UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4451

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

SHARIFF YSALAM CAUGHMAN, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, 

District Judge. (5:07-cr-00307-BO-1) 

Submitted: October 23, 2008 Decided: March 24, 2009 

Before NIEMEYER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, 

Senior Circuit Judge. 

Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion. 

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Anne M. Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Shariff Ysalam Caughman pled guilty pursuant to a 

written plea agreement to one count of possession with intent to 

distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006), and one count of possession of a 

firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006). The district court 

sentenced Caughman to a 131-month term of imprisonment. On 

appeal, Caughman’s counsel has filed an Anders∗

 brief, noting 

that Caughman waived the right to appeal his sentence in the 

plea agreement and that there are no meritorious issues for 

appeal. However, counsel questions whether Caughman’s sentence 

is longer than necessary to achieve the objectives of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) (2006). Caughman has filed a pro se supplemental 

brief raising several issues. The Government has moved to 

dismiss the appeal based on Caughman’s waiver of appellate 

rights. We dismiss in part and affirm in part. 

 A defendant may waive the right to appeal if that 

waiver is knowing and intelligent. United States v. AmayaPortillo, 423 F.3d 427, 430 (4th Cir. 2005). Generally, if the 

district court fully questions a defendant regarding the waiver 

of his right to appeal during the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy, 

 ∗ Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 

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the waiver is both valid and enforceable. United States v. 

Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. 

Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1991). The question of 

whether a defendant validly waived his right to appeal is a 

question of law that we review de novo. United States v. Blick, 

408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005). 

 Our review of the record leads us to conclude that 

Caughman knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal 

his sentence. Moreover, the sentencing claim Caughman’s counsel 

raises on appeal falls within the scope of the waiver. We 

therefore grant the Government’s motion to dismiss this portion 

of the appeal. 

 Although the waiver provision in the plea agreement 

insulates Caughman’s sentence from appellate review, the waiver 

does not preclude our consideration of any errors in Caughman’s 

convictions that may be revealed by our review pursuant to 

Anders. In accordance with Anders, then, we have examined the 

entire record in this case and have found no meritorious issues 

not covered by the waiver. Our review of the transcript of the 

plea colloquy leads us to conclude that the district court 

substantially complied with the mandates of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 

in accepting Caughman's guilty plea and that any omissions did 

not affect his substantial rights. The district court ensured 

that the plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily and was 

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supported by an independent factual basis. See United States v. 

DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991). Moreover, 

none of the issues in Caughman’s pro se supplemental brief raise 

meritorious issues for appeal. 

 Accordingly, we affirm Caughman’s convictions and 

dismiss the appeal of his sentence. This court requires that 

counsel inform his client, in writing, of the right to petition 

the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If 

the client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel 

believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel 

may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel's motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED IN PART;

DISMISSED IN PART