TESTIMONY

OF

ROBERT M. CALIFF, M.D.

COMMISSIONER OF FOOD AND DRUGS

FRANK YIANNAS, M.P.H.

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, FOOD POLICY AND RESPONSE

SUSAN T. MAYNE, PH.D.

DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY AND APPLIED NUTRITION

FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Formula Safety And Supply: Protecting The Health Of America’s Babies

MAY 25, 2022

RELEASE ONLY UPON DELIVERY
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Introduction

Chair DeGette, Ranking Member Griffith, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting us 

here today to testify before you on supply disruptions in infant formula. We have all seen the images of 

empty store shelves and heard the stories of parents of kids unable to find the food their children need to 

survive. This situation is unacceptable. The staff at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA or the 

Agency) feel this not just as public servants whose job it is to ensure that these critical products are safe 

and nutritious, but also as parents and grandparents. Our top priority now is addressing the dire need for 

infant formula in the U.S. market, and our teams are working night and day to help make that happen.

At the same time, we have begun an after-action review to evaluate our own performance. We appreciate 

the opportunity to discuss conditions at the Abbott Nutrition facility in Sturgis, Michigan, which led to 

the recall that contributed to the current supply disruptions; our infant formula supply chain monitoring 

and mitigation efforts; and additional tools necessary if we are to prevent, monitor, and mitigate any 

future infant formula supply disruptions.

Inspection of Abbott Nutrition’s Sturgis, Michigan, Facility

On September 20, 2021, FDA learned of a Cronobacter infection in an infant who reportedly consumed 

powdered infant formula produced at Abbott Nutrition’s Sturgis, Michigan, facility. FDA immediately 

reported this case to Abbott Nutrition and immediately followed up on the complaint, including testing 

formula associated with this case complaint. No Cronobacter was recovered from the product after FDA 

testing.

On November 17, 2021, FDA received a complaint involving an infant with Salmonella infection. FDA 

and our partners at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) eventually determined this 

event was unrelated to the other cases.

FDA received the second complaint involving an infant with Cronobacter infection on December 1, 2021. 

We again collected intact samples of powdered formula; no Cronobacter was recovered. We also notified 

Abbott Nutrition about this case.

Because Cronobacter is not a nationally reportable disease, isolates of the pathogens had not routinely 

undergone genomic analyses, as would occur with pathogens like Salmonella. In 2021 there was no 

genetic evidence available for us to know if these two cases from 2021 were linked by whole genome 

sequencing.

But given the two case complaints and the potential severity of Cronobacter infections, along with a 

complaint from a former employee at the Sturgis facility, on December 6, 2021, FDA initiated 

inspectional planning for a for-cause inspection at the Sturgis facility with an anticipated inspection date 

in early January 2022. We notified Abbott Nutrition of the planned inspection on December 30, 2021. 

Abbott Nutrition responded by notifying FDA of approximately a dozen COVID-19-positive employees 

in its facility. Although we delayed our inspection temporarily because of these COVID-19 infections,

FDA commenced our inspection on January 31, 2022.

FDA received a third report of an infant Cronobacter illness on January 11, 2022, while the facility’s

COVID-19 outbreak delayed FDA’s inspection. Again, FDA tested product associated with this illness, 

found no Cronobacter, and notified Abbott Nutrition.
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FDA learned of a fourth case of Cronobacter infection on February 17, 2022, the date on which Abbott 

Nutrition initiated a voluntary recall and FDA issued a consumer advisory.

Infants in all four cases were hospitalized, and Cronobacter may have contributed to deaths in two cases.

All of the infants are reported to have consumed powdered infant formula produced at Abbott Nutrition’s 

Sturgis facility. The Agency investigated each complaint and analyzed product from the consumers’ 

homes when available. FDA also notified Abbott Nutrition after receiving each complaint.

The CDC receives reports on foodborne disease outbreaks from state, local, and territorial health 

departments. On average, CDC receives two to four Cronobacter case reports annually; however, because 

Cronobacter infection is not reportable in most states, the total number of cases that occur in the United 

States each year is not known. Thus, the four cases that came to our attention between September 20, 

2021, and February 17, 2022, raised concerns. Despite this very unusual combination of events, we do not 

have definitive evidence proving that insanitary conditions of the Sturgis facility actually caused the 

Cronobacter illnesses of these infants.

We have included this timeline in Appendix A, and we have processes under review to develop better 

systems within FDA.

In sum, awareness of the four Cronobacter cases offered an evolving fact pattern, leading us to initiate a

for-cause inspection, but our inspection dramatically altered the fact pattern.

Sanitary environmental conditions and well-maintained equipment are the most basic, minimal conditions 

needed for a manufacturer to produce dry powdered infant formula that is free of bacterial contamination. 

The FDA inspection team observed significant operational deficiencies in Abbott Nutrition’s Sturgis 

facility during the January 2022 inspection. The totality of evidence obtained during our inspection 

caused FDA to conclude that infant formulas produced at this plant were produced under insanitary 

conditions and may be contaminated with Cronobacter. We based our conclusions on the following 

evidence:

• FDA investigators collected multiple samples from swabs in the facility’s environment, which 

later tested positive for Cronobacter sakazakii.

• FDA investigators observed serious cracks in the firm’s spray dryers, key pieces of equipment for 

producing powdered products and an issue that has been linked to at least one historical 

foodborne illness outbreak in powdered infant formula at a different facility.

• FDA investigators also found water leaks and condensation, which are risk factors for 

Cronobacter, in areas where dry powdered formula was produced.

• Employees in the facility lacked adequate handwashing technique.

• A review of the firm’s internal records also indicated environmental contamination with 

Cronobacter sakazakii and the firm’s destruction in 2019 and 2020, respectively, of two batches 

of finished product due to the presence of Cronobacter.
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• FDA investigators noted that Abbott Nutrition did not establish a system of process controls 

covering all stages of processing designed to ensure that infant formula does not become 

adulterated due to the presence of microorganisms in the formula or in the processing 

environment.

• FDA also noted that Abbott Nutrition did not ensure that all surfaces that contacted infant 

formula were maintained to protect infant formula from being contaminated by any source.

FDA investigators collected numerous product and environmental samples during the inspection. Product 

samples FDA collected at Abbott Nutrition’s Sturgis facility and analyzed for Cronobacter tested 

negative. It is well documented in the scientific literature, however, that end product testing is unlikely to 

detect low levels of contamination. In contrast, five environmental subsample surface swabs collected 

from the facility tested positive for Cronobacter sakazakii; four of these instances of contamination were 

detected by FDA-initiated testing, and one was detected through simultaneous firm-initiated testing. The 

positive Cronobacter sakazakii environmental samples collected at Abbott Nutrition’s Sturgis facility 

have been analyzed using whole genome sequencing, revealing five different strains of Cronobacter 

sakazakii. While none of these environmental samples matched the limited (two) clinical samples from 

infants ill with Cronobacter, these findings remain a serious concern, as environmental sources of 

Cronobacter in infant formula manufacturing plants have been identified as one of the most likely sources 

of contamination.

As soon as the Agency received these positive environmental sampling results in February 2022, we 

communicated with Abbott Nutrition about the need for the firm to issue a voluntary recall. Abbott 

Nutrition voluntarily ceased production at the Sturgis facility two days prior to the recall, and FDA 

supported this decision given the insanitary conditions at the facility. On February 17, 2022, we issued a 

public communication advising consumers not to use the affected products. Abbott Nutrition initiated a 

voluntary recall the same day.

Insanitary conditions of this kind are unacceptable in all food manufacturing facilities, but especially in 

areas producing dry powdered formulas that serve as the sole source of nutrition for infants. Finding 

pathogens in finished product during routine testing also generally indicates a potentially serious loss of 

sanitary process control during manufacturing. FDA would expect any manufacturer with a robust quality 

assurance program to identify and quickly take corrective action when such conditions are present.

FDA knew that restarting the Sturgis, Michigan, facility was critical, because it was one of three plants 

run by a company with the largest market share, and many of its specialty formula products cannot be 

quickly manufactured at other facilities. We also became aware that Abbott Nutrition lacked a 

contingency plan to produce its lines of specialty metabolic and amino acid formulas that serve as a sole 

source of nutrition for thousands of infants with metabolic disorders. We lost confidence that Abbott 

Nutrition had the appropriate safety and quality culture and commitment to fix these problems quickly. 

FDA was left with limited options. Given the market share that Abbott Nutrition had for regular and

critically needed specialty metabolic and amino acid formulas, FDA decided to negotiate a consent decree 

with the company rather than seeking a court order of permanent injunction through a contested process. 

A consent decree was the best option, giving FDA more control over the outcome, and was more likely to 

result in a safe resumption of operations by Abbott Nutrition at the Sturgis facility.
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With the urgent public health need in mind, FDA, along with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western 

District of Michigan, moved as quickly as possible through the negotiation process. In fact, the process 

here was shorter than it often is for obtaining a consent decree. FDA made clear its expectations for a safe 

reopening of the facility. Even still, because it was a negotiation process with a regulated firm, the U.S.

government did not completely control the timeline. Moreover, FDA’s negotiations needed to be 

informed by our inspection of the Sturgis facility, which did not close until March 18, 2022, to ensure that 

the consent decree would fully address all observed violations.

FDA’s and U.S. Government Actions to Increase the Supply of Specialty Metabolic Formulas

When we talk about the infant formula supply chain, we really need to consider multiple supply chains, 

including, but not limited to, the supply of infant formula for healthy infants, another for infants with 

allergies and/or medical conditions who need hypoallergenic amino acid formulas, and another for infants 

who have very serious medical conditions, such as inborn errors of metabolism, and require unique 

specialty metabolic formulas. Abbott Nutrition dominates the market for many of the amino acid-based 

and metabolic formulas. Unfortunately, the only site where Abbott Nutrition produces these critical 

products is the Sturgis plant. Thus, the Agency immediately had to consider the potential impact a recall 

of these specialty formulas could have on infant health.

FDA decided to exempt specialty metabolic products from the recall and required that the current stock of 

these formulas in storage would be subject to third-party review before release. Some of the infants who 

were using these non-recalled products could potentially be switched to comparable products, but 

transitioning is not always well tolerated or possible and thus requires clinical input from the child’s 

health care provider. For this reason, we coordinated with groups such as the American Academy of 

Pediatrics, Genetic Metabolic Dietitians International, and the Society of Inherited Metabolic Disorders so 

providers would be prepared to advise their patients whether switching products was appropriate. We also 

coordinated with the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Special Supplemental Nutrition Program 

for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), and made them aware of the pending recall in advance of it 

occurring. To help support supply chains, our infant formula team had to determine for each of these 

products what comparable products might exist from other infant formula manufacturers and request that 

they increase production of these products as much as possible. These efforts included seeking available 

inventory outside of the domestic market.

FDA worked with Abbott Nutrition to identify and prioritize specialty and metabolic formulas and asked 

Abbott Nutrition to establish a process to provide these formulas to those in need on a case-by-case basis. 

After the third-party audit concluded, Abbott Nutrition began releasing these critical products on a caseby-case basis. In these circumstances, the benefit of allowing caregivers, in consultation with their 

healthcare providers, to access these products may outweigh the potential risk of bacterial infection. FDA 

determined that the case-by-case release of these priority products is the best solution prior to resuming 

production of them at Abbott Nutrition’s Sturgis facility. Since Abbott Nutrition did not have a plan or 

any capability to produce these critical, lifesaving products at another of their facilities, case-by-case 

release was the only option. FDA continues to use all levers we have, including Operation Fly Formula, 

to be able to increase the supply of these formulas, which come from an even more limited set of 

manufacturers than general infant formula. The first airlifts of infant formula as part of Operation Fly 

Formula are amino acid and hypoallergenic hydrolyzed formulas that are most critically needed. We note 

that having access to good data on the availability of specialty and metabolic formulas is challenging; 

measures useful to assess the supply of general formula such as those from Information Resources Inc. 
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(IRI) (discussed below), are not informative for these products, as they are not always sold in traditional 

retail settings.

FDA’s Work with Partners to Increase the Broader Infant Formula Supply

The United States was facing infant formula supply chain stress even before the Abbott Nutrition recall 

began on February 17, 2022. Abbott Nutrition’s voluntary recall and subsequent voluntary cessation of 

operations at its Sturgis plant in February further destabilized the infant formula supply chain. Prior to the 

voluntary recall of several infant formula products produced at the Abbott Nutrition facility, FDA was 

working to address supply chain issues associated with the pandemic, including those impacting the infant 

formula industry. Our efforts to help support an all-of-government supply chain response included regular 

engagement with the Infant Nutrition Council of America (INCA), and its members, to identify 

challenges they were facing. Beginning immediately after the recall in February, this work greatly 

intensified, and the Agency has been working extensively with Abbott Nutrition and other manufacturers 

to bring safe products to the U.S. market as quickly as possible.

FDA’s intra-agency group includes experts from the Office of Food Policy and Response (OFPR) and the 

Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN). They began evaluating infant formula supply 

chain implications prior to the recall, met with USDA, and ensured that U.S. government supply chain 

partners were engaged at the highest levels. FDA and USDA, as co-leads for Food and Agriculture Sector 

Risk Management, provided regular updates to the White House regarding overall supply chain concerns, 

including information about infant formula. Since the first day, FDA has worked tirelessly with U.S.

government partners to mitigate the supply chain disruption for both regular and specialty formulas.

It is important to understand that only facilities experienced in and already producing infant formula and 

specialty metabolic products are in a position to make products that would not pose significant health 

risks to consumers. Infant formulas for healthy, full-term infants are complex in terms of formulation, 

processing, and other considerations to achieve required levels of 30 different nutrients and to avoid 

excessive levels of 10 nutrients that can be toxic when levels are too high. Formulas for low birth weight

or premature infants, or those with serious health conditions, are even more complex; for example, 

hypoallergenic formulas need to be manufactured to ensure cross-contact with other formulas made in a 

facility does not occur.

FDA continues taking key steps to help increase the supply of infant formula in the United States. FDA is 

leveraging all tools at our disposal to support the supply of infant formula products:

• Meeting regularly with major infant formula manufacturers to better understand and maximize 

their capacity to increase production of various types of infant formulas and essential medical 

foods. The infant formula industry is already working to maximize their production to meet new 

demands. Efforts already underway by several infant formula manufacturers include optimizing 

processes and production schedules to increase product output, as well as prioritizing product 

lines that are of greatest need, particularly specialty formulas.

• Helping manufacturers bring safe product to the market by expediting review of notifications of 

manufacturing changes that will help increase supply, particularly in the case of the specialized 

formulas for medical needs.

• Monitoring the status of the infant formula supply by using the Agency’s 21 Forward food supply 

chain continuity system, combined with external data. Originally designed to address the broader 
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food supply during the pandemic, FDA has adapted 21 Forward to monitor and support infant 

formula supplies by adding additional data sets to provide more frequent and granular 

information about infant formula product availability and sales.

• Compiling data on trends for in-stock rates at both national and regional levels to help understand 

whether the right amount of infant formula is available in the right locations, and if not, where it 

should go.

• Implementing a new process to temporarily exercise enforcement discretion, on a case-by-case 

basis, for certain requirements that apply to infant formula. These flexibilities, applicable to both 

imported and domestically produced infant formula, will augment supply volume while meeting 

FDA’s criteria for labeling, nutrition standards, and safety testing. Within a week, FDA informed 

two foreign manufacturers that they could use this pathway to import their infant formula, and we 

are evaluating multiple other promising requests.

• Expediting the necessary certificates to allow flexibility in the movement of already permitted 

products from abroad into the United States.

• Offering a streamlined import entry review process for certain products coming from foreign 

facilities with favorable inspection records.

• Exercising enforcement discretion on minor labeling issues to help increase volume of product 

available as quickly as possible.

• Continuing outreach to retailer stakeholder groups to request that their members consider placing 

purchase limits on some products to protect infant formula inventories for all consumers.

In broader whole-of-government efforts, agencies are working together to improve the supply of infant 

formula to American families by:

• Invoking the Defense Production Act, directing firms to prioritize and allocate the production of 

key infant formula inputs to help increase production and speed up supply chains.

• Launching Operation Fly Formula, coordinating the Department of Health and Human Services 

and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to leverage Department of Defense contracts with 

commercial air cargo lines to pick up overseas infant formula that meets U.S. health and safety 

standards, so it can get to store shelves faster. Bypassing regular air freighting routes will speed 

up the importation and distribution of formula and serve as an immediate support as 

manufacturers continue to ramp up production.

• Offering state health commissioners flexibilities through WIC to determine products that may be 

substituted for recalled products, allow families to purchase different container sizes and physical 

forms, allow purchase of noncontract brands, and waive retailer minimum stocking requirements 

to allow formula to transfer to where it is most needed. We thank Congress for passing the Access 

to Baby Formula Act of 2022 to expand access to baby formulas for certain American families 

during this supply chain disruption, but we know that still more remains to be done to ensure 

industry consolidation and sole-source purchasing contracts do not put future American families 

in this situation again.

• Addressing price gouging and unfair market practices by calling on retailers to issue purchasing 

limits, as well as engaging with state attorneys general to encourage them to user their power to 

monitor and act on price gouging and predatory behavior. In addition, the Administration has 
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asked the Federal Trade Commission to use all of its available tools to monitor and investigate 

illegal and predatory conduct.

FDA has been working closely with all major infant formula manufacturers to mitigate supply disruption. 

All manufacturers already in the U.S. market have increased production to capacity. However, FDA lacks 

authority, resources, or dedicated staff to predict, detect, and respond to supply chain issues for infant 

formula and medical foods – although we have requested authority to do so since 2020, including in our 

fiscal year (FY) 2022 and FY 2023 budget requests. FDA developed this legislative proposal because we 

were well aware that the U.S. infant formula supply chain was dominated by a small number of actors 

with only a handful of manufacturing facilities – making it at high risk for disruption by any single event 

or stressor. Even without the authorities to compel submission of supply chain data, FDA took numerous 

steps to request these data and shore up supply to the extent we received cooperation of firms.

Following FDA’s efforts, the major infant formula manufacturers are producing at increased capacity and 

have been further optimizing their lines to produce more infant formula to meet current demand. In the 

month of April, consumers purchased more infant formula than they did in the four weeks prior to the 

recall, which is a good indication that powdered infant formula availability is headed in the right 

direction. Data from IRI show nearly 80 percent in-stock rates for the week ending May 15, 2022,

(compared to 89 to 90 percent in-stock rates before the Abbott Nutrition recall; see figure 1). This means 

that if a local supermarket normally carries 50 different infant formula products, an 80 percent in-stock 

rate translates to 40 of those 50 product types being available. But we understand – as parents and 

grandparents ourselves – that many have been unable to access the products they need and that they are 

understandably frustrated and anxious.

Figure 1: National In-stock Rate 2022 Year-to-Date: Infant Formula

*Food and Drug Administra�on custom Infant Formula defini�on, excluding Electrolytes. Based on IRI CPG Supply Index tracking data. Weekly data ending 05/15/2022. Geography: All States Total, 

sum total which includes all 50 states. Measure: In Stock %.

0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

70.00%

80.00%

90.00%

100.00%

Week

Ending 01-

02-2022

Week

Ending 01-

09-2022

Week

Ending 01-

16-2022

Week

Ending 01-

23-2022

Week

Ending 01-

30-2022

Week

Ending 02-

06-2022

Week

Ending 02-

13-2022

Week

Ending 02-

20-2022

Week

Ending 02-

27-2022

Week

Ending 03-

06-2022

Week

Ending 03-

13-2022

Week

Ending 03-

20-2022

Week

Ending 03-

27-2022

Week

Ending 04-

03-2022

Week

Ending 04-

10-2022

Week

Ending 04-

17-2022

Week

Ending 04-

24-2022

Week

Ending 05-

01-2022

Week

Ending 05-

08-2022

Week

Ending 05-

15-2022

Weekly In-stock ~79% as of 

May 15, 2022

2/17/2022 Recall
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While in-stock rates have dropped gradually because of Abbott Nutrition’s inability to resume production 

as quickly as we all would like, there are some positive trends because of FDA’s call to action to the rest 

of the industry. National infant formula sales by volume for the most recent four weeks of data through 

May 8, 2022, increased 12 percent compared to the four weeks prior to the recall (see figure 2). And 

national infant formula sales by unit increased 5 percent for the most recent four weeks of data through 

May 8, 2022, compared to the four weeks prior to the recall (see figure 3).

Figure 2: Total National Volume Sales Infant Formula 2022 Year-to-Date

Figure 3: Total National Unit Sales Infant Formula 2022 Year-to-Date

**Food and Drug Administra�on custom Infant Formula defini�on, excluding Electrolytes. Based on IRI POS data, data ending 

05/08/2022 as compared to 4 weeks ending 2/13/2022, Geography: Total US - Mul� Outlet + Conv Measure: Volume Sales.

2/17/22 Recall

Comparing 4 weeks prior 

to the recall to the four 

weeks of most recent 

data (ending 5/8/22), 

sales by volume are up 

+12%

*Food and Drug Administration custom Infant Formula definition, excluding Electrolytes. Based on IRI POS data, data ending 

05/08/2022 as compared to 4 weeks ending 2/13/2022, Geography: Total US - Multi Outlet + Conv Measure: Unit Sales.

2/17/22 Recall

Comparing 4 weeks prior 

to the recall to the four 

weeks of most recent 

data (ending 5/8/22), 

unit sales are up +5%
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Through our weekly intensive discussion with manufacturers, we also know that all producers that supply 

the U.S. market have already stepped up to the challenge and are telling us they are producing at an 

expanded capacity. For example, Nestle Gerber increased the amount of its infant formula available to 

consumers by approximately 50 percent in March and April, and Reckitt is supplying more than 30

percent more product so far this year.

