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1346075.7 

PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO HCC LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY AND

HCC MEDICAL INSURANCE SERVICES, LLC’S MOTION TO STRIKE

CASE NO. 4:17-CV-618

Kelly M. Dermody (State Bar No. 171716)

kdermody@lchb.com 

Michelle A. Lamy (State Bar No. 308174) 

mlamy@lchb.com 

LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP 

275 Battery Street, 29th Floor 

San Francisco, CA 94111-3339 

Telephone: 415.956.1000 

Facsimile: 415.956.1008 

Rachel Geman (pro hac vice) 

rgeman@lchb.com 

LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP 

250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor 

New York, NY 10013-1413 

Telephone: 212.355.9500 

Facsimile: 212.355.9592 

Allen Carney (pro hac vice) 

acarney@cbplaw.com 

David Slade (pro hac vice) 

dslade@cbplaw.com 

CARNEY BATES & PULLIAM, PLLC 

519 W. 7th Street 

Little Rock, AR 72201 

Telephone: 501.312.8500 

Facsimile: 501.312.8505 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class

Michael J. Flannery (State Bar No. 

196266) 

mflannery@cuneolaw.com 

CUNEO GILBERT LADUCA, LLP 

7733 Forsyth Boulevard, Suite 1675 

St. Louis, MO 63105 

Telephone: 314.226.1015 

Facsimile: 202.789.1813 

Matthew Prewitt (State Bar No. 

291593) 

mprewitt@cuneolaw.com 

CUNEO GILBERT LADUCA, LLP 

16 Court Street, Suite 1012 

Brooklyn, NY 11241 

Telephone: 202.789.3960 

Facsimile: 202.789.1813 

Jay Angoff (pro hac vice) 

jay.angoff@findjustice.com 

MEHRI & SKALET 

1250 Connecticut Avenue, NW 

Suite 300 

Washington, D.C. 20036 

Telephone: 202.822.5100 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OAKLAND DIVISION 

MOHAMMED AZAD and DANIELLE 

BUCKLEY, on behalf of themselves and 

all others similarly situated, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

TOKIO MARINE HCC – MEDICAL 

INSURANCE SERVICES GROUP, 

HEALTH INSURANCE INNOVATIONS, 

INC., HCC LIFE INSURANCE 

COMPANY, and CONSUMER 

BENEFITS OF AMERICA, 

Defendants. 

Case No. 4:17-cv-618-PJH 

PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF 

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 

OPPOSITION TO HCC LIFE INSURANCE 

COMPANY AND HCC MEDICAL 

INSURANCE SERVICES, LLC’S MOTION 

TO STRIKE CLASS ACTION 

ALLEGATIONS 

Date: June 14, 2017 

Time: 9:00 a.m. 

Place: Courtroom 3 

Complaint Filed: February 7, 2017 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page

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ISSUES TO BE DECIDED ............................................................................................................ 1

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1

FACTUAL BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................... 2

A. Defendants’ Sale and Administration of Short-Term Medical Insurance 

Policies. ................................................................................................................... 2

B. Defendants’ Common Alleged Practices Cause Common Injuries. ....................... 2

C. Plaintiffs’ Experiences and the Underlying Litigation............................................ 4

D. Procedural History .................................................................................................. 5

LEGAL STANDARD ..................................................................................................................... 5

ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 6

A. Motions to Strike Class Allegations Are Routinely Rejected. ................................ 6

1. Motions to Strike Class Allegations Are Premature and Disfavored. ......... 6

2. Defendants’ Case Law Confirms the Impropriety of Their Motion. .......... 8

B. At the Appropriate Time, Plaintiffs Will Show that Their Claims Are WellSuited to Class-Wide Adjudication. ...................................................................... 11

1. Plaintiffs and the Class Were Exposed to Serial and Uniform 

Misrepresentations About the Quality of Defendants’ STMs. .................. 11

2. Defendants’ Improper Claims Handling Is Amendable to Class 

Treatment. ................................................................................................. 12

3. Defendants Ignore the Various Class Structure and Case 

Management Tools at this Court’s Disposal. ............................................ 15

C. Defendants Fail to Articulate that They Are Prejudiced by Plaintiffs’ Class 

Allegations. ........................................................................................................... 15

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 16

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1346075.7 -i- PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO HCC LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY AND

HCC MEDICAL INSURANCE SERVICES, LLC’S MOTION TO STRIKE

CASE NO. 4:17-CV-618

Cases

American Western Door & Trim v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co., No. CV 15-00153 BRO SPX, 2015 WL 1266787 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2015) ........................... 11 

Amey v. Cinemark USA Inc, No. 13-CV-05669-WHO, 2015 WL 2251504 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2015) ................................. 15 

Andrews v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. C-03-5200, 2005 WL 1490474 (D.N.J. June 23, 2005) ........................................................ 7 

Astiana v. Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc., No. C 10-4387 PJH, 2011 WL 2111796 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2011) ............................ 7, 8, 12, 15 

Baker v. Microsoft Corp., 797 F.3d 607 (9th Cir. 2015)........................................................................................................ 8 

Basurco v. 21st Century Ins. Co., 108 Cal. App. 4th 110 (2003) .................................................................................................... 17 

Bates v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 993 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (D. Or. 2014) .................................................................................... 12, 13 

Berger v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2014).................................................................................................... 17 

Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 902 (9th Cir.1975) ............................................................................................... 14 

Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2017).............................................................................................. 11, 18 

Campion v. Old Republic Home Prot. Co., 272 F.R.D. 517 (S.D. Cal. 2011).......................................................................................... 17, 18 

Cholakyan v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 1220 (C.D. Cal. 2011) ....................................................................................... 8

Cohen v. DirectTV, Inc., 178 Cal. App. 4th 966 (2009) .................................................................................................... 17 

Coolsystems, Inc. v. Nice Recovery Sys. LLC, No. 16-CV-02958-PJH, 2016 WL 6091577 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2016) ....................................... 6 

Covillo v. Specialtys Cafe, Case No. C-11-00594 DMR, 2011 WL 6748514 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2011) .............................. 9 

Cruz v. Sky Chefs, Inc., No. C-12-02705 DMR, 2013 WL 1892337 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2013) ......................................... 9 

Doninger v. Pac. Nw. Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1977)............................................................................................ 7, 8, 19 

Graves v. Sw. & Pac. Specialty Fin., Inc., No. C 13-1159 SBA, 2013 WL 5945851 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2013) ............................................ 9 

Henry v. Allstate Insurance Co., No. 07-1738, 2007 WL 2287817 (E.D. La., Aug. 8, 2007) ....................................................... 12 

Hernandez v. Dutch Goose, Inc., No. C 13-03537 LB, 2013 WL 5781476 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2013) ............................................ 6 

Hernandez v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., No. 16CV200-LAB (JLB), 2017 WL 932198 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2017) ................................... 12 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

(continued) 

Page

1346075.7 -ii- PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO HCC LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY AND HCC

MEDICAL INSURANCE SERVICES, LLC’S MOTION TO STRIKE

CASE NO. 4:17-CV-618 

Hibbs-Rines v. Seagate Tech., LLC., No. C 08–05430 SI, 2009 WL 513496 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2009) ................................................ 9 

In re Chase Bank USA, N.A. CHECK LOAN Contract Litig., 274 F.R.D. 286 (N.D. Cal. 2011) ............................................................................................... 16 

In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Mortg. Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 277 F.R.D. 586 (S.D. Cal. 2011)................................................................................................ 17 

In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2014)...................................................................................................... 11 

In re First All. Mortg. Co., 471 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2006)...................................................................................................... 16 

In re First Am. Home Buyers Prot. Corp. Class Action Litig., 313 F.R.D. 578 (S.D. Cal. 2016)................................................................................................ 17 

In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Wage & Hour Litig., 505 F. Supp. 2d 609 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ............................................................................... 6, 8, 15 

In Re: Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-02047, ECF No. 20740 (E.D. La. April 21, 2017) ......................................................... 11 

Kazemi v. Payless Shoesource Inc., No. C 09–5142 MHP, 2010 WL 963225 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2010)........................................... 7 

Langan v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 69 F. Supp. 3d 965 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ......................................................................................... 10 

Meyer v. Bebe Stores, Inc., No. 14-CV-00267-YGR, 2015 WL 431148 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2015) ................................... 7, 18 

Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2012).................................................................................................... 14 

Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 238 F.R.D. 482 (C.D. Cal. 2006) ............................................................................................... 16 

Newell v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 118 Cal. App. 4th 1094 (2004) .................................................................................................. 17 

Oracle Am., Inc. v. Micron Tech., Inc., 817 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2011) ....................................................................................... 6

Ramirez v. Baxter Credit Union, No. 16-CV-03765-SI, 2017 WL 1064991 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2017) ....................................... 10 

Roberts v. Wyndham Int’l, Inc., Nos. 12–CV–5180–PSG, 12–CV–5083–PS, 2012 WL 6001459 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012) ..... 9 

Rosales v. FitFlop USA, LLC, 882 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (S.D. Cal. 2012) ...................................................................................... 10

Sanders v. Apple Inc., 672 F. Supp. 2d 978 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ....................................................................................... 10

Spiers v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., No. CIV.A. 06-4493, 2006 WL 4764430 (E.D. La. Nov. 21, 2006) ......................................... 12 

Stearns v. Ticketmaster Corp., 655 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2011).................................................................................................... 16 

Tietsworth v. Sears, 720 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2010) ............................................................................... 10, 11 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

(continued) 

Page

1346075.7 -iii- PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO HCC LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY AND HCC

MEDICAL INSURANCE SERVICES, LLC’S MOTION TO STRIKE

CASE NO. 4:17-CV-618 

Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011) ................................................................................................................ 14 

Wells v. Allstate Ins. Co., 210 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2002) ....................................................................................................... 16 

Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2010).................................................................................................. 6, 15 

Wit v. United Behavioral Health, 317 F.R.D. 106 (N.D. Cal. 2016) ............................................................................................... 16 

Statutes

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 ...................................................................................................... 5 

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 ...................................................................................................... 5 

Cal. Ins. Code § 10384 ................................................................................................................... 14 

Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) ..................................................................................................................... 5, 9 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 ................................................................................................................. 7, 12, 13 

Treatises

7AA Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, 

Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1785.3 (3d. ed. 2017) .......................................................................... 8 

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1346075.7 -1- PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO HCC LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY AND

HCC MEDICAL INSURANCE SERVICES, LLC’S MOTION TO STRIKE

CASE NO. 4:17-CV-618

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 

 ISSUES TO BE DECIDED 

1. Have Defendants demonstrated that Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded, pre-discovery 

allegations of a common fraudulent scheme—involving the use of central scripts and conduct that 

has been scrutinized (and sanctioned) by various government agencies—can never be certified, 

notwithstanding that other courts have certified (on a proper record) similar claims involving 

insurance schemes? 

2. Is Defendants’ failure to even argue prejudice another basis to deny their 

premature motion to strike? 

 INTRODUCTION 

Defendants HCC Life Insurance Company and HCC Medical Insurance Services LLC’s 

motion to strike Plaintiffs’ class action allegations is premature and without merit. Defendants 

conflate the standard on a motion to strike with the standard for class certification. Defendants 

invite the Court to skip the pleading and discovery stages of this litigation, and summarily decide 

the question of class treatment in their favor without the benefit of any record, let alone the sort of 

fulsome record Plaintiffs are required to present, and thus entitled to develop. 

Defendants’ motion runs contrary to well-settled law in the Ninth Circuit, as (correctly) 

applied by this Court. This Court—like many others—has recognized that class allegations 

should not be struck at the pleading stage, except in unusual circumstances that are not present 

here. At the appropriate time, Plaintiffs will show that their claims are well-suited to class-wide 

adjudication. All Class members were subjected to the same common and fraudulent scheme, 

whereby Defendants engage in fraudulent marketing and take Class members’ premium payments 

only to subject them, if or when they incur potentially catastrophic medical expenses, to a claims 

process that is designed to uniformly and unconscionably deny the payment of valid claims. 

Plaintiffs’ claims sound in common evidence and raise numerous overriding commonalities. In 

addition, Defendants ignore the various class structure and manageability tools that will be at the 

Court’s disposal when the issue of certification is ripe. 

Defendants also fail to make the threshold showing that they are prejudiced by Plaintiffs’ 

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1346075.7 -2- PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO HCC LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY AND

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CASE NO. 4:17-CV-618

class allegations. Plaintiffs anticipate that Defendants will raise arguments about prejudice for 

the first time in reply, but garden variety discovery is not prejudice, it is litigation. In addition, to 

the extent Defendants have elsewhere asserted that all their policies and practices are consistently 

lawful and appropriate, the class is the legally appropriate and efficient way to test this. 

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

Defendants1 distort the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, in part by relying on disputed 

fact-based assertions that will require discovery from common sources.2 Defendants assert that 

Plaintiffs’ claims rest on disparate representations regarding Defendants’ Short Term Medical 

(“STM”) insurance policies and will require individualized inquiry into each Class members’ 

claims-handling experience. To the contrary, Defendants engage in a common and fraudulent 

scheme whereby they take Class members’ premium payments, only to subject them to a claims 

process that is designed to uniformly and unconscionably deny the payment of valid claims. 

Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 90-146. 

A. Defendants’ Sale and Administration of Short-Term Medical Insurance 

Policies. 

Defendants HCC, HII, and CBA collectively market and administer STMs to California 

consumers. Id. ¶¶ 17-18, 22, 22 n.5, 42, 51-53, 55, 57. Defendants HCC and HII have jointly 

developed—and market and provide—their STMs in 45 states, including California. Id. ¶¶ 17, 

22, 22 n.5, 42, 51-53, 55. Defendant CBA colludes with HCC and HII by acting as the group 

administrator for the STMs, thereby allowing HCC and HII to avoid more stringent regulatory 

requirements governing individually-issued health insurance policies. Id. ¶¶ 18, 57. 

B. Defendants’ Common Alleged Practices Cause Common Injuries. 

Defendants’ claim processing procedures for their STMs—and the requirements placed 

 

1

 Defendants on this motion are HCC Life Insurance Company and HCC Medical Insurance 

Services LLC (“HCC”). Health Insurance Innovations, Inc. (“HII”) and Consumer Benefits of 

America (“CBA”) are also Defendants in this action, and are included within the term 

“Defendants” where no specific Defendant is indicated. 

2

 Notably, Defendants seek to have it both ways: having opted—improperly—to include 

extensive self-serving and one-sided evidence with their pending motions to dismiss and strike 

(material this Court should not consider, but that, in any event, does not advance Defendants’ 

motions), here they claim that no discovery is needed. 

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1346075.7 -3- PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO HCC LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY AND

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CASE NO. 4:17-CV-618

upon the insureds—are purposely engineered and uniformly applied to allow the delay and denial 

of the claims of policyholders. Id. ¶¶ 3, 54, 56, 58-73. Upon submitting claims, insureds are 

required to provide every identifiable medical record in their history, regardless of whether such 

record relates to the claim at issue, and notwithstanding that this requirement is not disclosed in 

advance. Id. ¶¶ 3, 26-27, 33-37, 39-73. This requirement, common to all Class members, gives 

Defendants three common avenues for denying valid claims, effectively and improperly 

guaranteeing that Class members’ often large bills go unpaid. 

The first step in the strategy is to comb through all records provided by the insured in an 

effort to characterize the claim at issue as a “pre-existing condition.” Id. ¶¶ 3, 26-27, 33-37, 39-

57, 63-73. Defendants uniformly omit any appropriate explanation of the scope of this exclusion 

from their public-facing marketing materials. Id. ¶¶ 3, 39-57, 63-73. However, once a claim is 

submitted, the term is interpreted so broadly and incorrectly, and in such bad faith, as to 

encompass virtually any medical condition, regardless of when—or even whether—it was 

diagnosed or treated. Id. If the insured’s presented claim can be linked to anything in the 

insured’s past, from any point in time, the claim is denied. Id. 

Second, when there is no plausible way to link an insured’s claim to a prior medical 

condition, Defendants again demand to search through all available records—regardless of their 

relation to the claim—seeking evidence of a condition that would have rendered the claimant 

ineligible for coverage under the STM, thereby allowing Defendants to void the policy and not 

pay the claim. Id. ¶¶ 3, 26-27, 33-37, 56-73. This practice is also uniform to all Class members. 

Id. 

Third, Defendants’ policy and practice is to premise refusals to pay on common and 

incorrect assertions that there is insufficient information to process claims. Id. ¶¶ 3, 26-27, 33-37, 

54, 58-73. This allows Defendants to sidestep paying proper claims because it would be 

impossible for the insured to provide the level of detail purportedly needed. Id. 

