### FILED JUNE 4,2015 In the Office ofthe ClerkofCourt W A StateCourt ofAppeals, Division III

INTHE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 32043-0-III ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) PUBLISHED OPINION ) SAMUEL MILLER, ) ) Appellant. ) LAWRENCE-BERREY,J. - A YakimaCounty DistrictCourt dismissed charges against Samuel Miller, concludingthat

### Mr. Miller's CrRLJ 3.3 right to a speedy trial was violated. The district courtfound thatthe State failed to bring

### Mr. Millerto trial within 90 days ofthe issuance ofthe citation, as required by 

### City o/Seattle v. 

### Bonifacio, 127 Wn.2d 482,900P.2d 1105 (1995). The State appealed to Yakima County Superior Court. The superior courtreversed and remandedthe matter onthe grounds that

### Bonifacio was supersededbythe 2003 revisions to CrRLJ 3.3. We granted discretionary review, and we
now affirm the superior court.

### No. 32043-0-III State 

### v. Miller


### FACTS On September 29,2012, a Yakima County Sheriffs Officer issued Samuel Miller
a uniform criminal citation for driving with a suspended license and without an ignition interlock device. The officer checked the box for a mandatory court appearance; however, he did not enter an appearance date on the citation. The back ofthe citation instructed that ifthe appearance date box was blank, the court would give written notification ofwhen to appear. And, ifnotice was not received within 15 days, the citation instructed the person to call the court immediately. Mr. Miller called the courtto find out the date and was told that there was no record. On December 5, the State filed a complaint alleging the same offenses. Mr. Miller appeared at his first court appearance on January 3,2013. The district court entered an order setting conditions ofrelease and released Mr. Miller on his own recognizance. On January 17, at Mr. Miller's arraignment, Mr. Miller objected pursuantto CrRLJ 2.1, CrRLJ 3.3, andBonifacio. On February 8, he contendedthatthe State violated CrRLJ 2.1 by waiting over three months fromthe date ofthe citation to file a complaint and that the delay caused the issuance ofthe citation to initiate the criminal proceedings underBonifacio. Further, he contended thatthe criminal proceedings triggered the time-for-trial clock under CrRLJ 3.3 and, becausehe was notbrought to trial


### 2

### No. 32043-0-111 State v. Miller
within 90 days, the charges againsthim must be dismissed. The State argued that Bonifacio was no longer good law, considering the 

### 2003 amendments to the time-for-trial rules in CrRLJ 3.3. The State maintainedthat Mr. Miller's time-for-trial clock began at the time ofhis arraignment on January 17 and that his speedy trial right under CrRLJ 3.3
was not violated. The district court concluded thatBonifacio controlled because it was never overruled. The court also concluded thatthe officer's failure to file the citation within two days violated CrRLJ 

### 2.1 (d), the issuance ofthe citation initiated criminal proceedings and triggered the speedytrial clock, and Mr. Miller's speedy trial date had expired on January 17. The district court dismissed the charges withprejudice because ofthe violation ofMr. Miller's right to a speedy trial. The State appealed tothe superior court. The superior court held that the district court erred in dismissing the case. The court generally concludedthat the 

### 2003 amendments tothe time-for-trial rules were rewritten since the holding inBonifacio and that no violation occurred based on the amended rules. The superior courtremanded the
case back to district court. Mr. Miller appealed the superior court's ruling, and this court granted discretionary review.

3No. 32043-0-III State v. Miller
ANALYSIS "We interpret a court rule as though it were enacted by the legislature, giving effectto its plain meaning as an expression oflegislative intent." State v. Chhom, 162 Wn.2d451,458, 173 P.3d 234 (2007). "Plain meaning is discerned from reading the rule
as a whole, hannonizing its provisions, and using related rules to help identify the legislative intent embodied in the rule." 

### ld. Mr. Miller argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated because the State failed to bring him to trial within 90 days ofthe filing ofthe criminal proceedings against him. Relying on Bonifacio, Mr. Miller contends that issuance ofa citation begins the criminal process. Accordingly, a defendant's time-for-trial calculation begins either once the citation is filed or 48 hours after it is issued ifthe State fails to follow the two-day time limit for filing as prescribed by CrRLJ 2.1 (d)(2). Bonifacio, 127 Wn.2d at488-89. 1 In response, the State argues thatBonifacio was displaced by the 2003 amendments to the time-for-trial rules and is no longer good law. The question before this court is whetherthe 2003 time-for-trial rules supersede the holding in Bonifacio.

I Mr. Miller was given the citation on September 29,2012. The officer failed to file the citation in 48 hours. Thus, Mr. Miller contends his constructive filing date was October 1. Then, he uses CrRLJ4.1 (a)( 1) to calculate his time-for-trial commencement date to be 14 days after filing, or October 14. Based on this commencement date, he alleges thathis time-for-trial clock expired onJanuary 12. 

### 4No. 32043-0-III 

### State v. 

### Miller Accordingto CrRLJ 2.1 (a)(1), all criminal proceedings shall be initiatedby a complaint, except as otherwise provided by the rule. A citation is deemed a lawful complaint for the purpose ofinitiating criminal prosecution ofthe charged offense when the citation is signed by the citing officer and filed with a court ofcompetentjurisdiction. CrRLJ 2.1(b)(5). An arresting officermay serve a citation and notice to appear in court to a person who is arrested orcould have been arrested for a misdemeanorviolation. CrRLJ 2.1 (b)(1). The officermakes a determination whetherto release a person
or hold the person in custody after the consideration ofthe enumerated factors in CrRLJ 2.1(b)(2). The citation and notice to appear includes the time and place a person is to appear in court. CrRLJ 2.1(b)(3)(iv). The citation and notice must be filed with the court within two days after issuance, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, orholidays. CrRLJ 2. 1 (d)(2). "Acitation and notice not filed within the time limits ofthis rule may be dismissed without prejudice." CrRLJ 2.1(d)(2). In 1995, the Washington Supreme Court inBonifacio, addressed whetherthe mere issuance ofacitation starts the time-for-trial clock. 127 Wn.2d at 483. Seattlepolice officers detained Mr. Bonifacio for an alleged weapons violation and issued a citation before release. Id. at 483-84. The citation informed Mr. Bonifacio ofhis promiseto


### 5No. 32043-0-111 State 

### v. Miller
appear in court, butthe citation was blank in respect to the date and time ofthe required appearance. 

### Id. at 484. Afterwards, the officers did not file the citation with the court, but instead forwarded it to the city attorney's office for screening and a filing decision. Id. About four months later, the city attorney filed a complaint in municipal court against Mr. Bonifacio. 

### Id. The municipal court dismissed the complaint onthe grounds that criminal proceedings were initiated against Mr. Bonifaciowhen the citation was issued, and as a consequence, the time-for-trial rule in CrRLJ 3.3 was violated. 

### Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court waspersuaded by State v. Dolman, 22 Wn. App. 917, 594 P.2d 450 (1979) that the issuance ofa citation in lieu ofarrest was "'ineffect

... a release of[a] defendant on his personal recognizance,' and as a result, a citation and notice to appear [were] process issued by the court named in the citation." Bonifacio, 127 Wn.2d at487 (footnote omitted) (some alteration in original) (quotingDolman, 22 Wn. App. at 921). TheBonifacio court held that the issuance ofa citation, regardless of whether it is subsequently filed, commences the time-for-trial clock. 

### Id. at 488. The court also held that CrRLJ 2.1 required filing within 48 hours because "[t]he issuance and receipt ofa citation is not an insignificant intrusion on one's liberty" and an officer's consequences for failing to file could not be ignored. 

### Id. at 488-89. Initiating proceedings within 48 hours provides fairness and efficiency in addressing criminal
6No. 32043-0-III State v. Miller
citations. 

### ld. at489. "The significant aspect ofourholding is that the time for trial computation relates to the date the citation is filed or forty-eight hours after its issuance, if it is not filed." 

### ld. SinceBonifacio was decided in 1995, the time-for-trial rules in CrRLJ 3.3 and CrRLJ 4.1 wererevised. In the years leading up to 2002, a number ofissues surrounding the time-for-trial rules had surfaced. WASH. COURTS TIME-FOR

-TRIAL TASKFORCE, FINALREpORT, 

### §II.A, at 10. (Oct. 2002) (FINAL REpORT) (on file with Admin. Office of Courts, available athttp://www.courts.wa.gov/programs_orgs/pos_tft/index.cfm? fa=pos_tft.reportHome (last visited May 19,2015). Questions arose regarding the appropriate remedy for a violation, the length ofthe deadlines, and appellate court interpretation oftherules. FINALREpORT § II(A) at 10. In response, the Washington Supreme Courtcreated the Time-For-Trial Task Forceto conduct a comprehensive review ofthe time-for-trial rules and make recommendations for review. FINALREpORT, 

### § II(A) at 10. The TaskForce recommended revisions that included simplifYing and clarifYing the rule, stating more simply and specificallythe beginning and ending points for various timeperiods, and eliminatingthe need for extensivejudicial interpretation. FINALREpORT, 

### § I(B) at 5-6.

7No. 32043-0-III State v. Miller
One concern addressedby the TaskForce was thatthe time-for-trial standards
were moving away from the express language ofthe rules andwere more directedby judicial opinions. FINAL REpORT, 

### § I(B) at 6. To limitthe expansion ofthe rule by judicial interpretation, the TaskForce added CrRLJ 3.3(a)(4), which required computation oftime for trial in accordance with the rule and prohibited dismissal ifa trial
was timely underthe rule but delayed by circumstances outside ofthe rule. The Task Forcebelieved that the revisedrule covered the necessary range oftime-for-trial issues to the extent that additional provisions did not need to be interpreted into the rule. FINAL REpORT, 

### § nCB) at 12-13. Another significant andrelated issue addressed by the 2003 amendments was the problem created by the Striker2 and GreenwoocP holdings. FINAL REpORT, § n(C) at21-24. Striker/Greenwooddealt withpre-arraignment delay andpresented a problem in determining a commencement date for the time-for-trial period. TheStriker/Greenwood rule imposed a constructive arraignment date of 14 days after charges were filed ifthere
was any unnecessary delay by the State in bringing the defendant before the court for arraignment. Greenwood, 120 Wn.2d at 614-15. Periods thatthe State acted in due

2State v. Striker, 87 Wn.2d 870,557 P.2d 847 (1976). 3State v. Greenwood, 120 Wn.2d 585,845 P.2d 971 (1993). 8No. 32043-0-111 State v. Miller diligence in bringing the defendant to trial were excluded from the time-for-trial calculation. Id. at 604-05. The Task Force was concerned with the Striker/Greenwood vague due diligence standards and the delay caused by the related hearings and thought law enforcement would benefit from more precise guidelines. FINAL REpORT, § I(C)(1) at 21. In addressing the Striker/Greenwoodconstructive rule, the Task Force recognized that "[t]he time for trial should not begin until the actual arraignment. The filing ofthe information orcomplaint should not begin the running oftherule." FINAL REpORT, App. C at 2. The revision ofCrRLJ 3.3 included a newprovisionthat set the commencement date as the date ofarraignment as determined in CrRLJ 4.1. FINAL REpORT, § III(D) at 47. In CrRLJ 4.1(a)(2), the Task Force added the provision that no delay in bringing an out-of-custody defendant before the court shall affect the allowable time for arraignment. FINAL REpORT, § II(C)(1) at 23. The Task Force also recommended incorporating the due diligence standards into CrRLJ 2.2, the rule on issuing warrant ofarrest requirements and recommended relying on the remedy in that rule to address violations ofdue diligence. FINAL REpORT, § II(C)(I) at 21-24. "The proposal still requires the State to act with due-diligence, but does so without exacting the social sacrifice inherent in dismissals with prejudice." FINAL REpORT, § 1I(C)( 1) at 24.
9No. 32043-0-II1 State v. Miller
Thenewrules as proposedby the TaskForce for CrRLJ 3.3 were adopted in 2003. The underlying time-for-trial periods remained unchanged. Generally speaking, a defendant must be brought to trial within 60 days ofthe commencement date ifthe defendant is detained injail orwithin 90 days ofthe commencement date ifthe defendant is not detained injail. CrRLJ 3.3(b)(I), (2). A defendant's initial commencement date is the date ofarraignment as determined underCrRLJ 4.1. CrRLJ 3.3(c)(l). The arraignment date depends onthe status ofthe defendant. CrRLJ4.1(a). For a defendant detained injail or subject to conditions of release imposed in connection with the charges at hand, the defendant shall be arraigned
no later than 14 days after the date ofthe complaint or citation and notice is filed in court. CrRLJ 4.1(a)(I). For a defendant not detained injail or subject to conditions ofrelease, the defendant shall be arraigned not laterthan 14 days afterthe appearance that next follows the filing ofthe complaint orcitation and notice. CrRLJ4: 1 (a)(2). "Appearance" means the defendant's physical presence in thetrial court. CrRLJ 3.3(a)(3)(iii).4 "Anydelay in bringing the defendantbefore the court shall

4The complete definition of"appearance" is the "defendant'sphysical presence in the trial court. Suchpresence constitutes appearance only if(A) the prosecutorwas notified ofthepresence and (B) thepresence is contemporaneously placed on the record underthe cause number ofthe pending charge." CrRLJ 3.3(a)(3)(iii). There is no question here thatMr. Miller'sphysical presence in the courtroom on January 3 was an 10

### No. 32043-0-III 

### State v. 

### Miller

not affect the allowable time for arraignment, regardless ofthe reason for the delay." CrRLJ 4.1(a)(2). CrRLJ 3.3(a)(4) prohibits dismissal ofa defendant's charges under the rule ifthe time for trial is delayed for reasons not addressed in CrRLJ 3.3 or CrRLJ 4.1. "The allowable time for trial shall be computed in accordance with this rule. Ifa trial is timely underthe language ofthis rule, but was delayed by circumstances not addressed in this rule or CrRLJ 4.1, the pending charges shall not be dismissed unless the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated." CrRLJ 3.3(a)(4). Here, based on the Task Forcereport and the subsequent revisions to CrRLJ 3.3 and CrRLJ 4.1, we conclude that the 2003 amendments to the time-for-trial rule supersede the holding in 

### Bonifacio. Bonifacio created ajudicial interpretation ofthe time-for-trial rule prior to the 2003 enactment ofthe current version ofCrRLJ 3.3. The 2003 amendments were created to do away with such interpretation. The current version ofCrRLJ 3.3 clearly states that the allowable time for trial "shall be computed in accordance with this rule." CrRLJ 3.3(a)(4). Mr. Miller's initial commencement date is tied to the date ofhis arraignment as determined by CrRLJ 4.1. Mr. Miller's arraignment date is calculated from his first
appearance. 11

### No. 32043-0-II1 State 

### v. Miller


### appearance in court under CrRLJ 4.1(a)(2) because Mr. Miller was not injail or subject to conditions ofrelease.5 

### CrRLJ 4.1(a)(2) provides that Mr. Miller's arraignment date shall be not laterthan 14 days after his appearance following filing ofthe complaint or citation and notice. Any delay in bringing Mr. Millerto court, such as an untimely filing, does not affect the allowable time for Mr. Miller's arraignment. CrRLJ 4.1(a)(2). Mr. Miller's appearance occurred on January 3 and his January 17 arraignment date was timely within the rule. He had 90 days from his January 17 arraignment to be brought to trial. CrRLJ 3.3(b)(2)(i). His time for trial, therefore, had not expired at the time ofthe district court's dismissal. Bonifacio'sjudicial interpretation is no longer applicable afterthe revisions to the time-for-trial rules in CrRLJ 3.3 and CrRLJ 4.1. Therules were revised to address the judicial expansion ofthe right-to-trial rule. The revised rules provide the exclusive guidelines for determining the commencement date for a defendant's time-for-trial clock. According to these rules, Mr. Miller's CrRLJ 3.3 right to a speedy trial was notviolated.

5 

### Mr. Miller applies CrRLJ 4.1(a)(l) to calculate his arraignment date. However, CrRLJ 4.1(a)(l) does not apply because Mr. Miller was not detained injail or subject to conditions ofrelease imposed in connection with the charges. While Bonifacio considered the issuance ofa citation ,,'a release of[a] defendant on his personal recognizance,'" this does not mean that the citation imposes conditions ofrelease orthat CrRLJ 4.1(a)(l) applies to Mr. Miller. Bonifacio, 127 Wn.2d at 487 (alteration in original) (quotingDolman, 22 Wn. App. at 921). 12No. 32043-0-II1 

### State v. 

### Miller
We affinn the superior court's decision to remand the matter to district court and reinstate the charges against Mr. Miller.
Lawrence-Berrey, 1. WE CONCUR:

Feanng, J.

13