CLD-158 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 12-4127

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CLAUDE TOWNSEND,

Appellant

v.

NJ TRANSIT

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil No. 11-cv-06492)

District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan

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Submitted on the Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and

for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

March 14, 2013

Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
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(Opinion filed: April 2, 2013 )

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OPINION

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PER CURIAM

Claude Townsend filed a relatively short complaint against New Jersey Transit in 

state court. New Jersey Transit moved to dismiss the complaint. Townsend responded 

by elaborating on his claims, relying on federal statutes like the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“RA”), and the 

Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), as well as the New Jersey Law against 

Discrimination (“NJ LAD”). New Jersey Transit removed the action to federal court. 

Townsend sought to remand the matter to state court. After the District Court 

denied that motion, New Jersey Transit sought an extension of time to answer or 

otherwise respond to the complaint. The District Court granted the extension. Townsend 

then filed a motion to vacate the order granting the extension and to enter default against 

New Jersey Transit. New Jersey Transit subsequently sought to dismiss the matter, 

arguing, inter alia, that Townsend’s claims were barred by the doctrines of issue and 

claim preclusion. The District Court granted New Jersey Transit’s motion on the basis of 

“res judicata or claim preclusion,” while also mentioning issue preclusion, and denied 

Townsend’s motion. 
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Townsend appeals and seeks in forma pauperis status, which we grant. He also 

presents a “motion to reverse the District Court of New Jersey decision by submitting 

new medical evidence,” which New Jersey Transit opposes (suggesting that we 

summarily affirm instead). Additionally, Townsend has filed a motion requesting that we 

rule on his appeal. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the order 

granting the motion to dismiss is plenary. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 

203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009). We review the order denying the request for an entry of default 

and allowing the extension of time to stand for abuse of discretion. See Chamberlain v. 

Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000). Upon review, we conclude that no 

substantial question is raised on appeal, so we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 

See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.

As the District Court ruled, res judicata barred Townsend’s complaint. Res

judicata encompasses two preclusion concepts – issue preclusion, which forecloses 

litigation of a litigated and decided matter, and claim preclusion (often referred to as 

direct or collateral estoppel), which disallows litigation of a matter that has never been 

litigated but which should have been presented in an earlier suit. See Migra v. Warren 

City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 (1984). As the District Court determined by 

comparing Townsend’s amended complaint with his amended complaint in an earlier 

district court action, see Lum v. Bank of America, 361 F.3d 217, 222 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004), 

Townsend presented allegations under the ADA, FLMA, RA, and NJ LAD against New 
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Jersey Transit that have already been litigated and decided. See Certification of Deputy 

Attorney General Atkinson at Exs. 2, 3, & 5. To the extent there are allegations in his 

amended complaint in this action that are not identical to those in the earlier action, they 

are matters that should have been presented in the earlier suit. 

In short, the District Court properly granted New Jersey Transit’s motion to 

dismiss Townsend’s complaint. Furthermore, the District Court did not err in declining 

to enter default and denying the motion to vacate the order granting an extension of time. 

For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. Townsend’s 

“motion to reverse the District Court . . .” is denied, and his motion for a ruling is denied 

as moot. As we noted above, we grant his motion to proceed in forma pauperis.