8560 Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 19 / Thursday, January 30, 2025 / Notices 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Antitrust Division 

United States of America et al. v. 

RealPage, Inc. et al.; Proposed Final 

Judgment and Competitive Impact 

Statement 

Notice is hereby given pursuant to the 

Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 

15 U.S.C. 16(b)–(h), that a proposed 

Final Judgment, Stipulation, and 

Competitive Impact Statement have 

been filed with the United States 

District Court for the Middle District of 

North Carolina in United States of 

America et al. v. RealPage, Inc. et al., 

Civil Action No. 1:24–cv–00710. On 

January 7, 2025, the United States filed 

a Complaint alleging that Cortland 

Management, LLC’s (‘‘Cortland’’) 

agreements with RealPage and other 

landlords to share information and align 

pricing violate Section 1 of the Sherman 

Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. The proposed Final 

Judgment, filed at the same time as the 

Complaint, requires Cortland to end its 

use of RealPage or other third-party 

revenue management software or, in the 

alternative, requires use third-party 

revenue management software with the 

appointment of a compliance monitor, 

prohibits the use of certain 

competitively sensitive data in 

Cortland’s own revenue management 

software, and prohibits Cortland from 

sharing competitively sensitive 

information with other landlords. 

Cortland must also establish an antitrust 

compliance policy and cooperate with 

the United States in this litigation. 

Copies of the Complaint, proposed 

Final Judgment, and Competitive Impact 

Statement are available for inspection 

on the Antitrust Division’s website at 

http://www.justice.gov/atr and at the 

Office of the Clerk of the United States 

District Court for the Middle District of 

North Carolina. Copies of these 

materials may be obtained from the 

Antitrust Division upon request and 

payment of the copying fee set by 

Department of Justice regulations. 

Public comment is invited within 60 

days of the date of this notice. Such 

comments, including the name of the 

submitter, and responses thereto, will be 

posted on the Antitrust Division’s 

website, filed with the Court, and, under 

certain circumstances, published in the 

Federal Register. Comments should be 

submitted in English to Aaron Hoag, 

Chief, Technology and Digital Platforms 

Section, Antitrust Division, Department 

of Justice, 450 Fifth Street NW, Suite 

7100, Washington, DC 20530 (email: 

aaron.hoag@usdoj.gov). 

Suzanne Morris, 

Deputy Director Civil Enforcement 

Operations, Antitrust Division. 

In the United States District Court for 

the Middle District of North Carolina 

United States of America, U.S. Department 

of Justice, Antitrust Division, 950 

Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 

20530, State of North Carolina, 114 W 

Edenton Street, Raleigh, NC 27603, State of 

California, 300 South Spring Street, Suite 

1702, Los Angeles, CA 90013, State of 

Colorado, 1300 Broadway, 7th Floor, Denver, 

CO 80203, State of Connecticut, 165 Capitol 

Avenue, Hartford, CT 06106, State of Illinois, 

115 S LaSalle St., Floor 23, Chicago, IL 

60603, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 

One Ashburton Place, 18th Floor, Boston, MA 

02108, State of Minnesota, 445 Minnesota 

Street, St. Paul, MN 55101, State of Oregon, 

100 SW Market St., Portland, OR 97201, State 

of Tennessee, P.O. Box 20207, Nashville, TN 

37202, and State of Washington, 800 Fifth 

Avenue, Suite 2000, Seattle, WA 98104–3188, 

Plaintiffs, v. RealPage, Inc., 2201 Lakeside 

Blvd., Richardson, TX 75082, Camden 

Property Trust, 11 Greenway Plaza, Ste. 2400, 

Houston, TX 77046, Cortland Management, 

LLC, 3424 Peachtree Rd., Ste. 300, Atlanta, 

GA 30326, Cushman & Wakefield, Inc., 225 

W Wacker Dr., Ste. 3000, Chicago, IL 60606, 

Greystar Real Estate Partners, LLC, 465 

Meeting St., Ste. 500, Charleston, SC 29403, 

LivCor, LLC, 233 South Wacker Dr., Ste. 4700, 

Chicago, IL 60606, Pinnacle Property 

Management Services, LLC, 2401 Internet 

Blvd., Ste. 110, Frisco, TX 75034, and Willow 

Bridge Property Company, LLC, 2000 

McKinney Ave., Ste. 1100, Dallas, TX 75201, 

Defendants. 

AMENDED COMPLAINT 

Case No. 1:24–cv–00710–LCB–JLW 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

Table of Contents 

I. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 

II. RealPage’s Revenue Management Software Is Fueled by Nonpublic, Competitively Sensitive Information Shared by Landlords ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6 

A. Landlords Agree To Share Nonpublic, Competitively Sensitive Transactional Data With RealPage for Use in Generating 

Competitors’ Pricing Recommendations ...................................................................................................................................... 8 

B. AIRM and YieldStar Users Agree With RealPage To Use the Software To Align Pricing ....................................................... 12 

C. RealPage’s Transactional Data Is Fundamentally Different From Other Data Available to Landlords ................................... 14 

D. RealPage Revenue Management Software Uses Nonpublic, Competitively Sensitive Data To Recommend Prices .............. 16 

1. AIRM and YieldStar Leverage Competitively Sensitive Data To Generate Price Recommendations .............................. 17 

(a) AIRM Model Training Relies on Competitively Sensitive Data To Generate Learned Parameters .......................... 17 

(b) AIRM and YieldStar Incorporate Competitors’ Nonpublic Data To Generate Floor Plan Price Recommendations 17 

(c) AIRM and YieldStar Use Competitors’ Nonpublic Data—Including Data on Future Occupancy—To Determine 

Unit-Level Prices ............................................................................................................................................................. 21 

2. LRO Relies Primarily on Landlords To Input Data on Competitors ................................................................................... 23 

E. RealPage Uses Multiple Mechanisms To Increase Compliance With Price Recommendations .............................................. 24 

1. AIRM and YieldStar Make It Easy To Accept Recommendations and More Difficult and Time-Consuming To Decline ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 24 

2. RealPage Pushes Clients To Adopt Auto-Accept Settings That Automatically Approve Recommendations ................. 26 

3. RealPage Pricing Advisors Provide a ‘‘Check and Balance’’ on Property Managers To Increase Acceptance of Recommendations ........................................................................................................................................................................ 27 

4. Pricing Recommendations Heavily Influence Landlords’ Behavior ................................................................................... 29 

III. Coordination Among Competing Landlords Is a Feature of This Industry .................................................................................... 30 

A. Rental Housing Is a Necessity for Millions of Americans ......................................................................................................... 30 

B. The Multifamily Property Industry Is Rife With Cooperation Among Ostensible Competitors .............................................. 31 

1. At the Local Level, the Multifamily Property Industry Comprises a Small Number of Large Landlords Managing 

Buildings With Different Owners .......................................................................................................................................... 31 

2. Landlords Regularly Discuss Competitively Sensitive Topics With Their Competitors and Swap Information ............ 32 

3. At RealPage User Group Meetings, Landlords Discuss Competitively Sensitive Topics .................................................. 40 

C. RealPage Uses Nonpublic Information To Allow Landlords To More Easily Compare Units on an Apples-to-Apples 

Basis ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 45 

IV. RealPage Harms the Competitive Process and Renters by Entering Into Unlawful Agreements With Landlords To Share and 

Exploit Competitively Sensitive Data .................................................................................................................................................. 46 

A. AIRM and YieldStar Have the Purpose and Effect of Distorting the Competitive Pricing of Apartments ............................. 47 


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1As used in this Complaint, the term ‘‘landlord’’ 

refers to a variety of entities that are responsible for 

setting rents and other lease terms at multifamily 

properties, including owners, operators, and 

managers. 

B. AIRM and YieldStar Impose Multiple Guardrails Intended To Artificially Keep Prices High or Minimize Price Decreases 54 

C. AIRM and YieldStar Harm the Competitive Process by Discouraging the Use of Discounts and Price Negotiations ........... 58 

D. AIRM and YieldStar Increase and Maintain Landlords’ Pricing Power by Using Competitors’ Data To Manage Lease Expirations ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 59 

E. No Procompetitive Benefit Justifies, Much Less Outweighs, RealPage’s Use of Competitively Sensitive Data To Align 

Competing Landlords .................................................................................................................................................................... 61 

V. RealPage Uses Landlords’ Competitively Sensitive Data To Maintain Its Monopoly and Exclude Commercial Revenue Management Software Competitors ............................................................................................................................................................ 61 

A. Landlords Are Drawn to RealPage Because of Access to Nonpublic Transactional Data That Is Used To Increase Landlords’ Revenue ............................................................................................................................................................................... 62 

B. RealPage’s Collection and Use of Competitively Sensitive Data Excludes Competition in Commercial Revenue Management Software ................................................................................................................................................................................ 65 

VI. Relevant Markets ................................................................................................................................................................................ 70 

A. Conventional Multifamily Rental Housing Markets ................................................................................................................... 70 

1. Product Markets ..................................................................................................................................................................... 70 

(a) Conventional Multifamily Rentals Are Distinct From Other Types of Multifamily Housing .................................. 70 

(b) Single-Family Housing Is Not a Reasonable Substitute to Multifamily Rentals ....................................................... 72 

(c) Conventional Multifamily Rental Units With Different Bedroom Counts Are Relevant Product Markets ............. 74 

2. Geographic Markets ............................................................................................................................................................... 77 

(a) RealPage-Defined Submarkets Identify Relevant Geographic Markets ...................................................................... 79 

(b) Core-Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs) Are Relevant Geographic Markets ................................................................. 81 

B. Commercial Revenue Management Software Market ................................................................................................................. 85 

1. Product Market ....................................................................................................................................................................... 85 

2. Geographic Market ................................................................................................................................................................. 88 

VII. Jurisdiction, Venue, and Commerce ................................................................................................................................................. 88 

VIII. Violations Alleged ............................................................................................................................................................................ 95 

IX. Request for Relief ............................................................................................................................................................................... 114 

X. Demand for a Jury Trial ...................................................................................................................................................................... 115 

Appendix A: Submarkets ......................................................................................................................................................................... 127 

Appendix B: Submarkets by Bedroom Count ......................................................................................................................................... 135 

I. Introduction 

1. Renters are entitled to the benefits 

of vigorous competition among 

landlords. In prosperous times, that 

competition should limit rent hikes; in 

harder times, competition should bring 

down rent, making housing more 

affordable. RealPage has built a business 

out of frustrating the natural forces of 

competition. In its own words, ‘‘a rising 

tide raises all ships.’’ This is more than 

a marketing mantra. RealPage sells 

software to landlords that collects 

nonpublic information from competing 

landlords and uses that combined 

information to make pricing 

recommendations. In its own words, 

RealPage ‘‘helps curb [landlords’] 

instincts to respond to down-market 

conditions by either dramatically 

lowering price or by holding price when 

they are losing velocity and/or 

occupancy. . . . Our tool [ ] ensures 

that [landlords] are driving every 

possible opportunity to increase price 

even in the most downward trending or 

unexpected conditions’’ (emphases 

added). 

2. In fact, as RealPage’s Vice President 

of Revenue Management Advisory 

Services described, ‘‘there is greater 

good in everybody succeeding versus 

essentially trying to compete against one 

another in a way that actually keeps the 

entire industry down’’ (emphasis 

added). As he put it, if enough landlords 

used RealPage’s software, they would 

‘‘likely move in unison versus against 

each other’’ (emphasis added). To 

RealPage, the ‘‘greater good’’ is served 

by ensuring that otherwise competing 

landlords rob Americans of the fruits of 

competition—lower rental prices, better 

leasing terms, more concessions. At the 

same time, the landlords enjoy the 

benefits of coordinated pricing among 

competitors. 

3. RealPage replaces competition with 

coordination. It substitutes unity for 

rivalry. It subverts competition and the 

competitive process. It does so openly 

and directly—and American renters are 

left paying the price. 

* * * * * 

4. Americans spend more money on 

housing than any other expense. On 

average, American households allocate 

more than one-third of their monthly 

income to housing. Some purchase a 

home, while others choose to, or must, 

rent. A family’s selection of an 

apartment reflects a complex set of 

values and criteria including comfort, 

safety, access to schools, convenience, 

and critically, affordability. To ensure 

they secure the greatest value for their 

needs, renters rely on robust and fierce 

competition between landlords. 

5. RealPage distorts that competition. 

Across America, RealPage sells 

landlords commercial revenue 

management software. RealPage 

develops, markets, and sells this 

software to enable landlords to sidestep 

vigorous competition to win renters’ 

business. Many of the largest landlords 

in the United States, including Greystar, 

Camden, Cortland, Cushman & 

Wakefield and Pinnacle, LivCor, and 

Willow Bridge (collectively, Defendant 

Landlords), which would otherwise be 

competing with each other, submit or 

have submitted on a daily basis their 

competitively sensitive information to 

RealPage.1 This nonpublic, material, 

and granular rental data includes, 

among other information, a landlord’s 

rental prices from executed leases, lease 

terms, and future occupancy. RealPage 

collects a broad swath of such data from 

competing landlords, combines it, and 

feeds it to an algorithm. 

6. Based on this process and 

algorithm, RealPage provides daily, near 

real-time pricing ‘‘recommendations’’ 

back to competing landlords. These 

recommendations are based on the 

sensitive information of their rivals. But 

these are more than just 

‘‘recommendations.’’ Because, in its 

own words, a ‘‘rising tide raises all 

ships,’’ RealPage monitors compliance 

by landlords to its recommendations. 

RealPage also reviews and weighs in on 

landlords’ other policies, including 

trying to—and often succeeding in— 

ending renter-friendly concessions (like 

a free month’s rent or waived fees) to 

attract or retain renters. A significant 

number of landlords then effectively 

agree to outsource their pricing function 

to RealPage with auto acceptance or 


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other settings such that RealPage as a 

middleman, and not the free market, 

determines the price that a renter will 

pay. Competing landlords choose to 

share their information with RealPage to 

‘‘eliminate the guessing game’’ about 

what their competitors are doing and 

ultimately take instructions from 

RealPage on how to make business 

decisions to ‘‘optimize’’—or in reality, 

maximize—rents. 

7. Each landlord pays steep fees to 

license RealPage’s software. RealPage’s 

stated goals and value proposition are 

not a secret. Its executives are blunt: 

They want landlords to ‘‘avoid the race 

to the bottom in down markets.’’ 

Sometimes RealPage is even more 

direct, acknowledging that its software 

is aimed at ‘‘driving every possible 

opportunity to increase price’’ or 

observing that among landlords, ‘‘there 

is a greater good in everybody 

succeeding versus essentially trying to 

compete against one another in a way 

that actually keeps the entire industry 

down.’’ 

8. But that is not how the free market 

works. A free market requires that 

landlords compete on the merits, not 

coordinate pricing. Landlords should 

win renters by offering whatever 

combination of price and quality they 

think is most attractive. For example, 

landlords could lower rents or provide 

other financial concessions, like free 

months of rent, or with investments in 

amenities like gyms, grilling areas, or 

pools. Put differently, the fear of losing 

a renter to a competitor should motivate 

rival landlords to compete vigorously. 

9. RealPage’s revenue management 

software ingests on a daily basis 

nonpublic rental rates, future apartment 

availability, and changes in competitors’ 

rates and occupancy. As competitorlandlords increase their rents, 

RealPage’s software nudges other 

competing landlords to increase their 

rents as well. RealPage calls this 

‘‘maximiz[ing] opportunity[.]’’ As 

RealPage explained to one landlord, by 

using competitors’ data, they can 

identify situations where ‘‘we may have 

a $50 increase instead of a $10 increase 

for that day.’’ This is what RealPage 

encourages as ‘‘stretch and pull 

pricing.’’ 

10. RealPage allows landlords to 

manipulate, distort, and subvert market 

forces. One landlord observed that 

RealPage’s software ‘‘can eliminate the 

guessing game’’ for landlords’ pricing 

decisions. Discussing a different 

RealPage product, another landlord 

said: ‘‘I always liked this product 

because your algorithm uses proprietary 

data from other subscribers to suggest 

rents and term. That’s classic price 

fixing . . . .’’ A third landlord 

explained, ‘‘Our very first goal we came 

out with immediately out of the gate is 

that we will not be the reason any 

particular sub-market takes a rate dive. 

So for us our strategy was to hold steady 

and to keep an eye on the communities 

around us and our competitors.’’ 

11. RealPage’s scheme not only 

distorts competition to the detriment of 

renters, but also allows it to reinforce its 

dominant position in the market for 

commercial revenue management 

software. By its own account, RealPage 

controls at least 80 percent of that 

market. Its dominant position is 

protected by substantial data advantages 

due to its massive reservoir of ill-gotten 

competitively sensitive information 

from competing landlords. No other 

revenue management company can 

match RealPage’s access to landlords’ 

nonpublic, competitively sensitive 

rental data. This is why RealPage 

acknowledges that it ‘‘does not have any 

true competitors, mainly because our 

data is based on real lease transaction 

data.’’ RealPage’s conduct is predatory 

and exclusionary, which has allowed it 

to distort the market opportunities for 

honest providers of revenue 

management software. 

12. At bottom, RealPage is an 

algorithmic intermediary that collects, 

combines, and exploits landlords’ 

competitively sensitive information. 

And in so doing, it enriches itself and 

compliant landlords, including 

Defendant Landlords, at the expense of 

renters who pay inflated prices and 

honest businesses that would otherwise 

compete. 

13. The United States, and the States 

of North Carolina, California, Colorado, 

Connecticut, Illinois, Minnesota, 

Oregon, Tennessee, and Washington, 

and the Commonwealth of 

Massachusetts, acting by and through 

their respective Attorneys General, bring 

this action pursuant to Sections 1 and 

2 of the Sherman Act to rid markets of 

(i) RealPage’s and Defendant Landlords’ 

unlawful information-sharing and 

pricing alignment schemes, and (ii) 

RealPage’s illegal monopoly in 

commercial revenue management 

software. In so doing, Plaintiffs seek to 

restore the free market to deserving 

individuals, families, and honest 

businesses. 

II. RealPage’s Revenue Management 

Software Is Fueled by Nonpublic, 

Competitively Sensitive Information 

Shared by Landlords 

14. RealPage dominates the market for 

commercial revenue management 

software that landlords use to price 

apartments, controlling at least 80 

percent of that market, according to its 

own estimates. RealPage currently offers 

three revenue management systems to 

landlords: YieldStar, AI Revenue 

Management (AIRM), and Lease Rent 

Options (LRO). The company’s main 

legacy software, YieldStar, is the 

product of three acquisitions and 

subsequent internal development. Its 

successor, AIRM, uses much of the same 

codebase as YieldStar, but RealPage 

claims that AIRM’s refined models and 

forecasting are more precise. RealPage 

acquired its other revenue management 

software, LRO, in 2017. RealPage has 

made plans to sunset both YieldStar and 

LRO by the end of 2024. 

15. Competitively sensitive data 

collected from competing landlords is a 

critical input to RealPage’s revenue 

management software. AIRM and 

YieldStar collect this data, such as 

rental applications, executed new 

leases, renewal offers and acceptances, 

and forward-looking occupancy, and 

use it to generate price 

recommendations for the competing 

landlords. This information is among 

the most competitively sensitive data a 

landlord maintains. 

16. The exploitation of sensitive data 

from competing landlords is central to 

RealPage’s approach. As part of pitching 

its software to landlords, RealPage 

highlights that its pricing algorithms use 

their competitors’ data sourced directly 

from ‘‘lease transaction data.’’ RealPage 

describes this nonpublic data from 

competitors as one of three ‘‘building 

blocks of price’’ in AIRM and YieldStar. 

Landlords thus share their 

competitively sensitive information 

with RealPage with the understanding 

that RealPage’s software will use the 

data to generate recommendations for 

rivals (and vice versa). 

A. Landlords Agree To Share 

Nonpublic, Competitively Sensitive 

Transactional Data With RealPage for 

Use in Generating Competitors’ Pricing 

Recommendations 

17. RealPage amasses nonpublic, 

competitively sensitive data from 

competing landlords through use of its 

pricing algorithms, other rental property 

software, and thousands of monthly 

phone calls. The combined troves of 

nonpublic, competitively sensitive data 

are much more granular, sensitive, 

timely, and comprehensive than 

alternatives—and far more detailed than 

any data publicly available to potential 

renters. RealPage then uses this data in 

generating competitors’ pricing 

recommendations. 

18. Data shared through YieldStar 

and AIRM. Each AIRM and YieldStar 

client agrees to share detailed data with 


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2 Defendants Camden, Cushman & Wakefield and 

Pinnacle, Greystar, LivCor, and Willow Bridge were 

active beta testers for AIRM and provided feedback 

to RealPage during the AIRM design process. 

RealPage that are private, updated 

nightly, and granular. The data includes 

lease-level information on each unit’s 

effective rent (rent net of discounts), 

rent discounts, rent term, and lease 

status, as well as unit characteristics 

such as layout and amenities. It also 

includes the number of potential future 

renters who have visited a property or 

submitted a rental application. 

19. Landlords understand that AIRM 

and YieldStar use their data to 

recommend prices not just for their own 

units, but also for competitors. For 

example, a revenue management 

director at Greystar testified that she 

understood that Greystar, and other 

competing landlords who used AIRM or 

YieldStar, agreed with RealPage to share 

their data, which was combined in a 

single data pool for use by YieldStar and 

AIRM. An executive at Willow Bridge 

noted the advantages to using YieldStar 

at a property if others in the property’s 

submarket—the small geographic area 

around the property—also used 

YieldStar because ‘‘the shared data 

between the models at different 

communities can be a benefit in getting 

accurate transactional data on a timely 

basis.’’ 

20. Landlords agree to provide this 

information for use by their competitors 

because they understand they will be 

able to leverage the sensitive 

information of their rivals in turn. In its 

pitch to prospective clients, RealPage 

describes AIRM’s and YieldStar’s access 

to competitors’ granular, transactional 

data as a meaningful tool that it claims 

enables landlords to outperform their 

properties’ competitors by 2–7%. 

RealPage clients receive training that 

highlights the role of competitors’ 

transactional data in the price 

recommendation process. 

21. Data Shared Through Other 

RealPage Products. AIRM and YieldStar 

are not the only ways that RealPage 

shares nonpublic, competitively 

sensitive information among landlords. 

RealPage obtains the same confidential 

transactional data from landlords that 

license at least three other programs: 

OneSite, Performance Analytics with 

Benchmarking, and Business 

Intelligence. 

22. OneSite is RealPage’s property 

management software, which operates 

as the central source of data for 

landlords’ leasing activity. Performance 

Analytics with Benchmarking allows 

landlords to compare the performance 

of their properties and floor plans (e.g., 

a one-bedroom, one-bathroom unit) to 

their competitors. Business Intelligence 

is a data analytics tool that pulls data 

from a landlord’s property management 

software and other products. 

23. Each landlord using RealPage’s 

OneSite, Business Intelligence, and 

Performance Analytics with 

Benchmarking products agrees to share 

its proprietary data with RealPage and 

agrees that RealPage’s revenue 

management software can use the data 

to generate pricing recommendations. 

The license agreements for these 

products specifically identify the shared 

data, such as pricing information, as 

confidential, nonpublic information. 

RealPage takes this deeply confidential 

information and uses it to provide rent 

recommendations to competitors of 

these clients. 

24. These agreements grant RealPage 

access to confidential information from 

over 16 million units across the country, 

including many that do not use its 

revenue management products. With 

respect to Performance Analytics with 

Benchmarking alone, a RealPage sales 

representative told a prospective client 

that ‘‘we have over 16 million units of 

data coming from various source 

operating systems (PMS) [property 

management software] into the PAB 

platform,’’ making RealPage the top 

choice for ‘‘transactional data 

benchmarking.’’ With properties 

containing approximately 3 million 

units using AIRM and YieldStar, these 

additional agreements meaningfully 

multiply the scale of the transactional 

data used by AIRM and YieldStar. This 

gives RealPage greater visibility, 

including into markets with less 

penetration by AIRM and YieldStar, 

granting even initial AIRM and 

YieldStar adopters in a new market the 

benefit of access to a significant amount 

of nonpublic, competitively sensitive 

information. 

25. Landlords understand that AIRM 

and YieldStar will use data from these 

products. A revenue management 

director at Greystar explained that 

RealPage ingests transactional data from 

several RealPage products, besides 

AIRM and YieldStar, for use in revenue 

management. A property owner 

requested information from Greystar on 

which competing properties used 

revenue management software. In an 

internal response, the Greystar director 

noted that RealPage has ‘‘access to more 

transactional history than anyone and 

[is] pulling data from anyone using 

RealPage products which includes 

companies who manually price or use 

other revenue management firms but 

leveraging their BI [Business 

Intelligence] products.’’ 

26. A revenue management executive 

at Willow Bridge asked RealPage if other 

specific landlords were using RealPage’s 

non-revenue management products. The 

landlord’s owner client was concerned 

about the data available to YieldStar 

because competing properties were 

unsophisticated and did not use 

revenue management. This executive 

wanted to confirm that ‘‘YieldStar will 

be able to leverage actual transactional 

data behind the scenes and not just look 

at offered rents for their comps.’’ 

RealPage reminded the Willow Bridge 

executive that RealPage collected 

transactional data for all users of 

OneSite, Business Intelligence, and 

Performance Analytics with 

Benchmarking, and reassured the 

executive that YieldStar had ample 

transactional and survey data for that 

area. 

27. Calling Landlords. RealPage has 

an additional, complementary product 

called Market Analytics. Market 

Analytics compiles data from over 

50,000 monthly phone calls that 

RealPage makes to landlords across the 

country. On these calls RealPage 

collects nonpublic, competitively 

sensitive information by floor plan on 

occupancy rates, effective rents, and 

concessions, as well as information on 

the owner, management company, and 

any revenue management software used 

at the property. These market surveys 

cover over 11 million units and 

approximately 52,000 properties. 

Landlords, including but not limited to 

those that use AIRM, YieldStar, or other 

RealPage products, knowingly share this 

nonpublic information with RealPage. 

B. AIRM and YieldStar Users Agree 

With RealPage To Use the Software To 

Align Pricing 

28. In addition to agreeing to share 

nonpublic, competitively sensitive data 

with RealPage, each AIRM and 

YieldStar licensee agrees with RealPage 

to use the AIRM or YieldStar pricing 

software as RealPage designed it.2

Landlords are expected to review daily 

AIRM or YieldStar floor plan price 

recommendations and use the programs 

to set scheduled floor plan rents or even 

unit-level prices. 

29. While landlords may not accept 

every price recommendation, they use 

AIRM or YieldStar as their pricing 

software, regularly review AIRM or 

YieldStar floor plan recommendations, 

use AIRM or YieldStar to set a 

scheduled floor plan rent, and use 

AIRM or YieldStar to set unit-level 

prices. 

30. Landlords who use AIRM and 

YieldStar know that others are using the 

same software. Some landlords track 


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which revenue management software 

their competitors use, including by 

contacting competing properties directly 

and exchanging nonpublic information. 

Other landlords, including prospective 

AIRM and YieldStar users, ask RealPage 

whether there are existing AIRM and 

YieldStar users nearby before they 

themselves license the products. 

31. An executive at Willow Bridge, for 

example, explained to her team how she 

would learn from RealPage data or from 

a property’s website whether a property 

used revenue management. This 

information is important because 

properties that use revenue management 

tend to update prices much more 

frequently, and so a landlord will react 

differently to those price changes if it 

knows the competitor is using revenue 

management. 

32. RealPage frequently tells 

prospective and current clients that a 

‘‘rising tide raises all ships.’’ A RealPage 

revenue management vice president 

explained that this phrase means that 

‘‘there is greater good in everybody 

succeeding versus essentially trying to 

compete against one another in a way 

that actually keeps the industry down.’’ 

This rising tide lifts all landlords, 

including but not limited to AIRM and 

YieldStar users. 

33. In using AIRM and YieldStar, 

landlords expect this pricing alignment 

and use RealPage software in part for 

this reason. One landlord echoed the 

RealPage executive, using the phrase ‘‘a 

rising tide rises [sic] all ships’’ to 

explain that AIRM would move prices 

in a ‘‘similar manner’’ to how the top 

and bottom of the market move. 

Elsewhere that same landlord noted that 

‘‘if everyone in the market is doing well 

and everyone in the market has [sic] is 

having the rates go up, so should ours, 

right?’’ An employee at Willow Bridge 

referenced RealPage’s use of the phrase 

‘‘a rising tide raises all ships’’ to explain 

how AIRM would provide price 

recommendations that amplify market 

trends. Multiple landlords have 

expressed their preference that their 

competitors use YieldStar and AIRM 

because widespread use would benefit 

them all. An executive of one landlord 

(which itself uses YieldStar and AIRM) 

said in a 2021 earnings call that more 

sophisticated, ‘‘high-quality 

competition’’ was better for that 

landlord when ‘‘they all use revenue 

management. They are all smart. They 

raised rents when they should.’’ 

RealPage highlighted in promotional 

materials the sentiments of another 

landlord who noted, ‘‘It actually gives 

me chills to think about what a 

disadvantage we’d be at if we hadn’t 

adopted YieldStar, knowing others are 

using it.’’ 

C. RealPage’s Transactional Data Is 

Fundamentally Different From Other 

Data Available to Landlords 

34. The data that RealPage uses and 

supplies is unique relative to public 

data available to landlords on listing or 

property websites. As compared to 

public data, RealPage data is much more 

granular, covers a broader array of 

business information, and includes 

competitively sensitive data across 

several dimensions. For example: 

• Information on Actual 

Transactions. RealPage’s data include, 

for each lease, the unit, floor plan, listed 

rent, final transacted lease price 

(including any discounts), and lease 

term. 

• Renewals. RealPage’s data include 

the same information for lease renewals. 

Information on renewals is not listed 

publicly—not even asking rents— 

leaving a significant blind spot for 

landlords not using RealPage. 

• Time Span. AIRM and YieldStar 

have access to current and historical 

lease data, from the previous day and 

going back two to three years. 

• Future Demand. The shared data 

further includes information on tenant 

demand, including detailed information 

on inquiries and applications by 

potential future tenants. 

• Accuracy. Landlords have greater 

assurance of the accuracy of the data 

because it comes directly from the 

landlords’ own databases. 

• Coverage. The RealPage data covers 

millions of units from users of its 

revenue management software and other 

products. 

35. RealPage touts how its data is 

different. As one RealPage pitch deck 

put it, ‘‘we have [the] most data and the 

best data.’’ And the ‘‘[q]uality of data is 

best in class given that it is ‘lease 

transaction data’—this provides insight 

into performance data from actual 

signed leases, both new and renewal, 

net effective of concessions.’’ Another 

noted that without YieldStar ‘‘you’ll be 

pricing your renewals in the dark 

without insight into actual lease 

transaction data that YS uses to help 

you make pricing decisions. This is 

critical to price renewals right[,] 

especially in a downturn.’’ 

36. Access to this data proves 

important in winning over revenue 

management clients, including skeptical 

ones. One RealPage senior manager 

noted that a ‘‘highly suspicious CFO’’ 

was won over in part by YieldStar’s 

‘‘lease transaction data’’ that allowed his 

company to ‘‘achieve what his people 

couldn’t achieve on their own.’’ 

37. One landlord explained the 

benefits of YieldStar to its owner clients 

by calling the use of competitors’ 

transactional data a ‘‘game changer! We 

have 100% truth on [competitors’] 

activity powering YieldStar 

recommendations.’’ 

38. Another landlord’s internal 

training presentation on YieldStar 

highlighted the importance of having 

access to competitors’ transactional 

data: 


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Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 19 / Thursday, January 30, 2025 / Notices 8565 

D. RealPage Revenue Management 

Software Uses Nonpublic, Competitively 

Sensitive Data To Recommend Prices 

39. AIRM and YieldStar are built 

upon similar code and leverage 

competitive data in similar ways. LRO, 

on the other hand, was originally 

developed outside of RealPage and takes 

a different approach. 

1. AIRM and YieldStar Leverage 

Competitively Sensitive Data To 

Generate Price Recommendations 

40. AIRM uses competitors’ 

nonpublic, transactional data in three 

separate stages of the pricing process: 

(1) model training, (2) floor plan price 

recommendations, and (3) unit-level 

prices. YieldStar uses competitors’ 

nonpublic, transactional data in stages 

two and three of its process. 

(a) AIRM Model Training Relies on 

Competitively Sensitive Data To 

Generate Learned Parameters 

41. In the first stage, RealPage trains 

its AIRM models using nonpublic data 

from OneSite and other property 

management software, totaling millions 

of executed lease transactions, new lead 

applications, renewal applications, and 

guest cards filled out by visiting 

potential tenants. This data is run 

through a machine learning model to 

generate learned parameters for supply 

and demand models that are then used 

for all AIRM clients across the country. 

Like the coefficients in a regression 

model, the learned parameters are 

applied to the data of a landlord’s 

specific property, and to the data of its 

competitors, when AIRM makes pricing 

recommendations. RealPage generally 

retrains the models three to four times 

per year using updated nonpublic data. 

(b) AIRM and YieldStar Incorporate 

Competitors’ Nonpublic Data To 

Generate Floor Plan Price 

Recommendations 

42. In the second stage AIRM or 

YieldStar provides a price 

recommendation for every floor plan of 

a given property. A floor plan is a 

grouping of units that share similar 

characteristics, such as the number of 

bedrooms and bathrooms and square 

footage. Landlords define the floor plans 

in their buildings—for example, a large 

apartment building might have separate 

sets of floor plans for studios, onebedroom, and two-bedroom apartments. 

As discussed below, AIRM and 

YieldStar use competitors’ nonpublic, 

transactional data in nearly every step of 

setting a recommended floor plan price, 

including identifying peer properties, 

forecasting occupancy and leasing, 

increasing rents to match competitors’ 

changes, and determining the 

magnitude of price changes. 

