Th e H on ora ble Ni na Ge rsh on , o f t

he Un ite d S tat es D ist

ric t C ourt f

or t he Ea ste rn * Districtof New York, sitting by designat ion. 07

- 24 30

- cv ( L) , 07

- 25 48

- cv ( X A P) , 07

- 25 50

- cv ( X A P) O n e id a In d ia n N

a tion o f Ne w Y o rk, et a l. v . C o u n ty o

f O n e id a , et a l.

1 UNITED STATE S COURT OF AP PEALS 2 FO R T HE SE CO ND CI RC UI T 3 4 August Term 2007 5 6 7 Argued: June 3, 2008 Decided: August 9, 2010 8 9 10 Docket Nos. 07-2430-cv(L) , 07-2548-cv(XAP), 07-2550-c v(XAP) 11 12

_____________________________________ 13 14 ONEIDA IND IAN NATIONOF NEW YORK, O NEIDA TRIBE OF INDIANS O F 15 W ISCONSIN, ON EIDA OF TH E THAMES, 16 17 Plain tif fs- Ap pe lle es- Cros s-A

pp ellan ts , 18 19 UNITED STA TES OF AMERICA, 20 21 Intervenor -Plainti ff- Appellee-Cross -Appellant , 22 23 -v.- 24 25 COUNT Y OF ON EIDA, COU NTY OF MA DISON, 26 27 De fen da nts -C

ro ss- Ap pe lle es , 28 29 STATE OF NEW YORK, 30 31 De fen da nt- Ap pe lla nt- Cros s-A

pp ellee . 32

_____________________________________ 33 34 35 Before: McLAUGHLIN, LIVING STON, Ci rcu it J ud ges , and GERSHO N, District Judge

. * 36 37 De fe nd ant-App ell ant-C ros s-A pp ell ee S tat e o f N ewYo rk, Pl aintif fs -App ell ees -C ros s-2 1 Appellants Oneida Nation of New York, Oneida Tribe of Indians of W isconsin, and Oneida of the 2 Th am es, an d Int erv en or- Pl aintif f- Ap pe lle e-C ros s-A

pp ell ant Un ite d St ate s of

Am eri ca e ach

ap pe al 3 fr om

a d eci sio n of

th e Un ite d St ate s Di str ict C ourt fo r t

he No rth ern

Di str ict of Ne w Y ork

(L awren ce 4 E. Kahn, District

Judge ) gr antin g in

part the m oti on

f or summ ary

ju dg m ent f

ile d byth e St ate of

Ne w 5 Yo rk and

the Co untie s o f O ne ida

an d M ad iso n and

the reb y d ism iss ing m os t of pla int if fs ’ cl aim s as 6 barred by la ches. On appeal, the State of New York contends that the di strictcourt err ed in allowing 7 any cla im s to pr oc eed

. Meanwhil e, the U nit ed St ate s an d th e In dian N ati on pla int if fs co nte nd

that 8 the dis tri ct c ourt e rre d in dis m iss ingany o f t

he plainti ffs ’ cl aim s, arg uin g b oth that th is C ourt’ s 9 earlie r decisi on in Ca yu ga Ind ian Na tio n o

f N ew Yor k v. Pa tak

i , 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005), on 10 wh ich

the dis tri ct co urt

re lie d in dis m iss ing p lai nti ff s’ po sse sso ry c lai m s, wa s in co rre ctl y d eci de d 11 and that, e ven if Cayuga is left undisturbed, the defendants here have faile d to establ ish the 12 ne ces sar

y e lem ents o f a

lac he s d ef

en se. Li ke the distric t co urt , w e co nc lud e th at the pla int if fs ’ 13 possessory

c lai m s are b arr ed

b y eq uit ab le de fe ns es. W e als o co nc lud e, h ow ev er, th at the 14 purportedly no np os ses so ry c lai m ide nti fi ed

bythat co urt

is a lso barre d, bo th b y N ewYo rk’ s 15 sovereign i mm

unity and by the e quitable pr inciples applied in Cayuga . W e f ina llyco nc lude that 16 the alte rnative nonpos sessory cl aim articulate d on appeal by the pl aintif fs is l ik ew ise barr ed by 17 Cayuga

. 18 AFFIRMED IN PA RT, REVE RSED IN PA RT, AND REMANDE D. 19 Judge Gershon concurs in part and di ssents in pa rt in a se parate opi nion. 2 0 DEN IS E A

. H A R T M A N , A s s is tan t S o li c it o r G e n e ra l 2 1 (B A R B A RA D

. UN D E RW O O D , S o li c it o r G e n e ra l, 22 ANDRE W D. BING, Deputy Soli citor Gener al, on thebr ief , 23 an d D W IG HT HE AL Y, W hit e & C ase , LL P, N ewY ork , N ew 24 York, o f c o u n s el), for

AN DREW

M. CU OM O, Attor

ne y 25 Ge ne ral o f the S tat e of N ewY ork , Al bany , New York, for3 1 De fen da nt- Ap pe lla nt- Cros s-A

pp ellee S tate o f N ew Yo rk

. 2 3 KA TH RY N E . K OV AC S, U. S. De pa rtm ent of

Ju sti ce, 4 W ashington, D.C. (RONALD J. TENPAS, Acting Assist ant 5 Attorney General , CRAIG AL EXAND ER, ELIZABE TH 6 ANN PET ERSON, U .S. Department of Justice, Washington, 7 D.C., on the b rie f , and THOMAS B LASER, U .S. Department 8 of the Interi or, Washington, D.C., of c ou ns el), for Interv en or9 Plain tif f-A pp e lle e -C ro s s -A p p e ll a n t U n ite d S ta te s of A me ric a . 10 MIC HA EL R. SM IT H ( DA VI D A . REISER, on thebr ief ), 11 Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, W ashington, D.C., for Plain tiff12 Appellee-Cross -Appellant On eid a I n d ia n Na tio n o

f N ew Yo rk

. 13 14 ARLINDAF. LOCKLE AR, W ashington, D.C., for Plain tiff15 Appell ee -Cross-Appell ant Oneida Tribe of I ndians of 16 Wis co ns in

. 17 18 CAREYR. RAMOS, P aul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & 19 Garrison LLP, New York, New York, for Plain tif f-A pp ellee20 Cros s-A pp ellan t O ne ida of t

heTh am es . 21 22 DAVID M. S CHRAVER (DAVID H. TENN ANT, on the 23 br ief ), Nixon Peabody LLP, Roches ter , New York, for 24 Defendants-Cross- Appellees County of

Oneida, County of 25 Madison

. 26 27 JO HNDO SS ET T a nd VI RG IN IAD AV IS , N ati o n a l C o n gre ss 28 of Am erican Ind ian s, W ash ing ton , D .C ., an d KIM J

. 29 GO TT SC HA LK , N ati ve Am eri can Ri gh ts F un d, Boulde r, 30 Colorado,for Amicus Curiae National Congress of American 31 Indians

. 32 33 DEBRAANN LIVING STON, Circuit Judge : 34 W e ar e o nc e ag ain cal led up on to c on sid er the av ail ab ili ty of relie f to Indi annati on s al leg ed 35 to have been depr ived long ago of theirancestra l lands by the State o f N ew Yo rkin violat ion of 36 federal law. We adjudicate t hese ancientclaims, dating back overtwo hundred years, a gainst the 37 ba ck gro un d o f o ve r th irty y ear s o f l iti gatio n h ere an d in the Su pre m e C ourt. Th ese ear lier c ase s, 38 involving both pr esent plai ntiffs and the Cayuga Indian Nation, frame the issue now before us and4 1 in l arg e m eas ure de ter m ine its outco m e. 2 In 1970 the One id a In dian Nation of New York (“New York Oneidas”) and t he Oneida 3 Indian Nation of Wisconsin ( “Wisconsin Oneidas”) broughtsuit — a “t est case” — seeking from 4 the Counties of Madis on and Oneida in New York State t wo years of fair rental valu e (for 1968 5 and1969) for about 872 acr es occupied by these counties. This land represented a sm all portion of 6 certai n land ceded by the Oneida I ndian Nation, the plainti ffs’ ancestors, to New York Stat e in 1795 7 in a lle ged vio lat ion of bo th f ed era l tr eat ies an d th e T rad e an d Inter co urs e A ct ( “N on int erc ourse 8 Ac t”) , A ct o f July 22 , 1 79 0, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 13 7 (1 79 0) ( co dif ied as am en de d at 25 U. S. C. § 1 77 ), 9 which prohibit s sales of tri bal land withoutthe consent of the United States. The case reached t he 10 Su

pre m e C ourt. Th e C ourt c on clu de d th at b eca us e th e co m

pla int ass ert ed a cu rre nt r ight to 11 po sse ssi on

of the lan ds that ex ist ed

as a m att er of

fe de ral law , th e p lai nti ff

s h ad sat isf ied the we ll12 pleadedcomplaint rule: “The c laim m ay fail at a l ater st age for a variet y of reasons; but for 13 jur isd ict ion al purpo ses , thi s is no t a ca se whe re t he un de rly ingrig ht o r ob lig ati on ari ses on ly u

nd er 14 state l awan d f

ed era l law i s m ere ly a lle ge d a s a b arr ier to its e ff ect uatio n. ” Oneida Indian Nation 15 of N.Y

. v. Co un ty of Oneida , 4 14 U. S. 66 1, 67 5 (1 97 4) ( “ Oneida I ”). Su bs eq ue ntl y, the Co urt 16 determined in Co un ty of One ida v. On eid

a Ind ian Nat ion of Ne w Y

or k S tate , 470 U.S. 226 (1985) 17 (“ On eid

a II ”), that th e N ewYo rk and Wisc on sin On eid as, alo ng wi th t

he On eid a o f t

he Th am es 18 Band

Co un cil (co lle cti ve ly, “the One ida s”) , co uld ma int ain a caus e of

acti on fo r vi olatio n o f t

he ir 19 possessory rights to these aboriginal l ands based on federal comm on law. Se e O ne ida II , 470 U.S. 20 at 2 36

. In

th e ve ry de cis ion

re co gn izi ng th at such

a c au se of a cti on co uld be m aintai ne d, ho we ve r, 21 the Co urt

no ted that “[ t] he qu est ion

wh eth er e qu ita

ble co ns ide rati o n s s h o u ld

li m it th e re li ef av ail ab le 22 to t

he pre sent day On eid a Ind ian s” ha d no t bee n ad dre sse d an d that it exp res sed “no opin ion

as t o5 1 wh eth er o the r co ns ide rat ion s m aybe rel ev ant to the final disposi tio n o f [ the ] c ase ,” wh ich it 2 remanded f

or further proc eedings. Id . at 25 3 n. 27 . On re m an d, the di str ict court awarde d d am ag es 3 in t

he am ount o f $ 18 ,9 70 fr om Mad iso n C ounty and $15,99 4 f rom On eid a C ounty , a lon g w ith 4 prejudgment interes t, for a t otal judgment of about $57,000. On eid a In dia n N

ati on of N .Y . v . C ou nty 5 of Oneida , 2 17 F. Su pp . 2 d 2 92 , 3 10 (N .D .N .Y . 2 00 2). 6 Th e p res ent ca se w as b rou gh t in 1 97 4, b ut lay

d orm ant f

or t he be tte r part o f 2 5 y ear s whil e 7 the parti es explored s ettlement and the Oneida s pursued the pr eceding “te st case” o n it s two 8 separate trips to the S upreme Court. See City of Sher rill v. Onei da Indian Nation of N.Y. , 544 U.S. 9 19 7, 20 9 (2 00 5) ( no tin g th at the pre sent li tig ati on , “ he ld i n a be yanc e d uri ng the p en de nc y o f t

he tes t 10 cas e, ” re sum ed

on ly i n 2 00 0); seea lso O ne ida In dia n Na tio n ofN. Y. v. Ne w Y or k , 194 F. Supp. 2d 11 104, 113 (N.D.N.Y. 2002). The instant case involves the Onei das’ claim not to 872 ac res and to t wo 12 ye ars of

rent, but to ap pro xim ate ly 25 0, 00 0 acr es of ance str al land s, and

to r eli ef go ingba ck

ov er 1 3 tw o hun dre d

y e ars , t o th e p e ri o d

b e tw e e n1 7 9 5 an d

1 8 4 6 wh e nth e s e l an d s w e re c o n v e y e d in 14 multiple transac tions to t he State of New York. During the interveni ng years from 1974 until today, 15 moreover, a subsequent deci sion of the Supreme Court, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of 16 Ne w Y

or k , 544 U.S. 197, and this Court’s decisi on in Ca yu ga Ind ian Na tio n v . Pata ki , 413 F.3d 266 17 (2d Cir. 2005), cer t. d en ied, 547 U.S. 1128 (2006), have e xplored in ways per tinent t o our decisi on 18 here the ques tions thatremained undecided following Oneida I and On eid

a II — nam ely , whe the r 19 an d in wh at cir cum stanc es eq uit ab le pri nc ipl es m ight l im it the re lie f av ail ab le to pre sent day In dian 20 tribes de prived of ancestr al lands many years ago in vi olation of federal l aw. 21 The Oneidas, along with t he United State s, which inter vened in this litiga tio n in 1998, 22 asse rte d a

varie ty o f c lai m s b ef

ore the dis tri ct c ourt. In an o rde r dated May 21 , 2 00 7, the Un ite d6 1 States Dist rict Courtforthe Nort hern Distri ct of New York (Lawrence E. Kahn, District Judge ), 2 relying pr incipall y on t hi s Cou rt’s dec ision in Cayuga , g ranted in p art a m oti on

fo r summ ary 3 judgment filed by the Sta te of New York and the Countie s of Oneida and Madison on the ground 4 that all but one of the pla in ti ffs’ cl aims were barred by lache s. See Oneida Indian Nati on of N.Y. 5 v. New Yor

k , 500 F. Supp. 2d 128, 137 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (“ On eid a II I ”). Based on the S up re me 6 Court’s deci sion in Sh err ill , Cayuga ha d p rev iou sly de ter m ine d th at e qu itable defense s ap ply to 7 “disrupti ve” Indian l and claims, and that posse ssory claims — clai ms prem ised on the as sertion of 8 a co nti nu ingrig ht to po sse ssi on o f an cie nt tri ba l l an ds —

are byth eir

n ature dis rup tiv e, in t

hat th ey 9 call int o question set tled land t itles. Se e Cayuga , 413 F.3d at 274-75. The di str ict courtin the 10 pre sent ca se he ld t hat la ch es b arr ed

all the pla int if

fs ’ po sse sso ry c lai m s, but th at the pla int if fs co uld 11 proceed agai nst the Stat e of New Y ork alone with what the dis trictcourt ter med a “nonpossessory,” 12 co ntr act -ba sed

cla im fo r un co ns cio na

ble c o n s id e rati o n

in c o nn e c ti o n

w it hth e o ri g in a l l an d

tr an sf ers . 13 Th is C ourt g ranted Ne w Yo rk’ s pe tit ion

p urs uant t o 2 8 U .S .C . § 12 92 (b) fo r le av e to ap pe al, as w ell 14 as the cros s petiti ons of the Oneidas and the Unit ed States. 15 He re, the On eid as and the Un ite d S tates assert pr im ari ly t hat th e d istric t co urt

err ed in 16 dis m iss ing anyo f the O ne ida s’ cla im s, c onten din g bo th that t his C ourt’ s de cis ion in Cayuga wa s 17 inc orr ect ly d eci de d and that, e ve n a cce pti ng that Cayuga is co ntr oll ingh ere , th e d ef en dants fa ile d 18 to e sta

bli shthe ne ces sar

y e lem ents o f a

lac he s defense. The Unit ed St ate s d ef

en ds the dis tri ct 19 co urt ’s de cis ion

to th e ex tent i t p erm itt ed

p lai nti ff s to pro cee d wi th a “n on

po sse sso ry” cla im , whil e 20 at the sam e tim e it art icu lat es an a lte rnativ e cl aim to t hat re co gn ize d b y th e d istric t co urt , g rou nd edTh e O ne ida s as ser t th at b oth

fe de ral co m

m on lawan d th e N on int erc ou se A ct p rov ide a 1 basis for asser ting “nonposses sory” clai ms that are not subjec t to Cayuga ’s equitable defense. 7 1 no t in

fe de ral co mm on

lawbut in

the No nintercours e A ct. Meanwhil e, Ne w Y ork St ate arg ue s 1 2 pri nc ipa llythat th e d istric t co urt err ed in p erm itt ing a cl aim

to p roc eed

o n the the ory

that N ewYo rk 3 paid unconscionably inadequat e considera tio n fort he subject l ands and that r eformation of the 4 ori gin al a gre em ents t o p rov ide fo r a pp rop riate co m

pe ns ati on is an ava ila

ble rem ed y. It c onten ds , 5 inter a lia , th at this cla im , a s we ll as the al ter nativ e cla im

pres sed by pla int if

fs on ap pe al, fa lls wi thi n 6 Cayuga ’s recogni tion thatequitable considerat ions bar the adjudicat io n of disruptive I ndian land 7 cla im s. Ne w Y ork co nte nd s, in ad dit ion , that its s ov ere ign imm un itybars t

he co ntr act -ba sed

cla im 8 on which the dist rict cour t permitted the Oneida s to proceed. 9 Fo r th e re aso ns art icu lat ed be low , we con clu de that

the di str ict

co urt co rre ctl y d ete rm ine d 10 that Cayuga is control ling here, a nd that all claims dependent on t he assert ion of a current 11 po sse sso ry i nte res t in the su bje ct l an ds are barre d b y e qu ita ble de fe ns es. W e f

urt he r co nc lud e, 12 however, t hat t he purpor tedly nonpossessory claim identi fied by that court is a lso ba rred, both by 13 New York’s sovereign i mm unity and by the e quitable pr inciples applied in Cayuga

. In li gh t of 14 Cayuga ’s holding t hat equitable defenses apply to dis ruptive I ndian land cl aims, we finally conclude 15 that th e alt ern ati ve n on po sse sso ry cla im

arti cu lat ed

o n ap pe al byth e pla int if fs , pre m ised on a 16 violati on of the Nonintercours e Act, is als o barred. 17 BACKGROUND 18 Because both thi s Cour t an d th e Supreme Court have repe atedly consi dered this case and 19 oth er r elated

cas es i nv olv ingthe One ida s, the hi sto ric al ev ents th at f orm the ba sis for

the pla int if

fs ’ 20 claims have been des cribed extensivel y elsewhere, i ncluding in Oneida I , On eid a II , Sh err ill , th isTh e N on int erc ourse Ac t w as r en ew ed an d re vis ed

sev era l ti m es and

rem ain s co dif

ied 2 tod ayat 2 5 U .S .C . § 17 7. Th e v ers ion of the Ac t in

ef fe ct i n 1 79 3 p rov ide d in

rel ev ant part: [N]o purchase or grant of lands, or of any ti tle or cl aim thereto, from any Indians or natio n o r tr ibe of

Ind ian s, wi thi n th e b ound s o f t he Un ite d S tat es, sh all be of any v ali dit

y in law or equit y, unless the s ame be m ade by a trea ty or conventi on entered i nto pursuant to the const itution; and it shal l be a misdemeanor, in any person not employed under the authorit y of the United States , in nego[t]iating such t reaty or c onvention, punishable by fi ne no t ex cee din g o ne tho us an d d oll ars , and im pri so nm ent no t ex cee din g tw elv e m onths , directl y or indire ctly to t reat with a ny such Indians . . . for t he titl e or purchase of any lands by them held, or clai med. Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, § 8, 1 Stat. 329, 330.

8 1 Court’s deci sion in Oneida Indi an Nation of New York State v. County of Oneida , 719 F.2d 525 (2d 2 Cir. 1983), aff

’d in par t, rev’d in pa rt b y O ne ida II

, 470 U.S. 226 (1985), and the opini on of the 3 dis tri ct c ourt b elo w. Acc ord ing ly, we outli ne the se e ve nts on ly b rie fl y h ere , p rov idi ng a so m ewhat 4 more extended recounting of the c ase’s proc edural his tory. 5 The One id as ar e directdescendants of the Onei da Indian Nati on, one of six nations of the 6 Ir oquo is wi th anab or ig in al ho mel an d t ha t “[a ]tt he b ir th o f t he Un it edSt at es . . . c ompr is edso me 7 sixmi lli on

acre s in w hat is no w ce ntr al N ewYo rk. ” Sh err ill , 54 4 U. S. at 20 3. Un de r pr ess ure to 8 open this la nd for sett le ment in t he years afterthe Revolutiona ry War, New Y ork State i n 1788 9 co nc lud ed

the T reaty of

F ort S chuy ler w ithth e On eid a In dian N ati on pursu ant to wh ich

Ne w Y ork 10 purchased the majority of the Nation’s l and in New York, lea ving t he Nati on with a reserva tion of 11 approximately 300,000 acres

. Id . The legiti macy of thi s ini tial transfer is not at i ssue in the pr esent 12 case. Some two years after the Tre aty of Fort Schuyler, t he United State s Congress enact ed the 1 3 No ni n te rc o urs e A c t, wh ic h“ b ars s a le s o f tri b a l lan d

w it h o u t th e a c qu ie s c e n c e o f th e Fe de ral 14 Go ve rnm ent.” Id . at 20 4. In 1 79 4, the Uni ted Stat es e nte red

int o th e T reaty o f C an an da igu a, Ac t 2The Treaty of Buffalo Creek, which was entered i nto between the Onei das and the 3 United States in 1838, “envisi oned removal of all remaining New York Indians, incl uding the On eid as, to K an sas .” Sh err ill , 5 44 U. S. at 2 06 . “ In Arti cle 13 of the

. . . T reaty, the On eid as ag ree d to rem ov e to the Kans as l an ds the Un ite d S tat es h ad set asi de fo r th em

as s oo n a s th ey could make satisfactory arrangements for New York State’s purchas e of their lands at Oneida.” Id. (internal quotati on marks and alterati on omitted). 9 1 of Nov. 11, 1794, 7 Stat. 44, with the six I roquois nations: “That trea ty both ‘acknowle dge[d]’ the 2 On eid a R ese rvatio n a s est ab lis he d byth e Tr eat y of Fo rt S chuy ler

an d g uarantee d th e O ne ida s’ ‘ fr ee 3 us e an d e njo ym ent’ o f t he res erv ed

ter rit ory .” Sh err ill , 54 4 U. S. at 2 04 -05 (al ter ati on in o rig ina l) 4 (quoting Trea ty of Canandaigua, Art. II , 7 Stat. 45). 5 Despite the p ass ag e of th e No ninter co urs e Ac t and th e co nc lus ion

o f the T reaty of 6 Canandaigua, New York continued t o purchase land from the O neida Indian Nation i n a series of 7 transact ions from 1795 to 1846. Id . at 20 5. Th e Washington Adm ini str ati on ob jec ted to t he fi rst 8 of th ese tr an sac tio ns invo lvi ng 1 00 ,0 00 a cre s, b ut lat er adm ini str ati on s m ad e no atte m pt to i nte rf

ere 9 with New York’s continued a cquisiti on of land reserved t o the Oneida Nation. Se e id . In de ed , a s 10 the Supreme Court recognized i n Sh err ill , “ ear ly 1 9th -ce ntu ry f ed era l In dian ag ents in

NewYo rk 11 St ate did

no t si m ply fa il t o c he ck

Ne w Y ork ’s l and purchases , th ey‘to ok anact ive rol e . . . in 12 en co ura gin g the re m ov al of th e On eid as . . . to the west.’” Id . (quoting On eid a N ati on of N

.Y . v . 13 Un ite d S

tates , 43 Ind. Cl. C omm ’n 373, 390 (1978)). By 1838, six hundred mem bers of the Oneida 1 4 Na ti o nre s id e d

in W is c o n s in , w h il e 6 2 0 re m a in e d in N e wY o rk

S tate , an d

th e U n it e d

S tate s w as 15 act ive ly p urs uin g a plan, thr ou ghthe Tr eat

y o f B uf fa lo Cr eek , to rem ov e all o f the rem ain ingNe w 16 Yo rk O ne ida s, as we ll as oth er Ne w Yo rk Ind ian s, to Kans as. Id . at 20 6. “T he On eid as who staye d 3 17 on

in N ewYo rk .

. . co nti nu ed to d im ini shin n

um be r an d, durin g th e 1840’s, sold mos t of the ir 18 rem ain ing lan ds to t he St ate .” Id . at 206-07.10 1 Th e N ewYo rk and W isc on sin

On eid as f ir s t i n s ti tu te d c o urt p ro c e e d in g s s e e k in g re co m pe ns e 2 in c onne cti on

wi th t he se t ran sac tio ns wi th N ewYo rk S tat e in 1 95 1, wh enthe y b rou gh t su it a ga ins t 3 the United Stat es pursuant t o the Indian Cla ims Com mission Act (“ICCA”), ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 4 (19 46 ). T he y a sse rte d th enthat th eyha d re cei ve d un co ns cio na ble c om pe ns ati on in co nn ect ion

wi th 5 “lands thatNew York had acquired thr ough 25 treati es of cession concl uded between 1795 and 6 18 46 ,” that th e Unit ed Stat es ha d bre ach ed

its fi du ciary duty to them und er th e N on int erc ourse Ac t, 7 and that the y should receive the f air market value of

the transferred lands. Sh err ill , 544 U.S. at 207. 8 The Indian Claims Commission determined that the Unit ed States i n fact had ac tual or cons tructi ve 9 kn ow led ge of

the se t reatie s an d th at i t “w ou ld b e li ab le i f t he One ida s h ad

no t re cei ve d c on sci on ab le 10 co ns ide rat ion .” Id . at 208 (cit ing On eid a N ati on of N .Y . v . U nited Sta tes , 43 Ind. Cl. Comm ’n 373, 1 1 37 5, 4 0 6 -0 7 ( 1 9 7 8 ))

. A t th e r e qu e s t o f th e N e wY o rk

an d W is c o n s in

O n e id a s , h o w e v e r, th e ca se 12 then pe nding before t he Court of Claims was dism issed pri or to any dete rmination of the scope of 13 the United Stat es’ liability. Id . The Court of Claims noted at t he ti me that t his was as a resul t of the 14 plainti ffs’ view “that their interests would not be served by obtaining a ny monetary com pensation,” 15 an d that t

he y “p ref er[ red ] to pre ss lit igatio n . . . see kin g a de ter m inatio n th at the y h av e p res ent ti tle 16 to t

he lan d in Ne w Y ork

St ate

. . . . ” On eid

a N ati on of N

.Y . v . U nited Sta tes , 231 Ct. Cl. 990 (C t. 17 Cl. 1982) (per cur iam). 18 Co mm en ced bythe Ne w Y ork and

W isc on sin

On eid as s om e ei gh t ye ars be fo re the y 19 abandoned theircase before the I ndian Claims Commissi on , the i nstant li tigati on represent s the 20 alterna tive venue i n which the Oneidas elected to pursue their cl aims. As originally ple d in 1974, 21 this case sought recompense for the ill egal occupat ion of Oneida land by the Counti es of MadisonAs noted previousl y, the New York and Wisconsin Oneidas at the t ime this litiga tion 4 was initia ted were seeki ng damages from the United Stat es in the Courtof Claims proceeding for the period pr ior to 1951. See Oneida Indian Nati on v. County of Oneida , 199 F.R.D. 61, 68 (N .D .N .Y . 2 00 0). 11 1 and Oneida from

1951 onwards. The plaintiffs asserted no c laim for unconscionable consi deration 4 2 in c onne cti on

with t he ori gin al tran sf

ers to N ewYo rk S tat e an d, ind eed , c ou ld n ot h av e d on e so 3 because New York State was no t a pa rty to the litiga tion and the Counti es were not par ties to t he 4 various sal e agreements between Ne w York a nd the Oneida Indi an Nation. After decades during 5 wh ich

the su it l aydo rm ant, t

he Un ite d S tates interven ed in t he lit igatio n a ga ins t th e C ounti es i n 6 1998. In 2000, both the or iginal pl aintiffs and the Unite d States amended their pl eadings to add t he 7 On eid a o f t

he Th am es a s an

ad dit ion al p lai nti ff

and , fo r t he v ery f irs t ti m e, to n am e th e S tat e o f N ew 8 Yo rk a s a d ef

en dant. Both the Oneidas and the Un ite d S tat es a lso so ug ht t o jo in a s d ef en dants 9 20 ,0 00 pri vate l an do wn ers . T he d istric t c ourt pro hib ite d th e as ser tio n o f anycla im s ag ain st p riv ate 10 landowners, finding: ( 1) t hat t he Oneidas had acted in bad faith i n thatfor thirty years they “[had] 11 steadfast ly m aintai ne d th at the y w ere not s e e k in g t o d is ru

p t th e c urr e n t lan d o w n e rs , ” o nlyto 12 ab an do n th is p os iti on in an ef fo rt to dis po sse ss the se lan do wn ers and a lso to o bta in m on eydam ag es 13 from

them; and (2) that t he United State s had likewise failed to act in good faith by “vacillat ing on 14 the cri tic al i ssu e o f t he pri vate l an do wn ers ’ ro le .

. . in t his lit igatio n. ” Oneida Indi an Na tio n v . 15 County of Oneida , 199 F.R.D. 61, 81, 87 (N.D.N .Y. 2000). 16 The dist rict court did per mit the Oneidas s ignificantl y to amend their complaint agai nst the 17 present defendant s to expand both t he claims asserte d and the scope of the relief sought so thatthe 18 lit igatio n c am e to en co m pa ss t he 25 0, 00 0-s om e ac res an d th e 200-plus y ear his tor y n owat i ssu e. 19 Th e O ne ida s f

ile d an am en de d c om

pla int , n oti ng that it

wa s “f ile d in a cco rdanc e wi th [t

he dis tri ct12 1 court’s] deci sion” with re ga rdt o th e pri vate landowners and therefore was “nota waiver of any 2 rig hts or c lai m s. ” O ne ida Am . C om

pl. ¶ 2. As am en de d, the On eid as’ co m pla int states that: 3 Under Federal common law, the Nonintercour se Act and the Tre aty of 4 Canandaigua , P lai nti ff Tr ibe s . . . have “p os ses so ry r ights” in t he su bje ct 5 lands . . . and seek, i n vindi cation of those rights, da mages for unlawful possession 6 of

the su bje ct l an ds f

rom th e tim e eac h po rti on

o f the s ub

jec t l an ds wa s wron gf

ull y 7 acq

uir ed or t ran sf erred from

the On eid a In dian N ati on to t he pre sent ti m e; 8 disgorgement of the amounts by which defendants have been un ju stly enri ched by 9 rea so n o f t

he il leg al tak ingo f the s ub jec t l an ds ; an a cco untin g; and a d ecl aratio n th at 10 Ne w Y ork St ate acq uir ed and /or trans fe rre d th e su

bje ct l an ds fr om

the On eid a In dian 11 Nation in viol ation of the Noninter course Act and ot her Federal la w a nd thatthe 12 purported agreements and lett ers patentby which the subjec t lands were a cquired or 13 transferre d . . . were void ab ini tio. 14 Id. ¶ 3. Th e On eid as’ p ray er fo r r eli ef s eek s a de clarat ion : ( 1) that t he O ne idas “have possessor y 15 rig hts to t

he su bje ct l an ds

. . . and

the re h as be en no term inatio n of thos e po sse sso ry ri gh ts” ; (2) that 16 the su

bje ct l an ds we re “ co nv eyed u nlawf ull y” ; (3 ) th at t

he vario us ag ree m ents p urs uant t o whic h 17 the lands were conveyed “ were voi d ab initio” ; ( 4) t hat “ the s ubject lands have been in the unlawful 18 po sse ssi on

of tres pa sse rs” ; and

(5) that “a ll i nte res ts o f anyde fe nd ant in the su bje ct l an ds are nu ll 19 and v oid .” Id. at 2 4

. T h e O n e id a s s e e k i n ju n c ti v e r e li e f

“ a s n e c e s s ary

t o r e s to re [ th e m ] to 20 po sse ssi on

of tho se p ortions of the subj ect lan ds to w

hic h [ the ] d ef

en dants cla im

tit le. ” Id. at 25. 21 Th eyals o s eek

dam ag es: (1) “in

the am ount of

. . . th e f air m ark et v alu e of the su

bje ct l an ds , a s 22 improved”; (2) in the am ount of the lands’ fair m arket rental value f rom the date of transfer to the 23 pre sent; (3 ) in an am ount e qu al t o th e land s’ d im inutio n in va lue du e to any e xtr act ion of res ource s 24 or “damage, pollution or de structi on” to t he prope rty; and (4) in an amount equal to t he value of any 25 of

the se r eso urc es, whe the r t ak enf rom th e lan ds b y th e d ef

en dants or t

ho se “ purpo rti ng to a ct w ith 26 de fe nd an ts’ pe rm iss ion .” Id. T he O ne ida s als o see k be ne fi ts rec eiv ed byNe w Y ork

St ate “f rom its 27 purported pur chases and sal es of the subjectlands,” including “the difference i n value between the13 1 price at

whic h Ne w Yo rk St ate a cq uir ed o r t ran sf err ed e ach p ort ion o f the s ub

jec t l an ds f

rom the 2 On eid a In dian N ati on an d it s v alu e. ” Id. at 26. 3 The United States also amended its complaint in 2000. The 2000 United St ates complaint 4 asserte d both a “Federal Common L aw Trespass Claim” and a “Trade and I ntercours e Claim.” U.S. 5 Am . Com

pl. at 1 4, 15 . In

its praye r f

or r eli ef , th e Unit ed

St ate s so ug ht “ dam ag es, inc luding 6 pre

jud gm ent inter est , a ga ins t th e S tat e o f N ewYor k as th e pri m ary

tort fe aso r . . . f

or t he tre sp ass es 7 to t he Su

bje ct L an ds that or igi nated wi th t he St ate ’s i lle ga l tr an sac tio ns .” Id. at 1 6

. T h e Un ite d 8 St ate s al so so ug ht a de ter m inatio n th at t

he St ate ’s “ purpo rte d a cq uis iti on s” o f t

he pro pe rtyvio lat ed 9 federal law, that the various agreem ents pursuant to which these acquisiti ons took place wer e void, 10 an d an award of

app rop riate “d ecl arator

y rel ief and /or ejec tm ent” w ithregard to land s to w hic h N ew 11 York State and the Counties clai med title. Id. Th e Unit ed St ate s am en de d it s co m

plaint again

in 12 2002 to drop its claims against the Counties. In its pra yer for reli ef, the 2002 amended com plaint 13 seeks, inter a lia , a de clarat ory ju dg m ent “ that t

he O ne ida N ati on h as the rig ht t o o ccu

pythe [s ub

jec t] 14 lands . . . curr ently occupi ed by the State .” It s eeks “monetary and possessor y relief,” inc luding 15 ejectment againstthe State, wher e appropriate, along with mesne profits or t he fair renta l value for 16 all the s ubject la nds “from the time when the State attempted to acquir e each separ ate parcel . . . 17 until the present,” on t he theory tha t the Stat e “was the ini tial t respasser. . . and all inj ury to the 18 Oneida Nation flowed from the State’s tor tious act ions, includi ng the subsequenttrespass es by 19 pri vate l an do wn ers .” U. S. Se co nd Am . C om

pl. at 14- 15 . T he co m

pla int see ks a ju dg m ent ag ain st 20 Ne w Y ork

“aw ard ingap pro pri ate m on etary reli ef for thos e lan ds . . . ove r wh ich the St ate no lon ge r 21 ret ain s ti tle or c ontro l.” Id. at 15. It al so seeks “such ot her relief as [the] Court may deem just and 22 pro pe r.” Id.14 1 After the Supreme Court’s decisi on in Sh err ill and this Court’ s dec is ion in Cayuga , N ew 2 Yo rk and

the Co untie s m ov ed

fo r summ ary

jud gm ent on

both the On eid as’ an d th e Unit ed St ate s’ 3 cla im s o n the th eo ry that t he d oc tri ne o f lac he s pre clu de d the m . N oti ng that th e S up rem e C ourt i n 4 Sh err ill

ha d “ he ld t

hat eq uit ab le p rin cip les barre d the N ewYo rk O ne ida s f rom rea sse rti ng tri ba l 5 so ve rei gnty o ve r la nd the y h ad purchased that wa s w ith in t he bo un darie s o f t

he On eid as’ fo rm er 6 reservat ion area,” a nd that thi s Court had deter mined in Cayuga “that dis ruptive poss essory land 7 claims are subject to t he equi table doctrines , speci fically laches, appl ied in Sh err ill ,” On eid a II I , 500 8 F. Su

p p . 2 d a t 1 3 1 -3 2 , th e d is tr ic t c o urt c o n c lu d e d

th a t c la im s “ p re d ic a te d

o n[ th e On eid as’ ] 9 continuing r ight to posse ss land . . . and see k[ing] relief returni ng that land a nd damages based on 10 . . . dispossessi on” were subjectto the lac hes defense, id. at 134. The distr ict courtelaborat ed: 11 The Court is compelled to ta ke this act ion to preventfurther disruption: 12 Pl aintif

fs see k to eje ct Defe nd ants f rom the ir l an d and

ob tai n tr esp ass dam ag es 13 relate d to Defendants’ unjustpossession of the l and.

. . . [C]laims based on the 14 On eid as’ p os ses so ry rig hts are dis rup tiv e to De fe nd ants’ rig hts an d m ight al so cal l 15 into question the rig hts of

ten s o f t

ho us an ds of

pri vate l an do wn ers an d th eir 16 leg iti m ate rel ian ce int ere sts to c ontin ue in the un dis tur

be d u se and

en joym ent of

the ir 17 property. Pa st i njustice s suffered by the Oneidas cannotbe remedied by creati ng 18 pre sent an d f utu re i nju sti ces . 19 20 Id. at 137. The distr ict courtdetermined, however, that t he Oneidas had adequa tely pled a claim for 21 dis go rge m ent by the S tat e of

N ewY ork

o f the d if fe ren ce i n v alu e b etw een

the pri ce at whic h N ew 22 York acquired t he subject lands pursuant to the twenty-s ix agreements at is sue and the la nds’ value 2 3 at the t im e o f

th e s e tran s a c ti o n s . T h e c o urt d e te rm in e d

th a t th is c la im

“ [ w a s ] b e s t s ty led

as a 24 contractclaim that seeks t o reform or revise a contr act thatis void for un conscionabil ity” and 25 determined tha t su ch a claim was not disrupt ive because i t “only seeks retrospe ctive re lief in the 26 form

of dam ages, i s not based on Plai ntiffs’ continuing pos sessory ri ght to the cl aimed land, and 27 do es not vo id t

he ag ree m ents, ” b ut r ath er r ef orm s th em

“throu ghanex erc ise of [t he co urt ’s]15 1 eq uit ab le p ow er[ s] .” Id. at 140. Accordingl y, the court granted the de fendants’ motion in part and 2 de nie d it

in p art , n oti ng tha

t it s d eci sio n “ pe rm its the O ne ida s to ref orm an d re vis e th e tw enty- six 3 (26 ) ag ree m ents w iththe St ate an d to rec eive fair comp en sat ion fo r land s tr an sf

err ed bythe ir 4 an ces tor s. ” Id. at 147. The insta nt appeal and c ross appeal followed. 5 DI SC US SI ON 6 At

the start, bo th t

he On eid as and

the Un ite d S tat es u

rge us to r ep ud iat e th is C ourt’ s earli er 7 decision i n Cayuga . This we cannot do. This panel is bound to adher e to the ear lier pr ecedent of 8 this Court i n the absence o f a d ecision by t he Supreme Court or an en banc pane l of thi s C ourt 9 calling t hat precede nt into quest ion. S ee Su lli va n v. A m. Ai rli nes, Inc

. , 4 24 F. 3d 26 7, 27 4 (2 d C ir. 10 2005). N othing of the sort has occurred here. Accordingly, we must and we will follow Cayuga to 11 the extentit is cont rol li ng . W e thus begin wit h the Supreme Court’s decisi on in Sh err ill an d th is 12 Court’s deci sion in Cayuga , which explained Sh err ill ’s i mport for the proper adjudic ation of ancient 13 tri ba l land

cla im s. W e th enpro cee d to co ns ide r b oth th e po sse sso ry cla im s d ism iss ed bythe dis tri ct 14 court on the authorit y of Cayuga and the purport edly nonpossessory claims that plai ntiffs contend 15 the y are e nti tle d to pursu e. 16 I. Sh errill and Cayuga 17 This Court’s dec ision in Cayuga , u po n whic h th e d ist

ric t co urt rel ied in dis m iss ing the bu lk 18 of the plainti ffs’ claim s, was itself based on the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision i n Sh err ill , whic h 19 the Cayuga panel foun d f un dam ental ly t o h av e ch an ge d the background legal s tandards for ass essing 20 ancient t ribal l and claims. Cayuga , 413 F.3d at 273. Sh err ill invo lve d a

bo ut 1 7, 00 0 a cre s sc att ere d 21 throughout the Counties of Madison and Oneida that w ere once part of the plaintiffs’ ancestral lands 22 an d th at w ere purc ha sed on the ope n m ark et by

the N ewYo rk O ne ida s in 19 97 an d 1 99 8. Th e N ew16 1 York Oneidas, citi ng On eid a II , argu ed that up on rea cq uir ingthis land , wh ich

repr ese nte d le ss t

han 2 1. 5 % o f

th e C o un ti e s ’ to ta l are a , th e O n e id aI n d ianN a ti o n ’s an c ie n t s o v e re ig n ty o v e r ea ch 3 individual parcel was r evived, barr ing the City of Sherrill or the Counties of Madis on and Oneida 4 fr om

req uir ingthe pla int if

fs to p aypro pe rtytax es. Th e Ne w Y ork On eid as s ou gh t eq

uit ab le r eli ef 5 in t

he fo rm of a d ecl aratio n “ pro hib iti ng , curre ntl y and in t he futur e, the im

po sit ion of pro pe rty 6 taxes” on the lands they had reac quired. Sh err ill , 5 44 U. S. at 2 12 . T he Co urt de ter m ine d th at s uc h 7 relief could notbe granted: 8 [W ]e decline to pr oject re dres s forthe Tr ibe into t he present a nd future, thereby 9 disrupti ng the governance of ce ntral New York’s counti es and towns. Generat ions 10 have pa sse d d uri ng wh ich

no n-I nd ian s have o wn ed

and d ev elo pe d the area

that on ce 11 composed the Tribe’s hist oric res ervation. And atlea st s ince the middle years of the 12 19th century, most of the Oneidas have resided elsewhere. Given t he longstandi ng, 13 dis tin ctl y n on -In dian c harac ter of t he ar ea and

its inh ab itants , th e re gu lat ory 14 authorit y constantl y exercise d by New York Sta te a nd it s count ies and towns, and t he 15 On eid as’ lon g d elay in seekin g ju dic ial rel ief ag ain st p art ies oth er than th e Unit ed 16 St ate s, we ho ld t hat th e T rib e cann ot u

nil ate ral ly r ev ive its an cie nt sovereignty, in 17 whol e o r in part, ov er the parce ls at is su e. Th e O ne ida s lo ng ag o re lin qu ish ed the 18 rei ns o f government and cannot regain the m through open-m arket purc hases from 19 curre nt t itl eh old ers . 20 Id . at 202-03. 21 Th e C ourt a dd res sed a num be r of fac tor s in r eac hin g th is c on clu sio n. Al tho ug h th e Unit ed 22 States appea red as amicus curiae on behalf of the New York Oneidas in Sh err ill , th e S up rem e C ourt 23 no ted

that “[ f] rom

the early 180 0’s int o th e 1 97 0’s , th e Unit ed St ate s large ly a cce pte d, or w as 24 indifferent to, New York’s governance of the landi n qu es ti on and the vali dity vel non of the 25 On eid as’ sal es t o th e S tat e. ” Id . at 21 4. Ind eed , natio na l pol icy thro ug h m

uc h o f t he ear ly 1 80 0’s 26 “w as de sig ne d to dis lod ge e ast c oa st lan ds f

rom In dian po sse ssi on .” Id . at 214-15. The Court found 2 7 it r e le v an t th a t th e O n e id a s “ d id n o t s e e k t o r e g a in p o s s e s s io no f

th e ir a b o ri g in a l lan ds byco urt 28 decree unti l the 1970’s” and that the Oneidas for generations had predominantly sought relief “not17 1 [from ] New York o r it s lo ca l unit s” but from the United States. Id . at 21 6, 21 9 n .1 2. Durin g th is 2 lon g la

ps e o f t im e, the pro pe rti es h ad gre atl y inc rea sed

in val ue and

ther e had been dram ati c ch an ge s 3 in their character

. Id . at 21 6-1 7. Th e Co urt reco gn ize d th e “d isr

up tiv e p rac tic al c on seq

ue nc es” that 4 wo uld

fl owfr om

“[a ] ch eck erb oard of

alte rnatin g state an d tri ba l jur isd ict ion in N ewYo rk S tat e — 5 cre ate d unil ate ral ly at [ the pla int if fs ’] be he st. ” Id . at 21 9-2 0. Ev ok ingthe do ctr ine s o f l ach es, 6 acquiescenc e, and impossibility, the Court con cl ud edth atequi tabl e consi derations — considerat ions 7 ari sin g out of

the On eid as’ lon g d elay in see kin g re lie f, the att en dant d ev elo pm ent of jus tif ied 8 societal ex pe ct at io ns relati ng to the governa nce of the lands in que stion, and the potential of the 9 so ug ht- af

ter rel ief to disru pt t ho se e xp ect ati on s —

pre clu de d th e O ne ida s f rom ob tai nin g th eir 10 sought-after de clarat ion. Se e id . at 214-21. 11 Th is C ourt c on clu de d s ho rtl y a ft er Sh err ill wa s d eci de d th at b eca

us e it s cl aim s w ere lik ew ise 12 “indisputably disrupt ive,” the Cayuga Indian Nation was barr ed by similar equitable consider ations 13 f ro m see kin g re co m

pe ns e f or t he an cie nt d ep riv ati on

of its an ces tra l land s, ev entho ug h th ese cla im s, 14 unlike those in Sh err ill , s ound ed pri m ari ly i n lawrathe r t

han eq uit y, and e ve n th ou ghon ly m on ey 15 damages we re a t i ssue. Cayuga , 413 F.3d at 275. Cayuga inv olv ed the Cayu ga

Ind ian Natio n’s 16 claim to 64,015 acres of land that were ceded to New Y ork in 1795 and 1807, allegedly in viol ation 17 of

bo th t he No ninter co urs e A ct and the Tr eat y o f C an an da igu a. Th e C ayug as s ou gh t, inter a lia , 18 both eject ment of the current residents and trespass damages. The district court ruled in favor of the 19 plai nti ff

s o n li ab ili ty, but de ter

m ine d th at e

jec tm ent w as n ot a

pro pe r re m ed

y and the rea ft er 20 co nd

uc ted a jur y tr ial on dam ag es; the dam ag es w ere lim ite d to the fa ir m ark et v alu e o f t he pro pe rty 21 at the tim e of t rial in 2 00 0 and to f air rental va lue dam ag es f

rom 17 95 to 1 99 9. Th e tr ial res ult edTh e U nit ed St ate s su cce ssf

ull y inter ve ne d in the Cayuga litiga tion in November 1992, 5 so that notwit hstanding New York’s sover eign imm unity, the Cayugas wer e not barre d from bringing cl aims against the Stat e of New York identical to t hose brought by the United States

. Cayuga , 4 13 F. 3d

at 2 70 -71 . In

19 99 , th e d ist

ric t co urt rul ed that th e S tat e o f N ewYo rk “ co uld be deemed an original or pr imary tortfeasor,” re sponsible for the allegedl y unlawful occupation of the subject l and by third par ties, and t he distri ct court t hereafter el ected to pr oceed with the case with New York as the s ole defendant. Id . at 271-72. 18 1 in a verdic t againstNew York State that, wit h prejudgment interes t, total ed $247,911,999.42. 5 2 On appeal, this Cou rt determined that si nce the dist rict cour t’s rul ings in Cayuga , Sh err ill 3 had “dramatically a ltered” the l eg al lands cape againstwhich ancient t ribal l and claims should be 4 considered: “We understand Sh err ill to h old that eq uit ab le d oc tri ne s, su chas l ach es, acq uie sce nc e, 5 an d im

po ssi bil ity , c an , in ap pro pri ate c irc um stanc es, b e ap pli ed to I nd ian lan d c lai m s, ev enwh en 6 su cha

c lai m is le ga llyvia

ble an d w ith in t

he statut e o f l im itatio ns .” Id . at 27 3. The Co urt co nc lud ed 7 that Sh err ill ’s concern wit h the New York Oneidas’ cla im had been wit h “the disruptive nature of 8 the clai m itself,” and that, accor dingly, the equi table de fen se s invoke d in Sh err ill apply, not 9 narro wl y to cla ims see kin g a rev iva l of

so ve rei gnty, but to “‘d isr up tiv e’ I nd ian

lan d c lai m s m ore 10 ge ne ral ly, ” id . at 274, whether suc h claims are legal or equitabl e in charac ter, s ee i d . at 276, and 11 whether or no t th e remedy sought is l imited to an award of money dam ages, seeid . at 274. The 12 Co urt

co nc lud ed

that th e d oc tri ne of

lac he s b arr ed

the C ayug as’ cla im s, wh ich it c harac ter ize d a s 13 “possessory claims” thatwere by thei r nature di sruptive i n that they c alled int o question set tled land 14 tit les ov er a

“large sw ath

of c entra l N ewYo rk S tat e. ” Id . at 275. With regard speci fically to t he 15 eje ctm en t cl aim , th e C ourt o bs erv ed that “[ t] he fa ct that, nin ete enye ars int o th e ca se, at the dam ag es 16 stage, the Dis trictCourt subs titute d a monetary remedy for pl aintiffs’ preferred re medy of ejectment 17 canno t s alv ag e the c lai m , wh ich w as s ub jec t to dis m iss al ab ini tio .” Id . at 27 7-7 8 (f oo tno te o m itt ed ). 18 As for the trespas s claim, the Court sa id, i t “i s pre dicated ent irely upon pl aintiffs’ possess ory land19 1 claim” and “because plaintiffs are barred by laches from obtaining an order conferring pos session 2 in eject ment, no basis remains for finding such construct ive possessi on or imm ed ia te r ig ht of 3 po sse ssi on

as co uld su pp ort [t res pa ss] dam ag es. ” Id . at 278. The Court reve rsed the j udgment of 4 the distr ict courtin favor of the Cayugas and order ed judgment entered for the defendant s. 5 II. Th e On eid as ’ P os ses so ryLa nd Cl aim s 6 A. Cayuga ’s I mp or t 7 Th e d istric t co urt de ter m ine d h ere that

the p lai nti ff

s “a sse rt a curre nt p os ses so ry i nte res t in 8 the lan d” an d th at t he ir cla im s, to th e ex tent p rem ise d on s uc h aninter est , are s ub

jec t to the eq

uit ab le 9 considerat ions a t i ssue in Cayuga. On eid a II I , 50 0 F. S up p. 2 d at 13 3. “P lai nti ff s, ” the dis tri ct c ourt 1 0 o b s e rv e d , “ a s s e rt c e rt a in c la im s p re d ic a te d

o nth e ir c o n ti nu in g r ig h t to p o s s e s s l an d

. . . an d s eek 11 relief returni ng that land an d d am ag es b ase d o n th eir dis po sse ssi on .” Id

. a t 1 3 4

. T h e c o urt 12 co nc lud ed

that “[ t] he Se co nd

Ci rcu it h as h eld

that a l ach es d ef

en se d oe s ap ply

to ‘ ind isp uta

bly 13 disrupti ve’ possessory land claims, like those brought by the Cayugas and Plaintiffs in the i nstant 14 cas e, ” an d th at i t w as “ req uir ed to f ind Plai nti ff s’ po sse sso ry land

cla im s ar e su

bje ct t o th e d ef

en se 15 of

lac he s. ” Id . W e agree. 16 W ith regard to the claims that the Oneidas alone assert against Madison an d Oneida 17 Co untie s, each

one of th ese clai m s is a “p os ses so ry” clai m of the so rt f ound po tentia llysu

bje ct t o 18 equita bl e bar i n Cayuga . The Oneidas asser t that t he Counties have “unl awfully possessed the 19 subject l ands,” excludi ng the Oneidas from their right ful possession; t hat th ey have “kept and 20 co nti nu ed

to k eep [t

he On eid as] out of

po sse ssi on ”; and

th at the y have “ sev ere d atta chm ents s uc h 21 as minerals, crops, t imber and other valuabl e resource s from the land without authori ty to do so.” 22 Oneida Am. C ompl. ¶¶ 55-56, 59. The Oneidas seek, inter a lia , “d am ag es i n th e am ount o f t he fa irCayuga recognized, c orrectl y, that a cl aim sounds in ejectment even when the eje ctment 6 remedy is “effectively monetized,” since the “substi tut[ion] [of] a monetary remedy for plainti ffs’ preferred remedy of ejectment” does not alte r the char acter of a cla im asserting a pre sent ri gh t to po sse ssi on an d “ su bje ct t o d ism iss al ab ini tio .” Cayuga , 413 F.3d at 277-78.

20 1 market value of the subjectlands,” and damages repres enting “the fai r mar ke t rental va lue of the 2 su bje ct l an ds ” an d “th e val ue of al l m ine ral s and othe r res ource s tak enfr om the su bje ct l an ds .” Ea ch 3 of these claims, whether asse rting viol ations of federal common law, the Nonintercourse Act, or the 4 Tr eat

y o f C an an da igu a, so un ds eithe r in eje ctm ent, t

res pa ss, or a

related the ory

of inj ury de riv ed 5 fr om

the On eid as’ cla im ed

rig ht to po sse ssi on

o f the land s. Ind eed , the Co untie s w ere no t parti es

6 6 to th e v ar io us sa le ag re e me n ts be tw ee n Ne w Y ork a ndth e O ne id as , a ndth us th e o nl y c la ims 7 av ail

ab le to b e a sse rte d

against t hem relate t o thei r al leged unlawful occupat ion of the s ubject la nds 8 in de rog ati on

of th e On eid as’ sup eri or po sse sso ry inter est . Suc h cla im s, prem ise d on the On eid as’ 9 continuing r ight of po ss ession, fall wit hin Cayuga ’s h old ingthat eq uit ab le d ef

en ses “ap ply

to 10 po sse sso ry l an d c lai m s o f t his typ e. ” Cayuga , 413 F.3d at 276. 11 This much is clear from even the most cur so ry rea ding of Cayuga

. Cayuga expre ssl y 12 co nc lud ed

th at “p os ses so ry lan d cla im s” — any cla im s pre m ise d on th e ass ert ion

of a curre nt, 13 co nti nu ing rig ht t o p os ses sio n a s a r esu lt o f a f lawin th e ori gin al ter

m inatio n of

In dian tit le — are 14 by their nature disrupt ive and that , accordingl y, the equitable defenses rec ognized in Sh err ill ap ply 15 to such clai ms. See id. at 274-75 (det ermining claim seeking award of currentmarket value of 16 su

bje ct l an ds to b e m erely a “ m on eti zed ” f orm of a cl aim “as ser t[ ing ] a co nti nu ingrig ht t o 17 imm ed iat e p os ses sio n” (inter na l qu otatio n m ark s o m itt ed )); id. at 278 (indi cating tha t claim seeking 18 aw ard

of pa st r ental va lue ba sed

on a tre sp ass theo ry is sub

jec t to eq uit ab le de fe ns e b eca

us e “t he re 19 can

be no tres pa ss un les s the [pl aintif fs ] po sse sse d the land

in que sti on ” an d s uc h a

cla im “is ba sed21 1 on a violati on of their constructive poss es si on ”). As t he distri ct court i n this case determined, 2 Cayuga “co nc lud ed that this type of cl aim

is inh ere ntl y dis rup tiv e b eca us e it see ks to o ve rturn y ear s 3 of settle d land

owne rsh ip. ” On eid

a II I , 500 F. Supp. 2d at 133. Here, the cla ims against Madison 4 and Oneida Counties and t he relie f sought from these d efe ndants are e ffectively ide nti ca l to the 5 claims and relief sought i n Cayuga , in which the pla intiffs sought both the current fairmarket value 6 of the su bje ct l an ds as an a lte rnativ e re m ed y to inj un cti ve rel ief

so un din g in

eje ctm ent, an d re nta l 7 damages from

1795 to 1999 sounding in t respass. See Cayuga , 413 F.3d at 276, 278. Accordingly, 8 the c lai m s ag ain st Mad iso n an d On eid a C ounti es are s ub jec t to the de fe ns e re co gn ize d b y th is C ourt 9 in Cayuga

. 10 The same perforce ho ld s true forthe identi cal clai ms sounding in ejectment, trespass , or 11 relate d “possessory” theor ies of injury brought aga inst New York State by bot h the Oneidas and t he 12 United St ates. The dist rict cour t rightl y noted that t his Court “was very clear i n Cayuga : I nd ian 13 po sse sso ry l an d c lai m s th at s eek or s ound in e jec tm ent of

the curre nt o wn ers are ind isp uta bly 14 di srup ti ve a ndwo ul d, b y th ei r ve ry n atur e, pr oj ec t r edre ss in to th e p re se ntan d fu tu re ; s uc h c la ims 15 are sub

jec t to the do ctr ine of

lac he s. ” On eid

a II I , 500 F. Supp. 2d at 136. In Cayuga , th e C o urt 16 concluded with r egard to such c laims that “the i mport of Sh err ill is that ‘ disruptive,’ forward17 loo kin g c lai m s, a categ ory ex em pli fi ed bypo sse sso ry l an d c lai m s, are s ub jec t to eq uit ab le d ef

en ses , 18 inc lud ing lac he s. ” Cayuga , 4 13 F. 3d at 2 77 . T his is t

rue ev enwh ensu chcla im s are “le ga llyvia ble 19 an d w ith in t

he statut e o f l im itatio ns ,” id. at 2 73 , whe n th e re lie f s ou gh t is lim ite d to m on etary 20 damages, and when the disruptive claims sound at law rat her than in e quity, id . at 273-75. Indee d, 21 the Un ite d S tat es a ck no wl ed ge s in

its bri ef be fo re this Co urt

that Cayuga “h el d th at r equest s for 22 m on eydam ag es gr ound ed on the asse rte d rig ht to pos ses s the land at issu e, ” inc lud ingthe p lai nti ff s’22 1 No ninter co urs e A ct c lai m , to the ex tent pr ed icated on su cha rig ht, are su

bje ct t o th e la ch es d ef

en se. 2 U. S. Br . at 31 . The Uni ted Stat es co nte nd s that “[ thi s] hold ingwas in e rro r f or s ev era l re aso ns ,” id. , 3 but as no ted

ear lie r th is q

ue sti on is n ot p rop erl y b ef

ore us , and

we do no t ad dre ss i t. 4 B. Th e A pp lic ab ili ty o f L ac he s 5 The plainti ffs next argue that even if the equitable consi derations relevantin Cayuga are als o 6 ap pli cab le h ere , th e d ef en dants have ne ve rth ele ss f ail ed to e sta bli shthe ele m ents o f

a la ch es d ef

en se, 7 so the pla int if

fs ’ po sse sso ry c lai m s m aysti ll p roc eed . T he Un ite d S tat es argu es, in ad dit ion , th at 8 it i s n ot s ub

jec t to la ch es wh ena cti ng in its so ve rei gn

cap aci ty and

that th e d ist

ric t co urt the ref ore 9 erred in applying lache s against i t. For the re asons that foll ow, we disagree. 10 T hi s ma tt eris in di st in gu is habl e fr om Cayuga i nt e rm s o f th e un d e rl y in g f

act ua l 11 cir cum stanc es th at l ed the Cayuga co urt

to c on clu de no t on ly t

hat th e la ch es d ef

en se and oth er 12 eq

uit ab le d ef

en ses we re ava ila

ble , b ut als o that l ach es act ua llyb arr ed

th e cla im s at i ssu e in

that ca se. 13 Here, as in Cayuga , a tremendous expanse of time separates the events forming the predicat e of the 14 eje ctm en t an d tr esp ass -ba sed cla im s an d th eir

ev entua l as ser

tio n. In th at tim e, m os t of

the On eid as 15 have moved elsewhere, the subje ct lands have passed into the hands of a m ultitude of entities a nd 16 individual s, most of whom have no connection to the his torical injusti ce the One id as a ss ert , and 17 the se p art ies have the m sel ve s b oth bought and s old the lan ds , and als o d ev elo pe d th em

to an 18 enormous extent. These developments have give n rise to j ustified soci etal expec tations 19 (expectat ions held and ac ted upon not onl y by the Counti es and the St ate of New York, but also by 20 private l andowners and a plet hora of associat ed parties) under a sche me of “settl ed land ownership” 21 that would be disrupted by an award pursuant t o the Oneidas’ pos sessory cl aims. See Cayuga , 413 22 F.3d at 275. By Cayuga ’s l og ic, m ore ov er, thi s is tru e no m att er wh at sp eci fi c rel ief s uc h an award23 1 would entail, whet her actual ejectment, damages for ongoing trespass liabi lity, or, i nstead, payment 2 of the fair market value of t he prope rty in a single lump sum. As the Court in Cayuga concluded, 3 “d isr

up tiv en ess is inh ere nt i n th e cl aim its elf — whic h a sk s th is C ourt t o o ve rturn y ear s o f s ett led 4 land ownership — r ather tha n [being] an element of any particular r emedy which would flow from 5 the po sse sso ry l an d c lai m .” Id. 6 W e have used the t erm “laches” here, as did the districtcourt and this Court in Cayuga , a s 7 a co nv en ient sh ort hand fo r th e eq

uit ab le pr inciples at s tak e in thi s ca se, but th e te rm

is s om ewhat 8 im pre cis e fo r t

he p urp os e of

d esc rib ing th os e pri nc ipl es. A s Cayuga rec og niz ed , “ [o ]n e o f t he fe w 9 inc ontes tab le p rop os iti on s ab out th is unu su all y c om ple x and con fu sin g are a of

lawis th at d oc tri ne s 10 an d cat eg ori zat ion s ap pli cab le in oth er are as do n ot trans lat e ne atl y to the se c lai m s. ” Id. at 276. The 11 On eid as a sse rt that th e inv oc ati on o f a purpo rte d la ch es d ef

en se i s im pro pe r he re a s th e d ef

en dants 12 have n ot est ab lis he d the n ece ssary ele m ents of s uc h a de fe ns e. It is tru e that t he dis tri ct c ourt i n th is 13 cas e d id n ot m ak e fi nd ing s th at the On eid as u nre aso na bly de lay ed the ini tiatio n o f t

his act ion or t hat 1 4 the d e f

e n d an ts w e re p re

ju d ic e d b yth is d e lay—

b o th re qu ir e d e le m e n ts o f

atr a d it io n a l l a c he s 15 defense. Se e C

os tello v . U

nited Sta tes , 36 5 U .S . 2 65 , 2 82 (19 61 ) (“ La ch es r eq uir es p roo f o f ( 1) l ack 16 of

d ili ge nc e byth e partya ga ins t who m th e de fe ns e is ass ert ed , an d (2) p rej ud ice to the party 17 ass ert ing the de fe ns e. ”); Veltri v. Bldg. Serv. 32B-J Pension Fund , 393 F.3d 318, 326 (2d Cir. 2004) 18 (“Apartyass ert ingthe eq uit ab le d ef

en se o f lac he s m

us t e sta bli shb oth pla int if f’ s unre aso na

ble lac k 19 of diligence under the circum stances in initiat ing an action, as well as prejudice from such a delay.” 20 (int ern al qu otatio n m ark s om itt ed )). Th is om iss ion , ho we ve r, is no t u lti m ate ly im po rtant, a s the 21 equit ab le defense re cognized in Sh err ill and applied i n Cayuga does not focus on the el ements of 22 tra dit ion al l ach es b ut r ath er m ore ge ne ral ly on the len gth of

tim e at iss ue be tw een

anhis tor ica l24 1 inj us tic e an d th e p res ent day, o n the d isr up tiv e n ature o f c lai m s lo ng de lay ed , and on the de gre e to 2 which these cl aims up se t t he justifiabl e expectat ions of individual s and entit ies far removed from 3 the events gi ving rise t o the plaint iffs’ injury. 4 In Sh err ill , th e S up rem e C ourt c on clu de d th at “ stand ard s o f fe de ral In dian lawan d f ed era l 5 eq uit y pra cti ce” barr ed

the N ewYor

k On eid as f

rom ob tai nin g d ecl arator

y and inj un cti ve rel ief

that 6 wo uld have ex em pte d th em

fr om state p rop erty taxatio n f or f orm er r ese rvatio n land s re cently 7 rea cq

uir ed thr ou gh m arket transac tions. Sh err ill , 544 U.S. at 214 (internal quotati on m ark s o m itt ed ). 8 Mo re s pe cif

ica lly , th e C ourt determi ne d th at t he tre m en do us expans e o f t im e th at h ad pa sse d 9 be tw een

the ini tia l, all eg ed ly un law fu l tr an sac tio ns an d th e ev entua l in iti ati on of the act ion

at i ssu e, 10 as w ell as the inter ve nin g eco no m ic an d reg ulator y de ve lop m ent of

the su bje ct l an ds , h ad

giv enris e 11 to justi fiable societ al expecta tions thatwould be disrupte d by that remedy. See id. at 221 (“[T]he 12 distance from 1805 [ when the land at issue was transferred] to the present day, t he [plaintiff’s] long 13 de lay

in s eek ingeq

uit ab le r eli ef

a ga ins t N ewY ork

o r i ts l oc al unit s, an d d ev elo pm ents i n th e ci ty 14 of

Sh err ill sp annin g s ev era l gen eratio ns . . . re nd er i ne qu ita ble the pie cem eal sh if

t in go ve rnanc e th is 15 su it s eek s unilater all y to ini tiate. ”); see also id. at 2 15 -16 (no tin g th e ex ist en ce o f “ jus tif iab le 16 expe ctatio ns , g rou nd ed in t wo centur ies of

Ne w Y ork ’s ex erc ise of re gu lat ory jur isd ict ion ”); id. at 17 219-20 (discus sing the possi bility for t he dis rupt io n of such expectati ons were the pla intiffs to be 18 granted the r emedy sought). The Supreme Court di scussed laches not in its tradit ional appli cation 19 but as one of several preexist ing equitable defenses, along with ac quiescence a nd impossibility, 20 ill us tratin g f

un dam ental pri nc ipl es of

e qu itythat pr ecl ud ed

the pla int if

fs “f rom rek ind lin g e m

be rs 21 of

so ve rei gnty t

hat lo ng ag o g rewco ld. ” Id. at 2 14 ; see also id. at 217- 20 (finding support for t he 22 conclusion t hat t he pla intiff’s c laim was barred by equitable consi derations in the three preexist ing25 1 de fe ns es o f l aches, ac qu ies cen ce, an d im po ssi bil ity ); see also id. at 221 (noti ng that the r elevant 2 eq uit ab le c on sid eratio ns “ev ok e th e d oc tri ne s o f l aches, ac qu ies cen ce, an d im po ssi bil ity ”). 3 Mo reo ve r, t

he Su pre m e C ourt m ad e n o m entio n of unre aso na

ble d elay byth e Ne w Y ork On eid as, 4 as distinguished from delay alone, or prejudice to the particular defendants, as opposed to the 5 dis rup tio n o f b roa de r so cie tal expe ctatio ns. Sh err ill , then, did not i nvolve the appl ication of a 6 tra dit ion al l ach es d ef en se s o m uc h a s an equ ita ble def en se th at dr ewupo n lac he s and oth er e qu ita

ble 7 doctrines but that der ived from ge ne ral pri nciples of “federal Indian law and federa l equity pr actice.” 8 Id. at 213. 9 This Court’s analysi s in Cayuga wa s si m ilar. A lth ou ghthe Cayuga co urt , li ke the dis tri ct 10 court in t his case, employed the te rm “laches” to descr ibe the defense upon which its deci sion rest ed, 11 see Cayuga , 4 13 F. 3dat27 7, ital so ex pr es sl y i nd ic at edth atitba se d i t s co nc lu si ononth e s ame 12 reasoni ng that the Supr eme Court had em ployed in Sh err ill , seeid . at 27 5 (“ [W ]e co nc lud e th at 1 3 po sse s s o ry

l an d c la im s o f

th is typ e are s u

b je c t to th e e qu it ab le c o n s id e rati o n s d is c us sed in 14 Sh err ill .” ). A dd iti on all y, wh enthe Cayuga court, after c oncluding thatthe clai ms asserted by the 15 pla int if

f in that c ase w ere s ub

jec t t o th e Sh err ill de fe ns e, add res sed the su bs idi ary qu est ion wh eth er 16 tho se c lai m s w ere the reby barred, it consider ed only factors equi valent to t hose addresse d in Sh err ill , 17 see id. at 277, a nd, indee d, rej ected the Cayugas ’ cont ention that their claims were barred only i f the 18 elements of a tradit ional laches defense were met, see id. at 279-80 (conc luding thata finding of no 19 unrea so na

ble de lay did no t pr ecl ud e th e co nc lus ion that pl aintif

fs ’ c lai m s we re ne ve rth ele ss b arr ed 20 in light of, inter a lia , “the Supreme Court’s ruli ng in Sh err ill ,” id. at 280). The Un ite d S tat es 21 co ntends that Cayuga “wron gly alt ere d th e tr ad iti on al l ach es ana lys is b y m ak ingany in qu iryint o 22 unrea so na

ble delay irr ele vant. ” U.S . Br . at 3 8. W e co nc lud e, in c ontra st, that Cayuga applied notTh e d iss ent ar gu es t hat Cayuga is disti nguishable i n that the Unit ed States her e is acti ng 7 no t on ly o n b eh alf

of the On eid as, but to ass ert its own inter est

in t he vin dic ati on

of a f ed era l statute . In Cayuga , however, the United St ates als o asserte d that the i nitial transfers of land from the Cayuga Indian Nat ion had violat ed the Noninter course Act, U.S. Compl. in Interventi on ¶¶ 8, 10-11, Cayuga , 4 13 F. 3d

26 6, an d th e d iss ent’s purpo rte d d ist inc tio n th ere fo re c anno t se rve as a basis for decli ning to find Sh err ill ’s e qu ita ble de fe ns e ap pli cab le t o th e Unit ed St ate s in thi s cas e. 26 1 a tr ad iti on al l ach es d ef en se, but rathe r di sti nc t, a lbe it r elated , e qu ita ble co ns ide rat ion s th at i t dr ew 2 fr om Sh err ill . Eithe r way, we are bound by Cayuga an d th ere fo re r eje ct the On eid as’ an d Unit ed 3 St ate s’ c ontentio n th at the dis tri ct c ourt e rre d b y f ail ingto c on sid er the ele m ents o f a t rad iti on al 4 lac he s d ef

en se. 5 Fi na lly , th e int erv entio n of the U nit ed

Stat es on beh alf of th e On eid as do es n ot c hang e th is 6 outco m e. Al tho ug h the Uni ted St ate s is tra dit ion all y n ot s ub jec t to de lay -ba sed

eq uit ab le d ef

en ses 7 under most circumstances, see , e. g. , U nited Sta tes v. Su mm erl in , 310 U.S. 414, 416 (1940), Cayuga 8 expre ssl y c on clu de d th at the Un ite d S tat es is su bje ct t o s uc h d ef

en ses und er ci rcum stanc es l ike tho se 9 pre sented

he re ( i.e

. , a

len gthy d elay in

ass ert ingthe rel ev ant ca us e o f a cti on , th e ab sen ce o f an 10 ap pli cab le s tat

ute of li m itatio ns f

or the g reat m ajo rity of

thi s d elay, an d an inter

ve nti on to v ind icate 11 the inter ests of an Indian nation). Indeed, on facts virtually i ndistingui shable from those here, the 12 Cayuga co urt

co nc luded that “whatev er the pre cis e co nto urs of the ex cep tio n to the rul e ag ain st 13 subjecti ng th e Un ite d St ate s to a lac he s de fe ns e, th is cas e fa lls w ith in the h ear tland o f the 14 ex cep tio n. ” Cayuga , 4 13 F. 3d at 2 79

. Al tho ug h the Unit ed S tat es co nte nd s that t

his h old ingwa s 7 15 in error , seeU. S. Br . at 20 , th is argum ent is no t pr op erl y b ef ore u s an d w e d o n ot c on sid er i t, i ns tea d 16 adhering faithfull y to Cayuga

. See Sulliv an , 424 F.3d at 274. 17 III . T he “N on po sse sso ry ” C lai ms 18 Our co nc lus ion that th e d istric t co urt

pro pe rlyapplie d th e eq

uit ab le p rin cip les rec og niz ed27 1 in Sherr ill and Cayuga to th e p o s s e s s o ry c la im s a s s e rt e d

b yth e O n e id a s an d

b yth e U n it e d

S tates 2 does not end ou r in qu iry. The dist rict cour t also det ermined that although c laims based on the 3 Oneidas’ posses sory r ights to t he subj ect lands were dis ruptive and t herefore barr ed by laches, t he 4 On eid as h ad

“al leg e[ d] fa cts ne ces sar y to as sert non -po sse sso ry c lai m s” a ga ins t N ewYo rk S tat e 5 alone. On eid

a II I , 50 0 F. Sup p. 2d

at 1 39 . T he dis tri ct c ourt p erm itt ed the On eid as t o p roc eed

wi th 6 reg ard

to o ne su chcla im . T he pla int if fs pre ss ano the r on

ap pe al. W e b egin by l aying out w ith 7 specificit y each clai m now before us. 8 First, the distric t court, broadly construing the Oneidas’ com plaint, discerned in it a comm on 9 law“co ntr act ” cl aim — a d if fe rent cl aim

fr om any b ef ore co ns ide red

bythe Su

pre m e C ourt, thi s 10 Court, or the distr ict court itself in this liti gation’s t hirty-ye ar history — premised on the assert ion 11 that t

he O ne ida s re cei ve d unc on sci on ab le c on sid eratio n in the ori gin al tran sac tio ns wi th N ewYo rk 12 State. The remedy for this all eged wrong, the dist rict cour t concluded , is t he reformation of the 13 challenged a greements. Id. at 140. The districtcourt dete rmined that this cl aim was not barred by 14 lac he s: 15 Plaintiffs clai m that the State inade quate ly c ompensated the Oneida I ndian Nation 16 fo r lan d trans fe rre d to it . Thi s cla im is bes t sty led

as a contra ct c lai m

that se ek s to 17 ref

orm o r r ev ise a

c ontra ct that i s vo id fo r un co ns cio na bil ity . T his typ e o f c ontra ct 18 cla im

is n ot d isr

up tiv e. . . . [ T] he Co urt

wo uld ref orm the ag ree m ents thro ug h an 19 ex erc ise of its eq uit ab le p ow er, wh ich

im pli cit ly r eco gn ize s an d c o n f ir m s th e tr an sf

er 20 of property made pursuantto the agreements subjec t to att ack. Therefore, Plai ntiffs 21 may pursue this cause of action while c onform ing t o the Circuit ’s mandate in Cayuga 22 that Defendants’ s ettled e xpectati ons not be disrupted. 23 24 Id. Th e c ou rtde te rmi ne d t ha t t he On ei da s, t o p re va il onth is “u nc on sc io nabl e c on si de ra ti on ” c la im, 25 would need to establish eit her (1) “t he inadequacy of consider ation

. . . couple d with evidence of the 26 inf

eri ori ty o f t

he One ida Indi anNat ion ’s ne go tiatin g po sit ion , wh ich can be esta

bli sh ed by e vid en ce 27 de m on str ati ng that th e S tat e d ece ive d o r m isl ed Pl aintiff s as to t he va lue of

the lan d o r ha dTo reiter ate, the ver sion of the Noninterc ourse Act in effect in 1793 pr ovided in rel evant 8 part that“[N]o purchase or grant of lands, orof any tit le or cla im thereto, from any Indians or nation or t ribe of Indians, wit hin the bounds of the Unite d States, shall be of any validit y in law or eq uit y , unless the s ame be m ade by a trea ty or conventi on entered i nto pursuant t o the constitut ion.” 1 Stat. at330 (emphasis added). The Oneidas, while suppor ting the di strictcourt’s c onclusion tha t a nonpossessory, 9 co ntr act -ba sed

cla im pre m ise d o n f

ed era l co mm on

lawm aypro cee d, als o arti cu lat e as an alterna tive a “faircompensation” claim grounded in New York’s all eged violat ion of the No ninter co urs e A ct. 28 1 knowledge of any fact bearing upon i ts value t hat was not well known by Plai ntiffs”; or (2) “ the 2 gross inadequa cy of the considera tion rece ived . . . in comparison to t he fair market value of the land 3 such that i t is unneces sary for Plaint iffs to make any addit ional showing re garding the St ate’s ac tions 4 or k

no wl ed ge .” Id. at 144. Notably, the distri ct court grounded this claim in federal comm on law, 5 not in any viol ation of the Noninter course Act. See id. at 138-39 & n.4, 140. 6 Th e plaintiff s o n a pp eal , whil e g en era llysu pp ort ingthe dis tri ct c ourt’ s co nc lus ion that a 7 purpo rte dly

no np os ses so ry c lai m

m aypro cee d, fo cu s pri nc ipa llyo n a fu nd am ental ly dif

fe rent cl aim 8 from

the one recogni zed by the dist rict cour t. The United Stat es cont en ds tha t a finding thatthe 9 ch all en ge d land

trans act ion s vio lat ed

th e No ninter co urs e Ac t i s in an d o f i tse lf

su ff ici ent to su

pp ort 10 a d am ag es award. Co nte nd ingthat th e A ct p rot ect s n ot o nly agai ns t the una

uth ori zed sale of Ind ian 8 11 lands but tha t it al so seeks to ass ure that a ny such sales t hat do take pl ace are not“unfair,” the 12 United States asserts that “claims that seek fair compensation for the l and” as a form of restitution 13 “(rathe r than recovery of possession) are . . . appropriat e” under the A ct. U.S. B r. at 53, 56. The 9 14 Un ite d States furth er c onten ds that th e re sti tut ion ary rem ed y s ho uld inc lud e n ot o nly

fa ir 1 5 co m

pe ns a ti o nb u t a ls o d is g o rg e m e n t o f a ll p ro f it s r e a li z e d

b yth e S tate o f

N e wY o rk

th ro ug h it s 16 trans act ion s in

the su bje ct l an ds . T he dis tri ct c ourt c on clu de d s uc h a clai m , s eek ing a d am ag es29 1 aw ard

in l ieu of the ret urn of unlawf ull y trans fe rre d pro pe rty , is pr ed icated on th e O ne ida s’ r ight to 2 possess the s ubject la nds and is thus ba rred under t he principl es of Cayuga : 3 The Circuit’ s reasoning [in Cayuga ] s ug ge sts that any award o f d am ag es t hat is 4 predicat ed on possession of the land i n quest ion, howeverremotely, is t oo disrupti ve 5 and must be barred by laches . Plaintiffs’ and the Un it edS ta te s’ reli ance on the 6 Co urt ’s e qu ita ble po we rs t o c om

pensate th em

fo r th e lo ss o f l an d n ece ssaril y 7 implicates the Oneida s’ histor ical cl aim to the land in quest ion. 8 9 On eid

a II I , 5 00 F. Supp. 2d at 14 4 n .8 . T he co urt co nc lud ed

that it s co ntr act

cla im , in co ntr ast , 10 “does not rel y on any present orfuture cl ai m t o th e land in quest ion and [thus] does not run afoul 11 of

the Cayuga co urt ’s d eci sio n. ” Id

. 12 Th e S tat e o f N ewYo rk u rge s us to concl ud e th at ea ch of the ab ov e-d esc rib ed

cla im s is 13 similarly disruptive and acc ordin gl y subj ect to Cayuga ’s e qu ita ble de fe ns e. Ne w Y ork als o 14 contends, inter a lia , that it s sovereign i mm unity prevents t he Oneidas from proceeding on the 15 co mm on

lawco ntr act s-b ase d cla im , wh ich N ewY ork

a sse rts is n ot to b e f

ound in t he Un ite d S tat es’ 16 complaint. W e conclude, for the reasons stated bel ow, that the contract -based cla im articulated by 17 the distr ict courtis barre d by New Yor k’s s overeign immunity. W e agree with New York, 18 moreover, that t he equi table considerat ions in Cayuga are im pli cat ed bythe pla int if

fs ’ pu rpo rte dly 19 nonpossessory cl aims and that these con si derations likewise pr event such cl aims from going 20 forward. 21 A. Ne wYo rk’s So ve rei gn Imm un ityBa rs t he On eid as ’ “C on tra ct” Cl aim 22 W e b eg in w ithfi rst pri nc ipl es. I t is we ll e sta bli sh ed that “t he St ate s enter ed

the fe de ral 23 sy ste m

wi th t he ir s ov ere ignty i nta ct, ” an d th at this so ve rei gnty l im its the “judicia l autho rity in 24 Article I II” unless the s tates have “c onsented to sui t” i n court , “ei ther expressly or in the plan of the 25 conventi on .” Blatchford v. Nati ve Vill. of Noatak , 5 01 U. S. 77 5, 77 9 (1 99 1) ( int ern al q uotationThe Indian tr ibes in Arizona initia lly sought gr eater r elief than did t he United State s but 10 the United Stat es ultimately “j oined the Indi ans in moving for a supplemental decree to gr ant ad dit ion al w ate r ri gh ts t o th e re ser vatio n. ” Arizona , 460 U.S. at 612.

30 1 m ark s o m itt ed ); see also Principali ty of Monaco v . Missis sippi , 29 2 U. S. 313 , 32 2-2 3 (1 93 4). It i s 2 also well es tablishe d thatin entering the feder al uni on, the states implicitly gave cons ent t o suits by 3 the United Stat es, see, e.g. , Alden v. Maine , 5 27 U. S. 70 6, 75 5 (1 99 9); Pr inc ipa lit y o f Mo na co , 292 4 U. S. at 3 29 ; cf. U

nited S tates v . Mi nn eso ta , 27 0 U .S . 1 81 , 1 95 (19 26 ) (“ Th e re aso n th e In dians co uld 5 not bring t he s ui ts . . . l ies in the general i mm unity of the stat e . . . from suit in the absence of 6 consent. Of course, the i mm unity of the state is subject to the constitutional qual ification t hat she 7 m aybe su ed

in t his Co urt bythe Un ite d St ate s . . . .”) , but not to su its ag ain st s tat es b y In dian tr ibe s, 8 see Blatc hfo rd, 5 01 U. S. at 7 81 (findin g n o “ co m pe lli ng ev ide nc e” t o s ug ge st t hat co ns ent to su it 9 by Indian tr ibes was “inher ent in the c onstitut ional compact”). 10 The Supreme Court determined in Ar izo na v. Ca lif or nia , 4 60 U. S. 60 5 (1983), a d isp ute 11 among several states concerning t heir cla ims to the waters of the Colorado Rive r, that bec ause the 12 Un ite d S tat es had interv en ed in t he act ion to a sse rt w ate r ri gh ts c lai m s o n b eh alf of Ind ian tri be s, 13 the inter ven ti on of the tribes t hemselves did not infringe t he states ’ soverei gn imm unity. Se e 14 Arizona , 460 U.S. at 614

. S ig ni ficantl y, however, the tr ibes inte rvening in Arizona did no t “s eek 1 5 to b ri n g n e wc la im s o r i s s u e s a g a in s t t h e s tate s ” o th e r t

h anth o s e a lr e a dya s s e rt e d b yth e Un ite d 16 St ate s. Id. The Court r ecently reaffirmed the c ontinuing val idity of Arizona , b ut a ga in s ug ge ste d 10 17 that the c ase only appli es when a privat e party ass erts “an e ntirel y overlapping cl ai m” t o one 18 properly before the court , and only when the ove rlapping claim would “burden[] the State with noAlabama v. North Carolina inv olv ed a su it w ith in t

he Su pre m e C ourt’ s o rig ina l 11 jurisdi ction agai nst North Caroli na by a number of states and a priva te inter state commission relati ng to an inter state compact. Alabama , 1 30 S. Ct . at 23 02 -05 . T he sp eci al m ast er preliminarily r ecomm ended denying North Carol ina’s motion to dismiss the cl aims of the comm ission, which, t he state a rgued, were barr ed by its sover eign imm unity. Id. at 2314. The master relied on Arizona , n oti ng that th e o the r pl aintif fs — a ll s ov ere ign

states — w ere als o bringing cl aims against North Caroli na and it was too e arly in t he liti gation to t ell whetherthe co mm iss ion ’s c lai m s w ere “th e sam e cl aim s . . . see k[ ing ] t he sam e re lie f a s th e o the r pl aintif fs .” Id. Th e C ourt n ote d th at, wi th r esp ect to t wo of the co m m iss ion ’s c lai m s, the co mm iss ion ’s abilit y to sue deri ved entire ly from its ability t o representthe stat es’ inte rests cr eated by the interst ate compact. Id. at 2315. With respect to t he comm ission’s remaining three cl aims, the Court noted that“while the Comm ission agai n seemingly m akes the same claims and seeks the sam e re lie f a s th e S tat es, it i s co nc eiv ab le that as a m att er o f l awthe Co mm iss ion ’s c lai m s ar e no t identical .” Id. at 2316 (emphasis added). Ther efore it was appropr iate to “ defer” the sovereign i mm

unity questi on with respectto these cl aims until they were furthe r clari fied. Id. 31 1 ad dit ion al d ef

en se o r li ab ili ty. ” Alabama v. North Carolina , 13 0 S. C t. 22 95 , 2315 (2010 ). 11 2 Relying on Arizona , w e al so have ap pro ve d th e d en ial of an Elev enth A m en dm ent def en se in a ca se 3 in which an Indian tribe sued N ew York State and the United Stat es inter vened in the ac tion seeki ng 4 the same relief. Se e S en eca Na tio n o

f In dia ns v. Ne w Y

or k , 17 8 F. 3d

95 (2d Ci r. 1 99 9) ( pe r cu

riam ), 5 aff’g 26 F. Su

pp . 2 d 55 5 (W .D .N .Y . 19 98 ). W e aga in em ph asi zed , ho we ve r, th at “the Stat e o f N ew 6 Yo rk r eta ins its El ev enth Am en dm ent i mm un ityto th e ex tent t

hat th e [ pla int if

f I nd ian tri be s] rai se 7 cla im s or is su es t

hat ar e n ot identical to tho se m ad e b y th e Unit ed St ate s. ” Seneca Nation , 178 F.3d 8 at 9 7 (e m

ph asi s ad de d); seeals o S en eca Na tio n o

f In dians v. New

Yo rk, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 560 9 (no tin g th at the Unit ed S tat es’ c om

pla int in inter ve nti on s ou gh t “ the ide nti cal rel ief as t he Se ne cas ’ 10 [c om

pla int ]” ); a c c o rd

Mi lle L a c s B a n d

o f C h ip p e w a In dia n s v . Mi n n eso ta , 124 F.3d 904, 912-13 11 (8t

h C ir. 19 97 ) (r eje cti ng Minne so ta’ s so ve rei gn imm un ityde fe ns e whe n Un ite d St ate s inter ve ne d 12 in I nd ian

tri be s’ s uit

see kin g th e sam e rel ief

as sou gh t by t

he tri be s in

the un de rly ing act ion ). T his 13 is c on sis tent w iththe Su pre m e Co urt ’s adm on iti on that “[ a] fe de ral co urt

m us t ex am ine eac h c lai m 14 in a case t o see if the c ou rt ’s j ur isdicti on over that c laim is barred by the Eleventh Amendm ent.”See, e.g. , U .S . S eco nd Am . C om

pl. ¶ 1. b (i nd icatin g th at “ [b ]e cau se [ Ne w Y ork ’s 12 purch ase s o f t

he su bje ct l an ds ] v iol ate d th e T rad e an d Inter co urs e A ct, the St ate of Ne w Y ork fa ile d to ex tin gu ish

the On eid a N ati on ’s right to poss ess the Subje ct Lands un de r f ed era l law” ); id. ¶ 2 (“The United St ates seeks monetary and other rel ief from . . . New York for its denial of the On eid a N ati on ’s enjoyment of i ts rights to the Subjec t Lands under federal l aw and for the trespasses to the Subjec t Lands that or igi nated wi th t he St ate ’s i lle ga l tr an sac tio ns .” ); id. ¶ 8 (“The United Stat es has inte rvened in thi s action as plainti ff to enforce federal law, namely, the 32 1 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman , 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984). 2 W e need not addre ss her e the prec ise contours of when a tribe’ s complaint raises a claim or 3 iss ue no t “i de nti cal to” on e as ser ted by the Uni ted

Stat es, beca

us e ev enco ns tru ingthe Un ite d S tat es’ 4 m os t re cent am en de d c om pla int lib era lly , it

sim ply do es n ot co nta in th e contra ct- ba sed clai m that 5 the dis tri ct c ourt f

ound to b e ade qu ate ly pl ed

by the One ida s. Th e Un ite d St ate s adm its be fo re this 6 Co urt

that whil e a c om

pla int ne ed n ot sp eci fy

th e leg al the ory

un de rly ingits cla im s, it m us t se t f ort h 7 “th os e f

act s n ece ssary t o a

fi nd ingof

lia bil ity .” Amron v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Advisors I nc ., 464 8 F. 3d

33 8, 34 3 (2 d C ir. 20 06 ) (e m ph asi s om itt ed ). He re, the Unit ed St ate s’ c om

pla int all eg es n o f

act s 9 whatsoe ve r r eg ard inge sse nti al asp ect s of a c ontra ct- ba sed

c lai m — th at the c on sid eration the 10 On eid as r ece ive d f or t he su bje ct l an ds wa s in fe rio r or gro ssl y in fe rio r to the lan ds ’ fa ir m ark et v alu e, 11 that N ewYo rk d ece ive d o r m isl ed the On eid as a s to the va lue of the lan d, or t

hat N ewYo rk h ad 12 kn ow led ge of

any f act be ari ng on

the va lue of

the lan d th at was not kn own b y th e O ne ida s 13 themselves. Se e On eid a II I , 5 00 F. Su

pp . 2 d at 14 4 (d esc rib ingfa cts req uir ed to b e es tab lis he d to 14 pre va il o n th e d istric t co urt ’s c ontra ct- ba sed cla im ). A lth ou ghthe Un ite d S tat es’ am en de d 15 co m

pla int ref ers in o ne ins tan ce t o th e all eg ed prof its the St ate ma de on

its sal es o f t

he lan ds at i ssu e, 16 U.S. Second Am . Com pl. ¶ 18, it is clearfrom

the complaint’s desc ription of the na ture of the act ion, 17 the fa cts of

the lan d tr an sf

ers , th e cl aim s as ser

ted , and the “p ray er f

or re lie f” that

the Un ite d S tat es 18 ass ert s p red om inantl y, if no t ex clu siv ely , tr esp ass an d e jec tm ent-b ase d c lai m s. 12restric tions on ali enation set forth in t he Trade and Int ercourse Act. . . ; to enforce the

provisions of the Tr eaty of Canandaigua of 1794, . . . to which the Unit ed States was a pa rty; and to p rot ect the tre aty -re co gn ize d ri gh ts o f t he On eid a N ati on .” ); id. ¶ 13 (noting t hat the Trea ty of Canand aig ua

gave the On eid a N ati on

“th e ri gh t to oc cu

pythe Su bje ct L an ds an d g uarantee d the

. . . f ree an d und ist

urb ed us e o f t he lan d” ); id. ¶ 14 (no tin g th at the No ninter co urs e A ct “expressl y forbade and declared inv alid any sale of land , or any tit le or cla im thereto, by any Ind ian Natio n . . . wi tho ut t

he ap pro va l an d ratif

icatio n o f t

he Un ite d S tat es” ); id. ¶ 16 (“[ E] ach of the ab ov e-m entio ne d a gre em ents w as illegal and vo id a b in iti o un de r th e N on int erc ourse Ac t.” ); id. ¶ 18 (“After each of it s purported a cquisiti ons . . . New York wrongfu llyas ser ted control and/or

possession of

. . . th e S ub

jec t L an ds .” ); id. ¶ 19 (“N ewYo rk S tat e un law ful ly retains poss ession

. . . . ”); id. ¶¶ 2 2-2 4 (d esc rib ing“C lai m I: F ed era l C om

m on Law T res pa ss Cl aim ,” pre m ise d o n p ast an d c ontin

uin g v iol ati on s o f t

he On eid as’ po sse sso ry r ights) ; id. ¶¶ 25- 26 (de scr ibi ng “C lai m

II: Tr ad e an d Inter co urs e C lai m ,” pre m ise d o n f act that “N ewYo rk S tat e asserted cont rol and assumed possess ion of the Subject Lands[,] . . . continues t o assert c ontrol and possession of some of the Subject Lands,” and “purport[ed] to sell orotherwise gr ant the Subject Lands to t hird part ies,” causi ng “Third Party Tresp as ses ”); id. at 14 (“Praye r for Relief,” req ue sti ng (1) a d ecl arator

y ju dg m ent th at the On eid a N ati on “h as the right t o occupy the lands described i n this complaint”; ( 2) “a judgment awarding mo ne tar y a nd po sse sso ry reli ef, inc lud ing eje ctm en t w he re a

pp ro pr iate ”; (3) a j udgment awarding “ mesne profits or fair rent al value fo r th e entir e C lai m Ar ea, ” o n th e g rou

nd s th at N ewYo rk w as “ theini tia l tresp as ser”; (4) a ju dg m en t “awardi ng ap pro pri ate m on etary r eli ef ” f or l an ds no lon ge r oc cu

pie d b y th e S tat e, als o o n th e g rou

nd s th at i t w as “ theini tia l tresp as ser”; ( 5) atto rne ys fe es and co sts ; (6 ) “s uc h oth er r eli ef

as t his Co urt m ayde em

jus t an d p rop er” ) (e m

ph asi s ad de d throu gh out). 33 1 Ev en if

th e U ni te d S ta te s’ co mpl ai ntis de eme d t o a ll eg e apu rp or te dl y n onpo ss es so ry cl ai m, 2 m ore ov er, it i s clear t hat a ny such cla im in t he co m pla int is b ase d e nti rel y o n th e N on int erc ourse 3 Act. The Unite d States’ c omplaint asserts t wo claims against New York — a “Federal Common 4 Law Trespass Claim” and a “Trad e and I ntercours e Claim.” The form er clai m appears to ground 5 its cause of action in both t he Nonintercour se Act and federal c omm on law but, as a cl aim for 6 trespass , is clear ly possessory. See id. ¶ 24 ; Cayuga , 4 13 F. 3d at 27 8 (“[ T] he tres pa ss cl aim . . . is 7 predicat ed entire ly upon pl aintiffs’ possessory land c laim, for the simple r eason t hat t here can be no 8 tre sp ass un les s th e C ayug as p os ses sed the lan d in

qu est ion .” ). T he latterclaim , g rou nd ed on ly i n 9 the alle gation th at t he o riginal land trans actions vi olated the Nonintercours e Act, is ther efore the 10 on ly p ote nti al s ource of a n on po sse sso ry c lai m . B ut th e d ist ric t co urt did no t de riv e th e O ne ida s’The United States and Judge Gershon in di ssent note t hat New York described t he 13 Oneidas’ and Unite d States’ c omplaints as “paral lel” in i ts summ ary judgment briefing below. The State meant, however, only thatboth complaints asser ted the Oneidas ’ right t o po sse ss the 34 1 pu rpo rte dly no npossessory cl aim from the No ninter co urs e A ct; rat he r, t he “f air co m pe ns ati on ” cl aim 2 is b ase d o n an e nti rel y d if fe rent th eo ry —

that th e O ne ida s p os ses s a co mm on law ri gh t o f ac tion 3 so unding in contr act to re form land sale a greements that were suppor ted, they al lege, by 4 unconscionable considerat ion. Se e O ne ida III , 50 0 F. Sup p. 2d

at 1 40 -41 & n. 6; see also id. at 139 5 n.4 (indicat ing that “a claim predicated on a violation of the N onintercour se Act . . . m ight also be 6 appropriat e,” but decli ning to conside r such a cla im). 7 Th e Unit ed St ate s su gg est s th at w e m ayco ns ide r its p lea din gs “co ns tru cti ve ly am en de d” to 8 inc lud e the n on

po sse sso ry “co ntr act ” cl aim bro ug ht b y th e O ne ida s an d re co gn ize d b y th e d istric t 9 co urt

be cau se t

he iss ue wa s li tig ate d b elo w. Co ns tru cti ve am en dm ent, whe n u sed byap pe llate 10 co urt s, is a

“jud ici all y cre ate d” disc ret ion ary doc tri ne that

we have us ed

“ex tre m ely

sp ari ng [l y] ” to 11 recognize t hat an issue not in the parti es’ pleadings was actuall y litiga ted in the c ourt below. Ci ty 12 of

Ro me , N. Y. v . V eri zo n C om mc ’ns, In c. , 36 2 F. 3d

168 , 18 1 (2 d C ir. 20 04 ). “ Whe n is su es t hat w ere 13 no t ra is edi n the pleadi ngs are tr ied byexp res s o r im pli ed co ns en t of

thepa rti es , th is c on sent ac ts 14 to permit what is in effect a const ructive a mendm ent of the pleadi ngs to include those issue s.” 15 Walton v. Jen nings Cm ty. Ho sp ., Inc

. , 8 75 F. 2d 13 17 , 1 32 0 n .3 (7t

h C ir. 19 89 ) (e m

ph asi s added) 16 (internal quotati on marks om itted) . Here, however , New York never consented, expr essly or 17 oth erw ise , to the lit igatio n o f anynon po sse sso ry cl aim s, and

cert ain ly n ot t o th e cl aim

as f orm ulated 18 bythe dis tri ct c ourt; ind eed , it vig oro us ly c onten de d be fo re th e dis tri ct c ourt that ne ith er t he On eid as 19 nor the United St ates had ass erted such a claim in their complaints. See, e.g. , Def.’s Reply Mem., 20 Doc. 606 (Mar . 2, 2007), at2-8 & n.3. Although t he dis trictcourt rej ected thi s argument and found 13land in quest ion. Se e Def.’s Mem. of Law in Support of Motion for Summ ary Judgment at 3-4, Do c. 58 2 (Aug . 1 1, 20 06 ). N ewYo rk n ev er c on ced ed that eit he r complaint adequately a lleged nonpossessory cl aims, let alone consent ed to the li tigati on of such claims. 35 1 that the Onei das’ complaint all eged a nonpossessory claim, seeOn eid a II I , 500 F. Supp. 2d at 139- 2 40 , th is d oe s n ot a lte r th e f act that N ewYo rk did

n ot i n anyway c on sent to the lit igatio n o f anysu ch 3 no np os ses sory c lai m s su chthat w e m ayco ns ide r th e Unit ed St ate s’ c om

pla int co ns tru cti ve ly 4 amended. Cf

. 6A Arthur R. Miller& Ma ry Kay Kane, Federal Pra ctice and Pr ocedure §1494 (3d 5 ed . 2 01 0) ( “[ I] f t he iss ue in f

act has not been tri ed

wi th t he co ns ent of

the parti es, the n an 6 am en dm en t to co nf orm to t he p lea din gs w ill n ot b e p erm itt ed no m att er whe n m ad e. ”); Wahlstrom 7 v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd. , 4 F. 3d 10 84 , 1 08 7 (2d

C ir. 1 99 3) (al tho ug h pla int if fs c ou ld n ot s tat e 8 a claim und ers ta te tort la w, de fen da nts ha d argu ed

be fo re d istric t co urt

that f ed era l m ari tim e law 9 go ve rn edth e c la im a t i ss ue , a ndpa rt ie s h adl i t i ga te d wh et he r r el ie f wa s a va il ab le un de r ma ri ti me 10 law ; thus co m

pla int co uld be co ns tru cti ve ly am en de d to ass ert a m ari tim e law c lai m ). 11 Finally, we note t hat the Unite d States in i ts brief before thi s Court does not eve n defend the 12 contractclaim as articul ated by the di strictcourt. The United St ates a sser ts with rega rd to the 13 dis tri ct c ourt’ s co ntr act -ba sed cla im that it “does no t ag ree wi th t he entir ety

of the dis tri ct c ourt’ s 14 analysis,” U.S. Br

. at 64, a nd, specificall y, that itbelieves i t need only show viol ation of the 15 No ninter co urs e A ct t o e sta bli sha b asi s f

or re co ve rin g res tit

uti on ary dam ag es. Th e Un ite d S tat es’ 16 arg um en t w ithreg ard to N ewYo rk’ s so ve rei gn imm un ity , at b ase , is that b eca us e the Unit ed

St ate s 17 co uld

have ass ert ed

in i ts c om

pla int (if granted leav e to am en d) a cl aim

on wh ich the On eid as w ere 18 permitted to procee d, we should take the United States to have p le ad ed thi s claim. W e have our 19 do ub ts t

hat th is c asu al a

pp roa chto ana lys is o f a

state’ s as ser

tio n of so ve rei gn

imm un ityco uld

ev er 20 be appropria te. Se e B lat ch for d , 501 U.S. at 785 (noting tha t “[t]he consent, ‘i nherent in t heGi ve n th is d isp os iti on , w e n eed no t ad dre ss t

he St ate ’s a lte rnativ e ar gum ents that su ch 14 a cl aim do es n ot r ais e a f

ed era l qu est ion , s o th at the dis tri ct c ourt a bu sed its dis cre tio n in ex erc isi ng jur isd ict ion

ov er i t af ter dis m iss ing the po sse sso ry c lai m s, an d th at the co ntr act -ba sed claim does not exist i n federal comm on law. 36 1 co nv en tio n, ’ to su it b y th e U nit ed St ate s . . . is no t c on sent t o s uit byanyo ne wh om

the Un ite d S tat es 2 might select; and eve n consent to sui t by the United St at es fo r a partic ular pers on’s benefit is not 3 consent to sui t by th at p ers on himself”). It is part icularl y ina pp ro pr iate in t

his cas e, m ore ov er, 4 giv e nth a t th e Un it e d S tate s i ne f

f e c t d is a v o w s o n

a p p e a l th e c la im

o nwh ic hth e On eid as w ere 5 pe rm itt ed

to p roc eed . W e th ere fo re de ter m ine that N ewYo rk i s im m un e f rom su it w ithreg ard

to 6 the “contr act” cla im recognized by the dist rict cour t and c on cl ud e th at this c laim m ust be 7 dismissed. 14 8 B. Cayuga Ba rs t he No ni nt erc ou rse Ac t C lai m 9 New York next contends thatthe N onintercour se Act, which does not by its terms provide 10 fo r a d am ag es r em ed y, canno t su

pp ort a claim for damages , and that as a re su lt, the pla int if fs ’ 11 alt ern ati ve “n on

po sse sso ry” cla im

ba sed on vio lat ion o f t he Ac t st ate s n o g rou

nd s o n whic h th eyare 12 en tit led

to reli ef . NewYor

k arg ue s, in a dd iti on , th at this purpo rte dly no np os ses so ry c lai m

is b arr ed 13 by the equitable considerati ons describe d in Sh err ill and Cayuga . W e ag ree wi th N ewYo rk a s to 14 the lat ter propos iti on an d c on clu de , m ore ge ne ral ly, that ea chof the purpo rte dly

no np os ses so ry 15 claims pressed by p la in tiffs on appeal falls wit hin the equit able bar r ecognized in Cayuga

. 16 Ac co rdi ng ly, we ne ed no t and do not ad dre ss t he qu est ion

wh eth er the No ninter co urs e A ct c an 17 support a cl aim seeking damages. 18 The equitable defense re co gn ize d in Sh err ill and Cayuga is not li mited to “possessory” 19 cla ims —to cl aims prem ised on the as sertion of a current posses sory rightto triba l lands hel d byW e recognize that the municipali ty imposing the propert y taxes in Sh err ill ha d 14 initia ted evict ion proceedi ngs because of the New York Oneidas’ r efusal to pay. Se e S he rri ll , 54 4 U. S. at21 1. Th os e p ro ce ed in gs , h owe ve r, we re no t d ir ec tl y a t i ss ue be for e t he Supr eme Court, which consider ed only whether t he plainti ffs could seek relie f preventing the i mposition of taxes. Moreover , the evict ion proceedi ngs were premised on contemporary conduct, notthe an cie nt c on du ct l ead ingto t he pla int if

fs ’ or igi na l lo ss o f t

he lan ds

. 37 1 others on the theory thatthe origi nal trans fer of ownership of the la nds was in some way flawed. 2 Rather, the defense i s properly applied to barany ancient l and claims that are d is rupt ive of 3 significant a nd justified soc ietal e xpectati ons that ha ve ari sen as a res ult of a lapse of time during 4 which the plai ntiffs did not seek re lief. Se e S he rri ll , 5 44 U. S. at 2 15 n. 9 (“ Th e re lie f [ the Ne w Y ork 5 On eid as] see k[ ] .

. . is unava ila ble because of

the lon g la

ps e o f t im e, durin g whic h N ewYo rk’ s 6 go ve rnanc e re m ain ed un dis tur be d, an d th e p resent-dayan d f utu re d isr up tio n s uc h re lie f w ou ld 7 engender.”). 8 Th is much is cl ea r f ro m Sh err ill

itself. In Sh err ill , fr om

wh ich the Cayuga panel drew the 9 eq uit ab le p rin cip les on

whic h it rel ied , th e N ewYo rk O ne ida s so ug ht o nly eq uit ab le and

de clarat ory 10 rel ief

reg ard ingthe im

po sit ion of prop erty tax es on

land s to w hic h the y he ld le ga l titl e, an d whic h 11 they clai med w ere exempt from local ta xation

. S

ee id. a t 21 1-12. As it was undisput ed that the 12 plainti ffs had acquired legal title to the l ands through cont emporary m arket tr ansactions , see id. at 13 21 1, no ri gh t t o p os se ss io n wa s p la ce d a t i ss ue b y t h e ircl ai ms. De sp it e t hi s fa ct , t he Supr eme 14 14 Court determined that t he plainti ffs were barred from seeking their desired remedy due to the long 15 lapse of time between the Oneidas’ ancient di spossession a nd their at tempt to revive sover eignty, 16 the att en dant d ev elo pm ent of jus tif ied so cie tal expe ctatio ns as t o re gu lat ory autho rity d uri ng thi s 17 period, and the potential for the plainti ffs’ desired rem edy to disrupt those expectati ons. See id. at 18 21 4-2 1. Th e cr iti cal qu est ion the ref ore wa s n ot whe the r th e cl aim at i ssu e was premis ed

on an38 1 ass ert ion

of a cu rre nt p os ses so ry r ight stemm ing fr om a f lawin t he ori gin al t erm inatio n o f I nd ian 2 tit le, but rathe r wh eth er an award of relie f to the pl aintif

fs wou ld be disr

up tiv e of jus tif ied so cie tal 3 expectati ons arising at least in part from the long lapse of tim e between the conduct complained of 4 and the effort to obtai n relief. 5 This Court undert ook the same analysis in Cayuga . T he cl aims at iss ue in t hat ca se we re 6 pre m ise d o n th e as ser tio n o f a curre nt p os ses so ry r ight to the su bje ct l an ds fo un de d o n th e al leg ed 7 illegal ity of their init ial tr ansfer. See Cayuga , 413 F.3d at 277- 78. Cayuga expre ssl y h eld , h ow ev er, 8 that the di spositive question in a scertai ning the appli cabilit y of Sh err ill ’s equitable de fense is not 9 wh eth er a

curre nt p o s s e s s o ry

ri g h t i s a s s e rte d, but whe the r a p lai nti ff ’s c lai m is i nh ere ntl y d isr

up tiv e. 10 See id. at 2 74 (“[ W ]h at c on cer ne d th e [ Sh err ill ] C ourt w as t he dis rup tiv e n ature o f t he cla im 11 its elf

.” ); id. (indicat ing that t he equi ta bl e defense identified i n Sh err ill “ap pl[ ies ] t o ‘d isr

up tiv e’ 12 Ind ian

lan d c lai m s m ore ge ne ral ly” ); id. at 277 (“[T]he import of Sh err ill is that di sru

pti ve , 13 fo rw ard -lo ok ingcla im s, a categ ory ex em pli fi ed bypo sse sso ry l an d cla im s, are su bje ct t o e qu ita

ble 14 de fe ns es . . . .” (int ern al qu otatio n m ark s o m itt ed )); see also id. at 2 75 (co nc lud ingthat po sse sso ry 15 claims are disrupt ive in thatthey threa ten “ to overturn years of settl ed land ownership” ). Under the 16 reasoning employed in Cayuga , then, the equi table defense or iginall y recognized i n Sherrill is 17 po tentia llyap pli cab le t o a ll anc ient land clai m s th at are d isr

up tiv e o f j us tif

ied so cie tal int ere sts that 18 have developed overa long period of ti me, of which possessory c laims are merely one type , and 19 reg ard les s o f t

he parti cu lar

rem ed y s ou gh t. 20 Th e Noninte rcour se A ct c lai m pro po sed

bythe On eid as and

bythe Un ite d S tat es i s 21 dis rup tiv e in

prec ise ly th is f

ash ion . D esp ite the co nte nti on s o f t he pla int if

fs , th is c lai m

is, at b ase , 2 2 p re m is e d

o nth e i n v a li d it

yo f th e i n it ia l tr an s f

e r o f th e s u b je c t lan d s . T h e N o n inte rc ourse Ac t39 1 provides tha t “no sale of lands m ade by .

. . any nation or tribe of Indians” undertaken withoutthe 2 en do rse m ent of

the Un ite d S tat es “ sh all be va lid .” 1 S tat . at 33 0. Ev enass um ingthat a c ourt m ay 3 grant alt ernative remedies upon finding tha t a purported sal e was consumm ated in viol ation of the 4 Nonintercours e Act, the underl ying premise of a claim based on such a viol ation is t hat the 5 transact ion itsel f was void ab ini tio

. Se e O ne ida II , 470 U.S. at 245 (“The perti nent provisi on of the 6 [N o n inte rc o urs e A c t]

. . . m e re ly c o d if ie d th e p ri n c ip le th a t as o v e re ig na c t w a s re qu ire d to 7 extinguish aboriginal title and thus thata conveyance without the sove reign’s c onsent was void ab 8 ini tio .”). Such a claim, which necessari ly ca lls into question the validi ty of the origina l transfer of 9 the subjectlands and at least potential ly, by extension, subsequent ownershi p of those lands by non10 Ind ian

parti es, ef

fe cti ve ly “ ask s th is C ourt t o o vert urn ye ars of settle d land

owne rsh ip. ” Cayuga , 11 41 3 F. 3d

at 275 . Cla im s hav ingthis char act eri sti c, as Cayuga rec og niz ed , n ece ssaril y threaten to 12 un de rm ine bro ad ly h eld and just if ied exp ect ati on s as t o th e o wn ers hip of a v ast sw ath of lan ds — 13 expectati ons that have a risen not onl y through the pas sage of time but also the at tendant 14 de ve lop m ent of

the pro pe rti es. Ac co rdi ng ly, su chcla im s ar e sub jec t to th e def

en se r eco gn ize d in 15 Sh err ill

and Cayuga

. 16 Th e Uni te d Stat es contends, ci ting United States v. Mottaz , 4 76 U. S. 83 4 (1 98 6), that 17 all ow ing a cl aim

to g o f orw ard in t his cas e w ou ld c lear th e cl ou d o n ti tle to t he su bje ct l an ds cre ate d 18 bythe ir i nv ali d tr an sf er in viol ati on

of the No ninter co urs e A ct. W e d isa gre e . Mottazinvolved a 19 cla im

th at the Unit ed

S tat es ha d un law fu llyso ld t he pla int if

f’ s inter est

in l an ds to t

he Un ite d S tat es 20 Forest Service withouther consent. Mottaz , 47 6 U. S. at 8 36 -37

. T he C ourt co nc lud ed th at the cla im 21 wa s ti m e-b arr ed

un de r th e Q uie t T itl e A ct, 28 U. S. C. § 2 40 9a (a) , an d that t he cla im wa s su bje ct t o 22 th at Act beca use it soughtto confirm the plaintiff’s ti tle in herland. Id. at 8 41 -42 . T he Co urtW e note also t hat the basi s of the jury award r ejected i n Cayuga wa s, in p art , th e f air 15 market value of the land. Cayuga , 413 F.3d at 272. An award of the land’s fairmarket value wo uld pre sum ab ly, un de r th e Unit ed St ate s’s the ory , h av e si m ilarlyex tin gu ish ed the Cayu ga s’ po sse sso ry i nte res t in

the lan d, an d y et this pro vid ed no ba sis fo r av oid ingthe eq uit ab le b ar found to exist in t hat case. 40 1 dis tin gu ish ed

the cla im be fo re i t f

rom a hyp oth eti cal cla im

that w ould not be co ve red bythe Ac t, 2 in whic h th e p lai nti ff so ug ht o nly

“re co ve ry o f h er s hare o f t he pro cee ds rea liz ed

bythe Un ite d 3 St ate s” f

rom its sal e of the lan d “ but al leg ed ly n ev er d istrib ute d. ” Id. at 842. Such a clai m, the 4 Co urt

sai d, “would involv e a c on ces sio n th at t itl e h ad pa sse d” in t

he sal e an d w ou ld o nly

req uir e 5 decision of whether t he plainti ff received fair compensation. Id. 6 Unlike the hypothe tical c laim described in Mot taz , the N on int erc ourse Ac t cl aim he re 7 necessari ly requir es a conclusi on that ti tle did not pa ss va lid ly in t

he ch all en ge d land

trans act ion s, 8 because the c laim’s premise is t ha t the tr ansactions violated t he Nonintercour se Act. Plaint iffs 9 demand not, as in Mottaz ’s hy po the tic al, a shar e of

the p rof its fr om a concededly val id sal e th at w ere 10 all eg ed ly n ev er d istrib ute d, but “f air co m pe ns ati on ” an d “re sti tut ion ” m ere ly a s su bs tit ute rem ed ies 11 fo r th e re tur

n o f t he pro pe rtythat th eym

us t es tab lis h w as unlawfully t aken in o rde r to pro ve the ir 12 cla im

. T he inv ali dit y o f t he sal e ab ini tio is the und erl yin g pre m ise of a No ninter co urs e A ct c lai m 13 an d anythe ory

of re co ve ry p lai nti ff

s co uld see k p urs uant t o th is c lai m . Awardi ng su chrel ief he re 14 would not involve “concession[s] t hat t itle [has] passed” but r ather would est ab lis h th at i t ha d n ot, 15 but th at r eturn o f t he pro pe rtywa s im

po ssi ble as a

rem ed y und er the cir cum stanc es. 15 16 Even if it were notbarred by the Eleventh Amendm ent, the cont ract-ba sed claim that the 17 distri ct court a llowed to proce ed must sim ilarl y fail. The claim essentia lly amounts to the asse rtion 18 that th e ag ree m ent by wh ich the St ate of

Ne w Y ork

purpo rte d to acq

uir e tit le w as u

nc on sci on ab le. 19 If a contractis unconscionable then itis also necessari ly invali d and unenforceable. See, e.g. ,41 1 Ra go ne v. At l. Vide o at Man ha tta n C tr. , 5 95 F. 3d

11 5, 12 1-2 2 (2 d C ir. 20 10 ) (s um m ari zin g N ew 2 York law). Moreover , although some previous deci sions have gra nted reformation as a remedy for 3 such claims, see, e.g., Os age N ati on of I nd ian s v. Un ite d S

tates , 9 7 F . S up p. 38 1, 42 2 (C t. C l. 1 95 1), 4 an d a

co urt ge ne ral ly i s allowed substanti al f lex ibi lity in

its ch oic e o f r em ed

y whe n it de ter m ine s 5 that a contract or a term thereof is unconsc ionable, see Restatement (Second) of Contract s § 208 6 (19 81 ) (“ If

a co ntr act

or ter m th ere of is unc on sci on ab le at th e ti m e th e co ntr act is m ad e a c ourt m ay 7 refuse to enforce t he c ontr act, or may enforce the remainder of the contr act without t he 8 unconscionable term, or m ay so limit the appli cation of a ny unconscionable term as to avoid any 9 unconscionable result.” ), the tr aditional remedy for a claim of un consci onabilit y is to deny 10 enforcement of the relevant cont ract, see 8 Richard A. Lord, Wil lis ton on Co ntrac ts § 18. 1, at 2 -9 11 (4th ed. 1998 & Supp. 2009); 3 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of R em ed ie s: Damages-Equity- Restitut ion § 12 12 .8 (4) , at 21 5-1 9 (2 d e d. 19 93 ). Th e cl aim an d it s atten dant r em ed

y w ou ld a ga in n ece ssaril y c all 13 into question and disrupt sett led expecta tions regarding t he ownership of land ste mm ing from the 14 ori gin al tran sf

er o f t itle to N ewYo rk; the co ntr act cla im , th ere fo re, lik e th e N on int erc ourse Ac t 15 claim, is subject t o equitable defenses. 16 The plaintif fs , at le ast

fo r no w, have ele cte d a ft er y ear s o f l iti gatio n to pursu e p art icu lar 17 alterna tive remedies thatwould not actuall y requi re t he Stat e of New York or t he partie s that have 18 su

bs eq ue ntl y a cq

uir ed the su bje ct l an ds fr om

the State t o re tur

n th e land s to the On eid as. Th is 19 el ec ti on , h owe ve r, do es no t e xe mptth ei r c la ims fr om the de fen se es tabl is he d in Sh err ill and Cayuga

. 20 Cayuga cle arl y in dic ate d th at a dro it m an ipu lat ion of the rem ed

y s ou ght will n ot r esc ue a cl aim 21 where its es sential premise threat en s to di sruptjustified soc ietal e xpectati ons. Thus, Cayuga 22 confirms that in this context the applicabil ity of an e quitable defense re quires considerat ion of the42 1 ba sic premise of a claim, rather t han the part icular r emedy sought. See Cayuga , 41 3 F. 3d at 275 2 (no tin g th at the “d isr up tiv en ess [i de nti fi ed

bythe Cayuga Court was] inher ent i n the clai m itself . 3

. . rathe r th ananele m ent of any part icu lar

rem ed y whic h w ou ld f

low [t he ref rom ]” ); id. at 277-78 4 (not ing that th e cl aim wa s su bje ct t o d ism iss al “ ab ini tio ” r e g ard le s s o f th e r e m edy s ou gh t). 5 Ac co rdi ng ly , w e c o n c lu d e th at t h e p urp o rt ed ly n on

po sse sso ry c lai m s as ser

ted bythe pla int if

fs in t his 6 case are s ubject to t he de fense rec ognized in Sh err ill and Cayuga . Moreover, for the reasons we 7 have alrea dy discussed, t his defense is notonly applicable, but als o serves to ba r these cl aims. 8 W e note thatit would be significantl y anomalous i f we were t o hold otherwise . The relevant 9 defense, as origi nally art iculate d in Sh err ill , served so le ly t o bar a part icular e quitable r emedy on 10 account of underlyi ng equitable concerns. Cayuga he ld t hat cl aim s so un din g p rim ari ly i n law that 11 wou ld “pr oject re dress . . . int o the presentand future” are a lso subjectto Sh err ill ’s e qu it ab le 12 defense. Cayuga , 413 F.3d at 275 (quoting Sh err ill , 5 44 U.S

. at2 02 n .1 4) . T he po ss es so ry cl ai ms 13 in Cayuga an d in thi s cas e, c on sis tin g in

ef fe ct o f c lai m s f

or e jec tm ent an d tr esp ass , are c an on ica l 14 claims at law. See id. at 283 (Hall, J. , d iss enting i n p art an d c on curri ng in t

he jud gm ent in

part) 15 (“ Hi st oricall y, both eject ment and trespass are actions atlaw.” (cit ing 1 Dobbs, su pra , § § 5 .1, 16 5. 10 (1) )); see also id. at 2 75 (m ajo rity o pin ion ). I n c ontra st, the relie f so ug ht b y th e p lai nti ff s w ith 17 regard to t heir purpor tedly no np os ses so ryclaims — reformation of the agreements embodying the 18 ori gin al tran sfer of the subj ect lan ds res ult ing in an award o f “ fa ir c om pe ns ati on ” —

wa s 19 tra dit ion all y ava ila ble on ly t hrou gh eq uit y . See I vinson v. Hutton , 9 8 U .S . 7 9, 82 (18 78 ) (“ Po we r 20 to re fo rm

written contra cts . . . is eve rywhe re co nc ed ed to co urt s o f e qu ity , and

it i s eq ua llycle ar that 21 it is a pow er which cannot be exercise d by comm on-law courts.”); 1 Dobbs, su pra , § 4.3(7) , at 619 22 (“ Re for mat io n [o f a c on tr ac t] i s t ra di ti on al ly an equi tabl e r eme dy

. . . . Withi n l imi ts , s ome43 1 unconscionable contractprovisions may be reformed to bring them within m inimum legal st andards 2 of fairness.”). Grante d, the United Stat es also see ks “resti tution” i n lieu of the ret urn of the land, 3 U.S. Br. at 58, and restitution is a form of relief availabl e at law, seeGrea t-W . L ife& A nn uit

y In s. 4 Co. v. Knudson , 5 34 U. S. 20 4, 212 -16 (200 2). The cas es o n whic h th e Unit ed St ate s re lie s su gg est , 5 however, that suc h relief in t his c ase would also be e quitable i n nature. See, e.g. , Fe lixv. Pa tri ck, 6 14 5 U .S . 3 17 , 3 28 (18 92 ); Un ite d S tates v . Mi nn eso ta , 2 70 U. S. 18 1, 19 1-9 2 (1 92 6); seeals o Grea t7 W. , 534 U.S. at215 (descri bing “a n act ion for restitution of the property ( if not already di sposed of) 8 or disgorgement of proceeds (i f already dispose d of)” as “equitable” (emphasis omitted) (qu ot ing 9 H a rr is T r u s t & S a v . B a n k v . S a lo m o n S mi th B arne

y In c. , 5 30 U. S. 23 8, 25 0 (2 00 0)) ); 1 Do bb s, 10 su

pra , § 4. 3(5 ), at 60 8-1 4 (i nd icatin g th at a cti on s for res tit uti on see kin g d isg org em ent of pro fi ts 11 generall y have been deemed actions in e quity). Even when an action for rest itution is one at l aw, 12 moreover, the avai labili ty of relief is ani mated by equitable concerns. Se e 1 Dobbs, su pra , § 4. 2(3 ), 13 at 581 (cit ing Moses v. MacPherlan , (1 76 0) 9 7 E ng . Re p. 6 76 (K .B .))

. In sum , th is C ourt c on clu de d 14 in Cayuga that the e quit ab le d efe nse recogniz ed in Sh err ill also appli es againstcanonical a ctions 15 at l aw . It

wo uld be strange i nd eed

to c on clu de that it

is ina pp lic ab le to c los ely

rel ate d a cti on s at 16 equity or to r elated actions that are animated by equitable c oncerns. This confir ms our view that the 17 equitable defense recognize d in Sh err ill is applic able here. 18 Our de cis ion als o p rev ents the pla int if fs fr om co nv ert inganoth erw ise un su cce ssf ul c lai m 19 — like the claim s asserted by the Cayuga Indian Nation in Cayuga — into a su cce ssf ul c lai m sim ply 20 byre- fr am ing it as “n on po sse sso ry. ” A s thi s Co urt h as pre vio us ly ind icated , th e es sen ce o f a cau se 21 of

act ion is f ound in t he fa cts all eg ed

an d p rov enbythe pla int if f, no t th e particul ar l eg al t he ori es 22 articul ated. Cf. Hac k v. Pres ide nt & Fe llo ws of Y aleCo ll. , 237 F.3d 81, 89 (2d C ir. 2000) (“[W] e44 1 may not aff

irm the dismiss al o f [a] complaint because [the pl aintiff] ha[s] proceeded under the 2 wr on g th eo ry ‘ so long as [he has] all eg ed fa cts su ff

ici ent to su

pp ort a m eri tor iou s le ga l cl aim .’” 3 (quoting No rth ro

p v . H off ma n o f Si ms bu ry, Inc. , 134 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1997))) , abrogated on 4 other grounds by Swie rkiewicz v. Sor ema N.A. , 534 U.S. 506 (2002). The f actual pr edicate of the 5 claims asserted by t he Oneidas in this case is ne arly identica l t o thatunderl ying t he cl aims m ade by 6 the Cayuga plainti ffs. Co mp ar e Oneida Am. C ompl. ¶¶ 16-39, with Cayuga Compl. ¶¶ 30, 34-50. 7 Mo re ov er , e v e nl i b er al ly co ns trui ng th e c ompl ai nt s h er e t o c on ta in so me r efe re nc es to th e c la ims 8 now contended to be nonpossessory, the Onei das and the Unit ed Stat es, in the yea rs priorto Cayuga , 9 habituall y referr edto theirclaims as vindicat ing possessory rights, see, e.g. , On eid a C om pl. at ¶ ¶ 10 11, 14-17, 21-22, 25; Tr. of Argument re: Moti on to Am end at12-13, 20, 48, 83, Doc. 136 (Apr. 2, 11 19 99 ); S up p. Mem . o f N ewYo rk O ne ida s at 1, Do c. 12 1 (A

pr. 8, 1 99 9) (“T he s im

ple and s tar k f act 12 of

thi s cas e is th is c ase ha s alw ay s been a s uit for the enforcement of present and c ontinuing 13 po sse

sso ryr ig ht s.”); Oneida Am. Com pl. at ¶¶41-43, 46, 48-49, 51-52, 54-55, 58- 59, 61-62; and 14 only fully articul ated their purportedl y nonposses sory c laims in the aftermath of Cayuga . T he fa ct 15 that the Onei das’ clai ms are litigate d after this Court ’s decisi on in Cayuga ha s af fo rde d th em

an 16 opportunity t o attempt to cast their claims in such a way as to avoid Cayuga ’s equitable defense. The 17 equitable principl es that i nform ed Cayuga , however, are no le ss presentin this ca se. 18 Fi na ll y, th e O ne id as conte nd that the applicati on of Cayuga to th e p urp o rte dly no np os ses so ry 19 cla im s as ser

ted he re w ou ld e ff

ect ive ly o ve rru le On eid

a II

. W e dis agre e. Th e S up rem e C ourt 20 indi ca te d in On eid a II that th ere ex ist s a f

ed era l co mm on

lawcau se o f a cti on

bywh ich

Ind ian 21 nations may seek recompense for ancient depr ivations of thei r ancestr al lan ds, seeOn eid a II , 470 22 U.S. at 236, and suggested wit hout deciding t hat such a claim would not be barred by lache s, see id.45 1 at 244 n.16. Bu t se e id. at 263-70 (Stevens, J ., dis sentin g) ( co nte nd ingfo r f our Ju sti ces that la ch es

wo uld bar su chcla im s); Fe lix , 1 45 U. S. at 3 34 -35 (ap ply inglach es to an act ion seek ingto e sta

bli sh 2 3 a con str

uc tiv e tru st ov er land s conve ye d in v iol ati on of a f ed era l st atutor

y a lie natio n re str aint); cf. 4 Wetzel

v. Minn. Ry. Transfe r Co ., 169 U.S . 23 7, 24 1 (1 89 8) ( “T he truth i s, the re m us t be so m e li m it 5 of t ime wi thin which thes e excuses [for not bringi ng an action t o cancel an unl awful land 6 co nv ey an ce] sh all be av ail ab le, or titl es m ight f ore ve r be ins ecu

re. ”). It i s cr iti cal to n ote , h ow ev er, 7 that the pl aintiffs in On eid a II ass ert ed cla im s only against th e C ounti es o f M ad iso n and On eid a, 8 which were not all eged to have pa rt ic ipat ed in the ori ginal, purpor tedly unlawful tr ansfer of the 9 subject lands but which did maintain possession of those la nds. Se e O ne ida II , 470 U.S. at 229. The 10 only claim recognized by t he Supreme Court in On eid a II was thus ne cessari ly a claim premised on 11 an assert ion by the plai ntiffs of a continuing ri gh t t o possession. Id. at 236 (“[W] e hold that t he 12 On eid as c anm aintai n th is a cti on fo r vi olatio ns of

the ir po sse

sso ry rights bas ed on federal comm on 13 law.” (emphasis added)). Cayuga ’s ho ldi ng , whic h w e ar e b ound to f oll ow , w as t

hat al l cl aim s th at 14 are “ di sruptive,” a category whic h includes t hose premised on the asser tion of a continui ng 15 posses sory inter est in the subject l ands, are barred by the defense r ecognized in Sh err ill

. Cayuga 16 thus found Sh err ill ’s equitable defense to be appl icable t o the only cla im recognized i n On eid a II 17 — a res ult

th at wa s fu llyc on sis tent w ithth e Su pre m e Co urt ’s de cis ion in Onei da II , whic h o nly 18 rec og niz ed

that th e cl aim

ex ist ed . T he pla int iffs’ n on po sse sso ry c lai m s, in c ontra st, have be en 19 rec og niz ed

byne ith er the Su

pre m e C ourt n or b y th is C ourt and are , a s d iscussed ab ov e, lar ge ly 20 equitable in nature, re nd eri ngina pp lic ab le On eid

a II’s c o n c e rn

re g ard in g th e a

p p li cat ion of eq uit ab le 21 defenses t o claims at law. Se e O ne ida II , 47 0 U. S. at 24 4 n .1 6. In s um , th en , o ur d eci sio n h ere is 22 not in tensi on with On eid a II

.46 1 CO NC LU SI ON 2 For the foregoing re asons, we conclude t hat a ll claims rai sed by the plaint iffs in this acti on, 3 wh eth er p os ses so ry o r pu rpo rte dly no np os ses so ry, are s ub jec t to an d b arr ed

bythe de fe ns e 4 recognized i n Sh err ill and Cayuga . T he Oneidas’ c ontra ct- ba sed cla im is f urt he r barre d b y N ew 5 Yo rk’ s so ve rei gn

imm un ity

. F or thi s rea so n, th e jud gm ent o f the d istric t c ourt i s AFFIRMED as 6 to the dismissal o f pl aintiffs’ possess ory claims, and REVER SED wi th r esp ect to p lai nti ff

s’ 7 no np os ses so ry c lai m s. Th e ca se i s REMAND ED to the dist rict cour t for the entry of judgm ent and 8 the resol ution of any pending motions.1 GERSHON, District Judge , concurring in part and dissenting in part: 1 The Supreme Court has held that the Oneida Indian Nation has “a federal common-law 2 right to sue to enforce [its] aboriginal land rights.” County of Oneida, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian 3 Nation of N.Y. State , 470 U.S. 226, 235 (1985) (“ Oneida II ”); see also Oneida Indian Nation of 4 N.Y. State v. County of Oneida, N.Y. , 414 U.S. 661, 674 (1974) (“ Oneida I ”). It has done so 5 acknowledging that, while “[o]ne would have thought that claims dating back for more than a 6 century and a half would have be en barred long ago,” “neither pe titioners nor we have found any 7 applicable statute of limitations or other relevant legal basis for holding that the Oneidas’ claims 8 are barred or otherwise have been satisfied.” Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 253. A nd yet, after thirty9 five years of litigation, including two trips to the Supreme Court and th e intervention of the 10 United States on plaintiffs’ behalf, the majo rity forecloses the Oneidas from obtaining any 11 remedy in this action. 12 Like the majority, I accept that , in light of the decision in Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. 13 Pataki , 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005), plaintiffs’ claims that hinge on their possessory rights to the 14 land fail. Unlike the majority, I conclude that Cayuga does not foreclose plaintiffs’ non15 possessory claims. C onsequently, I dissent. 16 I. 17 The plaintiffs — the Oneida Indian Nation and the United States — both present two 18 cognizable non-possessory claims. First, the Un ited States emphasizes its federal common law 19 claim against the State for viol ating the Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177, when the State 20 failed to pay the Oneidas a fair price for their land. (The Oneidas also assert a claim under the 21 Nonintercourse Act.) This claim is consistent with the Act’s “obvi ous purpose”: “to prevent 22 unfair, improvident, or improper disposition by Indians of lands ow ned or possessed by them . . . 232 .” Fed

. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation , 362 U.S. 99, 119 (1960). Put differently, 1 the United States seeks to vindicate not its right under the Act to stop sale s without its approval, 2 but its right to ensure th at when the Oneidas sold their land, they would receive a fair price. See 3 U.S. v. Oneida Nation of N.Y. , 477 F.2d 939, 943 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (no ting that the United States’ 4 responsibility under th e Nonintercourse Act “was not merely to be present at the negotiations or 5 to prevent actual fraud, deception, or duress alone; improvidence, unfairness, the receipt of 6 unconscionable consideration would likewise be of federal concern. ”) (internal quotation marks 7 omitted) (emphasis in original). 8 Unquestionably, the United States may sue New Yo rk for a violation of a federal statute. 9 See Cramer v. United States , 261 U.S. 219, 233 (1923) (“The Un ited States may lawfully 10 maintain suits in its own courts to prevent inte rference with the means it adopts to exercise its 11 powers of government and to carry into effect it s policies.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 12 In other words, the United States has both an in terest in this suit as trustee for the Native 13 Americans, and an independent interest in ensuring that the State complies with the 14 Nonintercourse Act. See United States v. Minnesota , 270 U.S. 181, 194 (1926) (holding that the 15 United States’ interest in an Indian claims suit “arises out of its guard ianship over the Indians, 16 and out of its right to invoke the aid of a court of equity in removing unl awful obstacles to the 17 fulfillment of its obligations, and in both aspects th e interest is one which is vested in it as a 18 sovereign.”) 19 In my view, both the United States and the Oneidas also assert a claim arising under 20 federal common law which, as articulated by Judge Kahn, is a contract claim based on 213 unconscionability. 1 The majority does not challenge that the contract claim has been adequately 1 pled in the Oneidas’ complaint, but takes the position that the United States’ amended complaint 2 itself lacks sufficient factual allegations to support the claim. Because of disparities between the 3 two complaints, the majority concludes that th e Oneida Nation cannot take advantage of the 4 United States’ intervention to overcome the State’s sovereign immunity. See Alabama v. North 5 Carolina , 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2315 (2010) (concluding that a State’s sovereign immunity is not 6 compromised “by an additional, nonsovereign pl aintiff’s bringing an entirely overlapping claim 7 for relief that burdens the State withno additional defense or liability.”). 2 8 If the majority finds the United States’ ame nded complaint insufficient, then we should 9 deem the United States’ complaint constructively amended. See Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy 10 Indus., Ltd. , 4 F.3d 1084, 1087 (2d Cir. 1993). 3 Judge Kahn found that the Oneida Nation’s 11

1 In finding a cognizable fede ral contract law claim of unc onscionability, Judge Kahn drew analogies from the body of law federal courts ha ve developed relating to Indian claims seeking fair compensation from the United States. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. N.Y. , 500 F. Supp. 2d 128, 140-45 (N.D.N.Y. 2007). In part icular, he noted that when Congress, in 1946, enacted the Indian Claims Commission Act (“the ICCA”) “to hear and determine all tribal claims against the United States that accrued before August 13, 1946,” it included “claims whic h would result if the treaties, contracts and agreements between the claimant and the Un ited States were revised on the ground of fraud, duress, [or] unc onscionable consideration . . . .” Id. at 140-41. Judge Kahn explained that, “[w]hile claims based on uncons cionable consideration we re brought pursuant to statutory right, the Court of Claims fashioned a common law rule based on preexisting precedents to determine when Indian clai mants could prevail on related claims.” Id. at 142. Caselaw developed in the Court of Claims, he reasoned, “supports a holding that when the record shows that an agreement resulted in a gross disp arity between the fair market value and the price paid for the land transferred, a claim of unconsci onable consideration presumptively exists and supports the revision of contract.” Id

. 2 The majority does not dispute that the N onintercourse Act claim was pled by the United States and therefore does not pr esent sovereign immunity issues.

