### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Assigned on Briefs N

ovember 22, 2000
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DEBORA H GRAHAM & DENICE SMITH
Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Cocke County Nos. 7145,7146 Rex H. Ogle, Judge

No. E1999-02248-CCA-R3-CD March 29, 2001

After a jury trial, a Cocke County jury found the Defendants, Deborah Graham and Denice Smith, guilty of the first degree murder of Aaron Smith. Following a sentencing hear ing, the trial court sentenced both Defendants to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. In this appeal as of right, the Defendants raise the following issues: 1) whether the trial court erred in not dismissing the indictments

because of theState's failure to provide the Defendants with a speedy trial; 2) whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to decide not

to consolidate Ale

xandro Rivera’s c

ase with the Defendants’ case, because of a pot ential Bruton

problem, without fi

rst granting the D

efendants
an opportunity to be heard on the issue; 3) whether the trial court erred in failing to sever Defendant Smith’s case from Defendant Graham’s case; 4) whether the trial court er red in con solidating Defendant

Graham’s case with Defendant Smith’s case; and 5) whether the evidence was sufficient to convict each of theDefendants of f irst degree murder. After a thorough review of the evidenc e and the applicab

le law, we affir

m the decision of th

e trial court.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

T HOMAS T. W OODALL , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which G ARY R. W ADE , P.J., and J OE G. R ILEY , J., joined.

R.B. Baird, III, Rog

ersville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Deborah Graham; and Denise Terry Stapleton, Morristown, Tennessee, for the appellant, Denice Smith.

Paul G. Summers, Attor ney Gener al and Reporter; Patricia C. Kussmann, Assistant Attorney Genera l; A l Schmutzer, District Attorney; W. Brownlow Marsh, Assistant District Attorney; and James B. Dunn, Assistant District Attorney, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION-2- FACTS
Harry Smith, the victim’s fa

ther, testifie

d that, at the time of the murder of his son, Aaron Smith, he and his wife ope rated a campg

round called Camp

rite Acres. Aaron Smith

and Defendant Smithwere married

and lived in a house on the campgrounds. (Defendant Smith and Defendant Graham are twin sisters.) The campsite had a gated entrance, which required those using the campgrounds to have a key card to gain entrance, and Defendant Smith had one of these key cards. In 1995, Harry

Smith began to

notice that Defe

ndant Smith and the vi

ctim were experiencing marital problems. Later, the vi

ctim moved in with his p

arents, while Defendan

t Smith continued to

live in the marital home. At

some point, the victim filed for divorce. Subsequently , Defendant Smith a

lso filed for a divorce and a custody battle ensued. Following Aaron’s death, Harry Smith and his wife, Cleta, attained custody of their grandchildren, Brittany and Joshua.
Smith further testified that, on July 23, 1997, he left home at

approximately 4:20 p.m., but the victim was not home

at this time. He later returned at 6:00 p.m. to find a shoe sitting on a little rock wall that ran alon

g the walkway

. As he drove up th

e w alkway, Smith saw the victim’s body laying on the sidewalk. He got out of his truck and went into the house to call 911, where he found that someone had completely ransacked the house. As he waited for the p olice to arrive, he was careful not t o touch anything. Smith noticed that someone had removed the covering from an a i r vent, which he found strange, because he formerly hid his money in a similar place, when he lived in Florida. Smith stated that the victim an d Def endant Smith knew about his practice of hiding money in the a

ir vent.

Smithalso told the jury that he owned a .357 magnum

pistol, which he normally stored under
a table in the garage. After finding his son dead, Smith found his .357 magnum out of place. Smith testified that he also had three watches missing. On cross-examination, Smith testified that, on the day of the murder, he was working on the road by the gate and did not see anyone come in or out of the campgrounds. On the day after the murder, De fendant Smithcalled, identified herself and asked about the victim, but Smith g ave the phone to Agent Davenport of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI).

Robert Caldwell, the Chief Detective of the Cocke County Sheriff’s Department, testified that h e went to Camprite Acres Campground to investigate the murder of Aaron Smith. W he n Caldwell arrived at the Smith home, he saw the body of Aaron Smith lying on the walkway leading to the house. Caldwell, along with Agent Davenport o f the TBI , re quested an autopsy of the victim’s body. Dr. Cle

land Blake perf

ormed the autopsy

. Caldwell

also re quested that the TBI Crime Investigation Team help with the investigation.
Dr. Cleland Blake, an Assistant State Chief Medical Examiner, testified that he received a request to perform an autopsy on the victim. Dr. Blake found three gunshot wounds on the victim’s body--two

to the head and one to the trunk. Dr. Blake discovered that one head wound destroy ed the victim’s brain and served as the only immediately letha l wound to the victim’s body. The second wound, which entered the front portion of the right ear, went through the ear and was not lethal and hit no vital “structures”. The third wound (also not lethal) entered the left rear portion of the victim’s-3-

body at waist level and exited through the front right side of the victim’s chest. Dr. Blake concluded his testimony by noting

that the victim receiv

ed two gunshot wou

nds from the back (

i.e., the shots to the head and the waist) and one from the front (i.e., the shot to the ear).
Kelly Smith, a TBI forensic scientist, testified that she was a member of the Violent Crime Res ponse Team that went to Camprite Acres Campground to document, preserve and collect forensi c evidence. When Agent Smith and her team arrived at the Smith home, she saw a walkway leading to the front of the ho

use and another entrance through the garage. Agent Smith stated that someone had removed the victim’s body before her team arrived at the scene. The team used yellow markers to mark the location of

evidence before they package d the evidence. Agent Smith’s team marked evidence outside the home and then entered the interior of the home through the garage. The team collected the evidence an

d took photograph

s of the evidence found at the scene. Specifically, the team collected a sample of reddish-brown stains (later stipulated as humanblood), a spent bullet and
a handgun (stipulated

as the gun from which the spent bullet was fired). Agent Smith also found a pair of handcuffs on a

chair in the living room of

the home. Agent Smith made sketche s of the crime scene, which the State introduced into evidence, along with several photographs made of the interior and the exterior of the home. Agent Smith tol d the ju ry that several pieces of clothing and other articles were scattered throughout the house. The State later recalled Harry Smith and he testified that he had never before seen the handcu ffs found by Agent Smith’s tea

m. Further, Har

ry Smith sta ted tha t th e han dcu ffs did not bel ong t o hi s so n or anyo ne el se i n hi s fa mil y. Hoyt Phillips, a laten t fing erpri nt ex amine r with the TB I, testified that he examined evidence taken from the Smith home. P hillips stated that h

e examined the .357

magnum found at th

e crime scene, but no readable la

tent fingerpri

nts were found on the

gun. Phillips could

not say whether any fingerprints

may have been wiped off the gun. Also, Phillips testified that he was unable to recover any readable laten

t fingerprin

ts from the h andcuffs found at the crime scene. Of all the evidence examined by Phillips, he found four identifiable prints belonging to the victim, Aaron Smith.

Sharon Jarvis testified that she kept Defendant Smith’s two childrenat her in-home daycare center during the summer

of 1996. Jarvis told th

e jury that Defendant Smith told her about the divorce and custody battle that Defendant Smith and the victim were going through. Jarvis stated that Defendant Smith told her on three different occasionsthat if Aaron got custody of the children, she would kill Aaron or have him killed before she would lose her childr en. Jarvis testified that Defendant

Smith to l d her these thing s once on the telep

hone and twice in Ja

rvis’ home. Jarvis further explained that during these conver sations, D efendant Smith would be very emotional and “adamant”

about her intent to prevent the victim from attaining custody of the children. However, Jarvis did not report or tell anyone about Defendant Smith’s threats or intentions. On cr oss

examination, Jarvis testified that the three conversations she had with Defendant Smith occurred a year before the death

of Aaron Smith. Jarvis further testified that she believed the statements made by Defendant Smith, but

also stated that she

didnot think Defendant Smith would actually carry out the threats. Finally, Jarvis stated that the last time she saw Defendant Smith was when Defendant Smithcame to Jarvis’ home to get a refund

on two days w

orth of daycar e and to ask Jarvis

to testify at the divo rce hearing.-4-

Charles Jack Snyder testified that he wasworking at the post office in Gatlinburg, Tennessee, when he received a phone call from a Carl Sande rs. Sande rs said he was fro m Bismark, North Dakota, and that he was ca lling from a pay

phone. Sanders tol

d Snyder tha

t an express

mail package containing drugs and addre ssed to an Aaron Smi

th would be coming

to the post off

ice. Sanders supplied Snyder wi th t he special delivery number for the package . When the package arrived, Snyder gave the packa

ge to Scott Ginsel

l, th e acting supervisor, and the two contacted the postal inspectors. Russell Fallis, a postal inspector, retrieved the package.

Russell Fallis testified that he went to Gatlinburg to investigate an alleged shipment

of drugs. Fallis contacted Randy Parton and Richie McMahan, a

gents with the Fo

urth Judicial Distric

t Task Force, to assist him with the investigation. When Fallis arrived at the post office in Gatlinburg, he spoke with Charles Snyder and got the information ab

out the phone call Snyder had r eceived. Fallis examined the package, addressed to “Aaron Smith, Earthquake Museum Inter nation al, 653 Parkway , Gatlinbur g, Tennessee 37738.” The package was from “S. Jones, 1411 Peachtree Circle, Atlanta, Georgia.” Fallis later discovered that the return address did not exist. However, Fallis determined that the package was mailed from the Dr. Martin Luther King Post Office in Miami, Florida.

Fallis further testifie

d that he did not ope

n the package i

m mediately , because he needed a search warrant. Fallis posed as a postal carrier and delivered the package, intact, to Aaron Smith at the Earthquake Museum. As Fallis approached Aaron Smith, Smith was sitting at the entrance to the Earthquake Muse

um ride taking tic

kets and money. F

allis asked, “Are you Aaron Smith?” and Smithsaid, “Yes.” Aa

ron Smith signed fo

r the package

, and as Fallis

walked away, he

saw Smith open the package. A

t that point, the Tas

k Force agen

ts approached Aa

ron Smit h and identified themselves as narcotics ag ents. Fallis returned and

identified himself

as a postal inspec

tor. Smith immediately

yelled, “I’ve been

set up,” and then called for his boss. Smith allowed Fallis and the agentsto examine the inner envelope found in

the package, a

nd they foun

d “two extremely

small Ziploc bags that had a yellowish-whitish powder substance” in them. The writing on the inn er envelope read, “To Aaron Smith, next time the price goes up.” Falli s turned the powdery substance
overto the drug agen

ts for testing. L

ater, the TBI

lab identified the

substance “as be

ing cocain

e

base[d], a S chedu le II c ontrolled substanc e.” Fallis sent th

e package an

d the inner envelo

pe to Memphis to be checked for fingerprints. Bobby Ewi ng, of the M emphis crime lab, examined the package. Aaron Smith was never arrested for the drugs found in the pac kage.
Bobby Ewi ng, a for ens ic l ate nt p rin t an alys t fo r th e U. S. P ost al S ervi ce Me mph is La bor ato ry, testified that he examined the express delivery package sent to Aaron Smith. Ewing stated that he found no readable prints on the package itself; however, he did find five readable prints on the labe l of the packag e. Ewing te stified that he received a ten roll fingerprint card signed by Defendant Debor ah Graham, which Officer Rick Russell had taken. Ewing determined that the latent fingerprints

found on the orig

inal label of the package were the finger impressions of Defenda nt Graham. He also developed fingerprints from the inner envelope, and fou nd that “si x latent fingerpr ints of value for identif ication purposes”

belonged to Def

endant Graham. O

n crossexamination, Ewing tes tified t hat, while other smudges or impressions were on the materials he examined, “all latent prints that were of valu

e for identifica

tion purposes”

belon ged to Defendant Graham.-5-

Melanie Hearst and Christen Latham testified that they worked with Defendant Smith in the dental office of Dr. Steve

Madison. Hearst and Latham stated that often Defendant Smith told them about the marital difficulties she was having with the victim, Aaron Smith. A couple of years before the victim’s death, Defendant Smith told Latham that Aaron Smith had choked her while they
were on a cruise. Defendant Smith al so told Latham that Aaron Smith was abusive to the two children. Hearst and Latham testified that, more than once, De fendant Smith said that, if Aaron Smithgot custody

of the children, “

she would kill him or have him killed.” Hearst testified that as the custody hearing neared, Defendant Smith became more upset and distraug h t. Latham further testified that, on July 17,

1997 (six days b

efore the homici

de), Defendan

t Smith came to

the dental office to pick up her check, and she appeared upset and shaken. Defendant Smith’s car was packed and her father was with her in another vehicle.
On cross-examination, Hearst told the jury that she often saw bruises on Defendant Smith, which the Defendant said Aaron Smith had caused. Also, Hearst and L atha m admitted that they
never believed Defendant Smith w ould ac tually kill Aaron Smith. Hearst thought that Defendant Smithwas “just under pr es sure and she was just stressed,” when she spoke those words. Neither Hearst nor Latham reported this information to the police.
Next, twelve-year- old Bri ttany Smith (the daughter of the victim and Defendant Smith) testified. She stated that, two days after a court hadgranted custody of her and her brother (Joshua) to Aaron Smith, Defendant Smith took them to Fl orida to see Defendant Graham (Defendant Smith’s twinsister). Her grandfather, Don Graham, accompanied them. They

drove through the night and arrived at a motel in Miami. At some point, they met Defendant Graham, two d iff erent men who
were named “George,” and an “Alex,” behind a place called The Golden Nug get. While Defendant Smithand Don Graham talked with the men, Defendant Graham took Brittany and Joshua to the beachfor about an hour. During her testimony, Brittany also identified a photo of “Alex,” who was later identified as Alexandro Rivera.
Brittany further testified that, while they were in Florida, they

stayed at Th

e Driftwood motel. Also, during thi s tim e, Defendant Smith purchased another car. At some point, Alex, Defendant Graham and both Georges left in Defendant Smith’s new car and

did not return for

two or three day

s. During that same period,

Defendant Smith

also left for a da

y. Late one night, the De

fendants, Alex and one of the Georges returned to the motel, while Brittany and Joshua were asleep. Brittany stated that loud speaking awakened her and she overheard Defendant Gr aham say “they hurt

somebody.” Then, Defendant Smith said, “it was easy,” and Alex replied, “No, we’vekilled somebody.” Brittany never heard whom they had killed.
Brittany also recalled

that, before everyone left for those couple of day s, Alex “had a pair of handcuffs in his back pocket.” However, when she next saw Alex, he no longer had the handcuffs. Brittany testified that she

noticed that Alex wa

s wearing one o

f her “papaw’s

[Harry Smith] w

atches” and that Defendant Graham was wearing a pink ice ri ng t hat belonged to h

er “mamaw” (Cle

ta Smith). Two days lat

er, Defendant Sm

ith took the childre

n to Michigan, an

d they stay

ed at the home of Brittany’s Aunt

Marian and Uncle

Jerry. At some

point, Aunt Marian brought Brittany and Joshua back to Tennessee, wh

ere they c urrently r eside with

their grandparents, Harry and Cleta Smith. On-6-

cross-e xa mination, Brittany testified that they were in Florida for approximately five days. Also, Brittany stated that Defendant Graham was with her and Joshua almost every day , du ri ng the five days they were in Florida . Brittany recalled some things they did in Florida, including going with Defendant

Smith to rent a car, but she was unable to recall specific activities. Brittany testified that she first learned of her father’s death while she was in Michigan.

The parties stipulated that Defendant Smith rented a 1996 B

uick Regal from

Alamo Rentals in Miami from July 21, 1997 to July 28, 1997. The mileage on the car was 25, 734, when re nted, and 28, 210, when returned. Defendant Smith signed for the car in her own name and provided her Tennessee Driver’s License, her hom e address, and her work address to the employees of Alamo.

Vernon Brown testified that he and his wife ow

n a lot at Camprite A

cres, which the v

ictim sold to them. Brown stated that they were at the campground the day someone killed Aar on Smith. Browntestified that, at approximately 4:00 that afternoon, he and his wife were walking to the pool, when they saw Harry

Smith leaving his home. Then, Br own noticed two pe

ople sitting at a p

icnic table on the deck of a t

railer. Brown co uld only see that one person was blond and was wearing shorts. As Brown and his wife prepared to leave the pool and bath house, they notice d someone (it appeared to be a man) knocking on Harry Smith’s door. (This was about fifteen minutes after they had been at the pool.) Brown and his wife returned to their trailer. Between 4:30 an d 5:00 p. m., Brownheard three gunshots coming from the direction of Harry Smith’s home. Brown was sure of the time, because he and his wife had scheduled to have dinner with some neighbors at 5:00 p.m. and it was 5:00 when they arrived at the neighbor’s hous

e. Brown also te

stified that, beca

use they often heard gunshots around the campgroun ds, he did not think anything was wrong when he heard the three gunshots. Howev

er, Brown later

learned that someone had been murdered when the police came to the neighbor’s camper.

Brownstated, on cross-examination, that he told the police that the man hesaw knocking on the Smiths’ doo r was a “skinny white male with long dark hair.” Also, Brown testified that the distance from the pool to Harry Smith’s house was about 200 feet. On redirect, Brown stated that he had also seen a white car parked on one lot. Brown further testified that at around 5:00 p.m. he heard a car leaving in a hurry. At appr oxi mately 5:15 p.m., Brown learned from the neighbor’s daughter that the white car was no longer there.

StateTrooper Eddie Pull

ey testifie d that he worked in

McMinn County. Pulley testified that,
on July 23, 1997 at 7:41 p.m., he issued a ticket to a David Antonio Rivera of M iami, Flor ida. Pulley stated tha t Rivera was driving a white, 1996 four- door Buick. Pulley

testified that he c

ould not remember Rivera’s face or whether Rivera was traveling with one or two fe males.
Special Agent Ron Raccioppi, of the Florida Department of Law in Miami, testified tha

t in August of 1997, Agent Davenport of the TBI contacted him about “coming to Florida to

do a followup investigation on a homicide.” Specifically, Agent Raccioppi and Agent Davenport were looking for information on an “Alex,” a Deborah Graham and the activities of Denice Smith, while she was in Florida

. They received information from a club owner reg arding the tag of a vehicle in which Alex had just left the club. The tag number led the agents to a LaShawn Tay lor in Miami. The-7-

agents set up surveillance, w hich finally

led them to the man n

amed Alex, who ag

reed to help the agentsin their investigation. The agents learned, fr om Alex’s dr iver’s license (which was later determinedto be a false identification) and social secur ity card, th

at his purported na

me was David Antonio Rivera.
Raccioppi furth er t estified that he a nd Agent Daven

port learned tha

t the address on Da

vid Rivera’s driver’s license was the same as LaShawn Tay lor’s address. Also, Racciop pi stated that the Martin Luther

King Post Office

in Miami is 300 y

ards west of Rivera and Taylor’s address. The agentsconducted their surveillance of Taylor’s home from the parking lot of the Martin Luther King post office. Finally

, Raccioppi testif

ied that their inve

stigation revea

led th at someone had taken Defendant Graham to the airport, where she boarded a flight to New York.

David Hutchison, a Criminal Investigator with the Cocke County District Attorney’s Office, testified that he traveled to New York to locate and arrest Defendant Graham. On Aug ust 22, 1997, Hutchison arrested Defendant Graham and gave her the Miranda admonitions. Defendant Graham waived her Miranda

rights and gave the New York Police Department

and Investigator Hutchison a signed and wr

itten statement, wh

ich Hutchison rea

d into the record a

t trial.

In her statement, Defenda nt Graham said that she and Alex borrowed the car, rented by Defendant

Smith, to travel to Michigan. Alex and Defendant Graham planned to stop in Tennessee and pay a visit to the victim. Defendant Gr aham sta ted that Alex wanted to teach Aaron Smith a lesson, because Alex had h eard that Aaron

Smith was abusive to Defendant Smith and their children. Graham used Defendant Smith’s gate card to gain entrance to the campgrounds and show Alex where Aaron Smith lived. Graham and Alex stayed at the campground for about ten minutes. Then, Alex drove Graham back to Gatlinburg and let her out in front of the Ramada Inn. Graham said that she thought that Ale

x was “just going to talk to Aaron and ask him if he wanted to fight someone besides women and childre n.” Rivera retur

ned two hours late

r, pale and upset

. As t heydrove towardthe interstate, A

lex told Graham that

he had gone bac

k to the Smith hous e and entered through the garage.

As Alex was going

th rough the house, he found severa l guns. Aaron Smith returned home unex pect edl y a nd surprised Alex. Alex told Graham that “he [Aaron Smith]
sur prised me. I had to cap him.” Alex shot Aaron three times and then Alex went ba ck into th e house to make it look like someone had burglarized the home. Then, Al

ex threw two handg

uns in the woods and kept one handgun for himself.

After hearing this, Gr

aham said she cou

ld not go to

Michigan, so the two returned to Florida. When Graham arrived at The Driftwood motel in Miami, she discovered that her father, Defendant Smithand Smith’s children had gone back to Tennessee to turn themselves in to the police. Graham returned the rental car. She told Hutchison that Alex said “[I]f [she] ever told what he had -- what he had done, that he would let his boys know and they would take car e of [her] whole family.” Graham stated that she never saw Alex with any jewelry after he killed Aaron, but she said that he had given her a “gray plastic bag containing several gold neck laces a nd bracelets,” which he had plannedto give to LaShawn Taylor. Further , Graham said that on the way back to Florida, Alex got
a speeding ticket

in McMinn County. The last time Graham saw Alex was August 2, 1997, when LaShawn Taylor took Graham to the Miami airport to catch a flight to New York.-8-

On cross-examination, Investigator Hutchison acknowle dged that, initia

lly, Graha m told him several times thatshe hadnot killed anyone. Additionally, Hutchison admitted that he told Graham that someone had identified her, as being at the campground pool the day Aaron Smith was killed, although this was not true. On redirect, Hutchison testified that, before Graha m gave her written statement, she stated that she and Alex had not gone to Tennessee, but straight to Michigan to visit friends. However, when H utchison told Grah

am that someone ha

d seen her by

the camp groun d poo l, G raha m de cid ed t o ch ange her s tor y.
LaShawn Taylor testified that she and A lexandro Rivera have a son together and that they lived together for a short time in Miami, Florida. Taylor said that she met Defendant Graham during the summer of 1997, beforeAlex and Graham went to Tennessee together. After Graham and Alex returned to Miami, Taylor next saw Defendant Graham, when Graham came to Ta ylor’s home in a white car to see Alex. Alex went outside to talk with Grah am, while Taylor waited at the door. Ta ylor testified that she overheard Alex tell Graham “to get the car out of there.” The next time Taylor sa w Graham, G raham stayed two nights at Tay lor’s home. During this stay, Alex and Graham “were very secretive, alway s talking, going to the phones [pay ph ones], y ou know, whispering.” Taylor said

that Graham was c

onstantly calling her father. At the end of the two day

s, Taylor took Graham to the airport to catch a flight to New York. Several days after Graham left, the police stopped Taylor and Rivera. Taylor f urther testified that the Florida driver’s lic ense carried by Alex Rivera, bore Alex’s pic ture, but that the name on the license (David Rivera) was Alex’s brother’s name . Taylo

r also testified that she had gone with Alex to a pawn shop, where he redeemed seve

ral items, includin

g a Noah’s Ark b

racelet.

Robert Latta, an employee at the Cash In Pawn Shop in Miami, testified that Alex Rivera pawned an Elgin pocket watch, a gold Noah’s Ark bracelet, two women’s free fo r m rings and a Nikon camera. Alex Rivera retrieved these items on August 7, 1997.

Paul Dosler, a detective with thePort Authority Police Department in New York, testified that he aided Tennessee investigators with the arrest of Defendant Graham. They arr ested Graham at the home of M artin Giovi in A storia, New York. Dosler testified that he recovered a bag of costume jewelry from Giovi’s home, which contained 11 pieces of jew elr y. In court, Dosler identified the 11 pieces of jewelry and described the ba g that containe d th e je wel ry as “a gr aycolored plastic bag.”
Cleta Smith, the victim’s mother, identified the costume jewelry recovered by Paul Dosler from Martin Giovi’s apa

rtment, as the j ewelry taken from her home the same day someone killed Aaron. She also told the jury that several other items were taken from her home , including a

pink ice ring, a Noah’s Ark bracelet and a Nikon camera.

Martin Giovi testified that he and Defendant Graham had previously

lived together and that during this time, Graham asked him to kill Aaron Smith about three or four times, but Giovi refused. Giovi testified that, while Graham was living with him in New York in August of 1997, s h e was constantly

using a pay phone

to call her fathe

r and sister. Giovi

stated that Graha

m behaved so nervously that he finally asked her what was wrong. Graha m told Giovi, “[I]t is finally done. And-9-

[Giovi] said, ‘What’s done?’” Graham replied, “Aaron

is dead.” Giovi te

stified that Grah

am told him that she and Don Graham (the Defe ndants’ father) had paid someone to kill Aaron. Giovi further testified that Graham told him that she had gone to Aaron’s home with a man from Florida, and they had shot Aaron in the driveway or on the walkway. Shocked by Graham’s news, Giovi left the apartment and wh

en he returned,

he saw numerous po

li ce officers in f

ront of his house. The police arrested Graham. Later, Giovi allowed the police to return to his apartment and he gave them a bag containing costume jewelry, which Gra ham had left in Giovi’s apartment.

Shannon Jarnigan testified that, while she was an inmate in the Cocke County

Jail, Defendant Smithsaid “she hired her twin sister’s boyfriend to kill her husband,” beca use her husband had sexually molested the ch ildren and ph ysically abused her. Jarnigan a lso met Defendant Graham, who told Jarnigan that her boyfriend, Alex, had accidentally shot Aaron Smith. Jarnigan said that Graham told her that she (Graham) was afraid of Alex and that, after the shooting, Al ex wo uld not let Graham out of his sight. On

cross-examinati

on , Jarnigan admitted that the State had charged her withfelony murder and aggravate d rob bery i n an unrelated case and that, after she gave the authorities the information she h ad on this case, she pled guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated

robbery. Jarnigan acknowledged that she told her a ttorney that she

wanted to us e this information to help herself. However, Jarnigan denied making any deals with the State . The State subsequently

recalled D etective Robert Caldwell, who testified that the State reduced the charges in Jarnigan’s case because an autopsy was neve r performed on thedeceased victim’s body and the other victim (the key witness) could not be found.

Sandra Strange testifie

d that she knew De

fendant Smith from Sm ith’ s visits to Tanfastic Tanning S alon. Strange told the jury that, once, Smith asked Strange if she knew someone who could kill her husband. Strange further stated that Smith said that Aaron Smith was abusive to her and the childr en. Also, Smith told Strange that, if the court gave Aaron Smith custody of the
c hildren, she would either run away with the children or have Aaron killed. Howe ver , Strang e admitted that she did not take Smith’s statements seriously.

The State rested i

ts case-in-chie

f at this point.

Diane Levy, the Executive Director of Safe Space (a

domestic violence program), testified that Defendant Smith c

ontacted her org

anization in

1996 out of concern for the safety of her children. Levy testified that Smith also contacted Safe Space after Judge Vance rendered his decision

in the divorce and custody

case. On July

25, 1997, Levy

spoke with

Smith, who stated she was returning to Tennessee to turn herself in to the police. Levy advised Smith to contact the Public Defender’s office.
Judy Laws testifie d that she, Defen

dant Smith and Shanno

n Jarnigan were

simultaneously incarcerated

at the Cocke County Jail in February of 1998. One morning, Laws observed Jarnigan going through Smith’s personal pap ers. Laws testified that Jarnigan said, “I’m going to g et something, anything I can ge tto make a deal with.” Jarnigan further stated, “My attorney say

s if I
can get something o

n him (sic), that he ’ll cut me some slack and make a deal for me.” Finally, Smit h got out of the shower and took the papers away from Jarnigan. On re buttal, the State recalled-10-

Detective Robert Caldwell again and he testified that, on November 7, 19 97, he took Jarnigan’s statement about Defendant Smith saying that she hired her twin sister’s boy friend to kill her husband.

At the close of all the proof, the judge charged the jury on first degree murder, second degree
mu rder and facilitation of first and second degree murder. Following deliberations, the jur y convictedboth Defendants o f first degree murder. During the sentencing phase, the jury rejected the State’s one enhancemen

t factor, as appl

ied to each Defe

ndant, and sentenced both Defendants to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.

ANALYSIS
I. Right to a Speedy Trial

In their first issu e, the Defendants assert that the trial court violated their right to a speedy trial as guaranteed under the United StatesConstitution, the Tennessee Constitution, and Tennessee Code An notated § 40-14-101, and that the charges against them should be dismissed pursua nt t o Tenn. R. Crim. P. 48. The State concedes the appropriateness of an inquiry into the delay between th e Defendants’ arrest and their trial on June 16, 1999 , but argues tha t the delay w

as not due to improper actions by the State and was not prejudicial to t he Defend ants. There fore, the St ate's position is thatthe Defendants’ right to a speedy trial was not violated. After a review of the record, we are unable to find that the Defendants’ right to a speedy trial was violated.

The record is sparse

concerni ng this issue. On appeal, allegations found in pleadings and statements

made by counsel during a hearing or the trial a re not evidence. See State v. Draper , 800 S.W.2d 489, 493 (1990). We are unable to co

nsider either in li

eu of a verbatim t

ranscript. The sa

me is true for the recitation

of facts and argument

contained in appe

llate briefs submi

tted to this Court. Id.

When the rec ord is incomplete, and does not contain a transcript or statement of what transpiredin the trial court w ith respect to the i

ssue raise d on appeal, we are precluded from considering that issue. Id. Further, an appellate court is also prohibited from c onsidering the exhibits attached to motion s and supplements to

the moti ons that are included in the “te chnical” record. State v. Bennett

, 798 S.W.2d 783, 789-90 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). This Court can only
cons ideran exhi bit or an attachment to a pleading that has been (a) received into evidence, (b) markedby the

trial judge, clerk

or court reporte

r as having bee

n received into e

vidence as an exhi

bit, and (c) included in the transcript transmitted to this Court. Id. Thus, in the absence of a complete record on appeal, the ap

pellate court must

conclusively

presume that the ruling of the trial judge was correct.

