NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of:

ERIC E. TAYLOR, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

KIMBERLY A. TAYLOR, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 18-0310 FC 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC 2017-003647

The Honorable Geoffrey H. Fish, Judge

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Lincoln & Wenk PLLC, Goodyear

By Michael A. Lincoln, Russell F. Wenk

Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

Eric E. Taylor, Phoenix

Petitioner/Appellee

FILED 4-25-2019
TAYLOR v. TAYLOR

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Kimberly Taylor (“Wife”) appeals from the superior court’s

decree of dissolution of her marriage to Eric Taylor (“Husband”). 

Specifically, she challenges the court’s decision to limit her spousal 

maintenance award to 48 months. Because the court acted within its 

discretion, we affirm.

¶2 Husband and Wife were married from July 9, 2005, to August 

7, 2017, and they have two minor children. At the time of the decree, Wife 

was 45 years old and Husband was 44. After a trial, the superior court 

issued its dissolution decree, finding in relevant part that Wife was entitled 

to spousal maintenance under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 

25-319(A). The court then determined, under A.R.S. § 25-319(B), that 

Husband must “pay [Wife] spousal maintenance in the amount [of] $400.00 

per month for 48 months. The 48 months will allow [Wife] the time needed 

to secure additional employment and arrange for any training needed to 

secure appropriate employment as well as time to hopefully control her 

bi-polar and anxiety.” Wife’s timely appeal followed. 

¶3 We review the superior court’s decision fixing the duration of 

spousal maintenance for an abuse of discretion and will not disturb that 

decision if it is supported by reasonable evidence. Leathers v. Leathers, 216

Ariz. 374, 376, ¶ 9 (App. 2007). The factors listed in A.R.S. § 25-319(B) guide 

the exercise of that discretion. Id. at 377, ¶ 10. “In what is necessarily a 

case-by-case inquiry, some factors will not apply,” but a court abuses its 

discretion “by neglecting an applicable factor.” Rainwater v. Rainwater, 177 

Ariz. 500, 502 (App. 1993).

¶4 The goal of spousal maintenance is “to promote a diligent 

effort to become financially independent,” a goal that “must be balanced 

with some realistic appraisal of the probabilities that the receiving spouse 

will in fact subsequently be able to support herself in some reasonable 

approximation of the standard of living established during the marriage.”

Hughes v. Hughes, 177 Ariz. 522, 523–24 (App. 1993) (quoting Rainwater, 177 
TAYLOR v. TAYLOR

Decision of the Court

3

Ariz. at 503); see also Thomas v. Thomas, 142 Ariz. 386, 391 (App. 1984) 

(“[W]hile encouraging a [spouse] to seek employment is a worthy purpose, 

a judgment cannot be based upon mere hopes and speculative 

expectations.”). Accordingly, although a court has discretion to award 

indefinite maintenance to a spouse who is unlikely to achieve financial 

independence, Rainwater, 177 Ariz. at 503, a court generally does not abuse 

its discretion by fixing an award’s duration unless “countervailing factors 

subordinate the objective of requiring an effort toward independence by the 

receiving spouse,” see Hughes, 177 Ariz. at 525.

¶5 Wife does not challenge the monthly amount of the spousal 

maintenance award, arguing instead that the superior court abused its 

discretion by awarding maintenance for only 48 months instead of making 

the award indefinite. Specifically, Wife contends that through her own 

testimony and documents from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), 

she conclusively established she could not return to work because she is 

“bi-polar and suffer[s] from anxiety and depression.” She asserts the 

superior court did not properly apply this evidence under A.R.S. 

§ 25-319(B)(3).

¶6 As an initial matter, Wife’s argument fails to recognize that 

evidence of physical and emotional conditions is but one of many factors a 

court considers in determining the duration of a spousal maintenance 

award. The superior court’s decree appropriately listed all of the statutory 

factors and discussed the evidence pertinent to each. See A.R.S. § 25-319(B). 

As to A.R.S. § 25-319(B)(3), specifically, the court noted Wife’s testimony 

that she had been hospitalized and currently takes medication because she 

suffers from bipolar disorder, anxiety, and depression. The court also noted 

Wife submitted a letter into evidence establishing that the SSA pays her 

approximately $1,200 each month in benefits. This letter, however, does not 

state the basis for the payments, whether Wife’s eligibility terminates on 

her return to work, nor whether the SSA determined she would be unable 

to do so. The court also noted other evidence weighing against an indefinite 

award. Specifically, Wife worked before and during a portion of the 

marriage, earning more than Husband during those periods; her

employment history is primarily in accounting; and she had been receiving 

SSA benefits for under a year and last worked in 2015.

¶7 Given this conflicting evidence on the subject, we cannot say 

the court’s conclusion that Wife likely could return to work was 

unsupported by reasonable evidence. Wife cites no evidence that the court 

failed to address; instead, she disputes a conclusion the court drew from 

conflicting evidence. Contrary to Wife’s argument, however, we do not 
TAYLOR v. TAYLOR

Decision of the Court

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substitute our discretion for that of the superior court. Cooper v. Cooper, 130 

Ariz. 257, 261 (1981). Where, as here, the recipient spouse has neither been 

absent long from the job market nor lacks the skills needed to presently 

pursue employment, the marriage was of moderate duration, and the 

evidence does not conclusively establish the recipient spouse is unlikely to 

return to work, a court does not abuse its discretion by adhering to the goal 

of spousal maintenance and limiting an award’s duration. See Hughes, 177 

Ariz. at 525; see also Thomas, 142 Ariz. at 392 (noting that a long-term 

marriage and absence from the labor market combined with “the lack of a

presently existing employment skill” weigh in favor of an indefinite award 

(quoting Lindsay v. Lindsay, 115 Ariz. 322, 328 (App. 1977))).

¶8 Accordingly, we affirm the spousal maintenance award. Both 

parties request attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 25-324. We decline to award 

fees to Wife, and Husband is self-represented on appeal. We award taxable 

costs to Husband subject to his compliance with ARCAP 21.