FILED 

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

 August 24, 2005 

 THOMAS K. KAHN 

 CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-16480

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 04-20406-CR-FAM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

versus 

MARIO ANTONIO ACOSTA, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

_________________________

(August 24, 2005)

Before BIRCH, BARKETT and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

WILSON, Circuit Judge:

Mario Antonio Acosta, who was convicted by a jury for attempting to
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receive a videotape containing child pornography and attempting to possess a

videotape containing child pornography, appeals the denial of his motion for

judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. He

claims that the government failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement that the

videotape travel in interstate commerce, and that the district court was thereby

obligated to grant his motion. We affirm the district court’s ruling.

I. Background

In April 2004, Acosta logged-on to an Internet website that appealed to

people interested in youthful or underage homosexual activity, and made inquiries

about how he could purchase pornographic videos. Little did he know that the

website was actually part of an undercover operation designed to catch child

pornography purchasers over the Internet. A United States Postal Inspector in

Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, using the undercover name “Sam” obtained an

undercover e-mail address to receive communications from individuals during the

investigation and began communicating with Acosta. 

In some of the e-mails, Sam, graphically describing the child pornography

videotapes he had available, told Acosta that he would charge him twenty dollars

per tape. Acosta then e-mailed Sam telling him that he sent him a twenty dollar

money order for the videotape and asked Sam to mail the videotape to his home in
 Section 2252A(a)(2)(B) of Title 18 of the United States Code applies to “[a]ny person 1

who . . . knowingly receives or distributes any material that contains child pornography that has

been mailed, or shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, by any means,

including by computer. . . .” Section 2252A(a)(5)(B) of Title 18 of the United States Code

applies to “[a]ny person who . . . knowingly sells or possesses with the intent to sell any child

pornography that has been mailed, or shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by

any means, including by computer, or that was produced using materials that have been mailed,

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Miami, Florida. In response, Sam told Acosta that he sent the videotape by

overnight mail, and that he should expect it the following day. However, instead

of mailing the videotape overnight, Sam sent it by registered mail to a postal

inspector (Fernandez) in Miami. After receiving the videotape from Sam,

Fernandez packaged it in an express mail package to simulate its condition as if it

were an actual package mailed from Pennsylvania. Fernandez, dressed as a United

States mail letter carrier, personally delivered the package to Acosta, who signed

for the package. Fernandez then left Acosta’s home and later returned to arrest

him.

The grand jury returned a two-count indictment charging Acosta with

attempting to receive material containing child pornography “that had been mailed,

shipped or transported in interstate commerce by any means,” in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2)(B) and (b)(1), and attempting to possess a videotape

containing images of child pornography, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A),

“that had been mailed, shipped or transported in interstate commerce, by any

means,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). After the 1
or shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer

. . . .”

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government rested, Acosta unsuccessfully sought a judgment of acquittal under

Rule 29.

II. Standard of Review

We review the district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de

novo, viewing the facts and drawing all inferences in the light most favorable to the

government. United States v. Descent, 292 F.3d 703, 706 (11th Cir. 2002). To

affirm the denial of a Rule 29 motion, we look to the evidence to determine

whether it was sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. Id. Where, as here, defendant asserts that the government failed to prove a

jurisdictional requirement of a statute, we view that as a challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Key, 76 F.3d 350, 353 (11th Cir.

1996). 

III. Discussion

Acosta claims that the jurisdictional element of the statutes was not met

because an undercover postal inspector, rather than an actual mail letter carrier,

delivered the videotape to his home. According to Acosta, “actual mailing,” by an

“actual mailman” or a delivery at an “actual post office” must take place to satisfy
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the jurisdictional requirements of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2)(B) and

2252A(a)(5)(B). 

To consider Acosta’s contention, we examine the language of the statutory

provision at issue. “The starting point in construing a statute is the language of the

statute itself.” Randall v. Lofts Garden, 478 U.S. 647, 656, 106 S. Ct. 3143, 3149

(1986). The “cardinal cannon” of statutory interpretation is “that courts must

presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute

what it says there.” Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54,

112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992). Moreover, we construe statutes so that “no clause,

sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.” United States v.

Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1236 (11th Cir. 2005).

The statutes that Acosta faced unambiguously state that child pornography

need only be shipped, transported, or mailed in interstate or foreign commerce by

any means, to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement. See 18 U.S.C. §§

2252A(a)(2)(b), 2252A(a)(5)(B). Therefore, all that the government needed to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt to escape Acosta’s Rule 29 motion was that the

videotape was mailed, or shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce

“by any means.” Id.; see also United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042, 1051

(11th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). Certainly, without evidence that the child
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pornography traveled in interstate commerce, the government is unable to sustain

its burden of proof at trial. But the government’s burden is not as heavy as Acosta

suggests – we do not read the statute to require that the government must prove

that delivery take place by an “actual mailman” or that there is pick-up at an

“actual post office.” The phrase “by any means” obviously evidences Congress’s

intention to include alternative avenues of transportation, like a private courier

service, Federal Express, United Parcel Service or their equivalent, as long as child

pornography is shipped, transported or mailed through the channels of interstate

commerce. 

Other circuits appear to support this interpretation. We note that the Fourth

and Sixth Circuits have addressed the meaning of similar language in other child

pornography statutes. In United States v. Dornhofer, 859 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir.

1988), the defendant was convicted for receiving child pornography “that has been

transported or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce or mailed.” Id. at 1197. 

The defendant ordered a child pornography catalog from an undercover postal

inspector. Id. The catalog was mailed to a postal inspector in New Jersey, who

then mailed the catalog to another postal inspector in Washington, D.C., who gave

the catalog to the “regular letter carrier assigned to Dornhofer’s route, who

delivered [the pornography] to Dornhofer’s address.” Id. Dornhofer obtained the
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catalog from his mailbox. The Fourth Circuit concluded that “[a]ll that 18 U.S.C. §

2252(a)(2) requires is that a person knowingly receive child pornography that has

been transported or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce or mailed.” Id. at

1197 (internal quotations omitted). Further, the Dornhofer court held that the

pornography in that case was “mailed within the meaning of the statute.” Id. at

1197-98.

Like in Dornhofer, the defendant in United States v. Moore, 916 F.2d 1131

(6th Cir. 1990), was convicted for receiving child pornography that had been

transported, shipped, or mailed in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

2252(a)(2). In that case, the defendant ordered a child pornography videotape

from an undercover postal inspector. Id. at 1135. The postal inspector packaged

the tape in an express mail envelope, addressed it to Moore, affixed the proper

postage, drove to Moore’s hometown, and hand delivered the envelope to the town

postmaster, who then placed a note in Moore’s post office box telling him that a

large package had arrived for him. Id. Moore picked up the envelope and was

arrested. Id. The Sixth Circuit noted that the statute at issue “encompasses not

only receipt of child pornography through the mail, but also receipt of such

material ‘that has been transported or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce by

any means.’” Id. at 1138. The Sixth Circuit also noted that delivery via UPS,
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rather than via the United States mail, would still “have constituted as sure a

violation” of the statute at issue. Id. 

We conclude that the evidence presented in this case is sufficient to satisfy

the jurisdictional requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(b) and §

2252A(a)(5)(B). Sam used the United States Postal Service to mail the videotape

from Pennsylvania to a postal inspector in Florida, before it was delivered to

Acosta. The videotape, therefore, traveled through the channels of interstate

commerce. That alone would be sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement,

even though the videotape was not delivered by the mailman or picked up by

Acosta at the post office. The fact that a postal inspector, rather than a mail letter

carrier, later delivered the videotape to Acosta is immaterial. To read the broad

language of the statutes to require “actual mailing,” delivery by an “actual

mailman,” or delivery at an “actual post office” would limit the statutes in a

manner not intended by Congress.

IV. Conclusion

We therefore conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a

reasonable doubt that Acosta attempted to possess, and attempted to receive, a

videotape containing child pornography that had been shipped, transported or

mailed in interstate commerce.

AFFIRMED.