### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Se pte m be r 8, 200 8 S es sio n KAREN CRESPO, ET AL 

### . v. CA ROL M C 

### CULLOUG H, ET AL 

### .

Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 07C2193 Ham ilton V. Gayden, Jr., Judge

No. M2007- 02601-COA-R 3-CV - F iled October 29, 2008

Kar en Crespo a

nd Fr eddie Cre spo filed this medical m alpra ctice a ction in Aug ust 2007, alleg ing
ne g lig e nc e pr e c e din g the bir th of the ir da

ug hte r, L a

ur a Cr e sp o, in De c e mbe r 200 1. Th e de fe nd ants – OB /GYN phy sician Carol McCulloug h, OB /GYN nurse J erily n H. B oles , T en nessee Women’s Care, P.C., and Women’s He alth Alliance, P.C. – moved for dismiss al, claiming t he sui t is barre d by this state’s three -y ear

statute of repose for medical malprac tice claims, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26- 116(a) (2000), as interpre ted by the Tennessee Supreme C ourt in Calaway v . Schucker , 193 S.W .3d 509 (Tenn. 2005) . The plaintiffs a lleg e that the statute is unconstituti onal as a pplied to their ca se. The State of T ennesse e interve ned to def end the statute’s constitutionalit y

. The trial c ourt dismissed the ca se, but stated in its order that “Plaintiffs’ constitutional arguments are important [and] worthy of re vie w” and

“ wo uld be be st a dd

re sse d by the a

pp e lla te c ourt s. ” Th e pla int if

fs a pp e a l. We ho ld that Calaway ’s int e rp re tatio n o f § 29 -2 6- 11 6( a ) – e xtend ingthe statut e of re po se to m ino rs – e f f e c ti v e ly o v e rtu

r n e d a b o dy o f la

w th a t th e p la inti f

f s h a d r e a s o n a

b ly r e li e d u

p o n , an d that the sudden re versa l of those pre cede nts, without any opportunity

for the plaintiffs to pursue the ir vested
c l a i m s , w o r

k e d a v i o l a t i o n o f t h e s e p l a i n t i f f s ’ d u e p r o c e s s an d e qu a l p r o t e c t i o n r i g h t s

. A c c o r d i n g l y, we re ve rs e and

re mand fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Reve rsed; Case Rem anded

C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J ., joined. D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., dissented and f iled a sepa

rate opinion. David Randolph Smith and Edmund J

. Schmidt I I I , Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Ka ren Crespo and F reddie Crespo as natural par ents and guardia ns of L aura

Eliz abeth Cre spo, a Minor.

Noel F . Stahl a

nd J eff rey Z ag er, Nashville, Tenne ssee, for the appellee s, Carol McCullough, M.D ., Tenne ssee Women’s Care , P.C., and J erily n Bole s, R.N.-2-

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r, Mic ha e l E. Mo or e , Sol ic ito r Ge ne ra l, and P. Robin Dix on, J r., Assistant Attorney Gene ral, Civil Ri g hts and Claims Divis ion, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f

or the interve ning a

ppellee, the State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

I.

For ease of under standing , we will discuss the timeline of events in the instant ca se along side the chr onology of leg al developments a ffe cting the issue bef ore us. The first rele vant eve nt occur red in 1975, with the passag e of the Tenne ssee Me dical Malpra ctice Re view B oard a nd Claim Act. The pe rt ine nt p or

tio n o f t his a c t, n owc od if

ie d at T e nn . Co de Ann. § 2 9- 26 -1 16 (a ), state s a s f oll ow s: ( 1 ) T h e s tatute o f

li mi tati o n s in

ma lp r a c ti c e a c ti o n s s h a ll b e o n e ( 1) y ear as set for th in § 28-3-104. (2) I n the eve nt the alleg ed injury is not discovered w ithin such one (1) y ear period, the pe riod of limitation shall be one (1) y ear from the d a t e o f s u c hd i s c o v e r

y. (3) In no ev ent shall any such action be brought more than three ( 3) years after the dateon which the negligent act or omission occ urred except wher e ther e i s fra udulent conce alment on the par t of the defe ndant, in which ca se the a ction shall be commence d within one (1 ) ye ar a ft e r d isc ov e ry

that th e c a

us e of a c tio n e xists

. (4) The time limi tation here in set forth shall not apply in case s where a for eig n object has be en neg lige ntly left in a patient’s body , in which
case the ac tion s hall be commenc ed within one (1) y ear afte r the alleged i n j u ry or wrong ful ac t is discovered or should have be en discovere d. (Emphasis adde d.)

As ca n be see n, the s tatute i ndicates that no malprac tice claim will be allowed af ter the thre ey ear repose period ha s expi red, reg ardle ss of whe n the fa cts underly ing the claim wer e discove red. The statute men t i o n s only two exceptions, for fr audulent conc ealment a nd for f oreig n objects left in the patient’s body , neither of wh i ch ar e ap p l i ca ble in this case. How ever , in the wake of the statute’s passa g e, a que stion arose a s to whether it lef t open an implied exception for minors and persons of unsound mind, in acc ordanc e with the long -standingdisability tolling statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 2 8- 1- 10 6 ( 20 00 ), wh ic h s tate s in pe rt ine nt p art :T he s t at ut es hav e been r enu mb er ed s i nce t he Par l at o dec i s i on , bu t w i t h ou t s u bs t an t i v e ch an g es

. For e as e of 1

un d erstan d i ng , w e h av e re p l ac ed t he o l d st atuto ry ci t ati o ns w i t h the n ew o ne s. -3- I f t he pe rs on e nti tle d to com me nc e an ac tio n is, at the tim e the c a

us e of ac tion accr

ued, either

within the ag e of e ighte en (18) y ear s, or of unsound mind, such person, or suc h person’ s repr esent at i v es and privies, as the c ase ma

y be, may commence th e action, af ter the
remova l of such disability , wi t hin the time of limit ation for the particula r ca use of a ction[.]
§ 28-1-106 is a statute of g ener al applicability ; it is not spec ifically tailored to medica l malprac tice
case s. Neve rtheless, in the c ase of a minor who suffe rs an injury due to alleg ed medica l neg lige nce during his minority , § 28-1-106 clea rly tolls the one-y ear medical malprac tice statute of limitati ons , set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 ( 2000), until the minor’s 19th birthday . The que stion
cre ated by

the passag e of the Medica l Ma lprac tice Review Boa rd and Claim Ac t ( sometimes called simply the “Medic al Malprac tice Act”) was whether § 28-1-106 also tolls § 29-26-116(a) ’s three

y ear statute of repose for medic al malpra ctice a ctions, or whethe r the “ in no event” l anguag e of § 2 9 -2 6 -1 1 6 (a ) p re v en t s s u ch t o l l i n g.
The courts first g rapple d with this issue in a fede ral c ase, Pa rla to v . Ho we , 470 F.Supp. 996 (E.D. Te nn. 1979), which – much like the instant case – involved a child who wa s sever ely injured
a t bi rt h. Th e fe de ra l di str ic t c ourt summa ri zed the iss ue and

ru le d a s f oll ow s: [T ]h e questionp r e s e n te d to th e Co u rt i s w h e th e r Se c ti o n[§ 29-26-116( a)] superse des the ope ration of Sec tion [ § 28-1-106]

. 1

Se c tio n [§ 29 -26-1 16 (a )] h a s b e e n c ha ra c te ri zed a s “ an a bs olute three -y ear limit on the time within which ac tions could be broug ht.” Harrison v. Schrader , 5 6 9 S. W. 2 d 8 2 2 , 8 2 6 ( T e n n

. 1 9 7 8 )

. One of the major purposes of the statute was to r educe the “extended per iod d u r i n g w h i c h a p h ys i c i anc o u l d b e s u b j e c tt o p o t e n t i a l l i a

b i l i t y” b e c a u s e o f th e r u le th a t c a

u s e s o f a c ti o nf o r me d ic a l m a lp r a c ti ce a c c ru e wh e n th e patie nt d isc ov e rs , o r i n th e e xer c ise of re a so na ble
car e, should ha

ve discovere d the resultin g injury

. Harrison v. Schrader , su

pra ; see Tee ters v. Currey , 518 S.W .2d 512, 517 (Tenn. 1974).

Def endants a rgue that the words “in no event shall any such ac tion be broug ht more than thre e (3) y ear s after the date o n which the
ne g lig e nt a c t or

omi ssion occ ur

re d” are to b e take n li te ra lly . T his action wa s filed Fe bruar

y 28, 1979, much more than thre e y ear s after th e a ll e g e d n e g li g e n c e [w h ic h o c c u r r e d o n Se p te mb e r 3 0 , 197 1 ]. Thus, the strict application of S ection [ § 29-26-116( a)] would bar the-4- action. De fenda

nts argue that Section [ § 2 9 -2 6-116(a )], as more specific and later in e nactment, than Sec tion [ § 28-1-106], is entitled to prec edenc e. De fenda

nts also point out that s 22 of the Malpra ctice Ac t pr ov ide s th a t: All laws or p ar ts of laws inconsistent with the provisions o f t h i s Act be a nd the same a

re he reby
r e p e a l e d t o t h e e x t e n to f

s u c hi n c o n s i s t e n c y.

I n th e Court ’s vie w, Se c tio n [§ 29 -26 -11 6( a )] w a s n ot i nte nd e d to interfe re w ith the oper at i o n of the leg al disability statute. . . . The le g a l dis a bil ity statut e re pr e se nts a lon g -s tand ing po lic y of the State of Tenne ssee to pr otect potential cause s of ac tions by minors during the period of their minority

. See Gaugh v. Henderson , 39 Tenn. 628, 63 4 ( 1 8 5 9 )

. U n l i k e t h e d i s c o v e r y r u l e i t s e l f , t h e l e g a l d i s a

b ili ty statute does not repr esent a rec ent alteration in proce dure and is not in a ny wa y a sso c iate d w iththe “ me dic a l ma lpr a c tic e ins ur a n c e c ri se s” th a t c o n c e r

n e d the le g is latu

r e in p a s s in g Se c ti o n[§ 2 9

- 2 6

- 1 1 6 ( a ) ]. Harrison v. Schrader , 569 S.W .2d at 826. Befor e ac knowledg ing the elimination of such an e stablished policy , this Co u rt would requir e more e vidence of leg islative intent than mere silenc e.
The Cou rt is streng thened in its view by the par ticularly onerous burden ope ration of Sec tion [ § 29-26-116( a)] woul d h ave upon minors without the lega l disabilit y s t at ute. In its normal operation, Se c tio n [§ 2 9- 26 -1 16 (a )] m ay have the e ff

e c t of e lim inatin g a

c a us e o f a c t i o nb e f

o r e i ta c c r u e s , t h a ti s , p r i o r

t o t h e d i s c o v e r

y o f an y i n j u r y. Harrison v. Schrader , 569 S.W .2d at 827-28. The impact upon minors argued for

by defe ndants, howeve r, would be e ven har sher than t h at considere d by

the Tenne ssee Supre me Court in Schrader

. Under Section [§ 29-26-116( a)], if an injury is discovere d within the thr e e -ye ar pe ri od , an a du lt is a t le a st in a po sit ion to p ro te c t hi mse lf by bring ing his a ction promptly . A minor, es p ec i ally one who, like plaintiff her e, is injured at a very ear ly ag e, is h el p l ess to protec t himself. I f Section [§ 29-26-116(a )] is held to elim inate the leg al dis a bil ity statut e in m e dic a l ma lpr a c tic e c a se s, the min or c ou ld fo re ve r l os e his c a

us e of a c tio n s tr ic tly

thr ou g h th e ne g le c t of

oth e rs

. This burden upon minors would be so oppr es s i v e that the Court cannot r easona

bly so construe Sec tion [ § 29-26-116( a)] unless clea r le g isl a tiv e int e nt a

pp e ars

. Id. at 998-99 (f

ootnote omitted).-5-

Approxim ately

one month later, the same issue arose in state court whe n we r uled on Braden v. Yoder , 592 S.W .2d 896 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979). I n that case , involving alleg ed neg lige nt treatment of a seven- y ear -old’s broken arm, we reve rsed a trial court or der dismissing a malprac tice ac tion that
wa s fi l ed more than 11 y ear s after the injury

occur red, but “ approximately

two wee ks prior to the plaintiff’s nineteenth birthday .” Id. at 897. We initially noted that the key

events of that case long pr e -d a te d th e pa ssa g e of

the 19 75 ma lpr a c tic e statut e , a nd thu s the statut e “ is n ot a

pp lic a ble to t his suit.” Howeve r, we also stated:

I n Parlato v. Howe , U.S. Di strict Court, Knox ville, filed April 20, 1979, and desig nated f

or publication, J udg e Taylor held that T.C.A. [§ 29-26-116( a)] did not eliminate the spec ial rig hts of minors under T.C.A. [ § 28-1-106]. W

e agreecomplete ly. There is no leg islative int e nt that suc h rig hts be e lim inate d an d to do so wou ld c a us e ha rs h results to p arti e s in

ju r e d a t a ne ar ly a g e w h o ar e h e lp le s s to p r o te ct the ir ri g hts

.
For the re asons above, we h o ld that this sui t is not barred by the
maxim u m l im it a ti o np e r io d

o f T

. C. A

. [§ 2 9

- 2 6

- 1 1 6 ( a ) ].

Id. (empha sis added).

T h e r u l e a d o p t e d

b y Braden rema ined und isturbed for mor e than twe nty y ear s. I t was specific ally aff

irmed by this court in Bow e rs b

y Bow e rs v . Ha mm ond, 9 54 S.W. 2d 75 2 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 1997), a

nother c ase involving birth-re lated injuries g iving rise to a lawsuit filed more tha n three y ear s after

the child’s birth, but while the child was still a minor. Our opinion in Bow e rs e xten siv e ly quotes from both Pa rla to and Braden , a s we ll a s fr om an unp ub lis he d 1 98 3 o pin ion c ite d a s Adkins
v . M artin , s li p o p

. a t 6

- 9 ( T e n n

. Ct

. Ap p

. , f il e d M ar c h 2 8 , 1 9 8 3 ) , w h ic h h a d a p p li e d th e lo g ic of Pa rla to and Braden to case s involving mentally incompetent plainti ffs. In Bow e rs , w e e xten siv e ly
ana ly zed a ll thr e e c a se s, amon g oth e rs , a nd the n h e ld

that the trial cour

t erre d in enteringsummary judgme nt in favor of the De fe nd ants ba se d o n th e Me dic a l Ma lpr a c tic e A c t ’s thr e e -ye ar s tatut e of re pose. Althoug h the Def en d ants skillfully

advanc e seve ral arguments for why

this court should ree x amine it s holding in Adkins , a ft e r d oin g so , w e re ma in u nc on vin c e d th a t r e c e nt d e ve lopmen ts in thi s are a of the law r e qu ir e us to d e pa rt fr om p ri or

pr e c e de nt o f t

his
c ourt

. Id. at 758. O u r holding in Bow e rs , like the pre vious holdings, interpre ted Tenn. Code A nn. § 29-26-116( a) a s impli citly including a

n exception for minors duringtheir min o ri ty , in acc ordanc e with Tenn. Code Ann. § 28- 1-106.-6-

The Te nnessee Supreme Court first touched upon the interplay of § 29-26- 116(a) and § 28-1-106 in Penley v

. Honda Mot

or Co., Ltd. , 31 S.W .3d 181 (Tenn. 2000)

. Penley wa s a pr od uc ts liability case , n o t a medical malpr actice case , but the plaintiffs there in cited Bow e rs in support of their ar g ument that the s imilar Tenne ssee Products L iability Act st atute of repose, Te nn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103( a) ( 2000), should be tolled during a period of mental i ncompetenc y . The Hig h Court opined:
[The] plaintiff urg es this Court t o fo l l ow the appr oach taken by

Bow e rs by Bo wers v

. Ha mm ond, 954 S.W .2d 752 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 97 ), in wh ic h th e Court of Ap pe a ls h e ld t

hat th e le g a l di sa

bil ity statute tolled t h e t h ree -y ear medical malpr actice statute of re pose, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 26-11 6 , during the minority of the plaintiff. I n dicta, the Bow e rs court e x presse d the belief t h at minority status was sy non y mous with mental incompetency , and that sec tion 28-1-106 pe rm i t t ed tolling of the statute of repose for menta l inc omp e te nc y

a s w e ll. We disag ree with the rationale used by the Bow e rs court to find implied ex ceptions for

minority and mental incompe t ence to the th r e e
- ye ar me dical malpra ctice statute of re pose. The Bow e rs h o l ding is i n s tark c on tr a st t o th e pla in langua g e of the statut e , w hic h a dmi ts of no tolling other than for fraudule nt conce alment, and the holding fails to rec og nize the policies underlying the statute of re pose itself. I n addition, the Bow e rs c ourt se e ms t o h a ve ig no re d th at th e pla in lang uag e of the l eg al di sability statute applies onl y to toll s tatutes of limit ations rather

than statutes of re pose. Despite its imperfe ct re asoni ng , though, w e note that the a ctual holding of

the Bo we rs court doe s litt le structura l damag e to the
me dical ma lpr a c tic e statut e of re po se . A s w e state d e arl ie r, no t a ll ty pes of leg al disability

aff ect the r unning of a statute of r epose in the
same manne r, and a

n exception for m i nority [as opposed to an exception for mental incompe tency , which is p o t enti ally indefinite]
me re ly e xten ds – b ut d oe s n ot prac ti cal ly e lim inate – th e re po se period. B eca

use Bow e rs has bee n the law in this state since 1997, and because the Genera l Assembly has m ade no effor t to amend the three -y ear statute of re pose sin ce Bow e rs to remove the implied exception for minorit y , we recognizethat the bench, bar, and the public in general may

have v arious reliance interests in its hol ding. Ac c or din g ly , w e lim it the pr e c e de nti al wei g ht o f t hat op ini on

to i ts
e xplic it h old ingthat the three- year m edical malpr a ct ice statute of
re po se is tol le d du rin g the mi no rit yof t hepla int iff

. To the extent that the Bow e rs dicta ca

n be rea d to toll any statute of repose for menta l-7- incom petenc y

under Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 28-1-106, howeve r, it is overruled.
Penley , 3 1 S. W.3 d at 18 8 ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . It be ars re pe a tin g that Penley wa s a pr od uc ts l ia bil ity
case , not a medical malprac tice case, and thus the l ast para g raph quoted above is tec hnically dicta. Ne ve rt he le ss, that Penley

dicta, eve n while cr iticiz ing the “imperf ect r easoning ” of Bow e rs , expli citly endorse d Bow e rs ’s c o re h o l ding: that, in the Supre me Court’s words, “ the three -y ear medical malpr actice statute of re pose is tolled during the mino ri ty of the plaintiff.” The Penley opinion was rele ased on Aug ust 25, 2000.

On Dec ember

24, 2001, L aura

Crespo was born. Acc ording to the plaintiffs’ complaint, she sustained seve re injuries at birth due to “ox y gen d eprivation at and nea r birth associated with an abruption of Mrs. [Kar en] Crespo’s place nta [several h o urs bef ore L aura Crespo’s birth]. L aura sustained ‘hy

pox ic ischemic e ncepha lopathy ’ as a result of a conce aled plac ental abr uption.” The plaintiffs claim that the de fendan t s co m m i tted neg lige nce in f ailing to pr omptly

rec og nize the
emer g ency

situation and tell the Crespos to g o immediately to the hospital. The ir complaint states that this neg lige nce cause d “a failure to timely diag nose” the problem, which “ has left L aura Crespo with major life-a ltering disabiliti es.” At some point “more than one y ear ” af ter L aura Crespo’s birth, her p arents retaine d leg al counsel. Va ri o u s s t eps we re taken in pre paration for a possible lawsuit. The pa rties exchang ed information and corr esponded about various medical rec ords t hat t he prospective plainti ffs soug ht to o bta in. Th e Cr e sp os say the y ho pe d to se ttl e the c a se , a nd pr oc e eded in part

wi th t hat g oa l in mind. I n acc ordanc e with the courts’ then-ope rative interpre tation of the law of this state – under Penley , Bow e rs and the ear lier ca ses – there was no a ppare nt hurry

to file suit, as Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-106 would toll both the statute of limit ations and the statute of re pose duringthe per iod of L aura Crespo’s minority , allowing the C re s p o s t o file suit at any time before L aura

Crespo’s nineteenth birthda

y

. Then, on De cembe r 9, 2005, the leg al situation chang ed suddenly and dramatically

with the
r e le a s e o f th e T e n n e s s e e Su

p r e me Co u rt’ s o p in io nin C a l a w a y ex rel. Calaway v. Schucker , 193 S.W .3d 509 (Tenn. 2005) . That case had begun in f eder al court in Septe mber 2002, when a minor pla int if f a nd he r m other fi led a

me dic a l ma lpr a c tic e c la im r e latin g to i nju ri e s su sta ine d at bi rt

h in F e br ua ry 19 96 . The fe de ra l distr ic t court c e rt if ie d a ser ie s of que sti on s to the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court, including: “I s the t h re e- y ea r statute of re pose for medical malpr actice in Tennesse e Code An n o t at ed s ec t i o n2 9 -2 6 -1 1 6 , wh i ch co n t ai n s n o ex ce p t i o nfo r m i n o ri t y , t o l l edd u ri n g a p l ai n t i ff

's min or ity ? ” I n it s Calaway opinion, the Supreme Court, by a 3-2 vote, answe red this question in the
ne g a tiv e , o ve rr

uli ngthe ide nti c a l Braden and Bow e rs holdings and castingaside the Penley dicta. T h e C o u rte x p l a i n e d

i t s r u l i n g t h u s l y:
This case prese nts us with our first dire ct opportunity to addre ss the question whether

the mi n o ri ty

provisions of Tenne ssee’ s leg al dis a bil ity statute, Tenne sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 2 8- 1- 10 6, tol l-8- the m edica l malprac tice st atute of repose , Tenne ssee Code A nnotated Section 29-26-116( a)( 3).

* * *

We rec og nize that the L eg islature may , in some instances, a llow plaintiffs to commenc e a lawsuit despite the absolute nature of applicable statutes of re pose. For example, we f ind a clea rly stated exception in the m edica l malprac tice statute of r epose f or fr audulent
conce alment. SeeTenn.Code Ann. § 2 9

- 2 6 -116(a )(3) . The plaintiff’ s amicus her e ar gu es t hat the leg al disability statute, Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 28-1-106, was intended by the L eg islature to serve
a s an exc e pti on to the me dic a l malp ra c tic e statut e of re po se , cit ingin support a stringof ca ses from lowe r state c ourts an d one fe dera l court. See, e .g. , Parla to v . Ho we , 470 F.Supp. 996 (E.D. T enn. 1 9 7 9 ); B r aden v. Yoder , 592 S.W .2d 896 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979), Bow e rs v . Ha mm ond, 954 S.W .2d 752 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
We respec tfully

d is a gr e e w it

h the plaintiff’s amicus’ ar g ument. As we have stated above , the medica l malprac tice statute of r epose imposes an absolute three -y ear bar on such actions, with the exception of the exemptions in the statute i tself. In Penley , we state d that “whe n the Gene ra l Assembly

has desire d that exceptions apply to a statute of repose , ... the exception is either found with the langua ge o f t he statute itself, or in another part of the code spe cifica lly ref ere ncingthe particula r statute of r epose.” Penley , 31 S.W .3d at 184-85. We find neither r e qu ir e me n t s a ti s f ie d in th is c a s e f

o r mi n o r it y

. T h e me d ic al malprac tice statute of r epose c ontains no express exception for minors. Neither does any other part of the Code, includingthe leg al dis a bil ity statut e , r e ference the statut e of re po se wi th r e sp e c t to min or s.
* * * Although it i s true that we did, in Penley , acquie sce in the Bow e rs holding by “li mit[ ing] the pre cede ntial weig ht of [the Bow e rs ] opinion to it s expl icit holding that the thre e-year medical malpr actice statute of re pose is tolled during the minority of t h e p l aintiff,” 31 S.W .3d at 185, we c hose not to overr ule B o we rs b ec ause the issue was not squar ely

prese nted in that case , as it is her e. More over, the p l aintiff’s r eliance on this statement is mi splace d beca use our a c qu ie sc e nc e wa s cle arl y in dic ta . N ot o nly did the tw o c a se s c ome to differ ing c onclusions – Penley declining to f ind a n exemption for-9- mental incompetents to Tenne ssee’ s produ ct s liabilit y statute of repose , and Bow e rs implicitl y fi n d i ng an implied exemption for minors to the medical malpractice statute of re pose – the re spective bases upon whic h the two holdings r est ed were entire ly differ ent as well. In fac t, we expressed our total disag ree ment with the rea soning employ ed by

the Bow e rs co u rt t o re ac hi t s h o l d i n g. We disag ree with the rationale u sed by the Bow e rs cour t t o find implied ex ceptions for minority and mental incompetence to the three -y ear medical malprac tice statute of re pose. The Bow e rs ho ldi ngis in stark contra st to the pla i n lang uag e of the statute, which admits of no toll i ng other than f or fr audulent
conce al m ent, and the holdingfails to rec og nize the policies underly

ing the statute of re pose itself.

Id. , 31 S.W .3d at 188. We now expressly

overr ule the Bow e rs and Braden c ourt s and ho ld that the plaintiff’s minority does not toll the me d ical malpra ctice statute of re pose. Calaway , 193 S.W .3d at 514-17.

The Calawayde c isi on

did no t r e c ite or

sp e c if ic a lly a dd re ss the Court ’s pr e vio us state me nt, in Penley , that “[b] eca

use Bow e rs has bee n the law in this state since 1997, and beca use the Gene ral Assembly has made no eff

ort to amend the thre e-year statute of re pose since Bow e rs to remove the implied e x ception for minority , we rec og nize that the bench, bar, and the public in g ener al may have
v ar io u s r e li an c e inte r e s ts in it s h o ld ing .” Penley , 31 S.W .3d at 188. Howe ver, in re sponse to a pe tit ion to r e he ar f

ile d b y the pla int if

fs in t hat c a se , th e Court did

a me nd its Calawayopinion on F e br ua ry 21 , 2 00 6, to l imi t it s h old inga s f oll ow s:

I n order to avoi d undue har dship to potential plainti ffs who ha ve relied upon the Bow e rs ru le , th e ne w r ule we ann ounc e tod ay

is t o have prospective application only . There fore , for cases com menc ed
on or before Dec embe r 9, 2005 , we ho ld t hat th e pla int if

f’ s mi no ri ty tolls t he medica l ma lprac tice statute of repose

. For case s commence d afte r De cembe r 9, 2005, we hold that the plaintiff’ s minority does not toll the medical malpra ctice statute of re pose. Calaway , 1 93 S.W. 3d a t 518 (e mph a sis a dd e d)

. As no te d earl ie r, De c e mbe r 9, 200 5, wa s th e date the or ig ina l Calaway opinion was release d. Thus, althoug h the Februa ry 21, 2006, order

on petition to rehe ar ma de Calaway“ p r o s p e c t i v e ” i nt h e s e n s e t h a ti t d i d n o tc h an g e t h e r u l e s f o r an y law su its-10-

filed befor e it s relea se date , Calaway s t i l l r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y b ar r e d an y as-ye t unfiled claims relating to inj ur ie s that occur

red more than three y ear s befor e the r elea se of the or igina l opinion. Thus, the amende d Calawayopinion sti ll does not addre ss the “reliance interests” of potential plaintiffs, like the Cr e sp os , wh o wa ite d mor e tha n thre e y e ars to f

ile su it and were still wai ting when Calaway was released

. The Cre spos attempted to intervene in Calaway , filing a motion on Decemb er 19, 2005,
re qu e sti ngle ave to a

pp e ar a s amicus curiaein the Calaway case upon rehe aring . They also filed a proposed amicus brief w ith the Court. The Court rejec ted the Crespos’ motion s o n Fe b ru ary 21, 20 06 , in the same or de r t

hat ann ounc e d th e a me nd e d o pin ion . A c c or din g ly , th e Cr e sp os ’ a rgume nts
wer e neve r ac tually

befor e the Court in Calaway

. A lt h o u g h th e p la inti f

f s in C a l a w ay had filed suit in September 2002, w ell befor e the Dec ember

2005 deadline, the y

n ever theless filed a second

motion to rehear , asking the Court to “g ive p r o s p ec t i v e ap p l i ca t i o no f t h e n ew l y an n o u n ce d

ru l e t o ca s es i n v o l v i n g injuries occurring afte r Dec ember

9, 2005, rathe r than to cases c ommenc ed afte r this date.” Calaway , 193 S.W .3d at 522 (e mph a sis in or ig ina l) . T his mot ion wa s d e nie d o n Se pte mbe r 1 3, 20 07 , w itha sim ple state me nt: “Upon due consideration, we conc lude t hat t he appellants’ petit ion is not well-take n and should be denied.” Id. T h e H i ghC o u rt d i d n o tel ab o ra t e f

u rt h er o ni t s re as o n i n g.
Th e Cr e sp os fi le d the ir laws uit in t he ins tant c a se on

Au g us t 2, 20 07 . T he fi rs t pa g e of the ir complaint descr ibes the ca se as “ a medica l malprac tice lawsuit and c onstitut ional challeng e.” T he constitutional grounds a

re listed as “ [ d]ue process, e qual protec tion and improper r etroa ctive
a pp lic a tio n o f l aw. ” As we int e rp re t th e Cr e sp os ’ a rgume nt, the ir

c on sti tut ion a l argume nts a c tua lly fa ll into tw o dist inc t, ove ra rc hin g c a te g or ie s: 1 ) t

hat Calaway ’s int e rp re tatio n o f § 29 -2 6- 11 6( a ) i s unconstitutional, on both due proce ss and equa l protection g rounds, as a pplied to all

mi no rs (or at l e a s t a l l m i n o r s i n

j u r e d a t b i rt h ) ; an d 2 ) t ha t C a laway ’s pa

rt ia lly re tr oa c tiv e a

pp lic a tio n is unconstitutional, on both due process a nd equal protection g rounds, i nsofar as it bars the c laims of minors injured befor e Calawaywho wer e u n able to file suit wit hin three year s of their injuries beca use of the abrupt chang e in the law w orked by the Calaway decision. As will be seen, we do not rea ch the first set of arg uments, but rather base our decision entire ly

on the sec ond set, relating to Calaway ’ s r e t r o a c t i v i t y.
The de fenda

nts filed a motion to dismiss on September 7, 2007. The trial court he ard or al arguments on the motion to di smiss, and on November 8, 2007, the court dismissed the ca se. Howeve r, as noted e arlier , the cour t declar ed the plaintiffs’ constitutional arg uments “im portant [an d] wo rt

hy of re vie w” by

the a pp e llate c ourt s. Th e tr ia l c ourt a lso state d th a t th e pla int if fs ’ c la ims
are “supported by rec ord evidence to provide a fa ctual and le g al basis for the as-a pplied challeng e.” Spe c if ic a lly , th e c ourt

wr ote that th e pla intiff s “hav e pr e se nte d a ff

ida vit pr oo f f ro m e xpe rt s e sta bli sh ingtha

t L a ur a Cr e sp o r e c e ive d s e ve re br a in i njur ies a t bi rt h, ” and a dd e d th a t e vid e nc e in the re cord shows that “medica l rec ords and f ilms were still being g ather ed at the time the thr ee- y ear statute of re pose had e x pired.” The plaintiffs timely appea led.O ur ho l d i ng f o r t he p l ai nt i f

f s o n t hi s i ss ue p ret erm i t s co nsi d erat i o n o f t hei r b road e r c la im tha t Cal away ’s 2
i n t er pr et at i on of

T en n

. Code An n

. § 29- 26- 116( a) i s u n con s t i t u t i on al a s a ppl i ed t o a l l m i n o rs , or al l mi nor s i nj ur ed at b i rt h.

T he f

i rs t eq ual pro t ect i o n argument by t he d o ct o r i n Cal away c h al l en g ed t h e appl i ca t i on of t h e ol d B o w ers 3 rul e t o her p re- D ecem b er 2 0 0 5 c ase. T hat is sue i s rel evant , if a t a l l , o nl y to t he C res p o s’ bro ad er const i t ut i o nal argument
r ega r di ng “ al l mi nor s , ” whi ch we do not r eac h h er e. T he Cal away doct or’ s s econd equa l prot ect i on ar gu ment as s er t ed t hat t he pros

pect i ve as pect of

t he C al aw ay ru ling un fair ly f a vo rs tho se luc k y d e

fe n d a n ts whos e al l ege d m alp r act i ce vi ct i ms di d not s ue t hem pr i or t o t he rel eas e of t he C al aw ay d eci si o n. T hi s i s ess ent i al l y t he m i rr o r i m age o f t he p l ai nt i f f s ’ equa l prot ect i on ar gu ment t hat we wi l l addres s l at er i n t hi s opi ni on: t hat t he r et r ospect i ve as p ect of t he Cal away ru ling un fair ly di s ad vant ag es t hos e u nl uck y woul d- be p la in tif fs who di d n ot happen t o s ue t he i r all eged t ort f eas ors p r i or t o t he r el eas e of t he Cal away deci s i on. A l t houg h t hes e a r gu ment s ar e s t r uct ur al l y s i mi l ar , t he equi t i es
an d c on s i der at i on s i n v ol v ed i n adj u di ca t i n g t h em ar e s o di f f er en t t h at we ca n n ot dr aw a n y me an i n g f u l c on cl u s i on s f

r om t he Sup rem e C o urt ’ s reject i o n of t he d ef end ant do ct o r’ s argum ent i n Cal away

. A s f or t he due pr oces s ar gu ment s r ai s ed b y t he d o ct o r i n C al aw ay af t er t he m o t i o n f

o r r eheari ng by t he p l ai nt i f f s i n t hat case, one was r end ered m o o t by t he C our t ’ s r ej ect i on of

t hat mo t i on, an d t he ot her r eques t s a bal anc i ng of i nt er es t s t hat ha s no appl i cabi l i t y t o t hi s ca s e.
-11- II.

A.

This case prese nts a pure question of law, which we r eview de novo with no presumption of
corr ectne ss. Stein v. Davidson Hot el Co. , 945 S.W .2d 714, 716 (Tenn. 1997). Our de cision turns upon the question of whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Calaway , which ef fec tively “ra n out the clock” on the Crespos’ c laim with no prior war ning, w orked a

deprivation of these plaintiffs’ due pr oc e ss o r e qu a l pr ote c tio n r ig hts un de r t he state and

fe de ra l c on sti tut ion s. 2
Obviously , we a

re bound by

the Calawaydecision. “This c ourt does not have the pre rog ative to disreg ard de cisions of the Tenne ssee Supre me Court.” In re Esta te of Gre e namyre , 219 S.W .3d 877, 883 ( T e n n

. Ct

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 5 )

. O n th e c o n tr ar y , “ w e ar e o b li g e d to f

o ll o w th e d ir e c ti o n s of the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court , p art ic ula rl y a ft e r t he ‘c ourt ha s g ive n d e fi nit e e xpre ssi on to i ts v ie ws in
a case afte r ca

ref ul consideration.’ ” Id. (q u o t i n g Holder v. Tenn. Judicial Selec tion C om m ’n , 937 S.W .2d 877, 881 (Tenn. 1996) ). Howe ver, the constitutional iss ues ra ised here in w ere not before the Court in Calaway , nor we re the se plaintiffs and the ir

ri g hts a t is su e in t

hat c a se . T he on ly constitutional claims adjudicated in Calaway we re a pa ir of e qu a l pr ote c tio n and du e pro cess argume nts by the defendan t doctor

. The Cre spos’ attempt to raise the ir c on sti tut ion a l c la ims in

3 Calaway was thwarte d when the Court de clined their r equest to interve ne in the ca se, and the Court’s denial of the Calawayplaintiffs’ sec ond motion for rehe aring does not spell out the rationale of that decision. C er tainly , that denial of a second r ehea

ring did not “g ive[] definite e x pression to [the Court’s] views” on these constitutional questions. Holder , 937 S.W .2d at 881. In short, the Court’s opinion in Calawaysim

ply do e s not an sw e r the c on sti tut ion a l que sti on s ra ise d b y the pla int if

fs in this case. Ac cording ly , we c onclude that this ca se pre sents a matter of first impression with reg ard to the impact of Calawayon the constitutional rights of pla intiffs in the Crespos’ position, and we pr oc e e d o n th a t ba sis

.-12-

We believe that the a

brupt chang e in the law cre ated by the Calawaydecision depr ived the plaintiffs of both their due proce ss rig hts and their equa l protection rig hts. W e will discuss due proce ss first, then proce ed to equa l protection.

Be fore discussing e ither issue in detail, howe ver, w e wish to emphasize that our c onclusion does not imply

any criti ci s m o f

– s till l ess any attempt to overturn the bindingdictates of – the Sup re me Co ur

t of thi s st a te . A s w e have a lr e a dy po int e d o ut, the Hi g h Co ur t di d n ot h a ve the se plaintiffs or these fac ts before it when Calawaywa s a r g u e d

. By l i m i t i n g Calaway ’s ho ldi ngto “ca ses commenced after Dece mber 9, 2005,” the Hig h Court protec ted t he rights of the parties in that
c as e , i nt h e s i tu a t i o np r e s e n t e d b y tha t re c or

d . T he Cou

rt a lso e ns ur e d th a t other pl ain ti ffs wi th active c ases, f

iled before Calaway , would not suffer a “ha rdship” bec ause the y

“justifiably

relied upon the old prec edent.” M a r s h a l l v . M a r s h a ll , 6 70 S.W .2d 213, 215 (Tenn. 1984) . Howeve r, Calawaydid

no t a dd re ss – and did no t pur

po rt to ad dr e ss –

the pli g ht o f p la int if

fs lik e the Cr e sp os , who had be en pre paringtheir ca se for sever al y ear s, secur e in the knowledg e that they would not be pe na lize d for the ir

de lay – unti l Calaway su dd e nly , in e sse nc e , p ull e d th e ru g ou t f ro m un de r t

he m. I t is tha t situation, quit e diffe rent fr om the one Calaway prese nted to the Supreme Court, which, we
no w h old , c re a te d c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio ns

.
We rec og nize that it i s somewhat unusual to find that the due proce ss and equa l protection g uara ntees we re violate d by

the application a n d timing of a judicial decision, rather than by the application of a

statute. The Ma rsh all case just c ited, in disc ussing the issue of re troac tive versus prospec tive application of judicia l de c is io n s o v e r tu rning previously

relied- upon prec edents, doe s not
me nti on e ith e r due pr oc e ss o r e qu a l pr ote c tio n, no r d oe s Hil l v . Ci ty of Ge rmanto wn , 31 S.W .3d 234 (T e nn . 2 00 0) , w hic h is c ite d by the pla int if fs fo r t he pr op os iti on

that Calaway ’s a

pp lic a tio n to thi s case is imper

missibl y retroa ctive. B oth of these opinions state that new prec edents will be de nied
re tr oa c tiv e e ff

e c t “ on ly if su c h a n a pp lic a tio n w ou ld w or

k a ha rd sh ip upo n thos e wh o ha ve jus tif ia bly relied upon the old prec edent,” Hil l , 3 1 S

. W

. 2 d

at 2 3 9 (q u o t i n g Ma rsh all , 670 S.W .2d at 215), but this rule is not ex plicitly

framed in constitutional terms. I n the instant case , howeve r, we believe that
no t j u s t “ h ar d s h i p , ” b u t c o n s t i tu t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n s , ar e m an i f e s t

– e v e r y b i t a s m u c h a s i f

a ne wl y enac ted statute had violate d an indi vidual’s due process or e qual protec tion rights. We now proc eed to expl ain why

this is s o.

B.

Th e Fou rt e e nth

Am e ndme nt t o th e Un ite d St a te s Co ns tit uti on pr ov ide s th a t no state sh a ll “depr ive any person of life, l iberty , or property , without due process of law .” U.S. Const. amend. XI V, § 1. The L aw of

the L and Clause of the Tennessee Const itution s tates that no per son “shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his free hold, liberties or privileg es, or outlawe d, or exiled, or in a ny manner destroy ed or deprive d of his life, liberty or prope rty , but by

the judg ment of his peer s or the lawof the land.” Art. I , § 8. These c onstitut ional provisions are “sy nony mous.” Da ughe rty
v . St ate , 393 S.W .2d 739, 743 (Tenn. 1965)

.It shoul d al so b e no t ed t hat t he C o urt i n M ill s sp eci f i cal l y did no t ad d res s t he ret roac t i vi t y i ss ue t hat i s p res ent 4
i n t he i nst ant case. I nd eed , a f o o t no t e i n M ill

s ex pl i ci t l y poi n t s ou t t h at “ [ t ] h e di s t u r ban ce of v es t ed r i g h t s t hrough

r et r oact i ve l egi s l at i on .

. . i mp l i cat es a di f f er ent cons t i t ut i onal ques t i on wh i ch i s not at i ssue in t hi s ca s e. ” M ill s , 155 S.W

. 3 d at 92 2 , n. 5

. T h a t “d iff e rent co nst i t ut i o nal que st i o n” i s ess ent i al l y what i s at i ss ue here: whet her t he ef f ect i ve
c h a n g e in the law w o rk e d b y Cal away , w h ic h su d d e n ly an d un e x p e c te d ly eli m ina te d p la intiff ’s ab ili ty t o p u rs u e the ir exi st i ng l egal c l ai m , co nst i t ut es an i m p erm i ss i b l e “ d i st urbanc e o f vest ed ri ght s t hrough ret roac t i ve l egi sl at i o n”– or rat her, i n t hi s case, ret roac t i ve judici al i nt erpret at i o n of l egi sl at i o n. -13- Both provisions re cog nize a substantive due proc ess intere st in a n vested, e x isting ca

use of action. “It is well settled that a vested right of action is as much prope rty as ar e tang ible things a

nd is protected f

rom arbitra

ry leg islation.” Mo rri

s v . G ro ss , 572 S.W .2d 902, 905 (Tenn. 1978) . “Such
a ve ste d r ig ht o f a c tio n e njo y s th e fu ll p ro te c tio n o f the du e pr oc e ss c la us e s o f t he F e de ra l and

State Constit utions.” Id. Fur

thermore , notwithstanding the “the g ener al rule that no one has a vested rig ht in a pa rt ic ula r r e me dy fo r t he e nf or c e me nt o f a

ri g ht o f ac tio n, ” and

thu s “ the le g isl a tur e or din ari ly may chang e existi ng reme dies for the enforc ement of r ights, includingthose which have alr eady vested,” such a c hang e may work a violation of due proce ss rig hts if it fails to provide “ a substantial
reme dy t o re d re s s t hat rig ht by

some eff ective pr ocedur e.” Id. As the Supreme Court state d in a po st- Calawaycase , in which the plaintiffs c halleng ed the a pplication of the thre e-year statute of
r e p o s e t o c a s e s o f

m e n t a l i n c o mp e t e n c y, [i]t is c or re c t to say

th at the plaintiff

s’ ve sted right of action for medi c a l m a lp r a c ti c e in th is c a s e e n jo y s c o n s ti tu ti o n a l p r o te c tion

. Mr. Mills ’ cause of ac tion accr ued in Fe bruar

y 1997, when the plaintiffs first discover ed that he ha d Wil son’s Di sease . A vested rig ht of ac tion in tort i s a ca use of a ction which has acc rued, the reby becoming prese ntly

enfor cea ble. See Jones v. Morristown -Ham blen Hosp. Assoc., In c. , 595 S.W .2d 816, 820-21 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979). Vested r igh ts o f a c ti o n in tort may be cla ssified as constitutionally -protec ted prope rty interests. “[A] vested rig ht of
a c tio n is a s mu c h p ro pe rt

y a s are tang ibl e thi ng s

.. . a nd e njo y s th e fu ll pr ote c tio n o f t

he du e pr oc ess cl a

us e s o f t he F e de ra l and

State Constit utions.” Mo rri

s v . G ro ss , 572 S.W .2d 902, 905 (Tenn. 1978) ;
se e als o Logan v

. Zim m erm an Bru s h C

o. , 455 U.S. 422, 428, 102 S.Ct . 1148, 71 L .Ed.2d 265 (1982) ( “[A] cause of action is a specie s of pr op e rt y pr ote c te d b y

the F ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nt's Due Pr oc e ss Clause.”)

. Mil ls v . W ong , 155 S.W .3d 916, 921 (Tenn. 2005) (empha sis added). 4

Of c ours e , a s Mil

ls also states, “a rationally -base d statute of repose validl y exti ng uishes not only unacc rued c auses of

action, but also ca

uses of a ction which have alre ady ac cr u ed and veste d as rig hts.” Id. at 922. Howeve r, in a ccor dance with the lang uag e of Mil ls , a nd mor e g e ne ra lly

wi th simple common sense, we hold that the Crespo s ’ ri ght to sue was vested at the time the Calaway opinion was rele ased, and that their vested r ight ha d not y et bee n exti ng uished at that time. Under-14-

the law of this state as it wa s understood to exi st prior to Calaway , the re wa s no a pp lic a ble statut e of re pose, rationally

based o r ot herw ise, that could have exti ng uished it. Thus, it was the sudden
c h an g e i nt h e l awc a

u s e d b y Calaway , rathe r than the natural runningof a pre-e x isting statute of repose , that eff

ectively cut off the Crespos’ ve sted rig hts. This fact g ives rise to the Crespos’ due proce ss claim, and distinguishes t his case from others in which st atutes of repose ha ve bee n upheld.

Th e defe nd ants c on te nd

tha t Calawaydid not work a c hang e in the law, but r ather “interpr eted the A ct as orig inally enac ted,” Murvin v. Cofer , 968 S.W .2d 304, 310 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). Thus, they

argue, the Cre spos’ vested r ight to s u e ex p i re d not on Dece mber 9, 2005, when Calawaywas re lease d, but rather on Dec ember

25, 2004, when the statute of re pose – as i n t e r p r e t e d b y Calaway , almost a y ear later – ran. “ The Supreme Court’s . . . decision in Calaway did no t st ri p a wa y he r c a us e of a c tio n, ” the de fe nd ants argue . Rathe r, the y sa y , th e Court

“ sim ply int e rp re te d th a t st a tut e and se t f or th what a lw ay s ha s be e n the law; name ly , that the statut e of re po se is not tol led by

a plaintiff’ s minority .” Although we follow the defe ndants’ logic , we think such a conclusion would be monumenta lly unjust on these fac ts. Whether or not it is technically

define d as “ne w law,” Calawayc omp le te ly a lte re d the le g a l si tuatio n f a c ingthe se pa

rt ie s. Ne ith e r p art

y in this case ha d any rea son to believe, on Dec ember 25, 2004, that there was an applicable statute of
r e p o s e

. T h e c o u rt s , i n c l u d i n g t h e S u p r e m e C o u rt , w e r e u n an i m o u s t h a t § 2 9

- 2 6

- 1 1 6 ( a ) d i d n o ta p p l y.
Neve rtheless, the de fenda nts argue that we cannot c onsider Calawayto have “ chang ed” the law. I n support of this conclusion, they cite our la

ng uag e in Mur v in , a Consumer Protec tion Act
case in which we r ever sed the trial c ourt’s rulingbeca use the Supreme Court ha d announce d a new i n t e r p r e t a t i o no f

t h e g o v e r

n i n g s t a t u t e d

u r i n g t h e i n t e r

v e n i n g p e r i o d

b e t w e e nt r i a l an d

a p p e a l

. In decliningto limi t the subject Supreme Court opinion, Ga nze v oo rt v . Rus se ll , 949 S.W .2d 293 (Tenn. 1997), to prospec tive application only , we wr ote that

the S u p re me Court [i n Ga nze v oo rt] held, in effec t, that the Act has
ne v e r been a

pplicable to [ fac ts such as those in the case at issue]. The fac t that there was a [previous] holding of a fede ral district court and a d ec i s i o no f t h e C o u rt o f A p p ea l s t o t h e c o n t r ary d o es n o tch an ge thi s f a c t. T his is n ot a

c a se wh e re the Sup re me Court c ha nges the law and spec i fi cally

limit s the ca ses to which it is applicable. See, e .g. , Mc Inty re v . Ba le ntine , 833 S.W .2d 52, 58 (Tenn. 1992) . The Supreme Court interpr eted the A ct as orig inally enac ted. This means t h a tt h e i n a

p p l i c a b i l i t y o f t h e A c t t o [ f

a c t s s u c h a s t h e s e ] h a s a l w ays been the law eve n though it wa s o n l y rec ently pronounce d
a uth or itativ e ly

by the Sup re me Cou

rt

. 968 S.W .2d at 309-10. The re a re at least three key

differ ence s betwee n Mur v in and the instant ca se. First, that case simply did not involve the sort of e x tensive “r eliance interests,” in Penley ’s wo rd s, that are prese nt here . The leve l of fundamental unfairne ss that would be implicated by a contr ary ruling in this case is there fore fa r h i gh er. Secondly , the ruling in Ga nze v oo rt , which dictate d the result in Mur v in , involved the construc tion of a si n g le, spec ific statute; the rulingin Calaway , by-15-

contra st, involves the interpretation of the interplay betwee n two separ ate statutes, Te nn. Code Ann. § 29-26-116( a) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-106. T hus, as the plaintiffs wr ite in their reply brief, “[a]lt houg h the 1975 statute may have a lway s meant what it meant (as pronounc ed in Calaway in 2005), [the plain lang uag e of that statute] di d not answer what .

. . the 1975 statute did v is- a- v is the 1858 disability

statute that had a lway s protecte d minors.” Thirdly , and per

haps most importantly , Ga nze v oo rt di d n otalt er a p reced e nt t

ha t th e Sup re me Court its e lf ha d pre vio us ly e nd or se d. I t me re ly ov e rr ule d a n inte rp re tatio n b y

the Court of Ap pe a ls and a f eder al court. By contra st, in thi s case , the Court in Calawayeff ectively reve rsed its own prior
s t at ements in Penley

. T h e S u p r e m e C o u rto v e r

r u l e d a C o u rto f Ap p e a l s p r e c e d e n tt ha t it had announced, five y ear s ear lier in Penley , that it would let stand. The plaintiffs in the instant case , by waiting more than thre e y ear s to file suit, were r elying upon a body of appa rently settled law that ha d been g iven the explicit im primatur of the Supreme Court. This cre ates a far differ ent situation than
a ca se, like M

u rv in , i n which the pa

rties had a ssumed that prior low e r c ou rt interpre tations of a statute wer e valid. I t is very difficult t o fault the be nch, bar and public for

conductingthemselves in a manner

that presumes a

clea rly stated Supreme Court opinion is valid and oper ative.

We a re not unmindful of the fac t that the Court’s statement in Penley was tec hnically

dicta. Ho we ve r, it wo u l d

b e u n r e a s o n a

b l e t o e xp e c tt h e p art i e s i nt h i s c a s e t o h a v e s i mp l y i g n o r e d i t. I nd e e d, su c h a

n e xpe c tatio n w ou ld b e no t ju st u nr e a so na ble , b ut c on tr ary

to l aw, a s th e Sup re me Court made cle ar in Holder :

[T]r ia l c ourt s mu st f

oll owthe dir e c tiv es of su pe ri or c ourt s, pa rt ic ula rl y wh e n the su

pe ri or c ourt ha s g ive n de fi nit e e xpre ssi on to its views in a case afte r ca ref ul c onsideration. Ac cording ly , inferior
c ourt s are no t f

ree to d isr e g ard , o n th e ba sis that th e state me nt i s obiter dictum , the pronounce ment of a superior court when it speaks direc tly on the m atter before it, particula rly when the superior c ourt seeks to g ive g uidance to the bench a nd bar. To do othe rwise invites chaos into the sy stem of justice.

937 S.W .2d at 881-82 (T enn. 1996) ( citations omitt ed). It could h ar d ly be more clea

r that the Court’s statement in Penley wa s i n tended to “g ive g uidance to the bench a nd bar,” in light of the lang uag e that straig htforwa rdly premises its conc l u sion on the fac t that “the benc h, bar, a nd the public in g ener al may

have va rious relianc e intere sts in [ Bow e rs ’s] holdi ng .” Penley , 31 S.W .3d at 18 8. I t is e qu a lly

a pp are nt t hat Penley ’s dicta “ speaks dire ctly on the matter” at issue in the instant
case : it announced the c ontinuing validity of the “ hold i n g that the three -y ear medical malpr actice statute of re pose is tolled during the minority of the plaintiff,” prec isely the issue in this c ase. Id. Ac co rdi ng ly , “infe rior cour ts [ wer e] not free to disreg ard” Penley prior to the re lease of Ca laway

– nor, p re s u m ab l y , wer e member s of the bar and the public, whose “re liance inter ests” the Court premised its conc lusion upon.-16-

Havingconclude d that the plaintiffs’ r ight to sue wa s v es ted and e x isting on the date of Calaway ’s re le a se , th e c on c lus ion that Calawayviolated the plaintiffs’ due process rig hts follows natura lly

. The United States Supreme Court ar ticulated the r eleva

nt principle in Terry v

. Anderson , 95 U.S. 628, 632-33 (1877), stating : “This court ha s often dec ided t hat s tatutes of limitation affec ting exi s t i n g ri gh ts are not unc onstitut ional, if a reasonable time is given for the com menc eme nt of an action before the bar take s effect .” (Emph as i s ad d ed.) A lthough this ca se involves a statute of repose , rathe r than a statute of limit ations, the underly ing principle is the same. A “ rea sonable time” is what is missi ng here . The Calawaydecision allowe d no tim e fo r p la int iffs in th e Cr e sp os ’ position t o file suit – unless one considers whateve r brief period of hours m ay have e x isted betwee n the re le a se of

the op ini on

on De c e mbe r 9 , 2 00 5, and

the str ok e of

mid night o n De c e mbe r 10. Th is min us c ule pe ri od

is o bv iou sly

ins uf fi c ie nt t o g ive pr os pe c tiv e pla int if fs lik e the Cr e sp os a “re asonable ” opportunity

to adjust to the new pre cede nt and file their long -planne d lawsuits – and in a ny c a se , th e sig nif

ic anc e of thi s e xtre me ly

br ie f w ind owdid no t be c ome a pp are nt u nti l Calaway
was amended more than two months later.

The ne ed for a “rea sonable time” in such c ircumstance s was more rec ently noted by a cour t of this state in Sta te

v . Sumlin , No. 02C01-9204-CR-00095, 1993 WL15177, at *2 (Tenn. Cr. A pp., filed January

27, 1993) (quoting51 Am.J ur.2d L imitation of Actions § 2 7), which state d that exis ting time limi tations on c ivil ac tions may be shortene d “without violating c onstitut ional g uara nties . . . provided a rea sonable time is allowed for the enfor ceme nt of exis ting c auses of action,” a nd that new limit ations may

be im posed, provided that the new limit ation is “not made a pplicable to an e x isting
cause of ac tion in such a way as to p r e c l u d

e a n y o p p o r t u n i t y t o b r i ng

su it

. ” (Emphasis added.) H e r e , t h e a

b r u p tc h a n g e i np art i e s ’ l e g a l s i tu a t i o n , c a u s e d b y Calaway , d id in d e e d p r e c lu d e any op po rt un ity fo r t he Cr e sp os to b ri ngsu it.

To summarize: beca

use of Calaway ’s immediate applica bility , the plaintiffs were de nied any proce ss by

which to vindicate the ir vested leg al righ t s, throug h absolutely no fault of their

own. They had ever

y rea son to rely

on Bow e rs and the other related ca ses – esp e c ial ly a ft e r t he Sup re me Court in Penley expli citly stated, albeit in dic ta, that the Bow e rs prec edent wa s valid in situations like this one. So they

bided their ti m e, gat h ering infor mation and communicatingwith the defe ndants at a r elatively

leisurely pace , which wa s perf

ectly rea sonable g iven the cle arly stated law
a t th e tim e . T he n, ne arl y

fo ur y e ars a ft e r L a

ur a Cr e sp o’ s b ir

th, a t a tim e wh e n the pla int if fs we re sti ll
awa iting responses from the defendants on various re quests for medic al re cords, Calawaysu dd e nly
an d i n s t an t l y i n v a l i d a t e d

t h e C r e s p o s ’ c a u s e o f a c t i o n an d g a v e t h e m n o r e c o u r s e t o s a l v a g e i t

. If Calawayhad cr eate d, for e x ample, a one- or two-y ear window for plaintiffs in the Crespos’ position to file suit, that would have been an entirely differ ent situation. But, as things transpire d, no window at all was a

nnounced, a

nd the Crespos’ due proce ss rig hts were clea rly violated.

For all of t

he re a so ns state d a

bo ve , w e fi nd

that Calawayw o r

k e d a v i o l a t i o no f

t h e se plaintiffs’ due pr ocess r ights, a nd acc ording ly , we r ever se the trial c ourt’s dismi s s al o f t h ei r ca se. I n s o h old ing , w e do no t a lte r t he g e ne ra l rul e that re vis e d judi c ia l inte rp re tatio ns of statut e s u su a lly apply retrospe ctively , Hil

l v . Ci ty of Ge rmanto wn , 31 S.W .3d 234, 239 (Tenn. 2000) , nor d o we sug g est that a constit utional violation occurs in e ac h a nd e v e ry case wher e re troac tive applicationI t is w o rth no ting tha t t h e d e fen d a n ts’ ar g u m e n t t h a t Cal away di d not ch ang e t he l aw, but mer el y cl ar i f i ed wha t 5 the law ha s a lw a ys sa id , ha s n o a p p lica b ili ty t o the e q u a l p ro te c tio n issu e . A s the p la in ti ff s n o te in the ir re p ly b rie f, “[o ]b v io u sly Cal away c r ea t ed new l aw o n Februa r y 2 1, 2 00 6 whe n, on r ehe ar i ng , t he C our t r ul ed t hat mi nor s wh o s ued bef or e D ec embe r 9, 2005 ma y r el y on t ol l i n g a n d B o w ers wh er eas t hos e wh o f i l ed af t er war ds ar e t i me- barr ed an d get

no t o l l i ng. T he st at ut e as pass ed by t he T enness ee l egi sl at ure i n 19 7 5 m akes no such di st i nct i o n[. ]”
-17- would lead to some ha

rdship, or whe re some de g ree of re liance on prior ruli ng s can be s hown. Our ho ld in g is li mi te d to th e s e f a c ts , w h ic h w e b e li e v e p r e s e n t an u nu s u a ll y s ta r k e xample of cle ar relianc e on appa

rently settled law that, a fter be ing e ndorsed by the Supreme C o u rt, is upended by a swift and sudde n reve rsal that co m p l et el y chang es the pa rties’ leg al situation and leave s the plaintiffs with no rec ourse to pursue t h ei r ri gh t s . Most retrospec tive applications of judicial de c isi on s d o n ot v iol a te anyon e ’s du e pr oc e ss. Th is o ne , h ow e ve r, do e s.
C.

I n addition to the due proce ss violation, there is another constitutional problem here , which constitutes a sepa

rate , independe nt gr ound for r ever sal of the r esult below. As we have a lrea dy stated, this case has an e qual protec tion dimension as we l l

. “T h e conce pt of equa l protection
e sp ou se d b y th e fe de ra l and our s tate c on sti tut ion s gua ra nte e s th a t ‘ a ll p e rs on s si mil arl y c ir c u ms ta n c e d s h a ll b e tr e a te d a li k e

. ’ ” T en n essee Sm all School

System s v. McWherter , 851 S.W .2d 139, 153 (Tenn. 1993) (quoti n g F.S. Roy ste r Guano Co. v

. V irg inia , 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)) . For

purposes of our

analy sis, the “per sons simi l ar l y ci rc u m s t ance d” ar e a r eal pe rson – L aura Crespo, the primar

y plaintiff her ein – and a

hy pothetical per son, a plaintiff who w as injured
on the sa me da y a s L a ur a Cr e sp o, and wh o (l ike L a ur a Cr e sp o) wa ite d mor e tha n thre e y e ars to f

ile suit, but (unlike L aura

Crespo) f

iled suit prior to the Calawaydecision. 5

Th e Fou rt eenth A me ndme nt t o th e Un ite d St a te s Co ns tit uti on pr ov ide s th a t no state sh a ll

“ d e n y to an y p e r s o n w it

h in it s ju r is d ic ti o n th e e qu a l p r o te c ti o n o f th e la w s , ” U

. S. Co nst. amend. XI V, § 1, while the Te nnessee Constit ution states that the

L eg islature shall have no power to suspen d an y

g ener al law f

or the be ne fi t of any pa rt ic ula r i nd ivi du a l, n or

to p a ss a ny law f or the be ne fi t of i n d i v i d u a l s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e g e n e r a l l aw s o f t h e l an d ; no r t o pa ss a ny law g ra nti ngto a

ny ind ivi du a l or in div idu a ls, ri g hts , privileg es, immuniti e[s] or exemptions other than such as ma y be, by the same law extended to any member of

the community , who may be able to bring himself within the provisions of such law.

Tenn. Const. art. XI , § 8. I n addition, the earlier- quoted L aw of the L and Clause of the Tenne ssee Constit ution, Tenn. Const. a rt. I , § 8, has been interpre ted as g uara nteeing not just due proce ss, but equal protec tion a s well. State v. Tester , 879 S.W. 2d 82 3, 82 7 (T e nn . 199 4) . As w ithdu e pr oc e ss, the fe de ra l and

state e qu a l pr ote c tio n gua ra nte e s are esse nti a lly

sy no ny mou s. As Calaway its e lf noted, the Supreme Court of this state has “consistently held that the state e qual protec tion gua rante e is co-extensive with the equa l pr otection provisions of the Fif th and Four

teenth Amendme nts of the-18-

U.S. Consti tution.” Calaway , 193 S.W .3d at 518. W h i l e ac knowledg ing the “ling uistic and historical diffe renc es” be tween the fede ral a nd state equa l protection provisions, the Tenne ssee Supreme Court has “ g ener ally used an a naly tical fra mework similar to that used by the United States Supreme Court” in a

naly zing both g uara

ntees. State v. Robin son , 2 9 S. W. 3 d 4 7 6 , 4 8 0

- 8 1

. “ [W] e apply one of thre e standa

rds of scr utiny : (1) strict scr

utiny , (2) heighte ned scr

utiny , and (3) reduc ed scrutiny , applying the rational ba sis test.” Id. I n th e ins tant c a se , w he re in t he “ pe rs on s si mil arl y circ umstanced” are differ entiated in the law not by their member ship in any protec t ed class, but
rathe r b y the tim ingof

the ir laws uit s, ratio na l ba sis sc rutiny a pp lie s.
Al tho ug h r a tio na l ba sis sc rutiny is the le a st e xac tin g fo rm of e qu a l pr ote c tio n s c rutiny , it is exacting e noug h to reve al t he constit utional infirmity of Calaway ’s a

pp lic a tio n to the se pla int if fs

. I t is sim ply

irratio n al fo r t h e law to make such a pivotal distinction betwee n these plaintiffs a nd plaintiffs who may

have suf fer ed injury

on the same da

y as these pla intiffs, or eve n befor e, but who h a p p e n e d – b y p u r e lu c k

– to f il e s u it ju s t be fore C

a l away was re lease d. The de fenda nts contend otherwise, a

rguing that

the fa llacy

of plaintiffs’ sug g estion that the Supreme Court lac ked a
ratio na l ba sis for any

re tr oa c tiv e a

pp lic a tio n is re a dil y

a pp are nt. E xc lu d in g f r o m t h e a p p li cation of Calawayt h o s e m ed i ca l m al p ra ct i ce claims of minors for whom suit alre ady had been filed re sulted in no further tolling or e x tension of the statute of r epose and no unknown, unquantifiable inve ntory o f unfiled minor’s medica l malprac tice
c la ims a s to whi ch the statut e of re po se wo uld

no t r un fo r u p to eig hteen more y ear s. I n contra st, the further exclusion fr om the application of Calawayof thos e m ed ical malpra ctice c laims of minors, such as L aura

Crespo , fo r whom suit had not y et bee n filed
wo uld have fo re sta lle d the pr op e r a pp lic a tio n of

the statut e of

re po se in an unknown number of claims for potentially in excess of eig hteen y e ars . T he Sup re me Court ha d a ra tio na l bas is f

or se e kin g to a

vo id such a c ircumstance

. We d o n ot a g re e . T he de fe nd ants ’ argume nt m ig ht w e ll m a ke out a ratio na l ba sis fo r c re a tin g on ly
a br ie f, na rr owpo st- Calaway tim e wi nd owin whic h n e w p la int if fs , li ke the Cr e sp os , c ou ld f ile su it
– c e rt a inl y

a sh or te r p e ri od tha n “ e ig hte e n mo re y ears .” How e ve r, we do no t be lie ve the a larm ist specte r of a

n “unknown, unqua

ntifiable inventory

of unfiled . . . c laims” can rationally justify such stark discrimination betwe en similarly situated plaintiffs diffe rentiate d only by pure luc k.

As we have already stated, t here was no va lid reason f or anyone to pre sume, befor e Calaway , that the statute of r epose mig ht be applica bl e t o minors: the Supreme Court had plainly stated otherwise, a s had the other courts of this state that had pa ssed on the question. Thus, it cannot be said that disadvantag ing the se plaintiffs bec ause the y failed to file suit bef

ore Calaway is a rational penalty for their delay

. There was sim ply no rea son for them to believe that time was of the e ssence

. Nor wa s there a

ny rea son for our hy

pothetical plainti ffs, who waited more than three y ear s but then-19-

fi le d s uit jus t be for e Calaway , to be lieve that this e arlier filing was particula rly benef icial under

the law as it then e x isted. I t is pure happe nstance that distinguishes between these two classes of individuals, and happenstanc e is not a rational ba sis for treating “ persons similarly circ umstanced” differ ently

– espec ially

when the dif

fer ence is s u ch t h at one party has full leg al re course , and the other ha s no rec ourse wha tsoever.

Whil e the f

eder al and state constitutions require that “a ll persons similarly circ umstanced shall be treated alike,” the y of cour se do not

require equal tre atment of “ things whic h are differ ent in fac t or opinion.” D o ev . N or ris , 7 51 S.W .2d 834, 841 (Tenn. 1988) . Normally , “[t] he initial discretion t o deter

mine what is ‘diffe rent’ a nd what is ‘the same’ re sides in the leg islature[] .” Id. (q u o t i n g Plyler v. D oe , 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). Howeve r, in the instant c ase, be cause a judicial de c isi on rathe r tha

n a statut e c a

us e d the c ha

ng e in the law that tr ig g e rs our e qu a l pr ote c tio n a na ly sis , that initial deter

mination resides in the courts. Neve rtheless, we would not hold that a constitutional violation had occur

red if w e c ould find a rational basis for the distinction betwee n plaintiffs who, relying on pr ior prec edents, filed sui t after three y ear s but before Calaway , and plaintiffs who, relying on pr ior prec edents, wa ited more than three y ear s and we re still waiting when Calaway was rele ased. H oweve r, as we have a lrea dy stated, we can f

ind no such rational ba s i s

. There fore , we must conclude that the pl aintiffs’ equal protection rig hts wer e viol ated, and acc ording ly reve rse the trial court’ s dismis sal of the c ase.

III

. The judg ment of the trial c ourt is reve rsed. Cost s on appea l are taxed to the appellee s, Carol McCullough, M.D.; Te nnessee Women’s Care, P.C.; J erily n Bole s, R.N.; and th e St a

teo f Tenne ssee. Th is c a se is r e mand e d to the tr ia l c ourt fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s.

_______________________________ CHARL ES D. SUSANO, J R., J UDGE