22390 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 87 / Friday, May 5, 1995 / Notices

1Two parties subsequently requested and were

granted a 30-day extension of time to file replies.

ADDRESSES: Copies of the Waste

Analysis Guidance For Facilities That

Burn Hazardous Wastes EPA/530/R–94/

019 may be obtained by visiting the

RCRA Information Center or by calling

the RCRA Hotline. The public must

send an original and two copies of their

comments to: RCRA Information Center

(5305), U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency, 401 M Street, SW.,Washington,

DC 20460. Place the docket number (#F–

95–WAGA–FFFFF) on your comments.

The RCRA Information Center is located

in room M2616 at EPA Headquarters,

401 M Street S.W., Washington, DC

20460. It is open from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m.,

Monday through Friday, except on

Federal holidays. The public must make

an appointment to review docket

materials. Call (202) 260–9327 for

appointments. Copies cost 0.15 per

page.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For

general information and a copy of the

document contact the RCRA Hotline at

(800) 424–9346 toll-free or (703) 412–

9810 in the Washington, DC, area. For

information on specific aspects of the

guidance manual, contact John

Dombrowski at (202) 564–7036,

Chemical, Commercial Services and

Municipal Division (2224–A), Office of

Compliance, U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency, 401 M Street SW.,

Washington, DC 20460.

Dated: April 24, 1995.

Elaine G. Stanley,

Director, Office of Compliance.

[FR Doc. 95–11145 Filed 5–4–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6560–50–P

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION

Public Information Collection

Requirement Submitted to Office of

Management and Budget for Review

May 1, 1995.

The Federal Communications

Commission has submitted the

following information collection

requirements to OMB for review and

clearance under the Paperwork

Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3507).

Copies of these submissions may be

purchased from the Commission’s copy

contractor, International Transcription

Service, Inc., 2100 M Street, NW, Suite

140, Washington, DC 20037, (202) 857–

3800. For further information on this

submission contact Dorothy Conway,

Federal Communications Commission,

(202) 418–0217 or via internet at

DConway@FCC.GOV. Persons wishing

to comment on this information

collection should contact Timothy Fain,

Office of Management and Budget,

Room 10214 NEOB, Washington, DC

20503, (202) 395–3561.

OMB Number: N/A.

Title: Construction of SMR Stations

Request for Additional Information.

Form No.: FCC 800I.

Action: New collection.

Respondents: Individuals or

households; Businesses or other forprofit.

Frequency of Response: On occasion.

Estimated Annual Burden: 300

responses; 2.5 hours burden per

response; 750 hours total annual

burden.

Needs and Uses: FCC 800I is used as

a method of verifying if licensee has

placed station into operation and for

notifying the Commission of actual

number of mobile units placed in

operation after license grant. The data

collected ensures licensees are not

authorized for more mobile units then

they are actually using.

OMB Number: 3060–0360.

Title: Sec. 80.409(c) Public Coast

Station Logs.

Form No.: N/A.

Action: Extension of a currently

approved collection.

Respondents: Individuals or

households; Business or other for-profit;

Not-for-profit institutions; State, Local

or Tribal Government.

Frequency of Response:

Recordkeeping Requirement.

Estimated Annual Burden: 316

recordkeepers; 95 hours burden per

recordkeeper; 30,020 hours total annual

burden.

Needs and Uses: This requirement is

necessary to document the operation

and public correspondence service of

public coast radiotelegraph, public coast

radio telephone stations and Alaskapublic fixed stations. This information

is used by FCC personnel during

inspection and investigations to ensure

compliance with applicable rules and to

assist in accident investigations.

OMB Number: 3060–0364.

Title: Sec. 80.409(d) & (e) Ship

Radiotelegraph Logs, Ship

Radiotelephone Logs.

Form No.: N/A.

Action: Extension of a currently

approved collection.

Respondents: Individuals or

households; Business or other for-profit;

Not-for-profit institutions; State, Local

or Tribal Government.

Frequency of Response:

Recordkeeping Requirement.

Estimated Annual Burden: 10,950

recordkeepers; 47.3 hours burden per

recordkeeper; 517,935 hours total

annual burden.

Needs and Uses: This requirement is

necessary to document that compulsory

radio equipped vessels and high seas

vessels maintain listening watches and

logs as required by statutes and treaties.

This information is used by FCC

personnel during inspections and

investigations to insure compliance

with applicable rules and treaties and to

assist in vessel distress and disaster

investigations.

Federal Communications Commission.

William F. Caton,

Acting Secretary.

[FR Doc. 95–11117 Filed 5–4–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6712–01–F

FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

[Docket No. 94–24]

Petition of South Carolina State Ports

Authority for Declaratory Order; Order

Granting Petition in Part and Denying

Petition in Part

South Carolina State Ports Authority

(‘‘SCSPA’’ or ‘‘Petitioner’’) has filed

with the Federal Maritime Commission

(‘‘Commission’’ or ‘‘FMC’’) a Petition

For A Declaratory Order (‘‘Petition’’)

pursuant to Rule 68 of the Commission’s

Rules of Practice and Procedure, 46

C.F.R. § 502.68 (1993), to allow it to act

without peril in issuing in its FMC-filed

tariff guidelines for the criteria it will

apply to license stevedores and marine

terminal operators (‘‘MTOs’’) operating

at SCSPA facilities. SCSPA alleges that

‘‘economic regulation’’ of stevedores

and MTOs doing business or seeking to

do business at public port facilities is

necessary to protect the public

investment in the facilities.

Notice of the filing of the Petition was

published in the Federal Register

inviting interested parties to submit

replies to the Petition.1 Twelve parties

filed replies to the Petition. Following

receipt of all but two of the replies,

SCSPA filed a Motion For Leave To File

A Response (‘‘Motion’’). Six parties

responded to the Motion.

The Petition

SCSPA represents that it seeks ‘‘to

remove uncertainty, to terminate a

controversy, and to allow it to act

without peril upon its view of the right

to regulate the activity of persons

seeking to perform stevedore and public

marine terminal functions at [SCSPA]

facilities.’’ Petition at 1. SCSPA

maintains that its Petition is an

appropriate subject for exercise of the

Commission’s authority to entertain

petitions for declaratory orders under
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 87 / Friday, May 5, 1995 / Notices 22391

2Rule 68 provides, inter alia, that ‘‘the

Commission may, in its discretion, issue a

declaratory order to terminate a controversy or to

remove uncertainty.’’ Subsection (b) of the Rule

provides further that:

Petitions under this section shall be limited to

matters involving conduct or activity regulated by

the Commission under statutes administered by the

Commission. The procedures of this section shall be

invoked solely for the purpose of obtaining

declaratory rulings which allow persons to act

without peril upon their own view. Controversies

involving an allegation of violation by another

person of statutes administered by the Commission,

for which coercive rulings such as payment of

reparation or cease and desist orders are sought, are

not proper subjects of petitions under this section.

Such matters must be adjudicated either by filing

of a complaint under section 22 of the Shipping

Act, 1916 or section 11 of the Shipping Act of 1984

and § 502.62, or by filing a petition for investigation

under § 502.69.

3The guidelines, attached to the Petition at Tab

B, require each applicant for a stevedoring license

to submit, inter alia: its articles of incorporation; a

list of managerial employees, including supervisors,

superintendents and foremen; resumes of its

chairman, president, vice-president, chief financial

officer and local business representative; a list of all

equipment owned or leased to be used at SCSPA

facilities; financial statements or other documents

demonstrating credit-worthiness and resources, as

well as credit references; a list of business licenses;

a list of business locations and offices, describing

the business done at each location; a list of actual

or potential customers to be served at the port; and

insurance certificates an copies of safety, training

and substance abuse programs.

4The IMTOC letter is attached to the Petition at

Tab C. The Managing Director’s response appears at

Tab D to the Petition.

5See Tabs E and F to the Petition.

Rule 68.2 The Petition is supported by

the Declaration of W. Don Welch,

Executive Director of SCSPA.

SCSPA describes itself as an operating

port which provides public terminal

facilities and performs terminal

services, including stuffing and

stripping containers for some shippers,

at its facilities. SCSPA states that it ‘‘has

in its tariff a provision which gives it

broad authority ‘to control all services

performed in connection with cargo

moving through or over its facilities’

and has used that authority to decide

which entities may perform stevedore

and related functions at Ports Authority

facilities.’’ Pet. at 5.

With respect to marine terminal

services, SCSPA claims the authority to

determine whether it will permit such

services to be performed by others at its

facilities and to establish both the terms

under which it will allow such

operations and the identity of firms

which will be authorized to operate.

SCSPA advises that it performs marine

terminal services at its public facilities

with about 250 employees. SCSPA

states that it ‘‘makes a profit on this

operation, and does not desire to have

third parties use its facilities to compete

with it.’’ Pet. at 10. Therefore, it ‘‘has a

rule that it will not permit any third

party to hold itself out to the public to

perform marine terminal container

operations on Ports Authority

facilities.’’ Id. at 11.

SCSPA informs that the major carriers

calling at Charleston have ‘‘licensed’’

facilities at which marine terminal

services are performed by third parties

under contract with the carriers and that

SCSPA’s public marine terminal

services are utilized by the smaller lines

calling at the port and approximately 25

shippers.

SCSPA indicates that stevedoring

operations at the port have changed

drastically over the past twenty years as

a result of the effects of

containerization, including the

International Longshoremen’s

Association 50-mile Rules on

Containers. Instead of just three locallyowned and operated stevedoring firms

serving numerous carriers at the port,

there are now said to be nine stevedore

companies, most operating as units of

large national companies, serving only a

handful of carriers. These national

concerns, says SCSPA, have little or no

interest in advancing the economic well

being of the port or attracting cargo to

Charleston which they might handle at

another port at which they operate.

SCSPA advises that it already requires

stevedores seeking to operate at the port

to ‘‘register,’’ but now wishes to

implement procedures involving

economic and financial standards for

the licensing of stevedores. These

standards would include an assessment

of the applicant’s financial resources,

safety record, conformity with

environmental requirements, and safety

and substance abuse programs.3

Applicants would also be required to

demonstrate ability to ‘‘promote and

foster commerce through the ports of

South Carolina.’’ SCSPA reports that

twenty of twenty-five deepwater ports it

surveyed in the South Atlantic and Gulf

Coast require that stevedores obtain a

license to operate from the public port

agency.

SCSPA believes its actions are lawful

but wishes to remove doubt, created by

stevedore interests, so that it will not be

in peril for implementing new licensing

procedures. The ‘‘doubt’’ to which

SCSPA refers arises from a January,

1993, informal request by ‘‘a national

group of stevedore companies, the

Independent Marine Terminal Operators

Council (‘‘IMTOC’’),’’ that the FMC

investigate the practices of SCSPA and

the port authorities of Georgia, North

Carolina and Virginia to determine

whether these ports violated the

Shipping Act of 1984 (‘‘1984 Act’’), 46

U.S.C. app. § 1701, et seq., by refusing

to permit operations by third parties at

their facilities. The FMC’s Managing

Director declined to recommend the

initiation of such an investigation,

stating that the matter would more

appropriately be the subject of a

complaint.4 SCSPA indicates that the

South Carolina Stevedores Association,

as association of local stevedores, has

since continued to seek clarification and

modification of SCSPA’s policy

regarding reservation of public marine

terminal services work at SCSPA

facilities to itself.5

SCSPA maintains that the

Commission has jurisdiction to

determine the lawfulness of economic

regulation of stevedores by public port

agencies, citing Baton Rouge Marine

Contractors v. FMC, 655 F.2d 1210 (D.C.

Cir. 1981); Cargill, Inc. v. FMC, 530 F.2d

1062 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.

868 (1976) (‘‘Cargill’’); and Greater

Baton Rouge Port Commission v. United

States, 287 F.2d 138 (5th Cir.), cert.

denied, 368 U.S. 985 (1961). The

guidelines SCSPA wishes to issue

should be considered a reasonable

exercise of its business judgment, to

which the FMC should defer, says

SCSPA. The Commission is said to have

approved similar business-based

actions, or at least deferred to the local

authority to make such determinations,

in Petchem, Inc. v. Canaveral Port

Authority, lll F.M.C. lll, 23

S.R.R. 974 (1986), aff’d sub nom.

Petchem, Inc. v. FMC, 853 F.2d 958

(D.C. Cir. 1988) (‘‘Petchem’’); and

Seacon Terminals, Inc. v. Port of

Seattle, lll F.M.C. lll, 26 S.R.R

886 (1993) (‘‘Seacon’’).

Similarly, SCSPA argues that its selfpreference with respect to the

performance of public marine terminal

services at its facilities is not violative

of the Shipping Acts’ proscriptions

against discrimination, in section 16 of

the Shipping Act, 1916 (‘‘1916 Act’’), 46

U.S.C. app § 815 and sections 10(b) (11)

and (12) of the 1984, Act, 46 U.S.C. app.

§ 1709(b) (11) and (12), because there is

no triangular relationship involved in

self-preference. In support of this

proposition, SCSPA refers the

Commission to Puerto Rico Ports

Authority v. FMC, 642 F.2d 471 (D.C.

Cir. 1980), as well as the decision of the

Commission’s predecessor in Anglo

Canadian Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Mitsui

Steamship Co., Ltd., 4 F.M.B. 535

(1955).

Replies to the Petition

A. Replies in Support

Replies in support of the Petition

were filed by four Ports and one

association. The American Association
22392 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 87 / Friday, May 5, 1995 / Notices

6 Galveston’s comments are supported by the

Declaration of Ernest Connor, General Manager of

Galveston Wharves.

7 It reports that, because the number of companies

exceeds demand, Galveston quit granting new

licenses and, as a result, has been challenged in

court and at the Commission on its right to

withhold a license. Although these cases were

ultimately dismissed at both the District Court and

the FMC, it cost the port a great deal for attorney’s

fees to defend the suits.

of Port Authorities (‘‘AAPA’’) reports

that public investment in port facilities,

including those of operating ports as

well as landlord ports, is enormous

($12.5 billion over 46 years) and must

be protected by the public entities

(ports) created for that purpose. AAPA

states that:

The goals that [SCSPA] seeks to achieve are

laudatory, particularly in light of its status as

a public agency and the duty that it shares

with other port agencies to protect its

investment of public funds.

* * * * *

It is the position of AAPA that public port

authorities, because of their nature as

governmental enterprises be given the widest

discretion possible in controlling and

regulating and marine terminal facilities

under their jurisdiction.

AAPA Reply at 2–3. AAPA declares that

public port authorities * * *.

* * * charged with statutory

responsibilities relating to the planning,

development, financing and operation of

marine terminal facilities * * * financed

through the sale of bonds which pledge as

security the revenues of the public agencies

which offer them, * * * are motivated not

simply by a profit motive but by a mandate

from the people to stimulate economic

growth and to protect the public’s

investment.

Id. at 3–4. AAPA maintains that port

authorities are entitled to impose

reasonable conditions on those who

seek to do business within the port; to

find otherwise would be to grant them

less freedom to choose their business

partners than is enjoyed by all other

enterprises.

The Tampa Port Authority (‘‘Tampa’’),

an operating port, supports SCSPA’s

right to reserve to itself the right to

perform public MTO functions at its

facilities and to apply economic criteria

in granting permits or licenses for

stevedores and MTOs to operate at its

facilities. Tampa declares that the port

provides major employment (in Tampa’s

case, 68,000 jobs), tax revenues, income

and economic impact on its region.

Tampa reports that it licenses

stevedores and MTOs under its tariff.

Presently, Tampa advises that it is

defending a suit in state court

challenging its right to reserve general

cargo terminal operations for itself and

is seeking to have the suit referred to the

FMC under its primary jurisdiction.

Tampa’s arguments in favor of the port’s

right to regulate operations at or in

connection with its facilities, and to

reserve operations to itself, are said to

be supported by the same cases cited by

SCSPA.

The reply in support by the Virginia

Port Authority refers to the

responsibilities of public port

authorities to enhance the long-term

economic growth of their respective

ports and to protect their public

investors.

The Board of Trustees of the

Galveston Wharves (‘‘Galveston’’) also

supports SCSPA’s proposal to license

stevedores and the economic standard

to be applied by SCSPA.6 Galveston

indicates that it presently licenses

stevedores for operation at its facilities,

but does not apply the specific

economic criteria proposed by SCSPA.7

Galveston states that it would amend its

tariff to adopt the same proposal if

SCSPA is successful. Galveston

suggests, based on its own experience,

tha it is necessary for the Commission

to make clear in any ruling that port

authorities may deny stevedore licenses

if sufficient economic demand does not

exist to support such services.

Specifically, Galveston asserts that ports

should be able to base stevedore

licensing decisions on such criteria as:

existing demand for stevedore services;

an applicant’s support by a vessel

carrier; proof that an applicant will

bring new business to a port; and proof

that grant of an additional license will

not result in duplicative services or

destructive competition which will

impair the quality of port services. In

support of its arguments for the

authority claimed by itself and SCSPA

to regulate stevedores, Galveston cites

the Petchem, Seacon, and Cargill cases

relied on by SCSPA.

Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal

District (‘‘Lake Charles’’), a political

subdivision of the state of Louisiana,

describes itself as a general and bulk

cargo port, serving more than 800 ships

and barges in 1992 and 1993. Much of

the cargo is said to be P.L. 480

agricultural aid for the Department of

Agriculture, which uses a sophisticated,

computer analysis to determine the

lowest landed cost to select the exit port

for shipments. By keeping its charges to

cargo low, Lake Charles states it has

attracted this cargo and moved 1.1

million tons over facilities meant to

handle annual volume of 600,000 tons.

It allegedly has done so in part by

having an exclusive contract with a

single firm to load and unload cargo and

to move and spot railcars on a

continuous basis. Lake Charles advises

that it requires stevedores to get a

permit to work and states that it is

considering tariff amendments to tie the

grant of a permit to the economic

interests of the port. Lake Charles

suggests that the Commission give its

blessing to these business-based

decisions by granting the Petition.

B. Replies in Opposition

Carolina Marine Handling (‘‘CMH’’)

suggests that the Commission deny or

return the Petition unanswered. CMH

says the matter is one for the SCSPA

Board of Directors. CMH alleges that

SCSPA is trying to monopolize local

stevedoring functions of stuffing and

stripping containers and flatracks, and

fears that SCSPA may even attempt to

reserve to itself deep-sea stevedoring if

its revenues continue to decline. More

specifically, CMH alleges that the

proposed guidelines for licensing

stevedores are ‘‘overly broad, subjective

and subject to abuse by the Executive

Director.’’ CMH Reply at 1. CMH objects

particularly to the guidelines’

requirements that applicants provide

resumes, financial statements, customer

lists and customers targets, as part of the

licensing process.

In the most comprehensive reply filed

by any party, Ceres Corporation argues

that the Petition is inappropriate for

declaratory order disposition. Ceres

states that it provides stevedore and

marine terminal services at Charleston

through an affiliate, Ceres Marine

Terminals, Inc., which will be directly

affected by the proposed tariff rules. Its

Reply is supported by two affidavits:

That of Lester Francis, former General

Manager of Ceres Marine Terminal,

Inc.’s stevedoring facility at Charleston,

which describes operations at

Charleston by Ceres and other

stevedores; and that of James R.

Bramson, an attorney, who reports that

he examined 23 Atlantic and Gulf coast

port tariffs and found no similar

licensing provisions. Bramson reports

that his survey of port tariffs uncovered

a few license provisions but none

requiring production of new business or

a pledge of new business to permit

operations.

