Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

OPINION

No. 04-22-00324-CV

IN RE COMMITMENT OF Joaquin RIVERA

From the 187th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2021-CI-13023

Honorable Stephanie R. Boyd, Judge Presiding

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

Opinion by: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Beth Watkins, Justice

Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: October 25, 2023

AFFIRMED

A jury found appellant, Joaquin Rivera, to be a sexually violent predator in a civil 

commitment action. The trial court adjudged him as a sexually violent predator, and civilly 

committed him for sex-offender treatment and supervision. In two issues on appeal, Rivera asserts 

the trial court erred by (1) denying him the right to ask a proper commitment question regarding 

victims younger than fifteen and (2) denying a mistrial after the State violated a motion in limine 

during opening arguments. On August 2, 2023, we issued an opinion and judgment affirming the 

trial court’s judgment. On August 16, 2023, Rivera filed a motion for rehearing. We deny the 

motion for rehearing, but we withdraw our August 2, 2023 opinion and judgment, and we 

substitute this opinion and judgment in its place. We affirm.
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BACKGROUND

Prior to the commitment trial, Rivera had been convicted and sentenced as follows: in 1999 

for indecency with a child, in 2008 for violating annual Sex Offender Registration, and in 2012 for 

aggravated sexual assault of a child. The State later filed a petition, alleging Rivera was a sexually 

violent predator and requesting that he be committed for treatment and supervision. The trial court 

conducted a trial before a jury at which Rivera and the State’s forensic psychologist testified. The

jury found Rivera to be a sexually violent predator, and the trial court signed an Order of 

Commitment.

CIVIL COMMITMENT OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS

“A person is a sexually violent predator for the purposes of [Texas Health and Safety Code 

Chapter 841] if the person: (1) is a repeat sexually violent offender; and (2) suffers from a 

behavioral abnormality that makes the person likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual 

violence.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 841.003(a). The State must prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that a person is a sexually violent predator. Id. § 841.062(a). “Behavioral abnormality” is 

defined as “a congenital or acquired condition that, by affecting a person’s emotional or volitional 

capacity, predisposes the person to commit a sexually violent offense, to the extent that the person 

becomes a menace to the health and safety of another person.” Id. § 841.002(2).

COMMITMENT QUESTION

Rivera began his voir dire by asking venirepersons if they could listen to the facts and 

follow the court’s instructions if evidence was presented about child victims. Rivera’s attorney 

heard from several members of the venire in response to the following question, to which the State 

did not object:

If you hear that there’s evidence of child victims, will that be so weighty on you 

that you are not going to be able to listen to the facts and follow the instructions?

And does anybody have any responses or comments to that?
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When one venireperson asked, “When you say ‘child victims,’ like how old are you talking 

about? Like under 18 or . . .?,” the following conversation occurred with defense counsel:

Counsel: Well, let’s talk about it this way. I can’t go into facts of the case

obviously, right? But let’s – is there an age – is there an age that 

makes a difference?

Venireperson: To me it does, yeah.

Counsel: Okay. Do you have an age range that you think is more important?

Venireperson: Yes. I would say like any children that are like under 15 is a 

difference between a child that’s 16 or older, just from my own 

experiences. I would say so, yeah, kind of hard to answer that 

question when you’re not like putting into terms of how young the 

child is.

Counsel: If you hear that there’s a psychologist that makes a diagnosis of a 

pedophilic disorder. And someone asked what a pedophilic 

disorder is. That’s a sexual attraction to prepubescent children. So 

if you hear that there’s a diagnosis of pedophilic disorder, is that 

something that you’re not going to be able to get through in order 

to sit on this jury?

Venireperson: Like do – what do you mean by prepubescent?

Counsel: Scientifically, it would be the development of secondary sex 

characteristics.

Venireperson: Okay. So, yeah, that I wouldn’t be able to get past. Because that’s 

like a younger age. If it was an infant or someone who’s five years 

old, that’s different than 16 or older.

Counsel: Okay. So if you – if you hear evidence about a child victim and 

evidence about pedophilic disorder, are you automatically going 

to turn off and say enough is enough, that diagnosis alone by a 

psychologist, the person has a behavioral abnormality; the person 

is a sexual violent predator?

Venireperson: When it comes to terms with yes or no, no. I’m not going to turn 

off everything, no.

Counsel: Okay. Is it going to affect your ability to listen to the facts?

Venireperson: Yes.

Counsel: And how so?

Venireperson: Just like you said, like age difference. Like, if they were facts 

they’re – you know, older than a certain age or something like that, 

that would determine my answer.
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Counsel: Okay. So would you – if you hear the facts come off that stand of 

child victims younger than 15, is that going to affect your ability 

to move forward and listen to the rest of the facts in the case and 

answer the question beyond a reasonable doubt whether or not 

this person is a sexually violent predator?

Prosecutor: Your Honor, I’m going to object to the commitment question.

The Court: Sustained.

Counsel: Your Honor, that’s a proper commitment question.

The Court: Sustained.

On appeal, Rivera argues the trial court reversibly erred when it denied him the right to ask 

the above emphasized question.

The Law Relevant to Venire Questions

“Litigants have the right to question potential jurors to discover biases and to properly use 

peremptory challenges.” In re Commitment of Hill, 334 S.W.3d 226, 228 (Tex. 2011) (citing

Hyundai Motor Co. v. Vasquez, 189 S.W.3d 743, 749–50 (Tex. 2006)). However, this right is 

constrained by reasonable trial court control. Id. at 228–29. Thus, we review a trial court’s refusal 

to allow lines of questioning during voir dire for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 229. “[T]he proper 

discretion inquiry turns on the propriety of the question: ‘a court abuses its discretion when its 

denial of the right to ask a proper question prevents determination of whether grounds exist to 

challenge for cause or denies intelligent use of peremptory challenges.’” Id. (quoting Babcock v. 

Nw. Mem’l Hosp., 767 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex. 1989)).

“Commitment questions are those that commit a prospective juror to resolve, or to refrain 

from resolving, an issue a certain way after learning a particular fact.” Standefer v. State, 59 

S.W.3d 177, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). The Standefer Court articulated a three-part test for 

determining whether a voir dire question is an improper commitment question. Id. at 179–84. First, 

the trial court must determine whether a particular question is in fact a commitment question. See 

id. at 179. Second, if it is a commitment question, then the court must decide whether it is 
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nevertheless a proper commitment question. See id. at 181. To determine whether the question is 

a proper commitment question, the court first inquires whether one of the possible answers to the 

question gives rise to a valid challenge for cause. Id. at 182. If it does not, then the question is not 

proper and should be disallowed by the trial court. See id. Third, if the commitment question gives 

rise to a valid challenge for cause, then the court must determine whether the question contains 

only those facts necessary to test whether a prospective juror is challengeable for cause. Id. at 182.

Analysis

The parties agree the question was a commitment question. However, Rivera asserts the 

question was proper because he sought to determine whether the venireperson was so biased 

against him if the victims were younger than fifteen years of age that they would find a behavioral 

abnormality from this fact alone and would not listen to evidence beyond this singular fact. Rivera 

contends his question gave rise to a valid challenge for cause; thus, the question was proper. The 

State counters that the question was an improper commitment question because it invited the 

venirepersons to resolve the issue a certain way after learning a particular fact—a child victim 

under the age of fifteen.

Rivera asked, “[I]f you hear the facts come off that stand of child victims younger than 15, 

is that going to affect your ability to move forward and listen to the rest of the facts in the case and 

answer the question beyond a reasonable doubt whether or not this person is a sexually violent 

predator?” We begin by inquiring whether one of the possible answers to the question gives rise 

to a valid challenge for cause. Standefer, 59 S.W.3d at 182.

The ultimate question for jurors was whether Rivera was a “sexually violent predator,” 

which is a person that “(1) is a repeat sexually violent offender; and (2) suffers from a behavioral 

abnormality that makes the person likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence.” TEX.

HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 841.003(a). Sexually violent offenses include, as relevant here, 
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indecency with a child by sexual contact and sexual assault.1 Id. § 841.002(8). Behavioral 

abnormalities are conditions that predispose a person to commit a sexually violent offense, to the 

extent the person becomes a menace to the health and safety of another person—here, pedophilic 

disorder. Id. § 841.002(2). Given the question that would be posed to the jury, answers to questions 

regarding child victims and pedophilic disorder could (and did) result in successful for cause 

challenges.

During voir dire, Rivera inquired numerous times—both of individual venirepersons and 

of the entire panel, row-by-row—about whether venirepersons could properly sit for a case 

involving child victims and a diagnosis of pedophilic disorder, which Rivera described to the panel

as “a sexual attraction to prepubescent children,” being children without developed secondary sex 

characteristics. When Rivera again inquired of a venireperson regarding a specific “threshold” age, 

the State objected it amounted to an improper commitment question. At a bench conference, the 

State argued, “[H]e’s specifically going into trying to narrow down age. It is a proper question to 

ask if someone is unable to follow the law, if they fear that there’s an offense against a child. But

when you’re starting to narrow that down and narrow it down even more and more, I think it is an 

improper commitment question.” Rivera acknowledged that he was “trying to stay away from” 

delineating a specific age, and the trial court asked Rivera what question he intended to ask. Rivera 

responded, “My question was whether or not the evidence presented of pedophilic disorder and 

offenses against children is going to cause her to not listen to the rest of the case?” The trial court 

authorized the specific question posed by Rivera. Rivera then stated, “And then what’s going to

happen is she’s going to come back and start asking questions about ages; and I’m trying not to 

1 On August 30, 1999, Rivera was convicted of indecency with a child for fondling the breasts and buttocks of a tenor eleven-year-old child. On October 5, 2012, Rivera was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child after he 

fondled and penetrated the anus of a six- or seven-year-old child.
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get her there.” The trial court replied, “You’re just not allowed to ask that question.” Rivera 

responded, “Okay. Perfect.” Rivera then asked the trial-court-approved question.

In response to Rivera’s questions, several venirepersons stated they would be unable to set 

aside their biases and prejudices. Other venirepersons offered answers relevant to Rivera’s exercise 

of peremptory strikes. In other words, over the course of voir dire, Rivera obtained sufficient 

information to (1) discover external biases relating to child victims and pedophilic disorder, 

(2) determine whether grounds exist to challenge for cause, and (3) allow intelligent use of 

peremptory challenges. Hill, 334 S.W.3d at 229.2

Nevertheless, Rivera argues his question sought to determine whether the fact that his 

victims were younger than fifteen would result in the venireperson finding a behavioral 

abnormality on this singular fact alone, giving rise to a for cause challenge. We disagree and hold 

the possible answers to Rivera’s question regarding child victims under the age of fifteen do not 

give rise to a valid challenge for cause. Unlike Rivera’s general inquiries, this question isolated 

one fact—whether child victims were under the age of fifteen—and sought to gauge the 

venireperson’s opinion about the strength of this evidence.

Jurors are entitled to determine the weight of admissible evidence—here, the weight to be 

given to the specific age of child victims in assessing whether Rivera suffers from a behavior 

abnormality that predisposes him to commit a sexually violent offense. Therefore, asking about 

the strength of this isolated fact does not identify external bias or prejudice. See Vasquez, 189 

S.W.3d at 756 (“By isolating this fact, the question seeks to identify those jurors who agree that 

the one fact overcomes all others. As reasonable jurors, however, it is within their province to so 

2 In Hill, the supreme court held the trial court erred in rejecting a line of inquiry because the commitment question 

“was legislatively mandated: they were asked whether they would require the state to prove both elements of a 

conjunctive statute.” 334 S.W.3d at 229. Unlike Hill, Rivera’s inquiry of a specific fifteen-year-old threshold does not 

touch on either legislatively-mandated element.
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conclude. The question thus asks the jurors’ opinion about the strength of this evidence, and does 

not cull out any external bias or prejudice.”). Put another way, reasonable jurors are entitled to

place additional weight on evidence that a child victim was under the age of fifteen when 

determining whether a person is a sexually violent predator, and such a determination does not 

result from external bias or prejudice. See id. at 753 (“[A] question that asks jurors to judge the 

weight to be given an operative fact will not reveal whether jurors have potential external biases 

or prejudices that improperly skew their view of case facts.”).

“The trial court in this case reasonably could have concluded that the substance of the 

proposed question did not present a basis for disqualifying a juror for cause, and instead sought to 

test the weight jurors would place on the relevant fact . . .” See id. at 757–58. Because one of the 

possible answers to the question does not give rise to a valid for cause challenge, the question is 

improper, and the trial court did not err in disallowing it. See Standefer, 59 S.W.3d at 182.

Therefore, we overrule Rivera’s first issue on appeal.

MOTION FOR MISTRIAL

After the jury was selected and before the trial commenced, the trial court conducted a 

hearing on the parties’ respective motions in limine. Rivera had requested that the State be enjoined 

from “[a]ny mention of any actual or alleged gang involvement on the part of” Rivera. The trial 

court did not immediately rule on the request but reserved its ruling before any mention at trial.3

During its opening argument, the State argued as follows:

He also has this antisocial lifestyle; and that doesn’t mean 

someone’s reserved. In this sense, it means that it’s rule breaking. 

The ability to violate rules that you and I abide by quite easily, he is 

able to break. You will learn that at a very young age, Mr. Rivera 

has been in trouble with the law. He has, all the way from as a 

juvenile, convictions of burglary habitation, multiple . . . of those. 

3 The court later allowed Dunham to “speak about underlying gang activity, but he [was] not to mention the ‘gang’ at 

all.”
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You’ll also hear that he has involvement in gang activity and so 

forth. And it’s also just the general rule breaking. The ability to –

Defense counsel objected and noted his motion in limine. The State acknowledged it was

supposed to approach the bench before mentioning gang activity and apologized. Defense counsel 

requested a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion but instructed the jury as follows:

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I want to remind each of you that 

opening statements that are made by the [State] and [Rivera] are not 

evidence. Evidence will be what you hear from the witness stand 

and whatever exhibits are admitted. So, again, these are just opening 

statements what people expect the evidence to show. Any mention 

of gang activity or lack thereof, you are to completely disregard. 

Does everyone understand?

The jurors responded, “yes,” and trial resumed. On appeal, Rivera asserts no instruction

could cure the bias that resulted from the State’s mentioning gang involvement. Rivera contends 

the State started the trial with an improper, inflammatory, highly prejudicial comment by tying his 

alleged “gang activity” to his “rule breaking” and “antisocial lifestyle.”

“We will not disturb a ruling denying a motion for mistrial absent a showing of an abuse 

of discretion.” Bazan v. Munoz, 444 S.W.3d 110, 123 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.).

“A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding rules and principles 

such that the ruling is arbitrary or unreasonable.” Pressley v. Casar, 567 S.W.3d 327, 333 (Tex. 

2019) (per curiam). “When reviewing matters committed to the trial court’s discretion, a court of 

appeals may not substitute its own judgment for the trial court’s judgment.” Bowie Mem’l Hosp. 

v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam). A trial court does not abuse its discretion 

merely because it decides a discretionary matter differently than an appellate court would in a 

similar circumstance. In re Estate of Denman, 362 S.W.3d 134, 141 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 

2011, no pet.).
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Here, the trial court promptly instructed the jury to disregard the statement and the jury is 

presumed to have followed that instruction. See In re Rudolph Auto., LLC, 674 S.W.3d 289 (Tex. 

2023) (“The presumption that jurors follow curative instructions . . . is not a featherweight to be 

disregarded without some powerful reason.”). Nothing in the record demonstrates (1) the comment 

had any harmful effect, (2) the jury was unable to follow the trial court’s instruction, or (3) the 

presumption is otherwise rebutted. Accordingly, we overrule Rivera’s second issue on appeal. See 

id.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice