Supreme Court

No. 2019-318-C.A.

(P1/15-3840BG)

State :

v. :

Reginald Isom. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision 

before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers 

are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme 

Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, 

Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or 

Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical 

or other formal errors in order that corrections may be 

made before the opinion is published.

May 26, 2021
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Supreme Court

No. 2019-318-C.A.

(P1/15-3840BG)

State :

v. :

Reginald Isom. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ. 

O P I N I O N

Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. The issues in this appeal arise from a 

robbery and the resulting exchange of gunshots. A jury convicted the defendant, 

Reginald Isom, on eight criminal counts related to the robbery. The defendant now 

appeals from the judgment of conviction and commitment. He contends that the trial 

justice erred by refusing to include the withdrawal exception to the initial aggressor 

rule in his jury instructions on self-defense and by denying the defendant’s motions 

for a bill of particulars and to compel a bill of particulars. 

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the 

Superior Court. 
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I

Facts and Travel1

On the morning of October 23, 2015, defendant knocked on the window of 

his friend Leroy Dorsey’s house in Providence, and, according to Dorsey, the two 

“just sparked up a conversation.” Their discussion concerned the potential 

commission of a robbery of a pawnshop on Smith Hill. At the time, defendant was 

living in the back of a nonfunctioning pickup truck owned by Dorsey’s grandfather. 

The defendant was homeless and had dropped out of high school in his final 

semester. The defendant suggested that Dorsey “open the door and be a look-out” 

during the robbery. Dorsey agreed, and the pair went across the street to enlist their 

acquaintance, Andrew McLean, who had previously discussed the robbery with 

defendant. The group further discussed committing the robbery together. McLean, 

armed with a gun, then drove the three men to the pawnshop, Capital Gold, on Smith 

Street in Providence. 

The targeted pawnshop was owned by Justin Kemp. To enter the door of 

Capital Gold, one had to be buzzed in. Once the door closed, it locked automatically, 

and customers had to be buzzed back out to exit. The store was separated into two 

1 We recite the facts in narrative form. The essential facts are not disputed; indeed,

virtually the entire robbery was captured on security footage. 
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parts; the front section was separated from the back section by bulletproof glass and 

a half-door. 

When the trio arrived at Capital Gold at approximately 10:22 a.m., Dorsey 

buzzed the door and the door was unlocked for him. As they walked in—with 

Dorsey in front—defendant put gloves on and McLean brandished his weapon. 

Kemp took out his own gun and pointed it at the three men. Dorsey, who had 

apparently missed his assignment to hold the front door open, had allowed it to shut 

behind them. Dorsey raced towards the now-lockeddoor with his hands up, running 

into McLean and knocking the gun out of his hand. The defendant and McLean then 

also ran towards the locked door, putting their hands up as they attempted to flee. 

Dorsey recalled that Kemp then stated, “I should * * * kill you guys,” while his gun 

was pointed at them. 

When McLean began looking through the items on the groundwhere his gun 

had fallen, Kemp, still holding his gun, approached the men and grabbed McLean 

by the front of his sweatshirt. The defendant then jumped on Kemp’s back and

attempted to wrestle the gun away from him, while also swinging a pocketknife at 

Kemp. At some point during the scuffle, Dorsey was shot in the leg, and he retreated 

to the back of the pawnshop. McLean was shot in the stomach. Dorsey then returned

to the front of the pawnshop and assisted defendant in wrestling with Kemp. 

Meanwhile, McLean searched the ground for his gun; when he located it, he 
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approached Kemp—who was still wrestling with the other two men—and shot him 

in the head. 

The defendant then picked up Kemp’s gun, briefly pointed it towards Kemp’s 

body lying on the ground, and then placed it on a nearby stool. The defendant 

grabbed Kemp’s cell phone and placed it in his pocket. Dorsey then grabbed 

McLean’s gun, and defendant buzzed Dorsey out so he could exit the building. 

The defendant next attempted to find video footage and destroy it by pulling 

down a monitor connected to the cameras. The defendant also turned Kemp’s body 

over; Kemp was then lying face-up on the ground, surrounded by a pool of his own

blood. At this time, defendant began to look for his own wallet and pocketknife. 

Eventually, defendant left with McLean, who had gathered several items from

around the pawnshop, including two laptops. This entire event lasted approximately 

four minutes; Kemp was shot approximately fifty-three seconds after the trio entered 

the pawnshop. 

Vincent Ritter, a letter carrier for the United States Postal Service, was 

delivering mail on foot in the proximity of Capital Gold. While delivering mail 

across the street from Capital Gold, Ritter heard approximately five loud bangs, 

which seemed to come from inside Capital Gold. Ritter continued his deliveries and 

crossed to the side of the street on which Capital Gold was located. As Ritter 

approached the curb, he observed a young man, later identified as Dorsey, exiting 
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Capital Gold. Ritter asked Dorsey if “everything [was] okay in there[,]” to which 

Dorsey responded, “Yes sir, everything is fine.” Dorsey then went down a nearby 

street and tossed the gun. 

After Ritter observed Dorsey walking away, he attempted to make a delivery 

at Capital Gold. Ritter rang the buzzer at Capital Gold and then looked into the 

window, where he observed Kemp lying in a puddle of blood. Ritter then ran in the 

direction of his truck—where he had left his phone—stopping a vehicle on his way 

and asking the motorist to call 911. When Ritter reached his mail truck, he also 

called 911. 

At some point after Ritter called 911, police officers arrived at the scene and 

observed Kemp lyingon the floor inside Capital Gold. The officers requested a fire 

engine to respond to the scene to effectuate a forced entry, which they did using a 

master key. Kemp was subsequently transported to Rhode Island Hospital. 

Providence police officers continued their investigation at the scene, which included 

extracting video footage from Capital Gold’s surveillance system. Officers also 

responded to a separate location, less than a block away, where a firearm was 

discovered in a driveway. 

Ritterspoke to Detective Jay Simoneau of the Providence Police Department 

at the scene. Detective Simoneau brought Ritter to a residence about a block away 

on Ayrault Street, where officers had a suspect in custody. Ritter was shown the 
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suspect,Dorsey,sitting on a side-step of the house; Ritter recognized him as the man 

he had observed walking out of Capital Gold. 

Dorsey was taken to the hospital to treat his gunshot wound, and later to the 

police station to be questioned. At the police station, Dorsey identified photographs 

of defendant and McLean as the men who were present at Capital Gold with him. 

That same day, at 1:38 p.m., McLean was also apprehended. Because McLean had 

a gunshot wound to his stomach, he was first taken to the hospital. 

On July 20, 2016, Dorsey pled guilty to charges of first-degree robbery, 

conspiracy, discharging a firearm, and felony assault, for which he was sentenced to 

thirty years to serve at the Adult Correctional Institutions, followed by twenty years 

of probation. McLean also pled guilty to charges of first-degree robbery, conspiracy, 

discharging a firearm, felony assault, and carrying a pistol without a license, for 

which he was sentenced to forty years to serve at the ACI, followed by twenty years 

of probation. 

On November 24, 2015, an indictment was filed against defendant. On 

December 9, 2016, defendant was identified in an unrelated investigation in 

Pennsylvania. After defendant gave Pennsylvania officers several false names and 

birth dates, they ran defendant’s fingerprints, which came back with a “hit” for a 

warrant in Providence, Rhode Island, related to the robbery of Capital Gold. 
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A

Pretrial Motion

Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion for a bill of particulars requesting 

information on each count, regarding: “[t]he exact location of the alleged offense”;

“[t]he precise time of day that the offense was allegedly committed”; “[t]he manner 

and means by which the alleged offense was committed”; “[a] detailed statement of 

the factual information upon which the State will rely * * *”; and “any information 

in the prosecutor’s files * * * which establishes * * * the existence of any element 

of any of the alleged charges.” The state responded that the relevant facts were 

contained in their discovery response in the case, which, the state argued, satisfied 

the bill of particulars. The defendant then moved to compel the state to answer his 

motion for a bill of particulars. The defendant argued both of these motions in front 

of the trial justice on June 4, 2018, before the start of trial. However, the trial justice 

determined that “where the State has provided ample discovery and the indictment 

contains specific allegations, a bill of particulars is not appropriate.” Accordingly, 

the trial justice denied the motions. 

B

The Trial

The defendant’s trial occurred over six days in June 2018. In exchange for a 

letter to the parole board, Dorsey testified at defendant’s trial. Due to the severity 
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of injuries sustained, Kemp could not remember anything that happened on October 

23, 2015, and did not testify to these events; however, he testified as to his injuries 

and regarding the pawnshop more generally. Ritter and several police officers

testified regarding what they saw that day. The defendant also testified in his own 

defense.

At the conclusion of the trial, defendant requested a self-defense instruction 

“with regard to the felonious assault, the possession of a handgun as a felony, the 

discharge of a handgun during a crime of violence, and possession without a 

license.” The state objected to the self-defense instruction, specifically focusing on 

defendant’s proposed instruction regarding a withdrawal exception to the so-called

“initial aggressor rule” and stating that there had been no “good-faith withdrawal”

in this case. The trial justice ultimately agreed to give a self-defense instruction, 

stating that “[y]ou don’t need much” to get such an instruction. However, he refused 

to “give the withdrawal instruction[.]” The trial justice gave the self-defense 

instruction only with respect to the charges of assault with a dangerous weapon and 

discharge of a firearm during a crime of violence. That self-defense instruction 

stated, in part:

“The law of self-defense holds that a person may defend 

himself whenever he reasonably believes that he is in 

imminent danger of bodily harm from another. A person 

harboring such a reasonable fear need not wait for the 

other person to strike first. However, such a person must 
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use only such force as is reasonably necessary under all 

the circumstances to protect himself.

“* * *

“Although the State is obliged to negate the claim of 

self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt, you must also 

bear in mind that a defendant may not invoke the doctrine 

of self-defense if he has instigated the combative 

confrontation or has knowingly assisted in creating this 

occurrence.

“Self-defense is based on necessity, and a defendant is not 

entitled or permitted to provoke a difficulty, thereby 

creating necessity, and then attempt to justify his conduct 

as an act of self-defense.” 

After deliberations, the jury found defendant guilty of first-degree robbery of 

Kemp (count one); conspiracy to commit robbery(count two); discharging a firearm 

during a crime of violence, namely, robbery or attempted robbery resulting in injury 

to Kemp (count three); assaulting Kemp with a dangerous weapon (count four);

unlawfully possessing a pistol without a license as to both McLean’s gun and 

Kemp’s gun (counts five and seven); and unlawfully possessing a pistol after 

previously being convicted of a felony, as to both guns(counts six and eight). 

At sentencing, the trial justice noted that defendant was also adjudged a 

probation violator as to three other cases and ordered defendant to serve sixty-six 

monthsin each case. As to the case at bar, defendant was sentenced to a life sentence 

as to count one; ten years suspended, with probation, concurrent with the life 

sentence, as to count two; twenty years without parole with ten years to serve, 
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consecutive to the life sentence, as to count three; twenty years to serve, concurrent 

with the life sentence, as to count four; ten years suspended, with probation, 

consecutive to the count three sentence, as to count five; ten years to serve, 

concurrent with the life sentence, as to count six; ten years suspended, with 

probation, consecutive to the count three sentence, as to count seven; and ten years 

to serve, concurrent with the life sentence, as to count eight. The previously 

suspended probationary time was to be served concurrently with the new sentence 

imposed. 

A judgment of conviction was entered on January 15, 2019. The defendant 

filed a timely notice of appeal on January 22, 2019. 

II

Discussion

A

Jury Instructions

The defendant argues that the trial justice committed reversible error in 

refusing to instruct the jury about the withdrawal exception to the initial aggressor 

rule as it relates to the self-defense instruction. The defendant contends that he 

surrendered in good faith to Kemp, communicated that to Kemp, and was still 

confronted by deadly force. The state replies that the withdrawal exception is not 
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recognized in Rhode Island, and that, even if it were, the exception is not applicable 

here. 

1

Standard of Review

This Court reviews “jury instructions on a de novo basis.” State v. Ros, 973 

A.2d 1148, 1166 (R.I. 2009). “It is well established that, ‘on review, we examine 

jury instructions in their entirety to ascertain the manner in which a jury of ordinary 

intelligent lay people would have understood them.’” Id.(brackets omitted) (quoting 

State v. Ibrahim, 862 A.2d 787, 796 (R.I. 2004)). “This Court will not examine a 

single sentence apart from the rest of the instructions, but rather the challenged 

portions must be examinedin the context in which they were rendered.” Id.(brackets 

omitted) (quoting Ibrahim, 862 A.2d at 796). “A trial justice’s refusal to grant a 

request for jury instruction is not reversible error if the requested charge is fairly 

covered in the general charge.” State v. Hallenbeck, 878 A.2d 992, 1008 (R.I. 2005)

(brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022, 1044 (R.I. 2004)). 

“Pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 8-2-38, ‘we determine whether the jury charge 

sufficiently addresses the requested instructions and correctly states the applicable 

law.’” Ros, 973 A.2d at 1166 (quoting State v. Graham, 941 A.2d 848, 855 (R.I. 

2008)). “In so doing, we examine the record in a light most favorable to the 
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defendant.” State v. Soler, 140 A.3d 755, 759-60 (R.I. 2016) (quoting State v. 

Pineda, 13 A.3d 623, 631 (R.I. 2011)).

2

The Withdrawal Exception

In regard to a self-defense instruction, “we have held that a trial justice is 

obligated to give a proposed instruction on self-defense ‘regardless of how slight 

and tenuous the evidence may be on which the self-defense hypothesis is 

advanced.’” State v. Martin, 68 A.3d 467, 474 (R.I. 2013) (quoting State v. Linde, 

876 A.2d 1115, 1130 (R.I. 2005)). However, “we have affirmed a trial justice’s 

refusal to give a proposed instruction where there was an ‘incongruent self-defense 

theory proffered by the defendant to the trial justice and a dearth of evidence 

applicable to a properly articulated theory.’” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Pineda, 

13 A.3d at 634). 

“In fact, we have cautioned that an instruction that is unsupported by the 

evidence adduced at trial runs the risk of confusing or misleading the jury and thus 

should not be given.” Martin, 68 A.3d at 474. “[W]e also have observed that ‘one 

may not invoke the doctrine of self-defense if he or she has instigated the combative 

confrontation.’” Linde, 876 A.2d at 1130 (quoting State v. Martinez, 652 A.2d 958, 

961 (R.I. 1995)). “Self-defense is grounded on necessity, and one cannot provoke a 

difficulty, thus creating the necessity, and then justify the resulting homicide or 
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injury as an act of necessity and self-defense.” Id. (quoting State v. Guillemet, 430 

A.2d 1066, 1069 (R.I. 1981)).

For the first time, this Court addresses the application of the withdrawal 

exception to the initial aggressor rule in relation to self-defense. The United States 

Supreme Court has said that, under certain circumstances, “[i]t should [be] submitted 

to the jury whether the act of the accused * * * was intended to be, and should have 

been reasonably interpreted as being, a withdrawal by the accused in good faith from 

further controversy[.]” Rowe v. United States, 164 U.S. 546, 554-55 (1896). Other 

jurisdictions have outlined the test to determine whether the withdrawal exception is 

appropriate. “[T]he doctrine of communicated withdrawal may not be invoked 

unless the aggressor’s intent to withdraw is clearly made known to his victim.” State 

v. Diggs, 592 A.2d 949, 951 (Conn. 1991). In other words, “[o]nly in the event that 

he communicates to his adversary his intent to withdraw and in good faith attempts 

to do so is he restored to his right of self-defense.” United States v. Desinor, 525 

F.3d 193, 198-99 (2nd Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Taylor, 510 F.2d 1283, 

1287 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).

The defendant argues that, in moving towards the door and putting his hands 

up, he clearly withdrew and communicated his withdrawal to Kemp, who continued 

to scream at the three men and point his gun at them. The state, on the other hand, 

notes the short time span of this event and that defendant moved to ultimately have 
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an advantage over Kemp, by jumping on his back, with merely fifty-three seconds 

elapsing between defendant’s entrance into the store and Kemp getting shot. 

We recognize that the trial justice carefully considered our past jurisprudence 

in providing a self-defense instruction in the case at bar. As stated supra, we have 

repeatedly cautioned the trial courts to “instruct the jury on self-defense regardless 

of how ‘slight and tenuous the evidence may be on which the self-defense hypothesis 

is advanced.’” Linde, 876 A.2d at 1130 (quoting State v. Butler, 107 R.I. 489, 496, 

268 A.2d 433, 436 (1970)). However, one must scour the videotape footage very 

carefully to detect even a scintilla of evidence that defendant was entitled to a 

self-defense instruction. There is no question that defendant, entering the pawnshop 

with others who were armed to rob it, was the initial aggressor here;defendant does 

not dispute this. Therefore, his only remaining avenue under a self-defense theory 

was through the application of the withdrawal exception, which has never been 

adopted in this jurisdiction. 

Even if this Court were to adopt the withdrawal exception to the initial 

aggressor rule, we do not find that defendant satisfied the requirements under that 

exception as a matter of law. Under such a theory, defendant had to show not only 

that he had withdrawn, but also that the dangerous situation that he and his 

companions had created had dissipated. See Desinor, 525 F.3d at 199. We first note 

that any evidence that defendant had withdrawn was tenuous; defendant had his 
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hands up for less than thirty seconds, and, at his first opportunity, got behind Kemp 

and attacked him. However, even if defendant had presented evidence that he had 

withdrawn, which we do not find, he presented no evidence that the robbery 

dissipated. In fact, after Kemp was shot, defendant and McLean continued on with 

the robbery, collecting various items from the pawnshop. Accordingly, defendant 

did not present sufficient evidence to warrant a jury instruction on the withdrawal 

exception.

Thus,it is clear to usthat the trial justice was decidedly generous in giving an 

instruction on self-defense. We are convinced, however, that defendant was not

entitled to a jury instruction as to the withdrawal exception to the initial aggressor 

rule under a self-defense theory, an exception that we need not, and do not, adopt in 

the context of this case. 

B

Bill of Particulars

The defendant additionally argues that the trial justice abused his discretion 

in denying defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars and motion to compel such 

because two separate acts could have established the single count of assault with a 

dangerous weapon. The state responded that defendant was not entitled to a bill of 

particulars because the indictment was sufficiently worded to provide adequate 

notice to defendant. 
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Rule 7(f) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

“Upon motion of a defendant the court shall direct the 

filing of a bill of particulars. A motion for a bill of 

particulars may be made within thirty (30) days after 

arraignment or at such later time as the court may permit. 

A bill of particulars may be amended at any time subject 

to such conditions as justice requires.”

However, this Court has addressed situations where a bill of particulars was not 

presented. In State v. Mollicone, 654 A.2d 311 (R.I. 1995), we held:

“Although Rule 7(f) is expressed in mandatory terms, we 

have noted * * * that ‘the function of a bill of particulars 

is to provide the defendant with the factual detail omitted 

from an indictment or information. Its primary purpose is 

to supply the defendant with such particulars as are 

necessary in order that judicial surprise is avoided at 

trial.’” Mollicone, 654 A.2d at 325 (brackets omitted)

(quoting State v. Collins, 543 A.2d 641, 654 (R.I. 1988)).

Further, we have recognized that “the granting of a bill of particulars in any civil or 

criminal proceeding is within the discretion of the justice who hears the motion and 

his [or her] discretion will not be disturbed unless it appears that there has been an 

abuse of discretion.” State v. Gregson, 113 A.3d 393, 397(R.I. 2015) (quoting Union 

Mortgage Co. v. Rocheleau, 51 R.I. 345, 348, 154 A. 658, 660 (1931)).

As to the indictment, the trial justice noted that it “is very specific with respect 

to the assault charge. It is a charge of assault with a dangerous weapon, namely, a 

firearm. The video has been provided to counsel[.]” He went on: “[W]here the State 
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has provided ample discovery and the indictment contains specific allegations, a bill 

of particulars is not appropriate.” (Citing Mollicone, cited supra.)

We agree with the trial justice. Considering the specific allegations in the 

indictment and the discovery provided by the state—including the video of the entire 

encounter—we are of the opinion that the trial justice did not err in denying the 

motion for a bill of particulars and the subsequent motion to compel such, underthe 

circumstances of the case.

III

Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, the defendant’s appeal is denied, and the 

judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed. The record shall be returned to the 

Superior Court. 
SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2020)

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 

SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE

Licht Judicial Complex

250 Benefit Street

Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case State v. Reginald Isom.

Case Number No. 2019-318-C.A.

(P1/15-3840BG)

Date Opinion Filed May 26, 2021

Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and 

Long, JJ.

Written By Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Robert D. Krause

Attorney(s) on Appeal

For State:

Mariana E. Ormonde

Department of Attorney General

For Defendant:

Camille A. McKenna

Department of Attorney General