UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

LIND, KRAUSS,1

 and PENLAND 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Staff Sergeant AARON L. BRIDGES 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20120714 

Headquarters, I Corps (Rear)(Provisional) 

Kwasi Hawks, Military Judge (arraignment) 

David L. Conn, Military Judge (motions hearing & trial) 

Lieutenant Colonel John T. Rothwell, Acting Staff Judge Advocate (pretrial) 

Colonel William R. Martin, Staff Judge Advocate (post-trial) 

For Appellant: Mr. Charles D. Swift, Esquire; Captain Robert H. Meek, III, JA (on 

brief). 

For Appellee: Colonel John P. Carrell, JA; Major A.G. Courie III, JA; Major Daniel 

D. Derner, JA; Major Daniel M. Goldberg, JA (on brief). 

27 July 2015 

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OPINION OF THE COURT 

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KRAUSS, Judge: 

 An enlisted panel sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, 

contrary to his pleas, of wrongful sexual contact, forcible sodomy, and assault 

consummated by a battery in violation of Articles 120, 125, and 128 Uniform Code 

of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 920, 925 and 928 (2012) [hereinafter UCMJ].2

 The 

court-martial sentenced appellant to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for 6 

years, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to the grade of E-1. The 

 

1

 Senior Judge LIND and Judge KRAUSS took final action in this case prior to their 

retirement. 

2

 Appellant was convicted of sexual offenses involving two victims. 
BRIDGES — ARMY 20120714 

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convening authority reduced the sentence to confinement by two months, approving 

seventy months of confinement, but otherwise approved the adjudged sentence. 

This case is before the court for review under Article 66, UCMJ. Appellant 

assigns three errors and raises matters pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 

M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982). Appellant’s complaint relative to the use of a prior act of 

misconduct against him warrants brief discussion and relief. We find that 

appellant’s remaining complaints, including those raised pursuant to Grostefon, do 

not warrant relief. 

DISCUSSION 

 What we have in this case is a noncommissioned officer (NCO) who exploited 

his position in a Warrior Transition Battalion to seek sexual gratification from not 

only those suffering the trauma of wounds, his co-workers, but also from their 

families. The case would not be complicated in terms of appellate review except for 

the fact that the United States relied in merits and sentencing, in part, upon a fifteenyear old allegation of rape against appellant that had been subject to trial and 

resulted in acquittal. 

 Appellant objected to its admission and requested that, if admitted, the 

military judge should “include a strongly worded limiting instruction to guard 

against the problems associated with propensity evidence.” In support of this 

request, appellant made reference to and quoted from United States v. Mundell, 40 

M.J. 704 (A.C.M.R. 1994), endorsing an instruction to the panel that he had 

previously been acquitted of the charge. The judge denied appellant’s motion and 

admitted the evidence of the prior allegation as propensity evidence, evidence of 

modus operandi, and evidence of absence of accident or mistake under Military Rule 

of Evidence [hereinafter Mil. R. Evid.] 413 and 404(b). In his ruling, he also 

prohibited any reference to the previous court-martial “[t]o minimize the danger of 

any unfair prejudice to the accused,” but never informed or instructed the panel that 

appellant had been acquitted on that allegation. 

 The initial difficulty lies in the fact that the military judge’s analysis of the 

acquitted charge essentially began and ended with the recognition that a prior 

acquittal on a charge of sexual assault does not bar subsequent admission of the 

same allegation under Mil. R. Evid. 413. While this is correct, it serves only as 

introduction to the more nettlesome problem of considering the acquittal in weighing 

the probative value of the propensity evidence against any unfair prejudice that may 

result from its admission. See United States v. Wright, 53 M.J. 476 (2000). As 

appellant points out and our superior court noted in a similar circumstance, “There is 

a need for great sensitivity when making the determination to admit evidence of 

prior acts that have been the subject of an acquittal.” United States v. Griggs, 51 

M.J. 418, 420 (C.A.A.F. 1999). More recently, our superior court reiterated its 
BRIDGES — ARMY 20120714 

3

expectation that judges deal with the admission of evidence previously the subject of 

an acquitted charge very carefully. See United States v. Solomon, 72 M.J. 176 

(C.A.A.F. 2013). 

 Here, the judge failed to consider the fact that after a fair trial appellant was 

found not guilty of the prior charge when evaluating its probative value under Mil. 

R. Evid. 403. In failing to address the propriety of informing the panel of that 

acquittal, the judge also did not consider the danger of unfair prejudicial confusion 

over the extent to which a panel might consider the evidence without running an 

unacceptable danger of convicting or punishing appellant for a charge that resulted 

in appellant’s acquittal. Instead, the judge seems to have considered the only 

potential prejudice to appellant to be that of mentioning the prior acquittal. 

Contrary to the judge’s reasoning at trial here, both the Supreme Court and 

the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces have expressed approval and satisfaction 

with admission of such evidence as long as the judge carefully instructed the panel 

that the accused in each case had been acquitted on a charge of the same allegation 

and the necessity to conscientiously limit consideration of that evidence accordingly. 

United States v. Dowling, 493 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1990); Solomon, 72 M.J. at 182; 

Griggs, 51 M.J. at 420. Indeed, in this case, the panel posed questions during the 

findings portion wondering what became of the allegation first levied fifteen years 

ago. The judge only permitted testimony to the effect that a formal report was made 

but otherwise left the panel hanging by not informing them of the not guilty finding. 

The government effectively concedes this error and makes reference to United 

States v. Cuellar, 27 M.J. 50, 56 (C.M.A. 1988), for the proposition that the judge 

should not prevent an accused from ensuring a panel is informed that he was 

acquitted when tried for the prior misconduct. We agree with appellant and the 

government that the judge erred by failing to properly consider the effect of the 

acquittal when resolving admission of the evidence under Mil. R. Evid. 413 and 403, 

and further erred, in light of its admission, by failing to inform and instruct the 

panel of the acquittal accordingly. Therefore we must test for prejudice. See 

Griggs, 51 M.J. at 420. 

 As to findings, we find little trouble in resolving the question against 

appellant. Despite the judge leaving the panel wondering and the government’s 

reliance on the propensity evidence to argue “[H]ow else do we know that some of 

these crimes were committed? Because he’s done it before,” with underlined 

reference to the alleged victim of the acquitted charge, appellant essentially 

admitted to the acts of charged misconduct resulting in his convictions. Those 

admissions, in conjunction with the credible testimony of the victims describing the 

charged acts, convince us that the erroneous admission of the prior rape allegation, 

and failure to instruct the panel properly, did not substantially influence the 

findings. Id. 
BRIDGES — ARMY 20120714 

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 As to the sentence, we come to a different conclusion. Though the judge 

provided a standard instruction advising the panel that appellant should only be 

punished for the crimes for which he was found guilty, such instruction was 

insufficient under the circumstances of this case. As described above, the panel 

already expressed curiosity as to the outcome of the previous allegation and the 

government argued in findings that the panel could be confident that appellant 

committed the charged acts because he had done it before. In sentencing, though the 

government referred to three victims, trial counsel argued that appellant required 

severe punishment in the form of lengthy confinement because “he’s going to do it 

again. . . [h]e is predisposed to sexual assault. It’s wired in his identity.” Absent 

appropriate instruction to ensure the panel conscientiously avoided punishing 

appellant for the alleged crime of which he was previously acquitted, we cannot be 

confident that the sentence was not substantially influenced by this evidence. See 

Griggs, 51 M.J. at 420; Solomon, 72 M.J. at 182; see also United States v. 

Schroeder, 65 M.J. 49, 58 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (discussing generally the risk that an 

accused may be punished for uncharged conduct). 

On the basis of the error, the entire record, and applying the factors in United 

States v. Winckelmann, we conclude we can reassess appellant's sentence. 73 M.J. 

11, 15-16 (C.A.A.F. 2013). We note there is no change in the penalty landscape or 

exposure. See Id. The gravamen of the offenses has not changed because appellant 

remains convicted of all of the items originally charged. See Id. at 16. We 

recognize that appellant was sentenced by a panel. See Id. Nonetheless, this court 

reviews the records of a substantial number of courts-martial involving assaults and 

sexual offenses and we have extensive experience and familiarity with the level of 

sentences imposed for such offenses under various circumstances. In light of the 

aggravated nature of the misconduct involving a NCO exploiting victims at and from 

his workplace, we are confident that absent the error the panel would have sentenced 

appellant to at least a dishonorable discharge, confinement for four years, total 

forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to the grade of E-1. 

CONCLUSION 

 The findings of guilty are AFFIRMED. After considering the entire record, 

the court affirms only so much of the sentence as provides for a dishonorable 

discharge, confinement for four years, total forfeiture of all pay and allowances and 

reduction to the grade of E-1. All rights, privileges, and property, of which 

appellant has been deprived by virtue of that portion of his sentence set aside by the 

decision, are ordered restored. See UCMJ arts. 58b(c) and 75(a). 

Senior Judge LIND and Judge PENLAND concur. 
BRIDGES — ARMY 20120714 

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FOR THE COURT: 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: