IN THE SUPREME COIJRT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

STATE ex rel., STEVEN WADE ELLIOT, 

Relator, 

VS. 

DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL 

DISTRICT, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 

SWEET GRASS, THE HONORABLF BYRON 

L. ROBB, DISTRICT JUDGE, 

Respondent. 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: 

Counsel of Record: 

For Relator: 

James Tulley argued, Biq Timber, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Mike Greelv, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Jim Schier, Assistant Attorney General, arqued, Helena, 

Montana 

G. Thomas Biqlen, County Attorney, ~iq ~imber, Montana 

Submitted: March 19, 1984 

Decided-: June 20, 19 84 

Filed: >u\\ du '984 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Relator Steven Wade Elliot petitions this Court for a 

writ of supervisory control or other appropriate writ 

ordering the Sixth Judicial District Court, Sweet Grass 

County, to dismiss deliberate homicide and robbery charges 

for lack of jurisdiction. We deny the application for writ 

of supervisory control. 

The issues are: 

1. Whether a youth 15 years of age is legally capable 

of committing a crime? 

2. Does the District Court have jurisdiction to try an 

individual charged at 22 years of age for felonies allegedly 

committed at the age of 15? 

On July 1, 1.976, when relator was about 15 1/2 years of 

age, his neighbor, William Feldt, was found dead in his home. 

At about the same time, relator left home and was picked up 

several days later as a runaway. He was adjudicated a youth 

in need of supervision and confined at various youth 

institutions until he was 19. Soon after his release from 

Swan River Youth Camp, he was arrested and convicted of a 

felony in Missoula. He was sentenced to the State Prison and 

was later paroled. 

In May 1983, while being questioned in Helena concerning 

an incident there, relator confessed to having murdered and 

robbed his former neighbor, William Feldt. Upon 1ea.rning of 

the confession, Sweet Grass County authorities petitioned the 

District Court for authority to exhume Feldt's body for 

examination. Authority was granted and the results of the 

post-mortem examination corresponded with relator's 

confession. Relator, then 22 years of age, was charged in 

District Court with deliberate homicide and robbery. 
On June 30, 1983, relator moved the District Court for 

dismissal of the charges for lack of jurisdiction, arguing 

that the Youth Court had exclusive jurisdiction of the 

offenses. After a hearing on the motion, the District Court 

denied relator's motion and later filed a written order. The 

court reasoned that because the alleged crimes were not 

discovered until relator was 22, the Youth Court had never 

obtained jurisdiction and that the Youth Court's jurisdiction 

is exclusive only in cases where the offender is a youth when 

charged. Relator then filed this application for a writ of 

supervisory control. 

1 

Relator argues that the Legislature has by implication 

set the minimum age of criminal responsibility at 16 and that 

a 15 year old is incapable of committing a crime. A 15 year 

old, he argues, can commit only "delinquent acts." We reject 

this argument. 

Section 41-5-103 (12) (a), MCA defines "delinquent youth" 

as a youth who has committed an offense which if committed by 

an adult would constitute a criminal offense. Section 

41-5-206, MCA allows transfer from Youth Court to district 

court only if the youth charged was 16 or older at the time 

of the offense. Further, subsection (4) provides that "no 

youth may be prosecuted in the district court for a criminal 

offense originally subject to the jurisdiction of the youth 

court unless the case has been transferred as provided" in 

section 41-5-206, MCA. From these provisions, relator argues 

that the Legislature intended to establish a rule that one 

under the age of 16 is incapable of committing a crime. 

Relator argues that such a rule is consistent with a national 

legislative trend recognizing that youths under a certain age 

should not be subject to criminal responsibility. Further, 
he argues, a noncriminal act does not ripen into a crime by 

the mere passage of time. 

We conclude that the statutory provisions cited by 

relator are more consistent with a different legislative 

purpose and do not establish a rule that a youth under 16 is 

incapable of committing a crime. 

The primary purposes of these statutory provisions are 

to make it clear that delinquency proceedings in Youth Court 

are noncriminal, section 41-5-106, MCA, and to prohibit 

prosecution of youths in district courts while they are 

youths, section 41-5-206(4), MCA. These provisions are 

consistent with the fundamental objective of the Youth Court 

Act, which is to attempt to rehabilitate the offender while 

he is a youth and presumably amenable to rehabilitation. 

