*The Honorable Richard D. Cudahy, Circuit Judge of the UnitedStates Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.1RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATIONPursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0174P (6th Cir.)File Name: 00a0174p.06UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT_________________SHARONB.POLLARD,Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,v.E.I.DUPONT DENEMOURSCOMPANY,Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.;>1Nos. 98-6317/6319; 99-5125Appeal from the United States District Courtfor the Western District of Tennessee at Memphis.No. 95-03010—Jon Phipps McCalla, District Judge.Argued: May 4, 2000Decided and Filed: May 26, 2000Before: MERRITT, CLAY, and CUDAHY*, CircuitJudges.2Pollard v. E. I. DuPontde Nemours Co.Nos. 98-6317/6319; 99-5125_________________COUNSELARGUED:N. Victoria Holladay, WYATT, TARRANT &COMBS, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellant. Kathleen L.Caldwell, TAYLOR, HALLIBURTON, LEDBETTER &CALDWELL, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellee.ON BRIEF:John S. Wilson,III, N. Victoria Holladay,WYATT, TARRANT & COMBS, Memphis, Tennessee,J. Michael Brown, WYATT, TARRANT & COMBS,Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellant. Kathleen L. Caldwell,TAYLOR, HALLIBURTON, LEDBETTER & CALDWELL,Memphis, Tennessee, Alayne B. Adams, Memphis,Tennessee, for Appellee. Brian Owsley, EQUALEMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, OFFICEOF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, Washington, D.C., forAmicus Curiae._________________OPINION_________________MERRITT, Circuit Judge. Sharon Pollard and her husbandbrought this action against her employer, DuPont, for“continuing harassment based on her sex since 1987” underTitle VII, as well as the common law injuries of intentionalinfliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision, andloss of consortium. The district court found that she wassubjected to co-worker hostile work environment sexualharassment, that her DuPont supervisors were well aware ofthe discrimination, and that it resulted in a medical leave ofabsence from her job for psychological assistance and hereventual dismissal for refusing to return to the same hostileenvironment. We agree with the district court that the recorddemonstrates that DuPont employees engaged in flagrantdiscrimination based on gender and that DuPont managersand supervisors did not take adequate steps to stop it.22Pollard v. E. I. DuPontde Nemours Co.Nos. 98-6317/6319; 99-5125which Pollard endured over a period of months and years hasbeen characterized as a type of slow torture. Her work wassabotaged, her personal safety was compromised, she wassubjected to juvenile pranks intended to force her to resignfrom the shift, and she was repeatedly informed of her coworkers' belief in the inferiority of women. We foundourselves, after reviewing the record, proclaiming a sense ofmoral outrage that DuPont managers allowed the conduct ofthe men in the peroxide area to persist for years in silence,and therefore silent approval. Inaction by an employer, oranother actor in a position to exercise control, in the face ofcontinuous, deliberate, degrading treatment of another mayrise to the level of intentional infliction of emotional distress.The tort would be unnecessary in our law as a deterrent ifassault or physical harm were always made a necessaryelement.We conclude that material issues of fact are presented bythe outrageous nature of the conduct of DuPont employeestogether with the refusal of its managers to correct thesituation and its blanket, continuing official denial in the faceof contrary facts that discrimination based on gender occurredor that its managers were aware of the discrimination. A factfinder at the trial level will hear the case on remand anddecide whether the plaintiff has met the standard enunciatedby the Tennessee courts for the tort of intentional infliction ofemotional distress. We therefore REVERSE the districtcourt's decision to grant summary judgment to DuPont on thisissue and REMAND for trial. Otherwise we AFFIRM thejudgment of the district court. Plaintiff's motion to strikePollard's reply brief is denied.Nos. 98-6317/6319; 99-5125Pollard v. E. I. DuPontde Nemours Co.3The claim of sexual harassment was tried before the courtinstead of a jury. Judge McCalla was so persuaded byPollard’s claim that in his order he concluded that “[t]his is acase of wretched indifference to an employee who was slowlydrowning in an environment that was completelyunacceptable, while her employer sat by and watched.” Thecourt awarded Pollard $107,364 in back pay and benefits,$300,000 in compensatory damages, the maximum permittedby the statutory cap, and attorney’s fees in the amount of$252,997.38. DuPont now appeals the court’s decisions,arguing 1) that there was no harassment or discriminationbased on gender and that the trial court’s factual finding thatDuPont had actual knowledge of and responded indifferentlyto Pollard’s harassment was clearly erroneous, 2) that thedenial of judgment as a matter of law was improper becausePollard’s claim was one of retaliation, not harassment, 3) thatPollard’s harassment claim failed because she failed to showdisparate treatment, 4) that judicial bias, hostility, andpredetermination of facts precluded DuPont’s receipt of a fairtrial, and 5) that the award of attorney's fees to plaintiff