THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Thomas Chad Hilton, Claimant, Petitioner, 

v. 

Flakeboard America Limited, Employer, and Liberty 

Mutual Insurance Company, Carrier, Defendants, 

Respondents. 

Appellate Case No. 2015-000493 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 

Appeal from the South Carolina Workers' Compensation 

Commission 

Opinion No. 27670 

Heard January 13, 2016 – Filed October 12, 2016 

 VACATED AND REMANDED 

Andrew Nathan Safran, of Columbia, for Petitioner. 

Lawson Brenn Watson and Ian Charles Gohean, both of 

Willson Jones Carter & Baxley, P.A., of Greenville, for 

Respondents. 

Gary Christmas, of Howell and Christmas, of Mt. 

Pleasant; Stephen Samuels, of Samuels Law Firm, of 
 

Columbia; Michelle Powers, of Powers Law, of 

Greenwood; Ronald J. Jebaily and Suzanne H. Jebaily, 

both of Jebaily Law Firm, of Florence; Andrea Roche, of 

Mickle and Bass, of Columbia; John S. Nichols and 

Blake A. Hewitt, both of Bluestein Nichols Thompson 

and Delgado, of Columbia; Mary E. Jordan, of Hilton 

Head Island; David Pearlman, of The Steinberg Law 

Firm, of Charleston; and Linda McKenzie, of Bowen 

McKenzie Bowen, of Greenville, all for Amicus Curiae, 

Injured Workers' Advocates. 

CHIEF JUSTICE PLEICONES: We granted certiorari to review an order of the 

Court of Appeals dismissing Petitioner Thomas Hilton's appeal of an admittedly 

interlocutory order of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission's 

Appellate Panel (the Commission). Hilton v. Flakeboard America Ltd., S.C. Ct. 

App. Order dated Sept. 19, 2014. Hilton contends the Commission's interlocutory 

order vacating and remanding the Workers' Compensation Commission's single 

commissioner's (single commissioner) order is immediately appealable pursuant to 

S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A) (Supp. 2015). Section 1-23-380(A) states, in 

relevant part, that "a preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or 

ruling is immediately reviewable if review of the final agency decision would not 

provide an adequate remedy." We agree, under these unusual facts, that review of 

the final agency decision would not provide Hilton with an adequate remedy, and 

he is therefore entitled to an immediate appeal. Determining whether review of the 

final agency decision would give Hilton an adequate remedy requires us to reach 

the underlying merits of the Commission's order, and since we conclude that the 

order cannot stand, we vacate the Court of Appeals' order and remand the matter to 

the Commission. On remand, the Commission will limit consideration to 

Respondent Flakeboard's 102 specific exceptions to the single commissioner's 

order. 

FACTS 

Hilton suffered an admittedly compensable injury as the result of an insect or 

spider bite. The present dispute concerns whether he required further medical 
treatment to reach maximum medical improvement (MMI). The single 

commissioner agreed with Hilton on the merits, finding he had not reached MMI, 

and further that any misrepresentations he had made during the life of his claim 

were a result of a serious cognitive deficit from a previous brain injury. 

Flakeboard appealed to the Commission raising four "General Exceptions" and 102 

specific exceptions to the single commissioner's order. The four "General 

Exceptions" raised the issues of MMI, temporary disability, Hilton's entitlement to 

further medical treatment, and Hilton's credibility. Neither the four general 

exceptions nor the 102 specific exceptions raised issues of competency, the 

appointment of a Guardian ad Litem, or any claim that Flakeboard had been denied 

its right to have Hilton evaluated by a physician of its choice. 

Following a hearing, the Commission—without observing Hilton— issued an 

order that first reproduced the single commissioner's order, then recited a 

paragraph entitled "Issues on Appeal," and finally concluded with these findings by 

the Commission: 

FINDINGS OF THE FULL COMMISSION 

This matter was heard before the above-mentioned 

[Commission] during the last term of Review. The 

[Commission] considered the matter and Vacate[s] and 

Remand[s] the Decision and Order to [the single 

commissioner] to determine whether or not [Hilton] is 

competent to testify and whether or not [Hilton] needs a 

Guardian ad Litem pursuant to §42-15-55. They [sic] also 

order [Flakeboard] to send [Hilton] to a neurologist of [its] 

choice for an evaluation as to the causation and extent of 

[Hilton]'s problems. 

ORDER 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this matter is Vacated 

and Remanded to the [single commissioner] for the purposes 

of making a determination as to whether or not [Hilton] is 

competent to testify and whether or not [Hilton] needs a 

Guardian ad Litem pursuant to §42-15-55. It is also Ordered 

that [Flakeboard] send [Hilton] to a neurologist of [its] choice 
 

for an evaluation as to the causation and extent of [Hilton's] 

problems. Such evaluation shall be made available to the 

[single commissioner] for his or her consideration. 

AND SO IT IS ORDERED! 

(emphasis in original). 

Hilton appealed the Commission's decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of 

Appeals dismissed the appeal as not immediately appealable under S.C. Code Ann. 

§ 1-23-380(A). This grant of certiorari followed. 

ISSUE 

Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing Hilton's appeal 

under S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)? 

ANALYSIS 

Hilton argues the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing his appeal because the 

Commission's order was immediately appealable under section 1-23-380(A). We 

agree. We decide the merits of Hilton's challenge to the Commission's order and 

vacate the Court of Appeals' order and remand to the Commission with orders to 

only address the issues preserved in Flakeboard's Form 30. 

Appeals from administrative agencies are governed by the Administrative 

Procedures Act. Bone v. U.S. Food Service, 404 S.C. 67, 76, 744 S.E.2d 552, 557 

(2013). Section 1-23-380(A) of the APA states a "preliminary, procedural, or 

intermediate agency action or ruling is immediately reviewable if review of the 

final agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy."1

 This Court has held 

1 The concurring opinion maintains that "the result the Court reaches today is 

directly contrary to" the decision in Bone. Bone, a plurality opinion, defined the 

issue it was addressing as "the meaning of a "final judgment" under [a prior 

version of S.C. Code Ann.] section 1-23-390," whereas the issue in this case is the 

meaning of the exception to a "final agency decision" in § 1-23-380(A). These two 
 

 

that whether an intermediate action or ruling is immediately reviewable is to be 

decided on a case-by-case basis i.e., whether a review of the final decision would 

not provide an adequate remedy. The Island Packet v. Kittrell, 365 S.C. 332, 339, 

617 S.E.2d 730, 734 (2005) (interpreting identical language in a previous version 

of section 1-23-380). 

Only issues raised to the Commission within the application for review of the 

single commissioner's order are preserved for review. Ham v. Mullins Lumber Co., 

193 S.C. 66, 7 S.E.2d 712 (1952) (holding that all findings of fact and law by the 

Hearing Commissioner became and are the law of the case, unless within the scope 

of the appellant's exception to the Full Commission); Brunson v. American Koyo 

Bearings, 367 S.C. 161, 165, 623 S.E.2d 870, 872 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding that 

the findings of fact and law by the single commissioner become and are the law of 

the case unless excepted to by appellant) abrogated in part on other grounds by 

Bone v. U.S. Food Service, 404 S.C. 67, 744 S.E.2d 552 (2013); Green v. City of 

Columbia, 311 S.C. 78, 80, 427 S.E.2d 685 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding the findings 

of fact and law by the single commissioner become the law of the case, unless 

within the scope of the appellant's exception to the single commissioner's order) 

abrogated in part on other grounds by Bone v. U.S. Food Service, 404 S.C. 67, 744 

S.E.2d 552 (2013). This Court has also held that general exceptions, such as "the 

commission erred in making an award," are too ambiguous to fulfill the notice 

requirements of due process and do not preserve an issue for review. See Jones v. 

Anderson Cotton Mills, 205 S.C. 247, 31 S.E.2d 447 (1944). 

The Commission has further emphasized the importance of including all appealed 

issues in the Form 30 through its own regulations. Each party "shall arrange and 

present all evidence at the hearing." 8 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 67-613(A) (2012). 

And when a party decides to appeal the decision of the single commissioner: 

(3) The grounds for appeal must be set out in detail on the Form 30 in the 

form of questions presented. 

statutes, in addition to using different terminology, govern appealability in two 

different situations. Section 1-23-390, along with Rule 242, SCACR, govern this 

Court's review of a final decision by an intermediate judicial tribunal, while § 1-

23-380 defines the circumstances under which a judicial body may review an 

agency decision. See, e.g., Shatto v. McLeod Reg. Med. Center, 406 S.C. 470, 753 

S.E.2d 416 (2013) fn. 2. 
 

(a) Each question presented must be concise and concern one finding 

of fact, conclusion of law, or other proposition the appellant 

believes is in error. 

8 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 67-701 (2012). 

Under these unique circumstances where the Commission has ordered the 

relitigation of the entire dispute without regard to the matters raised by the 

appealing party, we find that requiring Hilton to wait until the final agency 

decision to appeal would not provide him an adequate remedy. Prior to the 

Commission's order, no issue regarding Hilton's competency had been raised by 

the attorneys for any party,2

 by the single commissioner who observed Hilton's live 

testimony, or by the medical experts who evaluated him. The Commission, 

nonetheless, without the benefit of personally observing Hilton, sua sponte raised 

the issues of competency, and potential appointment of a Guardian ad Litem. It 

further ex mero motu ordered Hilton to have his physical injuries evaluated by a 

physician of Flakeboard's choosing. Further, instead of simply remanding for a 

competency determination leaving open the possibility the single commissioner 

would find Hilton competent, it vacated the single commissioner's order; thus 

ordering both parties to begin anew, regardless of the ultimate competency 

determination. These extreme remedies, moreover, were ordered without any 

explanation from the Commission. 

