UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

Stephen Owen Wysong, 

 

Plaintiff, 

 

v. Case No. 3:13-CV-43-JVB-CAN 

 

Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Acting Commissioner of 

Social Security, 

 

 Defendant. 

OPINION AND ORDER

 Plaintiff Stephen Owen Wysong seeks judicial review of the final decision of Defendant 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, who denied his application for 

Disability Insurance Benefits under the Social Security Act. For the following reasons, the Court 

affirms. 

A. Procedural Background 

 In February 2010, Plaintiff applied for Disability Insurance Benefits alleging disability 

due to diabetes mellitus with retinopathy, prostate cancer, depression, and anxiety, with an onset 

date of November 4, 2009. (R. at 133–34.) His claim was denied initially and upon 

reconsideration. (R. at 70–73, 75–77.) He requested a hearing before an Administrative Law 

Judge (“ALJ”). (R. at 78–79.) The hearing was held before Romona Scales on September 13, 

2011, in Valparaiso, Indiana. (R. at 37.) On October 13, 2011, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff 

was not disabled. (R. at 6-22.) Following the Appeals Council’s denial of Plaintiff’s request for 

review, the ALJ’s opinion became final. (R. at 1–5.) 
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B. Factual Background 

(1) Plaintiff’s Background and Testimony 

 Plaintiff was born in 1951. (R. at 40.) He lives in South Bend, Indiana with his wife of 

thirty-eight years. (R. at 57.) After completing high school, he finished one year of college. (R. at 

41.) For fourteen years, he worked as a furniture salesman, and in that capacity, he often carried 

items weighing around 150 pounds, with and without assistance. (R. at 42–43.) Plaintiff 

identified that he often experienced anxiety and depression at work, which only worsened after 

doctors diagnosed him with prostate cancer. (R. at 44–45.) In November and December 2009, he 

underwent radiation treatment, which further accentuated his anxiety and depression. (R. at 45.) 

In March 2010, after experiencing suicidal thoughts he began psychological treatment at 

Madison Center, a psychiatric hospital located in South Bend, Indiana. (Id.) At the hearing, 

Plaintiff testified that his prostate cancer was not currently in remission, but rather his PSA 

numbers were increasing, potentially indicative of his need to undergo further hormone therapy. 

(R. at 56.) 

 Plaintiff’s daily routine involves: waking up around 9:00 a.m., eating cereal, feeling 

anxious, which causes him to return to bed for a few hours, waking up and watching television, 

falling asleep, waking up for dinner, returning to television, and then retiring to bed for the 

evening. (R. at 48, 55.) On average, Plaintiff sleeps about fifteen hours a day. (R. at 50.) Due to 

his fatigue, he described being able to help with some activities around the house—such as 

dishes or driving to the store for his prescriptions or a gallon of milk—but he contended he 

cannot complete any outside chores. (R. at 52.) Further, he explained he has difficulty focusing 

and remembering. (R. at 50.) A few hours after watching television, he is able to recall parts 
3 

(“maybe two thirds”) of what happened during the show, but the next day he hardly remembers 

anything about the program. (R. at 51.) 

 Concerning his physical capabilities, Plaintiff testified that occasionally he could lift 

about twenty pounds. (R. at 45.) He expressed no issues with sitting for extended periods of time 

but claimed he could only stand comfortably for about fifteen minutes due to his fatigue. (R. at 

46.) He does not regularly walk but could likely walk around the block. (Id.) Plaintiff has no 

problem using his hands or reaching his arms out in front of him; however, his balance causes 

him to struggle when reaching overhead. (R. at 48–49.) 

 He also suffers from severe vision problems. (R. at 49.) As of the hearing date, Plaintiff 

had undergone six laser surgeries—the most recent surgery took place one-and-one-half years 

earlier—and on two prior occasions, doctors had removed fluid from his right eye. (Id.) He 

expressed concern with his eyesight if he returned to work as a salesman because his vision 

would make it difficult to input inventory numbers into a computer. (R. at 50.) 