43. Identifying Peers. First, AIRM and 

YieldStar use confidential transaction 

data to identify a property’s peer 

properties, which include close 

competitors. In selecting peer 

properties, RealPage’s algorithm 

generally looks for properties with 

similar floor plans, within close 

geographic proximity, and with similar 

effective rents over time. AIRM or 

YieldStar clients may review the list of 

peer properties and request that 

RealPage add or remove specific 

properties. 

44. AIRM or YieldStar then uses the 

nonpublic data from competitors’ 

executed leases to generate a market 

range chart for each floor plan. This 

chart identifies a ‘‘smoothed’’ market 

minimum effective rent and market 

maximum effective rent. The market 

minimum is a hard floor. AIRM and 

YieldStar will not recommend a rent 

below the market minimum. On the 

other hand, the market maximum is a 

‘‘soft ceiling,’’ and the programs will 

recommend prices above the ceiling. 

45. The client has access to the market 

range chart within the AIRM and 

YieldStar interfaces. As shown below, 

for each floor plan the client can see the 

smoothed market minimum and market 

maximum and where the client’s own 

floor plan sits within the market range. 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES2EN30JA25.000</GPH>

Calculates Price using complex algorithms: 

• Historical data 

• current One Site data 

• Transactional Competitive Market Data 

Used to generate a price recommendation 

EVERY. day for EVERY unit! 
8566 Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 19 / Thursday, January 30, 2025 / Notices 

3 If there is insufficient historical data for a 

particular building, or floor plan within that 

building, RealPage will use data from what it calls 

a ‘‘surrogate property,’’ which is the confidential 

transactional data from another property with 

characteristics similar to the subject property. 

46. Forecasting Occupancy and 

Leasing. Every night, for each 

participating property, AIRM applies 

the model’s learned parameters to that 

property’s internal transactional data to 

forecast the number of expected 

vacancies and expected lease 

applications for a certain period into the 

future. AIRM may also use competitors’ 

data to adjust the projected supply. 

47. AIRM or YieldStar then 

determines whether actual leasing for a 

floor plan is on track to meet predicted 

leasing. To do so, it creates a forecast of 

the number of leases over time, using 

nonpublic lease and application data 

from the subject property, and 

potentially from so-called surrogate 

properties (similar properties in the 

surrounding area).3 When there is an 

imbalance between a property’s actual 

and forecasted leasing, it recommends a 

price change. 

48. Changing Rents to Match 

Competitors. Even when a property’s 

supply and demand are balanced, 

RealPage’s software will still 

recommend a price change, based on 

competitors’ nonpublic data, when it 

determines that the market is moving. 

For example, if the minimum and 

maximum of the competing floor plans’ 

effective rents increase, it will 

recommend a price increase to maintain 

the floor plan’s market position (its 

price position relative to its 

competitors). 

49. Determining Magnitude of Price 

Changes. Once AIRM or YieldStar has 

determined that it will recommend a 

price increase or a price decrease, it 

again uses competitors’ transactional 

data to determine how much the price 

should move and provide a floor plan 

price recommendation. It uses 

nonpublic transactional data from peer 

properties, in addition to data from the 

subject property and surrogate 

properties, to generate a market 

response curve—analogous to a market 

demand curve—for every floor plan. 

This demand curve provides an estimate 

of how demand for particular 

apartments would change in response to 

changes in rents, a measure that 

RealPage calls elasticity. In other words, 

it uses competitors’ nonpublic 

transactional data to calculate how 

many leases the property will likely 

gain or lose for a particular floor plan, 

for every price point along the curve. 

Using this data, AIRM or YieldStar can 

determine how much the price can 

increase and still achieve the target 

number of leases, or by how little price 

can decrease to maintain a target 

occupancy. 

50. RealPage describes elasticity as a 

pivotal input into balancing supply and 

demand and, therefore, price. 

51. The use of surrogate properties in 

this pricing process has the potential to 

push convergence on price even further. 

As two properties’ surrogate sets 

become closer—and therefore their 

respective demand curves become more 

similar—AIRM and YieldStar will 

generate increasingly similar prices for 

the two properties. And the use of 

surrogates is common. One of the largest 

landlords in the country, for example, 

uses surrogates at over 80% of its 

properties. 

52. This process repeats for every 

floor plan in the client’s property, every 

night. A new floor plan price 

recommendation is generated daily. 

(c) AIRM and YieldStar Use 

Competitors’ Nonpublic Data— 

Including Data on Future Occupancy— 

To Determine Unit-Level Prices 

53. A property manager at the 

landlord reviews each floor plan 

recommendation daily and enters the 

floor plan price. AIRM and YieldStar 

then use the floor plan price to generate 

prices for every unit within the floor 

plan. The unit price is shown in a 

pricing matrix, which provides the price 

for each combination of start date and 

lease term. To generate the price for an 

individual unit, the floor plan price is 

adjusted to account for unit-specific 


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Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 19 / Thursday, January 30, 2025 / Notices 8567 

4Some clients have internal revenue managers 

that are certified by RealPage. For those clients who 

have internalized the revenue management 

function, recommendation rejections may be routed 

to the internal revenue manager rather than a 

RealPage pricing advisor. 

factors such as amenities (e.g., a 

desirable view, the floor level, or an inunit washer and dryer), staleness (i.e., 

how long that specific unit has been 

vacant), and the timing of lease 

expirations. AIRM and YieldStar again 

use competitors’ nonpublic data during 

this step in at least two ways. 

54. First, AIRM and YieldStar use 

data on competitors’ supply of 

multifamily housing to adjust 

recommendations to limit ‘‘exposure’’ 

with a feature called lease expiration 

management. Exposure refers to the 

number of units that are available for 

lease. Managing lease expirations is an 

important element of revenue 

management software. If too many 

leases expire and the corresponding 

units become available at the same time, 

supply increases and rents for those 

units will tend to drop. This process 

will also tend to repeat itself as the same 

units will become available at the same 

time a year later for leases with a 

standard twelve-month term. 

55. The objective of expiration 

management is to smooth out this 

exposure so that landlords, as explained 

by one RealPage employee, ‘‘remain in 

a position of pricing power.’’ For 

example, if AIRM or YieldStar sees that 

a large number of units will likely be 

available in twelve months, it will 

increase the price recommendation for a 

twelve-month lease relative to price 

recommendations for leases of other 

terms, such as 11 months or 13 months, 

in order to nudge potential renters to 

accept those terms. Expiration 

management can only raise prices— 

AIRM does not lower a unit’s price if 

the lease term would fall in an 

underexposed period. 

56. This calculation does not rely only 

on the predicted future supply for the 

client’s property. For any landlord who 

uses a ‘‘market seasonality’’ setting, 

AIRM and YieldStar also rely on 

competitors’ transactional data and the 

supply for those competitors—including 

the supply of competitors’ existing 

leases that expire in the future. AIRM 

and YieldStar thus work to manage 

lease expirations for the client’s units 

based on how competitors’ supply will 

change. RealPage strongly recommends 

to landlords that they use market 

seasonality. 

57. The use of competitors’ nonpublic 

data in expiration management to fill 

out the pricing matrix occurs regardless 

of whether the landlord accepts the 

AIRM or YieldStar recommendation. 

Thus, even if a landlord were to 

override every price recommendation, 

its rental prices would still be 

influenced by nonpublic information 

about its competitors’ supply. 

58. Second, AIRM and YieldStar 

include an amenity optimization 

feature. By pricing specific amenities 

within units, landlords can avoid 

making wholesale pricing changes to a 

floor plan if a specific unit fails to lease. 

Within the amenity analysis, AIRM and 

YieldStar provide market values for 

specific amenities to landlords, allowing 

them to compare their perceived value 

of an amenity with the nonpublic 

valuation of their competitors. The peer 

data include the market minimum and 

maximum value for specific amenities. 

2. LRO Relies Primarily on Landlords 

To Input Data on Competitors 

59. RealPage’s LRO also provides 

pricing recommendations to users. Each 

week, LRO users manually input 

competitor information into the system 

that they have obtained from public 

websites or more questionable means, 

such as communicating directly with 

their competitors. 

60. A small number of LRO users 

subscribe to a feature called AutoComp. 

With this feature, RealPage provides 

information on competitors’ rents, 

traffic, and occupancy. This information 

comes from market surveys that 

RealPage compiles using call centers to 

call competitor properties. Landlords 

may use LRO without using AutoComp. 

E. RealPage Uses Multiple Mechanisms 

To Increase Compliance With Price 

Recommendations 

61. AIRM and YieldStar provide daily 

price recommendations. RealPage has 

taken multiple steps to increase 

compliance with AIRM and YieldStar 

price recommendations. It designed 

AIRM and YieldStar to make it much 

easier to accept recommendations than 

to decline them. It built an auto-accept 

function and pushes clients to adopt it 

and increase its role. And its pricing 

advisors encourage landlords to follow 

AIRM and YieldStar pricing 

recommendations. Among their duties, 

pricing advisors review any request to 

override a price recommendation. 

1. AIRM and YieldStar Make It Easy To 

Accept Recommendations and More 

Difficult and Time-Consuming To 

Decline 

62. Every morning, the landlord’s 

property manager chooses whether to 

accept the floor plan price 

recommendation, keep the previous 

day’s rent, or override the 

recommendation. These options are the 

same for new leases and renewal leases. 

RealPage makes it easier and faster for 

a client to accept a recommendation 

than to decline it. When accepting 

recommendations, the manager can 

choose to do a bulk acceptance—she can 

accept all or multiple floor plan 

recommendations at once. But she 

cannot do the same when overriding, or 

rejecting, the recommendation. 

63. Instead, for every recommendation 

that she does not accept—whether 

overriding or keeping the previous day’s 

rent—the property manager must 

provide ‘‘specific business 

commentary’’ for diverging from the 

recommendation. This justification, 

RealPage instructs, should not be a mere 

preference for another price but must be 

based on a factor that the model cannot 

account for, such as local construction 

or renovations occurring in the building. 

It must be a ‘‘strong sound business 

minded approach.’’ 

64. The property manager knows that 

these recommendation rejections and 

accompanying justifications will be sent 

to a RealPage pricing advisor.4 If the 

pricing advisor disagrees with the 

rejection or justification, the 

disagreement is escalated for resolution 

to a landlord’s regional manager, who 

typically supervises the property 

manager. 

65. As one client who complained to 

RealPage explained, RealPage’s design is 

‘‘trying to persuade [clients] to take the 

recommendations (almost like we made 

it hard to do anything but).’’ 

2. RealPage Pushes Clients To Adopt 

Auto-Accept Settings That 

Automatically Approve 

Recommendations 

66. AIRM and YieldStar each include 

auto-accept functions. This 

functionality automatically accepts 

price recommendations falling within 

certain parameters. By default, AIRM 

and YieldStar set auto-accept 

parameters of a 3% daily change and an 

8% weekly change. The landlord can 

change these parameters, disable or 

enable auto-accept, and even enable 

partial auto-accept. With partial autoaccept, if the recommendation exceeds 

the auto-accept parameters, the 

recommendation is accepted as far as 

the parameter permits. For example, if 

the auto-accept daily change limit is 4% 

and the price recommendation is 5%, 

using partial auto-accept will result in 

an increase of 4%. By enabling autoaccept, a landlord functionally delegates 

pricing authority to RealPage (within 

the bounds of the daily and weekly 

limits). 


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8568 Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 19 / Thursday, January 30, 2025 / Notices 

67. As part of the onboarding process, 

internal RealPage guidance states, 

‘‘AUTO ACCEPT should be confirmed 

as ‘on’ with parameters in place.’’ 

Internal AIRM training explained that 

RealPage wanted to ‘‘widen auto accept 

parameters’’ by introducing the feature 

and then ‘‘creating enough trust so that 

over time we have client[s] that are 

willing to let auto accept run with very 

wide parameters . . . AKA—accept all 

recommendations.’’ RealPage trains 

pricing advisors to have an 

‘‘accountability conversation’’ or a 

‘‘refresher on short term vs long term 

goals’’ for clients that show less 

tolerance for increasing auto-accept 

parameters. 

68. Even if a landlord does not want 

to use auto-accept, RealPage trains its 

advisors to convince the landlord to 

turn it on with 0% limits—a setting 

whereby auto-accept will never accept 

price changes. The reason? So that it is 

no longer a question of whether the 

client turns on auto-accept, but only a 

matter of convincing them to widen the 

parameters and further delegate pricing 

decisions. RealPage instructs its 

advisors on best practices: ‘‘[I]f a partner 

is not ready to use auto acceptance, are 

they ready to use revenue 

management?’’ 

3. RealPage Pricing Advisors Provide a 

‘‘Check and Balance’’ on Property 

Managers To Increase Acceptance of 

Recommendations 

69. RealPage offers landlords pricing 

advisory services. Landlords typically 

have an assigned pricing advisor, unless 

the client has internal revenue managers 

that were certified by RealPage. Pricing 

advisors play an important role in the 

daily review of pricing 

recommendations. Landlords’ property 

managers are asked to review 

recommendations every morning by 

9:30 a.m. After their review, a pricing 

advisor accepts agreed-upon pricing 

within an hour and escalates any 

disputes to the landlord’s regional 

manager. 

70. If a property manager disagrees 

with the direction of a recommended 

price change—e.g., the manager wants 

to implement a price decrease when the 

model recommends a price increase— 

the RealPage pricing advisor escalates 

the dispute to the manager’s superior. 

As a pricing advisor manager explained 

in a client training, the advisor would 

‘‘stop the process and reach out to our 

partners’’—the property manager’s 

supervisors—to ‘‘talk about this 

further.’’ The advisors, the manager 

elaborated, are part of a system of 

‘‘checks and balances.’’ The client 

confirmed the value of this system to 

stop property managers from acting on 

emotions, which could limit RealPage’s 

influence on their pricing. 

71. Beyond the daily interactions 

between pricing advisors and their own 

property managers, clients agree to 

make meaningful changes when they 

use RealPage’s pricing advisory services. 

Under the specifications for this service, 

clients agree to use AIRM or YieldStar 

exclusively to give quotes to potential 

renters, further tying landlords’ pricing 

decisions to RealPage’s software. Clients 

also agree to change their commission 

programs for leasing agents to ‘‘ensure 

these programs motivate sales behavior 

that is consistent with the objectives of 

revenue growth.’’ And clients further 

agree to revenue growth as the official 

metric to evaluate AIRM and YieldStar, 

as opposed to occupancy rates. 

72. RealPage imposes additional 

requirements on landlords who want to 

use internal or in-house revenue 

management advisors with YieldStar or 

AIRM (rather than use RealPage pricing 

advisors). RealPage requires these 

landlords’ employees go through 

RealPage certification. Certification is a 

multiday course in which landlords are 

trained—at times in the same session— 

on AIRM and YieldStar use and best 

practices, according to RealPage. 

Certification includes observing and 

leading pricing calls with property 

managers and passing a written exam. 

This certification program facilitates the 

landlords’ agreements with RealPage to 

align pricing by ensuring that landlords’ 

internal revenue managers are trained 

and tested to use AIRM and YieldStar in 

the same way. 

4. Pricing Recommendations Heavily 

Influence Landlords’ Behavior 

73. RealPage defines an acceptance as 

where the final floor plan price is 

within 1% of the recommended floor 

plan price. According to that definition, 

the average acceptance rate across all 

landlords nationally for new leases 

between January 2017 and June 2023 is 

between 40–50%. But RealPage itself 

recognizes that acceptance rates are not 

necessarily the best measure of its 

influence; one employee explained that 

the spread between a floor plan 

recommendation and the final 

scheduled floor plan price is more 

useful for measuring model adoption— 

and therefore influence—than the 

binary accept/reject decision that the 

RealPage-defined acceptance rate 

reflects. Widening the definition of 

acceptance even slightly to account for 

partial acceptances illustrates the 

influence of recommendations: nearly 

60% of final floor plan prices are within 

2.5% of RealPage’s recommendation, 

and more than 85% are within 5% of 

RealPage’s recommendation. 

74. RealPage’s preferred measure of 

acceptance understates the influence of 

RealPage’s price recommendations and 

the effect of competitors’ data. AIRM 

and YieldStar use competitors’ 

nonpublic transactional data to adjust 

unit-level pricing, after a floor plan 

recommendation has been accepted or 

rejected. RealPage’s metric does not 

capture the cumulative effect of rate 

acceptances over time. Nor do they 

capture when a client is influenced by 

and partially accepts a recommendation. 

III. Coordination Among Competing 

Landlords Is a Feature of This Industry 

75. Several characteristics of 

apartment-rental markets make it easier 

for landlords to coordinate with, or 

accommodate, each other. Rental 

housing is a necessity for many 

Americans, meaning that demand is 

inelastic—that is, changes in rent 

produce relatively small changes in the 

number of renters. There is significant 

concentration among landlords in local 

markets, and these landlords engage in 

widespread, regular communications 

with one another. And RealPage makes 

rental units more comparable to each 

other in AIRM and YieldStar, allowing 

landlords to track one another more 

easily. These industry characteristics 

exacerbate the harm to the competitive 

process—and ultimately to renters— 

from the exchange of nonpublic, 

competitively sensitive data through 

RealPage and the use of the AIRM and 

YieldStar models. 

F. Rental Housing Is a Necessity for 

Millions of Americans 

76. Shelter is a basic, foundational 

necessity of life. And for tens of 

millions of Americans, conventional 

multifamily apartment buildings are the 

only reasonable option for much of their 

lives. Many renters cannot afford the 

significant down payment needed to 

purchase a single-family home, among 

other requirements. 

77. Demand for apartments is 

relatively inelastic. Rising rents have 

disproportionately affected low-income 

residents: The percentage of income 

spent on rent for Americans without a 

college degree increased from 30% in 

2000 to 42% in 2017. In 2021, the 

proportion of severely burdened 

households—households spending more 

than half of their income on gross rent— 

was 25%, or approximately 10.4 million 

households, an increase in 

approximately 1 million households 

since 2019. By 2022, this number 

increased to 12.1 million households. 

For college graduates, the percentage of 


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Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 19 / Thursday, January 30, 2025 / Notices 8569 

income spent on rent increased from 

26% to 34% from 2000 to 2017. 

G. The Multifamily Property Industry Is 

Rife With Cooperation Among 

Ostensible Competitors 

78. Within particular metropolitan 

areas and neighborhoods, the 

multifamily property industry is 

concentrated and replete with 

competitively sensitive discussions 

among ostensible competitors. 

Landlords have agreed with one another 

to share nonpublic, sensitive 

information, both indirectly through 

RealPage software and directly outside 

of RealPage’s software. RealPage 

facilitates some of these discussions, 

while others are made directly between 

competing landlords. These discussions 

supplement and reinforce the indirect 

information sharing among landlords 

that occurs through AIRM and 

YieldStar. As a result of this 

coordination, RealPage’s pricing 

algorithms are even more likely to 

restrain, rather than promote, 

competition. 

1. At the Local Level, the Multifamily 

Property Industry Comprises a Small 

Number of Large Landlords Managing 

Buildings With Different Owners 

79. In 595 zip codes with at least 

1,000 total multifamily units across 125 

core-based statistical areas, five or fewer 

landlords manage more than 50% of the 

multifamily units. Within the 

submarkets alleged in this complaint, 

there are at least 214 zip codes, each 

with at least 1,000 total multifamily 

units, in which five or fewer landlords 

manage more than half of those units. 

Similarly, within the ten core-based 

statistical areas alleged in the 

complaint, there are 144 zip codes, each 

with at least 1,000 total multifamily 

units, in which five or fewer landlords 

manage more than half of those units. 

80. The same landlord often oversees 

nearby properties with different owners. 

In at least 502 zip codes, at least one 

landlord using AIRM or YieldStar 

oversees properties with different 

owners. 

81. There is also overlap among 

RealPage pricing advisor assignments. 

In at least 683 zip codes, within 96 corebased statistical areas, a RealPage 

pricing advisor has responsibility for 

properties managed by different 

landlords. RealPage takes no steps to 

avoid assigning the same pricing advisor 

to properties with different owners, 

even if those properties compete with 

each other or are RealPage-mapped 

competitors. 

2. Landlords Regularly Discuss 

Competitively Sensitive Topics With 

Their Competitors and Swap 

Information 

82. Landlords regularly solicit and 

obtain nonpublic information about 

inquiries by prospective renters, 

occupancy, and rents from their direct 

competitors. Although this information 

is not as accurate or thorough as the 

transactional-level data shared with 

AIRM and YieldStar, it is nonetheless 

sensitive competitive information. 

83. Landlords collect this information 

through a variety of means, including 

weekly phone calls, emails, and inperson visits. Some landlords also share 

information on their local geographic 

markets through shared Google Drive 

documents. One RealPage employee 

explained to his colleagues, reflecting 

on his former time working at a 

landlord, that these weekly inquiries 

‘‘required cooperation among the 

comp[etitor]s but wasn’t hard to get 

that.’’ In June 2023, a senior director at 

Cushman & Wakefield admitted that 

‘‘this practice has been prevalent in our 

industry for a long time.’’ 

84. Landlords not only knew of these 

so-called ‘‘market surveys,’’ but 

expected their property managers to 

participate. As a manager of Cushman & 

Wakefield’s revenue management 

department explained, ‘‘we have always 

expected our properties to continue 

doing a traditional market survey[,]’’ 

which ‘‘gives us insight into the very 

specific handful of competitors closest 

to the subject property.’’ 

85. At a February 2020 industry event, 

representatives from Cushman & 

Wakefield and two other landlords 

shared tips on collecting information on 

concessions and net effective rents from 

competitors. The suggestions included 

bi-weekly and monthly meetings with 

competitors, sponsored ‘‘cocktail hours 

for regional competitors to share info 

and build relationships and rapport,’’ 

and using Google Drive documents to 

share information on a weekly basis. 

Building relationships with competitors 

to get accurate data was ‘‘critical.’’ The 

representatives cautioned that the 

collected data was used to make ‘‘major 

decisions about pricing,’’ so the 

landlord employees collecting data 

should be trained accordingly to ask 

such questions as ‘‘are you seeing a slow 

down?’’ and ‘‘are you adjusting 

pricing?’’ 

86. Some landlords engage in even 

more sensitive communications about 

price, demand, and market conditions. 

These communications are not isolated 

instances at a specific property. Rather, 

they are conversations at the corporate 

revenue management level about 

strategies and approaches to market 

conditions that apply to the landlords’ 

business across all markets. 

87. For example, in January 2018, 

Willow Bridge’s director of revenue 

management reached out to Greystar’s 

director of revenue management and 

asked about Greystar’s use of auto 

accept in YieldStar. In response, 

Greystar’s director provided Greystar’s 

standard auto-accept settings, including 

daily and weekly limits and for which 

days of the week auto accept was used. 

The Greystar director, explaining why 

she provided this information, testified 

that the Willow Bridge director was a 

‘‘colleague,’’ even though Willow Bridge 

was a competitor to Greystar. 

88. In March 2020, Cushman & 

Wakefield’s director of revenue 

management reached out to Willow 

Bridge’s director of revenue 

management. The Cushman & Wakefield 

director wanted to hold a call among 

revenue management executives at 

multiple landlords to discuss market 

conditions, use of YieldStar, and 

strategy plans. The Willow Bridge 

director agreed and suggested a small 

number of landlords to invite to keep 

the group ‘‘tight.’’ The directors agreed 

to reach out to Greystar, as well as 

several other landlords. 

89. Also in March 2020, a senior 

executive at Greystar obtained a copy of 

Willow Bridge’s sensitive strategic plans 

regarding the COVID–19 pandemic. The 

plans included Willow Bridge’s 

corporate protocols for concessions, rent 

increases, and lease terms. The plans 

recommended that property managers 

work closely with YieldStar and LRO to 

preserve rent integrity. The Greystar 

executive forwarded Willow Bridge’s 

plans to executives at Cushman & 

Wakefield and another landlord. All 

four landlords compete with one 

another. 

90. In September 2020, Camden’s 

director of revenue management 

reached out to Greystar’s director of its 

internal revenue management team. 

Camden asked Greystar—a direct 

competitor—what increases on renewal 

pricing Greystar had seen in August and 

offered what it had seen. Greystar’s 

director replied with information not 

only on August renewals, but also on 

how Greystar planned to approach 

pricing in the upcoming quarter. 

Greystar’s director further disclosed its 

practices on accepting YieldStar rates 

and use of concessions. As the 

conversation continued, the two 

competitors shared additional highlysensitive information on occupancy— 

including in specific markets—demand, 

and the strategic use of concessions. 


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91. At the same time, Camden’s 

director emailed a revenue management 

executive at LivCor and asked how 

LivCor was faring on raising renewal 

rates. He explained his request by 

noting that Performance Analytics 

provided some good data, but it was 

‘‘hard to see what our competitors are 

signing today.’’ The two executives 

shared information about their 

respective renewal increases. After the 

Camden executive passed this 

information along internally, he 

continued his outreach with several 

other landlords and with the LivCor 

executive—who in the meantime had 

reached out to three other landlords 

about their renewal rates. Camden’s 

internal team decided to raise a renewal 

cap to get to the same renewal gains as 

LivCor. 

92. Camden’s director received 

competitively sensitive information 

from at least four competitors. Another 

senior executive at Camden asked him 

to compile the information so it could 

be shared internally. That executive 

noted the usefulness of the competitors’ 

information and the need to take 

advantage of the shared information 

while it was fresh. 

93. In June 2021, Willow Bridge’s 

head of revenue management emailed 

Greystar’s revenue management 

director. She proposed collaborating 

with Greystar to convince a client to 

move all of its properties, including 

those managed by Willow Bridge and 

those managed by Greystar, to AIRM. 

But she also noted that, in thinking 

about ‘‘the larger picture as well,’’ it 

could be useful to ‘‘coordinate with the 

other companies that we often share 

business with’’ to prepare to move their 

clients to AIRM as well. Greystar 

responded favorably to transitioning the 

joint client to AIRM. 

94. In November 2021, a revenue 

management executive at LivCor 

emailed an executive at Camden to 

propose a call to discuss Camden’s 

‘‘renewal philosophy,’’ for the purpose 

of informing how LivCor calculated 

renewal increases. The two spoke that 

day. The following day, another LivCor 

executive—who was included on the 

call—thanked the Camden executive for 

the opportunity to ‘‘connect on industry 

best practices’’ and asked another 

‘‘operational question’’ about 

implementing ‘‘larger renewal 

increases.’’ The executives exchanged 

emails over the next few months, 

including discussing their respective 

strategies on maximum increases to 

lease renewal prices. They shared not 

only their increase limits in specific 

markets but also what price increases 

they were able to achieve. For example, 

in April 2022, the executive at LivCor 

reached out to Camden to share that 

‘‘my current thinking (not sure it’s right, 

just where my mind is at) is . . . prices 

for almost everything are up 20%. 

Therefore, unless there is a good reason 

not to, should we be increasing rates on 

rentable items by 20%?’’ The Camden 

executive responded, ‘‘I like your 

thinking.’’ He continued, ‘‘Typically, we 

lean into the demand signals to inspire 

a price increase . . . . I’m divided on 

whether the default increase should be 

20% or closer to the 10% . . . . Curious 

what your thoughts are!?’’ 

95. In September 2021, a property 

manager at Cortland explained to a 

colleague that the manager had called 

two competitors and received from them 

pricing information on two-bedroom 

and three-bedroom units. The property 

manager asked for the information to 

decide how to act on YieldStar’s price 

recommendations. 

96. Landlords also engage in group 

discussions with local and national 

competitors about sensitive topics. For 

example, for a number of months in 

2020, dozens of ‘‘high-level 

participants’’ from competing landlords 

participated in weekly ‘‘multifamily 

leadership huddle’’ videoconferences. 

The organizer informed participants that 

‘‘the goal of the call is to share 

information about what our companies 

are doing, share some collateral and 

resources,’’ and then—perhaps 

recognizing the problematic nature of 

these calls—he claimed that ‘‘then we 

hang up and make our own decisions.’’ 

97. In one such call in April 2020 

with over 100 attendees, participants 

discussed a number of topics, including 

‘‘pricing and renewal strategies.’’ 

Several senior landlord executives, 

including a Greystar senior managing 

director and a CEO of another landlord, 

participated and shared their practices 

on new leases and renewals, use of 

renter payment plans, and use of 

YieldStar and other revenue 

management software. On a similar call 

in October 2020, participants discussed 

current and forecast rent prices, renewal 

strategies, and use of concessions. A 

Willow Bridge employee forwarded a 

colleague notes from the call, and he 

specifically highlighted information 

about a competitor’s use of concessions. 

98. These conversations among 

competing landlords have extended 

from the national level to local markets 

across the country. For example, in 

Minnesota, property managers from 

Cushman & Wakefield, Greystar, and 

other landlords regularly discussed 

competitively sensitive topics, 

including their future pricing. When a 

property manager from Greystar 

remarked that another property manager 

had declined to fully participate due to 

‘‘price fixing laws,’’ the Cushman & 

Wakefield property manager replied to 

Greystar, ‘‘Hmm . . . Price fixing laws 

huh? That’s a new one! Well, I’m happy 

to keep sharing so ask away. Hoping we 

can kick these concessions soon or at 

least only have you guys be the only 

ones with big concessions! It’s so 

frustrating to have to offer so much.’’ 

The property managers from Greystar 

and Cushman & Wakefield continued to 

discuss competitively sensitive topics. 

For example, in response to Greystar’s 

tipoff that it had reduced concessions 

and ‘‘hop[ed] the Spring/Summer 

market allow us to pull further back on 

concessions,’’ the Cushman & Wakefield 

property manager replied, ‘‘That’s great 

news and I love hearing about the 

concessions being pulled back. We have 

done the same and hoping the rest of the 

market follows suit.’’ These 

communications between RealPage 

users that are ostensibly competitors are 

examples of the industry-wide 

coordination that magnifies the 

anticompetitive effects of RealPage’s 

software. 

99. In addition to contacting each 

other directly, many landlords also 

exchange information through other 

intermediaries. One vendor offers a tool 

for landlords to exchange with one 

another nonpublic information on 

concessions, net effective rents, 

inquiries and visits by prospective 

renters, and occupancy that is pulled 

from each landlord’s property 

management software. Over 150 

landlords nationally have used this 

service, including Greystar, LivCor, and 

some of the other largest landlords 

across the country. The vendor’s CEO 

described this as a ‘‘quid pro quo or give 

to get’’ arrangement among landlords 

where ‘‘if you share this data with me, 

I’ll share the same data.’’ A RealPage 

employee noted that this vendor makes 

it ‘‘quicker and easier to get your market 

surveys.’’ 

100. Some landlords use this direct 

exchange of competitively sensitive 

information to update competitor rents 

within LRO—a practice that RealPage is 

aware of and accepts. 

101. Recently, under the scrutiny of 

antitrust lawsuits, some landlords have 

adopted internal policies prohibiting 

‘‘call arounds’’ and other direct sharing 

of competitively sensitive information 

with direct competitors. But even 

assuming that their property managers 

fully comply with these legally 

unenforceable internal policies, these 

landlords continue to use RealPage’s 

revenue management software. 


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5RealPage previously held separate AIRM and 

YieldStar user groups but combined them in 2023. 

3. At RealPage User Group Meetings, 

Landlords Discuss Competitively 

Sensitive Topics 

102. RealPage holds monthly ‘‘user 

group’’ meetings attended by competing 

landlords that use RealPage’s software. 

There are separate user group meetings 

for LRO and for YieldStar and AIRM.5

One of RealPage’s stated purposes for 

the user groups is to ‘‘to promote 

communications between users.’’ 

Attendees include a wide mix of 

competing landlords. For example, the 

June 2022 YieldStar user group 

included representatives from five of the 

largest property management companies 

in the country, among a larger group. 

103. Recurring topics at the user 

group meetings include product 

enhancements and an ‘‘idea exchange’’ 

on potential changes to the products. 

The user group participants often vote 

on the proposals discussed in the idea 

exchange. But discussions have covered 

competitively sensitive topics, 

including managing lease expirations, 

pricing amenities, the use of 

concessions, pricing strategies, and how 

to manage properties during the 

COVID–19 pandemic. RealPage 

encouraged landlords to use the user 

group meetings to discuss such topics in 

their industry and set agendas for these 

meetings to aid them in doing just that, 

remarking that ‘‘[t]he user group is 

meant to be self-governed to a degree 

and the clients should be leading it.’’ 

These RealPage-fostered discussions 

among competitors enhance and 

facilitate the landlords’ agreement with 

RealPage to use AIRM and YieldStar to 

align pricing. 

104. At an April 2020 YieldStar user 

group meeting, the participants 

discussed strategies for handling the 

COVID–19 pandemic. In the 

presentation, two RealPage employees 

and a landlord led a group discussion of 

trends in rent payments and collections 

and provided five strategic tips. One tip 

encouraged landlords to ‘‘push for 

occupancy but don’t give away the farm 

(pricing).’’ Another counseled landlords 

to ‘‘balance internal and external 

dynamics’’ and, referring to the 

nonpublic information used by 

YieldStar, to ‘‘use transactional market 

data for decision support and to know 

when you can be more aggressive’’ in 

pushing higher rents. Invited attendees 

included representatives from at least 

twelve landlords. At this meeting, 

Greystar and another landlord shared 

information on their usage of payment 

plans with tenants. 

105. In May 2020, RealPage started a 

YieldStar user group meeting by 

surveying them on concessions. 

RealPage asked landlords how many of 

their properties offered concessions, 

whether concessions applied to new 

leases or renewals, and the types of 

concessions offered (such as discounts, 

gift cards, or other benefits). Invited 

attendees included representatives of 

thirteen landlords. 

106. In March 2021, the user group 

meeting included a discussion on 

possible adjustments to how YieldStar 

calculated lease expiration premiums. A 

RealPage executive shared that she liked 

the idea of adding weekend premiums 

to incentivize prospective renters to 

move in during the week, and 

commented that ‘‘the rev[enue] 

potential would then scale up.’’ The 

LivCor representative responded in 

favor of weekend premiums, and 

another user group member suggested 

adding the proposal to the user group 

idea exchange. RealPage agreed to do so. 

107. RealPage began its agenda for an 

April 2021 YieldStar user group meeting 

with ‘‘strategic insights’’ from a 

RealPage economist. This employee 

shared ‘‘21 key strategic insights,’’ 

including ‘‘focus on renewals,’’ ‘‘be 

cautious with concessions,’’ and ‘‘drive 

up revenues—not just base rent.’’ 

Specifically, he urged the group to 

‘‘push up new and renewal pricing 

where demand [is] solid’’ and warned 

against over-relying on concessions. 

They were instead to ‘‘trust the science’’ 

of YieldStar. 

108. In May 2021, RealPage included 

a ‘‘Back to Basics’’ discussion in a 

YieldStar user group meeting. This 

discussion covered ‘‘returning to 

renewal increases post-COVID’’ and 

‘‘declining concessions,’’ as well as 

eviction moratoria and areas where 

acceptance rates were ‘‘seeing 

significant uptick in past 6 months.’’ 

The meeting group chat is even more 

revealing. Over a period of 

approximately fifteen minutes, 

representatives from fifteen landlords 

shared their plans for renewal increases 

and their use of concessions. The 

questions were posed, ‘‘At what point 

do we go back to normal? I[f] we go back 

to normal[,] [i]s it now? Is anyone seeing 

that the model is raising rent and are 

you doing it?’’ In response, these 

representatives made statements on 

renewal increases such as ‘‘increasing, 

back to normal,’’ ‘‘major rent growth on 

the west coast,’’ ‘‘increasing the 

renewals,’’ ‘‘almost all markets we are 

raising rents,’’ ‘‘actually raising more 

than before covid at some,’’ ‘‘raising,’’ 

and ‘‘we are pushing to get back to 

normal. Sending increases.’’ A 

representative from LivCor stated, 

‘‘increasing renewals and pushing new 

lease rents.’’ 

109. The user group members were 

similarly open about their disinterest in 

concessions, signaling to each other that 

they do not intend to offer them or 

would offer them less frequently. Their 

pronouncements included ‘‘no 

consessions [sic],’’ ‘‘no concessions,’’ 

‘‘considerably less concessions,’’ ‘‘less 

frequent and less aggressive,’’ ‘‘no 

concessions except in markets with a lot 

of lease-ups,’’ and ‘‘almost no 

concessions currently.’’ A representative 

from Willow Bridge noted concessions 

had ‘‘gone away a LOT. People asking 

for a free month on renewals and being 

denied, but still signing the renewal.’’ 

110. When the discussion turned to 

acceptance rates, a RealPage employee 

stated that rates had ‘‘pretty much gone 

back to pre-COVID. Rate Acceptance has 

grown 11% over the past 6 months.’’ A 

landlord responded that they had ‘‘seen 

our acceptance rate increase 

tremendously.’’ Another user group 

member explained to the group, for 

‘‘about 1⁄3 of the communities I manage 

the [YieldStar] model was too slow to 

respond, and we are pushing rates above 

market and above YS 

rec[ommendation].’’ A representative 

from Willow Bridge concluded, ‘‘Are we 

deciding as a group to remove 

hesitation?:).’’ 

111. The LivCor representative who 

attended this May 2021 meeting 

testified that similar discussions 

happened numerous times during the 

COVID–19 pandemic—specifically, the 

beginning of 2020 through the middle of 

2022. In these meetings, user group 

members discussed new and renewal 

rent increases, concessions, and renewal 

strategies, as well as other sensitive 

topics. 

112. RealPage claims that this and 

other user group meetings were not 

recorded. 

113. The July 2021 YieldStar user 

group meeting, held at RealWorld (a 

RealPage-hosted industry event), 

included a roundtable discussion among 

competitors. One of the discussion 

topics? ‘‘What is the one thing you 

consistently consider outside of the 

model when accepting or changing price 

and why?’’ 

114. At the October 2021 YieldStar 

user group meeting, a RealPage 

economist gave a presentation regarding 

the 2022 market outlook. RealPage 

presented analyses on current 

occupancy and pricing, and on expected 

occupancy and rent growth in 2022 by 

geographic regions. 

115. At the July 2022 RealWorld 

YieldStar user group meeting, RealPage 


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6A lease up is typically a pre-leasing period (such 

as with a newly constructed property) where a 

landlord is seeking to reach a certain, initial 

occupancy threshold. 

hosted a ‘‘roundtable discussion’’ on 

market volatility and its impact on how 

to use revenue management, unit 

amenities and their impact on tenant 

rents, and best practices for conducting 

lease ups.6

116. RealPage recognized the sensitive 

nature of the information shared at these 

meetings. Beginning in late 2022, after 

public reporting about AIRM and 

YieldStar, RealPage added an antitrust 

compliance statement in the user group 

presentations. Among other directions, 

the statement instructed participants not 

to discuss ‘‘confidential or 

competitively sensitive information,’’ 

and then noted that this included ‘‘you 

or your competitors’ prices or anything 

that may affect prices, such as current 

or future pricing strategies, costs, 

discounts, concessions or profit 

margins.’’ But these were the very topics 

of previous user group meetings, as 

described above, that RealPage 

encouraged its users to discuss. And 

these are the very types of nonpublic 

information that AIRM and YieldStar 

use to recommend and determine 

prices. 

117. Landlords frequently take 

advantage of RealPage user group 

meeting invites to email each other 

directly. In August 2020, for example, 

an employee of Cortland emailed a user 

group invitee list and asked them to 

support a change to how YieldStar 

calculated the number of leases needed. 

In response, an employee of a different 

landlord agreed, adding that ‘‘I also rely 

on comparing available units to 

adj[usted] leases needed, to forecast 

leases, to gut check the pricing recs. 

These data points are always a factor in 

my pricing decisions.’’ 

H. RealPage Uses Nonpublic 

Information To Allow Landlords To 

More Easily Compare Units on an 

Apples-to-Apples Basis 

118. Renters typically search for a 

rental unit using certain key criteria, 

including the number of bedrooms and 

the location. Recognizing this market 

reality, RealPage enables landlords to 

more easily compare unit prices. When 

picking a property’s ‘‘peer set,’’ 

RealPage matches floorplans with the 

same number of bedrooms that are 

geographically proximate. This makes it 

easier for landlords, through AIRM and 

YieldStar, to track and respond to 

competitors’ movements at the floor 

plan level. 

119. To account for amenities, 

RealPage instructs landlords to identify 

amenities using standardized naming 

conventions so that RealPage can use 

machine learning to group amenities 

together. RealPage then provides the 

market value for specific amenities, 

allowing landlords to more accurately 

identify and track how their competitors 

value these amenities and adjust their 

own pricing accordingly. The peer data 

include the market minimum and 

maximum value, as well as market 

quartile values, for specific amenities. 

IV. RealPage Harms the Competitive 

Process and Renters by Entering Into 

Unlawful Agreements With Landlords 

To Share and Exploit Competitively 

Sensitive Data 

120. AIRM’s and YieldStar’s use of 

nonpublic, competitively sensitive data 

is likely to harm, and has harmed, the 

competitive process and renters. AIRM 

and YieldStar distort the competitive 

process by using nonpublic data to 

maximize pricing increases and 

minimize pricing decreases. AIRM and 

YieldStar incorporate special rules, 

called ‘‘guardrails,’’ that override the 

ordinary functioning of the algorithms 

in ways that tend to push rival 

landlords’ rental prices higher than 

would occur in a competitive market. 

RealPage presses landlords to curtail 

‘‘concessions’’ to renters. And AIRM 

and YieldStar’s ‘‘lease expiration 

management’’ features aim to sequence 

vacancies to maximize landlords’ 

pricing power. 

I. AIRM and YieldStar Have the Purpose 

and Effect of Distorting the Competitive 

Pricing of Apartments 

121. As RealPage frequently trumpets 

to landlords, ‘‘a rising tide raises all 

ships.’’ AIRM and YieldStar ensure that 

the ‘tide’ flows primarily one way— 

higher rental prices. In a hot market, 

AIRM and YieldStar will recommend 

price increases to test what the market 

will bear, while in a down market AIRM 

and YieldStar will, to the extent 

possible, still increase or hold prices 

and minimize price decreases to reach 

the target occupancy rate. 

122. AIRM and YieldStar are designed 

to help landlords press pricing beyond 

what they could otherwise achieve 

while reducing the risk that other 

landlords would undercut them. A 

revenue manager at Willow Bridge 

explained it succinctly: YieldStar is 

‘‘designed to always test the top of the 

market whenever it feels it’s safe to.’’ By 

using competitors’ sensitive nonpublic 

data to generate elasticity estimates, 

among other things, AIRM and 

YieldStar can recommend higher price 

increases to extract more money from 

renters without losing an additional 

lease. As RealPage explained to a 

YieldStar client in training, this pricing 

elasticity measurement informs ‘‘how 

far do we stretch and pull pricing 

within the market.’’ That, in turn, means 

that ‘‘we may have a $50 increase 

instead of a $10 increase for that day.’’ 

123. That insight, gleaned from 

competitors sharing sensitive, 

transactional data with RealPage, which 

is in turn shared with landlords through 

pricing recommendations, removes 

uncertainty and competitive pressure 

that benefits renters. As one landlord 

put it, these products ‘‘eliminate the 

guessing game’’ on rent. 

124. As RealPage explains to its 

clients, AIRM and YieldStar reveal 

‘‘hidden yield.’’ This extra yield or 

revenue is hidden in a competitive 

market—a market in which competitors 

do not share sensitive information with 

each other—because landlords ‘‘can’t 

see the opportunity’’ and ‘‘fail to 

capture [the] full opportunity.’’ 

125. AIRM and YieldStar disrupt the 

normal competitive bargaining process 

between landlords and renters. They 

place landlords in a better negotiating 

position vis-a`-vis renters. Landlords 

using AIRM and YieldStar know that 

these models recommend floor plan 

prices and price units incorporating 

nonpublic data of their competitors, 

including effective rents and occupancy 

rates, all of which allow landlords to 

raise price with more certainty. 

126. As landlords appreciate, AIRM 

and YieldStar use competitors’ 

nonpublic data to predict with more 

certainty the highest price that the 

market will bear for a particular unit. A 

landlord is therefore less likely to 

negotiate on price. Any potential 

negotiation instead turns on lease term 

and move-in date, which AIRM and 

YieldStar adjust the pricing for to avoid 

overexposure for the landlord in the 

future. 

127. AIRM and YieldStar also 

encourage landlords to follow each 

other in raising rents. When 

transactional data reveal that peers are 

raising effective rents—particularly the 

highest and lowest competitors for a 

given floor plan—AIRM and YieldStar 

follow with recommendations to 

increase rental prices. This movement 

with the market is ingrained in the 

AIRM and YieldStar models; AIRM and 

YieldStar will not recommend a floor 

plan price that falls below the market 

minimum. 


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7There are separate AI Supply models, and 

therefore potentially different learned model 

parameters, for clients using Yardi’s property 

management software and clients using other 

property management software. But within these 

two categories the learned model parameters for the 

AI Supply models are the same. 

128. Accordingly, as adoption of 

AIRM and YieldStar increases among 

peer competitors, the use of AIRM and 

YieldStar can push prices up through a 

feedback effect. As peers move up, other 

AIRM or YieldStar users may move up 

accordingly. This phenomenon, where 

participating landlords ‘‘likely move in 

unison versus against each other,’’ a 

RealPage executive testified, explains 

‘‘the rising tide.’’ The same executive 

saw evidence of this ‘‘rising tide’’ in 

2020: When looking at multiple peer 

sites using YieldStar, ‘‘we started to see 

the trajectory of performance and trends 

be eerily similar when comparing 

subject sites and comp sets, thus 

showing that we are in fact ‘r[a]ising the 

entire tide.’ ’’ He acknowledged that 

YieldStar contributed to market prices 

rising as a tide. 

129. Landlords rely on competitors’ 

data within AIRM and YieldStar to 

determine their prices and how hard 

they need to try to be competitive. A 

revenue management director at 

Greystar noted in an internal AIRM deck 

that competitors’ data is ‘‘like the 

boundaries of the street you are driving 

on.’’ The director elaborated that ‘‘the 

competitive market range are [sic] the 

edges of the road, staying in those 

boundaries are [sic] necessary to get you 

to the destination.’’ 

130. Another landlord that used 

YieldStar told RealPage that within a 

week of adopting YieldStar they started 

increasing their rents, and within eleven 

months had raised rents more than 25% 

and eliminated concessions. The 

landlord added that they were now 

pricing at the top of their peers and, 

importantly, had ‘‘brought the rest of the 

Comps rents up with us.’’ A RealPage 

executive responded internally that this 

was a ‘‘great case study that highlights 

performance before, during, and a result 

of YS [YieldStar].’’ 

131. A landlord explained in an 

internal presentation that because 

YieldStar recommends floor plan 

pricing that moves with the market—a 

market position—YieldStar would use 

competitors’ data to inform ‘‘how 

competitive we need to be [e]ach [d]ay.’’ 

132. AIRM uses machine learning to 

train models on competing landlords’ 

sensitive data. The parameters learned 

in this training are then applied to each 

AIRM client.7 As a result, the model 

uses the same method and learned 

parameters to generate price 

recommendations from the relevant data 

for each landlord. 

133. This aligns and stabilizes prices 

in at least two ways. First, it reduces 

volatility in how prices change, 

compared to a situation in which each 

client sets prices independently. No 

longer do competitors react in 

distinctive ways to changing market 

conditions as they would in a market 

without access to competitors’ 

transactional data. Instead, AIRM price 

recommendations tend to standardize 

those reactions. This leads to the second 

result: pricing recommendations, and 

consequently pricing decisions, become 

more predictable and aligned among 

competitors as each is using the same 

set of learned model parameters. 

134. RealPage has even manipulated 

competitor mappings to increase the 

likelihood that AIRM or YieldStar 

would recommend price increases. For 

example, a prominent client asked why 

a subject property had mapped peers 

located more than 100 miles away, in a 

different metropolitan area, when there 

were satisfactory mapped competitors 

within five miles. RealPage’s response 

was that if these distant properties were 


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Demand is fixed, but our piece of the pie is variable 

YieldStar recommends a Market Position every day, not 

a price 

Previous achievement vs. Peers and Current need will 

determine how .... ,....TIT'" we to 
8574 Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 19 / Thursday, January 30, 2025 / Notices 

not mapped, the client’s property would 

be at the top of the market and it would 

be more difficult for AIRM to 

recommend price increases. RealPage 

had originally mapped these distant 

properties to give the model more room 

to recommend price increases for the 

client’s property. 

135. This dynamic exists not only in 

markets with growing demand, but also 

so-called ‘‘down markets,’’ where 

demand is decreasing. In a competitive 

market with a fixed supply (at least in 

the short run) of housing units, a 

demand decrease would result in prices 

falling. But AIRM and YieldStar resist 

price decreases in down markets as 

much as possible while achieving 

targeted occupancy rates. RealPage told 

one prospective AIRM client that the 

combination of ‘‘AI and the robust data 

in the RealPage ecosystem’’ would allow 

the landlord to ‘‘avoid the race to the 

bottom in down markets.’’ 

136. Using competitors’ transactional 

data to calibrate and set the bounds of 

its model enables YieldStar and AIRM 

to decrease prices as little as possible in 

a down market. As one example, in 

2023 a landlord reached out to RealPage 

with concerns about price 

recommendations at a property. Despite 

the property having too many vacancies 

and peer properties decreasing in price, 

AIRM was recommending price 

increases, frustrating the property 

owner. A senior RealPage executive 

responded that the model was not 

lowering prices because ‘‘there isn’t 

much elasticity between the 

recommended position and the current 

one’’ and ‘‘the model would recommend 

the highest possible position [i.e., price] 

without affecting demand.’’ 

137. RealPage succinctly summarized 

for landlords the effect of using AIRM 

and YieldStar in down markets: it 

‘‘curbs [clients’] instincts to respond to 

down-market conditions by either 

dramatically lowering price or by 

holding price when they are losing 

velocity and/or occupancy.’’ These tools 

instill pricing discipline in landlords, 

curbing normal fully independent 

competitive reactions by substituting 

them with interdependent decisionmaking (i.e., through the use of pricing 

recommendations based on shared, 

competitively sensitive information). 

These products ensure that clients are 

‘‘driving every possible opportunity to 

increase price even in the most 

downward trending or unexpected 

conditions.’’ 

138. When one client wanted to 

cancel YieldStar, a RealPage executive 

noted to colleagues that with 

cancelation the client would lose ‘‘our 

helping them mitigate damage during 

rent control and covid.’’ In particular, 

the client would lose ‘‘us helping them 

rise with the tide given their strategy.’’ 

139. Landlords understand the 

sensitivity of the information being 

shared and the likely anticompetitive 

effects. One potential client put it 

succinctly to RealPage: ‘‘I always liked 

this product [AIRM] because your 

algorithm uses proprietary data from 

other subscribers to suggest rents and 

term. That’s classic price fixing . . . .’’ 

140. Cushman & Wakefield 

recognized the anticompetitive potential 

of sharing this level of detailed 

competitor data. When a property owner 

asked for information on specific 

competitors, Cushman & Wakefield’s 

director of revenue management replied 

that the requested tool, RealPage’s 

Performance Analytics with 

Benchmarking, did not provide 

information on specific competitors. 

The reason? Performance Analytics with 

Benchmarking ‘‘tracks transactional 

information therefore due [to] the 

potential pricing collusion, it’s 

anonymize[d] by RealPage.’’ 

Performance Analytics with 

Benchmarking draws from the same 

transactional database as AIRM and 

YieldStar. And while AIRM and 

YieldStar do not display the granular 

transactional data to the user, AIRM and 

YieldStar see and use that data. The 

price recommendations are based upon 

the very data that this client recognized 

could lead to collusion. 

141. Even RealPage employees selling 

LRO recognized the anticompetitive 

harm from using competitors’ 

transactional data to recommend prices. 

In a 2018 training deck provided to 

clients, RealPage explained, ‘‘we often 

times get the question about if comps 

are on LRO, can we just update the rents 

for you? Unfortunately, no, we can’t. 

That could be considered price 

collusion, and it’s illegalb.’’ But this is 

precisely what AIRM and YieldStar do. 

J. AIRM and YieldStar Impose Multiple 

Guardrails Intended To Artificially Keep 

Prices High or Minimize Price Decreases 

142. Unsatisfied with relying merely 

on competitively sensitive data to 

advantage landlords, RealPage created 

‘‘guardrails’’ within AIRM and YieldStar 

to force adjustments to the price 

recommendation. But these guardrails 

serve as one-way ratchets that help 

landlords, not renters, by increasing 

price recommendations or limiting a 

recommended decrease. And each of 

these guardrails makes use of 

competitively sensitive data that 

landlords agree to share with RealPage. 

These guardrails have even spurred 

multiple landlords to tell RealPage that 

AIRM and YieldStar are not dropping 

recommended rents as much as their 

individual conditions, or even market 

conditions, would warrant. 

143. Hard Floor. AIRM and YieldStar 

will not recommend a floor plan price 

that falls below the smoothed market 

minimum effective rent. The market 

minimum is a hard floor. AIRM and 

YieldStar thus explicitly constrain floor 

plan price recommendations based on 

the prices of competitors, using shared 

nonpublic information. 

144. Revenue Protection Mode. 

RealPage created a ‘‘revenue protection’’ 

mode that effectively lowers output to 

increase revenues. Revenue protection 

activates when AIRM or YieldStar 

predict—using calculations 

incorporating competitors’ data—that 

demand is too low for a landlord to 

meet its target occupancy. Rather than 

lowering the price to stimulate demand, 

the algorithm reduces the target number 

of leases. AIRM and YieldStar then 

maximizes revenue for the reduced 

occupancy level, which tends to reduce 

price decreases or increase rental prices. 

145. RealPage acknowledges that 

revenue protection ‘‘may seem 

counterintuitive to leasing needs.’’ In 

June 2023, a landlord complained to 

RealPage that ‘‘something in your model 

is broken’’ because ‘‘the pricing model 

is not lowering rents dramatically’’ 

despite the client’s high exposure 

during a busy summer leasing season. 

RealPage explained that, with revenue 

protection, ‘‘the model still sees the way 

to make more revenue is to lease fewer 

units at higher prices.’’ In other words, 

the model seeks to ‘‘raise rates to get the 

highest dollar value possible for the 

leases we can statistically achieve’’ and 

ignore those leases that the client wants 

but the model predicts, using 

competitors’ data, the client will not get. 

146. The model’s hard price floor can 

trigger revenue protection mode. In May 

2022, for example, a landlord 

complained that AIRM was 

recommending price increases despite a 

projected shortfall in leases. Because 

revenue protection mode cannot be 

turned off, the RealPage pricing advisor 

recommended that the client reduce 

sustainable capacity. Sustainable 

capacity is a client-set parameter that 

imposes an inventory constraint and 

determines the number of leases AIRM 

and YieldStar will try to achieve. This 

is, of course, what revenue protection 

mode functionally does on its own: 

increase inventory constraints to reduce 

output. 

147. This phenomenon, a RealPage 

employee explained internally, was 

‘‘true revenue protection mode.’’ The 

client’s floor plan was priced toward the 


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8RealPage has at least considered changing this 

model logic because it introduced meaningful 

pricing volatility and significant price increases. 

Even if RealPage has implemented this proposed 

logic change, the new model logic still incorporates 

competitors’ confidential rents because AIRM and 

YieldStar recommend a market position that is tied 

to the bottom and top of the market, as defined by 

mapped competitors. 

9 In some circumstances AIRM will cap the floor 

plan recommended price increase at a five percent 

increase. 

bottom of its competitors. AIRM did not 

see any price decrease that would 

achieve the original target number of 

leases without dropping below the 

market floor (determined using 

competitors’ data). Because AIRM never 

recommends prices below the market 

floor, AIRM instead reduced the number 

of leases and optimized against that 

new, lower occupancy rate. 

148. Revenue protection mode 

interrupts AIRM’s and YieldStar’s 

normal revenue maximization process. 

As a RealPage data scientist explained, 

‘‘the model really wants to reduce rent 

but is prevented from doing so by the 

revenue protection restriction.’’ 

Revenue protection leads to higher 

prices and lower occupancy. 

149. Sold-Out Mode. Once a landlord 

reaches its targeted capacity for a 

particular floor plan, the model 

considers that floor plan ‘‘sold out’’ 

even though units may still be 

physically available. In that situation, 

AIRM and YieldStar recommends the 

maximum rent charged by a property’s 

competitors, even if the floor plan’s 

previous price was far lower. 

150. RealPage intentionally designed 

sold-out mode to use competitively 

sensitive data to lift rents. In an earlier 

version of the software, sold-out mode 

pushed rents to 95% of that floor plan’s 

highest recently achieved rent. But 

RealPage modified the algorithm in 

2022 to go ‘‘straight to 100% of comps,’’ 

deliberately aligning rents with 

competitors’ highest rents, rather than 

the property’s own historical 

performance.8

151. The Governor. AIRM and 

YieldStar favor recommended price 

increases over price decreases. When 

the model calculates that the current 

day’s ‘‘optimal’’ price will result in 

greater revenue than the previous day, 

a feature called the ‘‘governor’’ causes 

the model to recommend the current 

day’s optimal price.9 But when AIRM or 

YieldStar calculates that the current 

day’s optimal price will result in less 

revenue than the previous day, the 

governor recommends the recent 

average price even though it is not 

optimal for the current day. In other 

words, when market conditions weaken 

and the model calculates that a price 

decrease is warranted, this guardrail 

kicks in and recommends keeping the 

recent rent even though it is suboptimal. 

This asymmetry favors price increases 

over price decreases. 

152. The effect of these guardrails is 

intentionally asymmetric. AIRM and 

YieldStar recommend price increases 

generated by the model. But the 

guardrails reduce or eliminate certain 

proposed price decreases even though 

the model has determined such 

deviations may contravene the 

landlord’s individual economic interest. 

K. AIRM and YieldStar Harm the 

Competitive Process by Discouraging the 

Use of Discounts and Price Negotiations 

153. RealPage discourages landlords 

using AIRM and YieldStar from 

discounting rents. In the multifamily 

property industry, discounts typically 

consist of ‘‘concessions,’’ which are 

financial allowances (such as a free 

month’s rent or waived fees) offered to 

incentivize renters. Concessions may be 

offered generally or negotiated 

individually with a potential tenant. 

154. In a competitive marketplace, 

each landlord may independently 

decide to offer concessions so that it can 

better compete in enticing lessors. But, 

again, RealPage seeks to replace fully 

independent, competitive decisionmaking with collective action by ending 

concessions. AIRM and YieldStar do not 

work as well when landlords use oneoff or lumpy concessions. In its ‘‘best 

practices’’ for revenue management to 

landlords, RealPage’s guidance is 

simple: ‘‘Eliminate concessions.’’ 

Detailed ‘‘best practices’’ documents for 

both YieldStar and AIRM users explain 

that ‘‘concessions will no longer be used 

in conjunction with’’ YieldStar and 

AIRM. 

155. When onboarding a new 

property, RealPage emphasizes the 

importance of accepting price 

recommendations without offering 

discounts, including ‘‘no concessions.’’ 

Concessions cause landlords to deviate 

from what RealPage determines is the 

maximum revenue-generating price. 

156. Landlords have worked to 

implement RealPage’s requests. In one 

YieldStar training, Greystar explained 

that ‘‘Concessions are gone!’’ In a clientfacing FAQ document about its revenue 

management products, RealPage 

explained that ‘‘the vast majority of our 

clients have discontinued the use of 

concessions.’’ A 2023 RealPage client 

presentation showed that the number of 

units offering concessions generally 

trended downward from approximately 

30% of units in 2013 to under 15% in 

2023. A client’s refusal to offer 

concessions is bolstered by its 

awareness of competing landlords 

receiving the same advice from 

RealPage. In addition to discouraging 

discounts, RealPage discourages 

negotiating prices with renters. RealPage 

trains landlords that ‘‘YieldStar [or 

AIRM] is managing your Price,’’ so the 

landlord’s staff can focus on other 

things. The YieldStar or AIRM rent 

matrix is to be the source of prices that 

are given to a prospective renter. 

RealPage instructs leasing staff to 

provide prospective renters the specific 

price from the matrix that corresponds 

to the prospect’s desired move-in date, 

unit, and lease term. RealPage cautions 

landlords not to show renters the matrix 

itself. 

L. AIRM and YieldStar Increase and 

Maintain Landlords’ Pricing Power by 

Using Competitors’ Data To Manage 

Lease Expirations 

157. Supply is a basic component of 

pricing. For this reason, information on 

a company’s supply is highly sensitive, 

and its disclosure to competitors is 

particularly concerning. Yet AIRM and 

YieldStar use competitors’ supply data 

precisely for the purpose of adjusting 

unit-level pricing, regardless of whether 

the landlord accepts the floor plan price 

recommendation. The goal of this ‘‘lease 

expiration management’’ is clear: As a 

RealPage senior manager explained for a 

client, using this data means that the 

client’s property ‘‘will remain in a 

position of pricing power.’’ 

158. The purpose of lease expiration 

management is to avoid too many units 

becoming available in the market at the 

same time. Expiration management only 

increases unit-level prices. It never 

reduces the price. 

159. Every landlord can choose to use 

‘‘market seasonality’’ to inform its lease 

expiration management. As the name 

suggests, market seasonality adjusts the 

landlord’s prices based on how many of 

its competitors’ units will be vacant— 

that is, future supply. This feature is 

popular among landlords. For example, 

one of the largest landlords in the 

United States uses it in 98% of its 

properties. Every single property that 

uses market seasonality is leveraging 

RealPage’s access to this highly 

sensitive, nonpublic data about its 

competitors’ supply to inform pricing. 

RealPage trains landlords to turn on 

market seasonality as a best practice. 

160. When activated, the market 

seasonality function changes unit-level 

prices across the different possible lease 

terms regardless of whether the landlord 

accepts the AIRM or YieldStar floor 

plan price recommendation. 

161. RealPage determines for 

landlords an important input into lease 


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expiration management: the expirations 

threshold. This threshold influences the 

point at which expiration premiums are 

added. The threshold calculation relies 

on nonpublic lease transaction data for 

the property’s submarket and pulls from 

numerous RealPage products, including 

YieldStar, AIRM, OneSite, Business 

Intelligence, and Performance Analytics 

with Benchmarking. Landlords cannot 

adjust the expirations threshold. 

162. Fueled by competitor data, 

expiration management results in 

‘‘increased stability’’ and ‘‘pricing 

power.’’ Using competitors’ data 

reduces the risk of overexposure that 

‘‘could erode rent roll growth.’’ By 

adjusting price recommendations based 

on how much total supply is forecast in 

the market for a given time period, 

AIRM empowers landlords to charge 

higher prices than they could without 

access to competitors’ nonpublic data. 

M. No Procompetitive Benefit Justifies, 

Much Less Outweighs, RealPage’s Use of 

Competitively Sensitive Data To Align 

Competing Landlords 

163. AIRM and YieldStar do not 

benefit the competitive process or 

renters. Any legitimate benefits of 

revenue management software can be 

achieved through less anticompetitive 

means, and any theoretical additional 

benefits of AIRM and YieldStar are not 

cognizable and outweighed by harm to 

the competitive process and to renters. 

V. RealPage Uses Landlords’ 

Competitively Sensitive Data To 

Maintain Its Monopoly and Exclude 

Commercial Revenue Management 

Software Competitors 

164. Landlords are not the only ones 

that benefit from RealPage’s rental 

pricing practices. RealPage benefits too 

through maintaining its monopoly over 

commercial revenue management 

software for conventional multifamily 

housing rentals. In that market, 

RealPage’s internal documents reflect 

that it commands an 80% share. 

165. RealPage’s core value proposition 

creates a self-reinforcing feedback loop 

of data and scale advantages. The 

sharing of competitively sensitive 

information among rivals attracts more 

landlords that seek to maximize 

revenues and extract more money from 

renters. As a result of its exclusionary 

conduct, RealPage has been able to 

obstruct rival software providers from 

competing on the merits via revenue 

management products that do not harm 

the competitive process. 

166. Over time, RealPage has become 

more entrenched and has stymied 

alternatives unless they too enter into 

similar unlawful agreements with 

landlords to obtain and use nonpublic 

transactional data to price units. Even 

then, RealPage’s unparalleled troves of 

competitively sensitive data provide an 

ill-gotten advantage. 

N. Landlords Are Drawn to RealPage 

Because of Access to Nonpublic 

Transactional Data That Is Used To 

Increase Landlords’ Revenue 

167. Landlords prize RealPage’s 

accumulation of nonpublic transactional 

data from competing landlords. For 

example, Greystar noted that ‘‘RealPage 

supplies the best set of transactional 

data available via their millions of units 

of data — this becomes a valuable 

source of truth to our competitive 

landscape.’’ In a training document for 

its employees, the same landlord 

explained that ‘‘better data = better 

outcomes’’ and that AIRM has ‘‘over 15 

million units of data available.’’ From 

the perspective of Greystar, ‘‘pricing 

decisions start with data’’ and that 

precision in pricing ‘‘comes from data 

driven decisions.’’ Importantly, the 

landlord believed that AIRM’s ability to 

‘‘examine data quality . . . each night’’ 

via its property management software 

integrations, including guest card entry, 

‘‘plays an important role’’ in pricing. 

168. As another example, Cushman & 

Wakefield identified this data as 

especially helpful in a dense market 

because of insights into competitors’ 

actions in the market. The same 

landlord also concluded that the more 

data points, the better confidence a 

landlord has in RealPage’s rental 

recommendations. According to 

Cushman & Wakefield, more data— 

especially data about concessions— 

enabled the landlord to make better 

decisions because it showed the 

landlord where the market stood. 

Cushman & Wakefield’s director of 

revenue management explained to a 

colleague that YieldStar ‘‘collects about 

14 MILLION transactional lease data 

across the US and has over 20 years of 

historical records.’’ The director 

acknowledged that ‘‘[t]his is huge! 

Essentially, this is a window into the 

market and the shifts we are going to 

experience . . . Having insight into this 

data, allows [landlords] to make changes 

with the dynamic changes in the 

market.’’ 

169. Willow Bridge, who compared 

AIRM to another commercial revenue 

management software product, noted 

that the competing product ‘‘is about 

half of the cost and does a good job in 

reviewing rents and making 

recommendations but does it without 

the additional reporting capabilities and 

market data that AIRM uses.’’ 

Ultimately, this landlord decided to 

push their owner clients towards AIRM. 

The landlord’s decision to use AIRM 

was in part based on receiving ‘‘more 

accurate and time sensitive data’’ and 

noted that, although revenue 

management is not changing, ‘‘the 

amount of data and how that 

information is used to grow revenue is 

bigger and better than ever’’ with AIRM. 

170. Landlords want access to 

RealPage’s transactional data because 

RealPage advertises, and landlords 

believe, that the use of this data will 

increase a landlord’s revenue. ‘‘Due to 

the amount of data RealPage possesses,’’ 

Greystar explained, RealPage developed 

AIRM ‘‘to leverage machine learning to 

improve both the supply and demand 

modeling and provide a tool to further 

customize to each asset’s needs.’’ The 

materials sent to the landlord’s clients 

also included a flyer explaining that 

AIRM will ‘‘outperform the market 2– 

7% year over year’’ and that it provides 

‘‘[a]ctionable intelligence derived from 

the industry’s largest lease transaction 

database of 13M+ units.’’ 

171. Landlords view the lack of access 

to transactional data as a significant 

shortcoming in other commercial 

revenue management software. One 

landlord received a request from a 

property owner client for information 

on YieldStar and how it compared to 

another commercial revenue 

management product. A landlord 

executive explained that YieldStar was 

backed by robust data and ‘‘millions of 

units of transactional data to support 

not only their demand and forecast 

modeling but also their market/ 

competitive set information.’’ She 

concluded that the other revenue 

management software was ‘‘in a 

completely different class’’ than 

YieldStar. More than two years later, the 

same executive again concluded that 

this company’s new revenue 

management product was inferior to 

AIRM because AIRM had far more 

transactional data, supported by 

RealPage’s Market Analytics survey 

data. In another example, a different 

landlord compared multiple commercial 

revenue management products to 

RealPage’s YieldStar. He concluded that 

a major weakness of these alternatives 

was that they lacked access to 

transactional data on competitors’ rents. 

O. RealPage’s Collection and Use of 

Competitively Sensitive Data Excludes 

Competition in Commercial Revenue 

Management Software 

172. RealPage recognizes the barriers 

to competition on the merits that its 

data, scale, and business model provide. 

RealPage understands that ‘‘pricing 

decisions start with data.’’ RealPage 


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explains to its clients that ‘‘[t]he data 

entered into your [property management 

software] and collected each night, 

along with current market data (and 

lead data if OneSite) provides insight 

into advantageous demand drivers, 

identifies revenue risk and opportunity, 

and captures this competitive landscape 

for informed pricing.’’ 

173. This data and scale advantage is 

significant and creates a feedback loop 

that further increases barriers to 

competition for commercial revenue 

management software. RealPage touts its 

access to an ‘‘unmatched database.’’ In 

one case from 2023, a RealPage sales 

representative noted that RealPage’s 

‘‘revenue management is the most 

widely adopted solution in the 

industry’’ and RealPage had 

‘‘approximately 4.8M units on revenue 

management.’’ In a 2023 presentation 

for AIRM, RealPage advertised that the 

‘‘[a]mount of data we have (∼17mm 

units) is unique to RealPage’’ and that 

the ‘‘[q]uality of data is best in class 

given that it is ‘Lease Transaction 

Data.’ ’’ RealPage claimed this ‘‘supports 

that fact that the industry views 

RealPage as the source of truth for 

performance data.’’ 

174. RealPage has used this 

competitively sensitive data to develop 

an AI-driven revenue management 

solution that leverages the scale and 

scope of its data. RealPage’s plan to use 

this database as fuel for its AI pricing 

model is spelled out in a Go-To-Market 

summary from 2019. In that document, 

RealPage describes that: 

RealPage can achieve $10 Million in 

organic ACV growth through delivery of the 

next generation of revenue management. 

Failure to do so reduces the opportunity to 

harvest gains from our $300M investment in 

LRO and places a portion of current $100M 

revenue management revenue at risk to 

emerging competitors, including Yardi and 

low-cost alternatives that say ‘all revenue 

management is the same.’ Over time we can 

sunset YieldStar and LRO reducing expense, 

and leverage LRO capabilities as a revenue 

management lite offering. 

175. This plan came to fruition with 

the introduction of AIRM. In a RealPage 

training presentation from February 

2020—right before the launch of 

AIRM—RealPage discusses a new 

optimization solution that is built on the 

‘‘RealPage Foundation’’ which is 

defined as ‘‘13.5m units of lease 

transactional data informing our models 

with real actionable intelligence in near 

real time.’’ As described earlier in the 

deck, RealPage’s competitors ‘‘lack the 

foundational capabilities on which to 

build upon’’ leaving RealPage with the 

possibility ‘‘to tie together each 

capability . . . in a single view.’’ 

176. RealPage knows that its rivals do 

not have access to similar data sets. In 

one presentation from 2022, RealPage 

discussed competing revenue 

management products from Yardi and 

Entrata. Yardi and Entrata have fewer 

than 250,000 units, RealPage concluded, 

while RealPage had at least 4 million. 

Unlike RealPage, Yardi had a limited 

data set that used data only from Yardi’s 

property management software. 

RealPage likewise explained that Entrata 

lacked much data outside of student 

housing and Entrata’s revenue 

management software worked only with 

its own property management software, 

meaning Entrata could not pull data 

from RealPage’s OneSite or other 

property management software 

products. RealPage further criticized 

manual in-house pricing options for 

having biased data, introducing errors 

through manual pricing, and being 

inefficient. 

177. RealPage pitches prospective 

clients on its unique access to and use 

of nonpublic transactional data that is 

competitively sensitive. In 2021, 

RealPage discussed internally how to 

pitch AIRM to a prospective client who 

was considering an alternative revenue 

management solution. A RealPage 

employee pointed to the competitor’s 

lack of ‘‘AI driven competitor 

information derived from lease 

transaction data.’’ Another employee 

added that the salesperson should 

amplify the prospective client’s 

concerns about the competitor’s lack of 

nonpublic transactional data, comparing 

it to buying a ‘‘Ferrari without an 

engine.’’ RealPage’s chief economist 

concurred. 

178. RealPage’s use of competitors’ 

nonpublic transactional data provides it 

an important advantage on pricing 

renewals. Information on renewals is 

not available publicly. Competing 

revenue management vendors who do 

not use nonpublic, competitively 

sensitive data are left partially blind to 

this important part of the rental market. 

In 2022, a RealPage salesperson stressed 

this advantage to a prospective client 

who was also considering a competing 

commercial revenue management 

solution. The salesperson noted the 

lease transaction data RealPage 

collected on a nightly basis and 

declared that RealPage had an 

‘‘unequaled ability to stress test 

renewals nightly and drive amenity 

optimization.’’ 

179. RealPage recognizes that its use 

of competitively sensitive data 

minimizes any competitive pressure it 

faces. A RealPage senior vice president 

explained in a strategy document that 

RealPage’s unique nonpublic data on 

leasing decisions was a ‘‘data moat,’’ 

protecting RealPage from competitors. 

In 2020 RealPage’s chief economist 

noted that RealPage’s access to this data 

was a ‘‘major competitive advantage’’ 

and a ‘‘major reason we can do what we 

do.’’ In 2021 a prospective client asked 

RealPage why AIRM cost three times the 

amount of a competing revenue 

management product. Internally, a 

RealPage employee pointed to AIRM 

leveraging daily transactional data of 

over 13 million units to collect 

competitors’ rents and forecast demand. 

He noted that multiple large landlords 

had refused to adopt the competing 

revenue management product rather 

than AIRM even when the competitor 

offered it for free. The same RealPage 

employee explained to another client 

that RealPage’s leveraging of lease 

transaction data—with access to 

confidential data for over 14 million 

units—was a key advantage over a 

competing commercial revenue 

management provider. 

180. In June 2023 a landlord emailed 

RealPage and asked, ‘‘who are your 

competitors?’’ A RealPage sales 

executive responded, ‘‘Our revenue 

management solution does not have any 

true competitors, mainly because our 

data is based on real lease transaction 

data from all kinds of third-party 

property management systems . . . .’’ 

181. In addition, when discussing a 

potential entrant, a RealPage executive 

noted that the entrant needed ‘‘to get the 

data to enable [revenue management].’’ 

He further noted that [g]etting the data 

(and more modern methods) . . . will 

be hurdles for [the entrant].’’ Another 

RealPage senior executive explained 

that shifting clients from LRO, which is 

less reliant on competitively sensitive 

information of rivals, to AIRM, which is 

very reliant on such information, 

reduced the threat from new entry when 

she noted that migrating LRO clients to 

AIRM was ‘‘critical to reducing the risk 

that may come from this new [entrant’s] 

offering.’’ 

182. RealPage’s power and conduct in 

connection with commercial revenue 

management software serves to exclude 

rivals and maintain its monopoly 

power. RealPage has ensured rivals 

cannot compete on the merits unless 

they enter into similar agreements with 

landlords, offer to share competitively 

sensitive information among rival 

landlords, and engage in actions to 

increase compliance. As a result of its 

exclusionary conduct, RealPage has 

been able to obstruct rival software 

providers from competing via revenue 

management products that do not harm 

the competitive process in addition to 

cementing its massive data and scale 


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8578 Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 19 / Thursday, January 30, 2025 / Notices 

advantage that keeps increasing due to 

feedback effects. 

VI. Relevant Markets 

P. Conventional Multifamily Rental 

Housing Markets 

1. Product Markets 

183. Conventional multifamily rental 

housing is a relevant product market. 

Conventional multifamily rental 

housing includes apartments available 

to the general public in properties that 

have five or more living units. 

Conventional rental housing does not 

include student housing, affordable 

housing, age-restricted or senior 

housing, or military housing. This 

product market reflects consumer 

preferences, industry practice, and 

governmental policy. 

184. In 2023, RealPage estimated the 

conventional multifamily rental market 

to cover approximately 14 million units. 

The 2021 American Housing Survey 

estimated a total of 21.1 million 

multifamily apartments—not limited to 

conventional—in the United States. 

(a) Conventional Multifamily Rentals 

Are Distinct From Other Types of 

Multifamily Housing 

185. Other types of multifamily 

apartment buildings are not good 

substitutes for conventional multifamily 

rentals. Some kinds of multifamily 

buildings are restricted to specific types 

of renters, such as student housing 

units, affordable housing units (i.e., 

income-restricted housing), senior (i.e., 

age-restricted) housing, and military 

housing. These housing units focused 

on different classes of renters are not 

reasonable substitutes for conventional 

multifamily rentals. RealPage 

distinguishes conventional multifamily 

as being in a different market segment 

from senior, affordable, and student 

housing in the ordinary course of 

business. 

186. Non-conventional units are not 

widely available to all renters and can 

exhibit different buying patterns. For 

example, student housing serves 

individuals enrolled in higher education 

and is typically located on or near 

universities. Student housing is 

typically leased by the bed instead of by 

unit, and faces a significantly different 

leasing cycle and different patterns in 

renewals and leasing practices. 

Recognizing these differences, RealPage 

will assign to student properties 

surrogates that are distant student assets 

rather than nearby conventional assets. 

RealPage in fact offers a different 

version of both AIRM and OneSite, its 

property management software, for the 

‘‘student market.’’ 

187. Affordable housing units are 

available only to individuals or 

households whose income falls below 

certain thresholds. Multiple federal 

affordable housing regulations, for 

example, require participants in 

affordable housing programs to have 

incomes lower than a set percentage, 

such as 30%, of the median family 

income in the local area. Affordable 

housing units are also relatively scarce, 

with families seeking such housing 

often waiting years on a waitlist. These 

legal and practical restrictions prevent 

affordable housing from being a 

reasonable substitute to conventional 

multifamily housing for the typical 

renter. 

188. Senior housing is typically 

restricted to individuals aged 55 and 

older. RealPage separates senior housing 

into four categories: independent living, 

assisted living, memory care, and 

nursing care. Independent living offers 

senior-focused amenities—such as 

transportation, meals, and social 

gatherings among community 

members—that materially increase 

housing costs and are less desirable to 

younger households. The other three 

categories of senior housing provide 

professional or special care to assist 

renters with basic tasks like eating, 

bathing, and dressing, and they are not 

reasonable substitutes for conventional 

multifamily rentals. 

189. Military housing is also not a 

reasonable substitute to conventional 

multifamily rentals. It is typically 

geographically proximate to military 

installations, with roughly 95% of 

military housing found on-base. 

Although civilians may in some cases be 

able to live in military housing 

properties experiencing low occupancy 

rates, military regulations place them 

below five higher-priority categories of 

potential renters, including active and 

retired military personnel. 

(b) Single-Family Housing Is Not a 

Reasonable Substitute to Multifamily 

Rentals 

190. The multifamily industry, 

government regulators, and policy 

documents distinguish between 

properties with at least five units, which 

are classified as ‘‘multifamily housing’’ 

and those with fewer units, which are 

classified as ‘‘single-family rentals.’’ 

191. The purchase of single-family or 

other types of homes is not a reasonable 

substitute for conventional multifamily 

housing rentals. A former RealPage 

economist explained that ‘‘the choice 

between renting and owning is first and 

foremost a life stage and lifestyle choice 

over a financial one.’’ Single-family 

homes also generally require a 

substantial down payment. In March 

2023, a RealPage economist estimated 

an ‘‘entry premium’’ of $800 per month 

to home ownership over rentals. 

According to a 2021 RealPage strategic 

planning guide, the ‘‘myth’’ that people 

were abandoning multifamily properties 

for single-family homes is false, stating 

that ‘‘rising home sales do not hurt 

apartment demand.’’ Single-family 

home sales are not reasonable 

substitutes for conventional multifamily 

housing. 

192. More broadly, renters living in 

conventional multifamily apartments 

will not switch to single-family homes— 

purchases or rentals—because of a small 

increase in rent. The decision to move 

from an apartment building to a singlefamily home is primarily a life-stage and 

lifestyle choice. For example, the 

decision by a household to have 

children may spur a move to a singlefamily home. In many areas, relatively 

few children live in conventional 

multifamily apartments. Multifamily 

apartments typically offer community 

amenities and a different lifestyle, such 

as high walkability in an urban area, 

whereas single-family homes generally 

do not offer the same amenities and 

offer instead increased privacy, 

including private yards. A RealPage 

analyst explained in 2022 that because 

a move to a single-family home is a 

‘‘lifestyle choice,’’ single-family home 

rentals were not direct competitors to 

multifamily rental housing. A 2022 

RealPage deck, shared with a landlord, 

stated that multifamily rentals and 

single-family rentals were 

‘‘complementary, not competitive,’’ and 

targeted different renters, with different 

floor plans, in different locations. 

Another RealPage analyst explained to a 

multifamily property owner that singlefamily rentals offer a different renter 

profile than multifamily rentals. 

193. Industry participants agree that 

single-family rentals attract a different 

pool of renters from multifamily rentals. 

A managing director of a single-family 

rental property management company 

explained in 2021 that a renter’s journey 

from multifamily apartment living to 

single-family rentals came as life stages 

evolved. The CEO of a single-family 

rental developer similarly explained 

that these single-family rental homes are 

for renters who age out of multifamily 

apartments. 

194. Single-family rentals are also 

typically priced higher than multifamily 

apartments, further reducing potential 

substitution between them. The 

chairman of one institutional 

multifamily property owner explained 

in a 2022 earnings call that multifamily 

housing was relatively affordable 


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compared to single-family rentals. An 

industry price index showed that, in 

March 2024, single-family rent was 

approximately 18% higher than 

multifamily rent. 

(c) Conventional Multifamily Rental 

Units With Different Bedroom Counts 

Are Relevant Product Markets 

195. Different bedroom floor plans 

also constitute relevant product 

markets. A key criterion by which a 

current or prospective renter searches 

for a rental unit is the number of 

bedrooms. One-bedroom units are 

substitutes for other one-bedroom units, 

two-bedroom units are substitutes for 

other two-bedroom units, and so forth. 

Individual renters may change their 

desired numbers of bedrooms, but this 

is typically tied to changes in 

circumstance independent from price. 

For example, the birth of a new child 

may require a family to shift from a onebedroom unit to a two-bedroom unit. 

196. RealPage adopts this practical 

reality in the ordinary course of 

business. For every property using 

AIRM or YieldStar, RealPage maps peer 

floor plans. These mapped floor plans 

capture reasonable substitutes for the 

subject property floor plan and reflect 

the perceived market by a prospective 

renter. 

197. To be selected as a peer, a floor 

plan must have the same number of 

bedrooms. A RealPage employee 

explained the mapping process to a 

client: ‘‘we are looking specifically at 

the bedroom level. The tool will only 

map 2b[edroom] with 2b[edroom] or 

1b[edroom] with 1b[edroom].’’ The 

object of mapping peers is to mirror the 

prospect buying experience by 

identifying properties that a potential 

tenant will see in online searches when 

searching for a particular floor plan and 

price range. 

198. AIRM and YieldStar price the 

different floor plans, which consist of 

different numbers of bedrooms, 

independently. RealPage testified that 

the model considers no cross-price 

elasticity between different floor plans: 

‘‘when you set up the different floor 

plans, a one bedroom, a two bedroom, 

or three bedroom, those are completely 

independent. . . . [T]here’s no 

influence in what the pricing is for the 

two bedrooms, for example . . . has no 

influence on what the pricing is for the 

one bedrooms.’’ Landlords also take 

steps to maintain a pricing spread 

between one- and two-bedroom units 

and avoid pricing one-bedrooms at a 

higher rate than two-bedroom units. 

199. Landlords recognize that units 

with different bedroom counts face 

different demand from renters. For 

example, Greystar explained internally 

in 2022 that demand for studio 

apartments differs from demand for 

three-bedroom units. A separate 2023 

training by Greystar reiterated that 

demand trends, and therefore pricing 

trends, differ by bedroom counts and 

that staff should not react to a 

downward trend in one category, such 

as two bedrooms, with discounts in oneor three-bedroom units. At another time, 

Greystar emphasized the benefit of 

RealPage’s lease expiration management 

feature because it is managed at the 

bedroom level—not at the property 

level—so it could match seasonal 

demand for units with that specific 

number of bedrooms. A revenue 

manager at Willow Bridge similarly 

explained to colleagues that onebedroom units have drastically different 

demand patterns from two-bedroom 

units and from three-bedroom units. 

2. Geographic Markets 

200. Defining relevant geographic 

markets help courts assess the potential 

anticompetitive impact of the 

agreements challenged. Here, the 

relevant geographic markets for the 

purposes of analyzing the 

anticompetitive effects of RealPage’s 

agreements with landlords are the areas 

in which the sellers (the landlords) sell 

and in which the purchasers (potential 

renters) can practicably turn for 

alternatives. RealPage’s agreements are 

alleged to have suppressed price 

competition in the markets for 

conventional multifamily housing. The 

relevant geographic markets to assess 

those agreements are those property 

locations close enough for their 

apartments to be considered reasonable 

substitutes. In delineating a geographic 

market for conventional multifamily 


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8580 Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 19 / Thursday, January 30, 2025 / Notices 

10RealPage also tracks data at a more granular 

level than a submarket, called a neighborhood. 

11 Including penetration rates for RealPage’s 

Business Intelligence and Performance Analytics 

with Benchmarking products, which landlord users 

agree to share nonpublic data with RealPage that 

RealPage then uses in AIRM and YieldStar, would 

increase the data penetration rates subject to 

unlawful agreements for these and all other relevant 

conventional multifamily rental housing markets 

identified in the Complaint. 

housing, the focus is inherently local. 

Renters are typically tied to a particular 

location for work, family, or other 

needs. 

201. RealPage recognizes the local 

nature of geographic markets. One 

RealPage former employee explained 

that under ‘‘Real Estate 101 rules, real 

estate is local, local, local.’’ Another 

RealPage former chief economist noted 

that an effective evaluation of a 

property’s performance must be done in 

comparison to similar properties in the 

property’s neighborhood because 

competitive conditions in the 

neighborhood could differ widely from 

the city at large. When training 

landlords on lease expiration 

management, two RealPage executives 

explained that market seasonality was 

based on the most accurate geographic 

level, such as zip code, neighborhood, 

or submarket. They further explained 

that renters typically move locally. 

Similarly, a former property manager 

explained that potential tenants will 

look at a small number of properties in 

the same neighborhood, and it is on that 

neighborhood level where competition 

occurs among multifamily properties. 

This individual testified, ‘‘location 

really does matter in real estate.’’ 

202. RealPage has created a tool called 

True Comps. Used in performance 

benchmarking products that provide 

decisional support to AIRM and 

YieldStar, True Comps provides a more 

accurate mapping of competitor 

properties. It uses an algorithm to find 

the properties most comparable to the 

subject property, as measured by 

characteristics including distance, 

effective rent, age, property height, and 

unit count and mix. By default, True 

Comps picks competitors within a 15- 

mile radius. In scoring distance, True 

Comps applies a ‘‘highly-punitive 

model’’—the distance score drops from 

99% for a distance of 0.05 miles, to 56% 

for a distance of 2 miles, and to 10% for 

a distance of 8 miles. Thus, RealPage 

acknowledges and incorporates small 

geographic areas as the appropriate 

location in which to find true 

competitive alternatives. 

203. During a property’s 

implementation process, AIRM and 

YieldStar require the mapping of peer 

properties, including competitors. 

RealPage starts by looking for 

competitors within a half-mile radius 

from the subject property and then 

expands as necessary. Geographic 

proximity is in fact so important that 

YieldStar has a default radius that limits 

its search for competing properties to no 

more than 5 miles in urban settings, and 

to no more than 10 miles in suburban 

settings. RealPage has an internal 

process for escalating any proposed peer 

property that is more than 15 miles 

away. 

(a) RealPage-Defined Submarkets 

Identify Relevant Geographic Markets 

204. RealPage defines geographic 

submarkets in the ordinary course of 

business. Each submarket reflects the 

geographic area, defined by a set of zip 

codes, that features similar properties 

that compete for the same pool of 

potential renters. In constructing 

submarkets, which are generally larger 

than its neighborhoods, RealPage 

considers major roads, city and county 

boundaries, and school districts. 

RealPage also considers socioeconomic 

factors and apartment market 

characteristics, such as the age of 

properties and rental rates. 

205. Even within a city, apartment 

demand varies significantly based on 

factors such as employment. Supply 

may also vary widely as existing 

properties and new construction may be 

located in different parts of a city. A 

former RealPage chief economist 

explained that because ‘‘real estate is 

very local . . . you typically want to 

take a . . . more narrow view if you can 

on what’s going on in any given 

submarket.’’ 10

206. The multifamily industry 

recognizes submarkets as an important 

geographic area for analyzing 

competition and pools of renters. 

Multiple industry analysts offer data by 

submarkets. A revenue management 

director at Greystar testified about a 

submarket that ‘‘everybody in our 

industry uses this term.’’ She further 

stated that submarkets are a standard 

categorization system, used by RealPage 

and others, including to benchmark a 

subject property’s performance with 

comparable properties. A revenue 

manager at Cushman & Wakefield 

circulated a scorecard comparing 

performance to the submarket, and 

exclaimed that ‘‘we’re perfectly aligned 

with the submarket’’ on rent roll. 

207. A revenue management 

executive at Willow Bridge testified that 

submarkets identify specific, smaller 

areas of a city where renters look to live 

to be close to schools or work. This 

executive testified that submarkets 

typically identify the area within which 

a renter is comparing apartment options. 

This landlord tracks other properties’ 

rents in a subject property’s submarket 

to make sure the subject property 

remains competitive, and if rents in a 

submarket increased, then the landlord 

expected that its property in that 

submarket would also raise its rents. 

208. Appendix A lists RealPagedefined submarkets that identify 

relevant local markets in which the 

agreements among RealPage and 

landlords to share nonpublic, 

competitively sensitive information for 

use in pricing conventional multifamily 

rentals have harmed, or are likely to 

harm, competition and thus renters. 

209. The RealPage-defined 

submarkets identified in Appendix A 

are relevant markets in which the 

agreements between RealPage and AIRM 

and YieldStar users to align pricing has 

harmed, or is likely to harm, 

competition and thus renters. In each of 

these markets, the penetration rate for 

AIRM and YieldStar ranges from at least 

around 26% to 69%, and for AIRM, 

YieldStar, and OneSite ranges from at 

least around 30% to 78%.11 In each of 

these markets, the landlords using 

AIRM or YieldStar and/or sharing 

competitively sensitive information 

collectively have market power. 

210. Appendix B identifies 

submarkets by bedroom count that are 

relevant markets in which the 

agreements between RealPage and 

landlords, and agreements among 

landlords, to share nonpublic, 

competitively sensitive information for 

use in pricing conventional multifamily 

rentals have harmed, or are likely to 

harm, competition and thus renters. 

211. The markets identified in 

Appendix B are relevant markets in 

which the agreements between RealPage 

and AIRM and YieldStar users to align 

pricing collectively have harmed, or are 

likely to harm, competition and thus 

renters. In each of these markets, the 

penetration rate for AIRM and YieldStar 

ranges from at least around 26% to 79%, 

and for AIRM, YieldStar, and OneSite 

ranges from at least around 30% to over 

80%. In each of these markets, the 

landlords using AIRM or YieldStar and/ 

or sharing competitively sensitive 

information collectively have market 

power. 

(b) Core-Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs) 

Are Relevant Geographic Markets 

212. A core-based statistical area 

(CBSA) is also a relevant geographic 

market. A CBSA is a geographic area 

based on a county or group of counties. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 19 / Thursday, January 30, 2025 / Notices 8581 

A CBSA has at least one core of at least 

10,000 individuals. A CBSA includes 

adjacent counties that have a high 

degree of social and economic 

integration with the core, as measured 

by commuting ties. A CBSA includes 

both metropolitan statistical areas and 

micropolitan statistical areas. A CBSA 

includes the set of reasonable 

conventional multifamily rental 

alternatives to which a renter would 

turn in response to a small but 

significant, nontransitory price increase. 

213. RealPage itself tracks CBSAs in 

the ordinary course of business and 

refers to them as ‘‘markets.’’ 

214. Table 1 identifies relevant 

markets in which the agreements 

between RealPage and landlords, and 

agreements among landlords, to share 

nonpublic, competitively sensitive 

information for use in pricing 

conventional multifamily rentals 

collectively have harmed, or are likely 

to harm, competition and/or consumers. 

In each of these markets, the penetration 

rate for AIRM and YieldStar ranges from 

at least around 26% to 37%, and for 

AIRM, YieldStar, and OneSite ranges 

from at least around 35% to 45%. Three 

of these markets are located in North 

Carolina. 

TABLE 1—CORE-BASED STATISTICAL AREA (CBSA) MARKETS

Core-based statistical area (CBSA) markets YS/AIRM 

30% or more 

YS/AIRM/OneSite 

30% or more 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA .............................................................................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ................................................................................................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Charleston-North Charleston, SC .................................................................................................................. ........................... Yes. 

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ............................................................................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX ..................................................................................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ....................................................................................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Durham-Chapel Hill, NC ................................................................................................................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Nashville-Davidson—Murfreesboro—Franklin, TN ........................................................................................ ........................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL .................................................................................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh, NC .................................................................................................................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

215. The markets identified in Table 

1 are relevant markets in which the 

agreements between RealPage and AIRM 

and YieldStar users to align pricing 

collectively have harmed, or are likely 

to harm, competition and thus renters. 

216. Table 2 identifies relevant CBSAs 

by bedroom counts that are relevant 

markets in which the agreements 

between RealPage and landlords, and 

agreements among landlords, to share 

nonpublic, competitively sensitive 

information for use in pricing 

conventional multifamily rentals 

collectively have harmed, or are likely 

to harm, competition and/or consumers. 

In each of these markets, the penetration 

rate for AIRM and YieldStar ranges from 

at least around 27% to 42%, and for 

AIRM, YieldStar, and OneSite ranges 

from at least around 33% to 45%. 

TABLE 2—CORE-BASED STATISTICAL AREA (CBSA) MARKETS BY BEDROOM COUNT

Core-based statistical area (CBSA) markets Number of 

beds 

YS/AIRM 

30% or more 

YS/AIRM/OneSite 

30% or more 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ...................................................................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ...................................................................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ......................................................................................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ......................................................................................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Charleston-North Charleston, SC .......................................................................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Charleston-North Charleston, SC .......................................................................................... 2 ........................... Yes. 

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ..................................................................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ..................................................................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX ............................................................................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX ............................................................................................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ............................................................................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ............................................................................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Durham-Chapel Hill, NC ........................................................................................................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Durham-Chapel Hill, NC ........................................................................................................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Nashville-Davidson—Murfreesboro—Franklin, TN ................................................................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Nashville-Davidson—Murfreesboro—Franklin, TN ................................................................ 2 ........................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL ............................................................................................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL ............................................................................................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh, NC ............................................................................................................................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh, NC ............................................................................................................................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

217. The markets identified in Table 

2 are relevant markets in which the 

agreements between RealPage and AIRM 

and YieldStar users to align pricing 

collectively have harmed, or are likely 

to harm, competition and thus renters. 

218. Even assuming available land 

and no regulatory constrictions, local 

markets for conventional multifamily 

rental housing feature substantial 

barriers to entry. Landlords seeking to 

respond to rising rental prices by 

expanding supply, rather than simply 

acquiring an existing property, typically 

face substantial lead times to construct 

a new multifamily property. 

Additionally, there are significant 

upfront capital costs, including to fund 

expenditures on building material and 

labor, that are recuperated over time, 


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8582 Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 19 / Thursday, January 30, 2025 / Notices 

which may require landlords to secure 

financing. 

Q. Commercial Revenue Management 

Software Market 

219. RealPage has monopoly power in 

the market for commercial revenue 

management software for conventional 

multifamily housing rentals in the 

United States, with a durable market 

share over 80%, according to internal 

documents and other information. 

1. Product Market 

220. Commercial revenue 

management software for conventional 

multifamily housing rentals is a relevant 

antitrust product market. 

221. Other methods for pricing 

conventional multifamily housing units 

are not reasonable substitutes for 

commercial revenue management 

software. RealPage and others in the 

industry recognize that revenue 

management software companies for 

multifamily housing units compete 

primarily against each other and not 

manual or do-it-yourself pricing 

methods. 

222. Internal documents from 

RealPage refer specifically to 

commercial revenue management for 

multifamily housing and recognize 

RealPage’s substantial market share. For 

example, a 2021 strategy presentation 

described RealPage as ‘‘the market 

leader in commercial revenue 

management for multifamily [housing] 

with 45 of the 50 Top NMHC Owner 

and Operators’’ all using RealPage’s 

revenue management products. 

223. A presentation to RealPage’s 

board in 2022 noted that ‘‘[RealPage] 

has gained [the] pole position in 

Revenue Management largely through 

the success of AI Revenue Management, 

which has become RealPage’s leading 

differentiating product.’’ Additionally, 

the presentation described how 

‘‘Revenue Management is experiencing 

strong growth driven by AIRM’’ due to 

its ‘‘PMS agnostic approach’’ which 

gives RealPage the ability to aggregate 

data from its clients resulting in 

‘‘revenue management [that] has 

achieved a market share of 95% of the 

top 50 owners and operators.’’ 

224. RealPage acknowledges its 

market power and durable market 

position. A 2023 RealPage presentation 

reviewing the use of artificial 

intelligence in property technology 

noted that ‘‘RealPage is already the de 

facto market leader in certain key areas 

at leveraging AI for multifamily 

proptech’’ and shows ‘‘revenue 

management’’ as the area where it is the 

furthest ahead.’’ Later, the same 

presentation noted that RealPage’s 

current offer for revenue management is 

‘‘best-in-class’’ and that ‘‘[n]o other 

company is cross-pollinating their 

pricing tools with data in a way similar 

to [RealPage].’’ As early as 2019, a 

RealPage presentation for clients stated 

that RealPage ‘‘has around 80% of the 

Revenue Management market share.’’ 

That share has proved durable over 

time. In 2023, during a sales pitch to a 

property owner, a RealPage 

representative noted that ‘‘[RealPage] 

has 80% to 85% of the market share 

with the closest competitor around 12% 

(<750K units).’’ 

225. In late 2021, a RealPage 

employee preparing competitor 

intelligence explained to RealPage’s 

chief economist that RealPage 

‘‘dominate[d]’’ revenue management. He 

added that RealPage ‘‘dominate[d]’’ 

Yardi and Entrata, which are the next 

two largest commercial revenue 

management competitors. 

226. RealPage’s monopoly power is 

protected by barriers to entry, including 

the unlawful collection and use of 

competitors’ nonpublic transactional 

data on millions of multifamily units. 

227. Landlords also recognize 

RealPage’s substantial market share and 

market power over commercial revenue 

management software. In 2024, a 

landlord revenue management executive 

testified that manual pricing does not 

compete with AIRM. The same landlord 

pitched YieldStar to its owner clients by 

explaining that ‘‘it’s evident manual 

pricing cannot solve at the level a 

revenue management tool can.’’ 

228. In a 2023 pricing dispute with a 

large landlord, RealPage refused to 

lower the price for its AIRM software. In 

response, an employee employed by the 

landlord noted that it was no surprise 

they would not decrease their price, 

remarking that ‘‘[h]ere is the joy of a 

monopoly on a product category.’’ In 

2021, a different landlord commented 

that ‘‘the entire industry is feeling the 

monopolizing effects of RealPage right 

now and everyone is hungry for a new 

product.’’ A third landlord noted during 

AIRM renewal negotiations in 2022 that 

it had no options besides RealPage, with 

a senior executive stating about 

RealPage, ‘‘too bad they have a 

monopoly going here!’’ Also in 2022, a 

fourth landlord, in the face of RealPage 

pushing a 400% increase in annual 

revenue management costs over a fiveyear period, bemoaned the ‘‘limited 

competition in the market around 

revenue management tools’’ and how 

‘‘the industry desperately needs a solid 

competitor,’’ and then discussed a plan 

to ‘‘incubate a viable alternative to 

AIRM in the future.’’ In 2024, that 

alternative had less than one half of one 

percent market share. 

2. Geographic Market 

229. The United States is a relevant 

geographic market for commercial 

revenue management software. RealPage 

sells its commercial revenue 

management software in the United 

States and tracks its business in the 

United States in the ordinary course of 

business. RealPage sets its subscription 

prices on a nationwide basis. Further, 

RealPage can deploy its commercial 

revenue management software, which 

may use inputs from properties located 

throughout the country, in any U.S. 

state. Landlords in the United States 

purchase commercial revenue 

management software from RealPage to 

set rental prices for renters in the United 

States. Many landlords have centralized 

revenue management teams that set 

nationwide revenue management 

policies and conduct revenue 

management trainings for their 

employees across the United States. 

VII. Jurisdiction, Venue, and Commerce 

230. The United States brings this 

action pursuant to Section 4 of the 

Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 4, to prevent 

and restrain RealPage’s violations of 

Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 

U.S.C. 1, 2. 

231. The Attorneys General assert 

these claims based on their independent 

authority to bring this action pursuant 

to Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 

U.S.C. 26, and common law, to obtain 

injunctive and other equitable relief 

based on RealPage’s anticompetitive 

practices in violation of Sections 1 and 

2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, 2. 

232. The Attorneys General are the 

chief legal officers of their respective 

States. They have authority to bring 

actions to protect the economic wellbeing of their States and their residents, 

and to seek injunctive relief to remedy 

and protect against harm resulting from 

violations of the antitrust laws. 

233. This Court has subject matter 

jurisdiction over this action under 

Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 

4, and 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1337(a), and 

1345. 

234. The Court has personal 

jurisdiction over RealPage, Inc. 

(‘‘RealPage’’); venue is proper in this 

District under Section 12 of the Clayton 

Act, 15 U.S.C. 22, and under 28 U.S.C. 

1391 because RealPage transacts 

business and resides within this 

District. 

235. RealPage is a privately-owned 

company organized and existing under 

the laws of the State of Delaware and is 

headquartered in Richardson, Texas. It 


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is registered to do business in the State 

of North Carolina as a foreign 

corporation offering software solutions 

for the multifamily housing industry 

and software as a service. 

236. RealPage engages in, and its 

activities substantially affect, interstate 

trade and commerce. RealPage provides 

a range of products and services that are 

marketed, distributed, and offered to 

consumers throughout the United States 

and across state lines. 

237. The Court has personal 

jurisdiction over Camden Property Trust 

(‘‘Camden’’); venue is proper in this 

District under Section 12 of the Clayton 

Act, 15. U.S.C. 22, and under 28 U.S.C. 

1391 because Camden transacts 

business and resides within this 

District. 

238. Camden is a publicly-traded 

multifamily company organized under 

the laws of the State of Delaware and is 

headquartered in Houston, Texas. 

Camden is registered to do business in 

the State of North Carolina. Camden 

owns or manages at least one 

multifamily rental property using AIRM 

within this District. 

239. Camden engages in, and its 

activities substantially affect, interstate 

trade and commerce. Camden owns or 

manages multifamily rental units across 

the United States, including within this 

District. Camden’s rental properties are 

marketed and offered to consumers 

throughout the United States and across 

state lines. 

240. The Court has personal 

jurisdiction over Cortland Management, 

LLC (‘‘Cortland’’); venue is proper in 

this District under Section 12 of the 

Clayton Act, 15. U.S.C. 22, and under 28 

U.S.C. 1391 because Cortland transacts 

business and resides within this 

District. 

241. Cortland is a privately-owned 

company organized under the laws of 

the State of Delaware and is 

headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia. 

Cortland is responsible for the 

management of multifamily rental 

housing properties, either directly 

owned by an affiliated entity or other 

third-party owners of multifamily 

housing properties. Cortland is 

registered to do business in the State of 

North Carolina. Cortland owns or 

manages multiple multifamily rental 

properties within this District, which 

use (or recently used) AIRM. Cortland 

has a registered agent for service of 

process in this District. 

242. Cortland engages in, and its 

activities substantially affect, interstate 

trade and commerce. Cortland owns or 

manages multifamily rental units across 

the United States, including within this 

District. Cortland’s rental properties are 

marketed and offered to consumers 

throughout the United States and across 

state lines. 

243. The Court has personal 

jurisdiction over Cushman & Wakefield, 

Inc. (‘‘Cushman & Wakefield’’) and 

Pinnacle Property Management 

Services, LLC (‘‘Pinnacle’’); venue is 

proper in this District under Section 12 

of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 22, and 

under 28 U.S.C. 1391 because Cushman 

& Wakefield, including its subsidiary 

Pinnacle, transacts business and resides 

within this District. 

244. Cushman & Wakefield is 

organized under the laws of the State of 

New York and is headquartered in 

Chicago, Illinois. Cushman & 

Wakefield’s multifamily rental property 

business is operated through its 

subsidiary Pinnacle, and also under the 

Cushman & Wakefield name since 

acquiring Pinnacle in March 2020. 

Pinnacle is organized under the laws of 

the State of Delaware and is 

headquartered in Frisco, Texas. 

Pinnacle is registered to do business in 

the State of North Carolina. Cushman & 

Wakefield U.S., Inc. is also registered to 

do business in the State of North 

Carolina. Pinnacle owns or manages 

multiple multifamily rental properties 

using YieldStar within this District. 

245. Cushman & Wakefield engages 

in, and its activities substantially affect, 

interstate trade and commerce. Through 

Pinnacle, Cushman & Wakefield owns 

or manages multifamily rental units 

across the United States, including 

within this District. Cushman & 

Wakefield provides a range of 

multifamily property and revenue 

management services that are marketed 

and offered to consumers throughout 

the United States and across state lines. 

246. The Court has personal 

jurisdiction over Greystar Real Estate 

Partners, LLC (‘‘Greystar’’); venue is 

proper in this District under Section 12 

of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 22, and 

under 28 U.S.C. 1391 because Greystar 

transacts business and resides within 

the District. 

247. Greystar is a privately-owned 

company organized under the laws of 

the State of Delaware and is 

headquartered in Charleston, South 

Carolina. A Greystar management 

services entity is registered to do 

business in the State of North Carolina. 

Greystar owns or manages multiple 

multifamily rental properties using 

AIRM within this District. 

248. Greystar engages in, and its 

activities substantially affect, interstate 

trade and commerce. Through its 

subsidiaries, including Greystar 

Management Services, LLC, Greystar 

North America Holdings, LLC, and 

GREP Washington, LLC, Greystar owns 

or manages multifamily rental units 

across the United States, including 

within this District. Greystar provides a 

range of products and services that are 

marketed and offered to consumers 

throughout the United States and across 

state lines. 

249. The Court has personal 

jurisdiction over LivCor, LLC 

(‘‘LivCor’’); venue is proper in this 

District under Section 12 of the Clayton 

Act, 15 U.S.C. 22, and under 28 U.S.C. 

1391 because LivCor transacts business 

and resides within this District. 

250. LivCor is a privately-owned 

company organized under the laws of 

the State of Delaware and is 

headquartered in Chicago, Illinois. It is 

registered to do business in the State of 

North Carolina as a foreign corporation 

engaging in ownership and investment 

in real property and related services. 

LivCor owns or provides asset 

management services at least one 

multifamily rental property using AIRM 

within this District. 

251. LivCor engages in, and its 

activities substantially affect, interstate 

trade and commerce. LivCor owns or 

provides asset management services for 

multifamily rental units across the 

United States, including within this 

District. LivCor provides multifamily 

asset management services that are 

marketed and offered to consumers 

throughout the United States and across 

state lines. 

252. The Court has personal 

jurisdiction over Willow Bridge 

Property Company LLC (‘‘Willow 

Bridge’’); venue is proper in this District 

under 28 U.S.C. 1391 and Section 12 of 

the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 22 because 

Willow Bridge transacts business and 

resides within this District. 

253. Willow Bridge is a privatelyowned company organized under the 

laws of the State of Texas and is 

headquartered in Dallas, Texas. Willow 

Bridge is registered to do business in the 

State of North Carolina as a foreign 

corporation offering services for the 

multifamily real estate industry. Willow 

Bridge owns or manages multiple 

multifamily rental properties using 

AIRM within this District. 

254. Willow Bridge engages in, and its 

activities substantially affect, interstate 

trade and commerce. Willow Bridge 

owns or manages multifamily rental 

units across the United States, including 

within this District. Willow Bridge’s 

rental properties are marketed and 

offered to consumers throughout the 

United States and across state lines. 

255. The Durham-Chapel Hill CBSA is 

partially or entirely within the Middle 

District of North Carolina. 


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12Landlords may nevertheless use LRO in ways 

that may likely harm competition, as illustrated in 

paragraphs 59–60 and 100 above. 

256. RealPage tracks the number of 

rental housing units that use its 

commercial revenue management 

software products, including AIRM and 

YieldStar, by market (i.e., a CBSA) and 

submarket, and several of these markets 

and submarkets are entirely or partially 

within North Carolina. These RealPagedefined markets include Raleigh/ 

Durham, NC; Charlotte-ConcordGastonia, NC-SC; Greensboro/WinstonSalem, NC; Wilmington, NC; 

Fayetteville, NC; and Asheville, NC. The 

submarkets include Southwest Durham, 

Northwest Durham/Downtown, East 

Durham, and Chapel Hill/Carrboro, all 

of which are located entirely or partially 

within this District. 

257. Defendant Landlords each own 

or manage one or more properties in one 

or more relevant markets within the 

Middle District of North Carolina for 

which they, along with other landlords 

and RealPage, currently agree (or have 

in the past agreed) to share information 

and align pricing by using AIRM or 

YieldStar to generate rental pricing 

using pooled, competitively sensitive 

information. 

258. A substantial part of the 

activities and conduct giving rise to the 

claims asserted in this Complaint 

occurred within this District. As alleged 

in paragraphs 208–211 above and 

Appendices A and B below, relevant 

local geographic markets in which 

competition and renters have been 

harmed by RealPage’s anticompetitive 

conduct include the RealPage-defined 

submarkets in Raleigh/Durham. As 

alleged in paragraphs 214–217 above, 

relevant geographic markets in which 

competition and renters have been 

harmed by RealPage’s anticompetitive 

conduct include the Durham-Chapel 

Hill CBSA. 

VIII. Violations Alleged 

First Claim for Relief: Violation of 

Section 1 of the Sherman Act by 

Unlawfully Sharing Information for Use 

in Competitors’ Pricing 

(By All Plaintiffs Against RealPage, 

Cushman & Wakefield, Greystar, LivCor, 

and Pinnacle; By All Plaintiffs Except 

Washington Against Camden and 

Willow Bridge; By the United States, 

Colorado, and North Carolina Against 

Cortland) 

259. Plaintiffs incorporate the 

allegations of paragraphs 1 through 258 

above. 

260. Each landlord using AIRM and 

YieldStar, including each Defendant 

Landlord, has agreed with RealPage to 

provide RealPage daily nonpublic, 

competitively sensitive data. RealPage 

invites each landlord to share this 

information so that it can be pooled to 

generate pricing recommendations for 

the landlord and its competitors. Each 

of these landlords, including Defendant 

Landlords, uses (or has used) RealPage 

software, knowing or learning that 

RealPage will use this data to train its 

models and provide floor plan price 

recommendations and unit-level pricing 

not only for the landlord, but for the 

landlord’s competitors (and vice versa). 

Landlords are therefore joining together 

in a way that deprives the market of 

fully independent centers of decisionmaking on pricing. 

261. Each landlord using OneSite, 

Business Intelligence, or Performance 

Analytics with Benchmarking has 

agreed with RealPage to provide 

RealPage daily nonpublic, competitively 

sensitive data. RealPage invites each 

landlord to share this information, and 

each of these landlords understands that 

RealPage will use this data in RealPage’s 

other products, including revenue 

management products that provide 

pricing recommendations and prices to 

competing landlords. 

262. The transactional data these 

landlords agree to provide to RealPage, 

and indirectly to each other, includes 

current, forward-looking, granular, and 

highly competitively sensitive 

information. It includes information on 

effective rents, rent discounts, 

occupancy rates, availability, lease 

dates, lease terms, unit amenities, and 

unit layouts. Landlords also shared 

information on guest cards and lease 

applications. 

263. Landlords, including Defendant 

Landlords and other landlords that 

compete with each other in the relevant 

markets alleged, have agreed with one 

another, through RealPage and directly, 

to exchange nonpublic, competitively 

sensitive data, both through RealPage’s 

revenue management software and by 

other means. The other means include 

RealPage user groups, direct 

communications, market surveys, and 

other intermediaries. The information 

exchanged includes future pricing 

plans, current pricing and occupancy 

rates, pricing discounts, and guest 

traffic. 

264. RealPage uses this nonpublic, 

competitively sensitive data to train its 

AIRM models and provide floor plan 

price recommendations and unit-level 

pricing to AIRM- and YieldStar-using 

landlords. AIRM and YieldStar are 

designed to increase prices as much as 

possible and minimize price decreases. 

265. RealPage engages in a variety of 

conduct to increase compliance with the 

output of its products and the objectives 

it touts. 

266. The sharing of nonpublic, 

competitively sensitive data with 

RealPage, and its use in AIRM and 

YieldStar, is anticompetitive. It harms 

or is likely to harm the competitive 

process and results, or is likely to result, 

in harm to renters and prospective 

renters in at least the relevant antitrust 

markets identified in this complaint. 

267. In each relevant market, RealPage 

and participating landlords collectively 

have sufficient market power, including 

market and data penetration, to harm 

the competitive process and renters. 

268. AIRM and YieldStar do not 

benefit the competitive process or 

renters. Any theoretical benefits are 

outweighed by harm to the competitive 

process and to renters. 

269. Less restrictive alternatives are 

available to RealPage and the market. 

RealPage has recently altered AIRM or 

YieldStar for some clients to remove 

those clients’ access to competitors’ 

nonpublic data in at least certain 

portions of the software. RealPage has 

the ability to make changes to remove 

broader access to competitors’ 

nonpublic data in AIRM and YieldStar. 

RealPage has the capability to modify its 

software products to eliminate 

competitive defects. LRO does not 

require the same type and quantity of 

nonpublic, transactional data pulled 

from competitors’ property management 

software.12 RealPage has stopped 

offering LRO to new clients and made 

plans to discontinue LRO for legacy 

clients by the end of 2024. 

Second Claim for Relief: Violation of 

Section 1 of the Sherman Act Through 

Agreements To Align Pricing 

(By All Plaintiffs Against RealPage, 

Cushman & Wakefield, Greystar, LivCor, 

and Pinnacle; By All Plaintiffs Except 

Washington Against Camden and 

Willow Bridge; By the United States, 

Colorado, and North Carolina Against 

Cortland) 

270. Plaintiffs incorporate the 

allegations of paragraphs 1 through 268 

above. 

271. Each landlord, including 

Defendant Landlords, that licenses 

AIRM or YieldStar has agreed with 

RealPage to use the software as it has 

been designed. This includes providing 

nonpublic, competitively sensitive 

transactional data to RealPage, but more 

broadly is an agreement to use AIRM or 

YieldStar as the means to price the 

landlord’s rental units. The landlord 

agrees to review AIRM or YieldStar floor 

plan price recommendations, use AIRM 


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or YieldStar to set a scheduled floor 

plan rent, and use the AIRM or 

YieldStar pricing matrix to price units 

to renters. 

272. AIRM and YieldStar are designed 

to ‘‘raise the tide’’ for all landlords, 

including AIRM- and YieldStar-using 

landlords. AIRM and YieldStar have the 

likely effect of aligning users’ pricing 

processes, strategies, and pricing 

responses. 

273. These landlords understand this 

effect, and it is a reason why they sign 

up for and use AIRM or YieldStar and 

discuss their usage with one another in 

user group meetings and other settings. 

274. RealPage engages in a variety of 

conduct to increase compliance with the 

output of its products and the objectives 

it touts. 

275. RealPage’s user group meetings 

and its revenue management 

certification program facilitate 

landlords’ agreements with RealPage to 

align pricing. 

276. Taken together, the agreements 

between each AIRM or YieldStar 

landlord and RealPage to use AIRM or 

YieldStar, respectively, harm or are 

likely to harm the competitive process 

and renters. 

277. The agreement by a landlord to 

use AIRM or YieldStar is an agreement 

to align users’ pricing processes, 

strategies, and pricing responses. 

Collectively, these agreements between 

landlords using AIRM or YieldStar and 

RealPage are harmful to the competitive 

process and to renters. 

278. In each relevant submarket and 

CBSA, RealPage and participating AIRM 

or YieldStar landlords collectively have 

sufficient market power, including 

market and data penetration, to harm 

the competitive process and renters. 

279. AIRM and YieldStar do not 

benefit the competitive process or 

renters. Any theoretical benefits are 

outweighed by harm to the competitive 

process and to renters, and less 

restrictive alternatives are available to 

RealPage and these landlords. 

Third Claim for Relief: Violation of 

Section 2 of the Sherman Act Through 

Monopolization of the Commercial 

Revenue Management Software Market 

(By All Plaintiffs Against RealPage) 

280. Plaintiffs incorporate the 

allegations of paragraphs 1 through 279 

above. 

281. Commercial revenue 

management software for conventional 

multifamily housing rentals in the 

United States is a relevant antitrust 

market, and RealPage has monopoly 

power in that market. 

282. RealPage has unlawfully 

monopolized the commercial revenue 

management market through unlawful 

exclusionary conduct. RealPage has 

amassed a massive reservoir of 

competitively sensitive data from 

competing landlords and used that data 

to sell AIRM and YieldStar. RealPage 

has ensured that rivals cannot compete 

on the merits unless they enter into 

similar agreements with landlords, offer 

to share competitively sensitive 

information among rival landlords, and 

engage in actions to increase 

compliance. As a result of its 

exclusionary conduct, RealPage has 

been able to obstruct rival software 

providers from competing via revenue 

management products that do not harm 

the competitive process in addition to 

cementing its massive data and scale 

advantage that keeps increasing due to 

self-reinforcing feedback effects. 

283. RealPage’s anticompetitive acts 

have harmed the competitive process 

and reduced feasible and less restrictive 

alternatives for landlords, which 

alternatives thereby pose less risk of 

competitive harm to renters. 

284. RealPage’s exclusionary conduct 

lacks a procompetitive justification that 

offsets the harm caused by RealPage’s 

anticompetitive and unlawful conduct. 

Fourth Claim for Relief, in the 

Alternative: Violation of Section 2 of the 

Sherman Act Through Attempted 

Monopolization of the Commercial 

Revenue Management Software Market 

(By All Plaintiffs Against RealPage) 

285. Plaintiffs incorporate the 

allegations of paragraphs 1 through 284 

above. 

286. Commercial revenue 

management software for conventional 

multifamily housing rentals in the 

United States is a relevant antitrust 

market. 

287. RealPage has attempted to 

monopolize that market through 

unlawful exclusionary conduct 

enhanced by its self-reinforcing data 

and scale advantages. By amassing its 

massive reservoir of competitively 

sensitive data from competing landlords 

and the follow-on benefits that scale and 

its feedback effects provide in terms of 

blunting competition among landlords, 

RealPage’s conduct excludes 

commercial revenue management rivals 

from competing on the merits in a 

lawful manner. As such, it has 

increased, maintained, or protected 

RealPage’s power. 

288. RealPage’s anticompetitive acts 

have harmed the competitive process 

and reduced feasible and less restrictive 

alternatives for landlords, which 

alternatives thereby pose less risk of 

competitive harm to renters. 

289. As inferred from the 

anticompetitive conduct described in 

Sections IV and V, supra, RealPage has 

acted with a specific intent to 

monopolize, and to eliminate effective 

competition in, the commercial revenue 

management software market in the 

United States. There is a dangerous 

probability that, unless restrained, 

RealPage will succeed in monopolizing 

the commercial revenue management 

software market in violation of Section 

2 of the Sherman Act. 

Fifth Claim for Relief: Violation of North 

Carolina Law 

290. Plaintiff State of North Carolina 

incorporates the allegations of 

Paragraphs 1 through 289 above. 

291. Defendants engaged in the 

conduct alleged above while operating 

their businesses in North Carolina 

markets, including, but not limited to, 

the markets alleged in paragraphs 214, 

216, 256, and Appendices A and B. 

Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct 

has affected commerce in North 

Carolina to a substantial degree by 

harming the competitive process and 

renters across the State including, but 

not limited to, in the North Carolina 

markets identified in paragraphs 214, 

216, 256, and Appendices A and B. 

292. Defendants’ acts as alleged in the 

First and Second claims for reliefs 

stated in paragraphs 259–279 above, 

violate the North Carolina Unfair or 

Deceptive Trade Practices Act in that 

they constitute contracts in restraint of 

trade or commerce in North Carolina, 

and/or acts and contracts in restraint of 

trade or commerce which violate the 

principles of the common law. N.C.G.S. 

§§ 75–1, 75–2. 

293. Defendant Real Page’s acts as 

alleged in the Third and Fourth claims 

for relief stated in paragraphs 280–289, 

above, violate the North Carolina Unfair 

or Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 

N.C.G.S. § 75–1 et seq., in that they 

constitute unlawful monopolization of a 

part of trade or commerce in North 

Carolina. N.C.G.S. § 75–2.1. 

294. Plaintiff State of North Carolina 

seeks the following remedies available 

for claims under federal law and claims 

under N.C.G.S. §§ 75–1, 75–2, and 75– 

2.1, without limitation: 

a. Injunctive and other equitable relief 

pursuant to Section 16 of the Clayton 

Act, 15 U.S.C. 26, N.C.G.S. § 75–14, and 

the common law of North Carolina; 

b. Civil penalties pursuant to N.C.G.S. 

§ 75–15.2, which provides a penalty of 

up to $5,000 per violation; 

c. Costs of suit, including expert 

witness fees, costs of investigation, and 

attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 16 of 


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the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 26 and 

N.C.G.S. § 75–16.1; and 

d. Other remedies as the court may 

deem appropriate under the facts and 

circumstances of the case. 

Sixth Claim for Relief: Violation of 

California Law 

295. The State of California 

incorporates the allegations of 

Paragraphs 1 through 289 above. 

296. Defendants’ practices, as alleged 

above, violate the Sherman Act sections 

1 and 2 and therefore constitute 

unlawful business practices under 

California’s Unfair Competition Law 

(‘‘UCL’’), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, 

et seq. 

297. Plaintiff State of California seeks 

the following: 

a. injunctive relief and penalties 

pursuant to sections 17203 and 17206 of 

the UCL, 

b. costs of suit, including expert 

witness fees, costs of investigation, and 

attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 16 of 

the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 26, and 

c. other remedies as the court may 

deem appropriate under the facts and 

circumstances of the case. 

Seventh Claim for Relief: Violation of 

Colorado Law 

298. Plaintiff State of Colorado repeats 

and re-alleges and incorporates by 

reference Paragraphs 1 through 289 in 

this Complaint as if fully set forth 

herein. 

299. The acts alleged in the Complaint 

violate the Colorado Antitrust Act, § 6– 

4–101 et. seq., including C.R.S. § 6–4– 

104 and C.R.S. § 6–4–105. These 

violations substantially affect the people 

of Colorado and have impacts within 

the State of Colorado. 

300. Each of the unlawful agreements, 

arrangements, or acts alleged herein 

constitute at least one distinct violation 

of the Colorado Antitrust Act within the 

meaning of C.R.S. § 6–4–113. 

301. Defendants’ acts alleged herein 

constitute a continuous pattern and 

practice of behavior within the meaning 

of C.R.S. § 6–4–113(2)(c). 

302. Defendants’ acts alleged herein 

were willful within the meaning of 

C.R.S. § 6–4–113(2)(d). 

303. The State of Colorado seeks the 

following remedies under federal law 

and the Colorado Antitrust Act, 

including, without limitation: 

a. Injunctive and other equitable relief 

pursuant to Section 16 of the Clayton 

Act, 15 U.S.C. 26 and C.R.S. § 6–4–112; 

b. Civil penalties pursuant to C.R.S. 

§ 6–4–113 for each violation of the 

Colorado Antitrust Act; 

c. Costs and attorneys’ fees, pursuant 

to Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 

U.S.C. 26, and C.R.S. § 6–4–112(5); and 

d. Other remedies as the Court may 

deem appropriate based on the facts 

properly alleged and proven. 

Eighth Claim for Relief: Violation of 

Connecticut Law 

304. Plaintiff State of Connecticut, 

acting by and through its Attorney 

General pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 

§ 35–44a, incorporates the allegations of 

paragraphs 1 through 289 above. The 

State of Connecticut brings its state and 

federal law claims for relief against all 

Defendants except Cortland. 

305. The acts alleged in the Complaint 

also constitute violations of the 

Connecticut Antitrust Act, Conn. Gen. 

Stat. § 35–24 et seq. These violations 

had impacts within the State of 

Connecticut and substantially affected 

the citizens of Connecticut. 

306. Plaintiff State of Connecticut 

seeks all remedies available under 

federal law and the Connecticut 

Antitrust Act, including, without 

limitation, the following: 

a. Civil penalties pursuant to Conn. 

Gen. Stat. § 35–38, which provides that 

in any action instituted by the Attorney 

General, any person who has been held 

to have violated any of the provisions of 

the Connecticut Antitrust Act shall 

forfeit and pay to the state a civil 

penalty of not more than one million 

dollars for each violation; 

b. Injunctive and other equitable relief 

pursuant to Section 16 of the Clayton 

Act, 15 U.S.C. 26, Conn. Gen. Stat. 

§§ 35–34, 35–44a; 

c. Costs and fees including, without 

limitation, costs of investigation, 

litigation, expert witness fees, and 

attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 16 of 

the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 26, Conn. 

Gen. Stat. §§ 35–34, 35–44a; and 

d. Other remedies as the Court may 

deem appropriate under the facts and 

circumstances of the case. 

Ninth Claim for Relief: Violation of 

Illinois Law 

307. Plaintiff State of Illinois, acting 

by and through its Attorney General, 

incorporates the allegations of 

paragraphs 1 through 289 above. The 

State of Illinois brings its state and 

federal law claims for relief against all 

Defendants except Cortland. 

308. The acts alleged in the Complaint 

violate the Illinois Antitrust Act, 740 

ILCS 10/1 et seq., including 740 ILCS 

10/3(1), 740 ILCS 10/3(2), and 740 ILCS 

10/3(3). These violations substantially 

affect the people of Illinois and have 

impacts within the State of Illinois. 

309. The State of Illinois seeks all 

available remedies under federal law 

and the Illinois Antitrust Act, including, 

without limitation: 

a. Injunctive and other equitable relief 

pursuant to Section 16 of the Clayton 

Act, 15 U.S.C. 26; and 740 ILCS 10/7; 

b. Civil penalties pursuant to 740 

ILCS 10/7(4) for each violation of the 

Illinois Antitrust Act; 

c. Disgorgement, damages, and/or 

other equitable or monetary relief 

pursuant to federal law including 

Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 

4, Section 4c of the Clayton Act, 15 

U.S.C. 15c and state law including 740 

ILCS 10/7, and treble damages for 

injuries sustained, directly or indirectly, 

by individuals residing in Illinois to 

their property, pursuant to the State of 

Illinois’ parens patriae authority under 

740 ILCS 10/7(2); 

d. Costs and attorneys’ fees, pursuant 

to Section 4c of the Clayton Act, 15 

U.S.C. 15c, Section 16 of the Clayton 

Act, 15 U.S.C. 26, 740 ILCS 10/7(2); and 

e. Other remedies as the Court may 

deem appropriate on the basis of the 

facts properly alleged and proven. 

Tenth Claim for Relief: Violation of 

Massachusetts Law 

310. Plaintiff Commonwealth of 

Massachusetts repeats, realleges, and 

incorporates the allegations of 

paragraphs 1 through 289 above as if 

fully set forth herein. The 

Commonwealth of Massachusetts brings 

its state and federal law claims for relief 

against all Defendants except Cortland. 

311. The acts alleged in the 

aforementioned paragraphs of this 

Complaint, including but not limited to 

unlawful agreements in restraint of 

trade and unlawful monopolization, 

constitute unfair methods of 

competition and/or unfair or deceptive 

acts or practices in trade or commerce 

in violation of the Massachusetts 

Consumer Protection Act, M.G.L c. 93A 

§ 2 et seq. 

312. Defendants knew or should have 

known that their conduct violated the 

Massachusetts Consumer Protection 

Act, M.G.L c. 93A § 2 et seq. 

313. Plaintiff Commonwealth of 

Massachusetts is entitled to and seeks 

the following relief under M.G.L. c. 93A 

§ 4: 

a. Injunctive and other equitable relief 

pursuant to M.G.L. c. 93A § 4; 

b. Civil penalties of up to $5,000 per 

each violation committed by the 

Defendants pursuant to M.G.L. c. 93A 

§ 4; 

c. Costs and fees including, without 

limitation, costs of investigation, 

litigation, and attorneys’ fees pursuant 

to M.G.L. c. 93A § 4; and 

d. Other remedies as the court may 

deem appropriate under the facts and 

circumstances of the case. 


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314. The Commonwealth of 

Massachusetts notified the Defendants 

of this intended action at least five days 

prior to the commencement of this 

action and gave the Defendants an 

opportunity to confer in accordance 

with M.G. L. c. 93A § 4. 

Eleventh Claim for Relief: Violation of 

Oregon Law 

315. Plaintiff State of Oregon, acting 

by and through its Attorney General, 

incorporates the allegations of 

paragraphs 1 through 289 above. The 

State of Oregon brings its state and 

federal law claims for relief against all 

Defendants except Cortland. 

316. The acts alleged in the Complaint 

also constitute violations of the Oregon 

Antitrust Law, Oregon Revised Statutes 

(‘‘ORS’’) 646.705 to ORS 646.836. These 

violations had impacts within the State 

of Oregon and substantially affected the 

people of Oregon. 

317. The State of Oregon appears in 

its sovereign or quasi-sovereign 

capacities and under its statutory, 

common law, and equitable powers, and 

as parens patriae on behalf of natural 

persons residing in the State of Oregon 

pursuant to ORS 646.775(1). The State 

of Oregon seeks all remedies available 

under federal law and the Oregon 

Antitrust Law, including, without 

limitation, the following: 

a. Disgorgement and/or other 

equitable relief pursuant to federal law 

including Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 

15 U.S.C. 4, and state law pursuant to 

ORS 646.770, and ORS 646.775; 

b. Injunctive and other equitable relief 

pursuant to Section 16 of the Clayton 

Act, 15 U.S.C. 26, ORS 646.760, ORS 

646.770, and ORS 646.775; 

c. Civil penalties pursuant to ORS 

646.760(1) which provides that a court 

may assess for the benefit of the state a 

civil penalty of not more than 

$1,000,000 for each violation of the 

Oregon Antitrust Law, 

d. Costs of suit, including expert 

witness fees, costs of investigation, and 

attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 16 of 

the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 26, ORS 

646.760, ORS 646.770, ORS 646.775; 

and 

e. Other remedies as the court may 

deem appropriate under the facts and 

circumstances of the case. 

Twelfth Claim for Relief: Violation of 

Tennessee Law 

318. Plaintiff State of Tennessee 

incorporates the allegations of 

paragraphs 1 through 289 above. The 

State of Tennessee brings its state and 

federal law claims for relief against all 

Defendants except Cortland. 

319. Defendants engaged in the 

conduct described above, individually 

and collectively, to thwart competition 

for multifamily housing in Tennessee. 

This anticompetitive conduct in 

Tennessee harmed thousands of 

multifamily renters across the state. 

320. Defendants’ business practices 

have caused a reduction in competition 

in relevant Tennessee markets, 

including, but not limited to, in the 

markets identified in paragraphs 214 

and 216 and Appendices A and B, and, 

as a result, Tennesseans have suffered 

anticompetitive harms. 

321. Accordingly, Defendants’ actions 

violate the Tennessee Trade Practices 

Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 47–25–101, as 

amended. 

322. Defendant RealPage engaged in 

the conduct described above to maintain 

its monopoly and exclude competing 

commercial revenue management 

software competitors. 

323. Accordingly, Defendant 

RealPage’s actions violate the Tennessee 

Trade Practices Act, Tenn. Code Ann. 

§ 47–25–102, as amended. 

324. This conduct has affected 

Tennessee trade and commerce to a 

substantial degree. 

325. To remedy this anticompetitive 

conduct, the Tennessee Attorney 

General and Reporter seeks all remedies 

available to which it is entitled under 

federal law and claims under Tenn. 

Code Ann. §§ 47–25–101, 102, and 106, 

as amended, including, without 

limitation, the following: 

a. injunctive or other equitable relief; 

reasonable attorney fees, costs, and 

expenses, pursuant to Section 16 of the 

Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 26, Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 47–25–106(b), and the common 

law of Tennessee; 

b. civil penalties pursuant to Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 47–25–106(g); 

c. costs of suit, including expert 

witness fees, costs of investigation, and 

attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 16 of 

the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 26 and Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 47–25–106(b); and 

d. other legal and equitable remedies 

as the court may deem appropriate and 

the interest of justice may require under 

the facts and circumstances of the case. 

Thirteenth Claim for Relief: Violation of 

Washington Law 

326. The State of Washington 

incorporates the allegations in 

Paragraphs 1 through 289, except for the 

portions of paragraphs 95, 96, 97, 117, 

131, 171, and 228 that Washington was 

unable to review due to confidentiality 

redactions. Washington reserves the 

right to adopt the portions of those 

paragraphs which are later disclosed. 

327. Washington brings its federal and 

state law claims for relief against 

Defendants RealPage, Cushman & 

Wakefield, Pinnacle, Greystar, and 

LivCor (‘‘Washington Defendants’’). 

328. Washington Defendants engaged 

in the conduct alleged above while 

operating their businesses in 

Washington. This anticompetitive 

conduct in Washington harmed the 

competitive process and renters across 

the State including in, but not limited 

to, the markets identified in Appendices 

A and B. 

329. The acts alleged in the 

paragraphs incorporated by the State of 

Washington also constitute antitrust 

violations of the Washington Consumer 

Protection Act under Wash. Rev. Code 

§ 19.86.030, which declares unlawful 

every contract, combination, or 

conspiracy in restraint of trade or 

commerce. 

330. The acts alleged in the 

paragraphs incorporated by the State of 

Washington also constitute antitrust 

violations of the Washington Consumer 

Protection Act under Wash. Rev. Code 

§ 19.86.040, which declares 

monopolization or attempts to 

monopolize unlawful. 

331. Washington seeks the following 

remedies available under the 

Washington Consumer Protection Act 

and federal law including, without 

limitation, the following: 

a. That the Court adjudge and decree 

that conduct alleged in the complaint to 

be unlawful and in violation of the 

Washington Consumer Protection Act, 

Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.030 and 

§ 19.86.040; 

b. Injunctive and other equitable relief 

pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code 

§ 19.86.080; 

c. Damages including treble damages; 

disgorgement; and/or restitution and 

any appropriate interest pursuant to 

federal law including Sherman Act, 15 

U.S.C. 4, 15c and pursuant to state law 

including Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.080; 

d. Civil penalties pursuant to Wash. 

Rev. Code § 19.86.140; 

e. Costs and attorney’s fees and any 

appropriate interest on those fees and 

costs pursuant to Sherman Act, 15 

U.S.C. 15c and/or pursuant to Wash. 

Rev. Code § 19.86.080; and 

f. Other remedies, including prejudgement interest, as the court may 

deem appropriate under the facts and 

circumstances of the case. 

IX. Request for Relief 

332. To remedy these illegal acts, 

Plaintiffs request that the Court: 

a. Adjudge and decree that 

Defendants have acted unlawfully to 

restrain trade in conventional 


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multifamily rental housing markets 

across the United States in violation of 

Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 

1; 

b. Adjust and decree that RealPage 

has acted unlawfully to monopolize, or 

attempt to monopolize, the commercial 

revenue management software market in 

the United States in violation of Section 

2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 2; 

c. Enjoin Defendants from continuing 

to engage in the anticompetitive 

practices described herein and from 

engaging in any other practices with the 

same purpose and effect as the 

challenged practices; 

d. Enter any other preliminary or 

permanent relief necessary and 

appropriate to restore competitive 

conditions in the markets affected by 

Defendants’ unlawful conduct; 

e. Enter any additional relief the Court 

finds just and proper; and 

f. Award Plaintiffs an amount equal to 

their costs, including reasonable 

attorneys’ fees, incurred in bringing this 

action. 

X. Demand for a Jury Trial 

333. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 38(b), Plaintiffs demand a 

trial by jury of all issues properly triable 

to a jury in this case. 

Dated this 7th day of January, 2025. 

Respectfully submitted, 

For Plaintiff United States of America: 

Doha Mekki, 

Acting Assistant Attorney General. 

Ryan Danks, 

Director of Civil Enforcement. 

Catherine K. Dick, 

Acting Director of Litigation. 

George C. Nierlich, 

Deputy Director of Civil Enforcement. 

Aaron Hoag, 

Chief, Technology & Digital Platforms 

Section. 

Danielle Hauck, 

Assistant Chief, Technology & Digital 

Platforms Section. 

Adam Severt, 

Assistant Chief, Technology & Digital 

Platforms Section. 

lllllllllllllllllllll

Henry C. Su, 

Senior Litigation Counsel. 

lllllllllllllllllllll

David A. Geiger, Sarah M. Bartels, Markus A. 

Brazill, Jessica Butler-Arkow, Grant M. 

Fergusson, Ian Hoffman, John J. Hogan, Claire 

M. Maddox, Arshia Najafi, Kris Anthony 

Pe ́rez Hicks, Jariel A. Rendell, Christine 

Sommer, Andrew Tisinger, 

Attorneys, United States Department of 

Justice, Antitrust Division, 450 Fifth Street 

NW, Suite 7100, Washington, DC 20530, 

Telephone: (202) 307–6200, Email: henry.su@

usdoj.gov. 

* Lead Attorney To Be Noticed. 

For Plaintiff State of North Carolina: 

Jeff Jackson, 

Attorney General of North Carolina. 

Daniel P. Mosteller, 

Associate Deputy Attorney General. 

lllllllllllllllllllll

Kunal J. Choksi, 

Special Deputy Attorney General, N.C. Bar. 

No. 55666. 

Jessica V. Sutton, 

Special Deputy Attorney General, N.C. Bar 

No. 41652, North Carolina Department of 

Justice, 114 W Edenton Street, Raleigh, NC 

27603, Telephone: 919–716–6032, Email: 

kchoksi@ncdoj.gov. 

Attorneys for Plaintiff State of North 

Carolina. 

For Plaintiff State of California: 

Rob Bonta, 

Attorney General of California. 

Paula Blizzard, 

Senior Assistant Attorney General. 

Natalie Manzo, 

Supervising Deputy Attorney General. 

lllllllllllllllllllll

Doan-Phuong (Pamela) Pham, Quyen Toland, 

Deputy Attorneys General, Office of the 

Attorney General, California Department of 

Justice, 300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702, 

Los Angeles, CA 90013, Tel: (213) 269–6000, 

Email: Pamela.Pham@doj.ca.gov. 

Attorneys for Plaintiff State of California. 

For Plaintiff State of Colorado: 

Philip J. Weiser, 

Attorney General. 

lllllllllllllllllllll

Elizabeth W. Hereford, 

Assistant Attorney General. 

Bryn Williams, 

First Assistant Attorney General, Colorado 

Department of Law, Office of the Attorney 

General, Ralph L. Carr Judicial Center, 1300 

Broadway, 7th Floor, Denver, CO 80203, 

Telephone: (720) 508–6000, Email: 

Bryn.williams@coag.gov. 

Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Colorado. 

For Plaintiff State of Connecticut: 

William Tong, 

Attorney General of Connecticut. 

Jeremy Pearlman, 

Associate Attorney General. 

Nicole Demers, 

Deputy Associate Attorney General. 

lllllllllllllllllllll

Julia ́n A. Quin ̃ ones Reyes, 

Assistant Attorney General, Office of the 

Connecticut Attorney General, 165 Capitol 

Avenue, Hartford, CT 06106, Telephone: 

(860) 808–5030, Email: Julian.Quinones@

ct.gov. 

Attorney for Plaintiff State of Connecticut. 

For Plaintiff State of Illinois: 

Kwame Raoul, 

Attorney General of Illinois. 

lllllllllllllllllllll

Daniel Betancourt, 

Assistant Attorney General. 

Jennifer M. Coronel, 

Assistant Attorney General. 

Paul J. Harper, 

Assistant Attorney General. 

Office of the Illinois Attorney General, 115 S 

LaSalle St., Floor 23, Chicago, IL 60603, Tel: 

(773) 758–4634, Email: jennifer.coronel@

ilag.gov. 

Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Illinois, 

Notices of Special Appearance forthcoming. 

For Plaintiff Commonwealth of 

Massachusetts: 

Andrea Joy Campbell, 

Attorney General. 

lllllllllllllllllllll

Katherine W. Krems, 

Assistant Attorney General. 

Jennifer E. Greaney, 

Assistant Attorney General, Deputy Chief. 

Antitrust Division, Office of the 

Massachusetts Attorney General, One 

Ashburton Place, 18th Floor, Boston, 

Massachusetts 02108, (617) 963–2189, 

Katherine.Krems@mass.gov. 

Jennifer.Greaney@mass.gov. 

Attorneys for Plaintiff Commonwealth of 

Massachusetts Notices of Special 

Appearance forthcoming. 

For Plaintiff State of Minnesota: 

Keith Ellison, 

Attorney General of Minnesota. 

lllllllllllllllllllll

Katherine A. Moerke, Elizabeth Odette, Sarah 

Doktori, 

Assistant Attorneys General, Office of the 

Minnesota Attorney General, 445 Minnesota 

Street, Suite 600, St. Paul, MN 55101–2130, 

katherine.moerke@ag.state.mn.us, 

Telephone: (651) 757–1288, 

elizabeth.odette@ag.state.mn.us, Telephone: 

(651) 728–7208, sarah.doktori@

ag.state.mn.us, Telephone: (651) 583–6694. 

Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Minnesota. 

For Plaintiff State of Oregon: 

Dan Rayfield, 

Attorney General of Oregon. 

lllllllllllllllllllll

Timothy D. Smith, 

Attorney-in-Charge, Antitrust, False Claims, 

& Privacy Section, Oregon Department of 

Justice, 100 SW Market St. Portland OR 

97201, 503.798.3297 |tim.smith@

doj.oregon.gov. 

Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Oregon. 

For Plaintiff State of Tennessee: 

Jonathan Skrmetti, 

Attorney General of Tennessee. 

lllllllllllllllllllll

S. Ethan Bowers, 

Senior Assistant Attorney General. 

Daniel Lynch, 

Assistant Attorney General. 

Office of the Tennessee Attorney General, 

P.O. Box 20207, Nashville, Tennessee 37202, 

6.15.837.5582 | Ethan.Bowers@ag.tn.gov. 

Attorneys for State of Tennessee. 

For Plaintiff State of Washington: 

Robert W. Ferguson, 

Attorney General. 

lllllllllllllllllllll

Brian H. Rowe, Rachel A. Lumen, Sarah 

Smith-Levy, Kendall Scott Cowles, 


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Assistant Attorneys General, 800 Fifth 

Avenue, Suite 2000, Seattle, WA 98104–3188, 

(206) 464–7744, brian.rowe@atg.wa.gov, 

rachel.lumen@atg.wa.gov, sarah.e.smithlevy@atg.wa.gov, kendall.scottcowles@

atg.wa.gov. 

Attorney for Plaintiff State of Washington. 

XI. Appendix A: Submarkets 

Area Submarket YS/AIRM 

30% or more 

YS/AIRM/OneSite 

30% or more 

Anaheim-Santa Ana-Irvine, CA ................................ South Orange County .............................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ........................ Alpharetta/Cumming ................................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ........................ Briarcliff .................................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ........................ Buckhead ................................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ........................ Chamblee/Brookhaven ............................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ........................ Decatur .................................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ........................ Downtown Atlanta .................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ........................ Duluth ...................................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ........................ Dunwoody ................................................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ........................ Kennesaw/Acworth .................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ........................ Midtown Atlanta ....................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ........................ Norcross .................................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ........................ Northeast Atlanta ..................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ........................ Northeast Cobb/Woodstock ..................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ........................ Northeast Gwinnett County ..................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ........................ Roswell .................................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ........................ Sandy Springs ......................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ........................ Smyrna .................................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ........................ South Cobb County/Douglasville ............................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ........................ Southeast Gwinnett County ..................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ........................ Southeast Marietta .................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ........................ Southwest Atlanta .................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ........................ Vinings ..................................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ........................ West Atlanta ............................................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ........................................... Arboretum ................................................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ........................................... Cedar Park .............................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ........................................... Downtown/University ............................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ........................................... East Austin .............................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ........................................... Far South Austin ...................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ........................................... Far West Austin ....................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ........................................... Near North Austin .................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ........................................... North Central Austin ................................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ........................................... Northwest Austin ..................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ........................................... Pflugerville/Wells Branch ......................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ........................................... Round Rock/Georgetown ........................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ........................................... South Austin ............................................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ........................................... Southwest Austin ..................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD ............................ Columbia/North Laurel ............................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Birmingham-Hoover, AL ........................................... Southeast Birmingham ............................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH ........................ Chelsea/Revere/Charlestown .................................. ........................... Yes. 

Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH ........................ East Middlesex County ............................................ ........................... Yes. 

Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH ........................ Quincy ...................................................................... ........................... Yes. 

Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH ........................ West Norfolk County ............................................... ........................... Yes. 

Charleston-North Charleston, SC ............................ Downtown/Mount Pleasant/Islands ......................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Charleston-North Charleston, SC ............................ West Ashley ............................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ....................... Ballantyne ................................................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ....................... Huntersville/Cornelius .............................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ....................... Matthews/Southeast Charlotte ................................ ........................... Yes. 

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ....................... Myers Park .............................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ....................... North Charlotte ........................................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ....................... South Charlotte ........................................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ....................... Southwest Charlotte ................................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ....................... UNC Charlotte ......................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ....................... Uptown/South End ................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI .......................... The Loop ................................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Colorado Springs, CO .............................................. North Colorado Springs ........................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ............................................ Addison/Bent Tree ................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ............................................ Allen/McKinney ........................................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ............................................ Carrollton/Farmers Branch ...................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ............................................ Central/East Plano ................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ............................................ East Dallas .............................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ............................................ Frisco ....................................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ............................................ Grand Prairie ........................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ............................................ Intown Dallas ........................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ............................................ Las Colinas/Coppell ................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ............................................ Lewisville/Flower Mound ......................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ............................................ North Irving .............................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ............................................ North Oak Cliff/West Dallas .................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ............................................ Oak Lawn/Park Cities .............................................. Yes ................... Yes. 


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Area Submarket YS/AIRM 

30% or more 

YS/AIRM/OneSite 

30% or more 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ............................................ Richardson ............................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ............................................ Rockwall/Rowlett/Wylie ............................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ............................................ The Colony/Far North Carrollton ............................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ............................................ West Plano .............................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ................................ Broomfield ................................................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ................................ Downtown/Highlands/Lincoln Park .......................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ................................ Highlands Ranch ..................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ................................ Littleton .................................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ................................ Northeast Denver .................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ................................ Parker/Castle Rock .................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ................................ South Lakewood ...................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ................................ Southeast Aurora/East Arapahoe County ............... Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ................................ Southeast Denver .................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ................................ Tech Center ............................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ................................ Thornton/Northglenn ................................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ................................ Westminster ............................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach-Deerfield Beach, 

FL.

Plantation/Davie/Weston ......................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Fort Worth-Arlington, TX .......................................... Grapevine/Southlake ............................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Fort Worth-Arlington, TX .......................................... Northeast Fort Worth/North Richland Hills .............. ........................... Yes. 

Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT ............... Southeast Hartford/Middlesex County ..................... ........................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX .............. Bear Creek .............................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX .............. Downtown/Montrose/River Oaks ............................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX .............. Far West Houston ................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX .............. Friendswood/Pearland ............................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX .............. Galleria/Uptown ....................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX .............. Greater Heights/Washington Avenue ...................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX .............. Greenway/Upper Kirby ............................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX .............. Katy .......................................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX .............. Memorial .................................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX .............. Sugar Land/Stafford ................................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX .............. The Woodlands ....................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX .............. West University/Medical Center/Third Ward ........... Yes ................... Yes. 

Jacksonville, FL ....................................................... Baymeadows ........................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Jacksonville, FL ....................................................... Upper Southside ...................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Kansas City, MO-KS ................................................ Lee’s Summit/Blue Springs/Raytown ...................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV ....................... Henderson ............................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV ....................... Northwest Las Vegas .............................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV ....................... Summerlin/The Lakes .............................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA .................. Downtown Los Angeles ........................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Memphis, TN-MS-AR ............................................... Cordova/Bartlett ....................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Memphis, TN-MS-AR ............................................... Germantown/Collierville ........................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Mobile/Daphne, AL .................................................. North Mobile ............................................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Nashville-Davidson-Murfreesboro-Franklin, TN ....... Central Nashville ..................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Nashville-Davidson-Murfreesboro-Franklin, TN ....... East Nashville .......................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Nashville-Davidson-Murfreesboro-Franklin, TN ....... Franklin/Brentwood .................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Nashville-Davidson-Murfreesboro-Franklin, TN ....... South Nashville ........................................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Nashville-Davidson-Murfreesboro-Franklin, TN ....... Southeast Nashville ................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Nashville-Davidson-Murfreesboro-Franklin, TN ....... West Nashville ......................................................... ........................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL ............................. Altamonte Springs/Apopka ...................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL ............................. Casselberry/Winter Springs/Oviedo ........................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL ............................. Central Orlando ....................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL ............................. East Orange County ................................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL ............................. East Orlando ............................................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL ............................. Kissimmee/Osceola County .................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL ............................. Sanford/Lake Mary .................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL ............................. South Orange County .............................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL ............................. Southwest Orlando .................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL ............................. Winter Park/Maitland ............................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ ................................. Chandler .................................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ ................................. Deer Valley .............................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ ................................. North Glendale ........................................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ ................................. South Phoenix ......................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA .................... Aloha/West Beaverton ............................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA .................... Central Portland ....................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA .................... Hillsboro ................................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA .................... Lake Oswego/Tualatin/Wilsonville ........................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC ................................................ Central Raleigh ........................................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC ................................................ Chapel Hill/Carrboro ................................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC ................................................ East Durham ............................................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC ................................................ Far North Raleigh .................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC ................................................ Near North Raleigh .................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC ................................................ North Cary/Morrisville .............................................. Yes ................... Yes. 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES2
Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 19 / Thursday, January 30, 2025 / Notices 8591 

Area Submarket YS/AIRM 

30% or more 

YS/AIRM/OneSite 

30% or more 

Raleigh/Durham, NC ................................................ Northeast Raleigh .................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC ................................................ Northwest Durham/Downtown ................................. ........................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC ................................................ Northwest Raleigh ................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC ................................................ South Cary/Apex ..................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC ................................................ Southwest Durham .................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Reno, NV ................................................................. South Reno .............................................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Richmond, VA .......................................................... Northwest Richmond ............................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Richmond, VA .......................................................... Tuckahoe/Westhampton .......................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA .................... Corona ..................................................................... ........................... Yes. 

Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA .................... Rancho Cucamonga/Upland ................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA .................... Temecula/Murrieta ................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Salt Lake City/Ogden/Clearfield, UT ........................ Midvale/Sandy/Draper ............................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

Salt Lake City/Ogden/Clearfield, UT ........................ Southwest Salt Lake City ........................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX .............................. Far North Central San Antonio ................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX .............................. Far Northwest San Antonio ..................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX .............................. North Central San Antonio ...................................... ........................... Yes. 

San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX .............................. Northwest San Antonio ............................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

San Diego-Carlsbad, CA ......................................... Downtown San Diego/Coronado ............................. ........................... Yes. 

San Diego-Carlsbad, CA ......................................... Northeast San Diego ............................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA .................................. Downtown Seattle .................................................... ........................... Yes. 

Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA .................................. Federal Way/Des Moines ........................................ ........................... Yes. 

Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA .................................. Redmond ................................................................. ........................... Yes. 

Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA .................................. Renton ..................................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL ..................... Carrollwood/Citrus Park ........................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL ..................... Central Tampa ......................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL ..................... Town and Country/Westchase ................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Tucson, AZ ............................................................... Casas Adobes/Oro Valley ....................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Tucson, AZ ............................................................... Catalina Foothills ..................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Germantown ............................................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Loudoun County ...................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Manassas/Far Southwest Suburbs ......................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Navy Yard/Capitol South ......................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Northeast DC ........................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Reston/Herndon ....................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Tysons Corner/Falls Church/Merrifield .................... Yes ................... Yes.

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV West Alexandria ...................................................... Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV West Fairfax County ................................................ Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Woodbridge/Dale City .............................................. Yes ................... Yes. 

XII. Appendix B: Submarkets by 

Bedroom Count 

Area Submarket Number of 

beds 

YS/AIRM 

30% or more 

YS/AIRM/OneSite 

30% or more 

Anaheim-Santa Ana-Irvine, CA .................... South Orange County ................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Alpharetta/Cumming .................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes.

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Briarcliff ........................................................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Buckhead ..................................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Chamblee/Brookhaven ................................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Decatur ........................................................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Downtown Atlanta ....................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Duluth .......................................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Dunwoody .................................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Kennesaw/Acworth ...................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes.

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Midtown Atlanta ........................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Norcross ...................................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Northeast Atlanta ......................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Northeast Cobb/Woodstock ........................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Northeast Gwinnett County ......................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Roswell ........................................................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Sandy Springs ............................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Smyrna ........................................................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ South Cobb County/Douglasville ................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Southeast Gwinnett County ........................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Southeast Marietta ...................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Southwest Atlanta ....................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Vinings ......................................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ West Atlanta ................................................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ............................... Arboretum .................................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ............................... Cedar Park .................................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES2
8592 Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 19 / Thursday, January 30, 2025 / Notices 

Area Submarket Number of 

beds 

YS/AIRM 

30% or more 

YS/AIRM/OneSite 

30% or more 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ............................... Downtown/University ................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ............................... East Austin .................................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ............................... Far South Austin ......................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ............................... Far West Austin ........................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ............................... Near North Austin ........................................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ............................... North Central Austin .................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ............................... Northwest Austin ......................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ............................... Pflugerville/Wells Branch ............................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ............................... Round Rock/Georgetown ............................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ............................... South Austin ................................................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ............................... Southwest Austin ......................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD ................ Columbia/North Laurel ................................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Birmingham-Hoover, AL ............................... Southeast Birmingham ................................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH ............ Chelsea/Revere/Charlestown ...................... 1 ........................... Yes. 

Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH ............ East Middlesex County ............................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH ............ Quincy ......................................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH ............ West Norfolk County ................................... 1 ........................... Yes. 

Charleston-North Charleston, SC ................ Downtown/Mount Pleasant/Islands ............. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Charleston-North Charleston, SC ................ West Ashley ................................................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ........... Ballantyne .................................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ........... Huntersville/Cornelius .................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ........... Matthews/Southeast Charlotte .................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ........... Myers Park .................................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ........... North Charlotte ............................................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ........... South Charlotte ........................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ........... Southwest Charlotte .................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes.

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ........... UNC Charlotte ............................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ........... Uptown/South End ...................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI .............. The Loop ..................................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Colorado Springs, CO .................................. North Colorado Springs ............................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ Addison/Bent Tree ....................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ Allen/McKinney ............................................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ Carrollton/Farmers Branch .......................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ Central/East Plano ...................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ East Dallas .................................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ Frisco ........................................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ Grand Prairie ............................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ Intown Dallas ............................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ Las Colinas/Coppell .................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ Lewisville/Flower Mound ............................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ North Irving .................................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ North Oak Cliff/West Dallas ........................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ Oak Lawn/Park Cities .................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ Richardson .................................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ Rockwall/Rowlett/Wylie ............................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ The Colony/Far North Carrollton ................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ West Plano .................................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ..................... Broomfield ................................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ..................... Downtown/Highlands/Lincoln Park .............. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ..................... Highlands Ranch ......................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ..................... Littleton ........................................................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ..................... Northeast Denver ........................................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ..................... Parker/Castle Rock ..................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ..................... South Lakewood .......................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ..................... Southeast Aurora/East Arapahoe County ... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ..................... Southeast Denver ........................................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ..................... Tech Center ................................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ..................... Thornton/Northglenn .................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ..................... Westminster ................................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach-Deerfield 

Beach, FL.

Plantation/Davie/Weston ............................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Fort Worth-Arlington, TX .............................. Grapevine/Southlake ................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Fort Worth-Arlington, TX .............................. Northeast Fort Worth/North Richland Hills .. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT ... Southeast Hartford/Middlesex County ........ 1 ........................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX ... Bear Creek .................................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes.

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX ... Downtown/Montrose/River Oaks ................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX ... Far West Houston ....................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX ... Friendswood/Pearland ................................. 1 ........................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX ... Galleria/Uptown ........................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX ... Greater Heights/Washington Avenue .......... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX ... Greenway/Upper Kirby ................................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX ... Katy ............................................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX ... Memorial ...................................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES2
Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 19 / Thursday, January 30, 2025 / Notices 8593 

Area Submarket Number of 

beds 

YS/AIRM 

30% or more 

YS/AIRM/OneSite 

30% or more 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX ... Sugar Land/Stafford .................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX ... The Woodlands ........................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX ... West University/Medical Center/Third Ward 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Jacksonville, FL ............................................ Baymeadows ............................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Jacksonville, FL ............................................ Upper Southside .......................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Kansas City, MO-KS .................................... Lee’s Summit/Blue Springs/Raytown .......... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV ........... Henderson ................................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV ........... Northwest Las Vegas .................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV ........... Summerlin/The Lakes ................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA ...... Downtown Los Angeles ............................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Memphis, TN-MS-AR ................................... Cordova/Bartlett ........................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Memphis, TN-MS-AR ................................... Germantown/Collierville ............................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Mobile/Daphne, AL ....................................... North Mobile ................................................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Nashville-Davidson—Murfreesboro—Franklin, TN.Central Nashville ......................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Nashville-Davidson—Murfreesboro—Franklin, TN.East Nashville .............................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Nashville-Davidson—Murfreesboro—Franklin, TN.Franklin/Brentwood ...................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Nashville-Davidson—Murfreesboro—Franklin, TN.South Nashville ........................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Nashville-Davidson—Murfreesboro—Franklin, TN.Southeast Nashville ..................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Nashville-Davidson—Murfreesboro—Franklin, TN.West Nashville ............................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL .................. Altamonte Springs/Apopka .......................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL .................. Casselberry/Winter Springs/Oviedo ............ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL .................. Central Orlando ........................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL .................. East Orange County .................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL .................. East Orlando ............................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL .................. Kissimmee/Osceola County ........................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL .................. Sanford/Lake Mary ...................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL .................. South Orange County ................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes.

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL .................. Southwest Orlando ...................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL .................. Winter Park/Maitland ................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ ...................... Chandler ...................................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ ...................... Deer Valley .................................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ ...................... North Glendale ............................................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ ...................... South Phoenix ............................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA ........ Aloha/West Beaverton ................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA ........ Central Portland .......................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA ........ Hillsboro ....................................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA ........ Lake Oswego/Tualatin/Wilsonville ............... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC .................................... Central Raleigh ............................................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC .................................... Chapel Hill/Carrboro .................................... 1 ........................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC .................................... East Durham ............................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC .................................... Far North Raleigh ........................................ 1 ........................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC .................................... Near North Raleigh ..................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC .................................... North Cary/Morrisville .................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC .................................... Northeast Raleigh ........................................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC .................................... Northwest Durham/Downtown ..................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC .................................... Northwest Raleigh ....................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC .................................... South Cary/Apex ......................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC .................................... Southwest Durham ...................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Reno, NV ...................................................... South Reno ................................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Richmond, VA .............................................. Northwest Richmond ................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Richmond, VA .............................................. Tuckahoe/Westhampton .............................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA ........ Corona ......................................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA ........ Rancho Cucamonga/Upland ....................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA ........ Temecula/Murrieta ....................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Salt Lake City/Ogden/Clearfield, UT ............ Midvale/Sandy/Draper ................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Salt Lake City/Ogden/Clearfield, UT ............ Southwest Salt Lake City ............................ 1 Yes ................... Yes.

San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX .................. Far North Central San Antonio ................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX .................. Far Northwest San Antonio ......................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX .................. North Central San Antonio .......................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX .................. Northwest San Antonio ............................... 1 Yes ................... Yes.

San Diego-Carlsbad, CA .............................. Downtown San Diego/Coronado ................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

San Diego-Carlsbad, CA .............................. Northeast San Diego ................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA ....................... Downtown Seattle ....................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA ....................... Federal Way/Des Moines ............................ 1 ........................... Yes. 

Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA ....................... Redmond ..................................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA ....................... Renton ......................................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL ......... Carrollwood/Citrus Park .............................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES2
8594 Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 19 / Thursday, January 30, 2025 / Notices 

Area Submarket Number of 

beds 

YS/AIRM 

30% or more 

YS/AIRM/OneSite 

30% or more 

Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL ......... Central Tampa ............................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL ......... Town and Country/Westchase .................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Tucson, AZ ................................................... Casas Adobes/Oro Valley ........................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Tucson, AZ ................................................... Catalina Foothills ......................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV.Germantown ................................................ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV.Loudoun County .......................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV.Manassas/Far Southwest Suburbs ............. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV.Navy Yard/Capitol South ............................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV.Northeast DC ............................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV.Reston/Herndon .......................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV.Tysons Corner/Falls Church/Merrifield ........ 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV.West Alexandria .......................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV.West Fairfax County .................................... 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV.Woodbridge/Dale City ................................. 1 Yes ................... Yes. 

Anaheim-Santa Ana-Irvine, CA .................... South Orange County ................................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Alpharetta/Cumming .................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes.

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Briarcliff ........................................................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Buckhead ..................................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Chamblee/Brookhaven ................................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Decatur ........................................................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Downtown Atlanta ....................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Duluth .......................................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Dunwoody .................................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Kennesaw/Acworth ...................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes.

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Midtown Atlanta ........................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Norcross ...................................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Northeast Atlanta ......................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Northeast Cobb/Woodstock ........................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Northeast Gwinnett County ......................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Roswell ........................................................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Sandy Springs ............................................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Smyrna ........................................................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ South Cobb County/Douglasville ................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Southeast Gwinnett County ........................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Southeast Marietta ...................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Southwest Atlanta ....................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ Vinings ......................................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ............ West Atlanta ................................................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ............................... Arboretum .................................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ............................... Cedar Park .................................................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ............................... Downtown/University ................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ............................... East Austin .................................................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ............................... Far South Austin ......................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ............................... Far West Austin ........................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ............................... Near North Austin ........................................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ............................... North Central Austin .................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ............................... Northwest Austin ......................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ............................... Pflugerville/Wells Branch ............................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ............................... Round Rock/Georgetown ............................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ............................... South Austin ................................................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Austin-Round Rock, TX ............................... Southwest Austin ......................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD ................ Columbia/North Laurel ................................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Birmingham-Hoover, AL ............................... Southeast Birmingham ................................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH ............ East Middlesex County ............................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Charleston-North Charleston, SC ................ Downtown/Mount Pleasant/Islands ............. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Charleston-North Charleston, SC ................ West Ashley ................................................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ........... Ballantyne .................................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ........... Huntersville/Cornelius .................................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ........... Myers Park .................................................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ........... North Charlotte ............................................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ........... South Charlotte ........................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ........... Southwest Charlotte .................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes.

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ........... UNC Charlotte ............................................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 19 / Thursday, January 30, 2025 / Notices 8595 

Area Submarket Number of 

beds 

YS/AIRM 

30% or more 

YS/AIRM/OneSite 

30% or more 

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC ........... Uptown/South End ...................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI .............. The Loop ..................................................... 2 ........................... Yes. 

Colorado Springs, CO .................................. North Colorado Springs ............................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ Addison/Bent Tree ....................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ Allen/McKinney ............................................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ Carrollton/Farmers Branch .......................... 2 ........................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ Central/East Plano ...................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ East Dallas .................................................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ Frisco ........................................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ Grand Prairie ............................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ Intown Dallas ............................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ Las Colinas/Coppell .................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ Lewisville/Flower Mound ............................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ North Irving .................................................. 2 ........................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ North Oak Cliff/West Dallas ........................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ Oak Lawn/Park Cities .................................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ Richardson .................................................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ Rockwall/Rowlett/Wylie ............................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ The Colony/Far North Carrollton ................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX ................................ West Plano .................................................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ..................... Broomfield ................................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ..................... Downtown/Highlands/Lincoln Park .............. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ..................... Highlands Ranch ......................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ..................... Littleton ........................................................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ..................... Northeast Denver ........................................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ..................... Parker/Castle Rock ..................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ..................... South Lakewood .......................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ..................... Southeast Aurora/East Arapahoe County ... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ..................... Southeast Denver ........................................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ..................... Tech Center ................................................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ..................... Thornton/Northglenn .................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO ..................... Westminster ................................................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach-Deerfield 

Beach, FL.

Plantation/Davie/Weston ............................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Fort Worth-Arlington, TX .............................. Grapevine/Southlake ................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Fort Worth-Arlington, TX .............................. Northeast Fort Worth/North Richland Hills .. 2 ........................... Yes. 

Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT ... Southeast Hartford/Middlesex County ........ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX ... Bear Creek .................................................. 2 ........................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX ... Downtown/Montrose/River Oaks ................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX ... Far West Houston ....................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX ... Friendswood/Pearland ................................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX ... Galleria/Uptown ........................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX ... Greater Heights/Washington Avenue .......... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX ... Greenway/Upper Kirby ................................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX ... Memorial ...................................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX ... Sugar Land/Stafford .................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX ... The Woodlands ........................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX ... West University/Medical Center/Third Ward 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Jacksonville, FL ............................................ Baymeadows ............................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Jacksonville, FL ............................................ Upper Southside .......................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Kansas City, MO-KS .................................... Lee’s Summit/Blue Springs/Raytown .......... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV ........... Henderson ................................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV ........... Northwest Las Vegas .................................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV ........... Summerlin/The Lakes ................................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA ...... Downtown Los Angeles ............................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Memphis, TN-MS-AR ................................... Cordova/Bartlett ........................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Memphis, TN-MS-AR ................................... Germantown/Collierville ............................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Mobile/Daphne, AL ....................................... North Mobile ................................................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Nashville-Davidson—Murfreesboro—Franklin, TN.Central Nashville ......................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Nashville-Davidson—Murfreesboro—Franklin, TN.East Nashville .............................................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Nashville-Davidson—Murfreesboro—Franklin, TN.Franklin/Brentwood ...................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Nashville-Davidson—Murfreesboro—Franklin, TN.South Nashville ........................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Nashville-Davidson—Murfreesboro—Franklin, TN.Southeast Nashville ..................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL .................. Altamonte Springs/Apopka .......................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL .................. Casselberry/Winter Springs/Oviedo ............ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL .................. Central Orlando ........................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL .................. East Orange County .................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL .................. East Orlando ............................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 


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8596 Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 19 / Thursday, January 30, 2025 / Notices 

Area Submarket Number of 

beds 

YS/AIRM 

30% or more 

YS/AIRM/OneSite 

30% or more 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL .................. Kissimmee/Osceola County ........................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL .................. Sanford/Lake Mary ...................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL .................. South Orange County ................................. 2 Yes ................... Yes.

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL .................. Southwest Orlando ...................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL .................. Winter Park/Maitland ................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ ...................... Chandler ...................................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ ...................... Deer Valley .................................................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ ...................... North Glendale ............................................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ ...................... South Phoenix ............................................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA ........ Aloha/West Beaverton ................................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA ........ Central Portland .......................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA ........ Hillsboro ....................................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA ........ Lake Oswego/Tualatin/Wilsonville ............... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC .................................... Central Raleigh ............................................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC .................................... Chapel Hill/Carrboro .................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC .................................... East Durham ............................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC .................................... Far North Raleigh ........................................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC .................................... Near North Raleigh ..................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC .................................... North Cary/Morrisville .................................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC .................................... Northeast Raleigh ........................................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC .................................... Northwest Raleigh ....................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC .................................... South Cary/Apex ......................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Raleigh/Durham, NC .................................... Southwest Durham ...................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Reno, NV ...................................................... South Reno ................................................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Richmond, VA .............................................. Northwest Richmond ................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Richmond, VA .............................................. Tuckahoe/Westhampton .............................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA ........ Corona ......................................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA ........ Rancho Cucamonga/Upland ....................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA ........ Temecula/Murrieta ....................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Salt Lake City/Ogden/Clearfield, UT ............ Midvale/Sandy/Draper ................................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Salt Lake City/Ogden/Clearfield, UT ............ Southwest Salt Lake City ............................ 2 Yes ................... Yes.

San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX .................. Far North Central San Antonio ................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX .................. Far Northwest San Antonio ......................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX .................. North Central San Antonio .......................... 2 ........................... Yes. 

San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX .................. Northwest San Antonio ............................... 2 ........................... Yes. 

San Diego-Carlsbad, CA .............................. Downtown San Diego/Coronado ................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

San Diego-Carlsbad, CA .............................. Northeast San Diego ................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA ....................... Downtown Seattle ....................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA ....................... Federal Way/Des Moines ............................ 2 ........................... Yes. 

Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA ....................... Renton ......................................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL ......... Carrollwood/Citrus Park .............................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL ......... Central Tampa ............................................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL ......... Town and Country/Westchase .................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Tucson, AZ ................................................... Casas Adobes/Oro Valley ........................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Tucson, AZ ................................................... Catalina Foothills ......................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV.Germantown ................................................ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV.Loudoun County .......................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV.Manassas/Far Southwest Suburbs ............. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV.Navy Yard/Capitol South ............................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV.Northeast DC ............................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV.Reston/Herndon .......................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV.Tysons Corner/Falls Church/Merrifield ........ 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV.West Alexandria .......................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV.West Fairfax County .................................... 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV.Woodbridge/Dale City ................................. 2 Yes ................... Yes. 

United States District Court for the 

Middle District of North Carolina 

United States of America, Plaintiff, v. 

Cortland Management, LLC, Defendant. 

Case No. 1:24–cv–00710–LCB–JLW Proposed Final Judgment 

Whereas, Plaintiff, United States of 

America, filed its Complaint on January 

7, 2025; 


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Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 19 / Thursday, January 30, 2025 / Notices 8597 

And whereas, the United States and 

Defendant, Cortland Management, LLC, 

have consented to entry of this Final 

Judgment without the taking of 

testimony, without trial or adjudication 

of any issue of fact or law, and without 

this Final Judgment constituting any 

evidence against or admission by any 

party relating to any issue of liability or 

any other issue of fact or law; 

And whereas, Defendant agrees to 

undertake certain actions and refrain 

from certain conduct to remedy the loss 

of competition alleged in the Complaint; 

And whereas, Defendant represents 

that the relief required by this Final 

Judgment can and will be made and that 

Defendant will not later raise a claim of 

hardship or difficulty as grounds for 

asking the Court to modify any 

provision of this Final Judgment; 

Now therefore, it is ordered, 

adjudged, and decreed: 

I. Jurisdiction 

The Court has jurisdiction over the 

subject matter of and each of the parties 

to this action. The Complaint states a 

claim upon which relief may be granted 

against Defendant under Section 1 of the 

Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. 

II. Definitions 

As used in this Final Judgment: 

A. ‘‘Cortland’’ or ‘‘Defendant’’ means 

Defendant Cortland Management, LLC, a 

Delaware corporation with its 

headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia, its 

successors and assigns, and all of its 

subsidiaries, divisions, groups, 

affiliates, parents, partnerships, and 

joint ventures, and their directors, 

officers, managers, agents, and 

employees. 

B. ‘‘Competitively Sensitive 

Information’’ means, in this Final 

Judgment, property-specific data or 

information (whether past, present, or 

prospective) which, individually or 

when aggregated with such data or 

information from other properties, (1) 

could be reasonably used to determine 

current or future rental supply, demand, 

or pricing at a property or of any 

property’s units, including but not 

limited to executed rents, rental price 

concessions or discounts, guest traffic, 

guest applications, occupancy or 

vacancy, lease terms or lease 

expirations; (2) relates to the Property 

Owner’s or Property Manager’s use of 

settings or user-specified parameters 

within Revenue Management Products 

with respect to such property or 

properties; or (3) relates to the Property 

Owner’s or Property Manager’s rental 

pricing amount, formula, or strategy, 

including rental price concessions or 

discounts, in each case, with respect to 

such property or properties. 

C. ‘‘Cooperation Subject Matter’’ 

means Cortland’s use of RealPage’s 

Revenue Management Products, the 

violations of only Section 2 of the 

Sherman Act alleged in United States et 

al. v. RealPage (currently docketed as 

No. 1:24–cv–00710 in the Middle 

District of North Carolina) and includes 

conduct as well as the effects of 

conduct. Cooperation Subject Matter 

expressly excludes the prohibited 

conduct described in Paragraph VI.A. 

and any violation of Section 1 of the 

Sherman Act or any similar state law. 

D. ‘‘External Nonpublic Data’’ means 

all Nonpublic Data from any Person 

other than Defendant. It does not 

include data for a Cortland Property. 

E. ‘‘Cortland Property’’ means a 

residential property, located within the 

United States and its territories, owned 

or managed by Defendant or its agents 

(collectively referred to as ‘‘Cortland 

Properties’’). 

F. ‘‘Cortland Revenue Management 

Product’’ means Cortland’s internal 

proprietary revenue management 

software product that was in place as of 

January 1, 2025, and that has been 

under development since 2020. 

G. ‘‘Nonpublic Data’’ means any 

Competitively Sensitive Information 

that is not Public Data. 

H. ‘‘Person’’ means any natural 

person, corporate entity, partnership, 

association, joint venture, limited 

liability company, fund, investment 

vehicle, or any other legal entity or 

trust. 

I. ‘‘Property Owner(s)’’ means any 

Person who owns a multifamily rental 

property or that Person’s agent. 

J. ‘‘Property Manager(s)’’ means any 

Person, or the Person’s agent, who 

manages a multifamily rental property. 

K. ‘‘Pseudocode’’ means any 

description of the steps in an algorithm 

or other software program in plain or 

natural language. 

L. ‘‘Public Data’’ means information 

on a rental unit’s asking price (including 

publicly offered rental price 

concessions) that is readily accessible to 

the general public on the property’s 

website, physical building, brochures, 

or on an internet listing service. Public 

Data includes information on a rental 

unit’s asking price, concessions, 

amenities, and availability provided by 

a Property Manager or a Property Owner 

to any natural person who reasonably 

presents himself as a prospective renter. 

Public Data does not include any 

Competitively Sensitive Information 

obtained through communications 

between competitors. 

M. ‘‘RealPage’’ means RealPage, Inc., 

a Delaware corporation with its 

headquarters in Richardson, Texas. 

N. ‘‘Revenue Management Product(s)’’ 

means any software or service, 

including software as a service, that sets 

rental prices or generates rental pricing 

recommendations. 

O. ‘‘Runtime Operation’’ means any 

action taken by a Revenue Management 

Product while it runs, including 

generating rental prices or pricing 

recommendations for any units or set of 

units at a property. Runtime Operation 

does not mean training the demand and 

supply models. 

P. ‘‘Settled Civil Claims’’ means any 

civil claim by the United States arising 

from Defendant’s conduct accruing 

before the filing of the complaint in this 

action relating to (1) Revenue 

Management Products, including 

RealPage revenue management products 

that use competitors’ Competitively 

Sensitive Information, as well as (2) 

communications described by Paragraph 

VI.A. 

Q. ‘‘Third-Party’’ means any Person 

other than Cortland (collectively 

referred to as ‘‘Third-Parties’’). 

III. Applicability 

This Final Judgment applies to 

Defendant, as defined above, and all 

other Persons in active concert or 

participation with Defendant who 

receive actual notice of this Final 

Judgment. 

IV. Use of Proprietary Revenue 

Management Product(s) 

A. The Cortland Revenue 

Management Product must not set rental 

prices or generate rental pricing 

recommendations for a Cortland 

Property during its Runtime Operation 

using (1) External Nonpublic Data in 

any way, or (2) Nonpublic Data from a 

Cortland Property for another Cortland 

Property with a different Property 

Owner by pooling or combining 

Nonpublic Data from Cortland 

Properties that have different Property 

Owners. 

B. Defendant must not train the 

Cortland Revenue Management 

Product’s model (1) using External 

Nonpublic Data in any way, or (2) by 

pooling or combining rental pricing, 

concessions, discounts, occupancy rates 

or capacity, or other rental pricing terms 

from Cortland Properties with different 

Property Owners. For the avoidance of 

doubt, Defendant is not prohibited from 

training its supply and demand models 

using pooled or combined Nonpublic 

Data from across all Cortland Properties 

that does not incorporate rental pricing, 

concessions, discounts, occupancy rates 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES2
8598 Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 19 / Thursday, January 30, 2025 / Notices 

or capacity, or other rental pricing 

terms. 

C. The Cortland Revenue Management 

Product must not disclose in any way 

Nonpublic Data from a Cortland 

Property to any other Property Manager 

or Property Owner (other than the 

Property Owner of the Cortland 

Property from which the data arises or 

relates). 

D. Within 30 calendar days after the 

Court’s entry of the Stipulation and 

Order in this matter, Defendant must 

cease all direct or indirect use of ThirdParty Revenue Management Products 

used as part of setting rental prices or 

generating rental pricing 

recommendations for any Cortland 

Property. 

E. If, during the term of this Final 

Judgment, management responsibilities 

or ownership of a property within the 

United States or its territories is 

transferred from another Property 

Manager or Property Owner to 

Defendant, Defendant will have 30 days 

from the date of transfer to discontinue 

use of any Third-Party Revenue 

Management Product for that property 

and transition the transferred property 

to the Cortland Revenue Management 

Product. 

V. Restrictions Concerning Use of 

Third-Party Revenue Management 

Product(s) 

A. Notwithstanding Paragraphs IV.D 

and IV.E, Defendant may license or use 

a Third-Party Revenue Management 

Product for a Cortland Property before 

the expiration of this Final Judgment as 

long as Defendant does not: 

1. license or use, for any Cortland 

Property, any Third-Party Revenue 

Management Product that: (1) uses 

External Nonpublic Data in any way to 

set rental prices or generate rental 

pricing recommendations for a Cortland 

Property; (2) uses Nonpublic Data from 

a Cortland Property in any way to set 

rental prices or generate rental pricing 

recommendations for any other Cortland 

Property with a different Property 

Owner or for a non-Cortland Property; 

(3) discloses in any way Nonpublic Data 

from a Cortland Property to any other 

Property Manager or Property Owner 

(other than the Property Owner of the 

Cortland property from which the data 

arises or relates); (4) pools or combines 

Nonpublic Data from Cortland 

Properties that have different owners; or 

(5) contains or uses a pricing algorithm 

that has been trained using External 

Nonpublic Data; or 

2. license or use any Third-Party 

Revenue Management Product that: (1) 

incorporates a rental price floor or a 

limit on rental price recommendation 

decreases (excluding a rental price floor, 

or limit on rental price decreases, that 

Defendant manually selects and is not 

based on competing properties’ rental 

prices); or (2) requires Defendant to 

accept, or provides financial rewards for 

Defendant to accept, any recommended 

rental prices. 

B. Defendant may not agree, either 

expressly or implicitly, with any 

Property Owner of a Non-Cortland 

Property or another Property Manager to 

license or use a particular Revenue 

Management Product (or the utilities or 

functionalities thereof) or require any 

other Person to license or use a 

particular Revenue Management 

Product (or the utilities or 

functionalities thereof), except that 

Defendant is not prohibited from 

licensing or using a particular Revenue 

Management Product at a particular 

Cortland Property pursuant to an 

agreement with another Property 

Manager who, along with Defendant, is 

also managing that particular property 

on behalf of a Property Owner. 

C. Before licensing or using a ThirdParty Revenue Management Product, 

Defendant must first notify the United 

States, in writing, of its intention to 

license or use a Third-Party Revenue 

Management Product 30 calendar days 

prior to using a Third-Party Revenue 

Management Product and must secure 

and submit to the United States a 

certification from the proposed vendor 

of the Third-Party Revenue Management 

Product that the vendor’s product is in 

compliance with Paragraph V.A of this 

Final Judgment. 

D. If Cortland elects to license or use 

a Third-Party Revenue Management 

Product, Cortland must secure and 

submit to the United States, on an 

annual basis, a certification from any 

vendor of a Third-Party Revenue 

Management Product contracted by 

Cortland certifying each vendor’s 

compliance with Paragraph V.A. 

E. Defendant must not license or use 

a Third-Party Revenue Management 

Product for any Cortland Property until 

a Compliance Monitor has been 

appointed by the Court in accordance 

with Section IX and the Compliance 

Monitor’s work plan has been approved 

by the United States. 

VI. Other Prohibited Conduct 

A. Defendant must not, directly or 

indirectly, as part of setting rental prices 

or generating rental pricing 

recommendations for any Cortland 

Property (1) disclose Nonpublic Data to 

any other Property Manager or Property 

Owner (except to the Property Owner of 

the particular Cortland Property); (2) 

solicit External Nonpublic Data from 

any other Property Manager or Property 

Owner (except from the Property Owner 

of the particular Cortland Property); or 

(3) use External Nonpublic Data 

obtained from another Property Manager 

or Property Owner (except from the 

Property Owner of the particular 

Cortland Property). For avoidance of 

doubt, the restrictions set forth in this 

Paragraph include Nonpublic Data 

obtained through any form of 

communication, whether directly or 

through an intermediary, including call 

arounds or market surveys, in-person 

meetings, calls, text messages, chat 

communications, emails, surveys, 

spreadsheets, shared documents (e.g., 

Google documents and SharePoint 

documents), industry meetings (e.g., 

user groups), online fora, private 

meetings, Revenue Management 

Product, or information-exchange 

service. 

B. Defendant must not use or access 

any External Nonpublic Data, or data 

derived from RealPage that used or 

relied on External Nonpublic Data, in 

Defendant’s possession, custody, or 

control as of the Court’s entry of the 

Stipulation and Order in this matter, 

acquired through any means. Within 30 

calendar days of the Court’s entry of the 

Stipulation and Order in this matter, 

Defendant must identify to the United 

States in writing the existence and 

location of any such data and/or 

datasets. For avoidance of doubt, the 

proscriptions in this Paragraph do not 

apply to data for Cortland Properties 

maintained in OneSite. 

VII. Antitrust Compliance 

A. Within 30 days of entry of the 

Stipulation and Order, Defendant must 

adopt a written antitrust compliance 

policy, to be approved by the United 

States in its sole discretion, that 

complies with the obligations set forth 

in this Final Judgment. Defendant must 

annually train all employees on this 

written policy. As part of that policy, 

Defendant must designate a chief 

antitrust compliance officer, who will 

be responsible for implementing and 

enforcing this policy. The chief antitrust 

compliance officer will conduct an 

annual antitrust compliance audit. The 

annual audits must, at a minimum, 

cover: (1) employees (including 

supervisors) in Defendant’s residentialproperty revenue management group; 

and (2) a yearly, randomly selected, 

local, regional, or supervisory 

employees who manage property 

operations (at least 8 each year). The 

chief antitrust compliance officer will 

provide the United States with an 

annual report identifying all individuals 

audited. 


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B. On an annual basis during the term 

of this Final Judgment, Defendant must 

submit to the Antitrust Division a 

certification from the General Counsel 

of the Defendant attesting under penalty 

of perjury that (1) Defendant has 

established and maintained the annual 

antitrust compliance policy and training 

required by Paragraph VII.A; (2) 

Defendant has provided the Antitrust 

Division with an annual report 

identifying the individuals audited 

pursuant to Paragraph VII.A; (3) 

Cortland’s Revenue Management 

Product, if used by Defendant, 

continues to satisfy the requirements in 

Section IV; (4) Cortland has compiled 

with the requirements in Paragraph 

VI.A. 

VIII. Cooperation 

A. Defendant must cooperate fully 

and truthfully with the United States 

relating to the Cooperation Subject 

Matter in any civil investigation or civil 

litigation the United States brings or has 

brought. Defendant must use their best 

efforts to ensure that all current and 

former officers, directors, employees, 

and agents also fully and promptly 

cooperate with the United States. 

Defendant’s cooperation must include: 

1. as requested on reasonable notice 

by the Division, making up to 10 

employees available for voluntary 

interviews for up to 40 hours total 

regarding the Cooperation Subject 

Matter; 

2. providing full and truthful written 

or oral testimony in deposition, trial, or 

other proceeding relating to the 

Cooperation Subject Matter and making 

witnesses available to the United States 

upon reasonable notice before any such 

testimony; 

3. providing proffers, which may be 

made by counsel for Defendant, 

describing Defendant’s knowledge of 

and evidence relating to the Cooperation 

Subject Matter; 

4. within 30 days of receiving a 

written request (whether formal process 

or informal request) from the United 

States for documents, information, or 

other material relating to the 

Cooperation Subject Matter, (or 

whatever additional time the Division 

grants in its sole discretion), producing 

to the United States all responsive 

documents, information, and other 

materials, wherever located, not 

protected under the attorney-client 

privilege or the work-product doctrine, 

in the possession, custody, or control of 

Defendant or its agents, as well as a log 

of any responsive documents, 

information, or other materials that were 

not provided, including an explanation 

of the basis for withholding such 

materials; 

5. authenticating or otherwise 

assisting with establishing the 

evidentiary foundation of any 

documents Defendant produced or 

produces to the United States; and 

6. taking all necessary steps to 

preserve all documents, information, 

and other materials relating to the 

Cooperation Subject Matter until the 

United States provides written notice to 

Defendant that its obligation to do so 

has expired. 

B. Subject to Defendant’s full, 

truthful, and continuing cooperation, as 

required under Paragraphs VIII.A, 

Defendant is fully and finally 

discharged and released from Settled 

Civil Claims. 

C. Nothing in this Section VIII affects 

Defendant’s obligation to respond to any 

formal discovery requests in litigation or 

a civil investigative demand issued by 

the United States. 

IX. Appointment of Monitor 

A. If Defendant elects to license or use 

a Third-Party Revenue Management 

Product at any Cortland Property, or if 

a Court finds that Cortland has violated 

the terms of the Final Judgment, such as 

by using External Nonpublic Data in the 

Cortland Revenue Management Product 

Runtime Operation or training, upon 

application of the United States, which 

Defendant may not oppose, the Court 

will appoint an independent third-party 

antitrust compliance monitor (the 

‘‘Compliance Monitor’’) selected by the 

United States and approved by the 

Court. Defendant may propose to the 

United States a pool of three candidates 

to serve as the Compliance Monitor, and 

the United States may consider 

Defendant’s perspectives on the 

proposed candidates or any other 

candidates identified and considered by 

the United States. The United States 

will retain the ultimate right, in its sole 

discretion, either to select the 

Compliance Monitor from among the 

three candidates proposed by Defendant 

or to select a different candidate. Once 

approved, the Compliance Monitor 

should be considered by the United 

States and Defendant to be an arm and 

representative of the Court. 

B. The Compliance Monitor will have 

the power and authority to monitor 

Defendant’s compliance with Section IV 

and Paragraphs V.A, VII.A, and VII.B of 

this Final Judgment, including by 

determining whether employees 

(including supervisors) in Cortland’s 

residential-property revenue 

management group have complied with 

their obligations set forth in those 

Sections. As part of its monitoring 

duties, the Compliance Monitor may 

also choose, in consultation with the 

United States, a yearly selection of other 

local, regional, or supervisory 

employees of Defendant who manage 

property operations (not to exceed 15 

annually) and investigate whether those 

individuals have complied with the 

obligations set forth in Paragraphs V.B 

and VI.A. The Compliance Monitor will 

have other powers as the Court deems 

appropriate. The Compliance Monitor 

will have no responsibility for operation 

of the Defendant’s business. No attorney 

client relationship will be formed 

between Defendant and the Compliance 

Monitor. 

C. The Compliance Monitor will have 

the authority to take such steps as, in 

the Compliance Monitor’s discretion 

and the United States’ view, may be 

necessary to accomplish the Compliance 

Monitor’s responsibilities. The 

Compliance Monitor may seek 

information from Defendant’s 

personnel, including in-house counsel, 

compliance personnel, and internal 

auditors. Defendant will annually 

communicate to all employees that 

employees may disclose any 

information to the Compliance Monitor 

without reprisal for such disclosure. 

Defendant must not retaliate against any 

employee or third party for disclosing 

information to the Compliance Monitor. 

D. Defendant may not object to 

actions taken by the Compliance 

Monitor in fulfillment of the 

Compliance Monitor’s responsibilities 

under any Order of the Court on any 

ground other than malfeasance by the 

Compliance Monitor. Disagreements 

between the Compliance Monitor and 

Defendant related to the scope of the 

Compliance Monitor’s responsibilities 

do not constitute malfeasance. 

Objections by Defendant must be 

conveyed in writing to the United States 

and the Compliance Monitor within 10 

calendar days of the Compliance 

Monitor’s action that gives rise to 

Defendant’s objection, or else Defendant 

will have waived any such objections. 

E. The monitor will serve at the cost 

and expense of Defendant pursuant to a 

written agreement, on terms and 

conditions, including confidentiality 

requirements and conflict of interest 

certifications, approved by the United 

States in its sole discretion. If the 

Compliance Monitor and Defendant are 

unable to reach such a written 

agreement within 14 calendar days of 

the Court’s appointment of the monitor, 

or if the United States, in its sole 

discretion, declines to approve the 

proposed written agreement, the United 

States, in its sole discretion, may take 

appropriate action, including making a 


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recommendation as to the Compliance 

Monitor’s costs and expenses to the 

Court, which may set the terms and 

conditions for the Compliance Monitor’s 

costs and expenses. 

F. The Compliance Monitor may hire, 

at the cost and expense of Defendant, 

any agents and consultants, including 

investment bankers, attorneys, and 

accountants, that are reasonably 

necessary in the Compliance Monitor’s 

judgment to assist with the Compliance 

Monitor’s duties. These agents or 

consultants will be directed by and 

solely accountable to the Compliance 

Monitor and will serve on terms and 

conditions, including confidentiality 

requirements and conflict-of-interest 

certifications, approved by the United 

States in its sole discretion. Within 

three business days of hiring any agents 

or consultants, the Compliance Monitor 

must provide written notice of the 

hiring and the rate of compensation to 

Defendant and the United States. 

G. The Compliance Monitor must 

provide yearly reports to the United 

States, with the first report due six 

months after the Compliance Monitor is 

appointed and subsequent reports due 

yearly thereafter, setting forth 

Defendant’s efforts to comply with its 

obligations under this Final Judgment. If 

the Compliance Monitor learns of any 

potential violation of the Final 

Judgment by Defendant’s officers, 

employees, or agents, the Compliance 

Monitor must promptly disclose to the 

Antitrust Division the nature and extent 

of any such potential violation and the 

Antitrust Division may require, in its 

sole discretion and without prejudice to 

any other remedy available for any 

violation of the Final Judgment, that the 

Compliance Monitor conduct additional 

investigation of compliance with this 

Final Judgment beyond any limits set 

forth in Paragraph IX.B. 

H. The Compliance Monitor must 

account for all costs and expenses 

incurred. The compensation of the 

Compliance Monitor and agents or 

consultants retained by the Compliance 

Monitor must be on reasonable and 

customary terms commensurate with 

the individuals’ experience and 

responsibilities. 

I. Defendant’s failure to promptly pay 

the Compliance Monitor’s accounted-for 

costs and expenses, including for agents 

and consultants, will constitute a 

violation of this Final Judgment and 

may result in sanctions imposed by the 

Court. If Defendant disputes any part of 

the Compliance Monitor’s accounted-for 

costs and expenses, Defendant must 

establish an escrow account into which 

Defendant must pay the disputed costs 

and expenses until the dispute is 

resolved. 

J. Defendants must use best efforts to 

cooperate fully with the Compliance 

Monitor and to assist the Compliance 

Monitor to monitor Defendants’ 

compliance with their obligations under 

this Final Judgment. Subject to 

reasonable protection for trade secrets, 

other confidential research, 

development, or commercial 

information, or any applicable 

privileges, Defendant must provide the 

Compliance Monitor and agents or 

consultants retained by the Compliance 

Monitor with full and complete access 

to all personnel (current and former), 

agents, consultants, books, records, and 

facilities. Defendant may not take any 

action to interfere with or to impede 

accomplishment of the Compliance 

Monitor’s responsibilities. 

K. If the United States determines that 

the Compliance Monitor is not acting 

diligently or in a reasonably costeffective manner, or if the Compliance 

Monitor becomes unable to continue in 

their role for any reason, the United 

States may recommend that the Court 

appoint a substitute. 

L. Once appointed by the Court, the 

Compliance Monitor will serve until the 

expiration of the Final Judgment. 

X. Compliance Inspection 

A. For the purposes of determining or 

securing compliance with this Final 

Judgment or of related orders such as 

the Stipulation and Order entered in 

this matter or of determining whether 

this Final Judgment should be modified 

or vacated, upon written request of an 

authorized representative of the 

Assistant Attorney General for the 

Antitrust Division, and reasonable 

notice to Defendant, Defendant must 

permit, from time to time and subject to 

legally recognized privileges, authorized 

representatives, including agents 

retained by the United States: 

1. to have access during Defendant’s 

office hours to inspect and copy, or at 

the option of the United States, to 

require Defendant to provide electronic 

copies of all books, ledgers, accounts, 

records, data, and documents in the 

possession, custody, or control of 

Defendant relating to any matters 

contained in this Final Judgment; and 

2. to interview, either informally or on 

the record, Defendant’s officers, 

employees, or agents, who may have 

their individual counsel present, 

relating to any matters contained in this 

Final Judgment. The interviews must be 

subject to the reasonable convenience of 

the interviewee and without restraint or 

interference by Defendant. 

B. Upon request of the United States, 

Defendant must provide documents 

sufficient to show how Cortland’s 

Revenue Management Product is trained 

and how it determines prices for 

Cortland Properties during its Runtime 

Operation, and changes to these 

processes. 

C. The United States will have the 

right to obtain and inspect at an 

Antitrust Division office, or at another 

location at the Division’s discretion, the 

code and pseudocode of the Cortland 

Revenue Management Product to ensure 

compliance with Section IV. Cortland 

will be responsible for the costs and 

expenses associated with said 

inspection once annually. 

XI. Public Disclosure 

A. No information or documents 

obtained pursuant to any provision or 

this Final Judgment, including reports 

the Compliance Monitor provides to the 

United States pursuant to Paragraph 

IX.G, may be divulged by the United 

States or the Compliance Monitor to any 

person other than an authorized 

representative of the executive branch of 

the United States, except in the course 

of legal proceedings to which the United 

States is a party, including grand-jury 

proceedings, or as otherwise required by 

law. 

B. In the event that the Compliance 

Monitor should receive a subpoena, 

court order, or other court process 

seeking production of information or 

documents obtained pursuant to any 

provision in this Final Judgment, 

including reports the Compliance 

Monitor provides to the United States 

pursuant to Paragraph IX.G, the 

Compliance Monitor must notify 

Defendant immediately and prior to any 

disclosure, so that Defendant may 

address such potential disclosure and, if 

necessary, pursue alternative legal 

remedies, including intervention in the 

relevant proceedings. 

C. In the event of a request by a third 

party, pursuant to the Freedom of 

Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, for 

disclosure of information obtained 

pursuant to any provision of this Final 

Judgment, the Antitrust Division will 

act in accordance with that statute, and 

the Department of Justice regulations at 

28 CFR part 16, including the provision 

on confidential commercial information, 

at 28 CFR 16.7. Defendant, when 

submitting information to the Antitrust 

Division, should designate the 

confidential commercial information 

portions of all applicable documents 

and information under 28 CFR 16.7. 

Designations of confidentiality expire 10 

years after submission, ‘‘unless the 

submitter requests and provides 


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justification for a longer designation 

period.’’ See 28 CFR 16.7(b). 

D. If at the time that Defendant 

furnishes information or documents to 

the United States pursuant to any 

provision of this Final Judgment, 

Defendant represents and identifies in 

writing information or documents for 

which a claim of protection may be 

asserted under Rule 26(c)(1)(G) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and 

the Defendant marks each pertinent 

page of such material, ‘‘Subject to claim 

of protection under Rule 26(c)(1)(G) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,’’ 

the United States must give Defendant 

10 calendar days’ notice before 

divulging the material in any legal 

proceeding (other than a grand jury 

proceeding). 

XII. Retention of Jurisdiction 

The Court retains jurisdiction to 

enable any party to this Final Judgment 

to apply to the Court at any time for 

further orders and directions as may be 

necessary or appropriate to carry out or 

construe this Final Judgment, to modify 

any of its provisions, to enforce 

compliance, and to punish violations of 

its provisions. 

XIII. Enforcement of Final Judgment 

A. The United States retains and 

reserves all rights to enforce the 

provisions of this Final Judgment, 

including the right to seek an order of 

contempt from the Court. Defendant 

agrees that in a civil contempt action, a 

motion to show cause, or a similar 

action brought by the United States 

relating to an alleged violation of this 

Final Judgment, the United States may 

establish a violation of this Final 

Judgment and the appropriateness of a 

remedy therefor by a preponderance of 

the evidence, and Defendant waives any 

argument that a different standard of 

proof should apply. 

B. This Final Judgment should be 

interpreted to give full effect to the 

procompetitive purposes of the antitrust 

laws and to restore the competition the 

United States alleges was harmed by the 

challenged conduct. Defendant agrees 

that it may be held in contempt of, and 

that the Court may enforce, any 

provision of this Final Judgment that, as 

interpreted by the Court in light of these 

procompetitive principles and applying 

ordinary tools of interpretation, is stated 

specifically and in reasonable detail, 

whether or not it is clear and 

unambiguous on its face. In any such 

interpretation, the terms of this Final 

Judgment should not be construed 

against either party as the drafter. 

C. In an enforcement proceeding in 

which the Court finds that Defendant 

has violated this Final Judgment, the 

United States may apply to the Court for 

an extension of this Final Judgment, 

together with other relief that may be 

appropriate. In connection with a 

successful effort by the United States to 

enforce this Final Judgment against 

Defendant, whether litigated or resolved 

before litigation, Defendant agrees to 

reimburse the United States for the fees 

and expenses of its attorneys, as well as 

all other costs including experts’ fees, 

incurred in connection with that effort 

to enforce this Final Judgment, 

including in the investigation of the 

potential violation. 

D. For a period of four years following 

the expiration of this Final Judgment, if 

the United States has evidence that 

Defendant violated this Final Judgment 

before it expired, the United States may 

file an action against Defendant in this 

Court requesting that the Court order: 

(1) Defendant to comply with the terms 

of this Final Judgment for an additional 

term of at least four years following the 

filing of the enforcement action; (2) all 

appropriate contempt remedies; (3) 

additional relief needed to ensure 

Defendant complies with the terms of 

this Final Judgment; and (4) fees or 

expenses as called for by this Section. 

XIV. Expiration of Final Judgment 

Unless the Court grants an extension, 

this Final Judgment will expire 4 years 

from the date of its entry, except that 

after two years from the date of its entry, 

this Final Judgment may be terminated 

upon notice by the United States to the 

Court and Defendant that the 

continuation of this Final Judgment is 

no longer necessary or in the public 

interest. 

XV. Reservation of Rights 

The Final Judgment relates only to the 

resolution of the Settled Civil Claims. 

The United States reserves all rights for 

any other claims against Defendant that 

may be brought in the future. The entry 

of the Final Judgment does not limit the 

ability of any non-settling attorney 

general of any State to bring or maintain 

any action under federal or state law 

against Defendant. 

XVI. Public Interest Determination 

Entry of this Final Judgment is in the 

public interest. The parties have 

complied with the requirements of the 

Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 

15 U.S.C. 16, including by making 

available to the public copies of this 

Final Judgment and the Competitive 

Impact Statement, public comments 

thereon, and any response to comments 

by the United States. Based upon the 

record before the Court, which includes 

the Competitive Impact Statement and, 

if applicable, any comments and 

response to comments filed with the 

Court, entry of this Final Judgment is in 

the public interest. 

Date: llllllllll. 

[Court approval subject to procedures of 

Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 

U.S.C. 16] 

lllllllllllllllllllll

United States District Judge 

United States District Court for the 

Middle District of North Carolina 

United States of America, et al., Plaintiffs, 

v. RealPage, INC., et al., Defendants. 

No. 1:24–cv–00710–LCB–JLW 

Competitive Impact Statement 

In accordance with the Antitrust 

Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 

16(b)–(h) (the ‘‘APPA’’ or ‘‘Tunney 

Act’’), the United States of America files 

this Competitive Impact Statement 

related to the proposed Final Judgment 

against Defendant Cortland 

Management, LLC, which has been filed 

in this civil antitrust proceeding (ECF 

No. 49–1). 

I. Nature and Purpose of the Proceeding 

On August 23, 2024, the United States 

filed a civil antitrust Complaint against 

RealPage, Inc. (‘‘RealPage’’). On January 

7, 2025, the United States amended its 

civil Complaint (the ‘‘Complaint’’) to 

add Cortland Management, LLC 

(‘‘Cortland’’) and five other landlords as 

Defendants. Until January 1, 2025, 

Cortland licensed a revenue 

management software called YieldStar 

from RealPage. RealPage also licenses 

YieldStar and its other revenue 

management software to Cortland’s 

competitors, including the other 

landlords named in the United States’ 

Complaint. The Complaint alleges that 

Cortland’s licensing and use of 

RealPage’s YieldStar was unlawful 

under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 

U.S.C. 1. 

The Complaint alleges that, by 

unlawfully sharing its confidential and 

competitively sensitive information 

with RealPage for use in its and 

competing landlords’ pricing, Cortland 

violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 

15 U.S.C. 1. Under their licensing 

agreements with RealPage, Cortland and 

competing landlords have provided 

RealPage with daily, competitively 

sensitive, nonpublic information 

relating to their leasing businesses, 

including details like how many leases 

have been renewed, for what terms, and 

at what price. The transactional data 

that Cortland and other landlords have 

agreed to provide to RealPage includes 

current, forward-looking, granular, and 


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highly competitively sensitive 

information. RealPage has used 

Cortland’s competitively sensitive, 

nonpublic information to influence 

rental prices and other 

recommendations across rental 

properties managed by competing 

landlords. Cortland’s rental prices and 

related recommendations were also 

influenced by its competitors’ 

competitively sensitive, nonpublic 

information. In each relevant market, 

RealPage and participating landlords, 

including Cortland, have sufficient 

market power, including market and 

data penetration, to harm renters and 

the competitive process through this 

unlawful sharing of confidential and 

competitively sensitive information. 

Moreover, Cortland and other landlords 

can achieve any procompetitive 

objective of revenue management 

software without sharing this kind of 

information. 

The Complaint also alleges that 

Cortland and other landlords, by 

adopting and using RealPage’s revenue 

management software, have agreed with 

RealPage and each other to align their 

pricing and thereby violate Section 1 of 

the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. RealPage 

has entered into agreements with 

Cortland and its competing landlords 

relating to how to price rental units, 

including through the licensing of its 

revenue management software—AI 

Revenue Management (‘‘AIRM’’), 

YieldStar, and Lease Rent Options 

(‘‘LRO’’)—to landlords, and the 

provision by landlords of their 

competitively sensitive, nonpublic 

transactional data to RealPage for 

training and running its revenue 

management software. Adoption and 

use of RealPage’s revenue management 

software by Cortland and other 

landlords has the likely effect of 

aligning their pricing processes, 

strategies, and pricing responses, and 

Cortland and other landlord users 

understand this likely effect. 

The Complaint alleges 

monopolization and attempted 

monopolization claims against 

RealPage, but not against Cortland or 

any of its competing landlords. Through 

its licensing agreements, RealPage has 

amassed a massive reservoir of 

competitively sensitive data from 

competing landlords. RealPage has 

ensured that other providers of revenue 

management software cannot compete 

on the merits unless they enter into 

similar agreements with landlords, 

thereby obstructing them from 

competing with products that do not 

harm the competitive process. 

At the same time the Complaint 

against Cortland was filed, the United 

States filed a proposed Final Judgment 

and a Stipulation and Order 

(‘‘Stipulation and Order’’), which are 

designed to remedy the loss of 

competition alleged in the Complaint 

due to Cortland’s conduct. 

The proposed Final Judgment, which 

is explained more fully below, imposes 

several requirements and restrictions on 

Cortland that address the United States’ 

anticompetitive concerns regarding 

Cortland’s conduct alleged in the 

Complaint. Specifically: 

i. Cortland must move from RealPage 

revenue management software to its 

proprietary revenue management 

software within 30 days of entry of the 

Stipulation and Order; 

ii. Cortland’s revenue management 

software cannot use any third-party 

nonpublic data, including in training its 

models or in the run-time operation; 

iii. Cortland’s revenue management 

software cannot pool pricing 

information across its different owners; 

iv. The supply and demand models 

for Cortland’s revenue management 

software cannot be trained using rental 

pricing, concessions, discounts, 

occupancy rates or capacity, or other 

rental pricing terms data across different 

owners; 

v. Cortland cannot disclose, solicit, or 

use competitively sensitive information 

from competitors that can be used to set 

rental prices or generate pricing; 

vi. Cortland must cooperate in this 

civil antitrust proceeding (United States 

et al. v. RealPage et al.) with respect to 

its prior use of RealPage’s products and 

the monopolization and attempted 

monopolization claims against 

RealPage; 

vii. Cortland must adopt a written 

antitrust compliance policy and 

designate a chief antitrust compliance 

officer who will train Cortland 

employees on the policy, enforce the 

policy, and perform annual audits for 

compliance with the policy; 

viii. Cortland must allow the United 

States to perform inspections of its 

documents, code, and pseudocode 

relating to its proprietary revenue 

management software as well as to 

interview its employees to ensure 

compliance with the Final Judgment. 

ix. Cortland cannot license or use any 

third-party revenue management 

software without the appointment of a 

compliance monitor who will have the 

ability to seek information from 

Cortland’s employees to ensure 

compliance with certain restrictions 

related to use of third-party revenue 

management software and 

communications between Cortland and 

other property management companies; 

x. Even with the oversight of a 

compliance monitor, Cortland cannot 

license or use any third-party revenue 

management software that (i) uses thirdparty nonpublic data to recommend or 

set prices or (ii) pools information 

across Cortland properties with different 

owners; and 

xi. Cortland will also be subject to the 

appointment of a compliance monitor if 

the Court finds that Cortland has 

violated the terms of the proposed Final 

Judgment. 

Under the terms of the Stipulation 

and Order, Cortland must abide by and 

comply with the provisions of the 

proposed Final Judgment until it is 

entered by the Court or until the time 

for all appeals of any Court ruling 

declining entry of the proposed Final 

Judgment has expired. 

The United States and Cortland have 

stipulated that the proposed Final 

Judgment may be entered by the Court 

after compliance with the APPA. Entry 

of the proposed Final Judgment will 

terminate this action with respect to 

Cortland, except that the Court will 

retain jurisdiction to construe, modify, 

or enforce the provisions of the 

proposed Final Judgment and to punish 

violations thereof by Cortland. 

II. Description of Events Giving Rise to 

the Alleged Sherman Act Violations 

RealPage is a provider of commercial 

revenue management and property 

management software to property 

management companies, including 

Cortland, who have used that software 

to set rental prices for the properties 

that they manage and/or own. RealPage 

currently licenses three revenue 

management software products 

including its legacy product, YieldStar, 

to landlords. YieldStar uses 

confidential, competitively sensitive 

data collected from competing landlords 

as a critical input to generate price 

recommendations for competing 

landlords. This data includes rental 

applications, executed new leases, 

renewal offers and acceptances, and 

forward-looking occupancy. The data is 

pulled from property management 

software, such as RealPage’s OneSite 

product. Landlords use property 

management software to collect and 

track rental payments, manage leases, 

property maintenance, accounting, and 

other property management functions. 

When deciding where to live, renters 

often visit numerous properties that are 

owned and managed by competing 

landlords so that they can compare 

rental offerings and select their best 

housing option considering price and 

other terms. When competing landlords 

do not have access to each other’s 


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nonpublic data, or recommendations 

informed by competitors’ nonpublic 

data, they are more likely to act 

independently and compete more 

vigorously on price and better leasing 

terms to secure new leases and renewals 

from renters. RealPage, however, 

provides landlords who use its revenue 

management software with pricing 

recommendations and pricing based on 

competitors’ competitively sensitive 

data. Widespread adoption of RealPage’s 

revenue management software leads to 

pricing decisions by landlords such as 

Cortland that are based on 

recommendations coming from a 

common pricing model and powered by 

competitively sensitive, nonpublic data, 

harming the ability of renters to obtain 

a competitive price for their housing. 

The use of competitors’ competitively 

sensitive data in this manner thus harms 

renters as well as the competitive 

process itself. 

Cortland, headquartered in Atlanta, 

Georgia, is one of the largest apartment 

managers in the United States. As of 

2024, Cortland managed more than 

80,000 units and more than 220 

properties in the United States. As an 

apartment manager, Cortland makes 

strategic and competitive decisions for 

the apartments it manages, including 

determination of new lease and renewal 

terms, such as rental price. Before 

January 1, 2025, Cortland licensed 

YieldStar from RealPage. Per the 

licensing agreement, Cortland relied on 

YieldStar to recommend rental prices 

for its units, which was informed by 

competitively sensitive data provided 

by Cortland’s competitors. Cortland also 

provided its competitively sensitive 

data to RealPage, to be used to inform 

the rental prices that RealPage’s 

software recommended to Cortland’s 

competitors. Further, Cortland agreed 

with RealPage to use YieldStar pricing 

software as RealPage designed it. It 

reviewed YieldStar floor plan price 

recommendations daily and used the 

software to set scheduled floor plan 

rents or even unit-level prices. 

In summary, the Complaint alleges 

that Cortland unlawfully shared its 

competitively sensitive information for 

use in pricing by competing landlords 

that also license RealPage’s software, 

and that Cortland agreed to align its 

pricing with that of its competitors by 

using RealPage’s software in the way 

that the software has been designed. 

Until January 1, 2025, Cortland used 

RealPage’s revenue management 

software to inform its setting of rental 

prices and discounts—such as 

concessions of a free month of rent— 

and to make other competitive and 

strategic decisions relating to rental 

prices and terms. 

III. Explanation of the Proposed Final 

Judgment 

The relief required by the proposed 

Final Judgment will remedy the loss of 

competition alleged in the Complaint by 

precluding Cortland from sharing 

competitively sensitive, nonpublic 

information, directly or indirectly, with 

competing property management 

companies and from forming 

agreements, directly or indirectly, to 

align prices with its competitors. The 

terms described below provide prompt, 

certain, and effective remedies to ensure 

that Cortland has terminated its alleged 

illegal conduct and prevent Cortland 

from engaging in the same or similar 

conduct in the future. 

A. Cortland’s Use of Proprietary 

Revenue Management Product(s) 

Cortland has agreed to stop licensing 

and using YieldStar and will instead use 

its own proprietary revenue 

management software in all of its 

properties within 30 days of the entry of 

the Stipulation and Order. It has further 

agreed that it will transfer any future 

properties it will manage from thirdparty revenue management software to 

its proprietary revenue management 

software within 30 days from the date 

it begins managing such property. 

The proposed Final Judgment requires 

Cortland to limit the type of data it uses 

in its proprietary software. Paragraph 

IV.A of the proposed Final Judgment 

precludes Cortland’s proprietary 

revenue management software from 

using other landlords’ competitively 

sensitive data to set rental prices. 

Paragraph IV.A also prevents Cortland 

from pooling different property owners’ 

competitively sensitive data even if they 

are Cortland clients. This prohibition 

ensures that property owners who 

compete in the multifamily rental 

housing industry are not using their 

relationship with Cortland to gain 

access to each other’s data. 

Paragraph IV.B prohibits Cortland 

from training its revenue management 

software’s models using certain 

competitively sensitive data from other 

landlords. A model is a set of rules or 

instructions that software relies on to 

calculate a defined output which, in this 

case, is a recommended rental price for 

a floorplan or unit. Models are trained 

using data to define and refine the rules 

or instructions by which it operates. 

Paragraph IV.B restricts Cortland from 

pooling or combining data on rental 

pricing, concessions, discounts, 

occupancy rates or capacity, or other 

rental pricing terms from Cortland 

properties for different property owners. 

The restriction on pooling competitors’ 

data thus also prohibits Cortland from 

training its software models using 

pricing and occupancy data from 

competing property owners, therefore 

reducing concerns about competitors 

benefiting from each other’s 

competitively sensitive data to plan 

their pricing. 

Paragraph IV.C prohibits Cortland’s 

proprietary revenue management 

software from disclosing any of 

Cortland’s property data to any other 

property management company or 

property owner. 

B. Restrictions Concerning Use of ThirdParty Revenue Management Software 

The decree prohibits Cortland from 

using third-party revenue management 

software without an independent, courtappointed monitor and without 

satisfying additional conditions. By 

shifting to proprietary software, which it 

does not license or otherwise provide to 

other property management companies, 

Cortland will no longer use revenue 

management software to align prices 

with its competitors. Additionally, 

Cortland will no longer participate in 

RealPage-sponsored meetings, in which 

sensitive data has been or may be 

shared. If Cortland decides to use thirdparty revenue management software, 

Paragraph V.A requires Cortland to 

select a software product that does not 

(1) use competitively sensitive data from 

other landlords to set rental prices or 

generate rental pricing 

recommendations, (2) use data from 

different Cortland owners to set rental 

prices or generate rental pricing 

recommendations, (3) disclose data from 

a Cortland property to a rival property 

management company or property 

owner, (4) pool or combine data from 

different owners, or (5) contain or use a 

pricing algorithm that has been trained 

using non-Cortland data. Paragraph V.A 

also prohibits Cortland from selecting 

and using a third-party revenue 

management software product that has 

rental floors or limits rental pricing 

recommendation decreases based on 

competing properties’ rental prices. 

In the event that Cortland chooses in 

the future to use third-party revenue 

management software, then pursuant to 

Paragraph IX.A the Court will appoint 

an independent monitor. Paragraph IX.B 

provides that the monitor will be 

responsible for ensuring that Cortland 

complies with the requirements for 

licensing third-party revenue 

management software, as stated in 

Paragraph V.A. Further, the monitor 

will have the authority to take such 

steps that may be necessary to ensure 


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compliance with these requirements. 

These steps may include interviewing 

Cortland employees and collecting 

Cortland documents. 

The proposed Final Judgment 

includes an additional restriction on 

Cortland’s ability to make agreements 

with non-clients regarding revenue 

management software. Specifically, 

Paragraph V.B prohibits Cortland from 

agreeing with a non-client property 

owner or a competing property 

management company to use a 

particular revenue management 

software. This provision reduces the 

risk of competitors agreeing with each 

other to use the same revenue 

management software across their 

clients. 

If Cortland chooses to use third-party 

revenue management software in the 

future, Paragraph V.C requires Cortland 

to notify the United States 30 days prior 

to switching to that product. Cortland 

must also submit to the United States a 

certification from the third-party 

revenue management software vendor 

that the product complies with the 

requirements in Paragraph V.A of the 

proposed Final Judgment. 

C. Other Prohibited Conduct 

In addition to restrictions and 

conditions on Cortland’s use of revenue 

management software, the proposed 

Final Judgment also limits Cortland’s 

ability to communicate with 

competitors regarding certain 

competitively sensitive information for 

the purpose of setting prices. Paragraph 

VI.A prohibits Cortland from disclosing, 

soliciting, or using any competitively 

sensitive data from competitors as part 

of setting rental prices or generating 

rental price recommendations except for 

the property owner of a particular 

Cortland property. Paragraph VI.A 

clarifies that the restrictions include any 

data obtained through any form of 

communication, including call arounds 

or market surveys, meetings, calls, text 

messages, emails, or shared documents. 

Paragraph VI.B prevents Cortland 

from using any competitively sensitive 

data belonging to other landlords, 

whether Cortland derived that nonCortland data from revenue 

management software or obtained it 

from direct communications with other 

landlords. Cortland must also identify to 

the United States the existence and 

location of any such data. This does not 

apply to any data for Cortland 

properties maintained in OneSite. 

D. Cooperation 

Under the terms of the proposed Final 

Judgment, Cortland must cooperate with 

the United States relating to Cortland’s 

prior use of RealPage’s revenue 

management products and the United 

States’ monopolization and attempted 

monopolization claims against 

RealPage, as described above. The 

cooperation includes voluntary 

interviews with 10 employees for up to 

40 hours, making witnesses available to 

the United States before trial, proffers of 

knowledge, and the production of 

documents and other information. 

E. Compliance Terms 

Pursuant to Paragraph X.A, Cortland 

must provide the United States with 

access to Cortland’s books, records, 

data, and documents, including 

communications with other property 

managers, to enable the United States to 

assess Cortland’s compliance with the 

terms of the Final Judgment. Cortland 

must also permit the United States to 

interview Cortland’s officers, 

employees, or agents relating to any 

matters contained in this Final 

Judgment. Cortland must also provide 

the United States with documents 

describing how Cortland’s proprietary 

revenue management software is trained 

and how it determines prices for 

properties it manages, as well as 

changes to these processes. Cortland 

must also allow the United States to 

inspect Cortland’s software code and 

pseudocode of that software for 

independent verification. 

Additionally, Paragraph VII.A 

requires Cortland’s chief antitrust officer 

to audit Cortland’s operations. The 

annual audits must, at a minimum, 

include employees in Cortland’s 

revenue management group and a 

randomly selected group of employees 

who manage property operations. 

Paragraph VI.B requires Cortland to 

submit an annual certification from its 

General Counsel that Cortland has 

established and maintained the annual 

antitrust compliance policy and 

training, that Cortland’s revenue 

management software continues to 

satisfy the requirements in the proposed 

Final Judgment, and that Cortland has 

complied with the requirements in 

Paragraph VI.A to not disclose, solicit, 

or share competitively sensitive data. 

F. Compliance Monitor 

Paragraph IX.A requires that if 

Cortland decides to use third-party 

revenue management software rather 

than its own propriety revenue 

management software (as described 

above), or if a Court finds that Cortland 

has violated the terms of the proposed 

Final Judgment, Cortland agrees to the 

appointment of an independent thirdparty antitrust compliance monitor 

selected by the United States in its sole 

discretion and approved by the Court. 

The monitor will assess Cortland’s 

compliance with the Final Judgment, in 

particular, its use of revenue 

management software and 

communications with other property 

management companies. Paragraph IX.B 

provides the monitor the authority to 

select up to 15 Cortland employees to 

investigate their and Cortland’s 

compliance with the Final Judgment, 

such as by interviewing these 

employees and reviewing their files. 

The compliance monitor will serve at 

Cortland’s expense, on such terms and 

conditions as the United States 

approves, in its sole discretion, and 

Cortland must assist the compliance 

monitor in fulfilling his or her 

obligations. Among other 

responsibilities, the compliance monitor 

will provide an annual report to the 

United States setting forth Cortland’s 

efforts to comply with its obligations 

under the Final Judgment. The 

compliance monitor will not have any 

responsibility or obligation for the 

operation of Cortland’s businesses. The 

compliance monitor will serve for the 

remainder of the term of the consent 

decree. 

G. Other Provisions 

The proposed Final Judgment also 

contains provisions designed to promote 

compliance with and make enforcement 

of the Final Judgment as effective as 

possible. Paragraph XIII.A provides that 

the United States retains and reserves 

all rights to enforce the Final Judgment, 

including the right to seek an order of 

contempt from the Court. Under the 

terms of this paragraph, Cortland has 

agreed that in any civil contempt action, 

any motion to show cause, or any 

similar action brought by the United 

States regarding an alleged violation of 

the Final Judgment, the United States 

may establish the violation and the 

appropriateness of any remedy by a 

preponderance of the evidence and that 

Cortland has waived any argument that 

a different standard of proof should 

apply. This provision aligns the 

standard for compliance with the Final 

Judgment with the standard of proof 

that applies to the underlying offense 

addressed by the Final Judgment. 

Paragraph XIII.B provides additional 

clarification regarding the interpretation 

of the provisions of the proposed Final 

Judgment. Pursuant to Paragraph XIII.B 

of the proposed Final Judgment, 

Cortland agrees that it will abide by the 

proposed Final Judgment and that it 

may be held in contempt of the Court 

for failing to comply with any provision 

of the proposed Final Judgment that is 


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stated specifically and in reasonable 

detail, as interpreted in light of its 

procompetitive purpose. 

Paragraph XIII.C provides that if the 

Court finds in an enforcement 

proceeding that Cortland has violated 

the Final Judgment, the United States 

may apply to the Court for an extension 

of the Final Judgment, together with 

such other relief as may be appropriate. 

In addition, to compensate American 

taxpayers for any costs associated with 

investigating and enforcing violations of 

the Final Judgment, Paragraph XIII.C 

provides that in any successful effort by 

the United States to enforce the Final 

Judgment against Cortland, whether 

litigated or resolved before litigation, 

Cortland must reimburse the United 

States for attorneys’ fees, experts’ fees, 

and other costs incurred in connection 

with that effort to enforce this Final 

Judgment, including the investigation of 

the potential violation. 

Paragraph XVI.D of the proposed 

Final Judgment states that the United 

States may file an action against a 

Cortland for violating the Final 

Judgment for up to four years after the 

Final Judgment has expired or been 

terminated. This provision is meant to 

address circumstances such as when 

evidence that a violation of the Final 

Judgment occurred during the term of 

the Final Judgment is not discovered 

until after the Final Judgment has 

expired or been terminated, or when 

there is not sufficient time for the 

United States to complete an 

investigation of an alleged violation 

until after the Final Judgment has 

expired or been terminated. This 

provision therefore makes clear that, for 

four years after the Final Judgment has 

expired or been terminated, the United 

States may still challenge a violation 

that occurred during the term of the 

Final Judgment. 

Finally, Section XIV of the proposed 

Final Judgment provides that the Final 

Judgment will expire four years from the 

date of its entry, except that after two 

years from that date, the Final Judgment 

may be terminated upon notice by the 

United States to the Court and to 

Cortland that continuation of the Final 

Judgment is no longer necessary or in 

the public interest. 

IV. Remedies Available to Potential 

Private Plaintiffs 

Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 

U.S.C. 15, provides that any person who 

has been injured as a result of conduct 

prohibited by the antitrust laws may 

bring suit in federal court to recover 

three times the damages the person has 

suffered, as well as costs and reasonable 

attorneys’ fees. Entry of the proposed 

Final Judgment neither impairs nor 

assists the bringing of any private 

antitrust damage action. Under the 

provisions of Section 5(a) of the Clayton 

Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(a), the proposed Final 

Judgment has no prima facie effect in 

any subsequent private lawsuit that may 

be brought against Cortland. 

V. Procedures Available for 

Modification of the Proposed Final 

Judgment 

The United States and Cortland have 

stipulated that the proposed Final 

Judgment may be entered by the Court 

after compliance with the provisions of 

the APPA, provided that the United 

States has not withdrawn its consent. 

The APPA conditions entry upon the 

Court’s determination that the proposed 

Final Judgment is in the public interest. 

The APPA provides a period of at 

least 60 days preceding the effective 

date of the proposed Final Judgment 

within which any person may submit to 

the United States written comments 

regarding the proposed Final Judgment. 

Any person who wishes to comment 

should do so within 60 days of the date 

of publication of this Competitive 

Impact Statement in the Federal 

Register, or within 60 days of the first 

date of publication in a newspaper of 

the summary of this Competitive Impact 

Statement, whichever is later. All 

comments received during this period 

will be considered by the U.S. 

Department of Justice, which remains 

free to withdraw its consent to the 

proposed Final Judgment at any time 

before the Court’s entry of the Final 

Judgment. The comments and the 

responses of the United States will be 

filed with the Court. In addition, the 

comments and the United States’ 

responses will be published in the 

Federal Register unless the Court agrees 

that the United States instead may 

publish them on the U.S. Department of 

Justice, Antitrust Division’s internet 

website. 

Written comments should be 

submitted in English to: Aaron Hoag, 

Chief, Technology and Digital Platforms 

Section, Antitrust Division, United 

States Department of Justice, 450 Fifth 

St. NW, Suite 7100, Washington, DC 

20530. 

The proposed Final Judgment 

provides that the Court retains 

jurisdiction over this action, and the 

parties may apply to the Court for any 

order necessary or appropriate for the 

modification, interpretation, or 

enforcement of the Final Judgment. 

VI. Alternatives to the Proposed Final 

Judgment 

As an alternative to the proposed 

Final Judgment, the United States 

considered a full trial on the merits 

against Cortland. The United States 

could have continued its litigation 

against Cortland and brought the case to 

trial, seeking relief including an 

injunction against Cortland’s sharing of 

its competitively sensitive, nonpublic 

data with RealPage and other landlords, 

an injunction against Cortland using 

AIRM, YieldStar, or similar products 

that use competing properties’ 

nonpublic data to recommend prices, 

and an injunction preventing any 

communication with competitors that 

leads to alignment of prices. The United 

States is satisfied, however, that the 

relief required by the proposed Final 

Judgment will remedy the 

anticompetitive effects alleged in the 

Complaint with respect to Cortland, 

preserving competition for multifamily 

rental housing. Thus, the proposed 

Final Judgment achieves all or 

substantially all of the relief the United 

States would have obtained through 

litigation but avoids the time, expense, 

and uncertainty of a full trial on the 

merits. 

VII. Standard of Review Under the 

APPA for the Proposed Final Judgment 

Under the Clayton Act and APPA, 

proposed Final Judgments, or ‘‘consent 

decrees,’’ in antitrust cases brought by 

the United States are subject to a 60-day 

comment period, after which the Court 

shall determine whether entry of the 

proposed Final Judgment ‘‘is in the 

public interest.’’ 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1). In 

making that determination, the Court, in 

accordance with the statute as amended 

in 2004, is required to consider: 

(A) the competitive impact of such 

judgment, including termination of alleged 

violations, provisions for enforcement and 

modification, duration of relief sought, 

anticipated effects of alternative remedies 

actually considered, whether its terms are 

ambiguous, and any other competitive 

considerations bearing upon the adequacy of 

such judgment that the court deems 

necessary to a determination of whether the 

consent judgment is in the public interest; 

and 

(B) the impact of entry of such judgment 

upon competition in the relevant market or 

markets, upon the public generally and 

individuals alleging specific injury from the 

violations set forth in the complaint 

including consideration of the public benefit, 

if any, to be derived from a determination of 

the issues at trial. 

15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1)(A) & (B). In 

considering these statutory factors, the 

Court’s inquiry is necessarily a limited 

one as the government is entitled to 


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‘‘broad discretion to settle with the 

defendant within the reaches of the 

public interest.’’ United States v. 

Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1461 

(D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. U.S. 

Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69, 

75 (D.D.C. 2014) (explaining that the 

‘‘court’s inquiry is limited’’ in Tunney 

Act settlements); United States v. InBev 

N.V./S.A., No. 08–1965 (JR), 2009 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 

11, 2009) (noting that a court’s review 

of a proposed Final Judgment is limited 

and only inquires ‘‘into whether the 

government’s determination that the 

proposed remedies will cure the 

antitrust violations alleged in the 

complaint was reasonable, and whether 

the mechanisms to enforce the final 

judgment are clear and manageable’’); 

United States v. Charleston Area Med. 

Ctr., Inc., No. CV 2:16–3664, 2016 WL 

6156172, at *2 (S.D.W. Va. Oct. 21, 

2016) (explaining that in evaluating 

whether the proposed final judgment is 

in the public interest, the inquiry is ‘‘a 

narrow one.’’); United States v. 

Mountain Health Care, 1:02–CV–288–T, 

2003 WL 22359598, at *7 (W.D.N.C. 

2003) (‘‘[W]ith respect to the adequacy 

of the relief secured by the decree, a 

court may not ‘engage in an unrestricted 

evaluation of what relief would best 

serve the public.’ ’’) citing United States 

v. BSN, 858 F.2d 456, 462–63 (9th Cir. 

1988)). 

As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

D.C. Circuit has held, under the APPA 

a court considers, among other things, 

the relationship between the remedy 

secured and the specific allegations in 

the government’s Complaint, whether 

the proposed Final Judgment is 

sufficiently clear, whether its 

enforcement mechanisms are sufficient, 

and whether it may positively harm 

third parties. See Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 

1458–62; United States v. Math Works, 

No. 02–888–A, 2003 WL 1922140, *17 

(E.D. Va. 2003). With respect to the 

adequacy of the relief secured by the 

proposed Final Judgment, a court may 

not ‘‘make de novo determination of 

facts and issues.’’ United States v. W. 

Elec. Co., 993 F.2d 1572, 1577 (D.C. Cir. 

1993) (quotation marks omitted); see 

also Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1460–62; 

United States v. Alcoa, Inc., 152 F. 

Supp. 2d 37, 40 (D.D.C. 2001); United 

States v. Enova Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 

10, 16 (D.D.C. 2000); InBev, 2009 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *3. Instead, ‘‘[t]he 

balancing of competing social and 

political interests affected by a proposed 

antitrust decree must be left, in the first 

instance, to the discretion of the 

Attorney General.’’ W. Elec. Co., 993 

F.2d at 1577 (quotation marks omitted). 

‘‘The court should also bear in mind the 

flexibility of the public interest inquiry: 

the court’s function is not to determine 

whether the resulting array of rights and 

liabilities is the one that will best serve 

society, but only to confirm that the 

resulting settlement is within the 

reaches of the public interest.’’ 

Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1460 (quotation 

marks omitted); see also United States v. 

Deutsche Telekom AG, No. 19–2232 

(TJK), 2020 WL 1873555, at *7 (D.D.C. 

Apr. 14, 2020); Math Works, 2003 WL 

1922140 at *18; Mountain Health Care, 

2003 WL 22359598, at *7. More 

demanding requirements would ‘‘have 

enormous practical consequences for 

the government’s ability to negotiate 

future settlements,’’ contrary to 

congressional intent. Microsoft, 56 F.3d 

at 1456. ‘‘The Tunney Act was not 

intended to create a disincentive to the 

use of the consent decree.’’ Id. 

The United States’ predictions about 

the efficacy of the remedy are to be 

afforded deference by the Court. See, 

e.g., Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 

(recognizing courts should give ‘‘due 

respect to the Justice Department’s . . . 

view of the nature of its case’’); United 

States v. Iron Mountain, Inc., 217 F. 

Supp. 3d 146, 152–53 (D.D.C. 2016) (‘‘In 

evaluating objections to settlement 

agreements under the Tunney Act, a 

court must be mindful that [t]he 

government need not prove that the 

settlements will perfectly remedy the 

alleged antitrust harms[;] it need only 

provide a factual basis for concluding 

that the settlements are reasonably 

adequate remedies for the alleged 

harms.’’ (internal citations omitted)); 

United States v. Republic Servs., Inc., 

723 F. Supp. 2d 157, 160 (D.D.C. 2010) 

(noting ‘‘the deferential review to which 

the government’s proposed remedy is 

accorded’’); United States v. ArcherDaniels-Midland Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1, 

6 (D.D.C. 2003) (‘‘A district court must 

accord due respect to the government’s 

prediction as to the effect of proposed 

remedies, its perception of the market 

structure, and its view of the nature of 

the case.’’). The ultimate question is 

whether ‘‘the remedies [obtained by the 

Final Judgment are] so inconsonant with 

the allegations charged as to fall outside 

of the ’reaches of the public interest.’ ’’ 

Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 (quoting W. 

Elec. Co., 900 F.2d at 309). 

Moreover, the Court’s role under the 

APPA is limited to reviewing the 

remedy in relationship to the violations 

that the United States has alleged in its 

Complaint, and does not authorize the 

Court to ‘‘construct [its] own 

hypothetical case and then evaluate the 

decree against that case.’’ Microsoft, 56 

F.3d at 1459; see also U.S. Airways, 38 

F. Supp. 3d at 75 (noting that the court 

must simply determine whether there is 

a factual foundation for the 

government’s decisions such that its 

conclusions regarding the proposed 

settlements are reasonable); InBev, 2009 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *20 (‘‘[T]he 

’public interest’ is not to be measured by 

comparing the violations alleged in the 

complaint against those the court 

believes could have, or even should 

have, been alleged’’); Math Works, 2003 

WL 1922140 at *18; Mountain Health 

Care 2003 WL 22359598, at *8. Because 

the ‘‘court’s authority to review the 

decree depends entirely on the 

government’s exercising its 

prosecutorial discretion by bringing a 

case in the first place,’’ it follows that 

‘‘the court is only authorized to review 

the decree itself,’’ and not to ‘‘effectively 

redraft the complaint’’ to inquire into 

other matters that the United States did 

not pursue. Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459– 

60. 

In its 2004 amendments to the APPA, 

Congress made clear its intent to 

preserve the practical benefits of using 

judgments proposed by the United 

States in antitrust enforcement, Public 

Law 108–237 § 221, and added the 

unambiguous instruction that ‘‘[n]othing 

in this section shall be construed to 

require the court to conduct an 

evidentiary hearing or to require the 

court to permit anyone to intervene.’’ 15 

U.S.C. 16(e)(2); see also U.S. Airways, 

38 F. Supp. 3d at 76 (indicating that a 

court is not required to hold an 

evidentiary hearing or to permit 

intervenors as part of its review under 

the Tunney Act). This language 

explicitly wrote into the statute what 

Congress intended when it first enacted 

the Tunney Act in 1974. As Senator 

Tunney explained: ‘‘[t]he court is 

nowhere compelled to go to trial or to 

engage in extended proceedings which 

might have the effect of vitiating the 

benefits of prompt and less costly 

settlement through the consent decree 

process.’’ 119 Cong. Rec. 24,598 (1973) 

(statement of Sen. Tunney). ‘‘A court 

can make its public interest 

determination based on the competitive 

impact statement and response to public 

comments alone.’’ U.S. Airways, 38 F. 

Supp. 3d at 76 (citing Enova Corp., 107 

F. Supp. 2d at 17). 

VIII. Determinative Documents 

There are no determinative materials 

or documents within the meaning of the 

APPA that were considered by the 

United States in formulating the 

proposed Final Judgment. 

Dated: January 23, 2025. 

Respectfully submitted, 


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Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 19 / Thursday, January 30, 2025 / Notices 8607 

For Plaintiff United States of America: 

lllllllllllllllllllll

Henry C. Su, David A. Geiger, Danielle 

Hauck, John J. Hogan, Kris A. Pe ́rez Hicks, 

Attorneys, United States Department of 

Justice, Antitrust Division, Technology and 

Digital Platforms Section, 450 Fifth St. NW, 

Suite 7100, Washington DC 20530, 

Telephone: (202) 307–6200, Email: henry.su@

usdoj.gov. 

[FR Doc. 2025–01886 Filed 1–29–25; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–11–P 


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