UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ VALERIE ANNE SCHLECHT, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION, Defendant - Appellee. No. 14-1513 (D.C. No. 1:11-CV -03072-RM-BNB) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before TYMKOVICH , HOLMES , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Valerie Anne Schlecht, appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of her em ployer, defendant Lockheed Martin Corporation (LMC), on her disability discri mination claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. The facts are thoroughly and accurately set forth in the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation (R&R) and the di strict court’s order adopting the R&R and granting summary judgment; therefore, we recite only the most salient facts.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### September 28, 2015
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 I. Schlecht was employed with LMC as an optical engineer. In 2007, she was assigned to work on LMC’s Orion space shuttle project. Her wages were garnished in July 2008 and again in June 2009. In July 2009, she asked LMC to notify her immediately if it was served with anot her wage garnishment because she suffered from attention deficit disorder (ADD). In September 2009, she asked LMC to notify her within two days of receiving a garnishm ent order and to give her an accounting and explanation of the order before adjust ing her paycheck. Schlecht’s wages were not garnished again, however. In 2009, the Orion project was delayed, so LMC assigned Schlecht to different tasks. This work was not profitable for LMC or related to her optical engineering skills. In August 2009, LM C’s president told its empl oyees that it expected to eliminate approximately 800 positions beca use of federal budget cuts. Schlecht was told she would be included in this reduc tion-of-force. The funding for the Orion project was cut in 2010, and LMC laid of f approximately 490 employees in 2009 and 2010. LMC laid off Sc hlecht in June 2010. Schlecht then filed a pro se complain t alleging LMC violat ed her rights under the Americans with Disabi lities Act (ADA). She a lleges she suffers from ADD, major anxiety disorder, and pos t-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which cause her to have an irrational, paralyzing fear th at she would be harmed by LMC payroll processes. She alleged that LMC failed to accommodate these di sabilities, subjected her to a hostile work environment because of these disabilities, and terminated her3 both because of her disabili ties and in retaliation for he r attempt to obtain an ADA accommodation. LMC moved fo r summary judgment. Because Schlecht did not have any direct evidence of disability discrimination, she was required to establis h first a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that she “(1) is a disabled person as defi ned by the ADA; (2) is qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the job . . . ; and (3) suffered discrimination by an employe r . . . because of that disability.” EEOC v. C.R. England, Inc. , 644 F.3d 1028, 1037-38 (10t h Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). To satisfy the third prong, “a plaintiff generally must show that [s]he has suffered an adverse empl oyment action because of the disability.” Id . at 1038 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court assumed for the sake of argument that Schlecht was disabled as defined by the ADA, and it is undisputed that she su ffered an adverse employment action. Although Schlecht al leged LMC failed to make several requested disability accommodations, the di strict court ruled that she only produced evidence relating to her garnishment accomm odation requests. The district court ruled these accommodation requests were moot, however, because LMC never received another garnishment order afte r that accommodation request. Thus, it dismissed her ADA accomm odation claim. It also dismissed her ADA hostile work environment claim because Schlecht did not produce any evidence of a hostile work environment.4 As to Schlecht’s termination and retaliati on claims, the district court ruled that LMC presented evidence it selected Schlec ht for inclusion in its company-wide reduction in force for legitimate, nondiscri minatory reasons, namely, that her work on the Orion project ended due to budget cu ts, and her skill set was too narrow to assign her to profitable work at LMC. Because LMC presented evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, “the burden th en shifted back to [Schlecht] to show that [LMC’s] proffered reason was mere pretext.” Id . at 1052. The district court ruled that Schlecht di d not carry her burden to present evidence suggesting LMC’s proffered reasons for terminating her were pretext for ADA discrimination or retaliation. Accordi ngly, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of LMC on all of Schlecht’s claims. Schlecht filed a motion to alter or ame nd the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), requesting a hearing and attaching new evidence. The district court denied the motion because Schlecht failed to demons trate an interveni ng change in the controlling law, any new eviden ce previously unavailable, or the need to correct clear error or prevent mani fest injustice. See Servants of Paraclete v. Does , 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Ci r. 2000) (detailing grounds warra nting reconsideration under Rule 59(e)). Schlecht appeals.
II. “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court.” Helm v. Kansas , 656 F.3d 1277, 1284 (10th Cir. 2011). Summary j udgment is appropriate “if th e movant shows that there5 is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the m ovant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( a). We view the summary judgment evidence “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Helm , 656 F.3d at 1284. We review for abuse of discretion the distri ct court’s discovery and sanction rulings, Lee v. Max Int’l, LLC , 638 F.3d 1318, 1320 (10th Cir. 2011) , refusal to hold a hearing, Davoll v. Webb , 194 F.3d 1116, 1142-43 ( 10th Cir. 1999), and deni al of a Rule 59(e) motion, Loughridge v. Chiles Power Supply Co. , 431 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 2005). Although we construe Schlecht’s pro se brief liberally, “our role is not to act as [her] advocate.” Gallagher v. Shelton , 587 F.3d 1063, 1067 (10th Cir. 2009). Schlecht argues on appeal th at the district court e rred by (a) not sua sponte imposing sanctions on LMC for requesting overly-broad discovery of her medical records; (b) not informing her prior to f iling her Rule 59(e) motion she was required to authenticate her summary judgment evidence; (c) not c onsidering the evidence she presented in her Rule 59(e) motion in light of her pro se stat us and disabilities; (d) not holding a hearing on her Rule 59(e) mo tion; (e) ruling she failed to make any reasonable ADA accommodation request other than her garnishment request; and (f) improperly resolving disputed issues of fact when it (i ) characterized her accommodation request as seeki ng advance notice of a garnis hment order, rather than a “present assurance” that it would give her advance noti ce, Aplt. Opening Br. at 14,6 and (ii) did not let her pres ent testimonial evidence of a hostile work environment at a summary judgment hearing. 1
We note at the outset that Schlecht’s pro se status does not excuse her from following the strict requirements of Rule 56 in order to properly contest a summary judgment motion. Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone , 600 F.3d 1301, 1310 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing a pro se litigant’s duty to comp ly with Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Ogden v. San Juan Cty. , 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10t h Cir. 1994) (stating that a party’s “ pro se status does not excuse the oblig ation of any litigant to comply with the fundamental requirements of th e Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure.”). Thus, there is no merit to Sc hlecht’s claims (b), (c), and (f) that the district court erred in re quiring her to comply with the same evidentiary and procedural rules applicable to all litigan ts. To oppose summ ary judgment, Schlecht was required to do more than provide he r conclusory assertions or subjective interpretation of the evidence; she was re quired to present ad missible evidence of material fact. Gross v. Burggr af Constr. Co ., 53 F.3d 1531, 1546 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that “[s]ufficient evid ence (pertinent to th e material issue) must be identified by reference to an affidavit, a deposition transcript, or a specific exhibit incorporated

1 Schlecht also lists a clai m (g) in which she asks th is court to “consider her arguments in support of her need for an accommodation to enjoy equal benefits and privileges as other similarly situated empl oyees, even though the district court did not.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 19. Her quite brief arguments on this issue are too vague and general to present an authentic appellate issue. Furthermore, we will not address the many new arguments that Schlecht fi rst raised in her Reply brief. See Stump v. Gates , 211 F.3d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 2000) (“This court doe s not ordinarily review issues raised for the first time in a reply brief.”).7 therein”) (internal quotation marks omitte d). “[C]onclusory allegations standing alone will not defeat a pr operly supported motion fo r summary judgment.” White v. York Int’l Corp ., 45 F.3d 357, 363 (10th Cir. 1995). Turning to Schlecht’s challenge to th e substance of the district court’s summary judgment ruling, her claims (e) and (f), we conclude the record supports the district court’s findings that the only evidence Schlecht produced of an accommodation request she made that w ould trigger ADA liability were her garnishment requests. Be cause it is undisputed that LMC did not receive any garnishment orders after her requests, the district court correctly ruled that Schlecht offered no evidence that LMC denied her any reasonable accomm odations to which she was entitled, precluding her failure -to-accommodate claim under the ADA. See Kotwica v. Rose Packing Co. , 637 F.3d 744, 747-48 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that a plaintiff alleging a failure-to-accommoda te claim must establish, among other elements, that the defendant failed to ma ke reasonable modifications to accommodate the plaintiff’s disabilities). Schlecht makes conclusory a ssertions that she tried to communicate with LMC but she produ ced no supporting evidence that she communicated to LMC any adequate request to accommodate a disability other than her garnishment request. See C.R. England , 644 F.3d at 1049 (“The request for accommodation must be sufficiently direct and specific, giving notice that [the employee] needs a special a ccommodation.” (internal quota tion marks omitted)). The record further supports the district court’s findi ng that Schlecht did not present any evidence of a hostile work envi ronment. For a hosti le environment claim8 to survive summary judgment , Schlecht was required to pr esent evidence from which a rational jury could find that her wor kplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insu lt that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms, conditions, or privile ges of employment, and th e harassment stemmed from disability-relat ed animus. See MacKenzie v. City & Cty. of Denver , 414 F.3d 1266, 1280 (10th Cir. 2005). Schlec ht did not present any such evidence. She argues she could have presented such evid ence if the district court ha d held a hearing, but it is her obligation to present documentary ev idence in response to the motion for summary judgment. See Gross , 53 F.3d at 1546. Schlech t does not challenge the district court’s rulings that she failed to present any evid ence of pretext in connection with her discriminatory discharge and retali ation claims. We agre e with the district court that there were no genu ine issues of mate rial fact allowing any of Schlecht’s ADA claims to survive summary judgment. We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not sua sponte imposing sanctions for LMC’s me dical-records discovery request (claim (a)). Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in declining to hold a hearing on either LMC’s motion for summary judgment or Schlecht’s Rule 59(e) motion (claims (d) and (f)). A district court is not require d to hold a hearing or allow oral argument on a summary judgment or Rule 59(e) motion, Nolan v. de Baca , 603 F.2d 810, 812 (10th Cir. 1979), and refusing to conduct an unnecessary h earing is not an abuse of discretion.9 As to Schlecht’s Rule 59(e) claims, we note that the district court did not deny her Rule 59(e) motion solely because her newly-submitted evidence was not authenticated or did not comp ly with the requirements of Rule 56, but more broadly because Schlecht did not demonstrate any of the grounds warranting Rule 59(e) relief. The district court pr operly refused to consider a dditional evidence in support of Schlecht’s Rule 59(e) motion where th ere was no showing “that the evidence was newly discovered or unavailable in a more timely fashion through the exercise of diligence.” Comm. for First Amendment v. Campbell , 962 F.2d 1517, 15 24 (10th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Schlecht’s Rule 59(e) moti on (claims (b) and (c)). The district court’s ju dgment is affirmed. Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich Circuit Judge