 Further, Plaintiff has suffered from diabetes for thirty-four years but testified that “for the 

most part” it was under control. (R. at 47–48.) He described that a few times a week his blood 

sugars are too high or too low. (R. at 47.) As an illustration, he explained that he checks his 

blood sugar roughly seven to eight times a day, and about two or three of those times his blood 

sugar is low. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff also struggles to deal with groups of people for longer than ten minutes, and as a 

result experiences anxiety, causing him to breathe heavier and have lapses in memory. (R. at 52–

53.) Plaintiff described that he has a difficult time when his grandkids visit because the social 

environment becomes too stressful. (R. at 176.) At the hearing, he explained that he felt as 

though he was “getting boxed in” and stated that he wanted “to get out of [t]here.” (R. at 53.) 
4 

(2) Testimony of Plaintiff’s Wife 

 Plaintiff’s wife, Deborah Wysong, also testified at the hearing. (R. at 57–63.) Ms. 

Wysong explained that, before his treatment for prostate cancer, he was an outgoing salesman 

but that the radiation appeared to make him depressed and inactive. (R. at 57.) As a result, he 

sought treatment from Madison Center, which helped to make it so he was not feeling suicidal. 

(R. at 58.) However, ever since his prostate cancer, she testified that he “sleeps a lot” and 

contended that his fatigue, depression, and daily radiation treatments caused him to stop work. 

(R. at 61–62.) They used to go out to dinner or meet with friends often, but according to Ms. 

Wysong, Plaintiff now acts more isolated. (R. at 59.) 

 Ms. Wysong further confirmed Plaintiff’s difficulty in remembering. (Id.) For example, 

he would not recall what he watched on television, or if she simply asked him to complete a 

number of tasks he would forget. (R. at 60–61.) However, if she wrote down a list of things for 

him to do, then he would remember and complete the chores. (R. at 60.) Ms. Wysong further 

claimed that his memory initially contributed to his struggle in taking his medication. (Id.) 

(2) Medical Evidence 

 Plaintiff claimed that his severe, medically determinable impairments include: diabetes, 

diabetic retinopathy, prostate cancer, depression, and anxiety. (R. 133–34, 155.) 

 Concerning his diabetes, at the request of Dr. Stanish—Plaintiff’s primary-care 

physician—he visited Dr. Gardine, an endocrinologist, who in September and December 2008 

noted Plaintiff had nephropathy and retinopathy. (R. at 266, 277.) Dr. Gardine explained that 

Plaintiff struggled to control his blood sugars, as he described Plaintiff as “correcting lows 

frequently, and then chasing highs.” (R. at 266.) However subsequent visits seemed to illustrate 
5 

marked improvement in Plaintiff’s control of his diabetes and showed he was without 

retinopathy or nephropathy. (R. at 250, 257.) On August 24, 2010, Dr. Gardine noted that his 

diabetes was improving. (R. at 426.) 

 Plaintiff also saw an ophthalmologist, Dr. Thomas Hauch, regarding his diabetic 

retinopathy. (R. at 221.) In February 2008, he had developed proliferative diabetic retinopathy 

with bleeding in the right eye. (Id.) As a result, on multiple occasions, Dr. Hauch 

photocoagulated his eye and on one occasion vitrectomized it after it failed to show signs of 

improvement. (R. at 221, 224, 227.) At subsequent appointments, from October 2008 to July 

2009, Dr. Hauch reported that Plaintiff’s right eye was “stable.” (R. at 233–37.) However, in 

August 2009, Dr. Hauch photocoagulated Plaintiff’s left eye after his examination revealed a 

vitreous hemorrhage. (R. at 238.) His proliferative disease was stable in his right eye, as of 

January 2010, but he had developed a cataract. (R. at 242.) In June 2010, Plaintiff experienced 

bleeding in his left eye, which Dr. Hauch addressed with further photocoagulation, and later that 

month, Plaintiff underwent cataract surgery on his right eye, performed by Dr. Richard Weiss. 

