alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
CERTIFICATIONS



I, Jason Weber, certify that:



1.

I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of Alianza Minerals Ltd.;



2.

Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3.

Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4.

The Companys other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the Company and have:



a)

Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the Company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



b)

Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principals;



c)

Evaluated the effectiveness of the Companys disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



d)

Disclosed in this report any change in the Companys internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the annual report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Companys internal control over financial reporting; and



5.

The Companys other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Companys auditors and the audit committee of the Companys board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



a)

all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the Companys ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



b)

any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the Companys internal control over financial reporting.





Date:  January 31, 2017





/s/  Jason Weber

Jason Weber

President and CEO
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CANDIDA PALEGA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

THE PROPERTY SCIENCES GROUP,

INCORPORATED,

Defendant. /

No. C 17-00855 WHA

ORDER RE NOTICE OF

SETTLEMENT

The Court thanks the parties for their notice of settlement. Pursuant to the parties’

stipulation, plaintiff’s motion for an order to show cause is DENIED AS MOOT. Please note that

all other deadlines and hearings remain active and in place until a dismissal is filed. The parties

may file a motion for preliminary approval of the settlement on or before June 17, and may

notice the motion for any Thursday at 8:00 a.m.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 23, 2018 WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:17-cv-00855-WHA Document 76 Filed 05/23/18 Page 1 of 1
Stanley G. ROTHENBERG, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 12-1323.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 3, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose Alfredo PALACIOS-RIVERA, also known as Alfredo Palacios, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 03-51387

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 21, 2004.

*190Joseph H. Gay, Jr, Assistant US Attorney, US Attorney’s Office, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Lucien B. Campbell, Federal Public Defender, Donna F. Coltharp, Federal Public Defender’s Office, San Antonio, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before JOLLY, JONES, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

PEE CURIAM:*

Jose Alfredo Palacios-Rivera appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction of being found in the United States after deportation/removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Palacios-Rivera contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) define separate offenses. He argues that the prior conviction that resulted in his increased sentence is an element of a separate offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) that should have been alleged in his indictment. Palacios-Rivera maintains that he pleaded guilty to an indictment which charged only simple reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). He argues that his sentence exceeds the two-year maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed for that offense.

In *Almendarez-Torres v. United States,*523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of separate offenses. The Court further held that the sentencing provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. *Id.*at 239-47. Palacios-Rivera acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by *Almendarez-Torres,*but asserts that the decision has been cast into doubt by *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). He seeks to preserve his argument for further review.

*Apprendi*did not overrule *AlmendarezTorres. See Apprendi,*530 U.S. at 489-90; *United States v. Dabeit,*231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir.2000). This court must follow *Almendarez-Torres*“unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule it.” *Dabeit,*231 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED.

AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
EXHIBIT 61 

FILED UNDER SEAL 

Case 3:17-cv-00939-WHA Document 248-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 1 of 4
EXHIBIT 62 

FILED UNDER SEAL 

Case 3:17-cv-00939-WHA Document 248-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 2 of 4
EXHIBIT 63 

FILED UNDER SEAL 

Case 3:17-cv-00939-WHA Document 248-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 3 of 4
EXHIBIT 64

FILED UNDER SEAL

Case 3:17-cv-00939-WHA Document 248-1 Filed 04/21/17 Page 4 of 4
Justino A. SANTANA, Jr., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D19-1692

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

June 05, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
Case 4:17-cv-00719-HSG Document 5 Filed 02/13/17 Page 1 of 4
Case 4:17-cv-00719-HSG Document 5 Filed 02/13/17 Page 2 of 4
Case 4:17-cv-00719-HSG Document 5 Filed 02/13/17 Page 3 of 4
Case 4:17-cv-00719-HSG Document 5 Filed 02/13/17 Page 4 of 4
Kydele E. WELDON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-2247

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed May 22, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Sterling McKOY, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 12-9625.

Supreme Court of the United States

May 13, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied.
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1341 Introduced in House (IH)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1341

 To require each State to provide a minimum level of access to health 
care to all citizens of such State as a condition for participation in 
                 Federal health care funding programs.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 16, 2005

  Mr. Fattah introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committees on 
     Ways and Means and Resources, for a period to be subsequently 
   determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such 
 provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To require each State to provide a minimum level of access to health 
care to all citizens of such State as a condition for participation in 
                 Federal health care funding programs.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; FINDINGS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Health Care Access 
Assurance Act of 2005''.
    (b) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
            (1) Access to health care is a basic right protected by the 
        Constitution of the United States.
            (2) Each State should determine the minimum level of health 
        services to be provided within such State.
            (3) Any health care system operated by a State that does 
        not provide access to health care to all citizens of such State 
        is in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution 
        of the United States.
            (4) Federal funds may not be employed to support State 
        health care systems that are unconstitutional.

SEC. 2. MINIMUM ACCESS REQUIREMENT.

    (a) In General.--Not later than October 1, 2010, the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services shall require each State to certify that all 
citizens of such State have access to a minimum level of health care 
coverage as defined by such State. The Secretary may remove or 
reconsider a State's certification for cause.
    (b) Penalty.--Any State unable to certify that all citizens of such 
State have access to a minimum level of health care coverage shall be 
ineligible for funding from the Health Resources and Services 
Administration, the Indian Health Service, the Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration, and the Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services, to support the health care system in such State.
                                 <all>
```
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

LOIS TRASK, )

Plaintiff, )

)

 v. ) CAUSE NO.: 2:13-CV-1-RL-PRC

)

JOAN BISH, CANNON COCHRAN, )

HORSESHOE CASINO, HAMMOND, )

RICK KNIGHT, EDGAR RODRIGUEZ, )

and ANTWAN SULLIVAN, )

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the State Defendant’s[sic] Motion to Compel Interrogatory

Responses and Document Production [DE 39], filed by Defendants Antwan Sullivan and Edgar

Rodriguez on August 30, 2013.

On June 7, 2013, Defendants Sullivan and Rodriguez served Plaintiff with Defendants’ First

Set of Discovery under Rules 33, 34, and 36. On July 1, 2013, Plaintiff requested an extension of

time to respond to the discovery requests, which the Court granted, extending the response deadline

to July 16, 2013. Plaintiff did not serve her responses by that date. On August 23, 2013, pursuant

to Northern District of Indiana Local Rule 37-1, Defendants sent a letter to Plaintiff requesting that

she respond to the discovery requests on or before August 30, 2013. On August 30, 2013, counsel

for Defendants left a voicemail message for Plaintiff requesting that she return the call. That same

date, Defendants filed the instant motion. As of the date of the motion, Defendants had not received

Plaintiff’s responses. Defendants note that Plaintiff’s deposition is scheduled for September 12,

2013. Defendants ask the Court to order Plaintiff to serve Defendants with the discovery responses

prior to her scheduled deposition to allow Defendants to adequately prepare for the deposition.

1
Defendants bring this motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a), which

provides: “On notice to other parties and all affected persons, a party may move for an order

compelling disclosure or discovery. The motion must include a certification that the movant has in

good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make disclosure or

discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). Rule 37(a)(3)

indicates that a motion to compel may be made if a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted

under Rule 33 or fails to respond to a request for production made under Rule 34. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 37(a)(3)(iii), (iv). The Court finds that Plaintiff has not answered the Interrogatories nor

responded to the Request for Production. The Court further finds that these discovery responses are

necessary for Defendants to properly prepare for Plaintiff’s deposition.

Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS the State Defendant’s[sic] Motion to Compel

Interrogatory Responses and Document Production [DE 39] and ORDERS Plaintiff to serve

Defendants Antwan Sullivan and Edgar Rodriguez with her response to their First Set of Discovery

on or before September 10, 2013. In accordance with Northern District of Indiana Local Rule 26-

2(a)(2)(A), Plaintiff must also file a copy of her responses with the Court.

SO ORDERED this 3rd day of September, 2013.

s/ Paul R. Cherry 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE PAUL R. CHERRY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

cc: All counsel of record

Lois Trask, Plaintiff pro se

2
James Thomas WALLACE, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 12-9596.

Supreme Court of the United States

May 13, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.
Un mal paso puede hacer que la comida se Un mal paso puede hacer que la comida se

convierta en algo mortal.

Protege a todos. Nunca almacene cao mariscos crudos soalimentos listos par
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION AT LAFAYETTE

QUINTON D. HOLMES, )

)

Petitioner, )

) CAUSE NO. 4:13-CV-023 RM 

vs. )

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Quinton D. Holmes, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding. (DE 1.) The court is obligated to

review the petition and dismiss it if “it plainly appears from the petition and any attached

exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief[.]” RULE 4 OF THE RULES GOVERNING

SECTION 2254 CASES.

According to the petition, Mr. Holmes was found guilty of fighting in MCF 11-12-

0125, and as a sanction lost his contact visits for a period of six months. (DE 1.) A prison

disciplinary sanction can only be challenged in a habeas petition if it lengthens the duration

of the prisoner’s confinement. Hadley v. Holmes, 341 F.3d 661, 664-65 (7th Cir. 2003);

Moran v. Sondalle, 218 F.3d 647, 650-51 (7th Cir. 2000). The prison’s decision to suspend

Mr. Holmes’ contact visitation privileges affected the severity, but not the duration, of his

confinement. Moran v. Sondalle, 218 F.3d at 651. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the proper vehicle to

challenge more restrictive custody, “in the uncommon circumstances when it can be

challenged at all.” Montgomery v. Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 2001).
For these reasons, the petition (DE 1) is DISMISSEDpursuant to RULE 4 OF THE RULES

GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES.

SO ORDERED

ENTERED: April 4 , 2013.

 /s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr. 

Judge

United States District Court

2
Joey MACIAS, petitioner, v. FLORIDA.

No. 12-7671.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 15, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, denied.
Justin Michael CREDICO, petitioner, v. ADULT PROBATION/PAROLE (CHESTER COUNTY, PA), et al.

No. 12-9887.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 10, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari before judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.
Dante BROWN, petitioner, v. ILLINOIS.

No. 12-7900.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 10, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, denied.
Fernando PENA, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 12-10193.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 10, 2013.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.

Justice KAGAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.