RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 17a0219p.06 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA , Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v

.
$31,000.00 IN U.S. C URRENCY , et al., Defendants ,

T AIWAN W IGGINS ; D ALANTE A LLISON , Claimants-Appellants

. ┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ┘ No. 16-4279

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland. No. 1:16-cv-01581—Patricia A. Gaughan, District Judge. Decided and Filed: September 20, 2017
Before: COLE, Chief Judge; BATCHE LDER and MOORE, Circuit Judges.

_________________ COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: James R. Willis, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellants. Phillip J. Tripi, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Cl eveland, Ohio, for Appellee.

_________________ OPINION

_________________ ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. The federal law governing civil in rem forfeiture actions gives the government authority to seize items it suspects were used in furtherance of criminal activity and to commence civil in rem proceedings against the property without charging the property ’s owner with a crime. See United States v. Seventeen Thousand 

### >No. 16-4279 United States v. $31,000.00, et al. Page 2

Nine Hundred Dollars ($17,900.00) in U.S. Currency , 859 F.3d 1085, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (explaining the practice of civil forfeiture); see also Leonard v. Texas , 137 S. Ct. 847, 848–49 (2017) (Thomas, J.) (statement respecting the denial of certiorari) (describ ing some abuses in the
administration of civil forfeiture laws in the United States and questioning the constitutionality of such laws). Federal agents and entities have significant latitude to pu rsue these claims, from special discovery provisions writte n into the governing rules to a burden of proof that is lower than required in standard criminal cases. But th is latitude has its limits, and this case requires us
to define some of these limits. The district court granted the governme nt’s motion to strike Taiwan Wiggins’s and Dalante Allison’s claims to currency seized from each man at the Cleveland Hopkins International Airport. Each man’s claim asserted that he owned the currency
that had been taken from his suitcase. The dist rict court recited the facts as alleged by the government, found that each claim presented “ nothing more than a naked assertion of ownership,” and held that, under Sixth Circuit precedent, Wiggins and Allison lacked the standing necessary to pursue their claims.
In many ways, this civil forfeiture action looks routine, for federal courts have developed well-settled principles concerning a forfeiture claimant’s need to demonstrate both Article III and statutory standing. But this case comes to us in a procedural posture unlike most civil forfeiture actions—the government apparently moved to di smiss the claim before it engaged in any discovery. Its basic argument be fore the district court and on a ppeal is that the claimant’s pleadings must do more than a ssert a bare ownership in the res that is subject to forfeiture, and that the claimant’s pleadings must provide the government sufficient detail to draft interrogatories allowing it to test the claimant’s claim of ownership. As we will explain, the procedural rules governing civil forfeiture actions do not demand such a heightened standard. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s order granting the government’s motion to strike the claim and REMAND for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND
The parties dispute most of the facts underlyi ng this action. We begin where they find common agreement, drawing these details from the pleadings. On February 24, 2016, Taiwan Wiggins and Dalante Allison (together, “claima nts”) were each at the Cleveland HopkinsNo. 16-4279 United States v. $31,000.00, et al. Page 3

International Airport for a flight to Ora nge County, California. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was aware of the claimants’ itineraries and that each had previous felony drug convictions. The DEA observed them at the airport engaging in conve rsation before they walked together toward the se curity checkpoint. Beyond this, the government’s complaint and
the claimants’ answers and claims tell very different stories.

A. Wiggins
The government alleges that Wiggins spoke voluntarily with a DEA agent who had approached him after he passed through airport security. Wiggi ns stated that he owned a company named “Wiggins Cleaning,” but he coul d name only one client of his cleaning and construction services, “Mike and Mike.” A DE A agent asked if Wiggins was carrying any bulk currency, and Wiggins told the ag ents that he had $2,000 in a shoe in his bag. After Wiggins consented to a search, the agen ts found $31,000 hidden in the lining of his su itcase. He could not answer why he was traveling with that sum of money and, at some point, said it was earnings from Wiggins Cleaning. He seemed to be startled at the agents’ discovery, claimed to be traveling alone, and denied knowing Allison.
In his answer, Wiggins denied these facts. He specifically stated that neither his discussion with the DEA agent nor the se arch of his suitcase was consensual.