wasunreasonable.Pollard cross-appeals on the bases that 1) front pay shouldnot be subject to limitations on damages under § 1981a, 2) thestatutory cap on compensatory damages is unconstitutionalbecause it violates the doctrine of separation of powers andthe Equal Protection Clause, and 3) the district court erred ingranting summary judgment on Pollard’s claim of intentionalinfliction of emotional distress.I. FactsThe district court’s findings of fact are summarized asfollows: Pollard began working for DuPont in 1977. In 1978she was promoted to “assistant operator,” and she wastransferred to the hydrogen peroxide area of the plant in 1979.Of the approximately 28 employees in peroxide, four werewomen. Pollard was promoted to operator in 1987, andworked on “C” shift as one of the three operators on that shift4Pollard v. E. I. DuPontde Nemours Co.Nos. 98-6317/6319; 99-5125until 1992. On each shift, operator #1 is the control roomoperator, and operators #2 and #3 work in other areas ofperoxide manufacture, keeping the pipes, valves and othermachinery operating. Each operator’s duties are different andnone is superior in rank to the others. While Pollard wasworking on “C” shift, one of the assistant operators namedRory Brico refused to take direction from plaintiff becauseshe was a woman. He placed a Bible on her desk open to thepassage “I do not permit a woman to teach or have authorityover man. She must be silent.”After that incident, plaintiff was transferred and became the#3 operator on “A” shift in 1992. The other operators on hershift were Steve Carney, the control room operator, and JerryLee, and the assistant operators were named Moody, Walker,and Cobb. The shift supervisor was David Swartz. During1992 and 1993, the members of “A” shift got along withoutincident. In February 1994 the atmosphere abruptly changed.DuPont announced that it was going to participate in nationalTake Your Daughters to Work Day in April 1994, and Pollardwas asked to give a talk to a group of girls coming to visit theplant. Some of the men on “A” shift, particularly SteveCarney and Jerry Lee, loudly complained about DuPont’sparticipation in the program. A number of other men inperoxide were also against it, and they circulated an emailentitled “Bull Malarky” to everyone in the plant discussingtheir displeasure with the program.After plaintiff had discussions with both Steve Carney andJerry Lee about Take Your Daughters to Work Day in early1994, all of the men on the shift (with the exception of MarkCobb, an assistant operator), stopped talking to plaintiff.Cobb’s testimony, which was basically undisputed, indicatedthat Steve Carney, the control room operator, instructed all ofthe men on “A” shift to not eat with her, share food with her,be in the break room with her, or talk to her, and that Carneyinstructed the men not to follow any of Pollard’s instructionswithout consulting with him first. Carney admitted in hisNos. 98-6317/6319; 99-5125Pollard v. E. I. DuPontde Nemours Co.21cornerstone of our entire body of civil rights law. In apolitical compromise, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 waslimited in the remedies which it would provide due to a beliefthat unlimited damages for all forms of discrimination wouldforce employers to institute hiring quotas for their owneconomic safety.See137 Cong. Rec. S15472-01 (discussingthe fear of quotas that drove the compromise which wasreached in the Civil Rights Act of 1991). The adoption of theprovision saving the remedies available under section 1981was rationally related to the legitimate purpose of creatingreasonable damages available to all other victims ofintentional discrimination without being forced to limit thedamages already available to victims of racial and ethnicdiscrimination.For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the opinion of thedistrict court limiting plaintiff’s award pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§ 1981a.VII. Summary Judgment for the Defense on the CommonLaw ClaimsFinally, plaintiff cross-appeals the district court’s decisionto grant summary judgment for the defense on plaintiff’sclaim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Theconduct alleged by a plaintiff must satisfy an extremely highburden in order to survive a motion for summary judgmentwith respect to a claim of intentional infliction of emotionaldistress in Tennessee. The district court in this case correctlyquoted the appropriate language fromDunn v. Moto Photo,Inc., 828 S.W.2d 747, 751 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), saying thatthe conduct must be that which would be deemed utterlyintolerable in a civilized society. That case makes it clear thatcriminal, tortious, intentional, or malicious conduct does notautomatically satisfy the standard. We believe, however, thatthe intentional and malicious conduct found by the districtcourt in this case is unusually egregious and raises a factualissue with respect to the outrageousness of the behaviorinvolved. The sort of daily, consistent harassing behavior20Pollard v. E. I. DuPontde Nemours Co.Nos. 98-6317/6319; 99-5125Pollard also argues that the statutory damages provisionviolates the Equal Protection Clause of the FourteenthAmendment in that it unfairly discriminates among thosepersons who wish to vindicate their rights with respect toracial discrimination and those who wish to vindicate theirrights with respect to gender discrimination. Since the statuteat issue is a federal one, we assume that plaintiff meant toinvoke the implied equal protection clause inherent in the DueProcess Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is applicableto the federal government. The parties agree that the statutemust stand if it bears a rational relationship to any legitimatearticulated government purpose.42 U.S.C. § 1981a places a $300,000 statutory cap on allintentional discrimination on the basis of race, national origin,sex, religion, or disability (as defined in the Americans withDisabilities Act). The statute is inherently equitable on itsface. The difference in the application of this statute insituations of gender or race discrimination occurs due to aprovision in the Act which states that nothing in section1981a is to be construed as in any way limiting the remediesprovided in section 1981 itself, which does not limit recoveryfor intentional discrimination based upon race or nationalorigin. However, section 1981 provides relief for a differenttype of claim than encompassed by the remedies available toplaintiff in section 1981a. Section 1981 provides for relieffrom discrimination in the making and enforcing of contracts,while section 1981a provides for relief purely from intentionaldiscrimination in the employment context. While section1981 includes contracts for employment, it also includescontracts for admission to organizations, insurance and otherbusiness contracts with private persons or corporations, andadmission to schools. Plaintiff cannot therefore be said to be“similarly situated” with section 1981 claimants.Even if plaintiff is similarly situated with a section 1981claimant due to the fact that employment discrimination iscovered under both acts, her claim still fails. Discriminationon the basis of race and national origin is indisputably theNos. 98-6317/6319; 99-5125Pollard v. E. I. DuPontde Nemours Co.5testimony that “it was a possibility” that he had told the othermen to disregard Pollard’s directions.It was common knowledge in the peroxide area that manyof the men including Carney, Jerry Lee, and Rory Brico (ofthe Bible verse incident) did not approve of women workingin the peroxide department. Testimony proved that Carneymade remarks to this effect approximately five times perweek, consistently, and that Carney routinely referred towomen as “bitches,” “cunts,” “heifers,” and “split tails.” Thislanguage was commonly used by several men in peroxide,and Carney admitted that he used the terms to refer to womenin general and to plaintiff in particular. In addition, DuPonthad a company-sponsor support group called the Women’sNetwork which the men vocally disapproved of Pollardattending. Plaintiff worked in this hostile environment for thenext year and half.In May 1994, after about two months of this treatment,David Swartz, the shift supervisor, held a training meeting.During a break in the meeting, Carney and Walker werehaving a discussion about a girl’s softball team during whichCarney said “that heifer can’t coach” and “women have nobusiness coaching” in reference to the woman who coachedthe team. Plaintiff was seated across the table, became upset,and asked to leave the meeting. She went to the nurse’sstation and asked the nurse to call David Swartz. WhenSwartz arrived, Pollard told Swartz that she could not take itanymore and that she was tired of the men always sayingwomen couldn’t do anything and degrading women. Swartzspoke with his supervisor about the incident, and they decidedthat Swartz should speak with the men individually about it.With the exception of Walker, none of the men on the shiftremembered Swartz speaking with them about it. Carneytestified that Swartz did approach him about notcommunicating with plaintiff immediately after the tensionstarted in February, but that Swartz gave up on trying to talkto him about it because, according to Carney, “he knows I’mhardheaded . . . [and there] wasn’t no sense in saying anything6Pollard v. E. I. DuPontde Nemours Co.Nos. 98-6317/6319; 99-5125else.” In other words, Carney made it plain he was not goingto change his behavior.Swartz testified that he knew there was tension on the shiftbeginning in the spring of 1994 and that it did not improve forthe rest of the year. He specifically testified that plaintiffcomplained to him about the lack of communication andisolation and other gender-based conduct on severaloccasions. The situation worsened in the summer of 1994.Plaintiff and Mark Cobb testified that Carney would go so faras to set off false alarms in plaintiff’s area, causing her to runaround the peroxide area in search of a non-existent problem.Cobb testified that Carney bragged to the other men that thiswas his way of showing that he, a man, was in control. If afalse alarm was set while Pollard was on break cooking herdinner, the men would turn up the stove to burn her foodwhile she was searching for the problem. In addition, Cobbtestified that there were numerous incidents during whichCarney would not tell plaintiff about actual alarms in her area.Plaintiff would therefore not respond to the problem, and itwould appear to the operator on the next shift that she was notdoing her job.Plaintiff’s job duties included monitoring the vaporizers inthe peroxide tanks and determining when they should bemoved. She was to sample the peroxide in a tank one hourafter it was moved, and any delay would result in a weakproduct. Carney admitted instructing the assistant operatorson several occasions to remove the vaporizers from the tanksearlier than plaintiff instructed without telling her. Again, thismade it appear to the operator on the next shift that plaintiffwas not doing her job, and additionally it affected whethercustomers would receive their shipments on time. Thishappened approximately seven times in 1994 and 1995,according to Pollard, with the last incident occurring in July1995. After the first incident she spoke to the assistantoperators about it, and they informed her that they werefollowing Carney’s instructions. After the second incident,Pollard spoke with Swartz about the problem. PollardNos. 