NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2009-1278 

ANATOLY ROZENBLAT, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

DAVID J. KAPPOS, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and 

Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

Anatoly Rozenblat, of Chicago, Illinois, pro se. 

Raymond T. Chen, Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and 

Trademark Office, of Arlington, Virginia, for the Director of the United States Patent and 

Trademark Office. With him on the brief were Scott C. Weidenfeller and Joseph G. 

Piccolo, Associate Solicitors. 

Appealed from: United States District Court for the District of Columbia 

Senior Judge James Robertson
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

 2009-1278 

ANATOLY ROZENBLAT, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

DAVID J. KAPPOS, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property 

and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Case No. 08-CV1909, Senior Judge James Robertson. 

___________________________ 

DECIDED: September 16, 2009 

___________________________ 

Before NEWMAN, RADER, and LINN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Mr. Anatoly Rozenblat appeals the decision of the United States District Court for the 

District of Columbia, which dismissed his complaint without prejudice because it did not 

meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rozenblat v. Dudas, No. 08-CV-1909 (D.D.C. Nov. 5, 2008). Because the district court did 

not abuse its discretion, the dismissal is affirmed. 

DISCUSSION 

Mr. Rozenblat filed a pro se complaint in the district court, with the nominal 

defendant Jon Dudas in his official capacity as Under Secretary of Commerce for 

Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office. The 

complaint questions the patentability of U.S. Patent No. 6,199,519 (“the ’519 patent”), 

entitled “Free-Piston Engine,” identified on the patent as the invention of Peter Van Blarigan 

and assigned to Sandia Corporation. The complaint alleges that the Patent and Trademark 

Office (“PTO”) illegally issued the ’519 patent in view of copyrights and publications of Mr. 

Rozenblat, stating that several claims of the ’519 patent “have similarity with my drawing 

and claims that show infringement of my above-shown intellectual works, having the early 

priority.” The complaint requests a jury trial, technical expert testimony, and arbitration. No 

information or specificity, as to any ground of asserted invalidity, was presented in the 

complaint. 

The district court held that the complaint did not meet the pleading requirements of 

Federal Rule 8(a). Rule 8(a) requires “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for 

the court’s jurisdiction . . .; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 

The Supreme Court discussed the requirements of Rule 8(a) in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

__, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009),1 holding that “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

 1

 Mr. Rozenblat has moved to strike the Director’s citation of this case, which 

was decided after briefing was complete herein, as “supplemental authority.” The motion is 

denied. 

2009-1278 2
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 129 S. Ct. at 

1949 (citation omitted) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 

Dismissal under Rule 8(a) is a procedural aspect we review in accordance with the 

law of the regional circuit. Cf. McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1355-56 (Fed. 

Cir. 2007) (applying law of the regional circuit in reviewing dismissal under Federal Rule 

12(b)(6)). The D.C. Circuit reviews the dismissal of an action where a complaint violates 

Rule 8(a) “only to determine whether the court abused its discretion.” Ciralsky v. C.I.A., 

355 F.3d 661, 668 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 

On appeal, Mr. Rozenblat states that the district court failed to properly apply 35 

U.S.C. §§102(a)–(b), 282, 283, and 301, 28 U.S.C. §1338(a), Rule 706 of the Federal 

Rules of Evidence, and Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Director 

argues that the district court properly dismissed the complaint under Rule 8(a) because “the 

complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true 

substance, if any, is well disguised,” quoting Ciralsky, 355 F.3d at 670 n.9. The Director 

also states that if the complaint is read as a challenge to the validity of the ’519 patent—

and we agree that this is a reasonable interpretation—the complaint is defective not only for 

the absence of any supporting detail, but also because a challenge to validity cannot be 

brought in a suit against the Director of the PTO. 

Giving liberal interpretation to Mr. Rozenblat’s complaint, he has not met the 

requirements of the Rule. He has presented no viable legal theory for suing the Director of 

the PTO, although he was advised in earlier cases on the same issue that this remedy was 

2009-1278 3
2009-1278 4

not available. See Rozenblat v. Sandia Corp. [and Peter Van Blarigan and the Patent and 

Trademark Office], No. 04 C 3289, 2005 WL 1126879 (N.D. Ill. May 2, 2005); No. 05-1556, 

2006 WL 678923 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 17, 2006). The Director again points out that invalidation 

of an issued patent by the PTO is available only through an interference proceeding, 35 

U.S.C. §135, or reexamination, 35 U.S.C. §§301-318. Such proceedings are not referred 

to in this filing in the district court. In Syntex (U.S.A.) Inc. v. U.S. Patent & Trademark 

Office, 882 F.2d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1989), the court summarized that 

every perceived injury caused by improper agency action does not carry a 

right to immediate judicial redress. A right to immediate judicial review must 

be granted or reasonably inferred from a particular statute. For example, a 

potential infringer may not sue the PTO seeking retraction of a patent issued 

to another by reason of its improper allowance by the PTO. A remedy must 

await confrontation with the patent owner. 

Id. at 1576. Absent any colorable basis for suing the Director, and absent exhaustion of 

any administrative remedies, see McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969) (“The 

doctrine [of exhaustion of administrative remedies] provides ‘that no one is entitled to 

judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy 

has been exhausted.’”) (quoting Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-

51 (1938))), the district court could not provide any relief to Mr. Rozenblat. 

The dismissal of the complaint is affirmed.