In light of the above, common conduct, Defendants have also engaged in uniform material 

omissions in their representations to, and misrepresentations to, Class members. Namely, they 

have marketed health insurance policies that, because of the unconscionable claims-handling 

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CASE NO. 4:17-CV-618

processes described above, exclude virtually all claims submitted by the insureds, and are 

therefore borderline worthless. Id. ¶¶ 67, 100. Through various declarations, HCC has 

introduced copious pages of website screen shots and welcome kits. See, generally, Dkt. Nos. 50-

52. However, none of these documents, nor any documents referenced in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, 

could reasonably be said to alert an insured or a prospective insured to the virtually limitless 

obstructions and exclusions applied by Defendants in their claims-handling practices. Id.; see 

also Compl. ¶ 67. 

Defendants’ internal policies and procedures, public-facing representations, and customer 

service scripts reveal that the above-described practices are uniform to the Class. A 

whistleblower contractor in HCC’s customer service department confirmed that these policies and 

procedures are designed to frustrate Class members’ attempts to appeal a claim’s denial or to 

provide the information purportedly sought by Defendants, and further confirmed that Defendants 

have created a rigid script for dealing with insureds, from which their employees cannot deviate. 

Id. ¶¶ 58-72. As the whistleblower states: “the name of the game is runaround...It really felt like 

everything was designed to be so cumbersome that the customer would either get frustrated and 

give up or they could stall long enough to not have to pay out on the claim....The whole idea here 

is that we’re a legal buffer between HCC and [the insured] as was made crystal clear in training 

when they said outright that we’d be thrown under the bus if we ever deviated from the script.” 

Id. ¶ 67. 

C. Plaintiffs’ Experiences and the Underlying Litigation 

Plaintiffs Azad and Buckley were, respectively, insured under Defendants’ STMs. Id. ¶¶ 

19-38. Each Plaintiff purchased their STM policies in the belief that such policies would cover 

unexpected medical conditions. Id. Each Plaintiff did suffer an unexpected and major health 

incident and, in reliance upon the language of the policies, properly submitted claims. Id. Upon 

submitting claims to Defendants, however, each Plaintiff was asked for an ever-increasing 

number of medical records. Id. Specifically, as pled in the Complaint and supported with explicit 

references to Defendants’ records, Plaintiffs were not merely required to provide medical records 

relevant to their claims; rather, they were required to provide all medical records, provider notes, 

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CASE NO. 4:17-CV-618

and labs for the five years preceding their claims. Id. ¶¶ 26, 33; see also, Declaration of John 

Padgett in Support of HCC Life Insurance Company and HCC Medical Insurance Services, 

LLC’s Motion to Dismiss and Their Alternative Motion to Strike Class Allegations (Dkt. No. 52) 

(“Padgett Decl.”) at Exs. 16-19. 

After months of complying with Defendants’ requests for more information, consistent 

with the class allegations, both Azad and Buckley were again told that their claims could not be 

processed. Compl. ¶¶ 26-28, 33-38; Padgett Decl. at Exs. 16-19. Plaintiff Azad’s bills totaled 

roughly $12,000, and Plaintiff Buckley’s roughly $3,500. Motion to Stay (Dkt. No. 63) at n.4. 

Plaintiffs each made continual efforts to provide sufficient information to Defendants, and were 

continually asked for more. Compl. ¶¶ 26-38. Discouraged and convinced that Defendants were 

not acting in good faith, consistent with Defendants’ common scheme (and thus the experience of 

other Class members), Plaintiffs gave up and realized they would have to pay their medical bills 

directly. Id. 

Thus, like all Class members, Plaintiffs were: (1) misled into purchasing insurance 

policies that they believed would cover unforeseen medical events; (2) subjected to Defendants’ 

unconscionable claims-handling practices, despite complying in good faith with Defendants’ 

increasingly-unreasonable (and impossible to fulfill) requests; and (3) ultimately had their claims 

files closed by Defendants, in bad faith, which left Plaintiffs (like all Class members) on their 

own to resolve their unpaid, substantial medical bills. 

D. Procedural History 

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on February 7, 2017, alleging five claims for relief: (1) 

violations of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.; (2) violations of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 

§ 17500, et seq.; (3) breach of contract; (4) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing; and (5) unjust enrichment. Defendant HCC then filed the instant Motion to Strike. Dkt. 

No. 48 (“Mot.”). 

 LEGAL STANDARD 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(f) provides that a court “may strike from a 

pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” 

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1346075.7 -6- PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO HCC LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY AND

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CASE NO. 4:17-CV-618

“The function of a [Rule] 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money 

that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial.” 

Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). 

Motions to strike are “generally disfavored because [they] may be used as delaying tactics and 

because of the strong policy favoring resolution of the merits.” Hernandez v. Dutch Goose, Inc., 

No. C 13-03537 LB, 2013 WL 5781476, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2013) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

A motion to strike should be denied “unless it is clear that the matter to be stricken could 

have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.” Coolsystems, Inc. v. Nice 

Recovery Sys. LLC, No. 16-CV-02958-PJH, 2016 WL 6091577, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2016) 

(Hamilton, J.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Any doubt concerning the 

import of the allegations to be stricken weighs in favor of denying the motion to strike.” In re 

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Wage & Hour Litig., 505 F. Supp. 2d 609, 614 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 

Moreover, “courts may not resolve disputed and substantial factual or legal issue[s] in deciding 

. . . a motion to strike,” Whittlestone, 618 F.3d at 973 (internal quotation marks omitted), and 

“must view the pleading in a light most favorable to the pleading party,” Oracle Am., Inc. v. 

Micron Tech., Inc., 817 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (Hamilton, J.) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

“Given the disfavored status of Rule 12(f) motions, courts often require a showing of 

prejudice by the moving party before granting the requested relief.” Meyer v. Bebe Stores, Inc., 

No. 14-CV-00267-YGR, 2015 WL 431148, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2015) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

 ARGUMENT 

A. Motions to Strike Class Allegations Are Routinely Rejected. 

1. Motions to Strike Class Allegations Are Premature and Disfavored. 

Motions to strike are not properly directed at class allegations, where such allegations are 

“clearly relevant to the subject matter of the litigation, and do not amount to redundant, 

immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matters.” Astiana v. Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc., No. 

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C 10-4387 PJH, 2011 WL 2111796, at *14 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2011) (Hamilton, J.) (citation 

omitted). A motion to strike class allegations is appropriate only in the “rare case[]” that the 

complaint, on its face, demonstrates that the requirements of Rule 23 cannot possibly be 

satisfied. Kazemi v. Payless Shoesource Inc., No. C 09–5142 MHP, 2010 WL 963225, at *2 

(N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2010) (quoting Andrews v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. C-03-5200, 2005 

WL 1490474, at *2 (D.N.J. June 23, 2005)). See also Doninger v. Pac. Nw. Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 

1304, 1313 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that class certification may be denied at such an early stage 

of the litigation only where a plaintiff’s allegations “fail to make even a prima facie showing of 

Rule 23’s prerequisites”); Cholakyan v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1245 

(C.D. Cal. 2011) (“While defendant cites several cases for the proposition that class allegations 

can be stricken at the pleadings stage, it is in fact rare to do so in advance of a motion for class 

certification.”). 

The appropriate course is to permit discovery before requiring plaintiffs to defend the 

propriety of class certification. As this Court has recognized: 

Determining whether to certify the class is normally done through a 

motion for class certification under Rule 23. While it is true that a 

few courts have held that Rule 12(f) provides a means of striking 

class allegations, such a motion appears to allow a determination of 

the suitability of proceeding as a class action without actually 

considering a motion for class certification. 

Astiana, 2011 WL 2111796, at *14. See also 7AA Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary 

K. Kane, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1785.3 (3d. ed. 2017) (“As a practical matter, the court’s 

[class certification] determination . . . usually should be predicated on more information than the 

complaint itself affords.”). 

This Court’s analysis was—and remains—consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent. See, 

e.g., Doninger, 564 F.2d at 1313 (“[T]he better and more advisable practice for a District Court 

to follow is to afford the litigants an opportunity to present evidence as to whether a class action 

was maintainable.”); Baker v. Microsoft Corp., 797 F.3d 607, 615 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We hold 

only that the district court committed an error of law and abused its discretion when it struck the 

class action allegations from the complaint in contravention of applicable Ninth Circuit 

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precedent.”). 

Other courts within this District overwhelmingly agree with this Court’s conclusion and 

follow this Ninth Circuit precedent. See, e.g., Wal-Mart, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 615-16 (“[D]ismissal 

of class allegations at the pleading stage should be done rarely[.] . . . [T]he better course is to 

deny such a motion because the shape and form of a class action evolves only through the process 

of discovery. . . . [P]laintiffs should at least be given the opportunity to make the case for 

certification based on appropriate discovery.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Hibbs-Rines v. 

Seagate Tech., LLC., No. C 08–05430 SI, 2009 WL 513496, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2009) 

(same); Roberts v. Wyndham Int’l, Inc., Nos. 12–CV–5180–PSG, 12–CV–5083–PS, 2012 WL 

6001459, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012) (“The court agrees that Defendants’ arguments are 

premature. Defendants’ papers highlight that they really seek an early class certification 

determination, rather than merely striking class allegations.”); Graves v. Sw. & Pac. Specialty 

Fin., Inc., No. C 13-1159 SBA, 2013 WL 5945851, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2013) (“Defendant’s 

motion to strike is premature given that Defendant has not filed an answer to the complaint, 

discovery has not yet commenced, and no motion for class certification has been filed.”); Cruz v. 

Sky Chefs, Inc., No. C-12-02705 DMR, 2013 WL 1892337, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2013) (“Sky 

Chefs has yet to file an answer and class discovery began only recently. Given the relatively 

early stage of the proceedings, it is premature to determine whether this matter should proceed as 

a class action.”); Covillo v. Specialtys Cafe, No. C-11-00594 DMR, 2011 WL 6748514, at *7 

(N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2011) (denying Rule 12(f) motion to strike class allegations and noting that 

“[d]iscovery is integral to developing the shape and form of a class action, and the court will 

determine the propriety of the class allegations during the class certification process”) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

2. Defendants’ Case Law Confirms the Impropriety of Their Motion. 

Defendants offer no reason to depart from this general rule. The majority of the cases 

Defendants cite were decided at class certification on a full record,3

 and therefore do not support 

 

3 See infra at Section B.2 (explaining why these cases are also inapposite for the purposes of a 

certification analysis). 

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Defendants’ argument that an early certification decision is warranted on this motion to strike. 

The remaining cases are inapposite and readily distinguishable. In Sanders v. Apple Inc., 672 F. 

Supp. 2d 978, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2009), for example, the court struck a proposed nationwide class, 

with leave to plead a more narrow class, because the class definition necessarily included nonclass members. Moreover, courts within the Ninth Circuit have expressly rejected Sanders, 

opting instead to follow this Court’s analysis in Astiana. See Rosales v. FitFlop USA, LLC, 882 

F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1179 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (rejecting Sanders, adopting Astiana, and finding “that 

class suitability issues are best resolved during a motion for class certification”). In Ramirez v. 

Baxter Credit Union, No. 16-CV-03765-SI, 2017 WL 1064991 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2017), the 

court actually noted that “it is in fact rare to [strike class allegations] in advance of a motion for 

class certification,” id. at *7, and struck a period of plaintiffs’ class allegation only because 

plaintiffs sought to certify a class for longer than permitted by the statute of limitations, id. at *8. 

In Langan v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 69 F. Supp. 3d 965, 988 (N.D. Cal. 2014), the 

court again noted that “[c]ourts in this district rarely grant motions to strike class allegations,” but 

granted because plaintiff—a pro se law student with no expectation of passing the bar—could not 

possibly serve as an adequate class representative. And in Tietsworth v. Sears, 720 F. Supp. 2d 

1123, 1146 (N.D. Cal. 2010), the Court struck class allegations on the basis of an outdated4

ascertainability analysis. See id. at 1147 (“[T]he class as alleged in the SAC is not ascertainable. 

Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs’ class allegations will be granted, with leave to amend.”). 

None of these concerns exist here. 

Even the few insurance cases Defendants cite do not save their motion. To the extent 

Defendants assert that there is a categorical rule against class certification in the insurance 

context—or any time a case involves limited discretion in claims handling—that is not the law, as 

discussed in Section B below. Moreover, each case is—like the others—readily distinguishable. 

In American Western Door & Trim v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co., No. CV 15-00153 BRO SPX, 2015 

 

4 See Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1123, 1124 n.3 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding the 

“ascertainability” requirement some courts read into the class certification analysis “not 

compatible with the language of Rule 23,” and rejecting any such requirement within the Ninth 

Circuit). 

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WL 1266787, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2015), there seemed no dispute that the factual allegations 

of the common scheme presented common questions; rather, the dispute focused on defendants’ 

argument that the insurance laws of the 50 states differed (and the plaintiffs, rather than 

presenting a roadmap to manage this, apparently denied the differences). After agreeing with 

defendants, the court determined that the “main issue”—the amount by which plaintiffs’ 

deductibles were improperly exhausted, their damages—would “require individualized inquiries 

into each class member’s situation.” To the extent the court’s actual holding was that differences 

in damages preclude certification, this is wrong as a matter of well-settled law.5

Henry v. Allstate Insurance Co., No. 07-1738, 2007 WL 2287817, at *1 (E.D. La., Aug. 8, 

2007) and Spiers v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., No. CIV.A. 06-4493, 2006 WL 4764430, 

at *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 21, 2006) involved families seeking to obtain full compensation for damages 

to their homes caused by Hurricane Katrina; both cases lacked the (pre-discovery) evidence of 

common and systemic obstruction and bad faith, which Plaintiffs allege. See Compl. ¶¶ 58-72. 

In Hernandez v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., No. 16CV200-LAB (JLB), 2017 WL 932198, 

at *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2017), numerous franchises performed the allegedly defective water 

mitigation services for the putative class, whereas the plaintiffs were serviced by (and named) 

only two, and the court found it unlikely that these various, unnamed local franchises all provided 

the same substandard water mitigation service. And, in Bates v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 

993 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1340-43 (D. Or. 2014), the court’s predominance analysis was tied up in an 

overly stringent typicality finding that, though lengthy, cited no law (and was set against the 

backdrop of Oregon common law). 

Accordingly, Defendants offer the Court no reason to depart from its conclusion, and the 

general rule, that motions to strike are not properly directed toward class allegations. Astiana, 

2011 WL 2111796, at *14. On these grounds alone, the Court should deny Defendants’ motion 

5 See In Re: Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-02047, ECF No. 20740 at 

14 (E.D. La. April 21, 2017) (“[D]istrict courts may divide damage hearings into phases, 

particularly in complex cases where, as here, such a division would serve judicial efficiency by 

separating common issues from individual ones.”); see also In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 

790, 815 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[E]ven wide disparity among class members as to the amount of 

damages does not preclude class certification and courts, therefore, have certified classes even in 

light of the need for individualized calculations of damages.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

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and allow Plaintiffs the opportunity to demonstrate, at the proper stage of this litigation, that the 

requirements of Rule 23 are satisfied. 

B. At the Appropriate Time, Plaintiffs Will Show that Their Claims Are WellSuited to Class-Wide Adjudication. 

Though motions to strike are not properly directed at the merits of class claims, 

Defendants cannot—and do not—show that certification of a class in this case is impossible or so 

unlikely that the class allegations deserve to be struck from the pleading. To the contrary, 

Plaintiffs’ class allegations are more than sufficient to make a prima facie showing of the Rule 23 

requirements. This is far from the “rare case” where certification should be denied without 

affording the opportunity to take discovery. 

Defendants bear the burden of proving that their arguments defeat class certification at 

this early stage. See Bates, 993 F. Supp. 2d at 1340-41 (“[I]n the context of a motion to strike

class allegations, in particular where such a motion is brought in advance of the close of class 

discovery, it is properly the defendant who must bear the burden of proving that the class is not

certifiable.”) (emphasis in original). As set forth below, Defendants do not meet that burden. 

At the appropriate time, and with the benefit of a developed record, Plaintiffs will 

demonstrate that their claims are well-suited to class-wide adjudication. And, when that time 

comes, the Court will possess several tools—which Defendants completely ignore—to address 

any concerns regarding manageability. 

1. Plaintiffs and the Class Were Exposed to Serial and Uniform 

Misrepresentations About the Quality of Defendants’ STMs.

First, Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ class allegations fail because putative class members 

were exposed to disparate information about the preexisting conditions exclusion. Mot. at 5-13. 

That is wrong and misstates the claims. In light of the Defendants’ common, fraudulent scheme 

to avoid payment of valid claims, Defendants engaged in serial and uniform material omissions 

and misrepresentations to Class members about the quality of their STMs. Defendants marketed 

health insurance policies that, because of the unlawful claims-handling processes described 

above, were essentially worthless. None of the documents Defendants attach to their motions to 

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dismiss and strike, nor any documents referenced in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, could reasonably be 

said to alert an insured or a prospective insured to the virtually limitless exclusions (or the 

burdensome record requests) applied by Defendants in their claims-handling practices. 

Meanwhile, Defendants’ internal policies and procedures, misrepresentations, and customer 

service scripts reveal that the above-described practices are uniform to the Class. 

A common course of fraudulent conduct—such as the one challenged here—readily 

satisfies the commonality requirement. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 902 (9th Cir. 1975) 

(granting certification where “the class is united by a common interest in determining whether a 

defendant’s course of conduct is in its broad outlines actionable”); Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery 

Assocs., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The existence of shared legal issues with 

divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts coupled with 

disparate legal remedies within the class.”) (citation omitted). 

Here, Plaintiffs challenge a common, fraudulent course of conduct perpetrated on all Class 

members in substantially the same manner, giving rise to numerous common questions. See

Compl. ¶ 85 (identifying common questions). As just one example, one overriding common 

question—subject to common answers—is the legality of HCC’s post-claims underwriting policy. 

See Cal. Ins. Code § 10384 (prohibiting this practice). HCC may argue it is legal for all; 

Plaintiffs and the Class allege it is a uniform unlawful practice whose status does not vary by 

Class member. If the practice is unlawful—and Plaintiffs are confident that it is—then the 

consequences of this unlawful conduct will likewise be common to the Class. If it is lawful, then 

that question is answered for everyone (although HCC will still be liable for its other misconduct, 

but the issues are narrowed). 

Class treatment of the many common questions will be demonstrated to be appropriate, 

manageable, and a superior way to treat claims of vulnerable Class members facing catastrophic 

expenses. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). 

2. Defendants’ Improper Claims Handling Is Amendable to Class 

Treatment. 

Second, Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ improper claims-handling theory is not amenable to 

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class treatment because individualized examination of how each claim was investigated will be 

necessary. Mot. at 13-18. 

When plaintiffs claim a defendant’s policy and practice violates the law, the key question 

for class certification is whether there is a consistent practice that can serve as a basis for 

consistent liability. Amey v. Cinemark USA Inc, No. 13-CV-05669-WHO, 2015 WL 2251504, at 

*6 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2015). Here, Plaintiffs have alleged such a practice.

Defendants attempt to manufacture individualized issues by asserting that “Plaintiffs’ 

allegations of various improper claims-handling activities . . . demonstrate the disparate, 

uncommon nature of the alleged misconduct and the need for individualized inquiry.” Mot. at 3. 

But their assertions are flatly contradicted by the pleadings. For example, Plaintiffs cite to a 

whistleblower contractor of Defendants detailing Defendants’ systemic acts of obstruction and 

bad faith. Compl. ¶¶ 58-72. Further, the Complaint tethers this internal information to Plaintiffs’ 

own experiences, in which Defendants, in bad faith and pursuant to a uniform obstructive tactic, 

sought “all medical records, provider notes, and labs” from Plaintiffs despite the irrelevance of 

those records to Plaintiffs’ claims. Id. ¶¶ 3, 26-27, 33-37. Defendants’ bald assertions to the 

contrary, when Plaintiffs have clearly and adequately alleged otherwise, creates a quintessential 

factual issue. It would be improper for the Court to resolve this factual dispute on a motion to 

strike. Whittlestone, 618 F.3d at 973; In re Wal-Mart Stores, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 614. Viewing 

the complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, as this Court must on a motion to strike, 

Astiana, 2011 WL 2111796, at *13, demonstrates that Plaintiffs’ adequately pleaded common 

questions will predominate. 

Indeed, other courts have certified class actions predicated on uniform unlawful policies, 

including in cases involving discretionary claims handling and similar issues. See In re First All. 

Mortg. Co., 471 F.3d 977, 991 (9th Cir. 2006) (“It is the underlying scheme which demands 

attention. Each plaintiff is similarly situated with respect to it, and it would be folly to force each 

bond purchaser to prove the nucleus of the alleged fraud again and again.”) (citation omitted); 

Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 238 F.R.D. 482, 489-93 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (finding 

common issues regarding insurer’s overarching fraudulent scheme to induce class members to 

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purchase deferred annuities predominated over questions affecting only individual members); Wit 

v. United Behavioral Health, 317 F.R.D. 106, 140 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (finding plan participants 

satisfied predominance requirement in class actions challenging arbitrary and capricious denial of 

coverage for mental health and substance use disorders); Wells v. Allstate Ins. Co., 210 F.R.D. 1, 

12 (D.D.C. 2002) (“Allstate’s alleged failure to disclose material changes to its claims handling 

procedures with respect to claimants represented by counsel is the legal basis for all class 

members’ claims.”); In re Chase Bank USA, N.A. CHECK LOAN Contract Litig., 274 F.R.D. 286, 

290 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (certifying a class of cardholders alleging the bank breached the implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, despite the fact that each class member was subjected to 

“discretionary” conduct by the defendant). 

Defendants’ case citations do not counsel otherwise. In Stearns v. Ticketmaster Corp., 

655 F.3d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir. 2011), for example, the Ninth Circuit remanded for the district 

court to reconsider whether predominance could be shown, and noted that “it might well be that 

there was no cohesion among the members because they were exposed to quite disparate 

information from various representatives of the defendant.” Similarly, several of Defendants’ 

cases concerned UCL claims predicated upon misrepresentations that, after the appropriate 

period of discovery, plaintiffs could not demonstrate were common to the class. See Cohen v. 

DirectTV, Inc., 178 Cal. App. 4th 966, 979-81 (2009) (denying certification where the record 

showed the proposed class included customers never exposed to the alleged misrepresentations); 

Berger v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 2014) (same); In re First Am. 

Home Buyers Prot. Corp. Class Action Litig., 313 F.R.D. 578, 609 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (same); In re 

Countrywide Fin. Corp. Mortg. Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 277 F.R.D. 586, 608 (S.D. Cal. 

2011) (same). That simply is not the case here. As Plaintiffs allege, all Class members were 

subjected to the common and systemic acts of obstruction and bad faith documented by the 

whistleblower contractor, Compl. ¶¶ 58-72, and corroborated by Plaintiffs’ own experiences, id. 

¶¶ 3, 26-27, 33-37. 

Equally unavailing is the line of home insurance and home warranty cases cited by 

Defendants—Campion v. Old Republic Home Prot. Co., 272 F.R.D. 517, 536 (S.D. Cal. 2011); 

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Newell v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 118 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1103 (2004); and Basurco v. 21st 

Century Ins. Co., 108 Cal. App. 4th 110, 119 (2003). The Campion plaintiffs alleged, for 

example, that their insurer fraudulently induced them to buy home warranty policies. The district 

court denied class certification of their breach of contract claim because the factual record, 

developed after an opportunity for discovery, showed that “a very high percentage of the class 

members received benefits under their plans,” which introduced a high degree of individualized 

inquiry into plaintiffs’ claim for rescission and restitution. Campion, 272 F.R.D. at 531. No such 

facts exist here. To the contrary, Plaintiffs allege all Class members were subjected to the same 

common and fraudulent scheme, and this allegation must be taken as true on this motion to strike. 

To the extent that Defendants dispute Plaintiffs’ contentions, Plaintiffs should at least be 

entitled to conduct discovery to confirm them. Any attempt by Defendants to foreclose such 

opportunity at this early stage should be rejected. 

3. Defendants Ignore the Various Class Structure and Case Management 

Tools at this Court’s Disposal. 

In arguing against certification at this early stage, Defendants also ignore the various class 

structure and case management tools that will be at the Court’s disposal when the time is right. 

As the Ninth Circuit recently affirmed: 

[There is a] well-settled presumption that courts should not refuse 

to certify a class merely on the basis of manageability concerns. 

This presumption makes ample sense given the variety of 

procedural tools courts can use to manage the administrative 

burdens of class litigation. For example, Rule 23(c) enables district 

courts to divide classes into subclasses or certify a class as to only 

particular issues. 

Briseno, 844 F.3d at 1128 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Though it is too early 

in the case to consider the propriety of such tools, or whether they will be needed at all, they will 

be available if and when the Court addresses (on a proper record) the issue of class treatment. 

C. Defendants Fail to Articulate that They Are Prejudiced by Plaintiffs’ Class 

Allegations. 

Defendants also fail to make the threshold showing that they are prejudiced by Plaintiffs’ 

class allegations. Meyer, 2015 WL 431148, at *5. In fact, Defendants do not even argue that 

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they face any prejudice as a result of Plaintiffs’ class allegations. Plaintiffs anticipate that 

Defendants will raise arguments about prejudice for the first time in reply, but garden variety 

discovery is not prejudice, it is litigation. See Doninger, 564 F.2d at 1313 (“[T]he better and 

more advisable practice for a District Court to follow is to afford the litigants an opportunity to 

present evidence as to whether a class action was maintainable. And, the necessary antecedent to 

the presentation of evidence is, in most cases, enough discovery to obtain the material.”). In 

addition, to the extent Defendants have elsewhere asserted that all their policies and practices are 

consistently lawful and appropriate, they have the opportunity for common vindication through 

the class device. 

In the absence of any other conceivable prejudice, the Court should deny Defendants’ 

motion to strike Plaintiffs’ class allegations. 

 CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion to strike should be denied in its 

entirety. 

Dated: May 12, 2017 LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP 

By: /s/ Rachel Geman 

Rachel Geman (admitted pro hac vice) 

rgeman@lchb.com 

250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor 

New York, NY 10013-1413 

(212) 355-9500 

Kelly M. Dermody (State Bar No. 171716) 

kdermody@lchb.com 

Michelle A. Lamy (State Bar No. 308174) 

mlamy@lchb.com 

275 Battery Street, 29th Floor 

San Francisco, CA 94111-3339 

(415) 956-1000 

CARNEY BATES & PULLIAM, PLLC 

Allen Carney (admitted pro hac vice) 

acarney@cbplaw.com 

David Slade (admitted pro hac vice) 

dslade@cbplaw.com 

519 W. 7th Street 

Case 4:17-cv-00618-PJH Document 70 Filed 05/12/17 Page 21 of 22
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1346075.7 -17- PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO HCC LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY AND

HCC MEDICAL INSURANCE SERVICES, LLC’S MOTION TO STRIKE

CASE NO. 4:17-CV-618

Little Rock, AR 72201 

(501) 312-8500 

CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP 

Michael J. Flannery (State Bar No. 196266) 

mflannery@cuneolaw.com 

7733 Forsyth Boulevard, Suite 1675 

St. Louis, MO 63105 

 (314) 226-1015 

Matthew Prewitt (State Bar No. 291593) 

mprewitt@cuneolaw.com 

16 Court Street, Suite 1012 

Brooklyn, NY 11241 

(202) 789-3960 

MEHRI & SKALET 

Jay Angoff (admitted pro hac vice) 

jay.angoff@findjustice.com 

1250 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 300 

Washington, D.C. 20036 

(202) 822-5100 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class 

Case 4:17-cv-00618-PJH Document 70 Filed 05/12/17 Page 22 of 22