UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

NICK J. MARTIN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:13-cv-00016-SLC

)

GEORGE JONES, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

On December 2, 2015, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants

George Jones, Jones Auto, Trent Jones, Emma S. Jones, and Jones Auto Repair (collectively,

“the Jones Defendants”) on all of pro se Plaintiff Nick Martin’s claims, with the exception

Martin’s claim for unpaid wages for the period of April 22, 2012, through June 4, 2012. (DE

112). Now before the Court are two motions (DE 114; DE 115) filed by Martin that the Court

deems to be motions to reconsider the Court’s Opinion and Order dated December 2, 2015 (“the

Order”). 

A motion for reconsideration performs a valuable, but limited, function: “to correct

manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Caisse Nationale De

Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); Bank

of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that

the problems a motion to reconsider is designed to remedy “rarely arise and the motion to

reconsider should be equally rare” (citation omitted)). A motion for reconsideration cannot “be

employed as a vehicle to introduce new evidence that could have been adduced during the

pendency of the summary judgment motion.” Caisse Nationale De Credit Agricole, 90 F.3d at

1269 (citation omitted). 
For the most part, Martin conclusorily asserts in his motions that various “falsehoods”

underlie the Order. But Martin is simply reiterating the vague, cursory arguments of

“falsehoods” that he advanced in his response to the motion for summary judgment (DE 101). 

Motions for reconsideration should not be used merely to “rehash old arguments.” Oto v. Metro.

Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000). 

Martin does, however, raise three specific arguments in his motions. He first disagrees

with the Court’s observation in the Order that Martin did “not identify this white mechanic by

name or explain how he is similarly situated.” (DE 112 at 15). Martin points to his interrogatory

answer dated February 17, 2015, that lists “Loron W. Bowers White” (DE 76 at 2). But as the

Court stated in the Order, Martin did “not . . . show that a similarly situated employee outside of

his protected class was treated more favorably than him.” (DE 112 at 15-16 (citation omitted)). 

The Court explained: “Other than referring to himself and the white employee both as

mechanics, Jones does not state whether the white mechanic had the same supervisor; was

subject to the same standards; worked similar hours; and had comparable experience, education,

and other qualifications.” (DE 112 at 15 (citations omitted)). Martin’s cursory identification of

Bowers in his interrogatory answer does not show that Bowers was similarly situated to him and

treated more favorably than him. As such, the Court did not commit a manifest error of law or

fact by concluding that Martin “failed to provide sufficient evidence of a similarly situated

employee.” Johnson v. Holder, 700 F.3d 979, 982 (7th Cir. 2012). 

Martin next argues that George Jones, Emma S. Jones, and Stephen J. Lerch “are in a

corporation entity creation 12/22/2000 to present . . . .” (DE 114 at 2). Martin apparently is

challenging the Jones Defendants’ answer to an interrogatory inquiring about their ownership

interests in other companies. (See DE 94 at 4). But Martin does not show that this evidence is

2
material, as the Court did not cite this interrogatory response from the Jones Defendants in the

Order. Furthermore, Martin does not show why he could not have adduced this evidence while

the summary judgment motion was still pending. See Caisse Nationale, 90 F.3d at 1269-70. 

Therefore, this argument, too, is unavailing. 

 Finally, Martin contends that there never was a state court hearing on the petition for

protective order that Jones filed against him in October 2012 and that this shows bias of the state

court judge. The protective order issued against Martin in state court in October 2012, however,

is not an issue to be re-litigated in this suit. 

In short, because Martin has not shown that he has “newly discovered evidence” or that

the Court committed a “manifest error[] of law or fact,” id. at 1269, his motions to reconsider

(DE 114; DE 115) are DENIED. 

SO ORDERED.

Entered this 22nd day of February 2016.

/s/ Susan Collins 

Susan Collins 

United States Magistrate Judge

3