In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 03-3289

MARGARET M. GOOD, as Liquidation

Agent of the Liquidation Trust of

HEARTLAND STEEL, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

VOEST-ALPINE INDUSTRIES, INC.,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:03-CV-0476 SEB-VSS—Sarah Evans Barker, Judge.

____________

ARGUED APRIL 7, 2004—DECIDED FEBRUARY 22, 2005

____________

Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and WOOD and WILLIAMS,

Circuit Judges.

WOOD, Circuit Judge. This case begins and ends with our

lack of appellate jurisdiction, though the path to that

conclusion is not as straightforward as one might wish.

After Heartland Steel, Inc., filed for bankruptcy, VoestAlpine Industries, Inc., submitted a proof of claim seeking payment for services that it had provided to Heartland. Following some procedural finagling, Heartland’s

trustee in bankruptcy sued Voest in Indiana state court

alleging breach of contract and constructive fraud in

relation to the provision of those services. Voest promptly
2 No. 03-3289

removed the case to the bankruptcy court. At the trustee’s

motion, the district court withdrew the reference from

the bankruptcy court and remanded the trustee’s claims

to state court. Voest asks that we reverse the district court,

offering a clever but ultimately unpersuasive justification

for why the jurisdictional bars imposed by 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1452(b) and 1291 do not preclude our review of either

aspect of the court’s order. Because we conclude that

§ 1452(b) and § 1291 govern, we dismiss Voest’s appeal for

lack of jurisdiction.

I

Heartland set out to become the largest independent flatrolled steel processor in the United States, with a target

capacity of 1.1 million tons per year. To achieve this goal,

Heartland entered into a contract with Kvaerner U.S., Inc.,

which did business under the name Kvaerner Metals, under

which the latter would provide equipment for Heartland’s

facility in Terre Haute, Indiana. Kvaerner also contracted

with Heartland to provide software for an information

system known as “Level 3,” which was intended to coordinate the automated production information from each of

Heartland’s steel processing lines. Voest is the successor-ininterest to Kvaerner with respect to these contractual

obligations.

Heartland voluntarily filed for bankruptcy under Chapter

11 on January 24, 2001. Voest subsequently filed a proof of

claim in the amount of $20,471,242.94, plus interest and

attorneys’ fees. According to Voest, approximately $10.2

million of that claim was secured by mechanics’ liens and

the remainder was unsecured. On November 20, 2001, the

bankruptcy court entered an order confirming Heartland’s

Chapter 11 plan. Almost four months later, on March 11,

2002, Heartland’s trustee in bankruptcy, Margaret Good,

filed an objection to Voest’s assertion that valid mechanics’
No. 03-3289 3

liens secured the $10.2 million claim. Voest filed a motion

to strike the objection, and on July 30, 2002, the bankruptcy

court issued an order rejecting Good’s objection as untimely

and further denying her request to extend the deadline to

file additional objections. The district court reversed in

part, finding that Good’s objection to the secured status of

Voest’s claim was timely filed, but affirming the bankruptcy

court’s denial of her motion for an extension of time to file

other objections.

On January 17, 2003, six months after the bankruptcy

court’s order, Good filed a complaint against Voest in state

court in Indiana, alleging that “Kvaerner and/or Voest

was unable to cause the software system to operate according to Heartland’s performance requirements and, as a

direct and foreseeable consequence, Heartland lost its major

customers and its funding and was forced to file

for bankruptcy.” On February 21, 2003, Voest removed

the case to the bankruptcy court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1452(a). Shortly thereafter, Good filed two motions in

district court. First, Good moved to withdraw the reference on the grounds that the state court action was noncore and that “Plaintiff has requested a jury trial, the

bankruptcy court cannot hold a jury trial without the

parties’ consent, and Plaintiff has not and will not provide such consent.” Second, Good asked the district court

either to abstain or to remand the case to state court. She

argued that the requirements for mandatory abstention

under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) were satisfied or, in the alternative, that the district court should exercise its discretion to abstain under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) or to remand

under 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b).

The district court granted both of Good’s motions. The

court took note of the fact that, under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d), a

“district court may withdraw, in whole or in part, any case

or proceeding referred [to the bankruptcy court] under this

section, on its own motion or on timely motion of any party,
4 No. 03-3289

for cause shown.” Although the court found that

the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over Good’s statelaw claim because it was “related to a case under title 11,”

it nonetheless concluded that Good’s “right to a jury trial

dictates that the reference should be withdrawn.” Turning

to Good’s motion to abstain or to remand, the court observed that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b), a district court to

which a state “claim or cause of action is removed may

remand such claim or cause of action on any equitable

ground.” The court concluded that “[b]ecause the case at bar

involves claims based entirely on state law, and because the

claims fall within ‘related to’ jurisdiction, remand will have

minimal effects on the administration of the bankruptcy.

The state court can adequately address the state law issues

based on its expertise.” On this basis, it remanded the case

to state court. After unsuccessfully moving for the district

court to certify its order withdrawing the reference for

interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), Voest

appealed directly to this court, asking that we reverse the

district court’s order.

II

There are really two orders of the district court that Voest

would like this court to consider: first, the order under

§ 157(d) withdrawing the reference to the bankruptcy court,

and second, the order under § 1452(b) remanding the entire

proceeding to the state court. Good argues that § 1452(b)

bars our review of both of these orders. Even if her position

is correct in the end, however, we find it useful to consider

the orders separately. We look first at the district court’s

decision to withdraw the reference to the bankruptcy court,

and then at the order of remand.
No. 03-3289 5

A

According to Good, § 1452(b) bars our review of both

the district court’s withdrawal of the reference and its

remand of the case to state court. Voest counters that under

the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Waco v. United

States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 293 U.S. 140 (1934), the

withdrawal of the reference is a distinct order that was

entered before the order of remand, and as such, nothing in

§ 1452(b) precludes this court from reviewing it. Perhaps

not, Good responds, but even if Voest can satisfy § 1452(b),

it still needs to show that it is appealing either from a final

judgment, under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, or from an interlocutory

order that is otherwise appealable. As the parties have

done, we consider first § 1452(b), which Good claims is a

specific statutory ban on appellate review here, and then we

turn to the more general constraints imposed by § 1291.

In Waco, the Supreme Court indicated that appellate

review of a district court order that precedes a remand

order may be appropriate in some circumstances, even if the

remand order itself is unreviewable. Id. at 143. The case

began when Curtis Boggs sued contractor Combs & Glade

and the City of Waco in state court for damages from a

collision. Id. at 141. The city filed a cross-action against

Fidelity, asserting that it was liable as a surety on Combs

& Glade’s bond. Id. Fidelity removed to federal court based

on diversity jurisdiction. Id. The district court entered a

single decree consisting of three orders: first, it denied

Boggs’s motion to remand because a separable controversy

existed between the city and Fidelity; second, it found

Fidelity an unnecessary and improper party and therefore

dismissed the cross-complaint; and third, since the remaining parties were not diverse, it found that it lacked jurisdiction and remanded to state court. Id. at 142. The city

appealed the order dismissing Fidelity. Id. The Fifth Circuit

dismissed the appeal, finding that “as no appeal lies from

an order of remand, . . . the action of [the district] court in
6 No. 03-3289

dismissing the city’s cross-action was moot, and its propriety could not be reviewed.” Id. at 142-43. The Supreme

Court reversed, stating:

True, no appeal lies from the order of remand; but

in logic and in fact the decree of dismissal preceded that

of remand and was made by the District Court while it

had control of the cause. Indisputably this order is the

subject of an appeal; and, if not reversed or set aside, is

conclusive upon the petitioner. We are of opinion that

the petitioner was entitled to have the Circuit Court of

Appeals determine whether the dismissal of its crossaction against the Fidelity Company was proper.

Id. at 143. The Court stressed, however, that its reversal of

the dismissal order “cannot affect the order of remand, but

it will at least, if the dismissal of the petitioner’s complaint

was erroneous, remit the entire controversy, with Fidelity

still a party, to the state court for such further proceedings

as may be in accordance with law.” Id. at 143-44.

A number of courts, including this court, have relied on

Waco as a basis for reviewing district court decisions

that “in logic and in fact” preceded remand orders. For

example, in J.O. v. Alton Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d

267 (7th Cir. 1990), parents sued the school district in state

court, stating claims under state law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Id. at 268. The school district removed to federal court,

where it successfully moved to dismiss the § 1983 claim and

some of the state-law claims. Id. Left only with pendent

state claims, the court remanded to state court. Id. at 268.

On appeal, we found that “we ha[d] jurisdiction to review

both of the district court’s orders,” which we “separately

characterized as a dismissal order and a remand order,” but

we also noted that “our jurisdiction [was] not so self-evident

that we [could] dispense with a tedious discussion.” Id. at

269. Citing Waco, we held that our jurisdiction to review the

court’s dismissal order arose under an “exception to the bar
No. 03-3289 7

against appellate review of remand orders.” Id. at 271.

“This rule,” we explained, “provides appellate review, where

it might otherwise not be available, to a party adversely

affected by a district court’s substantive decision.” Id.

The question here is whether the Waco doctrine permits

us to review the district court’s order withdrawing the

reference. Good maintains that the answer is no, because

the Waco doctrine elaborates the general system of removal

and remand governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1447. But the Supreme

Court rejected the argument that there is any distinction

between the limits on reviewability imposed by the general

removal statutes and the limits in § 1452 in Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124 (1995). It held there

that:

If an order remands a bankruptcy case to state court

because of a timely raised defect in removal procedure

or lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, then a court

of appeals lacks jurisdiction to review that order

under § 1447(d), regardless of whether the case was

removed under § 1441(a) or § 1452(a).

516 U.S. at 129. We take this to mean that the other

qualifications on reviewability that have developed in the

line of cases beginning with Thermtron Products, Inc. v.

Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976), also apply to § 1452

cases. Thus, under Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484

U.S. 343 (1988), where the district court dismissed all

federal claims and remanded the remaining pendent claims,

appellate review of the dismissal was authorized. Similarly,

when a district court decides to abstain from exercising its

jurisdiction and then remands a case to state court, appellate review of the abstention decision is possible under

§ 1291. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706

(1996).

Courts have continued to rely on the Waco decision to

identify which orders are sufficiently distinct from the order
8 No. 03-3289

of removal to be entitled to appellate review, assuming that

either a final judgment or an authorized interlocutory

appeal is present. See Allen v. Ferguson, 791 F.2d 611, 614

(7th Cir. 1986) (finding “jurisdiction to consider the propriety of the district court’s order” dismissing a party under

“the reasoning of Waco and its progeny,” even though

§ 1447(d) barred appellate review of its subsequent remand

order); see also Christopher v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc., 240

F.3d 95, 99 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Waco in support of the

proposition that “Section 1447(d) does not allow district

courts to insulate separate and severable concurrent orders

from review merely by attaching those orders to a remand

order”); Aquamar, S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A.,

Inc., 179 F.3d 1279, 1285-86 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Section

1447(d) does not prevent us from reviewing the district

court’s order dismissing [the defendants’ third-party

complaints], even though it was made at the same time as

the order of remand, because of the limitation on section

1447(d) recognized in City of Waco.”); Carr v. Am. Red

Cross, 17 F.3d 671, 675 (3d Cir. 1994) (concluding that the

district court’s order dismissing a party “is separable from

the subsequent order of remand [and] [t]herefore, appellate

review of the dismissal order is not barred by 28 U.S.C.

§ 1447(d)”).

According to Good, this line of cases is distinguishable from the present case, which involves an order withdrawing the district court’s reference to the bankruptcy

court, rather than something like an order dismissing

a claim or party. We do not find that distinction to be

persuasive. In fact, we would not break new ground in

relying on Waco to review a district court order that

preceded a remand based on § 1452(b). In In re Adams, 809

F.2d 1187 (5th Cir. 1987), the Fifth Circuit found that

it had jurisdiction over such an order. After Adams’s creditor filed suit against him in state court, he filed for bankruptcy and removed the case to the district court, which in
No. 03-3289 9

turn sent it to the bankruptcy court. Id. at 1188. The

creditor voluntarily dismissed its state action, but then had

a change of heart and successfully moved for

the bankruptcy court to “reinstate” the lawsuit. Id. Adams

sought relief from the district court, which dismissed

his appeal and remanded to state court. Id. The Fifth

Circuit acknowledged that the remand decision “as such

is not reviewable” under § 1452(b), but observed that

“unless this court reviews the dismissal of the appeal by the

district court, that action is functionally non-reviewable.”

Id. at 1188-89. Relying on Waco, the court held that “[t]he

district court’s order, to the extent it dismissed the appeal

from the bankruptcy court, is consequently reviewable.” Id.

(We have no need here to consider whether the Fifth Circuit

correctly concluded that it had appellate jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 158(d) to review the district court’s dismissal of

the appeal from the bankruptcy court’s order reinstating a

claim; it is enough to say that the order withdrawing the

reference before us raises different concerns, as we discuss

below.)

It is true that courts have generally limited their application of Waco to orders dismissing parties or claims. See, e.g.,

Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 1286-87 (dismissing a claim); Carr,

17 F.3d at 674 (dismissing a party); J.O., 909 F.2d at 268

(dismissing a claim); Allen, 791 F.2d at 613 (dismissing a

party); see also Nutter v. Monongahela Power Co., 4 F.3d

319, 321 (4th Cir. 1993) (“[M]ost decisions applying City of

Waco have involved orders dismissing some party or

claim.”). Although the Second Circuit seems to have

suggested that this is a closed list of reviewable orders, see

Medisys Health Network, Inc. v. Local 348-S United Food &

Commercial Workers, 337 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 2003), we

see nothing in the Supreme Court’s decisions that would

justify such a restrictive rule. Nor, apparently, did the Fifth

Circuit, which as we have just noted, relied on Waco to find

appellate jurisdiction over an order denying an appeal from
10 No. 03-3289

a bankruptcy court’s order reinstating state court litigation.

Adams, 809 F.2d at 1188.

The difficult question is whether the order for which

review is sought precedes “in logic and in fact” the remand

order. See Nutter, 4 F.3d at 321 (“Which portions of a

remand order are severable is not entirely clear . . . .”).

Neither of our prior cases applying Waco has elaborated

upon this requirement beyond suggesting that the preceding order must be one involving a “decision on the merits of

a removed case.” See J.O., 909 F.2d at 271. Other circuits

have held that an order qualifies as prior “in logic and

in fact” only when it is not “inextricably intertwined

with” or “essential to” the decision to remand, Christopher,

240 F.3d at 99, or when it is “conclusive on the [substantive] rights of the parties,” Nutter, 4 F.3d at 321, but cf.

Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 1286 (“Unlike the ‘matter of substantive law exception’ to section 1447(d), which allows courts

of appeals to review only those remand orders that are

based on substantive determinations of law, the Waco

doctrine allows us to review a district court’s jurisdictional

determinations.”).

Voest naturally insists that the court’s order withdrawing

the reference was prior “in logic and in fact” to its remand

decision, because “without the order the judge would not

have had the case to remand in the first instance.” Voest

further argues that the withdrawal of the reference “was

separable from the remand, because it was based solely on

the district court’s finding of ‘cause’ pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 157(d),” and therefore was “completely unrelated to the

statutory ‘equitable grounds’ upon which the district judge

based her remand order.” In evaluating Voest’s position, we

need not decide whether the order withdrawing the reference is indeed prior in logic and fact to the remand order.

Even if Voest convinced us that it was, and thus that

§ 1452(b) does not ban appellate jurisdiction, it must still

find an affirmative authorization that allows this court to
No. 03-3289 11

hear the case. We turn, therefore, to Good’s arguments

under § 1291.

B

As Voest acknowledges, the district judge’s order withdrawing the reference is not a final order in the sense

that it ends the litigation. Indeed, we have consistently held

that an order withdrawing the reference is interlocutory

and thus unreviewable until after a judgment has issued.

See Matter of McGaughey, 24 F.3d 904, 908 (7th Cir. 1994)

(“Since the order granting a motion to withdraw is not a

final judgment, this court lacks jurisdiction to review that

order at this point in the litigation.”); In re Pruitt, 910 F.2d

1160, 1166 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that “[a]t least five courts

of appeals have held that decisions to grant or deny motions

for withdrawal of the reference are interlocutory rather

than final”). This is undoubtedly why Voest began its quest

for appellate review with a motion asking the district court

to certify its order withdrawing the reference for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

Waco is of no use to Voest here, as Waco itself made clear

that the order for which appellate review is sought must

independently be reviewable. See Waco, 293 U.S. at 143

(providing that the order to be reviewed must be “conclusive

upon the petitioner”); Carr, 17 F.3d at 675 (holding that a

“court cannot prevent appellate review of a final collateral

order by contemporaneously remanding a case to state

court,” but noting that the order to be reviewed “must

satisfy [the] two separate jurisdictional requirements”

imposed by § 1447(d) and § 1291 (emphasis in original));

Powers v. Southland Corp., 4 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 1993)

(explaining that, although under the Waco doctrine “the

appeal is not barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), we still must

determine whether the district court’s decision is a ‘final

decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291”).
12 No. 03-3289

Although it is plain that the controversy between Voest

and Good has not come to a definitive conclusion in the trial

courts, Voest claims that it can receive appellate review of

the order withdrawing the reference under the collateral

order doctrine established in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.

Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The Supreme Court

described that doctrine as follows in Richardson-Merrell,

Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985):

The collateral order doctrine is a narrow exception [to

§ 1291], whose reach is limited to trial court orders

affecting rights that will be irretrievably lost in the

absence of an immediate appeal. To fall within the

exception, an order must at a minimum satisfy three

conditions: It must conclusively determine the disputed

question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively

unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.

Id. at 430-31 (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted). There is no doubt that the court’s order withdrawing the reference satisfies the first and second conditions.

It conclusively determined the question whether the

bankruptcy court could retain the case over Good’s objection, given the right to a jury trial, and that question was

distinct from the merits of the underlying contract and

fraud claims. At issue is the third condition, which requires

that the order be “effectively unreviewable on appeal from

a final judgment.” Id. at 431. Voest insists that this requirement is satisfied here because “the withdrawal order

includes an order of remand,” and hence the withdrawal

order is “effectively unreviewable.” Voest acknowledges,

however, as it must, that we previously have found that

§ 1291 bars interlocutory review of orders withdrawing a

reference precisely because such orders are not “effectively

unreviewable,” given the availability of appellate review

after a final judgment is entered. See, e.g., In re Powelson,

878 F.2d 976, 979 (7th Cir. 1989). Whether this analysis
No. 03-3289 13

changes when a remand order follows on the heels of the

withdrawal of the reference appears to be a matter of first

impression.

In addressing this issue, we find instructive the Second Circuit’s decision in In re Ben Cooper, Inc., 924 F.2d 36

(2d Cir. 1991). As part of its Chapter 11 reorganization

plan, Cooper obtained insurance from Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania (ICSP). Id. at 37. Cooper

filed a claim with ICSP after a subsequent fire loss, but

ICSP refused to pay; instead it brought a state action

alleging misrepresentations by Cooper in its policy application. Id. After the bankruptcy court granted its motion to stay the state court proceedings, Cooper sought a

declaration in bankruptcy court that ICSP was liable for the

fire-related losses. Id. ICSP moved for the district court to

withdraw the reference and to lift the stay. Id. The district

court held that Cooper’s adversary proceeding was non-core

and that ICSP was entitled to a jury trial. Id. at 38. It then

withdrew the reference, abstained from exercising its

jurisdiction, and lifted the stay. Id. In justifying its jurisdiction over Cooper’s appeal of the withdrawal of the reference,

the Second Circuit explained that “had the district court

gone no further than to withdraw the reference to the

bankruptcy court, that decision would have been interlocutory and not appealable,” but because “the interlocutory

withdrawal order here merged into the final judgment [it]

thus became reviewable.” Id.

As in Ben Cooper, the district court here withdrew the

reference from the bankruptcy court and then permitted the

state court litigation to proceed. On the surface, this

suggests that the Second Circuit’s rationale for finding

appellate jurisdiction might likewise support the applicability of the collateral order doctrine in the instant case. But

on closer examination, we conclude that a dismissal of a

federal court proceeding, coupled with relief from a stay of

independent state court proceedings, is materially different
14 No. 03-3289

from a decision by a district court to remand a removed case

back to state court. Nothing stands in the way of reviewing

the action on the stay at the same time as the withdrawal

order in the former situation, while § 1452(b) must be taken

into account in the latter. In Ben Cooper, the federal court

merely removed an impediment from continuing with the

state court case. That order, along with the order of dismissal, fully disposed of the matter before the federal court.

Here (as Voest acknowledges when it argues that

§ 1452(b) does not prevent us from reviewing the order

withdrawing the reference), we have before us two separate

orders, one of which it claimed was within the statutory bar

and the other of which was not. See Waco, 293 U.S. at 143

(permitting review of those district court decisions that “in

logic and in fact” precede the subsequent remand orders).

But if the withdrawal of the reference is really separate, it

is not the de facto last word in the case called for by the

collateral order doctrine. In Ben Cooper, the Second Circuit

found that it had jurisdiction because the withdrawal of the

reference “merged into” the order lifting the stay on the

state court proceedings. Similarly, Voest argues, the order

withdrawing the reference is “effectively unreviewable” for

purposes of the collateral order doctrine because the

“withdrawal order includes an order of remand.” Voest thus

seems to want it both ways, treating the district court’s

orders withdrawing the reference and remanding the case

as distinct for purposes of Waco and § 1452(b), but as linked

for purposes of the functional finality addressed by the

collateral order doctrine.

In the final analysis, Voest’s real objection appears to

be to the fact that it will have to litigate these claims in

state court, not to the fact that they might have been in the

district court rather than the bankruptcy court. This is

precisely the decision that normally does escape appellate

review, because Congress has made the judgment

that parties must live with the district court’s decision
No. 03-3289 15

about the allocation of cases between federal and state

courts. If every remand decision could be relabeled as a

“collateral order,” there would be nothing left of either

§ 1452(b) or § 1447(d). We therefore conclude that, in these

circumstances, the order withdrawing the reference was

an interlocutory order, that it was not appealable as a

collateral order or otherwise, and that we therefore lack

appellate jurisdiction to review it.

C

Voest also argues that it is entitled to appellate review of the court’s order remanding the breach of contract

and constructive fraud claims to the state court, notwithstanding § 1452(b). Our starting point must be with the

language of the statute, which reads as follows:

The court to which such claim or cause of action is

removed may remand such claim or cause of action on

any equitable ground. An order entered under this

subsection remanding a claim or cause of action, or a

decision not to remand, is not reviewable by appeal or

otherwise by the court of appeals under section 158(d),

1291, or 1292 of this title or by the Supreme Court

under section 1254 of this title.

“Read literally this language denies us jurisdiction to

review the orders remanding . . . cases to state court

regardless of the basis of the orders or the grounds for

challenging them.” Matter of United States Brass Corp., 110

F.3d 1261, 1265 (7th Cir. 1997). Yet, as we noted earlier,

the various qualifications on the rule of nonreviewability

that the Supreme Court has recognized in its Thermtron

line of cases apply to this statute as well. Analogizing to the

Supreme Court’s treatment of § 1447(d), we have found that

a district court’s decision to remand a case or claim pursuant to § 1452(b) is unreviewable only when it relies on “any

equitable ground” in doing so. See United States Brass
16 No. 03-3289

Corp., 110 F.3d at 1265-66. In this context, we have said

that the term “equitable” means “appropriate.” Hernandez

v. Brakegate, Ltd., 942 F.2d 1223, 1226 (7th Cir. 1991); see

also Things Remembered, 516 U.S. at 133 (Ginsburg, J.,

concurring) (quoting Hernandez approvingly and confirming

that, in this context, “ ‘equitable’ signals that which is

reasonable, fair, or appropriate”).

In the present case, the district court explained that it

was remanding “[b]ecause the case at bar involves claims

based entirely on state law, and because the claims

fall within ‘related to’ jurisdiction, remand will have minimal effects on the administration of the bankruptcy. The

state court can adequately address the state law issues

based on its expertise.” In addition, the court noted that the

only disadvantage that the parties “will suffer is limited to

the shifting forums in which the adjudication of the case

has proceeded.” These grounds easily come within the wide

net cast by the term “equitable.” Because the district court

relied on the statutory ground for remand, the ban on

appellate review also applies here.

III

For these reasons, we hold that we lack jurisdiction

to review either aspect of the district court’s order withdrawing the reference from the bankruptcy court and

remanding Good’s breach of contract and constructive fraud

claims to state court. The practical effect of our holding—that the state-law claims will be adjudicated in state

court while the bankruptcy action proceeds in federal

court—is not particularly unusual or onerous. Both

§ 1452(b) and § 1334(c) expressly contemplate parallel

proceedings in the bankruptcy and state courts. Finally, we

note that Heartland’s plan of reorganization provides that

the bankruptcy court “will retain jurisdiction to determine

the allowance of all Claims” and “will have concurrent
No. 03-3289 17

jurisdiction with non-bankruptcy courts to effectuate the

collection of the Estate Assets.” The plan thus makes clear

that the final word as to the actual allocation of Heartland’s

assets, including those to which Voest may be entitled, will

be that of the bankruptcy court.

We DISMISS Voest’s appeal of the district court’s order

withdrawing the reference and remanding the statelaw claims for want of jurisdiction.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—2-22-05