1 

2024 IL App (5th) 210143-U 

NO. 5-21-0143 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the

 ) Circuit Court of 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Alexander County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 19-MR-41 

 ) 

FANELLE D. WOODSON, ) Honorable 

 ) Jeffery B. Farris, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE WELCH delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Moore and McHaney concurred in the judgment.

 

 ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea

 was not an abuse of discretion where the defendant was admonished that his

sentence was at the trial court’s discretion and could include incarceration,

and there was no indication that he had difficulty comprehending the court’s

admonishments at the plea hearing. The defendant’s challenge to his

sentence as excessive is moot where his appellate counsel has indicated that

he has served the entirety of his sentence.

¶ 2 The defendant, Fanelle D. Woodson, pled guilty to indirect criminal contempt for failing 

to appear as a witness and was subsequently sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. On appeal, 

he contends that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because there was doubt as to 

his guilt, he has a defense worthy of consideration, and the ends of justice would be served by 

holding a trial. He also challenges his sentence as excessive. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

NOTICE

Decision filed 08/12/24. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Petition for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).
2 

¶ 4 On August 5, 2019, the State filed a petition for adjudication of indirect criminal contempt 

(serious) against the defendant, in which the State indicated that the defendant had been served 

with a subpoena in relation to Alexander County case No. 19-CF-6 (People v. Warren), directing 

him to appear in court and testify at the trial on May 14, 2019. Warren had been charged with the 

first degree murder of Stacy Carter-Gonzalez, and the defendant had given a statement to police 

indicating that he was present at the time of the shooting. The petition indicated that the defendant 

failed to appear at the trial and could not be located. Consequently, the State moved to continue 

the trial, which was subsequently granted by the trial court. 

¶ 5 The petition then indicated that, between May 15 and May 28, multiple agencies expended 

time and resources in an effort to locate the defendant. However, despite these efforts, the 

defendant was not found before the rescheduled jury trial date of May 28, 2019. The State again 

moved to continue the trial date, but the trial court denied the State’s request. The State then moved 

to nol-pros the murder charge. In the petition, the State contended that the defendant had 

knowledge of the subpoena and willfully, knowingly, and contumaciously violated it by failing to 

appear in court and testify. 

¶ 6 The State had also separately charged the defendant with obstruction of justice, a Class 4 

felony, for concealing himself with the intent to obstruct Warren’s prosecution. 720 ILCS 5/31-4 

(West 2018). On September 24, 2019, the defendant pled guilty to serious indirect criminal 

contempt. In exchange for his plea, the State agreed to dismiss the obstruction of justice charge.

There was no agreement as to his sentence. 

¶ 7 During the guilty plea hearing, the State indicated that contempt was punishable by fine or 

imprisonment, there was “no sentencing classification arranged,” and it was within the trial court’s 

discretion. The State noted, however, that the sentence was not without limit as it could be limited 
3 

by the appellate court and that there was “case law on what’s an abuse of discretion, what’s too 

much, what’s acceptable.” The court admonished the defendant as follows regarding the potential 

penalties: “[T]he possible penalties are basically unlimited. I can imprison you. I can do any 

number of things. And it will be my ultimate discretion.” The court asked the defendant whether 

he understood that, and the defendant responded, “Yes.” The court then noted that the attorneys 

would make recommendations, but “it will be me who will make the final decision.” The court 

again asked the defendant if he understood, and the defendant responded, “Yes.” The court then 

reiterated, “You can be released, you can be jailed, you can be sent to prison. It will be up to me.”

The court again asked the defendant if he understood, and the defendant once more responded, 

“Yes.” 

¶ 8 The trial court then admonished the defendant concerning the rights he would give up by 

pleading guilty and questioned him to determine whether the guilty plea was knowingly and 

voluntarily made. After the State read the factual basis, the trial court accepted the defendant’s 

guilty plea, finding that it was knowingly and voluntarily made with a full understanding of the 

charge, the possible penalties, and the constitutional rights that the defendant was giving up by 

pleading guilty. 

¶ 9 On March 5, 2020, the trial court, after considering the factors in aggravation and 

mitigation, sentenced the defendant to seven years’ imprisonment. At the sentencing hearing, the 

court acknowledged the defendant’s explanation that he did not appear in court to testify because 

he had received threats to his life. The court noted that it would not be surprising if the defendant 

received threats to prevent him from testifying and that it could not say that it did not believe his 

allegations of threats. However, the court found that a witness’s fear of retaliation was not a valid 

reason for not testifying. After the court imposed the seven-year sentence, it admonished the 
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defendant about his appeal rights. However, the court failed to admonish him that he could file a 

motion to withdraw the plea and vacate the judgment. The defendant initially did not file any 

postplea motions following his sentencing hearing. Instead, on March 17, 2020, he filed a pro se

notice of appeal.

¶ 10 Because the trial court failed to admonish the defendant that he could file a motion to 

withdraw the plea, the court’s admonishments did not comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 

605(b) (Oct. 1, 2001). Consequently, this court remanded the matter to the trial court for proper 

Rule 605(b) admonishments and to give the defendant an opportunity to file either a motion to 

reconsider the sentence or a motion to withdraw the plea and vacate the judgment. People v. 

Woodson, No. 5-20-0108 (2020) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 

23(c)). 

¶ 11 Following remand, the defendant was readmonished, and, on August 31, 2020, he filed a 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In the motion, he argued that, at the time he pled guilty, he 

believed that entering into a plea would result in a sentence of time served. He also argued that he 

had limited intellectual capacity and cognitive reasoning skills, and he entered into a guilty plea 

because of a serious misapprehension of the law.

¶ 12 On September 30, 2020, the defendant filed an amended motion to vacate the judgment 

and withdraw his guilty plea, in which he contended that his guilty plea was not knowing, 

voluntary, and intelligently made because he had limited cognitive reasoning, had a mental illness, 

and had a history of chronic alcohol and substance abuse. He also argued that his plea counsel 

provided ineffective assistance because counsel assured him that, if he pled guilty, he would be 

sentenced to time served. He further argued that counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to 

explain to him that the trial court had discretion in sentencing, and in similar cases, there was 
5 

precedent for a court to impose a sentence of up to 10 years. He contended that he lacked the 

“wherewithal to understand his right to trial, and the analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of 

his case.” He argued that he entered into the plea based on a misapprehension of the law.

¶ 13 On September 30, 2020, the defendant filed a motion to reconsider, vacate, set aside, or 

correct judgment or sentence, asking the trial court to resentence him to time served or “time 

service with probation” with any conditions that the court deemed appropriate and just. 

¶ 14 On October 21, 2020, the State filed a response to the defendant’s amended motion to 

vacate the judgment and withdraw plea and a memorandum in support of the response. In the 

memorandum, the State argued that the defendant had not shown that he lacked the mental capacity 

to enter into a guilty plea. The State noted that, at the time the defendant entered the plea, he 

exhibited no signs that he was unfit to enter a plea of guilty, he behaved appropriately, he 

intelligently answered the trial court’s questions, and he did not exhibit any signs of being 

intoxicated. Also, the State noted that the defendant’s plea counsel, who was an experienced 

criminal law attorney, never indicated any concern about the defendant’s mental capacity. Further, 

although the defendant contended that the presentence investigation report was incomplete as it 

did not adequately represent his physical and mental limitations, the State noted that it was based 

on information provided by him to the probation department.

¶ 15 As for the defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of plea counsel, the State contended 

that the defendant had not provided any evidence that his counsel assured him that he would be 

sentenced to time served if he pled guilty. However, even assuming that his counsel made this 

representation, the defendant’s reliance on it was not justified as it was made clear, at his plea 

hearing, that the sentence was within the trial court’s discretion, his conviction was punishable by 

a fine or imprisonment, the possible penalties were unlimited, and the trial court made the ultimate 
6 

decision about sentencing. Thus, the State argued that the court made it clear that the sentence did 

not have to be time served and could be more than that. The State also contended that a sentencing 

court was not bound by an attorney’s recommendation at sentencing, and an incorrect prediction 

made by counsel was not sufficient to allow withdrawal of a guilty plea. Lastly, the State argued 

that the defendant failed to demonstrate that he suffered from a misapprehension of law at the time 

that he pled guilty. 

¶ 16 On December 15, 2020, the defendant filed a memorandum in support of his motion to 

vacate judgment and withdraw plea, in which he argued that the trial court should allow him to 

withdraw his guilty plea because he misapprehended the law due to his severely limited cognitive 

ability. He indicated that he suffered severe lead poisoning when he was 18 months old, which 

caused irreparable damage to his brain; severely impaired his ability to reason, understand complex 

subjects, and think critically; and impaired his memory function. He also had a psychiatric 

examination while incarcerated and was diagnosed with “non-specif” psychosis. Thus, he 

contended that he could not intelligently plead guilty or understand the complexities of an open 

plea because of his limited cognitive ability. The defendant also argued that his plea counsel, on 

three different occasions, advised him to plead guilty, and each time told him that, if he pled guilty, 

he would be sentenced to time served. 

¶ 17 On January 6, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on the defendant’s amended motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea. At the hearing, the defendant’s father testified about the circumstances 

surrounding the defendant’s ingestion of paint chips that caused him to suffer lead poisoning. He 

also testified about the defendant’s cognitive deficiencies and how the defendant would not ask 

questions or admit if he did not understand something. 
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¶ 18 The defendant’s mother also testified about the defendant’s cognitive deficiencies. She 

testified that she was present during the defendant’s meetings with his plea counsel, and counsel 

told them that the defendant should get time served if he pled guilty. She then said that counsel 

said that the defendant would get time served. She testified that she did not believe that the 

defendant understood the consequences of entering an open plea because of his cognitive 

limitations. Then, Dr. Victor Wilburn, an expert in early childhood development, testified about 

the adverse impact of lead poisoning on early childhood development. 

¶ 19 On January 6, 2021, the defendant filed his affidavit in support of his motion to withdraw 

his plea, in which he reiterated that his counsel advised him to plead guilty and told him that he 

would be sentenced to time served. He indicated that he did not understand that he could be 

sentenced for up to 10 years for the offense. 

¶ 20 On May 7, 2021, the trial court entered an order denying the defendant’s motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea. In the order, the court found that the defendant failed to prove a lack of 

ability to knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently enter into a guilty plea because of his alleged 

limited cognitive reasoning capacity, mental illness, and alcohol and substance abuse at the time 

of his plea. The court noted that, at no time during the entirety of the proceedings had the 

defendant’s attorneys or the State moved to have the defendant examined for fitness to plead. The 

court indicated that, based on its own observations, it never questioned the defendant’s fitness to 

plead. The court noted the defendant was clearly able to understand the nature and purpose of the 

proceedings and assist in his own defense. 

¶ 21 The trial court then noted that, at the time the defendant entered his plea, it went to great 

length to explain the potential consequences of an open plea, including the fact that it would not 

be limited by the attorneys’ sentencing recommendations. The court indicated that limited 
8 

intellectual ability, without more, did not render a defendant unfit. The court noted that the 

defendant’s mental health evaluation from the Illinois Department of Corrections indicated that he 

was oriented, appropriately focused, alert, had clear/coherent thought processes, and unremarkable 

thought content or behavior. Although the defendant presented evidence of his exposure to lead 

paint, and the possible effects of lead poisoning, the court noted that he did not present evidence 

of any professional evaluation that linked the lead poisoning incident to his ability, or lack thereof, 

to enter into a plea. The court also noted that the defendant did not provide any testimony as to his 

state of mind at the time he entered his plea. 

¶ 22 Also, the trial court concluded that the defendant’s guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, 

and made with a full understanding of the charge that he pled guilty to, the possible penalties, the 

constitutional rights that he waived by entering the plea, and that the court would not be bound by 

his counsel’s sentence recommendation. The court noted that the defendant’s plea counsel was 

deceased, so it was impossible to discern what conversations she had with the defendant about 

sentencing alternatives, whether in or out of his mother’s presence. The court agreed with the 

State’s assessment that it was unlikely that the defendant’s plea counsel ever assured him that his 

sentence would be time served. It was more likely that she indicated that she would recommend 

time served as the defendant’s sentence. The court concluded that, whether the defendant had a 

misapprehension of the possible outcome on his own, or based on his attorney’s prediction, neither 

was enough to vacate his conviction and withdraw his plea. The court also concluded that no 

mistake of law occurred regarding the defendant’s potential sentence. Last, the court concluded 

that the defendant’s sentence was justified by his willful and deliberate defiance of the court’s 

subpoena, the seriousness and consequences of the contumacious behavior, the public interest, and 

the interest in deterrence. The defendant appeals.
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¶ 23 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 24 On appeal, the defendant contends that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea 

because there was doubt as to his guilt, he has a defense worthy of consideration, and the ends of 

justice would be served by holding a trial. The defendant also contends that his seven-year sentence 

was excessive. 

¶ 25 A. Withdrawal of Guilty Plea

¶ 26 A defendant does not have an automatic right to withdraw a guilty plea. People v. Jamison, 

197 Ill. 2d 135, 163 (2001). Rather, defendant must show a manifest injustice under the facts 

involved. Id. In determining whether to permit defendant to withdraw his plea, the court should 

evaluate whether the guilty plea was entered through a misapprehension of the facts or of the law, 

or if there is doubt of the accused’s guilt and the ends of justice would be better served by 

submitting the case to trial. People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 40 (2000). “A defendant should not 

be allowed to withdraw his plea when the real basis for his withdrawal is that he is dissatisfied 

with the length of his sentence.” People v. Cunningham, 286 Ill. App. 3d 346, 349-50 (1997).

¶ 27 The decision whether to permit a defendant to withdraw his plea rests in the sound 

discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s decision will not be disturbed on review absent an 

abuse of discretion. People v. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d 240, 244 (1991). An abuse of discretion will be 

found only where the court’s ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or where no reasonable 

person would take the view adopted by the trial court. People v. McIntosh, 2020 IL App (5th) 

170068, ¶ 36. 

¶ 28 In this case, in his appellate brief, the defendant argues that his guilty plea should be 

withdrawn because he has a defense worthy of consideration. Specifically, he contends that the 

State failed to prove that his absence at court was willful and that his actions were calculated to 
10 

embarrass, hinder, or obstruct the court in its administration of justice. The defendant notes that a 

party’s mere absence from court, without more, is insufficient to establish intent for the purposes 

of contempt. He indicates that he did not appear at court and testify at Warren’s trial because he 

was afraid due to the threatening phone calls he had received. He also indicates that he presented 

substantial evidence concerning his cognitive disabilities that supported his argument that he 

lacked intent to disrupt the proceedings by failing to appear and testify. 

¶ 29 The defendant also contends that the ends of justice would be supported by allowing him 

to withdraw his guilty plea in light of the severity of his prison sentence and the fact that he did 

not understand that he could be sentenced for up to 10 years in prison. Also, the defendant indicates 

that there was evidence presented that showed that he did not actually understand the ramifications 

of pleading guilty, especially considering his trial counsel’s advice and assurance of a sentence of 

time served. 

¶ 30 First, we note that the defendant never asserted that he had a defense worthy of 

consideration in his motion seeking to withdraw his guilty plea filed in the trial court. He also 

never made this argument at the hearing on this motion. Thus, he has forfeited this argument on 

appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024) (any issue not raised by defendant in the 

motion to reconsider the sentence or withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgment is 

waived). Accordingly, we will not address this argument as a basis for withdrawing his guilty plea. 

¶ 31 As for the defendant’s remaining arguments, after hearing the evidence concerning his 

cognitive deficiencies and the testimony from his mother about plea counsel’s conversations with 

her and the defendant, the trial court found that the defendant’s plea was knowing, voluntary, and 

made with a full understanding of the charge that he pled guilty to, the possible penalties, the 

constitutional rights that he waived by entering the plea, and that the trial court would not be bound 
11 

by his counsel’s sentencing recommendation. The court indicated that, based on its own 

observations of the defendant at the plea proceedings, it never had a question as to the defendant’s 

capacity to plead guilty. The court noted that the defendant was able to understand the nature and 

purpose of the proceedings and assist in his own defense. The court also noted that it went to great 

length to explain the potential consequences to him of entering into an open plea, which included 

that it would not be limited by the attorney’s sentence recommendations and that the sentence was 

unlimited and could include incarceration. 

¶ 32 The trial court recognized the evidence presented concerning the defendant’s limited 

intellectual ability but noted that he did not present evidence of any professional evaluation that 

linked the lead poisoning incident to his ability, or lack thereof, to plead. He also did not provide 

any evidence as to his state of mind at the time that he entered the plea. 

¶ 33 The trial court found it unlikely that the defendant’s plea counsel assured him that he would 

receive time served if he pled guilty. Instead, the court indicated that it was more likely that time 

served was discussed in the context of what she would recommend at his sentencing hearing. The 

court then concluded that any misapprehension that the defendant had about the possible outcome 

was not enough to vacate his conviction and withdraw his plea. The court further concluded that 

the sentence was justified by the defendant’s willful and deliberate defiance of the court’s 

subpoena, the seriousness and consequences of the contumacious behavior, the public interest, and 

the interest in deterrence.

¶ 34 Thus, the record demonstrates that, in making its decision to deny the defendant’s motion 

to withdraw his guilty plea, the trial court took into consideration the evidence presented about the 

defendant’s limited cognitive abilities and his understanding that he would receive a sentence of 

time served based on conversations with his plea counsel. Nothing in the record indicates that the 
12 

court’s decision was an abuse of discretion. Because nothing in the record indicates that the court’s 

decision was an abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea.

¶ 35 B. Excessive Sentence

¶ 36 The next issue is whether the defendant’s seven-year prison sentence was excessive.

However, the defendant indicated in his reply brief that he was no longer incarcerated and that the 

issue was now moot because this court cannot grant him the requested relief to either reduce his 

sentence or remand for resentencing.

¶ 37 A question is said to be moot when no actual controversy exists or where events occur 

which render it impossible for the court to grant effectual relief. People v. Lynn, 102 Ill. 2d 267, 

272 (1984). A challenge to the validity of an imposed sentence becomes moot once the entire 

sentence has been served. People v. Melton, 2013 IL App (1st) 060039, ¶ 28. As the defendant has 

now indicated that he has served the entirety of his sentence, his challenge to this sentence is moot.

¶ 38 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 39 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of the defendant’s motion to withdraw his 

plea.

¶ 40 Affirmed.