

following graphic, created by Qualcomm, shows the evolution of this technology.

7

34. For purposes of this case, following the first generation of cellular technology, 

the cellular industry developed second generation (“2G”) cellular technology, from which two 

primary technology paths, or families of standards, emerged: (1) CDMA, which stands for 

“Code Division Multiple Access” and (2) “GSM,” which stands for “global system for 

mobility.” CDMA is a channel access method used by various radio communication 

technologies. It provides multiple access, where several transmitters can send information 

simultaneously over a single communication channel. CDMA is used as the access method in 

many mobile phone standards. GSM is another access method that is widely used in Europe 

and much of Asia, other than Japan and South Korea. It utilizes a variation of time division 

multiple access. Wireless network carriers operated under one or the other path, with, for 

example, Verizon and Sprint operating CDMA-path networks, while AT&T (formerly 

Cingular) and T-Mobile operated GSM-path networks. The CDMA and GSM technology 

paths are not interoperable; in other words, equipment and technologies designed to be 

compatible with one standard cannot be used with the other standard.

 7 Qualcomm, The Evolution of Mobile Technologies-1g-2g-3g-4g-lte, (June 2014), 

https://www.qualcomm.com/media/documents/files/the-evolution-of-mobile-technologies-1gto-2g-to-3g-to-4g-lte.pdf. 

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35. Mobile devices are configured for a particular carrier, like AT&T or Verizon, 

and thus chipsets designed for a particular wireless device must conform to the standard

technology chosen for the carrier’s associated network. In other words, CDMA-based

networks demand chipsets that conform to the CDMA standard, and GSM networks require 

chipsets that conform to the GSM standard. As a result, chipsets that comply with a given 

standard are not substitutes for chipsets that comply with other standards. These chipsets 

likewise have different price and demand characteristics. Downstream consumers purchase 

cell phones that include chipsets configured to operate using the standards chosen for a 

particular network, and once purchased, those consumers are inextricably tied to that standard 

for use of that device.

36. Qualcomm pioneered the development of CDMA. As a result, it controlled, 

and continues to control, the market for such technology, initially selling 90% of the CDMAchipsets and continuing to control over 80% of the market. Additionally, Qualcomm amassed 

many patents related to this standard. Consequently, virtually any company that makes 

CDMA-based products—be they chipsets, phones, or infrastructure gear—has to obtain a 

license from Qualcomm. Licensees pay a one-time fee for access to the patent portfolio and 

then royalties based on the final product sold by the licensee (e.g., a smartphone). Nearly all 

cellular companies have signed patent licenses with Qualcomm.

37. Qualcomm’s royalty stream has continued in the technologies standardized in 

third generation (“3G”) cellular technology. As with the prior generation of cellular 

technology, 3G evolved into two competing standards—but this time, both major standards 

were based on CDMA. While an improved version of CDMA technology was developed, the 

Universal Mobile Telecommunications Service (“UMTS”) standard was also developed. 

38. UTMS uses radio technology called WCDMA, which stands for “Wideband 

Code Division Multiple Access.” WCDMA technology allows for even further increased data 

speed and capacity. The UMTS standard was adopted by SSOs in the United States and 

elsewhere after evaluating alternative available technologies. Qualcomm supplies some of the 

essential technology that ETSI included in the UMTS standard and holds intellectual property 

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rights (“IPRs”), such as patents, in this technology. Among others, Qualcomm owns the 

essential patents for the WCDMA standard.

39. Consequently, CDMA-based technology has been adopted for all 3G wireless 

standards throughout the world, and Qualcomm has in turn reaped more than $50 billion in 

licensing revenues since 2000. Indeed, Qualcomm charges a royalty on nearly every 

smartphone made, whether or not the device uses its chips. 

40. ETSI and other SSOs required a commitment from vendors whose 

technologies are included in the CDMA and other CDMA-based standards to license their 

technologies on FRAND terms. Qualcomm voluntarily and publicly agreed to accept 

FRAND obligations, allowing it to license its patent portfolio to more than 155 companies, 

and making its portfolio the most widely licensed in the industry. 

41. Indeed, in 2008, Qualcomm noted that it “has had a long standing policy of 

broadly offering to license its standards essential patents for CDMA-based 

telecommunications standards on terms and conditions that are fair, reasonable, and free from 

unfair discrimination (FRAND), subject to reciprocity.”8 But in that same press release, 

Qualcomm publicly stated that “FRAND embodies a flexible approach that allows individual 

licensors and licensees to negotiate the terms and conditions that are best suited to address 

their respective commercial objectives” and “FRAND does not, and never has, prescribed 

formulas for imposing cumulative royalty caps or proportional allocations of such royalty 

caps.” This public statement was false. As regulatory actions in multiple countries have 

confirmed, Qualcomm has not abided by FRAND principles and its interpretation of FRAND 

is not consistent with the obligations imposed on it by SSOs. Qualcomm’s promises to 

comply with its FRAND obligations induced the SSOs to adopt its technology in the cellular 

standards relevant to this action. That conduct constituted deceit and fraud on the SSOs and 

has injured Plaintiffs and others that have paid unreasonably high prices for cellular devices 

as a result of Qualcomm’s royalty demands. 

 8 Qualcomm, LTE/WiMax PATENT LICENSING STATEMENT (Dec. 2008), 

https://www.qualcomm.com/documents/ltewimax-patent-licensing-statement. 

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42. Qualcomm has abused its power over SEPs and the chipset supply to increase 

its own dominance in these markets and charge exorbitant royalties. It has also abused its 

involvement in the SSOs, which set standards around Qualcomm technology and gave it the 

means to be as economically powerful as it has become. Qualcomm’s manipulation of this 

unique position is confirmed by multiple investigations of its conduct by trade and 

competition agencies around the world, as discussed below. 

43. The fourth generation of cellular technology (“4G”) brought with it the “LTE” 

standard, which stands for Long Term Evolution of UMTS. Nearly all cellular-enabled 

devices sold today support LTE for 4G service. LTE is an “orthogonal frequency division 

multiple access” or “OFDMA”-based technology. The LTE standard does not implement 

CDMA-based technologies.

44. But like the UMTS technology before it, the arrival of LTE has not 

significantly impacted Qualcomm’s control over the chipset market or the power of its 

licensing business. Qualcomm holds a patent portfolio that applies to LTE technologies, 

including OFDMA, and over 90 companies (including Apple, LG, Nokia, and Samsung) have 

royalty-bearing licenses under Qualcomm’s patent portfolio for use in OFDMA products 

(which do not implement any CDMA-based standards). Additionally, many of the 4G-based 

cellular devices still implement CDMA-based technology to be backwards-compatible with 

other CDMA-based technologies that are still in use today. Qualcomm exclusively supplies 

multimode CDMA-LTE chipsets that are backward compatible with CDMA.

45. Consequently, with its power over CMDA technology, Qualcomm can and 

does use this as leverage to gain a greater share of the LTE-chipset market. The following 

chart, prepared by the KFTC9

, demonstrates how Qualcomm has used control over CDMAbased technologies to acquire more power and control over the LTE chipset market.

 9 Qualcomm has provided an unofficial translation of the KFTC’s press release on its website. 

See KFTC Issued Press Release Dated December 28, 2016 – Unofficial English Translation, 

https://www.qualcomm.com/documents/kftc-issued-press-release-dated-december-28-2016- unofficial-english-translation (last visited Jan. 15, 2017). 

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46. In sum, Qualcomm holds a dominant position in the supply of chipsets that 

support CDMA, on which devices sold by Verizon and Sprint continue to depend. It also 

holds a dominant position over the LTE-chipset supply. Qualcomm has had a share of at least 

80% or more of the CDMA chipset market for many years, and Qualcomm’s share of the LTE 

chipsets market was above 90% between 2012 and 2014, and remains close to 70% today. 

Qualcomm has leveraged its monopoly power over the supply of these chipsets to force 

device manufacturers into anticompetitive license agreements. In other words, because these 

companies need CDMA- and LTE-based chipsets (controlled by Qualcomm) to be able to 

operate with CDMA- and LTE-based networks, Qualcomm has coerced device manufactures

into accepting unreasonable and one-sided license terms dictated by Qualcomm. As one 

commentator noted: “Qualcomm’s status as both a chipset and IP vendor provides them with 

unparalleled leverage to collect licensing fees at a lower cost, simply by denying physical 

delivery of the chipsets until all fees are paid.”10

47. In its complaint, the FTC referred to this as the “no license, no chips” policy 

and said Qualcomm’s “anomalous” position set it apart from other SEP holders in the 

industry. As the FTC pointed out, this policy compelled potential SEP licensees to accept 

Qualcomm’s terms and effectively precluded them from seeking judicial determinations of 

what an appropriate FRAND rate would be. An example of such a determination is provided

by Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217 (W.D. Wash. 

 10 Richard A. Taddonio, Long – Qualcomm (NASDAQ: QCOM) - $68.42, Columbia Business 

School 2015, 

https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/valueinvesting/sites/valueinvesting/files/Taddonio_RichardQCOM_0.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2017).

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April 25, 2013), aff’d, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015). There, the SEP holder sought $6-$8 as 

a royalty rate for each gaming console manufactured by the plaintiff, and the district court, 

after a bench trial, ruled that the FRAND rate was only four cents per console. The United 

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld this determination, stating:

The framework settled on [for making a FRAND determination] was 

“generally [consistent] with Motorola’s approach.” Applying that 

approach, the district court sought to approximate the royalty rates 

upon which the parties would have agreed by setting up a hypothetical 

negotiation between the parties. In doing so, the court carefully thought 

through the “factors an SEP owner and implementer would consider” 

in an actual negotiation directed at licensing a patent subject to RAND 

commitments. The court then discussed each of Motorola’s fifteen 

H.264 patents and eleven 802.11 patents, considering the objective 

value each contributed to each standard, given the quality of the 

technology and the available alternatives as well as the importance of 

those technologies to Microsoft’s business. Finally, the court 

performed a meticulous analysis of the testimony of eighteen 

witnesses, including executives, economists, and technology experts, 

to sort out which evidence to rely upon in determining the RAND 

royalty rate. Generally, the court credited Motorola’s experts; where it 

did not, it provided reasoned explanations for not doing so.

795 F.3d at 1040 (first edit added; other edits in original).

11

48. Qualcomm also holds a dominant position in the SEP licensing market.

Qualcomm has declared thousands of its patents as essential to CDMA, UMTS (WCDMA), 

and LTE standards. Consequently, device and device component manufacturers are highly 

reliant on Qualcomm’s SEPs, as each CDMA-, UMTS-, and/or LTE-related SEP is 

indispensable and irreplaceable for such manufacturers. Qualcomm thus controls the 

licensing market for SEPs for CDMA, UMTS (WCDMA), and LTE technologies because 

manufacturers could not produce 3G and 4G devices without risking Qualcomm’s initiating 

patent infringement lawsuits or seeking injunctions. 

 11 See also Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., No. C-12-3451-RMW, 2014 WL 

2738226, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2014) (“The court hereby enters declaratory judgment 

that, upon Realtek’s request for a license, to be in compliance with its RAND commitment, 

LSI must offer Realtek a license to the ’958 Patent on RAND terms, including a royalty rate 

of 0.12% on the total sales of Realtek’s products.”).

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49. Qualcomm also uses its SEPs to require device and device component 

manufacturers and others to license its entire patent portfolio, which includes non-SEPs as 

well. Non-SEPs refer to the patents that are either not essential to the realization of the 

standard or replaceable in their functionalities through design-around or avoidance design. 

There is no requirement that non-SEPs be licensed on FRAND terms. By putting both SEPs 

and non-SEPs into one license, Qualcomm avoids its obligation to set license terms on a 

FRAND basis. In doing so, Qualcomm can charge exorbitant royalties to any licensees that 

were forced to accept the packaged patent licenses.

50. Qualcomm’s licensing division brings in the vast majority of its profits, as 

illustrated in the graph below. As such, it is critical for Qualcomm to maintain its licensing 

and related terms which have made it so profitable.

51. Qualcomm has structured its business to maintain that licensing power. In 

2007, Qualcomm claimed publicly that any manufacturers using CDMA and 

UMTS/WCDMA technology “ha[s] to take out a license from Qualcomm” and that 

Qualcomm had been “pretty consistent in that model.”12 

 12 Qualcomm, Inc. at Jefferies Technology Conference (Oct. 2, 2007), at 5.

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52. Again in 2007, Qualcomm filed an amicus brief to the United States Supreme 

Court in which it described its licensing business model as follows:13 

Qualcomm has provided chipmakers nontransferable, worldwide, 

nonexclusive, restricted licenses to its portfolio of technically 

necessary patents through licensing agreements called ASIC

[Application Specific Integrated Circuits] Patent License Agreements 

(“APLAs”). Chipmaker licensees typically pay Qualcomm an up-front 

license fee and a running royalty (paid quarterly) that is an agreed upon 

percentage of the defined Net Selling Price of the chips produced by 

the licensee. . . . An APLA provides the chipmaker-licensee with a 

license to make (or have made) its own ASICs. An APLA also provides 

the chipmaker-licensee with a restricted license to sell ASICs, but only 

to handset makers that the APLA defines to be an “Authorized 

Purchaser” for incorporation into fully assembled handsets. 

Authorized Purchasers are those handset makers that themselves have 

a license from Qualcomm through their own Subscriber Unit License 

Agreement (“SULA”) to make, use and sell fully assembled handsets 

that, in the absence of a SULA, would infringe Qualcomm’s patents. 

Importantly, by their express terms, APLAs do not grant a license to 

the chipmaker to use the ASICs—i.e., licensed chipmakers may not 

themselves use or pass on to others the right to use the chipmaker’s 

ASICs to make, operate or sell handsets or any other product. APLAs 

explicitly state that the rights to use the ASICs to make, operate or sell 

handsets are only conferred by licensing agreements between 

Qualcomm and Authorized Purchasers (i.e., by SULAs). APLAs also 

expressly state that the license granted is only for the limited scope laid 

out, that no other license is granted or implied and that if the chipmakerlicensee sells ASICs to entities that are not Authorized Purchasers, the 

licensee has materially breached the APLA, which gives Qualcomm 

the right to terminate the agreement, including the license granted. 

As previously mentioned, producers of chips that are licensed through 

APLAs are granted, inter alia, a license to sell such chips only to 

handset makers that have entered into a SULA with Qualcomm. The 

standard terms of the SULAs have granted handset makers a 

nontransferable, worldwide, nonexclusive, unrestricted license to 

Qualcomm’s patents to make (and have made), import and use 

handsets, and to sell (and offer to sell) completed handsets. SULAs 

typically provide for an up-front licensing fee to be paid to Qualcomm, 

along with a running royalty (paid quarterly) that is set as a percentage 

of the Net Selling Price of the handsets sold.

 13 Br. of Qualcomm Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Quanta Comp., Inc. v. LG 

Elecs., Inc., 533 U.S. 617 (2008) (No. 06-937), at 7-9.

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53. Even where Qualcomm sells its own chips, it requires purchasers to agree to its 

license agreements (as the FTC also noted)—which include the royalty rate based on the 

selling price of the device. As Qualcomm explained in its amicus brief:

Qualcomm is also in the business of developing and selling its own 

chips and software for wireless handsets. Qualcomm typically sells 

chips only to those handset manufacturers that are licensed to 

Qualcomm’s patents under a SULA. Such chip sales are pursuant to 

Components Supply Agreements, in which handset makers agree to 

pay Qualcomm an agreed upon price for the chips sold by Qualcomm.

Components Supply Agreements provide that the buyer-handset 

makers may only incorporate the chips purchased from Qualcomm into 

fully assembled handsets that are the subject of the SULA.

Essentially, cellular devices today are unable to connect to their network without paying a 

royalty (between 3-5% of the price of the entire device) to Qualcomm.14

54. In short, the KFTC correctly identified three of Qualcomm’s abusive and 

anticompetitive practices. First, it did not provide SEP licenses to competing chipset 

companies while threatening to sue them under those patents if they compete against 

Qualcomm in the sale of chipsets. Second, in selling chipsets to device and device 

manufacturers, Qualcomm demanded the execution and performance of its license 

agreements, thus leveraging its SEPs improperly. And third, as a result, QTL coerced cellular 

phone makers to accept unilateral onerous terms. 

55. The KFTC depicted this conduct in the graphic below.

15

 14 See also Subscriber Unit License Agreement, SEC.gov,

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1092492/000119312504140764/dex103.htm (last 

visited Jan. 16, 2017).

15 See supra note 9.

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56. Qualcomm’s policy of not licensing SEPs to competing chipset makers while 

insisting on licensing from cellular device manufacturers has entrenched its market power. 

57. Additionally, as device manufacturers cannot purchase chipsets from 

Qualcomm’s competitors without also paying royalties to Qualcomm, to avoid such royalties, 

in some cases they agree to deal exclusively or near-exclusively with Qualcomm on the 

purchase of chipsets. As the FTC explained in its recently-filed complaint, since 2007, Apple 

has entered into agreements to deal exclusively with Qualcomm in exchange for partial relief 

from Qualcomm’s standard royalties. Samsung has also entered into a similar exclusive 

dealing arrangement with Qualcomm.16 Qualcomm’s exclusive supply arrangements with 

these device manufacturers denies other modem chipset suppliers the benefits of working with

those manufacturers and hampers their development into effective competitors.

 16 Joel Hruska, Qualcomm may have inked exclusive deal to put Snapdragon 820 in Samsung 

hardware, ExtremeTech.com (Dec. 21, 2015) https://www.extremetech.com/mobile/219791- qualcomm-may-have-inked-exclusive-deal-to-put-snapdragon-820-in-samsung-hardware.

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58. As the KFTC explained, the size of the modem chipset market doubled since 

2008, but Qualcomm’s licensing practices caused no significant competitor to enter the 

market and rather caused many existing competitors to exit it17:

59. The result has been a steady increase in Qualcomm’s share of the chipset 

market.

18

60. This dominance in the chipset market, coupled with its ownership of critical 

SEPs built into several of the standards adopted by various SSOs, allowed Qualcomm to 

impose onerous license terms on device manufacturers, including exorbitant royalties that 

were not the result of the FRAND process. 

61. Qualcomm’s royalty rates of 5% for most CDMA-based products and 3.25% 

for more recent LTE-based products are significantly higher than others in the industry. The 

following chart demonstrates this in the LTE context as of 2010:

 17 See supra note 9.

18 Id.

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62. Qualcomm’s rate base is also part of what makes Qualcomm’s royalties so 

abusive. Qualcomm admits that its “[r]oyalties are generally based upon a percentage of the 

wholesale (i.e., licensee’s) selling price of complete licensed products, net of certain 

permissible deductions (including transportation, insurance, packing costs and other items).” 

(Emphases added). Using the entire value of an end product is not a reasonable basis for 

calculating SEP-based royalties. As Apple has pointed out in its complaint, that rate base is 

calculated as a percentage of the value that Apple’s own research, development, and 

innovation created in successive generations of iPhones. Indeed, around February 8, 2015, 

the IEEE updated its licensing policy, stating that a reasonable royalty should be the value 

attributable to a SEP, excluding the value of that SEP’s inclusion in an IEEE standard, and 

that a factor to consider when determining the reasonable rate is the value of the relevant

functionality of the smallest salable compliant implementation that practices the essential 

patent claim.19 Qualcomm’s power and leverage allows it force licensees to pay excessive 

rates on an unreasonable rate basis, which results in a royalty divorced from the actual value 

attributable to its technologies.

63. Qualcomm realizes the benefits of maintaining its licensing business and 

chipset business in one company and has rejected a push from an activist investor hedge fund 

to split the businesses into two companies. “The strategic benefits of the current structure will 

 19 Deepa Sundararaman, Inside The IEEE’s Important Changes To Patent Policy, Law360 

(Apr. 3, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/637457/inside-the-ieee-s-important-changesto-patent-policy.

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best fuel Qualcomm’s growth as we move through the upcoming technology transitions and 

extend our technologies into new user experiences, services and industries,” said Qualcomm’s 

CEO, Steve Mollenkopf.20

64. The Apple complaint highlights another issue regarding Qualcomm’s conduct. 

Apple states at paragraph 93 of its complaint that “[s]pecifically, since 2011, Qualcomm has 

conditioned billions of dollars in rebates on exclusivity or de facto exclusivity from Apple. 

The monopoly power that Qualcomm enjoys today in the market for premium LTE chipsets is 

directly related to Qualcomm’s foreclosure of Apple’s business to actual and potential 

competitors in the premium LTE chipset market.”21 Apple made a submission to the KFTC 

in opposition to Qualcomm, and it notes at paragraph 160 of its complaint that “in restraining 

Apple from initiating action or bringing concerns to law enforcement, Qualcomm conditioned 

billions of dollars on Apple’s silence before courts and regulators about Qualcomm’s business 

practices. And Qualcomm is now interpreting that agreement to retaliate against Apple for 

responding to requests for information about Qualcomm’s practices from competition 

agencies, inhibiting law-enforcement review of Qualcomm’s anticompetitive practices.”

 C. Regulators Investigate and Penalize Qualcomm’s Abusive Conduct

65. While Qualcomm’s abusive and unfair licensing practices have allowed it to 

rake in billions of dollars in undeserved profits, these practices have not gone unnoticed. In 

the last few years, Qualcomm’s royalty and licensing practices have come under scrutiny by 

competition regulators from China, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Europe, and the United 

States. As described below, competition law enforcement authorities around the world have 

concluded that Qualcomm’s conduct as alleged herein is anticompetitive, unfair, and injurious 

to consumers. 

 20 Mike Freeman, Qualcomm Rejects Breakup Plan, Los Angeles Times (Dec. 15, 2015), 

http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-qualcomm-20151215-story.html. 

21 This alone was arguably inconsistent with Qualcomm’s FRAND promise to SSOs. See In 

re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *38 (N.D. 

Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (a FRAND licensor “cannot discriminate between licensees on the basis of 

their position in the market”).

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66. For example, in November 2013, China’s NDRC began to investigate 

Qualcomm’s SEP licensing practices.22 On February 10, 2015, the NDRC found Qualcomm 

(1) controlled the SEP Licensing Market and the CDMA, WCDMA, and LTE baseband chip 

markets, and (2) abused that dominance by, among other things, charging excessive and 

unfairly high royalties to licensees that were “forced” to accept the packaged patent licenses. 

The NDRC found Qualcomm’s conduct constituted violations of provisions of the China 

Anti-Monopoly Law and, among other things, imposed a $975 million fine.23 It also ordered 

Qualcomm to materially lower the effective royalty by calculating its royalty not based on the 

total wholesale price of the device, but by calculating its royalty at 65% of the net selling 

price.24

67. In July of 2009, the KFTC fined Qualcomm for abusing its dominant shares of 

the chipset market and the SEP license market.25 The $207 million fine was the largest the 

KFTC had then ever imposed on a company. Undeterred by this fine, Qualcomm doubled 

down on its unlawful conduct. In December of 2016, the KFTC issued a decision imposing 

its largest fine for Qualcomm’s monopolistic conduct and mandating changes to Qualcomm’s 

business model. Among other things, the KFTC found Qualcomm had coerced patent license 

agreements from device manufacturers while holding hostage the supply of chipsets. In other 

words, “Qualcomm actually used the threat of terminating the supply of modem chipsets as 

negotiation leverage in the process of license negotiations with handset companies.” 

 22 H. Stephen Harris, Jr., An Overview of the NDRC Decision in the Qualcomm Investigation 

July 2015, CPI Antitrust Chronicle (July 2015), available at 

http://www.winston.com/en/thought-leadership/an-overview-of-the-ndrc-decision-in-thequalcomm-investigation.html. 

23 Qualcomm Press Release, Qualcomm and China’s National Development and Reform 

Commission Reach Resolution (Feb. 9, 2015), 

https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2015/02/09/qualcomm-and-chinas-nationaldevelopment-and-reform-commission-reach. 

24 See supra note 22.

25 See Yoonhee Kim & Hui-Jin Yang, A Brief Overview of Qualcomm v. Korea Fair Trade 

Commission, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, (Mar. 2015)

https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Uploads/KimYangMar-151.pdf. 

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(Emphases in original).26 The KFTC found that Qualcomm’s control over the chipset market 

makes it so “handset companies have to bite the bullet and accept Qualcomm’s license terms, 

even if they are unfair, because if the modem chipset supply is suspended, handset companies 

would face the risk of their entire business shutting down.” (Emphases in original).27

68. Similarly, the European Commission (“EC”) notified Qualcomm of its

investigation in October of 2014. The EC issued a Statement of Objections against

Qualcomm in December of 2015, which alleged that Qualcomm’s practices harmed chipset

competition and innovation. Also, in December 2015, the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission 

(“TFTC”) notified Qualcomm of its investigation into the company’s licensing behavior and 

among other things, whether Qualcomm’s royalty charges are unreasonable.

69. Most recently, the United States FTC on January 17, 2017, filed an 

enforcement action in this Court seeking a permanent injunction against Qualcomm to undo 

and prevent its unfair methods of competition in violation of Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade 

Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). The FTC alleges, among other things, that 

(1) Qualcomm withholds its baseband processors unless a customer accepts a license to 

standard-essential patents on terms preferred by Qualcomm, including elevated royalties; (2) 

Qualcomm has consistently refused to license its cellular standard essential patents to its 

competitors, in violation of Qualcomm’s FRAND commitments; and (3) Qualcomm entered 

into exclusive dealing arrangements with Apple, which denied other baseband processor 

suppliers the benefits of working with a particularly important cell phone manufacturer and 

hampered their development into effective competitors. Id.

 D. Consumers are Harmed as a Direct Result of Qualcomm’s Conduct

70. Qualcomm has abused its monopoly power to force device manufacturers and 

other licensees to pay excessively high royalties, which has directly resulted in harm to 

Plaintiffs and members of the proposed classes because it resulted in them paying higher 

prices for their cellular devices than they would have in the absence of Qualcomm’s conduct. 

 26 See supra note 9. 

27 Id.

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71. Cellular devices are commodity products that consumers purchase as standalone products. Consumers typically buy cellular devices either from the device 

manufacturer, such as Samsung or Apple, or through their network carrier, such as Verizon or 

Sprint. 

72. Device manufacturers and network carriers are subject to vigorous price 

competition, and as a result, they do not absorb Qualcomm’s unlawful royalties, which are

based on a percentage of the wholesale cost of the device itself. Instead, they pass along 

some, or all, of the excessive royalty to consumers. For instance, baseband processors cost as 

little as $10 to $13, but royalty demands associated with this component approach $60 for a 

$400 smartphone.28 This disparity between royalty demands and component costs results in 

increased costs for cellular devices, which are directly passed on to the consumer. 

73. Plaintiffs and members of the proposed classes have been forced to pay supracompetitive prices for cellular devices. As Qualcomm bases its royalties on a percentage of 

the wholesale selling price of a complete licensed product, purchasers of cellular devices are 

only one level removed from the unlawful overcharge at issue here. Accordingly, this case 

will not involve complicated pass-through analysis in multiple and complex distribution 

chains. In Re: Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1098 (N.D. 

Cal. 2007). 

74. Economic and legal scholars have recognized that unlawful overcharges of a 

component normally result in such pass-through costs. Two antitrust scholars – Professors 

Robert G. Harris (Professor Emeritus and former Chair of the Business and Public Policy 

Group at the Haas School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley) and the late 

Lawrence A. Sullivan (Professor of Law Emeritus at Southwestern Law School and author of 

the Handbook of the Law of Antitrust) – have observed that “in a multiple-level chain of 

 28 See supra note 2; see also Nomura 2012 Smartphone Guide 

http://www.patentoday.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/08/nomura_smartphone_poster_2012.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2017),

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distribution, passing on monopoly overcharges is not the exception: it is the rule.”29 

Similarly, Professor Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason (Arthur W. Burks Professor for Information 

and Computer Science and Professor of Economics and Public Certification), an economist 

who presented evidence in a number of indirect purchaser cases, said: 

As is well known in economic theory and practice, at least some of the 

overcharge will be passed on by distributors to end consumers. When 

the distribution markets are highly competitive, as they are here, all or 

nearly the entire overcharge will be passed on through to ultimate 

consumers . . . . This general phenomenon of cost pass through is well 

established in antitrust laws and economics as well.

75. The FTC concurs in its complaint. It states at paragraph 1 of its complaint that 

“Qualcomm has engaged in exclusionary conduct that taxes its competitors’ baseband 

processor sales, reduces competitors’ ability and incentive to innovate, and raises prices paid 

by consumers for cell phones and tablets.” Likewise, at paragraph 63 of its complaint, the 

FTC says that “[t]he policy skews Qualcomm’s license negotiations with OEMs [Original 

Equipment Manufacturers] toward outcomes that raise the all-in prices that OEMs must pay 

on both Qualcomm baseband processors and those supplied by Qualcomm’s competitors. 

These higher all-in prices reduce demand for competitors’ processors and raise handset prices 

paid by consumers.” Similarly, at paragraph 87 of its complaint, the FTC observed that “[t]he 

incremental royalty that OEMs pay to Qualcomm operates as a ‘tax’ that raises OEMs’ costs 

of using baseband processors supplied by Qualcomm’s competitors, reduces demand for 

competitors’ processors, and reduces the ability and incentive of competitors to invest and 

innovate. The tax thereby maintains Qualcomm’s monopoly power and raises handset prices 

paid by consumers.” And at paragraph 95 of its complaint, the FTC noted that as a result of 

this “tax,” “OEMs likely pass some portion of these higher prices on to consumers in the form 

of higher handset prices or reduced handset features.”

 29 RG Harris & LA Sullivan, Passing-On the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy 

Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 269, 276 (1979).

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76. If Qualcomm was forced to stop abusing its monopoly power and charge a fair 

and reasonable royalty, consumers would receive better prices when purchasing cellular 

devices.

77. The precise amount of the overcharge impacting the prices of cellular devices 

purchased by consumers is measureable through commonly accepted statistical and regression 

modeling. 

VI. MARKET DEFINITION

78. The relevant geographic market for purposes of this action is the United States 

and its territories.

79. The relevant product markets are: (1) the market for CDMA-based and 

premium LTE modem chipsets (“Modem Chipset Market”), also known as baseband 

processors, which allow cellular devices to communicate with wireless networks and 

(2) intellectual property rights associated with SEPs (“SEP Licensing Market”). These two 

products – modem chipsets and SEP licenses – will be referred to collectively as the “Cellular 

Device Components” as both SEPs and modem chipsets are necessary components of the 

relevant cellular devices in this case which implement CDMA-based and/or premium LTE 

technologies (hereafter, the “Relevant Cellular Devices”).

80. Qualcomm directly participates in the market for the sale of the Relevant 

Cellular Devices to Plaintiffs and proposed class members by encumbering those devices

through its licenses and related royalties. Specifically, Qualcomm’s royalty payments are 

calculated as a percentage of the wholesale price of the Relevant Cellular Devices, which in 

turn increases the retail price of those devices. In other words, Qualcomm licenses 

technology essential to the operation of cellular devices and obtains monopoly rents tied 

directly to the entire wholesale price of the Relevant Cellular Devices. The effect of 

Qualcomm’s anticompetitive conduct is thus targeted at the cellular device as a whole and not 

components thereof. Accordingly, because Qualcomm royalties are based on the wholesale 

selling price of complete licensed products, the patent rights owned by Qualcomm are 

inextricably intertwined with the Relevant Cellular Devices themselves. As a result, 

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Qualcomm’s anticompetitive acts, as alleged herein, directly distorted the price of the 

Relevant Cellular Devices paid by Plaintiffs. 

81. Relatedly, Plaintiffs may not use the Relevant Cellular Devices without the 

licenses provided by Qualcomm. In the absence of the licenses, as recognized by federal 

courts, Qualcomm has standing to sue any indirect users—not just direct infringers—of 

cellular devices infringing on its patent rights.

82. Plaintiffs’ injuries are also inextricably intertwined with Qualcomm’s 

anticompetitive conduct with respect to modem chipsets and abuse of patent rights because it 

has increased the cost to them of purchasing the Relevant Cellular Devices by, among other 

things, (1) eliminating competition, (2) allowing Qualcomm to charge supracompetitive prices 

for its chipsets and licenses, and (3) forcing device manufacturers to agree to onerous 

licensing terms (with unreasonable royalties). 

VII. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

83. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and as a class action under 

Rule 23(a) and (b)(2), of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking equitable and

injunctive relief, as well as under Rule 23(b)(3) for monetary relief under California law, on 

behalf of the following class (the “Nationwide Class”): 

All persons and entities in the United States who purchased, paid and/or 

provided reimbursement for some or all of the purchase price for 

CDMA-based and/or premium LTE cellular devices (“Relevant 

Cellular Devices”) from January 17, 2013 through the present. This 

class excludes: (a) Defendant, its officers, directors, management, 

employees, subsidiaries, and affiliates; (b) all federal and state 

governmental entities except for those who have purchased Relevant 

Cellular Devices; (c) all persons or entities who purchased Relevant 

Cellular Devices for purposes of resale or directly from Defendant; (d) 

any judges or justices involved in this action and any members of their 

immediate families or their staff.

84. Alternatively to the claim for nationwide monetary relief under California law, 

Plaintiffs also bring this action on behalf of themselves and as a class action under Rule 23(a) 

and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seeking damages or monetary relief 

pursuant to the common law of unjust enrichment and individual state antitrust, unfair 

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competition, and consumer protection laws for each of the states listed below (the “Indirect 

Purchaser States”)30 on behalf of the following class (the “Damages Class”):

All persons and entities in the United States who purchased, paid and/or 

provided reimbursement for some or all of the purchase price for 

CDMA-based, and/or premium LTE cellular devices (“Relevant 

Cellular Devices”) from January 17, 2013 through the present. This 

class excludes: (a) Defendant, its officers, directors, management, 

employees, subsidiaries, and affiliates; (b) all federal and state 

governmental entities except for those who have purchased Relevant 

Cellular Devices; (c) all persons or entities who purchased Relevant 

Cellular Devices for purposes of resale or directly from Defendant; (d) 

any judges or justices involved in this action and any members of their 

immediate families or their staff.

85. The Nationwide Class and the Damages Class are referred to herein as the 

“Classes.”

86. While Plaintiffs do not know the exact number of the members of the Classes, 

Plaintiffs believe there are millions of members in each Class.

87. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Classes. This 

is particularly true given the nature of Qualcomm’s conduct to acquire and maintain 

monopoly power, which was and is generally applicable to all the members of both Classes, 

thereby making appropriate relief with respect to the Classes as a whole. Such questions of 

law and fact common to the Classes include, but are not limited to: 

• Whether Qualcomm possessed monopoly power over the Cellular Device 

Components in the United States during the Class Period;

• Whether Qualcomm willfully acquired or maintained monopoly power 

over the Cellular Device Components in the United States during the Class 

Period;

• Whether Qualcomm possessed monopoly power in the Modem Chipset 

Market (a critical market underlying the Cellular Device Components) in 

the United States during the Class Period;

 30 The “Indirect Purchaser States” consist of Arizona, Arkansas, California, District of 

Columbia, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, 

New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode 

Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia and 

Wisconsin.

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• Whether Qualcomm attempted to possess monopoly power in the Modem 

Chipset Market (a critical market underlying the Cellular Device 

Components) in the United States during the Class Period;

• Whether Qualcomm possessed monopoly power in the SEP Licensing 

Market (a critical market underlying the Cellular Device Components) in 

the United States during the Class Period;

• Whether Qualcomm attempted to possess monopoly power in the SEP 

Licensing Market (a critical market underlying the Cellular Device 

Components) in the United States during the Class Period;

• Whether Qualcomm tied the sale of its CDMA- and premium LTE- based 

chipsets to the purchase of license rights to its patent portfolio (including 

SEPs and non-SEPs);

• Whether Qualcomm tied the sale of its SEPs with the purchase of its nonSEPs;

• Whether Qualcomm’s acquisition and maintenance of its monopolies in the 

Cellular Device Components violated Sections 2 and 3(b) of the Sherman 

Act, as alleged in the First Claim for Relief;

• Whether Qualcomm’s conduct violated California’s Cartwright Act, Cal. 

Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16700, et seq., as alleged in the Second Claim for 

Relief;

• Whether Qualcomm’s conduct violated state antitrust and unfair 

competition laws, and/or state consumer protection laws, as alleged in the 

Third and Fourth Claims for Relief;

• Whether Qualcomm unjustly enriched itself to the detriment of the 

Plaintiffs and the members of the Classes, thereby entitling Plaintiffs and 

the members of the Classes to disgorgement of all benefits derived by 

Qualcomm, as alleged in the Fifth Claim for Relief;

• Whether the conduct of Qualcomm, as alleged in this Complaint, caused 

injury to the business or property of Plaintiffs and the members of the 

Classes;

• The effect of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct on the prices of Relevant 

Cellular Devices sold in the United States and its territories during the 

Class Period;

• The appropriate injunctive and related equitable relief for the Nationwide 

Class; and

• The appropriate class-wide measure of damages for the Damages Class.

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88. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Classes, and 

Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes. Plaintiffs and all 

members of the Classes are similarly affected by Qualcomm’s wrongful conduct in that they 

paid artificially inflated prices for purchased indirectly from Qualcomm.

89. Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of the same common course of conduct giving rise 

to the claims of the other members of the Classes. Plaintiffs’ interests are coincident with, 

and not antagonistic to, those of the other members of the Classes. Plaintiffs are represented 

by counsel who are competent and experienced in the prosecution of antitrust and class action 

litigation.

90. The questions of law and fact common to the members of the Classes 

predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, including legal and 

factual issues relating to liability and damages.

91. Class action treatment is a superior method for the fair and efficient 

adjudication of the controversy, in that, among other things, such treatment will permit a large 

number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum 

simultaneously, efficiently and without the unnecessary duplication of evidence, effort and 

expense that numerous individual actions would engender. The benefits of proceeding 

through the class mechanism, including providing injured persons or entities with a method 

for obtaining redress for claims that it might not be practicable to pursue individually, 

substantially outweigh any difficulties that may arise in management of this class action.

92. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Classes 

would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications, establishing incompatible 

standards of conduct for Defendant. 

VIII. CLAIMS AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Monopolization in Violation of Sections 2 and 3(b) of the Sherman Act

93. Plaintiffs repeat the allegations set forth above as if fully set forth herein.

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94. Qualcomm’s conduct, as alleged herein, constitutes unlawful monopolization 

of the Cellular Device Components, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 

§ 2), as well as Section 3(b) of Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 3(b)).

95. General antitrust principles apply to conduct involving intellectual property is 

the same way that they apply to conduct involving any other form of property. 

96. Market power is the ability profitably to maintain prices above, or output 

below, competitive levels for a significant period of time. Monopoly power is the ability to 

control prices and exclude competition in a given market. If a firm can profitably raise prices 

without causing competing firms to expand output and drive down prices, that firm has 

monopoly power. 

97. Qualcomm has monopoly power in the Modem Chipset Market. First, it has 

maintained high and durable market shares in this market. Qualcomm controls the CDMA 

chipset supply, historically controlling over 90% of the CDMA modem chipset market, and at 

the lowest point still controlling 83% of this market. Qualcomm also controls the Modem 

Chipset Market for LTE-based chipsets, controlling at relevant times up to 90% of the market, 

and today over 60% of the market. Qualcomm still exclusively supplies multimode CDMALTE chipsets that are backward compatible with CDMA. Second, there are substantial 

barriers to entry. CDMA- and premium LTE- based technologies are not interchangeable 

with or substitutable for other technologies, and adherents to these technologies and their 

related standards have become locked-in. Qualcomm also controls the patents, including 

SEPs, underlying CDMA-based technologies, and Qualcomm maintained this monopoly by, 

among other things, refusing to license to competitors and requiring purchasers of its chipsets 

to agree to its licenses for its patent portfolio. Third, and relatedly, Qualcomm’s monopoly 

power is shown by its demonstrated ability to repeatedly force device manufacturers to accept 

one-sided, unreasonable supply terms. Among other things, Qualcomm has used its control 

over the CDMA chipset supply to require purchasers to agree to its license agreements and 

related terms, including excessively high royalty terms.

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98. Qualcomm also has monopoly power over the SEP Licensing Market. SSOs 

have selected standards based on technology for which Qualcomm owns the patents (based on 

the condition that Qualcomm would supply its technology on FRAND terms). As to market 

share, Qualcomm holds virtually all of the SEPs—the essential patents—for CDMA standardbased technologies, which underlie virtually all 3G devices and 4G-LTE devices which are 

3G-compatible. Qualcomm has licensed its patent portfolio for 3G cellular technologies to 

more than 200 licensees. As these patents are “essential” to the particular standards that 

implement them, other patents and patented technology cannot replace or serve as an 

alternative for Qualcomm’s patents. Qualcomm’s market power over the SEP Licensing 

Market is further demonstrated by Qualcomm’s ability to leverage its control of its patents to 

force device manufacturers to agree to unfair and unreasonable license agreements and terms, 

including excessive royalties. Because these manufacturers need to use Qualcomm’s 

technology for their devices to communicate with the major carrier networks, they are forced 

to agree to Qualcomm’s unfair and unreasonable licensing terms.

99. As indicated, Qualcomm has acquired and maintained of its market power in 

the Cellular Device Components (based on the modem chipsets and SEPs which underlie and 

are incorporated into all the Relevant Cellular Devices), and it has done so through 

anticompetitive means, including, but not limited to excluding competition and demanding 

non-FRAND terms from licensees. 

100. Qualcomm thus holds market power over the Cellular Device Components

because it can encumber Relevant Cellular Devices with a royalty of its choice without other 

firms competing to drive down these prices. Specifically, Qualcomm’s control over the 

Cellular Device Components has allowed it to force license agreements on its competitors and 

devices manufacturers, and those licenses allow Qualcomm to charge royalties of between 

three to five percent (3-5%) of the wholesale price of the completed device. In other words, 

each Relevant Cellular Device sold with or based on Qualcomm technology is also

encumbered by Qualcomm’s excessive royalties, which in turn increase the cost of the device

for consumers like Plaintiffs and members of the proposed Classes.

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101. There is no procompetitive justification for the anticompetitive conduct in 

which Qualcomm has engaged. Qualcomm induced SSOs to use its technology and related 

patents in setting their standards on the promise that it would adhere to FRAND obligations. 

In doing so, other alternative (and potentially superior) technologies were not utilized by 

SSOs. But Qualcomm has not met its FRAND obligations, and instead, has abused its 

monopoly power over the Cellular Device Components to force device manufacturers into 

licenses with unfair and unreasonable terms, including, but not limited to, excessively high

royalty rates based on the selling price of the completed device rather than the value of 

Qualcomm’s contribution to that device. Qualcomm’s acts have also likely harmed the 

development of cellular technology, as it forced out competitors, thus reducing innovation and 

competitive pricing. 

102. Plaintiffs and members of the proposed Classes were harmed as a direct result 

of Qualcomm’s conduct, which increased the purchase price of their Relevant Cellular 

Devices. Additionally, Qualcomm’s conduct harmed innovation and competition, which 

harmed Plaintiffs in the quality and price of their Relevant Cellular Devices.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Nationwide Claim For Violation of the Cartwright Act, 

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16700, et seq.

103. Plaintiffs repeat the allegations set forth above as if fully set forth herein.

104. During the Class Period, Qualcomm engaged in monopolistic and 

anticompetitive conduct in unreasonable restraint of trade and commerce and in violation of 

California Business and Professions Code sections 16700, et seq. While Section 16700 does 

not reach solely unilateral conduct by a monopolist, it encompasses agreements between a 

monopolist and its customers where the monopolist effectively coerces the customer to accede 

to the restraint in order to obtain the good or service that is the subject of the agreement. That 

is what happened here. Despite its FRAND obligations, Qualcomm unilaterally imposed 

royalty rates that were unreasonable and exceeded what it could have obtained in a true 

FRAND negotiation. This conduct constitutes a “combination” under the Cartwright Act.

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105. Qualcomm established an unlawful scheme by which it acquired and 

maintained monopoly power over the Cellular Device Components through anticompetitive 

means, including by excluding competition.

106. The Relevant Cellular Devices are commodities.

107. As a direct result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and the Class 

were overcharged when they purchased their Relevant Cellular Devices. 

108. It is appropriate to apply California antitrust law to the Nationwide Class. 

Qualcomm is headquartered in California, and Qualcomm subjected its competitors as well as 

device manufacturers that reside and do business in California to its unlawful conduct. In 

doing so, Qualcomm reaped a significant portion of its profits as a result of its unlawful 

scheme from companies doing business in California. Additionally, California is the most 

populous state in the country, for which it was foreseeable that substantial number of 

California consumers would be impacted by Qualcomm’s unlawful behavior. 

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Nationwide Claim For Violations of Unfair Competition Law, 

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.

109. Plaintiffs repeat the allegations set forth above as if fully set forth herein.

110. Qualcomm’s conduct constitutes a violation of California’s Unfair 

Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq., which protects consumers from 

illegal, fraudulent and unfair business practices.

111. Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of themselves, the Damages Class, and on 

behalf of the public as private attorneys general pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204. 

112. As discussed above, Qualcomm’s conduct constitutes violations of the 

Sherman Act and the Cartwright Act. As such, Qualcomm’s acts constitute unlawful conduct 

under section 17200. Qualcomm unlawfully acquired and maintained its monopoly over the 

Cellular Device Components through anticompetitive conduct, including, among other things,

excluding competitors by refusing to license its technology to them, engaging in exclusive 

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dealing arrangements with its customers to keep out competitors, and forcing device 

manufacturers to license its patent portfolio.

113. Qualcomm’s conduct was deceptive because it induced SSOs to use its 

technology on the promise it would comply with FRAND. But after SSOs selected 

Qualcomm’s technology for their standards, Qualcomm refused to comply with its FRAND 

promises.

114. Qualcomm’s conduct is also unfair to Plaintiffs and members of the proposed 

Classes because as a direct result of its acts described above, Plaintiffs were charged more for 

their Relevant Cellular Devices than they would have but for Qualcomm’s conduct.

115. Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and the proposed Classes seek and are 

entitled to all forms of relief available under California’s Unfair Competition Law, including 

but not limited to restitution and disgorgement from Qualcomm of all earnings, profits, 

compensation, benefits and other ill-gotten gains obtained as a result of its conduct in 

violation of Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq. 

116. It is appropriate to apply California antitrust law to the Nationwide Class. 

Qualcomm is headquartered in California, and Qualcomm subjected its competitors as well as 

device manufacturers that reside in California to its unlawful conduct. In doing so, 

Qualcomm reaped a significant portion of its profits as a result of its unlawful scheme from 

companies doing business in California. Additionally, California is the most populous state in 

the country, for which it was foreseeable that substantial number of California consumers 

would be impacted by Qualcomm’s unlawful behavior. 

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Violations of State Antitrust and Restraint of Trade Laws

117. Plaintiffs repeat the allegations set forth above as if fully set forth herein.

118. In the event that the Court does not apply California law on a nationwide basis, 

Plaintiffs allege the following violations of state antitrust and restraint of trade laws in the 

alternative.

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119. Defendant Qualcomm’s anticompetitive acts described above were knowing, 

willful, and constitute violations or flagrant violations of the following state antitrust statutes.

120. Arizona: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 44-1401, et seq. During the Class 

Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Arizona commerce. As a direct 

and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the 

Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are threatened with 

further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in 

violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 44-1401, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the 

Damages Class seek all forms of relief available under Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 44-1401, et seq.

121. California: During the Class Period, Qualcomm engaged in monopolistic and 

anticompetitive conduct in unreasonable restraint of trade and commerce and in violation of 

California Business and Professions Code sections 16700, et seq. While Section 16700 does 

not reach solely unilateral conduct by a monopolist, it encompasses agreements between a 

monopolist and its customers where the monopolist effectively coerces the customer to accede 

to the restraint in order to obtain the good or service that is the subject of the agreement. That 

is what happened here. Despite its FRAND obligations, Qualcomm unilaterally imposed 

royalty rates that were unreasonable and exceeded what it could have obtained in a true 

FRAND negotiation. This conduct constitutes a “combination” under the Cartwright Act.

122. Qualcomm established an unlawful scheme by which it acquired and 

maintained monopoly power in the Cellular Device Components through anticompetitive 

means, including by excluding competition. 

123. The Relevant Cellular Devices are commodities. 

124. As a direct result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and the Class 

were overcharged when they purchased their Relevant Cellular Devices.

125. District of Columbia: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive 

conduct has restrained trade in violation of District of Columbia Code Annotated §§ 28-4501, 

et seq. During the Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected District of 

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Columbia commerce. As a direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business and property 

and are threatened with further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has 

monopolized in restraint of trade in violation of District of Columbia Code Ann. §§ 28-4501, 

et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek all forms of relief 

available under District of Columbia Code Ann. §§ 28-4501, et seq.

126. Illinois: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of the Illinois Antitrust Act (740 Illinois Compiled Statutes 10/1, 

et seq.). During the Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Illinois

commerce. As a direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and 

members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are 

threatened with further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in 

restraint of trade in violation of the Illinois Antitrust Act (740 Illinois Compiled Statutes 10/1, 

et seq.). Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek all forms of relief 

available under District of the Illinois Antitrust Act (740 Illinois Compiled Statutes 10/1, et 

seq.).

127. Iowa: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has restrained 

trade in violation of Iowa Code §§ 553.1, et seq. During the Class Period, Qualcomm’s 

illegal conduct substantially affected Illinois commerce. As a direct and proximate result of 

Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been 

injured in their business and property and are threatened with further injury. By reason of the 

foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in violation of Iowa Code §§ 

553.1, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek all forms of 

relief available under Iowa Code §§ 553, et seq.

128. Kansas: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of Defendant has entered into an unlawful agreement in restraint 

of trade in violation of Kansas Statutes Annotated, §§ 50-101, et seq. During the Class 

Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Kansas commerce. As a direct and 

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proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages 

Class have been injured in their business and property and are threatened with further injury. 

By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in violation of

Kansas Stat. Ann. §§ 50-101, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages 

Class seek all forms of relief available under Kansas Stat. Ann. §§ 50-101, et seq.

129. Maine: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of Maine Revised Statutes (Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. 10, §§ 1101, et 

seq.). During the Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Maine

commerce. As a direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and 

members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are 

threatened with further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in 

restraint of trade in violation of Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. 10, §§ 1101, et seq. Accordingly, 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under Maine Rev. Stat. 

Ann. 10, §§ 1101, et seq.

130. Michigan: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated §§ 445.771, et seq. 

During the Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Michigan

commerce. As a direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and 

members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are 

threatened with further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in 

restraint of trade in violation of Michigan Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 445.771, et seq. Accordingly, 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under Michigan Comp. 

Laws Ann. §§ 445.771, et seq.

131. Minnesota: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of Minnesota Annotated Statutes §§ 325D.49, et seq. During the 

Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Minnesota commerce. As a 

direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the 

Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are threatened with 

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further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in 

violation of Minnesota Stat. §§ 325D.49, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the 

Damages Class seek all relief available under Minnesota Stat. §§ 325D.49, et seq.

132. Mississippi: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated §§ 75-21-1, et seq. During the 

Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Mississippi commerce. As a 

direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the 

Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are threatened with 

further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in 

violation of Mississippi Code Ann. § 75-21-1, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of 

the Damages Class seek all relief available under Mississippi Code Ann. § 75-21-1, et seq.

133. Nebraska: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of Nebraska Revised Statutes §§ 59-801, et seq. During the Class 

Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Nebraska commerce. As a direct 

and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the 

Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are threatened with 

further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in 

violation of Nebraska Revised Statutes §§ 59-801, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and 

members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under Nebraska Revised Statutes §§ 

59-801, et seq.

134. Nevada: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of Nevada Revised Statutes Annotated §§ 598A.010, et seq. 

During the Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Nevada

commerce. As a direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and 

members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are 

threatened with further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in 

restraint of trade in violation of Nevada Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 598A, et seq. Accordingly, 

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Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under Nevada Rev. Stat. 

Ann. §§ 598A, et seq.

135. New Hampshire: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct 

has restrained trade in violation of New Hampshire Revised Statutes §§ 356:1, et seq. During 

the Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected New Hampshire

commerce. As a direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and 

members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are 

threatened with further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in 

restraint of trade in violation of New Hampshire Revised Statutes §§ 356:1, et seq. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under 

New Hampshire Revised Statutes §§ 356:1, et seq.

136. New Mexico: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of New Mexico Statutes Annotated §§ 57-1-1, et seq. During the 

Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected New Mexico commerce. As 

a direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the 

Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are threatened with 

further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in 

violation of New Mexico Stat. Ann. §§ 57-1-1, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members 

of the Damages Class seek all relief available under New Mexico Stat. Ann. §§ 57-1-1, et seq.

137. New York: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of New York General Business Laws §§ 340, et seq. During the 

Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected New York commerce. As a 

direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the 

Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are threatened with 

further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in 

violation of the New York Donnelly Act, §§ 340, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members 

of the Damages Class seek all relief available under New York Gen. Bus. Law §§ 340, et seq.

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138. North Carolina: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of the North Carolina General Statutes §§ 75-1, et seq. During 

the Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected North Carolina

commerce. As a direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and 

members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are 

threatened with further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in 

restraint of trade in violation of North Carolina Gen. Stat. §§ 75-1, et seq. Accordingly, 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under North Carolina 

Gen. Stat. §§ 75-1, et. seq.

139. North Dakota: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of North Dakota Century Code §§ 51-08.1-01, et seq. During the 

Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected North Dakota commerce. As 

a direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the 

Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are threatened with 

further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in 

violation of North Dakota Cent. Code §§ 51-08.1-01, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and 

members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under North Dakota Cent. Code §§ 

51-08.1-01, et seq.

140. Oregon: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of Oregon Revised Statutes §§ 646.705, et seq. During the Class 

Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Oregon commerce. As a direct and 

proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages 

Class have been injured in their business and property and are threatened with further injury. 

By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in violation of

Oregon Revised Statutes §§ 646.705, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the 

Damages Class seek all relief available under Oregon Revised Statutes §§ 646.705, et seq.

141. South Dakota: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of South Dakota Codified Laws §§ 37-1-3.1, et seq. During the 

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Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected South Dakota commerce. As 

a direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the 

Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are threatened with 

further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in 

violation of South Dakota Codified Laws Ann. §§ 37-1, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and 

members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under South Dakota Codified Laws 

Ann. §§ 37-1, et seq.

142. Tennessee: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 47-25-101, et seq. During the 

Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Tennessee commerce. As a 

direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the 

Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are threatened with 

further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in 

violation of Tennessee Code Ann. §§ 47-25-101, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members 

of the Damages Class seek all relief available under Tennessee Code Ann. §§ 47-25-101, et 

seq.

143. Utah: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has restrained 

trade in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-10-911, et seq. During the Class Period, 

Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Utah commerce. As a direct and proximate 

result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have 

been injured in their business and property and are threatened with further injury. By reason 

of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in violation of Utah Code 

Annotated §§ 76-10-911, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class 

seek all relief available under Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-10-911, et seq.

144. Vermont: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of Vermont Stat. Ann. 9 §§ 2453, et seq. During the Class 

Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Vermont commerce. As a direct 

and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the 

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Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are threatened with 

further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in 

violation of Vermont Stat. Ann. 9 §§ 2453, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of 

the Damages Class seek all relief available under Vermont Stat. Ann. 9 §§ 2453, et seq.

145. West Virginia: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of West Virginia Code §§ 47-18-1, et seq. During the Class 

Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected West Virginia commerce. As a 

direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the 

Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are threatened with 

further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in 

violation of West Virginia Code §§ 47-18-1, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of 

the Damages Class seek all relief available under West Virginia Code §§ 47-18-1, et seq. 

146. Wisconsin: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of Wisconsin Statutes §§ 133.01, et seq. During the Class Period, 

Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Wisconsin commerce. As a direct and 

proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages 

Class have been injured in their business and property and are threatened with further injury. 

By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in violation of 

Wisconsin Stat. §§ 133.01, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class 

seek all relief available under Wisconsin Stat. §§ 133.01, et seq.

147. Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class in each of the above states have 

been injured in their business and property by reason of Qualcomm’s unlawful 

monopolization. Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have paid more for Relevant 

Cellular Devices than they otherwise would have paid in the absence of Qualcomm’s

unlawful conduct. This injury is of the type the antitrust laws of the above states were 

designed to prevent and flows from that which makes Qualcomm’s conduct unlawful. 

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148. In addition, Qualcomm has profited significantly from the aforesaid 

monopolization. Qualcomm’s profits derived from their anticompetitive conduct come at the 

expense and detriment of Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class.

149. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class in each of the 

above jurisdictions seek damages (including statutory damages where applicable), to be 

trebled or otherwise increased as permitted by a particular jurisdiction’s antitrust law, and 

costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, to the extent permitted by the above state 

laws.

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Violation of State Consumer Protection Statutes

150. Plaintiffs repeat the allegations set forth above as if fully set forth herein.

151. In the event that the Court does not apply California law on a nationwide basis, 

Plaintiffs allege the following violations of state antitrust and restraint of trade laws in the 

alternative.

152. Qualcomm engaged in unfair competition or unfair, unconscionable, deceptive 

or fraudulent acts or practices in violation of the state consumer protection and unfair 

competition statutes listed below.

153. Arkansas: Qualcomm has monopolized through unfair, unconscionable, and/or 

deceptive practices in violation of the Arkansas Code Annotated, § 4-88-101, et. seq.

Qualcomm knowingly acted in restraint of trade or commerce by affecting, fixing, controlling, 

and/or maintaining at non-competitive and artificially inflated levels, the prices at which 

Relevant Cellular Devices were sold, distributed, or obtained in Arkansas. The 

aforementioned conduct on the part of Qualcomm constituted “unconscionable” and 

“deceptive” acts or practices in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated, § 4-88-107(a)(10). 

Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct had the following effects: (1) price competition for the 

Cellular Device Components restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout Arkansas; (2) 

Relevant Cellular Devices prices were raised, fixed, maintained, and stabilized at artificially 

high levels throughout Arkansas; (3) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were 

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deprived of free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class 

paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for Relevant Cellular Devices. During the 

Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Arkansas commerce and 

consumers. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful conduct of Qualcomm, Plaintiffs

and members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are 

threatened with further injury. Qualcomm has engaged in unfair competition or unfair or 

deceptive acts or practices in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated, § 4-88-107(a)(10) and, 

accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under that 

statute.

154. California: Qualcomm has engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, deceptive or fraudulent acts or practices in violation of California Business 

and Professions Code § 17200, et seq. During the Class Period, Qualcomm committed and 

continue to commit acts of unfair competition as defined by Sections 17200, et seq. of the 

California Business and Professions Code, by engaging in the acts and practices specified 

above. This claim is instituted pursuant to Sections 17203 and 17204 of the California 

Business and Professions Code, to obtain restitution from Qualcomm for acts, as alleged 

herein, that violated Section 17200 of the California Business and Professions Code, 

commonly known as the Unfair Competition Law. Qualcomm’s conduct as alleged herein 

violated Section 17200. The acts, omissions, misrepresentations, practices and nondisclosures of Qualcomm, as alleged herein, constituted a common, continuous, and 

continuing course of conduct of unfair competition by means of unfair, unlawful, and/or 

fraudulent business acts or practices within the meaning of California Business and 

Professions Code §17200, et seq., including, but not limited to, the following: (1) the 

violations of the Sherman Act, as set forth above; (2) the violations of Section 16720, et seq. 

of the California Business and Professions Code, set forth above. The illegal conduct alleged 

herein is continuing and there is no indication that Qualcomm will not continue such activity 

into the future. The unlawful and unfair business practices of Qualcomm, as described above, 

have caused and continue to cause Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class to pay 

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supracompetitive and artificially-inflated prices for Relevant Cellular Devices. Plaintiffs and 

members of the Damages Class suffered injury in fact and lost money or property as a result 

of such unfair competition. Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class are accordingly 

entitled to equitable relief including restitution and/or disgorgement of all revenues, earnings, 

profits, compensation, and benefits that may have been obtained by Qualcomm as a result of 

such business practices, pursuant to the California Business and Professions Code, §§ 17203 

and 17204.

155. District of Columbia: Qualcomm has engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of District of Columbia Code § 28-

3901, et seq. Qualcomm acted in restraint of trade or commerce by affecting, fixing, 

controlling and/or maintaining, at artificial and/or non-competitive levels, the prices at which 

Relevant Cellular Devices were sold, distributed or obtained in the District of Columbia. The 

foregoing conduct constitutes “unlawful trade practices,” within the meaning of D.C. Code § 

28-3904. The suppression of competition that has resulted from Qualcomm’s conduct has 

ultimately resulted in unconscionably higher prices for purchasers so that there was a gross 

disparity between the price paid and the value received for the Relevant Cellular Devices. 

Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct had the following effects: (1) Relevant Cellular Devices price 

competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout the District of Columbia; 

(2) Relevant Cellular Devices prices were raised, fixed, maintained, and stabilized at 

artificially high levels throughout the District of Columbia; (3) Plaintiffs and members of the 

Damages Class were deprived of free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members 

of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for Relevant Cellular 

Devices. As a direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s conduct, Plaintiffs and members of 

the Damages Class have been injured and are threatened with further injury. Defendant has 

engaged in unfair competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of District 

of Columbia Code § 28-3901, et seq., and, accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the 

Damages Class seek all relief available under that statute.

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156. Florida: Qualcomm has engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair 

Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 501.201, et seq. Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct had the 

following effects: (1) Relevant Cellular Devices price competition was restrained, 

suppressed, and eliminated throughout Florida; (2) Relevant Cellular Devices prices were 

raised, fixed, maintained, and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout Florida; (3) 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open competition; 

and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially 

inflated prices for Relevant Cellular Devices. During the Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal 

conduct substantially affected Florida commerce and consumers. As a direct and proximate 

result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have 

been injured and are threatened with further injury. Qualcomm has engaged in unfair 

competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of Florida Stat. § 501.201, et 

seq., and, accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek all relief available 

under that statute.

157. Missouri: Qualcomm has engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of the Missouri Merchandising 

Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.010, et. seq. Plaintiffs and members of the Damages 

Class purchased Relevant Cellular Devices for personal or family purposes. Qualcomm 

engaged in the conduct described herein in connection with the sale of Relevant Cellular 

Devices in trade or commerce in a market that includes Missouri. Qualcomm affected, fixed, 

controlled, and/or maintained, at artificial and non-competitive levels, the prices at which 

Relevant Cellular Devices were sold, distributed, or obtained in Missouri, which conduct 

constituted unfair practices in that it was unlawful under federal and state law, violated public 

policy, was unethical, oppressive and unscrupulous, and caused substantial injury to Plaintiffs

and members of the Damages Class. Qualcomm concealed, suppressed, and omitted to 

disclose material facts to SSOs concerning its unlawful activities and suppressed, and omitted 

facts would have been important to SSOs as they related to selecting Qualcomm’s 

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technologies into their standards. Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct had the following effects:

(1) price competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout Missouri; (2) 

prices of Relevant Cellular Devices were raised, fixed, maintained, and stabilized at 

artificially high levels throughout Missouri; (3) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class 

were deprived of free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages 

Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for the Relevant Cellular Devices. The 

foregoing acts and practices constituted unlawful practices in violation of the Missouri 

Merchandising Practices Act. As a direct and proximate result of the above-described 

unlawful practices, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class suffered ascertainable loss 

of money or property. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek all 

relief available under Missouri’s Merchandising Practices Act, specifically Mo. Rev. Stat. § 

407.020, which prohibits “the act, use or employment by any person of any deception, fraud, 

false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, unfair practice or the concealment, 

suppression, or omission of any material fact in connection with the sale or advertisement of 

any merchandise in trade or commerce...,” as further interpreted by the Missouri Code of 

State Regulations, 15 CSR 60-7.010, et seq., 15 CSR 60-8.010, et seq., and 15 CSR 60-9.010,

et seq., and Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.025, which provides for the relief sought in this count.

158. Montana: Qualcomm has engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of the Montana Unfair Trade 

Practices and Consumer Protection Act of 1970, Mont. Code, §§ 30-14-103, et seq., and §§ 

30-14-201, et. seq. Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct had the following effects: (1) price 

competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout Montana; (2) prices of 

Relevant Cellular Devices were raised, fixed, maintained, and stabilized at artificially high 

levels throughout Montana; (3) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived 

of free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid 

supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for Relevant Cellular Devices. During the Class 

Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct described herein substantially affected Montana 

commerce and consumers. As a direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful 

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conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured and are threatened 

with further injury. Qualcomm has engaged in unfair competition or unfair or deceptive acts 

or practices in violation of Mont. Code, §§ 30-14-103, et seq., and §§ 30-14-201, et seq., and, 

accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under that 

statute.

159. New Mexico: Qualcomm has engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of the New Mexico Stat. § 57-12-1, 

et seq. Qualcomm acted in restraint of trade or commerce by affecting, fixing, controlling 

and/or maintaining at non-competitive and artificially inflated levels, the prices at which 

Relevant Cellular Devices were sold, distributed or obtained in New Mexico. The 

aforementioned conduct on the part of the Defendant constituted “unconscionable trade 

practices,” in violation of N.M.S.A. Stat. § 57-12-3, in that such conduct, inter alia, resulted 

in a gross disparity between the value received by Plaintiffs and members of the Damages 

Class and the prices paid by them for Relevant Cellular Devices as set forth in N.M.S.A., § 

57-12-2E. Qualcomm’s conduct with regard to sales of Relevant Cellular Devices, including 

their illegal conduct to fix the price of Relevant Cellular Devices at supracompetitive levels, 

was substantively unconscionable because it was one-sided and unfairly benefited Defendant

at the expense of Plaintiffs and the public. The suppression of competition that has resulted 

from Qualcomm’s conduct has ultimately resulted in unconscionably higher prices for 

consumers so that there was a gross disparity between the price paid and the value received 

for the Relevant Cellular Devices. Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct had the following effects: 

(1) Relevant Cellular Devices price competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated 

throughout New Mexico; (2) Relevant Cellular Devices prices were raised, fixed, maintained, 

and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout New Mexico; (3) Plaintiffs and members 

of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and 

members of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for Relevant 

Cellular Devices. During the Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected 

New Mexico commerce and consumers. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful 

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conduct of Qualcomm, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured and

are threatened with further injury. Qualcomm has engaged in unfair competition or unfair or 

deceptive acts or practices in violation of New Mexico Stat. § 57-12-1, et seq., and, 

accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under that 

statute.

160. New York: Qualcomm has engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349, et 

seq. Qualcomm acted in restraint of trade or commerce by affecting, fixing, controlling 

and/or maintaining, at artificial and non-competitive levels, the prices at which Relevant 

Cellular Devices were sold, distributed or obtained in New York. Because of Qualcomm’s

unlawful trade practices in the State of New York, New York class members who indirectly 

purchased Relevant Cellular Devices were misled to believe that they were paying a fair price 

for Relevant Cellular Devices or the price increases for Relevant Cellular Devices were for 

valid business reasons; and similarly situated consumers were potentially affected by 

Qualcomm’s conduct. Qualcomm knew that its unlawful trade practices with respect to 

pricing Relevant Cellular Devices would have an impact on New York consumers and not just 

Qualcomm’s direct customers. Qualcomm knew that its unlawful trade practices with respect 

to its royalties and other encumbrances on Relevant Cellular Devices would have a broad 

impact, causing consumer class members who indirectly purchased Relevant Cellular Devices

to be injured by paying more for Relevant Cellular Devices than they would have paid in the 

absence of Qualcomm’s unlawful trade acts and practices. Qualcomm’s conduct described 

herein constitutes consumer-oriented deceptive acts or practices within the meaning of N.Y. 

Gen. Bus. Law § 349, which resulted in consumer injury and broad adverse impact on the 

public at large, and harmed the public interest of New York State in an honest marketplace in 

which economic activity is conducted in a competitive manner. Qualcomm’s unlawful 

conduct had the following effects: (1) Relevant Cellular Devices price competition was 

restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout New York; (2) Relevant Cellular Devices 

prices were raised, fixed, maintained, and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout New 

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York; (3) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open 

competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, 

artificially inflated prices for Relevant Cellular Devices. Qualcomm’s illegal conduct 

substantially affected New York commerce and consumers, and accordingly Plaintiffs and 

members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(h).

161. North Carolina: Qualcomm has engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of North Carolina Gen. Stat. § 75-

1.1, et seq. Qualcomm acted in restraint of trade or commerce by affecting, fixing, 

controlling and/or maintaining, at artificial and non-competitive levels, the prices at which 

Relevant Cellular Devices were sold, distributed or obtained in North Carolina. Qualcomm’s 

conduct could not have succeeded absent deceptive conduct by Qualcomm to cover up its 

illegal acts. Qualcomm’s conduct described herein constitutes consumer-oriented deceptive 

acts or practices within the meaning of North Carolina law, which resulted in consumer injury 

and broad adverse impact on the public at large, and harmed the public interest of North 

Carolina consumers in an honest marketplace in which economic activity is conducted in a 

competitive manner. Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct had the following effects: (1) Relevant 

Cellular Devices price competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout 

North Carolina; (2) Relevant Cellular Devices prices were raised, fixed, maintained, and 

stabilized at artificially high levels throughout North Carolina; (3) Plaintiffs and members of 

the Damages Class were deprived of free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and 

members of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for Relevant 

Cellular Devices. During the Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected 

North Carolina commerce and consumers. Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek 

actual damages for their injuries caused by these violations in an amount to be determined at 

trial and are threatened with further injury. Qualcomm has engaged in unfair competition or 

unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of North Carolina Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, et seq., 

and, accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under 

that statute.

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162. Rhode Island: Qualcomm has engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of the Rhode Island Unfair Trade 

Practice and Consumer Protection Act (R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 6-13.1-1, et seq.). Members of this 

Damages Class purchased Relevant Cellular Devices for personal, family, or household 

purposes. Qualcomm acted in restraint of trade or commerce in a market that includes Rhode 

Island, by affecting, fixing, controlling, and/or maintaining, at artificial and non-competitive 

levels, the prices at which Relevant Cellular Devices were sold, distributed, or obtained in 

Rhode Island. Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct had the following effects: (1) Relevant Cellular 

Devices price competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout Rhode 

Island; (2) Relevant Cellular Devices prices were raised, fixed, maintained, and stabilized at 

artificially high levels throughout Rhode Island; (3) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages 

Class were deprived of free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the 

Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for Relevant Cellular 

Devices. As a direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s violations of law, Plaintiffs and 

members of the Damages Class suffered an ascertainable loss of money or property as a result 

of Qualcomm’s use or employment of unconscionable and deceptive commercial practices as 

set forth above. That loss was caused by Qualcomm’s willful and deceptive conduct, as 

described herein. Qualcomm has engaged in unfair competition or unfair or deceptive acts or 

practices in violation of Rhode Island Gen. Laws. § 6-13.1-1, et seq., and, accordingly, 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under that statute.

163. South Carolina: Qualcomm has engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of South Carolina Unfair Trade 

Practices Act (S.C. Code Ann. §§ 39-5-10, et seq.). Qualcomm’s monopolization as 

described herein had the following effects: (1) Relevant Cellular Devices price competition 

was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout South Carolina; (2) Relevant Cellular 

Devices prices were raised, fixed, maintained, and stabilized at artificially high levels 

throughout South Carolina; (3) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived 

of free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid 

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supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for the Relevant Cellular Devices during the 

Class Period. Qualcomm’s illegal conduct had a substantial effect on South Carolina 

commerce during the Class Period. As a direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful 

conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business and 

property and are threatened with further injury. Qualcomm has engaged in unfair competition 

or unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of S.C. Code Ann. §§ 39-5-10, et seq., and, 

accordingly, Plaintiffs and the members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under 

that statute.

164. Vermont: Qualcomm has engaged in unfair competition and/or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of 9 Vermont § 2451, et seq. 

Qualcomm acted in restraint of trade or commerce in a market that includes Vermont, by 

affecting, fixing, controlling, and/or maintaining, at artificial and non-competitive levels, the 

prices at which Relevant Cellular Devices were sold, distributed, or obtained in Vermont. 

Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct had the following effects: (1) Relevant Cellular Devices price 

competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout Vermont; (2) Relevant 

Cellular Devices prices were raised, fixed, maintained, and stabilized at artificially high levels 

throughout Vermont; (3) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free 

and open competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid 

supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for the Relevant Cellular Devices. As a direct 

and proximate result of Qualcomm’s violations of law, Plaintiffs and members of the 

Damages Class suffered an ascertainable loss of money or property. That loss was caused by 

Qualcomm’s willful and deceptive conduct, as described herein. Qualcomm’s misleading 

conduct and unconscionable activities constitutes unfair competition and/or unfair or 

deceptive acts or practices in violation of 9 Vermont § 2451, et seq., and, accordingly, 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under that statute.

SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Unjust Enrichment

165. Plaintiffs repeats the allegations set forth above as if fully set forth herein.

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166. As a result of its unlawful conduct described above, Defendant Qualcomm has 

and will continue to be unjustly enriched. Qualcomm has been unjustly enriched by the 

receipt of, at a minimum, unlawfully inflated prices and unlawful profits related to the 

Relevant Cellular Devices.

167. Qualcomm has benefited from its unlawful acts and it would be inequitable for 

it to be permitted to retain any of the ill-gotten gains resulting from its unlawful practices 

during the Class Period.

168. Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class are entitled to the amount of 

Qualcomm’s ill-gotten gains resulting from its unlawful, unjust, and inequitable 

conduct. Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class are entitled to the establishment of a 

constructive trust consisting of all ill-gotten gains from which Plaintiffs and members of the 

Damages Class may make claims on a pro rata basis.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment that:

1. The Court determine that this action may be maintained as a class 

action under Rule 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and direct 

that reasonable notice of this action, as provided by Rule 23(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, be given to each and every member of the Class;

2. That the unlawful conduct alleged herein constituted a violation of 

Sections 2 and 3(b) of the Sherman Act, and the state antitrust and consumer protection laws 

set forth herein;

3. Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class recover damages, to the 

maximum extent allowed under such state antitrust and consumer protection laws, and that a 

joint and several judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class be 

entered against Defendant Qualcomm in an amount to be trebled to the extent such laws 

permit;

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4. Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class recover damages, to the 

maximum extent allowed by such laws, in the form of restitution and/or disgorgement of 

profits unlawfully gained from them;

5. Defendant, its affiliates, successors, transferees, assignees and other 

officers, directors, partners, agents and employees thereof, and all other persons acting or 

claiming to act on their behalf or in concert with them, be permanently enjoined and 

restrained from in any manner continuing, maintaining or renewing the conduct alleged 

herein, or from committing any other conduct having a similar purpose or effect, and from 

adopting or following any practice, plan, program, or device having a similar purpose or 

effect; 

6. Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class be awarded restitution, 

including disgorgement of profits Defendant obtained as a result of their acts of unfair 

competition and acts of unjust enrichment;

7. Plaintiffs and members of the Classes be awarded pre- and postjudgment interest as provided by law, and that such interest be awarded at the highest legal 

rate from and after the date of service of this Complaint; 

8. Plaintiffs and members of the Classes recover their costs of suit, 

including reasonable attorneys’ fees, as provided by law; and

9. Plaintiffs and members of the Classes have such other and further relief 

as the case may require and the Court may deem just and proper.

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury, pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, of all issues so triable.

Dated: February 9, 2017 Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Christopher Lebsock

Michael P. Lehmann (SBN 77152) 

Christopher L. Lebsock (SBN 184546) 

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Bonny E. Sweeney (SBN 176174)

Bruce J. Wecker (SBN 78530)

Samantha J. Stein (SBN 302034)

HAUSFELD LLP 

600 Montgomery St., Suite 3200

San Francisco, CA 94111 

Tel: (415) 633-1908 

Fax: (415) 358-4980 

Email: mlehmann@hausfeld.com

Email: clebsock@hausfeld.com

Email: bsweeney@hausfeld.com

Email: bwecker@hausfeld.com

Email: sstein@hausfeld.com

Michael D. Hausfeld

HAUSFELD LLP

1700 K Street, NW, Suite 650

Washington, DC 20006

Tel: (202)-540-7200 

Fax: (202)-540-7201

Email: mhausfeld@hausfeld.com

Eugene A. Spector

Jeffrey L. Kodroff

William G. Caldes

Jonathan M. Jagher

Len A. Fisher

SPECTOR ROSEMAN KODROFF & 

WILLIS, P.C.

1818 Market Street, Suite 2500

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Tel: (215) 496-0300

Fax: (215) 496-6611

Email: ESpector@srkw-law.com

Email: JKodroff@srkw-law.com

Email: BCaldes@srkw-law.com

Email: JJagher@srkw-law.com

Email: LFisher@srkw-law.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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