Nos. 12

- 15

- 00130

- CR & 12

- 15

- 00129

- CR

IN THE TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS TYLER, TEXAS

LATOSHA LANETTE MCGEE Appellant,

v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS Appellee

On Appeal from the 114th District Court of Smith County, Texas Trial Cause Nos. 114

- 1775

- 13 a nd 114

- 1776

- 13

ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED

Austin Reeve Jackson Texas Bar No. 24046139 112 East Line, Suite 310 Tyler, TX 75702 Telephone: (903) 595

- 6070 Facsimile: (866) 387

- 0152 ACCEPTED 12-15-00129-CR TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS

TYLER, TEXAS 7/23/2015 10:39:47 AM

CATHY LUSK CLERKii IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNS EL

Attorney for Appellant Appellate Counsel: Austin Reeve Jackson 112 East Line, Suite 310 Tyler, TX 75702
Trial Counsel: Melvin Thompson 423 S. Spring St. Tyler, TX 75702 Attorney for the State on Appeal
Michael J. West Assistant District Attorney, Smith County 4th Floor, Courthouse 100 North Broadway Tyler, TX 75702iii TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

................................ ................................ . ii TABLE OF CONTENTS

................................ ................................ ............................... iii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

................................ ................................ ......................... iv STATEMENT OF THE CASE

................................ ................................ ....................... 2 ISSUE PRESENTED

................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 3 STATEMEN T OF FACTS

................................ ................................ ............................. 3 PROFESSIONAL EVALUATION OF THE RECORD

................................ ................ 3 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

................................ ................................ ............. 4 ARGUMENT

................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 4

I. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN REVOKING APELLANT'S COMMUNITY SUPERVISION

.................. 5 Standard of Review

................................ ................................ ................................ ... 5 A. There was Legally Sufficient Evide nce to Support the Revocation

................... 5 1. The Plea

................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 6 2 . Sufficiency of the Evidence

................................ ................................ ........... 7 B. Appellant's Setence was Within the Statutory Range of Punishment

................. 9 C. Appellant Received Effective Assistance of Counsel

................................ ....... 10

CONCLUSIO N AND PRAYER

................................ ................................ .................. 11 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

................................ ................................ ..................... 12 CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

................................ ................................ ................... 13 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

................................ ................................ ............ 13iv INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967)

................................ ... 3 , 11, 13 Robinson v. Califor nia, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962)

................................ ..... 9
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983)

................................ . 9 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1984)

................................ . 10

TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS: Aguirre

- Mata v. State , 125 S.W.3d 473 (Tex.Crim. App. 2003)

................................ ........................ 6
Cardona v. State , 665 S.W.2d 492 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984)

................................ ........................ 4
Cobb v. State , 851 S.W.2d 871 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993)

................................ ........................ 7, 8
Cole v. State , 578 S .W.2d 127 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979)

................................ ........................ 7 Ex parte Brown, 158 S.W.3d 449 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005)

................................ ........................ 10
Garcia v. State, 57 S.W .3d 436 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001)

................................ ......................... 11
Hernandez v. State, 988 S. W.2d 70 (Tex.Crim.App . 1999)

................................ ......................... 10v TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (CON’T):
Jackson v. State, 877 S.W .2d 768 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994)

................................ ....................... 11
Jordan v. State, 495 S.W.2d 949 ( Tex.Crim.App . 1973)

................................ ....................... 9 Lyles v. State , 850 S .W.2d 497 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993)

................................ ........................ 4
Mendez v. State , 138 S .W.3d 334 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004)

................................ ........................ 6

Mini el v. State, 831 S.W.2d 310 (Tex .Crim.App. 1992)

................................ ....................... 11
Moore v. State , 605 S .W.2d 924 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980)

................................ ........................ 7
Moore v. State , 694 S.W.2d 528 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985 )

................................ ........................ 11
Moses v. State, 590 S.W.2d 469 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979)

................................ ....................... 7 n.2
Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113 (Tex.Crim.App. 199 6)

................................ ....................... 9
Rickles v. State , 202 S .W.3d 759 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006)

................................ ........................ 4, 7 Stafford v. State, 813 S.W .2d 503 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991)

................................ ....................... 11 Thompson v. State, 9 S.W .3d 808 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999)

................................ ........................... 11vi TEXAS COURTS OF APPEAL:
Brooks v. State , 995 S.W.2d 7 62 (Tex.App.

— San Antonio 1999)

................................ .......... 7
Canseco v. State , 199 S.W.3d 437 (Tex.Ap p.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2006)

............................... 5
Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 7 19 (Tex.App.

— D allas 2003)

................................ .................. 9
Duke v. State , 2 S.W.3d 5 12 (Tex.App.

— San Antonio 1999)

................................ .............. 4 Hays v. State, 933 S.W.2d 659 (Tex.App.

— San Antonio 1996)

................................ ......... 5, 6, 7, 8 Joseph v. State , 3 S.W.3d 627 (Tex.App

. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1999)

................................ . 5
Lewis v. State , 195 S.W.3 d 205 (Tex.App.

— San Anto nio 2006)

................................ .......... 5 Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 290 (Tex.App.

— Fort Wroth 1995)

................................ ............ 4
Noland v. State, 264 S.W.3d 144 (Tex.A pp.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2007)

.............................. 9

Reasor v. State, 281 S.W.3d 129 (Tex.App.

— San Antonio 2008)

................................ .......... 8
Roman v. State, 145 S.W.3d 316 (Tex.App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2004)

............................. 10
Sims v. State , 326 S.W.3d 707 (Tex.App.

— Texarkana 2010)

................................ ............. 6
Trevino v. State, 174 S.W.3d 925 (Tex.App.

— Corpus Christi 2005)

................................ ...... 9vii STATUTES AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:

T EX

. H EALTH & S AF ETY C ODE § 481.115

................................ ......................... 9

T EX

. P EN

. C ODE § 12.34

................................ ................................ .................... 10

T EX

. P EN

. C ODE § 12.35

................................ ................................ .................... 9

- 10

T EX

. P EN

. C ODE § 22.01

................................ ................................ .................... 10

T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 33.1

................................ ................................ .......................... 6, 9
U.S. C ONST

. A MEND

. VIII

................................ ................................ ................. 9
U.S. C ONST

. A MEND

. XIV

................................ ................................ ................. 9No s . 12

- 15

- 00130

- CR & 12

- 15

- 00129

- CR

IN THE TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS TYLER, TEXAS

LATOSHA LANETTE MCGEE Appellant,

v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS Appellee

On Appeal from the 114th District Court of Smith County, Texas Trial Cause Nos. 114

- 1775

- 13 and 114

- 1776

- 13

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTIC ES OF THE COURT: COMES NOW, Austin Reeve Jackson, attorney for Latosha McGee and files this brief pursuant to the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and would
show the Court as follows:2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Latosha McGee seeks to appeal her convict ions and sentences for the o ffenses of Po s session of a Controlled Substance and Assault on a Public Servant rendered against her in the 114th District Court of Smith County, Texas. (I CR1 98; I CR2 105). 1 After being indicted for theses offenses in Decem ber of 2013, Ms. McGee entered pleas of “guilty” in each case and was placed on deferred a djudication community supervision for a period of five years. (I CR1 60; I CR2 62). In April of this year, the State, by way of an Application to Proceed to Final Adjud i cation, sought to revoke that community supervision. (I CR1 93; I CR2 101). Following a hearing on that application the trial court did adjudicate guilt,
revoked Ms. McGee’s comm u nity supervision, and imposed a sentence of co nfinement on 24 April 20 15. (I CR1 98; I CR2 105). Notice of appeal was then timely filed. (I CR1 105; I CR2 114).

1 The Clerk ’ s Record in cause 12

- 15

- 00129

- CR / 114

- 1775

- 13 is cited as “ CR1 ” and that of cause 12

- 15

- 00130

- CR / 114

- 1776

- 13 as “ CR2. ”3 ISSUE PRESENTED
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETIO N IN REVOKING APPELLANT’S COMMUNITY SUPERVISION.
STATEMENT OF FACTS In early 2014 Appellant, Ms. Lat osh a McGee, entered pleas of “guilty” in the two cases currently before the Court. (I CR1 60; I CR2 62). In exchange for her plea, she was placed by agreement on a five

- year term of deferred adjudication community supervision. ( Id .). In April of this year, the State, by way of an Application to Proceed to Final Adjud i cation, sought to revoke that community supervision. (I CR1 93; I CR2 101). Follo w ing a hearing on that application the trial court did adjudicate guilt,
revoked Ms. McGee’s co m munity sup ervision, and imposed a sentence of co nfinement on 24 April 2015. (I CR1 98; I CR2 105). Notice of appeal was then timely filed. (I CR1 105; I CR2 114).
PROFESSIONAL EVALUATION OF THE RECORD In accordance with the requirements of Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 1400, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), counsel has reviewed the record and determined that, in his professional opinion, the record contains no reversible error or jurisdictional defects. Under circumstances where there appears t o be no arguable grounds for reversal on appeal, counsel is required to present a profe s-4 sional evaluation of the record supporting this assertion. See Mays v. State , 904 S.W.2d 290, 922

- 23 (Tex.App.

— Fort Worth 1995, no pet.).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Pur suant to the responsibilities and requirements of the governing code of professional conduct, a thorough review of the record has been made. Counsel’s research has revealed no arguable, non

- frivolous grounds that could be advanced in support of a claim th at there exists reversible error in the trial, judgment, or se ntence of Appellant. A review and analysis of any potential issues is herein presented for the Court.
ARGUMENT
Standard of Review
Where a trial court revokes a previously imposed term of comm unity supe rvi sion the decision to do so is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
Rickels v. State , 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006); Cardona v. State , 665 S.W.2d 492 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts

w ithout reference to guiding principles. Lyles v. State , 850 S.W.2d 497, 502 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). This review considers the record in the light most favor able to the trial court’s decision. Duke v. State , 2 S.W.3d 512, 515 (Tex.App.

— San Antonio 1999, no pet.).5 Proof of even a single violation is sufficient to support a revocation. Ca nseco v. State , 199 S.W.3d 437, 439 (Tex.App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d). Therefore, in order to prevail an appellant must show that taking the ev idence in the light most favorable to the court’s decision there is insufficient ev idence to support each and every finding of the court. Lewis v. State , 195 S.W.3d 205, 209 (Tex.App.

— San Antonio 2006, no pet.); Joseph v. State , 3 S.W.3d 627, 640 (Tex.App.

— Houston [14 th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). Additionally, a plea of true, standing alone, is sufficient to support a trial court’s revocation of community s upervision. See Hays v. State , 933 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex.App.

— San Antonio 1996, no pet.) (holding that a plea of “tru e” to any violation can by itself support a rev ocation).
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCR ETIO N IN REVOKING APPELLANT’S COMMUNITY SUPERVISION.
A. There Was Legally Sufficient Evidence to Support the Revocation. By way of a written motion to proce ed to final adjudication, Ms. McGee was alleged to have violated the terms of her community supervision. (I CR 1 93; I
CR2 101 ). The applic a tion included the following allegations: Application Paragraph Allegation I Identity of Defendant II Possession of a Controlled Substance III Use of a Controlled Substance IV and V Failure to Pay Fees and Costs6 ( Id

. ). To paragraph s I, IV, and V, plea s of “true” were entered . ( VII RR 10

- 12

. ). Thus, if the pleas of “true” were entered freely, knowingly, and volun tarily, the tr ial court had before it sufficient evi dence to revoke Ms. McGee’s community s upervision. Hays , 933 S.W.2d at 661.

1. The Plea Before accepting her plea s , the trial court advised Ms

. McGee as to the co nsequences of entering her plea s , includ ing the potential range of punishment, and
also advised her of the right to remain silent and the right to have a hearing on the allegations at issue. ( VII RR 4

- 13 ). After having been so advised, Ms

. McGee persist ed in her desire to enter plea s of “true” and gave no indication that s he was doing so involuntarily. ( Id

. ); see Sims v. State , 326 S.W.3d 707, 713 (Tex.App.

