SCOTT LAW FIRM 

1388 SUTTER STREET, SUITE 715

SAN 

FRANCISCO, CA 94109

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

John Houston Scott (SBN 72578)

Lizabeth N. de Vries (SBN 227215)

SCOTT LAW FIRM

1388 Sutter Street, Suite 715

San Francisco, CA 94109

Tel: (415) 561-9601

Fax: (415) 561-9609

john@scottlawfirm.net

liza@scottlawfirm.net

Izaak D. Schwaiger (SBN 267888)

527 Mendocino Avenue Ste. B

Santa Rosa, CA 95401

Tel. (707) 595-4414

Fax: (707) 851-1983

E-mail: izaak@izaakschwaiger.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff TAYLOR SWIFT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TAYLOR SWIFT

Plaintiff,

v.

CENTRAL MARIN POLICE AUTHORITY, 

DAVID WOO, VERA HICKS, and DOES

1-25

Defendants.

Case No. 3:17-cv-00866 VC

PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS COMPLAINT

Date: May 18, 2017

Time: 10:00 a.m.

Courtroom: 4, 17th Floor 450 Golden Gate Avenue

 San Francisco, CA 94102

Judge: The Honorable Vince Chhabria

PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT

Case 3:17-cv-00866-VC Document 8 Filed 04/05/17 Page 1 of 8
SCOTT LAW FIRM 

1388 SUTTER STREET, SUITE 715

SAN 

FRANCISCO, CA 94109

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. INTRODUCTION

This is not a garden variety excessive force case. Rather, the Plaintiff Taylor Swift had a 

history of epileptic seizures which on occasion required a call for emergency medical assistance. 

He was at home on the morning of September 2, 2016 and suffered a seizure. This case arises out 

of a 911 call for medical aid by his mother. Complaint, ¶ 9. The seizure was beginning to subside 

and Taylor’s mother recognized the onset of his postictal period. During the postictal period, 

epileptics may become more easily frightened, upset, and unable to communicate. Complaint, ¶

11. 

The officers arrived at the scene along with medical personnel. They were aware that this 

was a call requesting medical assistance for an epileptic seizure at the time they came into contact 

with Taylor Swift.

The Complaint goes on to allege as follows:

12. Contemporaneous with the onset of Taylor’s postictal period, officers from the 

Central Marin Police Authority arrived at the home along with emergency medical staff. 

Officers walked into the home and one said to the paramedics, “We’ll get this.” Officers

David Woo and Vera Hicks contacted Taylor in the living room where he was beginning 

to stand up. Despite their awareness of the medical nature of the call, Officers Woo and 

Hicks determined that Taylor posed a danger to law enforcement staff because he

appeared agitated and was not complying with the officers’ orders. The officers yelled, 

“Stop resisting!” and attempted to gain control of Taylor by forcing him face down on an 

air mattress on the floor and placing him in a rear wrist lock.

13. Officers are trained that a cardinal rule in the handling of any person having a 

seizure is that the subject should not be restrained in any way unless it is essential for his 

safety or the safety of others. It is well known that restraint of persons during or after a 

seizure may exacerbate or precipitate combativeness. As the restrained subject’s resistance 

to his restraints increases, so does the risk to his life. Restraining an epileptic face-down 

and/or with his arms behind his back poses an aggravated danger of asphyxiation.

14. Officers Woo and Hicks’ actions aggravated and escalated the situation. Officer 

Woo then unholstered his Taser and fired it into Taylor’s back while Officer Hick’s 

attempted to hold Taylor’s body down. Taylor began to scream in pain. Officer Woo fired 

a second and third volley of electrical current into his body. Taylor was held face-down on 

the ground and handcuffs were applied behind his back. Taylor called for his mother, and 

began to slur that he couldn’t breathe. Taylor’s mother pleaded with the officers to roll 

him onto his side. When they did, she could see that his face was covered in blood.

- 1 -

PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT

Case 3:17-cv-00866-VC Document 8 Filed 04/05/17 Page 2 of 8
SCOTT LAW FIRM 

1388 SUTTER STREET, SUITE 715

SAN 

FRANCISCO, CA 94109

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15. Taylor was removed from his home on a gurney and handcuffed, still within his 

postictal period, and transported to Marin General Hospital. Taylor was charged by 

Officer Woo with violations of California Penal Code Sections 148(a)(1), resisting arrest, 

and 243(b), assault on a peace officer. The Marin County District Attorney declined to 

prosecute. Body-worn cameras were employed during this event, and were requested by 

Taylor following the D.A.'s rejection of his case. To date the Central Marin Police 

Authority have refused to provide them to him.

It is true that Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to support a Monell claim based on (1) a 

custom or policy of excessive force or (2) deliberate indifference to the use of excessive. As to 

those two Monell theories. The court has discretion to dismiss those Monell theories at this time, 

or allow Plaintiff the opportunity to conduct discovery and decide the issue at the summary 

judgment stage.

The Monell theory based on inadequate training and supervision regarding the use of force 

on a person in the midst of a serious medical emergency, an epileptic seizure, does not require 

evidence of a custom or practice to be actionable. City of Canton v Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)

The need for more or different training or supervision of police officers is so obvious that a jury 

could find deliberate indifference based on a single incident. Id. at 390. See also, Oviat v Pearce, 

954 F2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1992); Lee v City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2001).

In addition, a Monell theory based on ratification does not require evidence of a custom or 

practice. Rather, it requires proof that a municipal policy maker made a conscious, affirmative 

choice to ratify the conduct in question. City of St. Louis v Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988); 

Lassiter v City of Bremerton, 556 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2009); Lytle v Carl, 382 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 

2004).

As to Plaintiff’s request for appropriate injunctive relief, this case falls within the narrow 

class of cases involving police misconduct where federal courts have recognized certain limited 

types of injunctive relief are appropriate.

II. ARGUMENT

A. Applicable Law Regarding a Motion to Dismiss

A dismissal motion should be denied if the subject complaint contains factual allegations 

adequate to give defendants fair notice of the pending claims, and, enables them to defend 

- 2 -

PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT

Case 3:17-cv-00866-VC Document 8 Filed 04/05/17 Page 3 of 8
SCOTT LAW FIRM 

1388 SUTTER STREET, SUITE 715

SAN 

FRANCISCO, CA 94109

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

themselves if the complaint’s allegations, taken as true, plausibly suggest entitlement to relief. 

Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216-1217 (9th Cir. 2011), rehearing en banc denied, 659 F.3d 850 

(9th Cir. 2011). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all of the 

factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 

2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007).

In addition, the Court must draw inferences in favor of the plaintiff. The complaint should 

be construed favorably to the pleader. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see also 

Walleri v. Federal Home Loan Bank of Seattle, 83 F.3d 1575, 1580 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper "only if it is clear that no relief could be 

granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. 

King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 81 L. Ed. 2d 59, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984). The issue is whether 

the plaintiffs are entitled to offer evidence to support the claims, not whether based on a

complaint’s allegations the will prevail as a matter of law. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 

40 L. Ed. 2d 90, 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974) (no quotations added). The Ninth Circuit has "repeatedly 

held that a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading 

was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of 

other facts." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).

B. Plaintiff Has Alleged Sufficient Facts to Support a Deliberate Indifference Claim 

Based on a Failure to Train or Supervise

In City of Canton v Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) a detainee brought a civil rights action 

against the City of Canton alleging she was deprived of her right to receive necessary medical 

attention while in police custody. When taken into custody Harris made an incoherent remark 

when asked if she needed medical attention. When brought inside the police station she slumped 

on the floor on two occasions. She was then forced to lie on the floor to prevent falling. No 

medical attention was ever summoned. After about an hour she was released from custody and 

taken by ambulance, provided by her family, to a nearby hospital.

- 3 -

PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT

Case 3:17-cv-00866-VC Document 8 Filed 04/05/17 Page 4 of 8
SCOTT LAW FIRM 

1388 SUTTER STREET, SUITE 715

SAN 

FRANCISCO, CA 94109

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Evidence was presented that shift commanders were authorized, in their sole discretion, to 

determine whether a detainee required medical attention. Evidence also suggested that shift 

commanders received no special training, beyond first aid training, to make a determination as to 

when to summon medical aid.

 The Supreme Court held that there are limited circumstances in which an allegation of 

“failure to train” can be the basis for liability under Section 1983. Only where the failure to train 

reflects a deliberate or conscious choice by a municipality can a city be liable for a failure under 

Section 1983. Id. at 389. It may seem contrary to common sense, “but it may happen that in light 

of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or different training is 

so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the 

policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.”

Id. at 390. See also, Tsao v Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F3d 1128, 1145 (9th Cir. 2012) (policies of 

omissions regarding the supervision of employees can be policies or customs that create 

municipal liability.)

 The facts alleged in this case are equally, if not more, egregious than the facts in City of 

Canton v Harris. It is foreseeable and likely that police officers will respond to scenes where a 

person is having a seizure, including but not limited to epileptic seizures. While in some 

situations a police officer may not be able to determine the cause of the seizure, in all likelihood it 

is a medical emergency. 

Here, the police were called to the plaintiff’s home in response to a 911 call requesting 

medical assistance. The officers were told by the plaintiff’s mother that her son was starting to 

recover from an epileptic seizure. The officers responded by using force to restrain, and gain 

control, of a man experiencing a medical emergency. Instead of allowing the medical staff on 

scene to respond to the situation, they escalated it and caused serious injuries in the process.

The plaintiff has alleged that the acts and omissions of Officers Woo and Hicks were

caused by inadequate training and/or supervision regarding the use of force and that these failures 

constituted deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights. The plaintiff also alleged that the 

- 4 -

PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT

Case 3:17-cv-00866-VC Document 8 Filed 04/05/17 Page 5 of 8
SCOTT LAW FIRM 

1388 SUTTER STREET, SUITE 715

SAN 

FRANCISCO, CA 94109

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Central Marin Police Authority knew or should have known that its acts and omissions would 

likely result in a violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of a person in Plaintiff’s situation. It 

is further alleged that these acts and omissions were a moving force in causing the injuries.

(Complaint, at paragraphs 28 – 30).

As in City of Canton v Harris, supra, the need for more or different training is obvious, 

and the inadequacy is likely to result in a violation of constitutional rights. The risk of harm is 

not simply plausible. Rather, it is foreseeable and likely that persons suffering from a seizure will 

be seriously injured, or killed, if officers use force to restrain and control them. Either the 

officers did not receive adequate training to deal with a foreseeable medical emergency, or they 

acted contrary to their training and/or acted without adequate supervision. Jackson v Barnes, 749 

F3d 755 (9th Cir. 2014) (a failure to supervise coupled with actual or constructive notice that its 

omission would likely result in a constitutional violation can be a basis for municipal liability 

based on deliberate indifference.)

If the officers here acted contrary to their training it would follow that a review of this 

incident by one or more supervisors would result in remedial training or some form of discipline.

A failure to administratively review the use of force incident would constitute additional evidence 

of deliberate indifference. If the incident was administratively reviewed and found to be within 

policy by a final policymaker, a claim for ratification would also exist.

C. Plaintiff Has Alleged Sufficient Facts to Support a Ratification Claim

The plaintiff has also alleged municipal liability based on ratification. In City of St. Louis 

v Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988) the court recognized the relevance of ratification to what may 

be chargeable as municipal liability. See also, Christie v Iopa, 176 F3d 1231 99th Cir. 1999); 

Trevino v Gates, 99 F3d 911 (9th Cir. 1996); and Gillette v Gilmore, 979 F2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1992).

A single decision by a municipal policymaker may be sufficient to trigger Section 1983 

liability under Monell. Lassiter v City of Bremerton, 556 F3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2009). Ratification 

requires both knowledge of the alleged constitutional violation, and proof that the policymaker 

specifically approved the subordinate’s act. Lytle v Carl, 382 F3d 978 (9th Cir. 2004).

- 5 -

PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT

Case 3:17-cv-00866-VC Document 8 Filed 04/05/17 Page 6 of 8
SCOTT LAW FIRM 

1388 SUTTER STREET, SUITE 715

SAN 

FRANCISCO, CA 94109

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Liability based on a theory of ratification does not require evidence of a custom or 

practice of constitutional violations. Rather, a final policymaker must have knowledge of the 

alleged constitutional violation and specifically approve of the subordinate’s acts. Here, given the 

seriousness of the injuries sustained requiring the plaintiff to be taken to a local hospital on a 

gurney, with his face covered in blood, it is reasonable to infer this incident was reviewed by the 

Chief of Police. If he approved of the officers acts this would be evidence of ratification. If this 

was not reviewed, it would be additional evidence of deliberate indifference based on inadequate 

supervision.

D. Plaintiff’s Prayer for Injunctive Relief is Proper and Supported by Facts

In City of Los Angeles v Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) the plaintiff lacked standing because 

it was speculation and conjecture that he might be subjected to a chokehold in the future. Here, it 

is quite foreseeable that Taylor Swift will have another medical emergency, an epileptic seizure, 

that will result in officers from the same agency responding and resorting to the unnecessary use 

of force. For that reason, damages are not an adequate remedy at law. Here Taylor Swift 

suffered serious injuries as alleged in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Complaint.

It is foreseeable that he will have other seizures within the jurisdiction of the Central 

Marin Police Authority. He has alleged, at paragraph 10 of the Complaint, that between 

September 2015 and September 2016 emergency personnel were called to his residence on six 

occasions to help him during the most serious seizures. The injunctive relief could be narrowly 

tailored in relation to the training and supervision of officers who, as part of their jobs, respond to 

calls involving seizures and related medical emergencies. This injunctive relief would have the 

benefit of not only protecting the plaintiff from further assaults by police officers, it could well 

save the lives of others who request help by dialing 911 when experiencing seizures or other

related medical emergencies.

- 6 -

PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT

Case 3:17-cv-00866-VC Document 8 Filed 04/05/17 Page 7 of 8
SCOTT LAW FIRM 

1388 SUTTER STREET, SUITE 715

SAN 

FRANCISCO, CA 94109

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons the motion to dismiss should be denied. Alternatively, plaintiff should

be given leave to amend.

Dated: April 5, 2017 Respectfully Submitted,

SCOTT LAW FIRM

/s/ John Houston Scott

John Houston Scott

Attorney for Plaintiff 

- 7 -

PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT

Case 3:17-cv-00866-VC Document 8 Filed 04/05/17 Page 8 of 8