NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

PETRO PAULO RUBEN LONGORIA, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 22-0546 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2021-132993-001

The Honorable Michael S. Mandell, Judge

The Honorable Geoffrey Fish, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Celeste Kinney 

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Robert W. Doyle

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 9-19-2023
STATE v. LONGORIA

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which Presiding 

Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Defendant Petro Paulo Ruben Longoria appeals from his

convictions and probation grants for luring a minor for sexual exploitation

and attempting to involve or use a minor in drug offenses. We find no error 

and affirm.

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 While conducting an undercover investigation into online

criminal offenses committed against children, a Chandler Police Detective 

created a digital profile of a fictional teenage girl, “Jazzy-T” (Jazzy). The 

detective posted Jazzy’s profile on a “meet-up” website requiring its users 

to specify they were at least 18. Juveniles posted on the site despite the age 

restriction because it lacked “true vetting mechanisms.”

¶3 “Star V” responded to Jazzy’s post and exchanged text 

messages with the detective, who continued posing as Jazzy using an 

“undercover” cell phone. In one of the first messages, Jazzy asked, “Are u 

okay if I’m not 18[?]” Star V responded, “Hell no[,]” before continuing:

STAR V: Let’s chat[.] I’m just older compared to you[.]

JAZZY-T (UC): I don’t care [a]bout age[.]

STAR V: [B]ut are you close[?] What are you looking for[?]

JAZZY-T (UC): I’m almost 16[.]

STAR V: I’m still interested but let’s proceed ca[r]efully[.]

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

judgment. State v. Mendoza, 248 Ariz. 6, 11, ¶ 1, n.1 (App. 2019).
STATE v. LONGORIA

Decision of the Court

3

¶4 Jazzy and Star V also exchanged digital photographs of each 

other,2 and their text conversation eventually turned sexual. Star V 

specifically asked whether Jazzy would be interested in having anal sex

with him and whether Jazzy knew how to perform oral sex on a man. Star V 

texted he was attracted to Jazzy “even though [he] . . . shouldn’t be[,]” and 

he asked her, “If I asked you to touch yourself . . . would I be in trouble?”

¶5 Jazzy and Star V then made plans to meet at Jazzy’s home 

when her mother would not be there. Star V asked Jazzy whether he should 

“bring anything, like, party stuff, 420, whatever[,]” and Jazzy responded, 

“Yeah, I love getting faded.”

¶6 As Star V proceeded on a city bus to meet Jazzy, he

periodically texted his GPS location to Jazzy. The detectives followed

Star V’s progress and waited near a bus stop where Star V’s text messages 

showed he would stop. After the detectives watched a person matching 

Star V’s appearance exit the bus and walk toward the location where he and 

Jazzy planned to meet, an officer, posing as Jazzy, called Star V’s phone 

number. The officers saw the suspect immediately answer a cell phone and 

arrested him. The suspect was identified as 48-year-old Longoria.

¶7 The officers searched Longoria’s bag and found a cell phone, 

a glass pipe containing methamphetamine, and marijuana wrapped in a 

paper towel. The detective then used the undercover cell phone associated 

with Jazzy to call Star V. The phone in Longoria’s bag rang. The officers

seized Longoria’s phone and obtained a warrant to search the phone’s 

contents. The search revealed the text messages and digital images 

Longoria and Jazzy had exchanged. The messages and images were 

extracted and preserved.

¶8 The State charged Longoria with luring a minor for sexual 

exploitation and attempting to involve or use a minor in drug offenses, both 

class three felonies. Longoria moved to suppress the evidence found on his 

cell phone. He argued the search warrant failed to satisfy the Fourth 

Amendment’s particularity requirement because the warrant incorrectly 

identified the phone’s color and manufacturer as a black Samsung.

¶9 When opposing the motion, the State conceded that 

Longoria’s seized cell phone was a “grey/black Motorola.” The State 

2 To depict Jazzy, the detective used images of an adult female who 

appeared underage. 
STATE v. LONGORIA

Decision of the Court

4

argued that the warrant satisfied the particularity requirement because it 

correctly referred to the phone’s unique evidence identification number,

which was assigned when the detectives impounded it. The State also

provided an affidavit from a Chandler Police Department representative 

describing how every piece of evidence impounded in the police 

department has a unique evidence number referenced in the warrant. At 

the evidentiary hearing, the State emphasized that the phone was the only 

phone seized in this investigation, and its unique evidence number was 

referenced in the warrant. The superior court denied the motion to 

suppress. The trial proceeded, and the State offered into evidence the text 

messages and images extracted from Longoria’s phone.

¶10 The jury found Longoria guilty as charged. The superior court 

suspended the sentence and imposed two concurrent terms of probation, 

the longest being 20 years. Longoria appealed. We have jurisdiction under 

Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. 

§§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶11 As the sole issue on appeal, Longoria challenges the denial of 

his motion to suppress. He repeats his argument that the search warrant’s 

incorrect description of the phone’s color and manufacturer violated the 

Fourth Amendment because there are “likely dozens of cell phones in 

police property rooms” and “[s]lapping the wrong paper tag [depicting the 

evidence number] on the wrong phone is always a possibility.” He asserts 

“the possibility of confusing cell phones from various sources in a police 

property room cannot simply be overlooked.”

¶12 We review the superior court’s ruling on a motion to suppress

for an abuse of discretion. State v. Crowley, 202 Ariz. 80, 83, ¶ 7 (App. 2002).

We review de novo whether a warrant is sufficiently particular to comply 

with the Fourth Amendment. State v. Roark, 198 Ariz. 550, 552, ¶ 6 (App. 

2000).

¶13 The Fourth Amendment requires search warrants to 

“particularly describe the things to be seized.” Roark, 198 Ariz. at 552, ¶ 8 

(citing Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976)); see A.R.S. § 13-3915(C)

(requiring a warrant to describe items “with reasonable particularity”). “‘If 

the property [to be seized] is sufficiently recognizable from the description 

[in the warrant] to enable the officer to locate the premises with definiteness 

and certainty, it is adequate.’” State v. Morgan, 120 Ariz. 2, 3 (1978) (quoting 

People v. Watson, 186 N.E.2d 326, 327 (Ill. 1962)).
STATE v. LONGORIA

Decision of the Court

5

¶14 Applying this test, Morgan concluded that a search warrant’s 

incorrect address and color description for an apartment did not render the 

warrant insufficiently particular because the warrant otherwise correctly

described the apartment’s geographic location, and no other apartment 

complexes were located there. Id. at 3-4.

¶15 In this case, although the search warrant incorrectly noted the 

cell phone’s color and manufacturer, it still accurately described Longoria’s 

phone by referring to the unique evidence number assigned to it upon 

being impounded. Given the evidence number and that Longoria’s cell 

phone was the only phone seized in this case, the officer who executed the 

warrant would know that he or she was searching Longoria’s cell phone for 

evidence of the charged offenses. Longoria’s speculative concern about the 

possibility that his phone was not the one searched according to the search

warrant is not supported by the record. It fails to overcome the warrant’s 

presumed validity. See Crowley, 202 Ariz. at 83, ¶ 7 (Search warrants are 

presumed valid, and the defendant is burdened to prove otherwise.).

¶16 The search warrant described Longoria’s cell phone with the 

particularity required under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the superior 

court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION

¶17 We affirm.