IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-20557

SMITH & FULLER, P.A.; HUGH N. SMITH,

Appellants

v.

COOPER TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, A Delaware Corporation,

Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

Before REAVLEY, PRADO, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

REAVLEY, Circuit Judge:

The law firm of Smith & Fuller, P.A. and Attorney Hugh N. Smith appeal

from the district court’s award of sanctions in favor of the Appellee because the

Appellants violated the court’s protective order. The district court imposed the

sanctions pursuant toFED. R. CIV.P. 37(b). Appellants contend that the district

court lacked authority to impose sanctions and that the fees and expenses sought

by the appellee were unreasonable. We AFFIRM.

I. Factual Background

In the underlying action in this case, Appellants Smith & Fuller, P.A. and

Hugh N. Smith represented the Trenado family in a products liability suit

against Appellee Cooper Tire & Rubber Company. That case resulted in a jury

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

June 21, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 11-20557

verdict in favor of Cooper in September 2010. Prior to trial, the district court

entered an Amended Protective Order of Confidentiality pursuant to FED.R.CIV.

P. 26(c) to protect Cooper’s trade secrets and confidential information produced

during discovery. The Protective Order strictly limited access of protected

information to “authorized persons, solely in the performance of their duties in

connection with the trial preparation of this case.” Smith and his law firm do

not dispute that they violated this Protective Order.

In August 2010, Smith and his firm inadvertently disseminated Cooper’s

trade secrets and confidential information to a number of personal injury

lawyers during a conference sponsored by Attorneys Information Exchange

Group, Inc. about obtaining discovery from Cooper. The release of the 1

confidential information occurred when someone from Smith’s firm mistakenly

copied it onto compact discs that were then distributed to the attorneys

attending the conference. Cooper discovered the violation when its counsel in

this case received documents from a plaintiff’s attorney in an unrelated suit

against Cooper. Many of those documents were marked with Trenado Bates

numbers and had been deemed confidential.

On September 2, 2010, the district court entered an order on Cooper’s

Motion to Enforce Protective Order, which stated that “[i]t is clear that the

court’s Protective Order has been violated.” The court ordered Smith and his

firm to take immediate action to enforce the Protective Order and to correct the

violation. The court reserved its ruling on Cooper’s motion for sanctions.

 Smith had previously agreed that his firm would serve as a “clearing house [sic] for 1

the accumulated information [concerning accidents involving Cooper tires manufactured at

Cooper’s Texarkana and Arkansas plants] and to make that information available to

contributing attorneys.”

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Following trial, the district court held that Smith and his firm did not

willfully violate the Protective Order. It determined, however, that sanctions

should be imposed for several reasons. The court recognized that Cooper had

sought a strongly worded protective order and had vigorously moved for its

enforcement. Smith understood the importance of complying with the order

inasmuch as Cooper’s production of confidential documents was made in reliance

upon the protections given by the court; yet, Smith allowed dissemination of the

protected information to personal injury lawyers who sue Cooper and other tire

manufacturers. As a result, Cooper incurred attorneys’ fees and expenses in its

effort to identify the violation and to enforce the Protective Order. The court

also noted that Smith had previously violated a similar protective order. The 2

district court held that sanctions were appropriate in order to deter future

violations of protective orders and to reflect the seriousness of such orders.

Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C), the court ordered Appellants to

reimburse Cooper for the attorneys’ fees and expenses connected to Appellants’

violation of the Protective Order. The court ordered Cooper to submit affidavits

setting forth the services for which it sought reimbursement, including time

expended, reasonable hourly rates sought, and proof of expenses incurred. After

reviewing Cooper’s submission, the court ordered Appellants to pay Cooper

$29,667.71 in fees and expenses. Appellants now appeal.

Smith was sanctioned for willfully violating a protective order in another case against

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Cooper by providing confidential material to an attorney in Arizona. See McDonald v. Cooper

Tire & Rubber Co., No. 801CV1306T27TGW, 2005 WL 3372855, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 12, 2005)

(unpublished).

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II. Standard of Review

A district court’s imposition of sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(b) is

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. O’Neill v. AGWI Lines, 74 F.3d 93, 95 (5th

Cir. 1996). “The district court’s underlying findings of fact are reviewed for clear

error and its underlying conclusions of law reviewed de novo.” Am. Airlines, Inc.

v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 228 F.3d 574, 578 (5th Cir. 2000).

III. Discussion

A. Application of Rule 37(b)(2) Sanctions to the Violation of a Rule 26(c)

Protective Order

As noted above, the district court provided several reasons for its

determination that sanctions were proper. The Appellants contend that the

violation of the Protective Order was inadvertent and that the court erred by

imposing sanctions. They further argue that the district court’s remedial powers

were limited to the “Inadvertent Disclosure” provision of the Protective Order.

“FED. R. CIV.P. 37(b) empowers the courts to impose sanctions for failures

to obey discovery orders. In addition to a broad range of sanctions, including

contempt, FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2) authorizes the court to impose a concurrent

sanction of reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure

to obey a discovery order.” Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co., 702

F.2d 770, 784 (9th Cir. 1983). The district court “has broad discretion under

Rule 37(b) to fashion remedies suited to the misconduct.” Pressey v. Patterson,

898 F.2d 1018, 1021 (5th Cir. 1990). This discretion, however, is limited.

“[U]sually, . . . a finding of bad faith or willful misconduct [is required] to support

the severest remedies under Rule 37(b)—striking pleadings or dismissal of a

case.” Id. at 1021. Lesser sanctions do not require a finding of willfulness. See

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Chilcutt v. United States, 4 F.3d 1313, 1323 n.23 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that

district courts “have authority to grant a broad spectrum of sanctions” under

Rule 37(b), and “neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has ever determined

that the lack of willful, contumacious, or prolonged misconduct prohibits all

sanctions”). Having found no willful misconduct, the district court here imposed

one of the least severe sanctions under its authority. See id. at 1320 n.17.

Appellants cite the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Lipscher v. LRP Publ'ns,

Inc., 266 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2001), to argue that the district court lacks

authority to impose Rule 37(b) sanctions for violation of FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)

protective orders. The Lipscher court reasoned that Rule 37(b)(2) does not

mention Rule 26(c) protective orders and that the rule applies only when “a

party ‘fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery . . . .’” Id. at 1323

(quoting Rule 37(b)(2)). The court held that “a Rule 26(c) protective order is not

‘an order to provide or permit discovery,’ and therefore, such orders do not fall

within the scope of Rule 37(b)(2).” Id. (citations omitted).

The Eleventh Circuit’s narrow application of Rule 37(b) has been

questioned by several courts. Indeed, the effect of the Rule was broadened 3

when it was amended in 1970. The Advisory Committee Notes to the 4

See Valdez-Castillo v. Busch Entm’t Corp., No. 06-20772-CIV, 2008 WL 4999175, at 3

*5–6 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2008) (unpublished); Whitehead v. Gateway Chevrolet, Oldsmobile, No.

03 C 5684, 2004 WL 1459478, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 29, 2004) (unpublished) (refusing to follow

Lipscher and holding that imposing Rule 37(b) sanctions of attorneys’ fees may be awarded for

violation of a protective order).

The 1970 Advisory Committee Notes state in relevant part:“The scope of Rule 37(b)(2) 4

is broadened by extending it to include any order ‘to provide or permit discovery,’ including

orders issued under Rules 37(a) and 35. Various rules authorize orders for discovery--e.g.,

Rule 35(b)(1), Rule 26(c) as revised, Rule 37(d). Rule 37(b)(2) should provide comprehensively

for enforcement of all these orders.” (Emphasis added) (Internal citation omitted).

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amendments have been oft cited by courts when imposing Rule 37 sanctions. 

See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Newman & Holtzinger, P.C., 992 F.2d 932,

934–35 (9th Cir. 1993); Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 154 F.R.D. 29, 31 (D. Me.

1994). There is thus significant authority in support of the imposition of Rule

37(b) sanctions for violation of Rule 26(c) protective orders. See Falstaff Brewing

Corp., 702 F.2d at 784 (holding that Rule 37(b)(2) authorizes the court to impose

sanctions for disobeying a discovery order); United States v. Nat’l Med. Enters.,

Inc., 792 F.2d 906, 911 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding the court’s grant of sanctions

under Rule 37(b) for violation of a protective order); Poliquin, 154 F.R.D. at

31–33 (imposing sanctions of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Rule 37(b) for

violations of a protective order).

Even under Lipscher’s narrow reading of Rule 37(b), however, the district

court here concluded that its Protective Order in this case was an “order to

provide or permit discovery” as the phrase is used in Rule 37(b)(2). We agree. 

The Protective Order in this case: “govern[ed] confidential material produced or

disclosed by these Defendants or Plaintiff[s] in response to formal or informal

discovery conducted in this matter” (¶ 3); allowed each party to designate as

confidential material “all or any portions of documents, things and information

it produces formally or informally to the other parties to this litigation” (¶ 4);

addressed the “inadvertent [or] unintentional . . . production of any confidential

material” (¶¶ 5, 13); included procedures for objecting to the designation of

material produced as confidential (¶ 6); limited access to confidential material

(¶ 7); contained a provision to address confidential materials when “any

subpoenas, requests for production, or any other forms of discovery . . . are

served on any party to this Protective Order” (¶ 10); and included provisions

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regulating the storage, use in depositions, and the return of confidential material

(¶¶ 9, 12, 15).

In our view, by prescribing the method and terms of the discovery of

confidential material, the Protective Order was granted “to provide or permit

discovery” of confidential documents within the meaning of Rule 37(b). See FED.

R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A). Indeed, no one disputes that Cooper produced thousands

of pages of trade secrets or confidential information in reliance on the Protective

Order. Thus, there is no basis to vacate the district court’s determination.5

Appellants’ argument that the district court could not impose sanctions

because the Protective Order addressed the “Inadvertent Disclosure” of

documents is unavailing, as this provision of the order did not restrict the

district court. Pursuant to Rule 37(b), the court is authorized to impose

sanctions against parties or counsel, “‘including attorney’s fees,’ caused by the

failure to comply with discovery orders.” Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447

U.S. 752, 763, 100 S. Ct. 2455, 2462–63 (1980). The district court provided

specific and well-reasoned grounds to impose sanctions as it determined that any

lesser penalty would not have been an adequate future deterrent. Appellants

concede that they violated the court’s Protective Order, and it was well within

the court’s discretion to use sanctions as a tool to deter future abuse of discovery. 

See Adolph Coors Co. v. Movement Against Racism and the Klan, 777 F.2d 1538,

1542 (11th Cir. 1985) (observing that “a primary purpose of Rule 37 sanctions

is to deter future abuse of discovery”) (citing Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro.

Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643, 96 S. Ct. 2778, 2781 (1976)); see also

Appellants also rely on Tiberi v. CIGNA Insurance Company, 40 F.3d 110 (5th Cir. 5

1994), to contend that Rule 37(b) sanctions are inapplicable to Rule 26. Appellants’ reliance

on Tiberi is misplaced as that case concerned FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(4). Id. at 111.

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Batson v. Neal Spelce Assocs., Inc., 765 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding

that under Rule 37(b)(2), a “dismissal is proper only in situations where the

deterrent value of Rule 37 cannot be substantially achieved by the use of less

drastic sanctions” (emphasis added)); Bluitt v. Arco Chem. Co., 777 F.2d 188, 190

(5th Cir. 1985) (same).

B. Reasonableness of Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses

Appellants make several arguments contesting the amount of the 

attorneys’ fees awarded to Cooper. A party can be held responsible only for the

reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses caused by the party’s misconduct. See

Tollett v. City of Kemah, 285 F.3d 357, 368 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Chapman &

Cole & CCP, Ltd. v. Itel Container Int’l B.V., 865 F.2d 676, 687 (5th Cir. 1989)). 

This court uses the “lodestar” method to calculate attorneys’ fees, which is

applied by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by an

appropriate hourly rate in the community for the work at issue. Id. at 367. 

There is a “strong presumption that the lodestar award is the reasonable fee[.]” 

Heidtman v. County of El Paso, 171 F.3d 1038, 1044 (5th Cir. 1999).

The record shows that in response to the district court’s order, Cooper

timely filed affidavits from Attorney T. Christopher Trent, its lead counsel in

this case, and from Attorney Nicole K. Schwieterman, whose law firm served as

Cooper’s national discovery counsel, to establish its attorneys’ fees and expenses

associated with identifying the Appellants’ violation of the Protective Order and

enforcing that order. The affidavits and supporting evidence showed the time

spent by Cooper attorneys investigating the violation, drafting various motions

to enforce the Protective Order, preparing replies to the Appellants’ responses,

coordinating and conferring with Cooper, and attending court hearings. The

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affidavits also documented the hourly rates of the attorneys and paralegals who

worked on this matter. The affidavits of counsel may alone be sufficient proof

for purposes of Rule 37 to establish the amount of fees to be awarded. See

Tollett, 285 F.3d at 367 (citing Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 323–24

(5th Cir. 1993)).

To the extent that the Appellants argue that Cooper relied on multiple

firms and generated unreasonable fees to investigate the violation of the

Protective Order, we are unpersuaded. The district court considered various

investigative actions, motion preparations, and hourly rates to conclude that

Cooper’s claimed expenses were reasonable. Our review of the record shows no

abuse of discretion by the district court. This is particularly true since Cooper

did not learn of the violation until the eve of trial in the underlying action when

its lead counsel was engaged in trial preparation, thereby causing a need for

additional involvement by Cooper’s national discovery counsel.

Appellants further argue that the district court erroneously allowed

Cooper to submit a “necessary affidavit of a third-party” to establish the

reasonableness of its fees after the expiration of the fifteen-day time period

established by the court. The district court has broad discretion to control its

own docket and permit the filing of pleadings. See Enlow v. Tishomingo Cnty.,

Miss., 962 F.2d 501, 507 & n.16 (5th Cir. 1992). Appellants complain that they

were unable to respond to the third-party affidavit. However, Appellants not

only fail to explain how they would or could have responded to the affidavit, but

they also fail to show any prejudice from its submission because the third-party

affidavit was neither required nor necessary. As noted above, here the timely

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affidavits of Cooper’s counsel sufficiently established the fees to be awarded. See

Tollett, 285 F.3d at 367.

IV. Conclusion

The extra time and effort exerted on this matter could have been avoided

had the Appellants been more careful in the handling of Cooper’s confidential

materials. The Protective Order was granted specifically to protect Cooper’s

trade secrets and confidential information from incidents such as this. Although

Appellants contend that they made great efforts to correct the violation,

guarding against the dissemination of its confidential materials is vital to

Cooper’s business. And, in light of the Appellants’ prior violation of a protective

order, Cooper’s proactive steps in this matter were reasonable.

AFFIRMED.

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