As with competency, Flakeboard never sought to have Hilton seen by a doctor of 

its choosing. The Commission ex mero motu ordered Hilton to be seen by a doctor 

of Flakeboard's choosing to determine the cause of his physical injuries. To be 

sure, S.C. Code Ann. § 42-17-30 (2015) 3 and S.C. Code Ann. § 42-15-80 (2015) 4 

2 Flakeboard's claim that its four general exceptions raised these issues to the 

Commission is contrary to this Court's jurisprudence. Each issue raised to the 

Commission must be done with specificity, not through blanket general exceptions. 

Further, we find no evidence in this record that Flakeboard was concerned with 

Hilton's competency or the need for an additional medical examination. Ham v. 

Mullins Lumber Co., 193 S.C. 66, 7 S.E.2d 712 (1952) (holding unchallenged 

findings of the single commissioner became the law of the case). 

3 Section 42-17-30 states, in pertinent part, "The commission or any member 

thereof may, upon the application of either party or upon its own motion, appoint a 
 

 

grant the Commission the authority to require Hilton to be evaluated by a physician 

of its choosing. But instead, the Commission ordered Flakeboard "to send [Hilton] 

to a neurologist of their choice . . . ," despite no such request being made by 

Flakeboard under either statute. The Commission's order furthermore gives no 

explanation why further medical evaluation is required; a decision effectively 

granting Flakeboard a "do over" of the entire litigation. 

Under these extraordinary circumstances, we are convinced that the standard set by 

section 1-23-380(A) has been met. The facts of this case—where the Commission 

has in effect ordered a new trial without regard to the matters raised by the 

appealing party and without any explanation why such an extreme remedy is 

appropriate—convince us that requiring Hilton to wait to appeal until the final 

agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy. If under the circumstances 

presented here, the Commission's order is allowed to stand, a party could face the 

possibility of repeated unexplained "do overs" before a final decision of the 

Commission. We caution that circumstances such as these that will permit the 

immediate appeal of an interlocutory administrative decision under section 1-23-

380(A) "are about as rare as the proverbial hens' teeth." State v. Lytchfield, 230 

S.C. 405, 409, 95 S.E.2d 857, 859 (1957) (referring to appellate reversals of denial 

of continuance motions). 

CONCLUSION 

We vacate the Court of Appeals' order dismissing Hilton's appeal and remand the 

matter to the Commission for consideration only of Flakeboard's 102 specific 

exceptions to the single commissioner's order raised in the Form 30. 

disinterested and duly qualified physician or surgeon to make any necessary 

medical examination of any employee and to testify in respect thereto." 

4 Section 42-15-80 states, "After an injury and so long as he claims compensation, 

the employee, if so requested by his employer or ordered by the commission, shall 

submit himself to examination, at reasonable times and places, by a qualified 

physician or surgeon designated and paid by the employer or commission." 
VACATED AND REMANDED. 

Acting Justice James E. Moore, concurs. BEATTY, J., 

concurring in result only. KITTREDGE, J., concurring in a 

separate opinion in which HEARN, J., concurs. 
JUSTICE KITTREDGE: I concur in result but write separately to note my view 

that the result the Court reaches today is directly contrary to this Court's decision in 

Bone v. U.S. Food Service, 404 S.C. 67, 744 S.E.2d 552 (2013). I joined the 

dissent in Bone, and I remain firmly convinced that Bone was wrongly decided and 

should be overruled. The majority maintains that this case is distinguishable from 

Bone because "the issue in this case is the meaning of the exception to a 'final 

agency decision' in § 1-23-380(A)." Specifically, the majority cites to the 

provision in section 1-23-380 that states, "A preliminary, procedural, or 

intermediate agency action or ruling is immediately reviewable if review of the 

final agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy." S.C. Code Ann. 

§ 1-23-380 (Supp. 2015). The majority correctly finds "that review of the final 

agency decision would not provide Hilton with an adequate remedy, and he is 

therefore entitled to an immediate appeal." But I respectfully disagree with the 

suggestion that Bone and this case involve "two different situations," for the 

petitioners in Bone made the identical argument based on section 1-23-380 as that 

made by Hilton, i.e., that review of a final agency decision would not provide an 

adequate remedy. The Court rejected that argument in Bone, where it was far more 

compelling than it is in this case. See Bone, 404 S.C. at 74, 744 S.E.2d at 556 

(concluding, after the circuit court ruled the employee–respondent suffered a 

compensable injury as a matter of law, that review of the Workers' Compensation 

Commission's final decision would provide the petitioners with an adequate 

remedy). 

HEARN, J. concurs.