What these data tell us collectively is that while there is more product being produced and sold, it is of 

less variety than prior to the recall. These metrics also indicate that we are on a positive trajectory. 

However, we know that one parent not being able to find the products they want is one parent too many,

and we, also, have seen the photos of empty shelves and heard of the stressful stories of parents having to 

work extra hard to find product. This is unacceptable.

Importantly, we know that some data suppliers who use less standardized metrics have reported lower instock rates, and we believe those news reports, recited without validation, may have exacerbated the 

situation in recent weeks. Throughout the pandemic, retailers have experienced a new type of consumer 

behavior – which we can appreciate and understand – where consumers may purchase additional units to 

ensure they can stock their pantries, because of a loss in confidence that their desired products will be 

available during their next grocery shopping trip. And when it comes to ensuring their infants have access 

to a sole source of nutrition, this behavior is understandable.

As discussed above, data available to FDA show that volume sales of infant formula, as a category, are 

currently higher than they were before the Abbott Nutrition recall. However, there have been dramatic 

shifts in which products (e.g., brand, type, and size) are being sold, and the recent increases in 

consumption create empty shelves that require further ramp up of supply. In addition, there are significant 

concerns related to the availability of certain specialty formula products, such as amino acid-based 

products and formulas for individuals with inborn errors of metabolism – these are products on which 

FDA has been especially focused. Indeed, the availability of specialty and metabolic formulas remains a 

fluid and evolving situation.

The Agency’s best current assessment is that with all of the current actions, and the potential for Abbott 

Nutrition’s Sturgis facility to resume production safely in the near term, the supply of infant formula will 

continue to improve over the next several weeks. In the meantime, FDA is encouraged to see that as of 

early May, the amount of infant formula sold in the United States continues to rise.

On May 16, 2022, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan entered a consent decree 

of permanent injunction between FDA and Abbott Nutrition, as well as three Abbott Nutrition principals. 

Under the consent decree, Abbott Nutrition has agreed to take corrective actions following FDA’s

inspection of its Sturgis, Michigan, facility. The consent decree obligates Abbott Nutrition to take actions 

that are expected to ultimately result in an increase of infant formula products, while ensuring that the 

company undertakes certain actions that would ensure safe powdered infant formula is produced at the 

facility. When the company restarts production at this facility, it must conform with the provisions of the 

consent decree and meet FDA food safety standards. If contamination is identified, the company must 

notify FDA, identify the source of the problem, and conduct a root-cause investigation before resuming

production.

Modernizing Infant Formula Safety and Supply Chain Security

We take seriously our duty to prevent and respond to foodborne illnesses and food contamination events. 

FDA will be conducting an evaluation of our response to this incident and determine what additional 
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steps should be taken to ensure the maximum effectiveness of Agency programs and policies related to 

infant formula and medical food complaints, illnesses, and recalls.

More than 3.5 million babies are born in the United States each year, many of whom rely on formula at 

some point as their sole source of nutrition. FDA has nine staff devoted to reviewing infant formula 

premarket submissions for safety and nutrition. Even before the voluntary recall and production halt at 

Abbott Nutrition’s Sturgis facility, FDA’s infant formula staff faced increased workload due to COVID19 supply chain issues and increased product innovation in the infant formula industry. Furthermore, the 

war in Ukraine has caused a disruption in the supply of sunflower oil, an ingredient in many formulas, 

which has further increased FDA’s review responsibilities as manufacturers assess their supply chains and 

needs to reformulate product. Recent actions to increase imports will also increase FDA’s workload, as 

the review team must review incoming applications and collaborate with the food safety team to ensure 

that these products are both safe and nutritionally adequate.

The wide-reaching impacts of a recall from a single infant formula manufacturing facility underscore the 

risks and vulnerabilities in the supply chain when production is consolidated among few major 

manufacturers utilizing few manufacturing facilities. Building resiliency across the infant formula supply 

chain will better enable the industry to withstand any future disruptions without a significant breakdown 

in supply. To this end, we are exploring additional mechanisms to incentivize flexibility and redundancy 

of the infant formula supply chain infrastructure to increase resiliency in the infant formula industry over 

the long term. Recommendations from the White House’s 100-day supply chain review report1 with 

regard to pharmaceutical and active pharmaceutical ingredient supply chain resiliency may prove 

insightful here. In partnership with other agencies across the U.S. government, we also hope to initiate a 

broad dialogue on how contracting models for these products could be enhanced to incentivize greater 

resiliency for infant formula supply, encourage new entrants into the market, and diversify the supply 

chain, without adversely impacting programmatic costs and the number of infants served by the WIC 

contract models.

While infant formulas – and particularly specialty and metabolic formulas – are regulated by FDA as 

food, they are in many ways comparable to life-saving medications. Viewing these products through the 

lens of how FDA addresses drug shortage monitoring and mitigation supports the need for a more 

responsive mechanism to monitor for and mitigate against potential supply chain disruptions. FDA’s 

foods regulatory program has and can continue to benefit from the expertise and experience available 

within the Agency’s medical product centers in this regard. The importance of a team with clinical, 

nutritional, and analytical expertise cannot be emphasized too much.

Strengthening data and technology tools at FDA and other agencies is also critical to enhancing infant 

formula supply chain resiliency. The industry has sophisticated supply chain data enabling modeling and 

predictive analytics for the individual manufacturers and suppliers, but there is no data system to combine 

the information into a composite picture that would enable an understanding of the resiliency of the entire 

system to stresses, disruptions, and changes in demand. We need a sustainable mechanism for infant 

formula supply chain monitoring to allow us to better identify and address existing and future potential 

supply chain disruptions. A dynamic, interconnected supply chain monitoring platform and robust data 

1 The White House, Building Resilient Supply Chains, Revitalizing American Manufacturing, and Fostering Broadbased Growth: 100-day Reviews under Executive Order 14017, June 2021, available at 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/100-day-supply-chain-review-report.pdf.
11

sets are necessary to enable the Agency to be most effective in monitoring food supply chains, managing 

risks, and identifying and quickly addressing supply chain disruptions to reduce impacts on consumers.

One example of a beginning to this effort is FDA’s 21 Forward platform, which has been essential to our 

infant formula supply chain efforts. Further development of the technology will allow us to integrate, 

analyze, and monitor multiple data sets – including data on consumer purchasing, in-stock product 

availability, food facility registration, and imports – in real time to inform our response and help us focus 

on the areas of greatest need.

In the President’s FY 2023 budget request, we have also identified legislative changes that would provide 

new tools to help FDA signal our partners who control supply chain dynamics to take action that would 

prevent or mitigate shortages of infant formula and essential medical foods. Our proposal would require 

firms to notify FDA of anticipated significant interruptions in the supply of infant formula or essential 

medical foods, similar to how drug manufacturers do today. These notifications would allow the Agency 

to receive relatively imprecise – but helpful – indicators about likely or confirmed shortages in the U.S. 

marketplace, better enabling us to alert the system and stimulate the industry and government partners to 

take steps that promote the continued availability of these important foods, which often are a sole source 

of nutrition.

Another component of this proposal would be requiring manufacturers to develop and implement risk 

management plans. These are routine in most industries and have been used in our drug shortages supply 

chain oversight. These plans would identify, evaluate, and manage risks to the supply of infant formula or 

essential medical food. These plans would serve supply chain resiliency within each manufacturer, but 

they would also be available to FDA for its real-time monitoring efforts of the way they fit together to 

produce a complete picture of resiliency and vulnerability of this vital supply chain.

None of these improvements would be as useful as a digital platform that monitors the supply chain 

constantly and in real time. This industry and most others have been resistant to efforts to develop such a 

system, but until such steps are taken, the American public will be vulnerable to threats from natural 

disasters and cyberattacks as well as the quality problem that created the current infant formula situation.

Another legislative change identified in the President’s FY 2023 budget request is access to records in 

lieu of or in advance of an inspection, or, in other words, the authority to conduct remote regulatory 

assessments. Presently, FDA has such authority for drug inspections, and the Agency often relies on 

voluntary participation for remote regulatory assessments of many non-drug establishments. However, 

reliance on voluntary requests is not sufficient to achieve effective and efficient oversight, as firms can 

refuse to provide records or other information in advance of or in lieu of an inspection or to participate in 

remote regulatory assessments. We are seeking to expand the explicit statutory authority in section 

704(a)(4) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to require firms to provide records or other 

information pertaining to all FDA-regulated products. An expansion across the board, in advance of or in 

lieu of inspections, would significantly enhance FDA’s ability to obtain access remotely to records and 

other information from facilities producing infant formulas and essential medical foods, and would help 

the Agency investigate emerging supply chain issues, promote regulatory compliance, and protect the 

public health.
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Conclusion

Ensuring the availability of safe, sole-source nutrition products like infant formula is of the utmost 

importance to FDA. Our teams have been working tirelessly with all the responsible entities across 

government to address and alleviate supply issues while protecting safety, and we will continue doing 

everything within our authority to ensure the production of safe infant formula products.

Thank you, and we look forward to answering any questions you may have.
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Appendix A: Timeline of Infant Formula Recall and Supply Chain Disruption

Summary

Below is the timeline associated with ongoing stressors on the infant formula supply chain and FDA’s 

investigation and response to complaints associated with and conditions at Abbott Nutrition’s Sturgis, 

Michigan, facility.

In this investigation, FDA received a total of five case complaints (four Cronobacter cases and one 

Salmonella case). Of these complaints, four were received prior to FDA’s January 2022 inspection (three 

Cronobacter cases and one Salmonella case). FDA and CDC later determined the Salmonella case to be 

unrelated to the Abbott Nutrition facility. FDA had clinical isolates for only two of the Cronobacter

cases. Investigating case complaints takes time – product samples are taken, interviews are conducted, 

records are collected, and pathogens are sequenced. In three of the Cronobacter case complaints, the 

product samples taken during the case investigations all tested negative for Cronobacter. However, as 

FDA received additional complaints and associated details over time, a pattern emerged that suggested a 

potential problem at the Sturgis facility. The timeline below sets forth the actions that FDA took to 

investigate these cases and Abbott Nutrition’s Sturgis facility, as well as to obtain agreement from the 

company to cease production and enter into a consent decree containing a legally enforceable path 

forward to resume safe operations at the facility.

FDA has taken aggressive action to attempt to address the infant formula supply chain issues. Days after 

the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic, FDA experts became concerned that a 

disruption at a single infant formula or medical foods facility could lead to a shortage of critical

products – especially specialty metabolic and amino acid formulas. FDA developed and submitted to 

Congress a legislative proposal in March 2020 requesting supply chain authority. Despite not receiving 

such authority nor having dedicated resources, FDA stood up a system to monitor potential food supply 

chain disruptions, 21 Forward, which was funded by Acting Commissioner Janet Woodcock out of Office

of the Commissioner’s reserve funding.

Prior to Abbott Nutrition’s voluntary recall, FDA began having supply chain discussions with our federal 

partners and stakeholders, and these continued on a frequent basis. FDA ensured specialty metabolic 

formulas at Abbott Nutrition were excluded from the recall, held, and made available for those in critical 

need. Just after the recall, for example, FDA engaged with the relevant infant formula manufacturers to 

begin regular conversations about bolstering production and supply.

This timeline demonstrates areas where FDA can and must do better or be faster. A detailed internal 

review is ongoing to determine what process, policy, and authority changes can improve FDA’s response 

to infant formula investigations and recalls. For example, the FDA investigator who performed the 

September 2021 inspection at the Abbott Nutrition facility followed standard process to search for 

associated case complaints days prior to inspection, and thus during the inspection was unaware of the 

first Cronobacter complaint that FDA received. If FDA had modernized IT systems that could have 

instantly linked the first Cronobacter complaint to the IT system the investigator was using during the 

inspection, it is likely FDA’s timeline would look very different.

However, FDA’s investigation was impacted by events not fully in the Agency’s control, such as the 

emergence of the omicron variant that likely led to an outbreak of COVID-19 cases at the Sturgis plant 

that resulted in the delay of this inspection. Since Cronobacter is not a reportable pathogen, FDA is not 
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able to know if clinical cases share the same pathogen, suggesting a point source, and there is not a robust 

database of sequenced samples, which meant that FDA is not able to make rapid comparison of clinical, 

product, or environmental samples during an investigation to determine whether matches exist that can 

link a product or facility to an illness. There was also delay in the confidential complainant’s availability 

to meet with FDA. And while FDA pursued the consent decree as quickly as possible, FDA does not have 

control over how quickly negotiations resolve.

FDA’s path forward is informed by our experience. Even while responding to this supply chain crisis, we 

are working to improve our agency to make sure that we are protecting the most vulnerable members of 

our society. We are committed to coming back to this Committee after our review is complete to share 

more details on the ways we believe that FDA can improve our processes and programs, as well as any 

areas where we may need the Committee’s support for additional authorities or resources.
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