(R. at 382–83, 399.) In August 2010, Dr. Hauch saw Plaintiff post-cataract surgery and noted 

that his left eye showed improvement but his right eye was borderline concerning the amount of 

retained lens that could be tolerated. (R. at 401.) 

 Plaintiff met with Dr. Walker, on August 24, 2009, as a follow-up for his previous 

prostate cancer. (R. at 246.) Dr. Walker noticed that Plaintiff appeared to be doing well but that 

his PSA levels were rising. (Id.) At a subsequent appointment, in February 2009, Dr. Walker 

identified that Plaintiff’s PSA levels showed an increase over the past few years but that “it has 

not been highly suspicious for recurrent prostate cancer.” (R. at 247.) 
6 

 Plaintiff also contends that he suffers from severe depression and anxiety. In December 

2009, Plaintiff visited Dr. Stanish concerning his depression. (R. at 321.) Dr. Stanish described 

Plaintiff as “experiencing anxious, fearful thoughts, irritable mood, fatigue or loss of energy and 

panic attacks.” (Id.) Dr. Stanish advised of various medications and also proposed the possibility 

of employing a psychiatrist for further help. (R. at 322.) 

 On February 24, 2010, Plaintiff visited Madison Center for a psychological evaluation, 

after referral from Dr. Stanish and Plaintiff’s oncologist. (R. at 353.) The psychiatric evaluation 

revealed that weakness was major issue of Plaintiff’s depression, as he would spend twelve to 

fourteen hours in bed. (Id.) Further, the evaluation revealed that Plaintiff had developed anxiety 

and depression that was secondary to the post radiation therapy concerning his prostate cancer. 

(R. at 355.) 

 In May 2010, Plaintiff informed Dr. Stanish that he did not want to return to Madison 

Center, as his insurance would not cover it. (R. at 410.) Plaintiff explained that he finished 

radiation six months earlier, but he was feeling weak and fatigued since radiation, which 

prevented him from working. (Id.) Further, in July 2010, he expressed that he became fatigued 

during activity; however, while he contended that he had more difficulty with strength, he did 

not exhibit any weakness during the physical examination. (R. at 406, 408.) Plaintiff also 

complained of difficulty with memory and concentration since beginning radiation. (R. at 406.) 

In September 2010, Dr. Stanish noted that Plaintiff’s diabetes, depression, and hyperlipidemia 

were stable and that Plaintiff did not have fatigue. (R. at 458–59.) Additionally, on August, 8, 

2011, Dr. Stanish recorded that Plaintiff was not suffering from fatigue. (R. at 464.) 

 As the primary care physician, Dr. Stanish authored a letter on March 4, 2011, outlining 

his assessment of Plaintiff. (R. at 453–54.) In his opinion, Dr. Stanish explained that during 
7 

Plaintiff’s radiation therapy he experienced “extreme fatigue.” (R. at 453.) According to Dr. 

Stanish, the fatigue was so significant that Plaintiff quit his job because of his inability to stay 

awake. (Id.) He described Plaintiff as “recalcitrant to any oral medications” and noted that 

Madison Center diagnosed that he “had very severe depression.” (Id.) Dr. Stanish recognized that 

Plaintiff was unable to continue work due to the severity of his depression, but contended: 

It is difficult for me to tell if this has been caused by the radiation therapy, but it did seem 

to happen time wise. . . . Currently his diabetes is under control and it is not a limiting 

factor. His retinopathy is an issue as far as vision is concerned, but I do not have the 

details to tell the severity of this at this time. 

(R. at 454.) 

 Additionally, in May 2010, Plaintiff met with Dr. Mahmoud Yassin-Kassab for an 

examination concerning his disability claim. (R. at 376–77.) Dr. Yassin-Kassab recorded that 

Plaintiff was “able to grasp, lift, carry, manipulate objects in both hands and perform repeated 

movements with both feet.” (R. at 377.) Further, he could “bend over without restriction and 

squat normally” and also “sit, stand and walk normally.” (Id.) 

 Dr. Amy Johnson, a state agency psychological consultant, also examined Plaintiff, on 

April 1, 2010. (R. at 358–61.) Dr. Johnson recognized that he was moderately limited in his 

ability to understand and remember detailed instructions. (R. at 358.) Further, he had moderate 

limitations in carrying out detailed instructions, maintaining attention or concentration for 

extended periods, completing a normal workday or workweek without psychological difficulty, 

interacting with the public, and responding to changes in the work setting. (R. at 358–59.) Thus, 

Dr. Johnson reasoned that Plaintiff suffered from an anxiety disorder and mood disorder but 

found that it did not precisely satisfy the diagnostic criteria. (R. at 358–61.) 

 Subsequently, Plaintiff met with Dr. Goldstein concerning his psychological concerns on 

January 2, 2011. (R. at 467–68.) Dr. Goldstein recognized that Plaintiff suffered from increased 
8 

anxiety, issues with depression, and was unable to work because he could not face people. (R. at 

468.) Dr. Goldstein recommended increasing Plaintiff’s medication. (R. at 468.) At a follow-up 

examination in March 2011, Plaintiff stated that he would often forget to take his medication 

after the morning dosage and would refuse to take some medication because he believed that it 

made him more anxious. (R. at 469.) Dr. Goldstein reported that Plaintiff “clearly is resistant to 

taking medication.” (R. at 469.) Further, at a follow up examination in June 2011, Dr. Goldstein 

noted that Plaintiff “does not take the medications consistently.” (R. at 471.) 

(3) Vocational Expert’s Testimony 

 Vocational expert Dr. James Lozer (“VE”) testified at Plaintiff’s September 13, 2011, 

hearing before the ALJ. (R. at 62–67.) During the VE’s testimony, the ALJ provided him with 

three hypotheticals to evaluate, all of which included Plaintiff’s age, education, and prior work 

experience. (R. at 63–67.) For the first scenario, the ALJ instructed the VE to assume the 

individual could “understand, remember, and carry out simply instructions,” could engage in 

“work that involves brief, superficial contact with the general public, but could otherwise interact 

with co-workers and supervisors appropriately,” and could “sustain attention and concentration 

to carry out simply, routine, repetitive work, [while] tolerat[ing] the stresses associated with 

such.” (R. at 64.) The VE concluded that, under this factual scenario, Plaintiff could not perform 

his past relevant work. (Id.) However, he could complete medium unskilled work. (Id.) Examples 

of positions included assemblers (18,000 existing jobs in Indiana), custodians (25,000 existing 

jobs in Indiana), and dishwashers (7,000 existing jobs in Indiana). (R. at 64–65.) 

 For the second hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE to assume the previous limitations 

along with limiting the person to “occasional climbing, occasional crouching, crawling, and 

kneeling, frequent balance and stop, occasional overhead reach bilaterally, [and] occasional 
9 

exposure to hazards.” (R. at 65.) The VE concluded that Plaintiff could perform the previously 

identified jobs with these additional limitations. (Id.) 

 Under the third factual scenario, the ALJ proposed a hypothetical involving all the 

previous limitations but under the light exertion level, as outlined in the regulations. (Id.) The VE 

concluded that these circumstances would preclude all semi-skilled or skilled work. (R. at 66.) 

The ALJ followed up by inquiring as to how those scenarios would be impacted if a person, due 

to psychological factors, was off task 15% to 20% of the time, missed a day of work, or laid 

down for at least one hour during the work day. (Id.) The VE opined that such absence would 

eliminate full time competitive work. (Id.) 

(4) ALJ’s Decision 

 On October 13, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision that Plaintiff was not disabled from 

November 4, 2009, through the date of the decision. (R. at 18.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff 

suffered from multiple severe impairments: diabetes mellitus with retinopathy, status postprostate cancer, depression and anxiety. (R. at 11.) Nevertheless, the ALJ concluded that these 

impairments did not meet any of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, 

Appendix 1. (R. at 12.) 

 Further, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff had not engaged in any substantial gainful 

activity since the alleged onset date (R. at 11), and was unable to perform any past relevant work. 

(R. at 16.) However, the ALJ concluded that in considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work 

experience, and residual functional capacity, there were other jobs that existed in significant 

numbers that Plaintiff could perform. (R. at 17.) 

C. Standard of Review for Disability Insurance Benefits Claim 
10 

 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court has the authority to review Social Security Act 

claim decisions. 40 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006). The Court will uphold an ALJ’s decision if it is 

reached under the correct legal standard and supported by substantial evidence. Briscoe ex rel. 

Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence consists of “such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). This Court will not reconsider facts, re-weigh 

the evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its 

judgment for that of the ALJ. Boiles v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005). However, 

this Court will assess whether the ALJ built an “accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to 

his conclusion so that, as a reviewing court, we may access the validity of the agency’s ultimate 

findings and afford a claimant meaningful judicial review.” Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 

(7th Cir. 2002). 

D. Disability Standard 

 To qualify for Disability Insurance Benefits, a claimant must prove that he suffers from a 

disability. A disability is an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of 

any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in 

death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security regulations set forth a five-step test used 

to assess whether a claimant qualifies for disability benefits. Pursuant to these regulations, a 

claimant must establish: 

(1) he is not presently employed; (2) his impairment is severe; (3) his impairment is listed 

or equal to a listing in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) he is not able to 

perform his past relevant work; and (5) he is unable to perform any other work within the 

national and local economy. 
11 

Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 699–700 (7th Cir. 2004). 

 An affirmative answer leads either to the next step or, on steps three and five, to a finding 

that the claimant is disabled. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001). A negative 

answer at any point other than step three stops the inquiry and leads to a finding that the claimant 

is not disabled. Id. The burden of proof lies with the claimant at every step except the fifth, 

where it shifts to the Commissioner. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000). 

E. Analysis 

 Plaintiff contends that the Commissioner’s decision is not based on substantial evidence 

as required under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ committed two legal errors: 

(1) the ALJ failed to give adequate weight to Plaintiff’s primary physician; and (2) the ALJ erred 

in failing to properly analyze Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of chronic fatigue because the 

ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s credibility was conclusory. 

(1) The ALJ’s decision considering the weight to afford Dr. Stanish’s medical opinion was 

supported by substantial evidence. 

 An ALJ must afford a treating doctor’s opinion controlling weight if it is well supported 

and consistent with other substantial evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). “If an 

ALJ does not give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight, the regulations require the 

ALJ to consider the length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship, frequency of 

examination, the physician’s specialty, the types of tests performed, and the consistency and 

supportability of the physician’s opinion.” Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2011); see 

also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). 

 Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred in her assessment of Plaintiff’s Residual Functional 

Capacity (“RFC”) assessment because she failed to give controlling weight to treating physician 
12 

Dr. Stanish. However, the ALJ provided sufficient reasons as to why Dr. Stanish’s opinion was 

inconsistent with other evidence in the record and outside his area of expertise, and thus not 

entitled to controlling weight. (R. at 15–16.) 

 The ALJ opined that Dr. Stanish’s medical source opinion deserved little weight because 

the opinion was inconsistent with other psychological records. (R. at 16.) The Court agrees. Dr. 

Stanish contended that Plaintiff was “unable to work because of the severity of his depression,” 

noting that it “has not improved despite all of the medications that [he] ha[s] tried.” (R. at 454.) 

Although Plaintiff undoubtedly has received various medications, Dr. Stanish himself recognized 

Plaintiff was “recalcitrant to any oral medications.” (R. at 453.) Further, Dr. Goldstein’s 

psychiatric records from March 2011, support that Plaintiff “clearly is resistant to taking 

medications.” (R. at 469.) Plaintiff admitted at the examination with Dr. Goldstein that he often 

forgets to take his medication after the morning dosage. (Id.) A follow-up examination, in June 

2011, further supports Plaintiff’s failure to take his prescribed medication. (R. at 471.) Dr. 

Goldstein recorded that he “does not take the medications consistently.” (Id.) For instance, 

although Plaintiff recognized the medication was helping his condition, he acknowledged that he 

failed to consistently take such medication. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff also takes issue with the determination because the ALJ claimed Dr. Stanish was 

“not a mental health professional and therefore [was] not qualified to give an opinion regarding 

disability regarding mental impairments.” (R. at 16.) Thus, the ALJ gave Dr. Stanish’s opinion 

concerning mental impairments little weight and instead allocated controlling weight to the 

opinion of state agency psychological consultant, Dr. Johnson. (Id.) The Court finds that the ALJ 

provided a sufficient basis for her allocation of weight. The ALJ recognized that Dr. Johnson’s 

opinion was consistent with the objective evidence of record, including Dr. Goldstein’s 
13 

psychiatric evaluations and Madison Center’s assessment. (R. at 351–57, 467–72.) Consistent 

with the Madison Center evaluation, Dr. Johnson opined that Plaintiff suffered from a mood and 

anxiety disorder. (R. at 355, 360, 365, 367.) Nevertheless Dr. Johnson found that Plaintiff’s 

mood and anxiety disorders did not precisely satisfy the diagnostic criteria required. (R. at 365, 

367.) Dr. Johnson’s opinion is also consistent with the assessment conducted by Dr. Goldstein in 

2011. (R. at 467–72.) Dr. Goldstein’s assessments revealed Plaintiff suffers from an adjustment 

disorder with depression and anxiety, and an anxiety disorder. (R. at 468.) Further, on two 

follow-up examinations, in March 2011 and June 2011, Dr. Goldstein diagnosed Plaintiff with a 

major depressive disorder with moderate recurrence and a generalized anxiety disorder. (R. at 

469, 471.) These consistencies, coupled with Dr. Stanish’s previous observations regarding 

Plaintiff’s discipline in taking his medications, support that the ALJ provided a sufficient basis 

for affording Dr. Johnson’s opinion, an opinion of a mental health professional, controlling 

weight. 

 Further, although Dr. Goldstein’s opinion is in some regards consistent with Dr. Stanish’s 

opinion concerning the depression, this alone does not signal that Plaintiff’s condition satisfies 

the diagnostic criteria under 12.04. Thus, the ALJ’s decision to allocate little weight to Dr. 

Stanish’s opinion, relating to Plaintiff’s mental health issues, is supported by substantial 

evidence. 

 The Court also finds that the ALJ did not completely discredit Dr. Stanish’s 

findings because the ALJ made accommodations to Plaintiffs RFC after reviewing Dr. 

Stanish’s assessment of Plaintiff’s fatigue. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not 

appropriately consider the other evidence offered by Dr. Stanish in his medical opinion. 

In pertinent part, Plaintiff argues that “there is ample evidence to support Dr. Mark 
14 

Stanish’s opinion that [Plaintiff]’s severe fatigue, memory difficulties and inability to 

focus are so severe he would be unable to support full time competitive employment.” 

(Pl.’s Opening Br. 13.) However, the ALJ once again recognized that Dr. Stanish’s 

opinion was inconsistent with his own assessment of Plaintiff. (R. at 15.) In July 2010, 

Plaintiff claimed he experienced fatigue, but Dr. Stanish upon examination found no 

physical weakness. (R. at 406, 408.) Additionally, in September 2010, Dr. Stanish 

recorded Plaintiff was negative for fatigue, and similarly, in August 2011, noted Plaintiff 

exhibited no symptoms of fatigue. (R. at 459, 464.) Yet, even though Dr. Stanish’s 

records were inconsistent with his opinion, the ALJ subsequently noted that it 

accommodated Plaintiff’s complaints of fatigue and lack of energy, as recognized by Dr. 

Stanish, by limiting Plaintiff to the medium physical demand, restricting his postural 

activities, overhead reaching, and exposure to hazards. (R. at 15.) 

 The Court finds the ALJ’s assessment of the amount of weight afforded to Dr. 

Stanish’s opinion is sufficient considering his area of expertise and other evidence in the 

record. Thus, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s assessment of weight afforded to the 

treating physician’s opinion is supported by substantial evidence. 

(2) The ALJ sufficiently considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints concerning his chronic 

fatigue and its impact on his ability to work. 

 Last, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ legally erred by improperly dismissing Plaintiff’s 

testimony concerning his chronic fatigue. Because the Court finds that the ALJ adequately 

accommodated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of fatigue, the Court affirms the ALJ’s findings. 

 The Seventh Circuit has recognized that “[b]ecause the ALJ is in the best position to 

observe witnesses, we will not disturb h[is] credibility determinations as long as they find some 
15 

support in the record.” Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1178–79 (7th Cir. 2001). The Court 

will reverse an ALJ’s credibility determination only if Plaintiff establishes it was “patently 

wrong.” Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 2000). “Patently wrong” is a high burden. 

Turner v. Astrue, 390 Fed. App’x. 581, 587 (7th Cir. 2010). “An ALJ’s credibility determination 

need not be flawless.” Adams v. Astrue, 880 F. Supp. 2d 895, 905 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (citing Simila 

v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 516 (7th Cir. 2008)). Only when an ALJ’s determination lacks any 

support or explanation will the Court declare it “patently wrong,” so as to require reversal. Elder 

v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413–14 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Thus, only if the ALJ 

grounds his credibility determination in an unreasonable argument or observation will the 

credibility finding be reversed. Sims v. Barnhart, 442 F.3d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 2006). 

 The issue is whether the ALJ supported this credibility determination with an explanation 

and sufficient evidence from the record, and the Court finds that she provided sufficient evidence 

as to why the Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the extent of his fatigue was not credible. Most 

convincingly, the ALJ recognized various discrepancies between Plaintiff’s subjective 

complaints and the medical evaluations conducted. For instance, although Plaintiff testified that 

his PSA levels were increasing and claimed that his prostate cancer was not currently in 

remission, Plaintiff failed to provide any records indicating the recurrence of his prostate cancer. 

(R. at 56.) Further, the previous records of Dr. Walker provided contrary evidence regarding the 

rise in PSA levels. (R. at 247.) Dr. Walker noted that over the years Plaintiff’s PSA levels were 

unstable and often times had increased, but he nevertheless contended this was not “highly 

suspicious for recurrent prostate cancer” (R. at 247.) 

 Additionally, although Plaintiff complained of “fatigue and decreased energy due to the 

radiation therapy,” the ALJ recognized that Dr. Stanish noted Plaintiff demonstrated no 
16 

weakness upon physical examination when he was in remission. (R. at 408.) Further, subsequent 

evaluations performed by Dr. Stanish—for instance, in September 2010 or August 2011—

revealed that Plaintiff did not exhibit symptoms of fatigue. (R. at 458–59, 464.) As a result of 

this inconsistency, the ALJ, in assessing Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, chose to limit him to 

the medium physical demand and further restricted his postural activities, overhead reaching, and 

exposure to hazards, consistent with additional subjective complaints. (R. at 15.) Thus, although 

the ALJ did not necessarily believe the extent of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, she still made 

accommodations to Plaintiff’s RFC to reflect the extent of his alleged fatigue. 

 Each of the above-mentioned reasons supports the ALJ’s finding concerning Plaintiff’s 

credibility as it relates to the extent of Plaintiff’s fatigue. Thus, the Court finds the ALJ’s 

decision concerning Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of fatigue is supported by substantial 

evidence. 

F. Conclusion 

 The Court finds that the ALJ gave appropriate weight to Plaintiff’s primary physician, 

and the ALJ also did not err in her determination of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints concerning 

his fatigue. 

 The Court affirms. 

SO ORDERED on March 27, 2014. 

 S/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

 JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE