Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Epstein v. Bochko, 2017 IL App (1st) 160641

Appellate Court 

Caption

DAVID A. EPSTEIN, Cook County Public Administrator, for the 

Estate of Anna Polchanin, Deceased, Petitioner-Appellant, v. IRENE 

BOCHKO, KATERYNA SZCZUDLO, STEPHEN A. 

KUBIATOWSKI, and SELFRELIANCE UKRAINIAN AMERICAN

FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, Respondents (Selfreliance Ukrainian 

American Federal Credit Union, Respondent-Appellee).

District & No. First District, Fourth Division

Docket No. 1-16-0641

Filed May 11, 2017

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 11-P-3154; the 

Hon. Mary Ellen Coughlan, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Leinenweber, Baroni & Daffada LLC, of Chicago (Justin L. 

Leinenweber, Thomas More Leinenweber, and James V. Daffada, of 

counsel), for appellant.

Oleksiuk & Associates, P.C., of Chicago (Dmytro Kurywczak, of 

counsel), for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices McBride and Howse concurred in the judgment and opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 Irene Bochko (Bochko) and Kateryna Shchudlo1 were employed as caregivers for an 

elderly woman, Anna Polachanin (Anna). In April 2008, Shchudlo and Bochko obtained 

power of attorney for property and health care for Anna. Shortly after obtaining power of 

attorney, Shchudlo took Anna to Selfreliance Ukrainian American Federal Credit Union 

(respondent or Selfreliance) and opened a joint bank account, with Anna as the primary 

account holder. Over the next few months, Shchudlo and Bochko deposited much of Anna’s 

life savings into this joint account from her other bank accounts. Shchudlo then wired the 

money from the joint account at Selfreliance to bank accounts in Ukraine. In October 2008, a 

licensed psychiatrist evaluated Anna and concluded that she had dementia and that her 

dementia had been present for several years. The public guardian petitioned the Cook County 

circuit court for a citation to recover assets from Bochko, Shchudlo, respondent, and others. 

Shortly thereafter, Anna died, and the Cook County public administrator (petitioner) was 

appointed to supervise her estate and continued to pursue the petition. Respondent moved for 

summary judgment, and after a hearing, the court granted that motion finding that there was no 

evidence respondent knew or should have known of Anna’s mental incapacity at the time she 

opened the joint bank account. We find the circuit court properly granted respondent’s motion 

for summary judgment where there were no issues of material fact and respondent was not 

liable for the fraudulently converted funds. 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 According to petitioner’s amended petition, Anna, a 95-year-old woman, lived alone until 

2008 when she required live-in care while she recovered from surgery. A handyman who 

worked in Anna’s building, Volodymyr Bochko (Volodymyr) told Anna that his daughter, 

Bochko, would be willing to work as a caregiver for her. Shortly thereafter, Shchudlo began 

working with Bochko as Anna’s caregiver. In April 2008, Bochko and Shchudlo took Anna to 

attorney Stephen Kubiatowski’s office to prepare and execute a power of attorney for Anna. 

¶ 4 On May 31, 2008, Shchudlo took Anna to Selfreliance to open a joint bank account. As 

identification to open the account, Shchudlo presented an expired foreign passport. Valentina 

Sidelnik, the manager at Selfreliance, testified that she did not require further identification 

from Shchudlo because she already had an account with Selfreliance. Sidelnik further testified 

that neither Anna nor Shchudlo presented her with the power of attorney form because it was 

not necessary to open the account. Sidelnik testified that Anna was present, she asked to have 

the account opened, and she signed her own name on the account agreement. Sidelnik also 

noted that Anna walked into Selfreliance without assistance and spoke Ukrainian. Sidelnik 

testified that Anna told her that she wanted to open an account with Selfreliance because it was 

a Ukrainian institution. The joint account was opened with a check for more than $50,000 from 

Anna’s account at Hoyne Savings Bank. Sidelnik testified that this was not an unusual amount 

to be deposited into a new account. 

¶ 5 Between May and June 2008, more than $300,000 was transferred or deposited into the 

joint account at Selfreliance from Anna’s accounts at other financial institutions. In July 2008, 

Bochko and Shchudlo began to wire money from the joint account at Selfreliance to accounts 

 

1

Shchudlo is occasionally identified in the record as Kateryna Szczudlo or Lateryna Szczudlo. 
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in Ukraine. Between July and October 2008, more than $250,000 was transferred from the 

joint account at Selfreliance to bank accounts in Ukraine. 

