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 17-cv-00600-LB

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 3 TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE, QUESTIONING, OR ARGUMENT 

REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S RECEIPT OF COLLATERAL SOURCE PAYMENTS 

MIRIAM KIM (State Bar No. 238230) 

miriam.kim@mto.com 

EMILY C. CURRAN-HUBERTY (State Bar No. 293065) 

emily.curran-huberty@mto.com 

SKYLAR D. BROOKS (State Bar No. 310707) 

skylar.brooks@mto.com 

MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP 

560 Mission Street 

Twenty-Seventh Floor 

San Francisco, California 94105-2907 

Telephone: (415) 512-4000 

Facsimile: (415) 512-4077 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

RENEE LEPAGE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 

RENEE LEPAGE, an individual, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

COUNTY OF NAPA; COUNTY OF NAPA 

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; AND DEPUTY 

TIMOTHY REID, 

Defendants. 

 Case No. 3:17-cv-00600-LB 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 3 

TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE, 

QUESTIONING, OR ARGUMENT 

REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S RECEIPT 

OF COLLATERAL SOURCE PAYMENTS 

Judge: Hon. Laurel Beeler 

Date: September 26, 2019 

Time: 1:30 p.m. 

Crtrm.: B – 15th Floor 

Trial Date.: October 15, 2019 

Case 3:17-cv-00600-LB Document 117 Filed 09/06/19 Page 1 of 4
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 -1- 17-cv-00600-LB

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 3 TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE, QUESTIONING, OR ARGUMENT 

REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S RECEIPT OF COLLATERAL SOURCE PAYMENTS 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Plaintiff Renee LePage herein moves to exclude all evidence, questioning, or argument 

regarding any collateral source payments—including, but not limited to, insurance payments and 

public benefits from federal, state or local sources—Ms. LePage received following the December 

1, 2015 incident that gives rise to this action. Under the collateral source rule, any such payments 

do not reduce the damages Ms. LePage may seek to recover from Defendants County of Napa, 

County of Napa Sheriff’s Department, and Deputy Timothy Reid (collectively, “Defendants”) at 

trial, and Defendants may not introduce evidence of such payments for the purpose of convincing 

the jury to reduce Ms. LePage’s damages. And because introducing evidence regarding collateral 

source payments for any other purpose poses a grave risk that the jury will rely on the evidence for 

the improper purpose of reducing its damages award, the evidence should be excluded entirely. 

Ms. LePage therefore respectfully requests that the Court exclude all evidence, questioning, or 

argument regarding her receipt of collateral source payments pursuant to the collateral source rule 

and Federal Rule of Evidence 403. 

II. ARGUMENT 

“Under the collateral source rule, benefits received by the plaintiff from a source collateral 

to the defendant may not be used to reduce that defendant’s liability for damages.” McLean v. 

Runyon, 222 F.3d 1150, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). The rationale 

for the rule is that a “defendant should not get a windfall for collateral benefits received by the 

plaintiff and that the defendant should not profit from benefits that the plaintiff has paid for 

himself.” Id. at 1156. The collateral source rule is part of the federal common law and is also 

recognized under California state law. See Howard v. Cty. of Riverside, 2014 WL 12589655, at *2 

(C.D. Cal. June 3, 2014) (“[T]he collateral source rule[] is recognized as part of the federal 

common law and applies to section 1983 actions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Howell v. 

Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 52 Cal. 4th 541, 551 (2011) (collateral source rule applies in 

California). 

Applying the collateral source rule here, it is clear that Defendants may not introduce 

evidence that Ms. LePage has received payments or benefits from sources other than Defendants 

Case 3:17-cv-00600-LB Document 117 Filed 09/06/19 Page 2 of 4
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 -2- 17-cv-00600-LB

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 3 TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE, QUESTIONING, OR ARGUMENT 

REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S RECEIPT OF COLLATERAL SOURCE PAYMENTS 

themselves in order to argue that her damages should be reduced. See, e.g., Ellis v. Navarro, 2012 

WL 3580284, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2012) (excluding, pursuant to collateral source rule, 

evidence that plaintiff’s medical expenses were paid by the California Department of Corrections); 

Henderson v. Peterson, 2011 WL 2838169, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2011) (same). 

Nor should the Court permit Defendants to introduce evidence regarding collateral source 

payments for any other purpose. Under Rule 403, evidence should be excluded if its probative 

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of “unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, 

misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” 

Fed. R. Evid. 403. Here, Defendants have identified no theory under which evidence of thirdparty payments and benefits Ms. LePage may have received since the incident would be relevant 

and admissible. By contrast, the risk that the jury will rely on any such evidence for the plainly 

improper purpose of reducing its damages award is high. This risk of unfair prejudice 

substantially outweighs whatever minimal probative value the evidence of collateral source 

payments may have, and thus the evidence should be excluded.1

 See Ellis, 2012 WL 3580284, at 

*5 (“[W]hether Plaintiff’s medical expenses were paid by the CDCR is not probative of any 

factual matter to be decided at trial, and [] the admission of such evidence would likely confuse 

the jury regarding whether Plaintiff has already been compensated for some of his damages.”). 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should exclude all evidence, questioning, or argument 

regarding any collateral source payments—including, but not limited to, insurance payments and 

 

1

 To the extent Defendants believe they may eventually be entitled to a reduction of any damages 

awarded to Ms. LePage pursuant to California Government Code section 985, that is not a basis 

for presenting evidence of collateral source payments to the jury. Section 985 provides for a posttrial reduction in damages under certain circumstances in which the defendant is a public entity 

and the collateral payments were made by certain public benefits programs. Even assuming 

section 985 could potentially apply here—which Plaintiff does not concede—section 985 makes 

clear that any damages reduction is to be handled by separate motion following trial and is not an 

issue for the jury. Cal. Gov’t Code § 985(b) (“Any collateral source payment paid or owed to or 

on behalf of a plaintiff shall be inadmissible in any action for personal injuries or wrongful death 

where a public entity is a defendant.”). Accordingly, section 985 provides no basis for presenting 

evidence regarding collateral source payments at trial. 

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 -3- 17-cv-00600-LB

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 3 TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE, QUESTIONING, OR ARGUMENT 

REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S RECEIPT OF COLLATERAL SOURCE PAYMENTS 

public benefits from federal, state or local sources—Ms. LePage received following the December 

1, 2015 incident that gives rise to this action. 

DATED: August 20, 2019 Respectfully submitted, 

MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP 

 MIRIAM KIM 

EMILY C. CURRAN-HUBERTY 

SKYLAR D. BROOKS 

By: /s/ Emily C. Curran-Huberty 

 Emily C. Curran-Huberty 

 

 Attorneys for Plaintiff RENEE LEPAGE 

Case 3:17-cv-00600-LB Document 117 Filed 09/06/19 Page 4 of 4