B. Allison
The government alleges that while the DEA questioned Wiggins, Allison walked by, glaring at the agents. He joined a long line at Starbucks a mere ten minut es before his scheduled flight time and quickly jumped out of line when the gate agent paged him. He rushed down the jet way, but a Homeland Security Investigations agent asked the gate agent to ask Allison to come back up the jet way to speak with hi m. Allison voluntarily spoke with agents, acknowledged that he was carryi ng currency, and agreed to wait for a DEA agent who had been speaking with other passengers. When the DEA agent approached him, he agreed to speak to him and consented to a search of his carry-on luggage. The agent found $10,000 in currency in a sock. Allison stated that he had won the money at a casino but could not provide details about
the date when he had won it or th e casino where he had played. He also stated that his employerNo. 16-4279 United States v. $31,000.00, et al. Page 4

was “Jay’s Cleaning Service,” that he earned $ 35,000 annually, that he file d taxes annually, that he was travelling alone, and th at he did not know Wiggins.
Like Wiggins, Allison filed an answer denying the relevant allegations by the government. He admits that he possessed $10,000, but he denies that he consented to the search of his carry-on luggage.

C. Additional Factual Background
After the claimants allegedly allowed the DEA to search their bags, a canine alerted to
the odor of narcotics on “the se parate boxes containing each of th e defendant currencies.” The government thereafter seized the fu nds. In its complaint, the gove rnment further alleges that the DEA could not locate business filings for Jay’ s Cleaning, Wiggins Cleaning, or Mike and Mike,
and that neither claimant filed state income tax returns for 2011–2015. Finally, the government alleges that the defendant currencies were forf eitable pursuant to 21 U. S.C. § 881(a)(6), as proceeds traceable to drug traffick ing activities or that were used or intended to be used to facilitate drug-trafficking in vi olation of 21 U.S. C. §§ 841(a), 846.
Allison denies the allegations concerning th e drug-sniffing dog and the lack of business filings for the three companies. Both Allison and Wiggins deny that they failed to pay taxes 1 and
that the funds were forfeitable.

D. Procedural History
The government filed its ci vil in rem forfeiture complaint on June 23, 2016, naming as defendants $31,000 in U.S. Currency and $10,000 in U.S. Currency. In response, Wiggins and Allison filed verified claims on July 6, 2016. Wiggins asserted an ownership interest in defendant $31,000 in U.S. Currency, and Allison did the same for defendant $10,000 in U.S. Currency. Beyond this difference, the two claims are substant ially the same; in both, the
claimants assert that the DEA conducted “a wa rrantless arrest and a wa rrantless search and seizure [in] the absence of proba ble cause.” In addition, each alle ged that “this Claim is further

1 Wiggins adds that he may have been incarcerated for that period of time and “doubts” it can be shown that he was required to pay taxes.No. 16-4279 United States v. $31,000.00, et al. Page 5

based on the indisputable fact that as the person who is the sole and absolute owner, and who was in exclusive possession of the monies, I was victimized by an illegal arrest and I was victimized by the illegal seizure of the funds here involved.” In the midst of further assertions that the government violated each man’s constituti onal rights, they each st ated that “the funds [that] were forcibly taken from me . . . were in my possession.”
Wiggins and Allison each filed an answer to the forfeiture complaint on July 20, 2016. The district court held a case management c onference on August 12, 2016, at which the parties agreed upon a deadline for the completion of discovery. 2

Less than a month later—well before the di scovery deadline passed or any discovery was undertaken—the government moved to strike both claims. The dist rict court found that Wiggins and Allison “lack[ed] standing because their claims are nothing more than a naked assertion of ownership.” The district court also explaine d that “the government’s motion put [them] on notice that their claims were deficient,” yet “they did not seek to suppleme nt them.” Therefore, the district court struck the claims. The gove rnment subsequently moved for an order of forfeiture, which the district court grante d on October 25, 2016. Wiggins and Allison timely appealed.

II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Generally, we review “a district court’s decision to strike a claim in an in rem forfeiture
action for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. One 2011 Porsche Panamera , 684 F. App’x 501, 506 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Thirty-Five Firearms , 123 F. App’x 204, 205– 06 (6th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)); see also United States v. $22,050 U.S. Currency , 595 F.3d 318, 322 (6th Cir. 2010). However, “[w]e review de novo the district court’s determination of a claimant’s standing to contest a federal forfeiture action.” United States v. Real Prop. Located at

2 In its brief, the government claims that at this c onference, it “stated that the government intended to file a motion to strike the claims based upon the bare assertion of ownership unless the claims were supplemented with additional detail about the origin and circumstances under which appellants acquired the seized currencies.” Gov’t Br. at 5. This assertion is not supported by the report from the parties’ planning meeting, and neither the report nor the resulting case management order imposed any deadline by which the claimants needed to amend their claims.No. 16-4279 United States v. $31,000.00, et al. Page 6

4527-4535 Michigan Ave., Detroit, Mich. , 489 F. App’x 855, 857 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing United
States v. Salti , 579 F.3d 656, 667 (6th Cir. 2009) (discussing criminal forfeiture)). “In so doing, we accept as true all material al legations contained in the claim and liberally construe them in
favor of the claimants.” Id. (citing Am. Canoe Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Louisa Water & Sewer
Comm’n , 389 F.3d 536, 540 (6th Cir. 2004)).

B. Supplemental Rule G
Because this case presents an issue of first impression in this circuit, we discuss the applicable procedural rules a nd case law in some detail.

1. Text of the Rule
The rules governing civil in rem forfeiture actions are found in 18 U.S.C. § 983 and Rule
G of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime
Claims and Civil Forfeiture Acti ons (the “Supplemental Rules”). See United States v. $506,069.09 Seized from First Merit Bank , 664 F. App’x 422, 433 (6th Cir. 2016). Rule G details various procedures with which parties to an in rem forfeiture action must comply.
Rule G(2) requires, among other things, that the government file a verified complaint that “describe[s] the property with r easonable particularity,” “identi f[ies] the statute under which the forfeiture action is brought,” and “state[s] su fficiently detailed facts to support a reasonable belief that the government will be able to meet its burden of proof at trial.” Rule G(2)(a)–(f).
Rule G(5) outlines how a claimant may beco me a part of the case and requires a wouldbe claimant to file two pleadings. Rule G(5)(a) states that anyone “who asserts an interest in the defendant property may contest the forfeiture by filing a claim in the court where the action is pending.” Rule G(5)(a)(i). The claim must “identify the specifi c property claimed,” “identify
the claimant and state the claimant’s interest in the property,” “be si gned by the claimant under penalty of perjury,” and be serv ed on the government in the specified way. Rule G(5)(a)(i)(A)– (D). “The verification requirement of Supplementa l Rule G is particularly important because it helps ‘prevent the danger of false claims in forfeiture proceedings by informing the court on oath
or affirmation that the claimant is entitled to cont est the forfeiture action by virtue of his interestNo. 16-4279 United States v. $31,000.00, et al. Page 7

in the defendant property.’” United States v. One Men’s Rolex Pearl Master Watch , 357 F. App’x 624, 627 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Currency $267,961.07 , 916 F.2d 1104, 1108 (6th Cir. 1990)).
Additional provisions in Rule G(5) set th e timelines for filing a claim and provide a specific pleading rule for those asserting an interestin the property as a bailee. Rule G(5)(a)(ii)– (iii). Rule G(5)(b) gives the claimant twenty-one days to file an answer or a motion under Rule
12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Once a party has filed a claim, Rule G(6) gives the government authority to “serve special interrogatories . . . at any time after the cl aim is filed and before discovery is closed.” Rule G(6)(a); see United States v. $133,420.00 in U.S. Currency , 672 F.3d 629, 635 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing this limited discovery power as one that is “unlike” wh at usually occurs “in typical civil proceedings”). These special interr ogatories are “limited to the claimant’s identity and relationship to the defenda nt property.” Rule G(6)(a); see also $133,420.00 in U.S. Currency , 672 F.3d at 635 (“The purpose of the rule is ‘to permit the government to file limited interrogatories at any time after the claim is filed to gather information that bears on the claimant’s standing.”’ (quoting Supplemental Rule G advisory committee’s note (subdiv. (6)))). The claimant must answer or object to the speci al interrogatories within twenty-one days of service. Rule G(6)(b).
Rule G(8) creates four motions and one petition applicable in in rem forfeiture actions. Rule G(8)(a) allows a party “with standing to c ontest the lawfulness of the seizure” of the defendant property to “move to suppress use of the property as evidence.” Rule G(8)(b) allows “[a] claimant who establishes st anding to contest forfeiture [to] move to dismiss the action under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b).” Rule G( 8)(c) provides that “[a]t any time before trial, the government may move to strike a claim or answer” either (a) “for failure to comply with Rule G(5) or (6),” or (b) “because the claimant lacks standing.” Rule G(8)(c)(i)(A)–(B). The Rule further provides that a motion to strike mu st be decided before a claimant’s motion to dismiss, and “may be presented as a motion fo r judgment on the pleadings or as a motion to determine after a hearing or by summary judgmentwhether the claimant can carry the burden of establishing standing by a preponde rance of the evidence.” Ru le G(8)(c)(ii)(A)–(B).No. 16-4279 United States v. $31,000.00, et al. Page 8

