Docket No. 102562.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.

JOHNNIE WILSON, Appellee.

Opinion filed February 7, 2008.

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman, Fitzgerald, Kilbride,

Garman, and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

At issue in this case is whether a warrantless, suspicionless search

of a parolee is prohibited by the fourth amendment.

In the instant case, a parole officer, acting on an anonymous tip

that defendant Johnnie Wilson was violating the conditions of his

parole agreement, ordered two police officers to search defendant’s

bedroom, despite not having a search warrant or receiving defendant’s

consent. After the search yielded cocaine and heroin, defendant was

charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to

deliver. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the drug evidence,

arguing that the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution

prohibited the search of his bedroom.
 

1What was referred to as “parole” in Illinois prior to February 1, 1978,

is now termed “mandatory supervised release” (MSR). 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(d)

(West 2006). For clarity, Illinois defendants on MSR shall be referred to as

“parolees” in this opinion.

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The circuit court of Cook County denied the motion, finding that

defendant consented to the search when he signed his mandatory

supervised release (MSR) agreement. The appellate court reversed

defendant’s conviction and remanded the matter for a suppression

hearing. 364 Ill. App. 3d 762. For the reasons that follow, we reverse

the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the

circuit court.

BACKGROUND

On February 27, 2002, defendant was placed on mandatory

supervised release (MSR)1 from a 15-year sentence for armed

violence. When defendant was released, he signed a “Parole or

Mandatory Supervised Release Agreement” (MSR agreement), which

set forth the conditions of his release in accordance with section

3–3–7 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3–3–7 (West

2002)). Two of the conditions were as follows:

“You shall consent to a search of your person, property, or

residence under your control”;

and

“You shall refrain from the use or possession of narcotics or

other controlled substances in any form, or both.”

The MSR agreement also stated:

“If such rules are violated, parole or mandatory supervised

release may be revoked under the rules and regulations

promulgated by the Prisoner Review Board or other releasing

authority. *** Until final discharge, you shall at all times be

under the legal custody of the Department of Corrections,

subject to being retaken at any time, with the establishment of

probable cause, and the lodging of a warrant, within the

enclosure of an Illinois State correctional center.”
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On February 3, 2003, defendant, who was on parole, was arrested

and charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to

deliver. Prior to his bench trial, defendant filed a motion to quash his

arrest and suppress evidence. A hearing on defendant’s motion was

held on March 18, 2003.

At the hearing, parole officer Raymond Hayes testified that, on

February 3, 2003, his office received an anonymous tip that defendant

had narcotics and weapons in his apartment. Hayes stated that, based

on this tip, he visited defendant’s apartment with two Chicago police

officers to investigate this possible parole violation. At the apartment,

he was given permission to enter by a relative who was “either

[defendant’s] mother or grandmother.”

 Upon entering the apartment, Hayes saw defendant emerge from

a bedroom just a few feet from the front door. Defendant told Hayes

that the bedroom was his. Hayes then instructed the police officers to

search defendant’s bedroom. The police officers found several

containers of substances that the Illinois Crime Lab later determined

to be cocaine and heroin.

Hayes admitted that he did not have a warrant to search defendant

or his room and did not ask defendant for his consent to search the

room. Hayes testified that he felt neither a warrant nor defendant’s

consent was needed because defendant’s MSR agreement constituted

defendant’s consent to any searches of his person, property, or

residence.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the motion

to suppress evidence, finding that defendant consented to the search

when he signed his MSR agreement. Following a bench trial on

September 23, 2003, defendant was found guilty of possession of a

controlled substance and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellate court held, based on a totality of the

circumstances, that the search of defendant’s bedroom was improper.

Accordingly, the appellate court reversed defendant’s conviction and

remanded the matter for a new trial. People v. Wilson, 361 Ill. App.

3d 93 (2005). The State then appealed to this court. We denied the

appeal, but ordered the appellate court to vacate its decision and

reconsider its judgment in light of People v. Moss, 217 Ill. 2d 511

(2005). Upon reconsideration, the appellate court again reversed
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defendant’s conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial. 364

Ill. App. 3d 762. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

Initially, we note that the search in question was nonconsensual.