In the instant case,

the record tran

smitted to this Court did not contain a transcription of the relevant proceedings in the

trial court concerning this issue. The Defendants failed to provide this Courtwithevidence from a hearing or a statement of the evidence from a proceeding, whe rein the trial court denied the Defendants’ motion for a speedy trial. Concerning the speedy trial issue, the record on appeal merely consists of an order overrulingDefendant Smith’s “motion for a speedy trial-11-

or in the alternative to set bond,” and statements made by the trial court concerning the denial of the Defendants’ mot ion to d ism iss for not hav ing a spe edy trial, at an other pre-t rial motio n hearing. However, the order overruling Defendant Smith’s motion does not show what, if any, findings were made by the trial court re garding the mo

tion. Moreover, th

e following collo

quy betwee

n the tria l court and the attorneys, at another pretrial motion hearing, provides no basis for consideration of the Defendants’ as sertions on appea l:

The Court: Yeah. And so it’s been set. I’m not--look, folks, the issue on

a speedy tria

l the Court’s alre

ady dealt with. I set it [the trial date]. You all ha d conflict s. I re-set it. The State had a conflict at one time and I’ve done the best I can so whatever happens, happen

s.

Mr. Baird [Gr

aham’s Co

unsel]: My point was, Judge, I’ve not seen

an order to that regard in the

file so I just wanted to bring that to the Court’s attention.

The Court: Yeah, well, I need an Order to

reflect all that

. Gen. Marsh: We’ ll h ave i t fo r you tod ay.
The Court: So the iss ue on the Motion for a Speedy Trial, the Court’s already dealt with and I’m not going to deal with that again.

Thus, absent proof a nd findings, we presume the trial court ruled correctly on the issue pertaining to De

fendants’ righ

t to a speedy

trial.
II. Right to be heard on whether a Bruton problem prohibited the consolidation of

Alexandro Rivera’s trial with the Defendants’ Trial
Next, the Defendants c

ontend that the tria

l court violate

d their rights to procedural due processby depriving them of an opportunity to be heard on the issue of whether a Brutonviolation existed, which would serve to exclude Rivera f

rom being tr

ied joi ntl y with them. See Bruton v. United States , 391 U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968) (holding it a vio lation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right t o confront and cr

oss-examine witnes ses, when a cour t admits evidence of p retrial statements made by a co-defendan

t to implicate the de

fendant’s guilt

) . As a preliminary

matter, we note that the Defendants have waived this issue by failing to include it in

their respective motions for a new tr ial. Tenn. R. App. P.

3(e); State v. Maddox , 957 S.W.2d 547, 553 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). Even if not wa ived, Def endants would not be

entitled to relief

on this issue.

Artic le I, § 9 of the Tennessee Constitution provides that "the accused hath the right to b e heard by himself

and his counsel." Based upon the record, we find that while the Defendants had-12-

the right to be heard, neither defense counsel request ed an opportunity to be heard on whether a Bruton problemexisted. At the pretrial motions hearing, both defense counsel argued that Smith, Graham and Rivera should e

ither be tried all

together or all

separa tely. The State argued for the consolidation of Graham and Smith’s cases pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 13, giventhat the two were indicted separately. During the course of the Stat e’s motion for consolidation, the

State explained to th

e trial court that

, while it desired t

o try Graha

m, Smith and Rivera jointly, Defendant Graham’s statement, identifying Rivera as the shooter , presented a Bruton problem, which prohibited the consolidation of the three cases . The trial court accepted the State’s assessment

of the Brutonissue and ordered that Graham and Smith’s cases b

e consolidated. T

hus, the record indicate

s that th e State never

sought to join Rivera’s case with Defendant Smith’s and Defendant Gra

ham’s cases.
First, the Defendants challenge the State’s decision to consolidate their cases, without consolidating Rivera. Rule 12 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Proced ure requires tha

t a request to consolidate

be raised prior to trial. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(5). Rule 13 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure permits the trial court to cons olidate the cases of def

endants, when the

State could have opted t

o join the defenda

nts in a single

indictment. Tenn. R

. Crim. P. 13(a). As such, it is the State’s decision ( as well as a defe

ndant’s decision)

whether to file a

motion to consolidate defendants. In this case,

the State electe

d to move for a con

solidation of Smith an

d Graham’s case

s, which was within the

State’s prerog

ative. The State

would have liked to

join all three cas

es, but a Bruton violation made it ne

cessary f or Rivera’s case

to remain se

parate. In contrast, joinder of Graham and Smith was clearly permissible under Rules 8(c) and 13(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. More over, the Defen

dants were not entitled

to a hearing on the State’s internal decision to file or not to file a motion to consolidate.
Second, the record

indicates that the Defendants were present in court when the trial court made the ruling addressing the Bruton issue. The Defendants off ered no specific

argument aga

inst the State’s argument for the application of Bruton , as it relate d to Rivera. Therefore, be cause Defendants

failed to reques

t an opportunity

to be heard

at the pretrial mo

tions hearing an

d failed to raise this issue in t

heir motions for a n

ew trial, we find

no violation of thei

r rights to due pr

ocess.
III. Severance and Consolidation

Defendant

Smith claims the trial court erred in denying her motion to sever her trial from Defendant

Graham’s trial.

Defendant Graham claims the trial court erre

d in consolidating

her case with that of Defe

ndant Smith, becau

se the evidence

against Smith was stronger. Essentially, each Defendant

argues that because the evidence against the o t her was more suf

ficient, joinder o

f their trials produced a spill-over effect, which permitted one to be prejudiced by the multitude of evidence against the other. The State contends the t rial court acted properly, because the case against the Defendants

presented a “common scheme or plan,” which made consolidation permissible under Rules 8, 13 and 14 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. We find that the trial court properly consolidated the two cases, and properly denied Smith’s motion for a severance.

A. Defendant Smith’s Motion for Severance-13-

Defendant

Smith contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant her a severance from Defendant

Graham. She specifically complains that due to the overwhelming amount of evidence against Defendant Gra

ham, the trial cou

rt should have sev

ered her case

to prevent any

prejudice to her. We believe that the trial court properly declined to grant the se verance.

We review a trial court’s decision to deny or grant a seve rance of co-defendants for

an abuse of discr etion. State v. Little , 854 S.W.2d 643, 648 (T enn. Crim. App. 1992

); see also , State v. Moore , 6 S.W.3d 235, 238 (Tenn. 1999) and State v. Shirley , 6 S.W.3d 243, 247 (Tenn. 1999) (holding that a trial court’s dec isio n to sever offenses pursuant to Rules 8(b) and 14(b)(1) is to be reviewed for an abuse of

discre tion). Absent an a ffirmative showin

g of prejudice

, this Court will notreverse the trial court’s exercise of sound discretion. State v. Ensley , 956 S.W.2d 502, 508 (Tenn. Cri m. App. 1 996). In Woodruff v. State , 164 Tenn. 530, 538-39, 51 S.W.2d 843, 845 (1932), our supre

me court noted tha

t:
The state, as well as the persons acc used, is entitled to h

ave its rights protected, and wh en several persons are charged jointly with a sing le crime, we think the stat e i s entitled to have the fact of guil t determined and p

unishment assesse

d in a single tria

l, unless to do so would unfairly prejudice the rights of the defendants.

Thus, the defendant bears the burden of showing that she was “clearly prejudiced

to the point that the trial court 's discretion ended and the grantin

g of [a] severanc

e became a judicial duty.” Parham v. State , 885 S.W.2d 375, 383 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

Severanceof

defendants

is allowed pursuant to Rules 13(b) and 14(c) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Her e, there is no indic

ation that a

severance was

“necessary

to achieve a fai

r determination of

the guilt or innocence of” the Defendants. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 14(c)(2)(ii) (2000). Further, there is no evidence that a severance was required pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 14(c)(1), permitting severance of co-defendants where a Bruton violation would follow (as with Rivera). The Defendants had been separately indicted for A aron Smith’s mur d er. At the pretrial motions hearing,

the trial court,

upon motion of the State, consolidated the Defendants’ cases under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 13(a

), which permits

the consolidation of two or more indictments where all defendants coul

d have been joine

d in a single indic

tment. The trial court fou nd that the Defendants

could have been joined

in the same indictme

nt, pursuant to

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 8, be

cause eachof the Defendan

ts was charged

with accountabili

ty for the murder of the victim and because the
o ffense charged showed signs of a common scheme or plan. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 8(c)(1) and (3 )(i ) (2000).

After a review of the record and the law, we are unable to find an abuse of discretion by the trial court. I

n refusing to sev

er the Defenda

nts’ cases, the tr

ial court corre

ctly applied the law and reached a logical decision based upon the facts as they applied to the law. De fenda nt Smith h as failedto sho w that she su ffered prejudice from her case being consolidated with Defendant Gr aham’s
case. Even assuming that the evidence at trial appeared to weigh more heavily against Defendant-14-

Graham, there was a significant amount of evidence showing Defendant Smith’s involvement as the
one who solicited her t

win sister (Defenda

nt Graham) and Riv

era tocommit the homicide. The trial court determinedthat the evidence of a common plan or scheme agains

t the individual Def

endants would perm it the jury to fairly determine the g uilt or innocence of the Defendants, thereby eliminating the need for severance.
B. Defendant Graham’s Argument Against Consolidation

Defendant

Graham argues that the trial court erred in consolidating h

er case with Defendant Smith’s case. She conten ds that the evidenc

e clearly sh owed that only Defendant Smith had a motive for killing Aaro

n Smith . She asser ts that because the jury found that the evidence was insufficient

to show that this murder was committed for promise of remuneration, there is no evidence to show that she had any motive for participating in this murder. She further claims that the unreliable testimony of LaShawn Ta ylor and Mar

tin Giovi made the State’s case against her weak, compared

to the case against Defendant Smith. Thus, Graham argues that she was prejudiced by the consolidation of her case with Smith’s case. We disagree.

Joinder is permissible when each defendant “is charged with accountability for each offense included.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 8(c)(l ) ( 2000). However,

the trial court ma

y grant a severance prior t o trial if it is necessary “to promote a fair determination of the g uilt or innocence of one or more defendants.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 14(c)(2)(i) & (ii) (2000). As no

ted above, the de

cision to grant a
severance is within the trial judge’s sound discretion, State v. Little , 854 S.W.2d at 648, and the exercise of that discretion will not be reversed absent an affirmative showing of prejudice, State v. Ensley , 956 S.W.2d at 508. Here, each of the Defendants was charged with accountability for the murder of Aaron Smith. Therefore, consol idation of the Defendants’ cases was permissible and within the sou nd discretion of the trial court. Defendant Graham has failed to demonstrate an affirmative showing of prejudice resulting from the consolidat ion of her case with Defe ndant Smith’s
case.
Fin all y, we find that the trial court protected the De

fendants against the risk of prejudice or a possible “spill-o

ver effect,” b

y giving t he following jur

y instruction

s:
All right, you are trying two sep arat e cases that have been consolidated for trial . The first indictment, #7145, charges the Defendant DeborahGraham p

ri marily with the offense of first degree murder. The secondindictment,#7146, charges Denice Graham Smith with the offense of first degree murder. Both indictments will be handed to you as you consider these charges during

your del ibera tion s. In considering each case, it is your duty to wei gh care fully t he evi dence as it a ppli es to e ach ca se. Ifthere be
e vidence that sheds light upon the guilt or innocence in one case, b ut i s immaterial or irrelevant

as to the other, be certain that you do not permit the evidence to receive any consideration or have any bearin

g on your ve

rdict in
case s in whi ch i t ca nno t ap ply.-15- In other words, each indictment -- or, in other words, please consider eachindictment and each

-- each defendant separately, and conside r only that portion of the evidence that bears on a precise charge. Do not let y our verdict of gui lt or innocence on one charge affect y our verdict on the other. Yo u r judgment must be independently made as to each charge and each

defendant.

We must presume that the jury complied with the trial judge's instruction. Richardson v. Marsh , 481 U.S. 200, 211 (19 87); State v. Blackmon , 701 S.W.2d 228, 233 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985), perm. to appeal denied , (Tenn. 1985). The reco rd does not demonstr

ate that the Defe

ndants sustained prejudice as a

result of the joint t

rial. Further, t

he trial court did n

ot abuse its discretion by finding that the evidence presented a “common plan or scheme” between the Defenda nts. Thus, the Defendants are not entitled to relief on this issue.
IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Both Defendants contend that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions for first degree murder. We disagree.

The proper inquiry for an appellate court determining the sufficiency

of evidence to

support
a conviction, is whether, considering the evidence in a light most favorable

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elemen

ts of the crime bey

ond a reasonable

doubt. See Jackson v. Virgini

a , 443 U.S. 307, 9 9 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Hall , 8 S.W.3d 593, 599 (Tenn. 1999). “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved

by the trial court, acc

redits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the prosecution’s theory.” State v. Bland , 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1 997). Questions about the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the trier of fact, and this Court does not reweigh or reevaluate the evidence. Id. Nor may this Court substitute its inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence for those dra wn by the trier of fact. See Liakas v. State , 199 Tenn. 298, 305, 286 S.W.2d 856, 859 (1956).

The standard for appellate review is the same

whether the conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence. See State v. Vann , 976 S.W.2d 93, 111 (Tenn. 1998). A conviction may be based entirely on circumstantial evidence where the fa cts are "so clearly interwoven and connected

that the finger of guilt is pointed unerringly at the Defe ndant and the Defendant alone." Statev. Smith , 868 S.W. 2d 561, 569 (Tenn. 1993 ) (quoting State v. Duncan , 698 S.W.2d 63, 67 (Tenn. 19 85)). A verdict of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and replaces it with a presumption o f guilt , and on appeal the defendant has the burden of illustrating why the e vidence is insufficient to support the verdict rendered by the jury. Id. ; see also State v. Tuggle , 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). In contrast, the State on appea

l is entitled to the str

ongest legitimate view of the evidence and

all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. See Hall , 8 S.W.3d at 599; Bland , 958 S.W.2d at 659.

Un derTennes see law, first degree murder is “[a] premeditated and intentional killing of another.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1) (1997). A person acts intentionally “when it is the-16-

person’s conscious objective or d e sire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106(a)( 18) (1997). “‘[P]re meditation’ is

an act done after exercise of reflection and judgment.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(d) (1997). Although premeditation requires that “the intentto kill must have been formed prior to the act itself,” “[i]t is not necessary

that the purpose to kill pre-exist in the mind of the accused for any definite period of time. ” Tenn . Code Ann. § 39-13-202(d) (1997). The element of premeditation is a question for the jury which may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the killing. State v. Gentry , 881 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). Tennessee courts have delineated several circumstances that may be indicative of premeditation, including the use of a deadly weapon upon an unarme d victim, Bland , 958 S.W.2d at 660, facts from which motive may be inferred, State v. Bordis , 905 S.W.2d 214, 222 (T enn. Crim. App. 1995), and calmness immediately after the killing, Bland , 958 S.W.2d at 660.
Accomplice liability provides a basis for the convictionsof Defendants Graham and Smith. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-402(2) (1997). In State v. Maxey , 898 S.W. 2d 7 56, 757 (Tenn. Crim

. App. 1994), this Court held that the statute a ttac hing criminal liability for the conduct of another requires pr oof of an “in tentional ” culpable m ental stat e. Knowing, reckless, and negligent mental states are insufficien

t. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-302(a) (1997). For the evidence to be sufficient to sustain a conviction under the theory of criminal responsibility f or the conduct of another, there must be proof that the Defendants intended, as defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-1 1-302(a), to promote or assist the commis sion of the offens e, or to benefit in

the proceeds o

r results of the offens e. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-402( 2). In additio

n, there must be pr

oof that the Defe

ndants solicited, directed, aided, or attempted to aid another to commit the offense. Id. The jury may infer t he intent of the acc

essory fro m her “presence

, companionship, a

nd conduct befor

e and afte r th e offense. . . .” State v. McBee , 644 S.W.2d 425, 428-29 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982).

A. Graham's Conviction
Taking the facts in a light

most favorable to the State, Graham’s intent to kill the victim may be inferred from h

er asking Marti

n Giovi to kill

the victim. The proof further showed that Graham had Rivera accompany her to Tennessee, in order to kill the victim. She drove the vehicle, rented by Defendant Smith, from Florida to Tennessee and showed Rivera where the victim lived. After the murder, Graham and Rivera drove back to Flo rida and returne

d the car to Alamo C

ar Rental. Graha m returned to Florida without alerting the authorities about the victim’s death. L aShaw n Taylor testified that Gra

ham and Rivera we

re very se

cretiv e and nervous, after t hey return

ed to Florida. Then, Defendant Graham fled to New York, while maintaining possession of Cleta Smith’s jew elr y. In New York, Graham stayed w ith Giovi and tol d him that Smith and her father paid
someone to kill the vi ctim and th at she (Graham) had accompanied the man to Tennessee, where they shot the victim in the driveway. Graham was later arrested by the police and gave

a statement attesting to the above facts. Hence, a rational jury could have found that Defendant Graham intended to assist with the commission of the murder of Aaron Smith.

B. Smith's Conviction-17-

Reviewing the facts in a light most favorable to the State, De fenda nt Smith, on numerous occasions,spoke of her in te nt to kill the victim or have him killed, if he were awarded custody of the children. Likewise, Shannon Jarnigan (Smith’s cell mate) testified that Smith told her that she hired Graham’s boyfriend (Rivera) to kill her husband. Moreover, Smith’s intent to kill

her husband
can be inferred

from her actions of driving to Florida to meet with Graham, renting the car Graham and Rivera used to drive to Tennessee to com mit the criminal act, discussing with Rivera and Graham the fact that they had killed someone (in earshot of her daughter, Brittany Smith) and fleeing to Michigan soon after the killing. Cons equently, we hold that a rational trier of fact could have found that Defendant Smith intended to promote and assist the commission of the murder of Aaron Smith. The evidence was sufficient to show that Defendant Smith solicited t he aid of Defe ndant Graham and Rivera to commit the first degree murder of Aaron Smith.
Having reviewed the pr

oof in the light mos

tfavorable to the State, as we are required to do,
we find that

the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury ’s verdict as to both Defendants. The jury resolved all issues of credibility in fav or of the St ate, and this Court may not reconsider the jury’s credibility assessments. See State v. Gentry , 881 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). The Defendants are not entitled to relief on this issue.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing and the record as a whole, we affirm the judg ments of the trial court.

___________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE