Opinion filed September 23, 2021

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals ______________

No. 11-19-00366-CR

______________

KAREN WINDAM BROWN A/K/A CAREN JEAN WINDHAM,

Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 35th District Court

Brown County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CR26598

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant, Karen Windam Brown a/k/a/ Caren Jean Windham, was indicted

for the third-degree felony offense of knowingly possessing less than one gram of 

methamphetamine in a drug-free zone. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.

§§ 481.115(b), 481.134(d)(1) (West 2017). Appellant waived her right to a jury trial, 

and after a bench trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty of the indicted offense, 
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found an enhancement allegation to be true, and assessed her punishment at five

years’ imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of 

Criminal Justice. The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly. In a single issue, 

Appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction. 

We affirm.

I. Factual Background

On July 27, 2018, Officers James Wells and Kayla Moore of the Brownwood

Police Department were dispatched to the Savoy apartment complex to investigate 

an aggravated robbery complaint. The Savoy apartment complex is located within 

one thousand feet of the Brownwood Middle School and is known by law 

enforcement to be situated in an area with a high-crime rate and a propensity for 

significant drug trafficking. Upon arriving at the apartment complex, Officers Wells 

and Moore made contact with the complainant, David West, who advised that 

Appellant had threatened him with a gun. West further advised the officers that 

Appellant was a resident of the apartment complex, and he directed the officers to 

the unit where Appellant resided.

Officers Wells and Moore knocked on the door of the apartment where 

Appellant purportedly resided. Appellant opened the door and allowed both officers 

to enter her apartment; Appellant was alone. After they entered, Officer Wells saw 

the ceramic “fake gun” that Appellant used to threaten West. As Officer Wells 

conversed with Appellant about the circumstances of the threats that Appellant had 

made to West, Officer Moore noticed two pipes in plain view on Appellant’s coffee 

table. The pipes resembled methamphetamine pipes and were located inside a 

koozie. Officer Moore also observed that the pipes contained visible burnt residue,

which indicated that the pipes had been used.

Appellant told the officers that she did not use methamphetamine and that she 

had not used the pipes for any type of drug use, on that date or any other date. She 
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testified at trial that she most likely purchased the pipes and various other items at a 

garage sale; however, Officer Wells testified that Appellant told him that she 

obtained the pipes from another man, whose name she could not recall. The pipes 

discovered in Appellant’s apartment were seized by the officers, and Appellant was 

arrested.

As a result of a limited search of Appellant’s apartment, no methamphetamine 

was found. However, one of the pipes that was seized from Appellant’s apartment 

was field tested by Officer Moore, and the contents of the same pipe was later 

analyzed by William L. Todsen, a forensic chemist with the Texas Department of 

Public Safety. The results of Todsen’s forensic testing revealed that the pipe 

contained a trace amount of methamphetamine.

During her interaction with Officers Wells and Moore, Appellant was 

agitated; her body was constantly twitching; and she “rambled” when she spoke to 

them. Appellant’s erratic and agitative behavior persisted as she was transported to 

the law enforcement center in Brownwood. According to Officer Wells, Appellant’s 

behavior was consistent with methamphetamine use. Nevertheless, Appellant, and 

other witnesses who testified on her behalf, stated that the effects of Appellant’s 

prolonged, excessive alcohol consumption caused her to shake, to become irritable, 

and to act erratically.

II. Standard of Review – Sufficiency of the Evidence

In her sole issue, Appellant contends that the evidence is legally insufficient 

to support her conviction. Specifically, Appellant contends that the evidence cannot 

support her conviction for knowingly possessing a controlled substance as charged 

because (1) the pipes that were seized from her apartment only contained a trace 

amount of methamphetamine that could not be weighed or measured and (2) no 

“other evidence” existed to link Appellant to the methamphetamine or to show that 

she knew the substance in either pipe was methamphetamine.
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We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, regardless of 

whether it is denominated as a legal or factual sufficiency challenge, under the 

standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. 

State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286,

288–89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we 

review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine 

whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Zuniga v. 

State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633,

638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict requires that

we consider all of the evidence admitted at trial, including improperly admitted 

evidence. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v. 

State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). As such, we defer to the 

factfinder’s credibility and weight determinations because the factfinder is the sole 

judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight their testimony is to be afforded. 

Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 768; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at

778. This deference accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the 

testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts 

to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Zuniga, 551 S.W.3d at 732; Clayton, 

235 S.W.3d at 778. We may not reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence 

to substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 

735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Therefore, if the record supports conflicting 

inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the 

verdict, and we defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Merritt v. 

State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 

778.
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Because the standard of review is the same, we treat direct and circumstantial 

evidence equally. Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Hooper

v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). It is not necessary that the 

evidence directly prove the defendant’s guilt. Rather, circumstantial evidence is as 

probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor and can, without 

more, be sufficient to establish his guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). A guilty verdict does 

not require that every fact must directly and independently prove a defendant’s guilt. 

Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Instead, the cumulative force of all the incriminating 

circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Id. Therefore, in evaluating 

the sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider the cumulative force of all the 

evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Murray v. 

State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). 

III. Analysis

A person commits the offense of possession of a controlled substance if she 

intentionally or knowingly possesses a controlled substance in the applicable penalty 

group without a valid prescription. See HEALTH & SAFETY § 481.115(a), (b). 

Possession is defined as “actual care, custody, control, or management.” TEX. PENAL 

CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(39) (West 2021). Therefore, to prove unlawful possession of 

a controlled substance, the State must show beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the 

defendant exercised actual care, custody, control, or management over the substance

and (2) the defendant knew the substance in her possession was contraband. Tate v. 

State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 

744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Hughitt v. State, 539 S.W.3d 531, 538 (Tex. 

App.—Eastland 2018), aff’d, 583 S.W.3d 623 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).

To be convicted of this offense, there is no requirement that the defendant 

must possess a usable amount of a controlled substance. Joseph v. State, 897 S.W.2d 
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374, 376 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); see HEALTH & SAFETY § 481.002(38) (West Supp. 

2020), § 481.115(a) (West 2017). Instead, it has been held that, “when the quantity 

of a substance possessed is so small that it cannot be measured, there must be 

evidence other than mere possession to prove that the defendant knew the substance 

in [her] possession was a controlled substance.” King v. State, 895 S.W.2d 701, 703 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (quoting Shults v. State, 575 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tex. Crim. App.

[Panel Op.] 1979)); see also Joseph, 897 S.W.2d at 376. While one’s presence at 

the location where the drugs are found is, without more, insufficient to prove 

possession, such presence can be sufficient to establish possession when combined 

with “other evidence.” Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 

As such, the evidence must be analyzed in combination, rather than independently, 

to determine if it is sufficient to prove each element of the charged offense beyond 

a reasonable doubt. Id. at 166.

Appellant contends that the State did not establish that she knowingly

possessed a controlled substance because the State did not link Appellant to the 

methamphetamine that was found in the pipe that was discovered in her apartment. 

Thus, Appellant would appear, in part, to rely upon the “affirmative links rule” in 

support of her challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. See Evans, 202 S.W.3d 

at 162; Pollan v. State, 612 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). 

“The ‘affirmative links rule’ is designed to protect the innocent bystander 

from conviction based solely upon his fortuitous proximity to someone else’s drugs.” 

Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), overruled in part 

on other grounds by Robinson v. State, 466 S.W.3d 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). 

Therefore, if the accused was not in exclusive possession of the location where the 

substance was found, it cannot be concluded that the accused had knowledge of or 

control over the contraband unless additional independent facts and circumstances 

exist to affirmatively link the accused to the contraband. Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 
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406; see Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12 (listing affirmative links recognized by 

courts).1 The number of “links” that can be identified is not particularly significant; 

rather, what is controlling is the “logical force” or degree to which the “links” that, 

alone or in combination, do exist and tend to affirmatively link the accused to the

contraband. Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162. 

Here, whether characterized as “other evidence” or simply evidence that 

“linked” Appellant to the contraband that the officers discovered and seized from 

her apartment, the State adduced, and the record contains, sufficient evidence that 

Appellant knowingly possessed a controlled substance as charged in the indictment. 

Such evidence, although not particularly exhaustive, included that: (1) Appellant 

was alone and the only resident of the apartment where the pipes that contained 

methamphetamine were discovered; (2) no one, except Appellant, had access to the 

apartment; (3) Appellant had exclusive possession of the apartment when Officers 

Wells and Moore were granted entry to the apartment; (4) the officers noticed two 

pipes that resembled methamphetamine pipes in plain view on the coffee table in 

Appellant’s apartment; (5) Appellant had exclusive control of the pipes; (6) the pipes 

were within her reach and accessible to her; (7) Appellant’s demeanor and 

behavioral traits throughout her interactions with the officers (agitation, twitchy and 

fidgety body movements, and rambling speech) were consistent with and indicative 

of methamphetamine use; and (8) Appellant’s apartment was located in a high-crime 

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Courts have identified the following non-exclusive factors as affirmative links that may establish 

an accused’s knowing possession of a controlled substance or other contraband: (1) the accused’s presence 

when a search is conducted; (2) whether the contraband was in plain view; (3) the accused’s proximity to, 

and accessibility of, the contraband; (4) whether the accused was under the influence of narcotics when 

arrested; (5) whether the accused possessed narcotics or other contraband when arrested; (6) whether the 

accused made incriminating statements when arrested; (7) whether the accused attempted to flee; 

(8) whether the accused made furtive gestures; (9) whether there was an odor of contraband; (10) whether 

other contraband or drug paraphernalia were present; (11) whether the accused owned or had the right to 

possess the place where the contraband was found; (12) whether the place where the contraband was found 

was enclosed; (13) whether the accused was found with a large amount of cash; and (14) whether the 

conduct of the accused indicated a consciousness of guilt. Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12.
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area that was known by law enforcement to involve a high level of drug trafficking. 

See Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 163 (holding that the defendant exercised care, custody, 

and control over drugs on a coffee table directly in front of him partly because the 

contraband was in plain view and within arm’s reach). 

Furthermore, if additional facts and circumstances (“other evidence”) 

establishes a person’s knowledge or control of a substance, the State need not show

that a minimum amount of the substance exists or that the substance possessed is 

observable or visible to the naked eye in order to prove one’s knowing possession of 

a controlled substance. See Joseph, 897 S.W.2d at 376; Cantu v. State, 546 S.W.2d 

621, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). As enumerated above, the record before us is 

replete with such “other evidence.” Additionally, although forensic testing revealed 

the presence of methamphetamine in one of the pipes that was seized from 

Appellant’s apartment, albeit a trace amount, to show the knowing possession of a 

controlled substance the State is not required to establish that the amount of the 

controlled substance is either measurable or subject to being assigned a specific 

weight. See King, 895 S.W.2d at 704; Johnson v. State, 843 S.W.2d 238, 239 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, pet. ref’d) (no minimum weight of the contraband 

is required to sustain a conviction for possession of a controlled substance). Here, 

and contrary to Appellant’s contention, we cannot say that the evidence in the record 

before us is insufficient to support her conviction. 

The factfinder is authorized to believe all, some, or none of any witness’s 

testimony. Adelman v. State, 828 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Reyes v. 

State, 465 S.W.3d 801, 805 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, pet. ref’d) (citing Sharp v. 

State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)); see Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 

768; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. Notwithstanding the testimony of Appellant and 

the witnesses she presented at trial, when, as in this case, the evidence conflicts, the 

applicable standard of review requires that we presume the factfinder resolved any 
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conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to the factfinder’s determination in that 

regard. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. It is the factfinder’s 

duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw 

reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. It is not our role or function 

to engage in or make credibility determinations. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; 

Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Sanders v. State, 119 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2003). Therefore, we resolve any conflicting inferences, if supported by the 

record, in favor of the factfinder’s determinations. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Merritt, 

368 S.W.3d at 525–26; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.

Consistent with the applicable standards of review, we have carefully 

reviewed all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s verdict 

and judgment. Irrespective of Appellant’s contentions, we hold that the record 

before us contains sufficient evidence from which a rational factfinder could have 

logically inferred and found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant knowingly 

possessed a controlled substance in a drug-free zone as charged in the indictment. 

Accordingly, because legally sufficient evidence supports Appellant’s conviction for 

the charged offense, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal.

IV. This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

W. STACY TROTTER

JUSTICE

September 23, 2021

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,

Trotter, J., and Williams, J.