United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit ____________ 

No. 22-20562 

____________ 

Brent Hebert, 

Plaintiff—Appellant, 

Aaron Mohammed, 

Appellant, 

versus

FMC Technologies, Incorporated, 

Defendant—Appellee. 

______________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas 

USDC No. 4:20-CV-2059 

______________________________ 

Before Jolly, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

E. Grady Jolly, Circuit Judge:

*

Brent Hebert, formerly an “installation engineer” with FMC 

Technologies, Inc. (“FMC”), contends that he is owed overtime pay under 

the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 207. He appeals the 

_____________________ 

*

 This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. 

United States Court of Appeals 

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

June 21, 2023 

Lyle W. Cayce 

Clerk 

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2 

district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of FMC, arguing that the 

district court erred when it determined that his position fell under the 

“learned professional” exemption of the FLSA’s overtime requirement. 

For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM. 

I. 

FMC is a global offshore oil and gas equipment and service company. 

It employs installation engineers. Their responsibilities, requirements, and 

remuneration are particularly important in this appeal. FMC requires a 

bachelor’s degree in an engineering field for its installation engineers. 

According FMC’s job description of installation engineers, they “provide[] 

support for testing, installation, intervention, and recovery of subsea 

equipment.” Their main tasks are to “plan, create technical procedures, 

create equipment lists, provide on-site technical [support], and write the post 

activity technical report.” Stated differently, these engineers work in office 

environments and occasionally visit offshore sites to assist with the 

installation of FMC equipment. Their work in the office largely consists of 

planning and preparing for installing the complex subsea drilling equipment 

that FMC sells. Their work “in the field” consists of providing on-site 

technical support and troubleshooting during the installation process. FMC 

pays its installation engineers both (1) a biweekly salary that does not change 

based on the days or hours worked, and (2) a “field service premium” on top 

of their salaries for days spent working at an offshore site. 

Brent Hebert worked as an installation engineer at FMC from 2013 to 

2020. Consistent with FMC’s requirement, Hebert holds a bachelor’s 

degree in mechanical engineering. While at FMC, Hebert spent over half of 

his time in the office planning and reviewing installation projects. He also 

provided on-site technical support for issues and troubleshooting during the 

installation process for FMC’s equipment. If any issues were discovered 

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3 

during installation, Hebert assisted with analyzing those issues and designing 

solutions to them. Occasionally, Hebert’s on-site work required manual 

labor. Once a project was complete, Hebert and his team then conducted inoffice reviews of that project. It is undisputed that FMC paid Hebert a salary 

and that Hebert received a field service premium for days he spent working 

at offshore sites. 

 Hebert filed this lawsuit alleging that FMC owed him overtime pay 

under the FLSA because FMC improperly classified him as an exempt 

employee. FMC filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the 

evidence established that Hebert was exempt from the FLSA’s overtime 

requirements under the “learned professional exemption.” The district 

court granted FMC’s motion and dismissed Hebert’s complaint with 

prejudice. This appeal followed.1

II. 

 We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, 

employing the same standards as the district court. Owsley v. San Antonio 

Indep. Sch. Dist., 187 F.3d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). 

Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material 

fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. 

_____________________ 

1

 Aaron Mohammed—whose name appears in the caption of this appeal, but 

nowhere else—submitted a consent to opt-in to a class under the FLSA in the district 

court. The district court declined to certify a class, noting that Hebert and Mohammed 

were not similarly situated employees. Hebert and Mohammed did not present any issue 

related to the district court’s certification decision in their opening brief. Thus, Hebert has 

waived any arguments related to that decision, and Mohammed is not a party to this appeal. 

See Gen. Universal Syss., Inc. v. HAL, Inc., 500 F.3d 444, 453 (5th Cir. 2007) 

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III. 

Under the FLSA, employers must pay overtime compensation to 

covered employees who work more than forty hours per week. 29 U.S.C. 

§ 207. That said, employers are not required to pay overtime to employees 

who work in a “bona fide executive, administrative, or professional 

capacity.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). The “professional capacity” part of this 

exemption—otherwise known as the “learned professional exemption”—is 

at issue here. Hebert contends that the district court erred in concluding that 

he satisfied this exemption. 

The learned professional exemption applies when an employee: (1) is 

compensated on a salary or fee basis at a specified salary level and (2) has a 

primary duty of performing work that requires “knowledge of an advanced 

type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged 

course of specialized intellectual instruction.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.300. Because 

Hebert challenges both the salary basis element and the primary duty 

element, we address each argument in turn. 

A. 

 Hebert first argues that the district court erred in concluding that he 

was paid on a salary basis.2

 We disagree. An employee is paid on a “salary 

basis” if “the employee regularly receives each pay period on a weekly, or 

less frequent basis, a predetermined amount constituting all or part of the 

employee’s compensation, which amount is not subject to reduction because 

of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed.” 29 C.F.R. § 

_____________________ 

2

 To be eligible for the learned professional exemption, an employee must receive 

a salary at a rate of no less than $684 per week. 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.300(a)(1), 541.600. The 

record reflects that Hebert received a base salary of $90,000 per year during his last year 

of employment at FMC. He does not dispute that his salary met the salary-level 

requirement for the learned professional exemption. 29 C.F.R. § 541.600. 

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541.602(a). Hebert admits that he received a bi-weekly salary without regard 

to the number of hours or days he worked. That salary plainly satisfies the 

definition of “salary basis” in § 541.602(a).3

 

Hebert responds that, as earlier noted, in addition to his salary, he was 

also paid a field service premium for days that he was required to be in the 

field to assist with installation projects. This premium payment for the 

specific services, he argues, means that he was not paid on a salary basis. The 

regulations foreclose that assertion. Hebert does not lose his status as an 

employee paid on a salary basis just because he is also paid a bonus on top of 

the salary that the record has established was guaranteed to him. 29 C.F.R. 

§ 541.604(a).4

 We thus conclude that the district court correctly found that 

Hebert satisfied the “salary basis” element of the learned professional 

exemption.5

_____________________ 

3

 Indeed, before the district court, Hebert’s counsel acknowledged that if Hebert 

were not paid the field service premium and instead was only paid this salary, Hebert would 

satisfy the salary basis element. 

4

 “An employer may provide an exempt employee with additional compensation 

without losing the exemption or violating the salary basis requirement, if the employment 

arrangement also includes a guarantee of at least the minimum weekly-required amount 

paid on a salary basis.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.604(a). 

5

 Hebert also argues that Hewitt v. Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc., 15 F. 4th 289 

(5th Cir. 2021) (en banc), requires FMC to establish the reasonable relationship 

requirement of Section 604(b). Section 604(b), however, only applies to employees whose 

earnings are computed on an hourly, daily, or shift basis. 29 C.F.R. § 541.604(b). 

Furthermore, in Hewitt, there was no dispute that the employee was paid solely at a daily 

rate. 15 F.4th at 292. Thus, Section 604(b) is inapplicable here because the record shows 

Hebert was paid a guaranteed bi-weekly salary. 

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B. 

Hebert further contends that the district court erred in concluding 

that his primary duty was the performance of work “[r]equiring knowledge 

of an advanced type.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.300(a)(2)(i). Instead, he asserts that 

his primary duty as an installation engineer was “very much a technician 

role” in which he performed manual labor at offshore sites. But the record 

again does not support his assertions. 

For one, Hebert, consistent with his engineering degree, did perform 

work “[r]equiring knowledge of an advanced type.” Id. For purposes of the 

learned professional exemption, such work must satisfy three criteria: (1) the 

employee must perform work requiring advanced knowledge; (2) the 

advanced knowledge must be in a “field of science or learning;” and (3) the 

advanced knowledge must be “customarily acquired by a prolonged course 

of specialized intellectual instruction.” Clark v. Centene Co. of Tex., L.P., 656 

F. App’x 688, 693 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (citing 29 C.F.R. 

§ 541.301(a)). And here, Hebert performed work that checks off all three. 

First, the record shows that Hebert’s work as an installation engineer 

required advanced knowledge. The FLSA’s implementing regulations 

define “work requiring advanced knowledge” as work that is 

“predominantly intellectual in character, and which includes work requiring 

the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment, as distinguished from 

[the] performance of routine mental, manual, mechanical[,] or physical 

work.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.301(b). Such work usually requires that employees 

“analyze, interpret[,] or make deductions from varying facts or 

circumstances.” Id. 

At FMC, Hebert was required to: (1) create technical procedures for 

installation projects, (2) analyze and interpret information, (3) review 

engineering designs and documents, and (4) consult with other departments 

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on designs. Once his planning duties were complete, Hebert then assisted 

with the on-site installation of FMC’s complex subsea drilling equipment, 

which, it is true, required him, at times, to perform manual labor. His on-site 

work, however, also consisted of identifying problems during installation and 

providing technical support for the issues that arose during the process. To 

the point: Hebert’s work in the office and on-site required him to consistently 

exercise his discretion and judgment regarding the appropriate procedures 

for installing FMC’s equipment. In short, Hebert performed work requiring 

advanced knowledge. 

Second, such knowledge is in a field of science or learning. The 

regulations specifically identify “engineering” as a “field of science and 

learning.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.301(c). 

And third, such knowledge is “customarily acquired by a prolonged 

course of specialized intellectual instruction.” “[T]he best prima facie 

evidence that an employee meets this requirement is possession of the 

appropriate academic degree.” Clark, 656 F. App’x at 693 (citing 29 C.F.R. 

§ 541.301(d)). The record shows that FMC required its engineers to hold a 

degree in engineering and that Hebert has a bachelor’s degree in mechanical 

engineering. Hebert speculates that some installation engineers did not have 

degrees in engineering. But that assertion does not advance his claim—the 

exemption only requires that the advanced knowledge be customarily

acquired through prolonged, specialized intellectual instruction. 

§ 541.301(d) (“Thus, for example, the learned professional exemption is 

available to the occasional lawyer who has not gone to law school, or the 

occasional chemist who is not the possessor of a degree in chemistry.”). 

Thus, the record shows that Hebert performed work “[r]equiring knowledge 

of an advanced type.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.300. 

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Finally, despite his contention otherwise, that work was his primary 

duty. The regulations define an employee’s “primary duty” as the 

“principal, main, major or most important duty that the employee 

performs.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a). “[E]mployees who spend more than 50 

percent of their time performing exempt work will generally satisfy the 

primary duty requirement.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(b). And here, the record 

shows that Hebert spent more than 50 percent of his time at FMC planning 

and reviewing installation procedures—not performing manual labor at the 

offshore installation sites. 

Thus, the record reflects that Hebert’s primary duty at FMC was the 

performance of exempt work and that he therefore falls under the learned 

professional exemption from overtime payment. 

IV. 

 To sum up: We conclude that Hebert was paid on a salary basis and 

that his primary duty as an installation engineer at FMC was the performance 

of exempt work. We therefore hold that the district court did not err in 

concluding that Hebert was exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirement 

under the learned professional exemption, and, consequently, the judgment 

of the district court is 

AFFIRMED. 

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