[Cite as State v. Cline, 2022-Ohio-1632.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

WASHINGTON COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. 21CA9, 21CA10,

21CA11, & 21CA121

v. :

CODY J. CLINE, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY 

Defendant-Appellant. :

_________________________________________________________________

APPEARANCES:

Rhys Brendan Cartwright-Jones and Tabitha L. Stewart, Youngstown, 

Ohio, for appellant. 

Nicole Coil, Washington County Prosecuting Attorney, Marietta, 

Ohio, for appellee.

___________________________________________________________________

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT

DATE JOURNALIZED: 5-10-22

ABELE, J.

{¶1} This is an appeal from four Washington County Common 

Pleas Court judgments that denied applications to seal the record 

of Cody J. Cline, defendant below and appellant herein. Appellant 

assigns one error for review: 

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING CODY J. 

CLINE’S PETITION TO SEAL RECORDS.”

1On September 9, 2021, this court granted appellant’s motion 

to consolidate Case Nos. 21CA9, 21CA10, 21CA11, and 21CA12. 
WASHINGTON, 21CA9,10,11,& 12

2

{¶2} Because this matter involves four separate judgments, we 

first discuss the factual background of each case.

APPELLATE CASE NO. 21CA9

TRIAL COURT CASE NO. (06CR294)

{¶3} In 2006, appellant entered a guilty plea to the charge of 

possession of heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a fifthdegree felony. The trial court sentenced appellant to: (1) serve 

nine months in prison, (2) pay court costs, (3) be subject to three 

years of post-release control, (4) pay $837.48 in restitution to 

the Marietta Police Department for damage to a cruiser, and (5) 

serve a six-month license suspension to begin after release from 

incarceration. 

{¶4} On March 22, 2021, appellant filed an R.C. 2953.32

application to seal his record of conviction. Appellant asserted 

he “qualifies as a first time offender as defined in R.C. 

2953.31(A) and as logically connected as part of an overall vice 

and of a logical connections [sic.]. No criminal or traffic 

charges are pending against her/him.” On April 5, 2021, appellant 

filed a virtually identical amended R.C. 2953.32 application to 

seal a criminal record. 

{¶5} After review, the trial court denied appellant’s 

applications. The court noted that R.C. 2953.31(A)(1) defines 

eligible offender, in pertinent part, as “* * * if all of the 
WASHINGTON, 21CA9,10,11,& 12

3

offenses in this state are felonies of the fourth or fifth degree 

or misdemeanors and none of the offenses are an offense of violence 

* * * or in R.C. 2953.31(A)(2) as someone who has “* * * not more 

than two felony convictions.” The court held:

The Court has reviewed the Defendant’s criminal history 

and it indicates in pertinent part that he has two F-4 

Thefts in 2000, an M-1 Assault in 2006, an F-5 Possession 

of Heroin in 2007, an F-4 Vehicular Assault in 2010, and 

an F-5 Theft in 2013. 

The Court finds that an Assault conviction is an offense 

of violence so he is not eligible under (A)(1). Also, the 

Defendant has more than two felony convictions so he is 

not eligible under (A)(2). 

{¶6} The trial court noted that appellant argued that, under 

the R.C. 2953.36(A)(4) exceptions, misdemeanor assaults should be 

excluded as offenses of violence. The court, however, did not find 

that any of the exceptions apply to appellant. The court further 

noted that, even if appellant is an eligible offender, appellant 

has not been rehabilitated to the court’s satisfaction. 

{¶7} Thus, the trial court concluded that the government’s 

legitimate need to maintain the records outweighs the applicant’s 

interest in having the conviction sealed. 

APPELLATE COURT CASE NO. 21CA10 

TRIAL COURT CASE NO. (10CR52)

{¶8} On February 26, 2010, a Washington County Grand Jury 

returned an indictment that charged appellant with (1) one count of 
WASHINGTON, 21CA9,10,11,& 12

4

aggravated vehicular assault in violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a) 

& (B)(1) (while committing a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)), a 

third-degree felony; and (2) one count of aggravated vehicular 

assault in violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a) & (B)(1)(a)(as a 

proximate result of committing a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A) and 

driving under a suspension imposed under Chapter 4510), a seconddegree felony. 

{¶9} On October 27, 2010, appellee filed a motion to dismiss 

the indictment because appellant entered a guilty plea to a bill of 

information in Case No. 10CR227 for charges that arose from this 

case. The trial court granted the request to dismiss on October 

28, 2010.

{¶10} On March 22, 2021, appellant filed an identical R.C. 

2953.32 application and amended application to seal his criminal 

record as he did in Case No. 06CR294(21CA9). Once again, the trial 

court denied the applications. The court concluded that, although

the case had been dismissed, the statute of limitations expired and 

no criminal proceedings pending, the government’s legitimate need 

to maintain the records outweighed the applicant’s interests in 

sealing the record. 

APPELLATE CASE NO. 21CA11 

TRIAL COURT CASE NO. (06CR238)

{¶11} On September 11, 2006, a Washington County Grand Jury 
WASHINGTON, 21CA9,10,11,& 12

5

returned an indictment that charged appellant with (1) one count of 

vandalism in violation of R.C. 2909.05(B)(2)&(E), a fifth-degree 

felony; and (2) one count of criminal damaging in violation of R.C. 

2909.06(A)(1)&(B), a second-degree misdemeanor. On November 17, 

2006, appellee filed a motion to dismiss because, on November 16, 

2006, appellant entered a guilty plea in Case No. 06CR294. On 

November 22, 2006, the trial court dismissed the case.

{¶12} On March 22, 2021, appellant filed an R.C. 2953.32 

application to seal his criminal record and, on April 5, 2021, 

appellant filed an amended application to seal his criminal record. 

The trial court denied appellant’s applications and concluded that, 

although the case had been dismissed, the relevant statute of 

limitations expired and no criminal proceedings pending, the 

government’s legitimate need to maintain the records outweighed the 

applicant’s interests in sealing the conviction. 

APPELLATE CASE NO. 21CA12 

TRIAL COURT CASE NO. (06CR227)

{¶13} In 2010, appellant entered a guilty plea to a charge of 

vehicular assault in violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(2)(b)&(C)(1)&(2), 

a fourth-degree felony. The trial court ordered appellant to: (1) 

serve 16 months in prison, (2) pay court costs and fees, (3) serve 

3 years of post-release control, and (4) undergo a five-year 

license suspension.
WASHINGTON, 21CA9,10,11,& 12

6

{¶14} Subsequently, the trial court denied appellant’s 

application to seal the record of conviction. The court noted that 

R.C. 2953.31(A)(1) defines eligible offender, in pertinent part, as 

“* * * if all of the offenses in this state are felonies of the 

fourth or fifth degree or misdemeanors and none of the offenses are 

an offense of violence * * * or in R.C. 2953.31(A)(2) as someone 

who has “* * * not more than two felony convictions.” The court 

held:

The Court has reviewed the Defendant’s criminal history 

and it indicates in pertinent part that he has two F-4 

Thefts in 2000, an M-1 Assault in 2006, an F-5 Possession 

of Heroin in 2007, an F-4 Vehicular Assault in 2010, and 

an F-5 Theft in 2013. 

The Court finds that an Assault conviction is an offense 

of violence so he is not eligible under (A)(1). Also, the 

Defendant has more than two felony convictions so he is

not eligible under (A)(2). 

{¶15} The trial court pointed out that appellant argued, under 

the R.C. 2953.36(A)(4) exceptions, that a misdemeanor assault 

should be excluded as an offense of violence. However, the court 

did not find the exception applicable and noted that, even if 

appellant were an eligible offender, appellant has not been 

rehabilitated to the court’s satisfaction. Thus, the court 

concluded that the government’s legitimate need to maintain the 

records outweighs the applicant’s interests in having the 
WASHINGTON, 21CA9,10,11,& 12

7

conviction sealed. 

I. 

{¶16} In his sole assignment of error, appellant asserts that 

the trial court erred in denying his application to seal various 

court records generated in multiple criminal proceedings.2

{¶17} Sealing records of conviction is generally a two-step 

process. State v. C.L.H., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-495, 2019-

Ohio-3786, ¶ 12. First, a trial court must determine whether an 

applicant is an “eligible offender” under the relevant statute. If 

the applicant does not qualify as an eligible offender, “a trial 

court lacks jurisdiction to grant the application.” State v. 

D.M.C., 2020-Ohio-3556, 154 N.E.3d 1054, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.); State v. 

Jones, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 20 MA 0078, 2021-Ohio-2499, ¶ 10. 

Further, whether an applicant is an “eligible offender” for 

purposes of an application to seal the record of a conviction is an 

issue that appellate courts review de novo. State v. R.M.M., 10th 

Dist. Franklin No. 20AP-6, 2021-Ohio-3314, ¶ 13; D.M.C., 2020-Ohio3556, ¶ 8; State v. A.L.M., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 16AP-722, 2017-

Ohio-2772, ¶ 9. 

2

 In his procedural history, appellant refers to Marietta 

Municipal Court entries. However, as appellee observes, 

appellant’s notices of appeal refer to four Washington County 

Common Pleas Court cases (06CR294, 06CR238, 10CR52, and 10CR227).
WASHINGTON, 21CA9,10,11,& 12

8

{¶18} If a court finds an applicant to be an eligible offender, 

the second step requires the court to use discretion to (1) 

consider objections, if any, the prosecutor raises, and (2) weigh 

the applicant’s interests in sealing the record against any 

legitimate governmental need to maintain those records. R.C. 

2953.52(B)(2)(c)and (d). See also State v. D.D.F., 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 20AP-10, 2020-Ohio-4663, ¶ 7, 10. Generally, an 

appellate court will apply “an abuse of discretion standard when 

reviewing a trial court’s resolution of these issues.” D.M.C., 

2020-Ohio-3556, ¶ 9, citing State v. Paige, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 

15AP-510, 2015-Ohio-4876, ¶ 5; State v. Hilbert, 145 Ohio App.3d 

824, 827, 764 N.E.2d 1064 (8th Dist.2001); State v. Pierce, 10th 

Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-931, 2007-Ohio-1708, ¶ 5. The abuse of 

discretion standard is used to determine whether a court’s attitude 

is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. 

Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 

{¶19} The purpose behind sealing a criminal record is to 

recognize that some people may become rehabilitated. State v. 

Petrou, 13 Ohio App.3d 456, 469 N.E.2d 974 (9th Dist.1984); State 

v. Hair, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2019-CA-73, 2020-Ohio-3128, ¶ 10. 

Thus, sealing a record is an “act of grace created by the state,” 

State v. Hamilton, 75 Ohio St.3d 636, 639, 665 N.E.2d 669 (1996); 
WASHINGTON, 21CA9,10,11,& 12

9

State v. Pariag, 137 Ohio St.3d 81, 2013-Ohio-4010, 998 N.E.2d 401, 

¶ 12, and should be granted “only when all requirements for 

eligibility are met, because it is a ‘privilege, not a right.’” 

Pariag, supra, citing State v. Futrall, 123 Ohio St.3d 498, 2009-

Ohio-5590, 918 N.E.2d 497, ¶ 6. Moreover, the statute in effect at 

the time of filing an R.C. 2953.32 application is controlling. 

State v. LaSalle, 96 Ohio St.3d 178, 2002-Ohio-4009, 772 N.E.2d 

1172, paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶20} Appellant initially contends that the trial court denied 

his application because appellant used the term “first offender” 

when appellant actually intended to use the term “eligible 

offender” as defined in R.C. 2953.31(A). Appellee, however, claims 

that this misnomer is irrelevant because the court did not indicate 

in its entry that the use of this term had any bearing on the 

denial of appellant’s application. Rather, the court denied the 

application because it determined that appellant is not an eligible 

offender. 

{¶21} Second, although appellant argues he is an eligible 

offender, R.C. 2953.32 requires a trial court first to determine 

whether an applicant is indeed an “eligible offender.” A.L.M., 

2017-Ohio-2772 at ¶ 9; Futrall 123 Ohio St.3d at ¶ 6. Pursuant to 

R.C. 2953.31(A)(1), an “eligible offender” means either of the 
WASHINGTON, 21CA9,10,11,& 12

10

following:

(a) Anyone who has been convicted of one or more offenses, 

but not more than five felonies, in this state or any other 

jurisdiction, if all of the offenses in this state are 

felonies of the fourth or fifth degree or misdemeanors and 

none of those offenses are an offense of violence or a 

felony sex offense and all of the offenses in another 

jurisdiction, if committed in this state, would be felonies 

of the fourth or fifth degree or misdemeanors and none of 

those offenses would be an offense of violence of a felony 

sex offense;

(b) Anyone who has been convicted of an offense in this 

state or any other jurisdiction, to whom division (A)(1)(a) 

of this section does not apply, and who has not more than 

one felony conviction, not more than two misdemeanor 

convictions, or not more than one felony conviction and 

one misdemeanor conviction in this state or any other 

jurisdiction. When two or more convictions result from or 

are connected with the same act or result from offenses 

committed at the same time, they shall be counted as one 

conviction. When two or three convictions result from the 

same indictment, information, or complaint, from the same 

plea of guilty, or from the same official proceeding, and 

result from related criminal acts that were committed 

within a three-month period but do not result from the same 

act or from offenses committed at the same time, they shall 

be counted as one conviction, provided that a court may 

decide as provided in division (C)(1)(a) of section 2953.32 

of the Revised Code that it is not in the public interest 

for the two or three convictions to be counted as one 

conviction. 

{¶22} After appellant filed his application, the trial court 

reviewed appellant’s criminal history and indicated that appellant 

has two fourth-degree felony theft convictions in 2000, a firstdegree misdemeanor assault conviction in 2006, a fifth-degree 

felony possession of heroin conviction in 2007, a fourth-degree 
WASHINGTON, 21CA9,10,11,& 12

11

vehicular assault conviction in 2010, and a fifth-degree felony 

theft conviction in 2013. The trial court concluded that appellant 

is not eligible offender because (1) under R.C. 2953.31(A)(1), 

assault is an offense of violence, and (2) under R.C. 

2953.31(A)(2),3 appellant has two felony convictions. 

{¶23} The Revised Code does exclude certain criminal offenses 

from being sealed. For example, R.C. 2953.31(A)(1)(a) precludes 

eligible offender status if an offender has one or more misdemeanor 

“offenses of violence.” Interestingly, the term “offense of 

violence” is not defined in the statutes that relate to sealing 

records. State v. R.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104347, 2017-Ohio7396, ¶ 8; State v. A.G., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110132, 2021-Ohio4428, ¶ 20. However, R.C. 2901.01, which provides general 

definitions for Revised Code terms, defines “offense of violence.” 

Also R.C. 2901.01(A)(9)(a) specifies certain code sections as 

offenses of violence. Menacing, a violation of R.C. 2903.22, is 

listed in R.C. 2901.01(A)(9)(a) as an offense of violence. 

Appellee thus asserts that appellant’s 2008 menacing conviction 

falls under this statute and, because R.C. 2952.31(A)(1)(a) 

precludes eligibility for record sealing if an applicant has one or 

3 It appears that the trial court intended to refer to R.C. 

2953.31(A)(1)(b). 
WASHINGTON, 21CA9,10,11,& 12

12

more misdemeanor “offenses of violence,” appellant is not an 

eligible offender. 

{¶24} Appellee further argues that appellant’s 2006 assault 

conviction constitutes an offense of violence. Assault, a 

violation of R.C. 2903.13, is, in fact, listed in R.C. 

2901.01(A)(9)(a) as an offense of violence. In State v. J.B., 9th 

Dist. Summit No. 29699, 2021-Ohio-187, the Ninth District recently 

considered the sealing of a misdemeanor assault conviction. In 

J.B., the applicant conceded he had a prior assault conviction, an 

offense of violence pursuant to R.C. 2901.01(A)(9)(a), but argued 

that the court should have applied R.C. 2953.31(A)(1)(a) when it 

determined his “eligible offender” status. J.B. thus argued that 

because a conviction for misdemeanor assault is eligible for 

sealing under R.C. 2953.36(A)(3), it should not be considered an 

“offense of violence” for purposes of R.C. 2953.31(A)(1)(a). Id. 

{¶25} Although the Ninth District agreed that R.C. 

2953.36(A)(3) does not outright preclude a misdemeanor assault 

conviction from being sealed, the court did not agree with the 

contention that for sealing purposes the statute stripped 

misdemeanor assault of its general classification as an “offense of 

violence” under R.C. 2901.01(A)(1)(9). In State v. J.B., 9th Dist. 

Summit No. 29699, 2021-Ohio-187, at ¶ 14, the court wrote:
WASHINGTON, 21CA9,10,11,& 12

13

An applicant for sealing whose offenses are not statutorily 

exempt from sealing still must otherwise demonstrate that 

he is an ‘eligible offender.’ See id. at ¶ 14-15; R.C. 

2953.32(A)(1). Because J.B.’s misdemeanor assault 

conviction was an offense of violence, see R.C. 

2901.01(A)(9)(a), the trial court correctly determined 

that he was subject to the ‘eligible offender’ definition 

contained in R.C. 2953.31(A)(1)(b). 

Under R.C. 2953.31(A)(1)(b), an eligible offender is 

someone who has ‘not more than one felony conviction, not 

more than two misdemeanor convictions, or not more than 

one felony conviction and one misdemeanor conviction in 

this state or any other jurisdiction.’ The trial court 

concluded that, because J.B. had more than two misdemeanor 

convictions, he was not eligible to have his records 

sealed. The trial court further concluded that J.B. was 

not eligible because he had been convicted of more than 

one felony and one misdemeanor.* * *” 

J.B., 2021-Ohio-187 at ¶ 13-14.

{¶26} In the case at bar, appellee argues that appellant should 

be ineligible because: (1) the menacing conviction makes appellant 

ineligible under R.C. 2953.31(A)(1)(a); and (2) appellant is 

ineligible under R.C. 2953.31(A)(1)(b) because he has more than one 

felony conviction and more than two misdemeanor convictions. 

Although we agree that the misdemeanor convictions of violence may 

not be precluded from sealing under R.C. 2953.36(A)(3) courts must 

determine whether an applicant is an eligible offender under R.C. 

2953.31(A)(1)(b). After our review, we have no disagreement with 

the trial court’s conclusion that, at this juncture, appellant’s 

records should not be sealed. See R.C. 2953.31(A)(1)(a) and (b). 
WASHINGTON, 21CA9,10,11,& 12

14

{¶27} Appellant further asserts that the trial court based its 

decision, in part, on pending criminal proceedings or 

investigations. However, we point out that the trial court’s

entries specify: “The Court finds that there are no criminal 

proceedings pending against the Defendant.” Therefore, appellant’s 

argument in this regard is without merit. 

{¶28} Appellant additionally claims that he has a meaningful 

interest in the relief sought because his criminal offenses stem 

from a time when he suffered from addiction, but he now has 

attained sobriety and his criminal record prevents him from 

becoming a “useful and gainfully employed member of society.” 

Although appellant is correct that a trial court must weigh an

applicant’s interests in sealed records versus the state’s reasons 

to oppose an application and the government’s need to maintain 

those records, as the appellee observes the R.C. 2953.32(C)(1) 

standard does not simply consider whether appellant has a 

meaningful interest in the relief sought, but also whether the 

state’s legitimate need to maintain the records outweighs that 

interest. R.C. 2953.32(C)(1)(e) instructs trial courts to: “weigh 

the interests of the applicant in having the records pertaining to 

the applicant’s conviction or bail forfeiture sealed against the 

legitimate needs, if any, of the government to maintain those 
[Cite as State v. Cline, 2022-Ohio-1632.]

records.” 

{¶29} In the case at bar, appellee claims that appellant’s 

criminal history, including community control violations, postrelease control, and judicial release demonstrate that, at this 

juncture, the state has a legitimate interest to ensure that the 

public is aware of appellant’s criminal record until more time has 

passed and appellant shows more evidence of remorse and conformity 

to law. After our review, we do not believe that the trial court’s 

determination that the government’s legitimate need to maintain 

appellant’s record of conviction outweighs appellant’s interest in 

having his convictions sealed constitutes an abuse of discretion. 

{¶30} Finally, appellant argues that he has been rehabilitated 

and the trial court’s denial of his application constitutes an 

abuse of discretion. Appellant emphasizes that the sealing 

provisions should be liberally construed to promote their purpose 

and to assist parties to obtain justice. See State v. C.A., 10th 

Dist. No. 14AP-738, 2015-Ohio-3437, ¶ 11; State ex rel. Gains v. 

Rossi, 86 Ohio St.3d 620, 622, 716 N.E.2d 204 (1999), citing R.C. 

1.11; Barker v. State, 62 Ohio St.2d 35, 52, 402 N.E.2d 550 (1980). 

{¶31} In support of his argument, appellant cites State v. 

Bates, 5th Dist. Ashland No. 03-COA-057, 2004-Ohio-2260. In Bates,

the trial court denied the application to seal, but the Fifth 
[Cite as State v. Cline, 2022-Ohio-1632.]

District determined that the trial court did not make any findings, 

on the record or otherwise, regarding (1) appellant’s interest in 

having the record sealed or the government’s need to maintain those 

records, and (2) whether appellant had been rehabilitated to the 

court’s satisfaction. The court observed that the trial court’s 

findings “simply stated that it was denying appellant’s motion 

‘based upon the nature of the Defendant’s offenses.’” Id. at ¶ 25. 

Notably, at the hearing the trial court stated that “it is the 

nature of the offense, it is the nature of the addiction that 

causes the court simply to say no.” Id. at ¶ 25-26. The appellate 

court, however, concluded that the trial court failed to address 

whether this particular defendant had been rehabilitated and, thus, 

applied the wrong standard when it reviewed applicant’s motion. 

Id. at ¶ 26.

{¶32} We find Bates inapplicable. In the case at bar, the 

trial court did not determine that all defendants who suffered from 

addiction are precluded from sealing a criminal record, but instead 

examined the record and found insufficient evidence of appellant’s 

rehabilitation to the court’s satisfaction. 

{¶33} Appellant also contends that State v. J.S., 2017-Ohio7613, 97 N.E.3d 790 (10th Dist.) supports his position. At a 

hearing, J.S. offered an affidavit from an employer to support her 

application. The trial court, however, concluded that the 
[Cite as State v. Cline, 2022-Ohio-1632.]

affidavit did not state that J.S.’s record “would stop [her] from 

moving forward.” The court further informed J.S. that, if her 

situation changed, she could provide the court with an affidavit 

“where you [are] actually being affected by this,” and that would 

be a change in circumstances for the court. Id. On appeal, the 

Tenth District reversed and observed that R.C. 2953.32 does not 

include a requirement that an applicant must affirmatively 

demonstrate that his or her criminal record adversely and 

specifically affected the applicant before a record may be sealed. 

Id. at ¶ 9. We, however, believe that J.S. is distinguishable from 

the present case because here, the trial court did not impose any 

additional requirements that appellant must affirmatively 

demonstrate and present actual evidence to show that the criminal 

record has adversely affected the applicant. Here, in addition to 

the trial court’s determination that appellant is not an eligible 

offender, the denial of the application also concluded that 

appellant “has not been rehabilitated to the satisfaction of the 

Court and government’s legitimate needs of maintaining the records 

outweigh the applicant’s interests in having the conviction

sealed.” The trial court did not, however, require appellant to 

provide any additional proof beyond the statute’s requirements. 

{¶34} Furthermore, although in the case sub judice the trial 

court may not have specified its reasons for its determination that 
[Cite as State v. Cline, 2022-Ohio-1632.]

appellant has not been rehabilitated to the court’s satisfaction, 

this lack of specificity does not constitute an abuse of 

discretion. Appellate courts have not interpreted R.C. 2953.32 to 

require specific findings in the judgment entry. R.M.M., 2021-

Ohio-3314, ¶ 29, citing State v. Johnson, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 06 

MA 188, 2008-Ohio-1183, ¶ 15 (R.C. 2953.32 “requires the court to 

take a number of steps, but it does not require the court to record 

findings”); State v. Smith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91853, 2009-

Ohio-2380, ¶ 12, fn. 5 (“we reject any notion that R.C. 2953.32 

mandates the trial court to include its findings in the judgment 

entry”). 

{¶35} Therefore, based upon all of the foregoing reasons, we 

agree with the trial court’s conclusion and find no abuse of 

discretion with the determination that appellant’s records should 

not be sealed at this time. Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s 

assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
WASHINGTON, 21CA9,10,11,& 12

19

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed. Appellee shall 

recover of appellant the costs herein taxed.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court 

directing the Washington County Common Pleas Court to carry this 

judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate 

pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Smith, P.J. & Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

For the Court

BY:_____________________________ 

 Peter B. Abele, Judge

 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a 

final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal 

commences from the date of filing with the clerk.
WASHINGTON, 21CA9,10,11,& 12

20