LOREN MITCHELL

MAGISTRATE IN CHANCERY

COURT OF CHANCERY

OF THE

STATE OF DELAWARE

 LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER

 500 NORTH KING STREET, SUITE 11400

 WILMINGTON, DE 19801-3734

January 12, 2024

Paula H. Smith

10 Ironwood Drive

Newark, DE 19711

Melanie J. Thompson, Esquire

CoraAnn M. Foley, Esquire

Orlans PC

4250 Lancaster Pike, Suite 140

Wilmington, DE 19805

Re: Paula H Smith v. Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie 

Mae), C.A. No. 2023-0653-LM

Dear Counsel & Parties:

Pending before me is a motion to dismiss an action seeking to quiet title due 

to adverse possession. The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff fails to state a claim 

for adverse possession due to her inability to meet the statute’s twenty-year

occupancy requirement. I agree and recommend that the motion be granted, and this 

action dismissed, for this reason. This is my final report.

I. BACKGROUND1

Petitioner Paula H. Smith (“Smith”) seeks title to a parcel of land located at 

10 Ironwood Drive, Newark, Delaware 19711 (the “Property”).2

 Smith avers she 

1 Unless otherwise noted, the facts recited herein are taken from the Complaint. Docket 

Item (“D.I.”) 1.

2 D.I. 1 at 1.
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January 12, 2024

Page 2

had been “maintaining the property, doing repairs,...replace[d] broken well pump, 

replace[d] piping in septic tank, replace[d] nonwork[ing] HVAC system, paying 

property tax and HOA fees including back HOA fees[,] and bi-weekly 

landscaping.”3 But she has never been the record owner.

The property was originally owned by Brenda and Charles Ferris.4 Petitioner 

asserts that the property was subject to Sheriff Sale on November 9, 2016.5

 It was 

subsequently deeded to Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) as 

a buyback on or around January 27, 2017.6 The Petitioner asserts she has attempted 

to purchase the property since April of 2018.7 She alleges she obtained the property 

by adverse possession on February 4, 2020.8

Smith filed this Petition for Quiet Title by adverse possession on June 26, 

2023.9 On July 17, 2023, Fannie Mae timely responded to the Complaint, moving 

to dismiss it in full, for failure to state a claim (the “Motion”).

10 

3 D.I. 1, Page 3. 

4 D.I. 4, Page 3. 

5 Id.

6 D.I. 4, Ex. A.

7 Id. 

8 D.I. 1, Page 3. 

9 D.I. 1.

10 D.I. 10. 
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January 12, 2024

Page 3

In her response to the Motion, Smith represents that she has attempted to 

purchase the house and applied for a mortgage.11 She adds that she has made efforts 

to work with Fannie Mae and details her communications with Fannie Mae regarding 

the purchase since April 2018. Nonetheless, she maintains in her response to the 

Motion that she obtained the property by adverse possession on February 4, 2020. 

II. ANALYSIS

Fannie Mae moves under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the 

property cannot be obtained via an adverse possession claim as Smith failed to plead 

a reasonably conceivable claim of adverse possession. The standards governing a 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim are settled: 

(i) all well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true; (ii) even 

vague allegations are “well-pleaded” if they give the opposing party 

notice of the claim; (iii) the Court must draw all reasonable inferences 

in favor of the non-moving party; and ([iv]) dismissal is inappropriate 

unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any 

reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof.12

Although “[t]he Court will view pleadings filed by pro se litigants with 

forgiving eyes... proceeding pro se will not relieve Plaintiffs of their obligation to 

11 D.I. 11 ¶ 5.

12 Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 896-97 (Del. 2002) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted).
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January 12, 2024

Page 4

‘allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief’ or ‘to present and support 

cogent arguments warranting the relief sought.’”13

Based on her Petition, Smith is unable to prove she is reasonably entitled to 

recover under a claim for adverse possession. The elements of adverse possession 

require the Petitioner to show that she “openly, exclusively, notoriously, 

continuously and adversely” possessed the property in dispute for 20 years.14 If any 

element is unsupported, the claim should be dismissed. 

Smith avers that she has been “maintaining the property, doing 

repairs,...replace[d] broken well pump, replace[d] piping in septic tank, replace[d] 

nonwork[ing] HVAC system, paying property tax and HOA fees including back 

HOA fees[,] and bi-weekly landscaping.”15 Even with forgiving eyes and viewing 

the Petition in a light most favorable to Smith, Smith has failed to adequately plead 

actual possession of the Property for more than twenty (20) years. This alone is 

sufficient to grant the Motion without an analysis of the remaining elements.

13 Hall v. Coupe, 2016 WL 3094406, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 25, 2016) (internal citations 

omitted).

14Acierno v. Goldstein, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 82, at *23 (Del. Ch. June 29, 2004); Tumulty 

v. Schreppler, 132 A.3d 4, 24 (Del. Ch. 2015).

15 D.I. 1, page 3. 
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January 12, 2024

Page 5

Even if I were to consider the additional documentation16 Smith submitted 

with her Response to the Motion to Dismiss and the follow up letter and attachments, 

Smith consistently maintains that she has only occupied the property since February 

4, 2020.

17 As she is unable to establish that she has occupied the property for more 

than 20 years, Smith has failed to plead a reasonably conceivable claim of adverse 

possession and, therefore, her claim should be dismissed. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, I find the Motion should be granted. Based on the 

allegations in the Petition, Smith would not be able to plead a reasonably conceivable 

claim of adverse possession. Thus, the Petition should be dismissed. This is my 

final report, and exceptions may be filed under Court of Chancery Rule 144.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Loren Mitchell

Magistrate in Chancery

16 I decline to include the additional documentation filed by the Petitioner as they are not 

integral to the claim. See Fortis Advisors LLC v. Allergan W.C. Holdings, Inc., 2019 WL 

5588876, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 30, 2019) (“On a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider 

documents that are integral to the complaint, but documents outside the pleadings may be 

considered only in particular instances and for carefully limited purposes. Whether a 

document is integral to a claim and incorporated into a complaint is largely a facts-andcircumstances inquiry. Generally, a document is integral to the claim if it is the source for 

the . . . facts as pled in the complaint.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

17 D.I. 11 and D.I. 12