UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOSE A. PEREZ, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. 

XAVIER BECERRA, in his official capacity 

as Secretary of Health and Human Services, et 

al., 

Defendants.

Case No. 1:21-cv-02039-TNM

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Proceeding pro se, Jose and Nancy Perez challenge the U.S. Department of Health and 

Human Services’ COVID-19 policies on several grounds. See Sec. Amended Compl. (Compl.), 

ECF No. 36. In short, the Perezes want to avoid a COVID-19 vaccination. See Compl. at 48–

49.1

 They also want the Court to rescind certain decisions of the Department, restrict its 

authority over public health emergencies, and cut its research funding. See id. 

The Department moves to dismiss contending, among other things, that the Perezes lack 

standing. See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 38. The Court agrees and will grant the Department’s 

motion. The Court will also deny a motion to intervene filed by Virna Fender as Fender does not 

have a legally protected interest in this action. See Mot. to Intervene, ECF No. 42. 

1

 All pagination refers to the page numbers generated by the Court’s CM/ECF electronic filing 

system. 
2

I.

The Perezes’ Complaint is a patchwork of factual, statutory, and constitutional 

allegations that the Court struggles to piece together. Throughout the Complaint, the Perezes

return to several themes: 

• The Department requires them to get vaccinated and wear masks. See, e.g.,

Compl. at 1 (claiming the federal government “is sending federal agents to knock 

on doors trying to convince Americans that they must vaccinate”); see also id. at 

31, 40–42, 45. 

• COVID-19 vaccines are harmful. See id. at 13–21.

• The Department “abandoned” its statutory mission by “causing viruses to be 

engineered [to] increase their pathogenicity.” Id. at 2; see also id. at 4, 7–13.

• The Department acts at the behest of the pharmaceutical industry and seeks to 

enrich it even though cheap alternatives to vaccines exist. See id. at 21–31. The 

Department facilitated this by declaring a public health emergency. See id. at 24. 

• The Department claims there is a pandemic yet allows millions of undocumented, 

unvaccinated aliens to enter the country. See id. at 31–32.

• The Department engaged in a “huge disinformation campaign unnecessarily 

scaring the population and causing serious economic damage.” Id. at 3; see also 

id. at 32–40, 42–43.

The Perezes seek a declaration that the Department lacks the authority to announce a 

public health emergency and cannot force them to get vaccinated. See id. at 48–49. They ask 

that the Department conduct a serological test on them for COVID-19 antibodies and, if the test 

reveals none, that the Department give them the Baciel Calmette-Guerin (BCG) vaccine instead 

of a vaccine designed to combat COVID-19. Id. They want the Department to inform them of 

the nature and consequences of a COVID-19 vaccine as well as alternatives to the vaccine. Id. 

They seek a so-called vaccine passport so they can freely travel and visit establishments that 

require proof of vaccination. Id. Finally, they demand that the Department recalculate COVID-
3

19 deaths and new cases under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) and the Information Quality 

Act (IQA) and cease gain-of-function (GOF) research.

The Department responds that the Perezes cannot show injury, causation, or 

redressability as required for standing. See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 5–12

(Defs.’ Mem.), ECF No. 38-1. The Department’s motion is now ripe. 

II.

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of 

proving that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear its claims. See Arpaio v. Obama, 

797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015). That includes showing that the plaintiff has standing. See 

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). In evaluating a motion to dismiss under 

Rule 12(b)(1), the Court must “accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the 

complaint” and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Brown v. Dist. of Colum., 

514 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

The Perezes proceed without counsel. This triggers special solicitude for them. “A 

document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully 

pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (cleaned up). More, courts assess a pro se complaint 

“in light of all filings, including filings responsive to a motion to dismiss.” Brown v. Whole 

Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 

But pro se plaintiffs must still adequately plead their complaint consistent with the edicts 

of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 

See Atherton v. D.C. Off. of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681–82 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The Court thus does 

not accept as true legal conclusions or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 
4

supported by mere conclusory statements.” Yellen v. U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 301 F. Supp. 3d 43, 

47 (D.D.C. 2018) (internal citation omitted).

III.

To establish standing, the Perezes must allege: (1) that they have suffered an injury in 

fact that is both concrete and particularized and actual or imminent; (2) that the injury is fairly 

traceable to the District; and (3) that a favorable decision is likely to redress the identified harm. 

See Sabre, Inc. v. DOT, 429 F.3d 1113, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The Perezes bring many claims 

and must show standing for each claim and each form of relief sought. See Davis v. Fed. 

Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008). 

Start with injury. The Perezes’ alleged injuries fall into three broad categories. First, 

vaccine- and mask-related injuries. The Perezes claim that the Department requires them to get 

vaccinated, Compl. at 1; that these vaccines are harmful, id. at 13–21; that the Department

refuses to consider alternatives, id. at 21–31; and that the Perezes cannot travel without 

vaccination because so many establishments require vaccine passports, id. at 4, 45. They also 

argue the Department requires them to wear masks. See id. at 45. 

Not so. The Perezes can show none of these injuries because they do not point to any 

regulation or policy from the Department requiring them to obtain COVID-19 vaccines or wear 

masks. Nor do they plausibly allege that such a requirement is imminent. 

Consider vaccines first. With no requirement that the Perezes receive the vaccine, they 

cannot allege injury based on their belief that the vaccine is harmful. Nor can they allege injury 

based on the Department’s ostensible refusal to consider alternatives because the Perezes may 

seek alternative treatments. Indeed, they detail the regimen they take to avoid COVID-19 and do 

not suggest that the Department interferes. See id. at 25. 
5

Consider also the Perezes’ allegations about vaccine passports. They allege that “[m]any 

merchants and government entities” demand these passports before entry into certain facilities. 

Id. at 46. The Perezes contend this violates their “right to travel,” the Commerce Clause, the 

Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Id. at 4. But again, the Perezes 

point to no federal policy—much less a policy of the Department—that mandates these 

passports. A plaintiff can establish standing based on the actions of third parties if the federal 

government’s policies had a “predictable” effect on these parties. See Dep’t of Com. v. New 

York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2566 (2019). But the Perezes allege no facts suggesting the Department’s 

approval of certain COVID-19 vaccinations had any such effect. 

Now consider masks. The Perezes allege the Department “violate[s] the Perez’ right to 

liberty when they demand the Perez’ wear a face mask.” Compl. at 45. The Perezes point to no 

Department requirement that they wear face masks. True, the Department has required masks at 

times. For example, recall the widely touted federal “mask mandate” applied to “people on 

public transportation conveyances or on the premises of transportation hubs.” Ctrs. for Disease 

Control and Prev., Order: Wearing of face masks while on conveyances and at transportation 

hubs, Feb. 25, 2022.2

 But the Perezes do not claim they have used public transportation or been 

present at transportation hubs where this mandate applies. See id. Nor do they cite any other 

Department requirement that requires them to wear masks. On the contrary, the Perezes state 

they do not wear masks. See Compl. at 25. 

Second, injuries related to the Department’s research funding. The Perezes allege that the 

Department “engineered” the virus that causes COVID-19 to “increase [its] pathogenicity.” 

Compl. at 2–3, 7–13. The Department did this, the Perezes say, by supporting gain-of-function 

2

 Available at: https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/masks/mask-travel-guidance.html. 
6

research in Wuhan, China. See id. at 8. But these facts, even if true, do not show injury to the 

Perezes in a particularized manner. An individual “seeking relief that no more directly and 

tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large [] does not state an Article III case or 

controversy.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74. 

The relief the Perezes seek for this supposed injury underscores this point. They ask that 

the Court find 18 U.S.C. § 177(b)—part of the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 

1989—unconstitutional. Section 177(b) provides an affirmative defense to those sued by the 

United States for violating restrictions on biological weapons. Declaring § 177(b) 

unconstitutional would not benefit the Perezes any more than the population at large. More, this 

statute has no applicability here because the United States is not suing the Perezes or anyone 

else. 

Third, injuries related to misinformation. The Perezes claim the Department has engaged 

in a misinformation campaign that hurts the economy, exaggerates the effects of the pandemic,

and benefits pharmaceutical companies offering COVID-19 treatments. Compl. at 3, 21–40, 42–

43. The Department facilitates this misinformation campaign, in part, by declaring a public 

health emergency in which they anointed “themselves the arbiters of the truth and any dissenting 

doctor[] or scientist[] who opposed their narrative was a ‘dangerous disinformer’ who should 

have their license revoked.”3

 Id. at 24; see also id. at 37–40. 

3

 The Department’s declaration of a public health emergency is undermined, say the Perezes, by 

its decision to let in millions of undocumented, unvaccinated aliens. See Compl. at 31–32. But 

this inconsistency—even if it exists—does not harm the Perezes. And if it did, the Perezes do 

not explain how it harms them uniquely compared to any other individual. See Lujan, 504 U.S. 

at 573–74 (stating that an individual “seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits 

him than it does the public at large [] does not state an Article III case or controversy”). 
7

Once again, the Perezes do not explain how this hurts them. They allege that other 

treatments are more effective against COVID-19 than vaccines. See id. at 25–31. But the 

Perezes and others are free to pursue those treatments. 

The Perezes also allege an informational injury, claiming the Department failed to follow 

the PRA and IQA. See id. at 37–38. This harms them, they claim, because the Department is 

“failing or refusing to provide the accurate information the Perez’ need for an informed consent.” 

Id. at 38. But the Perezes do not want to get a COVID-19 vaccination, so they allege no scenario 

in which informed consent is relevant to them. Even more, the IQA does not provide the Perezes

with any private right of action to sue. See Miss. Comm’n on Env’t Quality v. E.P.A., 790 F.3d 

138, 184 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“[A]lmost every court that has addressed an Information Quality Act 

challenge has held that the statute creates no legal rights in any third parties.”) (cleaned up). Nor 

does the PRA. See Alegent Health-Immanuel Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 34 F. Supp. 3d 160, 169 

(D.D.C. 2014) (“[T]he PRA does not create a private right of action.”).4

 

Without a concrete injury to themselves or the threat of such injury, the Perezes fail to 

satisfy the threshold requirement of showing an injury in fact. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. That 

alone is enough to doom their Complaint. 

4

 In their opposition brief, the Perezes cite Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 

261, 269 (1990), and Akins v. FEC, 66 F.3d 348, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1995), to show that an 

informational injury can confer standing. Cruzan involved the informed consent doctrine. But

this doctrine is irrelevant here because the Department is not forcing the Perezes to receive a 

vaccination nor do the Perezes want to receive one. And the D.C. Circuit vacated Aikins on 

rehearing en banc. See Aikins v. FEC, 74 F.3d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc). Even still, the 

case does not help the Perezes because there the plaintiffs sought information within the “zone of 

interests” intended to be served by the statute. Akins, 66 F.3d at 351. Here, Plaintiffs do not 

have a cause of action under the AQI or the PRA. 
8

Even if the Perezes could show injuries, they cannot establish traceability or 

redressability for most of them. Vaccine requirements, mask mandates, and vaccine passports 

are typically managed at the local and state level. The Perezes thus cannot trace these

requirements to the Department. Accord Null v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., No. CV 09-1924 

(RBW), 2009 WL 10744069, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 10, 2009) (“[J]ust because the federal 

government approved a vaccine as safe for human consumption, [it] cannot be said to be the 

action that is allegedly creating the threat of the actual and imminent harm complained of by the 

plaintiffs, when it is the State of New York which is actually requiring the plaintiffs to submit to 

the vaccination.”). By the same token, the Court could grant the relief the Perezes seek and 

South Carolina, the Perezes’ home state, could implement its own requirements for vaccines, 

masks, and vaccine passports.5

 Thus, the relief the Perezes seek does not redress their alleged 

injuries. 

Finally, the Court observes that the Perezes failed to address the Department’s standing 

arguments in their opposition to the motion to dismiss. See generally Pls.’ Reply at 40. So they 

conceded these arguments. See Texas v. United States, 798 F.3d 1108, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 

(“[I]f a party files an opposition to a motion and therein addresses only some of the movant’s 

arguments, the court may treat the unaddressed arguments as conceded.”); see also Stubbs v. L. 

Off. of Hunter C. Piel, LLC, 148 F. Supp. 3d 2, 4 (D.D.C. 2015) (applying concession principles 

5

 Indeed, the Perezes recognize the independence of states when they state that South Carolina 

“has adamantly objected to all federal interference with its public health laws.” Mem. in Supp. 

of Am. Compl. at 4, ECF No. 24-1. 
9

to a pro se litigant), aff’d, 672 F. App’x 3 (D.C. Cir. 2016). This is independent and sufficient 

grounds for dismissal.6

IV.

Finally, the Court turns to Fender’s motion to intervene. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

24 governs this motion. The rule requires an intervenor to show, among other things, a “legally 

protected interest in the action” and that “the action . . . threatens to impair that interest.” 

Karsner v. Lothian, 532 F.3d 876, 885 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). Fender, a nurse, claims an 

interest in this litigation because her Texas employer, Conroe Health Care Center (CHCC), 

requires her to get a COVID-19 vaccination as a result of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Biden v. 

Missouri, 142 S. Ct. 647 (2022). Biden stayed district court injunctions against the enforcement 

of a Department rule requiring COVID-19 vaccinations of staff at facilities receiving Medicare 

and Medicaid funding. See id. at 650. Because CHCC receives such funding, it requires Fender 

to receive a vaccine. Mot. to Intervene at 1. 

Nowhere in their briefs do the Perezes discuss Biden, Medicare and Medicaid funding, 

CHCC, or mandatory vaccines for healthcare workers. Fender thus has no “legally protected 

interest in the action.” Karsner, 532 F.3d 876 at 885. For the same reason, dismissing this case 

will not impair her ability to pursue separate legal action against the appropriate parties. See id. 

* * *

6

 The Perezes do argue they have standing based on their informational injury and the Tenth 

Amendment. See Pls.’ Reply at 52–54. But this is the extent of their standing argument in reply. 

They do not address the Department’s argument that they fail to show injury, causation, and 

redressability. See Defs.’ Mem. at 5–12. And in any event, as shown above, the IQA and the 

PRA do not provide the Perezes with a cause of action. 
10 

For all these reasons, the Court will grant the Government’s motion to dismiss and will 

deny Fender’s motion to intervene. A separate Order will issue.

 

Dated: April 13, 2022 TREVOR N. McFADDEN

United States District Judge