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United States District Court 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MARVIN GLENN HOLLIS,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

NURSE REISENHOOVER, et al., 

 Defendants. 

Case No. 17-00326 BLF (PR) 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED 

COMPLAINT; DENYING MOTION 

FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED 

WTIHOUT PAYMENT OF INITIAL 

PARTIAL FILING FEE; DENYING 

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF 

COUNSEL; DENYING MOTION 

FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 

 

(Docket Nos. 58, 59, 63, 65, 68, 70, 72)

Plaintiff, a California inmate, filed the instant pro se civil rights action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against medical officials at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”). 

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis was granted in a separate order.1

 

Plaintiff has filed several duplicative motions in this matter: motion for leave to file a 

proposed amended complaint, (Docket Nos. 58, 65, 72); motion for appointment of 

counsel, (Docket Nos. 63, 68); motion requesting to proceed without paying initial partial 

filing fee, (Docket No. 59); and a motion for an extension of time to serve Defendant 

 

1 The Court determined that although Plaintiff has suffered three strikes under 42 U.S.C. § 

1915(g), he was entitled to the “imminent danger of serious physical injury” exception and 

permitted him to proceed IFP. (Docket No. 52.) 
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McCall, (Docket No. 70). The Court addresses these motions below. 

DISCUSSION 

A. Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint

 Plaintiff filed a proposed amended complaint in which he adds two new 

Defendants, Correctional Officers J. Guess and R. Simpson, and new claims against them. 

(Docket No. 20-1.) Plaintiff claims that when he arrived at Pelican Bay State Prison 

(“PBSP”) on January 21, 2016, he was placed in a holding room area in “Receiving & 

Release” where PBSP staff replaced the restraints that he had been transported in with their 

own handcuffs. (Docket No. 20-1 at 8.) Plaintiff immediately informed Defendant Guess, 

in the presence of Defendant Simpson, that his wrists were in pain and requested that the 

handcuffs be loosened. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff claims both Defendants refused and then left 

“without any concern for Plaintiff’s pain.” (Id.) Later, he began to have chest pain, 

Plaintiff asked Defendants Guess and Simpson if they could remove his handcuffs so that 

he could take his nitroglycerin medication. (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff claims that they “failed to 

respond and ignored” his pleas for help. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that their failure to respond 

and ignorance of his medical condition was “intentional and purposeful” and caused him to 

suffer “unnecessary prolonged chest pain, elevated blood pressure, nervousness and 

psychologically [sic].” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that he was later taken to the “TTA 

Emergency Room” to receive treatment for his hypertension. (Id. at 11-12.) 

Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides different ways to 

amend, and these ways are not mutually exclusive. Ramirez v. Cty. Of San Bernardino, 

806 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 2015). Rule 15(a) provides that a party may amend its 

pleading once as a matter of course, generally, within 21 days after serving it, and that in 

all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written 
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consent or the court’s leave. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Here, because the proposed amended 

complaint was filed over six months after Plaintiff filed the original complaint, he can only 

be seeking leave to amend under the second option, i.e., at the court’s leave.2

 

Rule 15(a) is to be applied liberally in favor of amendments and, in general, leave 

shall be freely given when justice so requires. See Janicki Logging Co. v. Mateer, 42 F.3d 

561, 566 (9th Cir. 1994); cf. id. (attempt to amend complaint requiring amendment of 

scheduling order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 must be based upon good cause). “‘In the 

absence of any apparent or declared reason–such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory 

motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of 

allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.–the leave sought should, as the 

rules require, be “freely given.”’” Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1073 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). 

Although leave to amend should be freely given, the proposed amended complaint 

improperly joins new claims against new Defendants which are not related to the claims 

against medical personnel that were found cognizable in the original complaint. Plaintiff 

alleged that Defendants Nurse Risenhoover, Dr. Adams, Psychiatrist McCall, and “Psy. 

Technician” Aldafe acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. 

(Compl. at 4.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims Defendant Risenhoover discontinued several 

prescriptions for medication to treat his chest pain, diabetes, hypertension, and mental 

health, stating that PBSP does not prescribe such medication. (Id. at 6-7.) When Plaintiff 

complained of chest pain, problems with his heart, and extreme pain in his lower back and 

shoulder, these Defendants failed to respond. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff also claims that 

Defendants McCall and Aldafe discontinued his mental health medication which has 

caused him to suffer psychologically, including depression, anxiety, and symptoms 

 

2

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associated with bipolar. (Id. at 9-10.) 

“A party asserting a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim may join, 

as independent or alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an opposing party.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). Accordingly, “multiple claims against a single party are fine, but 

Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against 

Defendant 2.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). “Unrelated claims 

against different defendants belong in different suits,” not only to prevent the sort of 

“morass” that a multi-claim, multi-defendant suit can produce, “but also to ensure that 

prisoners pay the required filing fees – for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the 

number of frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of 

required fees.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint clearly violates Rule 18(a) because he raises new 

claims against newly named Defendants that are based on separate events that took place 

solely on January 21, 2016, when he arrived at PBSP, and are not related to the actions by 

medical personnel at some later time that affected his ongoing medical needs. 

Accordingly, the motion to file an amended complaint is DENIED. (Docket Nos. 58, 65, 

72.) Plaintiff may file the claims against Defendants Guess and Simpson in a separate 

action and be subject to the filing fee. Because the Court has already determined that 

Plaintiff has at least three prior dismissals that count as strikes under § 1915(g), (Docket 

No. 52), he must pay the entire filing fee at the outset of the action. He will only be 

permitted to proceed IFP in the new action if he is able to show that he is entitled to the 

imminent danger of serious physical injury exception. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

B. Motion to Proceed Without Paying Initial Partial Filing Fee 

 Plaintiff has filed a request to be relieved of paying the initial partial filing fee of 

$32.00 which the Court ordered to be paid when it granted Plaintiff’s IFP motion. (Docket 
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No. 59.) The Court ordered that the initial partial filing fee be paid within 28 days from 

the date the order was filed on July 27, 2018. (Docket No. 51.) Plaintiff states that he is 

currently “100% indigent and unable to pay the initial filing fee.” (Docket No. 59.) The 

motion is DENIED as unnecessary. The Court provided instructions to the prison trust 

account office with respect to how payments for the filing fee were to be deducted and 

forwarded to the clerk of the court. (Docket No. 51 at 2.) The instructions specifically 

stated that “[i]f the prisoner does not have sufficient funds in his/her account to pay the 

initial partial filing fee, the prison trust account office should forward the available funds, 

and carry the balance forward each month until the amount is fully paid.” (Id.) These 

instructions are clear and require no further court order. 

C. Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Medical Expert

 Plaintiff requests appointment of counsel because the issues are complex, and he 

has limited understanding, education, and lack of skill at law. (Docket No. 63.) He also 

states that he needs legal assistance to locate and serve Defendant McCall. (Id. at 2.) The 

Court notes that recently a request for waiver of service has been sent to Defendant 

McCall’s address listed on the state’s medical board website. (Docket No. 71, 72.) 

Accordingly, assistance of counsel is no longer needed in this regard. 

 There is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case unless an indigent litigant 

may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social 

Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981); Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(no constitutional right to counsel in § 1983 action), withdrawn in part on other grounds 

on reh’g en banc, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). The decision to request counsel 

to represent an indigent litigant under § 1915 is within “the sound discretion of the trial 

court and is granted only in exceptional circumstances.” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 

1221, 1236 (9th Cir. 1984). Here, the difficulties Plaintiff raises are no different than those 
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any other prisoner faces. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED without prejudice for 

lack of exceptional circumstances. See Agyeman v. Corrections Corp. of America, 390 

F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004); Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (9th Cir. 1997); Terrell v. 

Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 

(9th Cir. 1986). This denial is without prejudice to the Court’s sua sponte appointment of 

counsel at a future date should the circumstances of this case warrant such appointment. If 

counsel is appointed, it is for counsel to decide whether a medical expert should be 

consulted. 

D. Motion for Extension of Time to Serve Defendant McCall 

 Plaintiff requests an extension of time to serve Defendant McCall with this action. 

(Docket No. 70.) As stated above, the Clerk of the Court recently sent a request for waiver 

of service to Defendant McCall’s address listed on the state’s medical board website. 

(Docket No. 71, 72.) Should this most recent attempt to serve Defendant McCall be 

unsuccessful, the Court will advise Plaintiff of his continued responsibility to obtain a 

relevant address before dismissing Defendant McCall under Rule 4(m). (Docket No. 61.) 

Accordingly, the motion is DENIED as unnecessary. 

CONCLUSION

 For the reasons discussed above, the Court orders as follows: 

 Plaintiff’s motions for leave to file a proposed amended complaint, (Docket Nos. 

58, 65, 72), are DENIED to filing the new claims against new Defendants in a separate 

action. Plaintiff’s motions for appointment of counsel and medical expert, (Docket Nos. 

63, 68), are DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed without paying 

initial partial filing fee, (Docket No. 59), and motion for an extension of time to serve 

Defendant McCall, (Docket No. 70), are DENIED as unnecessary. 
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This order terminates Docket Nos. 58, 59, 63, 65, 68, 70, and 72. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: _____________________ ________________________ 

BETH LABSON FREEMAN 

United States District Judge 

Order Addressing Pending Motions 

PRO-SE\BLF\CR.17\00326Hollis_motions2