Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-166| June 23, 2020 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Samuel J. Beasley

Muncie, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 

Attorney General of Indiana

Josiah Swinney

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Charles F. Carmen,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

June 23, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-CR-166

Appeal from the Delaware Circuit

Court

The Honorable Mary G. Willis, 

Senior Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

18C01-1804-F6-236

Bradford, Chief Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-166| June 23, 2020 Page 2 of 6

Case Summary

[1] On October 4, 2019, Charles Carmen was convicted of Level 6 felony domestic 

battery resulting in moderate bodily injury and ultimately sentenced to one year 

suspended to probation. Carmen contends that the trial court erred by denying 

him the opportunity to cross-examine Elizabeth Riggs regarding her pending 

criminal charges. We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Early in the morning on April 15, 2018, Carmen punched Riggs, with whom he 

was romantically involved, in the nose, breaking it. On April 20, 2018, the State 

charged Carmen with Level 6 felony domestic battery resulting in moderate 

bodily injury. On September 26, 2019, a bench trial was held, at which the State 

called Riggs as a witness. During direct examination, the State asked Riggs if 

she was going to receive any benefit from testifying, stating

[STATE:] Do you still have cases pending here in Delaware 

County? 

[RIGGS:] Yeah. 

[STATE:] And as a result of your testimony here today in Court, 

have you been offered any leniency or breaks in any of the cases 

that you currently have pending in our county? 

[RIGGS:] No, none at all. 
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[STATE:] Has any mention been made of that? 

[RIGGS:] No. 

[STATE:] Is it your understanding that you’re getting any 

leniency for your testimony today. 

[RIGGS:] No, not at all. 

Tr. Vol. II pp. 63–64. During cross-examination, Carmen’s counsel did not 

question Riggs regarding her pending charges; however, after Riggs testified 

that she did not consider herself to be a violent person, Carmen’s counsel 

attempted to question her regarding her criminal history, prompting an 

objection from the State. Carmen’s counsel argued that 

once [Riggs] has said she doesn’t consider herself to be a violent 

person, I can inquire as to specific instances of bad conduct and 

ask her whether she thinks that that constitutes her being a 

violent person. (Inaudible) either change her opinion or stand by 

her opinion that she’s not violent in light of this evidence. She 

says her opinion is she’s not a violent person. I then get to inquire 

as to specific bad acts to find out if her opinion considers those 

bad acts. 

Tr. Vol. II p. 79. The trial court sustained the State’s objection, and Carmen’s 

counsel made the following offer of proof:

All right. Judge, the State provided in discovery a criminal 

background check of [Riggs] so this is nothing of surprise. It was 

also discussed previously with counsel. And as an offer of proof, 

I would present evidence to the Court indicating that [Riggs] has 

been found – been charged and found guilty of intimidation. In 

the same cause, there was a battery by bodily waste. There was 

also a resisting law enforcement which were each dismissed. 
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I would also present evidence that she was charged with 

domestic – with a disorderly conduct, as well as, a public 

intoxication. Additionally, there was a separate disorderly 

conduct charge. Then in another instance, she was charged with 

battery and disorderly conduct. Again, a subsequent charge –

arrest and charge battery – domestic battery. Again, a subsequent 

charge, domestic battery. Another arrest and charge for battery 

with injury. Another charge for battery with injury to law – or a 

battery with no injury to a law enforcement officer, as well as, 

resisting law enforcement. And that’s in addition obviously to the 

attempted robbery that already been put into evidence. 

I think it’s absolutely germane to her credibility as a witness if 

she’s going to maintain that she’s not a violent person, it’s 

absolutely pertinent that this Court consider those facts and that 

she doesn’t consider those to be the acts of a person who is a 

violent person. 

Tr. Vol. II pp. 79–80. Following trial, the court took the matter under 

advisement. On October 4, 2019, the trial court found Carmen guilty as charged 

and ultimately sentenced him to one year suspended to probation.

Discussion and Decision

[3] Carmen contends that the trial court erroneously denied him the opportunity to 

cross-examine Riggs regarding her pending criminal charges in order to

demonstrate that her testimony was biased in order to curry favor with the State 

regarding the resolution of her pending criminal charges. At trial, however, 

Carmen’s arguments and offer of proof only indicate that he sought to question 

Riggs regarding her prior convictions and/or charges. Because Carmen makes 

his bias argument regarding Rigg’s pending charges for the first time on appeal, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-166| June 23, 2020 Page 5 of 6

it is waived for appellate review. See Washington v. State, 808 N.E.2d 617, 625 

(Ind. 2004) (noting that an argument or issue that is not raised by a party at the 

trial court level is waived on appellate review). Moreover, while Riggs testified 

on direct examination that she was not receiving any benefit or leniency in the 

resolution of her pending charges in exchange for her testimony, Carmen never 

attempted to cross-examine Riggs regarding her pending charges. Carmen’s 

entire argument is based on a false premise, which is that the trial court denied 

him the opportunity to ask certain questions even though he never attempted to 

ask the questions. Put another way, Carmen cannot argue that the trial court 

denied him the opportunity to question Riggs about her pending criminal 

charges when he never sought to question her regarding her pending criminal 

charges. 

[4] Waiver notwithstanding, even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court erred, it 

could only be considered harmless error. The United States Supreme Court has 

held that “some constitutional errors ... are so unimportant and insignificant 

that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless.” 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630 (1993) (internal quotations omitted). 

Errors under the Sixth Amendment are subject to harmless error analysis. 

Collins v. State, 822 N.E.2d 214, 221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. “Error is 

deemed harmless when there is no substantial likelihood the error contributed 

to the verdict, or, in other words, that the error was unimportant.” Id. (internal 

quotations omitted). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-166| June 23, 2020 Page 6 of 6

[5] Here, the record is devoid of any physical evidence indicating an alternative 

cause of Riggs’s injury other than Carmen punching her in the nose. In fact, 

when Carmen asked Dr. Douglas Kuxhausen if the type of injury that Riggs 

sustained could have been inflicted by falling, he stated that “[w]e usually do 

not see facial injuries from a person that is awake and falls, because that’s the 

first thing they usually block is their face[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 23. The only evidence 

that supports an alternative cause of Riggs’s injury is Carmen’s self-serving 

testimony, which the trial court was not entitled to believe and did not. Carmen 

has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion. 

[6] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

Baker, J., and Pyle, J., concur.