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United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MITZIE PEREZ, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

WELLS FARGO & CO. and WELLS 

FARGO BANK, N.A., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 17-cv-00454-MMC 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION TO DISMISS; AFFORDING 

PLAINTIFFS LEAVE TO AMEND; 

CONTINUING CASE MANAGEMENT 

CONFERENCE 

Re: Dkt. No. 43 

Before the Court is defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s ("Wells Fargo") motion, 

filed June 16, 2017, to dismiss plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint ("FAC").1

 Plaintiffs 

Mitzie Perez ("Perez"), Andres Acosta ("Acosta"), Sergio Barajas ("Barajas"), Teresa 

Diaz Vedoy ("Diaz Vedoy"), Victoria Rodas ("Rodas"), Samuel Tabares Villafuerte 

("Tabares Villafuerte"), and California League of United Latin American Citizens 

("LULAC") have filed opposition, to which Wells Fargo has replied. Having read and 

considered the parties' respective written submissions, the Court rules as follows.2

BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiffs allege that each of the individual plaintiffs is "not a citizen of the United 

States" (see FAC ¶ 81) and has "authorization to work in the U.S. under Deferred Action 

for Childhood Arrivals" (see FAC ¶¶ 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14). The remaining plaintiff is alleged 

to be a "civil rights organization" that has as one of its "primary functions and purposes" 

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By notice filed May 3, 2017, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the FAC to the extent it 

was alleged against defendant Wells Fargo & Co. 

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By order filed June 13, 2017, the Court took the matter under submission. 
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the "improvement and advancement of educational opportunities for persons of Latino 

and Mexican-American descent or nationality." (See FAC ¶ 15.) 

Plaintiffs allege each individual plaintiff applied for credit from Wells Fargo and that 

Wells Fargo denied each application because the applicant did not meet "Wells Fargo's 

citizenship status requirements" (see FAC ¶¶ 72, 79), under which requirements, 

plaintiffs allege, an applicant must be either a citizen of the United States (see FAC ¶ 80) 

or a permanent resident who has a cosigner who is a citizen (see FAC ¶¶ 40, 63-67, 80). 

Specifically, according to plaintiffs, (1) Perez applied for a "student loan," which 

Wells Fargo denied "due to her citizenship status" (see FAC ¶¶ 39, 40), (2) Acosta 

applied for a "commercial equipment loan," which, "because he was neither a U.S. citizen 

nor a permanent resident," Wells Fargo denied and, additionally, "cancelled" a "credit 

card" it previously had issued to him (see FAC ¶¶ 43, 45-48), (3) Sergio Barajas applied 

for a "credit card," which Wells Fargo denied because he "did not have a green card" 

(see FAC ¶¶ 43, 46), (4) Diaz Vedoy applied for a "personal loan and a credit card," both 

of which Wells Fargo denied because she was "not a permanent United States resident" 

(see FAC ¶¶ 58, 60), (5) Rodas applied for a "student loan," which Wells Fargo denied 

because she was "not a permanent resident" (see FAC ¶¶ 64, 67), and (6) Tabares 

Villafuerte applied for a "student credit card," which Wells Fargo denied because he was 

"not a permanent resident" (see FAC ¶¶ 69, 71). 

 Based on the above allegations, plaintiffs, on their own behalf and on behalf of a 

putative class, assert three Claims for Relief, specifically, a claim under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1981, a claim under the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, and a claim under the 

California Unfair Competition Law. 

DISCUSSION 

Wells Fargo seeks dismissal of all claims alleged in the FAC. 

A. Federal Claim: 42 U.S.C. § 1981 

In the First Claim for Relief, plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo's denials of the 

individual plaintiffs' applications for credit violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which provides, in 
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relevant part, that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the 

same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed 

by white citizens." See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Section 1981 "protect[s] primarily against 

racial discrimination" but also "protects against discrimination on the basis of alienage." 

