United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 13-2465

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Roger Fires, Individually, and as Parents of Child Doe; Dawn Fires, Individually,

and as Parents of Child Doe

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

Heber Springs School District; Russell Hester, Individually, and in His Official

Capacity as Superintendent; Ginger Wallace, In Her Official Capacity as Principal

of Heber Springs High School; Brad Reese, In His Official Capacity as Assistant

Principal of Heber Springs High School

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

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 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Batesville

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 Submitted: March 10, 2014

 Filed: June 2, 2014

[Unpublished]

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Before WOLLMAN, MURPHY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Roger and Dawn Fires (“the Fireses”), individually and on behalf of their

daughter Child Doe, appeal the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to them under 42
U.S.C. § 1988. After the jury awarded $1.00 in nominal damagesfor their underlying

42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, the Fireses requested attorney’s fees in the amount of

$57,225. The district court approved a reduced fee award of $10,000. 1

The Fireses brought thislawsuit against the Heber Springs School District and

various school officials after their daughter was suspended from school and required

to perform community service. This punishment was the consequence of a prank

phone call that the Fireses’ daughter and other students placed while on a school trip

on April Fools’ Day in which they fabricated a story about a school bus accident. The

Fireses alleged that their daughter had been punished without due process, in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and claimed violations of federal and state

law. The Fireses’ complaint sought compensatory and punitive damages as well as

permanent injunctive relief. Shortly before trial, the Fireses voluntarily dismissed the

individual-capacity claims against two of the school officials. After a four-day trial,

the jury found for the Fireses on their § 1983 claim and awarded them $1.00 as

nominal damages.

Following the jury’s verdict, the Fireses requested $57,225 in attorney’s fees. 

The district court concluded that an award of attorney’s fees was appropriate because

the Fireses were the prevailing party under § 1988 and because their victory was not

merely technical or de minimis. Although the district court accepted as reasonable

the hourly rate that the Fireses’ counsel proposed, the court determined that the

attorney’s fee award sought by the Fireses was unreasonable in light of the case’s lack

of complexity and the minimal relief obtained by the Fireses. The district court also

provided three examples of excessive time that counsel expended on this matter. 

After weighing these considerations, the district court awarded the Fireses $10,000

for attorney’s fees.

The Honorable Brian S. Miller, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

1

the Eastern District of Arkansas.

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“Attorney’s fees are within the broad discretion of the district court and will

not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.” Hanig v. Lee, 415 F.3d 822, 825 (8th

Cir. 2005). Under § 1988, a district court may award a reasonable attorney’s fee in

an action brought under § 1983 if the plaintiff is the prevailing party. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988(b). A plaintiff is the prevailing party “when actual relief on the merits of his

claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the

defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.” Farrar v. Hobby,

506 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992). This “generous formulation” includes a plaintiff who

wins nominal damages. Id. at 109, 112; see Piper v. Oliver, 69 F.3d 875, 876 (8th

Cir. 1995). But being the prevailing party does not mean that a plaintiff who recovers

nominal damagesis entitled to attorney’s fees. Id. at 877. Indeed, “[w]hen a plaintiff

recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element

of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” 

Milton v. Des Moines, 47 F.3d 944, 945 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Farrar, 506 U.S. at

115). In order to receive attorney’s fees, a plaintiff who recovers nominal damages

must achieve more than a technical or de minimis victory. Piper, 69 F.3d at 877

(setting forth three factors relevant to whether a plaintiff has achieved more than a

technical or de minimis victory).

If a plaintiff who receives nominal damages achieves more than a technical or

de minimis victory, a district court should award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the

plaintiff. See id.; Ollis v. HearthStone Homes, Inc., 495 F.3d 570, 576-77 (8th Cir.

2007); Lowry ex rel. Crow v. Watson Chapel Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 752, 764-66 (8th

Cir. 2008). The “most useful starting point” for determining a reasonable attorney’s

fee is the lodestar, which is the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the number

of hours reasonably expended on the matter. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433

(1983). When calculating the lodestar, a district court need not accept counsel’s

submission of hours as conclusive but should exclude from that total those hours that

were not reasonably expended on the litigation. Id. at 433-34. A district court also

may weigh other considerations to determine whether an attorney’s fee should be

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adjusted upward or downward from the lodestar. Id. at 434. The “most critical” of

these additional factors is the degree of success achieved by the plaintiff. Id. at 436-

37; Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114-15.

The Fireses assert that the district court abused its discretion by failing to

follow the lodestar-based method from Hensley. We disagree. The district court

expressly analyzed both of the inputs for calculating the lodestar—a reasonable

hourly fee and the number of hours reasonably expended. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at

433. The court accepted the Fireses’ counsel’s proposed hourly rate of $250 as

reasonable. And after reviewing counsel’s submission detailing the hours she

expended on the matter, the court concluded that some of the hours she billed were

excessive. The district court also provided three examples of excessive hours

included in counsel’s hourly total: time for travel during trial; time spent preparing

a motion for voluntary dismissal; and time expended on the matter generally in light

of the limited discovery and motion practice conducted in the case.

The Fireses correctly point out that the district court did not expressly identify

all of the hours that it deemed to be excessive. This omission, they contend, means

that the district court failed to calculate the lodestar. Cf. Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d

938, 957 (8th Cir. 2010) (“The district court’s failure, under the circumstances here,

to analyze [the plaintiff’s] entitlement to attorney fees under the lodestar approach

was an abuse of discretion.”). The district court’s explicit consideration of both of

the inputs into the lodestar is sufficient for us to conclude that the district court

performed the lodestar calculation. See Corbett v. Sullivan, 353 F.3d 628, 631 (8th

Cir. 2003) (affirming attorney’s fee award where the district court “impliedly, if not

explicitly” determined the lodestar); Padrta v. Ledar Transport, Inc., 116 F. App’x

36, 38 (8th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (affirming attorney’s fee award where it was

“obvious the district court engaged in the lodestar analysis” even though the district

court “could have been more clear with regards to which precise bills it found to be

excessive”). The Fireses further contend that even if the district court calculated the

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lodestar, it nonetheless abused its discretion by classifying certain hours as excessive. 

However, giving due deference to the district court’s unique understanding of the

legal and factual issues implicated by this matter and counsel’s handling of them, we

cannot say that the district court’s decision to classify as excessive the three

categories of hours discussed above amounted to an abuse of discretion. See Polacco

v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 37 F.3d 366, 370 (8th Cir. 1994); Winter v. Cerro Gordo

Cnty. Conservation Bd., 925 F.2d 1069, 1074 (8th Cir. 1991).

The Fireses also object to the downward adjustment of their attorney’s fees

based on the district court’s conclusions regarding the minimal relief that they

obtained and the case’s lack of complexity. The Fireses claim that other

considerations weigh against the downward adjustment, including their attorney’s

experience, reputation, and ability; the undesirability ofthe case and the skill required

to litigate it; the nature ofthe attorney-clientrelationship; and awards in similar cases. 

Although the Hensley Court acknowledged that a district court may consider these

factors in determining a reasonable attorney’s fee, 461 U.S. at 429 n.3, 434 n.9, it

emphasized that “many of these factors usually are subsumed within the initial

calculation of hours reasonably expended at a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. at 434 n.9;

see also Hardman v. Bd. of Educ. of Dollarway, 714 F.2d 823, 825 (8th Cir. 1983)

(per curiam). The Hensley Court also held that the decision to adjust attorney’s fees

from the lodestar amount to account for limited success is an equitable judgment for

which “[t]here is no precise rule or formula.” 461 U.S. at 436-37. The district court’s

reliance on the limited complexity of this matter and the minimal relief obtained by

the Fireses did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The Fireses’ counsel admits that

this was a run-of-the mill case with issues that were neither novel nor difficult, and

the chasm between the Fireses’ requested relief and the relief that they obtained is

vast. The Fireses’ complaint requested compensatory and punitive damages and

permanent injunctive relief. Though the Fireses prevailed before the jury, they were

awarded only $1.00 in nominal damages. As such, the district court was well within

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its discretion to reduce the Fireses’ attorney’s fees to $10,000. See id.; Farrar, 506

U.S. at 114-15. We affirm.

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