No. 79-99 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1980 

MILON L. DICKERSON, 

Petitioner and Appellant, 

VS . 

ANN S. DICKERSON, 

Respondent and Respondent. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, 

In and For the County of Gallatin. 

Honorable Joseph B. Gary, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Berg, Morgan, Coil and Stokes, Bozeman, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Bennett and Bennett, Bozeman, Montana 

Filed: JULM i$@ 

Submitted on briefs: April 25, 1980 

Decided : JBt 26 1980 
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy delivered the opinion of the 

Court. 

This is an appeal by Milon L. Dickerson from the 

property distribution in the parties' decree of dissolution 

of marriage granted by the Hon. Joseph B. Gary in the Eighteenth 

Judicial District Court, Gallatin County. 

Milon L. Dickerson and Ann S. Dickerson were married at 

Bozeman, Montana on April 6, 1957. They have three children: 

two daughters, Merianne Dickerson and Carrie Dickerson, and 

one son, Bruce Dickerson. All of the Dickerson children are 

over eighteen years of age. 

Before the dissolution of their marriage, the Dickersons 

were a typical Montana ranch family, sharing in the duties 

of maintaining a hay/cattle operation and a dairy ranch 

fifteen miles southwest of Bozeman, Montana. Milon Dickerson 

handled most of the farm work. Ann Dickerson did farm 

chores and supplemented the family's income by working as a 

bookkeeper. The Dickersons began their ranch in 1961 by 

leasing ranch property from the parents of Ann Dickerson. 

In 1971, Ann Dickerson's mother, Jean Stimson, transferred 

the ranch property to Ann, half by gift and half at the 

value of $200 per acre, secured by a mortgage upon which Ann 

and Milon Dickerson were liable. This mortgage was paid by 

the Dickersons after it was partially forgiven by gifts by 

Stimson to the Dickersons. The Dickerson ranch property presently 

includes approximately 200 acres of land held partially in 

joint tenancy and the remainder by Ann ,Dickerson alone. 

In addition to the ranch property, the Dickersons own 

livestock valued at $144,880.00, equipment valued at $13,314.55, 

a truck and automobile valued at $1,800.00 each and miscellaneous personal property. Each of the Dickersons separately 

-2- 
own personal property. Milon Dickerson owns his own tack, 

shop tools, bank accounts, A. I. inventory and livestock 

feed. Ann Dickerson owns her own bank accounts and is the 

sole beneficiary of a trust established by her mother. The 

Dickersons owe $69,861.76 in debts. 

Milon and Ann Dickerson were unable to agree on a 

property division. After a trial without jury, judgment was 

entered on October 9, 1979, dissolving the Dickerson marriage 

and incorporating the findings of fact and conclusions of 

law previously made by the court. The District Court ordered 

that Milon and Ann Dickerson be individually awarded the 

property separately owned by each of them. Milon Dickerson 

was awarded the parties' truck and Ann Dickerson was awarded 

the automobile. Except for a $40,000.00 gift of property to 

Ann Dickerson, the District Court held the remaining Dickerson 

property was marital property and should be divided equally. 

The District Court received conflicting testimony as to 

the value of the Dickerson ranch land. Ann Dickerson testified 

the land was worth $1,000.00 per acre. Norman C. Wheeler of 

Belgrade, Montana, a local real estate appraiser and consultant, 

testified in behalf of Milon Dickerson, estimating that a 

portion of the Dickerson ranch was worth $3,000.00 per acre 

and the rest of the ranch was worth $2,000.00 per acre. 

Wheeler testified that there is a high demand in the Gallatin 

Valley for gentlemen-type farms and ranches and that this 

demand establishes the area real estate market. 

The District Court adopted the $1,000.00 per acre value 

for the ranch property and in finding of fact no. 11, the 

court divided the marital property as follows: 

ANN DICKERSON 

Real estate (160 acres) $160,000.00 

Household furniture 2,250.00 
Jewelry 

Cash from husband 

TOTAL TO WIFE 

MILON DICKERSON 

Real estate (40 acres) 

Livestock 

Equipment 

Less: Debts $69,861.76 

Cash to 

wife - 916.00 70,777.76 

TOTAL TO HUSBAND $125,166.79 

In a memorandum to the finding of fact and conclusions 

of law, the District Court explained its selection of a 

$1,000.00 per acre value for the ranch property. The 

District Court provided: 

"In arriving at the appraisal of $1,000 per 

acre, the Court adopted the appraisal of the 

respondent as the major owner of the real estate. 

I will grant that the petitioner's appraiser appraised 

the property considerably in excess of this, ranging 

from $2,000 to $3,000 per acre, but this was subject 

to an assumption that it would be sold for subdivision 

purposes. . . . 

"At the post-trial conference, counsel for the 

petitioner indicated a displeasure with the concept 

that the Court was adopting and felt that adopting 

the appraisal of the property utilized by the 

respondent was improper. However, if you examine 

the income tax records, it is obvious that the 

property does not have an earning capacity based 

on any $2,000 to $3,000 per acre valuation.. . ." 

One issue is presented by appellant on appeal: Did the 

District Court err in its valuation of the ranch property, 

resulting in a substantially inequitable division of the 

marital assets? 

The disposition of property owned by a husband and wife 

in a dissolution of their marriage is governed by section 

40-4-202, MCA. 
"In a proceeding for dissolution of a marriage . . . the court . . . shall . . . finally equitably 

apportion between the parties the property and 

assets belonging to either or both, however and 

whenever acquired and whether the title thereto 

is in the name of the husband or wife or both. . ." 

This Court's scope of review of a District Court 

dissolution of marriage property division was recently 

restated as follows: 

"A District Court has far-reaching discretion 

in resolving property divisions, and its judgment 

will not be altered unless a clear abuse of 

discretion is shown. (Citation omitted.) The 

test for reviewing the District Court's discretion 

is: Did the District Court in the exercise of 

its discretion act arbitrarily without employment 

of conscientious judgment, or exceed the bounds 

of reason in view of all the circumstances?" 

(Citation omitted.) In Re Marriage of Jacobson 

(1979) I - Mont . , 600 P.2d 1183, 1186, 36 

St.Rep. 1773, 176. 

This Court has ordered the District Court to reconsider 

its property division if the District Court was clearly 

unadvised of the current value of the parties' assets, or if 

the District Court ordered a substantially inequitable 

division of the parties' assets. In Re Marriage of Brown 

(1978), - Mont. - , 587 P.2d 361, 35 St.Rep. 1733; Kruse 

v. Kruse (1978), Mont . , 586 P.2d 294, 35 St.Rep. 

In Downs v. Downs (1976), 170 Mont. 150, 551 P.2d 1025, 

we directed the District Court to hold a new trial because 

the evidentiary record contained no reliable estimate of the 

husband's net worth. In Martinez v. Martinez (1978), 

Mont. , 573 P.2d 667, 35 St.Rep. 61, we vacated the 

disposition of property ordered by the District Court and 

remanded the case for a new hearing because the District 

Court had failed to ascertain the present values of property 

owned by the parties. 
Substantially inequitable property divisions were 

reversed by this Court in In Re Marriage of Berthiaume 

(19771, 173 Mont. 421, 567 P.2d 1388; and In Re Marriage of 

Brown, supra. In Brown, the District Court awarded the wife 

$25,000.00 for her interest in a $350,000.00 ranch, the 

major marital asset. In Berthiaume, the District Court 

found that the parties' marital property should be equally 

divided, but the court awarded the husband over $17,000.00 

of the marital property and awarded the wife less than 

$1,000.00 of the property. In both cases, one spouse was 

awarded over 90 percent of the marital property. Both 

property decrees were held to be substantially inequitable 

and were reversed. 

The case now before the Court is different from Downs, 

Martinez, Brown or Berthiaume. In this case, evidence was 

presented to the District Court regarding the present net 

worth of the parties' property. Extensive evidence was 

received by the court including the testimony of the parties, 

copies of the parties' tax returns, a listing of the parties' 

property, and an appraisal of the partiesf real property. 

No substantially inequitable division of property was ordered 

by the District Court. The court, after ascertaining the 

parties' net worth, awarded the wife assets worth approximately 

$165,000.00 and awarded the husband assets worth approximately 

$195,000.00 while ordering him to pay the debts. Except for 

the $40,000.00 gift to Ann ~ickerson, the Dickerson marital 

property was divided equally. This property division is not 

substantially inequitable. 

The property valuation issue presented in this case is 

similar to the property valuation issue presented in ~iegalke 

v. Biegalke (1977), 172 Mont. 311, 564 P.2d 987. In ~iegalke, 

the appellant contended that an inaccurate property appraisal 

-6- 
was used by the District Court to divide the parties property. In the case now before us, the record indicates that 

the District Court was presented with conflicting evidence 

of the value per acre of the Dickerson ranch. Testimony 

regarding the per acre value of the ranch was given by the 

respondent and by an appraiser, an expert witness testifying 

in behalf of the petitioner. The District Court, as the 

trier of fact in this trial without a jury, accepted the 

value of the respondent and rejected the expert's valuation. 

This is not reversible error. As we explained in Biegalke, 

". . . the trier of the facts has the discretion to give 

whatever weight he sees fit to the testimony of the expert 

from 0 to loo%." Biegalke, 172 Mont. at 317, 564 P.2d at 

990. Unless a finding of fact is clearly erroneous, it 

cannot be set aside by this Court. See, Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P. 

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. 

,*-- 

Justice 

We Concur: 

Chief Justice