Docket No . 102562.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

THE PEOPLE OFTHE STATE OFILLINO IS, Appellant, v.

JOHNNIE WILSON, Appe ll ee.
Opinion filed February 7, 2008.

J USTICE BURKE del

iv ered the judgm

ent of the court, wi t h op inion. Chi ef Justice Thomas and Justices F

reema n, Fi tzgerald, Ki

lb ride, Gar man, a nd Kar meier co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion.

OPINI ON

At is sue i n th i s ca se is wh

ethe r a warrantles s, suspici onle ss search of a p arol ee i s proh i b i ted b y th e f our th am en dm en t. In the inst ant case , a p ar o le o ffice r , ac t ing o n a n a no nymo us t ip that defen

dan t Jo hnn ie Wils o n w as vio lat ing t he co nd it io ns o f his pa r o le ag re eme nt , o rd er ed t wo po lice o ffi c ers t o sea rch defendant’s be dr o o m, des pit e no t having a s ear ch wa rr ant orreceiving defen dant’s
co nsent . Aft er t he sea rc h yielded co caine a nd her oin, defend ant was charged with posses si on of a c o n trol l ed su b sta n ce wi th i n ten t to del i ver. Befo re t rial, d efenda nt move d to suppress the drug ev

ide nce, ar guing t hat t he fo ur t h amendment of t he Uni ted St ates Consti

tution pr o hibit ed t he se ar ch o f his b ed r o o m.1 Wha t wa s r efer red to as “parol e” in Ill in oi s prior to

February 1, 1978, is now termed “manda tor y supe rvis ed release” ( MS R). 730 ILC S 5/ 5–8 –1( d) (We st200 6). For clar ity, Il li no is d ef en dan ts on MSR shall

be ref erred to as “p ar olees” in this op inion.
-2- The ci rcu i t cou rt of Co ok Co unt y denied t he motion, f in din g that defend ant co nsent ed t o t he se ar ch whe n h e si gne d hi s m andatory supervised

release (MSR) agreem

ent. The appel

la te court reversed defendant’s convi

ction an d reman ded the m

atter for a suppr ess io n heari ng. 364 Ill . App. 3d

762. Fo r the reaso ns that follow, we reverse t he ju dg m en

t of t he ap pellat e co ur t and a ffi rm t he judg ment o f the ci rc ui t cou rt.

BACK

GROUND On Fe br ua ry 2 7, 2002, d

ef en dan t was p l ace d on m

andatory supervised release (MSR) 1 from a 15-yea

r sentence f

or armed violen ce. Wh e n d

ef en da nt wasrel

ea se d, h e s i gned a “ Par ol e or Man datory Supervised Release Agree ment” (MSR

agreem ent), whi ch setforth the condi

tions of h

is release i n accordance wi

th s ec ti on 3–3–7 of the Uni

fi ed Code of Corr ections (730 ILCS 5/3–3–7 ( West 2002)) . Two of the conditions were as foll ows:

“ You sh al l consent to a

sea rc h of

your p ers on, prop erty

, or resi dence un

der your control”; and

“ You

sh al l ref rai n f rom the us e or p oss es si

on of na rcoti csor other con troll ed subs tanc es i n a ny f orm, or b oth.” The MSR agreem

ent al so stat ed: “If such rul esare vi ol ate d, p arol

e or ma ndatory supervi

sed releasemay be revo ked unde r t he r ules a nd r egu latio ns promulgated by

the Prisone

rRev i ew B oard

or ot her re leasing
au t ho r it y. *** Until f

in al discharge, you sh a ll at all t imes be under t he leg al c us t o dy o f the Depart men t o f Correct ions, subj ect to bei

ng retaken at

any time, wit h t he es t ablishmentof pr o ba ble cause, and the l odgi ng o f a war ra nt , w ithin t he
enclosure of

an Ill i noi s State c orrectional

cen ter.”-3- On February 3, 2003, de f

en da nt, wh o wa s on parole, was arrested and ch arged with posses si on of a controlled su b sta n ce wi th i n ten t to de liver

. Pr io rt o his be nc h t r ial, de fen da nt filed a mo t io n t o qu as h his arrest and s upp re ss evide nce. A hear ing on def endan t’s motion was hel d on March 18, 2003. At the he ari ng , pa role of f i cer Ra y mond Ha yestes ti f i ed tha t, on Feb ruary 3, 2003, hi s off

ic e recei ved an anony moust ip t hat defend ant had narcoticsand weapons

in hi s apartmen

t. Hayes stated that, based
on this tip, he visited defendant’s apartment wi th two Chi

cago poli ce off i cers to inve st iga t e t his p o ss ible pa rol e v i ol ati on . A t th e a pa rtm en t, he was given pe rmission to enter by a rela tive w ho was “e ither [def endan t’s] m other or gra

ndm other.” Up on ent er ing t he ap artm

en t, Ha yessa w d ef en da nt e merg e f rom a be droom j us t a few f eet from the f

ront do or. Defendan

t t old Hay es that t he be droom was h

i s. Ha yes then i nstructed the pol

i ce of f i cers to search defend ant ’s bed ro om. The po lice officer s fou ndseve ral contain ers of sub stances that

t he Ill in ois Cri me Lab l ater deter mi

ned t o be co caine a nd her oin. Hay es adm itted tha t he di d n ot have a war ra nt t o s ear ch de fendant
orhis ro om and did no t ask defend ant for his co nsent t o s ear ch t he
r o o m. Hay es te stified t hat he felt neither a wa rrant nor d efendant’s
co nsent was needed because def enda nt’s M SR agreem ent constituted defendant’s consent t o any searches of hi s p ers on, prop erty , or resi dence. At the con cl us i on of the heari

ng, th e tri al courtdeni

ed the moti on to suppress evi

dence, f in din g that defenda

nt consented to t he search when he sig ne d h is M SR ag r ee men t

. Fo ll owing a b en ch tri al on Se pt emb er 23, 20 03 , d efe nda nt wa s fo und gu ilty o f po ss es sio n o f a
con trol l ed su b sta n ce an d s en ten ce d to e i gh

t yea rs ’ i m pri son men t. On app eal, t he ap pellat e co ur t held, base d o n a t ot ality o f the circumstances, that the sear ch of defendant’s bedroom wasi m proper. Ac co r di ng ly, th e a

pp el l ate courtre ver sed defend ant ’s co nvictio n and
reman ded the ma tt er f or a ne w tri al

. People

v. Wilson , 361 Ill . App. 3d 93 (2 005 ). The St at e t hen ap pea led t o t his co ur t . We denied t he ap pe al, bu t o r de r ed t he ap pe llat e c o ur t t o va ca t e it s d ec is i on a nd
reco nsider its jud gme nt in light o f People v. Mo ss , 217 Ill . 2d 511 (2005 ). Upon

re co ns ide

ration, the appella

te court agai

n revers ed-4- def endan t’s c onv i cti on an d rem anded the m

atter f or ane w t r ial. 364 Ill . App. 3d 762. This

appeal fol lowed.

AN AL YSIS I nit iall y, we note that t he search in que st io n w as no nc o nse nsu al. Off ic er Hayes d id no t ask f

or consent b ef

ore or deri ng the se arc h of defendant’s bedroom. Moreover, defenda nt’s search

condi tion, whi ch
ma ndated that he “ sh

al l con se n t to a s ea

rc h ,”di d n ot co n sti tute pr os pec t iveconsent. See People v. Lampitok, 207 Ill . 2d 231, 260-61 (2003) (“sh

all s ubm it” i n a search

condi tion cha rges a probationer wi th th e d uty to s ub m i t to a s ea rc h wh en di re cte d to do s o; i

t doe s n ot con sti tute prospective cons ent). The Stat e concedes that the search
was nonconsen

sual , but argues that it wa s r ea so na ble none t heless a nd that th e a pp el l ate co ur t er re d in re ver sing t he ci rcu i t cou rt’ s den i al of defen dant’s m ot ion to suppress ev

ide nce. Ge ne r ally, our rev

i ew of a ci rcui t court’s ru

li ng on a moti on

to suppress ev

i den ce i n v ol v es b oth questions of

fact an d la w. Moss , 217 Ill . 2d at 517. We wi

ll uphold f in din gs of h is to rical fact m ade by the cir cu it cou

rt u n l es s s uch f i n di n gsare a gai n st th e m an i f est we i gh t o f t he evi den

ce. People v. Pitman , 211 Ill . 2d 502, 512 (2004). If we uphold the f

actual fi ndi ngs, we rev

ie w de novo whether s

uppres si on is appr op ri ate un

der those f

acts. Moss , 2 17 I ll. 2d a t 518 . I n t he insta nt case, there ar e no quest ions of f act disputed by the part ies. Accordingl

y, we review the applicati on of law to t he f acts de novo

. Appl ic abl e Law The fourth am

endm ent to t he U

ni ted St ates Constitution, whi ch guarantees the righ

t o f the people to be s ec ure in thei r perso ns, houses, papers, and ef

fects ag ainst unr eas ona ble sear ches and seizures, app lies to t he st at es t hro ugh t he du e pr oc ess c lause of t he f our tee n th am endm en t. People v. James , 163 Ill . 2d 302, 311 (1994 ). Ge ne r ally, t he fo ur t h amendment re quir es t he go ver nment to possess a war ra nt su

pp orte d b y prob ab l e c au se

f or a se arch to be consi

dered reasonabl e. Illino is v. McArthur , 531 U.S. 326, 330, 148 L. Ed. 2d 838, 84 7, 1 21 S. Ct. 946, 949 (20 01) . How ever, the req ui rem en t f or a warrant hasbe en he ld

unn ece ssa ry i n c ase s i nv olv i ng probati

oners and par olee s whe n t he search is deem ed reasonabl e. See United States-5- v. Knights , 534 U.S. 112, 122, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497, 507, 12 2 S. C t. 587, 593 (20 01) ; Samson v . California , 547 U.S . ___ , ___ , 165 L. Ed. 2d 2 50, 262 , 12 6 S. Ct . 21 93, 220 2 (2 006 ); Moss , 217 Ill . 2dat 534. In deter mi

ni ng the reasonableness of a war ran tle ss s earch, a courtmust exam

in e the to tality

of the circumstances an

d ass e ss , on t he one han

d, the degree to whi

ch the sea

rch i ntrudes upon an indi vidual’ s pri

vacy and, on the other, t he de gr ee t o wh ich it is needed f orthe promotion of l

egi tim ate governme

ntal in terest s. Knights , 534 U.S. at 118- 19, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 505, 122 S. Ct. at 591. In a seri es of cas es, the Uni ted S t at es Su pr eme Co ur t an d t his courtha ve he l d tha t pro b at io ne r s a nd pa r o lee s e njo y a g r ea t ly di m i ni sh ed ex pe cta ti on of priv acy due to thei

r status as prob ati oners and pa r o lee s, an d t he sa lient go ve rnme nt int er es t in preven t ing recidi vi sm an d p r o t ec t ing so cie t y fro m future c rim es. See Griffin v. Wisconsin , 483 U.S. 868, 880, 97 L. Ed. 2d 7 09, 72 2, 1 07 S. Ct. 3164, 3172 (1987) (warrantless s earch of prob ati on er ’s h om e b y sta te prob ati on offi cers pursuant to Wi sconsi n reg ulat ion r equ iring “r ea so na ble groun

ds ” h el d n ot to vi ol ate

f ourth am endm en t); Knights , 534 U.S. at 121, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 506-07, 122 S. Ct. at 593 (“Wh en an off ic er has rea so nabl e suspici on th at a prob ati one r s ub j ec t to a search co nd it io n is engaged i

n cri mi nal activ ity, there is en

ough li kelih ood t hat crim

in al conduct is occurri

ng that an intr usio n on t he pr ob ati oner ’s sig nific an t ly diminis he d p r iva cy int er es t s is r ea so na ble ”) ; Lampitok , 20 7 I ll . 2d at 25 1 ( se ar ch o f a p r o ba t io ne r ’s r es ide nc e is
r ea so na ble as long as it is performe d by

a probation off

ic er who has
r ea so na ble susp icion to investigat e violat ions o f pro bat ion); Moss , 217 Ill . 2d at 532 (war rantless, suspici onlesspa t-dow n s ea rch of parolee f orwe ap o ns is r ea so na ble , an d a ny ev ide nc e fo un d d ur in g such a search is ad missible , w hen t he s afe t y of a n inve st iga t ing o ffi cer is at iss ue). In con

trast to the

di m i ni sh ed ex pe cta ti ons of pri va cy of proba tion ersand parolees, t he st at e’ s int er es t in supervisi ng parolee s hasbeen hel d to be sub stantial . See Knights , 534 U.S. at 120-21, 151 L. Ed . 2 d at 506 , 1 22 S . C t . a t 592 (st at e’s int er est in p ro t ect ing pot entia l vic t ims o f cr imes by r eo ffen de r s a llo ws i t to f ocu s on proba tion ersin a way that it does not on t he or dinary citizen); Moss , 217 Ill . 2d

at 5 31 ( “ Th e s tatei s j us ti f i ed i n f ocu si ng gre ater atte

nti on on pr o ba t io ne r s be ca us e o f t he ir h igh er like lih ood o f r ec idiv ism.-6- [Ci tation .] Persons on

MSR , e ven mor e t han pr oba t ioner s, p re sent a ri sk to the p

ubl i c”). The appe l l ate court

recognized that defen

dant, as a parolee, had
a di m i n i sh ed ex pe cta ti on of pri v acy , a n d th at th e state had a l eg i ti mate in terest i n prev en ti ng rec i di vi sm an d pr otec ti ng soc i ety f rom f uture crim es. 364 Ill . App. 3d at 770. Ho wever, the appel la te court hel

d that because the search

at i ss uewa s n ot a pa t -d ow n sea rc h, a s in Moss , but rathera ful

l-f le dged search

o f a r es ide nc e fo rev ide nc e, it offend ed t he “sig nific an t ly pr o t ec t ed st at us ” o f his h o me. 36 4 I ll. App. 3d at771. Co ns eq ue nt ly, t he co ur t held t hat defend ant ma in taine d an ex pe cta ti on o f pr iva cy in h is ho me t ha t wo uld ou t weigh t he i n terests o f th e state unless t he St at e w as ab le to prov e th at i t h ad re as on ab l e s

us pi ci on to conduct the search. 364I ll. App. 3d at 771. The appella te court then reversed the ci rcuit court and reman

ded th e c au se wi th i n str uc ti on s to t he ci rcuit court t o eval

uate whether the off

ic er s had r ea so na ble
sus picion t o be lievethat defendan t violated the t erms of h

is MSR so that t he search

was j ustif

ie d. 364 Ill . App. 3d at 772. Defend ant contends that the appella te court actedprop er ly in
re ver sing the circuit court , and request s c ro ss-relie f on the grounds that a new h

earin g on reman

d would erron eously

giv e the State a
sec ond oppor tunity

to establ

is h probabl

e ca use an d r ea so na ble suspici on, which i

t faile d to do pr ev io us ly. The St at e ar gue s t hat t he appe l l ate co ur t ’s de cision s hou ld be r ever sed , a nd t hat no r ea so na ble
sus picion s hou ld be req

ui red f or a warran

tl es s s ea rch of defendant’s resi dence, becau se t his iss ue is n o w c o nt r o lled by Samson v. California , 547 U.S. ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d 250, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006 ), a Un i ted States S uprem

e Court case an nounced af

ter the de ci si on of the appella

te court in

the in stant case. In Samson , the petitioner was wal kin g down a street when he

was spott ed by a po lice officer who was aware that the petitione r was on pa r o le follow ing a co nvictio n for po sses sion o f a firear m by a felon. Samson , 547 U.S . at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 255, 126 S. Ct. at 2196. The police off

ic er stopped t he peti

tioner and, b as ed

sol ely on t he pet itioner’s status as a p arol ee, s earche d the peti tion er. Samson , 547 U.S. at ___, 165 L . Ed. 2d a t 256 , 1 26 S . C t . a t 219 6. Dur ing t he search, the off

ic er fou nd met hamphet amine in one o f the pet itioner’s sh i rt pockets

. Samson , 547 U. S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 256, 126 S. Ct. at 2 19 6. Th e S tate

then ch arged the petitione

rwi th p oss es si

on of-7- a contro l l ed subs

tanc e. Samson , 547 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d a t 256, 126 S. Ct. at 2196. The pet iti oner fil

ed a mot ion t o s upp re ss t he met hamphet amine evi dence, whi

ch was den i ed. Samson , 547 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 256, 12 6 S. Ct. at 21 96. A j ury then conv

icted t he pe t itio ner of t he pos se ss i on

char ge a nd se nt ence d him to seve n yea rs ’ i m pri son men t. Samson , 54 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 256, 126 S. Ct. at 2196. T he Ca lifo rniaCourt of Appea l a ff irm ed the trial court , holdi

ng that suspici onless se ar ch es o f pa r o lee s a r e la wfu l und er Calif ornia l aw. Samson , 54U. S. a

t

___ , 165 L. Ed. 2d at 256, 126 S. Ct. at 2196. The Un i ted Sta t es Suprem

e Court t hen

granted certiorari to det er mine “whether a condition of releas e can so dim in ish or e l i m i n ate
a releas ed pri

sone r’ s reaso n ab l e ex

pe cta ti on of pri v acy th at a suspici onless sea rc h by a law enf

orc ement officer wo uld no t offend the F ourth A

mendm en t.” Samson , 547 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 256, 126 S. Ct. at 2196. The exam i na ti on of the p etit ioner’s expectation of priv acy began wi th an ass essmen

t of h i s status as a parolee, a s compared t o t he petitioner in Knights , wh

o wa s a prob ati on er. Sams on , 547 U.S. at

___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 258, 12 6 S . C t. a t 21 98 . Th

e C our t h el d th at, li ke pr o ba t io ne r s, pa r o lee s a r e o n t he “c o nt inu um” of state-im posed pu n i sh men ts and, in fact , ha ve eve n fewer expe ct at ions of pri vacy than pr obat i oners

“b ecause parole

is more aki

n to im prisonm ent than prob ati on i s to i m pri sonm en t.” Samson , 547 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 258, 1 26 S. C t. at 2198. Th e Court ex pla ine d t ha t pa r o le i s n ot
a si mpl e rele ase f

rom i mprisonm ent, butrath er

an al ter n ati v e to continue d co nfine men t t ha t is e ligible o nly to those who agree to abi

de by ce r t ain rules f

or the b alance of

thei r sen tenc e. Samson , 547 U.S. at

___, 165 L . Ed. 2d a

t 258, 126S. Ct. at 219 8. Howe ver, the C ourt
ma de clear that it was n ot equ at ing par olee s wit h pr isone rs fo r t he purpo se of concl

udin g th at p arol ee s, l i

ke pri son er s, h av e n o f our th amendment ri ghts

. Samson , 54 U.S. at ___ n.2, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 258 n.2, 126 S. Ct. at 2198 n.2. The C our

t f oun d th at the ge neral conditions o f Cal if or nia’s parole, whi

ch i ncl uded, among other

thi ngs , mandatory

dr ug t est ing and meetin

gs with parole offi

cers, rest rictions on asso cia ti on wi th felons or ga

ng mem be rs , a b an on own ers hi p of fi rearms a nd speci fi ed weapons, an

d a req ui rem en t to r equ es t pe rmiss io n fr o m a p ar o le off ic er to travel m

ore t han 50 mi le s f rom hom e, clea rly dem onstrated2 The cou rt cited figur es pr ovided by the Ca liforni a Att orne y Gen eral showingthat 68% of a dultpa ro lees ar e retu rned to p ris on. F ifty-f ive percent
are returne d fo r a parole vi ol ation, and 13 % fo

r the com mi ssi on o f a new felony of fe ns e. California At

to rne y Gen era l, Crime i n Califor nia 37 (Apr il 20 01 ). Fu rt her , a sep ar at e st udy rev eal ed tha t 70 % of

Ca lifo rn ia ’s pa ro led felons re of

fe nd ed wi thin 18 m on th s o f be in g re lease d f rom ph ys ic alcust ody. See J. Pe te rsil ia, Chall enges of Pris onerRee ntry a nd P

arole in Califo rnia , 12 Cal. Pol’y Re s. Cente

r Brief 2 (Jun

e 2000).
-8- that pa rol ee s h av e “ se v erel y di m i n i sh ed ex pe cta tions of p rivacy by vi rtue of thei

r status a l one.” Samson , 547 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 25 9, 12 6 S

. Ct

. at 21 99

. Ad dit i onal ly , t he Co ur t fou nd t hat t he pa r o le search condi

tion under

Ca lifo rniala

w–whi ch requi res i nm ates who opt for parole to subm it to suspici

onle ss search

es by eit he rpa r o le off i cers or po li ce off ic ers at any

tim e– w as c learly expr esse d t o t he petitioner be f ore he si gne d hi s pa role agree men t. Samson , 547 U.S. at

___, 165 L . Ed . 2d

at 2 59 , 12 6 S . C t. a

t 21 99 . Th

e C our t h el d th a t because the

pe ti ti one r ac ce pte d h i s “cl ea r an d un am bi guous” search
co ndit ion, hi

s exp ec tations

of pri vacy were “s i gni f i can tly di m i nished.” Samson , 165 L. Ed. 2d at 25 9, 12 6 S. Ct. at 2199. The Court t hen hel d, “Exam in in g the t ot al

i ty of th e c i rc um sta n ce s p er tai n i n g to pet itio ne r’s st atu s a s a pa rolee , ‘ an

es tab l i sh

ed va riati on on i m pri sonm en t,’ [ cit at io n] inc lud ing t he pla in term s of the parole search
co ndit ion, we concl

ude that pe ti

ti one r di d n ot ha ve an ex pe cta ti on of priv acy that society would recognize as l egi tim ate.” Samson , 547 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 259, 126 S. Ct. at 2199. Tu rni ng to t he “go ver nmenta l pur po se” side o f the balance , t he Courtfound that Cal

if ornia h ad an “ ‘o ve rwh elming int er es t ’ in sup er vising

pa r o lee s be ca us e ‘ pa r o lee s .

. . ar e mo r e lik ely t o co mmit f uture crim

in al off enses .’ ” Samson , 547 U.S. at 165 L. Ed. 2d at 260, 126 S. Ct. at 2200, quot in g Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parol ev. Scott, 524 U .S. 357, 3 65, 1 41 L. Ed. 2d 344 , 353, 118 S. Ct. 20 14 , 20 20 (1 99 8) . Th e C our t n oted th at “ thisco urt has repe at ed ly

ack now ledge d t hat a St at e’s int er est s in red ucing recidi vi sm an d t he r eb y pr o mo t ing r ein t eg r at io n an d po sitive cit ize nsh ip among probationers and paro lees war rant priv acy intr usio ns th at woul

d n ot other wise b e to le rated un

der the F our

th Am endm en t.” Samson , 547 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 260, 126 S. Ct. at 22 00

. Aft er cit ing emp ir ica l evi dence 2 ill ust ra t ing t he signifi cance of the stat e’s i

nterest i n pr ev en tin g reci di vism, the C ourt-9- hel d, “C al i f orn ia ’s ab il

ity to conduct suspi ci onle ss search es of parole es serves its int er est in red ucing re cidivism, in a ma nne r that aids, rather than hi nders, the rei

ntegration of parol ees i

nto pr oduct i

ve society .” Samson , 547 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 260, 126 S. Ct. at 2200. Moreover, the Court found that a requirem ent that searches b e based
on i nd i vi dua l ize d suspici

on wo uld “ gi

v e p arol ee s g

re ate r oppor tun i ty to an ti c ipat e se ar ches and c onc eal cr imi nality” and “unde rmine t he St ate ’s ab i l i

ty to eff ectivel y s upervi se parolees

an d p r o t ec t t he pu blic f rom crim in al acts by reoff enders.” Samson , 54 U.S. at
__ _, 165 L

. Ed. 2d at 261, 126 S. Ct. at 2200-01. The Co ur t held t hat , wh ile some states m ay im pose additional
re qui re men ts for individualized s usp icion, th e f our th am endm ent does not require reasonable suspi

cion f or all searches. Samson , 547 U.S. at

___ n.4, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 261 n.4, 1 26 S. C t. at 2201 n .4. The Court then noted that reasonablenes s, not individualized s usp icion, is “[t ]he touch sto n e of

th e F our th Am endm ent.” Samson , 54 U.S. at ___ n.4, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 261 n.4, 126 S. Ct. at 2201 n.4 . T he Court concl uded, “the Fo ur t h Amendment does not pro hi bi t a polic e off

ic er f rom co nduc t inga suspi

ci onle ss search

of a parolee.” Samson , 54 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 262, 126 S. Ct. at 2202. The Sta te a rgue s th at Samson not o nl

y rei nf orces the legi

tim acy of t his s t at e’ s int er es t in

preven ting reci div is m, b ut also establ

is hes that defend ant ’s st at us a s a p ar olee , a long wi th the terms of h

is search
co ndit ion, diminis he s his ex pe cta ti on of pri va cy to apoi n t th at s oci ety wo uld no t re co gnize a s legit imate. Defend ant do es no t co nt est t he le giti ma cy of t he st at e’s int er est in pre vent ing recidi vi sm , but contends that Samson i s n

ot c ontr ol l i

ng on th e i ss ueof hi s exp ec tati

ons of pr iva cy. Defe

ndan t argues that because the MSR sy stem in I llino is di f f erssignifi cantl y f rom the Cal

if ornia s ys tem, and b ecause h

is search
con di ti on is unl ike the search

cond i tion use d i n C al i f orni a, Samson does not apply

here. Def

endan t also contends that

Samson made no fi ndi ngsregardin

g the search of

a parolee’s

resi dence and, assu ch , is inapp lica ble t o t he inst ant case. We shal l address these ar gu men t s in t ur n.

Pa r o le S yst ems De fen da nt ar gu es t ha t o ur manda toryMSR sy

stem af fords an I llino is pa r o lee a g r ea t er ex pe ct at io n o f pr iva cy t ha n a Ca lif or nia parolee, who may “ele ct ” t o st ay in t he p hysica l cu st o dy o f t h e-10- dep ar t ment of

correct ions

or choo se to accept a set of c ond itio ns and
co mp l ete hi s sentence on paro le. According to defendant, because MSR i s m andatory f oran I lli nois p riso ner , he is not pr ese nt ed w ith t he choi ce between stay

in g in prison or bei

ng rel eas ed o n par ole, and therefore do es not have the same level of “unam biguous awar eness” of the acceptanceo f a

search condi

tion that Calif

ornia prisoners hav

e. We find de fen da nt ’s ar gu men t t o be wit ho ut me ri t

. T he r e is not hingi n th e s tatute s th

at g ove rn the Ill i noi s p arole system that
su pp ortsde f

en da nt’ s c onte nti on th at Il l i noi s p arol ee s a re s omeh ow less awar e t han t heir Ca lif

or nia co unt erpar t s t hat t hey are acc ept inga col l ec ti on of condi tions i n order to secure thei

r releas e from

phy si cal
cu st o dy. Further, we can f in d no appreci abl

e di ff erences b etween

each stat e’s operational process f or en t er in g a

period of

pa role or f or remai ni ng on parole. In C al i f orni a, prisone rs sentence d to any

term, other t han

natural lifein prison w ithoutparole, may

be com e e l i gi bl e f or pa role b as ed on a deci sion of the B oard of

Parole Hea

ri ngs . Cal

. Penal

Code §3041 (West 2007)

. Cal i f

orni a p ri son

ers wh o are de cl are d e l i gi bl e f orpa r o le must sig n a nd r et ain a c o py o f a p ar o le a gr ee me nt that pla ces c o ndit ions on th

ei r l i be rty dur i ng thei r pa role, i nc l udi ng a c ond i ti on that req ui res the m to b e s ub j ec t to se arc

h or se izu re a t an y ti me f or any r ea so n. Ca l. Pe na l Co de §3 06 7 ( We st 20 07 )

. I f a C alifo rnia prisone rre fuses t o s ign suc h an ag re ement , he re ma in s i mprisoned. Cal . Penal Code §3060.5 (West 2007). In Calif ornia, parole es en

j oy f ree dom f rom the ph y si cal cu stod y of the Cal i f orn i a D ep artm

en t of Corr ections, bu t r ema in

under th e l eg al cu sto dy of th e D ep ar

tmen t,
an d are su bje ct t o r eimp r iso nme nt fo ran y vio lat io ns o f t he ir p ar o le agree men t. Cal . Penal

Code §3 056 (W

est 200 7). Sim il arly , in Il li nois, prisoner s no t se rv ing a t er m o f nat ur al life impriso nment h av

e th e op por tun i ty to be co me e ligible fo rpa r o le (730 ILCS 5/ 3– 3– 3( c) (W es t 20 06 )) , a nd w hen eligib le fo r paro l e are presented wit h an ag r ee men t t ha t se t s fo r t h t he co nd it io ns o f t he ir releasefrom

the phy si cal custody of the Departm

en t o f Co rr ect ions (730 ILCS 5/3–3–7 (Wes t 200 6) ). The y must s ign t his agr eement and
r et ain a copy i n orde r to secure

their rel ease f rom the phy

si cal custody of t he De par t ment of C orrections. 7 30 IL CS 5/3 –3–7( c) (West 200 6); People v. Pow ell , 217 Ill . 2d 123, 128 (2005) (pr is oner who refuse d to si gn his M SR ag r ee men t wa s k ep t in p hysic al c us t o dy)

. I llino is3 This condi tio n ha s s ince b een codi fied i n sec tio n 3– 3– 7( a) of t he Unif ied Code of Corre cti on s, w hich pro vides, “Th

e co nd it io ns of eve ry parole and [MSR] a r e t ha t t he s ubjec t: *** (10) consen t to a sear ch

of his or her pers on, pr opert y, or residence under hisor her co ntrol .” 730 ILCS 5/3–3–7(a)(10) (West 2006).

4 This conditio

n has since

been c odif

ied in sec tio n 3– 3– 9( a) of t he Unif ied Code of Co

rrectio ns, wh ich provid es, “[i]f pr ior t o expir at ion or ter mination of the te rm of par ole or [MSR ], a person violates a ** *cond ition of par ole ***, the Boar d m

ay: (1) con

tinu e th e e xistin g te rm, w ith or wi tho ut modifying or enlar ging

the con di tion s; or (2) paro le

or release the

pe rson to
a ha lf- wa y hou se; or (3 ) r evoke the pa role or [ MS R] a nd reconfine the person ** *.” 730 ILCS 5/3–3–9(a) (West 2006).
-11- paroleesr ema in in

t he lega l cust od y of t he Dep ar t ment o f Cor re ct ions f orthe d uration of thei r parol e. 730ILCS 5/3–1 4–2(a

) (We st 2006 ). We find t ha t t he pa r o le s yst ems o f I llino is a nd Ca lifo rniaare v ery muc h ali ke in oper ation. The parallels il lust r at ed ab o ve be lie defendant’s as s er t ion t hat t he syst ems o f the t wo st at es d iff er t o t he degree that precludes Samson fro m co nt ro lling o ur ana lysis o f a search of an Il li nois parolee.