According to Ceres, all container

terminal facilities at the port of

Charleston are owned by SCSPA; a few

carriers with large volumes of traffic

lease some of the container terminal

facilities at which private stevedore

companies, including Ceres, perform

marine terminal services for the

containerized cargo. Receipt and

delivery of containerized cargo at the

public terminal is allegedly reserved by

SCSPA. In addition, all CFS cargo (cargo

stuffed or stripped at the port) is said to
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 87 / Friday, May 5, 1995 / Notices 22393

be handled at the public facilities

owned and operated by SCSPA; receipt

and delivery of all such cargo is

allegedly reserved by SCSPA for its own

performance. Most of the cargo

controlled by carriers (including but not

limited to those with leased container

facilities) is stuffed and stripped by

private stevedores, reports Ceres;

shipper-controlled cargo is stuffed and

stripped by SCSPA.

Ceres argues that the tariff is

unreasonable because it would extend

the port’s monopoly of cargo receiving

and delivering and stripping and

stuffing of containers from shippercontrolled cargo to all cargo except that

of the few large carriers with leased

facilities. Under the proposed

guidelines, SCSPA would continue to

reserve to itself the receiving and

delivery of all CFS and containerized

cargo at the public terminal; in addition,

Ceres points out, SCSPA would reserve

for itself the stripping and stuffing of

CFS cargo under the control of carriers

other than the few who lease terminal

facilities, as well as the already-reserved

shipper-controlled CFS cargo. Ceres

points out that the Commission is asked

to rule on the lawfulness of these

practices without benefit of economic or

financial analysis which shows the

necessity for the practice, the effect on

stevedores, or the amount of cargo

served by the SCSPA or the stevedores

to be affected by the rule.

With respect to the specific elements

of the licensing guidelines, Ceres states

that the past SCSPA practice of

requiring annual ‘‘registration’’ of

stevedores operating at the port

involved only a one-page form

identifying responsible persons and

credit references, with proof of

insurance coverage, which Ceres

compares to the much more extensive

and intrusive requirements of the

proposed licensing guidelines. In

addition to the information

requirements noted at footnote 3, above,

Ceres points out that the Executive

Director is authorized to request

additional information ‘‘as he sees fit’’

and is directed to consider, in addition

to the financial and other factors

specified and such other factors as he

deems relevant, the ability of the

applicant to ‘‘promote and foster

commerce through the Ports of South

Carolina.’’

Ceres takes issue with the lack of

factual material offered in support of the

Petition. Ceres notes for example that

SCSPA has neither alleged nor shown

that any stevedore at the Port of

Charleston has ever diverted to another

port traffic that would otherwise have

moved through Charleston, although the

likelihood of such behavior is offered as

justification for requiring that

stevedores demonstrate the ability to

promote and foster commerce through

South Carolina ports. Similarly lacking

are said to be alleged instances of

destructive competition among

stevedoring companies, which, to the

contrary, notes Ceres, have objected

only to SCSPA’s solicitation of their

private customers in the past. Ceres

points out that, according to SCSPA’s

Petition, a port formerly served by just

three local stevedores now supports the

operations of nine stevedoring

companies and states that no stevedore

has left the Port of Charleston in at least

the past three years. Ceres Reply at 12.

Ceres notes that the Petition refers to

various objections raised in the past by

IMTOC, Stevedoring Services of

America and CMH to its practice of

reserving public marine terminal

services to itself, and offers those

objections as a basis for its need to

secure a declaratory order to terminate

a controversy and enable it to act on its

proposed tariff guidelines without peril.

Ceres argues that the objections raised

related to the reservation of terminal

services only, not the later-drafted

proposal to license stevedores. Ceres

also represents that the stevedores

sought to resolve their differences with

SCSPA concerning the division of

operating rights between the private and

public entities at the Port prior to

SCSPA’s promulgation of the guidelines

and its request for advance approval by

the Commission through the Petition.

Ceres protests that SCSPA is here

seeking FMC approval in advance of its

actions on the basis of a very sketchy

factual presentation.

Ceres alleges that SCSPA is seeking

Commission approval for exclusive

arrangements rarely found reasonable,

and then only on fact-intensive records

showing extraordinary circumstances

not present at Charleston. This case,

moreover, is said to involve a major

container port, unlike the exclusive

franchising cases involving individual

terminals or small or start-up ports,

such as Petchem, relied on by SCSPA.

Consideration of the Petition would

require significant factual investigation

and hearings on material issues of fact,

including economic justification for the

proposal and the impact on stevedores

presently operating at the port, says

Ceres. The Petition is therefore said to

be unsuitable for disposition on

declaratory order.

The licensing standards, Ceres

charges, are vague and subjective and

therefore unreasonable. With respect to

the reservation of MTO services, Ceres

argues that, even if the

antidiscrimination provisions of section

16 of the 1916 Act and sections 10(b)

(11) and (12) of the 1984 Act do not

apply to the proposal in the absence of

a triangular relationship, as urged by

SCSPA, the reasonableness standard of

section 17 of the 1916 Act, 46 U.S.C.

app. section 816, and section 10(d) of

the 1984 Act, 46 U.S.C. app. section

1709(d), does apply, and that the

practice is unreasonable under that

standard. And, says Ceres, the unlawful

preference sections probably do apply

where, as here, the port authority wears

two hats: MTO and stevedore, and acts

in one capacity to favor the other.

The Carriers Container Council, Inc.

(‘‘CCCI’’), claiming to represent carriers

of 90 per cent of the containerized cargo

moved through the Port of Charleston,

states that, while SCSPA has a

monopoly of MTO functions at

Charleston, carriers now have a choice

of nine stevedores to service their

vessels. CCCI alleges that the proposed

tariff guidelines would deprive the

carriers of this choice. In addition, CCCI

objects that the licensing standards are

vague, subjective, and

unconstitutionally delegate to the FMC

a state function: review of the actions of

the state port authority acting under

state law. The stated standards are said

to show bias in favor of local

companies, which was found to violate

the Shipping Act in Plaquemines Port,

Harbor and Terminal District v. FMC,

838 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1988). CCCI

argues that an evidentiary hearing is

necessary to test the proffered economic

justification for the licensing scheme,

and that a triangular relationship is not

necessary to find a violation of section

16 where the port authority wears two

hats, as here, citing Puerto Rico Ports

Authority v. FMC, 642 F.2d at 489.

