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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: C.M.R.,

A MINOR

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: T.R. AND T.R.R.,

NATURAL PARENTS

:

:

No. 54 WDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree, November 8, 2017,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Orphans’ Court Division at No. CP-02-AP-0000056-2016

BEFORE: STABILE, J., MUSMANNO, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 21, 2018

T.R. (“Mother”) and T.R.R. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal

from the November 8, 2017 decree entered in the Court of Common Pleas of

Allegheny County, Orphans’ Court Division, granting the petition of the

Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families (“CYF”) and

involuntarily terminating their parental rights to their dependent child,

C.M.R., male child, born in June of 2004, pursuant to the Adoption Act,

23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). After careful review, we

affirm.

The trial court summarized the relevant procedural and factual history

as follows:

[C.M.R.], born [to Mother and Father], initially came

to the attention of CYF in March, 2008. However,

beginning in 2004, prior to CYF involvement,

[C.M.R.]’s family had already begun to receive

in-home assistance from numerous health service
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providers at the recommendation of the children’s

pediatrician, out of concern that [C.M.R.] and his

older brother J.R ([born in August] 2002) suffered

developmental delays.

CYF’s first interaction with [C.M.R.]’s family began

[on] March 13, 2008, after CYF received a report

that J.R., age five at the time, had appeared at

school with bite marks and scratches and stated that

[C.M.R.], his younger brother, had caused them. CYF

conducted an investigation but did not accept the

family into its program at that time as the family was

already receiving multiple services including

Wraparound, home health nurses, and skilled

nursing care for the children who received between

two to ten hours [of] care every day. CYF did

however note some concern with the family’s

circumstances including the fact that J.R. and

[C.M.R.] were unable to dress themselves, and were

not toilet trained.

CYF next interacted with the family on September 7,

2008, when CYF received a second childline report

alleging that Father had kicked 4-year-old [C.M.R.]

Additionally, Mother reported that Father was

physically abusive towards her. A CYF visit to the

home revealed excessive clutter in the home and

indications that the family suffered from a tendency

to hoard. CYF also received reports of ongoing

conflict and physical confrontations between the

family members, and subsequently received

additional reports of injuries to J.R.

On September 29, 2008, CYF received another

childline report alleging that 4-year-old [C.M.R.] had

hit J.R. leaving bruises, and that J.R. continued to

arrive at school with bite marks and scratches

caused by [C.M.R.] CYF conducted an investigation

and provided the family with a behavioral specialist

consultant.

In November 2008, CYF accepted the family for

services as a result of repeated childline reports, and

after Father admitted to hitting [C.M.R.] in the face.
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CYF instituted a safety plan instructing Father not to

use physical discipline. CYF provided the family with

in-home services to help manage the excessive

clutter in the home and address the family’s reported

problems with hoarding. The services continued until

2009 when they were reduced after service providers

reported that Parents had made only minimal

progress and failed to follow through with service

provider’s instructions unless staff were present in

the home.

In March and April 2009, CYF received additional

reports of injuries to J.R., and subsequent reports of

failure by Parents to adequately supervise the

children. In addition, CYF received multiple reports of

physical aggression between the children, reports of

the children playing in the street unsupervised, and

reports that the children displayed bite marks,

bruises, and scratches. The children were removed

from the home on multiple occasions. In May and

June 2011, CYF received two additional childline

reports concerning the family. On February 15,

2012, [C.M.R.], along with his brother J.R. and sister

A.R. were adjudicated dependent on grounds that

the children suffered from a lack of supervision, and

Parents displayed a lack of improvement in their

ability to parent their children despite the provision

of various services to aid them.

Because of [C.M.R.]’s developmental and behavioral

problems, [C.M.R.] has been removed repeatedly

from his [P]arents’ care beginning in July [] 2008

when, at four years of age, he was admitted to

Western Psychiatric Institute and Clinic (WPIC) after

escalating displays of physical aggression. [C.M.R.]

subsequently returned home on August 11, 2008,

and during that time also resided with his maternal

grandmother, until December 15, 2009 when he

returned to WPIC after increasingly physically

aggressive behavior. In January 2010, [C.M.R.]

returned to the care of his maternal grandmother

before moving to Residential Enhancement Services,

Planning Opportunities for New Directions

(RESPOND), a mental health facility for intensive
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treatment of children with mental health disorders

who have not succeeded at other facilities. He

remained at RESPOND until October 14, 2011, when

he returned home.

In September 2012, Mother admitted [C.M.R.] to the

Mercy Behavioral Health Diversion and Acute

Stabilization (DAS) program because of his increased

aggression and destruction of property. He

subsequently moved to a treatment foster home

until December 3, 2012 when he moved to Auberle

Shelter after incidents of physical aggression and

threats to kill his foster family. [C.M.R.] then

returned to his parents[’] care for two days before

readmission to WPIC after an emotional outburst

while attending a psychological evaluation in the

office of Dr. Patricia Pepe, a licensed psychologist.

Following his release from WPIC, [C.M.R.] resided at

Auberle shelter and then Pressley Ridge crisis home

until September 26, 2014. After a period in foster

care from August 26, 2014 to December 28, 2014,

he returned to WPIC after displays of aggression and

homicidal and suicidal ideations. He returned to

foster care until November, 2014, but after repeated

threats of harm to his foster family, he was

transferred to Southwood, then Auberle Shelter and

the RESPOND program. After his behavior improved

while at RESPOND, [C.M.R.] moved to a foster home

on July 9, 2016, where he currently resides and

where he continues to enjoy notable improvement in

his behavior and functioning. His sister A.R. ([born

in November] 2007) currently resides at the

RESPOND facility. His brother J.R. currently resides

in foster care.

Between 2011 and 2016, the children have

undergone numerous psychological evaluations. In

2011 and 2012, Dr. Patricia Pepe, a licensed

psychologist, evaluated [C.M.R.], his siblings J.R. and A.R., and Parents. Dr. Pepe diagnosed the three

children as suffering from various mental health

conditions and diagnosed Mother and Father as

suffering from mental health problems as well. With
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respect to [C.M.R.] in particular, Dr. Pepe diagnosed

him with Pervasive Developmental Disorder, Mild

Mental Retardation, Seizure Disorder, Mixed

Receptive Expressive Language Disorder, and

Cognitive Disorder.

In 2013, Dr. Pepe conducted evaluations of the

family and noted an increase in the severity [of]

[C.M.R.]’s “out of control” aggressive behaviors. In

2014, Dr. Pepe attempted to conduct another round

of psychological evaluations of the family but was

unable to do so after [C.M.R.]’s older brother J.R.

physically attacked her. Thereafter, Dr. Pepe

declined to conduct further evaluations of the family.

In the interim, Dr. Neil Rosenblum, a licensed

psychologist, was assigned to evaluate the family,

and conducted several psychological evaluations

between 2014 and 2015. Dr. Rosenblum diagnosed

[C.M.R.] with Pervasive Developmental Disorder

NOS, Attention Deficit Disorder, Expressive- Receptive Language Disorder, Articulation Disorder,

R/O Intermittent Explosive Disorder, Parent Child

Relational Problem, Sibling Relational Problem, Mild

Mental Retardation, and Seizure Disorder. He noted

that [C.M.R.] suffered from a severity of

psychosocial stressors, including removal from

parents’ care, multiple foster and group home

placements, and recent psychiatric hospitalizations.

In 2016, Dr. Rosenblum declined to conduct further

evaluations of the family, testifying at the TPR

hearing that he felt his views as to the family were

not consistent with the outcome CYF was seeking. Because of the difference of opinion in how he and

CYF viewed the case, he declined to conduct any

further psychological evaluations of the family. Dr. Pepe therefore resumed working with the family,

and conducted final psychological evaluations of

Parents and the three children 2016.

On March 28, 2016, CYF filed petitions for

termination of the parental rights of Mother and

Father. This Court initially conducted hearings on
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the [termination of parental rights (“TPR”)] petitions

on April 8, 2016, July 1, 2016, October 7 2016,

January 17, 2017 and April 21, 2017. However,

following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision

in In [r]e[ Adoption of] L.B.M[, 161 A.3d 172 (Pa.

2017),] this Court appointed new counsel for each

one of [the] three children, and de novo hearings on

the TPR petitions commenced on September 8,

2017, September 14, 2017, September 25, 2017 and

October 12, 2017. On November 8, 2017, this court

entered an order terminating the parental rights of

Mother and Father to [C.M.R.][Footnote 1] Parents

filed a notice of appeal on December 5, 2017 . . . . Trial court opinion, 1/8/17 at 2-8 (footnote omitted).

The record reflects that simultaneous with the filing of their notice of

appeal to this court, Parents filed a statement of errors complained of on

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court then filed its

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.

Parents raise the following issues for our review:

[1. Whether] the trial court erred in finding that

[CYF] had proved grounds for termination

under [23] Pa[.]C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(2), (5) and

(8)?

[2. Whether] the trial court erred in finding that

[CYF] had proved by clear and convincing

evidence that the conditions which led to the

removal of [C.M.R.] had not or could not be

remedied within a reasonable period of time[?]

[3. Whether] the trial court erred in finding that

[CYF] had proved by clear and convincing

evidence that termination of [Parents’]

parental rights would best serve the

developmental, physical and emotional needs

and welfare of [C.M.R.] as required by

[23] Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(b)[?]
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Parents’ brief at 6 (full capitalization omitted).1

In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our

standard of review is as follows:

The standard of review in termination of parental

rights cases requires appellate courts “to accept the

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the

trial court if they are supported by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa.

2012). “If the factual findings are supported,

appellate courts review to determine if the trial court

made an error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may be reversed for an abuse of

discretion only upon demonstration of manifest

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or

ill-will.” Id. The trial court’s decision, however,

should not be reversed merely because the record

would support a different result. Id. at 827. We

have previously emphasized our deference to trial

courts that often have first-hand observations of the

parties spanning multiple hearings. See In re

R.J.T., 9 A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)].

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “The trial court is free to

believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to

make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f

1 We note that in the argument section of their brief, Parents have

abandoned their second issue on appeal and have only advanced arguments

with respect to termination under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and

(b).
J. S18045/18

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competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if

the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of

T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, guides

the termination of parental rights and requires a bifurcated analysis of the

grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the child.

Our case law has made clear that under

Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated

process prior to terminating parental rights. Initially,

the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party

seeking termination must prove by clear and

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct

satisfies the statutory grounds for termination

delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants

termination of his or her parental rights does the

court engage in the second part of the analysis

pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of

best interests of the child. One major aspect of the

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and

status of the emotional bond between parent and

child, with close attention paid to the effect on the

child of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We

have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc), quoting

Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M. II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998).
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In this case, the trial court terminated Parents’ parental rights

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8), as well as (b). We

have long held that, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we

need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of

Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380,

384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, we analyze the court’s termination decree pursuant to

Subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in

regard to a child may be terminated after a

petition filed on any of the following grounds:

. . . . (2) The repeated and continued

incapacity, abuse, neglect or

refusal of the parent has caused

the child to be without essential

parental care, control or

subsistence necessary for his

physical or mental well-being and

the conditions and causes of the

incapacity, abuse, neglect or

refusal cannot or will not be

remedied by the parent.

(b) Other considerations.--The court in

terminating the rights of a parent shall give

primary consideration to the developmental,

physical and emotional needs and welfare of

the child. The rights of a parent shall not be

terminated solely on the basis of

environmental factors such as inadequate

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and

medical care if found to be beyond the control

of the parent. With respect to any petition
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filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8),

the court shall not consider any efforts by the

parent to remedy the conditions described

therein which are first initiated subsequent to

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by

terminating Parents’ parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three

elements must be met: (1) repeated and continued

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the

child to be without essential parental care, control or

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental

well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity,

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be

remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that

cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the

contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to

perform parental duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216

(Pa.Super. 2015), quoting In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super.

2002). “Parents are required to make diligent efforts towards the

reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities. . . . [A] parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness

regarding the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected
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as untimely or disingenuous.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d at 340 (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

Here, in finding grounds for termination pursuant to

Section 2511(a)(2), the trial court concluded that CYF presented clear and

convincing evidence. After summarizing the testimony from the termination

hearing, the trial court concluded:

After careful review of the foregoing, this Court

concludes that CYF presented credible testimony

that, over the course of time during which Parents

have been provided with assistance to address

[C.M.R.]’s complex developmental, psychological

needs and parent him effectively, they have enjoyed

very limited success. Rather, despite the services

provided to them to help them parent [C.M.R.], Mother and Father have been unable to remedy the

circumstances that have rendered them unable to

provide for [C.M.R.]’s wellbeing. Despite Parents’ efforts over many years to provide for their child’s

needs, [C.M.R.] failed to display significant

improvement in his behavior and ability to function

until his most recent placements at the RESPOND

home and subsequent move to a supportive foster

care environment in the past year, where he is

thriving. The improvements in [C.M.R.]’s capacity to

function are described as “remarkable” especially

when viewed in light of the extreme delays and

behavioral health problems that he has suffered.

While this Court has no doubt that a bond exists

between Parents and [C.M.R.], the evidence and

testimony presented at the TPR hearings indicates

that despite many years of their efforts, Parents

have been unable to provide the essential parental

control and care necessary for [C.M.R.]’s well-being.

This Court cannot wait indefinitely for Parents to

develop the skills necessary to meet [C.M.R.]’s

particular and individualized needs. Rather, this

Court recognizes [C.M.R.]’s individual right to the

[sic] have proper parenting and fulfillment of his
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potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment

which Parents, unfortunately, have been unable to

provide. In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502,

507 ([Pa.Super.] 2006). Given that [C.M.R.] now

resides in a foster home in which he has developed a

bond with his foster parents, where his psychological

and behavioral health problems are well-managed,

and where he is thriving, this Court concludes that

[C.M.R.]’s developmental, physical and emotional

needs and welfare will be best served by the

termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights.

Trial court opinion, 1/8/17 at 23-24.

In their brief, Parents contend that “they have substantially remedied

the conditions which led to the child being removed.” (Parents’ brief at 15.)

Parents then set forth testimony from the termination hearings to support

their position. (Id. at 16-18.) Our standard of review, however, requires us

to accept the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations

where they are supported by the record. See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.

Here, the record supports the trial court’s factual findings and credibility

determinations. Moreover, we have reviewed the record and find no error of

law or abuse of discretion. We must, therefore, defer to the trial court. Id.

As noted above, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we

need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of

Section 2511(a) before assessing the determination under Section 2511(b).

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 384. We, therefore, need not address any further

subsection of Section 2511(a) and turn to whether termination was proper

under Section 2511(b).
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As to Section 2511(b), our supreme court has stated as follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a)

are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to

the developmental, physical and emotional needs

and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b).

The emotional needs and welfare of the child have

been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles

such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In

In re E.M., 620 A.2d [481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this

Court held that the determination of the child’s

“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the

emotional bonds between the parent and child. The

“utmost attention” should be paid to discerning the

effect on the child of permanently severing the

parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.

However, as discussed below, evaluation of a child’s

bonds is not always an easy task.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “In cases where there is no evidence of any

bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond

exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on

the circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753,

762-763 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted).

When evaluating a parental bond, “[T]he court is not required to use

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as

well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding

evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (internal citations omitted).

Moreover,

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child

is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b)

best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of
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many factors to be considered by the court when

determining what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the

trial court can equally emphasize the

safety needs of the child, and should also

consider the intangibles, such as the

love, comfort, security, and stability the

child might have with the foster

parent. . . . In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219, quoting In re N.A.M., 33

A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Our supreme court has stated that, “[c]ommon sense dictates that

courts considering termination must also consider whether the children are

in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster

parents.” T.S.M., supra at 268. The court directed that, in weighing the

bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the

ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. The T.S.M. court

observed, “[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and we have

an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail

. . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.

Here, in determining that termination of Parents’ parental rights

favored C.M.R.’s needs and welfare, the trial court reasoned that C.M.R. has

developed a bond with his foster parents, his psychological and behavioral

problems are being well-managed, and that he is thriving. (Trial court

opinion, 1/18/17 at 23-24.)
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In their argument on this issue, Parents set forth select testimony of

Dr. Neil Rosenblum in an effort to convince this court to reach a different

result. (Appellant’s brief at 21-23.) The trial court, however, was free to

believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and was likewise free to

determine witness credibility and to resolve conflicts in the evidence. See

In re M.G., 855 A.2d at 73-74 (citation omitted). Once again, our standard

of review requires us to accept the trial court’s factual findings and credibility

determinations where, as here, they are supported by the record. See

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.

Upon review, we again discern no abuse of discretion. The record

supports the trial court’s finding that C.M.R.’s developmental, physical, and

emotional needs and welfare favor termination of Parents’ parental rights

pursuant to Section 2511(b). There was sufficient evidence to allow the trial

court to make a determination of C.M.R.’s needs and welfare, and as to the

existence of a bond between Parents and C.M.R. that, if severed, would not

have a detrimental impact on C.M.R. Therefore, as confirmed by the record,

termination of Parents’ parental rights serves C.M.R.’s developmental,

physical, and emotional needs and welfare and was proper pursuant to

Section 2511(b). While Parents profess to love C.M.R., a parent’s own

feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination

of parental rights. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. As we stated, a child’s life

“simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the
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ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125. Rather, “a

parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his [or her]

child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the

child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in

a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted).

Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of

discretion and conclude that the trial court appropriately terminated Parents’ parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/21/2018