— Texarkana 2010, pet. struck) ( citing Mendez v. State , 138 S.W.3d 334, 350 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004)) (holding that challenges to the voluntarin ess of a plea must be raised before the trial court in order to preserve the error for appeal); see also

T EX

. R. A PP

. P ROC . 33.1(a)(1). Finally, could any error be advanced regarding the trial court’s admonishments, such error would be non

- constitutional error su b ject to a harm analysis and, given t he record before the Court, Ms. McGee could not
meet that burden in this case. See Aguirre

- Mata v. State , 125 S.W.3d 473, 474

- 76 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003).7 2. Sufficiency of the Evidence The State must prove all egations in a revocation setting by a preponderance
of the evidence. Cobb v. State , 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). Ev idence, therefore, is sufficient if an analysis of its comparative weight tends to su pport the trial court’s conclusion that a t least one condition of probation was viola ted. See Rickels , 202 S.W.3d at 764 (holding that evidence is sufficient to support a revocation where the greater weight of the credible evidence before the court supports a reasonable belief that a condition o f probation has been violated). More over, a plea of true, standing alone, is sufficient to support a trial court’s revocation of community supervision. See Hays v. State , 933 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex.App.

— San Antonio 1996, no pet.) (holding that a plea of “t rue” to any violation can by itself support a revocation). Thus, where the Court finds that a voluntary plea of true was entered, as was the case here, the evidence is legally sufficient to support
the revocation. (V RR 14); Moore v. State , 605 S.W.2d 92 4, 926 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980); Cole v. State , 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979); Brooks v. State , 995 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Tex.App.

— San Antonio 1999, no pet.). 2 Because a validly made plea of true to even a single violation provides sufficient evidence t o support a revocation, the Court need not look at those allegations

2 The record also contains a written stipul ation of evidence, signed by Ms. McGee , offered an d
a c cepted by the court at trial, and admitting to the truth of the allegations made against her . ( I CR1 103; I CR 2 110 ; VII RR 13 ). Such a written stipulation is, likewise, sufficient to support the trial court’s decision. See Moses v. State , 590 S.W.2 d 469, 470 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979) (a plea of true and written stip u lation is sufficient to support revocation).8 to which pleas of “not true” were made. Hays , 933 S.W.2d at 661; s ee also Reasor
v. State , 281 S.W.3d 129, 134 (Tex.App.

— San Antonio 2008, pet. ref’d) (holding
that where the Court finds that the record supports any ground alleged as a basis
for revocation the Court need not look to the suff i ciency of any other ground a lleged); However should the Court do so, such a review reveals that there was ev idence as to those violations from whi ch the Court could have concluded that they had been proved. Sp e cifically, as to the allegations relating to the use and posse ssion of cocaine, the technician who oversaw the detailed testing of Ms. McGee’s
urine sample that had originally revealed the pr esence of cocaine, testified that, although the amount of cocaine found in the sample was low it was, nonetheless,
could ind i cate use. (VII RR 26). While he also co n ceded that the sample results may also show secondhand exposure or the result of Ms. McGe e taking amoxicillin
and such a scenario could not be ruled out, the trial court, under the applicable pr eponderance of the evidence standard , could have found that the totality of the e v idence weighed in favor of a finding that it was more likely than not th at Ms.
McGee had co n sumed cocaine while on probation. (VII RR 26, 30, 31, 38, 46);

S

ee Cobb v. State , 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993) (State must prove allegations by a preponderance of the ev i dence).9 B. Appellant’s Sentence Was Within the Stat utory Range of Punishment. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of “cruel and unusual pu nishment.” U.S. C ONST

. A MEND . VIII. The Eighth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. C ONST

. A MEND . XIV; Robinson v. California , 370 U.S. 660, 667, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962). Here, neither Ms. McGee nor her trial counsel raised the issue of cruel or excessive punishment at the time sentence was imposed and, therefore, this issue has likely been waived on app eal. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P ROC

. 33.1(a)(1)(A); Rhoades
v. State , 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); Noland v. State , 264 S.W.3d 144, 151

- 52 (Tex.App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d); Castaneda v. State , 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex.App.

— Dallas 2003, no pet.); but see Solem v. Helm , 463 U.S. 277, 288, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3008

- 09, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983) (noting exce ption to this general rule if sentence assessed is grossly disproportionate to the
crim e). Additionally, the sentences imposed of eighteen month s and seven years’
confinement were within the statutory punishment range s for the respective offen se s and, consequently, are virtually presumed not to be constitutionally cruel and
unusual. (I CR1 98; I CR2 105); Jordan v. State , 495 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex .Crim.App. 1973); Trevino v. State , 174 S.W.3d 925, 928 (Tex.App.

— Corpus Christi 2005, pet. ref’d); see also T EX

. H EALTH & S AFETY C ODE § 481.115 (defi ning possession of a controlled substance as alleged as a state jail felony ); T EX

. P EN10 C ODE § 12.35 (punis hment range for a state jail felony) ; T EX

. P EN

. C ODE §
22.01 (defi n ing assault as alleged as a third degree fel o ny ); T EX

. P EN C ODE § 12.34 (pu n is h ment range for a third degree felony)

. Finally, due process requires that the trial court consider the full range of punishment for an offense and weigh both mit igating and incriminating evidence in
the assessment of sentence. Ex parte Brown , 158 S.W.3d 449, 454 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). I n the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, on a ppeal the Court will presume that the trial court did not act arbitrarily a nd consi dered all of the evidence before it. Roman v. State , 145 S.W.3d 316, 319 (Tex.App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d). Given the record before the Court, this presumption cannot be overcome on direct appeal.
C. Appellant Received Effective Assistance of Counsel.
Effective assistance of counsel is to be evaluated under the standard enunc iated in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1984); see also, Hernandez v. State , 988 S.W.2d 70 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). To prevail in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that her trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonabl eness, and (2) that a reasonable probability exists that, but for trial counsel’s alleged errors, the result would have been different. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687

- 88. On appeal, the defendant carries the burden of proving ineffective assistance by a pr e-11 ponderance of the evidence. Moore v. State , 694 S.W.2d 528, 531 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985). Fi nally, trial counsel’s performance is not to be judged with the benefit of hindsight. Miniel v. State , 831 S.W.2d 310, 323 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). With this standard in mind, a comprehensive review of the record has been made of the proceedings including pr etrial matters, Ms. McGee ’ s original plea s , the re vo c a tion hearing, and the arguments of counsel. Here, that review fails to shows, given the totality of the representation provided by trial counsel, any basis
from which to a r gue that ineffective assistanc e was rendered. See, e.g., Garcia v.
State , 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001); Thompson v. State , 9 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999); Jackson v. State , 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994).
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
As counsel was unable to rai se any arguable issues for appeal, he is required
to move for leave to withdraw. See Stafford v. State , 813 S.W.2d 503 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, counsel prays that the Court,
after af fording Ms. McGee the opportunity to rev iew the record and file a pro se
brief should s he desire to do so, accept this brief and grant the attached Motion to
Wit h draw pu r suant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 18 L.Ed.2d 493, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967).12 Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Austin Reeve Jackson Texas Bar No. 24046139 112 East Line, Suite 310 Tyler, TX 75702 Telephone: (903) 595

- 6070 Facsimile: (866) 387

- 0152

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a true and correct copy of this brief was delivered to counsel for the State by facsimile on this the 23rd day of July 2015

.

/s/ Austin Reeve Jackson13 CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL The attorney’s role as an advocate requires that I support my client’s appeal to the best of my ability. Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738. I, Austin Reeve Jackson, counsel of record in this appeal, do hereby state that I have diligently searched the entire record in this cause. I have researched the law applicable to the
facts and issues contained therein , and it is my professional opinion that the record reflects no reversible error. In conformity with the applicable law pertaining to an appeal of this nature, I have set forth any potential grounds of error and have briefed them to the extent possible. I have further caused a copy of this brief to be served by certified mail on Appellant, accompanied by a letter informing Appellant of the right to examine the record for the purpose of filing a pro se brief.

/s/ Austin Reeve Jackson

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify that this document complies with the requirements o f Rule 9.4 and consists of 2, 576 words.
/s/ Austin Reeve Jackson