20654 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 81 / Thursday, April 27, 1995 / Rules and Regulations

(i) Is operating under the Federal

license;

(ii) Holds a license issued by the State

of Alaska; and

(iii) Is not a member of the crew of the

vessel.

(2) Navigate with either two licensed

deck officers on the bridge or a federally

licensed pilot when operating South of

60°49′ North latitude and in the

approaches through Hinchinbrook

Entrance and in the area bounded:

(i) On the West by a line one mile

west of the western boundary of the

Traffic Separation Scheme;

(ii) On the East by 146°00′ West

longitude;

(iii) On the North by 60°49′ North

latitude; and

(iv) On the South by that area of

Hinchinbrook Entrance within the

territorial sea bounded by 60° 07′ North

latitude and 146°31.5′ West longitude.

Dated: March 17, 1995.

Robert E. Kramek,

Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard Commandant.

[FR Doc. 95–10231 Filed 4–26–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–14–P

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Part 213

[Docket No. RST–94–3, Notice No. 1]

Policy on the Safety of Railroad

Bridges

AGENCY: Federal Railroad

Administration (FRA), DOT.

ACTION: Interim statement of policy.

SUMMARY: FRA issues an interim

statement of policy for the safety of

railroad bridges. FRA establishes

suggested criteria for railroads to use to

ensure the structural integrity of bridges

that carry railroad tracks. FRA will

subsequently make the interim

statement of policy part of the final rule

amending 49 CFR part 213 (See 57 FR

54038, November 16, 1992). This final

rule will reflect any changes that appear

necessary following public comment on

the interim statement of policy.

DATES: Effective Date: The interim

statement of policy is effective May 30,

1995. Written comments must be

received no later than June 26, 1995.

Comments received after that date will

be considered to the extent possible

without incurring additional delay or

expense.

ADDRESSES: Written comments on this

policy should be submitted to the

Docket Clerk (RCC–30), Office of Chief

Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, SW.,

Washington, DC 20590. Persons desiring

to be notified that their written

comments have been received by FRA

should submit a stamped, self-addressed

postcard with their comments. The

Docket Clerk will indicate on the

postcard the date the comments were

received and return the postcard to the

addressee. Written comments will be

available for examination, both before

and after the closing date for comments,

during regular business hours in Room

8201 of the Nassif Building at the above

address.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Gordon A. Davids, P.E., Bridge

Engineer, Office of Safety Enforcement,

Federal Railroad Administration, 400

Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC

20590, (Telephone: 202–366–0507), or

Nancy Lummen Lewis, Trial Attorney,

Office of Chief Counsel, Federal

Railroad Administration, 400 Seventh

Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590,

(Telephone 202–366–0635).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Beginning

in 1991, FRA conducted a review of the

safety of railroad bridges. The review

was prompted by the agency’s

perception that the bridge population

was aging, traffic density and loads were

increasing on many routes, and the

consequences of a bridge failure could

be catastrophic.

I. Bridge Safety Survey

FRA counted the approximate number

of bridges that carry railroad track in the

United States, and then surveyed the

safety of those bridges. The count

revealed that

a. Approximately 100,700 bridges

carried railroad tracks in 1991,

b. Approximately 10 bridges exist for

every 14 miles of railroad, and

c. Approximately 120 feet of track per

mile is located on a bridge.

The safety survey accomplished

several objectives. It determined

whether the condition of railroad

bridges posed a significant hazard to the

safety of the public. It documented the

methods used by the railroad industry

for the inspection, management and

assurance of safety of those bridges. It

provided information with which FRA

could evaluate the need for federal

action to improve the safety of railroad

bridges.

The survey assessed the policies and

practices used by 80 railroads to ensure

the integrity of their bridges. The

railroads surveyed included 21 major

railroads (including 14 class I railroads

and seven major passenger or commuter

railroads), 20 class II regional railroads,

and 39 class III shortline railroads. The

21 class I and passenger railroads are

termed ‘‘major railroads’’ because they

own most of the railroad bridges and

handle the majority of freight and

passenger traffic. In the course of the

survey, FRA inspectors observed

railroad inspections of more than 8,000

bridges.

The survey showed that all of the 21

major railroads have conducted

comprehensive, effective bridge

inspection programs for several decades.

The survey demonstrated that these

railroads are acting to safeguard the

integrity of their bridges. The railroad

managers know the condition of their

bridges, and they are taking appropriate

action to prevent structural failure. The

findings for the 20 regional railroads

were similar to those of the major

railroads.

The survey showed the major and

regional railroads use a variety of

methods to inspect and manage their

bridges. The degree to which inspectors

are supervised, the levels at which

certain decisions are made, and the

methods used to record and report

inspections vary considerably among

railroads. Nevertheless, these programs

share certain basic principles that

characterize effective bridge

management practices.

The consistency of findings among

the Class I and II railroads, passenger

operators, and many smaller railroads

indicates that railroads are following a

course of action that corresponds with

the public interest in prevention of

bridge failures. The railroads’ actions

are driven by a need to prevent the

significant economic harm that result

from the loss of a valuable bridge and

the cost of associated casualties.

On shortline railroads, however, FRA

found considerable variation in the

quality of bridge management programs

and bridge conditions. Many shortlines

have exemplary programs, well-suited

to their size and the nature of their

structures and traffic. A few, however,

did not address all of their

responsibilities for the safety of their

bridges.

These smaller railroads with minimal

bridge management programs typically

move low levels of traffic over a small

number of bridges. Nevertheless, the

consequences of a bridge failure on one

of these railroads could be as severe as

a failure occurring anywhere. The risk

of human casualty or environmental

damage would be the same for each, and

the cost of the failure could be ruinous

to a railroad with limited resources.

This finding indicates a situation that

FRA must address.
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 81 / Thursday, April 27, 1995 / Rules and Regulations 20655

II. The Safety Record of Railroad

Bridges

During the past five decades, not one

fatality has been caused by the

structural failure of a railroad bridge.

Train accidents caused by the structural

failure of railroad bridges have been

extremely rare.

Although the average construction

date of railroad bridges predates most

highway bridges by several decades, the

older railroad bridges were designed to

carry heavy steam locomotives. Design

factors were generally conservative, and

the bridges’ functional designs permit

repairs and reinforcements when

necessary to maintain their viability.

Railroad bridges are most often

privately, rather than publicly, owned.

Their owners seem to recognize the

economic consequences of neglecting

important maintenance. Private

ownership enables the railroads to

control the loads that operate over their

bridges. Cars and locomotives exceeding

the nominal capacity of a bridge are not

operated without permission from the

responsible bridge engineers, and then

only under restrictions and conditions

that protect the integrity of the bridge.

Many railroad bridges display

superficial signs of deterioration but

still retain the capacity to safely carry

their loads. Corrosion on a bridge is not

a safety issue unless a critical area sees

significant loss of material. Routine

inspections are prescribed to detect this

condition, but determination of its effect

requires a detailed inspection and

analysis of the bridge. In general, timber

bridges continue to function safely, and

masonry structures built as early as the

1830’s remain functional and safe for

their traffic.

Of the few train accidents that

involved bridges, most have not been

caused by structural failure. FRA

accident records for 1982 through 1993

show 15 train accidents that were

caused by bridge structural failures,

including three that involved improper

repair procedures. These accidents

caused no reportable injuries and a

reported $856,046 damage to railroad

facilities, cars and locomotives.

During the same period, 29 train

accidents on or near bridges were

caused by track conditions on the bridge

or its approaches. These accidents

caused no reportable injuries, and a

reported $4,596,733 damage to railroad

facilities, cars and locomotives.

