UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-5052

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TERRELL E. ROBERSON,

Defendant - Appellant,

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

Party-in-Interest.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior 

District Judge. (1:10-cr-00060-CMH-1)

Submitted: September 1, 2011 Decided: September 14, 2011 

Before MOTZ, KING, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Todd M. Richman,

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, Appellate 

Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. 

MacBride, United States Attorney, Michael E. Rich, Assistant 
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United States Attorney, Michael J. Frank, Special Assistant 

United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Terrell E. Roberson appeals his convictions for 

carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2006); using and 

carrying a firearm during a violent crime, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2006); and transporting stolen 

vehicles, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (2006). Roberson 

challenges the district court’s admission of testimony and 

refusal to give his proffered jury instructions. For the 

following reasons, we affirm.

Roberson argues that the district court abused its 

discretion when it denied his motion to strike a witness’s

testimony on the ground that the witness was inherently 

incredible in light of her prior false statements to the grand 

jury. Because it is not the function of the district court to 

sit as a gatekeeper and to shield the jury from evidence of 

questionable veracity, the district court properly submitted the 

issue of the witness’s credibility to the jury. See United 

States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 283 (4th Cir. 2007). Thus, we 

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Roberson’s motion to strike. See United States v. Cole

Next, Roberson asserts that the district court abused

its discretion when it refused to give his proffered jury 

instructions. We “review[] jury instructions in their entirety 

, 

631 F.3d 146, 153 (4th Cir. 2011) (stating standard of review).
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and as part of the whole trial . . . [to] determine . . . 

whether the [district] court adequately instructed the jury on 

the elements of the offense and the accused’s defenses.” United

States v. Bostian, 59 F.3d 474, 480 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Both the decision whether to give a 

jury instruction and the content of that instruction are 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Passaro, 

577 F.3d 207, 221 (4th Cir. 2009). The denial of a requested 

jury instruction is reversible error only if the proposed 

instruction “(1) was correct; (2) was not substantially covered 

by the court’s charge to the jury; and (3) dealt with some point 

in the trial so important, that failure to give the requested 

instruction seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to 

conduct his defense.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

With these standards in mind, we have reviewed both 

the proffered jury instructions and the district court’s charge 

to the jury in the context of the entire trial. We conclude 

that the substance of Roberson’s proffered instructions was 

adequately covered by the district court’s charge to the jury. 

Finally, our review of the record establishes that the district 

court’s refusal to charge the jury with the exact text of

Roberson’s proffered instructions did not impair Roberson’s 

ability to meaningfully mount his defense, as he thoroughly 

cross-examined the witness who admitted lying before the grand 
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jury, called impeachment witnesses, and presented a zealous 

closing argument attacking the witness’s credibility.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED