_______________________________________________________________________________ NOTICE OF MOTION AND PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO

FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Carolyn Hunt Cottrell (SBN 166977) 

David C. Leimbach (SBN 265409) 

SCHNEIDER WALLACE 

COTTRELL KONECKY 

WOTKYNS LLP 

2000 Powell Street, Suite 1400 

Emeryville, California 94608 

Telephone: (415) 421-7100 

Facsimile: (415) 421-7105 

 ccottrell@schneiderwallace.com 

 dleimbach@schneiderwallace.com 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs, the Collective and 

Putative Class 

Additional Counsel on the following page

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DESIDERO SOTO and STEVEN 

STRICKLEN, on behalf of themselves and all 

others similarly situated, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 vs. 

O.C. COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; 

Defendant. 

Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

NOTICE OF MOTION AND PLAINTIFFS’ 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL 

CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE 

NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) 

 

Date: August 31, 2017 

Time: 10:00 a.m. 

Ctrm.: 4 

Filed: January 18, 2017 

Judge: Vince Chhabria 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 1 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ NOTICE OF MOTION AND PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO

FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Shanon J. Carson (pro hac vice) 

 Sarah R. Schalman-Bergen (pro hac vice) 

 Camille Fundora (pro hac vice) 

 BERGER & MONTAGUE, P.C. 

 1622 Locust Street 

 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103 

 Tel: (215) 875-3000 

 Fax: (215) 875-4604 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs, the Collective 

and Putative Class 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 2 of 31
______________________________________________________________________________

_ NOTICE OF MOTION AND PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO

FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TO ALL PARTIES AND ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: 

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on August 31, 2017 at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 4 

before Judge Vince Chhabria of the United States District Court, Northern District of California, 

Plaintiffs Desidero Soto and Steven Stricklen (“Plaintiffs”) move the Court, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 

§ 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq. (“FLSA”), for conditional 

certification to proceed as a collective action and facilitate notice (“Section 216(b) Motion”). 

This Section 216(b) Motion is based on this notice, the following supporting authority and 

arguments, the Declaration of Carolyn H. Cottrell in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Conditional 

Certification and to Facilitate Notice Under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“Cottrell Decl.”), the declarations 

of the two named Plaintiffs who have opted in to this case, and the declarations of opt-in Plaintiffs 

Andre Holmes Carlos Rios, Trever Tranberg, Jacky Charles, Steeve Fondrose, Mohammed Idress, 

Mike Pfeffer, and Pedro Vieira, and the deposition testimony of O.C. Communications, Inc.’s Rule 

30(b)(6) corporate representative, Chief Operating Officer, Larry Wray. 

Accompanying this motion are also: (1) Plaintiffs’ Proposed Order Granting Plaintiffs’ 

Motion for Conditional Class Certification and to Facilitate Notice under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); (2) 

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Notice of Collective Action Lawsuit; and (3) Plaintiffs’ Proposed Opt-in 

Consent Form. 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 3 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ iii 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

I. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................... 1

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND......................................................................... 3

A. OCC and Its Technician Employees. ............................................................................... 3

B. Working as an OCC Technician. ...................................................................................... 4

C. OCC’s Technician Compensation Model. ........................................................................ 8

III. ARGUMENT............................................................................................ 12

A. The FLSA Permits Collective Actions to Prohibit Unlawful Labor Practices. .............. 12

B. Collective Action Certification is a Two-Stage Process. ............................................... 14

C. This Case Should Be Conditionally Certified Because Plaintiffs Satisfy the “Similarly 

Situated” Standard. ......................................................................................................... 15

1. Collective Members Have Similar Job Duties, Responsibilities, Work 

Hours, and Compensation ......................................................................................16

2. OCC Uniformly Victimizes Collective Members in the Same Way. ....................17

3. Similar Cases Have Been Certified. ......................................................................19

D. Notice is Appropriate and Necessary to Protect Collective Members’ Rights. ............. 20

E. The Statute of Limitations Should Be Tolled for Collective Members. ........................ 21

IV. CONCLUSION......................................................................................... 22

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 4 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ iv 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Federal Cases

Adams v. Inter-Con Sec. Sys., Inc. 

242 F.R.D. 530 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ....................................................................................... 15, 20, 21 

Balarezo v. NTH Connect Telcom, Inc. 

No. C 07-5243 JF (PVT), 2008 WL 1944116 (N.D. Cal. 2008). .................................................. 19 

Beasley v. Custom Commc’ns, Inc., 

 No. 5:15-CV-583-F, 2016 WL 5468255 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 28, 2016) ............................................. 20 

Bonner v. SFO Shuttle Bus Co. 

No. C13–1606 THE, 2013 WL 6139758 (N.D. Cal. 2013) ..................................................... 13, 14 

Brewer v. Gen. Nutrition Corp. 

No. 11–CV–03587 YGR, 2013 WL 100195 (N.D. Cal. 2013) ............................................... 13, 14 

Brown v. Permanente Med. Grp. 

2017 WL 1536493 (N.D. Cal. 2017) .......................................................................... 13, 15, 16, 20 

Daniels v. Aeropostale W., Inc. 

No. C 12-05755 WHA, 2013 WL 1758891 (N.D. Cal. 2013) ................................................. 13, 14 

Escobar v. Whiteside Const. Corp. 

 No. C 08-01120 WHA, 2008 WL 3915715 (N.D. Cal. 2008) .......................................... 13, 15, 19 

Flores v. Velocity Exp., Inc. 

No. 12–cv–05790–JST, 2013 WL 2468362 (N.D. Cal. 2013) ................................................ 13, 14 

Gomez v. H.R. Gunland Ranches, Inc. 

No. CV F 10–1163 LJO MJS, 2010 WL 5232973 (E.D. Cal. 2010) ............................................. 19 

Gounev v. Delta Mech., Inc. 

2015 WL 116587119 (S.D. Cal. 2015) .......................................................................................... 19 

Guilbaud v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., Inc. 

2014 WL 10676582 (N.D. Cal. 2014) .................................................................................... passim 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 5 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ v 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Harris v. Vector Mktg. Corp. 

716 F. Supp. 2d 835 (N.D. Cal. 2010) ........................................................................ 13, 14, 15, 16 

Hill v. RL Carriers, Inc. 

690 F. Supp. 2d 1001(N.D. Cal. 2010) .............................................................................. 12, 14, 15 

Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., v. Sperling 

493 U.S. 165 (1989) ........................................................................................................... 13, 14, 20 

Jason v. Falcon Data Com, Inc. 

No. 09-cv-03990 (JG)(ALC), 2011 WL 2837488 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) ............................................. 20 

Joiner v. Groupware Int’l, Inc. 

No. 8:09–cv–1943–T–26MAP, 2010 WL 2136533 (M.D. Fla. 2010) .......................................... 20 

Leuthold v. Destination Am. 

224 F.R.D. 462 (N.D. Cal. 2004) ................................................................................................... 15 

Lewis v. Wells Fargo & Co. 

669 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ............................................................................. 13, 14, 15 

Luque v. AT&T Corp. 

 No. C 09–05885 CRB, 2010 WL 4807088 (N.D. Cal. 2010) ................................................. 13, 14 

Luviano v. Multi Cable, Inc. 

No. 2:15-cv-05592-BRO (FFM) (C.D. Cal. 2013) ........................................................................ 19 

Misra v. Decision One Mortg. Co., LLC 

673 F. Supp. 2d 987 (C.D. Cal. 2008) ........................................................................................... 16 

Ramirez v. Ghilotti Bros. Inc. 

941 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2013) ....................................................................... 12, 13, 14, 15 

Rother v. Lupenko 

515 Fed. Appx. 672 (9th Cir. 2013) ............................................................................................... 12 

Shaia v. Harvest Mgmt. Sub LLC 

306 F.R.D. 268 (N.D. Cal. 2015) ................................................................................................... 14 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 6 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ vi 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Taylor v. Bear Commc’ns, LLC 

No. 4:12–CV–01261–BCW, 2013 WL 3270971 (W.D. Mo. 2013) .............................................. 19 

Tennessee Coal Iron & R. Co., v. Muscoda Local No. 123 

321 U.S. 590 (1944) ....................................................................................................................... 12 

Williams v. Grayco Cable Servs., Inc. 

187 F. Supp. 3d 760 (S.D. Tex. 2016) ........................................................................................... 19 

Wren v. RGIS Inventory Specialists 

2007 WL 4532218 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ............................................................................................. 15 

Zaborowski v. MHN Gov’t Servs., Inc. 

2013 WL 1787154 (N.D. Cal. 2013) ....................................................................................... 13, 14

Federal Statutes

29 U.S.C. §§ 215(a)(5) ....................................................................................................................... 13 

29 C.F.R. § 516.2(a)(7) ...................................................................................................................... 13 

29 C.F.R. § 531.35 ............................................................................................................................. 18 

29 C.F.R. § 790.21(b)(2) .............................................................................................................. 14, 21 

29 C.F.R. §§ 785.18 ........................................................................................................................... 12 

29 C.F.R. §§ 785.19(a)....................................................................................................................... 12 

29 U.S.C. § 202(a)(b) ......................................................................................................................... 12 

29 U.S.C. § 206 .................................................................................................................................. 18 

29 U.S.C. § 207 (g) ............................................................................................................................ 18 

29 U.S.C. § 207(a) ....................................................................................................................... 12, 18 

29 U.S.C. § 211(c) ............................................................................................................................. 19 

29 U.S.C. § 216(b) ......................................................................................................................... 2, 13 

29 U.S.C. §§ 206 ................................................................................................................................ 12 

29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(1). ...................................................................................................................... 12 

29 U.S.C. §§ 211(c) ........................................................................................................................... 13 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 7 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ vii 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

State Statutes

Cal. Lab. Code § 226 ......................................................................................................................... 17 

Other Authorities

DANIEL C. LOPEZ, Collective Confusion: Flsa Collective Actions 

Rule 23 Class Actions, and the Rules Enabling Act 

61 HASTINGS L.J. 275(2009) ............................................................................................................ 2 

The Fair Labor Standards Act 3-9 

(Ellen C. Kearns et al. eds., 1999) 

H.R. Rep. No. 75-2182 (1937) ......................................................................................................... 2 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 8 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ 1 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. INTRODUCTION 

Plaintiffs and proposed Collective members are former and current non-exempt employees of 

Defendant O.C. Communications, Inc. (“OCC”). OCC is a national fulfillment contractor for lowvoltage installations, providing cable and communication equipment installations on behalf of cable 

operators throughout the United States. Plaintiffs and proposed Collective members worked for OCC 

as Technicians and carried out OCC’s installation service business. 

This lawsuit concerns OCC’s violation of Federal and California labor laws. Throughout the 

relevant time period, OCC eschewed its obligations under the FLSA by not paying Plaintiffs and 

proposed Collective members proper wages, including minimum and overtime wages. Specifically: 

(1) OCC caps the amount of time for which it compensates Technicians on a given activity, including 

but not limited to specific job tasks as well as drive time, regardless of how long the activity in fact 

takes; (2) OCC pressures Technicians to underreport the amount of time worked, instructs 

Technicians to alter their time cards to underreport their hours, and manipulates time cards to decrease 

the amount of minimum and overtime wages due; (3) OCC unilaterally deletes piece-rate codes 

submitted by Technicians, even when the task was completed; (4) OCC unilaterally changes code 

entries for piece rates to lower-paying piece rates; (5) OCC instructs Technicians not to enter piece 

rates for job tasks that were completed; (6) OCC requires Technicians to deduct a thirty-minute meal 

period from their hours, even when OCC knows the Technicians do not, and by virtue of their 

schedules could not, take a meal period; (7) OCC fails to provide and otherwise denies Technicians 

the opportunity to take meal and rest breaks, and fails to pay premium pay for missed meal and rest 

breaks; and (8) OCC requires Technicians to incur significant expenses for OCC’s sole benefit, 

resulting in unlawful kickbacks to OCC that reduces Technicians’ minimum and overtime wages. 

OCC further fails to maintain proper time records of such work, thereby violating the FLSA’s recordkeeping requirements. 

Plaintiffs now seek conditional certification of this collective action. Plaintiffs also seek 

Court-facilitated notice so that other similarly situated employees may “opt in” to this lawsuit. This 

case is ideally suited for collective action. It involves modest, hourly wage earners who do not have 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 9 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ 2 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the means to individually challenge their employer’s compensation policies. OCC’s Technicians are 

the kind of workers that the FLSA was designed to protect.1

 Specifically, Plaintiffs seek to notify: 

All current and former non-exempt hourly employees of OCC working as 

Technicians throughout the United States from January 18, 2014, until the 

resolution of this action (the “Collective”). 

To date, 170 potential Opt-In Plaintiffs have already submitted consent forms to join the lawsuit. Dkt. 

Nos. 1, 8-11, 13-22, 24-28, 30, 34-38, 48, 51, 54, 61-63, 65-66, 69-71, 74-97, 99, 101-104. These 

proposed Collective members are similarly situated because they: (1) have similar job positions and 

requirements; (2) are subject to similar employment terms; and (3) are subject to OCC’s common 

policies and practices, regardless of geographic laction, as described herein, that violate the FLSA. 

Under the FLSA, individuals may bring collective actions on behalf of all others “similarly 

situated.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Courts grant conditional certification for court-facilitated notice based 

upon the pleadings and limited evidence showing a common illegal policy. Plaintiffs meet this lenient 

standard with the detailed allegations in the Collective and Class Action Complaint (“Complaint”),2

the declarations of the two named Plaintiffs, the declarations of 8 additional opt-in Plaintiffs,3 the 

declaration of Carolyn H. Cottrell, and the deposition testimony of OCC’s Rule 30(b)(6) corporate 

designee, Chief Operations Officer, Larry Wray. 

Thousands of other employees may be eligible to join this Collective action. Because there 

are many other workers who may not be aware of this lawsuit and their right to proceed in this forum, 

Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court conditionally certify the proposed Collective, direct 

notice to be sent to the proposed Collective members, and toll the statute of limitations to May 18, 

2017 to preserve all claims. 

 

1 See DANIEL C. LOPEZ, Collective Confusion: Flsa Collective Actions, Rule 23 Class Actions, and the Rules Enabling 

Act, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 275, 281(2009) (citing The Fair Labor Standards Act 3-9 (Ellen C. Kearns et al. eds., 1999) and 

H.R. Rep. No. 75-2182, at 6 (1937)) (“It was believed that a nationwide statutory floor was needed to ensure humane 

working conditions for workers on the lowest rung of the socio-economic ladder and that state laws would be toothless 

without this federal floor. Large employers would suppress wages, lower the price of their goods, and ultimately find a 

market for those cheap goods in states that attempted to maintain high labor standards.”). 2 See ECF 1. 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 10 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ 3 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

A. OCC and Its Technician Employees. 

OCC is a national fulfillment contractor for low-voltage installations, providing cable and 

communication equipment installations on behalf of cable operators throughout the United States.4

To carry out its installation services, OCC employs “Technicians” – individuals who are classified as 

non-exempt and compensated on a hybrid hourly and piece rate basis.5 Technicians’ job duties, 

working hours and conditions, as well as OCC’s compensation model, are the same or substantially 

similar across the United States.6

Technicians’ duties include but are not limited to: driving to customers; installing cable, 

telephone, and internet service; making repairs; troubleshooting; and educating customers.7 Plaintiffs 

Desidero Soto and Steven Stricklen worked as Technicians for OCC between 2014 and 2016.8 To 

perform these basic job duties, Technicians must purchase their own tools, such as a wireless drill, 

 

4 See Pl.s’ Compl., ¶ 20; Declaration of Steven Stricklen (“Stricklen Decl.”), ¶ 6; Declaration of 

Carlos Rios (“Rios Decl.”), ¶ 6; Declaration of Desidero Soto (“Soto Decl.”), ¶ 7; Declaration of 

Andre Holmes (“Holmes Decl.”), ¶¶ 5; Declaration of Trever Tranberg (“Tranberg Decl.”), ¶ 2; 

Declaration of Jacky Charles (“Charles Decl.”), ¶ 6; Declaration of Steeve Fondrose (“Fondrose 

Decl.”), ¶ 6; Declaration of Mohammed Idress (“Idress Decl.”), ¶ 6; Declaration of Mike Pfeffer 

(“Pfeffer Decl.”), ¶ 6; Declaration of Pedro Vieira (“Vieira Decl.”), ¶ 6; Deposition Transcript of 

Defendant’s Person Most Knowledgeable, Larry Wray (“Wray Depo Tr.”) at 16:4-17:1. 

5 See Pl.s’ Compl., ¶¶ 21-22, 24; Stricklen Decl., ¶¶ 5, 20-24, 26; Rios Decl., ¶¶ 4, 17-19; Soto Decl., 

¶¶ 5, 22; Holmes Decl., ¶¶ 2-3, 6-10; Tranberg Decl., ¶¶ 5, 18-20; Charles Decl., ¶¶ 4, 20-26; 

Fondrose Decl., ¶¶ 4, 20-24; Idress Decl., ¶¶ 4, 19-22, 25; Pfeffer Decl., ¶¶4, 11-14, 17; Vieira Decl., 

¶¶ 4, 22-28; Wray Depo Tr. at 172:10-12. 

6 See Pl.s’ Compl., ¶ 21; Stricklen Decl., ¶¶ 7, 8; Rios Decl., ¶¶ 7, 8; Soto Decl., ¶¶ 8, 9; Holmes 

Decl., ¶¶ 5, 11; Tranberg Decl., ¶¶ 7; Charles Decl., ¶¶ 7, 9; Fondrose Decl., ¶¶ 7, 8; Idress Decl., 

¶¶ 7, 8; Pfeffer Decl., ¶ 7, 8; Vieira Decl., ¶¶ 7, 8; Wray Depo Tr. at 65:14-19; 74:18-76:2; 79:9-

80:24; 134:9-17; 171:12-172:12. 

7 See Pl.s’ Compl., ¶ 21; Stricklen Decl., ¶ 7; Rios Decl., ¶ 7; Soto Decl., ¶ 8; Holmes Decl., ¶ 5; 

Tranberg Decl., ¶ 7; Charles Decl., ¶ 7; Fondrose Decl., ¶ 7; Idress Decl., ¶ 7; Pfeffer Decl., ¶ 7; 

Vieira Decl., ¶ 7; Wray Depo Tr. at 171:12-172:12. 

8 See Pl.s’ Compl., ¶ 23; Stricklen Decl., ¶¶ 2-3; Soto Decl., ¶¶ 3-4. 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 11 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ 4 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

drill bits, pliers, screwdrivers, staple guns, nails, splitters, net gear, many types of cable, gasoline for 

trucks, boots and pants.9

 

B. Working as an OCC Technician. 

Technicians’ workdays begin early; typically between 6:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m.10 At this time, 

Technicians report to an OCC warehouse, where they gather equipment for the day.11 If Technicians 

do not have enough equipment on hand, they wait in line with the other Technicians to 

gather additional equipment from the warehouse.12 Technicians are not compensated for this preshift activity.13

Similarly, two to six days per week, Technicians are required to report to the warehouse one 

hour before their usual start time so that OCC can perform an inventory of their vehicles.14 At this 

time, Technicians would be required to pick up additional equipment OCC deemed necessary.15

 

9 See Pl.s’ Compl., ¶ 39; Stricklen Decl., ¶¶ 24-25; Rios Decl., ¶ 20; Soto Decl., ¶ 26; Holmes Decl., 

¶¶ 30-32; Tranberg Decl., ¶ 29; Charles Decl., ¶ 27; Fondrose Decl., ¶ 25; Idress Decl., ¶ 23; Pfeffer 

Decl., ¶ 22; Vieira Decl., ¶ 20. 

10 See Pl.s’ Compl., ¶ 25; Stricklen Decl., ¶ 8; Rios Decl., ¶ 9; Soto Decl., ¶ 9; Holmes Decl., ¶ 11; 

Tranberg Decl., ¶ 8; Charles Decl., ¶ 9; Fondrose Decl., ¶ 8; Idress Decl., ¶ 8; Pfeffer Decl., ¶ 8; 

Vieira Decl., ¶ 8. 

11 See Pl.s’ Compl., ¶ 29; Stricklen Decl., ¶ 8; Rios Decl., ¶¶ 9-10; Soto Decl., ¶ 9; Holmes Decl., ¶ 

11; Tranberg Decl., ¶ 8; Charles Decl., ¶ 9; Fondrose Decl., ¶ 8; Idress Decl., ¶ 8; Pfeffer Decl., ¶ 8; 

Vieira Decl., ¶ 8. 

12 See Pl.s’ Compl., ¶ 29; Stricklen Decl., ¶8; Rios Decl., ¶¶ 9-10; Soto Decl., ¶ 16; Holmes Decl., ¶ 

11; Tranberg Decl., ¶ 8; Charles Decl., ¶ 10; Fondrose Decl., ¶ 9; Idress Decl., ¶ 9; Pfeffer Decl., ¶ 8; 

Vieira Decl., ¶ 9. 

13 Id. 

14 Stricklen Decl., ¶ 8; Rios Decl., ¶ 10; Soto Decl., ¶ 16; Holmes Decl., ¶ 20; Charles Decl., ¶ 10; 

Fondrose Decl., ¶ 9; Idress Decl., ¶ 9; Pfeffer Decl., ¶ 8; Vieira Decl., ¶ 9. 

15 Stricklen Decl., ¶ 8; Rios Decl., ¶ 10; Soto Decl., ¶ 16; Holmes Decl., ¶ 20; Charles Decl., ¶ 10; 

Fondrose Decl., ¶ 9; Idress Decl., ¶ 9; Pfeffer Decl., ¶ 8; Vieira Decl., ¶ 9. 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 12 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ 5 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Technicians are not compensated for this pre-shift activity.16

Once all uncompensated pre-shift activity is completed, Technicians receive their job 

assignments for the day – typically around 7:00 a.m.17 Technicians are generally assigned seven to 

eight jobs per day.18 Each job entails one or more tasks, e.g., installing a cable, setting up internet 

service, and/or creating an electrical outlet.19 

For each discrete task, OCC provides Technicians with a corresponding code.20 Each code 

equals a set dollar amount.21 Throughout the day, and for each job, Technicians document and submit 

these codes to OCC as they are completed, so they can be compensated accordingly.22 OCC, 

however, routinely deletes codes that Technicians have submitted for completed job tasks.23 OCC 

also changes code entries to lower paying codes.24 OCC also pressures Technicians to not submit 

 

16 See Pl.s’ Compl., ¶ 28, 29; Stricklen Decl., ¶ 8; Rios Decl., ¶ 10; Soto Decl., ¶ 16; Holmes Decl., 

¶ 20; Charles Decl., ¶ 10; Fondrose Decl., ¶ 9; Idress Decl., ¶ 9; Pfeffer Decl., ¶ 8; Vieira Decl., ¶ 9. 

17 Stricklen Decl., ¶ 9; Soto Decl., ¶ 10; Holmes Decl., ¶ 12; Tranberg Decl., ¶ 9; Charles Decl., ¶ 11; 

Fondrose Decl., ¶ 11; Idress Decl., ¶ 11; Pfeffer Decl., ¶ 10; Vieira Decl., ¶ 10. 

18 Stricklen Decl., ¶ 10; Rios Decl., ¶ 11; Soto Decl., ¶ 11; Holmes Decl., ¶ 13; Tranberg Decl., ¶ 10; 

Charles Decl., ¶ 12; Fondrose Decl., ¶ 12; Idress Decl., ¶ 12; Pfeffer Decl., ¶ 10; Vieira Decl., ¶ 11. 

19 See Declaration of Carolyn H. Cottrell, Ex. B. 

20 Id. 

21 Id. 

22 Stricklen Decl., ¶ 21; Rios Decl., ¶ 17; Soto Decl., ¶ 22; Holmes Decl., ¶ 7; Tranberg Decl., ¶ 18; 

Charles Decl., ¶ 21; Fondrose Decl., ¶ 21; Idress Decl., ¶ 19; Pfeffer Decl., ¶ 17; Vieira Decl., ¶ 23. 

23 Stricklen Decl., ¶ 23; Rios Decl., ¶ 17; Soto Decl., ¶ 23; Holmes Decl., ¶ 9; Tranberg Decl., ¶ 33; 

Charles Decl., ¶ 25; Fondrose Decl., ¶ 22; Idress Decl., ¶ 20; Pfeffer Decl., ¶ 18; Vieira Decl., ¶25. 

24 Stricklen Decl., ¶ 23; Rios Decl., ¶ 17; Soto Decl., ¶ 23; Holmes Decl., ¶ 9; Tranberg Decl., ¶ 18; 

Charles Decl., ¶ 25; Fondrose Decl., ¶ 22; Idress Decl., ¶ 20; Pfeffer Decl., ¶ 18; Vieira Decl., ¶25; 

Wray Depo Tr. at 57:19-58:5 (“Denae Hefley does what we call our payroll and billing . . . So her 

group is the one that takes all the time cards, work orders, that sort of thing, corrects them, puts them 

into our programs.”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 72:16-74:2; 99:24-101:4; 103:3-16. 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 13 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ 6 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

code entries for tasks they completed.25 Indeed, a former Technician supervisor declares he would 

delete piece rate codes completed by Technicians, pursuant to OCC’s express instructions.26

Once a Technician completes one job, they drive to their next job. The drive time often takes 

over thirty minutes, and can take up to an hour.27 OCC, however, instructs Technicians to underreport 

their drive time, often limiting Technicians to report ten minutes of drive time.28

Most jobs take between one and four hours to complete, however, some jobs can take an entire 

day.29 Moreover, throughout the day, Technicians receive instructions from supervisors to assist other 

Technicians in the field, adding even more work to their daily schedule.30

This work schedule requires Technicians to work long hours. Technicians typically work five 

to six days per week, ten to sixteen hours per day, and between fifty and one-hundred hours per 

week.31 Much of this time, however, goes unreported or is outright eliminated from Technicians’ 

compensation. OCC systematically pressures Technicians to underreport their hours, and threatens 

 

25 Stricklen Decl., ¶ 23; Rios Decl., ¶ 17; Soto Decl., ¶ 23; Holmes Decl., ¶ 9; Charles Decl., ¶ 25; 

Fondrose Decl., ¶ 22; Idress Decl., ¶ 20; Pfeffer Decl., ¶ 18; Vieira Decl., ¶ 25. 

26 Fondrose Decl., ¶ 30. 

27 Stricklen Decl., ¶ 12; Rios Decl., ¶ 12; Soto Decl., ¶ 12; Holmes Decl., ¶ 15; Tranberg Decl., ¶ 12; 

Charles Decl., ¶ 13; Fondrose Decl., ¶ 13; Idress Decl., ¶ 13; Pfeffer Decl., ¶ 11; Vieira Decl., ¶ 13. 

28 Stricklen Decl., ¶ 12; Rios Decl., ¶ 12; Soto Decl., ¶ 12; Holmes Decl., ¶ 15; Charles Decl., ¶ 13; 

Fondrose Decl., ¶ 13; Idress Decl., ¶ 13; Pfeffer Decl., ¶ 11; Vieira Decl., ¶ 13. 

29 Stricklen Decl., ¶ 11; Rios Decl., ¶ 11; Soto Decl., ¶ 11; Holmes Decl., ¶ 15; Tranberg Decl., ¶ 11; 

Charles Decl., ¶ 12; Fondrose Decl., ¶ 12; Idress Decl., ¶ 12; Pfeffer Decl., ¶ 10; Vieira Decl., ¶ 11. 

30 Stricklen Decl., ¶ 13; Soto Decl., ¶ 13; Holmes Decl., ¶ 17; Tranberg Decl., ¶¶ 14, 37; Charles 

Decl., ¶¶ 14, 25; Fondrose Decl., ¶ 14, 22, 35; Idress Decl., ¶¶ 14, 20; Pfeffer Decl., ¶ 10; Vieira 

Decl., ¶¶ 12, 25. 

31 See Pl.s’ Compl., ¶¶ 25-26, 28; Stricklen Decl., ¶ 15; Rios Decl., ¶ 8; Soto Decl., ¶ 30; Holmes 

Decl., ¶ 21; Tranberg Decl., ¶ 17; Charles Decl., ¶ 8; Fondrose Decl., ¶ 17; Idress Decl., ¶ 16; Pfeffer 

Decl., ¶ 13; Vieira Decl., ¶ 16. 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 14 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ 7 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to – and in fact does – unilaterally change Technician time records.32 Indeed, during meetings with 

OCC’s Chief Operating Officer, Larry Wray, and OCC’s director of operations for the entire State of 

Florida, Technician Supervisors were explicitly instructed to reduce Technicians’ hours.33

Consider, for example, the manner in which Technicians’ days typically conclude. 

Technicians often find themselves working near or after 9:00 p.m.34 At 9:00 p.m., OCC’s warehouses 

close.35 If Technicians finish their work before 9:00 p.m., they are required to drive back to the 

warehouse and drop off equipment.36 Technicians are told not to write down this last leg of drive 

time, and in fact, are not compensated for this drive time.37 And even if Technicians finish working 

after 9:00 p.m. – and thus, go home as opposed to the warehouse – OCC routinely instructs 

Technicians to report that they stopped working several hours earlier than they actually did – often 

between 6:00 p.m. and 7:30 p.m.38 

As a natural consequence of Technicians’ overwhelming workload, and OCC’s constant 

pressure to complete all daily job assignments, they are systematically denied the opportunity to take 

 

32 Stricklen Decl., ¶ 24; Rios Decl., ¶ 19; Soto Decl., ¶ 25; Holmes Decl., ¶ 15; Tranberg Decl., ¶ 19; 

Charles Decl., ¶¶ 24, 26; Fondrose Decl., ¶¶ 23-24; Idress Decl., ¶¶ 21-22; Pfeffer Decl., ¶¶ 19-20; 

Vieira Decl., ¶¶ 26-27. 

33 See Wray Depo Tr. at 8:7-12, 32:12-24; Fondrose Decl. ¶¶ 36-40; Tranberg Decl., ¶¶ 38-39. 

34 Stricklen Decl., ¶ 14; Rios Decl., ¶ 9; Soto Decl., ¶ 14; Holmes Decl., ¶ 18; Tranberg Decl., ¶ 15; 

Charles Decl., ¶ 15; Fondrose Decl., ¶ 15; Idress Decl., ¶ 15; Pfeffer Decl., ¶ 12; Vieira Decl., ¶ 15. 

35 Soto Decl., ¶ 14; Holmes Decl., ¶ 19; Tranberg Decl., ¶ 15. 

36 Stricklen Decl., ¶ 14; Soto Decl., ¶ 14; Holmes Decl., ¶ 19; Tranberg Decl., ¶¶ 15-16; Charles 

Decl., ¶ 15; Fondrose Decl., ¶ 15; Idress Decl., ¶15; Pfeffer Decl., ¶ 12; Vieira Decl., ¶ 15. 

37 Stricklen Decl., ¶ 14; Soto Decl., ¶ 14; Holmes Decl., ¶ 19; Charles Decl., ¶ 15; Fondrose Decl., ¶ 

15; Idress Decl., ¶ 15; Pfeffer Decl., ¶ 12; Vieira Decl., ¶ 15. 

38 Stricklen Decl., ¶ 24; Rios Decl., ¶ 19; Soto Decl., ¶ 25; Holmes Decl., ¶ 10; Tranberg Decl., ¶ 19; 

Charles Decl., ¶¶ 24, 26; Fondrose Decl., ¶¶ 23-24; Idress Decl., ¶¶ 21-22; Pfeffer Decl., ¶¶ 19-20; 

Vieira Decl., ¶¶ 26-27. 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 15 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ 8 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

meal and rest breaks.39 OCC, however, routinely requires Technicians to falsely document that they 

took a thirty-minute meal break.40 These thirty-minute meal periods – meal periods that rarely, in 

fact, occur – are uncompensated.41 

If Technicians do not document that they took a thirty-minute meal break, OCC often alters 

their time sheets to show a thirty-minute meal break.42 In fact, former Technician supervisors from 

OCC testify that OCC instructed them and other supervisors to alter time records to include a thirtyminute meal period if the Technician failed to include one, whether the Technician took a thirtyminute meal period or not.43 Former OCC supervisors testify that they routinely altered time records 

to include a thirty-minute meal period.44 This was done pursuant to OCC’s express instructions.45 

C. OCC’s Technician Compensation Model. 

OCC primarily compensates its Technicians on a piece-rate basis.46 OCC’s piece-rate 

compensation system uses (1) the total dollar value for “miscellaneous” time,47 (2) the total dollar 

 

39 Stricklen Decl., ¶¶ 16-19; Rios Decl., ¶¶ 13-16; Soto Decl., ¶¶ 18-21; Holmes Decl., ¶¶ 22-29; 

Tranberg Decl., ¶¶ 21-28; Charles Decl., ¶¶ 17-19; Fondrose Decl., ¶¶ 18-20; Idress Decl., ¶¶ 17-18; 

Pfeffer Decl., ¶ 14-16; Vieira Decl., ¶¶ 17-19. 

40 Stricklen Decl., ¶ 19; Rios Decl., ¶ 15; Soto Decl., ¶ 20; Holmes Decl., ¶ 23; Tranberg Decl., ¶ 22; 

Charles Decl., ¶ 40; Fondrose Decl., ¶ 20; Pfeffer Decl., ¶ 16; Vieira Decl., ¶ 19. 

41 See Wray Depo Tr. at 129:12-18; Stricklen Decl., ¶ 19; Rios Decl., ¶ 15; Soto Decl., ¶¶ 19, 21; 

Holmes Decl., ¶ 26; Tranberg Decl., ¶ 25; Charles Decl., ¶ 19; Fondrose Decl., ¶ 20. 

42 Stricklen Decl., ¶ 19; Rios Decl., ¶ 15; Soto Decl., ¶ 20; Holmes Decl., ¶ 23; Tranberg Decl., ¶ 22; 

Charles Decl., ¶ 19; Fondrose Decl., ¶ 20; Pfeffer Decl., ¶ 16; Vieira Decl., ¶ 19. 

43 Tranberg Decl., ¶¶ 33-35; Fondrose Decl., ¶¶ 30-33. 

44 Id.

45 Id. 

46 See Pl.s’ Compl., ¶ 24; Stricklen Decl., ¶ 20; Rios Decl., ¶ 17; Soto Decl., ¶ 22; Holmes Decl., ¶¶ 

6-7; Tranberg Decl., ¶ 18; Charles Decl., 20; Fondrose Decl., ¶ 21; Idress Decl., ¶ 19; Pfeffer Decl., 

¶ 17; Vieira Decl., ¶ 22. 

47 Florida-based Technicians do not receive compensation for miscellaneous time. Wray Depo Tr. at 

75:16-76:2; 81:12-82:1; 133:20-134:17. Instead, Florida-based Technicians are compensated on a 

purely piece rate basis. Id. 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 16 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ 9 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

value for piece-rate work, and (3) the number of hours recorded as worked, to calculate Technicians’ 

regular hourly rates of pay for each week. The hourly rates reflected on Technicians’ pay stubs 

fluctuate weekly, and are calculated in an excel database based on a specific OCC formula.48 

First, OCC aggregates Technicians’ total miscellaneous time for the week, which is then paid 

at separate hourly rates for miscellaneous time.49 According to OCC, “miscellaneous” time includes 

any time reflected on Technicians’ time sheets where Technicians do not perform an installation or 

service task (i.e., non-productive time).50 OCC relies on the applicable minimum wage for 

Technicians’ geographic locations when determining this separate hourly rate for miscellaneous 

time.51 However, the hourly miscellaneous rate is not necessarily that geographic area’s applicable 

minimum wage – the applicable minimum wage is merely a factor in the hourly miscellaneous rate.52 

The miscellaneous hourly rate is a secret, and OCC considers this information their proprietary 

business information.53 By design, Technicians are prevented from knowing how they are 

compensated for non-productive time, and at what rate.54

 

48 See id. at 65:14-24; 132:6-133:19; 144:22-145:24; 182:23-185:5. Defendant’s Chief Operations 

Officer, Larry Wray, created this excel database (referred to as the “payroll program”), and its 

corresponding formulas. Id. at 63:14-64:3; 100:2-20; 101:9-11; see also Cottrell Decl., Ex. C. 

49 Id. at 132:6-133:19; 141:14-142:5;143:6-12; 149:3-17. 

50 Id. at 112:7-11 (“Anytime that you are not at a customer’s house doing production is considered 

miscellaneous time.”). 

51 Id. at 121:18-124:17. 

52 Id.

53 Id. at 122:15-24; 124:12-14. 

54 Id. at 149:18-151:23 (“A: [T]hey wouldn’t know what their miscellaneous time is by looking at 

NAVARRO 6 . . . Q: And looking at the wage statement NAVARRO 6, the technician cannot 

determine what the miscellaneous rate is; correct? A: No. Q: That’s not correct? No, that is correct.”). 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 17 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ 10 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Next, OCC aggregates Technicians’ piece rates, and adds up the dollar values generated by 

each code entry that were submitted and accepted.55 OCC then adds Technicians’ miscellaneous 

hourly pay to the dollar value of Technicians’ piece rate pay, and divides that aggregated total by 

Technicians’ total reported and accepted hours worked during that week.56 This generates 

Technicians’ regular hourly rates for the week, which are reflected on Technicians’ pay stubs.57 OCC 

then multiplies the regular hourly rates by one-point-five (1.5) or two (2) to compute the overtime 

rates or double time rates, respectively.58 

All California OCC Technicians have been paid according to this compensation model from 

January 18, 2014 to the present, except for a period of time in 2014 where OCC contends it paid its 

Technicians a flat hourly rate for all work.59 For all relevant times that OCC utilized the abovereferenced piece-rate compensation model, California OCC Technicians used a time sheet that 

tracked miscellaneous time.60 

All Florida OCC Technicians were paid according to a virtually identical compensation model 

from January 18, 2014 to approximately June 15, 2017,61 with the following exceptions: at some 

unspecified point in time, OCC paid its Florida Technicians a flat hourly rate; and at another 

 

55 Id. at 132:6-133:19; 144:22-145:8; Stricklen Decl., ¶ 21; Rios Decl., ¶ 19; Soto Decl., ¶¶ 22-23; 

Holmes Decl., ¶¶ 6-9; Charles Decl., ¶ 21, 25; Fondrose Decl., ¶ 21-22; Idress Decl., ¶ 19-20; Pfeffer 

Decl., ¶¶ 17-18; Vieira Decl., ¶ 23, 25. 

56 Wray Depo Tr. at 132:6-133:19; 145:9-16; Stricklen Decl., ¶¶ 20-22; Rios Decl., ¶ 17; Soto Decl., 

¶¶ 22-23; Holmes Decl., ¶¶ 6-10; Tranberg Decl., ¶ 18; Charles Decl., ¶¶ 20, 24, 26; Fondrose Decl., 

¶¶ 21, 23-24; Idress Decl., ¶¶ 19, 21-22; Pfeffer Decl., ¶¶ 17, 19-20; Vieira Decl., ¶¶ 22, 26-27. 

57 See Wray Depo Tr. at 132:6-133:19; 145:9-16; 182:23-185:5; see also Cottrelly Decl. Ex. C. 

58 Id. at 145:9-16; 157:7-15. 

59 Id. at 65:14-19; 74:18-76:2; 134:9-17. 

60 Id. at 79:9-80:24. 

61 Id. at 28:24-29:14; 31:20-32:6 (Approximately one month ago, Defendant sold its Florida 

locations’ assets, but not its liabilities, to ITG). Plaintiff intends to move for leave to amend to add 

ITG as a defendant under a successor liability theory. 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 18 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ 11 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

unspecified point in time, OCC stopped paying its Florida Technicians for “miscellaneous” time, and 

only paid Florida Technicians for submitted and accepted piece rates.62 

All Washington, Arizona, and Utah OCC Technicians have also been paid according to this 

piece-rate compensation model since the end of June of 2017, when Defendant acquired these 

locations.63 In sum, the compensation system has been virtually the same for all OCC Technicians 

since 2014.64

Through this uniform compensation system, Technicians are systematically denied the wages 

to which they are due and entitled. Technicians are routinely denied the piece rate compensation they 

earned for completed job tasks.65 Technicians’ hours are customarily slashed, and their compensation 

cannot be squared with the long hours they in fact work.66 Indeed, former OCC Technician 

supervisors admit it is OCC’s policy and practice to unilaterally alter time cards to minimize the 

amount of reported Technician work time.67 Technicians’ pay – undercompensated as it already is – 

is not given unconditionally, free and clear of unlawful kickbacks to OCC by virtue of the countless 

 

62 Id. at 65:14-19; 74:18-76:2; 79:9-80:24; 134:9-17. 

63 Defendant acquired these locations March 1, 2017, but did not transition these locations onto its 

piece rate compensation system until end of June of 2017. Id. at 33:9-16; 34:1-3; 35:9-23; 62:24-

63:15; 65:1-3; 76:3-78:4. 

64 Id. at 65:14-19; 74:18-76:2; 79:9-80:24; 134:9-17. Defendant also owned one Texas location at 

some point, but could not recall when Defendant began and ceased operations in Texas. Id. at 36:18-

37:10. 

65 Stricklen Decl., ¶ 23; Rios Decl., ¶¶ 17-18; Soto Decl., ¶¶ 22-23; Holmes Decl., ¶¶ 6-9; Tranberg 

Decl., ¶ 18; Charles Decl., ¶ 25; Fondrose Decl., ¶ 22; Idress Decl., ¶ 20; Pfeffer Decl., ¶ 18; Vieira 

Decl., ¶¶; 

66 Stricklen Decl., ¶ 24; Rios Decl., ¶ 19; Soto Decl., ¶¶ 24-25; Holmes Decl., ¶¶ 10, 15; Tranberg 

Decl., ¶ 19; Charles Decl., ¶¶ 24, 26; Fondrose Decl., ¶¶ 23-24; Idress Decl., ¶¶ 21-22; Pfeffer Decl., 

¶¶ 19-20; Vieira Decl., ¶ 26-27. 

67 Tranberg Decl., ¶¶ 38-39; Fondrose Decl., ¶¶ 36-40. 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 19 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ 12 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

expenses Technicians must incur for OCC’s benefit.68 And to top it all off, OCC, by design, 

obfuscates – indeed, OCC intentionally conceals69 – the manner in which Technicians are 

compensated, preventing them from fully understanding the extent to which they have been 

wronged.70 

III. ARGUMENT 

A. The FLSA Permits Collective Actions to Prohibit Unlawful Labor Practices. 

The FLSA is a remedial statute that protects the rights of workers and is applied liberally. 

Tennessee Coal Iron & R. Co., v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597-98 (1944); see also

Ramirez v. Ghilotti Bros. Inc., 941 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1202-03 (N.D. Cal. 2013). The FLSA’s purpose 

is to “eliminate” unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)(b). It prohibits “customs and contracts 

which allow an employer to claim all of an employee’s time while compensating him for only a part 

of it” and provides employees a private right of action to recover their unpaid wages. Tennessee Coal 

Iron & R. Co., 321 U.S. at 602. Specifically, Sections 206 and 207 require that employers pay nonexempt, hourly employees overtime of at least one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for hours 

worked in excess of forty per week. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207(a)(1). The calculation of hours worked is 

not limited to hours “clocked-in” and may include pre-shift and post-shift work. Ramirez, 941 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1201-06. “Working time” also includes meal or rest periods, when an employee does not 

actually take a break but instead continues to work. 29 C.F.R. §§ 785.18, 785.19(a); Hill v. RL 

Carriers, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Rother v. Lupenko, 515 Fed. Appx. 672, 

674 (9th Cir. 2013). Employers are required to create and maintain accurate records of all hours 

 

68 Stricklen Decl., ¶¶ 24-25; Rios Decl., ¶¶ 20, 22; Soto Decl., ¶¶ 26-27 ; Holmes Decl., ¶¶ 30-32; 

Tranberg Decl., ¶¶ 29-30; Charles Decl., ¶¶ 27-28; Fondrose Decl., ¶¶ 25-26; Idress Decl., ¶¶ 23-24; 

Pfeffer Decl., ¶ 22; Vieira Decl., ¶¶ 20-21. 

69 Wray Depo Tr. at 149:18-151:23. 

70 Stricklen Decl., ¶¶ 20-22; Rios Decl., ¶¶ 17-19; Soto Decl., ¶ 28; Holmes Decl., ¶¶ 6-10; Tranberg 

Decl., ¶¶ 18-20; Charles Decl., ¶¶ 20-24; Fondrose Decl., ¶¶ 21-22; Idress Decl., ¶¶ 19-20; Pfeffer 

Decl., ¶¶ 17-18; Vieira Decl., ¶¶ 24-25. 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 20 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ 13 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

worked by employees. 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(c), 215(a)(5); 29 C.F.R. § 516.2(a)(7). An employer cannot 

shift this duty to employees. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c). 

The FLSA permits employees to bring a collective action on behalf of himself or themselves 

and other employees similarly situated. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Although the FLSA does not explicitly 

define the term “similarly situated,” district courts have broad discretion to allow a party asserting 

FLSA claims on behalf of others to notify potential “similarly situated” plaintiffs that they may 

choose to “opt in” to the suit. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 169 (1989). District 

courts, including those in this District, usually exercise their discretion to permit collective actions to 

proceed. See, e.g., Guilbaud v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., Inc., 2014 WL 10676582 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 

2014) (Chhabria, J.) (conditionally certifying a nationwide group of retail store employees asserting 

FLSA claims based upon allegations of uncompensated pre- and post-shift work, as well as 

allegations that they performed work during uncompensated meal periods); Brown v. Permanente 

Med. Grp., 2017 WL 1536493 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2017) (Chhabria, J.) (conditionally certifying 

nationwide group of call center-based “Advice Nurses,” asserting FLSA claims based upon 

allegations of uncompensated pre- and post-shift work, as well as allegations that they performed 

work during uncompensated meal periods); Ramirez, 941 F .Supp. 2d at 1206 (granting plaintiff’s 

motion for conditional collective action certification); Bonner v. SFO Shuttle Bus Co., No. C13–1606 

THE, 2013 WL 6139758, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2013) (same); Flores v. Velocity Exp., Inc., No. 

12–cv–05790–JST, 2013 WL 2468362, at *8 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2013) (same); Zaborowski v. MHN 

Gov’t Servs., Inc., 2013 WL 1787154, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2013) (same); Daniels v. Aeropostale 

W., Inc., No. C 12-05755 WHA, 2013 WL 1758891, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2013) (same); Brewer 

v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., No. 11–CV–03587 YGR, 2013 WL 100195, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2013) 

(same); Harris v. Vector Mktg. Corp., 716 F. Supp. 2d 835, 848 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (same); Luque v. 

AT&T Corp., No. C 09–05885 CRB, 2010 WL 4807088, at *7 (N.D. Cal., Nov. 19, 2010) (same); 

Lewis v. Wells Fargo & Co., 669 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1129-30 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (same); Escobar v. 

Whiteside Const. Corp., No. C 08-01120 WHA, 2008 WL 3915715, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2008) 

(same). 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 21 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ 14 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

B. Collective Action Certification is a Two-Stage Process. 

Section 216(b) requires a person to affirmatively “opt in” to an FLSA action by filing a 

consent form. It also authorizes a court to issue notice to “similarly situated” employees informing 

them of the case and their right to opt-in. Shaia v. Harvest Mgmt. Sub LLC, 306 F.R.D. 268, 272 

(N.D. Cal. 2015). Unlike Rule 23 class actions, in collective actions, the statute of limitations for 

proposed collective members is not tolled with the filing of the action, but rather with the filing of 

an opt-in consent. 29 C.F.R. § 790.21(b)(2). Thus, court-authorized notice protects against 

“misleading communications” by the parties, resolves the parties’ disputes regarding the content of 

any notice, prevents the proliferation of multiple individual cases, assures that joinder of additional 

parties is accomplished properly and efficiently, and expedites resolution of the dispute. HoffmanLa Roche, Inc., 493 U.S. at 171-72. 

Courts in this District have employed the now well-established, two-tiered approach to these 

cases. See, e.g., Guilbaud, 2014 WL 10676582 at *1 (“Certification of collective actions under the 

FLSA generally proceed in two stages”); Ramirez, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 1203; Brewer, 2013 WL 100195 

at *2-*3; Daniels, 2013 WL 1758891 at *42; Zaborowski, 2013 WL 1787154 at *41; Flores, 2013 

WL 2468362 at *85; Bonner, 2013 WL 6139758 at *2; Hill, 690 F. Supp. 2d at 1009; Harris, 716 F. 

Supp. 2d at 837; Luque, 2010 WL 4807088 at *3. First, the court makes an initial, conditional 

determination of whether plaintiffs are similarly situated, “deciding whether a collective action 

should be certified for the purpose of sending notice to potential class members.” Ramirez, 941 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1203. Then, once discovery is complete, the court makes a second determination as to the 

propriety and scope of the class. Id. Only the first step is relevant to a motion for conditional 

certification. Id.

The first step requires the court to determine whether the plaintiffs are “similarly situated” 

and whether notice of the action should be given to potential opt-in plaintiffs. See Guilbaud, 2014 

WL 10676582 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2014) (Chhabria, J.) “The initial notice stage determination 

uses a ‘lenient [standard] that typically results in certification.’” Ramirez, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 1203 

(quoting, Lewis, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 1128 ); see also, Guilbaud, 2014 WL 10676582 at *1 (N.D. Cal. 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 22 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ 15 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Oct. 3, 2014) (Chhabria, J.) (“Although certification is not automatic, the plaintiffs' burden is 

nonetheless a light one”); Brown, 2017 WL 1536493 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2017) (Chhabria, J.) 

(“This ‘fairly lenient standard’ typically results in conditional certification being granted”). 

 The court’s determination is based on plaintiffs’ allegations, supported by declarations or 

discovery, showing that the putative collective members were victims of a common policy. See 

Guilbaud, 2014 WL 10676582 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2014) (Chhabria, J.) (conditionally certifying 

class based on consistent statements contained in declarations submitted by the plaintiffs); Brown, 

2017 WL 1536493 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2017) (Chhabria, J.) (same); see also, Harris, 716 F. Supp. 

2d at 837 (referencing Gilbert v. Citigroup, Inc., 2009 WL 424320, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2009) 

(finding lenient standard met based on declarations from plaintiff and four other individuals); 

Escobar, 2008 WL 3915715, at *3–4 (finding lenient standard met based on declarations from three 

plaintiffs); Leuthold v. Destination Am., 224 F.R.D. 462, 468–69 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (finding lenient 

standard met based on affidavits from three proposed lead plaintiffs)). Plaintiffs need only show that 

their claims are similar, not identical to other putative class members. Adams v. Inter-Con Sec. Sys., 

Inc., 242 F.R.D. 530, 536-38 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Wren v. RGIS Inventory Specialists, 2007 WL 

4532218, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2007). Indeed, “many courts have indicated that a plaintiff must 

simply show that ‘there is some factual basis beyond the mere averments in their complaint for the 

class allegations.’” Id. “And, courts need not even consider evidence provided by defendants at this 

stage.” Ramirez, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 1203 (citing, Kress v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 263 F.R.D. 

623, 627 (E.D. Cal. 2009); Lewis, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 1128). 

C. This Case Should Be Conditionally Certified Because Plaintiffs Satisfy the 

“Similarly Situated” Standard. 

Plaintiffs meet the lenient standard for conditional FLSA certification because the proposed 

Collective members are “similarly situated.” Hill, 690 F. Supp. 2d at 1009. The Complaint, 

numerous declarations submitted with this motion, deposition testimony of OCC’s person most 

knowledgeable, and the opt-in consent forms on file with the Court provide far more evidence than 

necessary to support conditional certification. See Guilbaud, 2014 WL 10676582 at *1 (N.D. Cal. 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 23 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ 16 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Oct. 3, 2014) (Chhabria, J.) (Declarations attesting to common types of unlawful conduct is sufficient 

for conditional certification purposes); Brown, 2017 WL 1536493 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2017) 

(Chhabria, J.) (same); See also, Misra v. Decision One Mortg. Co., LLC, 673 F. Supp. 2d 987, 996 

(C.D. Cal. 2008) (“The consistency of the statements in the various declarations submitted by 

Plaintiffs is sufficient to satisfy a modest factual showing that they were similarly situated, in that 

they routinely worked unpaid overtime in violation of the FLSA.”). 

OCC’s non-exempt Technicians around the country have similar job duties, are subject to the 

same compensation and overtime polices, and share the same complaints regarding unpaid work and 

improper timekeeping records.71 ¶; See Harris, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 837; Guilbaud, 2014 WL 10676582 

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2014) (Chhabria, J.); Brown, 2017 WL 1536493 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2017) 

(Chhabria, J.). Not only have Plaintiffs submitted 10 declarations from members of the Collective 

attesting to these circumstances, but Plaintiffs have also submitted the testimony of two former OCC 

Technician supervisors, as well as the deposition testimony of OCC’s person most knowledgeable. 

See Tranberg Decl., ¶¶ 31-39; Fondrose Decl., ¶¶ 28-40, Wray Depo Tr. 132:6-133:19. This is much 

more than is required to conditionally certify the Collective. Accordingly, the Court should grant 

Plaintiffs’ Section 216(b) Motion and conditionally certify the collective action. 

1. Collective Members Have Similar Job Duties, Responsibilities, Work 

Hours, and Compensation 

Plaintiffs and proposed Collective Members have similar job responsibilities across the 

United States. All OCC Technicians are non-exempt.72 All OCC Technicians perform various 

services related to the installation and repair of wireless services for OCC’s clients; primarily, 

 

71 See Wray Depo Tr. 132:6-133:19; Stricklen Decl., ¶¶ 5, 7-26; Rios Decl., ¶¶ 4, 7-22; Soto Decl., 

¶¶ 5, 8-28; Holmes Decl., ¶¶ 3, 5-32; Tranberg Decl., ¶¶ 5, 7-30; Charles Decl., ¶¶ 4, 7, 20-28; 

Fondrose Decl., ¶¶5, 7-30; Idress Decl., ¶¶ 5, 7-25; Pfeffer Decl., ¶¶ 4, 7-23, ; Vieira Decl., ¶ 4, 7-

28. 

72 See Stricklen Decl., ¶ 5 ; Rios Decl., ¶ 4; Soto Decl., ¶¶ 5; Holmes Decl., ¶ 3; Tranberg Decl., ¶ 5; 

Charles Decl., ¶ 4; Fondrose Decl., ¶ 4; Idress Decl., ¶ 4; Pfeffer Decl., ¶ 4; Vieira Decl., ¶ 4. 

 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 24 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ 17 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Comcast.73 The services uniformly included installing cable, internet and phone; troubleshooting; 

running new telephone lines; running coax cables for new outlets; installing ground cable; educating 

customers on equipment; providing customer service; replacing and installing drops; and installing 

alarm systems.74 All declarants testify they regularly worked in excess of forty hours a week and were 

subject to the same piece rate compensation policy.75

2. OCC Uniformly Victimizes Collective Members in the Same Way. 

As a result of the practices described above, OCC systematically violated, and continues to 

violate, the FLSA. 

Before the beginning of their shifts, OCC requires Technicians to work off-the-clock. See 

supra, Section II.B. at 4: 4 – 5: 1; fn. 10-16. Whether by virtue of a Technicians’ acquiescence to 

OCC’s pressure or OCC’s unilateral altering of time sheets, Technicians work thirty minutes, off-theclock, during periods that are falsely designated as a meal period. See supra, Section II.B. at 7: 13 – 

8: 9; fn. 39-45. 76 And whether by virtue of a Technicians’ acquiescence to OCC’s pressure or OCC’s 

unilateral altering of time sheets, Technicians often work several hours off-the-clock towards the end 

of the day. See supra, Section II.B. at 7: 4 – 7: 11; fn. 34-38. 

OCC’s conduct in requiring Technicians to work off-the-clock reduces the total hours factored 

into OCC’s compensation formula, which necessarily reduces Technicians’ total compensation, 

 

73 See Stricklen Decl., ¶ 7 ; Rios Decl., ¶ 7; Soto Decl., ¶ 8; Holmes Decl., ¶ 5; Tranberg Decl., ¶ 7; 

Charles Decl., ¶ 7; Fondrose Decl., ¶ 7; Idress Decl., ¶ 7; Pfeffer Decl., ¶ 7; Vieira Decl., ¶ 7. 

74 Id. 

75 See Stricklen Decl., ¶¶ 15, 20-26; Rios Decl., ¶¶ 8, 17-22; Soto Decl., ¶¶ 17, 22-23; Holmes Decl., 

¶¶ 21, 6-9; Tranberg Decl., ¶¶ 17, 18-20; Charles Decl., ¶¶ 8, 20-28; Fondrose Decl., ¶¶ 17, 21-27; 

Idress Decl., ¶¶ 16, 19-25; Pfeffer Decl., ¶¶ 13, 17-23; Vieira Decl., ¶¶ 16, 20-28; see also, supra, 

Part II.C.

76 Though not at issue in this motion, which concerns Plaintiffs’ claims under the FLSA, OCC also 

fails to provide Technicians with legally mandated meal and rest break premiums, in violation of 

California law. See Cal. Lab. Code § 226. 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 25 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ 18 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

overtime compensation, as well as the total number of hours compensated at the required, bona fide, 

overtime rate.77 This uniformly violates the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 207 (a), (g). 

Additionally, because OCC eliminates, reduces, or pressures Technicians to omit piece rate 

codes for completed work activities, Technicians’ total compensation and overtime compensation is 

necessarily reduced, and Technicians are not compensated at the bona fide regular rate, nor are they 

compensated at the bona fide overtime rate. See supra, Section II.B. at 5: 6 – 6: 2; fn. 20-26. This, 

too, uniformly violates the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a), (g).78 

Moreover, because OCC requires Technicians to regularly incur a multitude of expenses for 

OCC’s sole benefit, See supra, Section II.A. at 3: 11 – 4: 2; fn. 9, the regular and overtime 

compensation provided to Technicians is not paid unconditionally, free, and clear of deductions 

and/or kickbacks. This also uniformly violates the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 206; 29 C.F.R. § 531.35. 

Finally, for all the reasons discussed above, OCC does not keep required, accurate records of 

all hours and piece rates worked by Plaintiffs and the Collective. This uniformly violates the FLSA. 

See 29 U.S.C. § 211(c). 

 

77 Take, for example, a Technician who was paid $400 in piece rates, and $100 in miscellaneous time, 

for a total of $500 in a given week. Now also assume the Technician in fact worked 60 hours, but 

because he was required to work 10 hours off-the-clock, OCC only factored 50 hours into its formula. 

OCC would compensate the Technician as follows: $500 / 50 hours, for a regular rate of pay of $10 

per hour. OCC would then pay 10 of those hours at 1.5x his regular rate, resulting in total 

compensation of $550 ($400 for 40 regular rate hours[$10/hour x 40 hours]; $150 for 10 overtime 

hours [$15/ overtime hour x 10 hours]). However, if OCC paid that Technician for all time he in fact 

worked, his regular rate of pay would be $8.33 ($500/ 60 hours), resulting in regular pay of $333.20 

($8.33 x 40 hours), overtime pay of $249.90 (($8.33 x 1.5) x 20 overtime hours), and total 

compensation of $583.1 ($333.20 + $249.90). Notably, this anecdote shows only a fraction of OCC’s 

unlawful treatment of its Technicians, as it does not address the systematic elimination and reduction 

of piece rate pay. 

78 Plaintiffs have outstanding document requests that would provide critical evidence confirming that 

OCC regularly manipulates Technicians’ time sheets, in terms of hours worked, eliminating and/or 

reducing piece rates, as well as creating meal periods that never took place. This discovery has been 

outstanding for over two months, but OCC has yet to produce any of the relevant time sheets. 

Ironically enough, OCC has recently promised to produce these documents: On July 18, 2017 – the 

day after this conditional certification brief is due. 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 26 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ 19 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3. Similar Cases Have Been Certified. 

Substantially similar cases involving FLSA claims on behalf of cable installers and piece rate 

workers are routinely certified, both within the Ninth Circuit and nationally. For example, in Balarezo 

v. NTH Connect Telcom, Inc., the Northern District of California conditionally certified a nationwide 

class of cable installation technicians who worked for a contractor hired by Comcast to perform 

installation services, and alleged their piece rate compensation did not pay the overtime required by 

the FLSA. No. C 07-5243 JF (PVT), 2008 WL 1944116, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2008). Likewise, 

just a few months ago in Luviano v. Multi Cable, Inc., the Central District of California conditionally 

certified a class of installation technicians who were allegedly misclassified as independent 

contractors, relying on the fact that the installers had the same job duties, i.e., cable installation, repair 

and maintenance services, and were compensated pursuant to a uniform piece rate system. No. 2:15-

cv-05592-BRO (FFM) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2013) Order, p. 41 (ECF 140); See also, Gounev v. Delta 

Mech., Inc., 2015 WL 11658711, at *9 (S.D. Cal. July 24, 2015) (conditionally certifying collective 

action where “all Installers had the same job duties, were compensated according to a uniform pay 

structure, received job assignments via DMI's scheduling system, and were required to sign the same 

“Independent Contractor” agreement with DMI when they were hired”); Gomez v. H.R. Gunland 

Ranches, Inc., No. CV F 10–1163 LJO MJS, 2010 WL 5232973, at *8 (E.D. Cal., Dec. 16, 2010) 

(conditionally certifying a collective of employees who were paid on a piece rate basis for farming 

grapes, who alleged they were not paid the required minimum and overtime wages); Escobar, 2008 

WL 3915715 (certifying a nationwide class of construction employees who met the lenient Section 

216(b) standard for certification by demonstrating that they did not get similarly compensated for 

working through meal and rest breaks).79 And indeed, this Court has repeatedly recognized the low 

 

79 Beasley v. Custom Commc’ns, Inc., No. 5:15-CV-583-F, 2016 WL 5468255, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 

28, 2016) (conditionally certifying cable installer technicians who were paid on a piece rate 

compensation scheme); Williams v. Grayco Cable Servs., Inc., 187 F. Supp. 3d 760, 768 (S.D. Tex. 

2016) (same); Taylor v. Bear Commc’ns, LLC, No. 4:12–CV–01261–BCW, 2013 WL 3270971, at 

*3 (W.D. Mo. June 27, 2013) (granting conditional certification of cable installer technicians); Jason 

v. Falcon Data Com, Inc., No. 09-cv-03990 (JG)(ALC), 2011 WL 2837488, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 

2011) (granting nationwide conditional certification of cable installer technicians); Joiner v. 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 27 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ 20 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

threshold for conditional certification, and conditionally certified nationwide classes of mistreated 

workers. See Guilbaud, 2-14 WL 10676582 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2014) (Chhabria, J.); Brown, 2017 WL 

1536493 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2017) (Chhabria, J.). 

D. Notice is Appropriate and Necessary to Protect Collective Members’ Rights. 

Plaintiffs’ proposal for Court-approved notice to the proposed Collective members is timely, 

accurate, and informative – as required. Hoffman-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 172. The Proposed Notice 

of Collective Action Lawsuit and Proposed Opt-in Consent Form (which are attached as Exhibits G 

and H, respectively, to Cottrell Decl.) provide notice of the pendency of the action and opportunity 

to opt in. Plaintiffs’ legal claims are accurately described, and proposed Collective members are 

advised that OCC is defending the claims. The Notice also clearly states that they are not required to 

participate in this action. The Notice provides clear instructions on how to opt in, accurately states 

the prohibition against retaliation for participation in a FLSA action, and informs proposed Collective 

members that this Court has not made any determination regarding the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims. 

Thus, Plaintiffs request that the Court approve the Proposed Notice and Opt-In Consent Form 

submitted herewith for distribution to proposed Collective members. 

Early distribution of the Notice is essential. See, e.g., Adams, 242 F.R.D. at 542-43. The 

declarations submitted herewith contain ample evidence that proposed Collective members are 

“similarly situated” and that OCC has violated the FLSA. Given this evidence, Notice to proposed 

Collective members should be expedited, as delay threatens to destroy their ability to seek 

compensation for numerous hours of work for which they were not paid. In order to facilitate notice, 

Plaintiffs request that the Court require OCC to produce to Plaintiffs’ counsel, within fourteen (14) 

days of the Court’s order granting Plaintiffs’ Section 216(b) Motion, a computer-readable database 

that includes the names of all proposed Collective members, along with their last known mailing 

addresses, email addresses, telephone numbers, and social security numbers. Based on this contact 

 

Groupware Int’l, Inc., No. 8:09–cv–1943–T–26MAP, 2010 WL 2136533, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 27, 

2010) (granting conditional certification of piece rate cable installer technicians). 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 28 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ 21 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

information, a third-party notice administrator will mail the Court-approved Notice of Collective 

Action Lawsuit and Opt-In Consent Form to proposed Collective members. Further, Plaintiffs request 

that proposed Collective members be required to return their signed Opt-In Consent Forms to the 

notice administrator within ninety (90) days (received or postmarked, or completed via an electronic 

signature service) after the date on which the Notice and Consent Forms are mailed. Id. at 542 (also 

approving a 90-day notice period in light of the number of potential plaintiffs). Plaintiffs’ counsel 

will file the Consent Forms with the Court on an ongoing basis and no later than two weeks after the 

end of this 90-day notice period. 

E. The Statute of Limitations Should Be Tolled for Collective Members. 

Plaintiffs also respectfully request that this Court toll the statute of limitations for all opt-in 

Plaintiffs as of May 18, 2017 the date by which Plaintiffs requested that OCC provide proposed 

Collective members’ identities and contact information. See Cottrell Decl., ¶ 4. The claims of the 

potential opt-in Plaintiffs are being extinguished every day. Id. at 542-43 (equitably tolling the statute 

of limitations to prevent potential plaintiffs from being “deprived of their legal rights”). Unlike Rule 

23 class actions, in Section 216(b) collective actions, the statute of limitations for proposed collective 

members is not tolled with the commencement of the action, but rather with the filing of an opt-in 

consent. 29 C.F.R. § 790.21(b)(2). Thus, every day that passes is a day of unpaid wages and damages 

each potential Plaintiff will be unable to recover. As the court did in Adams, this Court should toll 

the statute of limitations because of the procedural difficulties and delay in consolidating the cases 

and because Plaintiffs timely requested proposed Collective member contact information from OCC, 

which OCC has not produced.80 

 

80 On May 18, 2017, Plaintiffs served discovery requests on OCC, including Plaintiffs’ Request for the Production of 

Documents, Set One. In particular, Document Request No. 2 requests that OCC produce “[a] list identifying all Collective 

Members from January 18, 2014, to the present. The list should include each Collective Member’s name, last-known 

address, last-known phone number, last-known email address, dates of employment, and location at which the employee 

worked.” OCC objected to this Interrogatory and has not provided the information Plaintiffs requested in their Document 

Requests. See Cottrell Decl., ¶ 3. 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 29 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ 22 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court conditionally certify 

the Collective class under Section 216(b), authorize notice to allow potential Plaintiffs to opt in to 

preserve their rights, and toll the statute of limitations for all proposed Collective members. 

Date: July 17, 2017 Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ Carolyn H. Cottrell

 Carolyn H. Cottrell 

 SCHNEIDER WALLACE 

 COTTRELL KONECKY LLP 

 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 30 of 31
_______________________________________________________________________________ 23 

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(B) 

Soto and Stricklen v. O.C. Communications, Inc., Case No.: 3:17-cv-00251-VC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court 

for the United States District Court, Northern District of California, by using the Court’s CM/ECF 

system on July 17, 2017. 

I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will 

be accomplished by the Court’s CM/ECF system. 

 

 Date: July 17, 2017 Respectfully Submitted, 

/s/ Carolyn H. Cottrell 

Carolyn Cottrell (SBN 166977) 

SCHNEIDER WALLACE 

COTTRELL KONECKY WOTKYNS LLP 

2000 Powell Street, Suite 1400 

Emeryville, California 94608 

Telephone: (415) 421-7100 

Facsimile: (415) 421-7105 

ccottrell@schneiderwallace.com 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs, the Collective and Putative 

Class 

Case 3:17-cv-00251-VC Document 105 Filed 07/17/17 Page 31 of 31