The same time period saw 19 train

accidents on bridges caused by external

damage to the bridge, including three

fires, 11 floods or washouts, four bridges

struck by motor vehicles, and one bridge

struck by a marine vessel. The accident

at Mobile, Alabama on September 22,

1993 alone caused 47 fatalities, 102 nonfatal injuries, and over $10,000,000 in

property damage. The losses from these

19 accidents totaled 47 fatalities, 124

non-fatal injuries, and $22,150,865

damage to railroad facilities, cars and

locomotives.

IV. Bridge Safety Policy

The severity of a train accident is

usually compounded when a bridge is

involved, regardless of the cause of the

accident. FRA must retain its capability

to deal effectively with any safety

problems involving the structural

integrity of railroad bridges. At the same

time, FRA must assure that private and

public resources are not diverted

unnecessarily from other programs that

are also critical to railroad safety.

At one extreme, FRA could respond to

bridge issues only when accidents occur

or when someone contacts the agency

about particular concerns. However,

such a reactive policy would inhibit

FRA’s ability to detect impending

problems with railroad bridges. At the

other extreme, FRA could regulate all

aspects of railroad bridge management,

including inspection, rating,

construction and maintenance. The

expense to the railroad industry of such

a policy is not justified by the findings

of the safety survey.

Because the industry has no apparent

systemic bridge safety problem, FRA

chooses to adopt a policy, rather than

issue regulations, to carry out its

responsibility of protecting bridge

safety. The policy includes nonregulatory guidelines to inform railroad

managers and all concerned about

current good practices related to bridge

inspection and management. The

guidelines accommodate a wide variety

of effective bridge inspection and

management methods.

Even without specific bridge safety

regulations, FRA maintains authority

under 49 U.S.C. 20101 et seq. (formerly

the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970)

to inspect any railroad facility that

affects safety and, if necessary, to

remove it from service. The guidelines

represent the general criteria against

which FRA will evaluate each railroad’s

bridge inspection and management

program.

FRA does not expect that its policy

will unnecessarily divert resources

away from the functional work of bridge

management by forcing railroads to

change effective bridge management

programs. Likewise, the policy should

not require FRA to divert public

resources to employ a large staff of

bridge specialists.

FRA will revise the guidelines as

necessary to accomplish the objectives

of the bridge safety program. To that

end, FRA will continue to monitor and

evaluate the railroads’ bridge inspection

and management programs to guarantee

that those responsible for the safety of

bridges continue to meet their

responsibilities. FRA will make its

findings available to the public upon

request, excluding any proprietary

information received and identified as

such. Should FRA find through its

monitoring that widespread bridge

structural problems have developed, it

may use the information it has gathered

to commence a rulemaking proceeding.

Effect of This Interim Statement of

Policy

The purpose of this notice is to issue

an interim statement of policy

containing guidelines for the proper

maintenance of bridge structures. It is

meant to be advisory in nature; it does

not have the force of regulations under

which FRA ordinarily issues violations

and assesses civil penalties.

However, FRA maintains emergency

authority to issue emergency,

compliance, and disqualification orders,

as well as authority to seek injunctive

relief in federal district court, under 49

U.S.C. 20104 (formerly known as the

Federal Rail Safety Act of 1970) and 49

CFR part 209. FRA will exercise this

authority when an unsafe condition or

improper maintenance of a railroad

bridge creates an imminent hazard of

death or injury to persons. Furthermore,

should FRA, in the future, find the need

to address bridge integrity in a

regulatory proceeding, it will do so.

Following the comment period, FRA

will issue any necessary changes to the

interim statement of policy. The notice

of changes will appear simultaneously

with the Notice of Final Rule for the

proceeding amending the track safety

standards in 49 CFR part 213, begun in

November, 1992. (See 57 FR 54038,

November 16, 1992.) Except as modified

in response to the comments, this

interim statement of policy will become

a final statement of policy at that time.

Public Participation

Because the interim statement of

policy is advisory in nature, notice and

public participation are not required.

However, the public is invited to submit

comments within 30 days following its

publication.

FRA would appreciate comments

about its plan to issue a statement of

policy rather than regulations governing

railroad bridge maintenance. FRA

would also welcome comments about

the value of permanently placing the
20656 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 81 / Thursday, April 27, 1995 / Rules and Regulations

statement of policy in a new appendix

to 49 CFR part 213. Finally, FRA would

like comments about the guidelines

themselves and their value as criteria in

deciding whether stronger enforcement

action on particular railroad bridges is

warranted.

Comments received after the 30-day

deadline will be considered if it is

possible to do so without incurring

additional delay or expense.

Regulatory Impact

Executive Order 12866 and DOT

Regulatory Policies

This interim statement of policy has

been evaluated in accordance with

existing regulatory policies. The

regulatory document is considered to be

a nonsignificant regulatory action under

E.O. 12866 and is a nonsignificant rule

under section 5(a)(4) of DOT Regulatory

Policies and Procedures (44 FR. 11034,

February 26, 1979) because it is

advisory only and does not carry with

it the force of law or regulation. For

nonsignificant rules, the DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures

ordinarily require an economic

evaluation to be placed in the public

docket. This evaluation should include

an analysis of the economic

consequences of the rule, including (if

possible) an estimation of the cost and

benefits of the rule to the private sector,

consumers, and all levels of

government. However, such an

evaluation is not required if the

expected impact of a rule is deemed

minimal. Because this interim statement

of policy offers only guidelines to be

followed and does not mandate any

actions or establish any recordkeeping

requirements, the need for a regulatory

evaluation is not indicated.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980

(5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) requires a review

of rules to assess their impact on small

entities. In reviewing the economic

impact of this interim statement of

policy, FRA concluded that it will not

have any measurable impact on small

entities. There are no direct or indirect

economic impacts for small units of

government, businesses, or other

organizations. Therefore, it is certified

that this rule will not have a significant

economic impact on a very substantial

number of small entities under the

provisions of the Regulatory Flexibility

Act.

Paperwork Reduction Act

There are no information collection

requirements contained in this interim

statement of policy.

Environmental Impact

FRA has evaluated this interim

statement of policy in accordance with

its procedures for ensuring full

consideration of the potential

environmental impacts of FRA actions,

as required by the National

Environmental Policy Act and related

directives. This notice meets the criteria

that establish this as a non-major action

for environmental purposes.

Federalism Implications

Implementation of this interim

statement of policy could result in a

judicial determination that it constitutes

FRA’s occupation of the field of railroad

bridge safety regulation. Under 49

U.S.C. 20106, a state may enforce its

own statute or regulation related to

railroad safety until the Secretary of

Transportation issues an order or

regulation ‘‘covering the subject matter’’

of the state’s law. A state may adopt or

enforce a more stringent law relevant to

the subject matter as long as it ‘‘(1) is

necessary to eliminate or reduce a local

safety hazard; (2) is not incompatible

with a law, regulation, or order of the

United States Government; and (3) does

not unreasonably burden interstate

commerce.’’

At this time, FRA is aware of only one

state that could be affected by a court’s

determination that the Secretary of

Transportation, through FRA, has

covered the subject matter of railroad

bridge safety by issuing this policy

statement. FRA has prepared a

Federalism Assessment, pursuant to

Executive Order 12612 and placed it in

the docket reserved for this proceeding,

to address the federalism implications

this interim policy could have on that

state or any other state seeking to

regulate railroad bridge safety.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 213

Penalties, Railroad safety, Railroads.

Therefore, in consideration of the

foregoing, the Federal Railroad

Administration issues the following:

Interim Statement of Agency Policy on

the Structural Integrity of Railroad

Bridges

The structural integrity of bridges that

carry railroad tracks is important to the

safety of railroad employees and that the

public. The responsibility for the safety

of railroad bridges rests with the owner

of the track carried by the bridge,

together with any other party to whom

that responsibility has been assigned by

the track owner.

The capacity of a bridge to safely

support its traffic can only be

determined by intelligent application of

engineering principles and the laws of

physics. Bridge owners should use, as

FRA will, those principles to assess the

integrity of railroad bridges.

The long term ability of a structure to

perform its function is an economic

issue beyond the intent of this policy. In

assessing a bridge’s structural condition,

FRA will focus on the present safety of

the structure, rather than its appearance

or long term usefulness.

FRA inspectors will conduct regular

evaluations of railroad bridge inspection

and management practices. The

objective of these evaluations will be to

document the practices of the evaluated

railroad and to disclose any program

weaknesses that could affect the safety

of the public. Should problems be

disclosed, FRA will seek a cooperative

resolution. If public safety is

jeopardized by failure to resolve a

problem, or by the incompetence or

dishonorable intentions of any bridge

owner, FRA will use available legal

means, including issuance of emergency

orders, to protect the safety of railroad

employees and the public.

This policy statement addresses the

integrity of bridges that carry railroad

tracks. It does not address the integrity

of other types of structures on railroad

property, i.e., tunnels, or bridges

carrying highways or other features over

railroads, except to the extent that

position and condition of these

structures affects the safe passage of

trains. Likewise, this policy statement

extends its reach beyond the narrow

issue of bridges carrying railroad tracks

only where it is necessary to do so for

the protection of highway users,

pedestrians and others lawfully

occupying the space under a railroad

bridge.

The guidelines published in this

statement are advisory, rather than

regulatory, in nature. They indicate

those elements FRA deems essential to

successful bridge management

programs. FRA will use the guidelines

when evaluating bridge inspection and

management practices.

Guidelines

1. Responsibility for safety of bridges.

(a) Track owner. The owner of the

track carried by a bridge is responsible

for ensuring that the bridge will safely

support the trains which operate over it

and the loads imposed upon it.

(b) Operating railroad. The operating

railroad that authorizes train

movements over a bridge should take

whatever steps are necessary to verify

that the maintenance responsibility for

the bridge is being fulfilled so as to

safeguard trains operated under its

authority.
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 81 / Thursday, April 27, 1995 / Rules and Regulations 20657

(c) Assignment of responsibility. The

owner of the track carried by a bridge

may assign responsibility for

maintenance of the bridge to another

party as long as the assignment ensures

that responsibility for the safety of the

bridge is not diminished.

2. Capacity of bridges.

(a) Determination. The safe capacity

of bridges should be determined by

competent engineers using accepted

principles of structural design and

analysis.

(b) Analysis. Proper analysis of a

bridge requires knowledge of the actual

dimensions, materials and properties of

the structural members of the bridge,

their condition, and the stresses

imposed in those members by the

service loads.

(c) Rating. The factors which were

used for the design of a bridge can

generally be used to determine and rate

the load capacity of a bridge provided:

(i) The condition of the bridge has not

changed significantly, and

(ii) The stresses resulting from the

service loads can be correlated to the

stresses for which the bridge was

designed or rated.

3. Bridge loads.

(a) Control of loads. The operating

instructions for each railroad operating

over bridges should include provisions

to restrict the movement of cars and

locomotives whose weight or

configuration exceed the nominal

capacity of the bridges.

(b) Authority for exceptions.

Equipment exceeding the nominal

weight restriction on a bridge should be

operated only under conditions

determined by a competent engineer

who has properly analyzed the stresses

resulting from the proposed loads.

(c) Operating conditions. Operating

conditions for exceptional loads may

include speed restrictions, restriction of

traffic from adjacent multiple tracks,

and weight limitations on adjacent cars

in the same train.

4. Bridge records.

(a) The organization responsible for

the safety of a bridge should keep

design, construction, maintenance and

repair records readily accessible to

permit the determination of safe loads.

Having design or rating drawings and

calculations that conform to the actual

structure greatly simplifies the process

of making accurate determinations of

safe bridge loads.

(b) Organizations acquiring railroad

property should obtain original or

usable copies of all bridge records and

drawings, and protect or maintain

knowledge of the location of the original

records.

5. Specifications for design and

rating.

(a) The recommended specifications

for the design and rating of bridges are

those found in the ‘‘Manual for Railway

Engineering’’ published by the

American Railway Engineering

Association (AREA). These

specifications incorporate recognized

principles of structural design and

analysis. They are continually reviewed

and revised by committees of competent

engineers. Other specifications for

design and rating, however, have been

successfully used by some railroads and

may also be suitable now.

(b) A bridge can be rated for capacity

according to current specifications

regardless of the specification to which

it was originally designed.

6. Periodic inspections.

(a) Periodic bridge inspections by

competent inspectors are necessary to

determine whether a structure conforms

to its design or rating condition and, if

not, or the degree of nonconformity.

(b) The prevailing practice throughout

the railroad industry is to inspect

railroad bridges at least annually.

Inspections at more frequent intervals

may be indicated by the nature or

condition of a structure or intensive

traffic levels.

7. Underwater inspections.

(a) Inspections of bridges should

include measuring and recording the

condition of substructure support at

locations subject to erosion from moving

water.

(b) Stream beds are often not visible

to the inspector. Indirect measurements

by sounding, probing, or any other

appropriate means are necessary in

those cases. A series of records of those

readings will provide the best

information should unexpected changes

suddenly occur. Where such indirect

measurements do not provide the

necessary assurance of foundation

integrity, diving inspections should be

performed as prescribed by a competent

engineer.

8. Special inspections.

(a) A special bridge inspection should

be performed after an occurrence that

might have reduced the capacity of the

bridge, such as a flood, a derailment, or

an unusual impact.

(b) When a railroad learns that a

bridge might have suffered damage

through an unusual occurrence, it

should restrict train operation over the

bridge until the bridge can be inspected

and evaluated.

9. Inspection records.

(a) Bridge inspections should be

recorded. Records should identify the

structure inspected, the date of the

inspection, the name of the inspector,

the components inspected, and their

condition.

(b) Information from bridge inspection

reports should be incorporated into a

bridge management program to ensure

that exceptions on the reports are

corrected or accounted for. A series of

inspection reports over time should be

maintained so as to provide a valuable

record of trends and rates of degradation

of bridge components. The reports

should be structured to promote

comprehensive inspections and

effective communication between an

inspector and an engineer who performs

an analysis of a bridge.

(c) An inspection report should be

comprehensible to a competent person

without interpretation by the reporting

inspector.

10. Bridge inspectors and engineers.

(a) Bridge inspections should be

performed by technicians whose

training and experience enable them to

detect and record indications of distress

on a bridge. Inspectors must provide

accurate measurements and other

information about the condition of the

bridge in enough detail for an engineer

to make a proper evaluation of the safety

of the bridge.

(b) Accurate information about the

condition of a bridge should be

evaluated by an engineer who is

competent to determine the capacity of

the bridge. The inspector and the

evaluator are often not the same

individual. The quality of the bridge

evaluation depends on the quality of the

communication between them.

11. Scheduling inspections.

(a) A bridge management program

should include a means to ensure that

each bridge under the program is

inspected at the frequency prescribed

for that bridge by a competent engineer.

(b) Bridge inspections should be

scheduled from an accurate bridge

inventory list that includes the due date

of the next inspection.

12. Special considerations for railroad

bridges.

Railroad bridges differ from other

types of bridges in the types of loads

they carry, in their modes of failure and

indications of distress, and in their

construction details and components.

Proper inspection and analysis of

railroad bridges requires familiarity

with the loads, details and indications

of distress that are unique to this class

of structure.

Issued at Washington, DC., on April 21,

1995.

Jolene M. Molitoris,

Administrator.

[FR Doc. 95–10323 Filed 4–26–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–06–P