See Sagana v. Tenorio, 384 F.3d 731, 738 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding "[j]ust as the word 

‘white’ indicates that § 1981 bars discrimination on the basis of race, the word ‘citizen’ 

attests that a person cannot face disadvantage in the activities protected by § 1981 solely 

because of his or her alien status").3

At the outset, the Court notes that plaintiffs do not suggest, and the Court does not 

find, that a creditor cannot consider whatever factors may be relevant in assessing an 

individual's creditworthiness. Nor do plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo categorically 

denies all credit applications submitted by aliens. Plaintiffs acknowledge that Wells 

Fargo does accept credit applications from permanent residents who have citizen 

cosigners (see FAC ¶¶ 40, 63), and the Court understands plaintiffs to be alleging that 

Wells Fargo violated § 1981 by not allowing plaintiffs to submit an application even where 

such plaintiff has a citizen cosigner (see FAC ¶ 40 (alleging that "had [plaintiff] Perez 

been allowed to apply for a loan, she would have had a cosigner available to meet Wells 

Fargo's cosigner requirement"); FAC ¶¶ 63, 65, 67 (alleging plaintiff Rodas's application 

was denied although a citizen cosigner had "submitted paperwork by mail in connection 

with [her] application")). 

Wells Fargo argues that plaintiffs' § 1981 claim is subject to dismissal in light of the 

Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1691. The ECOA provides that it is 

"unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect 

 3

Although, as Wells Fargo correctly observes, Sagana found § 1981 prohibits 

"governmental discrimination on the basis of alienage," see id. at 739, "[t]he rights 

protected by [§ 1981] are [also] protected against impairment by nongovernmental 

discrimination," see 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c); Anderson v. Conboy, 156 F.3d 167, 176 (2nd 

Cir. 1998) (holding "the rights enumerated in § 1981(a) are protected from private as well 

as governmental discrimination"). 
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of a credit transaction," see 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a), where such discrimination is "on the 

basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age (provided the 

applicant has the capacity to contract)," see 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1), or "because all or 

part of the applicant's income derives from any public assistance program," see 15 

U.S.C. § 1691(a)(2), or "the applicant has in good faith exercised any right under [the 

ECOA]," see 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(3). As Wells Fargo observes, "alienage is not within 

the purview of the [ECOA]." See Nguyen v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 513 F. Supp. 

1039, 1040 (N.D. Texas 1981).4

Citing, inter alia, RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 

639, 645 (2012), Wells Fargo argues that "[w]hen statutes overlap or conflict, the more 

specific statute must control and the claims under the general statute should be 

dismissed." (See Def.'s Mot. at 10:24-25; 11:16-17.) 

As the Supreme Court observed in RadLAX, however, the "general/specific canon 

is not an absolute rule," but, rather, one of statutory construction. See RadLAX Gateway 

Hotel, 566 U.S. at 646 (noting, where general and specific provisions appear in same 

statute, canon is "strong indication of statutory meaning"). In that regard, "[i]t is, of 

course, a cardinal principle of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not 

favored." See Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976) (internal 

quotation and citation omitted). Indeed, as the Supreme Court has explained: 

When there are two acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give effect to 

both if possible. The intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and 

manifest. It is not sufficient . . . to establish that subsequent laws cover 

some or even all of the cases provided for by the prior act; for they may be 

merely affirmative, or cumulative, or auxiliary. There must be a positive 

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The only reference to alienage appears in two regulations promulgated under the 

ECOA. Neither, however, states a creditor is free to decline credit to an applicant solely 

on the basis of alienage. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(e) (providing "creditor may inquire about 

the permanent residency and immigration status of an applicant or any other person in 

connection with a credit transaction") (emphasis added); 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(7) 

(providing "creditor may consider the applicant's immigration status or status as a 

permanent resident of the United States, and any additional information that may be 

necessary to ascertain the creditor's rights and remedies regarding repayment") 

(emphasis added). 
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repugnancy between the provisions of the new law and those of the old; 

and even then the old law is repealed by implication only, pro tanto, to the 

extent of the repugnancy. 

See United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198-99 (1939) (internal quotations, 

citation and alteration omitted). 