3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b)(2) provi des that “[w]hen an issue not raised by the pleadings is tried by the parties’ e xpress or implied consent, it must be treated in all respects as if raised in the pleadings.” Although this rule technically does not apply on appeal, appellate courts, using Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b) “by way of analogy,” permit cons tructive amendment of4 complaint set forth adequate facts to support it s non-possessory contract claim, a finding the 1 majority does not dispute. The State, therefore, had full notice of the claim, and it never argued 2 below that the parties’ complaints were inconsis tent; in fact, in its su mmary judgment briefing, 3 the State described the complaints as “parallel.” The State chose to bring its dispositive motion 4 as one for summary judgment, where the theories of the case and issues would be more clearly 5 defined than at the pleading stage. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A , 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) 6 (“[Fed. R. Civ. P.’s 8(a)(2)’s] simplified notice pleading requirement relies on liberal discovery 7 rules and summary judgment moti ons to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of 8 unmeritorious claims.”). And ev en after plaintiffs squarely pr esented the State with their non9 possessory theories, the State avowed that no further discovery was ne cessary. All parties 10 briefed the availability of non-possessory claims and damages extensively in their briefs on 11 appeal. Consequently, the State would suffer no unfair prejudice; it had full knowledge of the 12 facts and legal theories relied upon by both plai ntiffs at the time of the summary judgment 13 motion, and, given that it did not raise any dispar ities between the two complaints, or sovereign 14 immunity issues, before the district court, ca nnot plausibly claim that it would have supported 15 the motion any differently had there been no disparities. 4 16

pleadings “when the effect will be to acknowle dge that certain issues upon which the lower court’s decision has been based or consistent withthe trial court’s judgment have been litigated.” 6A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1494 (3d ed. 2010).

4 Constructive amendment in these circumstan ces is consistent with our federal rules’ instruction that “[p]leadings must be construed so as to do justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). “This provision is not simply a pre catory statement but reflects one of the basic philosophies of practice under the federal rules.” 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1286 (3d ed. 2010). “One of the most impor tant objectives of the federal rules is that lawsuits should be determined on their merits and according to the dictat es of justice, rather than in terms of whether or not the averments in the paper pleadings ha ve been artfully or5 In addition to finding the United States’ pleadi ng insufficient, the majority also reasons 1 that the United States “disavows” such a claim in its briefs to this court. This mischaracterizes 2 the United States’ position. The United States assertedat oral argument th at there is both a 3 federal common law contract claim and a common law Nonintercourse Act claim. Clearly the 4 United States prefers its Noninter course Act claim, under which, it argues, it would not have to 5 prove “gross inadequacy of consideration” or the “inferiority of the Oneida Indian Nation’s 6 negotiating position” to prevail. But there is nothi ng in its briefs or statements at oral argument 7 that “disavows” the contract claim. 5 8 In any event, whether the claim is premised on contract law or the Nonintercourse Act, 9 the remedy would, as Judge Kahn acknowledged, be the same: “the difference between the fair 10 market value of the land at the time and the c onsideration received by the Oneida Indian Nation 11 minus any offsets, including, but not limite d to, sales costs incu rred by the State.” Oneida Indian 12 Nation of N.Y. v. N.Y. , 500 F. Supp. 2d 128, 144, 139 n.4 (N.D .N.Y. 2007) (noting that “an 13 analysis of Plaintiffs’ common law claims would be part of the determination of a remedy that 14

inartfully drawn.” Id. Where, as here, a defendant has suffered no prejudice, constructive amendment is entirely compatible with this objective.

5 Judge Kahn premised the Oneidas’ and th e United States’ non-possessory claim on the contract claim rather than the Nonintercourse Ac t. This was because he found that “the Circuit recognized an implied right of action [under the Nonintercourse Act] that was possessory in nature,” and that the federal common law cla im was, therefore, “on stronger ground.” 500 F. Supp. 2d at 139 n. 4. Although this court did, in fact, suggest that an implied right of action under the Nonintercourse Act woul d be possessory, it did so when only the Counties, and not the State, were the defendants in this case. See Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Oneida County , 719 F.2d 525, 540 (2d Cir. 1983). Becaus e the Counties were not involvedin the land transactions, the Oneida Nation could assert only possessor y remedies against them. Therefore, nonpossessory claims were never at issue until now.6 would be commensurate with vi ndicating any violations of the Nonintercourse Act.”). 6 1 Voluminous evidence of unfair compensati on was before the district court. See id. at 145. An 2 expert reviewed the State’s record s of proceeds it obtained from sa les of the Oneida land to show 3 the gross disparity between the price the State pa id the Oneidas for their land and the price the 4 State received after a quick resale . Judge Kahn also noted “previ ous rulings that the State paid 5 the Oneida Indian Nation ‘approx imately fifty cents per acre’ in1795 to purchase about a third 6 of the reservation and resold the land to ‘white settlers for about $3.53 per acre.’” See id. at 145 7 (quoting Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y. State v. Oneida County , 719 F.2d 525, 529 (2d Cir. 8 1983)). Taken together, this ev idence “suggests that th ere are material facts indicating that the 9 consideration paid to the Oneida Indian Nation by the State was significantly under the then-fair 10 market price.” Id. Remedying the disparity would both cure the unconscionability of the 11 original contract and disgorge the benefits the State gained by the contract in violation of federal 12 law. See Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies , § 4.1, at 552 (2d ed. 1993) (the “purpose [of 13 restitution] is to prevent the defendant’s unjust enrichment by recapturing the gains the defendant 14 secured in a transaction.”) 15 II. 16 Determining whether plaintiffs have alleged cogn izable claims is only the first part of the 17 inquiry; the court must also consid er whether both the claims and remedies the plaintiffs assert 18 are precluded by the equitable defense articulated in City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian 19 Nation of N.Y. , 544 U.S. 197 (2005) (“ Sherrill ”), and Cayuga. Sherrill was an extraordinary 20 case. The Oneida Nation claimed that it was exempt from paying property taxes to the City of 21

6 The Nonintercourse Act “cont ains no remedial provision.” See Oneida II, 470 U.S. 238- 39. Therefore, the court may “presume the avai lability of all appropriate remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated otherwise.” Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch. , 503 U.S. 60, 66 (1992).7 Sherrill for land that was part of the Oneidas’ historic rese rvation, but which had been sold by 1 them years before, and then reacquired. Plaintiffs argued that they had regained sovereignty over 2 the land they purchased in the open market. See 544 U.S. at 213. The Court rejected their 3 “unification theory,” explaining that the “standards of federal Indian law and federal equity 4 practice” precluded the Oneida Nation from “rek indling embers of sove reignty that long ago 5 grew cold.” Id. at 214. The Court noted that “the que stion of damages for the Tribe’s ancient 6 dispossession is not at issue in this case, and we therefore do not disturb our holding in Oneida 7 II .” Id. at 221. “However,” the Court concluded, “the distance from 1805 to the present day, the 8 Oneidas’ long delay in seeking equitable relief against New York or its local units, and 9 developments in the City of Sherrill spanning several generations . . . render inequitable the 10 piecemeal shift in governance this suit seeks unilaterally to initiate.” Id. 11 In Cayuga , this court applied Sherrill ’s equitable defense to bar the Cayugas’ possessory 12 land claims. The Cayugas had filed suit in 1980, alleging that the ce ssion of certain tribal lands 13 to the State of New York in 1795 and 1807 was ne ver ratified by the fe deral government. For 14 these violations, they, later jo ined by the United States, soughtactual possession of their 15 ancestral reservation land. After ruling for the Cayugas on the liability issues, the district court 16 decided a series of issues concerning the ap propriate remedy. The court concluded that 17 ejectment was a drastic, inappropriate remedy that would “result in wide spread disruption not 18 only to the Counties and those re siding therein, but to the State of New York as a whole.” 19 Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cuomo , 1999 WL 509442 at *29-30 (N .D.N.Y. July 1, 1999). 20 The district court submitted the issue of monetary damages to a jury and the jury awarded the 21 Cayugas damages “for loss of use and possession” of the land. See Cayuga Indian Nation of 22 N.Y. v. Pataki , 165 F. Supp. 2d 266, 273 (N.D.N.Y. 2001). 238 The Second Circuit reversed. It understood Sherrill as holding “that equitable doctrines, 1 such as laches, acquiescence, and impossibility, can, in appropriate circum stances, be applied to 2 Indian land claims, even when such a claim is legally viable and within the statute of 3 limitations.” Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 273. It also held that Sherrill ’s equitable considerations 4 applied equally to the district court’s “monetizati on” of their ejectment claim, reasoning that the 5 main concern underlying Sherrill ’s decision was the “disruptive nature of the claim itself.” Id. at 6 274. Therefore, despite Sherrill ’s emphasis that the question of rights was “very different” from 7 the question of remedy, 544 U.S. at 213, the Cayuga court held that “[w]hether characterized as 8 an action at law or in e quity, any remedy flowing from this possessory land claim , which would 9 call into question title to over 60,000 acres of land in upstate New York, can only be understood 10 as a remedy that would similarly ‘project redress into the present and future.’” Cayuga , 413 F.3d 11 at 275 (emphasis added) (quoting Sherrill , 544 U.S. at 202). 12 The plaintiffs’ claims at issue here—wheth er premised on the Nonintercourse Act or 13 contract law—are non -possessory and do not “project redress into the present and future.” The 14 Nonintercourse Act claim seeks restitution of th e State’s profits from the State, a common 15 remedy for violations of federal law, and one th at does not implicate land ownership, much less 16 possession. See, e.g. , Securities and Exchange Comm’n. v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co. , 446 F.2d 17 1301, 1307 (2d Cir. 1971) (“[T]he Supreme Court has upheld the power of the government 18 without specific statutory authority to seek restitution . . . as an ancillary remedy in the exercise 19 of the courts’ general equity powers to afford comp lete relief.”). As for the contract claim, a 20 finding that a term in the contract was unconsci onable does not require “voiding” the underlying 21 title, as the majority suggests. Even while acknowledging the “substantial flex ibility” courts 22 have to remedy such claims, the majority assert s that “the traditional remedy for a claim of 239 unconscionability is to deny enforc ement of the relevant contract.” Therefore, the majority 1 concludes, “[t]he claim [of unc onscionability] and its attendant remedy would again necessarily 2 call into question and disrupt se ttled expectations regarding th e ownership of land stemming 3 from the original transfer of title to New York [.]” 4 But we are not constrained to provide only a “traditional” remedy for any violation; to the 5 contrary, judgments “should grant the relief to wh ich each party is entitled, even if the party has 6 not demanded that relief in its pl eadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54. As the majority itself notes, in 7 remedying an unconscionability claim, courts ca n choose, as Judge Kahn did, to reform the 8 contract, rather than void it. This has the effect of denying enforcement of the unconscionable 9 provision — in this case, the price —while pres erving the rest of the contract, including the 10 transfer of title. 11 I do not agree with the implicati on that a claim is possessory if even one potential remedy 12 would question title. In United States v. Mottaz , 476 U.S. 834 (1986), a plai ntiff alleged that the 13 United States had unlawfully sold her interest in her land and sought the market value of the land 14 as the remedy. The plaintiff’s position was that the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a), which 15 governs actions to “adjudicate a disp uted title to real property inwhich the United States claims 16 an interest,” did not ap ply to her case. The Court disagr eed, holding that, in “demand[ing] 17 damages in the amount of the current market value of her intere sts,” the plaintiff sought “a 18 declaration that she alone posses[ed] valid title to her interests . . . and that the title asserted by 19 the United States is defective . . . .” Id. at 842 (emphasis in original). Therefore, the Quiet Title 20 Act applied, and, because the plaintiff had not filed within the limitations period of that Act, her 21 claim was defective. The Court, however, ackno wledged that, if she ha d sought merely a share 22 of the proceeds, rather than the current fair market value of her land, “a claim for monetary 2310 damages in that amount would involve a concession that title had passed . . . and that the sole 1 issue was whether [she] was fairly compensated for the taking of her interests in the allotments.” 2 Id . This reasoning applies to the plaintiffs in th is case: their claim, a nd their requested remedy, 3 necessarily concedes that title has validly passed. 4 The majority distinguishes Mottaz by stating that awarding reli ef in this case “would not 5 involve ‘concession[s] that title [has] passed’ but rather would establish that it had not, but that 6 return of the property was impossible as a re medy under the circumstances.” In doing so, the 7 majority refers to plaintiffs’ requests for “fai r compensation” and “restitution” as “substitute 8 remedies,” apparently to liken what is s ought here to the moneti zation found improper in 9 Cayuga . But these are not “substitute remedies” — a term that is the majority’s own, and not 10 that of the plaintiffs or the district court — but separate claims with separate remedies pled in the 11 complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d) (“A party may set out 2 or more statements of a claim or 12 defense alternatively or h ypothetically . . . .”). 13 The suggestion that plaintiffs raised these non-possessory claims and remedies only “to 14 cast their claims in such a way as to avoid Cayuga ’s equitable defense” is not to the point. 15 Unlike the majority, I do not fa ult the Oneidas for adjusting their claims to recognize the 16 changing legal landscape. It shows no disr espect to precedent to acknowledge that Cayuga 17 significantly changed that landscape. Cayuga not only applied laches to bar Indian land claims, 18 as well as remedies, relying on Sherrill , but it also applied laches to the United States’ claims. 7 19

7 I need not address the app licability of this aspect of Cayuga’ s holding to the present case because I do not agree with the majority that Sherrill’ s equitable defenses apply to the nonpossessory claims. However, it is worth noting that the Cayuga majority acknowledged that “laches is not available against the federal gov ernment when it undertakes to enforce a public right or protect th e public interest.” Cayuga , 413 F.3d at 279 n.8. Reas oning that “the United States intervened in [ Cayuga ] to vindicate the interest of the Tribe , with whom it has a trust relationship,” the majority in Cayuga held that the United States was subject to a laches defense11 After thirty-five years of litigation in this case, and intervening appeals in two other cases, 1 Sherrilland Cayuga , it is not surprising or improper that pl aintiffs would reevaluate and refine 2 their positions. 3 At its broadest reading, Cayuga limits only recovery for all possessory claims; while 4 Cayuga found that both legal and e quitable claims could be possesso ry in nature, and therefore 5 subject to equitable defenses based on disruption to settled e xpectations regarding land title, 6 Cayuga does not compel us to find, or even suggest, that non-possessory clai ms are to be treated 7 as possessory. This is particularly true here wh ere the United States seeks to vindicate a right 8 that is not possessory in any sense: the right to sue for a violation of its statute. 9 III. 10 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we must not forget the actual concerns Cayuga 11 and Sherrill addressed. In Cayuga , the court wrote that “[i]nasmuch as th e instant claim, a 12 possessory land claim, is subject to the doctrine of laches, we conclude that the present case must 13 be dismissed because the same considerations that doomed the Oneidas’ claim in Sherrillapply 14 with equal force here.” Caygua , 413 F.3d at 277. A claim for act ual possession, as involved in 15 Cayuga , or monetization of the possesso ry claim, as the district court granted the Cayugas, was 16 found to presuppose that no title ever passed to th e State. This in turn introduced difficult 17 present-day complications that w ould affect innocent third-party purchasers and the current value 18

because, it concluded, that case did not involve the enforcement of a public right or the protections of a public interest. Id. at 278, 279 n.8. In this case, as described above, the United States has two independent roles: as trustee for the Oneidas, and as a sovereign. The United States’ role as a sovereign enfo rcing its own statute by definition “involve[s] the enforcement of a public right or the protections of a public intere st.” Thus, the question of laches does not rest “on facts virtually indis tinguishable” to those in Cayuga , as the majority s uggests; the different claims call for a different analysis.12 of the developed land. These were among the cons iderations that had led the Supreme Court in 1 Sherrillto reject the restoration of sovereignty to the Oneidas. 2 The nonpossessory claims and remedy involved here implicate none of these concerns. 3 Present-day land considerations are irrelevant to the questi on of whether the State should 4 disgorge the profit it earned from violating a United States statute. To calculate a restitution or 5 fair compensation remedy, the court would not have to consider improvements to the land, 6 settled expectations of innocent parties, or the “distinctly non-Indi an character of the area and its 7 inhabitants.” Sherrill , 544 U.S. at 202. The distance in time matters little in this case because the 8 damages calculation, with the excepti on of interest, would be no diffe rent than if this claim had 9 been brought immediately after the alleged sales by the State. 8 In other words, a fair 10 compensation remedy would not upset present- day expectations because it has nothing to do 11 with the present at all. 12 Cayuga held that “the import of Sherrillis that ‘disruptive,’ forward-looking claims, a 13 category exemplified by possessory land claims, ar e subject to equitable defenses, including 14 laches.” Cayuga , 413 F.3d at 277. Nothing in Cayuga or Sherrillprohibits the pu rely backward15 looking, non-possessory claims asserted here and the remedy described by Judge Kahn. What 16 Cayuga was concerned about—whether labele d a claim or remedy—was avoiding undue 17 disturbance of ancient land titles and settled e xpectations regarding th em. The claims and 18 remedy recognized by the district court in this case, and pursued now by the Oneidas and by the 19

8 Of course, the distance in time affects pre- judgment interest. But, as Judge McCurn recognized in Cayuga , prejudgment interest is an equitable matter. See Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. , 165 F. Supp. 2d at 297. The particulars of Judge McCurn = s analysis have never been addressed by this Court, and there is no reason to believe that the district court, on remand, and then this Court, on appeal, could not address th e equities of prejudgmen t interest if damages were awarded. But the potential for a large awar d, without more, cannot itself be treated as so disruptive as to justify dismi ssal of a legally sound claim.13 United States, involve no such disturbance. With this decision, the majority forecloses plaintiffs 1 from bringing any claims seeking any remedy for their treatment at th e hands of the State. This 2 is not required by Sherrill or Cayuga , and is contrary to the spirit of the Supreme Court’s 3 decisions in this very case. Therefore, I dissent and would affirm Judge Kahn’s carefully 4 considered decision and order denyin g summary judgment to the State. 5