Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 84 / Tuesday, May 2, 1995 / Notices 21557

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555, (301) 415–7516.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 25th day

of April 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

James F. McDermott,

Secretary, Executive Resources Board.

[FR Doc. 95–10728 Filed 5–1–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

[Docket No. 50–410]

Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine

Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 2);

Exemption

I

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation

(NMPC or the licensee) is the holder of

Facility Operating License No. NPF–69,

which authorizes operation of Nine Mile

Point Nuclear Station Unit 2 (the

facility/NMP2), at a steady-state reactor

power level not in excess of 3323

megawatts thermal. The facility is a

boiling water reactor located at the

licensee’s site in Oswego County, New

York. The license provides among other

things, that it is subject to all rules,

regulations, and Orders of the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the

Commission or NRC) now or hereafter

in effect.

II

Section III.D.1.(a) of Appendix J to 10

CFR Part 50 requires the performance of

three Type A containment integrated

leakage rate tests (ILRTs), at

approximately equal intervals during

each 10-year service period of the

primary containment. The third test of

each set shall be conducted when the

plant is shutdown for the 10-year

inservice inspection of the primary

containment.

III

By letter dated March 9, 1995, NMPC

requested temporary relief for NMP2

from the requirement to perform a set of

three Type A tests at approximately

equal intervals during each 10-year

service period of the primary

containment. The requested exemption

would permit a one-time interval

extension of the second Type A test by

approximately 18 months (from the

April 1995 refueling outage, to the late

1996 refueling outage).

The licensee’s request cites the

special circumstances of 10 CFR 50.12,

paragraph (a)(2)(ii), as the basis for the

exemption. The existing Type B and C

testing programs are not being modified

by this request and will continue to

effectively detect containment leakage

caused by the degradation of active

containment isolation components as

well as containment penetrations. The

licensee has analyzed the results of the

previous Type A tests performed at

NMP2. Two Type A tests (including the

preoperational test) have been

conducted from 1986 to date with no

failures. Therefore, application of the

regulation in the particular

circumstances is not necessary to

achieve the underlying purpose of the

rule.

IV

Section III.D.1.(a) of Appendix J to 10

CFR Part 50 states that a set of three

Type A leakage rate tests shall be

performed at approximately equal

intervals during each 10-year service

period.

The licensee proposes an exemption

to this section which would provide a

one-time interval extension for the

second Type A test by approximately 18

months. The Commission has

determined, for the reasons discussed

below, that pursuant to 10 CFR

50.12(a)(1) this exemption is authorized

by law, will not present an undue risk

to the public health and safety, and is

consistent with the common defense

and security. The Commission further

determines that special circumstances,

as provided in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are

present justifying the exemption;

namely, that application of the

regulation in the particular

circumstances is not necessary to

achieve the underlying purpose of the

rule.

The underlying purpose of the

requirement to perform Type A

containment leak rate tests at

approximately equal intervals during

the 10-year service period, is to ensure

that any potential leakage pathways

through the containment boundary are

identified within a time span that

prevents significant degradation from

continuing or becoming unknown. The

NRC staff has reviewed the basis and

supporting information provided by the

licensee in the exemption request. The

NRC staff has noted that the licensee has

a good record of ensuring a leak-tight

containment. All Type A tests have

passed with significant margin and the

licensee has noted that the results of the

Type A testing have been confirmatory

of the Type B and C tests which will

continue to be performed. The licensee

stated in its submittal that a visual

internal and external inspection of the

mechanical and structural integrity of

the containment shell is completed

during every refueling outage. The NRC

staff considers these inspections provide

an important added level of confidence

in the continued integrity of the

containment boundary.

The NRC staff has also made use of

the information in a draft staff report,

NUREG–1493, which provides the

technical justification for the present

Appendix J rulemaking effort which

also includes a 10-year test interval for

Type A tests. The integrated leakage rate

test, or Type A test, measures overall

containment leakage. However,

operating experience with all types of

containments used in this country

demonstrates that essentially all

containment leakage can be detected by

local leakage rate tests (Type B and C).

According to results given in NUREG–

1493, out of 180 ILRT reports covering

110 individual reactors and

approximately 770 years of operating

history, only 5 ILRT failures were found

which local leakage rate testing could

not detect. This is 3 percent of all

failures. This study agrees well with

previous NRC staff studies which show

that Type B and C testing can detect a

very large percentage of containment

leaks. The NMP2 experience has also

been consistent with these results as

previously noted.

The Nuclear Management and

Resources Council (NUMARC), now the

Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), collected

and provided the NRC staff with

summaries of data to assist in the

Appendix J rulemaking effort. NUMARC

collected results of 144 ILRTs from 33

units; 23 ILRTs exceeded 1.OLa. Of

these, only nine were not due to Type

B or C leakage penalties. The NEI data

also added another perspective. The NEI

data show that in about one-third of the

cases exceeding allowable leakage, the

as-found leakage was less than 2La; in

one case the leakage was found to be

approximately 2La; in one case the asfound leakage was less than 3La; one

case approached 10La; and in one case

the leakage was found to be

approximately 21La. For about half of

the failed ILRTs the as-found leakage

was not quantified. These data show

that, for those ILRTs for which the

leakage was quantified, the leakage

values are small in comparison to the

leakage value at which the risk to the

public starts to increase over the value

of risk corresponding to La

(approximately 200La, as discussed in

NUREG–1493). Therefore, based on

these considerations, it is unlikely that

an extension of one cycle for the

performance of the Appendix J, Type A

test at NMP2 would result in significant

degradation of the overall containment

integrity. As a result, the application of

the regulation in these particular

circumstances is not necessary to
21558 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 84 / Tuesday, May 2, 1995 / Notices

achieve the underlying purpose of the

rule.

Based on generic and plant specific

data, the NRC staff finds the basis for

the licensee’s proposed exemption to

allow a one-time exemption to permit a

scheduler extension for NMP2 of one

cycle for the performance of the

Appendix J, Type A test, provided that

the visual containment inspection is

performed, to be acceptable.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the

Commission has determined that

granting this Exemption will not have a

significant impact on the environment

(60 FR 17374).

This Exemption is effective upon

issuance and shall expire at the

completion of the late 1996 refueling

outage.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 24th day

of April 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Steven A. Varga,

Director, Division of Reactor Projects—I/II,

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95–10729 Filed 5–1–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

[Docket No. 50–336]

Northeast Nuclear Energy Co.; Notice

of Consideration of Issuance of

Amendment to Facility Operating

License, Proposed No Significant

Hazards Consideration Determination,

and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment

to Facility Operating License No. DPR–

21, issued to the Northeast Nuclear

Energy Company (NNECO/the licensee),

for operation of the Millstone Nuclear

Power Station, Unit No. 2, located in

New London County, Connecticut.

The proposed amendment would

revise the Technical Specification (TS)

3.1.2.4, ‘‘Charging Pumps—Operating,’’

by adding a note that indicates that the

provisions of TS 3.0.4 and 4.0.4 are not

applicable for entry into MODE 4 from

MODE 5.

Currently Millstone Unit 2 is in an

extended shutdown, but is scheduled to

start up in the near future. The current

TS 3.1.2.3 limits Millstone Unit No. 2 to

only one charging pump and one high

pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump

for MODES 4 and 6. TS 3.1.2.4 requires

that two charging pumps be operable in

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. The ACTION

statement requires that if one charging

pump is operable, that an additional

charging pump must be restored to an

operable status or the unit must be shut

down. TS 3.0.4 prohibits entrance into

an operational MODE when the limiting

condition for operation (LCO) is not met

and the ACTION statement requires a

shutdown. Similarly, TS 4.0.4 prohibits

entry into an operational MODE if the

Surveillance Requirement cannot be

met. The proposed change would permit

Millstone Unit 2 to enter MODE 4 as

planned. Exigent action is justified in

order to avoid an unnecessary delay in

reactor startup.

Before issuance of the proposed

license amendment, the Commission

will have made findings required by the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended

(the Act) and the Commission’s

regulations.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6) for

amendments to be granted under

exigent circumstances, the NRC staff

must determine that the amendment

request involves no significant hazards

consideration. Under the Commission’s

regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means

that operation of the facility in

accordance with the proposed

amendment would not (1) involve a

significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously

evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of

a new or different kind of accident from

any accident previously evaluated; or

(3) involve a significant reduction in a

margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR

50.91(a), the licensee has provided its

analysis of the issue of no significant

hazards (SHC) consideration, which is

presented below:

* * * The proposed changes do not

involve a SHC because the changes would

not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the

probability or consequences of an accident

previously evaluated.

The proposed technical specification

change will require that a second charging

pump be returned to service within four

hours of entering MODE 4 or prior to entering

MODE 3, which ever occurs first. The

addition of the footnote indicating that

Technical Specifications 3.0.4 and 4.0.4 are

not applicable for entry into MODE 4 from

MODE 5 will allow for the testing and

subsequent return to service of a charging

pump that was required to be inoperable in

MODE 5. The testing is necessary to restore

the pump to operable status.

The need to restrict charging pump

availability in MODE 5 is for LTOP

protection. The restriction contained in the

Technical Specification 3.1.2.4 to have a

maximum of two charging pumps operable

when the RCS [reactor coolant system] is less

than 300°F is provided for the boron dilution

analysis. Maximizing charging pump flow is

desirable from shutdown risk management

schemes. However, all three events, LTOP

[low-temperature overpressure protection],

boron dilution, and shutdown risk

management must be integrated to maximize

overall safety. The short (less than 4 hours)

delay in verifying the operability of the

second charging pump after entry into MODE

4 does not significantly affect the overall risk.

The technical specification as proposed,

balances all three events and will allow the

plant to operate.

The addition of the proposed footnote to

Technical Specification 3.1.2.4 will not

significantly increase the probability or

consequences of an accident previously

evaluated. The charging systems safety

related functions are not being impacted by

the proposed change.

2. Create the possibility of a new or

different kind of accident from any

previously evaluated.

The proposed change does not alter or

affect the design, function, failure MODE, or

operation of the plant. The proposed change

will allow NNECO to perform the required

operability tests to support the restoration of

a charging pump to an operable status.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a

margin of safety.

The proposed modification will allow for

the restoration of a second charging pump to

support plant operation in MODES 1, 2, 3,

and 4. Testing of the charging pump is

necessary to verify operability of the pump.

Sufficient flow is provided by the remaining

available pumps to address shutdown risk

issues. This proposed change will not

negatively impact the LTOP evaluation or

boron dilution analysis.

The NRC staff has reviewed the

licensee’s analysis and, based on this

review, it appears that the three

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff

proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration.

The Commission is seeking public

comments on this proposed

determination. Any comments received

within 15 days after the date of

publication of this notice will be

considered in making any final

determination.

Normally, the Commission will not

issue the amendment until the

expiration of the 15-day notice period.

However, should circumstances change

during the notice period, such that

failure to act in a timely way would

result, for example, in derating or

shutdown of the facility, the

Commission may issue the license

amendment before the expiration of the

15-day notice period, provided that its

final determination is that the

amendment involves no significant

hazards consideration. The final

determination will consider all public

and State comments received. Should

the Commission take this action, it will

publish in the Federal Register a notice

of issuance. The Commission expects

that the need to take this action will

occur very infrequently.

Written comments may be submitted

by mail to the Rules Review and

Directives Branch, Division of Freedom