## COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH NO. 02 - 14 - 00148 - CR

JAMIE LEE FORD APPELLANT
V. THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

---------- FROM THE 43RD DISTRI CT COURT OF PARKER C OUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. CR12

- 0559

---------- 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

---------- I. I NTRODUCTION Appellant Jamie Lee Ford appeals his conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of fourteen. See generally Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02 (West 2002) . In two points, Ford argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State’s expert, a sexual assault nurse examiner, to

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.2

testify at trial and that the trial court erred by overruling his motion for mistrial. We will affirm

. II. B ACKGROUND Because neither of Ford’s points require an entire r ecitation of the evidence adduced at trial , we provide only a recitation ne cessary to dispose of Ford’s points and to provide context to the reader

. Daughter 2 told her older friend a “secret,” alleging that her biological father, Ford, would say he was cl eaning her or checking her for “ bumps and bruises, ” but Daughter, rather than describing what would be considered appropriate adult touching, went on to describe what appeared to be sexual acts. Daughter also told her friend n ot to tell anyone because she feared growing up without a dad, but the friend told her own parents, who went across the street and told Daughter’s mother. When Mother asked Daughter about what she had told her friend , Daughter told Mother and the friend’s parents that Ford had been s exually assaulting her for years. Later, the State indicted Ford for the continuous sexual abuse of a child. At trial, Daughter, ten years old at the time, testified that throughout her first through third grade s in elementary school , Ford would have her undress in his bedroom and lay on the bed. Sometimes he would cover her face and touch her sexual organ with his hand

. Other alleged acts included numerous incidents

2 We use aliases when possible to protect the minor child’s identity in this case.3

of fondling and digital penetration and at least one allegation of penetration of her

mo uth with his penis. One of the Fords ’ neighbors testified that he was reluctant to believe allegations made against Ford until he witnessed Daughter’s outcry and asked Daughter if her dad was touching her. He then believed her. According to Neighbor, Dau ghter “got real upset and turned her face

. . . where we could barely hear her” and said Ford had been touching her. At one point, Neighbor testified that Daughter was “a stand

- up little girl.” When the State asked what he meant by Daughter being a “stan d

- up” girl, defense counsel objected that the State was trying to “boost credibility.” The trial court instructed the State to rephrase its question, and the State complied . After further testimony by Neighbor that Daughter would “fess up” to mistakes, t he State asked if that was “the kind of thing that makes [Neighbor] think [Daughter was] a stand

- up kid?” Defen se counsel then lodged a “boost ing credibility” obje c tion , and the trial court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the N eighbor’s answer. Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial, and the trial court denied the motion. The State also introduced the testimony of Rebecca Sullivan, the sexual assault nurse examiner who had performed a sexual assault exam on Daughter shortly after Daughter’s outcry. Sullivan said that she performed a detailed sexual history interview and exam of Daughter

. Sullivan testified that the results of her exam were normal but that “completely normal” results were seen in 85

–4

95% of children with pene tration by any means. Defense counsel lodged a reliability objection to the State’s witness , and the trial court overruled the objection. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and assessed punishment at thirty

seven years’ incarceration. The trial court entered judgment accordingly, and this appeal followed.
III. D ISCUSSION In his first point, Ford argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to introduce “testimony under the medical records exception.” Specifically, Ford argu es that the trial court erred by improperly admitting “medical records

. . . concerning the sexual assault examination conducted months after the alleged assault s

. . . for the reason stated in this Court’s decision in Salinas v. State .” See 166 S.W.3d 36 8 , 371 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2005, pet

. ref’d) (holding that expert testimony diagnosing sexual abuse based on a child's medical history had been erroneously allowed). In short, Ford argues that the State’s expert witness was impermissibly allowed to test ify to the complainant’s credibility, thereby bolstering it. The State counters that Ford’s reliance on Salinas is misplaced because the expert who testified concerning the medical records in this case “never gave a diagnosis of sexual abuse” and therefore could not have based her testified

- to diagnosis “merely [upon] a verbal history given to her” by the complai nant. We agree with the State.5

We review the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude scientific expert testimony under an abuse of discretion s tandard. Sexton v. State , 93 S.W.3d 96, 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to an y guiding rules and principles. Montgomery v. State , 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 199 1 ) (op. on reh’g) . T hus, we will uphold the trial court’s decision as long as it is within the zone of reasonable disagreement, given the evidence presented and the requirements of Rule 702 of the Texas Rules of Evidence. Sexton , 93 S.W.3d at 99. Rule 702 provides that an ex pert may testify if the expert’s “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue .” Tex. R. Evid. 702; Duckett v. State , 797 S.W.2d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990 ), disapproved on other grounds , Cohn v. State , 849 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (noting that to be admissible, expert testimony must “assist” the trier of fact). Expert testimony does not assist the jury if it constitutes “a direct opinion on the tr uthfulness” of a child complainant’s allegations. Youn t v. State , 872 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) ( holding testimony regarding an opinion of truthfulness “does more than ‘assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fac t in issue’; it decides an issue for the jury.”). In other words, an expert may testify that a child complainant exhibited symptoms consistent with sexual abuse but not that a complainant is truthful. Cohn , 849 S.W.2d at 818

– 19 ; Salinas , 166 S.W.3d
at 37 0

.6

Because Ford’s argument is predicated on this c ourt’s decision in Salinas , a discussion and comparison between Salinas and this case is warranted. 166 S.W.3d at 3 70. In Salinas , the complainant testified that the defendant had digitally penetrated her anus with his finger. Id. The State’s expert testified that, generally, there will be no physical evidence of the insertion of a finger into the anus of a six

- year - old child. Id. Nevertheless, the expert testified that s he had diagnosed sexual abuse b ased solely upon the history provided by the complainant, noting that the complainant’s medical exam results were “ consistent with that history. ” Id. That is, the expert “diagnosed sexual abuse by digital penetration of the anus [solely] because the chil d told her that digital penetration had occurred.” Id. This Court held that such testimony was “a direct comment on the credibility of the complaining witness.” Id. at 371. According ly , we held that “[b]ecause there was no physical indication of digita l penetration, [the expert]’s testimony [could] only be seen as an attempt to directly bolster the credibility of the complainant and a direct comment on the complainant’s truthfulness.” Id. This Court further stated that “Although [the expert] could [ha ve] properly testif [ied] that the physical exam was normal, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting [the expert]’s testimony that she had diagnosed sexual abuse based on the child ’ s medical history.” Id. In this case, as the State argues, the f acts are distinguishable from Salinas

. Here, with respect to any physical findings of sexual assault, the State’s expert witness testified that the results of her examination of Daughter were7

consistent with what a medical professional would expect to fin d based upon generally accepted scientific literature. Specifically, the State’s expert testified that she saw no physical signs of sexual abuse and that she was unable to make a diagnosis of sexual abuse

. Thus, unlike in Salinas , the expert witness in t his case made no diagnosis of sexual abuse. Because the State’s expert witness in this case never testified directly about Daughter’s credibility or honesty and because a trial court may admit expert testimony that a child exhibits physical signs that have been empirically shown to be common among children who have been sexually abused, including that the child exhibited no physical signs of sexual abuse at all, the expert witness did not “bolster” Daughter’s testimony, and the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by allowing the expert to testify. See Salinas , 166 S.W.3d at 370; compare Reyes v. State , 274 S.W.3d 724, 730 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2008, pet. ref ’ d) (holding that doctor’s testimony about behavioral characteristics common among abused child ren was permissible under rule 702 of Texas Rules of Evidence). We overrule Ford’s first point. In his second point, Ford argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for mistrial. Other than citing one case standing for the proposition for
wh en a mistrial is appropriate, Ford does not cite any authority to explain what his second point of error actually is. See Young v. State , 137 S.W.3d 65, 69, 72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“A grant of a motion for mistrial should be reserved for those cases in which an objection could not have prevented, and an instruction to8

disregard could not cure, the prejudice stemming from an event at trial.”); see also Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”); Tong v. State , 25 S.W.3d 707, 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (“In failing to provide any relevant authority suggesting how the judge’s actions violated any of appellant’s constitutional rights, w e find the issue to be inadequately briefed.”) , cert. denied , 532 U.S. 1053 (2001)

. In his brief, Ford does point to a colloquy in the record wherein the prosecutor ask ed questions of Neighbor , and Neighbor specifically answered one of the questions that D aughter is a “stand

- up little girl.” Defense counsel objected to the line of questioning , stating that the prosecutor was attemptin g to “boost credibility.” The trial court instructed the prosecutor to rephrase the question, and the prosecutor capitulate d. Later in the same colloquy, the prosecutor asked the witness whether when other children in the neighborhood would get in trouble, Daughter would not. Neighbor answered “Yes.” Then again, the prosecutor asked N eighbor if Daughter was involved in “tro uble,” whether Daughter would “fess up that she was doing it, too?” And Neighbor again answered “Yes.” Y et again, the prosecutor asked Neighbor if this conduct by Daughter is why he believed Daughter to be a “stand

- up kid?” The witness answered, “Absolu tely.” Defense counsel then objected that the prosecutor was attempting to “b oost [] credibility.” The trial court sustained the objection,9

instructed the jury to disregard the witness’s answer, and then denied Ford’s motion for mistrial. See Young , 137 S.W.3d at 72. The State argues that this colloquy indicates that Ford failed to timely object at trial to the evidence he now complains of on appeal because the question had been asked and answered multiple times prior to and in

- between Ford’s objections. It is difficult to understand Ford’s second point because of his failure to discuss the substance of his complaint. See Tong , 25 S.W.3d at 710. Regardless , we agree with the State that Ford has failed to preserve this error for our review because the wit ness was allowed to answer the same question multiple times without Ford objecting. See Dinkins v. State , 894 S.W.2d 330, 355 (Tex. Crim. App.) (“[I]f a question clearly calls for an objectionable response, a defendant should make an objection before the witness responds.”) , cert. denied , 516 U.S. 832 (1995) . We overrule Ford’s second point.
IV. C ONCLUSION Having overruled both of Ford’s points on appeal, we aff irm the trial court’s judgment. /s/ Bill Meier BILL MEIER JUSTICE PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; GARDNER and MEI ER, JJ. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: April 23 , 2015