Stevedoring Services of America

(‘‘SSA’’) opposes the Petition and

asserts that it seeks an inappropriate use

of Rule 68: both an advance ruling that

its implementation of its guidelines will

not violate the Shipping Acts of 1916

and 1984 (quoting the Petition as

seeking ‘‘a Commission declaration that

its prospective stevedore license

judgments will be lawful.’’ SSA Reply at

4, quoting Petition at 6) and a ruling as

to past conduct which has already been

alleged, by IMTOC, to be violative of the

Acts. The latter request is said to be akin

to an attempt to use the declaratory

order procedure to defend against past

or future complaint proceedings, ruled

improper in Petition of Yangming

Marine Transport Corp. for Declaratory

Order, lll F.M.C. lll, 24 S.R.R.

1057, 1058 n.3 (1988), says SSA.

SSA also objects to the stevedoring

guidelines requirement that applicants
22394 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 87 / Friday, May 5, 1995 / Notices

8Rule 68(e) provides that ‘‘No additional

submissions will be permitted unless ordered or

requested by the Commission.’’

provide a customer list. SSA argues that

the guidelines are objectionable because

they would deprive stevedores of the

right to operate, are vague and

subjective, would impermissibly permit

monopoly practices by SCSPA, and

would deprive carriers of their right to

a stevedore of their choice. With respect

to the guidelines’ requirement that

stevedore license applicants

demonstrate ability to promote and

foster commerce through South Carolina

ports, SSA points out that no similar

requirement is placed on carriers who

call the port, and that the carrier, rather

than the stevedore, controls the choice

of port to be served by a vessel. Finally,

SSA alleges that the guidelines

impermissibly seek to deprive

stevedores of the right to redress in state

and federal courts, through a provision

that exclusive appeal of a license denial

by the Executive Director and the Board

of the Ports Authority is to the Federal

Maritime Commission. This, says SSA,

would deprive the applicant of rights to

challenge the action under laws other

than the Shipping Acts. SSA urges that

the Petition be denied or investigated by

the FMC through a fact-finding

proceeding initiated by show cause.

Maritrend, Inc., a stevedoring

company operating in two ports in the

Gulf region, declares that the guidelines

are too vague and subjective: licensing

should be based solely on objective

criteria such as insurance, bonding, etc.,

not whether the stevedore operates at

competing ports, uses non-union labor

or competes with existing licensees. The

guidelines are said to reflect ‘‘loyalty’’

requirements and local favoritism which

are inappropriate considerations

according to Maritrend. Also allegedly

inappropriate is the guidelines’

requirement that applicants show that

they will bring ‘‘new business’’ to the

port, because carriers, not stevedores,

control the cargo and selection of port

calls.

IMTOC, among whose members are

MTOs who perform stevedoring at

SCSPA, claims that, with respect to the

reservation to SCSPA of the right to

perform all MTO operations at its

facilities, the Petition is the mirror

image of the IMTOC request for

investigation refused by the FMC last

year. IMTOC agrees with the FMC

Managing Director’s determination in

his letter to IMTOC that the matter can

be concluded only after a proceeding

permitting receipt of evidence and legal

arguments from all affected parties.

IMTOC submits that a full investigatory

proceeding is necessary; therefore, a

declaratory order is not appropriate.

Regarding the possible violation of

section 16 of the 1916 Act by SCSPA’s

reservation of MTO functions at its

facilities, IMTOC maintains that because

some third party MTOs are permitted to

operate the SCSPA facilities of licensed

carriers, as SCSPA admits, the triangular

relationship necessary to find a

violation of section 16 does exist.

Moreover, IMTOC claims, no

justification under Petchem exists for

the exclusionary nature of SCSPA’s

practices: its only stated reason is

unwillingness to forgo profits from its

MTO operations, which is not a proper

public purpose.

The South Carolina Stevedoring

Association (‘‘SCSA’’), an association of

privately owned stevedoring companies,

some of which are also MTOs, who do

business at South Carolina Ports, notes

that the Petition asks the Commission to

rule on the legality of two separate

matters: the proposal to license

stevedores eligible to work at SCSPA

facilities, and SCSPA’s past and present

practices of excluding certain thirdparty terminal operations on its

facilities. Neither the licensing issue nor

the MTO exclusion issue can be

determined on this Petition, claims

SCSA. The MTO exclusion issue

allegedly involves past and present

conduct as to which the Petition does

not begin to meet its burden of proof

that there are no violations of the

Shipping Acts.

And despite SCSPA’s characterization

of it, SCSA claims that the licensing

issue does not concern the general

authority of SCSPA to set reasonable

terms and conditions for use of its

facilities, but the reasonableness of the

terms proposed. Those terms are said to

include too many vague and unspecified

powers of the Executive Director to

establish requirements for applicants,

revoke or suspend licenses, and

condition licenses which are

unreasonable on their face. SCSA

submits therefore that the matter is

unsuitable for determination on a

petition for a declaratory order.

The licensing provisions are also

argued to be objectionable because they

require a ‘‘loyalty oath’’ of stevedores by

requiring promotion of the interests of

the port, in addition to the

inappropriate statements about lack of

local ownership. This requirement that

local interests be promoted and favored

does not, in SCSA’s opinion, appear to

be required of carriers that call at the

port, or the MTOs who work for

licensed carriers at the port; there is,

moreover, no indication of their loyalty

or lack of loyalty to the port. SCSA

charges that these attempts to favor local

interests, or to recreate the days of local

stevedoring firms, are an

unconstitutional burden on interstate

commerce. SCSA concludes that the

FMC should deny the Petition and order

a full-scale evidentiary hearing on an

order to show cause.

SCSPA Motion for Leave To File a

Response and Replies

SCSPA requests an opportunity,

normally prohibited by the terms of

Rule 68,8 to address ‘‘1) certain

erroneous assumptions, and 2)

misapprehensions of fact, made by

parties responding to the petition

* * *.’’ SCSPA Motion at 1. SCSPA

states that grant of its Motion will

narrow some of the issues raised by

opponents of the Petition and eliminate

other issues.

SCSPA believes that opposition to the

Petition stems in part from a

misunderstanding of the purposes and

goals of SCSPA’s proposed regulation of

stevedores and MTOs. Referring

specifically to the concern of CCCI that

the guidelines will deprive carriers of

their choice of stevedores, SCSPA offers

to add appropriate language to the

guidelines to remove that issue if it is

permitted to file a response; also to be

addressed would be the ‘‘loyalty oath

issue,’’ as raised by SCSA.

Stating that some opponents have

misunderstood ‘‘some of the facts

underlying the * * * Petition,’’ relying

on ‘‘facts which are demonstrably

incorrect,’’ SCSPA seeks the

opportunity to ‘‘sort out the incorrect

fact assertions and * * * correct them’’

in a response. Motion at 4. Nevertheless,

SCSPA does not ‘‘mean that there may

not be some facts as to which there is

a dispute * * *.’’ Id.

SCSPA notes that the Commission

permitted a response to replies in

another declaratory order proceeding,

Matson Navigation Co., Inc.—

Transportation of Cargoes Between

Ports and Points Outside Hawaii and

Islands Within the State of Hawaii,

lll FMC lll, 25 S.R.R. 245

(1989), so that it could ‘‘render a

definitive verdict’’ on the issue. SCSPA

Motion at 5, quoting Matson, 25 S.R.R.

at 245. Similar to the procedure used in

that case, SCSPA suggests that it be

permitted to file a response limited to

20 pages and that interested parties be

permitted to make surrebuttal filings

within 15 days.

Six parties filed Replies to the

Motion. Maritrend claims that the

Motion demonstrates the

inappropriateness of proceeding by

declaratory order in this matter. SSA

reiterates its position that allegations of
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 87 / Friday, May 5, 1995 / Notices 22395

9SSA raises an issue regarding the guidelines

provision which allegedly would deprive

stevedores of right to redress in state and federal

courts by making license denials appealable only to

the FMC. The question of whether this provision is

an ‘‘unreasonable practice’’ under the 1916 and

1984 Acts is one for the Commission’s

determination in the first instance.

violation of the Shipping Acts are

outside the scope of Rule 68 and

maintains that declaratory orders are not

suited to dispose of contested factual

issues, citing Petition for Declaratory

Order of Seatrain International, S.A., 21

F.M.C. 187 (1978). IMTOC suggests that

the Motion ‘‘be denied or held in

abeyance until the Commission decides

what to do with the original Petition

* * *.’’ IMTOC Reply at 1. Ceres does

not object to SCSPA’s request ‘‘so long

as any response is strictly limited to a

factual presentation that is directly

responsive to specific factual assertions

or assumptions made by others.’’ Ceres

Reply at 1 (emphases in original).

Ceres states that it does not believe

that any factual supplementation of the

record by SCSPA can cure the flaws in

its Petition. For example, says Ceres,

SCSPA wants to respond to questions

Ceres raised about SCSPA’s survey of

licensing practices at other ports, but

the real problem is not whether 20 or

even all other South Atlantic and Gulf

ports license stevedores, but the

particular requirements and practices

proposed by SCSPA. Ceres takes the

position that SCSPA has not requested,

nor should it be permitted, to respond

to the legal arguments offered by those

opposed to the Petition.

CCCI reads the Motion as indicating

that ‘‘the SCSPA confesses that it made

an error in not telling the carriers that

they have a right to appoint their own

stevedore to work anywhere on the

terminals.’’ CCCI Reply at 1. CCCI

suggests that SCSPA end the dispute

and misunderstanding by withdrawing

its Petition. Otherwise, CCCI opposes

the Motion.

SCSA argues that because Rule 68

requires that a petition be accompanied

by petitioner’s complete legal and

factual presentation, and does not

provide for submission of additional

evidence or argument by a petitioner,

the Motion is in reality an amended

petition. SCSA notes that the Motion

addresses only factual questions related

to the proposed stevedore licensing

scheme, rather than past and present

SCSPA practices concerning the

exclusion of certain marine terminal

operators. SCSA submits that the

Motion should be denied, but that, if it

is granted, at least 30 days be permitted

for the filing of responses to SCSPA’s

submission.

Discussion

The replies to the Petition reflect a

division of views between stevedores

and non-port MTOs, who oppose the

proposals, and public ports, who

support the proposals. The level of

interest and concern generated by the

proposals is arguably an indication that

application of the Commission’s

resources to resolution of the

controversy is appropriate.

However, as many of the opponents

point out, SCSPA’s petition has two

purposes: To secure the Commission’s

imprimatur of lawfulness of its present

and continuing practice of reserving

certain terminal functions at its public

facilities for itself and to prospectively

assure the lawfulness of its proposal to

license stevedores under the criteria in

its guidelines. These two areas of

concern covered by the Petition differ to

some extent as to their impact and

eligibility for disposition on a petition

for a declaratory order.

A distinction may be made between

issues which appear to be appropriate

for disposition under Rule 68 and those

which are not. Thus, we would agree

with those parties who regard the issue

of SCSPA’s reservation of terminal

functions for itself as inappropriate for

disposition on declaratory order because

it involves past and present conduct

which may entail violations of the

Shipping Acts.

We are reluctant to undertake a

proceeding on a declaratory order

which, even implicitly, involves ruling

on the lawfulness of Petitioner’s past

activities. The new policies governing

reservation of functions are

incorporated in the draft tariff rule

attached at Tab B to SCSPA’s Petition,

while the policies applied in the past

are reflected in the existing tariff rule

attached to the Petition at Tab A. While

the policies regarding reservation of

certain MTO functions for future

application are not co-extensive in

coverage with the policies SCSPA has

applied to its marine terminal

operations for some time, they are,

nevertheless, intertwined: they differ in

scope, not kind. Ruling on the legal

issue raised—the reservation of

functions and exclusion of competing

MTO’s by the public owner of the

facility—with respect to the future

would necessarily determine the same

issues raised with respect to SCSPA’s

past conduct. These practices, reflected

in SCSPA’s present tariff, were the

subject of IMTOC’s 1993 informal

request for an FMC-initiated

investigation of the practices of SCSPA

and three other public ports, rejected by

the Commission’s Managing Director.

We therefore find these issues

procedurally inappropriate for

determination under Rule 68. The

declaratory order proceeding initiated

herein will not address the merits of

SCSPA’s reservation of terminal

functions for itself. SCSPA’s reservation

practices are neither found lawful nor

prohibited by anything herein.

The proposed tariff rule for the

licensing of stevedores, on the other

hand, raises issues which are uniquely

within the expertise of the Commission,

do not involve possible past or present

violations of the Shipping Acts, and,

insofar as they arise under the Shipping

Acts, are not issues which are or may be

raised in another forum.9 In United

States Lines, S.A.—Petition for

Declaratory Order Re: The Brazil

Agreements, order entertaining petition

and referring matter to administrative

law judge, lll F.M.C. lll, 24

S.R.R. 1034, 1040 (1988) (‘‘Brazil

Agreements’’), the Commission

discussed the factors to be assessed in

determining whether to entertain a

petition which is within the

Commission’s substantive jurisdiction.

Analyzing cases in which declaratory

orders had been granted or denied on

the merits, the Commission explained

that * * *

* * * the following weigh heavily in favor

of issuance of such orders (and their absence

against it): (1) Presentation of clear-cut legal

issues and non-disputed facts; (2) ability of

the Commission to resolve all issues in a

proceeding so as to terminate the

controversy; (3) presence of issues of fact or

law which require the Commission’s expert

knowledge or judgment; (4) non-pendency of

other proceedings or absence of need to

resort to other tribunals to resolve matters in

dispute; (5) claim which is purely declaratory

in nature as opposed to an action for

reparation for violation of statutes or

regulations.

In Brazil Agreements, the Commission

concluded that the issues presented,

which involved interpretation of a

Commission-approved agreement, were

clear-cut and appropriate for

determination by the agency. Although

some factual issues were also in dispute,

the Commission determined that

disposition of those issues through an

evidentiary hearing would not be

inconsistent with issuance of an

otherwise appropriate declaratory order.

24 S.R.R. at 1040. It is, similarly, clear

from the replies to the Petition, as well

as from SCSPA’s Motion and the replies

thereto, that there are material issues of

fact in this case which cannot be

disposed of on the basis of the existing

record.

Some of the parties in this proceeding

make the point that these disputed
22396 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 87 / Friday, May 5, 1995 / Notices

factual issues, involving the economic

and other justification for the proposed

licensing guidelines, as well as the need

for the specific information being

requested, render the Petition

inappropriate. This does not appear to

be an insurmountable problem;

questions of disputed fact may be

referred to an administrative law judge

(‘‘ALJ’’) for an evidentiary hearing.

Brazil Agreements; see also In the

Matter of Rates Applicable to Ocean

Shipments via American President

Lines, lll F.M.C. lll, 21 S.R.R.

1168, 1169 (1982). Furthermore, the

participation in this case of other public

ports with an interest in similar actions,

as well as national stevedoring

companies with operations at several

ports, make this a particularly

appropriate proceeding in which to

determine these issues.

Some parties opposing the Petition

allege that it is an inappropriate effort

by SCSPA to secure FMC approval in

advance for specific decisions SCSPA

will make in granting or denying

licenses. Ceres, in particular, notes that

SCSPA specifically ‘‘seeks a

Commission declaration that its

prospective stevedore license judgments

will be lawful.’’ Ceres Reply at 30,

quoting Petition at 6. We see no bar to

consideration of the lawfulness of the

guidelines themselves on the same basis

that the Commission is frequently called

upon to determine an allegation that a

tariff provision is unlawful not in its

execution but in its terms. We see

nothing in SCSPA’s Petition or the

guidelines themselves that would

prevent the filing of a complaint

alleging unfair prejudice or

disadvantage in an individual case

based on denial of a license.

Section 5(d) of the Administrative

Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 554(e),

authorizes each agency to issue

declaratory orders ‘‘ * * * in its sound

discretion * * *.’’ Similarly, FMC Rule

68 provides, inter alia, that ‘‘[t]he

Commission may, in its discretion, issue

a declaratory order to terminate a

controversy or to remove uncertainty’’

(emphasis added). In exercising its

discretion, the Commission is entitled to

assess the advantages and disadvantages

associated with declaratory relief.

Advantages include the opportunity to

efficiently terminate a controversy or

remove uncertainty, while

disadvantages include both the

administrative burden imposed by a

policy of issuing advisory opinions and

the familiar problems surrounding the

adjudication of abstract controversies.

Climax Molybdenum Co. v. Secretary of

Labor, 703 F.2d 447, 452 (10th Cir.

1983). See also Yale Broadcasting Co. v.

FCC, 478 F.2d 594, 602 (D.C. Cir.), cert.

denied, 414 U.S. 914 (1973).

In this case, the issues with respect to

the licensing guidelines do not appear

to be abstract or lacking in sufficient

factual context for determination upon a

more complete record. We also note, as

several parties have pointed out, that

the burden of proof in commission

proceedings falls on the proponent of a

rule or order, 46 CFR 502.155, in this

case SCSPA. See, e.g., Ceres Reply at 15.

Therefore, we find that portion of the

Petition which relates to the guidelines

for licensing stevedores appropriate for

declaratory relief and refer the matter to

an administrative law judge for

determination of critical facts and

issuance of an initial decision. This

approach will enable the Commission to

fully resolve the questions raised in the

Petition which are appropriate for

declaratory relief, without addressing

questions of past practices of SCSPA

which the parties were free to raise by

way of a complaint at any time.

All filings made to date with respect

to the Petition will be incorporated into

the record herein, for such purpose and

weight as may be appropriate. In

addition, we specify in our referral

particular issues of fact and law to be

resolved. SCSPA’s Motion to

Supplement the Record is denied as

moot, because it will have an

opportunity to supplement the record in

the proceedings before the ALJ.

Therefore, it is ordered, That SCSPA’s

Petition for a Declaratory Order is

granted to the extent that proposed tariff

Rule 34–051 relates to the licensing of

stevedores and it is referred to the Chief

Administrative Law Judge, for

assignment and issuance of an initial

decision;

It is further ordered, That the

administrative law judge to whom this

proceeding is assigned shall exercise his

discretion to insure that the issues are

resolved in the most expeditious means

consistent with due process and a

sufficient record upon which to render

a decision;

It is further ordered, That in reaching

the ultimate issue of the lawfulness of

the proposed tariff Rule No. 34–051 in

this proceeding, attention shall be

devoted to resolution of the following

issues:

1. Whether SCSPA, a public marine

terminal operator, engages in an

unreasonable practice or acts in an

unfairly prejudicial manner when it

allows some stevedoring companies

access to its facilities and denies such

access to other companies on the basis

of the public marine terminal operator’s

assessment of demand for services by

carriers and shippers using its

terminals, or similar economic criteria

not related to an individual applicant

for a license.

2. Whether any of the specific

provisions of the proposed tariff Rule

No. 34–051 are unduly prejudicial or are

likely to unfairly discriminate against

individual applicants for stevedoring

licenses.

3. Whether the powers granted the

Executive Director to require additional

information or to place conditions on

licenses granted constitute an

unreasonable practice under the

Shipping Acts.

4. Whether the provision of draft tariff

Rule No. 34–051 restricting appeals of

license denials or other actions to the

Federal Maritime Commission

constitutes an unreasonable practice or

is otherwise unlawful under the

Shipping Acts.

It is further ordered, That SCSPA’s

Petition for a Declaratory Order is

denied in all other respects;

It is further ordered, That SCSPA’s

Motion For Leave to Supplement the

Record is denied;

It is further ordered, That pursuant to

Rule 61 of the Commission’s Rules of

Practice and Procedure, 46 CFR 502.61,

the initial decision of the

Administrative Law Judge shall be

issued by May 1, 1996 and the final

decision of the Commission shall be

issued by September 2, 1996;

It is further ordered, That notice of

this Order be published in the Federal

Register, and a copy be served on

parties of record;

It is further ordered, That each person

who filed a reply to the Petition herein

is designated a party to this proceeding;

It is further ordered, That other

persons having an interest in

participating in this proceeding may file

petitions for leave to intervene in

accordance with Rule 72 of the

Commission’s Rule of Practice and

Procedure, 46 CFR 502.72;

It is further ordered, That all further

notices, orders, and decisions issued by

or on behalf of the Commission in this

proceeding, including notice of the time

and place of hearing or prehearing

conference, shall be served on parties of

record; and

It is further ordered, That all

documents submitted by any party of

record in this proceeding shall be

directed to the Secretary, Federal

Maritime Commission, Washington, DC

20573, in accordance with Rule 118 of

the Commission’s Rules of Practice and

Procedure, 46 CFR 502.118, and shall be

served on all parties of record.
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 87 / Friday, May 5, 1995 / Notices 22397

*Commissioner Scroggins did not participate in

this proceeding.

By the Commission.*

Joseph C. Polking,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 95–10993 Filed 5–4–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6730–01–M

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

Citizens Investment Company, Inc.;

Formation of, Acquisition by, or

Merger of Bank Holding Companies

The company listed in this notice has

applied for the Board’s approval under

section 3 of the Bank Holding Company

Act (12 U.S.C. 1842) and § 225.14 of the

Board’s Regulation Y (12 CFR 225.14) to

become a bank holding company or to

acquire a bank or bank holding

company. The factors that are

considered in acting on the applications

are set forth in section 3(c) of the Act

(12 U.S.C. 1842(c)).

The application is available for

immediate inspection at the Federal

Reserve Bank indicated. Once the

application has been accepted for

processing, it will also be available for

inspection at the offices of the Board of

Governors. Interested persons may

express their views in writing to the

Reserve Bank indicated for that

application or to the offices of the Board

of Governors. Any comment on an

application that requests a hearing must

include a statement of why a written

presentation would not suffice in lieu of

a hearing, identifying specifically any

questions of fact that are in dispute and

summarizing the evidence that would

be presented at a hearing.

Comments regarding this application

must be received not later than May 30,

1995.

A. Federal Reserve Bank of

Minneapolis (James M. Lyon, Vice

President) 250 Marquette Avenue,

Minneapolis, Minnesota 55480:

1. Citizens Investment Company, Inc.,

Glenville, Minnesota; to acquire 100

percent of the voting shares of Twin

Lakes State Bank, Twin Lakes,

Minnesota.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve

System, May 1, 1995.

Jennifer J. Johnson,

Deputy Secretary of the Board.

[FR Doc. 95–11140 Filed 5–4–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6210–01–F

Premier Financial Bancorp, Inc.; Notice

of Application to Engage de novo in

Permissible Nonbanking Activities

The company listed in this notice has

filed an application under § 225.23(a)(1)

of the Board’s Regulation Y (12 CFR

225.23(a)(1)) for the Board’s approval

under section 4(c)(8) of the Bank

Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C.

1843(c)(8)) and § 225.21(a) of Regulation

Y (12 CFR 225.21(a)) to commence or to

engage de novo, either directly or

through a subsidiary, in a nonbanking

activity that is listed in § 225.25 of

Regulation Y as closely related to

banking and permissible for bank

holding companies. Unless otherwise

noted, such activities will be conducted

throughout the United States.

The application is available for

immediate inspection at the Federal

Reserve Bank indicated. Once the

application has been accepted for

processing, it will also be available for

inspection at the offices of the Board of

Governors. Interested persons may

express their views in writing on the

question whether consummation of the

proposal can ‘‘reasonably be expected to

produce benefits to the public, such as

greater convenience, increased

competition, or gains in efficiency, that

outweigh possible adverse effects, such

as undue concentration of resources,

decreased or unfair competition,

conflicts of interests, or unsound

banking practices.’’ Any request for a

hearing on this question must be

accompanied by a statement of the

reasons a written presentation would

not suffice in lieu of a hearing,

identifying specifically any questions of

fact that are in dispute, summarizing the

evidence that would be presented at a

hearing, and indicating how the party

commenting would be aggrieved by

approval of the proposal.

Comments regarding the application

must be received at the Reserve Bank

indicated or the offices of the Board of

Governors not later than May 19, 1995.

A. Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

(John J. Wixted, Jr., Vice President) 1455

East Sixth Street, Cleveland, Ohio

44101:

1. Premier Financial Bancorp, Inc.,

Vanceburg, Kentucky; to engage denovo

through its subsidiary, Premier Data

Services, Inc., Vanceburg, Kentucky, in

providing data processing and data

transmission services, facilities

(including data processing and data

transmission hardware, software,

documentation, and operating

personnel) and data bases to its existing

and subsidiaries and other financial

institutions, pursuant to § 225.25(b)(7)

of the Board’s Regulation Y.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve

System, May 1, 1995.

Jennifer J. Johnson,

Deputy Secretary of the Board.

[FR Doc. 95–11141 Filed 5–4–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6210–01–F

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND

HUMAN SERVICES

Centers for Disease Control and

Prevention

[Announcement 534]

National Institute for Occupational

Safety and Health; Worker Exposure

Assessment and Hazard and Medical

Surveillance Programs; Notice of

Availability of Funds for Fiscal Year

1995

Introduction

The Centers for Disease Control and

Prevention (CDC), National Institute for

Occupational Safety and Health

(NIOSH) announces the availability of

fiscal year (FY) 1995 funds for a grant

program for worker hazard and medical

surveillance projects associated with

occupational exposures to radiation and

other hazardous agents at nuclear

facilities and other energy-related

industries. Studies conducted in the

nuclear power industry and deliberate

exposure of human subjects in radiation

experiments are outside the scope of

this announcement.

The Public Health Service (PHS) is

committed to achieving the health

promotion and disease prevention

objectives of ‘‘Healthy People 2000,’’ a

PHS-led national activity to reduce

morbidity and mortality and improve

the quality of life. This announcement

is related to the priority area of

Occupational Safety and Health. (For

ordering a copy of ‘‘Healthy People

2000,’’ see section ‘‘Where to Obtain

Additional Information.’’)

Authority

This program is authorized under the

Occupational Safety and Health Act of

1970, Section 20(a) and 22(e)(7), [29

U.S.C. 669(a) and 671(e)(7)]. The

applicable grant program regulations are

in 42 CFR Part 52.

Smoke-Free Workplace

PHS strongly encourages all grant

recipients to provide a smoke-free

workplace and to promote the non-use

of all tobacco products, and Public Law

103–227, the Pro-Children Act of 1994,

prohibits smoking in certain facilities

that receive Federal funds in which

education, library, day care, health care,