¶ 6 Dr. Geoffrey Shaw, a licensed psychiatrist, evaluated Anna on October 30, 2008. After 

meeting with her, Dr. Shaw concluded that Anna was disabled by dementia and later opined 

that her dementia had been present for at least several years. Dr. Shaw testified that when Anna 

went to Selfreliance on May 31, 2008, she was suffering from dementia, but he could not offer 

an opinion regarding how she presented herself to respondent’s employees on that date. Based 

on Dr. Shaw’s report, the circuit court declared Anna a disabled person and appointed the 

public guardian as plenary guardian of Anna’s estate and person.2

 

¶ 7 On February 19, 2010, the public guardian filed an amended petition for a citation to 

recover assets from Bochko, Volodymyr, Shchudlo, Kubiatowski, and Selfreliance. Counts V 

and VI of the eight-count petition were directed at Selfreliance. In count V, the public guardian 

alleged that respondent breached a duty of care owed to Anna. The allegation stated that 

“Banks, Savings and Loans, and Credit Unions generally owe their customers a duty of 

ordinary care to maintain and guard a customer’s accounts, and protect the account holder from 

fraud, abuse and waste.” In count VI, the public guardian alleged that the account agreement 

between Anna and Selfreliance was “a nullity” because Anna was incapable of entering into 

contracts at the time she signed the account agreement with Selfreliance on May 31, 2008. The 

public guardian requested that the court rescind the May 31, 2008, account agreement and 

order Selfreliance to reconvey all of the funds from the fraudulent wire transfers. Anna died on 

May 7, 2011, and the court appointed the Cook County public administrator as the supervised 

administrator of her estate. 

¶ 8 On September 25, 2015, respondent filed a motion for summary judgment on counts V and 

VI of the amended petition. Respondent contended that it did not owe a duty of ordinary care to 

maintain and guard a customer’s accounts and protect the account holder from fraud, abuse, 

and waste. Respondent further contended that there was no evidence suggesting that it knew or 

should have known that Anna was disabled when she came to Selfreliance to open the joint 

account. In regard to count V, the circuit court found that neither the Uniform Commercial 

Code nor any Illinois authority imposed a tort duty of ordinary care between a depositor and a 

bank, except with regard to negotiable instruments. The court determined that since wire 

transfers are not negotiable instruments, Selfreliance did not breach any duty owed to Anna. 

¶ 9 With regard to count VI, seeking rescission of the May 31, 2008, account agreement, the 

court found that there were no material facts to establish that Selfreliance either knew or should 

have known of Anna’s condition at the time she opened the joint account. The court noted that

the only facts presented concerning Anna’s mental condition on the date the account was 

opened were contained in Sidelnik’s deposition testimony because Dr. Shaw testified that he 

could not offer an opinion regarding how Anna appeared on that date. Accordingly, the court 

found that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that respondent was entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law on counts V and VI. Petitioner now solely appeals the court’s 

dismissal of count VI. 

 

2Bochko was convicted of elder abuse and financial exploitation and was incarcerated. Shchudlo 

fled the country. 
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¶ 10 III. ANALYSIS 

¶ 11 On appeal, petitioner contends that the circuit court erred in granting respondent’s motion 

for summary judgment where there was a question of material fact as to whether Anna was 

mentally competent at the time she opened the joint account and it was irrelevant whether 

respondent knew or should have known about her incompetency. Petitioner asserts that 

because Anna lacked the capacity to enter into an account agreement with Selfreliance, the 

contract should be rescinded and Selfreliance should reimburse her for the loss of her life 

savings. 

¶ 12 Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits 

on file, when viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveal that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. General Casualty Insurance Co. v. Lacey, 199 Ill. 2d 281, 284 (2002). “A 

genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment exists where the material facts are 

disputed, or, if the material facts are undisputed, reasonable persons might draw different 

inferences from the undisputed facts.” Adames v. Sheahan, 233 Ill. 2d 276, 296 (2009) (citing 

Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32, 43 (2004)). We review de novo the circuit 

court’s entry of summary judgment. Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co., 183 Ill. 2d 342, 

349 (1998). 

¶ 13 A. No Genuine Issue of Material Fact 

¶ 14 Petitioner first contends that the medical records and deposition testimony created a 

question of fact regarding whether Anna was mentally competent when she opened the joint 

account with Selfreliance. In so contending, petitioner relies on the medical opinion of Dr. 

Shaw, who examined Anna in October 2008, five months after she opened the joint account at 

Selfreliance. Dr. Shaw testified that, in his opinion, Anna suffered from dementia and had 

severe problems with memory recall. In his report, Dr. Shaw noted that Anna could not recall 

the day of the week and had a limited understanding of finances. On November 9, 2008, Dr. 

Shaw issued an addendum to his report, in which he stated that he believed Anna’s dementia 

had been present for at least several years. In his deposition testimony, however, Dr. Shaw 

stated that he could not offer an opinion regarding how Anna presented herself on May 31, 

2008, when she went to Selfreliance to open the joint account. 

¶ 15 We observe that, despite contending that there was a genuine issue of material fact 

regarding Anna’s competency at the time she opened the joint account, petitioner also asserts 

in its brief that “the undisputed evidence in this case established that [Anna] was not competent 

to enter into a contract with respondent to open a joint bank account on May 31, 2008.” 

(Emphasis added.) In fact, respondent acknowledges that it does not dispute Anna’s incapacity 

at the time she opened the joint account and did not contest her competency in its motion for 

summary judgment. Rather, respondent asserts that its ignorance of her condition, as well as 

the fact that the credit union did not improperly convert her funds or otherwise defraud her, 

absolves it of any liability. 

¶ 16 Nonetheless, petitioner asserts that because the evidence of Anna’s competency was not 

disputed, the court could properly void the joint account agreement and require Selfreliance to 

return the improperly converted funds to Anna. As the trial court recognized, the only facts 

presented regarding Anna’s competency on the day she opened the joint account came from 

Sidelnik, who testified that Anna did most of talking, signed her own name, and walked 
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without assistance. Petitioner contends that Dr. Shaw’s report contradicts Sidelnik’s 

testimony, but Dr. Shaw stated in his testimony that he could not offer an opinion regarding 

how Anna presented herself at Selfreliance on May 31, 2008. The only person other than 

Sidelnik who could offer testimony regarding Anna’s condition on that date is Shchudlo, who 

has left the country.3

 

¶ 17 Thus, it is clear from Sidelnik’s testimony that Selfreliance had no knowledge of Anna’s 

incompetency when she signed the account agreement. Contrary to petitioner’s contentions, 

the trial court did not “entirely ignore[ ]” Dr. Shaw’s testimony regarding Anna’s competency, 

but observed, correctly, that he did not observe her on the date she went to Selfreliance to open 

the joint account and could not offer an opinion regarding how she presented herself on that 

date. Thus, Dr. Shaw could not offer testimony regarding what respondent knew or should 

have known regarding Anna’s mental condition. 

¶ 18 As our supreme court has recognized “[a] contract made with a lunatic in good faith, 

without any advantage taken of his position, and for his own benefit, is valid both in equity and 

at law, and where a conveyance or contract is made in ignorance of the insanity, with no 

advantage taken and in perfect good faith, a court of equity will not set it aside if the parties

cannot be restored to their original position.” Walton v. Malcolm, 264 Ill. 389, 396 (1914). 

Here, it is clear from the evidence presented that Selfreliance entered into the contract in good 

faith, without taking advantage of its position and in ignorance of Anna’s mental incapacity. 

Selfreliance was entitled to rely upon the legal presumption that every person is sane until the 

contrary is proven. See, e.g., In re Estate of Elias, 408 Ill. App. 3d 301, 316 (2011). 

¶ 19 Accordingly, we find that the circuit court correctly found that there was no question of 

material fact regarding Anna’s competency on the date she opened the account at Selfreliance. 

In addition, we find that the circuit court correctly held that the account agreement should not 

be rescinded where there was no evidence in the record to show that respondent knew or 

should have known of Anna’s incompetency. 

¶ 20 B. Respondent’s Knowledge of Anna’s Competency Not Irrelevant 

¶ 21 Petitioner next contends, however, that respondent’s knowledge of Anna’s competency is 

irrelevant. Petitioner asserts that even though respondent lacked knowledge of Anna’s 

incapacity, the loss of her life savings should fall on respondent because precedent dictates that 

Anna, who was incapable of entering into the contract, should be protected. In so contending, 

petitioner relies on two cases: Jordan v. Kirkpatrick, 251 Ill. 116 (1911), and In re Estate of 

Trahey, 25 Ill. App. 3d 727 (1975). 

¶ 22 In Jordan, a woman and her husband executed a $1000 note and mortgage payable to W.A. 

Kirkpatrick. Jordan, 251 Ill. at 118-19. George Jordan, the conservator of the wife, filed an 

action to cancel the note and mortgage alleging that the wife was a “distracted person and 

incapable of executing the note and mortgage.” Id. at 118. The trial court found that the wife 

 

3At the hearing, petitioner suggested that it could offer the testimony of Bochko, who would testify 

that Anna regularly used a walker or a wheelchair to get around, to rebut Sidelnik’s testimony that Anna 

walked into the bank unassisted. As the trial court recognized, however, the testimony of Bochko, a 

convicted felon, that Anna regularly used a walker or wheelchair would do nothing to establish Anna’s 

lack of mental capacity on the date she opened the joint account at Selfreliance, particularly where 

Bochko was not present at Selfreliance on the date in question. 
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was “insane” at the time the note and mortgage were signed. Id. at 119. The trial court thus 

ordered that the note and mortgage should be cancelled and set aside even though the court 

noted that Kirkpatrick, the mortgagee, had no knowledge of the wife’s mental condition at the 

time. Id. at 119-20. The supreme court affirmed the trial court’s holding, finding that:

“The reason given in the cases for requiring the consideration to be returned where 

the lunatic has received the benefit of it is, that to refuse to do so would be allowing the 

lunacy to be the means of perpetrating a fraud. Where the benefit of the consideration is 

not received by the lunatic the reason upon which the rule is based does not exist, and in 

view of the difference in circumstances and opportunities of the parties it would seem 

in harmony with sound principles of justice that the lunatic, having no responsibility 

for the transaction and receiving no benefit therefrom, should receive the protection of 

the court of equity and the loss should be made to fall on the party dealing with the 

lunatic.” Id. at 122. 

The supreme court later distilled its holding in Jordan, noting that a contract may be rescinded 

in cases where “the insane grantor receives no benefit from the consideration paid.” Williams 

v. Williams, 265 Ill. 64, 77 (1914). The court noted that “[i]n such case the conveyance will be 

set aside without requiring the return, or offer to return, of the consideration, although the 

grantee did not know the grantor was insane when the deed was made.” Id. 

¶ 23 In Jordan, at contrast with this case, Kirkpatrick, the lender, was seeking the benefit of the 

bargain he made with a person later found to be mentally incompetent. Here, respondent made 

no such claim against Anna and is not seeking to recover anything from her. Moreover, in 

Jordan the supreme court noted that Kirkpatrick did not meet with the wife before making the 

transaction where “it was within [Kirkpatrick’s] power to have seen [the wife] and ascertained 

her mental condition before making the loan.” Jordan, 251 Ill. at 121. The court observed that 

the evidence showed that the wife had just been released from the hospital and that both her 

mental and physical conditions were “very bad.” Id. at 122. 

¶ 24 Here, in contrast, Anna went to respondent’s offices and met with respondent’s personnel. 

Sidelnik testified that Anna walked without assistance, did most of the talking while opening 

the account, and signed her own name to the account agreement. Petitioner presented nothing 

to rebut this evidence except Dr. Shaw’s testimony that Anna had suffered from dementia for 

several years, but Dr. Shaw could not offer an opinion regarding how she presented herself at 

Selfreliance on the date she opened the account. Accordingly, the case before us is thus unlike 

Jordan where Selfreliance is not seeking to recover anything from Anna and bank personnel 

dealt with her directly when opening the account. 

¶ 25 We likewise find petitioner’s reliance on Trahey misplaced. In Trahey, Margaret 

Fitzpatrick, a relative of Josephine Trahey, took her to a bank to open a joint account in their 

names using funds from Trahey’s previous bank account. Trahey, 25 Ill. App. 3d at 729. 

Trahey was subsequently adjudicated incompetent, and a citation was directed to Fitzpatrick to 

appear before the court for information about and discovery of personal property belonging to 

Trahey’s estate. Id. Fitzpatrick appeared before the court and turned over the joint account 

passbook. Id. at 729-30. Thereafter, the court granted the conservator’s petition to redeposit the 

funds from the joint account back into Trahey’s original account. Id. at 729. Nearly a year later, 

Fitzpatrick filed a motion asking that the order redepositing the funds be vacated. Id. at 730. 

The trial court found that Trahey was incompetent at the time she opened the account with 

Fitzpatrick and declined to vacate the original order. Id. 
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¶ 26 On appeal, this court observed that the fact that Fitzpatrick “quickly surrendered” the joint 

account passbook and never consulted a lawyer to defend her right could have led the trial 

court to conclude that she had waived her interest in the account. Id. at 731. The court further 

found that Fitzpatrick was in “no position to protest” because she did not appeal from the final 

order transferring the funds from the joint account to Trahey’s original account. Id. 

¶ 27 Initially, we observe that Trahey involved procedural issues not present in this case. 

Moreover, and more importantly, Fitzpatrick, the joint tenant who improperly opened a joint 

bank account with a mentally incompetent person, was found to be at fault for opening a joint 

account with a mentally disabled person, not the bank. Nowhere in the court’s opinion is it 

implied that the bank where the joint account was opened would have been liable for any 

fraudulently converted funds as petitioner seems to suggest. Thus, consistent with Trahey, as 

the trial court recognized in its order, any loss should be made to fall upon those who defrauded 

Anna and not on Selfreliance. 

¶ 28 Accordingly, we find no support for petitioner’s contention that respondent’s knowledge 

of Anna’s incompetency is irrelevant. Furthermore, we find no support for petitioner’s 

contention that Selfreliance should return the wrongfully converted funds. Rather, the weight 

of the authority suggests that Shchudlo and Bochko, the parties who fraudulently converted the 

funds, are liable for the amounts fraudulently transferred. We thus find that the circuit court 

properly granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment where petitioner failed to show 

that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to Anna’s incompetency and that respondent 

either knew or should have known of her incompetency. 

¶ 29 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 30 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County. 

¶ 31 Affirmed.