98-6317/6319; 99-5125Pollard v. E. I. DuPontde Nemours Co.19other Circuits have reached a conclusion contrary toHudson.See Martini v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n,178 F.3d 1336,1348-49 (D.C. Cir. 1999);Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc.,164 F.3d 545, 556 (10th Cir. 1999);Kramer v. Logan CountySch. Dist. No. R-1, 157 F.3d 620, 625-26 (8th Cir. 1998).SeealsoRivera v. Baccarat, Inc., 34 F. Supp.2d 870, 878(S.D.N.Y. 1999);Bizelli v. Parker Amchem, 17 F. Supp.2d949, 954 n.2 (E.D. Mo. 1998).We agree with these arguments, but our hands are tied.One panel of this court may not overturn the decision ofanother panel of this court--that may only be accomplishedthrough an en banc consideration of the argument. Plaintiffdoes not purport to distinguishHudson. Therefore, we mustdecline to overturn the district court’s decision that front payis included in the compensatory damages statutory cap foundat 42 U.S.C. § 1981a.VI. Constitutionality of the Statutory Cap on DamagesPlaintiff cross-appeals on the basis that the statutory cap oncompensatory damages found at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a is anunconstitutional violation of the Separation of Powersdoctrine. Pollard argues that by creating the statutory cap,Congress impermissibly encroached upon the judiciary and its“traditional responsibility” for assuring against excessiveverdicts on a case-by-case basis. We do not find thisargument persuasive. Congress created Title VII, andCongress may designate the remedies under Title VII.SeeNorthern Pipeline Construction v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,458 U.S. 50, 83-84 (1982) (plurality opinion) (holding thatwhere Congress creates a statutory right, “it clearly has thediscretion, in defining that right, to create presumptions, orassign burdens of proof, or prescribe remedies.”) The factthat the judicial branch is limited in the amount of damageswhich it may award does not mean that its ability to decidecases is being impaired by Congress.18Pollard v. E. I. DuPontde Nemours Co.Nos. 98-6317/6319; 99-5125argues that the attorney’s fees are excessively high. Plaintiffargues only that the fees were “reasonable.” Neither partygives any explanation, either with or without mathematicalcalculations, as to why the fees were “reasonable” or“unreasonable.” Without a more specific claim that theattorney’s fees were unreasonable, it is difficult to concludethat the award constituted an abuse of discretion. This was ahard-fought case which has gone on for four years. We areoffered no basis for setting aside the fees, and thereforeAFFIRM the district court's award of attorney's fees.V. Statutory Limitation of Front PayPollard cross-appeals on the basis that front pay should notbe subject to the limitations on “compensatory damages”under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. The district court noted that it wasbound by this Circuit’s decision inHudson v. Reno, 130 F.3d1193 (6th Cir. 1997), which held that front pay was subject tothe $300,000 statutory cap because front pay was an elementof future pecuniary losses. Pollard now argues that front payis not an element of future pecuniary losses, but is instead areplacement for the remedy of reinstatement in situationswhere reinstatement would be inappropriate. The EqualEmployment Opportunity Commission, in an amicus brief,agrees with Pollard that theHudsoncase was wronglydecided.First, the argument is made that § 1981a, by its very terms,explicitly excludes remedies which were traditionallyavailable under Title VII from the statutory cap, and notes thatfront pay was a traditionally available remedy. Second, theargument is made that the legislative history of the statutorycap on compensatory damages clearly indicates that front paywas not intended to be included in it. Third, plaintiff claimsthat theHudsondecision misinterpreted existing Sixth Circuitcases examining the nature of front pay as a remedy. Andfinally, Pollard and the EEOC argue that public policyconcerns weigh in favor of excluding front pay from the$300,000 statutory cap on compensatory damages and thatNos. 98-6317/6319; 99-5125Pollard v. E. I. DuPontde Nemours Co.7discussed these ongoing communication problems withSwartz on numerous occasions. Swartz would tell Carneythat he must call out the alarms and communicate withplaintiff, but Carney would tell Swartz that he was doing hisjob, and that Pollard was simply not doing her job. Swartzdid not investigate further or discipline Carney. Carney wasnever suspended or fired for this behavior.During the summer of 1994 plaintiff found the tires on thebicycle she rode from the gate to her section of the plant hadbeen slashed. That day, Pollard complained to Swartz thatshe suspected Carney had done it. Swartz spoke with Carney,and he denied having done it. Swartz did not investigatefurther.In December 1994, two of the assistant operators, MarkCobb and David Walker, approached Swartz and asked himto call a meeting to discuss the treatment of Pollard by Carneyand the other men. Swartz scheduled a meeting which theycalled the “first healing meeting.” Carney was on vacationthe day of the meeting. At the meeting, Walker and Moodytold Pollard that Carney told them not to talk to her orcommunicate with her, and that Carney told them that Pollardwas “keeping a book on them.” Pollard told them that shewas not doing so, and stressed the importance ofcommunicating with her in order for her to do her job and toavoid possible dangerous consequences. David Swartz waspresent and heard all of plaintiff’s complaints at this meeting.Carney returned from vacation and was angry that ameeting had been held without him. He demanded a secondmeeting. During that meeting, plaintiff reiterated herconcerns about the lack of communication and otherproblems. Plaintiff also mentioned her bicycle tire slashing,and told the group of another incident in which she believedCarney tried to run her off the road as she left the plant.Carney “got in plaintiff’s face” and said “Nobody in this arealikes you, you’re here all alone, it’s all your own fault.”When plaintiff asked Swartz if he was going to allow Carney8Pollard v. E. I. DuPontde Nemours Co.Nos. 98-6317/6319; 99-5125to talk to her that way, Swartz said “I think that’s enough”and ended the meeting. Nothing happened to change thesituation.The tension continued, and plaintiff continued to complain,both to Swartz and in her Women’s Network meetings.Pollard told the group she was afraid for her safety and wasconcerned that a dangerous situation might arise in theperoxide area of which the men would not inform her. BethBasham, David Swartz’s supervisor, attended these meetings.She testified that she heard Pollard’s complaints, andrecognized that the problem in the peroxide area was due tothe male workers not accepting a woman working in that area.In answer to a question on cross-examination, Bashamtestified that she was “of the firm belief that plaintiff had beenharassed on account of her sex in the peroxide area.”Basham, however, never investigated Pollard’s complaintsfurther.In the face of this record, and despite the express testimonyof management officials Basham and Swartz that they knewof the sexual harassment, counsel for DuPont--both at trialand in their briefs on appeal--maintain that there was nosexual harassment and that no DuPont managers had anyknowledge of harassment. At oral argument on appeal, thefollowing testimony from Basham, the general overallsupervisor of the peroxide department, was read to Ms.N. Victoria Holladay, counsel for DuPont:Q: And you were of the firm belief that she had beenharassed on account of her sex in the peroxide area,correct?A: Yes.Q: Now, you talked about this situation with AlanHubbell on several occasions, did you not?A: Yes.Nos. 98-6317/6319; 99-5125Pollard v. E. I. DuPontde Nemours Co.17Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550 (1994) (quotingInre J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 654 (2nd Cir. 1943)).There is no indication in the case at hand that the districtcourt was in any way personally biased for the plaintiff beforethe trial began, nor is there evidence that DuPont was treatedunfairly during the course of the trial. The remarks weremade just prior to the conclusion of the defense case, after thedistrict court had heard the vast majority of the evidencebefore it. In the absence of any evidence that the district courtwas unfair in his dealings with the defense during the courseof the trial, it is difficult for us to conclude that the judge wasunfairly biased. In addition, since there was no jury whichcould have been improperly influenced by the comments,there is no compelling reason to subject this case to a retrial.We believe the court’s comments stemmed from theconclusions which the judge had rightly formed as part of hisfactfinding duty, although the comments were spoken in angerand moral outrage in response to the injustice and harmDuPont and some of its employees visited upon plaintiff. Itis difficult to read the record in this case without sympathy forthe plaintiff who endured, without relief, the cruelty of SteveCarney and other male co-workers at DuPont. We thereforeDENY defendant's motion for a new trial.IV. Attorney’s FeesDuPont challenges the district court’s decision to awardplaintiff attorney’s fees. Attorney’s fee awards are reviewedfor an abuse of discretion.See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461U.S. 424 (1983). Attorney’s fees are generally awarded for areasonable number of hours expended multiplied by areasonable fee, and are generally reduced in an amountreflective of the amount of time spent pursuing claims whichwere ultimately unsuccessful. DuPont argues that the awardof attorney’s fees ($252,997.38) should have been reduceddue to the district court’s summary judgment for the defenseon the issues of intentional infliction of emotional distress,negligent supervision, and loss of consortium. DuPont also16Pollard v. E. I. DuPontde Nemours Co.Nos. 98-6317/6319; 99-5125final defense witness and the highest-ranking member ofDuPont management who testified, Judge McCalla expressedhis opinions with regard to this case. He angrily challengedShaw and questioned him for a period of time, using languagethat was hostile and evidenced his desire to inform Shaw ofthe ways in which he believed DuPont had erred in theirbehavior towards Pollard. The court’s comments seem toindicate three things: First, that after hearing all of thetestimony (with only the remainder of Shaw’s testimony to beheard), the court was quite convinced that the witnesses forthe plaintiff were trustworthy and the key witnesses for thedefense (the other members of “A” shift, including SteveCarney) were lying. Second, the court had also concludedthat DuPont’s actions in attempting to remedy the harassmentwere entirely unsatisfactory. And, finally, the court wantedBob Shaw to hear his comments on the way DuPont handledthis case so that DuPont could learn from its mistakes in thiscase and proceed differently in the future.The standard of behavior expected of a judge is differentwhen the case is tried to the bench rather than before a jury.The Supreme Court has recently concluded in languageapplicable to the conduct in this case:The judge who presides at a trial may, upon completionof the evidence, be exceedingly ill disposed towards thedefendant, who has been shown to be a thoroughlyreprehensible person. But the judge is not therebyrecusable for bias or prejudice, since his knowledge andthe opinion it produced were properly and necessarilyacquired in the course of the proceedings, and are indeedsometimes (as in a bench trial) necessary to completionof the judge's task. As Judge Jerome Frank pithily put it:“Impartiality is not gullibility. Disinterestedness doesnot mean child-like innocence. If the judge did not formjudgments of the actors in those court- house dramascalled trials, he could never render decisions.”Nos. 98-6317/6319; 99-5125Pollard v. E. I. DuPontde Nemours Co.9Q: And Mr. Hubbell’s position in 1994-‘95 was what?A: He was the area manager of hydrogen peroxide.Joint Appendix at 412. In the face of this testimony expresslyacknowledging sexual harassment and knowledge, counselmaintained that there was no such harassment and noknowledge by DuPont management.In May 1995, a specialist in diversity training from DuPontheadquarters named Bernie Scales attended the Women’sNetwork meeting. Pollard told Scales of the problems in theperoxide area. Scales spoke to the plant manager about theproblem, who subsequently spoke to Bob Shaw, employeerelations manager for the plant. Shaw, Lee Ann Rice, andGary Fish met with plaintiff on May 28, 1995 to discuss hercomplaints. According to Shaw and Rice, Pollard recountedfully all of her complaints at this meeting. Subsequently,Shaw and Rice spoke to Carney about his behavior. Carneynever received a formal written reprimand, was neversuspended, transferred, demoted, terminated, or in any otherway disciplined for his behavior. There was no furtherinvestigation.Carney’s behavior improved for about a month (June1995); he then returned to his old patterns of behavior in earlyJuly 1995. Plaintiff asked David Swartz to transfer her toanother shift. Swartz offered to transfer her to the controlroom operator position on shift “C” with Rory Bricco, theman who had refused to take direction from her when he hadbeen an assistant operator under her some years before, andwho had initiated the Bible incident at that time. Plaintiffdeclined that offer. In late July 1995, Pollard discovered ahighlighted copy of that same Bible verse in her locker,stating “A woman should learn in quietness and fullsubmission. I do not permit a woman to teach or haveauthority over a man, she must be silent.” Upon finding thenote, plaintiff requested a medical leave of absence fromDuPont.10Pollard v. E. I. DuPontde Nemours Co.Nos. 98-6317/6319; 99-5125In order to investigate the bible verse incident, DuPontformed a list of identical questions, answerable by a simpleyes or no. When each employee denied having knowledge ofthe incident, no further questions were asked and theinvestigation was stopped. Carney himself was neverquestioned about his knowledge of who had placed the versein Pollard’s locker because he was on vacation at the time itoccurred.After Pollard left “A” shift, the entire shift, includingsupervisor David Swartz, held a party. They taped balloonsto the ceiling and had a fish fry. The purpose of the party wasto celebrate Pollard’s departure, as Carney admitted in histestimony. Carney said at the party, “Glad the bitch is gone,glad the bitch is not coming back.” David Swartz told Carneyto shut up, that he did not need to hear Carney saying thosethings in case of future investigations concerning Pollard.Plaintiff was on short-term disability leave for six monthsbased in part on the advice of DuPont's psychologist. DuPontscheduled a “return to work” meeting in February of 1996 inspite of the psychologist's advice to the contrary, at whichtime DuPont told Pollard that they could not guarantee thatshe would not be put back on a shift with Steve Carney andthe other members of “A” shift. When plaintiff declined toreturn to work under those conditions, DuPont fired her.II. Hostile Work Environment Sexual HarassmentAfter reviewing the Supreme Court’s decision inBurlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), werecently concluded that a plaintiff seeking to establish acompany’s liability for acts of her co-workers must show thatthe employer “knew or should have known of the chargedsexual harassment and failed unreasonably to take prompt andappropriate corrective action.”Fenton v. HiSan, Inc., 174F.3d 827, 830 (6th Cir. 1999).Defendant DuPont challenges the district court’sdetermination that plaintiff was harassed on the basis of herNos. 98-6317/6319; 99-5125Pollard v. E. I. DuPontde Nemours Co.15work environment sexual harassment. The federal courts treatthe two types of cases differently for good reason. TheMcDonnell Douglas framework is meant to prove thatconduct which might have some otherwise legitimate motive(such as promoting a man instead of a woman) was in factbased upon discriminatory motive. When a plaintiff provesthat a hostile work environment existed, there is no legitimatejustification for such an environment, and thus recourse to theMcDonnell Douglas test is not warranted. A defendant’s onlyoption is to deny the charges or argue that defendanteffectively remedied the situation, not to submit that thehostile environment was in some way warranted.Additionally, as the Supreme Court recognized inMeritorSavings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-68 (1986), the proofof a hostile work environment is in fact part of “‘the entirespectrum of disparate treatment of men and women’” in theworkplace, which is in no way limited to actions whicheconomically impact a plaintiff, such as decisions to hire,promote, or fire an employee.Id.at 64 (quotingLos AngelesDept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707(1978)). In other words, the Supreme Court has longrecognized that proof of hostile work environment sexualharassment is proof of disparate treatment. For these reasons,it is one of the most basic tenets of employmentdiscrimination law that it is not necessary to prove economicdisparate treatment in order to make out a prima facie case ofcoworker hostile environment sexual harassment. Thedefendant's argument to the contrary is based upon afundamental misunderstanding of the law.For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’sopinion finding DuPont liable for the co-worker sexualharassment of its employees.III. Judicial BiasDuPont also claims that the trial judge was so biased in hisapproach to this trial that DuPont was denied the fundamentalright to a fair trial. During the testimony of Bob Shaw, the14Pollard v. E. I. DuPontde Nemours Co.Nos. 98-6317/6319; 99-5125investigation, even if ineffective, should shield DuPont fromliability; and 4) that her complaints to her direct supervisor,David Swartz, as well as the complaints made in the contextof Women’s Network meetings, were not actually complaintsto management about harassing conduct, and therefore did notput DuPont on actual notice of her problems. Thesearguments are not persuasive. Not only was it reasonable forthe district court to conclude that members of DuPontmanagement were actually aware of Pollard’s harassmentcomplaints, the district court was justified in finding thatDuPont’s reaction to Pollard’s complaints did not constitutea “good faith” effort to remedy the situation. As noted above,this trial produced substantial evidence that several membersof DuPont management were aware of Pollard’s situation,both through her complaints and through first-handexperience, but they allowed the situation to fester withoutdefinitive action on the part of management. Steve Carney’sbehavior toward Pollard was well known. No disciplinaryaction was taken against him.We next address DuPont’s argument that Pollard’s claimwas one of retaliation, not sexual harassment, and thus thatthe decision holding that sexual harassment existed must bereversed. This is a red herring argument. There is nothing inPollard’s testimony, her complaints to DuPont, or hercomplaint initiating this action which indicates that DuPonttook adverse action against her for complaining of thetreatment she was receiving on “A” shift. The complaintsindicate quite clearly that Pollard’s problem was with hertreatment by the other members of her shift and DuPont’sinaction with respect to that problem, not any further actionwhich DuPont took against her.Finally, we turn to DuPont’s claim that plaintiff cannotprevail on her claim of hostile work environment sexualharassment because she did not prove disparate treatment.Disparate treatment sexual harassment (assuming that by“disparate treatment” DuPont means harassment subject to theMcDonnell Douglas test) is inherently different from hostileNos. 98-6317/6319; 99-5125Pollard v. E. I. DuPontde Nemours Co.11sex because the conduct, according to DuPont, was genderneutral and non-sexual in nature. In order to prove that formsof conduct not inviting sexual relations constituted sexualharassment, plaintiff “‘must show that but for the fact of hersex, she would not have been the object of harassment.’”Williams v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 565 (6thCir. 1999) (quotingHenson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,904 (11th Cir. 1982)).As the district court found, there was overwhelmingtestimony as to the anti-female animus which the men inperoxide consistently demonstrated, specifically towardwomen working in the peroxide area (as opposed to womenfilling traditionally “female” jobs, such as secretaries andoffice workers in other areas of the DuPont compound). Wehave recited these facts in detail above.Plaintiff must prove that, after considering the totality ofthe circumstances and the context in which certain treatmentof plaintiff occurred, the harassment which she sustained wassufficiently pervasive and severe as to alter the conditions ofher employment and create an abusive working environment.Each alleged act of harassment must not be viewed in avacuum, but must be considered together with the other acts.Characteristics such as their frequency, intensity, and whetherthey “merely” created psychological trauma or whether theyactually interfered with a plaintiff’s work are all factors to beconsidered.In the recentWilliamsdecision, we determined that thefollowing behavior was severe and pervasive enough toconstitute harassment: co-workers who used foul language,such as “fuck” and “slut”; sexual innuendos concerning theplaintiff’s breasts or sexual prowess; tasteless sexually-basedjokes and puns directed toward plaintiff; co-workersconspiring against her in order to force her onto another shift;objects glued to the top of her desk; being told “I’m sick andtired of these fucking women” and having a box thrown at hersimultaneously; being denied overtime and breaks; and other12Pollard v. E. I. DuPontde Nemours Co.Nos. 98-6317/6319; 99-5125“pranks,” such as being locked in a room, or finding materialsblocking her way into or out of an area of the plant.SeeWilliams, 187 F.3d at 559. This behavior seems clearly toencompass many types of sexual harassment: actual sexualpropositioning, offensive language or behavior about womenin general and women in the workplace, and non-sexualactions directed toward a plaintiff in order to interfere withher work. Plaintiff here proved daily sexually degradingcomments about women which often occurred outside of herhearing; a co-worker who instructed the men working as herassistants not to take direction from plaintiff or talk to her atany time because of her gender; several incidents of plaintiffnot being informed of facts concerning her job which wouldresult in an appearance of incompetence on her part, andwhich could be potentially physically dangerous to her and toother members of the plant; isolated incidents occurringwithin her hearing of women being called “heifers” and beingdegraded for their inability to accomplish tasks as well asmen; being subjected to false alarms and practical jokes, suchas her dinner being burned, with the alleged intent of drivingplaintiff away from her shift; and the Bible verse concerningwomen’s proper submissive role being placed in her locker.This conduct constitutes severe and pervasive harassment,just as severe and pervasive as inWilliamsand our other coworker sexual harassment precedent.Next, we address the issue of whether or not DuPontreceived actual or constructive notice of Pollard’s complaintsand responded reasonably. DuPont challenges the court’sfactual findings, arguing that the findings concerningDuPont’s lack of responsiveness towards Pollard’s numerouscomplaints were clearly erroneous. Specifically, as pointedout above, DuPont continues to argue that the testimony attrial failed to establish that DuPont was ever made aware thatany sex-based derogatory comments were addressed toPollard. This argument assumes that only sex-basedderogatory language is actionable under Title VII, and fails toconsider the testimony related to a lack of work-relatedcommunication, sabotage of plaintiff’s work, and personalNos. 98-6317/6319; 99-5125Pollard v. E. I. DuPontde Nemours Co.13isolation and harassment, all of which was based on the beliefthat women should not work in the peroxide area.After reviewing the trial testimony in this case, we believethat the trial court’s findings of fact were correct. Thetestimony at trial indicated that plaintiff told her directsupervisor, David Swartz, of the incidents of harassment onnumerous occasions. David Swartz, in particular, wasindependently aware of the language, isolation, andcommunication problems on “A” shift through his ownobservations of the shift, even absent plaintiff’s complaints tohim. In addition, Beth Basham, David Swartz’s supervisor,testified that although she believed, based on Pollard’scomplaints during Women’s Network meetings, that SharonPollard was being harassed by her coworkers because theycould not accept a woman working in the peroxide area, shenever initiated any further investigation concerning theallegations. After the most blatant episode, when Pollardfound the Bible verse in her locker, DuPont managementinterviewed the members of “A” shift with a list of yes-or-noquestions, and when they responded “no” to the questionconcerning knowledge about the event, the interviews wereconcluded. The lack of an admission under suchcircumstances is not surprising. No member of the peroxidearea was ever formally reprimanded, suspended, or transferredto another shift due to any of their actions. Finally, Bob Shawconfirmed in his testimony that Sharon Pollard was told thatif she returned to work, she would be put back on the sameshift with Steve Carney and the other members of “A” shift,although a woman would be added to the shift.This testimony is countered by DuPont’s arguments 1) thatthe men were instructed not to behave inappropriately and tocontinue to communicate with Pollard as to work-relatedmatters once DuPont became aware of Pollard’s workisolation; 2) that DuPont posted notices explaining whatconstituted inappropriate conduct after learning of the July1995 Bible verse incident and explained that conduct of thatnature would result in termination; 3) that a good-faith