IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-2019

Filed September 23, 2015

JUNE BETTY LYMAN,

Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Duane E. 

Hoffmeyer, Judge.

June Lyman appeals from the district court’s denial of her application for 

postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.

Priscilla E. Forsyth, Sioux City, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean C. Pettinger, Assistant Attorney 

General, Patrick Jennings, County Attorney, and Terry Ganzel, Assistant County 

Attorney, for appellee State.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Doyle, JJ.
2

DANILSON, Chief Judge.

June Lyman appeals from the district court’s denial of her application for 

postconviction relief (PCR). She maintains she received ineffective assistance 

from trial counsel. Specifically, Lyman argues trial counsel was ineffective (1) for 

failing to redact or object to the admission of a video showing her invoke her right 

to counsel and (2) for failing to call Dr. Fischer as a witness or lay the proper 

foundation for Dr. Fischer’s report to be admitted as evidence. Because Lyman 

cannot establish she suffered prejudice, we affirm the district court’s denial of her 

application for PCR.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On May 15, 2006, police received an anonymous call reporting a dead 

body and requesting police assistance at a specific address. When the police 

arrived at the address, they found Lyman and the body of her husband, Leo. 

While officers were checking Leo’s vitals, Lyman stated her husband deserved 

what he got, was a child molester, and she hoped he was dead. She also stated 

she had shot him and her fingerprints were all over the gun. When medical 

personnel confirmed Leo was dead, June said, “Yes, I did it. I shot him.” 

Lyman was read the Miranda warning and allowed to call her daughter-inlaw before being transported to the police station. During transport, Lyman made 

numerous voluntarily incriminating statements, such as, “I shot the motherf*cker,” 

“I’ve already admitted to you I killed him,” and “I shot the f*cker. Hey, and I can’t 

deny it. My fingerprints are on the gun.” She also referenced her right to an 

attorney and her right to remain silent. The transport was recorded by the patrol 

car’s video recording system.
3

Lyman was charged with murder in the first degree. 

In preparation for trial, Lyman was interviewed and examined by Dr. Karla 

Fischer. Dr. Fischer was one of the only experts who personally interviewed

Lyman. She opined about Lyman as a battered woman and her mental state at 

the time of the alleged offense. 

The matter proceeded to trial. Lyman admitted she shot her husband four 

times and he died as a result of the shooting. She asserted the defense of 

diminished responsibility, arguing she was not responsible for first-degree 

murder. 

The State played the full video recordings of Lyman’s transport to the 

police station. Her counsel did not object or ask to redact any portion of the 

videos. 

As part of Lyman’s defense, several experts testified at trial. The experts 

reviewed Dr. Fischer’s report and relied at least in part on that report in arriving at 

their opinions. Lyman’s trial counsel did not call Dr. Fischer as a witness. When 

counsel offered the report as evidence, he failed to lay the appropriate foundation 

to have it admitted as being reasonably relied upon by another expert.

Following the close of evidence, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of

murder in the second degree.

Lyman appealed her conviction, and our supreme court retained the 

appeal. In State v. Lyman, 776 N.W.2d 865, 879 (Iowa 2010), the court affirmed 

the conviction.

Lyman filed a pro se application for PCR on April 2, 2012. She was 

appointed counsel and amended her application. 
4

On November 20, 2014, the district court denied Lyman’s amended

application. She appeals.

II. Standard of Review.

Generally an appeal from a denial of an application for PCR is reviewed 

for corrections of errors at law. Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Iowa 

2012). However, when an applicant asserts claims of a constitutional nature, our 

review is de novo. Id. Thus, we review claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel de novo. Id.

III. Discussion.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Lyman must 

prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) counsel failed to perform an 

essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted from the failure. See State v. 

Rodriguez, 804 N.W.2d 844, 848 (Iowa 2011). To establish prejudice, Lyman 

must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See State v. 

McCoy, 692 N.W.2d 6, 25 (Iowa 2005). Because Lyman has raised multiple 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we look at the cumulative effect of the 

prejudice arising from those claims. See State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 501 

(Iowa 2012). Her claim fails if either element is lacking. See Everett v. State,

789 N.W.2d 151, 159 (Iowa 2010).

Here, Lyman cannot establish she was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged 

errors because the jury ultimately accepted her defense. At trial, she admitted 

she shot her husband four times and he died as a result of the shooting. The 

only defense she presented was one of diminished responsibility. “The 
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diminished responsibility defense allows a defendant to negate the specific intent 

element of a crime by demonstrating due to some mental defect she did not have 

the capacity to form that specific intent.” Anfinson v. State, 758 N.W.2d 496, 502 

(Iowa 2008). In other words, Lyman’s defense was that she could not form the 

specific intent necessary for a conviction of murder in the first degree.

“Evidence of diminished responsibility may not, however, negate general 

criminal intent, and is therefore not a defense to crimes which do not require 

proof of specific intent.” Id. “It is well-settled law that murder in the second 

degree is a general intent crime only requiring proof of malice aforethought.” 

State v. Lyman, 776 N.W.2d 865, 877 (Iowa 2010). Thus, the defense was not 

applicable to the charge that she was ultimately convicted of, second-degree 

murder. 

Lyman contends the result of her trial may have been different if the jury 

had not been allowed to see her invoke her right to counsel and/or if Dr. Fischer’s 

report was admitted into evidence. However, Lyman does not explain how the 

admission of the report or exclusion of the pertinent portion of the video would 

cause the result of the proceeding to be different.

1

 Because the jury ultimately 

accepted the defense the she presented at trial, Lyman cannot establish she 

suffered prejudice. We affirm.

AFFIRMED.

 

1 The PCR court indicated it believed trial counsel had attempted to instruct the jury on 

the doctrine of jury nullification, which Iowa has rejected. See State v. Willis, 218 

N.W.2d 921, 925 (Iowa 1974) (“Jury nullification exalts the goal of particularized justice 

above the ideal of the rule of law. We are persuaded the rule of law should not be 

subverted. A central theme in our constitutional system is that no man is above the law 

and all are equally accountable to it. The people are sovereign, but they exercise their 

sovereignty through government rather than juries. We hold juries should not be told 

they have a right to disregard the law given them in the court’s instructions.”).