alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 31.1  I, Andreas Klimm, in my capacity indicated below, certify that:  1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Alco Energy Corp. (the Registrant); 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4. I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Registrant and have: a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under my supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the Registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to me by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; b) evaluated the effectiveness of the Registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report my conclusion about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and c) disclosed in this report any change in the Registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the Registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the Registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Registrant's internal control over financial reporting; 5. I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Registrant's auditors and the audit committee of Registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function): a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the Registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the Registrant's internal control over financial reporting.  Date: November 10, 2009 /s/ Andreas Klimm Andreas Klimm, President (as Principal Executive Officer)
Filed 6/23/14 P. v. Fleming CA

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.111.5. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CONNIE K. FLEMING, 

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B253656

(Super. Ct. No. 1440592)

(Santa Barbara County)

Connie K. Fleming appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted 

her of misdemeanor assault (Pen. Code, § 240).1 The trial court sentenced appellant to 180 

days county jail with credit for time served and ordered appellant to pay a $140 fine and a 

$165 restitution fine/fee. The trial court exonerated $265 of the fines/fees. 

We appointed counsel to represent appellant in this appeal. After counsel’s 

examination of the record, she filed an opening brief in which no issues were raised. 

On May 8, 2014, we advised appellant that she had 30 days within which to 

personally submit any contentions or issues she wished us to consider. No response has 

been received. 

 

1 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2

We have reviewed the entire record and are satisfied that appellant's attorney 

has fully complied with her responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. 

Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 443; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 126.) 

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P.J.

PERREN, J.
3

Brian E. Hill, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Sarah G. LoPresti, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant. 

No. appearance for Respondent.
Semie ROBINSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D16-3993

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[June 6, 2019]

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
### THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13

- 16

- 00124

- CR

David Wills
v. The State of Texas

On a ppeal from the 214th District Court of Nueces County , Texas Trial Cause No. 15

- CR

- 4083

- F

JUDGMENT THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on
appeal, concludes the appeal should be dismissed. The Court orders the appeal

DISMISSED in accordance with its opinion

. We further order this decision certified below for observance.
July 7, 2016.
STATE of Louisiana v. Ruffin STOKES

2018-K-1771

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 28, 2019

**ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT, PARISH OF IBERIA**

Writ denied.

GUIDRY, CLARK, HUGHES, would grant.

CRICHTON, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.

Crichton, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.

I agree with the decision to deny this writ. I write separately to note my view that this brutal armed robbery offense, which included as victims two adults and a three-year-old child, warrants a significant hard labor sentence. However, I agree with the court of appeal's remand for resentencing, though for a different reason than the court of appeal. Here, in my view, *562the trial judge did not comply with La. C.Cr.P. 894.1. Specifically, he failed correctly to assess applicable mitigating factors, *i.e.* defendant's youth (20 years old) and status as a first-time offender. In fact, contrary to clearly established jurisprudence, the trial judge deemed his youth an ***aggravating*** factor, rather than ***mitigating*** factor, emphasizing that defendant would likely commit additional crimes. *Cf.**State v. Knox* , 425 So.2d 707, 708 (La. 1982) (recognizing "youth and first offender status" as common mitigating circumstances); *State v. Walker* , 414 So.2d 1245 (La. 1982) (same). Accordingly, I agree with the court of appeal that the case must be remanded for resentencing and proper assessment of all applicable 894.1 factors. *See* , *e.g.* , *State v. Ladd* , 14-1611 (La. 3/27/15, 164 So.3d 184 (remanding case for resentencing for trial court's failure to comply with application of 894.1 factors).
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cc: Hon. Jessie Elizabeth Walsh, District Judge Ian Armese Woods Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA 2

(0) 1947A
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter of Francis M. Deslauriers, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2017-002562 

Opinion No. 27788 

Submitted March 7, 2018 – Filed April 4, 2018 

PUBLIC REPRIMAND 

John S. Nichols, Disciplinary Counsel, of Columbia, for 

Office of Disciplinary Counsel. 

Francis M. Deslauriers, of Memphis, Tennessee, pro se 

PER CURIAM: By order of the Board of Professional Responsibility of the 

Supreme Court of Tennessee dated April 20, 2017, respondent was censured for 

violating the Rules of Professional Conduct.1

 The order was forwarded to this 

Court by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) on December 19, 2017. 

Thereafter, pursuant to Rule 29(b) of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 

Enforcement, Rule 413, SCACR, ODC and respondent were notified by letter of 

the Clerk of this Court that they had thirty days to inform the Court of any claim

1

 The order states that in August 2012, respondent was retained to represent a client in a lawsuit 

against an insurance company for a property damage claim, but filed nothing in the case and did 

not communicate with his client despite the client's numerous requests for updates. Eventually, 

respondent filed a complaint in January 2015; however, in March 2016, after another year of 

taking no action and failing to communicate with his client, respondent informed his client that 

he had failed to serve the defendants or take their depositions, resulting in his client's case being 

dismissed. The order concluded respondent violated Rules 1.1 (competence), 1.3 (diligence), 1.4 

(communication), 3.2 (expediting litigation), and 8.4 (misconduct) of the Tennessee Rules of 

Professional Conduct. Respondent was publicly censured for the violations. 
 

that imposition of the identical discipline in South Carolina is not warranted and 

the reasons for any such claim.2

 Respondent did not respond to the Clerk's letter. 

We find a public reprimand is the appropriate sanction to impose as reciprocal 

discipline, as none of the reasons set forth in Rule 29(d) of the Rules for Lawyer 

Disciplinary Enforcement for the imposition of different discipline exists in this 

matter. 

PUBLIC REPRIMAND. 

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW and JAMES, JJ., concur. 

2

 This letter was mailed to the most recent address respondent provided in the Attorney 

Information System (AIS).
Exhibit 15.1  Consent of Independent Registered Chartered Accountants  We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement No.s 333-163952 and 333-167860 on Form F-3 of our reports dated April 26, 2011, relating to the consolidated and combined financial statements of Brookfield Infrastructure Partners L.P., and the effectiveness of Brookfield Infrastructure Partners L.P.s internal control over financial reporting, appearing in this Annual Report on Form 20-F of Brookfield Infrastructure Partners L.P. for the year ended December 31, 2010.   /s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP  Independent Registered Chartered Accountants Licensed Public Accountants Toronto, Canada  April 26, 2011
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-6125

PETE S. BRYANT,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

LEROY CARTLEDGE, Warden,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District 

Judge. (3:09-cv-03234-CMC)

Submitted: July 28, 2011 Decided: August 4, 2011

Before KING, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Pete S. Bryant, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General, Brendan McDonald, OFFICE OF THE 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Pete S. Bryant seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition. 

The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge 

issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(1)(A) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not 

issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the 

district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies 

this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would 

find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 

(2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural 

grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive 

procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a 

debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 

529 U.S. at 484-85. We have independently reviewed the record 

and conclude that Bryant has not made the requisite showing. 

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss 

the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts 

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
3

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

DISMISSED
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-7501

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

RUPERT O. STONECIPHER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Parkersburg. Charles H. Haden II, Chief

District Judge. (CR-90-156)

Submitted: March 13, 1997 Decided: March 19, 1997

Before HALL, ERVIN, and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Rupert O. Stonecipher, Appellant Pro Se. Hunter P. Smith, Jr.,

Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Rupert Stonecipher appeals the district court's order denying

Stonecipher's motion to remit his fine. We have reviewed the record

and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. United

States v. Stonecipher, No. CR-90-156 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 10, 1996).

Stonecipher's motion for provision of transcript at government expense is denied. We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
STATE of Louisiana v. Blaise GRAVOIS

NO. 2019-KK-0499

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 17, 2019

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.
Exhibit 32.2

Certification Statement of Chief Financial Officer
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1850,  as Adopted  Pursuant to Section 906 of the
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
--------------------------

The  undersigned,  the Chief Financial  Officer of The Wilber  Corporation  (the
"Company"), hereby certifies that to his knowledge on the date hereof:

      (a)   the Form 10-Q of the Company for the three-month  period ended March
            31, 2005,  filed on the date hereof with the Securities and Exchange
            Commission (the "Report"),  fully complies with the  requirements of
            Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (b)   information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
            respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations of the
            Company as of and for the period covered by this report.


                                        /s/ Joseph E. Sutaris
                                        -------------------------------------
                                        Joseph E. Sutaris
                                        Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer
                                        Date: May 5, 2005
                                              -----------

The forgoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to Subsections (a)
and  (b) of  Section  1350,  Chapter  63 of  Title  18,  United  States  Code in
accordance with Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 and shall not be
deemed  "filed" for  purposes of Section 18 of the  Securities  Exchange  Act of
1934, or otherwise  subject to the  liability of that section,  and shall not be
deemed to be  incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act
of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.


                                       31
Jason Eugene RITENOUR, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D19-2127

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

June 25, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Denied.
Wayne BASS III, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D17-42

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed February 13, 2019.

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
# Fourth Court of Appe als San Antonio, Texas

September 10, 2021

No. 04

- 21

- 00218

- CR

William Earl CUNNINGHAM,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

From the 437th Judicial District Court

, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2015

- CR

- 10050 Honorable Melisa C. Skinner , Jud ge Presiding



### O R D E R

Appellant’s motion for extension of time is GRANTED. Appellant’s brief is due on or before October 4, 2021

.

_________________________________ Irene Rios , Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 10th day of September, 2021

.

___________________________________ MICHAEL A. CRUZ

, Clerk of Court
1

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3

4

5

6

7

8

9

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11

12

13

14

15

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19

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23

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25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In re TYLER R. JOHNSON, BA4465, 

Plaintiff.

___________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. C 17-0599 CRB (PR) 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

On February 6, 2017, the clerk filed as a new prisoner action a letter from

plaintiff complaining of inadequate medical care at San Quentin State Prison. On

that same date, the court notified plaintiff in writing that the action was deficient

because he did not file an actual complaint or pay the requisite filing fee or,

instead, submit a signed and completed court-approved in forma pauperis (IFP)

application. Plaintiff was advised that failure to file the requested items within 28

days would result in dismissal of the action. 

Plaintiff instead filed a letter explaining that he did not intend his letter to

be filed as a new action because he still is exhausting administrative remedies. 

Good cause appearing, the case is DISMISSED without prejudice. The clerk is

instructed to close this matter as improvidently opened. No filing fee is due. 

SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 17, 2017 _________________________ 

 CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\CRB\CR.17\Johnston, T.17-0588.dismissal.wpd

Case 3:17-cv-00599-CRB Document 8 Filed 03/17/17 Page 1 of 1
Exhibit
32.2





CERTIFICATIONS
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Cono Italiano, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the
quarter ended June 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Alex J. Kaminski, Principal Financial
Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to my knowledge
that:





(1) 
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





(2) 
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.





Date:
August 13, 2010




By:
              /s/ Alex J. KaminskiName:   
      Alex J. KaminskiTitle:     
      Principal Financial
Officer