THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Isaac D. Brailey, Claimant, Appellant, 

v. 

Michelin North America, Inc., (US7), Employer, and 

Safety National Casualty Corp., Carrier, Respondents. 

Appellate Case No. 2019-000556 

Appeal From The Workers' Compensation Commission 

Opinion No. 5906 

Heard February 9, 2022 – Filed April 27, 2022 

REVERSED AND REMANDED 

Stephen Benjamin Samuels, of Samuels Reynolds Law 

Firm LLC, of Columbia, for Appellant. 

Grady Larry Beard and Jasmine Denise Smith, both of 

Robinson Gray Stepp & Laffitte, LLC, of Columbia, for 

Respondents. 

WILLIAMS, C.J.: Issac D. Brailey appeals the order of the Appellate Panel of 

the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission (the Commission) 

denying his claim for benefits against Michelin North America, Inc. Brailey 

contends the Commission erred in finding (1) he failed to prove he sustained a 

compensable injury; (2) his claim was barred by the fraud in the application 
 

defense under Cooper v. McDevitt & Street Co.;

1

 (3) Michelin proved the elements 

of Capers v. Flautt;

2

 and (4) he intentionally and willfully caused injury to himself. 

We reverse and remand, finding Brailey's injury is compensable under South 

Carolina's workers' compensation law. 

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Brailey was hired by Michelin on April 17, 2017. He passed a physical during 

Michelin's hiring process and was cleared for full duty. He trained as a rubber 

stretcher for very large mining tires. In his deposition, Brailey denied being 

trained in the correct procedures for filing workers' compensation claims or for 

reporting injuries at work. He said his back started bothering him when he began 

the physical work at Michelin, but his supervisor and the Michelin nurse told him it 

was normal to have back pain when stretching rubber. Brailey went to the 

emergency room (ER) on June 11, 2017, for back pain. He did not tell anyone at 

Michelin, and he was not ordered out of work. The ER doctor prescribed Flexeril 

for the back pain. Brailey stated he saw his family doctor for minor back pain on 

June 13. The medical records from the visit with his family doctor showed Brailey 

described pain that was a "ten out of ten" and showed that Brailey had been having 

back pain for two weeks prior to the visit. He did not disclose the June 13 doctor's 

visit to Michelin, and he was not ordered out of work by the family doctor on June 

13. 

On Saturday, June 24, 2017, Brailey suffered sharp back pain while stretching 

rubber at Michelin. He tried to see the Michelin nurse but the office was closed. 

He went to the ER and was prescribed multiple pain medications and restricted 

from work for three days. Brailey claimed he called his supervisor during the ER 

visit and the supervisor told him to see the Michelin nurse. Brailey told him the 

nurse's office was closed, and the supervisor told him to wait until Monday. The 

Michelin nurse called Brailey and told him to relax, take Aleve, and see the 

Michelin doctor on Monday morning. 

Brailey saw Michelin's doctor, Dr. Stephen Izard, on Monday, June 26. Dr. Izard 

told him to take Ibuprofen and Flexeril, to not follow up with a neurosurgeon, and 

to return to work on June 27 with no restrictions. Despite instructions from his 

Michelin supervisors to follow up with Dr. Izard, Brailey missed his follow up 

appointment because he did not want to drive while taking pain medicine and 

refused transportation offered by Michelin. He did not return to work at Michelin 

1

 260 S.C. 463, 196 S.E.2d 833 (1973).

2

 305 S.C. 254, 407 S.E.2d 660 (Ct. App. 1991). 
 

 

 

after June 24. He went back to the ER on June 27 because he was feeling 

"terrible." He received an x-ray and a shot and was restricted from work for three 

days. 

The ER referred Brailey to Dr. Scott Boyd, a neurosurgeon. Dr. Boyd ordered an 

MRI and physical therapy in July 2017. Dr. Boyd filled out a medical 

questionnaire that stated it was his opinion to a reasonable degree of medical 

certainty that, more likely than not, Brailey injured his lumbar spine at his 

employment on June 24, 2017. Dr. Boyd stated in his deposition that Brailey had a 

herniated disk and there was no way to tell how long it had been present. Dr. Boyd 

recalled that Brailey told him he injured his back on June 24 stretching rubber at 

Michelin and he had previous back problems twenty-five years ago that resolved 

without treatment. 

During his deposition, Dr. Boyd reviewed Brailey's medical records from his June 

11 and June 13 doctor's visits. Dr. Boyd stated that Brailey's complaints and 

symptoms of back pain on June 11 and 13 were similar to what he reported on June 

24 but were perhaps more severe on June 24. Under cross-examination, Dr. Boyd 

stated he was uncertain about the exact date of Brailey's injury. At the conclusion 

of the deposition, Dr. Boyd opined, "I believe, based on his history and in his 

records, that [the injury] was related to his work at Michelin in the continuum with 

some event on about June 24 that made things worse." 

At the hearing before the single commissioner, Brailey testified about his prior 

work history. He recalled that he experienced middle-back pain three weeks after 

beginning work at Richtex Brick in 1997.3 Brailey was placed under a 

no-heavy-lifting restriction in 1997 until he saw a surgeon. He did not see a 

surgeon and settled a workers' compensation claim with Richtex Brick for $2,500.4 

Brailey then worked at Westinghouse for sixteen years before being laid off. 

Brailey indicated he did not suffer from back pain while working at Westinghouse. 

Brailey testified that during training at Michelin in 2017, he filled out a form that 

asked if he had ever had medical attention for back injury, backache, or back pain. 

He answered "no" on the form. Brailey did not list Richtex Brick as a previous 

employer on his Michelin employment application. 

3

 Brailey claimed his current pain was in a different area of his back. 

4

 The doctor at Richtex Brick noted that Brailey was probably not physically able 

to perform the work at Richtex Brick and may have had a "litigation thought 

process." 
 

 

The safety manager at Michelin, Mark Gross, testified that all incoming employees 

are trained in safety and workers' compensation protocol. Gross verified that 

Michelin relies on the answers given by employees on hiring forms. Gross stated 

that he called Brailey in June 2017 to offer to send a taxi to pick him up for the 

follow-up visit with Dr. Izard. Brailey told him to talk to his lawyer and hung up 

on him. 

Brailey filed a workers' compensation claim that Michelin denied in July 2017. 

After a hearing, the single commissioner denied the claim. In affirming the single 

commissioner's denial of benefits to Brailey, the Commission found Brailey was 

not credible based on his testimony and the single commissioner's observations of 

him. The Commission found Brailey was not clear about the date of injury and 

found the medical records were inconsistent with his testimony. The order noted 

that Brailey had a "very similar incident" at Richtex and omitted information about 

Richtex on his Michelin employment application. The Commission found that 

Brailey 

repeatedly attempted to justify his answers during his 

testimony. We find that while testifying, the claimant 

gave confusing answers when asked direct questions by 

his attorney. As noted by the [single] [c]ommissioner 

throughout the proceeding, the claimant provided vague 

responses when questioned by defense counsel. He 

would not answer defense counsel's questions, rambling 

through responses. 

The Commission's order stated "causation [was] not provided in the medical 

records because Dr. Boyd had no knowledge of the extent of claimant's prior back 

issues." The order noted Dr. Boyd opined on the medical questionnaire that 

"[Brailey] injured his lumbar spine at Michelin on June 24, 2017, the injury 

resulted in radiculopathy down [his] left leg, . . . and [Brailey] had not reached 

maximum medical improvement." The order further stated that Dr. Boyd opined in 

his deposition that "more likely than not, [Brailey] injured his lumbar spine at 

Michelin, including 'some episode on June 24.'" 

The Commission found Brailey committed fraud in the application for employment 

with Michelin because he knowingly and willfully made a false representation as 

to his prior back condition on a Michelin medical questionnaire and Michelin 

relied on those false answers. 

The order stated, 
This claim is denied in its entirety based on evidence of 

numerous issues relating back to 1997 through 2017. 

The claimant has failed to carry his burden of proof of an 

accident being sustained on June 24, 2017, due to his 

lack of credibility, the lack of sufficient medical evidence 

to support his allegations, and moreover, due to medical 

evidence to the contrary. We find the claimant was 

unable to return to work after June 24, 2017, due to a 

previous incident. We find the June 24, 2017, incident is 

not compensable based upon the greater weight of the 

evidence and the other reasons stated within this finding. 

The order stated Brailey "did not sustain compensable injury to his low back while 

under the employ of [Michelin] on June 24, 2017, as alleged." The order also 

stated, 

Under § 42-9-60, assuming [Brailey] actually sustained 

an injury by accident on June 24, 2017 . . . [he] 

intentionally and willfully did so by failing to alert or 

notify his employer he was allegedly suffering from ten 

out of ten low back pain for at least 4 weeks prior to that 

date and seeking medical treatment on his own without 

any knowledge by his employer due to his failure to 

provide same. 

This appeal followed. 

ISSUES ON APPEAL 

I. Did the Commission err in finding Michelin proved the elements of the 

Cooper v. McDevitt & Street defense? 

II. Did the Commission err in finding the claim was barred by Capers v. Flautt? 

III. Did the Commission err in finding Brailey's claim was barred by section 

42-9-60 of the South Carolina Code (2015)? 

IV. Did the Commission err in finding that Brailey did not meet his burden of 

proof to show he injured his back in an accident arising out of his employment at 

Michelin? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 

"The South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act (APA) establishes the 

standard for judicial review of decisions of the Workers' Compensation 

Commission." Bass v. Isochem, 365 S.C. 454, 467, 617 S.E.2d 369, 376 (Ct. App. 

2005); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (Supp. 2021). "An appellate court's 

review is limited to the determination of whether the Commission's decision is 

supported by substantial evidence or is controlled by an error of law." Clemmons 

v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc.-Harbison, 420 S.C. 282, 287, 803 S.E.2d 268, 270 

(2017). This court "may reverse or modify the [Commission's] decision if 

substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the 

[Commission's] findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . affected by 

other error of law [or] clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and 

substantial evidence on the whole record." Frampton v. S.C. Dept. of Nat. Res., 

432 S.C. 247, 256, 851 S.E.2d 714, 719 (Ct. App. 2020) (final alteration in 

original) (quoting § 1-23-380(5)(d), (e)). 

In workers' compensation cases, the Commission is the ultimate fact finder, and its 

findings are presumed correct and will not be set aside unless unsupported by 

substantial evidence in the record. Holmes v. Nat'l Serv. Indus., 395 S.C. 305, 308, 

717 S.E.2d 751, 752 (2011). "'Substantial evidence' is not a mere scintilla of 

evidence[,] nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is 

evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds 

to reach the conclusion that the administrative agency reached . . . in order to 

justify its action." Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 

(1981) (quoting Law v. Richland Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 270 S.C. 492, 495–96, 243 

S.E.2d 192, 193 (1978)). When evidence conflicts, either in testimony given by 

different witnesses or by the same witness, the Commission's factual findings are 

conclusive. Anderson v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 343 S.C. 487, 492–93, 541 S.E.2d 526, 

528 (2001). "The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the 

evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's findings from being 

supported by substantial evidence." Liberty Mut. Ins. v. S.C. Second Inj. Fund, 363 

S.C. 612, 620, 611 S.E.2d 297, 301 (Ct. App. 2005). "The final determination of 

witness credibility and the weight to be accorded evidence is reserved to the 

[Commission]." Brunson v. Am. Koyo Bearings, 395 S.C. 450, 455, 718 S.E.2d 

755, 758 (Ct. App. 2011). 

LAW/ANALYSIS 

I. Fraud in the Application Defense 
Brailey argues the Commission erred in finding Michelin proved the elements of 

fraud in the employment application under Cooper v. McDevitt & Street Co. We 

agree. 

The Cooper court set forth the following factors that must be present before a false 

statement in an employment application will bar benefits: 

(1) The employee must have knowingly and wil[l]fully 

made a false representation as to his physical 

condition. (2) The employer must have relied upon the 

false representation[,] and this reliance must have been a 

substantial factor in the hiring. (3) There must have been 

a causal connection between the false representation and 

the injury. 

Cooper, 260 S.C. at 468, 196 S.E.2d at 835. "All factors must be present for the 

employer to avoid paying benefits." Vines v. Champion Bldg. Prods., 315 S.C. 13, 

16, 431 S.E.2d 585, 586 (1993). 

Here, the Commission made the following findings of fact with regards to the 

Cooper defense: 

We find Dr. Boyd provided restrictions of no heavy 

lifting. However, we find causation is not provided in 

the medical records because Dr. Boyd had no knowledge 

of the extent of [Brailey's] prior back issues. This 

finding is based upon the greater weight of the evidence 

in the record, the deposition testimony of Dr. Boyd, and 

the testimony of [Brailey]. 

We find [Brailey] knowingly and willfully made a false 

misrepresentation as to his prior back condition. We find 

[Michelin] relied on the claimant's misrepresentations on 

his post-hire medical questionnaire. We find a causal 

relationship exists between [Brailey's] prior back 

problems and the subsequent back problems arising from 

his alleged work-related accident. This finding is based 

upon the testimony of all witnesses and the medical 

evidence in the record. 

(emphases added). The Commission concluded as a matter of law that all three 

Cooper elements were met in this case. 
 

While substantial evidence supports the Commission's findings that Michelin met 

the first two Cooper elements,5

 Michelin has not proven a causal connection 

between the false representation and the injury. See Corbin v. Kohler Co., 351 

S.C. 613, 624, 571 S.E.2d 92, 98 (Ct. App. 2002) ("Expert medical testimony is 

intended to aid the Appellate Panel in coming to the correct conclusion."); Tiller v. 

Nat'l Health Care Ctr. of Sumter, 334 S.C. 333, 340, 513 S.E.2d 843, 846 (1999) 

("[W]hile medical testimony is entitled to great respect, the fact finder may 

disregard it if there is other competent evidence in the record."). 

The Commission found Dr. Boyd was not aware of "the extent" of Brailey's 1997 

back injury. However, the record contains no evidence that the 1997 injury did not 

resolve, and the record does not indicate the "extent" of the injury. In the medical 

notes from 1997, the Richtex doctor noted that Brailey had been improving. 

Dr. Boyd's deposition testimony shows that although he wavered on a specific date 

of injury he opined that Brailey's back problems were related solely to his work at 

Michelin, and the injury was aggravated on June 24. The record contains no 

medical evidence that Brailey's 1997 back injury somehow contributed to the June 

24 injury or that he was predisposed to back injury. Indeed, Brailey worked at 

Westinghouse for sixteen years without a back injury. See Vines, 315 S.C. at 16, 

431 S.E.2d at 586 ("There is no evidence Vines' previous injury contributed to the 

occurrence of the accident. Additionally, although there was evidence indicating 

Vines was predisposed to back injuries because of his previous injury and surgery, 

Vines' physician testified the accident alone without any prior injury would have 

been sufficient to cause an injury of this nature."); cf. Givens v. Steel Structures, 

Inc., 279 S.C. 12, 14, 301 S.E.2d 545, 547 (1983) (finding the claimant's condition 

was one of disc degeneration reflecting the cumulative effect of successive 

injuries). Here, because the medical testimony is the only competent evidence in 

the record relating to a causal connection, or lack thereof, between Brailey's false 

representation of the 1997 back injury and the 2017 injury, the Commission erred 

in finding Michelin proved its fraud in the application defense. See Burnette v. 

City of Greenville, 401 S.C. 417, 428, 737 S.E.2d 200, 206 (Ct. App. 2012) (stating 

that when the Commission bases its finding on its own medical opinion, rather than 

5

 Substantial evidence supports the Commission's findings that Brailey willfully 

and knowingly made false statements as to his physical condition to Michelin on 

his employment application. Further, Michelin proved it relied on those statements 

and they were a substantial factor in hiring Brailey. 
 

 

the opinion of a medical provider, the finding is unsupported by substantial 

evidence in the record). Therefore, we reverse this finding. 

II. Capers v. Flautt 

Brailey contends the Commission erred in finding his claim was barred by Capers 

v. Flautt. We agree. 

The Commission's order does not contain sufficient findings of fact and 

conclusions of law relating to Capers. "The findings of fact of the Appellate Panel 

must be sufficiently detailed to enable the reviewing court to determine (1) 

whether the law has been properly applied to those findings and (2) whether the 

findings are supported by the evidence." Sanders v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 379 

S.C. 554, 559–60, 666 S.E.2d 297, 300 (Ct. App. 2008). Here, the order merely 

states that "moreover, the claim would be barred under Capers v. Flautt." The 

Commission did not apply the law to its findings or indicate which findings were 

applicable to Capers. Therefore, we reverse this finding. 

III. Section 42-9-60 

Brailey argues the Commission erred in finding his claim was barred by section 

42-9-60. We agree. 

In pertinent part, section 42-9-60 provides: 

No compensation shall be payable if the injury or death 

was occasioned by the intoxication of the employee or by 

the wil[l]ful intention of the employee to injure or kill 

himself or another. In the event that any person claims 

that the provisions of this section are applicable in any 

case, the burden of proof shall be upon such person. 

(emphasis added). The record contains no evidence that Brailey deliberately 

intended to injure himself as described in this section, and the Commission's 

finding is not supported by substantial evidence. The application of section 

42-9-60 is limited to "only . . . those cases where it is shown that the acts of the 

employee are so serious and aggravated as to evince a wil[l]ful intent to injure." 

Zeigler v. S.C. Law Enf't Div., 250 S.C. 326, 329, 157 S.E.2d 598, 599 (1967). The 

facts of this case do not rise to the level of "serious and aggravated." The record 

contains no evidence Brailey began working at Michelin with the willful intention 

to injure his back. Further, he was not placed on work restriction after having back 

pain in the weeks before June 24, 2017, and there is no evidence in the record that 
 

his conduct was of such a serious nature as to evidence a willful intent to injure 

himself. Cf. id. at 331, 157 S.E.2d at 600 (finding a "fatal altercation was 

voluntarily entered into, and the conduct of the deceased was of such a grave or 

serious nature as to evidence a wil[l]ful intent on his part to injure his fellow 

employee, thereby barring any right to benefits"). Therefore, we reverse this 

finding. 

IV. Brailey's Back Injury 

Brailey argues the Commission erred in finding he did not injure his back in an 

accident arising out of his employment at Michelin. We agree. 

"In determining whether a work-related injury is compensable, the Workers' 

Compensation Act is liberally construed toward the end of providing coverage 

rather than noncoverage in order to further the beneficial purposes for which it was 

designed." Shealy v. Aiken Co., 341 S.C. 448, 455, 535 S.E.2d 438, 442 (2000). 

"Any reasonable doubt as to the construction of the Act will be resolved in favor of 

coverage." Id. at 455–56, 535 S.E.2d at 442. 

The Commission specifically grounded its findings on Brailey's lack of credibility 

and his "vague" and "rambling" responses. Our supreme court has noted it has 

affirmed the factual findings of the Commission based on credibility 

determinations when credibility constituted a "reasonable and meaningful basis" 

for the Commission's decision. Crane v. Raber's Disc. Tire Rack, 429 S.C. 636, 

645, 842 S.E.2d 349, 353 (2020); see also Shealy, 341 S.C. at 455–56, 535 S.E.2d 

at 442 ("In cases in which we affirmed factual findings of the commission based on 

its credibility determination, we did so because it made sense for the commission 

to use credibility as the dispositive factor in deciding the particular issue."). Here, 

Brailey's credibility as to his prior workers' compensation claim and prior back 

injury in 1997 is not a reasonable and meaningful basis for the Commission's 

determination that he did not suffer an accidental injury arising out of his 

employment at Michelin in 2017. Rather, the medical evidence pertaining to his 

2017 injury, which consists of an MRI and the expert medical opinion of a 

neurosurgeon, is not contradicted and constitutes substantial evidence that supports 

a reversal of the Commission's order. See Frampton, 432 S.C. at 256, 851 S.E.2d 

at 719 (noting the court "may reverse or modify the [Commission's] decision if 

substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the 

[Commission's] findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . affected by 

other error of law [or] clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and 

substantial evidence on the whole record." (final two alterations in original)). 

Therefore, we reverse the Commission on this issue. 
CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Commission's order is reversed and the matter is 

remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 

KONDUROS and VINSON, JJ., concur.