 Here, there is no dispute that § 1981 is the general statute, in that it prohibits 

discrimination in the making of any type of contract, while the ECOA prohibits 

discrimination in the making of a specific type of contract, namely, a contract for credit. 

As set forth above, however, the Court is obligated to "give effect to both if possible." 

See id. at 198. In that regard, the Court finds the two statutes can be read to give effect 

to both, in that § 1981 precludes a creditor from discriminating on the basis of race or 

alienage, whereas the ECOA precludes a creditor from discriminating on additional 

grounds, such as religion and national origin.5 As noted in Borden, the fact that the laterenacted statute "cover[s] some . . . of the cases provided for by the prior act" is "not 

sufficient" to establish Congress intended to repeal the prior statute. See Borden, 308 

U.S. at 198 (internal quotation, citation and alteration omitted). A creditor can comply 

with § 1981 and the ECOA by not discriminating on the basis of any of the categories 

listed in the two statutes. 

Wells Fargo seeks to avoid the proscriptions of § 1981 by relying on the absence 

of protections for aliens under the ECOA. "It is not enough," however, "to show that the 

two statutes produce differing results when applied to the same factual situation, for that 

no more than states the problem." Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 155. Rather, there must be 

"a positive repugnancy between them" or, put another way, that "they cannot mutually coexist." See id. 

For example, Congress has enacted statutes that have "barred aliens from federal 

 5

Moreover, the ECOA provides to a plaintiff covered thereunder an additional basis 

for relief. In particular, while liability under § 1981 requires a finding of intentional 

discrimination, see General Building Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 

382-91 (1982), liability under the ECOA can be established by a showing of disparate 

impact, see Miller v. American Express Co., 688 F.2d 1235, 1239-40 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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employment," see Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co., 414 U.S. 86, 90 (1973) (noting 

1973 appropriations act precluded use of federal funds to pay any federal employee who 

was not "a citizen of the United States"), as well as a statute that prohibits all employers 

from hiring "an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien," see 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. 

In those instances, it is readily apparent that § 1981 would, by implication and "to the 

extent of the repugnancy," be repealed by the specific statutes. See Borden, 308 U.S. at 

198-99. By contrast, § 1981 and the ECOA are, as discussed above, capable of coexistence. 

 The Court next considers whether the legislative history nonetheless indicates that 

Congress, by enacting the ECOA, intended to repeal by implication § 1981 insofar as 

§ 1981 would apply to credit transactions. See, e.g., Brown v. General Services Admin., 

425 U.S. 820, 821, 833-34 (1976) (looking to legislative history of Title VII to determine its 

effect on claims brought under § 1981). 

Section 1981, as initially enacted in 1866, provided that "citizens of every race and 

color" had the "same right . . . to make and enforce contracts" as was "enjoyed by white 

citizens," see McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 291 n.21 

(1976), thus "bar[ring] discrimination on the basis of race," see Sagana, 384 F.3d at 738. 

In 1870, Congress amended § 1981 to replace the phrase "citizens of every race and 

color" with "all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States," the purpose being to 

increase the scope of § 1981 to "protect[ ] against discrimination on the basis of 

alienage," see id. at 737-38, and, in particular, "to alleviate the plight of Chinese 

immigrants in California," see Anderson, 156 F.3d at 173. 

The ECOA, as initially enacted in 1974, prohibited credit discrimination on the 

basis of "sex or marital status," see Brothers v. First Leasing, 724 F.2d 789, 791 (9th Cir. 

1984), the "purpose" being "to eradicate credit discrimination waged against women, 

especially married women whom creditors traditionally refused to consider for individual 

credit," see id. at 793-94 (internal quotation and citation omitted). In 1976, Congress 

amended the ECOA to "reaffirm[ ] the goal of antidiscrimination in credit . . . by adding 
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race, color, religion, national origin, and age to sex and marital status," see id. at 794, as 

well as persons whose income derives from public assistance or who have exercised a 

statutory right, see Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-

239, § 2, 90 Stat. 251 (1976), thereby creating "one more tool to be used in our vigorous 

national effort to eradicate invidious discrimination root and branch from our society," see 

Brothers, 724 F.2d at 794 (citing, inter alia, Senate report). Under such circumstances, 

the Court is not persuaded that Congress, by enacting the ECOA, intended to withdraw 

from aliens the protections provided by § 1981. 

Accordingly, the Court finds the First Claim for Relief is not subject to dismissal. 

B. State Law Claims 

 As noted, plaintiffs allege two claims arising under state law. 

1. Unruh Act 

 In the Second Claim for Relief, plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo's denials of the 

individual plaintiffs' applications for credit violated the Unruh Act, which provides that "[n]o 

business establishment of any kind whatsoever shall discriminate . . . on account of any 

characteristic listed or defined in subdivision (b) . . . of Section 51 [of the California Civil 

Code]." See Cal. Civ. Code § 51.5(a). Section 51(b), in turn, provides in relevant part 

that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter 

what their . . . immigration status are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, 

advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind 

whatsoever." See Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). 

 Wells Fargo first argues the Unruh Act claim is subject to dismissal pursuant to 

§ 51(c), which, in relevant part, provides that the Unruh Act "shall not be construed to 

confer any right or privilege on a person that is conditioned or limited by law." See Cal. 

Civ. § 51(c). Under § 51(c), "if there is a conflict between [the Unruh Act's] provisions 

and those of another statute, the former defers to the latter." See Lazar v. Hertz Corp., 

69 Cal. App. 4th 1494, 1504-05 (1999). Wells Fargo argues that the "general provisions 

of the Unruh Act" conflict with the "specific provisions of the ECOA." (See Def.'s Reply at 
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13:25-27.) As discussed above with respect to the First Claim for Relief, the Court finds 

Congress, by enacting the ECOA, did not intend to authorize creditors to discriminate on 

the basis of alienage or otherwise to remove protections against discrimination afforded 

under other statutes. 

 Wells Fargo next argues the Unruh Act claim is subject to dismissal in light of the 

California Supreme Court's decision in Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 52 Cal. 3d 

1142 (1991). In Harris, the Supreme Court set forth an analytical framework for the 

purpose of determining when a plaintiff may base an Unruh Act claim on a classification 

not expressly enumerated in the act. See Harris, 52 Cal. 3d at 1155 (citing prior cases in 

which courts had found Unruh Act "appl[ied] to several classifications not expressed in 

the statute"); Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club, 36 Cal. 4th 824, 840 (2005) 

(explaining Harris created "analytical framework" for determining when claims based on 

non-enumerated categories are "cognizable"). In particular, a plaintiff alleging such a 

claim must establish the classification is "based on a personal characteristic similar to 

those listed in the statute"; where the requisite showing is made, the trial court next 

considers "whether the alleged discrimination was justified by a legitimate business 

reason" and "the consequences of allowing the claim to proceed." See Semler v. 

General Elec. Capital Corp., 196 Cal. App. 4th 1380, 1392-93 (2011) (citing Harris, 52 

Cal. 3d at 1159-62, 1167)). 

 In reliance on Harris, Wells Fargo argues the Court should determine at the 

pleading stage whether plaintiffs' Unruh Act claim is viable under the framework set forth 

in Harris, i.e., whether Wells Fargo's alleged differential treatment is justified by legitimate 

business reasons and whether allowing the claim to proceed would have negative 

consequences. The framework described in Harris, however, is used to assess the 

viability of an Unruh Act claim "involving a category not enumerated in the statute or 

added by prior judicial construction." See Koebke, 36 Cal. 4th at 840. Harris provides a 

method of "statutory interpretation" to be used to determine whether the Legislature 

intended the Unruh Act to apply to a particular unenumerated category. See Harris, 52 
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Cal. 3d at 1159 (addressing whether Legislature intended Unruh Act to encompass 

"additional classification of 'economic discrimination'"); Koebke, 36 Cal. 4th at 836-37 

(observing Harris concluded Unruh Act "did not include within its ambit claims of 

economic status discrimination because economic status is fundamentally different than 

the categories either enumerated in the Act or added by judicial construction"). Here, 

plaintiffs base their Unruh Act claim on an enumerated category, specifically, 

"immigration status." (See FAC ¶ 103.) As the California Legislature has expressly 

determined that claims alleging discrimination on the basis of immigration status are 

cognizable under the Unruh Act, the question of statutory interpretation addressed in 

Harris is not presented here.6

An Unruh Act claim based on an enumerated category, however, fails "where 

public policy warrants [the challenged] differential treatment" or where "a compelling 

social policy support[s]" the challenged differential treatment. See Koire v. Metro Car 

Wash, 40 Cal. 3d 24, 38 (1985) (noting, "[f]or example, some sex-segregated facilities, 

such as public restrooms, may be justified by the constitutional right to personal privacy"). 

In that regard, Wells Fargo argues, "[t]here exist concerns about repayment of an 

obligation when the individual on the other end of the transaction cannot guarantee that 

they will continue to be in the country or be able to be contacted years into the future, 

when a loan or credit card may require payment." (See Def.'s Mot. at 17:20-22.) 

The Court recognizes the existence of a social policy favoring a stable economy, 

and that requiring creditors to extend credit to individuals under circumstances where 

creditors have little or no realistic ability to collect unpaid debts would undermine such 

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Wells Fargo argues that the Court of Appeal, in Howe v. Bank of America N.A., 

179 Cal. App. 4th 1443 (2009), applied the Harris framework to an Unruh Act claim that 

alleged discrimination on the basis of an enumerated category. Wells Fargo's reliance on 

Howe is misplaced. Although the Court of Appeal in Howe did apply the Harris 

framework, it did so after concluding the plaintiffs, although purporting to base their Unruh 

Act claim on the enumerated classification of national origin, in fact were alleging 

discrimination on the basis of "citizenship," which, at that time, was not an enumerated 

category. See Howe, 179 Cal. App. 4th at 1450 n.2. 
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policy. As discussed above, however, the policy challenged by plaintiffs is Wells Fargo's 

alleged categorical ban on considering any credit application submitted by an alien nonpermanent resident even where the applicant has a citizen cosigner, and, as noted, 

plaintiffs do not suggest a creditor cannot consider whatever factors may be relevant in 

assessing an individual's creditworthiness. At this stage of the proceedings, the record 

before the Court is insufficient to support a finding, as a matter of law, that public policy 

considerations warrant a creditor's distinguishing between a permanent resident who has 

a citizen cosigner and a non-permanent resident who has a citizen cosigner. Indeed, it 

would appear that, in either situation, the citizen co-signer could be held responsible for 

any non-payment by the alien. To the extent there may exist public policy considerations 

nonetheless warranting such distinction in spite of the Unruh Act's express inclusion of 

immigration status, such considerations are not apparent from the face of the FAC. 

Wells Fargo also argues that plaintiffs have "failed to plead intentional 

discrimination, as required to state a claim under the Unruh Act." (See Def.'s Reply at 

12:14-15.) The FAC, however, alleges that Wells Fargo advised the individual plaintiffs 

that their applications for credit were denied on the ground they were not permanent 

residents. (See FAC ¶¶ 40, 46, 55, 60, 67, 71.) To the extent Wells Fargo contends its 

decisions were based on considerations other than the alleged categorical exclusion, any 

such determination cannot be made on the face of the FAC. 

Lastly, Wells Fargo argues that, to the extent the Unruh Act is brought on behalf of 

plaintiff Acosta, the claim is subject to dismissal because the FAC alleges Acosta resides 

in Texas (see FAC ¶ 5), and that he applied for and was denied credit in Texas (see FAC 

¶¶ 43, 49). As the Unruh Act's protections extend only to "persons within the jurisdiction 

of this state," see Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b), and plaintiffs allege no facts to indicate Acosta 

is or has been such a person, the Court agrees. See Archibald v. Cinerama Hawaiian 

Hotels, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 3d 152, 159 (1977) (holding Unruh Act "by its express language 

applies only within California"). 

 Accordingly, the Second Claim for Relief, other than to the extent alleged on 
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behalf of Acosta, is not subject to dismissal. 

2. Unfair Competition Law 

In the Third Claim for Relief, plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo's denials of the 

individual plaintiffs' respective applications for credit violated California's Unfair 

Competition Law, as set forth in §§ 17200-17210 of the Business & Professions Code, 

which prohibits "any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice." See Cal. 

Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. 

At the outset, Wells Fargo argues that the § 17200 claim, which is derivative of 

plaintiffs' § 1981 and Unruh Act claims (see FAC ¶¶ 108, 111-12), is subject to dismissal 

for failure to allege an underlying unlawful act. As discussed above, however, the First 

and Second Claims are, with limited exception, not subject to dismissal. 

Wells Fargo next argues that the § 17200 claim, to the extent it is alleged on 

behalf of Rodas, Tabares Villafuerte, Perez, Diaz Vedoy and Acosta, is subject to 

dismissal for lack of statutory standing.7 As set forth below, the Court agrees. 

Under California law, a plaintiff may bring a claim under § 17200 only if he/she 

"has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair 

competition." See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204. Here, as Wells Fargo points out, the 

FAC includes no facts to support a finding that any of the above-referenced five plaintiffs 

lost money or property as the result of the credit denials. 

First, as to Rodas and Tabares Villafuerte, plaintiffs fail to allege, even in 

conclusory fashion, that either of those two plaintiffs lost money or property as a result of 

the credit denials. 

As to Perez and Diaz Vedoy, although the FAC contains an allegation that said 

plaintiffs used "various credit cards" to pay for, respectively, "tuition" (see FAC ¶ 41) and 

"college-related expenses" (see FAC ¶ 61), plaintiffs fail to allege that the interest rates 

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Wells Fargo does not make this argument as to plaintiffs Barajas and LULAC. 

(See Def.'s Mot. at 24:1-8.) 
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and fees charged by the credit card providers were in excess of the rates and fees those 

plaintiffs would have paid Wells Fargo had it approved their applications for student 

loans. 

Similarly, although plaintiffs allege that, after Wells Fargo cancelled Acosta's credit 

card, he "was forced to pay off the outstanding credit card balance using money he was 

saving to purchase a home" (see FAC ¶ 49), plaintiffs fail to allege that in repaying the 

obligation at the time and in the manner he did, Acosta paid more than he would have 

paid had his credit card remained operative. Additionally, as Wells Fargo notes, Acosta 

is alleged to reside in Texas and to have interacted with Wells Fargo in Texas. Section 

17200 "was not intended to regulate conduct unconnected to California," see Norwest 

Mortgage, Inc. v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. App. 4th 214, 222 (1999), and the FAC includes 

no facts to support a finding that Wells Fargo's decision to deny Acosta credit was in any 

manner connected to California. 

Accordingly, to the extent the Third Claim for Relief is alleged on behalf of Rodas, 

Tabares Villafuerte, Perez, Diaz Vedoy and Acosta, such claim is subject to dismissal. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss the First Amended 

Complaint is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows: 

1. To the extent the Second Claim for Relief is alleged on behalf of Acosta, the 

motion is GRANTED. 

2. To the extent the Third Claim for Relief is alleged on behalf of Rodas, Tabares 

Villafuerte, Perez, Diaz Vedoy and Acosta, the motion is GRANTED. 

3. In all other respects, the motion is DENIED. 

4. If plaintiffs wish to file a Second Amended Complaint for the purpose of curing 

any or all of the above-described deficiencies, plaintiffs shall file their Second Amended 

Complaint no later than August 18, 2017. Plaintiffs may not, however, add new claims for 

relief or new parties without first obtaining leave of court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). If 

plaintiffs do not file a Second Amended Complaint by the date specified, the instant 
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United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

action will proceed on the remaining claims in the FAC. 

5. In light of the above, the Case Management Conference is hereby 

CONTINUED from August 25, 2017, to September 18, 2017, at 10:30 a.m. A Joint Case 

Management Statement shall be filed no later than September 11, 2017. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 3, 2017 

 MAXINE M. CHESNEY 

 United States District Judge