IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

FRANK H. PRICE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 3:12-CV-857 

)

KEVIN KRAMBS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court sua sponte pursuant to 28

U.S.C. Section 1915A. For the reasons set forth below, the Court

will GRANT the Plaintiff leave to proceed against Defendant M.

Lightfoot for damages in her individual capacity on his Eighth

Amendment claim that she was deliberately indifferent to a serious

medical need, and will DISMISS all other claims and Defendants

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Frank Price (“Price”) is a prisoner confined at the

Indiana State Prison who alleges that officials at the Westville

Correctional Facility (“WCF”) violated the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments by denying him

medical care while he was housed at the WCF. The Defendants are WCF

Medical Director Kevin Krambs, Nurses M. Lightfoot and T. West, and

Health Services Administrator D. Boyan.
DISCUSSION

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), district courts must review

the merits of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of

a governmental entity,” and dismiss it if the action is frivolous

or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune

from such relief. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) provides for the

dismissal of a complaint, or any portion of a complaint, for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Courts

apply the same standard under § 1915A as when addressing a motion

under RULE 12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th

Cir. 2006).

The pleading standards in the context of a motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim are that the “plaintiff’s obligation

to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A court should assume the

veracity of a complaint’s allegations, and then determine whether

they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680 (2009).

In the context of pro se litigation, the Supreme Court has

stated that “[s]pecific facts are not necessary” to meet the

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requirements of Rule 8(a). The Court has further noted that a

“document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se

complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

To state a valid cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff

must allege violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws

of the United States, and must show that a person acting under

color of state law committed the alleged deprivation. West v.

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988). The first inquiry in every § 1983 case

is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right secured by

the Constitution or laws of the United States. Baker v. McCollan,

443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979). 

Price alleges that in mid 2012 he was having stomach problems,

and that on June 19, 2012, he saw Dr. Krambs who had a blood test

performed, prescribed fibercon pills and stool softeners, and set

him for a six week followup (DE 1 at 5). Price continued to have

problems and on July 15, 2012, Nurse Lightfoot told him he tested

positive for blood in his stool (Id.). On August 6, 2012, Price had

a bowel movement and in addition to feces, he passed a rubbery,

brownish substance about three inches long (Id.). He showed the

item to Nurse West, who told him to “put in a health care request”

(DE 1 at 6). On August 7, 2012, Price passed another rubbery

brownish object, which he showed to Nurse Lightfoot when she came

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to his cell (Id.). Nurse Lightfoot commented that “it is better out

than in,” gave him a specimen cup for the objects, and told him she

would take the specimens and “if they look at it they do, if they

don’t, they don’t” (Id.). Price suggested that “so basically you

are telling me you are not gonna turn it in” (DE 1 at 8). Nurse

Lightfoot suggested, in response, that “they don’t care!” (Id.),

and when Price responded “‘it seems you don’t care either,’

Lightfoot walked away[,] leaving the sample.” (Id.). 

A violation of the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual

punishments clause consists of two elements: (1) objectively,

whether the injury is sufficiently serious to deprive the prisoner

of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities, and (2)

subjectively, whether the official’s actual state of mind was one

of “deliberate indifference” to the deprivation. Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991).

The Eighth Amendment requires the government “to provide medical

care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.” Snipes v.

Detella, 95 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir.1996) (cert. denied, 519 U.S.

1126 (1997) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)).

In medical cases, the Eighth Amendment test is expressed in terms

of whether the defendant was deliberately indifferent to the

plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Williams v. Liefer, 491 F.3d

710, 714 (7th Cir. 2007); Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369

(7th Cir. 1997). A medical need is “serious” for Eighth Amendment

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purposes if it is either one that a physician has diagnosed as

mandating treatment, or is so obvious that even a lay person would

easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention, and if

untreated could result in further significant injury or unnecessary

pain, and that significantly affects the person’s daily activities

or features chronic and substantial pain. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111

F.3d at 1373.

Deliberate indifference is comparable to criminal recklessness, and is shown by “something approaching a total unconcern for

[the plaintiff’s] welfare in the face of serious risks, or a

conscious, culpable refusal to prevent harm.” Duane v. Lane, 959

F.2d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 1992) (Citations omitted). “A prison

official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for

denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the

official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health

or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837.

“Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 establishes a system of notice pleading,”

Nance v. Vieregge, 147 F.3d 589, 590 (7th Cir. 1998). Giving Price

the benefit of the inferences to which he is entitled, the Court

cannot say that he did not have a serious medical need when he

started passing rubbery objects in his stool, and it cannot say

that Nurse Lightfoot was not deliberately indifferent when she

would not do anything to assist him after he reported the problem

to her. These facts state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim

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against Nurse Lightfoot.

Price’s complaint does not, however, state a claim against any

of the other defendants. Dr. Krambs examined and treated Price for

his problems, and there is no suggestion in the complaint or its

attachments that Dr. Krambs showed any deliberate indifference to

his medical needs. When Price showed one of the rubbery objects to

Nurse West, she told him to put in a health care request, which

does not suggest that she was deliberately indifferent to his

medical needs. And Defendant Boyan, the Health Service Administrator, is not even mentioned in the body of the complaint. Section

1983 “liability depends on each defendant’s knowledge and actions,

not on the knowledge or actions of persons they supervise.” Burks

v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2009). “[P]ublic employees

are responsible for their own misdeeds but not for anyone else’s.”

Id. at 596. The doctrine of respondeat superior, which allows an

employer to be held liable for subordinates’ actions in some types

of cases, has no application to § 1983 actions. Moore v. State of

Indiana, 999 F.2d 1125, 1129 (7th Cir. 1993). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court:

(1) GRANTS the Plaintiff leave to proceed against Defendant M.

Lightfoot for damages in her individual capacity on his Eighth

Amendment claim that she was deliberately indifferent to a serious

medical need; 

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(2) DISMISSES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, all other

claims, and DISMISSES Defendants Kevin Krambs, M.D., T. West, and

D. Boyan;

(3) Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), ORDERS that Defendant

Lightfoot respond to the complaint as provided for in the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure; and

(4) DIRECTS the Marshals Service to effect service of process

on Defendant Lightfoot on the Plaintiff’s behalf, and DIRECTS the

Clerk’s Office to ensure that a copy of this order is served on her

along with the summons and complaint.

DATED: February 25, 2013 /S/RUDY LOZANO, Judge

 United States District Court

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