2. Relevant Case Law
Our cases are clear with regard to a claimant ’s need for standing to challenge a forfeiture action. In this regard, we have distinguished be tween Article III standing and statutory standing.
As in any federal suit, a claimant must have Article III standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” requires (1) an “injury in fact,” defined as the “invasion of a legally prot ected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; (2)
“a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of”; and (3) a likelihood “that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As th e Supreme Court noted in Lujan , constitutional st anding requires that “each element must be supported in the same wa y as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e. , with the manner and degree of ev idence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Id. ; see also $133,420.00 in U.S. Currency , 672 F.3d at 638 (applying
the Lujan rule in a civil forfeiture proceeding); United States v. $148,840.00 in U.S. Currency
, 521 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 2008).

We have assessed Article III standing in civil forfeiture cases by requiring that “a claimant must have a colorable ownership, possessory or security interest in at least a portion of the defendant property.” See United States v. $515,060.42 in U.S Currency , 152 F.3d 491, 497 (6th Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Real Prop. Located at 4257-4535 Michigan Ave., Detroit, Mich. , 489 F. App’x 855, 857 (6th Cir. 2012). A cl aimant with such an interest has Article III standing “because an ow ner or possessor of property th at has been sei zed necessarily suffers an injury that can be re dressed at least in part by the return of the seized property.” $515,060.42 in U.S. Currency , 152 F.3d at 497.
We have applied this principle in only a smattering of cases. For instance, in Real Property Located at 4527-4535 Michigan Ave. , the district court grante d a motion to strike for
failure to establish Article I II standing. 489 F. App’x at 857. There, fifteen members of a motorcycle club filed a claim challenging the forfeiture of their clubhouse located at the defendant property, which was owned by a not-for-profit corporation. Id. at 856. TheNo. 16-4279 United States v. $31,000.00, et al. Page 9

government argued that the club members lacked Article III standing, adduc ing a quitclaim deed and a title search that listed the corporati on, and not the individuals, as the owners. Id. The claimants argued that they believ ed they had been acquiring an ow nership interest in the property through the payment of th eir membership dues. Id. at 856–57. We affirmed the district court’s holding that the individual claimants fa iled to allege Article III standing. Id. at 857. The claimants alleged that they had been paying due s “in the belief” that they would obtain an interest in the property, but in the absence of a writing validating that belief, Michigan’s statute of frauds precluded the claim. Id.
Similarly, in United States v. $677,660.00 in U.S. Currency , 513 F. App’x 531 (6th Cir. 2013) (per curiam), we affirmed the district court’s finding that a claimant did not have Article III standing after a hearing “to resolve credibi lity issues” arising in the face of “contradictory
evidence.” Id. at 532. The claimant there had told shif ting stories about the origin of the funds to be forfeited, ranging from claiming that an u ndocumented alien had given the funds to her, to denying that she owned the money, to claiming that she owned some of it. The inconsistency was crucial to the finding of a lack of standing. Id. at 533 (“Crumpler’s constantly changing stories and her inability to verify any interest in the money justified the district court’s finding that Crumpler had no credible legal interest in the currency.”).
Notably lacking from any of the cases addres sing Article III standing is a case that finds Article III standing by looking at Rule G(5)(a)(i )(B)’s requirement that a claim “identify the
claimant and state the claimant ’s interest in the property.”
In addition to demonstrating Article III standi ng, we also require a claimant to comply with Rule G in order to establish statutory standing. See United States v. Real Props. &
Premises , 521 F. App’x 379, 384 (6th Cir. 2013); Real Prop. Located at 4527-4535 Mich. Ave., Detroit, Mich. , 489 F. App’x at 858 (citing $515,060.42 in U.S. Currency , 152 F.3d at 497 (providing for same standard under previous Suppl emental Rule C)). A single deviation from the statute’s requirements deprives a claimant of st atutory standing. See, e.g. , One 2011 Porsche
Panamera , 684 F. App’x at 506–08 (striking a claim for failure to file a timely answer).No. 16-4279 United States v. $31,000.00, et al. Page 10

C. Application
We begin our analysis by noting that the gove rnment moved to strike the claim pursuant to Rule G(8)(c)(i)(A), but not Rule G(8)(c)(i)(B). The former ground for striking a claim is based on failure to comply with Rule G(5) or Rule G(6); the latter is ba sed on a claimant’s lack of standing. Rule G(5) details how a claimant must file his clai m and his answer, and Rule G(6) describes the procedure for the exercise of the government’s power to serve special interrogatories. The government does not cla im that it served interrogatories, nor does our review of the record find that the government ev er served special interrogatories. Therefore, we limit our analysis to whether the claimants failed to comply with Rule G(5). As just stated, a claimant must comply with these procedural rule s to establish “statutory standing.” And as we will demonstrate below, the claimants here have complied with the procedural rules, so it was
error for the district court to strike the claim.
Rule G(5) provides that “[a] person who asse rts an interest in the defendant property may contest the forfeiture by filing a claim . . . [tha t] must . . . identify the claimant and state the claimant’s interest in the property.” Rule G(5)(a)(i)(B). The distri ct court stated that “[b]ecause of the danger of false claims, a claimant cannot satisfy Rule 5(G)(a)(i) with a conclusory statement of ownership.” Conseq uently, it held that under either Article III or the statutory requirements, “it is clear that Wiggins and Alli son lack standing because their claims are nothing
more than a naked assertion of ownership.” On appeal, the govern ment asks us to affirm this holding, relying on our precedent requi ring strict compliance with the dictates of Rule G(5) and arguing that the district court properly found that the claimant s failed to comply with this provision.
The government’s interpretation of Rule G(5) is in correct. Although it rightly notes that Rule G(5)(a)(i) “sets forth certain minimum requireme nts,” it argues that the claim at issue failed to satisfy those requirements because “eac h claim made only a naked assertion of ownership/possession, and failed to provide any expl anation or contextual information regarding [the claimants’] relationship to the defendant U.S. currency found intheir luggage.” Gov’t Br. at 8-9. The government and the district court cite to no binding precedent supporting this approach, however, and Rule G does not require a claimantto provide “any explanation or contextualNo. 16-4279 United States v. $31,000.00, et al. Page 11

information.” Article III standing may require some contextual information for a possessory interest, but even that is distinct from the assertion of an ownership interest. Cf. United States v.
1978 Cessna Turbo 210 , 182 F.3d 919, 1999 WL 407469, at *4 (6th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table opinion) (“[T]he test for stan ding to contest forfeiture is that the claimant have a ‘colorable ownership interest’ which can be evidenced by se veral interests—actual possession, control, title, and financial stake.”).
Rule G(5) requires claimants to do no more than identify themselves and state their interest in the property subject to forfeiture. The government, on the contrary, wants claimants to provide additional detail, a position that it attempts to justify as a means to ward off false claims and to give it a starting point to draft its special interrogatories pu rsuant to Rule G(6). Nowhere in the text of Rule G do we see any support for this approach, and our case law demonstrates why it is not necessary. First, the would-be claimant must demonstrate Article III standing, which, at the pleading stage, necessarily requires that the claimant allege the facts necessary to satisfy Lujan ’s “irreducible constitutiona l minimum of standing.” See Lujan , 504 U.S. at 560. Second, a claimant’s ability to proceed under Rule G, which we have called “statutory standing,” is satisfied through mere compliance with the rule, see Real Props.
& Premises , 521 F. App’x at 384, and we see no pers uasive reason to import a heightened pleading standard that has no basis in the text. And third, we have held that Rule G’s verification requirement is a built-in preventative measure that limits the danger of false claims. One Men’s
Rolex Pearl Master Watch , 357 F. App’x at 627.
We agree with the Seventh Circuit’s approach to cases in a procedural posture like this one, where the claimant has asserted an ownership interest in the res and the government moves to strike the claim based solely on the pleadings. See United States v. $196,969.00 in U.S. Currency , 719 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2013). There, state police seized cash from a suspected drug dealer’s home, and the United States government f iled a forfeiture suit that alleged that the cash was proceeds from illegal drug activity. Id. at 645. The claimant’s claim asserted that he owned all the property in his home, including the de fendant funds. As it did here, the government immediately moved to strike the claim, but un like here, the motion was “on the ground that [the claim] failed to establish Article III standing and also failed to comply fully with SupplementalNo. 16-4279 United States v. $31,000.00, et al. Page 12

Rule G(5).” Id. The district court ruled that the claim failed to comply with the statutory requirements, and without reaching Artic le III standing, struck the claim. Id. at 646 (“[T]he judge held that to comply with the rule the claimant must st ate in addition ‘how he obtained possession of the currency, includi ng, but not limited to, the person( s) from whom he received the currency, the date of receipt, the place of th e receipt, and a description of the transaction which generated the currency.’” (quoting $134,750 U.S. Currency , 2010 WL 1741359, at *3)).
The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that compliance with Rule G(5) provides no basis for “the additional assertions required by” the di strict court, and that a “bald assertion” of ownership complies with the rule. Id. ; see also id. at 647 (“Strict complia nce is achieved if the claimant states his interest, which Johnson did. We can’t see what additional requirements can be extracted from the terse and crystalline la nguage of the subdivision on which the government and the district court place their entire reliance.” ). The Seventh Circuit also responded to the government’s argument that the claimant failed to demonstrate a colora ble legal interest. Id. “The government has confused the requirement of pleading Article III standing, which in a case such as this requires no more than alleging that the government should be ordered to turn over to the claimant money that it’s holding that be longs to him, with the additional requirements imposed on claimants in civil forfe iture proceedings by Rule G(5).” Id. The claimant had filed a
verified claim—“like an affida vit”—asserting ownership, so th e government could not demand that the claimant prove standing. Id.
We agree with the Seventh Circuit that this is the right way to appro ach standing issues in Rule G cases. At the pleading stage, a verified cl aim of ownership is sufficient to satisfy Article III and the procedural requirements of Rule G. See id. ; see also United States v. Funds in the Amount of $239,400 , 795 F.3d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[S]a tisfying procedural requirements— not demonstrating ‘legitimate’ ownership—is a ll that Rule G asks of claimants aside from showing constitutional standing.”). Here, where the government alleged that it took a bundle of cash from a claimant’s suitcase, and each claimant stated that he owned the cash, there is a clear allegation of ownership that satisfies Article III. And the claimant’s ma king of such a statementNo. 16-4279 United States v. $31,000.00, et al. Page 13

is what satisfies Rule G’s statutory standing requirement. Therefore, at least at this stage in the litigation, there was no basis on which the district court coul d strike the claim. 3

The government sings a sirens’ song about th e value of high pleading standards and the benefits it will receive from forcing claimant s to support their claims from the outset of a forfeiture proceeding. But all of the government ’s arguments rest on flawed assumptions about the procedural rules governing in rem forfeiture cases. The basis for requiring a claimant to provide factual support and context for its claim appears to stem fr om a few district court cases within our circuit, including another case from th e Northern District of Ohio. That case held that, “[b]ecause of the danger of false claims, Rule G(5)(a)(i) is not satisfied by a conclusory statement of ownership.” United States v. $25,982.28 in U.S. Currency , No. 5:14-cv-150, 2015 WL 410590, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 29, 2015 (citing, among others, United States v. Thirty-One Thousand Dollars in U.S. Currency , No. 11-12116, 2012 WL 5343350, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2012)). The district court there cited no Si xth Circuit precedent for this opinion, and we disagree with its analysis. As we explained above, a statement of ownership duly verified pursuant to Rule G(5) is enough to satisfy the rule, and the verification requirement is what prevents the danger of false claims. See One Men’s Rolex Pearl Master Watch , 357 F. App’x at
627. As One Men’s Rolex Pearl Master Watch notes, we strictly enforce the verification requirement—as well as the othe r statutory requirements—in orde r to deter false filings. If Congress wishes to add an addi tional layer of protection to th e statutory requirements by having claimants state their interest with specificity, it may. But a panel of our court is not the proper body to do so.
The government also directs us to two out-of-cir cuit cases whose hol dings support its position that an assertion of ownership or possession does not co mply with Rule G(5)(a)(i)(B). We reject the reasoning of both. In United States v. $104,250.00 in U.S. Currency , 947 F. Supp.

3 For the sake of completeness, we note that we have construed the government’s motion to strike as one made “on the pleadings” pursuant to Rule G(8)(c)(ii)(B). That subdivision of Rule G provides that a motion to strike “may be presented as a motion for judgment on the pleadings or as a motion to determine after a hearing or by summary judgment whether the claimant can carry the burden of establishing standing by a preponderance of the evidence.” We do not address the “pre ponderance of the evidence” burden of proof here, b ecause that standard is inapplicable in a review of the pleadings in which the claimant need only allege, ra ther than prove, the facts establishing his standing to pursue the claim. Cf. Lujan , 504 U.S. at 561–62; $196,969 U.S. Currency , 719 F.3d at 646.No. 16-4279 United States v. $31,000.00, et al. Page 14

2d 560, 565 (D. Md. 2013), the district court found that a claim was “too vague to make the threat of a perjury prosec ution for filing a false claim a true de terrent” and that “the only way to guard against the possibility that the Claimant is making a false claim is to insist that she state the source of the defendant property in more detail, and that she do so under oath.” Id. at 565; see also United States v. $134,750 in U.S. Currency , No. RWT 09-cv-1513, 2010 WL 1741359 (D. Md. Apr. 28, 2010). Put simply, this case reads more into Rule G than is actually there. As we have explained, Rule G does notsupport this analysis, for it di ctates no special pleading rules
unless the claimant is a bailee. We also see no reason why the threat of perjury is an insufficient deterrent against the filing of false claims, and because the drafters of Rule G did not include such a requirement, we will not import one here.
The government also cites United States v. $154,853.00 in U.S. Currency , 744 F.3d 559, 562–63 (8th Cir. 2014). There, the Eighth Circuit reviewed a distri ct court’s striking of both a claim and an amended claim. The Eighth Circuit a ffirmed the striking of the claim for failure to comply with Rule G(5) because it contained “bla nket assertions that did not sufficiently identify [the claimant’s] interest” in the funds to be forfeited. Id. at 563. The Eighth Circuit does not provide any persuasive analysis of Rule G(5) to demonstrate why this holding must be true. In addition, the district court in that case offered the claimant the opportunity to amend his claim at
the time it struck the in itial claim, and the motion to strike the claim came after the government served and the claimant answered special interrogatories. See id. at 561–62. This significant difference in procedural posture n ecessarily diminishes the persuasi ve effect that case has on our analysis of the case before us.
The government’s reliance on United States v. $57,888.00 in U.S. Currency , No. 5:10-cv2022, 2011 WL 2972106 (N.D. Ohio Jul. 21, 2011), is indicative of its problematic interpretation of Rule G. There, the defendant funds were seized from the claimant after the currency was found in his carry-on suitcase at the Akron/Ca nton airport. When asked about the money, however, the claimant “stated both verbally and in writing that he did not know anything about the money in the suitcase.” Id. at *1. After the government filed its complaint, the claimant filed a claim stating that the money had been in hi s possession, and the government moved to strike for lack of statutory standing. Id. at *2. The district court found th at the claimant lacked ArticleNo. 16-4279 United States v. $31,000.00, et al. Page 15

III standing because the claim was one of “naked possession.” Id. at *3. In the context of analyzing Article III standing, the district court looked fo r an explanation of “how [the claimant] came to possess the defendant currency in his carry-on suitcase,” and, finding none, struck the claim for lack of standing. 4 Id. The government misreads this case. Although the government moved to strike for failure to comply with Ru le G(5), the district court analyzed Article III standing alone. Its analysis c oncerning naked possession claims, th erefore, should be cabined to Article III questions. In its brief here, the gover nment cites the Article III analysis as if the district court had been analyzing the naked pos session claim for purposes of Rule G statutory standing. But the fact remains that the two analyses are distinct. Cf. United States v. $677,660.00 in U.S. Currency , 513 F. App’x 531, 533 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Because [claimant] lacks Article III standing, we cannot r each her challenges to the government’s forfeiture action and need not address whether she had statutory standing.”).
Finally, we note our concern that the govern ment’s approach would turn the burden of proof in forfeiture actions on its head. Under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), the government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that the subject of a civil forfeiture action is, in fact, forfeitable. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(c); see also United States v. $174,206.00 in U.S. Currency , 320 F.3d 658, 661–62 (6th Cir. 2003). Requiring a forfeiture claimant to explain the nature of hi s ownership at the pleadin g stage would be asking the claimant to satisfy the government’s burden of proof, or at least go a long way toward doing

so. See Funds in the Amount of $239,400 , 795 F.3d at 645–46 (rejecting a reading of Rule G that would “require a claimant to demonstrate ‘legi timate’ ownership” becaus e it would “nullify” a central purpose of CAFRA). Neither Article III nor Rule G demands this. Rule G(8)(c) provides
that a motion to strike a claim “may be presented as a motion for judgment on the pleadings or as a motion to determine after a hearing or by summ ary judgment whether th e claimant can carry the burden of establishing standing by a preponderan ce of the evidence.” Rule G(8)(c)(ii)(B). It is clear from both the language and the structure of that rule that a claimant responding to a

4 The government’s motion in that case sought to strike the claim for failure to comply with Rule G(5), as the motion at issue did here. The court seems to have sua sponte converted the motion from one about statutory standing to Article III standing, which appears to have been harmless since it was indeed a naked possession assertion.No. 16-4279 United States v. $31,000.00, et al. Page 16

motion for judgment on the pleadings has no eviden tiary burden; rather, that burden arises only when the government moves for a determination of standing after a hearing or in summary judgment proceedings. Because the government’s approach would require claimants to help prove the government’s case against them, we reject it.

D. The Government’s Policy Argument
Before concluding, we briefly address an argum ent that the government presents in favor of its position that an in rem forfeiture claim must state the claimant’s interest in some detail. It asserts that its preferred pleading requirement would serve a “major purpose of promoting efficient and focused discovery.” Gov’t Br. at 18. In other words, it argues, “[r]equiring the
claimant to make more than a ba ld assertion of ownership permits the United States to efficiently propound special interrogatories focused on the partic ulars of the claim rather than forcing the United States to embark on a discovery ‘fis hing expedition’ through rounds of special interrogatories on this threshold issue.” G ov’t Br. at 18–19 (citing $104,250 , 947 F. Supp. 2d at 565–66.). But Rule G provides no foundation for the government’s re quest for a standard that will assist federal government lawyers in drafti ng the interrogatories necessary to probe the
nature of a claimant’s interest in the res subject to forfeiture, and we will not create such a wholly extra-textual rule. The gove rnment asserted a similar intere st before the Seventh Circuit, and we fully join that co urt’s reasoning in rejecti ng the government’s proposal:
The government argues that “forcing the claimant to spell out his interest in the property at the outset not only discourages false claims, but allows the parties to focus directly on the interest that is assert ed in their discovery requests.” This is an argument for amending the rule, which does not require “spe lling out,” rather than for judicial elaboration of it. A nyway we are given no grounds for thinking that a claimant's failure to particularize the nature of his claimed interest beyond what Rule G(5) requires burdens the government or the courts unduly. The government can depose the claimant or serve an interrogato ry on him without leave of court, as expressly authorized by Rule G(6)(a). If the claimant is unresponsive, the government can move for dismissal of the claim and for entry of a judgment of forfeiture. And the judge can shortcut the entire pr ocess without impropriety by asking the claima nt to clarify his claim. $196,969.00 U.S. Currency , 719 F.3d at 647. Here, the district court agreed “with the government that it should not be put to the burde n of propounding special in terrogatories in thisNo. 16-4279 United States v. $31,000.00, et al. Page 17

situation because the claimants’ a ssertions of ownership are too vague to facilitate the drafting of focused interrogatories.” This was error. We have no doubt that the lawyers of the United States Attorney’s Offices within the Sixth Circuit have the capacity to draft useful interrogatories that
will either confirm a claimant’s interest in the res or expose the futility of the claim. They do not
need our hand on the scale.

III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the district court erred by dismissing Wiggins’s and Allison’s claims due to a lack of standing. We hold that strict compliance with Rule G does not require a claimant to state the additional fact s that the government requests, where, as here,
the claimants make a verified claim of owne rship and not mere possession. Because Wiggins and Allison have Article III standing and have satisfied the requirements of Rule G, we return
this case to the district cour t for further proceedings. We e xpress no opinion on any other aspect of this case. Accordingly, we REVERSE the di strict court’s order granting the government’s motion to strike and REMAND the case for further proceedings.