IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2016-CA-01235-COA GREGORY SHOWS APPELLANT

v. HOPE SHOWS CROSS APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/24/2016 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. T. K. MOFFETT COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: MONROE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: KURT AUGUST MORD ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: HOPE SHOW S CROSS (PRO SE) NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 02/27/2018 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE LEE, C.J., WILSON AND WESTBROOKS, JJ. WILSON, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Greg Shows and Hope Shows Cross d ivorced in February 2007. The divorce decree awarded H o p e p h y sical cu sto d y o f th e co u p l e’s o n ly c h i ld , S .S

. 1 In D ecem b er 2 0 1 1 , G r eg f iled a petition to m o d if

y custody

. A hearing on the petition was held over t he course of f our day s in 2012, 2015, and 2016. Af ter Greg presented his case, the chancellor dism issed his petition to m odif

y custody , f

inding that h e had f

ailed to m eet h is burden of proving a m aterial change in circum stances that adversely a f f ected S.S. On appeal, Greg challenges that ruling

as w ell as the chancellor’s r ulings on issues o f child support, contem pt, a nd the

1 We u se th e m in o r ch i ld ’s in itials b ecau se th e case in v o l v es alleg atio n s o f ab u se, alb eit u n p ro v en alleg atio n s.apportionm ent of the f e es of the guardian ad litem (GAL). F or the reasons discussed below, we f ind no error and af

f i rm . FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. Greg and Hope m arried i n July 2005; their son, S.S., was born in March 2006; they separated in May 2 0 06; and the c hancery court entered a f i nal judgm ent of d ivorce based on irreconcilable dif

f erences in February

2007. ¶3. T h e d i v o r c e decree adopted and incorporated the parties’ custody a n d p r o p e r t y settlem ent agreem ent. The partie s a g r e e d t o j oint legal custody o f S.S. with Hope to have “prim a ry phy sical custody

. ” 2 Greg was granted visitation, including alternating weekends, f our weeks in the sum m er, spring break, and certain holiday s. The agreem ent also required Greg to pay

child support as f

ollows:
1. The parties agree that [ Greg] w i l l pay , as and f or support of [ S.S], the m onthly

am ount of

$200.00 . . . .
2. Additionally , as and f or f urther m ont h ly child support, [ Greg] shall pay one-half o f day -care f o r [ S.S.] per m onth or $135.00, w h i c h e v e r is greater. W hen [ Greg] p ay s the current m onthly support am ount of $200.00 he shall also pay his portion of the day

- c a r e e xpenses, as stated herein, f or the preceding m onth, so that w hen the $200.00 f or February [ 2 0 0 7 ] i s p a id by [ Greg], his portion of the January [ 2007] day -care e xpenses shall be added and paid at that tim e, and likewise f or every m onth. ¶4. In Decem

ber 2011, Greg f

iled a petition f

or m odif ication o f custody s eeking “prim ary

2 “A lth o u g h it is a p h rase co m m o n ly u s ed b y law y ers a n d j u d g e s, th e r e is a ctu ally n o p ro v isio n u n d er th e statu te f o r ‘p r im a ry ’ p h y sical cu sto d y .” R u sh v. R u sh , 9 3 2 S o . 2 d 7 9 4 , 7 9 6 (¶9 ) (M iss. 2 0 0 6 ) (citin g M iss. C o d e A n n . § 9 3

- 5 -2 4 (R ev . 2 0 0 4 ) ). “[ W ] ith reg ard to p h y sical cu sto d y , [ th e statu te] o n ly p ro v id es f o r j o in t p h y sical cu sto d y , an d p h y sical cu sto d y in o n e p aren t o r an o th er.” M cS w a in v. M cS w a in , 9 4 3 S o . 2 d 1 2 8 8 , 1 2 9 0 n .2 (M iss. 2 0 0 6 ). A s in t h is case, th e p h r ase “p rim a ry p h y s i cal cu s to d y ” i s o f ten m ean t to d escrib e p h y sical cu sto d y in o n e p a ren t, w i th th e o th er h av in g sp ecif ied v isitatio n rig h ts. 2phy sical custody ” of S.S. Greg alleged t hat Hope had r em arried and had “allow[ ed] both her

new husband, as well as [ her] children by a previous m arriage, to em otionally a nd verbally abuse [ S .S.]” G reg also alleged that Hope “herself had verbally abused [ S. S

. ] ” Greg’s petition requested appointm ent of a GAL f o r S.S. ¶5. Hope a nswered Greg’s petition and also f iled a petition f

or contem pt and a counterco mp l a i n t t o m o d if

y or clarif

y the visitation provisions of the parties’ agreem ent. Hope alleged that Greg had violated the agreem ent’s child support and visitation provisions. Hope denied that a GAL was ne c e s sary , but the chancellor subsequently a ppointed attorney Jonathan Martin as GAL f or S.S. ¶6. The hearing on Greg’s petition and H ope’s p etition and c o unter-com plaint was held

on October 30, 2012; July 16, 2015; and February 17 and 2 4, 2 016. Chancellor Talm adge Littlejohn presided over the f irst two day s of the hearing; however, C h a ncellor Littlejohn
p a ssed a way in October 2015. The c ase was then reassigned to Chancellor T

. K

. M o f f e t t , who presided over the f

inal two day s of

the hearing. ¶7. On the f

irst d ay o f the h earing, Greg t estif ied that he w as living i n Senatobia with his

new wif e, Kip, and a s tepdaughter, who w as then s even y ears o ld. Greg was unem ploy ed at the tim e, as he had recently closed a used car lot and was still collecting on som e car notes. Kip was em

ploy ed as a sales m anager f or a com pany that sells shipping containers. ¶8. Greg alleged that Hope had ref u s e d to a llow him t o h ave scheduled weekend visitation with S.S. three tim es between 2008 and 2010. He also alleged that s even to ten t im es he had

to ask t he s herif

f ’s departm ent to accom

p any him to pick up S.S. f

or visitation. Greg claim ed

3t h a t h e needed the sherif f ’ s departm ent’s help because Hope had threatened that her n e w husband, K enny , w ould “kick [ his] A.” Greg also t estif ied that H o p e i n t erf

e red with his phone calls with S.S. by requiring S.S. to talk to him on speaker and then e a ves-dropping on their c o nversations. Greg testif ied that he c ould hear cursing and threats in the background when he talked to S.S. on the phone. Greg claim ed that S.S. was “withdrawn” when Greg picked him up at Hope’s house, th a t h i s dem eanor im proved w hile he was with Greg, and that S.S. becam e upset and cried when he had to go back to Hope’s house. ¶9. G r e g testif

ied t hat in 2011 he becam e concerned about S

. S

. ’ s “ w i t h d r a w n ” a n d “def iant” behavior. W ithout consulting Hope, G r e g took S.S. t o a licensed prof essional counselor, Tajuana W illiam s, in Septem be r 2 0 1 1

. W illiam s testif ied that when she began counseling S.S., who was then f ive y e ars old, she was concerned that he exhibited sy m ptom s of depression, that he reported hearing a lot of p rof anity at h is m other’s house, and that he described Hope as “m ean.” S.S. also told W illiam s that his stepf ather, Kenny , “had wiped
poop on his f

ace”; however, af

t er questioning S.S. f

urt h e r , W i lliam s could not determ ine what he me a n t o r what exactly happened. Hope told W illiam s that S.S. s im ply had

m isunderstood a bad “joke.” W illiam s initially “had concerns of n eglect, verbal abuse, and possible phy sical abuse.” Prior to one session, Greg told W i lliam s that S.S. had slapped his stepsister at Greg’s house, and w hen W illiam s discussed the incident with S.S., he told her that step-siblings at Hope’s house had slapped h i m . T h i s concerned W illiam s, but she testif i ed that the incidents “could also be just children play ing.” ¶10. On cross-exam ination, W i l l i a ms testif ied that s he u ltim ately f

ound no evidence of

4phy sical a

buse, even af

ter f ollow-up m edical e xam inations by phy sicians. In addition, af ter W i lliam s reported her i nitial c o n c erns to the Departm ent of Hum an Services (DHS), DHS investigated and f

ound n o evidence of phy sical abuse. W illiam s opined that s o me o f the inciden t s t h a t S.S. described to her constituted “em o tional m altreatm ent,” but she was unwilling to use the t erm “ em otional abuse.” W illiam s also acknowledged that she had never

see n S

. S. interact with Hope or Kenny , so she had only seen “one side of the picture.”
W i lliam s also testi fi e d t

h a t S

. S

. ’s initial com

plaints that Hope was “ m ean” were non-specif ic, and in later sessions S.S. told her that Hope was “being nice.” ¶11. W i lliam s stopped counseling S.S. in May 2012 because he was “happy ” a nd “healthy ” and no longer exhibited sy m ptom s of anxiety o r depression. W i lliam s conf irm ed that S.S.

was doing well i n school and h a d not had any disciplinary p roblem s. T he hearing recessed at the conclusion of

W i lliam s’s testim ony . ¶12. As noted above, t he hearing r e c e s s e d f or about thirty -two m onths between the f irst and second d ay s of testim ony . I n the interim , lawy ers on both sides withdrew, new lawy ers entered a p p e a rances, and there were a num ber of continuances, m o st of which Greg requested. ¶13. In addition, on July 31, 2013, Greg f iled an em ergency m otion f or tem porary custody in w hich h e alleged: (a) that S .S. was undergoing counseling and that his c ounselor had advised it was not in his best interest to be returned to H ope’s c u stody and (b) that S.S. had been “ diagnosed

. . . w ith ulcers associated w ith the f ear of returning to [ Hope’s] h om e and other related m a t t e r s.” Hope denied Greg’s allegations and f iled a petition f

or contem

pt

5based on Greg ’ s f a i lure to return S.S. to her. Based o n the GAL’s recom m endation, the chancellor f

o und that returning S.S. to Hope’s custody pending a f inal hearing on the m erits would n ot result in any irreparable harm to S.S. The c hancellor theref ore denied Greg’s

em ergency

m otion f or custody

. ¶14. Bef

ore the hearing resum e d, Greg also f iled a m o tion to allow S.S. to testif y and f o r

an “in cam era Jethrow exam ination” of S.S. 3 The hearing f inally resum ed on July 16, 2015, with Greg still on direct exam ination. 4 ¶15. Greg testif

i ed t hat in J une 2013 his f

am ily and Hope’s f

am i ly both attended a

baseball
gam e of S.S.’s in Am ory . Greg claim ed that af ter t he gam e H ope approached h im and Kip and b egan “m outhing and say i ng s tuf f to us.” According t o Greg, Hope a nd her sister then “attacked” him

and his sister. Greg testif ied t hat S.S. witnessed part of the altercation and

was “very shook u

p and scared” by it. The three wom en w ere all a r rested and released af

ter posting cash bonds. ¶16. About two weeks later, there was another incident at a baseball gam e in Pascagoula. According to Gr e g , af

ter the gam e, Hope “ grabbed [ S.S.’s] a rm and y anked him up away f rom [ Greg],” while “y e lling and scream ing a t [ G r e g ]

. ” Greg c laim e d t hat Hope “threw [ S.S.] over her shoulder, and turned and started walking out of the ballf i eld, s panking [ S.S.] while [ he was] kicking and scream ing and c r y ing not wanting to go.” Greg testif i ed that he f iled his em ergency

m o tion f or custody

based in part on these two incidents.

3 S ee Jeth ro w v. Jeth ro w , 5 7 1 S o . 2 d 2 7 0 , 2 7 3 -7 4 (M iss. 1 9 9 0 ).

4 G reg ’s testim o n y w as in t erru p t ed o n th e f irst d ay o f th e h earin g t o allo w William s to testif y o u t o f o rd er. 6¶17. Greg testif ied that af

t er his em ergency

m otion f or tem porary custody was denied in August 2013, S.S. was u pset a bout havin g t o r e t u r n to Hope’s custody

. Greg also

com plained that Hope had c ontinued to interf ere with h is phone conv e r s a tions with S.S. since the f irst day of the hearing. The c ourt recessed the hearing at the end of the day on July 16, 2015, with Greg still testif y i ng. The hearing was continued until February 17, 2016. ¶18. On January 19, 2016, G reg f iled a m otion f

or contem p t, alleging that Hope h ad denied him visitation the weekend b ef ore Thanksgiving i n 2015. T he docket indicates that Hope f iled a response, although it is not included in the record. ¶19. T h e h e a ring r e sum e d on February 17, 2016, bef ore Chancellor Mof

f ett. As no t e d above, the case was reassigned to Chancellor Mof f e tt af ter Chancellor L ittlejohn’s death in October 2015, and the parties agreed that Chancellor M of f e t t could read a n d con s i d e r the testim o ny already given during the f irst two day s of the hearing. On February 18, 2016, the

court granted Greg’s r equest f or a Jethrow exam i nation of S.S. W hen the hearing continued

on February 24, 2016, the chancellor conducted a n in cam era Jethrow exam ination and ruled that S.S. was c om

petent to testif

y , although he was s t ill too y oung f or t he chanc e l l o r to consider his pref

erence, if any , regarding custody

. S.S. testif ied in cham

bers with only

the chancellor, the court reporter, the GAL, and the parties’ attorney s present. ¶20. At the tim e of his testim o n y , S

. S. was in f ourth grade and alm ost ten y ears old. He lived with Hope, Kenny , two half -brothers (then ages twenty -f our and t wenty -two), a n d a half -sister (then age s eventeen). The f am ily lived n ext door t o his g randm other, who operated a day care out of her hom e. S.S. testif

ied that he m ade all As in school except f or

7a B in m ath, which was consistent with report cards adm i tted into evidence.

¶21. S.S. testif

ied t hat he had heard prof a nity at both of his p arents’ hom es but m ore of ten
at Hope’s hom e. S.S. testif ied about an incident in w hich his a u nt (Hope’s sister) f

ought with his cousin’s wif

e, and the f

ight escalated to the point that one wom an pointed a shotgun at the other, but n o s hots were f i red. This incident o c c u r red som etim e i n t he spring of 2015, and H ope was not present. S.S. also testif ied that he had h eard Hope and Kenny disparage Greg and even s ay t hat “they w ould like to kill [ Greg]”; h owever, S.S. k new that Hope and Kenny were not actually going to kill Greg. ¶22. S .S. t estif

ied that the previous sum m er he had gone to Georgia f or two w e e k s f

o r f a m i ly gatherings with Hope’s f am ily

. At a f

am i ly shrim

p and crab boil, h is grandf athe r (Hope’s f ather) gave him a Budweiser, and he “tasted som e . . . b ut i t was n ast y .” S.S. testif i ed that Hope saw his grandf ather give him the Budweiser. S .S. also testif ied that Hope and Kenny allowed his then-sixteen-y ear-old half -sister to have a Michelob Ultra, and “[ s]he drank half of it.” That was the o nly tim e he had e ver seen his h alf -sister drink alcohol. He had witnessed Greg, Kip, Hope, and Kenny all drink beer or wine, but he testif ied that none of them drank f requently , and he had never seen any of them drunk. ¶23. S.S. testif

ied that Hope loses her tem p e r a b o u t o n c e o r t w i ce a m onth, and he is “af raid” when that happens. However, he also t estif ied t hat Hope regularly helps him with his h om e work and teaches his W e dnesday night c l ass at church. S.S. testif ied that both of his p arents were “responsible” and that he got along w ith both o f them w e l l and “[ a]bout the

sam e.” W hen the chancellor asked S.S. whether either Greg or Hope could do any thing to

8m ake his lif e better or easier, his only com m e n t was that they

could both quit sm oking. ¶24. Following S .S.’s in-cham b ers testim ony , Greg’s testim ony continued. Greg testif ied that Hope had continued to i nterf ere with his phone c alls with S .S. He also testif i ed that he

was working in auto sales on a com m ission-only basis, that his gross incom e f or 2015 was about $29,000, and that he expected his incom e to decrease in 2016. ¶25. The GAL reported that he did not believe that S.S. was in any d anger with either Hope

or G reg. In addition, based on his investigation, which included hom e visits and interviews with S .S., the G A L d i d not f ind that there h ad been any m aterial change in circum stances

s i n c e the divorce that adversely af f ected S.S. Theref

ore, the GAL did not recom m en d a

m odif ication of custody

. ¶26. Greg’s attorney then stated that he rested h is case, subject to h is right to cross-exam ine Hope during her case. Hope then m oved to dism iss Gr e g ’s petition to m odif y custody because G r e g had not proven any m aterial change in circum stances. Greg’s attorney objected that he should be allowed t o cross-exam ine Hope bef o re the chancellor ruled. At that point, the chancellor q u e s tioned Greg a s to what m aterial c hanges in c i rcum stances he alleged. Greg testif

ied that he considered increased “violence” and cursing and interf erence with his

r e lationship with S.S. to be m aterial changes in circum s t ances t hat had adversely af f ecte d S.S. phy sically

(alleged stom ach problem s) and em o tionally

. ¶27. The chancellor t hen directed Hope to testif y . The c hancellor questioned Hope about issues raised in S.S.’s testim ony and about Greg’s allegations. The chancellor also allowed Greg’s attorney to cross-exam ine Hope. Hope adm itted that she had used prof anity in f ront

9of S.S. Hope testif i ed that she did not know that S.S. had sipped a beer in Georgia. Hope claim ed that Greg’s f

am ily had attacked her in Am ory and that s h e o n l y d ef ended herself

. She ref erred to that incident as “ the m ost em barrassing m om ent of [ h er] lif e.” Hope denied that she had interf

e red w i t h G r e g ’ s r elationship with S.S. She also denied that S.S. had

stom ach ulcer s ; s h e testif ied that S.S. did not take a ny m edicine f or u lcers and that his prim ary treating phy sician told her that he did not have ulcers. ¶28. Following Hope’s t estim ony , t he chancel l o r announced his rulings f r om t he bench. First, the chancellor f

ound that Greg had not m e t his burden of proving a m aterial, adverse change of circum stances. T heref ore, he dism issed G reg’s petition to m o dif y custody

. Next, the cha n c e l l o r ruled that the p arties’ original custody and p roperty settlem ent agreem ent, which the divorce decree i ncorporated a n d a d o p ted, required Greg to pay m inim um child support of $335 per m o nth, not $200 per mo n t h a s G r e g contended. See supra ¶3. Greg challenges this ruling on appeal, a nd we discuss the issue in m ore detail below. In addition, the chancellor ruled that Greg’s c hild support obligation would be m odif ied prospectively based o n Greg’s current adjusted gross incom e. The chancellor also ordered that Greg would
pay the rem aining balance of t he GAL’s f ees. The chancellor also f ound that Greg was in

contem pt f or f ailing t o r eturn S.S. f

ollowing visitation in J uly 2013 b ut that Hope w as not in

contem pt f or deny ing Greg visitation in Novem ber 2015. However, the chancellor denied both parties’ requests f

o r attorney ’ s f

ees. Finally , the chancellor m odif ied Greg’s visitation schedule to, inter alia, grant signif icant additional sum m er visitation. ¶29. The c hancellor subsequently entered a f inal judgm e nt based o n his bench rulings. The

1 0j u d g me n t allowed Greg 120 day s to pay his child support arrearage, w hich the chancell o r

f ound to be $7,695. The judgm e nt also ordered Greg to pay the GAL’s f inal bill within 120 day s. The judgm ent m odif ied child support prospectively to $ 326 per m onth. The chancellor sentenced Greg to seven day s in jail f or contemp t but suspended t he sentence conditioned
upon Greg’s com

p liance with f

uture court orders. A gain, both parties’ r e quests f or attorney ’s f ees were denied. ¶30. Greg f

iled a notice of a

ppeal. On appeal, Greg argues that the chancellor erred by : (1) dism issing his petition to m odif y custody ; (2) f

inding t hat t he o riginal divorce decree required him to pay m inim um child support of $335 per m onth; (3) m odif y ing child support prospectively ; ( 4) f

inding h im in con t e m

pt; (5) not f

i nding Hope in contem

p t; and (6) requiring him

to pay the f ees of the G AL. Hope f

a i led to f i le a brief on appeal, her f

orm er attorney i nf

orm ed the Court that she no l onger represents Hope, a nd Hope then inf orm ed the Court by letter that she did not intend to f ile an appellate brief

. ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review ¶31. In general, when the appellee f ails to f ile a brief , this Court has two options. First, we m a y t ake the appellee’s f ailure to f ile a brief as a c onf

ession of error and reverse. Th i s o p t i o n i s f avored when the record is com

p licated or of large volu me and t he case has been thoroughly brief ed by the a

ppellant with apt and a

pplicable citation of authority so that the br i e f ma k e s o ut a n a

pparent case of error. However, if the record can be convenientl y e x a mined and such exam ination reveals a sound and unm istakable basis o r g round upon which the judgm ent m a y be s a f e ly af f irm e d, we m ay

disregard the appellee’s error and af f irm

. Patrick v. Patrick , 20 4 S o . 3 d 8 54, 8 57 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. A pp. 2016) (quoting Jay Foster

1 1PLLC v. McNair , 1 7 5 So. 3d 565, 5 71 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. A pp. 2015)). Moreover, “when ‘child

custody i s a t i s s u e , t h i s C ourt is com pelled to review the record, despite [ the appellee’s] f ailure to f ile a brief .’” Vassar v. Vassar , 228 So. 3d 367, 374 ( ¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Muhammad v. Muhammad , 622 So. 2d 1239, 1243 (Miss. 1993)). ¶32. “This Court d oes not sit to redeterm ine questions o f f a ct.” Century 21 Deep S

. Props., Ltd. v. Corson , 6 12 So. 2d 359, 367 (Miss. 1992). Theref ore, “[ a] chancellor’s f

indings of f act will not be d isturbed unless m anif estly wrong or c l e a r l y erroneous.” S anderson v. Sanderson , 8 24 S o. 2d 623, 625 (¶8) (Miss. 2002). “Legal questions, however, are reviewed de novo.” Sanford v. Sanford , 124 So. 3d 647, 652-53 (¶21) (Miss. 2013). ¶33. At the c onclusion of Greg’s case in chief , the chancellor dism i ssed Greg’s petition to

m odif y custody p u rsuant to M i ssissippi Rule o f Civil P rocedure 41(b) 5 because Greg f ailed to prove a m aterial change in circum stances that adversely af f ected S.S. In a bench trial, a judge ruling on a m otion f or involuntary dism issal under R ule 41(b) “m

u st c o n s i d e r t h e evidence f

airly , rather than in t he light m ost f avorable to t he plaintif

f .” Corson , 612 So. 2d

at 369. If the judge “would f ind f o r the def endant, the case should b e d ism issed.” Id. The judge should d eny a Rule 41(b) m otion “only if the j udge would be obli g e d t o f ind f or the plaintif f if the p l aintif

f ’s evidence were a ll the evidence of f ered in the case.” Id. “This Court applies the s ubstantial e vidence/m anif est error standards to an appeal of a grant or denial of

a m otion to dism i ss pursuant to [ Rule] 41(b).” Id.

5 “A f ter th e p l ain tif

f , in an actio n t ried b y th e co u rt w ith o u t a j u ry , h as co m p leted th e p resen tatio n o f

h is ev id en ce, th e d ef

en d an t, w ith o u t w aiv i n g h is r ig h t to o f f er ev id en ce in th e ev e n t th e m o tio n is n o t g ran ted , m ay m o v e f o r a d ism issal o n th e g ro u n d th at u p o n th e f acts an d th e law th e p l ain tif f h as sh o w n n o rig h t to relief .” M .R .C .P . 4 1 (b ). 1 2II. Petition to Modify Custody

¶34. “To obtain a change in custody , the m oving party m ust prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) a m aterial change of circum stances has occurred in the custodial hom e since the m ost recent custody decree, (2) the change adversely af f ects the child, and (3) the child’s best interests m andate a change in custody

. ” B u t l e r v. Butler , 218 So. 3d 759, 762 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). “To determ ine whether a m a t erial change in circum stances has occurred, the c ourt m

ust consider t he ‘totality of the circum stances.’” Id. ( quoting Moreland

v. S pears , 187 So. 3d 661, 664 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016)). The chancellor does not conduct

an Albright 6 analy sis unless he f irst f i nds t hat there h as been a m ateria l c h a n g e in circum stances that adversely af f ects the child. Strait v. Lorenz , 155 So. 3 d 1 97, 203 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (citing W hite v. W hite , 26 So. 3d 342, 351 (¶28) (Miss. 2010)). ¶35. On appeal, Greg contends that the chancellor should have f ound a m aterial c hange in circum stances. Greg relies p rim arily on evidence that S.S. s i p p e d a Budweiser in Hope’s
p r e s e n ce a t a f

am ily gathering. Greg also cites evidence that H ope and o thers cursed and disparaged him

in S.S.’s presence and interf ered with his visitation. Greg also alleges that Hope has “inf

licted” “ em o tional abuse

. . . on [ S.S.],” including by “ losing h er tem per.” Finally , Greg cites the two incidents at baseball gam es in the sum m er of 2013. ¶36. W e cannot say that the chancellor erred in f inding t hat G reg f

ailed t o m e et his burden of p roving a m aterial change in circum stances that adversely af f e c ted S .S. Hope testif

ied that she did not know that S.S.’s grandf ather had given him a beer i n G eorgia. Moreover, S.S.

6 A lb rig h t v. A lb rig h t , 4 3 7 S o . 2 d 1 0 0 3 (M iss. 1 9 8 3 )

. 1 3concluded on his own that the beer “was n asty ,” and there is no evidence that Hope allowed

S.S. to d rink beer on any other o ccasion. W ithout condoning or m i nim izing any c o nsum ption of a lcohol by m inors, there is no evidence t hat this single incident h ad a ny adverse ef f ect on S.S. See Touchstone v. Touchstone , 682 So. 2d 374, 3 78-79 (Miss. 1996) (explaining that “isolated incidents” do not ty p ically justif y a m odif ication of custody ). ¶37. In additio n , w e c a n n o t s ay that the chancellor clearly erred b y f i nding that Hope’s

tem per, prof anity , and the incidents at baseball gam es in 2013 were not m aterial changes in circum stances that adversely af f ected S.S. The evidence in this case, which spanned several
y ears, s howed that S.S. c ontinued to perf orm well in school, was in good phy s ical and m ental health, and had good relationships with both of his parents. Hope also denied that she had interf ered with Greg’s v isitation or relationship with S.S., and even a ccepting Greg’s allegations a s true, Greg did not establish interf e r ence s o severe as to cons titute a m aterial change in circum stances. See Mixon v. Sharp , 8 53 So. 2d 8 34, 838 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (“Changing c hi l d custody is not an appropriate punishm ent f or [ a ref usal to allow visitation].”). Accordingly , w e f ind no error in the chancellor’s dism issal of G reg’s petition

to m odif y custody

. III. Child Support ¶38. As discussed above, the parties’ custody and property settlem ent agreem ent, which their f i nal judgm ent of divorce adopted and incorporated by ref erence, required Greg to pay child support as f

ollows:
1. The parties agre e t h a t [ Greg] will pay , as and f or support of [ S.S.], the m onthly

am ount of

$200.00 . . . .

1 42. A d d itionally , as and f or f urther m o nthly child support, [ Greg] shall pay one-half o f day -care f o r [ S.S.] per m onth or $135

. 0 0 , w h i chever is greater. W hen [ Greg] pay s the current m onthly s upport am ount o f $200.00 he shall also pay his portion of the day

- c a r e e xpenses, as stated herein, f or the preceding m onth, so that w h e n t h e $ 2 0 0.00 f or February [ 2 007] is paid by [ Greg], his portion of the January [ 2007] day

- care e xpenses shall be added and paid at that tim e, and likewise f or every m onth. ¶39. Greg argues that his obligation under the second quoted provision was only to pay f or day care expenses actually i ncurred. Thus, he argues that he was o bligated to pay only $200
per m o nth once S.S. was no longer in day care. However, the chancellor ruled that the plain language of the second provision required Greg to pay a m inim um of $135 per m onth ($335 total) even if

no day care expenses were incurred. ¶40. W e hold that the c hancellor correctly interpreted the parties’ agreem e n t. The p l a in language of the s e cond provision states that G reg “shall pay o ne-half of day -care f or [ S.S.]
per mo n t h o r $135.00, whichever is greater .” (em phasis added). Thus, the provision

unam biguously required Greg to pay an additional $135 per m onth even if S.S

. ’ s day care
expenses were less than that am ount or even $0. This provision was not c o n d itioned on S.S.’s enrollm ent in day car e , n o r did it lim i t Greg’s additional support obligation to the

am ount of S.S.’s actual day c are expense s . A ccordingly , Greg’s argum ent o n this issue is without m erit. See In re Dissolution of Marriage of Hanlin , 164 So. 3 d 445, 448, 451 ( ¶¶7, 20) (Miss. 2015) (holding that a property settlem ent agreem e nt is a contract and that it m ust be enf orced as written i f i t is not am biguous); Short v. Short , 131 So. 3d 1149, 1152 (¶¶9-10) (Miss. 2014) (holding that parties m ay agree on the am ount of

child support and, provided the am ount is suf

f icient to support the child, their agreem ent will be enf orced).

1 5¶41. Greg also argues that the chancellor erred by m odif y ing his child support obligation prospectively because there was no proof of a m aterial change of circum stances. Going f orward, the ch a n c e l l o r o rdered Greg to pay f o urteen p ercent of his current adjusted gross incom e ( $326 per m onth). The chancellor also ordered that Greg would pay only half that

am ount ($163 per m onth) in June and July of each y ear based on Greg’s increased sum m er visitation. Greg’s challenge to the m o dif ication is prem ised on his belief that the chancellor increased his support obligation. However, as di s c u s s e d just above, the parties’ original
agreem ent required Greg to pay a m inim um of $335 p er m o nth. Thus, the chancellor’s ruling actually reduced Greg’s s upport obligation. Because Greg i s not aggrieved b y t he reduction of h is support obligation, he l acks standing to raise the issue on appeal. See Patrick v. Boyd , 198 So. 3d 436, 445-46 (¶¶32-33) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).
IV. Contem pt ¶42. Next, Greg contends that the chancellor erred by holding him in c o ntem pt f or f ailing

to return S.S. f

rom sum m er visitation in July 2013 and b y not h olding Hope in contem pt f or deny ing him

visitation in Novem

ber 2015. W e f

ind no error in the chancellor’s rulings. ¶43. “W hether a party is in contem pt is a question of f

act to be decided on a

case-by -case basis. A chancellor h as substantial discretion in deciding contem pt m atters because of

the chancellor’s ‘tem

poral and visual proxim ity ’ to the litigants.” Gilliland v. G illiland , 984 So. 2d 364, 369-70 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008). ¶44. Greg did not d eny t hat he deliberately r ef use d t o return S.S. f

rom v isitation in July 2013, and the GAL and Chancellor Littlejohn f ound no m erit in Greg’s claim that S.S. would

1 6be harm ed if he was returned to Hope’s custody

. Theref o r e , t h e c h ancellor did not err in f inding tha t G r e g had violated the c ustody provisions o f the d ivorce decree a nd was in

contem pt. ¶45. Hope testif

ied that she denied Greg visitation t h e w e ekend bef ore Thanksgiving in
2015 because she thought that Greg’s Thanksgiving holiday visitation “supersede[ d]” his regular weekend visitation. Chancellor Mof f e t t declined to f

ind Hope in contem

pt, noting that Chancellor Littlejohn previously had ordered the parties to conf er and m a ke adjustm ents
to t heir holiday visitation schedules, which lef t the issue som ewhat unsettled. O n t hese f acts, we cannot say

that Chancellor Mof

f ett clearly erred or abused his discretion. 7
V. GAL Fees ¶46. Finally , G reg argues that the chancellor erred by ordering him to pay the GAL’s f inal bill 8 b e c a use his initial allegation of a b use was s upported by W illiam s’s testim ony . However, we f

i nd no error in the chancellor’s apportionm ent of the GAL f

ees. ¶47. “Our rules of proc e d u r e t r e a t g u a r d i a n ad litem f e e s as court costs to b e awarded against the non-pre v a i l i n g p a r ty .” McCraw v. Buchanan , 10 So. 3d 979, 9 85 (¶20) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Miss. Dep’t of Human Se r v s
. v
. Murr , 797 So. 2d 818, 821 (¶9) (Miss. 20 0 0 ) ) ; s e e M.R.C.P. 17(d). “This Court h as held that chancellors possess large

7 We n o te th at C h an c ello r M o f f e tt sim ilarly d eclin ed to f in d G reg in co n temp t f

o r f ailin g to p ay th e d isp u t ed $ 1 3 5 p er m o n th in c h ild su p p o rt. We also n o te th at alth o u g h h e f o u n d G reg in co n tem

p t , th e ch an cello r d en ied H o p e’s req u e s t f o r atto rn ey ’s f

ees.

8 C h an cello r L ittlej o h n ’s A u g u st 2 0 1 3 o r d er d en y in g G reg ’s em erg en cy m o tio n f o r tem p o rary cu sto d y o rd ered e ach p arty to p ay $ 1 ,5 0 0 to co m p e n s a t e th e G A L f

o r serv ices ren d ered to th at p o in t in th e case. 1 7discretion in apportioning c osts,” including the c osts o f the GAL. Darby v. Combs , 229 So.

3d 136, 146 (¶35) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (citing McCraw , 1 0 So. 3d at 985 (¶35)), aff’d , 229 So. 3d 108 (Miss. 2017). “If upon review t his Court f i nds that ‘the decree apportioning the

costs [ o f the GAL] works a m anif est injustice on any of the parties, t h e d e c r e e will be reversed.’” Id. (quoting McCraw , 10 So. 3d at 985 (¶21)). ¶48. W e f

ind no abuse of d iscretion or m anif est injustice i n the chancellor’s ruling on the
GAL’s f ees. G reg requested t he a ppointm ent of a G AL and specif ically alleged t hat Hope, Kenny , and S.S.’s step-siblings had abused S.S. Hope denied Greg’s allegations and also denied that a GAL was n ecessary . The GAL f ound no evidence of abuse, a n d Wi l l i am s agreed that t here w as no evidence of phy sical abuse. Although W illiam s opined that som e of Hope’s a lleged conduct c onstituted “em otional m altrea t me nt,” even W illiam s was unwilling to use the term “abu s e . ” Moreover, t he chancellor u ltim ately f ound that Greg f ailed to m eet his burden of p roving even a m aterial change in circum s tances. O n t hese f acts, Gre g h a s n ot shown that the chancellor’s ruling “works a m anif est injustice.” S

ee Darby , 229 So. 3d at 146 ( ¶35). Theref ore, we c annot s a y t hat the chancellor a bused his “large discretion” by

requiring Greg to pay

the GAL’s f

inal bill. Id.
CONCLUSION ¶49. W e f

ind n o error in t he chancellor’s rulings on custody , child support, contem pt, and
pay m ent of the f ees of the GAL. ¶50. AFFIRMED.
L E E, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, CARLTON, FAIR, GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS AND TINDELL, JJ., CONCUR.

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