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to press. 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 18-BG-1170

IN RE KAREN P. CLEAVER-BASCOMBE, PETITIONER.

A Disbarred Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia

(Bar Registration No. 458922)

On Report and Recommendation

of the Board on Professional Responsibility

(17-BD-35)

(Argued October 1, 2019 Decided November 27, 2019)

Karen P. Cleaver-Bascombe, pro se.

Joseph N. Bowman, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, with whom Hamilton P. 

Fox, III, Disciplinary Counsel, and Julia L. Porter and Jennifer P. Lyman, Senior 

Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, were on the brief. 

Before EASTERLY and MCLEESE, Associate Judges, and NEBEKER, Senior

Judge. 

PER CURIAM: Petitioner Karen P. Cleaver-Bascombe was disbarred in 2010 

for submitting a fraudulent voucher for services she knew that she had not rendered 

and then giving knowingly false testimony before a Hearing Committee of the Board 

on Professional Responsibility. In re Cleaver-Bascombe, 986 A.2d 1191, 1192-1201

(D.C. 2010) (per curiam). In 2017, Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe filed a petition for 
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reinstatement. After holding an evidentiary hearing, a Hearing Committee 

recommended that the petition should be denied. We agree.

I.

A petitioner seeking reinstatement must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence

(a) [t]hat the attorney has the moral qualifications, 

competency, and learning in law required for readmission;

and (b) [t]hat the resumption of the practice of law by the 

attorney will not be detrimental to the integrity and 

standing of the Bar, or to the administration of justice, or 

subversive to the public interest.

D.C. Bar R. XI, § 16(d)(1). We consider the following factors in determining 

whether a petitioner has made the required showings:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the misconduct for 

which the attorney was disciplined; (2) whether the 

attorney recognizes the seriousness of the misconduct; (3) 

the attorney’s conduct since discipline was imposed, 

including the steps taken to remedy past wrongs and 

prevent future ones; (4) the attorney’s present character; 

and (5) the attorney’s present qualifications and 

competence to practice law.

In re Yum, 187 A.3d 1289, 1292 (D.C. 2018) (per curiam).
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We defer to a Hearing Committee’s determinations of “basic facts,” including 

credibility determinations. In re Bailey, 883 A.2d 106, 115 (D.C. 2005) (per 

curiam). Although the decision whether to grant a petition for reinstatement is 

ultimately ours, we give great weight to the recommendations of the Board and the 

Hearing Committee on that issue. In re Mba-Jonas, 118 A.3d 785, 787 (D.C. 2015)

(per curiam).

II.

The first reinstatement factor is the nature and circumstances of the conduct 

for which Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe was disbarred. In re Yum, 187 A.3d at 1292. 

Those circumstances were determined in the original disbarment proceedings, and 

for the purpose of the current proceeding we do not understand Ms. CleaverBascombe to challenge the factual determinations underlying her disbarment. Those 

factual determinations are reflected in this court’s opinion in In re CleaverBascombe, 986 A.2d at 1193-98. In sum, Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe was an attorney 

appointed to represent indigent criminal defendants under the Criminal Justice Act. 

Id. at 1193. This court upheld a finding that Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe fraudulently 

submitted a voucher for services that she knew she had not rendered. Id. at 1193-
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95. This court also upheld a finding that Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe gave deliberately 

false testimony to the Hearing Committee about the voucher. Id. at 1196-98. 

Finally, this court noted the Hearing Committee’s conclusions that the testimony of 

a witness called by Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe was evasive, non-responsive, and 

contradicted by documentary evidence. Id. at 1197 n.8. 

The court characterized Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe’s misconduct as “extremely 

serious.” In re Cleaver-Bascombe, 986 A.2d at 1198 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). As we explained,

Where an attorney has deliberately falsified a voucher and 

sought compensation for work that he or she has not 

performed, or for time that he or she has not devoted to the 

case, that attorney’s fitness to practice is called into 

serious question. This is especially true if the attorney has 

compounded his or her initial fraud by testifying falsely

during the resulting disciplinary proceedings.

Id. at 1199 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 1200 (‘‘[L]ying under 

oath on the part of an attorney for the purpose of attempting to cover-up previous

misconduct is absolutely intolerable . . . .”) (brackets, ellipses, and internal quotation 

marks omitted). We therefore concluded that Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe had been 

shown to “lack[] the moral fitness to remain a member of the legal profession,” and 

we disbarred her. Id. at 1200-01. 
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The following evidence concerning the remaining disbarment factors was 

introduced at the reinstatement hearing. That evidence falls into several general 

categories.

A. Inaccurate Bankruptcy Filings.

Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe filed for bankruptcy in 2012. On a form requiring her 

to list transfers of property within the preceding two years, Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe 

checked the box “None.” That was false, because Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe sold a 

home about three weeks before filing for bankruptcy, deposited over $100,000 in 

proceeds into her checking account, and then withdrew over $100,000 to pay for 

expenses relating to a construction project in Jamaica. On the form at issue, Ms. 

Cleaver-Bascombe “declare[d] under penalty of perjury that [she] read the answers 

contained in the foregoing statement of financial affairs and any attachments thereto 

and that they are true and correct.” On a different form filed with the bankruptcy 

court, Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe indicated that she had $100 in her checking account,

when in fact she had nearly $10,000. Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe also declared under 

penalty of perjury that she had read that form and that it was true and correct to the 

best of her knowledge. When the accuracy of her filings was challenged at a hearing
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in the bankruptcy matter, Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe testified at the hearing that she had 

read the documents at issue. Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe subsequently withdrew the 

bankruptcy petition. 

When questioned about this incident before the Hearing Committee, Ms. 

Cleaver-Bascombe initially testified that she did not read the bankruptcy petition “at 

all.” On further questioning, however, Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe testified instead that 

she had not read the petition “carefully.” Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe testified that the 

bankruptcy filings were not intentionally false, but rather contained inadvertent 

inaccuracies because they were filed in haste to avoid foreclosure and because Ms. 

Cleaver-Bascombe was having personal problems.

B. Personal Use of Government-Issued Cell Phone.

While working for the United States Department of Agriculture, Ms. CleaverBascombe incurred charges of approximately $600 making personal calls on a 

government-issued cell phone. There were disputes before the Hearing Committee 

about precisely when that happened, whether that conduct was contrary to the 

policies in effect at the time, and whether Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe should have 
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known that her conduct was impermissible. Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe claimed to have 

repaid the government. 

C. Recognition of Seriousness of Misconduct.

At a hearing in the bankruptcy case, Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe was asked what 

led to her disbarment, and she responded that she had submitted a voucher that had 

“maybe 30 or so entries of which two or so fees couldn’t be substantiated.” 

During the reinstatement hearing, Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe repeatedly 

described her original conduct as inadequate, deficient, or shoddy recordkeeping, 

and she initially denied having committed perjury before the Hearing Committee in 

the original proceeding. Under cross-examination, Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe 

acknowledged that she had knowingly made a false representation on a voucher and 

eventually acknowledged having committed perjury before the Hearing Committee 

in the original proceeding. Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe initially denied that she had 

known that the witness she called at the original disciplinary hearing was going to 

lie, but she later acknowledged that that witness’s testimony was part of a “coverup.” 
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D. Present Character and Competence.

Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe called three attorneys who testified that Ms. CleaverBascombe was remorseful for her original misconduct, was of good character, and 

was a very capable attorney. On cross-examination, however, those witnesses 

acknowledged that they were not familiar with the details of Ms. CleaverBascombe’s original misconduct and/or were not aware of Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe’s 

false bankruptcy filings.

Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe introduced evidence that she had taken fifteen 

continuing legal education (CLE) courses since her disbarment. She also introduced 

evidence that she was certified as a mediator in Jamaica and was teaching at the 

University of Technology in Jamaica. 

III.

The Hearing Committee recommends that Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe’s petition 

for reinstatement should be denied. In support of that recommendation, the Hearing 

Committee analyzed the five reinstatement factors as follows.
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First, Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe’s original misconduct was “exceedingly 

serious.” 

Second, Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe’s conduct during her period of disbarment 

included conduct “bearing a striking resemblance to that for which she was disbarred 

-- namely submitting false information on court forms for financial gain.” 

Specifically, the Committee did not credit Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe’s testimony at the 

reinstatement hearing that she had not read the bankruptcy forms, and the committee

concluded instead that Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe dishonestly failed to disclose 

information on the bankruptcy forms. The Hearing Committee also found that Ms. 

Cleaver-Bascombe had acted improperly with respect to her use of a governmentissued cell-phone. We need not address the latter incident, however, because it does 

not affect our conclusion as to the proper disposition of this matter.

Third, Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe minimized her original misconduct, both 

during the bankruptcy hearing in 2012 and at the reinstatement hearing in 2018. 

Although Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe offered witnesses in support of her contention that 

she understood the seriousness of her original misconduct, those witnesses did not 

persuade the Hearing Committee, particularly given that two of them were not 

familiar with details of Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe’s misconduct. 
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Fourth, for essentially the reasons already stated, the Hearing Committee was 

not persuaded that Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe had shown that the character traits that 

led to her disbarment no longer exist. 

Fifth, the Hearing Committee was not convinced that Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe 

had demonstrated current competence to practice law. The Hearing Committee 

explained that only three of Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe’s CLE courses related to 

keeping abreast of legal developments, with the rest having related to Ms. CleaverBascombe’s prior position as a non-lawyer investigator for the Department of 

Agriculture. The Hearing Committee also noted that Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe had 

not introduced evidence about the competence of her work as a mediator and teacher 

in Jamaica. Finally, the Hearing Committee found “vague and unconvincing” the 

testimony of one of Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe’s witnesses as to Ms. CleaverBascombe’s efforts to keep abreast of legal developments. 

IV.

With the exception of the incident involving the personal use of a governmentissued cell phone, on which we need not and do not rely, we fully agree with the 
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Hearing Committee’s analysis and recommendation. We are not persuaded by Ms. 

Cleaver-Bascombe’s arguments to the contrary.

First, Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe argues that the Hearing Committee’s 

recommendation is “incorrectly based on [her] past acts.” To the contrary, the first 

reinstatement factor is “the nature and circumstances of the misconduct for which 

the attorney was disciplined.” In re Yum, 187 A.3d at 1292. The Hearing Committee 

thus quite appropriately placed substantial weight on the nature and gravity of Ms. 

Cleaver-Bascombe’s original misconduct.

Second, Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe in essence challenges the Hearing 

Committee’s factual conclusions in various respects. For example, Ms. CleaverBascombe argues that the inaccuracies in her bankruptcy filings were the result of 

innocent error, not dishonesty. We see no basis to look behind the contrary factual 

determinations of the Hearing Committee on this point or the other points raised by 

Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe. See, e.g., In re Tun, 195 A.3d 65, 72-73 (D.C. 2018) (“We

are required to defer to Hearing Committee credibility findings if they are supported 

by substantial evidence on the record.”; “[D]eference to the Hearing Committee’s 

factual findings and credibility determinations is especially heightened where the 
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determinations are based on direct observation of the respondent.”) (citation, 

brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted).

Third, Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe argues that the Hearing Committee’s concerns 

about Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe’s conduct relate to incidents -- such as the bankruptcy 

filing -- that were “remote in time.” We do not agree that the false bankruptcy filing 

in 2012 was unduly remote in time to be given weight in assessing Ms. CleaverBascombe’s reinstatement petition. Moreover, the Hearing Committee also focused 

on concerns that were more temporally proximate, such as Ms. Cleaver Bascombe’s

failure, even as of the reinstatement hearing in 2018, to accept full responsibility for 

her original misconduct. 

Finally, Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe argues that the Hearing Committee did not 

adequately consider her testimony, and that of her witnesses, that she was 

remorseful, of good character, and competent to practice law. We disagree. The 

Hearing Committee reasonably explained the limitations of that evidence. Here too 

we see no reason to look behind the reasoning and recommendation of the Hearing 

Committee.
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For these reasons, we adopt the recommendation of the Hearing Committee, 

and we deny Ms. Cleaver-Bascombe’s petition for reinstatement.

 

So ordered.