Section 41-5-102(2), MCA. A delinquent youth is defined as a 

vouth who has committed an offense which would be criminal if 

committed by an adult to emphasize that an adjudication of 

delinquency is noncriminal. However, this provision does not 

address the capacity of a youth to commit a crime. Cf. 

McBeth v. Rose (Ariz. 1975), 531 P.2d 156, 159. 

The incapacity argument raised by relator was rejected 

in State v. Little (Or. 1965), 407 P.2d 627. There, 

defendant was arrested and indicted for murder at the age of 

15. After defendant turned 16, his case was remanded to the 

jurisdiction of the circuit court for adult disposition. 

Oregon law provided that juvenile court had exclusive 

original jurisdiction over youths under 18 years of age, but 

that a child could be remanded to the appropriate trial court 

for adult disposition if at the time of the remand he was 16 

years of age or older. 407 P.2d at 628-29. The defendant 

contended that this statutory scheme was enacted with the 

intent to prohibit prosecution of any person for crimes 
committed before reaching the age of 16. The Oregon court 

rejected this argument, stating: 

"No Oregon statute permits the discretionary remand 

of a person under sixteen at the time of the 

remand. Therefore, the defendant argues, the 

legislature intended to make persons under sixteen 

immune from criminal liability. Exclusive 

jurisdiction of persons under sixteen, the 

defendant says, remains exclusive, and cannot be 

converted into concurrent jurisdiction by the 

passage of time. The defendant's argument rests 

upon a premise that the statutes forever fix the 

court's power over a child according to his age on 

the date an offense was committed. . .. 

"If there is to be some arbitrary age before which 

a person cannot, as a matter of law, be accorded 

adult treatment for his criminal conduct, the age 

may, of course, be clearly fixed by statute. If, 

however, the legislature has not fixed such an age, 

it is not the function of the courts to do so. 

"It is extremely unlikely that if the Assembly had 

considered the precise problem now before us, it 

would have intended to create a hiatus in the law 

that could wholly frustrate the administration of 

justice when a serious offense had been committed 

by a person below the age for discretionary 

remand." 407 P.2d at 629-30. 

Although Little involved a statutory transfer rule, slightly 

different from Montana's, we believe the Oregon court's 

reasoning applies here. Specifically, the Montana 

Legislature has not expressly stated a minimum age of 

criminal capacity, even though it could. have done so if such 

a rule had been intended. 

Relator contends that his position is supported by 

People ex rel. Terrell v. District Court (Colo. 19671, 435 

P.2d 763. There, a 15 year old was charged in district court 

with a.ssault with a deadly weapon. The court held that the 

Colorado Legislature, by enacting its statutory juvenile 

court provisions, in effect raised the minimum age of 

criminal responsibility from 10 to 16 years of age. The 
statutory language relied upon by the Colorado court appeared 

in section 22-1-4(4) of the Colorado Children's Code: 

"A child [under 181 shall be charged with the 

commission of a felony only as provided in 

subsection (4) (a) of this section, except for 

crimes of violence punishable by death or life 

imprisonment where the accused is 16 years of age 

or older." (court's emphasis) 

The court found that this language precluded prosecution of a 

15 year old for a felony. 435 P.2d at 765-66. 

However, at least two significant distinctions separate 

Terrell from this case. First, Terrell addressed a different 

factual situation. There the offender could have been 

charged in juvenile court instead of criminal court because 

he was only 15 when charged. Here the crime was not 

discovered nor was relator charged until the age of 22, when 

Youth Court jurisdiction was no longer available. Second, 

the Colorado statute included an express statement by the 

legislature that a child could be charged with commission of 

a felony only if 16 years of age or older and under specified 

circumsta.nces. Montana1 s statute provides only that a youth 

may not be prosecuted in district court for a criminal 

offense originally subject to Youth Court jurisdiction. 

Section 41-5-206(4), MCA. This statute is inapplicable to 

relator because he is not a youth and the alleged offense was 

never subject to Youth Court jurisdiction because it was not 

discovered until relator was 22. Terrell does not support 

relator's argument, nor does any of the numerous additional 

cases cited in furtherance of his argument. We have examined 

the cases cited by relator and find them distinguishable. 

The purposes of the Youth Court Act are set forth in the 

Act's "declaration of purpose," section 41-5-102, MCA. That 

section provides: 
"The Montana Youth Court Act shall be interpreted 

and construed to effectuate the following express 

legislative purposes: 

"(1) to preserve the unity and welfare of the 

family whenever possj-ble and to provide for the 

ca.re, protection, and wholesome mental and physical 

development of a youth coming within the provisions 

of the Montana Youth Court Act; 

"(2) to remove from youth committing violations of 

the law the element of retribution and to 

substitute therefore a program of supervision, 

care, rehabilitation, and, in appropriate cases, 

restitution as ordered by the youth court; 

" (3) to achieve the purposes of (1) and (2) of 

this section in a family environment whenever 

possible, separating the youth from his parents 

only when necessary for the welfare of the youth or 

for the safety a.nd protection of the community;" 

Reading the Youth Court Act as a whole in light of this 

declaration of purpose, we find the Act is designed to 

provide a separate method of treatment for youths while they 

are youths, with the ultimate goal of rehabilitation. Nowhere 

in the Youth Court Act has the Legislature declared that a 

youth is incapable of committing a crime. We believe that 

had the Legislature intended to establish such a rule, it 

would have expressly stated so. 

We hold that a youth 15 years of age is legally capable 

of committing a crime. 

Relator argues that the Youth Court Act vests in the 

Youth Court exclusive jurisdiction over crimes by persons 

under 18 years of age and that this jurisdiction cannot be 

transferred to district court if the youth was under 16 at 

the time of the offense. He argues that because the Youth 

Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over these offenses or 

transfer the cause district court , court has 

jurisdiction over the offenses and the charges must be 

dismissed.. We disagree. 
Section 41-5-203(1), MCA provides: 

"Jurisdiction of the court. (1 ) Except as 

provided in subsection (21, the [vouthl court has 

exclusive original jurisdidtion of all -proceedings 

under the Montana Youth Court Act in which a youth 

is alleged to be a delinquent youth, a in 

need of supervision, or a youth in need of care or 

concerning any person under - 21 years of age charged 

with having violated any - law - of the - state or 

ordinance of any city or town other than a traffic 

or fish and game law prior to having become - 18 

years of age." (emphasis addedT 

In State ex rel. Bresnahan v. District Court f1953), 127 

Mont. 310, 263 P.2d 968, this Court held that the 

substantially similar predecessor of this section granted the 

Youth Court jurisdiction where the offender is under 21 when 

charged and the offense was committed before the offender 

reached the age of 18. Thus, the "exclusive original 

jurisdiction" of the Youth Court depends upon two factors: 

(1) the offense wa.s committed while the youth was under the 

age of 18 and (2) the youth is charged before the age of 21. 

Because the crimes were not discovered nor charges brought 

until relator was 22, the exclusive original jurisdiction of 

the Youth Court was never invoked. Because relator's alleged 

offenses were not "originally subject" to Youth Court 

jurisdiction, the limitations on district court prosecution 

contained in section 41-5-206(4), MCA are inapplicable. 

Relator's argument that this statute precludes district court 

jurisdiction is without merit. 

It is true that some jurisdictions determine juvenile 

court jurisdiction based upon the offender's a.qe at the time 

of the offense. See Annotation, 89 A.L.R.2d 506 (1963). 

However, the determination depends upon the state 

jurisdictional statute in question, and cases from other 

jurisdictions decided under different statutes do not control 

our determination. Section 41-5-203, MCA expressly requires 
consideration of the offender's age when charged in addition 

to his age at commission of the offense. 

In State v. Fowler (Del. 1963), 194 A.2d 558, the 

Delaware court faced a similar dilemma. The offender had 

committed a homicide at the age of 17 and confessed 10 years 

later. The juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction of 

crimes committed by a person under 18 and charged before the 

age of 21. Youth court jurisdiction ended at 21. The court 

concluded that the general criminal court had jurisdiction 

because the offender was no longer a youth when charged. 194 

While the Youth Court is granted jurisdiction by 

statute, district courts are granted jurisdiction by the 

Constitution. Article VII, section 4 of the Montana 

Constitution provides: 

"The district court has original jurisdiction in 

all criminal cases amounting to felony . . . and 

such additional jurisdiction asmay be delegated by 

the laws of . . . the state of Montana." (emphasis 

added) 

Lack of Youth Court jurisdiction does not affect the 

scope of district court jurisdiction. In State v. Bradley 

(Wash.App. 1978), 580 P.2d 640, the court stated: 

"Bradley could not - be treated as a juvenile 

following his 18th birthday but this fact does not 

deprive the superior court of jurisdiction over his 

person . . .. Want of jurisdiction of the juvenile 

court merely precludes acts of that court. It does 

not invalidate an otherwise valid act of the 

superior court which properly had jurisdiction of 

the subject matter and the person." 580 P.2d at 

642 (citations omitted) (court's emphasis) . 

As in Bradley, the Montana district courts have been given 

jurisdiction by constitutional provision, and lack of 

jurisdiction in Youth Court does not limit a district court's 

jurisdiction. 

In In the Matter of the Welfare of S.V. (Minn. 1980), 

296 N.W.2d 404, the 17 year old defendant was charged with 
homicide in juvenile court. However, the case dragged on in 

juvenile court over four years and the court lost 

jurisdiction because the offender turned 21. At 22, the 

county sought to prosecute him in district court. Defendant 

made the same argument as relator here: 

". . . the respondent is attempting to take 

advantage of an alleged loophole in the juvenile 

court statutes. Minn. Stat. S260.111 . . . provides that juvenile courts have original and. 

exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed by 

persons under age 18 unless the case is referred by 

the juvenile court for adult prosecution. . .. However . . . juvenile court jurisdiction ends for 

all purposes at age 21. The respondent urges that 

the juvenile court lacks jurisdiction because he is 

over 21, and the district court lacks jurisdiction 

because there has been no juvenile court referral 

of the juvenile act. The respondent thus argues 

that he cannot now be prosecuted anywhere." 296 

N.W.2d at 407. 

The court responded that it had been confronted before 

with identical situations and had rejected the "home free" 

argument. The court relied on State v. Dehler (Minn. 1960) , 

102 N.W.2d 696, where the court allowed prosecution of a 34 

year old for an act committed at age 16. The court quoted 

from Dehler: 

"'We believe it would be ridiculous to say that if 

a person of 16 or 17 years of age commits a murder 

and escapes detection or apprehension either on a 

warrant or indictment until after he reached 18 

years of age, or 21 years under the recent changes, 

he could no longer be proceeded against in the 

juvenile court or tried by the district court. 

[court's emphasis deleted] 

"'Dehler's interpretation would be in violation of 

[the Minnesota Constitution] which gives the 

district court original jurisdiction in all 

criminal cases, and it would be unreasonable and 

absurd. The legislature does not intend a result 

that is absurd or in violation of the constitution . . .." 296 N.W.2d at 407. 

S.V. held the defendant could be prosecuted and distinguished 

State v. Fleming (Minn. 1974), 223 N.W.2d 397, cited here by 

relator, based upon statutory differences and because the 
offender in that case coull: still be tried in juvenile 

court. 296 N.W.2d at 408. 

In our review of the Youth Court Act, we do not find any 

direct statement or implication that the Legislature intended 

to place a person such as relator beyond the reach of the 

judicial process. Our review of the Act suggests that the 

possibility of the present fact situation was neither 

considered nor addressed by the Legislature. Relatorf s 

interpretation of the Act would lead to the type of result 

classified as absurd in State v. Little (Or. 1965), 407 P.2d 

627, 630. 

Because we have concluded that relator1 s age at 

commission of the alleged. offenses did not render him 

incapable of committing crimes, we hold that the District 

Court has jurisdiction to try an individual charged at 22 for 

felonies allegedly committed at the age of 15, as provided in 

the court's constitutional grant of jurisdiction over all 

felonies. 

We conclude that the District Court was correct in 

denying relator's motion to dismiss and we therefore deny the 

application for writ of supervisory control or other 

appropriate writ. 
We concur: 

X& 9, &** 

Chief Justice 

Justices 
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, specially concurring: 

I concur in the result here only because of the 

provisions of 1972 Montana Constitution, Art. VII, 5 4, and 

of section 46-2-201, MCA. 

Art. VII, § 4 provides in part: "The district court has 

original jurisdiction in all criminal cases amounting to a 

felony.. . ." 

Section 46-2-201, MCA, states: "The district courts 

have jurisdiction of all public offenses not otherwise 

provided for." 

Our statutes do not provide for a crime allegedly 

committed by a 15-year old person who was never prosecuted 

until he reached the age of 22. His case would fall between 

the cracks except for the enactment of section 46-2-201. It 

specifically covers Elliot's case, and we need look no 

further for jurisdiction in the District Court to handle the 

prosecution.