Officer Hayes did not ask for consent before ordering the search of

defendant’s bedroom. Moreover, defendant’s search condition, which

mandated that he “shall consent to a search,” did not constitute

prospective consent. See People v. Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d 231, 260-61

(2003) (“shall submit” in a search condition charges a probationer

with the duty to submit to a search when directed to do so; it does not

constitute prospective consent). The State concedes that the search

was nonconsensual, but argues that it was reasonable nonetheless and

that the appellate court erred in reversing the circuit court’s denial of

defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.

Generally, our review of a circuit court’s ruling on a motion to

suppress evidence involves both questions of fact and law. Moss, 217

Ill. 2d at 517. We will uphold findings of historical fact made by the

circuit court unless such findings are against the manifest weight of

the evidence. People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 512 (2004). If we

uphold the factual findings, we review de novo whether suppression

is appropriate under those facts. Moss, 217 Ill. 2d at 518. In the

instant case, there are no questions of fact disputed by the parties.

Accordingly, we review the application of law to the facts de novo.

Applicable Law

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, which

guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and

seizures, applies to the states through the due process clause of the

fourteenth amendment. People v. James, 163 Ill. 2d 302, 311 (1994).

Generally, the fourth amendment requires the government to possess

a warrant supported by probable cause for a search to be considered

reasonable. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330, 148 L. Ed. 2d

838, 847, 121 S. Ct. 946, 949 (2001). However, the requirement for

a warrant has been held unnecessary in cases involving probationers

and parolees when the search is deemed reasonable. See United States
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v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497, 507, 122 S. Ct.

587, 593 (2001); Samson v. California, 547 U.S. ___, ___, 165 L.

Ed. 2d 250, 262, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2202 (2006); Moss, 217 Ill. 2d at

534. In determining the reasonableness of a warrantless search, a

court must examine the totality of the circumstances and assess, on

the one hand, the degree to which the search intrudes upon an

individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed

for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Knights, 534

U.S. at 118-19, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 505, 122 S. Ct. at 591.

In a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court and this

court have held that probationers and parolees enjoy a greatly

diminished expectation of privacy due to their status as probationers

and parolees, and the salient government interest in preventing

recidivism and protecting society from future crimes. See Griffin v.

Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709, 722, 107 S. Ct.

3164, 3172 (1987) (warrantless search of probationer’s home by state

probation officers pursuant to Wisconsin regulation requiring

“reasonable grounds” held not to violate fourth amendment);Knights,

534 U.S. at 121, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 506-07, 122 S. Ct. at 593 (“When

an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a

search condition is engaged in criminal activity, there is enough

likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the

probationer’s significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable”);

Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d at 251 (search of a probationer’s residence is

reasonable as long as it is performed by a probation officer who has

reasonable suspicion to investigate violations of probation); Moss, 217

Ill. 2d at 532 (warrantless, suspicionless pat-down search of parolee

for weapons is reasonable, and any evidence found during such a

search is admissible, when the safety of an investigating officer is at

issue). In contrast to the diminished expectations of privacy of

probationers and parolees, the state’s interest in supervising parolees

has been held to be substantial. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 120-21, 151

L. Ed. 2d at 506, 122 S. Ct. at 592 (state’s interest in protecting

potential victims of crimes by reoffenders allows it to focus on

probationers in a way that it does not on the ordinary citizen); Moss,

217 Ill. 2d at 531 (“The state is justified in focusing greater attention

on probationers because of their higher likelihood of recidivism.
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[Citation.] Persons on MSR, even more than probationers, present a

risk to the public”).

The appellate court recognized that defendant, as a parolee, had

a diminished expectation of privacy, and that the state had a legitimate

interest in preventing recidivism and protecting society from future

crimes. 364 Ill. App. 3d at 770. However, the appellate court held that

because the search at issue was not a pat-down search, as in Moss, but

rather a full-fledged search of a residence for evidence, it offended the

“significantly protected status” of his home. 364 Ill. App. 3d at 771.

Consequently, the court held that defendant maintained an expectation

of privacy in his home that would outweigh the interests of the state

unless the State was able to prove that it had reasonable suspicion to

conduct the search. 364 Ill. App. 3d at 771. The appellate court then

reversed the circuit court and remanded the cause with instructions to

the circuit court to evaluate whether the officers had reasonable

suspicion to believe that defendant violated the terms of his MSR so

that the search was justified. 364 Ill. App. 3d at 772.

Defendant contends that the appellate court acted properly in

reversing the circuit court, and requests cross-relief on the grounds

that a new hearing on remand would erroneously give the State a

second opportunity to establish probable cause and reasonable

suspicion, which it failed to do previously. The State argues that the

appellate court’s decision should be reversed, and that no reasonable

suspicion should be required for a warrantless search of defendant’s

residence, because this issue is now controlled by Samson v.

California, 547 U.S. ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d 250, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006),

a United States Supreme Court case announced after the decision of

the appellate court in the instant case.

In Samson, the petitioner was walking down a street when he was

spotted by a police officer who was aware that the petitioner was on

parole following a conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon.

Samson, 547 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 255, 126 S. Ct. at 2196.

The police officer stopped the petitioner and, based solely on the

petitioner’s status as a parolee, searched the petitioner. Samson, 547

U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 256, 126 S. Ct. at 2196. During the

search, the officer found methamphetamine in one of the petitioner’s

shirt pockets. Samson, 547 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 256, 126 S.

Ct. at 2196. The State then charged the petitioner with possession of
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a controlled substance. Samson, 547 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at

256, 126 S. Ct. at 2196.

The petitioner filed a motion to suppress the methamphetamine

evidence, which was denied. Samson, 547 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d

at 256, 126 S. Ct. at 2196. A jury then convicted the petitioner of the

possession charge and sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment.

Samson, 54 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 256, 126 S. Ct. at 2196.

The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court, holding that

suspicionless searches of parolees are lawful under California law.

Samson, 54 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 256, 126 S. Ct. at 2196.

The United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari to

determine “whether a condition of release can so diminish or eliminate

a released prisoner’s reasonable expectation of privacy that a

suspicionless search by a law enforcement officer would not offend

the Fourth Amendment.” Samson, 547 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at

256, 126 S. Ct. at 2196.

The examination of the petitioner’s expectation of privacy began

with an assessment of his status as a parolee, as compared to the

petitioner in Knights, who was a probationer. Samson, 547 U.S. at

___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 258, 126 S. Ct. at 2198. The Court held that,

like probationers, parolees are on the “continuum” of state-imposed

punishments and, in fact, have even fewer expectations of privacy than

probationers “because parole is more akin to imprisonment than

probation is to imprisonment.” Samson, 547 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed.

2d at 258, 126 S. Ct. at 2198. The Court explained that parole is not

a simple release from imprisonment, but rather an alternative to

continued confinement that is eligible only to those who agree to abide

by certain rules for the balance of their sentence. Samson, 547 U.S. at

___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 258, 126 S. Ct. at 2198. However, the Court

made clear that it was not equating parolees with prisoners for the

purpose of concluding that parolees, like prisoners, have no fourth

amendment rights. Samson, 54 U.S. at ___ n.2, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 258

n.2, 126 S. Ct. at 2198 n.2.

 The Court found that the general conditions of California’s

parole, which included, among other things, mandatory drug testing

and meetings with parole officers, restrictions on association with

felons or gang members, a ban on ownership of firearms and specified

weapons, and a requirement to request permission from a parole

officer to travel more than 50 miles from home, clearly demonstrated
 

2The court cited figures provided by the California Attorney General

showing that 68% of adult parolees are returned to prison. Fifty-five percent

are returned for a parole violation, and 13% for the commission of a new

felony offense. California Attorney General, Crime in California 37 (April

2001). Further, a separate study revealed that 70% of California’s paroled

felons reoffended within 18 months of being released from physical custody.

See J. Petersilia, Challenges of Prisoner Reentry and Parole in California,

12 Cal. Pol’y Res. Center Brief 2 (June 2000).

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that parolees have “severely diminished expectations of privacy by

virtue of their status alone.” Samson, 547 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d

at 259, 126 S. Ct. at 2199. Additionally, the Court found that the

parole search condition under California law–which requires inmates

who opt for parole to submit to suspicionless searches by either parole

officers or police officers at any time–was clearly expressed to the

petitioner before he signed his parole agreement. Samson, 547 U.S. at

___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 259, 126 S. Ct. at 2199. The Court held that

because the petitioner accepted his “clear and unambiguous” search

condition, his expectations of privacy were “significantly diminished.”

Samson, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 259, 126 S. Ct. at 2199. The Court then

held, “Examining the totality of the circumstances pertaining to

petitioner’s status as a parolee, ‘an established variation on

imprisonment,’ [citation] including the plain terms of the parole search

condition, we conclude that petitioner did not have an expectation of

privacy that society would recognize as legitimate.” Samson, 547 U.S.

at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 259, 126 S. Ct. at 2199.

Turning to the “governmental purpose” side of the balance, the

Court found that California had an “ ‘overwhelming interest’ in

supervising parolees because ‘parolees ... are more likely to commit

future criminal offenses.’ ” Samson, 547 U.S. at 165 L. Ed. 2d at 260,

126 S. Ct. at 2200, quoting Pennsylvania Board of Probation &

Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365, 141 L. Ed. 2d 344, 353, 118 S.

Ct. 2014, 2020 (1998). The Court noted that “this court has

repeatedly acknowledged that a State’s interests in reducing

recidivism and thereby promoting reintegration and positive

citizenship among probationers and parolees warrant privacy

intrusions that would not otherwise be tolerated under the Fourth

Amendment.” Samson, 547 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 260, 126 S.

Ct. at 2200. After citing empirical evidence2 illustrating the

significance of the state’s interest in preventing recidivism, the Court
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held, “California’s ability to conduct suspicionless searches of parolees

serves its interest in reducing recidivism, in a manner that aids, rather

than hinders, the reintegration of parolees into productive society.”

Samson, 547 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 260, 126 S. Ct. at 2200.

Moreover, the Court found that a requirement that searches be based

on individualized suspicion would “give parolees greater opportunity

to anticipate searches and conceal criminality” and “undermine the

State’s ability to effectively supervise parolees and protect the public

from criminal acts by reoffenders.” Samson, 54 U.S. at ___, 165 L.

Ed. 2d at 261, 126 S. Ct. at 2200-01.

The Court held that, while some states may impose additional

requirements for individualized suspicion, the fourth amendment does

not require reasonable suspicion for all searches. Samson, 547 U.S. at

___ n.4, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 261 n.4, 126 S. Ct. at 2201 n.4. The Court

then noted that reasonableness, not individualized suspicion, is “[t]he

touchstone of the Fourth Amendment.” Samson, 54 U.S. at ___ n.4,

165 L. Ed. 2d at 261 n.4, 126 S. Ct. at 2201 n.4. The Court

concluded, “the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer

from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee.” Samson, 54 U.S.

at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 262, 126 S. Ct. at 2202.

The State argues that Samson not only reinforces the legitimacy

of this state’s interest in preventing recidivism, but also establishes

that defendant’s status as a parolee, along with the terms of his search

condition, diminishes his expectation of privacy to a point that society

would not recognize as legitimate. Defendant does not contest the

legitimacy of the state’s interest in preventing recidivism, but contends

that Samson is not controlling on the issue of his expectations of

privacy. Defendant argues that because the MSR system in Illinois

differs significantly from the California system, and because his search

condition is unlike the search condition used in California, Samson

does not apply here. Defendant also contends that Samson made no

findings regarding the search of a parolee’s residence and, as such, is

inapplicable to the instant case. We shall address these arguments in

turn.

Parole Systems

 Defendant argues that our mandatory MSR system affords an

Illinois parolee a greater expectation of privacy than a California

parolee, who may “elect” to stay in the physical custody of the
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department of corrections or choose to accept a set of conditions and

complete his sentence on parole. According to defendant, because

MSR is mandatory for an Illinois prisoner, he is not presented with the

choice between staying in prison or being released on parole, and

therefore does not have the same level of “unambiguous awareness”

of the acceptance of a search condition that California prisoners have.

 We find defendant’s argument to be without merit. There is

nothing in the statutes that govern the Illinois parole system that

supports defendant’s contention that Illinois parolees are somehow

less aware than their California counterparts that they are accepting a

collection of conditions in order to secure their release from physical

custody. Further, we can find no appreciable differences between each

state’s operational process for entering a period of parole or for

remaining on parole.

In California, prisoners sentenced to any term, other than natural

life in prison without parole, may become eligible for parole based on

a decision of the Board of Parole Hearings. Cal. Penal Code §3041

(West 2007). California prisoners who are declared eligible for parole

must sign and retain a copy of a parole agreement that places

conditions on their liberty during their parole, including a condition

that requires them to be subject to search or seizure at any time for

any reason. Cal. Penal Code §3067 (West 2007). If a California

prisoner refuses to sign such an agreement, he remains imprisoned.

Cal. Penal Code §3060.5 (West 2007). In California, parolees enjoy

freedom from the physical custody of the California Department of

Corrections, but remain under the legal custody of the Department,

and are subject to reimprisonment for any violations of their parole

agreement. Cal. Penal Code §3056 (West 2007).

 Similarly, in Illinois, prisoners not serving a term of natural life

imprisonment have the opportunity to become eligible for parole (730

ILCS 5/3–3–3(c) (West 2006)), and when eligible for parole are

presented with an agreement that sets forth the conditions of their

release from the physical custody of the Department of Corrections

(730 ILCS 5/3–3–7 (West 2006)). They must sign this agreement and

retain a copy in order to secure their release from the physical custody

of the Department of Corrections. 730 ILCS 5/3–3–7(c) (West 2006);

People v. Powell, 217 Ill. 2d 123, 128 (2005) (prisoner who refused

to sign his MSR agreement was kept in physical custody). Illinois
 

3This condition has since been codified in section 3–3–7(a) of the Unified

Code of Corrections, which provides, “The conditions of every parole and

[MSR] are that the subject: *** (10) consent to a search of his or her person,

property, or residence under his or her control.” 730 ILCS 5/3–3–7(a)(10)

(West 2006).

 

4This condition has since been codified in section 3–3–9(a) of the Unified

Code of Corrections, which provides, “[i]f prior to expiration or termination

of the term of parole or [MSR], a person violates a ***condition of parole

***, the Board may: (1) continue the existing term, with or without

modifying or enlarging the conditions; or (2) parole or release the person to

a half-way house; or (3) revoke the parole or [MSR] and reconfine the

person ***.” 730 ILCS 5/3–3–9(a) (West 2006).

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parolees remain in the legal custody of the Department of Corrections

for the duration of their parole. 730 ILCS 5/3–14–2(a) (West 2006).

We find that the parole systems of Illinois and California are very

much alike in operation. The parallels illustrated above belie

defendant’s assertion that the systems of the two states differ to the

degree that precludes Samson from controlling our analysis of a

search of an Illinois parolee.

Search Conditions

In Samson, the Court found that the reduced expectation of

privacy a parolee has is further diminished by his acceptance of the

clear and unambiguous terms of the search condition contained in his

parole agreement. Samson, 547 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 259,

126 S. Ct. at 2199. Defendant argues that, because his search

condition differs from the search condition considered in Samson, his

expectation of privacy should not be similarly diminished.

Defendant’s MSR agreement provides, “[y]ou shall consent to a

search of your person, property, or residence under your control”3 and

“If [the rules of the agreement] are violated, parole or mandatory

supervised release may be revoked.”4

In comparison, the search condition of the petitioner in Samson

mandated that he “ ‘shall agree in writing to be subject to search or

seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer at any time of the day
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or night, with or without a search warrant and with or without

cause.’ ” Samson, 547 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 255, 126 S. Ct.

at 2196, quoting Cal. Penal Code §3067(a) (West 2000). If the

petitioner in Samson were to refuse to be subject to a search he would

violate his parole and be subject to a return to physical custody of the

department of corrections. Cal. Penal Code §3060 (West 2007).

We recognize the distinct wording in each search condition, but

hold that the differences are of form, and not substance. In each state,

the parolee is obligated to comply with the search demands of law

enforcement officers or face potential revocation of parole. Despite

defendant’s protestations to the contrary, the legal and practical effect

of his search condition is no different from that of the search condition

at issue in Samson.

Defendant also maintains that, while California’s search condition

explicitly allowed for a search without cause by a police officer, his

search condition does not and is, therefore, indicative of a greater

expectation of privacy. In addressing this contention, we turn to Moss,

where we considered a search condition identical to defendant’s. In

Moss, we held that the search condition puts the parolee “on notice

that law enforcement officials may ask his consent to search his

‘person, property, or residence ***’ *** with or without reasonable

suspicion.” Moss, 217 Ill. 2d at 528. We further explained that this

search condition has no “limitation on what government agent may

perform that search or what purpose they may have.” Moss, 217 Ill.

2d at 532. As such, we find no merit in defendant’s argument that his

search condition was in any way less “explicit” than that considered

in Samson.

Search of a Residence

Defendant contends that the appellate court was correct in finding

that, where the search of a parolee invades his home, “it weighs

heavily in the balance that determines whether the search is reasonable

and remains a significant, rather than minimal, intrusion on defendant’s

albeit diminished expectations of privacy.” 364 Ill. App. 3d at 771.

Defendant maintains that the special protection the United States

Supreme Court and this court have historically afforded to searches
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of residences should be factored in to any assessment of his diminished

expectation of privacy.

Since Samson, many courts have held that there is no difference

between the expectation of privacy a parolee has in his person and his

residence, provided that the parolee has signed an agreement

containing a search condition similar to defendant’s search condition.

These cases all implement the principle set forth in Samson that “a

State’s interests in reducing recidivism and thereby promoting

reintegration and positive citizenship among probationers and parolees

warrant privacy intrusions that would not otherwise be tolerated under

the Fourth Amendment.” Samson, 547 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at

260, 126 S. Ct. at 2200.

In United States v. Stuckey, No. 06 CR 339 (S.D.N.Y. August 16,

2006), the defendant was a parolee with a search condition permitting

law enforcement to search his “person, residence, and property.” The

Stuckey court, relying on Samson, held that a suspicionless search of

the defendant’s residence was reasonable. The Stuckey court reasoned

that, “if it generally could be said that a free individual has a greater

expectations of privacy at home than in his person [citation], any

differential must be considered de minimis for a parolee who is

acutely aware of the search conditions attached to his liberty” and,

moreover, “the state has at least as much of an interest in searching a

parolee’s residence as it does in searching his person.” (Emphases in

original.)

In United States v. Lopez, 474 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2007), the

defendant was a parolee with a search condition that put him on notice

that his person, property, and residence were subject to search at any

time. Lopez, 474 F.3d at 1209. Following Samson, the Lopez court

held that the defendant, as a parolee, did not have an expectation of

privacy in his residence that society would recognize as legitimate.

Lopez, 474 F.3d at 1213. The Lopez court held:

“[I]f *** a parolee has no expectation of privacy in his person,

we reason that a parolee has no legitimate expectation of

privacy in his residence either, at least when the parolee is

present. Any other rule would diminish the protection to

society given by the search condition of parole, permitting

search at any time.” Lopez, 474 F.3d at 1213.
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See also United States v. Perkins, No. 05–CR–30137 (S.D. Ill.

December 15, 2006) (holding that this court “would most likely hold

that a search of a parolee’s residence need not be supported by

reasonable suspicion”).

 In the instant case, defendant signed and accepted a search

condition requiring him to “consent to a search of your person,

property, or residence under your control.” (Emphasis added.) Like

the defendants in Stuckey and Lopez, his status as a parolee, coupled

with the plain language of his search condition, reduced his

expectation of privacy in his residence to a level that society would

not recognize as legitimate. Accordingly, the special protection

normally afforded to an individual’s home does not apply to him.

We are unpersuaded by defendant’s arguments concerning the

differences between the parole systems and search conditions of

California and Illinois. Moreover, we find that any “special protection”

afforded to defendant’s residence was lost when he became a parolee

and agreed to consent to a search of his residence in his MSR

agreement. As such, we hold that the reasoning set forth in Samson

controls our analysis of the instant case. “[T]he Fourth Amendment

does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless

search of a parolee.” Samson, 547 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 262,

126 S. Ct. at 2202.

In light of our decision today, we need not address the State’s

argument that the appellate court erred by disregarding the propriety

of the search under the “special needs” doctrine set forth in Griffin.

Also, because we reverse the judgment of the appellate court, we need

not consider defendant’s request for cross-relief.

CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the

appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Appellate court judgment reversed;

circuit court judgment affirmed.