Sea rc h Co ndit ions In Samson , the C our

t f oun d th at th e red uc ed ex pe cta ti on of priv acy a parol ee h as is f urthe r d im inish ed by his acc ept ance of t he cl ear an d u na mbig uo us t er ms o f t he se ar ch co nd it io n c o nt ain ed in his paro le agree

men t. Samson , 54 7 U .S. at _

__ , 16 5 L . Ed . 2d

at 259 , 126 S. Ct. at 219 9. De fen dant argues that, because h is search
con di ti on differs fr om t he se ar ch co ndit ion co nsider ed in Samson , his expectation of

priv acy should not be si

mi la rly dim in is hed. Defendan t’s MSR agreement pro vides, “ [y ]ou sh al l con se n t to a search of y our person, pro perty, or residen ce under your co nt r o l” 3 and “If [t he r ules o f the agr eement ] a re vi ola ted, p arol e or m

andatory supe rvised releas e m

ay be revoked.” 4 In co mpar ison, t he se ar ch co ndit ion o f the pet itio ner in Samson
ma ndated tha t he “‘s ha l l agree i n w ri ti ng to be su bj ec t to sea rc h or sei zure by a p arol e of f i cer or ot her peace of

fi cer at any tim e of the day-12- orn i gh t, w i th or w i th out a se arch wa rra n t and with or wi

thout
cause. ’ ” Samson , 547 U.S. at _

__ , 16 5 L . Ed . 2d

at 2 55 , 12 6 S . C t. at 2196, q

uotin g Cal . Penal

Code §3 067(a

) (We st 2000 ). I f

t he petitioner in Samson wereto r efu se t o be su bje ct t o a s ea r ch he wo uld
v i ol ate hi s p arol e a nd be su bj ec t to areturn

t o p hysical cust od y of t he depa rtme nt of correcti ons. C al . Penal

Code §3 060 (W

est 200 7). We recognize the dis

tinct wordin

g in each se arch condi

tion, but ho ld t ha t t he diffe r en ce s a r e o f fo rm, and n ot substanc e. In each

state, t he pa r o lee is o blig ate d to compl y w ith the s earch dem

ands of la w enfo rc ement of

f i cersor f ac e p oten ti al re v oca ti on of pa rol e. De sp i te defendant’s prot estations to t he contrary, the l egal and practic al

eff ect of his s ea r ch co nd it io n is no dif f ere nt f rom tha t of the se arc h c ond i ti on at issue in Samson

. Defend ant als o maint ain s t ha t , wh ile Cal i f orn i a’ s s ea rch con di ti on ex plic it ly allo we d fo ra s ea r ch wit ho ut ca us e b y a p o lic e off ic e r , his search condi tion does not and i s, therefore, in dic ative of a greater
ex pe cta ti on of pri va cy . In addre ss i ng thi s c onte nti on, weturn

to Moss , wh erewe co nsid er ed a s ea r ch co nd it io n id en t ic al to d ef endan t’s. In Moss , we he ld t ha t t he se ar ch co nd it io n put s the parolee “on notice t hat la w e nfo r ce men t o fficia ls ma y as k h is c o nse nt t o se ar ch his ‘person, propert y, or residence ***’ *** wi th o rwit ho ut r ea so na ble
sus picion.” Moss , 2 17 I ll. 2d a t 528 . We furt he r ex pla ine d t ha t t his search cond i tion ha s n o “l i m i tation on wh at gove rn me nt ag ent ma

y perform tha

t search or what purpo se they

ma y h ave.” Moss , 21 7 I ll. 2d at 53 2. As s uc h, we find no mer it in de fen da nt ’s ar gu men t t ha t his search co nd i tion was i

n an y way le ss “ expl

ic it” than that considered in Samson

.
Search of a R esidence Defend ant contends thatth e a pp el l ate co ur t was co rr ect in fi

nding th at, where the search of a paro lee i nvades h is home, “it we ighs he av ily in the bal ance that det er mines whet her t he se ar ch is r ea so na ble and re mainsa s i gn

i f i ca nt, rath er th an m i ni mal , i ntr us i on on defendant’s alb eit dim in is hed ex pectations of pri

vacy.” 364 Ill . App. 3d at 771. Defend ant mai

nta i ns tha t the sp ec i al prot ect ion the Uni

ted St ates Supr eme Court and thi s court have historically aff orded t o searches-13- of resi dences s

hould b e fac

to red in to any asse ssment of his di mi ni shed
ex pe ct at io n o f p r iva cy. Sin ce Samson , man

y c ourt s hav

e hel d that t here i s no di ff

erence between t he expectation of

priv acy a parolee h

as in his pe r so n a nd his resi dence, provided that t he pa ro lee has s igned a n agr eement co nt aining

a s ea rch con di ti on si mi la r to defen dant’s search

co ndit ion. These cas es a ll i

mplement t he pr inciple set for t h in Sa mson t hat “a St ate ’s in

terests in reduci

ng rec idi vism and t her eby pr omo t ing rei nte gra ti on and posi tive c iti zensh ip a mong pr obationers an

d parolees
war ra nt priv

acy intr usio ns t hat wo uld no t ot her wise be to le rated under t he Fourth Am

endm ent.” Samson , 547 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 260, 126 S. Ct. at 2200. In United States v. Stuckey , No. 06 CR 339 (S. D.N.Y. August 16, 2006) , t he de fendant was a pa ro lee wit h a sea rc h co ndit ion p er mitt ing la wen f orc em en t to sea rc h his “per so n, r eside nce, and pr op er t y.” T he Stuckey cou

rt, re l y i ng on Sa mso n, he ld

tha t a suspici onl es s s ea rch of t he defen dant’s resi dence was reasonabl e. The Stuckey

court reasoned t ha t , “if it ge ne r ally c o uld be sa id that a free individual

has a greater expe ctati on s of p rivacy at home t han in his per so n [c itat ion] , a ny dif feren tial mus t be considered de m inimis for a parolee wh o is
ac ut ely aware o f the search conditi ons att ached to hi s libe rty” and,
moreover , “the state has at least as much of an i nterest in searchi ng a paro lee’sresi dence as

i t does i n s earchi ng h i s person .” ( E mph as es in origi na l .) In United States v. Lopez , 4 74 F .3 d 12 08 ( 9t h C ir . 2 007 ), t he defend ant was a parolee

with a search condi tion that put him

on notice that his per so n, p ro per t y, and re sidenc e we re subjec t t o s ear ch at any t ime. Lopez , 47 4 F .3d

at 1 209 . F ol l ow i ng Samson , the Lopez court he ld that t he def

endan t, as a parolee, did n

ot have an

ex pe cta ti on of priv acy in hi s residence that soci ety woul d recognize a s l egi tim ate. Lopez , 474 F.3d at 1213. The Lopez court hel d: “[I] f *** a paroleeha s no ex pe ct at io n o f pr iva cy in h is per so n, we reason

tha t a p arol eehas n o l eg i ti mateex pe cta ti on of priv acy in his r es ide nc e e it he r , at lea st wh en t he pa r o lee is pr es en t. Any o t he rrule wo uld diminis h t he pr o t ec t io n to soc i ety given by the sea rc h co ndit ion o f par ole, per mitt ing search at any

tim e.” Lopez , 474 F.3d at 1213.-14- S ee also United States v. Perkins , No

. 05 –C R– 30 13 7 ( S. D. I ll

. Decem ber 15, 200 6) (hold

i ng th at thi s court

“w o uld mo st like ly

ho ld that a s ea rc h o f a

paro lee’s r eside nce ne ed no t be su ppo rt ed by
reas onab l e su spi

cion”). In the i nstant case, de f

enda n t s ign ed and acce

pted a search
con di ti on requi ri n g him to “co nsent t o a sea rc h of yo ur per so n, pr o pe r t y, or residence

under yo ur co nt r o l. ” ( E mph as is added.) Like t he de fendant s in Stuckey and Lopez , hi s status as a parolee, coupled wi th the pla in la ngu ag e o f h is s ea r ch co nd it io n, r ed uc ed his
ex pe cta ti on o f pr iva cy in h is r es ide nc e t o a le ve l t ha t so cie t y wo uld not rec ogn izeasl eg i

ti mate . A cc or d i

ngl y , th e s pe ci al prote cti on no rmally a ffo r de d t o an ind ividua l’s ho me d o es no t ap ply t o him. We are unpersuaded b

y de fen dan t ’s ar gument s co ncer ning t he di ff erences bet wee n t he pa ro le syst ems and sea rc h co ndit ions o f Ca lifo rniaand Ill

in ois. Moreover, we fi

nd that any

“speci al pr ot ect ion” aff orded to defen

dant’s resi

dence was

lost when he b ecam e a parolee
an d agreed to co nsen

t t o a search of h

is resi dence in

hi s MS R ag re em en t. As suc h, w e ho ld t hat t he r eas oning set for t h in Samson
co nt r o ls ou r a nalysis of t he inst ant cas e. “[T ]he Fo ur t h Amendment do es not pr ohibit a po lice officer fro m cond uct ing a su spicio nl es s search of a parolee.” Samson , 547 U.S. at ___, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 262, 126 S. Ct. at 2202. In li ght of our decisi

on to day , we n e ed not addr ess the S tat e’s
ar gument that t he appel

la te court erredby disreg ar ding th e p rop riety of the search un

der the “spe ci al need s” d oc t rine se t for t h in Griffin

. A l so, beca use we r ever se t he judg ment of the appel la te court , we need
no t co nsid er de fend ant ’s r eq ue st fo r c ro ss -r elief.

CONCLUSION For the foregoing reas ons, we rever s e t he judg ment o f the appe l l ate cou rt a n d a f f i rm th e j udgm

en t of th e c i rc ui t cou rt.
Appellate court judgment revers ed; circuit court judgment affirmed.