UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 01-4826

CIRILO LOPEZ ROMERO,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.

N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., Chief District Judge.

(CR-00-362)

Submitted: April 29, 2002

Decided: June 6, 2002

Before WILLIAMS and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Neil M. Nameroff, NEIL M. NAMEROFF, P.A., Miami, Florida, for

Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Sandra J.

Hairston, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Cirilo Lopez Romero pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to

distribute in excess of five kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21

U.S.C.A. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (West 1999 & Supp. 2001), and one count

of conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18

U.S.C.A. § 1956(a)(1)(A) (West 2000 & Supp. 2001). He appeals his

sentence, specifically challenging the enhancement of his offense

level under the Sentencing Guidelines* for obstruction of justice and

possession of a dangerous weapon. We conclude that the district court

correctly applied these enhancements, and we therefore affirm. 

Romero first contends the district court erred in finding that he

willfully obstructed justice when he failed to disclose a 1980 misdemeanor conviction in the Southern District of Texas for illegal entry.

Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a two level

increase in a defendant’s offense level "[i]f (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the

administration of justice during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction." U.S.S.G.

§ 3C1.1. "[P]roviding materially false information to a probation officer in respect to a presentence or other investigation for the court" is

specifically listed as an example of conduct for which the enhancement is appropriate. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, comment. (n.4(h)). "Material"

information is defined as "information that, if believed, would tend to

influence or affect the issue under determination." U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1,

comment. (n.6). Whether information is material is a factual matter

determined by the district court, and the district court’s determination

is reviewed by this court under the clearly erroneous standard. See

United States v. Hicks, 948 F.2d 877, 886 (4th Cir. 1991). 

*U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2000). 

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The district court concluded that Romero’s testimony at sentencing

that he did not intend to deceive the probation officer when he failed

to disclose the prior conviction was not worthy of belief. Evaluation

of witness credibility is reserved to the finder of fact and is generally

not subject to review by this court. See United States v. Saunders, 886

F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1989). Moreover, the district court’s conclusion

that Romero’s prior conviction was a material fact is not clearly erroneous, as we have held that "[t]he threshold for materiality . . . is

‘conspicuously low.’" United States v. Gormley, 201 F.3d 290, 294

(4th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Dedeker, 961 F.2d 164, 167

(11th Cir. 1992)). Accordingly, the district court acted within its discretion by concluding that Romero willfully provided a materially

false answer to the probation officer’s question about his prior convictions and correctly applied the § 3C1.1 enhancement. 

Romero next contends the district court improperly enhanced his

offense level for possession of a firearm in connection with the drug

trafficking offense. A two-level increase applies if a dangerous

weapon is present during a drug trafficking crime "unless it is clearly

improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense."

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), comment. (n.3). The district court’s determination that a firearm or other weapon was present and justifies the

enhancement is a factual question that is reviewed for clear error.

United States v. Apple, 915 F.2d 899, 914 (4th Cir. 1990). 

After Romero’s drug distribution organization was discovered, a

search of a house used by the organization for storage of drugs in

Houston, Texas, resulted in the seizure of ten kilograms of cocaine,

$42,300, and a 9mm handgun. A subsequent search of Romero’s

North Carolina residence yielded a small quantity of marijuana and

four firearms. The district court found that Romero falsely testified

that the firearms found in his residence were not connected to his drug

distribution conspiracy and that he was unaware that co-conspirators

in Houston possessed firearms. The district court noted that Romero’s

organization distributed drugs in North Carolina for several years and

involved numerous individuals. Moreover, Romero admitted that

drugs transported from Houston arrived at his North Carolina residence before being stored at other houses. This evidence is sufficient

to support the district court’s findings that the firearms found in

Romero’s North Carolina residence were possessed for protection of

UNITED STATES v. ROMERO 3
the drug distribution organization and its profits and that the firearm

found in the Houston house was reasonably foreseeable to Romero.

See United States v. Kimberlin, 18 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 (4th Cir.

1994); United States v. White, 875 F.2d 427, 433 (4th Cir. 1989).

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly applied the

§ 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement to Romero’s offense level. 

We therefore affirm Romero’s conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the material before the court, and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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